British & German Battlecruisers: Their Development and Operations

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Cover Title Page Copyright Contents Abbreviations Introduction Chapter One: Collision Courses: British and German Policy from 1870 to the First World War Chapter Two: Birth of the Battlecruiser: Strategic, Economic and Technological Challenges Chapter Three: The Battlecruisers of the Royal Navy Chapter Four: The Battlecruisers of the Kaiserliche Marine Chapter Five: Operational Use Colour plate section Chapter Six: British and German Battlecruisers: A Technical and Operational Comparison Appendix: Battlecruisers of Other Nations Bibliography

Guide Cover Title Page

Copyright Contents Abbreviations Introduction Chapter One: Collision Courses: British and German Policy from 1870 to the First World War Chapter Two: Birth of the Battlecruiser: Strategic, Economic and Technological Challenges Chapter Three: The Battlecruisers of the Royal Navy Chapter Four: The Battlecruisers of the Kaiserliche Marine Chapter Five: Operational Use Colour plate section Chapter Six: British and German Battlecruisers: A Technical and Operational Comparison Appendix: Battlecruisers of Other Nations Bibliography

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Hood at Sydney in 1924, during her world cruise. Note the ‘crowded’ foremast, equipped with several platforms for fire control equipment (Courtesy, State Library of Victoria).

Copyright © Michele Cosentino and Ruggero Stanglini 2016 Line drawings and maps © Ruggero Stanglini 2016 First published in Great Britain in 2016 by Seaforth Publishing, Pen & Sword Books Ltd, 47 Church Street, Barnsley S70 2AS www.seaforthpublishing.com Published and distributed in the United States of America and Canada by the Naval Institute Press, 291 Wood Road, Annapolis, Maryland 21402-5034 www.nip.org Library of Congress Control Number: 2015956042 ISBN: 978 1 68247 011 4 PDF ISBN: 978 1 84832 396 4 EPUB ISBN: 978 1 84832 395 7 PRC ISBN: 978 1 84832 394 0 This edition authorized for sale only in the United States of America, its territories and possessions, and Canada All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior permission in writing of both the copyright owner and the above publisher. The right of Michele Cosentino and Ruggero Stanglini to be identified as the authors of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Printed and bound in China

CONTENTS ABBREVIATIONS INTRODUCTION Chapter One COLLISION COURSES: BRITISH AND GERMAN POLICY FROM 1870 TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR Chapter Two BIRTH OF THE BATTLECRUISER: STRATEGIC, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES Chapter Three THE BATTLECRUISERS OF THE ROYAL NAVY Chapter Four THE BATTLECRUISERS OF THE KAISERLICHE MARINE Chapter Five OPERATIONAL USE Colour plate section Chapter Six BRITISH AND GERMAN BATTLECRUISERS: A TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL COMPARISON

Appendix BATTLECRUISERS OF OTHER NATIONS BIBLIOGRAPHY

ABBREVIATIONS AA AC AG AP APC ATB atm BCF BCS BD BR BS BuC&R CPBC CP CPC COW CS DC DNC DNI DNO Drh L E-U fps GK grt HA

Anti-aircraft Alternating Current Aktien Gesellschaft (Public Limited Company) Armour Piercing Armour Piercing Capped Anti-torpedo boat atmosphere (unit of pressure) Battlecruiser Force Battlecruiser Squadron Battle Division Boiler Room Battle Squadron Bureau of Construction & Repair Common Pointed Ballistic Cap (the post-World War One designation for CP shells) Common Pointed Common Pointed Capped Coventry Ordnance Works Cruiser Squadron Direct Current Director of Naval Construction Director of Naval Intelligence Director of Naval Operations Drehscheiben Lafette (revolving platform mount) Entfernungs-Unterschied (range variation) feet per second Grosse Kreuzer gross registered tons High Angle

HE HM HMS HP hp HT IJN kHz LCS LP KBP KC KM KNC kW MHz MJ Mk MP MPL mps nm pdr psi QF RM RMA RMLI rpm shp SK SMS TS V

High Explosive His/Her Majesty(’s) His/Her Majesty’s Ship High Pressure horsepower High Tensile Imperial Japanese Navy kilohertz Light Cruiser Squadron Low Pressure Kriegsbauprogramme (war shipbuilding programme) Krupp Cemented Kaiserliche Marine (Imperial Navy) Krupp Non-Cemented Kilowatt Megahertz Megajoule Mark Medium Pressure Mittel Pivot Lafette (central pivot mount) metres per second nautical mile pounder per square inch Quick-Firing Reichsmark(s) Reichsmarineamt (Imperial Naval Office) Royal Marine Light Infantry revolutions per minute shaft horsepower See Kanone (naval gun) Seiner Majestät Schiff (His Majesty Ship) Transmitting Station volt(s)

VC W/T

Vickers Cemented Wireless Telegraphy

Metric-Imperial Conversion Table Length and Distance 1 km = 0.54 nautical miles = 0.621 miles 1 m = 1.09 yards = 3 ft 3 ⅜in 1 cm = 0.329 in 1 mm = 0.0329 in 1 nautical mile = 1.852 km 1 mile = 1.609 km 1 yard = 0.914 m 1 ft = 0.3048 m = 30.48 cm 1 in = 2.54 cm = 25.4 mm Pressure 1 atm = 14.69 psi Area 1 m2 = 10.76 sq ft 1 km2 = 0.386 sq miles 1 sq ft = 0.092 m2 1 sq mile = 2.59 km2 Volume 1 m3 = 35.31 cu ft Weight 1 metric tonne = 0.984 long tons 1 kg = 2 lb 3.27 oz 1 long ton = 1.016 metric tonnes 1 lb = 0.453 kg

INTRODUCTION

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attlecruisers are one of the most fascinating types of warship ever built. Their size, speed and armament – with the sense of force, quick reaction capability, modernity and challenge they convey – contribute to their appeal. Whether lying at anchor in their bases, dressed with flags during fleet reviews, or covered by thick clouds of smoke, illuminated by flames of large-calibre guns and washed by the waves raised by their hulls steaming at full speed toward the enemy, the battlecruisers embodied the best of technology and innovation during the period of their development and splendour, the years between 1905 and the end of the First World War. Episodes during the war – raids, pursuits, engagements – have highlighted the technical and engineering qualities of these warships which resulted from a combination of traditional disciplines (naval architecture and metallurgy) and new ones (electric power, steam turbines and oil-fired boilers, fire control and wireless telegraphy). Furthermore, these qualities were enhanced by the contribution provided by naval leadership, training and the valour of their crews. With the end of the First World War, the further evolution of technology and the emergence of new tools for maritime warfare (submarines and naval aviation) the battlecruiser’s usefulness was progressively reduced, leading to the gradual extinction of the type, to be replaced – as far as capital ships were concerned – by the fast battleship. The two flags under which the battlecruisers were born, became the protagonists of the most intensive development and excelled in the most famous naval battles, are the British and German. Their ‘father’ was Admiral Sir John Fisher, First Sea Lord between 1904 and 1910, who, after revolutionising the evolutionary path of the battleship with the creation of Dreadnought, introduced a new type of warship: the battlecruiser. The Invincible class was a combination of a powerful monocalibre armament similar to Dreadnought’s and a speed much higher than that of the contemporary capital ships and armoured cruisers tasked with reconnaissance and escort duties. The battlecruisers became the ideal tool for annihilating enemy cruisers –

including those used as the vanguard of the enemy fleet and those raiding merchant shipping – and operating as a fast vanguard of their own fleet, which was tasked with detecting enemy formations and reporting their course and speed to the senior admiral in command. Germany responded to the British initiative by laying down its own battlecruisers, starting in 1908 with Von der Tann. Both nations devoted huge resources to the construction of battlecruisers. Between 1906 and 1914, the Royal Navy commissioned ten units (of which nine were delivered before the outbreak of the Great War) and Germany five (four before the war). During the conflict, these were joined by four other British and two German vessels. The British battlecruisers constantly favoured, at least until Jutland, speed and armament as opposed to protection, even though the evidence shows that this was not the main aspect of the British battlecruisers’ vulnerability. The German designers produced more balanced ships, choosing to forego favouring armament (especially the main armament) while providing more attention to protection and other survivability factors, such as compartmentalisation and underwater protection. They promptly identified the risks associated with ammunition stowage and handling and established safety procedures for ensuring warship integrity. The importance of battlecruisers in terms of technical development, fleet evolution and naval history has always attracted the attention of specialists and naval writers, who have produced over the years a considerable body of work dedicated to them: books, articles, monographs dealing with individual ships, their genesis and operational activities, costs, technical characteristics, the analysis of battle performance and vulnerability. Generally, these works favour the text; though sometimes they are more focused on illustrations, namely drawings and photographs. Why then go into a picture already so crowded with a new book about battlecruisers? The first reason that led us to address this type of warship is undoubtedly the charm they emanate in terms of design, technology and history. The second reason was to offer, with this book, an added value for the potential reader by introducing elements of originality and completeness which, as a whole, are lacking in previous books. Therefore, we have followed a different approach from other authors. The criterion we have used to reach our goal consists of bringing together in a single volume elements that generally have been treated separately, in order to offer a ‘global picture’ and allow an overall assessment of this type of warship, including historical,

political, strategic, economic, industrial, technological and operational aspects. This fundamental choice has been the definition of the scope of the book. Attention has been focused on the British and German battlecruisers in the timeframe from the birth of the type to the end of the First World War. In our opinion, the selected ‘geographical’ (Britain and Germany) and time context (from the early years of the twentieth century to 1918, marked by the ‘Fisher revolution’ in Britain and the dominant influence of Admiral von Tirpitz in Germany) are best suited for addressing the most significant aspects of the subject. This meant focusing on the genesis of the battlecruisers, the analysis of the political (both domestic and international) and technological scenario, and their employment in naval operations, which occurred mainly in the North Sea. An immediate advantage of this approach has been to allow a comprehensive and indepth comparison of the technical and operational choices made by the British and German naval leaders and designers, thus addressing the close links between political, economic, strategic, industrial and technological factors. In our view this is an innovative element for this kind of literature. To the knowledge of the authors, there is actually no other book dealing with all these issues in a unified context. This choice influenced the structure of the book, which is divided into six chapters. The first frames the historical context in which the battlecruisers originated. This period was marked by a booming industrial and commercial expansion worldwide, the enlargement of colonial empires and a changing policy of alliances in Europe, a source of tensions and conflict which set the stage for the growing antagonism between Britain and Germany. This antagonism gave rise, especially after the access to the German throne of the impulsive and ambitious Kaiser Wilhelm II, to a naval armaments race that inevitably involved battlecruisers. Chapter 2 deals with technical and technological evolution, reviewing the types of ships (protected and armoured cruisers) which were the predecessors of the battlecruisers and explaining the genesis of the dreadnoughts and the German reaction. The development of the battlecruiser is set within the political, strategic, technological and financial challenges which marked that timeframe in Britain and Germany. Particular attention has been paid to the more significant technical aspects, from the advent of oil for naval propulsion to the innovations related to artillery, armour, communications and firecontrol systems. Chapters 3 and 4 describe, respectively, the battlecruisers built in Britain and Germany between 1906 (when Invincible was laid down)

to the commissioning of Hood (1920), which is generally considered as the last example of the type. Each class/unit is analysed in depth, including design, time and construction costs, and technical characteristics (hull, propulsion, protection, and armament). These chapters also include some battlecruiser designs which were never built, both in Britain and Germany. Chapter 5 addresses the main operations in which the battlecruisers were involved during the First World War: from the escape of Goeben across the Mediterranean to the destruction of von Spee’s Squadron at the Falklands; from the German raids against the British coast and the battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland until the sinking of the German battlecruisers interned at Scapa Flow. The description of each action is followed by a brief reference to technical and operational lessons learned, as well as ones not learned. Finally, Chapter 6 compares the British and German battlecruisers, addressing several technical and design choices made by the Royal Navy and the Kaiserliche Marine (Imperial Navy), the economic impact and production efficiency in Britain and Germany and the combat performance of the various units. The book closes with an Appendix regarding the battlecruiser programmes carried out in the same period by other nations, namely the Russian Borodino class and the Japanese Kongo class. The uncompleted US, French and Austro-Hungarian designs are also considered, in order to provide a complete overview of the initiatives undertaken by other naval powers in the same field and timeframe. In the authors’ opinion, the drawings are another essential aspect of the book. They comprise large-scale side elevations and plans for all classes of British and German battlecruisers, as well as a number of maps depicting the location of naval bases and of the industrial sites involved in building these ships. Another large group of maps has been produced to support the description of naval operations included in Chapter 5, providing a useful aid for a better understanding and appreciation of the development of each naval engagement. We do believe that battlecruisers, often criticised, deserve their proper merits because they helped shape strategic, doctrinal and technological developments in the domain of maritime warfare. Therefore, we are confident that our work, based on a holistic approach, will be appreciated by an international readership. We do feel obliged to thank a number of people who helped us in our research especially for their patience and commitment. Firstly, we are

grateful to Lieutenant Colonel Raphael Riccio, US Army (ret.), for his helpful checking of our texts and his support, as well as to Matthew Lynch for his revision of part of the text. John Roberts is known worldwide as the most expert author and historian on battleships and battlecruisers; we thank him especially for providing remarkable advice on specific naval terminology. Peter Schenk is a well-known German historian who helped us with a great deal of information on the specifics of German battlecruisers and naval operations in the North Sea as seen from the Kaiserliche Marine’s point of view. Dr Elizabeth Bruton, of Oxford University, has been of great help by making available her PhD thesis ‘Beyond Marconi’, from which very valuable information regarding introduction and development of wireless telegraphy (W/T) in the Royal Navy has been drawn. Finally, Andrew Choong, from the National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, helped us to pore over Ships’ Covers1 of British battlecruisers in order to identify some peculiarities that are scarcely addressed when dealing with these fascinating warships. The authors are also grateful to Maurizio Brescia and Mario Piovano, who contributed with photographs of British and German battlecruisers, and to the National Records of Scotland, which has granted the permission to use some photos taken at John Brown shipyard. Michele Cosentino and Ruggero Stanglini Rome and Florence May 2015 1

A collection of official documents belonging to each warship or class.

Chapter One

COLLISION COURSES: BRITISH AND GERMAN POLICY FROM 1870 TO THE FIRST WORLD WAR

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eginning in 1882, and continuing to this day, an important sailing event has taken place every June at Kiel, with hundreds of yachts gathering in the Baltic port. The Kieler Woche (Kiel Week), culminates in a regatta in which, from 1894, Kaiser Wilhelm II regularly participated. Many navies, especially from northern Europe, sent their ships to attend the event thus creating opportunities for officers and men to exchange visits, tour Kiel and attend sports competitions in an atmosphere of friendship and fraternisation. In May 1914, the British Admiralty announced that, in June, two important naval formations would arrive in the Baltic. The 1st Battle Cruiser Squadron, led by Rear-Admiral David Beatty, was to travel to Kronstadt, the Russian naval base close to St. Petersburg. The 2nd Battle Squadron, including four modern dreadnoughts under Vice-Admiral George Warrender, would be present at the Kieler Woche. In addition to the usual presence of the Kaiser, the event of June 1914 would also prove to be important for another reason. The works to enlarge the Kiel Canal (Kaiser Wilhelm Kanal), begun in 1907, were almost complete and the enlarged canal would be inaugurated during

the regatta.1

‘FRIENDS TODAY, FRIENDS FOREVER’ At the time, it was also thought that Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, might arrive in Kiel along with the British warships. He planned to meet Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz, Germany’s State Secretary of the Navy, to help boost the Anglo-German negotiations on the limitation of naval armaments. Kaiser Wilhelm II did not oppose the visit but the head of the Foreign Office, Sir Edward Grey, was against it, fearing that an encounter (or clash) between Churchill and Tirpitz would cause more harm than good. Therefore, on 23 June 1914 only Vice-Admiral Warrender arrived in Kiel.

The German royal yacht Hohenzollern at Kiel in 1903. The US battleship Kearsarge (BB5) is on the right. Kaiser Wilhelm II regularly attended the sailing competitions during ‘Kieler Woche’. (Naval History and Heritage Command, US Navy)

The British admiral and his captains were received on board the battleship Friedrich der Grosse by Admiral von Ingenhol, commander in chief of the Kaiserliche Marine’s Hochseeflotte (High Seas Fleet). On 24 June, von Tirpitz arrived in Kiel, met the British guests and explained the German navy’s development plans. In the afternoon, the Kaiser also arrived in Kiel on

the royal yacht Hohenzollern. After her transit through the enlarged Kiel Canal, Hohenzollern steamed in front of Warrender’s flagship, on which cheering sailors manned the rails. The Kaiser immediately invited the British captains on board Hohenzollern. The following day, dressed as a British Admiral of the Fleet (an honorary rank he had received in 1889 from Queen Victoria), he returned the visit on board King George V. On 26 June, the second day of the regatta, Wilhelm II took part in the competition with his own yacht, Meteor, inviting the British ambassador to Berlin, Warrender and von Tirpitz aboard. Meanwhile, British officers and men visited Kiel, cheered by the population, hosted by their German colleagues and invited to balls and sports competitions. Despite such a friendly atmosphere there were also elements of friction and contrast. The German naval attaché in London, Commander von Müller, repeatedly warned his colleagues about opening excessively to the British. He admonished that British officers had come to Kiel to gather information about the German Navy’s operational readiness. Warrender invited von Ingenhol and von Tirpitz to freely tour the British ships (excluding W/T rooms and conning towers), but they declined the offer because they were not keen to allow British officers to freely visit German ships. On 28 June, while Wilhelm II was steering Meteor in the regatta, the news came that the heir to the Austrian throne had been shot in Sarajevo. The atmosphere of the Kieler Woche cooled abruptly. The flags were lowered to half-mast, the celebrations were immediately cancelled and the next day Wilhelm II returned to Berlin. On the morning of 30 June Warrender and his ships weighed anchor. The parting came, at least formally, in an atmosphere of respect and friendship. The German ships at anchor hoisted flags to signal a ‘good journey’ to their British counterparts. Warrender replied with a warm message: ‘Friends today, friends in future, friends forever’. Thirty-five days later, when the British ultimatum expired at 23.00 on 4 August 1914, the Admiralty sent a very different signal to all British warships: ‘Commence hostilities against Germany’. Britain and Germany were at war.

NEIGHBOURS, COMPETITORS, RIVALS Since the end of the Napoleonic wars, there had been no great areas of friction between Britain and Germany. This situation lasted, at least, while each country remained within its role. Britain was a great maritime power, possessing an empire and global commercial interests. Germany was growing

as a major European land power, firstly committed to building its own national unity under Prussian hegemony and later to consolidating the empire (Reich) founded in 1871 at Versailles. Britain was keen to believe that the creation of the Reich would satisfy, at least temporarily, the Prussian expansionist thrust. London was even ready to accept the repeated assurances that Bismarck, Prussian prime minister from 1862 and Reich Chancellor from 1871 to 1890, provided to that effect. There were deep ideological and political differences between the two countries, linked to the acceptance of constitutional freedoms and the control of Parliament over the Cabinet. This fact was fully established in Britain but strongly opposed in Germany, especially in the conservative circles represented by Bismarck. The Chancellor was an admirer of British culture and way of life, affirming that ‘all my habits and tastes are English’. However, Bismarck was also a realistic and ultraconservative individual, who forged an agreement between the two most powerful German elites of the time. These were the Junkers, landowners who gained important roles in the Army and the state administration, and the industrialists. Both supported Bismarck’s attempts to implement a repressive policy against the workers and the German Social Democratic Party, thus hindering the enactment of laws in favour of freedom of the press, assembly and association.

Prince Otto von Bismarck (1815-98), German Chancellor from 1871 to 1890, masterminded the alliance system which characterised European politics in the second half of the nineteenth century. (Ad. Braun & Cie.)

However, there were also some important areas of affinity between Britain and Germany, especially with respect to religion and culture, and significant convergences linked to the development of economy, industry and commerce. These elements were coupled by a strong dynastic link, prompted by the marriage on 25 January 1858 of Queen Victoria’s first daughter to Prince Frederick, the heir to the Prussian throne. However, this link was abruptly severed by ensuing events before London could enjoy the benefits that they expected as a result of the marriage. Britain had an enduring rivalry with France regarding colonial and commercial matters, and with Russia, perceived as a threat to British interests in Asia. Therefore, London, at least initially, was keen towards Prussia and the German empire, which could act as an effective ‘barrier’ between those European powers which might create potential dangers to Britain.2 Britain had two priority requirements. Firstly, preventing an invasion from the sea, a risk which had been cancelled for the foreseeable future by Nelson’s victory at Trafalgar, and, secondly, ensuring the security of shipping, this being the conduit of the Empire’s raw materials, food, textiles and other goods that were the prerequisite for British industrial development, prosperity and the well-being of its population. As long as its basic security requirements were safeguarded, Britain could look with benevolence and detachment at European events, limiting itself to preserving – especially by diplomatic influence – a continental balance which was sufficient to prevent the supremacy of any one hegemonic power and hinder attempts to alter the status quo. This picture is ably synthesised by a statement of Lord Palmerston (prime minister from 1859 to 1865): ‘England has no eternal friendships nor eternal enmities, but only eternal interests’. The first of these requirements was satisfied by maintaining a clear naval supremacy, a fleet strong enough to cope successfully with any combination of hostile powers. This requirement was initially synthesised by the Two Power Standard rule, later redefined in a less ambitious formula due to a number of reasons, including growing costs and different expenditure priorities of Liberal and Conservative Cabinets. Further, the massive naval programmes launched in the late nineteenth century by several countries –

including Germany, Russia and the United States – made the Two Power Standard no longer affordable. Another enduring British interest was the independence of Belgium and The Netherlands, needed to ensure that their coasts, from which it was possible to control the Channel, was not taken by a hostile country, either France or Germany.3 The third element of interest was the already mentioned balance among European major powers (France, Germany and Russia), so that none of them could reach a position of supremacy, subjugate their rivals and resurrect the danger of an invasion.

INDUSTRIAL DEVELOPMENT Before focusing on the political actions implemented by Britain in the last decades of the nineteenth century and up to the eve of the Great War to pursue its fundamental aims, and the actions developed in this same timeframe by Germany to achieve its own objectives, it is worth analysing another aspect that greatly impacted on the progress of British and German fleets: the demographic, economic and industrial development of the two countries. As far as industrialisation, manufacturing and exports were concerned, until 1880 Britain had firmly played the role of a leading power, not only in Europe but also worldwide. The statistics indicate that the British population, which in 1860 numbered 29 million people, had grown to 31 million by 1870 and 35 million by 1880. In 1860, Prussia had 18.5 million people, but in 1871 the new Reich, thanks to the addition of other pre-unity states, reached 41 million, and by 1880, 45 million. This was favoured by a strong demographic growth trend, with a birth rate of about 40 per thousand people maintained in the ensuing years. The urban population is an indicator directly linked to industrialisation. In 1871, the British urban population was decidedly greater (about 50% more) than the German, a trend which continued during the following years until the eve of the First World War, although with a gradually decreasing gap.

The proclamation of the German empire in the Hall of Mirrors, at the Palace of Versailles, on 18 January 1871, as depicted in a painting by Anton von Werner. Chancellor Otto von Bismarck is in the centre, facing Kaiser Wilhelm I.

In 1871 the power used by British manufacturing industry was about 4 million horsepower (hp) while in Germany it was 2.5 million hp. The British contribution to worldwide manufacturing was nearly 32% while Germany contributed 13.2%. The British production of coal, cast iron and steel – especially important for the armament programmes – was respectively, 112, 6 and 0.7 million tons. In Germany, the corresponding figures were 32, 1.3 and 0.3 million tons. As for transportation, in 1870 Britain had 24,500 miles of railways, while in Germany they amounted to 19,000 miles. In terms of merchant shipping, Britain was at 5.6 million gross registered tons (grt), while Germany stood at 0.9 million grt. German industrial development increased shortly after unification but it was affected by a strong recession in the second half of the 1870s, especially in the mining, iron and steel sectors. However, the global growth trend in the

years that followed rapidly closed the gap. By 1900 Germany’s share of world manufacturing production was still 13.2% but the British contribution had declined to 18.5%. The lower British contribution and the German ‘missed’ growth were both due to the tremendous development of American industry, which doubled its production capacity from 1880 to 1890, attaining first place in the world. In 1910, Germany surpassed Britain to rank first in Europe and by 1913 the country accounted for 14.8% of total world production while Britain stood at 13.6%.4

Hamburg harbour in 1883. The development of industry was characterised, both in Britain and Germany, by a corresponding expansion of foreign trade and growth in the merchant fleets necessary for the transportation of goods. (Georg Koppman)

Between 1880 and 1910, Germany grew rapidly in all sectors. Its population totalled 49 million by 1890, 56 million in 1900 and 65 million in 1910. Britain’s population only surpassed 41 million in 1900 and had hardly reached 45 million by 1910. In 1890, German coal production was half that of Britain but reached parity in 1913, with 280 million tons of coal compared to 292 tons. A similar trend occurred in the production of steel and cast iron.

In 1890, Britain ranked first with 8 million tons of cast iron, with Germany at 4.1 million tons, but ten years later the picture was reversed. In 1913, Germany produced 14.7 million tons of cast iron, while Britain was at 11 million. From 1890 to 1914, British steel production rose from 3.6 to 6.5 million tons, but not enough to compete with Germany’s, which soared from 2.3 million to 14 million tons.

The launch of the battlecruiser Queen Mary, at Palmer’s shipyard, Jarrow, in March 1912. At the time, the British shipbuilding industry ranked first in the world in terms of tonnage. (Library of Congress, Bain collection)

As power used by industry came principally from burning coal, an important index of industrial development derives from coal consumption. In 1890 Britain consumed 145 million tons of coal, while Germany was at 71 million tons. In 1900, Britain ranked firmly first with 171 million tons, with Germany at 112 million tons. In 1910 Germany had substantially reduced the gap, consuming 158 million tons versus 185 million. In 1913 the two nations

stood almost equal, with Britain at 195 million tons and Germany at 187.5 In the wake of intensive German industrial development, the electromechanical, optical and chemical sectors also flourished. As a result, in 1910 German exports (which tripled between 1890 and 1913) surpassed Britain’s in several critical fields such as chemicals, machinery and metal wares, limiting the UK’s supremacy to textiles and coal. Britain remained the leader in the field of communications, mainly due to the Wireless Telegraph and Signal Company founded by Guglielmo Marconi in 1897. The commercial and private W/T broadcasting stations (about 500 worldwide, including 94 in Europe before the outbreak of the war) worked alongside a huge submarine cable network which, in 1913, included 2,457 lines, mostly (84%) owned or partially owned by governments, and part of a global cable network totalling 516,000km. Five of the eight most important world telegraph companies were British, with 210,000km of cables; whereas just two were German, owning less than 30,000km.

The Marienhütte blast furnaces at Eiserfeld, North Rhine-Westphalia, Germany c. 1900. German steel production rose from 2.3 million to 14 million tons between 1890 and 1914.

(Peter Weller)

Between 1910 and 1914 the two main German electrical firms, AEG and Siemens, employed more than 140,000 workers. Two banks and three mining companies ranked first among the German public companies, along with family-owned Krupp (whose workforce increased from 45,000 employees in 1902 to 100,000 in 1909), AEG and two shipping companies, NordDeutscher Lloyd and HAPAG. Starting from a rather modest beginning, the German shipbuilding industry gradually grew to a considerable size thanks to the 1898 Naval Law and the development of maritime trade, linked, in turn, to industrial growth. In 1913 it employed 93,000 workers, 26,000 in the imperial dockyards at Kiel, Wilhelmshaven and Danzig and 66,000 in private shipyards. The six major shipyards, including Blohm & Voss and Vulkan, employed 55,000 workers, while the others were split among several minor shipyards. The imperial dockyards were concerned only with building and maintaining warships while private shipyards were mostly involved in building merchant vessels, especially passenger and cargo ships (the total production achieved in 1912 was about 425,000 gross tons). British shipbuilding workers totalled 61,000 in 1871 and 85,000 in 1900, when production reached 1.3 million tons (15.2 tons per worker). In 1900, the German shipyards’ workforce totalled 31,000 with a production of 200,000 tons. This meant 6.3 tons per worker, equal to 40% of British productivity. During the period 1890-1900, the British shipbuilding industry produced 75% of world merchant tonnage but by 1914 this had decreased to 60%. British shipbuilding strengths included highly-developed iron, steel and engineering industries and the availability of a skilled workforce which meant specialisation and competitiveness. These factors enabled a production of 2.5 million tons to be achieved in 1913, of which 25% was exported.

The headquarters and main production centre of Carl Zeiss at Jena in 1908. Before the First World War, German industry had reached levels of excellence in the sectors of chemicals, optics and mechanical and electrical systems. (Carl Zeiss)

As for HM Dockyards, in 1905-6 Devonport employed 9,300 workers and Portsmouth 7,492. Seven years later, these figures rose to 11,400 and 9,886 respectively. These numbers are comparable with those of the major German imperial dockyards (Kiel and Wilhelmshaven).6 In a 1907 workforce classification related to British shipyards, HM Dockyards ranked first with 25,580 workers followed by Armstrong Whitworth (25,000), Vickers (22,500) and John Brown (20,000). However, the figures concerning the public companies include other products such as armour, machinery, guns and other components, although still related to military shipbuilding. As far as dry land transportation is concerned, in 1910 the German railway network (61,000 miles) largely surpassed Britain’s (38,000 miles). On the other hand, the German merchant fleet, although expanding, was still much smaller than the British: 1.9 million gross tons versus 9.6 million in 1901 and

3.1 million tons (consisting of 2,000 steamers and 400 sailing ships) versus 12.1 million (of which 8,500 were steamers and 750 sailing ships) in 1913. German maritime shipping, tasked with exporting the surplus goods produced in the country, was managed by seven large companies. Their operations were monitored and harmonised by the German government, so as to optimise the synergy. In this way, Germany was able to monopolise the maritime routes toward the United States and South America. By contrast, British maritime trade, run by 300 uncoordinated shipping companies in competition with each other, encountered increasing problems in keeping up with Germany. The expansion of merchant fleets was reflected in the expansion of foreign trade, since importing and exporting occurred mostly by sea. In 1890, Britain imported £356 million of goods and exported £264 million, while the corresponding German figures were £208 million and £166 million respectively. In 1900, the import/export ratio was 459:291 for Britain and 283:226 for Germany. In 1913, it was 659:525 for Britain and 505:537 for Germany, indicating that German exports had surpassed Britain’s. Within this general picture, it is worth examining Anglo-German trade, which shows a trend steadily in favour of Germany. In 1870, Britain exported to Germany goods worth £20.4 million and imported goods worth £15.4 million. Ten years later, this ratio was reversed with £24.3 million of imports and £16.9 million of exports. In subsequent years the imbalance increased and, by 1913, Britain imported £80.4 million of goods from Germany against exports of £40.6 million.

Knocking-off time at Harland & Wolff, Belfast, around 1910-11. The ship in the background is Titanic, launched on 31 May 1911.

British supremacy in the number of merchant ships and their tonnage was duly reflected in the naval field. In 1880, the total tonnage of the Royal Navy was 650,000 tons which rose to 1.06 million in 1900, 2.17 million in 1910 and 2.71 million on the eve of the First World War. In the same timeframe, the German fleet rose from 88,000 tons in 1880 (when the Kaiserliche Marine was a coastal navy) to 190,000 tons in 1890, 285,000 tons in 1900, 964,000 tons in 1910 and 1.3 million tons in 1914. The last two figures indicate a dashing growth but it was not sufficient to challenge British supremacy, thanks to the Royal Navy’s ability to concentrate its potential in the critical North Sea theatre. As for personnel, in 1912 the Royal Navy had 134,000 active officers and men (with 95,000 reserves). In 1913 the German Navy had 79,000 active officers and men. As far as budgets are concerned, the British Naval Estimates rose from £31 million in 1901-2 to £40.5 million in 1903-4 and to

£44.9 million in 1912-13. In 1904, the German naval budget was RM206 million (equivalent to £10.1 million), RM426 million (£20.9 million) in 1910 and RM462 million (£22.5 million) in 1912. For Germany, these figures should be interpreted considering the huge amount of expenditure on what was then the strongest army in Europe. The German Army was quantitatively surpassed by both the Russian and the French armies but it was better organised, trained, equipped and more effective than either of them. Between 1910 and 1914, the budget for the German Army was more than doubled, rising from RM420 million to RM920 million, while naval spending suffered a parallel slowdown.

COLONIAL EXPANSION In addition to a dramatic industrial development, the 1815-1914 timeframe witnessed a further expansion of colonial empires. In 1897, the British Empire totalled 11 million square miles, with more than 370 million people. This was one quarter of the Earth’s surface. There were huge, scarcelypopulated territories (Canada, Australia), other, densely-inhabited areas (India), medium-size possessions and protectorates (Cape Colony, Egypt, New Zealand) and tiny islands scattered in all the oceans (such as Saint Helena, South Georgia and Fiji). All these regions coalesced into a maritime empire. The essential condition for survivability, defence and economic development of such an empire was command of the sea. It ensured that Britain not only was able to exercise direct power on vast areas of the globe, but was also able to monitor indirectly, through the domain of world trade, the economies of important nations, especially in Asia and South America. In turn, British colonies, especially the richest and most populated, were able to contribute to the common defence with soldiers, materiel, supplies and financial resources. Key factors to link and to protect these assets were a global system of naval bases, coaling stations and maritime routes stretching between Britain and all corners of the Empire, powerful naval and merchant fleets and later, a widespread network of submarine telegraph cables.7 The most important piece of the Empire – the ‘jewel in the crown’ – was India, directly controlled by the British government since 1858, after the disbandment of the British East India Company; a Viceroy administered the territory – named the British Raj – in the name of Queen Victoria, crowned as Empress of India on 1 May 1876.

Since 1820, Russia had begun expanding into Central Asia. In 1839, Britain invaded Afghanistan to prevent a potential land threat to India from Russia, but it was initially defeated. Anglo-Russian relations remained tense until the agreement reached in 1878 at the Congress of Berlin on their respective spheres of influence in the region, while the Russian threat eased considerably after the defeat by Japan in 1905. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, the most important events related to the extension of British colonies in Africa with the invasions and occupations of Egypt (formally independent under the government of a Khedive but de facto a British protectorate), Sudan and the Boer republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State. The interest of Britain in Egypt grew after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869. London, which had initially opposed the enterprise, soon recognised its strategic importance. The canal considerably shortened travelling time to India and soon became ‘the jugular vein of the Empire’. In 1875, the British government bought 44% of the canal shares from Egypt whose government, led by Ismail Pasha, had gone bankrupt. The French government also contributed significantly to settling the Egyptian public debt. These moves established a sort of joint control over Egypt by the two European powers. This difficult cohabitation ended in 1882 when British troops, taking advantage of the unrest fomented by local nationalists, landed in Alexandria and in the Canal Zone and, after defeating Ahmed Arabi Pasha’s army, occupied the country.8 Since 1877, Sudan had been under the control of Egypt, with Charles Gordon (a British national) appointed as Governor General. The revolt in 1881, led by Muhammad Ahmad, the self-proclaimed ‘Mahdi’ (‘led by God’) and promoter of a holy war against Egypt, resulted, in 1885, in the siege and occupation of Khartoum where Gordon was slaughtered along with the last defenders. In 1896, Britain decided to intervene again and ordered General Kitchener to occupy Sudan; his objective was to gain control of the Upper Nile (essential for the security of Egypt) and block the small French expedition (160 men, led by Captain Marchand) moving toward Sudan and the Upper Nile for a possible occupation.

French Army Captain Jean-Baptiste Marchand (1863-1934), commander of the mission ‘Congo-Nilo’, which left Loango, on the Atlantic coast of Africa, in July 1896 and arrived at Fashoda on 10 July 1898. (P. Philippoteaux, Musée des Armée)

Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902). An ardent believer in colonialism, he was prime minister of the Cape Colony from 1890 to 1896 until he was forced to resign following the failure of the Jameson Raid. (E. Mills)

Paulus ‘Paul’ Kruger (1825-1904), president of the South African Republic (Free State of Transvaal) from 1883 to 1900. He left for Europe when the war turned against the Boers in 1900 and died in exile in Switzerland in 1904. (Provincial Archives of the Free State, Müller Collection)

After long planning, Kitchener moved south, leading an army of 26,000 Anglo-Egyptian soldiers and, on 2 September 1898, defeated the Mahdists at Omdurman and entered Khartoum two days later. On 18 September, Kitchener met Captain Marchand at Fashoda, where the French had hoisted their flag on a disused Egyptian fortification, and asked him to withdraw. Marchand’s refusal led the two countries to the brink of war, which was

avoided only because France, not feeling prepared to fight, eventually accepted the British requests. In 1899, the Fashoda crisis ended with an agreement on the British and French spheres of influence in Africa, bounded by the watershed of the Nile. The creation of the Cape Colony dated back to 1814, as a result of the British settlements in the area of Cape Town, beginning in 1806. As a consequence, many Boer settlers originally present in the region moved inland, creating the Republic of Transvaal (1852) and the Orange Free State (1854), both recognised by Britain. After a failed first attempt at annexation and defeat in the first Boer War (1880-1), the British interest in the regions north of the Cape Colony was revived by the discovery of huge mineral resources, especially gold, in those territories. At the end of 1895, Leander Jameson, secretly supported by the prime minister of the Cape Colony, Cecil Rhodes,9 organised an expedition to encourage a revolt of the uitlanders, foreign immigrants mainly of British origin which the Transvaal had had to accept to cope with the lack of skilled workers required for exploiting its resources. The Jameson Raid was intercepted and neutralised by the Transvaal’s forces. A period of rising tension with Britain followed and resulted in an ultimatum issued on 9 October 1898 by the Transvaal’s president, Paul Kruger: if Britain did not withdraw the troops deployed on the border of the Transvaal and the Orange Free State within 48 hours, a declaration of war would follow. In the first phase of the conflict, the Boers gained important tactical victories, but in 1900 Britain sent a strong expeditionary force to the Cape Colony headed by Field Marshal Lord Roberts who broke the Boer sieges of major cities and, in June, occupied Pretoria, the Transvaal capital. The Boers did not surrender but launched a protracted and bloody guerrilla war against the British forces under Kitchener, who responded by adopting a scorched– earth policy. The conflict ended on 31 May 1902 when delegates of Transvaal and the Orange Free State signed the surrender in return for assurances about the future autonomy of the two states. A few years before establishing itself in Egypt, Britain had strengthened its position in the eastern Mediterranean by taking control of the island of Cyprus, a useful forward base for the protection of the Suez Canal and, at the same time, a potential stepping stone along an ‘alternate route’ to India through the Levant. The opportunity to gain control of Cyprus was offered by the conflict that broke out in 1877 in the Balkans, during which Russia came

close to Constantinople before the armistice and the ensuing peace treaty of March 1878 stopped her advance. Britain pressured the Sultan, offering military assistance in the event of new Russian attacks in Asia in exchange for Cyprus. A few days before the opening of the Congress of Berlin in June 1878, Constantinople signed a secret agreement which allowed the occupation of the island and transferred its administration to Britain. Before 1880, Germany had virtually no colonial empire. The only German settlements abroad were those created by missionaries and traders in some ports and places in Africa and Asia. The establishment of the German colonial empire was the result of private commercial initiatives and negotiations between the major powers rather than of military operations. Germany did not possess a maritime power base sufficient to support its moves without the open support, consent or, at least, the tacit benevolence of Britain. Without these, German colonies would be quickly swept away in the event of war.10 Another relevant factor was that, when Germany began to show interest in colonies, most of the territories ‘available’ in the world – especially the most attractive in terms of potential and resources – had already been occupied by other countries. Initially, Bismarck did not devote much attention to the problem of colonies, since he was mainly concerned with the balance of power in Europe. In his opinion, it was better to leave the matter to France, Britain and Russia, which, in colonial adventures, would find a reason to be ‘distracted’ from European events and, hopefully for Germany, some grounds to increase their mutual rivalries. The situation began to change after the establishment of the Kolonialverein (Colonial League), a pressure group founded in Frankfurt on 6 December 1882 by a number of politicians, industrialists, businessmen and bankers. Using the press and pressuring the government and the Reichstag (the German parliament), they sought to stimulate the acquisition and annexation of colonial territories. Bismarck paid attention to these requests not because he had changed his mind about the colonies, but because he saw a double opportunity; he wanted to get a ‘prize’ from Britain for the support given to London in the Egyptian crisis and, at the same time, to encourage anti-British feelings in the German public opinion. This latter objective was also aimed at weakening both the Crown Prince, Frederick, who was known to be pro-British, and the liberal opposition in the Reichstag.

Thus, between 1883 and 1885, Germany annexed a number of territories in Africa and Asia whose surface area exceeded five times that of the Reich: Togoland and Cameroon in West Africa; Südwest-Afrika (today, Namibia) on the northern borders of the British Cape Colony; Ostafrika (corresponding to the current Uganda and Tanzania) on the eastern African coast; a part of New Guinea and the Solomon, Caroline and Marshall archipelagos in the Pacific. The largest colonies were Ostafrika, Südwest-Afrika and Cameroon (with a surface area ranging between 285,000 and 385,000 square miles). However, they were generally poor in resources, costly to maintain and difficult to explore. Their possession spoke much more to the Weltmacht (world power) ambitions of Germany rather than representing a real economic or strategic advantage. In 1890, with the so-called Vertrag über Kolonien und Helgoland (Treaty of the Colonies and Helgoland), Germany got Heligoland (a small island in the North Sea owned by Britain since 1807 and strategically important for controlling access routes to the main German ports); the Caprivi Strip (a 7,000 square mile sliver of land extending from the eastern border of Südwest-Afrika to the Zambezi River) and the control of the coast around Dar-es-Salaam in Ostafrika. In exchange, Germany renounced the sultanate of Witu (on the east African coast), pledged not to interfere in relations between London and Zanzibar and recognised British interests in East Africa.

In the 1880s, Germany annexed a number of territories in Africa and Asia whose surface area was five times greater than that of the Reich. The largest colonies were Ostafrika,

Südwest-Afrika and Cameroon; however, they were poor in resources, inhospitable and costly to maintain. Key: 1. Germany. 2. Cameroon. 3. South-West Africa. 4. Kiaochow. 5. Togo. 6. Samoa. 7. East Africa.

In 1898, seizing on the pretext of the killing of two German missionaries in the Chinese region of Kiautschou (Kiaochow in English; today, Jiaozhou), Wilhelm II ordered the occupation of the Kiautschou bay and the adjacent territory which, in the following year, was transferred from China to Germany as a protectorate for 99 years. Unique among the German colonies, Kiautschou was administered by the Reichsmarineamt (Imperial Navy Office or RMA) instead of the Kolonialamt (Colonial Office), in view of its strategic importance. Despite the expectations in the potential of Kiautschou as a way into the huge Chinese market, Germany did not obtain any real benefit from this colony. The occupation and administration costs amounted to RM100 million between 1897 and 1907, compared with revenues of less than RM10 million.

ALLIANCES AND WARS IN EUROPE The outcome of the war between Russia and Turkey in 1877-8 – with the enlargement of the Balkan states, in particular pro-Russian Bulgaria, at the expense of the European portion of Turkey – marked the first political success of Pan-Slavism. This worried both Britain and Austria as they each, for different reasons, feared an excessively strong Russian empire due to their interests in Asia and the Balkans, respectively. Faced with the prospect of a new, enlarged conflict that could involve Russia on one the hand and AustriaHungary, Britain and Turkey on the other, Bismarck offered his mediation, suggesting Berlin as the venue of a peace conference in which Germany was to play the role of ‘honest broker’ between the parties. As a result of the agreements reached at the Congress of Berlin (which ended on 13 July 1878), Russia was forced to give up part of its territorial gains. Serbia, Montenegro and Romania were recognised as independent states; Bulgaria remained

autonomous but was forced to give up Macedonia; Austria was awarded the concession of a protectorate over Bosnia-Herzegovina. Britain obtained Cyprus, as mentioned earlier. Russia’s discontent and the escalation of the Austro-Russian quarrels in the Balkans led to the signature, in 1879, of the German-Austrian treaty in which Germany provided guarantees to Austria-Hungary in case of a Russian attack. The Dual Alliance, so established, was enlarged in 1882 to include Italy, which was attracted to it by some disagreements with France (the latter had occupied Tunisia in 1881, in which Rome had expressed its interest). This gave birth to the Triple Alliance, renewed at successive deadlines until 1912, only to be dropped in 1914 when Italy declared its neutrality at the outbreak of the First World War. Despite the signature of the Dual Alliance, Bismarck had no interest in entering into conflict with Russia. His main objective was to cover Germany’s back to the east in the event of a conflict with France. Therefore, in June 1881 he invited Russia to revitalise the ‘Dreikaiserbund’ (Pact of the Three Emperors)11 which had been signed in 1873 but had been discontinued just two years later. The pact was signed in June 1881 and Germany, Austria and Russia pledged to maintain a mutual attitude of neutrality in the event of aggression against one of them by France or Britain. The pact was renewed in 1884 and remained in force until 1887 when, in response to growing tensions between Russia and Austria-Hungary, Germany signed a defensive counterinsurance treaty with Russia which guaranteed the neutrality of Berlin in case of an Austrian attack on Russia in exchange for Russian neutrality in the event of a German attack on France.12 With this treaty, the alliance system forged by Bismarck reached its peak, but the chancellor was never able to involve Britain in its grand design. Disraeli, the British prime minister, wanted time to consider the proposals put to him at the Congress of Berlin but his fall from power and the establishment of the Gladstoneled Liberal cabinet in 1880 postponed any further initiatives for a considerable period of time. After the dismissal of Bismarck in 1890 by the new and ambitious emperor Wilhelm II, who came to the throne following the short reign of his father, Frederick III, in 1888, German foreign policy underwent a progressive shift. This was highlighted by the desire to be considered a prominent player on the world scene and by shows of strength, caused by both the impulsive character of Wilhelm II and an over-confidence in German diplomatic and military

capability. This behaviour caused the non-renewal of the counterinsurance pact with Russia when it expired in 1890 and paved the way for a rapprochement between St. Petersburg and Paris, encouraged by the French willingness to supply military equipment and the financial resources needed for the development of Russian industry and railways. A military convention followed in 1892, a prelude to the Dual Entente of 1894, with which France and Russia pledged to open two fronts against Germany in case of attack on one of the two signatories by Germany, alone or with another member of the Triple Alliance. Meanwhile, Anglo-German relations cooled because of the growing ambitions of Germany, as it became increasingly engaged in an expansionist and authoritarian policy. The status of the dominant land power in Europe was no longer deemed sufficient by Wilhelm II and his collaborators who were determined to make Germany a ‘Weltmacht’, a world power not only in industry and commerce but also in colonial and military terms. To make matters worse for Anglo-German relations, in January 1896 Wilhelm II sent a telegram to Paul Kruger in which the Kaiser congratulated the president of the Transvaal Republic for defeating the Jameson Raid. Furthermore, a first expansion programme for the German fleet was formalised in 1898 with the approval of the first Naval Law, created and supported by Admiral Tirpitz.13

Joseph Chamberlain (1836-1914), British Secretary of State for the Colonies from 1895 to 1903 under Lord Salisbury and then Balfour. He believed that Britain and Germany shared common interests and claimed, until 1902, that a defensive alliance should be established between the two countries. (Library of Congress, Bain collection)

Curiously, in the same year (1898) Britain’s influential Secretary of State for the Colonies, Joseph Chamberlain, expressed his initial interest in an alliance with Germany, driven by fear of the Russian threat to British interests in Asia. Despite Chamberlain’s repeated attempts, the German

government put aside his proposals, being more interested in cultivating public anti-British feelings in order to facilitate the approval of the Naval Laws by the Reichstag. Germany was also convinced – but this calculation proved to be wrong – that a policy of waiting, before responding favourably to British proposals, would bring better results, given the difficulties besetting Britain because of the Boer War and the tensions with France and Russia. The year 1898 marked, with the Fashoda incident, a low point in relations between France and Britain. Since 1899, however, the patient and assiduous action of the French foreign minister Théophile Delcassé and of the French ambassador to London, Paul Cambon, had led to a gradual rapprochement, initially opposed by Chamberlain who, until 1901, was in favour of an alliance with Germany. The resolution of differences between France and Italy in the field of their respective interests in North Africa which culminated, in 1902, in the secret pact that ensured the neutrality of Italy in the event of a war started by France following a German provocation, and the signature of the alliance treaty between Britain and Japan14 (1902) paved the way for better relations between Paris and London, encouraged by the visit of King Edward VII to Paris (May 1903), reciprocated a few months later by French President Émile Loubet. In April 1904, the settlement of colonial disputes in North Africa, with the recognition of British interests in Egypt in exchange for those of France in Morocco, allowed the signature of the Anglo-French Convention which included a commitment to mutual diplomatic support should issues arise from applying the clauses related to Egypt and Morocco. Germany’s chancellor, von Bülow, initially underestimated the scope of the convention, as it was presented by the signatory partners as an understanding in a purely colonial ambit. However, its real implications became evident with the first Moroccan crisis of 1905-6. France, determined to establish its protectorate over Morocco, asked the Sultan to cede control of the police and customs. The Sultan opposed the request and Germany, appealing to the Treaty of Madrid of 1880 (which required mutual consultations in the event of a change of the status quo in Morocco), decided to thwart French plans. During an unexpected visit to Tangier (31 March 1905), Wilhelm II declared that Germany was determined to protect its ‘large and growing interests in Morocco’. France, aware of its lack of readiness and of German military superiority, and despite British encouragement to hold out, chose the

path of compromise. This forced the foreign minister, Delcassé, to resign in June 1905 and France accepted an international conference, to be held at Algeciras in January 1906. During the conference, German diplomacy – rude, isolated and poorly supported by Austria – suffered a substantial setback, yielding eventually to British firmness and recognising the dominance of France in Morocco, albeit on terms less clear than those initially proposed by Paris. Berlin got a result opposite to that intended: the ‘Entente Cordiale’, instead of staggering under the German blows, was eventually strengthened. Inevitably, Anglo-Russian relations were also bound to change. The defeats suffered at Mukden and Tsushima during the war with Japan forced Russia to sign the Treaty of Portsmouth (5 September 1905), while the threat Russia could pose to Britain practically dissolved as a consequence of the disastrous economic and military conditions from which the country emerged after the conflict. The new scenario paved the way for an agreement between Britain and Russia, signed in St. Petersburg on 31 July 1907. The agreement delimited the respective spheres of influence in Persia and aimed to reduce friction in Tibet and Afghanistan, which saw their territorial integrity guaranteed as buffer states. This agreement, consolidated by the visit in June 1908 by King Edward VII to Tallinn to meet Tsar Nicholas II, enabled the Dual Alliance between France and Russia and the Entente Cordiale between Britain and France to converge into the Triple Entente.

Nicholas II (1868-1918) was Tsar of Russia from 1894 until he was forced to abdicate in 1917. He encouraged Russian expansion into Manchuria that led to war with Japan in 1904.

In 1911, a new Moroccan crisis flared up as a result of the country’s confused and unstable internal situation. A tribal revolt erupted in Fez in April 1911 and led to the installation of a new sultan who requested France’s intervention to restore order. Germany opposed this, fearing the subversion of the agreement reached five years earlier in Algeciras. Under the pretext of protecting its industrial and commercial settlements in southern Morocco, Berlin sent the gunboat Panther to Agadir on 1 July 1911. The initiative, perceived as a provocation by Britain, threatened to lead to war. However, this was prevented by a compromise favourable to France, strongly supported by Britain. Paris received recognition of its de facto protectorate over most of Morocco,15 giving as compensation to Germany 100,000 square miles of the French Congo, which were annexed to Cameroon.

The German Kaiser, Wilhelm II, and Winston Churchill attending the autumn military manoeuvres near Breslau, Silesia, in 1906. (Library of Congress, S. Riegel)

A new setback to Anglo-German relations was the failure, in spring 1912, of negotiations on the limitation of naval armaments. A proposal to this effect had already been presented by Britain at the 1907 conference in The Hague that resulted in the Hague Convention, but Germany opposed placing this item on the agenda. The approval of the amendments to the German Naval Law in 1906 and 1908 led to a growth in the tension between the two countries and to a firm British reaction, with the corresponding decision to expand the new construction programmes for the Royal Navy. Looking for an exit from the impasse, in February 1912 the British Cabinet decided to send the Minister of War, Richard Haldane, to Berlin to informally discuss the terms of a possible agreement. Despite a promising start to the talks, the negotiations failed.

King Edward VII (left, saluting) and Tsar Nicholas II aboard the Russian royal yacht Standart in Reval (now Tallinn, Estonia), 1908. After the understanding with France in

1904, the ‘Entente Cordiale’ was extended to Russia in 1908.

Alarmed by the extent of the 1912 amendment to the German Naval Law, which provided a further and substantial strengthening of the fleet, and not willing to grant unconditional guarantees of neutrality demanded by Germany, Britain terminated the negotiations, provoking the wrath of Wilhelm II. In September, Winston Churchill, the First Lord of the Admiralty, decided to recall the battleships of the Mediterranean Fleet to strengthen the British forces in the North Sea. To fill the void left by the Royal Navy, France – despite the absence of a formal military agreement – agreed to redeploy six battleships from its Atlantic Fleet at Brest to Toulon. In the first decade of the twentieth century, the Balkans confirmed its destabilising potential by affecting relations between the great powers. In Serbia, the assassination of the pro-Austrian King Alexander I Obrenović in 1903 and the return to power of the pro-Russian Peter I Karageorgević reexacerbated Austro-Russian rivalry and energised the initiatives of those parties which wanted to build a ‘greater Serbia’ including all the southern Slavs. A further critical element was the Young Turk revolution which broke out in Constantinople in July 1908 with the aim of modernising the Ottoman Empire and turning it into a constitutional state. Concerned that Turkey, pervaded by the new spirit of nationalism, could demand the return of Bosnia-Herzegovina (administered by Vienna for the last thirty years), Austria declared the unilateral annexation of the region on 5 October, inflicting a blow to the ambitions of both Turkey and Serbia. The progressive weakening of the Ottoman Empire, marked by the territorial claims made by Bulgaria and Serbia and the Italian occupation of Tripoli in 1911, favoured the resumption of local nationalisms. In March 1912, Bulgaria and Serbia, supported by Russia, created the anti-Turkish Balkan League, which was also joined by Greece and Montenegro. The four allies unleashed the First Balkan War (October 1912-March 1913) and, after inflicting a series of heavy defeats on Turkey, forced Constantinople to accept German and British mediation and sign an onerous peace in London on 30 May 1913. The difficulties arising between the former allies when the time came to partition the conquered territories, and the contrasting objectives of Austria and Russia for the region’s future, soon led to a clash between Bulgaria, supported by Austria in a anti-Russian perspective, and Serbia, supported by

its former allies and Turkey. This led to the Second Balkan War (JuneAugust 1913) which ended with the defeat of Bulgaria. The Treaty of Bucharest (10 August 1913) stripped Bulgaria of most of the gains achieved through the Treaty of London in favour of Serbia, Romania and Greece. The latter was also given recognition of its sovereignty over Crete, contested by Turkey ever since a revolt on the island in 1897.

Archduke Franz Ferdinand, heir to the Austro-Hungarian throne, in 1910. His assassination in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914 precipitated the First World War.

The end of the Second Balkan War did not lessen infighting in the region. Austria, believing that it had suffered a serious setback, began to meditate plans for revenge, while Serbia felt penalised for the nonallocation of the expected access to the Adriatic, precluded by the creation of the autonomous principality of Albania. The animosity between Austria-Hungary and Serbia, exacerbated by the assassination of the heir to the Austrian throne, Archduke Franz Ferdinand, in Sarajevo on 28 June 1914, was a major cause of the outbreak of the First World War. On 23 July, Austria-Hungary sent a harsh ultimatum to Belgrade; its ten points were intended to severely hamper Serbian sovereignty. Two days later, Belgrade accepted all the clauses, except the last in which Austria asked for the participation of its officials in bringing to trial those responsible for the assassination of Franz Ferdinand. The Serbian reply, delivered to the Austrian Ambassador in Belgrade two minutes before the expiry of the ultimatum, was considered unsatisfactory. Austria reacted by breaking-off diplomatic relations and declaring partial mobilisation. On 28 July, despite last minute efforts made by international diplomacy, Vienna declared war on Serbia. At this point, the inexorable automatism of alliances was triggered. On 30 July Russia declared a general mobilisation, followed on 31 July by Austria. On the same day, Germany sent a 12-hour ultimatum to St. Petersburg asking Russia to suspend its mobilisation. With no response forthcoming, on 1 August Berlin mobilised its forces and declared war on Russia. Berlin urged Paris to make a declaration of neutrality on that day too, demanding the transfer of two border fortresses as a guarantee. France replied that it would act ‘in accordance with its interests’. On 2 August Germany invaded Luxembourg and ordered Belgium to grant free passage for German troops through its territory. On 3 August Berlin declared war on France. After the violation of Belgian neutrality, the British government, which had already decreed the mobilisation of the fleet and provided guarantees to France concerning the defence of the coast along the English Channel, overcame its remaining hesitations about the possibility of widening the conflict. On 3 August Britain sent an ultimatum to Germany demanding the respect of Belgian neutrality. At 2300 on 4 August (2400 in

Berlin), in the absence of a response, Britain declared war. The Great War had begun.

THE NAVAL ARMAMENTS RACE The German navy had never taken a prominent position in the policy of Bismarck and his successor to the Chancellery, General Leo von Caprivi. Bismarck recognised that the other great powers were focused on colonial issues, while Germany aimed at strengthening its position in Europe. The cornerstone of this reinforcement was the army: a coastal navy, essentially limited to defensive tasks, was more than enough. The scenario began to change with the accession to the throne of Wilhelm II in June 1888 as he was a fan of ships and naval matters, a reader and admirer of the theories of American sea power advocate Alfred Thayer Mahan and, above all, the proponent of an ambitious world role for Germany. For a future ‘Weltmacht’, a fleet befitting these ambitions became indispensable.

Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz (1849-1930) held the office of Secretary of State of the German Imperial Navy Office (Reichsmarineamt) from 1897 until 1916. Thanks to his decisive support, the Reichstag approved Naval Laws that turned the German navy from a modest coastal force into a world-class fleet.

In 1897, the Kaiser told Bernhard von Bülow, chosen as the next foreign minister, that his main task would be to permit Germany to complete the construction of a powerful fleet without causing a premature war with Britain. A year earlier the head of the Marine-Kabinett,16 Admiral Georg von

Müller, had admitted that a war would eventually become inevitable in order to determine which of the two world empires would assume the dominant role. The man who satisfied the naval ambitions of the Kaiser was RearAdmiral Alfred Tirpitz, appointed in June 1897 as the Secretary of State for the RMA. A few days after his appointment, Tirpitz presented a secret memorandum to Wilhelm II in which he traced the future naval strategy of Germany. He identified Britain as the most dangerous antagonist and the area in the North Sea between Heligoland and the Thames as the decisive theatre in which to concentrate German capital ships as the means to force a decisive outcome of a future confrontation. Fleet strength, required investments and the timeframe for implementing the naval programme were all precisely defined, anticipating the scope of what would become the Flottengesetz (Naval Law) of 1898, approved on 10 April by the Reichstag. Through the allocation of RM408 million for new construction over seven years, the German fleet planned to have two squadrons of eight battleships, a flagship, two reserve battleships and a considerable number of cruisers by 1905.17 This would amount to a remarkable fleet that would have enabled Germany to face France or Russia but not, yet, challenge British supremacy. The 1898 Naval Law and the ensuing measures were not the only issues that concerned Britain. The major problem was the climate of Anglophobia in which Germany carried out the development of its fleet. The Kruger Telegram had been a first sign, while the propaganda of the Flottenverein18 (Naval League) and the reaction of the Kaiser and German public opinion after the Royal Navy stopped some German steamers suspected of carrying weapons and smuggled goods for the Boers (January 1900) contributed to intensify the rivalry. The pressure of external events, such as the Boxer Rebellion in China and the Second Boer War, helped to contribute to the approval a second version of Flottengesetz in June 1900. This aimed to double the navy’s most important component, i.e. the battleships, by 1920 and spending limits on the programme’s implementation were removed. The failure of the Algeciras Conference led, in 1906, to the approval of a first amendment (Novelle) to the Naval Law, which updated the construction programme by including six ‘Grosse Kreuzer’ (large cruisers i.e. the future battlecruisers) and numerous smaller units. In Tirpitz’s vision, a powerful German fleet concentrated in the North Sea

would deter Britain from attacking Germany, because to do so the Royal Navy would risk suffering such losses as to threaten British naval supremacy. Consequently Germany, after overcoming the so-called ‘danger zone’,19 would benefit from greater freedom of action for implementing its expansionist colonial and commercial policy. However, Tirpitz’s calculations proved completely wrong. Instead of creating a deterrent able to intimidate Britain and persuade it to accede to the foreign policy claims of Berlin, the expansion of the German fleet only served to cement British hostility and progressively isolated Germany on the international scene. This isolation favoured, firstly, the alliance between Britain and Japan (1902), then the Entente Cordiale with France (1904) and, finally, the agreement with Russia (1907).

The Russian pre-dreadnought battleship Borodino at Kronstadt in 1904. Borodino, launched in 1901 and completed in 1904, was sunk at the battle of Tsushima on 27 May 1905. Russia’s defeat the war with Japan facilitated the establishment of the Triple Entente.

A 12in twin turret of the battleship Dreadnought. By building the first all-big-gun battleship, Britain opened a new era in the naval armaments race. (Library of Congress, Bain collection)

As for Britain, from the approval of the Naval Defence Act in 1889 until the early years of the twentieth century, the official objective of its naval policy – expressed by the First Sea Lord George Hamilton on 7 March 1889 – was to implement the previously-mentioned Two Power Standard, according to which the Royal Navy had to be strong enough to prevail in all circumstances against its two strongest rivals, represented at the time by France and Russia. The construction programme approved in 1889 (ten battleships, forty-two cruisers and eighteen destroyers) served just this purpose. In the decade from 1880 to 1890 Russia and France added a total of 233,000 tons of warships to their fleets, while Britain added 196,000 tons. In the following decade, the situation was reversed, with over 700,000 tons of new warships built in Britain and 495,000 in France and Russia. In 1904, facing the risk of British involvement in the Russo-Japanese War, the prime minister, Arthur Balfour, stated that, to avoid the possibility that the country would come out so weakened by a possible war that it would be at the mercy of a third party with an intact, powerful fleet, it was necessary to provide an extra margin. This was specified in November 1904 by Admiral

Louis of Battenberg as a 10% margin over the ‘most likely combinations against us […]. In order of probability: 1. Germany and Russia; 2. France and Russia’, to be achieved by the end of 1907. Even before this happened, an event occurred that marked the advent of a new era in naval history and technology. On 2 October 1905 the battleship Dreadnought was laid down in Portsmouth. Completed within a year, with her speed of twenty-one knots (two more than any other battleship in service) and a main armament including ten 12in guns (capable of firing a broadside weighing 30-65% more than those of the latest British battleships), Dreadnought made all the ships of the line of the previous generation obsolete. Besides being praised for her highly innovative content and offensive power, Dreadnought was harshly criticised, especially in Britain, because her construction threatened to erase the clear superiority of the Royal Navy in terms of pre-dreadnoughts. By building their own dreadnought-type warships, all other naval powers would start from scratch along with Britain. This would cause a sudden cancellation of the advantage the Royal Navy had secured by past expenditure. Another serious problem was the destabilising potential of this new type of warship, whose commissioning would inevitably cause the start of an arms race and a consequent surge in naval spending. Admiral Sir John Fisher, the ‘father’ of Dreadnought, was aware of these risks, but he was equally convinced that it was an inevitable choice,20 a race in which Britain could not afford to fall behind. In late 1900 the British Cabinet approved the policy on naval construction outlined by the Admiralty in the ‘Cawdor Memorandum’,21 which planned the laying down of four new dreadnoughts each year. The different priorities of the subsequent Liberal government headed by Sir Henry CampbellBannerman (1905-8) which intended to favour social spending, and the expectations placed in the 1907 Hague conference,22 led to the abandonment of the Cawdor programme. In both 1906 and 1907, Britain laid down only three dreadnoughts, while the Naval Estimates decreased from £36.8 million (1904-5) to £31.4 million (1907-8). 1908 marked a turning point because of fears that arose in Britain about a possible acceleration of the German naval programme.23 On 27 March the Reichstag had approved a second amendment to the Naval Law (the Novelle 1908), reducing the age for replacing battleships from twenty-five to twenty years. This would increase the pace of new construction while leaving the

total strength of the fleet unchanged. Other information, collected by British naval intelligence and/or revealed by interested industrialists, indicated a sharp increase in the production capacity of naval guns and turrets by German industry (notably Krupp). All in all, this contributed to painting a threatening picture about the actual capability of Britain to maintain its naval superiority. The German official statements about the continuation of existing programmes and the lack of acceleration in construction times were not accepted in Britain,24 where a belief emerged that Germany was hiding something. According to projections produced by the Conservative Party to give credence to its proposals on naval policy, it was only a matter of time before Germany surpassed Britain in terms of dreadnoughts. Without a substantial shift in building policy, maintaining the Two Power Standard would soon become a mirage. The slogan ‘We want eight, and we won’t wait’, coined by the Conservative MP George Wyndham and related to the number of dreadnoughts to be included in the 1909-10 building programme, became the battle cry of ‘patriots’ against ‘pacifists’. The prime minister, Herbert Asquith, had to intervene in Parliament to reassure the public opinion that the government ‘…would provide not only a sufficient number of ships but for such a date of laying down of such ships that … the superiority of Germany [in dreadnoughts] would not become an actual fact’. As a result, the Cabinet was forced to give up the reduction in naval spending, so that from 1909-10 Naval Estimates experienced a sharp rise.

The battlecruiser Inflexible on the slipway at John Brown, Clydebank, where she was launched on 26 June 1907. Note the rounded lower portion of her stem. (National Records of Scotland, UCS1/118/374/11)

Germany too felt the pressure of naval expenditure on the state budget. In 1909 Chancellor von Bülow resigned after a failed attempt to introduce new taxes aimed at reducing the deficit. In mid-October his successor, BethmannHollweg, tried to revive the bilateral negotiations for a slowdown in naval constructions, but the demand to link the naval agreement with a political agreement providing guarantees of neutrality from Britain wrecked the initiative. However, the capital ships laid down in Germany as a result of the Naval Laws led to the virtual scrapping of the Two Power Standard. The validity of the formula had been reconfirmed by Asquith in November 1908 but a few months later, in May 1909, the Prime Minister told the Commons that ‘the Two Power Standard is not to be understood as a transcendent dogma, but as

a convenient rule-of-thumb, to be applied with reference to political and strategical conditions’. In fact, the reference standard – suggested by Jellicoe in April 1909, but publicly admitted by Churchill only three years later – became a superiority of 60% ‘above German strength in every class of vessel’. A renewed German proposal in July 1910 for a possible slowdown of capital ship construction, carried out by the German government without affecting the privileges of the Reichstag on naval legislation, prompted the British Cabinet to begin new negotiations. On the technical side, Britain stressed the need to agree to an exchange of information on the respective programmes, accompanied by a suitable verification process (inspections of dockyards and shipyards). Germany insisted on the simultaneity of the information exchange and demanded that information on programmes delivered to the counterpart could not be changed during that specific financial year, so that one country could not take advantage of the information provided by the other. The rocky shore on which even this negotiation foundered was not the technical details but the outbreak of the second Moroccan crisis, triggered by the arrival of the German gunboat Panther at Agadir. Thus, while the British government prepared to evaluate a German proposal which could favour progress in the negotiations, at least as far as the exchange of information was concerned, the sudden cooling of bilateral relations caused the interruption of the discussions. After the resolution of the crisis by the Franco-German agreement on Morocco, the Anglo-German competition resumed with renewed vigour. German public opinion felt cheated by the outcome of the Agadir crisis, believing that without the British ‘interference’ France would have made more concessions. Both Wilhelm II and Tirpitz concluded that asking for a further strengthening of the fleet was the only way to rein in Britain and to ensure Germany that ‘nobody will dispute our rightful place in the sun’.25 The result was the 1912 Novelle, passed by the Reichstag on 21 May, according to which planned German capital ships rose to forty-one battleships and eighteen battlecruisers.26 The expenditure to cope with these shipbuilding plans was becoming increasingly onerous, both in Germany and Britain. The table below shows the trend of annual naval budgets.

British and German Naval Expenditure, 1904-13

In Britain, a strong growth in expenditure began in 1909-10, while in Germany this occurred a few years earlier, as a result of the 1898 and 1900 Naval Laws. Table 4-A shows that in 1904-5 the German estimate was only 27.47% of Britain’s. In 1907-8 the percentage rose to 45.62% and peaked at 56.33% in 1909-10. Then it went down to 47% in 1913-14. With these numbers, the 60% margin of superiority established by the Admiralty in 1909 was never really challenged. Ironically, the budgets of Germany, which had started the naval race, recorded a significant slowing in the growth rate from 1910-11. The reason lies in the fact that, in coping with growing fears of the outbreak of a war in Europe, Germany decided to focus its priority on the army, diverting attention from the development of the fleet. Thus, the proportion of naval expenditure within overall German military spending fell from 35% in 1911 to 33% the following year, and fell further to 25% in 1913. The German naval estimates continued to increase in absolute values, but the curve – that between 1906 and 1909 had a strong upward swing – progressively flattened.

In 1912, the German Navy decided to deploy the battlecruiser Goeben to the Mediterranean, together with the light cruiser Breslau, in order to exert greater influence in the region. (Italian Navy Historical Office)

Under the pressure of costs, a new round of negotiations took place in February-March 1912 just as the Novelle 1912 was being drafted. Following the contacts made in Germany and in Britain by the industrialist Albert Ballin and the banker Sir Ernest Cassel,27 on February 8 the British Secretary of State for War, Richard Haldane, travelled to Berlin to meet BethmannHollweg, Wilhelm II and Admiral Tirpitz to informally discuss the terms of a possible agreement. Three days of talks raised some hope. BethmannHollweg was friendly and prone to concessions. Tirpitz, under pressure from the Kaiser, agreed to postpone the laying-down of three battleships, and Wilhelm II, with one of his typically impulsive actions, handed Haldane the draft of the 1912 Novelle which not even the Reichstag had yet been able to examine. This very document caused the failure of the negotiations. As soon as Haldane was back in London, the Admiralty thoroughly evaluated the draft, which revealed that the German naval modernisation plans were much larger and more threatening than feared in Britain.28 The reaction of Haldane, who on 22 February complained to the German ambassador in London that he had

not been fully informed about the scope of the 1912 Novelle during his stay in Berlin, infuriated the Kaiser. The same thing happened in early March when Haldane made Berlin aware that, to cope with the provisions of the 1912 Novelle related to the German fleet readiness, the Admiralty was assessing whether to redeploy the Mediterranean Fleet’s battleships in home waters. A very upset Wilhelm II wired his ambassador in London that he would consider such an act as a cause for war. As soon as Bethmann-Hollweg was informed of the telegram, he felt his constitutional prerogatives had been bypassed and offered his resignation. The Kaiser rejected it and the Chancellor, taking advantage of the circumstance, tried to revive the negotiations promising that the 1912 Novelle would be substantially moderated if Britain would offer Germany a politically acceptable formula on the issue of neutrality. Haldane and the British Foreign Minister Grey prepared a draft, approved by the Cabinet on 14 March. However, this draft was not considered satisfactory by Germany as it lacked an explicit reference to British ‘benevolent neutrality’ in case of an attack on Germany by third countries. Grey rejected the German request on 18 March, scuttling the negotiation.

Richard Burdon Haldane, 1st Viscount Haldane (1856-1928), held the office of Secretary of State for War between 1905 and 1912. In February 1912, he travelled to Berlin to informally discuss the terms of a possible agreement on the reduction of naval armaments. (Library of Congress)

A further window for negotiation seemed to open in 1913 when Tirpitz claimed to accept the new criterion of a 60% British superiority over the German fleet, as stated by Churchill on 28 March of the previous year. Churchill renewed the proposal of a ‘naval holiday’ which Tirpitz, however, rejected, stating that Germany could not afford to keep its shipyards inactive. Churchill resubmitted his proposal on 18 October, but again without success. Even Haldane, perhaps the most well-disposed towards the Germans within the British Cabinet, eventually stated that ‘Whatever efforts Germany may make she must reckon upon our making efforts which will be still greater,

because sea power is our life and in sea power we intend to remain supreme’. Less than a year later the Great War began. 1

The works to build the Kiel Canal commenced in 1887 and it was opened on 21 June 1885; the cost was RM156 million. Between 1907 and 1914, the canal was enlarged to allow the transit of dreadnoughts, with two large new locks (310m long and 42m wide) built at Kiel (in the Baltic) and at Brunsbüttel (in the North Sea). The canal depth was also increased from 9m to 11m. These works cost RM242 million and the canal was inaugurated again by Wilhelm II during the 1914 Kieler Woche. 2 However, Lord Cowley, British ambassador in Paris from 1852 to 1867, understood well in advance the risks deriving from the potential developments of the German policy, especially in the naval field. Cowley actually wrote: ‘I have no faith in the friendship of Prussia, and if ever she becomes a naval power she will give us trouble’. 3 It is worth noting that the German invasion of Belgium in August 1914 triggered the issuing of the ultimatum that led Britain to enter the First World War. 4 The United States ranked first in the world with 32%. 5 Between 1900 and 1910, half of the total coal consumption was typically devoted to manufacturing industry, while 15% was used by the transportation system, 13% for domestic heating and the rest for other requirements. 6 British and German public dockyards have usually been considered more productive than private shipyards. However, elements which allow a thorough comparison are lacking. Chapter 6 provides a comparison related to some British and German battlecruisers. 7 Unrivalled command of the sea, exercised by the Royal Navy for a long time after Trafalgar, was the factor that enabled Britain to maintain and defend the Empire. The major European land powers had difficulty in admitting that Britain, a nation without a powerful army, was able to control a country such as India, thousands of miles away and ten times more populated than its motherland. 8 In 1888 the Convention of Constantinople assured freedom of transit through the Suez Canal to ships of any country, even in the event of war. 9 Cecil Rhodes (1853-1902) was a British businessman and politician who played a central role in the colonisation of Africa. 10 As indeed happened when the First World War broke out. 11 The ‘pact’ did not represent a real alliance but rather a forum for consultation based on the ideological affinity between the conservative monarchies of Russia, Germany and Austria-Hungary. 12 The pact left freedom of manoeuvre to the signatories if they were to start hostilities. For example, Russia was allowed to join France if the attacker was Germany. Germany and Russia agreed to keep the pact secret; the former because it basically betrayed its alliance with Austria, the latter because Tsar Alexander III feared the reaction of Pan-Slavists. 13 Alfred von Tirpitz (1849-1930), Admiral and Secretary of State of the Imperial Navy

from 1897 to 1916; he was granted a noble title in 1900. 14 This pact ended the British policy of ‘splendid isolation’, which basically meant the renunciation of signing formal alliances. 15 A smaller part of Morocco came under a Spanish protectorate. 16 Wilhelm II created the Marine-Kabinett (Naval Office) in 1889 as an interface between the imperial authority and the heads of the Navy, assigning to it some of the tasks that belonged to the Militär-Kabinett (Military Office). 17 More details on the scope of the 1898 and 1900 German Naval Laws and ensuing amendments (‘Novellen’) are given in Chapter 2. 18 The Flottenverein was established in Berlin in April 1898 as an initiative by a group of industrialists, bankers and politicians supported by Tirpitz. It played an active role in spreading an awareness of maritime matters in Germany and in supporting the approval of the Naval Laws. The Flottenverein totalled one million members by 1908. 19 The ‘danger zone’ was the timeframe during which the German fleet, being reinforced but still far from reaching a sufficient strength, would be exposed to a preventive and annihilating surprise attack by the Royal Navy. This hypothesis was actually considered by Admiral Fisher. 20 All other major naval powers – Russia, Germany, France, the US and Japan – were considering their future battleships in the same terms as Dreadnought. Thus, whoever got there first was only a matter of time. 21 Frederick Campbell, 3rd Earl Cawdor, was First Lord of the Admiralty from April to December 1905. During his tenure, the Royal Navy laid down Dreadnought and the battlecruiser Invincible. 22 Britain tried to limit military spending in Europe and proposed placing this topic on the agenda of the Second Hague Peace Conference (June-October 1907). Germany, however, flatly refused. 23 The so-called ‘naval scare’ of 1908-9 was fuelled by some politicians and the conservative press and supported by some circles within the Admiralty and the armaments industry, who feared the end of British naval superiority. The debate took the form of a collective hysteria, involving a large part of public opinion. 24 The Admiralty deemed the assurances provided by the German ambassador in London, Count Metternich, as deceitful. On his part, Admiral Fisher stated ‘We have got to have a margin against lying!’ 25 This sentence comes from the speech given by Wilhelm II in Hamburg on 27 August 1911. 26 Including eight for overseas service. 27 Ballin was managing director of the shipping company HAPAG, while Cassel had German origins. 28 In addition to the already-mentioned increase in capital ships, the 1912 Novelle provided for the construction of seventy-two new submarines and fifty destroyers and an increase of 20% in active navy personnel.

Chapter Two

BIRTH OF THE BATTLECRUISER: STRATEGIC, ECONOMIC AND TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES

T

his chapter addresses the birth of the concept of the battlecruiser and its development from c. 1875 until the end of the First World War. This was a very interesting period because almost all major naval powers, especially Britain and Germany, made great efforts to produce a new type of warship – the battlecruiser – which some authors have recognised as the ‘strategic cavalry of the fleet’. The Royal Navy officially adopted the term ‘battlecruiser’ a few years before the outbreak of the First World War, notably in the Admiralty Week Order n.351 of 24 November 1911. Furthermore, on 31 January 1913 the Admiralty announced that all cruisers were to be divided into three classes: ‘Battle Cruisers’, ‘Cruisers’ and ‘Light Cruisers’. For the first time, classes were to be formally grouped tactically and administratively and battlecruisers were grouped into battlecruiser squadrons. The Imperial German Navy never adopted the term ‘battlecruiser’: Von der Tann and other similar warships were still defined as ‘Grosser Kreuzer’ (large cruiser), a term that, in 1918, became ‘Grosskampfschiff’ (large fighting ship). However, since it is commonly accepted that the true ancestor of the

battlecruiser is the armoured cruiser, this chapter will examine three major topics: – The development of the armoured cruiser in the late nineteenth century. – The evolution from armoured cruisers to battlecruisers in the Royal Navy and the Imperial German Navy, including how the introduction of Dreadnought-type capital ships influenced the birth of battlecruisers. – The multifaceted challenges addressed by naval designers in the abovementioned evolution. It is worth noting that the armoured cruiser emerged as a distinct new type of capital ship at the same time that naval technology was introducing impressive new features in warship design and construction. Therefore, in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the world’s major naval powers changed their approach towards producing a type of naval vessel able to outpace their competitors. As discussed in Chapter 1, this was especially true in Europe where the United Kingdom, France and Russia faced off politically and militarily against an increasingly influential Germany. When called to conceive and develop a new type of capital ship, naval designers had to cope with three major challenges. The first challenge was related to strategic/tactical issues derived from fleet composition and warship roles. Some time before commencing construction of battlecruisers in the United Kingdom and Germany, the Danish naval designer William Hovgaard had correctly identified four ways in which battlecruisers might be employed: quick concentrations and outflanking manoeuvres during fleet actions, including chasing enemy vessels retiring from gun engagements; mass reconnaissance; independent actions; and support of smaller cruisers. However, the driving factor that impacted pre-First World War British and German naval programmes mainly derived from lessons learned from previous naval battles and engagements in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century.

The battlecruiser Invincible, laid down in April 1906, was the lead ship of a class of three. The Royal Navy officially adopted the term ‘battlecruiser’ a few years before the outbreak of the First World War. (Courtesy, Terry Dickens, World Naval Ship Forum)

The second challenge was economic. The planning and construction of battlecruisers was heavily affected by a debate in which the economic aspect often prevailed over other home and foreign policy issues in Britain and Germany. Additionally, and especially in wartime, naval planners had to

assess the impact of constructing a battlecruiser against programmes related to other warships types The third challenge was probably the most complex. Designers, because of the introduction of new technologies that emerged in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, had to fight against traditional conservatism rooted in almost all the admiralties in the world. Apart from that, and bearing in mind that battlecruisers and battleships shared many innovative technologies, this challenge included three major areas. First, the state of the art of naval construction in Britain and Germany in 1904; secondly, emerging naval technologies at that time (hull/protection, propulsion, fuels, naval architecture, artillery and fire control, communications); and thirdly, warship building capabilities in Britain and Germany (shipbuilders, artillery, machinery, armour). Finally, it is important to consider how Britain and Germany developed their naval bases and infrastructures in order to meet their strategic requirements, including the preparation for the First World War.

THE PREDECESSORS Although in the last quarter of the nineteenth century the application of new technologies to naval construction had not significantly altered the basic composition of any major fleet, the seeds of what would become the battlecruiser were planted. In 1875 the two major categories of combatants that formed the fleets of the major naval powers were traditional ships-of-theline (commonly known as armoured ships, ironclads, or ‘battleships’) and scouts. The former were armoured capital ships intended for conventional naval battles, while the latter were considerably smaller and devoted to scouting roles. The capital ships had their armament grouped in a main battery placed in casemates surrounding the central section of the vessel, with some larger guns mounted in fore and aft turrets. Interestingly, naval strategists recognised that, whereas ships-of-the-line were able to engage with and fight against similar enemy vessels, their employment in tasks that did not require offensive capabilities was not cost-effective. Therefore, maritime reconnaissance and surveillance tasks undertaken by these ships, which also provided protection of a country’s sea trade from enemy attack and defence of maritime borders, as well as raids against enemy coasts, needed to be met by a different type of vessel. This meant that a new design approach needed to be implemented. The execution of protective, and sometimes defensive,

tasks required a different model with high mobility and more firepower, which led to a new category of warship, the cruiser. The early classes of cruisers, which were introduced in the 1870s, were slightly faster than battleships, had greater range and protection than their scout predecessors and were equipped with a main battery normally formed by 8in guns in casemates. In principle, cruisers were rated as first, second and third class, in accordance with their size and firepower. The first class cruisers also became known as ‘armoured cruisers’ and the first ship of this category was the Russian General-Admiral. She was a sailrigged warship started in 1870 and completed in 1875. Her main role was to threaten British maritime trade, the vital lifeblood of the British Empire, and to support the maritime expansion policy pursued, at the time, by Russia. General-Admiral indeed troubled the British Admiralty, who retaliated with the construction of the Shannon, considered to be the first armoured cruiser of the Royal Navy. Shannon was considered unsuccessful because of her poor speed and range but, in contrast to her predecessors, she featured an armoured deck below the waterline that improved her horizontal protection. This was later copied in Nelson, commissioned in 1876, and Northampton, commissioned two years later. Both ships maintained a sail-rigged configuration but were equipped with an armoured citadel and wheelhouse placed below the armoured deck. France, in the early 1880s, began work on Vauban and Duguesclin, both armoured cruisers with a displacement of 6,100 tons and a maximum speed of 14 knots. The Russian Navy followed with Vladimir Monomach and Dmitri Donskoj, displacing 5,800 tons and reaching a maximum speed of 15 knots. Their armament included four 8in and twelve 6in guns, while a belt of compound armour, with a maximum thickness of 9in, ensured protection. The British responded with Imperieuse and Warspite, commissioned in 1886 and 1888 respectively. These sail-rigged armoured cruisers had a displacement of 8,500 tons, reached a maximum speed of 16 knots and were equipped with four 9.2in guns in shielded mounts. However, they were highly criticised; Admiral Sir John Commerell stated in the House of Commons: ‘They are among the most powerful failures in building modern warships; badly designed, badly constructed, absolutely dangerous’. Although both ships were probably not as bad as this critic makes out, they

were basically second class battleships rather than first-class armoured cruisers. Indeed, their speed was essentially that of a battleship. Speed was a problem not only for the Royal Navy, since it was a weakness common to all armoured cruisers. This was because of the difficulty designers and shipbuilders faced when striking an adequate balance between decent speed and effective protection. Nevertheless, armoured cruisers were built in large numbers because they were more affordable than battleships, especially in navies that had limited financial and technical resources. In 1885-9, the Royal Navy made a further attempt to attain greater speed with their Orlando class armoured cruisers. They had a displacement of 5,600 tons, their top speed was increased to 18 knots, and their armament consisted of two 9.2in guns in shielded mounts and ten 6in guns in casemates. However, like Shannon, the Orlandos were unsuccessful because, at full load, their freeboard was very low, thus making them hazardous in rough seas. This led, in 1887, to the Royal Institute of Naval Architects to compile a detailed comparison between the Orlandos and armoured cruisers used in other foreign navies. The poor performance of the Orlandos convinced the Royal Navy to abandon the construction of armoured cruisers for almost a decade, and to focus instead on ‘protected cruisers’. Protected cruisers were vessels with an armoured deck that offered protection to vital machinery spaces from fragments from shells exploding above, and a hull divided into various watertight compartments. A major breakthrough in the design and construction of the protected cruisers came from Sir William Armstrong and his shipyard at Elswick (Newcastle), which later expanded to become the largest private naval shipyard in Britain. As well as eliminating sail rigging and having limited protection, the first protected cruisers designed by Armstrong provided an effective combination of powerful armament and high speed. They were also within reasonable size and displacement limits, which also made them cost-effective. Over approximately twenty years, Armstrong’s shipyard built nineteen Elswicktype protected cruisers for the Italian, Chinese, Argentine, Japanese, Chilean, Brazilian, US, Portuguese and Turkish navies, making them an export success. Moreover, between 1885 and 1905 the Royal Navy commissioned thirty-five ships, split into seven classes. Paradoxically, the most praised quality of the Elswick-type protected

cruisers – their speed – was also their most criticised quality, especially in Britain. The renowned naval designer Sir Edward Reed charged that the high speeds claimed for Elswick-type cruisers were only achieved during sea trials and thanks to various favourable technical conditions. Whether or not this charge was true, the same problem affected, at that time and in the following years, most naval constructions around the world. The root cause of the alleged problem was perhaps the divergence between original design requirements and the realities of fitting-out a warship, which required many modifications introduced by naval staffs during specific individual constructions. One positive outcome of this was that more technological developments emerged towards the end of the nineteenth century. This was most notable in innovation in armour and gunnery that were implemented onboard warships that up to then had spent too much time on slipways.

The French protected cruiser Jean Bart, steaming at low speed. She and her sisters were one of the concrete expressions of the ‘Jeune Ecole’ theory, which also aimed at replacing battleships with armoured cruisers. (Library of Congress)

The naval technical debate in Europe, as shown, generally revolved around speed, protection and gunnery. On the opposite side of the Atlantic, in the United States, this was no different. In the 1890s, the US Navy began construction of an entirely new fleet. The fleet’s agenda, importantly, was dictated by a naval expansion policy largely influenced by principles conceived by the US Navy’s then-captain Alfred Thayer Mahan. Mahanian theories were aimed at assuring the free access of the United States to the oceans, even during war, and to cope with any possible blockades of the American coast. To achieve those strategic objectives, including disrupting enemy maritime trade routes, a powerful fleet of modern battleships was created. This ‘sea power doctrine’ developed by Mahan had a dramatic impact not only in the United States, but also in Europe and the Far East and, together, with technological advancements, greatly influenced universal naval lore. In France, the cruiser had always been considered the most important type of fleet vessel, making it a design priority for French naval architects. In 1893, this priority produced Dupuy de Lôme. She became the first real armoured cruiser, as opposed to the protected cruiser, and greatly influenced naval construction in the last part of the nineteenth century. Dupuy de Lôme was, however, more an experimental vessel than a fighting ship and thus did not achieve the desired operational maturity. When she entered ‘experimental’ service in 1890, Dupuy de Lôme was able to outrun any contemporary battleship. She had a full load displacement of 6,820 tons and her propulsion system achieved a top speed of 19.5 knots. Her hull was very sleek (about 394ft long and 30.5ft wide), with a long ram envisaged to allow higher speeds and a protection of variable thickness distributed throughout the hull. Her armament included two 7.6in and six 6.4in guns, all housed in enclosed mounts distributed along the main deck.

The US armoured cruiser Tennessee (ACR 10) at anchor in 1907. Naval analysts considered the four Tennessees as probably the best class of armoured cruiser in the world. (Naval History and Heritage Command, US Navy)

Despite some unsatisfactory performance issues, Dupuy de Lôme did impress many navies. She had almost complete protection, was able to deflect any high explosive shells shot by quick-firing guns and, since her speed outpaced that of existing battleships, the problem of speed and armament that had plagued earlier armoured cruisers began to be overcome. Dupuy de Lôme was thus regarded as the best type of warship for commerce raiding. France was the first nation to exploit this design concept with the Amiral Charner class. This programme consisted of four units built between 1892 and 1894. They were smaller and slower than Dupuy de Lôme, but all units operated until the First World War. Their design concept also contributed to the revival of the French idea of replacing battleships with armoured cruisers, a proposal pushed forward mostly by supporters of the ‘Jeune Ecole’ theory and bureaucrats in the Treasury. This proposal emphasised the ‘guerre de

course’ and involved fast cruisers and torpedo boats that could strike at Britain’s merchant fleet, seriously threatening her trading monopoly. Following this programme, the French Navy commissioned eighteen armoured cruisers between 1888 and 1908, split into eight different classes. Other nations, both in and outside Europe, adopted a similar design approach. In the United States, New York and Brooklyn were built between 1891 and 1895. However, the 1898 war with Spain was followed by a short period of naval inactivity. The US Navy again started to build armoured cruisers in the early 1900s. These included six Pennsylvania class units (13,700 tons and 22 knots), three Charleston class units (9,700 tons and 22 knots) and four Tennessee class units (14,500 tons and 22 knots); all these vessels were built between 1901 and 1906. Naval analysts considered the Tennessees as the best-armoured cruisers built in the United States, and probably the best type of armoured cruisers in the world. Common to all these cruisers was a relatively high speed of 22 knots and a progressive increase in displacement, the latter due to enhancements in gunnery and protection. In the Far East the Imperial Japanese Navy was one the first navies to understand the full potential of armoured cruisers. As a result of its ‘6-6 Fleet’ naval programme, which envisioned its new cruisers as half the fleet’s battle line, the Japanese Navy commissioned six units, split into three classes (Asama, Yakumo and Iwate) each consisting of two vessels. All of them were built in Europe. These armoured cruisers had a full load displacement of about 10,000 tons, reached over 20 knots, were well protected and equipped with 8in and 6in guns.

The Japanese armoured cruiser Iwate at Plymouth in 1900. The Imperial Japanese Navy was one of the first to understand the full potential of armoured cruisers and commissioned six units of the type. (Library of Congress)

In the 1880s and 1890s, European politics evolved around Anglo-French naval competition. Starting in 1889, Britain implemented the ‘Two Power Standard’ naval policy that focused on maritime developments in France, as well as in Russia. The French Navy, on the other hand, realised that it could never outpace British battleships and decided to build several powerful, lightly-armoured and fast commerce raiders. In the event of war, they would threaten Britain’s worldwide trade routes, forcing the Royal Navy to dispatch hunting forces to remote areas and thus providing a ‘naval parity’ in European waters. By contrast, in the Imperial Russian Navy, armoured cruisers were conceived not only for raiding enemy maritime trade routes but also as capital ships to support expansion in the Far East. Russia commissioned four armoured cruisers (Admiral Nachimov, Pamyat Azova, Rossija and Gromoboi) before 1900, with full load displacements varying from 7,900 to 12,000 tons. Although their design was forward-looking, their operational performance was not as successful as expected. The Royal Italian Navy also found the armoured cruisers concept attractive, and so built several vessels conforming to this type. These included Marco Polo and the two Vettor Pisani class units, which were smaller than their foreign counterparts. They also developed the Garibaldi

class, which raised marked interest abroad. The Italian navy commissioned three units of the Garibaldi class (each displacing 7,500 tons, armed with guns of different calibres and capable of reaching a top speed of 20 knots), and seven units were sold to foreign navies prior to their completion. As mentioned above, Britain had decided to halt construction of armoured cruisers for financial reasons. However, the progress made by Russia and France pushed the Admiralty to reconsider this decision and the Royal Navy attempted to counter the threats originating from French and Russian torpedo boats and armoured cruisers. This was achieved in two ways: by creating the so-called torpedo-boat destroyer, later simplified to ‘destroyer’, and by building new classes of armoured cruisers that were faster, better protected and more powerful in terms of firepower than their Russian and French counterparts. This ‘rebirth’ of the true armoured cruiser in Britain was also aided by the introduction, in the 1890s, of Krupp steel, which allowed new warships to be better protected without having to drastically increase their displacement. From 1899-1901, the newly-designed British armoured cruisers included thirty-five units, split into several classes, and tasked with various duties such as commerce protection, fleet scouts and fast combatants for battle lines. Another nation that needed to be contended with was Germany, which, in the last decades of the nineteenth century, emerged as a new political and military power. Her expansionist aspirations and industrial potential caused the Imperial German Navy to create a strong fleet in a relatively short time, and the armoured cruiser was central in its order of battle. The conceptual and industrial efforts of both Britain and Germany deserve a more detailed analysis: Tables A and B show the main features of the armoured cruisers built by the Royal Navy and the German Imperial Navy before the First World War. The Cressy class armoured cruisers represent the first step in the process that eventually led to the introduction of the battlecruiser in the Royal Navy. They were similar to the previous Diadem class, but with two changes. The first was the restoration of 9.2in guns. The second, more important, was that the Cressys featured a 6in armoured belt that extended around the central section of the hull. This included the placement of 5in bulkheads at each end of the armoured belt, which created an armoured box. The Drake class armoured cruisers were enlarged Cressys and their protective role was similar too. They were designed primarily to achieve

higher speeds and provide space for more 6in guns. The Drake class cruisers were, for several years, the fastest ships in the world at 23 knots. Some guns, however, were mounted too low in the hull and thus had limited use in anything but calm seas.

The British armoured cruiser Achilles. She belonged to the Warrior class (four units), displaced 14,500 tons and featured a main armament of six 9.2in guns. (Library of Congress)

The British armoured cruiser Cornwall at Esquimalt, British Columbia, in December 1914. Until the 1890s, British armoured cruiser construction had been halted for financial reasons but the progress made by the navies of Russia and France pushed the Royal Navy to resume building them. (Royal Canadian Navy)

This gun problem was partially rectified by the Monmouth class armoured cruisers, often known as the ‘Counties’, which were smaller than their predecessors because they were not fitted with heavy main guns. This also meant they had reduced protection. The ‘Counties’ were, however, cheaper ships and so could be produced in larger numbers for trade protection, especially in European waters. Like the Drake class, they were fitted with new propellers that improved their speed. The design of the Devonshire class armoured cruisers was an attempt at improving the Monmouths. There was a modest increase in size and the class featured a heavier main armament, with single-mounted 7.5in guns replacing the twin 6in turrets of the previous armoured cruisers. Two more 7.5in guns were added to the design during construction, replacing the forward 6in guns installed in casemates. The Admiralty, however, acknowledged that the Monmouths and

Devonshires were not powerful enough to operate within the battle fleet, so they reverted to a larger type. The Duke of Edinburgh units increased firepower by being equipped with 9.2in main guns in single turrets. However, these armoured cruisers still had their 6in battery mounted too low in the hull, thus making these guns useless in anything but good weather. The Warrior class armoured cruisers were developed as an alternative to the Duke of Edinburgh units. The most noticeable difference from their predecessors were the single 7.5in gun turrets abreast the funnels in place of the 6in guns. These 7.5in turrets were higher above the waterline, thus allowing them to be used in rougher seas. The self-protective capabilities of the Warrior class were very similar to that of the Duke class, aside from a slight reduction in deck thickness. The Minotaur was the last class of traditional British armoured cruisers before naval construction switched to battlecruisers. The Minotaurs were enlarged and more heavily armed than the Warriors, but not as highly regarded. The Minotaurs were considered over-gunned, and the resulting additional displacement would perhaps have been better used for improving protection. Table A below provides a survey of British armoured cruisers built between 1898 and 1909.

Table A – Main Features of British Armoured Cruisers

In 1896, correctly assuming that a powerful fleet was a valid foreign policy tool, Germany began her programme of constructing armoured cruisers. However, unlike Britain, Germany built several singleship classes. This was because of a lack of design consolidation and the higher priority given to battleships in the early 1900s. Fürst Bismarck is recognised as the first modern German armoured cruiser. She was an expanded version of previous designs, had better armament and protection, and was easily distinguishable by her larger gun turrets. She was a seaworthy vessel but because of her massive propulsion plant, Fürst Bismarck suffered from heavy vibration at high speeds. The armoured cruiser Prinz Heinrich was designed to be a smaller and cheaper model. It had reduced armour and armament but could travel at a higher speed. Prinz Heinrich also differed from her predecessor in having single rather than twin main gun turrets and a lighter forward superstructure, as well as a concentration of secondary guns amidships. The two Prinz Adalbert class armoured cruisers were generally similar in layout to Prinz Heinrich, but featured three funnels. The armoured belt of this class was slightly more extensive than in the previous design, and twin

smaller-calibre gun turrets replaced the single main guns. It also had a weakness in that the lower casemates for the secondary armament were prone to flooding, a defect actually common to several warships of the time. The two Roon class armoured cruisers followed, which were a continuation of the general pattern of previous German designs. The main difference was the introduction of a fourth funnel, necessitated by a slight increase in engine power and speed. The two Scharnhorst class units were the last ‘conventional’ German armoured cruisers. They were bigger than the Roons because of improvements in the main armament. However, the layout of four of the eight 21cm guns in single wing turrets above the casemates limited firing arcs. Blücher is considered as the last German armoured cruiser designed in the period. She was an enlarged development of the Scharnhorst class but had a much heavier armament, could travel at a higher speed, and featured improved protection. The Reichsmarineamt (RMA) worked on Blücher’s design during 1905. The new cruiser was laid down at the Imperial Dockyard at Kiel in February 1907, launched in April 1908 and commissioned in October 1909. Her design displacement was 15,592 tons, and the maximum 17,224 tons. Overall length was 489ft, and breadth 80.3ft. Design power was 32,000 shp, for a corresponding top speed of 24.5 knots. Blücher was equipped with 18 boilers and three four-cylinder vertical triple expansion engines connected to three shafts. Range was 6,600 miles at 12 knots, while her complement was 853 officers and men.

The German armoured cruiser Roon in 1907, during a visit in the US. (Library of Congress)

To increase Blücher’s firepower and deal with space limitations caused by the adoption of a bulky steam-expansion engine, the RMA decided to install twelve 21cm SK L/45 guns in twin turrets. Two were placed forward and aft on the centreline and two on each broadside. Space limitations curbed the ammunition allowance to 85 rounds per gun, as in earlier armoured cruisers. The broadside 21cm turrets were placed as far from the bridge as possible to keep the conning tower free from smoke and muzzle blast effects. Thus, those turrets were installed above the boiler rooms, while their magazines were placed in the forecastle, next to the forward turrets. Ammunition was forwarded through a special connection passage along the ship’s centreline on the armoured deck. Two hoists supplied the four broadside turrets with propellant charges and shells. Blücher’s secondary battery included eight 15cm guns in casemated mounts, while the anti-torpedo boat battery consisted of sixteen 8.8cm guns in single mounts. There were four 45cm underwater torpedo tubes, one bow, one stern, and one mounted on each side just aft of ‘A’ turret. Vertical protection included a 3in–7in belt; maximum

thickness of turret armour was 7in. The forward conning tower was 9.8in maximum, while the aft tower was 5.5in. Table B below provides a survey of German armoured cruisers built between 1896 and 1909.

A 21cm twin turret on Blücher. This ‘Grosse Kreuzer’ (large cruiser), commissioned in 1907, represented the watershed between German armoured cruisers and battlecruisers. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

When the German Navy became aware of the Invincibles’ characteristics, the RMA had neither sufficient time nor the financial resources to change Blücher’s design. Thus, outclassed by the new British battlecruisers, especially in armament, she was designated a gunnery training ship in 1911. Following the developments in fire control introduced by the Royal Navy in its new Dreadnought-type battleships and battlecruisers, the Reichsmarineamt decided to equip Blücher with the first fire-control director in the German Navy, in conjunction with a Zeiss stereoscopic rangefinder. When war loomed in 1914, Blücher joined the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe (1st

Scouting Group) of the Hochseeflotte.

Table B - Main Features of German Armoured Cruisers

In principle, then, the armoured cruiser emerged as a new type of ship-of-theline as warship design and technology evolved. This occurred mainly in the last decade of the nineteenth century when the major naval powers were called to change their design approach for warships; a new type of naval vessel needed to be produced to implement new facets of changing strategies and needs of the maritime powers, while also outpacing the competitors. Some elements were common amongst the various armoured cruisers designs developed by the world’s main navies. These commonalities included higher speeds, more powerful guns, a marked increase in hull size, a generally balanced protection (if still lighter in comparison with battleships) and construction affordability. A comparison between British and German armoured cruisers built in this period shows some interesting trends that affected future battlecruiser projects. Firstly, British ships were longer and slightly bigger than the corresponding German vessels. Secondly, German ships appeared slower

than British ships. Thirdly, the trend surfaced in both navies toward a standardisation of major calibres, notably 21cm (8.2in) for German ships and 9.2in for British ships. Lastly, although costs fluctuated for some time, the last armoured cruisers commissioned were generally more expensive than their predecessors both in Britain and in Germany. Blücher was a remarkable exception to this picture: her characteristics show a distinct departure from previous German armoured cruiser designs, so confirming her reputation as a ‘bridge’ toward future German battlecruisers. Both Britain and Germany built their last classes of armoured cruisers when the Invincible-class programme had already commenced; however, ‘battlecruiser’ was still not the term used for the Invincibles and her sisters. Designs continued to be modified in approaching what we now conceive of as a battlecruiser. In this context, it is worth mentioning another important development that occurred in respect of the battleships in the service of major navies. In 1880, Britain laid down a new type of battleship, Collingwood. This produced a good prototype for a new design approach by the Royal Navy, as well as by other major navies of that time. The result was that until c. 1905 most of the battleships in the world were similar to Collingwood’s design. She introduced many positive features including improved protection, gun layout, speed and endurance; however, a low freeboard severely affected her manoeuvrability and efficient use of the armament. After improving the Collingwood design, Britain commenced three battleship construction programmes (Royal Sovereign class in 1892, Majestic in 1895 and Canopus in 1899, totalling twenty-two units). The construction of the Majestic class pushed other navies to make a detailed analysis of her characteristics in order to follow this trend. The United States built two Kearsarge class battleships; Germany, the Wittelsbach class (five units); Russia, the Tsesarevitch; and France, the Liberté class (four units). All these ships were built between 1898 and 1907. All these programmes began before 1905, but the consolidation of technological progress and the emergence of new tactical concepts were paving the way – primarily in Britain and Germany – for a new era of naval construction that would include both the development of a new ship-of-theline and, more importantly, the definitive transition from the armoured cruiser to the battlecruiser.

STRATEGIC AND ECONOMIC CHALLENGES

During the late nineteenth century, Britain still based its naval strategy on the assumption that the main task of the Royal Navy was to engage and destroy enemy fleets in a large-scale battle. This assumption was the key for Britain to maintain a large extent of maritime power in Europe and the Mediterranean. If Britain maintained a reasonable advantage in both the quality and quantity of large warships, victory at sea would be guaranteed. Moreover, the influence of British maritime power on land events would contribute to stability across the whole of Europe. At that time, the main naval threats to Britain were still France and Russia and the possibility of a conflict with them was of great concern. This was especially true regarding commerce raiding in distant waters, where the Royal Navy did not deploy a significant number of warships. During the same period, Germany had started to develop a grand strategy of political and military expansion aiming at consolidating an alliance in continental Europe in order to defend itself against France and Russia, the two powers that were perceived as the main threats, and to affect British foreign policy. Therefore, Germany pursued a closer relationship with Austria-Hungary and Italy in order to establish solid links in the Mediterranean, the Balkans, the Middle East and beyond. This did not rule out the acquisition of colonies and concessions in central or southern Africa, the Far East and the Pacific Ocean. It was assumed that such an expansionist attitude would generate rivalry between Britain and Germany, thus leading Berlin to rebalance its military strategy with a stronger focus on maritime issues. Kaiser Wilhelm II strongly promoted the development of this new German grand strategy. It was also facilitated by unprecedented growth in industry and commerce and a constant increase in coal and steel production. This German industrial revolution resembled the industrial revolution that had occurred earlier in Britain. It also led to the improvement of the merchant marine in Germany, which was also helped by the construction of new large ports, such as Bremerhaven and Hamburg, and the development of new shipyards in Kiel, Bremerhaven, Wilhelmshaven and Danzig.

The Russian armoured cruiser Admiral Ushakov, sunk at Tsushima by the Japanese navy. That battle led to widely-accepted conclusions about protection, large guns, manoeuvrability and the torpedo threat that influenced subsequent naval shipbuilding. (tsushima.ru)

The transition between the nineteenth and the twentieth century also saw an improvement in the political and military stability of Europe, a scenario that was favoured by a form of strategic balance between continental and maritime powers. The crisis in Crete between Greece and Turkey that had erupted in 1897 was successfully managed using both diplomacy and an international naval force, for example. Moreover, the major wars of the time occurred far from Europe.1 However, two events took place that would swiftly change the approach of the major powers to naval warfare. The first was doctrinal in nature and derived from naval technology. The second had operational significance, occurred in the Far East and derived from the first war that pitted a European power, Russia, against an Asian nation, Japan. Interestingly, both events marked strong departures from previous concepts of warship armament.

