Britain and Jordan: Imperial Strategy, King Abdullah I and the Zionist Movement 9780755610815, 9781848853102

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The idea for this book originated as whilst I was involved in my doctoral research, which was undertaken at the School of Oriental and African Studies. I would like to thank Professor Emeritus Colin Shindler for his wise advice and consistent support. This book could not have been completed without the assistance of a number of individuals who were kind enough to provide me with invaluable feedback on earlier versions of the manuscript. They include Rose Esber, Matthew Hogan, Alex Martin, Cristina Palomares and Kristos Vassilicos. I also benefited from numerous conversations with Yoav Alon, and my good friend James Onley. This book is based on a wide range of archives located in the UK, Israel and the United States. I would like to thank the staff at the National Archives at Kew for their unfailing assistance. The National Archives, despite budgetary cuts, has established the gold standard for students and scholars. Archivists at the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College London, the Imperial War Museum and Rhodes House, Oxford also deserve thanks for their help. I would also like to thank Debbie Usher, the archivist at the Middle East Centre in Oxford, who oversees a crucial collection of personal papers with consummate skill. In Israel, I benefited from the advice of Yoram Mayorek, formerly the directory of the Central Zionist Archives. Yoram went out of his way to point me in the direction of some of his more obscure collections. In the United States librarians and archivists

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at the National Archives in Washington, the Library of Congress, Georgetown University Library Special Collections and the Harry S. Truman Library, all provided invaluable assistance. I was fortunate to meet a number of people in Jordan who were very generous with their time and recollections of the early years of Jordan’s history. I would like to offer thanks to various friends, including Julianna Fuzesi, Shakireh Ispahani, Amelie Jousseaume, Nick and Anna Klemz, Courtney and Joe Lodico, Jennie Reuvid, Raymond and Laura Saba and Stephanie Seul. I am especially grateful to the Lodico and Saba families in Washington who have wholeheartedly welcomed me into their families during my lengthy visits to Washington. Finally, I would like to thank my family for their forbearance.

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MAPS

Map 1 Pre-World War One Ottoman Administrative Districts

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Map 2 Jordan’s Frontiers

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Map 3 Palestine’s administrative boundaries during the mandate

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Map 4 United Nations partition plan, November 1947

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Map 5 Arab-Israeli armistice lines, 1949

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INTRODUCTION

In this book, I seek to fill a significant lacuna in the existing literature on British imperialism and the Middle East. While many studies exist on British imperial activity in the Arabian Gulf, Egypt, Israel/ Palestine, Iran and Iraq, historians of the British Empire in the region have largely ignored the development of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and its predecessor state, Transjordan. For many students of the Empire and the region, key factors that may explain this oversight include the fact that Jordan was viewed as a regional backwater devoid of a historically significant capital city, as well as lacking in key natural resources such as oil. This gap in the historiography of Jordan, while unsurprising, is also unjustified. For Jordan remains, perhaps the only place outside of a few Arabian Gulf shaikhdoms, where British imperial policies in the Middle East have proven an enduring success. While revolutions, wars and coups have demolished the friendly Middle Eastern regimes nurtured by Britain over the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, Jordan has remained a steadfast British and Western ally. As this book goes to press, the country is helmed by a Sandhurst-trained, Anglo-Jordanian monarch directly descended from the ruler the British Colonial Office designated as its local partner in creating the state that would become Jordan—an imperial project of the early twentieth century that today’s political vernacular would call ‘nation building’. This book explores the origins and nature of that success story. I will describe how and why the British and a small number of Jordanians starting at the end of the First World War created a viable polity from scratch. I will show how this was all done with a constant

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attention to the need to save money, to launch a nation, as it were, ‘on the cheap’. Additionally, and with the aid of fresh sources and analysis, we will examine the personality and actions of King Abdullah Ibn Husayn, Britain’s choice of ruler for the new polity. We will consider in detail the series of agreements and treaties with him that over decades gave the new nation a military and civil infrastructure, one entrusted to Abdullah with the understanding that he would follow British guidance on foreign policy. Finally, we will see how Jordan was able to maintain its continuing strategic significance and friendly association with Britain throughout both nations’ separate and convoluted interactions with the Zionist movement seeking a Jewish state in Palestine. This friendly association survived the 1948 upheavals in Palestine and King Abdullah’s death in 1951.

Organisation of This Book This book is divided into five chapters. In the first, I discuss the political background that undergirded the expansion of British interests in the Middle East during the First World War and provide a theoretical model with which to evaluate these developments in the broader context of British imperial history and practice. I treat as well the parallel development of Abdullah’s worldview, which included the notion that his dynasty, the Hashemites, had the right to establish a wider Arab kingdom throughout the Middle East. I further detail how British officials’ originally contemptuous attitude towards King Abdullah during the First World War guided policy until that attitude evolved into a more respectful engagement with him. This chapter shows that the original view of the Hashemite Amir as little more than an idle spendthrift uninterested in the tedium of governance had a significant impact during Britain’s early considerations of the ultimate status of Palestine and Transjordan, alongside the better-known issues of imperial competition and strategy, accommodations to Zionism, and promises to Arab nationalists. The second chapter addresses the practical development of Transjordan and Abdullah’s tenuous position as ruler of the new desert

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emirate. I also delineate the practices and considerations by which the British were determined to exert their influence at the lowest possible cost in money and resources. I describe how the British applied a model of indirect rule that had originated in India, and under that model were willing to grant Abdullah limited autonomy in running the kingdom. Additionally, this chapter introduces one of the most contentious aspects of Abdullah’s long career: his burgeoning contacts with the Zionist movement in Palestine. The third chapter addresses the challenges the British Empire faced in the Middle East during the 1930s, which combined with a tendency to belittle and hinder Abdullah’s broader ambitions for a larger Hashemite kingdom. Domestically, the British continued to accord Abdullah a degree of autonomy. This chapter shows how bilateral relations increasingly were affected by the protracted unrest in Palestine from 1936 to 1939. Abdullah was a realistic, pragmatic and even far-sighted politician who wisely maintained close relations with the Zionists. But Abdullah’s intentions were never widely trusted by the Arab leaders of the day, and his hopes to include Palestine within a Hashemite kingdom would prove less realistic than the pragmatic engagement of his diplomacy. The fourth chapter accounts for the period between the outbreak of the Second World War and 1947. I show unambiguously the contemporary success of British policy in Jordan. For despite global upheaval and uncertainty, Abdullah remained steadfastly loyal to British interests, going so far as to allow the British-commanded and financed Arab Legion to participate decisively in the Allied invasion of Iraq in 1941. The British did not quite reciprocate, however. Abdullah’s support for the Allied cause did not win him a simultaneous granting of his desire for full independence. Even in 1946, when Abdullah finally became king, with relations with the British defined by treaty, he still relied heavily on British financial support. The final chapter focuses on the impact of the British withdrawal from Palestine and the consequent first Arab-Israeli war in 1948–49, including the controversial negotiations and allegations that the British gave Abdullah a ‘green light’ to intervene in that conflict. The decline of British influence in Palestine, and the fraught nature of

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relations with Egypt and Iraq, transformed the value of Abdullah and Transjordan to the British. The chapter further details how Abdullah took advantage of his relations with the British and the new Middle East realities in the last years of his life, and how his powers diminished prior to his death in July 1951. I describe how the friendly relationship between Jordan and Britain continued, along with regime stability, despite threats and disruptions to both. And, I trace the personal expertise and involvement of one key official, Sir Alec Kirkbride, who played an important role in preserving the relationship and the government even after the king’s death. In the conclusion, I review the overall development of Britain’s imperial project in Jordan to highlight the historical and policy themes that made the project work, and the challenges that were overcome.

Areas of Emphasis and Controversy In these chapters, I also contest certain perspectives in current historiography that I regard as being incorrect and argue for others I view as underemphasised or entirely absent in conventional historiography and polemic. Chief among these issues are the underappreciation of the key role that cost-consciousness played in imperial policy in the region and towards resource-deprived Palestine and Jordan in particular; the common misperception of Abdullah as a British stooge or puppet; the erroneous view that Great Britain gave—as part of some secret ‘collusion’ to the detriment of the Palestinians—a green light to Abdullah’s seizure of the West Bank in 1948, and the related view, most associated with the Oxford historian Avi Shlaim, that King Abdullah and the founders of Israel ‘colluded’ to divide up Palestine through a clear agreement on Transjordan’s intervention. Still further, I will argue that more proper attention must be paid to the dynamic and underappreciated role played by Sir Alec Kirkbride, the resident minister in Amman from 1939 to 1951, who receives less credit for the successful nurturing of the bilateral relationship between Great Britain and Transjordan than does the more colourful and public Sir John Bagot Glubb, the British Arab Legion commander popularly

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known as ‘Glubb Pasha’. I also contend that one of the products of Kirkbride’s efforts and statesmanship, the 1948 Anglo-Transjordan Treaty revision, was a key factor in deterring the Israelis from invading the West Bank and absorbing all of Palestine in 1948. Far from being a British stooge, King Abdullah, we will see, was a dynamic and increasingly statesmanlike political actor. It is true that he succeeded only with British assistance in establishing the foundations of a stable political system in Jordan. But he played his weak hand with considerable skill, especially as time progressed. Abdullah’s ambitious attempts to expand his kingdom may have been divorced from reality, but his broader views on regional stability and dealing with the Zionists and Israelis were in advance of his time. In contrast with other Arab leaders of this period, Abdullah’s approach was one of moderation, realism and reconciliation.

Sources This book benefits from a wide range of primary and secondary sources. The relationships among the British government, Abdullah and the Zionist movement in Palestine in the period 1921 to 1951 offer a potentially endless set of topics. To best meet the challenge presented, I accessed the sources described below. The National Archives (formerly the Public Records Office) at Kew possess by far the most significant range of sources used in this book. In addition to consulting and citing extensively the records of the Foreign and Colonial Offices, I have explored other sources that tend to be overlooked or ignored. These include Treasury records that provide insight into the importance of financial considerations in the making of British imperial policy in Palestine and Transjordan. I also took full advantage of a wide range of military records, including those of the Royal Air Force and the War Office, which, in tandem with the Chiefs of Staff papers, provide crucial insight into the strategic aspects of British policy in Palestine and Transjordan. The gradual opening of intelligence archives at Kew has also been very beneficial. The records of the Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) and the Security Service (MI5) give an important insight into that

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‘missing dimension’ of British policy. Nevertheless, historians remain thwarted by the high wall that surrounds the records of the Secret Intelligence Service. The official record of British policy therefore contains significant omissions, but it is possible to substantiate the sources located at Kew by consulting a wide range of private papers of officials and soldiers held in several other archives in London and Oxford. These include the Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives at King’s College, University of London, and the Imperial War Museum. The excellent archives at the Middle East Centre, St. Antony’s College and Rhodes House in Oxford hold the papers of numerous public servants and soldiers who served in Palestine and Jordan. These private collections are far from complete, and unfortunately, two important figures from the period, Sir Arthur Wauchope (high commissioner for Palestine, 1931–38) and the near-omnipresent Kirkbride, left behind no private papers that would give a clearer picture of their roles. Archives in Israel and the United States also hold significant collections. In Jerusalem, the Central Zionist Archives, and to a lesser extent the Israel State Archives, hold records that were crucial to this study. These include the extensive records of the political department of the Jewish Agency and its successor, the Israeli Foreign Ministry. During the mandatory era the Zionists showed great interest in events in Transjordan. Zionist officials provided detailed accounts of meetings with Abdullah, the leading shaikhs of the country, and British officials. The Zionists also succeeded in penetrating the highest levels of the British administration, and these records give an insight into what the Zionists knew about British policy. After World War II, the United States became increasingly involved in events in the region. Some of the American records have been published by the State Department, but there is a wealth of material available at the U.S. National Archives in College Park, Maryland. The primary sources include the complex records of the State Department and recently declassified reports produced by the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA). Additionally, I consulted extensively the records held at the Harry S. Truman Library in Independence, Missouri. These highlight the extent

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of Zionist influence on the president and his advisors and the tempestuous nature of the president’s relations with the British. The American presidential libraries are a crucial but underutilised source, and the Truman Library is of special note for holding a series of CIA documents not available in Washington. One of the main problems associated with a study of this nature is almost a complete lack of access to primary sources in Arabic. Inevitably this means that historians are limited in terms of the sources available. There have been attempts in recent years to conduct oral histories, but there are clear limitations to this approach. Inevitably, a book of this nature builds on the work of others. My hope is that the reader of this book will find useful insight and fresh raw material on an undertreated area of the strife-ridden modern Middle East and the sweeping drama of late British imperial history. I also hope that some readers will be provoked to pursue issues raised or suggested in this book, to press on to help narrow and fill the historiographical gaps that persist, and to challenge misinterpretations that survive. At minimum, the reader should be enlightened; at best, the reader will be inspired. In either event, this book will have served its purpose in its exploration of the unique historical success story that the British-Jordanian relationship has constituted.

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often relied on an unequal treaty or alliance that defined the extent of intervention in domestic affairs and constrained the rulers’ freedom of action in their foreign policy. Not only was this mechanism cheap, but it allowed the British to extract themselves from confrontations with local national feeling, thereby preventing nationalist politicians from taking advantage of local issues in order to rouse the population against the British.7 This pattern of indirect rule had its origins in the princely states of India in the form of a residency system. The British routinely drew on the Indian residency model as a means of extending de facto imperial control at the lowest possible cost throughout the Empire.8 The evolution of this ‘system’ of imperial rule was based on a small number of competent British officials who relied on coercion, collaboration with local rulers and the impression they created of benign rule through popular acquiescence. This system of low-cost imperial administration also relied on locally recruited staff, leading to the development of a imperial bureaucracy. Some historians argue that the continuation of British influence was a confidence trick based on bluff rather than force.9 Palestine during the mandate clearly contradicts this notion. The mandatory era was characterised by outbreaks of violence that seriously challenged British rule and were only suppressed by considerable force. The nature of Britain’s informal empire has been the subject of debate. Michael Doyle argues that the difference between formal and informal imperialism was a question of degree because in reality the outcome was the same.10 James Onley observes that British officials took the concept seriously to the extent that they tended to regard the distinction between formal and informal empire in constitutional terms. The formal empire included territories where the British were fully sovereign, but the informal empire referred to foreign regions where the British exercised a degree of suzerainty via unequal treaties, mandates, and protectorates. According to Onley, Britain’s formal empire in the Middle East at its height in the twentieth century consisted of Malta, Cyprus and the Aden Settlement, whereas the informal empire included a wide range of territories including the Aden Protectorate, the Gulf shaikhdoms, British-protected Egypt, Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, British Somaliland

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and the mandates of Iraq, Transjordan and Palestine. Furthermore, Onley contends that the British continued to exercise considerable informal influence in states such as ‘independent’ Egypt (1936–52), Iraq (1930–58) and Jordan (1946–56).11 Understanding imperial history in this framework also requires understanding the mentality of decision makers. An additional feature of Robinson and Gallagher’s thesis is their discussion of the ‘official mind’ of civil servants and politicians in London. The two authors study the official thinking of ministers and their advisors, as well as the wide range of moral and political influences that determined the policies they adopted. Robinson and Gallagher note that with certain exceptions, such as the formidable Lord Curzon, who served as Viceroy (1898–1905) and Foreign Secretary (1919–24), most decision makers had scant personal knowledge of the Empire. Their education and social background, combined with their detachment from the realities of Empire, led them to entertain a variety of prejudices and preconceptions about Britain’s overseas influence.12 These officials’ control over the purse strings gave them a central but understated role. The ‘official mind’ they embodied, however, was characterised by divisions between government departments, such as the Foreign and Colonial Offices, on the one hand, and the Treasury, on the other.13 British policy in Palestine and Transjordan highlights the extent to which the official mind was split, contributing to the failure to develop a coherent policy. Robinson also introduced the notion of ‘collaboration’.14 Without the voluntary or enforced cooperation of indigenous elites Britain’s strategic interests could not be assured.15 The British could exert overwhelming force over a territory but they could not succeed without mediators within the indigenous society. Robinson contends that the success of a collaborative system was proportionate to the amount of power and wealth invested in it.16 The system established by the British in Transjordan contradicts this contention because limited financial and military resources were expended but significant strategic and political returns were achieved. In contrast with Robinson and Gallagher, P.J. Cain and A.G. Hopkins maintain that economic factors were the primary force motivating

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Britain’s imperial expansion. Cain and Hopkins focus on the metropolitan core of the Empire, arguing that the City of London was a driving force behind Britain’s influence. Existing theories, they claim, underplay or misjudge the relationship between the British economy and Britain’s presence overseas.17 Britain’s foreign economic interests were thus the result of interplay between financiers in the City and officials and statesmen in Whitehall known as ‘gentlemanly capitalists’. They included the landed aristocracy, financiers and the service sector, an elite that shared ‘a common view of the world and how it should be ordered’. The gentlemanly capitalists were educated in public schools and at Oxbridge where they learned a code of honour and conduct, as well as the pre-eminence of duty over self-advancement. These immutable commonalties, such as class and education, were replicated abroad, where imperial administrators shared similar values. Service in the empire allowed them to exercise the values that they had learned at school, and led them to search for local allies they believed shared their interests. According to Cain and Hopkins, a ‘like-mindedness’ and a ‘common view of the world’ united the ‘gentlemanly capitalists’ of the City and Whitehall.18 In practice this monolithic treatment of the ruling class in Britain is hard to sustain; very little evidence supports the contention that a close relationship existed between financiers and officials in Whitehall.19 In addition, the Cain and Hopkins paradigm barely addresses the Middle East beyond discussing the British occupation of Egypt in 1882 and relations with the Ottoman Empire and Persia.20 Britain’s interests in Palestine and Transjordan were determined by strategic considerations, which focused on the crucial role of the Suez Canal. Palestine and Transjordan had minimal economic value because their economy was predominantly agricultural, with a small industrial sector.21 During the interwar years, Palestine’s economy expanded but agriculture remained the main economic activity. The absence of any economic interest in Palestine and Transjordan calls into question the ability of the Cain and Hopkins paradigm to explain the nature of Britain’s interest there. The First World War gave Britain a preponderant position in the Middle East, a domination that lasted for at least four decades.

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Britain’s imperial interests in the Middle East led to agreements with the Hashemites and the Zionists. These agreements, although wildly contradictory, had a seminal influence on the events in the region in the following decades. This chapter examines their importance in the evolving events in Palestine and Transjordan. In order to comprehend Abdullah Ibn Husayn and the central role he played in the region’s politics, we must understand his dynastic worldview, shaped by a lifelong obsession with the establishment of a Greater Syria, encompassing Lebanon, Palestine, Syria and Transjordan. We therefore begin by examining Abdullah’s early diplomatic contacts with the British and the Arab Revolt against the Ottoman Empire in 1916, which was key to the development of his dynastic ambitions.

Amir Abdullah, the Hashemites and Britain Abdullah Ibn Husayn was born in Mecca in February 1882, the second son of Husayn Ibn Ali, a member of the Hashemite dynasty. Although Abdullah and his descendents have gone to great lengths to portray themselves as Bedouin, in fact Abdullah spent his formative years (1893–1908) in Istanbul, where his father had been exiled in 1892. Since the tenth century, Mecca and the Hejaz had been ruled by a Sharif, or descendant of the Prophet, a title that bestowed considerable prestige on the family as custodian of the holy places of Islam.22 Abdullah sought to take full advantage of his noble lineage in his relations with his Arab contemporaries and with the Jewish national movement. In the years preceding the First World War, Abdullah remained loyal to the Ottoman Empire, and his main preoccupation was advancing Hashemite interests. He played an important role in his father’s relations with the Ottoman Empire, even claiming later that he was instrumental in having his father appointed as Sharif of Mecca in 1908.23 From 1908 to 1913, Abdullah remained loyal to the Empire and focused on extending his family’s interests in Arabia. In order to achieve this objective, Sharif Husayn and his son Abdullah cultivated diplomatic relations with Lord Kitchener, the British High Commissioner

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widely seen as a political and strategic error.55 In contrast with the McMahon-Husayn correspondence and the Sykes-Picot Agreement, classic examples of secret diplomacy deplored after the war, the Balfour Declaration was publicly enunciated. The immediate problem facing the British was their relations with the Hashemites and whether the declaration was compatible with the Husayn-McMahon correspondence. King Husayn was disturbed to hear about the Balfour Declaration and sought clarification concerning its meaning and scope. In order to calm Husayn’s disquiet, Commander David Hogarth, a member of the Arab Bureau, which had been established in Cairo in 1916 to coordinate intelligence gathering and analysis in the Middle East,56 was sent to the Hejaz in January 1918 to meet with the King Husayn. The Foreign Office instructed Hogarth to state that ‘the Arab race shall be given full opportunity of once again forming a nation in the world’. As far as Palestine was concerned, Hogarth reaffirmed ‘that no people shall be subjected to another’ and that the British government supported the return of the Jews to Palestine so long as this was ‘compatible with the freedom of the existing population both economic and political’.57 George Antonius argues that the Hogarth message was important because it led Husayn to believe that Jewish settlement in Palestine would not conflict with Arab independence. Antonius maintains that King Husayn was not opposed to the presence of the Jews in Palestine on humanitarian grounds, but he was emphatically opposed to a Zionist takeover.58 Therefore, when the British refused to acknowledge Arab independence in Palestine following the war, King Husayn felt betrayed. In contrast, Elie Kedourie has argued that King Husayn had no special claim over Palestine and its holy places, which is why Hogarth informed the King that Jerusalem would fall under an international regime after the war.59

The Impact of the First World War on Amir Abdullah’s Aspirations During the course of the revolt Amir Abdullah’s prestige with the British fundamentally declined. Largely responsible for this were the

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reports by T. E. Lawrence in the Arab Bulletin, a digest of events in the Middle East produced by the Arab Bureau and widely circulated in London. Abdullah played a tangential role in the Arab Revolt since he was primarily involved in relations with neighbouring tribes and in the siege of Medina. Criticism was levelled particularly at his failure to capture this city, which only fell after the end of the war in November 1918.60 Abdullah’s failure to take Medina can be attributed to antagonism between Syrian and Iraqi officers in his army. Indeed, Lawrence argued in the Arab Bulletin that these officers ‘have proved an almost worthless lot . . . the Syrians are the worst’, and that ‘the indolent character of the Amir [Abdullah] has offered inducement and scope to their chauvinism’.61 Abdullah’s failure to take Medina contributed to the development of a dismissive attitude towards him amongst many British officials, who described him as not just ‘indolent’ but ‘apathetic’.62 These opinions became characteristic of British attitudes towards Abdullah for many years to come. Various explanations can be cited for the dramatic decline of Abdullah’s reputation. The evidence suggests that he relied on McMahon’s vague promises and that he assumed the Syrian throne was guaranteed after the war.63 This explains why there were suggestions that Abdullah sought to extend Hashemite interests towards the Yemen. During 1917 and 1918, Abdullah was preoccupied with a territorial dispute with the Amir of the Khurma oasis on the Hejaz-Nejd border.64 This conflict derived from the Khurma Amir’s conversion to Wahhabism in 1914 and subsequent Hashemite efforts to subdue him. A succession of abortive Hashemite campaigns compelled the Amir to turn to Ibn Saud for support. Ibn Saud responded by dispatching to the oasis a force of Ikhwan (a religious militia used by Ibn Saud to conquer Arabia), which defeated a superior force under Abdullah at the battle of Turaba in May 1919.65 Abdullah’s defeat at Turaba deeply undermined his political aspirations in Arabia for years to come. As a result of this debacle, King Husayn forced Amir Abdullah into internal exile in Taif in the Hejaz. Amir Faisal replaced his brother as the Hashemite representative to the Allied Powers, a reward for his successful command of the

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Northern Arab army, which fought the Ottomans in the Hejaz and Syria during the revolt. Abdullah subsequently blamed his fall from grace on his father. As C. E. Vickery, the British agent in Jedda, noted in a wide-ranging interview with Abdullah in March 1920, Abdullah declined Faisal’s overtures to become his foreign minister in Damascus because of his jealousy and other ambitions.66 The fiasco at Khurma also harmed Hashemite relations with the British. The conflict almost resulted in war between Britain’s two most important allies in Arabia.67 King Husayn was widely regarded by the British as recalcitrant, which had dramatic, long-term consequences for the Hashemites because the British came to regard Ibn Saud as their most important ally in Arabia. Indeed, Husayn’s fall from favour led some British officials to believe that Husayn should abdicate in favour of one of his sons. This finally occurred in 1924 when Husayn’s eldest son Amir Ali briefly replaced him as King of the Hejaz. Abdullah’s standing with the British can be contrasted with that of Faisal, who received widespread support in London. Faisal benefited from the personal contacts he was able to establish in London in 1918 and 1919, whereas only a handful of British representatives, such as T. E. Lawrence and Sir Mark Sykes, were acquainted with Abdullah.68 Decision makers in London showed very little enthusiasm for Abdullah; many were critical of his wartime performance and doubtful of his suitability to assume the crown of either Iraq or Syria. These wartime impressions of Abdullah and Faisal came to dominate British attitudes towards the Hashemite amirs following the war. The future status of Abdullah and Faisal was inextricably linked to the interests of the British and the French in Palestine and Syria. This was clearly shown in September 1918, when the allies adopted a temporary plan for the division of Palestine and Syria, called the Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA). According to this scheme, the British were responsible for the administration of Palestine (OETA South), the French controlled the littoral of Syria (OETA West) and Faisal, who had entered Damascus on 1 October 1918, was in charge of administering the interior of Syria, including Transjordan (OETA East).

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The Postwar Settlement in the Middle East The British government’s assurances to the Hashemites, and the agreement with the French during the war, were politically expedient. By 1918, British officials decided that the political and strategic foundations of policy in the Middle East need not be fettered by these contradictory guarantees. Policy makers in London were determined to revoke the SykesPicot Agreement, which Lord Curzon described as ‘a fancy sketch to suit a situation that had not arisen nor was likely to arise’ and was now regarded as a menace ‘which has been hanging like a millstone round our necks ever since’.69 In March 1918, an Eastern Committee, chaired by Curzon, had been established to determine the future of British policy in the Middle East.70 Curzon and the members of the Eastern Committee sought to curtail French interests in the Levant on the grounds that they had barely contributed to the regional war effort. The committee also rejected the international administration of Palestine and the creation of a single Arab state under the sovereignty of King Husayn.71 Instead, Curzon and his colleagues argued in favour of Britain assuming a mandate over Palestine, and proposed that negotiations should be opened with the French with a view to cancelling the Sykes-Picot Agreement.72 Although the French had played no meaningful role in the war in the Middle East, the British continued to recognise French interests because they wanted to uphold the alliance with the French in Europe, and the British could not afford to occupy Syria and Lebanon. Amir Faisal was rewarded for his role in the war when the British nominated him King of Syria in March 1920. The hopes of the Hashemites were based on the assumption that the British would support them in their dynastic aggrandisement. However, this premise was ill founded in the case of Syria, where Faisal’s regime proved to be short-lived following the defeat of his army by the French at the battle of Maysolun on 24 July 1920. The postwar peace terms inaugurated a new phase of Western imperialism in the Middle East and considerably deflated Hashemite plans to create an Arab kingdom. In April 1919, the peace conference approved

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Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, which introduced the novel, but nebulous, concept of a ‘mandate’.73 The Covenant applied to former Ottoman dependencies, including Mesopotamia (part of contemporary Iraq), Syria, Palestine and Lebanon, ‘which are inhabited by peoples not yet able to stand by themselves under the strenuous conditions of the modern world’. In these territories, ‘there should be applied the principle that the well-being and development of such peoples form a sacred trust of civilisation and that security for the performance of this trust should be embodied in this Covenant’. The ‘tutelage’ of such peoples should be entrusted to advanced nations and this ‘should be exercised by them as mandatories on behalf of the League’. The Covenant also stated that the role of the mandatory was to prepare these territories for independence, and that ‘the wishes of these communities must be a principal consideration in the selection of the Mandatory’. Palestine was a special case, however, because Article 2 of the mandate spoke about the development of self-governing institutions instead of independence. This reflected the fundamentally flawed nature of the Palestine mandate, which committed the British to reconciling the interests of the Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs. The Levant was divided between the British and French at the San Remo Conference in April 1920. France was awarded a mandate over Lebanon and Syria, whilst the British took control of Mesopotamia, Palestine and Transjordan.74 In reality, the mandate was little more than a cloak for the expansion of Western imperialism in the Middle East. The creation of Britain’s ‘undeclared empire in the Middle East’ occurred with no real reference to the wishes of the populations of Iraq, Palestine or Transjordan, and was in fact based on an updated form of imperialism ostensibly influenced by the Wilsonian concept of self-determination.

Abdullah’s Trajectory from the Hejaz to Transjordan The establishment of a Hashemite kingdom east of the Jordan was accidental, resulting from the political and strategic circumstances that prevailed in the region after the First World War. Abdullah intended to use his arrival in Transjordan as a stepping stone towards

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the expansion of Hashemite interests beyond the Hejaz; there is little indication that he intended to remain in the territory for long. In the aftermath of the war, Abdullah’s future remained uncertain. In March 1920, two parallel congresses met in Damascus, one of which demanded independence for Syria.75 A second congress took place on the initiative of Iraqi military officers who called for Iraqi independence and for Abdullah to become King of Iraq.76 Abdullah shared his aspirations in a series of interviews with C. E. Vickery, the British agent in Jedda. Abdullah said he would accept the throne of Iraq if the British guaranteed support and aid for twenty years.77 Initially, Abdullah had been earmarked for the Iraqi throne and had received the tacit support of Viscount Allenby, the High Commissioner for Egypt.78 Nonetheless, his candidacy met implacable opposition from senior officials in the India Office, especially Arnold Wilson and Sir Percy Cox, who considered his nomination to be intolerable. In London, Faisal was seen as a far more promising candidate to rule Iraq.79 During the Ottoman era, Transjordan was divided between the vilayets (provinces) of Syria and the Hejaz. Due to its small population and lack of resources, Transjordan remained on the margins of the Ottoman Empire. Transjordan would undoubtedly have remained irrelevant had it not been for the hajj caravans that traversed it.80 Between 1900 and 1908, the Ottoman government built the Hejaz railway between Damascus and Medina. The Ottomans sought to protect the railway by constructing a series of outposts along it, and by paying the local tribes to prevent them from attacking the railway and the hajjis.81 During the Arab Revolt the Transjordanian population, and especially the tribes, was at best ambivalent towards the Hashemites. In the spring of 1918, the British attempted to seize Amman in a series of abortive raids launched from Palestine that sought to interdict the railway.82 Transjordan was only conquered after the defeat of the Ottoman army in Syria the following autumn. The British military occupation of Transjordan lasted until November 1919, when British forces withdrew from Syria. The population of Transjordan, estimates of whose population ranged from 230,000 to 350,000, was mainly organised along tribal

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lines.83 Following the withdrawal of British forces in late 1919, however, public security was undermined, with outbreaks of violence against the Zionist programme in Palestine.84 Although Transjordan formed part of Faisal’s Arab kingdom, its population remained uninterested in events in Damascus.85 During this brief interregnum, Faisal, preoccupied with European diplomacy, administered the territory only loosely. The absence of direct government in Transjordan left Palestine vulnerable to tribal raiding.86 As part of a wider propaganda campaign to spread their influence in the region,87 the French tried to take advantage of unrest to persuade the Christian communities in the Transjordanian towns such as Kerak, Madaba and Salt to send petitions to Jerusalem calling for their occupation.88 Meanwhile, prominent shaikhs, such as Mithqal al-Faiz and Mashur al-Faiz of the Beni Saqr, approached the French due to their dissatisfaction with Faisal’s rule,89 and to secure their position should the French enter Transjordan.90 The dearth of public security east of the River Jordan caused some concern to the British, and was compounded by uneasy relations with the French in Syria.91 In late 1919, Colonel Richard Meinertzhagen, the Chief Political Officer in Palestine, addressed the future administration of Transjordan. Meinertzhagen assumed the region would continue to be administered by the British through an Arab administrator based in Damascus.92 However, the fall of Faisal’s regime in July 1920 precluded such an arrangement. The combination of a lack of security in Transjordan, and local fears that the French might extend their influence south, led many shaikhs to demand immediate British occupation.93 Sir Herbert Samuel, High Commissioner for Palestine from 1 July 1920, sought to take advantage of these demands. Samuel persistently asserted that the occupation of Transjordan could easily be effected, arguing, ‘We shall be making a grave error of policy if we do not now include Transjordan in Palestine’.94 This perspective was further reinforced by Samuel’s visit to Salt in August 1920, when many shaikhs demanded British occupation.95 Samuel’s insistence that the east bank of the Jordan be occupied raised suspicions within the Foreign Office and War Office that he had the ulterior motive of including Transjordan within the Jewish

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National Home.96 The Foreign Office’s questioning of the veracity of Samuel’s reports was almost certainly motivated by his being a wellknown supporter of the Zionist movement.97 Samuel’s proposals led Foreign Office officials to note that he was ‘very anxious for us to occupy Transjordan at any cost’,98 and that he ‘avail[ed] himself of every pretext for sending troops to Transjordan’.99 British General Headquarters in Cairo concurred that the occupation of Transjordan would simplify the problem of tribal raiding in Palestine and that the presence of British imperial forces would stabilise the situation on the east bank, and that this could be achieved without reinforcements.100 Nonetheless, the War Office rejected Samuel’s attempts to include Transjordan in Palestine because it was under considerable pressure from the Treasury to cut the garrison in Palestine to five thousand men to reduce costs.101 Rejecting the deployment of troops to Transjordan, the Foreign Office instead proposed that a handful of political officers be assigned provided no military escorts were needed for their safety.102 Rather than establishing direct British administration over Transjordan, as Samuel and many shaikhs had demanded, six officers were dispatched to establish three local governments in Ajlun, Salt and Kerak.103 In October 1920, a seventh officer, Frederick Peake, was ordered to take command of a locally recruited gendarmerie, and he remained in Transjordan as commander of the renamed Arab Legion until 1939.104 Alec Kirkbride was one of the officers sent to Transjordan in 1920, and the tenuous nature of his position highlights the limitations imposed on these officers. Kirkbride, who had served with T. E. Lawrence during the Arab Revolt, was dispatched to Kerak in southern Transjordan to advise the self-styled ‘National Government of Moab’ in establishing local government, collecting taxes and enforcing law and order.105 In practice, Kirkbride’s influence was very limited given that his only weapons were ‘influence’ and ‘advice’.106 As Yoav Alon argues, the British had to contend with the existing socio-political tribal order that dominated the territory.107 Nonetheless, the deployment of these officers marked the beginning of Britain’s imperial control over Transjordan, and it conformed to the maxim ‘Informal control if possible, formal control if necessary’. The dispatch of a handful of political

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officers, as opposed to a de facto occupation, allowed the British to exert control over Transjordan ‘on the cheap’. The limited impact of these officers led General Congreve, the General Officer Commanding of the Egyptian Expeditionary Force, to argue that without troops the officers would remain powerless. For Congreve, dispatching the officers was little more than a half measure with very little chance of success, and that failure would be detrimental to Britain’s prestige. He proposed two alternatives: dispatch troops or surrender the mandate to another power, such as the French.108 Abdullah’s exile, which he spent pursuing his dynastic ambitions in Mesopotamia, was curtailed when his father invited him to Cairo in the spring of 1920 to discuss recent events in the region.109 Viscount Allenby, the High Commissioner in Egypt, was concerned that inviting Abdullah to Cairo might be regarded as supporting his ambitions in Mesopotamia.110 Abdullah’s visit to Cairo was largely ceremonial, but he sought to raise political questions, and he presented Allenby with two memoranda from his father stating that he repudiated Faisal as his representative and appointed Abdullah in his stead.111 Nonetheless, Abdullah’s attempts to enter into negotiations with Allenby were politely rebuffed.112 After his return from Cairo, Abdullah’s relations with his father reached their nadir following a dispute concerning quarantine regulations in the Hejaz. The immediate result of King Husayn’s obstinacy was that Abdullah resigned his official position as the Foreign Minister of the Hejaz.113 The combination of Abdullah’s awkward relations with his father and his failure to accede to the Iraqi throne seemed to end his dynastic aspirations. Therefore, Abdullah had little choice but to leave the Hejaz. Prior to his departure, Vickery reported that King Husayn intended to send one of his sons to Syria, and that Abdullah was unwilling to take responsibility for this mission.114 Many scholars argue that Abdullah left the Hejaz in the autumn of 1920 with the intention of going to Syria to lead a revolt against the French in response to their removal of Faisal from Damascus in July 1920.115 There is, however, no evidence that the brothers were acting in unison. Taking into consideration the awkward relations between

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them, it seems most unlikely that Abdullah had any intention of taking revenge on Faisal’s behalf.116 Abdullah sought an alternative for his failed attempts to gain the Iraqi throne, and his departure to Transjordan was a stepping stone in that direction, but there is no indication that Abdullah had a fixed plan apart from getting away from his father, although he may have intended to exert pressure on the British and French in order to obtain ill-defined political concessions. Prior to Abdullah’s arrival in Transjordan at the end of October 1920, British officials were uncertain about his objectives.117 During 1920, the British viewed Transjordan as a separate entity from the Damascus state now under French control. Once it became clear that Abdullah was going to Transjordan, Sir Herbert Samuel told the political officers in Transjordan that it would impossible to forestall his journey, and that local agitation might necessitate reconsideration of the action to be taken. Samuel instructed the officers to make every effort to ensure public security, on the assumption that their withdrawal would be detrimental to British strategic interests in Palestine and Transjordan.118 Abdullah arrived in Ma’an in southern Transjordan on 21 November 1920 with a lightly armed force variously described as numbering a few hundred to several thousand men.119 In light of the view that Transjordan would become an Arab state, British policy on Transjordan was to allow matters to shape themselves via the skeleton administrative system that had been established by the handful of political officers. There was still overwhelming opposition to the dispatch of forces, and the Foreign Office hoped that the political officers would be able to use their influence to keep the situation under control.120 Abdullah arrived in a territory whose political situation was in a state of flux, and whose future had yet to be determined.121 The stated reason for his arrival in Transjordan was to prepare for his invasion of Syria.122 Abdullah’s first three months there were dedicated to the development of ties with the shaikhs of the region123 and with Syrian and Transjordanian nationalists who had been exiled from Syria following Faisal’s defeat.124 It is open to question just how much interest Transjordan notables, especially the tribal shaikhs, had in Abdullah.

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They may not have wished to offend the possible future ruler of the territory by refusing to meet him.125 Abdullah also used these months in Ma’an to advance the Sharifian cause in Transjordan by sending his brother Amir Ali north to Amman to gauge local support.126 Transjordan also became the focus of anti-French intrigue. Abdullah sought to enlist the notables for an anti-French movement.127 It was widely believed in Transjordan and Syria that the British were supporting the Sharifian movement against the French in Syria.128 This impression gained further credibility after Abdullah’s arrival in Amman on 2 March 1921 accompanied by the shaikhs of Kerak, Shobak and Amman.129 The notion that the British were supporting Hashemite aspirations in Syria against the French, although untrue,130 complicated British dealings with the French in Syria131 and can be regarded as the continuation of Anglo-French friction over the powers’ respective aims in the region.132 Indeed, the British consul in Beirut reported that the French in Syria believed that Samuel could have prevented the movement of Sharifian forces but chose not to because he preferred that Abdullah be free to take action in Syria rather than against Zionism in Palestine.133 Samuel, however, believed that the lack of security forces east of the River Jordan would make it impossible to stop an Arab incursion in Syria.134 The British consul in Damascus believed that if there was an incursion, French troops stationed in Dera’a on the SyrianTransjordanian border would have defeated an Arab force.135 In view of Abdullah’s paltry army at this time, it is more than likely that it would have suffered the same fate as Faisal’s in July 1920.136 In spite of Abdullah’s presence in Transjordan, the political situation there continued to be unsettled due to the lack of security forces.137 This state of uncertainty gave Samuel a further pretext to promote the military occupation of Transjordan as the only way to prevent Abdullah invading Syria.138 Samuel rejected the direct administration of Transjordan, but he maintained that the two banks of the Jordan were inextricably linked, and that unrest on the east bank would inevitably impinge on the security situation in Palestine, requiring the garrison to be retained at an expensively high level. Samuel suggested that the presence of five hundred troops in Amman could assure the

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security of Palestine’s eastern boundary, thereby allowing a smaller Palestine garrison.139 Abdullah’s presence in Transjordan forced the British to reassess their policy concerning the future of Transjordan. The territory formed part of the area designated for an Arab state by Sir Henry McMahon in 1915–16, but its marginal economic importance and ill-defined boundaries meant that its political status remained uncertain. Transjordan’s incorporation into Britain’s informal Middle East empire occurred when Abdullah and the Colonial Secretary, Winston Churchill, met in Jerusalem in April 1921.

Financial Constraints on British Interests in Palestine and Transjordan It is essential to understand Britain’s grand strategy in the reordering of the region. Control of Palestine and Transjordan, as I discussed above, was part of a massive extension of Britain’s imperial influence over much of the Middle East, as remarkable as the sudden acquisition of the Indian and tropical empires in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.140 But, while the strategic concerns that focused on the Suez Canal and the desert air route to India were paramount, financial limitations were critical in deciding policy, especially for at least a decade after the First World War. The War Office was sceptical of the Palestine mandate’s strategic value. Field Marshal Sir Henry Wilson, the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), initially argued that the occupation of Palestine served no strategic purposes since it was unnecessary for the defence of the Suez Canal.141 In 1923, however, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID), the body responsible for determining British imperial policy until 1939, conducted a detailed survey of British interests in Palestine and Transjordan that challenged this assertion.142 The strategic concern, however, had to be balanced with budgetary ones, particularly the new concept of the ‘Ten-Year Rule’, introduced in August 1919 and based on the assumption that the Empire would not be engaged in a major war in the next ten years, and that no expeditionary force would be necessary.143 In 1922, the Committee

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on National Expenditure (known as the Geddes Committee) recommended drastic cuts in expenditure on the army, from £97 million to £60.5 million, and a reduction in the army’s establishment, from 201,000 to 153,000.144 These reductions were required in spite of the considerable expansion of Great Britain’s commitments in the Middle East, including Palestine, which the War Office regarded as a drain on its dwindling resources. The reduction of the army in the Middle East meant that the British were vulnerable to insurrections in the region, such as those that occurred in Iraq and Palestine.145 One of the ways to reduce troop commitment was to recruit and train locally. And thus was born the more enduring pillar of the Transjordanian state and British-Jordanian cooperation. The British regarded Transjordan as a buffer zone protecting Palestine’s eastern frontier against tribal raiding.146 In order to secure Transjordan against raiding and to maintain law and order, the British established a reserve security force of locals under the command of Frederick Peake. It was renamed the Arab Legion in 1923.147 The raising of a gendarmerie was a cost-effective measure, contributing to the reduction of the Palestine garrison from 7,000 in 1921 to 3,550 in 1923. By 1929, the security forces in Palestine and Transjordan, including the police, numbered 3,480 men, which included only 227 British military personnel.148 This was a clear example of the extension of Britain’s imperial interests on the cheap and reflected the constant tension between limiting the financial burden of the Empire in the Palestine-Transjordan area and financing its defence.149 In April 1922, military control of Palestine and Transjordan was transferred from the War Office to the Air Ministry in order to achieve the overriding objective of cutting the cost of defending the region.150 The adoption of a policy known as ‘air control’—the replacement of ground forces by a small number of aircraft and armoured cars—was determined primarily by budgeting restrictions imposed by the Geddes Committee and by the desire to give the newly formed Royal Air Force (RAF) a role.151 Budget considerations also led to the funnelling of Palestine and Transjordan issues into one department, engendering bureaucratic rivalry. Following the First World War, responsibility for British

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policy in the Middle East was divided between no fewer than four Whitehall departments: the Foreign Office, the Colonial Office, the India Office and the War Office. The centralisation of policy making in the Middle East was considered in Whitehall in order to streamline operations in the region.152 Lord Curzon, the Foreign Secretary, argued that the Colonial Office was unsuited to running such an assignment, on the grounds that its work in Africa bore little resemblance to the situation in the Middle East.153 Curzon’s objections were no doubt influenced by the desire to prevent any diminution of the Foreign Office’s control over policy making in much of the region. Edwin Montagu, the Secretary of State for India, was also opposed to the Colonial Office directing Middle East policy since he believed it would give the impression that the British sought to annex these territories.154 The Cabinet rejected the argument that the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office should have a monopoly over the Middle East,155 and instead supported the establishment of a new Middle East Department in the Colonial Office. On 1 March 1921, responsibility for Iraq and Palestine, including Transjordan, was transferred from the Foreign Office to the Colonial Office, with the Air Ministry responsible for defence.156 In practice, this policy reinforced the bureaucratic divisions in Whitehall that characterised British policy in the Middle East. The Colonial and Foreign Office’s policies were fundamentally at odds with each other, which was inimical to a unified policy. The Colonial Office had limited experience of the conditions in the Middle East, but was responsible for implementing the mandate, whereas the Foreign Office was concerned with the international ramifications of this policy. These divisions led inevitably to confusion, which played into the hands of the Arabs and Zionists, and other powers such as Italy, which sought to undermine British influence in the region.

Abdullah’s Fait Accompli and the Birth of Transjordan By the autumn of 1920, it had become urgent to establish the basis of British policy in the Middle East. Winston Churchill, the Colonial

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Secretary, proposed that a conference be held in Cairo in March 1921 to determine a new policy for the Middle East.157 Churchill and his advisors agreed that a policy for the region should be based on several assumptions. First, Faisal, not Abdullah, should become King of Iraq in compensation for losing the Syrian throne. Second, an Arab state should be formed in Transjordan under the control of one of the Hashemite amirs. Third, Abdullah had to be prevented from invading Syria. Fourth, Britain’s wartime commitments to the Hashemites had to be met to preserve British prestige.158 Abdullah’s presence in Transjordan presented the British with a fait accompli. During the conference’s deliberations, Herbert Samuel agreed that Transjordan should be administered on different lines from Palestine, but questioned the desirability of appointing Abdullah as ruler because he posed a threat to Anglo-French relations.159 Appointing Abdullah in order to prevent him from invading Syria was questioned by numerous participants at the conference, including Colonel Sir Wyndham Deedes (Civil Secretary of the government of Palestine) and T. E. Lawrence, Churchill’s personal advisor on the Middle East, who argued that ‘the ideal would be a person who was not too powerful, and who was not an inhabitant of Trans-Jordania, but who relied on His Majesty’s Government for the retention of his office’.160 Lawrence’s sentiments reflected British views of Abdullah’s regime in Transjordan. Churchill, however, stressed that there was no alternative to Abdullah, and he proposed that Transjordan should be occupied by imperial troops to secure a settled government. Churchill hoped that tribal raiding could be brought under control, allowing for a further reduction in the Palestine garrison, which had already been reduced from twenty-five thousand to seven thousand. Churchill persuasively argued that occupying Transjordan would lead to a decline in intrigue against the French authorities in Syria, and that the Hejaz railway could be reopened to pilgrims making the journey to Mecca.161 Churchill’s views were based on the assumption that an agreement could be reached with Abdullah and that his rule in Amman would complement Faisal’s in Baghdad. T. E. Lawrence had a significant influence on the development of the ‘Sharifian solution’, a British policy of friendship and cooperation with the Hashemites.162

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Churchill’s assumptions were challenged in London, where concern was raised about how the French would react to Abdullah’s appointment. Members of the cabinet supported the presence of a small garrison in Transjordan and doubted that Transjordan would be big enough for Abdullah.163 Churchill responded by reiterating that while ‘we do not expect or particularly desire Abdullah himself to undertake governorship’, his friendship was necessary to prevent him from causing trouble in Syria. Churchill also stressed that a stable government in Transjordan was a precondition for reducing the size of the Palestine garrison.164 Financial considerations and the desire to maintain amicable relations with the French were the two factors that influenced the cabinet and the participants at the Cairo conference.165 One of the most significant resolutions of the conference was that Transjordan would constitute an Arab province of Palestine under an Arab governor, responsible to the High Commissioner for Palestine.166 Relations between the British and Abdullah were finally determined following the Cairo conference during three meetings Churchill held with the Amir in Jerusalem on 28–30 March 1921. In their first meeting, Churchill informed Abdullah that the British intended to form an Amirate in Transjordan with an Arab governor responsible to the High Commissioner. Churchill stressed that Transjordan would not be included in the administrative system of Palestine, and therefore the Zionist clauses in the mandate would not apply. In response, Abdullah suggested that Palestine and Transjordan should have one Amir, whose relations with the High Commissioner would be the same as Faisal’s with his counterpart in Baghdad. This was the first time Abdullah proposed that his nascent kingdom in Transjordan should also include Palestine, indicating that his ambitions were not limited to Syria.167 During the second meeting, Churchill explained to Abdullah that he would be expected to recognise British control over his government and to abstain from anti-French agitation. In the third meeting, Churchill laid down the terms being offered to Abdullah, who agreed to reside in Amman for six months to prepare the way for an Arab governor. He also agreed to be advised by a British political officer, who would assist in restoring order and establishing a Western-style financial system.

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Abdullah’s request that there be no garrison was granted, but in return he guaranteed there would be no anti-French and anti-Zionist subversion, and that he would assist in the opening of the Hejaz railway and the desert air route to Baghdad.168 Churchill insisted that Abdullah be given ‘a free hand’, and he was advanced £5,000 to cover his personal expenses during this probationary period.169 Churchill’s talks with Abdullah have been a source of contention.170 One area of dispute concerns a vague comment about the future of Syria. Churchill alluded to the possibility that in the future the French might reconsider their opposition to a Hashemite King of Syria. Churchill stressed this could only occur if Abdullah halted his anti-French activities. The Palestinian nationalist Auni Abd al-Hadi, who accompanied the Amir to Jerusalem, maintains that Abdullah understood these comments to mean that the British would support his candidacy for the Syrian throne.171 George Antonius contends that ‘what Churchill did in fact do was . . . to trick Abdullah into remaining in Amman as ruler of Transjordan on the promise of a real settlement which was never realised’.172 The contention that Churchill tricked Abdullah does not stand up to critical scrutiny because the former was in no position to make a specific promise, and because the Amir had little choice but to remain in Transjordan. Nevertheless, Abdullah believed that assurances had been given, and he referred to them in future correspondence with Churchill.173 Churchill’s determination that Abdullah should run an administration was disingenuous given that British support was conditional on his keeping his Syrian ambitions under control. Nonetheless, the Jerusalem talks established relations between Abdullah and the British on an informal basis. Abdullah agreed to work with the British and to act as a mediator between them and the population of Transjordan. The Jerusalem talks were determined by financial considerations; an example of empire on the cheap.

‘Indirect Rule’: Informal Empire in Transjordan The system of government that was established in Transjordan during the 1920s has received very little scholarly attention in comparison

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with those of Egypt, Iraq or Palestine. In practice, the administration of Transjordan was entirely distinct from Palestine. The objective of British policy in Palestine was to implement the Balfour Declaration and the development of the Jewish National Home, rather than to establish a representative government.174 In contrast with the situation in Iraq, where the duty of the mandatory was to advise and assist the administration, in Palestine the mandatory was sovereign, since powers of legislation and administration were conferred upon it.175 Following the establishment of an autonomous Arab government under Abdullah, the Colonial Office acknowledged that Transjordan was exempt from having to accommodate Jewish immigrants.176 Abdullah’s appointment led to the establishment of an indirect form of imperial control whereby Abdullah nominally controlled a local administration with the assistance of the Chief British Representative (retitled Resident from 1928) and the commander of the local defence forces, who reported to the High Commissioner in Jerusalem.177 In practice, this meant that the British operated a dual mandate in Palestine and Transjordan; Palestine was directly ruled by the British, whereas in Transjordan the local government was semi-autonomous under the authority of the High Commissioner. In 1939 Sir Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner for Palestine, who had decades of experience of imperial rule in the Sudan and Tanganyika (Tanzania), outlined the personal requirements the Resident and his deputy needed to possess. These included a good knowledge of spoken and written Arabic, alongside the qualities of tact, judgement, patience and a personality likely to promote a harmonious relationship with Abdullah, his ministers and the population.178 Glen Balfour-Paul sums up the subtle nature of informal influence observing that ‘the boundary between offering advice and enforcing it may have been as narrow as a vocal inflection’.179 Transjordan during the mandate was the epitome of inexpensive, effective interference in an indigenous political system. In theory, the mandate for Palestine included Transjordan, and the High Commissioner was the representative of the British government in the country.180 In practice, however, the Resident was delegated significant powers of interference and acted as the main conduit with Abdullah and

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the local government. British influence in Transjordan was defined by several characteristics, including the presence of a comparatively small number of officials responsible for advising Abdullah and running the administration. During the 1920s and 1930s, the number of British officials, including the Resident and the senior officers in the Arab Legion, rarely exceeded twenty men.181 In contrast, the British presence in Palestine numbered 268 British officials in 1921 and increased to 397 in 1929.182 Similarly, in Egypt in 1919 there were 1,600 British officials, declining to 575 in 1927 and 400 by 1945.183 The most significant feature of British influence in Transjordan was a remarkable degree of continuity in the senior British officials. Between 1924 and 1946, when Transjordan received her nominal independence, only two Residents served in Amman. Colonel Sir Henry Cox was Resident between 1924 and 1939, and his successor Sir Alec Kirkbride held the position between 1939 and 1946, going on to serve as Minister between 1946 and 1951. Kirkbride and John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha) were the two most influential British officials in Transjordan. Kirkbride’s career in the Middle East was remarkable. He served with T. E. Lawrence during the Arab Revolt, and between 1920 and 1939, he worked only in Palestine and Transjordan. Roger Louis underestimates Kirkbride’s ability by describing him as having a ‘dour manner in his duties’, and having ‘acquired the reputation of a solid if somewhat unimaginative latter-day proconsul’.184 In fact, Kirkbride’s talent was probably wasted in Transjordan, but he was held in high regard in London for his sound political judgement.185 Glubb Pasha’s unrivalled expertise on the politics of Arabia made him a living legend.186 After serving in France during the First World War, Glubb was posted to Iraq in 1920 and remained there until 1930. He was sent to Transjordan in 1930 to raise the Desert Patrol, a branch of the Arab Legion that played a central role in the pacification of the desert tribes. Glubb was very successful in expanding the authority of the state during the 1930s, but his influence grew following his appointment as commander of the Arab Legion in 1939. Hugh Foot, Kirkbride’s deputy in Amman during the Second World War, observed that Glubb was a great enthusiast who penned numerous memoranda covering a wide range of political issues which exceeded

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his military responsibilities.187 Glubb and Kirkbride were very different in how they saw their roles, but they were equally influential in articulating Abdullah’s views in London. Yoav Alon is correct in arguing that the small number of British officials in Transjordan was a strength rather than a weakness because it gave limited fuel to nationalist opposition.188 Whereas there was a remarkable degree of continuity in the British officials who served in Transjordan, the local administration was dominated by foreigners from Palestine or Syria, or by minorities like the small Circassian population, whose forefathers had fled Russia in the mid- to late nineteenth century. Abdullah relied on foreigners and minorities to run the administration for two reasons. First, the country had a very small educated population capable of running the bureaucracy, although the number of Transjordanians entering the civil service did increase, and by 1938 out of total staff of 927, 707 were locally recruited.189 Second, Abdullah’s reliance on a cadre of expatriate ‘king’s men’ was based on his desire to exclude the local sources of power from the government. Instead, it was run by individuals whose primary loyalty and status was defined by their relationship with Abdullah.190 Between 1939 and 1951, the politics of the country was dominated by the rivalry between Samir al-Rifai and Tawfiq Abul Huda. The latter originated in Palestine and became Prime Minister on three separate occasions during these crucial years.191 In theory, Transjordan was a constitutional monarchy, but in practice Abdullah was an absolute head of state with the power to appoint and dismiss ministers, summon and dissolve the bicameral legislature and issue decrees.192 Nonetheless, following the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948–49, the absolutist nature of Abdullah’s rule diminished, and by the time of his murder in July 1951, he had been forced to concede significant powers to his government. The British were content for Abdullah to administer the country so long as their interests were not impinged. Nonetheless, there were sources of tension, such as Abdullah’s irredentist claims in the Hejaz, his dealings with the Zionists, and his aspirations in Palestine and Syria. Kirkbride argued that at the beginning of the mandate the British were too busy establishing a civil administration in Palestine

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‘to be bothered’ about the remote and undeveloped hinterland which lay east of the Jordan.193 Kirkbride’s observation actually applied to most of the mandatory era, during which senior officials in London and Jerusalem were preoccupied with developments in Palestine and their impact on Britain’s prestige in the Middle East. In 1942, William Tripe, an administrative officer serving in Tanganyika, was sent to Transjordan to assess how the system of government in Transjordan could be applied in British-occupied Cyrenaica (part of contemporary Libya). Tripe concluded that the political development of Transjordan had been a success because it had succeeded in ‘bringing happiness and a measure of material progress to the people’.194 Glubb argued that Transjordan was the only success among the Middle East mandates, and in May 1943, he wrote a long memorandum in which he extolled the virtues of Transjordan’s political system. Glubb believed that Transjordan was a comparative success because the population never rebelled against the mandatory, which made it the only state in the region not garrisoned by British troops. Glubb also considered Transjordan a success because it had not been given independence after the First World War, but instead instilled with a constitution that split the difference between ‘Eastern despotism and British democracy—a compromise which has functioned in an almost ideal manner’. In Transjordan, British ‘influence, lightly and tactfully applied, still controls the country’.195 Glubb contended that the system worked for several reasons. The British exerted close financial control over Transjordan’s finances because of the country’s abject poverty. Glubb argued that the British exercised their right of interference with extreme moderation, but he was critical of London’s failure to acknowledge the creation of a successful constitutional model. This failure led Abdullah to believe that he was ‘the object of scorn and condescension’ because he had not achieved ‘the Iraqi model’ of constitutional development. Glubb’s argument that Transjordan had been an ‘almost unqualified success’ was tempered by London’s consistent failure to devote more money to Transjordan’s economic and social development. Between 1924 and 1939, the budget was dominated by the cost of internal security, which accounted for more than 30 per cent of the budget, but financial

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limitations caused by the Great Depression precluded expenditure on Transjordan’s economic development.196

The Jerusalem Agreement and Its Shortcomings Following Abdullah’s appointment in Amman, the political situation in Transjordan was characterised by continued turmoil and anti-French propaganda.197 Many of the reports by Albert Abramson, who served briefly as Chief British Representative in Amman, pointed to a dire administrative situation, in which Abdullah showed no real interest in running the country. In reality, Abdullah had few supporters in the Palestine government. Sir Herbert Samuel contended that Abdullah had failed to impose order on the population and that he was more concerned with furthering his ambitions in Syria than with governing Transjordan.198 Wyndham Deedes, the Civil Secretary of the Palestine government, described Abdullah’s interest in the administration of Transjordan as ‘fleeting’ and ‘languid’ but noted that he did have his uses, including settling tribal disputes and curbing the ambitions of his Syrian entourage.199 The presence of these Syrians led one Foreign Office official to observe, ‘Abdullah . . . has surrounded himself with a gang of discontented, idle and incompetent Syrians whose sole idea is a war of revenge against the French’.200 The leading shaikhs of Transjordan also regarded the Syrians as a threat to their influence and demanded the Syrians’ removal.201 The security situation in Transjordan reached its nadir on 23 June 1921, following an attempt to murder General Henri Gouraud, the French High Commissioner of Syria. Wyndham Deedes accused Abdullah of being complicit in the attempt and criticised the Amir for failing to control his subordinates. Deedes argued that Abdullah’s lack of interest in the affairs of government demonstrated his unfitness to head the administration or to assume its responsibilities. Deedes also maintained that Abdullah would feel ‘absolved from his obligation . . . and that his zeal decreases proportionally to the decrease in the number of days that remain’.202 Samuel absolved Abdullah of any responsibility for either the attempt to assassinate Gouraud or the anti-French activities of his

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Syrian entourage, and he contradicted French claims to that effect.203 The French remained suspicious of British intentions and tried to convince Samuel of Abdullah’s role in fomenting propaganda against them.204 In response, Samuel noted Abdullah’s loyalty to the commitment he made to Churchill and said that he could not be held responsible for those who claimed to act in his name.205 The probationary period was widely regarded as a failure,206 leading the secretariat in Jerusalem to argue that the only solution was to remove Abdullah and his Syrian entourage.207 Albert Abramson reinforced this argument when he reported that Abdullah’s ‘inability to govern, and the activities of his Syrian advisors, have succeeded in alienating the majority of the people’.208 Samuel concurred, saying that ‘although an attractive personality and of honourable character, he is not a competent administrator’.209 Samuel proposed that Abdullah be removed while he was on an official visit to London, and that he be replaced with his youngest brother, Amir Zeid, who would act as the titular head of the administration.210 The consensus amongst British officials in Palestine was that Abdullah’s presence in Transjordan was a waste of money. Hubert Young of the Colonial Office believed that expectations of Abdullah’s ability to rule effectively were low, although he acknowledged that British plans for Transjordan were still at the embryonic stage. Sir John Shuckburgh, head of the Colonial Office’s Middle East Department, made a similar point: ‘I do not think we need to trouble ourselves unduly over the inefficiency of Abdullah’s administration, so long as he fulfils our main object by keeping the peace with his neighbours. If we want efficient administration we should have to pay for it, and that we cannot afford to do.’211 Churchill rejected proposals to remove Abdullah on the grounds that it was unlikely he would leave without installing a compliant stand-in. Churchill also believed that Sharifian rule in Transjordan would preclude Zionist penetration of the country, and his insistence on retaining the status quo assured Abdullah’s position in a territory in which he had little interest.212 The agreement that had been reached between the Amir and Churchill in Jerusalem in March 1921 was tacitly allowed to continue

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until Abdullah was invited to London in October 1922.213 Abdullah’s objective in going to London was to obtain official definition of his status in Transjordan. His visit led to verbal assurances that the British would support the establishment of an independent administration on condition that he establish a constitutional government that would not preclude the British government from carrying out its obligations as the mandatory. The prospective agreement stated that executive authority would lie in the hands of Abdullah, who undertook to establish an effective administration and implement a sound financial regime.214 It was therefore envisaged that Abdullah would be an independent ruler under the aegis of the mandate, and that the High Commissioner would be responsible for Transjordan in his capacity as representative of the mandatory power, rather than the head of the Palestine administration.215 The Foreign Office initially refused to support the agreement with Abdullah due to French criticism of the Amir.216 In March 1923, the Foreign Office rescinded its opposition to the agreement on the condition that action be taken against alleged participants in the attempted assassination of Gouraud.217 Abdullah made the best of the agreement and on 1 April 1923 declared Transjordan an independent Amirate under the mandate.

Failures within the System of Transjordanian Rule The failure to bring the financial situation under control, to establish constitutional government or to create a legislative assembly kept the situation in Transjordan uncertain. These limitations were highlighted in October 1923 by a revolt by the Adwan tribe, which was discontented with an administration system dominated by foreigners, and by Abdullah’s tendency to exempt powerful tribes from taxation. The revolt was easily suppressed, but it highlighted the problems associated with the system of government that had been established in Transjordan. The weaknesses of Transjordan’s political system during the early years of the mandate are usually attributed to the failure to distinguish between the revenue of the state and Abdullah’s income, and

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the absence of constitutional government. Transjordan was entirely dependent on British financial and military support, but the amount of grant-in-aid fluctuated between 1921 and 1924. In the 1921–22 financial year, £180,000 was allocated, in the following year the sum was reduced to £100,000, and in 1923–4 it increased to £150,000.218 Grant-in-aid achieved its objective of reducing raiding across the frontier and establishing a government under Abdullah. In spite of a lack of progress in creating a Western-style system of government in Transjordan, the alternative to grant-in-aid was direct British rule, whose cost made it inconceivable. The system of indirect rule in Transjordan was characterised by several weaknesses that were manifested by the appointment of St. John Philby as Chief British Representative in October 1921.219 Philby had been a member of the Indian Civil Service and had served in Iraq, where he became an opponent of King Faisal. Philby’s well-known bias in favour of Ibn Saud made his appointment to Amman a serious error of judgement. Philby’s main role was to sort out Amir Abdullah’s finances, but he had very limited scope to achieve this objective since his powers were based on non-interference in the affairs of the quasiindependent government. Abdullah took full advantage of the Colonial Office’s willingness to grant him a semblance of independence, which led Sir John Shuckburgh at the Colonial Office to doubt whether Philby had been exercising the control ‘that one would expect from a tactful and firm’ representative.220 Relations between Abdullah and Philby never recovered following their quarrel in June 1923 over the destruction by Abdullah’s government of an ancient basilica in Amman that was torn down in order to make way for the construction of a mosque.221 Philby’s failure to handle Abdullah was compounded by a fraught relationship with Samuel and the secretariat in Jerusalem. Philby’s reputation for causing trouble in Iraq had made Samuel reluctant to appoint him, but T. E. Lawrence persuaded Samuel that Philby was a suitable candidate. Philby succeeded in alienating the secretariat in Jerusalem with his constant complaints about his salary and living conditions in Amman.222 Philby was also accused of financial irregularities and the mismanagement of grant-inaid, which had dramatic consequences for Abdullah.

