BRICS and Resistance in Africa: Contention, Assimilation and Co-optation 9781350218765, 9781786996305

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Acknowledgements and dedication

Any book is the sum of many people’s efforts. But the editors would like to give a special thanks to the Dean of the Faculty of Military Science, Professor Samuel Tshehla, and Stellenbosch University for their financial support of this project. We wish to also acknowledge Lwando Mthamo and Jeanne Enslin’s dedicated editorial support. Also, we are indebted to Ken Barlow from Zed Books for his support and comments during the proposal phase of our project, and to Kim Walker for taking up the reins. Lastly, we wish to express our gratitude to the anonymous reviewers of our manuscript. For Daniella.

About the contributors

Phineas Bbaala, Lecturer, Department Administrative Studies, University of Zambia

of

Political

and

Patrick Bond, Professor, Wits School of Governance, University of Witwatersrand, South Africa Nicole Dodd, Chair, School of Human and Organisational Development, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa Shakespear Hamauswa, Lecturer, International Relations and Development, Mulungushi University, Zambia, and Doctoral Candidate, University of KwaZulu-Natal Godfrey Hampwaye, Senior Lecturer, Department of Geography and Environmental Studies, University of Zambia, Zambia and Research Affiliate, School of Tourism and Hospitality, University of Johannesburg, South Africa Ishmael Lesufi, Lecturer, Department of Sociology, University of South Africa, and Doctoral Candidate, Wits School of Governance Farai Maguwu, Director, Centre for Natural Resource Governance, Zimbabwe, and Doctoral Candidate, Wits School of Governance Mbekezeli Mkhize, Researcher, Centre for Military Studies, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa Lwando Mthamo, Researcher, Centre for Military Studies, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa Eldar Salakhetdinov, Postdoctoral Fellow, Institute for Dispute Resolution in Africa, University of South Africa, South Africa Vukile Sibiya, Chair, Department of Mercantile and Public Law (Mil), University of Stellenbosch, South Africa

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Vasily Sidorov, Researcher, Centre for Southern Africa Studies, Institute for African Studies of the Russian Academy of Sciences, Russia. István Tarrósy, Associate Professor, Department of Political Science and International Studies, University of Pecs, Hungary Lisa Thompson, Professor, School of Government, University of the Western Cape, South Africa Justin van der Merwe, Senior Researcher, Centre for Military Studies, University of Stellenbosch, South Africa

Published in association with the International African Institute The principal aim of the International African Institute is to promote scholarly understanding of Africa, notably its changing societies, cultures, and languages. Founded in 1926 and based in London, it supports a range of seminars and publications including the journal Africa. www.internationalafricaninstitute.org

Acronyms and abbreviations

AA Affirmative Action ABSA ABSA bank AIDS Acquired Immunodeficiency Syndrome AMCU Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union ANC African National Congress APF Anti-Privatisation Forum ASGISA Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative South Africa AU African Union BBBEE Broad-based Black Economic Empowerment BEE Black Economic Empowerment BLF Black First Land First BRI Belt and Road Initiative BRICS Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa BTUF BRICS Trade Union Forum CAK Conservation Alliance of Kenya CGN China General Nuclear Power Group CNMM China Nonferrous Metal Mining COSATU Congress of South African Trade Unions CRA Contingency Reserve Arrangement CREC China Railway Engineering Corporation CSR China South Railways CST Colonialism of a special type DA Democratic Alliance DIRCO Department of International Relations and Cooperation (SA) EDF Élictricité de France EDGAR Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research EDZ Export development zone EFF Economic Freedom Fighters EPRDF Ethiopian People’s Democratic Front ERC Ethiopian Railway Corporation ESKOM Electricity Supply Commission of South Africa EU European Union

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ExIm Bank China’s Export–Import Bank EZLN Zapatista Army of National Liberation FDI Foreign Direct Investment FEDUSA Federation of Democratic Unions of South Africa FIFA Fédération Internationale de Football Association FMF Fees Must Fall movement FOCAC Forum on China–Africa Cooperation G20 Group of 20 GBM government-business-media complex, the GDP Gross Domestic Product GEAR Growth, Employment and Redistribution plan HDI Human development index HIV Human Immunodeficiency Virus IAEA International Atomic Energy Agency ICT Information communications technology IDA International development assistance IDEA Institute for Development and Leadership in Africa IFI International financial institutions IMF International Monetary Fund IMR International Minerals Resources IPAP Industrial Policy Action Plan IRP Integrated Resource Plan ITUC International Trade Union Congress LCM Luanshya Copper Mine LGBTI Lesbian, gay, bisexual, transsexual, and intersex MDCAlliance Movement for Democratic Change-Alliance MDM Mass Democratic Movements MFEZ Multi-Facility Economic Zone MMD Movement for Multi-Party Democracy MNC Multinational corporation/company MSRI Maritime Silk Route Initiative NACTU National Council of Trade Unions NAM Non-Aligned Movement, The NDB New Development Bank NEDLAC National Economic Development and Labour Council NEPAD New Partnership for Africa’s Development NFCA Non-Ferrous Company-Africa NGO Non-governmental organisation NGP New Growth Path NIEO New international economic order NIGATOM Nigerian Atomic Energy Commission

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NPP Nuclear power plant NSFAS National Student Financial Aid Scheme NSM New social movements NUM National Union of Mineworkers NUMSA National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa OBOR One Belt One Road Initiative PRC People’s Republic of China RDB Rwanda Development Board RDP Reconstruction and Development Programme RFI Request for information RSB Rwanda Standards Board SA South Africa SACP South African Communist Party SACU Southern African Customs Union SADC Southern African Development Community SAPS South African Police Service SAREC South African Renewable Energy Council SDPP Strategic Defence Procurement Packages SEZ Special Economic Zones SGR Standard gauge railway SITC Standard international trade classification SMDC Strategic maritime distribution centre SOE State-owned enterprise SONA State of the nation address STI Science, technology, and innovation TAC Treatment Action Campaign TAZARA Tanzania–Zambia Railway UAE United Arab Emirates UK United Kingdom UN United Nations US United States USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics WEF World Economic Forum WTO World Trade Organisation ZANU-PF Zimbabwe African National Union – Patriotic Front ZCCM Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines ZCMT Zambia–China Mulungushi Textile Joint Venture Limited

Illustrations

Figures 4.1 4.2 9.1 9.2

Africa–BRICS trade categorised by product, 2016 77 Africa–China trade, 2012–2016 85 The Belt and Road Initiative Maritime Route 171 Strategic Maritime Distribution Centres 179

Tables 4.1 Trade between selected partners, 2016 76 4.2 Africa–BRICS trade categorised by product, 2016 78 4.3 Africa–Brazil trade, 2016 80 4.4 Africa–Russia trade categorised by product, 2016 81 4.5 Africa–India trade categorised by product, 2016 83 4.6 Africa–China trade, 2016 84 4.7 Africa–South Africa trade, 2016 86

1 African assimilation, co-optation, and resistance in the BRICS era Justin van der Merwe, Nicole Dodd, and Patrick Bond

This volume brings together Africanists who cover the terrain of social and geopolitical resistance to oppression in Africa – resistance that is gathering renewed vigour due to the accelerated processes of accumulation by dispossession set in motion by the rise of the BRICS. Alongside the resurgence of nationalism and trade protectionism, Western and BRICS economic and political turbulence, as well as rising ecological threats, together increase the precariousness of those in the world’s periphery and semi-periphery (whether in the Northern or Southern hemispheres). The situation is exacerbated by global capital’s turn to hybridised, deregulated, and increasingly chaotic economic strategies to maximise exploitation and to deepen inequality. This combination of factors has led to crises in African states, eliciting responses from local and regional elites as well as from ‘ordinary’ people and groups as they seek to push back or generate creative responses ‘from below’. At a micro level, these responses range from developing new ways of surviving in impoverished communities to civic mass mobilisation. At the macro level, new forms of development finance (development banks and regional initiatives) are generating an alternative means of accumulating, not through production but speculation, including on mega-infrastructure projects which may never pay off. Many of these initiatives, including the BRICS New Development Bank (NDB) and Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), make ‘localised’ forms of generativity seem possible because they imply new sources of funds at a time when debt crises are returning to Africa. They also serve the more significant purpose of speaking truth to power, insofar as critiques of the Bretton Woods institutions are more loudly expressed by a Third World professional intelligentsia (as well as populist politicians like former South African president Jacob Zuma). However, despite their ostensibly revolutionary basis, one should question whether the new institutions are forms of acquiescence (co-option

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and accommodation), as opposed to true resistance to neoliberalism. If so, answers should emerge now, five years after the BRICS institutions were founded in Brazil in 2014 and four years after the International Monetary Fund was reformed to give the four BRIC countries (not the ‘S’) dramatically increased voting shares (see Chapter 3). This book critically examines two notions of resistance involving the BRICS and Africa. First, at the global level, BRICS supporters claim that the bloc may act as a transformative agent and thereby enhance Africa’s stature; meaning that the BRICS in concert with Africa may resist Western hegemony when and where they can. Whether this is an empirical reality or not, non-Western intellectuals were particularly fond of arguing the potential for anti-imperialist politics until reality asserted itself recently with pro-US leaders like Narendra Modi, Michel Temer, Cyril Ramaphosa, and Jair Bolsonaro taking power. This proclivity is evident in the volumes of mostly International Relations literature dedicated to this topic. These volumes claim that the rise of BRICS offers a legitimate challenge to the status quo and prophesise the supposed demise of the West. The actual evidence for this is lacking, suggesting that these intellectuals may be under the influence of ‘BRICS from above’ discourses emanating from their respective governments, business sectors, and state-linked as well as commercial media. The second, more realistic, area of resistance involving BRICS and Africa can be seen in responses by critical Africans to the BRICS. They are showing how the BRICS themselves represent new threats to Africa and suggesting scepticism and caution, in terms of how African elites engage with their BRICS counterparts. Frank discussion concerning the BRICS’ exploitative role in Africa is slightly harder to find and has sometimes been overshadowed by the more triumphalist literature, written by those based in the non-West and the West. Those who question BRICS’ role in Africa adopt a different ideological or epistemic approach to the BRICS altogether, and advance the standpoint termed ‘BRICS from below’ (see Garcia and Bond’s definitions below). In this volume, we are primarily concerned with argumentation about BRICS from the middle and below. A critical-pragmatic and pro-African viewpoint necessitates more discussion concerning the potential benefits and dangers of BRICS’ elite-driven relationship with Africa. Are BRICS countries opening opportunities that may not have materialised for African countries otherwise? Are they helping Africa to have a place at the global ‘top table’? Alternatively, are

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they pushing smaller countries down to have that place, through a new mode of exploitation operating under the guise of South–South solidarity? What are the individual and societal responses to the role of BRICS across Africa? What is certain is that the African elite is genuinely conflicted in their relationships with the BRICS countries. On the one hand, they want the BRICS nations to ‘thrive’ in the vague hope that BRICS may somehow help to kick-start development within their territories helping to propel Africa forward, without the conditionalities and loss of sovereignty imposed by the Western multilateral institutions and donor agencies. On the other hand, these African elites also feel the need to protect their resources from excessive depletion by BRICS firms, thereby inscribing a general sense of circumspection into this relationship. This scepticism is not without merit, as the BRICS countries’ and corporations’ motives in Africa seem to be increasingly dubious, if not outright deleterious or dispossessing. There are many examples of BRICS activities in Africa resulting in threats to African livelihoods and interests. For example, local fishers in Hout Bay in Cape Town, South Africa, undertook a string of protests in September 2017 over the loss of the fishing rights that they had traditionally held. The assumption was that illegal Chinese commercial fishing was threatening traditional fishing communities in the area. This concern was not unfounded as it is estimated that more than $2 billion worth of fish is illegally taken from African waters every year with the resultant loss of 300,000 jobs in West Africa alone (Kgomoeswana, 2017). More recently in Kitwe, Zambia, in October 2018, over 100 people were arrested for protesting against China’s acquisition of ZAFFICO, a government-owned timber business (Lusaka Times, 2018). Other BRICS countries have also faced similar protests, with opposition to mining and land grabs reflecting increasingly frequently on the Environmental Justice Atlas (2018). Trade-driven macro-level economic policy is creating localised sites of dispossession where communities are forced to merely survive, many of whom lack the resources to mobilise with, or even identify allies facing similar challenges. ‘BRICS from above’ collaboration with their hinterland counterparts is touted as beneficial, yet the way in which contracts are sometimes handled (and the corruption associated with these contracts) is anything but developmental. South Africa, as a junior and African partner in BRICS, seems particularly vulnerable to less than salubrious influence from BRICS partners. The deal between South Africa’s Transnet and China

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South Railways, which involved kickbacks to a narrow Guptaempire elite and the syphoning of money to tax havens in the United Arab Emirates (UAE), is a stark example of how these deals can go awry, and how with a $5 billion credit from the China Development Bank arranged by the same men who authorised the Transnet graft, South Africans will be repaying this sort of odious debt for generations (see Chapter 8). The craftiness and complexity of the attempts to launder money are indicative of the lengths to which predatory elites would go to channel African public money into private, sometimes foreign hands. Cyril Ramaphosa’s own experiences on behalf of Lonmin, MTN, and Shanduka are just the examples that have come to light thanks to whistle-blowers in Panama and London law firms (see Chapter 3). Another similar example of misguided ‘BRICS from above’ interference is found in the Russia–South Africa nuclear deal (Chapter 12). This $100 billion deal, foisted upon the South African citizenry by the state president with such heavy-handedness and limited due diligence, threatened to send South Africa into a further downward economic spiral until it was halted by civil society (Earthlife Africa and the SA Faith Communities Environmental Initiative) using ‘street heat’, widescale social delegitimisation, and court action. Resistance to the deal is a tribute to the power of ‘BRICS from below’ and the critical forces within ‘BRICS from the middle’. However, there are growing indications across the BRICS of threats to dissenters’ freedom to express themselves. The more established democracies in the group are partnering with those who are authoritarian, especially China whose command of the internet and social surveillance will become official in 2020 with ‘social credit’ installed by Tencent, which is 30 per cent owned by South Africa’s largest firm, Naspers (formerly as pro-apartheid as any corporation). Instances of corruption or nepotism are reasoned away by the elite by employing cultural relativism, branding these practices as somehow different from a Western ‘way’ of doing business, yet equally acceptable. For example, India’s state-owned Bank of Baroda allowed the Gupta brothers to lubricate massive outflows of illicit funds for many years. In any case, South Africa’s corporate elites are regularly awarded the biannual PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) ‘Economic Crime’ survey rating: most corrupt businessmen on earth. After Transnet’s chief executive was fired thanks to revelations about Gupta-related corruption, the South African BRICS Business Council – on which he served as one of five directors – was dissolved

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in October 2018. The self-promoting group led by newspaper proprietor Iqbal Survé was simply too controversial, notwithstanding that the Council had just weeks earlier hosted high-profile networking events in Sandton and Durban. ‘BRICS from above’ participated enthusiastically, ‘BRICS from the middle’ was mainly quiet, and only ‘BRICS from below’ engaged in protest. Questionable deals driven by ‘BRICS from above’ that result in capital outflow, socio-ecological destruction, and disruption of local economies cause the loss of global reputations (including investor confidence) while reducing the security of citizens, and normally only benefit the elite. As illustrated during the Jacob Zuma era, this is, at its worst, achieved under cover of hackneyed, anti-Western rhetoric that although sometimes justified, is often used to wilfully mislead: a ‘talk left’ in order to ‘walk right’. Given this top-down scenario, what does the rise of the BRICS mean to African citizens? Does BRICS mean anything to what might be viewed as ‘ordinary’ African citizens? Does it have any (positive) material impact on their lives or is it just an elite construct, leaving the mass of citizenry alienated and still concerned mainly with basic survival? Although closer ties benefit ‘BRICS from above’ these ties may have devastating effects in partner countries in the sense that close association with authoritarian countries might legitimise human rights violations, especially given the fragility of Africa’s fledgling democracies. The West uses economic interventions to discipline states that violate labour laws and human rights. However, most, if not all the BRICS countries continue to trade and engage with countries with questionable track records, neutralising much of the effect of the global disciplining forces. Notably, in Africa, four BRICS – Russia, India, China, and South Africa – continued to engage with Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe until the November 2017 coup (which was considered pre-approved in Beijing), and are courting Zimbabwe’s new president, Emmerson Mnangagwa for new, low-regulation investment opportunities as that country’s economy collapses (see Chapter 6). It could be argued that these interactions prop up regimes and obstruct reform and that this will continue under Zimbabwe’s ‘new’ leadership. Admittedly, there is a counter-argument that BRICS countries respect sovereignty and recognise each nation’s right to selfdetermination. However, when oppressive regimes stifle popular resistance, then economic and diplomatic channels seem the most prudent means of initiating reform. But such pressures – whether from angry citizens or Western sanctions – are neutralised when

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states like the BRICS offer alternative sources of income. The BRICS leaders are then often complicit in oppression, as witnessed in sites as diverse as Sudan and Myanmar. With the commodities downturn and extractivist capital retreating from the continent, foreign capital inflow has declined. This has finally put paid to the bogus ‘Africa Rising’ trope (see, for example, Taylor, 2014). Tough economic circumstances in countries, coupled with a sometimes rebellious, even reckless spirit towards Western rating agencies, sovereign credit downgrades, a sluggish global growth environment, and rising unemployment have created fertile conditions for uprisings and popular protest. These were most spectacular in 2011 in North Africa, removing the Ben Ali, Mubarak, and Gaddafi regimes within weeks of the protest upsurges. Popular pressure – often decisive – rose against leaders in Senegal later that year, Nigeria in 2012, Burkina Faso in 2014, Burundi in 2015, Congo-Brazzaville, and DR Congo in 2016, Zimbabwe in 2017, and Ethiopia in 2018 (see, generally, Branch and Mampilly, 2015). South Africa also can credit its change in leadership from Zuma to Ramaphosa in early 2018 to mass uprisings over the prior two years. Likewise, tens of thousands of protesters massed in national capitals and other major cities in 2017–2019 in Togo, Cameroon, Somalia, Morocco, Uganda, Kenya, and the Gambia. However, often using not only Western but BRICS technologies, the spaces for meaningful mobilisation are also simultaneously suppressed by dictatorial ruling elites eager to hold on to power. This book seeks to move the debates about BRICS forward by theorising these resistances and the various narratives accompanying them at the levels of BRICS from above, the middle, and below. What is unique about the discourses emanating from above and below, in relation to BRICS extractivism, economic exploitation, ecological degradation, and rights violations? How do these fit with the more prominent contributions to revived debates about imperialist and sub-imperialist agendas in Africa? Naïve hopes of development stemming from glib phrases such as ‘South–South solidarity’ do not help Africa to advance. Likewise, perpetual short-termism by African elites during upturns in commodity cycles does nothing to help them to articulate a meaningful development position in relation to the BRICS. At the micro level, ordinary African citizens face similar challenges in their daily lives. They must eke out a living in an increasingly competitive local arena, often in combat with a kleptocratic elite, amidst an unfavourable geopolitical climate, so is it any wonder that protests arise?

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What we know about ideological orientations to the BRICS Geopolitical discourses emanate from three main sources or types of geopolitics: practical, formal, and popular geopolitics. Practical geopolitics pertains to practitioners of statecraft such as foreign affairs officials and others in government. Formal geopolitics covers discourse created by academics and public intellectuals (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992). Finally, popular geopolitics comprises ‘popular’ sources and might include cartoons, satire, movies, and other expressions of geopolitical interests found in popular culture (for example, the band Pussy Riot) (Dodds, 2010). Although applicable to the global Southern setting, such discourses were often embedded in the global North and West and scripted the global South without affording them any substantive agency or voice. Within the global Southern context, however, an understanding of global Southern intellectuals’ orientation towards dominant Western geopolitical discourse is also necessary. This applies both to the analytical purchase afforded to academics engaged in such studies, but also to the way elites orient themselves practically in multilateral fora, international institutions, and when interacting with the West and each other. Garcia and Bond’s (2015) classification of ‘BRICS from above’, the ‘middle’, and ‘below’ articulates both theoretical and practical geopolitics. ‘BRICS from above’ comprises heads of state, corporates, and elite allies. Garcia and Bond contend that the elites might be seen as operating in somewhat contradictory modes, depending on the vantage point of the observer and their assumed interests. These modes label BRICS as anti-imperialist, sub-imperialist, or inter-imperialist (2015:6–7). ‘BRICS from above’ will often attempt to portray themselves as anti-imperialist and as some form of alternative to global capitalism (this image is sometimes accepted and echoed by less-critical members of ‘BRICS from the middle’). In South Africa, this identity is best captured by the African National Congress’ (ANC’s) mantra of ‘talk left, walk right’ where trade unionists and socialist blocs are appeased by discourse but are undermined by policy. Often at the intra-BRICS level, the memory of solidarity with Africa’s liberation movements is invoked as a means of fostering goodwill and cooperation (for example, description of the role of the USSR in the liberation of sub-Saharan African states). The supposedly anti-imperialist identity is expressed in practical actions such as the creation of the New Development Bank.

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When BRICS are viewed as sub-imperialist, we accept that they do not challenge but instead buttress the existing neoliberal Western-led system of accumulation. Although not traditionally considered to be sub-imperial powers in the mould of Brazil and South Africa, both China and Russia’s move towards a more neoliberal economy lends weight to the arguments that this is their dominant mode, despite their protestations and attempt to cast themselves as anti-imperialist. The levers and modes through which sub-imperialist states manoeuvre spans a range of interventions and include the super-exploitation of their immediate country and respective hinterlands. Inter-imperialism refers to the development of rival blocs of imperialist interests. In contrast to anti-imperialism, where the notion is challenged and rejected, and sub-imperialism, which implies integration into the existing system, inter-imperialism speaks of competition with existing imperial systems. The BRICS Academic Forum, intellectuals, trade unions, and NGOs form ‘BRICS from the middle’ can also be divided into three groups based on their perceptions of the BRICS’ imperial orientation (anti-, sub-, or inter-). The first, which could be labelled ‘pro-BRICS advocates’, includes most participants in the BRICS Academic Forum, members of ‘think tanks’ and the ‘Civic BRICS’ initiated by Russia. More broadly, the group encompasses those who subscribe to the idea that BRICS can serve as an anti-imperialist force that will challenge global injustices. The second group (within the middle tier) has adopted a waitand-see approach concerning the BRICS. This includes most NGOs, their funders, and global Southern intellectuals who hoped that BRICS would become anti-imperialist. In so doing it was hoped that they would reform the United Nations and Bretton Woods institutions using alternative institutions such as the New Development Bank and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement. The third and final ‘middle’ group comprises critics of BRICS. This group, through exposure to the experiences of ‘BRICS from below’, has concluded that the BRICS are largely sub-imperialist and sometimes also inter-imperialist. ‘BRICS from below’ is made up of grassroots activists who have bottom-up perspectives of global development challenges. Once more, this group comprises three general orientations or interpretations of the BRICS. ‘Localists’ have limited exposure beyond their locale or sector and might engage in ‘popcorn’ protests, sometimes even against BRICS companies. Localists can launch isolated

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responses to systemic problems that directly affect their communities. However, they run the risk of being accused of xenophobia and populism. Their modes of resistance may prove to be ineffectual because of their isolated and uncoordinated efforts. The second group ‘from below’ could be labelled as being ‘nationally bound’. These mostly civil society activists are aware of BRICS and generally hostile towards it. They are focused on national and sectoral struggles, most of which counteract BRICS’ agenda but fail to collaborate with other actors in other sectors who might help them to advance their agendas. Finally, the ‘solidaristic-internationalists’ are aligned to global justice movements and provide solidarity to groups across the BRICS when their allies are repressed. These parties build intra-BRICS networks in support of universal human and ecological rights and against common BRICS enemies such as Vale, Transnet, and the New Development Bank. A fourth group, aside from the ideological viewpoints towards the BRICS that are held by those ‘above’, in ‘the middle’, and ‘below’, orients itself to and is pro-Western business, potentially placing them within the imperialist system. Most organic intellectuals connected to ‘old money’ hold this viewpoint. Others might include those working for multinationals who have corporate branches or plants in their home countries. Northern-centric institutions and political parties are also inclined to this bias. These parties express the concern that, in future, the BRICS might emerge as an effective anti-Western bloc and might threaten their economic and cultural interests.

‘BRICS from the middle’: resisting co-optation and collusion in Africa As already highlighted, this book focuses on ‘middle’ and ‘below’ relations. ‘BRICS from the middle’ are particularly vulnerable to cooptation ‘from above’, yet, equally so, can build solidarity networks with those ‘from below’. The primary issue at this level is therefore whether they choose to be co-opted by those above or to resist in solidarity with those below. To elaborate, the formal BRICS grouping has led to the creation of networks that have great potential to resist transnational bourgeoisie interests moulded in Western form and can mobilise societies and enact resistance. However, at the same time, through

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reliance on funding, unquestioned following of state discourses, or coercion, those in ‘the middle’ can easily be subsumed into the system. Individuals may get lulled into thinking that they are acting independently, yet, are not. This is particularly prominent in the areas of commercial research and at universities. As donor (often state-linked) funding flows between BRICS research institutes and universities, we should once again ask the question: is it for the good of these societies or is it serving ‘BRICS from above’? Much can, of course, be gained through critical comparison of the BRICS. For example, Brazil and South Africa are both regional hegemons that have been beset with similar scandals related to corruption, mega-event exhaustion, protests, and calls for impeachment (Chapter 10). As South African civil society begins to push back against ‘BRICS from above’, it may also draw lessons from Brazil’s experiences. This is particularly true considering Brazil’s ability to hold its leaders to account. Intra-BRICS cooperation is not without its benefits. Interaction ‘from above’ via initiatives such as government-led science and technology partnerships, offers great opportunities where BRICS countries can learn from each other. This is at least a line which BRICS countries tout when pushing for contracts. There is certainly value to be gained from ‘South–South’ collaborations that help to build and ‘lock-in’ intellectual property into the global South, as opposed to losing it to highly developed countries. However, a caveat must be attached to any calls for solidarity or even benevolence as what seems like alliance-building across the BRICS may just be the usual charm offensive in exchange for resources, or to gain leverage in African markets. For example, BRICS multinationals might use corporate social responsibility and official development assistance as a means of facilitating co-optation and goodwill among NGOs, researchers, and unions to neutralise resistance. India has successfully crafted a seemingly benign image in Africa while simultaneously expanding its corporate and industrial footprint sometimes with little consideration for the environment or human rights (Taylor, Van der Merwe, and Dodd, 2016; see Chapter 11). Indeed, those in the ‘middle’ would do well to remind themselves of the realpolitik of the situation between Africa and the BRICS. The primary reason that the BRICS countries show any interest in the continent is due to its natural resources. China decided to append Africa to its One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative because of ongoing albeit declining demand for African resources. China has

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key strategic interests in Africa, namely access to raw materials, markets, and more recently, manufacturing sites (see Van der Merwe, 2018). China’s growth has attracted the interest of African states too as it has been viewed as a potential growth model for Africa. For example, African states have emulated China’s Special Economic Zones. This state-led model of development has gained further traction because of China’s OBOR model, influencing East Africa in particular (see Chapter 9). South Africa, the only African BRICS member, is not unlike the other members. The expectation when South Africa joined BRICS was that the alliance would help to uplift the southern African subregion. Trade relations, however, seem largely unchanged (Chapter 4). Regional government officials, business leaders, and media and intellectual elites seem as critical as ever about South Africa’s involvement in BRICS and whether this will bring about any substantive change. In response, regional groups spanning trade unions, NGOs, and critical regional media are often openly defiant towards South African government and businesses, actively constructing counterhegemonies. Instances such as MTN, a South African mobile network provider’s flouting of regulations in Nigeria, xenophobic violence within South Africa, South Africa’s ineffectual mediation in Zimbabwe, and a generally ‘cowboy’ mentality to doing business in the region (as witnessed in Lesotho in 1998 and the Central African Republic in 2013), to name but a few, have all contributed to loss of confidence in South Africa as a force for mutual development. South Africa’s inability to get its own house in order does not bode well for regional development.