THE ‘ALL-BIG-GUN’ CAPITAL SHIP In the early 1900s, technological developments in naval gunnery and fire control led the Royal Navy to establish two committees, which were tasked with analysing these problems and devising possible new fleet tactics. Concurrently, Colonel Vittorio Cuniberti of the Italian Navy started a debate in European naval circles regarding a new concept for capital ships. Cuniberti, in an article2 dedicated to the Royal Navy, wrote: ‘Let us imagine a vessel whose armour is so well distributed … as to be able to resist all the attacks of an enemy’s artillery with the exception of the projectiles of the 12inch guns …’

After some consideration on speed and tactics, Cuniberti stated: ‘From this it appears that for our ideal and intensely powerful ship we must increase the number of pieces of 12-inch so as to be able to get in at least one fatal shot on the enemy’s belt at the water-line before she has a chance of getting a similar fortunate stroke at us from one of the four large pieces now usually carried out as the main armament … We thus have outlined … the main features of our absolutely supreme vessel – with medium calibres abolished – so effectively protected … and armed with only twelve pieces of 12-inch …’

Cuniberti also predicted that such an ideal battleship would have a top speed of 24 knots and a displacement of 17,000 tons. In short, Cuniberti’s proposal was focused on an ‘all-big-gun’ battleship which was well protected and capable of outrunning similar enemy warships. Some naval circles received the proposal with interest; however, it was also criticised for being overstated.3

The sketch of the all-big-gun capital ship as proposed by Col. Vittorio Cuniberti, Engineering Corps, Italian Navy. This proposal started a debate in European naval circles about a new concept in capital ships. (All The World’s Fighting Ships, 1903)

Admiral of the Fleet Sir John Arbuthnot Fisher (1841–1920), First Sea Lord from 1904 to 1910, is well known for his efforts at reforming the Royal Navy, in particular its organisation and equipment. He also established a ‘Committee on Designs’ to examine and report on the requirements of future warships. (Library of Congress)

These concepts and ideas, however, did not vanish because a significant drive to develop an all-big-gun battleship occurred in October 1904, when Admiral Sir John Fisher became First Sea Lord in the Royal Navy.4 Before this appointment, Fisher was impressed by proposals and opinions regarding large-calibre naval guns put forward by Sir William Armstrong at Elswick and naval designers working at the British Admiralty. When Fisher became First Sea Lord, Britain still regarded France and Russia as her main naval threats; however, in less than one year, the entire political and naval situation was to change.5 The arrival of Fisher at the Admiralty also meant a revision of the original ‘Two Power Standard’ strategic principle by adding an additional 10% margin. This meant that Britain had to maintain 10% superiority in battleships against the two likely combinations of peer competitors, which were Russia and France, or Germany and Russia. In addition, the Royal Navy had to watch the United States and her neoimperialist policy mainly based on naval expansion. Regarding the reforms accomplished by Fisher, two had a major impact on the future structure of the Royal Navy. The first was the scrapping of old and obsolete warships in order to reduce operational and maintenance costs. The second was the development of new classes of armoured cruisers that would ensure the protection of global trade at key points of British interest around the world. Fisher was also a stalwart supporter of the new naval technologies emerging in those years. Since 1902, the Royal Navy had been carrying out studies and theoretical exercises aimed at developing a strategy for the construction of new types of warships. These focused especially on the calibre and the number of ships’ guns and tactics to be employed during any battle against an enemy fleet. Progress in fire control also encouraged these activities and set forth the superiority of 12in calibre guns over 10in. In fact, 12in guns could fire shells of greater destructive effect and possessed greater accuracy and longer range. Conversely, 10in guns were cheaper and could be installed in greater numbers within a given ship’s displacement. Fisher also undertook some studies influenced by a desire for ships with a longer endurance and better

speed, which could achieve tactical superiority and hence overwhelm the enemy battle line. The technical debate, however, was soon aided by strategic discussions related to emergent German naval power.

GERMANY’S NAVAL VISION: TIRPITZ AND THE NAVAL LAWS Germany ostensibly entered the European naval scene when the Reichstag passed its first Naval Law in April 1898. Kaiser Wilhelm II had always been fascinated by navies, the Royal Navy in particular, since his childhood. During frequent trips to Britain, he had spent considerable time at the HM Dockyard Portsmouth and on board British warships. That these early impressions influenced him is demonstrated by his wish to reproduce a German navy on a similar scale to that he had seen in Britain. Moreover, Wilhelm’s early interest in naval affairs was later to mesh with the imperialism pursued by the world’s major powers. Opportunities for expansion in Europe were limited and, reflecting this, the Kaiser felt that Germany’s future lay in overseas colonisation (a ‘place in the sun’). Any empire that Germany would establish had to be supported by naval force. As Wilhelm II knew well, Germany was bound by economic necessities, increasing population and the need to expand its commercial interests beyond its own frontiers. These reasons were similar to those expressed by Britain when justifying her expansion. Such similarity is significant since it indicates that naval expansion, and Germany’s in particular, was not the product of anything peculiar but reflected a widespread contemporary tendency. The idea that a European nation, and especially a wealthy and rich nation like Germany, had a right to own colonies, with a navy to protect them, was widely accepted throughout Europe. German naval expansion also received a boost from the Kruger Telegram affair in January 1896. The result was a deterioration in Anglo-German relations and the inability of Germany to influence the South African situation during the Boer War was seen as an important and object lesson in the importance of sea power. After 1896, the German government used antagonism toward Britain as a fulcrum in its push for an organic shipbuilding programme. Another factor of importance in explaining German naval expansion was the failure of the British government in 1897 to renew the Anglo-German commercial treaties of 1862 and 1865. The Kaiser realised

the potential damage to German trade and concluded that Germany must build a strong fleet. While the enthusiasm of Wilhelm II for naval matters promised a great new age for the German Navy, the expansion and modernisation of the Kaiserliche Marine was also a prime objective for Admiral Tirpitz.6 In 1897 he was appointed as head of the RMA, when it became the main administrative organisation of the Imperial German Navy. Concurrently, a reform of German naval institutions took place. The Kaiser dissolved the German Naval Supreme Command and restructured it into several organisations, each one taking on the role of a pressure group. The most important was the RMA under Tirpitz, reporting directly to the German Chancellor but taking orders from the Kaiser, and covering administrative, technical and training matters. The ‘Admiralstab’ – Admiralty Staff – had an advisory role, while the warships were split into the First Squadron, the Cruiser Squadron and the squadrons based or deployed abroad. The commander of each of these forces was directly subordinated to the Kaiser.7 In the framework of such a fragmented command structure, Tirpitz became the most influential individual and, after his appointment as Secretary of State for the Navy, German naval expansion entered a new phase. Tirpitz knew German limitations thoroughly and had the ability to present both clearly and effectively his arguments for a battle fleet. Furthermore, he proved to be very skilled in dealing with the Reichstag, the Kaiser and the Kaiserliche Marine and much of the credit for building the German fleet must be given to him.

Fleet Admiral Alfred von Tirpitz was the most influential personality in the German Imperial Navy until he was forced to resign in 1916. Through his Naval Laws, he transformed a modest coastal navy into a first-class force capable of threatening British superiority. (Library of Congress)

Tirpitz believed that sea power was a critical factor in national prosperity and power. In this, he shared the vision of Alfred Thayer Mahan, the US Navy officer who, in 1890, had published the famous book The Influence of Sea Power upon History. Britain had been able to establish a world empire because she had become a paramount sea power and had no competitors. Thus, Tirpitz reasoned, if Germany wished to become a world power, only a powerful navy, with modern battleships and armoured cruisers, could make it possible. However, according to his judgement, when he became Secretary of State, the Kaiserliche Marine was a ‘collection of experiments in shipbuilding surpassed in exoticism only by the Russian Navy’. However, warship building was a delicate issue in German domestic politics. Until Tirpitz had become Secretary of State for the Navy, the government and his advisors had tried to have the Reichstag approve money for as many warships as possible, but without a clear strategy beyond coastal defence. Indeed, the Reichstag still had annual budgetary power over the Navy, while the Kaiserliches Heer (Imperial Army) budget was calculated every five years. Moreover, the army was considered the mainstay of Germany’s strength. Tirpitz, however, had a long-term strategy that relied upon the construction of heavy battleships. Since coal was still the main fuel for warships, German naval planners had two options: they could build cruisers with large coal bunkers, but few powerful guns, capable of long endurance without having to return to coaling stations. These would be fast and mobile, but vulnerable in a big naval battle. The other option was to concentrate on heavy battleships with small coal bunkers and equipped with the most powerful guns. These battleships could destroy cruisers but, due to their limited range, would have to remain near home waters or coaling stations overseas. Tirpitz claimed that Germany, having few naval bases overseas, had to concentrate its battleships in the North Sea and the Baltic. Although Tirpitz was reluctant to admit it in public, he made it clear in private that a powerful German battle fleet should be a lever to secure British colonial concessions, as well as a deterrent against British attacks. To those

critics who argued that such a battle fleet could defend neither Germany’s overseas commerce nor its colonies, Tirpitz replied that the mere existence of a strong battle fleet indirectly shielded German colonies and trade all over the world, despite the battleships’ short endurance. On 10 April 1898, the Reichstag passed the first German Naval Law. Its provisions reflected the content of a secret memorandum drafted by Tirpitz in June 1897, where Britain was identified as ‘the most dangerous naval threat’. The fleet required to counter this threat would also enable Germany to face the French and Russian navies. The 1898 Naval Law planned the construction of nineteen battleships (two squadrons of eight, plus a flagship and two spares), eight armoured cruisers, twelve large cruisers and thirty light cruisers to be completed by 1905. The crucial importance of this law was that it ended uncertainty and instability. The whole programme was firmly established in terms of time and cost,8 including the service life after which the different kinds of ships would have to be replaced: 25 years for the battleships, 20 years for the large cruisers and 15 years for the light cruisers. The construction of vessels solely for coastal defence was over. Regarding the battleship/armoured cruiser controversy, Germany decided to follow Britain’s lead and initially focused on battleships. The 1898 Naval Law embodied three of Tirpitz’s principles: an automatic regulation of the obsolescence and replacement of warships; fixing a definite establishment of warships, officers and men, to be reached and maintained over time; and his theory of risk. This theory was described in a memorandum accompanying the proposed Naval Law of 1900 and stated: To protect Germany’s maritime trade and colonies, in the existing circumstances there is only one means: Germany must have a battle fleet so strong that, even for the adversary with the greatest seapower, a war against it would involve such dangers as to imperil his position in the world. For this purpose, it is not absolutely necessary that the German battle fleet should be as strong as that of the greatest naval power, because a great naval power will not, as a rule, be in a position to concentrate all his striking forces against us. But even if it should succeed in meeting us with considerable superiority, the defeat of a strong German fleet would substantially weaken the enemy that, in spite of a victory he might have obtained, his own position in the world would no longer be secured by an adequate fleet.

The German armoured cruiser Scharnhorst, commissioned in 1908. A fleet of battleships and battlecruisers was the centrepiece of the strong fleet proposed by Tirpitz in the Naval Laws that were approved by the Reichstag from 1896 onwards. (D Fillon Collection)

In practice, Tirpitz emphasised the political bargaining power that a fleet would bring to Germany. He maintained that Britain would make concessions to Germany rather than risk a war that would leave her too weak to face the Franco-Russian alliance. In the case of a war breaking out that involved Britain, Russia and France, an enlarged navy would leave Germany with the balance of naval power.

A drawing of Nassau prepared by British naval intelligence. The four units of this class were the first German dreadnought-type battleships. Nassau was laid down on 22 July 1907 and all four ships were commissioned between 1909 and 1910.

On 14 June 1900, Tirpitz submitted a new naval programme to the Reichstag. According to this second Naval Law, by 1920 the strength of the German fleet would be double that established just two year before, including thirty-eight battleships (four squadrons of eight, plus two flagships and four spares), fourteen armoured cruisers, thirty-eight light cruisers and ninety-six destroyers. These warships were split between a battle fleet based in home waters (including all the battleships) and a fleet for overseas service, including three large and ten light cruisers. A reserve fleet existed, too, including four battleships, three armoured cruisers and four light cruisers. The second Naval Law also confirmed the service life of battleships and armoured cruisers, to be replaced respectively after 25 and 20 years. The overall achievement of Tirpitz, who succeeded in getting the law approved by the Reichstag, elated Wilhelm II so much that he made him Secretary of State and a hereditary Prussian peer; hence, the head of RMA became Alfred von Tirpitz.

Goeben, steaming at full speed during her sea trials. The picture shows the general layout of these first generation German battlecruisers. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

THE ROAD TO DREADNOUGHT AND THE INVINCIBLES Initially, the German Naval Laws did not intimidate Britain because the Admiralty was confident that the Royal Navy’s qualitative and quantitative superiority would suffice when facing any future threat. However, prior to the arrival of Fisher as First Sea Lord, the Royal Navy was in the doldrums. Overwhelmed by the pace of technological change and lacking any cohesive strategic direction, British naval policy faltered. Fisher, too, although focused on the combination of speed and firepower, showed some vacillation regarding the type of capital ships that should have priority.9 Moreover, other members of the Admiralty did not share Fisher’s views on speed and firepower. Fisher himself probably realised two things: firstly, that a sudden and radical change in British construction policy would have made him many

enemies within the Admiralty and, secondly, that he could not impose, let alone implement, his technical and tactical concepts in isolation. The best ally he could find when he became First Sea Lord was Rear-Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg, a German prince related to the British Royal Family who had spent his career in the Royal Navy. However, such an alliance was not deemed sufficient to fight, and win, against likely opposition from the conservative Admiralty. To overcome this obstacle without offending those who did not share his opinion, Fisher decided to establish a ‘Committee on Designs’ whose formal mandate was to examine and report on the requirements of future warships.10 This Committee’s scope of work included future battleships, armoured cruisers and destroyers. Its composition reflected Fisher’s strategy to overcome any opposition. Indeed, the members chosen by Fisher for the Committee had already been revealed to Lord Selborne11 prior to his becoming First Sea Lord. Most of these men shared Fisher’s vision and some of them had already worked closely with him. It is noteworthy that, in normal circumstances, the Admiralty discussed and agreed on new designs that were proposed by the Third Sea Lord,12 while the final approval for the actual construction of new warships, with the associated funds, came from the government. The Committee on Designs created by Fisher would change this process, although the Admiralty made the final decision on new construction. The Committee on Designs convened formally for the first time on 22 December 1904 and included naval and civilian personnel, from both government organisations and private companies. The first group included Prince Louis of Battenberg (Director of Naval Intelligence, DNI); Engineer Rear-Admiral Sir John Durston (Engineer-in-Chief of the Fleet and expert in propulsion systems); Rear-Admiral Alfred L Winsloe (Commander of Torpedo and Submarine Flotillas); Captain Henry B Jackson (soon to become Third Sea Lord and Controller); Captain John R Jellicoe (soon to become Director of Naval Ordnance, DNO); Captain Reginald H S Bacon (Naval Assistant to First Sea Lord); and Captain Charles E Madden (soon to become Naval Assistant to Third Sea Lord). The civilians were Sir Philip Watts (Director of Naval Constructions, DNC); W H Gard (Chief Constructor at HM Dockyard Portsmouth); Edmund Froude (Superintendent of the Admiralty’s model test tank at Haslar); Lord Kelvin (physicist and mathematician); J H Biles (Professor of Law at the University of Glasgow); and Sir John Thornycroft (owner of the Thornycroft Shipbuilding

Corporation). Fisher made himself Chairman of the Committee,13 while Commander Wilfred Henderson was the Secretary of the Committee and had Assistant Constructor E H Mitchell as assistant secretary. Assistant Constructor J H Narbeth acted as Secretary to Philips Watts and was responsible for providing details of the various designs.

Prince Louis of Battenberg (1854-1921), here as a Vice-Admiral, played an important role as the senior officer on the ‘Committee on Designs’. He served as First Sea Lord from December 1912 to October 1914. (London News)

TOWARD BATTLECRUISERS: STRATEGY AND ECONOMICS The first result of Fisher’s fervent activities, passed by the Committee on Designs, was the construction of Dreadnought.14 Some historians have judged Dreadnought as the starting point of Anglo-German naval rivalry. Other historians have challenged this statement, saying that such rivalry was because of the first of Tirpitz’s Naval Laws. Other schools have debated, and are still debating, whether the Anglo-German naval race was a major reason for the outbreak of the First World War. A viewpoint common to all is that Dreadnought epitomised a radical change in building new large warships and in encouraging their use in the naval battles of the future. Nevertheless, and regardless of British maritime policy, the problem that Fisher and the Admiralty needed to solve had two facets: the affordability of a battle fleet solely including Dreadnought-type capital ships and the operational and tactical potential offered by evolving naval technologies. As far as affordability was concerned, the impending crisis that Britain faced in the early years of the twentieth century, and the consequent limits imposed on naval spending, prompted a radical rethinking regarding the resourcing of maritime missions and tasks. It must be recalled that, except during the Boer War (1899-1902), when expenditure on the British Army was higher, the Royal Navy was the one of the largest-spending departments of the British government. The First Lord of the Admiralty15 presented the Navy Estimates to Parliament each spring. The Estimates provided a detailed breakdown of anticipated naval expenditure for the upcoming year, preceded the government’s budget by about one month, and were prepared in consultation with the Cabinet and the Chancellor of the Exchequer. Between 1900 and 1905, the Royal Navy built or laid down sixteen battleships, including Dreadnought, at an average cost per ship of £1,339,448. Naval expenditure had risen substantially, from £23,880,875 in 1899-1900 up to £36,859,681 in 1904-5. These rapidly-expanding costs put enormous pressure on the Treasury and some fiscal innovations had to be introduced to cope with the Royal Navy’s requirements. For example, the Naval Works Act of

1896 established that surplus revenue funds were to be used to fund the construction of new and larger warships and the modernisation of the HM Dockyards. However, more expenditure invariably meant higher taxes and the Cabinet, in turn, determined the financial limits of British military spending. Since the Navy Estimates were one of the largest components of government spending and particularly susceptible to cost overruns, they were blamed for unbalancing the budgets. Therefore, while the Royal Navy was popular in Britain, spending was not, one reason for this being the political pressures for social spending in competition with naval and military requirements. According to the British financial scenario, it was therefore quite difficult, if not impossible, to continue the construction of modern warships, especially battleships, in the numbers and varieties required to protect all Britain’s maritime interests. Therefore, some choices were needed and some risks had to be taken.

A stern view of Dreadnought, showing her wide beam. The Admiralty agreed on her design in February 1905 and she was laid down at the Royal Dockyard in Portsmouth on 2 October 1905. (Naval History and Heritage Command, US Navy)

Being visionary and imaginative, Fisher was in the best position to develop

new and innovative ways of meeting the full strategic needs for upholding British maritime supremacy, including questioning the battleship as the yardstick of maritime power. Therefore, building new types of warships, including what would later become the battlecruiser, was both a strategic and economical challenge. Fisher was particularly in favour of torpedo boats and submarines. In August 1904, he had become convinced that fast torpedo boats would outpace the traditional ‘battle fleet’: battleship functions could therefore be performed by fast armoured cruisers. In his ‘Naval Necessities’,16 which were circulated while he was still in Portsmouth, Fisher emphasised that ‘The new Navy, excepting a few special local vessels, [ought] to be absolutely restricted to four type of vessels, being all that modern fighting necessities’. These were a 21-knot battleship, a 25-knot armoured cruiser, a 36-knot destroyer equipped with 4in guns and modern, ocean-going submarines. However, when Fisher became First Sea Lord his interest in battleships seemed to waver. He considered the possibility that Britain should suspend the construction of new battleships, which could then be replaced by fast armoured cruisers. To compensate for their thin armour, they would rely mainly on speed and firepower, and fight the enemy head on. In this way, it would be difficult for enemy shells to penetrate their armour, which in turn could be made thinner. On the other hand, Fisher was aware that Britain could not stop building battleships because other nations, in Europe and elsewhere, were continuing to build them. Therefore, he reasoned, a new type of battleship, as fast as armoured cruisers but equipped with large-calibre guns, had to be developed. From a strategic point of view, Britain still had three main imperatives and challenges: to defend, respectively, the homeland, the empire and the vast network of interwoven global trade routes. Fisher realised that the conventional approach to these requirements, that of employing three specialist platforms – battleships, station cruisers,17 and armoured cruisers – was no longer affordable or even tactically sound. The battle fleet was now vulnerable to the torpedo in shallow waters around the homeland, while the speed and range of heavy modern warships meant that the less-capable station cruisers scattered around the world on diplomatic duties were vulnerable. Squadrons of fast armoured cruisers could pose a real threat to enemy vessels that were neither strong enough to fight, nor fast enough to run away. Again, Fisher turned to new technologies in a problem-solving

exercise: if submarines and torpedoes were making the shallow seas unacceptably risky for the battle fleet, then move the battle fleet out of harm’s way and rely on these very systems in British waters to deter any potential invader. Similarly, Britain needed to develop ‘flying squadrons’ of powerful and fast armoured cruisers that could respond quickly to events around the world, including in British waters when needed, and do away with station cruisers. In short, submarines and new fast armoured cruisers would take the place of the three specialist platforms, with the promise of considerable savings.

FROM DREADNOUGHT TO INVINCIBLE Before examining the process that led to the design of the Invincible class battlecruisers, it is worth mentioning the impact of the lessons learned from the Russo-Japanese war regarding tactical and technical concepts that were then prevailing in Europe. The war between Russia and Japan culminated with the battle of Tsushima, on 27 May 1905. The Russian and Japanese navies had already implemented technological advances in naval guns and machinery. Analyses after Tsushima led to four immediate, widely-accepted conclusions: armour was effective against every type of naval shell; large calibres were more accurate than small calibres; battleships remained key players in naval warfare; and the performance of destroyers and torpedo boats relied on skilled crews. Further analyses proved that these conclusions could not be fully accepted without taking into account other aspects such as tactical innovations that derived from greater speed and manoeuvrability. Indeed, Tsushima proved that naval engagements could be fought at greater ranges than formerly considered. In addition, the threat posed by the torpedo, which debuted at Tsushima, made it imperative that battles be fought at longer ranges, while improvements in fire control later validated this conclusion. In short, Tsushima provided a confirmation for Fisher and the Admiralty that, after all, the decision to modernise the Royal Navy by building not only Dreadnoughttype battleships but also powerfully-armed and faster battlecruisers was tactically correct. While the official genesis of the Invincible class battlecruisers occurred in the Committee on Designs, Fisher and W H Gard, who was Chief Constructor at the HM Dockyard Portsmouth, had already performed some preliminary activities during their Mediterranean posting. The very first

conceptual approach to a new generation of armoured cruisers dated back to early 1902, when Gard started to work out a preliminary outline of a ship that Fisher christened Perfection. Her particulars were a speed of 25 knots, a displacement of 15,000 tons, a main battery of four 9.2in guns, and a secondary battery of twelve 7.5in quick-firing guns. Some features of Perfection reflected Fisher’s ‘dreams’: funnels were to be abolished if possible, or made telescopic if not;18 no bridges, derricks, anchor gear and masts, except for one wireless pole; magazines placed below the guns, eliminating ammunition passages and reducing the number of men needed to handle ammunition; and an ability to use ten guns either ahead or astern. Fisher sent this proposal to the Admiralty but it had little effect on the Royal Navy’s construction policy. When Fisher went to London in June 1902 as Second Sea Lord, he saw that the design of capital ships had been realised differently from that which he had proposed. The construction policy that had gone ahead was aimed at producing capital ships that were individually superior to similar types in foreign navies. This led to an increase in their size. In his capacity as Commander-in-Chief Portsmouth, Fisher further developed his earlier proposals for new designs for battleships and armoured cruisers. He was supported by Gard and they worked out details for two different designs. Both had a uniform-calibre armament that originated from advances in long-range fire control. The proposed battleship was armed with sixteen 10in guns, and the armoured cruiser had an equal number of 9.2in guns. Both designs featured a displacement of 15,900 tons, the battleship having a top speed of 21 knots and the armoured cruiser 25.5 knots. Although the design could be considered innovative, it is hard to imagine how a propulsion plant designed for 25.5 knots might be accommodated in a hull roughly the same size as one for a vessel designed for 21 knots. Returning to London as First Sea Lord, Fisher wasted no time in promoting his ideas. The 25.5-knot armoured cruiser armed with sixteen 9.2in guns proposed by Gard evolved as Unapproachable in October 1904. These ideas lingered when a debate arose within the Committee on Designs regarding the possibility of installing larger-calibre guns on warships that were smaller than battleships. After some discussion, the Committee agreed that 12in guns could also prove valuable on ships forming a fast light squadron to support battleships and fight against enemy vessels in the vanguard or in rearguard of an enemy battle fleet.

Another factor that probably influenced such agreement was that some capital ships which were being built for the navies of Italy (Regina Elena class) and Japan (Tsukuba class) had a main battery of 12in guns. The decision to equip both Dreadnought and the planned new armoured cruisers with 12in guns was also probably taken to retain the same main armament for the two types of ships. An additional reason was that Fisher probably hoped the new design might evolve into a potential, cheaper alternative to costly battleships. In any case, the choice to install 12in guns on the future armoured cruisers was crucial because it paved the way for a new type of capital ship that was to eventually become the battlecruiser. Beside the decision to go ahead with the construction of a new generation of armoured cruisers, the Committee on Designs also tried to define their concept of operations.19 For the new battleship, this was an easy task because the type had been in service for a long time. For the armoured cruiser the issue was to convert Fisher’s various proposals, especially regarding superior speed, into roles and missions. In doing so, the Committee had to consider many aspects: the roles of existing armoured cruisers, how greater speed and firepower could be exploited, and against which type of enemy warship the new armoured cruisers would fight. In the geostrategic scenario of late 1904/early 1905, the Royal Navy initially focused its attention on Germany. This was because of both the Entente Cordiale and the alliance between France and Russia, but the Admiralty was also aware of developments occurring within other European navies. In broad terms, this would mean that naval battles and engagements would probably take place in confined waters such as the Channel, the North Sea, the Baltic, and the Mediterranean. In addition, the possibility of facing naval contingencies in distant maritime areas existed, this being a task aptly suited for a squadron of fast armoured cruisers. From a strategic point of view, the rise of German naval power was changing the naval balance. The Admiralty did not foresee that the Kaiserliche Marine would seriously threaten maritime trade routes. Rather, the German fleet would be concentrated in the North Sea, acting as a deterrent to the Royal Navy, and thus fully implementing the concepts promulgated by Tirpitz. The longer such circumstances persisted, the better it was for Germany in expanding and increasing her fleet. From a tactical point of view, the existing slow armoured cruisers could not act as an effective scouting force for the battle fleet because they did not possess the speed,

protection and firepower of the existing battleships, let alone Dreadnought’s. Therefore, the main task of future British armoured cruisers would be reconnaissance in force. Since they were powerfully armed, they could intrude into any screen made up of existing cruisers and destroyers, report on the composition of an enemy fleet through close observation and quickly withdraw thanks to their speed. If speed and firepower could ensure that they would prevail over enemy cruisers and destroyers and escape from enemy battleships, an additional assumption was that they did not require protection in dealing with direct hits. Moreover, their firepower and greater speed would enable them to chase and pursue a retreating enemy fleet and possibly destroy or damage slow enemy warships. Another task suited to the new armoured cruisers would be their rapid concentration and their movements during a naval engagement. They would deploy ahead or astern of the battle line so that they could protect the battleships against sudden action by enemy warships, especially destroyers. At the same time and should the opportunity arise, they might threaten enemy battleships but engage them only if circumstances were favourable. Their greater speed could also allow them to perform enveloping movements in the rearguard or vanguard of the enemy battle line and hence gain a good firing position against isolated enemy warships. The task of protecting maritime commerce would remain unchanged for the new armoured cruisers.20 Their speed could cope with enemy raiding cruisers and armed merchant vessels, and their superior firepower could annihilate them. For an island nation like Britain, maritime commerce protection was probably the most important priority and the early classes of British battlecruisers were thus suited to this. Conversely, maritime commerce interdiction would have been the objective for German battlecruisers; however, to meet other requirements the Kaiserliche Marine opted for more balanced designs. Shore bombardment was another task not immediately considered, but it was something that both British and German battlecruisers would perform several times during the First World War. In fact, their armament was suited to engage coastal targets such as military and industrial facilities, ports, forts and other infrastructure. Should an enemy force suddenly appear in an area of operations, their speed would ensure quick retirement. A further task was global power projection, which cruisers showing the flag on foreign stations traditionally carried out. A battlecruiser would make a far more lasting

impression in this, with a single ship able to cover more maritime space than several smaller cruisers. Finally, a little known role the Royal Navy conceived for the new armoured cruisers was engagement against smaller German battleships, such as the Wittelsbach class, or similarly-sized warships. Several authors have stated that the Admiralty never formally approved such missions and tasks, but these would come later as shown by the first engagements in the First World War. In fact, in his report on the 1913 naval manoeuvres, Vice-Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, Commander-in-Chief of the Red Fleet (representing the German High Seas Fleet), noted first among several points: (a.) The immense value of battle cruisers of the highest speed. They dominate the situation absolutely. This has been shown time after time in both the recent and in previous manoeuvres. They can drive off any other cruiser with great ease, they can shadow a battle fleet with equal ease, and it is almost impossible to shake them off in the daytime; the only method by which they can be disposed of is by waiting till dark and then attacking them with destroyers. A Commander-in-Chief will certainly sacrifice a good deal to compass the destruction of hostile battle cruisers, as he cannot feel safe until they are disposed of. Battle cruisers, or at any rate some of them, must have a speed at least equal to that attained by the battle cruisers of possible enemies. The value of powerful armament and good protection in a ship of great speed is enormous, but if an opposing vessel has considerably greater speed even with less offensive qualities it will be difficult to shake off.

Some months later (December 1913), in his ‘Remarks on the Conduct of a Fleet in Action’, the then-Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet, Admiral Sir George A. Callaghan, gave the ‘principal functions’ of battlecruisers in action: Battle-Cruisers. – The primary function must be that of engaging the battle-cruisers of the enemy. There are many reasons for this, the most important being that, owing to their great power and speed, battle-cruisers, if not in the line of battle, can force all inferior vessels to give way, and, consequently, if the enemy’s battle-cruisers are not ‘held,’ their power to inflict damage on ships of weaker types is unchecked, and they are able to assume positions from which they can concentrate on, or enfilade, the line of battle, cover the attack of light-cruisers and torpedo-craft, etc. If the enemy has no battle-cruisers with his fleet, the function of our battle-cruisers may be an equally definite one; they may be employed as a fast division of the battlefleet, or comparative freedom of action may be given to the Admiral commanding to

attack the enemy in the manner (indicated above) he may judge best.

It is noteworthy that initially Fisher did not claim that the new armoured cruisers would deploy in the main battle line and fight alongside battleships. However, it is interesting that, while the Committee on Designs was discussing roles and missions for the new British armoured cruisers, the battle of Tsushima became the stage to test the concept of deploying armoured cruisers in the battle line. The progress report of the Committee confirmed Fisher’s ideas concerning the new fast armoured cruiser as a fast battleship. In that report, he stated that they were not comparable with any existing warships because in reality they were faster. A brief examination of the sequence of events provides insight into the developments that led to the final decisions regarding the design and construction of British battlecruisers. The Committee on Designs met for the last time on 22 February 1905. The Admiralty approved the general designs that they proposed for both Dreadnought and the new class of armoured cruisers on 17 March 1905 (before Tsushima), while the final detailed design for the future Invincible class was approved on 7 July 1905 (six weeks after Tsushima). As for funding the new constructions, the Royal Navy was given a large increase in the 1904-5 Navy Estimates by promising the British cabinet that substantial reductions would be made the following year. However, a negative forecast was to affect the Admiralty programmes that Lord Selborne had devised a few years earlier. He planned to lay down three battleships and four armoured cruisers annually to keep pace with the strategic requirements. Meanwhile, some additional ideas lingered regarding the future of capital ships. In December 1905 Fisher set up what was actually a second Committee on Designs to consider the merging of the battleship and armoured cruiser into a so-called ‘fusion design’ with ten 12in guns, a speed of 25 knots and a displacement of 22,500 tons. However, this Committee did not fully support Fisher’s views: the general feeling was that the Entente Cordiale and the defeat of the Russian fleet had diminished the need for fast and more powerful cruisers while Dreadnought-type battleships, that were allegedly cheaper than the fusion design, could counter the growing German threat. Considerable pressure also came from the Treasury: the commitment to a stringent economic policy had practically ruled out the possibility of combining high speed, heavy armament and thick armour in a single vessel

because of increased cost per unit. A compromise was reached to maintain both types of capital ships and reduce the procurement of armoured cruisers from four to three. Therefore, the 1905-6 Navy Estimates presented to Parliament on 13 February 1905 totalled £33,151,841, a reduction of over £3.5 million from the previous year. This included the construction of Dreadnought and three new armoured cruisers.21 In short, this outcome favoured Fisher’s preference for the new type of warship because he could claim that ‘his’ battlecruisers could be built without increasing the Navy Estimates. As for the terminology, the old name ‘armoured cruiser’ continued to be used and Invincible was defined as such when ordered. In the Report of the Navy Estimate Committee in November 1905, the battleship and armoured cruiser were merged together as ‘large armoured ships’ and later the term ‘capital ship’ was used for both.

REACTIONS IN GERMANY AND THE RESPONSE IN BRITAIN The construction of the three Invincibles22 was greatly concealed. In accordance with Fisher’s instructions, false information was leaked so that the new British ships would be considered merely as a development of the previous Minotaur class armoured cruisers. The construction of Dreadnought was also carried out in great secrecy, as a decoy to any foreign naval powers interested in British warship developments. The very first reaction of Germany to Fisher’s deception plan was the construction of Blücher, the last German armoured cruiser, which was definitely less capable than the Invincibles. The deception worked well because the appearance of Dreadnought left the German Navy with a dilemma: either to abandon its plan to compete with the Royal Navy or devote more funds to the construction of larger capital ships. After a debate within the RMA, von Tirpitz and his staff decided to accept the new challenge and in May 1906 he went to the Reichstag with a supplement (‘Novelle’) to the second Naval Law. Approved on 19 May, the Novelle 1906 added to the fleet six large cruisers (five for service overseas and one spare) and forty-eight destroyers, while the budget for the German Navy rose from RM206,555 million in 1904 to RM290,883 million in 1907. However, although the 1906 Novelle allowed construction of the four Nassau class battleships to start, it failed to cope with the Invincibles. The

latter’s actual characteristics were publicly announced only in summer 1906 when it was too late to modify the armament layout of Blücher, let alone the calibre of her guns and other features. In fact, when the Invincibles were revealed publicly in summer 1906 it was clear that their 25-knot speed and 12in guns definitely outpaced Blücher’s 8.2in guns and 23-knot speed. The Hague Conference (June-October 1907) attempted to limit the naval armament race between Britain and Germany. However, the conference had little chance of success, since Germany opposed what it perceived as ‘unilateral disarmament’. Thus, the German Navy decided again to attempt to counter the new British warships. In the 1908 Novelle,23 Tirpitz announced that the new construction programme would include an all-big-gun armoured cruiser comparable to the Invincibles. The first of these warships was Von der Tann, which became the first real German battlecruiser. Meanwhile, the debate within the Admiralty over a possible continuation of the Invincible programme stalled, since they assumed the three new battlecruisers were more than adequate to withstand the perceived threat stemming from Blücher and other older armoured cruisers. Fisher managed to add an improved Invincible to the 1907-08 Navy Estimates, justifying his view that this new battlecruiser would be more powerful and faster than Dreadnought and the Invincibles. However, the Admiralty rejected this proposal because of high costs and disagreement on the calibre of her main guns. The Admiralty instead decided that the 1908-9 Navy Estimates would include only one battleship and one battlecruiser, this being a mere repeat of the Invincibles.24 Meanwhile, the Kaiserliche Marine had started the construction of the battlecruisers Moltke and Goeben, the first ordered under the 1908-9 programme and the second a year later.

Invincible, Inflexible and Indomitable, dressed with flags and passing through the Solent in 1909. Their construction was kept secret and false information was leaked about their characteristics. (Courtesy, T Dickens, World Naval Ship Forum)

When, in summer 1908, the Director of Naval Intelligence reported the enlarged scope of German naval plans for new battleships and battlecruisers, Fisher ordered a concurrent enlargement of the original Invincible’s design and a new campaign of secrecy began for what would later be revealed as Indefatigable. In addition, in a political move aimed at strengthening their positions within what was starting to be called the Commonwealth, Australia and New Zealand decided to fund the construction of two units of the same design. This decision paved the way for the construction of the battlecruisers Australia (under Royal Australian Navy command but available to Britain in case of war) and New Zealand (under the command of the Royal Navy).25 Prime Minister Asquith reaffirmed the principle of the Two Power Standard in 1908, but meanwhile the French and Russian navies had been replaced as the world’s second and third ranked navies by the German and US fleets. A different approach based on a 60% quantitative superiority of the Royal Navy over the Kaiserliche Marine was proposed in 1909, but would be announced to the House of Commons only in March 1912. In summer 1909, the Admiralty began to suspect that the Kaiserliche Marine had begun a programme to expand its fleet of battleships and battlecruisers with additional units that could possibly outnumber Britain’s capital ships. A confirmation of

these fears came from meetings held between Sir Edward Grey, the thenBritish Foreign Secretary, and the German ambassador in London.

Von der Tann at anchor. She was the first real German battlecruiser, built in the framework of the 1906 supplement to the second Naval Law proposed by Tirpitz to further strengthen the German fleet. (Library of Congress)

This gave birth to what was known as the ‘Naval Scare’. The ‘revelation’ of German naval plans alarmed some members of Parliament, who viewed the German fleet as a sword pointed at the very heart of the British Empire. To counter this threat Reginald McKenna, First Lord of the Admiralty since April 1908, proposed an expansion of Britain’s construction programmes, including six capital ships in the 1909-10 Estimates and another twelve in the next two fiscal years. A fierce debate started between the Liberals and Conservatives, with members of both parties arguing the merits of increased naval expenditure as opposed to the need for social programmes.

Reginald McKenna (1863-1943), First Lord of the Admiralty from April 1908 to October 1911. To counter the German naval buildup, he proposed an expansion of Britain’s construction programmes, including eighteen capital ships across the 1909-12 Naval Estimates. (Library of Congress)

Australia, alongside at Portsmouth in June 1913. She was funded by Australia and put under Royal Australian Navy command but made available to Britain in the event of war. (Royal Australian Navy)

The discussions ended with a compromise that allowed funding of four capital ships in 1909, and conceded special funding for an additional four, that Britain would build to face any further German naval expansion. As for battlecruisers, this meant the approval of the construction programme for Lion, with special funding provisions for Princess Royal. Another battlecruiser, Queen Mary, would follow within the 1910-11 Estimates. These battlecruisers departed significantly from the Invincibles and Indefatigables, and represented a major leap forward from the previous designs. Their most significant improvement was the introduction of 13.5in guns. The last battlecruiser laid down in Britain before the outbreak of World War one was Tiger, included in the 1911-12 Navy Estimates.26 Reaction from Germany materialised with new construction programmes funded by existing budget provisions and with a further Supplement to the 1900 Naval Law, the ‘Novelle 1912’. This Supplement, approved on 21 May 1912, called for three additional capital ships to be built over the next five years, which added one ship each year (1912, 1914 and 1916) to the existing

programmes. Tirpitz also wanted to increase and redistribute personnel, so more ships would be ready for active service. Between 1910 and 1914, the Kaiserliche Marine built and commissioned Seydlitz, an improvement of the Moltke class, followed by Derfflinger, based on a radical new design that would show its merit during the impending conflict. In short, from the laying down of Invincible to the beginning of the war, the battlecruiser component of the naval armament race between Britain and Germany included the commissioning of fourteen battlecruisers, nine in the Royal Navy and five in the Kaiserliche Marine, destined to become key players in the next maritime war.

Herbert Asquith (1852-1928), British prime minister from 1908 to 1916, reaffirmed the principle of the ‘Two Power Standard’, with German and US fleets replacing those of France and Russia as the reference points for defining the Royal Navy’s strength. (Library

of Congress)

A view from the bow of the battlecruiser New Zealand at anchor in Wellington in 1913.

She and her almost-twins, Indefatigable and Australia, were really a mere repetition of the Invincibles. (Courtesy, National Library of New Zealand)

BIRTH OF THE BATTLECRUISER: TECHNOLOGICAL CHALLENGES When considering the development of armoured cruiser design and its evolution into the battlecruiser in the early 1900s, it is important to remember that a large-scale conflict had not occurred in Europe for nearly thirty years. The few regional wars that had taken place up to Tsushima did not influence overall warship design but involved lesser, but still critical, aspects such as logistic support and movements of troops ashore. Small wars provided little operational understanding in comprehending effective solutions when implementing new designs.

Lion at sea. The three Lion-class battlecruisers, built between 1909 and 1913, represented a significant improvement over the Indefatigables in terms of speed, main armament and protection. (Courtesy, R A Burt)

As far as armoured cruiser design was concerned, it followed concepts and rules that major warships usually implemented and were dictated by key requirements. Firstly, a warship needed protection for her vital systems

against enemy shells and torpedoes. Secondly, her fighting potential had to be at least equal to that of similar enemy warships, while her speed had to equal and possibly be greater than that of her competitors. This was so she could engage and disengage at times of her choosing. Thirdly, her range needed to be adequate for meeting tactical requirements that were imposed by strategic and political circumstances. Achieving the best compromise amid these requirements would mean the success of a major warship design, be it a battleship, an armoured cruiser, or a real battlecruiser.

HULL AND PROTECTION Significant developments had occurred since iron had replaced wood in the construction of a warship’s hull.27 However, it was the replacement of iron with steel, first used in the mid-1870s, which marked a real innovation. Concurrent with progress in naval artillery was the development of new ways to protect both hull sides and gun installations without increasing a warship’s overall weight. A first solution came from compound armour, soon to be replaced by mild steel that was thereafter largely adopted for new warships. The technological studies and trials of construction materials concluded that the best solution was nickel-steel, since it offered better resistance to hits than any other type of steel. Nearly all major navies used nickel-steel for their new warships, while the Royal Navy preferred to employ Harveyised, or cemented, steel plates. Harveyised armour immediately established its superiority over other types: the improvement amounted to an 18% increase in resistance, 13 inches of Harvey armour being equivalent to about 15.5 inches of nickel-steel armour, with weight saving being the immediate benefit. The most important development in the armour field occurred in Germany, thanks to the processes developed by Friedrich Krupp.

An aerial view of the German battlecruiser Derfflinger. She was based on a new design, that would show its merit during the First World War. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

In the early 1880s, Krupp improved its armour production process in order to gain additional hardness in steel plates. This process was applied to manufacture Krupp Non-Cemented (KNC) plates, especially for the German navy.28 The next development occurred during the early years of the twentieth century and resulted in the Krupp Cemented (KC) armour. Industrial developments in Europe favoured the diffusion of these processes outside Germany so that KNC and KC plates were also used for the protection of many European warships, including British battlecruisers.29 The latter also used high tensile (HT) and nickel-steel armour plates, especially for horizontal protection. These developments in armour and in naval gunnery heavily influenced warship design. The advent of mechanical propulsion did not convince the major naval powers to abandon sail rigging until the late 1880s, but boilers and engine rooms had definitely found their location in the after-centre section of the hull. The introduction of watertight bulkheads was another

significant aspect of passive protection and allowed a better exploitation of internal hull volumes. Maximum firepower being a key requirement, the placement of new types of guns and their protection became a major driver of the design process for several decades. A long debate was sparked in Britain in 1880 that produced the design of Collingwood. She was a battleship with a displacement of 9,500 tons and a main battery arranged around two twin 12in gun turrets placed at each end of an armoured citadel that enclosed and protected the secondary battery. Such an armament layout would be adopted in most other British and German battleships up to Dreadnought, as well as in armoured cruisers. The only difference was that 9.2in guns formed the main armament of the latter. Regarding armour arrangement, the emphasis was mostly on concentrating armour over critical areas. Thus, a main belt protected the central section of the hull. It ran vertically from just below the waterline to some distance above it and extended from, approximately, the forward gun turret to the aft one. The main belt armour would normally decrease to a lesser thickness along the side of the hull towards bow and stern. It might also decrease from the central citadel towards the superstructure.

The test tank at Torquay where Edmund Froude performed the first tests to further enhance the evolution in hull configuration that had commenced with the introduction of steel.

The launch of the German predreadnought battleship Preussen on 30 October 1903. The developments in hull construction and armour from the late 1890s onwards benefitted all new British and German capital ship programmes. (Dillinger Hütte)

The Dillinger Hütte armour test range at Dillingen, Saarland, in 1904. Here, armour plates were tested before being accepted for installation on German capital ships. (Dillinger Hütte)

Winston Churchill (1874-1965), a strong supporter of a powerful Royal Navy, became First Lord of the Admiralty in 1911. He established a solid relationship with Fisher, who became a frequent visitor to the First Lord after the outbreak of the First World War, and played a decisive role in reappointing Admiral Fisher, then aged 74, as First Sea Lord in October

1914. (Library of Congress)

Several European navies soon followed the example of Britain and built their own test tanks. This picture shows the model test tank at Bremerhaven, built in 1899 adjacent to the ‘Kaiserdock 1’. (HSVA)

Horizontal protection was typically more limited and thinner than vertical protection for two main reasons. Firstly, the flat trajectory of enemy shells tended to hit hull sides and other vertical parts of a ship; secondly, the need to avoid stability problems caused by topside weight, especially when battleships and armoured cruisers were designed with a higher freeboard than similar previous designs. A double bottom running for almost all the hull length provided some form of underwater protection. The introduction of mines and torpedoes in the inventory of naval warfare would cause an extension of the double bottom up to the lower part of the hull sides, the adoption of anti-torpedo nets30 and the installation of a longitudinal bulkhead below the main deck. After 1915, underwater protection gained more importance, when several studies and tests proved the effectiveness of solutions based on the combination of bulges

and multiple longitudinal bulkheads. Finally, the model testing initiated in 1867 by William Froude and later introduced both in Germany and other European countries further enhanced the evolution in hull form that configuration commenced with the introduction of steel.

PROPULSION AND MACHINERY The last quarter of the nineteenth century saw the definitive consolidation of mechanical propulsion for warships. High-pressure steam generated by evolving types of boilers fed multiple reciprocating engines that were directly linked to one or more shafts equipped with two- or three-blade propellers. Various studies conducted in Britain and other nations subsequently set the following requirements: the entire propulsion plan (boilers, engines, condensers and ancillary equipment) had to be arranged entirely below the waterline; engines had to be simple in construction so as to allow for optimal effectiveness and all parts of the propulsion plant had to be readily and easily accessible for required maintenance and removal. In 1900, progress with materials and procedures confirmed three important trends: a decrease in volume and weight of machinery spaces; an increase of specific power and, most importantly, a decrease of specific coal consumption. As far as boilers were concerned, using Belleville boilers in British warships was advantageous, although it favoured French commercial interests over British manufacturers. Although several large British warships had already been equipped with Belleville boilers, a Committee on Boilers convened in September 1900 to address the issue. After four years of trials and experiments with several types of boilers, in June 1904 the Committee recommended maintaining Belleville boilers on warships already fitted with them, but adopting British-made boilers on new warships. The Admiralty initially chose Babcock & Wilcox boilers for capital ships and Yarrow boilers for smaller vessels.

Turbinia, the experimental steam turbine-powered vessel built by Sir Charles Parson in 1894. Turbines soon replaced reciprocating engines in warships both large and small.

A remarkable technological revolution occurred in 1884 when Sir Charles Parsons invented the steam turbine.31 This new machine was not considered for marine application until 1892, when running several types of turbinedriven devices ashore proved its superiority over multiple reciprocating engines. After Turbinia, an experimental vessel built in 1894, steamed down the Jubilee Review at Spithead at over 30 knots, the Admiralty ordered, in 1899, a turbine-equipped torpedo-boat destroyer, the Viper. During her first contractors’ trials, Viper reached an average speed of 35.4 knots, thus demonstrating superior performance when compared to comparable vessels equipped with reciprocating engines.32 In 1902, the Admiralty ordered Amethyst, a 3,000-ton cruiser equipped with steam turbines that confirmed her superiority in comparison with sister-ships still equipped with

reciprocating engines. The ultimate decision to the adopt the steam turbine for battleships and battlecruisers came from the Committee on Designs, which advised that in future turbine machinery should be used exclusively in all classes of warships. According to Lord Selborne, the steam turbines were chosen ‘because of the saving in weight and reduction in the number of working parts and reduced liability to breakdown; its smooth working, ease of manipulation, saving in coal consumption at high powers, and hence in boiler-room space, and saving in engine-room complement; also because of the increased protection provided with this system, due to the engines being lower in the ship’. Efficiency and economy were the two main elements that led to the preference of turbines over reciprocating piston engines. Turbines required less steam than piston engines for any given power output. They thus needed fewer boilers to achieve the same speed. This meant saving weight in the propulsion plant, in the hull structure and in the protection, since a reduced length in the configuration of the whole machinery led to a proportionate length reduction of the entire ship. Turbines were also shorter than piston engines, so that they could be located below the waterline and therefore given better protection.33 In terms of reliability, a steam turbine was a rotating machine that had fewer moving components than a piston engine, the latter being therefore more prone to failure and requiring more maintenance. Another technical challenge that derived from increasingly powerful turbine-driven propulsion plants was solved by splitting the total power into four shafts, so that each shaft and its propeller could work without too much stress at full power. Both Dreadnought and the Invincible class battlecruisers sported four shafts, a feature that would be implemented in all British capital ships that followed. The employment of the steam turbine was later refined with the introduction of several types of engines, namely Curtis, De Laval and Brown. All experiments and studies conducted by their inventors had in common the objective of maximising the whole process of converting thermal energy into mechanical energy. This occurred firstly in the United States, and later in Europe, and included the development of high-pressure, medium-pressure and low-pressure turbines, along with the installation of devices that enabled engines to reverse for steaming astern. However, tests and trials showed that steam turbines were inefficient at

low speeds, where coal consumption was higher than at high speeds. The introduction of the cruising turbine, optimised to run at lower steam pressures, would solve the problem of saving coal at low speed. However, cruising turbines proved to be unreliable due to their discontinuous use and therefore were not installed on the later classes of battlecruisers with directdrive turbines.34 When Turbinia failed to achieve the expected speeds in her first trials, Parsons discovered a significant issue stemming from the adoption of steam turbines as maritime engines. Studying the effects of a propeller rotating at high speed, he soon realised what later became known as cavitation.35 Modifying the propeller design helped, as did using smaller propellers, but in practical use the only option was to run the turbine at less efficient slower speeds and use small propellers. The solution to the problem was that turbines needed to be geared down, but a reduction gear was introduced only in 1911 on some British destroyers and adopted for the first time in the designs of the Courageous class battlecruisers. As far as the Kaiserliche Marine was concerned, the scenario was different. Although Germany had reached a degree of industrialisation comparable to Britain’s, and was in some fields even more advanced, von Tirpitz and his staff showed great caution in introducing sophisticated new propulsion plants. Therefore, the German Navy chose to fit its first all-big-gun battleships – the Nassau class – with a conventional propulsion plant consisting of three triple-expansion reciprocating engines. The second group of four German dreadnought-type battleships and the last German armoured cruiser, the Helgoland class and Blücher respectively, all laid down in 1908, were also fitted with reciprocating machinery. Von der Tann was the first German battlecruiser equipped with steam turbines, later adopted in major German capital ships. The German Navy had, however, introduced small water-tube boilers well before the Royal Navy, thus exploiting the weight and size savings to improve hull protection. The Admiralty opposed an attempt to introduce small water-tube boilers in the design of the battlecruiser Lion, as such a radical change was judged premature.36

Steam turbines ready for installation at the Blohm & Voss factory in Hamburg. Weight and space saved through using steam turbines was exploited to improve other features, such as armour and armament (Blohm and Voss).

In order to recover from a technological delay that would negatively affect tactical and operational circumstances, the German Navy pressed for the installation of modern propulsion plants far beyond safety limits usually adopted by the Royal Navy. This reflected the great importance that was attached to the operation of warships able to match or outperform their British counterparts, but resulted in cramped machinery spaces.

THE BATTLE OF FUELS A technical challenge that positively influenced the overall efficiency of the propulsion plant, and hence the overall effectiveness of the warship, was the replacement of coal with liquid fuel. Such a challenge had wide strategic

implications because it concerned the availability of supply sources, both within and outside Europe. One reason why the earliest experiments carried out on marine boilers burning oil fuel occurred in Britain only in the mid1860s was that Britain and Germany had plenty of coal mines.37 A second reason was the danger of fire in case of oil leakage, a nightmare for all mariners since the introduction of mechanical propulsion. Additionally, the location of coal bunkers on board warships provided additional protection. This was probably another reason why the issue of using oil on warships remained dormant until 1901. At the time, and due to the progress brought about by the adoption of KC armour plates, new experiments took place ashore at Devonport and Haslar, with coal being sprayed with oil to increase the evaporation rate. The very first advantage of oil versus coal is the former’s greater caloric value. Secondly, oil can be stowed in any compartment of a warship, whatever its shape and the location, and can be easily transferred from there to the boilers. Thirdly, coal bunkering from a supply ship to a warship was a very long and tiresome task that involved a great deal of personnel and raised much dust all over the ship, causing great injury to the health of the stokers.

Stokers aboard the battlecruiser Australia. Coal was widely used on both British and German warships and the location of coal bunkers on board also provided additional protection. (Royal Australian Navy)

The technical advantages of oil over coal were translated into operational ones, the major one being the increase in speed and endurance of an oil-fired warship. Moreover, a large oil-fired warship such as a battlecruiser offered a significant saving in the engine-room complement. For example, the battlecruiser Tiger had boilers fed by coal sprayed with oil, with an engine room complement of 600 personnel; conversely, the battlecruiser Hood was equipped only with oil-fed boilers and her engine room complement decreased to 300. As far as warship design was concerned, the introduction of oil enabled either an increase in power and speed for a given weight of machinery, especially in larger warships, or reduced weight and space requirements for a given power. The weight and space savings could then be exploited for other military requirements, such as armour and armament. Lastly, it should be said that two things influenced the adoption of oil: firstly, the amount of crude oil produced in the world increased from 4.2 million tons in 1880 to 21.3 million tons in 1900. Secondly, Britain had an easy access to oil wells located in many regions surrounding her empire.38 Other navies, both in Europe and elsewhere, had also been active in developing the use of liquid fuels, initially for mixed firing and later as a more efficient alternative to coal.39 In the German Navy, the abundance of domestic coal and the uncertainty of oil supply in case of emergency precluded significant changes in fuel policy. In 1898, the Kaiser Barbarossa class battleships were the first German warships provided with small quantities of oil. However, it was only in 1908-9 that spraying oil on coal became standard procedure. The adoption of propulsion plants entirely made of oil-fired boilers, however, took a long time to come on board German warships; all battleships and battlecruisers designed before the First World War were hence equipped with both coal-fired and oil-fired boilers.

GUNS AND FIRE CONTROL In the late 1900s, the main driver for development in major world navies was the availability of powerful naval guns. The objectives of most innovations introduced at that time were greater precision and increased striking power at

long range. In this context, the competition between British and German naval guns was a competition between Armstrong and Krupp models, the former manufactured through the combination of several tubes and the latter made of a single barrel. The composite barrel was better suited to withstand tensile and compression stresses, but Krupp later closed the gap by producing guns that were made of nickel-steel alloys. Improvements in the breechloading mechanisms, both in Britain and in Germany, increased safety for gunners and avoided gas leakage that could result in less effective shooting. New gun models with a higher muzzle velocity delivered an increase in kinetic energy against the target. Guns could also be manufactured with improved steel alloys, which enabled a rise in chamber pressure without a significant increase in weight.

Oil wells in Romania in the early years of the twentieth century. The use of oil-fired boilers on warships greatly contributed to saving manpower in the engine rooms. However, while the Royal Navy had free access to most of the world’s oil producing areas, Germany had to rely on much more limited resources.

Important developments also affected the gun turrets; improved elevation

and training mechanisms allowed the turret crews to aim continuously at the target. This was also the case when the ship was rolling and pitching. Advances in loading arrangements and ammunition supply enabled a higher sustained rate of fire, which was essential for the implementation of new tactics based on greater firepower in all circumstances. The installation of several large and heavy turrets required strengthening of their mountings, so the hull structures could easily absorb higher loads. Developments also affected the ammunition, both projectiles40 and bursting charges; the casing of the former progressively evolved from iron to chromium-steel alloys, while the latter developed toward modified cordite with a slower combustion time that enabled the employment of larger charges, providing a uniform pressure distributed along the gun barrel. All navies introduced safety rules and procedures to limit hazards inherent in storing and handling ammunition, but often these rules were ignored in order to achieve a higher rate of fire. Trials and tests were continuously carried out to devise the optimal range for effective engagement of enemy vessels and to determine what the most suitable large calibre was. The transition from mixed calibres to an all-biggun capital ship meant a new cycle of long debates between traditionalists and innovators, thus trials and experiments continued even after the design and the construction of Dreadnought and during the design process of the Invincibles.41 Although the Admiralty selected 12in guns as the main armament for both types, another challenging aspect of the debate focused on the layout of large calibre guns in order that they achieve maximum effect with the heaviest broadside. When the Committee on Designs ended discussion on armoured cruiser design, it was decided that 12in guns were to be arranged in a layout that theoretically allowed six guns to be fired on either broadside or directly ahead or astern. This would enable them to outgun a conventional mixed-calibre battleship both in broadside and in chase engagements. This aspect remained crucial for the layout of largecalibre guns on the battlecruiser designs that followed the Invincibles. Another major challenge arising from the installation of large-calibre guns was the effect of their blast on equipment and structures that were placed on the upper decks. This was especially troublesome for the gun turrets positioned amidships. As they needed to achieve an optimal arc of fire for maximum broadside the decision was made, both in Britain and in Germany, to arrange them ‘en echelon’ and to allow for suitable space between them.

Such a layout also influenced the distribution of space within the hull, allowing requirements for boiler room and magazines to be met. Progress in guns and ammunition introduced in the last decade of the nineteenth century could not be fully exploited at longer ranges without adequate fire control. Ship motions, mainly rolling and pitching, greatly challenged accuracy, while the target’s position could quickly change due to continuous changes in course and speed, in turn continuously altering the target’s range and bearing.42 All these aspects magnified the problem of achieving the correct training and elevation of guns, at least until rangefinders were introduced into major fleets in 1899, allowing a better estimate of the target’s range. The development of rangefinders in Germany and Britain followed different technical patterns. Initially, the Kaiserliche Marine battlecruisers were fitted with 3m Carl Zeiss stereoscopic rangefinders.43 They had a ‘mark’ that had to be centred on the amidships-area of the target. Since 1906, the Royal Navy had mostly used Barr & Stroud (B&S), FQ2-type 9ft-long coincidence rangefinders in their battlecruisers. These devices produced two pictures of the target, which then had to be merged together in order to produce a uniform picture. Once the range was found, the British rangefinders achieved greater precision for short ranges over long ones. However, they often proved unreliable, especially in conditions of poor visibility. The German stereoscopic rangefinders were remarkably good at finding the initial range and were less affected by vibrations and smoke than British systems, but they needed very skilled operators trained to keep constant track of a target during a battle.44

Turrets equipped with Vickers guns ready to be installed on board. The objectives of most innovations in gun design introduced in the early 1900s were greater precision and increased striking power at long range. (Library of Congress)

The 12in ‘P’ and ‘Q’ turrets of Indomitable. A major challenge generated by the installation of large-calibre guns was the effect of their blast on equipment and structures. (Library of Congress)

Coordinating the firing of several guns, spotting the splashes of salvos and, finally, correcting train and elevation of the gun turrets was a challenging task that needed centralised fire control. An embryonic form of fire control was introduced in the Royal Navy in 1902 through the Dumaresq, a mechanical device with three input parameters (the ship’s own speed, and the target’s course and speed) that provided the rate of the target’s change of range and deflection.45 Information from the Dumaresq, fitted on the most modern British capital ships, was used to update the Vickers clock, another device that gave a continuous indication of the target’s estimated range as it changed with the changing position of the two ships. These devices and a rangefinder were fitted on the ‘spotting tops’. These were the designated posts that were located on top of fore and main masts and linked to one or more transmitting stations (TSs), placed in the lower decks and connected with the gun turrets. The TSs processed a continuous flow of data gathered from both visual information and mechanical devices in order to achieve maximum gunnery efficiency. Further improvements occurred in 1911 with the Royal Navy’s experimentation with the Dreyer Table,46 which continuously plotted the target’s range against time. This was later refined and installed into battleships and battlecruisers. The Kaiserliche Marine used a mechanical system called Entfernugs-Unterschied Anzeiger (E-U Anzeiger), a range’s rate indicator that was considered less sophisticated than the Dreyer Table. In fact, it was a manually-operated system based on three elements: a range clock, a German version of the Dumaresq and a pointer. The Royal Navy also trialled the Argo Clock, which was more technically advanced than the Dreyer Table, but eventually chose the latter for financial reasons. It appears logical that battlecruisers, which were much more likely to fight under conditions of rapid change of rate in bearings and range, would have benefitted by using the Argo Clock system. In fact, Dreyer systems were more suitable for battleships, which were likely to fight on near-parallel courses with a slow rate of change in bearing and range. The final evolution in fire control in Britain before the First World War occurred with the introduction of a main fire-control tower, which housed an officer responsible of directing and simultaneously firing all the

major calibre guns. The introduction of electro-mechanical fire-control devices did not diminish the importance of human skill in the whole process, especially before the introduction of gyroscopically-stabilised and rotating mountings. The Royal Navy continued a long debate on the mutual position of masts, funnels and fire control positions after the commissioning of Dreadnought, with the aim of reducing interference between smoke, range taking and spotting. There were different opinions in the Royal Navy concerning the need for heavy and conspicuous masts. Their main use was for placing rangefinders and spotters well above the smoke of the ship’s guns and the enemy’s shells, but several officers questioned this arrangement and preferred to use a lower control position, thus accepting a possible lack of accuracy. Battleships and battlecruisers built after Dreadnought, the Invincibles and the Indefatigables showed different arrangements. It was only in 1911 that the Admiralty directed the naval architects to design, shape and place all masts, funnels, and fire control positions at convenient locations in order to ensure effective fire control functions.

A close-up view of the aft 28cm turret on the battlecruiser Moltke, at anchor in US waters in 1912. In Germany, Krupp had a monopoly on the production of large-calibre guns for capital ships. (Library of Congress)

ELECTRICAL MACHINERY Electricity debuted on warships in the 1870s for lighting and firing of guns. Dynamos driven by reciprocating steam engines provided electrical power with direct current (DC). Progress in electrical machinery then occurred in Britain, Germany and the United States, which allowed for the expanding use of electricity on warships. Initially, installed capacity for lighting purposes was about 50kW in a battleship. The searchlights represented a considerable part of the total load. The Royal Navy remained committed to hydraulic machinery for other equipment because of a belief in the unreliability of electric motor-driven equipment. They thus retained steam for deck machinery and many other auxiliaries such as pumps, refrigerating machinery, and air compressors.

The schematic drawing of an FQ 2 rangefinder, produced by Barr & Stroud, on a MNI mounting. The development of rangefinders in Germany and Britain followed different technical patterns, with the German navy using stereoscopic rangefinders and the Royal Navy opting for coincidence rangefinders. (Handbook, Barr & Stroud Rangefinders, Courtesy of The Dreadnought Project)

A picture of the Mk I Dreyer Table. This device, firstly deployed in 1915, allowed a continuously plot of the target’s range against time, considerably improving fire control on British warships. (Handbook for Capt. F C Dreyer’s Fire Control Tables)

A 3m-base rangefinder is tested at the Zeiss factory in Jena before being delivered to the German Navy. Carl Zeiss started with a small optics workshop in 1846 and soon established himself as one of the best manufacturers of scientific instruments in Germany. (Carl Zeiss Archive)

In the late 1890s, with the introduction of electric ventilation and other motor-driven, electric-powered auxiliaries such as gun turrets, ammunition loaders, pumps, derricks, winches and capstans, the rapid increase in power demand highlighted the need to design a decent supply and distribution system. As for power generation, a British battleship usually had four DC dynamos arranged in pairs, each pair being driven by a single steam reciprocating engine and connected in parallel through a switchboard. Total installed power increased to over 500kW, while the standard voltage for all new British constructions was 100V DC, later increased to 225V. The German Navy adopted 200V DC, while the installed power was nearly 1,300kW, a clear demonstration of widespread adoption of electrical machinery that helped to dramatically reduce the number of steam pipes that crossed through decks and watertight bulkheads. At that time, in newly-

constructed warships, all but one dynamo was placed below the waterline behind armour in close proximity to machinery spaces. An additional machine, known as the ‘peace’ or ‘daylight’ dynamo, was placed in a sheltered position on the upper deck.

Steam and electric power facilitated a widespread adoption of large auxiliary machinery on board battlecruisers and battleships, such as many types of pumps as those shown in this picture. (Weir)

Distribution was usually arranged by a two-wire parallel switchboard system in which the dynamos were connected to the bus bars of one or more switchboards. These were located in different spaces separated by watertight bulkheads. Supplies to the electrical users were taken from the bus through switches and fuses and thus through a ‘tree’ distribution system. Switches and inter-connecting cables linked each switchboard, thus enabling any dynamo to feed all or part of the system. The risk of disabling damage was reduced by providing alternative supplies for the most important users. This

system, adopted by all major navies in the early 1900s, permitted parallel operation of dynamos and facilitated the switching over of machines without interruption of power supply. As new electrical equipment was installed to improve living conditions, this resulted in a requirement for enhancing power production and distribution, without increasing the weight of the entire electric installation too greatly.

Searchlights in operation on Australia. Power generation in British and German battlecruisers was provided by combinations of dynamos mostly driven by reciprocating engines and steam turbines. (Royal Australian Navy

When the Royal Navy decided to equip the battlecruiser Invincible with electric-driven 12in gun mountings, integrity of the system in case of battle damage or accident, weight saving and increase in installed capacity became important challenges to cope with.47 The solution was a ring-main system of

distribution, divided into sections by watertight disconnecting link boxes and fed by electrically-operated branch-breakers. Thus, the Invincibles were equipped with a ring-main system that was subsequently adopted in later battlecruiser designs. As far as power generation was concerned, early classes of British battleships and battlecruisers had a combination of Siemens dynamos that were driven by reciprocating engines, steam turbines or diesel engines, with a total output of around 600kW and connected to a switchboard from which 105V DC was distributed to the ring-main. Some motorgenerators that fed a 15V DC circuit through dedicated switchboards supplied low power for fire control instruments, gun-firing circuits and other communication devices. The German Navy adopted a combination of turbodynamos and diesel engines, while the commonality between the two navies rested solely on the adoption of Siemens dynamos. As already noted, the development of advanced electrical machinery on board capital ships favoured the installation of several devices devoted to communication and fire control, thus partially replacing the use of signal flags. Signal projectors and semaphores on battleships and battlecruisers were usually placed on the forward superstructures and helped the execution of tactical evolutions of the squadrons. The introduction of electrical searchlights overcame the challenge of effective night fighting. Projector layouts on battleships and battlecruisers normally included a dozen or more 36in devices, distributed on both sides of forward, amidships and aft superstructures. Searchlights were also placed on raised platforms abreast of funnels and were gradually linked with fire control systems. Internal communication improved from voice pipes to manually-powered and electric phones, especially for linking the conning tower, the fore and aft fire-control stations, the TSs and the gun turrets.

WIRELESS TELEGRAPHY One of the major technological innovations that emerged from the RussoJapanese war was the widespread use of wireless communication, better known as ‘wireless telegraphy’, or W/T. This outcome, and the need of the European powers to quickly communicate with their colonies and ships abroad, confirmed and consolidated the significant efforts that the Royal Navy and the Kaiserliche Marine had already started to equip their ships with W/T systems. Many experiments conducted, especially, during fleet manoeuvres and

exercises by the major world navies led to the recognition that W/T systems could transmit and receive signals over significant distances. Those navies soon realised the advantages of W/T systems, mainly consisting in their independence from bad weather, fog or darkness; the capability to communicate with scouting ships steaming at long distance from a flagship and the ease of installation on board warships, especially capital ships. The perceived disadvantage of W/T systems was the possibility of signal interception and/or jamming by the enemy, either from another warship or ashore. In Europe, both the Royal Navy and the Kaiserliche Marine introduced W/T systems on their warships from about 1900. Their range gradually increased, extending from a few dozen up to 300 miles according to the height, shape and length of the aerials. The dimensions of the warships in turn determined these factors. W/T equipment had a limited power requirement (usually less than 10kW) and was fed by alternating current, supplied through a converter linked to the ship’s DC mains. Each W/T set included both a transmitter and a receiver, each of them connected to a dedicated aerial. Normally, battleships and battlecruisers were equipped with two or three W/T rooms or ‘offices’. The main office was located close to the bridge, while an auxiliary one was usually placed in the aft superstructure block. Each W/T office was connected to the flag bridge and other operational spaces. The installation of aerials was made simpler by the presence of masts, poles and upper works on all classes of capital ships that had been commissioned since the early 1890s. The development of new electrical and mechanical materiel and improved manufacturing techniques helped to increase the range and reliability of shipborne W/T systems. The first valve sets gradually replaced early arc and spark transmitters, thus increasing the safety of W/T operations and the system’s range. A parallel development occurred in the communication between warships and shore stations, which allowed several navies to coordinate their fleets’ movements and operations from bases on land. Furthermore, an increase in the transmission power of the shore stations allowed both Britain and Germany to establish very long distance communications with their colonies. This made W/T a strategic tool for conducting naval operations both in home and distant waters. The Royal Navy’s interest in exploiting Hertzian waves (electromagnetic waves, usually of radio frequency) can be traced back to 1891 when

Lieutenant Henry Jackson,48 then serving in the Mediterranean, became interested in wireless communications. Jackson was not able to put his experiments into full practice until he was appointed to command Defiance, the torpedo school training ship at Devonport, in January 1895. Here, Jackson had access to the resources required to develop a prototype wireless system. On 27 July 1896, the Director of Naval Ordnance accepted the War Office’s invitation to attend a demonstration by the Marconi Company of its W/T equipment on Salisbury Plain and a small committee, including Captain Jackson, was appointed for this purpose. As a result, Jackson first met Marconi in August 1896 and they discovered they were both independently developing wireless systems along similar lines. According to a naval report, Marconi’s system had a longer range but Jackson’s apparatus was better suited to maritime signaling and Jackson’s suggestions led to significant improvements of the Marconi equipment. A year later, the Wireless Telegraph & Signal Company was established and, in the summer of 1898, the Admiralty decided to test Marconi’s W/T sets during the upcoming naval manoeuvres of 1899. Three ships (Alexandra, Juno and Europa) were fitted with Marconi’s equipment and demonstrated the capability to communicate over distances of up to 60 miles. Five W/T sets, originally intended for the British Army, were used by the navy during the Second Boer War, when Thetis became the first vessel to be equipped with a W/T apparatus under wartime conditions.49 The installation of Jackson-designed, navy-built W/T sets continued in parallel with the lease of thirty-two Marconi sets in July 1900. This led to a massive expansion of the wireless branch of the Royal Navy and, in turn, to increased training, much of this managed by Jackson.

Guglielmo Marconi (1874-1937) shared the 1909 Nobel Prize in Physics with the German scientist K F Braun for ‘their contributions to the development of wireless telegraphy’. Marconi established the Wireless Telegraph and Signal Company in Great Britain in 1897 and went on to supply most of the early W/T equipment used by both the Royal Navy and several other navies. (Library of Congress)

Negotiations with the Marconi Company continued until July 1903, when a new contract was signed, including the supply of additional W/T sets and granting the Admiralty the right to use apparatus covered by existing and

future Marconi patents for a period of eleven years. In about 1904, the Navy switched to exclusively using W/T systems supplied by the Marconi Company. Type I and Type II were the standard W/T sets gradually installed on British battleships and battlecruisers after around 1906. They were later replaced by more advanced models. When the German press reported Marconi’s experiments, some scientists and engineers started working on scientific and technical research into wireless telegraphy in their country. Adolf Slaby, a famous specialist and advisor to German military and political leaders, and Georg Wilhelm von Arco set up the first experimental German W/T transmitter in Potsdam in 1897. Sponsored by Kaiser Wilhelm II, who was very interested in the new technology, and partially supported by the Kaiserliche Marine, Slaby and Arco conducted their experiments and developed new equipment. In 1901, Tirpitz ordered that a battleship and three cruisers be fitted with W/T equipment. The first to receive it was the armoured cruiser Friedrich Carl and, by 1902, two more ships followed. The training of naval personnel started in 1901 onboard the cruisers Friedrich Carl and Blücher; in 1902 the task was transferred to the newly-established Funken-Telegraphie Schule (W/T School), based in Flensburg-Mürwik. In 1903 the main industrial companies formerly competing in the W/T field (AEG, Siemens and Braun) merged, establishing the Gesellschaft für Drathlose Telegraphie (W/T Company), also known as Telefunken, which soon became the main supplier of German civil and military users, as well as a strong competitor of the Marconi Company in export markets. Marconi’s initial near-monopoly in Germany was ultimately broken in 1908, when Telefunken patented its first devices. By the end of that year, ninety W/T stations had been delivered to German warships, and sixty-two more to German merchant ships. In order to make sure the vessels of the Imperial Navy were adequately equipped for communications, Tirpitz issued an instruction in 1909, according to which every ‘Grosse Kreuzer’ (including battlecruisers) should be fitted with two transmitting stations, three receiving stations and as many aerials; similar standards were introduced for smaller ships. The transmitter types included the Mark TV-1, TV-2.5 and TV-5 by Telefunken, with an output power ranging from 4 to 8kW and an operating frequency of 150-500 kHz, and the Mark US-1.5 and US-4 by Lorenz, with an output power ranging from 1.5 to 4kW and an operating frequency of up

to 375 kHz. Starting in 1912, the flagships, battleships and battlecruisers were also fitted with an additional, combined transmit-receive station located in the conning tower, operating at 670-1,760 kHz and connected to fixed aerials, as well as to a number of emergency aerials mounted on telescopic masts. At the outbreak of the First World War, some 680 W/T stations, based on domestic patents (von Slaby, Arco, Braun and Siemens) were operating onboard German military and merchant vessels. A further fifteen shore W/T stations (Marinefunkstellen) were operated by naval personnel. German patented/manufactured W/T equipment was also extensively fitted onboard Austro-Hungarian Navy ships.

PRODUCTION RESOURCES The introduction of new technologies in machinery, armament and protection paved the way in the late 1880s for a significant expansion and enhancement not only in the naval shipbuilding sector but also in marine engineering and naval gunnery. A significant challenge faced by public and private shipyards in both Britain and Germany was the steady increase in the size of capital ships, this meaning that a continuous modernisation effort was needed to meet not only shipbuilding requirements but also to perform refit and maintenance tasks. In addition, the introduction of new and technologicallyadvanced equipment meant that people working in all industries related to warship construction and outfitting had to improve their skills.

W/T transmitter-receiver equipment on board a British warship. In 1904, the Royal Navy switched to exclusively using W/T systems supplied by the Marconi Company. For its part, the German navy relied upon Telefunken-developed W/T systems from 1908 onwards.

W/T equipment on board a German ship. The training of German naval personnel in this type of installation started in 1901 aboard the armoured cruisers Friedrich Carl and Blücher. (Telefunken)

Export orders for foreign navies provided an additional incentive for commercial shipyards to invest in their infrastructure in order to boost competitiveness and be able to meet the requirements of all customers. This tendency especially emerged in Britain, where a growing number of private shipyards emerged better equipped than the HM Dockyards of Devonport and Portsmouth50 thus becoming regular contractors to the Royal Navy. Both in Britain and Germany, the advent of Dreadnought-type battleships and battlecruisers tested the capability of any individual shipyard to construct large warships and manage the complex programme of manufacturing and/or integrating hull, armament, armour, propulsion and auxiliary systems. From an historic point of view, a remarkable difference existed in the late nineteenth century. Britain was already a maritime power with an established shipbuilding infrastructure, while Germany was an emerging industrial nation whose strength was mostly devoted to land-based technologies. However, a catalyst for German naval industrial growth came from the rise of the maritime trade. Until the 1880s, all the large steamers required by the major

German shipping owners (Hamburg-Amerika Line and Norddeutscher Lloyd) were built in Great Britain. Then the German government began a policy to encourage the construction of large merchant ships and warships in Germany, both by subsidising the expansion of private yards and significantly improving the then-small Imperial dockyards at Wilhelmshaven, Danzig, and Kiel.51 Therefore, shipbuilding was boosted significantly and, by the 1890s, German shipyards were capable of building commercial vessels and warships qualitatively similar, if not superior, to their British counterparts and therefore able to meet the emerging political and military requirements generated by Germany’s quest for worldwide expansion. Broadly speaking, the industrial effort devoted to building battleships and battlecruisers was remarkable, a consideration that applies to both British and German military-industrial complexes. Looking at the numbers, between 1905 and 1914 the Royal Navy built ten battlecruisers, while the Kaiserliche Marine built five. During the conflict, the Royal Navy laid down and/or ordered another nine battlecruisers; five were commissioned, but one of them (Furious) was predominantly used as an aircraft carrier. Hood was completed in 1920, while her three sisters were later cancelled. In the same period, the Germany Navy commissioned two battlecruisers and laid down five additional units that were never completed. Thirteen out of fifteen battlecruisers completed by the Royal Navy from 1906 to the end of the war were contracted to private shipbuilding companies (the other two were awarded to Devonport). The German Navy followed a similar process; twelve out of fourteen planned battlecruisers were contracted to private shipbuilders, which also manufactured the propulsion plants. Two ships were assigned to the Imperial Dockyard at Wilhelmshaven, and only one completed. The shipyards involved in the construction of battlecruisers, both in Britain and in Germany, are listed in Table C opposite. In more detail, the construction of British and German battlecruisers – just those completed – was split as shown in Tables D and E opposite. Interestingly, the major industrial effort in the United Kingdom for battlecruisers was performed in Scottish yards, notably in the estuary of the River Clyde where Fairfield (in Govan) and John Brown & Co Ltd (Clydebank) shipyards were located. Furthermore, the principal private shipyards also included the machinery factories (boilers, turbines and auxiliary systems), which eased the construction of most British battlecruisers. From a strategic point of view, the

location of most British private shipyards in Scotland, Northern England and Northern Ireland was geographically removed from potential naval threats from the European continental powers, France and Russia at first and Germany later. This consideration is corroborated by the fact that fourteen out of sixteen battlecruisers that entered into service with the Royal Navy were built in these shipyards; the exception to this rule was Devonport, where Indefatigable and Lion were built.52 The location of German shipyards followed a different pattern: Hamburg and Wilhelmshaven were open to potential naval threats coming from the North Sea, while Kiel and Danzig were located in the Baltic and thus exposed to a potential Russian threat. However, after the Japanese victory at Tsushima, the credibility of the Imperial Russian Navy was limited. Both British and German shipyards would probably have suffered in the event of aerial bombing, but this threat never materialised, although it did for some military installations.

Dreadnought during construction. A significant challenge faced by British and German

shipyards, both public and private, was the steady increase in the size of capital ships. This meant that a continuous yard modernisation effort was needed to meet shipbuilding requirements. (Courtesy, D Zorini)

Table C: Shipyards Involved in Battlecruiser Construction Country Great Britain

Shipyards/Ships John Brown & Co, Clydebank: Inflexible, Australia, Tiger, Repulse, Hood. Fairfield, Govan: Indomitable, New Zealand, Renown, Rodney (laid down). Armstrong-Whitworth, Elswick: Invincible, Courageous, Furious, Anson (laid down). HM Dockyard Devonport: Indefatigable, Lion. Palmer’s, Jarrow: Queen Mary. Vickers, Barrow: Princess Royal. Harland & Wolff, Belfast: Glorious. Cammell Laird, Birkenhead: Howe (laid down).

Germany

Blohm & Voss, Hamburg: Von der Tann, Goeben, Moltke, Seydlitz, Derfflinger, Mackensen (launched, not completed), Ersatz Freya (laid down), Ersatz Yorck (laid down), Ersatz Scharnhorst (ordered). Imperial Dockyard Wilhelmshaven: Hindenburg, Ersatz Friedrich Carl (laid down). Schichau, Danzig: Lützow, Graf Spee (launched, not completed) Germania Werft, Kiel: Ersatz Gneisenau (ordered). AG Vulcan, Hamburg: Ersatz Yorck (laid down).

Regarding workforce, a comprehensive calculation of British and German workers engaged in the construction of battlecruisers is difficult to carry out because each public or private shipyard might be involved in the concurrent construction of other types of warship and even merchant ships. The global shipbuilding capabilities of both nations have been addressed in Chapter 1. In addition to what has already been said, by restricting attention to the shipyards that were actually engaged in the construction of battlecruisers, the infrastructure includes a dockyard (Devonport) and six private yards (Armstrong, John Brown, Fairfield, Harland & Wolff, Palmers and Vickers) in Britain, compared with a dockyard (Wilhelmshaven) and three private yards (Blohm & Voss, Schichau and Vulkan AG Hamburg) in Germany.

Here, one of three planned battlecuisers of the Ersatz Yorck class was awarded to the Germaniawerft shipyard in Kiel in 1915, but she was never laid down.

Table D – Construction Times of British Battlecruisers

Table E – Construction Times of German Battlecruisers

A three-quarter bow shot of HMS Tiger, taken shortly before her sea trials. Thirteen out of fifteen battlecruisers completed by the Royal Navy from 1906 to the end World War 1 were contracted to private shipbuilding companies. (National Records of Scotland, UCS1/118/418/150)

Excluding the latter from the calculations, the total workforce potentially involved in Britain in 1912-13 was about 98,000, a figure that is obtained by adding the 9,500 employees of the arsenal of Devonport53 to the 9,700 of

John Brown, 8,300 of Fairfield, 23,500 of Armstrong, 23,000 of Vickers, 15,000 of Harland & Wolff and 9,000 of Palmers.54 In Germany, the corresponding workforce in 1913 amounted to 38,500, the result of summing the employees of the Imperial dockyard of Wilhelmshaven (10,500) to those of Blohm & Voss (10,000), Schichau (9,000) and Vulkan AG (9,000). It should be stressed once more that these figures are only indicative, as on the one hand they include workers engaged in other kinds of activities (construction of ships other than battlecruisers, repairs, production of machinery and artillery etc.), while, on the other hand, they do not include the workforce, difficult to assess but certainly considerable, of the suppliers of other kinds of outfitting equpiment. In addition, the total workforce was subject to change from year to year, depending on the current building programmes. Several private companies expanded their activities into shipbuilding from a previous business in armaments, armour, and steel production. From the early 1900s, private British shipyards competed tenaciously to achieve contracts from the Admiralty, since the construction of big capital ships was highly rewarding and prestigious, both domestically and in terms of exports. Indeed, the Admiralty strongly favoured competition between private companies as an opportunity to decrease construction costs and to enhance Britain’s industrial capabilities. The same applied to Germany, even if competition proved harder to achieve, as demonstrated by the initial nearmonopoly of Blohm & Voss over battlecruiser construction. The construction of a battleship or battlecruiser was also a tool for the Admiralty to understand the upper limit of shipbuilding capabilities in Britain and therefore to plan future naval expansion programmes. Competition also emerged between a group of shipbuilders (Cammell Laird, John Brown and Fairfield) and weapons manufacturers (Vickers and Armstrong-Whitworth), with the former creating the Coventry Ordnance Works (COW) to design and product guns and turrets.55 However, the lack of experience caused some major problems in guns and mountings production, especially when Britain’s naval shipbuilding industry was called to execute the maximum effort. Another boost to the shipbuilding industry in both Britain and Germany came from the growing size of warships that occurred in the decade before the outbreak of the First World War. This trend especially affected battleships and battlecruisers, and only grew further during the conflict, and was mainly caused by the quest for larger and more powerful guns. The never-ending

struggle between guns and armour and the quest for greater speeds also contributed to the increase in warship size.

The battlecruiser New Zealand being fitted out at Fairfield. British private shipyards and Royal Navy dockyards built ten battlecruisers between 1905 and 1914. (Royal New Zealand Navy)

This trend influenced shipyard infrastructure, which in Britain and Germany had to be enhanced in order to handle bigger guns and associated mountings, heavier armour plates and bulkier machinery. However, not all private and public shipyards had the capability to follow such trends and update their facilities, especially on the eve of war. This forced the Admiralty to reassign some contracts, which had previously been awarded to smaller shipyards, to bigger companies. This issue was further exacerbated after 1914, when the Admiralty required shorter and shorter construction times for battlecruisers whose hull lengths implied longer slipways and larger associated infrastructures.56 A particular pattern of naval industrial development evolved from machinery, especially because battlecruisers required powerful and compact propulsion plants. All British battlecruisers up to Queen Mary were fitted with Parsons turbines but in Tiger the builders, John Brown, persuaded the Admiralty to adopt their own Brown-Curtis turbines, the latter being a variant of the American Curtis turbine that they built under licence. For direct drive, these proved very successful and had distinct advantages in weight-savings

and efficiency over the Parsons type. Another pattern developed from the production of armour, a very complicated and expensive process that significantly affected a battleship’s cost. Although armour in battlecruisers did not have the same priority as machinery and armament, it nevertheless influenced the whole construction process and thus provided another challenge for the shipyards. In Britain, John Brown, Vickers, Cammell Laird, and Armstrong were the most important armour producers, all of them clearly benefitting from the colocation of the shipyards. This was not the case for the HM Dockyards, whose productivity was influenced by a supply chain that had to be carefully planned to avoid delays and additional costs. To overcome this issue, the Admiralty decided to share the manufacture of armour plates throughout its suppliers in accordance with the shipbuilding planned for any given year. In Germany, gun production was a Krupp monopoly, while Krupp and Dillinger Hütte were the main suppliers of armour plating. Both armour and guns, produced in various German factories, had to be moved to the shipyards on the Baltic and North Sea coasts, which required careful planning. The location of the main companies (including state-owned dockyards) involved in battlecruiser construction in Britain and Germany is shown on the maps below and oppostite. In terms of the pace of warship construction, it is interesting to note that, at the beginning of the naval race between Britain and Germany, a survey57 conducted across all major private German shipyards involved in building capital ships revealed that they had the capability to surpass and even double Britain’s annual production of capital ships. This was even without the involvement of the Imperial dockyards. This statement appears quite unrealistic and would prove misleading, since it did not account for the fact that British shipbuilding of capital ships dramatically increased when compelled to do so by the full implementation of the German Naval Laws and their supplements. It is worth noting that the alleged ability of the German private shipyards to establish a higher rate of warship construction was subject to the timely delivery of armour plates and heavy guns by Krupp, whose near-monopoly on these two essential items was undoubtedly a weakness of Germany naval shipbuilding.

A map indicating the location of the main facilities involved in the construction and fitting out of British battlecruisers. Major shipyards were often part of large industrial companies that also supplied armour, machinery and guns. (Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini)

SUPPORTING BATTLECRUISERS: NAVAL BASES

AND FACILITIES The consolidation of new technologies in the fields of hull, armament, machinery, and protection led to the development of a system of naval bases and infrastructure in accordance with the maritime strategy of each nation. This principle applied to the major naval powers in the late 1890s, especially after the publication of Mahan’s The Influence of Sea Power upon History. This was the case for Britain and Germany; in addition to the improvement and expansion of their fleets, they also worked to enhance the capability of their naval infrastructure, which would have a fundamental role in the maintenance and support of the fleets engaged in the North Sea. The Kaiserliche Marine’s docks (five in all) and shipyards comprised basins capable of containing the largest warships then in service. The two most important naval bases were Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, the former located on the Jade Bay in the North Sea and the latter placed in the inlet of the same name near the Baltic Sea entrance of the Kaiser-Wilhelm Canal. The canal was opened in 1895 and widened before the First World War, thus enabling German warships to pass rapidly from one sea to the other and concentrate at any desired point on either basin. The Kaiserliche Marine also built other naval bases at Danzig, Cuxhaven, Bremerhaven, Emden and Heligoland. Wilhelmshaven comprises a strip of land near the mouth of the River Weser, which opens into the Jade Bay. It had been a large naval station since Prussian times and included an elaborate infrastructure made up of a canal, several docks, workshops, barracks, wharves and extensive basins. The entire system was strongly fortified and by 1905 had become one of the best defended and most important European naval bases. Wilhelmshaven also became the main dockyard of the Kaiserliche Marine, benefitting from improvements carried out between 1908 and 1912. Two years later, Wilhelmshaven included four building slipways, seven dry- and six floating docks and an autonomous power plant. However, the Jade was not ideally situated for a first-class naval base, since the 14-mile long entrance/exit channel had to be dredged continuously to avoid sudden and dangerous changes of water level. Furthermore, the abnormal rise and fall of the tide meant an elaborate system of locks had to be devised, through which larger warships could enter and leave the port, and much time was consumed in operating the locks when warships were entering or exiting, especially when a whole squadron of battleships or battlecruisers was involved. On the other hand, one advantage of Wilhelmshaven was that both the dockyard and the

naval base were safe from attack by enemy torpedo craft or submarines. In 1906, Cuxhaven, located on the south bank of the Elbe River’s estuary, was selected as an alternative naval base, since warships had often been sent there to relieve congestion at the Jade. It was improved with the establishment of fortifications, barracks and ammunition magazines. As soon as infrastructure works were completed, Cuxhaven became the alternate naval base for Wilhelmshaven. On the Baltic Sea, Kiel had been the main naval base of the Prussian Navy since the 1870s and was later expanded to include shipyards, docks, fortifications and the Naval Academy. The construction of the Kiel Canal in 1895 and its expansion between 1907 and 1914 facilitated a further industrial and military growth of Kiel and its suburbs. Further east on the Baltic coast, Danzig on the River Vistula was chosen as a naval base and shipyard in 1871, the same year in which the German empire was proclaimed. The infrastructure was progressively enlarged and improved and, by the outbreak of the First World War, the Kaiserliche Werft Danzig was one of Germany’s main submarine building facilities while the naval base was used by light warships operating in the Baltic. In the early 1900s, the Kaiserliche Marine decided to convert the port of Emden, 35 miles from the mouth of the River Ems, into a base for torpedo boats. This decision was Germany’s reply to the establishment of the Royal Navy’s Home Fleet and the creation of a new flotilla of torpedo-boat destroyers at Dover. Emden became the nearest German naval base to Britain’s coast and was connected to Wilhelmshaven by the Ems-Jade Canal.

The main companies involved in the construction and fitting out of German battlecruisers were spread across the Reich. Among the major shipyards, Blohm & Voss held a nearmonopoly from 1907 until 1912 as far as battlecruiser construction was concerned. The first battlecruiser contract awarded to a competitor was that of Lützow, the sixth unit of this kind, which went to Schichau Danzig. (Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini)

Heligoland is a small archipelago in the North Sea that includes Rock Island and the smaller Sand Island, has a surface of about one square mile, and is located about 40 miles from the German mainland, being equidistant from the mouths of the Weser and Elbe. Heligoland formed, with Wilhelmshaven and Kiel, the nucleus of the German coastal defence system and its infrastructure was improved in the 1880s to make it a sort of Gibraltar of the North Sea. While the importance of Heligoland as a protective harbour for German warships was slight compared to the safety of the Kiel Canal, its value as a coaling station and a submarine and torpedo-boat base was significant. Large warships, such as cruisers and battleships, however, could only lay at anchor. Therefore, a significant component of the Hochseeflotte in 1914 was based at Wilhelmshaven. The battlecruisers then in service (Seydlitz as flagship,

Moltke, Von der Tann, Derfflinger and the armoured cruiser Blücher) formed the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe (1st Scouting Group), while the 2. Aufklärungsgruppe included cruisers and destroyers. Goeben was part of the Mittelmeer-Division (Mediterranean Division).58 For operational and tactical reasons, the battlecruisers that were to enter service later in the war (Hindenburg and the Mackensen class) would probably have formed a new Aufklärungsgruppe.

The First and Second Battleship Squadrons of the Hochseeflotte at anchor in Kiel. By 1914, a large proportion of the German Navy, including the battlecruisers, was based at Wilhelmshaven. (US National Archives and Records Administration)

German naval bases were located in two separate basins, the North Sea and the Baltic. Fast

and secure transfers of ships between them was, however, made possible by the Kaiser Wilhelm (or Kiel) Canal, connecting Kiel in the Baltic with Brunsbüttel on the North Sea coast. (Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini)

Several strategic, historical and other factors dictated the reorganisation of Britain’s naval bases in the early 1900s, with quite complicated results. Before the rise of the Kaiserliche Marine, the threat to British naval supremacy in Northern Europe had come from France and Russia. The Royal Navy’s main bases were placed to confront these traditional enemies and were concentrated in southern England: Chatham, at the mouth of the Thames; Portsmouth, protected by the Isle of Wight; and Devonport, at Plymouth.59 In 1904, growing concerns about German naval expansion favoured a redeployment of the fleet into the North Sea and the establishment of a new base for battleships at Rosyth, on the northern bank of the Firth of Forth and not far from the John Brown shipyard. The Forth was 375 miles across the North Sea from Heligoland and Wilhelmshaven; there was ample accommodation for a large number of warships, the anchorage was connected by rail with all of Britain and its entrance was easily defensible against attack from the sea. However, its major drawback was the huge railway bridge spanning the Firth, whose collapse could entrap the fleet anchored upstream. Weighing all these factors against each other, Parliament approved funds to build a major naval base on the Firth of Forth. As time passed, there was no unanimous agreement within the Admiralty about this project. Fisher preferred either the Cromarty Firth, north of Rosyth or Cromarty and Invergordon, or the Humber River, on the north-eastern coast of England. The result of this quarrel was that, during the tenure of Fisher as First Sea Lord, no serious work was done at Rosyth.60 Another reason for the delay at Rosyth was because of the strategy of distant blockade planned by the Royal Navy in case of war with Germany. It called for a redeployment of the fleet to the north to control the gap between Scotland and Norway. While work at Rosyth proceeded at a slow pace, Cromarty and Scapa Flow came into consideration, the former chosen as an advanced base for battleship squadrons and the latter as a war anchorage for lighter forces. However, various delays caused work to proceed slowly and, while Rosyth and Cromarty had been equipped to cope with attacks by light surface ships by the outbreak of war, they remained vulnerable to submarines and Scapa Flow lingered undefended.

Located in the Orkney archipelago six miles off the northern coast of Scotland, Scapa Flow includes several sounds that made it one of the great natural anchorages in the world. Enclosed by a ring of rounded islands, notably Mainland, Hoy, South Ronaldsay and Burray, the anchorage covered of 140 square miles and had a sandy bottom about 50ft deep and therefore large enough to hold a huge number of warships and other vessels. The anchorage had three entrances or sounds (Hoy, Hoxa and Holm), all of them subject to strong tides and tidal currents. As a base for the Grand Fleet,61 Scapa Flow offered many advantages. Its vast natural harbour was far larger than Cromarty and Rosyth and offered the shortest and safest route by which warships deployed on the western cost of Britain could deploy in the North Sea.

British battlecruisers at anchor at Scapa Flow, before the First World War. From right to left, Inflexible, Invincible, Indefatigable and Indomitable. In February 1915, the Grand Fleet established a separate battlecruiser force of three squadrons, based at Rosyth. (M Brescia Collection)

British naval bases were mainly located along the east coast of England and the Channel. Scapa Flow was the Grand Fleet’s main anchorage while the battlecruisers were based at Rosyth, from where they could promptly deploy to cover areas on the east coast exposed to German attacks. (Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini)

Frequent bad weather and strong tides made Scapa Flow almost invulnerable to hostile warships; its major drawback was, however, the absence of any railway connection between the Orkneys and the rest of Britain so that everything needed by the fleet, including coal, oil, ammunition, food, stores and provisions, had to be brought by ship. Moreover, the strong tides within the anchorage made the employment of large floating docks unsuitable, thus greatly hampering major maintenance and repair works to warship hulls. Finally, deploying the Grand Fleet at Scapa Flow would place it hundreds of miles away from many vulnerable areas the Royal Navy was tasked to protect, notably the long and exposed eastern coast of England. Nevertheless, as the First World War approached, the Admiralty chose Scapa Flow as the major base for the Grand Fleet.62 Meanwhile, work progressed at Rosyth and in the Cromarty/Invergordon area. This was usually visited by British warships because of their channel depth and vast anchorages. Before 1914, the area’s infrastructure was gradually enhanced so that the Firth of Cromarty became a full-scale naval base for the Royal Navy, providing anchorage, dockyard repairs and many supplies for warships and their crews. The location of the main British and German naval bases in the North Sea, Channel and Baltic areas is shown in the maps above and opposite. The assignment of the British battlecruisers to the various components of the Royal Navy and their deployments before the First World War followed a pattern that reflected the operational requirements stemming from the military situation. In July 1914, the Admiralty approved a future reorganisation of battlecruisers and cruisers in full commission that grouped them into four Battlecruisers Squadrons (BCS). Under this scheme, it was envisaged that each BCS would include two battlecruisers and four cruisers by December 1915. However, some dissent from the fleet and the changing circumstances prevented the implementation of this reorganisation. Eventually, in August 1914 Invincible and New Zealand formed the Second BCS, based on the River Humber to provide support in case of German naval raids against England. Inflexible, Indomitable and Indefatigable formed the Second Battlecruiser Squadron of the Mediterranean Squadron, based in Malta. Later they were both homeported at Rosyth and Cromarty.63 Lion, Princess Royal and Queen Mary formed the First Battlecruiser Squadron of the Grand Fleet and were based at Cromarty; Tiger joined them in October 1914.

In February 1915 the Grand Fleet established a separate battlecruiser force of three squadrons, based at Rosyth and with Lion as flagship. They were the First BCS, including Princess Royal (flag), Queen Mary and Tiger; the Second BCS, formed by Australia (flag), Indefatigable and New Zealand; and the Third BCS, grouping Invincible (flag), Indomitable and Inflexible. The main advantage of basing battlecruisers at Rosyth was both the relatively short distance in case a fast deployment to the North Sea was needed and the availability of repair docks, while the drawback was the lack of an area for gunnery practice. This obliged the British battlecruisers to sail to Scapa Flow, an issue that in several circumstances adversely influenced the planning of gunnery exercises for the whole Grand Fleet.

FINAL REMARKS Conclusions and remarks stemming from this chapter can be summed up by answering questions relating to the need for battlecruisers, when this need arose, and how the type was developed in Britain and Germany. This was the idea of a tactically and materially-evolved armoured cruiser whose main task was to secure maritime trade against enemy raiders and to cope with similar warships then in service with Britain’s perceived enemy fleets. Although without a clear statement about its roles but helped by steady technological progress, the armoured cruiser was considered able to fight alongside the new generation of Dreadnought-type battleships, and possibly replace them in the battle line. Since the mid-nineteenth century, the Royal Navy had remained strongly oriented toward a great and decisive naval battle fought amongst ships-ofthe-line, and Fisher was happy to champion construction programmes for battleships and battlecruisers. However, he was firmly convinced that the superior speed of the battlecruisers would ultimately allow them to replace the battleships as the capital ships of the major fleets worldwide. This was another inherent reason that helped Fisher to push for several construction programmes of battlecruisers while he was First Sea Lord. The naval armaments race against Germany represented another compelling justification. The second question concerned when the need for battlecruisers arose. It can reasonably be claimed that such a requirement arose when Fisher, probably knowing that he had a real chance to become First Sea Lord, developed his own plans to drastically reform the Royal Navy further and

replace obsolete capital ships with new and more advanced types. It is probably safer to place these plans circa 1903, when he was still in Portsmouth. In answering these two questions, the Kaiserliche Marine’s approach to the battlecruiser development has been intentionally evaded because it is included in the answer to the third question.64 Indeed, the Kaiserliche Marine did not consider the design and construction of battlecruisers until the public unveiling of Invincible. Furthermore, at that time, the RMA could no longer modify Blücher’s design without accepting a long delay in her construction. The Kaiserliche Marine, therefore, firstly replied with Von der Tann (the first real German battlecruiser), which was commissioned in 1910. Then, Germany went ahead with a class of two units (Moltke and Goeben), followed by a new design (Seydlitz) and then a class of three units (Derfflinger, Lützow and Hindenburg). Subsequent construction programmes did not come into fruition because the war completely changed the Kaiserliche Marine’s plans. Conversely, the Royal Navy began battlecruiser development by building two classes of three units each (Invincibles and Indefatigables); then Lion, Princess Royal and Queen Mary followed. Tiger was a prototype that was followed three years later by the Renown class (two units) and the Courageous class (three units). Finally, Hood was to be the lead ship of a four-unit class. In short, the German approach to battlecruisers developed on a modest quantitative pace when compared to Britain’s, which was in part due to a lengthy design and construction process. This was in part caused by problems at the shipyards that were difficult to solve. As already discussed, nine battlecruisers entered service with the Royal Navy before the outbreak of the First World War while the Kaiserliche Marine, in the same period, commissioned four. Including the battlecruisers built by the two nations during the war, Britain totalled fourteen units, excluding Furious, while Germany totalled seven. Finally, it is fair to state that qualitative advantages enjoyed by German battlecruiser design over their British counterparts could not compensate for this numerical disparity.

The battlecruiser Hood in May 1924, during her world cruise. Hood was the last battlecruiser actually commissioned in the Royal Navy. She was to have been followed by three more units but they were all cancelled in 1919. (Courtesy State Library of Victoria) 1

In the Caribbean and the Far East, the United States fought against Spain in accordance with its own expansionist policies. In northeast Asia, China and Japan fought a war aimed at ensuring their influence over, or possession of, the Korean peninsula. 2 The article, titled ‘An Ideal Battleship for the British Fleet’, appeared in the 1903 edition of All The World’s Fighting Ships, edited by Fred T. Jane, later known as the publisher of Jane’s Fighting Ships. Colonel Vittorio Emanuele Cuniberti belonged to the Naval Engineering Corps, the part of the Royal Italian Navy in charge of naval design and construction. 3 The ship proposed by Cuniberti could not have attained 24 knots with the displacement he described. The required propulsion power would have meant having large and heavy machinery that would increase the displacement well beyond 17,000 tons. 4 John Arbuthnot Fisher joined the Royal Navy in 1854 and served in the China and Egyptian wars. Promoted Rear-Admiral in 1890, he later became Commander-in-Chief of the Mediterranean Fleet. In 1902, Fisher was appointed Second Sea Lord and a year later Commander-in-Chief at Portsmouth. 5 France and Britain signed the ‘Entente Cordiale’ in 1904 and, as later discussed, the Russo-Japanese war effectively annihilated the Russian Navy. 6 Alfred Tirpitz joined the then-Prussian navy in 1865 and served aboard the armoured frigate König Wilhelm. He spent some time at Plymouth and became an enthusiast for the

Royal Navy. Later, he commanded several Prussian and German warships, became an expert in torpedoes and eventually moved to the Imperial Naval Staff in Berlin. 7 Other organisations subordinated to Wilhelm II were the Marine-Kabinett, headed by an admiral and responsible for matter pertaining to the higher ranked naval officers; the heads of the naval bases, responsible for coastal defence, ports and fortifications; and an admiral responsible for training and education. 8 According to the content of the first Naval Law, the Kaiserliche Marine was provided with RM408 million for the period 1898-1903, to be spent on new warships. The total cost of the envisaged fleet would actually amount to slightly more than RM700 million, but it has to be considered that the target strength included a number of existing ships, that would have to be replaced only after 1905. In that timeframe, the average cost for each battleship was estimated at RM20-22 million, while each armoured cruiser cost RM16-18 million, a cruiser RM5.5 million and a light cruiser RM4 million. 9 As far as minor combatants were concerned, opinions were less divided because the threat from torpedoes and torpedo boats would be faced by a new type of warship, the destroyer. 10 The establishment of dedicated committees formed of military and civilian experts had long been common practice in the Royal Navy. 11 Lord Selborne was the First Lord of the Admiralty. This post was the equivalent of a ‘Secretary of the Navy’, a political appointee who was part of the British Cabinet, responsible to the prime minister, and chairman of the Board of Admiralty. 12 This is explained in more detail in Chapter 3. The Third Sea Lord was responsible, inter alia, for new naval construction. 13 When he was in Portsmouth, Fisher had established an informal ‘committee’ made up of seven officers and civilians who later became members of the Committee on Designs. The role of this ‘Committee of Seven’ was to perform in-depth operational and technical analysis of the proposals for new warships envisioned by Fisher. 14 The Admiralty agreed on the design of Dreadnought in February 1905 and she was laid down at Portsmouth on 2 October 1905. The ship was completed for trials after one year and a day. 15 At the time of Dreadnought, the First Lord of the Admiralty was still Lord Selborne, who on 28 March 1905 was replaced by Lord Cawdor. The latter stayed on the Board for only six months, before being replaced by Lord Tweedmouth in December 1905. 16 These were a collection of papers addressing several issues raised by Fisher before he became First Sea Lord. 17 These were the older cruisers that had been permanently based overseas to police the British colonies. 18 This particular proposal was aimed at reducing the ability of an enemy vessel to detect the ship at long range, but it did not address the issue of exhausting smoke from the propulsion plant. 19 The Committee met for the first time on 3 January 1905 and ten days later finalised the preliminary design of Dreadnought.