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In October 1923, Samuel reported that Abdullah was no longer willing to work with Philby, which made the latter’s position untenable.223 Philby announced his resignation in January 1924, bitterly attacking Samuel’s pro-Zionist policies and the constant interference by the Middle East Department in London.224 Philby’s departure from Amman in April 1924 removed the most significant source of tension between the British and the Amir, but relations continued to be strained by the financial crisis and by persistent allegations of maladministration. Abdullah’s alleged financial incompetence led Sir Gilbert Clayton, Chief Secretary of the Palestine government, to state, ‘It may be argued that, in view of his extravagant habits . . . he is a luxury which Transjordan in its present impecunious state is unable to afford, and that it would be therefore advisable to replace him with a less expensive ruler.’225 Allegations of financial mismanagement were related to Philby’s failure to account adequately for how the grant-in-aid had been disbursed. In London, the Treasury argued that the absence of detailed accounts was inconsistent with Western principles of finance and audit.226 In response, it unilaterally cut the grant-in-aid for 1924–25 to zero and contended that customs receipts totalling £70,000 owed by the Palestine government should cover the costs of the administration in Transjordan.227 The Treasury’s decision created a crisis. Abdullah questioned whether the cessation of payments freed him from his obligations made in 1921 and 1922. British officials were concerned that the financial collapse of Transjordan caused by the cessation of grant-in-aid might force Abdullah to approach the Hejaz for financial support.228 Abdullah’s future in Amman was also called into question by the arrival of his father in January 1924, leading to rumours that Husayn sought to remove him and unify Transjordan with the Hejaz.229 British officials were convinced that Abdullah was a bad ruler, but they recognised that the alternatives were worse. The policy in Transjordan was based on the fallacy that Transjordan could support Abdullah financially. Clayton observed that adequate administrative and financial control along Treasury lines was incompatible with administrative independence under Abdullah’s rule.230 Bertram Thomas, Philby’s

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assistant in Amman, was equally critical of the system of influence that had prevailed since 1921. He argued that the role of the Chief British Representative had been based on ‘non-interference’, giving Abramson and Philby ambassadorial functions, which led Abdullah to regard non-interference as a right.231 Philby’s successor in Amman, Lieutenant Colonel Henry Cox, who had previously served as a district commissioner in Palestine, also argued that his predecessors had failed. Cox proposed that he assume far greater powers over the budget, the levying of taxes and the control of the security forces.232 In June 1924, Abdullah refused to accept Cox’s attempts to impose tighter control over his finances, which gave the British the pretext to reconsider his position.233 Abdullah spent most of the summer in the Hejaz, during which a lengthy correspondence took place between Amman, Jerusalem and London. Clayton and Cox concurred that the Amir was ‘a blight on the country’ and should not be allowed to return from the Hejaz.234 Abdullah’s dismissal, however, was made impossible by the likely ramifications, and threats to withdraw grant-in-aid were spurious since this would have led to the disbandment of the Arab Legion, which was clearly contrary to British interests. Clayton declared that he was willing to take the risk in removing Abdullah, and that he was well aware of the dangers of such a drastic step.235 These included the possibility that Transjordan could fall under the aegis of his father, King Husayn, which would have aroused the animosity of both the French and Ibn Saud, both of whom feared the extension of Hashemite interests. Abdullah’s expulsion might have given Ibn Saud a pretext to invade Transjordan. Strategic considerations, including the defence of the Palestine border against tribal raiding and securing the air route to India, dictated that Abdullah remain in Amman, and that he receive adequate financial assistance.236 This is why the Foreign Office regarded threats to remove Abdullah as a bluff designed to effect his submission rather than an actual attempt to remove him.237 Cox and Kirkbride met with Abdullah on his return from the Hejaz on 20 August and outlined in the clearest terms that he must agree to greater control over his affairs or accept the consequences.238 They told Abdullah he was required to remove members of his Syrian entourage,

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vest financial control in the hands of the Chief British Representative, and grant the General Officer Commanding (GOC) Palestine the right to inspect local forces.239 This crisis exemplifies the British preference for informal mechanisms of control that characterised Anglo-Transjordan relations during Abdullah’s life. Moreover, it highlights the extent to which the British were willing to allow Abdullah to run an administration in Transjordan so long as he acceded to basic British demands. They justified the system of close control over finance and internal security because it gave Transjordan financial stability and orderly government.240

Formal Imperial Control: The 1928 Agreement The informal nature of relations between London and Transjordan continued until the signing of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement, which established Abdullah as a quasi-independent ruler.241 The agreement finally legalised Abdullah’s relations with the British, thereby publicly acknowledging Britain’s formal imperial influence in the Transjordan. The agreement was very similar to the Unilateral Declaration of Egyptian Independence that was issued by the British in 1922. The treaty gave the British almost complete control over the Transjordanian government’s essential functions, including foreign policy, the armed forces, communications and the budget. Transjordanians responded critically to the agreement because of its one-sided nature and its failure to make any mention of Transjordan’s independence, which had been widely expected.242 Ma’an Abu Nowar argues that the main reason why objections were so strong was that the Arabic translation of the agreement was vague, thereby amplifying the limitations placed on Abdullah.243 Historians often regard the agreement as tangible evidence of Abdullah’s reliance on British support, but in practice, the British often found it hard to exert direct legal control over the Amir and limit his dynastic aspirations. The constitutional framework in Transjordan was established by the promulgation in April 1928 of the Organic Law.244 The Organic Law was strongly criticised in the towns. In July 1928, a ‘national conference’ was held in Amman at which 150 delegates, representing the tribal and urban elite, signed an eleven-point ‘national pact’ that

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rejected the Balfour Declaration and implicitly but forcefully criticised the British and the mandate. Abdullah’s reaction to these events is unclear, and the British adopted a contradictory approach. On the one hand, Cox and Peake were determined to suppress any dissent, especially when it was related to events in Palestine; on the other hand, they tended to dismiss opposition, believing that it originated from Syria and Palestine.

Amir Abdullah Consolidates His Position as Autocrat Abdullah was a benevolent autocrat who faced a series of internal and external challenges during the first decade of his rule. The main challenge was expansion of the state’s authority. Following Abdullah’s arrival in Transjordan, he had been closely involved with the tribes, who numbered about fifty thousand people, or roughly one-third of the population.245 In tandem with his cousin Amir Shakir Ibn Zeid, Abdullah spent much of his limited income on securing the allegiance of the tribes and resolving intertribal disputes.246 Abdullah and Shakir were determined to dominate the management of tribal affairs, and they made it clear they would not tolerate any British interference.247 The British recognised that attempts to bring the tribes under the control of the state would be futile without Abdullah’s assistance.248 In recognition of the special status enjoyed by the tribes, the British created the Tribal Control Board (TCB) in 1929. This body was responsible for the administration of tribal affairs through ‘tribal law’, rather than through the civil courts that prevailed in the towns.249 There is no indication prior to late 1928 that the government made any attempt to control the tribes on the southern frontier or to exert its influence east of the Hejaz railway.250 Raiding had been taking place across the southern frontier since August 1922 and posed various problems for the government.251 The administration in Transjordan had no practical experience of desert control, and until the early 1930s, the government lacked the military and financial resources to prevent raiding. The Arab Legion was neither equipped nor trained to control the frontier or defend the tribes against predations originating in the Hejaz and Nejd.252

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Raiding had a dramatic impact on the tribal population in the south, which was already suffering from the drought and locusts that had left much of the population destitute.253 The inability of either Abdullah or the British to prevent raiding damaged their prestige in the desert area. Nonetheless, law and order was gradually achieved on the southern frontier, and the slow process of bringing the tribes under the jurisdiction of the state can be regarded as one of the most important internal developments in Transjordan prior to the Second World War.254 During the process of pacification, which was achieved with much less bloodshed than in neighbouring states, the tribes were transformed from the state’s most intractable opponents into its most loyal adherents. Raiding also had serious diplomatic ramifications related to the process of demarcating regional frontiers, which restricted the tribes’ seasonal transhumance. The Foreign Office regarded raiding as a serious diplomatic problem and accused Abdullah of trying to reclaim the Hejaz, which had been lost to Ibn Saud in 1925. The enmity dividing Abdullah and Ibn Saud was widely acknowledged within the Foreign Office, leading to accusations that the Amir sought to take advantage of dissatisfaction with the Saudi regime amongst the tribes of the northern Hejaz.255 British officials accused Abdullah in May 1932 of supporting a revolt led by Ibn Rifada, the chief of the Billi tribe, against Ibn Saud.256 Poorly planned, the revolt was crushed by the British authorities, who had been forewarned, allowing them to bolster security forces along the Hejaz-Transjordan border.257 Cox, Glubb and Peake258 believed that Abdullah had played an active role in the rebellion, but they were unable to produce conclusive evidence of his complicity.259 The Foreign Office found Abdullah’s alleged role intolerable, since it amounted to inspiring a rebellion against a British ally.260 The British Chargé d’Affaires in Jedda regarded Abdullah as ‘the root of the problem’ of British relations with Ibn Saud.261 The Foreign Office’s concurrence with Ibn Saud’s charges against Abdullah signified a shift in British policy in Arabia from the pro-Hashemite orientation adopted during the First World War towards the belief that Ibn Saud was the region’s best hope for security.262

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The suspicion that Abdullah was undermining relations with Ibn Saud led senior officials in the Foreign Office, especially George Rendel, the head of the Eastern Department,263 to propose that he be removed in order to appease the Saudi King.264 Rendel’s views are significant because he became an opponent of Abdullah and a fervent supporter of Ibn Saud. Sir Robert Vansittart, the permanent Under-secretary at the Foreign Office, believed that this would create more problems than it would solve.265 Sir Arthur Wauchope, the High Commissioner for Palestine, was forced to invoke Article 5 of the 1928 Agreement by warning Abdullah that he was compelled to heed British advice on foreign policy.266 This episode was an example of the use of formal levers of control, and thus contrasted with the crisis in relations between Abdullah and the British in the summer of 1924. It was a rare example of the British employing their treaty rights to fetter the Amir. The process of integrating the tribes into the state gathered momentum in 1930 following the arrival of John Glubb from Iraq. Glubb Pasha played an instrumental role in the long-term process of bringing the desert area under state control.267 P. J. Vatikiotis argues that the army was central to the creation of the state since it played a key role in the pacification and integration of the tribes. The army ‘civilised’ the tribes and diverted their loyalty in favour of the monarchy, so that Abdullah and each of his successors became the paramount chief of the tribal population.268 The integration of the tribes into the state also transformed the tribes’ traditional military role from raiding into an organised and disciplined fighting force, the regime’s Praetorian Guard. The incorporation of the tribes into the state and the development of an efficient army had far-reaching implications. Gradually the Arab Legion was transformed from a gendarmerie responsible for internal security into a skilled fighting force that became an essential tool in Abdullah’s foreign policy. Nonetheless, the shortage of funds meant that the Arab Legion was not capable of becoming an effective offensive force. The army suffered a second weakness, its reliance on British financial and technical assistance, until 1956. Nonetheless, one of the most significant legacies of the British role in Transjordan was the creation of an army that has remained loyal to the monarchy.

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Conclusion The First World War resulted in the expansion of British strategic interests in the Middle East. The defence of the Suez Canal was essential for Britain’s defence planners until the Suez crisis in 1956. The need to defend the Suez Canal had a significant influence on the decision to occupy Palestine and Transjordan following the war. During the war, the British made a series of contradictory pledges to the Hashemites, the French and the Zionists. These agreements significantly diminished Britain’s prestige in the Middle East. Abdullah and the Arabs believed that the British had agreed to support the establishment of an independent Arab state after the war, and the failure to achieve this objective led to accusations of British perfidy. These allegations were compounded by the British commitment to support the establishment of a Jewish National Home in Palestine. The Balfour Declaration meant that the British were required to mediate between two mutually antagonistic populations. The Palestine mandate became a liability for the British Empire in the Middle East, leading to significant tension between the British and the Arab states that were determined to prevent the development of the Zionist political programme. This is why Britain’s support for Zionism was regarded by some British officials, the Arabs, and some historians as major strategic and political error. Abdullah played a central role in the development of relations between the Hashemites and the British between 1914 and 1916. A combination of the Hashemite custody of the holy places of Islam in Mecca and Medina and the correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon in 1915 and 1916 led Abdullah to believe that his family had the right to lead the Arabs. Abdullah’s pre-eminent position collapsed during the latter part of the war. Instead of being respected by the imperial power, Abdullah was widely derided. Abdullah’s appointment to run the government in Transjordan was a paltry reward. Although Transjordan was a regional backwater, devoid of significant natural resources, the system of government that evolved during the 1920s proved surprisingly enduring. Notwithstanding Abdullah’s weaknesses, he played an instrumental role, with the assistance of a small number of British officials, in establishing a state out of nothing.

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CHAPTER 2 ABDULL AH AND THE SPECIAL R EL ATIONSHIP: THE OR IGINS OF HASHEMITE-ZIONIST R EL ATIONS

Transjordan in the Middle: Britain, Abdullah, the Zionists and Multiple Promises The creation of Transjordan1 by the British after the First World War was remarkable because the territory had very little to offer. Historically, Transjordan was a backwater of the Ottoman Empire, with no oil or other significant natural resources. Nonetheless, the kingdom has endured against the odds, remaining comparatively stable. The foundations of the Jordanian polity were laid during the mandatory era and resulted from the interaction of three institutions: Abdullah and his government, the British Resident and the commander of the Arab Legion. Britain’s interest in establishing a state ruled by Abdullah Ibn Husayn defined imperial strategy. The focus of British strategy in the Middle East was the defence of the Suez Canal, the establishment of an air route to India and Britain’s colonies in the Far East that traversed Transjordan, and the protection of oil interests in Iraq and Iran and

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the oil pipeline from northern Iraq to Haifa. The British were determined to exert their influence in Transjordan at the lowest possible cost. During the 1920s and 1930s, financial considerations were the key determinant of British policy in Palestine and Transjordan. Unlike in Egypt and Iraq, the British showed little interest in the internal affairs of Transjordan. The system of imperial control established by the British in Transjordan was characterised by several unusual features, including a remarkable longevity in the British officials who served in the country. Abdullah’s main weakness was his shortage of funds and limited opportunities to raise them, which gave him little choice but to rely on British assistance. Abdullah is often characterised as a British pawn, and these allegations are based on the argument that he was acting on British instructions to annex parts of Palestine and to expand his kingdom in Syria. In reality, Abdullah’s determination to pursue his dynastic aspirations in Syria and Palestine often conflicted with British interests. Abdullah’s relations with the Zionist movement in Palestine were also highly controversial, opening him to accusations of colluding with the Jews. Abdullah’s contacts with the Zionists originated in the 1920s but only became politically significant a decade later. Abdullah made several significant mistakes, including accepting money from the Zionists, which damaged his prestige in the Arab world. Nonetheless, in contrast with his counterparts in the region, Abdullah adopted a moderate policy on the future of Palestine that became a defining characteristic of his successors.

How Abdullah and the Zionist Movement Perceived Each Other Abdullah’s relations with the Zionist movement aroused as much public anger as anything he did in his political career. Abdullah never became a fanatical opponent of Zionism, in contrast with some Arab leaders, notably the Mufti of Jerusalem, Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Abdullah’s moderation can be attributed to his Ottoman education, which stressed the role of minorities in so-called millets, which allowed

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groups such as the Jews to preserve their identity within the Ottoman Empire.2 Abdullah’s numerous proposals to the Jewish Agency (a quasi-governmental organisation responsible for representing and administering the Yishuv, or the Jewish community in Palestine) show that he perceived the Zionists as a millet within a Hashemite kingdom, in which they would be allowed political autonomy and religious freedom, but not statehood. Abdullah’s perception of the Zionist movement was influenced by his belief, shared by other Arab notables, that the Jews had political and financial influence in London. Abdullah hoped to persuade the Zionist political leadership to use this perceived influence with the British in support of his dynastic objectives. Abdullah’s long-term aim was to elicit their support for the foundation of a ‘Semitic Kingdom’ embracing Palestine, Syria and Transjordan, with him as King.3 Zionist attempts to colonise Transjordan can be dated from 1879 and were motivated by a combination of economic and political considerations.4 Some Zionists were influenced by the ideological conviction that the east bank of the River Jordan, especially the biblical lands of Reuven, Gilead and Moab, were intrinsically connected to the Jewish National Home, within which the Zionists sought to include Transjordan.5 Zionist leaders sought to persuade the British that there would be significant economic advantages in demarcating the eastern boundary of Palestine up to the Hejaz railway.6 These aims led the Zionists to offer proposals to the Paris Peace Conference in 1919 that included the following propaganda: ‘The fertile plains east of the Jordan, since the earliest biblical times, have been linked economically and politically with the land west of the Jordan . . . and the country which is now very sparsely populated . . . could now serve admirably for colonisation of a large scale.’7 The main geographical factor influencing Zionist thinking at the time was that the Transjordan plateau could act as the breadbasket of the Yishuv (the Jewish community in Palestine).8 Beyond their claim that Transjordan could receive a large number of Jewish settlers, however, the Zionists lacked a coherent strategy for settling it.9 Chaim Weizmann, the Zionists’ elder statesman and the first President of Israel, persisted in demanding that the east bank of the

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Jordan be included in the National Home, noting that Palestine had always been vulnerable to tribal raiding.10 Weizmann maintained that the British could permit sixty thousand to seventy thousand Jews from Transcaucasia, ‘who are capable soldiers, good agriculturists and who have maintained for centuries a pure Hebrew tradition’ to settle in the fertile areas of Transjordan.11 Weizmann wrote to Churchill in March 1921 stressing that Palestine and Transjordan enjoyed close economic, historical and geographic ties. Weizmann claimed that the ‘Transjordan plateaux . . . lie neglected and uninhabited, save for a few scattered settlements and a few roaming Beduin [sic] tribes’. Weizmann maintained that ‘Jewish settlement could proceed on a large scale without friction with the local population’.12 Churchill and his advisors were not swayed by Weizmann’s argument, which was based on remarkable ignorance concerning the population and geography of Transjordan. Zionist attitudes were also influenced by the belief that colonisation could play an important role in defending Jewish settlements along the Palestine-Transjordan border against tribal raiding.13 Zionist leaders believed that these settlements should have a quasi-military organisation, and that settlers would be responsible for their own defence.14 Sir Herbert Samuel concurred that the eastern boundary of Palestine should include parts of Transjordan, but he disagreed with Weizmann on its extent.15 Samuel proposed that the eastern border of Palestine follow the ‘Meinertzhagen line’, which ran several miles to the west of the Hejaz railway.16 Samuel argued that the boundary must be delineated along this line, since it would be easier to defend Palestine from Bedouin incursions if security forces were stationed on the Transjordan plateau.17 Herbert Samuel and Richard Meinertzhagen, the Chief Political Officer in Palestine during 1919–20,18 both failed in their attempts to influence the demarcation of Palestine’s frontiers to include parts of Transjordan. We have already seen that the British were determined not to send forces to Transjordan for budgetary reasons, and the Foreign Office advocated a policy of non-intervention and peaceful penetration so long as raids could be prevented.19 The decision to separate Transjordan from Palestine was also influenced by the assumption that the territory lay within the area defined by the

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Husayn-McMahon correspondence, in which the British were bound ‘to recognise and support the independence of the inhabitants’.20 The separation of the two banks of the River Jordan was enshrined in the white paper of June 1922,21 and in Article 25 of the Palestine mandate, which precluded the extension of the Jewish National Home to Transjordan.22 According to Chaim Arlosoroff, the head of the Jewish Agency’s political department between 1931 and 1933, the Zionists viewed the decision with equanimity, ‘not because we were in any way prepared to acquiesce in a division of Palestine into two, but because we believed that during the present period of transition, we better concentrate on strengthening our position west of the river’.23

The Growth of Contacts between Abdullah and the Zionist Movement, 1921–1929 Abdullah initially approached the Zionists in October 1921 when he proposed that they lend him £7,000, to be repaid through remittances from his father.24 Little tangible progress was made in relations between Abdullah and the Zionist movement during the 1920s. The Zionists acknowledged that Transjordan was becoming an Arab state under Abdullah’s tutelage, but they still assumed that Transjordan was an integral part of the Palestine mandate. They believed that colonisation would occur when the population of Transjordan realised that economic development was only possible with external assistance.25 Chaim Weizmann thought that Transjordan was capable of receiving a large number of Jewish settlers, and during a visit there in May 1926, he found ‘unlimited possibilities; very cheap land, plentiful water, and above all the country is empty’.26 British officials were not swayed by Zionist pressure and continued to reject any possibility of Jewish penetration of Transjordan. They believed that the population would reject any attempt to introduce Zionist influence into the territory, and they were concerned about the spread of disorder from Palestine.27 Colonel Sir Henry Cox maintained that the influx of Zionist settlers would imply that Palestine and Transjordan were under the same administrative system. Field Marshal Lord Plumer, Samuel’s successor as High Commissioner, went

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to great lengths to show that political developments on the two banks of the Jordan were uneven, thereby precluding any possibility of their union.28 Zionist efforts to infiltrate Transjordan during the 1920s were not limited to settlement plans. Important concessions were awarded to Jewish businessmen such as Pinhas Rutenberg, who at Naharayim in the Jordan Valley constructed an electricity station that provided power for Amman.29 The Zionists demanded that Jews be able to serve in the Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF), an imperial regiment raised in 1926 and commanded by British officers.30 Lord Plumer argued that the recruitment of Jews into the TJFF would ‘render this force not merely unsuitable for employment in Transjordan but would be a positive menace to the tranquillity of that country’. Plumer’s assessment was based on the assumption that the population of Transjordan ‘is always fearful of Jewish penetration and is bitterly anti-Jewish’.31 Proposals by Colonel Frederick Kisch, chairman of the Palestine Zionist Executive, were also rejected on the grounds that the Arabs ranks would become disaffected, thereby undermining the effectiveness of the force.32 The Zionist approach to Transjordan was summed up in March 1926 in a succinct piece of propaganda: ‘We see in Transjordan the eastern part of Eretz Israel. However, we shall not build the bridge across the river Jordan with soldiers—we shall make our way by Jewish labour, with the plough not with the sword’.33 Zionist activities in Transjordan were indeed initially non-political and peaceful. The Zionists understood that in order for Jews to colonise Transjordan they would have to assess the prevailing agricultural and economic situation.34 In parallel to intelligence-gathering efforts, Zionist leaders were well aware of the importance of securing the goodwill of British officials, since they had reached the conclusion that ‘in the last resort . . . the English decide everything in Transjordan’.35

Unrest in Palestine as Contacts Continue During the 1920s, British officials went to great lengths to prevent Zionist penetration of Transjordan. Nonetheless, the British found

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it very difficult to isolate Transjordan from events in Palestine. In August 1929, riots broke out in Palestine as a result of disputes between Jews and Muslims over access to the Western (Wailing) Wall in Jerusalem.36 The primary role of the security forces, which numbered 3,550 in August 1929, was the defence of Palestine and Transjordan against external aggression, whilst internal security was downplayed.37 The policy of defending Palestine on the cheap with a small number of aircraft and armoured cars might have been useful in policing the frontier, but it was totally ill-suited to quelling largescale rioting. Events in Palestine were an indictment of the policy of air control, since the authorities were forced to dispatch troops from Egypt and Malta to suppress the riots. In the aftermath of the violence, the Committee of Imperial Defence (CID) conducted a detailed survey of the security requirements in Palestine. The CID assumed that incidents would break out again but that it was possible to mitigate unrest by developing an effective intelligence organisation, and by posting adequate forces in Palestine.38 Transjordan’s forces played an important role in defending Jewish settlements, and in preventing insurgents and arms from crossing the River Jordan.39 The British were concerned that the riots could spill over into Transjordan, where an armed Bedouin population could have been incited to oppose the authorities.40 Colonel Cox believed that there was a real danger of the development of a mass movement in Transjordan, and that events in Palestine had left the British very unpopular.41 Nonetheless, the evidence suggests that during the late 1920s, political parties in Transjordan were still in their infancy and lacking a coherent political doctrine. This precluded them from gaining widespread support from a public that was still strongly influenced by tribal affiliation.42 Transjordan remained largely free of disorder and Cox stressed that the situation was ‘attributable mainly to the entirely proper attitude taken by Abdullah . . . all influence both personal and official being exerted to prevent any participation of Transjordanians in the disorders’.43 Abdullah had every incentive to prevent the spread of extremist sentiment to his unstable territory, which was being threatened by Bedouin raiding from the Hejaz and Nejd.44

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The causes of the riots were examined by two commissions of inquiry,45 which resulted in the promulgation of a white paper that led to restrictions on Jewish land sales and immigration so as not to exceed the ‘absorptive capacity’ of Palestine.46 The Zionist leadership responded by renewing its interest in a solution to the land question in Palestine. In the autumn of 1930, Chaim Weizmann renewed the Zionist claim to Transjordan when he met with a cabinet committee that had been established to address the Palestine issue. Weizmann argued that Transjordan would benefit from Jewish settlement,47 and the Jewish Agency argued that the government policy of excluding Jews from Transjordan contravened the mandate.48 Zionist interest in Transjordan was the source of considerable anxiety in the Foreign and Colonial Offices. One Colonial Office official noted that ‘it would be extremely impolitic if any mention of Transjordan were made in any public document arising out of the present negotiations with the Jewish Agency’, and that to afford the Jewish Agency the right to enter Transjordan ‘would be ill-advised and might create serious political difficulties’.49 British officials rejected any suggestion that Jews be allowed to join the TJFF because they wanted to localise the effects of the Palestine problem. They were also determined to deny the Zionists any influence over the internal affairs of Transjordan. Despite these fruitless proposals, the Zionists continued to develop clandestine ties with Transjordan.50 Zionist emissaries investigated the value of land in Transjordan and negotiated with shaikhs for the purchase or lease of land. These efforts were thwarted by British objections, and by threatening propaganda disseminated in Palestine’s Arabic press against anyone doing business with Zionist emissaries. Zionist policy was influenced by a number of considerations in the early 1930s. Chaim Arlosoroff, the head of the Jewish Agency’s political department, argued that the main reason for developing relations with Abdullah and the tribal chiefs was the impact of the 1930 white paper, which marked a fundamental shift in British policy. The Zionists continued to regard Transjordan as ideal for settling large numbers of Jews in a territory still considered part of mandatory

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Palestine.51 Land in Transjordan also was much cheaper than property in Palestine. In addition, the Zionists were influenced by the severe economic and agricultural problems that prevailed in Transjordan during the early 1930s.52 They assumed that the situation would compel the population of Transjordan to seek Zionist financial assistance and agricultural expertise to facilitate economic development. Arlosoroff believed that contacts should be established with Abdullah and the shaikhs, who possessed both political influence and large areas of cultivable land.53 In 1931 and 1932, many offers were received from important shaikhs, such as Said Pasha Abu Jaber, Mithqal al-Faiz and Refaifan al-Majali, to either sell or lease land to the Jews.54 The shaikhs were motivated by their severe economic situation and need for financial assistance, rather than by any empathy for Zionist objectives in Transjordan.55 The Zionists’ ability to advance their interests in Transjordan was limited by a shortage of funds in the early 1930s. The budget of the Department of Arab Affairs, which was responsible for intelligencegathering activities in Palestine and the neighbouring Arab states, was limited to £500 for Palestine and Transjordan in 1930.56 This left the Zionists in a weak position to exploit overtures from one of the most important constituencies in Transjordan.57 They also had to contend with Ottoman laws that precluded the sale of land to foreigners, providing the government with a convenient pretext to halt these transactions.58 The tight financial controls imposed by the British had the unintended outcome of forcing Abdullah into the arms of the Zionists. During the late 1920s and early 1930s, there were significant limitations on Abdullah’s civil list (the annual grant that covered the costs of the Amir in performing his official duties), which was cut from £13,000 in 1928 to £10,000 in 1930.59 In August 1928, Cox proposed that Abdullah be granted state lands in order to provide him with a permanent means to support his family.60 Abdullah’s loyal support during the riots of August 1929 provided an additional motivation to lend him financial support. Nonetheless, the Treasury initially rejected Cox’s proposal on the grounds of perennial financial limitations, but it grudgingly changed its mind in May 1931.61

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The grant of sixty-five thousand dunams (approximately fifteen thousand acres) of state land by the British seemed to provide Abdullah with the means to cultivate an independent income. In practice, it presented him and the British with the problem of how the land’s development could be financed from his civil list.62 With the Great Depression deepening, the Treasury only reluctantly granted Abdullah an additional £3,000 to develop the land,63 a sum insufficient to irrigate a large tract at Ghaur al Kibd in the Jordan valley. The failure to provide sufficient funds was a political error: apparently unwilling to reward Abdullah for his loyalty, the British forced him to find alternative sources of capital. General Sir Arthur Wauchope, who was appointed High Commissioner in 1931, recognised that the shortage of land in Palestine meant that Zionist settlement in Transjordan would have to be addressed, but he knew that Abdullah’s prior consent was essential.64 The British were concerned about the political and strategic implications of allowing Jewish settlement in Transjordan, since it could have been interpreted as an extension of the Balfour Declaration beyond the borders of Palestine. Wauchope and Sir Cosmo Parkinson at the Colonial Office were also concerned that the British would be responsible for the security of settlers, and they chose to stonewall the Zionists.65

Conclusion Strategic considerations and the requirement to compensate Abdullah for his failure to acquire either the Iraqi or the Syrian thrones influenced the expansion of British imperial influence in Transjordan. The British model of imperial rule in Transjordan relied on a system of influence that evolved in India during the nineteenth century. Determined to exert their influence over Transjordan at the lowest possible cost, the British relied on a Resident to advise Abdullah on political and economic issues. The British granted Abdullah a modicum of sovereignty so long as he acceded to their demands, which included abstaining from anti-French propaganda or attempting to undermine Ibn Saud. In return, the British funded Abdullah’s civil list and the cost of the security forces.

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Abdullah faced a series of significant challenges to his rule during the 1920s and early 1930s, and, with limited British assistance, he succeeded in expanding the sovereignty of the state. The incorporation of the tribes was a notable achievement that took place in spite of significant environmental challenges and persistent violence on the southern frontier. The long-standing tribal tradition of raiding was contrary to the process of state building, and the demarcation of regional boundaries turned raiding into a significant diplomatic problem for the British. The British tended to blame Abdullah for raiding in spite of evidence that Ibn Saud was responsible. So long as Abdullah’s activities did not impinge on Britain’s wider interests in the region, the mandatory granted him some freedom of action. During the early years, Abdullah was preoccupied with consolidating his rule and pursuing his dynastic objectives in Syria and the Hejaz. The failure of the British to finance adequately the civil list, and the dire economic outlook in Transjordan, explains why the Amir, along with several tribal shaikhs, established relations with the Zionist movement. The Zionists’ attempts to prevent the separation of Transjordan from Palestine failed, and their policy of cultivating ties with Abdullah and the tribal shaikhs was motivated by a combination of economic and political interests. Financial restraints and consistent British opposition stymied Zionist attempts to infiltrate Transjordan until the early 1930s.

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CHAPTER 3 DIPLOM ACY DUR ING THE AR AB R EVOLT: THE BR ITISH, ABDULL AH AND THE JEWISH AGENCY, 1931–1939

By the 1930s, the British Empire was overstretched and under-resourced, placing greater pressure on imperial strategy, especially during the second half of the decade. Britain’s hegemonic position in the Middle East faced an unprecedented challenge from the growing German-Italian axis. This challenge to British ascendancy significantly influenced the direction of its policy in the Middle East. The outbreak of rioting in Palestine in April 1936 was the most significant challenge to the British imperial presence in the Middle East prior to the Second World War. Between 1936 and 1939, the British government was determined to prevent the events in Palestine from affecting relations with its Arab allies. This led the British to ask the leaders of neighbouring states to appeal to the Palestinian Arabs to halt the insurrection so that a commission of inquiry could be sent to investigate the causes of unrest. The decision to permit the Arab states to intervene was a sign of weakness, and it had considerable long-term consequences. The failure to deal with the rebellion in Palestine led to the regionalisation of the Palestine question. Meanwhile, the bureaucratic machine in London became deeply divided between the Colonial Office, which

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supported partitioning Palestine, and the Foreign Office, which rejected partition, as well as any suggestion that Abdullah might benefit from the division of Palestine. The Foreign Office believed that the failure to make concessions in Palestine would lead to the rise of an anti-British pan-Arab movement that would have devastating repercussions for Britain’s standing in the region. The situation in Palestine had a significant impact on Abdullah and his relations with the British and the Zionists. The British continued to regard Abdullah as a leader of no consequence; instead, the Foreign Office believed that the Saudi King Ibn Saud was the most important Arab ruler. Transjordan was viewed as a regional backwater, and the British were determined to prevent the spread of Zionist colonisation across the River Jordan. The Jewish Agency, which had obtained illicitly a considerable quantity of documents from the government offices in Jerusalem, was well aware of British attitudes.1 Abdullah’s willingness to lease land to Zionist emissaries was a serious political error that significantly damaged his prestige. The revolt in Palestine gave Abdullah an opportunity to mediate between the rebels and the British, but the Amir was widely distrusted because of his relations with the Zionists. Determined to cultivate economic and political relations with the Zionists, Abdullah made proposals which involved Palestine’s becoming part of a Hashemite kingdom under his rule. These plans were inimical to the Zionist objective of establishing a sovereign state in Palestine. During the 1930s the Zionists achieved limited political benefits from their relations with Abdullah, and the absence of senior Zionist policy makers in these talks suggests that they were of marginal importance.

Overstretch: The British Imperial Position in the 1930s Middle East During the 1930s, British foreign policy faced a series of unprecedented challenges that had a significant impact on Britain’s role in the Middle East. Seemingly disparate events in events in Africa and in Europe coalesced to undermine Britain’s prestige as a great power. As a consequence, the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff believed

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that the government had to make significant political concessions to the Arabs in order to retain their goodwill in the event of another world war. In the 1930s, British commitments overseas were characterised by imperial overstretch. The Great Depression left successive governments in London increasingly hard-pressed to pay for maintaining and defending a far-flung empire. During the 1930s, British strategists had to contend with the long-standing requirement to defend India, to protect Britain’s far-flung colonies in the Far East, and to maintain the balance of power in Western Europe. Lawrence Pratt argues that the Mediterranean and the Middle East were a relatively low priority in imperial defence, and that the naval presence in the region was outdated and lacked adequate air defence.2 Nonetheless, the Royal Navy was the dominant naval power in the Mediterranean and the Red Sea, and British strategists assumed that the sea route from Gibraltar to Suez was secure. The sense of complacency that characterised British policy in the Mediterranean and Red Sea region came to the fore following Italy’s invasion of Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in September 1935.3 The Abyssinian crisis was a major challenge to British prestige, and to London’s commitment to uphold the integrity of the League of Nations. In tandem with the French, the British failed to exert meaningful pressure on the fascist government in Rome, thereby allowing a blatant act of aggression against a member of the League to go unpunished. The British believed that they had to make concessions to the Italians in order to prevent the nightmare scenario of having to fight a war simultaneously against Italy, Germany and Japan. The policy of appeasing Italy resulted from Britain’s imperial overstretch and strategic vulnerability in the Middle East. The Abyssinian crisis reinforced the importance of Egypt and the Suez Canal to the British Empire.4 In August 1936, the Egyptian and British governments signed a treaty of alliance meant to remain in force for twenty years. The British acknowledged Egypt’s formal independence and were allowed to maintain ten thousand troops there in peacetime. In reality, the British continued to exert considerable influence in Egypt, and the military presence, which

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far exceeded the terms of the treaty, was regarded as an affront to Egyptian sovereignty. In the short term, the military clauses of the treaty were of great strategic value because they allowed the British to protect their vital interests, including exclusive control over the Suez Canal and the ability to send reinforcements to Egypt in wartime.5 Nonetheless, Britain’s imperial strategy was fundamentally influenced by events in Europe, including the Nazi reoccupation of the Rhineland in 1936 and the Czech crisis in 1938, that led the Foreign Office and Chiefs of Staff (COS) to regard the rebellion in Palestine in terms of its impact on Britain’s prestige in the Middle East. American diplomats observed that events in Palestine had aroused widespread sympathy in the Muslim world and made the Arab world increasingly cohesive.6 The littoral of the eastern Mediterranean was made important by its lying under the air route to India, and along an overland route to Iraq on which reinforcements could be moved from Egypt to India. During the early 1930s, the port in Haifa became strategically significant as it was made the terminus for an oil pipeline from northern Iraq. Haifa also was regarded as an alternative to the Royal Navy’s primary base in Alexandria. In February 1939, the Chiefs of Staff produced their ‘European Appreciation, 1939–40’, which reviewed Britain’s global commitments. The strategists made various assumptions about the international situation before the outbreak of the war in Europe. The COS believed that if Japan remained neutral, the Royal Navy could retain control of the Mediterranean. However, if Japan entered the war, the Mediterranean fleet would likely be dispatched to the Far East, which would allow the Italians to take advantage of the diminished British presence to assume control of the region. If this occurred, it would be very difficult to sustain the Egyptian base, and the COS therefore believed that British forces in the region would have to be strengthened before the outbreak of war and remain self-sufficient.7 These international factors had a significant bearing on British policy and led the government to impose a policy on Palestine that sought to ameliorate Arab opposition and to appease Muslim opinion in India, which had been incensed by the rebellion in Palestine.

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Arab Revolt and British Reaction, 1936–1939 By 1936, British strategists understood that events in Palestine, which had been a political headache for over a decade, could not be viewed in isolation. The revolt that broke out in Palestine in April 1936 was the most sustained insurrection against the British mandate since its inception, and the rebellion considerably damaged Britain’s prestige in the Middle East. The revolt was characterised by a total loss of British nerve and a failure to suppress the violence at an early stage. Initially the government was determined to end the rebellion without imposing martial law, and instead it encouraged the Arab states to intervene in Palestine. The Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff developed an exaggerated fear of militant Arab nationalism, which led the government to make significant political concessions to the Arabs. The revolt had a major role in encouraging the development of Palestinian nationalism, but it had devastating long-term consequences for the Palestinian Arab population. As a result of the revolt, the Arab population became deeply divided between rival political factions, and many of its leaders were imprisoned. The revolt in Palestine is usually attributed to Arab discontent with the unprecedented rise in Jewish immigration during the 1930s, when the annual number of immigrants rose from 5,249 in 1929 to 61,854 in 1935.8 The early 1930s also saw the rapid development and expansion of the Yishuv, aided by widespread land purchases from Palestinian landowners.9 Ylana Miller argues that the revolt was more than just a nationalist rebellion, since it resulted from deep divisions within Palestinian society. The urban leaders were influenced by nationalist sentiment, whereas in the countryside the population blamed the government for pervasive poverty, landlessness and land sales to Jews.10 The revolt, characterised by attacks on the infrastructure of British rule, became a protracted and sporadic peasant war with three basic features: (1) attacks against the symbols of the mandatory government, (2) attacks on the Yishuv, and (3) internecine conflict amongst the rebels. The varied dimensions of the revolt, based on a combination of racial, religious, familial and peasant struggle, revealed the failure of the Arab leadership to create

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a cohesive opposition that could transform the rebellion into a fully fledged revolutionary war.11 There were also important external influences on the rebellion, including Britain’s failure to prevent the Italian invasion of Abyssinia, which led to the perception that the government could be intimidated. The rebels were also influenced by a strike in Syria that immediately preceded the riots in Palestine. The situation in Syria was caused by France’s unwillingness to resume treaty talks with the Syrian nationalist movement, an ineffectual Syrian government, and a depressed economy.12 The subsequent treaty negotiations in Paris between the National Bloc (the Syrian nationalist party) and the French government impelled events in Palestine. The Palestinians believed that they could obtain similar concessions from the British by resorting to violence.13 In April 1936, the Arab Higher Committee (AHC) was established with the Mufti as its president and included the heads of the main political parties in Palestine. The AHC achieved a semblance of unity between the various factions in Palestinian politics and was responsible for articulating Palestinian demands. These included a cessation of immigration, the establishment of democratic government, and the halt of future land sales.14 The British were well aware that a renewal of violence was likely, but there was no agreement between the civil and military authorities concerning its timing and intensity.15 Charles Townshend notes that the complexity of the revolt made it difficult for the British to comprehend its nature. He argues that the root of British hesitancy lay in their difficulty in interpreting Arab actions. By 1936, the British had become accustomed to thinking that the Palestine Arabs were incapable of organising unified national resistance.16 The failure to appreciate developments in the Arab population can also be attributed to a breakdown of intelligence gathering that made it very difficult to foresee the riots.17 The riots in 1936 were entirely different from previous outbreaks of violence, in terms of their scale and duration. The revolt became the most intractable imperial crisis of the interwar years, and the last significant challenge for British security forces in the Middle East before

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the Second World War. The rebellion in Palestine provided further evidence that the doctrine of air control was completely ill-suited to quelling an insurgency. British forces in Palestine, which had been reinforced by two infantry battalions following the 1929 riots under RAF command,18 proved unable to suppress the rebellion. This led to the dispatch of twelve infantry battalions in September 1936, and by November 1938, two divisions, including eighteen infantry battalions and two cavalry regiments, were based in Palestine.19 The insurgency in Palestine represented a significant commitment of Britain’s limited military resources, and by 1939, there was a pressing strategic requirement for these forces to be transferred to the United Kingdom to participate in a European war. From the outset of the violence, the authorities in Palestine were deeply divided about the use of force and the implementation of martial law. The military strongly advocated the use of harsh measures,20 whereas the High Commissioner Sir Arthur Wauchope and the Colonial Secretary William Ormsby-Gore opposed martial law, which they regarded as an admission of failure.21 The Foreign Office also opposed a crackdown because it believed that force would be ineffective and would provoke widespread anti-British feeling in all the Arab countries.22 In June 1936, Nuri al-Said, the Iraqi Foreign Minister, appointed himself as a mediator in Palestine and proposed a solution based on the creation of an Arab federation in the Fertile Crescent under Hashemite rule.23 In August 1936, the cabinet agreed to Nuri’s mediation and in the process made a dramatic error by giving Arab leaders the right to participate in future negotiations.24 Senior officials at the Colonial Office expressed serious doubts about the wisdom of such a policy. Sir John Shuckburgh argued that allowing Nuri and other Arab leaders to meddle in Palestine would be interpreted as a sign of weakness. Recognising the right of the Arab rulers to intervene in the affairs of Palestine, he said, would be regarded by the Arabs as a precedent, making government policy vulnerable to their pressure.25 Senior officials in the Foreign Office, including the Permanent Under-secretary Sir Robert Vansittart, recognised the risks entailed by allowing Nuri and other Arab leaders to mediate.26 Nonetheless, they believed that

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Nuri’s intervention offered an opportunity to bring about a settlement in Palestine.27 The Foreign Office argued that Jewish immigration should be stopped until the Royal Commission had completed its report.28 Whitehall was therefore deeply divided over how the Palestine situation should be handled, highlighting a fundamental weakness in the making of British policy in the region since 1921—that no single department assumed overall responsibility. The Foreign Office’s perspective on the situation in Palestine was heavily influenced by the legacy of the Abyssinian crisis, which had done serious damage to Britain’s prestige and highlighted the Empire’s strategic vulnerability in the Middle East.29 The Foreign Office was also concerned about the impact of the Palestine situation on relations with the Arab states.30 Reports from Cairo and Jedda suggested that interest in the Palestine issue was minimal in Egypt and Saudi Arabia,31 but the British ambassador in Cairo, Sir Miles Lampson (Lord Killearn), believed that developments in Palestine were certain to harm Anglo-Egyptian relations.32 Lampson and his successors argued for a policy centred on Egypt because of the importance of the Suez base and because of Egypt’s increasing influence in the Middle East. The policy of allowing the Arab states to intervene appeared to succeed when they persuaded the rebels to call off the strike on 12 October so that the Royal Commission could proceed to Palestine.33 The cessation of the violence can also be attributed to the transfer of military command from the RAF to the army, and the dispatch of a considerable number of reinforcements.34 Notwithstanding the presence of the army, Sir Arthur Wauchope was opposed to the imposition of martial law. Wauchope’s policy led to a crisis in civil-military relations, with the military commanders believing only martial law would terminate the revolt.35 General Sir John Dill, who took command in September, concluded: ‘Arthur Wauchope loves greatly, administers with knowledge and imagination, but does not rule’.36 Duff Cooper, the Secretary of State for War, also argued that Wauchope’s policy had been a lamentable failure, and he demanded Wauchope’s dismissal.37 Wauchope’s rejection of stern measures, including the disarming of the population, had significant long-term consequences.38 During the Royal Commission’s deliberations in

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Jerusalem and London (November 1936 to July 1937), the rebels were given a respite in which they rearmed and reorganised themselves for a further wave of violence that engulfed Palestine following the publication of the Royal Commission report in July 1937.39 The Eastern Department of the Foreign Office became increasingly sceptical about the chances for peace in Palestine and feared that the British government was becoming overcommitted.40 George Rendel, the head of the Eastern Department since 1931, played a pivotal role in the development of policy. Rendel believed that if the Arabs’ demands were not met, British interests would be crippled by their hostility.41 Elie Kedourie and Aaron Klieman argue that Rendel was strongly influenced by the political and strategic significance of Saudi Arabia.42 They also believe that Ibn Saud made a favourable impression on Rendel when the latter visited Saudi Arabia in March 1937.43 Ibn Saud made it clear that if the British failed to make concessions in Palestine, he would find it difficult to support British interests.44 Rendel therefore reached the conclusion that the adoption of a policy favourable to the Jews would make it impossible for Ibn Saud to maintain his friendship with the British.45 Rendel’s viewpoint was supported by reports from Lampson in Cairo, who argued that the Palestine issue remained the essential problem in Britain’s relations with the Arab world.46 The Foreign Office received catastrophic evaluations from the Middle East suggesting that Britain’s position in the region was imperilled by events in Palestine. Limited evidence was provided to support this contention, but Rendel dismissed reports that challenged the prevailing zeitgeist in the Foreign Office.47 Not all of the Foreign Office’s representatives believed that the situation was damaging Britain’s relations with the Arabs. The Acting Consul in Damascus reported that the Syrians showed far greater interest in relations with France than with Palestine.48 Colonel Mackereth, the Consul in Damascus, was a notable critic of the Foreign Office’s assumptions.49 Mackereth acknowledged that the Palestine question was undermining Britain’s relations with the Arabs, but he questioned whether the Arabs would be satisfied by the destruction of the Jews in Palestine. Instead, he argued that Britain would receive no credit from the Arabs, regardless of the policy it adopted.50

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The intelligence department of the War Office also questioned the Arabs’ ability to mount effective opposition against the British. The War Office argued that Arab nationalism was a theoretical rather than a practical movement. This was the result of ineffectual leadership and conflicting economic and political interests. The War Office analysts acknowledged that the Palestine question had produced a universal sentiment among the Arabs that could have been translated into action against British interests. Nonetheless, it was unlikely that the Arab governments would take direct action, given their military weakness and the presence of British forces in the region.51 The long-running tension between the Colonial Office and Foreign Office over British policy in the Middle East was reflected in their interpretations of the War Office analysis. For senior officials in the Colonial Office, the assessment confirmed their belief that the Foreign Office was overstating the strategic threat posed by the Arab states.52 The Colonial Office also doubted the reliability of Foreign Office reports. Sir John Shuckburgh believed that the Foreign Office was encouraging its representatives in the Middle East to exaggerate Arab hostility. He assumed that the Foreign Office was deliberately undermining the Colonial Office’s support for the Jewish National Home.53

The Royal Commission Report and Its Impact In July 1937, the Royal Commission published its report, which outlined a number of radical proposals. The commissioners argued that the conflict in Palestine was irrepressible, and that it would grow more serious in the future. The commission concluded that the mandate was unworkable since representative government could not be established.54 The report also proposed that Palestine be divided into two states, one Arab and one Jewish, and it recommended that the Arab part of Palestine be joined with Transjordan, under the rule of Abdullah. Both of these states would establish treaty relations with the British based on the Iraqi model.55 In tandem with the publication of the report, the government promulgated a white paper that laid out its support for partition.56 The Royal Commission’s recommendation

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that Palestine be partitioned into two states became the foundation for numerous future attempts to solve the Palestine question. The promulgation of the Royal Commission (referred to as the Peel Commission/Report after its chairman Earl Peel) report resulted in a bureaucratic battle between the Foreign and Colonial Offices that characterised Britain’s disjointed policy in the region. Rendel rejected partition and the proposal that the Arab part of Palestine be joined with Transjordan. Rendel believed that a united state under Abdullah would be rejected out of hand by Transjordan’s neighbours, who feared Abdullah’s expansionist policies. Rendel argued that the only solution was for the Arab parts of Palestine and Transjordan to be federated with Syria. 57 The reports that the Foreign Office received from the Middle East confirmed its worst fears.58 The governments in Baghdad and Damascus publicly denounced the Peel Report,59 whereas the Egyptian government, despite widespread public anger, was reluctant to take a position. Ibn Saud was opposed to partition because of his hostility to Abdullah’s becoming king of a united state, and the concomitant threat such an entity could pose to the regional balance of power.60 Glubb Pasha argued that Ibn Saud’s rejection of the unification of Arab Palestine and Transjordan gave him the opportunity to gain popularity in the Arab world as a defender of the Arab cause in Palestine.61 The Foreign Office argued that the Arab rejection of partition posed a severe threat to British interests, since the strained international situation was making Arab support increasingly important.62 Rendel reached the conclusion that the government should not commit itself to unqualified support for partition.63

Partition and the Foreign and Colonial Offices Rendel’s opposition to partition was reinforced by the renewal of violence in Palestine in the autumn of 1937.64 Rendel’s views came to the fore at an interdepartmental meeting at the Colonial Office in October 1937. Rendel outlined the Foreign Office’s objections to partition. These objections were challenged by Shuckburgh of the Colonial Office, who argued that reconsideration of partition would

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be construed as a sign of weakness. Shuckburgh suggested that if the government reversed its publicly stated policy the British should consider leaving Palestine. The views of the other Whitehall departments led Rendel to conclude that Britain’s position in the Middle East would be irreparably damaged by the government’s Palestine policy.65 Rendel was contemptuous of a Colonial Office suggestion that Arab opposition to partition should be ignored and that partition should be implemented.66 Rendel believed that the Middle East was ‘an organic whole . . . the frontiers are largely artificial creations, resting on no true national, geographical, ethnographical basis’. Rendel added that a strong reaction in one country would lead inevitably to reverberations elsewhere in the Middle East. He thus surmised that it was dangerous to deal with the Palestine question in isolation.67 Rendel’s attitudes were widely held in the Foreign Office68 and forcibly expressed by Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary, in the cabinet.69 Ormsby-Gore believed that the government could no longer rely on the Arab rulers to vitiate the stance of the Palestinian leadership because the Arab governments had become equally hostile to partition.70 Eden challenged the Colonial Secretary’s assumptions and stressed that partition would be resisted by the Arabs. He also argued that any attempt to impose partition by force would create a very serious situation in the Middle East for the British, especially in the event of a European war.71 In December 1937, the Colonial Office’s policy supporting partition was overruled by the cabinet.72 Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain supported the dispatch of a new commission of inquiry, whose narrow terms of reference were disclosed to Wauchope on 23 December 1937 and publicised in January 1938.73 The objective of the new Partition (Woodhead) Commission was to examine the practicability of partition, but as Chamberlain stated to the cabinet, the new commission should not be precluded from rejecting partition if it believed it was unworkable.74 The Colonial Office’s policy was defeated by the Foreign Office, despite efforts by Ormsby-Gore to persuade Chamberlain to reverse his opposition to partition.75 The new High Commissioner, Sir Harold

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MacMichael, supported Ormsby-Gore in his opposition to any Arab involvement in the affairs of Palestine because he believed that the neighbouring states should not be given an excuse to become involved in Palestine.76 By now senior officials at the Colonial Office in London understood that this point had been conceded.77 Michael Cohen and Martin Kolinsky argue that the reversal in government policy was an example of ‘appeasement’ whereby the government made significant concessions to the Arabs.78 By the autumn of 1938, the future of Palestine had become a serious distraction for the British government, which was focused on the threat posed by Nazi Germany and the expansion of Japanese influence in the Far East. Events on a global scale explain why Malcolm MacDonald, who was appointed Colonial Secretary in May 1938, explored alternatives to partition. MacDonald embarked on widespread consultations with the Chiefs of Staff and the Foreign Office to establish the strategic value of Palestine to the Empire,79 and he made a rare foray to Palestine in August 1938 to discuss the future with MacMichael and General Haining (the General Officer Commanding).80 The result of these consultations was that MacDonald adopted the anti-partition policy enunciated by the Eastern Department and the Chiefs of Staff. MacDonald agreed that concessions on Palestine were essential for the protection of Britain’s strategic interests in the Middle East.81 This meant that the Zionists would be forced to accept a complete suspension of immigration, and that the future of Palestine would be in abeyance until after the forthcoming world war. The Woodhead inquiry’s finding that partition was impracticable82 was supported by the Cabinet Committee on Palestine, and it was consonant with the prevailing mood in Whitehall.83 The Chamberlain government proposed to invite the Jewish Agency, the Palestinians, and representatives from the Arab states (not including Syria and Lebanon, which were still under the French mandate) to a conference in London in February 1939. The stated objective of the St. James’s Palace Conferences (two parallel conferences took place because the Arabs delegations refused to meet with the Zionists) was to negotiate solution to the Palestine problem.84 In practice, prior to the conferences the Foreign Office exerted strong pressure

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on Whitehall to formulate a policy that would satisfy Arab apprehensions.85 Nonetheless, it was widely assumed in Whitehall that the conference would fail.86 The government’s determination to find a solution to the Palestine question was given added urgency by the worsening situation in Europe and the Far East.87 The Chiefs of Staff published in February 1939 a European strategic appreciation that detailed how deeply imperial defence was interconnected between different regions. It showed that the Mediterranean and Middle East were crucial in communications between Europe and the Far East, especially if the Japanese sided with Germany and Italy in a world war. This would require the dispatch of a fleet from the Mediterranean to the Far East, thereby weakening the Royal Navy’s presence in the region and making the region vulnerable to Italian air and naval power.88 The Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC), a subcommittee of the Chiefs of Staff, believed that opposition was likely to materialise if the Palestine conferences failed to satisfy Arab demands. This led the JIC to predict that in the event of a European war, the British would face considerable hostility in the Arab world. Furthermore, if Egypt and Iraq refused to carry out their treaty obligations this would have a major impact on the military position in the Arab world.89 The pressure exerted by the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff to secure Great Britain’s position in the Middle East led the government to promulgate a white paper in May 1939 that proposed a radical reversal of policy in Palestine.90 The white paper stated that after ten years an independent Palestinian state would be established, and that it would have treaty relations with Great Britain. Jewish immigration would be limited to seventy-five thousand people over a five-year period, after which the consent of the Palestinians would be necessary. Finally, severe restrictions would be imposed on land purchases. The reaction to the white paper was almost entirely negative. The Chamberlain government was denounced in the House of Commons by allies of the Zionists, including Winston Churchill.91 The Mufti and the Arab states rejected the white paper out of hand92 (because they would not accept any solution short of complete sovereignty over Palestine), whereas the reaction in Transjordan was muted.93 Abdullah

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argued that the Mufti and his allies were making a serious political error by rejecting the white paper.94 Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi supported Abdullah’s approach, which had the effect of reconciling them after a two-year estrangement.95 The Zionists regarded it as a fatal blow to their aspirations, and in spite of their unswerving rejection of the new policy, Weizmann made it clear to the government that the Jews would support the British in the forthcoming war.96 Whitehall remained committed to the white paper policy during the war. Nonetheless, a number of proposals were made for a federal solution to the Palestine problem between 1939 and 1942.97

Abdullah Seeks New Support: Land Deals with the Jewish Agency Abdullah was willing to lease land to the Zionists in order to overcome the limitations imposed by the British on his civil list. Abdullah also sought to encourage investment in Transjordan to ameliorate the country’s abject poverty and to supplement the Colonial Office’s limited funds for economic development. However, Abdullah’s willingness to negotiate with the Zionists had far-reaching political ramifications, leading to accusations that he was acting out of self-interest. The Zionists hoped to lease land from Abdullah and some of the leading families in Transjordan as a precursor to the Jewish settlement, but these efforts were unlikely to succeed because of British opposition and the absence of a comprehensive settlement strategy. The dire economic conditions that prevailed in Transjordan during the late 1920s and early 1930s were the main reason why Abdullah and the shaikhs contemplated leasing land to the Zionists.98 By the early 1930s, the tribal shaikhs, who were important landowners in the country, had been suffering from persistent drought and reduced to abject poverty.99 In 1932, several concerted efforts were made by the Zionists to advance their interests in Transjordan. Zionist diplomats understood the importance of continuing contacts with both Abdullah and the leading notables of the country.100 A number of considerations hastened Zionist interest in Transjordan. First, many Zionists believed

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that Palestine lacked enough suitable land to facilitate large-scale immigration. Second, Chaim Arlosoroff, head of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department between 1931 and 1933, developed an activist policy regarding the development of ties with neighbouring Arab rulers. Shlomo Avineri suggests that Arlosoroff’s contacts with Abdullah and the shaikhs in Transjordan were based on pragmatic grounds rather than a conviction that Transjordan was part of the biblical Jewish homelands, as argued by the Revisionist Zionists.101 The Colonial Office remained the key impediment to Zionist settlement in Transjordan. As one official wrote to Wauchope, ‘We are inclined to think that it would be impossible for the Palestine Government to take any steps to promote the settlement of Jews in Transjordan without arousing Arab suspicion that an endeavour was being made to extend the scope of the Balfour Declaration beyond the borders of Palestine’.102 The Zionists knew from their intelligence sources that Colonel Cox, the British Resident in Amman, was an outspoken opponent of Zionist penetration of Transjordan.103 Nonetheless, Arlosoroff and Weizmann understood the importance of cultivating the support of the British and the shaikhs of Transjordan.104 The Zionists continued to regard the shaikhs as a significant source of influence in Transjordan.105 Nonetheless, the lack of a coherent settlement plan made Zionist settlement in Transjordan purely speculative. In September 1932, Moshe Shertok (Sharett) proposed to the Jewish Agency Executive (JAE), the highest decision-making body in the Yishuv, that the development of ties with Transjordan take place gradually.106 In November 1932, two members of the JAE, Heschel Farbstein and Emanuel Neumann, were unilaterally responsible for signing an option to lease sixty-five thousand dunams in Ghaur alKibd in the Jordan valley.107 This was a portion of the land that had been granted to Abdullah in 1929, and according to the agreement, the Zionists would receive a six-month option, costing £500.108 If the lease was activated, it would run for a period of thirty-three years and would be renewable for two further periods of the same duration. According to the agreement, Abdullah would receive rent of £2,000 per annum plus 5 per cent of the profits from produce grown on the land.109

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Abdullah was responsible for approaching Neumann and Farbstein concerning the leasing, without informing Cox or Wauchope.110 The lease was legally valid, and British officials were furious that Abdullah had presented them with a fait accompli.111 The agreement was equally problematic for the Zionist leadership, since it exemplified the risks inherent in unauthorised activities by members of the JAE. Weizmann stressed that Neumann’s political ambitions presented grave political consequences for Zionist relations with the British.112 The lease was renewed on an annual basis until the spring of 1939 and cost the Jewish Agency £20,000. Smaller payments were also made to the leading shaikhs of Transjordan and to the Circassian and Christian communities in Transjordan to maintain land leases.113 The Zionists also paid Abdullah an additional £3,700 between February 1936 and March 1938.114 Moshe Shertok reached the conclusion that the lease ‘has taken, for all practical purposes the form of a political subsidy to the Emir’.115 Yoav Gelber characterises these transactions as a bribe.116 The Jewish Agency’s payments to Abdullah were a substantial and undeclared addition to his civil list, and there can be little doubt that they served their purpose in helping Abdullah maintain order in Transjordan. Notwithstanding Gelber’s view that these payments were ‘insignificant’, they served an objective similar that of the far more substantial amounts disbursed by Glubb to the tribes. The Political Department regarded this expenditure as a long-term investment in Abdullah and the notables in Transjordan, but it is difficult to identify a tangible political return. Nevertheless, there was a meeting of interests—Abdullah benefited financially and the Zionists fostered a relationship that secured the eastern border of Palestine. Mary Wilson argues that Abdullah paid the price for being too eager to make money without taking into consideration the political consequences, concluding that, ‘in a sense, Britain had provided the rope and Abdullah had hanged himself’.117 Abdullah had little choice but to turn to the Zionists, or any other source of financing, due to his large personal expenditure and because the British had cut his civil list. Wilson is correct in arguing that the Amir must have underestimated the political consequences of his urgent need for money.

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The agreement had a widespread impact.118 Arlosoroff and Weizmann knew that the lease would create significant problems with the British.119 Arlosoroff made no effort to hide his dislike of the agreement in his meetings with Sir Arthur Wauchope.120 Colonel Cox believed that Abdullah had intentionally misled him about the lease, whereas the Amir tried to placate Cox and Wauchope by stating that he would forego the deal if ordered to do so.121 Wauchope believed that the lease was an error, and that it was unwise to allow Jewish immigration into Transjordan. The High Commissioner believed that banning the lease would have serious repercussions with Abdullah and the Zionists,122 but he concurred with the Air Officer Commanding (AOC) in Palestine that colonisation must be prohibited on the grounds of security for settlers.123 George Rendel’s opinion, the head of the Eastern Department of the Foreign Office, was damning. He wrote that the lease showed Abdullah had been ‘running with the hare and hunting with hounds over the question of Jewish settlement in Transjordan, and is now trying to fasten the responsibility for a decision on HMG’.124 The lease quickly became public knowledge in the Arabic press.125 In spite of the publication of denials of the lease by the Royal Diwan (the royal office of the king), Abdullah came under strong pressure from the Istiqlal (an Arab independence party) in Palestine, and from the Mufti of Jerusalem, to renounce the lease.126 The reaction in Transjordan was mixed. Cox observed that the population was divided into two groups, one consisting of people, especially landowners, who could also benefit from leasing their land,127 and the second consisting of people who had no land to sell. The latter section of the population instigated muted demonstrations against the agreement, for example in Salt in February 1933.128 King Faisal of Iraq called on Abdullah to deny his contacts with the Zionists publicly. Faisal told Abdullah that he had brought disgrace and humiliation on his family, and all but ruin on himself because of his relations with the Zionists, adding that the Arabs would never permit the Jews to colonise Transjordan without a struggle.129 Faisal was engaged in a long-standing attempt to establish Hashemite rule in a united Iraq, Syria and Transjordan.130 Abdullah harboured similar

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aspirations, but with himself not Faisal as sovereign, and thus opposed his brother’s unification plans.131 Philip Khoury argues that the re-establishment of a monarchy in Syria was supported by religious leaders and retired Sharifian officers, but without any agreement on a candidate. The movement faced concerted opposition from the urban notables of Damascus and the members of the nationalist National Bloc.132 Glubb believed that proposals to unify Iraq and Transjordan were intended to forestall Zionist penetration of Transjordan.133 Following Faisal’s death in September 1933, these plans collapsed and Abdullah became the leader of the Hashemite movement in Iraq, Syria and Transjordan.134 Mary Wilson argues that Abdullah’s relationship with the Jewish Agency underlined his unsuitability to replace Faisal.135 Rendel was entirely opposed to Hashemite aggrandisement and believed that Arab unity was an illusion. He developed a multifaceted argument to justify this opposition. He argued that any attempt to unify Syria and Transjordan would conflict with the mandate, and that Transjordan had not reached a level of development that justified independence. Even if Transjordan fulfilled these terms, the possibility of Jewish settlement precluded Transjordan from becoming independent. Rendel’s views were dominated by his animosity towards Abdullah, as exemplified in his claim that the Amir ‘has proved a disappointing ruler . . . and has shown himself so short-sighted and untrustworthy that it is difficult to see how HMG could recommend his emancipation from British rule’.136 Rendel was a consistent and influential opponent of Abdullah during his long tenure at the Eastern Department. His opposition to Transjordan’s receiving independence marked a trend in Foreign Office thinking that denied Abdullah independence until 1946, regardless of his loyalty to the British. Rendel’s views should be seen in terms of his support for Ibn Saud and the implications an independent Transjordan would have posed for relations with the Saudi King.137 Abdullah’s relations with the Zionist movement in Palestine were the most contentious feature of his political life. Abdullah was widely regarded as a traitor to the Arab cause on account of his contacts with the Zionists, which included the lease of land to them in Transjordan.

