Britain and the World since 1945 (Seminar Studies) [1 ed.] 113877927X, 9781138779273

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Britain and the World since 1945

This Seminar Studies title is a succinct study of modern British foreign policy, focusing on the period from 1945 to the present day. Since the end of the Second World War, Britain has been engaged in international conflicts from the Suez crisis to the Gulf War and has actively sought involvement in transnational and global affairs. Starting with a brief overview of the rise and fall of the British Empire and continuing chronologically with detailed chapters covering the second half of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first, Alasdair Blair discusses the highs and lows of British foreign policy in an accessible yet analytical manner. Dealing with themes such as the issues triggered by decolonisation and the changing relationship between Britain and Europe, this text considers the pivotal moments in modern Britain’s engagement with the wider world. Included in this title are supporting materials, such as a chronology of important events from 1945, a Who’s Who of key government figures and a collection of relevant primary sources. Thorough yet concise, Britain and the World since 1945 is the ideal resource for students interested in the development of British foreign policy. Alasdair Blair is Jean Monnet Professor of International Relations, Head of the Department of Politics and Public Policy, and Director of the Jean Monnet Centre of European Governance at De Montfort University. His main area of research and teaching is in the area of British foreign policy and European integration, and his publications include The European Union: A Beginner’s Guide (2012) and The European Union since 1945 (2010).

Introduction to the series

History is the narrative constructed by historians from traces left by the past. Historical enquiry is often driven by contemporary issues and, in consequence, historical narratives are constantly reconsidered, reconstructed and reshaped. The fact that different historians have different perspectives on issues means that there is often controversy and no universally agreed version of past events. Seminar Studies was designed to bridge the gap between current research and debate, and the broad, popular general surveys that often date rapidly. The volumes in the series are written by historians who are not only familiar with the latest research and current debates concerning their topic, but who have themselves contributed to our understanding of the subject. The books are intended to provide the reader with a clear introduction to a major topic in history. They provide both a narrative of events and a critical analysis of contemporary interpretations. They include the kinds of tools generally omitted from specialist monographs: a chronology of events, a glossary of terms and brief biographies of ‘who’s who’. They also include bibliographical essays in order to guide students to the literature on various aspects of the subject. Students and teachers alike will find that the selection of documents will stimulate the discussion and offer insight into the raw materials used by historians in their attempt to understand the past. Clive Emsley and Gordon Martel Series Editors

Britain and the World since 1945 Alasdair Blair

First published 2015 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2015 Alasdair Blair The right of Alasdair Blair to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Blair, Alasdair, 1971– Britain and the world since 1945 / Alasdair Blair. pages cm. – (Seminar studies) Includes bibliographical references and index. 1. Great Britain–Foreign relations–1945– I. Title. DA589.8.B58 2014 327.41–dc23 2014004234 ISBN: 978-1-138-77927-3 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-408-24829-4 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-315-76820-5 (ebk) Typeset in 10/13.5pt ITC Berkeley by Graphicraft Limited, Hong Kong

For William

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Contents

List of plates Preface Abbreviations Chronology Who’s who Glossary

x xi xii xiv xxvi xxx

1

THE RISE AND FALL OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE: 1496–1945 The birth of the British Empire Workshop of the world Scramble for Africa The challenge of Empire The impact of war The interwar years The Second World War

1 2 5 7 11 13 16 20

2

THE EARLY POST-WAR YEARS: 1945–1955 The post-war settlement Pressures for reform World War to Cold War Tension and conflict Choices and decisions European questions The end of Empire Reviewing the balance sheet

24 25 28 32 34 39 41 44 47

3

THE LIMITATIONS OF POWER: 1955–1970 The 1956 Suez crisis Searching for a role Economic challenges and world visions

49 49 54 55

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Britain and the World since 1945

The nuclear option Trimming the sails Wind of change Reluctantly European The first application The second application

58 60 62 65 69 72

4

FINDING A WAY: 1970–1979 Changing fortunes Joining Europe Adapting to new realities Eurosclerosis Renegotiation and referendum Challenges and turmoil

76 77 81 84 88 90 91

5

RESURGENCE: 1979–1990 Economic restructuring Empire legacies Cold War warrior European diplomacy Grappling with Europe On the sidelines of Europe

94 94 96 102 109 111 113

6

POST-COLD WAR ORDER: 1990–1997 New world order Britain and the Gulf War The hour of Europe Maastricht mutiny European disunity

118 118 122 126 131 135

7

TRANSFORMED WORLD: 1997–2013 Ethics and intervention New world disorder European visions Euro crisis

138 139 145 153 156

8

ASSESSMENT Reviewing the balance sheet The European conundrum The future direction of British foreign policy

160 160 163 164

contents

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

ix

DOCUMENTS

169

The Yalta Agreements, 11 February 1945 ‘A Financial Dunkirk’ ‘The Sinews of Peace’, Winston Churchill’s speech at Westminster College, Fulton, Missouri, 5 March 1946 Winston Churchill’s speech at Zurich University on the subject of a United States of Europe, 19 September 1946 The Bevin speech on Western Union, 22 January 1948 Winston Churchill, ‘Three interlocking circles of British foreign policy’, 9 October 1948 Reassessing the significance of Empire in the 1950s The Suez crisis The 1957 defence White Paper Decolonisation and winds of change From Empire to Commonwealth Britain’s first application for EEC membership France’s rejection of British EEC membership, 14 January 1963 Britain’s second application for EEC membership, 2 May 1967 Withdrawal from East of Suez Enoch Powell’s ‘Rivers of blood’ speech, 20 April 1968 Britain’s third application for EEC membership Renegotiation The 1975 referendum Thatcher’s Europe Tony Blair and liberal intervention Cameron and Europe British Prime Ministers and Foreign Secretaries since 1945

170 171

REFERENCES INDEX

191 202

171 172 173 173 174 175 176 177 178 179 180 181 182 182 183 184 184 185 187 188 189

List of plates

Plate 1

Empire Marketing Board 1927–1933 poster, Highways of Empire

Plate 2

Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at the Yalta conference in February 1945

Plate 3

Anthony Eden at the Conservative Party conference in 1956, during the Suez crisis

Plate 4

Edward Heath signs the Treaty of Accession in 1972

Plate 5

Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher at Camp David

Plate 6

George W. Bush and Tony Blair in Maryland in 2001

Plate 7

Illustration by Ingram Pinn from ‘British foreign policy should be realist’

Plate 8

UK Border Agency sign at London Gatwick airport

Preface

This book is a development of my earlier works on British foreign policy and European integration. The aim of the book is to provide an introduction to British foreign policy after 1945 through a chronological approach to the subject. The book seeks to impart an overarching narrative of Britain’s influence on world events in the post-1945 period within the context of a decline from Empire and the move to being a European power. In undertaking the research for this book I have been blessed with a considerable supply of source materials. This includes grand sweeping studies on the subject of Empire to general texts on Britain’s world role. These and a whole host of other sources are detailed in the list of references at the end of the book. I am especially indebted to the many colleagues who have spent time discussing Britain’s role in the world, particularly John Young, Philip Lynch, Anthony Forster, Steven Curtis, Christopher Goldsmith, Brian Hocking, Alexander Kazamias, Alistair Jones, John Martin, Panikos Panayi, Alison Statham, Spencer Mawby and Kenneth Morrison. I have also been fortunate to explore many of the points that are outlined in this study in my own teaching and the book has benefited from the opportunity to refine points of argument through discussions with students. I am also extremely grateful for the kind encouragement of the series editor, Gordon Martel, and the publishers with whom I have worked over a period of time that has been longer than I had initially intended. Last, but by no means least, my thanks and love to Katherine and William, who provide a welcome distraction. It goes without saying that none of these individuals bears the slightest responsibility for the book’s remaining deficiencies. Alasdair Blair, Thornton, November 2013

Abbreviations

BMD BSE CAP CEE CFSP CJD EC ECB ECJ ECSC ECU EDC EEC EFTA EMS EMU EPC ERDF ERM ERP ESDI EU Euratom FCO FTA GATT GDP GDR GLCM GNP

Ballistic Missile Defence Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy Common Agricultural Policy Central and Eastern Europe Common Foreign and Security Policy Creutzfeldt–Jakob Disease European Community European Central Bank European Court of Justice European Coal and Steel Community European Currency Unit European Defence Community European Economic Community European Free Trade Association European Monetary System Economic and Monetary Union European Political Cooperation European Regional Development Fund Exchange Rate Mechanism European Recovery Programme European Security and Defence Identity European Union European Atomic Energy Community Foreign and Commonwealth Office Free Trade Area General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade Gross Domestic Product German Democratic Republic Ground-Launched Cruise Missile Gross National Product

abbreviations

IBRD IGC IMF INF IRA JHA MAD MEP NATO NUM NSS OECD OEEC OPEC QMV SAS SDI SEA TEU UKIP UN USA WEU WTO

International Bank for Reconstruction and Development Intergovernmental Conference International Monetary Fund Intermediate Nuclear Forces Irish Republican Army Justice and Home Affairs Mutual Assured Destruction Member of the European Parliament North Atlantic Treaty Organisation National Union of Mineworkers National Security Strategy Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development Organisation for European Economic Cooperation Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries Qualified Majority Voting Special Air Service Strategic Defence Initiative Single European Act Treaty on European Union United Kingdom Independence Party United Nations United States of America Western European Union World Trade Organisation

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Chronology

1945 4–11 February 8 May 26 June 17 July–2 August 27 July

Yalta conference on post-war settlement. Victory in Europe Day. Formal surrender of Germany. United Nations Charter signed in San Francisco. Potsdam conference on post-war settlement. Victory for Labour Party in UK general election. Attlee became Prime Minister.

6 August

First atomic bomb was dropped on Hiroshima.

9 August

Second atomic bomb was dropped on Nagasaki.

15 August 24 October 6 December

End of war in the Far East. Creation of the United Nations. Agreement on US loan to Britain of US$4.4 billion.

1946 22 February 5 March 19 September

US diplomat George Kennan argued in his famous ‘long telegram’ that the USA should develop a policy of containment vis-à-vis the Soviet Union. Winston Churchill’s ‘Iron Curtain’ speech. Winston Churchill urged Franco-German reconciliation within a United States of Europe in a speech at Zurich.

1947 4 March

Treaty of Dunkirk. France and the UK signed a 50-year Treaty of Alliance and Mutual Assistance.

12 March

Truman Doctrine stated that ‘it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’.

chronology

xv

16 May

In a House of Commons speech, UK Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin rejected the view that Britain had ‘ceased to be a great power’, arguing instead that ‘we regard ourselves as one of the most vital to the peace of the world’.

5 June

Announcement of the Marshall Plan, which sought to provide a framework for the economic rehabilitation of Europe through the European Recovery Programme (ERP).

5 July

Indian independence bill.

15 August

India became independent. Partition of India and Pakistan.

1948 January 22 January 17 March

16 April

April 5 May

Belgium, Luxembourg and the Netherlands established a customs union. Western Union proposed by UK Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin. Brussels Treaty was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK. Constituting a 50-year alliance against attack in Europe, it provided for economic, social and cultural collaboration and collective self-defence. It was the forerunner of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO). Creation of Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) comprising Austria, Benelux, Denmark, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey and the UK. Berlin crisis. The International Committee of the Movement for European Unity held a European Congress in The Hague (The Hague Congress).

14 May

Proclamation of State of Israel and end of UK mandate in Palestine.

22 June

Start of post-war immigration to Britain from the Empire when the liner SS Empire Windrush landed at Tilbury docks carrying nearly 500 Caribbean immigrants to Britain.

24 June

Start of Berlin blockade by the Soviet Union.

25 July

Commencement of Berlin airlift.

1949 4 April

Creation of NATO by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and USA.

18 April

The Republic of Ireland Act entered into force, which ended any British authority in Ireland and took Ireland out of the Commonwealth.

5 May 12 May

Establishment of the Council of Europe. End of Berlin blockade.

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1950 9 May

Schuman Plan.

27 May

UK government explained to the French government that it could not accept a prior commitment to pool coal and steel resources and set up a common authority.

20 June

Start of the negotiations in Paris that led to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC).

25 June

Outbreak of Korean War.

29 August 24 October

British troops arrived in Korea to support the US-led United Nations force. Pleven Plan.

1951 25 October

Victory for Conservative Party in UK general election. Winston Churchill became Prime Minister.

1952 27 May

Creation of European Defence Community (EDC). A Treaty of Association was signed with the UK.

25 July

Establishment of ECSC.

3 October

UK became a nuclear power after testing a device below the frigate HMS Plym in the Monte Bello islands off Western Australia.

1953 27 July

End of Korean War.

1954 April

Nasser seized power in Egypt.

30 August

Collapse of EDC after it was rejected by the French National Assembly.

23 October

Treaty of Brussels amended to create Western European Union (WEU).

1955 6 April

Anthony Eden replaced Winston Churchill as Prime Minister.

14 May

Creation of Warsaw Pact.

25 May

Victory for Conservative Party in UK general election with Anthony Eden as Prime Minister.

1–2 June

Messina Conference of ‘the Six’ foreign ministers establishes the Spaak Committee to look at ways in which ‘a fresh advance towards the building of Europe’ could be achieved.

chronology

xvii

1956 26 July

Nationalisation of Suez Canal.

29 October

Israel attacked Egypt.

30 October

UK and France intervened in Egypt (Suez crisis).

6 November 22 December

UK and France accepted UN order for ceasefire in Suez crisis. UK and France evacuated troops from Suez.

1957 10 January

Harold Macmillan replaced Eden as Prime Minister.

7 February

UK proposal for European Free Trade Association (EFTA).

6 March 25 March 15 May

Ghana became the first British colony in Africa to gain independence. Signing of Treaties of Rome led to creation of the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Britain tested its first hydrogen bomb.

1958 1 January

EEC and Euratom commenced operation.

1959 20–21 July 8 October

Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK decided to create EFTA. Conservative Party won the UK general election with Harold Macmillan as Prime Minister.

1960 4 January 3 May

Stockholm Convention, establishing EFTA, was signed by Austria, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden, Switzerland and the UK. EFTA formally came into existence.

1961 10 August 8 November

UK submitted application to join EEC. Start of UK negotiations for EEC membership.

1962 22 October 20 November 18–21 December

Cuban Missile Crisis. End of US naval blockade of Cuba. USA agreed to supply UK with Polaris missiles at Nassau.

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1963 14 January

French President Charles de Gaulle vetoed UK application to join EEC.

29 January

End of UK application to join EEC.

18 October

Sir Alec Douglas-Home replaced Harold Macmillan as Prime Minister.

1964 15 October

Labour Party won UK general election. Harold Wilson became Prime Minister.

1966 31 March

Victory for Labour Party in UK general election.

1967 2 May

UK applied for EEC membership for second time.

1968 16 May

France vetoed UK application for EEC membership.

1969 2 March

Concorde, the world’s first supersonic airliner and jointly designed by Britain and France, made its maiden flight.

25 April

De Gaulle resigned as French President to be succeeded in July by Georges Pompidou.

December

Hague summit sets goal of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) by 1980.

1970 18 June

Conservative Party victory in UK general election. Edward Heath became Prime Minister.

30 June

Resumption of UK negotiations to join EEC.

1971 6 February

First British soldier was killed in the Northern Ireland ‘troubles’.

15 February

Decimalisation results in the end of the use of pounds, shillings and pence.

20 August

Concessions for exploration for oil in the North Sea were auctioned by the British government.

1972 22 January 4 August

Denmark, Ireland, Norway and the UK signed a Treaty of Accession to join EEC. Idi Amin expelled Ugandan Asians, many of whom settled in the UK.

chronology

xix

1973 1 January

Denmark, Ireland and the UK became members of the EEC.

6 October

Yom-Kippur War.

23 December

The Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) announced the doubling of the price of crude oil sold by the six Persian Gulf members.

1974 28 February

The UK general election resulted in a ‘hung Parliament’ because neither the Conservative or Labour party achieved an outright majority (the Conservatives won more votes, while Labour won more seats). The outcome was that the Labour Party assumed office with Harold Wilson as Prime Minister.

1 April

Start of UK renegotiation of terms of EEC membership.

4 June

UK outlined details of its terms of renegotiation of EEC membership.

10 October

Labour Party achieved a narrow victory in UK general election.

1975 10–11 March

Conclusion of the UK’s renegotiations at the first European Council meeting in Dublin.

9 April

House of Commons approved the renegotiated terms of UK membership of the EEC.

5 June

Referendum on UK membership of EEC results in a two-to-one vote in favour of continued membership.

1976 5 April September

Jim Callaghan replaced Harold Wilson as UK Prime Minister. Economic difficulties led to Britain having to get a loan from the International Monetary Fund (IMF).

1978/1979 Winter

The so-called ‘winter of discontent’ took hold as strikes paralysed Britain.

1979 1 March 12 March 4 May 27 August

Scotland and Wales rejected independence in referendum votes. Start of European Monetary System (EMS). Victory for Conservative Party in UK general election. Margaret Thatcher became Prime Minister. An Irish Republican Army (IRA) bomb killed the Queen’s cousin Lord Louis Mountbatten.

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Britain and the World since 1945

1982 2–3 April 14 June

Argentina invaded Falkland Islands. Argentina surrendered at Port Stanley in Falkland Islands.

1983 9 June

Victory for Conservative Party in UK general election with Margaret Thatcher as Prime Minister.

1984 26 June 12 October

Fontainebleau European Council produced agreement on UK budget dispute. IRA bomb explodes at Conservative Party conference in Brighton.

1985 3 December

Conclusion of the negotiations over the SEA to establish a single market in the EEC and the provision for an extension in the use of qualified majority voting (QMV) and an increase in the powers of the European Parliament. Enters into force in July 1987.

1986 8 December

Margaret Thatcher’s government privatised British Gas, which marked the start of a wave of privatisations of major nationalised industries.

1987 11 June 1 July

Victory for Conservative Party in UK general election. SEA came into effect.

1988 20 September

Prime Minister Thatcher’s Bruges speech criticised European integration.

1989 12 April

2 May

September 9 November

Delors Report proposed three-stage process for EMU, namely linking the currencies together, integration between states and the creation of a European central bank. Borders are opened between Austria and Hungary resulting in a massive influx of Germans from the German Democratic Republic (GDR) to the Federal Republic. This was the first move towards the fall of the Berlin Wall in November 1989. Collapse of Communist governments in Eastern Europe. Collapse of Berlin Wall.

chronology

xxi

1990 12 September

Two-Plus-Four Treaty on the Final Settlement with respect to the reunification of Germany.

3 October

German reunification.

8 October

UK joined Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM).

13 November

Sir Geoffrey Howe delivered speech in House of Commons criticising Margaret Thatcher’s leadership.

22 November

Margaret Thatcher resigned as Prime Minister.

28 November

John Major replaced Margaret Thatcher as UK Prime Minister.

1991 17 January

As a result of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, a multinational US-led force commenced ‘Operation Desert Storm’ to liberate Kuwait. The campaign was backed by a United Nations mandate, resulting in some commentators regarding this as a sign of hope that the UN would operate in a more cohesive manner after Cold War divisions.

16 May

Start of civil war in Yugoslavia due to ethnic and political tensions.

25 June

First steps towards the break-up of the Yugoslav Federation commenced with the proclamation of the independence of Croatia and Slovenia.

1 July 11 December

Warsaw Treaty Organisation disbanded. Agreement on Maastricht Treaty on European Union which provides for Economic and Monetary Union (with the provision of a UK opt-out), the establishment of common foreign and security policy and cooperation on justice and home affairs, as well as the strengthening of the powers of the European Parliament. The UK is exempted from cooperation on social policy through a Social Protocol. Entered into force in November 1993.

1992 9 April

Victory for Conservative Party in UK general election with John Major as Prime Minister.

6 May

Opening of Channel Tunnel linking London and Paris by rail.

16 September

Financial pressures led to UK leaving the ERM (‘Black Wednesday’).

1993 2 August

The UK ratified the Treaty on European Union.

3 September

Founding of Eurosceptical United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP).

1 November

Maastricht Treaty on European Union entered into force.

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Britain and the World since 1945

1995 4 July

John Major was re-elected leader of the Conservative Party, having announced his resignation on 22 June as a result of deep divisions within the Party over the issue of Europe.

1996 21 May

June

12 November

UK adopted a policy of non-cooperation with the European Union (EU) until a timetable to lift an EU ban on the export of British beef was resolved as a result of the announcement of a possible link between Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE), which is found in cattle, and the fatal disease found in humans known as Creutzfeldt–Jakob disease (CJD). UK ended its policy of non-cooperation with the EU after agreement was reached on the conditions for the eventual lifting of the ban on British beef. European Court of Justice (ECJ) ruled that the Working Time Directive is applicable to the UK.

1997 1 May

Victory for Labour Party in UK general election. Tony Blair became Prime Minister.

17 June

Amsterdam European Council produced agreement on Treaty of Amsterdam which includes a reversal of the social protocol agreed at Maastricht, an extension of cooperation in the area of justice and home affairs, and the ability of some decisions to be taken on a reduced basis of member states through flexibility mechanisms.

1 July 17 July September

Britain handed back Hong Kong to China. Chancellor Gordon Brown announced five economic tests for UK membership of EMU. Scotland and Wales voted in favour of devolution.

1998 10 April

Good Friday Agreement established a devolved Northern Ireland Assembly.

28 April

Outbreak of war in Kosovo which led to a NATO air campaign from 24 March to 11 June 1999 to stop the conflict and the ensuing humanitarian disaster.

4 December

Anglo-French defence cooperation agreement signed at the French port of St Malo.

chronology

xxiii

1999 1 January 1 May

Euro launched in 11 EU member states. Britain decided not to participate. Treaty of Amsterdam came into effect.

2000 7–9 December

Conclusion of negotiation on Treaty of Nice which reached agreement on a number of limited institutional changes to the EU to permit further EU englargement.

2001 7 June 11 September 7 October

Labour Party victory in UK general election with Tony Blair as Prime Minister. Islamic terrorist attacks on World Trade Center in New York and Pentagon in Washington DC led to war on terror. UK took part in US-led airstrikes against Afghanistan.

2002 1 January 31 May

The Eurozone came into existence as the euro replaced the currencies of the participating countries. EU ratified Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change.

2003 1 February 20 March

Treaty of Nice came into effect. UK joined US-led invasion of Iraq.

2004 20 April 1 May

Prime Minister Tony Blair committed the UK to a referendum to ratify the EU Constitutional Treaty. EU enlarged to 25 member states with 10 new states joining.

2005 16 February

Entering into force of Kyoto Protocol on climate change.

5 May

Labour Party achieved victory in UK general election.

7 July

Suicide bombers killed 52 people on London’s transport system.

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Britain and the World since 1945

2007 27 June

Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair as Prime Minister.

23 July

After negative referendum votes in France and the Netherlands, the EU started a process of negotiations for a new treaty to replace the failed EU Constitution.

13 December

Agreement on a Treaty of Lisbon which attached focus to institutional change that included granting more powers to the European Parliament, the appointment of a President of the European Council and an expansion in the role for the High Representative for foreign and security policy.

2008 July October

UK Parliament ratified the Treaty of Lisbon. The worldwide financial crisis hit the UK when the government had to part-nationalise three UK leading banks to save them from collapse.

2009 30 April November 1 December

A ceremony marked the end of six years of UK combat operations in Iraq. UK withdrew most of its troops from Iraq. Treaty of Lisbon came into force.

2010 6 May

October December

UK general election resulted in a hung Parliament which led to a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government, with David Cameron as Prime Minister. The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government announced large-scale spending cuts. The UK concluded a military and nuclear accord with France.

2011 March May 19 July

December

Britain undertook a prominent role in international intervention in the conflict in Libya. UK troops left Iraq after an eight-year period of deployment. The European Union Act 2011 received Royal Assent and became law. In so doing, it required a referendum to be held before a British government can agree to or change the EU treaties, or to agree to certain decisions such as transferring power to the EU. Prime Minister David Cameron refused to support the EU Fiscal Treaty at the Brussels European Council.

chronology

xxv

2012 12 July

UK Foreign Secretary William Hague announced that the government would be undertaking a Review of the Balance of Competences to examine the impact of what the EU does and how it affects the UK, with a view to the completion of the review by the autumn of 2014.

15 October

Prime Minister David Cameron and Scotland’s First Minister Alex Salmond reached an agreement on terms for a Scottish independence referendum to be held on 18 September 2014.

2013 23 January

16 December

Prime Minister David Cameron announced that if the Conservative Party were to win the 2015 general election then a future Conservative government would hold an in–out referendum on EU membership. Prime Minister David Cameron announced that UK troops will leave Afghanistan in 2014, commenting that it is ‘mission accomplished’.

Who’s who

Attlee, Clement (1883–1967): Leader of the Labour Party from 1935 to 1955, he served in the wartime coalition cabinet during the Second World War. He led the Labour Party to victory in the 1945 general election and served as Prime Minister until 1951. Although this period is often most remembered for the creation of a welfare state, in foreign policy matters Attlee’s view that Britain had the resources to maintain its Empire had significant implications for the future direction of British foreign policy. Bevin, Ernest (1881–1951): A prominent member of the Labour movement both as a trade unionist and a member of government. An active supporter of UK rearmament in the 1930s to counter the threat from Nazi Germany, Churchill appointed him Minister of Labour and National Service in 1940, a post he held until 1945. In the post-war Labour government of 1945–51 he was appointed Foreign Secretary where he played an influential role behind the formation of the OEEC in 1947 and the creation of NATO in 1949. Blair, Anthony (b. 1953): Labour Prime Minister 1997–2007. Appointed leader of the Labour Party in 1994 after the death of John Smith in the same year. Blair entered Parliament in 1983 and was elected to the shadow cabinet in 1988. However, it was not until his appointment as opposition spokesman on Home Affairs in 1992 that he rose to prominence, thereby providing a platform for his election as leader. A committed pro-European, as Prime Minister he attempted to raise the UK’s profile in Europe, although his premiership was overshadowed by his support for the US-led invasions of Afghanistan in 2001 and Iraq in 2003. Brown, Gordon (b. 1951): Labour Prime Minister 2007–10 having previously been Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1997–2007. His premiership was dominated by economic problems, the fallout from the UK’s ill-fated invasion of Iraq and the legacy of infighting that had dominated the Labour government since 1997.

Who’s who

Callaghan, James (1912–2005): Prime Minister 1976–9, previously Foreign Secretary 1974–6, Home Secretary 1967–70 and Chancellor of the Exchequer 1964–70. His premiership was dominated by poor economic performance and industrial unrest. Cameron, David (b. 1966): A Conservative politician, he has been Prime Minister of the Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government since 2010. His period in office has been dominated by greater hostility towards European integration, while the UK’s ability to orchestrate foreign policy independent of the EU has been constrained by budget cuts. Chamberlain, Neville (1869–1940): Prime Minister 1937–40, his period in office has been criticised because of his support for appeasement towards Nazi Germany. Churchill, Sir Winston (1874–1965): The UK’s most celebrated Prime Minister of the twentieth century, he served as Prime Minister from 1940 to 1945 and 1951 to 1955 (8 years and 240 days in total). In opposition he advocated closer European integration, urging for the construction of a United States of Europe in 1946. Suffering from poor health and frustrated with not being able to adequately tackle the problems facing Britain in the post-war period, he resigned in 1955. Cook, Robin (1946–2005): Foreign Secretary 1997–2001 and Leader of the House of Commons 2001–3, resigning in protest over UK’s invasion of Iraq. Douglas-Home, Alec (1903–95): Conservative Prime Minister 1963–4, assuming office after Harold Macmillan resigned because of ill health. Eden, Anthony (1897–1977): A Conservative politician who served as Prime Minister from 6 April 1955 until his resignation on 9 January 1957. He had previously served in various government posts, most notably as Churchill’s Foreign Secretary between December 1940 and July 1945 and also from 1951 to 1955. Despite his achievements in these offices, he is most remembered for the debacle of the Suez crisis, which brought about his resignation. Heath, Edward (1916–2005): Conservative Prime Minister from 1970 to 1974 (3 years and 259 days in total). A committed pro-European, he was in charge of the UK’s first application for membership of the EEC under Harold Macmillan’s government. As Prime Minister his government suffered various industrial disputes, which greatly influenced the Conservative Party being defeated in the 1974 general election. Howe, Geoffrey (b. 1926): Conservative Chancellor of the Exchequer 1979– 83, Foreign Secretary 1983–9 and Leader of the House of Commons and Deputy Prime Minister 1989–90. He resigned from office in November 1990 because of differences with Prime Minister Thatcher over European policy.

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Jenkins, Roy (1920–2003): Labour Party Chancellor of the Exchequer (1967–70) and Home Secretary (1974–6), he was appointed President of the European Commission from 1977 to 1981. A committed European, his time as President of the European Commission was dominated by UK complaints over its budget contribution. Lamont, Norman (b. 1942): Served as Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1990 to 1993 in John Major’s Conservative government. As Chancellor he was responsible for negotiating the monetary union part of the negotiations which led to the Maastricht Treaty, while he was also responsible for administering the UK’s participation in the ERM. The latter was a particularly difficult task and eventually resulted in Sterling’s exit from the ERM in September 1992. After his departure from government, he adopted a strong Eurosceptic position. Lawson, Nigel (b. 1932): Conservative politician who served as Chancellor of the Exchequer 1983–9. As Chancellor he campaigned for UK participation in the ERM, a policy that was contested by Prime Minister Thatcher. Differences of views between the two individuals over economic policy provoked him to resign in October 1989. Macmillan, Harold (1894–1986): Conservative Prime Minister 1957–63 (resigning on grounds of ill health), having succeeded Anthony Eden after the Suez crisis. He advocated membership of the European Community to strengthen UK influence in world affairs. Major, John (b. 1943): Conservative Prime Minister from 1990 to 1997, having won two general elections. His period of office was marked by severe splits over the issue of European integration, which influenced his decision to hold a Conservative Party leadership election in 1995, which he won. Towards the end of his period in office, his government’s majority had been eliminated and domestic difficulties, such as the beef crisis and scandalous behaviour by many Conservative MPs, meant that defeat in the 1997 general election was an inevitability. Thatcher, Margaret (1925–2013): Conservative Prime Minister between 4 May 1979 and 28 November 1990 and the first woman Prime Minister. Thatcher was an influential reforming Prime Minister who believed in the importance of the free market. Her foreign policy was shaped by a strong relationship with the USA and a belief that European integration was moving into aspects of policy that were the preserve of national governments. This particularly applied to the notion of an ‘identikit’ Europe, as emphasised by her opposition to social policy integration and the creation of a single

Who’s who

currency. This position brought her into conflict with senior Cabinet members and resulted in her losing the Conservative Party leadership contest in November 1990. Wilson, Harold (1916–95): Labour Prime Minister from 1964 to 1970 and 1974 to 1976, having won four general elections as Labour leader. His overall period as Prime Minister was 7 years and 279 days. He oversaw the nation’s second application for EEC membership in 1967 and, in 1974, renegotiated the terms of entry that Edward Heath had obtained. In 1975 he held a referendum on Community membership.

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Glossary

Appeasement: A term that is used in reference to the policies pursued by Britain towards Germany before the Second World War when Britain was prepared to accept Germany’s expansionist policies in exchange for what were paper guarantees of peace. Arms control: Initiatives to place limitations on the number of weapons. This can include efforts invested to stop the future spread of weapons, attempts to reduce the number of existing weapons, as well as the elimination of certain types of weapons. Atlantic Charter: Signed by Roosevelt and Churchill in August 1941, it detailed a number of principles for the post-war order. Balance of power: A situation where there is balance between one state and another, with no one state having a greater power. Berlin blockade: In June 1948 the Soviet Union closed road, rail and inland waterway access to West Berlin from the western zones of occupied Germany. These actions were prompted by initiatives being taken by the Western occupied powers (France, UK and the USA) to promote the founding of a West German state and to introduce a new and more stable currency in their zones. The Soviet Union opposed these initiatives. The blockade was broken by the Berlin airlift, whereby the basic necessities were flown into West Berlin, and the success of this initiative resulted in the blockade being lifted in May 1949, with the conclusion of the airlift in September 1949. Berlin Wall: In August 1961 a wall was erected by the GDR to control the movement of individuals from West Berlin to East Berlin. The wall came to signify the division between the Soviet-led Eastern bloc and the US-led Western bloc and was a key image of the Cold War. The lessening of the Sovietimposed controls on the Eastern bloc in the late 1980s resulted in the eventual collapse of the East German regime and the demolition of the Berlin Wall.

Glossary

Bretton Woods: An international conference that sought to plan the post-war world. This resulted in the creation of the IMF, World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). Brussels Treaty: In 1948 Britain, Belgium, France, Luxembourg and the Netherlands came together to establish a system of collective self-defence. Cold War: The rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War, which continued until the collapse of Communism in 1989 and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Colonialism: Refers to the establishment of control by one country over another. Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): Established to ensure the maintenance of an adequate supply of food in the European Community. Commonwealth: A voluntary organisation established in 1931 that comprises former members of the British Empire. By 2013 it had 53 members, the majority of whom have joined since 1945 as a result of the granting of independence. Containment: In 1947 the US diplomat George Kennan advanced the concept of containment that became the basis of American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union for the next 40 years. This policy of containment had three aims. First, restoring the balance of power, whereby the USA supported states that were threatened by the Soviet Union. Second, reducing the Soviet capability to project outside power by cooperating with communist regimes, such as Tito’s regime in Yugoslavia. Third, to modify the Soviet concept of international politics through the negotiation of outstanding differences. Council of Europe: Established in 1949 as a means of promoting cooperation among European states. It is often regarded as more of a ‘talking shop’. Council of Ministers: A key EU institution which comprises representatives of national governments holding meetings that are dependent on the topic being discussed, such as agriculture and trade. Court of Justice: The final arbiter of legal decisions in the EU. It is often regarded as a thorn in the side of the British government because its decisions have tended to be in favour of deeper European integration. Decolonisation: The process of colonial powers granting independence to their former colonies. Many of the countries that have been granted independence have suffered from poor economic and political governance and while the roots of such problems can be traced back to the colonial authorities, it is also the case that the decolonised countries have not always benefited from democratic governments.

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Détente: The relaxation of tension between the USA and the Soviet Union that took place from the late 1960s to the mid-1970s. Devolution: Refers to the transfer of powers from central government to a lower level, such as in the case of the UK through the granting of devolved powers to Northern Ireland, Scotland and Wales. European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC): Established in 1952 with six members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands) it became the forerunner of the EU. European Commission: An institution of the EU which acts as both an administrator of policies, such as agriculture, and also an initiator of policy ideas. European Defence Community (EDC): In the early 1950s European countries tried to establish an independent defence force to provide a means for German rearmament. The proposal collapsed in 1954 when it was rejected by France. European Economic Community (EEC): Established by the 1957 Treaties of Rome and came into existence on 1 January 1958 with six original members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). European Free Trade Association (EFTA): Created in 1959 by Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland as an alternative organisation to the EEC. European Monetary System (EMS): A forerunner of the single currency. Established in 1979 as a ‘zone of monetary stability’, it included the ERM, which was a parity grid for restricting the fluctuation of currencies. European Parliament: The only directly elected EU institution, it comprises Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) who are elected for five-year terms. European Union: Although the Treaties of Rome initially called for an ‘ever closer union’ among the peoples of Europe, it was the Treaty on European Union which realised this objective. Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM): A central component of the EMS that was established in 1979. The ERM acted as a stabilising mechanism for reducing currency fluctuations among the participating countries whose currencies were given an exchange rate set against the European Currency Unit (ECU). General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Came into existence on 1 January 1948 to reduce trade barriers between countries through agreements that were legally binding. Succeeded by the World Trade Organisation (WTO).

Glossary

Great Powers: A term that came to prominence at the time of the 1815 Congress of Vienna. The term tends to be used as a method of differentiating the influence of countries in world politics. Gross Domestic Product (GDP): The total value of the goods and services produced in a country over the period of one year. It excludes foreign exchange earnings. International Monetary Fund (IMF): Created in 1947 to promote free trade and ensure that countries pursue stable economic policies. Iron curtain: Term used during the Cold War to refer to the East–West division of Europe. League of Nations: Established in April 1919 as a result of the atrocities of the First World War, this was the first international organisation and is associated with the notion of idealism. Its efforts to promote collective security ultimately failed because of the aggression of such countries as Germany and Japan during the interwar period. The League was the forerunner of the United Nations. Lend-Lease: The supplies provided by the USA during the Second World War. Marshall Plan: In June 1947 US Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, set out a plan to improve the economic recovery of European states by means of US financial assistance. Between 1948 and 1951 the plan distributed just over US$12,500m in aid. North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): Established in 1949, this Cold War alliance was the main security guarantor of the West against the Soviet Union. Today, NATO’s membership has expanded to include a number of countries of Central and Eastern Europe that, during the Cold War, fell within the Soviet sphere of influence. Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD): Established in 1961 as the successor to the OEEC to discuss international economic policy. Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC): Created to coordinate the allocation of Marshall Aid. Replaced by the OECD in 1961. Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): An intergovernmental organisation of 13 oil-exporting countries that coordinates oil prices among the member countries. Referendum: A situation when the electorate is asked to either approve or disapprove a policy that has been set before it.

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Sovereignty: A term that is often used in reference to Britain’s relationship with the EU, where Eurosceptics argue that the EU has eroded the capacity for the British government to take decisions at a national level. At the level of world politics, sovereignty stresses the significance of a nation’s sovereign rights, including such issues as the non-violation of its borders. This was discussed at great length with regard to the US-led invasion of Iraq, which took place without the support of the United Nations and which was therefore criticised for breaching Iraqi sovereignty. Sphere of Influence: The ability of a country to exercise influence over other countries. It is a term that has been used to highlight the influence that the Soviet Union and the USA exercised over countries during the Cold War. Sterling Area: Countries that used the pound for international payments. Superpower: Countries that have resources far greater than those of other countries. During the Cold War it was recognised that the only superpowers were the USA and the Soviet Union. Supranational: Refers to a situation where national governments share sovereignty with each other and establish supranational institutions above the nation state to coordinate policies. To this end, supranationalism has an impact on national sovereignty because it imposes certain limitations on member states. Supranationalism can be contrasted with intergovernmentalism, which is an approach that attaches greater emphasis to the role of national governments in the decision-making process. The Seven: Refers to the seven founding members of EFTA (Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland). The Six: Refers to the six founding members of the European Community (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg and the Netherlands). Truman Doctrine: In March 1947 US President Harry Truman said that ‘it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’. It acted as the basis for a more active US foreign policy, marked by the creation of NATO in 1949. Versailles Treaty: The peace treaty that was signed by the Allies and Germany in 1919 after the end of the First World War. World Trade Organisation (WTO): An organisation that promotes global free trade and is the successor to the GATT.

1 The rise and fall of the British Empire: 1496–1945 Foreign policy is about power, about getting our way in an unhelpful world. But power is relative; and it is usually imputed rather than applied: governments act on an estimate of what the other side can do. Influence, or prestige, which can be called the halo round power, normally suffices. And a confident, decisive government, particularly one with some practical successes to its credit, can acquire disproportionate influence, impose its own estimate of itself and, to some extent, live beyond its diplomatic means. (Cradock, 1997: 199–200)

T

hese words, written by the British diplomat Sir Percy Cradock, emphasise what should be the central tenets of any nation’s foreign policy. For more than half a millennium, Britain – and prior to that England – has sought to exercise influence at a global level. And while this has sometimes led to policy failure, on many more occasions it has resulted in outcomes that have gone beyond the country’s natural influence on world affairs given its population, geographical size and access to raw materials. At its height in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries the British Empire formally controlled one-quarter of the world’s population. For many, this was an image of success, it being noted that the ‘sun never sets on the British Empire’. British influence stretched from the Arctic to the Antarctic, and from the Atlantic to the Pacific. Britain controlled the sea arteries that provided the means for economic growth and supplied the finance and manufacturing that the rest of the world required. Britain’s imperial influence was achieved by a mix of formal power through colonies and Dominions and informal power through economic influence over many other countries. The legacy of the British Empire continues to this day. From language to literature, economics to politics and the military to the sports field, Britain’s influence can be seen throughout the world. The legacy of Empire can also be found in the migration of peoples. In some instances this was forced, such as through the slave

2

Decolonisation: the pro­ cess of colonial powers granting independence to their former colonies. Many of the countries that have been granted inde­ pendence have suffered from poor economic and political governance and while the roots of such problems can be traced back to the colonial auth­ orities, it is also the case that the decolonised countries have not always benefited from demo­ cratic governments.

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trade between Africa and North America and in the transportation of convicts to Australia. But in other instances it was encouraged, such as the settlement of Canada or the movement of traders from India to Africa in search of new commercial ventures. This would in turn have an impact on Britain in future years, with decolonisation resulting in significant immigration in the post-war era that was marked by the arrival of the SS Windrush at Tilbury docks on 22 June 1948 carrying nearly 500 Caribbean immigrants to Britain. In looking at these issues, this study provides an overview of the post1945 period by chronicling the key episodes and decisions that have shaped Britain’s foreign policy, with a notable focus on the relative nature of Britain’s decline. To provide a context to this analysis, this chapter looks at the rise and fall of the British Empire.

ThE BIrTh oF ThE BrITISh EmPIrE The origins of the British Empire can be traced back to a calculated effort in the latter years of the fifteenth century to expand England’s influence at a time when other European nations, particularly Portugal and Spain, had already established considerable footholds abroad. England, along with France and the Netherlands, were envious of the wealth that Portugal and Spain had accumulated. Consequently, England, France and the Netherlands began a process of trying to establish colonies and trade networks, with a particular focus on the Americas and Asia. For the majority of studies a common starting point in their analysis of the British Empire is 5 march 1496 when King henry VII of England granted letters patent to the Venetian navigator John Cabot to lead a voyage in search of unknown lands. The first voyage undertaken in 1496 by Cabot and his family proved unsuccessful. In may 1497 Cabot and his son Sebastian tried again. Setting sail from Bristol with a crew of 20 in the ship Matthew, they found land 35 days later, on 24 June 1497, which they called Newfoundland. Cabot spent the better part of the next month exploring the coast of North America and claiming a considerable amount of land for England. When he returned to England later that year, he did so to a hero’s welcome, pointing out the opportunity for trade. The following year Cabot set sail once more with five ships to further explore the area. But sadly this crossing ended with Cabot being lost at sea. Despite these voyages, it would not be until the reign of Elizabeth I (1558–1603) during the last decades of the sixteenth century that a more coordinated effort to expand England’s influence took shape. During Elizabeth’s reign focus was attached to establishing lands in North America that would increase the possibilities for trade and access to resources, such as timber, which would in turn fuel economic expansion and support the

the rise and fall of the British empire

military. In 1578 Elizabeth I provided a patent to humphrey Gilbert for the discovery of overseas exploration. In that year Gilbert set sail for the West Indies with the idea of establishing a colony. Although that expedition failed, Gilbert sailed for a second attempt in 1583, which resulted in him claiming some 400 miles of the Newfoundland coast for England. In 1607 a settlement was established in Jamestown. A focus on expansion into North America provided a base from which English forces could defend themselves from French and Spanish attacks. When English ships could not find the precious goods, such as gold, that they had sought on their journeys, they turned to attacking the bases of other powers in the new lands and looted whatever they could get their hands on. In these early years England’s expansion overseas was basically undertaken by privateers. This was piracy in all but name. Elizabeth I took the decision to licence this system of privateering and, as a result, many ships set off in the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries with the sole intent of harassing the ships of other powers. This tactic proved remarkably successful; it is estimated that from 1585 onwards between 100 and 200 vessels set sail with a view to capturing Spanish vessels – the annual value of their finds amounted to at least £200,000 (Burke, 2007: 25). This was empire building on the cheap. The start of the seventeenth century witnessed the first steps towards the creation of a British (rather than just an English) Empire. In 1603 King James VI of Scotland ascended the English throne, and in so doing became King James I of England. It would be another hundred years before both countries came together in the 1707 Act of Union when the Parliament of Great Britain was formed. For Scotland, a key motivating factor behind the Union was that it provided the opportunity to get involved in the colonial trade where many Scots flourished (Ferguson, 2004: 33–4), while for England it provided an opportunity to secure its own borders at a time when its interests were increasingly focused on foreign affairs (Gamble, 2003: 45). The 1604 Treaty of London ended hostilities with Spain. Now that England was at peace with its main rival, the focus shifted to establishing overseas colonies. In the early seventeenth century the British Empire started to take shape, as merchants began to trade with far-flung territories, notably North America and a number of islands in the Caribbean. Virginia was settled in 1607, Bermuda in 1609 and Barbados in 1625. At the same time there was also significant expansion in Ireland. Private companies were established, most notably the East India Company in 1600, which focused on the spice trade, and the hudson Bay Company in 1670, which concentrated on the trade in Canadian furs. The exploration of the New World of the Americas also provided a place of refuge for people who felt that their way of life was threatened at home in England and other European countries, the most notable example of which was the Pilgrim Fathers who set sail from England

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Colonialism: refers to the establishment of con­ trol by one country over another.

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in 1620 to escape religious persecution and in so doing established Plymouth Colony in massachusetts Bay. By the eighteenth century the British Empire had expanded further. Although not yet in name, the beginnings of globalisation were taking place. Goods that were once the preserve of the wealthy elite, such as sugar, tea, tobacco and coffee, were being imported in ever-greater quantities year-onyear to supply the tastes of a growing body of English consumers. While overseas expansion provided products to satisfy the domestic market, it also provided the goods that would in turn be re-exported in a manufactured form to countries near and far. Cotton manufacture was the first industry to be tied to overseas trade. Between 1750 and 1770 export industries increased their output by 80 per cent, which contrasted with a growth of 8 per cent for domestic industries (hobsbawm, 1969: 48). British manufacturers who were at the centre of these developments benefited from a government that was prepared to protect its interests by entering into conflict with other countries and to colonise for the benefit of the manufacturers (Gamble, 2003: 45). What this amounted to was that Britain’s foreign policy was shaped by the realpolitik of economic and political objectives. British naval power supported the growth in overseas commerce and made the world safe for British trade. An aggressive foreign policy meant that by the eighteenth century Britain was in a pre-eminent position among European powers in terms of colonialism and had a worldwide dominance of the sea-lanes. As Jeremy Black has commented, ‘In 1740 Britain and France were both important colonial and maritime powers, though neither ruled the extent of territory or number of people that Spain possessed. By 1815 Britain was clearly the leading European commercial, colonial and maritime power’ (Black, 1998: 10). The attainment of this position had been achieved through a dramatic increase in the size of the royal Navy, which by 1815 had 214 ships. In comparison, France had 80 ships, russia 40 and Spain 25 (Kennedy, 1988: 129). The very process of expansion into new lands brought with it a need for labour. This resulted in Britain taking a leading role in the monstrous practice of slavery through the establishment of slaving stations in Africa, which resulted in the forced mass movement of peoples. The slaves provided the colonies with labour for backbreaking work on the likes of sugar and tobacco plantations and, in later years when they became free, would transform the nature of the population of these countries. Expansion abroad also provided an opportunity for people to seek opportunities in new lands and by the end of the seventeenth century it was estimated that at least 350,000 people had emigrated from England to North America. This was a sizeable number given that the total population of England and Wales was estimated to be just fewer than 5 million in 1600 (it was only with the introduction of a census in 1801 that more precise figures became available). The colonies

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also provided a ready means of dealing with a prison population at home by transporting prisoners overseas. Elsewhere, Britain obtained a small foothold in India as the process of expansion turned eastwards. A focus on India accelerated after 1776 when the American revolution resulted in the Empire losing half of its holdings in North America when the Declaration of Independence formed the United States from the 13 former British Colonies (Delaware, North Carolina, South Carolina, massachusetts, maryland, Virginia, Pennsylvania, New York, New Jersey, New hampshire, rhode Island, Connecticut and Georgia). And some 200 or so years on from the time of Elizabeth I, this period marked the end of what became known as the first British Empire.

WorKShoP oF ThE WorLD The next phase in the expansion of the British Empire from the late eighteenth century onwards would see Britain becoming the ‘workshop of the world’ as the industrial revolution took hold (Deane, 1979; mathias, 1983). This period would see a significant growth in the British population. Whereas in the hundred years from 1700 to 1801 the population increased from some 6 million to 10.5 million, by 1851 the population had reached 20.8 million, and by 1911 totalled 40.8 million (Crouzet, 1982: 20). This increase in population would have been greater if it had not been for the significant emigration that primarily took place to the United States, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. This emigration saw more than 20 million people leave the British Isles between the early 1600s and the 1950s, and was the biggest migration in human history (Ferguson, 2004: 45–6). The increase in population that did take place in Britain, combined with emigration, resulted in a surge in manufacturing output and a concurrent demand for the importation of raw materials and the exportation of finished products, with the Empire being at the centre of these developments. To compensate for the loss of the 13 North American colonies, the Empire began to reshape. Australia came under British control, with the first British fleet sailing into Botany Bay in 1788. one of the most important reasons for expanding into Australia was that there was a need to find a suitable place for the transportation of British convicts following the loss of the North American colonies ( Judd, 1996: 29). The established practice was that penal transportation was an important means of clearing out unwelcome sections of society from the country, with the last convicts arriving in Western Australia in 1868. over the period as a whole, more than 165,000 convicts were transported to Australia. Britain’s approach to the newly colonised territory was to follow a similar practice of imperial control as it had done in

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Great Powers: a term that came to prominence at the time of the 1815 congress of Vienna. the term tends to be used as a method of differ­ entiating the influence of countries in world politics.

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North America. This allowed the white settler population in Australia to rule themselves and this tendency towards control and influence at a distance was a notable factor in the way that the British Empire was run. But while Australia provided a ready-made alternative for Britain’s convict problem, its remoteness, geography and sparse population meant that it did not provide a substitute for the loss of the North American colonies and the growing wealth and prosperity that was to be found in the new United States of America (US). As a result of this the Empire began to turn eastwards towards Asia. In 1773 the British government was forced to take over the East India Company as a result of financial difficulties. By the end of the eighteenth century, Britain’s control over India extended into Afghanistan and Burma. Additional territories were obtained during the long war with France from 1793 to 1815, notably Guyana, the Cape Colony, Ceylon, mauritius, St Lucia, Trinidad and Tobago. The war would see Britain defeat Napoleon’s navy at Trafalgar in 1805 and his army at Waterloo in 1815. Britain emerged as a dominant global power in the wake of the agreements reached at the Congress of Vienna in 1815 that owed much to the skill of the Foreign Secretary Viscount Castlereagh (hayes, 1975: 3–23) and that led to the re-establishment of a balance of power among the Great Powers of Europe. The period that followed was a time of British overseas expansionism, with Britain controlling the main maritime sea-lanes. This saw Britain taking South Africa from the Netherlands as well as maintaining India in the face of the threat of russian expansion. Britain was emerging as the first industrial nation and the technological innovations that came with this directly led to a lowering in the costs of production through a move to mass manufacturing (mathias, 1983). And as British industry experienced cheaper production costs than those of competitors in other countries there was a significant expansion in the export of products, from cotton to iron (Crouzet, 1982: 7–8). Britain was the only country that was able to provide the commercial and financial backing that was necessary to support new markets. As a result, British businesses took a leading role in providing the services that facilitated this growth in global trade, from providing the merchant fleet through to the insurance and banking services that were essential to the enterprise (mathias, 1983: 282–4). Britain accounted for over 40 per cent of the world’s output of manufactured goods in 1850 and by 1876–80 controlled 30 per cent of world trade in primary products (Crouzet, 1982: 343). Such a dominant role ensured that Britain had a leading role as a technological innovator, typified by the launch of the SS Great Britain in 1843. Designed by the greatest engineer of the time, Isambard Kingdom Brunel, the ship was not only the largest ship, but also the first to be built of iron and to make use of a screw propeller rather than conventional paddle wheels.

the rise and fall of the British empire

Technological innovation and expansion into new lands would become synonymous with Queen Victoria who, having ascended the throne in 1837, was crowned Empress of India in 1877 at the urging of Prime minister Benjamin Disraeli. The focus on India was important for a number of reasons. The first was that Africa had become less lucrative for Britain with the end of the slave trade. (Britain had abolished slavery at home in 1807 and in its colonies in 1833. France abolished slavery in 1794, while slavery was abolished in much of Latin America in the 1820s.) Second, India was an increasingly crucial market for cotton, which was Britain’s main export. Finally, India was a vital linchpin in the broader trade with the Far East, where its exports primarily consisted of opium, which was overseen by a state monopoly that Britain had diligently encouraged. Such was the demand for opium that even by as late as 1870 it accounted for approximately half of China’s total imports (hobsbawm, 1969: 149). For Britain, the revenues it obtained from India’s trading surplus were central to its overall wealth.

SCrAmBLE For AFrICA many scholars refer to the period between 1815 and 1914 as Britain’s imperial century, with British foreign policy during this period being greatly shaped by Lord Palmerston, who served as both Foreign Secretary and Prime minister. The national interest was the cornerstone of British foreign policy, Palmerston noting in a speech to the house of Commons on 1 march 1848 that ‘We have no eternal allies, and we have no perpetual enemies. our interests are eternal and perpetual, and those interests it is our duty to follow’. During the period from 1848 to 1914 approximately 400 million people and 10 million square miles were added to the British Empire. Victory over Napoleon meant that Britain did not have a serious international rival, albeit with the possible exception of russia in central Asia. Britain was unchallenged at sea. This period would be known as Pax Britannica, referring to the ‘relative’ peace that existed in Europe from the Battle of Waterloo until the outbreak of the First World War. Britain’s growth in influence was not, however, a result of a coordinated strategy on the part of London, as Britain’s Empire emerged in something of a disorganised fashion. As John Young has written, ‘The Empire was a scattered and ramshackle affair with many different forms of government, including crown colonies, protectorates and selfgoverning entities’ (Young, 1997: 9). Life outside of Europe was not so settled. In the nineteenth century there was notable tension between Britain and russia whereby these two countries helped to fill the power vacuums left by the declining ottoman and Persian Empires. This rivalry in Eurasia came to be known as ‘The Great Game’. For

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Britain, the defeat that russia inflicted on Persia and Turkey in the russoPersian war of 1826–8 and the russo-Turkey war of 1828–9 demonstrated the imperial ambitions and capabilities of russia and resulted in fears that russia would invade India. To counteract this fear of russian encroachment into Central Asia, Britain invaded Afghanistan in 1839 to install a new leader, Shuja Shah Durrani. While this was viewed as a pretext for incorporating Afghanistan into the British Empire, and thereby bolstering British influence in Central Asia, the first Anglo-Afghan war of 1839–42 proved to be a disaster for Britain, with nearly 20,000 troops killed. In 1853, when russia invaded the Turkish Balkans, there were real fears that russia would dominate the mediterranean and the middle East, which resulted in Britain and France declaring war on russia on 28 march 1854 and invading the Crimean Peninsula in order to destroy russian naval capabilities. This would lead to the Crimean War of 1854–6, which was the only war that was fought between Britain and another imperial power during the Pax Britannica and resulted in a significant defeat for russia. In 1869 the Suez Canal was opened, linking the mediterranean with the Indian ocean. Although Britain was initially opposed to the canal, the government very quickly recognised its strategic importance in reducing the cost and time in the transit of goods to India. In 1875, using funding from Nm rothschild’s and Sons, the British government that was led by Benjamin Disraeli bought a 44 per cent shareholding in the Suez Canal for £4 million. While this did not provide Britain with outright control of the canal, it nonetheless provided significant leverage. In the end, the joint Anglo-French control over the canal resulted in outright British control over Egypt in 1882 when Britain invaded. A desire to secure British interests in the mediterranean as well as along the trading route to India would result in Britain acquiring Cyprus in 1878 and establishing protectorates in Aden in 1838 and Somalia in 1884. Intervention and expansionism in Africa in the nineteenth century became known as the ‘scramble for Africa’ and would result in considerable acquisitions throughout the 1880s and 1890s. This would include Sudan, British Somaliland, Uganda, Kenya, Zanzibar, Northern and Southern rhodesia, Nigeria, the Gold Coast, the orange Free State and the Transvaal ( Judd, 1996: 125). And while Britain and France were the two main protagonists, other ‘new’ European countries were also keen to expand their influence into Africa. This included Germany, which managed to acquire territory three times its own size in Africa (Brendon, 2007: 200–1). many other European countries also had expansionist aims. Belgium supported economic expansion in the Congo, while Italy had visions of a new roman Empire that reached across the mediterranean, of which Tripoli was identified as the first gain (Ferguson, 2004: 196).

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British and French interests came to a head at Fashoda (present-day Kodok) in the Eastern Sudan in 1898. Fashoda was a key strategic location because it was where British and French efforts to link their African colonies through a system of railroads met. British gains in Southern and East Africa had led Cecil rhodes to argue for the need for a Cape-to-Cairo railway that would link the strategically important Suez Canal to the mineral-rich Southern Africa. In 1888 rhodes occupied and annexed territory that would become rhodesia (present-day Zimbabwe). France wanted to extend its Empire from the east coast of Africa to the west. The competing interests of Britain and France resulted in a stand-off at the relatively obscure outpost of Fashoda. With the prospect of the face-off escalating into confrontation, the French Foreign minister, Théophile Delcassé, agreed to withdraw on 3 November 1898. Four months later, in march 1899, Britain and France agreed that the sources of the Nile and Congo rivers should mark their spheres of influence. For Britain, the Fashoda incident was greeted as a triumph ‘by destroying forever the French dream of a “Niger-to-Nile” belt of French territory stretching across Africa from the Atlantic to the red Sea’ (Nutting, 1970: 387). Fashoda also represented the last significant conflict between British and French forces. Britain’s success at Fashoda was quickly clouded by developments in the south of Africa. In 1815 Britain gained control of the Cape Colony from the Dutch. In line with the imperial preference of permitting local control, Britain left the local Dutch settlers – the Boers – to establish their own republics (the Transvaal and the orange Free State). In time this would lead to Gladstone’s government recognising the free status of the Transvaal after a short conflict in 1880–1. This situation would change only a few years later in 1886 with the discovery of gold in the Transvaal. This quickly resulted in the area becoming the richest part of Africa and one of the most important producers of gold in the world. Faced with this situation, the Cape Premier, Cecil rhodes, with the support of the British government, attempted in 1895 to overthrow the Transvaal government by force by launching the Jameson raid. The raid’s failure galvanised the Boers who declared war on Britain on 11 october 1899 and, in a short space of time, had broken through deep into British territory. When reinforcements eventually arrived, Britain was able to repel the Boers and they eventually accepted British rule with the Treaty of Vereeniging of 31 may 1902. The war had been costly in terms of human life, with Britain using ‘concentration camps’ to deter local support for the Boers. The war also raised serious questions about the extent to which Britain was able to claim itself a great power and ‘with a few exceptions, all of Europe appeared to enjoy Britain’s discomfiture and to applaud the Boers’ (Kennedy, 1981: 113). It had taken nearly three years and some 450,000 troops for Britain to defeat no more than 60,000 Boers. The financial cost was also

9

Sphere of Influence: the ability of a country to exercise influence over other countries. it is a term that has been used to highlight the influence that the soviet Union and the Usa exercised over countries during the cold War.