20

In 1902, Lord Selborne wrote a memorandum to the Cabinet in which he observed that there were two ways of dealing with the threat to British commerce from German armed liners: either building cruisers to cope with such threats, or subsidising merchant steamers built with equal or greater speed than those liners. 21 The Admiralty had proposed to King Edward VII that the name for the first armoured cruiser should be Invincible. 22 The names Immortalite and Raleigh were given to the other two vessels but were later changed to Indomitable and Inflexible to apparently match that of the class’s namesake. 23 The full title of the 1908 Novelle, approved on 27 March 1908, was ‘A Law to amend paragraph 2 of the Law concerning the German Fleet of 14 June 1900’ and did not appear as a very large piece of legislation. The entire text reads ‘With the exception of ships destroyed, battleships and cruisers shall be replaced after 20 years. Active life extends from the year of appropriation of the first instalment on the ship to be replaced to the appropriation of the first instalment of the replacement ship’. An annex listed warships to be replaced in the 1908-1917 timeframe. The overall strength of the Fleet remained unchanged; the most significant alteration regarded the replacement age of battleships, reduced from 25 to 20 years. 24 The 1908-9 Navy Estimates totalled £32,181,309, an increase of about £900,000 over the previous year. 25 Both battlecruisers were ordered within the framework of the 1910 construction programme. 26 The Navy Estimates rose from £32,181,309 in 1908-9 to £44,993,169 in 1912-3. This increase clearly reflects the effects of the ‘Naval Scare’. 27 See Before the Ironclad – Warship Design and Development 1815-1860 by David K Brown (Seaforth Publishing, Barnsley 2015). 28 Ballistic tests showed that 10.2in of KNC armour offered the same protection as 12in of Harveyised armour. 29 KC armour plates had some difference in composition (the percentages of carbon, manganese, nickel, chromium etc. in the alloy) when compared to KNC plates. This change also increased elasticity on the rear of the armour plate, resulting in a better performance when hit. 30 Anti-torpedo nets became a distinctive feature of battleships and battlecruisers. They were suspended from side outriggers, or booms, and deployed when the vessels lay at anchor or moored at a buoy. However, their effectiveness was questioned and they were removed during the First World War. 31 The first model powered a dynamo ashore that generated 7.5 kW of electricity. 32 In 1901, Viper took part in the August manoeuvres in the Channel Islands and, travelling at speed in fog, she ran over a reef that tore out her bottom and broke her back. Despite her short life, Viper convinced the Admiralty to continue the development of steam turbine propulsion. 33 The adoption of reciprocating machines with horizontal pistons would mean a wider, and

therefore heavier, hull. 34 Eventually, high-pressure turbines were equipped with cruising stages, which were fed for steaming astern or by-passed for steaming ahead. 35 At 2,000 rpm, the outer tips of the propellers were turning so fast that they generated pockets of vacuum. In extreme circumstances, the whole propeller would simply produce nothing but bubbles and no movement at all. 36 As for boiler maximum working pressures, at 240psi/16.5 atmospheres (atm), they were equivalent in the Royal Navy and the Kaiserliche Marine. The reason for this was that the German ships were fitted with Thornycroft-Schultz boilers based on a British design. 37 The Kaiserliche Marine soon followed the Royal Navy. 38 On the German side, provision of oil came mostly from Romanian oil fields, from where it had to travel by land. 39 Colonel Cuniberti led experiments carried out in the Italian Navy after 1890. In 1913, the Italian navy commissioned the battleship Dante Alighieri, equipped with mixed-fired and oil-fired boilers. In the French navy, developments were much slower; oil-fired warships were not adopted until well after the outbreak of the First World War. In Japan, British policy influenced warship design and the adoption of fuel oil followed the same pattern as in the Royal Navy. On the other side of the Atlantic, the US Navy adopted a policy of exclusively oil firing for all warship classes in 1914. 40 Projectiles in the Royal Navy and the Kaiserliche Marine included: AP, Armour Piercing, for use against heavily armoured targets; APC, Armour Piercing Capped, with a hard steel cap fitted over the nose, intended to exert a high initial force on the armour to be penetrated; CPC, Common Pointed Capped, used against lightly armoured targets; HE, High Explosive, contained a relatively large amount of explosive as compared to AP and was used against lightly armoured targets; and Illuminating, commonly called ‘Star Shells’, used at night to illuminate the target. 41 The main purpose of the secondary battery was to engage enemy destroyers at long range so that they could not close the target and launch their torpedoes. 42 In 1898, Captain Percy Scott of the Royal Navy developed a method of training guns that kept the aim continuously on the target despite the ship’s motions. This method could be implemented for smaller-calibre guns but 12in guns were too heavy to be laid manually. Moreover, the hydraulic elevation and train controls were not sufficiently fast to allow gunners to follow their targets with continuous aim. 43 During the last phases of the First World War, some German capital ships were fitted with 8m Zeiss rangefinders. 44 Unknown to the Royal Navy, stereoscopic rangefinders also had an advantage in that they could not be ‘spoofed’ by changing the profiles of the target by camouflage, which meant that the Royal Navy wasted a great deal of effort during the First World War by adding various extra details to their ships with that intent. 45 The device was named after his inventor, Lt. John Saumarez Dumaresq. The deflection is the amount of ‘aim off’, to the right or left, needed to hit the target. It was usually measured in knots.

46

This was an analogue device patented by Commander Frederick Dreyer. The decision was made to test this equipment against hydraulically-operated mountings that equipped Indomitable and Inflexible. Reliability problems plagued Invincible during a lengthy series of gun trials, so the Admiralty decided to revert to hydraulic gear. 48 Henry Bradwardine Jackson had joined the Royal Navy in 1868 and retired as Admiral of the Fleet in August 1919. He was then appointed the first Chairman of the Radio Research Board of the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research. In 1926, he won the Royal Society’s Hughes Medal for his pioneering work in the scientific investigations of radiotelegraphy and its application to navigation. 49 Dr. Elizabeth Bruton, ‘Beyond Marconi’, PhD Thesis, University of Leeds. 50 The HM Dockyards in Chatham and Pembroke were long established but were not equipped with the infrastructure suitable for building large warships. On the other hand, Portsmouth and Devonport relied on private companies for the supply of armament, machinery and armour. 51 The infrastructures of the three German Imperial yards were adapted to the development of the Kaiserliche Marine. By 1912, the Imperial yard at Kiel had two large slips and a small one for torpedo boats, six floating docks, and six dry docks. The yard at Wilhelmshaven had two large slipways, five floating docks, with four small ones for torpedo boats, and seven dry docks. At Danzig there was a comparatively small slipway, three horizontal slips, a docking-basin and two floating docks. Although the Imperial dockyards were generally confined to repairs, they were designed and equipped on the principle that they would possess a sufficient capability to prevent private yards establishing a monopoly in warship construction. 52 However, in the framework of the whole industrial effort carried out in Britain to build capital ships (battlecruisers and battleships) prior to and during the First World War, it must be remembered that the construction of fifty-one capital ships (from Dreadnought to Hood) was split between thirty-four units built in private shipyards and seventeen built in HM Dockyards. In comparison, Germany built twenty-six battleships and battlecruisers, with a ratio between private and Imperial shipyards that was roughly similar to Britain’s. 53 These figures include, in some cases, people working in coowned armour plate, machinery and gun factories as well as the shipyards. 54 The figures related to Vickers, Harland & Wolff and Palmers are an estimate. 55 The company was set up in 1905 with the encouragement of the British government, which wanted a third major arms consortium to compete with the duopoly of Vickers and Armstrong-Whitworth, in order to drive down prices. The heavy mounts were manufactured at Scotstoun, in the Glasgow area, close to the shipyards. 56 The hull length of British battlecruisers increased from the 567ft of the Invincibles to the 860ft of Hood. The design of battleships followed a similar pattern; their overall length evolved from the 572ft of Dreadnought to the 642ft of the Queen Elizabeths. 57 Ernst Reventlow, a well-known writer on naval topics, carried out the survey. 58 Wilhelmshaven was also home port for the German battleships, split into three 47

‘Geschwader’ (squadrons), with Friedrich der Grosse being the flagship of the whole Hochseeflotte. The Kaiserliche Marine officially adopted this latter term on 16 February 1907, as proposed by Tirpitz. 59 Malta had its HM Dockyard and was the home of the Mediterranean Fleet. 60 Two large dry-docks at Rosyth would be readied in 1916. 61 To implement the strategy of the distant blockade, the Royal Navy split its Home Fleet into two large battle fleets. The Channel Fleet guarded from Portsmouth and Devonport and operated in the English Channel, while the Grand Fleet covered the North Sea from Scapa Flow. Smaller cruiser squadrons carried out patrols and offensive sweeps between the two fleets and could call on the larger force if the German Hochseeflotte engaged them. At Scapa Flow, the main Grand Fleet anchorage was located north of Faro and Flotta islands. 62 Scapa Flow had served for many years as a summer training range for the Home Fleet, with dozens of warships, large and small, appearing in and around the Orkneys. 63 At that time, Australia was in her namesake country and deployed in the central Pacific to oppose possible German raids. 64 The question addressed how battlecruisers were developed in Britain and Germany. The Appendix describes the development of battlecruisers in other nations.

Chapter Three

THE BATTLECRUISERS OF THE ROYAL NAVY

T

he construction of British battlecruisers from 1908 until the end of the First World War followed a pattern of progressive development that was mainly dictated by the evolution of machinery and naval weapons. In turn, these developments meshed with the requirements of speed and firepower, mainly imposed by Admiral Fisher, at the expense of protection. Consequently, the battlecruisers built for the Royal Navy can be subdivided according to a criterion of generational development. Thus, the first generation British battlecruisers includes the Invincible and the Indefatigable classes, each comprising three units and armed with eight 12in guns. The second generation includes the Lion class, still at three units, and Tiger, the latter originally conceived as a fourth Lion but later developed as a stand-alone ship. This second generation featured a 13.5in main armament, a top speed of 28 knots and moderately improved protection, although insufficient to cope with large-calibre hits. After a pause caused by the outbreak of war in 1914, Fisher’s return to the Admiralty favoured the emergence of the third generation battlecruisers, made up of the two Renowns. They featured 15in main armament and a top speed of 32 knots; there was also some improvement in protection but this was deemed inadequate, although the Renowns never had the opportunity to engage

German battleships and battlecruisers. Although conceived and built after the Renowns, the three battlecruisers of the Courageous class were officially designated ‘large light cruisers’ and their overall characteristics were such that they are not considered a potential fourth generation of the type. As explained later, their role as imagined by Fisher was different from the traditional tactical employment that the Grand Fleet had envisaged for the previous classes of battlecruisers. Nevertheless, their main armament and top speed characterised them as battlecruisers, as confirmed by several authors. After having considered and discarded another new design for a more powerful battlecruiser imagined by Fisher and named Incomparable, the Admiralty debated at length the ship that became the last British battlecruiser, Hood. She was the only unit actually built in a class of four that could be considered as fourth generation battlecruisers. However, Hood emerged eventually as the result of applying the ‘fusion concept’ between battleship and battlecruisers that Fisher had already envisioned in 1905. In short, Hood’s designers achieved a level of balance between firepower, speed and armour that had been neglected in the previous classes of battlecruisers. The table on page 76 provides an overview of the main characteristics of the battlecruisers planned and built in Britain. The information provided for each class and/or unit actually built includes the following aspects: – The development of the programme, from the establishment of concept and operational requirements up to the design finalisation. This part also includes discussions about funding that took place within the relevant organisations, innovative aspects and design weaknesses. – The construction process, from the laying down of each ship/class up to the delivery and trials. – An analysis of each class or ship, including general features, protection, machinery, power generation, armament, history1 and main alterations. A table accompanying each class of British battlecruisers has been produced with information mainly derived from three sources.2 As far as construction dates are concerned, it is worth remembering that a difference may exist between completion and commissioning. Completion is usually a contractrelated term, indicating the date on which the shipbuilder completed the

contract and had the vessel ready for trials prior to her hand-over to the Royal Navy. Commissioning was the date on which the commanding officer assumed command and the White Ensign was hoisted. A variable period between completion and commissioning, from hours/days to years, may occur. Consequently, official dates of completion and commissioning were not always recorded separately. As for displacement, the tables show both legend displacement calculated for the class or for the single ship and actual load displacement, the latter as defined during the inclining experiment of each ship in a class, when available. Draught refers to load displacement; in particular, the listed figure refers to a specific ship in the class. As for steam trials, the numbers refers to the highest power and speed recorded during those trials by a ship in a class.

Admiral Fisher, the driver of innovation in the Royal Navy, during the Naval Review held at Spithead in August 1907 to celebrate the reconstitution of the Home Fleet. (Queen Alexandra photo book)

THE BRITISH DESIGN APPROACH Before addressing in detail what the Royal Navy achieved in terms of battlecruisers, it is worth addressing how the ‘Senior Service’ was organised for designing and building them. In Britain, the Board of Admiralty had the final say on the development of new warship designs and they had to be developed through a decisionmaking process that considered several factors, especially for large and costly vessels such as battleships and battlecruisers. The responsibility for new naval construction, naval gunnery, ordnance and propulsion plants fell on the Third Sea Lord and Controller of the Royal Navy.3 The Third Sea Lord was the boss of the Director of Naval Construction (DNC), usually a senior civilian naval architect who was either trained within the Royal Navy or recruited from private shipyards. The Third Sea Lord was also in charge of the Director of Naval Ordnance (DNO), responsible for naval weapons, and the Engineer-in-Chief, responsible for propulsion plants.4 The DNC’s Department had a staff of assistants, draughtsmen, inspectors and other specialised personnel, all working at the Admiralty; the hierarchical organisation included some Assistants to the DNC (defined ADNC) and a number of Chief Constructors, Constructors and Assistant Constructors. All these personnel were organised in design teams along with draughtsmen and other specialists and provided proposals for the DNC and higher levels. Projects developed within the design teams could be rejected by the DNC or the Third Sea Lord/Controller before reaching higher levels. Although the DNC’s Department was responsible for the whole design of a new class of warships, the Engineer-in-Chief was responsible for machinery layout, while the DNO provided the layout for the armament. Therefore, a strong synergy between different specialisms within the Third Sea Lord’s staff and the Admiralty was paramount for a design to meet the requirements.5

British Battlecruisers

Sir Philip Watts (1846-1926) served as Director of Naval Construction from 1902 to 1912. In this capacity, and under the strong impetus provided by Fisher, he supervised the design of most British battlecruisers.

Other personnel specialised in naval architecture and construction worked in the HM Dockyards, who were responsible for the detailed design of the warship’s actual components, especially hull structure; supervised the actual manufacturing of several other components and managed the entire construction of the new warship. The DNC’s Department also supervised the privately-owned shipyards, which had first been assigned warship construction contracts in the 1860s. This department normally functioned to provide outline warship designs and suggestions to the Admiralty and, after the latter had chosen a design among several proposals, it carried out the detailed work. Then, the Admiralty chose a final design, asked for the funds from the Cabinet, and commenced the construction programme at either an HM Dockyard or a private shipyard chosen through competitive tendering. During the early deliberations on the would-be Dreadnought and Invincibles, a Committee on Designs, as discussed earlier and highlighted later, actually took over the role of both the Third Sea Lord and the DNC, but business returned to normality after the presentation of the Committee’s first progress report.

Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt (1868-1951) took over from Philip Watts and supervised battlecruiser designs undertaken during wartime, including the ‘Admiral’ class. (Library of Congress)

The design process followed by the Royal Navy was consolidated during the 1890s and included three main phases: design study/concept, sketch design/feasibility, and detailed design. A design study included several alternatives stemming from a requirement provided by the Admiralty and lasted a couple of days, often with people in the DNC’s Department working overnight; the outcome of the design study was later discussed by the Third Sea Lord and the Admiralty. The main features of a new design study were usually taken from an existing successful warship of similar type (called the type ship), and possibly of similar or smaller size. The starting point of the design study was the armament, in terms of number and types of main guns and assuming that they existed already. Therefore, the advent of all-big-gun capital ships such Dreadnought and the Invincibles clearly eased this task. Furthermore, a decision on the armament, although not final, established its weight with sufficient approximation; then, assuming a similar armament weight’s percentage of the type ship, the weight percentage for the new warship could be determined, still with sufficient approximation. At this stage, an estimate was also made of the dimensions and the displacement of the new warship, and her maximum speed as well, thus allowing a quick estimate of the required power, usually through the formula called the Admiralty Coefficient or, more accurately, using the database developed by William and Edmund Froude.6 As the Committee on Designs had already defined the maximum speed of the Invincibles, using Froude’s data was far more precise than the Admiralty Coefficient; then, and similar to the methodology followed by other navies, the configuration and weight of the propulsion plant could be calculated. The design study ended with the preparation of a profile and plan of the upper deck, along with a brief paper explaining important aspects and critical factors of the new design. The second phase of the design process, the sketch design, commenced when the Admiralty gave the green light to the design study and usually provided specific requirements. The sketch design phase typically lasted two or three weeks and included additional calculations to justify or modify some choices already made in the previous phase. The first step included the definition of a suitable hull form through the Froude database; a refinement of the dimensions and displacement followed, thereby enabling the stability calculations, a more precise computation of all weights considered into the design displacement (hull, machinery, armament, armour, fuel and equipment) and a definition of the hull structure and its strength. Detailed

plans were then drawn, including a more accurate layout of the guns so that the effect of blast could be identified and potential corrections could be made. The sketch design ended with a robust consolidation of the design study and it was quite unusual for the Admiralty to introduce any new major change at this stage of the whole design process. The aim of the third and final phase of the design process was to verify and further refine previous calculations, especially those related to stability, propulsion power and stability, including an early calculation of the metacentric height and the definition of the stability curve, this latter being further refined through the inclining experiment.7 This third phase usually lasted some months and included a final definition of several design items such as fuel and food provisions, stores, ammunition, structural computation, protection and armour scheme and other relevant issues. Finally, the Admiralty introduced a margin in the summary of weights included in the design displacement, usually 100 tons, in order to compensate for possible errors in all previous calculations. Concurrently with these calculations, the DNC’s Department carried also out a detailed arrangement of the new warship, including the execution of drawings related to deck plans, profiles and cross sections. These drawings were part of a design package that also comprised a number of structural sections, a summary of calculations, a report and other support documents. The compilation of these documents was also the result of a continuous dialogue carried out between the DNC and other Departments of the Admiralty during the design process, obviously needed to avoid misunderstandings and delays. After the agreement of all stakeholders involved in the design process, the DNC signed the drawings, taking personal responsibility for the design and was now ready for the final discussions within the Admiralty. After approval, the design package was sent either to the HM Dockyard selected for construction or to the private shipyards invited to tender in the parallel procurement process. Although the design package was a complete product, either the shipyard or the HM Dockyard would often propose some minor changes; they were discussed by the DNC and, if approved, inserted into the final construction programme.8

THE INVINCIBLE CLASS As mentioned, the origin of the Invincibles dates back to Fisher’s first concepts developed during the early 1900s. To achieve his objectives, he

strongly pressured the Committee on Designs, which was easy to do as a majority of its members was already his followers. His ideas were also accepted because the general requirements set out by the Admiralty for the new class of armoured cruisers were included in Fisher’s preliminary design. These had been noted during his work in Britain and when posted abroad. The Committee did, however, carry out additional work, notably debating and defining the layout of armament and machinery. The Committee also took into account early lessons learned from the Russo-Japanese War Design, Construction and Costs Discussions regarding a project for a new class of armoured cruisers officially began in the Committee on Designs on 3 January 1905, although some members had already considered proposals with 9.2in guns. This calibre, however, had been discarded. The Committee then stated that the basic ship requirements called for a main battery comprising 12in guns, a speed of 25 knots, a protection scheme similar to that of the Minotaur class9 and the capability to use the existing docking infrastructures at home and abroad. No indications were provided for machinery and type of fuel. During the Committee meeting on 4 January, they debated three preliminary proposals based on sketches that were sequentially elaborated within the DNC’s Department, this being headed by Philip Watts. A propulsion plant based on reciprocating piston engines and twin turrets were the common denominators in all sketches. Constructor C H Croxford, instructed by W H Whiting in his capacity as Assistant DNC, prepared the first design sketch of Invincible. This is usually defined as Design ‘A’10 and sported two twin turrets side-by-side forward and two superfiring11 twin turrets aft, four funnels and a high forecastle. The design displacement was 17,000 tons and the gun layout allowed for broadsides of six guns (two forward and four aft), while four guns could operate ahead or astern. Design ‘B’ had two sided turrets fore and aft, with a ram-shaped bow like Design ‘A’. Its displacement was 17,200 tons, and the gun layout allowed a broadside of four guns, while the same number could fire ahead or astern. Design ‘C’ featured two sided forward twin turrets on the forecastle and one aft twin turret one level below. This had evident limitations, however, in both broadside and ahead/astern fire and the displacement decreased to 15,600 tons. A clipper bow featured in all sketches from Design ‘C’ onwards.

The Committee discussed these proposals during its first meeting, but rejected all of them because the Royal Navy lacked experience with superfiring turrets and because blasts could dangerously affect deck structures and equipment.12 Other flaws concerned the weak broadside and pitching effects caused by two heavy forward turrets. However, the Committee provided advice to the DNC, focusing especially on maximising fire in the broadside and ahead. Thus, when the Committee met again on 12 January, they discussed two further proposals: Designs ‘D’ and ‘E’. Design ‘D’ had one forward twin turret and another aft, both placed on the hull centreline on different levels. Two additional twin turrets were placed amidships. This layout allowed a broadside of six guns so, theoretically, there could be six guns firing either ahead or astern. The displacement would be 16,950 tons. On Design ‘E’, two amidships turrets were placed en echelon, both facing forward. This layout still allowed a broadside of six guns, while cross-firing was permitted only if the opposite turret (port or starboard) was not working. In fact, a normal cross-firing, although with a limited arc of fire, would cause dangerous blast effects. Six guns could fire both ahead and astern. The position of the echeloned turrets called for an unusual arrangement of the machinery, since boiler rooms would have to be alternated with magazines to support those turrets. The Committee preferred Design ‘E’, which had three funnels but was still equipped with reciprocating engines, and thus focused its discussions on how to maximise the advantages provided by the echeloned turrets, also known as wing turrets. Eventually, they asked the DNC to lengthen the forecastle to provide more space for the wing turrets and to improve seaworthiness. Meanwhile, Croxford prepared a new sketch, dubbed Design ‘F’, presented at the Committee’s meeting of 13 January. It featured two twin turrets placed side-by-side forward and two similar turrets widely separated and located on the hull centreline.13 On 18 January the Committee met in a Royal Navy-only format and accepted Design ‘E’ as the initial outline sketch for all future battlecruiser developments. Considering the length of time between these two meetings, Fisher could easily have lobbied heavily for this result. That the committee could be influenced is evident because, on the previous day, Sir Charles Parsons had recommended that the Committee adopted steam turbines. The Committee also debated underwater protection against mines and torpedoes, an issue that emerged after Britain received information about the Russo-Japanese War. The solution was to locate the magazines of the

large guns close to the hull centreline and to place internal protective bulkheads abreast these compartments. To avoid any increase of displacement resulting for this additional weight, the Committee decided to reduce, in several places, the thickness of the armour. These discussions took place in February and led to a design displacement of 16,750 tons.

Inflexible at Genoa in March 1914, when she was part of the Second Battlecruiser Squadron in the Mediterranean. Note the different height of the funnels and the white band on the forward one. (J Roberts Collection)

Indomitable being fitted out at Fairfield shipyard, Govan, in June 1908. She was partially completed on 20 June for participation in the Quebec Tercentenary celebrations in Canada and was later handed back to her contractors for completion. (M Brescia Collection)

The Committee on Design met for the last time on 22 February and produced a First Progress Report. This recommended that the Admiralty adopted the above described Design ‘E’. As a result, a number of subcommittees were established to address specific details, but the DNC’s Department took over the main responsibility for design development. The Admiralty finally approved Design ‘E’ on 16 March. The final design included a reduction in the number of 12pdr guns, later replaced with 4in guns, and minor adjustments, specifically in machinery and the hull. This caused an increase of the design displacement. The Admiralty also decided to change the layout of the wing turrets as one of the primary requirements for the battlecruisers was an optimisation of forward fire against a retreating enemy, possibly without blast interference. Therefore ‘P’ turret faced forward and ‘Q’ turret faced aft. This meant there could be six guns firing simultaneously ahead or astern14 while still maintaining a broadside of six guns. Assistant Constructor J H Narbeth was appointed to complete the design in

order that it could be contracted and funded within the 1905-6 Navy Estimates. In June the Admiralty approved standard iterations and modifications carried out during this phase and, in August, the final detailed designs, drawings and calculations for the Invincibles were eventually settled. The armament layout and the adoption of steam turbines was definitely an innovation in the design of this new class of capital ship. It thus differed greatly from Dreadnought, especially in association with the available dimensions. However, the placement of magazines between boiler rooms and the cross-deck firing of ‘P’ and ‘Q’ turrets remained a criticality. In their final design configuration, the Invincibles had a legend displacement of 17,250 tons. The summary of weights included hull (6,200 tons), machinery (3,390 tons), armour (3,460 tons), armament (2,440 tons), coal (1,000 tons), equipment (660 tons) and a Board Margin of 100 tons.15 Adding extra coal, reserve feed water for boilers and other equipment, the displacement in deep condition rose to 20,420 tons. Armstrong-Whitworth, John Brown and Fairfield were given the building contracts for Invincible, Inflexible and Indomitable respectively. The choice of these shipbuilding companies in preference to HM Dockyards, over which Fisher could maintain stricter control, is possibly due to the contemporary construction of Dreadnought (at Portsmouth) and the willingness of the Admiralty to test the proficiency of private shipyards to build large capital ships. Invincible began construction at Armstrong-Whitworth, Elswick, on 2 April 1906, was launched on 13 April 1907 and completed on 20 March 1908. Indomitable was laid down at Fairfield, Govan, on 1 March 1906 and was launched on 16 March 1907. She was partially completed on 20 June 1908 for participation in the Quebec Tercentenary celebrations in Canada and was handed back to her contractors in May for completion. Inflexible began construction at John Brown in Clydebank on 5 February 1906, was launched on 26 June 1907 and was completed on 20 October 1908. Machinery for Inflexible and Indomitable was manufactured by their shipbuilding companies, but Humpreys & Tennant, at Deptford, London, produced the machinery for Invincible. Fisher had wanted these battlecruisers completed within 30 months and, with the exception of Inflexible, which took 32 months, Invincible and Indomitable were completed in less time. Regarding cost, the initial estimates were £1,621,015 for each battlecruiser. This was later revised to £1,634,316 and then £1,625,120. The actual costs

were £1,625,277 for Invincible, £1,578,373 for Inflexible, and £1,617,791 for Indomitable. All these costs include guns, which were procured separately.16 All stability features calculated during the design were tested during the inclining experiments. Invincible was inclined in February 1909: her metacentric height varied between 3.15ft at light condition (16,100 tons) and 4.7ft at deep condition (20,700 tons, including oil fuel).17 The angle of maximum stability was 42.5°, and the angle at which stability vanished differed from 73° at deep condition to 85° at light condition. Rolling period was about 14 seconds. Speed trials of the Invincibles took place approximately one month after their completion. They occurred in several load conditions and lasted approximately four days.18 At full power, each of them achieved a speed slightly over 26 knots on the measured mile. This result validated the choices made by those who contributed to their design. The design maximum power was 41,000shp but, during the speed trials, it exceeded 47,700shp on Indomitable, at 17,435 tons, with an average speed of 296rpm and a ship speed of 26.1 knots. The table on page 82 summarises the main characteristics of the Invincible class. Indomitable entered service with the Royal Navy on 20 June 1908 and Inflexible followed on 20 October. Finally, Invincible joined her sisters on 20 March 1909. After being commissioned, the Invincible class battlecruisers were deemed the Royal Navy’s most attractive warships and, as far as design requirements were concerned, met expectations, since they did not greatly exceed the design displacement and sported excellent performances during the speed trials. General Features The dimensions of the Invincibles when completed were definitely greater than Dreadnought’s. They were 567ft long overall, about 79ft wide and about 27ft deep at full load. Their depth was 40ft at the edge of the upper deck and 48ft at the edge of the forecastle deck. At 17,420 tons load, Invincible had the highest displacement of the trio; she reached 20,135 tons at full load. The difference with the other two units was about 100 tons. Their slender hull had a block coefficient of 0.558 and featured a ram bow and a cruiser-type straight stern. The Invincibles also had an unusually long forecastle deck that ran up to the aft gun mount and provided a high freeboard, 21ft amidships. This allowed good seakeeping in bad weather. The hull was divided into six

decks.19 From top to bottom, these were the forecastle deck, upper deck, main deck, lower deck, upper platform deck, lower platform deck and hold. Sixteen watertight bulkheads hinged on the lower deck provided a horizontal subdivision into fifteen compartments. The superstructure occupied the aftcentral section of the forecastle and was split into two very narrow blocks. The forward block included two deckhouses that supported the bridge, the forward tripod mast and two funnels. The aft block included two smaller deckhouses that supported the third funnel, the aft tripod mast, and a boat deck or shelter deck. ‘P’ and ‘Q’ turrets occupied the space between these two superstructures, as it was a reasonably clear area so the turrets could be trained along relatively large arcs of fire. However, ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets, located at the ends of the superstructures, had larger arcs of fire.

The three Invincibles at anchor at Spithead during the Royal Review of the Home and Atlantic fleets, July 1909. Invincible is in the foreground, followed by Inflexible and Indomitable. At the time, the three battlecruisers were part of the First Cruiser Squadron, Home Fleet. (J Roberts Collection)

Invincible Class

Names Invincible, Inflexible, Indomitable Shipyards and construction Invincible: Armstrong, Elswick Laid down, 2 April 1906; launched, 13 April 1907; completed, early March 1908; commissioned, 20 March 1909. Indomitable: Fairfield, Govan Laid down, 1 March 1906; launched 16 March 1907; completed, April 1908; commissioned, 20 June 1908. Inflexible: John Brown & Co, Clydebank Laid down, 5 February 1906; launched, 26 June 1907; completed, early October 1908; commissioned, 20 October 1908. Displacement Legend, 17,250tons Invincible: inclined, 17,330 tons Indomitable: inclined, 17,800 tons Inflexible: completed, 17,290 tons Dimensions Length: 567ft (oa); 530ft (pp) Beam: 78ft 6in (moulded) Draught (load displacement): 25ft 6in fore, 26ft 7in aft (Indomitable) Armament Eight 12in 45cal Mk X, twin turrets Sixteen 4in 45cal Mk III, single mounts Five 18in torpedo tubes (four beam, one stern) Protection Belt: 6in amidships, 4in forward Bulkheads: 6in, from ‘X’ barbette to after ends of main belt Decks: main, mostly 1in; lower, 1.5in-2in Barbettes: 7in above main belt and on ‘X’ barbette between bulkheads Magazine screens: 2.5in Turrets: 7in face and sides, 3in roof Conning tower: 10in face, 7in rear, 2in roof and floor Communication tube: 4in Spotting top: 3in sides, 2in roof and floor Torpedo control tower: 6in sides, 2in roof and floor Machinery Thirty-one Yarrow large-tube boilers, 250psi Four sets Parsons direct drive turbines, four 3-blade propellers and two rudders. Power and speed (legend): 41,000shp, 25 knots

Power and speed (trials): 46,947shp at 291.3rpm, 26.48 knots (Inflexible) Fuel: 3,085 tons coal max; 725 tons oil Radius of action: 6,210nm at 10 knots; 3,050nm at 22.3 knots Complement Peacetime: 780 officers and men; 808 as flagship Wartime: 800 officers and men; 1,030 as flagship

Invincible 1909

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

A peculiarity of the Invincibles was their forward upper works. The wheelhouse had bridge wings extended well beyond the sides of the forward superstructure and was surmounted by a compass platform that extended outward. However, as the bridge was higher than the foremost funnel, it was later necessary to raise the funnel so as to avoid smoke that harmed lookouts and other personnel.20 The two masts housed two control platforms, also known as spotting tops, and each of them carried a rangefinder on a circular track. However, these spotting tops proved to be cramped. The mainmast had a hinged derrick for handling service boats. These were three steam boats, one launch, one sailing pinnace and one whaler, all of them placed on the shelter decks. Two cutters were carried out on davits on

either side of the mainmast, while other boats were stowed on a short shelter deck between the two forward funnels.21 Two derricks positioned abreast the central funnel serviced these boats. The Invincibles also had two 240ft-long bilge keels22 and two balanced rudders, whose location close to the inner shafts ensured excellent manoeuvrability.23 Twelve booms for antitorpedo nets were hinged along the hull sides that ran from ‘A’ to ‘Y’ turrets. All of these, however, were removed shortly after the outbreak of the First World War since they were deemed virtually useless. The Invincibles also benefitted from the more extensive use of electrical machinery already common in other major navies. This led to the widespread application of electrical power in all auxiliary equipment located outside major machinery spaces. There were notable exceptions including the main boats’ derricks, and the forward steam-powered capstan. As will be explained later, the Admiralty also decided to test electrically-operated gun mountings on the new battlecruisers. They were, therefore, equipped with a 105-volt ring-main, which was fed by two pairs of Siemens dynamos. These were operated either by reciprocating engines or turbines and at least one was oilfired. One pair of dynamos generated 210kW, while the other pair generated 420kW, thus totalling 630kW. Three dynamos and certain associated electrical machines (switchboards and motor generators24) were placed in the amidships compartment between Boiler Rooms 3 and 4. The fourth dynamo and a motor generator room were forward of ‘A’ turret, in a compartment below the lower deck. This electrical ring-main was modified during construction because of the adoption of electrically-operated gun turrets.

Indomitable, probably in 1909. The photo shows the layout of the central and forward sections, with the forward block of the superstructure and the aft-raked tripod mast. (M Brescia Collection)

Invincible at Malta on 18 November 1913, with her large spotting tops and white bands around the funnels. (M Brescia Collection)

The Invincibles were initially fitted with a Mk II W/T set, later changed to more modern types, and had a W/T office in each superstructure. The Mk II set on Indomitable was extensively tested during trials on her voyage to Canada and back in 1908. Tests were conducted with different frequencies (from about 70 KHz to 2.3MHz), with ranges from 1,400 miles at night to 730 miles by day.25 The trials were considered successful and contributed to the consolidation of W/T operations and organisation throughout the Royal Navy. The size and composition of the Invincibles’ complement varied throughout their services, especially as flagships, and significantly increased during the First World War. Invincible was designed for 722 officers and men but, when commissioned, had 730. When the three ships were alternately used as flagships between 1910 and October 1912, each complement varied between 795 and 799. At Jutland, Invincible, as flagship of the Third Battlecruiser Squadron, embarked 1,032 personnel. Crew accommodation reflected Fisher’s view that officers should live close to their usual action stations on the bridge or conning towers. A similar rule was applied to ratings and men, who should be able to reach their watch stations easily without having to go back and forth along passageways and corridors often full of coal bags. The Invincibles had the officers’ quarters located mostly below the fore superstructure, in the forecastle and shelter decks, while the rest of the crew was housed aft. This was different from previous ship designs but followed the same approach as in Dreadnought. The new arrangement did not change the specific living conditions on board, with officers and noncommissioned officers having, respectively, their own cabins and compartments, while in the mess decks hammocks were rigged at night.26 This arrangement, however, did prove to be very unpopular with the Royal Navy and was subsequently reversed in the design of the battlecruiser Queen Mary. At the beginning of their service, the British battlecruisers were painted with a grey officially termed ‘battleship grey’ which, after the outbreak of the First World War, changed to ‘mid-grey’. This was partly due to a shortage of dark pigments and the realisation that this problem could worsen as the conflict continued. During the first phases of the war, sometimes the midgrey

was turned to a light grey, although this was confined to a few parts such as funnels and superstructure. This scheme was applied to Invincible at the battle of the Falklands but it was abandoned later. The funnels initially had white painted bands for identification;27 however this was abandoned since enemy gunners could easily use the white-banded funnels as targets. Wooden decks were scrubbed daily with a special sandstone, called ‘holystone’, and took on a whitish colour. Camouflage was quite uncommon for British battlecruisers, with a few notable exceptions. As far as the Invincibles are concerned, during the Dardanelles campaign in early 1915 Inflexible wore a one-off, three-tone camouflage with dark grey for the hull, mid-grey for the superstructure and white splashes on the bows and masts. The central funnel was painted white, while the others had grey horizontal lines.28 Protection The concept behind the armour scheme of the British battlecruisers was to limit damage to the most vital parts of the vessels (machinery, armament and fire-control positions) in case of confrontation with vessels fitted with medium-calibre guns. Speed was the only real way to escape any risky engagement with similar or more powerful capital ships, although positioning the coal bunkers on both sides could provide some additional protection. The vertical protection of the Invincibles consisted of a 6in KC belt running amidships, extending longitudinally between the forward end of ‘A’ turret and the vertical axis of ‘Y’ turret.29 The upper edge of this belt was 7ft 5in above the waterline and 3ft 10in below it. The belt had a 4in thickness going from ‘A’ turret to the stem, while the after section of the hull, including the steering gear compartment, was unprotected. A 7in KC bulkhead closed the forward end of the main belt, while a 6in KC bulkhead closed the aft end. These two bulkheads were linked to ‘A’ and ‘Y’ barbettes. Horizontal protection was scarce because the limit imposed on the displacement meant the designers had to focus primarily on the main belt. The main deck was ¾in forward and 1in amidships, while the thickness of the lower deck varied from 1½ and 2½in across its length. The lower deck also had sloped edges. The barbettes had a 27ft internal diameter and ‘A’, ‘Q’ and ‘P’ mounts had 7in KC armour that extended to the main deck and were 2in below the main belt. The exposed face of ‘Y’ mount was 7in, it ran down to the lower deck and then reduced to 2in. The four main turrets were 7in on faces and rears, and roofs and sides were approximately 2½in. Magazines and

shell rooms had 2½in of mild steel longitudinal protection against torpedoes and mines. Initially, the 4in guns were unprotected, but shields were provided during the First World War. The forward conning tower, located below the bridge, had a 10in KC face and sides, a 7in KC rear, and a 2in KNC roof and floor. The forward communication tube ran down to the lower deck and had 4in KNC plates. The aft conning tower, located abreast the mainmast, had a 6in face, 2in KNC roof and floor and the aft communication tube had 3in KNC plates. Two transmitting stations, both placed on the lower deck, had 2in protection. Machinery Machinery compartments were placed below the lower deck and their length ran from ‘A’ barbette to ‘Y’ barbette, thus taking about 265ft of the hull length. From fore to aft, there were three boiler rooms, a compartment that housed electrical machines and auxiliary equipment, another boiler room and two engine rooms. A longitudinal bulkhead divided these rooms. Invincible and Inflexible were fitted with thirty-one Yarrow large tube boilers, while Indomitable had both Babcock and Yarrow boilers.30 Steam was raised at 250psi and all boilers were equipped with oil fuel burners that varied in number and model. Each engine room housed one set of Parsons turbines. The high pressure (HP) ahead and astern turbines operated the outer shafts, while the low pressure (LP) ahead and astern turbines, placed in the same casing, operated the inner shafts. A separate low pressure (LP) cruising turbine was linked to each inner shaft. At full power, the steam expanded firstly into the HP turbine, then into the LP turbine and finally went into the condenser. At cruising speed, the steam passed firstly into the LP cruising turbine and then followed the same pattern as at full power. During astern manoeuvres, the steam expanded into the HP astern turbines and then into the LP astern turbines. A fixed coupling connected the HP ahead and astern turbines, while a sliding coupling was placed between the HP ahead cruising turbines and the casing of the LP turbines.31 All turbines were directly attached to the shafts but this did not provide an efficient operation for the entire machinery chain because the propellers were prone to cavitation. The Invincibles were fitted with threeblade propellers, which all had the same pitch. The inner propellers had a larger diameter than the outer ones. At a cruising speed of 18.5 knots, the coal consumption was 370 tons per day, which corresponded to an endurance

of 3,180 miles; if oil fuel was also used, endurance rose to 4,230 miles. At full power, the coal consumption increased to 660 tons per day.32 The Invincibles had average fuel stowage of 3,000 tons for coal and 720 tons for oil, with small variations due to the slightly different capacity of coal bunkers and tanks in each ship. The propulsion plant was probably the main point of strength in the Invincible design. As with Dreadnought, the steam turbines fully demonstrated their superiority to the reciprocating engines, especially regarding sustaining higher speeds for longer times, which was particularly important during war. Armament The main battery’s layout was the most debated issue of the design process. Eventually, four 12in twin turrets, located as described earlier, were decided upon and the Vickers-designed Mk X 45-calibre gun was used, after it had been extensively tested ashore. The Admiralty approved a proposal for fitting one of the three ships with electrically-operated turrets after discussions that had taken place during the Invincibles’ design stage in August 1905.33 Vickers and Armstrong each manufactured and supplied a pair of such mountings. Therefore, Invincible had two Vickers BIX mountings, fitted in ‘A’ and ‘Y’ positions, and two Armstrong BX mountings in ‘Q’ and ‘P’ positions. Indomitable and Inflexible were fitted with BVIII-type, hydraulically-operated mountings.34 Some differences, however, did exist in turret design and shape in the three ships of the class. The 12in Mk X gun had an elevation of -3°/+13.5°, with a maximum range of 16,400yd. Rate of fire was approximately one round per minute in battle practice and this increased to two rounds per minute in gunlayers’ tests. The gun used APC, CPC and HE projectiles, each weighing approximately 850lb with a charge weight of 258lb. This meant that a six-gun broadside weighed approximately 5,100lb. The muzzle velocity was approximately 2,800ft/sec and each barrel had a service life of some 220 rounds. Armour penetration of AP shells was 10.6in at 10,000yd. The peacetime ammunition stowage was eighty rounds per gun, including twenty-four APC, forty CP and sixteen HE, thus totalling 960 rounds. When the First World War began, the outfit was increased to 110 rounds per gun, including thirty-three APC, thirty-eight CPC and thirty-nine HE. This provision changed by mid-1916 to forty-four APC, thirty-three CPC and thirty-three HE.35 Magazines and shell rooms were

located directly below each mount, the former above the latter. The three ships conducted their gun trials off the Isle of Wight, between April and October 1908. All results were satisfactory, with the notable exception of Invincible’s electrical mountings, whose training and elevation was considered slower than expected. The Admiralty thus decided to introduce various improvements that were carried at HM Dockyard Portsmouth. This, however, did not solve reliability problems and unsatisfactory performance. Eventually, the Admiralty decided that it was better to spend money on improving the hydraulically-operated mountings rather than to introduce modifications to solve problems with guns that were electrically-operated. Therefore, when Invincible was refitted in 1914, her mountings were converted to hydraulic operations and some electrical equipment was removed. Furthermore, gunnery trials showed that the blast damage from ‘P’ and ‘Q’ turrets was unacceptable when they fired across their opposite sides, directly forward and directly aft. Therefore, their firing arcs were restricted to 180°, while the firing arcs of ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets were about -150°/+150°. The secondary battery, conceived for anti-torpedo boats (ATB) purposes, consisted of sixteen 4in 45 calibre Mark III quick-firing (QF) guns. When the Invincibles were completed, there were four guns within the forward superstructure and four within the after superstructure, all of them in shielded mounts. A pair of guns in open mountings was placed on the roof of each main calibre turret. In 1914-5 this distribution was changed and the guns on ‘P’ and ‘Q’ turrets were removed, while those on ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets were relocated to the forward superstructure, thus reducing the total number to twelve guns. These ATB guns were manually operated, fired a 25lb shell and were also used as saluting guns. However, they were not powerful enough. Their range was 9,200yd at 20°, while the rate of fire was 8-10 rounds per minute. The ammunition stowage was 100 rounds per gun, with various combinations of CP, HE and HE night tracer shells. The three ships were also fitted with one or two anti-aircraft guns, but each ship featured different configurations using 3in, 3pdr and 4in Mk VII models.

A close-up of the aft end of the forecastle on Inflexible showing, in the foreground, the 4in

gun placed on top the right wing 12in turret. The photo was probably taken in 1910. (A Fraccaroli Collection, via M Brescia)

When completed, the two spotting tops placed at the head of the fore and main masts conducted the Invincibles’ fire control. Each spotting top was fitted with a 9ft Barr & Stroud rangefinder and two Dumaresq devices. They communicated directly with two transmitting stations (TSs) through electrical devices, telephones and voice pipes. The electrical wiring ran along the masts while the voice pipes were enclosed in the communication tube. Information from the spotting tops reported the rate of change of the target’s range, which was elaborated by the Dumaresq. This information was then processed in the TS, principally using some Argo range clocks and a plotting table that constantly predicted the target’s future range. The TSs then transmitted the appropriate range and deflection to the gun turrets, while a Dreyer table recorded a graphical representation of the target’s position, which the fire control officer could use for tactical purposes. Each gun turret had its own transmitters so that all turrets could be controlled from either spotting top via the TSs or in pairs from the fore and aft TSs. The forward spotting top eventually became the principal fire-control position, while the aft spotting top functioned as backup since the latter was more prone to smoke interference. Firing trials conducted over time revealed this system’s vulnerability to gunfire as the forward spotting top was often hit and splinters could severe the voice pipe and wiring running along the mast. During night engagements, the Invincibles relied on searchlights. As completed, they had eight 36in searchlights, placed as follows: two on the forward superstructure abeam the conning tower, two on a platform abeam the forward funnel, one on a platform abeam the central funnel on the port side, one on a platform abeam the aft funnel on the starboard side and two on a platform on the main tripod mast. The Invincibles were fitted with five 18in submerged torpedo tubes, two in each broadside and one at the stern, and embarked a total of twenty-three Whitehead weapons. The broadside torpedo tubes were located after ‘Y’ magazine and could be used in normal circumstances while the stern tube, located after the steering gear compartment, was conceived for defensive purposes; for example, when disengaging from enemy vessels. This operational concept, however, did not work and led to the removal, in 1916, of the stern tubes from both Inflexible and Indomitable and a reduction in the

number of torpedo tubes fitted on later classes of battlecruisers. Initially, the Invincibles also had 14in Whitehead torpedoes that were used by the steam pinnaces, which were equipped with a lightweight dropping gear.36 Aircraft debuted on British battlecruisers in 1917 and subsequently became embarked on most modern capital ships. By 1918, Indomitable and Inflexible carried a Sopwith Pup and a Sopwith 1½ Strutter37 on flying-off ramps fitted on top of ‘P’ and ‘Q’ turrets. Each platform had a canvas hangar to protect the aircraft during inclement weather. Service History and Main Alterations After their commissioning in the First Battlecruiser Squadron of the Home Fleet, the three Invincibles carried out several training activities and deployments in both home waters and the Mediterranean. On 28 August 1914, Invincible participated in the battle of Heligoland Bight and in November sailed to the South Atlantic with Inflexible. After participating in the battle of the Falkland Islands, Invincible returned to Europe in early 1915 and spent some time under refit only to then be sunk on 31 May 1916 during the battle of Jutland. Inflexible’s first combat action took place in early August 1914, when she was involved in the search for the German Mittelmeer-Division (Mediterranean Squadron) comprising Goeben and Breslau. From February to April 1915, Inflexible participated in the bombardment of the Dardanelles forts, after which she sailed home. She then participated in the battle of Jutland and was involved in minor actions until 1918. Inflexible was paid off for disposal on 31 March 1920 and was later sold to Stanlee Shipbreaking Co. In August 1914, Indomitable participated in the search for Goeben and Breslau and, in November, in a preliminary bombardment of the outer forts of the Dardanelles. On 24 January 1915, she took part in the battle of Dogger Bank (and, the following year, in the battle of Jutland. Indomitable was paid off on 31 March 1920 and was sold to Stanlee in December 1921. The main alterations of the Invincibles concerned armament and fire control. These were carried out in Portsmouth, Malta and Gibraltar. Apart from the replacement of electrical mountings with hydraulically-operated systems and other minor changes mentioned earlier, Invincible had a major refit between

March and August 1914, during which she received a fire-control director placed on a new platform that was mounted just below the fore spotting top.38 The forward spotting top was also enlarged and reshaped. In addition, ‘A’ turret was fitted with a 9ft rangefinder at the rear of the turret roof that worked as a back-up in case of battle damage to the forward spotting spot. Further alterations included the repositioning of some 4in guns and the removal of others, the installation of 3in antiaircraft guns and the shortening of the topmasts. Almost all 4in guns were shielded. Before the First World War, range clocks were fitted on the front side of the forward spotting top, but they were later removed. During wartime, Inflexible and Indomitable received a new fire-control director, a Mk 1 Dreyer Table and 3in antiaircraft guns. After Jutland, additional armour was placed over vulnerable points and the searchlights were rearranged.

THE INDEFATIGABLE CLASS Although the Invincibles were at their time among the most powerful warships ever built, and were capable of overwhelming any other class of armoured cruiser in service among foreign navies, during the second half of 1905 Fisher initiated a debate aimed at developing a single type of capital ship featuring characteristics of both the Dreadnought and the Invincibles. The DNC’s Department then prepared sketches for a faster Dreadnought-type ship that had a displacement of 22,500 tons. Meanwhile, to further forward his ideas, Fisher established a ‘fusion’ Committee that solely included members of the Admiralty. However, to Fisher’s dismay, they decided that building a warship with the Dreadnought’s armament and the Invincibles’ speed would be too costly and could result in a reduction in the number of warships that could be built, to the detriment of Britain’s overall naval requirements. Design, Construction and Costs The change of government in early 1906 from the Conservatives to the Liberals under Herbert H Asquith paved the way for a more stringent economic policy. This meant that building a faster Dreadnought was not yet viable so discussions regarding the construction of future battlecruisers were postponed. This policy changed in November 1906 when the DNC’s Department prepared sketches, named by the letters ‘A’ to ‘C’, for a new ship. These had in common 12in guns, but with longer calibre, and were

slightly slower than the Invincibles. The displacement also increased and averaged 18,500 tons. These designs, notably the protection scheme, were presented to the Third Sea Lord/Controller and refined for a discussion that occurred at an Admiralty meeting on 22 November 1906. A further refinement carried out by the DNC’s Department produced sketch ‘E’, which featured some changes to the armour scheme and a speed of 25 knots. However, the financial pressure on Britain’s military budget deferred any decision to build a new class of battlecruisers to the Navy Estimates of 19089. However, a compromise allowed the planned building of a single ship of the type and, to limit the cost, the then Rear-Admiral Jellicoe proposed that future battlecruisers be equipped with 9.2in guns instead of 12in weapons. The Admiralty eventually decided to build one battlecruiser armed with 12in guns on 31 March 1908, although discussions on the turret layout and protection scheme continued. Meanwhile, rumours emerged that Germany had begun to build better-protected and larger battlecruisers and confirmation of this came when the German government announced their intention to launch new shipbuilding programmes that would outclass Dreadnought and the Invincibles. Indeed, the information that emerged showed that the Von der Tann would probably be superior to the Invincibles. Jellicoe, therefore, in his new capacity as Third Sea Lord/Controller, recommended the abandonment of the 12in gun battlecruiser and the development of a more powerful vessel. The Admiralty, however decided otherwise and formally approved the construction of the planned battlecruiser in November. The HM Devonport dockyard was entrusted with the construction of the new ship, designed by W T Davis and to be named Indefatigable. She was laid down on 23 February 1909 and became the first of two Royal Navy battlecruisers built in a Royal Dockyard.

Indefatigable at Genoa in 1910, with the gangway and ship’s boats in full operation during crew visits ashore. The searchlights on the aft superstructure are clearly visible. (G Parodi Collection)

Indefatigable Class Names Indefatigable, New Zealand, Australia Shipyards and construction Indefatigable: HM Dockyard, Devonport Laid down, 23 February 1909; launched, 28 October 1909; completed, April 1911; commissioned, 24 February 1911. New Zealand: Fairfield, Govan Laid down, 20 June 1910; launched, 1 July 1911; completed, early November 1912; commissioned, 19 November 1912. Australia: John Brown & Co, Clydebank Laid down, 23 June 1910; launched, 25 October 1911; completed, early June 1913; commissioned, 21 June 1913. Displacement, load

Legend, 18,750 tons Indefatigable: inclined, 18,500 tons Australia: completed, 18,500 tons Dimensions Length: 590ft 3.5in (oa); 555ft (pp) Beam: 79ft 9in (moulded) Draught (load displacement): 24.9ft fore, 27ft aft (Indefatigable) Armament Eight 12in 45cal Mk X, twin turrets Sixteen 4in 50cal Mk III, single mounts Four 3pdr Two 18in torpedo tubes (one each beam, submerged) Protection1 Belt: 6in amidships, 4in abreast ‘A’ and ‘X’ barbettes, 2.5in forward and aft Bulkheads: 4in and 3in forward, 4.5in aft Decks: main, 2in under barbettes; lower, 2in-1.5in amidships, 2in fore, 2.5in aft Barbettes: 7in above main belt, 2in splinter protection between main and lower deck Magazine screens: 2.5in Turrets: 7in face and sides, 3in roof and floor at rear Conning tower: 10in face and sides, 7in rear, 3in roof and floor Communication tube: 4in Spotting top: 4in sides, 3in roof and floor Machinery Thirty-one Babcock & Wilcox large-tube boilers, 250psi Four sets Parsons direct drive turbines, four 3-blade propellers, and two rudders. Power and speed (legend): 43,000shp, 25.8 knots Power and speed (trials): 55,881shp at 308.6rpm, 26.89 knots (Australia) Fuel: 3,340 tons coal max; 870 tons oil Radius of action: 6,690nm at 10 knots; 3,360nm at 23.5 knots Complement Peacetime: 790 officers and men Wartime: 835 officers and men 1

Improvements in Australia and New Zealand.

New Zealand 1913

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

Meanwhile, Fisher was in close contact with Sir Philip Watts because he wished to further pursue the design for a faster battlecruiser. However, this would materialise only after Indefatigable had been laid down and it was too late to change her design. This was not the case for two more battlecruisers, Australia and New Zealand, which were funded by their respective Dominions as part of a scheme to secure their naval capabilities. Long debates and discussions, however, delayed the commencement of construction of these two additional battlecruisers. Therefore, from a programmatic point of view, Indefatigable was originally the only ship in the class as Australia and New Zealand joined later because of these deliberations. Australia was laid down at Fairfield on 20 June 1910; New Zealand followed at John Brown three days later. As this was happening, the Director of Naval Intelligence acquired more accurate information on both Von der Tann and the even newer Moltke and Goeben. A clearer picture, therefore, emerged showing that the German battlecruisers were not only as fast as the Invincibles but also better protected; their main armament consisted of eight 11in (28cm) guns. The construction of Indefatigable was too advanced to improve its design, but this was not the case for Australia and New Zealand. They could therefore perhaps be modified to cope with the new concrete German threat. However, it was decided not to modify them and the main reasons were probably financial.

Indefatigable’s cost was £1,536,600 (including guns) and it is possible that neither Australia nor New Zealand could afford to pay much more for modified and probably costlier vessels. Another reason was Fisher’s preference to have more battlecruisers sooner rather than fewer battleships later. Two other reasons were that British public opinion wholeheartedly supported the Royal Navy’s battlecruisers and the Royal Navy wanted to operate a homogenous squadron of six new battlecruisers. Indefatigable’s construction then commenced three years after Invincible. However, at this point, there was still no feedback from the performances of the previous class. Despite this, Philip Watts decided to design Indefatigable as an enlarged follow-on of the Invincible class. The design development ended with a final sketch, renamed ‘A’, and was approved in November 1908. The main requirement was to provide more space on the upper deck so that the two wing turrets had wider arcs of fire when shooting on the opposite beam. This partially prevented blast issues, although it did not completely solve them. The gun layout allowed an eight-gun broadside because ‘P’ and ‘Q’ turrets had a total arc of 80° when firing on their opposite beams. The arcs of fire for ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets were about 280°. Firing ahead or astern could theoretically involve six guns, but in practice only two turrets would be used – a limitation that the Royal Navy accepted.

The battlecruiser Australia arrives in Sydney in October 1913. She had been commissioned in Portsmouth in June and was visited by King George V before sailing for her namesake country. (Royal Australian Navy)

New Zealand at anchor in the bay of Auckland, probably in June 1913. The right wing turret is trained abeam, while the gangway is being lowered. (Royal Australian Navy)

Length increased by 25ft, with a corresponding 2ft growth in width in order to maintain unchanged the hull form, the block coefficient, and the

related performance. The result was a load displacement of 18,750 tons, 1,500 tons greater than the Invincibles. In this condition, the summary of weights was as follows: hull, 7,000 tons; machinery, 3,555 tons; armour, 3,735 tons; armament, 2,580 tons; coal, 1,000 tons; general equipment, 780 tons and Board Margin, 100 tons. Adding extra coal, oil fuel, reserve feed water for boilers and other equipment, the displacement in deep condition was 22,430 tons, nearly 2,000 tons more than the Invincibles. John Brown and Fairfield also provided machinery for Australia and New Zealand respectively. Indefatigable had machinery purchased by John Brown, was launched on 28 October 1909 and was completed by April 1911. Australia was launched on 25 October 1911 (nearly two full years after the first of the class) and New Zealand on 1 July 1911. They were completed in June 1913 and in November 1912 respectively. Regarding cost, the approximate figure for both Australia and New Zealand was £1,685,000, including guns, and it appears that actual costs did not exceed this. The increased cost of the Dominion pair was probably due to their construction in private shipyards rather than in a HM Dockyard. In addition, two years had passed since the orders of the first ship and her sisters, so inflation perhaps contributed to the increased price. The metacentric height calculated for Indefatigable at legend displacement was 3.45ft, a figure that increased to 4.8ft at deep displacement. Indefatigable was inclined on 11 March 1911, with a resulting displacement of 22,130 tons. In this condition, the metacentric height was 4.78ft. The angle of maximum stability was 43°, and the angle at which stability vanished varied from 74° at load condition to 83° at light condition. The three battlecruisers’ speed trials took place at different times. Indefatigable was trialled from December 1910 to April 1911. At full power, she recorded a top speed of 26.89 knots. Speed trials of New Zealand and Australia lasted a few days, in October 1912 and March 1913 respectively. Both ships reached the same top speed as Indefatigable, confirming that the choice of hull shape and machinery was correct. The Indefatigables have since been the most criticised battlecruisers to serve with the Royal Navy. This is because they were seen as a mere repetition of, if not inferior to, the Invincibles. In fact, the lengthening of the hull and the limits on displacement made the protection scheme worse than the Invincibles – although this was partially compensated by a weightier broadside. Their construction, however, especially Australia’s and New

Zealand’s, should be framed in the context of Britain’s shipbuilding policy, which had to balance financial pressures with the German naval build-up and an emphasis on quantity rather than on quality. Fortunately, the British public, who were completely unaware of their inherent weakness, welcomed them.

New Zealand lying at anchor with a steam pinnace manoeuvring alongside. Note the two wing turrets trained on the inner side and the potential hazard caused by their blast. This photo was taken in 1913. (Courtesy, State Library of Victoria)

New Zealand moored at Adelaide in 1919. The battlecruiser shows her wartime modifications, including the protruding bridge above the gun control tower. (M Brescia Collection)

General Features Although the design of the Indefatigables derived directly from that of the Invincibles, several differences existed between the two classes of battlecruisers. Moreover, but usual in the construction of warships belonging to a same class but built in different shipyards, differences existed between Indefatigable and the ‘Dominions’ pair. Therefore, rather than providing a detailed description of the class, this section will focus on the Indefatigables’ differences with the Invincibles as well as the changes in Australia and New Zealand. When completed, the Indefatigables had an overall length of 590ft, a beam of 80ft and a draught of 30ft at a deep displacement of 22,080tons. Depth was 49ft and amidships freeboard was 22ft, making for good seakeeping. The table on page 90 summarises the main characteristics of the Indefatigables. The lengthening of the amidships section of the hull, however, meant ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets had to be placed closer to the hull ends. This made the Indefatigables less seaworthy than the Invincibles. The main external

difference between the Invincibles and the Indefatigables was the longer amidships zone. Providing more space between the two wing turrets meant a short deckhouse could be placed there that housed the central funnel and two small hoists for handling some service boats. This arrangement resulted in more space between the forward and central funnel and was the most distinctive feature of the new class. The compass platform, mounted above the wheel-house, did not extend as far outward as in the Invincibles. However, the Indefatigables’ bridge wings remained extended well beyond the sides of the forward superstructure. In addition to the forward spotting top, Indefatigable had a separate signal-andspotting station. It was placed between the conning tower and the forward funnel and protected by armour plates. This station was equipped with a spotter and a Dumaresq, but both the forward mast and the conning tower obstructed the operator’s view. The aft funnel was placed further from the mainmast, and had its legs raked aft instead of forward as in the Invincibles. The aft conning tower on the Indefatigables was used only for torpedo control. From their plans, it appears that none of the three ships had the aft transmitting station. Service boats were located in both the two superstructures and the central short deckhouse and handled by a main aft derrick and two smaller hoists. After the problems experienced with the electrically-powered mountings of Invincible, the Admiralty decided to install hydraulically-operated mountings on the Indefatigables. The requirements for power generation were, therefore, slightly less than the previous class of battlecruisers. Moreover, the voltage of the ring main changed to 225V. The Indefatigables had three steam-driven Siemens dynamos, two with reciprocating engines and one with a turbine. Each dynamo generated 900 amperes and the total installed power was just over 600kW. The Indefatigables were initially equipped with a Mk I W/T for long range communications and with a W/T 9 for shorter-range use. As for complement, size and composition varied with service. Initially, Indefatigable had 790 officers and men, New Zealand 806 and Australia 818. These numbers rose gradually and reached 840 for Australia in 1919 and 1,070 on New Zealand in 1921. There was also an increase in Australia’s complement when she became flagship of the Royal Australian Navy. The class had camouflage applied in early 1915, but this was removed after about a year. Australia and Indefatigable were initially painted with long

dark grey panels along the hull amidships. New Zealand had a more elaborate camouflage scheme including irregular patches on funnels, superstructures and main guns. Apart from camouflage, Australia and New Zealand differed externally from Indefatigable because of alterations to the bridge structure, including moving the spotting-and-signal tower from behind the conning tower to above it. Another quite distinctive feature of the ‘Dominions’ pair when completed was the lack of a spotting top on the aft mast. Other differences regarded the internal arrangements. Protection Although the secrecy surrounding the Indefatigables led to speculation about a 9in main belt, their protection scheme was actually just a modified, and less capable, version of the Invincibles’. In fact, the 6in KC main belt ran for about 290ft amidships, and was reduced to 4in abreast ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets. This meant it was a few inches narrower than the Invincibles’. This belt was further reduced to 2.5in fore and aft, but was wider in its extreme forward part. The 6in belt formed a citadel that was closed in by two 4in forward and aft KC bulkheads, which were placed respectively slightly ahead of ‘A’ turret and abreast the barbette of ‘Y’ turret, and extended vertically from the lower deck and the upper deck. Horizontal protection included 1in-thick nickel steel plates for the main deck that rose to 2in around the barbettes, and 1.5-2in thick nickel steel plates for the lower deck. The latter ran from stem to stern and sloped along the central part of the hull. The exhaust ducts had 1.5inthick nickel steel plates between the forecastle and the upper deck, as did the machinery hatches. The KC barbettes of ‘A’, ‘P’, and ‘Q’ mountings were 7in thick, but they reduced to a 2in-thick trunk linked to the main deck. ‘Y’ turret had a 7in barbette that reduced to 4.5in but retained its diameter. However, the barbettes of ‘P’ and ‘Q’ mountings were smaller than those of ‘A’ and ‘Y’ mountings. The turrets had 7in armour on all sides, which was reduced to 3in on the roof. The front side of the forward conning tower was 10in thick, while the roof was 3in. The communication tube was 7in, which was reduced to 2in on the forward transmitting station, the latter being placed on the main deck. The spotting-and-signal station placed behind the conning tower was 4in on the sides and 3in on the roof. The aft conning tower was used only for torpedo control, was enclosed in the superstructure, and had 1in plates. The shell rooms and magazines had a 2.5in-thick enclosure.

Australia and New Zealand had their armour modified in order to improve their entire protection scheme. The armoured belt was cut at about 55ft from stem and stern and a bulkhead then joined it. The thickness of the belt also increased to 5in between ‘A’ and ‘Y’ barbettes. Other changes in thickness regarded the main deck, the roof of the turrets and the relocation of the spotting-and-signal tower. Machinery The Indefatigables’ machinery had one boiler more than the Invincibles. Technological advances also meant improvements in these boilers, as well as in the turbines and auxiliary equipment. Although the overall layout of machinery was identical to the Invincibles, the wider spacing of ‘P’ and ‘Q’ turrets led to a different arrangement of space below the main deck. The magazines of ‘P’ and ‘Q’ turrets were located, respectively, between Boiler Rooms 1 and 2 and Boiler Rooms 3 and 4. This required a special cooling scheme for the magazines. Main machinery spaces were arranged differently from the Invincibles because a bulkhead separated each turbine room from its condenser room. The latter also housed much ancillary equipment, such as evaporators, main circulating pumps, and other auxiliary machinery. All three ships had Babcock & Wilcox boilers working at 250psi that fed Parsons turbines. Cruising turbines were omitted from the project. The designed power and top speed were 43,000shp (44,000shp for New Zealand) and 25.8 knots respectively. During her initial speed trials, Indefatigable experienced several issues due to very bad weather, adverse environmental conditions and hydrodynamic issues in the propulsion chain. After installing a slightly larger three-bladed propeller, speed trials were repeated in more benign weather. Then Indefatigable achieved 55,190shp and recorded 26.89 knots with forced draught. New Zealand and Australia had the same propellers as Indefatigable and achieved similar results during their speed trials. During all these trials, the displacement of each ship was 18,750 tons.

The first tests of naval aviation on battlecruisers: a Sopwith Pup takes off from the right wing turret of New Zealand in 1917, with Australia in the background. (Royal Australian Navy)

At full power, coal consumption was 790 tons per day, which at 14 knots dropped to 192 tons per day. Indefatigable had 3,340 tons of coal stowage and 870 tons of oil. Using coal and fuel, endurance was 3,360 miles at 23.5 knots and 6,690 miles at 10 knots. Armament Although rumours circulated that the Indefatigables would sport 13.5in guns, they carried eight 12in Mk X 45-calibre guns. However, they used BVIII* mountings. These had better performance than the existing BVIII. War outfit was the same as the Invincibles (110 rounds per gun, thirty-nine HE, thirtythree APC and thirty-eight CPC) but this was changed by mid-1916 to thirty-

three HE, forty-four APC and thirty-three CPC. After the bad experience with Invincible, all turrets were hydraulically operated. Similar to other contemporary mountings on capital ships, the hydraulic medium was an emulsion of hydraulic oil and water. The arrangement for the secondary battery differed from the Invincibles’. The sixteen 4in 50-calibre guns were placed in two groups in the superstructures – six forward and ten aft. Others were enclosed in the deckhouse. The guns were later given light shields to protect them and their crews from bad weather and blasts. Ammunition outfit was 100 rounds per gun, originally split into fifty HE and fifty common. This was changed later, firstly to seventy HE and fifty common, and finally to sixty HE, fifteen HE night tracers and twenty-five common. When fitted, the Indefatigables did not have anti-aircraft guns but they were added later. In particular, Indefatigable and Australia had one 3in-20cwt installed in 1915. Australia also had a 4in BL Mk VII installed in 1917. New Zealand received one 3in20cwt and one 6pdr Hotchkiss in October 1914. The Indefatigables had two 18in torpedo tubes, one fitted on each forward hull side. War outfit was twelve Mark VI* H torpedoes, later replaced by Mark VII. Fire control arrangements were different from the Invincibles, because of the lack of the aft conning tower and the corresponding TS in all ships. As completed, Indefatigable had one 9ft Barr & Stroud rangefinder in each spotting top. Instead of the spotting top on the main mast, Australia and New Zealand had an armoured spotting tower close to the conning tower where it was better protected and had an improved field of vision. A 9ft Barr & Stroud rangefinder was placed at the rear of their ‘A’ turrets. The type of searchlight was also different, because the Indefatigables were initially equipped with sixteen twin 24in devices. They were concentrated in the two superstructures: two behind the bridge, two abeam the first funnel, and four on a large platform abaft the mainmast. As for aircraft, a famous picture taken in 1917 shows a Sopwith Pup taking off from a platform placed on ‘P’ turret of New Zealand. The other wing turret had an identical platform and Australia had the same arrangements. Service History and Main Alterations Indefatigable was commissioned into the Royal Navy on 24 February 1911 and included in the First BCS, Home Fleet, on 1 January 1913, together with Lion, Indomitable, Invincible and Princess Royal. In December, Indefatigable

was included in a newly-formed Second BCS, operating in the Mediterranean with the three Invincibles. With Indomitable, Indefatigable unsuccessfully pursued Goeben and Breslau in early August 1914 and later participated in the initial bombardment of the Dardanelles forts. In February 1915, she became part of a new Second BCS within the Grand Fleet, that included New Zealand – commissioned on 23 November 1912 – and in which Australia was flagship. This then formed a homogenous battlecruiser squadron. After being heavily hit by Von der Tann at Jutland, Indefatigable sank on 31 May 1916. Australia entered service on 21 June 1913 as flagship of the Australian Squadron, sailed from Portsmouth in July, and reached Sydney on 4 October. When war broke out, she patrolled the central Pacific to prevent incursions of the Kaiserliche Marine’s ‘Kreuzer-geschwader’, which was trying to wrest British and French possessions in that region. Australia returned to Britain in late June 1915 and joined the Grand Fleet as flagship of the Second BCS. On 22 April 1916, she collided with New Zealand some 75 miles northwest of Horns Reef, Denmark and was docked for repairs until 1 June. Australia participated in minor operations until November 1918, when she escorted the Hochseeflotte to Scapa Flow and then took the German battlecruiser Hindenburg into custody. In April 1919 Australia sailed to her namesake country and became the flagship of the Royal Australian Navy for the next three years. On 12 April 1924 she was scuttled 24 miles east of Sydney. New Zealand undertook a world trip from February to December 1913, visiting her namesake country. After the outbreak of war, she operated with Invincible at the Humber estuary to deter German battlecruiser raids. On 28 August, New Zealand supported the Harwich Force during the Heligoland Bight action and was later part of the Second BCS. At Jutland, New Zealand engaged the battlecruiser Moltke and sustained minor damage to her ‘Y’ turret. Towards the end of the war, she became flagship of Second BCS and from February 1919 to February 1920 toured many of Britain’s dominions and colonies, totalling over 33,500 miles. On 19 April 1922, New Zealand was decommissioned, paid off for disposal and later sold for scrap to Rosyth Shipbreaking Co. Alterations on the Indefatigables mainly concerned modifying the antiaircraft (AA) guns and introducing structural changes aimed at installing fire

control equipment. Although these alterations chiefly concerned the Dominions pair, Indefatigable, sometime between 1911 and 1914, also had a 9ft rangefinder installed at the rear of ‘A’ turret. New Zealand had a firecontrol director installed between mid-1915 and mid-1916 below the forward spotting top, which in turn was enlarged and equipped with a 9ft rangefinder on its roof. In 1917, 9ft rangefinders were also installed in the rear of the wing turrets and another was added in an open mounting in the aft superstructure to improve torpedo control. Eight single 36in searchlights replaced the smaller types and were placed in pairs abeam the bridge, around the central funnel and on the aft superstructure. Topgallant masts were also removed and halyards rearranged for repositioning W/T aerials. The Dominions pair had deflection scales painted on ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets and range clocks fitted on the face of the spotting top. New Zealand’s forward superstructure was partially reconstructed and enlarged in preparation for the word tour of 1919-20.

THE LION CLASS As noted in the previous section, the design process for the battlecruisers of the Lion class commenced at about the same time as the Admiralty approved Indefatigable’s design. Concurrently, Fisher was, as usual, in close contact with his political supporters, further pursuing a new class of the type. At least four concurrent reasons influenced Fisher to do this. The first emerged from the Battle Practices executed in 1908 and 1909, in which Invincible and Indomitable performed successfully, at least according to the fleet reports. The second reason is due to the availability of a powerful 13.5in gun, whose development led Fisher to press for the construction of battlecruisers that were far more powerful than the previous classes of British capital ships. Indeed, the Admiralty was aware that adopting a 13.5in gun in the design for the new battlecruiser would involve an increase of its displacement. This also meant a general increase in construction costs, but the Royal Navy was ready to debate this point in the preparation of the Navy Estimates. After the Admiralty approved the design of Indefatigable in November 1908, information provided by the Director of Naval Intelligence confirmed that the Kaiserliche Marine was fully committed to a new construction programme that also included battlecruisers allegedly more powerful than Britain’s.39 This information leaked to the British press, who were ready to exploit it in order to create the already-mentioned ‘Naval Scare’ and influence the debate

on the impending Navy Estimates. This was the third reason that led Fisher to direct Sir Philip Watts to work on a new class of powerfully-armed battlecruisers, his aim being to force Germany to spend more money outside their ordinary naval construction budgets. The fourth reason was the existence of a 13.5in gun-equipped battleship design, the Orion class,40 which could be adapted to meet firepower and speed requirements embedded in the new battlecruiser concept. Design, Construction and Cost In April 1908, Reginald McKenna had replaced Lord Tweedmouth41 as First Lord of the Admiralty and staunchly supported the Royal Navy’s expansion in the Cabinet and Parliament. In the aftermath of the news coming from Germany, Rear-Admiral Sir John Jellicoe, appointed Third Sea Lord and Controller in October 1908, requested that the recently-approved Indefatigable design be cancelled and replaced by an entirely new and more powerful battlecruiser design. In fact, information from Germany seemed to confirm that the Kaiserliche Marine was quickly speeding up its naval construction programmes to challenge Britain’s naval supremacy. Therefore, in preparation for the 1909-10 Navy Estimates, the Admiralty recommended to the Cabinet that six capital ships be constructed. In February 1909, after an intense debate that also involved the press, the Cabinet agreed to construct four new capital ships, with the possibility of building four additional units in the case of an unmanageable German naval build-up. Obviously, Fisher pushed for eight battlecruisers, but the Second Sea Lord, Vice-Admiral Sir Francis Bridgeman, opposed this scheme because he thought that building battleships rather than battlecruisers was the best method to counter growing German naval strength. After some discussion within the Admiralty, the compromise reached was that three battleships and one battlecruiser, Lion, be constructed. They also decided upon a similar ‘three-plus-one’ arrangement for the additional, or ‘contingent’, programme. In this case, the ‘one’ battlecruiser was named Princess Royal.42 The Lions are considered second-generation battlecruisers and the class included a third unit, Queen Mary. She was introduced in the 1910-11 Navy Estimates and, although based on the original design of the Lion class, had some significant modifications. Therefore, Queen Mary will be analysed separately, later in this section. Discussions regarding the Lion design began in late May 1909, when the

Admiralty choose an armament layout derived from the Orions. A configuration consisting entirely of twin turrets placed along the centreline allowed both the wing turrets to be discarded and the forward mountings to be superimposed with ‘B’ turret firing over ‘A’ turret. An amidships turret and an after turret completed the eight-13.5in main battery. Compared with the 12in gun layout of the previous battlecruisers’ design, this arrangement doubled the weight of a single broadside. Moreover, the adoption of new machinery allowed almost twice the power of the first generation battlecruiser to be reached. Obviously, this meant an increase in size and costs but the Cabinet and public opinion accepted both. The DNC tasked Constructors E L Atwood and W T Davis with the design of the Lions. Several iterations were produced and the Admiralty approved the final design, dubbed ‘CV’, in August The Lions’ design showed a marked improvement over first generation battlecruisers. The developments concerned not only firepower and speed but, to some degree, also protection, as it was designed to withstand German 28cm/11in shells. However, some weaknesses regarding protection remained. The DNC’s Department produced a ‘CV’, or ‘C5’, design whose load displacement had increased to 26,350 tons, while its overall length reached 700ft. Beam and draught increased accordingly, providing the Lions with a block coefficient of 0.564. The choice of a proper hull form and the provision of more power meant they were expected to achieve a top speed of 28 knots. The summary of calculated weights in load displacement was as follows: hull, 9,710 tons; machinery, 5,190 tons; armour, 6,140 tons; armament, 3,260 tons; coal, 1,000 tons; general equipment, 800 tons and Board Margin, 100 tons.43 Adding extra coal, reserve feed water for boilers, oil fuel and other general and armament equipment, produced a deep displacement of 31,234 tons, a huge increase over both the Indefatigables and the Invincibles. However, the Lions’ design was criticised because of the gun layout. The increase in both size over the Orions and in speed over the previous classes of battlecruisers required more boilers and thus more space and weight for machinery. The logical choice would have been to arrange the four mountings in two pairs of superfiring turrets, as in the Orions. This layout was considered during the design process but the Admiralty discarded it in favour of maintaining an amidships turret and placing only one turret aft. This decision was probably based on financial grounds and was justified as the Admiralty could not push too much in terms of overall expenditure for the

entire naval construction programme that emerged from the 1909-10 Navy Estimates. Another possible reason was technical; maintaining the superfiring turret meant there remained the enduring problem of blast. In fact, firing these guns caused blast pressure to enter the lower turret’s gun ports and sighting hoods, resulting in serious damage to that turret’s instruments and injury to its crew.44 Devonport dockyard was entrusted with the construction of Lion45 and she was laid down on 29 November. The construction of Princess Royal was decided after a competition between shipbuilders. Vickers Armstrong became the preferred bidder for both ship and machinery and Princess Royal was laid down on 5 May 1910. As far as costs were concerned, Lion cost £2,068,337, including guns, while Princess Royal cost £2,013,886. This slight difference was acceptable considering that the former was built in a public shipyard and the latter in a private one.

Lion as completed, in May 1912. The tripod foremast was initially positioned abaft the fore funnel, this being higher than the other two. The aft mast has not yet fitted with a spotting top. (J Roberts Collection)

The Lions were designed with the forward mast placed abaft the first

funnel, an arrangement that the Admiralty chose because the forward service boats located in the aft superstructure needed a derrick for their handling.46 When Lion went to sea for her preliminary trials, this arrangement proved very inadequate because of smoke enveloping the forward spotting top and damaging some bridge instruments. Moreover, reaching higher and higher speeds meant more boilers working, and this made the mast legs very hot.47 This was further aggravated when the ship sailed head-on as it made the forward upperworks almost useless. Then, after several complaints came from the fleet, Lion was refitted at Devonport. Princess Royal was likewise refitted even though she was still undergoing construction. The main change was the relocation of the forward funnel abaft a new pole mast that replaced the forward tripod mast. The arrangement of the service boats was also reversed, while the second and third funnels were raised to the height of the first funnel.

Lion, pictured after her reconstruction in 1912. The fore tripod mast has been replaced by a pole mast fitted forward of the first funnel, while the layout of the bridge has been altered. (J Roberts Collection)

Lion was launched on 6 September 1910 but her completion was delayed until May 1912 because of trouble experienced during her speed trials.

Princess Royal, which had been launched on 29 April 1911 and completed in November 1912, experienced similar troubles. Lion was inclined on 1 June 1912. Her deep displacement reached 30,820 tons, with related meta-centric height and mean draught being, respectively, 6.0ft and 31ft 6in. The angle of maximum stability that resulted was 43°, at a load displacement of 26,270 tons. The angle at which stability vanished varied from 76° at load displacement to 85° at deep displacement. The figures for Princess Royal were comparable and Queen Mary, which was inclined after her completion, also achieved a similar result, with a metacentric height of 5.95ft at a deep displacement of 30,620 tons.48 Lion’s speed trials took place between 8 and 12 January 1912 and the results were very unsatisfactory. With a maximum power reaching nearly 76,630shp, she recorded 27.6 knots, which was less than the designed speed of 28 knots. Two causes of this slower speed were identified: the first was the dimensions of the propellers, which were not designed for the Lion’s hull. The second was the composition of the bottom coating, which increased drag. The Admiralty thus decided to change the propellers, but not to modify the bottom coating. Lion then conducted acceptance trials in June 1912 with the new propellers, but her performance did not improve. Princess Royal was trialled in September 1912. She developed about 78,800shp and recorded 28.5 knots with the old propellers. This confirmed that the bottom coating was the main problem. Eventually, both ships were fitted with the proper propellers.49 Princess Royal carried out her last speed trial in July 1913. She developed over 95,000shp, but achieved barely 28 knots. In short, although these results were unsatisfactory they were useful for both designers of future machinery plants and operators, as it meant they could better understand the performance limits of these ships. The Lions – nicknamed the ‘Splendid Cats’ – formed the last class of British battlecruisers constructed during Fisher’s first tenure as First Sea Lord and were immediately esteemed by the public. Fisher was particularly proud of them, as they were the ultimate expression of his theories of speed and firepower applied to capital ships. However, the story of British battlecruisers continued after Fisher left the Admiralty on 25 January 1910. General Features The most distinctive external features of the Lions were the superimposing of ‘B’ turret over ‘A’ turret; the different spacing between the three funnels and

– initially – the fore and aft masts being poles rather than tripods. In addition, the first funnel had a circular shape, while the other two were oval. The amidships space on the forecastle deck was occupied by the ‘Q’ turret, which had an arc of fire of nearly 160° on each beam. This meant that the Lions could fire a broadside with all eight 13.5in guns but firing head-on was limited to four guns and firing astern was limited to two guns. Maintaining an amidships turret continued to be a potentially dangerous fault in the design of British battlecruisers because of the need to alternate magazines and machinery spaces. In the Lions, the amidships magazine was placed between two boiler rooms, with all the consequential risks in terms of high temperatures and cooling systems. Looking at the Lions from above, it can be noted that both superstructure blocks were shaped as truncated diamonds, a feature that allowed the maximum arc of fire for all four turrets. When completed, the Lions had an overall length of 700ft, a maximum beam of 88.5ft and a draught of about 31ft 4in at a deep displacement of 30,084 tons. The table on page 102 summarises the main characteristics of the Lion class. Freeboard ranged from 30ft fore to 19ft aft, making these ships seaworthy. Additionally, ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets were placed closer to the hull ends than on other contemporary classes of British battleships. This improved seakeeping, especially in bad weather. The compass platform was outwardly extended and the whole arrangement reflected its derivation from the Orion class design. The structure was, however, lofty and narrow so that it did not interfere with the shooting of the four 13.5in guns of the forward turrets. The forward superstructure housed the lighter ship’s boats, which were handled by two hoists. The heavier boats were positioned on the after shelter deck and handled by a derrick hinged on the after pole mast.50 The layout of the conning tower was simpler than in the Indefatigables but, similarly, the Lions had a single forward spotting top. Lion and Princess Royal had three Siemens dynamos, all steam-driven. Two of them were driven by reciprocating engines, the remainder by a steam turbine. Each generated an average power of 900 amperes at 225 volts, thus totalling nearly 600kW. The Lions were initially equipped with an Mk I W/T for long range communications and with a W/T 9, or IX, for shorter-range use. Complement size and composition varied with service, especially for Lion in her role as flagship of the First BCS. When completed, she had 984 officers and men but they increased to 1,092 in 1915. Princess Royal had 985

officers and men in 1912 and probably maintained this during her service.

Lion Class Names Lion, Princess Royal, Queen Mary Shipyards and construction Lion: HM Dockyard, Devonport Laid down, 29 November 1909; launched, 6 August 1910; completed, May 1912; commissioned, 4 June 1912. Princess Royal: Vickers, Barrow Laid down, 2 May 1910; launched, 29 April 1911; completed, November 1912; commissioned, 14 November 1912. Queen Mary: Palmer’s, Jarrow Laid down, 6 March 1911; launched, 20 March 1912; completed, August 1913; commissioned, 4 September 1913. Displacement, load Legend: Lion, 23,350 tons; Queen Mary, 27,000 tons Inclined: Lion, 26,270 tons; Princess Royal, 26,100 tons; Queen Mary, 26,770 tons Dimensions Length: 700ft (oa); 660ft (pp) Beam: 88ft 4in (moulded) Draught (load displacement): 26ft 5in fore, 28ft 10in aft (Lion) Armament Eight 13.5in 45cal Mk V, twin turrets Sixteen 4in 50cal Mk VII, single mounts One 12pdr Two 21in torpedo tubes (one each beam, submerged) Protection1 Main belt: 9in amidships, from 6in to 4in fore and aft Upper belt: 6in amidships, 5in-4in fore and aft Bulkheads: 4in forward and aft Decks: forecastle, 1.5in amidships; upper, 1in over citadel; lower, 1.25in-1in amidships, 2.5in at ends Barbettes: 9in and 8in above upper deck; 4in and 3in below upper deck Magazine screens: from 2.5in to 1in Turrets: 9in face and sides, 8in rear, 3.25in-2.5in roof, 3in floor Conning tower: 10in walls, 3in roof, 4in floor Torpedo control tower. 1in sides, roof and floor Communication tube: 4in-3in Funnel uptakes: 1.5in-1in.

Machinery Forty-two Yarrow large-tube boilers, 230psi Four sets Parsons direct drive turbines, four 3-blade propellers and two rudders Power and speed (legend): 75,000shp, 27.5 knots Power and speed (trials): 79,404shp at 290.9rpm, 28.05 knots (Princess Royal) Fuel: 3,520 tons coal max; 1,135 tons oil Radius of action: 5,610nm at 10knots; 3,345nm at 20.5 knots; 2,420nm at 24.6 knots. Complement Peacetime: 1,000 officers and men Wartime: 1,092 officers and men (Lion as flagship) 1

Queen Mary had improvements in the forecastle deck, the control tower and the forward 4in gun battery.

Lion 1912

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

In November 1914, Princess Royal sported a camouflage scheme in which dark grey was painted over the central-aft section of the hull up and over the funnels, while the remainder of the hull, the mountings and the forecastle were painted white. However, as noted for earlier classes of battlecruisers, the

camouflage was removed later during the war.51 Protection As already noted, the overall armour layout of the Lions was an improvement over previous classes of battlecruisers. Such an increase in armour mainly favoured the boiler and the engine rooms, and the magazines of ‘Q’ turret as well. Vertical protection consisted of two main elements. The first element was a belt that ran from abreast the conning tower to the rear face of ‘Y’ barbette. It was 9in thick in the lower part, 6in thick in the upper part and ended vertically at the upper deck. The total height of this double-thick belt was 11ft 6in, and it mostly corresponded to the freeboard. The second element was a forward belt of variable thickness, from 4in to 6in, that longitudinally extended from abreast the conning tower to the stem, and an aft belt, 4in-5in thick, which ran from the rear face of ‘Y’ barbette to abreast the steering compartment. The forward and aft belts were as wide as the central belt. This vertical protection formed a citadel that was closed forward and aft by two 4in bulkheads. Horizontal protection comprised nickel-steel plates split among three decks. The forecastle deck had a thickness of 1.25in, while the upper deck was 1in thick and the main deck had a thickness that varied from 2.5in at the extreme ends to 1in in the central section. This deck was also sloped along its extension and on the sides. The maximum thickness of the barbettes was 9in, which gradually decreased to 3in while going down into the hull.52 Each turret had 9in on their faces and sides, with 8in in the rear and about 3in on the roof. Several plates, whose thickness varied between 1in and 2.5in, protected the magazines. The conning tower had a uniform 10in thickness but its roof was 3in. The communication tube was 3in, the bases of the funnel uptakes had 1in steel plates while some 1in screens protected the deckhouses around ‘Q’ turret. Machinery The machinery layout reflected the arrangement of the previous class of battlecruisers, although the number of boilers increased to forty-two. These were split into seven boiler rooms, each housing six Yarrow large-tube boilers working at 230 psi. The foremost boiler room was 34ft long and extended from side to side; a centreline bulkhead separated the other boiler

and the engine rooms. The shell room and magazine of ‘Q’ turret were placed between the second and third boiler compartments. The Lions had two sets of Parsons direct-drive turbines, with the LP turbines working on the inner shafts and the HP turbines linked to the outer shafts. All shafts could rotate ahead or astern, thus improving manoeuvrability, especially in confined waters. Each HP ahead turbine was equipped with a cruising stage. Ten boilers vented into the first funnel, which was smaller than the other two because these were sized to house the combined exhaust ducts of the remaining thirty-two boilers. All boilers were fitted with oil burners. At full speed, coal consumption was 1,410 tons per day, which decreased to 336 tons per day at economical speed. Burning both coal and oil,53 the Lions had a radius of action that varied from 2,420 miles at 24.5 knots to 4,935 miles at 16.5 knots. Apart from the aforementioned troubles experienced by Lion and Princess Royal during their speed trials, these second-generation battlecruisers were the fastest capital ships in service at the time.

Princess Royal sailing at slow speed after her completion, in November 1912. Note the rigs protruding from her masts and halyards for supporting W/T and signal cables. (J Roberts Collection)

Armament The four twin turrets sported new 13.5in 45cal Mk V guns, which Vickers had started manufacturing in the beginning of 1909. This gun had greater velocity and penetration power at long ranges than their 12in predecessors, which resulted in a very reliable and accurate aim and exceptionally low barrel wear. The hydraulically-operated BII mounting weighed 600 tons. The guns had a depression of -3° and a maximum elevation of 20°, giving a range of 23,800yd, but before the First World War the turrets’ optical devices were only able to reach less than 16°, thus limiting the gun’s range to 20,000yd. This was because, prior to the conflict, it was expected that battles would be fought at relatively short ranges and thus the Admiralty did not see any advantage in firing beyond 15,000 yards.54 The two hydraulic engines that were fitted during the Lions’ construction were found to be insufficient to feed all four BII mountings, so a third engine was installed in 1913. Rate of fire was 1.5-2 rounds per minute. Wartime ammunition outfit was 110 rounds per gun, including thirty-three APC, thirty-eight CPC and thirtynine HE. By mid-1915, this outfit was changed in favour of more APCs, which doubled. Later, it was again changed and eventually became seventyseven APC and thirty-three CPC.55 The secondary ATB battery was arranged in a more compact scheme than earlier battlecruisers, thus improving protection against shellfire and bad weather. It comprised sixteen 4in 50cal Mk VII guns installed in PIV* mountings that were evenly split into casemates placed in both superstructures. Ammunition outfit was initially 105 HE and forty-five CPC rounds per gun; later changed to ninety HE, thirty-eight CPC and twenty-two HE Night Tracers. The efficacy of these guns was, however, criticised because they could not cope efficiently with modern destroyers and torpedo boats.

‘Y’ 13.5in turret aboard Princess Royal, in a picture probably taken at Vickers during her fitting-out. Four aft 4in guns are also visible on the deckhouse behind the turret. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

AA armament reflected the low priority given to air threats in the years preceding the First World War. Lion only had a 6pdr Hotchkiss fitted in 1914 and a 3in 20cwt was installed in early 1915. Princess Royal initially only had a 6pdr Hotchkiss. During wartime, both battlecruisers had their AA armament layout altered several times. The Lions were fitted with two broadside submerged 21in torpedo tubes. They were placed forward of ‘A’ turret and their outfit was fourteen torpedoes. Each battlecruiser operated two Sopwith Camel aircraft, with flying-off platforms on the ‘Q’ and ‘X’ turrets. Fire-control equipment was a slight improvement on the Indefatigables, especially in terms of redundancy. The spotting top initially had a 9ft rangefinder and acted as the primary fire-control position. 9ft rangefinders were also installed in all turrets and in the aft control station located at the end of the forecastle deck. This layout had been decided in order to allow

local control and achieve some form of distributed secondary fire-control positions. However, problems generated by heat and smoke interference in the spotting top, and the need to provide sufficient protection during combat, caused a conceptual shift that resulted in moving the primary fire-control position to the conning tower.56 The conning tower in the Lions was equipped with an Argo 9ft gyro-stabilised rangefinder, fitted in a rotating hood on the top of the tower. This tower was also fitted with a small Dumaresq, had a different shape on Lion and Princess Royal and was connected to the Transmitting Station below the main deck. The Lions had sixteen 24in searchlights. Four were placed on both sides of the forward superstructure, abreast the wheelhouse and one level below. Two pairs were installed on platforms abreast the third funnel and two pairs were located on the aft superstructures, abreast the after torpedo director tower. Queen Mary Although of the same design as Lion and Princess Royal, Queen Mary was not laid down, at Palmers, near Newcastle, until March 1911. This delay meant that during her construction she could benefit from the improvements being introduced aboard her sisters. She thus emerged as an improved version of the original design. Queen Mary was launched on 20 March 1912 and made ready for trials in May 1913. Size changes involved a slight increase of beam and displacement (31,650 tons in deep conditions) that gave Queen Mary a block coefficient of 0.575, the highest among the second-generation battlecruisers. The installed power rose to 75,000shp, with the machinery manufactured by John Brown & Co. Queen Mary carried out her speed trials during May and June 1913, reaching a maximum power of 83,000shp and a corresponding speed of 28.17 knots. She cost £2,061,064 and was commissioned into the Royal Navy in August 1913. A significant change occurred inside Queen Mary’s hull. The layout of officer’s accommodation being forward and men aft was reversed. Moreover, Queen Mary’s first captain introduced vast improvements in the men’s living conditions. In particular, there were better wash places and washing machines were installed.57 Externally, Queen Mary differed from the other ‘Cats’ because she had a smaller spotting top and sported a prominent aft quarter. She had four dynamos; turbines drove two of them and the others were driven by reciprocating engines. Although information on generated power output is scarce, these dynamos would have likely generated about 800kW. In addition

to the W/T sets fitted on the two preceding Lions, Queen Mary was also equipped with a Type IX W/T set and also had a decoding office. As for armour, Queen Mary was partially fitted with HT steel rather than KC and KNC as on Lion and Princess Royal. HT steel was of equal quality to KNC but much cheaper. Horizontal protection slightly improved and there were some variations in distribution. As far as the secondary battery was concerned, the 4in guns installed in the forward superstructure were given armour plates of varying thickness. The eight guns in the forward superstructure were all placed in an armoured battery at forecastle deck level. Minor changes were introduced in anti-aircraft armament. Queen Mary had a 9ft rangefinder in each turret and was the battlecruiser chosen to trial the Argo Clock. This was part of the Argo fire-control system,58 which consisted of three elements: a 9ft gyro-stabilised rangefinder (already fitted on Lion and Princess Royal), the Argo Range Clock and the Argo true-course plotter (or simply, Argo Plotter). The core of the system was the Argo Clock, a mechanism that comprised many automated functions to model the evolving geometry of the firing solution. Inputs for this mechanism were the bearing and range of an enemy ship, which were continuously provided by the gyrostabilised coincidence rangefinder. Thus, a continuous true-course track of one’s own ship and the enemy ship could be automatically traced by the Argo Plotter. Meanwhile the Argo Clock would calculate the range and deflection to be transmitted to the fire-control officer and the guns. The Argo system was developed concurrently with the Dreyer Table, a similar and cheaper device working on a different principle which, however, was less precise and required more operators.59 Service History and Main Alterations Lion became the flagship of the First BCS on 1 January 1913, hoisting the flag of Rear-Admiral Sir David Beatty. On 28 August 1914, Lion participated in the Heligoland Bight action, sank the German cruiser Ariadne and participated in the sinking of the cruiser Köln. In December, she sailed south to engage German battlecruisers that had unsuccessfully bombarded Hartlepool and Scarborough. On 24 January 1915, Lion led the First BCS in the battle of Dogger Bank, engaging the battlecruisers Seydlitz, Moltke and Derfflinger. She suffered heavy damage, was towed by Indomitable to Rosyth and later repaired by Armstrong. By 31 May 1916, Lion had returned to again lead the First BCS during the battle of Jutland. There she suffered

the loss of ‘Q’ turret and other, lighter damage. After repairs at Rosyth, she rejoined the First BCS, but without ‘Q’ turret. Lion was later engaged in operations in the Heligoland Bight and in April 1919 was assigned to the Atlantic Fleet. Put in reserve in March 1920, she was paid off for disposal on 30 May 1922 and sold for scrap two years later.

Queen Mary 1913

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

Princess Royal was assigned to the First BCS and participated in the Heligoland Bight action. For the remainder of 1914, she deployed in the western Atlantic and the Caribbean to guard against possible incursions of von Spee’s squadron. Princess Royal participated in the Dogger Bank action, and sustained no damage, but later, at Jutland, she suffered damage inflicted by German battlecruisers. She was refitted at Portsmouth and rejoined the Grand Fleet in July 1916. In March 1922, Princess Royal was paid off for disposal and, in August 1923, her scrapping began.

Queen Mary sailing slowly down the Tyne under her own power after completion at Palmer’s shipyard, Jarrow, in 1912. The battlecruiser is heading for her sea trials. (R A Burt Collection, via World Naval Ship Forum)

A close-up view of Lion’s ‘Q’ turret in April or May 1918 with a Sopwith 2F Camel on the flying-off ramp. The three searchlight structures around the funnel are also clearly visible. (J Roberts Collection)

Queen Mary in 1914, sporting her superfiring forward turrets. She had a wider second funnel than Lion and Princess Royal. At the outbreak of war, she was included in the First Battlecruiser Squadron of the Grand Fleet. (J Roberts Collection)

Queen Mary’s career was short because she only became part of the First BCS in August 1913. She participated in the Heligoland Bight action in 1914 and the pursuit of the German battlecruisers that had bombarded Britain’s east coast. However, she missed the action off Dogger Bank due to a refit. Derfflinger and Seydlitz sank her at Jutland. Lion and Princess Royal had few structural changes in their upper works in 1914. A fire-control director was installed on Lion’s forward mast in May 1915 and in Princess Royal by early 1916.60 It was positioned on a platform between the compass platform and the spotting top, at about the same level as the top of the first funnel. Two aft-raked legs were installed on the forward mast to support the director control and dampen vibrations. Another director was installed aft on both ships shortly before the end of the war. After Jutland, the thickness of the upper and lower decks, and the turrets’ roofs, was increased in both ships with 1in of additional armour. In April 1917, the secondary battery lost one 4in gun after the removal of the port aftermost mount from Lion and the starboard aftermost mount from Princess Royal. Other changes included anti-aircraft armament. Searchlights were redistributed and 36in ones were installed. In 1917, the spotting tops on Lion and Princess Royal were enlarged and fitted with range clocks. These were also installed in the aft superstructure. In 1918, Lion had a cap put on the first funnel, becoming the only battlecruiser fitted with such a device. Its purpose was to deflect smoke from the director’s platform.

TIGER, THE LAST SECOND-GENERATION BATTLECRUISER While Princess Royal was being built at Vickers and the Lion construction programme was proceeding as planned, the British shipbuilding industry had the opportunity to show its abilities to Japan – a nation allied with Britain. At the same time, the British government also undertook significant political changes that had an impact on the Royal Navy and its construction policy. Although Fisher had been replaced in January 1910 by Admiral A K

Wilson as First Sea Lord,61 the construction programme for the Lion class would include a fourth unit. Her design, although updated, would follow that of Queen Mary and her construction was included in the next Naval Estimates. Meanwhile, the political debate regarding military spending versus social security culminated in the replacement of Reginald McKenna with Winston Churchill as First Lord of the Admiralty in October 1911. This choice, made by Asquith over other candidates, was intended to reorient the construction policy toward a more balanced approach aimed at keeping pace with German naval expansion but keeping down the costs for new types of capital ships. Churchill was deemed the right person in the right place because he had demonstrated a keen interest in the Royal Navy. This had come from his friendship with Fisher, which had endured despite their previous different opinions concerning the Naval Estimates. From a political and strategic point of view, Churchill was determined to follow the construction policy of his predecessors. After all, the 1912 German Supplement to the Naval Law nullified an attempt to reach an agreement between London and Berlin concerning a potential retrenchment of the naval armament race. In addition, the financial pressure on Germany was beginning to create serious problems and Britain was keen to exploit this.62 As far as new naval construction was concerned, this meant that the 191112 Naval Estimates included, in terms of capital ships, five battleships and one battlecruiser. The difference between the numbers of the two types was because battlecruisers were considered an expensive and dubious investment. Apart from that, this battlecruiser was to be the fourth unit of the Lion class, which would become Tiger.63 However, the design of Tiger benefitted more from the design of the Iron Duke class battleship than from the preceding Queen Mary. Design, Construction and Cost Before discussing the development of Tiger’s design, it is worth addressing its alleged ‘Japanese’ connection. Britain and Japan had been allies since 1902 and London was happy with Japan’s emergent navy since it might counterbalance the potential for Russian and German expansion in the Far East. Strong ties existed between the Royal Navy and the Imperial Japanese Navy, which continued after Tsushima and led, in 1905, to the first renewal of the alliance treaty. Seeing itself as a key tool to pursue a policy of naval expansion in Japan’s areas of interest, the Japanese navy decided to turn to

the British shipbuilding industry’s well-renowned design and construction expertise to strengthen its fleet. The friendly political situation between London and Tokyo favoured this approach, whose objective was the transfer of technology and know-how very much needed by Japan. While discussions were under way to renew the treaty again,64 the Imperial Japanese Navy was working, through its technical department, on a design for a new class of battlecruisers, the Kongos.65 Thus, they decided to have Armstrong and Vickers compete against each other with the aim of building a battlecruiser with characteristics superior to the Lion class. For its part, the Japanese navy’s technical department was developing a draft design of Kongo in cooperation with the preferred British shipbuilders, Vickers, who had been building the battlecruiser Princess Royal since 1909. The overall result of the joint activities between the Japanese navy and Vickers was the award in October 1910 of the contract for the construction of Kongo. The decision was made after the thorough assessment of a battlecruiser design prepared by Sir George Thurston, then head of the warship design division at Vickers, that significantly improved Lion’s design.66 Kongo’s keel was laid down in January 1911. According to the contract, Japanese designers and technicians of several branches, notably shipbuilding, machinery and armament, were sent to Vickers to supervise the construction and study the production process. Consequently, Kongo’s detailed design evolved and matured within a shipyard that had been chosen to build a new and improved Japanese battlecruiser while fitting out a slightly older British battlecruiser, Princess Royal. Meanwhile, the Admiralty gave the DNC’s Department the task of working on what would become Tiger. Her design development took some time and evolved from seven outline proposals that were produced from July to December 1911. All proposals, identified as ‘A’ to ‘A2b’, had in common a main battery with 13.5in guns, whose layout finally discarded the amidships turret and included an after ‘Q’ turret with an increased arc of fire.67 Incidentally, this main battery layout, which was the main driver in the design of the whole warship, was the same as in Kongo. Unfortunately, no records seem to exist in the Admiralty proving the derivation of Tiger’s design from Kongo’s. However, it is widely known that, during the construction of Royal Navy’s battleships, battlecruisers and other types of warships a very close relationship existed between the Admiralty, notably the staff of the DNC’s Department, and all British private shipbuilders. Within

such a relationship, personnel in the DNC’s Department were free to survey, monitor and inspect construction activities at these shipyards, including Vickers. Therefore, it is very likely that these personnel had several opportunities to observe and monitor the development of the Kongo’s detailed design and report back to the DNC office. It is interesting to note that the Kongo contract was signed in October 1910, while the DNC’s Department presented the first design sketches for Tiger nine months later, in July 1911. Therefore, the DNC’s Department had a lot of time to possibly improve its own preliminary sketches according to the information coming from Vickers.68 Another feature of Tiger was the increase of calibre, from 4in to 6in, of the secondary battery and its placement on the forecastle deck. This allowed for better protection and arcs of fire. Kongo was similar in having 6in guns. This was because the Japanese wanted to improve the secondary battery, a consequence of lessons learned at Tsushima. The Admiralty had also long debated the efficacy of the secondary battery for its capital ships because it was mainly conceived to counter fast and powerfully-armed German torpedo boats.69 Thus, the decision to equip Tiger with 6in guns does not seem to have been influenced by Kongo. It is also worth noting that the Iron Duke design had 6in guns. The most probable course of events can thus be summarised. The Japanese designers and engineers posted at Vickers were allowed access to British sketches as, probably, were Vickers’ technicians. In short, there-fore, it is safe to assume that Tiger and Kongo emerged as independent final products but with similar concepts and lines of thought. Apart from these considerations, Tiger’s initial gun layout foresaw 13.5in superfiring turrets fore and aft. However, this solution was rejected because two pairs of closely-spaced turrets were too vulnerable in case of a lucky hit, especially on the aft pair. Therefore, the Admiralty decided to equip Tiger with a pair of superfiring turrets placed forward and ‘Q’ turret placed aft and quite far from ‘Y’ turret. This layout allowed both a broadside of eight guns and firing astern with four guns. Firing ahead remained limited because the upper turret could not fire axially due to the blast effect on the lower turret. Thus, the upper turret had a 30° firing exclusion arc, port and starboard, along its axis.70 The gun layout and the provision of an aft torpedo room located well below the waterline were beneficial in respect of the mutual location of

magazines and boiler rooms. Tiger had all boiler rooms placed aft of ‘Q’ turret magazine, while the engine and the condenser rooms were placed abaft this magazine. Such a machinery layout allowed all boilers to vent through three equally-shaped funnels located amidships. In Tiger’s design, an issue that remained open after Fisher’s departure was the high-speed requirement, which led to an increase in power to 105,000shp in order to achieve 30 knots. This decision was probably also influenced by the poor performances of the Lions in their speed trials, which for Tiger meant the adoption of heavier and bulkier machinery. The Admiralty did not follow the advice to use small-tube boilers, preferring to rely upon large-tube boilers that led to a huge increase in bunker capacity and gave Tiger a radius of action comparable to the Lions. Although Tiger was designed with an almost equal provision of both coal and oil, she normally operated, at least during the First World War with much more coal than oil. The requirement for bigger machinery caused an expected increase in design displacement, which at load condition was calculated at 28,490 tons. The summary of calculated weights was as follows: hull, 9,580 tons; machinery, 5,630 tons; armour, 7,400 tons; armament, 3,660 tons; coal, 2,450 tons; general equipment, 845 tons and Board Margin, 100 tons.71 Adding extra coal, reserve feed water for boilers, oil fuel and other general and armament equipment, the calculated deep displacement was 33,470 tons. This meant an increase over the Lions and a huge increase – around 11,000 tons – over the first generation of British battlecruisers. The block coefficient that resulted was 0.554, making Tiger more slender than the Lions.

Tiger being outfitted. The photo allows the appreciation of many details of her armament and protection, including a portion of the armoured belt protruding from the port side, from ‘A’ turret aft. (National Records of Scotland, UCS1/118/418/139)

Tiger was designed with protection similar to the Lions, with a slight improvement to the overall armour due to the placement of 6in guns on the forecastle deck. A distinctive feature of the new battlecruiser was the aftraked tripod mast and the suppression of the mainmast. The service boats were grouped amidships and were handled by a number of derricks and hoists that were rearranged accordingly. The Admiralty concluded discussions regarding Tiger’s design on 19 December 1911 and approved the ‘A2b’ design. The winner of the competition among private shipbuilders was John Brown & Co, which was awarded the contract on 4 April 1912. They also manufactured the

machinery. Tiger was laid down on 20 June 2012 and underwent several modifications during her construction. These in part related to improvements in internal accommodation. Externally, the funnels were modified and made as high as in the Lions, while other changes concerned armament and fire control. Tiger was launched on 15 December 1913 and was completed in October 1914, just few months after the outbreak of the war. The cost estimated by the Admiralty was £2,100,000, a sum that probably did not include the guns. One source72 mentions £2,593,100, including guns, a figure that appears reliable. At her inclining experiment, Tiger’s actual deep displacement was 33,260 tons, with a mean draught of 32ft 5in and a metacentric height of 6.1ft. The angle of maximum stability was 43°, and the angle at which stability vanished differed from 71° at light condition to 86° at extreme deep condition.