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Abdullah made various proposals to the Zionists that involved their incorporation into a Hashemite kingdom in which they would enjoy religious and political rights but not sovereignty. Abdullah can be regarded as a moderate alternative to the fanatical anti-Zionism of some of his opponents. Relations between Abdullah and Jewish Agency became more significant during the 1930s, but there was little chance of the two parties’ reaching anything other than a modus vivendi concerning the future of Palestine. Abdullah’s ability to extend his influence to Palestine was also circumscribed by the opposition of the Palestinian Arab population, and in particular the Mufti of Jerusalem. Palestine was just one aspect of Abdullah’s dynastic aspirations, which focused on the Syrian throne. The lease for the land in Ghaur al-Kibd provided the Zionists with a convenient excuse to maintain their contacts with the Amir. Shertok knew from intelligence sources, however, that Cox and Wauchope remained opposed to Jewish colonisation,138 so he told Wauchope that there were no plans to settle Jews in Transjordan.139 The Zionists adopted a cautious approach in their relations with Abdullah, which was exemplified by the Jewish Agency’s handling of Abdullah’s visit to London in June 1934. The Political Department maintained regular contacts with Abdullah’s confidant Muhammad al-Unsi, who informed the Zionists that the Amir would do everything he could to find a solution to the Palestine issue while he was in London.140 Shertok concluded that the visit was intended to fulfil several objectives, which included increasing Abdullah’s standing in Transjordan and the Arab world, discussing treaty amendments, and showing that he was not just a titular head of government, but an important ruler and the successor to Faisal.141 Nothing of substance was discussed during Abdullah’s visit to London, but the Colonial Office was concerned about the ramifications of Abdullah’s contacts with the Zionists and the Amir’s perennial shortage of funds.142 The British tended to have a limited knowledge of relations between Abdullah and the Zionists,143 relying on rumour and on what the Zionists were willing to divulge.144 The British, therefore, were unaware of Abdullah’s proposal to the Zionists

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in early 1935 to unify Palestine and Transjordan under his crown.145 For the Zionists, this plan was inimical to establishing a Jewish state in Palestine, because it envisaged the Yishuv as a millet (the Ottoman system of granting rights to non-Muslim minorities) in a Hashemite kingdom.146 Relations between Abdullah and the Jewish Agency become more complex following the outbreak of the revolt in Palestine in April 1936. Abdullah’s representatives and the Political Department regularly shared information of mutual interest. In April 1936, Abdullah tried to persuade Shertok of the advantages of the Zionists’ participating in a Legislative Council,147 and accepting a temporary cessation of immigration.148 The Zionists rejected these proposals, which led Abdullah to believe that they were not interested in coming to an understanding with the Arabs.149 Shertok concluded that the complexity of events in Palestine, and Abdullah’s attempt to mediate with the Arab leadership, meant that there was little chance of the Zionists’ furthering their objective of settlement in Transjordan.150 Avi Shlaim is therefore correct in arguing that Abdullah was of limited political value to the Zionists in 1936 because he sought to influence all the sides.151

Abdullah Sees New Opportunities: Palestine and Syria The rebellion in Palestine in 1936 was both a threat and an opportunity for Abdullah. The situation was a cause for concern because of the possibility that disorder might spread to Transjordan, but it did give Abdullah the opportunity to expand his influence in Palestine. The British, concerned that a recurrence of violence in Palestine would inevitably spread to Transjordan, sought ways to keep the population quiescent.152 In September 1935, Glubb proposed that £10,000 in gold be disbursed by the government to the shaikhs and notables to keep them from being swayed by calls to support the Arabs in Palestine. Glubb understood that Abdullah’s support was essential for keeping Transjordan quiet, and he suggested that agitators should be sent into internal exile, for example to Aqaba.153 Glubb also believed

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that the Arabic press in Palestine should be censored, and that enemy radio propaganda should be countered.154 The commander of British forces in Palestine believed that if these measures failed, the security forces would have to resort to force to keep Transjordan under control.155 Although Abdullah had every reason to support these proposals, the situation showed that the British had to rely on the Amir and his skill in mediating with the population.156 Abdullah also played an important role in negotiating with the Palestinian Arab leadership to call off the revolt, and he sought the Political Department’s advice on the strategy he should adopt.157 By the spring of 1936, Abdullah had developed a range of contacts in Palestine and Syria intended to advance his political interests. Abdullah’s strategy in Palestine was based on developing close ties with opponents of the Mufti alongside his relations with the Zionists.158 Abdullah established a dialogue with a number of Palestinian notables including Farid Irshid (Jenin), Sulayman Tuqan (Nablus) and the Nashashibi family— which had established the National Defence Party in the autumn of 1934. The development of relations with the Nashashibis, particularly Raghib Bey, the patriarch of the family and leader of the National Defence Party, gave Abdullah the opportunity to extend his influence in Palestine. Abdullah and the Nashashibis shared a common interest in undermining the power of the Mufti, and in December 1935 Raghib Bey told Elias Sasson of the Jewish Agency that he supported Abdullah’s Greater Syria aspirations.159 Abdullah also took advantage of the political crisis in Syria to promote his claim to the Syrian throne. He reminded Sir Arthur Wauchope about Churchill’s promise in March 1921 to support his candidacy for the Syrian throne.160 More significantly, Abdullah was determined to thwart the National Bloc from achieving independence because of the implications this would have for his ambitions in Syria. Hence, in April 1936, Abdullah proposed to the National Bloc that Syria and Transjordan be united, with him as their King. The National Bloc was republican and thus rejected Abdullah’s overture. Likewise, the French High Commissioner, the Comte de Martel, opposed the idea because it implied territorial aggrandisement for the British, which would undermine French influence in Syria.161

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According to Sasson, the Amir sought to improve his relations with the nationalist Istiqlal party to win their support for his objectives in Syria.162 Sasson believed that Abdullah’s efforts were unsuccessful because most Syrian nationalists firmly opposed Abdullah’s plans.163 Abdullah also received a sharp rebuke from Wauchope for meddling in Syrian politics, which was obviously contrary to the 1928 AngloTransjordan Agreement.164 Nonetheless, Abdullah sporadically sought to rejuvenate his interest in Syria. There is little evidence to support Joseph Nevo’s contention that Abdullah used the first phase of the revolt as a long-term investment to establish his position in Palestine.165 In practice, Abdullah’s attempts to mediate with the Arab leadership, and in particular with the Mufti of Jerusalem, were futile because the Palestinians rejected his interference.166 Nonetheless, Abdullah did receive support from the Nashashibis in 1936,167 which can be attributed to the power struggle between the Mufti and Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi.168 Inevitably, the Mufti rejected Abdullah’s assistance because of the Amir’s relationship with the British, the Zionists and the Nashashibis.169 Nuri al-Said’s mediation threatened to eclipse Abdullah’s position as the main intermediary with the Palestinian leaders.170 Abdullah told Sir Henry Cox that allowing Arab leaders like Nuri to mediate would complicate efforts to find a solution.171 The Zionists were equally critical of the government’s policy of permitting foreign governments to interfere in the internal affairs of Palestine.172 Weizmann severely criticised Wauchope’s handling of the situation and argued that Nuri’s mediation would have grave implications.173 Nonetheless, the Zionists were willing to cooperate with the authorities in Palestine to suppress the revolt.174 The Zionists also benefited from their ability to acquire large quantities of documents from within the government offices in Jerusalem, which gave them unprecedented insight into British relations with Abdullah and the attitudes of British officials concerning the development of government policy.175 The Criminal Investigation Department of the Palestine police was well aware of the inherent weaknesses of the bureaucracy, which relied heavily on Arab and Jewish staff.176 These lapses in security were unexceptional at the time, and the evidence suggests that the

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British embassies in Berlin and Rome failed to adopt rigorous security procedures.177

Abdullah, the Royal Commission and Partition Abdullah was the first Arab leader to give evidence to the Royal Commission, which visited him in Amman on 9 January 1937.178 Abdullah presented a moderate view of events in Palestine and submitted a memorandum to the Royal Commission in which he argued that the Arabs could not find any historical justification for the Jewish claim in Palestine. He proceeded to challenge the Balfour Declaration and the provisions of the mandate, which he claimed favoured the Jews.179 The Political Department received a verbatim transcript of Abdullah’s meeting with the Royal Commission, which indicates the extent to which Abdullah and the Jewish Agency were willing to share information.180 But the Zionists had every reason to think that Abdullah was playing off all sides for his own benefit. Abdullah visited London in May 1937 to attend the coronation of King George VI. David Ben-Gurion, the head of the Jewish Agency in Palestine and the General Secretary of the Histadut trade union, instructed two colleagues, David Hacohen and Dov Hoz, to meet with Abdullah. They outlined an agreement that involved Abdullah’s support for Jewish colonisation in Transjordan in exchange for Jewish financial and political support. Abdullah showed no interest in this idea,181 which led Moshe Shertok to note that Ben-Gurion had little comprehension of the complexities of Abdullah’s position.182 There is reason to believe that for Abdullah, these talks were of more tangential interest than his treaty negotiations with the British. Prior to his visit to London, Abdullah requested that the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement be revised, and that Transjordan be allowed to join the League of Nations. Wauchope objected to this idea and hoped that the Amir would receive a definite rebuff.183 The Colonial Secretary concurred, believing that it was impossible to accede to this request prior to the publication of the Royal Commission report.184

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The Royal Commission report was published in July 1937 and was widely condemned by the Palestinian political parties. Abdullah was the only Arab leader who publicly supported it, and in particular its proposal to amalgamate the Arab portion of Palestine with Transjordan.185 Abdullah failed to persuade the Mufti to adopt a moderate approach and to accept partition by offering him the position of Prime Minister in the new state.186 Alec Kirkbride, deputy Resident in Amman, reported that the majority of the population in Transjordan was uninterested in the findings of the Royal Commission. Nonetheless, he observed that a minority of Transjordanians was opposed to the Peel Report because they feared their position in the Transjordan government might be threatened by unification with Palestine.187 Ma’an Abu Nowar notes that between 1935 and 1942 the spread of secondary education led to the development of a small educated class. However, in contrast to the elites in neighbouring states, the political influence of the educated population was limited to demanding revision of the 1928 agreement.188 The absence of an educated middle class explains why Transjordan did not experience the anti-British nationalism characteristic of Egypt and Iraq. Nonetheless, since May 1936, there had been signs of unrest in Transjordan, including acts of sabotage against the pipeline, interference with the telephone system, and several bombings in Amman. The authorities also found it difficult to prevent the movement of arms and men from Syria to Palestine via Transjordan. Sir Henry Cox and Glubb did not think a general uprising would occur in Transjordan so long as the government continued to pay subsidies to the notables. The government enacted a series of laws that enforced heavy penalties against agitators, who were exiled to Aqaba and desert posts. In tandem with these efforts, Abdullah used his personal influence to keep the country under control. Abdullah and the British succeeded in preventing the violence in Palestine from affecting the population in Transjordan. Nonetheless, Abdullah’s acceptance of partition had significant consequences. It led Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi and the National Defence Party to disassociate themselves temporarily from Abdullah.189 This schism points to the fraught nature of Abdullah’s relations with the

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Nashashibis and suggests that Abdullah’s power base in Palestine was weak. Abdullah’s unpopularity in Palestine raised serious doubts about the viability of partition. The Colonial Secretary instructed Wauchope to tell the Amir that the government was not committed to the unification of Arab Palestine with Transjordan. Ormsby-Gore also authorised Wauchope to tell Abdullah that he should not push his claim too hard, otherwise, he might prejudice his chances with the government and the Palestinians.190 Ormsby-Gore understood that Abdullah’s support for partition made him a liability in the face of concerted Arab opposition.191 Abdullah’s close relations with the British and his acceptance of government policy significantly diminished his prestige. It raised doubts in the minds of Arab leaders about his adherence to the Palestinian cause and reinforced the belief that he was a Trojan horse for British interests. Abdullah maintained his contacts with the Zionists, a dialogue based on the exchange of information on events in Palestine and in the Arab world.192 Abdullah looked to the Zionists to counter the influence of the Mufti,193 and sought their advice concerning his testimony to the Partition Commission. He was concerned that reiterating his support for partition might turn the Arab world against him.194 In May 1938, Abdullah presented the Partition Commission with a twelve-point programme calling for the establishment of an Arab kingdom that would be constituted from Palestine and Transjordan. Abdullah envisaged that the Jews would form autonomous districts, which would enjoy the rights and privileges of the rest of the kingdom. Jewish immigration, however, would be limited in numbers and confined to the Jewish district only. This plan reiterated earlier proposals made by Abdullah, and although it does not mention him by name, there can be little doubt that he envisaged himself as the ruler of this entity.195 The commission rejected Abdullah’s unsolicited proposal because it was beyond the panel’s terms of reference.196 George Wadsworth, the American Consul in Jerusalem, noted that Abdullah’s proposal was the first suggestion from an Arab source that a compromise might be possible.197 Abdullah’s initiative was related to a resurgence of his

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interest in the Syrian throne and consonant with his long-standing aspirations. Colonel Peake, the commander of the Arab Legion, noted that the Amir ‘passionately longs for a crown and would accept one at once from Syria or any other country’.198

Abdullah and the Revolt in Palestine The failure to suppress the Arab riots in Palestine during 1936 had significant long-term implications. The rebellion became a full-blown insurgency, threatening to undermine the authority of the mandate. It also had significant regional ramifications, strengthening pan-Arab sentiment. A further spate of violence in Palestine had been predicted since June 1937.199 The Foreign Office’s profound opposition to partition and its consequences was reinforced by a resurgence of violence in Palestine in September 1937.200 The recrudescence of terrorism in Palestine was a response to the Peel Report, and a result of the British failure in 1936 to suppress the armed gangs. Ormsby-Gore acquitted Wauchope of responsibility for the failure of the policy of ‘extreme conciliation’, but in reality, the High Commissioner’s unprecedented second term of office can be judged a failure and was curtailed early.201 Sir Henry Cox reported that the Mufti and his allies were making every effort to involve the Transjordan population in the revolutionary events in Palestine.202 The Mufti had taken for granted in 1936 that the population of Transjordan would come to the Palestinians’ assistance and was surprised when help failed to materialise. Kirkbride warned in December 1936 that in the event of further trouble in Palestine, the Arab leadership would do everything it could to secure the active assistance of the Transjordan population.203 Abdullah had every reason to be concerned about the encouragement of sedition in Transjordan. Muhammad al-Unsi, Abdullah’s confidant and go-between with the Zionists, reported that the Amir continued to support partition, despite the Mufti’s efforts to suborn Abdullah’s allies.204 The Mufti’s attempts to gain support in Transjordan were thwarted by Glubb’s steps to control the population, measures that had proved their value since 1936. Hajj Amin al-Husayni’s efforts to

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undermine public security in Transjordan and Palestine continued after he escaped to Lebanon in the autumn of 1937. The British accused the Mufti of organising the dispatch of armed rebel units from Syria to Palestine.205 These efforts were curtailed following the fortification of the Syria-Palestine frontier and the Arab Legion’s suppression of guerrilla bands that sought to take advantage of Transjordan’s long frontier with Palestine.206 Nonetheless, the Mufti’s popularity and his support for the Germans in the Second World War were a significant threat to British interests. This led to proposals to kidnap or assassinate the Mufti, which were rejected by the Foreign Office because of the harm such drastic measures would do to British prestige.207 Abdullah had cause to be concerned about an Arab congress that met in Bludan in Syria in September 1937. The conference was instigated by the Mufti to mobilise public opinion in the Arab world, and thus pressure the British to abandon partition.208 Elie Kedourie argues that the Bludan congress was a landmark in Arab involvement in the Palestine question.209 As a result of strong pressure exerted on the Arab governments, especially by Colonel Mackereth, the British Consul in Damascus, the congress proceeded with unofficial representatives from Syria, Palestine, Lebanon, Iraq, Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Transjordan. Abdullah sought to prevent delegates from Transjordan from attending, fearing he would be censured for accepting partition.210 Bludan was significant because a political committee established at the congress enunciated a number of proposals that included the termination of the mandate and the rejection of a Jewish state in Palestine. The committee called for an Arab government to be established in Palestine, similar to the one in Iraq, which would be related to the British by means of a treaty. These demands were endorsed by the congress as a whole.211 Meanwhile, Abdullah was trying to take advantage of the situation in Syria. By the end of 1937, Abdullah’s attempts to advance his interests in Syria received added momentum, following the pardoning and return of a number of Syrian political exiles.212 They included Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar and Sultan al-Atrash, who recruited participants in the Arab Revolt, such as Fawzi and Nasib al-Bakri. Abdullah

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encouraged his Syrian Druze allies to demand the secession of the Jebel Druze and its annexation by Transjordan. In December 1938, an important Druze leader and long-standing supporter of Abdullah, Abd al-Ghaffar Pasha al-Atrash, made such a request to Mackereth, who reported that the Druze would declare independence from Syria and support Abdullah.213 Abdullah’s renewed interest was intended to thwart Nuri al-Said’s plans for an Arab federation including Palestine, Transjordan, Iraq and perhaps Syria.214 Both MacMichael and Cox warned the Colonial Office of the threat posed by such a plan, and the dangers of overlooking Abdullah.215 But Lacy Baggallay, Rendel’s successor as head of the Eastern Department, wrote a minute stating that federation was not a viable solution to the Palestine question. He also believed that whoever was chosen to rule such a kingdom, others would be unhappy, but that the government should show sympathy for the general idea of federation.216 Shertok surmised that Abdullah’s plan was a tactical move designed to screen the Amir from criticism in the Arab world if partition was rejected, and to serve as a feeler for exploring alternatives.217 The Jewish Agency also submitted several memoranda to the commission,218 including a detailed document that extolled the advantages of extending the boundaries of the proposed Jewish state to include part of Transjordan.219 The Zionists sought to persuade the commission that Transjordan would benefit from the influx of Jewish capital and immigrants. Nonetheless, the commission rejected Zionist proposals on the advice of the military authorities, who stressed the military limitations of this idea.220 This proposal was futile, and the Jewish Agency’s intelligence sources within the Palestine government had provided ample information since the early 1930s that detailed the government’s emphatic opposition to Zionist penetration of Transjordan.

Abdullah and the St. James’s Palace Conferences By 1939, it was becoming increasingly apparent that a war might break out, which focused British attention on events in Europe. Because the defence of the British Empire had become increasingly interconnected,

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it was widely felt in London that steps must be taken to prevent the situation in Palestine from affecting Britain’s prestige in the Middle East. The possibility that the St. James’s Palace Conferences would achieve a negotiated settlement was virtually nil. By 1939, Abdullah’s ambitions in Palestine had been thwarted by the failure of the Peel Commission’s partition proposal, and by Foreign Office objections to the expansion of his kingdom. Furthermore, his attempts to acquire the Syrian throne faced implacable opposition from the Syrian nationalist movement. After eighteen years of development, Transjordan had become a ‘moderately prosperous country’ that faced three main challenges: security, land development and improving the standard of living.221 In spite of the Arab uprising in Palestine, the country remained relatively peaceful, with little sign of any organised opposition to Abdullah’s rule under British tutelage. Nonetheless, it was impossible for Transjordan to remain immune from international developments, and Abdullah was feeling increasingly constrained in his small desert kingdom. Abdullah accepted the invitation to attend the St. James’s Palace Conferences in London, and he nominated his Prime Minister, Tawfiq Abul Huda, to represent him.222 Abdullah, however, was more interested in negotiations with the British concerning his status than in the conferences. Abdullah’s bitter disappointment that partition had fallen through led him to demand a revision of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement.223 Abdullah requested that his title be changed to King, that his civil list be increased to £18,000 per annum, and that Transjordan be allowed to establish consular representation in neighbouring capitals.224 Colonel Cox recommended that these points be granted immediately as a ‘reward for good service and a guarantee for the future’. He argued that the granting of foreign representation would enhance Transjordan’s prestige, and that control of the budget should be relaxed. MacMichael and MacDonald agreed that these points should be conceded.225 Kirkbride advised the High Commissioner that experience showed that acceding to a small request made as a personal favour enabled him to refuse a dangerous proposal or effect some reform without opposition, whereas if the request was refused, the atmosphere became chilly and obstruction was met at

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every turn.226 These proposals were of limited interest to the Foreign Office, apart from Abdullah’s request to establish consular representation in the neighbouring capitals and his desire to raise his status. The Eastern Department rejected the proposal that Abdullah become King on the grounds that this would offend ‘certain neighbouring countries’ (which meant the Saudis) and would give the impression that the British intended to make Abdullah King of a united Palestine and Transjordan.227 Tawfiq Abul Huda played a minimal role in the proceedings of the conferences, but he held a number of meetings with Malcolm MacDonald. In a discussion held at the Colonial Office on 19 January, he proposed that Transjordan be united with Syria and Palestine so that it could become a more viable entity. Abul Huda was clearly aware of the difficulties entailed in such a plan, but he hoped that the international situation would make it possible to divest the French of Syria, thereby allowing the union of the three countries.228 In subsequent consultations, besides making the case for constitutional changes,229 he stressed that Transjordan was the nearest country to Palestine and that it had a special interest in preventing disorder from spreading across the border.230 Abul Huda also pointed out that Abdullah had warned the British about the dangers of immigration prior to the disturbances, and that he was personally afraid of an indefinite Jewish National Home.231 The future of the Arab Legion was important to the British and to Abdullah. The Arab Legion, which numbered 1,941 men in 1939, was still regarded by Glubb and the British as a police force responsible for internal security.232 According to Article 10 of the 1928 agreement, Abdullah was precluded from raising or maintaining military forces without British consent. Abdullah requested that this article be rescinded so that the Arab Legion could be transformed into a fully fledged army under the command of an Arab officer.233 Sir Harold MacMichael noted that Abdullah showed great interest in the development of the Arab Legion, but he contended that a British officer must be in command for the foreseeable future. In fact, British officers continued to dominate the higher echelons of the army until King Husayn,234 Abdullah’s grandson, dismissed Glubb in March 1956.

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The Colonial Office was willing to amend the 1928 agreement insofar as financial control and the Arab Legion were concerned. MacMichael argued that British officials including the Resident, his deputy and the legal advisor would be retained indefinitely, but it would be possible to replace junior British officers with locally recruited personnel if they received adequate training. MacMichael argued for less interference in the ‘pettifogging trivialities’ of determining the budget and said he should only be concerned with major questions of policy.235 MacMichael’s enlightened attitude towards granting a modicum of autonomy was undoubtedly influenced by his considerable experience of imperial rule in the Sudan and subsequently in Tanganyika (Tanzania). Although the High Commissioner was willing to support a gradual reduction in British interference in Transjordan, in practice the country relied almost entirely on the British subsidy to maintain its economy. The reliance on British financial support and the continuation of the system of indirect influence, personified by the Resident, suggests that the concessions were granted for reasons of Transjordan’s prestige. A handful of British officials continued to have considerable backstairs influence in Transjordan, and this did not change when Sir Henry Cox and Colonel Peake retired in March 1939. Their replacements, Alec Kirkbride and John Glubb, played a key role in the politics of Transjordan for years to come. Kirkbride believed that Abdullah was content with the revisions to the 1928 agreement, and he argued that the concessions had enhanced the King’s prestige.236 The British still regarded Abdullah as a relatively minor regional potentate in spite of the amendments to the 1928 agreement. The reaction to the white paper policy on Palestine gave Abdullah another opportunity to press his claim in Syria.237 In June 1939, two of Abdullah’s allies in Syria, Abd al-Rahman Shahbandar and Fawzi al-Bakri, led a delegation to Amman to discuss an initiative to remove the National Bloc government and install Abdullah as King.238 Kirkbride believed that the relationship between Abdullah and Shahbandar was based on mutual interest. Abdullah’s advantage in dealing with Shahbandar and his allies was that they might be able to help him in his campaign for the Syrian throne if the French decided to establish a monarchy in the country.239

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Nonetheless, Glubb and Kirkbride were at odds concerning the extent of Abdullah’s support in Syria. Glubb maintained that the Amir had strong support in the country and that many Syrians thought he would become King. Kirkbride was more circumspect,240 believing that the Amir was either dissatisfied with British policy in Transjordan or wished to sever his connection with Transjordan. Kirkbride advised that so long as the Amir did nothing to antagonise the French it would be a mistake to oppose him, since this would embitter Abdullah.241 Subsequently the Foreign Office concurred that action should only be taken if the French complained.242 Philip Khoury notes that the French High Commissioner of Syria favoured a Syrian monarchy on the grounds that the Franco-Syrian Treaty of 1936 would be more likely to last under a monarchy. Khoury argues that minorities in Syria, such as the Alawites and the Druze, preferred a monarch from a distinguished dynasty to politicians in Damascus. Khoury contends that the French favoured the Saudi dynasty over the Hashemites because they believed that Saudis would emphasise Islam rather than Arab nationalism.243 Indeed, at the time it was reported that the French had asked Ibn Saud whether he was interested in one of his sons’ becoming King of Syria.244 The Syrian nationalists were divided over the merits of unity, but the National Bloc sought Ibn Saud’s intervention to thwart Abdullah.245 The renewal of Abdullah’s interest in the Syrian throne was intended to thwart yet another attempt by Nuri al-Said to advance the cause of an Arab federation, and in particular the absorption of Transjordan into Iraq.246 Sir Harold MacMichael was convinced that Nuri was trying to use Abdullah as a pawn,247 and Abdullah refused to discuss the issue with his nephew Ghazi, whom he referred to as a ‘boy and a crook’.248 Meir Zamir argues that Emile Eddé, the Maronite President of Lebanon, considered both Abdullah’s Greater Syria concept and Nuri’s programme to be threats to Maronite domination of Lebanese politics.249 Most nationalist politicians in Syria and Lebanon opposed Abdullah’s Greater Syria project because it was inimical to their desire to establish republican regimes unfettered by outside interference. The Foreign Office also objected to either Abdullah’s or Ibn Saud’s acquiring the Syrian throne because of the regional implications.250 Lacy

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Baggallay of the Eastern Department believed that the British should vigorously promote pan-Arabism, but he concluded that supporting an Arab federation was ‘a very risky experiment’ from the point of view of relations with the Arab states, France and Turkey.251 Baggallay’s views were widely shared within the Foreign Office and dominated British policy on pan-Arabism during the early years of the war.252

Conclusion By the 1930s, British policy in the Middle East was affected by an economically and politically overstretched imperial system. The Abyssinian crisis showed that the British were vulnerable to challenges to their hegemonic position in the Middle East. The revolt in Palestine, and the government’s failure to suppress the Arab rebellion, was symptomatic of weakness. The British believed that they had to make significant political concessions to the Arabs to prevent a further weakening of their strategic position in the region. These concerns and Arab opposition to the partition of Palestine led the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff to reject the idea, culminating in the imposition of a policy in 1939 that favoured the Arab states. During the 1930s, Transjordan remained an imperial backwater, almost entirely dependent on British support. Relations between Abdullah and the British were determined by the 1928 AngloTransjordan Agreement, which guaranteed the Empire’s limited interests in the country. The British continued to regard Abdullah as a minor potentate and only showed interest in Transjordan in the context of regional developments. Abdullah was determined to expand his interests and, in contrast with other Arab leaders, entered into a dialogue with the Zionist movement. Abdullah consistently advocated a moderate policy regarding the Zionists, but his proposals to incorporate the Jewish population in Palestine under his rule were certain to fail because the Zionists sought to establish a sovereign state in Palestine. Abdullah’s willingness to lease land to the Zionists was intended to overcome significant financial limitations imposed by the British, who were unwilling to subsidise the economic development of Transjordan. Nonetheless, Abdullah’s pragmatism had

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significant political implications and led to widespread distrust of his motives. Abdullah’s attempts to mediate between the British and the Palestinian national movement were hindered by his well-known desire to annex Palestine. The British rejected proposals made by the Royal Commission in 1937 that the Arab areas of Palestine be incorporated into Transjordan because they believed that Abdullah’s rivals, such as Ibn Saud, would object to Hashemite aggrandisement.

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CHAPTER 4 THE COMPLEXIT Y OF DECOLONISATION: THE END OF THE M ANDATE, 1944–1947

At the end of the Second World War, Great Britain’s predominant strategic position in the Middle East faced a series of challenges. During the war, the British succeeded in maintaining their imperial interests despite the threat posed by Italy and Nazi Germany. In the aftermath of the war, British decision makers faced unprecedented economic and political challenges that called into question the viability of the Empire in the Middle East. In contrast with the situation that prevailed in 1918, by 1945, the British had to contend with Arab and Jewish nationalisms, encroachment by the superpowers and a domestic economy weakened by the cost of the war. Britain’s strategic interests in the Middle East were dominated by land, sea and air communications and the growing importance of oil. Following the war, British strategists were determined to defend these key interests at the lowest possible cost.

Prelude: The Arab Legion as an Ally during World War Two When the war broke out in September 1939, Abdullah was the only Arab leader who publicly expressed support for the Allied cause. This happened despite rumours that he had been in contact with the Nazis.1 The personage of Alec Kirkbride proved critical at this point. He

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argued that Abdullah ‘would like to reinsure with the Axis but lacks the means and is, at the same time, haunted by the fear lest he should change sides too openly and Great Britain win after all’.2 Such reports show Kirkbride’s remarkable access to the Amir and his thoughts, and help explain why British ‘indirect rule’ succeeded in Transjordan. The threat posed by Axis forces to Egypt and the Suez Canal highlighted Britain’s strategic vulnerability in the Middle East and were an unprecedented challenge to British predominance in the region. Britain’s position in Transjordan remained intact mostly because there was no plausible alternative. By the summer of 1941, Britain’s status in the Middle East was at its lowest ebb since the loss of Greece and Crete. The British faced additional threats in Vichy-occupied Syria, and in Iraq, following a coup d’état on 1 April 1941, that briefly unseated the regent Abd al-Ilah. The Iraqi regime led by the nationalist Rashid Ali al-Kailani included Britain’s nemesis in Palestine, Hajj Amin al-Husayni, who were bound by their mutual opposition to the British. The British became increasingly concerned with the Iraqi regime’s contacts with the Axis powers, which showed how vulnerable they were to German propaganda that supported Arab nationalist aspirations to remove all the vestiges of British influence.3 The British were concerned that the Rashid Ali regime might curtail their treaty rights, thereby weakening Britain’s hold over the country, and that the Axis powers would seek to influence the Rashid Ali government. These concerns led the British to invade Iraq in May 1941. The potential opening of a second front in the Middle East at a time when Britain’s position in the Middle East was seriously threatened highlighted the strategic importance of Transjordan, which became a launching point for an operation to overthrow the Rashid Ali regime and restore the monarchy.4 The invasion of Iraq offered Abdullah and the Arab Legion a golden opportunity to directly participate in WWII.5 The Arab Legion’s expertise in desert operations made it an obvious choice to assist the British expedition, known as ‘HABFORCE’. Together they crossed the desert frontier and defeated the Iraqi army with comparative ease. Although the Arab Legion was commended for

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its role in the invasion of Iraq, it was given only a supporting role in the invasion of Syria in June 1941.6 To add insult to injury, the Arab Legion was prevented from participating in the Allied campaign in the Western Desert in 1942 and 1943 and instead was relegated to defending lines of communication and bases in Palestine. Nonetheless, during the course of the war the Arab Legion underwent a fundamental transformation, at British expense,7 from a gendarmerie to a full-fledged fighting force under Glubb’s command. Subsequently this augmentation of the Arab Legion’s order of battle had fundamental political and strategic implications, as the Legion played the role of security support for the Transjordanian state. In contrast with Iraq and Syria, Transjordan remained stable following the outbreak of WWII war. This was achieved partly by the imposition of emergency regulations, which were intended to muzzle the press and any sign of dissent. (Nonetheless, there were indications of limited internal unrest, and elements of the British-commanded Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF) did mutiny during the invasion of Iraq.) But Abdullah’s ‘zealous loyalty’ to his British allies, and the quiescent situation in Transjordan, allowed the British to safely ignore and deny all Abdullah’s requests for greater freedom of action. This marked an ongoing trend whereby the British felt they could afford to ignore Abdullah because he posed no threat to their interests. Nonetheless, the Colonial Office believed that Abdullah should be rewarded for his loyalty with a greater measure of autonomy, which the Foreign Office and the War Cabinet’s Middle East Committee rejected.8 The Colonial Office’s effort to obtain a greater degree of independence for Abdullah was frustrated by his meddling in Syria, and by the Foreign Office’s raising the long-standing problem of Ibn Saud’s acquiescence to Abdullah’s enhanced independence, which was unlikely to be forthcoming. Finally, Sir Harold MacMichael argued that all communities in Palestine would construe such a move as a precedent for their own independence.9 Nonetheless, Abdullah and his government continued to demand acknowledgement from the British for their loyalty. MacMichael supported Abdullah’s claims since he was well aware of the dangers of denying Abdullah even a modicum of support,10 and he relayed warnings from Kirkbride about the Amir’s

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mental state.11 The Foreign Office and the Middle East Committee of the Cabinet were willing to concede only that independence would be addressed after the war.12 In July 1942, Alec Kirkbride provided a detailed account of Abdullah’s attitude towards the war and his British allies.13 As the war progressed, Abdullah became increasingly frustrated by the British government’s unwillingness to reciprocate his loyalty.14 Kirkbride believed that Abdullah was frightened by events in Iraq and that he particularly resented not being told about the British invasion of Syria beforehand. Instead of supporting Abdullah’s aspirations in Syria, the Foreign Office advocated handing over control of the country to the Free French, and in the long term, the British supported Syrian independence.15 The Foreign Office had absolutely no interest in supporting Abdullah’s claims in Syria. This gave the Amir reason to believe that he had been snubbed, but he lacked leverage to challenge that policy, an illustration of the limitations that were imposed on him. Abdullah undoubtedly became increasingly frustrated by Britain’s shoddy treatment, manifested by the Arab Legion’s limited role in the war and by London’s refusal to upgrade the Amir’s status to King until after the war.16 Nonetheless, Abdullah remained loyal to the British as a survival strategy and out of economic self-interest, which suggests that in contrast with either Egypt or Iraq, in Transjordan the system of ‘indirect rule’ worked. The Arab Legion and Abdullah proved loyal. But subsequent events in the region would lead to Abdullah’s playing a more independent role as great power relations shifted, nationalism and decolonisation took hold, and the conflict in Palestine took centre stage.

Abdullah’s Demands are Ignored, 1943–1947 Abdullah continued to depend on British economic support because of Transjordan’s poverty, but in contrast with its neighbours, his country remained politically passive. It had a small educated class that exhibited some interest in pan-Arabism but was incapable of stimulating unrest. Transjordan’s internal stability also resulted from the

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government’s tribal policy, which sought to incorporate the tribes and their customs into the state. In contrast with tribe-state relations elsewhere in the region, Transjordan’s tribes were not allowed to remain outside the law, and infractions were dealt with effectively. British officials such as John Glubb sought to prevent tribal unrest by enlisting the support of the tribes and by dispersing funds to the tribal sheiks in order to win their support. A final explanation was the nature of Britain’s imperial control, whereby British officials exerted influence behind the scenes. The absence of economic resources, such as oil, and a quiescent population allowed the British to pay very little attention to developments in Transjordan. Notwithstanding his close relations with the British, Abdullah’s regional ambitions led him to pursue several foreign policy objectives, including independence, the establishment of a Greater Syrian kingdom, and annexing parts of Palestine. In 1942, he proposed a wide-ranging plan that involved the union of the Levant states and a solution to the Palestine problem.17 The Foreign Office response to this letter is revealing of the prevailing view of Abdullah: ‘If he abdicated it would not bother us very much . . . and if he plays the fool and gives us the excuse to eliminate his dynasty, so much the better’.18 During the Second World War, Abdullah’s increasing dissatisfaction with British control was manifested in his persistent demands to be released from the mandate.19 Abdullah sent several letters to Winston Churchill seeking affirmation of Britain’s loyalty and respect. He also reminded Churchill of the promises he had allegedly made when the two met in Jerusalem in 1921.20 In response, Abdullah was told that it would be impossible to grant Transjordan independence until after the end of the war.21 Abdullah’s demands were ignored during the Second World War, suggesting that the British knew they could afford to ignore his requests. This policy led Abdullah to resent the British despite the fact he was their most loyal ally in the Middle East.22 Senior British officials, including Harold MacMichael, the High Commissioner for Palestine between 1938 and 1944, and Alec Kirkbride agreed that Abdullah should be given an assurance that independence would

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be granted after the war.23 Lord Gort, who served briefly as High Commissioner in 1944 and 1945, also believed that a gesture should be made because it was important to ‘appease his vanity’.24 The British knew that they could afford to take Abdullah for granted because he posed no threat. John Glubb argued that Abdullah and the population were proud that Transjordan had remained tranquil during the Arab Rebellion in Palestine. Glubb believed that Abdullah’s unswerving loyalty had gone unappreciated in London, and that he would have received more attention if he had rebelled. 25

Abdullah Begins to Assert Himself Abdullah’s demands only received serious attention in September 1945, when he was invited to London.26 Talks commenced when Abdullah arrived in London in February 1946, and the two sides rapidly agreed to replace the agreement signed in 1928 with a treaty.27 The proposed treaty was modelled on the agreement signed with Iraq in 1930, but it was different due to Transjordan’s greater need for British financial support. In contrast with the tortuous negotiations that characterised relations with Egypt and Iraq, Abdullah and the British had mutual interests in concluding a treaty without delay. General Sir Alan Cunningham, the last High Commissioner for Palestine, noted that Abdullah was under no illusion that Transjordan could stand alone, but Cunningham felt it was important to accord the country ‘all the outward semblance of sovereignty’.28 The British believed that granting independence would serve various objectives. They hoped that independence would reinforce Transjordan’s goodwill towards Britain and were determined to reduce the overt nature of British control over Transjordan. This applied particularly to the British-financed and officered Arab Legion, which was the best-known symbol of foreign influence in Transjordan.29 The British also wanted to secure their strategic interests in Transjordan. In parallel with Palestine, Transjordan was part of Britain’s system of defence for the Middle East and a buffer zone in the event of a Soviet incursion towards the Suez Canal.30 Transjordan possessed limited military facilities, but had an important geopolitical

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position in the region that was given added weight on account of the uncertain future of bases in Egypt and Palestine. Important lines of communication traversed Transjordan, including the oil pipeline from northern Iraq to Haifa and an air route that linked Britain with its Asian colonies. Britain’s strategic requirements were very similar to those in Iraq and Egypt, including the safeguarding and provisioning of military facilities in peacetime and base rights in time of war. These interests were preserved by the conclusion of a twenty-five-year treaty with Transjordan that granted the country its formal independence.31 Britain’s strategic requirements were outlined in the annex to the March 1946 Treaty.32 In peacetime, the British wanted the right to station forces in Transjordan, although this was not yet envisaged, and the right to develop the country’s communications facilities. In the event of a war, the British wanted the ability to station forces in Transjordan and utilise airfields and lines of communication that traversed the country.33 The future of the Arab Legion was a key feature of the treaty negotiations. During the Second World War, the Arab Legion underwent a major expansion, from two thousand men in 1939 to eight thousand in 1945.34 The increase in the Arab Legion’s order of battle resulted from the raising of fifteen garrison companies, which protected lines of communications and static military facilities in Palestine, and the establishment of a mechanised brigade that consisted of three regiments (the equivalent of mechanised infantry battalions). Between 1921 and 1939, the Arab Legion had been a police force responsible for internal security, but the raising of the mechanised brigade, which numbered 2,522 men in 1945, led to the creation of a highly trained fighting force.35 By the end of the war over 80 per cent of the Legion was serving in Palestine.36 The increase in the Legion’s establishment also increased its cost from £225,000 in 1939 to almost £2.4 million in 1945.37 This cost, which was borne by the British taxpayer, accounted for over 80 per cent of Transjordan’s £2,900,000 budget in 1945. Officials in the Treasury believed that the Arab Legion’s establishment was excessive, and they argued that one of the mechanised brigade’s regiments should be disbanded.38

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The Treasury’s attempts to cut the cost of the Arab Legion were spurred by the serious financial situation facing the British economy after the war. The civil and military authorities in Palestine opposed any reduction in the Legion’s establishment, however. They argued that the Arab Legion helped maintain tranquillity in Transjordan and performed internal security duties in Palestine, making it well worth the cost. Sir Alan Cunningham concurred, although he was concerned about the constitutional and political impact of deploying Arab troops in Palestine.39 The danger of the Arab Legion’s coming into conflict with the Jewish population was outweighed by the fact that British troops would have to replace the garrison companies.40 The Treasury argued that the treaty was merely an attempt to buy military facilities in Transjordan in return for a political subsidy of Abdullah.41 Glubb and Kirkbride agreed that the Arab Legion should be reduced in the future, but they insisted that any immediate reduction would be a false economy, with negative and avoidable economic and political consequences in Transjordan.42 Glubb and Kirkbride knew that Abdullah’s fear of the Soviet threat after the war made him anxious to possess an effective army. More significant, Abdullah wanted an army for the prestige it would bring him, and because he regarded the Arab Legion as a potentially effective political tool.43 The Legion had become the Praetorian mainstay of the Hashemite regime in Transjordan and an important tool in Abdullah’s foreign policy. The clearest outcome of Abdullah’s visit to London and the treaty negotiations was that he crowned himself King on 25 May 1946.44 The Foreign Office was ambivalent about Abdullah crowning himself, but it knew that objecting would be counterproductive, since he was determined to achieve status comparable to that of other regional monarchs.45 The treaty was well received in Transjordan.46 Although the neighbouring states welcomed it in principle,47 the military annex was attacked as a sign of continued British control.48 Ron Pundik finds these criticisms justified given the British commitment to paying a subsidy of over £2 million to maintain the Legion, and given the facilities that would be made available in wartime.49 The Zionists also objected to the treaty, calling it incompatible with the mandate,50 a claim the Colonial Office immediately rejected.51

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The international reaction to Transjordan’s independence showed that attempts by the British to ease their grip on the country met limited success.52 The United States postponed recognition of Transjordan’s independence, and the Soviet Union vetoed the new country’s membership in the United Nations.53 According to Uriel Dann, the Americans objected to the treaty because it did not grant full independence,54 but in reality the objection was a result of Zionist pressure.55 Transjordan was directly affected by the UN resolutions on Palestine in 1947 and 1948, and only became a UN member in 1949.

Kirkbride: The Link between the Colonial and Foreign Offices In April 1946, Alec Kirkbride was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary in Amman, which marked the seamless transfer of responsibility for Transjordan from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office.56 Kirkbride observed in his cautiously written memoirs that following independence the Foreign Office started to take more notice of Transjordan. Three months after the signing of the treaty, Kirkbride wrote Abdullah had lost his sense of inferiority as the ruler of a mandated territory with limited authority. Kirkbride believed that independence encouraged Abdullah to pursue his long-standing ambition to play a more effective role in regional politics. His aims included a closer union with Iraq, the establishment of a monarchy in Syria, and the expansion of Transjordan to include the predominantly Arab areas of mandatory Palestine.57 Kirkbride commented that his relations with the King and the government were unchanged by the signing of the treaty, and that the prime minister frequently asked him to use his influence with Abdullah on purely local matters. The treaty therefore had little immediate effect on the relations between Abdullah and the British. Kirkbride reported that his relationship with the King and the government were still based on informal discussions behind the scenes, of which, ‘I report anything of interest’.58 Nonetheless, the 1946 treaty only endured for two years and was revised in February 1948.

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The Postwar World: Decolonisation, American Supremacy and Palestine During the postwar era of decolonisation, the British gradually withdrew from the Empire. This retreat was influenced by a wide range of domestic and international events that coalesced to make the Empire unsustainable. One of the biggest challenges the British faced in the Middle East was the fate of the Palestine mandate, whose future was fundamentally influenced by the Holocaust and the Zionist demand for statehood. The intractable conflict between Arab and Jewish nationalism made the mandate appear to be a strategic and political liability. The failure of the postwar Labour government to reconcile Palestinian and Zionist demands made abrogation of the mandate inevitable. One of the objectives of this book is to challenge the widely held argument that Abdullah was a British stooge. Relations between Abdullah and the British were based on mutual interest. The British regarded Transjordan as a buffer zone in the defence of the Suez Canal, and the British-officered and financed Arab Legion was emerging as the most effective army in the region. Abdullah had little choice but to accept British support given Transjordan’s limited resources and vulnerability to attack. Nonetheless, areas of tension existed between Abdullah and the British during the war, the most significant of them being Abdullah’s desire to become independent. This was belatedly granted in the spring of 1946 when Abdullah became King. In practice, the treaty of alliance changed very little how relations were conducted. Abdullah played a weak hand with great skill and was determined to pursue his own interests, not those of the British. Between 1944 and 1947, Abdullah’s aspirations were focused on the establishment of a Greater Syrian kingdom and advancing his interests in Palestine. He adopted a cautious policy on the future of Palestine in the final years of the mandate, having learnt a bitter lesson in realpolitik following his public acceptance of the Peel Commission report in 1937. Nonetheless, Abdullah conducted a political campaign in Palestine that was intended to prepare the population for annexation, despite the opposition of the exiled Mufti and his allies. Abdullah’s relations with

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the Zionists are equally controversial, since the two sides were accused of agreeing to partition Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians.

Strategic Influences and the Labour Government’s Middle East Policy After World War II, ‘the global colonial order’ that had sustained the European imperial powers prior to 1945 began to collapse.59 In Great Britain, the years 1945–48 were a turning point, and the Labour government’s decision to withdraw from India and Palestine marked the onset of decolonisation.60 In the aftermath of the war, Britain faced a combination of foreign and economic problems that had not prevailed in 1918. The Second World War bankrupted the British economy, leaving the country incapable of competing with the United States or the Soviet Union as a global power. Britain’s empire had not yet broken up, but it was now a middle-ranking power. These limitations are essential in understanding the development of British policy in the Middle East in the years preceding the termination of the Palestine mandate. During the war, the Chiefs of Staff (COS) produced a series of papers that outlined the strategic importance of the Middle East to the Empire.61 The COS argued in June 1945 that the primary strategic aim of Britain’s foreign policy was to maintain the integrity of the Empire against both external and internal threats by securing its worldwide sea and air communications. The COS argued that steps should be taken in peacetime to secure oil resources, the integrity of communications through the region and the maintenance of military bases, especially those in Egypt.62 The expansion of Soviet influence in the Middle East had been recognised during the war, but some British officials believed that cooperation with the Soviet Union would be desirable in the aftermath of the war.63 Sir Orme Sargent, Deputy Under-secretary of State at the Foreign Office, argued cogently that Britain’s weaknesses gave it little choice but to cooperate with the United States and Russia.64 The deep divisions between the powers made this assumption short-lived.65

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The threat posed by the Soviet Union in Europe and the Middle East, particularly to the ‘northern tier’ (Iran, Turkey and Greece), quickly became apparent in 1945 and 1946 and effectively foreshadowed the early development of the Cold War.66 The Foreign Office was well aware of the importance of cooperation with the United States, but this did not prevent a bitter debate between London and Washington over the future of Palestine. The British mandate in Palestine was regarded as an economic and strategic liability, and its future had been an intractable problem since at least the 1930s.67 The failure to develop a coherent policy, and the grave error of encouraging Arab participation in the Palestine issue, contributed to the development of Arab nationalism, which challenged British hegemony in the region. Successive governments in London also had to contend with nationalist demands in Iraq and Egypt, with whom Great Britain had signed treaties in 1930 and 1936, respectively, giving it significant economic and military rights. Iraqis and Egyptians resented the agreements, which they saw as undermining their sovereignty, and demanded that the treaties be revised. Britain’s relations with Egypt were of considerable significance given the importance of the Suez Canal and the military facilities that had been established there. British strategists regarded Egypt and the Suez Canal as the linchpin of the British Empire in the Middle East. After the Second World War, Egypt and the Suez Canal were central to British strategy to defend the Middle East against any Soviet attack.68 Since Egypt was also politically important because of its central role in the Arab world, British diplomats and strategists regarded the continuation of amicable relations with Egypt, and the signing of a longterm treaty guaranteeing unfettered access to the Suez Canal to be a strategic priority. The discovery of valuable deposits of oil in Persia, and subsequently in the Arabian Peninsula, made protecting the Suez Canal even more vital to Britain’s economic and strategic interests.69 These challenges led Ernest Bevin, who became Foreign Secretary following the Labour Party’s victory in the July 1945 election, to summon the government’s Middle East representatives to London to discuss Britain’s regional policy (I will examine the deliberations on Palestine below).70 These talks were the most detailed discussion of

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British policy since the Cairo Conference in 1921. At a series of meetings held at the Foreign Office in September 1945, Bevin and the diplomats considered whether Britain was going to continue to assert its position in the Middle East and maintain control over the region’s defence. They concurred that the Middle East’s problems had to be seen in a regional context. Hegemony based on military power had to be supported by an economic and social policy promoting economic development.71 The COS saw the Mediterranean and the Middle East in terms of imperial strategy.72 The Foreign Office shared this point of view, but was challenged by the Prime Minister, Clement Attlee, whose critique of the FO and COS strategic conception for the Middle East originated in his assessment of the future of the Italian colonies in Cyrenaica (Libya).73 Attlee also was influenced by the development of atomic weapons and long-range air power, which he thought would negate Britain’s naval supremacy in the Mediterranean.74 Furthermore, he believed that attacking southern Russia from the Middle East was unsound, and that insufficient consideration had been given to defending the United Kingdom from Russian attack.75 Attlee argued that Britain’s domestic economic crisis made stationing large-scale forces in the Middle East unaffordable, thus displaying a far more realistic attitude towards the government’s economic and financial difficulties than was demonstrated by either the COS or the Foreign Office. Finally, Attlee called for retrenchment in Britain’s position in the Middle East, which led to Britain’s withdrawal from Greece and Turkey in 1947,76 and subsequently from Palestine. Other members of the Cabinet, including the Chancellor, Hugh Dalton, shared this perspective.77 Attlee demanded that the basis of Britain’s strategic policy in the Middle East be re-examined in light of the development of the atomic bomb, and in light of domestic constraints.78 Attlee’s views were strongly challenged by Bevin and the COS in the Cabinet Defence Committee,79 and in private correspondence between the two.80 Unlike Attlee, Bevin was influenced by traditional British thinking on the strategic importance of the Middle East to the Empire.81 This debate between Attlee and the Foreign Office and COS was influenced by Cold War concerns, especially the potential use of

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Middle Eastern air bases to bomb southern Russia.82 Attlee’s tenacious opposition to the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff only subsided when he understood he was vastly outnumbered.83 Richard Aldrich and John Zametica note that this debate failed to consider Britain’s inability to afford its defence plans in the Middle East.84 Remarkably, the Chiefs of Staff were told to make their plans without reference to Britain’s domestic economic situation, which, as the severe winter of 1946–47 showed, was close to the breaking point. The Chiefs of Staff outlined their defence planning in May 1947 with the publication of their memorandum ‘Future defence policy’,85 which stressed the crucial importance of the Middle East in Britain’s strategy. The COS argued that a strong Soviet position in the Middle East would be fatal to Britain’s security. Britain had to retain a firm hold over the region, and this could only be assured by the presence of British forces. The facilities Egypt possessed made it the strategic nexus in the COS’s plans for the Middle East.86 Palestine was considered as vital to the defence of Egypt in the event of an attack from the north.87 Events in the region showed that there was no chance of realising this strategy. The failure to agree with the Egyptians on a revision of the 1936 Anglo-Egypt Treaty, because of nationalist opposition,88 further reinforced the importance to the COS of Palestine, the only viable alternative to the Egyptian bases.89 But this was based on the flawed assumption that Britain would retain control of Palestine for the foreseeable future.90 On the domestic front, the government’s economic and financial inability to meet these requirements doomed the COS’s plans to failure.

Ernest Bevin and Britain’s Palestine Policy, 1945–1947 During the Second World War, the 1939 white paper formed the basis of government policy, but the future of Palestine was a low priority for the wartime government. By 1945, it was becoming increasingly clear to strategists and politicians in London that the benefits of controlling Palestine were outweighed by the economic and political burden of retaining the mandate. The decision to surrender the Palestine mandate is a case study of the complexity of decolonisation because it was

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determined by changes at the international, metropolitan and local levels that coalesced in 1946 and 1947. The future of Palestine proved to be one of the most intractable problems facing the British government after the war, and the Holocaust left the British unable to enforce a solution there. Ernest Bevin’s role as Foreign Secretary between 1945 and 1951 has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate.91 Kenneth Harris argues that Bevin misunderstood and mishandled Palestine policy from the outset, a failure he blames on Attlee.92 Roger Louis contends that Bevin, like Churchill,93 believed that Palestine was ultimately expendable,94 whereas Arthur Creech Jones, the Colonial Secretary between 1946 and 1949, outlined the pragmatic nature of Bevin’s thinking in the face of the numerous problems that the British government faced at the time.95 Notwithstanding Ernest Bevin’s dominance of it, policy making on Palestine’s future was characterised by bureaucratic divisions that typified British policy in the Middle East. The development of a coherent policy was impeded by a combination of American intervention and nationalist opposition. The future of Palestine was addressed during a meeting of British officials held at the Foreign Office in September 1945. Ernest Bevin understood the importance of dealing with the future of Palestine on a regional basis, and the conference reached the conclusion that the white paper should form the foundation of the government’s policy.96 The Colonial Office still believed that partition was the only viable solution, but the CO’s role in the development of policy had been overtaken by the Foreign Office in the late 1930s.97 The complications Britain faced in the aftermath of the Second World War were exemplified by the requirement to consult the United States, where oil interests and the Zionist influence were increasingly central.98 Bevin made his first attempt to persuade the United States to share responsibility for Palestine in the autumn of 1945, in the context of an effort to aid Holocaust survivors. On 4 October 1945, Bevin proposed to the Cabinet, over the objections of the Colonial Secretary, that a joint committee be formed.99 The findings of the Anglo-American Committee, published in April 1946, recommended that one hundred thousand immigration

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certificates be issued to Jewish refugees in Europe.100 Joseph Heller argues that the report demonstrated the failure of the British and the Americans to accord Palestine high priority on the international agenda. Instead, Palestine was treated ‘as a nuisance, a second-rate problem’ that did not warrant top-level agreement between the two governments.101 The establishment of a coherent policy was significantly affected by the Zionist insurgency in Palestine initiated in 1944 by the extremist Irgun Zvai Leumi (IZL, or National Military Organisation) and the Lohamei Herut Yisrael (LEHI, also known as the Stern Gang), who contended that the creation of a Jewish state legitimised the use of terror against the British. The acts of terrorism conducted by these groups, which included the infamous bombing of the King David Hotel in Jerusalem in July 1946, differed fundamentally from the Arab rebellion of 1936–39.102 Whereas the Arab revolt had been a mass movement, the IZL and LEHI were small organisations with several hundred active members. The Zionist insurgency in Palestine was an early example of the challenge imperial powers faced after 1945 in dealing with well-organised nationalist movements. Palestine showed that counterinsurgency campaigns against well-structured nationalist movements could only be won through ruthless suppression unacceptable to domestic and international opinion. Furthermore, recently declassified files of the Security Service (MI5) show that these groups were determined to adopt terrorist methods beyond the borders of Palestine.103 Their campaign of assassination, bombing and kidnapping of British personnel posed a fundamental challenge to the mandate and highlighted the limitations of British intelligence in trying to penetrate a hostile population.104 The presence of one hundred thousand British troops in Palestine, a territory the size of Wales, to counter the terrorist campaign, heightened the mandate’s economic cost. The terrorist campaign and the failure to achieve a diplomatic solution contributed to the development of a consensus within the government, the press and public opinion that the mandate was unsustainable. The decision to quit was also influenced by the financial drain of the mandate, which cost £40 million in 1947, in a context of severe economic crisis in the United Kingdom.