Creative responses from below? Citizens are developing creative responses to dispossession at the hands of the BRICS (and beyond). Despite an unfavourable geopolitical climate, deep inequality in Africa, and the state-sanctioned restriction of protest spaces, members of communities are still applying common-sense solutions and mobilising to engineer what may be called ‘creative responses from below’. This can take the form of civic mobilisation manifesting in student, political, and environmental protests. Such groups may include in their armoury innovative ways of surviving such as through communal or group savings schemes, and even through the valorisation of waste (see, for example, Samson, 2015). Although the latter examples are not

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traditionally or directly forms of resistance, they are part of the agency which community leaders and ‘everyday’ people are having to exact, choosing to act outside the formal state structures or being forced into these positions out of the need for survival and a lack of suitable alternatives. Emerging forms of resistance in Africa are hard to understand and analyse as they fall outside the traditional state-civic model of participation and commonly used (mostly Western in origin) theories and analytical frameworks. However, these ‘moments’ created in resisting trans-nationalising capitalist interests vis-à-vis the BRICS and beyond (see Taylor, 2017), may present opportunities to develop new ways of theorising resistance. A further important dimension to this debate is that ‘geopolitics’ is becoming increasingly part of the ‘every day’, and not only the exclusive preserve of state elites and intellectuals. In the modern era, examples of popular and seemingly spontaneous protests abound, such as what became known as the Arab Spring, where the online presence of the protesters was particularly decisive (Khondker, 2011). These protests can be considered a form of anti-geopolitics. According to Routledge (1998:245), anti-geopolitics represents an ‘ethical, political and cultural force within civil society’ that questions whether ‘the interests of the state’s political class are identical to the community’s interests’. Following the general line that the BRICS are components of, and not challenges to, the existing global order, what unites these forms of resistance is a mobilisation against the dispossessing qualities of capitalism. Here, Harvey’s (2007) idea of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ is particularly useful. These forms of resistance would, therefore, be seen as being firmly on the terrain of many other class struggles and social movements against global capitalism. The alliances between these movements, and their respective motives would need close analysis. South–South alliances similarly need a careful analysis of each party’s intentions.

Overview and structure of the book The authors in this text draw from their first-hand experiences in Africa and the BRICS to describe how the BRICS’ unique political and economic tactics are being received in local environments. Foregrounding African agency and ‘voice’ counters the general trend of analyses focusing on outside actors’ likely motives and ambitions. Conventionally state-based, glossed over, and even remote analysis

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of the situation, may miss some of the texture and nuances in class and worker responses to BRICS states. It is argued that the BRICS’ heightened involvement and interest in Africa is met with mixed responses from individual states and regions. At the local community level, responses also vary according to class, gender, and ideological differences. While some welcome the BRICS states’ overtures, others offer fierce, even violent resistance. Besides being encouraged to bring together interest in the BRICS, geopolitics, and social resistance, contributors were encouraged to address questions such as: What responses have been solicited by BRICS’ extractive behaviour, rights violations, and ecological degradation? To what extent are BRICS elites colluding with African elites? What does such collusion and co-optation suggest concerning the nature of Afro-BRICS engagement as well as intra-BRICS collaboration? Whose interests are served by BRICS’ expanded rounds of accumulation in Africa? The first few chapters are thematically-driven, overarching, and serve to provide context. The latter chapters are mostly empirical in nature detailing local impacts and responses, as well as collusive behaviour. The editors were not prescriptive of the theoretical approach adopted by the contributors. The book is divided into two parts: ‘BRICS: Joining the dots across Africa and the periphery’ and ‘BRICS and their southern and eastern African geographies of resistance: Dispossession, collusion, and local responses’. Part I explores Africa’s precarious position within the global economy and how systemic crises of global capitalism are pushing Africa’s poor and lower classes into a position where resistance is inevitable. Part II mainly relates cases of the receptions and responses to individual BRICS countries’ activities in Africa, alongside a critical examination of intra-BRICS and Afro-BRICS collusion and co-optation. Part I also provides what could be considered the conceptual underpinning for resistance explored throughout the book, suggesting that these struggles may be similar to, or foreshadow, those struggles which are yet to be experienced throughout the other BRICS states and their hinterlands. The first two chapters in Part I suggest that members within these regional and local communities exercise agency, or, in the least, should remain vigilant in how they choose to respond to BRICS states. Accordingly, Justin van der Merwe theorises the reactions and attitudes held by Africans towards the grand sweep of BRICS’ sub-imperialisms, arguing that resistance to them manifests as counter-imperialism. In Chapter 3, Patrick Bond interrogates ‘BRICS from the middle’s’ recent activities in

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South Africa, arguing that, in reality, its vehicles (BRICS Academic Forum, BRICS Trade Union Forum, Civil BRICS, Youth BRICS, and potentially a gender network) are being subverted to further the agenda ‘from above’. By outlining the complexity of these responses and their linkages with other global struggles, these chapters attempt to offer a framework to help readers understand seemingly unrelated events in Africa and the global South. Hence, the title of the section – ‘Joining the dots …’. Although the geopolitical script of the BRICS in Africa is fairly well known (see, for example, Taylor, 2014 or Carmody, 2013), it remains highly relevant given increasing global instability, inequality, and uncertainty. This is particularly relevant at a time when states within the West have become concerned with nationalism and trade protectionism. The latter two chapters in Part I therefore provide important background insertions that help to give further context to the cases presented later in the book. They also provide critical updates in trade and investment data and trends. The implication is that these systemic and structural conditions have exacerbated the insidious but palpable ‘top-down’ pressure being exerted on African citizens which is actively perpetuating or fuelling conditions for social protest. To this end, Nicole Dodd presents empirical and case-based evidence that, in the wake of declining commodity prices, the BRICS’ economic relationship with Africa is marked by rising debt levels and unequal trade relations. The data suggest that the relationship is unlikely to save Africa, and in some instances is more exploitative than Africa’s direct relationship with the West. In Chapter 5, Ishmael Lesufi and Lisa Thompson emphasise China’s reliance on the markets of the European Union and United States as a significant driving force behind its growth. Africa remains on the periphery owing to China’s orientation to these key centres and its mediating role in the global economy – conditions that lead to the continued subordination of Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the Chinese workforce. Having outlined the adverse systemic conditions to which Africa continues to be subjected, Part II presents further evidence of individual African countries’ responses to the BRICS, and how these can be understood as stemming from a broad position of social resistance. The exact geographies of resistance chosen in Part II relate to prominent or recurring sites of struggle regarding one or more BRICS country, as well as current hotspots. Africa’s history of dispossession and ongoing inequality and poverty heightens the intensity

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of these struggles, making these investigations all the more urgent. The southern and eastern African bias in Part II stems naturally from South Africa’s prominence within the orbit of BRICS, as the ‘official’ gateway for BRICS members into Africa, and because of the tacit endorsement for regional involvement implied in South Africa’s membership in the bloc. The focus on East Africa stems naturally from this region’s geographical proximity to the East and major BRICS centres, especially given East Africa’s envisioned role in linking the continent to the Middle East, Central Asia, and Europe via the maritime component of China’s One Belt One Road initiative. East Africa is therefore of key geostrategic interest to China’s grand plans for the 21st century through this initiative. China’s involvement in the oil-rich Niger Delta is an important site of struggle outside of these regions and is nominally covered in Chapter 4 (Part I). However, one could argue that caution should be exercised in this case. What appears as resistance by concerned groups is more accurately local elites seeking to draw rents from would-be investors. They act as ‘gatekeepers’ to lucrative oil contracts and even threaten violence if their demands are not met. These groups could be masquerading as revolutionaries claiming to be motivated by social justice but, in reality, replacing one patrimonial system with another (Obi, 2008). Such conflict in this region has also receded in recent years due to reduced appetite for risk. The chapters also resonate with broader themes regarding a particular BRICS country; covering an issue for which a BRICS nation has become particularly well known. The meta-themes covered are: lessons for African countries from Brazilian civic movements; responses to China’s development and economic initiatives at regional and national scales; insight into India’s careful (South–South solidarity) but not always effective (‘land grabs’) stage management of its image in Africa; Russia’s efforts to leverage notions of ‘cooperation’ in science and technology for economic gain, particularly in the nuclear sector; and South Africa’s dual role as both subject and agent of imperialism and exploitation in Africa. In this sense, the authors continue to expose the disjuncture behind BRICS rhetoric and policy, and the local consequences of their activities in Africa. Chapters are therefore also emblematic of the wider problems facing BRICS and African countries. Farai Maguwu and Shakespear Hamauswa assess the implications of BRICS investments in Zimbabwe in the aftermath of the military coup (Chapter 6). The chapter examines the possibility of a renewed scramble for Zimbabwe and the acceleration of resource

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plundering by BRICS nations as payback for their support of the military coup that brought Mnangagwa to power. Godfrey Hampwaye and Phineas Bbaala in Chapter 7 target a cross-section of economic sectors in Zambia (mining, agriculture, forestry, manufacturing, construction, and energy) arguing that although Chinese projects have had some positive spin-offs, their involvement still leaves much to be desired as evidenced by the frequent protests and strikes by the workers at Chinese-owned companies, among other reasons. Leaked emails to do with the Gupta’s ‘capture’ of South Africa provided clear evidence of intra-BRICS collusion, specifically the Transnet–China South Railways locomotives deal. In Chapter 8, Nicole Dodd and Justin van der Merwe explain how the Gupta network used Indian, South African, and Chinese actors to elicit bribes worth millions of dollars from Transnet. The case applies an analytical framework that gives depth to the ‘state capture’ debate in South Africa. In Chapter 9, István Tarrósy  deals with the Belt and Road Initiative in East Africa. Focusing on local responses to, and perceptions of, recent Chinese, OBOR-linked infrastructure developments in Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, and Ethiopia, it suggests that there is growing resistance to these projects. While the ‘charm offensive’ is still part of China’s pragmatic foreign policy, executing the OBOR initiative has not dealt with how to manage such local resistance and fears. African countries have much in common with Brazil including high levels of protests, corrupt leadership, mega-event exhaustion, environmental stressors, and aspirations towards achieving mature democracies. Mbekezeli Mkhize and Vukile Sibiya’s chapter (Chapter 10) documents possible lessons for Africa regarding the hosting of mega-events and regarding the management of leadership transitions. Growing protest cultures are seen as the background context to both Brazil and Africa, as Africa moves through a succession of leadership changes and similar social disruptions. In Chapter 11 Lwando Mthamo and Mkhize examine the effects of Indian land acquisitions on Ethiopian peasant farmers’ livelihoods. The Indian government’s activities in Ethiopia have led to displacement and accumulation by dispossession, with the Ethiopian government assisting Indian companies by forcefully removing Ethiopian peasants from their land. In ‘Rosatom and nuclear power in South Africa: Assistance and resistance’, Eldar Salakhetdinov and Vasily Sidorov balance

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oppositional perspectives regarding benefits and risks of Russia’s involvement in nuclear power on the African continent. Rosatom’s proposed nuclear project in South Africa was touted as one of the most promising opportunities for intra-BRICS cooperation. However, the proposed deal proved to be highly controversial and is likely to be an important ‘litmus test’ for what is and may yet unfold in other African countries. Service delivery protests and strikes in South Africa have been indicative of the decline of the ruling party’s capacity to govern, as well as signalling worsening levels of inequality in the country. The slow pace of social and economic transformation and the adoption of a neoliberal policy direction have further driven protest action. Mkhize (Chapter 13) contextualises the increased protests in South Africa in relation to the elite’s increasingly dictatorial and predatory actions and in relation to the BRICS as an ideological and financial alternative. Finally, in the conclusion, we try to weigh up whether the economic and development opportunities offered by the BRICS translate into real benefits on the ground in Africa. How does Africa ensure that it does not fall prey to further exploitation? Some of the chapters in this book stem from a panel hosted at the Institute for African Studies’ 14th International African Studies Conference in Moscow in October 2017. Following the conference, the editors invited additional scholars to round off the book. This book is a product of these exchanges. South Africa, October 2018

References Branch, A. and Mampilly, Z., 2015, Africa uprising: Popular protest and political change. London: Zed Books. Carmody, P., 2013, The rise of the BRICS in Africa: The geopolitics of South–South relations. London: Zed Books. Dodds, K., 2010, ‘Popular geopolitics and cartoons: Representing power relations, repetition and resistance’. Critical African Studies, 4, 1–19. Environmental Justice Atlas, 2018, EJAtlas | Mapping Environmental Justice, [online].

Available at: http://ejatlas. org. Accessed on: 2 December 2018. Garcia, A. and Bond, P., 2015, ‘Introduction’ in Bond, P. and Garcia, A. (eds.) BRICS: An anticapitalist critique. Johannesburg: Jacana, pp. 1–12. Harvey, D., 2007, Brief history of neoliberalism. New York: Oxford University Press. Khondker, H.H., 2011, ‘Role of the new media in the Arab Spring’. Globalizations, 8(5), 675–679. Kgomoeswana, V., 2017, ‘Leave local fishers alone,

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go for big Chinese illegals’. The Sunday Independent, [online] p. 1. Available at: https://www.iol.co.za/ sundayindependent/analysis/ leave-local-fishers-alone-go-forbig-chinese-illegals-11245635. Accessed on: 10 October 2017. Lusaka Times, 5 November 2018, ‘Over 100 picked up by police in anti-China protests in Kitwe’. https://www. lusakatimes.com/2018/11/05/ over-100-picked-up-by-police-inanti-china-protests-in-kitwe/. Ó Tuathail, G. and Agnew, J., 1992, ‘Geopolitics and discourse: Practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy’. Political Geography Quarterly, 11(2), 151–166. Obi, C., 2008, ‘Enter the dragon? Chinese oil companies and resistance in the Niger Delta’. Review of African Political Economy, 35(117), 417–434. Routledge, P., 1998, ‘Going globile: Spatiality, embodiment and media-tion in the Zapatista insurgency’ in Ó Tuathail, G. and Dalby, S. (eds.) Rethinking geopolitics. London: Routledge, pp. 240–260.

Samson, M., 2015, ‘Accumulation by dispossession and the informal economy: Struggles over knowledge, being and waste at a Soweto garbage dump’. Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 33(5), 813–830. Taylor, I., 2014, Africa rising: Diversifying dependency? Oxford: James Currey. Taylor, I., 2017, Global governance and transnationalizing capitalist hegemony: The myth of the ‘emerging powers’. Abingdon: Routledge. Taylor, I., Van der Merwe, J., and Dodd, N., 2016, ‘Nehru’s neoliberals: Draining or aiding Africa’ in Van der Merwe, J., Taylor, I., and Arkhangelskaya, A. (eds.) Emerging powers in Africa: A new wave in the relationship? London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 107–128. Van der Merwe, J., 2018, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: Reintegrating Africa and the Middle East into China’s system of accumulation’ in Li, X. (ed.) Mapping China’s One Belt One Road Initiative. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 197–217.

2 Notes from the hinterland: theorising BRICS and their geographies of resistance Justin van der Merwe

The BRICS phenomenon has been described as neo-colonial, subimperial, or even ‘new imperialism’. However, we should not only focus on the workings of BRICS as actors at the semi-periphery but also on the new forms of resistance to their actions at home (Nilsen and von Holdt, 2019) and in their respective hinterlands. As capital and class interests at the middle tier of global capital accumulation mature, and their ‘mandate’ becomes more explicit, we are faced with transformations in the modes of accumulation and, in turn, in responses from their respective regions. These struggles range from the Nigerian oilfields and the protests over community displacement in Kenya to the extraction of precious minerals in Zimbabwe and the Democratic Republic of Congo, and all the way to the labour movements and protection of indigenous rights in Zambia, Namibia, and South Africa. What are we to learn from these contemporary struggles against global capitalism as refracted through the BRICS, and what, if anything, is ‘new’ about these modes of resistance emanating from Africa, that might also be witnessed in future in other BRICS hinterlands? This chapter advances the arguments relating to the broadly subimperial nature of the BRICS and seeks to theorise responses from local African communities to this sub-imperialism. The regional component of sub-imperialism and the responses from local communities have been strangely neglected in the literature (Van der Merwe, 2014; 2016a). Such analyses would require a keen regional awareness; one where there is an understanding of the assertion of geopolitical control and power, and corresponding responses, sometimes subversive, from the region. The limited work that has been done on assessing local communities’ and workers’ responses to sub-imperialism has mostly focused on South Africa’s sub-imperialism in Africa (Miller, 2006; Miller, Saunders, and Oloyede, 2008). However, further focus on these processes is necessary if we are to understand the responses to the middle tier of global capital accumulation more broadly.

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As the BRICS ambitiously engage in increasingly expanded rounds of capital accumulation, what can we learn from this, and from the responses from local communities? In Africa, the BRICS’ involvement takes on particularly dangerous roles. As elites search for magical foreign direct investment (FDI), Africa seems to present itself as a canvas on which some of the most extreme accumulation processes known today can be painted. China’s concentrated One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative might be Western-focused into Central Asia and ultimately Europe, but it does reach African shores, penetrating the adjacent countries and regions via Alexandria, Djibouti, Lamu, Mombasa, Bagamoyo, and soon Nampula, Maputo, Durban, Mandela Bay, and Cape Town. Russia’s mix of ‘sweetheart’ diplomacy and nuclear deals is proving a particularly problematic combination in Egypt, Nigeria, Uganda, Zambia, and South Africa, as Rosatom presents its nuclear technology as an environmentally friendly solution to Africa’s perpetual power crises. Since attaining democracy, South Africa’s northwards gaze has attracted much scholarly and popular attention. Africa remains a particularly sought after ‘prize’ for South Africa’s businessmen and politicians, via the oft-celebrated Johannesburg–Durban–Cape Town ‘gateway’. To some extent, the reflexivity of African responses to these encroachments has been captured in the terms geo-governance (Carmody, 2012; 2014; Carmody, Hampwaye, and Sakala, 2012) and flexigemony (Carmody and Taylor, 2010). The ‘flexi’ prefix indicates how these powers mould their policies and strategies to fit different geographies and histories. However, both these concepts and certainly the latter could be said to focus more on the actions and motives of the penetrating state, and less on local agency and responses (Mohan and Lampert, 2012:94). Indeed, a more forceful inclusion of the anti-capitalist nature of these struggles seems necessary, based in the class and labour struggles of the respective geographies. In the last chapter of his 2010 book, The Enigma of Capital, David Harvey asked the question ‘What is to be done?’ Harvey suggested that after three decades of neoliberalism and the ensuing global financial crisis, the conditions are ripe for the emergence of an anti-capitalist movement ‘constituted out of a broad alliance of the discontented, the alienated, the deprived and the dispossessed’ (in Roccu, 2013:423). Commenting on Harvey’s analysis, Roccu (2013:423–424) suggested that ‘While painted in broad strokes and arguably with Europe and North America in mind, I find this characterisation to

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be particularly illuminating also in the context of the Arab Spring, and of the Egyptian revolution more specifically’. In a similar way, the current 2018 ‘BRICS moment’ arguably presents another juncture for Africa to assess what exactly is going on, and, if this is something that it really wants. This is particularly the case with many African countries who are being snared by the unfolding Chinese debt trap. Why is this important? Why is it necessary to understand the nature of these imperialist powers in Africa and the implications for resistance? As Samson (2009:94) noted in relation to South Africa in Africa, but essentially referring to the BRICS more broadly, the question of how to theorise South Africa’s role is not merely of academic interest. Arguing that South Africa [read BRICS] must be seen as a sub-imperial agent acting as a ‘proxy’ or conduit for American imperial interests has one set of political implications for those engaged in anti-imperialist struggle. Casting it as an independent imperialist force suggests, on the other hand, radically different targets for, and forms of mobilisation.

At the same time, we must be aware that the African National Congress (ANC) repeatedly terms its approach, especially via BRICS, ‘anti-imperialist’. This chapter theorises the responses to BRICS accumulation from the frontline of this accumulation in Africa and within its intended anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist context. The geopolitical calculus invoked by these exchanges is steeped in a stance of resistance – and accommodation – as Africans are also keenly aware of the need to intelligently leverage these investment and growth opportunities: Africa is, unfortunately, too weak to alter the global capitalist system and has no option but to ‘box clever’ in an increasingly crowded and competitive environment. Class, race, and gender issues are also important in these responses, as well as a multi-scalar approach, considering, amongst others, the regional nature of these struggles which is often lacking in such analyses.

What’s in a word? Brotherhood, solidarity, and other useful lies Audiences in the periphery are told by advocates of the BRICS that the bloc represents the rise of the non-West and that this rise will

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lead to greater parity between the North and South. Within reason, these same proponents argue that the BRICS phenomenon is something ‘new’ and worth celebrating, i.e. that their collective ambitions and goals are more virtuous than their Western counterparts and should therefore be encouraged or welcomed. Such proponents contend that interaction between the BRICS and the periphery is thereby mutually beneficial. The BRICS corporations within these territories are potential investors and are welcomed because of their job-creating power. They are even providing alternatives to Western products and services at more affordable rates. These same advocates suggest that African countries should adopt the BRICS’ development policies. This is further supported by the movement of the BRICS into the category of aid donors in the periphery, a space usually dominated by the rich Western countries. Most fundamentally, these assertions are then underpinned by the concomitant rise of financial instruments to underpin this cooperation. However, these are largely sanitised accounts of the relationship between the periphery and individual BRICS countries. The idea that these countries have long histories with the periphery does not seem to be central here; as if membership in BRICS could somehow change established patterns of how they operate in the periphery. For example, in southern Africa the results of 1950s–1980s Soviet influence have been mixed. Although assisting and providing an alternative to Western influence, its legacy has also been chequered. Chinese involvement in Africa is also nothing new. China adopted the infrastructure-for-influence approach in Africa several decades ago. The OBOR initiative is merely the latest iteration in a long line of contacts. But, only this time, it is manifesting in a far more assertive and concentrated manner. South Africa’s ‘long’ history in the region is also undeniably problematic (Van der Merwe, 2016b). Penetration of Angola and Mozambique by Brazilian capital and of Kenyan and South African markets by Indian firms is relatively more recent, but just as exploitative and corrupting. Nevertheless, the BRICS are by virtue of their ontological ‘sameness’ or epistemic commonality viewed as a safer ‘development partner’ to Africa than the West. This sometimes affords them significant latitude in what they can get away with, in no small part because China and India have become the largest new importers of African raw materials. In this way, BRICS becomes ‘business as usual’ or a familiar ally on the African continent. One of the overriding geopolitical ‘God tricks’ of BRICS is that instead of viewing their rise as the maturation of capital within

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the semi-periphery, i.e. as an indication of the steadily mounting strength of these powers, and exactly how they are in this position due to a slow and historical rise, premised on uneven development – the phenomenon asks us to believe in their wholesale redemption as ‘new’ global players. Although finding solidarity in initiatives such as the Bandung Conference, the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM), the G20, the New International Economic Order (NIEO), we should clearly distinguish between the logics of ‘affective labour’ and ‘infrastructural labour’ used to accrue capital on the continent (Van der Merwe, 2016a; Van der Merwe and Dodd, 2019). Or, more plainly, between the dynamics of capital accumulation and of the rhetoric coming from pro-BRICS elites, whose class interests are furthered by this. Besides the more fashionable elements of BRICS analysis, we should also be thinking about the maturation of global capital in the semi-periphery, the struggles throughout the periphery, and the new forms of accumulation in the periphery. Here, the BRICS moment provides two problematiques or paradoxes: despite the obvious familiarity and ‘age’ of capital in the periphery (and between the semi-periphery and periphery), we are asked to assume that it is ‘new’: the interconnectedness of class interests and their transnational links (both in relation to the core and semi-periphery, but also in relation to the semi-periphery and the periphery, up and down). This would imply a significant collective amnesia on the side of those in the periphery, never mind the literature from the structuralists arguing that global capitalist development is inherently relational (see Cordozo, Frank, Amin, Baran, Sweeney, and Marini). The maturation of capital and class interests within this configuration is often used to point to the falseness of the sub-imperial category (as conceptualised by Marini in the 1960s). This is basically because of the ‘integrated’ and ‘seamless’ nature of uneven global development as a product of and having its nerve centre in the core. However, as far as a nationally distinct bourgeoisie could exist, acting with transnational interests, and a careful exposition of their transnational links is apparent, then such a category has validity. Such accounts also do not consider the agency held by regional elites over their respective hinterlands, which has been well documented (see Martin, 2013; Bond and Garcia, 2015; Van der Merwe, Taylor, and Arkhangelskaya, 2016). The second paradox or problematique presented by the current BRICS ‘moment’ is that BRICS and their accumulation strategies are somehow different from the norms and established practices

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of capitalist accumulation, i.e. the typical, exploitative Western modes and tactics of capital accumulation. Despite evidence suggesting the contrary, those in the periphery are being asked to believe that the BRICS can and will act in their best interests to secure their creative, productive, and health well-being. This second paradox has a deeper question hardwired into its logic. If the BRICS are not neoliberals operating within a set of rules of contemporary global capitalism, then what are they? It implicitly suggests that modes of capitalist accumulation are incremental and that BRICS countries represent a slightly more antiquated form of capitalism through their approximate level of development. Here, one can invoke the stages or modes of capitalist accumulation as centred, for example, on mercantilist capital, then monopoly capital, and its financialisation (Moyo, Yeros, and Jha, 2012). If we are to believe that the BRICS represent a slightly ‘older’ form of capitalism, we should assume that, in accordance with their relative levels of development, they would be at a slightly earlier stage of capitalist development. However, such arguments about the BRICS fail to consider the integrated nature of the global capitalist system. Global finance is pervasive and can penetrate related sectors, such as through speculative ventures in the minerals sector. Think, for example, about China’s OBOR contracts and deals with Africa being centred on infrastructure (linked to minerals). However, the real ‘hook’ being placed into these societies is financial through debt repayment over time. Such finance capital is more about the chosen ‘medium’ than the actual sector. Finance can move horizontally into adjacent areas. To try to separate BRICS capitalism (state capitalism, network capitalism, or whatever) as different and somehow siloed from the current dominant mode of neoliberalism and financialisation is artificial and pointless. The minerals sector is now financialised. For example, Campbell (2008:101) argued that ‘the emphasis placed on … financial instruments has reinforced the disarticulation of African economies’ (although he erroneously concludes that China would help Africa to overcome this disarticulation – rather than strengthen it!). Although it is true that the BRICS may be at an earlier stage of capitalist development vis-à-vis their reliance on material production (linked to resources and manufacturing), versus the (rather clumsy term) of ‘non-material’ or ‘immaterial’ production characterising the developed global centres (services, finance, and remote production) (Amin, 2013), we cannot simultaneously assume that

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these stages are distinct and neat. Also, the absurdity of these claims is revealed through the illustration that the immaterial cannot exist on its own, without first working its way through, or basing its ‘immaterial’ strength on, its ‘material’ (Amin, 2013). China’s economy has transformed from being export-driven and focused on manufacturing, to now being more consumer-driven and including greater services and financial instruments. China holds large currency reserves in dollars and is a significant buyer of US Treasury securities. The BRICS themselves also have varying integration within finance capitalism. Here, South Africa’s relationship as both an African and BRICS state is illustrative. It represents the class and elite inner–outer dimensions of BRICS engagement with Africa at its most duplicitous. South Africa is both heavily integrated within global finance and has historically served as a gateway for mining interests into southern Africa (so much so that the minerals–energy complex has been re-dubbed the minerals–energy–financial complex, see Ashman, 2015). Its financial sector is regularly ranked as the best in the BRICS. Although African, the claims by South Africa to represent Africa within the bloc should be taken no less sceptically than the claims of the BRICS to be speaking on behalf of the people of the global South. We therefore know that the global market, although geographically differentiated through space, can also be thought of as highly integrated. Claims of something ‘new’ and therefore harmless are largely non-existent – largely by virtue of the capitalist system’s unrelenting homogenising effects. Against much evidence rather absurdly pointing to the negative effects of colonialism and imperialism, those in the periphery are now asked to take the BRICS at face value.