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significant. The cost of transporting troops to South Africa came to £211,156,000, a sum that added 25 per cent to the national debt (Kupchan, 1994: 106). As David reynolds rightly remarks, this raised the question of ‘how would Britain fare in a “real” war against a great power?’ (reynolds, 2000: 64). The outcome of the Boer War had a number of consequences. Improvements were made to Britain’s military, including significant reforms to the royal Navy that saw outdated ships being replaced with modern battleships, which also resulted in a significant spiralling in military expenditure as the complexity of weapons increased. Britain’s naval budget increased from £14.1 million in 1890–1 to £29.5 million in 1900–1 and to £40.3 million in 1910–11 (Kennedy, 1981: 35). These reforms were part of the Two-Power Standard, whereby the royal Navy aimed to be superior or equal to the next two most powerful naval forces. Whereas in 1910 Britain’s warship tonnage was 2,174,000, by 1914 this had increased to 2,714,000. The corresponding figures for Germany were 964,000 in 1910 and 1,305,000 in 1914, the United States 824,000 and 985,000, France 725,000 and 900,000, Japan 496,000 and 700,000, russia 401,000 and 679,000, Italy 327,000 and 498,000, and Austria-hungary 210,000 and 372,000 (Kennedy, 1988: 261). The government also undertook a review of Britain’s diplomatic position, as the country had for all intents and purposes isolated itself from the rest of the world. The exposure of the fragility of Britain’s armed forces when combined with the reality that the country faced challenges from many growing powers necessitated a reassessment of the nation’s position. Germany was a rising military and industrial power. With the German government having begun to build up a powerful navy since 1898, Britain recognised it as the most likely opponent in any future war. The key issue here was that naval dominance was central to Britain’s position in the world, whereas the same could not be said of Germany. As Churchill would later reflect, ‘a fleet for Germany was something of a luxury, for Britain it was a necessity’ (Lloyd, 2002: 11). Through recognition that Britain was overstretched in the Pacific and at the same time threatened at home by the German navy, Britain established an alliance with Japan in 1902 and with its old enemies France and russia in 1904 and 1907, respectively. And although the 1904 entente cordiale with France was initially viewed as an important instrument of settling disagreements between London and Paris over colonial spheres of influence through, for instance, recognising British influence in Egypt and French influence in morocco, the entente quickly took on a more significant role in tackling German ambitions of expansionism and highlighted the fact that AngloFrench interests outweighed their differences. Such alliances would prove important in helping to maintain Britain’s position as a great power. At the dawn of the twentieth century Britain was

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recognised as having an Empire where the sun never set. Whereas in 1860 the territorial reach of the British Empire had been some 9.5 million miles, by 1909 this had reached 12.7 million, which was approximately one-quarter of the world’s landmass, of which expansion in Africa was also matched by expansion in the Far East (Ferguson, 2004: 201–2). This expansion emphasised both the strength and weakness of the Empire. on the one hand the spread-out nature of the Empire meant that Britain could claim influence in every corner of the globe. Yet this meant that the resources that supported the Empire were disparate and required vast sea-lanes for communication. This contrasted with countries such as the US or russia, whose sheer geographical size would in time provide a more natural claim for great power status. The very expansion of the Empire also saw a significant focus attached to extolling the virtues of imperialism within Britain. People ate Empire biscuits, consumed exotic goods from the colonies and spent their time relaxing in Empire theatres. Product advertising exhorted the public to consume imperial goods as a way to cement the development of overseas holdings and strengthen the Empire. Slogans such as ‘buy Empire every day’ were commonplace on goods ranging from tea to chocolate. After the death of Queen Victoria in 1901, her birthday of 24 may formally became recognised as a public celebration under the name ‘Empire Day’. This continued until it was renamed ‘Commonwealth Day’ in 1958. What this demonstrated was that while the human and financial costs of Empire had been highlighted by the Boer War, this in itself did not lessen support for the Empire among the domestic public, with the populace as a whole being strongly supportive (Steiner, 1977: 15–18). Alongside the formal control that Britain had over its colonies, the dominant position that it occupied as the leading industrial and trading nation meant that it essentially controlled the economies of many other countries, ranging from China in the east to Argentina in South America. Britain’s imperial strength was underpinned by technological advances such as the advent of the steamship and the telegraph, and the fact that the finance houses of the City of London were at the heart of the global financial system. New technologies invented in the second half of the nineteenth century provided Britain with greater influence and ability to control the Empire.

ThE ChALLENGE oF EmPIrE Although Britain faced challenges from other countries in the early years of the twentieth century, it continued to have a dominant position up until the outbreak of the First World War (Crouzet, 1982: 343–4). British influence was particularly marked in the area of international trade and finance, and

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the City of London was the leading provider of banking, insurance and investment services. Sterling was the dominant international currency through the gold standard, whereby the Bank of England guaranteed the value of Sterling for a set amount of gold. British influence was also evident in the movement of goods across the globe, as British merchant ships benefited from the protection of the royal Navy. But other countries were increasingly challenging British influence. This was particularly evident in the economic field, where there was recognition that its dominant position could not be sustained indefinitely, given the greater material, financial and labour resources that would in time be available to other countries, particularly the US (Kennedy, 1988: 190). At the turn of the twentieth century, Britain’s key economic competitors were Germany and America, both of which enjoyed rates of economic and population growth that exceeded Britain’s. russia was also an important power. Whereas in 1900 Britain produced 6 million tons of steel and 8 million tons of pig iron, the US produced, respectively, 13.5 and 16 million tons and Germany 8 and 6 million tons (Lloyd, 2002: 2). At the same time, Britain’s population of some 42 million people was being dwarfed by America’s 76 million, Germany’s 56 million and russia’s 132 million. Britain, of course, could claim power by virtue of an Empire, which in 1900 had a total population of 367 million. But this was dependent on power abroad rather than power at home. Just as the government faced challenges abroad, it also faced difficulties at home. A particular concern was domestic poverty and the health of the population, which also impacted on Britain’s ability to project force abroad (Peden, 1985: 10). The issue of poverty came to wider public attention in Seebohm rowntree’s study of York, Poverty: A Study of Town Life that was published in 1901 (rowntree, 2001). While this became a clarion call for social and welfare reform, the reality was that any such reforms would be a drain on the nation’s finances, which were being threatened by foreign competition. In the economic field, Germany and the US had overtaken Britain in the production of steel by the 1890s. A growth in American and German economic power resulted in a lessening of their demand for British goods. By 1913 both countries had a greater share of world industrial production than Britain had. Whereas Britain had 31.8 per cent of world industrial production in 1870, this had fallen to 14 per cent by 1913. By contrast, corresponding figures for Germany were 13.2 per cent and 15.7 per cent, while for America 23.3 per cent and 35.8 per cent (Crouzet, 1982: 378). By the end of the nineteenth century American steel production was twice that of Britain’s and its manufacturing output had increased to 70 per cent of Britain’s (Burke, 2007: 381). It was therefore evident that Britain could no longer lay claim to its position as ‘the workshop of the world’. Yet, despite these challenges, Britain’s leaders had managed to maintain the country’s

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interests through a combination of alliances and an expansion of trade to India, the Far East and the Empire, where there was a particular demand for textiles, coal, iron and steel (Steiner, 1977: 13). The country could also count on having the world’s largest navy, and built 60 per cent of world shipping over the period 1900–14 (Pollard, 1983: 3). At the same time, the City of London continued to be the financial backbone of the world economy.

ThE ImPACT oF WAr matters changed with the outbreak of the First World War in 1914. Although the roots of the war lay in the assassination of the Archduke Franz Ferdinand (heir to the Austro-hungarian Empire) by a Serb nationalist, the competing interests of the European great powers would soon result in this single event becoming a world war. Britain was keen to protect its influence and its declaration of war on Germany and its allies had been influenced by a concern that a German victory would threaten the safety of Britain and Empire (Steiner, 1977: 242). The declaration of war reinforced the image of Britain’s imperial position, given that it committed the colonies and Dominions to the war. This provided Britain with significant material and financial support. India raised an army of 1.25 million, while the Dominions contributed in the region of 1 million troops out of a population of only 15 million. The significant contribution of the Dominions to the war was recognised by Prime minister David Lloyd George in 1917 when he invited the Dominion Prime ministers to join an Imperial War Cabinet. When the war eventually ended, with the signing of the Allied armistice with Germany in a railroad car near the front lines on 11 November 1918, the brute reality of four years of ‘total war’ backed by the industrial might of the countries concerned was evident to all. The devastation was particularly acute where the land conflict had actually taken place, most notably in France. The situation was compounded by the 1918–19 influenza pandemic that killed more people than the war had done. At war’s end there was a wish by many countries to obtain some form of recompense from Germany that would be known as reparations and would form the basis of the Paris peace negotiations that commenced in January 1919. of the 32 countries that attended the conference, France, Britain and the US were the key negotiators, being led respectively by Georges Clémenceau, David Lloyd George and Woodrow Wilson. Germany expected the negotiations to be based on Wilson’s Fourteen Points, which included disarmament, free trade, national self-determination and the creation of a League of Nations. In the end, the peace that was signed in the Palace of Versailles on 28 June 1919 reflected the armistice rather than Wilson’s views.

League of Nations: established in april 1919 as a result of the atrocities of the First World War, this was the first international organ­ isation and is associated with the notion of ideal­ ism. its efforts to pro­ mote collective security ultimately failed because of the aggression of such countries as Germany and Japan during the inter­ war period. the league was the forerunner of the United nations.

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Versailles Treaty: the peace treaty that was signed by the allies and Germany in 1919 after the end of the First World War.

What became known as the Versailles Treaty imposed far more severe terms than Germany had expected. Germany would lose land, pay reparations, have its army and navy disbanded, and also accept a ‘war guilt’ clause, which said that it alone was responsible for the war. The argument that the peace treaty was excessively harsh was put forward in John maynard Keynes’ The Economic Consequences of the Peace (1919). A more unforgiving settlement reflected the desire of France to impose tough terms on Germany. As Kennedy notes the French demand for a truly colossal sum was based partly upon an assessment of the physical damage the Germans had wrought upon northern France and partly upon the calculation that the transfer of such sums would permanently weaken the German economy. (1981: 215–16) And while Britain wanted Germany to pay for the war, it was also conscious of the need to leave it strong enough to trade and prosper and, as a result, policy-makers in London tended to disagree with the French view that Germany should face both a permanent demilitarisation and also a restructuring of its borders. A desire to establish greater stability in the continent would, in the following years, lead to the 1925 Treaty of Locarno, by which France, Germany and Britain attempted to secure the post-war settlement with the rehabilitation of Germany through its admission to the League of Nations. many hoped this would create better hopes for international peace. This would be referred to as the ‘spirit of Locarno’ and, as Douglas hurd has reflected, ‘For a few years after 1919 liberal ideas and international institutions seemed to gain the upper hand, supported by a public opinion sick of slaughter’ (hurd, 2011; 365). Although one outcome of the armistice was that the German navy was put under British control, just before the peace treaty was signed German officers gave the order to scuttle their ships at Scapa Flow. Elsewhere, Germany would lose all its colonies to Britain and France. While opinions on the Treaty of Versailles vary, there is general agreement that its terms were overly harsh and influenced the outbreak of the Second World War. Germany was particularly scornful of the Treaty, detesting the payment of reparations, the war guilt clause and the stripping of the colonies. And when combined with the collapse of the ottoman Empire, this would principally result in a further expansion of the British and French Empires, both of which reached their greatest size in the interwar period. Indeed, even before the war had ended Britain and France had concluded the Sykes-Picot agreement in may 1916 to break up the ottoman Empire, in which France was promised control over part of the middle East. Such divisions were formally

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set out in the August 1920 Treaty of Sèvres, which was the last treaty of the Paris Conference. In the end, Britain gained control of the former German colonies of Tanganyika, Togo and parts of Cameroon. The Dominions themselves grew in size, as Southwest Africa (present-day Namibia) went to South Africa, New Guinea to Australia and Samoa to New Zealand. When combined with the fact that the Dominions had acted during the war as sovereign states, organising their own war efforts, this reflected a shift in their own position vis-à-vis Britain as the Empire began to transform into the Commonwealth. As a result of the decisions taken by the League of Nations, Britain obtained from Turkey what would become mandates in Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and sheikdoms in the Persian Gulf (Sanders, 1990: 22–3). France would gain Lebanon and Syria, while Italy acquired part of Somalia. New states were also created after the break-up of the ottoman and Austrohungarian Empires. This would lead to the emergence of Austria, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, Estonia, Finland, hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, romania and Yugoslavia. But self-determination did not extend much further. The division in the middle East would prove particularly problematic, with Britain controlling Palestine and France, Lebanon. The upshot of these events was to create a complicated state of affairs over the future administration of the middle East and the Persian Gulf, where compliant regimes had been created, the future leaders of which would be educated and trained in Britain. It was a situation that had been reinforced by the then British Foreign Secretary, Arthur James Balfour, putting forward a declaration in 1917 that favoured the creation of a Jewish homeland in Palestine, albeit with vague details on territorial boundaries. Known thereafter as the Balfour Declaration, it became an important focal point in campaigns for a Jewish state and in many ways sowed the seed of future discord in the middle East. The war had itself been tremendously costly. In human lives this was reflected in some 723,000 British deaths, or 6.3 per cent of the male population. Nearly 2 million more were injured and maimed, while the British Empire registered some 198,000 deaths. The war had also been financially costly and towards the end the fragility of Britain’s financial position was all too apparent, with the government increasingly looking to America to provide assistance (Burke, 2007: 447). Although the British government had spent a great deal of its savings to cover the costs of the war, savings were not enough on their own and, as a result, the national debt expanded at an unrecognisable pace. The war increased the government’s financial burdens as the state’s spending accounted for ever-greater percentages of the country’s gross national product (GNP), reaching approximately 50 per cent in 1918.

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Commonwealth: a voluntary organisation established in 1931 that comprises former members of the British empire. By 2013 it had 53 members, the majority of whom have joined since 1945 as a result of the granting of independence.

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ThE INTErWAr YEArS Although emerging victorious, the war had been extremely costly for Britain in financial, material and human terms and those victory celebrations that did take place reflected a sense of loss rather than one of celebration. At war’s end there was also a reorientation in the global pecking order. America was transformed from a debtor into the world’s greatest creditor nation. And while the war had a positive impact on some British industries, such as chemicals where the reduction in overseas supplies stimulated domestic production, as well as driving forward technological change such as the move away from riveting to welding in the construction of ships (Pope, 1998: 21–2), the underlying picture was one of a decline in British economic influence at the global level. British industry suffered from having to concentrate on the war effort, thereby allowing other countries to fill the commercial void that was left. This meant that markets were lost in Europe and further afield, notably to the US in Latin America and to Japan in Asia and India (Kennedy, 1981: 148–9). In 1918 British exports were 40 per cent of their 1913 level (Pope, 1998: 21). Traditional patterns of trade within the British Empire were disrupted. Industrial enterprises sprang up in such places as Australia and India to manufacture products from local raw materials that had been hitherto sent to Britain for production (Peden, 1985: 57). In this context it can be seen that at war’s end Britain faced a double-whammy on the economic front: not only had it spent virtually all of its reserves, but its ability to regain its financial strength suffered through a loss of markets abroad and increased competition from producers who were more price competitive. This had a direct impact on the British population who suffered considerable economic hardship (Brendon, 2007: 260). The realities of war had meant that winning at all costs was the government’s absolute objective. The mobilisation of labour and the government’s control over the economy created dissatisfaction in the Empire. In the years after 1918 nationalist claims were particularly evident in Egypt and India where a new educated elite began to argue for self-government and ultimately independence. While this necessitated a reassessment of Britain’s imperial policy, such as through granting elected legislatures in India, this took place in the context of Britain extending imperial influence through the spoils of war rather than as a strategic decision. This extension of influence also created greater liabilities for Britain through the need to provide support (Barnett, 1995: 7–8). As michael howard has commented, ‘The characteristics which made the British so strong in 1919 were in almost every respect elements of weakness rather than strength’ (1972: 75). In India the Amritsar massacre of 13 April 1919 stands out as a particularly low point of imperial rule when, after thousands of people gathered at Jallianwala Bagh public

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gardens in Amritsar in defiance of a colonial rule banning public meetings, the British Brigadier-General reginald Dyer ordered his troops to open fire, the shooting only stopping ten minutes later when their ammunition ran out. While official authorities put the death toll at 379 and Indian authorities considered it was approximately 1,000, the massacre had a dramatic impact as it peeled back much of the veneer of moral superiority that had gone hand-in-hand with imperial rule and was part of a broader context of repression that shaped the policy of civil disobedience that was led by Gandhi throughout the 1920s. But the massacre also took place in a world where there was little recourse to international legal constraint and thus, while the then War Secretary Winston Churchill described the events as ‘monstrous’, it did not result in a dramatic change in terms of shifting the direction of British foreign policy (Porter, 2006: 39). The vast mobilisation of troops brought with it a desire for greater social equality after the war and, as a result, government expenditure on social services increased in the post-war period. This was a further drain on what was already a stretched resource base. The government also faced the challenge of having to deal with unrest in Ireland where previous attempts to provide home rule in 1886, 1894 and 1914 had proved unsuccessful. The combination of the 1916 Easter rising and the frustrations caused by the failure of Irish home rule resulted in Sinn Fein seeking to establish an Irish Assembly in Dublin from which Irish independence was declared in 1919. When combined with the fact that Britain became engaged in a guerrilla war in Ireland it meant that there was a need to find a solution. The compromise was the 1922 partition of Ireland. Further afield, forced to choose between an alignment with Japan and the US, Britain opted not to renew the naval alliance with Japan. In 1922 Britain signed the Washington Treaty whereby it accepted naval parity with the US. Struggles for independence took place elsewhere. The 1919 Government of India Act failed to satisfy the demands for independence; these would eventually be satisfied after the Second World War. The 1923 Imperial Conference recognised the ability of the Dominions to set their own policy independent of Britain. The 1931 Statute of Westminster went further by allowing the parliaments of Canada, Australia, New Zealand, the Irish Free State and Newfoundland to be independent of British legislative control. In other words, Britain could no longer pass laws for them without their consent. Although the great hope after the end of the First World War was that the League of Nations would provide a new world order that would abolish war, the prospects for the League were dashed in 1920 when the US Senate voted against America joining. The League’s aim of stopping wars, encouraging disarmament, improving working and social conditions, and encouraging international trade would, in a short space of time, lie in tatters. This was the

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Appeasement: a term that is used in reference to the policies pursued by Britain towards Germany before the second World War when Britain was pre­ pared to accept Germany’s expansionist policies in exchange for what were paper guarantees of peace. Chamberlain, Neville (1869–1940): Prime Minister 1937–40, his period in office has been criticised because of his support for appeasement towards nazi Germany.

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result of a number of factors. many key countries, notably the US, russia and Germany, were not members. members saw little value in the League because the Treaty of Versailles, which they themselves considered to be unjust, had set it up. The League also had no army of its own and its decisions had to be unanimous, which was difficult to achieve. This meant that the League appeared helpless when it was faced with a strong country that was prepared to ignore it. This proved to be particularly significant when the 1929 Wall Street crash resulted in a Great Depression, which by the early 1930s had marred all of the world’s industrialised economies. Britain’s own economic problems were emphasised in 1931 when the government was unable to restore the gold standard, which in turn meant that ‘the direct link between the pound sterling and gold was broken, never to be restored, and hopes for a return to a unified liberal economic world order based on the gold standard were shattered’ (Gamble, 2003: 5–6). It was against this background of economic despair that the message espoused by extreme political parties found greater favour. This was particularly evident in Germany, where by 1932 there were 6 million unemployed. This backdrop provided the context to hitler being appointed Germany’s Chancellor in 1933, which would in turn result in Germany adopting a more confrontational foreign policy. This position was mirrored in Italy and Japan, which too saw Fascist dictatorships take power in the 1930s. All would seek to assert greater influence. having joined the League in 1926, hitler announced Germany’s withdrawal in 1933. The following year he set aside a considerable amount of the German budget, which paved the way for rearmament to commence in 1935. Such flagrant violation of the Treaty of Versailles was followed by a policy of territorial expansion that would be marked by Germany retaking the rhineland in 1936 and uniting with Austria in 1938. Not only did such actions break the Treaty of Versailles, they also went against the Covenant of the League. But despite this aggression, Britain took the view that the German problem could be solved by a policy of appeasement, with the government seizing on any available evidence to support this stance. Neville Chamberlain maintained the policy of appeasement that Stanley Baldwin advanced when he became Prime minister in may 1937. The following year, at a meeting in munich that started on 29 September 1938 and which reached agreement in the early hours of 30 September, Chamberlain and his French counterpart Édouard Daladier reached agreement with hitler that Germany could have Czechoslovakia’s Sudetenland – which was home to some 3 million ethnic Germans – if he promised not to make any more territorial demands in Europe. Thereafter, Chamberlain and hitler signed a further agreement that their two countries would not go to war with each

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other. having considered that he had managed to successfully pacify hitler, Chamberlain famously returned to London waving the munich agreement that contained hitler’s guarantee: ‘This is the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time’ (reynolds, 2008: 91). Yet one year later Britain’s policy of what David Sanders has termed ‘co-operative diplomacy’ would come to an end when German troops went into Czechoslovakia in march 1939 (Sanders, 1990: 28). The League’s inability to prevent aggression in the 1930s was further emphasised by events in manchuria and Abyssinia. Fighting broke out in manchuria on 18 September 1931 between the private Japanese Kwantung Army that guarded the manchurian railway and local Chinese soldiers who had sabotaged the railway. In so doing, Japan had violated the Covenant of the League of Nations and, as a result, China appealed to the League for assistance on 21 September 1931. By 1932 Japan had conquered manchuria. The League appeared futile in the face of such aggression; when it requested that Japan leave manchuria, Japan simply left the League in 1933. Italy also had expansionist intentions. In the 1930s Abyssinia was one of the few remaining independent African states. mussolini wished to expand Italy’s Empire and in 1935 he ordered the Italian invasion of Abyssinia. This would prompt Emperor haile Selassie to ask for the League’s help. however, the League just banned arm sales to both countries. This had a greater impact on the poorly armed Abyssinian forces who were using ancient rifles and spears. Worried about the greater threat from hitler, Britain and France sought to placate Italy by offering it part of Abyssinia in return for Italy’s support against Germany. The secret deal, which was advanced by the British Foreign Secretary Samuel hoare and French Prime minister Pierre Laval, known as the hoare-Laval Pact, did not satisfy Italy who by may 1936 had conquered Abyssinia. These events demonstrated the futility of the League in the face of nations who had the power and willingness to ignore it. The League’s members basically put their own interests first. This was certainly the case for Britain, which was all too willing to pursue its interests over and above those of the League. There were, however, considerable ramifications from such decisions. The overthrow of haile Selassie highlighted the brute force of Western imperialism and in the longer term gave ‘an enormous boost to the intellectual evolution of black nationalism’ (holland, 1985: 33). Britain’s desire to reach what it regarded as mutually agreeable settlements with other countries that did not lead to conflict was classically illustrated by Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement towards hitler. having annexed Austria in march 1938, hitler turned his attention to the Sudetenland, where

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he wanted to overthrow the provision of the Versailles Treaty that had resulted in the Sudetenland being included in Czechoslovakia in 1919. The policy of appeasement was subject to criticism (Porter, 2006: 42), with the post-munich mood in the Foreign office (which did not have a representative at munich) being particularly bleak (Doerr, 1998: 240). Chamberlain’s belief that he could secure peace at munich because hitler was a man of his word was regarded as naïve and amateurish (reynolds, 2008: 91), with his visits to hitler being viewed as ‘an act of monumental folly’ (Denman, 1996: 117). This also suggests that Chamberlain was unwilling to accept the reality that war with Germany was inevitable. Yet despite these criticisms, some historians have defended appeasement because it gave Britain time to enhance its defences to ensure that it was able to meet the German military threat in 1939. The policy of appeasement also had considerable support, with the may 1937 Imperial Conference confirming the British policy. The Canadian Prime minister, mackenzie King, pressed Chamberlain ‘at all costs’ to stay out of war (ovendale, 1989: 281), while South African Prime minister James hertzog noted that it ‘cannot be expected to take part in the war’ (Watt, 1965: 165). Apart from the lack of desire to repeat the horrors of the First World War, there was also some recognition that Germany’s wish to expand its territories had a degree of validity given the penalising nature of the Versailles settlement (Ball, 1995: 94). Crucially, hitler realised that appeasement meant that he could do whatever he liked and as a result on 15 march 1939 German troops marched into Czechoslovakia. This action would formally mark the end of the policy of appeasement; Chamberlain recognised hitler’s breach of the munich agreement and in turn guaranteed Poland’s security the following month. When Germany invaded Poland on 1 September 1939, Britain declared war against Nazi Germany two days later on 3 September.

ThE SECoND WorLD WAr many scholars have sought to analyse the factors that influenced the outbreak of the Second World War (overy, 1998). A common thread in this analysis is the harsh terms that were imposed on Germany in the Treaty of Versailles (Keynes, 1919). Yet we must also note the weakness of the League of Nations in maintaining peace, while it could be argued that Britain’s desire to avoid war through a policy of appeasement actually made war more likely. By trying to pacify hitler by allowing him to get some of what he wanted, the League only reinforced Germany’s willingness to go further, with the German economy and military having been strengthened by the annexation of Austria and Czechoslovakia.

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Britain’s declaration of war against Germany included the crown colonies and India, resulting in considerable backlash in India because of the lack of consultation. And while Congress leaders resigned their government posts in protest, the reality of imperial rule led to them being arrested. But Britain did not automatically commit the Dominions to war, as its relationship with them was now ‘governed by different constitutional and conventional precedents’ than those that existed during the First World War (ovendale, 1975: 20). Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa did, however, all very soon declare war on Germany, while Ireland chose to remain neutral throughout the war. The support that Britain received from the Empire was crucial, ranging from troops to ports and naval bases. Whereas in the period 1939–45 Britain mobilised some 5.9 million troops, India’s contribution alone was 2.5 million, while the so-called ‘white dominions’ of Australia, Canada, New Zealand and South Africa raised 2 million. Such contributions were particularly relevant given that, after the German occupation of France in 1940, Britain and the Empire were left standing alone against Germany until the entry of the Soviet Union to the war in 1941. The war had a dramatic impact on Britain’s economic fortunes through the combination of having to pay for imports and military supplies at a time when exports were declining as manufacturing industries were focused on war production. This resulted in the British government virtually exhausting its gold and currency reserves of some £548 million by the end of 1940 (Self, 2010: 27). This alone was insufficient to meet the costs of war and as such Britain was faced with having to either sell or mortgage overseas investments. By the end of the war the country had sold some £1.2 billion worth of overseas investments (Abadi, 1982: 3). Apart from a deletion of the country’s assets, such a move also reduced Britain’s ability to pay for imports that had traditionally been dependent on earnings from overseas investments. Set against the backdrop of the parlous state of the country’s finances and the harsh reality of having to bear the burden of the fight against Germany, one of the most important tasks that befell Winston Churchill (who became Prime minister of the wartime coalition on 10 may 1940) was to convince US President roosevelt that Britain had the capacity and the will in the early years of the war to maintain the fight against Germany and as such was worth supporting. roosevelt’s own inclination was to support Britain, but he had to straddle this position and the isolationist views back home (holland, 1985: 53). America’s initial support for Britain was less than fulsome, with Churchill having to push hard just to obtain necessary military equipment, although this came at a price. on 2 September 1940 Britain and America signed the destroyers-for-bases deal, which was of far greater military significance to the US than it was to Britain. The deal provided Britain with

Churchill, Sir Winston (1874–1965): the UK’s most celebrated Prime Minister of the twentieth century, he served as Prime Minister from 1940 to 1945 and 1951 to 1955 (8 years and 240 days in total). in opposition he advocated closer euro­ pean integration, urging for the construction of a United states of europe in 1946. suffering from poor health and frustrated with not being able to adequately tackle the problems facing Britain in the post­war period, he resigned in 1955.

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Lend-Lease: the supplies provided by the Usa during the second World War.

Atlantic Charter: signed by roosevelt and chur­ chill in august 1941, it detailed a number of principles for the post­ war order.

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50 old American destroyers in exchange for giving the US 99-year leases, free from rent or charges, on eight British bases that extended from Newfoundland to the Caribbean: Antigua, Bahamas, Bermuda, British Guiana, Jamaica, Newfoundland, St Lucia and Trinidad. Although Britain argued that the deal was significant in helping bridge the gap until the production of ships in British yards was completed, policy-makers in London were also conscious that it was a much-needed sign of American support (reynolds, 2006: 53). Thereafter links between Britain and America intensified. When in December 1940 Churchill sent roosevelt a lengthy telegram highlighting the urgency for Britain to receive US military supplies to maintain the war effort, roosevelt responded with the idea of lend-lease, whereby the US would supply Britain with the necessary food, military supplies and other necessary items for the duration of the war. When Congress enacted this policy in march 1941 as the Lend-Lease Act it proved to be a major turning point for Britain. Some months later roosevelt and Churchill signed the Atlantic Charter on 12 August 1941 that included the statement in paragraph 3 that ‘They respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; and they wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprived of them’. A few months later the December 1941 Japanese attack on Pearl harbor resulted in the US entering the war. With the entry of the US into the war, Churchill recognised that victory would in the end be assured. But the manner by which Britain surrendered some of its colonies irreversibly impacted on Britain’s standing and position as an imperial power. The fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942, when a garrison of 130,000 British and Commonwealth troops surrendered to Japan, meant that that even before the war ended there was awareness that Britain could not really defend the Empire. This, in time, would push countries such as Australia and New Zealand, threatened by Japanese forces, into closer ties with the US, as illustrated by the 1951 ANZUS pact. While Britain emerged victorious when the Second World War ended in 1945, the ties that bound the Empire together had already started to unwind. In India the priority attached to the necessity of fighting the war had a negative impact on many areas of economic activity, such as disrupting food supplies and increasing food costs. This led to hoarding and, combined with a poor rice harvest in 1942–3, resulted in an estimated 3 million deaths. Britain’s failure to adequately respond to such a catastrophe only further fanned the flames in favour of Indian independence. Although at first glance the rise of independence movements in European colonies appeared to be purely just a matter of dealing with the pressures for change, the situation was complicated by the onset of the Cold War between the US and the Soviet Union. In principle both the US and the Soviet Union were anti-colonialist.

the rise and fall of the British empire

But it was perfectly clear that US anti-Communism was a more dominant theme in US foreign policy than anti-imperialism. In other words, the US was willing to tolerate – indeed support – the continuing existence of the British Empire where it helped to keep Communism at bay. A particular concern of US foreign policy in the post-war period was obtaining strategic bases around the world that could act as ‘unsinkable aircraft carriers’. Thus, while many people recognised the pressures for independence, the legacy of Empire would also provide Britain with networks that would help to preserve its influence.

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2 The early post-war years: 1945–1955

A

Gross Domestic Product (GDP): The total value of the goods and services produced in a country over the period of one year. It excludes foreign exchange earnings.

common theme running through accounts of British foreign policy in the post-1945 era is the way in which successive governments have sought to balance Britain’s declining economic and political influence with maintaining the country as a key strategic player in world politics. At the end of the Second World War, Britain was a nation undefeated and was the only major power that had fought for the duration of the war. Victory brought much to be proud of. Britain could claim to have an Empire and significant economic, political and military influence that would support the notion of it being a great power. In 1945 Britain had a military presence in over 40 countries in nearly every corner of the globe, from Austria to Aden, Burma to Bermuda and Egypt to Ethiopia (Sanders, 1990: 50). But the demands and obligations that came from a desire to maintain ‘Great Power’ status meant that the country faced numerous problems (Cairncross, 1985). Thus, as Singh has noted, while ‘In 1945 Britain was a great power with world-wide interests, military bases and forces . . . she lacked the wherewithal to retain that status in the long term’ (Singh, 1993: 1). The economy was in poor shape, with financial resources exhausted by the war effort (Toye, 2004). The leading economist of the day, Lord Keynes, noted in a Cabinet memorandum of 13 August 1945 that the country faced a ‘financial Dunkirk’ [Document 2]. Although industry suffered from poor competitiveness when compared with newly industrialising countries that utilised the latest methods of production, Britain was still able, by virtue of its position, to be a significant base of production. Yet the signs of decline were already there. Industry suffered from poor management, with managers who showed a disdain for the latest methods of management practices, and a workforce that was overly protected by trade unions that often failed to grasp the need to adopt differing working practices. In time this would be referred to as the ‘British disease’, denoting the inefficient working practices that brought British industry to its knees in the late 1960s and 1970s and which would be reflected in the gross domestic product (GDP) per capita of Britain declining from

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a position of seventh in the world in 1950 to eighteenth by 1970 (Pollard, 1983: 6). But despite the dramatic nature of this decline, in the post-war years many were oblivious to the fact that Britain’s place in the world was not assured and that it faced a number of key challenges. As a result, ‘for the early years of the immediate post-war boom British industry was able to coast along, but once continental factories had re-equipped, an already antiquated British industry, reluctant to invest, would face trouble’ (Denman, 1996: 183). Britain also faced pressures for independence in the colonies and the mandated territories that had been acquired after 1920. The issue was not whether change was likely, but rather the nature and timing of that change. Yet the implications of any withdrawal from Empire were massive, most notably in relation to trade and adjustments to the practicalities of government. At the time many people in government were of the opinion that there was scope for the Empire to be maintained in one form or another as a basis for upholding British influence. Others were more sanguine about the reality that Britain would retreat to a regional power. 1947 proved to be a particularly difficult year: Britain declared that it would grant independence to India, announced that it would withdraw from Greece and took the decision to refer the problem of Palestine to the United Nations (UN). In short, it seemed to be a formal statement of the country’s fall from great power status.

ThE POST-WAr SETTLEmENT As the carnage of the Second World War came to an end, the process of establishing the post-war settlement began. Discussions about the nature of the overall international system took place at the Bretton Woods negotiations of 1944–6, which were attended by some 44 countries and which resulted in the formation of the UN, General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBrD) and the International Monetary Fund (ImF). Upon reflection it is evident that the creation of these institutions and frameworks of governance produced the sort of stability that was lacking after the First World War, which in the eyes of the former British Foreign Secretary, Douglas hurd, ‘achieved the best reconciliation yet between rules and power’ because ‘these institutions were built realistically on the power structure of the day’ (hurd, 2011: 365–6). Britain was one of the key players in these negotiations and its position would result in it being confirmed as one of the five permanent members (P5) of the UN Security Council, a position which the then Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden was influential in ensuring that France was also part of. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the nature of a P5 membership,

Bretton Woods: An international conference that sought to plan the postwar world. This resulted in the creation of the IMF, World Bank and the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT): Came into existence on 1 January 1948 to reduce trade barriers between countries through agreements that were legally binding. Succeeded by the World Trade Organisation (WTO). International Monetary Fund (IMF): Created in 1947 to promote free trade and ensure that countries pursue stable economic policies.

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Sovereignty: A term that is often used in reference to Britain’s relationship with the eU, where eurosceptics argue that the eU has eroded the capacity for the British government to take decisions at a national level. At the level of world politics, sovereignty stresses the significance of a nation’s sovereign rights, including such issues as the non-violation of its borders. This was discussed at great length with regard to the US-led invasion of Iraq, which took place without the support of the United nations and which was therefore criticised for breaching Iraqi sovereignty.

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which comprised the US, russia, China, Britain and France, such a position reinforced Britain’s own sense of being a major world power as well as ensuring that the country’s interests were protected from the threat posed by a menacing russia because of the membership of France and America. Organisations such as the UN were established to assist with such principles as national self-determination, sovereignty and universal human rights that went hand-in-hand with moves towards decolonisation. They also served a broader purpose for policy-makers in Washington in that they took over some of the responsibility for the post-war settlement from a US that had emerged from the war as the dominant global power. By 1945 it was estimated that some 45 per cent of all global manufacturing took place in the US, while in the decade from 1940 to 1950 the US was the source of 82 per cent of all major inventions, discoveries and innovations (Lundestad, 2003: 28). This would, in turn, result in the US being the main source of credit and influence in the world economy in the post-war era. The economic strength of the US at war’s end contrasted visibly with that of Western Europe, where the devastation of a war-torn landscape resulted in problems of transport and infrastructure that accentuated the difficulties of dealing with refugees and displaced persons. Shortages of food and clothing were made worse by the tendency of people to hoard products because of mistrust over currency exchanges (Northedge, 1974: 20). Such economic difficulties raised in some people’s eyes the prospect of British leadership of Western Europe. Yet while Britain may have emerged from the war undefeated, it was also exhausted. As Paul Kennedy has commented, even the briefest survey of the country’s position in 1945 would show how disastrous the conflict had been. There were fewer manpower losses than in the First World War, since neither Churchill nor his generals desired to re-enact the horrors of the Western Front; but in all other major respects the costs were higher. (Kennedy, 1981: 317) The physical and economic costs were immense, with some £7,300 million having been spent fighting the war, equating to one-quarter of the nation’s wealth. Physical destruction of land amounted to £1,500 million, loss of shipping and cargo totalled £700 million, lack of investment in plant and machinery was some £900 million, while the need to pay for foreign imports meant that some £4,200 million of foreign assets had been sold (Northedge, 1974: 38). It is therefore hard to disagree with the views of John Young that ‘National survival was an enormous achievement which left the country with great prestige, yet it also, in the view of many, spelt the ruin of Britain’s Great Power status’ (Young, 1997: 141).

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Although Britain had entered the war as a significant global power, reflected in both its economic position and its military might, this was a less sure-footed position than the country had found itself in in 1914. The fragility of the British economic position was apparent before the war commenced as the twin impact of the costs of rearmament and financial pressures on Sterling meant that the country entered the war with perilously little in the form of financial reserves. The impact of having in the region of only £700 million in reserves at the start of the Second World War meant that, whereas Britain had acted as the banker in previous conflicts, at the onset of war in 1939 there was a recognition that this would not be possible this time round. The war had a particularly damaging impact on Britain’s export markets as the country was forced to concentrate on meeting domestic demand, which in turn left room for new suppliers to meet the demands of colonial consumers (holland, 1985: 48). For a country that prided itself on its position as a global financial centre and trading power, the stark reality of its economic fortunes confirmed a decline in its power. This was emphasised in 1941 when Britain’s very ability to maintain the war effort had been dependent on the financial support offered by America under the ‘lend-lease’ programme, which continued until the announcement by President Truman on 21 August 1945 that the aid would stop with immediate effect. And although over the course of the programme the US had supplied Britain with some $27 billion worth of goods, when the terms of lend-lease were agreed at the end of 1945 Britain only had to pay $650 million (Burke, 2007: 565; reynolds, 2000: 243). Such generosity came with conditions. During the war America insisted that all of Britain’s available resources should be focused on the war effort and, as a result, there was little room for exports to bolster its reserves. After the war the US insisted that Britain get rid of the system of imperial preference and controls over Sterling. Britain was reluctant to abolish the system of preferential trading access to the Empire, while the issue of a new international monetary system produced much heated discussion. In the end, agreement was reached at the Bretton Woods conference of July 1944 on a post-war system of exchange rates. Whatever the merits of Britain’s own views on these issues, the reality was that America had become the world’s most important economy and this meant that Britain’s economic fortunes would be tied to Washington. The fragility of Britain’s economic position necessitated that the government obtained finance to support post-war reconstruction as well as the importation of food and raw materials. Britain turned to America and duly dispatched to Washington the greatest economist of the time, Lord Keynes, to represent Britain’s interests. The negotiations, which took place from June to December 1945, resulted in a deal whereby Britain received a £3.75 billion

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loan from the US in December 1945. Yet, rather than the interest-free loan that British negotiators had hoped for, the US offered a loan that was to be repaid in 50 annual instalments at a rate of 2 per cent interest, beginning on 31 December 1951 (Northedge, 1974: 41). Such was the economic predicament that Britain found itself in during the years after 1945 that on a number of occasions it was unable to make the annual repayment. In the end, the final repayment of $100 million was made in December 2006, which was some 60 years after the loan had initially been agreed (Burke, 2007: 567–8). Thus, while Britain paraded itself as one of the ‘Big Three’ countries at the end of the Second World War, it was in every sense a lesser power when compared with the other two. It was certainly the lesser power in the key summit meetings that sought to reach agreement on the post-war world that took place with the US and the Soviet Union at Tehran in November 1943, at Yalta in the Crimea in February 1945 and at Potsdam in July–August 1945 [Document 1]. This was something that Churchill was aware of after the first meeting: When I was at Teheran I realised for the first time what a very small country this is. On one hand the big russian bear with its paws outstretched – on the other the great American Elephant – and between them the poor little English donkey.

Attlee, Clement (1883– 1967): leader of the labour Party from 1935 to 1955, he served in the wartime coalition cabinet during the Second World War. he led the labour Party to victory in the 1945 general election and served as Prime Minister until 1951. Although this period is often most remembered for the creation of a welfare state, in foreign policy matters Attlee’s view that Britain had the resources to maintain its empire had significant implications for the future direction of British foreign policy.

But despite this state of affairs, the Labour government sought to maintain British influence. For Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin this meant that when he arrived at the Potsdam conference to take over from Eden he informed the Chief of Staff General Ismay that ‘I’m not going to have Britain barged about’ (hurd, 2011: 315).

PrESSUrES FOr rEFOrm Alongside this reorientation of the country’s position in the global league table, Britain faced the twin challenges of the pressures for reform in the Empire and at home. The new Labour government led by Clement Attlee considered that the decline could be reversed (Kent, 1993: 214). In 1945 the position of the Foreign Office was that ‘This country possesses all the skill and resources required to recover a dominating place in the economic world’ (Young, 1998: 35). most notably the government considered that demands for greater independence from many of the countries of the Empire could be satisfied within a policy of British control. But Empires and colonies were not the fashion of the day at a time when the UN spoke of national selfdetermination. This accelerated the clamour for independence in the colonies.

The early post-war years

But while in general terms Britain’s retreat from Empire has provided a more positive legacy than that of many other imperial countries, it is nonetheless the case that in some instances British officers committed atrocities, most notably in the handling of the mao mao uprisings in Kenya (Elkins, 2005), while British policy towards rhodesia and South Africa received criticism. Elsewhere, Britain engaged in a 12-year war in malaysia between 1948 and 1960. Known as the ‘malayan emergency’, Britain undertook brutal measures such as large-scale bombing to counter dissent from disaffected Chinese workers who were employed in key industries such as tin and rubber that were crucial for Britain’s export earnings. malaya was also a strategically important location, both in terms of the maintenance and reinforcement of Britain’s position in East Asia as well as in the context of heightened Cold War tension. It was for these reasons that Labour and Conservative governments took the decision to commit troops to malaya up to and beyond its achievement of independence in August 1957. Intervention demonstrated the lengths that the country was prepared to go to to keep the Empire intact. Britain’s willingness (and need) to retain the Empire meant that it took many years for the country to fully recognise the necessity of withdrawal and, as a result, the intervening period would produce numerous debates about the direction of British policy. Indeed, by the early 1950s the Treasury was of the view that the economic benefits of Empire were overstated [Document 7]. A Treasury official noted in a letter to the Colonial Office on 30 June 1952 that it seems to me that the whole conception of Commonwealth development as the solution to our difficulties is becoming something of a castle in the air. We know all the difficulties of raising funds from the UK or from private American sources. We have a shrewd suspicion that US Government aid won’t go anywhere near to filling the gap. We haven’t very much faith in the capacity of the new Dominions to pull themselves up by their bootstrings. And now we have evidence that, even if the money were forthcoming, there are very few winners in the Colonial Empire. (White, 1999: 111) Difficulties at home added to the complexity of problems abroad. Britain faced the economic costs of rebuilding a war-torn landscape where housing and industrial factories had been decimated. Some 210,000 of the nation’s 4.5 million houses had been destroyed during the war, while an additional 250,000 were considered to be uninhabitable as a result of bombing, which inflicted a total of £1,450 million worth of damage to residential and industrial buildings at 1945 prices (Self, 2010: 28). There were additional demands on the national finances from the creation of a welfare state, providing support

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from the cradle to the grave, as outlined in the 1942 Beveridge report. The most notable example of this was the establishment of the National health Service on 5 July 1948. The creation of a welfare state would necessitate a restructuring of the traditional economic approach taken by successive governments to one of interventionism that was marked by an effort to create a more egalitarian society (marr, 2008: 62–4). however, the financial costs of this approach were compounded by the need to make financial payments to countries, such as India, who had contributed approximately half of the 5 million troops that the Empire provided to fight in the war. The government faced the problem of having little room to manoeuvre as there was little scope to increase taxation, which had already been subject to a fourfold increase over the duration of the war. Writing in 1951, the then Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden noted that The British economy is already fully stretched with a higher level of taxation than any other country in the world . . . men and women are unwilling to do this [to pay additional taxes] even in conditions of crisis short of actual war. (Eden, 1951: 340, cited in Abadi, 1982: 23) That rationing continued until 1954 indicated the complexity of Britain’s economic position. Basic products such as milk, eggs and meat were in limited supply, and others such as clothing were more scarce after the war than they had been during it. For many, the economic conditions of peacetime were every bit as bad as those endured during the war. The continuation of rationing at home was influenced by the fact that Britain was continuing to play a leading role abroad (Ovendale, 1984: 3). Germany and Palestine were particularly costly commitments, with Abadi noting that the cost of keeping troops in Palestine was £100 million per year, while the annual commitment of maintaining British troops in Germany was £80 million (Abadi, 1982: 7). In Europe the most obvious example of this dual role was Britain’s involvement in the post-war rehabilitation of Germany, where it was one of the four powers that governed Germany in the early post-war years. The economic and political chaos that beset Germany at this time meant that much rested on the governing powers to provide not just the injection of political capital to restabilise Germany, but also the basic items of food that were required to feed a starving population. An impoverished Britain therefore found itself having to restrict the supply of food at home to meet the needs of others abroad (Abadi, 1982: 25). A similar picture of complexity was evident on the international stage where, despite its domestic economic woes, Clement Attlee’s Labour government wanted Britain to be part of the nuclear club. This desire to gain atomic

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power status rose to the fore in the wake of the 1946 mcmahon Act, which stopped the exchange of atomic information between the US and any other country, including Britain and Canada, that had contributed to the wartime manhattan Project (hennessy, 2002: 47). Although the British government rightly felt aggrieved by the US position, policy-makers in London were concerned that an atomic bomb was necessary not just for the country’s defence against enemy threats, but also as a means of ensuring that it would be able to influence decision-makers in Washington. As the minutes of the Cabinet meeting of 25 October 1946 recorded, it was argued that we could not afford to be left behind in a field which was of such revolutionary importance from an industrial, not less a military point of view. Our prestige in the world, as well as our chances of securing American co-operation would suffer if we did not exploit to the full a discovery which we had played a leading part at the outset. (hennessy, 2002: 48) This dual concern of wanting an independent deterrent and the desire to exercise some influence on the US was further influenced by the fact that the successful Soviet atomic test of August 1949 signified a further heightening of Cold War tensions between moscow and Washington. A direct response to the Soviet atomic test was that by 1950 Britain had become a critical base for US nuclear bombers. Yet, as Winston Churchill commented, the implication of this state of affairs was that Britain ‘had probably become “the bull’s eye of a Soviet attack” ’ (reynolds, 2000: 170–1). According to Alan Bullock, the biographer of the ultra-nationalistic Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, this meant that Bevin wanted an atomic bomb ‘with a Union Jack on it’ (Bullock, 1983: 352). When this eventually happened at monte Bello on 3 October 1952, Britain became the third nuclear power. Yet, rather than acting as a leveller, when the US and the Soviet Union undertook h-bomb tests in 1952 and 1953 it opened a more significant gulf between Britain and the US and Soviet Union, as they now had a far more deadly weapon. more than half a century later, Britain continues to be one of only five recognised and legitimate nuclear powers (the others are China, France, russia and the US). And even though the requirements for a nuclear deterrence have changed over time, the maintenance of Britain’s position as a founder member of the nuclear club has inevitably come at an economic cost, with many commentators pointing to the fact that money could have been better spent on schools, roads and hospitals. Yet, each of the British governments that has faced this quandary has come to the conclusion that the maintenance of the country’s nuclear deterrent has been a price worth paying. Indeed, one of the first tasks that a British Prime minister undertakes

Bevin, Ernest (1881– 1951): A prominent member of the labour movement both as a trade unionist and a member of government. An active supporter of UK rearmament in the 1930s to counter the threat from nazi Germany, Churchill appointed him Minister of labour and national Service in 1940, a post he held until 1945. In the post-war labour government of 1945–51 he was appointed Foreign Secretary where he played an influential role behind the formation of the OeeC in 1947 and the creation of nATO in 1949.

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when entering office is to write identical letters of instruction for the captains of Britain’s nuclear submarines which set out the actions that are to be taken in the event that an enemy nuclear strike has destroyed the British government.

WOrLD WAr TO COLD WAr Even before the Second World War ended, both the US and Britain expressed concerns about Soviet motives for the post-war settlement. The Soviet Union had signed the secret molotov–ribbentrop non-aggression pact with Germany in August 1939 that divided up Poland and which a month later would result in Soviet annexation of eastern Poland. Stalin’s desire for Soviet territorial gains would lead him to invade Finland in November 1939 and the Baltic States in June 1940. matters changed with Germany’s attack on the Soviet Union in June 1941, which created the wartime alliance between Britain, the Soviet Union and the US. The alliance of the ‘Big Three’, or as it is often known, ‘The Grand Alliance’, was one of necessity and policy-makers in Washington and London were well aware that such a marriage would not last into peacetime (reynolds, 2006: 268–9). having suffered the greatest loss of lives during the war, the Soviet Union was keen to establish a buffer zone around its borders to ensure it could never be invaded again. In total, some 9 million military and more than 27 million Soviet citizens perished during the war, which equated to approximately 19 per cent of the pre-war Soviet population (mcCauley, 1995: 32). Tension between the ‘Big Three’ had been evident at the summit meetings that took place in Yalta and Potsdam, of which key items of discussion included the future map of Europe. At Yalta the leaders met at the Livadia Palace, built for Tsar Nicholas II in 1911, and reached agreement on the UN, the division of Germany, and that the Soviet Union would participate in the war against Japan within three months of the end of the war against Germany [Document 1]. The most sensitive issue was the division of Germany into four occupation zones that would be governed by America, Britain, France and russia, albeit with the intention that Germany would be treated as a single economic unit, as set out in Article 14 of the Potsdam agreement. Although French participation in the Allied Control Council that was to be created to govern Germany was a concession that Churchill had managed to achieve from Stalin, the outcome nonetheless basically divided Europe into two spheres of influence. This factor was compounded by America and Britain agreeing that the Soviet Union should have ‘friendly’ neighbours in Eastern Europe. This reflected the inability of Churchill and roosevelt to influence the reality of the dominance of the red Army in Eastern Europe (Gaddis, 2005: 11). As Plokhy has commented on Stalin’s objective at Yalta,

The early post-war years

‘The fate of Western Europe was a secondary matter for Stalin: what mattered to him was control of Eastern Europe, which bordered directly on the USSr’ (Plokhy, 2010: 262). America and Britain were powerless with regard to the fate of Poland, including in ensuring free elections despite Stalin having given this promise at Yalta [Document 1]. It would not be until the collapse of Communism in 1990 that free elections would take place in Poland. russia’s desire to extract as much as possible for its own interests out of the post-war settlement was shaped by the fact that it had been greatly weakened by the burden of war and that it wanted to give itself as much protection as possible while it regained its strength (Northedge, 1974: 27). The Potsdam agreement would authorise the removal of some 20 per cent of Germany’s pre-war territory to Poland and clarified the basis for the four-power control over Germany. While the latter would entail each of the zones being given a high degree of autonomy and, at the same time, a need for a high degree of coordination for the central quadripartite Allied Control Council to operate in Germany, it was also evident that there was a considerable lack of trust between the four powers. American suspicion of Soviet motives had increased by the Potsdam summit, where the US was represented by harry Truman who succeeded roosevelt after his death on 12 April 1945. Britain, which was represented first by Churchill and then by Clement Attlee after the general election, shared the US view that the Soviet threat was the most dangerous hazard facing Europe (Plokhy, 2010: 30). America and Britain were both unwilling to take a sympathetic view towards Stalin’s demands for reparations. With Germany’s defeat and America’s knowledge that its possession of the atomic bomb provided it with the capacity to end the war in the Far East, policymakers in London and Washington decided that the rationale for the alliance with the Soviet Union had come to an end. At the Potsdam meeting Truman was particularly keen to emphasise to the Soviets the significance of America’s powerful new weapon to try to persuade moscow to be more amenable towards Central and Eastern Europe. Yet, as martin mcCauley has noted, ‘the Americans were to learn that it is no use having a wonder weapon if the other side does not believe that it will be used against it’ (mcCauley, 1995: 65). This position would continue after the US brought the war in the Far East to an end by dropping atomic bombs on hiroshima and Nagasaki on 6 and 9 August. Japan surrendered on 15 August 1945. While the use of the atomic bomb expedited the end of the Second World War, it also acted as a public demonstration to the Soviet Union of America’s strength, which influenced moscow’s August 1945 decision to commit to build an atomic bomb. For some, the expansionist policies pursued by the Soviet Union necessitated a US response that focused on developing alliances

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to contain Soviet pressure. ‘revisionist’ writers who argue that the Soviet Union was perfectly justified in seeking alliances, given that it had incurred vast human and physical losses during the war and faced a post-war world dominated by the US economy, have challenged this ‘traditional’ or ‘orthodox’ interpretation. The fact of the matter was that the Soviet Union was hell-bent on establishing a network of client states in Eastern Europe. In 1945 the Communist world was largely confined to the Soviet Union and the territorial gains that moscow had obtained during the war, such as the Baltic states. But in a short space of time moscow established so-called ‘people’s democracies’ in Eastern Europe. Soviet control was achieved by a combination of the presence of the Soviet army in the countries that it had liberated in Central and Eastern Europe and the use of propaganda and force to discredit, intimidate and, in some cases, imprison and kill the leaders of political parties that were not sympathetic to moscow. By 1948 Czechoslovakia, hungary and romania had been forced into Soviet control. Other countries would similarly fall under a Soviet system of satellite control, which would continue until the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. Britain’s own relations with the Soviet Union had been tense for many years, which can be traced back to fears over russian expansionism in India and Asia in the nineteenth century. matters were not improved with the 1917 Bolshevik revolution, which influenced industrial unrest in Britain. By contrast, Britain and America had many common bonds, including culture, language and family. All were relevant to making this the closest of relationships (for example, both Churchill and macmillan had an American mother). And even though this was a relationship that had been subject to significant tensions over the years, it was one that was nonetheless based on shared interests. This had been evident during the First World War, when America’s economic strength came to the fore and policy-makers in London woke up to the reality that from thenceforward Britain’s own interests necessitated a strong bond with America – a factor re-emphasised by the Second World War.

TENSION AND CONFLICT

Iron curtain: Term used during the Cold War to refer to the east–West division of europe.

In 1945 a key question was how an impoverished Britain could stand up to a Soviet Union that was intent on creating puppet governments in Eastern Europe through a process of Stalinisation. The seriousness of the Soviet threat was encapsulated in Winston Churchill’s famous speech at Fulton, missouri, in march 1946 when he noted that ‘an iron curtain has descended across the Continent’ [Document 3]. Despite the fact that he was no longer Prime minister, Churchill’s speech nonetheless reflected the view that was taking hold in Washington and Whitehall at this time, with the speech acting

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as a galvanizing force against the Soviet threat. In moscow, Stalin reputedly referred to Churchill’s speech as a ‘declaration of war’. The position of the US was key, given that policy-makers in Washington had struggled to map out a coherent foreign policy in the months after the end of the Second World War. matters would begin to change in February 1946 with George Kennan’s now famous ‘Long Telegram’, in which the US diplomat stressed – in a number of dispatches so as not to put off his readership in Washington – that America needed to establish a policy of containment in response to the Soviet threat. By this stage there was growing evidence of a stronger Anglo-American cooperation in dealing with the post-war world, with this being further illustrated when both countries agreed in mid-1946 to merge their occupation zones that governed Germany to reduce costs. But while this ‘Bizone’ came into operation in January 1947, such developments were not based on an equal partnership. Instead, the reality of the situation was that, bit by bit, America was taking on a leadership role for the Western world as a whole and, when combined with subsequent support for European integration, the US was, in some commentators’ eyes, creating an ‘empire by integration’ (Lundestad, 2003). matters came to a head on 21 February 1947 when the British Ambassador to Washington informed the US government that Britain would be withdrawing its troops from Greece because it could no longer afford the financial cost of supporting the Greek government against the threat of being undermined by Communist guerrillas (Acheson, 1969: 217). Britain had been actively involved in Greece since late 1944 when, despite its weakened economic position, it had helped to suppress a Communist uprising and to challenge Soviet authority in Europe. In 1945–6 alone British military aid to Greece amounted to some £132 million (Burke, 2007: 579). This expense was an additional burden to Britain’s finances that were already in a parlous state. A need to reassess the country’s commitments led to Prime minister Attlee writing to Foreign Secretary Bevin to inform him that ‘I think we have got to consider our commitments very carefully lest we try to do more than we can’ and noting that ‘In particular, I am rather worried about Greece’ (hurd, 2011: 327). But while Bevin initially sought to repel Attlee’s point of view by arguing that Britain would be able to regain its financial strength, matters were brought to a head in January 1947 by the onset of one of the most severe periods of cold weather that the country had faced since the seventeenth century. Snow fell in Britain on every day from 22 January to 17 march 1947, while the Kew observatory did not record any sunshine between 2 and 22 February – the longest period of absence of sunshine ever recorded in Britain. The adverse weather conditions placed a significant strain on the post-war Labour government, which struggled to deal with the resulting challenges that ranged from the impact on the farming community

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Containment: In 1947 the US diplomat George Kennan advanced the concept of containment that became the basis of American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union for the next 40 years. This policy of containment had three aims. First, restoring the balance of power, whereby the USA supported states that were threatened by the Soviet Union. Second, reducing the Soviet capability to project outside power by cooperating with communist regimes, such as Tito’s regime in Yugoslavia. Third, to modify the Soviet concept of international politics through the negotiation of outstanding differences.

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Cold War: The rivalry between the USA and the Soviet Union after the end of the Second World War, which continued until the collapse of Communism in 1989 and the break-up of the Soviet Union in 1991. Marshall Plan: In June 1947 US Secretary of State, General George C. Marshall, set out a plan to improve the economic recovery of european states by means of US financial assistance. Between 1948 and 1951 the plan distributed just over US$12,500m in aid.