Tiger Shipyard and construction John Brown & Co, Clydebank Laid down, 20 June 1912; launched, 15 December 1913; commissioned, 3 October 1914. Displacement, load Legend: 28,490 tons Inclined: 28,430 tons Dimensions Length: 704ft (oa); 660ft (pp) Beam: 90ft 6in (moulded) Draught (load displacement): 28.5ft mean Armament Eight 13.5in 45cal Mk V, twin turrets Twelve 6in 45cal Mk VII, single mounts Two 3in QF, single mounts One 12pdr Four 21in torpedo tubes (beam, submerged) Protection Main belt: 9in amidships, 6in abreast ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘X’ turrets, 4in forward and aft Upper belt: 6in amidships, 5in abreast ‘A’, ‘B’, and ‘X’ turrets, 4in forward and aft Bulkheads: 4in and 2in forward, 4in aft

Decks: forecastle 1.5in-1in over secondary battery; upper 1.5in-1in fore and aft; main, 1in; lower, 1in amidships, 3in forward Barbettes: from 9in to 3in Turrets: 9in face and sides, 8in rear, 3.5in-3in roof, 3in floor Conning tower: 10in walls, 3in roof, 4in floor, 3in rangefinder hood Torpedo control tower: 6in sides, 3in roof, 4in floor Communication tube: 4in Funnel uptakes: 1.5in-1in Machinery Thirty-one Babcock & Wilcox large-tube boilers, 235psi Four sets Brown-Curtis direct drive turbines, four 3-blade propellers and one rudder. Power and speed (legend): 85,000shp, 28 knots Power and speed (trials): 104,635shp at 278.4rpm, 29.07 knots Fuel: 3,320 tons coal max; 3,480 tons oil max Radius of action: 5,200nm at 18 knots; 4,500nm at 20 knots; 4,000nm at 20 knots; 2,800nm at 25 knots Complement 1,109 officers and men (as designed); 1,144 (May 1915); 1,459 (April 1918)

Tiger 1914

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

Tiger’s speed trials took place on 12 October 1914 and it is probable that they were hastened because the ship was needed for war. At a displacement of 28,790 tons, and in overload machinery conditions, Tiger developed

104,635shp and recorded 29.07 knots. In normal conditions, she achieved 28.38 knots. These results did not meet the Admiralty requirements because they expected her to achieve 30 knots at an overload power of 108,000shp. A planned modification to install smaller propellers, aimed at improving speed, did not materialise because the Admiralty did not want to delay Tiger joining the Grand Fleet. Tiger was the last battlecruiser designed while Sir Philip Watts was in charge as the DNC73 and was the last ship of her type built before the outbreak of the First World War. She was judged as an attractive ship because of her profile and appearance, especially when compared to previous classes of battlecruisers and battleships. Nevertheless, her derivation from the Lions, especially in terms of armour, could not overcome some weaknesses. General Features Tiger was easily recognisable because of her three equally-spaced funnels and ‘Q’ turret located well abaft the third funnel, which allowed a very large arc of fire. The long forecastle deck extended up to ‘Y’ turret, while the hull maintained the rounded bow. In Tiger, the superstructure was more compact than it had been in previous battlecruisers and was grouped in a single block. The forward portion supported the tripod mast and housed an enlarged bridge while the aft portion housed the funnels, the service boats and their handling equipment, including an aft derrick that was as high as the third funnel. This overall layout was the result of placing almost all of the secondary battery into the forecastle deck. When completed, Tiger had an overall length of 704ft, a beam of 90ft 6in and a draught of about 32ft 3in at a deep displacement of 33,677 tons. Her main characteristics are summarised in in the table on pages 112-13. The amidships freeboard was 24ft 6in, slightly lower than in the Lions. This feature was risky for the safe operation of the secondary battery. To overcome rolling, Tiger was designed with anti-rolling tanks but, during her construction, the Admiralty decided not to install these tanks and increased the size of her bilge keels instead. Tiger had four dynamos. For the first time on British battlecruisers, there was one oil-driven diesel dynamo, generating 150kW. Two turbine-driven dynamos generated 200kW each, while the only reciprocating engine-driven dynamo another generated 200kW. Total output power was therefore 750kW at 220 volts, an indication of the increased importance given to electrical

equipment on board warships. Tiger had the same W/T equipment as the Lions, but this was gradually improved during the First World War, including the provision of a W/T set for fire-control purposes. When completed, Tiger had a crew of 1,112 officers and men, which gradually increased during the conflict, and peaked at 1,459 in 1918. A few days before the action at Dogger Bank in January 1915, Tiger had white stripes applied to her funnels and the mast and dark grey panels added to the central portion of the hull. This camouflage was removed shortly after Dogger Bank but that on the hull sides was restored in 1917.

Tiger as completed in 1914, showing the massive 13.5in superfiring turrets and the secondary armament on her port side. The battlecruiser was fitted with just a single mast; a very high tripod. (D Fillon Collection)

Protection The armour scheme was an improvement in comparison with the Lions, especially because the forward and aft 4in belt was longer. Furthermore, the secondary battery casemate had 10in of protection that ran from abreast the conning tower to the rear side of ‘Y’ barbette and contributed to the overall armour scheme. Another 5in plate ran from abreast the conning tower to the front face of ‘A’ barbette, giving continuity to the protection of the forecastle

deck and representing an innovation in the design of British battlecruisers, but the depth of the 9in main belt inherited from the Lions was reduced from 3ft to 2ft 3in. However, an additional 3in strip was placed below the 9in portion and ran from the rear face of ‘Y’ turret to the front face of ‘A’ barbette. Two 4in transverse bulkheads closed in the citadel. Horizontal protection varied from 1.5in at the forecastle and upper decks to 3in at the lower deck. This deck was also sloped along its extension as in the Lions. The barbettes of the four main gun mountings had a thickness that varied from 9in on the upper part to 1in in the lower part. The turrets had 9in faces, 8in rears and around 3in roofs. The conning tower’s sides were 10in, the roof was 3in and its lower part was 2in. The communication tube had a maximum thickness of 4in. The torpedo-control tower located at the aft end of the forecastle had 6in sides and a 4in roof. The spotting top had 6in and the magazines were protected by screens whose thickness varied from 2.5in to 1in. The vertical protection was mainly made of KC steel plates, while HT steel plates protected the decks. Machinery An advantage that favoured a balanced arrangement of the boiler uptakes into the three funnels was the grouping of all five boiler rooms in a row forward of ‘Q’ turret magazine. Another difference from the Lions was that the boiler rooms, each being 35ft long, were not provided with longitudinal bulkheads. Tiger had thirty-nine Babcock & Wilcox boilers: the foremost boiler room housed seven boilers, while each of the other four boiler rooms housed eight. During both the design and the construction of Tiger, the DNC pushed to equip her with small-tube boilers that would decrease overall weight and space taken by machinery. However, the Admiralty rejected this proposal because this type of boiler required more maintenance time, which reduced the ship’s operational availability.74 Tiger was also the first battlecruiser fitted with Brown-Curtis turbines, manufactured by John Brown under licence from the American firm Curtis.75 The turbines, the main condensers and the auxiliary equipment were placed into two separate compartments, which were in turn separated by longitudinal bulkheads. The working layout for both turbines and shafts was the same as in the Lions. Tiger had a maximum stowage of 3,320 tons for coal and 3,480 for oil.76 However, in practice these figures were 2,800 and 2,100 tons, respectively. Discussions took place regarding equipping Tiger with all oil-fired boilers,

but this was rejected and she had oil sprayed over coal. An estimated unofficial figure for Tiger’s daily coal consumption was 1,245 tons per day at 59,500shp. This power corresponded to a speed of 24 knots, which in turn gave an endurance of 3,300 miles with the maximum calculated fuel stowage. At 25 knots, the corresponding endurance was 2,800 miles, which increased to 5,200 miles at 12 knots. Armament The main battery was as in Queen Mary, with the Vickers 13.5in BII* mountings slightly modified to achieve an elevation of 20°. Wartime ammunition outfit was as in the Lions. When the Admiralty discussed the secondary battery for Tiger, they assumed that the 15cm/5.9in guns fitted on German capital ships were intended to destroy the 4in guns on board British capital ships, thus facilitating their own torpedo attack. In fact, by 1909, the increased range of in-service torpedoes and the greater size of German destroyers appeared to justify larger secondary guns on British battlecruisers as well. However, firing trials carried out at that time demonstrated that 6in guns were unsatisfactory, expensive and the location of their ammunition could pose a serious risk to the ship.77 Nevertheless, Tiger was fitted with twelve Vickers 6in 45cal Mk VII guns in single PVIII mountings. Ten mounts were placed on the forecastle deck and two on the upper deck, thus allowing a good concentration of fire astern. The 6in mount had an elevation of 14°, while the gun’s maximum range was 3,000yd. Rate of fire was five to seven rounds per minute. This gun used Common Pointed Ballistic Cap (CPBC), CPC and HE projectiles, each weighing almost 100lb. Wartime ammunition outfit was 130 rounds per gun, which was considered a poor allowance. Unlike previous battlecruisers, Tiger had an antiaircraft battery made up of two 3in/20cwt Mark I guns mounted on the shelter deck, abreast the conning tower. Their wartime ammunition outfit was 120 HE and thirty incendiary rounds for each gun. Four 21in submerged torpedo tubes were fitted on the beam, one pair port and starboard, forward of ‘A’ barbette and aft of ‘Y’ barbette, respectively. Ammunition outfit for the torpedo tubes was twenty weapons. As with previous battlecruisers, by the end of the First World War, Tiger a flying-off platform on top the ‘Q’ turret that was used by a Sopwith Camel. A canvas hangar placed around this platform gave the aircraft some protection.

As for fire control, Tiger represented a great leap forward since she had been fitted with a director since her construction, and benefitted from improved devices during her service career. The director was placed on the spotting top’s roof, which also had a 9ft B&S rangefinder, and another director was placed on top of the conning tower. When completed, Tiger also had 9ft rangefinders on each of her four turrets, and in armoured hoods on top the conning tower and on the torpedo-control station placed at the after end of the forecastle deck. All this equipment was greatly improved during wartime. In 1918, ‘A’ and ‘Q’ turrets had 25ft rangefinders; 15ft rangefinders replaced the earlier models in ‘Y’ turret, in the torpedo-control tower and in the guncontrol tower while a 12ft model equipped the spotting top. Finally, a small 2m FT 29-type rangefinder for anti-aircraft purposes was fitted in a shielded position above the spotting top. Tiger had a transmitting station for her main battery, which was located on the main deck. The secondary battery had its own transmitting station, with two control positions located on the upper deck, starboard and port, abreast the first funnel. Tiger was initially fitted with sixteen 24in searchlights. They were placed on the sides of the superstructure (four port and starboard), a pair on a small platform on top the derrick stump between the first and the second funnel and a pair on top the torpedo-control station.

Service History and Main Alterations Tiger joined the First BCS on 3 October 1914, although shipyard staff continued to work on board to ready her for war service. On 24 January, Tiger participated in the Dogger Bank action, engaged Seydlitz, Blücher and Moltke and was damaged in return. During the battle of Jutland, Tiger was hit several times and seriously damaged but was able to return to Rosyth for repair. In July 1916, she rejoined the Grand Fleet and became the temporary flagship of the First BCS while Lion was being repaired. After a refit from November 1916 to January 1917, Tiger took part in the action at Heligoland Bight on 17 November 1917. After the end of the war, Tiger was part of the newly-established Atlantic Fleet but was placed in reserve in August 1921. After the 1922 Washington Naval Treaty, the Admiralty initially decided to keep Tiger in service and from 1924 she was used as a gunnery training ship at Portsmouth. In summer 1926, Tiger rejoined the battle fleet and was included in the Atlantic Fleet’s Battlecruiser Squadron. She retained this position until May 1931, being paid off for disposal on 26 July 1931 and dismantled eight months later.

Tiger in dry dock, probably at Rosyth, during the First World War. She was the last battlecruiser constructed for the Royal Navy under the pre-war programme, and the last one supervised by Sir Philip Watts in his capacity as DNC. (National Archives of Canada).

A view of Tiger’s ‘Q’ turret taken in late 1917, showing the aircraft flying-off ramp and canvas hangar. Also clearly visible are a range clock and two searchlights abaft the third funnel. (J Roberts Collection)

Tiger was a more impressive-looking ship than her predecessor battlecruisers and received several external changes that altered her profile. Apart from the changes in fire control equipment mentioned above, Tiger had her spotting top enlarged after Dogger Bank. In 1915-16, Tiger had 6in gun directors placed in the compass platform and there were some changes in the boats’ handling equipment. After Jutland, her armour was improved, especially around the magazines. In 1917, six 36in searchlights replaced almost all the smaller types and they were also redistributed. In 1918-19, Tiger underwent alterations because of lessons learned during the war. The forward mast was shortened, the bridge was enclosed and the spotting top was further enlarged. A rangefinder position was placed abaft the spotting top’s director. Two positions for fore torpedo control and a concentration director were installed low on the forward mast. In the early 1920s, Tiger’s anti-aircraft armament was increased, the aft derrick was raised well above the third funnel and fitted with a very high topgallant and other minor alterations were made until the end of her service life.

THE RENOWN CLASS In the last years before the First World War, substantial changes occurred in the Admiralty that would considerably rework the Royal Navy’s battleship construction policy during wartime. While Winston Churchill was still First Lord of the Admiralty, the post of First Sea Lord passed, in December 1911, from Admiral Arthur Wilson to Admiral Francis Bridgeman and, one year later, to Admiral Prince Louis of Battenberg. When war between Britain and Germany broke out in August 1914, the battlecruisers Inflexible, Indomitable and Indefatigable immediately started chasing the German battlecruiser Goeben and the smaller cruiser Breslau in the Mediterranean. This quest, although unsuccessful for the Royal Navy, caused the Kaiserliche Marine to give up one of its most powerful ships that would otherwise have been useful in later actions in the North Sea. The first real naval engagement between the Royal Navy and the Kaiserliche Marine took place at the Heligoland Bight on 28 August 1914. The British order of

battle included five battlecruisers – Lion, Invincible, Queen Mary, Princess Royal and New Zealand. They easily defeated the lighter German force and sank three enemy cruisers and one destroyer.78 From these first actions, it seemed likely that battlecruisers would become the major players in the naval war, a perception felt especially strongly in Britain. However, the Naval Estimates of 1912-13, 1913-14 and 1914-15 had not included any battlecruisers. In particular, the 1914-15 Naval Estimates called for the construction of four battleships. The Admiralty decided that they would be an evolution of the previous Royal Sovereign class. They would be able to reach a top speed of 21 knots and be armed with new 15in guns.79 The construction of two of these units was assigned to HM Dockyards Devonport and Portsmouth while the other two were contracted to Fairfield and Palmers. The latter were named Renown and Repulse and, while their detailed design was being finalised at the shipyards, some materials were also put in place to lay them down as battleships. Design, Construction and Cost Two dramatic events would change these plans. A strong press campaign in Britain accused Battenberg of being sympathetic to Germany and forced him to resign as First Sea Lord. Churchill decided that Admiral Fisher should return to the post and so, on 30 October 1914, at almost 74, he began his second term as First Sea Lord and started a fresh campaign to press the DNC’s Department for a new battlecruiser design. Initially, he proposed a battlecruiser able to reach a top speed of 32 knots, armed with 15in guns and dubbed ‘Rhadamantus’.80 Then, Fisher asked Churchill to use the material already purchased by the shipyards to build Repulse and Renown to complete those two ships as battlecruisers. Concurrently, Fisher explained to Churchill that several of the long-lead items already contracted for the two ships, such as guns, mountings, machinery and plates, could still be used if they were converted into battlecruisers. According to Fisher, they would then prove more useful than battleships in what was looking to be a long war with Germany. In fact, the construction of the two ships had been slowed after the outbreak of the conflict because the Royal Navy wanted to understand better what naval construction projects should take priority during wartime. In autumn 1914, Fisher had another idea, this time operational in nature but closely linked with his ideas regarding battlecruiser construction. It was the ‘Baltic Project’, an amphibious assault on the Pomeranian coast that

would be supported by a squadron of fast, powerfully armed and shallow draught battlecruisers.81 Apart from Fisher’s judgment on the duration of the war and the effectiveness of capital ships, it is worth noting that his push for a new design of battlecruisers was well received by the new DNC, Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt, who was eager to accept this new challenge. Another event proved key in the decision to convert Renown and Repulse into battlecruisers. The battle of the Falkland Islands occurred in the South Atlantic on 8 December 1914 and it was during this action that Invincible and Inflexible sank the German armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau.82 The Admiralty and the public reacted with euphoria at the success of the British battlecruisers. This was not only a triumph for the new type, but also a triumph for Fisher’s ideas regarding their construction. Thus, it was easy for Fisher to convince Churchill to ask the Cabinet to approve the conversion of Repulse and Renown into battlecruisers. Additional support for building more battlecruisers came in a memorandum written in early December 1914 by the then-Third Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Gordon Moore. This related to future shipbuilding programmes83 and, mentioning the pursuit of Goeben, Moore affirmed that, as long as Germany built battlecruisers, the Royal Navy … would continue to build more and better ones … the great calls for this type of cruiser in all directions during the present War, so far as it has gone, show the value attached to them. As the sphere of the Battlecruisers lies more in open waters, they are not subject to the submarine menace as are Battleships; and, although the radius of the submarine will gradually extend to more open water, their menace to a Battlecruiser will never be so great in proportion, owing to the large areas over which the number of Submarines available will have to spread.

The amidships section of Repulse during her outfitting at John Brown. Note the different size of her funnels and the arrangements for the boats. (National Records of Scotland, UCS1/118/443/291)

Therefore, it appears that strengthening the Grand Fleet with more battlecruisers was the reason to construct the Renowns rather than the mere execution of the ‘Baltic Project’. Nevertheless, things moved quickly at the Admiralty because the DNC’s Department worked hard on the conversion project, especially over Christmas 1914. The shipyards were informed of the conversion of the ships into battlecruisers armed with at least four 15in guns and capable of 32 knots on 19 December. Meanwhile the DNC’s Department began to work on a new sketch of ‘Rhadamantus’ that also included a secondary 4in battery featuring new mountings, an all oil-fired propulsion system and an armour scheme comparable to the Indefatigables. Notwithstanding some different views

within the Admiralty and the fleet on the calibre of the main battery, Fisher quickly and definitely decided that the new battlecruisers would be armed with six 15in guns in three twin turrets. On 21 December, he passed this information onto the DNC. The initial impact of Fisher’s decision was an increase of the main dimensions over the earlier design sketch. The displacement also decreased, probably at the expense of armour. However, since these were preliminary calculations, it is perhaps possible that some assumptions were incorrect. When preliminary design activities commenced on 26 December, the Admiralty discovered that Palmers did not have a slipway long enough to build Repulse. It was thus decided to pass her contract to John Brown. Churchill then obtained Cabinet approval for what was eventually to emerge as a new class of battlecruisers but taking the names of the battleships as originally conceived. Fisher then summoned the two contractors on 29 December and convinced them to complete the construction of the ships in fifteen months from the date of the order. This schedule was passed the next day and the genesis of the third generation of British battlecruisers was thus consolidated. While the First Sea Lord gave directions to the shipbuilders, Admiral Jellicoe, Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet, wrote to Fisher, stressing the need to build fast battlecruisers. In a letter dated 29 December, Jellicoe, whose opinion was much appreciated, was … much concerned ever since the commencement on the war on the subject of the gradual lessening of our preponderance in battlecruisers as compared with Germany, owing to our having ceased to build these vessels of recent years, whilst Germany has been annually adding one battlecruiser to her Navy. We know that the latest German battle cruisers will certainly attain a speed, when chased, of 29 knots … I am therefore most strongly of opinion that we should immediately, if we have not already done so, commence to lay down battle cruisers possessing a speed of at least 30 to 31 knots. If we can get higher speeds by the use of oil fuel, it is most eminently desirable to do so.

Addressing the concepts followed by Fisher, Jellicoe reiterated his opinion and affirmed … The war, so far, has proved what you have yourself so often stated, first, the immense value of high speed, and secondly, the overwhelming value of the big gun. In every engagement that has taken place, this latter point has been most strongly emphasised, and for this reason, I am perfectly convinced that our new battlecruisers

should carry 15-inch guns. I have always been opposed to the 6-inch gun for antitorpedo boat work, as I considered the 4-inch was good enough. I still hold that opinion, and should advise the battle cruiser as well as the battleship of the future having 4-inch guns for her antitorpedo boat armament …84

In the New Year, the designs progressed, additional material arrived at the shipyards and both Renown and Repulse were laid down on 25 January 1915. In the following months, the design was changed to meet emerging requirements, including those coming from Jellicoe. A distinctive peculiarity of the new design was the high placement of the 4in ATB guns, which caused the definitive renouncement of the casemated solution in British capital ships. Conversely, the adoption of triple shielded gun mounts, chosen to obtain a greater concentration of fire, would encumber their efficient utilisation. However, in April, the DNC’s Department concluded its design activities, including stability and stress calculations and the Admiralty approved the revised design on 22 April. During the ships’ construction, additional changes, mainly related to hull structure, were introduced and slightly changed the displacement calculated at different load conditions. Finally, it is interesting to note that the Board Margin, usually 100-120 tons in most designs of major British naval ships, sharply decreased to 15 tons because of these changes. The final design of the Renown class clearly reflected its origin in the Royal Sovereign, with its two 15in forward superfiring twin turrets and one 15in aft turret. In comparison with Tiger, the greater calibre compensated for the lower number of guns and achieved a heavier broadside. The construction schedule imposed by Fisher led the Admiralty to choose a propulsion plant similar to Tiger’s, the only change being three additional boilers. Each shipyard provided both the hull and the machinery. A proper shaping of the hull produced the required increase of speed from 28.5 to 30 knots. The calculated load displacement of the Renowns was 26,500 tons. The summary of calculated weights was as follows: hull, 10,800 tons; machinery, 5,660 tons; armour, 4,770 tons; armament, 3,335 tons; oil, 1,000 tons; general equipment, 920 tons and Board Margin only 15 tons.85 Adding extra oil, reserve feed water for boilers and other general and armament equipment, the calculated deep displacement rose to 30,720 tons. This was slightly less than the equivalent figure calculated for Tiger. Block coefficient resulted at 0.542, making the Renowns more slender than their predecessors.

Repulse sailing down the Clyde after her completion at John Brown’s shipyard in August 1916. The Renowns, armed with 15in guns, can be considered as the third generation of Royal Navy battlecruisers. (J Roberts Collection)

Repulse was launched on 8 January 1916 and Renown followed on 4 March. Repulse was completed on 18 August with Renown following on 20 September. Therefore, the construction objective of 15 months was missed, probably because Fisher, who had resigned in May 1915 because of the military disaster at Gallipoli,86 could no longer exert his strong influence on shipyards and other contractors. However, completing the Renowns in roughly twenty months was outstanding, especially considering the adoption of new features such as the 15in guns and their associated equipment. The costs for the battlecruisers were £3,117,204 for Renown and £2,829,087 for Repulse. This is a clear indication of the increasing costs of British capital ships. Renown was inclined on 2 September and her actual deep displacement that resulted was 32,220 tons, with a mean draught 30.1ft and a metacentric height of 6.2ft. The angle of maximum stability was 44°, and the angle at which stability vanished differed from 64° at load condition to 73° at deep condition. Repulse was inclined soon after and had an actual deep displacement of 31,592 tons, a mean draught of 29.8ft and a metacentric height of 6.1ft. No other records seem to exist for Repulse, but it is probable that the stability figures were similar to Renown’s. The speed trials for both ships took place in August and September and were conducted off the Isle of Arran, in the Firth of Clyde, to avoid problems

similar to those that emerged with Tiger and previous battlecruisers. Renown developed a maximum power of 126,300shp and recorded 32.58 knots at 281.6rpm and 27,900 tons. Repulse had a displacement of 29,900 tons, developed 118,913shp and recorded a top speed of 31.73 knots at 274.7rpm. Taking into account their displacement during the trial, the Renowns’ speed performances were deemed acceptable. Furthermore, the ships proved to be good sea boats. Although they were difficult to maintain (so much so that they were affectionately nicknamed Repair and Refit), the Renowns were an example of outstanding proficiency in designing complex warships under pressure.87 Moreover, they adequately met the established Admiralty requirements. However, since Renowns’ completion came just a few months after Jutland, there was clearly no time to implement early lessons from that battle. General Features Other than the heavier-calibre guns, the Renowns had at least three distinctive features that, taken together, made them distinguishable from previous British battlecruisers. They had two large, high funnels, the forward one being visibly separated from the superstructure. The layout of the main battery featured three turrets placed along the centreline. No main-calibre turret was placed amidships, a characteristic that would be repeated in almost all future British capital ship designs. As in Tiger, the very long forecastle extended up to ‘Y’ turret. Another long shelter deck ran from ‘B’ turret to ‘Y turret. Finally, the aft funnel was surrounded by searchlight platforms. The only feature that helped to distinguish the two ships was that Renown had a closed bridge and Repulse an open one. The superstructure was built around an aft-raked tripod mast, and included a massive conning tower deckhouse. This resulted in a more compact structure than in Tiger. The boats were mostly stowed on the forecastle deck, abaft the second funnel, and were handled by a derrick hinged on the aft tripod mast.88 A smaller deckhouse was placed abaft the aft tripod mast and housed the after 4in director platform and a 4in triple mount. The aft mast had also a spotting top. When completed, the Renowns had an overall length of 794ft and a maximum beam of about 90ft. Their mean draught varied from 30ft 1in at a deep displacement of 32,200 tons in Renown to 29ft 8in at a deep displacement of 31,592 tons in Repulse. Depth was 41ft to the upper deck and

increased to 49ft at the forecastle deck. The table opposite summarises the main characteristics of the class. The hull had an elegant shape, with a strongly arched stem, an upward sheer, and a rounded stern. The Renowns had four dynamos. There was one turbine-driven dynamo with an output of 200kW, one oil-driven dynamo of 175kW, and two reciprocating engine-driven dynamos, each generating 200kW. This configuration appeared less advanced than Tiger’s. Total output was, therefore, 775kW at 220V. The Renowns had W/T equipment similar to Tiger’s, with sets distributed across main, second, third and fire control offices. Repulse had more W/T sets than Renown, including a Type 31 in the fire-control office. When completed, Renown had 953 officers and men, while Repulse had 967. Their complement gradually increased during wartime, reaching about 1,220 personnel in 1919. Toward the end of 1918, Repulse was camouflaged with dark grey on the sides of her shelter deck and large stripes on the funnels. Renown was given a wide dark band around her forward funnel. Protection Although the protection scheme of British battlecruisers marked some slight improvement over the first and second generation units, with the Renowns there was a marked regress as they were lightly armoured. The reason for this was probably based on Fisher’s decision to adopt a protection scheme similar to the Indefatigables. This meant that the DNC’s Department had to focus mainly on enhancing armament and machinery. In addition, the Renowns only had oil-fired boilers, which meant losing some degree of protection provided by coal stowed in bunkers placed along the hull sides.89 The KC main belt ran between the axes of ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets, had a thickness of 6in and a total width of 9ft but it was only 1ft 6in below the waterline. This belt was extended toward the hull ends for approximately another 40ft, but its thickness was reduced to 4in forward and 3in aft. There were two pairs of KC bulkheads; the first pair closed the main belt, while the second pair closed the fore and aft extensions of the main belt. The thickness of these bulkheads varied from 3in to 4in. Vertical protection also included the sides of the forecastle and shelter decks and the funnel uptakes. They had an thickness of about 1.5in HT. When completed,90 the HT main deck had a slope at the sides and its thickness was 1in. This increased to 2in above the magazines. The plates on

the other decks varied from 1.5in to 2.5in. The KC barbettes had a diameter of 30.5ft and their thickness varied from 7in in the upper section to 5in in the lower section. Each turret had KC armour of different thickness: 9in in the face, 11in in the rear, 7in at the sides and 4.5in in the roof. The conning tower had different thicknesses of KNC and KC protection, ranging from 2in at the base to 10in at the sides. The communication tube had 2in and 3in KNC. The torpedo-control tower was placed on the deckhouse abaft the aft mast and had 3in KNC protection. As for underwater protection, the Renowns had a moderate bulge below the main deck, with a 0.75in longitudinal bulkhead hinged on that deck’s sloped part. Although there had been plans to introduce torpedo nets during the design stage, they were not installed.

Renown Class Names Renown, Repulse Shipyards and construction Renown: Fairfield, Govan Laid down, 25 January 1915; launched, 4 March 1916; completed, 20 September 1916. Repulse: John Brown & Co, Clydebank Laid down, 25 January 1915; launched, 8 January 1916; completed, 18 August 1916. Displacement, load Legend, 26,500 tons Renown, inclined, 27,420 tons Repulse, inclined, 26,854 tons Dimensions Length: 794ft 1.5in (oa); 750ft 2in (pp) Beam: 89ft 8in (moulded) Draught (load displacement): 25.6ft 5.5in fore, 27ft aft (Renown) Armament Six 15in 42cal Mk I, twin turrets Seventeen 4in 44cal Mk IX, five triple and two single mounts Two 3in QF HA One 12pdr Two 21in torpedo tubes (beam, submerged)

Protection Belt: 6in amidships, 4in forward, 3in aft Bulkheads: 4in and 3in forward and aft Decks: forecastle 1in-0.75in; main deck from 1in to 4in in sloped sides; lower, from 1.75in to 3in over steering gear Barbettes: 9in and 8in above main deck; 3in and 4in between main and lower deck Turrets: 9in face, 7in sides, 11in rear, 4.25in roof Gun control tower: 10in walls, 3in roof, 3in floor Torpedo control tower: 3in Communication tube: 2in Funnel uptakes: 1.5in-1in Machinery Forty-two Babcock & Wilcox large-tube boilers, 275psi Four sets Parsons direct drive turbines, four 3-blade propellers and one rudder Power and speed (legend): 112,000shp, 31.5 knots Power and speed (trials): 126,300shp at 281.6rpm, 32.58 knots (Renown) Fuel: 4,289 tons oil max Radius of action: 4,700nm at 12 knots; 4,000nm at 18 knots, 2,700nm at 25 knots Complement 1,057 officers and men in 1917; 1,222 in 1919

Repulse 1916

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

In summary, the Renown class’s protection scheme was insufficient and only limited improvements could be made during their extended alterations, which took place after the war (Renown) and in the mid-1920s (Repulse).

Machinery During the design stage, discussions had taken place regarding the adoption of small water-tube boilers and lighter turbines. However, the tight time schedule meant the decision was taken to install a propulsion plant similar to Tiger’s. The Renowns, therefore, had forty-two Babcock & Wilcox boilers, working at 275 psi,91 and distributed over six boiler rooms. Compared to Tiger, the three additional boilers were introduced to meet the speed requirements, especially important were the Baltic Project to occur. The foremost boiler room had three boilers, with seven in the next boiler room and eight in the other boiler rooms. There were no auxiliary machinery rooms between adjacent boiler rooms. The total length of boiler rooms was 193ft. Two engine rooms, with Brown-Curtis turbines, and two condenser rooms extended over 110ft abaft the aftermost boiler room. Each condenser room housed one steering engine. Total oil stowage was about 4,250 tons, while coal stowage was limited to about 105 tons. The radius of action varied from 4,700nm at 12 knots to 2,700nm at 25 knots.

A shot of an engine room control station on board Repulse, showing the multitude of gauges and wheel-operated valves. The Renowns had two engine rooms and two condenser rooms that extended abaft the aftermost boiler room. (J Roberts Collection)

Armament The design of the gun layout became a secondary consideration, not as important as the short completion time that Fisher imposed or the implementation of the new 15in turrets. The final layout featured three twin turrets, although a fourth turret, if available, could have been superimposed above ‘Y’ turret. The Vickers 15in 42cal gun became the best heavy calibre naval gun ever developed in Britain.92 Its design was largely based upon the previous 13.5in 45cal Mark V and production quickly commenced as the usual lengthy prototype stage was forfeited because of war requirements. There was a slight difference between the mountings in Renown (all Mk I*) and Repulse (two Mk I and one Mk I*), which concerned the method of shell transfer from magazines to the main trunk. Each mounting weighed 770 tons and had a crew of sixty-four officers and men, while the gun elevation varied from -5° to 20°. The range at maximum elevation was 23,734yd and the rate of fire was two rounds per minute. Wartime ammunition outfit was 120 rounds per gun and its composition varied from the initial sixty APC and sixty CPC to eighty-four APC and thirty-six CPC at the end of the First World War. The Renowns were the first battlecruisers equipped with two directors for the main battery, one placed on top the armoured conning tower and the other on a platform that protruded from the forward mast above the bridge. As already stated, Fisher had always objected to heavy secondary batteries on capital ships so, at his insistence, the Admiralty decided to install 4in 45cal guns as the secondary armament on the Renown class. Initially, there was an option between two different 4in models but one was difficult to arrange for the director firing and the other had a low rate of fire. Thus, a Mark IX version emerged from a combination of the best features of these earlier models. The Renowns had five 4in 45cal Mark IX triple mounts and two PVIII single mounts. The former were located on the conning tower platform (two mounts abreast the forward funnel), on the shelter deck (one mount below the derrick and another at the end of that deck), and the last on a small deckhouse on the shelter deck. However, although each barrel could be elevated independently, the choice of a triple mount was judged clumsy, especially because the crew of each mount, totalling twenty-three, obstructed one another.

The two single mounts were on the shelter deck, abreast the aft funnel. This disposition allowed a good overall arc of fire for countering enemy torpedo boats, but the triple mounts’ rate of fire, 10-12 rounds per minute, was hampered by the lack of power assistance. Wartime ammunition outfit for the secondary battery was 150 rounds per guns. This initially included 105 HE and 45 CP projectiles but later increased to 200 rounds per gun (120 HE, 50 CP and 30 HE Night Tracers). In addition, the secondary battery had two fire control directors; one placed on the forward mast on a platform protruding below the spotting top and another on a platform of the aft mast. The Renowns also had two 3in 20cwt Mk I AA guns, each placed abreast the forward funnel. They had an ammunition outfit that included 120 HE and 30 incendiary shells.

Renown moored alongside in Melbourne in 1920, during her cruise with the Prince of Wales on board. Note the massive appearance of ‘B’ barbette and the layout of the forward upper works. (Courtesy, State Library of Victoria, Australia)

A design requirement was for the Renowns to have aft and forward torpedo rooms. An aft torpedo room was, however, difficult to arrange because the aft section of the ships was crowded with shafts, magazines and shells. Therefore, the Renowns only had an amidships torpedo room equipped with two 21in submerged tubes. Ammunition outfit was ten Mk IVHB and sixteen Mk IVSL torpedoes. Regarding fire control, the Renowns represented an improvement over previous classes of battlecruisers. This was because the Admiralty wanted to maximise the capabilities of the new 15in main battery. In addition to directors for 15in and 4in guns, the two ships received many Barr & Stroud rangefinders, ranging from 6ft to 30ft. This equipment was different in Renown and Repulse and was gradually improved during the war. Common elements were rangefinders in all 15in turrets, the conning tower93 and the torpedo control tower. There were also two separate transmitting stations, which were located on each side of the main deck, close to the basements of the forward mast. The Renowns had eight 36in searchlights. Six were placed in platforms surrounding the aft funnel, four low and two high. Another pair was placed on a platform high on the forward funnel. Two 24in signalling lamps were positioned behind the bridge, abreast the forward mast. Service History and Main Alterations Repulse joined the Grand Fleet at the end of 1916, relieving Tiger as flagship of the First BCS. Renown took up this same role in January 1917. As Fisher’s design priorities were increasingly at odds with the officers of the Grand Fleet, when the new battlecruisers became part of the fleet, special steaming formations were devised to keep them safe. However, only Repulse saw action during the war, notably at the second battle of Heligoland on 17 November 1917. After the conflict, both ships were included in the BCS of the Atlantic Fleet and participated in several training and ceremonial events before being extensively transformed during the inter-war period. The two battlecruisers then took part in the Second World War. Repulse was sunk on 10 December 1941 off the Malayan peninsula by Imperial Japanese Navy torpedo planes. Renown meanwhile participated in actions in the Atlantic Ocean, the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean. She was paid off for disposal on 1 June 1948 and sold for scrap that August.

Renown at high speed as seen from another British ship during wartime. Repulse joined the Grand Fleet at the end of 1916, relieving Tiger as flagship of the First BCS. Renown took up this same role in January 1917. (J Roberts Collection)

In 1917, deflection scales were painted on ‘Y’ turret, a feature often adopted during the war by other British battlecruisers and battleships. Flying-off platforms were mounted on ‘Y’ and ‘B’ turrets to operate fighter aircraft capable of intercepting Zeppelin airships that were used by the Kaiserliche Marine for long-range reconnaissance. In 1919, range clocks were fitted on Renown’s spotting top and her searchlights were redistributed. The number and types of rangefinders varied during wartime. The long double row of scuttles amidships clearly indicated a large area of hull left protected only by a thin strip of 6in. Therefore, during the refits that took place immediately after the war and in the 1920s, Repulse and Renown had their 6in armour belts moved up a deck and replaced by a 9in belt. Both ships were again extensively reconstructed in the 1930s. They had a three-year long reconstruction that altered their profile and changed their characteristics and performance. In 1939, their deep displacement exceeded about 36,000 tons (Renown) and 38,300 tons (Repulse). New Admiralty-type boilers developed a design power of 120,000shp, with a corresponding top speed of 29 knots. Renown and Repulse were much criticised but both proved useful,

especially during the Second World War. In fact, they met the requirements even though their protection was tested only when Repulse was sunk. Given the many harsh comments made about the Renown class design, it is interesting to quote Renown’s Captain, L. Halsey, who sent a letter to the DNC in 1920 during the Royal Tour of the US and Australasia. Halsey wrote: … The ship is a perfect marvel to me; she steams beautifully and is extraordinary economical; she burns a little over a ton per knot at twenty knots and she is perfectly wonderful in a heavy sea – in fact I never knew that any ship could behave as she does, as she is not abnormally wet, in fact in a head sea she is wonderfully dry, and her steadiness is extraordinary. We have now been about 18,000 miles since leaving England, and mostly at 20-25 knots, and the ship has behaved splendidly …

FROM THE COURAGEOUS CLASS TO INCOMPARABLE The euphoria generated in Britain by the battle of the Falklands and the perceived need for more battlecruisers in the Grand Fleet had many repercussions. One result was the construction of Repulse and Renown. Another was that more capital ships were requested by Fisher and the Admiralty in order to implement the Baltic Project, for which there was much enthusiasm. The war economy was, however, creating enormous pressure on the British budget and most of the Cabinet supported David Lloyd George, the Chancellor of the Exchequer, in tightening the purse strings. In fact, the burden laid upon British finance because of the outbreak of the First World War was larger and more complicated than just having to provide money for the Royal Navy and the British Army.94

Renown at Lyttelton harbour, New Zealand, in 1920. A 4in triple mount is clearly visible on the after flying deck, abaft the mainmast. The battlecruiser underwent several minor changes, aimed at providing extra accommodation for additional crew, before undertaking the Royal Tour. (Courtesy, State Library of Victoria, Australia)

On the other hand, British military strategy did include the use of the Royal Navy as a powerful tool to break the stalemate faced by the Allied armies fighting in Europe at the time. The strategy would involve the Royal Navy being present at the periphery of the main battle theatre – the Western Front – and called for several daring actions such as amphibious assaults in the Dardanelles, the Baltic Project and the creation of a huge minefield to prevent the Kaiserliche Marine entering the North Sea. However, deadlock during the Dardanelles campaign and an adequate stock of reliable mines being unavailable meant the Baltic Project became the primary strategic option for the Royal Navy to act. Some weeks after the Cabinet approved the Renowns’ construction, Fisher wrote and distributed a new round of memoranda and letters. These, sent to several people, were meant to keep alive the design he had put together for the capital ships that should be used in the Baltic Project. Emphasis was increasingly placed on high speed and powerful armament, while protection was neglected. A problem, however, was how to convince the Treasury and

the Cabinet as Lloyd George fiercely opposed the construction of ships larger than light cruisers. Fisher easily overcame this opposition by defining the new ships as ‘large light cruisers’ and trying to sell his ideas inside and outside the Admiralty. In a letter to Jellicoe sent on 23 January 1915, Fisher explained that he wanted a new ‘light cruiser’ armed with four 15in guns, capable of reaching 33 knots, with a draught of 23ft and to be completed in 11 months. Moreover, he indicated which shipyards could complete his plan. Two days later, Fisher got the approval of both Churchill, who was not convinced about the new ships but supported the Baltic Project, and d’Eyncourt, who was then tasked to commence the design for the new class with the characteristics mentioned earlier. Indeed, after equipping Repulse and Renown, the Royal Navy had six 15in twin turrets available for future use. Two were allocated to monitors, leaving two each for a pair of new large light cruisers. Therefore, it is possible that Fisher, who disliked monitors, preferred to use the available 15in turrets for additional battlecruisers. Design, Construction and Cost Unexpected support for more battlecruisers occurred the same day that Fisher wrote to Churchill and d’Eyncourt. On 24 January, the Royal Navy fought the Kaiserliche Marine at Dogger Bank. Jellicoe then informed Fisher about the need for more battlecruisers, stating that they would be indispensable in future battles against the German fleet. Additionally, Fisher threatened to resign if any other battlecruisers or battleships were going to be deployed off the Dardanelles. It appears that a mere promise to approve the construction of two or three large light cruisers convinced Fisher to stay.

Glorious. Her large-calibre twin turrets fore and aft and the single funnel made Glorious and her sister ship Courageous easily distinguishable from older British battlecruisers. (Courtesy, R A Burt)

For his part, d’Eyncourt, who liked to work to a tight schedule, did not waste time. By end of January 1915, he presented the design for the new class. It had a legend displacement of 17,800 tons, was armed with two twin 15in mounts and had a protection similar to that of a real light cruiser. An official statement from the DNC’s Department affirmed that [There] was a further special need for some very high speed ships carrying powerful guns and able to navigate shallower waters than any existing British or enemy ships of the same class. As sanction had already been obtained for the construction of some light cruisers, and as there might have been difficulty in getting additional capital ships sanctioned, it was decided to build ‘Courageous’ and ‘Glorious’ on the lines of large light cruisers. They were therefore designed as very large light cruisers, mounting a few guns of heaviest calibre; very lightly armoured, but having a speed of not less than 32 knots, while the draught was restricted to between 21 and 22 feet, or about 5 feet less than any existing battleship or battle cruiser. The main armament of four 15-inch guns would be more than a match for any raider or light cruiser that might be encountered.95

The new ships were essentially battlecruisers and their characteristics had some logic. As already discussed, the Baltic Project called for a speedy dash

into the Baltic in order to support a shore bombardment in preparation for an amphibious landing in Pomerania that would tie up a significant portion of German land forces.96 To carry out this mission, the battlecruisers were to have a limited draught and travel at a high speed in order to transit quickly through the Danish Straits and operate in the Baltic. They would need an adequate main battery to bombard coastal targets and a proper range to loiter off the Pomeranian coast.

Courageous Class Names Courageous, Furious, Glorious Shipyards and construction Courageous: Armstrong, Elswick Laid down, 25 March 1915; launched, 5 February 1916; completed, 28 October 1916. Glorious: Harland & Wolff, Belfast Laid down, 20 April 1915; launched, 20 April 1916; completed, 14 October 1916; commissioned, January 1917. Furious: Armstrong, Walker Laid down, 8 June 1915; launched, 18 August 1916; completed, 26 June 1917, as hybrid aircraft carrier. Displacement, load Courageous, inclined, 19,180 tons Glorious, completed, 19,180 tons Furious, inclined, 19,153 tons Dimensions Length: 786ft 9in (oa); 735ft 1.5in (pp) Beam: 81ft (moulded), 81ft 5in (over bulge) Draught (load displacement): 19ft 8in fore, 24ft aft (Furious) Armament Four 15in 42cal Mk I, twin turrets (Furious, one 18in 40cal Mk I) Eighteen 4in 44cal Mk IX, six triple mounts (Furious, eleven 5.5in 50cal Mk I in single mounts) Two 3in QF HA Two 21in submerged torpedo tubes as completed, twelve additional above-water tubes added later Protection Belt: 3in amidships, 2in forward Bulkheads: 2in and 3in forward, 3in aft

Decks: forecastle, 1in-0.75in; upper, 1in forward and abreast ‘X’ barbette; main deck 1in-0.75in in sloped sides; lower, 1in forward, 1.15in-1in aft, over steering gear Barbettes: 7in and 6in above main deck; 4in and 3in between main and lower deck Turrets: 9in face and forward sides, 7in rear sides, 11in rear, 4.25in roof1 Gun control tower: 10in walls, 6in roof, 3in floor Torpedo control tower: 3in sides, 2.5in roof Communication tube: 3in-2in Torpedo bulkheads: 1.5in-1in Funnel uptakes: 0.75in Machinery2 Eighteen Yarrow small-tube boilers, 235psi Four sets Parsons geared drive turbines, four 3-blade propellers and one rudder Power and speed (legend): 90,000shp, 32 knots Power and speed (trials): 91,195shp at 329.5rpm, 31.42 knots (Glorious) Fuel: 3,160 tons oil max Radius of action: 6,000nm at 20 knots Complement Courageous: 787 officers and men; Glorious: 768; Furious: 726 1 2

Furious had 9in front and sides, 11in rear and 5in roof. Furious had Curtis turbines and her designed speed was 31.5 knots.

Courageous 1917

Furious 1917

Line drawings © Ruggero Stanglini

However, some sources state that Fisher was not entirely committed to the Baltic Project and just used it as the official justification to build the large light cruisers. In this context, Fisher’s quest for shallow draught was probably due to his desire to have increasingly faster capital ships. In a memo Fisher wrote to d’Eyncourt on 6 March, he praised the DNC’s Department regarding the balance reached in terms of firepower, speed and shallow draught. Some people in the Admiralty criticised the design because two twin 15in turrets were deemed insufficient to fire the broadsides needed for proper spotting and thus proper fire control. Furthermore, the single forward twin turret was judged insufficient when employed for chasing fast and small targets. However, the DNC’s Department had completed the design by late February97 and the construction programme called for two units. Other new requirements that included improved safety against mines and torpedoes, better seakeeping, and greater reserve of buoyancy were worked out. The new battlecruisers, Courageous and Glorious, reflected their origin in the Renowns. The major differences were the omission of ‘B’ turret, the presence of a single funnel and a protection scheme similar to a light cruiser. The hull form was analogous to the Renowns with an integral bulge that protruded below the waterline. Minor changes introduced after the approval of the design concerned an increase in thickness of the longitudinal anti-torpedo bulkheads, which caused the displacement to increase 400 tons. Fisher was sure that the shipyards selected for construction, Vickers and Beardmore, would complete the ships in eleven months. However, this assumption proved wrong so Armstrong and Harland & Wolff were eventually awarded the contracts instead. The construction of the ships was shrouded in secrecy, for domestic and external reasons. Armstrong laid down

Courageous on 28 March and Glorious was laid down on 1 May by Harland & Wolff. In early March, Fisher had written to Churchill regarding the construction of four additional large light cruisers armed with 18in guns, but the First Lord approved only one unit.98 This was named Furious and was laid down on 8 June, at Armstrong’s, Elswick. The tight construction schedule imposed by Fisher on the new class led to the adoption of a propulsion plant already selected for the light cruiser Champion. This was advantageous because it led to the introduction of small tube boilers and geared main turbines99 on large British warships. The initial legend displacement of Courageous and Glorious was 17,400 tons. The summary of calculated weights was as follows: hull, 8,500 tons; machinery, 2,350 tons; armour, 2,800 tons; armament, 2,250 tons; oil, 750 tons; general equipment, 650 tons and Board Margin, 100 tons.100 As mentioned earlier, the legend displacement later increased to 17,800 tons. The characteristics of Furious were influenced by Fisher’s decision to introduce the new 18in gun. In fact, since he had already lobbied for larger guns, the plan was to provide all three ships with two single 18in turrets. However, Courageous and Glorious were needed quickly. Thus, they had the two twin 15in turrets foreseen in the original design, while the design of Furious was eventually modified. In reality, Furious was the only ship available for embarking the new 18in single turret. A major change was a 7ft increase in hull width to accommodate the new turret. This introduction caused an increase of the legend displacement to 19,100 tons.101 When d’Eyncourt completed the work on the initial design, he estimated a cost of £1,180,000 for each ship. However, he likely did not account for the cost of the 15in mountings. Costs for Courageous and Glorious were £2,038,225 and £1,967,223 respectively. Courageous was launched on 5 February 1916 and completed on 28 October; her machinery was manufactured by Parsons. Glorious was launched on 20 April and was completed on 14 October. Her machinery was procured by Harland & Wolff. Courageous was inclined on 8 October and her actual deep displacement resulted at 22,560 tons, with a mean draught of 25.8ft and a metacentric height of 6.0ft. The angle of maximum stability was 44° at 19,180 tons and the angle at which stability vanished differed from 85° at load condition to 94° at deep condition. These would result in the highest angles of capsizing for all British battlecruisers. When completed, Glorious had a deep displacement of 22,360 tons. It appears that no records exist concerning her

metacentric height and stability features; however, it is highly probable that she performed similarly to Courageous. In June, a proposal to convert Courageous and Glorious into seaplane carriers was rejected by the Third Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Bridgeman, because of the delay and cost involved. In addition, Fisher and Churchill had resigned a year earlier, thus the construction of the large light cruisers lost supporters and slowed down. On 19 March 1917, the Admiralty decided to convert Furious into a hybrid aircraft carrier as they needed a ship that was larger and more capable of carrying aircraft than ships converted from Channel ferries. The after gun had already been installed and was left on board the ship. The forward turret was replaced by a hangar and a sloping flight deck that extended to the forecastle.102 Speed trials for Courageous and Glorious were conducted quickly due to war conditions and took place between November 1916 and February 1917. Courageous achieved 91,200shp and reached 30.8 knots at 323rpm but, during one trial at full power and in adverse weather, suffered buckling of the forecastle in the forward section and so her hull was later stiffened. Glorious was trialled more extensively and achieved 91,195shp and reached 31.4 knots at 329rpm. In short, neither ship performed as well as their designers and operators expected. The three large light cruisers were also controversial within the Admiralty and were thus nicknamed the Outrageous class. Since the Royal Navy could not afford to ignore them in wartime, they were used as battlecruisers with the other ships of the type. General Features Their twin ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets and the single funnel made Courageous and Glorious clearly distinct from older British battlecruisers. As in previous classes, the long forecastle ran back to ‘Y’ turret, leaving wide deck spaces to bear two 15in turrets. The superstructure was placed in the central-aft part of the forecastle and included a shelter deck that supported the forward section with the forward mast, the funnel and the aft mast. The ships’ boats were mostly located on the shelter deck and their handling was by a derrick hinged to the aft mast. The single funnel was surrounded by searchlight platforms. As in the Renowns, a very small deckhouse was placed abaft the aft tripod mast and housed the torpedo-control tower. The secondary battery comprised six triple 4in mounts. Two were placed on the centreline, forward and abaft

the aft mast. Another pair was located abeam the funnel, while the last pair was placed abeam the bridge. When completed, the two ships had an overall length of about 786ft and a maximum beam of 90ft. Their mean draught varied from 22ft 8in at a load displacement of 19,180 tons to 25ft 10in at a deep displacement of 22,560 tons. Depth was 36ft to the upper deck. The hull had a moderate forward sheer, a strongly arched stem with a bulb, and a slightly rounded stern. The table on page 128 summarises the main characteristics of the Courageous class. The three ships all had four dynamos. There were three turbine-driven dynamos generating 200kW each and one oil-driven dynamo of 175kW. This configuration, which gave up on reciprocating engines, appeared more advanced than the Renowns. Total output was still 775kW at 220volts. W/T equipment was reduced to Types I and 16 for the main W/T office and Type 2 for the second office. When completed, Glorious had a complement of 768 officers and men while Courageous, as flagship, had 787 personnel. Protection Regarding protection, the Courageous class were actually light cruisers because their armour scheme was a real example of unbalance. They had a 3in HT belt that ran from the ends of ‘A’ and ‘Y’ barbettes and had a width of 24.5ft, mostly above the waterline. The belt had a 2in extension from ‘A’ barbette to the forward 2in bulkhead. This extension was approximately 18ft wide. Another 3in bulkhead ran obliquely between the ship’s sides, while a 3in aft bulkhead was placed abreast ‘Y’ barbette and closed the citadel. Funnel uptakes had a 1.5in plate. The forecastle deck was partially covered with a 0.75in plate. The upper deck was 1in from the forward bulkhead and around ‘Y’ barbette, with no protection in between. The main deck was originally 1in HT on slopes and 0.5in flat between barbettes but, after Jutland, this was increased while the ships were still under construction to about 2in, mainly over the magazines. The thickness of the HT lower deck varied between 1.5in and 2in between ‘A’ and ‘Y’ barbettes, with an increase to 2.5in over the rudder. The thickness of the KC barbettes varied from 7in above the upper deck to 3in down to the lower deck. The turrets had 11in KC rears, 9in KC faces, 7in KC sides and about 4in KNC roofs. The upper part of the conning tower had 10in sides and a 2in roof. At the lower sides, the protection decreased to 2in. The communication tube was 3in. Underwater protection relied on the integral bulge, which ran in correspondence with the

machinery space and magazines. The 1.5in HT internal longitudinal bulkhead ran for the same distance and extended vertically from the keel to the main deck.

Furious, photographed while she was being outfitted at Armstrong’s in 1917. The massive 18in single turret, the largest calibre ever operated by the Royal Navy, is visible on the quarterdeck. The decision to convert Furious into an aircraft carrier has already been taken, as indicated by the flight deck installed forward of the superstructure. (Naval History and Heritage Command, US Navy)

The aft twin 15in turret of Courageous in spring 1917. A range clock is fitted on the mainmast, while mines and rails for launching them are also visible on the quarterdeck. (J Roberts Collection)

Machinery The adoption, for the first time in a major British warship, of small-tube water boilers and double helical reduction gear represented a great technical leap in terms of the application of modern propulsion systems to naval vessels. The Admiralty’s choice to install two sets of geared turbines that had already been tested on the C class light cruisers provided an increase of about 30% in power over the water large-tube boilers. The Courageous class had eighteen Yarrow boilers working at 235psi located in three boiler rooms. This configuration allowed all exhaust ducts to converge into the large single funnel. The engine rooms took a total length of 84ft. They were split into four rooms by two longitudinal bulkheads and a transverse bulkhead. Each turbine set was housed in a separate engine room and comprised HP and LP ahead and astern turbines. The LP ahead and astern wheels were in one casing. The port and starboard outer shafts were each driven by a turbine set housed in a wing engine room. The port inner shaft was driven by a turbine set housed in the after amidships room. The starboard inner shaft was driven by a turbine set housed in the fore amidships room. There was a main condenser in each engine room and two wing engine rooms housed an auxiliary condenser. The compactness of the propulsion system enabled it to be housed in a relatively shorter length (164ft in total) than in the Renowns. Maximum oil stowage was about 3,160 tons. Fuel consumption was 1,031 tons per day at full speed. The radius of action varied from 6,000nm at 20 knots to 11,000nm at 10 knots, which was quite abundant for an expedition into the Baltic. Armament Since the 15in and 4in guns fitted on Courageous and Glorious were identical to the twin and triple mountings embarked on the Renowns, this section will mainly describe the 18in gun that was originally installed on Furious.103 Only three 18in 40cal Mk I guns were built by the Armstrong Works at Elswick, the only manufacturer capable of making such large weapons. The Admiralty and Armstrong designated these guns as the ‘15 inch B’ during their design and construction to hide their true size. Their mountings were

essentially 15in Mark I turrets adapted to take a single 18in barrel.104 The mount weighed 827 tons, while the gun elevation varied from -3° to 30°. Rate of fire was one round per minute, while the maximum range with an APC round was 32,200yd. Ammunition outfit for Furious was 30 rounds APC and 30 rounds CPC per gun.105 The 18in mount actually installed on Furious was trialled in July 1917 but these trials showed that this lightly-built ship could not handle the pressures generated. This was probably another reason for converting Furious to an aircraft carrier and definitively abandoning the huge gun. The Admiralty assumed, correctly, that the 18in guns of Furious would be inadequate to deal with enemy cruisers and destroyers. Thus, in April 1915, the Director of Ordnance had suggested equipping her with the 5.5in guns that had recently been introduced on new British cruisers. Some of these guns were being manufactured by Coventry Ordnance Works and eleven single Mk I mounts were installed on Furious. There were nine mounts on the shelter deck and two mounts on the forecastle deck. They had a maximum elevation of 30° and a corresponding range of 17,700yds. The armament of the three Courageous class battlecruisers also included two 3in/20cwt Mk I AA guns, each with 160 HE rounds. These guns were fitted abreast the aft mast. The three ships had two submerged broadside 21in torpedo tubes that were placed forward of ‘A’ turret, with 12 torpedoes. Fire control for the Courageous class was in practice a replica of equipment that was already installed on the Renowns. They had two directors for the main battery, one housed in the gun control tower and another on a platform located on the forward mast, halfway between the bridge and the spotting top. The secondary battery also had two directors, one in a platform below the aft spotting top and the other above it. Courageous and Glorious had three Barr & Stroud rangefinders each. Their base-length varied from 15ft to 6ft. Furious had two 15ft rangefinders rather than the three of her sisters. Courageous had six 36in searchlights, two abreast the bridge and four on a platform surrounding the funnel. Glorious had the same arrangement around the funnel, but on two levels, while four searchlights were abreast the bridge.106 Service History and Main Alterations Courageous and Glorious joined the Second Light Cruiser Squadron and patrolled trade routes off Scandinavia. On 17 and 18 November 1917, both

ships participated in the action off Heligoland, with poor results. Moreover, their decks were damaged by their own gunfire. In 1917-18, six above-water 21in torpedo tubes in twin mountings were installed on Courageous and Glorious abeam the main mast and ‘Y’ turret. Total torpedo outfit increased to twenty weapons. Courageous temporarily embarked mine rails on the quarterdeck but she never used mines. In 1918, both ships received flying-off platforms above their ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets and embarked a Camel and a 1½ Strutter.107 In the mid-1920s, both ships were converted into aircraft carriers and served as such during the early years of the Second World War. Courageous was sunk on 17 September 1939 by U29 off the Irish coast. Glorious was sunk on 8 June 1940 by the German battlecruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau off Jan Mayen Island, Norway. Furious had a very different career because, after having been converted into a full aircraft carrier, she served successfully as such during the conflict and was scrapped in 1948. In Fisher’s view, apart from their hypothetical participation in the ‘Baltic Project’, the role assigned to the large light cruiser was never more than chasing lighter enemy cruisers. However, the armament and speed of the Courageous class battlecruisers allowed them not only to outrun German capital ships then in service but also enemy torpedo-boat destroyers, including in adverse weather. Bad weather occurs a lot in the North Sea so this was a tactical advantage in any engagement between these battlecruisers and German warships. Although heavily criticised because of their origins, the three units of the Courageous resulted a positive longterm investment for the Royal Navy. They contributed significantly in creating and consolidating technical and doctrinal experiences that would later prove successful for British embarked aviation.108

FISHER’S LAST DREAM In late spring 1915, Fisher conceived his last battlecruiser proposal. He wanted a capital ship that was faster, larger and more heavily armed than any warship previously built. The new vessel, to be named Incomparable, was to be the logical continuation of a trend based on better firepower and speed, while her role was again conceived in the framework of the Baltic Project. To

realise this proposal, Fisher moved along two paths. Firstly, he asked d’Eyncourt what was the longest and widest ship that Cammell Laird could build109 and later he asked the Elswick Ordnance Manufacturing Department if they could design a 20in gun. The basic characteristics of Incomparable were a length of 1,000ft, a top speed of 35 knots and a main battery formed by three 20in twin turrets. The maximum width was to be 104ft, while standard displacement would reach 46,000 tons. Full load displacement would be 51,000 tons, with a corresponding draught of 24ft. This was consistent with the concept for shore-bombardment operations in shallow waters. However, it is not to rule out that information coming from Germany relating to the design and construction of new fast and heavily-armed battleships and battlecruisers influenced Incomparable.

An artist’s impression of the would-be Incomparable (in the background), which was to be equipped with three 20in twin turrets. Incomparable would have been 1,000ft long, dwarfing the mere 527ft of Dreadnought in the foreground. (The London Review)

The proposed 20in guns and the massive machinery required to achieve 35 knots would be the heaviest elements of the design, leaving little margin to improve protection over the previous classes of British battlecruisers. In fact, reaching such high speed would require no less than 180,000shp on four

shafts, including the adoption of Yarrow water-tube boilers and Brown-Curtis geared turbines similar to those fitted on the Courageous class. Layout of the main battery was similar to the Renowns, with two 20in forward superfiring twin turrets and one 20in aft turret. Vertical protection would consist of a narrow 11in belt, running between the barbettes of ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets. The belt was prolonged fore and aft, but its thickness decreased to 3in. Horizontal protection would likely be limited to a 4in main deck, with an upper deck and forecastle of no more than 1in. As suggested by earlier battlecruiser designs, the barbettes would be heavily armoured, with 14in plates. Sketches of Incomparable from the few sources available help to understand her general layout. The hull had an upward forward sheer, a bulbous bow and a rounded stern. As usual, the forecastle deck would end at the rear side of ‘Y’ turret. The superstructures were grouped amidships and included the forward block, with an aft-raked foremast, the single funnel, several deckhouses and the aft-raked mainmast. The secondary battery comprised five 4in triple and four 4in single mounts. Two triple mounts were placed abeam the bridge while the others were located on the centreline, abaft the mainmast. The four 4in single mounts were placed amidships, abaft the funnel. The AA armament included nine 3in/20cwt Mk I single guns; two were placed on the roofs of ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets and on the edges of the forward superstructure block. Eight 21in torpedo tubes would complete the armament. Fire control equipment would include directors for both 20in and 4in guns, with large-base rangefinders fitted in the conning tower, ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets and the forward spotting top. Fisher would likely put pressure on the DNC’s Department and Cammell Laird to complete Incomparable in a relatively short time. However, the installation of huge mountings onboard and the inherent complexity of the whole project would require a considerable amount of time and resources to build the ship. As already mentioned, in mid-May 1915 Fisher threatened to resign because he disagreed with the Dardanelles campaign, but he left open the possibility of remaining First Sea Lord if he had full control of the conduct of the war and naval construction policy. The Cabinet, however, refused to grant Fisher a free hand in the naval war effort and Incomparable remained a sketch.

HOOD, THE ROYAL NAVY’S LAST

BATTLECRUISER The construction of Hood represented the ultimate expression of the Royal Navy battlecruiser.110 The operations carried out by the Grand Fleet in the first months of the First World War in the North Sea and in the South Atlantic had highlighted several qualitative weaknesses that hampered an efficient employment of battleships and battlecruisers. The main problem was wetness caused by a low initial freeboard, a situation aggravated by the fact that ships went to sea more heavily loaded than in peacetime. This extra load included additional provisions, personnel, fuel and ammunition. Therefore, many vessels were operating at heavier weights than originally planned, thus increasing their draught. The net results of these technical deficiencies were reduced speed and difficulty in operating the secondary battery in heavy weather. The requirements thus emerging from these lessons were for a new capital ship design with a shallow draught, a secondary battery placed well above the waterline and a high freeboard.111 The combination of shallow draught and high freeboard would help reduce the hydrostatic pressure on bulkheads after damage and flooding and increase the reserve of buoyancy. Meanwhile, information in early 1915 emerged from Germany regarding the construction of a new class of battlecruisers that were an improvement over the Derfflingers.112 Design, Construction and Cost Hood’s design originated in a written communication sent in October 1915 from the Third Sea Lord, Rear-Admiral Charles Tudor, to the DNC, d’Eyncourt. The positive attitude of the Cabinet and the Treasury towards the release of funds for building new capital ships that were deemed necessary to face the new German threat favoured the development of this new design. According to the Admiralty’s view, the objective was an experimental battleship that would be similar to the Queen Elizabeths in terms of power, armament and armour but with a 50% reduction in draught and improved underwater protection. The DNC tasked constructors Stanley Goodall and Edward Atwood with the design and submitted a first sketch by the end of November. They proposed a ship with an overall length of 760ft and a draught of 23ft, which resulted in a 22% reduction on the Queen Elizabeths. In fact, a reduction in draught had to be compensated by a proportional increase in beam and length to preserve stability and slenderness.

Unfortunately, these dimensions only fitted three docks and a few building slipways in Britain and reduced the competition between shipbuilders. The DNC’s Department proposed variants on the first sketch including reduced length and beam, but pointed out that underwater protection was inadequate. Tests carried out on the Chatham Float revealed the effectiveness of providing bulges for the hull. This solution, however, meant there would need to be an increase in beam.113

A poor quality image of Hood, possibly when she first went to sea in early 1920. The main topgallant mast was removed a few weeks later and not replaced until 1923. (Naval History and Heritage Command, US Navy)

The variants of the battleship design proposed by the DNC’s Department all had a main armament with eight 15in guns and weak protection. Their top speeds ranged from 22 to 27 knots, which was clearly insufficient to deal with the new German battlecruisers. Displacement ranged from 26,250 tons to 31,000 tons. Jellicoe received these sketches and assembled a number of comments from his senior officers. The Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet replied on 16 February with a lengthy memorandum, clearly stating that he did not need any new battleship because ‘…Our superiority is very great and gives no cause for uneasiness in regard to this type of ships…’ Jellicoe took that as an opportunity to affirm his desire to strengthen the battlecruiser force, and asked to build new battlecruisers that could reach 30 knots and had no less than eight 15in guns.114 Beatty supported this opinion because he

sensed that the planned new German ships could defeat his battlecruisers. Given this advice, the Admiralty directed the DNC to modify the design approach and focus on a battlecruiser. In February, the next round of design iteration produced a new series of sketches with displacements spanning 32,500 tons to 39,500 tons. Armament included either 15in or 18in guns, in different layouts of twin turrets. The proposed top speed was 32 knots. The only commonality with earlier classes of battlecruisers was the adoption of twelve 5.5in secondary guns. Most sketches had small water-tube boilers, a decision that significantly helped to save weight. A new iteration provided a final design, dubbed ‘B’, which the Admiralty approved on 7 April with few modifications. Design ‘B’ featured eight 15in guns, a displacement of 36,300 tons and 32 knots speed. In this design, the estimate of weights was as follows: hull, 14,070 tons; armament, 4,800 tons; machinery, 5,200 tons; oil fuel, 1,200 tons; armour, 10,100 tons; general equipment 750 tons and Board Margin, 180 tons. The protection scheme revolved around an 8in belt that was thinner than the Queen Elizabeths but had a peculiar sub-vertical arrangement that would increase its overall effectiveness.115 Conversely, horizontal protection was limited to a maximum of 2.5in on the lower deck. The new battlecruiser was a synthesis of two correlated concepts. Firstly, the ship symbolised the final rejection of the initial battlecruiser concept, as conceived by Fisher, that had materialised in all earlier classes of the type. Concurrently, the ship emerged as the fulfilment of the ‘fusion’ concept that Fisher had already envisaged at the beginning of the British battlecruisers era in an effort to standardise the types of British capital ships. The Admiralty ordered three battlecruisers on 19 April from John Brown, Cammell Laird and Fairfield. Armstrong Whitworth was given the contract for a fourth unit on 13 June and, one month later, the Admiralty assigned them the names Hood, Howe, Rodney and Anson, thus formally establishing the ‘Admiral’ class.116 Some sources claim that work on Hood commenced on 1 June 1916, just one day after Jutland. Although no official records are available, it is likely that early lessons learned from that event obliged the Admiralty to stop further work on the ship and to investigate potential improvements that might be introduced to enhance her protection.117 It is also probable that the construction material already put on the slipway was removed. Thus, a long and complex process of redesign started, involving the DNC’s Department and including advice from the Grand Fleet. It is worth noting that on 18 June,

in the aftermath of Jutland, Beatty created a committee on battlecruiser design that included officers of the British battlecruiser force. This committee concluded that ‘British battle cruisers … are unequal to the duties assigned to them…’ because of ‘…deficiency of protection…’ and urged the Admiralty to discontinue battlecruiser construction in favour of ‘fast battleships’ like the Queen Elizabeths.118 However, it seems that Beatty did not share this opinion. For their part, Atwood and Goodall focused mainly on improving protection, especially on decks, without renouncing speed, and produced two designs in July, which were a ‘Modified Battlecruiser’ and ‘Battleship Design A’. They had identical overall length, beam and armament. Both designs had a nearly equal top speed of 31.5 and 32 knots but ‘Design A’ featured a dramatically improved protection scheme. Displacement for this design was 40,600 tons, with a mean deep draught of 31ft 6in.

Hood in 1921. Her fire-control arrangements, including the director control for both the main and secondary batteries and large-base rangefinders, can be easily identified. (J Roberts Collection)

The Admiralty discussed these two designs and then directed the DNC to consider other variations based on ‘Design A’. Their armament layout

included both twin and triple 15in turrets and resulted in displacements up to 43,100 tons. Such figures would mean an increased draught, something that contradicted the Admiralty’s earlier requirements. Eventually, they decided to use ‘Design A’ and a new design for the ‘Admiral’ class battlecruisers was started on 1 September. On the same date, Hood was officially laid down, although her construction proceeded at a slower pace. More lessons were being learned from Jutland, so the Admiralty and the Grand Fleet thoroughly discussed protection, ammunition outfit and vulnerability issues, often with mutual disagreement. Commencing in autumn 1916, d’Eyncourt and Jellicoe started to exchange views on the design in progress, with the former focused on preserving stability and the latter keen on improving protection. As a result, the DNC’s Department reviewed the design several times and consolidated it on 20 August 1917. The Admiralty gave their approval ten days later. In addition to increased armour, there were also some armament changes and upgrades, but the gun layout with four twin turrets, two fore and aft, remained the same. The increased weight distributed along the hull would subject the vessel to great stress. As such, it was necessary to incorporate additional reinforcements for strengthening purposes. Other important modifications concerned secondary armament and fire control, a new layout for both the bridge and conning tower and the installation of antiflash devices in ammunition hoists and magazines. All this resulted in a legend displacement of 41,200 tons, 31 knots speed and a draught of nearly 29ft. The estimate of weights was as follows: hull, 14,950 tons; armament, 5,255 tons; machinery, 5,300 tons; armour, 13,550 tons; oil, 1,200 tons; general equipment, 800 tons and Board Margin, 145 tons.119 Since length between perpendiculars and beam in both ‘Design B’ – approved in April 1916 – and this final design were identical, at respectively 810ft and 104ft, a comparison of weights percentages shows that lengthy discussions and debates had led to a significant increase in armour (27.8% versus 32.8%). This was compensated by small decreases in hull, armament and machinery. The overall outcome of this long design effort was that the DNC’s Department finally achieved a satisfactory balance between armour, speed and firepower.120 Serious weaknesses remained, however, in the form of a belt thickness not sufficient to withstand new types of 15in calibre shells and the absence of a sufficiently thick armoured deck. However, these deficiencies were not discovered until the Second World War, while vertical protection of Hood’, when completed, was more effective than that of any

ship of both the Great War and the 1920s. Adding 4,000 tons of oil fuel and other loads to the legend displacement, the DNC’s Department estimated a deep displacement of 45,620 tons. Other changes were introduced during Hood’s construction, mostly related to improved protection in several parts of the ship. The block coefficient that resulted was 0.546, which was satisfactory, although the bulges contributed to an increase in the hull beam below the waterline. Hood was finally launched on 22 August 1918. The Admiralty decided to complete her outfitting at Rosyth in order to clear the outfitting pier at John Brown for other, more urgent war construction. The voyage around Scotland proved challenging because of adverse weather, but confirmed Hood’s good seakeeping qualities.

Hood, in a picture taken during her world cruise of November 1923–September 1924. In preparation for this cruise, Hood underwent some preparatory work at Devonport. Note the aircraft platforms on top of ‘B’ and ‘X’ turrets.

The battlecruiser was inclined at Rosyth on 21 February 1920. Her load displacement was 42,670 tons. The estimate of weights was hull, 15,636 tons; armament, 5,302 tons; machinery, 5,969 tons; armour, 13,650 tons; oil, 1,200 tons and equipment, 913 tons.121 The metacentric height at a deep load displacement of 46,680 tons was 4.2ft. Although this figure made Hood a steady gun platform, it was deemed inadequate for such an important

warship. The angle of maximum stability was about 36° at all load conditions, while the angle at which stability vanished varied from 64° at light conditions to 73° at deep load conditions. Hood was fitted with a pair of 270ft-long bilge keels, which were placed in the central section of the hull. In early March 1920, Hood came back to Clydebank, for builder’s speed trials. These took place at Arran and were considered satisfactory.122 In fact, during a fullpower trial carried out on 3 March 1920, Hood developed 151,280shp, achieving 32.07 knots at 42,200 tons. In another test carried out on 23 March at 44,600 tons, Hood developed 150,220shp and achieved a top speed of 31.89 knots. This confirmed the choice made by her designers in terms of hull form and propulsion plant. Hood cost £6,025,000, which was a huge increase over previous battlecruisers and battleships. This was caused by inflation and a remarkable increase in labour and material costs. By comparison, the battleship Ramillies cost £3,295,810. She was equipped with eight 15in guns and was the most expensive warship of her type that included five units that the Royal Navy completed during wartime. Although it became evident that the Kaiserliche Marine could not afford to complete its programmes for new battleships and battlecruisers, it is probable that the Admiralty decided to complete Hood‘s construction anyway in order to partially fill the gaps that would occur in the Royal Navy after the end of war. In fact, they assumed correctly that several capital ships were to be withdrawn from service. The construction of the other battlecruisers – Anson, Howe, and Rodney – was suspended on 9 March 1917 because their shipbuilders had other priorities dictated by wartime developments in construction policy. Beatty criticised this decision because he was concerned about German naval programmes and hoped to strengthen the Grand Fleet’s battlecruiser force.123 The DNC’s Department proposed some modifications, notably moving the funnels closer together to confuse identification by the enemy, reducing the belt’s thickness to 11in, exchanging the position of the magazines and shell rooms, redesigning the bridge structure, installing more spotting tops and modifying the quarterdeck to avoid wetness with following seas. This meant that the three ships, if built, would probably constitute a new class of battlecruiser. Ultimately, the War Cabinet did not authorise the resumption of their construction, so no further progress was achieved. On 27 February 1919 the Admiralty definitively cancelled the remaining ‘Admirals’.124

When Hood was commissioned for her sea trials in January 1920, she became the fastest capital ship in the world and appeared to be a uniquely elegant and powerful warship. However, her reputation as the ‘Mighty Hood’ was largely overstated by the press, who grossly confused her size with fighting power.125 Notwithstanding her weak protection against long-range fire, Hood had several innovative features, such as oil-fired and small watertube boilers coupled with geared turbines, modern fire control devices and advanced W/T equipment. Although some authors have classified Hood as a fast battleship rather than a battlecruiser, in fact she represented the last stage of development in a concept imagined by the Royal Navy a decade earlier. General Features Her combination of fore and aft superfiring twin turrets made Hood easily distinguishable from the Renowns. Other major recognition features were her large conning tower and its prominent rangefinder; the massive fore spotting top and the large searchlight platform on the central part of the shelter deck between the fore and aft funnels. Hood’s hull had a clipper stem, a gentle sheer forward and aft and a rounded stern. These features kept the forecastle deck dry at full speed and in a seaway, although the quarterdeck often became wet. Hull sides had a marked flare that ran for their entire length. A long forecastle ran until ‘X’ turret and supported the shelter deck. Hood’s hull had five decks, including the upper deck. The main deck was the only continuous deck because the machinery spaces interrupted the decks below. Transverse bulkheads divided the hull into twenty-five principal watertight compartments, which were further subdivided both longitudinally and transversally. The double bottom ran for the entire hull length and extended transversally until the bilge. Since Hood’s length/depth ratio was greater than that of the Queen Elizabeths (16.5 versus 11.2), her structure was subject to greater hogging and sagging and, therefore, needed more careful design.126 This meant that Hood’s forecastle and upper decks worked as the upper elements of a huge box girder with outward sloping sides; the lower element of that box was the double bottom. The keel also had a box structure.

Hood Shipyard and construction

John Brown & Co Laid down, 1 September 1916; launched, 22 August 1918; commissioned for trial, 7 January 1920; officially completed 15 May 1920. Displacement, load Legend, 41,200 tons Inclined, 42,670 tons Dimensions Length: 860ft 7in (oa); 810ft 5in (pp) Beam: 103ft 11.5in (moulded); 105ft 2.5in (extreme) Draught (load displacement): 29ft 3in mean Armament Eight 15in 42cal Mk I, twin turrets Twelve 5.5in 50cal Mk I, single mounts Four 4in QF HA Six 21in torpedo tubes (four above water, two submerged) Protection Main belt: 12in amidships, 6in and 5in forward, 6in aft Middle belt: 7in amidships, 5in forward Upper belt: 5in amidships Lower belt: 3in abreast boiler rooms, 0.75in abreast magazines and engine rooms Bulkheads: 5in fore and aft, 4in at aft end of upper belt Decks: forecastle, 2in-1.75in; upper deck, 2in-0.75in; main deck, 3in-1in; lower, 3in-1in Underwater: bulges with sealed steel tubes and 1.75in torpedo bulkheads Barbettes: 10in and 12in outside citadel, 6in and 5in inside citadel Turrets: 15in face, 12in and 11in sides, 11in rear, 5in roof Gun control tower: 11in to 7in walls, 5in roof, 2in floor, from 10in to 2in director hood Communication tube: 3in Torpedo control tower: 3in sides and roof, 2in floor, 4in hood Funnel uptakes: 0.5in Machinery Twenty-four Yarrow small-tube boilers, 210psi Four sets Brown-Curtis geared turbines, four 3-blade propellers and one rudder. Power and speed (legend): 144,000shp, 31 knots Power and speed (trials): 151,280shp at 207rpm, 32.07 knots Fuel: 4,000 tons oil max Radius of action: 6,400nm at 12 knots Complement 1,433 officers and men (when completed)

Hood 1920

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

Hood in June 1924, while entering Vancouver’s harbour. The battlecruiser was by then the flagship of the Special Service Squadron. (Courtesy, City of Vancouver Archives)

The forward superstructure housed several deckhouses, including the

Admiral’s and fore bridges, and helped support the aft-raked forward tripod mast. After preliminary trials, Hood’s bridge was fitted with a window screen, which had a partial roof (open to the rear and around the mast) to improve the view aft and for weather protection. However, some criticism of the protection from the weather for crew on the bridge remained until the mid-1930s. The front portion of this forward superstructure housed an armoured oval-shaped gun control tower. This extended vertically on several decks and deckhouses. From the upper deck to the upper part of the conning tower, there were one W/T office and the auxiliary coding office, the intelligence office, the signal distributing office, one torpedo-control tower, a flag quarter, a 5.5in control tower, the flag’s control tower and a 15in control tower. The revolving hood was placed on top this armoured gun control tower. The service boats were grouped around the funnels and abreast the aft tripod mast. Other deckhouses placed aft on the shelter deck housed the searchlight control position and the torpedo control tower. The table on pages 138-9 summarises Hood’s main characteristics. When completed, Hood had an overall length of 860ft and a maximum beam of about 105ft 6in. Her mean draught varied from 28ft 3in at light condition to 32ft in deep conditions. Depth was 50ft 6in from keel to the forecastle deck. Amidships freeboard was 18ft 4in at 46,680 tons. Such a low freeboard caused wetness problems, especially after, where the quarterdeck was often awash. This situation worsened over time because, during her career, Hood’s displacement steadily increased and her freeboard decreased. Initially, Hood had been designed with four dynamos. The Admiralty decided to increase power generation because new electrical equipment was available and had been embarked on the ship. Thus, Hood had eight dynamos each producing 200kW. There were four dynamos driven by steam reciprocating engines, two driven by steam turbines and two driven by diesel engines. This dissimilarity amongst prime movers was probably because the Admiralty was reluctant to dispose of steam reciprocating engines and introduce generators driven by either steam turbines or diesel engines. The dynamos were housed in the middle and after engine rooms (one each), in ‘Y’ boiler room (two), in two different spaces forward of the boiler rooms (port and starboard) and in two other spaces abaft the engine rooms (port and starboard). Total output was therefore 1,600kW at 220 volts DC. This was a

remarkable improvement over both the Renown and the Courageous classes. This power output supplied a common main ring from which several branches fed a number of switchboards located within each watertight compartment.127 The dynamos could also generate 135 volts AC, which some transformers, located in the aft dynamo rooms, increased to 220 volts AC in order to feed the ship’s fixed submersible bilge pumps. Many small motor generators supplied power to low voltage circuits for gun firing, fire control, searchlights and telephones. Thus, Hood became the first Royal Navy warship equipped with an AC supply, an arrangement that would only be adopted in other British warships after the Second World War. Hood benefitted from progress in W/T equipment and was equipped with a modern communications suite.128 When completed, she had Types 1-16 and 1-18 for long-range communication and Type 1-34 and Type 31 for fire control purposes. Hood initially had three ‘numbered’ W/T offices. The main W/T office comprised two spaces, one located in the searchlight control platform and one on the main deck, close to the aft mast’s basement. The second W/T office was on the lower deck, adjacent to ‘X’ turret. The third W/T office was located on the forecastle deck, below the conning tower. When completed, Hood had a wartime complement of 1,433 officers and men, including the flag officer and his staff. Ordinary peacetime complement fluctuated between about 1,150 and 1,350 people, according to special duties or services. Accommodation was located in accordance to Royal Navy tradition. Thus, flag and senior officers’ accommodation and related spaces were placed on the forecastle deck. The aft section of the upper deck housed officers’ accommodation and working spaces. The central and forward sections were devoted to petty officers and seamen’s messes. Other accommodations for petty officers and seamen were placed on the main deck. Protection Hood’s original design foresaw a protection scheme similar to Tiger’s, but after lessons learned from Jutland, including the loss of the battlecruisers Invincible, Indefatigable and Queen Mary, it was improved. The Admiralty decided that accepting a reduction in top speed and a deeper draught might enhance Hood’s protection. One feature of the original design was a 12° slope of hull sides, which was maintained because a possible alteration would mean a radical change of the whole design. Hood’s vertical protection was mostly made up of KC plates and included

several elements. A 12in main belt ran from Station 71 to Station 352 and extended vertically from 4ft below to 5ft 6in above the waterline. This belt continued forward until Station 47 and aft until Station 371, although its thickness decreased to 6in. A 3in strip of almost equal length was placed below this main belt and extended vertically for 3ft. Another 7in belt ran between ‘A’ and ‘Y’ barbettes, extended vertically 7ft above the first belt, and continued forward with a thickness of 5in. A third 5in belt ran from ‘A’ barbette to abaft the aft mast and extended 9ft above the second belt. There were 4in bulkheads at ‘A’ and ‘Y’ barbettes and 5in bulkheads at the ends of the armoured belts Hood’s horizontal protection increased during her construction and was made up of HT plates. The forecastle deck thickness was 1.5in, with local 2in reinforcements over boiler and engine rooms. The upper deck thickness varied from 1.5in to 2in. The main deck was the principal armoured deck. It had a thickness of 1.5in for most of its length, with 2in and 3in reinforcements above machinery spaces and magazines. It also had a 30° slope at its sides. Outside the citadel, the main deck was 1in forward and 2in aft. In 1919, the main deck’s thickness was increased to 5in over the forward magazines and to 6in over the aft magazines. The lower deck’s thickness varied from 1in forward to 3in aft, the latter over the steering gear compartment. The funnel uptakes had 0.5in of local reinforcements. Hood’s underwater protection was the result of several tests and experiments, conducted by the DNC’s Department using both the Chatham Float and obsolete battleships. The bulge configuration was a marked improvement over earlier systems that had been fitted on the Renown and the Courageous classes. Hood’s bulges were placed entirely below the waterline, extended in length for 562ft and had an amidships maximum width of 11ft. They extended about 7.5ft beyond the sloped hull sides, ran from ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets and were structurally integrated into the hull sides.129 Vertically, the bulges extended mostly below the waterline at legend displacement. From outside, each bulge comprised an outer watertight air space that was separated by a 1.5in HT protective bulkhead from an inner buoyancy space. This protective bulkhead formed a continuation of the top vertical armour. Five rows of sealed steel tubes filled the inner buoyancy space. Their purpose was to absorb underwater explosions and distribute their concussions over a larger area of the protective bulkhead. Another 1.5in HT protective bulkhead bounded the buoyancy space internally. This was also the actual outer plating

for most of the ship and it extended vertically from the hull bottom to the lower deck. The upper part of each bulge placed outside the hull was made of a triangular space filled with crushing tubes and extended vertically from the lower deck to the main deck. The Admiralty estimated that the combination of bulges and internal compartmentalisation would allow Hood to withstand the explosions of four or five 1919-era torpedoes without having a substantial effect on her speed and fighting power. The barbettes had 12in KC, gradually decreased to 5in going down along the mounting sides. Each turret had 15in KC on their faces, 11in on their sides and backs and 5in on the roof. The massive conning tower had KC walls with a thickness varying from 7in to 11in. Its KNC roof was 5in. The conning tower was moulded with the front end of the forward superstructure, the latter being 6in. The forward KNC communication tube was 3in. The torpedo control tower, placed on the shelter deck abaft the after searchlight platform, had 1.5in KC on its sides and 4in on the roof. The aft communication tube was 1.5in HT. Broadly speaking, Hood was a compromise between pre-war and post-war protection concepts because her scheme was conceived in line with pre-war concepts but was partially modified in accordance with early post-Jutland lessons. It is worth noting that post-war protection concepts called, inter alia, for decks fitted with armour rather than with protective plating. The Royal Navy standard evolved during the 1920s in accordance with the ‘all-ornothing’ principle. US Navy battleships also adopted this principle after the First World War and it meant that a capital ship had a heavily-protected central citadel but few protected areas outside the citadel. Theoretically, in the inter-war period, Hood was to be subject to an extensive reconstruction aimed at achieving a degree of overall protection compliant with the ‘all-ornothing’ principle. However, it is not possible to assess either the feasibility or cost of either such a reconstruction or its effectiveness in coping with the German naval threats that materialised in the Second World War and that eventually led to the loss of Hood. Machinery Hood’s machinery had a layout similar to the Courageous class battlecruisers, but with more spaces. The total length of machinery spaces was 294ft, which meant it was 36% of the length between perpendiculars. There were three boiler rooms and three engine rooms, all in a row. Hood

sported twenty-four oil-fired Yarrow small water-tube boilers generating steam at 230lb/sq in. Each boiler room housed eight boilers, six feed water pumps, four oil fuel pumps and six oil fuel heaters.130 Steam was conveyed to the turbines through 19ft diameter pipes that ran along each side of the boiler rooms. These pipes were connected to a single athwartship pipe housed in the forward engine room, from which two additional 19in pipes ran to the middle and after engine rooms. There were four sets of Brown-Curtis turbines, one for the starboard inner shaft in the after engine room, two for the wing shafts in the forward engine room and one for the port inner shaft in the middle engine room. Each LP turbine casing contained reverse stages for astern manoeuvres, while the two complete sets housed in the forward engine room also had cruising stages. Each set was a complete package, including HP and LP turbines, reduction gear, condensers and auxiliary machinery and could be operated independently from each engine room. The ratio between weight and maximum power of Lion, the Renowns and Hood was 154, 113 and 84lb/shp respectively. This confirms the progress made in the span of a few years in warship propulsion plants.131 Hood had four three-blade propellers of 12ft diameter. The ship was steered by a single rudder, which was placed on the centreline. This worked best using ample power and flow from the inner two propellers. Maximum oil stowage was about 3,895 tons. It was mostly stowed in the double bottom. Fuel consumption was about 144 tons per day at full speed. The radius of action varied from 6,400 miles at 12 knots to 8,000 miles at 10 knots. Armament Hood’s main battery derived from various layouts assessed during the early phases of the design process. These layouts included both twin and triple turrets of both 15in and 18in guns. The final choice was for four twin 15in turrets that were arranged in pairs fore and aft. The Vickers 15in 42cal gun was the same model as on the Renowns, but the mountings were the new Mk II, designed and manufactured by Vickers. They were squarer than earlier models and had several improvements, such as a greater elevation (from 20° to 30°, but with loading limited at 20°), improved flash-tightness, a longer rangefinder (30ft instead of 15ft), pneumatic run-out and sighting ports in the forward side that decreased the effect of blast from the superfiring turrets.132 This allowed ‘B’ and ‘X’ turrets to also fire axially. Using maximum gun

elevation angle and four shells, provided a range of 29,850yd. Ammunition outfit was 120 rounds per gun and included 84 APCs and 36 CPCs. The secondary armament included 5.5in BL Mk I guns that had already been installed on the Courageous class. Hood had single CII mountings, provided with 1.5in shields, on the forecastle deck, port and starboard. From fore to aft, one pair was abeam the bridge, two pairs followed abeam the fore funnels, another pair was abeam the aft funnel and the last two pairs were abeam the wardroom. This layout also allowed this secondary battery to operate in adverse weather. However, these open mountings did not completely protect their crews.133 Ammunition outfit was 150 rounds per gun, including thirty-eight CPC, ninety HE and twenty-two HE Night Tracers. Hood’s anti-aircraft armament was a slight improved on previous battlecruiser classes, an indication that, even two years after the end of the First World War, the Admiralty still underestimated air threats. Hood had four 4in 45 calibre QF Mk V guns in Mark III High Angle (HA) single mountings allowing 80° elevation.134 Their maximum ceiling at this elevation was 28,750 feet. All mountings were placed on the shelter deck, two abeam the aft mast and two on the centreline abaft the torpedo control tower. Ammunition outfit was 160 HE and forty incendiary shells per gun.135

Hood moored alongside at Sydney, Australia, in 1924. The ship is swarming with visitors. (Courtesy, State Library of Victoria)

Hood’s torpedo armament changed during her construction and eventually consisted of two submerged and four Mk V above-water fixed 21in torpedo tubes. The submerged torpedo rooms were on the platform deck forward of ‘A’ turret handing room. The designers chose this arrangement because magazines, shell rooms and propulsion shafts took most of the space in the aft section of the lower decks. The four above-water torpedo tubes were on the upper deck, abeam the aft mast. However, this arrangement created concerns because of the danger of torpedo warheads being detonated by enemy fire. Placing armoured protection around and to the front ends of the tubes allegedly rectified this. Hood had fire-control arrangements that were more extensive than those the Renowns, including director control arrangements for both main and secondary battery. A director for the 15in guns, fitted with a 15ft rangefinder, was placed on the forward spotting top’s roof. The gun control tower, equipped with a 30ft rangefinder, housed another 15in director. Each 15in

turret had its own 30ft rangefinder. Both directors acted as primary firecontrol positions for the main battery. ‘B’ turret also acted as secondary firecontrol position for the main battery. The divided main battery’s fire control could be conducted from ‘B’ turret for the forward 15in guns and from ‘X’ turret for the aft 15in guns. Finally, each 15in turret could be controlled separately by its rangefinder and other fire-control devices. Two directors placed on the Admiral’s bridge, port and starboard, controlled the secondary battery. The spotting top had two 9ft rangefinders, port and starboard, for this secondary battery. Each secondary battery’s director acted as the primary control position for the 5.5in guns on each side. The 5.5in guns could also be controlled in groups of forward and after guns. This function was conducted either by the two directors or by some quarter positions placed on both the forecastle and the shelter deck, two of which had 15ft rangefinders. There were two transmitting stations, the forward used for the 15in guns and the after for the 5.5in guns. A torpedo lookout platform was placed below the spotting top. Torpedo launches were controlled from two main torpedo-control positions. The forward position was part of the armoured control tower at the superstructure’s forward end. The other main position was the torpedocontrol tower, which was fitted with a 15ft rangefinder and placed aft on the shelter deck. There were also two 15ft rangefinders for torpedo control, which were placed in the amidships searchlight control platform. When completed, Hood had eight 36in searchlights, which were controlled remotely from nearby positions, and four 24in signalling lamps. Four searchlights were housed in the deckhouse placed between the funnels. Two searchlights were on the deckhouse abaft the aft mast and two on a foremast platform above the compass platform. To concentrate fire on one target from several ships in company, Hood had four range clocks. Two clocks were close to the torpedo lookout platform, on the forward mast; another two were on the sides of the after searchlight platform. After her completion, Hood featured aircraft flying-off ramps and canvas hangars that were placed on ‘B’ and ‘X’ turrets. When not in use, these ramps and hangars were folded up and stowed on the turret roof. The Admiralty decided to replace them in the late 1920s with a catapult installed aft. History and Main Alterations When commissioned, Hood became flagship of the Battle Cruiser Squadron.

She thus carried out several activities aimed at showing the flag. From November 1923 to September 1924, Hood was the flagship of the Special Service Squadron that travelled 40,000 miles around the world. In the following years, Hood was flagship first for the Mediterranean Fleet and later for the Battlecruiser Squadron, Home Fleet. From June-August 1940, she was flagship of Force ‘H’, based in Gibraltar, and later flagship of the Battlecruiser Squadron, Home Fleet. While in this role, on 24 May 1941, Hood was sunk in action against the German battleship Bismarck. During the inter-war period, Hood was subject to several refits and alterations in HM Dockyards Portsmouth and Devonport. These aimed at improving her armour, changing her secondary and AA battery and altering her external profile. A complete reconstruction was planned for 1942 but the outbreak of war impeded it. At 860ft overall, over 105ft wide and with a deep displacement of 46,680 tons, Hood still remains the largest capital ship ever built for the Royal Navy.136 1

A short description of operations is included in this chapter. Chapter 5 provides a detailed account of battles and engagements involving British and German battlecruisers. 2 John Roberts, Battlecruisers (London, 1997); R A Burt, British Battleships of World War One (Barnsley, 2012) and British Battleships 1919-1945 (Barnsley, 2012). 3 This title was changed to Third Sea Lord on 12 June 1912. 4 When the first discussions on a new class of armoured cruisers that would lead to the development of the Invincibles commenced, the Third Sea Lord was Rear-Admiral William May. However, May was not appointed to the Committee on Designs that in January 1905 actually laid the foundations for the new type. In fact, Captain Henry Jackson had already been selected as May’s replacement and thus appointed to the Committee; he was later promoted Rear-Admiral and officially appointed Third Sea Lord on 7 February 1905. 5 These departments of the Admiralty also defined the technical specifications for hull, machinery, armour, armament and all other equipment that were later sent to an HM Dockyard or contracted to a private shipyard after the conclusion of a competition. In this latter case, the Director of Contracts played a key role in drafting all contracts that emerged from the diverse bids. 6 The information were stored in the so-called ‘Iso-K books’ and presented in graphical form. 7 The displacement was later calculated with more precision during the construction of new warships, since each component (structural elements and equipment) was weighed before its installation. During this phase, it was also possible to determine the position of the centre of gravity, because each component had a precise position with respect to both the aft perpendicular and the baseline.

8

The private shipyard or the HM Dockyard carried out a more detailed design, aimed at manufacturing the various pieces that formed the hull structure and its related equipment. 9 The Minotaurs had a belt whose thickness varied from 3in to 6in, while decks were around 2in. Barbettes and gun mounts had 8in armour, which increased to 10in for the conning tower. The three Minotaurs had a full load displacement of 14,600 tons and an overall length of 519ft. They were completed in 1907-8, during the construction of the three Invincibles. 10 Fisher, being very keen to influence designs and possibly supported by Constructor W H Gard, in his turn probably influenced Design ‘A’ through a previous proposal dubbed Uncatchable. Moreover, a report of the Committee on Designs stated that the layout of the 12in turrets in Design ‘A’, with two turrets side-by-side on the forecastle, was intended to meet a suggestion by Admiral A K Wilson, the then-Commander-in-Chief of the Home Fleet. 11 Superfiring turrets were closely-spaced centreline turrets set at different levels so that the upper turret fired over the lower one. 12 The Royal Navy had previously considered superfiring turrets as the US Navy had adopted this configuration in its early dreadnought-type battleship programme. The Royal Navy perhaps thought it could overcome potential problems generated by this approach. 13 In addition to the ‘main’ sketches, the DNC’s Department prepared some variants with different dispositions and number of funnels. 14 Other than engaging a retreating enemy, this layout also allowed pursuing enemies to be distracted while battlecruisers escaped. 15 Corresponding percentages were hull, 35.9%; machinery, 19.7%; armour, 20.1%; armament, 14.1%; coal, 5.8%; equipment, 4.3%; and Board Margin, 0.6%. 16 The source for these costs is Ian Johnston, Clydebank Battlecruisers: Forgotten Photographs from John Brown’s Shipyard (Barnsley, 2011). 17 Design calculations for Invincible had given 3.5ft at 16,020 tons and 5.0ft at 20,420 tons. By September 1917, these figures had decreased due to the increased top weight resulting from modifications. However, the metacentric height was always higher than the Minotaurs’. 18 The speed trials of all British battlecruisers and battleships were conducted off Polperro (on the south-western coast of Cornwall), Skelmorlie (in the Firth of Clyde, Scotland) and Chesil Beach (off Weymouth, Dorset). 19 All battlecruisers of the Royal Navy had one deck fewer than British battleships. 20 These works were carried in 1910 on Indomitable, in 1911 on Inflexible and in 1915 on Invincible. 21 Total capacity of the ship’s boats was 659. 22 This corresponded to about 40% of the hull length. 23 This was the same configuration as Dreadnought and provided a relatively large rudder area; the tactical diameter was much reduced if compared with previous vessels. 24 These were dynamos driven by electric motors and provided low power supply for fire-

control systems, searchlights and telephone circuits. 25 One reported problem was that smoke from Indomitable’s funnels weakened incoming signals, especially at longer wavelengths. 26 However, improvements in living conditions derived from the wider introduction of ventilation, lighting and heating. 27 Invincible had one band on each funnel, Inflexible on the first funnel only and Indomitable on the third funnel only. 28 These schemes, and those appearing on other classes of British battlecruisers and battleships, were experimental and their effectiveness is unknown. The Royal Navy only adopted a standard approach to camouflage in 1917 and results were mixed. 29 Armour consisted of thick cemented plates that were fixed to the hull’s structures by large bolts. Protective plating was made of high-tensile steel that was riveted in place as part of the hull’s structure. 30 Boiler Room 1 (BR 1, the foremost) housed seven boilers in three rows of two, two and three. Boiler Rooms 2, 3 and 4 were wider and each housed eight boilers, in two rows of four. Yarrow boilers were slightly lighter than Babcock boilers. All boilers in BR 4 had their exhaust ducts converging into in the aft funnel. All boilers in BR 3, and some in BR 2, vented into the central funnel. The remaining boilers in BR 2 and all boilers in BR 1 had their exhaust ducts converging into the fore funnel. 31 As the cruising turbines were problematic when operated because of their intermittent use, they were eventually disconnected and not fitted in the following classes of battlecruisers that had direct-drive turbines. 32 Indomitable made a record average speed of 23.5 knots with 43,700shp when she returned from Canada in August 1908. It took three days of steaming between Belle Isle, Newfoundland and Fastnet, Ireland. 33 The electrical system was specifically designed to improve training and elevation, as well as to reduce the overall weight (500 tons). 34 Two large-steam hydraulic pumping engines, with a capacity of 98 cu ft/min each, supplied pressure to a common ring main that fed the hydraulically-operated mountings. The two pumping engines were located in the compartment between BR 3 and 4. 35 The final outfit for Indomitable and Inflexible after the war was seventy-seven APC and thirty-three CPC. 36 The pinnaces could also carry a 3pdr gun, a Maxim machine gun and assorted small arms in their role as guard boats while the mother ship lay at anchor. However, when the war broke out, their use in this role diminished, especially as most battlecruisers, and battleships, landed their boats. 37 Also known as Admiralty Type 9901, the Sopwith Pup was a single-seat fighter widely used by the Royal Naval Air Service. The Sopwith 1½ Strutter was a two-seat light bomber. 38 In this position, the fire control officer (or director officer) fired the guns simultaneously, which helped in spotting the shell splashes and minimised the effects of the roll on the

shells’ dispersion. However, this equipment’s installation was interrupted by the outbreak of war and was only completed after the Battle of the Falkland Islands. 39 By summer 1909, the Royal Navy realised that Germany had laid down or ordered no fewer than nine battleships and battlecruisers, with other capital ships in the pipeline. The accuracy of the information on German battlecruisers is confirmed by the fact that, in his correspondence, Fisher used the same designations as the RMA did: ‘E’ (Blücher), ‘F’ (Von der Tann), ‘G’ (Moltke) and ‘H’ (Goeben). 40 The four battleships of the Orion class were built between November 1909 and May 1912. They had a deep displacement of 25,600 tons and a speed of 21 knots. Their main battery included five twin turrets with 13.5in 45cal guns. 41 In early 1908, Lord Tweedmouth had been criticised for corresponding with Wilhelm II about British naval programmes. 42 Therefore, the global 1909-10 Naval Estimates included two battlecruisers and six battleships. 43 Corresponding percentages were hull, 36.9%; machinery, 19.8%; armour, 23.5%; armament, 12.5%; coal, 3.9 %; general equipment, 3.1% and Board Margin 0.3%. Thus, there was some rebalance among all ship components in comparison with the Invincibles and Indefatigables. 44 These issues were later solved by the introduction of periscope-type gun sights and blast protection. 45 This battlecruiser was the second and last unit of the type built in that Dockyard. 46 This layout had been first introduced in Dreadnought and was not repeated in the following classes of either battleships or battlecruisers. Although impractical, it was introduced again in the design of the most modern battleships. Moreover, whereas hot gases caused serious problems on battleships, conditions were much worse on battlecruisers because they developed a higher power. Thus, it is surprising that the Admiralty did not take into account the early lessons learned from trials and operations of their first generation capital ships. 47 Another very serious risk was the burning of halyards and signal flags. 48 In principle, the stability parameters of the battlecruisers as designed did not differ substantially when the ships were inclined, thus confirming the correctness of calculations and the design maturity reached by the DNC’s Department for this new type of warship. 49 During these trials, both Lion and Princess Royal had a displacement of nearly 26,700 tons. 50 The Lions had thirteen ship’s boats. 51 In 1918, a camouflage scheme for Lion was conceived. Colours considered were white, black, dark and light blue and brown, in a dazzle pattern. This was never applied. 52 There was a slight difference between ‘Y’ barbette and the other three. 53 It is worth noting that the amount of oil fuel on board the Lions was greater than on the Indefatigables, indicating a gradual change in the Admiralty’s attitude towards oil. 54 The optical devices were modified after the outbreak of war; however, they were not

implemented on many British capital ships even as late as the battle of Jutland. 55 There were heavy and light APCs, weighing about 1,400lb and 1,260lb respectively. Each barrel could fire 450 light APC rounds or 220 heavy APCs before needing to be replaced. 56 This methodology was followed in other capital ships armed with 13.5in and 15in guns, but was later modified. 57 The first captain of Queen Mary was Reginald Hall who also introduced a cinematograph, a chapel and a library. In previous British battlecruisers and battleships, only stokers benefitted from wash places. 58 This was invented and patented by Professor Arthur H Pollen, who founded the Argo Company in 1909. 59 After a comparison between the Dreyer Table, two examples of which had been trialled on Lion and Princess Royal, and the Argo Clock, the Admiralty chose the former. Eventually, the Royal Navy purchased few Argo Clocks, and integrated them into improved versions of the Dreyer Table, but forty-five gyro-stabilised rangefinders were installed in the conning towers of several British capital ships. 60 The director was a powerful sighting device that had to be located high on a mast and connected by electric transmission instruments to the training and elevation receivers and then – through the Argo Clock or the Dreyer Table – into the turrets. Using this device, the officer responsible for firing, known as ‘Director’, had all the guns under his control and could fire them all simultaneously if he wished. The turret crews had to keep the elevation and training pointers of their guns aligned with the corresponding indicators worked out by the Director. 61 However, Fisher, who had been made a Lord, maintained a strong influence on Britain’s naval circles. 62 From 1906 to 1914, Germany spent proportionally more than Britain on battlecruiser construction (21% versus 18% of the whole naval construction budget). The same occurred for battleship construction (51% versus 47%), confirming that Churchill’s approach was correct. 63 According to the late German naval historian Siegfried Breyer, a sister ship named Leopard was considered in the 1912–13 Navy Estimate but it was deferred until 1914. However, there is no Admiralty record of such an additional Tiger. 64 The second renewal of the treaty, including an expansion in scope, took place in 1911. 65 The plan was to build the first ship of the class in a British shipyard, achieve expertise and the transfer of technology and then build the following three units in Japanese shipyards. 66 The main difference between Kongo and the Lions was the introduction, in the Japanese battlecruiser, of 14in/45calibre guns instead of 13.5in. 67 Some authors call this turret ‘X’ turret. 68 Some sources claim that the details of Tiger’s design were incorporated by Vickers into Kongo’s design.

69

These ships had a top speed of 32 knots, a heavy torpedo armament and were tactically employed with the capital ships. See Armament section below. 70 Allowing a wider space between ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets, as done for the aft turrets, would have caused an unacceptable increase in the ship’s length and displacement. 71 Corresponding percentages were hull, 33.6%; machinery, 19.8%; armour, 25.9%; armament 12.8%; coal, 3.1%; general equipment, 3.8%; and Board Margin 0.3%. 72 Jon Tetsuro Sumida, In Defence of Naval Supremacy. Finance, Technology and British Naval Policy (Boston, 1989). 73 In 1912, Sir Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt replaced Watts as DNC. 74 Indeed, the German Navy had consolidated the employment of small-tube boilers on its battlecruisers. 75 Brown-Curtis turbines proved more efficient than those of Parsons. 76 Detailed calculations resulted in a further increase in maximum oil stowage, which would be 3,800 tons. In this condition, the total fuel stowage would be 7,140 tons. 77 In short, Tiger was the equivalent of the Iron Dukes, featuring the same unreliable 6in secondary battery. Therefore, the Admiralty reverted to 4in guns for the secondary armament on the ensuing Renown class battlecruisers. 78 The battle of Heligoland Bight is described in detail in Chapter 5. 79 The 1914-15 Navy Estimates amounted to £51,550,000, thus becoming the largest demand for naval expenditure ever presented to the Commons. As usual, they were a compromise between Churchill and David Lloyd George, the Chancellor of Exchequer, and the debate in the Cabinet was heated. 80 In Greek mythology, Rhadamantus was the son of Zeus and Europe. A ship with such a powerful name was to be equipped with three triple 15in turrets. In his correspondence with Churchill, Fisher insisted upon the need to have three 32-knot ‘Rhadamantus’ that could catch the most modern German battlecruisers. 81 The ‘Baltic Project’ obtained support not only from Churchill but also from Lloyd George, who had previously fiercely fought the Admiralty on the 1914-15 Naval Estimates. 82 See Chapter 5. 83 ADM 1/8397/365: Warship Design, 1914-1922. 84 This document also appears in ADM 1/8397/365. Warship Design, 1914-1922. 85 Corresponding percentages were hull, 40.8%; machinery, 21.4%; armour 18.1%; armament 12.6%; oil 3.4%; general equipment 3.4%; and Board Margin 0.05%. 86 Churchill resigned too and Arthur Balfour took his place as First Lord of the Admiralty. 87 All preliminary design activities commenced on 18 December and ended on 26 December 1914. It is difficult to believe that the whole Admiralty had enough time to analyse and debate the various solutions. Rather, it is possible that Fisher and a few of his followers took all relevant decisions that needed endorsement by Churchill and approval by the Cabinet. 88 The two ships had fourteen boats. Repulse, as flagship, had three additional boats, including one 45ft Admiral’s barge.