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Arthur Creech Jones believed that the Arabs’ and Zionists’ unwillingness to negotiate a solution made abrogation of the mandate the only viable policy.105 The failure to achieve a negotiated settlement led Bevin and Creech Jones to decide in February 1947 to transfer the mandate to the United Nations and to administer Palestine in the interim.106 The Cabinet followed their advice, signifying the ultimate failure of Britain’s Palestine policy.107 The Arabs and the Jews were alarmed by the British decision, which Bevin announced in the House of Commons on 25 February. A month before, the COS had reiterated the strategic importance of Palestine, arguing that without unfettered access to facilities there, Britain’s strategic position in the Middle East would be in jeopardy.108 The COS also summarily rejected the proposal to hand Palestine over to the United Nations without the government’s recommending a solution.109 On 15 May 1947, the United Nations established a Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), whose role was to examine the situation in Palestine and make proposals for the future. Whereas the Zionists conducted a highly effective diplomatic campaign at the United Nations, the Arab states were ‘exceedingly inept’ in their rejection of UNSCOP.110 The Special Committee produced two alternative solutions to the Palestine question in August 1947. The majority report recommended partitioning Palestine into two states: one Arab and one Jewish, with Jerusalem placed under international trusteeship. The Arab and Jewish states would become independent after a two-year transitional period, during which time the British would continue to administer the country. The minority plan proposed that Palestine become ‘an independent federal state’ after a transition of three years, and that during this period, the United Nations be responsible for governing the country.111 The Foreign Office and the COS hoped that UNSCOP would preserve Britain’s political and strategic rights in Palestine for the foreseeable future.112 The hope that Britain would retain control of Palestine under UN auspices was based on the expectation that the United Nations could be used as a tool to justify the continuation of de facto British control. Hugh Dalton challenged this point of view, arguing that the commitment in Palestine was an unwarranted drain on Britain’s limited financial and military resources.113

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The assumptions made by the COS and Foreign Office about the UN role were divorced from reality. The UNSCOP majority report was anathema to the Foreign Office, but it ‘represented the cutting of the Palestine knot’.114 The work of UNSCOP culminated in a historic vote at the United Nations on 29 November 1947, when two-thirds voted in favour of the majority report and partition.115 One US diplomat noted that British officials were becoming increasingly ‘bloody-minded’ about the UN decision, and that a ‘deep gloom’ pervaded the Foreign Office. The same official also commented that ‘the Jews have not been given a Jewish state but a hunting licence for a Jewish state’.116 The decision to withdraw from Palestine in May 1948 was a sideshow in comparison with Britain’s departure from India in August 1947. Clement Attlee was strongly influenced by the Indian precedent in the final decision to leave Palestine.117 The government in London was determined to cut its losses in Palestine, and in the final months of the mandate, the military authorities focused on the withdrawal of a huge quantity of military supplies from Palestine. In light of the objections posed by the COS and the Foreign Office to leaving Palestine, the Cabinet Defence Committee only started to consider the implications of the withdrawal in the autumn of 1947,118 and in early November, agreement was reached on the nature of a unified plan for withdrawal.119 The primary goal of British planners was to get out of Palestine with minimal loss of life, a policy that had far-reaching implications in Palestine.120 Within hours of the UN vote, a civil war broke out in Palestine between the Jews, who were overjoyed by partition, and the Palestinian Arabs and their regional allies, who were determined to prevent the division of Palestine.121 The last six months of the mandate were an ignominious end to one of Britain’s most significant imperial failures.122

The Foreign Office Attitude toward Annexation of Palestine’s Arab Areas Counter to Avi Shlaim’s claim that the Foreign Office colluded in Transjordan’s annexation of Palestine’s Arab areas, I argue that although the British secretly supported annexation, they took steps

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to limit Abdullah’s ambitions.123 Until 1947, the Foreign Office had opposed annexation, but the decision to leave Palestine led to a fundamental reversal in British policy towards Abdullah’s taking control of the prospective Arab state in Palestine. The Foreign Office was determined to prevent Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, from assuming control of Palestine’s Arab areas. The union of Transjordan and Palestine was discussed at the meeting of Britain’s Middle East representatives in September 1945. Ernest Bevin proposed a federal union between Palestine and Transjordan under an Arab king.124 Bevin was unconcerned about the identity of the ruler, but it was clear to the diplomats present that Abdullah would head this unified state. The Eastern Department recognised the advantages of this solution, but this policy would sow discord within the Arab League.125 The participants in the conference emphatically rejected the extension of Abdullah’s kingdom on the grounds that it would alienate the governments in Egypt and Saudi Arabia, which were determined to thwart the Amir.126 Nonetheless, John Glubb and Alec Kirkbride became fervent advocates of Transjordan’s assuming control of the predominantly Arab parts of Palestine contiguous to Transjordan. In July 1946, Glubb advocated that Transjordan take control of parts of Palestine,127 subsequently arguing that an expanded Transjordan would be more economically viable. He also believed that the annexation of Arab areas contiguous to Transjordan would prevent Palestine from coming under the control of the Mufti. Instead, these areas, which in fact were ill-defined, would come under the pro-British King, with the added advantage that these districts would automatically be included in the provisions of the 1946 Anglo-Transjordan Treaty. Glubb was so confident that this plan could be put into action that he thought Transjordan would be able to extend its rule to Palestine within forty-eight hours.128 Glubb was well aware that annexation would be opposed by Abdullah’s rivals, so he argued that active support of the Transjordan government was crucial.129 Glubb, however, had a reputation for dispatching unsolicited memoranda to London, which were so ‘longwinded’ and ‘repetitive’ that their content was diluted.130 The Foreign Office rejected Glubb’s proposal on the grounds that it challenged the FO’s opposition to partition, particularly if Abdullah would be the beneficiary.131

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Sir Alec Kirkbride also argued that annexation would be to Transjordan’s advantage as long as this could be achieved without much bloodshed.132 Kirkbride was aware of the political and diplomatic sensitivity of such a policy, and he sought to persuade the Foreign Office of its benefits. In rarely cited correspondence he argued that ‘strategically and economically Transjordan has the best claim to inherit the residue of Palestine and . . . occupation of Arab areas by Transjordan would counter act the chances of armed conflict between a Jewish state and other Arab countries, in particular Iraq which I hold to be most dangerous’.133 Kirkbride pointed out that the King would be prepared to acquiesce in the formation of a Jewish state provided that Transjordan obtained the rest of Palestine. He also noted, like Glubb, that a greater Transjordan would not be against Britain’s interests. Kirkbride warned that a prior formal agreement between the King and the Jews ‘would be dangerous in that security would be impossible. It would act as a focus for the anger of the other Arab states against the King and alienate the Palestine Arabs’.134 Sir Orme Sargent, the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, replied: ‘We entirely agree with you in seeing considerable advantage in the occupation of part or the whole of the Arab areas of Palestine by King Abdullah, if this could be done without either too serious trouble with the United Nations or the loss of Abdullah’s whole position in the Arab world’.135 Sargent’s response marked a significant shift in the Foreign Office’s policy, which can be attributed to the declining situation in Palestine and the realisation that Abdullah and Transjordan were of considerable strategic significance. Nonetheless, the Foreign Office was concerned about Abdullah’s using the Arab Legion to take control of the Arab areas of Palestine. Harold Beeley believed that this was a dangerous policy, since Abdullah would be enforcing the partition of Palestine, which would inevitably lead to allegations that he was a British quisling.136

Abdullah and Arab Unity One of the most significant developments in the regional politics of the Middle East after the Second World War was the process of

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Arab unity. Attempts by the Arab states to establish a unified position on issues of mutual interest, notably the Palestine question, were thwarted by the development of two competing regional blocs.137 In spite of differences between the royal families in Amman and Baghdad, the Hashemites were determined to prevent Egypt from becoming the hegemonic power of the region. In contrast, the ‘Triple Alliance’, which consisted of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria, sought to contain the expansionist plans of the Hashemites in Syria.138 The formation of the Arab League in 1945 was a great concern to Abdullah, who believed that the Hashemites faced a significant threat from the Egyptian-dominated organisation. Abdullah had little option but to work within the confines of the Arab League, however, because it was regarded as the embodiment of pan-Arabism. Cooperation between the Arab states received explicit support from the British when Anthony Eden, the Foreign Secretary during most of the war, stated in May 1941 that the British government would support Arab unity, but only if the initiative came from the Arabs.139 Between 1943 and 1945, Whitehall’s strategy towards Arab unity and the creation of the Arab League in March 1945 was to allow Egypt to play a central role in establishing the League and leading the Arab world.140 The British did not intentionally encourage the creation of the Arab League itself, though they did endorse the principle of Arab union.141 The British had long-term strategic interests in promoting Arab cooperation and the material welfare of the Arabs as a means of preventing the balkanisation of the Middle East.142 Nevertheless, the Arab League, and its first Secretary General, Abd al-Rahman Azzam, became bitter critics of the British, which led one Foreign Office official to liken Azzam to Frankenstein’s monster.143 Egypt’s role in the creation of the Arab League was a result of various internal and external forces,144 but Egypt’s primacy worried Abdullah. Abdullah regarded the creation of the Arab League with intense suspicion because its charter included safeguards for the territorial integrity of member states, which precluded the unity schemes advocated by Abdullah and the Iraqi politician Nuri al-Said. Abdullah’s concern about the evolution of regional politics was exemplified by the Foreign Office’s failure to invite him and the Iraqi

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Regent to meet Winston Churchill in Egypt in February 1945.145 Abdullah’s fears that he had been marginalised by his most important ally were confirmed when Ibn Saud and King Farouk of Egypt were invited to confer with the Prime Minister.146 The Eastern Department welcomed the relegation of the Hashemites to a secondary position in Middle East politics and believed that any moral debt to the Hashemites originating from the Arab Revolt in the First World War was extinguished.147 Nonetheless, in December 1945, Abdullah published memoirs in which he sought to establish his claim to the Syrian throne and to counter criticism of his activities and personality.148 The publication of this book backfired since it gave Abdullah’s enemies additional reason to criticise him.149 Abdullah’s disenchantment with regional developments was revealed during his official visit to London in March 1946. Before he arrived there, Kirkbride persuaded Abdullah that Transjordan and Iraq should not leave the Arab League. Nonetheless, when Abdullah met with Clement Attlee he expressed his determination to leave the Arab League, saying that it was not pro-British, and that he intended to create a rival Hashemite union in alliance with the British.150 The Eastern Department of the Foreign Office had no interest in becoming involved in the intra-Arab struggle for regional supremacy, and Charles Baxter, the head of the department, argued that if Abdullah announced his departure from the League while in London, this would be regarded as a British-inspired plot to undermine it.151 During the course of 1947, Abdullah also took various steps to enhance his regional position, including signing treaties with Turkey and Iraq. He signed the first during a visit to Ankara in January 1947. The objective of this treaty was to strengthen Abdullah’s position in the Arab League by establishing a Turco-Hashemite bloc as a counterweight to the Arab League.152 This strategy was based on Abdullah’s well-founded concern that the Egyptian government and Azzam Pasha were using the Arab League as a vehicle to undermine the Hashemites.153 In April 1947, Iraq and Transjordan concluded a treaty of alliance ostensibly meant to strengthen the Hashemite bloc. Kirkbride believed that the Iraqi Regent, Abd al-Ilah, and Nuri al-Said had instigated

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the agreement because they believed it would strengthen the internal position of the royal family by making the intervention of the Arab Legion possible in the event of a coup d’état.154 The objectives of the treaty led to a bitter dispute between Sir Hugh Stonehewer-Bird, Ambassador in Baghdad, and Kirkbride, who claimed that his counterpart displayed the tendency ‘that so many of HM’s representatives in the Middle East are ready to believe (and sometimes say) the worst of King Abdullah who, in spite of his many faults, has been a faithful friend of Great Britain’.155 Nonetheless, the Iraqi-Transjordan treaty aroused the suspicion of the governments in Damascus and Riyadh, which were opposed to the expansion of Hashemite power, thereby pushing them further towards Egypt.156 Abdullah’s agreements with Iraq and Turkey aroused the suspicion of the Syrians, who believed that the Hashemites were trying to encircle them as a prelude to overthrowing the republican regime. The Saudis also regarded these agreements as a threat to the regional balance of power, although their concerns were based on a long-standing dynastic dispute with the Hashemites.157 The ramifications of Abdullah’s attempts to establish a counterweight to Egypt’s domination of the Arab League were minimal in comparison to the renewal of the King’s Greater Syria machinations, which continued with renewed vigour in the aftermath of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty.158 The Greater Syria movement was given added impetus by the departure of Allied troops from Syria in April 1946 and by Abdullah’s coronation. From Abdullah’s perspective, the formation of a Greater Syrian state made sense because it provided a means of overcoming Transjordan’s economic and political weaknesses and irrelevance in the Middle East.159 Abdullah also contended with competing plans from other Arab leaders, especially the veteran Iraqi politician Nuri al-Said. Abdullah’s machinations were therefore intended to promote his own interests and to thwart Nuri’s plans. Abdullah sought to take advantage of the endemic political chaos that characterised Syrian politics at the time, but he never won the initiative in Syrian politics.160 Abdullah’s machinations in Syria became the source of considerable friction and only succeeded in inspiring hostility amongst the Egyptian-led triple alliance, which assumed that the

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British supported his plans. The French and Russians also raised insuperable objections to the Greater Syria project, which they regarded as little more than the expansion of British interests under the guise of Abdullah’s kingdom.161 Abdullah’s dynastic objectives in Syria were unlikely to reach fruition because they were inimical to the country’s republican movement, which was determined to prevent the restoration of a monarchy. Mary Wilson notes that the King was encouraged by a small band of malcontents who ‘represented factional and minority interests alienated from the urban politics of Damascus’.162 Given their marginal position in Syrian politics, they hardly represented the support Abdullah needed. Abdullah’s propaganda had the effect of encouraging Lebanese-Syrian solidarity in the face of the Greater Syria danger, which was of serious concern to both governments.163 Shukri Quwwatli, the Syrian President, regarded Abdullah as the greatest threat to Syria’s independence. The regime’s policy towards Abdullah was a direct consequence of the country’s internal weakness and the questionable loyalty and competence of the army.164 The Lebanese political elite, especially President Bishara al-Khuri (1943–52), also regarded Abdullah’s scheme as a threat to Lebanon’s independence. Khuri’s diplomacy was founded on diverting Syrian attention away from absorbing Lebanon by requiring the Syrian government to request Lebanese support against a common threat. Abdullah’s attempts to win support in Lebanon were doomed by Maronite indifference and Sunni opposition. 165 The main obstacle facing the Foreign Office was the widespread impression that Abdullah had London’s support for his plans.166 The Foreign Office instruction to British diplomatic and military personnel to avoid making any statements giving the impression that Abdullah had British support had little practical impact.167 In July 1947 the Foreign Office publicly denied that it favoured Abdullah’s Greater Syria ambitions, stating in the House of Commons that its policy was based on ‘strict neutrality’.168 The Foreign Office opposed supporting Abdullah’s plans because it was believed they would result in anarchy in Syria, and because the regime in Damascus was regarded as best government presently available; the FO thus favoured maintaining the status quo.169 The British Consul in Beirut argued that the Greater

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Syria movement was close to reaching fruition and believed that the British government might benefit from the creation of a Syrian kingdom.170 In contrast, Laurence Grafftey-Smith, the Minister in Jedda, bitterly opposed to Abdullah, partly on the grounds that he had cheated at chess.171 Grafftey-Smith argued that Abdullah was widely regarded as a British puppet and viewed as a ‘rather bad joke’ in Egypt and Iraq. If Abdullah assumed the Syrian crown, it would lead to the claim that this was the work of the British government, which would inevitably arouse Ibn Saud’s anger, and the French would complain that the British were trying to undermine their position in Syria. Abdullah took full advantage of the Foreign Office’s unwillingness to define a coherent policy on the future of Syria, and its desire to adopt a neutral policy.172 Nonetheless, the likelihood of Abdullah’s achieving his objectives in Syria was remote. His low prestige there, his shortage of money and the administrative difficulties that such a plan entailed made success very unlikely.173 The Arab Legion was too small and lacked the resources to conduct such an operation, and the British would undoubtedly have objected. Abdullah’s ability to use his cherished army, funded entirely by the British, was in practice very limited, which highlights the limitations imposed on Transjordan’s independence.174 The King continued to press his increasingly obsessive claims in the form of the ‘Transjordan white paper’ published in May 1947. This collection of documents stressed that the Hashemites had been loyal to the Arab cause since 1916.175 The publication was a tactical error because it aroused the ire of the Syrian government and press. Abdullah could not resist replying to scurrilous attacks in the Syrian media, which simply further lowered his prestige in the region.176 American diplomats reported that Abdullah’s Greater Syria agitation was having a discordant effect among the Arab states, particularly in Syria and Saudi Arabia.177 Kirkbride argued that Abdullah’s statements were ‘relatively harmless’, but members of the Eastern Department believed that the King’s advancing age led him to realise that his lifelong ambition would be thwarted.178 Brigadier Clayton, the head of the British Middle East Office (BMEO), found the King ‘depressed’ and ‘completely obsessed by an idée fixe [regarding Syria]

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to the extent almost of monomania’.179 Kirkbride concurred, noting that the King was becoming increasingly concerned about his position in light of the withdrawal from India and the forthcoming departure from Palestine, fearing he would be encircled by enemies without British military support.180 The King’s concerns were outlined in a letter to Bevin in which he argued that the Russian threat in the Middle East could only be met by the establishment of Greater Syria. Christopher Pirie-Gordon, Kirkbride’s deputy in Amman, noted that this letter constituted an invitation to the British government to cooperate with Abdullah to overthrow the Syrian regime. Kirkbride and Pirie-Gordon advised that the King’s correspondence on Greater Syria be regarded with patience, and that it was inspired by his fear of uncertain relations with the British, in light of London’s decision to withdraw from Palestine, rather than by a desire for personal aggrandisement.181 Kirkbride and PirieGordon were exasperated by the King’s Greater Syria machinations, but they observed that issuing the King a stern warning and invoking the 1946 Treaty would have serious repercussions, possibly diminishing British influence.182 By the autumn of 1947, Kirkbride succeeded in tempering the King’s outbursts on Greater Syria, but Abdullah had diverted his attention away from Greater Syria towards Palestine.183 Abdullah succeeded in manipulating the Foreign Office’s policy on Greater Syria. The FO realised that it could do little more than instruct Kirkbride to issue a friendly warning, since threatening to cut the subsidy would achieve nothing.184 Such a reduction would be contrary to British interests, since the subsidy’s primary purpose was to fund an Arab Legion that was rendering valuable service in Palestine. The Greater Syria furore highlights the limitations of the treaty relationship between Abdullah and the British, and calls into question the extent to which he really was a British pawn.

Abdullah and Palestine during and after World War Two Abdullah had long been determined to expand Transjordan. The British decision to leave Palestine in May 1948 offered him another opportunity to achieve this objective, but the region had fundamentally changed

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since the late 1930s, when the British had thwarted his ambitions. Abdullah offered a pragmatic alternative to the Mufti of Jerusalem, leading the British to believe that the Arab parts of Palestine should come under Transjordan’s control. In public, the consensus amongst the Arab states was rejection of partition and the creation of a Jewish state, but in reality ‘not even the plaster of common policy towards Palestine [could] fill the fissures of jealousy, mistrust and conflicting ambitions’ that characterised the policy of the Arab League.185 The reaction of the Arab states to the inevitable conflict in Palestine should be regarded as a notable example of the failure of coalition warfare, since they were more focused on thwarting Abdullah’s ambitions than on defeating the Zionists. Much to the chagrin of his enemies, Abdullah enjoyed disproportionate influence within the League because of Transjordan’s proximity to Palestine and because the Arab Legion was seen as the most effective tool for defending the Palestinian population. Abdullah took full advantage of the ‘political and military neutering of the Palestinian Arabs’, which was the result of the suppression of the Arab rebellion in Palestine between 1936 and 1939, and the incompetent leadership of Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, who spent some of the Second World War in Nazi Germany.186 The Mufti’s opposition to British rule and his association with the Nazis led the Foreign Office to regard him as a pariah. Nonetheless, Abdullah’s enemies supported the Mufti because they opposed the King’s aspirations. In spite of the Mufti’s absence from Palestine, Abdullah failed to develop close relations with the Husayni faction, which refused to come under his aegis when he tried to promote the unity of the various political factions in the country.187 The Mufti’s exile had significant implications for Palestinian politics. The party system in Palestine had been irrevocably weakened by the revolt in the 1930s, which had the effect of precluding the consolidation of Palestinian representation at the Arab League, while at the same time increasing Palestinian dependence on the neighbouring states.188 In contrast with the other politicians in Palestine ‘who have repeated the same parrot cry for so long’, the Mufti was regarded as a national hero and remained the most significant obstacle Abdullah faced in Palestine.189

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During the Second World War, the future of Palestine was in abeyance, but Abdullah and his government privately supported partition. In January 1944, Tawfiq Abul Huda, who served as prime minister on three separate occasions during Abdullah’s reign, maintained that the Arabs of Palestine were unenthusiastic about coming under Abdullah’s rule but would accept it because they had no viable alternative.190 Abul Huda’s comments were inspired by rumours that partition was being debated in London. The wartime Palestine Committee advocated the absorption of the Arab areas of Palestine by Transjordan on the grounds that the only solution for a country stricken by poverty was integration with its more prosperous neighbour.191 Alec Kirkbride dissuaded Abdullah and Samir al-Rifai (Prime Minister between October 1944 and May 1945), as well as Rifai’s successors, from publicly supporting partition.192 Prior to termination of the Palestine mandate, Abdullah and his government tacitly supported partition but rejected it in public.193 In private, the King lamented the deteriorating situation in Palestine, warning that the Jews were a serious threat and that if the impasse was not broken violence would inevitably ensue.194 Abdullah adopted this surprisingly circumspect policy because he had learned a bitter lesson in 1937, when he supported the Royal Commission’s proposal to partition Palestine. Abdullah’s display of moral courage then led to bitter criticism and undermined his prestige; he was determined not to make the same mistake twice. Kirkbride’s advocacy of silence was based on his assumption that it would be folly for any Arab leader to openly advocate partition.195 Abdullah maintained the charade of supporting the Arab consensus rejecting partition in 1946 and 1947. Like other Arab leaders, he roundly condemned the 1946 Anglo-American Committee report. Likewise, when UNSCOP visited him in Amman committee members were disappointed by his ‘extreme discretion’.196 Christopher Pirie-Gordon noted that the King felt compelled to reject partition in his official evidence before UNSCOP, whilst advocating an independent unitary state in Palestine. Pirie-Gordon emphasised that Abdullah still supported partition as the only viable solution but that he rejected it in public because of the vilification he would receive for breaking with the consensus.197

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Abdullah’s attempt to hide his real views was exemplified by his attitude in various Arab League meetings that took place in 1946 and 1947. This was an exercise in futility, because his real views were common knowledge, and it is doubtful that the other Arab governments were convinced by his surprisingly cooperative diplomacy. Nonetheless, at an Arab League meeting held at Inshas (outside Cairo) in July 1946 to discuss the findings of the Anglo-American report, Abdullah counselled moderation and insisted that Palestine would remain an Arab country.198 Two weeks later, representatives from Transjordan attended a landmark Arab League meeting in Bludan, Syria. These discussions were crucial in the development of the Arab League’s policy on Palestine. The participants agreed to give the Palestine Arabs all possible assistance in their struggle, including the provision of arms, money and men. Abdullah made it clear to Kirkbride that he did not agree with these decisions.199 The Arab League met in Sofar, Lebanon, in September 1947 to discuss the UNSCOP report.200 Samir al-Rifai told the British Consul in Beirut that there was no chance the Arabs would agree to the report because opinion in the Arab world was considered to be so incensed that the governments feared they would be swept away if they did not adopt their usual hard line.201 However, Samir urged his colleagues to implement the Bludan decisions, which he believed were ‘out of date, meaningless and ineffectual’, because they were better than nothing.202 Samir also suggested that Transjordan occupy all of Palestine, which led Kirkbride to argue that he should not be taken too seriously, since he was clearly at odds with Abdullah.203 The League’s decision making was overtaken by events in New York, where the Americans made it clear that they would support partition, and by Britain’s surrender of the mandate. This led to another Arab League summit in Aley, Syria, on 7–15 October. Hitherto the Hashemites had succeeded in preventing the Mufti from participating in Arab League conferences. However, the Mufti demanded the establishment of an Arab government in Palestine.204 Abdullah’s rejection of this proposal represented a serious defeat for the Mufti in his attempt to establish an independent Palestinian state. The King’s position was

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based on the assumption that if the Mufti were allowed to create such a state this would lead to chaos.205 Samir al-Rifai represented the King in a series of talks that were to have a crucial long-term bearing on the League’s role in Palestine. At this meeting, decisions were taken to set up a military committee, establish an Arab headquarters, and mobilise the Arab armies along the frontiers of Palestine.206 Avi Shlaim argues that these resolutions ‘represented a fundamental change’ in the League’s policy towards Palestine, since they laid the ground for military intervention by the Arab states, even though no decision was taken about how this might occur.207 Abdullah’s role in the deliberations was crucial because his enemies understood that the Arab Legion was the only Arab force capable of taking effective action in Palestine. This led the delegates in Aley to proceed to Amman, where they would try to persuade the King to concur with their decisions. According to Kirkbride, their efforts were futile; the King lectured them on the futility of trying to throw the Jews out of Palestine. Abdullah did not miss the opportunity to remind those present that he was in the best position to conclude a settlement with the Jews.208 Abdullah’s policy can be summarised as a categorical rejection of the Arab League’s decisions.209 His recalcitrant attitude was influenced by his distrust of the governments in Egypt, Syria and Saudi Arabia, which he believed were trying to marginalise him in the Arab world. Consequently, the King hindered attempts by the Arab states to become more involved in Palestine. This approach was reinforced at the Arab League meeting held in Cairo between 8 and 17 December. Abdullah instructed his delegation to oppose the transit of Arab forces through Transjordan and to prevent the Mufti from obtaining any military or political influence.210 Moreover, the King argued that a Palestinian state under the Mufti would lead to the economic strangulation of Transjordan. Abdullah’s objective was to undermine the Mufti’s position while refusing to take part in the newly formed Arab League military committee because it would mean eventually surrendering independent command of the Legion.211 Azzam Pasha agreed that the Mufti should not be allowed a role in policy making, but because of the latter’s popularity he could not be sidelined.212

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‘Collusion’? Abdullah and the Jewish Agency in 1946 Among the most controversial aspects of Abdullah’s foreign relations are his contacts with the Zionist movement, which began in the 1920s. Abdullah’s relations with the Zionists are controversial because they are often regarded as self-serving, particularly at the expense of the Palestinians. In contrast with other Arab leaders of his generation, Abdullah adopted a pragmatic policy regarding the Zionist movement. Abdullah made various proposals to the Zionists during the 1930s and 1940s that involved Jewish autonomy within a Hashemite kingdom. In practice, Abdullah adopted a cautious approach to relations with the Zionists. Abdullah and the Jewish Agency had a common interest in sharing information about regional events, including the deliberations of the Arab League. During the mid-1940s the Jewish Agency’s intelligence service, the Shai, focused its attention increasingly on regional events.213 The Zionists received a wealth of information from their contacts in Transjordan, including Abdullah’s confidant, Muhammad al-Unsi. Al-Unsi provided the Zionists with details of developments within the Arab League214 and Abdullah’s relations with the British.215 The Jewish Agency’s intelligence sources also provided an insight into Abdullah’s support for the Anglo-American Committee report.216 The Jewish Agency’s contacts with Abdullah were motivated by the desire to nullify the threat posed by the Legion.217 The Zionists were concerned about the presence of the Arab Legion in Palestine, and the threat it posed to the Jewish population, but the Jewish Agency failed to persuade the High Commissioner to withdraw the Legion from Palestine.218 It has become an article of faith that Abdullah and the Zionists colluded to divide Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians. As a result of events in Palestine, relations between Abdullah and the Zionists became increasingly significant. The Jewish Agency’s contacts with the Arab states focused on trying to persuade Arab leaders to accept the inevitability of a Jewish state in Palestine and were part of a diplomatic campaign to reach agreement with the Arab states for a solution to the Palestine question.219 In July 1946 David Ben-Gurion, the leader of

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the Jewish Agency, suggested the establishment of two independent states, termed ‘Judea’ and ‘Abdulliah’, in Palestine and Transjordan. Accord to this scheme, Abdullah would have received parts of western Palestine—including the districts of Jenin, Nablus and Ramallah— and the two populations would agree to rectify the borders between them, whilst jointly administering the common interests of the former mandated territory.220 Yoav Gelber believes that Ben-Gurion adhered to these principles until the invasion of the Arab armies in May 1948.221 Alternatively, it can be argued that this scheme was little more than a tactical ploy by Ben-Gurion in the ongoing debate within the Zionist leadership on the partitioning of Palestine. In 1946, Moshe Shertok (Sharett), the head of the Jewish Agency’s Political Department, wanted to obtain Arab support for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.222 Members of the Political Department conducted secret negotiations in Cairo and Amman.223 The two meetings held with Abdullah on 12 and 19 August 1946 have led to claims that the King colluded with the Zionists to partition Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians.224 In the first meeting, the King reiterated his desire to expand the borders of Transjordan and create a larger and stronger Hashemite kingdom. This would be achieved in several stages. The first involved the partition of Palestine and the annexation of the Arab sector to Transjordan. The second stage would result in the annexation of Syria by Transjordan, leading to the entry of the enlarged Transjordan into a federation with Iraq. The King envisaged that the Jewish part of Palestine would enter into an alliance with the Transjordan-Syrian-Iraqi federation. Abdullah made it clear to the Zionists that the Palestinians would not agree to his federal plan, adding that the British, the Arab states and the Zionists would have to persuade them to acquiesce. According to Elias Sasson, one of the Jewish Agency’s Arabists who participated in the meetings, the King failed to convince the Zionists of the benefits they would accrue from these vague plans. Did the King favour the federal plan or partition? According to Sasson’s report, the King was evasive about which of these two initiatives he supported and how either the federal plan or partition could be imposed upon the Palestinians.

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Although Sasson received no clarification from Abdullah, the King told him to return a week later with the Jewish Agency’s answer to three questions. First, would it support either his federal plan or his partition plan? Second, was the Jewish Agency willing to stop violence against the British? Finally, would the Jewish Agency support his plans with all its power? The King also stated that he would need £40,000 to cover his political expenses. The King instructed Sasson to return with a £10,000 instalment.225 A week later Sasson returned to see the King and gave him £5,000. During the course of the interview, Sasson outlined the Jewish Agency’s attitude on partition and annexation, while the King, according to Sasson, stressed that the principle should be agreed first. Abdullah argued that all plans except that of ‘separation and annexation’ should be opposed, and that everything should be done to achieve annexation. Abdullah also made it clear to Sasson that he had British support for his Greater Syria plans. In light of the death of al-Unsi, the longstanding intermediary, Sasson wanted to establish a secure system for communication with the King. Abdullah agreed by appointing his personal physician Shawkat al-Sati as the go-between, so long as talks were limited to Shertok.226 In his report, Sasson does not mention any concrete agreement. Neither is there any reference to how the King intended to gain Palestinian assent for annexation. The outcome of the Abdullah-Sasson meetings has been the subject of considerable debate. Benny Morris argues that ‘an in-principle Hashemite– Jewish Agency agreement to partition Palestine between them had been reached’.227 Ilan Pappé has described the outcome of Sasson’s meetings with Abdullah in terms of a ‘tactical agreement over Palestine’ between the King and the Zionists.228 Joseph Nevo also believes that there was an oral agreement that became the working assumption of the Jewish Agency. He adds that ‘further meetings with either Abdullah or his representatives contained nothing to contradict their interpretation and this may have reinforced it’.229 Avi Shlaim characterises these meetings as a ‘preliminary reconnaissance mission’ that was useful in identifying common ground and providing the basis for future cooperation.230 However, there is reason to doubt whether an agreement was reached between the King and Sasson. Although Sasson was instructed

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by Shertok to meet Abdullah, it is unlikely that a lasting deal could have been agreed without the active participation of senior leaders, such as Ben-Gurion. The role and influence of Sasson and the Political Department is also open to question. Joseph Heller comments that Sasson was ‘at best . . . the official who floated Ben-Gurion’s trial balloons, at worst the author of inconsequential position papers’.231 The attitude of British officials tends to be understated. Abdullah gave Kirkbride a limited account of both meetings with Sasson,232 and the Foreign Office in London was closely informed about the negotiations in Cairo and Amman by the Cairo embassy233 and by senior Zionist sources in Paris.234 The Foreign Office’s knowledge of these Zionist overtures suggests that it is unlikely an agreement would have been tolerated because of the diplomatic repercussions.235 Moreover, Abdullah was determined to avoid at all costs the slightest inference that he was willing to support partition. Even if Abdullah had struck a deal with Sasson, there is every reason to believe that Kirkbride would have used his influence to dissuade the King from adopting such a dangerous course of action. Although Kirkbride supported the occupation of the West Bank, he argued that such a policy would have serious ramifications for the King, who was already distrusted by the Arab rulers. Kirkbride would have been in a strong position to exert formal, legal influence over the King by invoking the 1946 Treaty. This is because the Treaty required the King to consult the British on foreign policy matters, which such an agreement with the Zionists would have constituted.

Abdullah and the Jewish Agency after the August 1947 Talks Between August and November 1947, the situation in Palestine was fundamentally transformed as a result of the British decision to withdraw and the United Nations’ support for partition. Abdullah was becoming increasingly concerned about the fate of Transjordan following the British departure from Palestine. He maintained the façade of supporting the Arab consensus, but in private, he supported partition as the only viable solution. Abdullah and the Zionists therefore shared

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a common interest in trying to fill the political vacuum that was likely to arise in Palestine following the end of the mandate. In November 1946, Elias Sasson tried to establish a comprehensive policy for political action amongst the Palestinians and the neighbouring states. Sasson believed that the Jewish Agency had to respond to the establishment of the Arab League, Transjordan’s independence, and the development of what appeared to be a solid Arab front.236 The objective of this plan was to undermine Arab opposition to the establishment of a Jewish state. Sasson argued that the Jewish Agency should develop relations with minorities in the Middle East, such as the Maronites in Lebanon. He argued that the Zionists should support Abdullah’s Greater Syria ambitions in order to transform the political map of the Arab world. Sasson clearly assumed that if Abdullah’s plans came to fruition they would bring down the anti-Zionist Syrian government. Sasson estimated that this part of his plan would cost £50,000, one-quarter of the programme’s total budget.237 In reality, Sasson’s ideas were speculative, since he received no known reply. This calls into question Avi Shlaim’s assertion that this memorandum ‘is significant as an example of the Hashemite orientation which was to increasingly colour the political outlook of the Jewish Agency’.238 It is therefore possible to call into question Sasson’s influence on decision makers like Ben-Gurion. The lack of a coherent Arab policy is exemplified by a meeting of the Political Department held in London in January 1947. This meeting exposed serious differences between the members of the department on how to approach the Arab states. Eliahu Sasson and Reuven Zaslani (Shiloah) promoted the idea of supporting Arab adherents of a Jewish state, arguing that this would weaken the Arab front opposed to Jewish statehood. This approach was challenged by two wellknown stalwarts of the Political Department, Aubrey (Abba) Eban and Eliyahu Epstein (Elath), who were strongly opposed to encouraging dissension in Arab ranks.239 This meeting ended without a decision by the Department on its regional policy Relations with Abdullah should be seen within the context of this policy vacuum. Following Sasson’s meeting with Abdullah in August 1946, contacts were intermittent, which leads to the conclusion that

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the relations were of limited significance. In October 1946, Sasson met Samir al-Rifai, who outlined a plan for the solution of the Palestine question based on the establishment of a Greater Syrian state under the King’s rule.240 The Political Department was well aware of the King’s interests in Syria, but the nature of Abdullah’s intentions confused the Jewish Agency. The Zionists knew of the King’s private support for partition,241 which seemed to be contradicted by his public utterances and his ambiguous evidence to UNSCOP.242 In order to clarify Abdullah’s views, Ezra Danin, a member of the Political Department’s Arab Section, was sent to Amman in August 1947. According to Danin’s account, the King reiterated his support for partition and confirmed that the August 1946 ‘agreement’ was valid.243 Ostensibly, Danin’s account supports the contention that an agreement had been struck in August 1946. In reality, the King offered Danin nothing,244 instead warning the Zionists that they were too hasty in their desire to establish a state. Sasson was so annoyed with the King’s stance that he argued that all payments should be stopped until Abdullah clarified his suggestions for an agreement.245 The Political Department received various accounts that seemed to confirm the King’s support for partition. In October 1947 the Zionists received a report of a meeting between two British journalists with Glubb and Kirkbride, who allegedly confirmed Abdullah’s intention to take the towns of Jerusalem, Nablus and Hebron. It is inconceivable that such a cautious person as Kirkbride could have told journalists this was an ‘obvious solution’.246 A similar statement was attributed to Sir Henry Gurney, the Chief Secretary of the Palestine government, in November 1947.247 In order to clarify relations with Abdullah, Golda Meyerson (Meir) met the King on 17 November 1947.248 Meyerson was the Acting Director of the Political Department, since Shertok was in New York for the forthcoming UN meeting on Palestine. Danin and Sasson accompanied Meyerson, and, according to Danin’s record of the meeting, the King reiterated the idea of Jewish autonomy within a Hashemite state. This démarche was little more than a reiteration of the King’s long-standing policy. Abdullah stated he would not allow his forces to collide with the Jews or cooperate with the other Arab armies against

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them. The King belittled the strength of the other Arab armies and made it clear that the British had not suggested any scheme to him. The King reiterated that he was willing to sign a written agreement so long as the Jewish Agency assisted him in annexing the Arab parts of Palestine. Abdullah inquired about the Jewish Agency’s attitude regarding his plan to take control of the Arab areas. Danin’s report suggests that the Zionists promised to look favourably on it, especially if it did not hinder the Jewish state. The tentative nature of these talks is borne out by the fact that the parties agreed to meet again after the UN decision on the future of Palestine.249 This meeting only took place in May 1948. I will treat this in more detail in the next chapter, but suffice it to say here that Meyerson did not regard the meeting as having reached any kind of agreement, collusive or otherwise.

Conclusion The final years of the Palestine mandate highlight the extent to which Britain’s influence in the Middle East was waning after the Second World War. Britain’s decline as an imperial power resulted from the interaction of complex economic, political and strategic events. The continuation of the mandate considerably diminished Britain’s prestige in the Middle East and show the liability Palestine had become for the Empire. Practically, the British obtained very little from the continuation of the mandate; strategically, it was a hindrance to British interests in the Arab world. In contrast, Transjordan was the epitome of how the British Empire could be successfully run at relatively low cost. The British continued to support Transjordan because it was in their interests to do so, despite the fact that its existence made no economic sense. Given his country’s inherent limitations, Abdullah had little choice but to work with the British, but he succeeded in laying the foundations of an effective state. Abdullah also developed a role in the politics of the Middle East that was out of proportion to his country’s marginal status. In spite of his treaty relations with the British, which imposed formal limitations on Abdullah’s foreign relations, he was determined to pursue his dynastic ambitions in Syria and Palestine. In reality, Abdullah was unlikely to

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assume the Syrian crown because of opposition from the Syrian nationalists. The Greater Syrian programme threatened the regional balance of power, which is why Abdullah’s aspirations were rejected. The most contentious aspect of Abdullah’s foreign policy concerned Palestine and his desire to annex the Arab areas of the country. Abdullah’s views had been common knowledge ever since he accepted the partitioning of Palestine in 1937. Abdullah’s public acceptance of partition had considerable damaged his standing in the region and fuelled the belief that he was a British stooge. This perspective was reinforced by Abdullah’s contacts with the Zionists. The King was willing to give the Jews a measure of autonomy in a Hashemite kingdom under his rule, rather than statehood. It is therefore unlikely that the King and the Zionists could have reached an agreement.

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CHAPTER 5 THE IM AGERY OF COLLUSION: FROM THE M ANDATE TO STATEHOOD, 1948–1951

By 1948, Great Britain’s declining economic and strategic position was abundantly clear. The cost of fighting WWII had bankrupted the British economy, and the country was incapable of competing with the United States and the Soviet Union. Although the United Kingdom was becoming a second-ranking power, the official mind in Whitehall assumed that Britain was still the paramount force in the Middle East. Britain’s ascendant position in the region was challenged by local nationalism, which sought the end of Britain’s influence, and by the superpowers, which were becoming increasingly influential. The situation in Palestine highlighted the limitations imposed on the British, who had no choice but to accept American criticism in spite of Washington’s limited interests in the region. The first Arab-Israeli war (1948–9) showed the weakness of the British bargaining position, and the policies adopted in London, such as the imposition of an arms embargo, undermined Britain’s prestige in the eyes of its Arab allies. Although the British seemed to enjoy close relations with a number of states in the region, including Egypt and Iraq, in practice Transjordan was one of Britain’s closest allies. In the spring of 1948, Britain and Transjordan signed a revised treaty of alliance that guaranteed Britain’s strategic

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interests in Transjordan, and King Abdullah obtained vital financial and technical support for the Arab Legion. The 1948 treaty provided for the continuation of British influence in Transjordan, but in reality, the treaty unintentionally became a defensive alliance, which Abdullah used to protect himself against the possibility of an Israeli attack. The most controversial aspect of the treaty negotiations is the alleged British ‘collusion’ with Abdullah to occupy the Arab areas of Palestine contiguous to Transjordan. This study challenges this widely held assumption, arguing that the British did all they could to limit the Arab Legion’s role in the war. In contrast with the armed forces of Egypt and Iraq, which were held in low regard by the British, the Arab Legion was incorporated in the British order of battle for the Middle East. This meant the Arab Legion was regarded as a higher priority for the supply of arms and munitions. All the same, the Arab Legion’s ability to fight the first Arab-Israeli war was severely affected by the UN imposition of a British-inspired arms embargo. The first Arab-Israeli war, which broke out in May 1948, fundamentally changed Anglo-Transjordan relations. King Abdullah and his government exerted considerable pressure on the British government to provide the Arab Legion with supplies, but Ernest Bevin refused to countenance this, pointing to Britain’s commitment to the UN Charter and its relations with the United States. Bevin and his advisors were determined to improve relations with the United States, which had become strained as a result of American meddling in the Palestine question. The Anglo-Transjordan relationship was of secondary significance compared with the maintenance of the ‘special relationship’ with the United States, which was becoming increasingly significant as a result of the Cold War in Europe. The failure to provide arms precipitated the most far-reaching crisis in relations between the British and Abdullah. Ernest Bevin’s refusal to support Abdullah called into question the validity of the recently signed treaty, and the value of similar agreements with Egypt and Iraq. The 1948 war therefore had considerable unforeseen consequences for Britain’s prestige in the Middle East. The failure of the British to support their most reliable ally in the Middle East challenges the widely held assumption that Abdullah was

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a British stooge. During the course of 1948, Abdullah acted in his own interests rather than in those of the British. Abdullah was determined to occupy the predominantly Arab areas of Palestine following the British departure from Palestine. His objectives were common knowledge at the time, and his regional opponents were determined to prevent the expansion of his sphere of influence. These divisions within the Arab League had far-reaching consequences for the Arab states. Abdullah took advantage of Transjordan’s proximity to Palestine and the presence of the Arab Legion in the country. The annexation of the Arab areas by Transjordan was the only viable alternative in 1948: an independent Palestinian state was barely considered, and there was widespread opposition to the creation of a ‘Mufti-state’ dominated by Hajj Amin al-Husayni. Abdullah adopted a realistic appreciation of the situation in Palestine, in contrast with the dogmatic approach that characterised the other members of the Arab League, who became victims of their own propaganda. Although the King had been in contact with Zionist representatives, the argument that Abdullah and the Zionists colluded to divide Palestine at the end of the mandate is hard to sustain in light of the fighting in Palestine between the Arab Legion and Israeli forces, some of the most intense combat of the war. Abdullah achieved his long-standing objective of annexing the predominantly Arab parts of Palestine, but the influx of a large number of Palestinian refugees and Israel’s policy of retaliation led to the radicalisation of Transjordan’s body politic. This resulted in the decline of the old order and limited Abdullah’s ability to rule unchallenged. This process was particularly significant with regard to the peace talks with the Israelis because the King could not carry his government. The assassination of Abdullah in July 1951 marked the end of an era and the demise of one of the most pragmatic rulers in the region, as well as a gradual decline in British influence in Jordan.

The Revision of the Anglo-Transjordan Treaty in 1948 Relations between Britain and Transjordan were characterised by the remarkable continuity in the officials who served in the country. This was exemplified by the career of Sir Alec Kirkbride (Resident

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in Amman between 1939 and 1946 and Minister until his transfer to Tripoli in 1951), who was posted in Transjordan for three decades, with the exception of short postings in Palestine. Kirkbride’s contribution to relations between Britain and Jordan has been obscured by the prominent public profile of his counterpart General Sir John Bagot Glubb (Glubb Pasha), who commanded the Arab Legion from 1939 to 1956. As we saw in the previous chapters, Britain’s relations with Transjordan were formally established by an agreement signed in 1928, which was transformed into a treaty in 1946, when the country received its independence. The British continued to subsidise the cost of the Arab Legion, which would have been impossible to maintain with Transjordan’s limited economic resources, and in return, the British expected to obtain access to Transjordan in the event of a war in the Middle East. As a result, of tempestuous relations with Egypt and Iraq, however, Transjordan and the Arab Legion became disproportionately significant to the British in their plans for the region’s defence. The 1946 Anglo-Transjordan Treaty quickly came to be regarded as flawed despite its having served its ostensible objectives. Kirkbride reported to the Foreign Office that there was a desire in Transjordan that the 1946 treaty be revised. He noted that this arose not out of local dissatisfaction but as a result of consistent attacks by the neighbouring Arab states and the Soviet Union against its annex, which outlined the nature of Britain’s support for the Arab Legion.1 Transjordan’s independence was widely regarded as spurious because of Whitehall’s continued payment of a subsidy to maintain the Legion. The decision to amend the treaty with Transjordan was influenced by the disastrous failure of the Anglo-Iraqi Portsmouth Treaty in January 1948.2 The Portsmouth Treaty was immediately attacked in Baghdad by nationalist parties who already found the UN partition vote on Palestine outrageous, and by members of the political elite who were determined to bring down the Saleh Jabr government. The effect of these demonstrations was that the Regent Abd al-Ilah refused to ratify the new treaty.3 The immediate abrogation of the treaty had serious implications for British prestige. The Foreign Office conducted a detailed post mortem

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of the failed treaty, which concluded that it had misconstrued the unpopularity of the Saleh Jabr government and the Regent’s weakness in the face of nationalist agitation.4 The Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Office, Sir Orme Sargent, argued that a new treaty with Transjordan should not be signed because agreeing to sign a revised treaty cast doubt on the validity of the existing agreement. He also claimed that nationalist opposition would make ratification difficult to achieve.5 Kirkbride responded to this pessimistic view by arguing that the situation in Transjordan was entirely different from the circumstances that prevailed in either Egypt or Iraq. He observed that Abdullah’s rule was ‘a benevolent form of patriarchal autocracy’ that balanced the democratic side of the government. Kirkbride argued that Transjordan was different from its neighbours economically and socially because it lacked large estates and fortunes, and strong tribal traditions in the territory created a comparatively harmonious society.6 The muted reaction in Transjordan to the signing of the treaty showed how little swayed the country was by nationalism before the 1948 war. In spite of its immediate rejection in Iraq, the Portsmouth Treaty was the blueprint for the revised treaty with Transjordan. The failure of the Portsmouth Treaty led the Chiefs of Staff (COS) and Foreign Office (FO) to reconsider the significance of Transjordan in British defence plans for the Middle East. The COS were becoming increasingly concerned about the impact of the departure from Palestine on the planning for a world war.7 Transjordan was regarded as an essential element of Britain’s strategic position in the Middle East, which led the COS to recommend Transjordan’s annexation of the Arab areas of Palestine. Moreover, the strategists were well aware of the potential danger facing Transjordan as a result of the British departure from Palestine, and the possible threat from neighbouring states. Nonetheless, they had no intention of deploying British troops to defend Transjordan.8 The strategic importance of Transjordan and the application of the provisions of the treaty were eventually rendered moot by Israeli aggression. Negotiations for a revised treaty began when the Transjordan delegation, led by the Prime Minister, Tawfiq Abul Huda, arrived in London in January 1948. The Eastern Department already was well

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aware of the issues that would be raised in the meetings with Abul Huda.9 The Transjordan delegation was concerned about the future of the Arab Legion, the continuation of the British subsidy—which amounted to £2 million in 194810—and the supply of arms.11 The Foreign Office knew that the King would ask whether he should act against the Arab League, and whether the British would support him at the United Nations. The Foreign Office instructed Kirkbride to give Abdullah disingenuously vague replies to these questions.12 In contrast with the negotiations with the Iraqis, the meetings with Abul Huda and his colleagues reached a rapid conclusion.13 The failure of the Portsmouth Treaty was an important lesson in how not to conduct treaty negotiations, and the Foreign Office knew that it had to be very careful in the public presentation of the Transjordan treaty.14 The revised treaty formed the basis of a mutual defence pact, and Article 3 stated that if one side became engaged in a war, the other would ‘immediately come to his aid as a measure of collective defence’.15 The treaty highlighted the unique status of Transjordan and the Arab Legion in British defence plans against a possible Soviet incursion towards the Suez Canal.16 The most significant articles of the treaty were placed in its annex. Article 1 (sections a–d) required Transjordan to provide military facilities in wartime, to develop lines of communication, and to allow the Royal Air Force (RAF) to maintain airfields in Transjordan. Article 4 committed Transjordan to provide facilities for the rapid movement of British forces across Transjordan. Altogether, the revised treaty effectively allowed the British to utilise Transjordan’s limited infrastructure in wartime. The value of the treaty was tested during and after the 1948 war in the context of British support for the Arab Legion against Israeli aggression. In practice, the treaty underwent a subtle transformation from a mutual defence pact that benefited British strategic interests to a political weapon that Abdullah used to secure Transjordan against possible Israeli aggression. The reaction to the 1946 treaty showed that Abdullah’s critics would inevitably accuse him of being a British puppet. This led the Foreign Office to devise a publicity campaign whereby details of the treaty would be carefully leaked to the press in order to ameliorate the

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public reaction. Kirkbride reported that the Syrian government had organised a number of Transjordan political refugees in Damascus to foment disorder in Transjordan. He reported that there had been demonstrations in the Ajlun district in the north of the country, but he assigned little importance to them and praised both the King and the Prime Minister for taking a firm line when the treaty was ratified in Amman on 15 March 1948.17 Elsewhere in the region, the treaty was met with criticism, which the King ignored.18

The Bevin–Abul Huda Meeting Reassessed The strategic significance of the revised treaty has been obscured by a long-running historical debate as to whether Ernest Bevin encouraged Abdullah to occupy the West Bank during the 1948 war. This allegation is historically significant because it suggests that the Foreign Office encouraged Abdullah to take action that would have undermined the November 1947 United Nations’ recommendation to partition Palestine. One of my objectives in this book is to challenge this assumption by utilising a wide range of primary sources, which show that Bevin and his advisors knew that they could not encourage Abdullah to take any precipitous action before the end of the mandate on May 15, 1948. Whereas the British understood the political and strategic value of Transjordan’s occupation of parts of Palestine, the international ramifications of Transjordan’s occupying all or part of Palestine were clearly understood, and following the cessation of the mandate, the British were forced to implement an arms embargo that had a dramatic impact on the Arab Legion’s military effectiveness. Before the arrival of the Transjordan delegation in London, the Foreign Office had been deliberating about the role of Abdullah and the Arab Legion after the British withdrawal from Palestine. The Foreign Office had consistently opposed Abdullah’s well-known desire to annex the predominantly Arab parts of Palestine, but the forthcoming geographically phased withdrawal of the civil administration that started in February 1948, led to a reversal of this policy.19 During the autumn of 1947, Kirkbride secretly corresponded with Orme Sargent, the Permanent Undersecretary at the Foreign Office, about

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the benefits of Transjordan’s occupying the Arab areas of Palestine.20 In January 1948, Kirkbride resumed his correspondence with Sargent, in which he argued that Abdullah and his government recognised the delicacy of the British government’s position regarding Transjordan’s role in Palestine. Kirkbride believed that Abdullah was not expecting British encouragement to take action, and he advised that it was important that no steps be taken that would reduce the ability of the Arab Legion to take control of the Arab areas.21 Kirkbride’s views were clearly outlined in rarely cited private correspondence with Sir Harold MacMichael, a former High Commissioner for Palestine. He argued that the Transjordan authorities were determined to make a bid to acquire the Arab areas of Palestine. Kirkbride’s trenchant support for Abdullah’s expansionist ambitions were motivated by the concern that if Transjordan was cut off from the Mediterranean it would be very difficult for the country to survive economically.22 The Foreign Office sought the views of its representatives about the impact in the Arab world of Abdullah’s plans to seize part of Palestine and to acquiesce to a Jewish state.23 The Eastern Department of the Foreign Office established that the regional reaction would be varied. The governments of Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Syria would ‘intensely dislike’ a purely Transjordanian force occupying all or part of Palestine, even under the command of the Arab League, whereas the Iraqis would acquiesce.24 The Foreign Office was determined to discourage Abdullah from taking action that would unite the Arab world against him, and to avoid Britain’s being accused of ‘using him to engineer [its] re-entry into Palestine’.25 Harold Beeley, the Foreign Office’s Palestine expert who was responsible for ‘about two-thirds of the British ideas regarding Palestine during the past few years’,26 argued that Abdullah could count on a large measure of support in the Arab world if he defied the United Nations and invaded the prospective Jewish state. However, if Abdullah confined himself to the Arab area, this would be regarded as personal aggrandisement, which would lead to his isolation and threaten the future of the Arab League.27 The Foreign Office and the COS secretly supported the extension of Transjordanian control over parts of Palestine but understood that they could not encourage Abdullah because of how Abdullah’s enemies

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would react. This was reflected in the advice Bevin received prior to meeting with Tawfiq Abul Huda on 7 February 1948.28 There are several accounts of the meeting, of which John Glubb’s description is the most commonly cited, but no Jordanian source has ever been quoted.29 Glubb’s account, which was published in 1957, can be compared with the official record despatched to Amman on 9 February.30 Ernest Bevin supposedly encouraged Abdullah’s emissary to invade Palestine in defiance of the UN partition plan. In reality, many historians have blindly followed Avi Shlaim’s contention that this meeting resulted in ‘collusion’ between Bevin and Abul Huda in which the Arab Legion was given a ‘green light’ to invade Palestine after 15 May 1948.31 Shlaim also argues that Bevin tacitly sought to undermine the UN partition scheme for Palestine, which envisaged two autonomous states after the British departure. Shlaim reaches the conclusion that the meeting ‘was a major turning-point in Britain’s policy towards the Middle East’.32 There is in fact no evidence to support Shlaim’s assertion that Bevin gave Abul Huda a ‘green light’ to invade the Arab areas of Palestine immediately following the termination of the mandate.33

British Support for the Arab Legion A number of facts refute the charge that an agreement was reached between Bevin and the King. After the Second World War, British policy in the Middle East had been complicated by the gradual of expansion of American interests in the region. The deepening of the Cold War in Europe made the Foreign Office determined to maintain amicable relations with President Harry S. Truman’s administration. The postwar era was also characterised by Britain’s gradual decline as an imperial power. British supremacy in the Middle East was in a state of flux as a result of nationalist pressure, which was typified by the refusal of the Egyptian and Iraqi governments to sign revised treaties that were intended to guarantee Britain’s interests. In contrast, relations with Abdullah underwent a subtle transformation. Hitherto British attitudes towards the King had been condescending, and Transjordan was regarded as little more than an imperial convenience.

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However, events elsewhere in the region led to a reconsideration of Transjordan’s strategic value. This was manifested by Britain’s willingness to subsidise the expansion of the Arab Legion, whereas the armies of Egypt and Iraq were held in low regard by British and American strategists. British policy makers believed that the supply of arms was an important mechanism for exerting political influence and for obtaining much needed foreign exchange.34 The treaties with Egypt, Iraq and Transjordan required them to obtain their arms solely from the British, which had the effect of making Britain the most significant arms supplier in the region.35 The British, well aware of the political and strategic value of arms supplies, assumed incorrectly that ‘arms diplomacy’ was an effective mechanism for exerting influence.36 The United States formally acknowledged Britain’s role as the main arms supplier in the region during the ‘Pentagon talks’ in October and November 1947.37 Nonetheless, British arms supply policy was fundamentally influenced by the implementation of a unilateral American arms embargo on supplies to the Middle East that was announced in December 1947. The rationale for the American embargo was to prevent the Arabs from using ‘arms of US origin against Jews, or Jews using them against Arabs. In either case, we [the United States] would be subject to bitter recrimination’.38 The American embargo was publicised by the State Department on 5 December 1947.39 It included a detailed breakdown of the inconsequential US arms supplies to the region. Advisors to President Truman, such as Clark Clifford, argued that the US embargo should be forsaken to give the Zionists an equal opportunity to arm themselves.40 In response, the State Department consistently argued that lifting the embargo in favour of the Zionists would have disastrous implications for US interests in the Middle East and undermine Anglo-American cooperation in the region.41 The State Department maintained that the ‘attendant chaos would provide a breeding ground for communism’, possibly leading to the rise of dictatorships opposed to the interests of the United States and Great Britain.42 Bevin was infuriated by Truman’s de facto recognition of Israel on 14 May 1948,43 but both governments remained united by a desire to

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prevent Soviet penetration of the Middle East. One of the most significant long-term implications of the Second World War was that the British found it increasingly difficult to sustain the economic burden of a far-flung imperial system. By 1948, Britain’s economic limitations, including the precipitous decline in its dollar and gold reserves, made it increasingly reliant on American economic aid.44 Britain therefore had little choice but to accept, with considerable reservation, the expansion of American interests in the Middle East.45 The progressive decline in Britain’s ability to defend Western interests had made the region vulnerable to Soviet pressure. Although the British wanted to remain the senior partner in the Middle East, they had little choice but to seek American assistance in order to preserve their increasingly unpopular treaties. The inexorable decline in Britain’s capabilities did not go unnoticed in the region, where it was becoming increasingly obvious that the British were incapable of meeting their commitments.46 The failure of the Portsmouth Treaty in 1948 and the Foreign Office’s inability to persuade the Egyptians to sign a revised treaty were clear signs of Britain’s waning influence. The Americans, who were opposed to British support for the old social classes in Egypt and Iraq, were becoming increasingly concerned that Britain’s economic weakness and the burden of imperial defence might force them to assume some of Britain’s commitments.47 These considerations led Clement Attlee and the Minister of Defence, Albert Alexander, to conclude in January 1948 that the Arab states would be net losers if the Americans lifted their embargo.48 The Foreign Office instructed Britain’s representatives in the Middle East to present the situation to the Arab states and to give them a choice: either the United States could lift its embargo, in which case the Zionists would be the main beneficiaries, or the British could impose a temporary suspension of arms supplies. With the exception of the Syrians—who had ‘nothing to lose’ from a temporary suspension because they received no arms from the British—the Arabs’ reaction to this démarche was overwhelmingly negative.49 As far as King Abdullah was concerned, the choice was meaningless because he believed the Zionists would arm themselves in spite of any suspension of British supplies.50

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King Abdullah’s recognition of the emptiness of the ‘choice’ offered to the Arab states to gain their acquiescence to a temporary suspension of arms supplies was confirmed by two parliamentary statements on 2 and 18 February. Albert Alexander stated in the statements that an arms embargo on Palestine would remain in force until the termination of the mandate on 15 May 1948. Alexander also stated that the government would refuse British arms manufacturers’ permission to export arms except under existing treaty obligation contracts.51 Compared with Egypt and Iraq, Transjordan enjoyed more favourable terms for British supplies than Egypt and Iraq. Transjordan and the Arab Legion’s advantageous position among Middle East states was underscored following the completion of treaty talks in February 1948.52 The Legion’s expansion was the result of a proposal Glubb made in May 1947 that the Arab Legion be expanded into a combined arms division.53 After the COS consented,54 the headquarters of Middle East Land Forces (MELF) reviewed Glubb’s proposal and decided on a three-phased reorganisation of the Legion, including replacing obsolete artillery with second-hand weapons supplied from Egypt and Palestine.55 The MELF staff proposed the development of a larger and much more effective organisation funded entirely by the British.56 The Arab Legion was envisaged as an infantry-based force whose primary role was to ensure internal security rather than as an army equipped to fight a regional war. Glubb noted in his memoirs that ‘it had never been contemplated that the Arab Legion would fight an independent war’ because of the British presence in Palestine and because Transjordan faced no potential enemy.57 During the negotiations, both countries gave great weight to the future of the British-financed and commanded Arab Legion. Glubb emphasised that it was imperative for supplies to reach Transjordan by 15 May.58 The vast majority of the Arab Legion’s supplies were dispatched overland from the vast British base in the Suez Canal Zone via Palestine to Transjordan. The long-term viability of this route was uncertain due to the civil war raging in Palestine, during late 1947. The British incorporated the Arab Legion into their defence plans for the region, whereas no such planning occurred with Egyptian and Iraqi armed forces. Cooperation with Transjordan was viewed as

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critical because the country was integral to Britain’s system of defence for the Middle East and was a buffer zone in the event of a Soviet incursion towards the Suez Canal.59 Although Transjordan’s position among Arab League countries was precarious, its geostrategic position in the region was disproportionately significant. Transjordan’s regional importance increased due to the uncertain future of Britain’s bases in Egypt, Iraq, and Palestine. The COS concluded that the British evacuation from Palestine ‘greatly increases the minimum forces which we can contemplate in our interests for Transjordan in the immediate future’. Ostensibly, these arms were required to guarantee internal security in Transjordan, and to provide the Arab Legion with the means to participate in British plans for the defence of the Middle East. The COS believed the Arab population of Palestine and the Arab states might demand that the Arab Legion be deployed to restore law and order in Palestine. Therefore, the COS concluded that ‘any developments which give King Abdullah an increased influence in Palestine increase the importance to us of retaining our influence over him’. The Arab Legion was therefore regarded by the COS as the main instrument for protecting Britain’s strategic requirements in Transjordan ‘and in any area of Palestine over which King Abdullah’s influence may extend’.60 However, the plan to expand the Legion contradicted Albert Alexander’s public statements. To deflect attention from this glaring contradiction, Arab Legion supplies were sent from depots in Egypt and Palestine, rather than from the United Kingdom. Because the Transjordan government had requested additional arms in May 1947, the COS also argued that the equipment was already ‘in the pipeline’ before the government revised its policy, and it concluded therefore that the British government was not debarred from supplying it.61 Transjordan received large quantities of arms and ammunition in the months preceding the termination of the mandate.62 There was a sense of urgency in Whitehall to take steps to provide the Arab Legion with the supplies it needed to be an effective force. No such steps were taken on behalf of Egypt and Iraq. However, the Arab Legion was still drastically short of ammunition during the first Arab-Israeli war. This was because of the slow movement of arms shipments from the

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Suez Canal Zone to the Transjordanian port in Aqaba, and a remarkable Egyptian embargo of a shipment of munitions intended for the Arab Legion in May 1948.63 These errors had severe implications for the Legion during the 1948 war and precipitated a crisis in AngloJordanian relations.64

British Debates and Approaches to the Arab Legion’s Intervention in Palestine The British secretly supported Abdullah’s plan to take control of the Arab areas of Palestine after the withdrawal in May, but paradoxically they took steps that significantly hampered the Arab Legion’s performance during the 1948 war. These included attempts to limit the role of British officers serving in the Legion and the cessation of arms supplies. These efforts undermine the argument that the British ‘colluded’ with Abdullah to occupy the West Bank in 1948. In accordance with the British evacuation plan, the Arab Legion units in Palestine started to withdraw in February 1948, and by May some soldiers remained west of the Jordan.65 In the months preceding the end of British rule in Palestine, Alec Kirkbride provided the Foreign Office with numerous reports concerning the Legion’s likely plans following the cessation of the mandate. They highlight Kirkbride’s remarkable relationship with the King, which had evolved over several decades. Kirkbride’s analysis of developments in Palestine and the wider region was based on Abdullah’s ‘habit of informing [Kirkbride] what he has in mind in both official and private matters with a frankness which is sometimes startling’,66 but were hedged by the fluid nature of the situation and the conflicting pressures on the King. Officials in London tended to hold Kirkbride’s reports from Amman in high regard. But other well-informed sources also provided a wealth of information about the rapidly changing events in the region. By 1948, Glubb had achieved the rank of brigadier and continued his long-standing habit of providing unsolicited commentaries on the political and military situation. In March 1948, Glubb sought the advice of the MELF headquarters about how the Arab Legion could

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be employed in Palestine after 15 May. Glubb and MELF agreed that the soundest course of action for Transjordan was to deploy Legion units in the vicinity of al-Ramla and Hebron (both within the projected Arab state), which would also allow Glubb to control the axis between Tel Aviv and Jerusalem. General Pyman, the Chief of Staff of MELF, observed that ‘the part that Transjordan are [sic] trying to play in Palestine is rather interesting. They wish to retain the approval of the outside world and ourselves and show themselves as moderate and upholders of law and order. On the other hand, they are not prepared to sit back and do nothing and by so doing lose prestige in the eyes of the Arabs who expect the Arab Legion to play a major part in upholding the Arab cause’.67 This observation shows that Glubb was seriously considering carrying out operations beyond the border of the Arab state. This calls into question the notion of a ‘collusion’ in which the Legion would not go beyond the Arab areas in Palestine. The Foreign Office was well aware of Abdullah’s intention to occupy the predominantly Arab areas of Palestine, but it could not encourage him to take such action given the international ramifications this would have for Abdullah and for British prestige. The primary concerns for Bevin and his advisors were maintaining amicable relations with the Americans and preventing the Soviet Union from taking advantage of Britain’s waning influence. The future of mandatory Palestine had been a source of friction between London and Washington since 1945, and relations reached their nadir following President Truman’s decision to acknowledge Israel’s existence on 14 May. The Foreign Office was dismayed by this decision,68 but it was well aware of the importance of American strategic co-operation in the Middle East.69 To achieve a semblance of unity, a UN-sponsored arms embargo was mooted by Harold Beeley. Beeley argued that the most effective mechanism to prevent the Arabs and Jews from acquiring arms from either the Americans or the Soviets was an arms embargo.70 The State Department was equally concerned that if the Arab states invaded the Jewish state it would be impossible to resist US domestic opinion in favour of rescinding the embargo.71 The British and Americans were in accord on the need to prevent the Russians from exploiting Anglo-American divisions. This

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goal influenced London, with American support, to table a Security Council resolution. The impact of a Security Council resolution imposing an embargo on arms supplies to the Arab states was a secondary consideration for policy makers in the Foreign Office. The Security Council passed the resolution on 29 May 1948 which called ‘upon all governments and authorities concerned to refrain from importing or exporting war material’ into the region during a four-week cease-fire that was also promulgated in this resolution.72 The embargo and ceasefire were intended as short-term expedients rather than as a long-term solution to the Palestine conflict. The arms embargo was reaffirmed on 15 July and 16 November 1948. Immediately following the UN resolution, and at Bevin’s instigation, the War Office ordered MELF to cease all arms supplies to the Arab states.73 The British also sought to exert pressure on Abdullah by cutting the subsidy that was payable under the 1948 treaty, which was only resumed in August of that year. The cessation of supplies was intended to curtail the conflict in Palestine, but the embargo was severely flawed. The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) noted that the Israelis possessed local arms manufacturing facilities and much more money to covertly acquire weapons in Eastern Europe; whereas the Arab states and the Palestinian Arabs had no manufacturing capabilities and lacked the financial resources to purchase arms.74 Regardless of the ample intelligence that the Israelis were routinely breaching the embargo, Bevin doggedly enforced a strict embargo on the Arab states.75 The embargo had a telling impact on the Arab armies, including the Arab Legion, which were rendered militarily ineffectual.76 In contrast, the Israelis procured arms from Soviet-backed countries such as Czechoslovakia, reducing the impact of the US and UN embargos significantly.77 This increase in numerical strength was reflected in the ‘Ten Days’ fighting between 9 and 18 July 1948, during which alRamla and Lydda fell to the Israelis. With the exception of the Legion, which managed to hold its positions despite the critical shortage of munitions, the other Arab armies were repulsed. This led Glubb to conclude that the war in Palestine was a duel between the Legion and the Israelis. Glubb added that the other Arab states would not be sorry

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if the Legion was defeated, since they could not forgive or forget that the King had signed the 1948 treaty with the British.78 Nonetheless, the Israelis failed to capitalise on their military superiority and drive the Arab Legion from Palestine. The Arab Legion had a second weakness: its reliance on the forty British officers who commanded the army’s key units.79 These officers were divided into three groups: those who served in the Legion as private citizens; officers such as Glubb who until the end of the mandate were still part of the Palestine Civil Service; and the thirtytwo officers on secondment from the British Army.80 The COS and the Eastern Department agreed that while it was inevitable that the Legion would return to Palestine, the officers seconded to the Legion must be ordered not to join their units in the invasion.81 The Foreign Office was concerned about a potentially embarrassing situation, in terms of its relations with the Americans and at the United Nations, if these officers accompanied their troops into action. The FO outlined several possible responses to the situation. These included either prohibiting the officers from entering Palestine or allowing them to enter Palestine only if they served in the Arab areas outlined by the United Nations and went no further.82 Kirkbride warned the FO of the dangers of removing officers who formed the backbone of the Legion. He argued that this would undermine relations with the King and could lead to drastic changes in the role of British officers. Kirkbride proposed that the seconded officers be allowed to serve with their regiments, but not if they went beyond the borders envisaged in the United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP) partition plan promulgated in August 1947.83 The FO warned that Glubb and two other Legion officers seconded from the Colonial Service could be charged under the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 for being in the service of another power in war without the knowledge of Whitehall.84 This was clearly a spurious argument, suggesting that these threats were a bluff. Nonetheless, Bevin informed his American counterpart, U.S. Secretary of State General George Marshall, on 24 May that the seconded officers had been instructed to withdraw to Transjordan if the Legion came into conflict with the Israelis.85 Kirkbride was given similar instructions

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by Bevin,86 which he chose to ignore;87 instead, he demanded that the officers accompany their troops into battle, so long as they did not go beyond the UN-defined Arab areas of Palestine.88 The British were also confronted with the widely held belief in the United States that Glubb commanded the army and that he was following British orders.89 As far as the Israelis were concerned, ‘Glubb Pasha is directing the campaign and Abdullah’s orders are thrown into the waste-paper basket’.90 The Arab Legion’s participation in the fighting in the environs of Jerusalem contradicts this assertion. Initially Glubb wanted to avoid committing the army to fighting because it was neither equipped nor trained for urban warfare. Glubb came under intense pressure from the King and Abul Huda to act, however. Kirkbride noted that Glubb avoided the King and Abul Huda and their demand for immediate action by visiting troops at the front.91 Glubb’s reluctance to follow orders raises the question of how in control the King was of the Legion’s operations at the time; the Legion’s entry into Jerusalem on 19 May 1948 suggests that the King was indeed in command and that he took this decision despite Glubb’s objections. These orders had a profound influence on the future of the war, and more particularly on relations between the King and his British allies. The Legion’s attack on Jerusalem led to the realisation of the Foreign Office’s worst fears of how such an operation could reverberate internationally. Although Abdullah and Abul Huda personally supported a UN-sponsored cease-fire that came into effect on 11 June,92 they were in no position to extend it, since the very survival of the Hashemite monarchy in Transjordan could have been threatened if the King had defied the Egyptian-led consensus that rejected a cease-fire.93 Fear that the poorly armed Arab Legion might be defeated prompted the King and Abul Huda to send Bevin numerous and increasingly urgent requests for more supplies.94 They received vigorous support from Glubb and Kirkbride.95 Yet Kirkbride’s advice had no discernable impact on Bevin, who was more concerned about the diplomatic ramifications of the continued arms supplies with the Americans and at the United Nations.96 The Foreign Office legal advisors had already established the primacy of the UN Charter over existing treaties, an interpretation that prevailed despite evidence that the Israelis were