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through to a fuel crisis as the demand for coal dramatically increased. At a time when the country was having to deal with the impact of the cancellation of lend-lease and was becoming increasingly dependent on Dollar loans to support its balance of payments, the combination of adverse weather and a worsening economic situation led to unemployment rising dramatically from 350,000 to 2,300,000 as industrial production came to a standstill (Abadi, 1982: 21). The unusually bad weather of the winter of 1947 therefore proved to be a key factor in determining Britain’s post-war position and acted as a significant marker in the decline of its power as ‘The case for continuing aid to Greece and Turkey collapsed along with the economy’ (hurd, 2011: 327). At a time of growing superpower conflict, in 1947 the fear was that if Greece fell to Communist control it would set off a chain reaction that could spread to Iran and Turkey as well as to Italy and France. And while the latter two had strong Communist political parties that played an important role in hitler’s downfall, in peacetime Communism was seen as a threat to many countries, given the Cold War tension between the Soviet Union and the US. The government in Washington responded swiftly to this challenge and on 12 march 1947 President harry Truman, in a speech before a joint session of Congress, said that ‘I believe it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’. The speech would rapidly be known as the Truman Doctrine and it set out a more coordinated US foreign policy against the Soviet Union, which would be followed up in June 1947 by the Marshall Plan that offered financial support for the post-war reconstruction of Europe through the European recovery Programme (ErP). Of the $13 billion marshall Aid that was provided to Europe between 1948 and 1951, Britain received $3.2 billion, which was the largest amount (Dickie, 1994: 55). The reality of the Soviet threat became all too apparent when on 20 march 1948 their representative left the Allied Control Council and moscow commenced a policy of restricting Western access to Berlin, which had been divided into four-power control at the end of the war, thereby mirroring the division of Germany. When the Western allies of France, Britain and the US merged their zones in June 1948 to create West Germany (including West Berlin), the formal division between East and West took place. A day after the formal creation of West Germany, the Soviet Union created a total blockade of West Berlin and in so doing threw up an immediate challenge to the West. Berlin was strategically and ideologically important because it lay at the front of the Cold War struggle, of which this was the first major test. The West’s resolve against Soviet pressure was clearly under scrutiny and this would necessitate a major airlift to supply the people of West Berlin with the materials and foodstuffs necessary for survival (Dilks, 1981: 26). In this

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first test of the Cold War, the airlift to overcome the Berlin blockade continued until 12 may 1949 when the Soviet Union lifted the restrictions on access, having realised its futility in the face of the Western response. A combination of the airlift and the successful test of a Soviet atomic bomb in August 1949 brought to the fore the importance of some form of collective European defence. On 4 march 1947 Britain and France signed a Treaty of Alliance and mutual Assistance against the potential of a future German attack. Otherwise known as the Dunkirk Treaty, it would be quickly superseded by the Brussels Treaty of 17 march 1948 that was signed by Belgium, France, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the UK, with a view to providing economic, social and cultural cooperation among the member states. The main basis of the Treaty was a guarantee to collective defence, with Article IV noting that should any of the parties be the object of an ‘armed aggression in Europe’, the other signatories to the Treaty would grant the attacked party ‘all the military aid and assistance in their power’. In September 1948 the signatories of the Brussels Treaty established the ‘Western Union’ or ‘Brussels Treaty Organisation’ with the immediate purpose of providing security through its headquarters in Fontainebleau, France, of which Field marshal montgomery was appointed Chairman of the Commanders-in-Chief Committee. Although the absence of a US commitment placed a question mark over the ultimate ability of these agreements to deter Soviet aggression, the Treaty was a means of luring America to Europe’s defence and, as such, ‘was to the “sprat” to catch the American “mackerel” ’ (reynolds, 2000: 165). Talks took place between the US and the Western powers which ended with a favourable view towards the creation of a defensive organisation in the North Atlantic area. The text of the North Atlantic Treaty was published on 15 march 1949 and on 4 April the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in Washington by Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the UK and the US. With the creation of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) the military structure of the Brussels Treaty was absorbed into it and the drive towards a separate European defence identity was more or less extinguished. And while NATO’s Article 5 mirrored the collective defence nature of the Brussels Treaty, whereby if one member were attacked then all the other members would be obliged to respond, the true innovation was that US involvement meant that a stronger security blanket was provided for Europe. While the immediate attention of the post-war years had been on the reconstruction of Europe and the threat posed by the Soviet Union, on 1 October 1949 the Cold War turned global when Chinese communists under the leadership of mao Zedong proclaimed the founding of the People’s republic of China. A pivoting of US concern towards Asia was exacerbated with the outbreak of war in Korea in June 1950. The US viewed the attack

Berlin blockade: In June 1948 the Soviet Union closed road, rail and inland waterway access to West Berlin from the western zones of occupied Germany. These actions were prompted by initiatives being taken by the Western occupied powers (France, UK and the USA) to promote the founding of a West German state and to introduce a new and more stable currency in their zones. The Soviet Union opposed these initiatives. The blockade was broken by the Berlin airlift, whereby the basic necessities were flown into West Berlin, and the success of this initiative resulted in the blockade being lifted in May 1949, with the conclusion of the airlift in September 1949. Brussels Treaty: In 1948 Britain, Belgium, France, luxembourg and the netherlands came together to establish a system of collective self-defence.

North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO): established in 1949, this Cold War alliance was the main security guarantor of the West against the Soviet Union. Today, nATO’s membership has expanded to include a number of countries of Central and eastern europe that, during the Cold War, fell within the Soviet sphere of influence.

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by North Korean troops as part of a broader Communist offensive strategy as the Soviet Union supported the North Korean Stalinist regime of Kim Il Sung. This, in turn, influenced the so-called domino theory, with the argument that ‘if Stalin were not stopped in Korea he would advance and states would fall in succession to communism until it dominated Europe and Asia or started a Third World War’ (mcCauley, 1998: 18). The US countered by leading a UN force that sought to repel the North Korean attack. A combination of Britain’s desire to combat Communism, support the US and be seen as a significant global power resulted in British troops fighting a war in Korea. But apart from this public show of support, Attlee also wanted Britain to act as a limiter on US action in Korea, as he was conscious of the need to ensure that Washington’s support for the defence of South Korea should not in any way spill over into tension with China. Although Britain was a secondary power in a Korean war that would last for three years and claim in excess of 3 million lives until agreement was reached to divide the countries along the 38th parallel – which was exactly the position which marked the border between North and South Korea before the war began – the war was a further drain on the nation’s finances as the government undertook a massive rearmament ‘which almost certainly overstrained the convalescent British economy’ (Cradock, 2002: 94). For example, during the Korean War Britain’s military expenditure and contribution of forces in relation to economy and population was greater than those of America. As John Dickie reminds us, In the first year of the Korean War America’s defence expenditure was 6.9 per cent of national income compared to Britain’s 7.7 per cent. At that time 6.6 per cent of British men aged between 18 and 44 were in the armed forces compared to 4.8 per cent in the United States. (Dickie, 1994: 65) Defence expenditure would eventually peak at 9.8 per cent of GNP in 1952 (hennessy, 2002: 13; Phythian, 2007: 47). But for the Attlee government, and in particular its Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin, this was a price worth paying. As Gill Bennett has noted, For Bevin, ensuring a continued US commitment, not just to Europe, but to what he called the Free World, was worth far more than a brigade in Korea. he was also quite sure of Britain’s importance to the Americans and to the West as a whole. Britain, albeit weakened and impoverished by the war, remained a global power in a key position, central to what he regarded as the prime objective of creating an Atlantic community that transcended Europe. (Bennett, 2013: 18)

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Nonetheless, the impact of spiralling rearmament costs, which increased from £3,600 million over three years in June 1950 to £4,700 million in January 1951, caused a further deterioration in the nation’s finances. With the diversion of resources from the industrial economy Britain shifted from having a balance of payments surplus of £307 million in 1950 to a deficit of £369 million in 1951 (ruane and Ellison, 2005: 148). Thus, when the Conservative Party returned to power in October 1951, the costs of rearmament were ‘so extensive and bearing so heavily on the economy that by an irony Churchill, the incoming Prime minister, had to reduce it’ (Dilks, 1981: 31).

ChOICES AND DECISIONS In July 1945 Sir Orme Sargent wrote a memorandum at the request of the then Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden entitled ‘Stocktaking after VE Day’. Sir Orme, who would become Permanent Under Secretary at the Foreign Office, argued that Britain should become the leader of Western Europe and the Commonwealth so as to be treated as an equal to the US and Soviet Union. his view was that We must not be afraid of having a policy independent of our two great partners and not submit to a line of action dictated to us by either russia or the United States, just because of their superior power or because it is the line of least resistance, or because we despair of being able to maintain ourselves without United States support in Europe. This view struck a chord with the Labour Foreign Secretary, Ernest Bevin, who outlined his views in ‘The First Aim of British Foreign Policy’, published on 4 January 1948 [Document 5]. Bevin believed that Britain should lead a so-called ‘Third Force’ in world politics that would combine the resources of Western Europe, the Dominions and the colonies in Africa and Asia. Bevin’s desire to cement Britain’s position as a world power would be emphasised in a meeting with the Chancellor of the Exchequer, hugh Dalton, in October 1948, at which Dalton recorded in his diary that Bevin was of the opinion that if Britain ‘developed Africa we could have US dependent on us, and eating out of our hand, in four or five years’ (hurd, 2011: 333). Yet it was extremely doubtful if the country could ever have played the role that Sargent and subsequently Bevin outlined. By 1947, Gladwyn Jebb, then an Assistant Under Secretary in the Foreign Office, was arguing in an updated version of Sargent’s memorandum that, while there was validity in Britain pursuing an independent foreign policy, the country could not adopt a position that was independent of the US. This situation was further

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Council of Europe: established in 1949 as a means of promoting cooperation among european states. It is often regarded as more of a ‘talking shop’.

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confirmed by the growing spread of Soviet power, as evidenced by the bloodless coup in Prague in February 1948, and the reality was that Britain did not have the economic, military or political muscle to independently stand up to moscow. In the end Bevin lost his enthusiasm for a ‘Western Union’ and the Labour government boycotted the may 1948 hague Congress that was attended by over 800 European leaders, including Winston Churchill who was president of honour. The hague meeting advocated the creation of a European Assembly and provided the impetus that led to the creation of the Council of Europe. In taking this stance the Labour government’s concerns had influenced the Council becoming ‘a peripheral consultative organ rather than the executive body which European federalists desired’ (Greenwood, 1992: 31). The British government’s position had been shaped by the fact that few Labour mPs supported the concept of Britain joining a European federation that would sacrifice national sovereignty. But while policy-makers in London had come to the conclusion that Bevin’s notion of a British ‘Third Force’ was an unrealistic and unsustainable position, under Labour’s post-war government Britain nonetheless sought to play a significant international role (Dilks, 1981: 31). In 1949 the devaluation of Sterling, the Communist revolution in China and the successful testing of a Soviet atomic bomb all pointed towards the need for Britain to have a strong relationship with the US, as only America could provide the military power needed to counterbalance the Soviet threat. Oliver Franks, Britain’s Ambassador to America from 1948 to 1952, would later reflect that both countries shared a ‘broad identity of views on the main issues of foreign policy’ (Franks, 1995: 63). The British government therefore concluded that America was its most important ally and that the culturing of a special relationship with the US was crucial to defending Britain’s interests. In may 1949, the Permanent Under Secretary’s Committee, which had been established by Sargent to coordinate British foreign policy, warned against an attempt by Britain to form a ‘third force’ that was independent of the US, in its report ‘A third world power or Western consolidation?’. The key paragraph of the report stated the conclusion seems inescapable that for the present at any rate the closest association with the United States is essential, not only for the purpose of standing up to Soviet aggression but also in the interest of Commonwealth solidarity and of European unity. The Attlee government adopted this stance in 1949, while by march 1950 the Labour Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin noted that ‘the day when we, as Great Britain, can declare a policy independently of our allies, has gone’ (cited in Singh, 1993: 3).

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EUrOPEAN qUESTIONS The assessment that Britain’s interests were intrinsically linked to those of America coloured London’s views on developments with regard to closer European cooperation. While the US was keen for Britain to take a leading role in the development of European integration, Britain was hesitant to undertake such a role. The reasons for Britain’s unenthusiastic opinion on European unity was, first of all, because Britain had not suffered the same political upheavals before and during the war as had European states (A. Blair, 2010). There was a desire among European countries to create new institutions and new loyalties to replace those institutions that had previously been found to be wanting, which was not mirrored in Britain. Second, the British government believed that Britain’s real interests lay with the Commonwealth and the US rather than with continental Europe. The US was particularly keen that European states should enhance their levels of cooperation (Warner, 1984: 68); Truman and marshall were concerned about Western Europe’s ability to rebuild to tackle the Communist threat. Among key European figures of the time, robert Schuman and Jean monnet argued that European states needed to deepen their cooperation between each other. Their view was that the likes of the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC), which administered marshall Aid, were intrinsically weak because they did not require the member states to enter into shared decision-making. (In 1961 the OEEC would emerge into the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to coordinate economic matters at a global level.) The answer for monnet was that ‘a start would have to be made by doing something more practical and more ambitious. National sovereignty would have to be tackled more boldly and on a narrower front’ (monnet: 1978: 274). On 9 may 1950 in London Schuman proposed a supranational coal and steel body. Britain’s reaction to the Schuman Plan was lukewarm. The government refused an invitation to join the negotiations leading to the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) because it was not willing to accept the principle of supranationality, although it did in the end become an associate member in 1954. It was a view equally held by the Conservative Party in opposition. Britain may have emerged from the war with economic difficulties and some uncertainty over its future, but it was still a vibrant trading nation with global interests. In 1945 half of the world’s trade and financial transactions were completed in Sterling. In 1946 the total value of British foreign trade was 45.4 per cent of that of Western Europe, while in 1950 it was still 32.6 per cent (milward, 1984: 335). British steel production after 1945 was more than two-thirds of other European nations while its output of coal was nearly equal to that of other European states (A. Blair,

Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC): Created to coordinate the allocation of Marshall Aid. replaced by the OeCd in 1961. Organisation for Eco­ nomic Cooperation and Development (OECD): established in 1961 as the successor to the OeeC to discuss international economic policy. Supranational: refers to a situation where national governments share sovereignty with each other and establish supranational institutions above the nation state to coordinate policies. To this end, supranationalism has an impact on national sovereignty because it imposes certain limitations on member states. Supranationalism can be contrasted with intergovernmentalism, which is an approach that attaches greater emphasis to the role of national governments in the decision-making process. European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC): established in 1952 with six members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, luxembourg and the netherlands) it became the forerunner of the eU.

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Sterling Area: Countries that used the pound for international payments.

European Defence Com­ munity (EDC): In the early 1950s european countries tried to establish an independent defence force to provide a means for German rearmament. The proposal collapsed in 1954 when it was rejected by France.

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1997). Britain’s very strength was the crux of the issue. For some, it meant that Britain would naturally take a leading role in the redevelopment of Western Europe, where many of the countries were in a state of convalescence after the ravages of war. Jean monnet believed that Britain was the major power that could provide a nucleus around which a European Community (EC) might be formed (monnet, 1978). The British government favoured the concept of a loosely integrated united Europe, as in the realm of the Dunkirk and Brussels Treaties, as well as in the nature of the Council of Europe that was established in 1949. The unwillingness to share sovereignty reflected the viewpoint that Britain’s interests lay outside a federal Europe where political and economic power could be transferred (Lundestad, 2003: 43). relations with Europe had to compete with what were regarded as the more important Commonwealth and Empire connections, along with the Sterling Area and the special relationship with the US. And with the signing of the North Atlantic Treaty in April 1949, the Labour government concluded that it provided the framework for all defence issues concerning the Western world rather than European organisation. In taking this position it has been argued that Britain ‘missed opportunities’ to take a leading role in Europe (Charlton, 1983; Warner, 1984: 72; Greenwood, 1992: 37). This position of Britain viewing itself in an international, rather than European, context did not change with the return of the Conservatives to office in October 1951 (Young, 1985). In opposition, Churchill had spoken at a Conservative Party meeting in Llandudno in October 1948 of Britain being at the heart of ‘three circles’ that embraced the Commonwealth, the English-speaking world and Europe [Document 6]. In looking at these circles, the crucial point for Churchill was that ‘we are the only country which has a great part in every one of them’. Upon his return to the position of Prime minister in 1951, Churchill centred the Conservative government’s foreign policy on this theme. The argument was that Britain played a special role at the global level and that its influence in each of those circles was reinforced by its role in the others. Yet, while it did play an important role in each of these circles, the desire to maintain such an international position also severely impacted on the overall adaptation of British foreign policy to a role that is more reflective of its position. The Conservative government maintained Labour’s position of association short of full membership with regard to the European Defence Community (EDC) and the ECSC. The possibility of an EDC first arose when North Korea invaded South Korea on 25 June 1950. This was seen as Soviet-inspired and, consequently, there were fears of a Soviet attack on Western Europe. In Germany, Adenauer wanted to form an armed police force of 150,000 men to counter the Soviet threat and the US wanted limited German rearmament

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in order to relieve the burden of US troops on the continent. This was especially necessary as the US needed troops to fight in the Korean War. France grudgingly agreed to Germany’s request because 40 per cent of its forces were fighting in Indochina, even though it feared German rearmament. There was also an economic reason for Britain not joining the EDC as the Treasury did not believe that Britain could afford to become involved in European federal schemes since it would affect the country’s ability to uphold its responsibilities overseas as well as maintaining the strength of Sterling. Thus, at the debate of the Pleven Plan on 24 October 1950, with France adopting a take-it-or-leave-it attitude, the British refused to join. Attlee and Bevin further clarified the British position on 30 October when the Cabinet agreed that while Britain would not take part in a European army the country would associate closely with it. Churchill’s attitude towards the Schuman Plan was that Britain ‘should be with it, though they could not be of it’ (horne, 1988: 356). Although Churchill was a great supporter of European integration, having made a major contribution to the post-war reconstruction of Europe when he called for a ‘United States of Europe’ in a speech delivered at the University of Zurich in September 1946, he did not envisage Britain playing a key role in a process that, for him, centred on the need to ‘build a kind of United States of Europe’ around a Franco-German axis to provide a structure to promote peace and stability [Document 4]. Thus, while he made the argument for federalism in Europe, it was something for the continent rather than Britain. Such a position was crafted out of a belief that Britain had a broader, more global leadership role to play. Churchill sought to restore Britain’s interests, setting out his view that the country lay at the cross-section of three circles of power, namely the Commonwealth, US and Europe. In Churchill’s mind Britain was able to stand on equal terms with the US because, as he informed the French Foreign minister in 1949, ‘Britain cannot be thought of as a single state in isolation. She is the founder and centre of a world-wide Empire and Commonwealth’. The formation in 1952 of the high Authority marked the first step towards a supranational community in comparison with previous intergovernmental cooperation such as NATO and the OEEC and, in effect, pronounced the creation of the European Community. This was because the success of the ECSC founding members in tackling the problems of coal and steel led them to consider cooperation in other policy areas, and it was this very dynamic nature that policy-makers in London did not grasp. As Steven George has written, ‘most [British] civil servants and politicians failed to grasp what was happening within the ECSC’ (George, 1998: 22). Opposition to supranationalism extended into the security field in 1954 when the less federal Western European Union (WEU) emerged as the saviour of the EDC after it had been

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The Six: refers to the six founding members of the european Community (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, luxembourg and the netherlands). European Economic Community (EEC): established by the 1957 Treaties of rome and came into existence on 1 January 1958 with six original members (Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, luxembourg and the netherlands).

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rejected by the French National Assembly because of fears that without the UK’s participation West Germany might become the dominant power (moon, 1985: 30). The death of the EDC resulted in a temporary stagnation in the progress of the European federalist movement until June 1955 when The Six decided at the Italian port of messina to start negotiations that eventually resulted in the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). Taking these issues as a whole, it is evident that there were four main reasons why Britain did not join the European Community when it began in the 1950s. First, Britain had strong trade links with other countries in the Commonwealth, which gave it access to cheap foods, and strong political links with the US. A consequence of this was that it was felt that any European venture would weaken both ties, which were viewed as being of greater importance. Second, Britain’s international trading tradition created a sense of being separate from mainland Europe. Third, a large percentage of the population felt that conceding power to an outside body would result in a loss of sovereignty. Fourth, Britain was still an industrial power in the world in the early 1950s, with the country producing one-third of all steel of The Six in 1950 and half of the coal. Britain was also the second most powerful country in the Western world at the time (Greenwood, 1992: 59–60). But while such factors point to a country shaped by colonial and international interests that were less focused on European affairs, it is nonetheless the case that it was already experiencing a shift away from former colonial ties as the twin processes of a decline in Commonwealth trade and a rise in the power of Western European economies could already be charted in the 1950s. To this end, a criticism that could be levied at the governments of the day was that a focus outside of the European arena reflected an absence of long-term planning of foreign affairs.

ThE END OF EmPIrE In analysing the factors that shaped British foreign policy in the post-war period, one of the most important developments was the retreat from Empire and the refocusing of policy towards European integration. This was an outcome that policy-makers in the corridors of power in Whitehall did not conclude was inevitable at the end of the Second World War. One of the reasons for this was that although Britain had lost control of part of the Empire during the war, most notably Burma, hong Kong, malaya and Singapore, it was able to regain control of these territories at war’s end. The upshot was that Britain entered the post-war world being able to state that no British colonies had been lost during the war. This went some way to reinforce the

The early post-war years

view of British greatness, and post-war planning put considerable emphasis on the importance of the maintenance of the Empire. Yet, as many scholars have pointed out, such a position contradicted the overall position that Britain found itself in (rothermund, 2006: 19). The view within government was that this very position of weakness meant that Britain’s own economic and political recovery was greatly dependent on Empire. In practical terms this involved gaining access to the raw materials of the countries of the Empire, which would in turn be a destination for Britain to export finished products to. In addition, as the colonies were considerable exporters of products, such as cocoa from the Gold Coast and rubber from malaya, they in turn generated considerable foreign exchange reserves, most notably US Dollars (Saville, 1993: 157–8; White, 1999: 7). however, as the colonies were part of the Sterling Area, they were restricted in their ability to spend the Dollars because Britain bought all the foreign ‘hard’ currency, for which they received credits of Sterling balances in return. Although this state of affairs clearly benefited Britain’s balance of payments and meant that the colonies were expected to buy British consumer products, it also meant Britain was more focused on exporting to Dollar markets, which in turn meant that the colonies often faced an undersupply of goods (White, 1999: 7–8). While this example conveys a picture of British control and exploitation over the colonies, this is not to say that policy-makers in London were oblivious to the fact that the war had not impacted on the foundations of Empire; the continent of Africa was largely controlled by European imperial powers in 1945 (only Egypt, Liberia and Ethiopia being independent countries) and of the 49 founding members of the UN in 1945, only 12 were from Africa and Asia. But while there was an acknowledgement that there was a need to provide more localised control to the colonies, few would have considered that by 1965 most of the colonies would be independent. A view that change would be achieved through constitutional adjustments rather than a policy of outright independence was also shared by France, which at a 1944 conference at Brazzaville agreed to expand African involvement in local politics and to end forced labour. In 1946, Britain established African majorities in legislative councils in Nigeria and the Gold Coast (Ghana). The exception to this position was India, where the Second World War had temporarily interrupted the cause of nationalism. Over a number of years India had become increasingly autonomous from British control, most notably in the economic sphere where India had, by the outset of war, tariffs against British goods. The economic reality of Indian self-interest would also see it being agreed in 1939 that Britain would pay the costs of the Indian army’s contribution to the war effort that were in excess of those incurred during peacetime. The upshot of this was that at the end of the war Britain found itself in significant debt to India. But while Britain promised India that

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it would provide independence after the war was finished, it was also evident that there were clear divisions as the muslim League refused to accept the plans of the hindu-dominated All-India Congress Party for a united India after independence (Sanders, 1990: 76–7). It fell to Lord Louis mountbatten, whom the Attlee government had appointed the last Viceroy to India, to establish an agreement that would permit British withdrawal from India. Yet the intractable nature of muslim and hindu divisions proved impossible to resolve during negotiations that lasted from 1946 to 1947. A consequence of this was that Britain left a partition between India and Pakistan when it withdrew from the subcontinent in August 1947. This policy of ‘divide and quit’ led to more than 200,000 deaths in the Punjab and claims of British betrayal (Sked and Cook, 1984: 60). The granting of independence to India in 1947 was a key moment in identifying a reduction in Britain’s ability to act as a world power because India had provided the base and resources (economic and military) that allowed Britain to project influence in the Far East (Abadi, 1982: 67). A direct consequence of these events was that an already economically weakened Britain had to take on the burden of the responsibility of Empire without having the necessary resources to undertake such a task. In retrospect, this would have been the correct time for politicians in London to have undertaken a full reappraisal of Britain’s position in the world. This was not least given the fact Indian independence resulted in the emergence of the modern-day Commonwealth in 1949. But such a reassessment of British foreign policy did not happen and the view remained in Whitehall and Westminster that Britain was still a world power. The country continued to have considerable overseas commitments that required in the first instance military resources to protect them. The understanding at the time was that an attack on Australia or New Zealand would, in effect, be an attack on Britain. And instead of pulling back from these commitments, the 1950s would see Britain pursuing a policy of active involvement in its colonies which were themselves in need of economic development. The upshot of this was that in the post-war period Britain faced greater (rather than lesser) demands from the likes of Cyprus, Egypt, Greece, malaya and Palestine (Abadi, 1982: 5). This involvement did, however, reflect the predicament that Britain faced. The Labour government led by Clement Attlee that took office in 1945 did so on the backdrop of a promise to undertake social reform, which further burdened the government’s already depleted resources. For Clement Attlee and many of his Cabinet colleagues the solution to these issues was for Britain to seek even closer cooperation with many of the remaining colonies, in particular Australia, New Zealand and South Africa. Such a belief was conditioned by the fact that, despite the weakness of the British economy, it was nevertheless the case that the Sterling Area was still a dominant trading zone and accounted for over half of all of the world’s trade in the immediate post-war

The early post-war years

years. Such economic factors were of considerable significance in influencing the decision taken in June 1948 by Britain to engage in a military campaign in malaya to stop the rise of Communist insurgents. Commonly known as the malayan Emergency, Britain’s military campaign would last for 12 years until 1960. A decision to commit troops to malaya was greatly influenced by the fact that it produced approximately one-third of the world’s supply of rubber and one-half of its tin production. These products were critical to support the rebirth of the British economy as they provided valuable currency earnings to support the Sterling Area. At the same time, malaya was also a strategically important location, both in terms of the maintenance and reinforcement of Britain’s position in East Asia as well as in the context of heightened Cold War tension. It was therefore for these reasons that Labour and Conservative governments took the decision to commit troops to malaya up to and beyond its achievement of independence in August 1957.

rEVIEWING ThE BALANCE ShEET Although in retrospect it is possible to conclude that the maintenance of British influence in the world through its links with the colonies was a fanciful conclusion, at the time Britain was one of the main global powers and still had considerable evidence to support such a claim. Policy-makers in London concluded that the maintenance of British influence on world affairs through its status as the third great power required the continued ability to draw on the Empire and ensuring that strategic agreements underpinned Britain’s influence (Saville, 1993: 97–9). Any attempts to unravel such an outcome were basically rebutted. Consequently, Britain’s focus for many years after the end of the Second World War was on global affairs rather than more localised developments taking place in Europe. Sir Oliver Franks would conclude in 1954 that ‘It is part of the habit and furniture of our minds’ that Britain should continue to act as a world power (Coles, 2000: 37). The complexity of such a position has meant that there has been a significant amount of attention given to debates concerning the extent to which Britain should (and could) have played a leading role in the construction of Europe. This is not least because Britain never achieved the status of a grand third power that many in government had envisaged was its rightful position in world politics. Indeed, the reality for Britain was actually a steady decline in its power and influence that was caused by domestic economic difficulties and the fact that its vision of being able to draw on the resources of the Empire did not chime with the views of the policy-makers in the countries concerned and who, moreover, wished to have their own self-government. Whereas the process of India’s independence had been ‘relatively’ straightforward, the same could not be said for Britain’s exit from the middle East.

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Located between Europe, Asia and Africa, the middle East offered Britain an important strategic foothold and access to the increasingly important resource of oil. Palestine proved a particularly complex issue, given that the Nazi holocaust of the Second World War led to considerable Jewish immigration to Palestine. This resulted in demands by Jewish settlers for an independent state, with the British government having previously said in the 1917 Balfour Declaration that Palestine should become a national home for Jewish people. In the years after Britain secured the Palestine mandate at the 1919 Versailles peace settlement, there was a steady increase in Jewish migration, which accelerated after hitler’s ascent to power in 1933. Thus, whereas 11 per cent of the population were Jewish in 1922, by 1939 this had increased to 29 per cent (Lloyd, 2002: 247). After the Second World War, pressure for a so-called ‘Israeli’ state mounted through terrorist attacks in Palestine. One of the most notable examples of this was on 22 July 1946 when Jewish terrorists blew up the British headquarters in Palestine. An inevitable consequence of this was a lessening of British public support for keeping troops in Palestine, who were also an additional strain on the nation’s scarce finances (rothermund, 2006: 109). In addition to these pressures, Britain was faced with a strong Zionist lobby in the US. With the need to tackle what was becoming a complex problem, in February 1947 Britain referred the matter to the UN. This resulted in the UN agreement of 29 November 1947 to partition Palestine into Jewish and Arab states, with Jerusalem as an international city. But the plan drew considerable criticism from Arabs and Jews and when the British administration left on 14 may 1948 it brought to an end 28 years of Britain’s control of the territory. Britain’s departure was notably abrupt, with the Under Secretary of State for the Colonies, rees-Williams, informing the house of Commons that the withdrawal of the British administration took place without handing over to a responsible authority any of the assets, property or liabilities of the mandatory Power. The manner in which the withdrawal took place is unprecedented in the history of our Empire (Shlaim, 1989: 77) Fred Northedge has reflected that ‘the end of the Palestine mandate was a sorry story, with both Jews and Arabs bitterly disillusioned with their former master’ (1974: 176). Violence erupted between both sides. The years that followed witnessed a succession of Arab-Israeli wars with, for the most part, Arab views having turned against the West. Despite the undignified nature of Britain’s exit from Palestine and the resulting Arab-Israeli conflict, it was nevertheless the case that Britain continued to seek to maintain strategic influence in the middle East.

3 The limitations of power: 1955–1970

T

hroughout the 1950s and 1960s successive Labour and Conservative governments sought to maintain the country’s great power status. Yet the extent to which Britain could claim great power status was questionable. Just as Britain relied on the Empire for its wealth, it was also evident that the Empire was a significant liability as it required commitments and resources that Britain scarcely had. These conditions deteriorated throughout the 1950s and 1960s with the onset of a policy of decolonisation. But while these developments signalled a change in Britain’s role, they did not always produce a full-scale shift in the perception of British policy-makers that there was a need to readjust the military forces that they considered were still relevant for a great power strategy.

ThE 1956 SuEz CriSiS One of the most tangible signs of this change of position was the Suez crisis of 1956 [Document 8]. Some seven decades after Britain invaded Egypt in 1882 to gain control of the Suez Canal, an Anglo-Egyptian agreement was reached in July 1954 whereby Britain would withdraw its troops from the canal zone within 20 months. Britain hoped that it would provide the context for the establishment of a regional security organisation to act as a bulwark against the Soviet threat. Modelled on NATO, the Central Treaty Organisation (otherwise known as the Baghdad Pact) was established in February 1955 with iraq and Turkey its founding members. Britain joined a few months later in April, to be followed by iran and Pakistan. Policy-makers in London hoped that Egypt would join this pro-Western organisation through the enticement of receiving Western funding for the Aswan Dam, for which the uS had promised $56 million, Britain $14 million and the World Bank $200 million out of a total cost that was estimated to be at least $1,300 million (Sked and Cook, 1984: 129). The Egyptian leader Colonel Gamal

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Eden, Anthony (1897– 1977): a conservative politician who served as Prime Minister from 6 april 1955 until his resignation on 9 January 1957. he had previously served in various govern­ ment posts, most notably as churchill’s Foreign sec­ retary between december 1940 and July 1945 and also from 1951 to 1955. despite his achievements in these offices, he is most remembered for the debacle of the suez crisis, which brought about his resignation.

Abdel Nasser regarded the Dam as being essential to stimulate his country’s economic and agricultural transformation. But rather than a warming in relations between the two countries, 1955 would see a considerable deterioration take place. When invited to the conference of non-aligned African and Asian countries at Bandung in 1955, Nasser was looking to unify the Arab world around Egypt. Nasser was particularly keen not to be drawn into uS efforts to establish an anti-Communist bloc in the Middle East, as evidenced by Egypt signing an arms deal with Czechoslovakia in September 1955. As Czechoslovakia was within the Soviet orbit of Eastern Europe, Nasser had, in effect, signed a deal with the Soviet union. At the same time, discussions over the financing of the Aswan Dam were proving problematic. Some commentators have reflected that the wider context of power politics meant that ‘the Dam was always little more than a pawn in the regional struggle for power’ (holland, 1985: 195). Although Nasser initially accepted Anglo-American influence on Egyptian politics as a compromise for the economic benefits that the Dam would bring, the project began to stall as the negotiations between the parties ran into difficulties. Aware that Nasser had mortgaged Egypt’s cotton crop to pay for the Czechoslovakian arms deal, the uS Secretary of State, John Foster Dulles, was concerned that America would become saddled with the cost of the Dam and announced on 19 July 1956 that America would not contribute to the enormous building costs of the Dam (Sked and Cook, 1984: 129). Britain and the World Bank thereafter cancelled their offer of financial support. This action galvanised Egyptian public opinion and on 26 July 1956 Nasser took the decision to nationalise the Suez Canal as a means of raising funds. Given that the canal was a vital trade artery that connected Europe with india, Australia and the Far East, for example, there was considerable concern at Nasser’s actions. As many as 50 ships a day passed through the canal, each carrying vital supplies. Each ship also paid a toll to the Suez Canal Company, 44 per cent of which was owned by the British government. Anthony Eden, who succeeded Churchill as Prime Minister in April 1955, was particularly outraged, referring to Nasser as a ‘pocket hitler’ or a ‘Muslim Mussolini’ (Self, 2010: 53). The government considered it imperative that Nasser’s actions had to be challenged as otherwise it would convey a message that other countries could behave in a similar manner. For Eden this meant that Nasser ‘must be got rid of’ because of a fear of contagion (Adamthwaite, 1989: 229). Drawing on the experience of appeasement, Eden concluded that Nasser was from a similar mould to the dictators of the 1930s and that something had to be done as Nasser sought to obtain additional gains although Egypt had already received concessions from Britain in the July 1954 agreement (Sanders, 1990: 93). This position was shared equally by France, with Premier Guy Mollet considering it imperative to bring down Nasser’s regime,

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not least because it was the main supporter of the Algerian uprising that had started in 1954. Eden’s initial approach was one of applying economic and diplomatic pressure to bring Egypt to the negotiating table, with the threat of force being raised as a last resort option. Over the summer months of 1956 Eden was involved in intensive discussions with members of his Cabinet about how to respond to Nasser’s actions. Central to this strategy was the restitution of international control over the canal. Eden hoped that if Nasser was forced to backtrack on the nationalisation of the canal, it would severely weaken Nasser’s support in the Arab world. With the failure of diplomatic pressure, attention turned to military intervention, with Britain and France hatching a plan – known as Operation Musketeer – along with israel to regain control of the canal by force (Warner, 1979). in taking this stance Eden showed ‘a greater confidence than Churchill in Britain’s ability to function as a great power’ (reynolds, 2000: 192). The agreed pretext was for israel to attack Egypt, which would in turn provide the opportunity for Britain and France to invade to guarantee the safety of the canal. When israel declared war on Egypt on 29 October and then advanced deep into the Sinai desert, Britain and France issued an ultimatum on 30 October that called for both parties to withdraw their forces 10 km each side of the canal. in line with the agreed plan of action, israel accepted and Egypt rejected the terms. Britain and France then put into place Operation Musketeer on 31 October, with paratroopers being dropped over Port Said and Port Fuad. in retaliation for British bombing having destroyed the Egyptian air force, Egypt sank 47 ships in the Suez Canal to hinder the transit of goods (Lloyd, 2002: 299). The British government was condemned for the invasion from all corners of society. The Soviet union threatened Paris and London with nuclear reprisals. uS President Dwight Eisenhower was irate at not having been consulted over what he regarded as colonial aggression and ‘gunboat diplomacy’ (Gaddis, 2005: 127) [Document 8]. indeed, only a few weeks earlier on 2 September he had communicated to Eden his concerns over the use of force: ‘i really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forcible means. The use of force would, it seems to me, vastly increase the area of jeopardy’ (Carlton, 1988: 119). But while the uS was concerned that Britain had used force rather than law to deal with a situation that now muddied the waters of Cold War politics (Marr, 2008: 152), this was a somewhat duplicitous position to take as policy-makers in Washington had pursued an active interventionist position in the Third World, albeit through indirect support, as in restoring the authority of the pro-Western Shah of iran in 1953. Thus, ‘rather than conspicuous gunboat diplomacy, the Americans preferred to intervene in Third World affairs through covert methods’ (White, 1999: 81). Nonetheless, the uS was particularly irritated that the

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invasion took place only five days after the Soviet union had invaded hungary on 24 October 1956, which meant that Washington was not fully able to criticise Moscow. As Sanders notes, the invasion ‘let the Soviets off the propaganda hook’ (Sanders, 1990: 91). The invasion also took place just days before the uS Presidential election. For Britain, the repercussions were swift. The uN General Assembly voted on 2 November by 64 to 5 for an American resolution for an immediate ceasefire. international currency markets started to sell Sterling and the Bank of England watched as its efforts to defend its value proved fruitless without uS support. Policy-makers in Washington exacerbated the situation by selling British government bonds and refusing to lend any more to Britain. As John Dickie has recalled Chancellor Macmillan watched powerless and friendless as the sterling crisis mounted with reserves drained in the first week of November by 279 million. Not only was there no chance of a uS loan but also any prospects of getting funds from the international Monetary Fund were blocked by the Americans. (Dickie, 1994: 95) Eisenhower instructed a visibly shaken Eden to withdraw British troops and in the post-Suez period blocked the Prime Minister from any contact with high-ranking uS officials (holland, 1985: 199). Eden was cornered. Britain could not stand against America, but withdrawal would weaken relations with France. Britain’s economic predicament was the crucial factor in determining the course of action to withdraw. in reflecting on this outcome it is hard to disagree with the conclusion that the whole episode was ‘probably the worst intra-alliance crisis faced by the west in the five decades of the cold war’ (Macqueen, 1999: 24). Of the three Suez plotters, Britain came off worst (Lloyd, 1978: 250). Economic and political pressure had forced withdrawal. British influence in the Middle East was left in tatters. Nasser’s hand was strengthened and, boosted by his political and diplomatic victory, he became something of a ‘superstar in the developing world’ (reynolds, 2008: 263). All of this had the impact of reversing Western influence in the Arab world and, in turn, influenced coups against pro-Western leaders in the Middle East, such as iraq in 1958 (Mangold, 2001: 105). Britain’s relations with France fell into the doldrums. ‘For the French’, Sir Percy Cradock has written the British decision to withdraw when invading forces were only half way down the Canal was an additional bitter reminder of the unreliability of their British ally and a further impetus to build up another centre of power free from the British and the Americans. (Cradock, 2002: 132)

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in later years this would have dire consequences for Britain’s applications to join the European Economic Community (EEC). For Britain, Suez confirmed once and for all that it could not occupy a position as a global power [Document 8]. As Edward heath would later reflect, ‘the greatest legacy of Suez was that it forced many of the British establishment to accept that the sun was setting on the British Empire and that America was the new superpower’ (heath, 1998: 177). Among historians, there is a debate as to whether Eden’s diplomatic pressure was merely a means of providing time to prepare for an invasion, or whether Eden was sincere in seeking a peaceful solution (Pearson, 2003). Eden’s memoirs paint a one-sided picture in arguing that the invasion was the culmination of a consistent policy (Eden, 1960). however, the Minister of Defence, Sir Walter Monckton, and the First Sea Lord, Louis Mountbatten, had doubts about the invasion, while Foreign Office Minister Anthony Nutting resigned in protest. The opposition Labour Party was against a course of action that was out of step with Britain’s post-war foreign policy priorities that focused on the Anglo-American relationship and establishing new partnerships, as evidenced by the Baghdad Pact in the Middle East. To this end, ‘it is clear that Suez was one of the most divisive events in twentieth-century British foreign policy’ (reynolds, 2000: 193), with many commentators noting Eden’s instability and poor health as the basis for a policy decision that had such profound ramifications. To improve his poor health, Eden left for Jamaica on 23 November 1956, returning on 14 December. But his position as Prime Minister was in tatters and as a result Harold Macmillan became Prime Minister on 10 January 1957. At the age of 64, it was evident that Macmillan did not have a golden inheritance. The British economy had been dealt a setback by the Suez crisis; the Conservative Party’s morale had declined sharply in the past six months; relations with the united States were badly in need of repair, and the Conservatives were trailing the Labour Party in the political opinion polls. (Geelhoed and Edmonds, 2003: 11–12) But while a consequence of this was that Macmillan established a foreign policy that was firmly wedded to the uS, Britain would nonetheless maintain a presence in the Middle East for another decade, eventually withdrawing from Aden in 1967 and Bahrain in 1971. upon reflection it is evident that the Suez crisis was a very publicly humiliating exercise for Britain where its limitations and economic weaknesses were emphasised (Adamthwaite, 1989). For Selwyn Lloyd the most significant impact of Suez was ‘the psychological wound which it inflicted on so many people of British stock either at home or overseas’ (Lloyd, 1978: 252). Eden would sanguinely reflect in a note on 26 September (White, 1999: 128–9) that

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Macmillan, Harold (1894– 1986): conservative Prime Minister 1957–63 (resi­ gning on grounds of ill health), having succeeded anthony eden after the suez crisis. he advocated membership of the euro­ pean community to streng­ then UK influence in world affairs.

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. . . we must review our world position and our domestic capacity more searchingly in light of the Suez experience, which has not so much changed our fortunes as revealed realities. While the consequences of this may be to determine us to work more closely with Europe, carrying with us, we hope our closest friends in the Commonwealth in such development, here too we must be under no illusion. Europe will not welcome us simply because at the moment in may appear to suit us to look to them. The timing and conviction of our approach may be decisive in their influence on those with whom we plan to work. Traditional assessments have emphasised that Suez demonstrated that from then on Britain could no longer act without the acquiescence, if not the full support, of the uS. Some would later talk of a ‘Suez syndrome’ affecting Britain, with Barnett noting that Suez led to Britain being stuck in a ‘rut’ of decline (1995: 515). Margaret Thatcher would reflect that ‘Since the Suez fiasco in 1956, British foreign policy had been one long retreat’ (Thatcher, 1993: 173). While there is much truth in this analysis, other academics have noted that Suez did not result in a seismic shift in British foreign policy, even with regard to the Middle East (Barnes, 1987, cited in Adamthwaite, 1989). The years that followed witnessed a number of attempts by Britain to exercise influence, with interventions taking place in Oman, Kuwait and Jordan. But the fact of the matter was that they all took place with American approval. As horne has commented, ‘Suez meant that henceforth Britain would find it hard, if not impossible, to pursue a foreign policy totally independent of the united States’ (horne, 1988: 453).

SEArChiNG FOr A rOLE British economic policy after the Second World War was one of considerable contradictions. On the one hand, Britain was a bankrupt nation. Yet, rather than a complete collapse, the British economy actually expanded after the Second World War. Exports quadrupled between 1944 and 1950. in 1950 Britain accounted for some 25 per cent of total manufacturing exports in comparison with Germany, which had 7 per cent (reynolds, 2000: 194–5). A few years later in 1957, Britain had around 17 per cent of world manufacturing exports. And while this was a noticeable decline on only a few years earlier, the figure was still considerably higher than those of France and Japan, for example. Such a position would lead to Prime Minister harold Macmillan commenting in 1957 that most Britons ‘have never had it so good’. A decade later, in 1967, Wilson would reflect that a ‘white heat of technology’ was revolutionising Britain’s competitiveness in science and

the limitations of power

technology. Yet while there were some truths to these phrases, most notably evidenced by the development of the Franco-British designed supersonic aircraft Concorde which flew for the first time in 1969, the reality was that Britain’s position in the world economy was declining relative to that of others. Whereas in 1960 Britain’s share of world trade was around 16 per cent and Germany’s 19 per cent, the following decade would see Germany’s proportion of trade at the global level increase to 20 per cent while Britain’s fell to 10 per cent. On the one hand, the fact that, as a small island nation, Britain could still account for one-tenth of all global trade in 1970 was clearly a remarkable achievement. But on the other hand this also highlighted that the British economy had fallen off a cliff in every sense, from having had onequarter of total value of manufacturing exports in 1950. For some observers this reduction from 25 per cent to 10 per cent in a period of two decades was, in every sense, a disaster (reynolds, 2000: 195). What were the reasons for this change? The first point to note is that it was inevitable that the British economy would have experienced a degree of growth after the Second World War. This was the result of the fact that many of the continental economies, such as France, Germany and italy, had been devastated by the war effort and Britain was therefore in a dominant position. But rather than providing evidence of a considerable resurgence in the British economy as a result of a rise in exports, the British economy had been given a period of artificial grace in terms of having a dominance in trading relationships. This meant that British policy-makers used this dominance as evidence to highlight why Britain could continue to claim great power status. it also provided legitimacy behind the decision not to pursue a path towards European integration in the 1950s and to instead maintain close relationships with the uS and the Commonwealth. The fact of the matter was that the British economy was built on fragile foundations.

ECONOMiC ChALLENGES AND WOrLD viSiONS Why had the British economy not undertaken change? One of the reasons was that the economic realities of the time were overlooked when the country was establishing a new welfare state and making domestic reforms. it was also the case that British leaders expected that its main area of growth would be through the Empire, Commonwealth and the Sterling Area. it was for these reasons that Britain chose not to commit itself to European integration. however, this strategy of focusing on economic growth outside the European arena suffered from the fact that, as the economies of Europe grew after the war, Britain found itself trading with economies outside of Europe that were

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not as dynamic and did not have the same focus and competitiveness in new technology that the European ones did. in this context, ‘. . . the principal gains in international trade were occurring in exchanges in industrial blocs such as the EEC, and thus passed by the world’s primary-producing sector into which British interests were so deeply splayed’ (holland, 1985: 206). From the outside, it was evident therefore that the British economy was losing ground and by 1963 its income per head of £495 was overtaken by France and Germany, who had incomes of £510 per head (Lloyd, 2002: 343). The economies of Europe, such as France, Germany and italy, were of a more similar nature to Britain, in terms of size, dynamism and population, than was to be found in the Empire and Commonwealth. Britain’s strategy towards the Empire and Commonwealth had been one of exporting raw materials. Thus whereas Britain had expected that the Commonwealth and Empire would be the main area of economic growth after the Second World War, Britain found itself outside the EEC which proved to be the main area of economic growth. The problems that Britain faced were particularly evident through the case of Sterling. Whereas Britain’s own economic dominance at the turn of the century had meant that Sterling was widely used at a global level, the decade that followed in the early years of the twentieth century saw other currencies, particularly the uS Dollar, Japanese Yen and German Deutschmark, grow in use. Sterling therefore became only one of a number of currencies that were used in international economic transactions, rather than having a dominant position. Yet Britain still wanted to keep Sterling as an attractive currency at the global level to support overseas trade and to reinforce its position as a great power. To achieve this Britain maintained a policy of high interest rates to attract other countries to use Sterling. its use was also supported by a policy of inducements, such as economic aid and military support. however, the maintenance of high interest rates had a knock-on effect on domestic economic industry, which was suffering from trade union strikes. in May 1966 a strike by the National union of Seamen resulted in a reduction in exports and a lessening of confidence in the British economy by international finance markets who were concerned that the trade unions were getting out of control (Sked and Cook, 1984: 221). At the same time, economic crises, such as the 1967 Middle East War and a wider circulation of currencies, created difficulties for Britain. This would create periodic so-called ‘runs on the pound’ that the government of the day found difficult to defend. The upshot of this state of affairs was that the Sterling Area was a considerable burden for the British government, and also contributed to Britain’s own economic difficulties. This was because the British government was less able to pursue policies at the domestic level that were suited to British needs because of the desire to retain the Sterling Area.

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Britain’s desire to pursue a world role without adequate economic reserves necessitated a number of intervention strategies by the government to stabilise matters. Apart from keeping interest rates high, the government undertook a policy of deflation. in July 1966 Wilson announced a six-month freeze on wages and prices that was to be followed by a period of severe wage restraint. By the summer of 1967 there was a growing concern about the value of these policies. The trade figures for June 1967 revealed a trade gap of £39 million and in July it was announced that there had been a fall of £36 million in the nation’s gold and Dollar reserves. By October the trade gap had increased to £162 million (Sked and Cook, 1984: 223–4). While the severity of this economic situation necessitated a response, the answer was not to be found in the form of a foreign loan. Speculation had been mounting that there would have to be devaluation in the value of Sterling, and on 19 November 1967 the pound was devalued by 14.3 per cent from $2.80 to $2.40. in a broadcast to the nation on 19 November Wilson defended the policy as a means of allowing the country to ‘break out from the straitjacket’ of boom and bust economic policy and that this did ‘not mean that the pound here in Britain, in your pocket or purse or in your bank, has been devalued’. But the statement was derided as it papered over the broader consequences of devaluation that included cuts in public spending. it is therefore evident that in economic terms, British policy-makers’ desire to pursue a great power status had had considerable knock-on effects on Britain’s economic position and its ability to play that global role. indeed, rather than undertaking a whole-scale reassessment of Britain’s position in the world after the Second World War, the maintenance of the world role position through the 1950s and 1960s resulted in more gradual shifts of policy that would, on occasion, create knee-jerk reactions but that did not result in a whole-scale adjustment to policy. it was only towards the late 1960s that Britain’s relationships began to transform, as it moved towards Europe and away from the Commonwealth. Just as Britain sought to pursue a world role through its economic policy, it also attempted to do this through its defence policy. And while the postwar period had seen some efforts to reduce defence spending, the challenge of the deepening Cold War meant that rather than a reduction in defence expenditure, there was a need to rearm. This meant that, when compared with other leading countries such as Germany and Japan, Britain allocated a far greater share of its national expenditure to defence policy. in the mid-1950s Britain was spending in the order of 8 per cent of its national income on defence, compared with 4 per cent for Germany and less than 2 per cent for Japan (reynolds, 2000: 197). As a proportion of GDP, Britain was spending more on defence than any other NATO country. But while the maintenance of such a high level of expenditure had a knock-on effect on balance of payments,

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the lobby groups of the armed services were particularly effective at making their case for retaining considerable defence expenditure. Change came partly as a result of the 1956 Suez crisis, which brought to the fore Britain’s own economic problems. in January 1957 harold Macmillan succeeded to the premiership and the new Chancellor, Peter Thorneycroft, announced that there was an urgent need to reduce defence expenditure, the task of which fell to the Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys. When published in April 1957, the Sandys White Paper set out a series of changes to Britain’s defence policy [Document 9]. A consequence of this was to reduce the country’s capacity for independent action, which in turn meant that it would become increasingly tied to American policy (White, 1999: 86). The decision was taken to phase out conscription from 1960, to reduce Britain’s troop and air force commitment in Germany, and to reduce the number of personnel employed by the armed services from 702,000 in 1957–8 to 423,000 by 1962 (Dockrill, 1988: 151). This would lead to a reduction in defence expenditure from approximately 10 per cent of gross national product (GNP) in 1957–8 to 7 per cent of GNP by 1962. Change was also the outcome following the conclusion by the Macmillan government (1957–63) that ‘Britain’s post-Suez condition required a much more dramatic shift from conventional to nuclear defence spending’ (holland, 1985: 204). For Macmillan, the aim was to create a strike force that ‘would be small, more streamlined, more mobile, better trained and better equipped, more efficient and more cost-effective’ (horne, 1988: 49). A consequence of this was that the number of personnel employed by the armed services fell. Yet, there were other motives for these changes, including the fact that a considerable proportion of the working population was employed in defence industries. And at a time when the economies of many other countries were focused on export industries, there was a desire, if not a need, for Britain to develop and put effort into such endeavours. Taken as a whole, at the time the conclusion was that the Sandys White Paper represented ‘the biggest change in military policy ever made in normal times’ (Cmnd 124, para 35).

ThE NuCLEAr OPTiON A key aspect of Britain’s defence policy was the maintenance of a nuclear deterrent. in January 1957 uS President Eisenhower invited Macmillan to a meeting in Bermuda to publicly demonstrate the closeness of the ties between both countries. The meeting was of greater significance for Macmillan, as it ‘was vital to his strategy of drawing closer to the uS, and to Eisenhower personally, as well as to expand on the military cooperation between the two

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countries’ (Geelhoed and Edmonds, 2003: 15). Agreements were signed on 3 November 1957 (ratified on 2 July 1958) that gave Britain unique access to uS nuclear technology. Evidence of this close relationship would in time lead to the deployment of uS missiles in Britain and also the ability of the uS to deploy its Polaris submarines at the holy Loch in Scotland (Marr, 2008: 208–12). Economic issues would bring the relationship between Britain and the uS even closer in the 1960s. British efforts to establish the Blue Streak missile as a delivery vehicle for nuclear weapons were proving costly, with £60 million having already been spent on development and an estimated £500 million still needed to complete the project (Macmillan, 1972: 251). if cost was not sufficient to deter the government from maintaining the project, the need to cancel was confirmed by the fact that Blue Streak was reliant on an outdated method of liquid refuelling that did not offer the necessary quick response. in contrast to solid fuel, liquid fuel missiles could not be deployed from a mobile base such as a submarine. The difficulties surrounding Blue Streak resulted in Britain scrapping the policy in March 1960 (Macmillan, 1972: 251–2). This was only done after Britain secured agreement from the uS to purchase the Skybolt stand-off missile, which was being developed for the uS Air Force and in turn meant that Britain was dependent on America for maintaining its nuclear weaponry. When the uS took the decision in November 1962 to cancel Skybolt because of poor performance and heavy costs, Britain faced a huge problem in its ability to be a nuclear power and consequently ‘exposed the dangers of the government’s desire to have effective nuclear weapons without paying for them’ (Lloyd, 2002: 337). Thus while Britain sought a world role, it did not have the finances to pay for such a vision. This state of affairs was summed up by Dean Acheson (uS Secretary of State 1949–53) in a speech at West Point on 5 December 1962 when he noted that ‘Great Britain has lost an empire and has not yet found a role’ (Brinkley, 1992: 176). Faced with this backdrop uS President John F. Kennedy and Prime Minister Macmillan set off for a summit at Nassau in the Bahamas in December 1962. The stakes could not have been higher for Macmillan, as he needed to either convince Kennedy to retain Skybolt or secure a replacement (hennessy, 2002: 62). in the end an agreement was reached whereby the uS would provide Britain with Polaris missiles on extremely favourable terms. For Macmillan, this emphasised the special relationship between Britain and the uS, as Britain was the only country that was able to buy the American missiles. While Macmillan would argue that the deal was evidence that Britain was still able to be an independent nuclear power, the agreement meant that British policy was tainted by the perception (or more often than not the reality) that its foreign policy was intertwined with that of America. For

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many observers, Britain became the 51st American state. The Labour governments of 1964–70 grappled with this issue as they undertook a further review of Britain’s defence commitments under the leadership of Denis healey as Defence Secretary. The Ministry of Defence was instructed in November 1964 to reduce its annual defence budget to £2,000 million per year until 1969–70 (at 1964 prices). Defence spending fell from 8.3 per cent of GNP under the previous Conservative government to 6 per cent under Labour (Bartlett, 1972: 170). This would see Britain shift away from a reliance on the v-Bomber force to intercontinental ballistic missiles for nuclear defence and the cancelling of the TSr-2 long-range jet aircraft that was to be replaced by uS F-111s (healey, 1990: 272–3). Expensive domestic projects such as the navy’s CvA-01 aircraft carriers were cancelled. replacements often came in the form of agreements with the uS, while Britain became reliant on uS satellites for intelligence gathering. Taken together, these developments signified that Britain was being tied to the uS through a defence umbilical cord, of which nuclear cooperation was the cornerstone. in the words of David reynolds, ‘it locked Britain into a transatlantic nuclear dependence that has endured to this day’ (reynolds, 2000: 203). Closer to home the deal had considerable ramifications for Britain’s relationship with France, who had always been sceptical about uS influence on European integration.

TriMMiNG ThE SAiLS The economic and political conditions that determined the need to secure access to Polaris also impacted on Britain’s wider world role. in 1964 the Plowden report on Overseas representation concluded that it was no longer practical for Britain to maintain a separate Foreign Office and a Commonwealth relations Office, leading to the creation of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in 1968. A trimming of the sails of government extended to the maintenance of British bases overseas, where the 1967 devaluation crisis brought to the fore the need to reduce costs as Britain continued to have a plethora of bases, for example in Singapore, hong Kong, Malta, Cyprus and Aden. Yet even here there was a lack of consistency between economic needs and political rhetoric, with Prime Minister Wilson insisting as late as 1965 that Britain’s frontiers were on the himalayas. But this was just wishful thinking and in January 1968 the government announced the cancellation of the purchase of 50 American F-111s and, with the exception of hong Kong, the abandonment of bases East of Suez by the end of 1971 [Document 15]. The latter decision would provoke a great deal of concern in Washington, where policy-makers were concerned that, just as the uS had stepped into the breach caused by Britain’s retreat from the Mediterranean after the

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Second World War through the Truman Doctrine, it was now faced with the task of filling the gap left by Britain in the East (Dumbrell, 2001: 70–1). There was also concern among the rulers of many of the countries that Britain was now exiting from because British forces acted as an insurance against regional instability. Such a state of affairs would prompt the rulers of Dubai, Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and Qatar to offer to pay the cost of maintaining British forces in the area. Thus, while the defence secretary Denis healey would later reflect that ‘i imagine historians will best remember my six years at the Ministry of Defence for the liquidation of Britain’s military role outside Europe’ (healey, 1990: 275), he was conscious that any acceptance of offers to finance the maintenance of British forces could not be contemplated, noting that ‘it would be a great mistake if we allowed ourselves to become mercenaries for people who like to have British troops around’ (cited in Abadi, 1982: 214). More than anything else, healey was also right to note that such bases were ‘an anachronism which was essentially a legacy from our nineteenth-century empire’ (healey, 1990: 275). A consequence of all of this was that Britain refocused its energies in the European arena, as signified by it joining with other European members of NATO to form the Eurogroup in 1969. While a reduction in overseas commitments lessened the uK’s influence in Washington, this was a price that the uK had to pay and the task of managing these challenges fell to the Wilson governments of 1963–70. As Prime Minister, Wilson would, in the face of uS pressure, take the decision not to deploy troops in the vietnam War, although other intelligence assistance and arms sales were provided to aid the uS effort. The absence of a formal commitment was partly because of economic reasons, but also because Wilson argued that Britain’s assistance to America was better positioned as an ‘honest broker’ in mediating an end to the conflict (Dumbrell, 2001: 151; Phythian, 2007: 61). Despite these difficulties, Wilson recognised the significance of maintaining close cooperation with America, where ties continued to be strong in the areas of defence, intelligence and atomic cooperation and where a Britain in decline was still of value to America as the legacy of Empire provided access to strategic locations at a time of Cold War conflict. Thus, just as Britain took decisions to leave some imperial bases after the Second World War, most notably in the Middle East, it also sought to reinforce its presence in others (Abadi, 1982: 219). Britain’s utility to America was typified by the decision that it took in the 1960s to grant the uS access to establish a naval communication station on one of its island territories in the indian Ocean to stop China and the Soviet union exercising influence in the Arabian Gulf. The uS was granted permission to construct a base on Diego Garcia, which was the largest of the islands and had a settled population. For this to happen Britain forcefully

Truman Doctrine: in March 1947 Us President harry truman said that ‘it must be the policy of the United states to sup­ port free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures’. it acted as the basis for a more active Us foreign policy, marked by the creation of nato in 1949.

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evicted the island population of 2,000 people and, in order to stop the islands being handed back to Mauritius when it became independent in 1968, policy-makers in London established the British indian Ocean Territory in 1965. Not only did Britain inflict misery on the local population by evicting them, but it also established the only British colony that has been created since decolonisation. in straddling these issues, Wilson had deployed a pragmatic approach of trying to balance the various challenges that Britain faced. Yet the problem was that as the 1960s drew to an end it was increasingly clear that Britain’s future lay in the EEC and as a result the Labour Party lost the 1970 general election in the face of a Conservative Party that had already come to this conclusion.