89

Oil was stowed in the double bottom. After Jutland, Jellicoe asked that protection be improved as far as possible and some additional plates were installed on the decks at Rosyth. This work took two months for each ship. 91 This was a higher working pressure than on previous classes of British battlecruisers. 92 The 15in gun was very accurate and had low barrel wear. It remained in service with the Royal Navy until after the end of World War Two. 93 The armoured control position, with the revolving hood atop the conning tower, had been improved over time, including the addition of a large base rangefinder. Eventually, it became the ‘Gun Control Tower’. This definition was also applied to the Renowns. 94 Although Parliament had given the Cabinet authority for expenditure beyond the traditional Estimates, the Royal Navy requested £275,000,000 in addition to £362,000,000 voted on their behalf in the pre-war 1914-15 Budget. 95 Large Light Cruisers ‘Courageous’ & ‘Glorious’, ‘Furious’. ADM1/8547/430. f.2, The National Archives. 96 Moreover, a wider strategic objective was a quick advance toward Berlin by British and Russian forces that might end the war. 97 The actual designer of the new class seems to have been Stanley Goodall, who was supervised by W J Berry. 98 Fisher probably realised that, under the current circumstances, he could not obtain more than one additional large light cruiser. 99 Champion belonged to the ‘C’ class of light cruisers. She and her sister ship Calliope were modified to adopt machinery with reduction gears. 100 Corresponding percentages were hull, 48.8%; machinery, 13.5%; armour, 16.1%; armament, 13%; oil, 4.3%; general equipment, 3.7%; and Board Margin, 0.6%. 101 However, the turret ring maintained its original diameter so that, if problems were encountered with the new 18in gun, it would possible to install the 15in twin turret. 102 As modified, Furious was inclined on 25 May 1917 and her deep displacement resulted 22,890 tons. She was completed on 26 June. The hull cost for Furious was £1,050,000. 103 Ammunition outfit for the 15in guns was 120 rounds per gun, including seventy-two APC, twenty-four CPC and twenty-four HE. Initial ammunition outfit for the 4in guns was 150 HE rounds per gun, later increased to 250, including sixty-three CP, 150 HE and thirtyseven HE Night Tracer. 104 The 18in was the largest gun ever fitted in a warship with the exception of the 18.1in guns built twenty years later for the Japanese Yamato class battleships. 105 Assuming that Furious maintained her initial configuration as a large light cruiser or battlecruiser with two 18in guns, she would empty her magazines in about two hours. Each APC, CPC or HE shell weighed 3,320lb. 106 Furious had nine 36in searchlights. 107 Since it was decided that both of them would operate within the Grand Fleet, they also received the usual range clocks and deflection scales on the turret sides. 90

108

Furious’s hull-form was excellent and was used later as the starting point for the Royal Navy’s light fleet carriers and for the design of the abortive CVA-01 in the 1960s. 109 It is interesting to remember that Cammell Laird had not built any battlecruisers. The largest, most modern warship built there was the battleship Audacious, which had an overall length of about 600ft. 110 Hood was probably the most famous warship the Royal Navy had until her loss. 111 Additionally, the casemates of secondary guns were not watertight. This caused a risk of flooding in adverse weather and a consequent loss of reserve of buoyancy. 112 The new German battlecruisers were to be equipped with eight 13.8in guns and were designed to achieve a top speed of 30 knots. Their protection would be carefully designed, as was usual on German capital ships. 113 The Chatham Float was a barge based at the HM Dockyard in Chatham. Equipped with energy-absorbing devices, it was used extensively during the First World War in experiments to understand the effects of underwater explosions on large warships. 114 On that occasion, Jellicoe explicitly mentioned the German battlecruisers Lützow, Hindenburg, Victoria Louise, and Freya. He also urged Renown and Repulse into service and demonstrated scant interest in what were still then called the ‘large light cruisers’ of the Courageous class. 115 Tests carried extensively before and during the First World War found that a sloped armour plate would decrease the penetration power of a shell by at least 15% when compared with a vertical armour plate. 116 Samuel Hood, Richard Howe, George Rodney and George Anson had all been famous British admirals in the eighteenth century. 117 Rodney and Howe were laid down, respectively, on 9 and 16 October and Anson followed on 9 November. However, their progress was very slow. 118 Committee on Construction of Battle Cruisers, Memorandum for Beatty, 18 June 1916, ADM 137/2134, The National Archives, Kew Gardens, London. 119 Corresponding percentages were hull, 36.3%; machinery, 12.9%; armour, 32.8%; armament, 12.8%; oil fuel, 2.9%; general equipment, 1.9 %; and Board Margin, 0.3%. 120 The adoption of small water-tube boilers gave a calculated maximum power of 144,000shp and a corresponding top speed of 31 knots. 121 Changes introduced during the construction had absorbed the Board Margin. 122 As the war had ended, there was enough time to conduct Hood’s speed trials in a thorough manner. 123 Beatty had replaced Jellicoe as Commander-in-Chief of the Grand Fleet in November 1916. 124 The Admiralty had already cancelled the contracts in October 1918. The three hulls were later dismantled to clear the slipways after the armistice in November 1918. 125 The Admiralty never made public Hood’s known weaknesses. 126 This ratio, termed L/D, indirectly influences the structural strength as, the higher this ratio, the lower the structural strength. The requirement for higher speeds leads to longer

hulls, which was the case for Hood. On the other hand, the requirement for internal spaces in large ships leads to high values of depth. 127 A significant improvement was the introduction in Hood of the so-called ‘main guard’, a device intended to isolate non-watertight circuits from the common main ring in the event of flooding. 128 W/T equipment greatly improved during the 1920s and 1930s. 129 The bulges provided protection for magazines, boilers and engine rooms. 130 Boilers in Boiler Rooms ‘A’ and ‘B’ exhausted through the fore funnel and Boiler Rooms ‘X’ and ‘Y’ through the aft one. 131 At the time, Hood was a modern warship, equipped with much auxiliary machinery such evaporators to produce fresh water, hydraulic pumping engines for powering the mountings, ventilators and heaters for crew living spaces and several types of fire and bilge pumps. Boiler rooms, engine rooms and auxiliary machinery spaces ran from Station 119 to Station 302 and had a total length of about 470ft. 132 Each turret weighed 900 tons. Improved loading systems increased the rate of fire to one round per 1.5 minutes. 133 Hood was the last of the Royal Navy’s capital ships equipped with an open secondary battery. 134 The 4in 45-calibre Mk V gun entered service in 1914 and became the long-range AA weapon in the majority of British capital ships and cruisers. Its rate of fire was fourteen rounds per minute at 50° elevation. 135 Initially, anti-aircraft guns did not have fire-control devices. In 1926-7, a high-angle 2m rangefinder was installed on the after searchlight platform. 136 The battleships of the King George V class were 745ft long, 103ft wide and had a deep displacement of 42,630 tons. As for size, Hood was also bigger than Vanguard, the Royal Navy’s last and biggest battleship, but was surpassed by the aircraft carriers of the Audacious class, Eagle and Ark Royal, which were laid down during the Second World War, but not completed until the early 1950s.

Chapter Four

THE BATTLECRUISERS OF THE KAISERLICHE MARINE

A

s in Britain, the construction of battlecruisers in Germany followed a pattern of progressive development that was mainly dictated by improvements in machinery and weapons. However, the German Naval Staff was often forced to impose limitations, especially in terms of size, due to the financial constraints affecting the naval programmes. As far as battlecruiser development is concerned, the Kaiserliche Marine followed a different approach from the Royal Navy, because it constantly aimed at what was deemed a sounder balance between armour, armament and speed. The first generation of German battlecruisers includes Von der Tann and the Moltke class (two ships), all equipped with 28cm guns. Seydlitz is widely considered as a battlecruiser of a new generation, even if she was still armed with 28cm guns. A real second generation of German battlecruisers included the Derfflinger class (three ships), equipped with 30.5cm guns. A third generation comprised the Mackensens (four ships planned, but none completed), to be equipped with 35cm guns, and would have been consolidated with the Ersatz Yorcks (three ships planned, but never laid down). Eventually, the last battlecruiser designs sketched in Germany before 1919 envisaged huge 42cm guns, but they never left the drawing boards. Therefore, for the German Navy our description focuses on Von der Tann

and the follow-on classes up to the Ersatz Yorck. A description of the projects that were planned, mostly in the first half of 1918, but never finalised is also included. The table opposite provides an overview of the timetable of German battlecruiser programmes and the ships’ main characteristics.

German Battlecruisers

Hindenburg and the battleship König Albert (above right) at anchor, date unknown. Hindenburg, completed in 1917, was the last battlecruiser to enter service with the German navy before the end of the First World War. (R. Stanglini Collection)

Since German ship designers and builders used the metric system, all the data (dimensions, displacement, the calibre of guns, armour thickness etc) in this chapter have been expressed in metric units. To facilitate the reader’s conversion between metric and imperial, a dedicated table is provided on page 6.

GERMAN DESIGN APPROACH After the approval of the first Naval Law, the RMA became the driving force behind the German fleet’s modernisation and was specifically tailored to perform such a strategic mission. The RMA under Tirpitz was in charge of all the navy’s administrative, technical and training functions and was structured into Departement (departments) and Abteilungen (sections), each dealing with specific issues. The Allgemeines Marinedepartement (A) was in charge of general affairs (such as pensions, justice, sea transportation, supply,

questions concerning ships’ military requirements etc). The Werftdepartement (B) was responsible for overseeing the activity of shipyards and other industries supplying shipboard equipment and fittings, except artillery. The Konstruktionsdepartement (K) was in charge of designing ships and selecting their machinery, as well as of acceptance trials and general construction issues. The Etatabteilung (E) dealt with budgetary and financial issues while the Waffendepartement (W) was in charge of the selection of naval artillery (both for ships and coastal defence), the related installation, operation and maintenance issues and small arms. Other Departement/Abteilungen of the RMA were in charge of nautical, legal and health matters. The Secretary of State for the Navy also controlled the Nachrichtenbüro (Intelligence office) and the Marineattachés (naval attaches) in Vienna, Rome, London, Paris, St Petersburg, Washington, Tokyo and Buenos Aires. Their task was providing information and intelligence about the main foreign navies, whose programmes and evolution could affect German naval policy. The preliminary design of a new warship was assigned within RMA to the Construction department (K), led by a rear-admiral and formed of two main sections, one devoted to shipbuilding (Abteilung für Schiffbauangelegenheiten, KI) and the other to machinery (Abteilung für Maschinenbauangelegenheiten, KII). The department in charge of naval artillery (W) played a key role in the design process, too. Cost analysis and estimates were carried out by the budget section (E).

A sketch of ‘Grosser Kreuzer 11’, part of a series summarising battlecruiser projects

drafted by the Reichsmarineamt (RMA) in 1916. The responsibility for ship design in Germany belonged to the RMA and was discharged through its technical departments. (Courtesy, www.dreadnoughtproject.org)

The engineers, technicians and clerks employed in the RMA were mostly militarised civil servants, although led by senior navy officers. The candidate designers needed to join the Kaiserliche Marine for four years, including serving one year at sea and three years at the Imperial shipyards, and then pass a rigorous examination. After three years of service as an assistant engineer, they had to pass a second test, which included six weeks spent designing a warship. Passing this exam meant employment as a civil servant; after a few years, and only if the candidate was judged experienced and innovative enough, he was asked to join the RMA as a designer. These design teams were large and led by experienced senior engineers. The design process for a new German warship, including battlecruisers, started with a kick-off meeting, chaired by Tirpitz in his capacity as Secretary of State, during which the main parameters of the ship were discussed and agreed. They included the operational use of the vessel (in waters either close to Germany or abroad, in combat or support roles) and her requirements, especially armament, speed and range. The next step was the preparation of a preliminary design, with contributions from the relevant RMA Departments. This preliminary design, eventually approved by the whole RMA, was used for further meetings between the Secretary of State and the Kaiser, who was called on to provide his formal agreement. After the preliminary design was agreed at the highest level, the Reichstag was involved in a discussion that mainly regarded approval of the funding required. The document package examined by the Reichstag would include some small-scale sketches (usually 1:500) and all the vessel’s parameters, namely hull size, guns layout, distribution and strength of protection, propulsion plant (machinery and boilers), capacity of magazines and coal bunkers, crew and storage spaces, performance (speed and range) etc. The preliminary design also included an estimation of the design displacement, which was calculated considering, firstly, hull dimensions and then introducing hull volume, block coefficient and seawater density. After such calculations, each major element of a warship’s design – hull structure, machinery, protection, weapons, outfitting equipment and crew – was specifically addressed. Some of these elements were assigned a percentage of

the estimated light displacement, while other elements could be calculated more accurately. The RMA worked in accordance with a methodology generally also applied by other navies, including iterations that were carried out during the development of the design process. Each major element of a large warship’s design was addressed as below: – Hull structure: All hull structural components were considered, such as frames, girders, stiffeners, plating, longitudinal and transverse bulkheads etc. The total weight of these components was assumed to average 30% of the design displacement of battlecruisers. – Protection: The armour weight was estimated from experience with previous warships. The armour’s percentage of the design displacement was up to 40% for battleships and 30-35% for battlecruisers. – Propulsion system: size and weight of the propulsion system were determined in accordance with the power required to reach maximum speed. After having considered the maximum power from warships already in service, the RMA addressed the composition of machinery (boilers, reciprocating engines or steam turbines, turbo-dynamos, pumps, condensers, distillers etc.) and its layout. Then, the weight of each component, as installed in previous warships or provided by the manufacturers, gave the basis for an approximate calculation of the entire propulsion system’s weight. A more accurate methodology was introduced in 1892, when the RMA started using model towing tanks built, firstly, in Dresden/Ubigau and later in Bremerhaven (1900), Berlin (1903) and Hamburg.1 Machinery weight (including ancillary equipment) for a German battlecruiser was on average 10-15% of design displacement, and even lower for battleships. – Fuel supply: Fuel supply, mostly coal, and size of bunkers were determined in accordance with the warship’s cruising speed, usually set as half the maximum speed. The hourly coal consumption was known from trials with similar warships and was measured by so-called coal test runs at different speeds, including cruising speed. However, the actual dimensions of coal bunkers on German warships were 25-30% larger than those obtained using the calculated hourly coal consumption, since the actual cruising speed that resulted was always greater than the design requirements. – Armament: The armament of new German warships was discussed in the preliminary design’s initial meeting. Thus, the designers could rely in

advance, as a working hypothesis, on estimating the number of guns and their calibre, the ammunition requirements (number of shells per gun) and the intended installation (single or twin turrets, armoured casemates or deck installations etc.). Weapons manufacturers provided, where available, the weight of each component, thus easing the calculation of the armament’s total weight. Usually, this was 10-12% of the design displacement for battleships and battlecruisers. – Outfitting equipment: This element of the design displacement comprised many items (upper deck equipment, boats, masts, anchors, capstans, tools, spare parts etc.) and their calculation was a very arduous task at that time. Therefore, the specific weight of each item was based on existing values from previous warships of similar size and was usually 3-4% of the design displacement. – Complement, effects and provisions: The determination of these parameters was quite easy because the crew size and composition was established at the very beginning of the design process. Furthermore, everything in the Kaiserliche Marine was regulated and the calculation of these weights could be done in a very accurate way. The captain had assigned a baggage of 425kg, each other officer had 230kg and each petty officer and rating had 150kg. In addition, food was calculated according to type and ranks. Usually, German warships had food provisions for two months of operations close to home waters and for six months when deployed overseas. For the calculation of potable water, the assumption was a consumption of seventy litres per man per week. By using this methodology, the calculation of the partial weights was also used to estimate the partial and total costs for building the whole ship. At the end of the design process, the RMA prepared the technical specifications and the 1:100 scale ship plans. All documents related to the construction of the new warship were then handed over either to state-owned or private shipyards, with a request for tenders that was needed to establish some form of competition across all shipyards. (This phase of the procurement process did not include guns and armour, whose production was assigned directly by the RMA to German industry.) The RMA examined the bids from the various companies and, while the contract’s award depended on a variety of factors, the RMA usually awarded the contract to the shipyard that offered the lowest price and the shortest

delivery time. However, the contracts for the first five battlecruisers, from Von der Tann to Derfflinger, all went to one single shipyard, Blohm & Voss in Hamburg. Lützow, in 1912, was the first battlecruiser to be assigned to a different private shipyard and, thereafter, generally speaking, the RMA’s policy was to share the workload among all shipyards,2 as far as possible. In the budget years that included four battle-ships/battlecruisers, three ships went to privately-owned shipyards and one to the State Arsenal of Wilhelmshaven. The numbers of new constructions was, however, always limited, so the RMA could not really exploit the competition between yards, as the initial dominance of Blohm & Voss in battlecruiser building clearly indicates. Another consequence was that, even in the ‘fat’ years, at least three privately-owned shipyards would not get an order and preventing layoffs of trained and skilled workers and updating the shipbuilding infrastructure often presented a problem. The Kaiserliche Marine’s leadership strived to ensure high quality standards, but the German shipbuilding industry never reached the dimensions and efficiency of the then world-leading British shipyards.

Moltke (foreground) and Blücher at Wilhelmshaven. Blücher, sunk at the battle of Dogger Bank in 1915, was laid down in February 1907 as an enlarged and up-gunned version of

the Scharnhorsts, before the German Navy became aware of the Invincibles’ characteristics. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

VON DER TANN At the end of May 1906, Captain Coerper, the German naval attaché in London, informed Berlin that Britain was about to accomplish, with the new battlecruisers of the Invincible class, a leap forward similar to that achieved with the construction of Dreadnought. This news came too late to impact on Blücher’s construction but in time to influence the design of ‘Grosse Kreuzer F’3 (later named Von der Tann), part of the 1907 construction programme. The news from Britain became part of the contemporary debate in Germany about the nature and role of future ships of the line. On the one hand, there were those, such as Tirpitz, who argued for the need to maintain a distinction between battleships and ‘Grosse Kreuzer’, favouring, in the latter, speed and armament at the expense of protection. Conversely, a different school of thought, supported by Wilhelm II, advocated a convergence of the two types towards a ‘fast battleship’, arguing that battlecruisers had to be used not only for scouting, attacking enemy merchant shipping and fighting against similar units but also for fighting in the battle line. These different visions involved the choice of different trade-offs beween armament, speed and armour, choices that, in turn, affected overall displacement and building costs. The latter issue was particularly delicate, since the spending proposals for new constructions submitted by the RMA had to be discussed and approved by the Reichstag. Design, Construction and Cost Design work on Von der Tann4 started in June 1906. By 15 September, the RMA’s Department K (in charge of new construction) had worked out a number of preliminary projects that differed mainly in the layout of the main and secondary armament. Machinery was based on reciprocating engines, while the design speed was twenty-three knots and displacement was limited to 19,000 metric tonnes (t). The estimated costs ranged between RM34.6 million and RM35.4 million. These designs were further developed in the following days until Tirpitz submitted three projects to the Kaiser on 28 September. The least expensive, ‘2b’, was chosen. Despite the urgings of Tirpitz for a quick definition of the project that would allow the ship’s construction to start as soon as possible (Invincible

had been laid down on 2 April 1906 and the German Navy was determined close the gap swiftly), concerns and technical problems caused modifications and delays. The most important was the choice of turbines in place of reciprocating engines for the machinery, changes in armour thickness and layout, the adoption of twin rudders and the choice of the 28cm Drh. L C/07 twin turrets as the main armament. The possibility of installing a pair of superfiring large calibre turrets both forward and aft was discarded to avoid worsening hull stability. Fitting a pair of turrets on each side was also excluded, in order to make room for a more powerful propulsion system capable of ensuring the required speed. According to the original design, two lattice masts with a square base were to be fitted. Doubts about the stability of such structures in the event of shell hits, however, led to the adoption of pole trees.

Von der Tann, laid down in 1908, was the first real German battlecruiser. Her main armament consisted of eight 28cm (11in) guns, compared to the eight 12in guns of the Invincibles, but her protection was much better than that of the first British battlecruisers. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

As a result, design documentation was only completed in June 1907. On 22 June, the Kaiser signed the construction order and the contract was awarded to the Blohm und Voss shipyard in Hamburg. Von der Tann was laid down on 21 March 1908, launched on 20 March 1909 and was ready for acceptance trials on 1 September 1910. On 19 February 1911, the ship entered service with the Kaiserliche Marine. Her cost was RM36.66 million, distributed over four budget years (1907-10) and split as follows: hull and propulsion, RM26 million; armament, RM10 million and torpedo armament, RM0.66 million. Main Features Von der Tann featured a forecastle extending for about one third of the hull’s length, two funnels amidships and two blocks of superstructures, the first between the forward funnel and the forward large calibre turret, the second between the aft funnel and the aft turret. The table on pages 150-1 shows displacement, dimensions and the ship’s main characteristics. They largely exceeded those of Blücher as a consequence of improved armament, protection, and speed. Design displacement was 19,370t. The summary of weights was: hull, 6,004t; protection, 6,201t; armament (including ammunition), 2,096t; machinery, 2,805t and various equipment, 1,220t. Coal stowage represented most of the remaining 1,044t.5 The steel hull was divided longitudinally into fifteen watertight compartments and vertically into six decks. From the bottom, these were known as hold, lower platform deck, intermediate/between deck, armoured deck and battery deck while the forecastle deck was named the upper deck and ran until the first funnel. A centreline passageway in the platform deck ran between the working chambers of ‘A’ and ‘C’ turrets. The boilers were placed in five separate rooms: from fore to aft, there were three boiler rooms, then the magazines for the 28cm and 15cm guns and then two more boiler rooms. Another magazine for the 28cm and 15cm guns separated the rearmost boiler room and the engine rooms. The forward superstructure housed the main control tower, four 8.8cm guns, the chart room, the bridge and the admiral’s bridge. Aft of the deck, the foremast rose up with two

platforms for four 110cm searchlights. The aft superstructure housed the secondary conning tower and four more 8.8cm guns. The main mast also supported two platforms with four 110cm searchlights. Officers’ quarters were placed in the forecastle rather than aft, according to a German Navy tradition that was intended to facilitate quick access to the bridge. However, it did not prove satisfactory and was not adopted in subsequent ships. Von der Tann was equipped with eleven boats, grouped amidships port and starboard of the ‘en echelon’ turrets. Two derricks and davits were available for handling the boats. Frahm anti-rolling tanks, recently developed by Dr Frahm of Blohm und Voss, were installed for the first time on Von der Tann. Since this decision was made after construction had already started, the tanks were placed too far from the ship’s sides, and their volume was too small. As a result, they proved ineffective and were soon converted to coal bunkers. Bilge keels were later fitted to improve stability. Six turbo-generators, with a total output of 1,200kW at 225V, supplied lighting, communication and servo-systems for the large-calibre turrets through the ship’s electrical mains. There were two dynamo rooms, each housing three turbo-generators. As for W/T equipment, according to a directive issued by Tirpitz in 1909, Von der Tann was equipped with two transmitters and three receivers and as many antennas. In 1912, an additional transmitter-receiver was installed in the forward conning tower. Von der Tann’s metacentric height was 2.11m. The angle of maximum stability was 30° and the angle at which stability vanished was 70°. Complement included forty-one officers and 882 men; when Von der Tann served as flagship, there were an additional thirteen officers and sixty-two men. Protection The requirement to be able to fight against battleships resulted in Von der Tann having particularly strong and extensive protection that was much superior to the Invincibles. The main armour belt, consisting of KC steel plates, extended between the barbettes of the forward and the aft towers. It was 250mm thick and 125cm high with 35cm below the waterline. The belt tapered upwards to 150mm at the upper deck and to 160mm at the lower edge, 160cm below the waterline. The ship’s citadel had 170mm-120mm bulkheads at its ends, while the side armour of the battery deck was 150mm, supplemented by a 20mm splinter

bulkhead. Outside the main belt, side armour with a reduced thickness of 100mm extended aft and was closed by a 100mm bulkhead about 12m from the stern. Towards the bow, side armour was 80mm. The forward conning tower was protected by 250mm on the sides and 80mm on the roof while the aft conning tower had 200mm sides and a 50mm roof. The main gun turrets had 230mm faces, 180mm sides and 90mm flat roofs. The thickness of the barbettes ranged between 230mm and 170mm above the main belt but, behind this and the battery side armour, it was drastically reduced to 30mm. This was the main weakness of Von der Tann’s protection, as proved in battle. Horizontal armour was 25mm thick, in correspondence to the middle deck, inside the ship’s citadel, with 50mm side slopes. Outside the main belt, horizontal protection ranged between 50mm and 75mm. Underwater protection was provided by both watertight compartmentalisation and a double bottom extending for 75% of the hull length. A torpedo bulkhead, 30mm thick, ran about 4m inside the main belt for the entire length of the ship’s citadel. The space between the bulkhead and the outer armour was divided in half by another, thinner longitudinal bulkhead; the inner part of this space was filled with coal, so providing additional protection.

According to the original design, Von der Tann was to be fitted with lattice masts. Doubts about the stability of such structures, however, led to the adoption of pole trees. The concern was not entirely unfounded, as proved by the collapse of the foremast of Michigan (BB-27) in January 1918. (Naval History and Heritage Command, US Navy)

Von der Tann had originally been equipped with antitorpedo nets,6 but these did not prove useful and were removed by the end of 1916. Machinery Von der Tann was equipped with eighteen Schulz coal-fired boilers, housed in five rooms. Steam was raised at 16atm (235psi) and sent to two groups of Parsons turbines. There were four shafts, each fitted with a three-blade 3.6m propeller. This machinery layout, innovative for the German Navy because of the turbines and four shafts, proved, however, quite complex. A longitudinal bulkhead split the forward and aft engine rooms into separate compartments, thus improving survivability and the continuity of engine operations in the

event of flooding on either side. The forward port engine room housed a HP ahead turbine that ran the port outer shaft and a MP ahead cruising turbine that powered the port inner shaft. In the forward starboard engine room, the layout was reversed; the HP ahead turbine powered the inner shaft while the MP turbine operated the outer shaft. Each aft engine room housed an HP astern turbine that operated the corresponding shaft (the starboard shaft for the starboard room and the port shaft for the port room) and a LP turbine that housed the ahead and astern wheels in the same casing; each wheel operated an inner shaft. The decision to install turbines came after a careful evaluation of benefits (reduced vibration, wear and lubricant consumption and fewer crew) and disadvantages (reduced efficiency at slow speed,7 possible cavitation when running at high speed, risk of blade deformation and the layout’s greater complexity). However, the decisive issue was the steam turbine’s capability to develop greater power than reciprocating engines, which had reached the limits of their development. Design power was 42,000shp, providing 24.5 knots at 300rpm. This value was greatly exceeded during speed trials, in which Von der Tann achieved 79,007shp at 324rpm and a top speed of 27.4 knots. Design coal stowage was 1,000t, maximum 2,600t; endurance was 2,550 miles at 22.5 knots and 4,400 miles at 14 knots. After the removal of the ineffective roll-damping tanks, an additional 180t of coal could be stowed. At some point after the battle of Jutland, the boilers were equipped with tar oil sprayers, thus obviating the poor quality of the available coal and improving combustion efficiency.8 The twin rudders were operated by steam engines: each engine could drive both rudders, thus providing redundancy. Von der Tann was a seaworthy vessel and had good manoeuvring characteristics, but even she was difficult to steer when running astern. When turning at full rudder, Von der Tann lost about 60% of her speed and had an 8° heel. Armament The main armament consisted of eight 28cm L/45 guns, mounted in four C/07 twin turrets: one forward (‘A’ turret) and one aft (‘C’ turret) on the centreline, and two ‘en echelon’, or winged, amidships, on the starboard (‘B’ turret) and port (‘D’ turret)9 sides. This layout allowed Von der Tann to fire a full broadside of eight guns within a wide arc (about 75°) on both sides. The height of the gun axis was 9.9m above the waterline for the forward turret

and 7.75m for the others. The turrets were electrically-trained while the guns were elevated hydraulically. Each turret weighed about 430t and the working chamber and the lower hoist were part of the revolving structure. The bow and wing turrets had the propellant charge magazines above the shell rooms, while for the aft turret these positions were reversed. The guns could be elevated between -6° and +20°, with a maximum range of 18,900m; this was increased to 20,400m in 1915, after the battle of Dogger Bank. The 28cm guns fired an AP round of 302kg with a muzzle velocity of 850m/s, muzzle energy of 109.1 megajoule (MJ), and capable of penetrating 200mm of steel at a distance of 12,000m. The maximum rate of fire was three rounds per minute, while the weight of the full broadside (eight rounds) was 2,416kg. A total of 660 rounds were stored in four shell rooms (165 rounds per gun mount). The propellant charge consisted of a 26kg fore-charge in a double silk bag and a 79kg main charge in a brass case. Fire control could be carried out from either the primary or secondary stations, located respectively in the fore and aft conning towers, whose upper floors housed the fire-control crew and with Zeiss stereoscopic rangefinders mounted on the roofs. Additional, smaller rangefinders were installed in different places and, after 1914, a crow’s nest fire-control position with its own rangefinder was added on the foremast. The fire-control stations were connected to a central gunnery control room,10 located in a protected space below decks. Here, an officer received target information from the remote stations in the conning towers and issued firing orders via voice, telephone and/or electromechanical repeaters to the gun turrets.

Von der Tann Name Von der Tann (‘Grosse Kreuzer F’) Shipyard and construction Blohm and Voss, Hamburg. Laid down, 21 March 1908; launched, 20 March 1909; ready for trials, 1 September 1910; commissioned, 19 February 1911. Displacement Legend, 19,370t Full load, 21,300t Dimensions

Length: 171.7m (oa), 171.5m (wl) Beam: 26.6m (moulded) Draught (full load): 8.91m fore, 9.17m aft Armament Eight 28cm SK L/45, twin turrets Ten 15cm SK L/45, single mounts, casemated Sixteen 8.8cm SK L/45, either single mounts or casemated (later removed and replaced by two 8.8cm SK L/45 AA, single mounts) Four 45cm torpedo tubes Protection Belt: 250mm max, 100mm-80mm fore and aft Transverse bulkheads: 170mm-120mm Decks: 75mm-25mm Turrets: 230mm face, 180mm sides, 90mm roof Barbettes: 230mm-30mm Casemate: 150mm Forward conning tower: 250mm max Aft conning tower: 200mm max Machinery Eighteen Schulz-Thornycroft boilers, 16atm Four sets Parsons direct-drive turbines, four 3-blade propellers and two parallel rudders Power and speed (legend): 42,000shp at 300rpm, 24.5 knots Power and speed (trials): 79,800shp at 339rpm, 27.75 knots Coal stowage: normal 1,000t, max 2,600t Endurance: 4,400nm at 14 knots Complement 923 officers and men (998 as flagship)

Von der Tann 1911

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

The secondary battery comprised ten 15cm L/45 casemated guns on MPL C/06 single mounts, each weighing 15.8 tons. The height of the guns’ axis was 4.3m above the waterline. Initially, elevation was between -10°/+19°, with a corresponding maximum range of 13,500m. In 1915, after the battle of Dogger Bank, the maximum elevation was increased to 27° and the range extended to 16,800m. The HE round, weighing 45.3kg, was fired at an initial velocity of 835 m/s. The gun’s rate of fire was up to seven rounds per minute and ammunition stowage was 150 rounds per gun. To defend against torpedo boats and destroyers, Von der Tann was initially armed with sixteen 8.8cm L/45 naval guns on MPL C/06 pivot mounts. They were split into four groups of four, respectively mounted in the fore and aft superstructure and in casemates far forward on the forecastle deck and far aft on the main deck. The 8.8cm guns were first reduced to twelve and then all removed in 1916, when two 8.8cm AA guns on MPL C/13 single mounts, allowing a maximum elevation of 70°, were installed on the roof of the aft deckhouse. The maximum range was 10,700m at an elevation of 25°. Each complete round weighed 15kg, of which about 10kg was the HE shell. The rate of fire was up to fifteen rounds per minute and total ammunition stowage was 3,200 rounds (200 per gun). Von der Tann was also fitted with four 45cm underwater torpedo tubes (one forward, one aft and two on the broadside, forward of the barbette of ‘A’ turret), with a stowage of eleven torpedoes. Service History

Immediately after commissioning, Von der Tann sailed on a promotional cruise to South America, visiting Brazil, Paraguay and Argentina. During her return trip, Von der Tann averaged 24 knots from Tenerife to Heligoland and she returned to Kiel on 6 May 1911. In June, she participated to the Spithead naval review, celebrating the coronation of King George V. The operational activity of Von der Tann during the First World War is described in Chapter 5. After Germany’s surrender, she was interned at Scapa Flow on 24 November 1918 and, on 21 June 1919, she was scuttled by her crew. Raised in December 1930, she was scrapped in Rosyth in 1931-4.

Von der Tann was laid down in 1908 as ‘Grosse Kreuzer F’, was launched on 20 March 1909 and joined the fleet in February 1911. She was the only capital ship in the German Navy with officers’ quarters housed in the forecastle. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

THE MOLTKE CLASS In defining the designs of Grosse Kreuzer ‘G’ and ‘H’, included in the 1908 and 1909 building programmes, the RMA avoided the mistake made by

Britain, which failed to introduce in the Indefatigable class significant improvements over the Invincibles. In comparison to Von der Tann, the new German battlecruisers were, in fact, much larger, equipped with a more powerful main battery and better protected. This was possible thanks to the increased budget allocated to battlecruisers, which rose from RM36.7 million in 1907 to RM44.1 million in each of the two following years. Design, Construction and Cost The design process of Grosse Kreuzer ‘G’ started in April 1907. Faced with the alternatives of switching to a larger calibre (30.5cm) main gun, as in the new Helgoland class battleships, or increasing the number of existing 28cm guns, Tirpitz and Department K choose the latter. Given that Britain was building a larger number of battlecruisers than Germany, it was indeed advisable to have a greater number of guns, rather than increase their calibre. Moreover, the RMA considered the 28cm was sufficient even to engage battleships. Initially, the 28cm SK L/45 was selected and a preliminary design – dubbed ‘G2i’ – for a 22,000t battlecruiser equipped with five twin turrets and capable of developing 24 to 24.5 knots, was approved by the Kaiser on 28 May 1907. The project definition continued at a slow pace, due to both the many changes gradually introduced and the work overload affecting Department K. At one point, building Grosse Kreuzer ‘G’ as a repeat of Von der Tann to save time was even considered, postponing the introduction of improvements to the next ship, Grosse Kreuzer ‘H’. This proposal, however, was set aside, and on 15 May 1908 Tirpitz decided that Grosse Kreuzer ‘G’ and ‘H’ had to be identical. On 17 September, the RMA entrusted the construction of ‘G’ to the Blohm & Voss shipyard, which had submitted the lowest bid in anticipation of winning the contracts for both ships. The order for the first battlecruiser was signed on 28 September and, on 8 April 1909, Blohm & Voss also secured the contract for Grosse Kreuzer ‘H’. Moltke11 was laid down on 7 December 1908, launched on 7 April 1910 and declared ready for the acceptance tests on 30 September 1911. She entered service on 31 March 1912. Goeben12 was laid down on 12 August 1909, launched on 28 March 1911, declared ready for acceptance tests on 2 July 1912 and commissioned on 2 August. Moltke cost RM44.08 million, spread over four budget years (1908-11), and distributed as follows: hull and propulsion, RM29.15 million; guns, RM14 million; and torpedo armament,

RM0.93 million. The cost of Goeben was almost identical: RM44.125 million over 1909-12. General Features The main design features of the Moltke class (overall length 186.6m, beam 29.4m, design displacement 22,979t) were largely superior to those of Von der Tann. In particular, the greater size of the hull caused an overall increase of about 3,600t in the design displacement. The table on pages 156-7 shows displacement, dimensions and the ships’ main characteristics. This overall increase was due to several features. 1,000t came from a hull that was finer at the ends and wider amidships. An additional 1,000t were due to a greater freeboard and the installation of an additional 28cm turret and the consequent lengthening of the ship’s citadel caused an increase of 900t. The installation of more powerful machinery resulted in an additional 450t and, finally, larger ammunition stowage accounted for 100t. The hull was divided longitudinally into fifteen watertight compartments and horizontally into six decks. Extensive compartmentalisation and a double bottom extending for 78% of the hull length provided underwater protection. In addition, there were side longitudinal bulkheads that provided further compart-mentalisation in the central and aft sections of the hull. There were two passageways located along the hull sides in the upper, lower platform and hold decks, running from approximately the foremost boiler rooms to ‘C’ turret magazine. Another two middle passageways, only in the upper platform deck, ran along the boiler rooms. The forecastle rose up gently up to 7.6m far forward, while aft it continued up to the superfiring turret. The freeboard was increased by about 1m at the battery deck but reduced at the stern. The stem was nearly straight, instead of the pronounced ram bow fitted on Von der Tann.

Moltke. She was fitted with ten 28cm guns, trainable within a wide arc on both sides. The antitorpedo nets, initially fitted on most capital ships, were removed during the war due to their limited effectiveness and burdensome handling. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

The forward superstructure included the main control tower, two 8.8cm guns, the chart room and the bridge and the flag bridge. The rear part of this superstructure supported the forward funnel, which was higher than the aft funnel because it had a hood. The foremast was just forward of the fore funnel. Two searchlight platforms were fitted on each side of the fore funnel; the air vents for the boilers were located at its base, which also supported two derricks for handling the service boats. The aft superstructure included the secondary conning tower and a lattice frame with two platforms, each supporting two searchlights.13 These were installed aft, rather than on the sides of the aft funnel, to move them away from the flash and blast of the 28cm wing turrets. The aft funnel was not fitted with an outer coating; it was no longer needed since the aft searchlights were moved onto separate platforms. At the base of the aft funnel, there were the air intakes for the ventilation of the lower decks. The barrels of the 28cm guns were 1.4m longer than Von der Tann’s, due to the transition from 45 to 50 calibres. This resulted in a corresponding increase of the traversing radius, thus requiring an adjustment of the funnels’

positioning, with a consequent increase in length of the ship’s citadel. The original design foresaw lattice masts; concerns related to the increased volume of these structures, their stability in case of hits, and potential interference in the operation of the W/T equipment led to the adoption of metal pole masts. After 1914, a fire-control position was added on the foremast. The Moltkes were equipped with bilge keels to improve stability. Six turbo generators supplied 1,500kW at 225V, powering the lighting and communication systems and the training servo-mechanisms of the large calibre turrets. The turbo-generators were housed in four dynamo rooms, two positioned along the centreline and the other port and starboard of the forward engine room, in the upper platform deck. W/T fitting was the same as on Von der Tann. Anti-torpedo nets were originally fitted but they were removed in 1916. The Moltkes’ metacentric height was 3.01m. The angle of maximum stability was 34° and the angle at which stability vanished was 68°. Complement included forty-three officers and 1,010 men; when serving as flagship, there were an additional thirteen officers and sixty-two men. Protection The increase in displacement allowed for a considerable strengthening of the Moltkes’ protection, compared to Von der Tann. However, the weakness represented by the thinner armour of the barbettes behind the main armour belt was not eliminated. The main belt, consisting of KC steel plates, extended over 112m between the barbettes of the forward and the aftermost large calibre turrets. Maximum thickness was 270mm on a height of 175cm, 35cm of which was below the waterline. The belt tapered upwards to 200mm at the battery deck level (or at the upper deck outside the citadel) and to 130mm at the lower edge, 175cm below the waterline. The main belt was closed by 200mm bulkheads fore and aft. Beyond the main belt, side armour extended towards the bow and stern with a reduced thickness of 100mm.

Goeben at La Spezia in early 1914. Since Italy was part of the Triple Alliance, until she declared her neutrality in early August 1914, Goeben was entitled to have access to Italian naval bases. Her main support harbour in the Mediterranean was, however, the Austrian base of Pula on the Adriatic. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

The citadel enclosing the 15cm guns was protected by 150mm side armour between the upper and battery decks and was closed by bulkheads of equal thickness. The side protection of the main conning tower was 350mm, with an 80mm roof. The aft conning tower featured 200mm in side protection and a 50mm roof. The main gun turrets’ armour was unchanged from Von der Tann (230mm front, 180mm sides and 90mm flat roofs). The thickness of the barbettes was 200-230mm above the main belt but it was reduced to 80mm behind the battery side armour and to 30mm behind the main belt. Horizontal protection was 75mm inside the citadel, equally divided among the upper, battery and armoured decks. The thickness of the sloping sides of the armoured deck was 50mm. Outside of the citadel, protection was provided by the armoured deck, with a thickness between 50 and 75mm. A longitudinal torpedo bulkhead ran 3.75m inside the main belt with a thickness of 30mm, increasing to 50mm on the sides of the ammunition magazines.

Machinery Moltke and Goeben were equipped with twenty-four coal-fired SchulzThornycroft boilers. They were housed in groups of three in eight separated rooms amidships. The watertight compartment that housed ‘B’ turret magazine and some auxiliary equipment separated the two forward boiler rooms from the aft boiler rooms. In turn, these were split into six compartments, obtained by dividing two adjacent boiler rooms with two longitudinal bulkheads.

Goeben was commissioned on 2 July 1912 and served in the Mediterranean from October that year. She was transferred to the Turkish navy on 16 August 1914, receiving the name Yavuz Sultan Selim. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

After August 1914, Goeben served mainly in the Black Sea under the Turkish flag. She struck several mines, but survived the war and remained in service in Turkey until 20 December 1950, when she was placed in reserve. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

Steam was raised at 16atm and fed two groups of Parsons turbines, powering as many shafts fitted with three-blade propellers, 3.74m in diameter. The Moltkes, like Von der Tann, featured two side longitudinal bulkheads, which split the engine rooms into port and starboard compartments. The two forward engine rooms housed the HP turbines, which operated the outer shafts. The aft engine rooms housed the MP turbines, which ran the inner shafts. Design power was 52,000shp, providing 25.5 knots at 260rpm. This value was greatly exceeded during speed trials, in which Moltke attained 85,782shp at 332rpm, and a top speed of 28.07 knots. Goeben achieved 85,661shp at 330rpm, and 28 knots. Design coal stowage was 1,000t; the maximum 3,100t and endurance was 4,120 miles at 14 knots. After 1916, the boilers were

equipped with tar oil sprayers, thus obviating the poor quality of available coal; oil capacity was 200t. Moltke and Goeben had two rudders in tandem. Since the rudders were 12m apart, this layout increased manoeuvrability at slow speed and the ship’s survivability. However, this also remarkably increased the ship’s turning diameter at slow speed. When turning at full rudder, speed loss could reach 60%, while heeling could reach 9°. Armament The main armament consisted of ten 28cm L/50 guns in five Drh. LC/08 twin mountings: a bow turret (‘A’), two aft (‘C’ superfiring over ‘D’) and two wing turrets (‘B’ to starboard and ‘E’ to port).14 As in Von der Tann, this layout allowed firing a full broadside of ten guns within a wide arc (about 75°) on both sides. The height of the gun axis was 8.79m above the waterline for the forward turret, 8.43m for the wing turrets and 8.61m and 6.25m for the aft turrets. Each mounting weighed about 445t, and had a crew of seventy. Elevation of the large-calibre guns was -8°/+13.5°, 6.5° less than Von der Tann. Therefore, the maximum range was limited to 18,100m.15 When the maximum elevation was increased to 16° in 1916, range was extended to 19,100m. As Yavuz (ex-Goeben), the maximum elevation was further increased to 22.5°, in order to enable her to deal with the newest Russian battleships, armed with 30.5cm guns, operating in the Black Sea. The guns of Yavuz could then achieve a maximum range of 21,700m. Thanks to the increased length of the barrel when compared with the 28cm L/45, the new gun fired the 302kg AP shell with a muzzle velocity of 880 mps and corresponding muzzle energy of 116.9MJ. Maximum rate of fire was three rounds per minute while the weight of the full broadside (ten rounds) was 3,020kg. Ammunition outfit totalled 810 rounds. The capacity of the magazines was 150 rounds for the wing and aftermost turrets and 180 rounds for the other two turrets.

Moltke Class Names Moltke (‘Grosse Kreuzer G’), Goeben (‘Grosse Kreuzer H’)

Shipyards and construction Moltke: Blohm and Voss, Hamburg Laid down, 7 December 1908; launched, 7 April 1910; ready for trials, 30 September 1911; commissioned, 31 March 1912. Goeben: Blohm and Voss, Hamburg Laid down, 12 August 1909; launched, 28 March 1911; commissioned, 2 July 1912. Displacement Legend, 22,979t Full load, 25,400t Dimensions Length: 186.6m (oa), 186m (wl) Beam: 29.4m (moulded) Draught: 8.77m fore, 9.19m aft Armament Ten 28cm SK L/50, twin turrets Twelve 15cm SK L/45, single mounts, casemated Twelve 8.8cm SK L/45, either single mounts or casemated (later reduced to four AA on single mounts) Four 50cm torpedo tubes Protection Belt: 270mm max, 100mm fore and aft Transverse bulkheads: 200mm Decks: 75mm-50mm Turrets: 230mm face, 180mm sides, 90mm roof Barbettes: 230mm-80mm Casemate: 150mm Forward conning tower: 350mm max Aft conning tower: 200mm max Machinery Twenty-four Schulz-Thornycroft boilers, 16atm Four sets Parsons direct-drive turbines, four 3-blade propellers and two tandem rudders Power and speed (legend): 52,000shp at 260rpm, 25.5 knots Power and speed (trials): Moltke: 85,782shp at 332rpm, 28.07 knots Goeben: 85,661shp at 330rpm, 28 knots Coal stowage: normal 1,000 t, max 3,100t Endurance: 4,120nm at 14 knots Complement 1,053 officers and men (1,128 as flagship)

Moltke 1914

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

The secondary battery consisted of twelve 15cm L/45 guns on MPL C/06 mountings, casemated on both sides of the ship’s citadel. Each gun’s axis was 5m above the waterline. Ammunition outfit was 150 rounds per gun (1,800 in total). Two 15cm guns were removed from Yavuz in May 1915 and used to strengthen the fortress of In Tepe, on the Dardanelles. To defend against torpedo boats and destroyers, the Moltkes were initially armed with twelve 8.8cm L/45 naval guns: four were placed near the bow, two in the fore and four in the aft superstructure, and two on the upper deck, aft of the 15cm battery. These 8.8cm guns were first reduced to eight, removing the bow guns because they were flooded when the ship steamed at full speed; another four guns were removed in 1916. The remaining 8.8cm guns were replaced by four AA guns on MPL C/13 single mounts, which were installed on the aft superstructure. Ammunition outfit for these guns totalled 3,200 rounds (200 per gun). The characteristics of the 15cm and 8.8cm guns and their ammunition are identical to those already discussed in the description of Von der Tann. Moltke and Goeben were also equipped with four 50cm underwater torpedo tubes (one forward, one aft and two on the broadside), with eleven torpedoes carried.

Goeben 1912

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

Service History The operational activity of Moltke and Goeben during the First World War is described in Chapter 5. Moltke In April-May 1912, Moltke paid a visit to the United States along with the light cruisers Stettin and Bremen. In July, she escorted the Kaiser’s yacht during a visit to St. Petersburg. Back in Germany, Moltke became the flagship of 1. Aufklärungsgruppe and served as such until Rear-Admiral Hipper transferred his flag to the new Seydlitz, on 23 June 1914. Moltke was interned at Scapa Flow on 24 November 1918 and scuttled by her crew on 21 June 1919. Raised in June 1927, she was scrapped in Rosyth in 1927-9.

A bow view of Moltke showing the significant breadth of the ship, approx 29.4m. The design speed of the Moltke class (25.5 knots) was significantly exceeded during trials. (www.tsushima.ru)

Goeben In October 1912, after the outbreak of the First Balkan War, Germany decided to send a naval Division to the Mediterranean to exert influence in the area. On 4 November, Goeben, escorted by the light cruiser Breslau, sailed from Kiel to Constantinople, where they arrived on 15 November. At the end of the war in May 1913, the ships were supposed to return to German waters but the reopening of hostilities, in the Second Balkan War, dispelled this notion. On 28 June 1914, the day Archduke Franz Ferdinand was assassinated in Sarajevo, Goeben was cruising in the eastern Mediterranean, from where she immediately sailed for repairs at the Austro-Hungarian naval base of Pola (today, Pula in Croatia). Goeben was formally transferred to Turkey on 16 August 1914 and renamed Yavuz Sultan Selim. However, the German crew continued to man the battlecruiser until November 1918. Yavuz

remained in service under the Turkish flag until 20 December 1950, when she was placed in reserve. Deleted from the navy register in 1954, she was offered to Germany in 1963, with the proposal to turn her into a floating museum. Following the rejection of this idea by the German government, in 1971 Yavuz was sold for dismantling and scrapped in 1973-6.

Goeben, by then renamed Yavuz, en route to Trabzon on the northern coast of Turkey in February 1916. The battlecruiser was transporting soldiers and equipment to reinforce the Turkish army engaged on the Eastern Front against the Russians. A partially-disassembled aircraft, part of the resupply, is secured on the deck beside the superstructure. (Courtesy, Australian War Museum)

SEYDLITZ After the resignation of Chancellor von Bülow in July 1909 and his replacement by von Bethman-Hollweg, the Reichsschatzamt (Ministry of Treasury) tightened control over expenditure. The factor that more than any other influenced the design of Grosse Kreuzer ‘J’ – to become Seydlitz – was, therefore, the need to remain within the RM44.7 million cost limit set by the 1910 construction budget. The inability to get additional funding allocated to the new vessel had two main consequences. On the one hand, it excluded the

possibility of introducing major innovations, such as increasing the calibre of the main guns; on the other hand, it forced the RMA to search for all the possible ways, including exerting pressure on the shipbuilding industry to reduce costs, to create sufficient margins to allow for the introduction of a number of required improvements and modifications. The efforts of Tirpitz and the RMA resulted in the design displacement increasing by 2,000t compared to the Moltke class, as well as improving protection and confirming the main armament of ten 28cm guns. Design, Construction and Cost The design process had started in March 1909 and was completed in January 1910 but was constantly marked by the need to not exceed the spending limit indicated by the budget. During a meeting held on 25 September 1909, the RMA discussed several preliminary drafts. At the end, Tirpitz outlined two possible alternatives. The first was to build ‘tout-court’ a third Moltke, so as to curb spending and accelerate construction. The second was to further elaborate one of the preliminary projects (‘Entwurf II’, featuring the same armament of the Moltke class, and a design displacement of 23,900t), in order to determine possible further improvements without breaking through the planned expenditure ceiling.

Seydlitz, laid down in 1911 and commissioned in 1913, retained the same main armament

of the Moltkes but, thanks to an increase of 2,000 tons in the design displacement, was provided with better protection. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

Seydlitz at sea. The possibility of introducing larger calibre guns was discussed during her design process, but the opportunity was eventually discarded for both cost reasons and Tirpitz’s firm belief that the 28cm calibre was still sufficient to engage enemy capital ships. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

Further discussions followed, during which the possibility of arranging all the main calibre turrets along the centreline, with two superfiring pairs forward and aft (design ‘IVe’), was also considered. On 21 December 1909, Tirpitz finally took a stand in favour of the ‘competing’ project ‘IIc’, an improved version of ‘II’ that allowed, in his opinion, to ‘stay on the safe side’ without anticipating solutions that did not find confirmation in an explicit military requirement. On the other hand, the extension of the decisionmaking process allowed a price reduction to be obtained from both Blohm & Voss (the shipyard tendering for the construction of the vessel and the supply of turbines) and the armour suppliers (Krupp and Dillinger Hütte). These savings, although limited (1% and 3%, respectively), were used for further

improvements. They were incorporated in the final design, dubbed ‘IIe’, whose specifications were defined in a meeting, held little more than two weeks later on 7 January 1910, in order to authorise the start of construction work as quickly as possible. On 27 January, the project won the Kaiser’s approval. During the preparation of the construction documentation, Department A of the RMA suggested substituting the machinery layout adopted so far on battlecruisers – two HP turbines connected to the outer shafts and two LP turbines connected to the inner shafts – with a new configuration. According to the proposal, three shafts were to be fitted, each one driven by an HP and a LP turbine in series. According to Department A, this solution would considerably improve manoeuvrability at low speed, for example during transit along the waterways which, for German warships, represented an obligatory route. Such an advantage would have been even more significant for Seydlitz, when considering the significant length of her hull. According to Department A, the positive opinion expressed by the engine room crews of German battleships (which were already fitted with three shafts) about the simplicity and ease of conduct of this machinery layout was also of relevance. However, Department K expressed its opposition to the change, as the tapered shape of the stern of the battlecruiser would require reconsideration of the arrangement of the rudders; in addition, the three-shaft configuration would complicate the installation of the aft torpedo tube. In the end, Tirpitz intervened. After a meeting held on 18 March, he stated further delays were unacceptable and made clear that the contract had to be signed as soon as possible. The matter settled, on 21 March 1910 Blohm & Voss was awarded the construction order. Seydlitz16 was laid down on 4 February 1911, launched on 30 March 1912 and commissioned on 22 May 1913. Construction cost was RM44.685 million, distributed over four financial years (1910-13) and split as follows: hull and propulsion, RM29.65 million; guns, RM14.115 million; torpedoes, RM0.92 million. Main Features Seydlitz featured an overall length of 200.6m, a beam of 28.5m and a design displacement of 24,988t (28,550t at full load). The increase in the design displacement (about 2,000t over the Moltkes) went largely on increased protection, which, at 9,500t, accounted for 38% of the total displacement. Despite the increase in displacement, an accurate and careful definition of

hull shapes and its appendages allowed Seydlitz to attain a speed close to the Moltkes with a propulsion plant which, although in a new configuration, developed the same power. The table on pages 162-3 details displacement, dimensions and the ship’s main characteristics. The hull was divided horizontally into six decks, longitudinally into seventeen watertight compartments, and showed a marked forecastle, intended to improve seakeeping. The forecastle ended in a straight, almost vertical bow, and extended afterwards up to the foremast. The number and layout of the large-calibre (28cm) turrets remained the same as in the Moltkes. The forward superstructure supported the main conning tower, the foremast and the fore funnel (higher than the aft one due to the addition of a hood). Two platforms, each supporting a searchlight, were fitted on the sides of the funnel; an additional platform, with two searchlights, was located on the front side. The aft funnel rested on the usual polygonal basement, shaped so as to facilitate the training of the wing turrets towards the ship’s opposite side. The same basement also accommodated two derricks for handling the service boats, recovered on the deck amidships. The aft, smaller superstructure included the secondary conning tower, the main mast (with two staggered platforms, each supporting two projectors) and the air intakes for the ventilation of lower decks. Both masts were metal poles. After 1914, a fire-control position was added on the foremast. There were two side passageways in the upper platform, platform and hold deck, running from ‘A’ to ‘D’ magazines. Two other centreline passageways, port and starboard to the centreline, ran between ‘A’ magazine and an aft auxiliary engine room. Six turbo-generators delivered a total output of 1,800kW at 220V; four aft turbo-generators were housed in the upper platform deck, above the HP turbine rooms, while two forward turbo-generators were located in the lower platform deck, above ‘A’ magazine. Anti-torpedo nets were originally fitted, but they were removed in 1916. Seydlitz was a seaworthy vessel, but her manoeuvrability was generally poor. Metacentric height was 3.12m. The angle of maximum stability was 33°, while the angle at which stability vanished was 72°.

Seydlitz in 1913. She twice survived extremely severe battle damage from shell hits that destroyed ‘C’ and ‘D’ turrets, both at Dogger Bank and Jutland. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

When Seydlitz was commissioned, her crew was largely drawn from that of the armoured cruiser Yorck, which has recently been placed in reserve. The complement was forty-three officers and 1,025 men. When Seydlitz served as flagship, this increased by thirteen and sixty-two, respectively. Protection The increase in displacement over the Moltke class resulted in giving Seydlitz the substantial benefit of greater structural strength and protection, although the typical weakness represented by the thinning of the barbettes behind the main armoured belt remained. The side belt, consisting of KC steel plates, extended for about 119m between the barbettes of the forward and aft large calibre turrets. Its maximum thickness reached 300mm on a height of 175cm, 35cm of which was below the waterline. The belt tapered upwards to 230mm at the upper deck, with a further reduction to 200mm at the lower edge of the battery gun ports. Downwards, the belt tapered to 150mm at a depth of 150cm below the waterline. The main belt was closed at its ends by 220-200mm bulkheads. Outside the main belt, side armour extended towards the bow for another 18m with a thickness of 120mm, then decreasing gradually to 20mm to the stem. Aft, the vertical protection was 100mm nearly until the stern, where it was closed by

a 100mm bulkhead. The ship’s citadel featured 150mm vertical armour between the upper edge of the main belt and the upper deck, and was closed by 150mm bulkheads. A splinter bulkhead, 20mm thick, ran behind the 15cm guns casemates. Splinter bulkheads separated the individual guns. The maximum thickness of the fore conning tower was 350mm (80mm on the roof), while the aft conning tower had 200mm sides and a 50mm roof. The main gun turrets had 250mm faces, 200mm sides, 100mm sloping front roofs and 70mm flat roofs. The thickness of the barbettes was 230mm above the main armoured belt; the barbettes of ‘A’ (forward) and ‘C’ (aft superfiring) turrets were, however, reduced to 200mm where these were screened by the fore conning tower and the barbette of ‘D’ turret, respectively. The outer faces of ‘A’ and ‘D’ barbettes were 230mm down to the armoured deck; thickness was then reduced to 30mm behind the main belt. The barbettes of the wing turrets were 100mm behind the battery armour, then reducing to 30mm behind the main belt. Horizontal protection, divided between the main deck and armoured deck, ranged between 30mm and 80mm (50mm on the sloping sides of the armoured deck). Anti-torpedo protection was provided by a double bottom extending for 76% of the hull length. Longitudinal anti-torpedo bulkheads extended between the barbettes of ‘A’ and ‘D’ turrets, with a thickness of 45mm (increasing to 50mm by the magazines) and were closed by 20mm traverses.

Seydlitz Name Seydlitz (‘Grosse Kreuzer J’) Shipyard and construction Blohm & Voss, Hamburg Laid down, 4 February 1911; launched, 30 March 1912; commissioned, 22 May 1913. Displacement Legend, 24,988t Full load, 28.550t Dimensions Length: 200.6m (oa); 200m (wl) Beam: 28.5m (moulded) Draught: (full load): 8.91m fore, 9.17m aft

Armament Ten 28cm SK L/50, twin turrets Twelve 15cm SK L/45, single mounts, casemated Twelve 8.8cm SK L/45, either single mounts or casemated (later reduced to two AA single mounts) Four 50cm torpedo tubes Protection Belt: 300mm max, 120mm-20mm for and 100mm aft Transverse bulkheads: 220mm-200mm Decks: 80mm-30mm Turrets: 250mm face, 200mm side, 100mm roof Barbettes: 250mm-200mm-100mm-30mm Casemate: 150mm Forward conning tower: 350mm max Aft conning tower: 200mm max Machinery Twenty-seven Schulz-Thornycroft boilers, 16atm Four sets Parsons direct-drive turbines, four 3-blade propellers and two tandem rudders Power and speed (legend): 63,000shp, 26.5 knots Power and speed (trials): 89,738shp at 329rpm, 28.13 knots Coal stowage: normal 1,000t, max 3,450t Endurance: 4,200nm at 14 knots Complement 1,068 officers and men; 1,143 as flagship

Seydlitz 1917

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

Machinery Steam was raised at 16atm by twenty-seven Schulz-Thornycroft coal-fired boilers. The boilers were arranged in five compartments: two compartments had no longitudinal bulkheads, while each of the three remaining compartments featured two longitudinal bulkheads. This meant that the boilers were split into eleven compartments. An auxiliary engine rooms divided the three forward boiler compartments from the remaining two. The boilers fed two sets of Parsons turbines, driving four shafts fitted with threebladed propellers, 3.88m in diameter. The forward engine rooms housed the HP turbines, operating the outer shafts. The LP turbines, fed by the steam discharged from the HP turbines, were housed in the aft engine rooms and powered the inner shafts. All engine/turbine rooms had centreline or side longitudinal bulkheads, while an auxiliary engine rooms was located between the rearmost boiler room and the HP turbine rooms. Design power was 63,000shp, for a corresponding design speed of 26.5 knots. This value was greatly exceeded during speed trials, in which Seydlitz achieved 89,738shp at 329rpm and a top speed of 28.13 knots. The designed coal allowance was 1,000t; the maximum 3,540t and endurance was 4,200 miles at 14 knots. At some point after Jutland, Seydlitz was modified to carry 200t of tar oil to be sprayed on the coal in order to improve combustion. Seydlitz was fitted with two rudders in tandem, a solution that improved both turning performance at low speed and the efficiency of the propellers. Manoeuvrability was similar to that of the Moltkes. Armament The main armament consisted of ten 28cm L/50 guns in five Drh. L C/10 twin turrets, arranged as on the Moltke class. The wing turrets could fire within a wide arc on both the near beam (nearly 180°) and the far beam (125°). The heights of the firing axis of the 28cm guns over the design waterline was slightly reduced compared to the Moltke class: 8.1m for the wing turrets and, respectively, 6.07m and 8.43m for the aft turrets. The firing axis of the forward turret was, however, increased from 8.79m to 10.36m as a result of the higher forecastle. Each turret weighed about 457t (mainly as a result of the armour’s increased thickness) and was served by a crew of 70. Initially, the guns’ elevation was -8°/+13.5°, with a corresponding maximum range of 18,100m. After the battle of Dogger Bank, the maximum elevation was increased to 16°, while the minimum was limited to -5.5°. The maximum

range increased to 19,100m. The characteristics of the AP ammunition were the same as for the Moltke class. The total weight of the full broadside was 3,020kg, while total ammunition outfit was 870 rounds. The medium calibre battery consisted of twelve 15cm L/45 guns on MPL C/06 mounts, casemated on both sides of the ship’s citadel. The ammunition outfit was 160 rounds per gun (1,920 in total). The anti-torpedo boat battery was originally composed of twelve 8.8cm SK L/45 guns, ten casemated (four on the bow, two in the forward superstructure and four aft) and two in shields on the aft superstructure. Total ammunition outfit was 3,400 rounds. At the beginning of the First World War, the two guns on the aft superstructure were replaced by two 8.8cm AA guns, in single MPL C/13 mountings with a maximum elevation of 70°. All other 8.8cm guns were removed before the battle of Jutland. Seydlitz was fitted with four underwater 50cm torpedo tubes: there was one torpedo tube forward and one aft, this oriented to the port side. Two torpedo tubes were fitted on the sides, forward of ‘A’ barbette. Total torpedo stowage was eleven weapons. Service History On 23 June 1914, Seydlitz became the flagship of Admiral Hipper’s 1. Aufklärungsgruppe and retained this role until 26 October 1917, when she was replaced by Hindenburg.17 Her operational activity during the war is described in Chapter 5. On 24 November 1918, she was interned at Scapa Flow and, on 21 June 1919, she was scuttled by the crew. The hull was raised in November 1928 and was scrapped in Rosyth in 1930.

THE DERFFLINGER CLASS The three battlecruisers of the Derfflinger class were the last that Germany completed during the First World War and represented a remarkable improvement over Seydlitz. Some authors consider Hindenburg, the last of the construction programme, as a new class. However, since she featured only minor changes when compared to Derfflinger and Lützow, Hindenburg is discussed in this section. The most important change regarded the main armament, comprising four 30.5cm twin turrets, all placed along the centreline according to the layout that was almost concurrently chosen for the battleships of the König class. The increase in displacement benefitted, especially, protection, propulsion and range; there were also significant advances in construction techniques. Among the three planned units, only

Derfflinger, belonging to the 1911 construction programme, was considered part of the build-up of the fleet (‘Vermehrungsbau’). According to the Naval Law, the other two battlecruisers were planned as ‘Ersatzbauten’, i.e. as replacements for two old armoured cruisers (Kaiserin Augusta and Herta) due to retire from service. Design, Construction and Cost The design process of Grosse Kreuzer ‘K’ (named Derfflinger18 at her launch) started in April 1910. Preliminary discussions focused on two issues: the first regarded a machinery arrangement with three shafts (as in German battleships), whose central one had to be driven by a diesel engine. The second issue concerned the main armament and included gun calibre, a possible adoption of triple turrets, and their layout. In February 1910, the RMA had signed an agreement with the MAN company for the development of a 6,000shp, three-cylinder experimental diesel engine, which would serve as a test bed to develop more powerful versions. Being too early to know about the outcome of this initiative, a meeting, held on 11 May 1910 at the RMA, focused on the guns. The head of Department W presented the results of the latest experiments with 28cm, 30.5cm and 32cm guns and affirmed that the 28cm guns were no longer able to engage enemy battleships which now had a 12in main armour belt.19 The adoption of 30.5cm guns was suggested, especially since the installation of four heavier calibre twin turrets would have resulted in only a limited increase in weight over five 28cm turrets; such increase was about 35t, considering also ammunition and strengthening the turrets’ front. However, Tirpitz affirmed that the 28cm calibre was still sufficient because he considered Department K had overestimated actual fighting ranges. According to Tirpitz, only confirmation of the rumours about an improvement in the protection of the Lion class battlecruisers would have justified the adoption of 30.5cm guns on new German battlecruisers. Another firm demand of Tirpitz was for a diesel propulsion system, which he considered an absolute priority because of its expected benefits.20 He was also convinced that diesel engines would have meant a ‘real leap ahead for the German Navy’. Tirpitz trusted the experimentation commenced by MAN and affirmed that, in case of failure, a fall-back plan was also ready: to save cost and time, Grosse Kreuzer ‘K’ would have been a replica of Seydlitz. While waiting for a final decision, Department K worked out some

preliminary designs, with either five 28cm turrets, as in Seydlitz, or four 30.5cm turrets placed both ‘en echelon’ and on the centreline. During a meeting held on 1 September, the Machinery Section of Department K declared that a diesel propulsion system was not viable and the new battlecruiser needed a steam plant with boilers and turbines. In that meeting, the RMA also chose the 30.5cm SK L/50 gun for main armament, even though Tirpitz maintained some reservations about a centreline layout. Before giving his final approval, he wanted confirmation that both forward and aft superfiring turrets had no limitations on their arcs of fire. Four days before a meeting with the Kaiser, planned for 26 September, Department K presented three preliminary designs, named ‘1’ to ‘3’21 and all armed with eight 30.5cm guns. Propulsion power, maximum speed, armour thickness and layout were very similar to Seydlitz, while the increase in the displacement ranged between 300 and 900t. The assessment and the analysis of these designs produced a new iteration, design ‘4’, which had four 30.5cm guns placed on the centreline, a change in the layout of the 15cm turrets and in the freeboard, a 5m lengthening of the hull, and an increase in the displacement of 1,000t over Seydlitz. The Kaiser approved this preliminarily design on 26 September, thus confirming a centreline layout for the main guns. During the following months, Department K worked out two improved versions, dubbed designs ‘4b’ and ‘5’, which were submitted to Tirpitz on 18 March 1911. The displacement increased by 400t because of the adoption of the new MPL C/06 mountings for 15cm guns and a 3m lengthening at the fore. In particular, design 5 devised a more effective layout of the armour, made possible by reducing the height of the 15cm gun axis; other features were a 0.7m increase in freeboard at the stern, more space dedicated to coal bunkers and an overall structural strengthening provided by more frames. The estimated construction cost was close to RM50 million, compared to the budgeted cost of RM45.6 million.

Lützow was the shortest-lived German battlecruiser: commissioned on 8 August 1915, she was torpedoed and sunk in the North Sea on 1 June 1916 by the German destroyer G-38, after the battle of Jutland, in order to prevent larger losses among the crew. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

Further discussions concerned the convenience of replacing some of the twenty-two coal-fired boilers with oil-fired ones and of installing Frahm stabilisation tanks. This latter concept had initially been put aside because of its cost and poor efficacy, as demonstrated by Von der Tann’s South American cruise. Until mid-June 1911, Department K worked on design ‘5d’, an improved version of ‘5’, which was approved by the Kaiser on 24 June. This design was the final iteration; however, the Frahm tanks were abandoned and the space used to install two more 15cm guns. Eventually, Derfflinger was the only battlecruiser of her class fitted with the Frahm tanks and a secondary battery of twelve 15cm guns; Lützow and Hindenburg had fourteen guns and bilge keels instead of anti-rolling tanks. The contract for the construction of Derfflinger was awarded to the Hamburg-based Blohm & Voss shipyard and the ship was laid down on 30 March 1912. In early March 1911, Department K proposed using the final design of Derfflinger for Kaiserin Augusta’s replacement (known as Ersatz Kaiserin Augusta), named Lützow22 at her launch. This proposal was aimed at avoiding both a cost increase and additional work for the Department, which was also involved at that time in designing the Bayern class battleships. A significant change concerned the choice of the shipyard: the contract for

Lützow was awarded to the Danzig-based shipyard Schichau,23 thus ending the practice that had assigned all previous German battlecruisers to Blohm & Voss. Because the RMA confirmed that Derfflinger’s plans could be used to build Lützow, she was laid down on 15 May 1912, only six weeks after Derfflinger and the beginning of the fiscal year 1912. This also allowed met the Kaiser’s request to cut the time spent on decisionmaking and the processing of administrative issues.

Derfflinger’s 30.5cm bow turrets photographed from the bridge. Part of the 3m Carl Zeiss rangefinder installed on top of the forward conning tower is also visible (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano).

Derfflinger Class Names Derfflinger (‘Grosse Kreuzer K’), Lützow (Ersatz Kaiserin Augusta), Hindenburg (Ersatz Herta) Shipyards and construction Derfflinger: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg Laid down, 30 March 1912; launched, 12 July 1913; ready for trials, 1 September 1914; commissioned, 16 November 1914 Lützow: Schichau, Danzig Laid down: 15 May 1912; launched, 29 November 1913; ready for trials; 8 August 1915, commissioned, March 1916 Hindenburg: Imperial Dockyard, Wilhelmshaven Laid down, 1 October 1913; launched, 1 August 1915, delivered, 10 May 1917, commissioned, 25 October 1917. Displacement Derfflinger: legend, 26,600t; full load, 31,200t Lützow: legend, 26,741t; full load, 31,200t Hindenburg: legend, 26,947t; full load, 31,500t Dimensions Derfflinger and Lützow: Length: 210.4m (oa); 210m (wl) Beam: 29m (moulded) Draught (full load displacement): 9.20m fore, 9.56m aft Hindenburg: Length: 212.8m (oa); 212.5m (wl) Beam: 29m (moulded) Draught (full load displacement): 9.29m fore, 9.57m aft Armament Eight 30.5cm SK L/50, twin turrets Derfflinger: Twelve (Lützow and Hindenburg, fourteen) 15cm SK L/45, single mounts, casemated Eight or twelve 8.8cm SK L/45 AA guns; four casemated in the forward superstructure (only in Derfflinger) and eight on single mounts. These were later replaced by two or four 8.8cmm SK L/45 AA guns on MP LC/13 single mounts Four 50cm torpedo tubes (60cm in Lützow and Hindenburg) Protection

Belt: 300mm max, 120mm-100mm fore and aft Citadel: 150mm Transverse bulkheads: 250mm-200mm Decks: 80mm-20mm Turrets: 270mm face, 220mm side, 110mm-80mm roof (150-80mm in Hindenburg) Barbettes: 260mm-30mm Forward conning tower: 350mm max Aft conning tower: 200mm max Anti-torpedo bulkhead: 45mm Machinery Fourteen Schulz-Thornycroft coal-fired and four oil-fired boilers, 16-18atm Four sets of Parsons direct-drive turbines, four 3-blade propellers and two tandem rudders Power and speed (legend): Derfflinger and Lützow, 63,000shp at 280rpm, 26.5 knots. Hindenburg, 72,000shp at 290rpm, 27 knots Power and speed (trials): Derfflinger, 76,600shp at 271rpm, 25.8 knots; Lützow, 80,988shp at 277rpm, 26.4 knots; Hindenburg, 95,777shp at 290rpm, 26.6 knots Fuel: normal, 750t coal, 250t oil Fuel: max, Derfflinger 3,500t coal and 1,000t oil; Lützow 3,700t coal and 1,000t oil; Hindenburg 3,700t coal and 1,200t oil Endurance: Derfflinger and Lützow 5,600 nm at 14 knots; Hindenburg 6,100nm at 14 knots. Complement 1,112 officers and men (1,188 as flagship)

Lützow 1915

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

In early December 1911, Department K asked to be informed whether changes had to be introduced in Derfflinger’s design for the construction of Erstaz Herta, included in the 1913 programme. Department W confirmed the adoption of 30.5cm guns as the main armament, but asked for the top speed to be increased to 28 knots and eighteen 15cm guns installed. The first requirement implied enlarging the spaces devoted to the machinery and a consequent increase in the displacement. Therefore, Department K opposed the request, because of both the unavoidable cost increase and the expectation of potential developments in diesel engines. Department W also asked that the armoured deck and the anti-torpedo bulkhead be strengthened and six torpedo tubes be installed, including two additional aft side mounts; however, these requests were also rejected. During a meeting held on 31 May, the RMA discussed the installation of two aft torpedo tubes angled at 20° as a replacement for the single tube in Derfflinger’s design, but a decision was postponed pending further evaluations. At that meeting, Tirpitz was eager to ‘avoid at all costs’ the definition of a new design for Ersatz Herta. Such a strong statement also helped ensure that demands for an increase in speed (which would require changes to the hull form) and in the number of 15cm guns (which would require an enlargement of the citadel) were dropped. The RMA decided instead to install eight 8.8cm AA guns, all in MPL C/13 mounts, and to strengthen (from 100mm to 120mm) the forward vertical protection. The weight savings obtained by avoiding an increase in protection benefitted the main calibre guns, which used the new Drh. LC/13 mounting. This increased the combined weight of the four turrets by 115t. To save weight, Department K also suggested using a pole mast rather than a tripod, but the proposal was rejected. The final design was defined in accordance with a document drafted by Department K on 7 September and approved by the Kaiser on 30 September. In the following months, the design underwent some changes, including the enlargement of the central deckhouse to create additional crew quarters and a 2.5m lengthening of the aft section in order to obtain a slender hull and avoid a reduction sin peed due to the increase, albeit limited, in the displacement. The construction of Ersatz Herta (named Hindenburg at her launch) was assigned to the Imperial Dockyard of Wilhelmshaven, where the ship was laid down on 1 October 1913. The table on pages 166-7 lists the dates of launch and delivery of each battlecruiser, as well as the main characteristics

of each ship of the class. The construction costs of the Derfflingers widely exceeded the budget estimates of RM45.6 million to 47.1 million for each vessel. The actual costs were RM56 million for Derfflinger, RM58 million for Lützow and RM59 million for Hindenburg.

Derfflinger 1916

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

General Features Derfflinger featured an overall length of 210.4m, a beam of 29m and a design displacement of 26,600t (1,600t more than Seydlitz), due largely to the increase in her size. Despite the increase in the displacement and the adoption of a propulsion system providing the same design power (63,000shp) as Seyditz, the design speed – 26.5 knots – was also the same as Seydlitz, meaning that Derfflinger’s hull form was more efficient. The summary of weights was as follows: hull, 30.7%; armour, 37%; machinery, 11%; armament, 10.3%; general equipment, 5.1%; coal, water and design margin, 5.9%.24 The steel hull was divided longitudinally into sixteen watertight compartments (seventeen in Lützow and Hindenburg),

horizontally into six decks and featured a double bottom that ran along 65% of the hull length. The first time in a German battlecruiser, the hull had a flush deck and featured a marked forecastle, intended to improve seakeeping. Forward freeboard was 7.7m, while aft freeboard was increased to 4.7m. As for construction techniques, an important innovation was the adoption of longitudinal frames spaced 64cm apart; it was 120cm in the previous battlecruisers. This solution strengthened the whole ship’s structure with a limited increase in the light displacement. Conversely, Derfflinger featured a single centreline longitudinal bulkhead, instead of the two side bulkheads installed on previous battlecruisers. The decrease of both longitudinal bending and torsion strengths caused by this configuration was partly compensated by the increase of the freeboard. There were passageways located as in Seydlitz, those along the centreline connecting the damage control centre to the ‘D’ turret magazine. In Derfflinger, the main guns were all placed, for the first time in a German battlecruiser, along the centreline, with two forward and aft superfiring mountings. This layout had significant advantages, including a notable increase of the arcs of fire, 300° for the forward turrets and 308° for the aft turrets. In addition, it was possible to use four guns when firing ahead, and this meant a target could be engaged continuously even if it moved to port or starboard. The two aft turrets were widely spaced apart (about 26m between their training axes) because the aft engine rooms were located between their barbettes. This layout, and the placement of the forward engine rooms on either side of ‘C’ barbette, allowed a length saving of an entire compartment. On previous battlecruisers, which had wing turrets placed en echelon, such layout was not feasible because an excessive separation between the aft turrets would have resulted in insufficient space amidships. In addition, the foremost and aftermost main turrets (‘A’ and ‘D’) were far from the hull’s extreme ends, thus reducing the longitudinal bending moment. A further advantage of this layout was that these turrets were positioned in a beamier section of the hull, thus increasing the effectiveness of the anti-torpedo protection for their magazines. The removal of the echeloned turrets improved the utilisation of space amidships, simplifying the positioning of boiler rooms, funnels, superstructures, crew spaces and service boats. Both Derfflinger and Lützow were initially fitted with pole masts, while

Hindenburg had a tripod mast with a massive spotting top. In Derfflinger, the forward pole mast was replaced by a massive tripod during repairs carried out after Jutland. The slightly inclined pole masts, the different height of the funnels and twelve 15cm guns (instead of fourteen in Lützow and Hindenburg) made Derfflinger easily distinguishable from the other ships of her class. The main ring worked at 220V; two turbo-generators and two diesel generators provided 1,660kW of electrical power. The turbo-generators were housed in a dynamo room located in the upper platform deck, above the High Pressure (HP) turbine rooms. The diesel generators were located in the hold, below ‘A’ magazine.25 Anti-torpedo nets were installed along the hull sides, but all devices were removed in 1916. Seakeeping was very good, with a gentle motion; all three ships were, however, slow in responding to the helm. When turning with hard rudder, the loss of speed reached 65%, with 11° heel. The metacentric height was 2.60m. The angle of maximum stability was 34°, while the angle at which stability vanished was 74°. Complement included forty-four officers and 1,068 men (1,138 in Hindenburg). When serving as flagship, they increased by fourteen and sixty-two, respectively.

Derfflinger was initially fitted with a pole foremast, which was replaced by a broad-based tripod during repairs following the battle of Jutland. The battlecruiser was also the only of one her class fitted with Frahm anti-roll tanks in the central superstructure. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

Hindenburg 1917

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

Derfflinger was the first German battlecruiser equipped with 30.5cm guns, all placed along the centreline. Her launch was delayed by one month when the hull became stuck on the

slipway in June 1913. The ship’s commissioning was also delayed until mid-November 1914, due to turbine damage suffered during speed trials. (Fondo Occhini, Bergamo)

Protection In Derfflinger, the increase in displacement was largely due to an increase in size. However, protection was also improved, thus confirming the choices already made for Seydlitz. The main belt was made of KC steel plates and ran for 122m between the barbettes of ‘A’ and ‘D’ turrets. Its maximum thickness was 300mm across 175cm of height, of which 35cm was below the design waterline. Outside this height, the thickness tapered above to 230mm (220mm in Hindenburg) at the upper deck and below to 150mm at the lower edge, 170cm below the waterline. The main belt ended with two 250mm-200mm armoured bulkheads. The belt extended until 5m of the stern (7.5m in Hindenburg), its thickness reduced to 100mm, and was closed with another 100mm bulkhead. The belt also extended forward, with a thickness varying from 30mm to 120mm to the stem (in Hindenburg the thickness was 120mm until 16.5m from the stem, and then dropped to 30mm). The citadel had a vertical protection of 150mm; a 20mm anti-splinter bulkhead ran behind the 15cm gun casemates and each mount had a 70mm shield. The forward conning tower had a thickness of 350mm but was limited to a narrow front face, with 300mm on the sides, 125mm on the roof and 200mm at the base. The aft conning tower had 200mm on the sides and 50mm in the roof. The main calibre turrets had a 270mm face, 220m sides and an 110mm80mm roof (150mm-80mm in Hindenburg); a splinter bulkhead ran longitudinally inside each turret, thus separating the two guns. The barbettes were 260mm above the main deck but they reduced to 100m in ‘B’ and ‘C’ turrets in correspondence with the citadel. ‘D’ barbette was 230mm up to the main deck. In all turrets, the barbettes were 60mm in correspondence with the main armoured belt; below the armoured deck, the barbettes further decreased to 30mm. Only the front of ‘A’ barbette had 200mm down to the armoured deck, and then decreased to 30mm. The horizontal protection was split into two decks. The armoured deck was 30mm amidships, 25mm until the forward bulkhead and 80mm until the aft bulkhead. The upper bridge was 50mm, in correspondence with the roof of the casemated 15cm guns, and then decreased to 20-30mm. The torpedo protection was provided by longitudinal bulkheads that ran between the

barbettes of ‘A’ and ‘D’ turrets; these 45mm longitudinal bulkheads were closed by 30mm transverse bulkheads. Machinery Steam was raised by eighteen Schulz-Thornycroft boilers: fourteen doubleended and coal-fired and four double-ended and oil-fired. The boilers were arranged in twelve separate compartments, six of them on each side of a central longitudinal bulkhead. Boiler layout differed slightly in the three ships. Each of the four forward compartments in Derfflinger and Lützow had one oil-fired boiler; then, each of the following six compartments had two coal-fired boilers while each of the rearmost compartments had one coal-fired boiler. The oil-fired boilers in Hindenburg were not installed in adjacent rooms; instead, the second pair was placed between the second and the third group of coal-fired boilers. Steam was raised at 16atm and fed two pairs of Parsons turbines, which drove four shafts with three-blade propellers. In Derfflinger and Lützow, the propellers had a diameter of 3.9m, while Hindenburg’s were 4m. All three ships had two rudders in tandem, whose shafts were 15m apart.

Hindenburg during speed trials. She developed a maximum power of 95,777shp at 290rpm, achieving a top speed of 26.6 knots in shallow water, equivalent to 28.5 knots in deep

water. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

The two forward engine rooms were located either side of ‘C’ turret and housed the HP turbines, which drove the outer shafts. The aft engine rooms were located between ‘C’ and ‘D’ turrets, had a central longitudinal bulkhead, and housed the LP turbines, which drove the inner shafts. Design power was 63,000shp at 280rpm for Derfflinger and Lützow, with a corresponding speed of 26.5 knots; in Hindenburg these figures were 72,000shp at 290rpm and 27 knots. These figures were greatly exceeded during speed trials, which took place in the Little Belt because the usual deep water mile at Neukrug, in the Baltic, was considered unsafe during wartime. During these trials, Derfflinger reached 76,600shp at 271rpm, achieving 25.8 knots (equivalent to 28 knots at legend draught in deep water), while Lützow reached 80,988shp at 277rpm, achieving 26.4 knots (equivalent to 28.3 knots in deep water). Hindenburg reached 95,777shp at 290rpm, achieving 26.6 knots (equivalent to 28.5 knots in deep water). All three battlecruisers had a designed provision of 750t of coal and 250t of oil. Maximum stowage for coal and oil was, respectively, as follows: Derfflinger, 3,500t coal and 1,000t oil; Lützow, 3,700t and 1,000t; Hindenburg, 3,700t and 1,250t. The radius of action was 5,600 miles at 14 knots for Derfflinger and Lützow, 6,100 miles for Hindenburg. Armament The main armament comprised eight 30.5cm L/50 guns in four twin Drh. LC/1912 turrets, placed on the centreline, two forward (with ‘B’ turret superfiring) and two aft. Hindenburg had LC/1913 turrets, slightly heavier and with a safer and more reliable ammunition feeding system because the shell hoist was not interrupted at the working chamber level. The turrets’ shape was slightly modified because they were fitted with the new 8m Zeiss rangefinders (the other two ships had 3m ones). The gun axis heights on the waterline were as follows: ‘A’ turret, 8.20m; ‘B’ turret, 10.85m; ‘C’ turret, 9.25m; ‘D’ turret, 6.10m. Each turret weighed 545t and had a crew of 70-80. All turrets were fitted with electrical servomechanisms for training, while elevation was provided by hydraulic devices. Elevation was initially -8° to +13.5°, with a maximum range of 16,200m. After the battle of Dogger Bank, the elevation was changed to -6.5°/+16°, with a corresponding maximum range of 20,400m.

Ammunition stowage included AP and HE rounds, weighing respectively 405.5kg and 405.9kg: the explosive charge weighed 27kg. The bursting charge was made up of a 91kg cased main charge and a two-silk bag 34.5kg fore charge. Muzzle velocity was 855 mps, with a corresponding energy of 148.4MJ. The rate of fire was two-three rounds per minute. An AP eight-shell broadside weighed 3,244 kg. Ammunition outfit was ninety rounds per gun (sixty-five AP and twenty-five HE), totalling 720 rounds. In Derfflinger and Lützow, the shell rooms of ‘A’, ‘B’ and ‘C’ turrets were located above the magazines, while for ‘D’ turret this layout was inverted. In Hindenburg, all turrets had shell rooms above and magazines below. The legend secondary battery included fourteen 15cm L/45 guns, with MPL C/06.II mountings; the guns were casemated in the superstructure block and had a -10°/+19° elevation. Derfflinger only had twelve guns because a pair was removed to install the Frahm anti-rolling tanks. Hindenburg had MPL C/13 mountings, with -8.5°/+19° elevation. The maximum range was 13,500m. Ammunition outfit was 160 rounds per gun. The initial design foresaw an anti-torpedo boat armament including twelve 8.8cm SK L/45 guns; eight guns would be fitted with MPL C/06 single shielded mountings while, in Derfflinger, only four were installed, in the forward superstructure. Ammunition outfit was 3,400 rounds. In 1916, on Derfflinger and Lützow, the number of 8.8cm guns was reduced to eight, all on MPL C/13 AA mountings with a maximum elevation of 70°; four guns were fitted close to the forward superfiring turret, the others at the base of the forward funnel. Later, the aft guns were removed. Hindenburg had only four AA guns close to the forward funnel.26 There were four submerged torpedo tubes (one at the bow, one at the stern and trained outside, and two broadside forward of ‘A’ turret). Derfflinger had 50cm torpedo tubes and twenty weapons. Lützow and Hindenburg had 60cm torpedo tubes, with an outfit of twelve and sixteen weapons, respectively. Service History The operational activity of Derfflinger, Lützow, and Hindenburg is described in Chapter 5. Derfflinger Derfflinger was due to be launched on 14 June 1913 but the hull stopped on the slipways, probably due to excessive pressure on the central slipway,

which was later scrapped and rebuilt. She eventually entered the water on 12 July. Another accident occurred during speed trials, with damage to the turbines that delayed Derfflinger’s entry into service until 16 November 1914. Interned at Scapa Flow on 24 November 1918, Derfflinger was scuttled on 21 June 1919 by her crew. She was refloated in 1938-9 but her scrapping, interrupted by the Second World War, was not completed at Faslane until 1946-8. Lützow Lützow was declared ready for acceptance trials on 8 August 1915 but, during speed trials held in October, the LP starboard turbine failed. This delayed her entry into service until March 1916. Lützow was heavily damaged during the battle of Jutland and, on 1 June, the German destroyer G-38 rescued her crew and sent her to the bottom with two torpedoes. Hindenburg Hindenburg was delivered to the German Navy on 10 May 1917, was declared operational on 26 October and replaced Seydlitz as the flagship of 1. Aufklärungs-gruppe. However, she was too late to see any major action. Interned at Scapa Flow on 24 November 1918, Hindenburg was scuttled by her crew on 21 June 1919. Refloated in July 1930, she was scrapped at Rosyth in 1931-2.

THE MACKENSEN CLASS The first battlecruiser of the Mackensen class (Ersatz Viktoria Louise) was part of the peacetime construction programme that, in its latest version (namely, the Novelle 1912), envisaged one ship per year from 1914 to 1917 as replacements for older armoured cruisers. Two more battlecruisers were ordered after the outbreak of war in 1914 and joined Ersatz Viktoria Louise in the framework of the first wartime construction programme. In spring 1915, four more ships were planned to replace the cruisers already lost during the war (Yorck, Gneisenau, Scharnhorst and Blücher), thus totalling seven battlecruisers. In 1917, the navy decided to complete the four battlecruisers in the most advanced stage of construction in accordance with the original design. It was also decided to redesign the remaining three planned units, in order to install a heavier armament; this led to the Ersatz Yorck class. With the Mackensen class, the legend displacement of German

battlecruisers passed the threshold of 30,000t for the first time, an increase of 15% over Lützow. The calibre of the main armament increased from 30.5cm in the Derfflingers to 35cm. Consistent with these figures, the estimated cost in 1914 for the first ship was about RM55 million, 20% more than the average estimated cost of the Derfflingers.

Mackensen was launched on 21 April 1917. Construction work, however, proceeded quite slowly and she was still 15 months from completion at the end of the war.

Design, Construction and Cost The design process of the Mackensen (the name assigned to Ersatz Viktoria Louise at her launch) began in summer 1912 and lasted about eighteen months. During the debate, Tirpitz was generally keen to exercise moderation and prudence, especially when discussing elements – such as displacement, armament and speed – which could raise, in his judgement, financial and political issues that could lead to potential disagreements with the Chancellor and the Reichstag. Indeed, Tirpitz feared that such disagreements could jeopardise the development plan of the German fleet as established by the Naval Law. Inevitably, this caution clashed with the ambitions (and

sometimes fixations) of the Kaiser and the proposals, often diverging from Tirpitz’s point of view, put forward by both the RMA’s technical departments and the Hochseeflotte. Therefore, in summer 1912, Wilhelm II reproached Tirpitz for the considerable delay to the introduction of the 35cm calibre gun in the fleet and the fact that it had only happened at all due to his insistence. Furthermore, according to the Kaiser, the RMA elaborated many naval design choices on its own, without involving the operational branch of the German Navy in the decisionmaking process. Tirpitz replied that the RMA was doing its best with the available resources, but the Kaiser argued that he wanted only the best for ‘his’ navy, even though this ‘best’ was often the most expensive. Tirpitz wanted a quick definition of the design for the battlecruiser planned in the 1914 construction programme. Thus, in August, he ordered Department K to establish a preliminary assessment for a ship armed with four 35cm twin turrets: speed and protection would have been as Hindenburg. A few days later, the Kaiser approved these requirements. Although the navy was informed about the new British battleships of the Queen Elizabeth class, armed with eight 15in guns and capable of 25 knots, Tirpitz was not fully convinced of the need to substantially increase the calibre of the main guns of the new battlecruisers.27 He firmly believed that simultaneous requirements for improved armour and heavy and medium calibre guns could not be met. Also, Tirpitz feared that meeting those requirements would cross the ‘psychological’ border of 30,000t of displacement, thus risking the battlecruisers’ cancellation and jeopardising the future of the Naval Law. However, in September Department K prepared seven preliminary designs that the RMA would collectively assess. Assuming that the cost and size of the new class were not allowed to increase in an ‘unsustainable’ manner, Department K put forward several alternatives. A marginal decrease of speed and armour (‘A’ and ‘B’ designs, armed respectively with 34cm and 35cm guns) would limit displacement and cost. Side protection of 300mm and 28 knots meant a hull length of 220m (designs ‘A2’ and ‘B2’); the displacement would be more than 30,000t, with cost rising above the RM55 million budgeted for the 1914 fiscal year.

Graf Spee fitting out in early 1918. Note the barbettes of the main turrets protruding from the forecastle and the two funnels lying on the battery deck, waiting to be erected. (R. Stanglini Collection)

A further increase of size and cost would result from adding a continuous upper deck (design ‘A3’), thus avoiding a low freeboard astern, which increased wetness and compromised habitability. In fact, all previous German battlecruisers suffered a low stern freeboard (4m in Moltke and 4.3m in Derfflinger), which resulted in an aft deck awash at high speed and low internal volumes.28 Since Tirpitz was to submit to the Kaiser29 an ample range of alternatives, the RMA worked out additional designs, including some having the same armament as Derfflinger (eight 30.5cm guns). On 30 September, Wilhelm II showed inconsistency with his previous requirements and surprisingly chose design ‘A9’; it featured a legend displacement of 29,000t, a length of 215m, a speed of 27.25 knots, the same armament as Derfflinger, but eight 60cm torpedo tubes. The estimated cost was RM52.4 million. Tirpitz initially accepted this decision but it was opposed by most people in the RMA. They were absolutely keen on increasing the gun calibre in order to align the main armament of German battlecruisers with that of the most recent battlecruisers of Britain (13.5in in the Lions), Japan (14in in the Kongos) and Russia (14in in the Borodinos). Once Krupp had ensured that choosing a 35cm gun would not delay the completion of Ersatz Viktoria Louise (planned for spring 1917), Department K insisted on that calibre. A layout with triple or quadruple turrets was also considered, in order not to exceed the displacement limit. However, design

‘A9’ was still affected by several issues, such as an excessive number of torpedo tubes and an increase of the stern freeboard. According to Department K, this request would inevitably lead to an increase of both the silhouette and the displacement. Thus, they suggested using design ‘A3’ as the baseline for future proposals. After a lengthy debate within the RMA, in April 1913 Department K submitted a memorandum to Tirpitz that included some new preliminary designs and – assuming that Britain adopted the 14in calibre (35.6cm) for Tiger30 – asked whether it would be advisable to install 38cm guns on Ersatz Viktoria Louise. Such a decision would simplify the supply chain because this calibre had already been chosen for the Bayern class battleships. In fact, this would have avoided the introduction of an intermediate calibre between 30.5cm and 38cm and, above all, secured for the German battlecruisers the desired leap ahead over foreign ships of the type. Eventually, on 24 April, Tirpitz also approved the 38cm calibre guns, but with an armament reduced to three twin turrets so as not to exceed cost and displacement limits. Indeed, design ‘D9’ had a displacement of 29,200t; a length of 215m; a speed of 27.5 knots; a main armament of six 38cm L/45 guns and eight 60cm torpedo tubes; its estimated cost was RM55.6 million. Design ‘D10’ had slightly lower displacement and speed and the same armament, with an estimated cost of 54.7 million marks. Searching for a solution to be submitted to the Kaiser, in late June the RMA prepared further designs, including the variant ‘D48a’: it was 29,600t, 218.5m long, 27.5 knots, with a main armament of six 38cm guns in three twin turrets (one aft superfiring), sixteen 15cm guns and six 60cm torpedo tubes. Its estimated cost was RM55.3 million and the Kaiser approved it on 28 June. However, the apparent ‘victory’ of the 38cm calibre was not final. After additional argument with Wilhelm II and discussions within the RMA, in early November Tirpitz31 asked to work again on a design armed with 34cm or 35cm guns. Thus, during a meeting held on 22 November 1913 he submitted to the Kaiser, as an alternative to ‘D48a’, the new design ‘58’, related to a vessel with a displacement of 31,000t, a length of 225m, a speed of 27.25 knots, a main armament consisting of eight 35cm L/45 guns, a secondary battery of fourteen 15cm guns and six 60cm torpedo tubes. The Kaiser urged a final decision, but, at the insistence of Tirpitz, he approved delaying the programme until spring 1914, in order to allow a budget consolidation. However, Tirpitz had already made up his mind and

ordered a stop to work on designs featuring 38cm guns and focusing on those with 35cm guns. In early December 1913, the RMA defined many details, including a high stern freeboard (6m, later reduced to 5.7m) to ensure a dry deck even at high speed and provide more crew spaces. To save weight, the maximum thickness of protection was limited in several areas. Further variants and alternatives concerned the central deckhouse, the boilers, the horizontal protection and, for the first time in the German Navy, the adoption of a bulbous bow to improve speed. In early 1914 all these features led to new variant, design ‘60’, which featured five torpedo tubes, a repositioning of the fore funnel (to reduce smoke on the spotting post located on the tripod mast) and a total of thirtytwo boilers (twenty-four coal-fired and eight oil-fired), thus allowing steam to be raised in a more regular and reliable manner.32 Project ‘60’ had a displacement of 31,000t33 and was finally approved by the Kaiser on 23 May, thus ending a lengthy design process. Further changes, introduced by exploiting the design margins and discarding the anti-torpedo nets, allowed a slight improvement in the protection. The contract was rapidly prepared and the order for the first ship was awarded to Blohm & Voss on 14 August. Mackensen34 was laid down in Hamburg on 1 January 1915 and launched on 21 April 1917. The second ship of the class (Ersatz Freya, whose planned name was Prinz Eitel Friedrich35) was also assigned to Blohm & Voss; she was laid down in Hamburg on 1 May 1915 but her construction was suspended in summer 1917, about twenty months from completion. The third ship (Ersatz Blücher) was awarded on to the Schichau shipyard in Danzig on 15 April 1915. She was laid down on 30 November that year and launched on 15 September 1917. She was named Graf Spee, to honour Vice-Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee who had died during the battle of Falklands; his widow Margarete was the launch sponsor. The fourth and last battlecruiser was initially planned as an additional unit (‘Vehrmerungsbau A’) of the peacetime naval programme, but her construction was eventually approved as a replacement unit (‘Ersatzbau’) for the armoured cruiser Friedrich Carl, sunk on 17 November 1914. Ersatz Friedrich Carl (whose planned name was Fürst Bismarck, to honour the architect of German unification) was assigned to the Imperial Dockyard at Wilhelmshaven on 18 April 1915; she was laid down on 3 November that year. However, her construction progressed very slowly and she was never launched.

Mackensen Class Names Mackensen (Ersatz Viktoria Louise), Ersatz Freya, Graf Spee (Ersatz Blücher), Ersatz Friedrich Carl Shipyards and construction Mackensen: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg Laid down, 1 January 1915; launched, 21 April 1917; not completed, scrapped in 1922 Ersatz Freya: Blohm & Voss, Hamburg Laid down, 1 May 1915; launched in 1920; not completed, scrapped in 1920-22 Graf Spee: Schichau, Danzig Laid down, 30 November 1915; launched, 15 September 1917, not completed, scrapped in 1921-2 Ersatz Friedrich Carl: Imperial Dockyard, Wilhelmshaven Laid down, 3 November 1915, not launched, scrapped in 1922. Displacement Legend, 31,000t; full load, 35,300t Dimensions Lenght: 224m (oa); 223m (wl) Beam: 30.4m (moulded) Mean draught (full load displacement): 8.85m Armament Eight 35cm SK L/45, twin turrets Fourteen 15cm SK L/45, single mounts, casemated Eight 8.8cm SK L/45 AA, single mounts Five 60cm torpedo tubes Protection Belt: 300mm max, 120mm fore, 100mm aft Tranverse bulkheads: 250mm-200mm Citadel: 150mm Decks: 80mm-25mm Turrets: 320mm face, 200mm side, 120mm roof Barbettes: 290mm-60mm Forward conning tower: 350mm max Aft conning tower: 200mm max Anti-torpedo bulkhead: 60mm-50mm Machinery Twenty-four single-ended, coal-fired boilers and eight doubleended, oil-fired boilers Four sets of turbines, four 3-bladed shafts, two parallel rudders Power and speed (legend): 90,000shp at 295rpm, 28 knots

Fuel (coal/oil): normal, 800/250t; max, 4,000/2,000t Endurance: 8,000nm at 14 knots Complement 1,186 officers and men (1,262 as flagship)

Mackensen

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

The final estimated cost for the construction of a Mackensen class battlecruiser was RM66 million. General Features The Mackensen class battlecruisers had an overall length of 224m and a beam of 30.4m. The legend displacement was 31,000t and reached 35,300t at full load. At legend displacement, fuel stowage was 800t of coal and 250t of oil. The table on pages 176-7 details the main characteristics of the project. The hull was divided vertically into six decks, longitudinally into eighteen watertight compartments and featured a double bottom that ran along 92% of the hull length, much longer than Derfflinger. The hull had a flush deck and a greater freeboard than previous classes of German battlecruisers; this was 8.5m forward, 6.6m amidships, and 5.7m aft. This feature, and a more marked flare, would result in a decent sea boat. A remarkable innovation of the Mackensens was the bulbous bow, which

Admiral David Taylor of the US Navy had introduced few years earlier; the German Navy was only the second in the world to adopt it in a capital ship. The bulbous bow, having a volume of 200m3, contributed to reduced resistance (as confirmed by the tank trials) and moved the centre of buoyancy forward. This latter requirement also came from the slight relocation of both the forward main turrets and the machinery, needed to create room for one additional torpedo tube equipment on each side. Shortening and reducing the volume of the shafts and propeller struts also contributed to moving the centre of buoyancy forward. The Mackensens were equipped with two parallel rudders (rather than ones in tandem as in the Moltkes and Derfflingers). This layout put the rudders in the flow of the inner propellers, thus providing better manoeuvrability. The choice of the flush deck and considerably enlarged aft and amidships spaces improved crew habitability. The main armament included four twin turrets (‘B’ and ‘C’ were superfiring) on the centreline, as in the Derfflingers; the greater freeboard in the Mackensens led to an increase of the axis height on the waterline for all turrets. As in the Derfflingers, the considerable distance between the aft main turrets (about 31m between their vertical axes) allowed the aft engine room to be placed between ‘C’ and ‘D’ barbettes. This also reduced the risk that a single hit could damage both turrets. The secondary battery included fourteen 15cm guns placed at the sides. There were eight single 8.8cm AA guns. The machinery was designed to deliver a legend power of 90,000shp at 295rpm and a top speed of 28 knots. Their layout included four shafts, as in previous German battlecruisers. There were two HP turbines on the outer shafts and two LP turbines on the inner shafts; as in the Derfflingers, the turbines were housed in four separated compartments. The main ring worked at 220V, with eight diesel generators that supplied 2,320kW. There were twenty-four coal-fired and eight oil-fired boilers, fourteen more than in the Derfflingers. It was decided to split steam production into a greater number of smaller boilers, thus allowing more uniform steam generation and a greater reserve of equipment in case of failure. The gas exhaust ducts went into two high funnels (topping 18m above the upper deck). The forward funnel was placed aft of the superstructure housing the conning tower, the bridge and other operational spaces and supporting a tripod mast. This had a large spotting top and a secondary fire control position; the spotting top was placed at 36m from the waterline to allow it to pass beneath the bridges over the Kiel Canal. A pole mast was placed aft the

second funnel. Eight searchlights for night fighting were positioned on platforms placed between the tripod mast and the first funnel and aft the second funnel.

Graf Spee was the second and last battlecruiser of the Mackensen class to be launched, on 15 September 1917. None of the four scheduled ships was ever completed and all were scrapped in 1920-2 (R. Stanglini Collection).

The general layout of protection was not much different from the Derfflingers, except for the increase in the thickness of armour for turrets and barbettes due to the rise of the calibre. The service boats (up to ten steam pinnaces, launches, cutters, and yawls) were placed on the central deckhouse, between the funnels. Complement was forty-six officers and 1,140 men; if a Mackensen served as flagship, the numbers increased by fourteen and sixtytwo, respectively. Protection The main belt ran for about 126m between the extreme ends of the main turrets’ barbettes and had a maximum thickness of 300mm. It tapered to 220mm at the upper deck and to 150mm until 2m below the waterline. This belt was closed by 250mm-200mm transverse bulkheads. The belt extended until 11m from the stern, with a thickness of 100mm and was closed by another 100mm transverse bulkhead. Forward, the belt ran until about 20m from the stem with a 120mm thickness, was closed by a 20mm transverse bulkhead, and then extended until to the stem with 30mm. The side

protection of the battery deck was 150mm, with 20mm antisplinter bulkheads. The horizontal protection was split into three levels: upper deck, battery deck, and armoured deck. The first was 25mm above the main armoured belt and increased to 40mm on the side edge, in correspondence with the secondary battery. The battery deck had a thickness of 25mm-20mm, while the armoured deck varied from 30mm (in the central section, where it reached the antitorpedo bulkhead) to 80mm aft, to protect the steering gear. The forward conning tower had 350mm-300mm front plates, a 200mm base and rear plates and 160mm roof plates. The aft conning tower had a maximum thickness of 200mm and an 80mm roof. The main turrets had 320mm front plates, 220mm rear plates and 200mm side plates, those inclined decreasing to 180mm. The turret roof was 120mm-110mm. The barbettes were 290mm above the upper deck, decreased to 120mm at the battery deck level, and to 90mm-60mm in correspondence with the main belt. Anti-torpedo protection was provided by the double bottom and a side 50mm longitudinal bulkhead, which increased to 60mm in correspondence with the main guns’ magazines and machinery spaces. Coal bunkers were no longer available to provide protection because they were largely replaced by oil tanks. Anti-torpedo nets were initially planned, but wartime experience led to the decision not to install them. Machinery Steam was raised by thirty-two boilers, twenty-four single-ended coal-fired and eight double-ended oil-fired. They were housed in ten separate compartments, five on each side of the central longitudinal bulkhead. Steam fed two groups of turbines, housed in separated compartments and driving three-blade 4.2m propellers. The two forward engine rooms were located outside ‘C’ barbette and housed the HP turbines, that drove the outer shafts. The aft engine rooms were placed in the section between ‘C’ and ‘D’ turrets and housed the LP turbines, which drove the inner shafts. The first three Mackensens and Ersatz Scharnorst would also have two geared ahead turbines driving the inner shafts, allowing a 20% increase in the cruise range at 16 knots. At high speeds, these turbines were disconnected. The RMA had also planned to install a Föttinger-type hydraulic reduction gear that would improve the ratio between turbine and propeller speeds. However, this solution was only introduced in the following Ersatz Yorck

class. The design power was 90,000shp, with a corresponding speed of 28 knots at 295rpm. Legend fuel stowage was 800t of coal and 250t of oil; maximum stowage, 4,000t of coal and 2,000t of oil. Estimated range was 8,000 miles at 14 knots. Armament The main armament consisted of four 35cm SK L/45 twin turrets along the centreline. Two turrets were placed forward (‘B’ superfiring over ‘A’) and two aft (‘C’ superfiring over ‘D’, but placed further apart). This layout allowed large arcs of fire for each turret: about 300° for the forward turrets and slightly more for the aft ones. The axis heights of all main turrets above the waterline were greater than in the Derfflingers, with ‘A’ turret reaching 9.2m. Apart from protection, there is no other information on turret model and weight. Initially, the guns’ elevation was to be -8°/+16°, but this was changed at -5°/+20° after Jutland. Maximum range corresponding to 16° was about 21,600yds, increased to about 25,160yds at 20°. Planned ammunition outfit was ninety rounds per gun, totalling 720 rounds, and included AP and HE shells, each weighing 600kg. The bursting charge had a cased main section and a fore charge. Muzzle velocity was 815mps, with a corresponding energy of 199.3MJ. An eight-shell broadside weighed 4,800kg; rate of fire was 2.5 rounds per minute. The secondary battery included fourteen 15cm L/45 single guns, placed along the sides between ‘A’ and ‘C’ turrets and more spaced than in previous German battlecruisers. These guns had MP LC/13 mountings, with a -8.5°/+19° elevation. Ammunition outfit was 160 rounds per gun. The secondary battery also included eight 8.8cm AA guns on MP LC/13 mountings. Four guns were placed at the angles of the forward superstructure and another four around ‘C’ turret. Ammunition outfit totalled 3,000 rounds.36 The Mackensens had also five 60cm underwater torpedo tubes: one forward and two on each side, respectively, forward of ‘A’ and aft of ‘D’ barbettes. Torpedo stowage was twenty-eight H8-type weapons.