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routinely flouting the embargo.97 Britain’s diplomatic representatives sent numerous telegrams to London reporting on the embargo’s deleterious impact, and demanding arms.98 Kirkbride believed the Arab states would blame their defeat by the Israelis on the British failure to supply them with weapons, profoundly damaging Britain’s prestige in the Middle East. Kirkbride wrote in August 1948 that Arab opinion of Britain in Transjordan had reached a new low: ‘I have a growing conviction that if a disaster overtakes Transjordan whilst we are still withholding supplies and ammunition . . . we might as well abandon the present policy of building defensive alliances in the Middle East’.99 In response, Bevin acknowledged that the Arab Legion had borne the brunt of the fighting in Palestine,100 but he made it clear to Kirkbride that he could only satisfy demands for arms from Amman if the King followed his advice and agreed to the extension of the cease-fire. In August 1948, Bevin wrote, ‘I am not ashamed of the part that we have played . . . it is quite untrue that we have let the Arabs down or failed in any obligations towards them’. Bevin added ‘we did not urge them to intervene in Palestine nor did we promise them support if they did so’.101 Alan Bullock argues that Bevin’s Palestine policy was influenced by his exasperation with the Truman administration. Bevin, however, understood that too much was at stake in Europe and the Middle East to let differences over Palestine weaken the Western alliance. Bevin also saw himself as a bulwark against the expansion of Soviet influence, and he regarded the Israelis as the main source of instability in the region.102 The importance Bevin attached to the United States as a key factor in finding a solution to the Palestine question led him to adopt a cautious policy on arms supplies. Bevin held that Arab demands for arms were impossible to fulfil in the face of proZionist pressure on the State Department to lift the US embargo. Bevin and his advisors were determined to uphold the spirit of the arms embargo103 and the British government’s commitment to the United Nations Charter.104 Bernard Burrows, head of the Eastern Department, proposed that supplies be sent to British bases in Iraq and Transjordan so that ordnance would be available in a crisis. Burrows argued that the UN

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resolution was intended to prevent arms from falling into the hands of the belligerents105 and not to preclude the movement of military material from one British base to another.106 Therefore, Burrows maintained that there was no legal impediment to the movement of supplies to and from British bases.107 The Minister of Defence, Albert Alexander,108 and the Chiefs of Staff supported sending supplies to the Arab Legion.109 By August 1948, the Chiefs of Staff had refined plans to despatch 240 tons of munitions by air to the RAF station in Amman. Although this plan had strong support from Field Marshal Montgomery,110 the Chief of the Imperial General Staff, Bevin persuaded the COS that the movement of these stores was not a pressing matter.111 British policy was characterised by confusion and a lack of coordination between the Foreign Office and the Ministry of Defence. The Eastern Department of the Foreign Office was responsible for formulating British policy on arms supplies, but FO staff members held significantly different views about the issue.112 The FO confusion is demonstrated by Bevin’s impression that supplies could be flown from the Canal Zone to bases in Iraq and Transjordan in a week, when in reality it would take much longer.113 This mistaken impression, which was not corrected until the end of October 1948,114 may explain in part why Bevin rejected the advice of the COS and Kirkbride to send munitions to Transjordan immediately.115 Eventually a compromise was reached. Bevin agreed to ship supplies to Transjordan only after he had succeeded in obtaining American acquiescence at the end of October 1948.116 This approach was confirmed by the Cabinet, which at the same time reaffirmed the application of the Anglo-Transjordanian 1948 treaty, if the Israelis attacked Transjordan.117 The supplies were only dispatched to the RAF station in Amman in January 1949.118 The Arab Legion’s shortage of ammunition not only made the army militarily impotent; it also gave rise to strong anti-British feeling. Hitherto, Abdullah’s moderate position in the Arab League had been based on an effective army, but his bargaining position was undermined by the arms embargo, which unintentionally undercut the military effectiveness of the Arab Legion.119 The key issue was the rigid

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enforcement of the embargo, and the Arab Legion’s dearth of supplies, also applied to Egypt and Iraq, both of which relied on British equipment and munitions.120 Before the outbreak of the 1948 war British and American intelligence agencies had accurately estimated that the Arab armies, with the exception of the Legion, were in a poor state of readiness.121 It was also thought that they would find it difficult to sustain large forces in Palestine over long lines of communication,122 which led to the conviction that logistical difficulties would force the Arab armies to withdraw sooner rather than later.123 British diplomats elsewhere in the region commented on the serious damage being done to British influence and prestige because of the embargo,124 and on how the Palestine question had come to dominate the political scene in these countries.125 Britain’s maintenance of limited arms supplies to its allies as a result of the embargo is somewhat baffling, considering the overwhelming contemporary evidence that the Israelis simply ignored the embargo and imported large quantities of arms and munitions from any source that would supply them.126 Sir Henry Mack, Ambassador in Baghdad, was indubitably correct in characterising the embargo as ‘a farce because the Jews import what they want’.127 Nonetheless, in Transjordan, the arms embargo contributed to the most serious and far-reaching crisis in relations between the King and London. Kirkbride and Pirie-Gordon reported that Abdullah was in an impossible position, and that he could not withdraw the army without losing face. Glubb’s and Kirkbride’s warnings about the lack of supplies had an alarming effect on the King’s mental state,128 which must have been reinforced by his erroneous conviction that the RAF held secret supplies of ammunition in Amman.129 The Arab Legion’s shortage on men and munitions came to the fore during a brief break in the UN ceasefire. On 9 July the Israeli army launched ‘Operation Danny’ whose objective was to secure the length of the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road. The first stage of the operation led to the conquest of the Arab towns of Lydda and al-Ramla, which were populated by approximately 60,000 civilians. The second stage of the operation was a failed attack against the strategically vital Arab Legion position at Latrun, which dominated the Jerusalem-Tel Aviv road. The

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Israeli attack on Lydda and al-Ramla was influenced by their erroneous assessment of the strength of Arab Legion forces in the vicinity of the towns, which supposedly posed a threat to Tel Aviv ten miles away. A token force of Arab Legion soldiers and irregulars held the towns, and on 12 and 13 July the Israelis defeated Lydda and al-Ramla leading to the mass flight of tens of thousands of civilians.130 The fall of the towns contributed significantly to the Palestinian refugee problem, but it also led to accusations that they had been deliberately lost by the King and the Arab Legion for reasons of political expediency.131 Glubb advised the King and his government that the towns were militarily indefensible, and that any attempt to reduce the garrison holding Latrun to protect Lydda and al-Ramla would have led to a disaster.132 Militarily Glubb was no doubt correct in his assessment of the situation, but politically the King was under considerable pressure on the part of his supposed allies to continue fighting against impossible odds. Furthermore, the loss of Lydda and al-Ramla undermined Abdullah’s propaganda that he was the bulwark of the Palestinian population. The defeat at Lydda and al-Ramla, and the massive influx of destitute refugees into Transjordanian controlled territory, precipitated unprecedented demonstrations in Transjordan and the West Bank that bitterly criticised Glubb personally and the British in general.133 Demonstrators attacked Glubb because they believed that that the towns had been deliberately lost on British instructions as a means of ensuring Transjordan’s acceptance of a truce.134 These allegations were unfounded, but Glubb’s relations with the King and his government reached their nadir following the fall of Lydda and al-Ramla.135 On 13 July Glubb was summoned to a tense meeting with Abdullah and the Council of Ministers (the King’s cabinet), and his previous advise about defending the towns was ignored, and his complaints about the shortage of munitions disbelieved.136 King Abdullah suggested that there would be no complaints if Glubb resigned, which sent shockwaves through the Foreign Office.137 Glubb’s standing with the King was weakened by the belated discovery that he had spent at least £400,000 on the Legion without the knowledge of either Abdullah or the government.138 Glubb acted on the assumption that the Arab League would fulfil an earlier promise to reimburse the Legion, which it never did.139

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During the course of these events Kirkbride was on sick leave in London, and following his return to Amman at the beginning of August he reprimanded Abdullah for the accusations that had been levelled against Glubb and the British officers of the Arab Legion.140 The American consul in Jerusalem argued that the government and people in Transjordan were happy ‘to have a whipping boy on whom they can place blame for their own deficiencies’.141 Nonetheless, Glubb’s unauthorised expenditure on the Legion, and the belief that he had failed the population of Lydda and al-Ramla, led the Council of Ministers to demand the right to exercise closer control over the Legion.142 Kirkbride believed that this desire was entirely reasonable, and British officials thought that increased cabinet authority would weaken the charge that Glubb was acting under instructions conveyed to him by the legation in Amman.143 The Transjordanian government’s demand for more control at the expense of the King and Glubb started a decline in the King’s dominance of Transjordan and the increasing power of a more nationalist cabinet and parliament. Sir Alec Kirkbride and Christopher Pirie-Gordon believed that the impact of the embargo and the fall of Lydda and al-Ramla had serious implications for Britain’s prestige in Transjordan.144 Pirie-Gordon held that Britain’s reputation in Transjordan had reached its nadir and that Britain was now universally unpopular.145 Kirkbride was also struck by the extreme precariousness of Britain’s position in Transjordan. He wrote that the British had reached a state of unpopularity ‘which I would have described as impossible six months ago’, adding, ‘I have a growing conviction that if a disaster overtakes Transjordan whilst we are still withholding supplies and ammunition we might as well abandon the present policy of building defensive alliances in the Middle East’.146 Although the British subsidy to the King, which had been cut at the end of May, was restored at the beginning of August, this did little to improve the tense relationship between the King and his British allies.147

The Myth of ‘Collusion’: Abdullah and the Jews in 1948 Abdullah’s relations with the Zionists were roundly criticised during his life, and he was persistently accused of secretly colluding to thwart the

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establishment of a Palestinian state. His relations with the Zionists were characteristic of his moderation, but they contributed to the accusation that he was a ‘traitor, a puppet of the British and a client of the Jews’.148 In truth, Abdullah acted out of self-interest in cultivating ties with the Zionists. In November 1947, he met with representatives of the Jewish Agency and agreed to the partition of Palestine without any reference to the Palestinian population. However, events in Palestine made any agreement ‘antiquated and impractical’.149 During the final days of the mandate, relations between the King and the Jewish Agency were characterised by uncertainty. This led David Ben-Gurion to comment that the King was completely isolated and could not be relied upon.150 The King maintained his intermittent relations with the Zionists by using intermediaries such as his personal physician, Shawkat alSati.151 In January 1948, the Jewish Agency tried to persuade the King to accept a Jewish state in Palestine,152 a proposal that he could not agree to given the rapidly deteriorating situation. The Zionists seemed to be confounded by the mixed signals they received concerning Abdullah’s true intentions, which is surprising given that his objectives in Palestine had been consistent since the mid-1930s.153 Abdullah was confronted by a series of pressures in Palestine and in the Arab League that impinged on his attitude towards Palestine and the Zionists. Sir Alan Cunningham believed that Abdullah’s occupation of Palestine would be generally welcomed, although not by the Mufti and his allies, so long as he was acting on the authority of the League.154 The King’s relations with the Zionists were fundamentally transformed by the 9 April massacre of more than one hundred civilians at Deir Yassin, a village close to the Jaffa-Jerusalem road. It has been widely argued that the massacre indelibly marked the Arabs of Palestine politically and psychologically because it was the precursor to the exodus of several hundred thousand civilians—many of whom became destitute refugees in Transjordan.155 Although the massacre was perpetrated by the LEHI, Abdullah rejected the Jewish Agency’s protestations that it played no role in these events and refused to continue the dialogue with the Zionists.156 Nonetheless, the King publicly reiterated his long-standing offer of local autonomy for the Jews within an Arab kingdom.157

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Prior to the British withdrawal, two attempts were made to restore contacts between the King and the Zionists. The first involved a meeting of British officers of the Arab Legion with their Haganah counterparts that took place on 2 May 1948 at Naharayim in the Jordan valley.158 This encounter has been interpreted as proof of collusion between the Jewish Agency and the Arab Legion to divide Palestine.159 The various accounts of this meeting do not lend credence to this assumption, since there is no evidence that the King was aware of it. According to the Israeli accounts, the meeting was held at the request of the Arab Legion, which was represented by British staff officers presumably acting on Glubb’s orders.160 The objective was to discuss what would happen after the end of the mandate, and to make sure that the Legion and the Jewish forces would not come into conflict.161 Skirmishes had already taken place between the Legion and the Jews before this meeting at Gesher in the Jordan valley, and thereafter in Jerusalem and Gush Etzion.162 An alternative view of this meeting is that it was consistent with Glubb’s long-standing plan to take only the Arab areas adjacent to Transjordan. Glubb was well aware that his small army was considerably outnumbered by the Jews, and he knew that any extended operation would lead to its defeat. On 10 May, Golda Meyerson (Meir) met with Abdullah.163 The King requested that the Zionists defer their declaration of statehood, and he restated his long-standing plan for autonomy status in a Hashemite Kingdom.164 Meyerson and her colleagues failed to convince the King of the virtues of partition. Abdullah Tall, who served as an officer in the Arab Legion and was later accused of having a role in the King’s murder, claimed that Meyerson demanded that the King declare peace with the Jews and refrain from sending the Legion into Palestine.165 Meyerson allegedly agreed to Transjordan’s annexation of the Arab parts of Palestine, in return for which Abdullah promised that the Legion and the Iraqi army would not attack. The veracity of Tall’s account is questionable given his political motives and the fact he was not present.166 Meyerson’s meeting with Abdullah has been the subject of considerable scholarly debate. Avi Shlaim contends that the records ‘prove beyond a shadow of doubt that a firm deal was concluded between the

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King and Mrs Meyerson on the division of Palestine between them and the King was willing to commit himself in writing’. Shlaim adds that this meeting was ‘the progeny of an unholy alliance between the Zionists and Hashemites’.167 In reality, the documentation is not so emphatic. Nonetheless, Shlaim’s argument has become an article of faith.168 Uri Bar-Joseph maintains that this conversation brought relations between the two sides to a new phase that ended on 11 May 1948 (the date of the second meeting). Moreover, Bar-Joseph thinks that Abdullah and the Zionists clearly understood what had been achieved at the meeting.169 Joseph Nevo argues that the meeting ‘constituted a genuine landmark’ and the ‘discussions were no longer theoretical’, adding that ‘for the first time an agreement was reached on concrete operative measures that were acceptable to both parties while it also contained an element of quid pro quo’.170 These views are unsatisfactory for various reasons. First, it is unclear on whose instructions Meyerson was acting when she met the King. More important, there was no discussion of an agreement in the Jewish Agency Executive (JAE) at the time. It is possible that the meeting was considered so secret that it should not be divulged to the JAE. However, in May 1948, Meyerson gave her colleagues an overview of her meeting with Abdullah shortly after her second meeting with him in the same month.171 If Abdullah and the Zionists had colluded to partition Palestine, Ben-Gurion would have been a central figure. A comparison with his direct participation in the talks in Sèvres with the British and French in 1956 is telling. Instead, Meyerson, who had no experience or training in dealing with Arab potentates, was sent. Heller argues that BenGurion never regarded the King as a plausible partner in any form of collusion.172 This leads to the conclusion that the significance of these meetings has been overstated. Abdullah’s proposals regarding the position of the Jews in a Hashemite entity had been mooted a decade earlier. Moreover, the Jewish Agency’s Political Department had received mixed signals regarding the King’s real intentions. Finally, subsequent events in Palestine contradict the idea of a predetermined deal: the final months of the mandate were confused, and the massacre

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of Palestinian civilians at Deir Yasin in April 1948 hindered relations with the King. The intense fighting that took place after 15 May between the Legion and the Jews also contradicts the idea of an agreement.173 As a result of Meyerson’s report of the meeting, Ben-Gurion informed the Haganah staff that military questions in the forthcoming conflict would override all other considerations, and that half of the Haganah’s total force should be deployed to meet the threat posed by the Legion.174 Opinion in the Political Department was still divided about the King’s intentions.175 Zionist attitudes towards the King were influenced by an erroneous assessment of his relations with the British allies. In March 1948, Reuven Zaslani (Shiloah), a member of the Political Department, was sent to London to ascertain British plans for Palestine. He reported that the government intended to withdraw its support for Abdullah in favour of the Syrians.176 Zaslani therefore misconstrued relations between the Foreign Office and the King, and his report contributed to the deep suspicion that characterised AngloIsraeli relations until the early 1950s.177 The immediate consequence of Zaslani’s misreading of relations between the King and the British was that the Israelis accused the British of supporting the Arab Legion and overestimated the extent of that support.178

Abdullah and the Arab States’ Interventions in Palestine Abdullah’s position in the Arab League was undermined by the widespread knowledge of his intentions.179 Publicly the Arab states were opposed to partition and the creation of a Jewish state, but the conflict in Palestine highlighted the deep divisions between the Arab leaders, who seemed more interested in thwarting Abdullah’s ambitions than acting in unison.180 The failure of the Arab states to achieve solidarity had far-reaching consequences during the 1948 war and can be regarded as a model of how not to fight a coalition war. By 1948, the Palestinian population was a society characterised by social and factional divisions, making it incapable of meeting the Zionist challenge.181 Abdullah could not ignore the Palestinians, however, and during the final phase of the mandate he sought to

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undermine the Mufti and expand the basis of his support in Palestine. He succeeded in curtailing the Mufti’s influence in the Arab League and refused to recognise a government in exile.182 Although the King succeeded in circumventing the Mufti within the League, he failed to prevent him from establishing a small volunteer army in Palestine under the command of his kinsman Abd al-Qadir al-Husayni.183 The Arab Legion played a key role in inspiring support for Abdullah.184 Glubb and the officers of the Legion persuaded notables to support the Hashemite cause and explain the futility of supporting the Mufti,185 and they started to prepare the ground in the RamallahJericho-Jerusalem area for the forthcoming war.186 In response, the Mufti resorted to anti-Abdullah propaganda in Palestine, and it is likely that his allies were responsible for several bombings in Amman during the spring.187 The 1948 war has thrown up a number of controversies, including the relative balance of military strength between the Arab states, the Palestinians and the Zionists. After the Second World War, the Zionists started to plan for a war in Palestine, which led them to establish effective political and military institutions under David Ben-Gurion’s control.188 While the Zionists portrayed themselves as defenceless in the face of the Arab Goliath, British and American intelligence agencies significantly overestimated their strength, believing that they numbered over sixty thousand men.189 In reality, Zionist forces numbered about sixteen thousand in February 1948 and by May they had increased to just over thirty-five thousand.190 The growth in Zionist strength resulted from an effective recruiting drive and the illicit influx of a large quantity of weapons from Czechoslovakia at the end of April.191 In contrast with the Zionists, who established a domestic arms industry and procured foreign weapons that allowed them to equip their recruits, the Palestinians completely failed to arm themselves. Foreign intelligence agencies also found it difficult to estimate the size of Palestinian forces, which numbered between three thousand and seventy-seven hundred men.192 These troops were supplemented by irregulars such as the Arab Liberation Army, which was raised in Damascus and numbered between four thousand and five thousand men but contributed very little to the Arab campaign in Palestine.193

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The deep divisions in the Palestinian population prevented a unified and effective military response between December 1947 and May 1948. These internal weaknesses allowed the Zionists to overwhelm the Palestinians militarily, creating considerable pressure on Abdullah to intervene.194 Since December 1947, Transjordan had been the main centre of Palestinian refugees, and in February 1948 leading notables such as Musa al-Alami and Yusuf Haikal (the Mayor of Jaffa) visited Abdullah to seek his help. It was, however, impossible for Abdullah to intervene before the end of the mandate, since the British had warned the Arab states not to take action before 15 May.195 British and American intelligence doubted whether the Arab armies, with the exception of the Arab Legion, which was widely regarded as the best-trained and best-led army in the region,196 were capable of taking effective action in Palestine. The British held the Arab armies and their officers in low regard and lamented their lack of training and logistical support, which compounded the failure to develop effective plans to invade Palestine.197 The response of the Arab states in the final months of the mandate was characterised by uncertainty and the desire to thwart Abdullah’s ambitions.198 Inter-Arab jealousies meant that there was little sign of coordinated action, and it was assumed that the governments would indirectly support the Palestinian population. The British also believed that the extent of intervention would vary, and that the Hashemite armies would bear the burden of the fighting.199 The massacre at Deir Yassin and the fall of Haifa to Jewish forces at the end of April 1948 increased public pressure on the governments to intervene directly, and Abdullah publicly stated that these attacks were a casus belli.200 Alan Cunningham believed that Deir Yassin increased support for the King, and he highlighted the Arab leaders’ political and military impotence.201 Nonetheless, Abdullah’s enemies believed that they had little choice but to intervene in order to uphold the prestige of the Arab League as the embodiment of Arabism. King Farouk and the President of Syria, Shukri Quwwatli, were also influenced by their desire to thwart Abdullah’s ambitions, which the Syrians regarded as a precursor to the realisation of the King’s Greater Syria ambitions.202 The Arab leaders were also influenced by a virulent

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propaganda campaign, which led one American diplomat to conclude that the Arab world was verging on mass hysteria, where considerations of prestige and honour ‘drove reason from the field’.203 Notwithstanding their contempt for and distrust of Abdullah, the Arab leaders were forced to accept the realities of regional power politics. Transjordan’s proximity to Palestine and the relative strength of the Arab Legion made Amman the nerve centre of the Arab League’s political and military activity prior to the end of the mandate.204 Sir Alec Kirkbride reported that the Arab leaders were under considerable pressure to intervene, and he observed ‘a general slump in Arab morale and an inclination to indulge in recrimination instead of planning to deal with the situation’.205 The Arab leaders made a final attempt at unity when they met in Amman on 29 April and agreed on the principle of intervention but failed to establish a unified system of command. The failure of the Arab leaders to establish common goals made any attempt to establish a system of joint planning at best cursory.206 From Abdullah’s perspective, these weaknesses were to his advantage, since he was determined to maintain his freedom of action from the dictates of the Arab League.207 He clearly envisaged fighting a limited war in Palestine and continued to receive telegrams from the populace requesting his intervention. One of the persistent myths relating to the civil war in Palestine is that the Arab leaders publicly called on the population to leave Palestine. In practice, the opposite occurred, and on 4 May, Abdullah made a passionate radio broadcast in which he referred to the massacre at Deir Yassin and praised the population for its courage. The King appealed to those who had left to return and urged the population to defend itself against Zionist aggression.208 His appeal had limited impact on a population that was leaving the country in droves. The uncertainty and mistrust within Arab ranks was reflected in British intelligence reports, which concluded that intervention was likely, but that the role of the Arab armies remained uncertain.209 Cunningham believed that with the exception of the Hashemites, the Arab states would not invade. He assumed that the Arab armies were incapable of fighting; this led him to conclude that the Arab League states had no intention of intervening directly.210 This perspective was

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shared in London, where the Joint Intelligence Committee concluded that in the unlikely event that the Arabs did invade, they would do so with very limited forces.211

Transjordan’s Occupation of the West Bank The invasion of Palestine by the Arab Legion fulfilled Abdullah’s ambition of expanding his realm beyond the regional backwater that he had been granted by the British in 1921. The Transjordanian occupation of the West Bank, which was annexed in 1950, had considerable unforeseen domestic and international consequences for Abdullah and his British allies. During the course of the war, the Arab Legion succeeded in occupying Jerusalem and the West Bank. Glubb had been sceptical about occupying Jerusalem, since the Arab Legion was neither equipped nor trained for urban warfare. Nonetheless, Abdullah chose to ignore Glubb’s advice, and the Legion entered the city on 18 May. It took control of the key religious centres, which remained under Jordanian control until June 1967.212 Jerusalem and its environs, especially Latrun, which lies across the main road linking Tel Aviv and Jerusalem, became the focus of fighting between the Israelis and the Arab Legion. The Legion deployed more than 50 per cent of its total strength in the area during the first phase of the war (between 15 May and 11 June).213 During the summer of 1948, Abdullah tried to solidify his position in Palestine, but his manoeuvres made his position among the Arab states difficult, if not dangerous.214 Concerted opposition to his expansionist ambitions in Palestine, rather than ‘Triple Alliance’ support for the principle of an independent Palestinian state, undermined Abdullah’s regional position. His efforts to establish direct rule in the areas held by the Legion were initially ineffective because he managed to alienate the remaining Palestinian Arab notables, and the population had little desire for the King’s leadership given widespread maladministration. The Arab population was understandably wary of Hashemite rule, resenting Abdullah for ‘cashing in on partition’ and aware that Transjordan was economically unviable.215

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The immediate problem that faced the Transjordan government was how to handle the considerable expansion of the state. Transjordan had never been a going concern from an economic point of view due to a lack of exploitable natural resources, and its agrarian base left the population vulnerable to poor harvests.216 Kirkbride estimated that it would cost £5 million (including the £2 million subsidy for the Arab Legion) over the following two to three years to support the expanded state, which included more than 170,000 largely destitute refugees.217 Sir John Troutbeck, head of the British Middle East Office, which was responsible for regional economic development, commented that Transjordan was facing a ‘political and economic typhoon’. Troutbeck believed that these problems were beyond the capacity of the government to handle alone, and he argued that it was in Britain’s interest to save the country from disaster.218 Likewise, Bernard Burrows, the head of the Eastern Department, argued: ‘If we can have a viable Greater Transjordan for this expenditure, we shall have made a good bargain’.219 Nonetheless, Kirkbride warned the Foreign Office that it should avoid interfering in the administration of aid, and that British personnel were not necessary to make an ‘eastern government work’. Kirkbride rejected British interference because he believed that the Palestine mandate was ‘a most efficient administration’ that ‘became so unpopular with the inhabitants that the latter, both Jews and Arabs, took every steps to destroy it’.220 British officials ostensibly rejected the establishment of a Palestinian state because there was little chance that it could become a viable administrative or economic entity.221 The Foreign Office supported making the remaining Arab areas in Palestine part of Transjordan and believed that everything possible should be done to prevent the proclamation of an Arab government in Palestine.222 In reality, the Foreign Office adopted this policy because it was determined to prevent a Palestinian administration from falling under the control of the Mufti.223 The Foreign Office believed that the incorporation of the Arab areas by Transjordan was a satisfactory outcome of the war, but British officials were clearly aware of the repercussions of this policy for Abdullah, who was already widely distrusted and regarded as a British stooge.224

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Shortly after the outbreak of the war, the United Nations appointed the Swede Count Bernadotte as the first of many mediators on the Palestine question. Bernadotte’s mission, which ended with his murder by Jewish terrorists in September 1948, led him to propose a binational or unitary state in which the Palestinians would receive the Negev and the Israelis the Galilee.225 His proposals were very similar to those made by the Foreign Office, which led the Israelis to believe that he was a British ‘catspaw’.226 Bernadotte proposed the annexation of the West Bank to Transjordan. This was countered by the Arab League’s announcement of the formation of a temporary Palestinian administration under the aegis of the Mufti. The King took measures to thwart the League’s plans by condemning the Mufti and appealing to the population to support him. Nonetheless, in September 1948, the Arab League established in Gaza an ‘all-Palestine’ government dominated by the Mufti and his allies.227 Abdullah publicly refused to acknowledge the ‘all-Palestine’ government on the basis that the population had not been consulted.228 This was clearly a façade, and Abdullah undermined the Gaza government by persuading members of the Palestinian regime, such as Auni Abd al-Hadi, to desert the Mufti, and by arresting Jamal Husayni, the ‘foreign minister’ of the government.229 Abdullah also subverted the Mufti and the ‘all-Palestine’ government by arranging two congresses.230 In October 1948, the ‘First Palestine Congress’ was held in Amman and was financed and supported by the Transjordanian government. With the exception of Yusuf Haykal, the former Mayor of Jaffa, and Sulayman Tuqan, hardly any other prominent Palestinian leader attended. Nonetheless, the congress was important because it started a process whereby the population publicly requested Transjordan’s occupation of the West Bank. The congress attacked the ‘all-Palestine’ government, and sought to delegitimise the right of the Palestinian leadership, especially the Mufti, to represent the population.231 These events highlight the extent to which the creation of an independent Palestinian state was thwarted in 1948. The Israeli Foreign Ministry also opposed a Mufti-led government and believed that a Palestinian state was bound to be a weak political entity. This led the Israelis to support the extension of Transjordan’s control over the West

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Bank.232 Crippled by these insuperable challenges, the ‘all-Palestine’ government was stillborn, and following the defeat of the Egyptian army in October 1948 by the Israelis, it was forced to withdraw from Gaza to Egypt. The demise of the Gaza government gave the King an unexpected opportunity to rehabilitate himself in Palestine,233 leading some Palestinians to lend their support for unification.234 These developments encouraged Abdullah’s allies to arrange a second congress in Jericho on 1 December, which included a large number of delegates from the occupied areas of Palestine.235 The Transjordan government gave the impression that the congress was a spontaneous meeting rather than one arranged by the King. The congress supported the incorporation of Palestine into Transjordan and the recognition of Abdullah as King of Palestine, but it rejected partition as a solution and called on Abdullah to liberate all of Palestine.236 The Jericho congress was significant because it rubber-stamped Abdullah’s desire to assume control of the occupied parts of Palestine. Abdullah demanded that the resolutions of the congress be implemented immediately, which led to a significant clash with the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister, Tawfik Abul Huda, tried to persuade the King that these demands were precipitous and were certain to have important international ramifications, particularly with respect to the 1948 Anglo-Transjordan treaty and relations with the Arab states and the United Nations. Initially the King held his ground, only giving way when his ministers threatened to resign en masse.237 This spat between the King and his Cabinet marked the beginning of a series of resignations by successive Transjordanian prime ministers between 1949 and 1951, all of them related to the Palestine question. The King’s efforts to consolidate his position in Palestine and bring about the de facto unification of the areas under his control worsened his relations with the Arab League.238 The King’s unilateral action in Palestine led to strong Egyptian resistance, and King Farouk regarded Abdullah as a traitor to the Arab cause.239 Sir Ronald Campbell, Ambassador in Cairo, and Sir John Troutbeck observed that Abdullah’s unilateralist policy would result in the Egyptians’ adopting a diehard attitude on Palestine. They were certain that little could be done to

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ameliorate the Egyptian government’s unremitting hostility towards Transjordan, and that it would be difficult for the British to avoid being associated with Abdullah’s expansionist policies.240 They both believed that the King had made a mistake in alienating his Arab partners and that attempts to secure cooperation between Abdullah and the Egyptians in order to achieve a settlement with Israel were bound to fail.241 The Foreign Office’s support for Abdullah raised concerns that it was relying too much on the King, which led to a bitter dispute between some of its representatives. Campbell argued that the King’s ‘versatility’ led to the impression that he was an agent of British policy.242 Troutbeck accused the King of exploiting the situation in order to pursue his expansionist ambitions, arguing that he had ‘all the qualities of a born land-grabber’. Troutbeck was concerned that Britain’s prestige was tied to Transjordan and doubted the wisdom of ‘putting more and more of our Middle East eggs into that exiguous basket’; instead, he emphasised the centrality of Egypt to Britain’s interests. Kirkbride’s pragmatic argument was that British policy should be based on giving favours to those states, such as Transjordan, that were helpful to British interests. In response to criticism of the King, Kirkbride retorted that ‘he is not better or worse than other Arab rulers . . . his motives are not altruistic but I have yet to meet an Eastern potentate or statesman whose motives are altruistic’.243 Kirkbride believed that the determination of the Egyptian and Iraqi governments to frustrate British policy meant that it was in Britain’s interests to keep Transjordan ‘alive and on our side’.244 Despite the low opinion of Abdullah that most British officials had held since the First World War, the situation in Palestine and the interests they shared with Abdullah now led to a transformation of Transjordan’s standing in London. Nonetheless, the British military headquarters in Egypt regarded the Arab Legion as a ‘political fop’ calculated to keep Abdullah and Transjordan happy and well-disposed to British interests.245 Abdullah achieved his long-standing objective of expanding his kingdom, but the annexation of the West Bank and the arrival of large numbers of refugees had considerable unforeseen social and political

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consequences.246 As a result of the annexation, administrative divisions were rescinded, resulting in the inevitable process of direct Palestinian representation in the Jordanian legislature.247 Prior to the annexation of the West Bank, Kirkbride assumed that the Jordanian population would dominate an expanded state, whereas in reality the opposite occurred. With the exception of the army, which was dominated by the traditional elite, the Palestinians, who were better educated and more business-oriented than their neighbours, came to dominate the economic and social scene.248 Politically the influx of educated Palestinians led to a complete overhaul of the political system in Jordan.249 The King had hitherto dominated the Jordanian political system with the active assistance of a clique of ‘king’s men’, and the population had been generally willing to accept without question decisions taken by him. In March 1950, Kirkbride laconically summed up the fundamental impact of these changes on Abdullah’s authority: ‘It would appear that the times during which the King could act as benevolent autocrat without giving rise to serious opposition by his subjects are drawing to an end. The process of change is likely to be somewhat painful for the monarch’.250 During 1950 and 1951 one of the most marked and far-reaching changes in the Jordanian political system was that consistent refusal by successive cabinets to toe the King’s line on negotiations with Israel.251 This led to several crises between the King and his government in 1950, leading Kirkbride to conclude that the King was no longer able to operate independently of his government, and that the government would refuse to enter into direct negotiations with the Israelis.252

Britain Falls in Line behind Greater Transjordan The 1948–49 war raised a number of questions that dominated Britain’s relations with the King until his assassination in July 1951. Following the first Arab-Israeli war, the British were concerned with how to maintain their strategic interests in the country, and how to defend Transjordan on the cheap. They reached the conclusion that the most cost-effective ways of meeting their commitments to Abdullah and protecting their interests were to reinforce the military capability

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of the Arab Legion and to rely on the 1948 treaty as a deterrent against Israeli aggression. This policy led to a significant increase in Britain’s financial contribution to Jordan, from £2.5 million in 1948 to £7.3 million in 1951.253 In practice, events such as Israeli raiding across Transjordan’s lengthy frontier showed that applying the treaty was easier said than done. The British also had to contend with the gradual decline of Abdullah’s ability to act independently of his government, which was a direct consequence of the war and contributed to the development of a more independent-minded government in Amman. Hitherto Abdullah and the British had showed little interest in the development of democratic institutions, but the 1948 war and the death of the King in July 1951, led to a limited development of democratic bodies.254 Nonetheless, Abdullah and his successors remained virtually absolute monarchs who enjoyed considerable executive powers to dissolve parliament and appoint ministers when they liked.255 The post-1948 phase in relations between the British and the King has been characterised as a process of rapid decline in British influence in Jordan.256 In December 1948, Kirkbride wrote that his influence was ‘showing signs of wear and tear after its excessive use’ over the previous nine months,257 but in July 1950 he wrote the following: ‘I do not deny that I can wield considerable personal influence but . . . the fact that this influence has survived so many years and a change in regime . . . is due to my care not to abuse its use and to a belief entertained by King Abdullah and his Ministers that I would not personally advise them to do a thing unless I believed that it was in the best interests of the country’.258 American diplomats also commented on Kirkbride’s formal influence as Minister and his personal relationship with the King,259 but they were well aware of the gradual decline of British influence after the 1948 war, and following Abdullah’s death in July 1951.260 The King’s seizure of Arab Palestine placed the Foreign Office in an awkward position. Although the British supported Abdullah’s conquest, they were determined to avoid becoming involved in the interArab disputes that characterised the Palestine issue. Supporting the establishment of Greater Transjordan raised a number of problems, including the cost of such a policy to the British government and the

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regional reaction. Although Glubb and Kirkbride disagreed about the extent of support for the King in the occupied areas of Palestine, it was obvious that Abdullah’s erstwhile allies in the region would emphatically reject his self-aggrandising policy.261 The occupation led Abdullah to inquire whether the newly signed treaty applied to the Arab areas of Palestine, and he was led to believe that it was in force so long as it did not conflict with Britain’s commitments to the integrity of the UN Charter.262 The King’s seemingly innocent inquiry masked a question of considerable political and strategic importance. The 1948 treaty had been intended to guarantee Britain’s limited strategic interests in Transjordan and to cover the costs of the army, which the local government could not meet. In practice, the treaty went through a subtle reorientation as a result of Abdullah’s occupation of Palestine, and the King came to regard it as a means of defending his newly expanded kingdom. Not only did the occupation raise important questions about the application of the treaty to the West Bank, it also led to serious concerns in London about the economic viability of Greater Transjordan.263 The British were also determined to assure their strategic interests, and the most effective method of guaranteeing these requirements had been the subsidy paid to the Arab Legion.264 General Miles Dempsey, commander of Middle East Land Forces, argued that the deployment of air and land forces in Palestine and Transjordan was essential for the defence of the Middle East. ‘We have suffered a great setback to our strategic interests’ because of the withdrawal from Palestine, he argued, noting that adding central Palestine to Transjordan opened the way for the development of military facilities to meet these strategic requirements.265 The termination of the mandate and the war in Palestine raised a number of pressing questions, including which strategic facilities the British would need in wartime, what level of forces Abdullah needed to carry out his treaty commitments, and whether Greater Transjordan would be able to defend herself against external, especially Israeli, aggression.266 Strategists in London maintained that Egypt was crucial to the defence of the region, despite the failure to conclude a revised treaty. They also commented on the inherent logistical limitations

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imposed on the maintenance of British forces in Transjordan because of the country’s limited infrastructure.267 Transjordan’s role in these plans was limited to transit rights for British forces, facilities for training and the safeguarding of roads and the oil pipeline that traversed the country. For defence planners, the principal foe was the Soviet Union, and they regarded the importance of Transjordan and access to communications facilities in neighbouring Palestine in the context of their efforts to deny the region to the Soviets.268 Nonetheless, they had to contend with the possibility of an Israeli assault on the occupied areas in Palestine or Transjordan.269 In December 1948, the Chiefs of Staff produced a paper that outlined far-reaching changes in the size, composition and armament of the Arab Legion. These changes included doubling the Legion to fourteen thousand men and reequipping it.270 The objective of this plan was twofold: to provide Transjordan with the means to defend itself against Israeli aggression long enough for British reinforcements to arrive, and to provide the Arab Legion with the resources to participate in Britain’s war plans for the Middle East, which envisaged the Legion playing a flanking role in the defence of the Suez Canal.271 The Chiefs of Staff believed that this programme would cost more than £6 million a year, but two factors made it unlikely the Legion’s equipment requirements could be met: the arms embargo that was only rescinded in August 1949 and shortages in the United Kingdom.272 The annexation of the West Bank, which was formally acknowledged by the Foreign Office at the end of April 1950,273 had important implications for relations between the King and the British. The most important of these was the question of whether or not the provisions of the 1948 Anglo-Transjordan Treaty would also cover the West Bank. Eventually Whitehall concluded that in the case of an Israeli attack Jordan would be able to request British assistance.274 Although there can be little doubt that the COS and Foreign Office believed that the 1948 treaty applied to the West Bank, as with British war plans for the Middle East, it was never put to the test. The validity of British guarantees to Jordan is open to question. The value of the 1948 treaty and its application is exemplified by Israeli retaliatory operations against the West Bank. Apart from

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deploying a small force to Aqaba in early 1949, the British never defended Jordan during the period 1949 to 1951. The Israelis were well aware of the 1948 treaty and the possible consequences of a fullscale operation against Jordan. Therefore, instead of a single massive attack, the Israeli army mounted numerous small-scale ones, some of which crossed the Jordanian border but none of which went far enough to warrant British intervention.275 There is, however, reason to believe that if the Israelis had attacked Jordan, the British would have lacked the political will and military resources to prevent such an operation.

The Jordan-Israel Negotiations after the 1948 War One of the most controversial aspects of the events that followed the 1948 war is whether or not an opportunity for peace was missed.276 Talks were initiated in July 1948,277 but the Israelis believed that it was ‘absurd to think of Abdullah as an independent agent of policy’ because they assumed that Glubb and Kirkbride exerted considerable influence over him.278 Negotiations gave Abdullah an opportunity to secure his position in Palestine, especially in Jerusalem, and to prevent a military defeat. A further explanation for the King’s desire to open talks with the Israelis, in contrast with the other Arab states that declined to do so, was his desire to obtain de facto Israeli acknowledgement of his annexation of the West Bank. Kirkbride was initially strongly opposed to the talks on the assumption that ‘unilateral action by Transjordan in opening talks with the Jews would doubtless bring down on Transjordan and probably on ourselves too the wrath of the Arab world and might lead to the expulsion of Transjordan from the League’.279 Kirkbride correctly assumed that the King had deliberately kept him out of the picture,280 and that he would continue talks on the grounds that he was a ‘great believer in reinsurance’.281 In December 1948, however, Kirkbride reversed his attitude about the efficacy of talks, saying that they were only likely to succeed if the Israelis knew that Transjordan had full British support.282 Kirkbride’s colleagues in Beirut and Cairo expressed strong reservations about the viability of any agreement because it would undermine the Arab position and allow the Israelis to eliminate the

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Arab armies piecemeal.283 Furthermore, some British officials, such as Sir John Troutbeck,284 used the Munich agreement of September 1938 as a metaphor to explain the dangers of selling Abdullah down the river for the sake of a spurious peace due to the threat posed by a militarily superior Israel.285 This comparison is open to question because it was in Britain’s interests to maintain a viable Transjordan via the subsidy payable to the Arab Legion. The Foreign Office’s fear of a Middle East Munich turned out to be overstated, however, because the Israelis were uncertain about British support for Transjordan.286 Members of the newly formed Israeli government, such as the Foreign Minister, Moshe Sharett, rejected suggestions that Transjordan be attacked because of the potential international ramifications,287 which included the fear that Abdullah might invoke the Anglo-Transjordan treaty.288 The state of war between the two countries came to an end following the signing of a cease-fire agreement in Rhodes on 4 April 1949, but this document failed to prevent numerous border clashes.289 The talks between Israel and Jordan lasted until March 1950, but they collapsed because the two countries were unable to compromise on a number of key questions, such as Abdullah’s demand for a corridor to the Mediterranean.290 Abdullah was interested in an agreement, but in reality, his room for manoeuvre was constrained by his inability to carry either the government or public opinion, which was deeply affected by the influx of Palestinian refugees and Israeli retaliatory operations.291 These incursions by Israeli forces were ostensibly responses to the infiltration of Israel’s borders by terrorist gangs, but they were intended to coerce Israel’s neighbours into preventing attacks across their frontiers.292 Regardless of the operations’ true intent, the overwhelming application of force, which included alleged atrocities by Israeli forces, hardened the attitude of the government and the public against any agreement with Israel.293 This was compounded by the Israeli tendency to take full advantage of military superiority and make maximalist demands while only giving the Jordanian government vague assurances about what it would accrue in return. Abdullah’s policy of negotiating with the Israelis also had regional implications, and his government was concerned about being ostracised

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by the Arab League.294 The Jordanian government’s worst fears were confirmed when the League convened in the spring of 1950, and during the course of talks, Abdullah was bitterly criticised by the other members of the League, and in particular by the Egyptians, who were also negotiating with Israel.295 The League passed a resolution stipulating that any member that reached a separate peace with Israel would be expelled and would also face economic sanctions and diplomatic isolation. This resolution had a severe impact on the Jordanian cabinet, which was not prepared to risk being ostracised, thus leaving it no choice but to reject any possible agreement with Israel.296

The End of an Era: Assassination, Succession and the Resignation and Return of Alec Kirkbride Abdullah’s willingness to negotiate directly with the Israelis confirmed the widely held impression that he was a traitor to the Arab cause and a tool of British imperialism. Abdullah paid the ultimate price for his willingness to challenge the Arab consensus and negotiate with the Israelis. Abdullah was assassinated in Jerusalem on 20 July 1951, but the extent of the conspiracy behind his murder is still disputed.297 Domestically the assassination of the King ‘was a notable manifestation of the fact that the once peaceful Amirate of Transjordan has been largely taken over by the Palestinians’.298 The death of Abdullah in these circumstances raised the prospect of serious internal unrest and the possibility that Jordan’s hostile neighbours might take advantage of the power vacuum. As it turned out, the political system in Transjordan worked well, and Kirkbride played a central role in stabilising the situation. Kirkbride laconically described his informal influence on the politicians and the palace,299 but his American counterpart, Gerald Drew, had no doubt that Kirkbride exercised considerable backstairs influence.300 Kirkbride contended with several issues immediately following the death of Abdullah, the most important of which was who would succeed Abdullah. Abdullah’s obvious heir was his oldest son Amir Talal, but their personal relationship was undermined by Abdullah’s overbearing personality. Their relations were so poor, and Talal was so distrusted because of his anti-British views, that

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he had been secretly excluded from the line of succession.301 At the time of Abdullah’s assassination, Talal had been undergoing treatment for a mental disorder, which called into question his fitness to become King.302 Nonetheless, Talal briefly replaced his father, but his poor health led to his removal in a palace coup twelve months later.303 Whether Abdullah’s death marked a turning point is also a matter of contention. The 1948 war considerably weakened Abdullah’s ability to rule the country as a benevolent autocrat. As a result of the war and the influx of the Palestinian refugees, there was a significant growth in nationalist fervour and demands for constitutional reform, which Abdullah could not ignore despite his distaste for democratic institutions.304 Although Abdullah’s ability to rule Jordan had diminished, his demise was ‘an event that shook one of the pillars of British rule’ in the Middle East.305 In contrast with other Arab leaders of this era, Abdullah remained loyal to his British allies out of self-interest; Jordan was economically and politically unviable without British support. Abdullah’s death led some British officials to question Jordan’s long-term viability. An assessment produced by the Joint Intelligence Committee argued that he was irreplaceable since there was no one approaching his stature, and that Jordan suffered from constitutional weaknesses compounded by the country’s poverty.306 In the spring of 1949, Troutbeck, an influential critic of British policy in Jordan, had called into question Britain’s continued responsibility for the country’s future.307 Following Abdullah’s death Troutbeck expressed pessimism about Jordan’s viability, given its lack of a clear leader or economic resources. Troutbeck argued that Jordan suffered from internal dissension and that the country was also vulnerable to external intrigue and the possibility of Israeli aggression. This low opinion of Jordan’s future led Troutbeck to conclude that the country was little more than a financial burden on the British government.308 Kirkbride refused to comment on the future, but he refuted Troutbeck’s argument that the subsidy was a waste of money by pointing to the Arab Legion’s strategic value.309 He challenged Troutbeck’s assumption that Abdullah’s death would lead to drastic internal and external repercussions. Furthermore, he pointed out that Jordan’s

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political leaders had overcome their dismay at Abdullah’s death and that the country could survive without him. Kirkbride was well aware of the threats posed by Israel and the possibility of Syrian encroachment, but his views on Jordan’s viability and the value of the subsidy proved to be a more accurate assessment of the country’s future. Alec Kirkbride played an understated but pivotal role in maintaining Anglo-Jordanian relations. By 1951, he had served in Palestine and Jordan for more than thirty years, but the death of Abdullah led Kirkbride to request a transfer, and in December 1951 he became Britain’s first Minister in Libya.310 Kirkbride played a central role in the development of Jordan as a viable state, leading his successor to comment that his departure aroused ‘widespread and very genuine sorrow among all classes of Jordanians who regarded him, with King Abdullah, as the father of their country’.311 Kirkbride’s departure from Jordan marked a significant turning point because none of his successors enjoyed comparable influence over King Husayn, who was crowned in May 1953. Sir Geoffrey Furlonge, who succeeded Kirkbride in early 1952, concluded that ‘the close and confidential relationship inherited from mandatory times is being gradually eroded’.312 Nonetheless, the Foreign Office believed that the British departure from Palestine, the withdrawal from Egypt and the uncertain nature of relations with Iraq made Jordan the hub of Britain’s remaining influence in the Middle East.313 General Glubb mirrored the complacency that characterised Foreign Office thinking on the future of relations with Jordan. Glubb, the most prominent example of British influence in Jordan, also challenged foreign pessimists, arguing that the country remained stable following the King’s death. Glubb maintained that the monarchy’s opponents were discouraged by the country’s apparent stability. He explained that Abdullah’s lack of interest in the routines of government meant that ‘his disappearance did not immediately throw the machine out of gear’.314 Glubb noted that hostile radio propaganda transmitted by the highly influential Egyptian broadcaster Sawt alArab (Voice of the Arabs) foretelling Jordan’s demise was patently false. In contrast with her neighbours Jordan remained stable, the monarchy ‘seem[ed] entirely to command the loyalty of the people’, and relations with Britain remained cordial despite the disastrous impact of British

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policy in Palestine.315 Glubb’s attempts to portray a positive picture of the situation in Jordan were quickly overtaken by domestic and regional events that made the British presence in the country untenable. Glubb played a key role in the development of the principality, but his position as commander of the army and the presence of dozens of British officers, who held key positions in the army, was increasingly anachronistic and became a lightning rod for nationalist agitation and criticism in the foreign press. More significantly, following King Husayn’s coronation in May 1953, there were clear signs that the young King was unhappy with Glubb, which was no doubt influenced by the wide gap in their ages.316 Glubb complacently failed to see that his position was untenable, and the young King found it politically expedient to unceremoniously dismiss him in March 1956.317 King Husayn’s decision to remove Glubb and the senior British officers shocked the British, who believed that Colonel Abdel Nasser had instigated their removal. Although King Husayn wanted to retain close relations with the British, his decision to sack Glubb was a clear break with the past and symbolised the beginning of the end of Britain’s formal influence in Jordan. The circumstances of Glubb’s departure could have led to a serious crisis in relations between Amman and London. Fortuitously Kirkbride reappeared from the shadows and acted as an unofficial intermediary between the young King and the British government.318 Kirkbride argued that the Jordanians believed that they had rid themselves of the ‘last vestiges of “imperial domination”’, which led him to conclude that it was desirable for the British government to reconsider its obligations under the 1948 treaty.319 Kirkbride persuaded the British Cabinet that Glubb’s dismissal was not a sudden decision but instead derived from long-standing dissatisfaction with the way Glubb commanded the Arab Legion. Sir Anthony Eden, the British Prime Minister, followed Kirkbride’s advice and chose not to impose a severe penalty on Jordan because it might have led to the collapse of the country.320 The following year Britain’s formal role in Jordan was terminated when the 1948 treaty was nullified and the remaining British troops were withdrawn. Nonetheless, British troops were briefly sent to support King Husayn following the coup in Iraq in 1958, and the King remained an Anglophile for the rest of his life.

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Conclusion The abrogation of the Palestine mandate in May 1948 marked the end of one of the most significant failures in twentieth-century British imperialism. By 1948, Britain’s ability to pursue her interests in the Middle East had been significantly curtailed by economic weaknesses and the requirement to consult the United States despite Washington’s minimal role in the region. The official mind in Whitehall understood that the onset of the Cold War required close cooperation with the United States, but the retreat from Palestine was an early example of the postwar special relationship, highlighting the extent to which British strategists were forced to concede to American interests. Britain’s decline was symbolised by its failure to sign new treaties with the Egyptian and Iraqi governments guaranteeing rights of access in wartime. In contrast, Transjordan had become Britain’s most reliable ally in the Middle East, and the two governments signed a revised treaty in 1948. King Abdullah was a pragmatic ruler who understood that his country’s economic weakness and marginal political status made close relations with the British crucial to its survival. Abdullah’s relationship with his British paymasters led to consistent allegations that he was little more than a British cipher. Until 1948, the British had ignored Abdullah, believing him to be a ruler of limited significance. However, the withdrawal from Palestine and tenuous relations with Egypt and Iraq transformed Transjordan’s status in the eyes of the Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff. The Foreign Office had summarily rejected the expansion of Abdullah’s kingdom, citing regional objections, but in 1948 Ernest Bevin, unquestionably the dominant figure in the making of British foreign policy in the years immediately after the Second World War, secretly supported Abdullah’s expansionist ambitions. The Foreign Office knew that it could not publicly support the King’s plans, so it adopted the policy of expanding the Arab Legion at British expense. However, allegations that the British gave the King a green light to invade Palestine do not stand up to critical scrutiny, because the British undermined the military capability of the Arab Legion by imposing an arms embargo.

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The embargo had considerable unforeseen consequences, including giving Arab governments the opportunity to blame the British for the Arabs’ failure to fight an effective coalition war. The failure to establish an effective coalition in the spring of 1948 resulted from deep divisions among the Arab rulers, who were determined to thwart Abdullah’s ambitions. The Arab armies, with the exception of the Arab Legion, were totally unprepared to fight an expeditionary war in Palestine. The Arab Legion was the only Arab army that performed well in the war, and as a result, Abdullah achieved his long-term objective and seized control of parts of mandatory Palestine. Abdullah’s control of the West Bank proved to be one of the King’s most significant challenges. Not only was the Transjordan government responsible for four hundred thousand Palestine refugees, but the economic cost of occupation far exceeded Amman’s limited financial resources. The occupation also had far-reaching political implications, and Abdullah found that he was no longer able to dominate the political system of Transjordan and ignore the population, which had become radicalised by the events in Palestine and by the Israeli policy of conducting retaliatory cross-border raids. By July 1951, Abdullah’s power had significantly diminished, but he was still regarded as Britain’s most reliable ally in the region. Following his death, Britain’s influence declined, but far more gradually than after the revolutions in Egypt (1952) and Iraq (1958). In spite of Glubb’s dismissal in March 1956, King Husayn was an Anglophile who remained in the Western camp for the duration of the Cold War.

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CONCLUSION: THE BR ITISH IMPER IAL PROJECT IN JOR DAN

The British imperial project in Transjordan was a success compared with the mandates in Iraq or Palestine, which did untold damage to Britain’s prestige in the Middle East. The British succeeded in Transjordan because they fulfilled one of the basic objectives of the League of Nations mandatory system and established a viable state in the most unlikely circumstances. The creation of a viable state in Transjordan seemed to be unfeasible due to the country’s lack of historical unity and chronic economic underdevelopment. The creation of a capable state apparatus came to the fore following the death of King Abdullah in July 1951, and a less secure political system may well have succumbed to internal and foreign pressures. During the first decades of Transjordan’s development, the country relied almost entirely on British financial and political support; without it, Transjordan would have been unviable, and its future as an independent state may well have been short. British control of Transjordan was unplanned and resulted from events on the ground following World War I. Britain’s interest in controlling Transjordan was defined by imperial strategy, which was focused on the defence of the Suez Canal. Transjordan was also regarded as a buffer zone for the defence of Palestine’s eastern frontier. The British exerted their influence in Transjordan at the lowest possible cost, and financial considerations were a key factor in the development of a system of indirect rule in Transjordan. However, a severe shortage of funds in the interwar years and the impact of the Great Depression

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made the economic and social development of Transjordan a secondary consideration to the cost of maintaining stability. Transjordan’s internal security was closely associated with intermittent disturbances in Palestine, and the concern that the population of Transjordan might become radicalised. John Bagot Glubb (‘Glubb Pasha’) pointed out on a number of occasions that the system worked because the country never experienced a rebellion, which meant that the British never needed to deploy anything more than a token military force in the country. Nonetheless, the maintenance of internal security rested on a relatively homogeneous population with a generally very limited level of education. The system of imperial influence that the British established in Transjordan was a notable example of indirect rule in which an effective collaborative system was established. This scheme of imperial control in Transjordan was based on three pillars of power: Abdullah and his government, the British Resident, and the commander of the Arab Legion. Abdullah’s appointment as Amir in 1921 was supposed to be a short-term expedient, and until 1924, he ruled the country inauspiciously. Abdullah’s main weakness was his lack of an independent income and his very limited opportunities to raise funds. This required him to rely heavily on British financial support and led him to seek alternative sources of revenue, such as leasing land to the Zionists. Abdullah’s second weakness was his lack of credibility with the majority of British officials, who tended to regard him in condescending terms because of his lack of financial acumen and his meddling in the affairs of Palestine and Syria. Belatedly, the British came to appreciate Abdullah’s value as a loyal ally, but they were well aware that he was widely regarded as their pawn. The assumption that Abdullah was little more than a servant of British interests undermined his credibility as a regional actor. The collaborative relationship between Abdullah and the British was defined by the King’s almost total reliance on British economic and political support. As a pragmatist, Abdullah understood that he had little choice but to rely on the British to guarantee Transjordan’s independence. The force of circumstances left him little choice but

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to work with the British, who attempted to impose significant limitations on his independence. Abdullah’s poverty and reliance on British largesse has led many historians to conclude that the British completely dominated this relationship. In fact, the British heavily relied on Abdullah and the Transjordanian government to maintain order and to expand the state’s authority beyond the settled areas of the country. The clearest example of this process was the integration of the tribal population into the institutions of the state. Abdullah played a central role in managing relations with the tribes, and from a British perspective, the expansion of Abdullah’s authority was the most cost-effective way for the British to exert their influence. The British granted Abdullah considerable latitude in the management of tribal affairs so long as he acceded to British interests. Abdullah’s determination to control relations with the tribes shows that British were not all-powerful in Transjordan: they had to rely on his influence to maintain internal security. The second pillar of British influence in Transjordan was the role of the British Resident. The British applied in Transjordan a model of imperial control that originated in India and had been successfully adopted in the Arabian Gulf shaikhdoms. Nonetheless, Transjordan was unique because of the continuity in the number and quality of British officials who served there. Between 1921 and 1946, the High Commissioner for Palestine was nominally responsible for Britain’s relations with Transjordan, but in practice the Resident played a pivotal role in advising Abdullah and his government. The Resident’s role became increasingly significant following the signing of the 1928 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement, which formally defined Britain’s interests in Transjordan. Hitherto, relations between Abdullah and the British were based on informal agreements influenced by financial stringencies and the requirements of imperial defence. Sir Henry Cox and Sir Alec Kirkbride were the imperial proconsuls who dominated relations with Abdullah from 1924 to 1951. Their duties were defined by the requirement that Abdullah adhere to strict financial controls that had been imposed in 1924 at the Treasury’s behest. In addition to requiring the establishment of a sound financial system, the 1928 Agreement gave Cox and Kirkbride considerable

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powers to intervene in the politics of Transjordan. One of the biggest challenges Colonel Cox faced in the early 1930s were persistent allegations that Abdullah was involved in trying to foment discontent in the Hejaz and undermine the government of his enemy Ibn Saud. The Foreign Office regarded Abdullah’s alleged meddling in the Saudi kingdom to be intolerable, reinforcing the low regard with which he was held. Abdullah had ample grounds for discontent, given the long-running tribal raiding across the recently demarcated SaudiTransjordan frontier, which contributed to the impoverishment of his country’s population. Evidence that the Saudi regime had played a central role in encouraging raiding was ignored by the Foreign Office, and Cox warned Abdullah that his alleged meddling in the Hejaz contravened the 1928 Agreement. British attempts to enforce the 1928 Agreement and control Abdullah were limited. Threats to cease the subsidy were clearly a bluff, since the subsidy had proved the most effective way for the British to achieve their goal of maintaining a stabile system of government at the lowest possible cost. Britain’s refusing to pay the subsidy would have given Abdullah little choice but to seek alternative sources of support. Abdullah clearly exasperated his British allies, who realised that it was economically and strategically advantageous to allow the Amir and his government to take responsibility for running the country and for expanding the state’s remit to include the tribal population. The alternative to this light-touch regime was greater British involvement in the running of Transjordan, but this would have been contrary to Britain’s interests. In short, the British allowed Abdullah to run the country because it suited their interests to do so. The British Resident therefore was not an omnipotent presence in Transjordan, and Abdullah was not a powerless pawn. The biggest challenge facing Cox and Kirkbride during their remarkably long periods of service concerned Abdullah’s regional aspirations, whether in Palestine or Syria. In theory, the 1928 Agreement imposed significant limitations on Abdullah’s ability to act independently of British policy, but the evidence clearly shows that he was determined to follow his interests, and not those of the British. Abdullah’s long-term intention to establish a monarchy centred on Syria, and his ideas about annexing

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parts of Palestine were examples of this. In practice, the British found it very difficult to prevent Abdullah’s intervention in the politics of either Palestine or Syria. The failure to prevent Abdullah’s meddling in the affairs of his neighbours reinforced the impression that he was little more than an agent of British imperialism. In spite of these pressures, the system of influence worked well, and unlike in Egypt and Iraq there were no rebellions against British influence in Transjordan. The granting of independence in 1946 was a façade, since it did little to alter relations between Abdullah and the British. In May 1946, Abdullah crowned himself King and responsibility for Transjordan was passed from the Colonial Office to the Foreign Office. Kirkbride’s title changed from Resident to Minister, but there was no alteration to the tried and tested system of informal influence. Although Abdullah deliberately withheld details of his relations with the Zionists, Kirkbride’s influence on the King was considerable. The evidence clearly shows that Kirkbride’s advice was well received in London, but his role in consolidating Anglo-Jordanian relations between 1946 and 1951 has been understated by historians. Events in Palestine had a fundamental impact on Kirkbride’s role. Between 1946 and 1948, he secretly supported plans for Abdullah to take control of the Arab parts of Palestine. Kirkbride supported Abdullah’s expansionist goals because he believed that annexation was the only viable solution. Kirkbride’s secret advice to the Foreign Office significantly contributed to reversing the anti-Abdullah perspective that had dominated thinking in London. Kirkbride’s status as Minister to a regional backwater does not reflect the extent of his influence at the highest levels of the Foreign Office. Abdullah was a pragmatic autocrat who was intermittently obsessed with expanding his kingdom in the Hejaz, Syria and Palestine. His dynastic aspirations highlighted the extent to which he was determined to pursue his own interests, and not Britain’s. Abdullah’s determination to establish a Greater Syrian kingdom was completely impractical, since the French in Syria believed that he was a Trojan horse for the expansion of British interests and thus entirely opposed his objectives. The Syrian nationalist movement wanted to establish an independent Syria rather than form part of a Hashemite monarchy. Abdullah’s

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dynastic rival, Ibn Saud, also opposed any attempts by Abdullah to expand his influence at Saudi expense and exerted considerable pressure on the Foreign Office, which consistently rejected Abdullah’s plans. Abdullah’s aspirations in Syria were a weakness, contributing to the widespread distrust of his intentions, but the British failed to prevent Abdullah’s meddling in Syrian politics during the 1930s and 1940s, furthering the impression that they tacitly supported his goals. The limitations of formal methods of control over Abdullah came to the fore as a result of his desire to lease land to Zionist agents. Abdullah financially benefited from his relations with the Zionists, but British objections to Zionist settlement in Transjordan proved to be insurmountable. Even more controversial were Abdullah’s proposals to annex Palestine. Abdullah’s aspirations in Palestine were common knowledge, but they resulted in his intentions being widely questioned by his enemies, such as Hajj Amin al-Husayni, the Mufti of Jerusalem, who had no interest in falling under his influence. Abdullah’s public acceptance of partition in 1937, and his relations with the Zionists, further weakened his support in Palestine. Abdullah’s willingness to lease land to the Zionists led to persistent allegations of collusion, but the main obstacle facing Abdullah was the Foreign Office, which held him in low regard and considered him a leader of secondary importance to Ibn Saud. The Foreign Office believed that partitioning Palestine was unworkable because such a policy would alienate the Arab states, especially the regional competitors who feared the expansion of his kingdom. During the 1930s, the Foreign Office opposed any suggestion that Abdullah might benefit from partition. The failure to prevent Italian aggression in Abyssinia and the rise of German power had far-reaching influence on the official mind in Whitehall, which was determined to protect British supremacy in the Mediterranean. The Foreign Office and the Chiefs of Staff were therefore determined to adopt a policy in Palestine that would maintain Arab goodwill, thereby guaranteeing the crucial lines of communication that ran through the region. The British believed that they could afford to belittle and ignore Abdullah because he posed no threat to their interests. In contrast

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with the governments in Egypt and Iraq, Abdullah remained a loyal ally during the world war, and the rapid conclusion of the treaty negotiations in 1946 and 1948 was in marked contrast to similar efforts with the Egyptian and Iraqi governments, which, bowing to nationalist opposition, refused to update their treaties. Abdullah’s role in Palestine came to the fore after World War II, and the British decision to quit Palestine in May 1948 transformed his importance for officials in London. Hitherto Abdullah’s aspirations had been checked by a combination of British opposition and his failure to garner a modicum of support in Palestine. By 1948, Britain’s relations with the Egyptian and Iraqi governments had grown awkward. The rapid conclusion of negotiations with Transjordan leading to independence and revision of the treaty was a clear reflection of the mutual benefits Abdullah and the British sought to gain from these agreements. The British continued to regard Transjordan as a buffer zone for the Suez Canal, which lay at the centre of their military plans for the region. The British departure from Palestine and their failure to secure a revised treaty with the Egyptians transformed the strategic value of Transjordan. The Arab Legion also enjoyed a special status in British strategic plans for the defence of the Middle East that bore no relation to Transjordan’s marginal political status. Abdullah’s desire to annex the predominantly Arab parts of Palestine was common knowledge, and unlike in the late 1930s, the British now secretly supported these plans. The Foreign Office adopted this policy because it opposed the creation of a Palestinian state that would have fallen under the influence of Hajj Amin al-Husayni, a notable opponent of British rule in Palestine. It is widely, but erroneously, argued that the British colluded with Abdullah to occupy parts of Palestine at the expense of the Palestinians. Abdullah’s desire to incorporate parts of mandatory Palestine coincided with British interests, but the British took various steps, including the imposition of an arms embargo, that had dramatic but unforeseen consequences. The Arab Legion, which relied entirely on British arms, was denied additional supplies of weapons from the British due to the embargo, whereas the Israelis succeeded in avoiding the international embargo and purchased large quantities of arms from a wide variety of sources, including Czechoslovakia.