WiND OF ChANGE While plans had been set out for independence for india in 1947, there was little in the way of wider impact in terms of independence for other colonies in the decade that followed. By 1967 virtually all of the colonies had become independent. A shift in British policy was influenced by a shift in government policy in favour of decolonisation that was led by the Colonial Secretary iain Macleod after the 1959 general election. A change in government policy was influenced by a realisation that the attempts to maintain colonial influence through more localised development could lead to political, social and economic unrest. in the case of the Gold Coast this was reflected in the way that Britain’s introduction of a new parliamentary system of government in 1949 led to Kwame Nkrumah’s new political party (Convention People’s Party) winning the first legislative elections in 1951. This led to independence for what is now known as Ghana in 1957 and which in turn took its place as the first African country in the Commonwealth. British policy towards decolonisation was influenced by a desire to exit from the colonies before significant tension developed and policy-makers in London believed that this would allow Britain to retain close ties with those countries in a reinvigorated Commonwealth. Such a viewpoint was based on a cost–benefit analysis, where one of the first acts that Macmillan undertook as Prime Minister was to review Britain’s colonial position. This ‘balance sheet of Empire’ concluded that the costs greatly outweighed the benefits (rothermund, 2006: 19). This was a conclusion that the Treasury had pointed to a decade before. The retention of colonial control involved considerable expenditure on development programmes at a time when the government had little in the way of spare resources, while the colonies were regarded as having little commercial value that would offset these costs (holland, 1985: 207).

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There was also a political dimension to this analysis. Policy-makers in London were aware that if Britain were to retain a colonial position then this would drag the country into conflicts and there was certainly no appetite for such a scenario to unfold. Wider political factors included the impact of the Cold War, where British policy-makers were well aware of the importance of standing close to the uS rather than carving out an independent policy. A change in government policy was also rooted in an appreciation of the fact that Britain’s economic ties were being pushed closer towards the countries of Europe as the economic dynamism of those countries created stronger rates of growth. Britain’s patterns of trade and investment were less tied to the Empire and Commonwealth at a time of expansion in the capitalist world economy through the post-war Bretton Woods system. The amount of exports to the Commonwealth would decline from some 47.7 per cent in 1950 to 40.2 per cent in 1960, to 24.4 per cent in 1970. At the same time there was also decline in the amount of imports from Commonwealth countries, from 41.9 per cent in 1950 to about 34.6 per cent in 1960 and 25.9 per cent in 1970 (reynolds, 2000: 209). Decolonisation was also a result of the fact that Britain was under pressure to grant independence where there was a groundswell of opinion for nationalism among those countries. This was a point that harold Macmillan made in an address to the South African Parliament in Cape Town on 3 February 1960 when he noted that the ‘wind of change is blowing through this continent, and, whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact’ [Document 10]. Macmillan was conscious that he did not want to engage in the same type of colonial war that France had encountered in Algeria and, as a result, under his premiership decolonisation progressed at pace where Britain was faced with strengthening nationalist movements. The speech marked not only a shift in policy towards decolonisation, but also a shift in British policy towards apartheid in South Africa, with that country being expelled from the Commonwealth in 1961. By the late 1960s, Britain would see independence being granted to the rest of the countries in Africa, with the exception of rhodesia [Document 11]. independence would also be given to the majority of the West indies and also to Aden and Mauritius. While economic pressures had influenced moves towards decolonisation, one consequence of this process was that it led to the emergence of many countries that at independence became some of the poorest in the world. Britain responded by providing technical guidance and economic support in the form of loans to its former colonies. A desire to establish a more coherent government position with regard to the aid provided to colonies resulted in the Conservative government establishing the Department for Technical Cooperation in 1961, while in 1964 the incoming Labour government went one step further with the creation of the Ministry for Overseas Development.

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While the creation of such a ministry gave the impression that the government took seriously the economic development of its former colonies, economic pressures within Britain meant that spending on aid was a relatively small part of government expenditure. The effectiveness of this aid was also reduced by the tendency for it to be tied to the purchase of British goods and services. Economic concerns were also impacted by political unease at the granting of aid to former colonies, which instead of making a transition towards democracy were in a number of cases still governed by military dictatorships. in some instances, the new leaders of these countries also embarked on a policy of racial discrimination, albeit this time exercised by Africans. in East Africa this discrimination would be aimed at Asians whose families had initially moved there at a time of colonial rule to build projects such as railroads and who in turn had become successful in their own right, often occupying key positions such as doctors, teachers, civil servants and business people. Tension arose from these discrepancies, with Jomo Kenyatta, who had led Kenya to independence in 1963, giving the Asians the choice of either surrendering the British passports that they held or taking full Kenyan citizenship. in the months and years that followed, the Kenyan government increased pressure on the Asian community, such as by depriving them of jobs; faced with this situation they emigrated to Britain in their thousands. Such mass immigration divided opinion in Britain. Within Parliament a number of MPs, including the former Colonial Secretary, iain Macleod, considered that Britain was bound to accept the immigrants. Others, including the new home Secretary, James Callaghan, wanted to tackle the situation to reduce public disquiet. This resulted in the Commonwealth immigrants Act, which drastically reduced the number of immigrants who could enter Britain. in what can only be described as a shameful and controversial piece of legislation, the government slammed shut the door on immigrants. Yet the public at large supported a policy that was being stirred up by the antiimmigrant speeches of MPs. The chief protagonist of these was the right-wing Conservative Enoch Powell, who in an inflammatory speech at the Midland hotel in Birmingham on 20 April 1968 stated that ‘We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants’ and ‘As i look ahead, i am filled with foreboding; like the roman, i seem to see “the river Tiber foaming with much blood” ’ [Document 16]. Known thereafter as the ‘rivers of blood’ speech, it stirred up a huge debate on immigration, particularly among white lower class workers who considered that their livelihoods and ways of life were being threatened by the new immigrants (Marr, 2008: 300–5). What can be seen from these developments is that decolonisation and its associated ramifications was a far from straightforward affair. While there is

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much truth in the fact that Britain’s policies towards decolonisation worked better than those of other former imperial powers, the governments of the day often took decisions that were highly controversial and politically motivated. Divisions would also be evident in the Commonwealth, most notably over South Africa in the 1960s. Through the 1970s the most significant challenge that Britain faced was rhodesia, over which, despite moves to decolonisation, Britain still retained control. it would prove to be a particularly problematic country through the 1960s and 1970s, where the hard-line leadership of ian Smith, who had assumed the premiership in 1964, created division because of the country’s refusal to accept majority black rule. But rather than tackling this issue head on, Britain somewhat side-stepped it. And as a result, the Commonwealth, which had been created in a modern format after india’s independence in 1947, was subject to considerable division through the 1960s and 1970s.

rELuCTANTLY EurOPEAN Of all the issues that Britain faced in this period, one of the most significant was European integration. in the immediate post-war period, Britain’s position with regard to the ideal of European unity was conditioned by a fear of losing control over economic and political affairs. Thus, while both the Labour and Conservative post-war governments favoured the concept of a loosely integrated Europe, as in the realm of security ties such as the Dunkirk Treaty of March 1947 and the Brussels Treaty of 17 March 1948, there was a belief that Britain’s interests lay outside initiatives that sought to establish supranational cooperation. A consequence of this was that Britain did not engage in the discussions that led to the creation of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1952 and nor did it engage in a proactive way with the European Defence Community (EDC) discussions. The eventual failure of the EDC Treaty in 1954 spurred the Belgian Foreign Minister, Paulhenri Spaak, to draft a memorandum for European integration to proceed beyond the ECSC. The foreign ministers of the six ECSC members met in the italian port of Messina in June 1955 to discuss Spaak’s proposals that sought to establish a common market and atomic energy community. Britain’s reaction to these developments was lukewarm. ‘Neither the British press nor British ministers saw any reason to get excited over the meeting at Messina’ (Denman, 1996: 197). Although Prime Minister Anthony Eden was opposed to the talks and hostile to the concept of a European federation, the then Foreign Secretary harold Macmillan argued that the government would be able to exert a greater influence on the talks if it was a full participant and not just an observer. in the end the government sent

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a representative, russell Bretherton, an official from the Board of Trade, to the Messina process that had subsequently moved to Brussels. Some commentators have highlighted that Eden’s decision to send an official as opposed to a foreign secretary – as the other countries had – emphasised a lack of commitment on Britain’s part (Burgess and Edwards, 1988: 401). hugo Young has written that the decision to send Bretherton was designed ‘to insult’ because he ‘was the nominee, void of power or status or the faintest resemblance to the roaring British lion, whom the politicians sent to register their continuing absence from the integration of Europe’ (Young, 1998: 71–2). By November 1955 Bretherton was instructed to tell Spaak that the government did not want its views taken into consideration. Spaak noted that ‘little by little the British attitude changed from one of mildly disdainful scepticism to growing fear’ (Spaak, 1971: 232) over the outcome of the meeting. Although Bretherton later stated that the decision to distance itself from the talks was because the Foreign Office thought ‘that nothing would happen’ (Charlton, 1983: 178), Britain attempted to counter the Messina process with its own proposals. in February 1956 Macmillan – in his capacity as Chancellor of the Exchequer – asked the Treasury to prepare an alternative plan (horne, 1988: 393–5). After a period of consultation in Whitehall, this resulted in November 1956 in a proposal – to be known as ‘Plan G’ – for an alternative Free Trade Area (FTA) in industrial goods being put forward. This would comprise the six member states of the ECSC, Britain and other countries from the OEEC that wished to join. The view in Whitehall was that if a suitable arrangement could not be achieved then Britain would suffer considerable damage as exports would be subject to Community tariffs, while it would also suffer from not being attached to a group of countries that would have a significant economic and political weight in the world economy (reynolds, 2000: 204). For Britain, the inventiveness of the proposal was that it did not hinder the six members of the ECSC in establishing closer European integration, yet crucially ensured that Britain would have access to the markets of these countries while protecting the trade preferences given to Commonwealth countries. Somewhat inevitably, The Six were less than impressed with a proposal that favoured British interests over their own; Britain would obtain access to their markets and retain Commonwealth ties, while the focus purely on industrial goods had little appeal to France, italy and the Netherlands who had a greater concentration on agricultural production. Moreover, the ‘ministers and officials of the six separate member states were too deeply entrenched to be dislodged’ by the British proposal (Denman, 1996: 204). Britain’s chances of success with the proposal were also hampered by the fallout from the 1956 Suez crisis and the fact that the six ECSC members

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were cognisant of the fact that ‘Britain’s conversion to the abandonment of protection was neither perfectly complete nor perfectly genuine and the desire simply to ruin the customs union was never far from the surface’ (Greenwood, 1992: 70). Consequently, it was not surprising when in March 1957 The Six signed the Treaties of rome which established the European Economic Community (EEC) and European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom). The signing of the Treaties of rome accentuated the need for Britain to establish a FTA with those OEEC countries who likewise felt unable to join the EEC because of the impact on national sovereignty. This resulted in Austria, Britain, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Sweden and Switzerland – otherwise known as ‘The Seven’ – establishing the European Free Trade Association (EFTA) on 4 January 1960. While Britain’s preference towards EFTA was because it did not involve the demand on national governments that the EEC required, it is hard to disagree with David reynolds’ conclusion that ‘the merits of this move were dubious for Britain’ (reynolds, 2000: 205). Not only did EFTA offer little in the way of economic advantages for Britain – which was by far the biggest economy of the seven EFTA states – but membership also offered few political benefits. Britain was not alone in reaching such a conclusion as other EFTA countries were already looking towards membership of the European Community. To outsiders it appeared that EFTA served to divide Europe at a time when the EEC was supposed to be unifying it and this position was not lost on the Kennedy administration in Washington. Drawing on the membership of the respective organisations, commentators would allude to the lack of synergy between these two groupings by reflecting that Europe was at ‘sixes and sevens’ (Benoit, 1961; Macmillan, 1972, 44–60). For Britain, having decided not to join the EEC because of a preference for a wider global role – including the maintenance of a close relationship with the uS – it now found itself in a position of being isolated from American policy-makers who increasingly viewed the Community as the key decision-making environment (Macmillan, 1972: 58–9). Commenting on this state of affairs John Dumbrell has written that Kennedy was not unworried about European protectionism, but saw Britain’s entry as a way of alleviating it. And only full entry would do; the uS would not be recruited in support of the “outer seven” solution: the European Free Trade Area. (Dumbrell, 2001: 178) The reality of the position that Britain faced was summed up by Macmillan in December 1959 when he wrote to his Foreign Secretary that

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The Seven: refers to the seven founding members of eFta (austria, Britain, denmark, norway, Portugal, sweden and switzerland). European Free Trade Asso­ ciation (EFTA): created in 1959 by austria, Britain, denmark, norway, Portugal, sweden and switzerland as an alter­ native organisation to the eec.

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For the first time since the Napoleonic era, the major continental powers are united in a positive economic grouping, with considerable political aspects, which, though not specifically directed against the united Kingdom, may have the effect of excluding us both from European markets and from consultation in European policy. (Young, 1998: 118) This was a point that was further highlighted six months later in a report of the European Economic Association Committee of the Cabinet that was published on 25 May 1960: The economic division of Europe will confront the united Kingdom with a most serious situation. There are significant political dangers which Ministers have emphasised in recent months – the fear that, despite the manifest advantages of the rapprochement between France and Germany, economic divisions may weaken the political division of the West at a time when a common Western front is more than ever necessary. if, as seems to be the intention, the policy of The Six is to press forward with economic integration, impetus will be given to political integration. The Community may well emerge as a Power comparable in size and influence to the united States and the uSSr. The pull of this new power bloc would be bound to dilute our influence with the rest of the world, including the Commonwealth. We should find ourselves replaced as the second member of the North Atlantic Alliance and our relative influence with the united States in all fields would diminish. All this would add to the strains on EFTA. The independence which we have sought to preserve by remaining aloof from European integration would be of doubtful value, since our diminished status would suggest only a minor role for us in international affairs. (Greenwood, 1996: 119) upon reflection it is evident that Britain did not fully acknowledge the significance of the desire among other European countries for supranationalism and take on board the implications of non-participation. As Gill Bennett has reflected, ‘Throughout the 1950s the uK’s attitude towards “Europe” remained both disengaged and skeptical, and few politicians of any persuasion, or government officials, showed much interest in it’ (Bennett, 2013: 69). Anthony Nutting, who was the Minister of State responsible for European affairs, would later reflect that ‘i think it was the last and the most important bus that we missed. i think we could have had the leadership of Europe if we had joined in Messina’ (Denman, 1996: 199). it was certainly the case that Britain had underestimated the desire for closer European integration among

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the ECSC members, with the underlying consensus being that ‘European unity was just a lot of Continental hot-air’ (Nutting, 1960: 4). Britain’s Ambassador to France, Gladwyn Jebb, was reported to have informed the Foreign Office that the Messina process was unlikely to produce outcomes of any significance (Burgess and Edwards, 1988). Yet Britain’s economic and political strength relative to that of other European member states meant that it had the ability to exercise influence on European policy developments in the Messina process. This was a point that russell Bretherton had noted: if we are prepared to take a firm line, that we want to come in and be part of this, we can make this body into whatever we like. But if we don’t say that, something will probably happen and we shan’t exercise any influence over it. (Charlton, 1983: 184) While it is true that there were notable factors that underpinned the British position, such as the links with Empire and Commonwealth, it is also evident as harold Macmillan would later recall that Britain ‘should have been more alert to the dangers’ of the Messina discussions (Young, 1989: 216). But the problem for Britain was that the factors that shaped its negotiating position quickly changed over the coming years, which in turn meant that a position of independence from Europe became non-sustainable. As John Young has written: in 1955 the British had reached the point where they realised that their power was waning, that Commonwealth trade was likely to decline, and that the common market, if successful, could harm them. But the speed of their demise was uncertain, Commonwealth preferences and the ideal of trade liberalisation still held promise, and the Six had failed before to press on down the supranational road. On balance it still seemed best to steer clear of supranationalism in Europe. Only the bitter lessons of the next few years – the Suez crisis, the independence of the African colonies, and the creation of the EEC – would reveal the importance of the year 1955. And by then, of course, it was too late. (Young, 1989: 218)

ThE FirST APPLiCATiON it was against this background that Prime Minister harold Macmillan announced in the house of Commons in July 1961 that ‘her Majesty’s Government have come to the conclusion that it would be right for Britain

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to make a formal application . . . with a view to joining the Community’ [Document 12]. This was just four years after the Treaties of rome had been signed. According to Edward heath (who managed the 1961 application), The decision of harold Macmillan’s government to apply for membership of the European Community represented an historic moment in post-war politics. it determined the direction not just of British policy, but also that of Europe and the Atlantic alliance . . . it signalled the end of a glorious era, that of the British Empire, and the beginning of a new chapter of British history. (heath, 1998: 203) As far as economic factors were concerned, the reduction in tariff barriers between the member states had provided a greater boost to the Community than many had expected. By 1961 Britain was exporting more to the EEC than to the Commonwealth, while the Community’s integrated market was increasingly the target of overseas investment that had traditionally come to Britain. EFTA had failed to provide Britain with access to countries that had large-scale economic plants that would stimulate economic competition for Britain and improved productivity. in 1961 the population of the EEC was 160 million while in EFTA Britain had partners with a population of 40 million. Macmillan would himself write in his diary on 9 July 1960: Shall we be caught between a hostile (or at least less and less friendly) America and a boastful, powerful ‘Empire of Charlemagne’ – now under French but later bound to come under German control. is this the real reason for ‘joining’ the Common Market (if we are acceptable) and for abandoning (a) the Seven [European Free Trade Association or EFTA countries] (b) British agriculture (c) the Commonwealth? it’s a grim choice. (Macmillan, 1972: 316) Britain therefore looked towards the European Community for a lifebelt for its economic and political survival as it feared that it would become just another European country (White, 1999: 26–9). America was also keen for Britain to secure membership of the Community, with the conclusion being that the special relationship with the uS was more secure inside the EEC than outside it (Lundestad, 1998: 134). After a meeting with President Kennedy in April 1961, Macmillan would reflect that Kennedy repeated how anxious the Americans were for us to get into the Six. . . . Economically they thought it would be better for them to deal with one large group than with two groups; bargaining on tariffs and trade

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would be easier. Politically they hoped that if we were in the Six we should be able to steer them and influence them, whatever might be the political personalities. (Macmillan, 1972: 350–1) Yet Britain’s decision to apply for membership was by no means an easy one. There was an absence of consensus in Parliament, with the Conservative Party’s pro-European position not being shared by the opposition Labour Party. The Conservative’s pro-European position also belied a number of competing interests that impacted on policy preferences, most notably strong agricultural and colonial interests. As a result, while Britain accepted many of the key principles of the Treaties of rome, such as the common external tariff, Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) and common commercial policy, the government stipulated the need to secure satisfactory arrangements for EFTA, the Commonwealth and the interests of British agriculture (Kitzinger, 1973: 77). Among Commonwealth countries, Australia, Canada and New zealand were particularly concerned about the impact that membership of the Community would have on their trading links. The fact that Britain was still aiming to secure policy outcomes that satisfied a global preference for the Commonwealth and EFTA also highlighted that Britain had not made an application towards European integration at all costs. To the observer it seemed that Britain was setting out a policy that was less about a complete desire to join the Community and more about a need to satisfy its own interests and, in this sense, ‘had seemed more like the initiation of a fishing expedition than the reflection of a strategic choice’ (hannay, 2013: 40). Britain’s agreement on the Polaris missile at the Nassau summit in December 1962 also highlighted the significance of the special relationship. And for France, the Nassau Agreement would be used as justification to veto Britain’s membership of the Community [Document 13]. But Macmillan needed both to join the Community of Europe and at the same time to secure Polaris after the uS had scuppered Skybolt. Although the French President, Charles de Gaulle, publicly used this lack of outright commitment towards Europe as justification to question the wisdom of Britain joining the Community, in reality de Gaulle was fearful that Britain would take France’s position as the Community’s effective leader. For de Gaulle this meant that there could only be ‘one cock on the dunghill’ (hollowell, 2003: 73). When de Gaulle issued his veto at the Élysée Palace on 14 January 1963 Britain’s application came to an end [Document 13]. The French position had been shaped by a hardheaded viewpoint that was based on a desire to maintain French dominance of a Community that served its national interests through the establishment of the CAP.

Common Agricultural Policy (CAP): established to ensure the main­ tenance of an adequate supply of food in the european community.

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When the negotiations were finally interrupted on 29 January 1963 none of the other issues such as legal, financial and institutional policies had been discussed in any real depth (heath, 1998: 225–35). however, as Britain had accepted the Treaties of rome none of these questions would have posed any real problems. in retrospect it could be noted that Just as Britain was not yet ready to join the Community, neither was the Community ready for British membership. We have to remember that the Community was still a fledgling organisation, barely four years old, and one that had yet to define its own objectives, let alone embark on an expansion of membership. (A. Blair, 2002: 12) Yet the fact of the matter was that ‘the quest to join the Common Market was Britain’s only shot. She was not prepared for it to fail, and had no contingency plan ready when it did so. For Macmillan, therefore, the event was catastrophic’ (Young, 1998: 143). Although in public Macmillan stoically defended the outcome, noting that the negotiations had come to an end not ‘because the discussions were menaced with failure’, but rather ‘because they threatened to succeed’ (Macmillan, 1973: 377), the fact of the matter was that the veto destroyed his foreign policy objectives and was ‘one of Britain’s great missed chances in Europe’ for it to take a leading role (Denman, 1996: 223). This was a point that he himself noted in his diaries: ‘All our policies at home and abroad are in ruins . . . We have lost everything, except our courage and determination’ (Macmillan, 1973: 367). As Alan Sked and Chris Cook have commented Britain, no longer an independent nuclear power, had not been allowed to restore her prestige by capturing – however belatedly – the leadership of Europe. She could no longer, therefore, present herself as a world partner – even a junior one – of the united States of America. (Sked and Cook, 1984: 174) Yet writing in his diary after the veto, harold Macmillan would reflect that ‘the great question remains, “What is the alternative?” to the European Community. if we are honest, we must say there is none’ (Macmillan, 1973: 374).

ThE SECOND APPLiCATiON in May 1967 Britain applied to join the European Community for a second time [Document 14]. The application was put forward by the Labour government

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of Harold Wilson which had initially been elected to office in October 1964 with a small majority of five MPs, being subsequently strengthened in the March 1966 general election (Daddow, 2003). Wilson’s conclusion as to the necessity of membership was influenced by the sluggish growth of the British economy and the post-Suez pressures on the retreat from Britain’s global role. America was also supportive of this application, with Washington hoping that British membership would assist in reinforcing the Atlantic link within the Community (Dumbrell, 2001: 181). The application was advanced at a time when the Community had recently experienced a bitter dispute between France and the EEC (which emphasised the complexity of issues surrounding national sovereignty among the member states) and at the same time had concluded a complex global trade negotiation (which emphasised the potential benefits of pooling sovereignty when negotiating with nonCommunity member states). The dispute involving France had arisen as a result of plans to increase the power of the EEC and reduce the influence of individual member states. in response to this threat to national decisionmaking, France boycotted the Community institutions in July 1965 and it would take a further six months until a compromise agreement was reached in Luxembourg. The so-called Luxembourg compromise of January 1966 – which ended what had become known as the Empty Chair Crisis – halted the further transfer of power to Community institutions and reinforced the influence of the member states in the decision-making process. Looking on from the sidelines, policy-makers in London took heart from an agreement that sought to protect (rather than erode) the interests of Community member states. For Britain, the same reassurance could not be taken from the worldwide trade negotiations of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) that took place in Geneva between 1964 and 1967. Commonly known as the Kennedy round, the principal influences behind the eventual outcome were the uS, Japan and the Community member states who acted as a collective in the negotiating process. Britain was very much on the sidelines, given its absence from the Community and its declining economic status. David hannay, who was part of Britain’s negotiating team, has reflected that the negotiations were ‘a salutary lesson in how Britain’s exclusion from the European Community and the weakness of our economy had left us with a very diminished capacity to influence the outcome of major international negotiations’ (hannay, 2013: 40). The 1967 British application had fewer reservations than that advanced by Macmillan (Kitzinger, 1973: 77). Although Commonwealth interests had proved in the first application to be a rallying cry for those opposed to even testing the waters in preparation for the tabling of an application, by the mid-1960s the Commonwealth was losing some of its emotional pull, as had been evidenced by the 1962 Commonwealth immigration Act. The openness

Wilson, Harold (1916–95): labour Prime Minister from 1964 to 1970 and 1974 to 1976, having won four general elections as labour leader. his overall period as Prime Minister was 7 years and 279 days. he oversaw the nation’s second application for eec membership in 1967 and, in 1974, renegotiated the terms of entry that edward heath had obtained. in 1975 he held a refer­ endum on community membership.

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Council of Ministers: a key eU institution which comprises representatives of national governments holding meetings that are dependent on the topic being discussed, such as agriculture and trade.

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of the second application reflected the general feeling that a second failure could not be risked. There was a desire to enter the Community as part of an attempt to boost economic fortunes. Between 1958 and 1968 GNP increased twice as fast in The Six as in the uK, while over the period 1958 to 1969 the production of The Six all but doubled while in the same period the uK’s rose by roughly 50 per cent. The very weakness of the British economy, as highlighted by the 14.3 per cent devaluation of the pound in relation to the Dollar on 18 November 1967, and the worsening balance of payments problems, influenced the conclusion that de Gaulle noted at a press conference on 27 November 1967 when he effectively vetoed the uK’s second application by referring in a hostile manner to the incompatibility of the uK with the Common Market: ‘What France cannot do is to enter at present into a negotiation with the British and their associates which would lead to the destruction of the European structure of which she is a part’ (O’Neill, 2000: 11). The subsequent communiqué issued by the Council of Ministers on 19 December 1967 referred to the need for the uK economy to be strengthened before it would be possible for membership to take place, although with the adage that the application would remain on the Community agenda (Kitzinger, 1968: 311–17). upon reflection it is evident that many members of the government had predicted that just as de Gaulle had vetoed the first application, he would veto the second. Edward heath, Wilson’s successor as Prime Minister, has for instance noted that there ‘was no real sense of surprise or anger’ to the veto and the ‘fact that he felt able to veto Britain before formal negotiations had started suggests that he did not consider Labour’s decision to seek membership as serious or genuine’ (heath, 1998: 358). however, if anything, the economic arguments were far greater for joining this time than they had been in the early 1960s. Just as Macmillan had attempted to secure agreements for the Commonwealth, EFTA and agriculture, so did Wilson. Britain’s application to join the Community was also welcomed by other member states, particularly Germany and italy, where there was the view that Britain’s membership would help to provide a balance to French dominance of the Community. At home, however, the government’s enthusiasm for EEC membership was somewhat tempered by the growing reality that rather than offering a salvation for Britain’s economic troubles, the Community could have a negative impact on living standards as a result of the costs of the CAP. Thus, when in 1967 de Gaulle once more vetoed Britain’s membership application, ‘the mood in Britain tended to be one almost of relief that all discomforts of joining Europe had once more been avoided’ (Northedge, 1974: 351). The irony was that the economic concerns of joining the Community at home were also shared by de Gaulle, albeit with the French President arguing

the limitations of power

that the weakness of the British economy meant that it was not sufficiently aligned to the Community for it to join. This was doubly ironic given that Britain’s application to join had been primarily based on economic grounds. As Peter Catterall has reflected, an ‘irony is the way in which “imperial Britain” continued to play a part in the articulation of an economic policy which simultaneously both helped to prompt, and stymied, British attempts to join Europe’ (Catterall, 2003: 248). And while Wilson was despondent at the veto, some members of his government were relieved, as they did not wish to enter the Community. But despite the evidence of such divisions, Wilson concluded that de Gaulle’s actions did not mean that Britain would not eventually join the Community. As a result Wilson took the decision to leave Britain’s application ‘on the table’ at the end of 1967. Thus, when de Gaulle resigned from office in 1969, Wilson’s Labour government once more looked to the possibility of joining the Community. But before this could take place, the Labour Party lost the June 1970 general election and as a result the task of joining the Community fell to the Conservative government that was led by Prime Minister Edward heath.

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4 Finding a way: 1970–1979

B

y the early 1960s the British economy was beginning to stutter as the strategy of post-war economic growth based on imperial ties was failing to deliver significant economic improvements. Britain’s political influence also appeared to be waning as successive governments defiantly sought to defend Britain’s status as a world power with a seat at the top table of international affairs. But, whereas in earlier decades such a claim rested on Empire, naval supremacy and economic influence, from the 1960s the basis of this position had shifted to a reliance on the Commonwealth, being a nuclear power and having military forces in the far-flung corners of the fag-end of the Empire. Such changing fortunes resulted in government officials and ministers beginning to reassess Britain’s position in the world, with the conclusion drawn in the early 1960s that participation in European cooperation was the only option. But, as the previous chapter noted, the applications Britain put forward to join the EEC in 1961 and 1967 failed because of the view that the country was not sufficiently committed to the European cause. Rejection of membership confirmed Britain’s position as a country adrift; it was unable to reposition itself as a European power in the face of a declining global role. The burden of the latter soon became unsustainable, with the 1967 devaluation of the pound being followed within a matter of weeks by the decision to withdraw Britain’s military forces from East of Suez [Document 15]. That is not to say that the years that followed would not involve successive British governments being drawn into conflicts, many of which were influenced by the legacy of Empire. Indeed, a willingness and capacity to intervene would see British forces being involved in military action – with the exception of 1968 – every year since 1945. Moreover, while Britain’s withdrawal from East of Suez would be signified by the closure of its naval base in Singapore in October 1971, this did not equate to a retraction of all interests in Southeast Asia, as it established a Five-Power Defence Agreement with Australia, Malaysia, New Zealand and Singapore on 1 November 1971 to reassure these countries of Britain’s continuing support. To this end, it is

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evident that the legacy of Empire has had a significant impact on shaping British foreign policy. This has been particularly evident in the country’s relationship with European integration. When Britain joined the European Community on 1 January 1973, the general viewpoint among politicians, business leaders and the general public was that the nation’s future lay in closer ties with the nations of Europe. Britain would be followed into the Community by Denmark and Ireland and it was hoped that this first enlargement would produce renewed optimism in the Community. Yet, on both accounts, the reality proved to be considerably different. Rather than providing the injection of growth and competitiveness that the British economy so badly needed, the 1970s would see a further decline in Britain’s economic performance, with some commentators considering the country to be ungovernable by the end of the decade (Young, 2000: 111). Such a viewpoint not only reflected the nature of British industrial relations, but also mirrored the fact that towards the end of the 1970s the Labour government could only manage to hang onto power by its fingertips.

ChANgINg FORTuNES Britain’s changing economic fortunes took place against a period of considerable change at home and abroad. Although the great tidal wave of 1960s decolonisation had created independence for a significant number of countries, Britain still had to deal with the legacy of being a colonial power. The late 1960s saw the re-igniting of tension in Northern Ireland, where the division that occurred in the 1920s had resulted in ulster being dominated by a Protestant-controlled grouping that dominated all aspects of Northern Ireland society. It was against this backdrop that pressures for reform were called for from Catholics through the 1960s, supported by the Irish Republican Army (IRA), of which its Provisional Wing was focused on an armed struggle. And while this was met with limited reforms by the then ulster Premier Terence O’Neill in the mid-1960s, the restricted nature of the changes that did take place only created demand for further reforms. This was an extremely difficult situation to resolve, as the very reforms that were advocated by the Catholics inevitably created alarm among Protestant groupings that were concerned at any initiatives that diluted their own influence. The intractable nature of this situation resulted in a more militant stance by the Protestant community, most notably in the presence of Ian Paisley who emerged as the leader of the Democratic unionist Party in 1971. The tension between the competing groupings resulted in violence and, when the local police force could no longer contain matters, the British government took the decision on 14 August 1969 to send troops to Northern

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Ireland to restore law and order. While this was supposed to be a temporary deployment, the fact of the matter was that stability proved hard to establish, as both Protestants and Catholics became engulfed in a bitter and lethal campaign against each other. For the government in Westminster, Northern Ireland became a highly visible legacy of Empire that it found nearly impossible to resolve. The presence of British troops also created flashpoints for conflict, of which the events of 30 January 1972 when members of the Parachute Regiment killed 13 unarmed civilians in Londonderry was one of the most notable. Known as ‘Bloody Sunday’, the deaths provoked outrage from communities around the world and acted as a catalyst in escalating the troubles into even more deadly conflict (Marr, 2008: 334–7). This would rip apart communities in Northern Ireland and result in devastating consequences for mainland Britain where the IRA undertook a bombing campaign that lasted from the 1970s until the late 1990s when peace was eventually achieved. The purpose of this campaign was to pressurise for change and undermine the British government. A consequence of this was that British troops would remain in Northern Ireland as a means of enforcing peace until 1 August 2007, with their very presence being a focal point of tension for communities that were increasingly being segregated on religious grounds. This 38-year deployment became the longest military operation in British history. Britain’s commitment to the security of Northern Ireland added further pressures to a defence budget that was being strained by the difficulties besetting the British economy. This resulted in a defence review commencing in 1974 under the leadership of Roy Mason. When the review was eventually published in March 1975 it emphasised that, despite the relaxation in Cold War tension as a result of the process of détente, the overall conclusion was that the Soviet union and the Warsaw Pact were still regarded as the principal threat to Britain’s security. The period of détente that dominated the 1970s posed a further challenge to British policy-makers. The warming in relations between the Soviet union and uS provided a greater degree of international stability, as emphasised by the signing of treaties to limit the number of nuclear weapons that each side had. The most notable was the Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) I agreement that resulted in the 1972 AntiBallistic Missile (ABM) Treaty that restricted the deployment of anti-ballistic missile defences. Within the European context the period of détente would be typified by the signing of the 1975 helsinki Final Act of the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) that emphasised a commitment to human rights, and in so doing provided a means to challenge the Soviet union, which was a signatory to the Treaty. The success of the SALT I agreement provided the motivation for further talks in what became known as the SALT II negotiations that commenced in 1972 and ended with the signing of the SALT II treaty in Vienna on 18 June

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1979. But, although the SALT II treaty sought to limit new missile programmes and the number of strategic launchers, in the end the treaty was not ratified (although much of its content was observed) as superpower relations began to deteriorate at the start of the 1980s. Yet, on the other hand, while the lessening of Cold War tension was welcomed in Britain, the process of détente was nonetheless one that at times concerned policy-makers in London, who considered that the process was conducted purely with uS interests at heart. For Britain this created some difficulties at times, such as in relation to Cyprus where in 1974 Turkey’s invasion and occupation of nearly some twofifths of the island resulted in its partition. As Ann Lane has noted

Superpower: countries that have resources far greater than those of other countries. during the cold War it was recognised that the only superpowers were the Usa and the soviet Union.

The resort to partition, which gave the impression of rewarding Turkish aggression, a solution which for historic reasons the British found difficult to accept, was blamed by Callaghan on the failure of the united States to assist the diplomatic process by threatening the Turks with the use of force. (Lane, 2004: 157) Such events brought to the fore the challenges faced by both Conservative (1970–4) and Labour (1974–9) governments in establishing a coherent foreign policy at a time of significant global developments, and when Britain’s own economic and political standing was in decline. The need to improve Britain’s economic fortunes meant that, just as priority was attached to joining the European Community, the costs attached to the Commonwealth and the remaining fragments of the Empire increasingly came under scrutiny. The decision taken by the Conservative government in 1970 to incorporate the Ministry of Overseas Development into the Foreign Office signalled a downgrading in the importance of aid to former colonies and also hinted towards the priority of joining the European Community. And although the Labour government that was elected to office in 1974 reversed this policy by once again establishing a separate Ministry of Overseas Development, in reality the Foreign Secretary retained control. Although such administrative restructuring gave a sense of the relative priority attached by different governments to overseas aid, the fact of the matter was that where aid was provided to former colonies its nature was, for the most part, determined by the extent to which the receiving nation made use of British goods and services. The implication here was that the granting of aid had to be manageable at a domestic political level, whereby the government could emphasise how the aid given had a positive impact on supporting jobs in British businesses. Such policies demonstrated the difficulties that British governments faced throughout the 1970s in balancing the pressures at home and abroad that came from the legacy of Empire. This extended to decisions such as that

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Heath, Edward (1916– 2005): conservative Prime Minister from 1970 to 1974 (3 years and 259 days in total). a com­ mitted pro­european, he was in charge of the UK’s first application for mem­ bership of the eec under harold Macmillan’s government. as Prime Minister his government suffered various indus­ trial disputes, which greatly influenced the conservative Party being defeated in the 1974 general election.

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taken by the heath government in June 1970 to introduce further restrictions on immigration as part of an attempt to placate right-wing views in the Conservative Party. Such policies highlighted the tension of post-war Britain: the country was struggling to establish its identity and the challenges of declining economic growth saw traditional working communities being threatened, both through economic restructuring and immigration. But the problem with such policies was that the legacy of Empire meant that the government could not turn its back on its former colonies, many of whose citizens had the right to live in Britain. This situation was further compounded by instability in the newly independent countries which faced significant challenges that included a lack of stable leadership. This came to the fore in the early 1970s when the heath government faced a similar challenge as had the Wilson government over Kenyan Asians. In 1972 the violent, uK-educated and unpredictable Idi Amin took a similar decision to that of Jomo Kenyatta when he decided to expel ugandan Asians on the basis that they had accumulated considerable wealth at the expense of black ugandans. But while the Wilson government had panicked over Kenya, Edward Heath’s government acted quickly to arrange airlifts for more than 28,000 ugandan Asians to take refuge in Britain between 1972 and 1973 (heath, 1998: 256–7). In contrast to the decisiveness of Britain’s response to the situation in uganda, one of the most complex foreign policy issues to dominate British foreign policy throughout the 1970s (and beyond) was Rhodesia. Although the majority of Britain’s colonies had gained independence in the 1960s, the British government’s position was that majority rule had to be in place before independence could be granted to Rhodesia. When in 1964 the leader of the Rhodesian Front, Ian Smith, became Prime Minister, his initial efforts to achieve independence from Britain were rejected because he represented the rule of the minority white population. Smith’s subsequent 1965 unilateral declaration of independence under white minority rule created an international backlash. A consequence of this was that the years that followed were dominated by efforts to achieve a suitable system of governance. But while in the late 1970s this was a task that dominated the work of Dr David Owen, who had become Foreign Secretary in February 1977 at the age of 37 upon the death of Anthony Crosland, a final political settlement that permitted independence for Rhodesia would not be agreed until 1980. Issues such as the fate of the Kenyan Asians and the governance of Rhodesia brought to the fore debates within Britain about its colonial legacy where immigration had a considerable impact on changing the ethnic and racial make-up of Britain. And while, somewhat tragically, the countries that immigrants left behind often went backwards, the changing ethnic mix of Britain would in turn raise questions about identity among communities who felt threatened by such immigration (Marr, 2008: 320–4).

Finding a way

JOININg EuROPE The election in June 1970 of a Conservative government led by Prime Minister Edward heath took place against the backdrop of a Labour government that had failed to reverse Britain’s economic fortunes. For heath, a key issue for the country was the need to secure entry to the European Community and in this regard the country had elected a Prime Minister who brought to Number 10 a committed pro-European position that was a combination of his political and personal beliefs, having been steeped in European culture and history since childhood (heath, 1998: 722–6). unlike his predecessors, heath did not regard membership of the European club as the lesser of two or more evils, and he rejected ‘the temptation to play party politics on this issue’ (heath, 1998: 358). heath was able to succeed where Macmillan and Wilson had failed for a number of reasons. One of the most important was that de gaulle was no longer in office, having resigned in April 1969 after losing a vote on a constitutional referendum. his successor, georges Pompidou, was far more amenable to Britain’s membership of the Community and wanted Britain to join. Pompidou also wanted to oversee a renaissance in the Community’s fortunes after the difficulties of the 1960s. In an effort to inject new dynamism into the Community, Pompidou invited the heads of state and government of the then six member states to attend a ‘summit’ meeting at The hague in December 1969. This emphasis on the personal diplomacy of government leaders mirrored a broader move towards such meetings at an international level to resolve intractable problems. Within the Community this would, in a short period of time, see the establishment in 1974 of the European Council which brought the heads of state and government together on three or four occasions each year. This also reflected a tilt in power away from the Community institutions towards the member states. One product of the hague meeting was the decision to further investigate the opportunity for deeper economic and political integration. Two committees were established to undertake this task, of which the economic committee was chaired by Pierre Werner and the political committee by Étienne Davignon. Both committees reported in 1970, with the Werner Report setting out the objective of monetary union by 1979 and the Davignon Report advocating greater cooperation on foreign policy between the member states through a process of European Political Cooperation (EPC). The objective of monetary union proved difficult to achieve, not least because the Community still had considerable barriers to trade between member states as a result of initiatives to protect national industries. The wider economic environment was also not conducive to such an initiative and this in turn meant that little progress towards European integration was achieved in the 1970s (A. Blair, 2002: 53–5). The situation was compounded

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Balance of power: a situation where there is balance between one state and another, with no one state having a greater power.

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by the fact that, just as heads of state and government did not have the capacity to bring their countries out of the crisis, European institutions did not have the authority to pressurise them to make changes (Aldcroft and Oliver, 1998: 149). Pompidou also considered British membership to be part of a broader process of diluting the influence of germany. Whereas de gaulle considered this to be less relevant at a time of French dominance of the Community in the early years of the European integration project, by the late 1960s germany had emerged as the dominant European economic and political force and therefore Pompidou was keen to achieve more of a balance of power among European states, for which British membership was viewed as crucial. It was against this background that heath set out Britain’s application to the Community [Document 17]. heath kept Britain’s conditions for membership to the minimum, with one scholar noting that heath regarded the Commonwealth to be ‘an irritant’ in the whole process (May, 1999: 47). The government’s own account of the negotiations reflected this balance of priorities: ‘What mattered was to get into the Community, and thereby restore our position at the centre of European affairs which, since 1958, we had lost’ (O’Neill, 2000: 355). This re-ordering of priorities impacted on London’s relations with Washington because ‘in contrast to all other post-war British Prime Ministers, heath’s Europeanisation even led him to distance himself from the uS’ (Young, 2000: 100). The former uS Secretary of State, henry Kissinger, would later reflect that ‘of all British leaders, heath was the most indifferent to the American connection and perhaps even to Americans individually’ (Kissinger, 1982: 141). This reflected the fact that the heath government had ‘moved on from regarding the Atlantic link as the “first circle” of Britain’s influence, and to have made the European connection its first priority’ (Wallace, 1978: 38). The third application, which began in earnest on 30 June 1970, was surrounded with optimism and led to the heath–Pompidou summit of May 1971 that was critical in establishing a new entente cordiale between Britain and France, with Paris agreeing to support British membership. This paved the way for agreement to be reached between the representatives of The Six and the British negotiators on 23 June 1971 on the terms for Britain’s accession to the EEC. For the government a key consideration was that they considered that membership would lead to an improvement in the country’s economic fortunes. But despite this focus on economic objectives, sovereignty also remained a key issue in the negotiations. This was in spite of the fact that the 1971 White Paper stated that ‘There is no question of any erosion of essential national sovereignty’. Yet opposition could be found within and outside of Parliament, which meant that the passage of the European Communities Bill through Parliament was not a foregone conclusion. In the

Finding a way

subsequent debate on the First Reading of the Bill that took place on 28 October 1971, the Labour leader harold Wilson argued that membership would place a burden on the population: ‘I believe the terms so frivolously negotiated by the right hon. and learned gentleman . . . involve an intolerable and disproportionate burden on every family in the land and, equally, on Britain’s balance of payments’. In attacking government policy, Wilson’s comments were aimed more at placating the interests of his own MPs and thus, while some 244 MPs voted against heath’s terms of entry, this left 356 MPs who were in favour of the policy. Although this provided the basis for heath to sign the Treaty of Accession in Brussels on 22 January 1972, the government still had the task of obtaining the assent of Parliament on the Second and Third Readings of the European Communities Bill. At the Second Reading of the Bill in February 1972 the Bill was passed by an eightvote majority (309 to 301 MPs), and at the Third Reading in July 1972 by a seventeen-vote majority (301 to 284 MPs). This in turn led to the Bill receiving its Royal Assent on 17 October 1972. This paved the way for Britain to join the European Community on 1 January 1973, and together with Denmark and Ireland the six member states had become The Nine. For Britain, the process of joining the Community had brought to the fore the lack of consensus within and between the political parties on the issue of European integration. This included the fact that the opposition Labour Party had used the context of the European Communities Bill as an opportune moment to destabilise and criticise the Conservative government by voting against the Bill. This was despite the fact that the Labour government had put forward the second application and had done much of the work that had influenced the third. Such criticism and the reality of party politics meant that while the uK had nowhere else to go, as the Commonwealth and EFTA did not offer anything like the advantages in terms of access to markets and increased status that the Community did (Northedge, 1974), Britain’s membership of the European Community was far from a settled issue in British politics. For Britain, the desire to join the Community would, in the years ahead, create domestic difficulty. This was partly the result of the fact that membership of the Community did not produce a significant change in the way that British people began to consider themselves European. Such emotional issues went hand-in-hand with the more practical matter that Britain had to accept the terms of entry as they stood, rather than adjust those terms. The upshot for Britain was that it would have to bear a considerable burden of the Community budget (because of the dominance of the CAP), because a ‘price’ had to be paid for the decision not to join the Community at the outset. But while the nature of these terms would dominate the agenda in the years that followed, the question mark that hung over Britain’s terms of membership

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was less to do with the terms of entry and more to do with the way in which future governments engaged with the Community [Document 18]. Britain’s entry to the Community on 1 January 1973 provided it with the opportunity to position itself in a larger economic market and to gain increased prestige and influence from being part of a grouping that contained some of the most prosperous countries in the world. Entry was therefore based on the economic and political argument that joining the Community would stimulate the British economy and would provide Britain with the means by which its influence and weight could in some way be felt by countries that were otherwise far more powerful, most notably the uS and Soviet union. The 1973 accession of Britain, Denmark and Ireland added some 60 million people to the Community and meant that, with a combined population of 250 million, the Community was broadly equivalent in size to the uS and the Soviet union. An increase in population size was also matched by an increase in economic impact with the accession of the new member states enhancing the Community’s influence on the world stage, with it now accounting for approximately one-fifth of world trade. But, just as enlargement increased the Community’s influence, it also had a corresponding impact on EFTA, which saw its membership and reach of influence decline when Britain and Denmark left to join the Community.

ADAPTINg TO NEW REALITIES For Britain, entry appeared, at face value, to be the sign-off point on its reshaping as a European power, with recognition that the Commonwealth was of little value in propping up British influence and that the special relationship with America had to be set in a wider context where policymakers in Washington increasingly viewed West germany, rather than Britain, as the key European power. While this reflected germany’s position as a dominant European – and world – economic power, accounting for approximately one-fifth of global manufacturing exports by the 1970s, it also resulted in the german government in Bonn having growing political influence. West germany’s position as the dominant European power meant that it was a natural interlocutor for policy-makers in Washington who, apart from recognising the shift in the European balance of power, were also aware that Britain offered less and less in terms of having an influence on uS foreign policy. In essence, the old intimate relations of the wartime alliance were being superseded by the hard practical realities of the latter decades of the twentieth century. The very process of membership had a profound effect on transforming the organisation and structure of how government policy was undertaken.

Finding a way

The heath government had to implement the cumulative body of regulations that had been established since the Community came into existence in 1958. Known as the acquis communautaire, this ranged from the common external tariff through to the CAP. By 1970 this amounted to some 13,000 pages of typed text (Young, 1998: 27). Not all of these new policies were received with enthusiasm, as the Community began to intrude into the nooks and crannies of British politics. Yet, they had to be accepted if Britain was going to be able to join the Community. In the words of Sir Con O’Neill, who led Britain’s negotiations for Community membership, Britain had to ‘swallow the lot, and swallow it now’ (hannay, 2013: 61). The Community’s reach was further influenced by its institutional structure. This included the European Commission as a policy initiator, the European Parliament as a representative body, which at that time was made up of national parliamentarians, the Council of Ministers as a forum for national governments and the Court of Justice as a binding legal body. The latter proved to be a particularly challenging institution, given the supremacy of European over national law. But whereas the British government understood the way in which the Eu institutions had specific roles and powers set down in Treaty text, this was viewed in the context of these being relative powers where member states were the main driving force behind the future direction of the Community. And of these member states, the view was that, as the most powerful countries, Britain, France and germany would have a particularly important role. A direct consequence of this was that the general consensus among most of the Community governments was that the Commission would be less a driver of European integration and more a servant of the member states’ interests. Yet one of the root causes of the difficulties that have subsequently surrounded Britain’s membership is that this power dynamic between the Community institutions and the member states has changed as the former – most notably the Commission – have gained greater power and influence and thereby acted as a greater constraint on the latter. To deal with the challenge of implementing Community policies and to ensure that Britain was able to influence Community institutions (and other member states), a number of changes were made to the administration of Britain’s European policy. As Community issues had a direct relevance to a range of government departments, from agriculture to trade, it was evident that these matters went beyond purely being the remit of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). The Cabinet Office was restructured to create a European Secretariat with the task of bringing together the various parties with a view to establishing a united policy. Britain also established a Permanent Representation in Brussels that acted as a sort of mini-Whitehall, comprising officials from a range of relevant government departments that had the task of being the focal point for advancing the government’s position

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European Commission: an institution of the eU which acts as both an administrator of policies, such as agriculture, and also an initiator of policy ideas. Court of Justice: the final arbiter of legal decisions in the eU. it is often regarded as a thorn in the side of the British government because its decisions have tended to be in favour of deeper european integration.

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in EC meetings. The regular nature of these meetings was a further sign of change, with Britain now taking part in a process of near-constant multilateral diplomacy. government ministers were drawn into this process through meetings of the Council of Ministers, which comprised the national ministers responsible for such policy areas as agriculture and finance. And it was here that many of the key decisions would be taken once the less important issues had been resolved at official level. While all of this activity took place at a time when nations were engaged in evermore bilateral and multilateral diplomacy through such forums as the uN, NATO and Council of Europe, the feverish pace of this diplomatic activity was aided by improvements in telecommunications and transportation, most notably jet aircraft. This would set the context for a greater involvement of heads of state and government in diplomacy. Such talks rested on so-called shuttle diplomacy, and in the European context this would result in the establishment in the 1970s of the European Council, comprising heads of state and government, although it would not be officially recognised until the 1986 Single European Act. All of this activity potentially signalled that the traditional role of the FCO as the key actor in foreign policy had been challenged by the involvement of wider government departments (Bulmer and Burch, 1998; A. Blair, 2004). While there was some truth in this, the FCO continued to be the key linchpin, albeit with a recognition that the advancement of a national negotiating position required a body such as the European Secretariat to ensure that a common viewpoint could be advanced. This conclusion emphasised the fact that of the changes brought about by EC membership one of the most significant was the blurring in the distinction between domestic and foreign policy (Coles, 2000: 90). While it is unlikely that heath would have been able to predict the extent to which European policy-making would intrude into areas that had traditionally been decided at a national level, he nonetheless recognised that Community membership imposed a certain level of constraints and required the fulfilling of obligations. Although he regarded this as a price worth paying, it quickly transpired that the terms of entry that heath had secured were not particularly advantageous to Britain. This was particularly evident in the case of the budget, where it transpired that Britain was sharing a far greater burden of the costs than its economic position merited. This situation was exacerbated by the fact that by the time Britain joined the Community it had already been in existence for 15 years and, as such, Britain signed up to a whole raft of policies that did not necessarily suit it. This applied specifically to the CAP, the acceptance of which meant that Britain could no longer buy cheap foods from the Commonwealth and therefore food prices increased when Britain joined the EEC.

Finding a way

Matters were further complicated by the way that the budget was calculated. With the knowledge that the budget had been subject to some bitter infighting over previous years, the French President georges Pompidou was insistent that discussions over the budget had to be settled before the Community enlarged. The upshot of this was that in 1970 the then six member states – without any input from prospective applicant countries such as Britain – agreed that the Community should establish its own resources that would be made up through a combination of agricultural levies charged on the importation of agricultural products from countries outside the Community, customs duties levied on the importation of industrial products into the Community and a small amount of revenues that would come from value added tax. The practical implication of this decision was that those countries which imported significant quantities of agricultural and industrial goods – such as Britain and West germany – would in turn bear a greater burden of the Community’s budget than those countries that were primarily reliant on products from within the Community. upon reflection, it is evident that the exclusion of applicant countries such as Britain from the 1970 budget agreement was a tactical blunder because it meant that upon its entry to the Community Britain was faced with having to shoulder a burden of the Community’s budget that was not proportionate to the size of its economy. The unjustness of this situation was further highlighted by the projection that, by the end of its transitional period of membership in 1978, Britain would be one of the largest contributors to the Community budget by providing 20 per cent of the Community’s income while only receiving just under 9 per cent of Community expenditure. The discrepancy was influenced by the fact that at that stage nearly two-thirds of the Community budget was spent on the CAP, with Britain receiving only a fraction of the total payments because of the propensity for farming to be arranged in relatively small and efficient units. This state of affairs represented a body-blow for heath as it gave fuel to those who had argued against British entry to the Community. But in securing the terms of entry that he achieved, heath was well aware of the fact that Britain was hardly negotiating from a point of strength and that, with a backdrop of Britain’s application having been twice subject to a veto, it was inevitable that membership had to be secured at any price. The price in this context was the adverse nature of the budget and CAP settlement. To allay criticism of these terms, heath managed to secure agreement in 1974 on a European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) as a means of addressing the financial imbalance of Britain’s relationship with the Community through the provision of financial support to reinvigorate areas of industrial decline.

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EuROSCLEROSIS

Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC): an intergovernmental organ­ isation of 13 oil­exporting countries that coordinates oil prices among the member countries.

The complexity of the issues that Britain faced in the 1970s was compounded by the fact that it joined the Community at a time of domestic and international economic difficulty. In August 1971 America decided to end the Bretton Woods monetary system of fixed exchange rates. The system, which had been established in 1944 to provide monetary stability whereby the uS Dollar was redeemable for gold, had come under increasing pressure as the overvaluation of the Dollar meant that foreign banks held more Dollars than the uS held gold. This meant that the uS was susceptible to a run on its gold reserves as nations began to redeem their Dollars for gold. Faced with these circumstances, uS President Richard Nixon took the decision to break up the Bretton Woods system and to place a 10 per cent surcharge on imports. Apart from the negative impact on exports from countries such as Britain, the collapse of the Bretton Woods system pushed Community member states to consider the merits of monetary union. For Britain, under the leadership of Edward heath, these issues were framed in the context of a foreign policy that was influenced more by its European partners. At times this created tension with policy-makers in the uS. Thus, when in an effort to chart a new relationship between America and Europe henry Kissinger called in a speech to the Associated Press in New York on 23 April 1973 for a ‘Year of Europe’ that would lead to a new ‘Atlantic Charter’, the British response was lukewarm to an initiative about which it had not been consulted. To this end, rather than acting as the bridge between America and Europe that Kissinger anticipated, heath positioned the country alongside its newfound European partners. Matters were further complicated a few months later with the October 1973 ArabIsraeli war when Britain refused to allow the uS to use its bases in Britain to provide supplies to Israel. The war also had economic consequences as the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) placed an oil embargo that lasted until March 1974 as a result of the West’s support for Israel. The embargo particularly affected the world’s industrialised countries, principally Western Europe, the uSA, Canada and Japan, as the restriction in supply resulted in the price of oil first doubling and then quadrupling. The dependence of industrialised economies on oil meant that this had a calamitous effect and the economic growth of the post-war period came to a grinding halt and sent shockwaves across the world. For Britain this was a further blow as the anticipated bounty of membership – access to markets for trade – never materialised in the way that policy-makers anticipated. In Britain, the economic situation would result in little, if any at all, economic growth in the mid-1970s and an increase in unemployment, and, at the same time, rising inflation. This would reach a high point of 26 per cent in 1975.

Finding a way

The period would be known as Stagflation. The end result was that while Britain had sought membership of the community to reinvigorate its economy, the reality was that the 1970s would see a continuation of Britain’s economic decline. The situation was not helped by the fact that heath’s Conservative government appeared less than sure-footed on economic policy, which in itself was contrary to the established view held of the Conservative Party. For heath, matters were not helped by the death of his Chancellor of the Exchequer, Iain Macleod, within one month of taking office, whose successor, Anthony Barber, paid too much attention to reforming taxation and not enough attention to the fact that there was little growth in the economy. While the government’s own analysis was one of not wishing to intervene to prop up ailing industries, rising unemployment resulted in the government making a number of interventions in 1970 by giving support to Rolls-Royce and upper Clyde shipyards to save them from bankruptcy. The economic situation was further affected by the fact that in 1972–3 Britain was experiencing the so-called Barber boom, whereby Chancellor of the Exchequer Barber deliberately expanded the money supply in an effort to reduce unemployment (Sked and Cook, 1984: 258–61). however, this expansion led to inflationary pressures that the government sought to control by imposing a policy that controlled prices and incomes. Such a policy inevitably led to frustrated workers and, at a time of constrained energy supplies, this placed the National union of Mineworkers (NuM) centre stage in a conflict with the government over pay and conditions of coal miners. Faced with the prospect of industrial action, dwindling reserves at power stations and a balance of payments deficit, heath took the decision on 13 December 1973 to conserve energy supplies by announcing a three-day week, which finally came into operation on New Year’s Eve. For a country that only three decades before had defeated hitler, the pictures of people working by candlelight hardly conveyed the impression of a prosperous nation (Marr, 2008: 340–1). As Dominic Sandbrook has reflected Nothing like it had ever been seen before in Britain in peacetime, and life during the last days of 1973 had a faint, domesticated whiff of the last days of Pompeii about it, with reports of people queuing outside shops for bread, candles, paraffin, toilet paper and cans of soup. (Sandbrook, 2011: 595) Matters worsened when on 4 February 1974 the NuM announced that a majority of 81 per cent of miners had voted to go on strike for greater pay from 5 February. This raised the question of who was running the country; in response heath called a general election in February 1974 with the statement

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‘who governs Britain?’. The answer given by the electorate was that it was not heath.

RENEgOTIATION AND REFERENDuM

Callaghan, James (1912–2005): Prime Min­ ister 1976–9, previously Foreign secretary 1974– 6, home secretary 1967– 70 and chancellor of the exchequer 1964–70. his premiership was domi­ nated by poor economic performance and indus­ trial unrest. Devolution: refers to the transfer of powers from central government to a lower level, such as in the case of the UK through the granting of devolved powers to northern ireland, scotland and Wales.