Admiral Eduard von Capelle (1855-1931) succeeded Tirpitz as Secretary of State for the Navy in March 1916. He refused to consider scrapping the Mackensens and the Ersatz Yorcks that were, by then, on the slips and allowed their construction to continue, albeit at a very slow pace, to keep the workforce occupied. (A. Meyer)

Service History None of the Mackensen class was completed. The first ship’s completion was planned for July 1918 but work was suspended after her launch in 1917. The hull was sold in October 1921 and scrapped in Hamburg in 1923-4. After the war, the possibility of converting her and the other two hulls into oilers, using diesel engines originally planned for submarines, had been considered but was discarded as uneconomic. Ersatz Freya was launched on 13 March 1920 to free the slipway and laid up alongside at Blohm & Voss; she was scrapped in Hamburg in 1920-2. At the end of the war, Graf Spee was the ship at the most advanced stage of construction: her completion was planned in 12-18 months; she was sold in October 1921 and scrapped in Kiel in 1921-3. In October 1918, Ersatz Friedrich Carl was still two years from completion; she was scrapped on the slipway in 1922. In 1917, some of 35cm SK L/45 guns manufactured by Krupp for the Mackensens were used as field artillery on the Flanders front. During this time, one gun fired 578 shells without reaching the barrel life limit, which was designed at 250 shells.

THE ERSATZ YORCK CLASS After lengthy and controversial discussions, in early 1917 the RMA decided to modify the initial design of the three Mackensen class battlecruisers that were in a less advanced stage of construction. The aim of this effort was to install a heavier armament (38cm instead of 35cm twin turrets), thus also meeting the requirements stemming from the fleet command. Apart from the growth of main gun calibres, the changes introduced in the design were minor, in order to allow use of the materials already ordered and avoid wasting money and further delays. The battlecruisers involved were Ersatz Yorck, Ersatz Gneisenau and Ersatz Scharnhorst, but none of them was completed. Design, Construction and Costs Ersatz Yorck, Ersatz Gneisenau and Ersatz Scharnhorst were ordered in

April 1915; their completion was planned between spring and autumn 1918. The orders for the materials were regularly issued but in the following months work progressed very slowly. After one year, most of the materials were still being manufactured. The resignation of Tirpitz as Minister of the Navy on 15 March 1916 further delayed work on the ships. The Kaiser replaced Tirpitz with Admiral Eduard von Capelle, former head of the RMA’s Department C (Administration). This event caused an abrupt interruption to the thinking and continuity of action that had driven the RMA for almost twenty years. Further, Tirpitz’s resignation paved the way for the RMA to come under further pressure exerted by the Kaiser and attempts at ‘intrusion’ by the Hochseeflotte and the Admiralstab (Admiralty Staff) in its field of technical competence. Wilhelm II had for a long time pushed for ‘fusing’ in a single category (the fast battleship) the two types of ships – battleships and battlecruisers – whose identity Tirpitz had stubbornly kept separate, consistent with his vision traced through the various German naval laws. In turn, the Hochseeflotte and the Admiralstab claimed a strong say in defining the characteristics of the new construction. The fleet command claimed the benefits of its war experience, while the Admiralstab underlined its responsibilities for strategic planning. On 19 May, in preparation for a meeting between von Capelle and the Kaiser, Department K presented some preliminary designs, or sketches, for both battlecruisers (designs ‘GK1’, ‘GK2’ and ‘GK3’) and battleships (designs ‘L1’, ‘L2’ and ‘L3’), which were to be used as baselines for future developments. All sketches envisaged a main armament composed of eight 38cm SK L/45 guns, sixteen 15cm guns and eight 8.8cm AA guns. As far as the battlecruisers were concerned, the designs envisaged a notable increase in the displacement, intended especially to enhance propulsion power and lengthen the hull to allow greater speed. Protection was subject to only minor changes. The ‘GK1’ sketch called for a legend displacement of 34,000t, a waterline length of 235m and a propulsion power of 110,000shp, with a corresponding speed of 29.25 knots. In the ‘GK2’, at 38,000t and 243m, propulsion power increased to 120,000shp and speed to 29.5 knots. Machinery layout included twenty-four coal-fired and twelve oil-fired boilers. The ‘GK3’ sketch maintained the same displacement and length as ‘GK2’, but had a power of 115,000shp and a speed of 29 knots; there was more focus on protection,

especially horizontal. Both von Capelle and Department K were oriented toward the ‘GK1’ sketch, this being less ‘racy’ than others and more compatible with some constraints, including access to German naval bases. The commander of the Hochseeflotte, Admiral Reinhard Scheer, favoured the ‘GK3’, judging it as the best combination among firepower, speed and protection. The existing disagreements on speed, when this was sacrificed for protection, suggested – together with other issues – further insights. Between May and July 1916, Department K worked out a new design, the ‘GK6’: it had a displacement of 36,500t and 235m length, the same protection as GK6, but a lower speed (28 knots instead of 29). ‘GK6’ was also in accordance, if circumstances would allow, with the transition to the single type of ship-ofthe-line that Wilhelm II hoped for. However, Scheer and Department A opposed ‘GK6’. They believed that its speed was insufficient, while protection and main armament did not implement, in their opinion, the lessons learned from Jutland. They suggested installing a fifth 38cm twin turret or, as an alternative, to switch to 42cm as the main calibre. Meanwhile, the work slowdown and further unavoidable delays postponed delivery to 1920-1 and caused fears that the battlecruisers, once completed, could either be obsolete and/or largely inferior to their British counterparts, as a result of an inappropriate choice of their characteristics and performance.

Ersatz Yorck Class Names Ersatz Yorck, Ersatz Gneisenau, Ersatz Scharnhorst Shipyards and construction Ersatz Yorck: AG Vulcan, Hamburg Laid down, July 1916; never launched, scrapped on slipway Ersatz Gneisenau: Germania Werft, Kiel Never laid down Ersatz Scharnhorst: Blohm and Voss, Hamburg Never laid down. Displacement Legend, 35,500t; full load, 38,000t Dimensions

Length: 228m (oa), 227.8m (wl) Beam: 30.4m (moulded) Draught (full load displacement): 9.30m aft Armament Eight 38cm SK L/45, twin turrets Twelve 15cm SK L/45, single mounts, casemated Eight 8.8cm SK L/45, AA, single mounts Three 60cm torpedo tubes Protection Belt: 300mm max, 120mm fore, 100mm aft Transverse bulkheads: 250mm-200mm Citadel: 150mm Armoured deck: 90mm-30mm Turrets: 300mm face, 250mm side, 150mm roof Barbettes: 300mm-80mm Forward conning tower: 350mm max Aft conning tower: 200mm max Anti-torpedo bulkhead: 60mm-45mm Machinery Twenty-four single-ended, coal-fired boilers and eight doubleended, oil-fired boilers Four sets of turbines, four 3-bladed shafts, two parallel rudders (Ersatz Scharnhorst: two additional ahead cruising turbines) Power and speed (legend): 90,000shp at 295rpm, 27.25 knots Fuel (coal/oil): 850/250t normal; 4,000/2,000t max Endurance: 5,500nm at 14 knots Complement 1,217 officers and men

Line drawing © Ruggero Stanglini

Therefore, some in the navy considered again the alternative of immediately scrapping those ships of the Ersatz Viktoria Louise class at a less advanced stage of construction. However, the RMA rejected this proposal for economic, political and industrial reasons, including the waste of money (about RM30 million in components had already been manufactured and partially assembled), possible hostile reactions from the government and the Reichstag and a demoralising effect on the shipyards. Taking into account all these factors, in January 1917 Department K worked out two further technical proposals (designs ‘I’ and ‘II’) aimed at keeping most of the existing Mackensen design. Therefore, there were no changes in size or machinery (boilers and turbines having already been ordered), in order to allow the use of items already manufactured. Compared to Ersatz Viktoria Louise, design ‘I’ called for a 1,350t displacement increase, caused by an improvement in protection and increased calibre of the main armament; the hull form did not change. Design ‘II’ provided for a growth in displacement of 2,400t, thus making room for major changes: a 4m increase in length, a longer casemate (up to ‘D’ turret), and selected improvements in protection (forward conning tower, barbettes and magazines). Using the same machinery as in design ‘I’, speed decreased by 0.5 knots. On 16 January, von Capelle rejected any proposal to scrap ships under construction and urged the selection of either design ‘I’ or ‘II’, with one of them to be presented to the Kaiser for approval. Department K supported design ‘II’, a decision shared within the RMA. However, Department A suggested modifying only Ersatz Gneisenau and Ersatz Scharnhorst and scrapping Ersatz Yorck: von Capelle rejected this last proposal. After the Kaiser approved design ‘II’, Department K worked on defining it in more detail. The displacement grew to 33,000t, the hull was lengthened by about 1m and speed decreased by 0.25 knots. Boilers were tightly grouped in order to convey exhaust gases into a single funnel. The obvious change in appearance resulting from this choice led Department K to decree that the three ships concerned were to be designated as ‘Ersatz Yorck class’, rather than ‘Umbau’ (changes in construction) and ‘Umarmierung’ (changes in armament). Cost estimate for the construction of these battlecruisers was RM75 million each. General Features

The legend displacement of the Ersatz Yorck increased to 33,500t from 31,000t of the Mackensen, while the full load displacement reached 38,000t. The table on page 181 provides the main characteristics of the project. Most of the growth was caused by replacing 35cm turrets with 38cm ones and related changes, which affected the ship’s whole structure and weight. The waterline length was 227.8m, 4.8m more than the Mackensens: the overall length was 228m, while beam remained unchanged at 30.4m due to the usual constraints deriving from docking and passage in navigable channels. A 0.3m depth growth increased mean draught by the same quantity because freeboard did not change. Also the hull form remained unchanged because it was impracticable to redesign the entire ship after the central section of the Ersatz Yorck’s keel had been laid down. However, the growth in the main armament could not avoid some additional changes.37 The greater weight of each turret forced the forward turrets to move aft by 2.3m, while ‘D’ turret was moved 3.5m aft as well. The distance between ‘C’ and ‘B’ turrets increased by 2.5m, as did the length of the central section of the hull: this improved crew spaces and allowed repositioning of the two side torpedo tubes aft, improving their protection. The armoured citadel located amidships was also lengthened until ‘D’ turret. The twelve 15cm guns were relocated along the greater available length; two were moved aft (at the base of ‘D’ turret), while the six forward mounts (three on each side) were spaced more apart from the central four. Machinery layout did not change, but the compartment between boilers rooms 3 and 4, present in the Mackensens, was discarded.38 The single funnel provided many benefits, including more distance from the tripod mast and the forward conning tower; this would avoid, in the event of damage, elements of the tripod mast crashing on the conning tower, affecting its operational capabilities. Also the aft pole mast was relocated at a greater distance from the funnel, thus reducing smoke interference with fire-control positions. Protection Protection was subject to minor changes when compared to the Mackensens. The citadel was extended until ‘D’ turret to better protect machinery spaces and magazines, and its vertical protection reached a maximum thickness of 300mm. At the upper deck level, thickness decreased to 200mm forward, 220mm amidships and 240mm aft. Beyond the citadel, protection ran until 25m from the hull ends, decreasing to 120mm forward and 100mm aft. The

citadel was closed by 250mm-200mm transverse bulkheads. The horizontal protection was mostly unchanged from the Mackensens, with small reductions aft; also the anti-torpedo bulkheads remained unchanged. The forward conning tower had 350mm-300mm front plates and a 160mm roof. The aft conning tower had a maximum thickness of 200m. The main turrets had 300mm front plates (250mm in the inclined part), 290mm rear plates, 150mm roof plates and 250mm side plates (200mm inclined). The barbettes were 300mm above the upper deck, reduced to 180mm in correspondence with the citadel and 80mm at the main belt level. Machinery Machinery layout and composition were unchanged from the Mackensens, because all major components had already been ordered, apart from the Föttinger39 hydraulic coupling. This circumstance was one of the major constraints in redesigning the Ersatz Yorck class, affecting the layout of internal spaces and reducing top speed (from 28 knots of the Mackensens to 27.25 knots). In fact, design propulsion power remained unchanged (90,000shp), while the full load displacement increased by 2,500t. Steam was raised by thirty-two double-ended boilers, twenty-four coal-fired and eight oil-fired; they were housed in ten compartments, to the sides of the central longitudinal bulkhead. Boilers fed two groups of turbines, with the same layout as in the Mackensens. Only Ersatz Scharnhorst had two ahead turbines, connected to reduction gears that drove the outer shafts, which improved range at cruising speed. Two parallel rudders were placed in the flow of the inner propellers40 Data relating to fuel stowage and endurance are given in the table on page 181. Electrical equipment was as in the Mackensens. Armament The planned main armament included eight 38cm SK L/45 guns in twin turrets, identical to those installed in the Bayern class battleships, and placed on the centreline with ‘B’ and ‘C’ turrets superfiring. Each gun was 17.10m long and weighed 80t. A complete Drh. LC/14 turret weighed 850t. Elevation would probably have been -5°/+20°, as in Bayern. The turrets had electrical training mechanisms and hydraulic equipment for elevation and shell handling. Planned ammunition outfit was ninety rounds per gun (totalling 720

rounds), split into 750kg AP and HE shells and barrel life would have been 300 rounds. Muzzle velocity was 800mps, with a corresponding muzzle energy of 240MJ. An eight shell broadside was 6,000kg, while rate of fire was 2-2.5 rounds per minute. The secondary battery included twelve 15cm L/45 guns with MP LC/13 mountings, with -8.5°/+19° elevation; the guns were placed on the sides, between ‘A’ and ‘D’ main turrets. Ammunition outfit was 160 rounds per gun. The secondary battery also included eight 8.8cm L/45 AA guns on MP LC/13 mountings. Four guns were placed on the central deckhouse on the sides of the forward superstructure and four on the upper deck beside ‘C’ turret.41 Armament included also three underwater 60cm torpedo tubes (one aft and two on the sides), with a total outfit of fifteen H8-type torpedoes. Service History Only Ersatz Yorck was laid down in Hamburg in July 1916, but was never completed. However, some components (armour plates, boilers, turbines, diesel-generators and hull sections) had been ordered for all ships of the class. The construction of all battlecruisers was suspended during 1917, because of the higher priority given to other ship types (notably submarines and destroyers). At that moment, the planned delivery of the Ersatz Yorcks was postponed to summer 1920-spring 1921. Hull elements assembled on the slipway for Ersatz Yorck (or preassembled in the shipyards for the other ships of the class) were scrapped at the end of the war.

An aerial view of a Bayern-class battleship leaving port. Baden and Bayern were the only German capital ships of the First World War fitted with 38cm/L45 guns. The same main armament was, however, envisaged for the three Ersatz Yorck-class battlecruisers. (R Stanglini Collection)

GERMAN BATTLECRUISER DESIGNS FROM 1916 TO 1918 Capital ship design studies continued in Germany during the war, as already mentioned in the description of the Mackensen and Ersatz Yorck classes. The discussions involving the technical departments of the RMA on one side, and Wilhelm II, the fleet command and the Admiralstab on the other and were revived in early 1916. The debate was mainly inspired by lessons learned during the engagements with the Royal Navy, including Jutland, and regarded both battlecruisers and battleships. After Tirpitz’s resignation and his replacement by von Capelle, the Kaiser now faced a more open and amenable counterpart, compared to the often uncompromising Grossadmiral. This was particularly true when Wilhelm II wanted to deal with a topic towards which he had always been very sensitive, that is the possible merger of battleships and battlecruisers into a unique type of fast capital ship. When the armoured cruiser Prinz Adalbert was torpedoed and sunk in the Baltic by the British submarine E-8 on 23 October 1915, the Kaiser ordered that she be replaced by a new, larger ‘Ersatzbau’, armed with 35cm guns. Tirpitz was well aware that he lacked both the financial and technical resources to meet the Kaiser’s request. The Reichstag was likewise not eager to allocate additional money for big warships. The second, and more important reason, was the unavailability of the engineers and technicians needed to produce detailed new projects. In fact, priority in the RMA’s design departments had already been diverted to submarines and minor combatants. Tirpitz managed to persuade the Kaiser to temporarily give up his request but Wilhelm II was, by then, determined to replace his Secretary of the Navy with a more manageable person. Von Capelle was actually keener to accommodate the Kaiser’s desires and thus, in April 1916, Department K produced a number of sketches related to both battlecruisers (‘GK1’, ‘GK2’, and ‘GK3’42) and fast battleships (‘L1’, ‘L2’, and ‘L3’). They were all armed with 38cm guns and were to be used as the basis for further studies.

After Jutland, the debate resumed with renewed momentum, involving the RMA, the Admiralstab, the fleet command and, obviously, the Kaiser. The discussions concerning battlecruisers revolved around the lessons learned at Jutland, and stressed three main requirements: higher speed, a stronger main calibre battery and improved horizontal protection. The Fleet Command identified an increased top speed and a heavier main battery (38cm, or even 42cm) as the top priorities, whereas the Admiralstab and the RMA were inclined to increase the number of main calibre turrets (from four to five, deeming the 38cm calibre still sufficient), and to reinforce the horizontal armour. A peculiar aspect of these discussions was the possible merger of designs for future battleships and battlecruisers into a new fast battleship concept, which was something similar to the ‘fusion’ concept, envisaged by Fisher in 1914 and finalised in Hood. However, the Kaiserliche Marine found the application of this concept difficult and, although the debate continued through 1917 and up to the end of the war, a final decision was never achieved. Apart from the ‘technical’ issues, such as those arising from the need to match the length and beam of the harbour locks and dry docks in Wilhelmshaven, and to limit the draught of the ships in accordance with the depth of the waterways giving access to the naval bases, the main problem in the background was the availability of financial and material resources, in the light of the overall military situation and the navy’s changed building priorities.

‘GK6’ (Grosse Kreuzer 6) was one of the schemes considered during the design review phase of the Mackesen class that led to the Ersatz Yorck design. However, Admiral Scheer and Department A of the RMA rejected this proposal, pressing for higher speed and heavier armament. (Courtesy, www.dreadnoughtproject.org)

The main common feature across all nine sketches that evolved from the earlier ‘GK1’ to ‘GK3’ into the series ‘GK6’ to ‘GK12’ was a main battery including four twin 38cm turrets, with superfiring mountings both fore and aft, although, in some sketches, the aft turrets were spaced well apart. The secondary battery included sixteen 15cm guns, housed in a long casemate that ran from turret ‘A’ to turret ‘C’ in all but one sketch. The width of the Wilhelmshaven locks, which was about 34m, constrained the maximum beam in the new projects. Their lengths, however, were mostly determined in accordance with the capabilities of the Kiel and Wilhelmshaven floating docks, which were 255m long. Legend displacements varied according to speed, size, and protection, ranging from 36,500 to 44,000t. The main data relevant to the ‘GK6’ to ‘GK12’ studies are summarised in the table opposite. The hull was very large and was divided into six decks. The upper deck ran for the hull’s entire length and there was no forecastle deck. This provided the main battery with a very broad arc of fire. The casemate for the secondary battery was embedded into the upper deck. The bow configuration was a typical German battlecruiser design, with a 60cm torpedo tube placed on the centreline. Sixteen watertight bulkheads were hinged on the main deck and there was a double bottom running for the entire hull length. This ensured a great degree of compartmentalisation. A shelter deck ran from ‘B’ to ‘C’ barbettes and supported two funnels of different size and two short superstructures, fore and aft. The fore superstructure housed the fore conning tower and supported an aft-raked tripod mast. A pole mast was placed on the aft superstructure, which also included a secondary conning tower. Both masts had spotting tops and a pair of platforms. However, since these were only sketches, it is likely that a differently-arranged superstructure would emerge from a more detailed project. The armament also included eight 8.8cm SKL/45 guns in single mounts placed on the upper and shelter decks. In ‘GK6’, four submerged torpedo tubes were placed abeam, fore of ‘A’ turret and aft of ‘D’ turret, in addition to the centreline bow tube. Other ‘GK’ studies featured a centreline torpedo tube and two abeam torpedo tubes.

As for machinery, all the designs featured four turbines and a combination of coal- and oil-fired small-tube boilers. Coal-fired boiler rooms alternated with oil-fired boiler rooms. Legend power varied according to speed, the latter ranging from 26 to 32 knots. ‘GK10’, the largest design study, featured three funnels, thirty-six coal-fired and sixteen oil-fired boilers. Total power was not recorded but, with a design speed of 32 knots and a displacement of 44,000 tons, it would probably have been in the region of 200,000shp. ‘GK10’ featured two tandem rudders, while all the other designs had just one rudder.

Main Characteristics of German GK6-12 Battlecruiser Designs

Protection followed the RMA’s traditional approach of balancing, as much as possible, armour, firepower and speed. Information provided for the ‘GK6’ design showed vertical protection with a 300mm main belt, tapering upwards to 240-200mm and downwards to 150mm. The upper deck side armour was 150mm and the belt was closed by 250-200mm bulkheads. The forward bulkhead was positioned well ahead of the barbette of ‘A’ turret, while the aft bulkhead also protected the steering gear compartment.

Main Characteristics of German GK-Four Digit Battlecruiser Designs

The RMA continued to draft sketch designs of battleships and battlecruisers late into the war, such as ‘GK8’ (top) and ‘GK12’ (below). ‘GK1’ to ‘GK6’ were part of the design development of the Ersatz Yorck class while some of the later drafts envisaged heavier main guns, up to 42cm (16.5in), and larger displacements. (Courtesy, www.dreadnoughtproject.org)

As for horizontal protection, the upper deck had a 50mm plate extending from ‘B’ to ‘C’ turrets. The main deck had 50mm plates, reinforced to 80mm on the sides in correspondence with the casemates of the 15cm guns. The lower deck had 30mm of protection running from the extreme bow to the aft bulkhead, with thicker plates protecting the steering compartment. A 6050mm torpedo bulkhead provided most of the underwater protection. Each main calibre barbette had a different thickness in accordance with its placement. The upper part was 300mm, tapering to 150mm behind the main belt and to 90mm below. Each turret had 350mm on its front face, 250mm on its sides and 100mm on the roof. The fore conning tower had a 300-350mm front side, a 150mm roof and a 40mm floor. Its communication tube was 180150mm. The aft conning tower was 80mm on the roof, 200mm in the sides and 50mm in the floor. Its communication tube was 80mm. The forward spotting top was 20mm. All sketches show at least three rangefinders, which were placed in the main conning tower, the fore spotting top and the aft conning tower. Two searchlight platforms were placed close to the fore and aft masts. New iterations of the battlecruiser design studies occurred through 1918 until the end of the war. They differed from the previous ‘GK’ sketches in that they featured a main armament mainly based on 42cm SKL/45 guns, arranged in different layouts and numbers of turrets. The main data regarding the ‘GK3021’-‘GK 4552’43 studies are summarised in the table on page 185. They differ in displacement, width, draught and speed, while the lessons learned from Jutland led to the abolition of submerged abeam torpedo tubes. Machinery featured both coal- and oil-fired boilers. In March 1918, the RMA also produced some designs inspired by the British battlecruisers Glorious and Courageous that had been engaged by German light cruisers in November 1917. The most significant of these, ‘GK3022’, featured four 35cm SKL/45 main guns, a 100mm armoured belt and 48 boilers (eight coalfired and forty oil-fired) placed on two decks. Legend propulsion power was 200,000shp, for a corresponding speed of 33 knots. A further design effort took place in May-June 1918, when the RMA

produced designs for 270m-long battlecruisers, which would have required the lengthening of the locks at Wilhelmshaven. These sketches looked like previous designs, including widely separated aft main turrets. Legend displacement would reach 49,200t. It was estimated that the thirty-two boilers would produce 220,000shp, which would give a top speed of 32 knots. However, such ships would not be compatible with the geographical and logistic limits affecting the German basing and repair facilities, while the quest for higher speeds and larger main calibre guns inevitably forced a reduction in the number of turrets, as well as protection. In any case, it is surprising to see how, in 1918, the RMA was still working on projects that, because of the long development and construction times, could not have had any effect on the war’s outcome. At that time, Germany was mobilising whatever reserves it had left in support of the land forces while the internal political situation was starting to deteriorate. Perhaps, at the highest levels of command there were those who still believed in a favourable conclusion of the war. The design efforts might be interpreted, in this perspective, as a way of preparing for the post-war period, when a strong fleet would provide a means to safeguard the ‘fruits of victory’. However, from 1917 onwards, construction work on capital ships was de facto suspended in Germany and, despite the continuing design effort, there was little, not to say no, prospect that new battlecruisers would be built during the war. 1

This meant that all new warships built in Germany after the approval of the Naval Laws benefitted from the results of wave resistance tests carried out on towed models, following a methodology that was already in place for British warship design. 2 In Germany, there were three Kaiserliche Werften (Imperial Arsenals or Dockyards) and eight major and three minor privately-owned shipyards dealing with warship construction. Seven of them (the Kaiserliche Wertf in Wilhelmshaven, plus Blohm & Voss and Vulkan in Hamburg, AG Weser in Bremen, Germania and Howaldt in Kiel and Schichau in Danzig) were suited to build battleships and battlecruisers. 3 The official term for battlecruiser in the Kaiserliche Marine was ‘Grosse Kreuzer’ (large cruiser) but ‘Schlachtkreuzer’ (battlecruiser) was widely used in contemporary sources. 4 The ship was named to honour General Ludwig Freiherr von und zu der TannRathsamhausen, who fought in the Franco-Prussian war in 1870. 5 Corresponding percentages were hull, 31%; protection, 32%; machinery, 14.5%; armament, 10.8%; and various equipment, 6.3%. 6 They were used when the ship was moored or otherwise stationary.

7

According to trial records, coal consumption was 0.64kg/shp/hour at 26.8 knots and 68,250shp. At 16.2 knots and 12,400shp, coal consumption increased to 0.71kg/shp/hour. At 12 knots and 4,240shp, it increased to 1.14kg/shp/hour. 8 After experiencing difficulties in maintaining boiler fires at Jutland, the German navy started to modify them to spray tar oil on the coal to make it burn better. The work is thought to have started in the months following the battle and gradually extended to the fleet’s various battleships and battlecruisers. However, the dates individual ships were modified are not available. 9 This differed in the Royal Navy, where the port wing turret was located closer to the bow. 10 This had the same role as the transmitting stations fitted in British battlecruisers. 11 The ship was named after Field Marshal Helmuth Karl Bernhard von Moltke, Chief of Staff of the Prussian, and then German, Army from 1857 to 1888. 12 The ship was named after August Karl von Goeben, a Prussian general and close friend of Moltke, who fought in the wars against Denmark, Austria and France in 1864-71. 13 In total, there were eight 110cm searchlights. 14 According to German naval tradition, the large calibre turrets were designated with a capital letter (‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’ etc.) from the bow, continuing aft along the starboard side, to the stern and then back toward the bow along the port side. 15 Taking into account visibility conditions prevailing in the North Sea, the German Navy did not consider such limited maximum elevation as a penalising factor in terms of maximum range. Estimated fighting ranges varied from ten to thirteen miles, well within the maximum range of the German large-calibre guns. The large depression (up to -8°), by contrast, could be used to compensate for the heeling with the guns aimed abeam. Another reason was to make swabbing them out easier. 16 The battlecruiser was named after Friedrich Wilhelm Freiherr von Seydlitz (1721-73), one of the most talented Prussian cavalry generals during the reign of King Frederick the Great. 17 Seydlitz was actually replaced as flagship on 24 March 1916 by Lützow, but resumed the role when Lützow was sunk at Jutland. 18 The ship was named after Georg von Derfflinger (1606-1695), a famous cavalry officer and Field Marshal of Brandenburg during the Thirty Years War. 19 These were the British battleships of the Orion class. 20 These were reduced space requirements, greater efficiency, easier feeding, less manpower (stokers were no longer required) and better cost/performance ratio. 21 Design ‘3’ envisaged a substantial distance between the aft main calibre turrets, later confirmed in the final design. 22 The ship was named after the Prussian general Ludwig Adolf Wilhelm von Lützow (1782-1834), who had fought in the Napoleonic Wars. 23 This decision was affected by geographical and economical reasons. In addition, the RMA wanted to break the Blohm & Voss monopoly in building turbines. 24 These percentages refer to Hindenburg, but they can be considered valid, with good

approximation, for all ships of the class. 25 The diesel generators were relocated on Hindenburg and total output was 2,120kW. 26 The characteristics of the 15cm and 8.8cm guns and their ammunition were as described in the section on Von der Tann. 27 In addition to the adoption of the 35cm SK L/45 gun, the RMA studied two alternatives, based on the 34cm SK L/45 and 35.5cm SK L/50 models. 28 This issue had already emerged during Moltke’s May-June 1912 transatlantic cruise. 29 The Kaiser also wanted larger torpedo tubes. 30 The German assumption was wrong because Tiger had 13.5in guns, as in Lion. 31 He was still in search of a compromise with the resources planned for the 1914 budget, so as to safeguard the future of the Naval Law. 32 Design ‘58’ had eighteen bigger boilers. 33 Tirpitz considered this figure as an absolutely impassable limit and rejected a last attempt by Department K to replace four 35cm twin turrets with four 38cm twin turrets with a ‘modest increase in displacement’. 34 This name was assigned to Ersatz Viktoria Louise to honour Field Marshal August von Mackensen (1849-1945), who fought gallantly during World War one on the Balkan and Eastern fronts. The launch sponsor was von Mackensen’s wife. 35 The Kaiser’s second son. 36 The characteristics of the 15cm and 8.8cm guns and their ammunition are the same as described for Von der Tann. 37 The footprint of the 38cm twin turrets did not differ too much from 35cm. The same was also true for the ammunition. Therefore, the distance between the forward turrets and the size of their magazines did not change. 38 This compartment housed diesel generators and magazines for two 15cm guns. 39 The Föttinger system had been trialled in the light cruiser Wiesbaden before its installation in the Ersatz Yorck. This system allowed a maximum revolution ratio between turbine and propeller shafts of 5:1, allowing them to run more effectively. However, it had a maximum efficiency of only 90%, which would partially cancel out this gain. 40 The characteristics of 15cm and 8.8cm guns and their ammunition are the same described in reference to Von der Tann. 41 Projects ‘GK1’, ‘GK2’ and ‘GK3’ played a specific role in the development of the Ersatz Yorck class. These projects have hence been illustrated with reference to the latter. This also applies to project ‘GK6’. 42 The 42cm gun was under predevelopment by Krupp from late 1916, but it is difficult to assess the timing of its installation on board potential new German battlecruisers and battleships. 43 An alphanumeric code, consisting of four digits prefixed by ‘GK’, identified these design studies. The first two digits referred to the displacement in thousands of metric tons, the second digit was the number of main turrets and the fourth digit was an identifier.

Chapter Five

OPERATIONAL USE

O

n 4 August 1914, Britain entered the war with nine battlecruisers (including the three Lions armed with eight 13.5in guns). In October Tiger, the fourth ‘Cat’, joined them. Germany could oppose them with only four battlecruisers. Three were in the North Sea while Goeben, deployed in the Mediterranean since 1912, was soon to be transferred to the Turkish navy. All German battlecruisers had 28cm guns against the 12in and 13.5in guns equipping their British counterparts. In December Derfflinger (fitted with eight 30.5cm guns) was commissioned, thus bringing the number of German battlecruisers in the North Sea to four. After Tiger, the Royal Navy commissioned four more battlecruisers between 1916 and July 1917, all equipped with 15in guns. In addition, Furious was laid down as a battlecruiser to be armed with two single 18in guns. However, shortly after completion, she was converted into an aircraft carrier, first removing the forward gun and, later, the aft one too. In the same timeframe, German shipyards delivered only two battlecruisers (Lützow and Hindenburg), in August 1915 and October 1917 respectively. Broadly speaking, although it suffered more combat losses (three battlecruisers sunk at Jutland compared to one German), the Royal Navy constantly maintained a quantitative superiority in battlecruisers even when considering the temporary unavailability of some of them due to accidents or repairs. As for naval operations, apart from some exceptions during the initial phases of the war (Coronel, Falklands, the Mediterranean and Dardanelles),

the actions of the British and German surface forces took place almost exclusively in the North Sea. In contrast to the rationale behind the birth of this new type of surface combatant, the battlecruisers were not widely used for protecting maritime commerce or smashing slower and less wellarmed enemy forces, namely armoured and light cruisers. Rather, they were used as the fleet’s ‘quick reaction force’ to both fight against their counterparts and act as the vanguard and support of the main battle force. When, after the battle of Heligoland Bight in August 1914, Wilhelm II forbade exposing the Hochseeflotte to the risk of heavy losses, the German battlecruisers also became the only type of major surface combatant that could be ‘expended’ at sea as in the raids carried out against the British coast and, in the final phase of the war, to intercept Allied shipping in the North Sea. Chapter 2 provided technical considerations concerning design compromises between armament, protection and speed, of paramount importance with regard to operational use. It is worth recalling here that Tirpitz’s vision (‘the main task of a warship is to stay afloat’) was duly applied to the design and construction of German battlecruisers. As a result, they showed on several occasions (at Dogger Bank and Jutland but also when struck by mines or hit by torpedoes in the North Sea, the Mediterranean and the Black Sea), a remarkable capacity to withstand damage caused by both large calibre guns – including the 15in guns of the Queen Elizabeth class battleships at Jutland – and underwater weapons. British battlecruisers have often been criticised for their poor protection but the major risk (and, at Jutland, the cause of the loss of three of them) was not actually insufficient thickness of decks and belts but fires and ammunition explosions. Thus, British losses were caused not so much by design choices as by incautious storage of propellant charges and ammunition-handling procedures that were incompatible with safety. Apart from technical characteristics, many other aspects affected the capabilities and performance of a warship, such as doctrine, training, logistics, leadership and last, but not least, intelligence.

The battleships of the Second Battle Squadron of the German High Seas Fleet at sea for a training cruise before the First World War. (US Defenseimagery. mil photo HD-SN-9902146)

As for doctrine, it is worth noting that before the war both navies underestimated effective engagement distances, believing that 10,000-12,000 yards was a limit hard to overcome in a combat involving ships of the line. Such a limit also took into account visibility conditions, especially in the North Sea. Yet the first actions disproved this assumption.1 This led to both unexpected ammunition consumption and, on German ships, the need to increase the maximum elevations of guns so as to produce a more effective engagement range. In terms of training, both the Royal Navy and the Kaiserliche Marine scored very highly. In many circumstances, the German Navy demonstrated superiority in fighting because they straddled their targets more quickly and achieved a good concentration of impact points. This was due to several factors such as gun accuracy, propellant charge homogeneity, rangefinder quality, better ballistic calculation equipment and centralised fire control. There was, however, another important difference. Before Jutland, the procedure to determine the distance in a naval engagement used by the Royal Navy called for firing a first ‘short’ shell which was then followed by one or more shells with range ‘corrected’ in accordance with spotting earlier shell splashes until achieving a straddle on the target. Then rapid and continuous fire could begin.2 The German procedure was different and decidedly faster.

Three rapid salvoes fired at different elevations gave a first ‘bracket’ on the target and so there was no need to wait for spotting shell splashes in order to correct elevation for the following salvoes. Often, a single salvo was sufficient to straddle the enemy and this provided German battleships and battlecruisers with a decisive advantage. As mentioned in Chapter 2, naval basing was a decisive weakness for Germany. Because of their deep draught, entrance and exit of large ships from the main bases in the North Sea, Wilhelmshaven and Cuxhaven, were greatly affected by shoals and tide. In addition, the locks and dams system was time consuming, especially when large squadrons or even the entire Hochseeflotte had to sail. As for communications, both navies had high-level equipment and organisations. The Royal Navy used shore and onboard W/T systems developed by the Marconi Company, while the German Navy, both for technological independence and security reasons, chose national equipment.3 In addition to reliable W/T systems, the German ships also used effective jamming equipment which, in many circumstances (the raids on Yarmouth and Scarborough and at Dogger Bank) harmed the enemy’s communications and delayed his reaction. Conversely, a Royal Navy point of strength was communications intelligence, focused on Room 40 at the Admiralty. With two strokes of luck, Britain’s ability to decipher German W/T signals soon became impressive. The first was the capture of the German ciphering code ‘Signalbuch der Kaiserliche Marine’ (SKM) from the wreck of the light cruiser Magdeburg, sunk in the Baltic Sea. On 26 August 1914, the Russians recovered the SKM code and had passed it to the Admiralty by late October. The second event occurred on 30 November when a British fishing trawler recovered, off the island of Texel on the Dutch coast, a sealed chest that had been dropped overboard by the German torpedo boat S-119 during a fight on 17 October between a German flotilla which was heading for the British coast to lay minefields and a British squadron.

John Rushworth Jellicoe (1859-1935) joined the Royal Navy as a cadet in 1872, qualified as a gunnery officer in 1883, became Director of Naval Ordnance in 1905 and was promoted to full admiral on 4 August 1914, when he took command of the Grand Fleet. He held that post until November 1916, when he was appointed First Sea Lord. (Library of Congress, Bain collection)

The chest contained a copy of the ‘Verkersbuch’, the code intended for communication with warships operating overseas and with German embassies and naval attachés abroad, as well as some charts of the North Sea marked with the German operational grids used to plot friendly and enemy ships. By 3 December, this material was in Room 40. From then on, and also

because the German navy did not realise its codes had been compromised, London was able to read all German communications including those between shore commands and ships at sea. This provided the Royal Navy with an immeasurable operational advantage. In the following years, the only way for Germany to limit the damage was to drastically reduce W/T traffic, a heavy restriction that often affected operational situations. From an economic point of view, it is worth assessing the construction of battlecruisers in terms of ‘value for money’. Britain spent about £31.5 million to procure fifteen battlecruisers, including Furious but excluding Hood, which was not completed until 1920. Germany spent RM342 million4 to build seven ships; i.e. less than half what Britain spent.

David Richard Beatty (1871-1936) joined the Royal Navy as a cadet in 1884. In 1912, he was appointed Private Naval Secretary to the new First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill. In 1913, Beatty became commander of the First Battlecruiser Squadron, which he led at the battles of Heligoland Bight, Dogger Bank and Jutland. (Library of Congress, Bain collection)

At the end of the day, Britain’s financial effort proved not only more sustainable in relation to the Empire’s economy, but also more rewarding. This consideration actually applies to both battlecruisers and the entire surface fleet. Indeed, despite the massive financial effort required to implement Tirpitz’s Naval Laws, the Hochseeflotte was never able to

challenge the Royal Navy’s command of the North Sea and was largely confined to home waters for the duration of the conflict. Several factors contributed to a failure to make a return on the capital invested by Germany. Some have already been mentioned while others are discussed in the description of combat actions. On the eve of the First World War, and in accordance with its centuries-old tradition, Britain was an empire fully aware that the command of the sea was extremely important. The country was ready to support this awareness by all means in the political, legislative and economic fields. Other than a first rate navy, Britain had another important asset: a number of admirals and captains able to fight in accordance with what Fisher called a ‘Nelsonic temperament’. That means they were courageous officers endowed with initiative and prepared to bear the risks associated with their decisions, even when they ‘anticipated’ orders or in some cases simply ignored them.5 The history and traditions of the German Navy were just decades old but it, too, could rely on several brilliant and courageous leaders. Beatty, commander of the British battlecruisers force, had a worthy counterpart in Admiral Hipper, whereas many others, both officers and personnel, showed competence and expertise. The behaviour of the German captains and crews at the Falklands, and those of Blücher at Dogger Bank, is a valid example of professionalism, determination and courage. The same applies to Von der Tann’s captain at Jutland, where the ship, after being reduced to a hulk almost devoid of fighting capabilities, remained in line with the other German battlecruisers to prevent the enemy concentrating his fire on them. However, while Beatty and the Royal Navy were supported by a government and a country convinced of their fleet’s capabilities and ready to risk it in the cause of victory, Hipper had to deal with a very different situation. The Kaiser and his naval advisors, up to and including Admiral Hugo von Pohl, the commander of Hochseeflotte in 1915-16, were unwilling to expose the fleet to the uncertainties of battle. The attitude of Wilhelm II seriously limited his commanders’ freedom of action. The Kaiser feared that ‘his’ beloved navy could suffer losses which would be hard to replace and potentially dangerous for the future of Germany. In this way, Wilhelm II took a significant part of the value away from the powerful tool built by Tirpitz, transforming it from a fearsome weapon into a ‘treasure’ to be carefully preserved, so much so that it became virtually impossible to exploit. This attitude could perhaps have changed towards the end of the war when

Scheer became the head of Admiralstab and Hipper took command of the Hochseeflotte. However, it was too late for bolder leadership, willing to risk the surface fleet, to produce sizeable results. Evidence shows that the opportunities missed by the Hochseeflotte due to the cautious and fearful behaviour obsessively imposed by the Kaiser diminished the role it could have played during the war. The main actions involving British and German battlecruisers are described in the following pages. It should be noted that this is not a general history of the maritime operations of the First World War but a summary of actions in which battlecruisers played a role. Such actions are discussed in chronological order, from Goeben’s escape through the Mediterranean to the scuttling of the Hochseeflotte at Scapa Flow. This general rule allows a few exceptions; some minor actions have been grouped according to the operational theatre (namely the Baltic and the Black Sea), thus avoiding an excessive fragmentation of the text.

Reinhardt Scheer (1863-1928) joined the Kaiserliche Marine as a cadet in 1879. By the outbreak of the First World War, he was the commander of the Second Battle Squadron. In January 1916, he was promoted full admiral and became commander of the High Seas Fleet, which he led at the battle of Jutland. In 1918, he was appointed Chief of the Naval Staff. (Library of Congress, Bain collection)

THE ESCAPE OF GOEBEN Even before the opening of hostilities, British and German battlecruisers had become antagonists in 1914. Goeben, deployed from Germany to the Mediterranean in 1912 to show the flag and strengthen naval cooperation within the Triple Alliance, entered Pula naval base on 19 July to execute

some boiler repairs that could not be further postponed. Repairs were almost complete when the German government informed Rear-Admiral Wilhelm Souchon, commander of the Mediterranean Naval Division (including Goeben and the light cruiser Breslau), that the outbreak of war was imminent. Goeben left Pula on 29 July. To avoid remaining bottled up in the Adriatic, and after a short stop at Trieste for coaling, Souchon headed south. His plan was to attack ships transporting French troops from North Africa to France, then set course for Gibraltar, exit into the Atlantic and, if possible, reach Germany. The obstacle to this plan was mainly represented by the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet led by Admiral Sir Archibald Berkeley Milne. Based in Malta, this fleet included three battlecruisers (Inflexible, flagship, Indefatigable and Indomitable, forming the Second Battlecruiser Squadron, BCS), four armoured cruisers (First Cruiser Squadron, CS, led by Rear Admiral Troubridge), four light cruisers and a flotilla of sixteen destroyers.

Franz von Hipper (1863-1932) joined the German navy as a cadet in 1881. He commanded torpedo boats and cruisers before being appointed commander of the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe in October 1913, a position he held until he succeeded Scheer as commander of the High Seas Fleet in 1918. (R Stanglini Collection)

The battlecruiser Goeben in the Mediterranean, followed by the light cruiser Breslau. The two ships comprised the Kaiserliche Marine’s Mediterranean Division from November 1912 until it was disbanded in August 1914 when both cruisers were transferred to Turkey. (R Stanglini Collection)

The international situation was volatile and continuously evolving. Italy declared its neutrality on 2 August 1914, Britain declared war on Germany on 4 August (at midnight Berlin time), while France didn’t declare war on Austria-Hungary until 10 August. On 30 July, the Admiralty sent instructions to Milne. His task was to protect the transfer of French troops from Algeria to France and to intercept Goeben if she tried to interfere. Milne was, however, to avoid fighting against superior forces6 while waiting for reinforcements. On 1 August, Souchon dropped anchor off Brindisi, but local Italian authorities did not allow coaling. At 17.00 Goeben headed south and soon was joined by Breslau, coming from Durres in Albania. The light cruiser was sent to Messina in Sicily for coaling and, at 15.00 on 2 August, Goeben joined her. After some difficulties, the German embassy in Rome ensured the ships were allowed to embark 2,000 tons of coal; at 01.00 on 3 August both

ships sailed through the northern exit of the Strait of Messina. Souchon wanted to intercept the French transport ships between North Africa and Toulon and to bombard Philippeville (now named Skidka) and Bona (Annaba) in Algeria, where one French division was supposed to board the transport ships. While steaming north, at 18.00 on 3 August Souchon got a message informing him that Germany was at war with France. At 21.00, south of Sardinia, his ships parted company: Goeben headed for Philippeville and Breslau for Bona. Fearing a German attack, France had postponed the transfer of troops for some days. Meanwhile, at 04.00 on 3 August, the French fleet left Toulon and steered for the Algerian coast. At the Admiralty, Churchill was sending Milne a stream of orders, clarifications and corrections. On 3 August, he said ‘Watch on mouth of Adriatic should be maintained but Goeben is your objective’. On 4 August, Churchill, anticipating the declaration of war against Germany, ordered Milne ‘If Goeben attacks French transports, you should at once engage her.’ Shortly after, Churchill changed the order because the Cabinet had banned combat operations before the expiration of the ultimatum and said ‘No act of war should be committed before that hour. […] This cancels the authorisation […] to engage Goeben if she attacks French transports’. Unaware of German warship movements, on 1 August Milne had concentrated the Mediterranean Fleet at Malta. Following the Admiralty’s instructions on 2 August, he sent Troubridge with two battlecruisers, three armoured cruisers, the light cruiser Gloucester and eight destroyers to the Ionian Sea, to monitor the exit of the Adriatic; the light cruiser Chatham was ordered to reconnoitre the Strait of Messina. At 08.00 on 3 August, Chatham informed Milne that there were no German warships at Messina.7 Thus the admiral, assuming that Goeben and Breslau were heading west, ordered Troubridge to leave Gloucester and eight destroyers on station and come back to Malta with the other ships. At 13.30 orders changed again: Troubridge and the First CS were sent to support Gloucester. Meanwhile, the Admiralty was concerned that Goeben was heading for the Atlantic: on the evening of 3 August Milne was ordered to send Indomitable and Indefatigable at full speed to Gibraltar to seal off the Mediterranean. While Souchon was nearing the Algerian coast, at 02.35 on 4 August a message from Berlin ordered him to head at full speed for Constantinople8 where Goeben’s presence was deemed necessary to exert pressure on Turkey.

Although it had signed a defensive alliance with Germany against Russia, the Ottoman Empire was actually reluctant to wage war. Souchon, about to go into action, decided not to proceed immediately according to the new orders and continued towards the African coast which he reached a few hours later. Since there were no French ships at Philippeville Goeben targeted a barrack, the railway station and some stores, firing a score of 15cm rounds that caused little damage. Meanwhile, Breslau was attacking Bona where she fired a few 10cm rounds, but with poor results. At 08.00 the German ships left; before heading for Constantinople, they planned to call at Messina since coal was badly needed.

Admiral Archibald Berkeley Milne (1855-1938) was the commander of the Mediterranean Fleet at the outbreak of the war and, as such, responsible for pursuing and intercepting the German battlecruiser Goeben and the cruiser Breslau. His mission was to prevent the enemy ships attacking French ships transporting troops from Algeria to Europe and/or attempting to reach the Atlantic through the Strait of Gibraltar. Goeben and Breslau eventually escaped to Constantinople. (Photo by Queen Alexandra, 1907)

While entering the Sardinia Channel from the west, Souchon, for the first time, met the British warships. At 10.32, Indomitable (under Captain

Kennedy), which was steaming at 22 knots toward Gibraltar, sighted Goeben at 17,000 yards. Because Britain and Germany were still at peace, the main guns were trained fore and aft. Although crews were at action stations there was no engagement. During some thrilling minutes, Souchon watched the two British battlecruisers pass on an opposite course 8,000 yards apart and then leave astern. Soon after, Kennedy reversed course and, positioning his ships on both sides astern of the German ships, began to follow Goeben at 10,000 yards. Kennedy informed Milne, while Souchon, trying to escape, gradually increased his speed. However, the difference in speed was not enough, and good visibility allowed the British ships (which were joined by the light cruiser Dublin at 15.00) to keep contact. The situation was critical because each of the two formations could be informed at any time of the declaration of war, open fire without warning and catch the enemy off guard. Souchon, trying to deceive the British ships about his real destination, steered for Naples but, at 16.00, ordered Breslau to head for Messina for coaling. In the afternoon, visibility deteriorated. This, and Goeben’s superior speed, allowed Souchon to break away from the British battlecruisers. Only Dublin could maintain contact while Inflexible and Indomitable were diverted to patrolling the Sardinia Channel. At about midnight the radio station at Sibenik, in modern Croatia, relayed to Souchon a message from Berlin which said ‘Krieg mit England’ (‘War with England’). An hour later, Milne received a similar message from Malta. At 07.30 on 5 August, Goeben arrived in Messina. Some Italian destroyers were cruising close to the Calabrian coast but did not show hostile intent. The Italian government allowed Souchon to coal ‘for the last time’, but recalled that international law permitted belligerent warships to call in a neutral port for a maximum of twenty-four hours before being interned. Therefore, Souchon was allowed to remain at Messina until the afternoon on 6 August. At 19.00 on 4 August the Admiralty informed Milne that Italian neutrality had to be ‘rigidly respected’. He was ordered to stay outside Italian territorial waters, thus not entering the Strait of Messina. Assuming that Souchon would steer west, Milne neither sent his battlecruisers north of the strait to check the German ships’ movements, nor positioned one battlecruiser to guard each exit of the Strait, so as to block their escape. Judging that protection of the French transports was still his main mission, Milne – who was sailing through the Sicilian Channel with Inflexible and other light units – ordered Indefatigable and Indomitable to join him at 12.00 on 5 August off

Pantelleria and informed the Admiralty about his decisions. Gloucester was sent to guard the southern exit of the Strait of Messina. In the early afternoon on 5 August, Milne sent Indomitable to Bizerte in Tunisia for coaling while Inflexible and Indefatigable steamed north. Meanwhile, Souchon was still in Messina. At noon on 6 August, after coaling was completed, he gave his exhausted crews some rest before leaving. One hour earlier, Berlin had sent bad news: calling at Constantinople was no longer advisable, while Austria-Hungary (still at peace with Britain and France) was not available to support the German warships. Under such circumstances, Souchon was authorised to choose his destination freely. At 17.00, Goeben and Breslau left Messina heading south: assuming that he could neither reach the Atlantic nor escape into the Adriatic, Souchon decided to steer for Constantinople.9 At 06.30 on 6 August, Milne moved the patrolling area to the north of Sicily. While he was heading for the Tyrrhenian Sea, Gloucester (under Captain Howard Kelly) informed him that Souchon was steaming south. Thus, Milne decided to round the western end of Sicily and call at Malta for coaling before resuming the chase in the morning of 7 August. While Gloucester was following Goeben and Breslau, Kelly informed Milne that the German ships were steaming east and then northeast, sailing along Calabria’s coast, apparently heading for the Adriatic.

Inflexible during a visit to the United States before the outbreak of the war. Inflexible was

the flagship of Admiral Milne in the Mediterranean. Indefatigable and Indomitable were the first to sight Goeben and Breslau, in the Sardinia Channel, on the morning of 4 August 1914. The German ships, after bombarding French ports in North Africa, were heading to Messina for coaling. (Library of Congress)

Souchon stayed on this course for a few hours, then, at 22.45, he ordered Goeben and Breslau to alter course to southeast and head for Cape Matapan. With Gloucester still following the German ships, Troubridge was now on the spot. The First CS10 was steaming off the Greek island of Cephalonia. Troubridge assumed that the German ships were heading for the Adriatic, thus he planned to intercept and engage them off Corfu. Only at about midnight did Kelly inform him that Souchon was heading southeast. Troubridge changed course to south still hoping to engage the enemy before dawn.11 Shortly before 04.00 it became clear that the First CS, then off Zante, could not reach Goeben in time. Thus, Troubridge abandoned the chase and informed Milne. At sunrise on 7 August, Souchon sighted Gloucester’s column of smoke astern. The British cruiser continued chasing even though, at 06.30, Milne had ordered Kelly ‘to gradually drop astern to avoid capture’. At about 13.00, Breslau, trying to distract Gloucester,12 moved away from Goeben and pretended to lay mines in her wake. Kelly, determined to keep contact, opened fire on Breslau at 13.35, increased speed to come alongside the enemy and exchanged broadsides.13 At that point, Goeben changed course and opened fire with her 11in guns against Gloucester which, however, was out of range. Kelly, satisfied at having momentarily stopped the escape of the enemy to the east, dropped astern without breaking contact. Only at 16.40, short of coal and with Milne ordering her not to sail beyond Cape Matapan, Gloucester broke off, while Goeben and Breslau steamed east. At noon on 7 August, Milne was temporarily relieved when four French cruisers were made available by Admiral Boué de Lapeyrère14 to guard the western entrance of the Sicilian Channel. Thus, he headed for Malta with Inflexible and Indefatigable. Shortly after, Indomitable, in need of urgent boiler repairs, also reached Valletta in Malta. Milne considered it inadvisable to split his force by sending one of his battlecruisers to chase Goeben. Moreover, he was still convinced that his main duty was to maintain his position in order to intercept the German ships should they head west. Therefore, he remained in Malta until 02.00 on 8

August, when he left and headed for Cape Matapan, where the enemy had been sighted eight hours earlier. At 14.00, while Milne steamed east at twelve knots, the Admiralty sent a message that ordered, ‘Commence hostilities at once against Austria’. Thus, Milne turned north to join Troubridge at the exit of the Adriatic Sea and abandoned the quest for Goeben. Only at 18.00, after some checks, was it evident that the message sent at 14.00 was the result of an error.15 Later, another message informed him that the situation with Austria remained critical so Milne kept his fleet concentrated. Only at 12.00 on 9 August, did the Admiralty clarify that Britain was not at war with Austria-Hungary and that the quest for Goeben must be resumed. However, Souchon was by now too far away. No longer trailed by Gloucester, the German ships steamed through the islands of the Aegean Sea. Souchon signalled a collier, coming from Piraeus, to meet him at Denusa, a remote Aegean island. Goeben and Breslau dropped anchor there in the morning of 8 August and began coaling. Souchon had sent the auxiliary cruiser General to Izmir to contact the German Embassy in Constantinople16 in order to get the Turkish government’s permission to enter the Dardanelles. Throughout the day on 9 August, he vainly waited for an answer. Beginning at about 21.00 on 9 August, German W/T operators began picking up signals from British warships. The signals grew louder as Milne, who at 22.55 had rounded the southern tip of the Peloponnese, headed east. At 03.00 on 10 August, still without news from Constantinople, Souchon decided he could not wait any longer and he left Denusa and headed north along the Turkish coast. Meanwhile, Milne steamed in fruitlessly through the Aegean islands. At 17.00, Goeben and Breslau dropped anchor off Cape Helles, at the western mouth of the Dardanelles, waiting for permission to enter. After some hours of stressful waiting, during which the Turkish forts at Kum Kale and Seed el Badr trained their guns on the German ships, at 20.00 Souchon asked the Turkish authorities to provide a pilot. Two destroyers emerged from the small harbour at Cape Helles and signalled the German ships to follow.17 At sunset, gliding past Chanak, Goeben and Breslau dropped anchor at Nagara Point. The escape was complete. Goeben’s entrance into the Dardanelles was welcomed in Britain, where the Royal Navy was hailed as having swept the Mediterranean clean of a dangerous presence and the German navy derided for what was characterised as a shameful internment. Actually, the story had serious consequences, both

politically and disciplinary. On the morning of 12 August, a Turkish destroyer reached the British cruiser Weymouth, on station at the mouth of the Dardanelles, to inform her captain that the Turkish government had bought Goeben and Breslau. On 16 August, during a solemn ceremony in which the German flag was lowered and replaced by the Turkish one, Goeben was renamed Yavuz Sultan Selim while Breslau became Midilli. The German sailors wore fezzes but remained aboard. On 23 September, Souchon was appointed commander in chief of the Turkish Navy, but the plan of the Germans and Enver Pasha to have Turkey join the war were still unsuccessful. On 27 October, with Enver Pasha’s collaboration, Souchon left the Bosphorus with his fleet for ‘manoeuvres’ and headed for the Black Sea, steaming toward the Russian coast. During the morning of 29 October, separate elements of his fleet bombarded Odessa, Sevastopol and Novorossiysk. On 30 October, the British ambassador presented an ultimatum to the Turkish government, demanding that the German crews be removed from Goeben and Breslau within twelve hours. The ultimatum was rejected. Thus, on 3 November, Indomitable, Indefatigable and two French battleships bombarded the forts at the entrance of the Dardanelles. On 4 November, Russia declared war on Turkey and was followed, the day after, by Britain and France. The ultimate objective of Goeben and Breslau’s run to Constantinople was finally achieved. In Britain, early satisfaction that the Mediterranean had been ‘cleansed’ of German ships quickly soured into mortification. Milne, recalled to England, was sent to a Court of Inquiry. On 30 August, the Court announced that their Lordships ‘approved in all respects’ the measures taken by the commander of the Mediterranean Fleet during the crisis. However, this formal acquittal was not enough to revive Milne’s fortunes. In September, Troubridge also returned to Britain to face a Court of Inquiry. The Court concluded that he had foresaken ‘a very fair chance of delaying Goeben by materially damaging her’ and passed the case up to a court martial. On 9 November, the court acquitted Troubridge, ruling that Goeben was a ‘superior force’ compared to the four armoured cruisers. Thus, Troubridge, refusing to engage the enemy, had obeyed the Admiralty guidelines. However, acquittal did nothing to rehabilitate Troubridge; he was never again assigned to any important post. During the chase of Goeben across the Mediterranean there was no direct

clash between battlecruisers and, thus, no opportunity to assess their performances. Numerous coalings imposed by offensive forays, escapes and chases from the North African coast to the Aegean provided evidence of the range limits of this type of ship, especially when forced to steam at high speed. However, these limits weighed more on the German Navy, forced to rely on supplies at sea from commandeered or rented colliers, than on the Royal Navy supported by a large network of worldwide bases and supply ports.

THE RAID ON THE HELIGOLAND BIGHT The first month of war was nearing its end. In the North Sea, the Grand Fleet was still waiting for the opportunity to give battle to the German Fleet. The proposal to raid the Heligoland Bight, in order to provoke a reaction from the enemy navy, was submitted to the Admiralty by Commodore Reginald Tyrwhitt, commander of the Harwich destroyer flotilla, and Commodore Roger Keyes, commander of the submarines also based at Harwich. Keyes’s boats had been patrolling German waters since the first hours of the war and had thus acquired knowledge of the movements and habits of the enemy’s light forces that counteracted British submarines and minelayers. The plan would use British submarines as bait to attract the German destroyers, providing Tyrwhitt’s light cruisers and destroyers with the opportunity to attack them. Other British submarines would ambush enemy vessels that might be at sea near Heligoland. The Admiralty’s War Staff, under Vice-Admiral Frederick Sturdee, was not impressed by this proposal, thus Keyes applied directly to the First Lord, Churchill, who saw him on 23 August. Churchill was impressed by Keyes’s initative and, with his support, the Admiralty approved the plan the day after, with some changes. The operation was scheduled for 28 August. The plan involved risk. It meant exposing almost fifty British submarines and light combatants within a short distance of Wilhelmshaven. Both Tyrwhitt and Keyes requested the support of the Grand Fleet but Sturdee opposed it, and allowed only the positioning of two battlecruisers (New Zealand and Invincible) forty miles northwest of Heligoland and the stationing of four armoured cruisers further to the west. The operation began on 26 August with the submarines leaving their base, followed the next morning by Tyrwhitt’s two light cruisers (Arethusa, flagship, and Fearless) and thirty-two destroyers. Jellicoe was only informed

of the operation on 26 August. He was alarmed and immediately asked for more details. He also told the Admiralty that, in absence of different dispositions, he would sail on the morning of 27 August. Sturdee replied that the Grand Fleet’s cooperation was not required; however, Jellicoe could support New Zealand and Invincible with Lion, Queen Mary and Princess Royal. Thus, led by Rear-Admiral Beatty, they left Scapa Flow at 05.00 on 27 August escorted by the six ships of the First Light Cruiser Squadron, led by Commodore Goodenough. Shortly after, Jellicoe left Scapa Fow with the Grand Fleet, informing the Admiralty when his ships were already at sea. Only at 13.00 did the Admiralty acquaint Tyrwhitt and Keyes with these new reinforcements, but, due to a mistake, the message sent to Harwich never reached the ships at sea. Tyrwhitt was informed directly by Goodenough only at dawn on 28 August, on the eve of the battle. Keyes was informed still later and in a much more dangerous way when, after 08.15, the destroyer Lurcher (his flagship) met Goodenough’s cruisers and mistook them for German ships. The first real contact between the opposing forces occurred at 07.00 when Arethusa sighted the German destroyer G-194 three miles ahead. The destroyer immediately turned towards Heligoland, pursued by four British destroyers. The captain of G-194 informed his superior, Rear-Admiral Leberecht Maass,18 that he had met an enemy ship. In turn, Maas signalled Hipper, who, besides commanding the German battlecruisers, was also responsible for the defence of the Heligoland Bight. However, low tide prevented the heavy German ships leaving the Jade before noon; thus, the German destroyers could initially rely only on support from two light cruisers, Frauenlob and Stettin, already on station. The first part of the battle was fought, on the British side, by Tyrwhitt’s two cruisers and some destroyers and, by the German side, by Frauenlob, Stettin and some destroyers and minesweepers. The fight developed into chases and short skirmishes hampered by haze and ended at 08.15. The Germans tried to take shelter close to Heligoland, while the British were forced to give up and retreat to avoid the coastal batteries. By then, Arethusa, Frauenlob and three German destroyers had been damaged. Shortly after turning west, Tyrwhitt met six German destroyers that were returning to Heligoland after their patrol mission. They fled south but the flotilla leader, V-187, was forced to reverse course toward Tyrwhitt when she unexpectedly met two light cruisers of Goodenough’s van, coming from the

northwest. Surrounded and fired on by eight destroyers, V-187 sank at 09.10. This event was followed by an extremely confused and highly risky phase for the British ships, due to the Admiralty’s delay in informing Tyrwhitt and Keyes about the presence of Goodenough’s cruisers. As a consequence, the submarine E-6 fired two torpedoes at Southampton, mistaking her for a German cruiser. E-6 narrowly missed the target, and shortly after was nearly rammed by the cruiser. At 10.15, Tyrwhitt again decided to turn west, recalling his destroyers. He ordered Fearless to provide cover for Arethusa while she was temporarily repairing damage caused by the fight with Frauenlob. At 10.40, Arethusa was able to steam again at 20 knots, just in time to face the growing German reaction. By then, three additional light cruisers (Köln, Strassburg and Ariadne) had left Wilhelmshaven and another, Mainz, had left the Ems estuary at 10.00, some thirty-five miles to the west, to cut off the British retreat. At 08.50, Hipper had requested permission from the commander-inchief, Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl, to send out Moltke and Von der Tann and, by now, was raising steam and waiting for the tide to rise enough to cross the Jade bar.

Mainz was the first German light cruiser to be sunk during the battle of Heligoland Bight. She was scuttled by her crew after being hit by several medium calibre shells and a torpedo during a skirmish with British light forces.

At 11.00 Arethusa was sighted and fired on first by Strassburg, soon forced to withdraw after a torpedo attack by British destroyers, and then by Köln, also forced to retreat in the face of the same threat. Tyrwhitt had mistaken Köln for a more powerful armoured cruiser and asked Beatty’s support, who was then cruising 40 miles northwest. Without the information to build a clear picture, Beatty did not want to expose his battlecruisers to a three-fold risk: minefields, a submarine attack (including from Keyes’s boats, which were not aware of his presence in the area) and the Hochseeflotte battleships which, favoured by poor visibility, could catch him by surprise. At 11.35, pressed by Tyrwhitt’s request and fearing that any further hesitation would eventually be fatal to the Harwich Force, Beatty ordered the battlecruisers to head southeast and steam at full speed toward the British ships under attack. Meanwhile, Tyrwhitt, who was again turning west, was attacked by Mainz. After a brief skirmish the German cruiser broke off contact to escape from Goodenough’s cruisers, suddenly sighted to the northwest. Mainz reversed course toward the south, only to again meet Tyrwhitt’s destroyers. Both sides opened fire; Mainz damaged three destroyers but took a torpedo and several shells from the British light cruisers that wrecked the German ship. At 12.20, Mainz’s captain gave the order to scuttle her. The cruiser went down at 13.10, taking eighty-nine men with her. At 12.40, while Köln and Strassburg again attacked Arethusa and the British destroyers, Beatty’s battlecruisers arrived. In a few minutes their accurate fire put Köln out of action and forced Strassburg to retreat. At 12.56, Beatty sighted Ariadne ahead and Lion and Princess Royal opened fire on her. The German ship, completely enveloped by flames, was abandoned by her crew and sank at 15.10. Worried by the sighting of some mines and fearing being too close to Heligoland and the German bases, Beatty ordered a turn to the north at 13.10 and then west at 13.25. During her course alteration, Lion sighted Köln, which, after the first fight, had retreated northeast. In a few minutes, Lion’s heavy guns reduced her to a wreck and, at 13.25, the German cruiser capsized and sank. Several hundred men had had time to dive into the water but, due to the impossibility of providing immediate help, just a single survivor was found, rescued by a German destroyer two days later. Köln took with her Rear-Admiral Maass and about 500 men. The other German cruisers still on the spot escaped thanks to poor visibility which masked them from the British battlecruisers.

While Beatty was supporting Tyrwhitt’s ships and sailing home, at 14.10 Moltke and Von der Tann eventually left the Jade, and at 14.25 they came into contact with the retreating German light cruisers. Hipper, an hour astern in Seydlitz, ordered Moltke and Von der Tann not to engage the enemy. Hipper searched for the missing German ships from 15.10 until 16.00. With no sightings, he ordered his ships to return to the Jade before the next low tide. By 20.20, the German battlecruisers were back at Wilhelmshaven. Beatty’s battlecruisers and the First Light Cruiser Squadron arrived at Scapa Flow on the night of 30 August. In the afternoon of 29 August, Tyrwhitt had also arrived home, with Arethusa towed by the armoured cruiser Hogue.

Princess Royal was part of the battlecruiser force led by Vice-Admiral Beatty that, between 12.40 and 13.25 on 28 August 1914, overwhelmed the German light cruisers at the Heligoland Bight, sinking two and forcing a third to retreat. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

Three German cruisers and one destroyer were sunk during the battle of the Heligoland Bight; casualties included 712 dead and 336 prisoners of war. On the British side, Arethusa and three destroyers were damaged; causalities were only thirty-five dead and about forty wounded. The most serious German mistake was to send the light cruisers to attack one by one, without waiting to concentrate a stronger force. Thus, it became easier for the British

ships to overwhelm them. In addition, the armament of the German ships was inferior to that of the British light cruisers (10cm [4in] guns against 6in ones). On the British side, the Admiralty made a serious planning mistake when they failed to inform Jellicoe of the operational details and the at-sea commanders about what ships were to be present. If the Admiralty, forced by Jellicoe, had not sent Beatty and Goodenough to support Tyrwhitt, the result might have been a disaster. Poor visibility contributed to confusion during the engagements in which the only battlecruisers to play a role were the British. Deciding to enter the Heligoland Bight at full speed, Beatty took a considerable risk, but withdrew unharmed and become the hero of the day in Britain. Hipper, hampered by the tide, failed to intervene in time and even if he had succeeded he would have been outnumbered, even with the advantage of fighting close to his bases. The battlecruisers showed their overpowering superiority against light forces, as confirmed later at the Falklands. However, the lack of a direct comparison delayed learning the lessons that would come later, at least for the Germans, from the battle of Dogger Bank. For the German Navy, a serious consequence of the battle was the effect it had on the Kaiser. Stunned by the Nelsonian spirit shown by British captains and German losses, Wilhelm II ordered that the Hochseeflotte not be committed in circumstances that could result in heavy losses. Thus, the fleet was ordered neither to fight far from German bases nor against superior forces; the Kaiser would authorise in advance every important operation. In the future, this decision would deprive the German fleet of several opportunities for success.

THE BATTLE OF THE FALKLAND ISLANDS At 05.30 on 8 December 1914, the German Vice-Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee, having the Falkland Islands19 in view, ordered the cruisers Gneisenau, commanded by Captain Maerker, and Nürnberg to set out to reconnoitre Port Stanley, according to the bombardment plan agreed two days before at a meeting held at Picton Island,20 southern Chile. Von Spee would continue northeast with his flagship (Scharnhorst) and two light cruisers (Dresden and Leipzig), while three colliers that accompanied the squadron were ordered to wait near Port Pleasant, approximately 20 miles from the capital of the British archipelago. The aim was to destroy the W/T station at Port Stanley with gunfire and, during a quick landing, to burn coal stocks and try to seize the British governor. The latter was in retaliation for the capture

of the German governor of Samoa by New Zealand troops in late August. As the two German cruisers approached Port Stanley, they first spotted the antenna of the W/T station at Hooker’s Point. They then saw a column of smoke rising to the east. This was the armed merchant cruiser Macedonia patrolling the entrance to the harbour. At about 08.30 a denser cloud of smoke was sighted towards Port Stanley and Captain Maerker deduced this was evidence that the British, perhaps knowing an attack was imminent, were destroying coal stocks to prevent them from falling into enemy hands. Through the smoke and behind the low hills, the German lookouts also began to detect some signs of activity in the harbour – there were mastheads moving slowly eastwards. However, it was not until around 09.00 that Lt Cdr Bushe (Gneisenau’s gunnery officer), saw, through his binoculars, a threatening and completely unexpected sight: four tripod masts. To him, this meant dreadnoughts. However, according to information available to the Germans, there were no British dreadnoughts in the South Atlantic. Maerker, to whom Bushe reported the sighting, decided to consider it a mistake and therefore did not inform von Spee. The German cruisers subsequently continued towards their intended position just south of Cape Pembroke to begin the bombardment. While the German ships were approaching, the British garrison was already on alert. From the early hours of the morning, the squadron of ViceAdmiral Frederick Sturdee, who had arrived in Port Stanley on the morning of the previous day, 7 December,21 had begun to coal, so that he could sail in search of von Spee. At 07.30, a lookout on Sapper Hill sighted two columns of smoke approaching from the southwest. At 07.45 the battleship Canopus, deliberately grounded off Port Stanley, received the alarm. However, precious minutes were lost in relaying the message to Invincible. Canopus did not have a telephone connection to Sturdee’s flagship, nor was Canopus visible to Invincible. The signal ‘Enemy in sight’, hoisted by the battleship, was sighted by the cruiser Glasgow, under Captain Luce, who repeated it at 07.56 so that Invincible could see it. Invincible, however, gave no sign of having received the signal, thus Captain Luce ordered a gun to be fired to attract attention. At the same time he ordered his intelligence officer to climb aloft to identify the enemy ships. The Germans had achieved complete surprise. Invincible and Inflexible were still coaling from nearby colliers; Kent and Cornwall had not yet commenced coaling, while Bristol had put out boiler fires and opened up her engines to

carry out urgent repairs. Carnarvon and Glasgow had just filled their bunkers which left Kent as the only ship ready to fight. Sturdee got the message from Luce a few minutes before 08.00. Keeping calm, he ordered all the vessels to raise steam as fast as possible and sent his crews to have breakfast. At 08.10 a succession of flags on Invincible’s halyards notified the other ships of Sturdee’s next orders. Kent was to leave immediately to protect Macedonia. Secondly, all British vessels had to raise steam and confirm when they could reach a speed of 12 knots. If necessary, they could also open fire from their current position and Canopus was to open fire on the enemy ships as soon as they were within range.

Vice-Admiral Maximilian Graf von Spee (1861-1914) led the German squadron at the battle of the Falkland Islands on 8 December 1914. There, the German armoured cruisers Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were defeated by the faster and more heavily-armed British battlecruisers Invincible and Inflexible. (Library of Congress, Bain collection)

Unaware of the actual situation, Gneisenau and Nürnberg continued to approach Port Stanley to begin their bombardment. However, they were suddenly shocked by an unexpected event. At 09.20, two huge columns of water caused by the 12in rounds fired from Canopus rose from the sea, a

thousand yards short. Two more rounds followed closely. Canopus had opened fire at her maximum range of about 12,000 yards, as soon as a gunnery officer stationed at the observation post ashore reported that the enemy was within range. The German ships hoisted their battle flags and, seeing Kent coming out of the harbour, increased speed with the apparent intent of intercepting. However, the order came from von Spee to set a course of east by southeast to rejoin the flagship, then twelve miles away. This was because the conditions for an unopposed landing no longer existed. As von Spee ordered this move, he was still unaware of the presence of the British battlecruisers, but even the confrontation with an old battleship armed with 12in guns was to be avoided. Von Spee was sure he could rely on the higher speed of his ships to prevent that. By choosing to retire rather than attack, von Spee possibly gave up the opportunity to overwhelm Kent and concentrate his fire on British ships still in the harbour, where they would be able to use only a portion of their superior armament. In any case, by 09.50 all British ships (with the exception of Bristol which, delayed because of her partly disassembled engines, did not leave Port Stanley until 11.0022) were at sea or leaving the harbour, ready to start a chase. The weather was extremely favourable to the British. It was a clear, cloudless day with a calm sea and excellent visibility. These conditions are rarely found at those latitudes and were perfect for persuit and long-range shooting. Just the smoke plumes of the five German cruisers were visible on the horizon at the time, but the long period of light of the summer day offered Sturdee plenty of time to take advantage of his superior speed and armament. At 10.20, Sturdee raised the ‘General Chase’ signal and the two battlecruisers, steaming at 25 knots, soon overtook the slower armoured cruisers and took the lead in the formation. The German ships were southeast, about fifteen miles away, but Sturdee knew that all elements would play in his favour. His battlecruisers, thanks to their clean hulls, could reach 25 knots, while the German armoured cruisers, which had been at sea for months, were only able to reach 20 knots. Moreover, Invincible and Inflexible, each armed with eight 12in guns, could fire a broadside of 6,800lb at a maximum distance of 16,350 yards, whereas Scharnhorst and Gneisenau, whose main armament consisted of eight 21cm guns, could only fire a broadside of 1,956lb at a maximum range of 13,600 yards.23 Meanwhile, German binoculars were focused on the big warships coming

towards them, spewing clouds of smoke from their funnels. Von Spee now realised with growing dismay that the vessels he was dealing with were actually battlecruisers. Against them, the game was lost unless a miracle occurred. At 11.15, aware that the situation was under control, Sturdee ordered Invincible and Inflexible to reduce their speed to 20 knots and allow the slower armoured cruisers to come closer, so postponing the beginning of the engagement. At 11.32, Sturdee signalled for his crews to have lunch. By 12.20, noting that the German ships were still some ten miles ahead and his armoured cruisers were following too slowly, Sturdee decided he would use the battlecruisers to attack and gave the order to increase speed to 25 knots. At 12.47, while the German squadron headed southeast with Gneisenau and Nürnberg in the lead, followed by Scharnhorst, Dresden and Leipzig, the British admiral hoisted the signal ‘Engage the enemy’. Then, at 12.55, Inflexible opened fire with ‘A’ turret against Leipzig at a range of about 16,500 yards. A few minutes later, Invincible opened fire on the same target. However, the first salvoes fell short by a few thousand yards. By 13.10, the distance between the German ships and the battlecruisers had been reduced to about 13,000 yards. The British salvoes then neared Leipzig, which would have been at risk of suffering a deadly blow. At that point, von Spee decided to give his light cruisers a chance to escape. At 13.20 he ordered them to split up and try to get away,24 while Scharnhorst and Gneisenau turned to port to engage the British battlecruisers. At 13.30, the German armoured cruisers opened fire on the British vessels. The first shots fell short but, with the distance diminishing, the third salvo straddled Invincible. However, Sturdee was determined to maintain his distance so that his main guns could hit the enemy while allowing his ship to remain out of range. He therefore turned sharply to port, to attain a course parallel to the German ships. For about thirty minutes the British and German cruisers exchanged broadsides. During this time the accuracy of the British battlecruisers’ gunfire was seriously hampered by poor visibility due to thick funnel smoke that the wind carried towards the enemy, thus hiding it from sight and preventing the observation of shell splashes and hits. For its part, the German cruisers’ gunfire proved to be efficient and more accurate. Indeed, at 13.44 Invincible was hit by Scharnhorst. Then, to prevent a shot crippling any of his ships, Sturdee ordered a turn in order to move out of range. As a consequence, the

battle suffered a momentary interruption.

Vice-Admiral Frederick C Doveton Sturdee (1859-1925) arrived at Port Stanley, East Falkland, with his force, including two battlecruisers, on the morning of 7 December 1914. His ships were coaling on 8 December when the German squadron under von Spee approached the island to shell the harbour and nearby support facilities. (Library of Congress, Bain collection)

In this first phase, the British battlecruisers fired just over 200 large-calibre

rounds with rather disappointing results. Inflexible scored three hits on Gneisenau, one of them piercing the armoured deck. It then entered an ammunition magazine that had to be flooded to prevent further damage. Scharnhorst was hit only once by Invincible. On the other side, the German gunfire, though rapid and accurate, was not able to inflict appreciable damage. At 14.05 von Spee tried another tactic. Hoping that the smoke enveloping the British battlecruisers would momentarily hide his movements, he made a sharp turn south, both playing for time and hoping to meet weather conditions that might cover his attempt to escape. The range increased to 17,000 yards, but Sturdee realised what was occurring and also turned south, increasing his speed to 24 knots. Thus a second chase began, which ended at 14.45 when the range was again reduced to 15,000 yards. The British battlecruisers then turned to port in order to open the arc of fire of their turrets and resumed firing. Some minutes later, von Spee, giving up the attempt to flee, turned in the same direction and an intensive exchange of broadsides began. With the distance reduced to 10,000 yards, the German medium-calibre (5.9in) guns were now able to hit the enemy at maximum elevation. During the next fifteen minutes Invincible was hit several times but did not suffer any serious damage. The British battlecruisers’ gunfire also became more accurate and both Scharnhorst and Gneisenau were repeatedly hit. The thick smoke generated by the funnels and gunfire hindered the shooting of both British and German warships. Nevertheless, Gneisenau was hit below the waterline and two boiler rooms were flooded. In addition, both German cruisers suffered considerable damage to the batteries on the sides exposed to enemy fire.

Scharnhorst was the flagship of Vice-Admiral von Spee at the Falklands. On 1 November 1914, von Spee’s squadron defeated a British one led by Rear-Admiral Christopher Cradock off the Chilean coast at Coronel before heading for Cape Horn and the Atlantic Ocean. (Naval History and Heritage Command, US Navy)

At 15.15, Sturdee ordered a turn to port to bring his cruisers to windward of the German vessels, so as to be no longer hindered by the smoke. During the turn Invincible was hit aft by two 8.2in shells from Scharnhorst, but again she did not suffer any significant damage. Von Spee reacted by also turning his ships. This brought undamaged guns on the starboard side into action. An intense exchange followed but the German ships, notably Scharnhorst, were suffering from the fire that they had been subjected to for about forty-five minutes. As a result, von Spee’s flagship had lost a funnel and both masts, the superstructure and deck fittings were largely destroyed, while flames were visible inside the hull through large holes in the ship’s side. Despite the growing destruction caused by the British gunfire, the German starboard battery continued to fire until a few

minutes before 16.00. At that point, Sturdee signalled Scharnhorst to surrender but there was no reply. At 16.04 the cruiser, her bow halfsubmerged and almost adrift, but her battle flag still flying, began listing to port. Thirteen minutes later, Scharnhorst sank, carrying with her von Spee and her entire crew of 800 men. Before succumbing, von Spee sent a last message to Gneisenau ‘Try to escape, if your engines are still intact’, but Maerker had no doubt that his fate was also sealed. For the next hour and a half, Gneisenau was battered by Invincible, Inflexible and Carnarvon at ranges decreasing from 10,000 to 4,000 yards, but she continued to return fire until the end, even scoring a few hits on Invincible. At 17.40, having expended all ammunition, Maerker ordered Gneisenau to be scuttled. Scuttles were opened in the hull and charges exploded in the engine rooms. Gneisenau began to sink and disappeared beneath the waves at 18.00. About 300 survivors had time to get into the water and 190 were later recovered by British ships.25 The outcome of the battle was inevitable from the outset. The British battlecruisers had an overwhelming superiority in terms of speed and firepower, so the destruction of the German armoured cruisers was only a matter of time. Only an unpredictable factor such as adverse weather conditions or a lucky shot capable of slowing down or seriously damaging the British ships could have momentarily changed the fate of von Spee’s squadron. The German cruisers’ shooting was rapid and accurate, as Admiral Sturdee had no difficulty in recog-nising.26 Scharnhorst straddled Invincible with her third salvo, but despite scoring twenty-two hits, she failed to cause any major damage.27 Gneisenau was less successful against Inflexible,28 as her shooting was long hampered by the battlecruisers’ smoke. However, the German cruisers ceased firing only when their guns were no longer able to receive ammunition, either because the magazines had been emptied or they were no longer accessible due to battle damage. The British battlecruisers were slower in adjusting their gunfire: only three or four hits were scored out of 210 large-calibre rounds fired in the first phase of the chase. However, after Invincible and Inflexible found their targets and the range decreased, the mass of metal and explosives they released was relentless, playing havoc with the German armoured cruisers. During the engagement, Invincible fired 513 large-calibre rounds and Inflexible 66129 – a really impressive expenditure, considering that maximum wartime outfit was

110 rounds per barrel (peacetime outfit was eighty rounds per barrel, i.e. 640 rounds per ship). Furthermore, the closest place where the battlecruiser could replenish was Gibraltar. The number of 12in hits is estimated to have been about forty on Scharnhorst and fifty on Gneisenau. This is quite a high percentage in comparison with the total number of rounds fired, explained in part by the fact that many shots in the final phase of the fight were aimed at relatively close targets, while the enemy was virtually unable to reply. A number of factors limited, at least initially, the accuracy of the British shooting. Among these were: – The dense smoke generated by funnels and cordite clouds that obscured the targets and hindered both the observation of the salvoes’ fall and damage assessment. – The strong vibrations produced by the high speed developed in some phases of the combat, hampering the use of rangefinders. – The pressure wave, blast and smoke effects generated when ‘Q’ turret fired across the deck over ‘P’ turret, deafening and dazing ‘P’ turret’s crew. British gunners in the initial phase also lacked experience with long-range shooting because of insufficient practice in pre-war exercises. Finally, it is worth mentioning what happened to the armoured cruiser Kent during her confrontation with Nürnberg. A German 4in shell hit the gun port of a 6in gun on the British ship setting fire to one or more charges inside the casemate. Flames spread along the hoist into the ammunition magazine below where an alert sergeant, Charles Mayes RMLI, was quick enough to remove another charge exposed to the flame and flood the compartment, thus preventing a possible fatal explosion. The Admiralty failed to adequately assess the implications of the risk run by Kent, with consequences that became apparent both at Dogger Bank and Jutland.

YARMOUTH AND SCARBOROUGH: THE RAIDS AGAINST THE BRITISH COAST The raids against the British coast – beginning with the bombardment of Yarmouth on 3 November 1914 – had three aims: carrying out demonstrative actions with strong morale effects on both British and German public opinion; throwing a bait capable of attracting the Grand Fleet across a line of

U-boats or into German minefields; and finally, create opportunities for the Hochseeflotte to catch by surprise and overwhelm an inferior enemy force.30 The plan for 1. Aufklärungs-gruppe’s raid against Yarmouth was devised within these overall guidelines. In addition, the German Navy wanted to retaliate for the loss of four torpedo boats which had been intercepted and sunk off the Dutch island of Texel during an unsuccessful mine-laying action on 17 October. The raid’s formal authorisation came on 29 October 1914 and called for the light cruiser Stralsund to lay a minefield between Yarmouth and Lowestoft with close support provided by the battlecruisers who would, meanwhile, bombard Yarmouth’s harbour. At 16.30 on 2 November, Seydlitz (flagship), Moltke, Von der Tann, the armoured cruiser Blücher, four light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas left Wilhelmshaven and headed for the British coast. An hour and a half later, two battleship squadrons of the Hochseeflotte followed them. They would support Hipper and intervene against British forces should these pursue German ships returning to their bases. More concerned about mines than an improbable engagement with heavy enemy forces, Hipper was northeast of Yarmouth at dawn on 3 November. Shortly after, the light cruisers Strassburg and Graudenz sighted the gunboatminesweeper Halcyon, patrolling the area five miles away, with the destroyers Lively and Leopard. The two German cruisers opened fire but Hipper, afraid they could sail into a minefield, ordered them to retreat. At 07.12, Seydlitz and the other battlecruisers fired on the British ships. While Lively laid down a smoke screen to protect Halcyon, they were engaged by the German battlecruisers for fifteen minutes. Halcyon was slightly damaged and suffered three wounded, while Lively escaped undamaged. At 07.40, after Stralsund completed laying the mines, Hipper turned his ships back to sea. As the battlecruisers departed, they fired a few shells toward Yarmouth but the projectiles hit the beach.

Von der Tann steaming in the rear of the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe that bombarbed Yarmouth and Lowestoft on 3 November 1914, two days after the German victory at the battle of Coronel.

Meanwhile, the Admiralty, informed about the raid by Halcyon at about 07.00, waited since they feared that the bombardment of Yarmouth was a diversion to mask another and more dangerous action. Only at 09.55, once the picture became clearer, did the Admiralty order Beatty’s battlecruisers and the Grand Fleet’s battleships to chase Hipper but, by then, he was already too far away. The first major surface offensive carried out by the German Navy in the North Sea ended with the loss of the armoured cruiser Yorck,31 while Britain lost the submarine D-5 and two trawlers sunk off Yarmouth, probably by mines laid by Stralsund. Although the raid on Yarmouth proved unsuccessful, the relative ease with which Hipper had been able to approach and withdraw from the British coast led him to plan a new operation. On 16 November, von Ingenohl requested authorisation from the Kaiser, who approved the plan. The attack, originally planned for 22-24 November, envisaged the bombardment of military and industrial objectives at Scarborough, Whitby and Hartlepool (about 150 miles north of the towns targeted in the earlier attack), the laying of a minefield off those towns and a deployment of U-boats off Harwich and the Humber estuary in order to ambush British naval forces which might intervene. On 21 November, the submarine U-27 reconnoitred the area, searching for updated information on enemy minefields and coastal defences. The boat was back at Wilhelmshaven with the required information by 26 November but a

number of events – poor weather, leaks in the British press about a new and imminent German attack, the temporary unavailability of Von der Tann due to repairs and the news of the destruction of von Spee’s ships at the Falklands – led to several postponements. Therefore, Hipper departed from the Jade only at 03.00 on 15 December. Hipper led the 1. Aufklärungs-gruppe, with Seydlitz as flagship, Moltke, Von der Tann, the newly-commissioned Derfflinger32 and Blücher. The German force also included four light cruisers (with Kolberg carrying 100 mines) and eighteen destroyers. In the afternoon, fourteen battleships and eight predreadnoughts of the Hochseeflotte left their anchorages; they would wait for Hipper at the eastern border of the Dogger Bank. One hundred and seventy miles north of Heligoland, Hipper turned toward the British coast. The weather progressively worsened during the day so that, at dawn on 16 December, Stralsund, close to the British coast, reported to Hipper that poor visibility and the condition of the sea prevented an effective action against shore targets. Hipper decided, however, to carry on with the operation and sent back all light combatants, except Kolberg, toward the Hochseeflotte. At 07.40 Hipper split his force into two groups: the Northern Group, with Seydlitz, Moltke and Blücher, headed for Hartlepool while the Southern Group, including Von der Tann, Derfflinger and Kolberg, headed southwest to bombard Scarborough and Whitby and lay mines. Even before the German warships left the Jade, the Admiralty had been alerted about the imminent operation. The Royal Navy’s deciphering service, Room 40, was not operational at the time of the previous raid on Yarmouth but was now able to read most of the German radio traffic and the results were not long in coming. On the evening of 14 December, Churchill was informed that in a few hours the German battlecruisers would sail, probably reaching the British coast at dawn on 16 December. That night, orders were sent to Jellicoe, Tyrwhitt (Commander, Harwich Force), and Keyes (Commander, Submarines). Jellicoe was to immediately unleash Beatty’s battlecruisers from Cromarty, the First Light Cruiser Squadron (LCS) led by Commodore William Goodenough and the six battleships of the Second Battle Squadron33 (BS) led by Rear-Admiral Sir George Warrender, from Scapa Flow, and Rear-Admiral William Packenham’s Third Cruiser Squadron (CS), with four armoured cruisers,34 from Rosyth. Their task was to intercept Hipper’s ships on their course back to Germany. Tyrwhitt was ordered to leave at dawn on

15 December, sail off Yarmouth, intercept the German force and then trail it to report its position. Keyes was to set an ambush line with eight submarines off the Dutch coast, close to the island of Terschelling, should Hipper head for the Channel.35 Jellicoe chose a point 25 miles southeast of the Dogger Bank southwest patch as the most favourable position for intercepting the German force sailing back to base and ordered the other British squadrons to converge in that area at 07.30 on 16 December. However, the Admiralty refused to send Tyrwhitt’s light forces to the rendezvous point. Thus, at dawn on 16 December, Beatty’s four battlecruisers and Warrender’s six battleships were steering, without suspicion, toward von Ingenohl’s fourteen battleships and eight predreadnoughts. Had it held its course, the German fleet would have met the enemy in the condition of superiority it had always hoped for. However, some fortuitous engagements between the light forces in the van of both the Hochseeflotte and Warrender’s squadron, which were confused and discontinuous due to poor visibility, meant that such an opportunity vanished. Von Ingenohl thought, in good faith but mistakenly, that the enemy light forces were the van of the Grand Fleet and, afraid of contravening the Kaiser’s command, ordered his ships to turn toward the Heligoland Bight at 05.30. Therefore, von Ingenohl let the possibility of an engagement with Beatty’s and Warrender’s forces fade away, while also depriving Hipper’s ships of the expected support during their return.

Blücher, the last and heaviest German armoured cruiser to be built, operated with Admiral Hipper’s 1. Aufklärungsgruppe from the outbreak of the First World War until she was sunk by British battlecruisers at the battle of Dogger Bank. (Library of Congress, Bain collection)

Off the Yorkshire coast, the two German task groups were steaming towards their targets. Seydlitz, Moltke and Blücher headed for Hartlepool, a small town with a population of 90,000. Its defences consisted of two batteries, each of three 6in guns, and a battalion (about 200 officers and men) of the Territorial Army. Two old light cruisers, four destroyers and a submarine, reporting to the Coastal Command, were based there. Because of the weather and tide that morning, only the destroyers went on patrol at 06.40. Shortly before 08.00, they sighted the German battlecruisers five miles northeast of Hartlepool. During a violent seven-minute fight, Seydlitz fired about 100 medium calibre shells and Moltke thirty-eight 28cm and fifty-four 15cm shells. The state of the sea and poor visibility hindered German shooting so it was quite ineffective. The British destroyers broke off contact and the German ships gave up as the shore bombardment had been their priority.

Seydlitz opened fire on the Heugh Battery and a cable factory at about 08.30 while Moltke pounded a coastguard station and the other artillery battery near the lighthouse. Blücher targeted some factories, the railway station, the shipyards and the ships inside the harbour. The bombardment lasted 16 minutes; the German ships fired 1,150 large, medium and small calibre shells. Eighty-six civilians and nine soldiers were killed and 436 were wounded, mostly civilians. The bombardment and the ensuing fires damaged some factories, the gasometer and several hundred houses. The damage was not heavier because a large number of shells failed to explode on impact. In turn, the German ships were damaged by the shore batteries which fired a total of 123 shells. Four shells hit Blücher (nine dead and two wounded), three Seydlitz (one wounded) and one Moltke. Inside the harbour, two 21cm shells fired from Blücher hit the British cruiser Patrol, causing four dead and seven wounded. At 08.46, Hipper’s ships ceased fire and steamed off. Meanwhile, the Southern Group, including Von der Tann, Derfflinger and Kolberg and led by Commodore Topken, headed toward Scarborough and Whitby. At 08.00 the two battlecruisers opened fire on Scarborough, a small seaside town without any industrial or military targets. Their fire was aimed at the railway station and the gasometer but, hindered by coastal hills and mist, mainly hit civilian homes. The bombardment lasted twenty minutes; the German ships fired 333 5.9in and 443 3.5in shells and caused seventeen dead and ninety-nine wounded, all civilians. Between 08.14 and 08.41, Kolberg laid a minefield ten miles offshore, then headed to the rendezvous with Hipper’s ships. Derfflinger and Von der Tann sailed north along the coast to destroy the coast guard station at Whitby; their medium-calibre guns fired for ten minutes, causing limited damage. Topken’s ships ceased fire at 09.13 and headed east; the rendezvous with Hipper took place at 09.45, 25 miles off the British coast. Then the German ships headed east at 23 knots. Whilst the German ships were bombarding the coast, Beatty and Warrender had joined forces southeast of the Dogger Bank at 07.30, an ideal position to intercept Hipper on his return. However, confusion generated by sporadic fights between opposing light forces, delays in W/T communication (effectively jammed by the Germans) and incomplete information provided by the Admiralty to Warrender and Beatty swept away this opportunity. At 08.42, Lion intercept a signal from Patrol (surprised by Hipper’s bombardment inside Hartlepool’s harbour) which informed that she was

engaging two German battlecruisers, but without giving her position. Ten minutes later, another intercept informed Warrender and Beatty that Scarborough was being shelled. At this point, both admirals reversed their course and headed toward the British coast. At 09.35, while Beatty (leading with his battlecruisers and escorted by Goodenough’s light cruisers) and Warrender (following with his battleships and Packenham’s armoured cruisers) headed west, another intercepted message informed them that Hartlepool was also being shelled. To cut the exit routes from a 25-mile gap between the minefields along the British coast off Whitby, from which Hipper would surely emerge, Beatty and Warrender decided to split up and head separately to north and south respectively, away from the Dogger Bank’s shallow waters.36 Thus, at 11.00 the British and German formations, 100 miles apart, were steaming directly toward each other on converging courses at a combined speed of 40 knots. Two factors worked against their encounter. First, a sudden worsening of the weather and visibility and, second, and unbeknownst to both Warrender and Beatty, the German light cruiser and destroyers that had been sent back towards the Hochseeflotte that morning and that were now steaming 60 miles in the van of Hipper’s main force.

The German battlecruisers Seydlitz, Moltke and Derfflinger steaming ahead of Von der Tann in rough seas during the raid against Scarborough, Hartlepool and Whitby on 16

December 1914. On the way back to its bases, the German force narrowly avoided a clash with British formations led by Vice-Admiral Warrender and Rear-Admiral Beatty.

A heavy storm over the Dogger Bank at about 11.30 suddenly reduced visibility and forced Beatty to reduce speed to 18 knots. Shortly after, the light cruiser Southampton (Goodenough’s flagship), the wing ship on the southern edge of Beatty’s van, sighted some enemy vessels at a distance of a few miles37 and headed straight toward them. Goodenough opened fire on the light cruiser Stralsund and signalled Beatty ‘Engaged with enemy cruisers’ only for the German ships to suddenly disappear. Beatty, believing that Goodenough had met Hipper’s van, was worried since all the cruisers of his screen had departed, exposing his battlecruisers should a clash occur. Thus, he told his Flag Lieutenant, Ralph Seymour, to order one of his light cruisers to resume station. Uncertain which ship to contact, Seymour used the generic term ‘light cruiser’ and thus signalled, ‘Light cruiser resume station’. The signal searchlight being aimed directly at one cruiser, Seymour believed that only that ship would obey the order. Instead, three cruisers read the signal and, believing that it regarded the whole squadron, relayed it to Southampton as well. Therefore, all four light cruisers manoeuvred to resume station in Beatty’s van while the German ships disappeared, steering south in the mist.

Admiral Friedrich von Ingenohl (1857-1933), commander of the German High Seas Fleet from January 1913 to January 1915. In the early morning of 16 December 1914, fearing an imminent clash with the Grand Fleet and afraid of contravening the Kaiser’s orders, he ordered the High Seas Fleet to retreat towards the Heligoland Bight, depriving Hipper of much-needed support.

However, luck had not yet completely deserted the British ships. At 12.15, shortly after Beatty was stunned by Goodenough breaking off the action, Warrender’s 2nd BS was steaming fifteen miles on a southerly course and

again sighted the German light cruisers. When the captain of Stralsund saw the British battleships looming up through the mist, he flashed a fake recognition signal but the Orion’s captain ordered the main turrets trained toward the enemy and asked Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Arbuthnot, commander of the Second Battleship Division, for permission to open fire. Arbuthnot reported the sighting to Warrender but refused to authorise opening fire until a direct order was issued by the latter; but the order never came. Shortly afterwards, Warrender sighted the German ships, which could be seen from time to time as they ran out of one rain squall and disappeared into another. In any case, Warrender did not open fire; instead, he ordered Packenham to give chase with his four armoured cruisers. However, their speed was insufficient and the German ships disappeared, never to be seen again. At this point, both Beatty and Warrender were convinced that Hipper’s battlecruisers were still ahead of them, although the two British admirals had no idea about the position of the German ships. Between 11.30 and 12.30, Beatty, unsure what to do continued to steam toward the northern edge of the minefields’ gap, from which he believed Hipper would appear. At 12.25, Warrender reported sighting the German light cruisers to Beatty, followed fifteen minutes later by another signal: ‘Enemy’s course east. No battle cruisers seen yet.’ At 12.30, Beatty, fearing that Hipper’s battlecruisers, faster than Warrender’s battleships, could sail at a short distance from them and vanish, made a fateful decision. He reversed course and headed east, convinced that his squadron was fast enough to intercept the enemy. At that moment, Hipper’s battlecruisers were in front of Beatty, only 20 miles away. Beatty steamed eastward for forty-five minutes and then turned north. At 13.43 a signal from the Admiralty fuelled new uncertainties. Room 40 informed him that an intercepted German signal, deciphered at 12.15, reported the German battlecruisers exiting the gap through the minefields, course east-southeast, speed 23 knots. If course and speed were correct, Beatty would have intercepted the enemy at the southwest corner of the Dogger Bank, from which he had just headed away. Since that had not happened, it meant that Hipper was trying to escape further south. For this reason, at 13.55, Beatty turned east once more and then east-southeast, steaming at full speed to intercept Hipper’s course along the Dogger Bank-Heligoland line. Warrender came to the opposite conclusion: the Germans were sailing

home on a course north of the Dogger Bank. Thus, after a turn to north at 13.24, Warrender’s Second BS followed on north-northwest with Packenham’s armoured cruisers deployed on his port side. At that moment, the formations led by Beatty, Hipper and Warrender were within 25 miles of each other. At 11.00, Hipper, then 50 miles off the British coast, had signalled von Ingenohl that his ships had completed the mission and were steaming home. In reply, Hipper was informed that the Hochseeflotte – instead of heading west to meet him, or at least waiting for him at the rendezvous point – was itself steaming home and was now 150 miles east of his current position. A message from Stralsund at 11.39 informed Hipper that she was in contact with Goodenough’s light cruisers. Without a clear picture, Hipper decided to head east temporarily and, at about 11.20, to head southeast so as to rendezvous with his light forces. By assessing reports that came from German cruisers about sightings and fighting with British ships, Hipper was convinced that he faced not six but eleven enemy battleships. Thus, at 12.45 he turned sharply north to avoid a possible engagement; then, at about 13.00, he turned northeast in order to sail around the Dogger Bank. Convinced that the British forces were by then far enough to the south, at 14.30 Hipper turned east, so as to maintain a leeward position that would favour his aiming in case of a fight. At about 14.10, Kolberg, seriously damaged by bad weather and lagging behind the battlecruisers, sighted funnel smoke on her starboard side, probably from the armoured cruisers of the Third CS that preceded Warrender’s battleships. With the Second BS on a diverging course and getting gradually farther away, the only hope of intercepting Hipper was now Beatty, who was 30 miles southeast. However, information coming from the Admiralty, based on deciphered German signals, reached Beatty too late to be of any use. Thus Beatty, who was still steaming ahead of Hipper toward the east, was not able to engage the enemy. At 15.47 with dusk beginning to fall Hipper by then escaped, and Warrender signalled Beatty to relinquish the chase. Beatty also turned; Hipper’s battlecruisers were by that time fifty miles north and unreachable.38

Vice-Admiral George J Scott Warrender (1860-1917) led the Second Battle Squadron, deployed to the South West Patch of Dogger Bank on 16 December 1914, together with the First Battle Cruiser Squadron of Read-Admiral Beatty. They were expected to intercept German forces retreating after the raid against Scarborough. (Library of Congress, Bain collection)

The raid against Scarborough did not achieve significant results from a military point of view. It helped to raise the morale of the German fleet but caused a strong reaction by British public opinion. The Germans were accused of slaughtering eighty-six helpless civilians at Hartlepool, in violation of the Hague Convention of 1907, and the effect of the raid was to strengthen Britain’s resolution to fight. The Royal Navy was criticised for failing again – after the bombardment of Yarmouth – to provide an effective

defence of the British coast. Preventing a surprise attack was, however, impossible and the only realistic goal was to prevent the Germans from returning home unscathed. Therefore, on 20 December, Beatty’s battlecruisers moved 100 miles south, from Cromarty to Rosyth, so that they could intervene faster to cut off the course of a retreating enemy. To prevent the Germans from surprising inferior British forces and overwhelming them, the Admiralty ordered that, from then on, the Grand Fleet would sail in its entirety instead of deploying isolated squadrons. From a disciplinary viewpoint, Beatty was disappointed by what he believed was grave misconduct on the part of Goodenough by breaking off contact with the German light cruisers on the morning of 16 December. Beatty suggested removing Goodenough from command, but Jellicoe opposed the request, aware that the true mistake was not Goodenough’s behaviour but the transmission of an equivocal order by Seymour. Nevertheless, Seymour kept his position, and went on to repeat similar errors at both the battles of Dogger Bank and Jutland. The German fleet was embittered and dissatisfied because of the raid’s limited results and, especially, for having lost a great opportunity due to the premature course reversal of the Hochseeflotte. Bad weather and Scarborough’s coastal defences inflicted damage on the German ships, which suffered ten dead and twelve wounded. The German battlecruisers’ fire against targets ashore was below the capabilities often demonstrated during combat at sea, but this was due to the use of inadequate ammunition, the partial masking of targets by natural obstacles and poor visibility.

THE BATTLE OF DOGGER BANK Several hours before the battlecruisers of Hipper’s 1. Aufklärungsgruppe39 left the Jade at 17.45 on 23 January 1915, Admiral of the Fleet Sir Arthur Wilson and Rear-Admiral Henry Oliver, Director of the Intelligence Division had walked into Churchill’s office to inform him of a German message just deciphered by Room 40. This was the order von Ingenohl had sent to Hipper, authorising a reconnaissance in force as far as the Dogger Bank40 and requesting him to return to Wilhelmshaven by the evening of 24 January. Yet another success of British naval intelligence allowed the Admiralty to prepare a trap for Hipper’s ships and possibly avenge the humiliation suffered during the previous attacks against Yarmouth and Scarborough. Thus, by early

afternoon on 23 January, the Admiralty had issued orders to Beatty, Jellicoe and Tyrwhitt to rendezvous their forces in the area where the German formation would arrive the next morning. Beatty’s five battlecruisers41 and Goodenough’s four light cruisers would leave the Firth of Forth and meet Tyrwhitt’s ships (three light cruisers and thirty-five destroyers) at dawn on 24 January. They would be covered by Vice-Admiral Sir Edward Bradford, sailing from Rosyth with eight predreadnoughts of the Third BS, and Jellicoe, coming from Scapa Flow with twenty-two battleships of the Grand Fleet. Hipper left Wilhelmshaven with the 1. Aufklärungs-gruppe, four light cruisers and nineteen destroyers and sailed slowly through the night in order to reach the Dogger Bank in the early hours of 24 January and begin the ‘cleansing operation’. The four major combatants steamed in a single line, with Seydlitz ahead of Moltke, Derfflinger and Blücher. Two light cruisers and eleven destroyers were deployed a few miles ahead in order to intercept hostile vessels, while one cruiser and four destroyers sailed on each side of the line. Tyrwhitt’s forces, coming from the south, were split into two groups: the first included the cruiser Arethusa (flagship) and seven destroyers. It sailed ahead of the second group which comprised the remaining units and the cruiser Aurora, her departure having been delayed by dense fog. It promised to be an ideal morning with clear sky, calm sea, a light breeze and excellent visibility. In these conditions, Aurora sighted a cruiser and four destroyers toward the east at 07.05. Thinking they were the first group of Tyrwhitt’s units, she closed and gave the prescribed challenge. Instead, it was Hipper’s van deployed on the port side which opened fire. At 07.20 Aurora signalled ‘Am in action with the High Seas Fleet’ and raised the alarm for the other British units. Shortly thereafter, Goodenough sighted, first, the light cruisers, which were in the van of Hipper’s force, and then the battlecruisers. Hipper was initially pleased to learn about the engagement between his van and Aurora since he thought he had met the enemy light forces he wanted to intercept and destroy. However, the subsequent signals from his cruisers worried him: the concurrent sightings of ships to the southwest and northwest made him suspect an ambush, its form and development still unclear but no less threatening. Hipper knew he could expect no support from the Hochseeflotte (which was still in harbour). At 07.35, he ordered his ships to stop the operation, turn southeast and run for home at 20 knots. If the ships to

the northwest were battleships, Hipper was certain that this speed was sufficient to maintain a safe advantage and, if necessary, he could increase speed to 23 knots. At 07.50, however, he realised that the enemy ships were closing. Hipper assumed they were battlecruisers steaming at about 26 knots. Von Ingenohl, informed of the new situation, ordered the Hoch-seeflotte to prepare for sea. However, the battleships would not be ready to leave until 10.10. Hipper had to find a way to survive alone for the next few hours. Meanwhile, Goodenough was positioned on the port quarter of Hipper’s ships. At 07.47, he informed Beatty that the German ships now included four battlecruisers, steaming at 24 knots. Beatty sighted the enemy vessels three minutes later at 14 miles. The chase was on, with the British battlecruisers converging on Hipper on a southeasterly course. This permitted Beatty to use the wind to his advantage, in that his battlecruisers could fire unimpeded by smoke from their own guns and funnels. Blücher’s accurate fire repelled an attempt by Tyrwhitt’s destroyers to close the distance and attack the armoured cruiser with torpedoes. Then Beatty ordered his light forces to stay out of the way; he would destroy the enemy using his heavy guns. To close the distance quickly, Beatty ordered his battlecruisers to increase speed. Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal, able to reach 28 knots, gradually out-distanced New Zealand and Indomitable, which could not achieve more than 26. Lion, heading the British formation, was 20,000 yards from Blücher, Hipper’s rearmost ship, and fired a 13.5in shell at 08.52, which fell short. Two more shells fell long. Beatty’s order, ‘Open fire and engage the enemy’, was issued at 09.00 and promptly obeyed by Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal, now within range. New Zealand and Indomitable, struggling in the wake of the faster units, were not yet able to intervene. Lion first hit Blücher at 09.09. Six minutes later, at a distance of 17,000 yards Blücher returned fire and, at 09.28, she hit Lion in the front plate of ‘A’ turret with a 21cm shell which, due to the concussion, put the left gun out of use. By 09.35, New Zealand was 18,000 yards from Blücher and also opened fire. At this point Beatty, having his four ships engaging Hipper’s four, ordered ‘Engage the corresponding ship in enemy’s line’ to allow a correct distribution of fire. Beatty assumed that all his captains understood this. Indomitable, still not within range, was not included in this command. Tiger’s captain, believing that Indomitable was already firing on Blücher, moved every British ship one vessel forward against the German line. Therefore, he fired on Seydlitz42 and left Moltke unmolested. This was not the

only mistake made by Tiger during the day. Her poorly-trained gunners not only missed Seydlitz but also mistook Lion’s shells – many of which hit the target – as theirs and so did not correct their aim. On the other side, smoke erupting from the ships’ funnels steaming at full speed hindered German firing, which during the entire engagement was aimed at Lion and Tiger and was initially quite ineffective. The first shell to hit Hipper’s flagship almost proved fatal. At 09.43, a 13.5in shell from Lion hit Seydlitz, pierced the barbette of the after 28cm turret and exploded inside, igniting some powder charges stowed on an ammunition hoist. The explosion spread upward, incinerating the turret crew, and then down toward the magazines. The magazine crew tried to flee forward by opening the watertight doors to the magazine of the adjacent ‘C’ superfiring turret. In this way the flames, following the escaping crew, ignited the powder charges in ‘C’ turret, destroyed the turret and killed its crew. A damage control party promptly opened the flooding valves, thus preventing a magazine explosion which would have destroyed the ship. Seydlitz, with two turrets out of action and 600 tons of water in her aft hull, continued steaming southeast, maintaining her speed and continuing to fire her three 28cm turrets that were still in working order. At 09.55, Hipper sent an urgent request for support to von Ingenohl, whose battleships eventually sailed. Meanwhile, Blücher, heavily battered by Princess Royal and, from 09.30, also by New Zealand, was seriously damaged. She was forced to abandon the line at 10.05 and her speed decreased. A 12in shell from New Zealand put Blücher’s 21cm aft turret out of action. At 10.30, a 13.5in shell hit her amidships and penetrated her armoured deck close to the central tunnel used to feed ammunition to her forward wing turrets.43 The explosion ignited about forty powder charges; the fire spread through the ammunition hoist to the turrets, putting them out of action. The explosions caused a blaze amidships, damaged the forward boiler room and broke some important lines, including the steering gear and the engine telegraphs which ran inside the same protected tunnel used for ammunition. Speed dropped to 17 knots and Blücher fell astern of the German formation.