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The first Arab-Israeli war posed an unprecedented challenge to Anglo-Jordanian relations. By May 1948, the gradual process of transforming the Arab Legion into a full-fledged army was progressing. The army was widely regarded as the best-trained and best-led force of its kind in the Arab world, providing Abdullah with an important political weapon. Kirkbride exerted considerable personal pressure on the King not to intervene in Palestine before the end of the mandate on 15 May, 1948, and the British took full advantage of Transjordan’s reliance on their arms and economic support. The Arab Legion was the most effective of the Arab armies in the 1948–9 Arab-Israeli war, but the cessation of arms supplies severely weakened its capability. The Egyptian and Iraqi armies also relied on British arms supplies and lacked the industrial base to produce weapons or the financial resources to purchase them from non-British sources. The Foreign Office’s policy of denying arms was influenced by Ernest Bevin’s resolve to prevent the United States from supplying the Israelis. Bevin was determined to maintain amicable relations with the Truman administration, despite American meddling in the Palestine question. The dawn of the Cold War made the British and American governments determined to prevent the spread of Soviet influence in the Middle East. Differences over the future status of Palestine and the arms embargo were early examples of the complex nature of the Anglo-American ‘special relationship’. Bevin and the Foreign Office were determined to retain British influence in the Middle East, but they were negotiating from a position of weakness caused by Britain’s precipitous economic decline. Bevin’s policy of imposing an arms embargo on Britain’s Arab allies had serious ramifications that were compounded by the failure of the Palestine mandate. Notwithstanding numerous demands from Abdullah and his government for additional weapons, Bevin rigidly adhered to this policy, which resulted in the most serious crisis in relations between Amman and London. Like the Egyptian and Iraqi governments, which were also let down by their British allies, the Jordanians had reason to believe that they could not trust British intentions. The enforcement of the embargo was Britain’s first major betrayal of the Arabs after World War II, and the disastrous

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consequences of this policy, rather than the Suez Crisis of 1956, heralded the decline of British influence in the Middle East. The defeat of the Arab armies in the 1948–9 war had dramatic consequences, including undermining the credibility of the governments in Baghdad and Cairo. For Abdullah, the first Arab-Israeli war in 1948–9 was a qualified success, since it allowed him to achieve his long-standing objective of expanding his kingdom. Although the Arab Legion was adversely affected by the arms embargo, the King and his government took full advantage of the 1948 treaty, which was originally intended to guarantee British interests in Transjordan and provide the framework for British support for Transjordan. The treaty underwent a subtle and unforeseen transformation, and the Transjordan government came to regard it as a mutual defence treaty that committed the British to come to Transjordan’s aid in the event of an Israeli attack. The British did develop plans to defend Transjordan, but the notion that they would fight a war on Abdullah’s behalf ignored political reality. The British concluded that the most costeffective and strategically beneficial way to support their ally was to increase the subsidy, which would lead to a significant growth in the Arab Legion’s capability. The first Arab-Israeli war had significant unforeseen political and economic implications for Abdullah and Transjordan. Hitherto Abdullah had ruled Transjordan as a benevolent autocrat, and there had been no requirement to alter a political system dominated by the King and a handful of ‘King’s men’. Abdullah found it impossible to ignore the rise of nationalism, however, and in the final years of his life, his ability to rule the country by decree was severely diminished. The influx of several hundred thousand Palestinian refugees imposed a severe burden on Transjordan’s limited financial resources. The 1948–9 war had far-reaching domestic and international implications for Transjordan. By 1950, the King found it impossible to persuade his government to follow his lead and conclude an agreement with the Israelis. The failure of negotiations with the Israelis has been the subject of considerable debate, but Abdullah was negotiating from a position of weakness. The Israelis had no reason to make significant concessions, such as granting Transjordan access to the Mediterranean,

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and the Israeli policy of retaliating against refugees who tried to reclaim their property undermined attempts to reach an agreement. The Israeli policy of deterring Palestinian infiltration to their home villages with overwhelming force contributed to the radicalisation of the Transjordanian population, which rejected any negotiated settlement with Israel. By July 1951, Abdullah’s ability to rule the country without consulting nationalist forces had been seriously diminished. Nonetheless, the system of government that had taken root over the previous thirty years confounded observers who believed that the King’s violent death would lead to the collapse of the monarchy. These prophecies failed to materialise in 1951 because the third pillar of the political system in Jordan, the Arab Legion, remained loyal. The development of an army that remained apolitical was remarkable compared with the cases of Iraq and Syria, whose armies posed a serious threat to their political systems. One explanation for the Arab Legion’s loyalty to the monarchy is the degree of continuity in its British commanders, Frederick Peake (1924–39) and John Bagot Glubb (1939–56). Peake and Glubb developed the Arab Legion as a professional fighting force, and one of the most significant legacies of the British era in Transjordan was the development of an army that was both efficient and loyal to the monarchy. Unlike some of its neighbours, Jordan has never experienced a successful coup d’état. It was in Britain’s interests to develop the Arab Legion into the best-trained and best-led army in the region. Rather than relying on British forces, which were expensive to maintain, the development of an indigenous army commanded by British officers became a fundamental feature of British imperial influence in Transjordan. In the 1930s, the Arab Legion played a central role in the state’s incorporation of the hitherto autonomous tribal population. The tribes became a significant source of recruits for the Arab Legion, thereby enhancing the loyalty of the desert population to the monarchy. Until World War II, the Arab Legion had been an internal security force whose roles gradually expanded to include protecting the country’s frontiers. The Arab Legion also played an important role in assisting the security forces in Palestine during the 1929 disturbances

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and the Arab rebellion between 1936 and 1939. One of the Arab Legion’s tasks was to prevent the disorder in Palestine from spreading to Transjordan. Although the Legion found it difficult to stop arms and men passing through Transjordan from Syria to Palestine, Glubb successfully used British Secret Service funds to maintain the loyalty of the population. During the Second World War, the Arab Legion underwent a fundamental transformation from a police force to a full-fledged army under the command of Glubb Pasha. Glubb became a central pillar not only in the development of the state, but also in relations between Britain and Transjordan. During World War II, the Arab Legion was the only Arab army that contributed to the Allied war effort, participating in the British invasions of Iraq and Syria. Glubb was frustrated by London’s unwillingness to give the army a wider role than just defending lines of communication and installations in Palestine. Nonetheless, the Arab Legion’s establishment was significantly expanded during the war, laying the foundations for the post-war growth. The Egyptian and Iraqi armies were also trained and equipped by the British, but they were never transformed into capable fighting forces. The British failed to establish enduring treaties with Egypt and Iraq, and there were serious doubts about their reliability. Although Egypt and Iraq were strategically more important to the British, Transjordan, which had been originally conceived as an imperial convenience, was regarded as a reliable ally. The departure from Palestine in May 1948 contributed to a reversal in British attitudes towards Transjordan, and the Arab Legion benefited from close British attention. Not only did the Arab Legion enjoy a special status in British defence plans for the Middle East, but with British money and weapons, it also was transformed into a small, but highly efficient fighting force. For Abdullah, the expansion of the Arab Legion was of considerable significance internally and a foreign policy tool. The expansion of the Arab Legion prior to the 1948–9 Arab-Israeli war was mutually beneficial for Abdullah and the British, but the application of an arms embargo in May 1948 highlighted a significant limitation on Abdullah’s ability to use his army. In contrast with the other Arab armies, the Arab Legion’s performance in Palestine during

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the 1948 war was impressive, despite the requirement that it fight an urban campaign in Jerusalem for which it was neither equipped nor trained. The arms embargo showed that Abdullah remained vulnerable to developments in British foreign policy, and it was a clear example of the unbalanced nature of Anglo-Jordanian relations. The interaction of these three pillars, the King and his government, the British Resident (Minister from 1946), and the Arab Legion, contributed to a rare British imperial success story in the Middle East. Abdullah was widely regarded as a British pawn, but he was responsible for establishing the foundations of a monarchy that continues to endure. Abdullah was a pragmatic leader who was well aware of Transjordan’s inherent weaknesses, which led him to establish a strategic relationship with the British. The maintenance of an alliance with a powerful benefactor was one of the King’s most significant legacies. Despite the shocking dismissal of Glubb in March 1956, which led to the cessation of British support, King Husayn (who became King in May 1953) clearly understood that the viability of the monarchy rested on foreign economic and military support.

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ABBREVIATIONS

AHC AIR AOC ARBUR BMEO CAB CIA CID CIGS CO COS CZA DEFE DFPI DOS FBIS FO FORD FRUS GHQ GOC HA HSTL

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Arab Higher Committee Air Ministry Air Officer Commanding Arab Bureau (British) British Middle East Office Cabinet Office Central Intelligence Agency Committee of Imperial Defence Chief of the Imperial General Staff Colonial Office Chiefs of Staff (British) Central Zionist Archives, Jerusalem Ministry of Defence Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel State Department (United States) Foreign Broadcast Information Service Foreign Office Foreign Office Research Department Foreign Relations of the United States General Headquarters General Officer Commanding Haganah Archives Harry S. Truman Library, Independence, MO

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IDCE IOLR ISA IZL IWM JAE JIC KV LCP LEHI LHCMA LOC MEC MELF MI5 NACP OETA OHBE PDD PREM RAF RG RHL SIS SWB T TCB TJFF TNA UNSCOP WO

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Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs India Office Library and Records, British Library, London Israel State Archives, Jerusalem Irgun Zvai Leumi Imperial War Museum, London Jewish Agency Executive Joint Intelligence Committee Security Service (MI5) Larry Collins Papers, Georgetown University Lohamei Herut Yisrael (‘Stern Gang’) Liddell Hart Centre for Military Archives, King’s College, London Library of Congress, Washington, D.C. Middle East Centre, St. Antony’s College, Oxford Middle East Land Forces (British) Military Intelligence, Section 5 (Security Service) National Archives, College Park, Md. Occupied Enemy Territory Administration Oxford History of the British Empire Political and Diplomatic Documents Prime Minister’s Office Royal Air Force Record Group (United States National Archives) Rhodes House Library, Oxford Secret Intelligence Service (MI6) BBC Summary of World Broadcasts Treasury Tribal Control Board Transjordan Frontier Force The National Archives, Kew United Nations Special Committee on Palestine War Office

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NOTES

Chapter 1 Wartime Diplomacy and the Establishment of the Mandatory Regime in Palestine and Transjordan 1. Darwin, John, ‘An undeclared empire: The British in the Middle East, 1918– 1939’, in R. D. King and R. Kilson (eds), The Statecraft of British Imperialism: Essays in Honour of Wm. Roger Louis (London, 1999), p.159. 2. Alon, Yoav, ‘Historiography of empire: The literature on Britain in the Middle East’, in Z. Levey and E. Podeh (eds), Britain and the Middle East: From Imperial Power to Junior Partner (Brighton, 2007), p.34. 3. Sluglett, Peter, ‘Formal and informal empire in the Middle East’, in The Oxford History of the British Empire [hereafter OHBE], Vol. 5, Historiography, edited by R. Winks (Oxford, 1999), p.422. 4. Darwin, John, ‘Imperialism and the Victorians: The dynamics of territorial expansion’, English Historical Review 112 (1997), p.614. 5. Robinson, Ronald, and John Gallagher, ‘The imperialism of free trade, 1815–1914’, Economic History Review, 2nd ser., 6 (1953), pp.1–15; Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians: The Official Mind of Imperialism (London, 1961); Robinson and Gallagher, ‘The partition of Africa’, in F. H. Hinsley (ed), The New Cambridge Modern History, Vol. 11 (Cambridge, 1962), pp.593–640. For a comprehensive survey, see Louis, William Roger, The Robinson and Gallagher Controversy (New York, 1976). 6. Fisher, Michael H., Indirect Rule in India: Residents and the Residency System, 1764–1858 (New Delhi, 1998), p.6. 7. Darwin, John, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World (London, 1988), p.48. 8. Fisher, Indirect Rule, pp.24, 29, 458–77; Gifford, Prosser, ‘Indirect rule: Touchstone or tombstone for colonial policy?’, in Prosser Gifford and

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9.

10. 11. 12. 13.

14.

15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21.

22. 23.

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William Roger Louis (eds), Britain and Germany in Africa: Imperial Rivalry and Colonial Rule (New Haven, Conn., 1967), pp.351–91; Lugard, Lord, The Dual Mandate in British Tropical Africa (London, 1965), pp.193–229. Kirk-Greene, A. H. M., ‘The thin white line: The size of the British colonial service in Africa’, African Affairs 79 (1980), pp.25–38; Sharkey, Heather J., Living with Colonialism: Nationalism and Culture in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan (Berkeley, Calif., 2003), pp.67–9. Doyle, Michael W., Empires (Ithaca, N.Y.: 1986), pp.30–47. Onley, James, The Arabian Frontier of the British Raj: Merchants, Rulers and the British in the Nineteenth-Century Gulf (Oxford, 2008), p.31. Robinson and Gallagher, Africa and the Victorians, pp.19–22. Hyam, Ronald, ‘Bureaucracy and trusteeship in the colonial empire’, in J. M. Brown and W. R. Louis (eds), OHBE, Vol. 4, The Twentieth Century (Oxford: 1999), pp.255–78. Robinson, Ronald, ‘Non-European foundations of European imperialism: Sketch for a theory of collaboration’, in R. Owen and B. Sutcliffe (eds), Studies in the Theory of Imperialism (London, 1972); Robinson, Ronald, ‘The excentric idea of imperialism, with or without empire’, in W. J. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel (eds), Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities (London, 1986). Robinson, ‘Non-European foundations’, p.120. Ibid., p.121. Cain, P. J., and A. G. Hopkins, British Imperialism, Vol. 1 (London, 1993), p.5. Ibid., pp.28–30. See, for example, Hyam, Ronald, Understanding the British Empire (Cambridge, 2010), pp.133–52. Ingram, Edward, The British Empire as World Power (London, 2001), pp.49–52. Owen, Roger, The Middle East in the World Economy, 1800–1914 (London, 1993), pp.264–6; Owen, Roger, and Sevket Pamuk, A History of the Middle East Economies in the Twentieth Century (London, 1998), pp.51–76. Salibi, Kemal, The Modern History of Jordan (London, 1993), pp.50–5. Abdullah Ibn Husayn, Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan (London, 1950), pp.43–4; Wilson, Mary C., King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge, 1987), p.15. Secret Intelligence Service (SIS) memo, ‘Three sons of the King of the Hejaz’, 9 April 1921, TNA: FO 371/6239/ E5816. Tauber, Eliezer, The Emergence of the Arab Movements (London, 1993), p.154.

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24. The precise timing of Abdullah’s initial contacts with the British is uncertain because of inadequate and inconsistent sources. For a discussion see Dawn, C. Ernest, From Ottomanism to Arabism: Essays on the Origins of Arab Nationalism (Urbana, Ill., 1973), pp.58–62. 25. Tauber, Emergence of Arab Movements, pp.63–7; Storrs, Sir Ronald, Orientations (London, 1937), pp.142–3; for Abdullah’s account, see Abdullah, Memoirs, pp.105–6, 111 and 113. 26. Kedourie, Elie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth: The McMahon-Husayn Correspondence and Its Interpretations, 1914–1939 (Cambridge, 1976), p.5. 27. For further details of British policy vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire prior to the Great War, see Kedourie, Elie, England and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Empire, 1914–1921 (London, 1978), pp.9–28; Kent, Marian, ‘Great Britain and the end of the Ottoman Empire’, in M. Kent (ed), The Great Powers and the End of the Ottoman Empire (London, 1984), pp.172–85. 28. Cited in Hughes, Matthew, Allenby and British Strategy in the Middle East, 1917–1919 (London, 1999), p.89. 29. CID 98B, ‘The position of the Suez Canal in time of war’, 12 February 1907, TNA: CAB 4/2; defence of the Suez Canal, 2 June 1910, TNA: CAB 16/12. 30. Robinson, Francis, ‘The British Empire and the Muslim world’, in OHBE, Vol. 4, pp.398, 402. 31. Cleveland, William L., ‘The role of Islam as a political ideology in the First World War’, in E. Ingram (ed), National and International Politics in the Middle East: Essays in Honour of Elie Kedourie (London, 1986), p.85. 32. Accounts of the meetings can be found in the Arab Bureau document ‘Summary of historical documents from the outbreak of the war between Great Britain and Turkey, 1914, to the outbreak of the revolt of the Sherif of Mecca in June 1916’, TNA: FO 371/6237/E155; Storrs, Orientations, pp.173–7. 33. Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, pp.29–31. 34. British Desiderata in Turkey and Asia: Report, Proceedings and Appendices of a Committee Appointed by the Prime Minister, 30 June 1915, TNA: CAB 27/1. 35. Gershoni, Israel, ‘The Arab nation, the House of Hashim and Greater Syria in the writings of Abdullah’, Hamizrah Hehadash [New East] 25 (1975), pp.5–6. 36. Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth; Tibawi, A. L., Anglo-Arab Relations and the Question of Palestine, 1914–1921 (London, 1978), pp.64–130. 37. Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon . . . and the Sherif of Mecca, July 1915–March 1916, Cmd. 5957 (London, 1939). 38. See minutes by Rendel, 24 April 1934, TNA: FO 371/17831/E2456, and Baggallay, 6 May 1937, TNA: FO 371/20806/E2525.

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39. Paris, Timothy J., Britain, the Hashemites and Arab Rule, 1920–1925: The Sherifian Solution (London, 2003), pp.31–2. 40. Report of a Committee Set Up to Consider Certain Correspondence between Sir Henry McMahon and the Sherif of Mecca in 1915–1916, Cmd. 5974 (London, 1939). In 1964 Rohan Butler, the Foreign Office historical advisor, reviewed the correspondence and concluded that McMahon had intended to exclude Palestine, TNA: FO 371/175635/EE1051/3. 41. Kostiner, Joseph, The Making of Saudi Arabia, 1916–1936: From Chieftaincy to Monarchical State (New York, 1993), pp.7–8. 42. Kedourie, Elie, ‘Cairo and Khartoum on the Arab question, 1915–18’, Historical Journal 7 (1964), pp.281–2. 43. ‘The Sheriff of Mecca and the Arab movement’, memo by the General Staff, 1 July 1916, IOLR: Mss Eur F112/277. 44. Troeller, Gary, The Birth of Saudi Arabia: Britain and the Rise of the House of Sa’ud (London, 1976), pp.73–117. 45. Claims of double-dealing have been challenged by Kedourie, England and the Middle East, pp.40–2; and Monroe, Elizabeth, Britain’s Moment in the Middle East, 1914–1956 (London, 1963), pp.33–7. 46. Friedman, Isaiah, The Question of Palestine, 1914–1918: British-Jewish-Arab Relations (New Brunswick, N.J., 1992), p.101. 47. Childs, W. J., ‘Memorandum on the exclusion of Palestine from the area assigned for Arab independence by the McMahon-Husayn Correspondence of 1915–16’, 24 October 1930, TNA: FO 371/14495/E6491. 48. Dawn, From Ottomanism to Arabism, pp.69–75. 49. Karsh, Efraim, and Inari Karsh, ‘Myth in the desert, or not the Great Arab Revolt’, Middle Eastern Studies 33 (1997), pp.267–312. 50. Antonius, George, The Arab Awakening: The Story of the Arab National Movement (Beirut, 1938), pp.184–242. 51. Nevo, Joseph, ‘Abdullah’s memoirs as historical source material’, in A. Susser and A. Shmuelevitz (eds), The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World: Essays in the Honour of the Late Professor Uriel Dann (London, 1995), p.167. 52. Porath, Yehoshua, In Search of Arab Unity, 1930–1945 (London, 1986), p.23. 53. ‘The Sherifs’, 27 October 1916, TNA: FO 882/5, pp.39–41. 54. Balfour to Lord Rothschild, 2 November 1917, TNA: FO 371/3083/143082. For a summary of British motives, see Fieldhouse, D. K., Western Imperialism in the Middle East, 1914–1958 (Oxford, 2006), pp.130–49. 55. IWM Film and Video Archive, Thames Television interviews with Sir Harold Beeley and General Sir John Glubb, 1976; Grafftey-Smith, Laurence, Bright Levant (London, 1970), pp.154–5. 56. Westrate, Bruce, The Arab Bureau: British Policy in the Middle East, 1916– 1920 (University Park, Penn., 1992), pp.103–4.

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57. The Hogarth message was included in Statements Made on the Behalf of His Majesty’s Government during the Year 1918 in Regard to the Future Status of Certain Parts of the Ottoman Empire, Cmd. 5964 (London, 1939). 58. Antonius, Arab Awakening, pp.268–9. 59. Kedourie, In the Anglo-Arab Labyrinth, p.189. 60. Kedourie, Elie, ‘The surrender of Medina, January 1919’, Middle Eastern Studies 13 (1977), p.133. 61. Tauber, Emergence of the Arab Movements, pp.150–3; Arab Bulletin, no. 80, 26 February 1918, TNA: FO 882/27. 62. Arab Bulletin, no. 51, 23 May 1917, TNA: FO 882/26; EC thirty-ninth meeting, 27 November 1918, TNA: CAB 27/24, pp.8–11; minutes of the Interdepartmental Conference on Middle Eastern Affairs (IDCE), 17 May 1920, TNA: FO 371/5226/E5643. 63. Sykes, Mark, ‘Note of a conversation with the amirs Abdullah and Faisal’, 1 May 1917, TNA: FO 882/16 pp.233–6; Wilson, Jeremy, Lawrence of Arabia: The Authorised Biography of T. E. Lawrence (London, 1989), pp.385–7, 1061–2. 64. Arab Bulletin, no. 112, 24 June 1919, TNA: FO 882/28; Kostiner, Joseph, ‘Prologue of Hashemite downfall and Saudi ascendancy: A new look at the Khurma dispute, 1917–1919’, in Susser and Shmuelevitz (eds), Hashemites, pp.48–52. 65. Arab Bulletin, no. 111, 24 May 1919, TNA: FO 882/28; for Abdullah’s account, see A, Abdullah, Memoirs, pp.183–7; and Nevo, Abdullah’s Memoirs, pp.173–4. 66. Report by Vickery, 6 March 1920, TNA: FO 371/5061/E2534. 67. Curzon to Allenby, 4 May 1920, TNA: FO 371/5062/E3798. 68. EC thirty-ninth meeting, 27 November 1918, TNA: CAB 27/24, p.9; IDCE meeting, 17 May 1920, TNA: FO 371/5226/E5643. 69. EC thirty-ninth meeting, 27 November 1918, TNA: CAB 27/24, p.4. 70. Goldstein, Eric, ‘British peace aims and the Eastern question: The Political Intelligence Department and the Eastern Committee’, Middle Eastern Studies 23 (1987), pp.421–6. 71. EC forty-fourth meeting, 18 December 1918, TNA: CAB 27/24, p.6. 72. EC forty-first meeting, 5 December 1918, TNA: CAB 27/24, pp.7–18, and EC forty-third meeting, 16 December 1918, TNA: CAB 27/24, p.3. 73. Louis, William Roger, ‘The era of the mandates system and the non-European world’, in H. Bull and A. Watson (eds), The Expansion of International Society (Oxford, 1984), p.204; Fieldhouse, Western Imperialism, p.69. 74. Franco-British Convention of December 23, 1920 on Certain Points Connected with the Mandates for Syria and Lebanon, Palestine and Mesopotamia, Cmd. 1195 (London, 1921).

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75. Tauber, Eleizer, The Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq (London, 1995), pp.27–9, 203–5. 76. Young to FO, 13 March 1920, TNA: FO 371/5032/E1452. 77. Report by Vickery, 6 March 1920, TNA: FO 371/5032/E2534; ‘Value of the Sharifian Arab movement for British policy’, TNA: FO 371/3385/E191229. 78. Allenby to Curzon, 21 March 1920, TNA: FO 371/5061/E2534. 79. Wilson to Montagu, 22 March 1920, TNA: FO 371/5033/E2060; Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 27 March 1920, TNA: FO 371/5034/E2329. 80. For accounts of Transjordan during the Ottoman period, see ‘Abujaber, Raouf Sa’d, Pioneers over Jordan: The Frontiers of Settlement in Transjordan, 1850–1914 (London, 1989), pp.24–41; Rogan, Eugene L., ‘Bringing the state back: The limits of Ottoman rule in Jordan, 1840–1910’, in Eugene L. Rogan and Tariq Tell (eds), Village, Steppe and State: The Social Origins of Modern Jordan (London, 1994), pp.32–57; Wilson, King Abdullah, pp.53–9. 81. Mousa, Suleiman, ‘The rise of Arab nationalism and the emergence of Transjordan’, in Suleiman Mousa, Cameos: Jordan and Arab Nationalism (Amman, 1997), p.87. 82. Hughes, Allenby and British Strategy, pp.78–88. 83. Samuel to Churchill, 30 July 1921, TNA: CO 733/4/41144; Naval Intelligence Division, Geographical Handbook Series, Handbook on Palestine and Transjordan, B.R. 514 (London, 1943), pp.465–6. 84. Clayton to FO, 2 May 1919, TNA: WO 106/190. 85. Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 10 November 1919, TNA: FO 371/4147/156998. 86. Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 13 January 1920, TNA: FO 371/4186/174490; unsigned report on Transjordania, 3 June 1920, CZA: Z4/2800/II. 87. CP 1450, 8 June 1920, TNA: CAB 24/107. 88. Report on French propaganda in Jerusalem, 2 February 1919, TNA: WO 106/189. 89. Jerusalem to Allenby, 7 August 1920, TNA: FO 141/440/12085/1/pt. 1/no. 179. 90. Clayton to GHQ Cairo, 15 October 1919, TNA: FO 406/41/163275. 91. Unsigned memo on the situation in Trans-Jordan, 9 March 1920, ISA: 4/1/7/II; intelligence report no. 6, Beersheba District, 13 November 1920, ISA: 4/2/54. 92. Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 10 November 1919, TNA: FO 371/4147/156998. 93. Ponsonby to Samuel, 31 August 1920, ISA: 4/2/50/aleph; Samuel to George V, 12 September 1920, ISA: 100/649/7; Samuel to Faisal 16 August 1920, TNA: WO 106/199; Samuel to FO 12 August 1920, TNA: FO 371/5121/E9866. 94. Samuel to FO, 7 August 1920, TNA: FO 371/5121/E9599; General Headquarters (GHQ) Cairo to the War Office (WO), 4 November 1920, TNA: FO 371/5289/E13779.

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209

95. Monckton to mother, 21 August 1920, MEC: Monckton Papers, box 1/I; Samuel to Prodrome, 22 August 1920, ISA: 4/2/50/aleph. 96. Minutes by Curzon, Tilley and Young, 9 August 1920, TNA: FO 371/5121/ E9599. 97. See minute by Young, 20 October 1920, TNA: FO 371/5123/E12874. 98. Minutes by Young, 9 August 1920, TNA: FO 371/5121/E9599 and Scott, 2 November 1920, TNA: FO 371/5124/E13506. 99. WO to General Officer Commanding (GOC) Egypt, 22 October 1920, TNA: FO 371/5124/E13217. 100. GHQ Egypt to WO, 3 August 1920, TNA: FO 371/5121/E9455. 101. Churchill to Wilson, 5 March 1920, TNA: WO 32/5280; CP 2324 (20), 18 December 1920, TNA: CAB 24/117. 102. FO to Samuel, 11 August 1920, TNA: FO 371/5121/E9542; Samuel to FO, 13 September 1920, TNA: FO 371/5123/E11947. 103. Storrs to Camp, 27 August 1920, ISA: 4/2/50; Samuel to FO, 13 September 1920, TNA: FO 371/5123/E11947. 104. Dann, Uriel, Studies in the History of Transjordan, 1920–1949: The Making of a State (Boulder, Colo., 1984), pp.22–4. 105. Kirkbride, Alec Seath, A Crackle of Thorns: Experiences in the Middle East (London, 1956), pp.18–28. 106. Deedes to Tilley, 27 September 1920, TNA: FO 371/5123/E12406. 107. Alon, Yoav, The Making of Jordan: Tribes, Colonialism and the Modern State (London, 2007), pp.26–34. 108. Congreve to WO, 15 November 1920, TNA: WO 32/5770. 109. Allenby to FO, 18 February 1920, TNA: FO 371/5060/E494. 110. Allenby to FO, 25 March 1920, TNA: FO 371/5061/E2644. 111. Translations of statements handed by Abdullah to Samuel on 28 April 1920 and 3 May 1920, TNA: FO 141/510/11150. 112. Scott to Curzon, 10 May 1920, TNA: FO 371/5062/E5574. 113. Abdullah to the British Agent, Jedda, 1 June 1920, TNA: FO 686/43; Vickery to ARBUR, 3 June 1920, TNA: FO 686/43. 114. Vickery to ARBUR, 21 September 1920, TNA: FO 686/12. 115. Abu Nowar, Ma’an, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Vol. 1, The Creation and Development of Transjordan, 1920–1929 (Oxford, 1989), p.40; Wilson, Mary, King Abdullah, p.44. 116. Peake to Somerset, 10 July 1921, MEC: Somerset Papers. 117. Curzon to Jedda, 19 November 1920, no. 376, TNA: FO 686/43. 118. Samuel to FO, 16 November 1920, TNA: FO 371/5289/E14289. 119. GHQ Egypt to the WO, 20 December 1920, TNA: FO 371/5290/E15939; cf. Samuel to FO, 28 November 1920, TNA: FO 371/5290/E14597.

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120. Tilley to Deedes, 13 November 1920, TNA: FO 371/5124/E13797. 121. ‘Notes of the southern part of Trans-Jordania’, unsigned memo, 27 July 1920, ISA: 4/2/50/aleph; reports on the Belka and Ajlun areas, 21 and 31 December 1920, TNA: FO 406/44/E1064; Deedes to Samuel, 28 December 1920, TNA: FO 371/5290/E16127. 122. Brunton to Deedes, 29 October 1920, ISA: 4/2/50; extract from a French report, 21 October 1920, ISA: 4/1/14/mem. 123. Samuel to FO, 15 December 1920, TNA: FO 371/5290/E15939, and 28 December 1920, TNA: FO 371/5290/E16167; Samuel to Curzon, 20 December 1920, TNA: FO 371/5290/E16222. 124. Transjordan political report for February 1921, 3 March 1921, TNA: CO 733/1/13449. 125. Samuel to Curzon, 12 December 1920, TNA: FO 371/5290/E15544; Transjordan political report for March 1921, TNA: CO 733/2/21968. 126. Abu Nowar, History, Vol. 1, pp.41–4; Samuel to Curzon, 4 January 1921, TNA: FO 371/6371/E244. 127. Easton to GHQ Cairo, 24 January 1921, TNA: WO 32/5770. 128. Deedes to Tilley, 19 December 1920, TNA: FO 371/6371/E153; Samuel to FO, 24 February 1921, TNA: WO 106/201. 129. Palmer to FO, 14 March 1921, TNA: FO 371/6371/E3810; Samuel to Jedda, 6 March 1921, TNA: FO 686/78. 130. Samuel to Curzon, 4 December 1920, TNA: FO 371/5289/E15192. 131. Curzon to Hardinge, 19 December 1920, TNA: FO 371/5290/E15772; Curzon to Hardinge, 25 February 1921, TNA: FO 371/6238/E2505. 132. Curzon to Hardinge, 6 April 1921, TNA: FO 406/46/E4164. 133. Fontana to FO, 2 December 1920, TNA: FO 371/5289/E15168. 134. Samuel to Curzon, 1 February 1921, TNA: FO 371/6371/E1515. 135. Palmer to FO, 12 February 1921, TNA: FO 371/6371/E2894. 136. GHQ Egypt to WO, 4 November 1920, TNA: FO 371/5289/E13724; Tauber, Formation of Modern Syria and Iraq, pp.208–18. 137. Samuel to Curzon, 24 January 1921, TNA: FO 371/6371/E1064. 138. Samuel to Curzon, 22 February 1921, TNA: FO 371/6371/E2559. 139. Samuel to Curzon, 24 January 1921, TNA: FO 371/6387/E1062. 140. Darwin, ‘Undeclared empire’, p.161. 141. Wilson to Lord Derby, 10 December 1921, TNA: WO 32/5840. 142. 199-C, 2 July 1923, TNA: CAB 5/5; 174th meeting of the CID, 12 July 1923, TNA: CAB 2/3. 143. Bond, Brian, British Military Policy between the Two World Wars (Oxford, 1980), pp.22–6. 144. CP 3682 (22), 4 February 1922, TNA: CAB 24/132.

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145. CP 3619 (22), 20 January 1922, TNA: CAB 24/132. 146. Samuel to Churchill, 28 October 1923, TNA: AIR 5/275. 147. Vatikiotis, P. J., Politics and the Military in Jordan: A Study of the Arab Legion, 1921–1957 (London, 1967), pp.58–68. 148. PGS 5, 27 June 1930, TNA: CAB 16/97. 149. ‘Notes on public security in Palestine’, 2 September 1929, TNA: AIR 9/19. 150. Air Staff memo, 5 July 1923, TNA AIR 5/586. 151. CP 1320, 20 May 1920, TNA: CAB 24/106; Omissi, David E., Air Power and Colonial Control: The Royal Air Force, 1919–1939 (Manchester, 1990), pp.20–2. 152. Memo by Young, 7 May 1920, TNA: FO 371/5255/E4870; CP 1372, 26 May 1920, TNA: CAB 21/186; Maisel, Ephraim, The Foreign Office and Foreign Policy, 1919–1926 (Brighton, 1994), pp.204–12. 153. CP 1434, 8 June 1920, TNA: CAB 21/186; CP 1777, 16 August 1920, TNA: CAB 24/110. 154. CP 2343, 22 December 1920, TNA: CAB 24/117. 155. CC 82 (20), 31 December 1920, TNA: CAB 23/23. 156. CP 2545, 7 February 1921, TNA: CAB 24/119; Maisel, Foreign Office, pp.222–5. 157. Richard Toye, Churchill and Empire, Churchill’s Empire: The World That Made Him and the World He Made (London, 2010), pp.144–5. 158. Draft agenda for the Cairo Conference, 1 March 1921, TNA: CO 732/3/9837. 159. CP 3123 (21), TNA: CAB 24/126, pp.97–8. 160. Ibid. 161. CP 2751, 21 March 1921, TNA: CAB 24/121. 162. For accounts of Lawrence’s influence on Churchill, see Meinertzhagen, Richard, Middle East Diary, 1917–1956 (London, 1959), p.33; Wilson, Jeremy, Lawrence of Arabia, pp.643–63. 163. Lloyd-George to Churchill, 22 March 1921, TNA: FO 371/6342/E4211. 164. CP 2770, 24 March 1921, TNA: CAB 24/121. 165. Churchill to Ritchie, 25 February 1921, TNA: CO 732/3/10749. 166. Klieman, Aaron, The Foundations of British Policy in the Arab World: The Cairo Conference of 1921 (Baltimore, 1970); Kazziha, Walid, ‘The political evolution of Transjordan’, Middle Eastern Studies 15 (1979), pp.243–5. 167. CP 3123, TNA: CAB 24/122, p.109. 168. Ibid., p. 113. 169. Churchill to Samuel, 2 April 1921, TNA: CO 733/13/17431; CP 2815, April 1921, TNA: CAB 24/122; cabinet discussion of his proposals, CC 14 (21), 22 March 1921, TNA: CAB 23/24.

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170. Gelber, Yoav, Jewish-Transjordanian Relations, 1921–1948 (London, 1997), pp.14–5; Nevo, Joseph, King Abdullah and Palestine: A Territorial Ambition (London, 1997), pp.5–6; Wilson, Mary, King Abdullah, pp.51–3. 171. Rudd, J. A., ‘Abdullah bin al-Husayn: The making of an Arab political leader, 1908–1921’ (Ph.D. diss., School of Oriental and African Studies, University of London, 1994), p.308. 172. Cited in Wilson, Mary, King Abdullah, p.53. 173. Abdullah to Wauchope, 22 February 1936, CZA: S25/22779; MacMichael to Stanley, 24 April 1943, TNA: PREM 4/43A/7; Abdullah to Churchill, 22 February 1944 and 28 August 1944, TNA: PREM 4/43A/7. 174. Samuel to Curzon, 12 July 1920, TNA: FO 371/5121/E8599; Wasserstein, Bernard, The British in Palestine: The Mandatory Government and the ArabJewish Conflict, 1917–1929 (London, 1978), pp.92–3. 175. Chancellor to Shuckburgh, 14 June 1929, TNA: CO 831/6/3. 176. Palestine: Views of the Department, 1 March 1921, TNA: CO 732/3/9837; Mandate for Palestine, Together with a Note by the Secretary-General Relating to Its Application to the Territory Known as Transjordan, under the Provisions of Article 25, Cmd. 1785 (London, December 1923). 177. Political report for March 1921, TNA: CO 733/2/21968; Luke, Harry Charles, and Edward Keith-Roach, The Handbook of Palestine and Transjordan (London, 1930), pp.423–4. 178. MacMichael to MacDonald, 7 January 1939, TNA: CO 831/54/8. 179. Balfour-Paul, Glen, The End of Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Relinquishment of Power in Her Last Three Arab Dependencies (Cambridge, 1991), p.103. 180. Chancellor to Shuckburgh, 14 June 1929, TNA: CO 831/6/3. 181. Colonial Office, Report by His Majesty’s Government in the United Kingdom to the Council of the League of Nations on the Administration of Palestine and Transjordan, 1929, pp.142–3; 1936 Report, p.318; 1938 Report, p.315. 182. Wasserstein, British in Palestine, p.246. 183. Kirk-Greene, Anthony, Britain’s Imperial Administrators, 1858–1966 (London, 2000), p.65. 184. Louis, William Roger, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford, 1984), p.354. 185. Memo by Macdonald, 8 September 1939, TNA: CO 732/85/21. 186. Downie to Baxter, 3 December 1940, TNA: FO 371/24549/E3028/G. 187. Foot, Hugh, A Start in Freedom (London, 1964), pp.64–7. 188. Alon, Making of Jordan, p.62. 189. 1938 Administration Report, p.314.

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190. Satloff, Robert B., From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York, 1994), pp.6–7. 191. Ibid., pp.22–5; Wilson, Mary, King Abdullah, p.217. 192. For a CIA analysis of Transjordan’s political system, see Special Report 25, ‘Arab States’, 27 September 1949, HSTL: PSF, box 217. 193. Kirkbride, Crackle of Thorns, p.19. 194. Report on the political development of Transjordan, 1942, MEC: Tripe Papers. 195. ‘A further note on peace terms in the Middle East’, enclosed in Reilly to Hankey, 1 October 1943, TNA: FO 371/34975/E5925. 196. Summaries of revenue and expenditure for the years 1924–9 can be found in the 1929 Administrative Report, pp.147–9; for 1932–6 see the 1936 Report, p.373; and for 1936–9 see the draft 1940 Report, pp.280–1. 197. Reports from Abramson, 9 May 1921 and 15 May 1921, TNA: CO 733/3/27574 and 25833; Philby, H. St. J. B., ‘Transjordan’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 11 (1924), pp.301–2. 198. Samuel to Churchill, 13 June 1921, TNA: CO 733/3/31760. 199. Samuel to Churchill, 11 July 1921, TNA: CO 733/4/36252. 200. Minute by Murray, 29 June 1921, TNA: FO 371/6372/E7438. 201. CO to FO, 29 June 1921, TNA: FO 371/6372/E7436. 202. Deedes to CO, 12 July 1921, TNA: CO 537/850/42529. 203. Samuel to Churchill, 15 August 1921, TNA: CO 733/6/49093. 204. Palmer to FO, 12 February 1921, TNA: FO 371/6371/E2894; Satow to FO, 17 February 1921, TNA: FO 371/6371/E2895. 205. CO to FO, 8 November 1921, TNA: FO 371/6462/E11154; report by Deedes, 28 August 1921, TNA: CO 537/851/44723. 206. Fifth report by Abramson, 11 July 1921, TNA: CO 733/4/36252; Transjordan situation report for 28 November 1921 to 31 March 1922, 26 April 1922, TNA: CO 733/21/21848. 207. Note on Col. Lawrence’s report prepared by the Secretariat, 14 November 1921, TNA: CO 733/7/57016; Dann, Studies, pp.37–46. 208. Eighth report by Abramson, 6 October 1921, TNA: CO 733/6/52088; Abu Nowar, History, Vol. 1, pp.60–2. 209. Samuel to Churchill, 24 November 1921, TNA: CO 733/7/60892. 210. Meinertzhagen, Middle East Diary, p.34. 211. Minute by Shuckburgh, 1 July 1921, TNA: CO 733/17A/32297. 212. Churchill to Samuel, 7 January 1922, TNA: CO 733/8/261. 213. Samuel to Churchill, 21 July 1922, TNA: CO 733/23/37765. 214. Memo by Clayton, 18 November 1922, TNA: CO 733/37/51982. 215. Minute by Young, 19 October 1922, TNA: CO 733/37/51982.

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216. Minute by Young, 13 November 1922, TNA: FO 371/7792/E12582; Shuckburgh to Oliphant, 17 November 1922, TNA: FO 371/7792/ E12880. 217. Shuckburgh to Curzon, 6 March 1923, TNA: FO 371/9008/E2500; Shuckburgh to Oliphant, 15 March 1923, TNA: FO 371/9008/E2481; Oliphant to Shuckburgh, 17 March 1923, TNA: CO 733/55/13766. 218. Treasury memo, 5 May 1924, TNA: T 161/121. 219. Monroe, Elizabeth, Philby of Arabia (Oxford, 1998), pp.103–24. 220. Shuckburgh to Samuel, 21 November 1923, TNA: CO 733/50/51405. 221. Philby’s account of the episode can be found in his unpublished manuscript ‘Stepping stones in Jordan’, MEC: Philby Papers, box 4/1/17, pp. 99–112. 222. The extent of Philby’s grievances is revealed in personal papers, MEC: Philby Papers, box 1/5/2. 223. Samuel to Devonshire, 5 October 1923, TNA: CO 537/860, and 7 December 1923, TNA: CO 537/861. 224. For Philby’s criticism of the system of government in Transjordan, see his ‘Memorandum on Transjordan and other Near East problems’, 26 June 1926, MEC: Philby Papers, box 1/5/1. 225. Clayton to Samuel, 1 February 1924, TNA: FO 371/10101/E1717. 226. Minute by Barstow, 5 May 1924, TNA: T 161/121. 227. Barstow to the CO, 26 February 1924, s9824/02, TNA: T 161/121. 228. Samuel to Thomas, 20 April 1924, TNA: CO 733/67/19003. 229. Situation report for January and February 1924, 14 March 1924, TNA: CO 733/66/14205. Philby’s long-winded account can found in ‘Stepping stones’, pp. 223–40. 230. Memo of 5 April 1924, TNA: CO 733/67, p. 86. 231. Samuel to Thomas, 15 April 1924, TNA: CO 733/67, no. 20298. 232. Undated memo by Cox, TNA: CO 733/67, pp. 92–3. 233. A detailed account of this episode can be found in Dann, Studies, pp.81–92. 234. Minute by Young, 7 August 1924, CO: 733/71/37139. 235. Clayton to Thomas, 24 July 1924, TNA: FO 371/10101/E6767. 236. Memo by the Middle East Department of the Colonial Office, 26 April 1924, TNA: AIR 5/275; Air Staff memo, April 1924, TNA: AIR 9/19/38. 237. Minute by Osborne, 11 August 1924, TNA: FO 371/10102/E6780. 238. Cox to Clayton, 23 August 1923, TNA: CO 733/72/41628. 239. Clayton to Thomas, 15 August 1924, TNA: CO 733/72/40570. 240. MacMichael to Macdonald, 20 March 1939, TNA: CO 831/54/3. 241. Transjordan, Agreement between the United Kingdom and Transjordan, Cmd. 3069 (London, 1928).

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242. Wilson, Mary, King Abdullah, p.96–7. 243. Abu Nowar, History, Vol. 1, 198–9. 244. A copy of the Organic Law can be found in Plumer to Amery, 1 March 1928, TNA CO 831/1/5. 245. Alon, Making of Jordan, pp.40–6. 246. Cox to Shuckburgh, 4 November 1928, TNA: CO 831/3/1. 247. Cox to Chancellor, 22 May 1928, TNA: CO 831/3/1; note of a conversation with the High Commissioner, 14 April 1929, TNA: CO 831/5/1. 248. Chancellor to Amery, 31 May 1929, TNA: CO 831/5/1. 249. Abu Nowar, Ma’an, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Vol. 2, The Development of Trans-Jordan, 1929–1939 (Amman, 1997), pp.72–4; Alon, Making of Jordan, p.87–92. 250. See, for example, Alec Kirkbride’s report of a visit to the tribes east of the Hejaz railway, 27 December 1928, TNA: CO 831/5/1. 251. Samuel to Churchill, 15 August 1922 and 17 August 1922, TNA: AIR 5/203. 252. Memo by Glubb on the history of the Legion, 19 April 1939, TNA: CO 831/54/14. 253. Report by Kirkbride of his inspection of southern Transjordan from 29 February 1932 to 6 March 1932, TNA: CO 831/19/8; Epstein, Eliahu, ‘The Bedouin of Transjordan: Their social and economic problems’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 25 (1938), pp.228–36; Glubb, J. B., ‘The economic situation of the Trans-Jordan tribes’, Journal of the Royal Central Asian Society 25 (1938), pp.448–59. 254. Dann, Studies, p.10. 255. Ryan meeting with Abdullah in February 1932, TNA: FO 371/16013/ E1000. 256. Kostiner, Making of Saudi Arabia, pp.158–62. 257. Report on Souforce Operations, 28 September 1932, TNA: AIR 5/1246. 258. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 1 July 1932 and 6 July 1932, TNA: FO 371/16015/E3327 and E3453. 259. Minute by Rendel, 12 December 1932, TNA: FO 371/16016/E4198. 260. Vansittart to Wilson, 5 July 1932, TNA: FO 371/16015/E3327. 261. Hope Gill to FO, 29 November 1932, TNA: FO 371/16017/E6261. 262. Rendel to Oliphant, 1 December 1932, TNA: FO 371/16017/E6261. 263. Minute by Rendel, 6 May 1932, TNA: FO 371/16013/E2276. 264. Minute by Warner, 12 December 1932, TNA: FO 371/16017/E6495. 265. Minute by Rendel, 7 July 1932, TNA: FO 371/16015/E3412. 266. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 3 September 1932, TNA: FO 371/16024/ E4703.

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267. Alon, Making of Jordan, pp.84–109; Royle, Trevor, Glubb Pasha, The Life and Times of Sir John Bagot Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion (London, 1992), pp.165–97. 268. Vatikiotis, Politics and the Military, pp.5–6.

Chapter 2 Abdullah and the Special Relationship: The Origins of Hashemite-Zionist Relations 1. Renamed the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in April 1950. 2. Dann, Uriel, Studies in the History of Transjordan, 1920–1949: The Making of a State (Boulder, Colo., 1984), p.11. 3. Kirkbride, Sir Alec, From the Wings: Amman Memoirs, 1947–1951 (London, 1976), p.3. 4. Memo Ruppin, 20 November 1919, CZA: Z4/25053. 5. Shindler, Colin, ‘Likud and the search for Eretz Israel: From the Bible to the twenty-first century’, Israel Affairs 8 (2002), pp.96–7; memo by Sidebottom, 11 November 1919, CZA: Z4/565; memo by Trietsch, June 1920, CZA: Z4/25052. 6. Weizmann to Churchill, 19 September 1919, TNA: WO 32/5732; memo by Aaronson, June 1920, CZA: Z4/582. 7. The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, series A: Letters (Jerusalem: 1983), Vol. 9, p.397. 8. Biger, Gideon, An Empire in the Holy Land: Historical Geography of the British Administration in Palestine, 1917–1929 (New York, 1994), pp.55–6. 9. Weizmann to Wilson, 4 February 1919, CZA: Z4/16024; ‘Transjordania: Its resources and possibilities’, circa 1920, CZA: Z4/528; Gil-Har, Yitzhak, ‘The separation of Transjordan from Palestine’, in L. Levine (ed), Jerusalem Cathedra: Studies in the History, Archaeology, Geography and Ethnography of the Land of Israel, Vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1982), p.309. 10. Landmann to Shuckburgh, 19 October 1921, TNA: CO 733/16/52260. 11. Weizmann to Curzon, 2 February 1920, ISA: 100/649/6. 12. The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, series B: Papers (Jerusalem: 1984), Vol. 10, pp.160–1. 13. Eder to Weizmann, 15 January 1920, CZA: Z4/16033; reports on Transjordan, 26 January 1919 and 9 March 1920, CZA: L4/747. 14. Note on the Palestine military problem, unsigned and undated, circa May– June 1921, CZA: Z4/16151. 15. Samuel to Curzon, 16 June 1920, TNA: FO 371/5035/E6685. 16. Samuel to FO, 8 June 1920, TNA: FO 371/5035/E6224; a map of the Meinertzhagen line can be found in Meinertzhagen, Richard, Middle East Diary, 1917–1956 (London: Crescent, 1959), p.64.

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17. Samuel to Curzon, 8 June 1920, TNA: FO 371/5035/E6224. 18. Meinertzhagen to Curzon, 26 September 1919, TNA: FO 371/4148/ E141037. 19. Minute by Young, 9 August 1920, TNA: FO 371/5121/E9599. 20. Memo by Young, 30 November 1920, TNA: FO 371/5066/E14959. 21. Palestine: Correspondence with the Palestine Arab Delegation and the Zionist Organisation, Cmd. 1700 (London, 1922). 22. Mandate for Palestine, Cmd. 1785 (London, 1922); CP 4188, 14 September 1922, TNA: CAB 24/138. 23. Arlosoroff to Brandeis, 8 May 1932, CZA: S25/3489. 24. Eder to Meinertzhagen, 11 November 1921, CZA: Z4/16151; Stein to Meinertzhagen, 11 November 1921, TNA: CO 733/16/57721. 25. Stein to Kisch, 8 June 1923, CZA: S25/751. 26. Weizmann Letters, Vol. 13, pp.30, 130–1. 27. Tudor to the Air Ministry, 16 February 1924, TNA: AIR 5/206. 28. Plumer to Amery, 18 August 1926, TNA: CO 733/116/17194; Plumer to Amery, 27 October 1926, TNA: CO 733/117/20734. 29. Reguer, Sara, ‘Rutenberg and the Jordan River: A revolution in hydro-electricity’, Middle Eastern Studies 31 (1995), pp.691–729. 30. Evidence of Zionist demands can be found in CZA: S25/754; on the TJFF, see Rudd, Jeffery A., ‘Origins of the Transjordan Frontier Force’, Middle Eastern Studies 26 (1990), pp.161–84. 31. Plumer to Amery, 19 March 1926, TNA: CO 733/113/7162; Chancellor interview with Plumer, 15 August 1928, RHL: Chancellor papers, box 11/2. 32. Playfair to the Chief Secretary, 28 April 1930, TNA: CO 831/10/5; Cox to Chancellor, 4 May 1930, TNA: CO 831/10/5. 33. Weizmann Papers, Vol. 2, p.471. 34. Undated and unsigned report on the climatic and economic situation in Transjordan, CZA: S25/10001. 35. Kisch to Hoz, 21 October 1926, CZA: S25/751. 36. ‘Operations in connection with the civil disturbances in Palestine, Aug.–Sept. 1929’, TNA: AIR 5/1243/13; memo by Peake, 11 September 1929, TNA: FO 371/13754/E5178; Porath, Yehoshua, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, Vol. 2, 1929–1939 (London, 1977), pp.1–37. 37. Air Staff notes on public security in Palestine, 2 September 1929, TNA: AIR 9/19. 38. CID 339-C, 20 December 1929, TNA: CAB 5/7; CID 348-C, 27 June 1930, TNA: CAB 5/7. 39. Dowding to the Air Ministry, 26 December 1929, TNA: AIR 5/1243/13. 40. Chancellor to Passfield, 27 August 1929, TNA: FO 371/13751/E4232; Cox to Chancellor, 27 October 1929, TNA: CO 831/5/9/69460.

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41. Cox to Chancellor, 27 October 1929, TNA: CO 831/5/9. 42. Abu Nowar, Ma’an, The History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Vol. 2, The Development of Trans-Jordan, 1929–1939 (Amman, 1997), p.58. 43. Cox to Chancellor, 27 November 1929, CO: 831/5/9. 44. Report by Epstein, February 1931, CZA: S25/3489. 45. Report of the Commission on the Palestine Disturbances of August 1930, Cmd. 3530 (London, 1930); Palestine: Report on Immigration, Land Settlement and Development, by Sir John Hope-Simpson, Cmd. 3686 (London, 1930); for detailed discussion, see Kolinsky, Martin, Law, Order and Riots in Mandatory Palestine, 1928–35 (London, 1993), pp.73–8, 132–7; Stein, Kenneth, The Land Question in Palestine, 1917–1939 (Chapel Hill, N.C., 1984), pp.105–20. 46. Palestine: Statement of Policy, Cmd. 3692 (London, October 1930). 47. Weizmann’s meetings with the Cabinet Committee on Palestine, 27 November and 5 December 1930, TNA: CAB 27/433. 48. Jewish Agency memo submitted to the Cabinet Committee on Palestine, 16 December 1930, TNA: CAB 27/433. 49. Beckett to Dixon, 1 January 1931, TNA: FO 371/15325/E17. 50. Reports by Papper, 8 August 1930, CZA: S25/3490; 10 August 1930, CZA: S25/10001; 4 November 1930, CZA: S25/3746; and 12 November 1930, CZA: S25/3746. 51. Weizmann interview with Cunliffe-Lister, 2 June 1932, Weizmann Papers, Vol. 2, p.13. 52. Memos by Glubb, 11 December 1930 and 16 June 1931, TNA: CO 831/11/1/ pt. 1; report on the Transjordan deserts for October 1931, TNA: FO 371/16013/E703. 53. Report by Epstein, February 1931, CZA: S25/3489; ‘The problem of Transjordania’, 30 March 1931, CZA: S25/3490. 54. Kisch to Weizmann, 3 May 1931, CZA: S25/3509; Arlosoroff to Brodetsky, 1 February 1932, CZA: S25/5797; Cox to Wauchope, 18 January 1933, TNA: CO 831/21/8/pt. 1. 55. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 24 December 1931, TNA: CO 732/53/3/pt. 1; report by Avraham Shapira, 15 December 1932, CZA: S25/3489. 56. Budget of the Department of Arab Affairs, CZA: S25/10621. 57. Arlosoroff to New York, 24 November 1931, CZA: S25/3509; Arlosoroff to Brodetsky, 1 February 1932, CZA: S25/5797. 58. Report by Epstein, February 1931, CZA: S25/3489. 59. Cox to Chancellor, 17 December 1930, TNA: CO 831/14/3. 60. Cox to Plumer, 27 August 1928, TNA: CO 831/3/1. 61. Chancellor to Passfield, 1 March 1930, TNA: CO 831/9/5; Williams to the Treasury, 24 January 1931, TNA: CO 831/15/5.

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62. For details of the land granted to Abdullah, see Cox to Chancellor, 10 June 1930, TNA: CO 831/9/5. 63. Hopkins to CO, 19 March 1931, TNA: CO 831/14/3. 64. Wauchope to Parkinson, 6 February 1932, TNA: CO 831/18/4. 65. Parkinson to Wauchope, 26 February 1932, TNA: CO 831/18/4.

Chapter 3 Diplomacy during the Arab Revolt: The British, Abdullah and the Jewish Agency, 1931–1939 1. Porath, Yehoshua, The Palestinian Arab National Movement: From Riots to Rebellion, Vol. 2, 1929–1939 (London, 1977), p.354, n.325; Gelber, Yoav, Jewish-Transjordanian Relations, 1921–1948 (London, 1997), p.307, n.1. 2. Pratt, Lawrence, ‘The strategic context: British policy in the Mediterranean and Middle East, 1936–1939’, in U. Dann (ed), The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919–1939 (New York: 1988), pp.12–15. 3. Michaelis, Meir, ‘Italy’s Mediterranean strategy, 1935–39’, in M. J. Cohen and M. Kolinsky (eds), Britain and the Middle East in 1930s: Security Problems, 1935–39 (London, 1992), pp.48–53. 4. Kolinsky, Martin, Britain’s War in the Middle East: Strategy and Diplomacy, 1936–42 (London, 1999), pp.29–31. 5. CP 25 (36) 7 February 1936, TNA CAB 24/259; Morsy, Laila, ‘Military clauses of the Anglo-Egyptian Treaty, 1936’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 16 (1984), pp.67–97. 6. Memos by Alling, 21 October 1938 and 2 November 1938, NACP: RG 59 867n.01/1287 and 1329. 7. DP (P) 44, 20 February 1939, TNA: CAB 16/183A, pp.41–2, 68. 8. Vansittart to Eden, 19 September 1936, TNA FO 371/20025/E5967; Government of Palestine, A Survey of Palestine, Vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1946), pp.141, 185. 9. Mackereth to FO, 26 February 1934, TNA: FO 684/7/2/4. 10. Miller, Ylana N., Government and Society in Rural Palestine, 1920–1948 (Austin, Tex.: 1985), pp.121–2. 11. Bowden, Tom, ‘The politics of the Arab Rebellion in Palestine, 1936–39’, Middle Eastern Studies 11 (1985), pp.147–8. 12. Mackereth to FO, 4 April 1936, TNA: FO 684/9/58/1; memo by Parr, undated, TNA: FO 684/9/1956/2; Khoury, Philip S., Syria and the French Mandate: The Politics of Arab Nationalism, 1920–1945 (London, 1987), pp.457–64. 13. Shambrook, Peter A., French Imperialism in Syria, 1927–1936 (Reading: 1998), pp.207–28.

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14. Mattar, Philip, The Mufti of Jerusalem: Al-Hajj Amin al-Husayni and the Palestinian National Movement (New York: 1988), pp.70–2. 15. Brooke-Popham to Ellington, 27 November 1935 and 16 April 1936, LHCMA: Brooke-Popham Papers, box 4/3. 16. Townshend, Charles, ‘The defence of Palestine: Insurrection and public security’, English Historical Review 103 (1988), pp.918–9. 17. ‘Military lessons of the Arab rebellion in Palestine’, TNA: WO 191/70, pp.45–51; Thomas, Martin, Empires of Intelligence: Security Services and Colonial Disorder after 1914 (Berkeley, Calif., 2008), pp.244–8. 18. PGS 5, 27 June 1930, TNA: CAB 16/97; Palestine and Transjordan defence scheme, 1932, appendix 1, TNA: AIR 5/1250. 19. History of the disturbances in Palestine, 1938–39, TNA: WO 191/88, p.3. 20. Peake to Chancellor, 23 June 1936, RHL: Chancellor Papers, box 22/MF40; Brooke-Popham to Ellington, 20 July 1936, LHCMA: Brooke-Popham Papers, box 4/3. 21. CP 225 (36), 26 August 1936, TNA CAB 24/263 22. Minute by Sterndale-Bennett, 30 August 1936, TNA: FO 371/20023/ E5434/G. 23. Tripp, Charles, A History of Iraq (Cambridge: 2000), p.97; Porath, Yehoshua, In Search of Arab Unity, 1930–1945 (London, 1986), pp.39–41. 24. The correspondence dealing with Nuri’s intervention can be found in CP 227 (36) and CP 235 (36), 2 and 31 August 1936, TNA: CAB 24/264. 25. Meeting of ministers held at the CO, 11 September 1936, TNA: FO 371/20025/ E5779; Simon to Baldwin, 2 September 1936, TNA: PREM 1/352. 26. Sterndale-Bennett to Oliphant, 14 August 1936, TNA: FO 371/20023/ E5251/G; minute by Sterndale-Bennett, 28 August 1936, TNA: FO 371/20023/E5324. 27. Meeting of ministers, 11 September 1936, TNA: FO 371/20025/E5779. 28. Minute by Rendel, 18 June 1936, TNA: FO 371/20021/E3642; memo by Sterndale-Bennett, 22 August 1936, TNA: FO 371/20023/E5390. 29. Martin Kolinsky, Britain’s War in the Middle East: Strategy and Diplomacy, 1936–42 (London, 1999), pp.17–20; CP 165 (36), 10 June 1936, TNA: CAB 24/262. 30. CP 178 (36), 20 June 1936, TNA: CAB 24/263. 31. Calvert to Eden, 31 August 1936, TNA: FO 371/20023/E5474. 32. Lampson to Eden, 18 August 1936, TNA: FO 371/20023/E5207; Gershoni, Israel, and James P. Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930–1945 (Cambridge: 1995), pp.168–73. 33. Ormsby-Gore to Wauchope, 15 September 1936, TNA: FO 371/20025/ E5873; Transjordan situation report for October 1936, TNA: CO 831/37/1; IWM Film Archive, interview with Sir John Hackett.

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34. Military lessons of the Arab revolt in Palestine, 1936, February 1938, TNA: WO 191/70. 35. Memo by Pierce, 20 August 1936, appendix 1 in Wauchope to OrmsbyGore, 22 August 1936, TNA: CO 733/297/3/75156/pt.3 (copy in CZA: S25/22764); Dill to War Office, 30 October 1936, TNA: WO 32/9401. 36. Connell, John, Wavell: Scholar and Soldier (London, 1964), p.188. 37. Duff Cooper to Ormsby-Gore, 2 October 1936, TNA: CO 967/92. 38. CP 272 (36), 22 October 1936, TNA: CAB 24/264; CP 285 (36), 26 October 1936, TNA: CAB 24/265. 39. CP 1 (37), 1 January 1937, TNA: CAB 24/267; statement by MI2a, 22 June 1937, TNA: WO 106/1594B. 40. Minutes by Rendel and Vansittart, 9 and 11 January 1937, TNA: FO 371/20804/E173. 41. Minute by Rendel, 14 January 1937, TNA: FO 371/20804/E317. 42. Kedourie, Elie, ‘Great Britain and Palestine: The turning point’, in Islam in the Modern World and Other Studies (New York: 1980), pp.116–20; Klieman, Aaron S., ‘Bureaucratic politics at Whitehall in the partitioning of Palestine, 1937’, in U. Dann (ed), The Great Powers in the Middle East, 1919–1939 (New York: 1988), pp.149–50. 43. Memo by Rendel, 23 April 1937, TNA: FO 371/20787/E2312, esp. pp. 58–9. 44. Bullard to FO, 24 March 1937, TNA: FO 371/20804/E1685. 45. Memo by Rendel, 12 April 1937, TNA: FO 371/20806/E2202. 46. Lampson to Eden, 8 April 1937, TNA: FO 371/20806/E2158; Clark Kerr to FO, 20 June 1937, TNA: FO 371/20807/E3527. 47. Minute of 18 January 1937, TNA: FO 371/20804/E275. 48. Ogden to Eden, 21 August 1936, TNA: FO 371/20024/E5492. 49. Fry, Michael G., and Itamar Rabinovich, Despatches from Damascus: Gilbert Mackereth and British Policy in the Levant, 1933–1939 (Tel Aviv, 1985), pp.43–55. 50. Mackereth to Eden, 26 May 1937, TNA: FO 371/20807/E3054. 51. Memorandum by Cawthorn, 9 February 1938, TNA: WO 106/1594B. 52. Minute by Martin, 16 February 1938, TNA: CO 732/81/3. 53. Minute by Shuckburgh, 17 May 1938, TNA: CO 733/368/1. 54. Report of the Palestine Royal Commission, Cmd. 5479 (London, 1937), chap. 20. 55. Ibid., chap. 22; IWM Film Archive: Thames Television interview with Sir John Martin. 56. Palestine: A Statement of Policy, Cmd. 5513 (London, 1937). 57. Memo by Rendel, 23 June 1937, TNA: FO 371/20807/E3427.