Building consent in the hinterlands: assent to BRICS? How is it that the BRICS can create the necessary conditions for spatially expanded rounds of capital accumulation? Those in the developing world are not stupid and have gone through these patterns of exploitation before. The answer is that at capitalism’s core is a sense of trickery. What is presented as mutually beneficial, and possibly in your best interest, is not necessarily the case. A sober recounting of the BRICS phenomenon would illustrate this. An American investment bank developed a term to describe a group of investor-friendly states based outside the West. These

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states then used the term to develop a concentrated ‘spatial fix’ for investors to secure their markets. However, intra-regional trade amongst themselves and their respective regions remained limited, and the real beneficiaries were to be the Western countries once again. Does this sound like the latest in a series of crafty efforts by the United States (US) to disguise the explicitness of imperial ambition? First, it was the ‘American century’ which was used to cloak territorial ambition. This was done by cloaking territorial conquest within a temporal frame – ‘century’. Then, once territorial expansion was no longer necessary and easily exposed, neoliberalism was used to maintain remote control through privatisation, deregulation, and financialisation – while operating under the guise of ‘reciprocal development’ under globalisation. It seems that the next step would be to deny the non-West of its right to choose its development path and encourage further growth of trade liberalisation within these territories, if you like, by setting up ‘Trojan horses’ within these territories who would do their bidding. One would imagine that the real successes of a BRICS open model of trade should be the movement of capital, goods, and people amongst their immediate regions, and to some extent, between the BRICS states themselves. Indeed, the notion that the West is not a primary beneficiary of a BRICS-driven round of global capital accumulation should be closely interrogated (Van der Merwe, 2014:145–146). The lack of a considered regional approach suggests that the BRICS alliance was not organically developed out of historical, political, and economic struggles like most regional economic communities. Rather, the BRICS was born of an investment conception based on two decades of investor-friendly returns from several large non-Western countries. Its pretension to assume a shared experience in the non-West is, in some respects, equally flawed, and although having a certain logic to it, such pretensions could easily be thrust upon these states by others and are not necessarily reflective of lived experiences within the non-West. Worryingly, there is no real consideration for the regional communities of which the BRICS members are normally the most dominant. Paradoxically, BRICS-driven rounds of capital accumulation may actually further skew regional inequalities and leave the more marginalised states worse off than before, especially those in Africa (Van der Merwe, 2014:146). In a bigger sense, this was merely the latest sophisticated effort in a long cycle of Northern exploitation of the South:

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The goal of the neoliberal regime, it soon became clear, was not to generate development so much as to create ‘emerging market economies’ that would enhance the accumulation of assets within global centers. The result has been acceleration of the flow of economic surplus from poor to rich countries. As reported in the New York Times (March 25, 2007), ‘According to the United Nations, in 2006 the net transfer of capital from poorer countries to rich ones was $784 billion, up from $229 billion in 2002 … Even the poorest countries, like those in sub-Saharan Africa, are now money exporters to the rich countries’. (Rosenberg, 2007 in Foster, 2007:1)

BRICS merely represents the essence of this idea. A selfperpetuating consent machine which, if effectively ‘sold’, could precede and co-construct global reality. The ‘script’ suggested that ‘emerging markets’ would seek to pass down their crises of overaccumulation as they focused on super-exploitation of the hinterland. The emerging powers were the actors acting on behalf of their overlords, the Western powers, and would seek to streamline implementation of their policies. Pieterse (2010:5), writing on the turn to neoliberalism and recent developments in North–South relations, has noted: ‘As part of accelerated globalisation, neoliberal policies impose neoclassical economics on the south, applying western standards of policy and systems of accounting to align economies and financial and credit regimes’. Viewed from this perspective, around the late 1990s and early 21st century, and especially as a result of the global financial crisis, Africa and the South became vehicles for continued growth during otherwise difficult times. Tragically, this cycle of accumulation was ‘sold’ to Africa and the South as their chance to develop. Yet, in truth, it remained a way to sub-contract growth out to other poles while the West regained their footing. The hype preceded the reality, and the BRICS are now experiencing the fallout as a result of believing these tales (see below). In this sense, one could speak of the BRICS as a geopolitical ‘God-trick’ – a space–time trick, used by geopoliticians and finance capital. Although appearing magnanimous, these spatial markers are typically employed as discursive devices used by capital to move across space and time (Van der Merwe, 2019). This is not to say that the BRICS phenomenon is not underpinned by real advances. Three of the most triumphalist developments for global capital in the late 20th/early 21st century were Russia’s

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injection of neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ in the 1990s; China’s joining the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in 2001 and its ‘Going Out’ policy of 1998; and India’s turn to neoliberalism. These events introduced literally hundreds of millions of people to the global middle class or at least set them on the path to join this group. The class forces of these changes are undeniable and powerful enough to substantially alter the global economy. But, underpinning these advances are expansive geopolitical gambits and tangible processes of accumulation and dispossession. Here, we are required to understand some of the finer points of the ongoing nature of primitive accumulation in Africa and the theoretical-conceptual updating of Marx’ concept by David Harvey. It is to these matters which I now turn before further exploring how Africa is currently being exploited.

Primitive and other modes of capitalist accumulation As already highlighted, as capital at the semi-periphery matures and its ‘mandate’ becomes more explicit, we are faced with the transitions and understanding of the evolving mode of accumulation in the periphery. We do know that the BRICS are leaders of what may be called the third wave of agro-capital accumulation centred on land grabs, and which is intensified by the scramble for energy resources (Moyo, Yeros, and Jha, 2012:199; Moyo, Jha, and Yeros, 2018). There is mounting evidence to suggest that these are the patterns of accumulation which are driven by the BRICS within the periphery. The extractive industries of the BRICS within their respective regions and Africa have been the focus of many analyses (Bond and Garcia, 2015; Van der Merwe, Taylor, and Arkhangelskaya, 2016). Ecological degradation, displacement effects, and violations of rights have resulted in social protests against the dispossessing qualities of the BRICS and the overall thrust of these endeavours resonates with what Harvey would call ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Harvey’s reformulation of Marx’s primitive accumulation is instructive as he identified the inherently predatory nature of capital accumulation, something that is hardwired into the system’s very logic. Harvey proposed the term ‘accumulation by dispossession’ as a means of updating and expanding our understanding of ‘primitive accumulation’. ‘Accumulation by dispossession’ in the context of imperialism, refers to the wide range of activities that imperial states and their corporates and banks use to dispossess people and countries through extractive processes that enrich entities from the

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imperialist nation, but leave the recipient nation and its entities no better or even worse off. This process takes the form of extracting financial, natural, and intellectual resources without any real profits or benefits going to the country of extraction. The rise of neoliberal theory in the 1970s and the associated politics of privatisation were the primary driving forces of accumulation by dispossession. Accumulation by dispossession became increasingly prominent after 1973, primarily to avoid the problem of overaccumulation arising within expanded rounds of accumulation in the US and other established centres of capital (Harvey, 2005:156). The opening up of territories in the global South and the East to capitalist development and markets also played a role, as did the ‘primitive accumulation’ accomplished in those countries (such as South Korea, Taiwan, and China) that allowed for their insertion into global capitalism as active players (Harvey, 2005). Harvey’s (2005) idea of a ‘spatiotemporal fix’ (whereby imperialist states locate their geographical expansion and capitalist crises within a space, however defined) is particularly useful in relating his ideas of imperialism to the regional scale and sub-imperialism. Not everyone fully agrees with the use of accumulation by dispossession (see Moyo, Yeros, and Jha, 2012). That said, in accordance with Harvey’s general analysis regarding the evolution of modern capitalism, the now dominant mode of capitalist accumulation is indeed the financial mode (with the credit system being seen as a radical form of accumulation by dispossession). As noted, there is a paradox here revolving around the extent to which the dominant mode of accumulation is financialised, albeit manifesting primarily through resource accumulation in Africa. But, as described above, the distinction is fairly arbitrary. It is certainly fair to say that the BRICS generally have been integrated into the era of global financialisation and its movement towards accelerated and new forms of capital accumulation under neoliberalism and the hegemony of the dollar. A key element here and litmus test for the BRICS’ embracing of accumulation by dispossession would be the extent to which the BRICS are reproducing some of the worst aspects of global finance. Are the BRICS prongs within the system which feeds the global banks – either directly through the New Development Bank, and others, or through tacit support of the Western international financial institutions? Do they take on and advance this agenda at the behest of global capital of which they are very much a part? Despite early attempts by usually critical opinionmakers to argue that the BRICS are indeed reformers of the global

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financial system (Bello, 2014; Campbell, 2014), these accounts seem overly optimistic. A more cautious outlook is certainly needed in the underdeveloped world. As well as opening up opportunities for an International Monetary Fund-managed structural adjustment loan should a country wish to take more than 30 per cent of its borrowing quota, the New Development Bank’s Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA), which allows BRICS countries to manage their short-term balance of payment problems, at least initially, chose to trade in US dollars despite the talk of wanting to challenge the dollar with the renminbi as an alternative global currency (Johnson, 2015:209; Bond, 2016:613). A possible new BRICS credit ratings agency and the increased use of local currencies in trade and finance are encouraging signs, however (see Chapter 3). The lived experience of many states is that they can no longer service their debts to China and are having to hand over key assets like ports to Chinese control (such as in Sri Lanka – with possibly Djibouti, Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Lao, Maldives, Mongolia, Pakistan, and Montenegro to follow). This ultimately forms part of the bigger impending debt crisis linked to OBOR. Some countries like Pakistan and Nepal are preemptively sourcing alternative financing for projects (Fernholz, 2018). Sierra Leone recently turned down Chinese assistance for the construction of its airport (BBC News, 2018). There are alleged talks underway for China to take over control of Zambia’s electricity generator, ZESCO, other state-owned companies, and China already controls Zambia’s state broadcaster (Lusaka Times, 2018). Africans generally would be unwise to let down their guard against easy money coming from China (see Chapters 4 and 5). The BRICS are also innovators, and their presence in Africa possibly hastens some of the more nefarious elements of globalisation. Globalisation and financialisation enhance the deceptiveness of accumulation in areas of significant spatial asymmetries – and possibly create new spaces for social protest and resistance. Abrupt leaps in technology and the integrating forces of financialisation have increased the opportunities for social dislocation and ‘disruption’ in Africa. This is partly attributable to the often over-hyped mobile finance or e-commerce revolution, involving greater and quicker transfers in payment through QR codes, M-Pesa in Kenya, Paga in Nigeria, and virtual currencies like Bitcoin and other cryptocurrencies. Wilfully malicious outcomes are also facilitated by the mix of technology and finance, such as in the case of those Africans falling prey to Russian-styled Ponzi schemes (and their hybrids in Nigeria, for example) and other online scammers, as well as spyware and other

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identity-stealing computer viruses. More generally, the effects of globalisation are felt at local and community levels as new social forces alter traditional ways of life and cultures, while eroding traditional occupations and livelihoods (Kabandula and Shaw, 2018). Beside the disrupting effects of globalisation, BRICS elites and their diasporic networks (often in collusion with Africa’s elite) are also directly involved in dispossessing Africa of its capital and resources through the exploitation of regulatory and legal loopholes. Some of the worst effects of globalisation are felt through what is called ‘shadow banking’ which generally refers to unregulated institutions and activities in financial services. The BRICS are complicit in this through a complex network of offshore transactions in tax safe havens and via shell companies. However, thanks to data dumps like the ‘Panama Papers’ and the ‘Gupta leaks’ (as well as the investigative journalism done by amaBhungane), we know about the Guptas moving of South African public money accrued from the sale of state locomotives to China, and then onto shell companies in the UAE, where they could disperse kickbacks to those loyal to them and invest this money. The fact that an immigrant family from India is now the embodiment of a predatory bourgeoisie in South Africa – historically the preserve of Randlords from Britain – seems fitting in an era of BRICS (see Chapter 8). Likewise, thanks to the Panama Papers, we also know about the director and owner of the popular Botswanan supermarket, Choppies, Farouk Ismael, an Indian national and his family, who were able to move money through a network of proxies to secretly set up a property company in the Bahamas (Sunday Standard, 2016). The above trends are also linked to Africa’s wholehearted (and seemingly naïve) embracing of what is typically called the ‘fourth industrial revolution’, which was very much the focus of the World Economic Forum meeting in Durban in 2017. According to this perspective, entire industries and jobs could soon be rendered obsolete. Due to the slow pace of adaptation to new technologies, this would mean that Africa would certainly not be in a position to benefit from this revolution. However, there is also a deeper argument about the nature of capital and its accumulation: with merchant capital and monopoly capital being related to the ‘real’ economy and underpinned mainly by fossil capital, with financial capital being seen as slightly different and more elusive, relating more to services and information communication technologies (ICT), or what I have called ‘animated capital’ (Van der Merwe, 2017). The impacts of this are only starting to be understood as they may lead

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to significant ‘disruptions’ of social relations in Africa, and, in turn, creative responses ‘from below’ (see, for example, Zelenova and Kruchinsky, 2017).

Sub-imperialism in crisis? Cycles of overaccumulation and intensified accumulation by dispossession According to Harvey, the post-war period in the West was characterised by a ‘class compromise’ between capital and labour, where fiscal and monetary policies were used to dampen business cycles. States set standards for the social wage by creating welfare systems (healthcare and education). In return, labour would retreat in its protest behaviour. This was synonymous with the rise of embedded liberalism in Europe in the 1950s and 1960s (2007:9–19). By the 1970s, declining profits, increased inequality, stagflation, and mass unemployment began to present major problems to the dominant economic system (Herrera, 2006:2). This resulted in a crisis of overaccumulation affecting everyone as the post-war class compromise began to unravel, leading to social protests (Harvey, 2007:9–19). Overaccumulation within the established centres of capital led to the reinvestment of surpluses elsewhere on a grand scale. In the wake of these developments, capitalism and competition in economic and military activities spurred on the turn to neoliberalism and the resultant uneven global spread of neoliberalism (Harvey, 2014:87). The rise of the credit system is closely associated with this as a global means of indebting poorer countries and peoples and creating a global dependency on the US and international financial institutions, by indenturing people into debt, especially in places where this was needed the least. The structural adjustment programmes were instrumental in Africa’s maldevelopment during this period. This, in turn, led to accelerated and increased concurrent development of the core and underdevelopment of the periphery with the semi-periphery playing a role in overseeing and remotely enforcing periphery exploitation. Harvey (2007:19) argued that at its heart, the purpose of neoliberalism was the restoration of class power and the power of economic elites. Harvey further contended that this system of devolved capital accumulation gave rise to ‘sub-imperialism’ (2005:185), which, following his broader argument concerning neoliberalism, was intimately tied to the restoration of class and elite power within these locations (see Taylor, 2017 for an exposition of the restoration of

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class power within the BRICS states). These powers, located at the semi-periphery, were both the absorbers of surplus capital but also increasingly became new sites of overaccumulation. Networks of elites who had mastered the technologies of capitalism and imperialism transplanted crises of overaccumulation from the core to the semi-periphery, and from the semi-periphery to the periphery. The argument adopted in this chapter is therefore that neoliberalism has had the same effect in Africa whereby the power of the economic elite and upper classes has been restored but at the expense of the poor and underclasses. Such a stratified capitalist system has also given rise to prominent centres of capital at the middle tier of global capital accumulation who relocate their crises of overaccumulation onto their respective regions and spatio-temporal fixes including, but not limited to, Africa. Some of the key sites of global struggle have been over Africa’s land and resources with African women carrying a disproportionate burden for the social reproduction of capitalism. From this perspective, combined and uneven development undoubtedly leads to the concurrent and parallel rise in the core, and depletion of the periphery, based on super-exploitation in the semi-periphery and periphery. The capitalist system therefore gives rise to new global centres of capital as they, in turn, experience their own crises of overaccumulation, indicative of China’s current ‘restructuring’ and ‘rebalancing’ of its economy. The increased capital inflow and surpluses that led to the now growing Chinese middle class and their increased appetite for consumer goods, increases in wages, and higher relative levels of development and infrastructure booms, are being forced externally onto the spatio-temporal fix of its OBOR initiative, as it is hoped that OBOR can soak up this excess capital and the reserves of building materials accumulated by its state-owned enterprises (SOEs). Much like the post-war period was centred on opening up western Europe to control by the US through the stimulus package known as the Marshall Plan and to dollarisation of the world economy, the next several years will be focused on China’s leveraging of the Eurasian landmass and its adjacent areas through OBOR and a supposed charge on the US dollar, albeit through neoliberalism with ‘Chinese characteristics’. Yet, whether OBOR will achieve these outcomes is questionable (Van der Merwe, 2018). With lower demand for commodities caused by China’s settling economy, some BRICS economies and Africa, heavily reliant on income from sales in commodities, have struggled to sustain growth.

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To be sure, China was the major force in underwriting the so-called ‘rise of the South’ over a period of around three decades, by effectively carrying the other centres with it due to its high demand for their minerals (Taylor, 2014; Van der Merwe, 2019). With the downturn in commodity prices from at least 2011 and certainly 2015, however, Africa has struggled and is seemingly responding by deepening its dependency on China through its addiction to easy finance. The bogus ‘Africa rising’ narrative has well and truly been put to bed and opposition in the semi-periphery and periphery has arguably grown as income from mineral sales has dried up (Bond, 2017). This is partly because these crises have led to a further squeeze by owners of capital to extract profits. For example, the stripping of Pamodzi gold mine and the non-payment of workers by Khulubuse Zuma, Jacob Zuma’s nephew, and the other directors of Aurora mines (Makhafola, 2016), as well as forcing miners to work longer and harder in increasingly dangerous conditions (Niselow, 2018). Such a squeeze on the working class and acts of desperation on the side of the owners of capital have arguably led to more acute protests and corresponding backlashes as local communities are then sometimes violently oppressed. The Marikana massacre remains a blight on the conscience of South Africa. It happened shortly after the downturn in commodity prices were felt, and with now South African president Cyril Ramaphosa’s (a non-executive board member of Lonmin at the time) infamous email prompting ‘concomitant action’ sent to board members a day before the massacre and which is believed to have influenced the outcome. His company, Shanduka, was a minority shareholder in Lonmin. He therefore had a direct interest in the profitability of the Lonmin mines (Bruce, 2015). Regional African responses have arguably become more vociferous and have elicited corresponding clampdowns. Protests at Chinese-owned mines and businesses are a regular occurrence (Chapter 7), while the looting of Marange mines continues as new ‘scrambles’ unfold in Zimbabwe (Chapter 6). In the rich vein of global Southern resistance, the BRICS have, therefore (either directly or through collusive behaviour with African elites) reignited much debate about their involvement in Africa. From this vantage point, Africa is a space in which the BRICS seek to launch initiatives, resolve crises of overaccumulation, and project geopolitical ambitions of aspirant elites. Despite many analyses focusing on ‘land grabs’ and ‘scrambles’, integrating the capitalist ‘logics’ of these new accumulation techniques and established understandings of enclosure movements becomes key

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to understanding what is happening. Here, an integration of geographical and historical sensibilities merge with the immediacy and relevance of materialist analysis and class struggles. But before we are able to discuss this matter further we should understand how Africa is still located at the sharp end of accumulation.

How Africa is being exploited The neoliberal script in Africa reads similarly to many other developing locations, involving the clearing of the way for capital through deregulation and privatisation. This leads to the opening of Africa’s markets and drawing from the global export market. International competition is welcomed because of its inflation controls. Corporations which provide this competition are applauded. The strong encouragement and courting of international capital is implied by the jostling by Africa’s elites for improved positions on investment indices and rankings. All barriers are removed to the free movement of capital as profits need to be repatriated back to the home countries. Credit is extended locally to meet the needs of expanded growth and the repayments are to be accrued over time, introducing a temporal element to spatial expansion. Proximity to the state is a further condition for reaping benefits in Africa. Take, for example, the numerous examples of flagrant corruption in Africa frequently through collusion with foreign multinational corporations – but which can sometimes be seen as a bourgeoisie double standard – as corruption is in fact a global problem. The strong ‘do as we say – not as we do’ component of neoliberalism is apparent in Africa, as the West attempts to ‘ply’ open societies and markets in underdeveloped spaces, while maintaining some protection for their citizens and markets. South Africa had no small part in helping to leverage open African states, a point which belies their inclusion in BRICS (Van der Merwe, 2014). Although by global standards, South Africa is a small player, its influence on the continent was significant in the early 1990s and first decade of the 21st century. Between 1990 and 2000, South Africa was the largest investor in Africa, investing an average of US$1.14 billion of its annual FDI in the continent (South African Foundation, 2004). South Africa’s role in the 1990s and 2000s of wedging open and leveraging the African continent for further penetration by global capital should not be underestimated (Bond, 2004). As a continental and regional power, there were three key initiatives driven by South Africa to facilitate capital

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accumulation on the continent, namely: the African Renaissance, NEPAD, and its broader attempts at a type of multilateral imperialism in the African Union (AU) and other multilateral fora. South Africa’s dominance in the Southern African Development Community (SADC) region and especially the Southern African Customs Union (SACU) region has remained absolute during the post-apartheid era despite making some concessions (Van der Merwe, 2019). What is clear is the extent to which countries on the periphery have opened themselves up to foreign exploitation, usually motivated by the promise of increased foreign investment in an openly competitive environment. For example, Tanzania and Ethiopia’s uncritical engagement with and inviting of global capital has resulted in land grabs centred on the extraction of minerals in these countries. These land grabs led to concurrent displacement effects resulting in rights and access issues, along with ecological degradation (Kamata, 2012; Makki and Geisler, 2011). Such case studies are useful in helping to bridge the divide between the more macro processes of accumulation by dispossession and what could be considered the more fine-grained exploitation behind these processes. This story is a familiar one and has played itself out across Africa again and again. As mentioned, the argument adopted in this chapter is therefore that neoliberalism has had the same effect in Africa as it has had globally whereby the power of the economic elite and upper classes has been restored and recreated at the expense of the poor and underclasses. The evidence for this is numerous as acts of privatisation and enclosure of land have dispossessed those who need it most. It is capital’s control of the commons and its penetration which reminds one of Polanyi’s marketisation of society and the corresponding push for social protections – the so-called double movement (1944). Although the basic ideas of the double movement are certainly useful, these processes have also been modernised through shrewd and carefully calculated geopolitical equations. How are Africans to understand these movements within the modern era?