The February 1974 election returned harold Wilson to power as leader of a minority Labour government. While the Labour Party won four more seats than the Conservatives, it had 34 too few for an outright majority. The Labour government called a further general Election in October 1974, which resulted in Labour gaining an overall majority of four MPs. This narrowest of margins was complicated by the presence of clear divisions within the Labour Party, most notably between those who advocated more centrist policies, such as Roy Jenkins and Denis healey, and those who advocated radical left-wing policies, such as Tony Benn. The latter was a particularly influential grouping and this meant that both Wilson and his successor as Prime Minister, James Callaghan (1976–9), required the support of minor parties to ensure the government was able to retain power. The minor parties of the Liberals, Scottish and Welsh Nationalists and the ulster unionists had increased in power as their number of MPs increased to 26 at the October 1974 election (in Scotland the Scottish Nationalist Party received over 30 per cent of the vote). Not only did this make the process of government more difficult, it also strengthened the nationalist cause that led to devolution referendums being held in Scotland and Wales in March 1979, although these did not receive sufficient support from the electorate. This backdrop of a divided parliamentary party and the reliance on the support of minor parties meant that the Labour government’s policies at home and abroad had to reflect a wide group of interests. This had a profound effect on Britain’s European policy, where Wilson’s pragmatism had already led him in 1971 to commit a future Labour government to renegotiate the terms of entry that heath had obtained. In March 1974 Wilson set out to renegotiate the terms of entry and, as Denman notes, ‘these were devices to hold the Party together’ (1996: 246). The Foreign Secretary James Callaghan laid out the government’s concerns over the terms of Britain’s membership of the Community in a speech to the Council of Ministers on 1 April 1974 [Document 18]. Four key issues dominated the renegotiations: the reform of the CAP, the Commonwealth, the issue of state aids to industry and the regions, and the budget. Wilson and Callaghan entered into negotiations with Britain’s European partners during the winter of 1974–5 and managed to achieve some concessions, notably with regard to access for Commonwealth trade. Other issues proved more complex, with there being no desire for a renegotiation of the CAP. Elsewhere the government was able to secure

Finding a way

a so-called ‘correcting mechanism’ on the budget, which meant that Britain would receive a rebate of up to £125 million if its share of the Community budget were to exceed its proportion of the total Community gDP. While this did not go as far as the government had hoped for, the fact that the discrepancy was acknowledged helped to remove some of the concerns in government. As the process of renegotiation did not produce fundamental changes in Community policy, this in itself gave rise to a concern that the policy was as much to do with squaring the domestic circle of a Labour Party that was divided over the issue of Europe as it was about securing better terms of membership for Britain (Allen, 2004: 55). The reality of these divisions would be confirmed when the Cabinet voted by 16 to 7 in favour of the renegotiated terms at a meeting on 17 March 1975 (the seven ministers who rejected the terms were Barbara Castle, Tony Benn, Michael Foot, William Ross, Peter Shore, John Silkin and Eric Varley). A majority of the parliamentary Labour Party were similarly opposed (Forster and Blair, 2002: 21). Although the terms were finally approved by two-to-one in the June 1975 referendum (17.3 million voted ‘yes’ and 8.4 million ‘no’), the very process of ripping up Britain’s terms of entry and putting them to a referendum vote inevitably undermined Britain’s position within the Community [Document 19]. Domestic politics seemed to have taken precedence in determining the European agenda. Writing in 2001, Peter Mangold was able to reflect that ‘the 1975 referendum, despite the large majority it produced for continued British membership of the EEC, did not reconcile the country to the Community’ (Mangold, 2001: 169). Within the Labour Party the renegotiation did not resolve the issue of Europe, with the left wing of the Party failing to accept the government’s decision.

ChALLENgES AND TuRMOIL Outside the European arena, the Labour government attached priority to the maintenance of Britain’s close relationships with the uS (Dumbrell, 2001: 78). This was a shift in direction from heath’s focus on Europe, and harked back to an earlier era of British foreign policy. Yet the notion of having a special relationship was diminished by the fact that Britain increasingly faced competition from other European countries that America regarded as equally close relations. The Labour government did not set out an outright European policy and this would result in Britain not engaging in the decision to create the European Monetary System in the late 1970s. Of all the factors that dogged the Labour government, financial issues were the most severe. Matters came to a head on 28 September 1976 through

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Jenkins, Roy (1920–2003): labour Party chancellor of the exchequer (1967– 70) and home secre­ tary (1974–6), he was appointed President of the european commis­ sion from 1977 to 1981. a committed european, his time as President of the european commis­ sion was dominated by UK complaints over its budget contribution. European Monetary Sys­ tem (EMS): a forerunner of the single currency. established in 1979 as a ‘zone of monetary stabil­ ity’, it included the erM, which was a parity grid for restricting the fluctu­ ation of currencies.

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a combination of industrial trouble and economic malaise. On that fateful day the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Denis healey, had been due to fly to a Commonwealth Finance Ministers’ Conference in hong Kong that preceded the annual International Monetary Fund (IMF) meeting in Manila. Before he got to London’s heathrow airport, a further decline in the value of Sterling meant that he was forced to cancel his plans and return to the Treasury to take control of matters (Marr, 2008: 366). As healey later recalled, ‘If I took the plane, I would be cut off from all contact with London for seventeen hours. I decided not to risk it, and drove back to London, still planning to go to Manila as soon as I had sorted things out’ (1990: 429). however, instead of travelling to Manila, healey went to the Labour Party conference in Blackpool on 30 April 1977 where he was forced to speak about the nation’s financial predicament from the conference floor rather than the platform as he was no longer a member of the Party’s executive. The whole situation appeared out of control. healey would later reflect that this was ‘to be the worst week of my life’ (1990: 428) and that the time between 28 and 30 April was ‘the lowest point of my period at the Treasury’ (1990: 429). To many observers, it seemed that the country was out of control. While such assessments were clearly an exaggeration, there was nevertheless an element of truth in the matter, with the Sterling crisis requiring a loan from the IMF in Washington to prop up the British economy (Dell, 1991). Britain’s dependency on the IMF highlighted the nation’s economic frailty and the extent to which European integration had not created the transformation in daily lives that people expected. For some the solution to this state of affairs was further European integration, most notably in the area of monetary cooperation. Much of the impetus came from Roy Jenkins who, upon his appointment as President of the European Commission in January 1977, sought to reinvigorate the Community after nearly a decade of sluggish economic progress. Central to this process was ‘reproclaiming the goal of monetary union’, which Jenkins publicly announced in a speech at the European university Institute in Florence on 27 October 1977 ( Jenkins, 1991: 463). Among Community member states, France and germany were crucial to this initiative, and at the April 1978 Copenhagen European Council, helmut Schmidt and Valéry giscard d’Estaing, in a private meeting with other heads of government, discussed the issue of constructing a new route to Economic and Monetary union (EMu). They specifically envisaged a fixed exchange rate that linked European currencies together, and this interest in monetary union crucially reflected a change in the underlying political climate that once again attached emphasis to further integration in this area of policy-making (Ludlow, 1982). Faced with this prospect, Callaghan decided that Britain would not join the European Monetary System (EMS). A considerable issue was the pressure

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that Callaghan was under from left-wing members of his Cabinet who did not welcome plans that would tie Britain closer to the EEC. There was also a wider concern about the need for independence in the setting of British monetary policy. Callaghan himself was lukewarm towards the Community and he held an American view that the stimulation of growth was best achieved through an existing organisation such as the IMF. On the other hand, the german Chancellor helmut Schmidt saw the battle against the recession essentially in terms of a fight against inflation, with the EMS, in which each participating currency accepted the discipline of the system, playing a central role. There was also the wider issue of British economic difficulties. European countries were forming their own common market out of an area that was their majority market, whereas Britain had markets elsewhere. Finally, Callaghan was reluctant to expose the pound to the rigour of being linked to a stronger Deutschmark and within a Community with which Britain still did less than half her trade (though this was increasing annually). While the Labour Party faced pressure on the European front, as the 1970s came to a close it was evident that it faced a greater threat from the public sector, where the government’s desire to gain a degree of control over the economic situation would result in a backlash of industrial disputes in 1979 that would become known as the ‘winter of discontent’. One of the most public demonstrations of this period was the decision taken by the Liverpool Parks and Cemeteries Branch of the general & Municipal Workers’ union to refuse to bury dead bodies, resulting in more than 300 corpses being left in a storage facility (Marr, 2008: 375). Such images gave the impression of a third-rank power struggling to retain control and it was against this background that Margaret Thatcher led the Conservative Party to victory in the 1979 general election under a campaign of ‘Labour isn’t working’. Few at the time could have predicted the true significance of Thatcher’s victory, which led to a Conservative government retaining power until 1997. Not since the radical reforms of the post-war Attlee government had Britain seen such significant changes as those that Thatcher implemented. But Thatcher also sought to re-emphasise Britain’s international standing, not least in terms of the special relationship with the uS. The years that followed resulted in some of the most significant changes in British politics of the twentieth century.

Thatcher, Margaret (1925–2013): conser­ vative Prime Minister between 4 May 1979 and 28 november 1990 and the first woman Prime Minister. thatcher was an influential reforming Prime Minister who believed in the importance of the free market. her foreign policy was shaped by a strong relationship with the Usa and a belief that european integration was moving into aspects of policy that were the pre­ serve of national govern­ ments. this particularly applied to the notion of an ‘identikit’ europe, as emphasised by her oppo­ sition to social policy integration and the cre­ ation of a single currency. this position brought her into conflict with senior cabinet members and resulted in her losing the conservative Party leader­ ship contest in november 1990.

Plate 1 Empire Marketing Board 1927–1933 poster, Highways of Empire. Long before the current focus on globalisation, the Empire resulted in significant movements of people and economic exchange. By the early years of the twentieth century Britain’s economic position was being challenged by Germany and the USA. © The National Archives

Plate 2 Churchill, Roosevelt and Stalin at the Yalta Conference in February 1945. The Yalta meeting resulted in Germany being divided into four occupation zones that would be governed by the US, Soviet Union, Britain and France. Such a decision essentially divided Europe into spheres of US and Soviet influence. © Pictorial Press Ltd/Alamy

Plate 3 Anthony Eden at the Conservative Party conference in Llandudno in October 1956, during the Suez crisis. Despite his great experience in the arena of foreign policy, Eden demonstrated a lack of sound judgement over the Suez crisis. In the end, the crisis would be his undoing. © Getty Images

Plate 4 Edward Heath signs the Treaty of Accession for Britain to join the European Community on 22 January 1972. For many critics, this was a crucial point when Britain essentially signed over its sovereignty to ‘Europe’. But the reality was that by the early 1970s there was an overwhelming viewpoint that Britain’s future lay in Europe. © European Union, 2013

Plate 5 Ronald Reagan and Margaret Thatcher at Camp David. Thatcher and Reagan formed one of the closest relationships of all political leaders. Both leaders shared the same view on the importance of free enterprise, a reduced influence of the state at home and the need to counter Communism abroad. © Everett Collection Historical/Alamy

Plate 6 George W. Bush and Tony Blair in Maryland in 2001. Such was Blair’s personal commitment to stand shoulder-to-shoulder with Bush over the war on terror that Iraq has been viewed just as much as ‘Blair’s War’ as ‘Bush’s War’. © AFP/Getty Images

Plate 7 Illustration by Ingram Pinn from ‘British foreign policy should be realist’. As Prime Minister, David Cameron has been criticised for pandering to Eurosceptic interests by not offering an outright commitment to Europe. For some, however, this is indicative of a turn towards a foreign policy that focuses on Britain’s interests. © The Financial Times Limited 2013. All Rights Reserved

Plate 8 UK Border Agency sign at London Gatwick airport. The creation of the UK Border Agency in 2008 signified a tightening of government policy on immigration. Although it was decided in 2013 to return its work to the Home Office, the underlying policy of restricting immigration into the UK has continued. © Russell Hart/Alamy

5 Resurgence: 1979–1990

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ew were surprised when Margaret Thatcher’s Conservative Party won the May 1979 general election. Her entry into Downing Street ushered in a period of 18 years of Conservative government. Thatcher proved to be the ultimate conviction politician, with her views about Britain’s foreign and domestic policy being shaped by her own personal leadership. While her policies helped to establish a degree of economic and political stability, this did not mean that her period in office was one of consensus. Domestic reforms ushered in dramatic changes to the structure of the British economic and political system, which resulted in a restructuring of the old industrial consensus that saw an increase in unemployment in traditional heavy manufacturing industries such as coal and steel and a concurrent decline in the power of trade unions.

EConoMiC RESTRuCTuRing The 1980s were marked by a greater emphasis on industries of the service economy, such as finance, insurance and leisure. This strategy was part of an effort to increase the competitiveness of the British economy and rid it of out-of-date industrial practices that the government believed were primarily responsible for the economic malaise that engulfed the nation in the 1970s. in practical terms this meant that unemployment actually trebled, from 1 million in 1979 to over 3 million by 1983, peaking at a rate of 12 per cent of the labour force in 1982. The impact of these changes was hardest felt in industrial communities and inner cities, and this in turn contributed to the civil unrest and riots that engulfed a number of English cities in 1981. Although such reforms were about trying to make Britain competitive again, there was a clear political dynamic to them as the Thatcher government wanted to weaken the role of the trade unions (Sked and Cook, 1984: 343). The changes that followed resulted in a significant restructuring of the British

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labour market that was reflected in a growth in flexible work patterns, as well as an increase in the number of predominantly part-time female workers. The product of these changes was that the British labour market had the least legislative restrictions among European member states in the 1980s, with this proving to be a considerable area of tension between the desire of European member states to give employees greater social protection and the British government’s desire for deregulation. A combative approach to Europe was particularly evident in the area of Britain’s contribution to the Community budget where the government’s calculations predicted that Britain was becoming the largest net contributor. But while there was a need to ensure a fairer deal for Britain, Thatcher attacked the issue with a degree of zeal which did not endear her to other European leaders and her period in office would see Britain’s position within the Community cemented as a disconnected and awkward member state (george, 1998). To observers this reflected a move back to a more natural state of affairs as the Thatcher government’s foreign policy became wrapped around the themes of ‘strong support for the Atlantic Alliance, hostility towards the Soviet union, a strong defence of the nuclear deterrent with only a rather mechanical deference towards the European Community or the new Commonwealth’ (Sked and Cook, 1984: 363). Whereas some commentators reflected that Thatcher helped to make Britain great again, her period in office was actually a more complex state of affairs. As Roy Denman has reflected Mrs Thatcher struck up a strong friendship with President Reagan, indulged in an orgy of flag-waving over the Falkland islands, robustly set about anyone in the Commonwealth club who dared to criticise her policies, and made no secret of her contempt for attempts to unify Europe. (1996: 259) As Prime Minister she helped to elevate the country once more to the top table, but the fundamental economic weaknesses that had blighted the country remained at the end of her period in office. Britain in 1990 was, on the one hand, more competitive than it had been in 1979, but competitiveness based on worker productivity had not dramatically changed; British workers just worked more hours. Britain had also become a more divisive society, with the focus on free enterprise attaching greater priority to the role of the individual; success and wealth were fashionable, poverty was not. Poverty rates increased, with the gap between the rich and the poor widening against a backdrop of Thatcher’s comment that ‘there is no such thing as society’. Thatcher’s period in office also benefited from a huge surge in revenues from north Sea oil and gas, and

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without this revenue she would not have been able to progress her domestic economic reforms. indeed, it is a somewhat tragic situation that both she and many of the leading government ministers of the day devoted such little attention in their memoirs to the reality of this state of affairs (Marr, 2008: 440). The economic windfall from the north Sea meant that Thatcher could progress with policies that resulted in spiralling unemployment and which by 1982 led to opinion polls charting her as the most unpopular Prime Minister since 1945. Yet as Prime Minister she would go on to win the 1983 and 1987 general elections. That she achieved this owed as much to events 8,000 miles away when Argentina invaded the Falkland islands on 2 April 1982 than it did to the government’s strategy towards its domestic, foreign and defence policy.

EMPiRE lEgACiES Although Britain’s entry to the Community marked a shift in focus away from Empire, like her post-1945 predecessors Thatcher was confronted with having to deal with the imperial legacy. While Britain’s withdrawal from Africa did not always result in the newly independent countries experiencing the stability and growth that many hoped for, one of the first issues that Thatcher had to deal with on her entry to Downing Street in May 1979 was the impending collapse of the Rhodesian government. in the late 1970s Rhodesia was a throwback to the days of Empire, where a minority white government controlled a majority black population. in the changed geopolitical situation of post-colonial Africa this was no longer acceptable and as such Rhodesia increasingly stood out from the norm under a government led by ian Smith. While circumstances began to change in April 1979 with the election of a black-led government under the leadership of Bishop Abel Muzorewa, Smith remained in power and this presented a complex situation for the Thatcher government where a considerable number of Conservative MPs wanted Britain to recognise Muzorewa as the leader of the government. The problem was that the white Rhodesians did not share this view. Britain’s Foreign Secretary, lord Carrington, was particularly mindful of the need to ensure that a new government in Rhodesia had to have, as far as was possible, the backing of the international community (Carrington, 1989: 288). For this to be achieved, Carrington organised a conference that took place at lancaster House in london from 10 September to 15 December 1979. The meeting produced the lancaster House Agreement that provided the vehicle for transition; the country was temporarily returned to British rule until free elections were held from 27 to 29 February 1980. The outcome of the elections was that Robert Mugabe was elected leader and Rhodesia achieved

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independence as Zimbabwe in April of that year. While the settlement had not resolved all issues of concern, including the key issue of the control of land between black and white communities, for Britain ‘What was significant, however, was that the Rhodesian issue had been removed from the agenda of British politics. A burden of considerable weight had been lifted from the country’s diplomatic agenda’ (Bennett, 2004: 126). With the granting of independence to the new Hebrides (to be renamed Vanuatu) in 1980 and Belize in 1981, this meant that, with the exception of a few islands scattered across the globe, the process of decolonisation that had begun after the Second World War had been largely completed. Whereas the Thatcher government managed to bring independence to Rhodesia, Britain’s imperial past was tested to the full when Argentina invaded the Falkland islands in April 1982. Although in their history the Falkland islands have had a combination of Argentinian, British, French and Spanish settlements, they have been governed by Britain since 1833. Few people in Britain were aware of these barren and windswept islands which had not figured in the great debates on decolonisation that had taken place in the post-1945 era. But while the islanders themselves wished to remain under British rule, the islands had strong economic links with Argentina. A combination of economic realities and Argentina’s continuing claim for sovereignty meant that since the 1960s a succession of British governments had sought to explore options for a negotiated settlement. Although the Thatcher government initially continued with this strategy, it was a policy that ran counter to the wishes of the islanders who wanted to remain British. But while the Thatcher government decided not to progress with its plans for a negotiated settlement – primarily as a result of a publicity campaign and parliamentary pressure – it failed to back up its support for the islands with anything more than words. indeed, Britain was actually planning to scale back its overseas military expenditure and in this sense the policy of the Conservative government ‘was contradictory, wishing on the one hand to restrict spending, on the other to pose as the party of strong defence’ (Young, 1997: 201). in 1981 the Secretary of State for Defence, John nott, undertook a review to slim down Britain’s defence roles, which nonetheless still required significant resources to maintain a balance between defending the uK, retaining strategic nuclear forces, contributing to nATo, continuing with its commitments in germany and contributing to other obligations as and when they arose. All of this required significant financial resources and consequently the 1981 defence review sought to reduce Britain’s defence budget by concentrating in the future on nATo and on maintaining a nuclear deterrent. This meant that Britain would no longer have the capability to operate out of the nATo area and this in turn necessitated a significant reduction in the

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size of the Royal navy to about 100 ships (from 300 in the late 1950s). This included the withdrawal of HMS Endurance, an ice-patrol ship that operated in the South Atlantic and which acted as a symbol of Britain’s defence of the Falkland islands (Sharp, 1997: 58). The problem with such a strategy was that it sent a mixed message to both the islanders and to the government in Buenos Aires; on the one hand Britain wanted to continue its governance of the islands, but on the other did not wish to provide the means to do this. As Reynolds has noted ‘the Thatcher government, like those of Baldwin and Chamberlain in the 1930s, was caught between appeasement and deterrence’ (2000: 244). The military junta in Buenos Aires interpreted the situation to mean that while Britain was unwilling to pursue a negotiated settlement, it would not stop Argentina taking control of the islands (Bennett, 2013: 164). This proved to be a fatal miscalculation, which answered the prayers of a senior British official who had quipped after the nott review that ‘what we need now is a small colonial war requiring a lot of ships’ (Reynolds, 2000: 261). While the Argentinian invasion of the Falkland islands in April 1982 initially created panic among senior members of the British government, a decision was quickly taken to assemble a task force to recapture the islands. The decision was shaped by the views of the Chief of the naval Staff, Sir Henry leach, who assured Thatcher that a military solution could be achieved. This was a key moment for her as she recognised the high nature of the political stakes. As Paul Sharp has reflected, This defeat had happened on Thatcher’s watch, and her government’s defence policy could plausibly be regarded as a contributing factor. Worse, it was hard to counter the charge that the whole episode was symptomatic of precisely the sort of post-imperial failure of nerve which Thatcher herself had so strongly criticised. Argentina’s success mocked everything for which she stood and posed a deadly threat to everything she valued, not least her own political future. (Sharp, 1997: 63) in response to the invasion, the Defence Secretary, John nott, and the Foreign Secretary, lord Carrington, offered their resignations. in Thatcher’s mind someone had to be blamed and the chief focus of her wrath was the Foreign office, which she saw as the Ministry for foreigners. She regarded it as being too amenable on foreign policy issues generally and specifically criticised it for not having had the foresight to anticipate the invasion. in reflecting on these events one academic has noted that British foreign policy during the period prior to the Falklands invasion could be regarded as ‘the diplomacy of disaster’ (Sharp, 1997: 50–63). Consequently, lord Carrington was the sacrificial lamb that Thatcher considered necessary to lessen disquiet at this

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invasion of British sovereignty. Such a course of action marked a weakening in the power of the Foreign office and a strengthening of her own influence on foreign affairs, which in her mind required less focus on a willingness to compromise with foreigners and more of a greater need to adopt the same sort of combative approach that she brought to domestic politics. Britain’s efforts to recover the Falkland islands sparked a great deal of national pride, with large crowds watching the initial Task Force set sail on 5 April, but sending forces to the South Atlantic also acted as a significant propaganda boost to Britain’s international standing in emphasising a renewed sense of confidence and purpose. it was a viewpoint captured in the Newsweek cover of 19 April 1982 that bore the caption ‘The Empire Strikes Back’. The Task Force, which would eventually include over 100 ships, managed to recover the islands in just over two months, the Argentine forces surrendering on 14 June. Victory had come at the cost of the lives of 255 men and the loss of a number of ships to Argentine aircraft using the latest Exocet missiles. But Britain had equally inflicted considerable losses on Argentine forces, of which the sinking by the British submarine Conqueror of the Argentine cruiser Belgrano with the death of some 321 sailors proved to be the most controversial incident of the conflict because the ship was heading away from the exclusion zone that Britain had set around the islands and therefore was not a legitimate target. Whatever the legitimacy of the sinking, the fact of the matter was that it had the effect of silencing threats from Argentine naval forces. This was important because Britain’s victory was less than assured, with the complexity of fighting a war some 8,000 miles away and the fast-approaching South Atlantic winter placing significant strains on the nation’s resources. Victory was made possible partly through the support provided by Britain’s allies, of whom the uS proved to be the most significant in terms of intelligence assistance, military supplies, the use of Ascension island as a crucial transit point between Britain and the Falklands, and even the offer of a uS aircraft carrier (Cradock, 1997: 55). Whatever the close-run nature of the Falklands victory, it had a dramatic effect on Britain’s standing in the world. Both at home and abroad, Thatcher’s personal popularity increased and the government’s decisiveness in undertaking the operation was a vivid contrast to much of the indecision that appeared to shackle government policy-making through the 1970s. Victory provided Thatcher with a much-needed boost among the domestic electorate and provided the basis for the Conservative Party’s triumph in the 1983 general election with a majority of 144 MPs. Just as the Falklands reflected Britain’s willingness to go to war to defend a far-flung outpost of Empire, some 10,000 miles away in the case of Hong Kong the country faced a different problem. Whereas policy-makers in london were caught off-guard with Argentina’s invasion of the Falklands, in the case

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Howe, Geoffrey (b. 1926): conservative chancellor of the exchequer 1979– 83, Foreign secretary 1983–9 and leader of the house of commons and deputy Prime Minister 1989–90. he resigned from office in november 1990 because of dif­ ferences with Prime Minister thatcher over european policy.

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of Hong Kong they were aware of the impending problem of the need to secure a negotiated settlement with China. under the terms of the 1842 Treaty of nanking, Hong Kong island had been ceded by what at that time was a relatively weak China to Britain in perpetuity and in so doing marked the end of the First opium War. A few years later in 1860 Britain acquired in perpetuity part of the Kowloon Peninsula and Stonecutters island. Finally, on 9 June 1898 Britain obtained what were known as the new Territories, albeit this time on a 99-year lease. While all of these lands constituted Hong Kong, the vast majority of the colony (over 92 per cent) was comprised of the new Territories that were the primary source of basic necessities such as food and water (Cradock, 1994: 162). A century later and with Britain now facing a China that was economically, militarily and politically powerful, the inevitable question faced by policy-makers in london was what could they do to achieve a satisfactory solution for Hong Kong, given that the lease on the new Territories expired on 30 June 1997? The task of seeking a solution was led in the early stages of the negotiations principally by Prime Minister Thatcher and Foreign office officials, most notably the chief negotiator Sir Percy Cradock. By contrast, Foreign office ministers had less of a role. This reflected the significance of the issues at stake and the fact that in the early 1980s the Foreign office was led by three different Foreign Secretaries (lord Carrington, Francis Pym and geoffrey Howe) [Document 23]. indeed, it would not be until the appointment of Geoffrey Howe in the summer of 1983 that the Foreign office began to play a larger role in the issue of Hong Kong (Cradock, 1994: 176–7). The government was aware that a solution could not be achieved by resorting to military means, given that it faced ‘a regime with vastly superior power, imbued with nationalist sentiment, determined to recover lost territory, and impatient to issue its decrees to that end’ (Cradock, 1994: 209). Moreover, Hong Kong was dependent on the new Territories for vital utilities and on China for the importation of food. But while it was inevitable that Britain would have to hand Hong Kong back to China, it was not clear what the precise terms of that settlement would be, given that the country could not just hand over Hong Kong to the Communist rulers in Beijing without some form of protection for democratic rights in Hong Kong (Patten, 1998: 13). A key factor influencing settlement was the necessity of maintaining business confidence. This was further shaped by the fact that the majority of mortgages on Hong Kong land were for a period of 15 years. As the chief British negotiator on Hong Kong, Sir Percy Cradock, noted, the consequence of this was that ‘if there were no clarification of the future by 1982 or 1983, prospective purchasers might feel they lacked security and business confidence could rapidly dwindle’ (Cradock, 1994: 165). Britain’s initial response under Prime Minister Thatcher was to propose a British administration with Chinese

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sovereignty, a suggestion that China did not look favourably upon. in the end, in 1984 a deal was reached under the terms of a Sino-British joint declaration whereby on 1 July 1997 Hong Kong would become a Special Administrative Region of China. The joint declaration guaranteed the maintenance of Hong Kong’s capitalist system for 50 years, the election of its legislature, the maintenance of existing legal and judicial frameworks, preservation of the rights and freedoms of the people of Hong Kong under Hong Kong law, the retention of the existing educational system, the ability for Hong Kong residents to travel and move freely in and out of Hong Kong, and that Hong Kong would retain autonomy in relation to economic, financial and monetary matters (Cradock, 1994: 208–9). This became known as the concept of ‘one country, two systems’ and was an example of a British government engaging in proactive diplomacy to secure a solution (Coles, 2000: 109). While the agreement to hand over Hong Kong marked for many the end of the Empire, the event highlighted the changed nature of Britain’s position in world politics. Whereas in the 1950s, 1960s and 1970s the Empire legacy was principally viewed through the lens of the costs associated with former and existing colonies, from the 1980s onwards greater attention was attached to the way in which the Commonwealth could be used to support Britain’s economic and political objectives. This included greater emphasis by the Foreign office on trade promotion and good governance, while Britain’s leadership of the Commonwealth was also used as justification for its permanent seat on the un Security Council whenever reform of the latter was raised. Just as pragmatism was brought to bear in resolving Britain’s interests in Hong Kong, the Thatcher government demonstrated a similarly realistic approach to the issue of northern ireland. The northern ireland issue extended beyond the interests of the governments in london and Dublin to include policy-makers and activists in the uS where a strong irish lobby, notably in the form of political support from key members of Congress known as the Friends of ireland and financial fundraising for the Provisional irish Republican Army (iRA) from the irish northern Aid Committee (otherwise known as noraid), impacted on any efforts to secure peace. The upsurge in republican violence that took place in the 1970s meant that northern ireland, and in particular Belfast, was divided by the paramilitary organisations that engaged in a brutal campaign for either the uniting of ireland or the maintenance of northern ireland as part of the uK. of these organisations, the most high-profile was the iRA, whose objective was to use both force and political pressure to create a united ireland. in the 1970s high-profile iRA bombs killed 19 people in Birmingham on 21 november 1974, the Conservative MP Airey neave on 30 March 1979 and the Queen’s cousin lord louis Mountbatten on 27 August 1979. Thatcher’s own preference was not

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to negotiate with terrorists, a policy that was emphasised by the use of Britain’s Special Air Service (SAS) to end the iranian Embassy siege in May 1980 and the iRA’s attempt to blow her up at the Conservative Party conference in october 1984. Yet, despite her personal revulsion at such terrorist action, Thatcher was equally aware of the need to establish some form of political settlement in northern ireland and to work towards peace. This manifested itself in her signing the Anglo-irish agreement at Hillsborough Castle in County Down on 15 november 1985 with the irish leader, garret Fitzgerald. The significance of the agreement lay in the fact that it provided the government in Dublin for the first time with a say in the governance of northern ireland through the creation of regular intergovernmental Conferences that would involve ministers and officials from both countries. in so doing, the agreement went some way to acknowledging the problem of northern ireland and moving forward towards a peaceful solution.

ColD WAR WARRioR While the legacies of Empire impacted on British foreign policy in the 1980s, a defining feature of the decade was the renewed Cold War tension between America and the Soviet union. The backdrop was a deteriorating situation in international affairs in the late 1970s as the period of détente gave way to greater conflict. 1979 was marked by the iranian revolution, which not only removed a key Western ally in the region but also resulted in the taking of uS hostages in the uS Embassy in Tehran on 4 november. A few weeks later, on 27 December, the Soviet union invaded Afghanistan. To policy-makers in Washington, the underlying picture of the late 1980s was one of ‘the united States had been disadvantaged in its rivalry with the Soviet union and that it was losing the Cold War’ (Blair and Curtis, 2009: 78). Within the uS much of the blame for this state of affairs was inevitably placed at the feet of President Jimmy Carter and it was not surprising that 1980 brought with it the election of a new President, Ronald Reagan, and a change from détente to renewed Cold War conflict. When Reagan eventually took office in January 1981, after the period of transition between the outgoing Democrat and incoming Republican administrations, he did so with ‘the explicit intention of restoring our military and political strength’ (Weinberger, 1990: 234). The hallmark of the early Reagan presidency was an impassioned assertive and aggressive stance towards the Soviet union. He would comment that ‘the Soviet union was engaged in a brutal war in Afghanistan and Communism was extending its tentacles deep into Central America and Africa’ (Reagan, 1990: 217). in a speech to the British Parliament in 1982 Reagan condemned the Soviet union to the

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‘ash heap of history’ while he later said that it was the ‘focus of evil in the modern world. . . . an evil empire’. Reagan essentially wanted a speedy end to what was left of détente as this period had witnessed a strengthening of Soviet influence in the Third World, especially in Africa and indo-China. The uS view of the détente period was that it had been a one-way street favouring Moscow. But while he undertook a considerable build-up of uS armed forces, Reagan did so also within the context of rhetoric regarding the potential for arms reductions. The dual nature of this policy of military build-up alongside arms control was reflected in the decision taken by nATo in 1979 to modernise its intermediate nuclear Forces (inF) in Europe with ground-launched Cruise Missiles (glCMs) and Pershing ii missiles, while at the same time beginning arms control negotiations with the Soviet union. Known as the ‘dual-track’, the decision to deploy uS Cruise and Pershing ii missiles had been influenced by the deployment, since 1977, of a new generation of Soviet missiles called the SS-20. This strategically necessary, but politically difficult, decision which had been advocated by European governments to counter the SS-20 threat, nonetheless took place at a time of a renewed campaign by peace movements in Western Europe, the leading group of which was the Campaign for nuclear Disarmament (CnD). in Britain this was reflected in a fracturing of the political consensus between labour and Conservative governments on nuclear deterrence that had developed over the years, with the labour Party having adopted an increasingly left-wing position after 1979 under the leadership of Michael Foot. labour’s position contrasted vividly with that of Thatcher who was pro-America and anti-Soviet. Thatcher fully recognised the significance and importance of nuclear deterrence and as such not only backed the Cruise and Pershing decision, but also renewed Britain’s own nuclear deterrent by agreeing in March 1982 to the purchase of the submarinelaunched Trident ii-D5 ballistic missiles from the uSA as the successor to the Polaris system negotiated by Macmillan (Bennett, 2013: 165). Thatcher’s decision to secure Trident not only emphasised Britain’s privileged access to uS technology, but also demonstrated its commitment to retain a global role as one of only a small number of legitimate nuclear powers. As was the case for her predecessors, Britain’s special relationship with America tended to have greater benefits for policy-makers in london than Washington as ‘it gave an extra dimension to British foreign policy, a further lease of life to British influence across the board’ (Cradock, 1997: 52). The Trident decision inevitably came at an economic cost as the government struggled to balance the increasing costs of military hardware with a limited ability to cut costs at a time of renewed Cold War tension. The delicate nature of these decisions had been highlighted in the Falklands conflict where, if the

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Détente: the relaxation of tension between the Usa and the soviet Union that took place from the late 1960s to the mid­ 1970s.

Arms control: initiatives to place limitations on the number of weapons. this can include efforts invested to stop the future spread of weapons, attempts to reduce the number of existing weapons, as well as the elimination of certain types of weapons.

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government had made further inroads into its 1981 defence cuts, its capacity to retain the islands would certainly have been limited. With the Falklands victory behind it, for the remainder of the 1980s the Thatcher government prioritised Britain’s ability to project force. While this would see British forces being deployed as part of a Western European union (WEu) response to protect shipping interests in the gulf between 1987 and 1990 (Sanders, 1990: 184), the costs of adopting such a position and upgrading its own forces to meet new challenges often proved to be a strain on the nation’s finances. As John Young has written, ‘The old dilemma of multiple roles and limited finance had not therefore disappeared with the withdrawal from East of Suez, even if resources were much better matched to commitments’ (1997: 2001). European governments, having demonstrated their loyalty to the alliance by confirming their decision to deploy Cruise and Pershing missiles, were hoping for a period of relaxation in transatlantic relations. This was not to be, as Reagan, with no allied consultation whatever, announced on 23 March 1983 the concept of strategic ballistic missile defence (BMD) as a means of rendering nuclear weapons ‘impotent and obsolete’. By doing so he took much of the nATo alliance and part of his administration by surprise. The European response to the Strategic Defence initiative (SDi), dubbed ‘Star Wars’, was hostile because it fundamentally challenged the superpower relationship between America and the Soviet union and the nature of the Atlantic Alliance. This was because ‘this laser astrodome of defence would overrule or overcome the core principle of deterrence by taking the “mutual” out of mutual assured destruction (MAD), as it removed the threat of Soviet retaliation’ (Blair and Curtis, 2009: 90). For European allies this meant that the principle of equal security and, therefore, equal vulnerability would have been reduced as the uS obtained greater protection than its allies through the intended creation of what was imagined as a dome of protection over America against nuclear weapons whereby lasers deployed in space would destroy enemy missiles. For European governments the main military question mark over SDi was that in providing defence for the uS it could remove the linkage between America’s security and that of Europe. irrespective of concerns over the feasibility of the SDi project, it was clearly evident that it posed a significant question for European governments. Thatcher publicly supported the project, although privately she raised concerns with Reagan (Reynolds, 2000: 262). Although Thatcher’s public support for SDi was influenced by a desire to be part of the likely inevitable economic stimulus that would arise from the development of the high-tech weaponry, the overriding factor that influenced her support was a realisation that it was not in Britain’s interests to stand against America. Thus, while Thatcher was aware of the pitfalls and problems attached to SDi, her foreign policy adviser Sir Percy Cradock notes that her views

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were more than balanced by the President’s attachment to the plan; and that it would be pointless and would do Britain and the transatlantic relationship no good if we were seen to be carping and railing at a major American policy move. We had to work with the grain, welcome the proposal and try to fit it into a framework helpful to British and European interests. (Cradock, 1997: 64) Thatcher’s willingness to stand side-by-side with America reflected her own views of the successes and failings in British foreign policy in the post-war period, most notably Suez, about which she would later recall that the lesson of Suez was that ‘We must never again find ourselves on the opposite side to the united States in a major international crisis affecting Britain’s interests’ (Thatcher, 1995: 88). This pragmatism did not sit well with her Foreign Secretary, Sir geoffrey Howe, who publicly set out his reservations about SDi in a speech to the Royal united Services institute (RuSi) in March 1985. His concern was that, rather than enhancing deterrence or curbing the arms race, America was actually in danger of stimulating a new arms race. Howe’s rebuke of the strategic reasoning that underpinned SDi infuriated Thatcher. The speech was a further demonstration of the growing tension between Thatcher and her Foreign Secretary, and which would be reflected in the Prime Minister’s greater reliance on her own personal advisers on foreign policy issues, notably Sir Charles Powell and Sir Percy Cradock. Commenting on this relationship, the former British diplomat Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles has written: Powell’s ruthless efficiency, his golden pen, his intellectual rigour, his visceral scepticism towards Europe or at least towards greater union, and his profoundly Atlanticist views all played into his boss’s view of the world. But what really did for Mrs Thatcher was to give her instincts on foreign policy the intellectual respectability and bureaucratic coherence they needed. (Cowper-Coles, 2013: 85) While this suggested a tilting away from the FCo’s power and influence on foreign affairs, in reality Thatcher’s use of her own foreign policy advisers reflected a frugal build-up of power in Downing Street rather than bureaucratic empire building. As Sir Percy Cradock has rightly reflected, this was ‘a typically British, shoestring operation, depending more on devotion beyond the call of duty and a certain sleight-of-hand than on any inherent logic or practical exercise’ (Cradock, 1994: 217). Thatcher’s public support for uS policy mirrored a continuation of the line pursued by successive governments. And where there were exceptions

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to the rule, they were often influenced by personal viewpoints – such as refusing to go along with the uS boycott of the Moscow olympics after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan – and where there were particular economic interests at stake. This included her decision to challenge the decision taken by the Reagan administration in June 1982 to impose sanctions on European firms that were involved in the building of a 3,600-mile pipeline from the Western Siberian urengoy field to Western Europe. This included the Scottish company, John Brown Engineering, which had a contract for over £100 million worth of turbines for the pipeline. The dispute arose out of deep-rooted differences between the uS and Europe over East–West trade policy. Reagan had argued against the pipeline at the ottawa summit of July 1981, noting his concern at the prospect of the Soviet union gaining hard currency earnings, as well as Western Europe becoming dependent on Soviet gas and thereby giving Moscow a political leverage. However, the European view was coloured by the fact that ‘for them the punitive dangerous dependence on Soviet natural gas and the Soviet gains in Western currency were reasonable trade-offs for a $10 billion pipeline deal that would energize their economies at a time of recession’ (Kaplan, 1988: 161). These divisions were emphasised when the British government mobilised powers that directed companies not to abide by the uS regulations and gave directions to certain companies under these powers. Such a position was also influenced by a view that the uS adopted a hypocritical position, given that it was continuing to sell grain to the Soviet union while seeking to block the pipeline, and eventually, in november 1982 the uS announced that it was lifting sanctions against the pipeline (Cradock, 1997: 56; Thatcher, 1993: 255). While Britain’s position over the pipeline was a rare example of it acting independently to Washington in the course of the 1980s, it was also an illustration of the benefits of Community membership, where the uS retraction of sanctions had been influenced by a collective European position. Commenting on this episode, David Hannay has noted that ‘it was already clear, even then, that our influence in Washington could be greatly augmented if we were part of a European mainstream view on this or that policy issue’ (Hannay, 2013: 119). in the 1980s the only other notable point of friction between America and Britain occurred in october 1983 when President Reagan ordered uS troops into the tiny West indies island of grenada to restore order after a left-wing group undertook a coup and killed the country’s Prime Minister. Thatcher noted her annoyance of the invasion to Reagan, stating she was ‘deeply disturbed’ by the uS action as grenada was a Commonwealth country (Thatcher, 1993: 331). Such disputes were very much a rarity, however, and the tendency throughout the 1980s was for the Thatcher government to offer unswerving support for the policies of the Reagan administration. Such

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support took a variety of forms, from standing side-by-side with the uS in international forums such as the un on issues such as Afghanistan (because of the Soviet invasion) and nicaragua (because of the Socialist-leaning Sandinista government). A consequence of this was that ‘the Thatcher government operated as little more than an enthusiastic anti-communist client of the uS’ (Dumbrell, 2001: 90). indeed, the Thatcher government engaged in the covert sale of arms to Saddam Hussein in iraq as a means of trying to counterbalance the threat posed by iran. This was irrespective of the fact that the Thatcher government fully recognised that Saddam Hussein was a brutal and thuggish dictator who inflicted many human rights abuses on his own people. one of the most notable public demonstrations of the emphasis that Thatcher attached to the special relationship was when Britain was the only European state that allowed American use of its bases for the launch of aircraft bombing raids against libya on 15 April 1986 (Cradock, 1997: 75). Although America had been critical of libyan policies, which included active support for terrorist groups, the raids were retaliation for the bombing by libyan agents of a Berlin nightclub frequented by uS servicemen a few days earlier. Britain’s support contrasted with the views of other European allies, whose reaction was a mixture of criticism and a lack of cooperation, with France refusing to let American F-111 fighter jets overfly its territory. The significance of Thatcher’s support for America was that it reflected her position that supporting America was more important than maintaining close relations with other European countries, such as France and germany (Sanders, 1990: 184). But this stance also represented Thatcher’s tendency to view foreign policy issues as isolated events and to judge each issue on its own merits, with only the relationship with America receiving a degree of continuity in terms of the direction of British policy (Bennett, 2013: 154). Thatcher’s efforts to raise Britain once again to the premier league of global politics came to the fore in the mid-1980s when, by dint of an invitation from the Foreign office to the relatively unknown Soviet politician Mikhail gorbachev, she became the first Western leader to get to know someone who would in a matter of months become leader of the Soviet union. given that gorbachev was six years younger than Thatcher, his relative youthfulness was a stark contrast to the ailing Soviet leaders that tended to die in quick succession (Brezhnev in 1982, Andropov in 1984 and Chernenko in 1985). Although, across the Atlantic, Reagan would later quip in his memoirs ‘the reason i haven’t negotiated with a Soviet leader is because they all keep dying on me’ (Reagan, 1990: 217), it was Thatcher who was first to acknowledge the significance of gorbachev, famously commenting that ‘We can do business together’ (Reynolds, 2000: 264). While Thatcher quickly found herself doing this when gorbachev became Soviet leader in March 1985, she soon

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Berlin Wall: in august 1961 a wall was erected by the GdR to control the movement of individuals from West Berlin to east Berlin. the wall came to signify the division between the soviet­led eastern bloc and the Us­led Western bloc and was a key image of the cold War. the lessening of the soviet­imposed controls on the eastern bloc in the late 1980s resulted in the eventual collapse of the east German regime and the demolition of the Berlin Wall.

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found herself a bit-part player in what became a series of key negotiations between America and the Soviet union over arms control. This included the December 1987 agreement on an intermediate nuclear Forces (inF) Treaty, the first such agreement to actually reduce nuclear weapons in Europe. This was against the backdrop of a Soviet system that was demonstrating increasing signs of weakness, including the inability to feed its own people. Although gorbachev had responded through policies of ‘glasnost’ (openness) and ‘perestroika’ (restructuring), these in turn unleashed pressures for further reform in the Soviet union as well as in the Soviet-dominated countries of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). Faced with this state of affairs, in the summer of 1989 gorbachev announced that it was up to the people of CEE to decide their own fate and that Moscow would not interfere, a decision which was the signal for uprisings and reform which stretched from Poland to Hungary and from Czechoslovakia to Romania. Throughout 1989 and 1990 the political map of Europe was being redrawn as the established order of the post-1945 consensus gave way, signified particularly by the pulling down of the Berlin Wall on 9 november 1989. For some observers this marked the end of the Cold War, although for others the end only came in December 1991 when the Soviet union itself collapsed. Whatever the date chosen to mark the end of the Cold War, the fact was that these events drastically changed the geopolitical environment in Europe, as well as all over the globe. For Britain – and in particular for Thatcher – this period also raised questions about the future direction of Europe. A key concern for Thatcher was the implications that such events would have for the security blanket that America had provided for Europe since the end of the Second World War. Thatcher was also faced with a different Europe, most notably in the form of german reunification, which for her brought to the fore concerns about potential german dominance and resulted in her publicly questioning the need for unification to take place in the short term (Hannay, 2013: 150). These issues proved particularly difficult for Thatcher to get to grips with. The desire to widen European membership to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe and, at the same time, to deepen the process of European integration by creating new areas of policy cooperation once more highlighted her own anxieties and prejudices. John Dickie has reflected that Thatcher’s resistance to german reunification was ‘the most serious misjudgement of her career in international politics’ (Dickie, 1994: 208), while the former Conservative politician Chris Patten has noted that ‘Her behaviour was diplomatically crass and morally wrong’ (Patten, 2006: 71). The outcome was a further division between her views and those of the Foreign office which, ‘in her perpetual struggle against a hostile world she saw them [the Foreign office] as defeatists, even collaborators’ (Cradock, 1997: 24), would see Thatcher place greater reliance on the views of her

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own policy advisers, most notably her Private Secretary on Foreign Affairs Sir Charles Powell. Powell’s successor in the role of Private Secretary to the Prime Minister on foreign policy issues, Sir Stephen Wall, would later reflect that Powell ‘established himself in her confidence in a way that few others have with a Prime Minister before or since’ (Wall, 2012: 29). The problem for Thatcher was that after ten years as Prime Minister she had become isolated within the European arena and sidelined on the international stage as a globetrotting leader, where the currency of her views no longer marched in time with the reality of world politics. later, she would reflect in her memoirs that ‘if there is one instance in which a foreign policy i pursued met with unambiguous failure, it was policy on germany unification’ (Thatcher, 1993: 813). As Sharp has written, towards the end of her period in office, Thatcher’s foreign policy had been undone by her persistent failure to understand the nature of diplomatic influence. one of the reasons why she failed to mobilise support from the other European great powers, it could be claimed, was because she completely lacked any diplomatic capital with them. (Sharp, 1997: 224)

EuRoPEAn DiPloMACY of all the issues that shaped Thatcher’s period as Prime Minister, European integration proved to be one of the most complex. Against the backdrop of a labour government whose foreign policy towards Europe was shackled by domestic politics, European leaders genuinely welcomed Thatcher’s election as Prime Minister. But the gloss attached to the hope of the emergence of a close relationship quickly tarnished as Thatcher sought to defend Britain’s sovereignty against what she regarded as a strengthening tide of European regulation. one consequence of this was that she pressed on with even greater vigour than had the previous labour government to secure a suitable compromise relating to Britain’s budget contributions. Britain’s own economists in the Treasury calculated that with the end of the country’s transition period of membership in January 1978, it would become the largest net contributor to the Community budget, while at the same time being ranked only fifth in terms of its average share of the Community’s gDP. The projected deficit for 1979–80 alone was £1 billion. in short, the view in london was that Britain was paying too much into the Community and receiving too little from it. This issue of unfairness dominated Thatcher’s initial policy towards Europe [Document 20]. in her memoirs she records that

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in spite of north Sea oil, by 1979 Britain had become one of the least prosperous members of the Community, with only the seventh highest gDP per head of population among the member states. Yet we were expected shortly to become the largest net contributor. (Thatcher, 1993: 63) She therefore proceeded to ‘spell out the facts’ to her fellow European leaders when she attended her first European Council, held in Strasbourg in June 1979. However, as an early indication of her inability to fully appreciate the nuanced nature of European politics, whereas she considered that she ‘had made an impression as someone who meant business’, the then President of the European Commission, Roy Jenkins, reflected that she ‘performed the considerable feat of unnecessarily irritating two big countries, three small ones and the Commission with her opening performance at a European Council’ (Thatcher, 1993: 64; Jenkins, 1991: 495). The crux of the issue was that although the other member states were aware the budget issue was a significant negotiating point, they were nonetheless unwilling to accept the argument that Britain’s payments to the budget should be approximately the same as the amount it received from the Community. Such conflicting positions meant that early efforts to resolve the budget problem proved to be particularly complex (Tugendhat, 1987: 121). The Commission initially proposed a package agreement whereby Britain would receive a rebate of some £350 million, with the additional promise of greater direct funding from the Community in the future. But Thatcher regarded this as an unacceptable offer because it did not equate to the full rebate of £1 billion. Thatcher’s negotiating strategy ensured that the budget issue dominated the Community agenda and, in an effort to resolve this impasse, the Commission doubled its offer to about £760 million at the next European Council meeting in April 1980. Yet again Thatcher refused, not least because the rebate agreement was only scheduled to last for two years. in the end, the British budget question (or, as it was commonly referred to in Brussels, the ‘Bloody British Question’) was only finally resolved at the June 1984 Fontainebleau European Council. That agreement provided Britain with an immediate payment of 1,000 million ECu for 1984 and a rebate in subsequent years of some two-thirds of the difference between what it contributed to the Community and what it received from it. While Thatcher revelled in her negotiating success, the financial settlement was not significantly greater than that which had been on the table a number of years before. Foreign office mandarins were concerned about the extent to which Britain’s negotiating position in European meetings had been hamstrung by the budget discussions and the extent to which its ability to secure future agreements had been compromised (Cradock, 1997: 126).

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Thatcher’s position therefore represented more than just a defence of the nation’s finances because her ‘megaphone diplomacy’ (gowland and Turner, 2000) marked a considerable shift in British foreign policy and in time proved to be a contributing factor to Britain’s relative isolation from its European partners (Hannay, 2013: 105). This was all for what amounted to a relatively small amount of money when taken in the wider context of the total amount of uK government spending. At that time the entire Community budget was broadly equal to that of a large British government department of state and the budget in total amounted to approximately 1 per cent of the national income of all the member states combined. Moreover, in securing the budget settlement, Thatcher also agreed to a further rise in the Community budget but the agreement did not provide the protection of Britain’s national interests in terms of defending the nation’s sovereignty that Thatcher attempted to claim it had. in the long run Thatcher’s negotiating position did not reflect the fact that Community agreements ‘involved give-and-take, log-rolling, back-scratching, all rooted in a concept of “victory” that couldn’t be defined by anything as simple as the short-term interest of one country’ (Young, 1998: 326–7). it was a situation that was particularly apparent to Thatcher’s successor as Prime Minister, John Major, who would later comment that i had been shocked at my early European Councils to discover Margaret’s strength of will, so admired at home, was used against us abroad. it was the butt of sly little jokes. Most of the other leaders utterly disagreed with her. (Major, 1999: 265)

gRAPPling WiTH EuRoPE The resolution of the budget issue provided an opportunity for the Community to address other issues. This included the need to review the method of Community decision-making and examine ways in which the Community could become more competitive. While the former focused on such issues as providing a stronger role for the European Parliament and making greater use of majority voting (in order to move away from the reliance on the national veto), the latter was concerned with the extent to which the Community’s economic competitiveness had slipped behind that of America and Japan. The real concern here was that national governments had adopted measures to protect their own industries through what were known as non-tariff barriers to trade, which in turn had the detrimental effect of reducing competition as companies were sheltered from global competition. A lack of

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Major, John (b. 1943): conservative Prime Min­ ister from 1990 to 1997, having won two general elections. his period of office was marked by severe splits over the issue of european inte­ gration, which influenced his decision to hold a conservative Party leader­ ship election in 1995, which he won. towards the end of his period in office, his government’s majority had been eliminated and domestic difficulties, such as the beef crisis and scandal­ ous behaviour by many conservative MPs, meant that defeat in the 1997 general election was an inevitability. European Parliament: the only directly elected eU institution, it com­ prises Members of the european Parliament (MePs) who are elected for five­year terms.

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competitiveness limited the opportunity for exports, which in turn meant that the Community as a whole began to experience significant trade deficits. The situation was not positive, and national governments and business lobby groups awoke to the fact that there was a need to stimulate European competitiveness. The question was, how this was to be done? in March 1985 the heads of state and governments of the Community member states asked the European Commission President, Jacques Delors, to establish a plan to create a real ‘internal market’ that would stimulate Europe’s competitiveness. Delors delegated the task to the European Commissioner with responsibility for the internal Market, lord Arthur Cockfield, who just happened to be from Britain. The ensuing White Paper, Completing the Internal Market, proposed the removal of all internal barriers within the Community by 1992 to enable the free movement of people, services, capital and goods. While this plan was approved by the member states at the June 1985 Milan European Council, a further series of meetings were scheduled to take place to negotiate the various amendments to existing treaties. This was deemed necessary because, for a genuine internal market to be created, the member states would have to agree on the harmonisation of a whole host of policies and regulations to standardise the variation of rules that proliferated at the national level. For the internal market to work effectively, the Commission would have to act as a sort of European policeman. The implication of these developments for Britain was particularly significant. on the one hand, Thatcher’s advocacy of free competition was reflected in the internal market goals, but on the other the shift towards greater standardisation and regulation represented an enhancement in the powers of the European institutions to which she was adamantly opposed. These conflicting demands and pressures were reflected in the Single European Act (SEA), a new Treaty that member states agreed to at the December 1985 luxembourg European Council. The SEA was the first significant revision of the Community’s structures since the 1957 Treaties of Rome. The new Treaty was not just concerned with matters to do with operationalising the internal market, but also sought to address some imbalances in the structure and operation of the Community that had evolved over the years. This included an enhancement in the powers of the European Parliament through the introduction of a new cooperation procedure, which both helped to redress the fact that the Parliament had historically only played a minor role in the development of the Community and ensured that it would act as a greater check on the power of the Commission going forward. The very creation of a deadline of 1992 for the achievement of the completion of the internal market meant that the legislative and regulative powers of the Commission were also enhanced, with the competence of the Community also extended into a number of new areas, such as social, environmental and

Resurgence

technological policies. The SEA also extended the use of majority voting, and thereby lessened the opportunity for individual member states to veto policies. At the time many observers considered that the significance of the SEA lay in the fact that it ended the stalemate that had smothered the Community’s development since the 1970s. Yet the fact that each member state portrayed the outcome of the negotiations in a different light also highlighted the importance that national governments gave to ensuring that the full implications of the Treaty were not always transparent to the national electorate. Prime Minister Thatcher particularly emphasised the significance of the objective of completing the internal market by 1992 and the fact that it formally included the European Political Cooperation (EPC) procedure within the Community. Although in Thatcher’s eyes these policies reflected British pragmatism rather than the pipe dreams that she accused Brussels bureaucrats of dreaming up, the move to strengthen EPC hinted at the development of a stronger European defence identity that went against Britain’s traditional emphasis on the importance of the Atlantic Alliance. Thus, while Thatcher would later reflect on the SEA that ‘Part of our task the whole time has been to diminish their expectations and draw them down from the clouds to practical matters’, such an assessment did not reflect the nature of the final outcome or the reality of European negotiations. To this end she papered over the fact that the Treaty represented a seismic shift in the future direction of European policy-making through the introduction of majority voting, the granting of enhanced powers to the Commission and the fact that these objectives were centred on the wishes of France and germany (Thatcher, 1993: 558–9). The issue here, as Anthony Forster has emphasised, was that ‘for many Conservatives, attempts to work from within the Community appeared to have failed as it became increasingly clear that the SEA had not delivered the policy goals of the Conservative government and might even threaten them’ (Forster, 2002: 75).

on THE SiDElinES oF EuRoPE While the uK insisted that ‘1992’ was only about the implementation of a free market within Europe, other member states, as well as the European Commission, viewed the internal market programme as a catalyst for further European integration, most notably in the area of monetary and social policies. in 1986 the Community enlarged to incorporate Portugal and Spain, both of which were poorer member states. once again this raised the issue of economic disparity between member states. But the issue of trying to ensure greater economic and social cohesion was further challenged by the

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Exchange Rate Mechan­ ism (ERM): a central component of the eMs that was established in 1979. the eRM acted as a stabilising mechanism for reducing currency fluctuations among the participating countries whose currencies were given an exchange rate set against the european currency Unit (ecU).

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internal market programme. This was because the Community faced the prospect of employers relocating to take advantage of cheaper labour costs in some member states, and some industries closing down because of a lack of competitiveness. A consequence of this was that the Commission advanced the development of a stronger social dimension to the Community. Apart from the impact on Europe’s citizens, proposals for a stronger social dimension also chimed with the views of the British labour Party and this in turn signalled a readjustment in the views of a political party that had hitherto been sceptical towards European integration. The implication was that the labour Party became a stronger pro-European political party, while the Conservative Party became increasingly Eurosceptic. The other significant policy area concerned the desire to create a single currency, an objective that had first been outlined in the 1970 Werner Report. But as noted in Chapter 4, the objective of creating a monetary union had proved too ambitious. Member states returned to this issue with the creation of a European Monetary System (EMS) in 1979, of which the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) had acted as a means of coordinating economic policies between member states with a view to creating a more stable set of exchange rates. While Britain had been unwilling to participate in the ERM because of a concern that the economic and political conditions were not right, by the mid-1980s the ERM had helped to create more stable economic conditions between its participating members. This was because companies could benefit from greater stability when trading within the system. A combination of the success of the ERM and the fact that the move to create an internal market highlighted the need to acknowledge that the movement of people, goods, services and capital were still taking place in a Community with distinct currencies in turn meant that the idea of creating a single currency came to the fore. in the eyes of a number of member states and European institutions this was a logical extension of the ERM and the internal market, as at the very least the transaction costs associated with changing one currency to another were a further barrier to trade. Yet rather than acknowledging that such an outcome might materialise, Britain instead considered that this would never happen. At the June 1988 Hanover European Council member states committed themselves to ‘the objective of a progressive realisation of Economic and Monetary union’ and tasked Jacques Delors to chair a committee that included central bank governors with the purpose of examining how a single currency could be created. in April 1989 the committee published its findings, which became known as the Delors Report, that set out a detailed three-stage plan for the creation of monetary union. This caused uproar in Downing Street, as Prime Minister Thatcher had expected the committee to kick the single currency idea into the long grass (A. Blair, 1999: 154). This was not least

Resurgence

because she considered that the central bank governors, including the governor of the Bank of England, Robin leigh-Pemberton, would never support a policy that eroded their own influence. That this did not happen was primarily because the head of the german Bundesbank, Karl otto Pöhl, and Britain’s Robin leigh-Pemberton accepted the wisdom of creating a single currency (lamont, 1999: 117). The publication of the Delors Report was problematic for Britain because it marked its isolation from debates on monetary union, given that it was not even part of the ERM. This resulted in debates within the British Cabinet about how the government should engage with the European integration process (A. Blair, 2002: 89–111; Hannay, 2013: 145–8). Whereas Thatcher considered that the internal market should be the limit of European integration, she was increasingly aware that the SEA had unleashed pressures for deeper European integration which she opposed, including ERM membership. She would later regard the Foreign office’s advice to sign the SEA as a ‘great betrayal’, which in turn only created further tension and division within Cabinet, with Thatcher considering that ‘the Foreign office was almost imperceptibly moving to compromise with these new European friends’ (Thatcher, 1993: 559). Thatcher’s scepticism of the Foreign office (and Treasury) had resulted in her favouring the views of her own foreign policy adviser Sir Charles Powell and her economic adviser Sir Alan Walters. in an attempt to set out her own agenda on Europe, Thatcher grasped the opportunity of an invitation to deliver a lecture on 20 September 1988 at the bastion of pro-European integration thinking, the College of Europe in Bruges, to denounce the Commission’s proposals for deeper European integration [Document 20]. For Thatcher, the speech reflected the point that ‘. . . the time had to come to strike out against what i saw as the erosion of democracy by centralisation and bureaucracy, and to set out an alternative view of Europe’s future’ (Thatcher, 1993: 742). Although the speech did not represent the views of Cabinet, with geoffrey Howe noting that it was ‘sheer fantasy’ (Howe, 1994: 537), it marked a key turning point when the issue of European integration became central to the electoral strategy of political parties. The years that followed were marked by a division within and between political parties on this issue (Daddow, 2013: 218). The Bruges speech highlighted divisions within Cabinet over the nature of Britain’s European policy as well as the impact of Thatcher’s leadership style, which increasingly appeared to be out of touch both at a domestic and European level. Domestically, this included the ill-fated proposals to introduce a poll tax. in this context the lack of support within Cabinet for some of the Prime Minister’s sceptical policies, and the view that they were harming Britain’s position within Europe (a view also held by the business community), was reflective of the wider lack of consensus on all areas of

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Lawson, Nigel (b. 1932): conservative politician who served as chancellor of the exchequer 1983–9. as chancellor he cam­ paigned for UK participa­ tion in the eRM, a policy that was contested by Prime Minister thatcher. differences of views between the two indi­ viduals over economic policy provoked him to resign in october 1989.