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58. Mediterranean and Middle East Appreciation, 1937. Memo by the Joint Planning Sub-Committee, 26 July 1937, COS 603 (JP), TNA: CAB 53/32. 59. Clark-Kerr to FO, 10 July 1937, TNA: FO 371/20808/E3919; Mackereth to FO, 10 July 1937, TNA: FO 371/20808/E4052. 60. Bullard to FO, 14 July 1937, TNA: FO 371/20808/E4034; Lampson to FO, 21 July 1937, TNA: FO 371/20808/E4194. 61. Glubb to Cox, 25 August 1937, CZA: S25/22713; Glubb’s report on the Transjordan deserts, August 1937, TNA: CO 831/41/11. 62. Memo by Rendel, 20 July 1937, TNA: FO 371/20809/E4167; minute by Baggallay, 6 August 1937, TNA: FO 371/20810/E4458 (copy in CZA: S25/22713); memo by Vansittart, 18 August 1937, TNA: FO 371/20812/ E4812; memo by Rendel, 29 September 1937, TNA: FO 371/20815/E5726. 63. Minute by Rendel, 15 July 1937, TNA: FO 371/20808/E4297. 64. For an American appreciation of Rendel’s attitudes, see Johnson to DOS, 9 November 1937, NACP: RG 59 867n.01/969. 65. Memo by Rendel, 30 October 1937, TNA: FO 371/20818/E6410. 66. Memo by Rendel, 3 November 1937, TNA: FO 371/20819/E6470. 67. Ibid. 68. Minutes by Oliphant and Vansittart, 12 November and 13 1937, TNA: FO 371/20820/E6750. 69. Rendel to Eden, 16 November 1937, TNA: FO 371/20820/E6751; Cab. 42 (37), 17 November 1937, TNA: CAB 23/90A. 70. CP 269 (37), 9 November 1937, TNA: CAB 24/272. 71. CP 281 (37), 19 November 1937, TNA: CAB 24/273. 72. Cabinet conclusion 46 (37), 8 December 1937, TNA: CAB 23/90A. 73. Cmd. 5634. 74. The Times, 31 May 1938, pp.17–18. 75. Ormsby-Gore to Halifax, 15 March 1938, TNA: FO 800/321; Ormsby-Gore to Chamberlain, 9 January 1938, TNA: FO 371/21862/E559/G; Ormsby-Gore meeting with Woodhead, 30 March 1938, TNA: CO 733/381/1/75730. 76. MacMichael to Shuckburgh, 13 April 1938, TNA: CO 733/370/4/75156/52. 77. Shuckburgh to MacMichael, 13 April 1938, TNA: CO 733/370/4/75156/52. 78. Cohen, Michael J., Palestine, Retreat from the Mandate: The Making of British Policy, 1939–1945 (London, 1978), pp.85, 189; Kolinsky, Britain’s War, chap. 5. 79. Appreciation of the Joint Planning Staff, 21 January 1938, COS 655, TNA: CAB 53/35; Strategical Aspect of Partition, Report by the COS Subcommittee, 462-C, 14 March 1938, TNA: CAB 5/8; Palestine—Strategical aspect of partition, COS 761, 25 August 1938, TNA: CAB 53/38. 80. Carstairs to Harvey, 3 August 1938, TNA: FO 371/21880/E5027; Martin to Baggallay, 12 September 1938, TNA: FO 371/21880/E5330.

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81. Memo by Baggallay, 23 September 1938, TNA: FO 371/21864/E5603/G; IWM Film Archive: Thames Television interview with Malcolm MacDonald. 82. Note to Chamberlain, 18 October 1938, TNA: PREM 1/352; The Times, 10 November 1938, p.11. 83. The proceedings of the committee can be found in TNA: CAB 27/651. 84. Caplan, Neil, Futile Diplomacy, Vol. 2, Arab-Zionist Negotiations and the End of the Mandate (London, 1986), pp.105–13. 85. Bullard to FO, 27 November 1938, TNA: FO 371/21867/E7126; Lampson to Oliphant, 6 December 1938, TNA FO 371/21868/E7543. 86. Strategic Importance of Egypt and the Arab Countries of the Middle East. Report by COS Sub-committee, 1508-B, 14 January 1939, TNA: CAB 4/29; COS Sub-committee, minutes of the 266th meeting, 5 January 1939, TNA: CAB 53/10; Measures to influence minor powers and Arab states. Draft report, 24 January 1939, M.E. (O) 292, TNA: CAB 51/11. 87. IWM Film Archive: Thames Television interview with Malcolm MacDonald. 88. DP (P) 44, 20 February 1939, TNA: CAB 16/183A. 89. JIC 80, 6 January 1939, TNA: CAB 56/4. 90. Palestine: Statement of Policy, Cmd. 6019 (London, 1939). 91. Parliamentary Debates, House of Commons, 5th ser., Vol. 347, cols. 1937– 1954, 22 May 1939. 92. Houston Boswell to FO, 16 May 1939, TNA: FO 371/23235/E3592; Newton to Butler, 28 June 1939, TNA: FO 371/23238/E4794; MacMichael to MacDonald, 21 July 1939, TNA: FO 371/23245/E5678. 93. Transjordan situation report for May 1939, TNA: CO 831/51/8. 94. Kirkbride to MacMichael, 19 May 1939, TNA: FO 816/105. 95. Transjordan situation report for June 1939, TNA: CO 831/51/8; Wilson, Mary C., King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge, 1987), p.127. 96. Cawthorn to Eyres, 5 June 1939, TNA: FO 371/23237/E4103; memo by Baggallay, 7 September 1939, TNA: FO 371/23239/E6384. 97. Zweig, Ronald W., Britain and Palestine during the Second World War (London, 1986), pp.89–115; Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, pp.114–26. 98. Knabenshue to DOS, 15 September 1931, NACP RG 59 890i.00/10; Sloan to DOS, 14 June 1933, NACP: RG 59 890i.50/2. 99. Sloan to DOS, 15 February 1933, NACP: RG 59 890i.00/15. 100. Report by Shapira, 15 February 1932, CZA: S25/3489. 101. Avineri, Shlomo, Arlosoroff (London, 1989) pp.71, 74. 102. Parkinson to Wauchope, 26 February 1932, TNA: CO 831/18/4.

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103. News from ‘Gad’, 29 July 1932, CZA: A123/549. 104. The Letters and Papers of Chaim Weizmann, series A: Letters (Jerusalem, 1983), Vol. 15, pp.309–15. 105. Shertok meeting with Mithqal Pasha al-Faiz, 18 August 1932, CZA: S25/3491. 106. JAE meeting, 28 September 1932, CZA: S100; Arlosoroff to the JAE, 6 December 1932, CZA: S25/3492. 107. Memo by Silberman, ‘Transjordan affair’, undated, CZA: A123/87; Shapira, Anita, ‘The option on Ghaur al-Kibd: Contacts between the Emir Abdullah and the Zionist executive, 1932–1935’, Zionism 2 (Autumn 1980), pp.245–9; Shlaim, Avi, Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford, 1988), pp.50–2. 108. JNF memo, 1 February 1933, CZA: KKL 5/5841; unsigned statement by the Jewish Agency on Transjordan, 7 February 1933, CZA: S25/3494. 109. A copy of the agreement can be found in CZA: K3/16. 110. Neumann and Farbstein meeting with Abdullah at Shuna, 27 November 1932, CZA: S25/3487. 111. Cox to Wauchope, 12 and 13 January 1933, TNA: CO 831/21/8/pt. 1. 112. Weizmann Letters, Vol. 15, pp.309–15. 113. Report by Cohen, 18 January 1937, CZA: S25/3642. 114. During a similar time frame al-Unsi took receipt of £800, handwritten notes by Cohen, August 1938, CZA: S25/3513. 115. Shertok to Brodetsky, 7 June 1934, CZA: S25/3515. 116. Gelber, Jewish-Transjordanian Relations, pp.93, 112. 117. Wilson, Mary C., King Abdullah, p.114. 118. Sloan to DOS, 3 February 1933, NACP: RG 59 890i.001/4. 119. Weizmann Letters, Vol. 15, pp.386–7; Weizmann meeting with CunliffeLister, 7 March 1933, CZA: S25/795. 120. Arlosoroff meeting with Wauchope, 20 January 1933, CZA: A44/37. 121. Cox to Wauchope, 12 and 18 January 1933, TNA: CO 831/21/8/pt. 1. 122. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 27 January 1933, TNA: CO 831/21/8/pt. 1. 123. Wauchope to Parkinson, 14 April 1933, TNA: CO 831/21/3/pt. 2; Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 29 July 1933, TNA: CO 831/21/10. 124. Rendel to Oliphant, 7 March 1933, TNA: FO 371/16926/E1163. 125. Translations of the Palestine Arabic press, CZA: S25/5684. 126. Palestine Police intelligence summaries, 28 January 1933 and 24 February 1933, TNA: FO 371/16926/E919 and E1369. 127. Transjordan situation report for April 1933, TNA: CO 831/23/11. 128. Transjordan situation report for February 1933, TNA: CO 831/23/11. 129. Note of a conversation between Humphrys and Faisal, 13 July 1933, TNA: FO 371/16855/E6221.

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130. Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, pp.4–18. 131. Reports on the Transjordan deserts for July and August 1933, TNA: FO 371/16861/E5127 and E5518. 132. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, pp.338–9. 133. Report on the Transjordan deserts, October 1933, TNA: FO 371/16861/ E7512. 134. Kirkbride to Jerusalem, 26 September 1933, TNA: CO 732/57/11/18133; Damascus quarterly report, October–December 1934, TNA: FO 684/8/58/1. 135. Wilson, Mary C., King Abdullah, p.115. 136. Memo by Rendel, 13 June 1933, TNA: FO 371/16855/E3119. 137. Memo by Rendel, 12 April 1937, TNA: FO 371/20806/E2202. 138. Note by Cox, 4 April 1935, CZA: S25/22774. 139. Shertok meeting with Wauchope, 12 January 1935, TNA: CO 831/31/8. 140. Cohen meeting with al-Unsi, 5 March 1934, CZA: S25/3486; Shertok visit to Amman, 24 April 1934, CZA: S25/3515. 141. Shertok to Brodetsky, 7 June 1934, CZA: S25/3515. 142. Wauchope to Cunliffe-Lister, 12 April 1934, TNA: CO 831/27/13. 143. Cox to Wauchope, 13 September 1934, TNA: CO 831/26/2. 144. Shertok meeting with Wauchope, 23 August 1934, TNA: CO 831/26/2. 145. Report by Cohen, 3 January 1935 (misdated on report), CZA: S25/3485. 146. JAE meetings, 27 January 1935 and 3 February 1935, CZA: S100. 147. Exchange of correspondence between Abdullah and Shertok, 30 April 1936, CZA: S25/3243. 148. Cohen meeting with al-Unsi, 5 July 1936, CZA: S25/10093. 149. Sasson meeting with al-Unsi, 21 June 1936, CZA: S25/3435. 150. Sharett (Shertok), Moshe, Yoman Medini [Making of Policy: The Diaries of Moshe Sharett], Vol. 1 (Tel Aviv, 1968), pp.131–2. 151. Shlaim, Collusion, p.56. 152. Williams to Maffey, 17 September 1935, TNA: CO 733/271/75054/pt.1. 153. ‘Note on the reaction in Transjordan in event of a European war’, 19 September 1935, TNA: FO 371/20032/E1472/G (copy in CZA: S25/22774). 154. MacDonald, Callum A., ‘Radio Bari: Italian wireless propaganda in the Middle East and British countermeasures, 1934–38’, Middle Eastern Studies 13 (1977), pp.195–207. 155. Peirse to Air Ministry, 10 July 1936, TNA: AIR 2/1840. 156. Cox to Chancellor, 16 June 1936, RHL: Chancellor Papers, box 17/4. 157. Cohen to Shertok and Ben-Zvi, 18 May 1936, CZA: S25/22233; Shertok’s report to the Executive, 7 June 1936, CZA: Z4/10318/I. 158. Porath, Palestinian Arab National Movement, p.74.

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159. Sasson talk with Raghib Bey al-Nashashibi, 8 December 1935, CZA: S25/3051. 160. Abdullah to Wauchope, 22 February 1936, TNA: FO 371/20065/E2146. 161. Cox to Wauchope, 26 March 1936, TNA: FO 371/20065/E2871; intelligence report for March 1936, 31 March 1936, TNA: FO 371/20030/E2054. 162. Report by Sasson, 18 March 1936, HA: Shai files 8/35/454. 163. Sasson’s reports of 23 March 1936, CZA: S25/3139, and 30 March 1936, CZA: S25/5578; Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, pp.24–5. 164. Transjordan situation report for April 1936, TNA: CO 831/37/1. 165. Nevo, Joseph, King Abdullah and Palestine: A Territorial Ambition (London, 1996), p.33. 166. Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore, 7 June 1936, TNA: CO 733/297/2/75156/pt. 2 (copy in CZA: S25/22725); appendix 2 in Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore, 22 August 1936, TNA: CO 733/297/3/75156/pt.3 (copy in CZA: S25/22764). 167. Peirse to the Air Ministry, 17 November 36, TNA: WO 32/4177. 168. Weekly summaries of intelligence, 7 August 1936 and 11 September 1936, TNA: FO 371/20030/E5255 and E5996. 169. Mattar, Mufti, p.79. 170. Peirse to Wauchope, 20 August 1936, TNA: AIR 2/1840; weekly summary of intelligence, 28 August 1936, TNA: FO 371/20030/E5688 (copy in CZA: S25/22741). 171. Transjordan situation report for August 1936, TNA: CO 831/37/1 (copy in CZA: S25/22779); Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore, 12 September 1936, TNA: CO 831/37/1 (copy in CZA S25/22725). 172. Shertok to Wauchope, 30 August 1936, CZA: S25/4169. 173. Weizmann/Ben-Gurion meeting at the CO, 31 August 1936, TNA: CO 733/297/3/75156/pt.3; Weizmann Letters, Vol. 17, p.328. 174. Gelber, Yoav, Shorshe ha-havatselet: Ha-modi’in ba-Yishuv, 1918–1947 I [Growing a Fleur-de-Lis: The Intelligence Services of the Yishuv, 1918– 1947] (Tel Aviv, 1992), p.3. 175. Ben-Gurion, David, My Talks with Arab Leaders (Jerusalem, 1972), pp.104–20; Ben-Gurion, Zikhronot, Vol. 3 [Memoirs] (Tel Aviv, 1973), pp.493–505. 176. MacMichael to MacDonald, 10 September 1938, TNA: CO 733/368/8. 177. SIS reports of 20 February 1937 and 22 July 1937, TNA FO 850/Y775/G and Y832/G. Dashwood to Eden, 31 March 1943, TNA FO 850/74A/ Y2071/G. 178. Transjordan situation report for January 1937, TNA: CO 831/41/8. 179. Hathorn Hall to Ormsby-Gore, 4 March 1937, TNA: CO 733/344/11. 180. Memo by Cohen, ‘Between the Political Department and the Amir’s palace’, 16 February 1937, CZA: S25/3642; cf. Abu Nowar, Ma’an, The History

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of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, Vol. 2, The Development of Trans-Jordan, 1929–1939 (Amman, 1997), pp.277–82. 181. Hacohen/Hoz meeting with Abdullah, 15 May 1937, CZA: S25/3485. 182. Sharett, Yoman, Vol. 2, pp.150–1; Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, Vol. 2, pp.66–7. 183. Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore, 22 May 1937, TNA: CO 831/44/13. 184. CP 144 (37), 27 May 1937, TNA: CAB 24/269. 185. CP 127 (37), 30 April 1937, TNA: CAB 24/269. 186. Memo by Kirkbride, 17 July 1937, in Wauchope to Ormsby-Gore, 22 July 1937, TNA: CO 733/351/4/75718/2; Iraqi consul, Jerusalem to Baghdad, 20 September 1937, CZA: S25/3644. 187. Transjordan situation reports for July, August and October 1937, TNA: CO 831/41/11. 188. Abu Nowar, History, Vol. 2, pp.153–4. 189. Monthly report on the Transjordan deserts for August 1937, TNA: CO 831/41/11; Wilson, Mary C., King Abdullah, p.123. 190. Ormsby-Gore to Eden, 2 July 1937, TNA: FO 371/20808/E3906. 191. Ormsby-Gore to MacMichael, 15 December 1937, MEC: MacMichael Papers. 192. Reports by Cohen, 26 January 1938 and 16 March 1938, CZA: S25/22189. 193. Reports by Cohen, 2 and 18 August 1938, CZA: S25/22189. 194. Cohen meeting with al-Unsi, 29 April 1938, CZA: S25/22189. 195. Transjordan situation report for May 1938, TNA: CO 831/46/6; Cohen’s memo ‘Between the Political Department and the palace’, May 1938, CZA: S25/22189; Abdullah Ibn Husayn, My Memoirs Completed ‘Al Takmilah,’ translated by Harold W. Glidden (London, 1978), pp.89–90. 196. MacMichael to MacDonald, 11 June 1938, TNA: CO 733/381/8/75730/17. 197. Wadsworth to DOS, 27 June 1938, NACP: RG 59 867n.01/1108. 198. Peake to Reid, 23 June 1938, IWM: Peake Papers, DS/MISC/16/reel 2. 199. Dill to Wauchope, 15 June 1937, TNA: WO 282/2; MI2a estimate, 22 June 1937, TNA: WO 106/1594/B. 200. Battershill to Shuckburgh, 21 November 1937, RHL: Battershill Papers, box 10/3. 201. CP 232 (37), 8 October 1937, TNA: CAB 24/271. 202. Transjordan situation report for August 1937, TNA: CO 831/41/8. 203. Kirkbride, ‘A political forecast for Transjordan in regard to external affairs’, December 1936, CZA: S25/22799; Wauchope to Cox, 5 January 1937, CZA: S25/22778. 204. Report by Joseph and Sasson of a meeting with al-Unsi, 5 August 1937, CZA: S25/5171.

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205. MacMichael to MacDonald, 29 July 1937, TNA: FO 371/21879/E4568; Elpeleg, Zvi, The Grand Mufti: Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement (London, 1993), p.49. 206. Mackereth to Wauchope, 24 December 1937, TNA: FO 371/21872/E10; Mackereth to Eden, 7 January 1937, TNA: FO 371/21872/E279. 207. Amery to Halifax, 5 October 1940, TNA: FO 371/24568/E2762/G and minute by Baxter rejecting these proposals, 18 November 1940, TNA: FO 371/24568/E2900/G. 208. Mackereth to Eden, 15 September 1937, TNA: FO 371/20814/E5515; Glubb to Cox, 17 September 1937, CZA: S25/22778. 209. Kedourie, Elie, ‘The Bludan Congress on Palestine, September 1937’, Middle Eastern Studies 17 (1981), p.107. 210. Mackereth to Havard, 17 September 1937, TNA: FO 371/20814/E5602; Transjordan situation report for September 1937, TNA: CO 831/41/8. 211. Mackereth to FO, 11 September 1937, TNA: FO 371/20813/E5319 (copy in CZA: S25/22713); Mackereth to Eden, 15 September 1937, TNA: FO 371/20814/E5515. 212. Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, pp.27–8. 213. Mackereth to FO, 30 December 1938, TNA: FO 371/23276/E18. 214. MacMichael to MacDonald, enclosing a letter from Cox dated 30 August 1938, TNA: CO 733/369/12/75156/41. 215. MacMichael to MacDonald, 2 September 1938, TNA: FO 371/21881/ E5677 (copy in CZA: S25/22777); Cox to MacMichael, 30 September 1938, TNA: FO 371/21881/5677. 216. Minute of 4 October 1938, TNA: FO 371/21881/5677. 217. Shertok to Lourie, 27 May 1938, CZA: S25/5171. 218. Memo submitted to the Partition Commission by the JAE, 23 May 1938, CZA: A185/7. 219. Memo submitted to the Partition Commission by the JAE, 7 June 1938, CZA: Z4/4114. 220. The Palestine Partition (Woodhead) Report, Cmd. 5854 (London, 1938), p.113. 221. The Times, 3 June 1939, p.11. 222. MacMichael to MacDonald, 19 November 1938, TNA: FO 371/21866/ E6957. 223. MacMichael to MacDonald, 17 November 1938, TNA: FO 371/23247/ E646. 224. Abdul Huda to MacDonald, 13 February 1939, TNA: CO 831/54/3. 225. MacDonald to MacMichael, 18 March 1939, TNA: CO 831/54/3. 226. MacMichael to MacDonald, 21 February 1939, TNA: CO 831/54/3.

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227. Minutes by Eyres and Baggallay, 28 January and 8 February 1939, TNA: FO 371/23247/E646. 228. Luke to Oliphant, 8 February 1939, TNA: FO 371/23247/E1030. 229. Abul Huda meetings with MacDonald, 16 and 19 January 1939, TNA: CO 831/50/18; note of an informal discussion with Abul Huda, 21 February 1939, TNA: FO 371/23225/E1464. 230. Sixth meeting with the Arab delegations, 15 February 1939, TNA: FO 371/23224/E1220. 231. Abul Huda meeting with MacDonald, 13 March 1939, TNA: CO 831/53/7. 232. MacMichael to MacDonald, 20 January 1940 enclosing memoranda by the AOC Palestine and Glubb, TNA: CO 831/67/7. 233. MacMichael to MacDonald, 13 January 1939, TNA: CO 831/53/8. 234. Husayn Ibn Talal, King of Jordan, 1953–1999. 235. MacMichael to MacDonald, 20 March 1939, TNA: CO 831/54/3. 236. Kirkbride to MacMichael, 10 June 1939, TNA: CO 831/51/10. 237. Transjordan situation reports, May–July 1939, TNA: CO 831/51/8; Glubb’s desert reports, May–July 1939, TNA: CO 831/51/10. 238. Mackereth to Baxter, 12 June 1939, TNA: FO 371/23277/E4400. 239. Kirkbride to MacMichael, 10 June 1939, TNA: FO 371/23280/E4826; Transjordan situation report for June 1939, TNA: CO 831/51/8. 240. Glubb’s desert report for May 1939, TNA: CO 831/51/10; Kirkbride to MacMichael, 10 June 1939, TNA: CO 831/51/10. 241. Kirkbride to MacMichael, 10 June 1939, TNA: FO 371/23280/E4826. 242. MacDonald to MacMichael, 7 October 1939, TNA: FO 371/23281/ E6880. 243. Khoury, Syria and the French Mandate, p.586. 244. Bullard to FO, 15 April 1939, TNA: FO 371/23276/E2803. 245. Mackereth to Baxter, 25 July 1939, TNA: FO 371/23281/E5493. 246. MacMichael to MacDonald, 12 August 1939, enclosing a letter from Kirkbride, 8 August 1939, TNA: CO 733/410/4. Details of Nuri’s federation plans can be found in Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, p.39–48. 247. MacMichael to MacDonald, 11 July 1939 and 12 August 1939, TNA: CO 733/410/4. 248. MacMichael to Parkinson, 6 April 1939, TNA: FO 371/23276/E3092. 249. Zamir, Meir, Lebanon’s Quest: The Road to Statehood, 1926–1939 (London, 2000), p.221. 250. Minute by Baggallay, 28 October 1939, TNA: FO 371/23281/E7087. 251. Memo on Arab federation, 29 September 1939, TNA: FO 371/23239/E6357; Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, pp.238–40.

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252. Tod to Baggallay, 1 November 1939, TNA: FO 371/23195/E7314; Mackereth to Baggallay, 15 November 1939, TNA: FO 371/23195/E7749; memo by Downie, 12 December 1941, TNA: CO 732/87.

Chapter 4

The Complexity of Decolonisation: The End of the Mandate, 1944–1947

1. See Dann, Uriel, Studies in the History of Transjordan, 1920–1949: The Making of a State (Boulder, Colo.: Westview, 1984), pp.117–18. 2. Kirkbride to MacMichael, 20 July 1942, TNA CO 831/59/16. 3. Tripp, Charles, A History of Iraq (Cambridge, 2007), pp.100–102. Ilan Pappé, The Rise and Fall of a Palestinian Dynasty. The Husaynis 1700-1948 (London, 2010), pp.304-309. 4. For background details of the operation, see ‘The Iraq campaign’, no date, TNA: WO 201/1255. 5. Glubb’s official account, written in June 1941, can be found in TNA: FO 371/27078/E4209. See also Glubb, John Bagot, The Story of the Arab Legion (London, 1948), pp.279–94 and 309–45. 6. Glubb’s account was written in October 1941, TNA: FO 371/27318/E7938. See also Royle, Trevor, Glubb Pasha: The Life and Times of Sir John Bagot Glubb, Commander of the Arab Legion (London, 1992), pp.247–86. 7. This was reflected in the increased cost of the Arab Legion, from £225,302 in 1939 to £1.85 million in 1945. See a minute by Reid, 26 February 1946, S. 21404.3, TNA: T 161/1220. 8. Seymour to Shuckburgh, TNA: FO 371/27137/E3407/G; minute by Eyres, 5 July 1941, TNA: FO 371/27137/E4239; M.E. (O) (41) 4, 2 August 1941, TNA: CAB 95/1; M.E. (O) (41) 4th meeting, 6 August 1941, TNA: CAB 95/1. 9. Correspondence between MacMichael and Lloyd, 6 and 10 July 1941, TNA: CO 831/59/11. 10. Minutes of meeting held during MacMichael’s visit to London, 24 April 1942, TNA: CO 831/58/1. 11. MacMichael to Cranborne, 17 June 1941, TNA: CO 831/58/1. 12. M.E. (O) (42) 2nd meeting, 17 April 1942, TNA: CAB 95/1. 13. Kirkbride to MacMichael, 20 July 1942, TNA: CO 831/59/16. 14. MacMichael to Cranborne, 23 November 1942, TNA: CO 831/59/12. 15. ‘Our Arab policy’, WP (41) 116, 27 May 1941, TNA: CAB 66/19/39. 16. Policy on Transjordan, 2 August 1941, ME (O) (41), TNA: CAB 95/1. See detailed minutes in TNA: CO 831/59/11. 17. Abdullah to Churchill, 30 November 1942, TNA: PREM 4/43A/7; Edmonds to Martin, 28 December 1942, TNA: CO 831/59/12. 18. Minute by Eyres, 31 December 1942, TNA: FO 371/31338/E7578.

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19. Shaw to Stanley, 24 April 1944, TNA: PREM 4/43A/7; Cornwallis to FO, 11 April 1944, TNA: FO 371/39987/E2244. 20. Abdullah to Churchill, 22 February 1944 and 28 August 1944, TNA: PREM 4/43A/7. 21. Churchill to Abdullah, 7 June 1944, TNA: PREM 4/43A/7. 22. Pinkerton to DOS, 29 June 1944, NACP: RG 59 867n.00/2944. 23. Correspondence between MacMichael and Stanley, 12 July 1941 and 26 August 1941, TNA: CO 831/59/11; MacMichael to Stanley, 26 February 1943, TNA: CO 732/87/8. 24. Gort to Hall 18 October 1945, TNA: FO 371/45394/E8459. 25. Memo by Glubb 29, April 1945, TNA: WO 32/11417. 26. Martin to Howe, 10 September 1945, TNA: FO 371/45415/E6792; Hall to Attlee, 26 October 1945, TNA: FO 371/45394/E8459. 27. Wilson, Mary C., King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge, 1988), pp.148–9. 28. Cunningham to Hall, 26 December 1945, TNA: FO 371/5605/E937. 29. Gutch to Kirkbride, 4 December 1945, TNA: FO 816/22. 30. Martin to Jacob, 29 January 1946, TNA: CO 537/1460. 31. JP (46) 27 (Final), 18 February 1946, TNA: CAB 84/78; memo by Kirkbride, 13 March 1946, TNA: FO 371/61497/E2346/G. 32. CP (46) 112, 14 March 1946, TNA: CAB 129/8. 33. Cabinet Office to Commanders in Chief, Middle East, 23 March 1946, COS (ME) 64, TNA: FO 371/56605/E3411/G. 34. Gort to Stanley, 23 May 1945, TNA: CO 537/1499. 35. Report on the Arab Legion, 28 May 1945, no. 166729, NACP: RG 319, Army Intelligence document file, entry 85, box 1076. 36. D’Arcy to GHQ Middle East, 1 March 1946, TNA: CO 537/1499. 37. Minute by Reid, 26 February 1946, s 21404/3, TNA: T 161/1220. 38. Petch to Charlton, 14 August 1946, s 21404/3, TNA: T 161/1220. 39. Cunningham to Hall, 8 June 1946, TNA: FO 371/52930/E6157/G. 40. Minute by Baxter, 28 August 1946, TNA: FO 371/52931/E8704. 41. Minute by Winnifrith, 28 March 1946, s 21404/4, TNA: T 161/1220. 42. Memo by Kirkbride, 4 June 1946, TNA: CO 537/1499; minute by Furlonge, 11 October 1946, TNA: FO 371/52932/E10046. 43. Kirkbride to Wikeley, 5 September 1946, TNA: FO 371/52931/E9474 44. Cunningham to Hall, 18 June 1946, TNA: FO 371/52935/E6403. 45. Baxter to Sargent, 2 March 1946, TNA: FO 371/52573/E2307/G; Hall to Cunningham, 31 March 1946, TNA: CO 537/1849. 46. Abu Nowar, Ma’an, The Struggle for Independence, 1939–1947: A History of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan (Reading, 2001), p.193; Transjordan situation report for April 1946, TNA: CO 537/1840.

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47. Minute by Baxter, 6 March 1946, TNA: FO 371/52573/E2307/G. 48. Clayton to Smart, 28 May 1946, TNA: FO 141/1098/1040/2/46; Louis, William Roger, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, The United States and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford, 1984), pp.358–9. 49. Pundik, Ron, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Relations between Great Britain and Jordan, 1946–1951 (Oxford, 1994), p.46. 50. Linton to the FO, 22 January 1946, CZA: S25/3505; Linton to the CO, 14 March 1946, CZA: Z4/20279. 51. Minute by Bennett, 23 March 1946, TNA: CO 537/1848. 52. Strategic Services Unit, War Department, A68872, 1 May 1946, NACP: RG 226, OSS Microfilm 1656. 53. FO to Amman, 7 August 1947, TNA: FO 816/110. 54. Dann, Studies, pp.93–116. 55. Silver and Wise to Truman, 25 January 1946, CZA: S25/3505; minutes by Walker and Beeley, 17 December 1948, TNA: FO 371/68822/E15853. 56. Cunningham to Kirkbride, 22 April 1946, TNA: FO 816/109. 57. Kirkbride, Sir Alec, From the Wings: Amman Memoirs 1947–1951 (London, 1976), p. 11. 58. Kirkbride to Burrows, 16 February 1948, TNA: FO 371/68819/E2832/G. 59. Darwin, John, ‘Decolonization and the End of Empire’, in R. W. Winks (ed.) The Oxford History of the British Empire. Volume V: Historiography (Oxford, 1999), pp. 542–544. 60. Darwin, John, Britain and Decolonisation: The Retreat from Empire in the Postwar World (London, 1988), p.69. 61. Lewis, Julian, Changing Direction: British Military Planning for Post-war Strategic Defence, 1942–1947 (London, 1988), pp.55–177. 62. ‘The security of the British Empire’: Report by PHP for COS, 29 June 1945, PHP (45) (O) (Final), TNA: CAB 81/46. 63. Memo by Beeley, 4 March 1943, TNA: FO 371/34956/E1635; memo by Eden, 15 July 1943, TNA: FO 371/34975/E4264/G; Halifax to FO, 9 January 1944, TNA: PREM 4/52/5. 64. ‘Stocktaking after VE-Day’, 11 July 1945, TNA: FO 371/50912/U5471. 65. Adamthwaite, Anthony, ‘Britain and the world, 1945–9: The view from the Foreign Office’, International Affairs 61 (1985), pp.226–7. 66. JP (46) 82, 17 April 1946, TNA: CAB 84/80; JIC (46) 64 (Final), 6 July 1946, TNA: CAB 81/133; Louis, British Empire, pp.53–102. 67. Stanley to Churchill, 13 July 1945, TNA: CO 733/463/8. 68. DO (46) 67, 25 May 1946, TNA: CAB 131/1; DO (46) 80, 18 June 1946, TNA: CAB 131/2.

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69. DO (46) 45, 28 March 1946, TNA: CAB 131/2; Army Council Secretariat brief for the Secretary of State, 11 July 1946, TNA: WO 32/10260. 70. CP (45) 130, 28 August 1945, TNA: CAB 129/1. 71. ME (O) (45) 2, 18 October 1945, TNA: CAB 134/499; Kingston, Paul W.T., Britain and the Politics of Modernization in the Middle East, 1945–1958 (Cambridge, 1996), pp.10–11. 72. JP (46) 100, 23 May 1946, TNA: CAB 84/81. 73. CP (45) 144, 1 September 1945, TNA: CAB 129/1; DO (46) 27, 2 March 1946, TNA: CAB 131/2. 74. Aldrich, Richard J., and John Zametica, ‘The rise and decline of a strategic concept: The Middle East, 1945–51’, in R. J. Aldrich (ed), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945–1951 (London, 1992), pp.239–45. 75. Attlee to COS, 31 May 1946, TNA: PREM 8/473/D15/46. 76. Note by Henderson, 28 December 1946, TNA: FO 800/475/ME/46/25. 77. Dalton to Attlee, 11 August 1947, TNA: PREM 8/623. 78. DO (46) 47, 2 April 1946, TNA: CAB 131/2; DO 10 (46), 5 April 1946, TNA CAB 131/1. 79. Bevin’s memo of 13 March 1946, DO (46) 40, TNA CAB 131/2. 80. Attlee to Bevin, 5 January 1947, TNA: PREM 8/473/M15/47; Bevin to Attlee, 9 January 1947, TNA: FO 800/476/PM47/8. 81. Strang to Elisabeth Monroe, 22 October 1959, MEC: Monroe Papers. 82. Ball, Simon J., ‘Bomber bases and British strategy in the Middle East, 1945– 1949’, Journal of Strategic Studies 14 (1991), pp.515–22. 83. COS (47) 6th meeting, 7 January 1947, TNA: DEFE 32/1. 84. Aldrich, Richard J. (ed), British Intelligence, Strategy and the Cold War, 1945– 1951 (London, 1992), p.143. 85. DO (47) 44, 22 May 1947, TNA: CAB 21/1800. 86. Middle East Defence: Military Requirements in Egypt, 6 August 1947, JP (47) (Final) TNA: DEFE 6/3; Middle East: Brief for Discussions, 2 October 1947, COS (47) 209 (O) (Revise), TNA: DEFE 5/6. 87. Annex 1 in JP (46) 100 (Final), 23 May 1946, TNA: CAB 84/81; Cohen, Michael J., Fighting World War Three from the Middle East: Allied Contingency Plans, 1945–1954 (London, 1997), pp.95–6. 88. Louis, British Empire, pp.226–64. 89. Palestine: Strategic Requirements, 5 January 1947, JP (47) 1 (Final), TNA: DEFE 6/1; CM 6 (47), 15 January 1947, confidential annex, TNA: CAB 128/11. 90. Minute by Beeley, 12 August 1947, TNA: FO 371/61948/E7622. 91. Bullock, Alan, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951 (New York, 1983). 92. Harris, Kenneth, Attlee (London, 1983), p.388.

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93. Churchill to Ismay, 28 January 1945, TNA: PREM 3/29/6/M679/45; Churchill to Stanley and COS, 6 July 1945, TNA CO: 733/463/8/75872. 94. Louis, British Empire, p.105. 95. Creech Jones to Monroe, 23 October 1961, RHL: Creech Jones Papers, box 32/6. 96. FO memos 6 and 9 September 1945, TNA: FO 371/45379/E6954/G and E6955/G. 97. P (M) (45) 11, 1 September 1945, TNA: CAB 95/14. 98. Halifax to Bevin, 3 October 1945, TNA: FO 371/45380/E7599/G; Bevin to Halifax, 12 October 1945, TNA: FO 371/45381/E7757/G. 99. Granada Television interview with Sir Harold Beeley, 7 September 1983, RHL: Mss Brit. Emp. s. 527/10. 100. Report of the Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, Cmd. 6808 (London, 1946). 101. Heller, Joseph, ‘The Anglo-American Committee of Inquiry on Palestine (1945–1946): The Zionist reaction reconsidered’, in J. Reinharz and A. Shapira (eds), Essential Papers on Zionism (London, 1996), pp.718–19. 102. Memorandum comparing the treatment of the Arabs and Jews, in Cunningham to Creech Jones, 19 June 1947, MEC: Cunningham Papers, box II/1. 103. Walton, Calder, ‘British intelligence and the Mandate of Palestine: Threats to British national security immediately after the Second World War’, Intelligence and National Security 23 (2008), pp.435–62; Andrew, Christopher, The Defence of the Realm: The Authorized History of MI5 (London, 2009), pp.352–65. 104. JIC (47) 33rd meeting, confidential annex, 4 June 1947, TNA: CAB 159/1. For a detailed account of these limitations, see Charters, David A., The British Army and Jewish Insurgency in Palestine, 1945–1947 (London, 1989), pp.138–41. 105. Creech Jones to Bevin, 31 December 1946, TNA: FO 371/61762/E153. 106. CP (47) 259, 13 February 1947, TNA: CAB 129/17. 107. CM 22 (47), 14 February 1947, TNA: CAB 128/9. 108. JP (47) (Final), 6 January 1947, TNA: DEFE 6/1; COS (47) 4th meeting, 6 January 1947, TNA: DEFE 4/1; COS (47) 6th meeting, 7 January 1947, TNA: DEFE 32/1. 109. COS (47) 21st meeting, 6 February 1947, TNA: DEFE 4/1; Brook to Attlee, 21 January 1947, TNA: PREM 8/627/pt. 6. 110. Memo drafted by Beeley, 23 May 1947, TNA: 371/61780/E5047. 111. Cohen, Michael J., Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945–1948 (Princeton, N.J., 1982), pp.267. 112. Memo by Wright, 21 August 1947, TNA: FO 371/61557/E8411/G. 113. Dalton to Attlee, 11 August 1947, TNA: PREM 8/623.

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114. Louis, British Empire, p.472. 115. For further details see Cohen, Michael J., Palestine and the Great Powers, pp.292–300. 116. Louis Jones to Merriam, 6 January 1948, NACP: RG 59, lot file 45D403, NEA records, subject file, 1920–1952, box 10. 117. CM (47) 76, 20 August 1947, TNA: CAB 128/10; Harris, Attlee, p.397. 118. JP (47) 131 (Final), 19 September 1947, TNA: DEFE 6/3; JP (47) 135 (Final) 20 October 1947, TNA: DEFE 6/4; OCP (47) 3, 30 October 1947, TNA: CAB 134/526. 119. DO (47) 23rd meeting, 7 November 1947, TNA: CAB 131/5; COS (47) 138th meeting, 10 November 1947, TNA: DEFE 4/8. 120. Interview with General Gordon Macmillan, Georgetown University Library, Larry Collins Papers (hereafter LCP), box 2/16. 121. ‘The consequences of the partition of Palestine’, 28 November 1947, NACP: RG 263, Estimates of the Office of Research Evaluation, box 1. 122. The diary of Sir Henry Gurney, the last Chief Secretary of the Palestine government, provides a vivid account of the final months of the mandate, MEC: Gurney Papers. 123. Shlaim, Avi, Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford, 1988), pp.100–104. 124. Meeting at the Foreign Office, 6 September 1945, TNA: FO 371/45379/ E6954/G. 125. Memo by Howe, 5 September 1945, TNA: FO 371/45379/E6562. 126. TNA: FO 371/45379/E6955/G. 127. Glubb to Montgomery, 13 July 1946, TNA: WO 216/207. 128. ‘A further note on partition as a solution to the Palestine question’, 6 December 1946, MEC: Glubb Papers, box 210; Glubb to Beeley, 14 December 1946, TNA: FO 371/61858/E115. 129. ‘A note on the exact siting of the frontier in event of the adoption of partition’, in Kirkbride to Baxter, 17 January 1947, TNA: FO 371/61858/ E940. 130. Minutes by Reilly, 30 August 1946, and Martin, 20 January 1947, TNA: CO 537/1856. 131. Minute by Beeley, 20 December 1946, TNA: FO 371/52567/E12254; Beeley to Glubb, 1 February 1947, TNA: FO 371/61858/E940. 132. Pirie-Gordon to Bevin, 30 July 1947, TNA: FO 371/61876/E7242. 133. Kirkbride to FO, 29 October 1947, TNA: FO 371/61584/E11734/G. 134. Kirkbride to FO, 17 November 1947 TNA: FO 371/61584, no. 342, E11734/G. 135. Sargent to Kirkbride, 22 December 1947, TNA: FO 371/61584/E11734/G. 136. Beeley to Bromley, 20 February 1948, TNA: FO 371/68403/E1877.

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137. A detailed account of the motives of the Arab states can be found in Killearn to Eden, 23 March 1945, TNA: FO 371/45237/E2091. 138. Doran, Michael, Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question (New York, 1999), p.6. 139. ‘Background, development and prospects of the Arab League’, 1 July 1946, NACP: RG 59, lot 78D440, NEA subject file, 1942–53, box 2; Porath, Yehoshua, In Search of Arab Unity, 1930–1945 (London, 1986), pp.248–50. 140. Thornhill, Michael, ‘Britain and the politics of the Arab League, 1943– 1950’, in M. J. Cohen and M. Kolinsky (eds), Demise of the British Empire in the Middle East: Britain’s Responses to Nationalist Movements, 1943–1955 (London, 1998), p.42. 141. Porath, In Search of Arab Unity, p.312; Seale, Patrick, The Struggle for Syria: A Study in Post-war Arab Politics, 1945–1958 (London, 1986), p.22. 142. Killearn to Eden, 23 March 1945, TNA: FO 141/1011/pt.1/32/111/45; Louis, British Empire, pp.128–9. 143. Minute by Lascellas, 5 May 1947, TNA: FO 371/61524/E4697. 144. Gershoni, Israel, and James P. Jankowski, Redefining the Egyptian Nation, 1930–1945 (Cambridge, 1995), pp.196–208. 145. Conversation between Sir Edward Grigg and Abdullah, 26 February 1945, TNA: CO 733/462/12. 146. Gort to Stanley, 20 April 1945, TNA: FO 141/1011/pt.1/32/133/45. 147. The attitudes of the Eastern Department were clearly stated in minutes on TNA: FO 371/45237/E2091. 148. Abdullah Ibn Husayn, Memoirs of King Abdullah of Transjordan, edited by P. P. Graves with an introduction by R. J. C. Broadhurst (London, 1950); Nevo, Joseph, ‘Abdullah’s memoirs as historical source material’, in A. Susser and A. Shmuelevitz (eds), The Hashemites in the Modern Arab World: Essays in Honour of the Late Professor Uriel Dann (London, 1995), p.170. 149. Minute by Baxter, 20 February 1947, TNA: FO 371/52597/E1661; GraffteySmith to FO, 6 March 1947, TNA: FO 371/52597/E4539. 150. Martin to Howe, 14 March 1946, TNA: FO 371/52574/E2418; minute by Henderson, 14 March 1946, TNA: FO 371/52425/E926. 151. Minute by Baxter, 21 March 1946, TNA: FO 371/52572/E1418/G. 152. Minute by Smart, 21 January 1947, TNA: FO 371/62197/E1219. 153. Campbell to FO, 12 March 1947, TNA: FO 371/62967/J1178. 154. Kirkbride to Bevin, 15 April 1947, TNA: FO 371/61681/E3402. 155. Kirkbride to Baxter, 7 May 1947, TNA: FO 816/25. 156. Busk to Butler, 14 June 1947, TNA FO 371/61525/E5531. 157. US military attaché Cairo to War Department, 4 March 1947, no. 351775, NACP: RG 319, entry 85, box 2303.

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158. Pirie-Gordon to FO, 25 September 1946, TNA: FO 371/61530/E8919; Eyres to FO, 9 December 1946, TNA: FO 371/52355/E12185. 159. ‘The budgetary position of the government of Transjordan’, 3 February 1947, no. 4233, NACP: RG 59, R&A reports, microfiche 1221. 160. As detailed in a Foreign Office Research Department (FORD) memo ‘The Greater Syria movement’, pp.15–18, 10 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/61497/ E9137; Seale, Struggle, p.12. 161. ‘Probability and implications of a Greater Syria’, 10 May 1947, JIC (47) 19, TNA: CAB 158/1. 162. Wilson, King Abdullah, p.157. 163. Houston-Boswall to Bevin, 1 March 1947, TNA: FO 1018/30. 164. Landis, Joshua, ‘Syria and the Palestine war: Fighting King Abdullah’s “Greater Syria Plan”’, in E. L. Rogan and A. Shlaim (eds), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge, 2001), pp.179–84. 165. Zisser, Eyal, Lebanon: The Challenge of Independence (London, 2000), pp.86–7, 98–9. 166. Eyres to Bevin, 12 March 1947, TNA: FO 371/61492/E2509; GraffteySmith to FO, 1 April 1947, TNA: FO 371/61492/E2864; minute by Baxter, 11 April 1947, TNA: FO 371/61492/E3005. 167. COS (46) 278 (O), 15 November 1946, TNA CAB 80/103. 168. Parliamentary question of 14 July 1947, TNA: FO 371/61492/E6350. 169. Minutes by Beith and Baxter, 3 September 1946 and 9 September 1946, TNA: FO 371/52555/E8478. 170. Talbot to Bevin, 22 August 1946, TNA: FO 371/52355/E8478. 171. Grafftey-Smith to FO, 7 September 1946, TNA: FO 371/52355/E9216. 172. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1947, Vol. 5, p.752. 173. FORD memo, p.17. 174. Scrivener to FO, 21 July 1947, TNA: FO 371/61494/E6935. 175. Kirkbride to Bevin, 15 May 1947, TNA: FO 371/61493/E4602; a summary of the white paper can be found in CZA: S25/9037. 176. Transjordan situation report for February 1947, TNA: FO 371/62206/ E2430. 177. FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, pp.749–50, 752. 178. Beaumont to Pirie-Gordon, 9 September 1947, TNA: FO 371/61497/E8737; minute by Garran, 11 September 1947, TNA: FO 371/61497/E9883. 179. Clayton to Burrows, 27 August 1947, TNA: FO 371/61497/E9592. 180. Kirkbride to Bevin, 10 October 1947, TNA: FO 371/61497/E9918. 181. Pirie-Gordon to Bevin, 10 September 1947, TNA: FO 371/62226/E8679; memo by Cable, 4 November 1947, TNA: FO 371/62226/E10711. 182. Pirie-Gordon to Garran, 2 September 1947, TNA: FO 371/61496/E8525.

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183. Transjordan situation report for September 1947, TNA: FO 371/62226/ E9652; Kirkbride to Bevin, 28 October 1947, TNA: FO 371/62226/ E10367. 184. Minute by Baxter, 25 April 1947, TNA: FO 371/61492/E3005. 185. FORD memo on the Arab League and Palestine, 5 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68382/E13328. 186. Morris, Benny, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem, 1947–1949 (Cambridge, 1987), p.14. 187. Transjordan situation reports for December 1944, TNA: CO 831/60/2, and July 1945, TNA: CO 831/60/3; Wilson, King Abdullah, p.139. 188. Elpeleg, Zvi, The Grand Mufti: Haj Amin al-Hussaini, Founder of the Palestinian National Movement (London, 1993), p.81. 189. Interview with Kazem Khalidi, LCP: box 2/file 36; Khalaf, Issa, Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939–1948 (Albany, N.Y., 1991), pp.133–6. 190. P (M) (44) 3, 16 January 1944, TNA: CAB 95/14. 191. P (M) (44) 14, 16 October 1944, TNA: CAB 95/14. 192. Kirkbride to Gort, 28 November 1944, TNA: CO 733/461/6/pt. 4. 193. Kirkbride to Wikeley, 29 July 1946, TNA: FO 371/52551/E7868/G; Beeley to Sargent, 30 August 1946, TNA: FO 371/52555/E8636/G. 194. Martin to Howe, 14 March 1946, TNA: FO 371/52574/E2418. 195. Kirkbride to Gort, 16 December 1944, TNA: CO 733/461/6/pt.1. 196. Pirie-Gordon to FO, 28 July 1947, TNA: FO 371/61876/E6835. 197. Pirie-Gordon to Garran, 2 August 1947, TNA: FO 816/88. 198. Pirie-Gordon and Glubb meeting with Abdullah, 1 June 1946, MEC: Cunningham Papers, box VI/2. 199. Kirkbride to Wikeley, 23 July 1946, TNA: FO 371/52551/E7830. 200. Clayton to Amman, 17 September 1947, TNA: FO 816/88. 201. Evans to FO, 19 September 1947, TNA: FO 371/61529/E8671/G. 202. Evans to FO, 18 September 1947, TNA: FO 371/61529/E8744/G. 203. Evans to Amman, 12 October 1947, TNA: FO 816/89; Kirkbride to FO, 16 October 1947, TNA: FO 816/89. 204. Elpeleg, Grand Mufti, p.85. 205. Kirkbride to Burrows, 3 November 1947, TNA: FO 371/61836/E10611. 206. Minute by Cable, undated, TNA: FO 371/61886/E10349. 207. Shlaim, Collusion, pp.98–9. 208. Kirkbride to Bevin, 14 October 1947, TNA: FO 816/89. 209. Kirkbride to Bevin, 16 October 1947, TNA: FO 816/89. 210. Mayall to Burrows, 1 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/68365/E758/G. 211. Kirkbride to FO, 21 December 1947, TNA: FO 816/111. 212. Troutbeck to Clayton, 23 December 1947, TNA: FO 816/115.

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213. Sasson to Ben-Gurion, 13 March 1944, CZA: S25/3140/II; Sasson talk with al-Unsi, 3 July 1944, CZA: A291/6; note on the Arab Unity Congress, 27 July 1944, CZA: S25/3148; letter no. 5 from Cairo, 24 November 1945, CZA: S25/22313; Shimoni, Ya’aqov, ‘The Arab League’, 14 August 1947, ISA: 130.15/2567/14. 214. Sasson to Shertok, 21 October 1944, CZA: S25/3555; Sasson talk with alUnsi, 30 May 1945, CZA: S25/3504; Sasson to Joseph, 31 October 1945, CZA: S25/3504. 215. Sasson to Shertok, 26 November 1944, CZA: A291/6; Sasson’s comments at the 26 November 1944 meeting of the Executive, CZA: S100; Sasson to Joseph, 18 October 1945, CZA: A291/8. 216. Report by Sasson, 11 April 1946, CZA: S25/9020. 217. ‘The Arab Legion’, 30 May 1945, CZA: S25/22655; ‘Arab armies’, 6 June 1945, CZA: S25/22655; ‘Notes on the Arab armies’, 7 February 1946, CZA: S25/8009. 218. Meeting of the London Executive, 17 July 1945, CZA: Z4/302/29. 219. ‘Attempts to reach agreement with the Arabs’, 5 March 1946, CZA: S25/10692. 220. ‘Political assumptions’, 19 July 1946, CZA: S25/797; Ben-Gurion, David, Li-kerat kets ha-mandat: Zikhronot min ha-’ izavon, 29 be-Yuni 1946–Mars 1947 [Towards the End of the Mandate: Memoirs], edited by M. Avizohar (Tel Aviv, 1993), pp.81–5. 221. Gelber, Jewish-Transjordanian Relations, p.205. 222. Shertok to Sasson, 11 August 1946, CZA: A245/105. 223. For details of the Cairo talks see Caplan, Neil, Futile Diplomacy, Vol. 2, ArabZionist Negotiations and the End of the Mandate (London, 1986), pp.143–5; Caplan, Neil, and Avraham Sela, ‘Zionist-Egyptian negotiations and the partition of Palestine, 1946’, Jerusalem Quarterly 41 (1987), pp.19–30. 224. Caplan, Futile Diplomacy, Vol. 2, pp.145–7; Gelber, Jewish-Transjordanian Relations, pp.207–11; Shlaim, Collusion, pp.76–83. 225. Report by Sasson, 12 August 1946, CZA: S25/9036; Sharif to Linton, 13 August 1946, CZA: S25/1554. 226. Report by Sasson, 19 August 1946, CZA: S25/9036; Sasson, Eliahu, Ba-derekh el ha-shalom: Igrot ve-sihot [On the Road to Peace: Letters and Conversations] (Tel Aviv, 1978), pp.367–72. 227. Morris, Benny, The Road to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews (London, 2002), p.93. 228. Pappé, Ilan, The Making of the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1947–1951 (London, 1992), p.118. 229. Nevo, Joseph, King Abdullah and Palestine: A Territorial Ambition (London, 1996), p.62.

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230. Shlaim, Collusion, pp.78–9, 83. 231. Heller, Joseph, The Birth of Israel, 1945–1949: Ben-Gurion and His Critics (Gainesville, Fla., 2000), p.302. 232. Kirkbride to FO 18 August 1946, TNA: FO 371/52553/E8106; and 23 August 1946, TNA: FO 371/52554/E8409. 233. Campbell to FO, 2 September 1946, TNA: FO 141/1090/101/12/46/G. 234. Goldman to Bevin, 19 August 1946, in Freundlich, Yehoshua (ed), Political Documents of the Jewish Agency [PDJA], Vol. 1 (Jerusalem, 1996), pp.538–9; Paris to FO, 20 August 1946, TNA: FO 371/52641/E8217; Paris to FO, 3 September 1946, TNA: FO 371/52642/E8776/G. 235. Bevin to Campbell, and minute by Beeley, 5 September 1946, TNA: FO 371/52542/E8776/G. 236. Memo by Sasson, 18 November 1946, CZA: S25/9020. 237. Sasson to Shertok, 20 November 1946, CZA: S25/3016; Sasson, Ba-derekh, pp.378–82. 238. Shlaim, Collusion, p.84. 239. Meeting of the Political Department, 6 January 1947, CZA: S25/428. 240. Report by Sasson, 6 October 1946, CZA: S25/3301; Sasson at the London Executive, 9 October 1946, CZA: S25/6644. 241. Wadsworth to the State Department, 23 June 1947, CZA: S25/3885. 242. ‘In the Arab camp’, 30 July 1947, CZA: S25/3300; report from Geneva, 18 August 1947, CZA S25/5975. 243. Report by Danin, 22 August 1947, CZA: S25/3960; Sasson to Sharif, 23 August 1947, CZA: S25/6644. 244. Nevo, King Abdullah and Palestine, p.71. 245. Shertok and Sasson to Meyerson, 23 August 1947, PDJA, Vol. 2 (Jerusalem, 1998), p.602. 246. Off-the-record talks in Transjordan by two British correspondents, 27 October 1947, CZA: S25/9038. 247. ‘Summary of a conversation by a British journalist with the Chief Secretary’, 5 November 1947, CZA: S25/7706. 248. ‘Notes of two meetings with Abdullah’, undated, CZA: A289/129. 249. Danin, Ezra, Zioni beCol Tenai [A Zionist without Condition], edited by G. Rivlin (Tel Aviv, 1987), pp.185–6; Sasson to Shertok, 20 November 1947, CZA: S25/1699.

Chapter 5

The Imagery of Collusion: From the Mandate to Statehood, 1948–1951

1. Kirkbride to Burrows, 29 October 1947, TNA: FO 371/62208/E10378; FO to Amman, 30 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/68817/E1458/G.

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2. Louis, William Roger, The British Empire in the Middle East, 1945–1951: Arab Nationalism, the United States and Postwar Imperialism (Oxford, 1984), pp.331–4. 3. For a detailed account of the opposition in Iraq, see Batatu, Hanna, The Old Social Classes and the Revolutionary Movements of Iraq: A Study of Iraq’s Old Landed and Commercial Classes and of Its Communists, Ba’athists and Free Officers (Princeton, N.J., 1978), pp.545–57. 4. FO memo of 7 April 1948, TNA: FO 371/68385/E4371/G; Burrows to Campbell, 7 April 1948, TNA: FO 141/1285/363/18/48/G. 5. Minute by Sargent, 2 February 1948, TNA: FO 371/68817/E1728/G. 6. Kirkbride to Bevin, 26 April 1946, TNA: FO 371/68386/E5468/G. 7. JP (48) 160, 13 January 1948, TNA: DEFE 6/4; COS (48) 45, 26 February 1948, TNA: DEFE 5/10. 8. Waterfield to Burrows, 3 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/68836/E398/G. 9. ‘A note on the visit of a Transjordan delegation to London’, undated, MEC: Glubb Papers, box 215. 10. Minute by Pyman, 19 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/68827/E878/G. 11. Kirkbride to Bevin, 28 October 1947, TNA: FO 371/62206/E10367; Dempsey to Adam, 15 January 1947, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/11. 12. FO to Amman, 11 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/68817/E12264/G. 13. FO to Amman, 7 February 1948, TNA: FO 371/68817/E1669/G. 14. Meeting at the FO, 2 March 1948, TNA: FO 371/68817/E3108/G. 15. Great Britain, Foreign Office, Treaty of Alliance between the United Kingdom and Transjordan, Cmd. 7404 (London, 1948). 16. COS (48) 111, 15 May 1948, TNA: DEFE 5/11; Hunt to Pyman, 7 March 1948, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/14. 17. Kirkbride to Bevin, 15 March 1948, TNA: FO 371/68820/E3673 and 20 March 1948, TNA: FO 371/68820/E3744. For a survey of the regional press, see BBC Summary of World Broadcasts (SWB), part 3, no. 44, 1 April 1948, pp.60–1. 18. Campbell to FO, 22 March 1948, TNA: FO 371/68820/E3748; Busk to FO, 26 March 1948, TNA: FO 371/68820/E3919; minute by Walker, 1 April 1948, TNA: FO 371/68820/E3919. 19. The meticulously planned withdrawal envisaged British forces departing from Gaza in the south to Haifa port in the north of Palestine. TNA: DO (47) 91, 25 November 1947, CAB 131/4. 20. Kirkbride to Sargent, 18 November 1947, TNA: FO 371/61584/E11734/G. 21. Kirkbride to Sargent, 5 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/68367/E2095/G. 22. Kirkbride to MacMichael, 21 January 1948, MEC: MacMichael Papers, box I/4.

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23. Kirkbride to FO, 19 December 1947, TNA: FO 371/62226/E12084/G. 24. Broadmead to FO, 24 December 1947, TNA: FO 371/62226/E12263/G; Campbell to FO, 3 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/68364/176/G. 25. Minute by Pyman, 2 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/62226/E12264/G. 26. Jones to Satterthwaite, 28 July 1948, NACP: RG 59, 867N.01/7-2848. Granada Television interview with Sir Harold Beeley, 7 September 1983, RHL: mss. brit. emp. s.527/10 27. Minutes by Beeley, 22 December 1947, TNA: FO 371/68364/E504; 6 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/68364/E101/G. 28. For a detailed account of the advice given to Bevin see Bradshaw, Tancred, ‘History invented: The British-Transjordanian “collusion” revisited’, Middle Eastern Studies 43 (2007), pp.26–7. 29. Glubb, John Bagot, A Soldier with the Arabs (London, 1957) pp.63, 66; cf. IWM Sound Archive: interview with Glubb in 1979, accession 004410/6; Bullock, Alan, Ernest Bevin: Foreign Secretary, 1945–1951 (New York, 1983), p.509. 30. Bevin to Kirkbride, 9 February 1948, TNA: FO 371/68366/E1916/G. 31. Shlaim, Avi, Collusion across the Jordan: King Abdullah, the Zionist Movement and the Partition of Palestine (Oxford, 1988), pp.135–7; Shlaim, ‘The debate about 1948’, International Journal of Middle East Studies 27 (1995), p.293. Works by historians following Shlaim include Doyle, Michael, Pan-Arabism before Nasser: Egyptian Power Politics and the Palestine Question (New York, 1999), pp.121–6; Morris, Benny, ‘Review essay: Refabricating 1948’, Journal of Palestine Studies 27 (1998), pp.87-89; and Wilson, Mary C., King Abdullah, Britain and the Making of Jordan (Cambridge, 1987), p.168. 32. Shlaim, Collusion, p.138. 33. Louis, British Empire, pp.372–3. 34. DO (48) 11, 23 January 1948, TNA: CAB 131/6; DO (48) 5, 29 January 1948, TNA: CAB 131/5; JP (48) 49, 14 January 1948, TNA: DEFE 6/5. 35. Bradshaw, Tancred, ‘Arms and influence: British arms policy and the decline of British influence in the Middle East, 1948–49’, British Scholar 3 (2010), pp.80–1. 36. Tal, David, ‘Weapons without influence: British arms supply policy and the Egyptian-Czech arms deal, 1945–55’, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 34 (2006), pp.369–83. 37. FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, The Near East and Africa (Washington, D.C., 1971), pp.527–8; cf. Bevin to Attlee, 18 November 1947, TNA: PREM 8/841/ PM/47/169. 38. FRUS 1947, Vol. 5, p.1249. Slonim, Shlomo, ‘The 1948 American embargo on arms to Palestine’, Political Science Quarterly 94 (1979), pp.496–8.

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39. Enclosed in NACP: RG 353, entry 547, country file, 1945–1949, box 1. 40. Memo by Clark Clifford, 24 April 1948, HSTL: SMOF Naval Aid to the President Subject File, box 14; ‘Serving the best interests of the United States in the Near East’, 17 June 1948, HSTL: Clark Clifford Papers, box 13. 41. FRUS 1948, pp.577–8 and 1060–1; memorandum for the President, 14 May 1948, NACP: RG 59, Records of the Office of the Executive Secretariat. Memos from the Secretary to the President, 1947–1948, Lot53D444, box 2; Tuck to DOS, 26 May 1948, no. 598, NACP: RG 59, Palestine reference book of Dean Rusk, box 3. 42. Memo for Clark Clifford, undated, HSTL: SMOF Naval Aid to the President Subject File, box 14. 43. Minute by Wright, 15 May 1948, TNA: FO 371/68665/E6758; ‘Factors influencing President Truman’s decision to support partition and recognise the state of Israel’, LOC: Clark Clifford Papers, box 73. 44. As detailed in CIA 5, ‘Review of the world situation as it relates to the security of the United States’, 12 February 1948, HSTL: PSF Intelligence File, box 212 and CIA Special Report 25, ‘United Kingdom’, 7 December 1949, HSTL: PSF Intelligence File, box 218. 45. For a bitter critique of the American political system in relation to Palestine, see Balfour to FO, 24 May 1948, TNA: FO 371/68650/E7247. 46. CIA NIE 26, ‘Key problems affecting US efforts to strengthen the Near East’, 25 April 1951, HSTL: PSF Intelligence File, box 213. 47. ‘The effect of British decline as a world power on US interests’, 14 February 1950, HSTL: SMOF NSC Subject File, box 13. 48. Unsigned FO minute, 27 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/68410/E1440. 49. The views of Arab governments were summarised in a minute by Harold Beeley, 7 February 1948, TNA: FO 371/68410/E1537. 50. Kirkbride to FO, 1 February 1948, no. 52, TNA: FO 816/115. 51. Parliamentary Debates, 446 H.C. Deb 5s, col. 1805; 447 H.C. Deb 5s cols, 223–4. For a detailed breakdown of arms supplies, see Parker to Sargent, 9 February 1948, TNA: FO 371/68410/E1983/G. 52. Appreciation by COS of the minimum size of the Arab Legion, 15 January 1948, TNA: FO 371/68827/E898/G; Pundik, Ron, The Struggle for Sovereignty: Relations between Great Britain and Jordan, 1946–1951 (Oxford, 1994), pp.76–82. 53. Glubb to Montgomery, 22 May 1947, TNA: WO 32/15562. 54. COS (47) 133rd meeting, 29 October 1947, TNA: DEFE 4/8. 55. Pirie-Gordon to Greenhill, 22 September 1947, TNA: FO 371/62193/ E9325; Dempsey to WO, 15 Nov. 1947, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/11.