Counter-imperialism: the sub-imperial gaze and its riposte Scholars pay scant attention to how sub-imperialism manifests at the regional level as well as how local communities respond to it. Such analyses require keen regional awareness and would need to

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demonstrate an understanding of how actors assert control and power over this space, as well as how the region responds to this assertion. Viewed from the African hinterland, imperialism is a product of discourse and materialist considerations that operate across time and space through power networks (government, business, and media) with the goal being capital accumulation (Van der Merwe, 2016a). The implicit assumption is that if the assertion of BRICS imperialism can operate through power networks, then the resistance to such networks, and their discourses, should also be analysed in the same, or a similar, manner (see Pile and Keith, 1997). More explicit attention needs to be given to processes of resistance if we are to understand responses to BRICS imperialism and this includes the specific need to examine African communities’ responses to BRICS imperialism. What can we learn from local communities’ responses to the BRICS, as these emerging blocs of capital ebb and flow over the African space? Indeed, an analysis of imperialism would be somewhat incomplete without also assessing the regional responses to such discourses and power networks. To understand this, attempts are made to assess responses from these geographies. Here the chapter draws from the literature on geographies of resistance and counter-hegemonies. These counter-hegemonies (see Buchanan, 1997; Carroll, 2006; 2007; Evans, 2000; Robinson, 2005; Warf and Grimes, 1997), or what I will call counter-imperialism, can be characterised as a form of anti-geopolitics (Routledge, 1998; 2003). According to Routledge (1998:245), anti-geopolitics represents an ‘ethical, political and cultural force within civil society’ that questions whether ‘the interests of the state’s political class are identical to the community’s interests’. In its broadest sense, the literature on anti-geopolitics typically focuses on resistance to colonialism and imperialism (Fanon, 1965; Said, 1978), resistance to the Cold War (Frank, 1967; Smith, 1999), and on various anti-globalisation movements (Ettlinger and Bosco, 2004). However, a common problem with this literature is the desire to romanticise resistance and notions of struggle. This is based on the idea that it is an inherently ‘good’ endeavour to represent the marginalised in society (Dodds, 2005:172). Literature on the geographies of resistance tends to focus on case studies of activist groups working through transnational political movements in response to neoliberalism (Routledge, 2000; 2008). It also focuses on the manner in which individual journalists are able to invoke an ‘antigeopolitical eye’ (Ó Tuathail, 1996). Pile and Keith (1997) have

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provided an authoritative overview of the geographies of resistance, stating that ‘resistance needs to be considered in its own terms, and not as simply the underside of domination’ (1997:xi). There is indeed a need to understand the multiplicity of actors and spheres involved in these processes, including the role of the state. Drawing from the literature on resistance, this section therefore assesses who and what is responsible for these discourses within regional African communities. Counter-imperialism occurs when regional elites and members of the public use discursive formations and actions to assert counterclaims in the face of domination by the (sub)imperial state. The objective of counter-imperialism is to question the ‘normalcy’ of regional inequality and, more broadly, the prevailing global inequality seen as a ‘natural’ and ‘inevitable’ by-product of globalisation and neoliberalism. The members responsible for constructing these discourses (text, talk, and practice) are typically based in government, business, media, and other civic institutions and concerned parties such as trade unions or NGOs. These narratives are instrumental in forming a societal response to, and systematic rejection of, the dominant state’s accumulation over space. Counter-imperialism aimed at the dominant state ultimately contests the power and control exercised in the region. Counterimperialism typically manifests by questioning imbalances in trade and compliance with macro-economic neoliberalism and political policies in regional economic communities, alliances, or unions, as well as bilaterally. These narratives could also stem from a more loosely defined geographical formation with its own ‘territorial logic of power’ (Harvey, 2005:101), as demonstrated by the variable geographies of resistance across Africa. Counter-imperialist discourses aimed at the penetrating state assume that although multilateral trade agreements and industrial policy are put in place through practical geopolitical channels, ongoing lobbying efforts within the region occur parallel to this and involve an array of formal and popular geopolitical actors and sectors. Such ‘pressure’ is ultimately aimed at altering the ‘unevenness’ and ‘asymmetrical development’ of trade and industry within regional ‘communities’ and between states. Regional governments may work closely with business to provide protection for its industries by raising tariffs on imported goods. A contestation of the dominant state’s overall economic and social ‘vision’ towards the region also occurs, as regional communities and countries have their own initiatives and national

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development plans which need to be integrated into, or challenge, the one imposed upon them. Counter-imperialism questions the government’s political values, and the extent to which its policies and elite are perceived to be living up to these values both domestically and abroad. Such discourses typically emerge in the face of incongruence between the actions of government and business, and when there is a disjuncture between the messages projected by its cultural-media and its actions. It is therefore important to take three main areas into account when investigating regional counterimperialism: state-to-state engagement through foreign policy, trade, and state-led investment; business engagement; and what can be called cultural-media. Counter-imperialism directed at multinational corporations (MNCs) and state-owned enterprises (SOEs) from the foreign power manifests through resistance in local markets and various civic institutions. It also occurs when governments work with businesses, unions, and NGOs to represent the interest of the local workers and consumers, and sometimes intervene directly in labour disputes. Protests and picketing may erupt spontaneously ‘from below’ – forcing the hand of government and elected officials (as well as leading to sometimes violent clampdowns in the interest of profitseeking). In a more constructive manner, ministries may choose to address issues of ‘fairness’ and ‘competition’ in response to MNCs’ or state-created monopolies’ penetration into their markets. This also occurs more indirectly through regulators and boards that serve to constrain action by corporates and SOEs and create the conditions for enough local competition to emerge. Often such regulators are independent from government but work to protect the ‘public interest’. The governments of smaller states in Africa are particularly eager to attract FDI and are rather unquestioning (at least initially) of the implications for local manufacturers and producers. Corporates primarily dispossess local communities through the repatriation of profits to the MNC’s headquarters and through the use of supply chains linked to the sending country. Once this pattern has been established, a more critical backlash towards the practices and procurement policies of corporates and state-owned enterprises occurs, particularly when the countries have become ‘vulnerable’ due to increased dependency for basic goods and services, largely due to a lack of independent planning. Counter-imperialist discourses in Africa are primarily conveyed through the media and commercial research, who may adopt a ‘fact-creating’ as well as activist role. The policy and think-tank

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community (if not co-opted) may work in tandem with the media to expose the policies of the dominant state, by bringing the issues mentioned above into the public domain supported by expert opinion and analysis. Both the government-owned and especially the independent media can play an important role in marshalling government and business into action, and ultimately, may aid in effecting change in policy. Finally, this section has implicitly suggested that a defining feature when trying to understand resistance in Africa is the particularly nuanced geographies through which they operate. By placing a greater focus on regional agency one can see how resistance to global processes of neoliberalism can arise at the micro-scale of industry in a country, or through virtual communities on blogs and social media. Resistance can also occur bilaterally through state channels even though the same state enacting the resistance may simultaneously belong to SACU, SADC, and the AU, for example. The point is that our understanding of resistance need not be determined by official communities but determined also by a ‘territorial logic of power’ (Harvey, 2005:101) independent of ‘fixed’ political and economic organisations. Instead, geographies of resistance could be defined by common perspectives on human rights, or by common regional identities, histories, or levels of economic development. Looking at these geographies in a new light is especially important as the conventional channels of resistance or fora used to ‘voice’ regional concerns such as the AU appear ineffective, outdated, and in a state of paralysis. More dynamic coalitions and groupings are needed to solve some of Africa’s problems and to bring about greater equity in the periphery. What may be called counter-imperialism, therefore, refers to the multiple locations where sub-imperialism is exercised in the world and the regional resistance which is elicited against such subimperialism, not only at the local and regional scales but against the broader global inequalities of an imperialist and capitalist system. More critical thought should go into these evolving geographies of resistance in Africa and beyond.

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G.M., Naidoo, P., Pillay, D., and Southall, R. (eds.) New South African Review 5: Beyond Marikana. Johannesburg: Wits University Press, pp. 67–84. BBC News, 2018, ‘Mamamah airport: Sierra Leone cancels China-funded project’. 10 October. Available at: https:// www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-45809810. Accessed on: 18 October 2018. Bello, W., 2014, ‘The BRICS: Challengers to the global status quo’. Foreign Policy in Focus, 29 August. Available at: http://fpif. org/brics-challengers-globalstatus-quo/. Accessed on: 9 September 2018. Bond, P., 2004, ‘US empire and South African sub-imperialism’ in Panitch, L. and Leys, C. (eds.) Socialist Register 2005: The empire reloaded. New York: Monthly Review Press. Bond, P., 2016, ‘BRICS banking and the debate over subimperialism’. Third World Quarterly, 37(4), 611–628. Bond, P., 2017, ‘“Africa rising” in retreat: New signs of resistance’. Monthly Review, 1 September, 69(4). Available at: https:// monthlyreview.org/2017/09/01/ africa-rising-in-retreat/. Accessed on: 9 September 2018. Bond, P. and Garcia, A., 2015, BRICS: An anti-capitalist critique. London: Pluto Press. Bruce, D., 2015, Marikana will always stalk Ramaphosa. 19 June. Available at: https://mg.co.za/ article/2015-06-19-00-marikanashootings-will-always-stalkramaphosa. Accessed on: 9 September 2018. Buchanan, P., 1997, ‘Counterhegemonic strategies in neoliberal Argentina’. Latin American Perspectives, 24(6), 113–132. Campbell, H., 2008, ‘China in Africa: Challenging US global

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Kamata, N., 2012, ‘The economic diplomacy of Tanzania: Accumulation by dispossession in a peripheral state’. Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy, 1(3), 291–313. Lusaka Times, 2018, ‘China to take over ZESCO – Africa Confidential’. 4 September. Available at: https://www. lusakatimes.com/2018/09/04/ china-to-take-over-zesco-africaconfidential/. Accessed on: 9 September 2018. Makhafola, G., 2016, ‘Khulubuse Zuma and co lose appeal, must pay Aurora workers’. Mail and Guardian, 12 May. Available at: https://mg.co.za/article/2016-0512-khulubuse-zuma-loses-courtappeal-must-pay-aurora-workers. Accessed on: 9 September 2018. Makki, F. and Geisler, C., 2011, ‘Development by dispossession: Land grabbing as new enclosures in contemporary Ethiopia’. Paper presented at the International Conference on Global Land Grabbing, 6–8 April. Martin, W.G., 2013, ‘South Africa and the new “scramble for Africa”: Imperialist, subimperialist, or victim?’. Journal of Political Economy, 2(2), 161–188. Miller, D., 2006, ‘Spaces of resistance: African workers at Shoprite in Maputo and Lusaka’. African Development, 31, 27–49. Miller, D., Saunders, R., and Oloyede, O., 2008, ‘South African corporations and postapartheid expansion in Africa: Creating a new regional space’. African Sociological Review, 12(1), 1–19. Mohan, G. and Lampert, B., 2012, ‘Negotiating China: Reinserting African agency into China– Africa relations’. African Affairs, 112(446), 92–110. Moyo, S., Jha, P., and Yeros, P., 2018, Reclaiming Africa:

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Scramble and resistance in the 21st century. Singapore: Springer. Moyo, S., Yeros, P., and Jha, P., 2012, ‘Imperialism and primitive accumulation: Notes on the new scramble for Africa’. Agrarian South: Journal of Political Economy, 1(2) 181–203. Nilsen, A. and von Holdt, K., 2019, ‘Rising powers, people rising: Neo-liberalization and its discontents in the BRICS countries’. Globalizations, 16(2), 121–136. Niselow, T., 2018, ‘Mining industry to tackle “unacceptable” rise in deaths’. Fin24. 20 August. Available at: https://www.fin24. com/Companies/Mining/miningindustry-to-tackle-unacceptablerise-in-deaths-20180820-3. Accessed on: 9 September 2018. Ó Tuathail, G., 1996, ‘An antigeopolitical eye: Maggie O’ Kane in Bosnia, 1992–1993’, Gender, Place and Culture, 3 (2), 171–195. Pieterse, J.N. 2010, Development theory. Second Edition. London: Sage. Pile, S. and Keith, M., 1997, Geographies of resistance. London and New York: Routledge. Polanyi, K., 1944, The great transformation. New York and Toronto: Farrar & Rinehart. Robinson, W., 2005, ‘Gramsci and globalisation: From nation-state to transnational hegemony’. Critical Review of International Social and Political Philosophy, 8(4), 1–16. Roccu, R., 2013, ‘David Harvey in Tahrir Square: The dispossessed, the discontented and the Egyptian revolution’. Third World Quarterly, 34(3), 423–440. Routledge, P., 1998, ‘Going globile: Spatiality, embodiment and media-tion in the Zapatista

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insurgency’ in Ó Tuathail, G. and Dalby, S. (eds.) Rethinking geopolitics. London: Routledge, pp. 240–260. Routledge, P., 2000, ‘“Our resistance will be as transnational as capital”: Convergence space and strategy in globalising resistance’. GeoJournal, 52(1), 25–33. Routledge, P., 2003, ‘Antigeopolitics’ in Agnew, J., Mitchell, K., and Toal, G. (eds.) A companion to political geography. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 236–260. Routledge, P., 2008, ‘Transnational political movements’ in Cox, K., Low, M., and Robinson, J. (eds.) The SAGE handbook of political geography. London: SAGE, pp. 335–349. Said, E., 1978, Orientalism. New York: Vintage. Samson, M., 2009, ‘(Sub)imperial South Africa? Reframing the debate’. Review of African Political Economy, 36(119), 93–103. Smith, G., 1999, The post-soviet states: Mapping the politics of transition. London: Arnold. The South African Foundation (2004) South Africa’s business presence in Africa. Johannesburg: The South African Foundation. Sunday Standard, 2016, ‘Panama papers and the Choppies connection’. 25 April. Available at: http://www.sundaystandard. info/panama-papers-andchoppies-connection. Accessed on: 9 September 2018. Taylor, I., 2014, Africa rising: Diversifying dependency? Oxford: James Currey. Taylor, I., 2017, Global governance and transnationalizing capitalist hegemony: The myth of the ‘emerging powers’. Abingdon: Routledge. Van der Merwe, J., 2014, ‘The BRICS puzzle: Rise of the

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non-West or veiled subimperialism?’ in Deych, T., Zhukov, A., Kulkova, O., and Korendyasov, E. (eds.) Africa’s growing role in world politics. Moscow: Institute for African Studies, pp. 145–162. Van der Merwe, J., 2016a, ‘Theorising emerging powers in Africa within the Westernled system of accumulation’ in van der Merwe, J., Taylor, I., and Arkhangelskaya, A. (eds.) Emerging powers in Africa: A new wave in the relationship? London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 17–38. Van der Merwe, J., 2016b, ‘An historical geographical analysis of South Africa’s system of accumulation: 1652–1994’. Review of African Political Economy, 43(147), 58–72. Van der Merwe, J., 2017, ‘Animated capital’. Paper presented at the BRICS International Think Tank Conference. Xiamen, China. 23–26 June. Van der Merwe, J., 2018, ‘The Belt and Road Initiative: Reintegrating Africa and the Middle East into China’s system of accumulation’ in Xing, L. (ed.) Mapping China’s One Belt

One Road Initiative. London: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 197–217. Van der Merwe, J., 2019, ‘Geographies of hope and exploitation: South Africa, Africa Rising, and the global turn to BRICS’ in Xing, L. (ed.) The international political economy of the BRICS. New York: Routledge, pp. 180–196. Van der Merwe, J. and Dodd, N., 2019, The political economy of underdevelopment in the global South: The government–business– media complex. London: Palgrave Macmillan. Van der Merwe, J., Taylor, I., and Arkhangelskaya, A., 2016, Emerging powers in Africa: A new wave in the relationship? London: Palgrave Macmillan. Warf, B. and Grimes, J., 1997, ‘Counterhegemonic discourses and the internet’. Geographical Review, 87(2), 259–274. Zelenova, D. and Kruchinsky, V., 2017, ‘Digitalizing the Stokvel: Economic mutual aid in contemporary South Africa’. Paper delivered at the 14th International Conference of Africanists. Institute for African Studies, Moscow. 17–20 October.

3 Assimilation, co-optation, and resistance within ‘BRICS from the middle’ Patrick Bond

There are three central standpoints associated with the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), which in shorthand can be summarised as ‘from above’, ‘from the middle’, and ‘from below’. The optimistic narrative from ‘above’ is straightforward, and can be found in official documentation, in statements by the BRICS Business Council, as well as in pro-BRICS media such as the BRICS Post internationally and the Independent chain locally in South Africa. The ideology includes aspersions against Western control of the multilateral system of global governance, especially in relation to economic and geopolitical problems. Usually the ideology specifies only that there are ‘conditionalities’ or ‘lack of voice’ for emerging markets and poor countries. Sometimes, as occurred in South Africa’s ruling African National Congress (ANC) policy conference in 2017, there is even use of the term ‘anti-imperialist’ to describe the BRICS’ struggle for global justice. In contrast, ‘BRICS from below’ is a critique that emerged from various counter-summits since 2013. While BRICS elites may posture when attacking the West, they are not only assimilated into the world power structure through growing representation in multilateral institutions – invariably at the expense of poor countries – but their roles amplify the damages of world capitalism. This is obvious given the way that many major BRICS firms operate in their hinterlands, as well as through their own home-grown political and corporate corruption, state surveillance and repression, and super-exploitative processes within each of the BRICS. A ‘BRICS from below’ term, ‘sub-imperialism’, is often used in this narrative. Instead of fading with the 2017 advent of the Donald Trump regime in Washington – given its economic isolationism and protectionism – and the 2018 election of Jair Bolsonaro to lead Brazil, the sub-imperial tag may now be ever more relevant. The latter’s anticipated military cooperation with Washington is one obvious area of assimilation. But more importantly, the G20’s focus on global-scale neoliberal,

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pro-corporate financial and trade policies has shifted, to the EU and China. Xi Jinping is, simply, the most important advocate of corporate-driven ‘free trade’ and the main force backing ongoing World Trade Organisation (WTO) power at a time when Trump appears intent on sabotaging the WTO. This confluence makes the third ideological orientation – ‘BRICS from the middle’ – ever more difficult to sustain, because if there is anything consistent about the theory and practice of this approach, it is ‘wait and see’. In short, say those in the middle, the BRICS bloc is a great idea with unprecedented potential to shake up unjust Western power (compared to say, the Non-Aligned Movement and G77), especially with two solid new financial institutions (the New Development Bank and Contingent Reserve Arrangement) that might take a different approach than the Bretton Woods institutions. A potential new BRICS credit ratings agency and the increasing utilisation of local currencies (not the US dollar or the euro) in trade and finance are also portentous. A greater BRICS role in the UN Security Council and a new focus on ‘women’ (albeit not yet ‘gender’) are areas providing hope. But, ‘BRICS from the middle’ insist, these potential positive features rely upon the BRICS leaders becoming more forceful in turning their rhetoric into action, and in allowing more freedoms and respect for civil society. Advocacy from South Africa from within this assimilationist, middling standpoint is the subject of the following pages. The ‘BRICS from the middle’ advocates became far more visible in 2018 during South Africa’s hosting of the BRICS summit, especially trade unions, civil society, and intellectuals. The dilemma for these groups, as well as the ‘BRICS-from-below’ network that in July 2018 raised the call, ‘Break the BRICS!’ and engaged in the first demonstration at the New Development Bank (NDB), was how to make their voices heard. Varying approaches were attempted, ranging from participatory insider activities to workshops to newspaper articles to outsider protests. In each, the limits of both the BRICS and their middle-of-the-road allies were increasingly evident, especially in relation to sites of African solidarity. Before turning to some of the arguments coming from the BRICS Academic Forum and BRICS Trade Union Forum (BTUF) middle ground, consider how the ‘BRICS from above’ phrasing parallels that of the intellectuals and worker leaders. In 2018, the logic of the BRICS’ own assimilation was expressed by a leading neoliberal Indian member of parliament, Shashi Tharoor (2015:1):

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As countries acquire economic and military power, they start exercising their geopolitical muscle. The challenge for advocates of world order is to accommodate emerging powers … It is important to note that countries like China and India – unlike, say, Germany and Japan a century ago – are not seeking to overturn the world order. They seek to obtain redress within the broad framework rather than destabilize the framework itself. All that the ‘emerging powers’ want is a place at the high table. After all, countries realize that in the global system, you are either at the table or on the menu.

BRICS think-tankery in the shadow of Sandton corruption A ‘think tank’ is sometimes considered to be a group of people paid to think, by the people who control the tanks (Klein, 2007). In Johannesburg in mid-2018, one of South Africa’s highest-profile intellectual vehicles appears to be a victim of drunken driving by scholars from whom we otherwise expect much stronger political navigation skills. In the luxurious central business district of Sandton, a gathering of several dozen state-funded intellectuals (staying at the five-star Intercontinental Hotel) conferenced for three days at a reported cost of $700,000. The BRICS Academic Forum and South Africa BRICS Think Tank meeting at the Sandton Convention Centre adopted the ironic theme, ‘Envisioning Inclusive Development through a Socially Responsive Economy’ (South African BRICS Think Tank, 2018; NIHSS SA, 2018). The mandate from Higher Education and Training Minister Naledi Pandor’s opening speech was framed with unabashed talkleft ideology, regardless of obvious walk-right realities. She asked academics to develop a collaborative set of interventions that advances the agenda of the bloc. The BRICS formation is based on a progressive view of how the world should develop; and the world is in need of progressive ideas, of ideas that come from issues of social justice and inclusion. (Sibanyoni, 2018:1)

However, to advance that agenda entails active avoidance of major class contradictions within and between the BRICS, and between the BRICS and Africa, and especially the host, South

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Africa’s rampant corporate and state corruption. The point, according to BRICS facilitator Anil Sooklal, Deputy Director-General of Pretoria’s Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO), is state–business–intellectual ‘synergy. We found that the Think Tank and Academic Forum is working in one compartment, and our business [sector] was working in another compartment, and government in another compartment. So we took the initiative to bring them all together’ (Maromo, 2018:1). As the gathering illustrated, being embedded within a statecorporate power and funding system – at a time South Africa’s National Research Foundation is cutting back drastically on scholars’ research subsidies (Bozzoli, 2017) – risked transmission of the worst disease intellectuals can catch: failure of analytical nerve. For the BRICS Academic Forum occurred in a Johannesburg neighbourhood where, regular PricewaterhouseCoopers (PwC) studies show, ‘eight out of ten senior managers commit economic crime’ (Financial Mail, 2018), within a country that PwC regularly rates as having the world’s most corrupt bourgeoisie. (Paris and Nairobi usually compete for silver and bronze status) (PwC South Africa, 2018). In November 2017, to take just one example, the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists’ (2018) ‘Paradise Papers’ revealed secretive tax haven activities by BRICS presidents or their close associates. While Michel Temer and Vladimir Putin may be most profoundly exposed (Associated Press, 2017; Hans, 2018), investigative journalists have implicated Cyril Ramaphosa himself in massive illicit financial flows via his mining houses Lonmin and Shanduka, and cell phone giant MTN which he chaired (McKune and Makinana, 2014; McKune and Turner, 2015). The local BRICS Business Council convened at the same venue in late July, led by controversial ‘Fourth Industrial Revolution’ proponent Iqbal Survé (Sagarmatha Technologies, 2018), who succeeded disgraced Eskom boss Brian Molefe as Council head in 2017, before being fired (with his whole team) by Trade and Industry Minister Rob Davies in October 2018. Survé’s Independent newspaper chain carried non-stop cheery news about the BRICS, especially his Council leadership. Three of the four other Council members in mid-2018 were Transnet’s Siyabonga Gama, Aspen Pharmaceutical’s Stavros Nicolaou, and Mediterranean Shipping Company’s Sello Rasethaba. All acquired prolific wealth amidst very serious charges of tender fraud (Survé, Gama, and Rasethaba) (Sole, 2013; Chapter 8; Legal Brief, 2010), price fixing (Nicolaou) (Khan, 2017), Gupta-denialism (Gama) (Menon, 2017), spying

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on anti-corruption whistle-blowers (Gama) (Mashego, 2018), and even sexual harassment in the course of BRICS-related travel duties (Rasethaba) (Malope, 2018). The Business Council was founded in March 2013, when the BRICS heads of state summit came to Durban. As its enthusiastic chair, Molefe pronounced, ‘Our overarching goal as the SA BRICS Business Council is, therefore, to bring tangible projects to fruition more quickly and to strengthen the interface between the governments and private sectors of the BRICS economies’ (Molefe, 2016:1). Before losing his job running Eskom in 2016 due to the Gupta brothers’ bribery scandals, in which he became one of the country’s most reviled officials, Molefe was chief executive of Transnet. During the 2013 BRICS summit, he signed a high-profile $5 billion loan from the China Development Bank to pay for Durban port improvements and new locomotives (Hutson, 2013). However, as investigative journalists at amaBhungane reported, ‘Transnet bought seven of the world’s most expensive port cranes because its Chinese stateowned supplier [Shanghai Zhenhua Heavy Industries] inflated the price to pay off the Guptas’ (amaBhungane, 2017), and then the South China Rail supplier of locomotives gave 21 per cent kickbacks (Thamm, 2017) to the Guptas worth more than $400 million. This corrupt state-corporate nexus has assimilated not only trade unionists, but also a Civil BRICS driven by NGOs (especially Oxfam), the BRICS Youth movement, and the BRICS Academic Forum. All retain a generally positive attitude about promoting the BRICS bloc. In March 2018 Oxfam and the Africa Monitor NGO even publicly announced – on behalf of Civil BRICS – that the NDB should finance privatised state services. But none dared mention the specific stains of corruption spreading outwards from Durban in 2013 and Sandton in 2018. Moreover, all were told by DIRCO in no uncertain terms that their messaging must be provided in the form of polite policy ‘asks’, spelled out at least a month before the BRICS summit. That way their ideas would be integrated into the formal agenda, with no distracting counter-summits or protests to compete for the media’s and society’s attention.

Against mental colonialism Pro-BRICS rhetoric is simply untenable in this extreme context, and some of the intellectuals gathered in Sandton were quite critical of existing regimes. SA BRICS Think Tank chair Ari Sitas, a University

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of Cape Town sociologist, even cited a Russian interview with Brazilian philosopher-lawyer Roberto Mangabeira Unger. Unger (n.d.:1) said: Our whole tendency is to accept the general blueprint of the market economy imported from the North Atlantic world and then to compromise it or qualify it with elements of state capitalism, political authoritarianism and compensatory social democracy – that is what we do. It is a set of compromises, qualifications and evasions, rather than strong national projects. We lack these projects.

Unger (n.d.:1) continued with an autocritique that should have made the Sandton set squirm: Not only [do] we have political and plutocratic elites that subordinate national interests to … self-serving objectives, but in the midst of all our bluster about national self-searching we are all tainted by mental colonialism. What is shocking to see in these countries is that the intelligentsia and the political elites are to a very large extent servile, they are submissive to the intellectual fashions and alternatives that are imported from the Academy of the North Atlantic countries.