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policy-making (Major, 1999: 169). As far as European issues were concerned, in 1989 Britain was outside of the debates on the single currency and was out of step on discussions on german unification. Both Howe and the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Nigel Lawson, had argued that Britain needed to join the ERM as a means of being at the very least capable of shaping and influencing debates regarding the progression to monetary union (lawson, 1992: 931). While Thatcher’s unwillingness to countenance ERM entry triggered lawson’s resignation in october 1989, his successor as Chancellor John Major managed to get Thatcher to acquiesce to Britain joining the ERM on 8 october 1990. However, this did not signal a change in Thatcher’s underlying opposition to monetary union and deeper European integration, with her famously saying ‘no, no, no’ in a speech to the House of Commons on 30 october 1990 in response to calls by Delors for deeper European integration. Thatcher’s blistering attack was followed by Howe’s resignation on 1 november 1990. His resignation letter spoke of the ‘growing difference which has emerged between us on the increasingly important issue of Britain’s role in Europe’ (Howe, 1994: 648–50). A combination of this isolation abroad and the lack of Cabinet consensus on policies at home in turn lessened Thatcher’s own power within government. She therefore became increasingly vulnerable to attack from an unsympathetic Cabinet that realised her policies no longer reflected the majority of public opinion. The ‘iron lady’ appeared to be out of touch, a situation that influenced her former Defence Secretary, Michael Heseltine, to challenge her for the leadership of the Conservative Party. Against a backdrop of concerns about her divisive leadership, Thatcher failed by only four votes to secure the necessary majority in the first round of voting by Conservative MPs on 20 november 1990 (204 for Thatcher, 152 for Heseltine). The result was a shock to Thatcher who at the time of the vote was attending a European summit in Paris. The contest moved to a second ballot, but before it could take place she was persuaded by her own Cabinet colleagues that the second ballot would not produce the victory that she needed to carry on. The deed was done, and when the second ballot was eventually contested by John Major, Michael Heseltine and Douglas Hurd, the prize of victory would go to Major, who with Thatcher’s endorsement defeated the other candidates and became Prime Minister on 28 november 1990. Margaret Thatcher had clearly shaped Britain’s domestic and international policies in a manner that made her stand out among twentieth-century politicians. not since 1827 had anyone occupied 10 Downing Street for a longer continuous period than had she. not since the special circumstances of neville Chamberlain’s departure from office in 1940 had any Conservative Prime Minister left office other than at the desire of a doctor or the electorate. Her departure from office was clearly a major shock to the Conservative

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Party, a Party that had in recent years predominantly followed a leader who had an ideology named after her. Yet the problem for Major was that he inherited a divided Conservative Party and government, most notably over the issue of Europe, in part caused by the lack of a long-term viewpoint advanced by the Thatcher government. For instance, Thatcher’s former foreign policy adviser, Sir Percy Cradock, has noted that ‘during my time with Mrs Thatcher i recall no meeting examining our long-term aims in Europe’ (Cradock, 1997: 36). The consequence of this was that, by having to placate the various divisions within the Party, Major faced the possibility that the Party, far from adopting a more ‘centrist’ position could, in fact, become more polarised.

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6 Post-Cold War order: 1990–1997

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he collapse of the Berlin Wall in 1989 and the eventual implosion of the Soviet Union were two of the most momentous events of the twentieth century. The very ending of the Cold War brought with it significant questions as to what the post-Cold War world would look like. A common view at the time was that governments would need to spend less on defence – a peace dividend in the absence of superpower rivalry. This vision of a more peaceful world was summed up by the then US President George H.W. Bush when he predicted in a speech before a joint session of Congress on 11 September 1990 that the period of change would usher in a ‘new world order’. The significance of these words marked the fact that America was unchallenged as the leading global power because of the declining influence of the Soviet Union (which eventually collapsed in 1991). These changed circumstances became known as the unipolar moment and emphasised the need for American leadership to reshape the post-Cold War period as it had done in the post-1945 era. But whereas in 1945 the world was faced with having to deal with the economic, political and humanitarian catastrophe of the Second World War, the presence of what was regarded to be a more stable environment in 1990–1 disguised the true complexity of the post-Cold War era.

NeW World order These developments led to the emergence of a considerable body of literature that attempted to map out what the contours of the post-Cold War world would look like. one of the views advanced suggested that in the absence of the Cold War the US would not need to undertake an active foreign policy. This view emphasised the notion of a peace dividend, whereby the US would in effect become more focused on its own domestic affairs rather than the global policeman role that it had taken over from Britain in the post-1945

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period. Such a position also assumed that other countries and/or regions, such as europe, would assume greater influence over their own security concerns. Another view suggested that the US would take a far more active stance on foreign policy issues because it would be able to exert influence at a global level in a way that it had hitherto been unable to do. A final view represented a mix of both positions, noting that the US would proactively pursue its aims in areas that it regarded as central to its interests while at the same time retreating from areas that it regarded as being less relevant. of the writings that captured these views, the work of Francis Fukuyama and Samuel Huntington received particular attention. Fukuyama initially sought to capture the nature of the events that emerged in 1989 by suggesting that what we may be witnessing is not just the end of the Cold War, or the passing of post-war history, but the end of history as such: that is, the end point of mankind’s ideological evolution and the universalization of Western liberal democracy as the final form of government. (Fukuyama, 1989: 4) The argument being advanced here was that the end of the Cold War marked the end of the ideological division that had dominated historical events. In contrast, Huntington’s thesis focused on the fact that, rather than a peaceful world emerging, the world would be shaped by what he referred to as a clash of civilisations. ‘It is,’ Huntington wrote, ‘my hypothesis that the fundamental source of conflict in this new world will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural’ (1993: 22). Huntington’s thesis gained even greater resonance after the terrorist attacks on the US on 11 September 2001 that were orchestrated by osama bin laden. Both Fukuyama’s and Huntington’s views, however, have been shown to have limitations, as the world has not followed the peaceful path identified by Fukuyama and many of the post-Cold War conflicts have involved alliances that have cut across civilisations rather than between them (Blair and Curtis, 2009: 107). The reality of this changed geopolitical environment inevitably had a considerable impact on Britain where initial hopes for the peace dividend were replaced by the reality that the end of the superpower conflict also led to the emergence of a whole range of new threats. This included the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, as it became easier for countries and terrorist organisations to acquire biological, chemical and nuclear weapons as a result of technological advancements and the lessening of the controls that previously existed in countries which were often in a period of transition from Communist control. New threats also emerged. The 1994 UN Human

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development report brought to the fore the concept of ‘human security’ by providing a broader definition of security that focused on the many possible threats faced by individuals, whether of a military, economic, environmental, health or personal nature. This definition would subsequently be extended to include threats from human trafficking, drug smuggling and cyber crime. These challenges presented a dilemma for the British government where there was an awareness that while such problems could only be effectively tackled through cooperation with other countries – notably in the form of european integration – such agreements could nonetheless lead to criticism that national sovereignty was being eroded. Within Britain the challenges of the post-Cold War world impacted on the priorities of government, including demands for reduction in defence spending and a move towards more flexible armed forces. This was a result of the lessening in the prospect of a large all-out conflict with a major power that military planners had assumed would be the nature of conflict during the Cold War. While initially it was considered that the post-Cold War period would be a peaceful one, it was also the case that the removal of the fixed boundaries that dominated the Cold War presented new challenges. This included a need to review the nature of overseas commitments and diplomatic missions as well as the Foreign office dramatically reassessing its embassy staffing requirements in the former Soviet-dominated countries of Central and eastern europe (Cee) that were now looking to Western governments for security and guidance towards democracy. This extended to establishing ‘Know-How Funds’ to provide aid for eastern europe. developments such as these emphasised the fluid nature of the post-Cold War world and acted as a significant marker on the future direction of British foreign policy because it demonstrated a shift away from traditional projections of power through military means to the use of soft power (Martin and Garnett, 1997: 47). This changed circumstance was emphasised by the nature of the discussions that surrounded the remaining years of British rule in Hong Kong before the formal handover to China took place on 1 July 1997. Whereas the British government considered that the 1984 Sino-British declaration reflected a practical solution to the problems caused by the inability of the people of Hong Kong to survive without the New Territories (the lease of which expired in 1997) – a view that was chiefly advanced by Sir Percy Cradock who was one of the key architects of the declaration – critics considered that Britain had been too quick to secure an agreement that did not offer sufficient safeguards to protect the interests of the Hong Kong people from China. Such fears were reinforced by the Chinese government’s brutal suppression of pro-democracy groups in Tiananmen Square in 1989 (Cradock, 1994: 222). These issues came to a head with the appointment in 1992 of Chris Patten to the post of what would be the last Governor of Hong Kong.

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Patten’s appointment by Prime Minister John Major had emerged from a combination of a commitment given the previous year to appoint a politician to succeed the career diplomat and sinologist Sir david Wilson as the last Governor, in order to impart greater confidence in the governance of the colony in the wake of the crackdown in Tiananmen Square, and the fact that Patten had lost his own seat in the 1992 general election (despite delivering victory for Major as Conservative Party Chairman). At the top of Patten’s list of priorities for the remaining five years of British rule was the acceleration in progress towards democratisation. Having set out these objectives on 7 october 1992, Patten faced a Chinese government that was critical of him for what they saw as breaking the terms of the Joint declaration and the Basic law (Patten, 1998: 65). Chinese authorities responded by applying economic and political pressure on Hong Kong. This included taking an intransigent approach over the construction of a new airport to replace the existing one at Kai Tak which, apart from having no additional capacity, was located in the urban area of Kowloon, producing a great deal of noise pollution and raising concerns about the safety of landing planes. Although policy-makers in Britain and Hong Kong regarded the construction of a new airport as ‘a morale booster for the community and a shot-in-the-arm for the economy’, China was concerned about the potential legacy of the construction costs beyond 1997 (Patten, 1998: 40; Cradock, 1994: 237–46). The Chinese position reflected a propaganda campaign that was aimed at undermining Patten’s proposals and was part of a package whereby their foot-dragging meant that little of practical value was achieved in relation to discussions over the proposals for further enfranchisement of democracy. The upshot of this was that after having made no progress after 17 rounds of negotiations, Patten came to the conclusion in June 1994 that there was little option but to advance his proposals without Chinese consent before the Hong Kong legislative Council (legCo). The essence of the disagreement with China was deciding how many people would be allowed to vote in the 1995 elections to the legCo, which in turn would ensure that they would be able to participate in what became known as the ‘through-train’ of reforms that would continue after 1997. An inevitable consequence of Patten’s proposals was that they drew criticism from China as well as from key British China experts, most notably the architect of the Sino-British declaration Sir Percy Cradock, for undermining the through-train of reforms that had been agreed to. other critics also pointed out that Patten’s reforms were window-dressing, given that it was fanciful to think that Hong Kong could become fully democratic within a five-year period, because even if the reforms were implemented some two-thirds of the legCo would continue to be appointed (reynolds, 2000: 296). Yet, whatever the criticism levied at the

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decisions taken in promoting the reform process, Britain left Hong Kong under the banner of championing democratisation, with any frustration at the lack of progress being directed towards Beijing rather than london (Patten, 1998: 83). Although Hong Kong’s handover marked the conclusion of Britain’s imperial story, as it was the country’s last colony, closer to home there remained the problem of securing peace in Ireland, which had been its first colony. drawing on the 1985 Anglo-Irish settlement, John Major made Northern Ireland one of his top priorities upon becoming Prime Minister in November 1990. In so doing he achieved a close working relationship with the Irish leader Albert reynolds. This provided the basis for the downing Street declaration of 15 december 1993, which noted that the political wing of the IrA, Sinn Fein, could take part in discussions relating to the future of Northern Ireland if the IrA renounced violence. A similar offer was made to democratic loyalist parties if their paramilitary groups also renounced violence. For policy-makers in london and dublin, the essence of the proposal was to get the relevant paramilitary organisations to put down their arms and not engage in violence. This was important, given the blood that had been shed and lives lost as a result of the troubles. In the early 1990s this was typified by an IrA bomb that killed two children in Warrington on 20 March 1993 and a bomb in Bishopsgate in the City of london that caused in the region of £350 million of damage a few weeks later on 24 April. Central to the whole peace process was the decommissioning of paramilitary weapons. A solution was sought in the form of an international commission headed by the former US Senator George Mitchell, which in its January 1996 report advocated decommissioning taking place in parallel with peace talks. IrA frustration at the slow pace of progress on the peace process led to them ending the ceasefire with a massive bomb in london’s docklands in February 1996. This inevitably placed pressure on Major who found himself embattled by right-wing members of the Conservative Party who wanted the government to withdraw from the peace talks. Yet, with an eye on history, Major started all-party talks in June 1996, albeit with the exclusion of the IrA because they had not disarmed.

BrITAIN ANd THe GUlF WAr When Iraq, under the leadership of Saddam Hussein, invaded the small but oil-rich state of Kuwait on 2 August 1990 it triggered the first major test of the post-Cold War world. For Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher the conflict offered an opportunity for Britain once again to assert its position at the centre of international developments. As Forster and Wallace have noted,

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she responded by ‘seizing the opportunity to reassert the Anglo-American relationship and to offer full British support in defending the principles of the “new world order” ’ (Forster and Wallace, 2001: 133). These principles were framed in a context that emphasised the virtues of the Atlantic Alliance and which raised questions about the merits of deeper european integration. Thatcher’s vision for the new world order contrasted with the assessments of other european governments, most notably France, who wished to explore options for a more european-focused security structure. Although at first glance this stance reinforced what many regarded to be a eurosceptic position, her outlook was rather more complex because she attached value to the virtues of european integration in terms of providing stability and security for the former Soviet-dominated countries of Cee. Thatcher was also conscious that a widening of membership would dilute the power of the Community’s institutions and key member states such as France and Germany. The end of the Cold War presented Britain with a need to reassess its defence commitments, which since the 1968 decision to withdraw from east of Suez had been focused on defending Britain (and Western europe) from a Soviet attack. A consequence of this focus was that Britain had significant numbers of troops deployed in Germany and, in the post-Cold War environment, questions were raised as to the need for such structures. In July 1990 the government presented a defence review entitled Options for Change which concluded that armed forces manpower would have to be reduced by approximately 56,000 by the mid-1990s, with the greatest impact of these cuts being on the army, which was to be reduced in strength from 160,000 to 120,000. While the review attached greater emphasis to a defence policy that was rooted in capabilities rather than threats, the government was criticised for implementing such significant changes before it was possible to ascertain how the landscape of the post-Cold War environment would look. The Gulf War highlighted this lack of certainty, where a hawkish Britain contributed the second-largest number of ground troops (35,000 in total) to a coalition of 34 states that was overwhelmingly led by the US to repel the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait. The coalition, which was supported by UN Security Council resolution No. 678 of 29 November 1990, launched the US-led operation desert Storm on 17 January 1991, which resulted in the surrender of the Iraqi army by 28 February 1991. The relatively short-lived nature of the Gulf War, combined with the multinational troop deployment, presented a positive image in terms of the potential rebirth of the role of the UN. The significance of this optimism lay in the fact that for much of its history the UN had been hijacked by superpower politics. This particularly applied to the workings of the Security Council, of which lord Hannay, who served as Britain’s Ambassador to the UN

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from 1990 to 1995, later reflected ‘for most of the Cold War the permanent members were not a group at all, but were at daggers drawn’ (Hannay, 2008: 15). In the absence of Cold War conflict, many observers concluded that the UN could become a force for good. Yet, despite this optimism, the period that followed demonstrated the UN to be incapable of providing adequate responses to the international crises that flared up around the world, and incapable of dealing with an uncooperative Iraq that would not allow UN weapons inspectors to verify the destruction of all its biological, chemical and nuclear weapons. This would result in some observers, including former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher, reflecting that the allied forces should have progressed all the way to Baghdad during the Gulf War and removed Saddam Hussein from power. The Gulf War highlighted the complexity of a post-Cold War world order where established parameters and alliances had become blurred as a US-led coalition was pitted against an Iraq that Western countries had supported throughout the 1980s. This support had its roots in the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution when the Western-leaning Shah was overthrown by Ayatollah Khomeini’s Islamic fundamentalist regime. Having been taken by surprise by the revolution, and thereby having lost a key ally in the shape of Iran, key Western states, including the US and the UK, sought to regain influence in the region by supporting Saddam Hussein’s regime through trade. While this trade was not supposed to involve military equipment, economic realities meant that companies were often involved in agreements that exploited the thin line dividing military and non-military equipment. This came to a head at the November 1992 trial of three directors of the Coventry-based company Matrix Churchill, which made machine tools. during the trial it emerged that the directors had been encouraged and supported by the Ministry of defence to apply for export licences for products that could have a dual civilian and military use, while key government ministers including Alan Clark, Kenneth Clarke and Michael Heseltine had signed Public Interest Immunity (PII) certificates that prevented the defendants from accessing papers that would have demonstrated their innocence. The subsequent collapse of the trial triggered the commissioning of a judicial enquiry, led by Sir richard Scott, that was critical of government policy. For Britain, under the leadership of Prime Minister John Major, the Gulf War was an immediate sign of Britain’s special relationship with America. Major established a close personal relationship with US President George H.W. Bush, which was something that Thatcher had been less successful at. The culturing of this relationship was a positive outcome for Major, given that he had taken up the reins of office at a time when there were momentous issues on the negotiating table: the nature of the post-Cold War world, internal division in the Soviet Union, the context of German unification, european

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treaty reform, the Gulf War and the break-up of Yugoslavia. In this complex environment it proved difficult for the government to assert a coherent viewpoint across all of these issues. In reflecting on this period, John Major’s foreign policy adviser, Sir Percy Cradock, has noted that Policy in these conditions was shaped less by longer-term aims than by a series of day-to-day decisions taken with little reference to a larger framework. The picture was built up in a pointillist style by a series of small brushstrokes. We felt our way forward and for too much of the time lived hand-to-mouth, locked in what dr Kissinger has called the “endless battle in which the urgent constantly gains on the important”. (Cradock, 1997: 36) Although, at first glance, such words appeared to convey a unique policymaking environment in the immediate post-Cold War period, the reality is that ministers of most governments often struggle with the sheer quantity of information that they are asked to assimilate. A cursory glance at the memoirs of government ministers reveals a common complaint about workload, with them spending many hours each night working through their ministerial red boxes. This situation is particularly acute for those working in the Foreign office. In his memoirs, Sir Geoffrey (later Baron) Howe recalls that during six years at the Foreign office I took home, to work through overnight while others slept, no less than 24 tonnes of paper: three boxes a night, six nights a week, forty weeks a year. Six o’clock was my normal time for getting up. My average bedtime was about four hours earlier. (Howe, 1994: 568) While all this hard work ensured that Sir Geoffrey had a full grasp of all relevant issues, it did not equate with an improvement in the conduct and quality of British foreign policy or an enhancement in the Foreign Secretary’s relationship with the Prime Minister. As Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles has reflected, ‘This aversion to risk, the tendency to want to examine every possible aspect on any issue, was one of her Foreign Secretary’s characteristics that seemed most to annoy Mrs Thatcher’ (Cowper-Coles, 2013: 84). In reflecting on these points, a common complaint of British policy-making is that it has tended to focus too much on the present with insufficient attention paid to future thinking, a situation that is often compounded by swift rotation of ministerial posts and a tendency of the Cabinet to be less of a decision-taker and more a manager of policy. John Coles has noted that ‘The excessive workload of ministers, their frequent rotation and the inordinate attention given to the media are all seen as problems which limit the capacity to make

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good policy’ (Coles, 2000: 22). Nearly 20 years earlier, Ferdinand Mount, the head of the Prime Minister’s Policy Unit in 1982–3, commented that ‘the Cabinet did not feel itself equipped to discuss difficult, long-term policy options; the fear of political embarrassment was too overwhelming to run the risk of being seen to examine such bleeding raw material’ (cited in Coles, 2000: 23).

THe HoUr oF eUroPe The disintegration of Yugoslavia in 1990 provided a different context to the degree of unity that had existed over repelling Iraq from Kuwait. The break-up of Yugoslavia would lead to the creation of the new countries of Slovenia, Croatia, Serbia, Macedonia, Montenegro, Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo. The roots of this conflict lay in a mix of tension between rival ethnic groupings that had been held together by Yugoslavia’s president, Marshal Tito. With his death in 1980 the simmering tensions between these rival groups began to resurface. The situation was further compounded by the fact that by the end of the 1980s Yugoslavia was under considerable strain from a combination of debt, inflation and high unemployment. In the face of these pressures the Serb nationalist Slobodan Milosevic attempted to stamp his mark by seeking to dominate the whole of Yugoslavia. Faced with this prospect, Slovenia and Croatia declared independence on 25 June 1991, with Croatia achieving this only after a violent war that lasted until the end of 1991. Further conflict broke out in Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, where the Muslim-dominated government declared independence in April. Given that the population of the country was split 44 per cent Muslim, 33 per cent Serb and 17 per cent Croat, this ‘plunged the country into a three-cornered war’ (reynolds, 2000: 290). Muslims were driven from their homes as part of a process of ethnic cleansing, resulting in human atrocities that had not been seen in europe since the Second World War. Conflict would continue until the end of the decade, with peace only being achieved through the intervention of the US. Much has been written on the break-up of Yugoslavia, including the factors that influenced its disintegration. Attention has been given to the response of european states that were involved in negotiating the Maastricht Treaty on european Union (TeU) during 1990–1. A commitment to negotiate a new european Treaty was initially the result of a desire to examine the opportunity for creating a single currency, but with the end of the Cold War it was decided to extend these discussions into the area of political union, including the creation of a stronger foreign and security policy. A number of european member states considered that the changed international political

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environment resulting from the end of the Cold War provided the context for europeans to be able to act on a basis that was independent of the US (A. Blair, 1998a; Forster and Niblett, 2001). This came to the fore in February 1991 in the form of a Franco-German proposal for a european Security and defence Identity (eSdI) (A. Blair, 1999: 128). Such a view contrasted with that of Britain where the government believed that NATo should remain the cornerstone of european security. Britain’s concern about the wisdom behind other european countries’ plans to decouple the US from europe’s security was influenced by the reality that european states had neither the collective ability nor the will to establish a separate identity. Faced with this prospect of a closer european security and defence identity, Britain sought to influence the debate in May 1991 by aligning itself with Italy, in the form of an Anglo-Italian proposal on european defence. To many observers, this was a rather strange alliance given that the countries were not natural bedfellows in terms of european politics, with Italy not being part of the closer defence relationships that dominated the london–Bonn–Paris axis (CowperColes, 2013: 135–6). America’s concern about the implications of a separate european defence identity led the then Under Secretary of State, reginald Bartholomew, to deliver a memorandum in February 1991 to european leaders that outlined the implications of withdrawing America from european security (A. Blair, 1999: 123). Thus, while the then chair of the eU presidency, the luxembourg Foreign Minister Jacques Poos, noted in 1991 that the break-up of Yugoslavia meant that ‘This is the hour of europe, not the hour of the Americans’ (reynolds, 2000: 290), the reality was far from the truth. American anxiety over the need for clarity on the part of european member states on defence matters resulted in US President George H.W. Bush laying down the gauntlet to european leaders at a NATo meeting in rome on 8 November 1991: ‘if, my friends, your ultimate aim is to provide independently for your own defense, the time to tell us is today’ (lundestad, 1998: 115). The response from european leaders was to reach a compromise at the Maastricht european Council of december 1991 between establishing an independent european security and defence policy and maintaining the role of NATo (A. Blair, 1998a). If there was a problem with the Maastricht outcome, it was that, while it signalled that the european Community now had a coherent foreign and security policy, there was a lack of focus on providing the necessary military and political resources to support such aims. A focus purely on cooperation between governments meant that there was no common figurehead to lead europe’s fledgling security structure. These issues came to a head in the Balkans when european states stood idly by and watched Yugoslavia tear itself apart. Much has been written to suggest that Germany’s desire to recognise

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Croatian independence (a country with which it had been allies during the Second World War) helped to fan the flames of the Balkans conflict. Germany’s insistence on Croatia’s recognition became part of the broader Maastricht deal, with Britain acquiescing to Germany’s demands in return for German support for British objectives (most notably its opt-out from the single currency commitment). The former British Foreign Secretary lord Carrington has described the Community’s decision to recognise Croatia and Slovenia as ‘an absolutely idiotic mistake’ (Stuart, 2004: 208). In response to the accusations that were levied at Britain for supporting the Community’s recognition of Croatia and Slovenia at the december 1991 Maastricht european Council, Foreign Secretary douglas Hurd considered that ‘the european Community was merely recognising a reality’ (Stuart, 2004: 208) and that ‘we would have not helped the peacemakers by denying for a few more weeks something which was already an established fact: namely, the independence of Croatia’ (Hurd, 2003: 451). Although the issue of linkage over Croatia at Maastricht is something that British government ministers and officials have repeatedly denied, the following months and years demonstrated a lack of a common european position on how to react to the disintegration of Yugoslavia (Forster and Niblett, 2001: 33). Britain’s attitude was not only shaped by a view that ‘its interests were not seriously threatened’ and that any engagement ‘would also mean the deployment of massive forces in very difficult terrain for an indefinite period’ (Cradock, 1997: 187), it was also the case that the government, as well as politicians from opposing parties, found it hard to get to grips with the issues that were at stake. As the Foreign Secretary, douglas Hurd, has noted: My colleagues in government and in all parties in the Commons were, with individual exceptions, sceptical of the need for even the limited intervention we undertook. They found the complicated situation in former Yugoslavia hard to understand and the characters in the drama unsympathetic. A decision to commit British troops to fight a war in Bosnia would have been deeply unpopular at all times. (Hurd, 2003: 446) Such a stance reflected the realpolitik of British foreign policy where the Major government considered that national interests did not necessitate intervention. This decision was notably different from that taken a few months earlier with regard to the Gulf conflict where British policy was framed on the basis that ‘Iraq’s aggression must not stand’ and that ‘Kuwait must be freed’ (Hurd, 2003: 391). Such a viewpoint was, however, set within the classical nature of a conflict that involved one nation against the other and, with the support of a UN resolution, proved easy for government ministers

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to take a decision on. The crux of the issue was that while the government recognised the tragic events that were unfolding in the Balkans, policymakers were unsure how to respond to such a crisis and considered that Britain’s interests were not fundamentally threatened by events. As the then Foreign Secretary, douglas Hurd, would later reflect ‘There was a British interest in preventing a general Balkan war, a substantial quarrel between the West and Yeltsin’s reforming russia, or a serious rift with NATo or within the eU. . . . But they were consequent, not central to Bosnia itself’ (Hurd, 1997: 129, cited in McCourt, 2013: 249). Britain’s stance was therefore shaped by both the reality of the complexity of the deployment of troops – including the likelihood of a lack of domestic support for such action – and the fact that few other governments equally wished to deploy. It is a situation that has led to considerable criticism being levied at government ministers for overseeing a policy that was ‘too mild towards Serbia’ (Hurd, 2003: 451). Such criticism has emphasised the extent to which British foreign policy struggled to establish a coherent narrative in the post-Cold War period. Yet if there is a defence to such a position, it is that in the post-Cold War environment there was a recognition that Britain did not have the capacity to undertake military intervention on its own and as such could only do so with an ally, most notably the US, which was itself unwilling to deploy ground troops. This was not least because Bill Clinton had won the 1992 Presidential election on the backdrop of the slogan ‘It’s the economy, stupid’. This, in essence, reflected the frustration of the American electorate that President George H.W. Bush had spent too much time focusing on world affairs – most notably the end of the Cold War – and not enough time solving America’s economic woes. The upshot of this was that when Bill Clinton assumed the presidency in January 1993 he was less inclined to focus on foreign policy. Apart from the broader impact at an international level, Clinton’s election had a direct impact on the special relationship, as Major found it difficult to establish the same personal friendship with Clinton as he had done with Bush. Aside from the fact that Major thought that Clinton was overly focused on domestic political issues (Major, 1999: 499), the special relationship suffered because during the Presidential election campaign the Major government had helped Bush, something which members of the Clinton administration found hard to forgive (dumbrell, 2001: 113). Clinton’s reluctance to fully engage on foreign affairs had been greatly influenced by the lessons of America’s involvement in Somalia. In december 1992 the then US President George H.W. Bush took the decision to launch operation restore Hope to bring stability to the war-torn country and arrest the warlord General Aidid. But despite committing some 28,000 troops, the US was unable to enforce peace. When two US helicopters were shot down

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in the capital Mogadishu by rebel Somali fighters in october 1993, resulting in the death of 19 military personnel, Clinton was faced with a domestic electorate backlash as ‘Americans were outraged and astounded’ (Clinton, 2004: 550) about an outcome that emphasised the complexity of engaging in such conflicts and highlighted the relative nature of US power and influence. The end result was that all US troops left Somalia within a matter of months. The outcome was one that pulled American foreign policy back home as President Clinton ‘didn’t believe that emotional, political, or strategic benefits of catching or killing Aidid justified further loss of life on either side, or a greater shifting of responsibility for Somalia’s future from the UN to the United States’ (Clinton, 2004: 554). Such reference to the UN reflected Clinton’s willingness to deflect criticism for the loss of American life in Somalia through inference that it had been a UN operation. A direct impact of this was to further lessen confidence in the UN to engage in the peacekeeping operations that were becoming evermore commonplace in the post-Cold War order. Thus, when a few months later in the Spring of 1994 the world was faced with a rwandan genocide that resulted in excess of 800,000 deaths in just over 100 days, no country was prepared to provide the forces necessary to strengthen the existing UN peacekeeping operation. Policy-makers in london stood by and watched the horrors of the genocide unfold, with Britain’s only engagement being that of voting for the UN peacekeeping operation. Britain’s then Ambassador to the UN, david Hannay, has rightly noted the impact of a decision which I still believe to have been deplorable whether it was motivated by prescience at the probable course of events or by the reluctance of the government’s backbenchers to get further involved in UN peacekeeping (we were already deploying troops in Bosnia). . . . The desire to avoid what came to be called “crossing the Mogadishu line” reinforced the timidity of the UN commanders in Bosnia, of which the Bosnian Serbs took ample advantage. (Hannay, 2013: 211) The British position in the Balkans was therefore framed in a broader context whereby it considered that any large-scale peacekeeping operation in Bosnia was not possible without the support of the US (or even europe). Apart from signalling the interconnected nature of foreign policy-making and the limited capacity for Britain to exert an independent position, these events created a strain in Britain’s special relationship with America, as policy-makers in london grew increasingly frustrated by Washington’s refusal to take on its traditional leadership role (McCourt, 2013: 252). Such a state of affairs created a significant problem because, in the words of Sir Percy Cradock,

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‘disengagement was unthinkable’. This was because ‘there were well-grounded fears that, unchecked, the conflict could spread and involve neighbouring countries’ and consequently ‘Western inaction in this instance would constitute a precedent and would send the worst message to potential aggressors elsewhere’ (Cradock, 1997: 188). The crux of the problem was that the Balkans conflict could only be solved with active US involvement and, because Clinton was only willing to participate in foreign policy issues that boosted his domestic popularity, this meant that there was no coherence to US foreign policy. This would lead French President Jacques Chirac to note that the US action over Bosnia meant that the ‘leader of the free world is vacant’ (Halberstam, 2001: 305), while other analysts referred to ‘Band-Aid diplomacy’ (Brinkley, 1997: 113). In commenting on this period, douglas Hurd has reflected that while ‘The dangers besetting the world have multiplied; the world’s response has become more feeble and incoherent’ (Hurd, 2011: 366). The world watched when in July 1995 Serb forces killed more than 8,000 Muslim men and boys in Srebrenica in Bosnia, which the UN had declared a safe area two years earlier in April 1993. This was the single largest mass murder in europe since the Second World War. Yet even this was not enough to bring the international community to its senses, and it was only when British and French troops were taken hostage in 1995 that the US resumed its leadership role by leading a NATo bombing campaign in August and September to protect people against Serb attacks. America’s change of tack was shaped by Clinton’s realisation that, rather than an electoral asset, a policy of non-commitment was increasingly viewed as a liability. But while this once again brought to the fore the post-1945 tradition of US foreign policy having a strong international dimension (McCourt, 2013: 253), it was nonetheless the case that such US engagement took place on a piecemeal basis and the Cold War did not result in the establishment of new forms of global governance that took into consideration the problems of the age. This failure to rebalance and restructure global institutions has rightly been viewed as a missed opportunity (Hurd, 2011: 366).

MAASTrICHT MUTINY In the midst of the complexities of the post-Cold War world, where Britain was faced with the need to respond to the momentous events that were unfolding, one of the thorniest issues that successive governments have faced has been the nature of the country’s relationship with europe. The fact that Britain’s membership of the european club had not reached a settled state was, from the objective standpoint of an accountant’s balance sheet,

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somewhat surprising given the fact that by 1990 the majority of the country’s trade had become located within the european arena. Such an economic argument had been one of the driving factors behind Britain’s very attempts to join the Community in the 1960s, with the attainment of membership in 1973 the result of a wider policy consensus that there was no other alternative. But, as the subsequent experiences of renegotiation and referendum in the 1970s and the turbulent environment of the 1980s under the Thatcher government highlighted, this was a relationship that, in the eyes of both politicians and the wider public, was less about economic issues and more about the fundamental issue of the encroachment of european decisionmaking on British politics. This was a trend that had accelerated with the Single european Act and that would undergo further change in the 1990s as the issue of european integration went from being essentially the preserve of discussions among policy-makers in Westminster to a mainstay of conversation among the electorate. At the heart of this issue lay the problem faced by successive governments of the need to balance the economic and political necessity of european membership with the building of alliances with other european countries to secure negotiating objectives that favour British interests and which in turn reflect domestic political priorities (A. Blair, 2007: 188–90). Yet Britain has struggled to do this effectively, although this is not the result of limited abilities of Foreign office staff. Indeed, of all european countries, Britain is regarded as having the most skilful diplomats and benefiting from one of the most highly organised and well-prepared civil services (A. Blair, 2007: 184–7). rather, the problem has centred on the difficulty faced by political leaders in charting a european policy that reflects the country’s commitment to europe and at the same time that of domestic concerns, given that Britain’s traditional preference was for quiet evolution in european integration that did not raise issues of contention at the domestic level or establish particularly grand policies at the european level that gave the impression of power being transferred away from Westminster. This was an issue that John Major was acutely aware of, having inherited from Margaret Thatcher a relationship with europe that was at a particularly low ebb. Two of Major’s immediate concerns on entering downing Street on 28 November 1990 were to gain greater credibility among his fellow european leaders and to maintain unity within a Conservative Party that had become increasingly divided on european issues. In dealing with these concerns, he hoped they would in turn improve the chances of winning the next general election, all of which seemed unobtainable during the latter years of the Thatcher premiership. A consequence of this was that domestic priorities were uppermost in his mind (Major, 1999: 275–6), commenting that ‘I also wanted to prevent my backbenchers from binding themselves to

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an anti-european posture that could either blow our election chances apart or, if we won, undermine my future negotiating strategy’ (Major, 1999: 293). While he managed to achieve these objectives in the short term, the period from 1992 to 1997 would see the Conservative Party become evermore divided on the issue of europe and incapable of achieving domestic political consensus. A desire to enhance Britain’s status on european policy matters was shaped by the need for Major to gain greater credibility with his fellow european leaders to ensure that Britain had more leverage and influence in the Maastricht Treaty negotiations. And while one element of this had already been achieved through Britain’s entry to the erM on 8 october 1990, Major would go on to achieve a closer working relationship with the German Chancellor, Helmut Kohl, than had Thatcher. This would be cemented on 11 March 1991 when Major spoke of the need to ‘place Britain at the Heart of europe’ in a speech delivered in Bonn, which at that time was Germany’s capital. Not only was this Major’s first speech outside Britain since being elected Prime Minister, it was also the first speech by a British Prime Minister in Germany since reunification and, as such, was meant to signal Britain’s commitment to europe and also to move on from the concerns that Thatcher had previously expressed about German unification (A. Blair, 1999: 9). This approach reflected Major’s pragmatic stance on europe and his desire to move away from the dogmatic approach of Thatcher. When the negotiations eventually reached their conclusion at the december 1991 Maastricht european Council, Britain received an opt-out from the single currency that the other member states committed to establish by 1999. At the same time, the new policy areas of Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) and Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) were subject to intergovernmental control by the member-state governments. To facilitate this, the Treaty established a three-pillar model of cooperation that resembled a Greek temple, of which the newly named European Union (eU) sat astride the top. Specific policies and the nature of decision-making was in turn determined on which pillar they were located, of which the first pillar included the main policy areas such as the internal market and permitted full involvement in the decision-making process by the european Commission, european Parliament and european Court of Justice. By contrast, the second and third pillars housed the CFSP and JHA, respectively, with the Commission, Parliament and european Court of Justice (eCJ) excluded from a decision-making process that was firmly controlled by the member-state governments. Another area of policy that Britain won an exclusion from was that of enhanced social policy cooperation in the form of the Social Chapter, in which the other member states agreed to pursue cooperation.

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European Union: although the treaties of rome initially called for an ‘ever closer union’ among the peoples of europe, it was the treaty on european Union which realised this objective.

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Referendum: a situation when the electorate is asked to either approve or disapprove a policy that has been set before it.

of these outcomes, securing the Social Chapter opt-out proved to be the most difficult, with agreement only being reached at the eleventh hour of the Maastricht negotiation as Britain’s eurosceptic employment Secretary, Michael Howard, had informed Major prior to the Maastricht meeting that he was prepared to resign if Britain accepted the Social Chapter (A. Blair, 1999: 110; Young, 1998: 431; Forster, 1999: 92). This meant that ‘Michael Howard was ensuring that John Major had no room for manoeuvre’ (Wall, 2012: 30). Such a course of action highlighted the difficulty that Major faced, whereby his very emphasis on having collegiate Cabinet government also allowed greater divisions to exist between ministers on a european policy that was increasingly dominated by cross-cutting issues that were not solely the preserve of the Foreign office (A. Blair, 1998b). Thus, while Major would later reflect on the Maastricht outcome as ‘Game, Set and Match’ for Britain (Major, 1999: 579), any sense of victory had to be set within the broader context of a Conservative Party that continued to have deep divisions on european issues. This came to the fore in 1992 when eU member states commenced the process of domestic implementation of the Maastricht Treaty, which for some member states also required a domestic referendum vote in support of treaty change. Although Britain did not require a popular referendum vote, the Treaty did have to gain the assent of the Houses of Parliament and a consequence of this was that the Foreign office was placed in the unusual situation of being at the centre of much of the government’s parliamentary business. Matters were further complicated when the April 1992 general election reduced the government’s majority from over 100 to just 21 MPs. This meant that small groups of MPs were more able to exert influence on the government’s policy by threatening defeat in the ratification process, with the situation being influenced by former Prime Minister Thatcher openly urging Conservative MPs to oppose the government’s policy and thereby defeat the Treaty (Major, 1999: 250, 261). The trigger for such rebellion was denmark’s rejection of the Treaty on 2 June 1992 by some 42,000 votes. The ‘no’ vote sparked a ratification crisis across europe as electorates and eurosceptic politicians began to digest the implications of the deepening of european integration that the Maastricht Treaty required. This included members of Major’s own government, for whom european integration was an issue of conscience that had priority over Party and Cabinet unity. on hearing the outcome of the danish referendum, the Chancellor of the exchequer, Norman Lamont, would later reflect that ‘I leapt into the air, punching it with my fist. It was an incautious reaction of sheer delight’ (lamont, 1999: 198). For Major, these developments presented a double-edged problem because, as Britain had assumed the six-month rotating presidency of the eU in July 1992, he had the task of trying to steer europe out of this ratification crisis

Lamont, Norman (b. 1942): served as Chancellor of the exchequer from 1990 to 1993 in John Major’s Conservative government. as Chancellor he was responsible for negotiating the monetary union part of the negotiations which led to the Maastricht treaty, while he was also responsible for administering the UK’s participation in the erM. the latter was a particularly difficult task and eventually resulted in sterling’s exit from the erM in september 1992. after his departure from government, he adopted a strong eurosceptic position.

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while having to face a group of eurosceptic MPs who were willing to challenge the government’s policy. If this task was not difficult enough, at a time of uncertainty over the future direction of europe, international currency speculators considered that the exchange rates of currencies for some of the erM members were over-valued and that this would necessitate an adjustment. These events culminated in an erM crisis in which Britain was forced to leave the Mechanism on 16 September 1992. Thereafter known as ‘Black Wednesday’, Britain was forced out of the erM by currency speculators who considered that the economy was too weak to stay in. Thus, despite massive government intervention of upwards of £3 billion, and the raising of interest rates from 10 to 15 per cent on 16 September, the government was unable to halt a fall in the value of Sterling (A. Blair, 2002: 166–71).

eUroPeAN dISUNITY These events had a dramatic impact on Major’s Conservative government as they removed its ability to defend the traditional Conservative position of sound economic policy, and they made a considerable dent in Major’s own political capital as he had been the driving force behind erM entry (dyson and Featherstone, 1999: 73–4). The events also raised the stakes for Major over his european policy because ‘Having lost the erM, Major had no choice but to defend Maastricht’ (reynolds, 2000: 284). This, however, became a near-impossible task as the months and years that followed witnessed the eurosceptic tide gain greater force within the Conservative Party as MPs rebelled against the Maastricht settlement. Major would later reflect that ‘in the Commons, a legacy of resentment lingered that flared up often enough to overshadow nearly everything the government tried to do’ (Major, 1999: 584). In an effort to reassert his leadership and to inject greater confidence into the handling of the government’s economic policy, in May 1993 Major replaced Norman lamont as Chancellor with Kenneth Clarke. Clarke provided Major with a loyal and confident ally within the Cabinet, which was something the Prime Minister had lost since Chris Patten’s departure to become the Governor of Hong Kong. A change in Chancellorship proved unable to halt criticism at the government’s european policy. Major was also now faced with an embittered former Chancellor of a eurosceptic disposition (lamont, 1999: 281–4; 518–24). on european issues the government would go on to lose a vote in the Maastricht ratification debate on 22 July 1993 by 324 votes to 316, which resulted in Major holding a vote of confidence the following day in an effort to silence the eurosceptic critics. Although such brinkmanship initially assisted in marshalling Conservative MPs behind a common position with only one MP daring to vote against the

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government, Major’s ability to assert his authority was further impacted by the Conservative Party’s failure to win successive by-elections. While the Maastricht Treaty was finally ratified by Britain on 2 August 1993 and officially came into force across europe on 1 November 1993, the government would face a fresh challenge from the commitment in the Maastricht Treaty to have a further Treaty review through an Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) negotiation. When these discussions commenced in March 1996, Major’s own domestic political credibility had been subject to a sustained battering from Conservative eurosceptic backbench MPs. When on 28 November 1994 eight eurosceptics voted against the imposition of a bill to introduce VAT on fuel, Major reacted by removing the Conservative Party ‘whip’ from them. The effect of this was that the government lost its majority in the Commons. Bit by bit the sceptics were limiting Major’s ability to govern, with the political landscape being increasingly dominated by Conservative pressure groups that were critical of government policy, namely the Bruges Group, No Turning Back Group, The Fresh Start Group and the ’92 Group. Major faced the impossible quandary of needing to restore the whip to the MPs to ensure that the government could pass its legislation in the Commons, while recognising that such action would mean that the rebels would require the government to pursue an increasingly sceptic tone. Faced with this impossible situation and the need to enforce some form of party discipline, Major took the extraordinary action of announcing on 22 June 1995 that he would resign as Conservative Party leader and in so doing threw down the gauntlet for his challengers to stand against him. For Major, this was an attempt to impose some form of authority on the Conservative Party by challenging critics to ‘put up, or shut up’ (Major, 1999: 612). Although the eurosceptic Welsh Secretary John redwood took up this challenge, Major was re-elected leader by 218 votes to 89. However, as John Young has written ‘with 34 absences, abstentions or spoiled papers it was hardly a ringing endorsement, a third of the parliamentary party being disaffected’ (Young, 2000: 169). Yet the election failed to deliver the expected outcome. Major’s victory did not silence the eurosceptic influence and consequently the government’s negotiating position was even more constrained in the IGC negotiations that started in 1996 than they had been at Maastricht. Matters went from bad to worse in May 1996 when Britain entered into a period of non-cooperation with its european partners until a eU ban on the export of British beef was lifted, and this proved to be ‘the worst breakdown since Britain joined the Community in 1973’ (Young, 1998: 462). But despite the lifting of the beef ban a few weeks later in June, the basic tenets of the British position did not change as the eurosceptic tide continued to engulf the decision-making ability of a Conservative government whose overall majority had been reduced

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in April 1996 to only 1, when it lost the Staffordshire east by-election. The perilous nature of the government’s parliamentary majority was further impacted by the difficulties that surrounded the Northern Ireland peace process at that time, which meant that the government could not count on the traditional support of Ulster Unionist MPs. ‘Constrained by the lack of a parliamentary majority and a eurosceptic Conservative Party, John Major’s government was unable and unwilling to play any constructive part in the negotiations and had essentially expended all of its negotiating capital’ (A. Blair, 2007: 194). This brought with it criticism from pro-european Cabinet ministers such as douglas Hurd and Kenneth Clarke who wanted to ensure that British influence within the eU was retained and that the government should retain the option of joining, at a later date, key policies such as the single currency. referred to as the ‘wait and see policy’, it in itself drew criticism from sceptics who wanted to have a clearer position of noncommitment. This stance was represented in the upsurge of support for political parties and movements who spoke to this eurosceptic beat, of which the UK Independence Party (UKIP) and referendum Party, created in 1993 and 1994, respectively, were attracting support from previously Conservativesupporting sections of the electorate. The net effect of this was that John Major’s government was, to all intents and purposes, on life support as it progressed towards the 1 May 1997 general election, with a backdrop of defeats in by-elections and poor performance in local elections. With a divided parliamentary party and the inability of Prime Minister John Major to assert his authority, under the leadership of Tony Blair the labour Party swept to victory with a massive majority of 179 MPs. As John Young has written, it was the worst Conservative performance since universal suffrage was introduced and had left Major in a position curiously like that of Harold Wilson two decades before: a moderate on european issues with no obvious alternative as a leader, increasingly caught between warring ideologies and choosing a managerial approach to hold his party together, the preservation of the party having become more important than effective government. (Young, 2000: 174)

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Blair, Anthony (b. 1953): labour Prime Minister 1997–2007. appointed leader of the labour Party in 1994 after the death of John smith in the same year. Blair entered Parliament in 1983 and was elected to the shadow cabinet in 1988. however, it was not until his appointment as opposition spokesman on home affairs in 1992 that he rose to prominence, thereby providing a platform for his election as leader. a committed pro-european, as Prime Minister he attempted to raise the UK’s profile in europe, although his premiership was overshadowed by his support for the Us-led invasions of afghanistan in 2001 and iraq in 2003.

7 Transformed world: 1997–2013

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Brown, Gordon (b. 1951): Labour Prime Minister 2007–10 having previously been Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1997– 2007. His premiership was dominated by economic problems, the fallout from the UK’s ill-fated invasion of Iraq and the legacy of infighting that had dominated the Labour government since 1997.

he Labour government that was elected to office in 1997 with a 179-seat majority and the youngest Prime Minister since 1812 took over from a Conservative government that had been battered by divisions among MPs and members of the Cabinet over the issue of European integration [Document 23]. Yet the 1997 general election was not fought and won on the issue of European integration, nor for that matter on any other foreign policy issue. Instead, the election was contested on the ability of the political parties to govern, most notably with regard to such issues as the economy, healthcare, policing and education. Yet the subsequent 13 years of Labour government (1997–2010) were dominated by foreign policy decisions, of which Britain’s participation in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 became a focal point of discussion (A. Blair, 2012b: 119– 20). Not only was this unexpected in light of the election campaign, it was also surprising given that Blair knew relatively little about foreign policy, with his expertise before becoming Labour leader having been focused on domestic affairs. As he would later reflect in his memoirs ‘I knew a lot about history before becoming prime minister; but about contemporary affairs, I knew little’ (T. Blair, 2010: 224). One of the upshots of this was that while the Labour government and its key architects of policy – Tony Blair and Gordon Brown – had specific views as to how they would develop domestic policy, their outlook on foreign policy was far less rooted in a clear sense of policy development. For Tony Blair this provided both a challenge and an opportunity for him as Prime Minister. Thus, while he was faced with a steep learning curve on foreign affairs, this was also a subject area that he could make his own and one on which he would not have to face the same level of battles as he did with Chancellor Brown on domestic policy. Foreign policy also provided Blair with the opportunity to move beyond the chore of domestic issues, of which the Labour government’s Deputy Director of Communications, Lance Price, would recall in his diary that by 1999 Blair ‘seems almost bored with the ordinary stuff and

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interested only in all the foreign leaders, Clinton, wars etc’ (Price, 2005: 69). But while this would provide Blair with the worldwide platform that he appeared to crave so desperately, it also meant that there were considerable contradictions in British foreign policy during the 1997–2010 period, most notably between a desire to provide an ethical foreign policy and undertaking military intervention, and which resulted in increased levels of public disquiet and criticism over an interventionist foreign policy. This provided the backdrop to the election of a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government in May 2010, which sought to advance a foreign policy that was less tied to the US-led interventionism that dominated the first decade of the twenty-first century.

EThICS AND INTErvENTION On 12 May 1997, 12 days after taking office, the new Foreign Secretary, Robin Cook, set out a mission statement that was intended to set clear objectives for the Labour government’s foreign policy and was part of a broader commitment to establish a third way in foreign policy, just as the government sought to do in domestic policy (vickers, 2000). This extended to the Labour government attaching greater prominence to international aid and development, illustrated by the establishment of the Department for International Development (DFID) in 1997. DFID marked a sea change in British policy on aid and development because it was headed by a member of the Cabinet and because of its focus on reducing poverty in the developing world. The Labour government’s desire to establish a different identity in its foreign policy was further emphasised by providing the patronage behind the launch of the Foreign Policy Centre in 1998, a new left-of-centre think tank of which Cook and Blair were, respectively, President and Patron. The work of the Centre chimed with the core elements of Cook’s foreign policy mission statement that included making Britain a leading player in Europe, strengthening the Commonwealth and creating a more effective UN. These issues were dominated by the pledge in Cook’s mission statement that British foreign policy should be based on ethical considerations. In a much quoted passage, Cook argued that The Labour government does not accept that political values can be left behind when we check in our passports to travel on diplomatic business. Our foreign policy must have an ethical dimension and must support the demands of other peoples for the democratic rights on which we insist for ourselves. (Cook, 1997)

Cook, Robin (1946– 2005): Foreign Secretary 1997–2001 and Leader of the House of Commons 2001–3, resigning in protest over UK’s invasion of Iraq.