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56. The MELF proposal along with detailed organisation diagrams can be found in Leask to Pyman, 3 December 1947, TNA: FO 371/62194/E11487/G. 57. Glubb, Soldier with the Arabs, p.91. 58. Hamilton to Burrows, 4 February 1948, TNA: FO 371/68828/E1864. 59. Martin to Jacob, 29 January 1946, TNA: CO 537/1460. 60. COS (48) 16 (O), 19 February 1948, TNA: DEFE 5/10. 61. Minute by Pyman, 6 February 1948, TNA: FO 371/68828/E1896/G. 62. MELF to WO, 5 March 1948 and 10 March 1948, TNA: FO 371/68828/ E3005; Eastern Department to Chancery, Washington, 10 March 1948, TNA: FO 371/68829/E3786/G; BMEO to FO, 12 July 1948, TNA: FO 371/68830/E9443. Pundik, Struggle for Sovereignty, pp.100–101. 63. Kirkbride to Bevin, 23 May 1948, no. 376 and 24 May 1948, no. 379, TNA: FO 816/121. 64. As detailed in MELF to WO, 21 August 1948, TNA: FO 371/68415/ E11868/G; BMEO to Eastern Department, 4 September 1948, TNA: FO 371/68831/E11710. 65. Transjordan situation report for February 1948, TNA: FO 371/68845/ E3364. 66. Kirkbride to Burrows, 16 February 1948, TNA: FO 371/68819/E2832/G. 67. Pyman diary, 1 March 1948, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/14. 68. Minute by Wright, 15 May 1948, TNA: FO 371/68665/E6758; Cohen, Michael J., Palestine and the Great Powers, 1945–1948 (Princeton, N.J., 1982), pp.379–90. 69. Memo by Montgomery, 18 August 1948, TNA: FO 800/453. 70. Beeley to Burrows, 30 April 1948, TNA: FO 371/68554/E6676. 71. FRUS 1948, p.885; Beeley to Burrows, 3 May 1948, TNA: FO 371/68554/ E6677. 72. The text of the resolution can be found in FRUS 1948, pp.1110–11. 73. Bevin to Attlee, 2 June 1948, TNA: FO 800/487/PA/48/51; Waterfield to Pyman, 7 June 1948, TNA: FO 371/68413/E7602. 74. ‘Probable effects on Israel and the Arab states of a UN arms embargo’, NACP: RG 263, ORE 48-48, 5 August 1948, estimates of the Office of Research Evaluation, 1946–1950, box 2. 75. JIC (48) 71, 13 July 1948, TNA: CAB 159/4/pt. 1. 76. Hillenkoetter to Truman, 8 July 1948, HSTL: PSF Intelligence file, box 211; CIA Special Report 25, ‘The Arab states’, 27 July 1949, HSTL: PSF Intelligence file, box 217, pp.45–9. 77. Ilan, Amitzur, The Origin of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race: Arms, Embargo, Military Power and Decision in the 1948 Palestine War (Houndmills, 1996), pp.153–74.

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78. Glubb lecture at GHQ MELF, 15 June 1948, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/17; note by Glubb, 19 August 1948, TNA: FO 371/68822/ E11049/G. 79. Lord Listowel to Bevin, 28 April 1948, TNA: FO 371/68853/E6409/G; Pundik, Struggle for Sovereignty, pp.110–13. 80. Bevin to Alexander, 9 February 1948, TNA: FO 800/477/ME/48/4; FO to Amman, 6 May 1948, TNA: FO 371/68853/E6410/G. 81. COS (48) 58th meeting, 27 April 1948, TNA: DEFE 4/12; Alexander to Bevin, 27 April 1948, TNA: FO 371/68853/E6408/G. 82. FO to Amman, 6 May 1948, TNA: FO 371/68853/E6410/G. 83. Kirkbride to FO, 8 May 1948, no. 302, TNA: FO 816/118. 84. FO to Amman, 7 May 1948, TNA: FO 371/68852/E6007; minute by Walker, 11 May 1948, TNA: FO 371/68852/E6008/G. 85. FRUS 1948, p.1038. 86. Wright to Douglas, 22 May 1948, TNA: FO 371/68830/E7224/G. 87. Monroe interview with Kirkbride, September 1959, MEC: Monroe Papers; Kirkbride, Sir Alec, From the Wings: Amman Memoirs, 1947–1951 (London, 1976), pp.35–6. 88. Kirkbride to Bevin, 8 May 1948, no. 302, TNA: FO 816/118. 89. ‘The extent of British participation in the Palestine fighting’, 27 May 1948, HSTL: PSF Subject File, box 160; ‘The Palestine ceasefire’, 31 May 1948, HSTL: SMOF Naval Aide to the President Subject File, box 14. 90. Freundlich, Yehoshua (ed), Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Vol. 1, May–September 1948 (Jerusalem, 1981), p.50. 91. Kirkbride to Bevin, 19 May 1948, no. 348, TNA: FO 816/120. 92. Kirkbride to Bevin, 24 May 1948 and 25 May 1948, nos. 386 and 390, TNA: FO 816/121. 93. Kirkbride to Bevin, 26 May 1948, no. 399, TNA: FO 816/120. 94. Amman to FO, 12 July 1948, TNA: FO 800/477/ME/48/22. 95. Kirkbride to FO, 6 June 1948, TNA: FO 371/68413/E7625; Glubb to Pyman, 6 June 1948, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/17. 96. Bevin to Kirkbride, 24 May 1948, no. 421, and 27 May 1948, no. 458, TNA: FO 816/121. 97. Minute by Beeley, 5 July 1948, TNA: FO 371/68822/E9296/G. 98. Kirkbride to Bevin, 6 June 1948, TNA: FO 371/68413/E7625; Mack to FO, 18 June 1948, TNA: FO 371/68470/E8294; Campbell to FO, 11 June 1948, TNA: FO 371/69202/J4098. 99. Kirkbride to Bevin, 6 August 1948, TNA: FO 371/68822/E11049/G. 100. Bevin to Kirkbride, 9 July 1948, TNA: FO 371/68830/E10351/G. 101. Bevin to Kirkbride, 20 August 1948, TNA: FO 800/477/ME48/31; Bevin to Kirkbride, 26 August 1948, no. 829, TNA: FO 816/128.

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102. Bullock, Ernest Bevin, pp.646–7, 652. 103. Bevin to Alexander, 19 June 1948, TNA: FO 371/68413/E8059, and 25 August 1948, TNA: FO 371/68415/E11184/G. 104. Minute by Roberts, 28 July 1948, TNA: FO 800/457/EG48/10. 105. Minute by Burrows, 31 July 1948, TNA: FO 371/68413/E10547/G. 106. Minute by Burrows, 21 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68671A/E13953. 107. Minute by Burrows, 6 November 1948, TNA: FO 371/68419/E14488/G. 108. Alexander to Bevin, 4 August 1948, TNA: CAB 21/1922. 109. The strategic rationale for supporting Transjordan was outlined by the COS in JP (48) 76, 15 June 1948, TNA: DEFE 6/6; COS (48) 107th meeting, 30 July 1948, TNA: DEFE 4/15. 110. COS (48) 112th meeting, 11 August 1948, TNA: DEFE 4/15. 111. COS (48) 120th meeting, 28 August 1948, TNA: DEFE 4/15. 112. Minute Maitland, 8 July 1949, TNA: FO 371/75104/E8800. 113. Alexander to Bevin, 3 November 1948, TNA: FO 371/68418/E14109; COS (48) 149, 4 November 1948, TNA: DEFE 5/8. 114. GHQ MELF to WO, 27 October 1948, 274/CCL, TNA: CAB 21/1922; discussed in COS (48) 153rd meeting, TNA: DEFE 4/17. 115. Kirkbride to FO, 25 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68418/E13849/G. 116. Record of a meeting with Marshall and Douglas, 30 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68594/E14148/G. 117. CM (48) 71st meeting, 12 November 1948, TNA: CAB 128/13; Bevin to Attlee, 15 November 1948, TNA: FO 800/487/PA/48/94. 118. FO to Amman, 30 December 1948, TNA: FO 371/68644/E16384/G. 119. Stabler to Mattison, 6 August 1948, NACP: RG 84, Jerusalem consulate general, classified records 1948, 800TJ, box 5. 120. Pyman to WO, 23 May 1948, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/16. 121. Arab-Jewish forces in the Middle East, 31 March 1948, no. 456080, NACP: RG 319, entry 85, box 2947. 122. JP (48) 33, 1 April 1948, TNA: DEFE 6/5. 123. JP (48) 76, 15 June 1948, TNA: DEFE 6/6. 124. Mack to FO, 26 May 1948, TNA: FO 371/68386/E7383/G; Houston Boswall to FO, 14 August 1948, TNA: FO 141/1246/1/45/48/G. 125. Broadmead to Wright, 2 June 1948, TNA: FO 371/68809/E8249/G; Damascus situation reports for June and July 1948, TNA: FO 371/68808/ E9905 and E12623. 126. JIC (48) 71st meeting, 13 July 1948, TNA: CAB 159/4/I; JWPS (WP) (Arms) 66, 29 July 1948, TNA: DEFE 10/197. 127. Mack to FO, 11 December 1948, TNA: FO 371/68471A/E15835. 128. Kirkbride to Bevin, 7 July 1948, TNA: FO 371/68375/E9169/G; Glubb, Soldier with the Arabs, p.166. 129. Pirie-Gordon to Bevin, 14 July 1948, TNA: FO 816/126.

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130. Tal, David, War in Palestine, 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy (London, 2004), pp.306-314. Morris, Benny, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 423-436. 131. Nevo, Joseph, King Abdullah and Palestine: A Territorial Ambition (London, 1996), pp.148-154. 132. Glubb, Soldier with the Arabs, pp.157-158 and 161; Pirie-Gordon to Burrows, 25 July 1948, TNA: FO 371/68822/E10325. 133. Pirie-Gordon to FO, 14 July 1948, no.568 and 19 July 1948, no.590, TNA: FO 816/126; Stabler to DOS, 14 July 1948, NACP: RG 59, 890i.00/7-1448, and 26 July 1948, NACP: RG 59, 890i.00/7-2648. For a vivid account of the demonstrations see Kirkbride, From the Wings, pp.47-48. 134. Transjordan situation report for July 1948, TNA: FO 371/68845/E10720; Glubb, Soldier with the Arabs, p. 165. 135. Kirkbride to FO, 12 July 1948, no.555, TNA: FO 800/477/ME/48/22; Stabler to Marshall, 23 August 1948, NACP: RG 59 741.90i/8-2348. For a detailed discussion see Morris, Benny, The Road to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews (London, 2002), pp.177-180 136. Pirie-Gordon to FO, 14 July 1948, no.570, TNA FO 816/126; Glubb to Pyman, 15 July 1948, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/18; and PirieGordon to Burrows, 25 July 1948, TNA: FO 371/68822/E10325; Glubb, Soldier with the Arabs, p.166. 137. See minute by Walker, 16 July 1948, TNA: FO 371/68574/E9573/G. 138. Kirkbride to Bevin, 5 August 1948, TNA: FO 371/68830/E10466/G. 139. Glubb, Soldier with the Arabs, pp.178–9. 140. Kirkbride to FO, 5 August 1948, TNA: FO 371/68830/E10502; Kirkbride to Bevin, 6 August 1948, no.636, TNA: FO 816/127. 141. Stabler to Mattison, 6 August 1948, NACP: RG 84, Jerusalem consulate general, classified records 1948, box 5. 142. Kirkbride to FO, 5 August 1948, TNA: FO 371/68830/E10502. 143. Kirkbride to FO, 25 September 1948, TNA: FO 371/68832/E12875. 144. Glubb to Pyman, 1 August 1948, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/19; Glubb, Soldier with the Arabs, pp.157–64. 145. Pirie-Gordon to Bevin, 25 July 1948, TNA: FO 816/127. 146. Kirkbride to Bevin, 6 August 1948, TNA: FO 371/68822/E11049/G; Douglas to DOS, 11 August 1948, NACP RG 59, 890i.00/9-948. 147. Glubb to Pyman, 11 August 1948, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/19. 148. Kirkbride to FO, 12 January 1949, TNA: FO 371/75272/E768. 149. Avraham, Sela, ‘Transjordan, Israel and the 1948 war: Myth, historiography and reality’, Middle Eastern Studies 28 (1992), p.627. 150. Ben-Gurion to Shertok, 9 December 1947, CZA: S25/1700.

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151. ‘From the Orphan after his return from London, Palestine and Transjordan’, 18 February 1948, CZA: S25/3569. 152. Sasson to Abdullah, 11 January 1948, CZA: S25/9038; PDD, pp.156–7. 153. Conversation with ‘Yogav’, 12 December 1947, CZA: S25/4064; BenGurion, David, Yoman ha-milhamah: Milhemet ha-’atsmaut, 5708–5709 [The War of Independence: Ben-Gurion’s War Diary], edited by G. Rivlin and E. Orren (Tel Aviv, 1982), pp.97–106. 154. Cunningham to Creech Jones, 20 December 1947, TNA: FO 371/62226/ E12317. 155. Esber, Rosemarie M., Under the Cover of War: The Zionist Expulsion of the Palestinians (Alexandria, Va., 2008), pp.185–95; Hogan, Matthew, ‘The 1948 Massacre at Deir Yassin Revisited’, The Historian 63 (2001), pp.209333; Morris, Benny, 1948: The First Arab-Israeli War (London, 2008), pp.126–8. 156. Correspondence between the Political Department and the Royal Diwan, 22 April 1948 and 23 April 1948, CZA: S25/5634; SWB, part 3, no. 47, 22 April 1948, p.72. 157. FBIS Daily Report, no. 298, 27 April 1948 and no. 304, 5 May 1948. 158. PDD, pp.721–2; meeting with Legion officers, 3 May 1948, ISA: 93.03/2513/2. 159. Nevo, King Abdullah and Palestine, pp.115–6; Shlaim, Collusion, pp.180–5. 160. Kirkbride to FO, 8 May 1948, no. 302, TNA: FO 816/118. 161. Detailed accounts can be found in Shlaim, Collusion, pp.180–6; Gelber, Yoav, Jewish-Transjordanian Relations, 1921–1948 (London, 1997), pp.279–80; Nevo, King Abdullah, pp.115–17. 162. PDD, pp.711, 738–41. 163. Protocols of the Minhelet Ha’am, 14 May 1948, pp.40–3; Meir, Golda, My Life (New York, 1977), pp.216–21; ‘Notes of two meetings with Abdullah’, undated, CZA: A289/129; Kirkbride to Bevin, 14 June 1948, no. 486, TNA: FO 816/123. 164. Ben-Gurion to Eban, 11 May 1948, PDD, p.778. 165. Details in Nevo, King Abdullah, pp.118–19; Shlaim, Collusion, pp.205–10. 166. al-Tall, Abdullah, Zikhronot [Memoirs] (Tel Aviv, 1960), p.50. 167. Shlaim, Collusion, p.116. 168. Caplan, Neil, Futile Diplomacy, Vol. 2, Arab-Zionist Negotiations and the End of the Mandate (London, 1986), pp.159–60; Gelber, Jewish-Transjordanian Relations, p.237; Morris, ‘Review essay: Refabricating 1948’, pp.87–8; Pappé, Ilan, Britain and the Arab-Israeli Conflict, 1948–51 (London, 1988), p.18. 169. Bar-Joseph, Uri, The Best of Enemies: Israel and Transjordan in the War of 1948 (London, 1987), pp.7–10.

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170. Nevo, King Abdullah, p.72. 171. Minhelet Ha’am (Provisional State Council): Protocols, 18 April 1948–13 May 1948 (Jerusalem, 1978), p.40–4. 172. Heller, Joseph, The Birth of Israel, 1945–1949: Ben-Gurion and His Critics (Gainesville, Fla., 2000), p.303. 173. Sela, ‘Transjordan, Israel’. 174. Ben-Gurion, Yoman, p.411; Tal, David, ‘The forgotten war: JewishPalestinian strife in Mandatory Palestine, December 1947–May 1948’, Israel Affairs 6 (2000), pp.9–10. 175. Meeting of the Arab section of the Political Department, 13 May 1948, CZA: S25/5634. 176. Report by Zaslani, 7 March 1948, CZA: S25/7706; Eshed, Haggai, Reuven Shiloah: The Man behind the Mossad—Secret Diplomacy in the Creation of Israel (London, 1997), pp.105–6. 177. Memo by the Israeli Foreign Ministry, 15 May 1949, ISA: 130.02/2412/26/ aleph; Kidron to Comay, 16 May 1950, ISA: 130.02/2412/26/aleph. 178. Lourie to Bunche, 14 April 1948, CZA: S25/5176; Shai ‘Tene’ daily report, 19 April 1948, CZA: S25/9209. 179. Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 27 December 1947, TNA: FO 371/61580/ E12324/G. 180. Estimate of the Palestine situation, 26 February 1948, NACP: RG 319, Plans and Operations Division, decimal file, 1946–1948, entry 154, box 24. 181. Khalaf, Issa, Politics in Palestine: Arab Factionalism and Social Disintegration, 1939–1948 (Albany, N.Y., 1991), pp.202–5, 219–28; Khalidi, Rashid, ‘The Palestinians in 1948: The underlying causes of failure’, in E. L. Rogan and A. Shlaim (eds.), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948, edited by Eugene L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim (Cambridge, 2001), pp.12–36. 182. Kirkbride to FO, 12 January 1949, TNA: FO 371/68365/E548. 183. Levenberg, Haim, The Military Preparations of the Arab Community in Palestine, 1945–1948 (London, 1993), pp.189–210. 184. Amman to FO, 30 January 1948, TNA: CO 537/3883; Memo by Glubb, 25 June 1949, TNA: FO 371/75298/E8592/G. 185. Quarterly historical report, 31 March 1948, TNA: WO 261/644. 186. Memo by Comay, 27 May 1948, ISA: 93.03/2513/2; Morris, Benny, The Road to Jerusalem: Glubb Pasha, Palestine and the Jews (London, 2002), pp.118–19. 187. Monthly situation report for April 1948, TNA: FO 371/68845/E6211; Glubb, Soldier with the Arabs, p.67. 188. Cohen, Eliot A., Supreme Command: Soldiers, Statesmen and Leadership in Wartime (New York, 2002), pp.142–53.

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189. JP (48) 33, 1 April 1948, TNA: DEFE 6/5; Palestine situation as of 7 February 1948, no. 439648, NACP: RG 319, entry 54, box 2690; Arab and Jewish military forces in the Middle East, 31 March 1948, no. 456080, NACP: RG 319, entry 54, box 2947. 190. Tal, War in Palestine, pp.25–34. 191. Ilan, Origin of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race, pp.157–61. 192. JP (48) 33, 1 April 1948, TNA: DEFE 6/5; Kirkbride to FO, 20 April 1948, TNA: FO 371/68370/E4989; Palestine situation as of 7 February 1948, no. 439648, NACP: RG 319, entry 85, box 2690. 193. Cairo to Washington, 11 May 1948, no 105. NACP: RG 319, entry 57, incoming and outgoing messages 1948, box 2; Esber, Under the Cover of War, p.109. 194. Kirkbride to FO, 13 January 1948, no. 11, TNA: FO 816/115. 195. COS (48) 61st meeting, 3 May 1948, TNA: DEFE 4/13. 196. Cairo to Washington, 6 April 1948, no. 255072, NACP: RG 319, entry 85, box 1705. 197. Arbuthnott to WO, TNA: FO 141/1265/126/2/48/G, Trevelyan to Bevin, 6 March 1950, TNA: FO 371/82450/EQ12101/1. 198. An estimate of the Palestine situation in 1948, 26 February 1948, NACP: RG 319, entry 154, plans and operations division, decimal file, 1946– 1948, box 24; GHQ MELF to WO, 23 April 1948, 229/CCL, TNA: CO 537/3926. 199. JIC (47) 80 (O) (Final), 6 January 1948, TNA: CO 537/3901. 200. FBIS Daily Report, no. 298, 27 April 1948, II/1. 201. Cunningham to Creech Jones, 12 April 1948, MEC: Cunningham Papers, box V/4. 202. Doyle, Pan-Arabism, pp.131–41; Landis, Joshua, ‘Syria and the Palestine war: Fighting King Abdullah’s “Greater Syria plan”’, in E. L. Rogan and A. Shlaim (eds), The War for Palestine: Rewriting the History of 1948 (Cambridge, 2001), pp.191–200. 203. Memminger to Marshall, 11 May 1948, A-212, NACP: RG 84, Jerusalem consulate general, classified records, 800 Palestine, box 4. 204. Kirkbride to Bevin, 27 April 1948, no. 255, TNA: FO 816/118; Amman to Cairo, 29 April 1948, TNA: FO 141/1246/1/282/48. 205. Kirkbride to FO, 24 April 1948, TNA: FO 371/68370/E5159. 206. Kirkbride to FO, 29 April 1948 and 2 May 1948, nos. 261 and 279, TNA: FO 816/118. 207. Kirkbride to Bevin, 10 May 1948, no. 311, TNA: FO 816/119. 208. FBIS Daily Report, no. 304, 5 May 1948, ii/1-2; SWB, part 3, no. 50, 13 May 1948, p.59.

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209. JIC (48) 3, 13 February 1948, TNA: CAB 158/3; JIC (48) 9, 23 July 1948, TNA: CAB 158/3. 210. Cunningham to Martin, 24 February 1948, MEC: Cunningham Papers, box VI/1. 211. JIC (48) 80, 6 January 1948, TNA: CAB 158/2; OCP (48) 3, 10 January 1948, TNA: CAB 134/527. 212. Lecture by Glubb at GHQ MELF, 15 June 1948, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/17; memo by Glubb, 21 October 1950, TNA: FO 816/170. 213. Memo by Glubb, 12 August 1948, TNA: FO 141/1246/1/94/48G. 214. Stabler to Marshall, 25 September 1948, no. 46, NACP: RG 84, Jerusalem consulate general, classified records, 800 Palestine, box 4. 215. Beaumont to FO, 30 September 1948, TNA: FO 371/68642/E12738; Nevo, King Abdullah, pp.139–41. 216. ‘Transjordan: Natural resources, industry and commerce’, 1 January 1944, NACP: RG 59, Notter file, lot 60D224, box 66, T437. A comprehensive survey of Jordan’s economic problems can be found in TNA: FO 371/104899/ ET1104/10. 217. Kirkbride to Bevin, 28 September 1948, TNA: FO 371/68862/E12910/G. 218. Troutbeck to FO, 16 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68862/E13635. 219. Minute by Burrows, 22 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68862/E15249/G. 220. Kirkbride to Burrows, 17 December 1948, TNA: FO 371/68862/E16205. 221. Memo by Bevin, 24 August 1948, CP (48) 207, TNA: CAB 129/29. 222. Chapman-Andrews to FO, 15 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68643/E13401; minute by Walker, 12 November 1948, TNA: FO 371/68643/E14503. 223. FO to Amman, 19 September 1948, no. 900, TNA: FO 371/68861/ E11809/G. 224. BMEO to FO, 8 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68642/E13122. 225. A summary of the Bernadotte report can be found in CP (48) 225, 21 September 1948, TNA: CAB 129/29. 226. Louis, British Empire, p.540. 227. Nevo, King Abdullah, pp.159–61. 228. FBIS Daily Report, no. 400, 21 September 1948, ii-2-3; FBIS Daily Report, no. 417, 14 October 1948, ii/3. 229. Elpeleg, Zvi, The Grand Mufti: Haj Amin al-Hussaini: Founder of the Palestinian National Movement (London, 1993), pp.105–6. 230. Kirkbride to Bevin, 4 October 1948, TNA: FO 816/130; SWB 1948, no. 70, 30 September 1948, pp.70–2; Wilson, Mary C., King Abdullah, p.180. 231. Nevo, King Abdullah, pp.162–4. 232. Shimoni to Sasson, 2 November 1948, ISA: 130.15/2570/11. 233. Beaumont to FO, 30 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68643/E14087.

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234. Kirkbride to FO, 2 November 1948, TNA: FO 371/68643/E14503. 235. Kirkbride to FO, 8 December 1948, TNA: FO 371/68644/E15789; SWB, no. 80, 9 December 1948, pp.56–8; Wilson, Mary C., King Abdullah, pp.182–3. 236. SWB, no. 81, 16 December 1948, pp.60–3; Nevo, King Abdullah, pp.166–7. 237. Kirkbride to FO, 9 December 1948, no. 938, TNA: FO 816/142; Transjordan situation report for December 1948, 31 December 1948, TNA FO 371/75273/E407. 238. As summarised in a memo by Buss, 11 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68642/ E13266. 239. Ibid.; Campbell to FO, 11 December 1948, TNA: FO 371/68644/E15734. 240. Campbell to FO, 18 December 1948, TNA: FO 141/1246/1/168/48/G; Troutbeck to FO, 28 December 1948, TNA: FO 141/1246/1/179/48/G. 241. Kirkbride to FO, 14 December 1948, no. 952, TNA: FO 816/142; FO to Amman, 16 December 1948, TNA: FO 371/68644/E16043/G. 242. Campbell to Wright, 19 March 1949, TNA: FO 371/75064/E4098. 243. Troutbeck to Wright, 3 March 1949, and accompanying minute by Kirkbride, 21 March 1949, TNA: FO 371/75064/E3158. 244. Kirkbride to Burrows, 21 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68864/E13843. 245. Judd to Younger, 16 June 1950, TNA: FO 371/82705/ET1016/19. 246. Pundik, Struggle for Sovereignty, pp.209–15; Shlaim, Collusion, pp.555–60. 247. Kirkbride to FO, 14 December 1949, TNA: FO 371/75277/E14906. 248. Kirkbride to McNeil, 2 January 1950, TNA: FO 371/82703/EE1013/1. 249. Fritzlan to DOS, 3 January 1951, NACP: RG 59, 785.00/1-351. 250. Kirkbride to Bevin, 3 March 1950, TNA: FO 371/82705/ET1016/4. 251. Drew to DOS, 27 June 1950, NACP: RG 59, 785.00/6-2750. 252. Kirkbride to Furlonge, 14 July 1950, TNA: FO 371/82179/EE1015/77. 253. Minute by Falla, 13 August 1954, TNA: FO 371/110887/VJ1052/10/G; Bailey to Waller, 29 January 1954, NACP: RG 59, 785.02/1-2954. 254. Drew to DOS, 16 November 1951, NACP: RG 59, 785.00/11-1651. 255. Duke to Lloyd, 10 November 1956, TNA: FO 371/121470/VJ1015/299. 256. Pundik, Struggle for Sovereignty, p.207. 257. Kirkbride to FO, 28 December 1948, no. 978, TNA: FO 816/142. 258. Kirkbride to Furlonge, 14 July 1950, TNA: FO 371/82179/EE1015/77. 259. Stabler to DOS, 1 February 1949, NACP: RG 84, London embassy confidential file 1949, box 192; Drew to DOS, 26 July 1951, NACP: RG 59 785.11/7-2651. 260. Drew to DOS, 23 August 1951, NACP: RG 59, 641.85/8-3051. 261. Kirkbride to FO, 8 September 1948, TNA: FO 371/68861/E11809/G.

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262. FO to Amman, 2 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68642/E12899. 263. See minutes on TNA: FO 371/68862/E12910/G. 264. War Office note on the size and shape of the Arab Legion for 1949–50, 20 December 1948, TNA: FO 371/68832/E16137/G; subsidy for the Arab Legion in 1949, GEN 270 1st meeting, 1 February 1949, TNA: CAB 130/44. 265. Dempsey to Montgomery, 24 June 1948, TNA: WO 216/686. 266. Burrows to Price, 8 and 24 September 1948. TNA: FO 371/68860/ E11665/G and E12387/G; COS (48) 220 (O), 28 September 1948, TNA: DEFE 5/12. 267. JP (48) 108, 26 October 1948, TNA: DEFE 6/7; COS (48) 154th meeting, 1 November 1948, TNA: DEFE 4/17. 268. JP (49) 29 (Final), 30 March 1949, TNA: DEFE 6/8. 269. COS (48) 157th meeting, 5 November 1948, TNA: DEFE 4/17. 270. Mideast to Troopers, 16 November 1948, LHCMA: Pyman Papers, box 7/1/21. 271. COS (48) 231, 31 December 1948, TNA: DEFE 5/9. 272. Ibid. 273. CM (50) 25th meeting, 25 April 1950, TNA: CAB 128/17; Kirkbride to Younger, 1 May 1950, TNA: FO 371/82703/ET1013/5. 274. COS (49) 186th meeting, 16 December 1949, TNA: DEFE 4/27; DO (50) 12, 2 March 1950, TNA: CAB 131/9. 275. Memo by Comay, 2 February 1950, ISA: 93.04/38/8. 276. Morris, Benny, 1948 and After: Israel and the Palestinians (Oxford, 1994), p.22; Shlaim, ‘Debate about 1948’, p.301. Cf. Heller, Birth of Israel, p.306. 277. Gelber, Yoav ,’Jewish-Arab talks during the War of Independence’, Journal of Israeli History 15 (1994), pp.288–93. 278. Freundlich, Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Vol. 1, p.314. 279. Kirkbride to Bevin, 3 November 1948, no. 854, TNA: FO 816/132. 280. Kirkbride to Bevin, 1 September 1948, S/1014/48, TNA: FO 816/128; Drew to DOS, 27 June 1950, NACP: RG 59, 785.00/6-2750. 281. Kirkbride to FO, 18 November 1948, TNA: FO 371/68862/E14829/G. 282. Kirkbride to FO, 6 December 1948, TNA: FO 371/68822/E15533/G. 283. Houstoun-Boswall to FO, 21 December 1948, TNA: FO 371/68644/ E16136/G; Campbell to FO, 21 December 1948, TNA: FO 371/68644/E16138; BMEO to FO, 28 December 1948, TNA: FO 141/1246/1/179/48/G. 284. Troutbeck to Bevin, 29 May 1948, TNA: FO 371/68559/E7376. 285. FRUS 1948, pp.1602–3 and 1622; Louis, British Empire, pp.562–3. 286. Eliash to Comay, 19 December 1949, ISA: 93.04/36/14/I. 287. Sheffer, Gabriel, Moshe Sharett: A Biography of a Political Moderate (Oxford, 1996), pp.395–6.

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288. Eytan to Sharett and Eliash, 15 December 1949, ISA: 130.15/2453/2; Eliash to Comay, 19 December 1949, ISA: 93.04/36/14/II. 289. Bar-Joseph, Best of Enemies, pp.196–239; Rabinovich, Itamar, The Road Not Taken: Early Arab-Israeli Negotiations (New York, 1991), pp.119–47. 290. Comay to Eliash, 10 January 1950, ISA: 93.04/38/8; meeting at the Foreign Ministry, 23 January 1950, ISA: 130.15/2453/2. 291. Comay to Elath, 3 April 1951, ISA: 130.09/2593/12 and 7 May 1951, ISA: 93.04/36/16/I; Kirkbride to Furlonge, 3 January 1972, LHCMA: Furlonge Papers. Morris, Benny, Israel’s Border Wars, 1949–1956: Arab Infiltration, Israeli Retaliation and the Countdown to the Suez War (Oxford, 1993), pp.28–96. 292. Blechman, Barry, ‘The impact of Israel’s reprisals on behaviour of the bordering Arab nations directed at Israel’, Journal of Conflict Resolution 26 (1972), pp.155–60. 293. Kirkbride to Furlonge, 5 December 1950, TNA: FO 371/82716/ ET1053/3/G. 294. Minute by Furlonge, 6 January 1951, TNA: FO 371/91364/EE1041/9. 295. Campbell to FO, 22 March 1950, TNA: FO 371/82710/ET1024/17; Oren, Michael B., ‘Secret Egypt-Israel initiatives prior to the Suez campaign’, Middle Eastern Studies 26 (1990), pp.351–3. 296. Rosenthal, Yemima (ed), Documents on the Foreign Policy of Israel, Vol. 5, 1950 (Jerusalem, 1988), pp.181–2; Helm to Furlonge, 3 July 1950, TNA: FO 371/82178/EE1015/72. 297. For accounts of the King’s assassination, see Satloff, Robert B., From Abdullah to Hussein: Jordan in Transition (New York, 1994), pp.3–4 and 15–16; The Times, 21 July 1951, p.6; FBIS Daily Report, no. 146, nn 1–7 and oo 1–4. 298. Jordan: Annual review for 1951, TNA: FO 371/98856/ET1011/1. 299. Kirkbride to Furlonge, 27 July 1951, TNA: FO 371/91789/ET1015/7; Kirkbride to Morrison, 30 July 1951, TNA: FO 371/91839/ET1942/49. 300. Drew to DOS, 26 July 1951, NACP: RG 59, 785.11/7-2651. 301. Kirkbride to MacMichael, 20 October 1939, TNA CO 831/54/17; Kirkbride to Burrows, 21 October 1948, TNA: FO 371/68864/E13843; Pirie-Gordon to Burrows, 12 July 1949, TNA FO 371/75316/E8782/G. 302. Drew to DOS, 17 May 1951, NACP: RG 59, 785.11/5-1751. 303. Ashton, Nigel, King Hussein: A Political Life (London, 2008), pp.20–36; Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, pp.38–56. 304. Drew to DOS, 16 November 1951, NACP: RG 59, 785.00/11-1651. 305. Louis, British Empire, p.620. 306. Rapp to Furlonge, 23 July 1951, TNA: FO 371/91839/ET1942/40. 307. Notes of a meeting at the Foreign Office, 28 March 1949, TNA: FO 371/75064/E4263/G.

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308. Troutbeck to FO, 15 August 1951, TNA: FO 371/91799/ET10393/27. 309. Kirkbride to Furlonge, 25 August 1951, TNA: FO 371/91799/ ET10393/31. 310. Kirkbride, From the Wings, p.145. 311. Walker to FO, 5 January 1952, FO 371/98857/ET1013/1. 312. Jordan: Annual Review for 1954, TNA: FO 371/115635/VJ1011/1. 313. Minute by Ward, 10 November 1955, TNA: FO 371/110887/ VJ1052/10/G. 314. Walker to Wardrop, 31 December 1951, TNA FO 371/98882/ET1202/1. 315. Memo of 1 July 1952, TNA FO 371/98861/ET1018/1. 316. Duke to Shuckburgh, 20 May 1955, TNA: FO 371/115715/VJ1941/43 and 6 October 1955, TNA: FO 371/115683/VJ12011/1. 317. For accounts of Glubb’s dismissal, see Duke to FO, 22 March 1956, TNA: FO 371/121466/VJ1015/152; Slade-Baker diary, audience with King Husayn, 6 March 1956, MEC: Slade-Baker Papers, box 4/7, pp.1225–34; Ashton, King Hussein, pp.51–3; Satloff, From Abdullah to Hussein, pp.135–43; Dann, Uriel, King Hussein and the Challenge of Arab Radicalism: Jordan, 1955–1967 (Oxford, 1989), pp.31–4. 318. ‘Notes on the Jordan situation by Sir A. Kirkbride: General situation’, 8 March 1956, TNA: PREM 11/1419. 319. ‘Note by Sir A. Kirkbride on a visit to Jordan’, 4 April 1956, TNA: PREM 11/1420. 320. CM (56) 21st meeting, 9 March 1956, TNA: CAB 128/50; Sir Norman Brook’s notebook, CM (56) 21, 9 March 1956, TNA: CAB 195/14.

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INDEX

Abd al-Hadi, Auni, 38, 173 Abd al-Ilah, Iraqi Regent, 104, 144–145 Abdel Nasser, Colonel Gamal, 185 Abdullah Ibn Husayn, King of Jordan Adwan revolt, 45 Allenby, Field Marshal Lord, meeting with (1920), 30 Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, 130 Anglo-Transjordan agreement, 90, 97–98 Arab-Israeli war, 156, 158, 162 Arab League, 124–125, 129, 131–133, 146, 148, 160, 167, 170, 173–174, 182 Arab Revolt, role in, 20–21, 23 Arab unity, 123n, 169–170 Arms embargo, 151–152, 158 Assassination, 182 Ben-Gurion, David, meeting with, 90 Bludan conference (1937), 94 British attitudes towards, 22–23, 24, 44, 98, 108, 149 British government, relations with, 53

index.indd 277

Churchill, Winston, meeting with (1921), 37–38 Civil list, 63 Druze, and, 95 Gouraud, General Henri, alleged attempt to murder, 43 Greater Syria, 125–128, 169 Husayn Ibn Ali, relations with, 23, 30 Hejaz, future in, 27 Hejaz, departure from, 30 Ibn Saud, relations with, 51 Independence, 108 Iraq, King of, 27, 30, 31, 64 Iraq, treaty (1947), 125 Khurma oasis, 23, 24 King of Transjordan, 110 Kitchener, Lord, contacts with, 15–17 Lawrence, T. E., and, 24 London, visits to, 45, 86, 90 al-Nashashibi, Ragheb Bey, and, 81, 88, 91 Origins, 15 Ottoman Empire, 15 Palestine, and, 61, 80–81, 87–89, 90–92

3/2/2012 11:49:00 AM

278

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AND JORDAN

Abdullah Ibn Husayn (Cont.) Peace with Israel, 181 Philby, St. John, relations with, 47 al-Said, Nuri, and, 89, 95 St. James’s Palace conference, 95–100 Samuel, Sir Herbert, and, 31–32 shaikhs of Transjordan, relations with, 31–32, 43 State lands, grant of, 64 Storrs, Ronald, and 16–17 Syrian throne, 23, 36, 38, 64, 86, 88, 93, 96, 98, 99, 124 Transjordan, system of government, 30–31, 41–42, 45 Turkey, treaty (1947), 124–125 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), 130 al-Unsi, Muhammad, and, 86, 93, 133, 135 World War II, supports Allies, 103–104 Zeid, proposed replacement by, 44 Zionism, and, 56–57, 59, 82–83, 87, 133–136, 142, 164 See also: Amman, Palestine, Transjordan, Zionists Abramson, Albert, 43–44 Abu Jaber, Said Pasha, 63 Abu Nowar, Ma’an, 49, 51 Abyssinia (Ethiopia), 69, 72, 74, 100, 194 Ajlun, 29, 147 al-Alami, Musa, 169 Al Saud, Abd al-Aziz, See: Ibn Saud Aldrich, Richard and John Zametica, 116 Alexander, Albert, 152–153, 160 Ali Ibn Husayn, 24, 32 Allenby, Viscount, 27, 30 Alon, Yoav, 29, 41 Amery, Leopold, 16 Amman, Abdullah, 32, 36–37, 43, 48, 98, 159 Anglo-Transjordan treaty (1948), 147 Arab League, 132, 170 Basilica, destruction, 46

index.indd 278

Bombings, 91, 168 British Residents, 40, 43 Cox, Sir Henry, 48, 82 Jewish Agency, 134, 136, 138 Kirkbride, Sir Alex, 91, 111, 144, 154, 159, 163 National conference, 49 Philby, 46–47 Pirie-Gordon, Christopher, 128 Power station, 60 RAF station, 160–161 Royal (Peel) Commission, 90 UNSCOP, 130 See also: Abdullah, Transjordan Anglo-American Committee on Palestine, 113, 117–118, 130–131 Anglo-Egyptian treaty (1936), 56, 114, 116, 151 Anglo-Iraq treaty (1930), 144, 151 Anglo-Transjordan agreement (1928), 49, 52, 63, 89, 90–91, 96–98, 100, 108, 144, 191–192 Anglo-Transjordan treaty (1946), 108–111, 128, 136, 143–144 Anglo-Transjordan treaty (1948), 121, 125, 141–143, 145–147, 156–157, 160, 174, 177–179, 180–181, 185–186, 195, 197 Antonius, George, 22, 38 Aqaba, 87, 91, 154, 180 Arab Bulletin, 23 Arab Bureau, 22, 23 Arab Higher Committee, 72 Arab-Israeli war, 41, 141–143, 153, 156–159, 161–162, 171, 173–174, 176, 181, 195–197, 199 Arab League, Abdullah, 124–125, 129, 131–133, 146, 148, 160, 167, 170, 173–174, 182 Egypt, and, 123 Gaza government, 173 Jewish Agency, 137

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INDEX Palestine/Transjordan union, 121, 129, 131–133, 143, 148, 160, 167–169, 173–174, 182 Arab Legion, Anglo-Transjordan treaty (1946), 110, 146 Anglo-Transjordan treaty (1948), 147 Arab-Israeli war, 125, 143, 154, 156–159, 160–163, 165, 167–168, 170–171, 186–188, 196 Arms embargo, 141–142, 147, 150–152, 155–156, 159–161, 163, 179, 186–187, 195–197, 199–200 British officers, 157 British support, 142, 146, 150, 152– 153, 167, 172, 175, 177–179, 181 Desert control, 51 Desert Patrol, 40 Development of Transjordan, 55, 112 Expansion, 97, 152–153 Formation of, 34 Iraq, invasion of, 104–105 Loyalty, 198 Palestine, 61, 92, 133, 167, 199 Syria, invasion of, 105 Transformation of, 52 Tribal raiding, 51 See also: Arab-Israeli war, Glubb, Transjordan Arab Liberation Army, 168 Arab nationalism, 71, 76, 99, 103, 112, 114 Arab Revolt (1916–1918), 16–17, 19–24, 27, 29, 40, 124 Arabian Gulf, 1, 191 Arlosoroff, Chaim, 59, 62–63, 82, 84 Arms embargo, 141–142, 147, 150–152, 155–157, 159–161, 163, 179, 186, 199–200 Asquith, Herbert, 18 al-Atrash, Sultan, 94 al-Atrash, Abd al-Ghaffar Pasha, 95 Attlee, Clement, 115–117, 120, 124, 151 Azzam, Abd al-Rahman, 123–124, 132

index.indd 279

279

Baggallay, Lacy, 95, 100 Baghdad, 36, 37–38, 77, 125, 144, 161,197 al-Bakri, Fawzi, 94, 98 al-Bakri, Nasib, 94 Balfour Declaration, 21–22, 39, 50, 53, 64, 82, 90 Balfour-Paul, Glen, 39 Bar-Joseph, Uri, 166 Bedouin, 15, 58, 61 Beeley, Harold, 122, 148, 155 Beirut, 32, 126, 131, 180 Ben-Gurion, David, Abdullah, 90, 136, 164, 166 Arab-Israeli war, 167–168 Transjordan, 133–134, 137 Beni Saqr, 28 Bernadotte, Count, 173 Bevin, Ernest, Abdullah, 128, 147, 186 Arms embargo, 156, 158–160, 196 Middle East conference (1945), 114–115 Palestine, 116–117, 119, 121 Transjordan, 121, 142, 147–149 United States, 150, 155, 157, 196 Bludan, 94, 131 British Empire (imperialism), Decolonisation, 112, 186 Expansion, 17, 26, 33 Financial limitations, 34, 38, 141 Historiography, 10–11 Imperial overstretch, 67–70, 74, 103 Middle East strategy, 16–17, 113–115 Palestine, impact of, 53, 70, 79, 103, 139 Theory of, 11–14 See also: indirect rule and informal empire (rule) British Middle East Office (BMEO), 172 Bullock, Alan, 159 Burrows, Bernard, 159–160, 172 de Bunsen, Sir Maurice, 18

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280

BRITAIN

AND JORDAN

Cabinet, British, 35, 37, 62, 73, 78–79, 105–106, 115, 117, 119–120, 160, 185 Cabinet Defence Committee, 115, 120 Cain, P.J. and Hopkins, A.G., 11, 13–14 Cairo, Abdullah, 16–18, 30, 174 Arab Bureau, 22 Arab League, 132 British Middle East policy, 20 Cairo Conference (1921), 36–37, 115 Hashemites, 18 Jewish Agency, 134, 136 Palestine, 74–75, 180, 197 Campbell, Sir Ronald, 174–175 Central Intelligence Agency (CIA), 156 Chamberlain, Neville, 78–80 Chiefs of Staff (COS), Anglo-Transjordan treaty (1948), 145, 148 Arab Legion, 152–153, 179 Arms supplies, 160 Cold War strategy, 116 European Strategic Appreciation, 70, 80 Middle East, strategic importance, 113, 116 Palestine rebellion, impact of, 71, 79–80, 100 Transjordan, role in war plans, 179 Transjordan value to HMG, 145, 186 Churchill, Winston, Abdullah, 33, 36–38, 44, 88, 107, 124 Cairo conference (1921), 35–36 Palestine, White Paper (1939), 80 Transjordan, 36, 58 Circassians, 41, 85 Civil list, 63–65, 81, 83, 96 Civil service, 13, 41, 157 Clayton, Sir Gilbert, 47–48 Clifford, Clark, 150 Cohen, Michael J., 79 Cold War, 114–115, 142, 149, 187, 196

index.indd 280

Colonial Office, Arab federation, 95, 97 Middle East department, 35 Middle East, division of responsibility, 10, 13, 35, 67, 76–77 Palestine, 73, 78–79, 90, 92, 117 Transjordan, 39, 44, 46, 62, 64, 81–82, 86, 92, 98, 105 Zionist movement, 62, 64, 76, 82, 86, 110 See also: Foreign Office, Palestine and Transjordan Committee of Imperial Defence, 33, 61 Committee on National Expenditure (Geddes Committee), 33–34 Congreve, General, 30 Cooper, Duff, 74 Cox, Colonel Sir Henry, Abdullah, threatens to dismiss, 48 Abdullah, proposes increase in civil list, 63–64 Abdullah, change in title, 96 British Resident in Transjordan, 40, 98, 191–192 Land leases, rejects, 82, 84 Palestine, impact of 1929 riots in Transjordan , 50, 61 Palestine rebellion, 91, 93 Philby, replaces in Transjordan, 48 Rejects Jewish settlement in Transjordan, 59, 82–84 See also: Abdullah and Transjordan Cox, Sir Percy, 27 Creech Jones, Arthur, 117, 119 Cunningham, General Sir Alan, 108, 110, 164, 169–170 Curzon, Lord, 13, 19, 25, 35 Czechoslovakia, 70, 156, 168 Dalton, Hugh, 115, 119 Damascus, Abdullah, 24 Arab conference (1920), 27 Arab Liberation Army, 168

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INDEX French mandate, 31–32 Greater Syria, 85, 126 Husayn-McMahon correspondence, 24 Iraq-Transjordan treaty (1947), 125 Transjordan, 27–28 Danin, Ezra, 138–139 Darwin, John, 9–10 Deedes, Wyndham, 36, 43 Defence Committee (Cabinet), 115, 120 Deir Yassin, 164, 167, 169–170 Dempsey, General Miles, 178 Dill, General Sir John, 74 Doyle, Michael, 12 Drew, Gerald, 182 Eastern Committee, 25 Eddé, Emile, 99 Eden, Sir Anthony, 185 Egypt, Abdullah, 30, 121, 127, 132, 175 Anglo-Egyptian treaty (1936), 13, 49, 69, 80, 108, 114, 116, 142, 149–151, 186, 195 Arab League, 123–125, 182 Army, 142, 174 British imperialism, 4, 10, 12, 14, 40, 56, 69–70, 74, 104, 106, 109, 113, 116, 141, 145, 152–153, 178, 184, 199 Palestine, 61, 77, 94, 121, 148, 154, 148, 161, 174 See also: British Empire and Palestine Egyptian Expeditionary Force, 30 Epstein (Elath), Eliyahu, 137 Faisal Ibn Husayn, King of Iraq, 23–25, 27–28, 30–32, 36–37, 46, 84–86 Abdullah, relations with, 30–31 Arab Revolt, 23 British government, relations with, 24 Death of, 85 King of Syria, 25 Transjordan land leases, response to, 84

index.indd 281

281

al-Faiz, Mashur, 28 al-Faiz, Mithqal, 28, 63 Farbstein, Heschel, 82–83 Farouk, King, 124, 169, 174 Fisher, Michael, 11 Foot, Hugh, 40–41 Foreign Office Abdullah, 48, 84–85, 96, 97, 105–107, 110, 136, 155, 192–193 Anglo-Transjordan agreement, revision of, 97–98 Anglo-Transjordan treaty (1946 and 1948), 144, 145, 146–148 Arab Legion, 154, 157, 158, 162 Arms embargo, 156, 160, 196 De Bunsen Committee, 18 Eastern Committee, 25 Eastern Department, of, 35, 52, 75, 80, 84, 86, 95, 97, 100, 121, 124, 128, 146, 149, 157, 159–160, 172 Greater Syria, 99, 106–107, 126–128 Hogarth Message, 22 Husayn-McMahon correspondence, 19 Middle East policy, 34–35, 113–115, 117 Middle East, division of responsibility, 10, 13, 35, 76–77 Palestine, frontiers, 28–29 Palestine, partition, 93, 121–122 Palestine rebellion, 68, 70, 71, 73–76, 78–79 Pan-Arabism, support for, 99–100, 124 Royal (Peel) Commission, response to, 77, 93 Raiding from Transjordan, 51 Samuel, Sir Herbert and the occupation of Transjordan, 28 Transjordan, 31, 45 Transjordan, annexation of Palestine, 172, 175, 177, 179, 186

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282

BRITAIN

AND JORDAN

Foreign Office (Cont.) Transjordan, independent government, 45 United States, 114, 149, 196 UNSCOP, 119–120 White Paper (1939), 80, 100 See also: Abdullah, Palestine, Transjordan France, Abdullah, 38, 43, 45, 64, 98–99, 106 Abyssinia crisis, 69 Gouraud, General, 43 Greater Syria, 126–127, 193 Mandate, 24–26, 30, 36, 72, 79, 88, 97, 99 Palestine, 75 Sykes-Picot agreement, 18, 20, 53 Syria, treaty talks, 72 Transjordan, 28, 32, 37–38, 44, 48 Furlonge, Sir Geoffrey, 184 Galilee, 173 Gallipoli, 20 Gaza, 10, 173–174 Gelber, Yoav, 83, 134 George VI, King, 90 Gesher, 165 Ghaur al-Kibd, 82, 86 Glubb, John Bagot (Glubb Pasha), Abdullah, assassination, 184–185 Arab-Israeli war, 155–158, 161–163, 165, 168, 171 Arab Legion, 97–98, 105, 110, 152, 154, 198, 199 Arab Legion commander, appointed, 98 Desert Patrol, 40 Dismissal, 185, 187, 200 Palestine, annexation, 121, 149, 178 Transjordan, role in, 40 Transjordan, system of government, 42, 108, 190 Tribal subsidies, 83, 87, 91, 93, 107 Tribal control, 52

index.indd 282

See also: Arab-Israeli war, Arab Legion and TJFF Gort, Field Marshal Lord, 108 Grafftey-Smith, Laurence, 127 Grant-in-aid, 46–48 Great Depression, 43, 64, 69, 189 Greater Syria, 15, 21, 88, 99, 107, 112, 125–128, 135, 137–138, 140, 169, 193 Greater Transjordan, 122, 172, 177–178 Gurney, Sir Henry, 138 Gush Etzion, 165 HABFORCE, 104 Hacohen, David, 90 Haganah, 165, 167 Haifa, 20, 55, 70, 109, 170 Haikal, Yusuf, 169 Haining, General Sir Robert, 79 Harris, Kenneth, 117 Hashemites, 2, 15–22, 24–25, 27, 36, 53, 99, 123–125, 127, 131, 166, 170 Hebron, 135, 155 Hejaz, 15–19, 22–24, 27, 30, 36, 41, 47–48, 51, 61, 65, 192, 193 Hejaz railway, 27, 36, 38, 50, 57–58 Heller, Joseph, 118, 136, 166 Histadut (trade union), 90 Hogarth, Commander David, 22 Holocaust, 112, 117 Hoz, Dov, 90 Huda, Tawfiq Abul, 41, 96–97, 130, 145–146, 149, 158, 174 Husayn Ibn Ali, Sharif of Mecca, Balfour Declaration, response to, 22 Contacts with the British, 18 Correspondence with Sir Henry McMahon, 18–19 Ottoman Empire, 17 Transjordan, arrival in, 47 Husayn-McMahon correspondence (1915–1916) 18–19, 22–23, 33, 53, 59

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INDEX Husayn Ibn Talal (King Husayn), 184–185 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin (the Mufti), Abdullah, 56, 84, 86, 91–92, 132, 194 Arab Higher Committee, 72 Arab League, 131–132, 168, 173 Germany, 94, 129 Iraq, 104 Palestine, 80–81, 88–89, 112, 121, 129, 143, 164, 168, 172–173, 195 Husayni, Abd al-Qadir, 168 Husayni, Jamal, 173 Ibn Rifada, 51 Ibn Saud (Abd al-Aziz Al Saud), King of Saudi Arabia, Abdullah, 20, 51, 64–65, 99, 192, 194 Foreign Office, 24, 51–52, 68, 105, 124, 127 Hashemites, 48, 101 Ikhwan, 23 Palestine, 77 Rendel, George, 52, 68, 75, 85 India, 3, 9, 12, 16–17, 20, 33, 48, 55, 64, 69–70, 113, 120, 128, 191 India Office, 10, 18–19, 27, 35 Indian Civil Service, 46 Indirect rule, 11–12, 38–39, 46, 98, 104, 106, 189–190 See also: British Empire and informal empire Informal empire (rule), 11–13, 29, 33, 38–39, 49, 56, 64, 107, 191 Inshas, 131 Intelligence, 22, 60–61, 63, 72, 76, 80, 82, 86, 95, 118, 133, 156, 161, 168–171, 183 See also: Joint Intelligence Committee Intelligence estimates, 161, 168–169 Iraq Abdullah, 24, 27, 30–31, 64, 106, 111 Allied invasion of, 104–105 Anglo-Iraq treaty (1930), 49, 76, 80, 108, 114, 141–142, 149

index.indd 283

283

Army, 104, 142, 150, 152, 161, 165 British mandate, 10–11, 35, 39, 42, 56, 189 Coup 1958, 185 Faisal, king, 36, 84 HABFORCE, 104 Iraq-Transjordan treaty, 124–125 al-Kailani, Rashid Ali, 104 Nuri al-Said, 73, 95, 123, 125 Oil pipeline, 55, 70, 91, 109, 179 Portsmouth Treaty, 144–146, 151 Irgun (National Military Organisation), 118 Irshid, Farid, 88 Israel, 10, 57, 141–143, 145–146, 150, 155–165, 167, 171, 173–184, 187, 195–199 Istanbul, 15 Istiqlal party, 84, 89 See also: Arab nationalism Italy, 35, 69, 80, 103 Jabr, Saleh, 144–145 Jaffa, 164 Japan, 69–70, 79–80 Jebel Druze, 95 Jenin, 88, 134 Jericho, 168, 174 Jerusalem, Abdullah-Churchill meeting (1921), 4, 33, 37–38, 107 Arab-Israeli war, 155, 158, 161, 163–165, 168, 171, 180–181, 200 King David hotel bombing, 118 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin (the Mufti), 56, 84, 86, 89, 121, 129, 194 Political status, 119, 138 Transjordan, 39, 42, 44, 46, 48 Western/Wailing wall, 61 See also: Palestine Jewish Agency, Abdullah, 57, 81–88, 133–139, 165–166 Arlosoroff, Chaim, 59, 82

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284

BRITAIN

Jewish Agency (Cont.) Intelligence, 68, 95, 133 Royal (Peel) Commission, 95 Sasson, Elias, 134–135, 137 St. James’s Palace Conference (1939), 79 Transjordan, 62, 82–83, 85 See also: Zionists Jewish National Home, 21, 39, 53, 57–59, 76, 97 Joint Intelligence Committee, 5, 80, 171, 183 Jordan, River, 28, 32, 57, 59–61, 68 Jordan valley, 60, 64, 82, 165 al-Kailani, Rashid Ali, 104 Kedourie, Elie, 22, 75, 94 Kerak, 28–29, 32 Khoury, Philip, 85, 99 al-Khuri, Bishara, 126 Khurma, 23–24 Kirkbride, Sir Alec Abdullah, 48, 96, 98–99, 104, 106–107, 110, 124–125, 127, 154, 175–176, 182–183, 193, 196 Anglo-Transjordan treaty, 144 Arab-Israeli war, 157–159, 160–161, 163, 170 Arms supplies, 160–161, 163 British Resident/Minister, 4, 5, 40–41, 111, 144, 154, 177, 184–185, 191–193, 196 Greater Syria, 128 Palestine, annexation, 121–122, 130–131, 136, 146–148, 154, 172, 176, 178 Palestine, 91, 93, 132 Peace with Israel, 180 Political officer in Transjordan (1920), 29 Transjordan, 29, 183–184 See also: Abdullah, Palestine and Transjordan Kisch, Colonel Frederick, 60

index.indd 284

AND JORDAN

Kitchener, Lord, 15–18 Klieman, Aaron, 75 Labour party, 114 Lampson, Sir Miles (Lord Killearn), 74–75 Latrun, 161 Lawrence, T. E. (Lawrence of Arabia), 21, 23–24, 29, 36, 40, 46 League of Nations mandates, 10–11, 26, 69 Lebanon, 15, 20, 25–26, 79, 94, 99, 126, 131, 137 LEHI (Stern Gang), 118, 164 Louis, Wm. Roger, 40, 117 Lydda, 156, 161–163 MacDonald, Malcolm, 79, 96–97 Mack, Sir Henry, 161 MacKereth, Colonel Gilbert, 75, 94–95 MacMichael, Sir Harold, 39, 79, 95–99, 105, 107, 148 Madaba, 28 Marshall, General George, 157 Martel, Comte de, 88 Maysolun, 25 McMahon, Sir Henry, 18–19, 22–23, 33, 58–59 See also: Husayn-McMahon correspondence Mecca, 15–17, 19, 36, 53 Medina, 17, 19, 23, 27, 53 Meinertzhagan, Colonel Richard, 28, 58 Mesopotamia, 20, 26, 30 Meyerson (Meir), Golda, 138–139, 165–167 Middle East Committee, 105–106 Middle East Land Forces (MELF), 152, 154–156, 178 Miller, Ylana, 71 Moab, National Government of, 29 Montagu, Edwin, 35 Montgomery, Field Marshal Bernard, 160 Morris, Benny, 135

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INDEX Nablus, 88, 134, 139 Naharayim, 60, 165 al-Nashashibi, Raghib Bey, 81, 88–89, 91–92 National Bloc, 72 See also: Arab nationalism National Defence Party, 88, 91 See also: Arab nationalism Nejd, 23, 50, 61 See also: Saudi Arabia Neumann, Emanuel, 82–83 Nevo, Joseph, 89, 135, 166 Occupied Enemy Territory Administration (OETA), 24 Onley, James, 12–13 Operation Danny, 161 Ormsby-Gore, William, 73, 78–79, 92–93 Ottoman Empire, 10, 14–18, 20–21, 24, 26–27, 55–57, 63, 87 Palestine Abdullah’s unpopularity in, 92, 171 ‘Appeasement’, in, 79 Arms embargo, 150–151 Balfour Declaration, 21 British withdrawal, 118–120 Cabinet committee, on, 62, 79 Disturbances (1929), 61 al-Husayni, Hajj Amin (the Mufti), 72, 93–94, 129, 168 Garrison of, 34, 118 Gaza government, 173–174 Jewish immigration, 62, 71–72, 74, 79, 82, 87, 92, 97 Mandate, Article 25, 59 Military control of, 34 Partition commission and Abdullah, 90, 92 Partition (Woodhead) Commission, 78, 92 Police, Criminal Investigation Department, 89

index.indd 285

285

Political status (1918), 24 Population, political divisions, 167, 169 Rebellion (1936–1939), 71, 73–74, 93 Royal (Peel) Commission, 74, 76–77 Strategic value to British Empire, 33 System of government, 39 Terrorist groups, 118 Transjordan, 58–59, 61, 121 War Office and, 34 White Paper (1939), 80–81, 98, 116–117 See also: Arab-Israeli war, British Empire, Transjordan Palestine committee, 79, 130 Pappé, Ilan, 135 Paris, 72, 136 Paris, Timothy, 19 Paris Peace Conference (1919), 57 Peake, Frederick (Peake Pasha), 29, 34, 50–51, 93, 98, 198 Philby, St. John, 46–48 Pirie-Gordon, Christopher, 128, 130, 161, 163 Plumer, Field Marshal Lord, 59–60 Pratt, Lawrence, 69 Pundik, Ron, 110 Pyman, General Sir Harold, 155 Quwwatli, Shukri, 126, 169 Ramallah, 134, 168 al-Ramla, 155–156, 161–163 Refugees, Palestinian, 143, 162, 164, 169, 172, 175, 181, 183, 187 Rendel, George, 52, 75, 77–78, 84–85, 95 Rhodes, 181 al-Rifai, Samir, 41, 130–132, 138 Robinson, Ronald and John Gallagher, 11–13 Royal Air Force (RAF), 34, 73–74, 146, 160–161

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286

BRITAIN

AND JORDAN

Royal Navy, 16, 69–70, 80 Rutenberg, Pinhas, 60 al-Said, Nuri, 73–74, 89, 95, 99, 123–125 St James’s Palace Conferences (1939), 19, 79, 95–100 Salt, 28–29, 84 Samuel, Sir Herbert, 28–29, 31–32, 43–44, 46–47, 58–59 San Remo conference, 26 Sargent, Sir Orme, 113, 122, 145, 147–148 Sasson, Elias, 88–89, 134–135, 137–138 al-Sati, Shawkat, 135, 164 Saudi Arabia, Abdullah, 51–52, 125, 148, 192 Arab League, 132 Bludan congress, 94 Foreign Office, 75, 85 Greater Syria, 99, 123, 127 Palestine, 68, 74 See also: Ibn Saud Sawt al-Arab, 184 Security Service (MI5), 5, 118 Shahbandar, Abd al-Rahman, 94, 98 Sharifians, 32, 36, 44, 85 Shertock (Sharett), Moshe, 82, 134, 181 Shlaim, Avi, 4, 87, 120, 132, 135, 137, 149, 165, 166 Shuckburgh, Sir John, 44, 46, 76 Sluglett, Peter, 10 Soviet Union, 108, 110–111, 113–114, 116, 141, 144, 146, 151, 153, 155–156, 159, 179, 196 ‘Special Relationship’, Anglo-US, 150, 155, 196 State Department, 159, 177 Stern Gang, See: LEHI Stonehewer-Bird, Sir Hugh, 125 Storrs, Ronald, 16, 17 Suez Canal, 14, 16, 20, 33, 53, 55, 69–70, 104, 108, 112, 114, 146, 153, 179, 189, 195

index.indd 286

See also: British Empire, Egypt Suez Canal Zone/Base, 74, 152, 154 Suez crisis, 197 Sykes, Sir Mark, 24 Sykes-Picot Agreement (1916), 20, 22, 25 Syria Abdullah as king of, 86, 93–94, 98–99 King Faisal, 25 Strikes, impact in Palestine, 72 Syrian throne (Greater Syria), 86, 93–94, 98–99 Transjordan, relations with, 27, 28 Taif, 23 Talal Ibn Abdullah, 182–183 Tall, Abdullah, 165 Tel Aviv, 155, 161–162, 171 Thomas, Bertram, 47–48 Townshend, Charles, 72 Transjordan (Jordan from April 1950) Administration, formation of, 39 Amirate, independent, 45 Anglo-Transjordan Agreement (1928), 49 Anglo-Transjordan treaty, 108–110, 144, 177–180 Arab Revolt (1916–1918) and, 27 British aid, dependence on, 46 British influence in, 11–12 British policy, 33, 39, 56, 64–65, 108, 112, 176 British occupation, possible, 29 British political officers (1920), 29 British Resident, role of, 39–40 Desert control, 51 Economic conditions, 81 Organic Law (1928), 49 Philby, St. John, British Resident, 46 Palestine, annexation, 121, 172, 176, 178 Palestine rebellion, impact on, 93–94 Peace with Israel, 180–181

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INDEX Population (c. 1920), 27 Situation in (1920), 32 Syria, relations with, 28 System of government in, 41–42 Tribal Control Board, 50 Viability, 183 See also: Abdullah, Kirkbride, Palestine Transjordan Frontier Force (TJFF), 60, 62, 105 Treasury, 5, 10, 13, 29, 63–64, 109–110, 191 Tribal Control Board, 50 Tribal raiding, 28–29, 34, 36, 48, 58 Tripe, William, 42 Troutbeck, Sir John, 172, 174–175, 181, 183 Truman, Harry S., 149–150, 155, 159 Tuqan, Sulayman, 88, 173 Turaba, battle of (1918), 23 Turkey, 100, 114–115, 124–125 United Nations, 111, 122, 136, 146–148, 157–159, 173–174 United Nations Special Committee on Palestine (UNSCOP), 119–120, 130–131, 138, 157 United States, 6, 111, 113–114, 117, 141–142, 150–151, 158–159, 186, 196 al-Unsi, Muhammad, 86, 93, 133, 135 Vansittart, Sir Robert, 52, 73 Vatikiotis, P.J., 52 Vickery, C.E., 27

index.indd 287

287

Wadsworth, George, 92 Wahhabist movement, 20, 23 War Office, 5, 18, 28–29, 33–35, 76, 156 Wauchope, Lt. General Sir Arthur, Abdullah, 88–90, 92 Palestine rebellion, 73–74, 93 Transjordan, 52, 64, 82–84, 86 Weizmann, Chaim, 57–59, 62, 81–84, 89 West Bank, 136, 154, 171–176, 178–179, 187 Whitehall, 14, 20, 35, 74, 78–81, 123, 141, 144, 153, 157, 179, 186, 194 Wilson, Arnold, 27 Wilson, Field Marshal Sir Henry, 33 Wilson, Mary, 83, 85, 126 Yemen, 23 Zaslani (Shiloah), Reuven, 137, 167 Zeid, Amir Shakir Ibn, 50 Zeid Ibn Husayn, 44 Zionists, Abdullah, alleged collusion, 133 Abdullah, development of relations with, 62–63 Abdullah, land lease, 81–84, 86 Arab-Israeli war, 165, 168 Transjordan, colonisation of, 57 Transjordan Frontier Force, Jews serving in, 60 See also: Jewish Agency, Palestine

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index.indd 288

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