For a while, at least before 2015, such fashions included the idea that a united BRICS would offer a genuine challenge to imperial power. However, by mid-2017 when the Chinese hosted similar gatherings of academics and civil society, there were such intense geopolitical and economic conflicts between Beijing and New Delhi that Narendra Modi nearly boycotted the BRICS heads of state summit, as he had done with the Belt and Road Initiative conference four months earlier (Bond, 2017a). As a precedent for the Sandton meeting, an August 2017 Quanzhou seminar of BRICS intellectuals, at the time tensions were hottest, ‘paid little attention to the ongoing India–China military stand-off’ on the Bhutan border (Alternative Information and Development Centre, 2018:1). Remarked the Delhi-based Observer Research Foundation’s chair, Sudheendra Kulkarni (2017:1): ‘Obviously, the Chinese hosts did not want a divisive bilateral issue to get any kind of focus in the midst of deliberations at a BRICS seminar’. Reflecting servility to local power, many of South Africa’s statefunded intellectuals and commentators remain pro-BRICS, albeit in often schizophrenic ways. At the extreme end of this spectrum, the most actively ‘anti-imperialist’ voices are those of Gayton McKenzie – whose BRICS chapter in the book Kill Zuma by Any Means Necessary last December loyally provided the Zuma narrative

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(Afro Worldview, 2017) – as well as Black First Land First led by Andile Mngxitama (Black First Land First, 2018) and Black Opinion (2018). According to these (pro-Gupta) analysts, Cyril Ramaphosa is a Western-oriented saboteur of BRICS – in a way like former Brazilian president Temer’s congressional coup and prison sentence, respectively, against his two Workers Party predecessors, Dilma Rousseff (2016) and Lula da Silva (2018). These claims are unpersuasive, typically lacking concrete evidence – aside from McKenzie’s request to anyone disagreeing with his often wild allegations, that they sue him in court where he will provide proof. No one has done so. Indeed, the Mail and Guardian recently quoted an unnamed DIRCO official, suggesting that Ramaphosa ‘is warming up to the West, almost recalibrating our relations to focus on the West because those are his friends, at the expense of BRICS … It’s almost like Zuma had put all his eggs in that [BRICS] basket’ (Bendile, 2018:1). A similar tale was spun by Zuma himself in 2017 who claimed, ‘I was poisoned and almost died just because South Africa joined BRICS under my leadership’ (Chambers, 2018:1). There has been no hard evidence beyond McKenzie’s mysterious assassination-attempt gossip about MaNtuli (Zuma’s fourth wife) and her seducer, the Central Intelligence Agency agent Bill Harvey (Matiwane, 2017). Arguments by the McKenzie–Mngxitama conspiratorial crew find Sandton scholarly allies, who also assert that the BRICS are actively undermining Western power over global finance and geopolitics. The BRICS Academic Forum programme profiled an abstract by University of Zululand historian Maxwell Shamase claiming: BRICS calls for the democratisation of the interstate system and opposes Western and US dominance of global governance … Most scholars do indeed agree that BRICS have rejected the dominant political economy paradigms of the liberal order, including a market-oriented regulatory system, fiscal austerity and comprehensive liberalisation of trade.1

1 Sadly, it turns out that the confident words above were not originally Shamase’s, they were borrowed verbatim without attribution from an Observer Research Foundation paper. But this was not an instance of South–South solidaristic resonance; they were actually penned in 2015 by idealistic Finnish PhD student Marko Juutinen and his colleague Jyrki Käkönen. And yet, as it became increasingly obvious that BRICS did not actually reject the dominant neoliberal world order, Juutinen reversed himself last September: ‘the BRICS on one hand seek to promote some form of pluralism in the international arena, and on the other do not seem to offer an alternative’.

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Residual anti-imperial fantasy In another example of dubious Sandton scholarship, one of South Africa’s most insightful technology analysts, Rasigan Maharajh from Tshwane University of Technology, has gone on record advocating a BRICS alternative to the Western-controlled internet, albeit with not a single mention of Beijing’s extreme surveillance, censorship, active net repression, and official Orwellian ‘social credit’ attempts at citizen behaviour modification (Maharajh, 2018). The latter is carried out by Tencent, in which the Sandton scholars made large investments (as have all of us with Johannesburg Stock Exchange pension portfolios, via the single largest firm listed there, Naspers, which through an historical accident owns nearly a third of Tencent). And India’s capacity for internet censorship (Sharma, 2018) was on display the week before the BRICS Think Tank meeting in Tamil Nadu province in the wake of a police massacre of 13 anti-pollution protesters against Vedanta’s Sterlite copper plant. The resulting uproar was so great that a court ordered Sterlite to permanently close. Also in the Academic Review, Maharajh (2018) claimed that endorsement of the UN Sustainable Development Goals is the basis for the BRICS’ ‘principles of constituting an alternative to the multilateral edifices of global capitalism’. Given that Xi is the world’s highest-profile proponent of corporate-driven free trade, this was truly outlandish (Anderlini, Feng, and Mitchell, 2017). In the same spirit, regarding climate change, Maharajh (2018:29) wrote in the BRICS Academic Review (a new journal launched at the Sandton event), ‘the BRICS are resolute in their efforts to continue to meet this commitment [to the Paris Climate Accord] … and have all indicated plans to moderate their own developmental expansions and curb their respective emissions’. But Maharajh excluded from consideration the extreme carbon-addicted features of South Africa’s National Development Plan (National Planning Commission, 2012): ••

••

the $60 billion Presidential Infrastructure Coordinating Commission (PICC) first priority mega-project, which aims to export 18 billion tons of coal from Limpopo, Mpumalanga, and KZN; the $20 billion PICC second priority mega-project, a Durban port-petrochemical expansion, to which the BRICS NDB committed $200 million;

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the $35+ billion Medupi/Kusile coal-fired (and also public– private corruption-riddled) power plants; new Operation Phakisa ‘Blue Economy’ offshore oil/gas drilling being carried out by ExxonMobil, Eni, Statoil, and Sasol; the state’s new fracking plans (probably in excess of $8 billion); worsening suburban sprawl due to the developer-driven search for cheap land for low-cost faraway housing; and higher levels of high-emissions meat consumption, plus higher pesticide and fertiliser use.

Less grandiose and far more critical in his BRICS Academic Review contribution was the progressive economist Seeraj Mohamed. However, even he spread the fairy dust: ‘The BRICS countries should continue to push for reform that gives increased voice, democracy and accountability of the IFIs, such as the World Bank and possibly support interventions and programmes of UN agencies more’ (2018:33). This line of argument, while incorrect, is widely repeated, e.g. by Sooklal’s DIRCO colleague Dave Malcolmson when in 2017 he addressed an Institute for Global Dialogue workshop: South Africa’s engagement in BRICS may also assist in achieving the reform of: global political and financial architecture; the UN, particularly the UNSC, to deliver representativity, promote collaborative responses to global challenges, and make the UNSC more effective; and the IMF and World Bank – in particular to expand representation for Sub-Saharan Africa … BRICS will continue to serve as a vanguard of the process of realignment in the new global order in cooperation with its partners in the Global South for the collective promotion of the interests of the Global South. (Malcolmson, 2017)

The BRICS have been doing exactly the opposite. In the UN, three of the BRICS – Brazil, India, and South Africa – repeatedly asked for permanent Security Council seats, but as is often lamented (even by Thabo Mbeki), the fear of diluting their votes to unreliable and often pro-Washington regimes prevents China and Russia from supporting any of them (Valdai Discussion Club, 2016). As for alleged Bretton Woods voting reform in Africa’s interest, consider how the December 2015 BRIC countries’ increase in International Monetary Fund (IMF) shares – China up by 37 per cent, Brazil 23 per cent,

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India 11 per cent, and Russia 8 per cent – occurred at the expense of Nigeria and Venezuela which both lost 41 per cent of their votes. Even South Africa lost 21 per cent, with a dozen more in between. And as for accountability, the five BRICS IMF directors joined the West’s in endorsing a second term (Inman, 2016) for Managing Director Christine Lagarde, in spite of ongoing French prosecution for her €400 million corruption during her time as finance minister, a vote which was reaffirmed a few hours after she was convicted of negligence on the charges (Samuel, Gosden, and Chan, 2016). It is important to cite the likes of Maharajh and Mohamed here – because they are usually very sensible analysts (i.e. they are among the best thinkers and not ‘hacks’), which suggests that because of their urgency to promote the BRICS, those in the academic consultancy zone twist and turn from interpreting what is in reality a ‘sub-imperial’ link with the West, into an anti-imperial fantasy.

BRICS–Western sub-imperialism-imperialism The BRICS record of amplifying Western control of global governmental institutions is already prolific, including in world finance, trade, and climate politics. As formerly pro-BRICS analyst Vijay Prashad wrote, the BRICS bloc – given the nature of its ruling classes, and particularly with the right now in ascendency in Brazil and in India – has no ideological alternative to imperialism … In fact, the new institutions of the BRICS will be yoked to the International Monetary Fund and the dollar – not willing to create a new platform for trade and development apart from the Northern order. (2018:1)

The IMF is strengthened by the oddly-named Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA), a supposed BRICS ‘alternative’ which forces borrowers to obtain an IMF structural adjustment loan programme before receiving the bulk of their BRICS CRA loans. This is a likely scenario in the event of the kind of foreign debt repayment crisis Pretoria is likely to face within a year (as are Argentina and Turkey now). Likewise, the NDB adopted a five-year strategy, which includes staff sharing, ‘joint projects and knowledge exchanges with the World Bank … to make the most of their decades of experience’ (New Development Bank, 2017:1). As for trade, the (Brazilian-headed) WTO’s December 2015 Nairobi summit gained crucial last-minute support from Brazilian

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and Indian leaders to destroy food sovereignty as part of the longawaited United States–European Union agricultural deal (Ragharan, 2015). Prashad (2018:1) complains, ‘Eagerness for Western markets continues to dominate the growth agenda of the BRICS states. The immense needs of their own populations do not drive their policy orientations’. And as a third case, the UN’s December 2015 Paris Climate Agreement contains no binding provisions (unlike the 1997 Kyoto Protocol) (Bond, 2016). This was due to a private deal driven by Barack Obama to make emissions cuts voluntary. It was agreed – to the consternation of the rest of the world – by four BRICS leaders (Zuma, Lula, Wen Jiabao, and Manmohan Singh) with Obama at the 2009 Copenhagen summit (McKibben, 2009). Hence when Donald Trump rejected multilateral climate policy in mid-2017, there was no punishment, even though Joseph Stiglitz (2017:1) argued, ‘If Trump wants to withdraw the US from the Paris climate agreement, the rest of the world should impose a carbon-adjustment tax on US exports that do not comply with global standards’. An exemplar of imperial-sub-imperial collaboration, the Paris deal also prohibits poor countries from legally invoking the ‘climate debt’ owed by major emitters, of which China is now the most pollution-intensive in absolute terms and India is most responsible for rapid emissions increases. Paris negotiators ignored military, maritime, and air transport emissions, and reintroduced carbon trading (the privatisation of the air) as a bankers’ solution to the climate catastrophe now unfolding. These features all suited not just the United States State Department’s global climate policy managers but also the BRICS elites, though they will certainly be fatal to hundreds of millions of Africans this century. As for larger geopolitical concerns, the BRICS have made only defensive military gestures in their immediate vicinities. These include China on the Korean Peninsula and South China Sea, Russia in Eastern Europe and Syria, and India on the Pakistan and Bhutan borders. If Trump attacks Iran or Venezuela in 2019 or beyond, as seems likely given his elevation of warmongers John Bolton and Mike Pompeo, Prashad (2018:1) concluded, ‘the BRICS project has no ability to counter the military dominance of the US and NATO’. Instead of facing up to the bully in Washington and, for example by arranging a world climate sanctions movement, the BRICS are busy elsewhere, including Africa – and not necessarily to the benefit of its peoples, economies, and environments.

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Africa on the BRICS menu Across the world – even if not yet articulated in South Africa – there is growing doubt by intellectuals concerning the BRICS agenda who, since the Durban summit of 2013, have lowered their expectations. Some follow the tradition of Brazil’s leading dependista theorist, Ruy Mauro Marini, who linked the internal and external characteristics of sub-imperial regimes (Marini, 1972). Prashad did so, too: The domestic policies adopted by the BRICS states can be described as neoliberal with southern characteristics – with a focus on sales of commodities, low wages to workers along with the recycled surplus turned over as credit to the North, even as the livelihood of their own citizens is jeopardised, and even as they have developed new markets in other, often more vulnerable, countries which were once part of the Third World bloc. (Prashad, 2018:1)

When facing an imperial-sub-imperial combination (Bond, 2018), the vulnerable countries include most of Africa, and this is where the BRICS’ Sandton scholars shirked perhaps their greatest responsibility: to unveil and criticise that neighbourhood’s predatory role on the continent – what with all the nearby headquarters of banks, mining houses, retail and wholesale empires, and cell phone companies that drain Africa of wealth. Most BRICS have profitable business arms in Africa, including the likes of Brazil’s land-grabbing Vale coal mining (Marshall, 2015) and bribery-addicted Odebrecht construction (Lewis and Brooks, 2017), Moscow’s nuclear-toting Rosatom, India’s brutal Vedanta (Foil Vedanta, 2018), Chinese corporations such as those that ran off with Zimbabwe’s diamonds (Zimbabwe Independent, 2012), and Johannesburg’s own AngloGold Ashanti (Business and Human Rights Resource Centre, 2018) and Glencore (Swiss-headquartered but run by South African Ivan Glasenberg) which have ravaged both minerals and the people of the Congo and many other sites that can be termed Resource Cursed. It is here, sadly, where the pampered academics explicitly fail in their historic task of ‘speaking truth to power’. So too do trade unionists fail in defending not just BRICS’ workers but their broader societies’ interests.

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The BRICS Trade Union Forum By far the world’s largest proletariat lies within the BRICS bloc, whose state leaders met in Johannesburg on July 25–27 2018, and whose union officials gathered in Durban the following weekend. Since 2012, the BTUF has attempted to traverse extremely difficult terrain, using an ever-changing roadmap. Overall, BTUF membership is uneven across the BRICS’ working classes. The absolute size of trade union membership and its density (i.e. the percentage of workforce unionised) vary, with China’s numbers reflecting workers’ often frustrating ‘company union’ status: China – 240 million (90% of workforce); India – 87 million (33%); Russia – 24 million (32%); South Africa – 3.3 million (30%); and Brazil – 17 million (17%). South African BTUF affiliates are the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU), allied with the ruling ANC since the 1980s, with 1.7 million members; the traditionally most conservative (and historically white) Federation of Democratic Unions of South Africa (FEDUSA), with 700,000; and the National Council of Trade Unions (NACTU), which has radical pan-Africanist rhetoric but suffers substantial internal strife (Mahlakoana, 2017), with 260,000. Membership figures ebb and flow (Van Rensburg, 2017). Aside from FEDUSA, which won back a public sector union last year, all have lost support. After the traumatic 2012 Marikana Massacre of 34 Lonmin platinum mineworkers who were on a wildcat strike, COSATU’s National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) surrendered much of its membership (down from 300,000 to 187,000) to the Association of Mineworkers and Construction Union (250,000 workers) (Mahlakoana, 2018). Even if greatly divided and weakened, South Africa probably hosts the most advanced and coherent of the BRICS union federation affiliates, and certainly boasts the most militant proletariat. In 2018, the World Economic Forum ranked it fifth most confrontational in the world, after a period from 2012 to 2017 as the most confrontational among 140 countries’ working classes. Yet due to internal rivalry, the BTUF specifically excludes the SA Federation of Trade Unions (SAFTU) and its 680,000 members. SAFTU was formed in 2017, after COSATU’s leader Zwelinzima Vavi and the 350,000-strong National Union of Metalworkers of South Africa (NUMSA) were expelled, followed by the Food and Allied Workers Union (with 130,000 members) and a few others. The reason was SAFTU’s much stronger opposition to ANC neoliberalism and state

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corruption than COSATU’s loyalist members, at the time led by NUM (Bond, 2017b). SAFTU is excluded from the BTUF on spurious grounds: it has not been admitted to the National Economic Development and Labour Council (NEDLAC), a corporatist institution which critics argue is a ‘toy telephone’ (Bell, 2018) and often irrelevant. As COSATU itself warned in 2016, Government continues to boycott and undermine NEDLAC by sending junior bureaucrats with no decision-making powers, while big business continues to condescendingly treat NEDLAC as a platform, where they think that they can go make presentations and not engage. We will shut down NEDLAC if these social partners keep undermining and undercutting it in this manner. (COSATU, n.d.:1)

The boycott of SAFTU – especially of its leader Vavi and SAFTU’s metalworkers union (South Africa’s largest by far) led by Irvin Jim – shifts the BTUF ideological orientation much more to the centre. As a result, the BTUF maintained its status quo approach, no matter how dangerous this is for members, societies, and the environment. That route forward is merely a continuation of predictable annual meetings in which trade unionists endorse the business-as-usual BRICS agenda, even while huge changes are underway in geopolitics, economics, and the environment – nearly all of which undermine labour, the broader society, and ecology. A different route would be to confront these contradictions head on and locate greater shop floor and grassroots unity. On July 21–22, 2018, the weekend before the BTUF meeting and just before the BRICS leaders’ summit, SAFTU gathered thousands of its members plus civil society allies for a Workers’ Summit, which spelt out major policy and political differences with the other federations (and also began the process of launching a workers’ party to run in the 2019 elections). For example, in April 2018, SAFTU put tens of thousands of workers on the streets against a proposed minimum wage – one strongly supported by the other three federations, but which ranges between just $0.80–$1.50/hour, i.e. ‘paltry’ according to Vavi (the realistic poverty line is $110/person/month) (Budlender, Woolard, and Leibbrandt, 2015). However, there are occasionally signs of potential unity among left-leaning trade unions. Such shop floor resistance was witnessed when in mid-June 2018, tens of thousands of NUM mineworkers and NUMSA metalworkers at the parastatal electricity supplier

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Eskom engaged in wildcat protests – allegedly using intimidation and ‘sabotage’ – sufficient to create a rolling national blackout (Huffington Post, 2018). The unions’ objective was to discredit Eskom’s zero per cent wage offer (the inflation rate is 4.5 per cent), and they immediately succeeded in gaining a new offer above 6.5 per cent. South Africa’s capitalist class was visibly unnerved by this show of strength (Mnyanda, 2018), a precedent that might even lead to formal institutional NUM–NUMSA reconciliation, as NUM’s more critical leaders won greatly increased power at their 2017 electoral convention (Modjadji, 2018). In November 2018, NUMSA and NUM combined in a march to the presidency at Pretoria’s Union Buildings against the privatisation of electricity generation (through Independent Power Producers ranging from renewable to coal-fired generators). Moreover, NUM began threatening to end electoral support for the ANC and transfer it to the South African Communist Party (SACP), a party that itself began debating whether to enter the 2019 election probably as a pressure point to make the South African president and ANC leader Cyril Ramaphosa more amenable to its demands. The SACP already has several cabinet positions, yet core ANC policies are still neoliberal. Recent exceptions include free tertiary education won through intense student battles, land ‘expropriation without compensation’ – so far more rhetorical than real – and a National Health Insurance plan that appears perpetually underfunded.

BTUF labour remains repressed, super-exploited, but unevenly militant In contrast to rising militancy, also witnessed in massive recent truck-driver strikes in Brazil and China, the BTUF’s annual efforts are mostly aimed at social dialogue: promoting state–capital–labour tripartism in areas of common concern with BRICS leaders and the BRICS Business Council. But whether in Russia (2012), South Africa (2013), Brazil (2014), Russia (2015), India (2016), China (2017), or South Africa (2018), these efforts have not been successful. In mid-2018 the BTUF acknowledged its own lack of agency: ‘The Government of the Republic of South Africa has determined the time and venues of events with the participation of trade unions under the South African presidency in BRICS’ (BRICS Trade Union Forum, 2018). And indeed, over the prior six years, the BTUF made reform proposals in the fields of global trade, finance, investment,

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climate, and geopolitics, all areas in which workers and the rest of the world had hoped BRICS leaders might provide a genuine alternative to Western imperialism. Instead, the BRICS amplify neoliberal and anti-Southern multilateral perspectives, as argued below. This is also apparent on home turf, for in some BRICS countries, e.g. China, the labour movement is extremely weak, which is characterised by state control, lack of autonomy, migrant labour discrimination, low wages, and wildcat strikes (often harshly repressed). Conditions are worsening due to new technologies and to fewer freedoms to organise. In the 2018 International Trade Union Congress Global Rights Index, South Africa was in the second rank of countries where workers have won basic rights (i.e. among the world’s best 38), a decline from 2014 when it was in the highest group, alongside European social democracies (ITUC Global Rights Index, 2018). Next is Russia, in the third rank of countries, i.e. facing regular violations of rights, followed by Brazil in the fourth rank, with its systematic violations. The worst group – including China and India – are labelled as countries with no guarantee of rights. One result is a relatively low level of absolute wages in the BRICS, illustrated within a sectoral case study: the textile industry (Ness, 2015). In 2011, South African textile workers were paid €3.8/hour, compared to €2.8 in Brazil, €0.8 in coastal China, €0.7 in India and €0.5 in inland China (the average wage in rich countries was €16.8/hour, but lower still are prevailing wages in places with vast labour reserves such as Vietnam and Bangladesh, at €0.3/hour). Profits soar up the value chain, to the copyright owners and brand managers usually in the global North, for as the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) remarks, even in a simple jacket, physical components, including labour, fabric, lining, buttons, sleeve heads, shoulder pads, labels and hangtags, account for only nine percent of the price; the remaining 91 percent of the value is for intangible assets, including a wide range of services such as retail, logistics, banking and marketing. (United Nations, 2017)

In other words, within a complex world division of labour characterised by global supply chains, the power of corporations controlling upstream value-chain components means that both BRICS and hinterland economies continue to suffer from super-exploitative processes (Smith, 2016): a wage rate that is often lower than the cost of reproducing labour-power. As an example, South Africa’s Bantustan system was

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typical of the migrant labour relations that left caring for children, sick workers, and the retired as a task for women in far-off settings, with little or no state support. This form of internal migrancy has usually emerged because it is extremely profitable, insofar as the employer does not bear the full cost of social reproduction. Such a system characterises most labour on the east coast of China, as well as sites like Marikana where mineworkers killed in 2012 were all migrants. As a result of low wages paid to most BRICS workers, labour’s input into GDP is relatively low. In most of the five (except South Africa), the period 2011 to 2015 witnessed a deterioration of the contribution of labour to GDP, according to UN DESA (United Nations, 2017). Fixed capital investments that would raise labour productivity have been weak. Instead of incoming foreign direct investment (FDI) taking advantage of wage differentials, recent years witnessed much less capital-deepening investment. One additional factor in labour productivity is worker militancy. One way to measure business–labour relations is the World Economic Forum (WEF) annual listing – based on polling 14,000 business executives from 137 economies – of shop floor collaboration on a spectrum from most ‘confrontational’ to most ‘cooperative’. In the 2017–2018 Global Competitiveness Report, three of the BRICS – South Africa, Brazil, and Russia – rated among the most confrontational third of the world’s national workforces, although South Africa fell from most militant to fifth most in the 2018–2019 survey (World Economic Forum, 2017–2018). Two other BRICS countries, India and China, are measured as having among the world’s more cooperative national workforces. Of course, supposed averagelevel ‘cooperation’ in the two largest BRICS may disguise intense pockets of labour militancy, for in China there are several thousand illegal wildcat strikes per year (Lockett, 2016) and in India in September 2016, there was a national strike of an estimated 180 million workers, the largest in world history.

BTUF assimilationist naivety The alternative approach to BRICS labour politics – based not on social dialogue but social power, based not on class snuggle but class struggle – entails, first, identifying as many other oppressed allies as possible (not simply gazing upwards in search of tripartite relationships which have proven so disappointing thus far). Making alliances with these social forces would expand the BTUF field of vision to more explicitly incorporate the interests of poor and working people,

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women, students and youth, environmentalists, the LGBTI community, and social movements across so many other issue areas. The BRICS counter-summits in Durban, Fortaleza, Goa, Xiamen, and Johannesburg sought just such ‘BRICS from below’ relationships. In the BTUF, in contrast, illusions remain that working within the BRICS will deliver the goods. International Trade Union Congress (ITUC) President João Felício argued at a July 2015 Ufa BTUF plenary, The BRICS have an opportunity to establish a de facto different political discussion on the direction of the economy, finance and the world of work … The new financial institutions of the BRICS cannot share the neoliberal rationale of the Troika, which puts the interests of big business above the rights of workers and the wellbeing of citizens in their countries. (Felício, 2015)

But that opportunity was lost – as witnessed by three choices to reform multilateralism made in December 2015, noted below – and will probably not arise again. Indeed, it is ever more likely with the turn by India and Brazil, to Trump, with economic conditions rapidly worsening, and with growing official hostility to trade unions in especially Brazil, India, and South Africa, that the interests of big business will prevail in the immediate future. ITUC leader Felício remarked, It is necessary to put solidarity before austerity, rights before profits, democracy before the market. If the BRICS succeed in becoming at least part of this process, it will create a political and economic frame of reference for other bodies, such as the G20, the IMF or the World Bank and even national governments. (Felício, 2015)

The likelihood that the BRICS leaders will oppose these values has been demonstrated above. Hence, Felício concluded, ‘politicising the debate was the only way to combat the deepening of inequality, fight for better salaries, promote collective bargaining and reverse the downward trend in unionisation rates’ (Felício, 2015).