Seydlitz at sea, with Von der Tann in her wake. Seydlitz was nearly lost at the battle of Dogger Bank when a large calibre shell fired from Lion pierced the barbette of the aft 28cm turret and exploded inside, igniting some powder charges and starting a fire that destroyed both aft turrets and killed their crews. Seydlitz was saved by the prompt flooding of the magazines. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

Lion, Rear-Admiral Beatty’s flagship at the battle of Dogger Bank. Lion was forced to retreat when, after being repeatedly hit by German fire, she had taken on 3,000 tons of

water and her speed dropped to 15 knots. When the last dynamo ceased operating, Lion was also deprived of electrical power, and thus unable to communicate with other vessels. (M Brescia Collection)

Meanwhile, German fire was also achieving results. An 11in shell from Seydlitz pierced Lion’s port side armour close to the waterline at 10.01. Water flooded in and spread to the main switchboard compartment where it shortcircuited two dynamos, shutting down the secondary armament circuits. Lion listed to port but maintained a speed of 24 knots. At 10.18, two more largecalibre shells hit the ship simultaneously below the waterline. One shell pierced the armoured belt and exploded inside, causing further flooding which damaged the boilers and stopped the port engine. The second shell exploded against the belt without piercing it, but buckled several plates and allowed more water to rush in. Between 10.35 and 10.52, Beatty’s flagship took more hits; one of them caused a small fire in ‘A’ turret which was, fortunately, extinguished before triggering a catastrophe similar to that on the Seydlitz. More shells hit Lion amidships and aft, starting such a violent fire that Moltke believed she was lost. By 11.00, Lion had taken on 3,000 tons of water and, after the last dynamo ceased operating, was left with no power, and thus unable to communicate by lamps or W/T equipment. Her speed dropped to 15 knots and, as she was losing her position, left Tiger to lead the British formation. Thus, Tiger became the primary German target. At that point a series of mistakes caused confusion in the British formation. At 10.54, Beatty believed he had sighted the wake of a submarine’s periscope to starboard and ordered a turn to port. The other battlecruisers, which were by now a few miles ahead, followed the flagship’s turn north, thus interrupting the chase. Realising the consequences of his own order a few minutes later, Beatty, who did not want to abandon the prey, hoisted the signal ‘Course north-east’44 so that Tiger, Princess Royal and New Zealand could resume chasing Hipper who, meanwhile, had turned northeast to help the damaged Blücher. Determined not to allow the Germans to escape, shortly afterwards Beatty hoisted the signal ‘Attack the rear of the enemy’. The two signals should have been read sequentially, but the flags were hauled down together.45 This caused Tiger and the other battlecruiser to understand it as a single order, ‘Attack the rear of the enemy course northeast’. Blücher was in that direction and the British battlecruisers steered for her. Beatty, enraged, issued a new order, ‘Keep nearer to the enemy’,

which, however, was not seen. With Lion dropping too far behind and Beatty unable to communicate, command passed to Rear-Admiral Archibald Moore, his flag hoisted on New Zealand. Ignoring the reason for the sharp turn to north, at 10.54, Moore, who had complete confidence in Beatty, followed his last order (‘Attack the rear of the enemy course north-east’). At that moment, only Blücher was in the northeast since, in the meantime, Hipper had turned south. At 11.10, Moore stopped firing on Hipper’s battlecruisers and joined Indomitable in pounding the German armoured cruiser. Hipper, in turn, was considering how to assist Blücher. One way to repel the British battlecruisers could be to launch a torpedo attack, even at the risk of heavy losses. Hipper decided to try it and to support the attack with his battlecruisers. At 10.58, he ordered a turn to southwest towards the enemy and at 11.00 he signalled, ‘Destroyer flotillas stand by to attack’. Just at that moment the British battlecruisers turned sharply north. Hipper thought that Beatty had reacted to evade the threat and, having already obtained the desired result, cancelled the destroyer attack. Assessing the possible options and the conditions of his ships (the German battlecruisers were by now short of ammunition), Hipper decided to give up, leaving Blücher to her fate. Ten minutes later, Seydlitz, Moltke, Derfflinger and their escorts headed for home.46 Although listing, slowed down and with four of her six 21cm turrets out of action, Blücher was still able to react and, at 11.05, she repelled an attack by Goodenough’s light cruisers. At 11.20, four of Tyrwhitt’s destroyers attacked Blücher. One was put out of action by a large-calibre shell; the other three launched their torpedoes, scoring some hits. From 11.30, Moore’s four battlecruisers battered Blücher from 7,000 yards using their thirty-two heavy guns and reduced her to a wreck. At 11.54, the distance between Tiger and Blücher had dropped to 5,500 yards and Moore ordered the battlecruisers to stop firing and turn around. At 12.07, Blücher, heavily listing, capsized but remained afloat for a few minutes, giving time for a few hundred men to slide into the sea. Blücher went down at 12.13, taking most of her crew with her.47

Blücher sinking at Dogger Bank. The armoured cruiser capsized and sank at about 12.13, taking over 700 men with her. In the final phase of the battle, Blücher had been hit by some seventy large-calibre rounds and several torpedoes, but stubbornly resisted up to the end. (US National Archives and Records Administration)

After the sinking of Blücher, and in the absence of further orders and with Hipper’s ships fifteen miles away, Moore was concerned because he had not received any communication from Beatty and decided to turn northwest towards Lion’s last known position. At 11.30, after having assessed that her damage could not be repaired at sea, Lion had turned northwest and headed for home, escorted by most of Tyrwhitt’s ships. However, Beatty was unwilling to give up. He signalled the destroyer Attack to come alongside, boarded her and ordered her to steam at full speed to join the other battlecruisers, which he sighted shortly after 12.00 coming back toward him. At 12.20, Beatty boarded Princess Royal and was informed about the latest events. Learning that Hipper’s ships – except Blücher – had escaped, an enraged Beatty gave the order to reverse course and resume the pursuit. However, the German ships were too far away for the British ships to catch up. At 12.45, Beatty again gave the order to reverse course, steering for Lion.48 The battle of Dogger Bank was over.

Dogger Bank saw the first ever clash between dreadnought-type units. As also witnessed at the Falklands, the battlecruiser again showed her clear superiority over armoured cruisers. Blücher was the ultimate expression of the latter, a sort of ‘link’ between the two types, but she was neither able to escape nor to survive the heavy guns of the British battlecruisers, clearly superior in speed and firepower. After resisting for three hours against the overwhelming assault of her pursuers and replying almost until she went down, Blücher sank with heavy loss of life, ravaged by about seventy largecalibre shells, seven torpedoes fired by Tyrwhitt’s light forces and an unknown number of 6in shells. On the other hand, Seydlitz took three 13.5in hits that caused 159 dead and thirty-three wounded but, by contrast, and despite the loss of the aft turrets and the large amount of water poured in to save the magazines from a catastrophic explosion, Seydlitz continued to steam at full speed, proving her excellent survival capabilities. The other two German battlecruisers escaped almost undamaged: three 13.5in shells hit Derfflinger, causing neither damage nor casualties, while Moltke received no hits at all. On the British side, the most badly damaged ship was Lion. As for the other British battlecruisers, Tiger took six large calibre shells; one hit the roof of ‘Q’ turret, putting it out of action, others caused damage inside the hull and a fierce fire amidships. A 21cm shell from Blücher also passed through the aft funnel but, overall, damage was limited and casualties were ten dead and eleven wounded. Tiger was repaired by 8 March. Blücher hit Indomitable only once, while New Zealand and Princess Royal were unscathed. As had happened at the Falklands, ammunition consumption was also very high at Dogger Bank. Overall, the British battlecruisers fired 1,150 shells (Lion 243, Tiger 355, Princess Royal 217, New Zealand 147 and Indomitable 134) scoring some seventy hits, mostly on Blücher. Overall, Seydlitz, Moltke and Derfflinger took seven hits. On their side, the German battlecruisers fired 976 large-calibre shells (Seydlitz 390, Moltke 276 and Derfflinger 310), scoring twenty-two hits. While the Royal Navy had already experienced this high expenditure of shells at the Falklands, it came as a surprise to the Germans at Dogger Bank, which led Seydlitz’s captain to suggest more space for magazines in future ships. Weather conditions on 24 January, and especially the excellent visibility, allowed the British battlecruisers to exploit the longer range of their guns, in particular the 13.5in Mk 5 guns, which, at an elevation of 20°, could fire at

23,700 yards. By contrast, Derfflinger’s 30.5cm guns could fire just 20,550 yards at a 13.5° elevation. After the lessons from the Dogger Bank were digested, her elevation was increased to 16°, increasing the range to 22,500 yards. The Germans learned a vital lesson from the damage to Seydlitz. The powder charges in ‘D’ turret’s ammunition hoist – penetrated by a British shell – caught fire easily. In addition, the flashes spread quickly to the other powder charges in the turret and, through the open watertight doors, to ‘C’ turret. This event led the German navy to introduce drastic measures to limit both the exposure of powder charges to the risk of fire and the danger that this would spread to other charges nearby. Multiple automatic ‘anti-flash’ shutters were installed between turrets and magazines, thus isolating ammunition hoists. Passages between magazines of different turrets were locked; turret captains, who could order their opening only after all ammunition was spent, held their keys. As a further safety measure, the number of ready powder charges was reduced. The Royal Navy was generally satisfied with the performance of their naval guns, in particular the 13.5in guns. However, while training proved unsatisfactory, the poor gunnery figures had to take into account that no battle had ever been fought at such ranges. In any case, the damage to Lion and Tiger did not induce sufficient reflection about the inadequacy of protection and the risk of ammunition fire and explosions. Both lessons would be seriously learned only at Jutland. The battle of Dogger Bank also had disciplinary consequences. In Germany, von Ingenohl was deemed responsible for not having supported Hipper with the Hochseeflotte and was relieved of command. Admiral von Pohl, the former chief of staff, replaced him. In Britain, the battle was presented to the public as a victory but Beatty was disappointed because a prey he thought he had already snared was allowed to escape. Moore became the scapegoat. He was accused of lacking ‘adequate Nelsonian spirit’ by abandoning the chase of Hipper, although he had formally obeyed Beatty’s orders, and was assigned to the command of a cruiser squadron in the Canary Islands. A last reflection regards the role of Room 40. Interception and deciphering German radio signals played a key role in setting the trap for the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe. Hipper’s surprise in having to again face heavy British forces was not sufficient to make the Germans suspicious that the Royal

Navy was able to read their radio traffic. Room 40 and its work remained a well-preserved secret even after the battle of the Dogger Bank. The Germans continued to suspect spies and did not bother to improve the security of their communications.

OPERATIONS IN THE BALTIC Compared to the North Sea, the Baltic Sea played a secondary role in naval operations during the First World War. The core of the Russian Baltic Fleet included five pre-dreadnoughts and six old armoured cruisers. However, the German Navy, although keeping most of its battle fleet in the North Sea, could rapidly establish superiority in the Baltic, if needed, by moving ships through the Kiel Canal. In the Baltic, the navy’s task was to bottle up the Russian fleet inside its bases, thus denying it freedom of manoeuvre and hindering it from supporting land operations. On its part, Russia kept a mainly defensive posture; it was concerned with protecting the coast against possible German landings, especially around the capital, St. Petersburg. In pursuing their objectives, both parties exploited minefields and used mainly light surface combatants and submarines. However, two major German naval operations in the Gulf of Riga were the exceptions to this general picture. The first took place in August 1915 while the second occurred in October 1917, in both cases to support land warfare. Between late July and early August 1915, Germany moved a strong naval force to the Baltic, including two groups led by Vice-Admirals Hipper and Ehrhard Schmidt. The first group comprised the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe, with three battlecruisers (Seydlitz, Moltke and Von der Tann), eight battleships of the Nassau and Helgoland classes and four light cruisers and their escorts. Its task was the surveillance of the mouth of the Gulf of Finland and to attack the Russian fleet if it attempted a sortie. The second group included three predreadnoughts, six cruisers, twenty-four destroyers and torpedo boats, one minelayer and fourteen minesweepers and its aim was to lay a minefield in the strait of Irben, at the southern side of the Gulf of Riga, to hinder the exit of Russian ships. This formation was also to bombard the coastal defences, clear the Russian minefields, enter the Gulf of Riga from the northern end (the strait of Moon) and contribute to the occupation of that town in as part of the German ground offensive on the north-eastern front. On 8 August, a first attempt to force the Gulf of Riga failed because

minefields caused the loss of two German torpedo boats. Eight days later, the German ships made a second attempt, supported by two of Hipper’s battleships. Although two minor vessels were lost, the German forces cleared the minefields and entered the Gulf of Riga, damaging the battleship Slava. However, on 19 August the operation was interrupted when the British submarine E-1 torpedoed the battlecruiser Moltke, which was steaming west of the island of Dagoe (now Hiiumaa in Estonia). The torpedo, sighted too late to allow evasive manoeuvres, hit Moltke in the forward torpedo room and damaged several weapons which did not explode. Eight men died and 430 tons of water flooded in. This attack, the threat from Allied submarines in the Baltic and the concurrent slowing of the ground offensive, forced Germany to pull back its naval forces without achieving its objectives. Moltke returned to the North Sea and was repaired at the Blohm & Voss yard in Hamburg between 23 August and 20 September. A second operation in the Gulf of Riga was decided on in October 1917, both to support Hindenburg’s offensive on the Eastern Front and to suppress the threat of Russian ships that, from the sea, could help Russian ground forces. The objective was the occupation of the islands of Dagoe and Ösel (now Saaremaa in Estonia), between the Gulf of Riga and the Baltic, through a joint navy-army operation. The ground component was the landing force largely comprised of the 42nd Infantry Division. The naval component, led by Vice-Admiral Schmidt, comprised ten modern König and Kaiser class battleships, nine light cruisers, thirty-four destroyers, two submarine flotillas, minelayers and minesweepers and auxiliary ships. Over forty steamships transported troops, the landing force’s equipment, coal, ammunition, oil and water supplies. Molkte was Schmidt’s flagship and embarked the naval staff and, initially, the landing force’s staff too. Thus, Schmidt could use Moltke’s W/T equipment to coordinate all movements. The operation commenced on 12 October. Molkte and other ships bombarded the Russian forts on Ösel while an enemy battery fired three salvoes at Moltke before being suppressed. In the morning, the German troops landed, completing the occupation of Ösel on 15 October. On 16 October, after clearing the Strait of Irbe between the southern end of Ösel and the Latvian coast, the German ships entered the Gulf of Riga. The Russians scuttled the battleship Slava on 17 October and, after the occupation of Dagoe by German troops the next day, their navy abandoned the theatre. Moltke provided fire support during the landings and played a significant role

as ‘joint afloat headquarters’. Her W/T systems were actually extensively used by naval and ground forces operating at sea and ashore. The history of battlecruiser operations in the Baltic would not be complete without mentioning the plan, devised by Admiral Fisher, for a Royal Navy action in support of landings to be carried out on the northern German coast. This plan had been born in Fisher’s mind during the Moroccan crisis of 1905. Three years later, during the visit of King Edward VII to Russia, Fisher detailed his original plan and thought of using Russian troops, instead of British, as landing forces. In fact, the capital of the Reich, Berlin, was about 100 miles from the coast of Pomerania, where long and sandy beaches could be used for landing troops. Moreover, these beaches were hard to defend against a large concentration of naval artillery. When Churchill became First Lord of the Admiralty, he endorsed Fisher’s plan. In August 1914, shortly after the outbreak of war, Churchill discussed with the Grand Duke Nikolai Nikolaievic Romanov, commander of the Russian Western Front, a joint operation in the Baltic in which the Royal Navy would transport and land a Russian army on the German coast. Prerequisites for a successful operation were the achievement of local naval superiority by the Royal Navy, which would force the Baltic through the Danish Straits and blockade the Kiel Canal, thus hindering Germany from being able to switch its ships from the North Sea to the Baltic. For a successful operation, a 600-ship naval task force would be needed including landing craft,49 minelayers, light cruisers and destroyers, submarines, monitors and ‘big ships’ armed with large calibre guns and able to provide fire support even in shallow waters. These big ships were to be the three ‘large light cruisers’ Courageous, Glorious and Furious, equipped with four 15in guns (two 18in on Furious) and authorised in the 1915 naval programme. However, although the ‘Baltic Project’ advocated by Fisher and supported by Churchill might seem attractive on paper, many obstacles hindered its feasibility. Forcing the Danish Straits, avoiding and/or clearing minefields, supporting a large fleet in the Baltic far from British bases through waters threatened by mines and submarines, would prove a very tough challenge, whereas the availability of Russian troops as landing forces was far from certain.

Moltke escaped almost untouched from the battle of Dogger Bank. In August 1915, she operated in the Baltic in support of an attempted landing in the Gulf of Riga. There, she was torpedoed by the British submarine E-1 on 19 August and forced to abandon the operation. The attempted landing was successfully accomplished in October 1917, with Moltke in the role of ‘joint afloat headquarters’ of the combined German army-navy operation. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano)

In addition, the intervention of the Hochseeflotte had to be prevented. This could be achieved either by weakening it through a naval battle50 or blockading it in its North Sea bases through minefields or by ‘sealing’ the Kiel Canal. All these actions were difficult to implement and had an uncertain outcome. Eventually, the ‘Baltic Project’ faded from British strategy between late 1914 and early 1915. By then, a plan for a similar operation in the Dardanelles was being considered and the idea of intervening in the Baltic was abandoned.

THE DARDANELLES AND BLACK SEA After having escaped from the Royal Navy’s Mediterranean Fleet and passing through the Dardanelles, on 16 August 1914 Goeben had hauled down the German flag, hoisted the Turkish one and been renamed Yavuz Sultan Selim. Actually, both her operational control (exercised by RearAdmiral Souchon in his new role as commander of the Turkish Navy) and her crew (who changed uniform but not nationality) remained German. In response to Goeben’s successful escape, the Allies immediately began the blockade of the Straits. The task was assigned to an Anglo-French squadron, led by Vice-Admiral Sackville Carden and including the battlecruisers Indefatigable and Indomitable, two old French battleships, twelve destroyers

and six submarines. On 27 September, Carden’s squadron boarded a Turkish destroyer which, violating neutrality rules, was operated by a mixed GermanTurkish crew. Then Turkey closed the Straits, but the Allies did not react. Goeben – now Yavuz – carried out her first operation under the Turkish flag in the Black Sea. On 27 October the battlecruiser, escorted by Midilli (ex-Breslau), another cruiser and four Turkish destroyers, left the Bosphorus for ‘training’, but once at sea she headed north toward the Russian coast. On 29 October, without notice and without a declaration of war, the ships bombarded the harbours at Odessa, Sevastopol and Novorossiysk, aimed at provoking a Russian reaction and the consequent entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war. During the operation, Souchon’s ships sank many merchant vessels, a Russian gunboat and burned oil tanks ashore. A Russian fort at Sevastopol hit Yavuz with two heavy shells which caused fourteen dead and limited damage. After this action, Britain dispatched an ultimatum to Constantinople, demanding the immediate removal of all German personnel from Yavuz and Midilli. The Turkish government rejected the ultimatum and on, 31 October, declared war on Britain. Although London would not reply formally until 5 November, two days earlier Indomitable and Indefatigable, supported by two French battleships, bombarded the forts at Sedd el Badr (now Seddülbahir) and Kum Kale at the entrance of the Dardanelles. The battlecruisers caused a magazine explosion at Sedd el Badr that killed sixty-six officers and men, erroneously encouraging Carden to believe that by repeating and prolonging the bombardment, the Allied ships could destroy the forts, enter into the Sea of Marmara and destroy the Turkish fleet. However, the bombardment on 3 November had no follow-up and led to a three-month interlude of calm. Indefatigable and Indomitable sailed back to Britain, while on 24 January 1915 Inflexible, returning from the Falklands, replaced them in the blockading squadron after a stop at Gibraltar for repairs.

Harbour infrastructure shelled by the light cruiser Midilli (formerly, the German Breslau) at Novorossiysk on 29 October 1914. On that day, Yavuz, Midilli and other Turkish ships bombarded Odessa, Sevastopol and Novorossiysk without notice and without a declaration of war, trying to provoke a Russian reaction and the consequent entry of the Ottoman Empire into the war. (R Stanglini Collection)

Rear-Admiral Wilhelm A Souchon (right) was appointed Commander in Chief of the Turkish navy after the transfer of SMS Goeben and Breslau to the Turkish flag in August 1914 and served in this position until September 1917. To the left of the photograph, is General Otto Liman von Sanders, German military advisor to the Ottoman Empire and commander of the Turkish 5th Army that opposed the Allied landing at Gallipoli.

In the Black Sea, a second engagement took place on 18 November 1914, when Yavuz and Midilli intercepted the Russian fleet south of the Crimea as it returned from bombarding the Turkish town of Trabzon. At midday, coming out of a dense fog, the two formations found themselves suddenly facing each other. In the ensuing fight, the battleship Evstafi hit Yavuz with a 12in shell, destroying a 15cm gun and killing its crew; the magazine was flooded to prevent greater damage. The battlecruiser hit the Russian battleship four times, damaging her superstructure and causing about fifty casualties. After 14 minutes, the battle ended with the enemy ships turning back. While she was sailing back to the Bosphorus after escorting a convoy of

Turkish troops sent to the Caucasus, on 26 December 1914 Yavuz struck a mine. It exploded on the starboard side, below the forward gun turret, and tore a 50m2 hole in the hull. Two minutes later, Yavuz hit another mine below the superfiring aft turret that tore a 64m2 hole. With 600 tons of water inside the hull, the battlecruiser entered the Sea of Marmara but the lack of a suitable dry-dock meant the leaks could only be temporarily plugged by means of cofferdams. Repair work forced Yavuz to remain in harbour for about three months. In early April 1915, Yavuz went back to Crimean waters to support a bombardment operation and sank two troopships before returning unharmed to the Bosphorus. Meanwhile, the British Cabinet was assessing how to force Turkey out of the war through a raid against the Dardanelles, trusting that a purely naval action would be sufficient to force the Straits and compel Constantinople to surrender. The detailed operational plan, drafted by Carden, arrived in London on 12 January 1915. The following day, the War Council discussed the plan which was approved on 28 January after lengthy discussions and disagreements between Churchill and Fisher. The renewed attack on Forts Sedd el Badr and Kum Kale began on 19 February with a bombardment carried out by the battlecruiser Inflexible and nine old British and French battleships. By the evening, although the Allied ships had fired 139 12in shells, the Turkish forts were unharmed. Bad weather meant the bombardment only resumed on 25 February. Thanks to Queen Elizabeth’s 15in guns, the forts of Helles, Sedd el Badr and Kum Kale were silenced and, the following day, demolition squads landed from the battleships and blew up dozens of guns in the abandoned forts. This outcome induced an atmosphere of great optimism about the operation’s future prospects. Unfortunately, during the preparation for the decisive attack against the inner forts at Chanak and Kilid Bahr (now Çanakkale and Kilitbahir respectively), a new element intervened to dampen the Allies’ enthusiasm: minefields. Repeated attempts to sweep the minefields were hindered by Turkish artillery until Carden, under severe stress and seriously ill, was replaced by Rear-Admiral John de Robeck. A new attack began on 18 March: the Allied warships steamed throughout the Dardanelles and took station for a new and massive bombardment that would silence the forts, as a prerequisite for a successful clearing of the minefields. Queen Elizabeth, deployed at the forefront of the Allied naval group close to Agamennon, Lord Nelson and Inflexible, opened fire at 11.25 against Fort

Chanak, while the other ships pounded Kilid Bahr, on the opposite shore. The Turkish guns fired back and repeatedly hit several ships, including Inflexible. A 15cm shell exploded against the forward mast; steel fragments slashed down through the fire control top, causing casualties among the fire control party. Shortly after, a 24cm shell hit the same mast, causing a fire on the bridge that could only be extinguished by heading Inflexible into the wind. The battlecruiser resumed firing but, at 16.11, while manoeuvring near the Asian shore, she struck a mine that tore a hole in her starboard bow, flooding some compartments and drowning thirty-nine men. The battlecruiser took on 1,600 tons of water and, to prevent her sinking, Inflexible was grounded on the island of Tenedos (now Bozcaada). After temporary repairs, she was refloated on 6 April and towed to Malta. Inflexible remained dry-docked there until early June before sailing to Britain where she joined the Third Battlecruiser Squadron. Other than Inflexible, the Turkish mines had put two British and three French battleships out of action; three of them, Bouvet, Irresistible and Ocean sank, while another ran aground. The forts had been heavily hit and, although the damage could be repaired, ammunition stocks had been heavily depleted: the Turks were not sure whether they could repel another attempt by the Allied fleet to force the Dardanelles.

The pre-dreadnought battleship Irresistible listing heavily at the Dardanelles after having hit a floating mine during the bombardment of Turkish forts on 18 March 1915. After the explosion, the ship drifted toward the beach and eventually sank. (Library of Congress)

It seemed that one last hope remained: Yavuz. At 17.00 on 18 March, she sailed past the Golden Horn and headed toward the southern tip of the Sea of Marmara, to face the attack expected the following day. By 19 March, there was no sign of Allied ships, or during the following days. The British Cabinet was by now convinced that a purely naval assault would not be successful and decided to postpone any new action until sufficient ground forces arrived in the area for a mass landing on the Gallipoli peninsula. On 27 April 1915, two days after the first Allied landings, Yavuz headed south to bombard the beachheads but she was sighted by a balloon and, having being straddled by Queen Elizabeth, was forced to retreat to a safer position. The same thing occurred on 30 April and, on 1 May, the battlecruiser headed for the Bosphorus to oppose the bombardment of the forts which the Russian fleet was carrying out on the other side of the Straits. A week later, Yavuz made a sortie against Sevastopol but she did not bombard the harbour due to a shortage of 28cm shells. While steaming back, two Russian predreadnoughts intercepted Yavuz and opened fire, hitting her twice. Although not seriously damaged, Yavuz broke off the contact and returned to the Bosphorus. In May, two 15cm and four 8.8cm guns were removed from Yavuz and installed ashore to strengthen the damaged artillery emplacements protecting the entrance to the Dardanelles. During and after the summer, the battlecruiser accomplished many escort operations. On 14 November, the Russian submarine Morzh fired two torpedoes at her, one a near miss. This event and the commissioning of two new Russian battleships (Imperatritsa Mariya class, armed with twelve 12in guns) in the Black Sea Fleet made Souchon more aware of the risk of continued operations there and they became less frequent.

The hole in the deck of the battlecruiser Yavuz (formerly, Goeben) that resulted from a direct hit by a 12in shell fired by a Russian battleship during the action off Sevastopol on 10 May 1915. (Courtesy, Australian War Memorial)

On 8 January 1916, while sailing back to the Bosphorus from Zonguldak, on Turkey’s northern coast,51 Yavuz was confronted by the battleship Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya (Empress Catherine the Great), which opened fire at 20,550 yards. The battlecruiser, hit by 12in splinters, returned fire but then chose to disengage. However, the manoeuvre was hampered because her fouled bottom and damaged shafts slowed her down. On 3-6 July, Yavuz was again at sea and, on 4 July, she bombarded the harbour of Tuapse. Thereafter, until the signature of the armistice between Russia and the Ottoman Empire in December 1917, coal shortages prevented Yavuz from providing more than sporadic support for ground operations in the Caucasus by transporting troops and materiél. After the end of hostilities in the Black Sea, the focus switched back to the Mediterranean. On 20 January 1918, Yavuz and the light cruiser Midilli (commanded by Vice-Admiral Hubert von Rebeur-Paschwitz52) left the Dardanelles to support the Ottoman Army which was being bombarded by

Allied ships off Palestine. The intention was to raid the Allied anchorages on the islands of Imbros (now Gökçeada) and Moudros and attack any patrolling ships. At 05.40, Yavuz and Midilli sailed past Cape Helles and entered the Aegean without being sighted and turned initially south-west to avoid the minefields laid by the Allies to block the strait. While approaching Imbros, Yavuz struck a mine without sustaining significant damage and so steamed on. After checking that the anchorage at Aliki, on the island of Paros, was empty, the Turkish ships turned north-east and then north along the eastern coast of Imbros, bombarding the wireless station at Kephalo. At 07.20, the British destroyer Lizard (patrolling northeast of the island) sighted Midilli, which led the formation, and Yavuz. Since the Germans effectively jammed radio communication, Lizard had to use signal lamps to alert the monitors Raglan53 and M28, laying at anchor at Kusu.

The central and aft 12in guns of the Russian battleship Imperatritsa Ekaterina Velikaya. Commissioned in October 1915, on 8 January 1917 she intercepted the battlecruiser Yavuz off the northern coast of Turkey. Yavuz was damaged by some 12in splinters before disengaging.

Raglan reacted and prepared to train her guns but she did not open fire

immediately because her captain believed his ship had not been spotted yet. Midilli first repelled Lizard and another supporting British destroyer, and then began firing on Raglan from 10,000 yards. A 15cm shell of the fourth salvo hit the monitor’s fire-control position, so that Raglan could no longer adjust her fire. After the destroyers failed to mask the monitors with smoke, Yavuz joined Midilli in the fight. An 28cm shell pierced the barbette of Raglan’s 14in turret, causing several casualties. At 08.15, further salvoes sank the monitor, which took 127 men with her. At that point, the Turkish ships targeted M28. A 15cm shell from Midilli hit the 9.2in turret, igniting a fire that reached the magazine and caused an explosion which, at 08.27, sent the ship to the bottom with nine out of sixty-six of her crew. Then Yavuz and Midilli turned south, heading towards the anchorage at Moudros. However, after passing the south-eastern tip of Imbros, the two ships entered a minefield. Midilli and Yavuz each struck a mine, then the light cruiser struck four more and, at 09.05, sank, taking about 330 men with her. Although damaged by a second mine, Yavuz reached the entrance of the Dardanelles with the help of some Turkish light combatants which, together with the guns of the forts, helped repel two pursuing British destroyers. Damaged and weighed down by the water inside her hull, Yavuz ran aground at Cape Nagara where she was unsuccessfully attacked by British planes. The battlecruiser was refloated six days later and towed by the Turkish battleship Turgut Reis to Constantinople. After brief repairs, Yavuz accomplished some minor operations in the Black Sea, but she no longer participated in combat. Further work to repair the damage caused by the mines began in August and caused Yavuz to be laid up until the war ended. During the operations in the Dardanelles, the Black Sea and the Aegean, battlecruisers played a secondary role. On the British side, the only combat operations were carried out against the forts defending the Straits. For her part, Yavuz fought occasionally with Russian battleships and with the British monitors at Imbros. No major damage was inflicted on either Inflexible or Yavuz by gunfire, but rather by mines. As for Yavuz, the lack of a suitable dry dock hindered repairs but both battlecruisers, especially the former German ship, showed good survivability against this type of threat.

As a suitable dockyard was not available in Constantinople to repair Yavuz after she hit some mines, caissons were installed across the waterline so that the damage to the hull could be repaired. The picture shows a caisson being manufactured at Constantinople. (Courtesy, Australian War Memorial)

THE BATTLECRUISERS AT JUTLAND On 26 March 1916, Hipper, exhausted by his responsibilities and afflicted by sciatica, temporarily left his post for some therapy and rest. On 16 May, he returned from sick leave and hoisted his flag on the newly-commissioned battlecruiser Lützow. During Hipper’s absence, on 24 and 25 April, the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe, led by Rear Admiral Friedrich Boedicker, raided the British coast again, this time against Lowestoft. The battlecruisers Seydlitz, Lützow, Derfflinger, Moltke and Von der Tann, escorted by the 2. Aufklärungsgruppe (including four light cruisers and two destroyer flotillas), were to bombard Lowestoft, a harbour used by British mine warfare forces, and Yarmouth, home to a submarine base and some industrial sites. The plan also included a possible engagement with inferior British naval forces should these intervene. At 12.00 on 24 April, the German ships were ready to leave the Jade; the aim was to get to the British coast at dawn, bombard the objectives with support from eight Zeppelin airships,

which would also provide reconnaissance, and then return to Wilhelmshaven. The Hochseeflotte, led by Scheer, would sail to support the battlecruisers. At 15.38 on 24 April, while Boedicker was steaming northeast of Nordeney (a German coastal town close to Wilhelmshaven), in an area deemed safe because it had been cleared by German minesweepers the night before, Seydlitz struck a mine that tore a 15m hole in the hull plating. Eleven men were killed and 1,400 tons of water flooded in. With her speed reduced to 15 knots, Seydlitz turned back to the Jade, escorted by two destroyers. Boedicker shifted his flag to Lützow and continued toward Britain, initially steaming along the Dutch coast. During the evening of the 24th, an intercepted signal informed the Admiralty that the operation’s objective was Yarmouth. At midnight, the Admiralty ordered the Harwich Force – led by Tyrwhitt and including the Fifth Light Cruiser Squadron with three cruisers and eighteen destroyers – to sail and intercept the enemy formation. The Grand Fleet, just returned from an operation in the North Sea, had been put on alert. At 19.05, it was ordered to leave Scapa Flow and head south. At 03.50 on 25 April, the light cruiser Rostock, by now close to the British coast, sighted some of Harwich Force’s destroyers to west-southwest. A few minutes later, Tyrwhitt also sighted the enemy: several destroyers, six light cruisers and four battlecruisers. Too weak to attack, he turned south, hoping that the German force would follow. Boedicker, however, refused to be diverted from his plan and, at 04.10, the German battlecruisers opened fire on Lowestoft at a range of 14,000 yards. They fired sixty large-calibre rounds which damaged 200 buildings, including several houses, causing fifteen civilian casualties, and destroyed two 6in shore batteries. After about ten minutes, the warships swung north to shell Yarmouth, but visibility was so poor that they fired only a few salvoes with poor results. Meanwhile, Tyrwhitt, seeing that he was not being followed, had turned back to the north, engaging the German light cruisers at 04.30. In turn, these tried to lure him towards the German battlecruisers. Ten minutes later, informed that Elbing and Rostock were in contact, Boedicker decided to suspend the bombardment and turned south to support his units. At 04.45, Tyrwhitt’s flagship, the cruiser Conquest, suddenly saw the four German battlecruisers at a range of 13,000 yards and was immediately targeted. Conquest was hit by a 30.5cm shell which killed twenty-three men and wounded fifteen, and reduced her speed to 20 knots. Conquest was

forced to turn away but Boedicker gave up the chase, probably afraid of running into an ambush. Consequently, the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe and its escort steamed east to join Scheer, who was waiting off Terschelling, some 50 miles away. At this point, the German ships were heading for their bases, and Jellicoe and Beatty, too far away to intervene and impeded by heavy seas, also decided to return home. Scheer was disappointed by the substantial failure of the operation, aggravated by the damage sustained by Seydlitz. He planned to repeat the raid on 17 May, this time bombarding Sunderland, almost 220 miles north of Yarmouth and only 100 miles south of the Firth of Forth, the base of the British battlecruisers. Scheer was convinced that Beatty would not fail to accept the challenge. Following the German battlecruisers at full speed, Beatty would run first into a submarine ambush and then into the fire of the Hochseeflotte, deployed close to the British coast. A substantial number of German airships would conduct scouting, providing Scheer with a security margin to avoid a clash with the Grand Fleet. Several factors – poor weather, boiler problems on some battleships and delays to Seydlitz’s repairs, which should have been ready by mid-May but was actually available only on 29 May – obliged Scheer first to postpone the operation against Sunderland and later to cancel it, again because of poor weather. Disappointed, Scheer devised an alternative plan: attacking British shipping in the Skagerrak.

British battleships at sea before the battle of Jutland. The British fleet sailed on 30 May 1916 after having been alerted by naval intelligence about an imminent major operation by the Hochseeflotte. However, actual contact with the German fleet was still only caused by a fortuitous event. (Courtesy, T Dickens, World Naval Ship Forum)

In the afternoon and the night of 31 May 1916, the British and German fleets clashed in the North Sea, off Denmark. In Britain, this was called the battle of Jutland, while in Germany it was named the battle of Skagerrak.54 The British fleet had sailed at 19.30 on 30 May, following information provided by the Royal Navy’s Division of Intelligence about an imminent large operation by the Hochseeflotte. The Grand Fleet, led by Jellicoe, left Scapa Flow with sixteen battleships, three battlecruisers,55 four armoured cruisers and several minor combatants. Added to them there was the Second Battle Squadron (BS), led by Vice-Admiral Martin Jerram, which sailed from Cromarty with eight battleships, four armoured cruisers and eleven destroyers. Finally, the Battle Cruiser Force (BCF), under Beatty, steamed from the Firth of Forth with six battlecruisers,56 four battleships,57 twelve

light cruisers, twenty-seven destroyers and the seaplane tender Engadine with three aircraft embarked. The British plan envisaged the rendezvous of the Second BS and the Grand Fleet at 14.00 on 31 May in the centre of the North Sea, off the southern tip of Norway. From there, the formation would head southeast. Beatty’s force, steaming on a southerly course, would reach a point 100 miles to northwest of Horns Reef, 65 miles southeast of Jellicoe. Then, Beatty would turn north and make contact with the Grand Fleet. The German fleet gathered in the Jade estuary on the night on 30 May. Scheer planned an offensive thrust as far as the entrance of the Skagerrak. There, at 14.30 on the following day, they would join the German van, including the 1. and 2. Aufklärungsgruppe, led by Hipper and including five battlecruisers,58 five light cruisers and thirty destroyers. Twenty-two battleships (including six pre-dreadnoughts), six light cruisers and thirty-one destroyers formed the German battle fleet, led by Scheer. The aim was to attack British shipping west of Norway, so as to provoke the intervention of part of the enemy fleet and fight a naval battle in a condition of superiority. The 1. and 2. Aufklärungsgruppe, led by Hipper, sailed at 02.00 on 31 May; the Hochseeflotte battleships and their escorts followed 50 miles behind. Until the early afternoon on 31 May, neither of the two fleets was aware of the presence of the other and only a fortuitous circumstance changed that. At 14.00, Beatty, who until then had sailed southeast with the battlecruisers in two columns, preceded at eight miles by the screening light forces and followed at five miles by the Fifth BS, hoisted the signal flags in Lion announcing a turn northwest, in order to converge with Jellicoe. Five minutes later, the signal was hauled down, making Beatty’s alert a command. The British light cruiser Galatea, on the port wing of the advanced screen, had difficulty seeing Lion’s signal and so held her course for a few minutes before beginning her turn. Then a lookout suddenly sighted a plume of smoke on the starboard bow, at a distance of ten miles. Galatea captain’s decided to investigate the contact and at 14.20 sighted a small Danish steamer dead in the water. Two German destroyers, B109 and B110, temporarily masked by the steamer, suddenly appeared. They had stopped the Danish ship to board her. At 14.28 Galatea reported the information to Beatty and opened fire on the enemy ships. Meanwhile, both Beatty’s battlecruisers and Evan-Thomas’s battleships had completed their turn to the north. However, Beatty reacted impetuously

to Galatea’s signal. At 14.32, he ordered ‘Action stations’, increased speed to 22 knots and turned Lion southeast even before the other ships in his formation had acknowledged his new intentions. The other battlecruisers, their captains aware of Beatty’s impulsive style, quickly followed Lion. In contrast, Evan-Thomas continued on his northerly course. Only seven minutes later, Beatty realised that the Fifth BS was not following and repeated the order by signal searchlight. By the time this was accomplished, the four battleships were ten miles away and, being slower than the battlecruisers, could not easily catch up. This event denied Beatty the decisive support of thirty-two 15in guns in the initial phase of the battle. The signal from Galatea had also alarmed Jellicoe, who was steaming 65 miles north and initially thought he was facing only German light forces.59 At 14.39, Galatea signalled ‘large amount of smoke as though from a fleet, bearing east northeast’. A few minutes later, Galatea confirmed the sighting of seven large vessels steaming north. Beatty correctly assumed the signal proved that Hipper’s battlecruisers were at sea. After the two German destroyers had been sighted and attacked by Galatea, they were supported by Elbing and two other light cruisers from the 2. Aufklärungs-gruppe. As a result of this action, Hipper’s left scout wing engaged Beatty’s right scout wing. Hipper turned to west-northwest, thinking that he was facing a group of British light cruisers that he could easily crush. Then, the misinterpretation of a signal from Elbing made Hipper believe that he was facing a large group of British battleships. He therefore turned southsouthwest. At 14.42, realising his mistake, he resumed a west northwest course. Meanwhile, at 14.47, Beatty, who was 30 miles west of Hipper’s formation and heading south-southeast to cut across the Germans’ homeward route, ordered Engadine to send up a Short reconnaissance seaplane. Still waiting for news,60 at 15.00, Beatty turned east and then, thirteen minutes later, northeast in order to support his light cruisers. The German battlecruisers, helped by the position of the sun, saw the enemy first silhouetted against the bright horizon. The British ships were easily visible, while Hipper’s ships remained indistinct against the hazy sky to the east. After this sighting, Hipper turned south-southeast at 15.30, while Beatty closed the range for another fifteen minutes before turning in the same direction. Both admirals were ready for the challenge. Beatty believed that he had

caught Hipper alone and that his own six battlecruisers and four fast battleships could prevail over the five German battlecruisers. On the other side, Hipper believed that Beatty was alone so he wanted to tempt him into a southerly chase that would draw him into the jaws of Scheer’s battleships, which were heading north and closing at a combined speed of 40 knots. Thus, the first round of the battle of Jutland, known as the Run to the South, commenced. The Run to the South At 15.45, Lion was in the lead, followed at 500-yard intervals by the other British battlecruisers. The first two vessels, Lion and Princess Royal, would fire on Lützow, heading the German formation, while the other British battlecruisers, Queen Mary, Tiger, New Zealand and Indefatigable, would engage Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke and Von der Tann respectively. EvanThomas’s four battleships, exploiting Beatty’s turns, had been closing the gap and were now seven miles away, still out of range. The German ships opened fire at 15.48: the range was now down to 16,000 yards. Beatty, refusing to exploit the greater range of Lion’s 13.5in guns, had allowed Hipper to close the range unopposed. A few seconds later, the British battlecruisers also opened fire, but, as occurred at Dogger Bank, their fire distribution was initially mistaken. Correctly, Lion and Princess Royal engaged Lützow but Queen Mary targeted Seydlitz instead of Derrflinger, allowing the latter to fire unopposed for about ten minutes. Tiger and New Zealand both fired at Moltke while the two smallest and oldest battlecruisers, Indefatigable and Von der Tann, carried on a private duel. The German ships, which had the advantage of better visibility and possessed superior rangefinders, straddled the enemy and were quickly on target. At 15.51, Lützow hit Lion twice, while Derfflinger and Moltke placed three shells on Tiger and Princess Royal, respectively. After some long salvoes, the British progressively corrected their fire. With the range down to 13,000 yards, Queen Mary scored two hits on Seydlitz at 15.55, putting her aft superfiring 28cm turret out of action. Ten minutes later, a 30.5cm shell from Lützow hit Lion’s ‘Q’ turret amidships, penetrating the armour and exploding inside. The shell blew off portions of the turret’s forward plate and the armoured roof; killing or seriously wounding most of the turret crew. Major Francis J W Harvey RMLI, the officer in charge of the turret, realised the danger and, before

dying, called down to close the magazine’s doors and flood it. Harvey’s orders probably saved Lion; shortly afterwards, the heat from the explosion ignited some charges, sending down a violent flame that killed all the crew on the lower compartments.61 Four minutes later, Indefatigable was not so lucky. Von der Tann fired two 28cm shells that hit the aft superstructure. Then two more shells hit the British vessel, one in the forecastle and the other in the forward tower; both shells appeared to explode on impact. After about thirty seconds, a huge explosion62 shook Indefatigable; sheets of flame and a dense, dark pall of smoke engulfed the ship. She rolled onto her side, capsized and sank, taking with her 1,107 officers and men. A German destroyer pulled only two survivors out of the sea hours later.

Indefatigable sank at about 16.09 on 31 May, after receiving several hits from Von der Tann. (Lt Cdr H T Day)

Indefatigable’s loss did not affect the battle, which continued with the two

formations steaming south along parallel courses. At 16.10, Evan-Thomas’s battleships eventually joined the British battlecruisers and opened fire on the two rear German battlecruisers: Barham and Valiant targeted Moltke, while Warspite and Malaya engaged Von der Tann. Trying to avoid the 15in shells, the two battlecruisers started zigzagging, so adversely affecting their own gunnery. After turning to starboard to open the range, in order to break off contact after the damage caused by other hits from Lützow on Lion,63 at 16.12 Beatty again headed south-southeast to close the range and engaged Lützow once more. A few minutes later, two shells fired from New Zealand and one of the battleships put Von der Tann’s fore and aft turrets out of action. Another disaster struck Beatty’s formation at 16.26. Queen Mary, targeted by Derfflinger and Seydlitz, was hit by several 30.5cm and 28cm salvoes. Then came an explosion forward, followed by a much more violent explosion amidships that blew up the ship. Her superstructure collapsed and a large amount of debris from the main turrets was blown into the air. Tiger and New Zealand, which were following at full speed, had to manoeuvre abruptly to avoid a collision with the hulk which capsized and sank quickly, taking with her 1,226 officers and men. Later, British destroyers saved eighteen survivors, while German destroyers saved two more.

Queen Mary was hit by several 30.5cm and 28cm salvoes fired by Derfflinger and Seydlitz. She blew up at 16.26 and quickly sank, taking with her 1,226 officers and men.

Shortly after, Princess Royal was straddled and disappeared into a haze of towering waterspouts. A Lion signalman stared in dismay and reported to Beatty, ‘Princess Royal blown up, sir’. Beatty, turning to Lion’s captain, shook his head and uttered the famous words, ‘There seems to be something wrong with our bloody ships today’. Shortly before Queen Mary’s explosion and hoping to alleviate the situation, Beatty had ordered the 13th Destroyer Flotilla to deliver a torpedo attack on the German battlecruisers. Hipper reacted by sending some of his own destroyers, led by the light cruiser Regensburg, to counterattack. In the frantic fight that followed, both sides lost two destroyers. However, Beatty’s battlecruisers avoided all German torpedoes, while one British torpedo hit Seydlitz, exploding on her port side near the forward turret. The explosion tore a 40ft × 13ft hole. Seydlitz embarked several hundred tons of water but her excellent compartmentalisation saved the ship and, although listing to port, she maintained her speed and held her place in the line. After the sinking of Queen Mary, both Beatty and Hipper turned simultaneously to avoid torpedo attacks and later came back on their previous courses. At this point, Hipper’s aim of luring his rival into the jaws of the Hochseeflotte had almost been achieved. Scheer’s battleships were just beyond the horizon. Goodenough was the first to sight the German fleet. At 16.35, his Second Light Cruiser Squadron was the most southerly among all British units. At first, Southampton’s lookouts sighted smoke clouds, then a forest of masts and then the shapes of sixteen battleships, preceded by their escorts. At 16.38, Goodenough flashed a priority and urgent signal to Beatty and Jellicoe, reporting the sighting of the enemy formation to the southeast. For another ten minutes, the British light cruisers kept their course, coming closer to the German ships to ascertain more precisely their number, course and speed. At 16.48, Goodenough flashed another urgent signal and then turned, thus revealing the profiles of his ships to the German battleships which had not opened fire until then because they assumed they were friendly forces. The British cruisers fled. Beatty, after receiving Goodenough’s first signal, held his course southwest for two minutes in order to see for himself the masts of Scheer’s battleships. At 16.41, he ordered a reverse course and Lion, followed by the other battlecruisers, turned northeast. At this point, Hipper must have been pleased to have successfully carried out his mission, i.e. leading the British

battlecruisers and Evan-Thomas’s battleships into contact with the Hochseeflotte. Shortly after, Hipper changed course and headed northeast so as to position his ships in the van of the German fleet. Beatty had risked coming under concentrated fire from Scheer’s battleships, but he also understood the opportunity he now had. The German warships were not aware that the Grand Fleet was closing the range. If he succeeded in luring them to the north in the hope of finishing him off, they would end up in a deadly trap. The Run to the North The change of course by the British and German battlecruisers ended the Run to the South, but the fighting resumed after a few minutes in the opposite direction, leading to the phase of the battle known as the Run to the North. At first this involved the battleships under Evan-Thomas. He did not notice that Lion’s flags were hauled down at 16.41, and so the Fifth BS continued racing southeast at full speed. It was not until 16.48 that Evan-Thomas passed along the British battlecruisers, which were steaming northeast at 26 knots. Immediately, Lion again hoisted the flags to repeat the order but they were not hauled down until 16.54. Since Evan-Thomas was not keen to act on his own initiative, his battleships continued steaming toward the Hochseeflotte for six minutes. When the Fifth BS finally altered course, the König class battleships, leading the German formation, were close enough to target them. Valiant escaped untouched but German shells badly pounded Barham, Warspite and especially Malaya. After their turn north, Beatty’s battlecruisers also continued to suffer damage from the shells of Hipper’s battlecruisers. Shortly before 17.00, Beatty decided to break contact and turned northwest at 24 knots, so allowing his crews to fight the fires, take care of wounded men and clear away wreckage. This left Evan-Thomas to fight alone against the German ships splitting his fire between Hipper’s battlecruisers and the four German battleships that were leading Scheer’s battle squadron. German battleships were steaming north at full speed, trying to keep contact, but were slower than Evan-Thomas’s battleships. The latter performed excellently and, although hit several times, kept their course to meet Jellicoe while pounding the enemy ships with their 15in guns. During this phase, Lützow and Seydlitz were badly hit; damage to Lützow’s W/T stations severed communication to the other ships in Hipper’s squadron.

Seydlitz, already damaged from her torpedo wound, suffered most. Between 17.10 and 17.20, at least two 15in shells hit Seydlitz, one putting her central port turret out of action and the other striking the aft superfiring turret and damaging one 28cm gun. At 17.20, one of Tiger’s shells hit Von der Tann and put her forward 28cm turret out of action by blocking its training mechanism. Three minutes later, another shell hit Von der Tann’s aft turret with similar consequences.

Warspite and Malaya at Jutland. Both battleships were part of the Fifth Battle Squadron led by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas. His delay in following Beatty’s battlecruisers when Lion turned south-east at 14.32 to support the British light cruiser Galatea deprived Beatty of the decisive support of thirty-two 15in guns in the initial phase of the battle.

A German battle squadron at sea. Battlecruisers were assigned to the First Scouting Group led by Rear-Admiral Franz von Hipper. Five of them took part in the battle of Jutland: Lützow (flagship), Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke and Von der Tann. (R Stanglini Collection)

The only 28cm echelon turret still working was also put out of action when its guns, overheated by intense use, jammed in their slides and would not return to their firing position. Although incapable of fighting, Von der Tann stayed in the line to prevent British fire concentrating on the other German ships. At 17.25, Beatty signalled to his battlecruisers ‘Prepare to renew the action’ and, five minutes later, he turned north to close the range once more. During this round of the battle, the fire from Hipper’s ships became less intense and precise because of both damage and poor visibility: the sun, low on the western horizon, blinded the German rangefinders and this, together with dense smoke, made it hard both to assess range and to spot splashes to adjust fire. Scheer, still assuming that he faced two isolated British squadrons and believing that a beaten opponent was escaping, was confident that he could still win the battle. Beatty, aware that the Grand Fleet was just over the horizon, did not intend to loosen the grip on the enemy for the opposite reason: he was convinced that victory was at hand. At 17.43, Beatty’s

battlecruisers opened fire again. A few minutes later, one of Lion’s lookouts sighted the armoured cruiser Black Prince to the northwest, operating on Jellicoe’s far right wing. After 17.45, Beatty turned progressively northeast in a move that threatened to cross the enemy’s ‘T’. To avoid this, Hipper turned in the same direction. By following this course, Beatty wanted to delay Hipper’s sighting of the Grand Fleet, approaching from the northwest with twenty-four battleships, so preventing him from warning Scheer and neutralising the trap ready to close. At 17.50, the light cruiser Frankfurt, of the 2. Aufklärungsgruppe, sailing a few miles ahead of the German battlecruisers, informed Hipper that she was fighting an isolated enemy cruiser. Five minutes later Frankfurt signalled that she had come under fire from battleships sighted to the east. These could not be the ships led by Evan-Thomas. Shortly after, the battleship König, steaming from the south and leading the Hochseeflotte, also realised that she was facing the Grand Fleet. At about 18.00, Beatty’s advance toward the northeast and Hipper’s consequent turn ended the Run to the North. However, this manoeuvre did not end the ordeal of the German battlecruisers, even though Hipper’s ships would score additional successes. At 16.05, Jellicoe, still far from the scene of action, had sent the Third BCS, led by Hood, ahead to support Beatty. Invincible, Inflexible and Indomitable were capable of 25 knots and thus able to intervene with less delay. Locating Beatty’s ships turned out to be difficult. At about 17.30, the Third BCS had reached a position northeast of Hipper, before he began his turn east. Shortly after, the 2. Aufklärungsgruppe engaged the British light cruiser Chester, which was between the British and German battlecruisers. Hood, sighting the gun flashes, turned immediately to support Chester, which, although repeatedly hit, escaped northeast. At 17.55, a blizzard of 12in shells surprised the German light cruisers, damaging one of them and fatally wounding Wiesbaden. Hipper sent Regensburg and thirty-one destroyers to attack the Invincibles. During this action, the British destroyer Shark was sunk but no German torpedos reached Hood’s battlecruisers. Hipper, assuming that he was opposed by a squadron of British battleships as signalled by Regensburg, did not intervene with his battlecruisers but turned southwest until he sighted the van of the Hochseeflotte, heading north-northeast. At this point, Hipper changed course again, taking a position ahead of the battleships of the 3.

Geschwader (3rd Squadron), led by Rear-Admiral Paul Behncke. In this phase of the battle, Seydlitz took six hits, embarked more water and increased her list to starboard. Meanwhile, Beatty had joined the Grand Fleet, but only signalled the Hochseeflotte’s position to Jellicoe at 18.15, who immediately deployed his battleships in a south-southeast battle line, ready to fight. In a few minutes, the deployment was complete and all twenty-four battleships were positioned along an arc six miles long, so that all vessels could train their guns toward the enemy. While Beatty’s battlecruisers, deployed on the right wing, fired against their German counterparts, Rear-Admiral Sir Robert Artbuthnot suddenly appeared on the battlefield. He was facing the German light cruisers that were escaping from Hood’s fire and charged with the two leading ships of the First CS, the armoured cruisers Defence and Warrior. Artbuthnot assumed that he could sink Wiesbaden, already dead in the water and billowing smoke. Steaming ahead, Defence came so close under Lion’s bow that the battlecruiser was compelled to make an emergency turn to avoid collision. Artbuthnot was unaware that Hipper’s and Scheer’s ships were nearby. They suddenly appeared a few miles away, out of a bank of mist. Defence tried to change her course but it was too late. Two German 30.5cm shells struck her near the after 9.2in turret. Then a salvo struck behind the forward turret, causing the explosion of the 9.2in and 7.5in magazines. In a few seconds, Defence went to the bottom, taking with her Artbuthnot and all 900 of her crew. Next, Warrior became the focus of German attention, but the armoured cruiser was saved by the unexpected intervention of Evan-Thomas and the Fifth BS. The guns aimed at Warrior were now shifted to Warspite. Hit by thirteen large-calibre shells and with a damaged rudder, Warspite was forced to withdraw north and managed to limp to Rosyth. Meanwhile, Hood headed west with his three battlecruisers, looking for Beatty and his BCF. Sighting Lion steaming toward him at full speed, Hood realised that, if he manoeuvred to position his ships behind Beatty’s, he would obstruct Jellicoe’s line of fire. So, at 18.21, Hood turned 180° and positioned his ships ahead of Beatty’s. As a result, the seven British battlecruisers were on a course parallel to that of Hipper’s five battlecruisers, 9,000 yards to starboard. Invincible, Inflexible and Indomitable concentrated their fire on Lützow and Derfflinger, leaving the other three German battlecruisers to Beatty.

Hood’s ships, fresh from gunnery practice at Scapa Flow and enjoying better visibility, struck the enemy with accurate fire. In a few minutes Invincible fired fifty shells at Lützow, hitting her eight times. However, the Germans reacted vigorously and, at 18.29, things turned upside down. Straddled by Derfflinger, Invincible was struck by a salvo that penetrated ‘Q’ turret and caused the explosion of both magazines amidships, breaking the battlecruiser in half. The two severed halves sank, taking with them 1,026 officers and men, including Rear-Admiral Hood. Hipper was unable to savour his third victory because four of his battlecruisers were seriously damaged. At 18.36, a few minutes after Invincible sank, Scheer ordered his ships to reverse course. After Jellicoe had crossed Scheer’s ‘T’, an immediate retreat seemed the only alternative to a potential disaster. At the same time, the German battlecruisers headed southsoutheast, moving away from the line of fire. Lützow was barely afloat: water poured into forward compartments, dragging her bow deep into the water and decreasing her speed. Moreover, the destruction of the W/T stations left Hipper unable to command his squadron effectively. Just before 19.00, the destroyer G-39 came alongside Lützow, Hipper jumped on board and gave orders to take him to another vessel. While Lützow steamed slowly south trying to escape, Hipper wandered across the battlefield in G-39, looking for another battlecruiser that he could use as his flagship. He went first to Derfflinger, but she was badly damaged and her W/T equipment could only receive but not send messages. Hipper then headed for Seydlitz, whose condition was even worse since several thousand tons of water had poured into her. Von der Tann, which Hipper tried next, had no large-calibre guns able to fire and was valueless as a fighting unit. That left Moltke, still largely undamaged, but Hipper only managed to board her after 22.00. The short break caused by Scheer’s first 180° turn ended twenty minutes later. Instead of continuing to steam south, at 18.55 Scheer ordered another 180° turn, this time north.64 Hipper’s battlecruisers and the Hochseeflotte van again came under intense fire from Jellicoe’s battleships and, by 19.15, from Beatty’s battlecruisers too. Weather and visibility were against the German ships, which could only aim at the flashes of British guns. As a result, their reaction was ineffective. Being in serious trouble again, at 19.12 Scheer hoisted the flags that ordered his force to prepare for a third course change: The flags were hauled

down six minutes later. To ease pressure on his battleships, a minute afterwards, Scheer ordered ‘Battlecruisers, at the enemy. Give it everything’. Led by Derfflinger,65 the four vessels still able to sail – if not fight – headed at 20 knots toward the British line and a fiery hell, in what is known as ‘the Death Ride’. Derfflinger, which led the German line, and Seydlitz, second in the line were badly struck. The first was hit fourteen times: two 15in shells penetrated and destroyed the after turrets, killing all the crew. Seydlitz, her bow already partially submerged, was also hit, as was Von der Tann. At 19.17, Scheer allowed the German battlecruisers to turn to starboard and gradually gain the rear. Then, to cover the new retreat of the Hochseeflotte, at 19.21 he ordered a massive torpedo attack that forced Jellicoe to turn southeast to escape the threat. This manoeuvre saved Scheer one more time. Sunset would come in less than an hour and, by dawn, which at those latitudes would arrive at 02.00, Scheer hoped to reach safety behind the minefields protecting the approaches to the German bases. During the night, the British and German fleets steamed first on diverging and later on converging courses to the south. Jellicoe sailed an easterly course to cut off his opponent’s retreat, while Scheer initially followed a westerly path. Between 23.30 on 31 May and 01.45 on 1 June, the German ships crossed the course of the enemy fleet without tragic consequences. At dawn, Scheer reached Horns Reef and the mouth of the navigable channel between shallow water and the minefields. Then he headed slowly for the Jade. However, the retreat of the German battlecruisers after the ‘Death Ride’ was not painless. Just as the sun was setting, Beatty, who at 20.00 had turned west to catch his prey, sighted Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Molkte and Von der Tann at 10,000 yards, sailing eastwards of Scheer’s fleet. After closing the distance, at 20.12 Beatty ordered his battlecruisers to open fire. In the ensuing twenty minutes, all of the German ships were hit, Seydlitz the hardest. A 13.5in shell from Princess Royal exploded on her bridge, killing half the men there and knocking out some navigation and steering equipment. On this occasion, the pre-dreadnoughts led by Rear-Admiral Franz Mauve, on to whom Beatty shifted his fire, saved the German battlecruisers. Sunset occurred at 20.19 and the fight – the last of that day for Hipper’s battlecruisers – ended at 20.30. During the night, Lützow met her fate. At 18.45 she parted company with the other battlecruisers and headed southeast, first at 15 knots and later, with

more water pouring into her damaged bow, at 7 knots. At 00.30 on 1 June waves washed over the forward turret and at 01.30 the forward boiler room also began to flood. Without electrical power and weighted down by 7,500 tons of water, Lützow continued to sink by the bow until the stern and the propellers rose out of the sea. At 02.20, fearing that his ship was about to capsize, Captain Harder called four accompanying destroyers alongside and ordered his surviving crew to board the smaller ships. At 02.45 Harder ordered the destroyer G-38 to fire two torpedoes at Lützow. She received the blows, rolled over and went down about thirty-seven miles northwest of Horn Reef. Casualties were 115 dead and fifty wounded. Seydlitz avoided Lützow’s fate by the narrowest of margins. Sighted between 00.45 and 01.15 by the battleships Malaya, Marlborough and Revenge while crossing the course of the British fleet, Seydlitz, incredibly, escaped. At 01.40, she reached the navigable channel where she ran aground three times because of 5,000 tons of water in her forward hull. Only in the afternoon of 1 June did two pumping ships stabilise her flooding and, eventually, Seydlitz reached the Jade. There she remained for three days, while, to reduce weight, the 28cm guns and much of the armour plate from the forward gun turret were removed. Finally, Seydlitz entered Wilhelmshaven and was docked. Repair work commenced on 15 June, ended on 1 October and she returned to duty in November. Subsequently, Seydlitz replaced Lützow as flagship of the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe. Derfflinger, hit by no less than seventeen large calibre and four medium calibre shells, returned home with 157 dead and fifty wounded, some 3,000 tons of water inside the hull and just two 30.5cm guns still capable of firing. Repair work started at Wilhelmshaven but then continued at Kiel where it was completed on October 15. Moltke, Hipper’s flagship also tried to edge through the British fleet between 23.30 and 00.20 but was repeatedly sighted. Hipper succeeded at his third attempt and at 01.00 crossed in front of the British fleet heading south at 22 knots until he eventually reached Horns Reef. Moltke was the only relatively unscathed German battlecruiser, four 15in hits had killed sixteen and wounded twenty. She had also taken on 1,000 tons of water, both because of battle damage and deliberate flooding to counterbalance listing. Blohm & Voss in Hamburg carried out repairs, which were completed by late July. During her slow voyage home, Von der Tann had 600 tons of water in her

hull. At 03.37 on 1 June she narrowly escaped a torpedo fired by the British destroyer Moresby. Her main battery, seriously damaged during the battle, was partially repaired on the return journey; however, the two echelon turrets remained useless. During the battle, Von der Tann’s crew suffered eleven dead and fifteen wounded. Repairs, carried out in Wilhelmshaven, lasted until 2 August. On the British side, Lion arrived at Rosyth on 2 June, together with the other units of the BCF. During the battle Lion had been hit fourteen times, with ninety-nine dead and fifty-one wounded. Repairs, quickly started, ended on 19 July. However, the ‘Q’ turret was temporarily removed and replaced during a refit at Armstrong Whitworth, Elswick, from 6 to 23 September. Tiger, badly hit, suffered twenty-four dead and forty-six wounded. She was immediately repaired and on 2 July became BCF’s flagship until Lion was back in service. Princess Royal had been hit nine times, with twenty-two dead and eighty-one wounded. After some hasty repair work at Rosyth, she moved to Plymouth for final repairs, which ended on 15 July, and she returned to Rosyth and joined the BCF on 21 July. The other British battlecruisers suffered only minor damage. The table on page 220 shows the large and medium calibre shell and torpedo consumption of British and German battlecruisers during the Battle of Jutland. The German battlecruisers delivered more accurate and effective fire, especially during the Run to the South. This result came not only from their guns, ammunition and training quality, but also from better visibility that helped German rangefinding and targeting. German rangefinders were not superior to the British equipment in terms of reach, but their stereoscopic aiming could help, under certain circumstances, to assess range even with poor visibility and smoke, while their operators were generally better trained.

Rounds Fired and Hits Suffered by the Battlecruisers at Jutland

As far as ammunition is concerned, there are two general considerations to be made. British AP shells tended to break up on initial impact with German armour rather than piercing it and exploding inside, especially at the high angles of impact typical of long-range engagements. British AP shells contained Lyddite, which was subject to exploding due to shock impact, thus nullifying the delaying action of the fuse. Instead, German AP shells used TNT, a more stable explosive. This explains, together with the higher quality of their hulls, why the German battlecruisers survived fire from 15in guns of the 5th BS that otherwise would have had far more lethal effects, as Hipper also pointed out. Another topic which emerges from the analysis of losses and damage was the insufficient British awareness of powder charge safety and handling. British powder charges, based on cordite and contained in silk bags, were highly flammable and subject to violent burning, so increasing the risk of fire spreading. In addition, to increase the battlecruisers’ rate of fire, powder charges were stored inside the turrets and along ammunition supply passages while magazine doors were left open to speed up the supply. This meant underestimating and even intentionally ignoring safety rules. In such circumstances, powder fires could easily spread and, under certain conditions, towards the magazines, with catastrophic consequences. German ships used less flammable powder charges. Moreover, the main charge was stored in safer brass cartridges, significantly reducing the risk.

The German Navy had learned useful lessons from the losses at Dogger Bank and increased safety along ammunition loading lines. The Royal Navy learned these same lessons only after Jutland. Lion, hit on ‘Q’ turret, was saved only when the turret captain ordered the magazines to be flooded: similar damage in Derfflinger, Seydlitz and Von der Tann disabled and/or destroyed the turrets but did not cause the fatal consequences that occurred in Indefatigable, Invincible and Queen Mary. While consumption of large calibre rounds was quite high (about 1,800 rounds fired by British battlecruisers and over 1,650 rounds by German ones), very few torpedoes were fired by battlecruisers, either at Jutland or during the war as a whole. Moreover, torpedoes rarely hit, thus belying the emphasis put, especially in Germany, on torpedo tubes aboard capital ships. W/T equipment performed well on both sides but the Germans used it more continuously and effectively.66 From a technical point of view, insufficient redundancy caused problems, both in Lion and Lützow when damage put W/T equipment out of order and forced Beatty and Hipper to revert to traditional methods such as flags and signal searchlights. Clearly these were not as reliable and effective as W/T equipment because of poor visibility caused by fog, smoke and distance. This caused serious issues, especially to British ships, both because of Beatty’s signalmen’s inadequacy67 and the vulnerability of the signal lamps, the latter subject to being sighted and intercepted at night. As for battle damage and losses, the battle of Jutland once more confirmed that the German battlecruisers were robustly built and better armoured, and featured effective compartmentalisation. Both Seydlitz, hit by a torpedo, and Derfflinger managed to return to their base although their hulls were badly damaged and flooded with thousands of tons of water. Compartmentalisation helped preserve integrity and operation of the boilers and engine rooms and hence to continue steaming and steering. Hipper’s battlecruisers, especially Derfflinger and Seydlitz, survived several large-calibre hits and showed that they met their design and operational requirements: sustaining a direct engagement with enemy capital ships and fighting together with German battleships. However, the less advanced protection of British battlecruisers was not the direct cause of the losses at Jutland, since the shells that blew up their magazines did not pierce their main belts, but were direct hits on the turrets. The battle of Jutland is often considered as the last major sortie of the

German Hochseeflotte. On the contrary, less than two months later Scheer and Hipper were again at sea for another raid against the British coast. The objective of this operation was also to raise the morale of German sailors, anything but high despite the ‘victory’ at the Skagerrak.68 Scheer’s plan was a revival of his planned attack on Sunderland, originally set for 17 May but later cancelled. The shore bombardment was to be carried out by Hipper with the two available battlecruisers, Moltke and Von der Tann. Three battleships – Markgraf, Grosser Kurfürst (both armed with 30.5cm guns), and the newly-commissioned Bayern, armed with eight 38cm guns – were temporarily attached as reinforcements to the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe. The Hochseeflotte, with fifteen battleships, would have followed the attack force one hour behind, ready to act against British ships if presented with such an opportunity. To avoid engaging the enemy in disadvantageous conditions, Scheer planned a double ambush line of submarines, deployed north and south of his objective, and an extensive airship reconnaissance carried out by Zeppelins. Some of these would patrol the North Sea between Scotland and Norway, in order to signal the possible presence of the Grand Fleet. Other airships would patrol the area adjacent to the attack path, operating in close contact with the German ships. Hipper, followed by Scheer, sailed from the Jade at 21.00 on 18 August. Intercepting German radio signals, Room 40 at the Admiralty was aware of the enemy plans. Thus, Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet with twenty-nine battleships, the Battle Cruiser Force led by Beatty and the Harwich Force (five light cruisers and twenty destroyers), led by Tyrwhitt, sailed five hours before the German ships. In addition, British submarines already deployed in the area where the German ships could pass were alerted. Beatty’s six battlecruisers, reinforced, as at Jutland, by the Fifth Battle Squadron (five fast battleships), sailed in the van of Jellicoe’s force. While the British formations steamed south to intercept the German fleet, at 05.05 on 19 August the submarine E-35 sighted Scheer’s force and torpedoed the battleship Westfalen. Scheer sent the damaged ship home, but maintained his course. At 06.00 the German submarine U-52, deployed on the ambush line north of Sunderland, fired two torpedoes against the light cruiser Nottingham, that was screening Beatty’s force. Hit for the third time at 06.25, Nottingham sank at 07.10. Goodenough, leading the First Light Cruiser Squadron, informed Jellicoe but he was uncertain whether the cruiser

had encountered mines or torpedoes. Worried that the Grand Fleet might enter an uncharted minefield, Jellicoe turned temporarily to north to sail away from the danger zone, followed by Beatty. While the Grand Fleet was temporarily steaming north, the Zeppelin L31 sighted it and reported to Scheer. Assuming that the enemy was steering away, the German ships continued to advance toward the British coast. Shortly after 09.00, after Goodenough had confirmed that Nottingham had been hit by torpedoes, the Grand Fleet and the battlecruisers reversed course to south. At that point, Jellicoe thought that he could engage the enemy in the afternoon, but another Zeppelin report altered events. Shortly after 12.00, the airship L13 sighted the Harwich Force about 100 miles southeast of Scheer’s position, misidentifying Tyrwitth’s light cruisers as battleships. Scheer jumped to the conclusion that this was an isolated British formation – the prey he had been seeking for a long time – and at 12.15 turned southeast to intercept it. The Zeppelins did not provide any further information, but at 14.00 a Uboat signalled that the Grand Fleet was 65 miles to the north. Thus, at 14.35, Scheer decided to give up the presumed prey and made course for his base. At 16.00 Jellicoe, too, informed of Scheer’s retreat, ordered a return to Scapa Flow. Beatty instead continued his hunt until 16.52, when another light cruiser of his force, Falmouth, was hit by two torpedoes fired by U-63.69 At that point, Beatty too decided to sail home. The Harwich Force sighted Scheer at 17.45 but Tyrwhitt, assuming that he could not reach a favourable attack position before sunset, gave up the chase. Scheer was greatly disappointed by the results of air scouting. In addition, in early October, the German government decided to resume unrestricted submarine warfare against enemy merchant shipping, thus precluding the use of U-boats for ambush and reconnaissance operations against British surface forces. Therefore, the German Navy renounced undertaking major operations in the North Sea.70

THE END OF THE WAR – AND OF THE GERMAN FLEET After late 1916, neither the Hochseeflotte, nor the battlecruisers of the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe, carried out any major operations because Germany had decided to focus on the U-boat war against Allied shipping.

Nonetheless, in April 1917 Scheer decided to plan a surprise attack by fast surface combatants against shipping between Britain and Norway in waters where U-boats could not effectively operate. On 17 October, two German fast cruiser/minelayers, armed with 15cm guns, pounced on a convoy of twelve steamers heading to Britain and escorted by two destroyers. Before the escorts could react, the German ships sank them with precise gunnery, then pursued the steamers and sent nine of them to the bottom. Britain’s answer materialised one month later. A formation led by ViceAdmiral Trevylyan Napier and including the First Cruiser Squadron (battlecruisers Courageous and Glorious), eight light cruisers and ten destroyers, later joined by the battlecruiser Repulse, was tasked to attack a German minesweeping force that, protected by four light cruisers and eight torpedo boats, was trying to open a gap in the minefields laid down in the Heligoland Bight. At 07.37 on 17 November, the German light cruisers boldly charged the stronger British force to cover the minesweepers’ retreat and then retreated to escape fire from the First Cruiser Squadron and Repulse. The fight ended two hours later when the battleships Kaiser and Kaiserin intervened to support the German light forces. During the action, some British and German cruisers were slightly damaged, while the Germans lost a minelayer. On 12 December, Scheer decided to attack a British convoy heading to Norway, comprising five merchant ships escorted by two destroyers. The task was assigned to four destroyers, which sank all the merchant ships and a British destroyer. The Admiralty reacted by stopping the daily traffic and grouping merchant ships in larger convoys. Each convoy sailed every four or five days, escorted by some battleships. This new scenario offered Scheer an opportunity to attempt a bolder action. Hipper’s battlecruisers would attack the convoy and its close escort while the Hochseeflotte would wait at a short distance, hoping that Hipper might lure an isolated squadron of British battleships towards the German dreadnoughts. Therefore, German battlecruisers returned to the North Sea in April 1918 after an absence of almost two years. At 05.30 on 23 April, the five battlecruisers of the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe and their escorts left their bases under radio silence and headed north towards the Norwegian coast. The Hochseeflotte followed with three battleship squadrons, three light cruiser groups and three destroyer flotillas. On the morning of 24 April, Hipper’s van was off Bergen but, at 05.10, Moltke lost a

propeller and, before the turbine could be stopped, its rotor broke, damaging a condenser and flooding the engine room. Hipper ordered Moltke to retreat toward Scheer’s main formation, but the damage was very serious and at 06.40 the battlecruiser signalled that she could only steam at four knots. The battleship Oldenburg took Moltke in tow at 10.45. The other four battlecruisers – Hindenburg, Derfflinger, Seydlitz and Von der Tann – steamed north until 14.10, searching for the convoy. They were unsuccessful because the convoy had not sailed when planned. Moltke’s problems had forced Hipper to break radio silence, thus alerting the Admiralty that the German fleet was at sea. In the early afternoon of 24 April, the Grand Fleet sailed, with thirty-two battleships, four battlecruisers and their escorts but the German ships were by now unreachable. At 18.45, Scheer reached the entrance of the safe channel through the German defensive minefields. There, the British submarine E-42 fired a torpedo at Moltke, scoring a hit which caused 1,800 tons of water to pour in, though the battlecruiser was able to return to Wilhelmshaven.

German destroyers breaking through the line. Capital ships at sea were usually escorted by scores of light cruisers and destroyers, as the risk of torpedo attacks had always to be considered. (R Stanglini Collection)

The April 1918 raid in Norwegian waters was not repeated but it was

sufficient to raise serious alarm in the United States, which at that time was committed to transferring a large numbers of soldiers and their equipment to Europe. Washington feared that a raid into the Atlantic carried out by one or more German battlecruisers could cause heavy losses. As a consequence, in the summer of 1918, the US Navy moved three battleships to Berehaven, on the south western coast of Ireland, to escort convoys. A major alert about a possible German incursion into the Atlantic was triggered in October 1918, but without consequences. A last sortie by the Hochseeflotte was planned on the eve of Germany’s surrender. The German fleet was still, at least on paper, a remarkable force. However, the political, military and disciplinary prerequisites for carrying out another mission – that, at this point, was only a final attempt to search for honourable death in battle – lacked. On 22 October, an officer from the Admiralstab arrived in Wilhelmshaven bringing Scheer’s verbal orders71 to Hipper, who, on 12 August, had become the commander of the German fleet. The Hochseeflotte would sail as soon as possible for a final attack on the British fleet. Before the surface action, a number of submarine attacks were intended to weaken the Grand Fleet. However, whatever the outcome of the U-boats’ ambush, the Hochseeflotte would not avoid the battle. The intention – or, rather, the hope – was to inflict such severe damage on the enemy that it might possibly influence armistice negotiations in Germany’s favour. Hipper issued the tactical orders on 24 October. Light forces, supported by the Hochseeflotte, would bombard the coast of Flanders, recently abandoned by the German army, while seven light cruisers and five destroyers, supported by the battlecruisers, would attack the Thames estuary. After the raids, all German ships would concentrate off the Dutch coast, where Hipper expected to meet the Grand Fleet. The operation would involve the entire German fleet: eighteen battleships, five battlecruisers, twelve light cruisers and seventy-two destroyers and torpedo boats, plus twenty-one submarines tasked with establishing six ambush arrays in the North Sea. Scheer approved the plan three days later and the operation was set for 30 October. The surface ships began to assemble in Wilhelmshaven on the evening of 29 October, with the sortie scheduled for dawn the next day. However, admirals and captains had not reckoned on a critical factor. The German sailors refused to sacrifice themselves in what was perceived as a ‘suicide mission’ meant only to ensure a dignified end for the fleet, if not as a

deliberate attempt to sabotage peace negotiations. Insubordination soon become real mutinies72 that broke out aboard the battleships Thüringen and Helgoland and then spread to other ships. At first, Hipper tried to disregard these threatening signals, but he was soon forced to cancel the entire operation. The admiral ordered the ships to scatter, believing that this would be enough to keep the situation under control. This did not happen. In early November, the revolt spread to all the main German harbours and naval bases. On 9 November, while, at Compiègne, Marshal Foch was dictating the surrender terms to the German delegation, the mutinous sailors hoisted a red flag on the battleship Bayern, forcing Hipper to leave his flagship. With the armistice of 11 November, Germany was committed to transferring all submarines and a large part of the surface fleet to the Allied powers. However, the latter had diverging views on the immediate destination of the enemy fleet. The plan to intern the German ships in neutral ports, waiting for the peace treaty to establish its ultimate fate, waned. On 12 November, the Allies approved the proposal to temporarily concentrate the German ships at Scapa Flow. If they did not sail from their bases by 18 November, the Allies would occupy the island of Heligoland. On 15 November, Rear-Admiral Hugo Meurer went aboard the battleship Queen Elizabeth, Beatty’s flagship, lying at anchor in the Firth of Forth, to discuss the details of the operation. Three days later, seventy out of seventyfour designated ships, under the command of Rear-Admiral von Reuter,73 left German harbours. They included nine battleships, five battlecruisers, seven light cruisers and fifty-four destroyers. Three ships on the armistice list were left behind, including the incomplete battlecruiser Mackensen. On 21 November, the German ships entered the Firth of Forth, guarded by the Grand Fleet. In the following days, groups of German ships sailed to Scapa Flow and the transfer was completed on 27 November. On 6 December the battleship König and the light cruiser Dresden, delayed by mechanical failures and the destroyer V-129 (replacing a sunken destroyer), joined the interned German ships. Finally, on 9 January 1919, the battleship Baden, replacing Mackensen, arrived at Scapa Flow.

Seydlitz heading for Scapa Flow on 21 November 1919. All five surviving German battlecruisers were interned there after the Armistice. (US Navy History and Heritage Command)

The interned ships were disarmed, stripped of W/T equipment and left with skeleton crews74 able only to ensure maintenance and steaming at low speed. Guard duty was assigned to a Royal Navy battle squadron on a rotational basis while armed trawlers patrolled the anchorage. For about seven months, the German ships remained at anchor, their crews confined aboard without any contact with the outside world. News was scarce and always late. The picture changed on 17 June when von Reuter, aware of the upcoming signature of the Versailles peace treaty (planned for 21 June) and fearing Britain would seize the German ships, distributed to his captains a detailed memorandum about the procedure for scuttling. Preparations were to be made immediately and executed when the signal ‘Paragraph Eleven. Confirm’ was received. On 20 June, von Reuter learned, by reading a copy of The Times dated 17

June, that the Allies had issued an ultimatum to Germany. Unless the German government signed the peace treaty by 12.00 on 21 June, hostilities would be resumed. Von Reuter was convinced that it was time to execute the scuttling plan, thus preventing British sailors seizing his ships. The 17 June news about the ultimatum was no longer valid by 20 June, since the Allies had conceded Germany another 48 hours to make up its mind. But von Reuter was not aware of this and, at 10.00 on 21 June, he signalled his ships to pay attention to an impending signal from the flagship. At 11.20 the cruiser Emden hoisted the signal ‘Paragraph Eleven. Confirm’. All ships opened their valves, condenser intakes and the hatches of submerged torpedo tubes. Seawater poured into the hulls and flowed through open watertight doors and other passages. At 12.00, all German ships hoisted the Kaiserliche Marine flag, while several began to heel over and sink. The first to sink was the battleship Friedrich der Grosse; the last the battlecruiser Hindenburg. Although the alarm was immediately raised, the few British vessels lying at anchor75 were able to do little: four German light cruisers and a dozen destroyers were beached; the battleship Bayern and four other destroyers failed to sink. Another fifteen dreadnought-type warships – including the battlecruisers Hindenburg, Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Molkte and Von der Tann – went to the bottom, together with four light cruisers and thirty-two destroyers. The Hochseeflotte had ceased to exist.

Hindenburg lying on the bottom at Scapa Flow, after having been scuttled by her crew on 21 June 1919. She was refloated in July 1930 and scrapped at Rosyth in 1931-2. (Occhini Collection, A Maj Library, Courtesy, M Piovano) 1

At Dogger Bank, Beatty opened fire at nearly 20,000 yards. This procedure aimed at saving ammunition during the initial phase of the fight but it meant taking more time to straddle the target. Before firing the following round ‘corrected’ for distance, fire direction officers had to spot the first shell splash and hence had to wait while the shell was in flight, usually about thirty seconds at long ranges. 3 Since 1903, they were manufactured by Gesellschaft für Drathlose Telegrafie, known as Telefunken. 4 These figures regard procurement costs only. They do not take into account personnel, training and operations. The exchange rate was RM20.43 to the pound. 5 Fisher said ‘Any fool can obey orders’. This meant that, in some circumstances, orders should be ignored or disobeyed, as Nelson had at Copenhagen. 6 This was not a reference to Goeben but to possible clashes with Austro-Hungarian naval forces coming from the Adriatic. 7 Souchon had already left. 8 This new destination came completely unexpected to Souchon, whose alternatives were still to head towards the Atlantic or the Adriatic. 9 Later, the steamer General, commandeered by Souchon as an auxiliary cruiser, left Messina and headed for the island of Santorini, in the Aegean Sea, to prepare for another 2

coaling. 10 The First CS included Defence (flagship), Warrior, Duke of Edinburgh and Black Prince. They were 14,000 tons, 23-knot armoured cruisers, armed with four to six 9.2in guns. 11 Troubridge assumed that, in daylight, Goeben, with her bigger guns, was a force superior to his own and therefore his instructions not to engage applied. Nevertheless, he still believed that he might succeed if he could meet and attack Goeben at dawn when poor light might partially nullify the advantage of the German guns’ greater range. 12 Souchon was aware that, with Gloucester and possibly other enemy ships on the spot, the planned coaling in the Aegean would be jeopardised. 13 Gloucester fired eighteen 6in and fourteen 4in rounds and hit Breslau once, inflicting no real damage. No round hit the British cruiser. 14 Commander-in-Chief of French naval forces in the Mediterranean. 15 The message was a product of a very zealous clerk who, discovering a draft lying on a colleague’s desk and wishing to be helpful, sent it without authorisation. 16 Souchon wanted to avoid revealing his whereabouts by using Goeben’s radio. 17 Permission to enter was given only at the last moment by the Turkish War Minister Enver Pasha who also gave the order to open fire on British ships which might possibly try to follow the Germans. 18 Commander of the Hochseeflotte destroyers; the light cruiser Köln was his flagship. 19 Vice-Admiral von Spee had reached the Falklands after leaving Tsingtao (China) on 23 June 1914. The armoured cruisers Scharnorst (flagship) and Gneisenau were joined by the light cruiser Nürnberg at Ponape (Caroline Islands) and crossed the Pacific, reaching Easter Island on 12 October. Here, they were met by the light cruisers Dresden and Leipzig. On 1 November, the German squadron defeated a British squadron under Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock off the Chilean port of Coronel. After stopping at Valparaiso and Mas a Fuera, von Spee sailed for the South Atlantic on 15 November, rounded Cape Horn on 1 December and then anchored at Picton Island at the entrance of the Beagle Channel, to coal from the accompanying colliers, until 6 December. 20 On the morning of 6 December von Spee summoned his captains on board Scharnhorst to reveal his intention of bombarding Port Stanley. Relying on outdated information, he believed the Falklands were undefended. 21 Sturdee had sailed from Devonport on 11 November with the battlecruisers Invincible (flagship) and Inflexible and had arrived in Port Stanley after stopping at Cape Verde and the Abrolhos Archipelago, northeast of Brazil, to coal. His arrival in Port Stanley was delayed by the failure to perceive the urgency of refit work to be carried out at Devonport, by a cable caught in the propellers of Invincible during practice shooting on 28 November and by the relative slowness with which Sturdee proceeded to the South Atlantic. At Abrolhos, the battlecruisers were joined by the cruisers Kent, Carnarvon, Cornwall, Bristol and Glasgow. The pre-dreadnought battleship Canopus had returned to Port Stanley on 14 November from the Pacific. She was run aground on a muddy bottom at the eastern end of the bay, so that she could cover the harbour entrance with her guns.

22

Shortly thereafter, following the sighting of three German colliers heading for the anchorage of Port Pleasant, Bristol and Macedonia were ordered to intercept and destroy them. Two colliers were captured and sunk, the third managed to flee to Argentina. 23 The comparison should be adjusted to take into account the higher rate of fire of the German guns, but this does not affect the clear superiority of the British battlecruisers. 24 As soon as Captain Luce on Glasgow saw the three German light cruisers turn southwest he gave chase without waiting for orders. He was followed by Kent and Cornwall, in accordance with written instructions issued earlier by Vice-Admiral Sturdee in anticipation of such an event. Nürnberg and Leipzig were caught and sunk while Dresden managed to escape into the Pacific Ocean, moving up along the coast of Chile. On 14 March 1915 Dresden was intercepted by Kent and Glasgow at the island of Más a Tierra (Robinson Crusoe Island). She refused to surrender and was scuttled by her crew. 25 After 19.30, Admiral Sturdee proceeded to the last known position of Kent which had been pursuing Nürnberg. The British cruiser was hit thirty-eight times, including in the W/T room. As a consequence, she was able to receive messages but not to transmit. Upon confirmation of the return of Kent to Port Stanley in the afternoon of 9 December, Sturdee went in pursuit of Dresden until the morning of the 10th, when coal shortage and adverse weather conditions forced him to return to the Falklands. 26 In his message to the senior surviving German officer, Commander Pochhammer of the Gneisenau, Sturdee expressed his admiration for ‘the good gunnery of both [German] ships’. 27 Of the twenty-two hits, mainly 21cm rounds, eleven hit the deck, four the armoured belt side, four the unprotected side area, one below the waterline, one the front of ‘A’ turret and one the forward tripod, taking away one of its legs. Also one man was slightly wounded. 28 Inflexible took three hits but suffered little damage with one man killed and three wounded. 29 To the 1,174 12in rounds fired during the battle another sixty-four must be added, used in target practice on 28 November 1914 en route to the Falkland Islands. 30 This was, however, subject to the Kaiser’s strict ruling that ‘the battle fleet must avoid heavy losses’. 31 On the night of 3 November, Yorck, which had sailed from Wilhelmshaven with the ships of the Hochseeflotte, met a dense fog that forced her to drop anchor outside the defensive minefields. On the morning of 4 November Yorck lost her way, hit two mines, capsized and sank taking over 300 men with her. 32 Derfflinger had entered service on 1 September 1914 but turbine damage during her sea trials delayed her operational availability until 16 November. 33 King George V, Ajax, Centurion, Orion, Monarch and Conqueror. 34 Antrim, Devonshire, Argyll and Roxburgh. 35 As the overall picture of German forces at sea became clearer, on the morning of 16 December the Admiralty also ordered Jellicoe to sail with the Grand Fleet. 36 The shallow waters to the bank’s southwest were deep enough to allow the big ships’

passage but the wrecks of sunken vessels, whose masts and superstructures rose up near the surface, made them dangerous. 37 They were the German light cruiser Stralsund, with eight destroyers, followed by the cruisers Strassburg and Graudenz and more destroyers. 38 The Royal Navy had a last card to play: Keyes’s submarines. The order to move the boats from the Dutch coast to an ambush line west of Heligoland arrived in the afternoon of 16 December. Keyes could deploy only four boats. In the morning of 17 December, E-11 intercepted von Ingenhol’s battleships returning to the Jade and fired two torpedoes against Posen, without success. 39 For this mission, the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe included Seydlitz (flagship), Moltke, Derfflinger and the armoured cruiser Blücher, a replacement for Von der Tann, which was unavailable due to repairs. 40 The operation, also proposed by Hipper to raise the morale of his crews, foresaw a reconnaissance as far as the Dogger Bank to destroy British light forces that would be there and those vessels that, according to the Germans, worked as spy ships mingling with fishing trawlers operating in the area. 41 Beatty’s force included the battlecruisers Lion (flagship), Tiger, Princess Royal, New Zealand and Indomitable. Queen Mary, considered to have the best gunnery of any ship in the force, was in dock at Portsmouth. 42 This was a decision in accordance with a Grand Fleet Battle Order that decreed that where there were more British ships than enemy ships, the two leading British ships were to concentrate their fire on the leading enemy ship. Therefore, Tiger’s captain thought logically that both Lion and Tiger should fire on Seydlitz; more so, because he was convinced Princess Royal would engage Moltke. 43 Blücher had an experimental system to feed ammunition to the wing turrets. The system used a string of pulleys placed on the ship’s centreline and was protected by the armoured deck. 44 Without power, Lion could communicate only by flags, and then only with severe limitations due to the availability of only two halyards. Moreover, smoke and growing distance made signals difficult to read by other ships. 45 According to naval procedure, when hoisting a signal meant to alert ships of an admiral’s intentions; the order had to be executed when the flags were hauled down. 46 At 15.30, the German ships met von Ingenohl’s battleships and together sailed to their bases, reaching the Jade at night. Seydlitz, after pumping out 600 tons water to reduce her aft draught, docked at Wilhelmshaven in the afternoon of 25 January. 47 Over 700 men were lost, including twenty-three out of twenty-nine officers. The British ships saved 234. 48 At 17.00 on 24 January, Indomitable began towing Lion. At dawn on 26 January they arrived at the Firth of Forth. Since the damage was too serious to be repaired at Rosyth, beyond a quick patch-up, the Admiralty sent Lion to Palmer’s shipyard at Newcastle-uponTyne. Repairs were completed on 28 March.

49

Two hundred so-called ‘X-lighters’ were ordered in January 1915. Britain considered the occupation of a German island in the Heligoland Bight in order to provoke such a naval confrontation. 51 She had escorted a collier. 52 Four months earlier, Paschwitz had replaced Souchon, who went back to Germany. 53 Raglan, 6,250 tons and 334ft 6in, had a 14in twin turret, a 6in single turret aft and two 3in guns. M28, 540 tons and 177ft 3in, had a 9.2in single turret forward, one 3in gun and a 2.5in anti-aircraft gun. 54 The following text is not a complete account of the Battle of Jutland, but just a description of events involving British and German battlecruisers. 55 They were Invincible, Inflexible and Indomitable (Third Battle Cruiser Squadron led by Rear-Admiral Horace Hood), temporarily detached from the BCF to conduct firing exercises at Scapa Flow in order to improve their shooting, which had been deemed completely unsatisfactory. 56 Lion (flagship), Princess Royal, Queen Mary, Tiger, New Zealand and Indefatigable. 57 They belonged to the Fifth Battle Squadron led by Rear-Admiral Hugh Evan-Thomas and including the fast battleships Barham (flagship), Warspite, Valiant and Malaya, temporarily attached to the BCF and replacing the battlecruisers of Third BCS detached to Scapa Flow. 58 Lützow (flagship), Derfflinger, Seydlitz, Moltke and Von der Tann. 59 Hasty and erroneous interpretation of information provided by intelligence had led the Admiralty to inform Jellicoe that the Hochseeflotte was still in port. 60 The seaplane sighted the German light cruisers at 15.20 and signalled their position and course repeatedly to Engadine until, at 15.45, engine failure forced the seaplane to interrupt its mission. However, its signals were not relayed to Beatty. 61 Harvey won a posthumous Victoria Cross. 62 The detonation of shells in ‘A’ turret probably caused the explosion. 63 One shell put Lion’s main W/T station out of action. 64 For this unexpected move, not even Scheer himself, after the war, could offer a rational explanation. 65 After Hipper had left Lützow, Captain Hartog, Derfflinger’s captain, took temporarily command of the 1. Aufklärungsgruppe. 66 For most of the battle, Jellicoe was unaware of the position of the German ships. Only Goodenough informed Jellicoe in a timely manner. 67 For example, Commander Seymour, already responsible for serious signal failures at Dogger Bank, delayed by several minutes the execution of the turning ordered to the 5th BS at the end of the Run to the South. 68 Although the losses at Jutland favoured the German Navy, the confidence of German crews was compromised by the evidence of the damage suffered, especially by their battlecruisers, and the awareness of having narrowly escaped a more severe punishment. 69 The following day, while Falmouth was being towed to the Humber estuary, U-66 sank 50

her. 70 On 5 November 1916, Moltke and the 3rd Battleship Division were involved in the attempted rescue of U-20 and U-32, grounded off the Danish coast. However, the British submarine J-1 torpedoed the battleships Kronprinz and Grosser Kurfürst and the operation was aborted. 71 Scheer deemed it inappropriate to issue written orders for security reasons. 72 The first signs had occurred on 27 October when, at Wilhelmshaven, 300 sailors deserted from Derfflinger and Von der Tann and another forty-five from the light cruiser Strassburg. 73 Admiral Hipper had refused to lead his fleet to surrender. 74 Of the 20,000 men who sailed with the Hochseeflotte to Scapa Flow, there were fewer than 5,000 left one month later and only about 1,800 in June 1919. 75 Five battleships of the First Battleship Squadron had left on the night of 20 June for a gunnery exercise, leaving only two destroyers and a few minor vessels at Scapa Flow to guard the German ships.

The escape of Goeben, 30 July–10 August 1914 The battlecruiser Goeben left Trieste on 30 July and, after joining the light cruiser Breslau in the Adriatic Sea, made a first call at Messina for coaling. In the morning of 4 August the German warships bombarded the ports of Philippeville and Bona on the Algerian coast and then steamed east. Having left behind their pursuers of the Mediterranean Fleet, Goeben and Breslau entered the Dardanelles on the evening of 10 August.

The raid on the Heligoland Bight, 27–28 August 1914 (I) On the morning of 28 August two groups of British light cruisers and destroyers carried out a raid in the Heligoland Bight, aiming to attack German patrol ships and draw the Hochseeflotte towards British submarines waiting in ambush. These British surface forces were supported by five battlecruisers, led by Rear-Admiral Beatty.

The raid on the Heligoland Bight, 27-28 August 1914 (II) To ease the enemy pressure on the British light cruisers and destroyers, at 11.35 on 28 August Beatty ordered his battlecruisers to head southeast at full speed toward the British ships under attack. The German light cruisers Ariadne and Köln were sunk by Beatty’s battlecruisers in the ensuing fighting.

The raid against Yarmouth and Lowestoft, 3 November 1914 The first German raid against the British coast occurred on 3 November 1914, when the 1st Scouting Group of Rear-Admiral Hipper shelled Yarmouth and laid a minefield between this port and Lowestoft.

The battle of the Falkland Islands, 8 December 1914 The squadron led by Vice-Admiral von Spee, sailing from the Pacific Ocean and aiming to bombard Port Stanley, was intercepted by the battlecruisers of Vice-Admiral Sturdee and destroyed at the end of a long chase. Only the light cruiser Dresden was able to temporarily escape.

The raid against Scarborough, Whitby and Hartlepool, 15-16 December 1914 (I) On 15 December the 1st Scouting Group left the Jade for a second raid against the British coast. The Admiralty, alerted by the Royal Navy deciphering service, promptly deployed substantial forces with the aim of intercepting the retreating German ships southeast of the Dogger Bank.

The raid against Scarborough, Whitby and Hartlepool, 15-16 December 1914 (II) Vice-Admiral Beatty’s battlecruisers, supported by the 2nd Battle Squadron of RearAdmiral Warrender and the 3rd Cruiser Squadron of Rear-Admiral William Packenham, struggled to intercept the retreating forces of Admiral Hipper in the morning and early afternoon of 16 December, their failure was due to the poor weather, delays in W/T communications, misjudgements and bad luck.

The battle of Dogger Bank, 24 January 1915 (I) Well before Rear-Admiral Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group left the Jade in the late afternoon of January 23, the Admiralty was aware of an imminent German operation in the North Sea thanks to another success by Naval Intelligence. This enabled the preparation a trap for Hipper’s ships, which was sprung in the early morning of 24 January when Commodore Tyrwhitt’s forces established contact with the German ships, soon followed by Commodore Goodenough’s light cruisers and Vice-Admiral Beatty’s battlecruisers. Hipper, initially pleased that he had met the enemy light forces he wished to destroy, soon realised that he was caught in an ambush.

The battle of Dogger Bank, 24 January 1915 (II) The retreating German force was chased and attacked by the British battlecruisers and light cruisers and the armoured cruiser Blücher was sunk; Hipper’s three battlecruisers managed to escape.

The sinking of Blücher at the battle of Dogger Bank, painted by William Wyllie. (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London)

The Baltic Sea The Baltic Sea represented a secondary operational theatre during the First World War, where light forces, submarines and mine warfare played a dominant role. However, in case of necessity the redeployment of German capital ships from the main North Sea bases to the Baltic was greatly facilitated by the Kiel Canal.

The Black Sea The Black Sea theatre saw a limited number of clashes between the Turkish fleet, reinforced by the incorporation of the German battlecruiser Goeben (renamed Yavuz), and the Russian Fleet. Shown here are also the bombardment operations carried out by Yavuz against Sevastopol in 1914 and Tuapse in 1916.

Attack against the Dardanelles forts, 18 March 1915

On 18 March 1915 the battlecruiser Inflexible took part in the attack intended to suppress the Turkish forts defending the entrance to the Dardanelles. She was repeatedly hit by the Turkish artillery and eventually struck a mine killing thirty-nine sailors and forcing the battlecruiser to withdraw and beach herself on the island of Tenedos.

Landing on Ösel, 12–15 October 1917

A joint operation by the German forces was undertaken in the Gulf of Riga in October 1917 to support the offensive on the Eastern Front. Infantry troops completed the occupation of Ösel on 15 October, forcing the Russians to scuttle the battleship Slava and to abandon the Gulf of Riga.

The raid against the Allied anchorages at Imbros, 20 January 1918 Goeben returned for the first and last time into the Aegean Sea as Yavuz in January 1918, to raid the anchorages at Imbros in pursuit of easing the pressure exerted by the Allied naval forces on the Ottoman Army in Palestine. The operation was aborted when Yavuz was damaged by repeated mine hits.

The 5th Battle Squadron in the Firth of Forth before the battle of Jutland, painted by William Wyllie. (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London)

The battle of Jutland – British and German approach courses, 30-31 May 1916 Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet and Beatty’s Battle Cruiser Force sailed on the evening of 30 May 1916, following intelligence about an imminent and major operation of the Hochseeflotte. The German fleet left the Jade in the early hours of 31 May, sailing north to possibly intercept British shipping. Neither of the two fleets was aware of the presence of the enemy until they met by chance in early the afternoon of 31 May.

The raid against Yarmouth and Lowestoft, 24-25 April 1916 Rear-Admiral Boedicker, commanding the 1st Scouting Group during Hipper’s sick leave, planned to bombard harbour and industrial infrastructures on the British coast with the support of eight Zeppelin airships on 25 April 1916. During the approach the battlecruiser Seydlitz hit a mine and was forced to return to the Jade, and the whole operation proved a substantial failure.

The battle of Jutland – 31 May 1916 (I) After the chance sighting of German ships by the light cruiser Galatea in the early afternoon of 31 May, Beatty’s Battle Cruiser Force – supported by Evan Thomas’ fast battleships – and Hipper’s 1st Scouting Group clashed off the Danish coast. The first phase of the battle, known as ‘Run to the south’, lasted from approximately 15.48 to 16.40 when the British ships, having sighted Scheer’s battleships, turned north. A second phase followed, known as ‘Run to the North’, which lasted until the German forces met Jellicoe’s Grand Fleet.

The battle of Jutland – 31 May 1916 (II) After turning west at 18.00, Hipper believed he had met an isolated squadron of British battleships and turned southwest until he sighted the van of Scheer’s High Seas Fleet, heading north-northeast. At this point the German battlecruisers changed course again, taking position ahead of the battleships of Rear-Admiral Behncke. Meanwhile, at 18.21 Rear-Admiral Hood positioned his 3rd Battle Cruiser Squadron ahead of Beatty’s BCF and engaged Hipper’s battlecruisers. Invincible, Inflexible and Indomitable concentrated accurate fire on Lützow and Derfflinger, but at 18.29 Invincible, straddled by Derfflinger, was struck by a salvo which penetrated ‘Q’ turret and caused the explosion of the

magazines amidships, breaking the battlecruiser in half. She sank immediately, taking with her 1,026 men including Rear-Admiral Hood.

The planned raid against Sunderland, 18-19 August 1916 Less than two months after the battle of Jutland Scheer and Hipper were again at sea for another raid against the British coast. The plan was a revival of the attack on Sunderland already planned for 17 May 1916, but later cancelled. The shore bombardment was to be carried out by the two available battlecruisers, Moltke and Von der Tann, supported by three battleships and extensive aerial reconnaissance conducted by Zeppelin airships.

Warspite and Warrior at the battle of Jutland at around 18.25, painted by William Wyllie. (© National Maritime Museum, Greenwich, London)

Firing arcs of British and German battlecruisers Firing arcs of some relevant British and German battlecruisers are depicted above. It is noteworthy that the disposition of large-calibre turrets along the centreline, introduced in Germany firstly with Derfflinger and in Britain with Lion, improved the coverage fields of the main armament.

The action off Norway, 23-24 April 1918 On 23 April 1918 the battlecruisers of the 1st Scouting Group left their bases to intercept Allied merchant ships off the coast of Norway. Admiral Scheer was forced to cancel the operation when Moltke lost a propeller and suffered turbine damage in the early morning of 24 April.

The internment and scuttling of the German fleet at Scapa Flow, November 1918–21 June 1919 The internment of the German fleet at Scapa Flow according to the armistice terms was almost completed by 27 November 1918. Five battlecruisers and eleven battleships anchored between Risa, Hoy, Mailand and Cava, where they were scuttled by their crews on 21 June 1919.