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A commitment to establish an ethical foreign policy was part of an attempt by the Labour government to distinguish itself from the previous Conservative administration and to mark a broader separation from Britain’s imperialist past (Wheeler and Dunne, 1998: 850; Williams, 2005). Such a standpoint reflected the fact that Britain was part of a far more interdependent world than it had hitherto been, and one that was shaped by the forces of globalisation and rising powers such as Brazil and China. This was emphasised by the official handover of hong Kong back to China on 1 July 1997. Cook’s mission statement therefore spoke of a foreign policy-making environment where national interests could not be wholly defined by narrow realpolitik. A commitment to an ethical foreign policy provided a means by which the public could engage with the concept of what Britain’s foreign policy was for. Yet this strategy instantly provided a reference point for which the Labour government’s foreign policy would be judged. This was problematic, given that Britain was one of the world’s major exporters of arms (Phythian, 2000). Critics also noted that it would be nearly impossible for any government to establish a foreign policy that had a moral and ethical undertone and still satisfied national interests (Brown, 2001; Martin and Garnett, 1997: 78–9). The near-impossible position that the Labour government found itself in on these matters was emphasised by it accepting legal advice to honour a contract negotiated by the previous Conservative government in December 1996 to sell hawk jets to Indonesia, and also agreeing to sell spare parts of hawk jets to Zimbabwe in 2000, despite the criticism levied at the repressive Mugabe regime. Closer to home, the Labour government ignored an October 1998 international arrest warrant from a Spanish judge for the extradition of the former President of Chile, Augusto Pinochet, who at that time was visiting Britain for an operation on his back. Decisions such as these drew criticism from human rights organisations such as Amnesty International and led to accusations that the Labour government’s commitment to an ethical foreign policy was being pursued on a ‘case-by-case’ basis. The Labour government also faced the continuing lack of stability in the Balkans. Since the start of the 1990s European governments had struggled to provide an appropriate response to the break-up of Yugoslavia and the ensuing ethnic conflict. While blame was directed in different directions, from the lack of appropriate European military resources to an absence of a coordinated European position, by 1999 the humanitarian crisis in Kosovo was evident to all, as the Serb leader Slobodan Milosevic was engaged in a campaign to ethnically cleanse the Serbian province of Kosovo of Muslim Albanians (who accounted for approximately 90 per cent of the population) (reynolds, 2000: 292). Faced with such atrocities, Blair and his Foreign Secretary, robin Cook, were of the view ‘that Milosevic must not be allowed to get away with in Kosovo what he had been allowed to in Bosnia’ (McCourt,

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2013: 256). The New Labour government thus advanced a different set of priorities to those of John Major’s Conservative administration, where Blair recognised the significance of events in Kosovo and the need for an international response that took the form of air strikes, which he regarded as being morally justified. In a speech on 27 March 1999 Blair set out the moral imperatives of such intervention: To those of you who say the aim of military strikes is not clear, I say it is crystal clear: it is to curb Milosevic’s ability to wage war on innocent civilians . . . Fail to act now, and the conflict unleashed by Milosevic would not stop. We would have to deal with the consequences of spiralling conflict and hundreds of thousands of refugees. (T. Blair, 1999) Blair’s willingness to get involved in Kosovo marked him from that point onwards as one of the most willing of Western leaders to undertake military action, with the British commitment being essentially a ‘moral issue’ for Blair (T. Blair, 2010: 228; Daddow, 2009). Such a stance reflected the significance that the Labour Party attached to internationalism, where British interests were interlinked with those of other countries over such issues as security and the environment (Atkins, 2013), and as such marked a notable difference from the previous Conservative government. This was also indicative of Blair’s tendency to compartmentalise foreign policy decisions into such camps as ‘good’ and ‘evil’, and in part reflected the strategy set out by Foreign Secretary robin Cook in 1997 to develop an ‘ethical foreign policy’, with Britain being a ‘force for good in the world’. A willingness to get involved in Kosovo was shared by the US Secretary of State, Madeleine Albright, who was of the opinion that the lack of American leadership in the first half of the 1990s had been the crucial problem in securing peace in Bosnia (Albright, 2003: 378–428, cited in McCourt, 2013: 256). This would result in policymakers in Washington embarking on a NATO-led bombing campaign on 24 March 1999 to stop Milosevic’s forces from systematically murdering and displacing the majority ethnic Muslim Albanian population. Yet rather than a swift campaign, the ethnic cleansing continued and so did the NATO campaign. American support was the crucial factor because, for all Blair’s rhetoric for action, the fact of the matter was that European allies were dependent on American military support to undertake such action, as ‘only the United States had the power to wage sustained war: it provided, for instance, some 80 per cent of the combat aircraft and funded about one-third of the costs of the bombing campaign (Britain paid about one-seventh)’ (reynolds, 2000: 293). Whatever the imbalance of these contributions, the Kosovo campaign breathed new life into the Anglo-American special relationship, demonstrated the significance of and rationale for NATO, and further cemented Blair’s personal

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friendship with US President Bill Clinton, with Blair seeking to position Britain as the strategic link between America and Europe. Intervention in Kosovo was also significant because it took place without a UN mandate – principally because russia was uncooperative – and as such raised questions over the legitimacy of the action in light of the government’s emphasis on working with the UN. Blair took the view that UN support was not required if the case for intervention had been made in previous UN resolutions (T. Blair, 2010: 227–30). The issue for Blair was that the international community had stood by in the 1990s as atrocities unfolded throughout the world, such as in 1994 in rwanda when the UN failed to adequately respond to the genocide where 800,000 Tutsi and moderate hutus were massacred by hutu militias. As such there was a clear case for intervention in Kosovo for humanitarian rather than purely military reasons. Yet what was less clear at the time was that such intervention would represent a high point of the Labour government’s endeavour to carve out an ethical foreign policy (McCormack, 2011: 108). Blair’s personal involvement in the Kosovo campaign not only marked him as the most ‘hawkish of European leaders’ (Naughtie, 2004: 54), it also brought to his attention the ability of the military to deliver outcomes and signalled his own willingness to take personal control on foreign policy issues (Daddow, 2011: 224; Dyson, 2011: 70). This in itself was representative of Blair’s tendency towards what has come to be known as ‘sofa government’, with policy discussions taking place outside of formal government meetings, such as Cabinet, and a growing shift in his personal powerbase of advisers within Number 10 Downing Street (Naughtie, 2004: 77). It is a point that Sir Michael Jay, a former head of the Foreign Office, noted in an interview undertaken in 2007 when Blair was still in office: ‘Blair has a much less conventional approach to government. he’s brought other people in; he hasn’t seen the need to operate through the Cabinet structure, the Civil Service structure, in the way in which others did’ ( Jay, 2007). A consequence of this state of affairs was that it led to notable turf-wars between Blair and his Cabinet colleagues as ‘Power was concentrated in his private office and entourage, who rampaged across the Whitehall bureaucracy’ (Patten, 2005: 124). On matters relating to foreign policy this also highlighted a downgrading in the role of the Foreign Office as Blair attached great store to his own abilities to resolve foreign policy dilemmas. This in turn meant that many of the key foreign policy speeches during the years when Blair was in office were given by Blair rather than the Foreign Secretary, with a notable exception being robin Cook’s 1997 mission statement. In Cook’s case this situation had been influenced by the fact that Cook’s standing in the Labour government quickly deteriorated after Labour assumed office in May 1997. This was partly because of the public breakdown of his marriage in the

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summer of 1997 as a result on an affair with his secretary Gaynor regan, as well as criticism over his handling of a number of policy areas. The latter included criticism levied at him in 1997 for casting a gloom over the state visit by the Queen to India and Pakistan to mark the 50th anniversary of independence, when Cook’s offer of mediating over the disputed border area of Kashmir was criticised by India. At the same time he was criticised by the British press for returning to the UK between the two state visits, supposedly to see Gaynor (Cowper-Coles, 2012). Matters were also not helped by the fact that Cook’s political views did not chime with the modernisation ethos that shaped Blair’s vision. Sir Sherard Cowper-Coles, who served as Cook’s private secretary in the Foreign Office, noted that ‘By the spring of 1999, robin Cook had acquired the reputation of being the most accident-prone member of the Blair Government’ (Cowper-Coles, 2012). As Blair’s foreign policy adviser Sir Stephen Wall would later reflect ‘robin Cook was damaged, because of the whole story about his marriage and because he was very much Old Labour opposed to the New Labour. So Blair did not really trust him and he turned much more to the European Secretariat’ (Wall, 2012: 36). The implication of this was that the Foreign Office was cut out from a considerable amount of strategic policy-making undertaken during the first Labour government when Cook served as Foreign Secretary from 1997 to 2001, while the war on terror that dominated matters after 2001 elevated Blair to the forefront of global discussions. The upshot of this was that Blair, rather than the Foreign Secretary, gave many of the key foreign policy speeches that took place during the years when Blair was in office. Of the speeches that Blair made on foreign policy matters, one of the most notable was the ‘Doctrine of the International Community’ speech that he gave to the Economic Club of Chicago on 22 April 1999. In the speech Blair outlined five key tests that had to be considered before any decision was taken to intervene: first, are we sure of our case?; second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options?; third, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake?; fourth, are we prepared for the long term?; and fifth, do we have national interests involved? [Document 21]. The Chicago speech was significant for a number of reasons. First, it marked a critical turning point in Blair’s thinking and also provided the context for a shift in British foreign policy. Second, in contrast to the prevarication of the Major years, Blair spoke of the need to reconceptualise the narrow view of the national interest, whereby ‘intervention to bring down a despotic dictatorial regime could be justified on grounds of the nature of that regime, not merely its immediate threat to our national interest’ (T. Blair, 2010: 248). Third, the speech reflected less of the traditional long-term thinking of foreign policy that was typical of the Foreign Office as it touched ‘on sentiments that are much more familiar to American political leaders than

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to Europeans, who are less likely to speak of foreign policy as a moral purpose’ (Naughtie, 2004: 57, 84–5). Finally, the main sections of the speech were not the product of Foreign Office thinking, but rather the result of a memo written by Professor Sir Lawrence Freedman of King’s College, London University that was sent to Blair’s Chief of Staff, Jonathan Powell. While for some commentators Blair’s speech represented a desire to tackle head on despotic regimes, in Blair’s view the resonance of the speech was that the international community could no longer stand on the sidelines when humanitarian crises were taking place. A consequence of this was that the responsibility to protect became a key focus of the ethical dimension of Britain’s foreign policy (Bulley, 2009: 40). To this end, Blair used the Chicago speech to defend the intervention in Kosovo, noting This is a just war, based not on any territorial ambitions but on value. We cannot let the evil of ethnic cleansing stand. We must not rest until it is reversed. We have learned twice before in this century that appeasement does not work. If we let an evil dictator range unchallenged, we will have to spill infinitely more blood and treasure to stop him later. For Blair this meant that We are witnessing the beginnings of a new doctrine of international community. By this I mean the explicit recognition that today more than ever before we are mutually dependent, that national interest is to a significant extent governed by international collaboration and that we need a clear and coherent debate as to the direction this doctrine takes us in each field of international endeavour. Yet the problem with this viewpoint was that the absence of UN support meant that there emerged considerable debate about the legitimacy of Britain’s, and NATO’s, actions (Bulley, 2010). It also highlighted the extent to which Western powers were willing (and unwilling) to get involved in interventions in a world where initial hopes for a ‘new world order’ were giving way to concerns about the emergence of a ‘new world disorder’, as threats began to emerge from ethnic conflict and so-called rogue states (hannay, 2008) [Document 21]. In this context, the paradox here is that, rather than being a time of conflict, the Cold War appears in hindsight to have been a time of relative peace as superpower influence helped to restrain divisions within societies emerging into war. It was with this growing uncertainty in mind that President Clinton would quip in October 1993, ‘Gosh! I miss the Cold War’ (White, 1998: 256), while his successor as President, George W. Bush, would reflect in the 2000 Presidential election campaign

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When I was coming up, it was a dangerous world, and we knew exactly who the “they” were. It was us versus them and it was clear who “them” was. Today, we’re not so sure who the “they” are, but we know they’re there. (Bruni, 2002: 44)

NEW WOrLD DISOrDEr Tony Blair’s willingness and desire for Britain to adopt an interventionist stance that differentiated the country from being merely a European power would result in British troops being deployed to East Timor in 1999 and Sierra Leone in 2000. Deployments such as these brought to the fore questions about the wisdom of the post-Cold War reductions in military capacity, when the Labour government undertook in 1998 a Strategic Defence review that attached focus to the importance of flexibility to ensure rapid troop deployment and greater levels of coordination between the army, navy and air force to enhance operational effectiveness. At the heart of this was the desire of the Blair government to exercise greater levels of influence at the international level. Using language that resonated back to the post-1945 period, in his Guildhall speech of September 1999 Tony Blair stated We have a new role. . . . It is to use the strengths of our history to build our future not as a super power but as a pivotal power, as a power that is at the crux of the alliances and international politics which shape the world and its future. This wish to position Britain at the interchange of the world’s significant alliances was reflected through its membership of the EU, UN, NATO, Commonwealth and G8. But whereas this language spoke of Britain playing a critical role across a number of fronts – in a manner that resembled Churchill’s famous three circles speech some seven decades earlier – the years that followed saw British foreign policy being primarily shaped by its special relationship with the US, rather than through these wider networks. The trigger for this was 11 September 2001 (9/11) when the terrorist organisation al-Qaeda, led by Osama bin Laden, crashed two hijacked commercial aircraft into the twin towers of the World Trade Center in New York, while an additional aircraft crashed into the Pentagon in Washington DC and a fourth crashed into a field in Pennsylvania. These terrorist attacks, which took place exactly 11 years after President George h.W. Bush had spoken of a new world order, resulted in thousands of deaths, most memorably pictured by the collapse of the twin towers, and led to a new conflict that has

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subsequently been referred to as the war on terror. The nature of America’s response to these events was the responsibility of George W. Bush, who assumed office in January 2001. his view was that the Clinton administration had attached too much emphasis on engaging with the multilateral framework of a UN that had failed to tackle the threat posed by terrorist groups and rogue states in a post-Cold War period in which US interests had been subject to a number of terrorist attacks, most notably in Aden and Yemen in 1992, the World Trade Center in 1993, Tanzania and Kenya in 1998 and the bombing of the USS Cole in 2000. A consequence of this was that in the wake of 9/11 the Bush administration took the decision to directly challenge states that provided safe havens to the terrorist organisations it believed were behind these attacks, as well as to confront those states it regarded as aiding international instability through, for example, the development of biological, chemical and nuclear weapons programmes. America’s attention was particularly focused on Iran, Iraq and North Korea, which Bush depicted as forming an ‘axis of evil’. Such concern was a further sign of the complexity of the post-Cold War world where the established alliances of the Cold War had given way to a far more fluid international system. This was emphasised by the emergence of new alliances and the significance of the growing shifting economic power to countries in Asia and South America, as well as the fact that the post-Cold War period was signified by the emergence of new security threats. These threats included cyber crime and the ability of rogue states and terrorist groups to obtain weapons of mass destruction (WMD), which had the potential to inflict massive damage as their use was not bound by the principles of equal vulnerability that had governed the US and Soviet relations during the Cold War. Iraq proved to be a notable case in point. In the aftermath of the 1979 Iranian revolution, the West had turned to Iraq as an ally in the region, with countries such as Britain selling arms to the Iraqi leader Saddam hussein. Such a course of action represented the aggressive arms sales policy that many British governments had pursued over the years as a means of supporting employment in Britain, as well as the manner by which Britain – and other countries – had sought to establish alliances with unsavoury leaders to achieve influence irrespective of the fact that such individuals often had appalling human rights records. While such alliances were viewed as being part and parcel of Cold War politics, their implications came to light in the 1990–1 Gulf War when it was highlighted that British troops were fighting an enemy that their government had secretly armed. Factors such as these additionally brought to the fore the complexity of implementing an ethical foreign policy in the manner that robin Cook had outlined. A willingness by the US to respond assertively to such challenges presented a marked contrast to the focus on containment that had been the

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bedrock of Clinton’s foreign policy. A consequence of this was that the US led an invasion into Afghanistan in 2001 to eliminate the Taliban regime and the al-Qaeda terrorist group to which it afforded protection. Two years later, in 2003, the US invaded Iraq, with the focus on this occasion being a belief that it was necessary to reduce the perceived threat of Iraqi WMD. In responding to these events, the Blair government was the quickest to offer its support to America. Britain’s willingness to support the American position drew on the long-standing close ties between the countries that befitted the special relationship (Marsh and Baylis, 2006), with Blair’s relationship with Bush having been influenced by Clinton’s advice to ‘get as close to George Bush as you have been to me’ (riddell, 2003: 131). The outcome was the formation of an extraordinarily close relationship that was evidenced when Blair received a standing ovation for simply being present when Bush addressed a joint session of Congress on 20 September 2001 to discuss the implications of the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Naughtie, 2004: 65). In reflecting on the implications of this relationship some commentators have noted that Blair was blinkered in his belief that he could exert influence on US policy where he sought to ‘direct Bush in three directions: towards an attack on Afghanistan rather than Iraq; towards incorporating a renewed drive for Middle East peace within whatever action was taken; and from making war unilaterally’ (Wallace and Phillips, 2009: 275). Questions have been raised about the extent to which Blair was really able to shape US decisions. Britain’s position as the only other nation initially involved in the Afghanistan conflict meant that its participation was of greater significance to America in lessening accusations that it was pursuing a unilateralist policy, than it was for Britain in being able to gain extra influence in Washington. The fact of the matter was that while Bush welcomed UK support, this was tangential to American needs and in hindsight Blair was somewhat misguided in thinking that his attempt to offer wise counsel would have a significant impact in shaping a US foreign policy that was focused on tackling what were regarded as recalcitrant states. This came to the fore over Iraq, where the US accused Saddam hussein of developing and possessing WMD of a biological and chemical nature and not complying with UN weapons inspectors by undertaking a cat-and-mouse game where the impression was that Iraq was trying to conceal its weapons. This would lead to the weapons inspectors being forced to leave Iraq in 1998, and Britain and America subsequently jointly undertaking a three-day bombing campaign between 16 and 19 December 1998 on Iraqi targets as a means of degrading Iraq’s WMD. International pressure on Iraq resulted in the return of UN weapons inspectors in November 2002, of which UN Security Council resolution 1441 provided the Iraqi government with a ‘final opportunity to comply with its disarmament obligations’.

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A desire to bring Iraq to justice and to remove Saddam hussein from power would see America trying to secure a second UN resolution to approve the use of force, with this position being influenced by Blair’s desire to gain legitimacy for the conflict (T. Blair, 2010: 445). The argument presented by both Britain and the US was that Iraq posed a significant threat because of its ability to deploy WMD. Among EU member states, France and Germany were opposed to the use of force against Iraq and this created a diplomatic divide that weakened the Atlantic Alliance and severely limited Tony Blair’s claim that he was able to act as an interlocutor between America and Europe. Faced with a lack of unity at the UN and within the Western alliance, Bush issued Saddam hussein an ultimatum on 17 March 2003 that, unless he and his family leave Iraq, a military conflict would commence. Much has been written on the background to the Iraq conflict that commenced on 20 March 2003 (ralph, 2011). This includes the extent to which Blair privately gave his support to an invasion, even before the matter had been subject to what proved to be a futile exercise for UN endorsement (Naughtie, 2004: 64–5). For Blair the importance of UN endorsement was that it reflected his desire to be a good internationalist (T. Blair, 2010: 445). The absence of a second UN resolution to provide the legitimacy behind such a coalition resulted in a considerable backlash against the policy of intervention. This included the Leader of the house of Commons and former Foreign Secretary robin Cook, who on 17 March 2003 became the first member of the Cabinet to resign over the decision taken by the Blair government to go to war in Iraq. In his speech, Cook specifically noted that ‘I can’t accept collective responsibility for the decision to commit Britain now to military action in Iraq without international agreement or domestic support’. In his resignation letter Cook wrote that ‘At cabinet for some weeks I have been frank about my concern over embarking on military action in the absence of multilateral support’ and ‘In principle I believe it is wrong to embark on military action without broad international support. In practice I believe it is against Britain’s interests to create a precedent for unilateral military action’. While Cook’s speech received a standing ovation from all political parties in the house of Commons, the government’s decision to commit to the Iraq conflict only received criticism from the Liberal Democrats. Although Conservative Party support was influenced by a desire not to appear weak on matters related to defence – a traditional Conservative political priority – the overall outcome was one which emphasised the relative weakness of Parliament in being able to hold government to account on foreign policy matters and the extent to which the direction of British foreign policy was being driven solely by the Prime Minister. Cook’s actions emphasised the degree of unease within government over a policy to pursue war in Iraq without sufficient UN backing. As Chris

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Patten has reflected, ‘It cannot have been helpful in the buildup to the Iraq war and its aftermath that the prime minister was divorced from the informed scepticism that the Foreign Office would have brought to a discussion of the available options’ (Patten, 2005: 125). This view was reinforced when, on 18 March 2003, the Foreign Office’s deputy legal adviser, Elizabeth Wilmshurst, resigned in protest at the government’s course of action, noting that I cannot in conscience go along with advice – within the Office or to the public or Parliament – which asserts the legitimacy of military action without such a resolution, particularly since an unlawful use of force on such a scale amounts to the crime of aggression; nor can I agree with such action in circumstances which are so detrimental to the international order and the rule of law. (Wilmshurst, 2005) While Blair initially deflected the ensuing criticism over the legality of the conflict on the basis of the WMD threat posed by Saddam, subsequent evidence emphasised that significant sections of the UK document (United Kingdom, 2003) that outlined the nature of the Iraq threat were unreliable (A. Blair, 2012b: 125). A problem with accurate intelligence afflicted both the UK and US position (Blix, 2005: 260–4). This would result in the February dossier being subsequently referred to as the ‘dodgy dossier’, a term shaped by the fact that large sections of the dossier had been plagiarised from various unattributed sources. This would be further emphasised when in July 2010 the former head of the British security service, MI5, Lady Eliza Manningham-Buller, in evidence to the Chilcot inquiry into Britain’s role in Iraq noted ‘very few would argue that the intelligence was substantial enough to make that decision [go to war]’. To many it seemed that both the US and the UK ‘were exaggerating the risks they saw in order to get the political support they would not otherwise have had’ (Blix, 2005: 271). Faced with criticism, the Blair government shifted its argument for invading Iraq from the threat posed by WMD to the fact that the world would be a safer place without Saddam hussein. But while such justification was based on Saddam’s history of inflicting human rights abuses on his own people, the fact of the matter was that the UK–US position differed from that of many other countries where there was a preference to seek a second UN resolution. And while Blair would continue to defend this course of action, public scepticism meant that ‘there now began to emerge a widening plausibility gap between the official framing of the Iraq war, and public perceptions about the actual motives involved’ (Kettell, 2013: 270). Criticism was also levied at the extent to which this was a foreign policy based on double standards, where the government was prepared to undertake military

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action in some countries such as Iraq (1998), Kosovo (1999), East Timor (1999), Sierra Leone (2000), Afghanistan (2001), the Democratic republic of Congo (2003) and Iraq (2003), but equally ignore others such as Iran (Kitchen and vickers, 2013). The government was also subject to criticism over allegations that as part of the war on terror it had been involved in socalled rendition activities of terrorists that used torture to obtain intelligence. This action in particular would spark considerable debate about the legal, moral and ethical rights of government action and would lead to considerable public disquiet over such a policy (Gaskarth, 2011). The end result was that the invasion of Iraq and the government’s response to criticism that was levied against it resulted in a significant decline in the public’s trust of government which extended far beyond the confines of the foreign policy decisions relating to Iraq. In evaluating these points it is evident that the Blair government’s commitment to deploy some 46,000 troops to Iraq was influenced by a desire to reinforce the alliance with America, where Blair hoped that he would be able to exercise influence on US policy-makers to engage them in more positive discussions on the Middle East and the environment (Naughtie, 2004: 88). These were subjects that were close to Blair’s heart. Yet on these and other issues Blair’s influence was minimal (Patten, 2005: 126–7). Bush was unwilling to engage in discussions with the leader of the Palestinian Liberation Organisation, Yasser Arafat (Bush, 2010: 404), and refused to ratify the Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change. This proved to be a doubly problematic outcome for Blair, because he regarded these policies, most notably securing Middle East peace, as a means of demonstrating his broader internationalist outlook. Yet, rather than achieving such an outcome, Blair became tainted by the Iraq conflict, which cost the lives of hundreds of British troops, placed a significant strain on overstretched military resources, and significantly undermined the doctrine of intervention that he had outlined a decade before. Blair’s successor as Prime Minister, Gordon Brown, upon taking office on 27 June 2007, attempted to distance himself from the foreign policy priorities of Blair. This proved problematic however, not least because as Chancellor of the Exchequer he had been a central figure in the Blair government. Brown’s preferences were more American than European and as a result he was able to offer little to restore the damage that had been inflicted on Britain’s European foreign policy through its support of the Iraq war (Whitman, 2010). To this end, the change in Prime Minister brought about a change of style rather than a change of policy, with Brown simply adding greater emphasis to such policies as championing debt relief in Africa, fighting poverty and tackling climate change. The problem here was that while these were big internationalist policies, they did not bring about

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greater influence for Britain at an international level, and thus 13 years after the Labour government had entered office in 1997, by 2010 its legacy was dominated by the Iraq war – a war which claimed the lives of 179 members of the British armed forces, with many hundreds more suffering severe injuries that would have otherwise resulted in death had it not been for improvements in body armour. It was against this background that David Cameron took office as Prime Minister of a Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition government in May 2010. Saddled by the legacy of Iraq, the coalition took the decision to withdraw all British troops from Iraq by May 2011 (combat troops had left by April 2009). By that stage the total costs of Britain’s involvement in Iraq had reached nearly £10 billion, with this figure being dwarfed by the estimated £1 trillion that the US spent on the war. Apart from the human and economic costs inflicted on Britain, it has been estimated that there were 100,000 Iraqi civilian deaths during the conflict. While Iraq may have emerged a more democratic country, problems of factionalism, unstable governance and corruption continued, while the country was itself badly scarred by the physical landscape of conflict. This state of affairs, when combined with the fact that the Iraqi invasion led to a radicalisation of young muslims, has not created a more peaceful world. Indeed, this was the conclusion reached by the former head of the British security agency MI5, Lady Eliza Manningham-Buller, in her evidence to the Chilcot inquiry into the Iraq war in July 2010. While it will be the task of historians in future years to reflect on whether the legacy of the Iraq conflict can be compared with other significant foreign policy episodes such as the Suez crisis, it is certainly the case that both Iraq and Afghanistan have made decision-makers within the British governing elite think twice about committing troops to other conflict zones. To this end, despite the rhetoric that has been expended in criticising the policies of such countries as Iran and North Korea, the reality of the Iraq war is that it is unlikely that Britain could muster the necessary support (and resources) to repeat such intervention. This unwillingness to publicly commit troops was evident in 2011 when, in reaction to internal uprisings in Libya against the leadership of Muammar Gaddafi, Britain along with France chose to respond by enforcing a no-fly zone to support the rebel forces. For Britain, the action highlighted the complexity of the position that it occupies in the world; on the one hand it remains a significant military power that continues to regard itself as a force for good and, along with France, has the greatest capacity among EU states for military action, but on the other hand its military resources are of a limited nature and are also further constrained by an unwillingness among the public to support further military involvement.

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Cameron, David (b. 1966): a Conservative politician, he has been Prime Minister of the Conservative–Liberal democrat coalition government since 2010. His period in office has been dominated by greater hostility towards European integration, while the UK’s ability to orchestrate foreign policy independent of the EU has been constrained by budget cuts.

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In assessing this situation, it is evident that in the twenty-first century Britain faces a far more complex world than policy-makers considered would have been the case when the Cold War ended. The eventual overthrow of Gaddafi in August 2011 was part of a chain of events that became known as the Arab Spring, which started the previous year with uprisings in Tunisia and subsequently saw regimes tumble in Egypt, Libya and Tunisia. Unrest spread to other countries, including Syria, which became engulfed in a bloody civil war between rebel forces and its ruler Bashar al-Assad that, by the spring of 2014, had not resulted in al-Assad being removed from office. Apart from the human catastrophe and the political instability caused by such conflicts, Britain faced the question of how to respond, given the lack of support and capacity for military involvement. Against a backdrop of public disquiet over military intervention, on 29 August 2013 the British Parliament rejected the government’s motion calling for military intervention in Syria. While critics of this vote have emphasised that it represented a significant moment when Britain turned its back on the world’s problems, the reality of the matter is that the outcome was less of a surprise than many commentators stated. It was both a product of public opinion consistently expressing concern about the use of military intervention in the aftermath of Iraq and the fact that the legacy of Iraq also meant that questions over the legitimacy of intervention have posed greater dilemmas for decisionmakers even when there is a plethora of evidence to support such action, as in the case of Syria. But not only have questions been asked about the case for intervention, the fact of the matter is that Britain’s very capacity to intervene has been significantly reduced as a result of the austerity programme of budget cuts introduced by the coalition government in 2010 (Gaskarth, 2013: 132). The 2010 Strategic Defence review set out an 8 per cent cut in defence spending over a four-year period. In practice this meant a reduction of 5,000 jobs from the navy, 7,000 from the army and a cut of 25,000 civilian staff. The defence cuts led to the decommissioning of Britain’s remaining aircraft carriers hMS Ark Royal and hMS Illustrious in 2011 and 2014, respectively, while harrier jets based on the carriers were sold to America in 2011. Although these cuts were the product of needing to balance the increasing costs of defence equipment with a constrained budget, they were also set within the context of the National Security Strategy (NSS) which emphasised the range of threats that Britain is likely to face over the coming decades, including cyber security, terrorism, organised crime, border security, WMD proliferation, energy security, civil emergencies and weak and fragile states. Given the variety of these threats, one inevitable criticism of the decision to decommission the carriers before the two new, larger, Queen Elizabeth-class carriers are built is that Britain will have a ten-year gap in carrier capacity

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that will reduce the country’s ability to respond to the threats that it faces. This was highlighted in the Libyan conflict where, despite Britain and France taking the lead, the operation nonetheless benefited from US intelligence and military assistance, once again demonstrating the relative limitations of Britain’s military capacity to act independently. This situation is unlikely to change going forward, given that pressures on defence expenditure will remain in the future. Indeed, from the decade following 2017 approximately one-third of Britain’s defence budget will be devoted to upgrading its Trident nuclear deterrent, this having been regarded by successive British governments as the ultimate deterrent.

EUrOPEAN vISIONS The 1997 election of a Labour government with a pro-European outlook marked not only a dramatic change in the fortunes and views of a Labour Party that last held office some 18 years previously, but also signified the political conversion of a political party previously opposed to European integration. In contrast to earlier Prime Ministers, whose views were shaped by the legacy of the Second World War and the backdrop of the origins of European integration, Blair’s experiences were less defined by Europe, with membership of the European club being an expected rather than a debated outcome. As Prime Minister, Blair gave a fresh sense of purpose to Britain’s European policy, and the government immediately engaged in some positive European diplomacy in the final weeks of the negotiations that resulted in agreement on a new European Treaty at the June 1997 Amsterdam European Council. The so-called Treaty of Amsterdam saw Britain agreeing to an extension in the use of qualified majority voting (QMv) and the codecision procedure, a strengthening of cooperation on foreign and security policy, and also accepting the Social Chapter, from which the previous Conservative government had negotiated an opt-out. But despite these significant achievements, there was nonetheless a lack of an overriding strategy to the government’s foreign policy. A consequence of this was that the Labour government continued to adopt a European policy that progressed on a case-by-case basis, which to a large extent mirrored the policy of previous British governments (Broad and Daddow, 2010). Thus, just as John Major had sought to create a closer relationship with Germany, Tony Blair attempted to culture stronger friendships with France. This would lead to the Anglo-French defence initiative that was launched in the French port of Saint Malo on 4 December 1998. Known thereafter as the Saint Malo declaration, it brought together the two most important European countries on defence matters that had hitherto

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held differing positions on European defence policy. The declaration was important because it injected a sense of realism into European defence policy cooperation by highlighting the need for more effective structures to be established that would enhance the EU’s capacity for action in areas that did not require US involvement. This would in turn feed into the European Security and Defence Policy that formed part of the Treaty of Nice agreed in December 2000 (A. Blair, 2012b: 121). Agreement was reached on the Treaty after a mammoth discussion that kept heads of state and government locked in negotiation for four days. This was the third Treaty that member states had concluded within a decade and it reflected a combination of the need for the EU to adapt to the fast-changing realities of the post-Cold War environment and the complexity of getting member states to reach agreement on policies that impacted on their national sovereignty. Whatever the discomforts of the negotiations for Europe’s leaders, the process of treaty revision reopened discussions within member states about the transfer of sovereignty away from the national level. But whereas the British government was of the opinion that this meant that there was no further need for European integration, other member states and EU institutions such as the Commission concluded that the proliferation of such Treaties as the SEA, Maastricht, Amsterdam and Nice meant that the time had come to wrap all of these texts up into a constitution that also sought to create new positions such as that of European Foreign Minister. In the end, this would prove to be a folly, but only after nearly seven years of effort passed (A. Blair, 2008, 2012a). It resulted in representatives of member state governments working on a draft text as part of a Constitutional Convention in 2002, which in turn led to IGC negotiations with a view to creating a Constitutional Treaty between October 2003 and June 2004. These negotiations proved to be particularly problematic for Britain. This included the fact that establishing a Constitution applicable to Britain posed certain political problems, given that Britain had an ‘unwritten constitution’. This would lead Prime Minister Tony Blair to announce on 20 April 2004 that Britain would hold a referendum on the proposed EU Constitution. The referendum commitment highlighted Blair’s anxieties in achieving the necessary parliamentary approval for the Treaty, despite the fact that Labour had been returned to office in 2001 with a majority of 167 MPs. But this also brought to the fore the distinction between what the public regarded to be the superiority of the instruments of British governance and the proposed Constitutional Treaty. Yet as Chris Patten has written, ‘The reluctance in Britain to confront this difference between the notional and the real betrays perhaps some of our illusions about our own importance in the world, and this in turn finds its symbols in our romantic view of how we are governed’ (Patten, 2005: 83). For Patten this meant that

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While we praise Westminster, parliamentary sovereignty, our independent judiciary, and our own brand of civil society, what do we actually put up with? We have an electoral system riddled with unfairness; a bicameral legislative structure that the government reorganises at regular intervals on the back of an envelope; a court whose judges are attacked by the executive because it does not care for the way they seek to protect our liberties; an executive that displays . . . the attributes of . . . an elected dictatorship; local government gutted by manic centralism . . . ; a quangocracy that spirits responsibility away from those elected to it; and a populist endorsement of referendums that undermine such authority as parliament has left to it. Are these really the sacrosanct instruments of self-rule that need to be preserved and protected against European assault, if such an assault is really taking place? (Patten, 2005: 84) The significance of these words is that they emphasised the complexity of debates on European integration, where populist pressure has often resulted in knee-jerk government responses, as in the case of the referendum commitment. Yet in this case, before such a referendum vote was needed in Britain, in the course of 2005 progress towards the Constitutional Treaty began to unravel as it was rejected in referendum votes in France and the Netherlands. After a period of reflection, negotiations restarted in July 2007 and led to agreement on a Treaty of Lisbon in December 2007. Apart from the obvious name change, the Lisbon Treaty introduced some of the amendments that the Constitutional Treaty had sought to achieve, such as the development of stronger EU mechanisms for cooperating on foreign and defence policy (A. Blair, 2012a). This would result in the creation of a new post of Council President and high representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy. Although the creation of the post of Council President represented the relative failure of the EU to deal with the crisis in the Balkans in the 1990s in an effective and coordinated manner, it also highlighted the extent to which the EU policy environment is an evolving one, which makes it hard for governments to present negotiated outcomes as a definitive position. To this end, some 15 years after John Major negotiated a Maastricht Treaty that positioned CFSP as an intergovernmental policy controlled exclusively by member states, Tony Blair agreed in the Lisbon Treaty to an outcome that moved foreign policy away from member state control. Whatever the necessities for such change, the process of explaining such decisions to member state electorates proved to be a more complex matter. This was demonstrated when the Irish electorate rejected the Treaty on 12 June 2008. It was a product of the combination of Irish concern about the global financial crisis and some legal guarantees that would result

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in Ireland finally voting yes for the Treaty on 2 October 2009, which in turn permitted the Treaty to enter force on 1 December 2009.

EUrO CrISIS At the same time that Europe’s leaders were finalising the details of the Treaty of Lisbon, they were also coming to terms with the global economic crisis that began in 2008 and that had its origins in excessive loans to US homeowners who did not have the capacity to repay them. The complicated nature of international banking arrangements quickly turned this into a global economic problem, with particular reference to the European and US economies. Faced with failing banks, governments were forced into a position of providing financial bailouts to further stem the spread of the crisis, as well as enforcing austerity programmes to limit spending. Within the EU this highlighted the complexity of the design of the single currency, whereby its members were subject to the policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) and yet at the same time were able to maintain independence over financial spending plans. The financial crisis emphasised the weaknesses of such a system as it proved impossible to enforce fiscal discipline throughout the Eurozone. Faced with this state of affairs, members of the Eurozone agreed to a new Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (otherwise known as the fiscal compact) that came into force in 2013. For Britain, this agreement highlighted its isolation from the single currency and the extent to which it could become sidelined from key areas of European integration, where the EU’s response to the financial crisis has been to advocate the need for more, rather than less, integration. Britain’s exclusion from the single currency had been part of the Maastricht negotiations and was further confirmed by the decision of the Blair government in October 1997 to rule out participation in the lifetime of the first Labour Parliament. Labour initially set out five economic tests upon which any decision for entry should be based and therefore, while this strategy of ‘prepare and decide’ publicly appeared to offer a greater sense of commitment than the previous Conservative government’s policy of ‘wait and see’, ‘it was nevertheless one that placed emphasis on the economic factors and proven economic benefit of membership rather than a political commitment to the idea of the euro’ (Forster and Blair, 2002: 158). To this end, the division between the Labour government’s position on the single currency and that of the previous Conservative government was far less stark than many observers might have imagined, with both governments emphasising economic conditions. For the Labour government this was part of a strategy

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of trying to disentangle itself from taking a political decision to join. After Labour’s victory in the 2001 general election, membership of the single currency became less of a priority for a Labour government that became increasingly entangled in discussions over the future direction of the EU through IGC negotiations and which at the same time became a central actor in the war on terror through participating in the conflict in Afghanistan and Iraq (A. Blair, 2013). One of the reasons for this change was that although Blair retrospectively came to the conclusion that he had the political capital to lead Britain into the single currency during his first term in office, when his own leadership of the party was in a dominant position, in the period after 2001 his own and the government’s political capital was increasingly concentrated on other issues. The government’s position was also shaped by the fact that the economic arguments in favour of membership had lessened (T. Blair, 2010: 537). A view that British economic interests were different from those of the Eurozone countries would lead the then Chancellor of the Exchequer Alistair Darling to reflect in the wake of the global economic crisis which took hold in 2008 that ‘One of the most astute decisions we ever took was to stay out of the euro’ (Darling, 2011: 295). But while this conveys a sense of the Labour government having taken the correct path, Labour’s European policy was, in the words of Tony Blair, ‘full of stunts but not strategy’ (T. Blair, 2010: 532). Thus, after 13 years in office, both Blair and his successor Gordon Brown failed to cement Britain as a leading member of the EU in the manner that the Labour Party had claimed it would do in the years before it entered office and the years in office. To this end, Labour adopted a similar position to that of previous British governments of viewing European policies as compartmentalised issues and, as such, failed to adapt to and adopt a coherent strategy. The Conservative–Liberal Democrat coalition that was elected to office in 2010 has had a more complex European policy to navigate, not least because of the election of a considerable number of Conservative Eurosceptic MPs in the 2010 Parliament. For Conservative MPs the issue of Europe has increasingly become a subject on which they have been prepared to rebel (Cowley and Stuart, 2012). This has in part been influenced by the fact that party loyalty has been more difficult to enforce for Cameron, given that the reality of coalition government has meant that Cameron has been less able to offer promotion to Conservative MPs and has also had to negotiate deals with the Liberal Democrats. For Britain this has led to a Eurosceptic tide increasingly dominating government decision-making, with Cameron refusing to support the Fiscal Treaty at the December 2011 Brussels European Council. Yet one month later Cameron announced that the government would no longer object to the

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treaty. This in itself highlighted the oscillating nature of government policymaking, which would see the government being accused of a lack of strategy on European affairs and a tendency to adopt policies that appealed to the public. This was confirmed in November 2010 when Prime Minister Cameron made a solemn pledge that his government would never propose the transfer of new powers of competences to the EU, and if such a transfer was ever to be proposed then the electorate would have the final word of approval in a referendum vote. This policy became the centrepiece of the European Union Act 2011 that entered into force in July 2011. The significance of this piece of legislation is that it marks an important shift in the way in which decisions on Britain’s EU policies are taken, by essentially transferring control to the British electorate with regard to the future transfer of sovereignty to Brussels. Such a populist policy does, however, require a degree of caution as, while the government has argued that it is part of a policy of restoring national sovereignty, by giving the electorate a final decision this has in fact eroded parliamentary sovereignty. The reality here is that while referendums are in themselves not necessarily a negative development, the electorate has to be empowered with the ability to make informed decisions. And, as I have argued in this book, Britain’s political parties have consistently failed to provide an informed debate on European affairs, and as such this lack of public engagement on European integration creates a democratic legitimacy problem in the context of ever closer European integration (habermas, 2012). Thus, the movement to a referendum on the future transfer of power to Brussels is part of a political manoeuvering tactic rather than an outright empowering of the electorate. Nearly one year later, on 12 July 2012, the government’s focus on engaging the public on European issues through an impression of defending Britain’s interests was further highlighted when Foreign Secretary William hague announced that the UK would be undertaking a review of the Balance of Competences, to assess the impact that the EU has had on the UK. For some observers, this is a tactical review aimed at deflecting Eurosceptic dissent and, in David Cameron’s case, keeping the Conservative Party together. Yet the outcome of the review is unlikely to pacify either Europhiles or Eurosceptics, as evidenced by the reaction to the first set of reports published in July 2013 which indicated that the balance of Britain’s relations with the EU were broadly acceptable; Eurosceptics inevitably stated that the findings were the result of a meaningless exercise while Europhiles stressed that the outcome is that little will change in terms of Britain’s relationship with Europe. If there is a problem with this outcome it is that it is likely to fail to appease the Eurosceptic desire for European cooperation that is based on a free trade model, as opposed to the Europhile wish for deeper cooperation. It is a situation that led Prime Minister Cameron to announce

Transformed world

in January 2013 that if a Conservative government was elected in 2015 it would hold an in–out referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU [Document 22]. What is so significant about these developments is that they have become policy on the backdrop of Eurosceptic pressure, which in the case of the Conservative Party has become an all-consuming mission. But rather than attempting to tame and control the Eurosceptic tide, Prime Minister Cameron’s strategy has the potential to feed British Euroscepticism and to divide his own political party rather than uniting it. It is therefore a dangerous strategy, and one which has drawn criticism from British business leaders as well as other political leaders from within and outside of the EU who have made it clear that they wish Britain to remain in the EU. Thus, some four decades after Britain joined Europe a gauntlet has been thrown down that could possibly see the country leaving. Yet, just as was the case with the first, second and third application, the question today remains the same: what is the alternative?

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8 Assessment

So if we are to regain our influence, to punch above our weight in the world, we need to understand our past. The past has formed these assets which give us that extra potential for good. This does not mean indulging in nostalgia or pining for a golden age which never was. It means forming a clear view of our history and bringing to bear on present problems the best of that inheritance. (Former British Foreign Secretary Douglas Hurd, 2011: 372)

F

rom its position of global dominance in the latter years of the nineteenth century, in 2014 Britain could still lay claim to being the world’s seventh largest economy, despite having just 1 per cent of the world’s population. Over that period of time the nature of international politics has been subject to significant changes, from the decline of colonies through to the spread of democracy. The Cold War has come and gone, and power has begun to shift from being centred on Western Europe and North America to the emerging powers of Asia, the Gulf and South America.

REvIEWING THE BAlANCE SHEET In examining the factors that explain the changes that have affected Britain, there has been a tendency to focus more on economic matters. A number of scholars have emphasised the inevitability of Britain’s relative decline, given the country’s small size and the fact that its share of world trade would decline as other nations undertook economic development. The attractiveness of this argument rests on the fact that other nations, such as the US, had greater material, physical and human resources. But at the same time, we have to be mindful that Britain faced relative competition in the second half of the twentieth century, with economic rivalry principally coming from the other leading economies of the time, namely France, Germany, Italy, Canada,

Assessment

Japan and America. In other words, in terms of leading economies, the world was a relatively small group of countries, with the emerging powers of the twenty-first century of Brazil, Russia, India and China not being as relevant. With this in mind, arguments of the inevitability of decline do not fully explain why other similar-sized countries, such as France and Germany, fared so much better, or why a fellow island nation with limited resources such as Japan could succeed where Britain could not. In trying to uncover some of the reasons that shaped this outcome, a useful starting point is to emphasise the fact that, in comparison with other economies, Britain lost ground through a combination of a lack of investment, a shareholder model of capitalism and a unionised labour force that was less able to adjust to the new realities of the time. In this context, the inevitability of decline is a weaker argument. For Margaret Thatcher, one of the principal reasons for Britain’s lacklustre economic performance was the dominance of trade unions. This situation had certainly been brought to the fore by the 1979 winter of discontent. While Thatcher focused on this need for structural adjustment in labour relations, the reforms that she introduced to free up the market also gave greater focus to a shareholder model of capitalism. This has ostensibly reinforced a short-term view in decision-making by a British industry that has become obsessively focused on quarterly performance. If anything, this has been a key contributing factor to Britain’s poor economic performance relative to that of other European countries such as Germany, where greater emphasis has been attached to management continuity, an apprenticeship system and family-owned small businesses known as the Mittelstand. Indeed, the latter account for in excess of 50 per cent of all economic output and employment in Germany. Despite these differences, Britain has proved itself remarkably adaptable in the face of the pressures of globalisation. Here there is often a paradox between the repeated concerns expressed by the public and successive governments about the intrusion of decision-making from bureaucrats in Brussels into the everyday life of British politics and the erosion of national sovereignty because of EU decisions, and the fact that Britain has demonstrated a remarkable willingness to allow inward investment into the country, and national companies and key strategic assets to be increasingly owned by foreign companies and governments. Governments have presented this development as a sign of British liberal free trade, with a nod back to earlier times when Britain was at the epicentre of global trade. But such investments, by countries including China and wealthy Gulf states, also bring with them risks in terms of the ownership of these resources. The China Investment Corporation (CIC) sovereign wealth fund already owns part of Thames Water and Heathrow airport; Scottish Power is owned by the Spanish company Iberdrola; British Airports Authority is owned by the Spanish company Ferrovial; while in October 2013 Prime Minister David Cameron announced that the construction of the

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first British nuclear power station in twenty years would be undertaken by the French-owned EDF energy company. Whereas 100 years earlier it was Britain that was investing its money abroad, it is now the case that successive governments have argued that, in order for Britain to succeed, it requires this inward investment. Yet, while this investment is often viewed as a sign that Britain is open for business, it comes with the caveat of the implications of having strategic resources in foreign hands (Brummer, 2013). One of the reasons for this state of affairs is that the formulation of British foreign policy has been shaped by structural factors that have tended to reinforce the status quo rather than force adaptation to new realities. Chief among these has been the institutional power and influence of the civil service, which, with its history and a tradition of the career civil servant, has meant that there has been little emphasis on change and adaptation in its ways of working. While this has meant that Britain has benefited from a stable governing elite, this has tended to be reflected in a pragmatic approach to policy-making that has not always fully got to grips with the challenges faced by the country, most notably with regard to European integration after 1945. A consequence of this is that the policies that have been promoted have sought to protect British interests, such as the defence of Sterling and the emphasis attached to Empire interests after the Second World War, with policy-makers being somewhat slower to adapt to the changed reality of a post-war environment where Britain’s claim to be a great power principally rested on the fact that it had emerged from the war as a victorious nation. Where criticism is levied at how British foreign policy has been constructed, a common complaint is that the policy-making environment suffered through a tradition of consensual policy-making, where career civil servants did not have to adjust to the same changeover of personnel that is typical of other countries such as France and the US. linked to this is the fact that the British policy-making environment was not impacted by the kind of radical changes faced by other countries, for example in the form of new constitutions that affected France and Germany after the Second World War, and the countries of Central and Eastern Europe after the end of the Cold War. Consequently, successive British governments have tended to advance policies shaped by a desire to protect the national interest by attaching emphasis to, among others, being a major global power, maintaining a strong military force, the significance of the Anglo-American special relationship, the legacy of the Commonwealth, the importance of free trade and economic growth and a recognition of the consequences of European integration. While these policies are in themselves relatively unproblematic in that they have for the most part been accepted by the major political parties since the end of the Second World War, there has nonetheless been significant disagreement regarding their relative priority, notably with regard to European integration.

Assessment

THE EUROPEAN CONUNDRUM In evaluating Britain’s European policy, a number of scholars have criticised post-war governments for failing to understand the challenges that Britain faced and thereby not adapting to the reality of European cooperation. While such analysis rests on conventional accounts that Britain missed the European bus, some have emphasised that this is a rather simplistic point of view. Whatever the merits of joining the European club, membership of the Community represented a shift of focus for Britain away from a global perspective to one that was more focused on regional issues. For successive British governments this has proved to be one of the most difficult issues that they have had to deal with, given that policy-makers have tended to dislike the radical nature of the change that European integration offered. In looking at these issues in more detail it is evident that on the one hand the evidence supporting the necessity of membership is unequivocal, given that in 2013 UK exports to the EU accounted for some 50.7 per cent of total UK exports (HM Revenue and Customs, 2014). Moreover, the UK exports more to many small EU countries than it does to countries such as China. Commenting on data released in 2010, Foreign Secretary William Hague noted that ‘the latest figures show that at the moment we export more to Ireland than we do to India, China and Russia put together’ (Hague, 2010). Although statistics such as these demonstrate the significance of EU trade for the nation’s economic fortunes, it is nevertheless the case that European integration has not offered the panacea that many members of government and business leaders would have hoped for. For a number of reasons, British industry did not experience a renaissance in the 1970s and, while industrial leaders welcomed the opportunity to compete with other European powers, the British economy has not really seen a vast improvement in its economic competitiveness vis-à-vis other European countries since joining. While the blame for this rests with issues other than European integration – such as a tendency towards short-termism, a lack of sufficient industrial investment and an economy that has been too reliant on the financial services sector – it is the issue of European integration that takes most of the blame. One factor here is that many policy-makers continue to hark back to an earlier time when the international economic environment was more benign and when British trade benefited by virtue of its imperial ties. And while European membership was symbolic in the cutting of these ties, Britain’s access to former imperial markets would have declined irrespectively. Europe has proved a complex issue for Britain arguably because the history of Britain in the twentieth century has been different from the majority of other members for whom Europe has become a crucial external stabilising factor, whether that is from the legacy of war or from totalitarian rule. For these countries, the EU is presented in the context of an idealism that is rarely held

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in Britain. The British public have tended to view European integration in a far more pragmatic manner, weighing up the costs and benefits of membership. The British position was, until the 2010 election, shaped by a tendency for the first-past-the-post electoral system to result in governments being elected with a strong mandate and a secure political majority that did not provide the need for coalition government, which by its very nature involves compromises with other political parties. This contrasts with the experience of many other continental European countries where coalition government tends to be the norm. Consequently, British government ministers have been less used to the sort of bargaining and negotiation that is typical of the EU. Taken as a whole, Britain has found it difficult to build the kind of alliances that are necessary to establish leadership in the European context. In assessing the reasons for this, one of the most notable factors is that Britain has not, from the outset, viewed European integration with a positive outlook. When Britain eventually concluded that it should join the Community, it did so from the viewpoint that its own economic and political fortunes were threatened by isolation from the Community. With the brief exception of Edward Heath, British Prime Ministers have, for the most part, continued to adopt such a policy and it is hardly surprising that successive governments have tended to defend European integration more in the context of the impact (or not) on national sovereignty, and less in the extent to which Britain and its political leaders have shaped the European debate. This sense of isolation was highlighted by Prime Minister Cameron’s promise of an in– out referendum in 2017 if the Conservative Party wins the general election that is scheduled to take place in 2015.

THE FUTURE DIRECTION OF BRITISH FOREIGN POlICY The foreign policy of a state is one element in the sense of identity of its citizens. Recollection of past successes and failures abroad is part of the image which a country has of itself. If the pattern of overseas involvement is one of retreat or defensiveness or failure to achieve what public opinion wants or has been led to want, confidence in the state and feelings of identity are weakened. But if it is felt that the country is doing well abroad, helping to solve international conflicts and problems, bringing relief to suffering, confidence in the state and pride in citizenship are strengthened. (Coles, 2000: 175) These words, written by Sir John Coles, a former head of the British Foreign Office, capture a sense of the importance of foreign policy to the way in

Assessment

which a country defines itself. But while Britain is inevitably defined by its history, the future direction of its foreign policy is not entirely clear as it progresses to the midway point of the second decade of the twenty-first century. This is a strange state of affairs, given that some seven decades after the Second World War there does not appear to be a complete consensus as to the nature of Britain’s foreign policy. As already noted, in the years after 1945 Britain continued to see itself as a major power, with interests that stretched across the globe. It would not be until the retreat from East of Suez in the late 1960s that the country began to position itself as a major European power, albeit one with interests of a more limited nature at a global level. This latter position has been shaped by the unique position that Britain finds itself in as a permanent member of the UN Security Council, having a worldwide network through the Commonwealth, being a major EU power, having a special relationship with the US, taking a leading role in NATO, being a member of key organisations such as the G8 group of leading economies and the World Trade Organisation (WTO), being a legitimate nuclear power and as a global trader (Gaskarth, 2013: 84–8). British influence is also exercised through the use of English as a global language, which apart from ensuring that the country’s cultural norms and values have a wider reach than, say, those of France or Germany, also results in British representatives to international negotiations often having a disproportionate influence in the drafting of documents that are often concluded in English. Indeed, it is somewhat paradoxical in the context of European integration where, despite a decline in the number of British nationals holding office in the EU institutions, Britain nonetheless continues to exercise considerable influence over the drafting of negotiation outcomes through the role that its officials play. Britain additionally benefits from the quality of its diplomatic corps, popularity of its universities, the role of the British Council and BBC World Service, and the global reach of British companies and the manner by which global companies invest in Britain. A consequence of this is that the British national interest covers a wide range of issues and countries, with arguably only the US having a greater reach and influence. Against such a backdrop, the future of British foreign policy should be bright. Yet the key problem faced by Britain is the articulation of a rational and clearly defined foreign policy that reflects the country’s economic, political and security interests. This task is made more difficult by the changing nature of Britain, where a clearly defined British identity is complicated by the fact that Britain actually comprises three distinct nations – England, Wales and Scotland – to which the addition of Northern Ireland forms the UK. British foreign policy therefore has to take into consideration these distinct identities, a situation that has been made more complicated since the introduction of devolution in 1998. This has led to considerable debates

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World Trade Organisation (WTO): An organisation that promotes global free trade and is the successor to the GAtt.

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and discussion about the nature of Britishness and in particular the nature of the Union that binds the four nations together. The situation is further complicated by the referendum vote on Scottish independence that is scheduled to take place on 18 September 2014, when the Scottish electorate will be asked the question: ‘Should Scotland be an independent country? Yes or No’. The outcome of this vote will have a considerable impact on the future direction of British foreign policy, irrespective of a yes or no vote. In the event of a yes vote, Scotland will clearly move towards becoming an independent country, with the intended prospect of it being a member of the EU. Yet at the same time a no vote is unlikely to cement the Union together, even though it is likely that Scotland will gain greater devolved powers through what has become known as a ‘devolution max’ outcome. One of the issues in this context is that the granting of devolved powers to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland has brought to the fore discussions about the way England is governed. This in itself is not a new issue, with the problem of non-English MPs voting on English-only laws being first highlighted in the 1970s when the labour MP Tam Dalyell, MP for West lothian, raised the matter in a House of Commons debate in 1977 over Scottish and Welsh devolution. This famously became known as the West lothian question. In the twenty-first century the desire to give greater independence to Scotland, Wales and Northern Ireland through devolution – principally as a means of keeping the Union together – has in fact led to increased tension between the different nations of the Union, of which the principal concern has been the extent to which opinion polls have emphasised that the people of England have an increasing sense of being disadvantaged and dissatisfied by current governing relations. One unintended consequence of devolution has been a growing lack of trust by the English electorate in established patterns of government and in the main political parties. This has provided the context for the rise in popularity of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), which has gained support primarily because there is no advocate to defend English interests. As such UKIP represents the view that there is a clear opinion that the status quo is no longer acceptable, rather than there being a concrete conclusion as to what should be done to improve matters. The rise of UKIP has had a major impact on the future direction of British foreign policy, most notably in the context of Conservative Prime Minister David Cameron attaching greater priority to Britain renegotiating its EU membership. But while such a strategy may have short-term appeal, in the longer term it is likely to split the Conservative Party and polarise British opinion on European integration. The emphasis on renegotiation has gone hand-in-hand with a growing recognition of the importance of the Commonwealth in British foreign policy. This reflects a desire by government to make use of existing Commonwealth ties to capitalise on trade opportunities in

Assessment

countries that have growing economies. But the language of the Commonwealth also speaks to a Britain of half a century ago, before EU membership, and when it could rightly or wrongly claim to be a great power. As such, the Commonwealth also provides an important opportunity to reposition British foreign policy at a time when there is a desire to move away from the EU. The Commonwealth additionally provides a welcome distraction from the trials and tribulations that have dogged Britain’s special relationship with the US over Afghanistan and Iraq, with the discrediting of plans to impose democracy by force resulting in the Commonwealth gaining greater recognition for its quiet promotion of democracy that does not involve invasion. A potential downgrading in the significance of the special relationship is more about the public presentation of foreign policy rather than the practical realities, where retaining close ties with America has remained, and is likely to remain, a key objective of successive governments. Even here, Britain’s hesitancy to fully commit to many European initiatives has caused just as much anxiety in Washington as it has in European capitals. In trying to ascertain some of the factors that have impacted on these issues, one of the most important is to consider who actually makes Britain’s foreign policy. This is certainly a more complex issue in an interdependent and globalised world, where all aspects of domestic government policy now have a foreign dimension. Much of this has been as a result of European integration. The result is that while the Foreign Office continues to play a key role in the shaping and making of British foreign policy, it takes place in an environment where all government departments are involved, albeit with some areas such as trade being of greater significance. In the UK, Parliament has traditionally had little impact on foreign policy, be that with regard to going to war, making treaties, giving aid, selling arms and negotiating in such forums as the EU and NATO. It has also traditionally been rare for the Foreign Office to be at the centre of parliamentary activity, rarely sponsoring government bills through parliament. Where Parliament has exercised influence on these matters it has primarily been in the format of oral and written questions, for example on specific points relating to government policy, such as budgetary contributions to the EU or the UN. The routine nature of questions and the manner by which they are controlled by party whips means that they rarely test government. The situation is compounded by the role of select committees, the work of which is somewhat dependent on the ability of their members to obtain copies of documents in advance, as committees are dependent on receiving information in good time. Change began to take place in the 1990s, principally because of the Maastricht Treaty that brought the issue of foreign policy to the fore of parliamentary activity. In this context, European issues became a central

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feature of British politics because of the willingness of Conservative MPs to rebel against the government. This situation was further compounded by the fact that parliamentary discipline had started to unravel, as MPs who had been in Parliament for a number of years were prepared to vote against their own government, while opposition parties prepared to vote against government on issues such as the EU. The post-Maastricht years have been marked by the fact that European integration has become a central issue for all successive governments as it has become an issue of conscience for many MPs who have been prepared to defy party lines. Just as foreign policy has traditionally not been high on the parliamentary calendar, it has also been the case that the public have generally not ranked foreign policy as a high-priority issue, traditionally rating issues such as healthcare and the economy as key issues to vote for. Yet here we see that the views of the public have increasingly been shaped by the media, which in turn has a significant impact on foreign policy. One of the most significant issues since 1997 has been the rise in the issue of immigration, primarily because EU citizens are allowed to live and work in the UK, with the majority of the new migrants arriving since 2004. A consequence of these developments is that while Britain continues to position itself as a country with global interests that is reinforced by its position as a nuclear power and being a permanent member of the UN Security Council, such interests and commitments remain a hangover from Empire days. But, whereas in the post-1945 era Britain was part of a world where its influence was being reshaped within the relative context of the redistribution of power among a handful of Western countries, in the twentyfirst century its influence is being reshaped by the emerging powers of Brazil, India, China and Korea that is illustrative of the relative decline of the West. For Britain this has posed the dilemma of whether its position as a mediumsized military and economic power is best secured through its membership of the EU, through its relationship with America or through the establishment of a stance that continues to draw on both these and other linkages such as the Commonwealth. In reality, while Britain’s influence is secured through all of these mechanisms, it is first and foremost a European power. The challenge that Britain faces is in many ways more domestic than foreign, as the country’s political parties need to articulate more reasoned and informed viewpoints that reflect the reality that Britain’s interests are fundamentally of a European nature, and that the best way to defend the country’s position in a globalised world is through EU membership.

Documents

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Document 1

the Yalta agreements, 11 FebruarY 1945

The wartime leaders of the USA, UK and the Soviet Union – Franklin D. Roosevelt, Winston Churchill and Joseph Stalin – met at Yalta in the Crimea to discuss the nature of Europe’s post-war reconstruction. These extracts emphasise that the outcome reflected the deep tensions that existed between the leaders of the Grand Alliance and signalled the Cold War that was to come. II. Declaration of Liberated Europe the following declaration has been approved: the establishment of order in europe and the rebuilding of national economic life must be achieved by processes which will enable the liberated peoples to destroy the last vestiges of nazism and fascism and to create democratic institutions of their own choice. this is a principle of the atlantic charter – the right of all people to choose the form of government under which they will live – the restoration of sovereign rights and self-government to those peoples who have been forcibly deprived to them by the aggressor nations. . . . IV. Zone of Occupation for the French and Control Council for Germany It was agreed that a zone in germany, to be occupied by the French forces, should be allocated to France. this zone would be formed out of the british and american zones and its extent would be settled by the british and americans in consultation with the French Provisional government. It was also agreed that the French Provisional government should be invited to become a member of the allied control council for germany. . . . VII. Poland the following declaration on Poland was agreed by the conference: a new situation has been created in Poland as a result of her complete liberation by the red army. this calls for the establishment of a Polish Provisional government which can be more broadly based than was possible before the recent liberation of the western part of Poland. the Provisional government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad. this new government should then be called the Polish Provisional government of national unity. . . . Source: http://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/yalta.asp (accessed 15 march 2013)

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‘a FInancIal DunkIrk’

Document 2

In this document for the post-war Labour government, Lord Keynes set out the stark economic problems that Britain faced. In the wake of the Cabinet discussions, Keynes set off to America where he managed to secure a $3.75 billion loan. 27. It seems . . . that there are three essential conditions without which we can have not a hope of escaping what might be described, without exaggeration and without implying that we should not eventually recover from it, a financial Dunkirk. these conditions are (a) an intense concentration on the expansion of exports, (b) drastic and immediate economies in our overseas expenditure, and (c) substantial aid from the united states on terms which we can accept. they can only be fulfilled by a combination of the greatest enterprise, ruthlessness and tact. 28. What does one mean in this context by a ‘financial Dunkirk’? What would happen in the event of insufficient success? that is not easily foreseen. abroad it would require a sudden and humiliating withdrawal from our onerous responsibilities with great loss of prestige and acceptance for the time being of the position of a second-class Power, rather like the present position of France. From the Dominions and elsewhere we should seek what charity we could obtain. at home a greater degree of austerity would be necessary than we have experienced at any time during the war. and there would have to be an indefinite postponement of the realist of the best hopes of the new government. . . . cabinet memorandum by lord keynes, 13 august 1945. Source: r. hyam (ed.) (1992) The Labour Government and the End of Empire, 1945– 1951, 4 Volumes, london: hmso.

‘the sIneWs oF Peace’, WInston churchIll’s sPeech at WestmInster college, Fulton, mIssourI, 5 march 1946

In this extract Winston Churchill highlights the growing threat of Communism and argues the need for non-Communist countries to unite and for a close association to develop between the US and Britain. From stettin in the baltic to trieste in the adriatic, an iron curtain has descended across the continent. behind that line lie all the capitals of the ancient states of central and eastern europe. Warsaw, berlin, Prague, Vienna, budapest, belgrade, bucharest and sofia, all these famous cities and the populations around them lie in what I must call the soviet sphere, and all are

Document 3

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subject in one form or another, not only to soviet influence but to a very high and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from moscow. athens alone – greece with its immortal glories – is free to decide its future at an election under british, american and French observation. . . . the safety of the world requires a new unity in europe, from which no nation should be permanently outcast. It is from the quarrels of the strong parent races in europe that the world wars we have witnessed, or which occurred in former times, have sprung. . . . surely we should work with conscious purpose for a grand pacification of europe, within the structure of the united nations and in accordance with its charter. that I feel is an open cause of policy of very great importance. . . . Source: http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1946/s460305a_e.htm (accessed 3 august 2012)

Document 4

WInston churchIll’s sPeech at ZurIch unIVersItY on the subject oF a unIteD states oF euroPe, 19 sePtember 1946

In this document Churchill called for an immediate start to be made to bring European states closer together. and what is the plight to which europe has been reduced? some of the smaller states have indeed made a good recovery, but over wide areas a vast quivering mass of tormented, hungry, care-worn and bewildered human beings gape at the ruins of their cities and homes, and scan the dark horizons for the approach of some new peril, tyranny or terror. . . . Yet all the while there is a remedy which, if it were generally and spontaneously adopted, would as if by miracle transform the whole scene, and would in a few years make all europe, or the greater part of it, as free and as happy as switzerland is today. What is this sovereign remedy? It is to re-create the european family, or as much of it as we can, and provide it with a structure under which it can dwell in peace, in safety and in freedom. We must build a kind of united states of europe. . . . Source: extracted from randolph s. churchill (ed.) (1948) The Sinews of Peace. PostWar Speeches by Winston S. Churchill, london: cassell, pp. 198–202.

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the beVIn sPeech on Western unIon. extract From an aDDress bY brItIsh ForeIgn secretarY ernest beVIn, house oF commons, 22 januarY 1948

Document 5

This document demonstrates the desire of the British government to find a suitable post-war foreign policy. I believe therefore that we should seek to form with the backing of the americans and the Dominions a Western democratic system comprising, if possible, scandinavia, the low countries, France, Portugal, Italy and greece . . . I believe therefore that the moment is ripe for a consolidation of Western europe. this need not take the shape of a formal alliance, though we have an alliance with France and may conclude one with other countries. It does, however, mean close consultation with each of the Western european countries, beginning with economic questions. We in britain can no longer stand outside europe and insist that our problems and position are quite separate from those of our european neighbours . . . Provided we can organise a Western european system such as I have outlined above, backed by the power and resources of the commonwealth and of the americas, it should be possible to develop our own power and influence to equal that of the united states and the ussr. We have the material resources in the colonial empire, if we develop them, and by giving a spiritual lead now we should be able to carry out our task in a way which will show clearly that we are not subservient to the united states of america or to the soviet union. Source: ‘the first aim of british foreign policy’, cabinet memorandum by the secretary of state for Foreign affairs, ernest bevin, 4 january 1948, cab 129/23, Public record office.