Conclusion Further politicisation is evidently necessary. Indeed, the potential for fighting back – for class struggle instead of class snuggle – is

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enormous. The best example of BRICS from below dates back more than 15 years: the economic attack against Western pharmaceutical corporate patents by two governments – Brazil and India – subsequently aided by South African HIV positive activists in the Treatment Action Campaign, COSATU, and their allies. By opening a state-supported generic industry and ignoring international property rights, the Indians and Brazilians assisted progressive South Africans who overthrew the denialist AIDS policy adopted by former president Mbeki. The combination of decommodification and deglobalisation of capital, and the coalition between progressive governments and radical community activists was decisive. Can that same alignment be repeated, and can it serve as the basis for an entirely different approach to BRICS, fusing states and people in the public interest? Regrettably, the BRICS have chosen the course of undergirding – not undermining – imperialist multilateral agencies (the WTO, Bretton Woods institutions, and the UN climate process) whose role in commodifying all aspects of life and globalising capital is disastrous for poor and working people, within the BRICS as well as for Africa. What that means for BRICS in the years ahead, it is fair to predict, is more top-down scrambling within Africa, and more bottomup resistance. Where African governments emerge that have more patriotic instincts, there will be scope for campaigning on matters of economic justice: e.g. against mining and petroleum extraction, illicit (and licit) financial flows, and illegitimate debt. With the profits of so many Western firms in Africa hitting new lows and their share value nearly wiped out (e.g. the 2011–2015 cases of Lonmin, Anglo, and Glencore, which each lost more than 85 per cent of value), there are precedents for what BRICS firms now may find logical: yet more extreme metabolisms of extraction and more desperate gambits to keep BRICS-friendly regimes in power, at the expense of the reproductive needs of society and nature. Thus, dissent is left to traditional ‘BRICS from below’ gatherings which since 2013 in Durban have offered constructive critique – e.g. in Hong Kong in 2017 (Lee, 2018), and Goa in 2016 (People’s BRICS, 2016) – and which in 2018 was hosted by the United FrontJohannesburg under the slogan, ‘Break the BRICS’. In academia and trade unions, we find a close parallel between what Brazilian civil society activist Laura Trajber Waisbich (2016) describes as a conflict between uncritical ‘civilised’ and critical ‘popular’ spaces when engaging the BRICS. That neither South African organised labour nor academia could rise to the challenge of offering rudimentary

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critique in 2018, and that so many aspects of the BRICS Think Tank, Academic Forum, and Trade Union Forum represent co-optation and assimilation, are sad signs of our times.

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Lewis, D. and Brooks, B., 2017, ‘Crooked business as usual in Angola’. Reuters, 20 March. Available at: https://www.reuters. com/article/us-odebrecht-angola/ crooked-business-as-usual-inangola-. Accessed on: 22 October 2018. Lockett, H., 2016, ‘China: Strikes and protests numbers jump 20%’. Financial Times, 14 July. Available at: https://www.ft.com/ content/56afb47c-23fd-3bcda19f-bddab6a27883. Accessed on: 23 September 2018. Maharajh, R., 2018, ‘Sustainable development for us all: What the BRICS can do’. BRICS Academic Review, 1(1), 28–31. Available at: https://www.nihss. ac.za/sites/default/files/BRICS/ BRICS_Academic_Review. pdf. Accessed on: 30 November 2018. Mahlakoana, T., 2017, ‘Union congress collapse after row over fees’. Business Day, 2 August. Available at: https:// www.businesslive.co.za/bd/ national/labour/2017-08-02unions-congress-collapses-afterrow-over-fees/. Accessed on: 5 September 2018. Mahlakoana, T., 2018, ‘Why the NUM’s days are numbered’. Financial Mail, 28 June. Available at: https:// www.businesslive.co.za/fm/ features/2018-06-28-why-thenums-days-are-numbered/. Accessed on: 16 July 2018. Malcolmson, D., 2017, Keynote address. Available at: http://igd. org.za/component/jdownloads/ send/21-igd-reports/605situating-the-future-of-bricsin-changing-global-dynamics. Accessed on: 30 November 2018. Malope, L., 2018, ‘Black Business Council chair accused of sexual harassment’. City Press, 19 March. Available at: https:// city-press.news24.com/

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4 BRICS’ trade with Africa: long live the new king, just like the old king Nicole Dodd

There are over 50 countries in Africa, and yet the continent struggles to compete with single countries with far fewer inhabitants. This is a result of structural, historical, and geographical conditions that are hard to mitigate and because of near-catastrophic crises of governance (Van der Merwe and Dodd, 2019). Historically driven distrust of the West drives African leaders to look for partners in new quarters. Enter the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa), lauded as an alternative to the traditional status quo, and projecting a more benign, ‘pro-South’ agenda as viable competition with the West. Although the BRICS are different from the West, they are by no means better for Africa in every respect. This chapter presents and analyses elements of the economic relationship between BRICS states and Africa. What emerges is that unless Africa diversifies and reforms, no external agent, and certainly none of the BRICS countries will change the continent’s economic fortunes. I offer one caveat before discussing BRICS’ economic activities in Africa: investment, trade, and debt are integrated activities geared towards capital accumulation. Although we frequently discuss these issues separately, they are impossible to analyse in isolation. Investment and debt are a means of managing over-accumulation through opening new territories in which to trade (Harvey, 1990). Infrastructure investment physically unlocks spaces and improves access to raw materials while the provision of credit allows for the reinvestment of capital. These two activities are self-reinforcing and allow for expansion and ongoing growth. This behaviour is not unique to the BRICS, nor is Africa the only space in which this occurs. That said, the focus of this chapter is on BRICS’ investment, trade, and debt relationship with Africa. Not that BRICS offers anything new. Garcia, in her analysis of bilateral investment treaties between BRICS and African countries, notes that BRICS does little but to ‘maintain the broader neoliberal economic order’ (2017:24). More worryingly, she notes that BRICS

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investments might result in ‘ongoing socio-economic and political ecological contradictions and dislocations that do not alter the broader systemic crises emerging from the late global capitalism of the early 21st century’ (Garcia, 2017:25). There is evidence to support this sentiment when one considers that the BRICS countries are primarily involved in extractivist activities in Africa, with their infrastructure development activities simply creating more efficient channels for exploitation. Africa’s choices are, however, limited. The global economic outlook is sobering at present. Foreign direct investment (FDI) is shrinking fast, as is trade and international finance. Global investment declined by 23 per cent between 2016 and 2017, and declined by 21 per cent in Africa (UNCTAD, 2018). During the same period FDI into the BRICS declined by less than 1 per cent (despite South Africa’s FDI declining by 41 per cent). Africa will be looking to maximise FDI from all possible quarters, including the BRICS at a time when capital is retreating because of deglobalisation. Although multinationals from developed countries remain the largest foreign direct investors in Africa, China, India, and South Africa are among the top ten investors. BRICS courts African countries via various fora, with considerable success because of the belief that FDI, aid, and trade are cure-alls for Africa and the global South’s development challenges. For Africa, and the global South, this is not the case. The misperception persists because pundits ignore the fact that investment relies on returns through the repatriation of profits. Although FDI might improve a country’s balance sheet over the short term, profit taking will likely reverse this trend over the long-term (Van der Merwe and Dodd, 2019). Investment poses another potential drawback in the sense that foreign companies crowd out and displace local firms, not to mention the potential labour and environmental risks. Finally, investors may boost productivity in certain sectors, but it is likely that this will not include beneficiation and will focus on primary and extractive sectors. This form of investment speeds up dispossession if revenues are not carefully reinvested in development initiatives. It is unsurprising then that for developing countries, FDI can result in reduced human development over time (Van der Merwe and Dodd, 2019). It would be reasonable to conclude then that courting investment, including investment from the BRICS, is imprudent unless development-oriented preconditions are imposed. Samir Amin’s (1990) work may be useful in this regard. He critiques multinational corporations’ insertion into local economies and offers ‘delinking’

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as an alternative to encouraging FDI with its concomitant risks to national development. His work provides policy-makers with a critical analytical lens. However, it is up to each country to negotiate the balance between courting FDI and promoting homegrown development (Van der Merwe and Dodd, 2019). Many African countries are not, however, in a position to negotiate.

Infrastructure Much Chinese funding is directed at infrastructure development. The act of funding infrastructure potentially serves China, and other BRICS countries more than it serves Africa (some meets basic needs, but many of these projects can be viewed as ‘white elephants’, ‘vanity projects’, or conduits for syphoning resources from the continent). In many instances, the infrastructure is built by BRICS firms as African countries lack the human resources to build it themselves. Much of the materials and the machinery needed for construction is also imported from BRICS partners. Although the infrastructure might benefit the local economy, the loan amount (plus interest) usually leaves Africa. The construction projects do not even contribute to significant human resources development as skilled workers are brought in from the BRICS partner for the duration of the project (Donnelly, 2018; Tarrósy, Chapter 9, this volume). The infrastructure accelerates the rate of dispossession, creating faster channels for the removal of raw materials from the continent. The trade data that follows bears testimony to the fact that raw materials still constitute the lion’s share of Africa’s exports and these are high-volume, low-value transactions that do little for Africa’s longterm development. In China’s case, much of the infrastructure that they have invested in or provided loans for serves as arteries for their One Belt One Road initiative (Gopaldas, 2018). Some of the projects are built on the back of false expectations of growth and development.

Trade Trade figures highlight the naivety in suggesting that BRICS trade will stimulate growth. Their growth is flagging, if not completely stalling. BRICS countries growth rates that were once viewed as a driver of the global economy have dropped dramatically (Bond, 2017). Africa might be looking East and might have been attracted

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to BRICS’ promises of South–South solidarity, but trade figures indicate that the East ‘looks West’, leaving Africa to remain at the lowest point in the hierarchy. Trade data also suggest that the West has not turned its back on Africa. The European Union (EU) is still the largest collective importer of African products, and a reasonably equitable one at that, spending 65 cents for every dollar of European products purchased by Africa (in 2016) (see Table 4.1). The United States of America (USA) offers Africa similarly favourable trade relations, spending 80 cents for every dollar Africa spends on US imports. In contrast with the more favourable trade relations with the EU and the USA, the BRICS states spend only 36 cents on imports from Africa for every dollar Africa spends. Looking at this ratio on a country by country basis, India has the most even trade relationship with Africa (98%), followed by South Africa (65%), and Brazil (51%). China (19%) and Russia (15%) are the worst offenders, spending less than 20 per cent of Table 4.1 – Trade between selected partners, 2016 Reporter

Partner

Gross exports

Gross imports

Exports: imports

EU

BRICS

$372,198,928.58

$565,743,132.35

0.66

US

EU

$302,265,063.88

$398,562,254.88

0.76

US

BRICS

$195,658,650.41

$465,869,776.28

0.42

Africa

EU

$87,514,302.64

$135,240,840.05

0.65

Africa

BRIC

$31,964,355.72

$89,524,964.97

0.36

Africa∗

BRICS

$30,872,073.46

$85,921,745.96

0.36

Africa

US

$17,154,361.55

$21,450,437.56

0.80

Africa

India

$15,930,588.40

$16,334,730.20

0.98

Africa

China

$11,408,473.91

$59,809,658.21

0.19

Africa

South

$9,531,927.53

$14,695,982.70

0.65

$3,725,749.78

$7,272,999.08

0.51

$899,543.64

$6,107,577.49

0.15

∗

Africa Africa

Brazil

Africa

Russia

Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions (2018). Values in US dollar thousands, SITC-4 data. ∗

excluding South Africa.

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the amount they make from exports to Africa. Based on volume and balance, is it fair to suggest then that Africa enjoys relatively favourable trade with the EU and the US in comparison with its other BRICS partners? The types of products traded between Africa and the BRICS reflect long-standing cycles of dependence and underdevelopment (Figure 4.1). The overall Africa–BRICS trade pattern shows that Africa’s economies have failed to diversify in any significant way. Africa also exports significantly more crude materials than it imports, importing manufactured goods in return (Table 4.2). Figure 4.1 – Africa–BRICS trade categorised by product, 2016 $35,000,000 $30,000,000 $25,000,000 $20,000,000 $15,000,000 $10,000,000 $5,000,000

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Trade Africa (excl ZA) - BRICS Gross Exports Trade Africa (excl ZA) - BRICS Gross Imports

Source: Author’s compilation from World Integrated Trade Solutions data (2018). Values in US dollar thousands. SITC-4 data.

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More alarmingly, Africa imports large quantities of food and live animals from the BRICS. Importing food makes little sense when one considers the continent’s significant natural endowments and potential for food production. It would suggest that African countries need to prioritise developing both their productive capacity and efficient intracontinental trade. Brazil only recently shifted from being a recipient of FDI to an investor. In the 21st century, under Lula’s leadership, Brazilian multinationals expanded their operations in developing countries (Rodrigues and Gonçalves, 2016). Not unlike others, Brazil has aimed to use investment and development cooperation to shore up economic and political influence, facilitating trade and investment via development cooperation in education, agriculture, and health (Garcia, 2017). In the past, the country has mainly invested in Lusophone countries in Africa, with Angola being the primary recipient. Two Brazilian multinationals (Petrobras and Odebrecht) have invested in Angola since the 1980s, followed more recently

Table 4.2 – Africa–BRICS trade categorised by product, 2016 Product codes

Gross exports

Gross imports

$2,505,760

$11,299,454

$971,208

$649,459

$3,350,176

$1,722,330

$13,444,084

$5,241,207

$39,776

$593,275

Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.

$2,289,344

$9,398,479

Manufactured goods classified chiefly by

$2,463,633

$19,553,536

Machinery and transport equipment

$564,243

$29,817,547

Miscellaneous manufactured articles

$343,618

$7,400,247

$4,900,232

$246,212

$30,872,073

$85,921,746

Food and live animals Beverages and tobacco Crude materials, inedible, except fuels Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes

material

Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC Total

Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions (2018). Values in US dollar thousands, SITC-4 data.

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by entrants in the mining, construction, finance, retail, and service sectors (Garcia, 2017). Odebrecht is particularly invested in Angola. Although initially participating in construction, the company also has stakes in sanitation, oil and gas extraction, agriculture, retail, and waste management (Garcia, 2017). The company’s dealings in Angola have been criticised because their bids for projects have lacked transparency and have involved corruption (BBC, 2018). The company has also been criticised for providing low-quality services and for engaging in unfair labour practices (Garcia, 2017). Vale also operates in Mozambique and has done so since 2004. The company, in conjunction with other Brazilian firms (including Odebrecht), was actively engaged in the development of the Nacala logistics corridor. This initiative involves the development of a railway line linking coal mines to the port of Nacala. It led to conflicts with local communities and with local movements because of the relocation of farmers to make way for the development of the Moatize mine. The farmers were moved to areas that are unsuitable for agriculture, have limited water, and restricted access to markets (Garcia, 2017). In response to this dispossession, local protesters blocked the railway and obstructed the entrance to the mine. Aside from the plight of the farmers, the mine itself has acquired a reputation for unsafe working conditions, preferential treatment of Brazilian workers, limited safety and security, and a high accident rate. Brazil once again met resistance, when it, in conjunction with Japan and Mozambique, invested in infrastructure for the ProSavana soybean production project. This resistance called the ‘No to ProSavana’ campaign included actors from all three countries (Japan, Mozambique, and Brazil) who rallied against the displacement of local farmers (Garcia, 2017). Of all the BRICS nations, Brazil leads when it comes to food exports to Africa (Table 4.3) and shows some level of reliance on African raw materials, particularly when it comes to mineral fuels, lubricants, and other related materials. Surprisingly, Brazil also imports chemicals and other related products from Africa. Moving up the value chain to machinery, equipment, and manufactured goods, trade moves in Brazil’s favour. Africa fails to export significant quantities of these products to Brazil. Overall Brazil exports almost twice as much to Africa than it imports. It is unclear how far-right President Bolsonaro, elected in October 2018, will approach Brazil’s trade relationship with Africa. It is likely to result in a cooling relationship with China, and a more pro-US, neoliberal trade agenda. The sea-change may favour bilateral trade

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Table 4.3 – Africa–Brazil trade, 2016 Product codes

Gross exports

Gross imports

$282,248

$4,575,715

$7,043

$117,304

$104,314

$394,621

$2,366,658

$70,772

$1,772

$119,379

Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.

$751,444

$266,556

Manufactured goods classified chiefly by

$149,208

$490,018

Machinery and transport equipment

$51,581

$810,620

Miscellaneous manufactured articles

$10,206

$59,112

$1,275

$368,903

$3,725,750

$7,272,999

Food and live animals Beverages and tobacco Crude materials, inedible, except fuels Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes

material

Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC Total

Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions (2018). Values in US dollar thousands, SITC-4 data, 2016 data.

over multilateralism and may even result in Brazil abandoning the BRICS alliance altogether (Fogel, 2018). Russia strengthens its contemporary relationships with African countries by drawing on good will from its historical support of the continent’s liberation movements. Russia’s overtures on the continent have been criticised for being short-term, growth-driven, and likely not in Africa’s best interests (Arkhangelskaya and Dodd, 2016). Investment and cooperation appear to be used as ‘sweeteners’ to gain access to minerals, energy, and markets for arms (see Table 4.4). They are certainly not the only country to be accused of using Africa as a staging ground for neo-colonial manipulation, but certain characteristics make Russian activities particularly troublesome. The arms trade stands out as an area of specific concern. Russia’s Cold War-era military-industrial complex still appears to drive investment activity in Africa. Like other countries, Russia’s global power appears to stem from brokering the allegiance of developing countries. Russia courts some of the countries ostracised by the Western international community because of their human rights track records. For

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Table 4.4 – Africa–Russia trade categorised by product, 2016 Product codes

Gross exports

Gross imports

Food and live animals

$592,370

$1,920,307

Beverages and tobacco

$30,871

$28,314

Crude materials, inedible, except fuels

$61,265

$482,552

$1,397

$1,272,332

$588

$251,169

Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.

$23,729

$625,556

Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material

$73,503

$1,312,271

Machinery and transport equipment

$33,936

$177,487

Miscellaneous manufactured articles

$10,604

$37,517

Commodities and transactions not classified

$71,281

$72

$899,544

$6,107,577

Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes

elsewhere in the SITC Total

Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions (2018). Values in US dollar thousands, SITC-4 data.

Russia, with its sanctions and ambitions, the need for allies seems to outweigh other considerations. For example, Russia has invested heavily in Zimbabwe’s platinum mines. Although Russia’s interest in Africa centres on mineral and energy resources, the country has also invested in financial services. However, for the most part, the bias is towards minerals and energy with more than 30 Russian companies having stakes in natural resource projects in Africa. Russia has energy resources of its own, but these are in almost inaccessible areas. Investing in Africa’s resources is, therefore, an attractive alternative (Arkhangelskaya and Dodd, 2016). Rosatom, Russia’s state nuclear energy corporation, has oversold nuclear energy to several African countries. To promote nuclear energy, the corporation has used a mix of scientific and economic overstatements. Their sales pitch has been strengthened by ‘build now, pay later’ financial contracts. In their eagerness, many African countries have circumvented normal consultation and due diligence, even waiving environmental and safety regulations, when securing contracts with Rosatom (Van der Merwe and Dodd, 2019).

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While trade volumes with Russia are marginal in comparison with the other trading partners, Russia’s trade relationship with Africa is fundamentally unbalanced. Russia reaps significant economic benefits at Africa’s expense. Why then do African countries subscribe to the idea that Russian relations are better for it than relations with the West? Arkhangelskaya and Dodd (2016) argue that Russia has managed to broker these trade relationships because they will court business with countries and in sectors where the West will not tread. From the previous analysis (Table 4.1) it is clear that the trade deals struck with the USA and with the EU were on far more favourable terms for Africa. Russia is active in arms and oil trade, even exchanging weapons for oil and other resources. Russia’s activities pose a threat to both people and the environment (Garcia, 2017). India’s investment in Africa is driven by their quest for resources, energy security, and market access (Chakrabarty, 2017; Paul, 2014), much like other countries. Their past investments have centred on extractive activities in oil, gas, and mining, and on automotive and pharmaceuticals manufacturing (Paul, 2014). Recently, the country has shifted its attention to renewable energy and sustainable development (Mishra, 2018). India’s trade activities in Africa are facilitated via cooperation, technical, financial, and technical incentives and assistance, peacekeeping efforts, and cultural interaction (Garcia, 2017). India mainly channels investments into Mauritius (Chakrabarty, 2017), because it is a tax haven. The country’s activities in the agricultural sector are of more interest. Indian public and private companies are heavy investors in the agricultural sector, being the fifth largest investor in land in Africa, and the largest land investor in Ethiopia. India’s land acquisitions have stirred up tensions and created conflict with locals (see Mthamo and Mkhize, Chapter 11). While India tends to project a more benign, ‘green’ image in comparison with its BRICS counterparts, this is not always the case. For example, Zambian villagers are suing Vedanta Resources, and its Zambian subsidiary Konkola Copper Mines, for water pollution caused by the company’s Nchanga copper mine (Lewis, 2017). Vedanta’s Anil Agarwal bragged that he bought the company’s majority stake in the mine, valued at $400 million for only $25 million. The mine yields $500 million to $1 billion per year (Bond, 2018a). India does offer Africa reasonably equitable trade relations with near parity in balance of trade with the continent. It exports almost twice as much food to Africa than it imports, but also relies heavily on Africa for crude materials and mineral fuels. Manufacturing

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strength is evidenced by India’s ability to export chemicals, manufactured goods, and machinery to Africa. The SITC revision 4 classification system makes allowance for the reporting of ‘commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC’ (see Table 4.5). This category includes sales of gold bullion. Here, we see how India’s jewellery industry relies on African gold and this tips trade in Africa’s favour in this category. China links investment, aid, and loans in its agreements, in concordance with its ‘Going Out’ programme. These inputs are linked to its goals of securing access to raw materials and markets. From a political perspective, China is aiming to increase its political influence and pursue its ‘One China’ agenda (Amisi, in Garcia, 2017). China was the fourth most significant source of FDI into Africa in 2017 (UNCTAD, 2018). Chinese activities in Africa and local responses are explored at length in the rest of this volume (see Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 9). Like the other BRICS countries, China exports more food to Africa than it imports, a surprising state of affairs, considering the size of Table 4.5 – Africa–India trade categorised by product, 2016 Trade by product

Gross exports

Gross imports

$1,112,255

$2,412,443

$437

$72,163

Crude materials, inedible, except fuels

$1,738,396

$174,810

Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials

$8,702,361

$2,589,207

$4,179

$24,962

Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.

$1,512,087

$3,710,816

Manufactured goods classified chiefly by

$1,466,442

$2,475,405

Machinery and transport equipment

$202,612

$4,099,279

Miscellaneous manufactured articles

$38,528

$715,332

$1,153,292

$60,312

$15,930,588

$16,334,730

Food and live animals Beverages and tobacco

Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes

material

Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC Total

Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions (2018). Values in US dollar thousands, SITC-4 data, 2016 data.

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Table 4.6 – Africa–China trade, 2016 Product codes

Gross exports

Gross imports

$373,420

$1,280,971

$49,670

$39,391

Crude materials, inedible, except fuels

$6,407,316

$625,267

Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials

$1,888,625

$299,031

$31,681

$18,001

$228,122

$4,945,094

$2,145,201

$15,635,867

Machinery and transport equipment

$195,558

$28,225,374

Miscellaneous manufactured articles

$45,153

$8,426,542

Commodities and transactions not classified

$43,727

$314,120

$11,408,474

$59,809,658

Food and live animals Beverages and tobacco

Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes Chemicals and related products, n.e.s. Manufactured goods classified chiefly by material

elsewhere in the SITC Total

Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions (2018). Values in US dollar thousands, SITC-4 data, 2016 data.

China’s population and Africa’s great potential for food production (see Table 4.6). Predictably, Africa exports large quantities of crude materials and mineral fuels to China and imports them back in the form of chemicals and manufactured goods. China is a significant purchaser of African raw materials because of its present position as the world’s manufacturing hub. Even with its dependence on raw materials and energy, China exports way more to Africa than it imports. The trade imbalance was not always the case (Figure 4.2). As recently as 2012, Africa posted a trade surplus with China. Over the years, however, the relationship skewed. The trade imbalance can partly be attributed to the commodities crash, but also points to how China has made trade inroads in Africa, crowding out domestic and international competitors and stunting local economic development. Added almost as an afterthought, South Africa initially served as a gateway to the continent for the other BRICS (Garcia, 2017). South Africa was co-opted in and given a small slice of the pie. In doing so, it lost the opportunity to dominate sub-Saharan Africa economically. The country should have bolstered its manufacturing

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Figure 4.2 – Africa–China trade, 2012–2016 $70,000,000.00 $60,000,000.00 $50,000,000.00 $40,000,000.00 $30,000,000.00 $20,000,000.00 $10,000,000.00 $0.00 2012

2013

2014 Exports

2015

2016

Imports

Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions (2018). Values in US dollar thousands, SITC-4 data, 2016 data.

and agricultural capacity instead and focused on strengthening logistical ties with the subcontinent. China’s infrastructure development activities are eroding South Africa’s potential role on the continent as China has opened transport corridors and developed alternative port access (see Tarrósy, Chapter 9). That said, the country still has significant political and economic influence, and its FDI is still an important driver of growth in sub-Saharan Africa. South Africa’s economy is going through a period of stagnation, and this may have a knock-on effect in the region. Domestically, South Africa saw a 41 per cent decline in FDI in 2017 because of political uncertainty and a declining commodities sector, but the country was the fifth-biggest source of FDI to the rest of the continent (UNCTAD, 2018). South Africa’s trade pattern with Africa follows a familiar pattern (see Table 4.7). The country exports food and manufactured products while importing raw materials, including fuels. The country also imports gold bullion from the rest of Africa. Although surveys have shown that South African companies enjoy a positive reputation in the region (Arizala et al., 2018), Carmody claims that South Africa and China collude to exploit local markets and natural resources (in Garcia, 2017). South Africa’s regional dominance has been challenged by protest action in the past (e.g. Shoprite in Zambia), and the country has been fined for irregular activities in foreign markets (e.g. MTN in Nigeria). South Africa is

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Table 4.7 – Africa–South Africa trade, 2016 Product codes

Gross exports

Gross imports

Food and live animals

$410,752

$1,907,941

Beverages and tobacco

$944,916

$450,488

Crude materials, inedible, except fuels

$529,282

$284,235

$2,376,721

$1,937,249

$2,165

$190,700

Chemicals and related products, n.e.s.

$130,163

$1,767,940

Manufactured goods classified chiefly by

$837,893

$2,736,254

Machinery and transport equipment

$386,296

$4,120,914

Miscellaneous manufactured articles

$282,567

$1,220,738

$3,631,171

$79,525

$9,531,928

$14,695,983

Mineral fuels, lubricants and related materials Animal and vegetable oils, fats and waxes

material

Commodities and transactions not classified elsewhere in the SITC Total

Source: World Integrated Trade Solutions (2018). Values in US dollar thousands, SITC-4 data, 2016 data.

in a unique position as it is a victim of, and complicit in, BRICS’ profiteering in Africa.