Chapter Six

BRITISH AND GERMAN BATTLECRUISERS: A TECHNICAL AND OPERATIONAL COMPARISON

H

aving discussed all programmes related to British and German battlecruisers and their operations during the First World War, it is worth comparing these ships from a technical and operational point of view. Areas of comparison will include general features of British and German designs, protection, machinery, armament, decision-making process, productivity and operational performance. The characteristics listed in the tables in both Chapter 3 and 4 and the naval engagements described in Chapter 5 will help in making this comparison.1 From a general point of view, it is interesting to note that the development of German battlecruiser designs continued without significant interruption up to the last months of 1918. In Britain, battlecruiser development began earlier than in Germany but it suffered a break after the design of Tiger, which lasted a few years. In fact, neither the 1913-14 nor the 1914-15 naval programmes included battlecruisers. When Fisher came back to the Admiralty, the euphoria generated by the battle of Falklands paved the way for the Renowns to be redesigned as battlecruisers, while the Courageous class and Hood followed in their wake.

GENERAL FEATURES As the main drivers for the development of battlecruisers in Britain and Germany were main-calibre guns and speed, these influenced a progressive increase of ship size in both nations, which, however, followed different patterns. In German peacetime battlecruiser designs, from Von der Tann to the Derfflingers, the legend displacement increased from 29,965 tons to 31,000 tons, mainly due to the increase in the number of guns, their calibre and armour. In British peacetime battlecruisers, a relatively small increase occurred from the Invincibles to the Indefatigables (about 800 tons), while the increase was very marked in the Lions (about 7,500 tons) and followed as such in Tiger. There are two main reasons for this growth; the first lay in the increase of main gun calibre, changing from 12in in the first generation battlecruisers to 13.5in in the Lions and Tiger. Indeed the Invincibles, armed with 12in guns, were dramatically surpassed by Von der Tann and the Moltkes, armed with 11in guns but better protected and faster.2 The second reason derived from a different layout of the main gun turrets and a consequent redesign of machinery spaces and superstructure disposition; this led to an increase in length, which, in turn, affected power, machinery weight and speed. Designs of British wartime battlecruisers were greatly influenced by war priorities and related expenses. The small decrease in displacement introduced in the Renowns was due to them having fewer main guns than Tiger (six versus eight), partially compensated for by a calibre increase from 13.5in to 15in. Length and speed also increased, especially because the constraints imposed by a moulded beam led to an improvement of hull hydrodynamic performances. A sharp reversal of the trend occurred with the design of the Courageous class, dubbed ‘large light cruisers’ for political reasons and displacing slightly over 19,000 tons but widely considered as battlecruisers. Finally, another drastic change took place in the very last British battlecruiser design, which emerged as the ‘Admiral’ class but was limited to Hood. Originally designed before Jutland,3 they envisaged a legend deep displacement of about 30,300 tons, thus widely surpassing Tiger and the Renowns. For the ‘Admirals’, growth in size came from the adoption of a main battery consisting of four twin 15in turrets, but some improvement in protection also contributed to the growth. However, lessons from Jutland dramatically changed the whole picture, allowing Hood to emerge from her

inclining experiment in early 1920 with a deep displacement of 46,600 tons. At 860ft, Hood was also the longest British battlecruiser. As far as speed is concerned, during his tenure as First Sea Lord, Fisher fought almost obsessively to achieve a good margin of speed over German battlecruisers. Therefore, the result was that both British and German designers tried to achieve higher and higher speeds, pushing power and hull form to the limits. British designs appeared more efficient, at least during steam trials, but these were carried out in a configuration difficult to replicate in actual operations. Indeed, steam trials in Britain were carried out in deep waters, while, in Germany, they were executed in a much shallower basin, which hindered German ships by 1-1.5 knots. Therefore, if one considers battlecruiser steam trials for both navies, a correction factor should be introduced that evens the balance among all classes. Hence, maximum speed increased from 27 knots in Von der Tann to 28.5 knots in the Derfflingers; these figures were related to reasonable sea conditions, clean hull and clean boilers and refer to a legend power that was greatly exceeded during steam trials. In Britain, only Renown and Hood achieved slightly more than 32 knots at full power during steam trials, while the top speed of their predecessors was between 25 and 29 knots. It is not easy to ascertain whether German battlecruisers exploited their maximum speed in action, such as at Dogger Bank and Jutland. Conversely, British battlecruisers often steamed at full power. German wartime battlecruiser programmes confirmed the peacetime trends, although none of them were completed. In the Mackensens and Ersatz Yorcks, displacement grew to up to 37,400 tons. Although it is not possible to assess whether a German battlecruiser actually laid down or built after the Ersatz Yorcks would have had a displacement greater than 37,400 tons, an educated guess confirms a rising trend toward more than 39,400 tons. The last preliminary designs elaborated by the RMA a few months before the end of the war – the ‘GK-four digit’ series – had legend displacements ranging from ‘only’ 29,530 tons and a speed of 33 knots to 44,290 tons. As already stated, the disposition of the main guns influenced the layout of both navies’ battlecruisers. A common feature of early British and German designs (Invincibles, Indefatigables and Von der Tann) was the pair of wing twin turrets amidships. Together with the fore and aft twin turrets, this feature allowed German battlecruisers to fire an eight-gun broadside, while in the Invincibles this feature was limited to six guns. The Moltkes and Seydlitz

followed the same pattern as in Von der Tann, but they were more powerful because their two superimposed aft twin turrets allowed a ten-gun 11in broadside. A common weakness of all battlecruisers equipped with winged turrets was that cross-deck firing caused significant damage to deck and superstructure fittings. This was especially true in the Invincibles and Indefatigables, while the wing turrets in early German battlecruisers were more spaced apart and longitudinally separated by a short deckhouse. An amidships turret survived in the Lions design, thus an eight-gun broadside port and starboard was still achievable.

The battlecruiser New Zealand at Lyttelton, in her namesake country, showing three of her four main turrets. Firepower was one of the main drivers of both British and German battlecruiser development. (Courtesy Alexander Turnbull Library, New Zealand)

As seen in this picture, the low aft freeboard in the first German battlecruisers caused a wet stern, especially when steaming at full speed. This weakness was partly remedied in Seydlitz and subsequent designs. (R Stanglini Collection)

In Tiger and the Derfflingers, the wing turrets were abandoned in favour of a layout with pairs of turrets fore and aft. While the fore turrets were actually superimposed, aft turrets were longitudinally spaced apart because of the machinery layout. This feature was also continued in the Mackensens and Ersatz Yorcks, while the last German ‘GK-four-digit’ designs included several configurations with single and superimposed twin turrets. The Renowns had superimposed forward turrets and one aft turret, but of heavier calibre than their predecessor battlecruisers. Eventually, Hood had two pairs of superimposed fore and aft turrets, thus reflecting her origin as the ‘fusion’ concept envisaged by Fisher.4 As for hull configuration, a common feature of all British battlecruisers, from the Invincibles to Hood was a very long forecastle deck, extended for about 80% of the hull length. The reason for this was to ensure sufficient hull strength and to avoid water flowing along the upper deck, especially when steaming at high speed. German battlecruisers followed a different trend. Von der Tann had a shorter forecastle deck than her contemporary British counterparts, but this was lengthened in the ensuing German peacetime programmes. Conversely, the Mackensens and Ersatz Yorcks had a flush deck

to compensate for the greater weight caused by the adoption of larger calibre guns. In principle, hull structure had to be improved in all British and German battlecruiser designs because the increase in length and displacement – with the exception of the Courageous – caused an increase of the bending moment. Bows in British battlecruisers were rounded and shaped for better seakeeping, while, in German ones, they had a ‘stepped’ shape to accommodate the centreline torpedo tube.5 A size comparison can be performed taking into account beam and length/beam ratio. A major issue affecting the size of British battlecruisers, and battleships as well, was the size of existing British docks, which limited the design of capital ships to a maximum beam of ninety feet. On their part, German capital ships, including battlecruisers, could reach nearly one hundred feet, thus improving fighting qualities such as armour, armament, strength and transversal stability.6 Since Fisher preferred speed over armour, the length/beam ratio of British battlecruisers was higher, varying from 7.15 of the Invincibles to 8.77 of the Renowns:7 conversely, this ratio on German battlecruisers varied from Von der Tann’s 6.45 to 7.49 of the Ersatz Yorcks. The wider beam also favoured a better compartmentation and disposition of internal spaces. Another interesting comparison regards the freeboard at normal load, a feature which was influenced by operational requirements. Freeboard in British battlecruisers was generally higher (fore, amidships and aft) than in German ships, because the latter were designed to operate mainly in northern European waters rather than worldwide. The lower amidships freeboard in German battlecruisers resulted in the secondary battery being too close to the waterline, adversely affecting its operation. Fore and amidships freeboard in British battlecruisers was generally 30ft and 24ft respectively, decreasing to 18-19ft aft.8 German battlecruisers’ freeboard was about 5-6ft less than in British ships, with a slight increase fore and amidships introduced only in the Mackensen and Ersatz Yorck designs. The low aft freeboard in the first German battlecruisers caused a wet stern, especially when steaming at full speed; this issue was remedied in Seydlitz, which was designed with a higher aft freeboard. Masts in British and German battlecruisers were mainly used to support equipment for fire control, wireless communication and boat handling. However, their shape and structure followed a different approach within the

two navies. Almost all British battlecruisers had tripod foremasts and aft pole masts, Tiger being a notable exception with her single tripod foremast. When completed, Lion had a tripod fore-raked foremast abaft the first funnel; this layout was heavily criticised by the Royal Navy’s ordnance experts, who claimed that heat and smoke would interfere with personnel operating in the spotting top. After sea trials, this arrangement was changed twice; firstly, a pole mast was fitted, later changed with a tripod to also carry the director.9 The tripod mast was also introduced in Princess Royal and, later, in Queen Mary. The preference of British designers for tripod masts probably derived from the high level of vibration in pole masts at high speed (which hampered fire control) and the need to accommodate heavier spotting tops than those in German battlecruisers. German battlecruisers initially had pole masts fore and aft, although a tripod mast had been installed in Blücher. However, after Jutland, Derfflinger received a heavy tripod foremast with its legs wide apart. The tripod mast was then also adopted in the Mackensens and Ersatz Yorcks. In terms of power generation, German ships were more generously equipped than British ones as they had to supply a substantially larger range of electric installations (such as turbo-pumps, turbo-fans, deck machinery etc) that replaced equipment that was still steam-powered on British battlecruisers. In German battlecruisers, power generation shows a steady increase from 1,200kW in Von der Tann to 2,320kW in the Mackensens. In addition, there was a higher degree of standardisation because German battlecruisers were equipped with turbo-generators and/or diesel generators, each of them having the same power output; the main ring worked at 220225V. Conversely, British battlecruisers had generators driven by both reciprocating engines and steam turbines, with diesel engines fitted only in Hood. Total output power varied between 630kW in the Invincibles to 775kW in the Renowns, and peaked at 1,600kW in Hood. The main ring worked initially at 105V, but voltage was later standardised at 220V.10 As far as stability is concerned, the table below lists the metacentric height of British and German battlecruisers (classes or single ships), as determined during inclining experiments at deep load conditions, which were those normally achieved in battle. Metacentric height (ft)

German battlecruisers had a higher metacentric height than British battlecruisers. This meant sharper motions in rough seas (a ‘stiff’ ship) and higher stress on hull structures but increased overall stability, which positively influenced gunnery performance.

PROTECTION Generally speaking, it has long been recognised that German battlecruisers were better protected than British units. The main reason for this lay in different operational philosophies adopted by the Royal Navy and the Kaiserliche Marine. Since Germany had fewer battleships than Britain, German battlecruisers were designed to fight in the battle line against the enemy fleet, while Fisher had conceived the British battlecruisers for operations in fast squadrons that would easily defeat smaller enemy ships. Therefore, they should not be involved in engagements with enemy capital ships; however, it is hard to think that a British admiral would have passed up the opportunity to use his battlecruisers against battleships, especially considering the potential offered by superior speed. Armour schemes followed some general rules, aimed at providing sufficient protection to specific features (turrets and magazines, machinery spaces, conning towers etc.) and was duly adopted in both navies’ battlecruisers.11 This scheme took into account three aspects, namely fighting range, enemy shell weights, and their trajectories. The results of firing trials at longer and longer ranges led to a preponderance of vertical protection over horizontal and underwater protection, this being provided by an anti-torpedo bulkhead and/or a double bottom.12 Perhaps, a weak point of protection in German battlecruisers lay in armour distribution along the hull, especially outside the citadel, which could be ascertained as the cause of the loss of

Lützow, and the near loss of Seydlitz, at Jutland. Main belt thickness amidships was higher in German battlecruisers, gradually increasing from 9.8in in Von der Tann to 11.8in in the Ersatz Yorcks. In British battlecruisers, these figures ranged from 6in in the Invincibles to 12in in Hood, the latter being redesigned after Jutland because the Admiralty considered that she was poorly armoured. The thickness of the main belt tapered to an average 4in fore and aft in both British and German battlecruisers. The main belt was closed by transverse bulkheads fore and aft, which, in British battlecruisers, were 4in to 6in while in German battlecruisers they were 7in to 9in. In principle, the combination of thicker main belts and transverse bulkheads provided German battlecruisers with a more robust and solid citadel than that in British ones. Horizontal protection was of less concern in both navies, probably because the threat of bomber aircraft did not materialise in time to influence First World War naval engagements. A configuration with two or three thin (1-2in) decks and an increase of thickness in the sloping side ends of the lower deck was considered sufficient to protect machinery spaces, while steering gear rooms were mainly protected with thicker horizontal plates. For turrets, the increase in gun calibre meant an increase in their armour thickness and weight. As a rule, turrets had thicker faces than sides and roofs. For comparison, it is sufficient to note that German battlecruiser turrets were generally thicker than those in British battlecruisers. Additional weaknesses of British turrets were their shape and vulnerability to splinters. In German battlecruisers, barbettes were generally thicker than in their British equivalents: in Von der Tann maximum thickness for barbettes was 9in, a figure that was achieved in Britain only from the Lions onwards. However, in both British and German battlecruisers, the thickness of barbettes drastically decreased behind the main belt, thus creating a vulnerability in the event of peculiar shell trajectories. The protection of conning towers followed the same rule as in turrets, with thicker faces and thinner sides and roofs. Conning towers in the Invincibles and Von der Tann were almost equivalent, but, from the Moltkes onwards, they appeared more protected in German ships than in British ones. For comparison, the Moltkes had conning towers with 13.7in faces, while Hood, after reconstruction, had 10in. A similar trend also occurred in the aft conning towers. A peculiar element that influenced overall protection, and hence

survivability, in German battlecruisers was a closer compartmentalisation. This was mainly achieved by fitting more longitudinal bulkheads than were found in British battlecruisers. However, Jutland revealed several flaws in the German approach to compartmen-talisation and drainage arrangements. Ventilation trunks, voice tubes and other systems, and even doors, passed through bulkheads and served as avenues for progressive flooding in both Seydlitz and Lützow.13 Stanley Goodall, who worked in the DNC’s Department, carried out an extensive survey of the German battleship Baden, and wrote that … Of the seventeen transverse bulkheads in the watertight compartments next to the ship’s side, ten are provided with doors for access. Further, there is a door between the two forward 15-in shell-rooms and similarly aft; each of the three forward enginerooms is in communication with the engine-room immediately abaft through doors in the transverse bulkhead, and the longitudinal bulkheads between boiler-rooms are similarly pierced.

The roof of ‘X’ turret of Tiger, in the aftermath of the battle of Jutland. Turret armour on German battlecruisers was generally thicker than on British ones.

In short, when comparing compartmentation in British and German battlecruisers it should be noted that some features (for instance, the longitudinal bulkheads between boiler rooms) did not even exist in British ships, so perhaps overall watertight security was not unduly hindered by the aforementioned flaws. However, damage control procedures and training in

the German navy appeared more elaborate and thorough than in British warships.

MACHINERY In all British and German battlecruisers the mutual disposition of machinery spaces (in particular boiler rooms), main armament and magazines heavily influenced the configuration of the superstructures, especially the number and position of funnels. British battlecruisers from the Invincibles to Tiger had three funnels, differently sized and spaced. In the earlier British classes, the three funnels were positioned in accordance to the arcs of fire needed for the wing turrets to contribute to full broadsides, port and starboard. The Courageous class had a single big central funnel, while Hood had two similar funnels amidships. The German Navy adopted a more standardised approach with all battlecruisers from Von der Tann to the Derfflingers, featuring two almost identical funnels. Up to and including Seydlitz, the aft funnel was placed on a short deckhouse that separated the two wing turrets, thus contributing to avoid blast interference when they fired across the deck. In the Mackensens, the aft funnel was smaller than the forward one, while the Erstaz Yorcks would have had a single large central funnel. Few commonalities occurred in the development of machinery designs for British and German battlecruisers. All of them had four shafts, driven by either Parsons- or Curtis-type turbines. Both navies adopted similar types of boilers, but Germany chose a small-tube standardised model (SchulzThornycroft, of British origin) that proved more efficient than the large-tube British models produced by Yarrow and Babcock & Wilcox. This meant that British battlecruisers were generally equipped with more boilers than German ones, a number that grew accordingly with legend power. Comparing Tiger with Hindenburg, the former had 11,900sq.ft of boiler rooms against 9,480sq.ft in the latter. Top speed for both battlecruisers was 28.5 knots. Hood was the first British battlecruiser to adopt small-tube boilers. However, the main difference regarding boilers in the two navies was fuel. The Royal Navy could rely upon both Welsh coal mines and oil wells located in many regions surrounding the British Empire, thus the Admiralty decided in 1904 that all new large warships would be designed to carry and burn oil in addition to coal. Initially, oil was not to be an alternative to coal; rather, oil would be sprayed over burning coal. Therefore, all battlecruisers from Invincible to Queen Mary were fitted with coal-fired boilers with oil sprayers.

Tiger was designed with an equal capacity for coal and oil, but she mainly used coal. Eventually, the Renowns became the first all oil-fired battlecruisers in the Royal Navy. For its part, the German navy relied mainly upon the coal mines of the Saar because the supply of oil came mostly from Romanian fields and had to travel by land. Thus, early classes of German battlecruisers were designed to operate only coal-fired boilers. This policy ended with the design of the Derfflingers, equipped with both coal- and oil-fired boilers; furthermore, in 1916 boilers on previous classes of battlecruisers were modified with the addition of oil sprayers. However, for the design of wartime battlecruisers, the poor quality of German coal meant the navy was forced to use both coaland oil-fired boilers, a policy that went on until the end of the war. However, reliance upon coal-fired boilers had involved a side benefit, since coal bunkers provided some form of additional side protection to machinery spaces and magazines. Von der Tann was the first large German warship to replace reciprocating engines with turbines, whose layout was, however, atypical. The two outer shafts were driven by the fore HP and MP/LP turbines while, for the two inner shafts, the disposition was reversed. All British battlecruisers had the outer shafts driven by HP turbines and the inner shafts driven by LP turbines. This configuration was adopted in all German battlecruisers starting with Moltke, probably because of some thrust imbalance at moderate speed.

Inflexible at speed during her machinery trials, sporting her three funnels. Germany chose small-tube boilers for her battlecruisers and these proved more efficient than large-tube British models. (National Records of Scotland, UCS1/118/374/44)

A close-up view of the shafts and rudders on Inflexible. British battlecruisers up to and including Tiger featured two semi-balanced rudders, each placed directly behind the inner propellers. This improved manoeuvrability astern. (National Records of Scotland, UCS1/118/374/15)

A reduction gear was firstly fitted in the Courageous class battlecruisers and later in Hood, thus providing greater efficiency in the entire propulsion system. All German battlecruisers had direct-drive shafts; plans were made to install a Föttinger-type hydraulic reduction gear in the Ersatz Yorcks. In general, machinery weight and spaces were larger in British battlecruisers than in German ones; however, in the latter, boiler and turbine rooms were considered cramped by Royal Navy standards because of the closely-packed machinery. It must also be recognised that the disposition of boilers and engine rooms in the latest classes of German battlecruisers was

influenced by the wider space between the two aft turrets, as also occurred in the Lions and Tiger. The search for lighter main machinery led the German navy to consider adopting diesel engines for propulsion, notably during the design of the Derfflingers. Experiments carried out by MAN in 1910 were aimed at manufacturing a diesel engine delivering 6,000shp at 165rpm. However, discussions within the RMA highlighted difficulties in fitting a fuel oil plant onboard a large warship that was compatible with available spaces and vulnerability. Tirpitz was keen to adopt oil-fed main machinery because this allowed lower fuel consumption, greater radius of action, and lighter main machinery, and he pushed to introduce diesel engines in Hindenburg. However, Tirpitz was opposed by the RMA’s Construction Department, which argued that diesel technology was not sufficiently mature for powering large warships. This, and the delay the industry experienced in developing the prototype commissioned by the German navy, led to Hindenburg being equipped with a traditional steam plant, as in Derfflinger and Lützow. As far as steering and manoeuvrability is concerned, British battlecruisers up to and including Tiger featured two semi-balanced rudders, each placed directly behind each inner propeller. This layout was introduced because ship length had increased, and it had two advantages: the tactical diameter was reduced and astern manoeuvrability improved. The Renowns, Hood and the Courageous class reverted to a single centreline rudder placed abaft the inner propellers because their smaller stern shapes were not suited to house two rudders and related equipment. However, this layout increased vulnerability, as shown when one Japanese air-launched torpedo hit and jammed Repulse’s steering gear on 10 December 1941.

Coaling on board Australia. British battlecruisers adopted all oil-fired boilers earlier than their German counterparts. The Derfflingers were the first Germany battlecruisers equipped with both coal- and oil-fired boilers. (Australian War Memorial)

German battlecruisers followed a different approach. Von der Tann was equipped with twin rudders placed abaft the inner propellers, while Moltke, Seydlitz and the Derfflingers featured two rudders placed in tandem along the centreline. As they were placed quite far apart, their survivability was increased. The German Navy reverted to twin parallel rudders in the Mackensens and Ersatz Yorcks, probably because a greater beam provided more space to install two sets of steering gear, thus improving survivability. As far as radius of action is concerned, the different operational requirements envisaged by the two navies probably influenced their battlecruiser designs more than any other feature. British battlecruisers were conceived to operate worldwide, and also far from their bases and coaling stations, while the main theatres of operations for German battlecruisers were

the North Sea and the Baltic where they could be supported by shore infrastructure in the vicinity. All these circumstances dictated the design in terms of fuel stowage, and hence radius of action. Fuel stowage followed different trends in British and German battlecruisers.14 In British designs, oil stowage increased proportionally with respect to coal stowage due to the greater reliance upon oil spraying on coal. In Tiger, oil stowage surpassed coal stowage: 3,320 tons of coal and 3,480 tons of oil respectively, although, in service, oil and coal capacity combined did not generally exceed 4,900 tons. German battlecruiser designs prioritised coal over oil, with Von der Tann, the Moltkes and Seydlitz having only 197 tons of oil. A limited reversal of this trend occurred from the Derfflingers onwards, with the Mackensens and Ersatz Yorcks stowing 3,940 tons of coal and 1,968 tons of oil. At a cruising speed of 14 knots, the endurance of German battlecruisers was, on average, 4,200nm; this was almost doubled in the Mackensens (8,000nm) and then went down again to 5,500nm in the Ersatz Yorcks. For their part, the first classes of British battlecruisers had an average 500nm advantage at 14 knots, which increased in Tiger and in the newer designs: the Renowns could steam for 4,000nm at 18 knots. Generally speaking, range was increased by several factors, such as the adoption of oil-fired boilers and marked improvements in hull forms stemming from design experience.

ARMAMENT British and German battlecruiser designs highlighted an enduring difference in main-calibre guns, whose development was basically aimed at achieving greater accuracy and hitting power at longer ranges. In general, the Royal Navy was ahead of the German Navy thanks to a continuous development that began with 12in in the Invincibles and ended with the 18in in Furious, although the latter was never used. Germany tried to catch up, but did not achieve the same results: Von der Tann began with 11in and the Ersatz Yorcks – none of which were commissioned – ended with 15in. However, the German disadvantage in calibre was compensated by higher quality gun and shell manufacturing and better ammunition handling and fire control. The surprise generated when Invincible was unveiled led the Germans to believe that the Royal Navy was considering engaging enemy ships at longer ranges than previously foreseen, while her superior speed would allow a tactical supremacy. Then, the German navy performed a thorough assessment

of the prevailing visibility conditions in the North Sea, compared with its own gun ranges. The conclusion was that visibility would be good enough for fighting at 13,500yd for only a few days a year. As the maximum effective range of the German 11in L/40 gun was about 12,200yd, the navy was basically satisfied with this performance, which was confirmed by many firing tests. Several measures were nevertheless devised to increase the probability of hitting the target at this range, including the adoption of longer barrels (allowing an increased muzzle velocity and a flatter trajectory), a more accurate target ranging capability, a limitation of spread through a reduction of brackets’ width and an improvement of fire control organisation and training. All these measures were gradually introduced in the German battlecruisers: Von der Tann had 11in L/45 guns, while the Moltkes and Seydlitz were fitted with 11in L/50 guns. The Derfflingers were armed with eight 12in L/45 guns which had a greater hitting power than the 13.5in British guns. The Mackensens were to be fitted with 13.7in L/45 guns, while the Ersatz Yorcks were planned to have 15in L/45 guns. In new constructions, the main calibre guns benefitted from increased firing arcs due to a better arrangement of the gun mounts, which on the Derfflingers were finally placed on the centreline. The firing arcs of the main guns in selected British and German battlecruisers are shown on page 236. The first and second generation battlecruisers – Von der Tann, Moltke and Seydlitz for Germany, the Invincibles, Indefatigables and the Lions in Britain – had just some turrets placed at the ends, while one or two more were placed either ‘en echelon’ or amidships, as in the Lions. The turrets placed fore and aft enjoyed large firing arcs, up to 300° or even slightly more, while the operation of the wing turrets was hampered by the superstructure. Thus, their firing arcs were split into two sectors, starboard and port, whose width depended on the turrets disposition (more or less close to the ship’s side), the layout of the deckhouses and funnels and the need to limit the potential damage caused by blast and overpressure when firing. The firing arcs of Von der Tann and the Indefatigables show a close similarity. Those of the wing turrets in the British battlecruisers were slightly larger, reaching 181–182° in the Indefatigables in comparison to 175°–176° in Von der Tann. Conversely, ‘A’ turret in the Indefatigables, the training of which was limited by a massive fore superstructure, had a firing arc of just 280°. The amidships turret in the Lions had a firing arc of 240° (120° on each side), slightly less than the wing turrets of the Indefatigables (about 250°).

Main guns in action on a German battlecruiser, probably Seydlitz. During the development of both British and German battlecruisers, a steady increase of full broadside weight occurred, the only exception being the Courageous class. (R Stanglini Collection)

The battlecruisers with heavy turrets placed along the centreline benefitted from larger firing arcs. Those of the Derfflingers reached 300° for the fore turrets and 308° for the aft turrets, with a total coverage of 1,216° (summing the firing arcs of the individual turrets). The corresponding figure for Von der Tann was 1,109°. A similar development occurred in British battlecruisers, where the corresponding figures attained were 1,083.5° in the Indefatigables, 1,140° in the Lions and 1,200° in Tiger. Initially, German guns had shorter ranges than British guns because of their limited maximum elevation. After the battle of Dogger Bank, the German Navy decided to increase elevation, at the expense of a decrease in maximum depression. In British battlecruisers, maximum range varied from 18,850yd at 13.5° of the 12in guns in the Invincibles to 23,730yd at 20° of 15in guns in the Renowns.15 The table below shows a comparison between main calibre guns fitted in British and German battlecruisers designed before the First World War.

The table below shows a comparison between main calibre guns fitted in British and German battlecruisers built and designed during the war. Broadside weights for the British types are given, respectively, for six 15in guns, as fitted in the Renowns, and for two 18in guns, as foreseen for Furious. For the German ships, data refer to the 35cm (13.7in) and 38cm (15in) guns foreseen for the Mackensens and Ersatz Yorcks, respectively.

Finally, the table below shows the full broadside weight for each class of British and German battlecruiser. This table has been created considering the number and calibre of main guns for each class available for broadsides and the weight of each projectile for that calibre. For the German navy, a ‘GK four-digit’ series design armed with eight 16.6in guns has been considered, assuming that each projectile would weigh 2,145lb. The table shows a steady increase of full broadside weight for British and German battlecruisers, the only exception being the two 18in guns envisaged for Furious. The broadside weight was more markedly increased from the Indefatigables to the Lions, while for the other classes it was more gradual. In absolute terms, British battlecruisers had a heavier broadside weight than German ones; however, the Invincibles, Indefatigables, Von Der Tann, Moltkes and Seydlitz featured a broadside of almost equal weight.

Summing up, German guns were more solid, had greater range, muzzle velocity, and service life than their British equivalents and could fire heavier shells. However, the former generally cost 30% more than the latter, while British battlecruisers had a total firepower greater than German ones. As for ammunition, British propellant charges were more unstable than the German ones and deteriorated over time. Additionally, they were usually stowed in silk bags rather than brass cases. As widely recognised, these weaknesses, combined with the inadequate and/or excessively risky ammunition-handling procedures, led to the loss of Queen Mary, Invincible and Indefatigable at Jutland and caused extensive damage to Lion at Dogger Bank. Another weakness of British shells was that they achieved poor results when they struck the heavily-armoured German battlecruisers and battleships at an oblique angle. As highlighted by several authors, a British shell either broke up on impact or only smashed a hole in the surface of a German capital ship’s armour instead of penetrating and bursting inside the target. Improvements were introduced some time after Jutland but this proved too late because there were no more engagements between British and German capital ships.

‘A’ 12in turret, the forward superstructure and the foremast of the battlecruiser New Zealand; the spotting top housed several fire-control devices. The effectiveness of gunnery on all classes of battlecruisers depended largely on fire control rather than on gun performance. (National Archives of Canada)

The early classes of British battlecruisers had a larger wartime ammunition outfit for their main guns than the contemporary German classes (880 and 660 rounds, respectively). Later, this feature was almost equal in British and German battlecruisers, totalling 720 rounds in the Derfflingers, the Renowns and Hood. In practice, gunnery effectiveness for all classes of battlecruisers depended largely on fire control rather than on gun performance. Fire control remained under continuous development in both navies. Experimental firing practices and a wider introduction of rangefinders led to a progressive increase of fighting ranges. German practice emphasised gunnery accuracy over range, while the Royal Navy aimed especially at increasing rate of fire because it relied upon the perceived hitting power of its greater calibres. As already mentioned in Chapter 2, the most important aspect of fire control remained the method or process developed and implemented in each navy. Before and during the First World War, this method relied entirely upon continuous observation of the target, in order to determine its position over time and the fall of shots fired at it. Therefore, in turn, this method relied heavily on rangefinders and their operators, associated equipment and fire-control organisation. British battlecruisers had 9ft rangefinders located on mastheads, notably in spotting tops, so that the enemy could be spotted at the long ranges (about 13,000yd) at which an action was supposed to begin. It was also envisaged that the spotting top would mostly be used during the opening phase of a battle and that fire control would then be transferred to the conning tower as soon as the range decreased. German battlecruisers did not have large rangefinders in their mastheads, but used longer rangefinders (20-26ft) placed on top of the control tower and in the rear of the main turrets. In fact, the smaller masthead positions fitted in German battlecruisers were used only to spot the target and determine a very approximate range with a small rangefinder. Longer rangefinders (30ft) in lower positions were not introduced in British battlecruisers until near the war’s end. It is worth remembering that, until the introduction of gyroscopically-stabilised and

rotating mountings, several difficulties challenged the operators of rangefinders. Keeping the target in view meant that the rangefinder had to be elevated, depressed, and trained back and forth to compensate for roll, pitch and yaw. These motions were particularly pronounced in mastheads or in an upper deckhouse. This was probably the reason why German battlecruisers did not have spotting tops with rangefinders. Moreover, the rangefinder operator had to consider any change in the position of the target relative to that of his ship. Furthermore, the operator, who was standing, had to keep his balance while carrying out all these operations, a task not easy to accomplish when the ship was subject to heavy motion and in rain, wind, cold, mist and smoke. As far as the method itself was concerned, and as discussed in Chapter 5, a marked difference existed between the Royal Navy and the German Navy. The British method was mainly aimed at avoiding waste of ammunition during the initial phase of an action, when the probability of hits was expected to be quite low. The German method was simpler, more rapid and more effective than the British one, and helped to counterbalance the heavier British guns and their associated fire control devices, such as Dreyer Tables and Argo Clocks. The introduction of director control on British and German battlecruisers allowed a gunnery officer to fire all main guns simultaneously, thus limiting the interference caused by blast, smoke, shock and vibrations. However, the adoption of director control in British battlecruisers (firstly in Invincible during her 1914 refit, then in Tiger and later in all pre-war and new battlecruisers) did not affect the different gunnery performance capabilities existing between the two navies too much. This difference lasted at least until after Jutland, when the Royal Navy decided to abandon the old process of bracket/straddle and revert to a method similar to the German one. As far as medium-calibre guns are concerned, German tactical doctrine during the war also envisaged medium- and short-range engagements. Thus German capital ships, including battlecruisers, were fitted with a secondary battery of powerful 5.9in guns; an antitorpedo boat battery of 3.4in guns and torpedo tubes.17 It appears that this combination of medium-to-small-sized armament consumed weight and space that could perhaps have been better used either to increase main-calibre guns or to improve speed. The threat of surface torpedo attack could be repelled by small calibre guns only because the effective range of early-generation torpedoes was limited to a few thousand feet. When the range grew to thousands of yards, a larger calibre

became mandatory and that was the 3.4in gun on German battlecruisers and the 4in one on British ships. British battlecruisers were, however, not fitted with heavier secondary guns until Furious and Hood.18

Tiger’s starfish and her spotting top. British battlecruisers had 9ft rangefinders located in spotting tops while German ones used longer rangefinders placed on top of the conning towers and in the rear of the main turrets. (National Records of Scotland, UCS1/118/418/139)

A detailed view of Repulse, showing two of the five 4in triple mountings which made up her secondary armament. German battlecruisers were generally fitted with a heavier secondary battery than their British counterparts. (National Records of Scotland, UCS1/118/443/314)

Loading 13.5in shells aboard Lion. Note the small trolleys used by the sailors to move them. Each shell weighed about 1,250lb including the bursting charge, which ranged from the 29.5lb of the Mark IVa APC projectile to 176.5lb in the HE one. (National Archives of Canada)

To conclude the comparison of armament, it is worth noting that the German Navy was much slower than the Royal Navy in embarking aircraft in battlecruisers, and battleships as well. Some basic experiments were conducted by a few German battlecruisers in 1915, using floatplanes placed amidships on the upper deck and lowered into and hoisted out of the water by derricks. However, German battlecruisers never operated aircraft on a regular basis, probably because the process of lowering/hoisting was rightly perceived as slow and complex. Conversely, many British battlecruisers experimented with aircraft using a flying-off ramp and canvas hangars place on the top of their main turrets and operated several types of aircraft during the latter part of the war.

INDUSTRIAL CAPABILITIES AND

PRODUCTIVITY A comparison between British and German shipbuilding productivity during the naval armaments race is a useful indicator of the industrial effort both nations put into building capital ships. This comparison is made by assessing three elements, the first being the sheer number of battleships and battlecruisers constructed from 1905 to the early part of the First World War. Britain totalled fifty-one, while Germany stopped at twenty-six. Considering battlecruisers, in August 1914 the Royal Navy had ten units; this number includes Tiger, whose outfitting was in its final stage, and Australia, although she was in service with the Royal Australian Navy. The German Navy had four units in commission, while Derfflinger was to be commissioned in September. The second element in comparing British and German shipbuilding productivity is related to the pace of battlecruiser construction, considering the monthly tonnage achieved in the 1905-14 timeframe for each nation. For Britain, this period spans from April 1906 (the laying down of Invincible) to October 1914 (the commissioning of Tiger) while, for Germany, it goes from March 1908 (the laying down of Von der Tann) to November 1914 (the commissioning of Derfflinger). 19The time frame is 103 months for Britain and eighty months for Germany. As for tonnage, the legend displacement has been considered and the battlecruisers accounted for are the Invincibles (three ships), the Indefatigables (three ships), the Lions (three ships), Tiger, Von der Tann, the Moltkes (two ships), Seydlitz and Derfflinger. The average British figure is 2,005 tons/month while the corresponding German one is 1,461 tons/month. Britain Germany

Total legend displacement 206,540 tons 116,920 tons

Months 103 80

It is noteworthy that Britain’s shipbuilding industry achieved better efficiency only after commencing the construction programmes of battleships and battlecruisers in 1905. Indeed, Britain’s ability to outperform her rivals in terms of naval shipbuilding had lasted until the 1890s, when several foreign yards, especially in Germany, significantly improved warship building times. Under these circumstances, the development of new types of capital ships abroad, primarily in Germany, could have seriously weakened the Royal

Navy’s dominant position and threatened the entire British grand strategy. The third element of comparison relates to competitiveness between British and German shipbuilders. This comparison is made in the table below considering the construction costs of some battlecruisers built before the war. The cost of German battlecruisers has been converted into sterling at the exchange rate of RM20.40 to the pound. Legend displacements are in tons for the British ships, in metric tonnes for the German ships.

The last column shows that the cost per ton was quite uniform in Britain and German for the same type of warship, also taking into account differences related to armament, speed and protection, etc. A more in-depth analysis of British and German shipbuilding productivity, this time focused on the construction of battlecruisers during wartime, reveals a British advantage. The variable for this analysis is construction time, from the laying down of each battlecruiser to her completion. Considering, too, that the displacement of all battlecruisers built by Britain and Germany followed a steady growth until at least 1916, construction time remains a reasonable factor to indicate shipbuilding productivity and efficiency. The overall average construction time is 27.3 months for British battlecruisers and 35.8 months for German ones. These figures take into account Hood (laid down in September 1916 but not completed until 1920) and Hindenburg (laid down in June 1913 and completed in October 1917). Excluding Hood, Britain’s average construction time decreased to 26 months

per battlecruiser. When considering the industrial effort up to the outbreak of the First World War, Britain’s average construction time is 29 months per battlecruiser, while Germany’s is 33.1 months. The shortest construction time in Britain was for Repulse, just 19 months at John Brown & Co, while the longest construction time was for Hood, 40 months, also at John Brown.20 In Germany, the longest construction time was 52 months for Hindenburg, at the Kaiserliche Werft in Wilhelmshaven, with a delay caused by the removal of material for the repair of Derfflinger after Jutland. The shortest construction time was 30 months for both Von der Tann and Seydlitz, both at Blohm & Voss, in Hamburg. As far as construction time is concerned, it is also interesting to discuss some elements raised in Germany in 1910 when Wilhelm II, concerned about the higher productivity of British shipyards, urged an acceleration of construction and outfitting of German battleships and battlecruisers. At the time, German shipyards normally took three years to build a new large warship plus one year for her trials. According to the Kaiser, this time should be cut to three years (twenty-four months for construction and twelve months for trials). However, reducing the German naval construction schedule was a difficult objective to achieve because the main private companies involved, notably Krupp and Dillinger, were not able to compress the manufacturing and delivery processes for guns and armour plates. For example, it took thirty-nine months to deliver the armour plates for Derfflinger. Another factor that slowed the decisionmaking process on new German battlecruiser designs was the often diverging views existing between the main departments of the RMA; this led to lengthy, and often heated, discussions, which reflected rigid positions on issues such as battlecruiser doctrine, gun calibre, ship size and speed.

Tiger being outfitted at John Brown, with the mainmast rigged almost ‘attached’ to the aft funnel. (National Records of Scotland, UCS1/118/418/110)

Another issue of a financial nature hindered a reduction of construction times. In Germany, naval construction costs were distributed over four years and their sudden rescheduling over three years would probably require an initial budget increase of RM25 million, which would have caused an unwanted friction between the navy, on one side, and the Chancellry and Reichstag on the other side. Wilhelm II also criticised the lengthy process between the authorisation to build a new warship and her actual laying-down; for example, it took from ten to twelve months to begin building Seydlitz and Derfflinger, an interval which Tirpitz justified because of the preparatory works needed before the shipyard was ready to lay down a new warship.

The ‘large cruiser’ Ersatz Herta, which later became Hindenburg, under construction at the Imperial Dockyard at Wilhelmshaven in 1915. She would be the last battlecruiser to be commissioned by the German Navy. (tsushima.ru)

According to Tirpitz, the faster schedules of British shipyards were a function of a three-year distribution of funds and, especially, by the interest each shipyard had in freeing their slipways as soon as possible to make way for new orders coming not only from the Royal Navy but also from abroad. German shipyards followed the opposite principle: they needed to delay construction times until the arrival of new work, as a result of the rigid schedule of German Naval Laws. Furthermore, in Britain the construction of a large warship involved up to 3,000 workers, while in German shipyards they were about only 1,000 because orders for new warships were scarce,21 and costs higher. Another circumstance that hindered the German navy increasing construction times was the work overload at the RMA’s Construction Department when designers and engineers had to prepare concurrent designs for battleships and battlecruisers. In addition, possible changes to German naval programmes, and thus construction schedules, were usually introduced only after the British Parliament disclosed information on the Royal Navy’s new naval programmes. All these circumstances provided Tirpitz with enough evidence to show the Kaiser the limits on German naval productivity, which remained lower than that achieved by British private and public shipyards both in peace and in war.

COSTS A comparison between the costs of British and German battlecruisers can be made considering the ships actually commissioned and is shown in the table opposite (the comparison excludes Furious as she was extensively modified during her fitting-out). As explained in Chapter 3, costs for the Indefatigables are estimated or approximate, but it appears that actual costs did not exceed these figures. All costs include hull, machinery, armour, guns and minor items. The right hand column shows the equivalent costs of German battlecruisers expressed in Reichsmarks (with £1 = RM20.40). All figures are rounded to the nearest RM1,000 and £1,000 respectively. British and German battlecruisers have been aligned ‘horizontally’ in the table to reflect their approximate contemporary construction times as related to costs. Inflation from 1905 to 1914 has not been taken into account. An approximate cost breakdown carried out for Tiger (lying in the ‘middle’ between British first and third generation battlecruisers) gives the following percentages: hull and equipment, 32%; armour, 19%; machinery,

27%; and armament, 22%. Broadly speaking, battlecruiser costs grew proportionally with size in both Britain and Germany. Others factors were the increase in the main gun calibre, the search for higher speeds (with bigger and more advanced machinery) and the technological developments that occurred from 1905 to the eve of war. Globally, Britain spent much more than Germany on battlecruisers, but this is justifiable given the Royal Navy’s worldwide commitments compared with the limited ones of the Kaiserliche Marine. From a comparative point of view, excluding Hood because she was completed in 1920, it appears from the table that German battlecruisers were on average more expensive than contemporary British ones, one reason for this probably being greater economies of scale available in Britain than in Germany. In addition, the industrial base was larger in Britain than in Germany, thus favouring a competitiveness that led to lower prices.

An amidships view of Repulse being outfitted at John Brown. The ship was constructed in the shortest time of any battlecruiser, just nineteen months. Broadly speaking, the costs of battlecruisers grew proportionally with their size in both Britain and Germany. (National Records of Scotland, UCS1/118/443/303)

In terms of contribution to the war effort, the table below shows the average cost for British and German battlecruisers. The total cost for both nations has been calculated including the cost of each battlecruiser involved in any type of naval action in the First World War (therefore excluding Hood) and including fourteen British and seven German battlecruisers. Country Battlecruisers commissioned Total cost of battlecruisers (£) Average battlecruiser cost (£)

Britain 14 28,408,000 2,029,142

Germany 7 17,127,250 2,446,750

PERFORMANCE IN BATTLE A comparison of the performance in battle of British and German battlecruisers is mainly focused on the major naval actions in the First World War, as described in Chapter 5. Although they were lucky because they were only once engaged with modern heavy guns, the Invincibles performed respectably during the war. However, they were grossly overestimated after the Falklands, and remained so after Dogger Bank. Being the more ‘senior’ battlecruisers of the Royal Navy, they showed many weaknesses, especially against 12in, or heavier, guns, and mines as well. Von der Tann has been considered a better fighting battlecruiser than her almost contemporary British counterparts and she gets the credit for blowing-up Indefatigable at Jutland. Goeben had few opportunities to fight against similar capital ships, but proved her robustness against mines. Moltke performed well against Lion and Tiger at Dogger Bank and Jutland and remained the only German battlecruiser in acceptable fighting condition at the end of Jutland. Lion was heavily damaged at Dogger Bank and barely escaped sinking at Jutland, thus confirming that, among other factors, her armour was not fully adequate to deal with German 12in guns. Although frequently cited for disappointing performance, Tiger performed well at Dogger Bank and Jutland, suffering significant damage only to ‘Q’ turret. At Dogger Bank Seydlitz fought against several battleships and battlecruisers and was heavily pounded by twenty-two 13.5in and 15in shells. Despite having 5,300 tons of water aboard, a draught of 46ft forward and 24ft aft and a 8° list to port, Seydlitz was still able to reach her home port. At Dogger Bank, Derfflinger engaged Lion, Tiger and Princess Royal and sustained little damage despite being hit by 13.5in fire. At Jutland, she contributed to Queen Mary’s sinking, took twenty-one 12in and 15in shells and suffered less damage than Seydlitz. At Jutland, Lützow’s shooting was probably the best of all German capital ships; she scored nineteen hits, mostly on Lion, and contributed to the sinking of Invincible. However, Lützow took twenty-four hits from 13.5in and 15in guns, which put her out of action and eventually forced the German destroyer G-38 to sink her with two torpedoes. Other, newer, British battlecruisers had no opportunities to show their strengths and weaknesses during the war.

A Zeiss 8m (26ft) rangefinder placed on a truck with trailer and ready for delivery to the German navy. Starting with the Derfflinger class, German battlecruisers were equipped with longer, and hence more effective, rangefinders. (Courtesy, Zeiss Archives)

Seydlitz in dry dock, showing the damage inflicted by a torpedo hit during the battle of Jutland. In terms of passive protection, the German battlecruisers performed better than British units. (Naval History and Heritage Command, US Navy)

AFTERMATH AND CONCLUSIONS From a global point of view, German battlecruisers demonstrated better fighting capabilities than their British counterparts. This superiority was due to five main reasons: a saving in hull and machinery weights that was used to improve protection; a better distribution of armour; much better compartmentisation (especially below the waterline); the better quality of German propellant charges (which did not ignite if a fire occurred) and safer ammunition handling rules and equipment. The main fault of German battlecruisers in battle was a trend to flooding forward, which was difficult to overcome because of their lower forward freeboard and insufficient pumps and drainage equipment. While the aforementioned advantages of German battlecruisers can also be seen as disadvantages of British battlecruisers, these latter also suffered the ineffectiveness of their APC shells, which broke up on

impact with armour rather than piercing it and exploding inside a ship’s vital spaces. In absolute terms, a German battlecruiser would have probably proved superior in a one-to-one engagement with any of her British counterparts; however, in relative terms, the Royal Navy demonstrated her superiority for two main ‘combined’ reasons. The first was the capability to plan, build, deploy and operate fourteen battlecruisers from 1908 (Invincible’s commissioning) until the end of the First World War. Conversely, the Kaiserliche Marine commissioned ‘only’ seven battlecruisers. The second reason was the ability of the Royal Navy to quickly recover from battle. At Jutland, Britain lost three battlecruisers and Germany only one, but two months later the Royal Navy had seven combat-ready battlecruisers and the Kaiserliche Marine only one. All the comparisons made above have to be put into the framework of the sequence of planning, design and construction for British and German battlecruisers. Many authors have criticised the Invincibles, marking them as ‘good’ and hoping for future improvements; however, the Indefatigables resulted in a mere duplication, if not worse. Von der Tann and the Moltkes were commissioned after Invincible, but before Inflexible, Indomitable and the Indefatigables, and reflected the ‘slow’ approach taken by the German navy in developing new battlecruiser designs. The Lions were conceived as an improvement over the Indefatigables to counter the Moltkes, but their protection remained poor when compared with their armament. The German Navy obtained some detailed information about Queen Mary, but apparently this did not influence its contemporary designs. For its part, the Royal Navy got some details of Seydlitz’s design, but even this seems not to have influenced British developments. Seydlitz was essentially a more heavily-armed version of the Moltkes, even though the envisaged adoption of 12in guns did not materialise. In principle, Seydlitz was better protected than Queen Mary, but this feature was ‘balanced’ by the 13.5in guns of the latter. Tiger was a distinct improvement over the Lions, except for protection and machinery weight. The Derfflingers marked a great design improvement over Seydlitz and are considered the best battlecruisers completed by either Britain and Germany before 1918. The Renowns were not an improvement over Tiger, especially because their protection was poorer, a problem that was supposedly solved during their construction, even though this could not be tested during the war. The Courageous class has

been unanimously judged of dubious usefulness, except perhaps for the role they were conceived for, the ‘Baltic Project’, including decoying German naval forces away because of their superior speed and shallow draught. Although a few examples of the type survived until the Second World War, the battlecruiser era practically ended with Jutland. As detailed in Appendix ‘A’, a few battlecruiser programmes survived in the United States and Japan after 1918, together with the ‘Admiral’ class in Britain; but the loss of three battlecruisers at Jutland had had a deep impact on naval circles and public opinion in Europe and elsewhere, while lessons from the Great War highlighted the advent of submarines and naval aircraft as the weapons of the future.

A close-up view of Hood’s forward superstructure and funnel, showing the arrangements for fire control. (Courtesy, Alexander Turnbull Library, New Zealand)

In the early 1920s, the Admiralty devised a capital ship policy based on three elements: the number of battleships and battlecruisers then in service with the Royal Navy, the results of Hood’s construction and, most importantly, the US and Japanese capital ship programmes. As detailed later in Appendix A, these nations had already planned a robust enhancement of their fleets during the First World War, notably by commencing important battlecruiser programmes: the six Lexingtons in the US and the four Amagis in Japan.22 After the usual rounds of design activities and discussions on six preliminary projects, dubbed from ‘K’ to ‘G’, the Admiralty chose the ‘G3’ design, which, with some modification, was consolidated in November 1921. The ‘G3’ battlecruisers had a legend displacement of 46,800 tons, were designed for a maximum speed of 31.5 knots and had a main battery of three triple 16in mountings. However, this and the other US and Japanese battlecruiser programmes were suspended, and then cancelled, in accordance with the limitation on capital ships imposed by the 1922 Washington Conference. Although the Conference dealt the final blow to the development of new battlecruiser concepts and designs, it is interesting to note that several battlecruisers in service or construction formed the basis for the development of naval aviation. In fact, naval leaders in the three nations refused to renounce these hulls whose features, especially speed, could prove useful in the future. Therefore, Furious, Courageous and Glorious became real aircraft carriers in Britain, followed by Lexington and Saratoga in the US and Akagi in Japan. By contrast, when the rearmament of the German Kriegsmarine began in the 1930s, the point of departure was the pocket battleship (defined as Panzerschiffe) in which protection was sacrificed for armament, range and, to a lesser extent, speed. Later, the Scharnhorst class was commissioned and several authors have classified the two ships (Scharnhorst and Gneisenau) as armoured cruisers rather than battlecruisers. The ships of the subsequent Admiral Hipper class were heavy cruisers. The only attempt to reintroduce battlecruisers (Schlachtkreuzer) was in the late 1930s with projects, named ‘O’, ‘P’ and ‘Q’, which never materialised.

Rear-Admiral David W Taylor, USN (left), Chief of the Bureau of Construction and Repair, and Rear-Admiral John K Robison, USN (right), Chief of the Bureau of Engineering, explain the conversion of a Constitution/Lexington class battlecruiser into an aircraft carrier. (Naval History and Heritage Command, US Navy)

The battlecruisers have been heavily criticised, especially in Britain, because of their lack of balance between firepower, speed and protection. The loss of three battlecruisers at Jutland was certainly a blow to the concept as envisaged by Fisher in Britain and followed by Tirpitz in Germany. Although Invincible, Indefatigable and Queen Mary sank because of explosions in their magazines caused by poor management of ammunition safety, the primary cause of their loss was direct enemy gunfire. A similar reasoning is also applicable to Lützow, so gravely damaged by enemy direct hits that she had to be scuttled. However, if one considers their entire service performance in battle during the First World War, it seems that battlecruisers performed according to the roles and missions they were conceived and designed for. After Jutland and the end of the war, naval powers tried to choose what was most affordable for

them to have, and to have not, in terms of warship types. Therefore, it appears that battlecruisers were somewhat ‘sacrificed’ because the fast battleship concept had outclassed every other type of capital ship while new weapons, notably aircraft and submarines, were emerging as the key elements of the future. 1

The German navy used the metric International System for all measurements. In order to facilitate comparison in this chapter, metric measurements, however, are converted to Imperial. See the metric-Imperial conversion table on page 6. 2 This circumstance obliged the Royal Navy to pursue the German Navy in building more powerful and faster battlecruisers. However, the Royal Navy initially failed in its purpose because the Indefatigables were still inferior to the Moltkes. An improvement came with the Lions and Tiger. 3 When the ‘Admirals’ were designed, the Royal Navy knew that Germany planned to build the Mackensens. 4 Courageous had 15in turrets, one fore and one aft. 5 Despite their potential in highspeed engagements, torpedoes did not prove to be useful weapons when employed by big ships such as battlecruisers and battleships. 6 When Jellicoe visited Kiel in 1910, Wilhelm II told him that docks were built to take ships and not vice versa. 7 A notable exception was the ratio in Courageous, which was 9.25, while Hood’s was 8.64. 8 Hood had 18.2ft amidships freeboard because her secondary armament was mounted well above the waterline. 9 Both masts were placed forward of the funnel, solving the problems of smoke and heat. 10 Siemens dynamos were initially manufactured in Germany and later produced elsewhere, including Britain. 11 The Courageous class has not been considered in this comparison because her design, including the armour scheme, was conceived exclusively for the ‘Baltic project’. 12 The bulges with sealed steel tubes fitted in Hood were an exception to this rule. 13 It appears that in Lützow these flaws in compartmentalisation and the malfunctioning of the drainage system contributed to the loss of the ship. In Seydlitz and Derfflinger, it turned out that the drainage arrangements above the armour deck were inadequate, so that water entering through shell holes or, as the battlecruisers settled deeper into the water, through casemate embrasures, could not reach the pumps below. 14 The comparison made here takes into account the maximum capacity, i.e. the usual condition of warships operating in wartime. 15 In Hood, the mountings of the 15in turrets were redesigned to increase the maximum elevation to 30° because the Admiralty recognised the greater ranges at which naval engagements had now taken place. This measure would have allowed a maximum range of

29,000yd to be achieved. 16 The Invincibles were equipped with eight 12in guns, but only six were actually trained on either side, to prevent interference and damage produced by the blast when one of the wing turrets fired across the deck over the opposite wing turret. However, this is not to rule out that both wing turrets were simultaneously operated in a cross-deck manner in action, as occurred on Invincible and Inflexible during the battle of the Falkland Islands. 17 Admiral Tirpitz was himself a torpedo specialist. 18 The 6in guns fitted in Tiger proved unreliable and were not installed in late battlecruisers. 19 The end point is the outbreak of war, with some approximation. 20 However, Hood’s construction was suspended in 1916 when the project was heavily modified in accordance with lessons learned from Jutland and changes in the armament layout. 21 Due to the rigid construction schedule set by the German Naval Laws, only three German private shipyards, out of six, could normally rely upon one large ship per year. 22 Japan had also commissioned the four Kongos.

Appendix

BATTLECRUISERS OF OTHER NATIONS

B

ritain and Germany were not alone in designing and building battlecruisers because other nations undertook similar efforts before and during the First World War. Japan was the most productive because its navy commissioned four battlecruisers, although they did not participate in the conflict. The United States followed behind Japan, designing a class of large battlecruisers, but just two of them were completed and only then as aircraft carriers after the 1922 Washington Treaty. Russia also tried to commission a number of battlecruisers before and during the war but the plan failed for several reasons, including the outbreak of the Revolution in 1917. France and Austria-Hungary initiated some preliminary designs but none of them materialised as actual ships.

JAPAN The Kongo class Lessons from the Russo-Japanese war of 1904-5; the technological revolution introduced by Dreadnought and the favourable relationship between London and Tokyo led the Imperial Japanese Navy (IJN) to conceive a new construction programme aimed at improving Japan’s strategic position. In 1909, the IJN’s Technical Department commenced working on a preliminary design for a battlecruiser with a displacement of 18,650 tons, armed with 12in guns and able to reach a top speed of 26.5 knots. However, Japanese designers had limited experience in this new type of warship.1 As a result, while the Imperial Diet (parliament) approved funds to support the so-called Naval Emergency Expansion Bill that authorised the design and construction of four battlecruisers and one battleship, the IJN turned to the Royal Navy’s battlecruiser programmes and the British shipbuilding industry. The aim was threefold: commission a modern battlecruiser, acquire the necessary expertise to complete the other ships in Japanese shipyards and expand the Japanese

naval-industrial base. The IJN’s Technical Departed prepared about thirty designs. They considered units displacing 18,000-19,000 tons, with a main armament based on 12in guns arranged in twin and triple turrets and a top speed of about 26 knots. However, the Japanese Naval Staff decided to take the British battlecruiser Lion as a model. A close working relationship between British and Japanese technicians led, in October 1910, to a contract being awarded to Vickers-Armstrong to design and build a ship that included some specific Japanese requirements. A main driver for the new design, which evolved into Kongo, was the decision to install a main battery made up of 14in 45-calibre guns. This decision was probably taken because the IJN expected the US Navy to install this calibre on their battleships in due course.2

The Japanese battlecruiser Kongo at anchor in June 1914. The design was developed by Sir George Thurston at Vickers-Armstrong. (Courtesy Dennis Fillon)

Sir George Thurston led Kongo’s design team at Vickers and introduced several changes compared to the Lion class.3 The most significant improvement was the layout of the main battery. There were two pairs of twin turrets, forward and aft, but the aft turrets were widely separated. This disposition proved more efficient than that of the Lions because ‘X’ turret had a larger arc of fire.4 Moreover, this disposition avoided, at least for the

aft turrets, the negative effects of blast on deck fittings and facilitated the placement of most service boats amidships. The three funnels were less widely spaced than in the Lions and the aft tripod mast was placed before the third funnel. The forecastle ran until ‘Y’ turret and the forward superstructure, which included the armoured conning tower, was considerably smaller than in the Lions. A shelter deck supported ‘B’ turret, the forward superstructure, the funnels, a number of searchlights platforms, an aft control tower (probably used for torpedo control) and ‘X’ turret. Each aft-raked tripod mast had a spotting top. The hull had a clipper stem that curved gently below the water and a rounded stern. Hull flare was larger than that of British capital ships, in accordance with the IJN’s policy of providing their ships with the most seaworthy design possible. Kongo’s hull was subdivided vertically into five decks (main, middle, lower, platform and hold) and horizontally by sixteen watertight bulkheads. Unlike British battlecruisers, Kongo had her shell rooms above the magazines, which were at platform deck level, while storerooms were placed between the magazines and the double bottom. Complement was about 1,200 officers and men. Kongo was laid down on 17 January 1910 at Barrow-in-Furness, launched on 18 May 1912 and completed on 16 August 1913. When completed, she had an overall length of 705.8ft, a beam of 92.2ft and a depth of 51ft. The summary of weight was hull and fittings, 9,449 tons; protection, 6,343 tons; machinery, 4,460 tons; armament, 4,332 tons; general equipment, 941 tons and coal, 1,100 tons.5 This gave a displacement of 26,625 tons, which increased to a normal displacement of about 27,400 tons with a fuel capacity of 4,200 tons of coal and 1,000 tons of oil. The corresponding mean draught was 27ft.

Haruna fitting out at Kawasaki shipyard, Kobe; a 14in Vickers gun is being installed. The battlecruiser had been laid down in March 1912 and she was the second ship of the class built in a Japanese shipyard. (Kure Maritime Museum)

Hiei at Sasebo in December 1915, sporting the two aft-raked masts and the funnels of

different heights. (Courtesy of Dennis Fillon)

Machinery comprised thirty-six Yarrow large-tube boilers generating steam at 205psi and two sets of direct-drive Improved Parsons turbines, each comprising an HP turbine and an LP one. The HP turbines drove the two outer shafts while the LP turbines drove the two inner ones. Boilers were placed in eight boiler rooms,6 which were separated longitudinally by a centreline bulkhead that ran through all machinery spaces and engine rooms. The machinery layout was thus conceived to ensure a degree of independence between the port and starboard turbines. Design speed was 27.5 knots at 70,000shp. During her speed trials on the Clyde, Kongo developed 78,275shp at 300.6rpm and achieved a speed of 27.54 knots; her displacement was 27,580 tons. Endurance was 8,000 miles at 14 knots and 10,000 miles at 10 knots. There were two rudders, which worked along the flow of the inner shafts, and three-bladed propellers. Bilge keels ran from ‘A’ turret to the end of the forecastle deck. Kongo’s armour reflected the conceptual approach pursued by British battlecruisers and the vertical protection that resulted was inadequate to withstand projectiles whose calibre was greater than that of her own main guns. Vertical protection was an 8in KC belt extending between ‘A’ and ‘Y’ barbettes that was 12.5ft wide. The belt extended fore and aft but its thickness decreased to 6in. A 5.5in Vickers Cemented (VC) forward bulkhead and a 6in-8in VC aft bulkhead closed this belt. An upper 6in belt was placed above the main belt to protect the secondary battery and was closed by two 6in bulkheads. As Kongo was completed well before the battle of Jutland, horizontal protection against long range plunging shells was very poor, comprising nickel steel and HT steel plates. The forecastle and upper decks were 1.5in with the main deck being 0.75in. The lower deck over machinery spaces and magazines was 0.75in and the steering compartment had 0.75in-1in. Boiler room uptakes were 9in, which appears disproportionate when compared to the decks’ protection. Barbettes had an upper thickness of 10in that decreased to 3in below the upper deck. Turrets had 10in faces, 9in sides and 3in roofs. It appears that there are no records for the rear thickness, although it would be thinner than the faces and sides. The short conning tower placed behind the ‘B’ turret was allegedly 9in and the thickness of the aft control tower was probably 2in. Communication tubes for both towers were probably 2in-3in. Underwater protection was limited to a 1.9in bulkhead placed outboard of the

machinery spaces and magazines. The IJN maintained anti-torpedo nets in the Kongos long after they were discarded by the Royal Navy. The main battery comprised eight 14in 45-calibre guns. VickersArmstrong submitted its original design for this gun to the IJN in November 1910. In an effort to hide its true calibre, Vickers’ internal documents designated this gun as the 12in Vickers Mark ‘J’, while the IJN designated it as the 12in ‘Meiji 43 Type’.7 Later, the guns built by Vickers were known as the 14in Vickers Mark ‘A’ and, to the IJN, as the 14in ‘43rd Year Type’.8 This gun had a rate of fire of two rounds per minute and each twin turret weighed 654 tons. Its original elevation was -5/+25° and the corresponding range at maximum elevation and with a 1,485lb APC shell was about 28,200yd. Ammunition outfit was ninety rounds per gun.

Haruna at anchor in the bay of Kobe. This picture was taken on 24 April 1915, two weeks after the ship was commissioned into the Imperial Japanese Navy. (Kure Maritime Museum)

For Kongo’s secondary armament, the IJN decided to mount 6in guns because the 4in guns mounted on Royal Navy battlecruisers were deemed insufficient to repel enemy destroyers.9 Consequently, the secondary battery included sixteen Vickers ‘Mark M’ 6in 50-calibre guns in single mounts, each weighing about 32 tons, which were casemated in the forecastle and evenly divided between port and starboard. The IJN initially designated this gun the 15cm 50-calibre ‘Type 41’ and its rate of fire was five rounds per minute. Elevation was -5/+30° and the corresponding range at maximum elevation with a 100lb Common Type 4 shell was about 21,300yd. Anti-aircraft armament reflected the trend of the time. Thus, Kongo also had ten ‘Third Year Type’ 3in 45 calibre guns in manually-operated single mounts10 placed in pairs on the roofs of all the turrets and with two other mounts on the forecastle, abeam the first funnel. Their range at 45° of elevation was 11,800yd. Kongo also had eight submerged 21in/533cm torpedo tubes for Type 44 No.2 weapons. These were housed in forward, central and aft compartments. Kongo’s fire control equipment followed British practice. From the available pictures, it is possible to ascertain that Kongo had at least four 9ft rangefinders, housed in the conning tower, the aft control tower and the spotting tops. The conning tower and the aft control tower were each connected with a transmitting station, or operating room. Kongo was fitted with eight searchlights, probably 36in. Two were housed in the forward superstructure, two on short platforms protruding from each of the forward and aft masts and two on platforms abreast the first funnel. The Kongo class also included three units built in Japan. These were Hiei, laid down at Yokosuka Navy Yard on 4 April 1911 and completed on 4 August 1914; Haruna, laid down on 16 March 1912 at Kawasaki Kobe and completed on 19 April 1915; and Kirishima, laid down at Mitsubishi Kawasaki on 17 March 1912 and completed on 19 April 1915. Considering that Japan had never built modern battlecruisers, it is remarkable that a programme for four complex ships was completed in about four years. There were some modifications between Kongo and her sister ships. Hiei’s first funnel was taller than Kongo’s and the distance between the first and

second funnel was increased. Vickers manufactured the turbines for Kongo and Hiei while Mitsubishi Nagasaki produced those for Kirishima. Haruna had Brown-Curtis turbines and Hiei also had Kampon boilers manufactured by Yokosuka Navy Yard. During the First World War, the Kongos guarded the Pacific against the German squadron led by Admiral von Spee. Britain asked Japan to deploy the battlecruisers in European naval waters, but Tokyo refused. Before the end of the war, there were a few changes in fire control and anti-aircraft armament but, in the inter-war period, the class was extensively modernised and reconstructed in two distinct phases. In the mid-1920s, the range of the main guns was increased by raising the elevation to 33°. In the late 1920s, the forward superstructure was rebuilt and modernised, fire control was improved and anti-torpedo bulges were fitted. Other major alterations, especially those during the 1930s, involved exchanging the boilers with Japanese ones, the elimination of one funnel, improvements in protection, an increase in coal and oil capacity and the installation of catapults for floatplanes. The Kongos were redesignated from battlecruisers to battleships and participated as such in the Second World War. Hiei was sunk off Savo Island on 13 November 1942 and Kirishima was sunk off Guadalcanal two days later. Kongo was sunk during the Battle of Samar on 21 November 1944 and Haruna was sunk in Kure on 28 July 1945.

RUSSIA The Borodino Class A few years before the outbreak of the First World War, the Russian Navy tried to rebuild its worn-out battle fleet. At that time, Russia was allied with Britain and France, with Germany being perceived as the major threat to this alliance. After having discussed the potential construction of new vessels with foreign shipyards, the navy decided to build them in Russia. The Russian Navy’s strategic plan included some unrealistic ambitions. It was envisaged that, between 1909 and 1930, Russia would deploy a powerful fleet in the Baltic that included twenty-four battleships and battlecruisers and twelve armoured cruisers. This naval build-up was part of two plans known as the ‘Great Programme’ and the ‘Small Programme’. The navy presented the Great Programme to the lower house of parliament, the Duma, and asked for 1.5 billion roubles to produce, initially, twelve battleships and four battlecruisers. The Duma opposed this huge expenditure but was overruled by

the Imperial Council, parliament’s upper chamber, which, in July 1912, endorsed a so-called Little Programme. This provided 502 million roubles to build four battlecruisers,11 four armoured cruisers and several additional surface ships and submarines. Naval developments in Europe obliged the Russian navy to focus on strengthening the Baltic and the Black Sea fleets especially. The four battlecruisers envisaged in the Little Programme were, in fact, expected to operate in the Baltic and their design had started at the time the Imperial Council endorsed the plan. The design was probably developed by the Russian Shipbuilding Committee, led by Aleksander Krylov, a well-known naval architect of the time, and was based on the Gangut class battleships. The initial requirements for the battlecruisers – named Borodino, Izmail, Kinburn and Navarin – called for 12in guns and a top speed of 28 knots. A number of private shipyards submitted preliminary bids but their costs were deemed too high and led to a reconsideration of the requirements. After a number of designs were produced, and influenced by information coming from Germany, the navy decided to increase the calibre of the main guns to 14in, although this resulted in a reduction in speed and some changes to the protection scheme. The initial idea to equip the vessels with superfiring turrets was abandoned in favour of a more traditional layout that took into account the disposition of the propulsion plant. After several iterations, the Russian Admiralty eventually approved the final design and the construction contracts were awarded to the New Admiralty Shipyard (Izmail and Borodino) and the Baltic Yards (Navarin and Kinburn), both based in St. Petersburg. The Duma had allocated 45.5 million roubles for each ship but the change in the main battery calibre and other modifications caused the estimated cost to increase by seven million roubles per ship. In principle, Russian battlecruiser design resembled a more German rather than British approach because protection was not neglected in favour of high speed. In fact, the Borodinos corresponded much more to battleships. However, some of the solutions chosen for both the main and secondary batteries would make them difficult to operate. The Borodinos had a design displacement of 32,500 tons, which increased to 38,000 at full load. Their overall length and beam were, respectively 750ft and 100ft. Design draught at full load displacement was 33.5ft. The hull included a bow slightly shaped as a ram and a rounded stern. The hull’s

forward section had short parallel sides that converged to form the bow, a strange configuration probably introduced to increase waterline area and stability in that section. Fore freeboard was 29ft 2in but decreased sharply to 20ft 6in amidships. The general hull arrangement was much influenced by the main battery layout, which comprised four centreline triple turrets including two placed amidships with a funnel between them. The gun layout allowed a twelve-gun broadside, with training of the two amidships turrets eased by the lack of deck structures. ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets had a 310° arc of fire, which decreased to about 280° for the amidships ones. However, only one turret could fire ahead or astern because training of the amidships turrets was constrained by the funnels and other deck fittings. Service boats were mostly located between ‘P’ and ‘Y’ turrets and were handled by two small derricks.

Profile and plan views of the Russian battlecruiser Izmail. The design was probably developed by the Russian Shipbuilding Committee, led by Aleksander Krylov, and was based on the Gangut class battleships. (From tsushima.ru)

The fore hull section housed ten 5.1in single guns mounted in casemates which were placed on both the main and upper decks. Other 5.1in guns were casemated in the main deck and along the hull sides, a position that would render them very wet and hard to operate in bad weather. The disposition of the secondary battery was probably chosen to allow the magazines for the main and secondary guns to be placed close to each other. A short forecastle

ran to the small superstructure, which was connected to the forward funnel by two short platforms. The superstructure supported the fore pole mast while the aft pole mast was placed behind the ‘Y’ turret. The hull was divided into six decks, with a 4ft 2.2in double bottom running along its entire length. Twenty-five watertight bulkheads provided horizontal subdivision and a good level of compartmentalisation. Internally, the hull reflected the main battery layout because ‘Q’ turret’s magazine was placed between two groups of boiler rooms. The Borodinos would have twenty-five Yarrow large-tube boilers, working at 242 lb/sq.in., and placed in seven rooms. The three forward boiler rooms housed only oil-fired boilers while the others housed only coal-fired ones. Two engine rooms located between ‘P’ and ‘Y’ turrets housed four sets of Parsons turbines, each driving one shaft.12 A longitudinal bulkhead separated the engine rooms into four spaces. The HP turbines drove the outer shafts while the inner shafts were driven by LP turbines. Maximum designed power was 68,000shp, with a corresponding speed of 26.5 knots. Fuel capacity was about 3,800 tons, almost equally divided between coal and oil. The radius of action was 2,280 miles at 26.5 knots, a figure that was deemed sufficient for operations in the Baltic. Power generation was provided by six turbo-generators and two diesel generators, each rated at 320kW and thus giving a total output of 2,560kW. These were housed in four compartments on the platform deck, two forward and two aft of the machinery spaces. A power grid including DC and AC sections ensured a reliable distribution of electricity to all users. The Borodinos had two rudders in tandem and three Frahm anti-rolling tanks on each side. The protection scheme was based on trials carried out on Chesma13 and included KC plates. Vertical protection included two belts. The main belt was 9.35in, ran from ‘A’ to ‘Y’ barbettes and was backed by 3in of wood to improve the connection between the armour and the hull structure. This belt extended vertically 16ft 5.4in above the waterline and 5ft 5in below. A 3in forward bulkhead and an 11.8in one aft closed the citadel; however, the thickness of the aft bulkhead decreased to 4in at the lower deck. The main belt decreased to 4.9in plates, backed by 2in of wood, forward and aft the ‘A’ and ‘Y’ barbettes. The upper belt was 3.9in, was 9ft 6in high, ran along the main deck and was closed at the ends by two 4in bulkheads. Behind the vertical armour, there was a 2in longitudinal splinter bulkhead between the main and lower decks. This bulkhead sloped down until it met the lower edge of the main belt and increased to 3in. 1in-4in plates protected the steering

compartments and the extreme aft section of the hull. The hull’s forward end was 4.4in. Horizontal protection was modest. The forecastle deck was only 0.35in before ‘A’ turret and increased to 1.4in around it. The main deck was mostly 1.47in, with some reinforcements around the barbettes. The lower and platform decks had about 0.75in. Underwater protection was limited to a 0.39in bulkhead behind the side upward extension of the double bottom. Funnel uptakes had 2in. Barbettes were 11.8in in the upper part, decreased to 5.8in in the lower part and were shaped as truncated cones, thus lessening their protective purpose. Turrets had 11.8in faces, sides and rears; their roofs were 5.9in. Two 1in bulkheads separated each gun inside the turrets. The conning tower had 15.7in in the upper part, which reduced to 11.8in below the upper deck, and a 10in roof. The main armament would consist of twelve Pattern 1913 14in/356mm 52calibre guns, divided between the four electrically-powered triple turrets. Each turret weighed 1,368 tons. The gun’s design started in 1910 and it was first produced by the Obukhovski Steel Plant (OSZ) and Vickers14 to equip the Imperatritsa Mariya class battleships. However, OSZ was unable to produce enough guns to meet the projected schedule for the battleships and the Russian navy decided to install them in the Borodinos. Eventually, OSZ completed only one and, although Vickers delivered ten guns to Russia in May 1917, the Borodinos never had them installed. This gun had a rate of fire of three rounds per minute at -5/+15° of elevation. Maximum elevation was 25°, which corresponded to a range of 25,420yd with a 1,586lb AP shell, but the rate of fire was reduced. Ammunition outfit was eighty rounds per gun.

Izmail, ready for launching. The picture was taken at the Admiralty Yard in St. Petersburg, probably in June 1915. None of the four planned Russian battlecruisers was completed. (From tsushima.ru)

A battlecruiser of the Izmail class being launched at the Baltic Yards in St. Petersburg. The class included Izmail, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin. (From tsushima.ru)

The secondary battery’s layout reflected the Russian navy’s view that torpedo attacks would mainly come from the forward quarters. This led to the installation of ten Pattern 1913 single casemated, 5.1in/130mm, 55 calibre guns in the hull forward section, abreast ‘A’ turret.15 Another two single casemated guns were placed abeam the superstructure and four others were placed, respectively, abeam ‘Q’ and ‘P’ turrets. The aft four casemated mounts were placed abeam the ‘Y’ turret. Vickers designed this gun as the 5.1in Mark A and, while OSZ produced it for other Russian warships, its production for the Borodinos was never completed. The designed rate of fire was 5-8 rounds per minute. Elevation would be limited to 30°; using AP or HE shells, the corresponding range was 20,000yd. Design ammunition outfit was 245 rounds per gun. Each main turret roof would have two 3in/75mm guns for training purposes and anti-aircraft defence would be provided by four 2.5in/64mm 38-calibre single guns placed on the upper deck, abreast the

superstructure. The Borodinos would have six underwater Mod 1912 18in/450mm torpedo tubes, with eighteen weapons. The torpedo tubes were housed in pairs in three rooms, located respectively abeam the conning tower, ‘Q’ turret and ‘Y’ turret. Fire-control equipment would include British, German and Russian components. ‘A’ and ‘Y’ turrets each had a 6-metre Zeiss rangefinder and another 5-metre Zeiss rangefinder was placed on the conning tower roof. A spotting top, probably equipped with a rangefinder, was located on the forward mast. Information from the rangefinders would feed an N K Geisler electro-mechanical fire-control computer housed in a transmitting station that was located on the platform deck. The Geisler system included a Russiandesigned Eriksen range clock and a device to correct for the effects of erosion on the guns’ bores.16 The Borodinos had seven searchlights. A 36in searchlight was placed closely forward of ‘A’ turret. A pair of 43in searchlights was on a platform that partially surrounded the forward funnel and another, identical, pair was on a similar platform around the aft funnel. The last pair was on a low platform on the aft mast. Complement would include about 1,250 men and officers. All four ships were laid down on 12 December 1913 but modifications to the protection scheme and serious delays in the fabrication of important items, such as the main turrets, caused their construction to slow. Izmail was launched first, on 22 June 1915, and was followed by Borodino and Kinburn on 31 July and 30 October respectively and Navarin on 9 November 1916. Political turmoil also heavily affected work in all sectors of the shipbuilding industry, including the outfitting of the Borodinos. At the time of the October 1917 Revolution, Izmail was about 60% complete but the turrets not would be available before 1919. By end of 1917, the new Soviet authorities decided to halt the construction of the Borodinos and their incomplete hulls lay up alongside for several years after the end of the war. Plans to complete at least two or three ships were made, including some changes in the main armament and in the power generation and distribution system. However, civil war and the poor state of the Soviet economy hampered both current and potential plans. After the end of the civil war, Borodino, Kinburn and Navarin were sold to Germany and were scrapped in 1923 in, respectively, Bremen, Kiel and Hamburg. In May 1925, the Soviet Navy considered converting Izmail into an aircraft carrier, displacing 22,000 tons and with a capacity of fifty aircraft. This proposal was initially approved

by the Soviet government, but it was reversed after the Red Army opposed allocating funds to naval programmes.17 The Borodino class battlecruisers were comparable in size, protection and speed to contemporary British and German designs – and the 14in guns would have made them slightly superior to the latter. However, some serious design flaws, including the main battery’s layout, combined with the inherent weakness of domestic industry and tragic political events, prevented their realisation.

UNITED STATES The Lexington class The origins of the US battlecruiser construction programme date back to exchanges between the two organisations involved in defining requirements for future vessels. These were the General Board, founded in 1900 as an advisory body to the Secretary of the Navy, and the Naval War College, created in 1884 as an academy for American naval officers. Technological and doctrinal developments that occurred in Europe in the early 1910s, including the design and construction of British and German battleships and battlecruisers, also influenced the two organisations’ views and opinions. Until that time, the development of capital ships for the US Navy (USN) had favoured the construction of battleships and armoured cruisers.18 Although there was not a common opinion on the role of battlecruisers in the USN, in 1910 the General Board requested the Bureau of Construction & Repair (BuC&R)19 to carry out some preliminary studies of potential future US battlecruisers. The required speed was 25.5 knots, displacement varied from 24,000 to 26,000 tons and armament included six to ten 12in guns. However, none of these studies proved thorough enough and work resumed two years later. This time, the BuC&R presented a number of sketches that considered several variations of speed, protection and range. The main armament was common to all sketches and comprised eight 14in guns. The largest preliminary design featured a displacement of 79,000 tons, which was considered too huge and expensive to even contemplate constructing. A subsequent internal debate on speed led the General Board to recommend against the construction of battlecruisers in the 1912 naval programme. However, Japan’s decision to proceed with the construction of the Kongos and the possibility of a conflict in the Far East increased the popularity of

battlecruisers and led the General Board to reverse its recommendation in 1913. Another debate on roles and missions for American battlecruisers exalted the virtue of speed and long-range armament, thus leading the USN towards a merging of the requirements relating to high-speed scouting and powerful armament that were typical of capital ships. Moreover, the outbreak of the First World War, naval construction in Britain and Germany and the results of war games carried out at the Naval War College dramatically influenced the USN’s consideration of battlecruisers. In December 1914, in the aftermath of the battle of Falklands, the General Board recommended following Britain and constructing battlecruisers as adjunct to battleships. Nevertheless, the Board still believed it prudent to complete the construction of a sufficient number of battleships before allocating any construction funds and assets to battlecruisers. The battle of Dogger Bank was another opportunity for battlecruiser proponents to press ahead and, in autumn 1915, the General Board was ready to consider the insertion of battlecruisers in the next building programme and initiated new preliminary designs. In keeping with a common view that new US naval vessels should be superior, ship-for-ship, to those of foreign navies, the first plans approved by the end of 1915 proposed a battlecruiser of 32,000 tons and armed with a main battery of ten 14in guns. The Naval War College’s war games helped to identify roles for battlecruisers; these were mainly focused on independent operations against similar vessels and reconnaissance in force before an engagement between battleships. Congress was also involved in the debate and the 1916 Naval Appropriation Act authorised six battlecruisers at a cost of $16.5 million, excluding armour and armament. Extensive discussions took place on the calibre of the main guns, especially because the new British and German capital ships were to be armed with 15in guns that would diminish the qualitative edge originally planned for American battlecruisers. The BuC&R argued that changing calibre from 14in to 16in would increase displacement considerably and make it impossible to maintain a top speed of 35 knots. An alternative would be to reduce the number of 16in guns to six, but the General Board considered such a small battery unacceptable and decided to keep the smaller calibre because having a larger number of vessels would compensate for the loss of the heavier guns. After considerable discussion and the presentation of several sketches, in November 1917 the General Board officially approved the change to a main battery of eight 16in guns, supported by a secondary

battery of sixteen 6in guns. This change would increase displacement and reduce top speed, but losing a few knots was no longer considered a crucial matter and a reasonable price to pay for a more satisfactory armament. Meanwhile, the United States had declared war on Germany and the 1916 capital ship construction programme was put aside to meet more urgent requirements stemming from the German U-boat offensive. By early 1918, plans for the battlecruisers appeared fixed but the 1916 programme had to wait for the end of the war before it could resume. During the war’s final months, discussions about the battlecruisers, including their cost, arose in both the US and Britain that put their future in doubt. Some officers proposed following an approach similar to that pursued with Hood and supported the construction of a fast battleship instead of a battlecruiser. The General Board put an end to the controversy and firmly resolved to build both battleships and battlecruisers, as already authorised by Congress in 1916. A political reason behind this decision was that Japan was contemplating a large-scale post-war building programme and many in the USN were convinced that Tokyo must not be allowed to gain a significant advantage. At that time, the BuC&R introduced the final changes in the battlecruiser design, stating that they would increase displacement to more than 43,000 tons and cut top speed to about 33 knots. This was also considered acceptable in terms of cost. In 1918, Congress had authorised an increase in each battlecruiser’s cost to $19.8 million, still excluding armour and armament. This sum was increased again in August 1919 to $23 million.20 Although public opinion proved reluctant to undertake the cost of financing a huge naval construction programme in the post-war period, the USN was authorised to proceed with placing contracts to build six battlecruisers. They were named Lexington, Constellation, Saratoga, Ranger, Constitution and United States and designated as CC-1 to CC-6, confirming their categorisation as battlecruisers.21 As discussed, the design of the Lexingtons originated from existing 14,000-ton cruiser designs, evolved through many iterations, and stabilised in 1919. At 43,500 tons of legend displacement, the Lexingtons were to become the heaviest and biggest battlecruisers in the world. The summary of weights was: hull, 24,060 tons; protection, 6,160 tons; machinery, 6,240 tons; armament, 3,600 tons; oil fuel, 2,000 tons; and equipment, 1,440 tons.22 There was no margin. Draft and metacen-tric height at that displacement

were, respectively, 31ft and 4.38ft. The calculated full load displacement was 44,638 tons, with a corresponding metacentric height of 4.86ft. As the overall length was 874ft and the maximum beam was 105.5ft, the linear dimensions made the Lexingtons comparable to Hood in terms of hull form. The Lexingtons’ block coefficient was 0.572, making them slightly fuller than Hood. The main gun layout and the propulsion system’s configuration dictated the Lexingtons overall size. There were two 16in superfiring twin turrets fore and aft, with a secondary battery including seven 6in single mounts on each side. The hull had a clipper bow and a straight stem that curved to about 90° at the bottom. It was horizontally divided into six decks and a double bottom while vertical subdivision included twenty watertight bulkheads. A long forecastle deck – called upper deck in the BuC&R plans – ran from the stem to aft ‘Y’ turret. A shelter deck supported a relatively short superstructure and the huge funnels. There was one lattice mast on top of the superstructure and the other was abaft the second funnel.

A document related to the preliminary sketch of a ‘B Cruiser’, as elaborated in October 1912 by the Bureau of Construction and Repair of the US Navy. The main armament included four twin turrets with 14in guns, while the legend speed was 29 knots. (US Navy)

The propulsion system was based on a turbo-electric drive, which was considered more advantageous than a traditional direct-drive or reductiongeared turbine installation.23 General Electric turbines drove electric generators, which were used to drive eight DC electric motors, which were connected, without reduction gears, to four propellers. There was one rudder. Three compartments housed eight DC electric motors, two for each shaft; the aftermost motor room housed the two pairs of electrical motors that drove the two inner shafts. The other two motor rooms were located at the sides of the aft magazines and each housed a pair of electrical motors that drove the

corresponding outer shaft; two 0.5in longitudinal bulkheads separated the side motor rooms and the magazines. This type of propulsion allowed a much more complete compartmentalisation, as the turbines were no longer connected directly to the propeller shafts. Sixteen Babcock boilers working at 295lb/sq.in were housed in pairs in eight side, or wing, compartments.24 These had two 0.5in longitudinal bulkheads that bounded two machinery spaces, each housing three General Electric turbo-generators,25 separated by a watertight 0.5in transverse bulkhead. The main machinery control room and an auxiliary machinery space were located between the aft machinery space and the forward motor rooms and were separated by 0.5in longitudinal bulkheads.

A photograph of a painting by Louise Larned, dated 1922, depicting the definitive design of the Lexington class battlecruisers. (US Navy Naval Historic and Heritage Command)

A painting by F Muller, circa 1916, depicting the original design adopted for the planned battlecruisers of the Constitution class. (Library of Congress)

Designed power was 180,000shp, for a corresponding top speed of 32.5 knots, but the two Lexingtons were never tested as battlecruisers in speed trials. Endurance was designed to be 10,000 miles at 10 knots, which was suitable for operations in the Pacific. Complement was planned at about 1,300 officers and men. Protection was much elaborated and reflected lessons learned from the First World War by Britain and Germany. An armour belt inclined at 11.5° ran from ‘A’ barbette to the end of the forecastle deck. This belt was 16ft 7in deep and extended above and below the waterline. The upper part was 7in and the lower part was 5in. A 1.5in secondary belt was placed above the main belt. Two 7in bulkheads closed the citadel fore and aft. An armoured box protected the steering gear compartment. Vertical protection relied upon a deck-layered configuration. The upper deck was 2.25in at the centre and 0.75in at the sides. The thickness of both the main deck and the second deck varied from 0.25in at the centre to 1.25in-1.5in at the sides. The third deck protected machinery spaces and boiler rooms and was 2in at the centre and 0.75in at the sides. The longitudinal bulkheads that bounded machinery spaces and boiler rooms ran vertically from the double bottom to the upper deck. Underwater protection used a 0.5in empty bulge placed below the lower belt and extended in correspondence with magazines and machinery spaces. In the space between each bulge and each external longitudinal bulkhead, there were three sections, two of them being filled with oil, and the inner empty. Two 0.5in-0.75in longitudinal bulkheads provided this

combination of sections. Reserve feed water was stowed in the double bottom. Barbette thickness varied from 9in in the upper part to 5in in the lower part. Turrets had 11in faces, 2in sides, 6in rears and 8in roofs. The conning tower was at the forward end of the superstructure and had 12in sides and a 6in roof; the communication tube was 8in and linked the conning tower with a plotting room on the lower platform deck. There was no aft control tower. The prototype of the 16in 50-calibre Mk 2 gun envisaged for the Lexingtons was manufactured at the Washington Navy Yard and tested in April 1918. Its production started soon afterwards. Rate of fire was two rounds per minute. Elevation was -4/+40°; at maximum elevation, range was no less than 40,000yd with a 2,100lb AP shell. Each turret’s arc of fire was 150° and the ammunition outfit was 120 rounds per gun. The secondary battery had a curious disposition, which differed from British and German practice. There was a pair of 6in guns in an open mount at the end of the forecastle deck. Three other pairs were casemated in the shelter deck, abreast the funnels and superstructure. The remaining three pairs were in open mounts on the shelter deck, above the previous pairs. The 16in, 53 calibre Mk 13 gun weighed 51.8 tons in its casemated version, while the open mount version was about 17 tons. Its rate of fire was six rounds per minute and elevation was -10/+20°. Maximum range was 23,300yd with a 105lb AP shell. The Lexingtons casemated guns had a 140° arc of fire; for the open mounts, this increased to about 315°. There were also four 3in AA guns.

A painting by F Muller, circa 1919, showing the final configuration with two funnels for the planned battlecruisers of the Constitution class. (Library of Congress)

The Lexingtons had a powerful torpedo armament, consisting of eight 21in torpedo tubes. There were four submerged tubes, housed at lower platform level forward of ‘A’ magazines, while the other four tubes were located on the upper deck, aft the forecastle deck.

Constitution (CC-1) under construction at the Philadelphia Navy Yard, in a picture taken in July 1921. This view shows the ship’s arrangement amidships, with two very long centreline machinery spaces. (Naval Historic and Heritage Command, US Navy)

The two lattice masts had massive spotting tops, which were probably equipped with large-base rangefinders. The USN also planned to accommodate scout aircraft on the superimposed fore and aft twin turrets. Constellation was laid down at the Newport News shipyard on 18 August 1920. The other units followed at different yards: Constitution, United States and Saratoga, were all laid down on 25 September 1920 at, respectively, Philadelphia Naval Shipyard (the first two ships) and New York Shipbuilding. Lexington was laid down on 8 January 1921 at Fore River Shipyard, Quincy, while Ranger followed on 23 June 1921, again at Newport News. When construction commenced, it was not difficult to imagine that the entire class would be completed. However, work progressed very slowly and was nearly stopped when the international conference of naval armaments opened in Washington in November 1922. These deliberations resulted in the Washington Treaty, agreed in February 1923, and obliged the USN to abandon its 1916 naval construction programme, including the battlecruisers. Nevertheless, the treaty allowed the USN to convert two battlecruisers into aircraft carriers. Eventually, Lexington and Saratoga were completed as carriers and demonstrated that they were a good investment.26

The incomplete hull of the battlecruiser Saratoga, looking aft from over n.3 barbette, at the New York Shipbuilding Company shipyard, New Jersey. This picture was taken in early March 1922, after construction had been suspended pending her conversion to an aircraft carrier. (Naval Historic and Heritage Command, US Navy)

FRANCE During the 1910s, France tried to emulate Britain and Germany and planned to modernise her battle fleet. However, the French Navy – the Marine Nationale – was attempting to stage a renaissance after a long period of decline characterised by political jobbery and muddled strategy at the ministerial level. France was a latecomer to the dreadnought arms race, launched across the Channel with the debut of all-big-gun capital ships, and all of France’s available dockyard space was tied up building the six Danton class pre-dreadnoughts until 1909. This gave the Marine Nationale time to assess new battleship and battlecruiser designs being built in Britain and Germany in order to come up with a uniquely French solution. The Naval Law of 30 March 1912 planned for the Marine Nationale to have twenty-four capital ships in service by 1920, possibly including battlecruisers. The French navy’s Technical Branch subsequently issued some requirements that included a displacement of 28,000 tons, a speed of 27 knots, an armament of eight 340mm/13.4in guns and a complement of 1,200 officers and men. Several proposals were submitted to the Technical Branch and, among them, were proposals prepared by P Gille, a naval engineer overseeing the construction of the battleship Flandre at the Brest shipyard, and Lieutenant Georges Durand-Viel, a student at the French Naval College.27 After a visit to British shipyards in 1911, Gille estimated that a French battlecruiser28 should have a top speed of 28-29 knots, a main armament more powerful than that usually installed in battleships, and protection similar to the latter, or at least capable of protecting vital components. Gille’s preliminary design,29 conceived in 1913, had a normal displacement of 28,347 tons, a length of 205 metres (about 672ft), a beam of 27 metres (88ft) and a mean draft of 9.03m (29ft 8in). The hull had a bulbous bow and a rounded stern and this hull form proved to be highly efficient in tank tests conducted during the design process. The heavy weight of the main turrets at the bow and stern required the hull structure to be strengthened to withstand the forces involved. The design’s metacentric height was 1.03m/3ft 5in, comparable to the Lion class. The main armament would consist of twelve 340mm/13.4in guns, arranged in three quadruple centreline turrets with the aft turret superimposed. This layout would allow a twelve-gun broadside, with ‘A’ turret used for head-on

firing and ‘X’ and ‘Y’ turrets available for firing astern. The secondary battery included twenty-four casemated 138mm/5.5in guns and the freeboard, 7.15m (23ft 5in) forward and 4.65m (15ft 4in) aft, would have been sufficient to allow these guns to operate even in bad weather.

Profile and plan views of the preliminary sketch for the ‘Projet Gille’, featuring quadruple turrets. The designs for a class of French battlecruisers were never completed. (Maurizio Brescia)

The design featured a long forecastle that included ‘Y’ turret. A long shelter deck ran from ‘A’ to ‘Y’ turret and supported a small superstructure with a pole mast, two funnels, service boats and a tripod aft mast equipped with a derrick. The arc of fire for each turret was about 310°, but blast from ‘A’ and ‘X’ turrets would restrict operation of, respectively, the forward secondary guns and ‘Y turret. Vertical protection comprised a 270mm/10.6in belt that ran from ‘A’ to ‘Y’ turrets. Thickness decreased to 178mm/7in fore and aft. A 7in upper belt protected the casemated guns placed in the forecastle deck. Horizontal protection relied on a 20mm/0.78in lower deck, which had 50mm/2in sloped sides. Casemated guns were 180mm/7.1in. Underwater protection only comprised a 20mm/0.78in bulkhead that ran along machinery compartments. The propulsion plant consisted of fifty-two Belleville coal-fired boilers,

working at 250psi. However, Gille envisaged increasing working pressure to 320psi and thus gain 1.5 knots, although this would require bigger and heavier boilers. There were four set of turbines, each driving one shaft. Each set included one geared HP turbine, one geared Medium Pressure (MP) one and one direct drive LP turbine that also included some stages for astern manoeuvring. Although precise information is not available, it is possible that HP and MP turbines drove the outer shafts and LP turbines drove the inner shafts. Some 20mm/0.78in longitudinal bulkheads separated the turbine compartments into four independent spaces for boiler, turbine and auxiliary machinery rooms. Legend power was 80,000shp, corresponding to a top speed of 28 knots. Fuel capacity was 2,833 tons of coal and 630 tons of oil and the radius of action was calculated to be 1,660 miles at 28 knots; 4,300 miles at 20 knots and 6,300 miles at 15 knots. The main guns were Model 1912 340mm/13.4in, 45 calibre ones. The Marine Nationale considered these guns excellent weapons but the warships they were actually installed on30 were handicapped by poor fire control and low maximum turret elevations and hence short range. Each turret weighed about 350 tons. Elevation was -5/+12° and the range at maximum elevation and with a 1,224lbs AP shell was 15,860yd. At this range, salvo dispersion was 100m/328ft. The secondary guns were Model 1910 138.6mm/5.46in, 55 calibre. Elevation was -7/+15°, training was about 160°. There would be six underwater 450mm/17.7in [as above] torpedo tubes. Two pairs of tubes would be placed forward of ‘A’ magazines and another pair placed abeam the aft mast. Weapons would probably be M12D Toulon. Complement would be forty-one officers and 1,258 men, thus not meeting the requirement set by the French Navy. In 1913, Georges Durand-Viel worked on two designs, named ‘A’ and ‘B’.31 They were different because design ‘A’ would have eight 340mm/13.4in guns in two quadruple turrets, while design ‘B’ would have 370mm/14.6in guns in four twin turrets. However, a gun of this calibre was never produced. It appears that design ‘A’ had a long forecastle, which would run to the rear end of ‘Y’ turret. A shelter deck housed ‘A’ turret, the forward superstructure enclosing the first funnel and an aft superstructure. There would be two other funnels and a high pole mast. Another short mast was placed on top of the bridge. Design ‘B’ would probably have had superfiring turrets fore and aft.

Legend displacement for both design ‘A’ and ‘B’ was 27,065 tons. Design ‘A’ had a waterline length of 209metres/689ft, which decreased to 207metres/682ft in design ‘B’. Beam was 27metres/88ft 7in in both designs. Propulsion plants were different and reflected some progress in machinery. Design ‘A’ would have had twenty-one Belleville boilers, some of them being oil-fired and the others coal-fired. Four sets of direct drive turbines would develop 74,000shp and achieve a top speed 27 knots. Fuel capacity was 1,810 tons of coal and 1,050 tons of oil, giving a radius of action of 3,600 miles at 16 knots. Design ‘B’ was to have eighteen Belleville boilers, ten coal-fired and eight oil-fired. Four sets of turbines would be either geared or direct drive. The former would develop 63,000shp and achieve 26 knots; the latter 80,000shp and 27 knots. The radius of action was the same as for Design ‘A’. Protection was similar to the never-built Normandie class battleships, but with a 280mm/11in main belt. The secondary armament for both designs would include twenty-four 138.6mm/5.5in casemated guns. Both designs would also have four submerged 450mm/17.7in torpedo tubes.

AUSTRIA-HUNGARY Since Austria-Hungary did not have significant maritime interests, the country only started to show some interest in battlecruisers after 1915. Between December 1915 and December 1917, the Austro-Hungarian navy (Kaiserliche und Königliche Marine, KuK Marine) produced nine preliminary battlecruiser design studies. These designs were given codes from I to VI, with I series including six variants. In September 1915, the technical department of the KuK Marine started work on ‘Series 1 Design A’. This preliminary design related to a battlecruiser carrying the same model of 35cm/14.8in 45-calibre guns, but in three triple turrets, as conceived for the battleships of the ‘Improved Tegetthoff’ class that had just been ordered but which not were built. German battlecruisers already in service or being designed inspired the hull form. There would be one turret fore and aft and one amidships. The design featured two aft-raked tripod masts and a forecastle deck running until the front end of ‘Y’ turret. The hull was divided into six decks, with a double bottom placed along machinery spaces and magazines. The secondary battery would include eighteen 15cm/5.9in casemated guns in single mounts, equally divided between both sides. Eighteen 9cm/3.5in casemated quick-firing guns

in single mounts, again equally divided on both sides, would provide antiaircraft defence.32 There would be six 533mm/21in submerged torpedo tubes. Full load displacement would be 34,000tons, with a waterline length of 220m/721.8ft and a beam of 29m/95ft. Draught would be 8.6m/28.8ft. Armour would consist of an 8.9in belt, 0.8in decks, 10.2in turrets and 10.6in conning tower. The double bottom and two side longitudinal bulkheads would provide some form of underwater protection. The propulsion plant would include four geared turbines, with a legend power of 100,000shp and a top speed of 30 knots. The development of this power would probably mean the adoption of about thirty small-tube boilers. The radius of action was calculated as 8,000 miles at 15 knots, and 2,700 miles at 30 knots, the latter deemed sufficient for operations in the Adriatic Sea. There would be two rudders in tandem.

The preliminary sketch for the ‘Projekt IV’ battlecruiser. This was one of several sketches developed between December 1915 and December 1917 by the Austro-Hungarian Navy. ‘Projekt IV’ contemplated a displacement of 33,000t and a main armament based on three twin 38cm turrets. (Erwin Sieche)

Difficulties with production of the Skoda guns led the KuK Marine to

develop a new preliminary design for a battlecruiser armed with twin turrets in December 1915. There were two variants of this preliminary design, dubbed ‘Series 1 B’ and ‘1 C’ and featuring different main battery layouts with echelon or superfiring turrets. Another variant, ‘Series 1 D’, would have had two forward superfiring twin turrets, one twin turret amidships and one twin turret aft. The next variant, ‘Series 1 E’, was the opposite of ‘D’, with aft superfiring twin turrets. Considering that echelon turrets would prove difficult to cross train, ‘Series 1 Design F’ would have been the most effective in terms of available broadside. This design featured two twin forward and aft superfiring turrets and the ship’s size and speed were similar to other ‘Series 1s’. However, all works on preliminary designs were stopped in the aftermath of Jutland and a team of KuK Marine officers travelled to Germany to study reports of the battle. In March 1917, requirements were changed to increase speed and gun calibre. However, displacement was limited to 36,000 tons, which caused problems in arranging the required machinery and new guns. Some preliminary designs for battleships and battlecruisers, dubbed ‘Series 2-6’, were produced, but size and displacement increased beyond the capabilities of any Austrian naval infrastructure. Therefore, the KuK Marine designers worked to try and accommodate as much armament and machinery as possible in a given 36,000 tons displacement. They produced a preliminary design, ‘Series 6’, for a battlecruiser that featured four 42cm/16.5in, 45 calibre guns in twin turrets and six decks, including the upper deck. Waterline length was 230metres/754.6ft. Protection remained the same as in earlier designs and armament also included four 15cm/5.9in single mounts for anti-torpedo boat defence. These would have an 85° elevation. Machinery would include fifteen oil-fired and twelve coal-fired boilers. All boilers would be housed in four compartments, and the turbines in two, and would develop 112,000shp and achieve 30 knots. Due to their characteristics, with speed and firepower largely prevailing over protection, this ‘Series 6’ resembled the Courageous class battlecruisers and the German preliminary designs of the GK series being produced at that time. This series of preliminary designs for Austro-Hungarian battlecruisers and battleships represented long-term studies only. As the construction of these warships would need large investments in shipyards and infrastructure, none of them was even ordered before the end of the First World War.

The preliminary sketch for the ‘Projekt VI’ battlecruiser. It featured a main battery including two twin 42cm turrets and a top speed of 30 knots. Austro-Hungarian battlecruiser designs were influenced by the progress achieved in Germany with the Moltke class. (Erwin Sieche) 1

The IJN was, at the time, building two armoured cruisers – Ibuki and Kurama, later classified as battlecruisers – that followed a pre-dreadnought design approach. Later, the IJN also worked on a design sketch that featured two turrets placed en echelon amidships. 2 Since this gun was entirely new at the time, the IJN ordered Vickers to manufacture a prototype, which was successfully tested at Shoeburyness, Essex, in March 1911. 3 For the alleged relationship between the designs of Kongo and Tiger, see Chapter 3. 4 ‘A’ and ‘B’ turrets had an arc of fire of 300°, which increased to 320° for ‘X’ and ‘Y’ turrets. There were four guns available for head-on fire and four guns for fire astern. 5 There was no equivalent of the Board Margin of British warship projects. Corresponding percentages were hull and fittings, 35%; protection, 24%; machinery, 17%; armament, 16%; equipment, 4%; and coal 4%. 6 The foremost boiler rooms had six boilers each; the other boiler rooms had four each. 7 ‘43’ indicated the 43rd year of the Meiji imperial era, which was 1910. 8 The guns later designed and manufactured in Japanese factories were designated ‘41st Year Type Model 1908’. In 1917, when the IJN converted to the metric system, all of these guns were designated as ‘36 cm’ (14.2 inches) but their bores remained unchanged at 14

inches (35.6 cm). 9 Later, the Royal Navy also adopted this policy. 10 Although the Japanese designation was ‘8 cm’, the actual bore diameter of all these weapons was 7.62cm. 11 The Borodinos were formally known as armoured cruisers. An order issued by the Russian Admiralty on 29 July 1915 changed their designation to battlecruisers. 12 The Franco-Russian Works, a company based in St. Petersburg, would produce the turbines for the battlecruisers built at the Admiralty Shipyard. The Baltic Works would manufacture the turbines for their ships. However, Russian industry was unable to manufacture important components for this machinery and tried to procure these from abroad. Turbines for Navarin were ordered from Vulkan AG in Germany but they were confiscated by the German navy at the outbreak of war and used on German warships. 13 Chesma was a pre-dreadnought battleship that had been used to test the effectiveness of the armour to be installed in the Gangut class. 14 The Vickers designation was 14”/50 (35.6 cm) Mark VI. 15 Two pairs of guns were placed directly above the other two pairs. 16 Before the war, the Russian navy purchased Pollen Argo systems, which equipped the Gangut class battleships. It is possible that the navy planned to replace the Eriksen systems in the Borodinos with Argo ones. 17 Izmail was scrapped in Leningrad in 1931. 18 Starting in about 1900, the US Navy built two classes of armoured cruisers, Tennessee and Pennsylvania, totalling ten ships. 19 It was responsible for supervising the design, construction, conversion, procurement, maintenance and repair of USN ships and other craft. The Bureau also managed shipyards, repair facilities, laboratories and shore stations. 20 The General Board approved the final design, dubbed ‘B3’, in June 1919. 21 This was promulgated by General Order 541 of 17 July 1920, which set up a standard ship nomenclature in the US Navy. 22 Corresponding percentages were: hull, 55.3%; protection, 14.1%; machinery, 14.3%; armament, 8.3%; oil, 4.6%; and equipment, 3.4%. 23 The US Navy also decided to use this type of propulsion system on contemporary battleships. Its advantages prevailed over its inherent negative aspects. 24 Technological developments favoured the installation of fewer boilers than earlier designs. 25 Lexington had Yarrow boilers. Ranger and Constellation would have Westinghouse turbogenerators. 26 The two ships advanced the development of US naval aviation in the 1930s and participated in the Second World War. Lexington was sunk on 8 May 1942 during the battle of the Coral Sea. Saratoga survived the conflict and was sunk as a target ship during atomic tests at Bikini Atoll in 1946. 27 Durand-Viel would later become the Chief of the French Navy.

28

Its official designation was ‘croiser de combat’. The battlecruiser Lion inspired this design. 30 They were the three battleships Bretagne, Lorraine and Provence, all built between 1912 and 1916. 31 Durand-Viel also proposed designs for two different types of battleship. 32 However, deck fittings and superstructures restricted their elevation. 29

BIBLIOGRAPHY PRIMARY SOURCES Admiralty Papers ADM 1/8397/365: Warship Design, 1914-1922 ADM 1/8586/70: Final Report of the Post-War Questions Committee, 1920 ADM 116/3381. f. 4., Naval Manoeuvres, 1913. Report by Vice-Admiral Sir J. R. Jellicoe, K.C.B., K.C.V.O., Commander-in-Chief, Red Fleet, Undated Ship’s Covers (National Maritime Museum, Greenwich) Invincible class, ADM 138/284 and 285 Indefatigable class, ADM 138/250 and 251 Lion and Princess Royal, ADM 138/348 and 349 Queen Mary, ADM 138/378 Renown, Repulse and Resistance (battleships 1914-5 programme), ADM 138/416 Renown and Repulse (battlecruisers), ADM 1387463 and 464 Courageous class, ADM 138/453 and 454 Hood class, AMD138/449-452

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