WInston churchIll, ‘three InterlockIng cIrcles oF brItIsh ForeIgn PolIcY’, 9 october 1948

In this extract Winston Churchill sets out his views on British foreign policy that placed Britain at the centre of the key relationships that dominated the post-war world. the first circle for us is naturally the british commonwealth and empire, with all that that comprises. then there is also the english-speaking world in which we, canada and other british Dominions and the united states play so important a part. and finally there is united europe. these three majestic circles are co-existent and if they are linked together there is no force or combination which could overthrow them or even challenge them.

Document 6

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now if you think of the three inter-linked circles you will see that we are the only country which has a great part in every one of them. We stand, in fact, at the very point of junction, and here in this island at the centre of the seaways and perhaps of the airways also, we have the opportunity of joining them all together. If we rise to the occasion in the years that are to come it may be found that once again we hold the key to opening a safe and happy future to humanity, and will gain for ourselves gratitude and fame. Source: Winston churchill, ‘speech at a conservative mass meeting, llandudno, 9 october 1948’, reprinted in randolph s. churchill (ed.) (1950) Europe Unite – Speeches 1947 and 1948 by Winston S. Churchill, london: cassell, pp. 417–18.

Document 7

reassessIng the sIgnIFIcance oF emPIre In the 1950s

By the early 1950s the Treasury had concluded that the economic benefits of Empire had greatly reduced (a), while the government concluded that the speed of movement towards independence in the Empire could not be subject to the dictat of Britain (b). (a) 2. . . . [It] seems to me that the whole conception of commonwealth development as the solution to our difficulties is becoming something of a castle in the air. We know all the difficulties of raising funds from the uk or from private american sources. We have a shrewd suspicion that us government aid won’t go anywhere near to filling the gap. We haven’t very much faith in the capacity of the new Dominions to pull themselves up by their bootstrings. and now we have evidence that, even if the money were forthcoming, there are very few winners in the colonial empire. 3. It really looks as if our only effective cards are:– (a) Pushing ahead with the slow business of basic development which is quite unremunerative in the short run; (b) hoping that the american mining companies will find new deposits to exploit in the sterling area. . . . [I]t does suggest that the flood of weekend speeches on the boundless possibilities of developing the empire may be giving rise to quite exaggerated hopes . . . letter from Flett, treasury to melville, colonial office, 30 june 1952. Source: cited in n.j. White (1999) Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945, harlow: longman, p. 111.

(b) . . . [c]onstitutional development is proceeding steadily in many parts of the colonial empire. that process cannot now be halted or reversed, and

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it is only to a limited extent that its pace can be controlled by the united kingdom government. sometimes it may be possible to secure acceptance of a reasonable and beneficial delay in order to ensure a more orderly transition. but, in the main, the pace of constitution change will be determined by the strength of nationalist feeling in the territory concerned. Political leaders who have obtained assurances of independence for their people normally expect that the promised independence will be attained within their own political lifetime; and, if they cannot satisfy their followers that satisfactory progress is being maintained towards that goal, their influence may be usurped by less responsible elements. no Party in this country can afford to have it said that, though it promised independence, it never meant to concede it. any attempt to retard by artificial delays the progress of colonial peoples towards independence would produce disastrous results. among other consequences it would ensure that, when power had eventually been transferred, it would be handed over to a local leadership predisposed towards an anti-british policy. Source: report by the official committee on commonwealth membership, 21 january 1954. cited in n.j. White (1999) Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945, harlow: longman, p. 122.

the sueZ crIsIs

The Suez crisis was a profound shock to Britain. Even before invasion took place, the US had expressed its concerns about the wisdom of such a policy (a). After invasion the US put economic pressure on Britain that resulted in the withdrawal of British troops (b). The period post-Suez resulted in a great deal of soul-searching as to the future direction of British foreign policy (c). (a) I really do not see how a successful result could be achieved by forcible means. the use of force would, it seems to me, vastly increase the area of jeopardy. I do not see how the economy of Western europe can long survive the burden of prolonged military operations, as well as the denial of near east oil. also the peoples of the near east and of north africa and, to some extent, of all asia and all of africa, would become consolidated against the West to a degree which, I fear, could not be overcome in a generation, and perhaps not even in a century, particularly having in mind the capacity of the russians to make mischief . . . Source: eisenhower to eden, 2 september 1956, in D. carlton (1988) Britain and Suez, london: blackwell, p. 119. cited in n.j. White (1999) Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945, harlow: longman, p. 127.

Document 8

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(b) the chancellor of the exchequer said that it would be necessary to announce early in the following week the losses of gold and dollars which we had sustained during november. this statement would reveal a very serious drain on the reserves and would be a considerable shock both to public opinion in this country and to international confidence in sterling. It was therefore important that we should be able to announce at the same time that we were taking action to reinforce the reserves both by recourse to the International monetary Fund and in other ways. For this purpose the good will of the united states government was necessary; and it was evident that this good will could not be obtained without an immediate and unconditional undertaking to withdraw the anglo-French force from Port said. . . . Source: minutes of cabinet meeting of 28 november 1956, in a. gorst and l. johnman (1997) The Suez Crisis, london: routledge, pp. 142–3. cited in n.j. White (1999) Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945, harlow: longman, pp. 127–8.

(c) the conclusion of all this is surely that we must review our world position and our domestic capacity more searchingly in light of the suez experience, which has not so much changed our fortunes as revealed realities. While the consequences of this may be to determine us to work more closely with europe, carrying with us, we hope our closest friends in the commonwealth in such development, here too we must be under no illusion. europe will not welcome us simply because at the moment it may appear to suit us to look to them. the timing and conviction of our approach may be decisive in their influence on those with whom we plan to work. Source: national archives, Prem 11/1138, note by sir anthony eden, 28 september 1956. cited in n.j. White (1999) Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945, harlow: longman, pp. 128–9.

Document 9

the 1957 DeFence WhIte PaPer

The defence White Paper of April 1957 was produced by the Minister of Defence, Duncan Sandys, and reflected a need to reduce Britain’s expenditure on conventional defence. 7. over the last five years, defence has on average absorbed ten per cent of britain’s gross national product. some seven per cent of the working population are either in the services or supporting them . . . In addition, the retention of such large forces abroad gives rise to heavy charges which place a severe strain upon the balance of payments . . .

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15. the free world is to-day mainly dependent for its protection upon the nuclear capacity of the united states. While britain cannot by comparison make more than a modest contribution, there is a wide measure of agreement that she must possess an appreciable element of nuclear deterrent power of her own. . . . 43. national service inevitably involves an uneconomic use of manpower, especially in the training organization. there are at present no less than 150,000 men training or being trained in the establishments of the three services. this figure is due, in large measure, to the continuous turnover inseparable from national service, the abolition of which would make possible substantial savings in manpower . . . 46. In light of the need to maintain a balanced distribution of the national resources the government have made a comprehensive review of the demands of defence upon the economy and of the country’s military responsibilities. they have concluded that it would be right to aim at establishing the armed forces on an all-regular footing at a strength of about 375,000 by the end of 1962 . . . Source: Defence: Outline of Future Policy, cmnd 124, london: hmso, april 1957.

DecolonIsatIon anD WInDs oF change

Moves towards decolonisation resulted in some concern that this reflected a decline in British strength, a point the government was keen to rebuke (a). But as Prime Minister Macmillan noted, the government faced a ‘wind of change’ that it could not stop (b). (a) . . . [t]here was no reason why we should be ashamed of our post-war record. In India the transfer of power had been made in such a way as to create friendship where otherwise there might have been enmity and bitterness. During his recent visits to India, Pakistan and ceylon he had been greatly impressed by the friendship and strength of common purpose which still bound those countries to the rest of the commonwealth. throughout these countries, though we no longer had authority, we still had great influence. . . . the commonwealth was not breaking up; it was growing up. the commonwealth as a whole still had great influence in the world, and there was no reason why that influence should not increase. and the united kingdom itself had great opportunities to influence world affairs through the medium of the commonwealth association. the material strength of the old commonwealth members, if joined with the moral influence of the asiatic

Document 10

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members, meant that a united commonwealth would always have a very powerful voice in world affairs. . . . Source: Prem 11/2219, record of the Final session of the annual conference of the commissioner-general, southeast asia, 19 january 1958. note by brook, 20 january 1958. cited in n.j. White (1999) Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945, harlow: longman, p. 116.

(b) In the twentieth century, and especially since the end of the war, the processes which gave birth to the nation states of europe have been repeated all over the world. We have seen the awakening of national consciousness in peoples who have for centuries lived in dependence upon some other power. Fifteen years ago this movement spread through asia. many countries there, of different races and civilisations, pressed their claim to an independent national life. today the same thing is happening in africa, and the most striking of all the impressions I have formed since I left london a month ago is of the strength of this african national consciousness. In different places it takes different forms, but it is happening everywhere. the wind of change is blowing through this continent, and whether we like it or not, this growth of national consciousness is a political fact. We must all accept it as a fact, and our national policies must take account of it. Source: harold macmillan (1972) Pointing the Way, london: macmillan, pp. 473–82.

Document 11

From emPIre to commonWealth

Despite pressures for decolonisation in the years after 1945, it was not until the 1960s that the speed of decolonisation accelerated. 1946 1947 1948 1956 1957 1960 1961 1962

trans-jordan ( jordan) India; Pakistan (east Pakistan seceded to become bangladesh in 1971) ceylon (sri lanka); burma (myanmar); Palestine (Israel) sudan gold coast (ghana); malaya british somaliland (became part of somalia); cyprus; nigeria sierra leone; cameroons (joined nigeria and cameroun); tanganyika (tanzania); kuwait Western samoa (previously administered by new Zealand); jamaica; trinidad and tobago; uganda

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1963 1964 1965 1966 1967 1968 1970 1971 1973 1974 1975 1976 1978 1979 1980 1981 1983 1984 1997

Zanzibar (joined with tanganyika to become tanzania); kenya; sabah; sarawak and singapore as malaysia (with malaya) nyasaland (malawi); malta; northern rhodesia (Zambia) singapore (left malaysia); gambia; maldives british guiana (guyana); bechuanaland (botswana); basutoland (lesotho); barbados aden (south Yemen) mauritius; swaziland; nauru (previously administered by australia, britain and new Zealand) tonga; Fiji bahrain; Qatar; united arab emirates the bahamas grenada british new guinea (Papua new guinea, previously administered by australia) seychelles Dominica; solomon Islands; ellice Islands (tuvalu) st Vincent and the grenadines; st lucia; gilbert Islands (kiribati) southern rhodesia (Zimbabwe); new hebrides (Vanuatu, previously ruled as an anglo-French condominium) belize; antigua and barbuda st christopher and nevis (st kitts and nevis) brunei hong kong (returned to china)

Source: n.j. White (1999) Decolonisation: The British Experience since 1945, harlow: longman, p. 131.

brItaIn’s FIrst aPPlIcatIon For eec membershIP

A decision to seek EEC membership reflected a conclusion that this was the only option for Britain’s future (a), although that did not stop the government setting out a number of conditions that had to be met (b). (a) the economic division of europe will confront the united kingdom with a most serious situation. there are significant political dangers which ministers have emphasised in recent months – the fear that, despite the manifest advantages of the rapprochement between France and germany, economic divisions may weaken the political division of the West at a time

Document 12

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when a common Western front is more than ever necessary. If, as seems to be the intention, the policy of the six is to press forward with economic integration, impetus will be given to political integration. the community may well emerge as a Power comparable in size and influence to the united states and the ussr. the pull of this new power bloc would be bound to dilute our influence with the rest of the world, including the commonwealth. We should find ourselves replaced as the second member of the north atlantic alliance and our relative influence with the united states in all fields would diminish. all this would add to the strains on eFta. the independence which we have sought to preserve by remaining aloof from european integration would be of doubtful value, since our diminished status would suggest only a minor role for us in international affairs. Source: report of the european economic association committee of the cabinet, 25 may 1960 (Pro cab 134/1820, eQ(60)27), in sean greenwood (1996) Britain and European Integration since the Second World War, manchester: manchester university Press, p. 119.

(b) . . . no british government could join the european economic community without prior negotiation with a view to meeting the needs of the commonwealth countries, of our european Free trade association partners, and of british agriculture . . . During the past nine months, we have had useful and frank discussions with the european economic community governments. We have now reached the stage where we cannot make further progress without entering into formal negotiations . . . therefore, after long and earnest consideration, her majesty’s government have come to the conclusion that it would be right for britain to make a formal application under article 237 of the treaty negotiations with a view to joining the community if satisfactory arrangements can be made to meet the special needs of the united kingdom, of the commonwealth and of the european Free trade association . . . Source: extracted from statement by harold macmillan on the first british application to the european economic community, Parliamentary Debates (hansard), house of commons, Fifth series, Vol. 645, pp. 928–31.

Document 13

France’s rejectIon oF brItIsh eec membershIP, 14 januarY 1963

This is an extract from General de Gaulle’s speech which cast a veto against the UK’s first application for EEC membership.

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. . . england is, in effect, insular, maritime, linked through its trade, markets, and food supply to very diverse and often very distant countries. Its activities are essentially industrial and commercial, and only slightly agricultural. It has, throughout its work, very marked and original customs and traditions. In short, the nature, structure, and economic context of england differ profoundly from those of the other states of the continent . . . It is foreseeable that the cohesion of all its members, who would be very numerous and very diverse, would not hold for long and that in the end there would appear a colossal atlantic community dependent on the us and under american leadership which would soon completely swallow up the european community. Source: charles de gaulle (1970) Discours et Messages, Pour l’effort Août 1962 – Décembre 1965, Paris: librairie Plon, pp. 66–70 (translated).

brItaIn’s seconD aPPlIcatIon For eec membershIP, 2 maY 1967

The second UK application reflected a general feeling that another failure could not be risked, not least because its economic fortunes had declined throughout the 1960s. britain has much to give but also much to gain, provided our essential interests can be met, as those of the common market countries were met nine years ago. to join the eec means joining the european coal and steel community and euratom, and few countries have more to contribute in the fields covered by these communities. In particular, britain leads the world, barring none, in the peaceful application of atomic energy. . . . I hope that we are not, at every stage in the debates within this country on the government’s decision, going to be dominated by the failures of the past. many of the anxieties that some of us expressed three or four years ago are much less real because of developments within the common market and within eFta. . . . there is no future for britain in a little england philosophy. there is no future, either, for anyone in a little england philosophy. For we do not see this venture, any more than our friends in europe do, as a self-sufficient rich man’s club – the identification of the eec with the development of so many african territories is a manifestation of this, as is the aid the countries of the eec have given on a wider scale. Source: harold Wilson at the lord mayor’s banquet, guildhall, 14 november 1966, in alex may (1999) Britain and Europe since 1945, harlow: longman, pp. 106–7.

Document 14

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Document 15

WIthDraWal From east oF sueZ

It was not until a decade after the Suez crisis of 1956 that the UK concluded that it did not have the financial resources to maintain a global military presence and, as such, in 1968 Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced the withdrawal of British forces from East of Suez, with the exception of maintaining a base in Hong Kong. 11. . . . there is no military strength whether for britain or for our alliances except on the basis of economic strength; and it is for this basis that we best ensure the security of the country. We therefore intend to make to the alliances of which we are members a contribution related to our economic capability while recognising that our security lies fundamentally in europe and must be based on the north atlantic alliance . . . 12. We have accordingly decided to accelerate the withdrawal of our forces from their stations in the Far east . . . and to withdraw them by the end of 1971. We have also decided to withdraw our forces from the Persian gulf by the same date. the broad effect is that, apart from our remaining dependencies and certain other necessary exceptions we shall by that date not be maintaining bases outside europe and the mediterranean. Source: speech by Prime minister harold macmillan to the house of commons, 16 january 1968, in a. gorst and l. johnman (1997) The Suez Crisis, london: routledge, p. 165.

Document 16

enoch PoWell’s ‘rIVers oF blooD’ sPeech, 20 aPrIl 1968

Delivered in Birmingham, Powell’s speech criticised the government’s policy of Commonwealth immigration and led to Powell being one of the most divisive politicians in Britain. We must be mad, literally mad, as a nation to be permitting the annual inflow of some 50,000 dependants, who are for the most part the material of the future growth of the immigrant-descended population. . . . as I look ahead, I am filled with foreboding; like the roman, I seem to see ‘the river tiber foaming with much blood.’ that tragic and intractable phenomenon which we watch with horror on the other side of the atlantic but which there is interwoven with the history and existence of the states itself, is coming upon us here by our own volition and our own neglect. Indeed, it has all but come. In numerical terms, it will be of american proportions long before the end of the century. only resolute and urgent action will avert it even now. Whether there will be the public will to demand and

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obtain that action, I do not know. all I know is that to see, and not to speak, would be the great betrayal. Source: http://www.telegraph.co.uk/comment/3643823/enoch-Powells-rivers-ofblood-speech.html.

brItaIn’s thIrD aPPlIcatIon For eec membershIP

These two documents provide contrasting perspectives on Britain’s third application to the EEC. Whereas the official government White Paper outlined a positive view of membership (a), the leader of the Labour Party, Harold Wilson, opposed membership (b). (a) the government is confident that membership of the enlarged community will lead to much improved efficiency and productivity in british industry, with a higher rate of investment and faster growth of real wages. . . . a more efficient united kingdom industry will be more competitive not only within the enlarged community but also in world markets generally. . . . the improvement in efficiency will also result in a higher rate of growth in the economy. this will make it possible to provide for a more rapid improvement in our national standard of living as well as pay for the costs of entry. Source: The United Kingdom and the European Communities, cmnd 4715, hmso, july 1971, in alex may (1999) Britain and Europe since 1945, harlow: longman, pp. 108–9.

(b) the condemnation of this government is not that they failed to secure terms which would have ensured that the labour government’s stated requirements were met. the condemnation of them is that they did not even try. . . . I believe the terms so frivolously negotiated by the right hon. and learned gentleman . . . involve an intolerable and disproportionate burden on every family in the land and, equally, on britain’s balance of payments. . . . the eec, as it stands today, was recently described in a pro-market sunday paper as a monopolies commission writ large. that is not true. It is a monopolies commission writ large on which there has been superimposed a gigantic public assistance committee, handing out doles without any means test to european farmers. Source: Parliamentary Debates (hansard), house of commons, Fifth series, Vol. 823, 28 october 1971, cols 2080–2102, in alex may (1999) Britain and Europe since 1945, harlow: longman, p. 109.

Document 17

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Document 18

renegotIatIon

In this document the British Foreign Secretary, James Callaghan, set out his concerns over EEC membership in a speech to the Council of Ministers on 1 April 1974. In view of the great importance of the issue of membership of the community, my government is now engaged in a root and branch review of the effect of community policies. . . . In particular, we are examining with great care the working of the common agricultural policy; the estimates for future contributions to and receipts from the community budget; the community’s trade and aid policies towards the commonwealth and developing countries; and how far in practice the existing rules, as they are interpreted, interfere with the powers over the british economy which we need to pursue effective regional, industrial and fiscal policies. . . . We are not asking for charity. We seek a fair deal. In 1973, only paying 8 per cent of the community budget in accordance with the transitional key, we were already the second largest net contributors. at the end of our normal transitional period we shall be paying over 19 per cent, well over the 16½ per cent which is our likely share of [gross national product] at that time. Source: alex may (1999) Britain and Europe since 1945, harlow: longman, p. 110.

Document 19

the 1975 reFerenDum

In presenting its view on the balance of membership in the 1975 referendum, the conclusion of Harold Wilson’s Labour government was that Britain should remain a member of the Community. let us be clear about one thing: In or out of the common market, it will be tough going for britain over the next few years. In or out, we would still have been hit by the oil crisis, by rocketing world prices for food and raw materials. but we will be in a much stronger position to face the future if we stay inside the market than if we try to go it alone. Inside, on the improved trade terms, we remain part of the world’s most powerful trade bloc. We can help to fix the terms of world trade. Inside, we can count on more secure supplies of food if world harvests turn out to be bad. and we can help to hold down market food prices – as we have done since we joined in 1973. Inside the market we can work to get more european community money spent in britain. . . . outside, we are on our own. . . .

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the government have made theIr choice. they believe that the new terms of membership are good enough for us to carry on InsIDe the community. their advice is to vote for staying in. Source: her majesty’s government, Britain’s New Deal in Europe, may 1975, in alex may (1999) Britain and Europe since 1945, harlow: longman, p. 111.

thatcher’s euroPe

After the difficulties of the Labour government of 1974–9, European leaders were initially pleased to see Margaret Thatcher appointed as Prime Minister. However, this positive viewpoint quickly changed as she battled to secure a rebate on Britain’s budget contributions (a). In a speech at the College of Europe in Bruges in 1999 she criticised moves towards closer European integration and advocated policies that focused on the nation state (b), a point that she famously reiterated in the House of Commons in October 1990 in response to proposals for a single currency (c). Yet this approach created a domestic backlash among Conservative MPs, among whom was Sir Geoffrey Howe, who expressed his concern about Britain being isolated in Europe (d). (a) In spite of north sea oil, by 1979 britain had become one of the least prosperous members of the community, with only the seventh highest gDP per head of population among the member states. Yet we were expected shortly to become the largest net contributor. so from the first my policy was to seek to limit the damage and distortions caused by the caP and to bring financial realities to bear on community spending. Source: margaret thatcher (1993) The Downing Street Years, london: harpercollins, p. 63.

(b) . . . and let me be quite clear. britain does not dream of some cosy, isolated existence on the fringes of the european community. our destiny is in europe, as part of the community . . . . . . my first guiding principle is this: willing and active cooperation between independent sovereign states is the best way to build a successful european community. to try to suppress nationhood and concentrate power at the centre of a european conglomerate would be highly damaging and would jeopardise the objectives we seek to achieve. europe will be stronger precisely because it has France as France, spain as spain, britain as britain, each with its own customs, traditions and identity. It would be folly to try to fit them into some sort of Identikit european personality . . .

Document 20

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. . . working more closely together does not require power to be centralised in brussels or decisions to be taken by an appointed bureaucracy . . . We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in britain only to see them re-imposed at a european level, with a european super-state exercising a new dominance from brussels. certainly we want to see europe more united with a greater sense of common purpose. but it must be in a way which preserves the different traditions, Parliamentary powers and sense of national pride in one’s own country; for these have been the source of europe’s vitality through the centuries. Source: margaret thatcher (1997) The Collected Speeches, london: harpercollins, pp. 315–25.

(c) the President of the commission, mr. Delors, said at a press conference the other day that he wanted the european Parliament to be the democratic body of the community, he wanted the commission to be the executive and he wanted the council of ministers to be the senate. no. no. no. Perhaps the labour party would give all those things up easily. Perhaps it would agree to a single currency and abolition of the pound sterling. Perhaps, being totally incompetent in monetary matters, it would be only too delighted to hand over full responsibility to a central bank, as it did to the ImF. the fact is that the labour party has no competence on money and no competence on the economy – so, yes, the right hon. gentleman would be glad to hand it all over. What is the point of trying to get elected to Parliament only to hand over sterling and the powers of this house to europe? Source: Parliamentary Debates (hansard), sixth series, Vol. 178, hous of commons, 30 october 1990, col. 873.

(d) there is talk, of course, of a single currency for europe. I agree that there are many difficulties about the concept – both economic and political. of course, as I said in my letter of resignation, none of us wants the imposition of a single currency. but that is not the real risk. the 11 others cannot impose their solution on the 12th country against its will, but they can go ahead without us. the risk is not imposition but isolation. the real threat is that of leaving ourselves with no say in the monetary arrangements that the rest of europe chooses for itself, with britain once again scrambling to join the club later, after the rules have been set and the power has been distributed by others to our disadvantage. that would be the worst possible outcome. . . . Source: Parliamentary Debates (hansard), sixth series, Vol. 180, house of commons, 13 november 1990, cols. 463 –5.

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tonY blaIr anD lIberal InterVentIon

A key defining feature of the Labour government that was in power from 1997 to 2010 was the speech that Tony Blair gave in Chicago on 24 April 1999, which argued that nation states could intervene in the affairs of another by military means to promote stability (a). However, this so-called Doctrine of the International Community became subject to criticism because, rather than promoting peace, it became a justification for the invasion of Iraq and led to a conflict which led to considerable casualties and created instability rather than stability (b). (a) looking around the world there are many regimes that are undemocratic and engaged in barbarous acts. If we wanted to right every wrong that we see in the modern world then we would do little else than intervene in the affairs of other countries. We would not be able to cope. so how do we decide when and whether to intervene. I think we need to bear in mind five major considerations. First, are we sure of our case? War is an imperfect instrument for righting humanitarian distress; but armed force is sometimes the only means of dealing with dictators. second, have we exhausted all diplomatic options? We should always give peace every chance, as we have in the case of kosovo. third, on the basis of a practical assessment of the situation, are there military operations we can sensibly and prudently undertake? Fourth, are we prepared for the long term? In the past we talked too much of exit strategies. but having made a commitment we cannot simply walk away once the fight is over; better to stay with moderate numbers of troops than return for repeat performances with large numbers. and finally, do we have national interests involved? the mass expulsion of ethnic albanians from kosovo demanded the notice of the rest of the world. but it does make a difference that this is taking place in such a combustible part of europe. I am not suggesting that these are absolute tests. but they are the kind of issues we need to think about in deciding in the future when and whether we will intervene. . . . Source: tony blair, ‘Doctrine of the International community’, 24 april 1999. http://www.britishpoliticalspeech.org/speech-archive.htm?speech=279 (accessed 17 november 2013).

(b) ‘as Prime minister, blair made a speech in chicago in 1999 in which he eloquently and intelligently set out the doctrine of humanitarian intervention. . . . unfortunately, when it came to the point in 2003, blair flung

Document 21

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the argument for humanitarian intervention into the pile of words he used to justify the anglo-american attack on Iraq, once his original pretext about weapons of mass destruction began to collapse. Weapons or not, it was argued, Iraqis had to be rescued from a vile dictator. the conditions laid down in the chicago speech were ignored; so were the facts about the likely Iraqi reaction to a foreign invasion. the result has been on the one hand 150,000 Iraqis killed and four million refugees; on the other hand the discrediting through the use of the doctrine of humanitarian intervention’. Source: Douglas hurd (2011) Choose Your Weapons: The British Foreign Secretary 200 Years of Argument, Success and Failure, london: Phoenix, p. 367.

Document 22

cameron anD euroPe

In this extract Prime Minister David Cameron sets out the case that a future Conservative government would hold an in–out referendum on Britain’s membership of the EU. ... the next conservative manifesto in 2015 will ask for a mandate from the british people for a conservative government to negotiate a new settlement with our european partners in the next Parliament. It will be a relationship with the single market at its heart. and when we have negotiated that new settlement, we will give the british people a referendum with a very simple in or out choice. to stay in the eu on these new terms; or come out altogether. It will be an in–out referendum. ... It is time for the british people to have their say. It is time to settle this european question in british politics. I say to the british people: this will be your decision. and when that choice comes, you will have an important choice to make about our country’s destiny. I understand the appeal of going it alone, of charting our own course. but it will be a decision we will have to take with cool heads. Proponents of both sides of the argument will need to avoid exaggerating their claims. of course britain could make her own way in the world, outside the eu, if we chose to do so. so could any other member state. but the question we will have to ask ourselves is this: is that the very best future for our country? We will have to weigh carefully where our true national interest lies.

189

documents

... and when the referendum comes let me say now that if we can negotiate such an arrangement, I will campaign for it with all my heart and soul. because I believe something very deeply. that britain’s national interest is best served in a flexible, adaptable and open european union and that such a european union is best with britain in it. Source: David cameron, EU Speech at Bloomberg, 23 january 2013. https://www.gov. uk/government/news/david-camerons-eu-speech-2 (accessed 17 november 2013).

brItIsh PrIme mInIsters anD ForeIgn secretarIes sInce 1945 Government

Period

Prime Minister

Foreign Secretary

War cabinet

may 1940– aug. 1945

Winston churchill

Viscount halifax (until Dec. 1940) and then anthony eden

labour

aug. 1945– oct. 1951

clement attlee

ernest bevin (until mar. 1951) and then herbert morrison

conservative

oct. 1951– apr. 1955

Winston churchill

anthony eden

conservative

apr. 1955– jan. 1957

sir anthony eden

harold macmillan (until Dec. 1955) and then j. selwyn lloyd

conservative

jan. 1957– oct. 1963

harold macmillan

j. selwyn lloyd (until june 1960) and then earl of home

conservative

oct. 1963– oct 1964

sir alec Douglas-home

r.a. butler

labour

oct. 1964– june 1970

harold Wilson

P. gordon Walker (until jan. 1965), michael stewart (until aug. 1967), george brown (until apr. 1968) and then michael stewart

conservative

june 1970– mar. 1974

edward heath

sir alec Douglas-home

labour

mar. 1974– apr. 1976

harold Wilson

james callaghan

labour

apr. 1976– may 1979

james callaghan

anthony crosland (until Feb. 1977) and then David owen

conservative

may 1979– june 1983

margaret thatcher

lord carrington (until apr. 1982) and then Francis Pym

conservative

june 1983– june 1987

margaret thatcher

sir geoffrey howe

Document 23

190

B r itain an d th e Wo r l d s in c e 1945

Government

Period

Prime Minister

Foreign Secretary

conservative

june 1987– nov. 1990

margaret thatcher

sir geoffrey howe (until june 1989), john major (until oct. 1989) and then Douglas hurd

conservative

nov. 1990– apr. 1992

john major

Douglas hurd

conservative

apr. 1992– may 1997

john major

Douglas hurd (until july 1995) and then malcolm rifkind

labour

may 1997– june 2001

tony blair

robin cook

labour

june 2001– may 2005

tony blair

jack straw

labour

may 2005– june 2007

tony blair

jack straw (until may 2006) and then margaret beckett

labour

june 2007– may 2010

gordon brown

David miliband

conservative– liberal Democrat coalition

may 2010–

David cameron

William hague

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Wallace, W. and Phillips, C. (2009) ‘Reassessing the Special Relationship’, International Affairs, 85(2): 263–84. Warner, G. (1979) ‘ “Collusion” and the Suez Crisis of 1956’, International Affairs, 55(2): 226–39. —— (1984) ‘The Labour Governments and the Unity of Western Europe, 1945–51’, in R. Ovendale (ed.) The Foreign Policy of the British Labour Governments 1945–51, Leicester: Leicester University Press, pp. 61–82. Watt, D.C. (1965) Personalities and Policies: Studies in the Formulation of British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century, London: Longman. Weinberger, C. (1990) Fighting for Peace, London: Michael Joseph Ltd. Wheeler, N. and Dunne, T. (1998) ‘Good International Citizenship: A Third Way for British Foreign Policy’, International Affairs, 74(4): 847–70. White, J.K. (1998) Still Seeing Red: How the Cold War Shapes the New American Politics, revised edition, Boulder, CO: Westview Press. White, N.J. (1999) Decolonisation: The British Experience, London: Longman. Whitman, R. (2010) ‘The Calm After the Storm? Foreign and Security Policy from Blair to Brown’, Parliamentary Affairs, 63(4): 834–48. Williams, P. (2005) British Foreign Policy Under New Labour 1997–2005, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Wilmshurst, E. (2005) ‘Wilmshurst resignation letter’, BBC News. Available online at http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/4377605.stm (accessed 7 May 2014). Young, H. (1998) This Blessed Plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair, London: Papermac. Young, J.W. (1985) ‘Churchill’s “No” to Europe: The Rejection of European Union by Churchill’s Post­War Government, 1951–52’, Historical Journal, 28(4): 923–37. —— (1989) ‘ “The Parting of the Ways”?: Britain, the Messina Conference and the Spaak Committee, June–December 1955’, in M. Dockrill and J.W. Young (eds) British Foreign Policy 1945–56, New York: St Martins Press, pp. 197–224. —— (1997) Britain and the World in the Twentieth Century, London: Arnold. —— (2000) Britain and European Unity 1945–99, 2nd edition, London: Macmillan.

201

Index

Abyssinia 19 Adenauer, Konrad 42 Acheson, Dean 59 acquis communitaire 85 Acts of Union (1707) 3 Aden 8, 24, 53, 60, 63, 146, 179 Afghanistan 6, 8, 102, 106, 107, 147, 150, 151, 157, 167 Africa 2, 4, 5, 7–11, 15, 19–21, 29, 39, 45, 48, 50, 62–5, 69, 96, 102–3, 150, 175, 178, 181, see also decolonisation al-Qaeda 145, 147, see also Osama bin Laden, ‘war on terror’ Albania 140–1, 187, see also Kosovo Albright, Madeleine 141 Algeria 51, 63 American Revolution (1776) 5 Amin, Idi 80 Amnesty International 140 Amritsar massacre 16–17 Anglo-Afghan war (1839–42) 8 Anglo-French Suez adventure 8, 10, see also Suez crisis Anglo-Irish agreement (1985) 102, 122 Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty (1972) 78 Antigua 22, 179 ANZUS pact (1951) 22 apartheid 63 appeasement 18–20, 50, 98, 144, see also Stanley Baldwin, Neville Chamberlain, Édouard Daladier Arab-Israeli conflicts 48, 88, see also Middle East Arab spring (2011) 152 Arafat, Yasser 150 Argentina 11, 96–9 arms control 103, 108 arms sales 61, 146 army 6, 13, 43, 123, 145, 152, see also defence, Ministry of Defence

Asia 6–8, 16, 29, 34, 37–9, 45, 47–8, 50, 64, 76, 80, 146, 160, 175, 177, 178 Aswan Dam 49–50 Atlantic Charter (1941) 22 Attlee, Clement 28, 30, 33, 35, 38, 40, 43, 46, 93, 189 austerity 152, 156, 171 Australia 2, 5–6, 15–17, 21–2, 46, 50, 71, 76, 179 Austria 10, 15, 18–20, 24, 67 Austro-Hungarian Empire 10 Baghdad Pact 49, 53 Bahamas 59 balance of payments 36, 39, 45, 57, 74, 83, 89, 176, 183 Baldwin, Stanley 18, 98 balance of power 6, 35, 82, 84 Balfour Declaration (1917) 15, 48 Balfour, Arthur James 15 Balistic Missile Defence (BMD) 60, 78, 103–5 Balkans 8, 127–31, 140, 155, see also Kosovo, Serbia, Yugoslavia Bank of England 12, 52, 115 Bandung conference 50 Barbados 3 Barber, Anthony 89 Belgium 8, 37, 41, 44 Benn, Tony 90–1 Berlin 34, 36, 37, 108, 118, 171 Bermuda 3, 22, 24, 58 Beveridge Report (1942) 30 Bevin, Ernest 28, 31, 35, 38–40, 43 bin Laden, Osama 119, 145 Blair, Tony 137–45, 147–50, 153–7, 187, 190 Boer War 9–11 Blue Streak 59 Bolshevik Revolution (1917) 34 Bosnia-Herzegovina 126, 128–31, 140–1

Index

Brazil 140, 161, 168 Bretherton, Russell 66, 69 Bretton Woods 25, 27, 63, 88 Brezhniv, Leonid 107 British Guiana 2 Brown, Gordon 138, 150, 157, 190 Bruges speech 115, 136, see also Margaret Thatcher Brunel, Isambard Kingdom 6 Brussels Treaty (1948) 37, 42, 65 Bulgaria 15 Bundesbank 115 Burma 6, 24, 44, 178 Bush, George H.W. 118, 124, 127, 129, 145 Bush, George W. 144, 146–8, 150 Cabinet 13, 24, 31, 43, 46, 51, 68, 85, 91, 93, 115–16, 125–6, 134–5, 137–9, 142, 148, 171, 173, 176 Cabinet Office 85 Cabot, John 2 Callaghan, James 64, 79, 90, 92–3, 184, 189 Cameron, David 151, 157–9, 161, 164, 166, 168, 189–90 Cameroon 15, 178 Campaign for Nuclear Disarmament (CND) 103 Canada 2, 5, 17, 21, 31, 37, 71, 88, 160, 173 Cape Colony 6, 9 capitalism 161 Carrington, Peter, 6th Baron 96, 98, 100, 128, 178 Carter, Jimmy 102 Castlereagh, Viscount 6 Central America 102 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 33, 34, 37, 108, 120, 162, 171 Central Treaty Organisation (CENTO) 49 Ceylon 6, 177–8 Chamberlain, Neville 18–20, 98, 116 Chilcot inquiry 149, 151, see also Iraq Chile 140 China 7, 11, 19, 26, 31, 37–8, 40, 61, 100–1, 103, 120–1, 140, 161, 163, 168, 179 Chirac, Jacques 131 Churchill, Winston 10, 17, 21–2, 26, 28, 31–3, 34–5, 39–40, 42–3, 50–1, 145, 170, 171, 172, 173, 174, 189 City of London 11–13, 122 Clark, Alan 124 Clarke, Kenneth 124, 135, 137 Clemenceau, Georges 13 climate change 150 Clinton, Bill 139, 142, 144, 146, 147 Cockfield, Lord Arthur 112

203

Cold War 9, 22, 29, 312, 34, 36–7, 47, 51–2, 57, 61, 63, 78–9, 102–3, 108, 118–20, 122–7, 129–31, 144–6, 152, 154, 160, 162, 170 colonialism 4 Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) 71, 74, 85, 86, 87, 90, 184, 185 Common Commercial Policy 71 Common External Tariff 71, 85 Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 133, 155 Commonwealth 11, 15, 22, 29, 39–44, 46, 54–7, 60, 62–6, 68–71, 73–4, 76, 79, 82–6, 90, 92, 95, 101, 106, 139, 145, 162, 165–8, 173–8, 180, 182, 184 Commonwealth Relations Office 60 Communism 23, 33, 36, 38, 102, 171 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 78 Congo 8–9, 150 Congress of Vienna (1814–15) 6 Conservative Party 39, 41–2, 53, 62, 71, 80, 89, 93, 94, 99, 102, 114, 116–17, 121–2, 132–7, 148, 158–9, 164, 166 Conservative-Liberal Democrat coalition government 139, 151–2, 157, 164 Constitutional Convention 154 Constitutional Treaty 154–5 containment 35, 146 Cook, Robin 139–43, 146, 148 Council of Europe 40, 42, 86 Council of Ministers 74, 85–6, 90, 184, 186 Cradock, Sir Percy 1, 38, 52, 99–101, 103–4, 107–10 Crimean War (1854–6) 8 Croatia 126, 128 Cruise Missiles 103 customs union 67 cyber crime 120, 146 Cyprus 8, 46, 60, 79, 178 Czechoslovakia 15, 18–20, 34, 50, 108 Daladier, Édouard 18 Dalton, Hugh 39 Darling, Alistair 157 Davignon Report 81 De Gaulle, Charles 71, 74–5, 81–2, 180, see also France debt 10, 15–16, 45, 126, 150 decolonisation 2, 26, 49, 62–5, 77, 97, 174–9 defence 20, 31, 37–8, 42, 57–8, 60–1, 76, 78, 95–8, 104, 111, 113, 118, 120, 123–4, 127, 129, 145, 148, 152–5, 176–7, see also army, Ministry of Defence, Royal Navy defence review 78, 97, 123, 145, 152

204

B r ItaIn an d th e Wo r l d sIn ce 1945

Delcassé, Théophile 9 Delors, Jacques 112, 114–16, 186 Delors Report on Economic and Monetary Union 114–15 Denmark 37, 67, 77, 83–4, 134 destroyer-for-bases deal (1940) 21–2 Détente 78–9, 102–3 Deutschmark 56, 93 devolution 90, 165–6, see also Northern Ireland, Scotland, Wales Diego Garcia 61 disarmament 13, 17, 103, 122, 147 Disraeli, Benjamin 7–8 Doctrine of the International Community 143–4, 150, 187–8, see also Tony Blair Dominions 13, 15, 17, 21, 29, 39, 171, 173–4 Downing Street 19, 94, 96, 105, 114, 116, 122, 132, 142, 185 Dulles, John Foster 50 Dunkirk Treaty (1947) 37, 42, 65 East Africa 9, 64 East Germany 108 East of Suez, withdrawal from 60, 76, 104, 123, 165, 182 East India Company 3, 6 Eastern bloc 108 Eastern Europe 32–4, 37, 50, 108, 120, 162, 171 Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) 114, 156, see also single currency Eden, Anthony 25, 28, 30, 39, 50–3, 65–7, 91, 175–6, 189 Egypt 8, 10, 16, 24, 45–6, 49–52, 152, see also Suez crisis Eisenhower, Dwight 51–2, 58, 175 Empire, the British 1–30, 35, 42–9, 53, 55–6, 59, 61–3, 69–70, 76–80, 96, 99, 101–3, 105, 162, 168, 171, 173–4, 178, see also Commonwealth, Dominions, names of individual countries Empty Chair Crisis 73, see also France Endurance, HMS 98 enlargement of EU 77, 84 entente cordiale 10, 82 Estonia 15 Ethiopia 24, 45 ‘ethical dimension’ to foreign policy 139–42, 144, 146, 150 Euro 156, 157 European Assembly 40, see also European Parliament European Atomic Energy Community (Euratom) 44, 67, 181 European Central Bank (ECB) 156

European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) 41–3, 65–6, 69, 181 European Commission 85, 92, 110, 112–13, 133 European Community (EC) 42–4, 67, 70–3, 77, 79, 81, 83, 86, 95, 127–8, 181, 184–5, see also European Economic Community (EEC), European Union (EU) European Constitution 154–5 European Council 114, 127–8, 133, 153, 157 European Council of Ministers 74, 85–6, 90,186 European Court of Justice (ECJ) 85, 133 European Currency Unit (ECU) 110, 114 European Defence Community (EDC) 42–4, 65 European Economic Community (EEC) 44, 53, 56, 62, 67, 69–70, 74, 76, 82, 86, 91, 93, 179–81, 183–4, see also European Community (EC), European Union (EU) European Free Trade Association (EFTA) 67–8, 70–1, 74, 83–4, 180–1 Europeanisation 82 European Monetary System (EMS) 92–3, 114 European Parliament 85, 111–12, 133, 186 European Political Cooperation (EPC) 81, 113 European Recovery Programme (ERP) (1947) 36, see also Marshall Plan European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) 87 European Security and Defence Identity (ESDI) 127 European Union (EU) 133, 158, 189 Eurosceptic 26, 114, 123, 134–7, 157–9 Eurozone 156–7 Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) 92, 114–16, 133, 135 exchange rates 27, 88, 92, 114, 135 Falklands War 95–9, 103–4 Far East 7, 11, 13, 33, 46, 50, 182 Fashoda 9 federalism 43 Ferdinand, Archduke Franz 13 ‘financial Dunkirk’ 24, 171 Finland 15, 32 First World War 7, 11, 13–14, 17, 20–1, 25–6, 34 Five-Power Agreement (1971) 76 Fontainebleau European Council (1984) 110 Foot, Michael 91, 103 Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) 60, 85–6, 105 France 6–10, 13–15, 19, 21, 25–6, 31–2, 36–7, 41–5, 50–2, 54–6, 60, 63, 66, 68, 69, 71, 73–4, 82, 85, 92, 107, 113, 123, 148, 151, 153, 155, 160–2, 165, 170–1, 173, 179–80, 185, see also Franco-German relationship Franco-German relationship 43, 127

Index

Franks, Oliver 40, 47 Free Trade Area (FTA) 66 Fukuyama, Francis 119 G8 group 145, 165 Gaddafi, Colonel Muammar 151, 152 Gandhi 17 General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) 25, 73, 165 Germany 8, 10, 12–14, 18–21, 30, 32–3, 35–7, 41–4, 54–8, 68, 74, 82, 84–5, 87, 92, 97, 107, 109, 113, 123, 127–8, 133, 148, 153, 160–2, 165, 170, 179, see also West Germany, Franco-German relationship Ghana 45, 62, 178, see also Gold Coast Giscard d’Estaing, Valery 92 Gladstone, William E. 9 glasnost 108 globalisation 4, 140, 161 Gold Coast 8, 45, 62, 178 gold standard 12, 18 Gorbachev, Mikhail 107–8 Great Depression 18 Great Game, The 7 great powers 6, 9–11, 13, 24–6, 47, 49, 51, 55–7, 109, 162 Greece 25, 35–6, 46, 172–3 Grenada 106, 179 Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 24, 57, 91, 109–10, 185 Gross National Product (GNP) 15, 38, 58, 60, 74 Ground-Launched Cruise Missile (GLCM) 103 Gulf conflict (1980s) 104 Gulf War (1990–91) 122–5, 128, 146 Hague Congress (1948) 40 Hague Summit (1969) 81 Hague, William 158, 163, 190 Hannay, David 71, 73, 85, 106, 108, 111, 115, 123–4, 130, 144 Healey, Dennis 60–1, 90, 92 Heath, Edward 53, 70, 72, 74–5, 80–3, 85–92, 164, 189 Helsinki Final Act (1975) 78 Hertzog, James 20 Heseltine, Michael 116, 124 High Authority 43, see also European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) High Representative of the EU 155 Hitler, Adolf 18–20, 36, 48, 50, 89, see also Germany Hong Kong 44, 60, 92, 99–101, 120–2, 135, 179 House of Commons 7, 48, 69, 116, 148, 166, 173, 180, 182, 183, 185–6

205

Howe, Geoffrey 100, 105, 115–16, 125, 185, 189–90 Hudson Bay Company 3 human rights 26, 78, 107, 140, 146, 149 human trafficking 120 Hungary 10, 15, 34, 52, 108 Huntington, Samuel 119 Hurd, Douglas 14, 25, 28, 35–6, 39, 116, 128–9, 131, 137, 160, 188, 190 Hussein, Saddam 107, 122, 124, 147, 148–9 immigration 2, 48, 64, 73, 80, 168, 182 Imperial Conference (1923) 17, 20 India 2–3, 5–8, 13, 16–17, 21–22, 25, 30, 34, 45–7, 61–2, 65, 143, 161, 163, 168, 177, 178 Indonesia 140 industrial revolution 5 inflation 88–9, 93, 126 interdependence 140, 167 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) 136, 154, 157 Intermediate Nuclear Forces (INF) 103, 108 internal market 112–15, 133 International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD) 25 international community, doctrine of see Doctrine of the International Community International Monetary Fund (IMF) 25, 92–3, 186 Iran 36, 49, 51, 124, 146, 150–1 Iranian Embassy siege (1980) 102 Iraq 15, 26, 49, 52, 107, 122, 124, 126, 138, 146–51, 157, 167, 187–8 Iraq inquiry see Chilcot inquiry Ireland 3, 17, 21, 77–8, 83–4, 90, 101–2, 122, 137, 156, 163, 165–6, see also Irish Republican Army (IRA), Sinn Fein, Northern Ireland Irish Republican Army (IRA) 77–8, 101–2, 122 iron curtain 34, 171 Israel 48, 51, 88, 178 Italy 8, 10, 15, 18–19, 36–7, 41, 44, 55, 56, 66, 74, 127, 160, 173 Jamaica 22, 53, 178 Jameson Raid 9 Japan 10, 13, 16–19, 22, 32, 33, 54, 56–8, 73, 88, 111, 161 Jebb, Gladwyn 39, 69 Jenkins, Roy 90, 92, 110 Jordan 15, 54, 178 Justice and Home Affairs ( JHA) 133 Kennan, George 35 Kennedy, John F. 59, 67, 70, 73 Kenya 8, 29, 64, 80, 146, 179

206

B r ItaIn an d th e Wo r l d sIn ce 1945

Kenyatta, Jomo 64, 80 Keynes, John Maynard 14, 20, 24, 27, 171 King, Mackenzie 20 Kissinger, Henry 82, 88, 125 Kohl, Helmut 133 Korea 37–8, 42–3, 168 Kosovo 126, 140–2, 144, 150, 187 Kuwait 54, 122–3, 126, 128, 178 Kyoto Protocol 150 Labour Party 53, 62, 71, 75, 83, 90–3, 103, 114, 137, 141, 153, 157, 183, 186 Lamont, Norman 115, 134–5 Latin America 7, 16 Latvia 15 Lawson, Nigel 116 League of Nations 13–15, 17, 19–20 Lebanon 15 Lend-Lease Act (1941) 22, 27, 36 Liberal Democrats 139, 148, 151, 157, 190 Liberia 45 Libya 107, 151–3 Lisbon Treaty 155–6 Lithuania 15 Lloyd George, David 13 Locarno Treaties (1925) 14 Luxembourg 37, 41, 44, 73, 112, 127 Luxembourg compromise 73 Maastricht Treaty 126–8, 131, 133–6, 154–6, 167–8 Macleod, Iain 62, 64, 89 Macmillan, Harold 34, 52–4, 58–9, 62–3, 65–7, 69–74, 81, 103, 177–8, 180, 182, 189 Major, John 111, 116–17, 121–2, 124–5, 128–9, 132–7, 141, 143, 153, 155, 190 Malaya 29, 44–7, 178–9 Malayan emergency 29, 47 Mao, Zedong, 37, see also China Malta 60, 179 Manchuria 19 Marshall, George 36, 41 Marshall Plan 36 Matrix-Churchill inquiry 124 Mauritius 6, 62–3, 179 McMahon Act (1946) 31 Member of the European Parliament (MEP) 111, see also European Parliament Messina Conference 44, 65, 99–100, 102–3 Middle East 8, 14–15, 47–8, 50, 52–3, 56, 61, 147, 150 Milosevic, Slobodan 126, 140–1

Ministry of Defence 60–1, 124, see also army, defence, Royal Navy Mollet, Guy 50 Molotov-Ribbentrop non-aggression pact (1939) 32 Monckton, Sir Walter 53 Monnet, Jean 41–2 Mountbatten, Lord Louis 46, 53, 101 Mugabe, Robert 96, see also Rhodesia, Zimbabwe Munich Agreement (1938) 18–20 Mussolini, Benito 19, 50 Mutual Assured Destruction (MAD) 104 Muzerowa, Bishop Abel 96 Namibia 15 Napoleon 6–7, 68 Nassau meeting (1962) 59, 71, see also Polaris missile Nasser, Gamal Abdel 50–2, see also Egypt, Suez crisis National Security Strategy (NSS) 152 National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) 89 nationalism 19, 45, 63 navy see Royal Navy Nazi Germany 20 net contributors 95, 109–10, 184–5 Netherlands 2, 6, 37, 41, 44, 66, 155 New Guinea 15, 179 new world order 17, 118, 123, 144–5 New Zealand 5, 15, 17, 21–2, 46, 71, 76, 178–9 Newfoundland 2–3, 17, 22 Nicaragua 107 Nigeria 8, 45, 178 Nixon, Richard 88 Nkrumah, Kwame 62 non-aligned movement 50 non-tariff barriers to trade 111 North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) 37, 42–3, 49, 57, 61, 68, 86, 97, 103–4, 122, 127, 129, 131, 141, 144–5, 165, 167, 172, 180, 182 North Korea 38, 42, 146, 151 North Sea oil 95–6, 110, 185 Northern Ireland 77–8, 90, 101–2, 122, 137, 165–6, see also devolution, Ireland, Irish Republican Army (IRA), Sinn Fein Norway 37, 67 Nott, John 97 nuclear weapons 30–3, 37, 40, 44, 51, 59, 61, 65, 67, 78, 97, 103–4, 108, 119, 124, 146, 153, 165, 168, 177, 181 oil 13, 48, 88–9, 91, 95, 110, 122, O’Neill, Terence 77 opt-out 133–4, 153

Index

Orange Free State 8–9 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) 41 Organisation for European Economic Cooperation (OEEC) 41, 43, 66–7 Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) 88 Ottoman Empire 7, 14–15 overseas aid 79 Owen, David 80, 189 Paisley, Ian 77 Pakistan 46, 49, 143, 177–8 Palestine 15, 25, 30, 46, 48, 178 Palmerstone, Lord 7 Patten, Chris 108, 120–2, 135, 142, 149–50, 154–5 Pax Britannica 7–8 Pearl Harbour (1941) 22 perestroika 108 Pershing missiles 103–4 Persian Empire 7 Persian Gulf 15, 182 pillar framework 133 ‘Plan G’ 66 Pleven Plan 43 Plowden Report in Overseas Representation (1964) 60 Poland 15, 20, 32–3, 108, 170 Polaris missile 59–60, 71, 103, 166 poll tax 115 Pompidou, Georges 81–2, 87 Poos, Jacques 177 post-Cold War 118–25, 129–31, 145–6, 154, see also new world order, Francis Fukuyama, Samuel Huntington Potsdam conference (1945) 28, 32, 33 Powell, Charles 105, 109, 115 Powell, Enoch 64, 182–3 Powell, Jonathan 144 Qualified Majority Voting (QMV) 111, 113, 153 rationing 30 Reagan, Ronald 95, 102–4, 106–7 referendum 81, 90–1, 132, 134, 137, 154–5, 158–9, 164, 166, 184, 188–9 renegotiation 90–1, 132, 166, 184 Reynolds, Albert 122 Rhineland 18 Rhodes, Cecil 9 Rhodesia 8–9, 29, 63, 65, 80, 96–7, 179, see also Zimbabwe

207

Romania 15, 34, 108 Rome, Treaties of 44, 67, 70–2, 112, 127, 133 Roosevelt, Franklin D. 21–2, 32 Rowntree, Seebohm 12 Royal Navy 4, 10, 12–14, 60, 98, 145, 152, see also defence, Ministry of Defence Russia 4, 7–8, 10–12, 18, 26, 31–2, 39, 129, 142, 161, 163, see also Cold War, Soviet Union Russo-Persian War (1826–8) 8 Russo-Turkey War (1828–9) 8 Rwanda 142 Samoa 15, 178 Sandys, Duncan 58, 176 Sargent, Sir Orme 39–40 Schmidt, Helmut 92–3 Schuman, Robert 41, 43 Scotland 3, 59, 90, 165–6, see also devolution Scott, Sir Richard 124 Second World War 14, 17–18, 20, 22, 24–5, 27–8, 32–6, 44–5, 47–8, 54–7, 61, 97, 108, 118, 126, 128, 131, 153, 162, 165, 180 Selassie, Haile 19 Serbia 126, 129 Siberian pipeline dispute 106 Singapore 22, 44, 60, 76, 179 single currency 92, 114–16, 126, 128, 133, 137, 156–7, 185–6 Single European Act (SEA) 81, 112, 132 Sinn Fein 17, 122 slave trade 1, 7 Slovenia 126, 128 Smith, Ian 65, 80, 96 Social Chapter 133–4, 153 soft power 120 Somalia 8, 15, 129–30, 178 Somaliland 178 South Africa 5–6, 10, 15, 20–1, 29, 46, 63, 65, see also Boer War South America 11, 146, 160 sovereignty 26, 40–2, 44, 67, 73, 82, 97, 99, 101, 109, 111, 120, 154–5, 158, 161, 164 Soviet Union 9, 21–2, 28, 31–9, 50–1, 61, 78–9, 84, 95, 102–4, 106–8, 118, 124, 170, 173, see also Cold War, Mikhail Gorbachev, Russia, Joseph Stalin Spaak, Paul-Henri 65–6 Special Air Service (SAS) 102 ‘special relationship’, the 40, 42, 59, 70–1, 84, 91, 93, 103, 107, 124, 129–30, 141, 145, 147, 162, 165, 167

208

B r ItaIn an d th e Wo r l d sIn ce 1945

spheres of influence 9–10, 32 Srebrenica 131 St Lucia 6, 22, 179 Stalin, Joseph 32–5, 38, 170 Statute of Westminster (1931) 17 sterling 12, 18, 27, 40–3, 45–7, 52, 55–7, 92, 135, 162, 174, 176, 186, see also Bank of England, Treasury Strategic Arms Limitations Talks (SALT) 78–9 Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI) 104–5 Strategic Defence Review (SDR) 145, 152 Sudan 8–9, 178 Sudetenland 18–20 Suez Canal 8–9, 49–51, see also Anthony Eden Suez crisis 49–54, 58, 66, 69, 151, 175–6, 182 summitry 28, 32–3, 59, 71, 81–2, 106, 116 superpower 36, 53, 79, 104, 118–19, 123, 144 supranationalism 41, 43, 65, 68, 69 Sweden 67 Switzerland 67, 172 Sykes-Picot agreement 14 Syria 15, 152 Taliban 147 Tanganyika 15, 178–9 tariff barriers 45, 66, 70–1, 73, 85, 111 Teheran conference (1943) 28 terrorism 48, 102, 107, 119, 143, 145–7, 150, 152, 157, 172 Thatcher, Margaret 54, 93–117, 122–5, 132–4, 161, 185–6, 189–90 Third World 38, 40, 51, 103 Thorneycroft, Peter 58 Tito 6, 12, 35, 126 Togo 15 Trafalgar, Battle of (1805) 6 Transvaal 8–9 Treasury, HM 29, 43, 62, 66, 92, 109, 115, 174 Treaty of Amsterdam (1997) 153, 154 Treaty of Locarno (1925) 14 Treaty of London (1604) 3 Treaty of Nanking (1842) 100 Treaty of Nice (2000) 154 Treaty of Sèvres (1920) 15 Treaty of Vereeninging (1902) 9 Treaty on European Union (TEU) 126, 133, see also Maastricht Treaty Trident 103, 153 Trinidad 6, 22, 178 Tobago 6, 178 Truman Doctrine 36, 61 Truman, Harry 27, 33, 36, 41 Turkey 8, 15, 36, 49, 79

Uganda 8, 80, 178 unemployment 8, 18, 36, 89, 94, 96, 126 unipolarity 118 United Kingdom Independence Party (UKIP) 137, 166 United Nations (UN) 13, 25–6, 28, 32, 38, 45, 48, 52, 86, 101, 107, 119, 123–4, 128, 130–1, 139, 142, 144–50, 165, 167–8, 172 United States of America (USA) 5–6, 9–10, 22, 35–6, 38–40, 43, 53–4, 61, 68, 72, 79, 88, 102–3, 105, 130, 141, 170–3, 176–7, 180, see also Cold War, new world order, post-Cold War, unipolarity V-bomber force 60 Versailles, Treaty of (1919) 13–14, 18, 20, 48, see also First World War veto 71, 72–5, 87, 111, 113, 180 Victoria, Queen 7, 11 Vietnam War 61 Virginia 3, 5 Wales 4, 90, 165–6, see also devolution Wall, Sir Stephen 109, 143 Wall Street Crash (1929) 18 ‘war on terror’ 143, 146, 150, 157 Warsaw Pact 78 Washington Treaty (1922) 17 Waterloo, Battle of (1815) 6–7 Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) 119, 146–9, 152, 188 welfare state 29–30, 55 Werner Report 81, 114 West Lothian question 166 West Germany 36–7, 44, 84, 87, see also Germany West Indies 3, 52, 63, 106 Western Bloc 108 Western Europe 26, 33, 39, 41–4, 88, 103–4, 106, 123, 160, 173, 175 Western European Union (WEU) 43, 104 Wilson, Harold 40, 54, 57, 60–2, 73–5, 80–1, 83, 90, 137, 181–4, 189 Wilson, Woodrow 13, see also League of Nations winter of discontent 36, 90, 93, 161 World Trade Organisation (WTO) 6, 25, 55, 84, 145–6, 160, 165, 184 Yalta conference (1945) 28, 32–3, 170 Yeltsin, Boris 129 Yugoslavia 15, 35, 125–8, 140 Zanzibar 8, 179 Zimbabwe 9, 97, 140, 179, see also Rhodesia, Robert Mugabe