Monopoly: Africa edition The trade data in the previous section has highlighted that Africa’s relationship with the rest of the world is still unequal. There is limited diversification and Africa still rests at the bottom of most global supply chains. The fourth industrial revolution remains a distant goal in comparison with the continent’s need to develop diversified economies. BRICS (except South Africa) and the global middle tier is moving from what Van der Merwe (2017) calls ‘fossil economies’ to ‘animated economies’. A large part of this move is a move from physical extraction, production, and sales to financialisation of markets. The BRICS have implemented this strategy in their dealings with Africa. Much of the capital gained from trade surpluses

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(achieved via exploitation of African resources, and labour elsewhere), is now being channelled into financial instruments offered to financially vulnerable countries in Africa. Infrastructure development projects are the primary vehicle used to sell these instruments. This is not the first time that surpluses have been turned to profit using debt by emerging powers. After the cartelisation of oil in the mid- to late-20th century, the oil producer’s capital entered Western markets only to be recycled as debt to developing countries (Greig, Hulme, and Turner, 2008). Now, the BRICS, notably China, have adopted the same strategy for the reinvestment of their profits. A debt crisis followed the earlier spate of loans to developing countries. By the 1980s and 1990s, many African countries were forced to negotiate bailouts from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, both of whom attached neoliberal conditionalities to their loans. These conditions did little to promote human development or long-term economic security. Africa was desperate for alternative sources of funding. Enter China, who after 2000 began to channel capital into Africa, with debt offerings amounting to $30 billion in 2016 (Fabricius, 2018). China had, it seemed, offered a more relaxed, less conditional approach to loans and, following the sourness of the experience with the West, was an attractive alternative. For many African countries, China became Africa’s ‘benevolent friend, offering cheap, easy and addictive money’ (Gopaldas, 2018:1). However, all was not as it seemed. Bond mentions that the BRICS nations amplify ‘Western control of global governmental institutions’ in the areas of finance, trade, and the environment (2018b:1). New institutions introduced by the BRICS such as the New Development Bank serve the IMF and reinforce the power of the dollar (Prashad, in Bond, 2018b). The BRICS Contingency Reserve Arrangement (CRA) assists countries facing short-term balance of payment pressures. At first glance, this seems to offer a chance for countries to avoid the strictures associated with assistance from the other international financial institutions (IFIs), and an opportunity not to make the same mistakes that followed previous debt crises. This is not the case because access to CRA assistance is contingent upon first embarking on structural adjustment via the IMF and World Bank (Bond, 2018b). The BRICS’ New Development Bank also reinforces the existing IFIs’ power by sharing staff, knowledge, and projects with the World Bank. In many respects, BRICS’ funding to Africa may be worsening the financial health of African countries, prompting them to, and certainly not stopping them from, turning to the IMF for assistance.

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For example, Angola, Mozambique, Zimbabwe, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo are approaching the IMF for assistance (Fabricius, 2018). This pending crisis is precipitated by the decline in commodity prices and rising interest rates, possibly in the wake of the move from ‘fossil capital’ to ‘animated capital’ (Van der Merwe, 2017). For many African countries, the servicing of debt is taking up ever greater proportions of GDP, particularly in oil-producing countries. This creates a vicious cycle as the servicing of this debt reduces countries’ capacity for development spending, creating further dependency. Countries in such a position end up with lower credit ratings, pushing them to accept unfair loan terms. The BRICS lenders are not the sole sources of indebtedness in Africa as the Paris Club still holds much of Africa’s debt (Donnelly, 2018). Aside from China’s significant stake in African debt, the other BRICS countries are also active in this regard. In 2018, Brazil extended its line of credit to Angola to up to $2 billion, the most recent offering in a revolving line that has been in place since 1995 and is mostly an attempt to create business opportunities for Brazilian companies, and to stimulate Angola’s economy (Pambazuka News, 2007; Macau Hub, 2018). India also extends lines of credit to African countries as part of its development cooperation efforts, having extended 152 lines of credit to 44 African states worth almost $8 billion in total (Mishra, 2018). Russia, on the other hand, has recently written off $20 billion in African debt (Copley, 2018). South Africa has loan agreements with China and the New Development Bank (Tshwane, 2018). However, the country is a notional lender as it owns 20 per cent of the New Development Bank. South Africa also has a $10 billion stake in the CRA. South Africa has only drawn down about $700 million in New Development Bank loans so far. China, on the other hand, holds a large proportion of some countries’ debt (77 per cent in the case of Djibouti, and 74 per cent in Zambia) (Donnelly, 2018). These countries are also faced with other liabilities that add to their precariousness such as hard currency liabilities in the form of profit outflows in US dollars. In Zambia’s case, this manifests as transfers of its natural capital to international banks and multinational companies such as Anil Agarwal’s Vedanta (Bond, 2018a). Although it is not the only lender, its patterns in Africa are instructive when looking at how they feed into its geopolitical ambitions. Beijing’s approach is also creating significant economic risk for those indebted to it. For this reason, I will devote some attention to the topic in the next section.

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The new cost of debt Unlike the other international financial institutions, China’s initial promise was that it would offer flexibility and unconditionality. One can be forgiven for assuming that this is a refreshing alternative to the prescriptions imposed by others, but two issues in the loan terms present significant drawbacks and have led to critics calling their approach ‘debt trap diplomacy’. The accusation is that developing countries are ‘naively mortgaging resources and strategic assets to China’ (Gopaldas, 2018:1). Indebted countries are being forced to repay China in kind because they lack financial reserves. This repayment in kind is achieved in two ways. The first concerns how the loans are collateralised and the second relates to how they are repaid. Their approach to loans can at best be described as calculating and strategic, with a less generous interpretation being that they are engineering unserviceable debt to further their geopolitical and economic ambitions (Gopaldas, 2018). China is not in the business of uncalculated risk, and their success is a testament to this. Many of their debtors have shaky credit records but have significant assets to offer. Accordingly, China collateralises loans against important natural and state assets. These might seem to have no use when assessed over the short term, but, when viewed in conjunction with the One Belt One Road initiative, they have value for China over the long-term (Gopaldas, 2018). Their collateralisation is not a weak threat either. Sri Lanka has already ceded control of the port of Hambantota. Rumours also abound that Zambia will lose control of its national power producer, ZESCO, having already ceded control of its national broadcaster (Lusaka Times, 2018). The Zambian government has denied that this is the case. There are similar rumours that Lusaka International Airport will be ceded to China, with similar denials by the state following that rumour (Lusaka Times, 2018). A second loan condition that is potentially exploitative relates to the sale of resources. In effect, China allows for debtors to service their loans by exchanging resources at a significantly reduced price (Gopaldas, 2018). Countries without foreign exchange reserves are trading resources or even mining concessions in return for loans. Not only is money being lost in the process of repaying debt, but also because of the uncompetitive prices paid for natural assets. Unfortunately, countries such as Zimbabwe, Zambia, and Djibouti are desperate enough to accede to these conditions because of their low credit ratings (Gopaldas, 2018).

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Power production is an area where China and Russia make deals based on inflated estimates of future demand and unrealistic growth projections. This was the case when a Chinese company was engaged in a public–private partnership to provide new substations in Mashishing, South Africa (Reddy, 2018). The project funded by the China Development Bank eventually ground to a halt due to a local outcry over rising costs and scope creep. Aside from construction and infrastructure, the China Development Bank sometimes becomes directly involved in local power production via loans. Recently the bank offered ESKOM, South Africa’s power utility, a loan amounting to approximately $2.2 billion (Donnelly, 2018). As mentioned, Russia’s Rosatom has also made similar promises and has used over-inflated sales pitches to sell nuclear power on the African continent. They have overestimated future demand for power and made unrealistic promises to local governments about the potential to export power to their regional power pools (Van der Merwe and Dodd, 2019). Again, the power plants are being built using borrowed money. In Russia’s case repayments are often deferred for several years to make the loans even more attractive. The loan conditions reduce the ability to hold government officials accountable for purchasing these white elephants and indebting their countries in the process.

Resisting dependency? A Sino-Nigerian example Trade data presented earlier in the chapter indicates that Africa mainly exports raw materials, importing manufactured goods in return. Oil and gas comprise a significant proportion of the raw materials exported by the continent. Nigeria discovered oil in the Niger Delta in the 1950s and it has since become the country’s biggest export. The oil is of a high quality, and easy and efficient to process. As one of Africa’s leading oil producers and among the greatest global producers, the country is of strategic international importance with both Western and Asian countries vying for influence (Taylor, 2014). Unfortunately, much of the country’s oil revenue has been wasted and the Niger Delta itself is polluted, its residents impoverished (The Economist, 2016). China began to challenge the West’s dominance in Nigeria’s oil sector in the early 2000s. Beijing used non-oil related sweetener deals, diplomacy, and a strong relationship with former Nigerian president Olusegun Obasanjo to facilitate preferential access to the

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country’s resources (Taylor, 2014). China’s presence was welcomed by the Nigerian petro-state and elites as they were eager to boost oil revenues and to reduce dependence on the West. They did not question China’s motives, provided their own interests were served (Taylor, 2014). China’s investment in oil and non-oil related infrastructure earned them the right of first refusal on oil blocs and other favourable deals such as the opportunity to acquire the Akpo oilfield in the Niger Delta (Taylor, 2014). However, China’s presence was met with resistance in the Niger Delta, an area known for its volatility. Local communities were less than welcoming and, in 2006, the Movement for the Emancipation of the Niger Delta (MEND) detonated a car bomb near the port town of Warri. The car bomb was intended to deter Chinese oil companies from embarking on any activities in the Niger Delta. This threat was followed by the kidnapping and subsequent release of Chinese oil workers on several occasions (Obi, 2008). China offered military patrol boats to help the Nigerian government to contain the violence. At the time the US would not assist because of Nigerian human rights violations (Taylor, 2014). MEND’s activities halted in 2009 when amnesty was granted to 30,000 militants. The former militants received a monthly stipend of $410 in return for laying down their arms (at a cost of $500 million per annum). All was well during the commodities boom and the country managed to raise its oil production from 800,000 barrels during the height of the militancy to 2.4 million in 2013 (Ross, 2013). Regardless of the deals concluded, little changed for the Niger Delta itself, where communities continued to contend with contaminated water sources and limited health and educational facilities. Although framed as pro-poor and community based, the militants essentially established a protection racket where threats of destruction of property resulted in payouts from multinationals. As a result, the militants became rich, even using their military power to secure commercial contracts with foreign oil companies. This had little to do with activism, and much to do with exploitation and a type of neo-feudal rent-seeking. China’s insertion into the Nigerian oil sector slowed following the end of Obasanjo’s rule in 2007. Nigerian elites were cautious about China’s all too familiar offers of infrastructure development in exchange for natural resources. The deals were greeted with scepticism because China was offering prices that were far lower than market prices for the oil sold to them. For the elites, the structure of China’s deals threatened their economic interests as they would lose

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money from the direct sale of crude oil on the international market (Umejei, 2013, in Taylor, 2014). By 2013 oil provided 80 per cent of Nigeria’s state income, and 95 per cent of its export income (Taylor, 2014). Nigeria’s economic decline since then demonstrates the effects of resource dependency on emerging economies. In 2015 alone, Nigerian oil exports dropped by 40.3 per cent (Ohuocha, 2016). Nigeria’s economy is oriented towards exports without significant beneficiation and with limited manufacturing capacity, relying on oil revenue to fund imports. The over-reliance on foreign revenue from oil sales meant that when oil prices fell, the country’s fiscus was seriously affected, resulting in reduced government spending, a weakened currency, increased inflation, and dismal economic growth (growth dropped by 3.4 per cent between 2014 and 2015). The country began to defer international debt repayments as a result. This created a second opportunity for China to gain traction in Nigeria. In 2016, Nigeria was trying to escape its financial predicament and was courting investment in order to do so. China stepped in, again offering to do business when others cannot or will not, offering $80 billion in infrastructure investment into Nigeria’s oil and gas sectors. This time, the Nigerian elites were in no position to turn down Chinese investment. The Chinese proposition was not without merit as the investment was ostensibly to be used to boost Nigeria’s capacity to refine and use its own oil. Despite having abundant oil, the country has imported much of its fuel in the past, owing to a lack of refining capacity. In mid-June, weeks before China’s investment was announced, The Niger Delta Avengers (NDA) blew up a state-owned oil pipeline. The NDA claimed that it wanted fairer distribution of the region’s wealth to its people. This was only one of a string of attacks that dropped Nigeria’s oil production to a 25-year low in 2016 and drove away other foreign firms (The Economist, 2016). It is perhaps unsurprising that China’s investments roughly coincided with the rest of the world losing its appetite for investment in the Nigerian oil sector. Global sentiment was echoed by Brazil’s Petrobras which made the decision to sell-off four fields in Nigeria following threats by the NDA in 2017 (Subsea Intel, 2017). The company subsequently sold its 50 per cent stake to Vitol for $1.4 billion in 2018 (Schipani and Hume, 2018). Despite MEND and the NDA’s attempts, China remained undeterred and continued to pursue oil interests in Nigeria. Swooping in during the country’s currency crisis means that the terms negotiated will most likely continue to be favourable to China, and not to Nigeria.

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Conclusion Despite the hope that new trade partners would empower Africa, trade is still stacked against Africa. The BRICS countries purchase raw materials and export them back to Africa at a profit, and the commodities downturn has eroded Africa’s economic power even further. The BRICS are not the first to behave in this way towards Africa. That said, excepting India, BRICS’ trade with Africa is more unbalanced than that of the US or EU, which casts further doubt about the BRICS’ suitability as an alternative source of trade, investment, and funding for Africa. BRICS investment in Africa is also ‘more of the same’. Capital injections might assist countries’ balance of payment over the short term, but this trend is all too easily reversed when profits are repatriated. In the interim, investments exact a pronounced toll economically, socially, and environmentally. One gets the sense that Africa is a staging ground for activities that would not be tolerated elsewhere. Underdevelopment, reduced demand for resources, and dependency mean that African countries are at risk of experiencing debt crises. These crises will look different in comparison with those of the previous century because of China’s role. Although China’s approach to loans may differ from the West’s, being indebted to China and other BRICS countries is not without risk, particularly because of how natural resources, in many cases the country’s only real assets, are being collateralised and traded. Despite BRICS’ more dominant insertion into the global political economy, and their role in creating African debt, it is likely that African countries will once again have to answer to the IMF and World Bank when the BRICS bubble bursts. Because of the labour, social, and environmental consequences of BRICS trade and investment this interaction should be resisted on a broader scale. African agency is needed now more than ever.

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Greig, A., Hulme, D., and Turner, M., 2008, Challenging global inequality. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Harvey, D., 1990, The condition of postmodernity. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Lewis, B., 2017, ‘Zambian villagers win right to sue Vedanta in English courts’. [online] Reuters. Available at: https:// www.reuters.com/article/ us-vedanta-zambia-court/ zambian-villagers-win-right-tosue-vedanta-in-english-courtsidUSKBN1CI1SC. Accessed on: 26 October 2018. Lusaka Times, 2018, ‘Kenneth Kaunda International Airport will not be surrendered to China-Dora Siliya’. Lusaka Times. [online] Available at: https://www. lusakatimes.com/2018/09/10/ kenneth-kaunda-internationalairport-will-not-be-surrenderedto-china-dora-siliya/. Accessed on: 24 October 2018. Macau Hub, 2018, ‘Brazil grants US$ 2 billion credit line to Angola’. [online] Available at: https://macauhub. com.mo/2018/02/12/ pt-brasil-concede-linha-decredito-de-2000-milhoes-dedolares-a-angola/. Accessed on: 24 October 2018. Mishra, A., 2018, ‘The changing nature of India’s lines of credit to Africa’. [online] ORF Online. Available at: https://www. orfonline.org/expert-speak/ changing-nature-india-lines-ofcredit-africa/. Accessed on: 24 October 2018. Obi, C., 2008, ‘Enter the dragon? Chinese oil companies and resistance in the Niger Delta’. Review of African Political Economy, 35(117), 417–434. Ohuocha, C., 2016, ‘Nigerian exports slumped 40 pct last year as oil prices plunged’.

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[online] Reuters. Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/ nigeria-trade-idUSL5N16Q41Z. Accessed on: 28 December 2018. Pambazuka News, 2007, ‘Angola: Angola fetes expanded Brazil credit line’. [online] Available at: https://www.pambazuka. org/global-south/angola-angolafetes-expanded-brazil-credit-line. Accessed on: 24 October 2018. Paul, A., 2014, ‘Indian foreign direct investment: A way to Africa’. Procedia - Social and Behavioral Sciences, 157, 183–195. Reddy, M., 2018, ‘China’s rural power grab’. amaBhungane. [online] Available at: https:// amabhungane.org/stories/chinasrural-power-grab/. Accessed on: 24 October 2018. Rodrigues, P. and Gonçalves, S., 2016, ‘Brazilian foreign policy and investments in Angola’. [online] Kclpure.kcl. ac.uk. Available at: https:// kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/en/ publications/brazilian-foreignpolicy-and-investments-inangola(9685b838-e94a-4feebd35-d257ba847d4e).html. Accessed on: 24 October 2018. Ross, W., 2013, ‘Has Nigeria’s Niger Delta managed to buy peace?’ [online] BBC News. Available at: https:// www.bbc.com/news/worldafrica-22357597. Accessed on: 28 December 2018. Schipani, A. and Hume, N., 2018, ‘Brazil’s Petrobras announces $1.4bn sale of African oil business’. Financial Times. [online] Available at: https:// www.ft.com/content/c3ec35c2dd5d-11e8-9f04-38d397e6661c. Accessed on: 29 December 2018. Subsea Intel, 2017, ‘Petrobras to exit Nigeria offshore field quartet’. [online] Available at: https://subseaintel.com/ news/4242. Accessed on: 29 December 2018.

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Taylor, I., 2014, ‘Chinese interest in Nigeria’s oil and the American context’. Canadian Journal of African Studies / Revue canadienne des études africaines, 48(3), 391–404. Tshwane, T., 2018, ‘China’s generosity queried’. Mail and Guardian. [online] Available at: https://mg.co.za/ article/2018-07-27-00-chinasgenerosity-queried. Accessed on: 29 October 2018. UNCTAD, 2018, ‘WIR-Foreign direct investment to Africa fell by 21% in 2017, says United Nations report’. [online] Available at: https://unctad. org/en/pages/PressRelease.

aspx?OriginalVersionID=461. Accessed on: 24 October 2018. Van der Merwe, J., 2017, ‘Animated capital’. Paper presented at the BRICS International Think Tank Conference. Xiamen, China. 23–26 June. Van der Merwe, J. and Dodd, N., 2019, The political economy of underdevelopment in the Global South: The government–business– media complex. London: Palgrave Macmillan. World Integrated Trade Solution, 2018, Data on Export, Import, Tariff, NTM. Available at: https://wits.worldbank.org/. Accessed on: 27 June 2019.

5 China in Africa: South–South solidarity or imperialism in the 21st century? Ishmael Lesufi and Lisa Thompson

The rise of the People’s Republic of China (PRC) includes its emergence as the main economic driving force in Africa, especially for commodity-exporting countries (Taylor, 2011; 2016; Sheldon et al., 2017; Gu and Kitano, 2018). Several economic and political indices in the past few decades point to this new reality. At an economic level, the PRC has become Africa’s single largest source of foreign direct investment (FDI), the fastest-rising source of trade, as well as a significant supplier of foreign aid and grantbased infrastructure (SAIIA, 2009; Grimm, 2011; van der Lugt, 2011; Bello-Schuneman et  al., 2017; Sheldon et  al., 2017; Gu and Kitano, 2018). Environmentally, its mega-projects include the largest dam ever conceived – at Inga on the Congo River – and numerous coal-fired power plants, as well as mineral and oil extraction projects. At a political level, the establishment of the Forum for China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2000 cemented closer working relations between the PRC and Africa (Cisse, 2012; Zhang, 2017). Yet, the FOCAC form of South–South cooperation brings with it the potential for both economic growth and exploitation in terms of the global capitalist systemic crises manifesting in the Chinese state-led economy, combined with the long-standing structural distortions left by colonialism in Africa where commodities remain the mainstay of exports and FDI (Taylor, 2011; Bond, 2015; Zhang, 2017). Moreover, China’s political success has also generated military tensions given that the Trump administration’s John Bolton declared in December 2018 that a new Cold War (with China) has begun in Africa. In this light, given Africa’s long history of what Walter Rodney (1972) calls a relationship of exploitation and surplus extraction by the capitalist countries of Europe and later the United States (US), the rise of the PRC raises crucial questions about the nature and likely trajectory of the China–Africa relationship. Academic and policy debates within the South African and the international

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context return ad nauseam to the question of whether the PRC’s engagement with Africa and other countries of the South is a harbinger of an era of equitable social and economic development, or merely a case of a new player within a system of imperialist relations led by the US since the Bretton Woods arrangements of 1944. Stated differently, is the burgeoning relationship between the PRC and Africa a form of progressive and pragmatic win–win (a favourite official slogan at BRICS summits) South–South collaboration? Or is Chinese economic investment and FDI an enforcer and indeed amplifier of imperialism under 21st-century global capital accumulation dynamics? International and African state-centric analyses of the influence of emerging powers in BRICS and elsewhere range from pragmatically optimistic to sceptically pessimistic. Pragmatic-progressive perspectives emerge from BRICS think tanks, affiliated academics, and policy analysts willing to endorse the rather flimsy notion of South–South collaboration contained in the official BRICS summit narratives. Recent examples of this type of endorsement include Sitas (2018), Mosoetsa (2018), Magida (2018), and Gomes and Esteves (2018). Both positive (Shaw, 2015) and more critical foreign policy analysts, for example Alden and Schoeman (2015), Weiss and Abdenur (2014), and Lipton (2017), emphasise the fragile hegemonic status of the regional hegemons in the BRICS bloc (South Africa in particular) but also the ways in which the bloc does not ideationally challenge the main aspects of economic liberalism globally. Xing (2016:83–84) adds, ‘(t)he continent is also seemingly becoming a battle ground of competition for the emerging powers to counter the dominance of the “North” and to pursue a putative reorganisation of the world economic and political order’. To answer the question of whether the PRC’s rising economic hegemonic status exemplifies South–South collaboration or, instead, new forms of exploitation, global systemic economic analyses are useful, as they move beyond state-centric framings. Patrick Bond’s 2015 chapter ‘BRICS and the Sub-Imperial Location’ contains a detailed analysis of the relation between imperialism and sub-imperialism, and how this relates to the sub-imperial location of BRICS economies. Bond links the main features of sub-imperialism to an accumulation-centric understanding of imperialism in historical context. He follows Rosa Luxemburg’s 1913 framing in The Accumulation of Capital (1968): ‘the extraeconomic coercion associated with exploitation between capitalist and non-capitalist spheres under conditions of capitalist crisis

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(in contrast to other accounts of the era which hinge more upon capital export, formal colonial relations and inter-imperial rivalries)’. This framing highlights the global systemic nature of capitalist crises, which while some have argued were historically specific, nevertheless characterise much of the economic expansionism of global hegemonic states, past and present (Bond, 2015; Van der Merwe, 2016; Zhang, 2017; Ayers, 2018). Relating modern day imperialism to sub-imperialist economic characteristics, particularly (but not only) evident in BRICS states, Bond (2015:17) draws on David Harvey’s seminal text, New Imperialism (2003), outlining the sub-imperial role in terms of four main features: accumulation is in part based on dispossession (not just exploitation), facilitated by regional powers; capital overaccumulates, a cyclical global system problem, which leads to crises in the sub-imperial economies that mimic the crises of the imperialist power(s); sub-imperial regimes expand the same (neo)liberal practices for use within their regional spheres of influence, thus legitimating the Washington Consensus in ideological and concrete terms (by facilitating multilateral trade, investment, and financing arrangements); and finally, imperialism’s relation to sub-imperialism is grounded in the super-exploitation of domestic labour. As internal (domestic) capitalist crises manifest, external markets become essential to spatially fix, as Harvey (2003) puts it, these over-accumulation crises. Bond (2015:17) emphasises that these crises in the sub-imperial location have redefined nationalist (and state-capitalist) state-based power relations, which in many cases incorporate neoliberal national public policies which originate in Western economies. These are defined in form and content by the rule-makers of multilateral finance and developmental institutions, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank, and are enforced by New York credit ratings agencies (see also Bond, 2016a). In contrast, pragmatic-progressive analysts of the New Development Bank (NDB) claim that the BRICS are a counter-hegemonic bloc characterised by, for example, the type of international regime analysis of the BRICS NDB provided by Qobo and Soko (2015). Following Krasner’s regime definition of norms, rules, and decision-making procedures, they argue that the NDB could change the landscape of global finance towards a more equitable South–South counter-hegemonic financial order. As a potential alternative to the IMF, the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) is one such BRICS innovation. Yet Bond (2016a:613) rebuts,

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(t)o the surprise and disappointment of many BRICS supporters … the CRA actually empowers the IMF because, if a member country is in need of more than 30% of its borrowing quota, it must first go to the IMF for a structural adjustment loan and conditionality before accessing more from the CRA.

Similarly, the NDB is considered an alternative to the World Bank, but has made many of the same mistakes. The NDB and CRA simply reinforce and link South–South financial collaboration to the main centres of financial imperialism, in particular, the IMF. The romance of the progressive pragmatism embedded in BRICS/FOCAC state and think tank narratives extends to the ways in which the Chinese form of international development assistance (IDA) will help to stimulate development in Africa as an alternative to the US and European Union (EU) forms of FDI and economic collaboration. In Africa, this official optimism is endorsed by the South African government, think tanks, mainstream media (especially the Independent newspaper chain), and social media linked to the African National Congress (ANC). The South African state’s narrative on China–Africa development follows its ascendance to the Brazil– Russia–India–China–SA (BRICS) group in 2010, thanks to Beijing’s sponsorship, and hence is saturated with anticipation about the PRC’s investment promises. This optimism, played out in increasingly celebratory moments that accompany BRICS and FOCAC meetings of state leaders, repeat the official rhetoric of the ostensibly positive, equitable, mutually beneficial relations between the PRC and the South (Taylor, 2011; 2016; Thompson and Tsolekile de Wet, 2017; Zhang, 2017). Van der Merwe (2016), drawing on Harvey (2003), Wallerstein (1997), and Gramsci (1971), defines this national– global capitalist economic relation between government, business, and the media as a systemic ‘complex’ that enables, reinforces, and legitimises the narrative of liberal economic development nationally, regionally, and globally. Highlighting the systemic nature of global accumulation, Van der Merwe (2016:22) states, ‘global audiences are influenced by mainstream media and experts drawn from industry and the scientific community. Global hegemonic discourse can have a colonising effect on alternative local discourses, forcing out opposing or dissenting voices and ideologies’. This links to what Taylor (2016) describes as the developmental neologism of South– South collaboration and latterly BRICS/FOCAC official narratives. The government–business–media complex nationally and globally

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circumscribes, curtails, and, in policy rhetoric, overrides the systemic realities of exploitation and resource extractivism that accompany the trade, investment, and financial aspects of the collaboration (Bond, 2018; Van der Merwe, 2016). This chapter challenges the influence of the state-centric analytical framework that privileges states, and state policies, either severally or jointly, as the predominant shapers of the evolution of international relationships. Instead, this chapter is based on an analysis of the dynamics of Chinese capitalism, especially the ways in which the PRC is inserted into the global economy in relation to its increasingly expansionist role in Africa that will maintain Africa’s role as an exporter of undervalued commodities. This relationship advances the interests of Western imperialism, as acknowledged already in critical analyses of trade flows and investment to Africa which emphasise the relative lack of the gains from IDA and FDI (Brautigam and Tang, 2012; Taylor, 2016; Sheldon et al., 2017; Thompson and Tsolekile de Wet, 2019). The rest of the chapter demonstrates deficiencies in the South African led, state-centric ways of thinking about the presence of the PRC on the African continent. First this paper outlines an alternative view of the political economy of Chinese capitalism in relation to the world capitalist system. This is followed by a brief analysis of the dynamics underpinning the PRC’s sub-imperial location in the imperialist system in the 21st century. The third part of the chapter reflects briefly on the impact of Chinese capitalism on other parts of the East Asian region with a view to map the regional implications of China’s economic expansionism in the South. On the basis of the evidence of systemic outcomes of Chinese economic expansion, referred to in official narratives as development cooperation, the fourth part of the chapter concludes that instead of South–South solidarity, Chinese capitalism on the African continent will support Northern imperialism as it has in other regions. The chapter concludes in supporting the notion of a Chinese sub-imperialist role on the continent, whereby the patterns of trade and investment both extend and shore up old and new imperialist patterns of trade and investment accumulation and exploitation in the 21st century.

World capitalism and the rise of the PRC The PRC’s insertion into the circuits of capital accumulation on a world scale took place when international capitalism had firmly

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entered what Arrighi (1994) describes as the ‘long wave of stagnation and contraction’ or what Meiksins Wood (2003) characterises as the ‘long downturn’. These developments signalled the end of the post-war boom and the beginning of a crisis of capital accumulation in the world economy from the late 1960s onwards. This crisis is variously characterised within the Marxist literature as the crisis of the falling rate of profit and the crisis of over-accumulation of capital, combining industrial over-capacity and overproduction (Clarke, 1990; Arrighi, 1994; Harvey, 2003; 2006; McNally, 2011; Bond, 2015; Taylor, 2016; Xing 2016; Zhang 2017). The evolution of international capitalism reached a stage at which there was sustained downward pressure on profits, as well as the emergence of large amounts of capital without avenues for profitable investment, especially in the North. The responses of the capitalist classes in advanced capitalist countries to the changing dynamics of capital accumulation included dismantling the policy and institutional landscape that presided over the long post-war boom. The late 1970s and 1980s marked the entry of the PRC into the world economy and offered a temporary solution to international capital’s twin problems: declining profits and lack of avenues for profitable investments. In other words, at this stage of the evolution of capitalism on a world scale, corporations had to reverse the downward pressure on profit rates and find new avenues for idle capital by creating new areas of profitable investment. Various measures adopted by the ruling classes in leading capitalist countries to find solutions to the crisis were tailored to address these two crucial problems. The subsequent emergence of the PRC as a fulcrum of capital accumulation on a world scale coincides with the intensification of global neoliberalism as Northern capital searched for profitable investment avenues in the 1990s–2000s. After a long period of stagnation in the advanced capitalist economies, the turn to the East took place at a time when the PRC and parts of East Asia were the only regions of the world to experience sustained high rates of economic growth (McNally, 2011). The opening up of the world economy signalled by the neoliberal turn also encompassed the spatial reorganisation of accumulation, making it possible for international capital to relocate to the PRC. While the long downturn in the previously prosperous parts of the world economy was a push factor; there were also pull factors that propelled capital to prefer the Chinese economy in search of profits.

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The development of capitalism within the PRC The historical and social conditions under which capitalism developed in the PRC generated distinctive characteristics of Chinese capitalism that could explain its unique status as a centre for global capital. The rapid development of capitalism in the PRC is a product of the reform programme carried out under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping in 1978, shortly after the death of Mao. The reforms transformed the Chinese economy from ‘a centralised planned economy in which the state played a key role to a capitalist one in which almost all economic activity is market determined … and even though the state continues to play a key role in strategic sectors, the great majority of value added in the all-important manufacturing sector is produced by profit-seeking private firms’ (Hart-Landsberg, 2010; Zhang, 2017). The reform programme not only ended central planning but most importantly, it also shaped the social and economic conditions for the further development of capitalism in the PRC. According to Zhang (2017: 315), starting from a semi-peripheral status at the onset of the reform period in the late 1970s, mainland China managed to integrate into the international value chain and division of labour at the right moment alongside tacit acknowledgement of the legitimacy of the US-led liberal world order.

Hung (2009:9) emphasises how the development of capitalism in the PRC gave rise to ‘an export-driven and private-consumptionrepressing growth model’. Mao’s era was characterised by an inwardlooking economic development model in which economic activities were organised to meet domestic needs. In contrast, the capitalist transformation process unleashed by Deng Xiaoping ushered in a model of economic development in which all major economic activities were organised and undertaken to meet the needs of external markets, particularly those of the US and EU. These two features of Chinese capitalism, its outward orientation and limited domestic market, remain crucial features of capitalism in the PRC (Wang, 2016; Zhang, 2017). One of the salient outcomes of Chinese capitalism’s outward orientation was the creation and expansion of export industries (Brautigam and Tang, 2011; 2012; Yejoo, 2013; Zhang, 2017). These industries, concentrated in the coastal areas of the country,

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grew and developed into vital engines of growth and dynamism in the whole economy. From the point of view of developments in the world economy, what made the growth of these sectors possible is that, as noted by Hung (2009:10), the labour-intensive take-off coincided with the onset of an unprecedented expansion of free trade in the 1980s … and that were it not for the outsourcing of industry from the global North and the latter’s mounting appetite for low-cost manufactured imports, the PRC would have found it impossible to export its way to prosperity.

Regarding domestic conditions, the export sectors were structured to accommodate the needs of international capital from advanced capitalist countries in search of areas of high profitability in the wake of a profound crisis of accumulation in the global North. According to Guerrero (2006) and Brautigam and Tang (2012), the PRC became the favourite destination for FDI because of the attractive benefits it offered at the time. These counted a business-friendly environment that included adjusted tax rates for FDI and conditions guaranteeing profits for transnational corporations. Profits were boosted by low rent, cheap natural resources and lax rules for their exploitation, low wages for workers, the absence of independent trade unions, and laws prohibiting workers’ strike action (Guerrero, 2006:1). The PRC’s export industries not only played host to cross-border production networks that turned the Chinese economy into a hub for the assembly of final products but as Hart-Landsberg (2010) and Zhang (2017) emphasise, through these industries, the PRC displaced the other East Asian economies in global trade. Zhang (2017: 316) states: during the 1980s and 1990s China has been quickly climbing up the East Asian regional production and value chains and has shown signs of replacing Japan and South Korea in a set of key manufacturing sectors as the leading regional powerhouse.

The role of the other Asian economies in the global chain has transformed from exporters in their own right into suppliers of parts for the final assembly located in the PRC. In this way, Chinese capitalism has conditioned and set the terms for the insertion of East Asian economies into global circuits of capital accumulation.

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Another significant feature of Chinese capitalism, which is a reason for the limited size of the PRC’s domestic market, is the economy’s heavy reliance on cheap labour for its functional dynamics. The low cost of Chinese labour was the basis of not only the growth of the export sectors but also the migration of international capital from areas of low profitability in the global North to areas of high profitability in the PRC. The low cost of labour was also the key reason why the PRC took the place of other East Asian economies as a destination for outsourced industrial projects from the global North. Hung (2009:12) points out that contrary to widespread beliefs that the PRC’s cheap labour was a product of its currency devaluation, the country’s ability to supply endless pools of cheap labour was a result of a range of finance and fiscal policies of the Chinese government. These policies bankrupted the countryside by transference of wealth to the urban areas, guaranteeing a cycle of poverty and generating a continuous exodus from the rural areas. The crucial years of the development of the urban industrial sectors were navigated through the sustained transference of wealth from the countryside using measures that amount to expropriation. The impoverishment of the rural areas, coupled with low wages in the urban industrial sectors, accounted for the low purchasing power and thus weak consumption capacity within the Chinese populations, which in turn accounted for the limited size of the domestic market. The basic characteristics of Chinese capitalism include its seemingly endless (until the early 2000s) supply of cheap labour and ability to absorb outsourced capital from elsewhere in the world. Another basic characteristic is the Chinese economy’s externalisation of environmental costs, both local – creating cities with extreme air pollution – and global, due to the extremely rapid increase in greenhouse gas emissions. The profits, growth rates, and Keynesian infrastructure investments have elevated the economic prestige of China, which is now the centre of gravity for global capital accumulation (Zhang, 2017). The resultant appetite for raw materials and component parts brought about a mutation in the global circuits of commodities from Africa and elsewhere in the South, with the PRC becoming the single biggest destination of such primary resources for their assembly and processing into final products. On the back of this, the PRC has surpassed both the US and EU as the single largest trading partner on the African continent, a characteristic of China–Africa economic relations that is a central focus in official pronouncements, and in the FOCAC 2018–2021 Declaration (FOCAC, 2018).

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Hung (2009) and Hart-Landsberg (2010) argue that, because of the PRCs export-driven model of development and failure to develop a domestic market as an engine of growth and dynamism, Chinese capitalism will remain ‘dependent on the consumer markets of the global North for its growth and the financial markets of the US as the store of value for its savings’. In other words, without the consumer markets of the global North, in particular those of the EU and the US, the long-term viability of Chinese capitalism is in serious doubt. Hung (2009) concludes that to bring this dependent relationship to an end, the PRC has to transform the foundations of the export-oriented growth model into one driven by domestic consumption through, among other interventions, largescale redistribution of income to the rural-agricultural sector (this transformation is beginning as Chinese workers’ disposable income climbs). In its turn, such a restructuring requires breaking the power of the coastal urban elites. Their vested interests are in the coastal export sector, which constitutes the central pillar of the export-oriented growth model. Both Arrighi (1994; 2007) and Wallerstein (1997) focus more on the dangers of capital over-accumulation within China in relation to the long-term stability of state capitalism. China’s ghost cities are an example of this (Yin, Qian, and Zhu, 2017; Yan et al., 2017). Yin, Qian, and Zhu (2017) state that the ‘ghost city’ emerges from massive (over-)investment in the urban built environment. These ghost cities and towns are referred to as such due to a combination of poor urban spatial planning and infrastructural over-investment, that have led to inconvenient transportation options, long commute times to more popular urban areas, and, consequently, very high vacancy rates (Yin, Qian, and Zhu, 2017:1). Initiatives such as the One Belt One Road (OBOR) initiative (also known as the Belt and Road Initiative or BRI) are driven by the Chinese state in conjunction with other forms of capital to mediate the glut of over-capacity (especially in infrastructural development). In order to ensure a steady rise in the living standards across all sectors of the workforce, OBOR also creates a steady source of labour-intensive job creation for China’s huge workforce (Wang, 2016; Zhang, 2017). As referred to earlier, the dependence of Chinese capitalism on US imperialism remains a product of the configuration of social forces within Chinese society that have shaped the evolution of the export-led model of capitalist development. The persistence of the export-driven model is tied to the enduring dominance of those

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sections of the Chinese ruling classes whose material wealth owes its origins and continued existence to the export sectors located in the coastal areas. This fraction of the Chinese ruling class, which Hung (2009:13) terms the ‘powerful urban-industrial elite’, over time have expanded financial resources, and political influence, thereby shaping central government policy in its favour. China’s rapid economic expansion has witnessed an extension of global capitalism with Beijing, reinforcing rather than undermining the institutions of imperialism (even if there are occasional disputes such as the South China Sea territorial dispute involving the US Navy and neighbouring countries). Consequently, as a structural reinforcer of capital accumulation and exploitation patterns globally, Bond (2015; 2016b) argues that China’s sub-imperialist role in the world economy and in Africa has extended to reinforcing the BRICS bloc, not as an alternative to Western imperialism, but as regional sub-imperial gendarmes. Sub-imperialist states, rather than challenging US dominance, shore up global patterns of financial and production power especially through their roles in the IMF, World Bank, World Trade Organisation, and even the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change whose provisions are far more advantageous to the North than to Africa. Bond (2015:15) argues that China and the other BRICS states demonstrate sub-imperialism by their ‘accumulation trajectory, global geopolitical economic-environmental strategy, hegemony over hinterlands and internal dynamics of class formation’. From a similar perspective, Hung (2009) states that reversing the export-driven model of capitalist development is a necessary condition for the PRC’s independence from USled imperialism. Ferguson and Schularick (2007:288) observe that the relationship between the PRC and the US is characterised by two central features: first, the entry of the PRC’s enormous labour force gave the single biggest boost to the returns on capital; and second, the PRC’s massive external surpluses were channelled through government hands to the US fixed income market, with the effect of lowering the global risk-free interest rate just when the returns on capital rose. In other words, there evolved a symbiotic relationship between the PRC and the US in which the former, through its abundance of cheap labour and massive capital surplus, guaranteed a supply of cheap imports and cheap credit to the latter. The PRC’s accumulation of US bonds (making credit cheap and accessible) in turn sustains US consumption of the PRC’s manufactured exports.

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As mentioned, prior to the emergence of the PRC as a capitalist economic force, the other East Asian economies, through their export-led growth models, were the steady source of low-cost imports to the US economy (Brautigam and Tang, 2011; Zhang, 2017). The PRC has not only overtaken the East Asian economies as the principal supplier of cheap credit and low-cost imports to the US, it has also transformed their role and place in the chain of relationships to world capitalism (Brautigam and Tang, 2011; Zhang, 2017). This transformation has had an impact on patterns of trade and corporate activity in the whole region. Most companies from the region relocated to the Chinese special economic zones to take advantage of cheap labour and other favourable conditions of capital accumulation. As mentioned, these economies increasingly became suppliers of parts and components to the Chinese export sector and thus resulting in a shift in their overall export activity away from the North towards the PRC (Bello, 2006; Hart-Landsberg, 2010). Consequently, the relationship of these economies with the markets of the US and EU were henceforth mediated through the Chinese economy. A division of labour emerged in which increasingly the other economies in the East Asian region reduced their assembling activities and became suppliers of the insatiable appetite of the Chinese export sectors for parts and components. This responsibility of servicing the needs of the export industries in turn made the PRC the single biggest supplier to the US and EU markets. The PRC became a medium through which the East Asian economies interacted with the markets of the US and EU, in particular the US. China thus built up a large trade surplus with the US, creating a dependence on Western consumer markets that beleaguers the Chinese economy to this day (Zhang, 2017). During this period the South East Asian region, led by China, moved away from the flying geese model centred on Japan. As Zhang (2017: 316) states, during the 1980s and 1990s China has been quickly climbing up the East Asian regional and value chains and has shown signs of replacing Japan and South Korea in a set of key manufacturing sectors as the leading regional economic powerhouse.

At the same time, during this period of global economic integration, China and the region became more vulnerable to the vicissitudes of Western markets. Hung’s (2009) and Zhang’s (2017) response to these developments was that

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the limitations of the Chinese development model – overdependence on consumption in the West and lethargic growth in the domestic market – inevitably translate into vulnerabilities for its Asian partners, leaving these economies exposed to any major contraction of consumption demand in the global North.

For that reason, and as discussed further in the next section, the rise of the PRC and the specific dynamics of its relations to global capitalism represent more of a threat than an opportunity for regional economies to move away from dependence on Western markets for economic growth and development. Hung (2009) and Zhang (2017), following Arrighi (2007), argue that reforming the Chinese model of capitalist development is not only necessary for the sustainability of its economic growth, but also for the collective future of East Asia as an integrated economic bloc. What does this detrimental global dependence mean for China–Africa relations and indeed for the discussion of the hegemonic rivalry in the global capitalist system between the US and China?

China–Africa relations in the 21st-century world order The PRC’s geostrategic positioning into the world economy and economic relations with countries in the East Asian region leaves no doubt about what awaits the countries on the African continent and the rest of the South. For as long as Chinese capitalism continues to be dependent on the markets of the global North, the African continent and rest of the South are destined to service the needs of the export model, whose characteristic occupation is to transfer the surplus from the South to North. This reality is due to the way capitalism developed in the PRC and the existing balance of forces supporting it (Arrighi, 1994; 2007; Zhang, 2017). Official FOCAC narratives that are reinforced at state level in the African Union (AU) and in other regional fora are synched with the Chinese state’s promotional views on OBOR and the Maritime Silk Route Initiative (MSRI). These narratives emphasise the PRC’s long history of solidarity with the struggles against colonialism which implies that unlike classical imperialism, the China–Africa relations are underpinned by symbiotic developmental imperatives. The PRC’s operations are framed as being free from imperialist domination, and as having different motives in their international relations. Official Chinese channels only speak of mutual benefit to convince

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African leaders to defend China’s strong economic influence on national economic development (FOCAC, 2018). In contrast to the conditions during the era of classical imperialism, universal capitalist relations of production make the extraction of wealth from poor regions of the world to the advanced capitalist countries possible without reliance on coercive measures. The emphasis has since shifted towards the creation of social and technical conditions to facilitate the extraction and transference of wealth from the South to the centres of the world capitalist system. The PRC has played a decisive role in these new forms of wealth extraction in the past few decades. This role is due to the dynamism of Chinese capitalism that accounts for its growing status as the single largest consumer of primary commodities and raw materials from the South. In this way, the PRC has become a channel through which wealth from the South is funnelled to centres of imperialism, reinforcing patterns of imperial exploitation and reinforcing its own sub-imperial role and position in the global political economy. The analysis above confirms that Chinese investment in infrastructure is not primarily driven by benevolent impulses, but mainly to facilitate the extraction and transference of raw material and mineral resources to service the insatiable appetite of the Chinese economy for primary commodities, to provide a spatial fix for domestic over-accumulation and over-capacity, and to ensure longterm labour-intensive employment (Harvey, 2006; Arrighi, 1994; Bond, 2015; Wang, 2016; Zhang, 2017). As the economy that anchors capital accumulation on a world scale and also the single biggest consumer of raw materials from the African continent, the PRC will find it difficult to escape culpability in the imperial processes of extracting and transferring wealth from the South to the centres of imperialism (Amisi et al., 2015). The declines in the volume of trade from African countries flowing to traditional trading partners such as the US and EU have been accompanied by an increase in the volume of resources heading towards China. In the context of the export-oriented Chinese model of capitalism, the flow of African resources to the Chinese economy represents an oblique way of funnelling these resources to the centres of global imperialism. After all, as matters currently stand, economic activities in the Chinese economy are geared towards servicing the markets located in the centres of global imperialism, and the US in particular (Zhang, 2017). By moving to replace the US and the EU with China as the main trading partner, African state leaders are reorganising their relationship

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with the world economy on the terms set by the dynamics of exportoriented Chinese capitalism. Due to the PRC’s relative failure to develop a viable, sustainable domestic market, it is likely to enforce and perpetuate the vulnerabilities of the African continent to Western imperialism. This conclusion is endorsed by Zhang (2017) in his analysis of the impact of OBOR and the MSRI. Focusing simply on policy formulation and management as the way to create symbiotic developmental China–Africa relations does not address this fundamental reality of Chinese capitalism that is so central in shaping the evolution of its relations with the South.

Conclusion The future trajectory of China–Africa relations has been reframed throughout the chapter by critically reflecting on both the methodological and substantive foundations of prevailing state-centric narratives and approaches. The official narrative supports the notion of BRICS and China–Africa development cooperation as both equitable and a form of alternative South–South collaboration. These approaches elevate the role of the state, with specific reference to policy formulation and management, as being of cardinal importance to the success of the economic relations, ignoring or under-playing structural and systemic inequalities and economic distortions. The approaches emphasise the history of the PRC’s relations with Africa and the South, attaching disproportionate significance to the PRC’s foreign policy, its ostensible continuity with the fundamental tenets of the 1955 Bandung Conference, and the supposedly benevolent aid and FDI to the African continent. Not only is the PRC viewed as the opposite of Western imperialism in its relations with the African continent and the South, but most importantly, the PRC is defined outside the framework of the chains of imperialist domination. To transcend the limits of these approaches, the discussion above focused on the centrality of capital accumulation processes in shaping China–Africa relations. The analysis underlines the impossibility of discerning a state’s geostrategic positionality based on its policies and official proclamations without interrogating the structural and material conditions within which the policies will be implemented. The chapter foregrounded the relationship between state policy and imperatives of capital accumulation, emphasising how the latter influences and conditions the former.

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China–Africa relations cannot be fully appreciated outside of the changed dynamics of capitalism as a world system and the specific ways in which the Chinese economy articulates patterns of accumulation through trade and investment within it. Chinese capitalism emerged as the fulcrum of global capital accumulation on the basis of a subservient role to the leading role of the US as the dominant imperialist power. Despite its size and growth rates, the Chinese economy remains heavily reliant on the economy of the US for its dynamism and development. While there is no doubt that the US economy is in long-term historical decline, it is also clear that without the consumption patterns and financial markets of the US, the viability of the Chinese economy is at risk. These two are locked in an inextricable co-dependent relationship in which the PRC needs the US for the consumption markets of its cheap imports while the US needs China to supply cheap credit with which to sustain the consumption capacity necessary for the PRC’s growth and dynamism. The discussion highlights how the PRC’s reliance on the economy of the US is a product of the specific ways in which capitalism developed in the PRC in the context of an export-led model of economic development. This export-led model was the result of processes of class formation in the PRC in which the powerful sections of the Chinese ruling class that influenced the development of capitalism in that country were favourably disposed to the outward-oriented path of development. Accordingly, Chinese capitalism is in no position to create a new world economic order governed by alternative social justice and mutual development framings. As such, the PRC’s relations with Africa and the rest of the South will mainly serve to perpetuate the interests of Western imperialism. It is no surprise then that the PRCs preferred measures to strengthen China–Africa relations to advance social and economic development in Africa are limited to state policy and management. It is likely that these will further lock Africa into export-oriented dependency. Genuine South–South collaboration and solidarity are destined to remain a dream if the PRC continues to play its sub-imperial linking role within the chains of imperialist capital accumulation.

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6 BRICS and the new scramble for Zimbabwe in the aftermath of the military coup Farai Maguwu and Shakespear Hamauswa

The extraordinary events of November 2017 that brought down the regime of Zimbabwe’s long-serving dictator, Robert Mugabe, once again brought to the fore the sub-imperial role of key members of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) in Zimbabwe’s internal affairs. While analysts and political commentators’ immediate focus has been on how BRICS nations allowed Emmerson Mnangagwa and the army to wrestle power from Mugabe (instead of saving his regime), the likely implications for governance and development have not been unravelled. Therefore, this chapter unpacks the sub-imperial role of BRICS in Zimbabwe especially from the time when Mugabe was deposed from power. The history of Zimbabwe’s relations with BRICS will be examined in order to provide a prognosis of how the new dispensation will impact on governance systems in Zimbabwe. The involvement of the BRICS in the planning and execution of the coup as well as their responses immediately after the coup, remain instructive when speculating about the likely implications for governance and development in Zimbabwe. As will be argued, the demise of the Mugabe regime has seen a new scramble for Zimbabwe, pitting the BRICS bloc against Western nations. None among the leading global powers dared call the overthrow of Mugabe by its proper name – a military coup, lest they lose access to the opportunities that Zimbabwe offers. China, Russia, and the Western powers chose instead to call the coup a ‘military intervention’. Upon assumption of the presidency, Mnangagwa immediately declared that ‘Zimbabwe is open for business’ and the country has seen an influx of fortune hunters from all over the world.

Antecedents of the coup: Chinese preference of Mnangagwa to succeed Mugabe China’s preference of Mnangagwa over Mugabe began to emerge as far back as 2015. During that time Mnangagwa was invited to

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China where Chinese authorities reportedly raised concerns about Mugabe’s advanced age, ZANU-PF leadership renewal, and Zimbabwe’s investment climate and the ease of doing business, among other issues. Mnangagwa responded by giving a candid assessment of the Zimbabwean economy which he said was lagging by 15–16 years. Thereafter China stalled on nine so-called mega deals that Mugabe himself had directly negotiated during his state visit to China in 2014. Mugabe interpreted China’s stalling of the mega deals as the imposition of sanctions on Zimbabwe. Such developments indicate the involvement of China in Zimbabwean politics. Much like his response to the West when they imposed travel restrictions on him and his inner circle, Mugabe’s response to China was drastic. In 2015 Mugabe announced that government was going to merge the diamond mining firms into one consolidated state diamond mine. In February 2016 Mugabe summarily kicked out all the diamond mining firms in Marange, including two Chinese firms – Anjin and Jinan. The eviction of the diamond mining firms saw Mugabe’s relationship with China hitting rock bottom with the Chinese government formally protesting against the decision which Mugabe refused to rescind. Thereafter Mugabe confessed that the diamond mining firms and army had robbed Zimbabwe of revenue worth at least US$13 billion dollars, hence the decision to expel them (Malaba, 2016). Mnangagwa, who was Minister of Defence during the Inclusive Government between 2009 and 2013, presided over the militarisation, politicisation, and securitisation of Zimbabwe’s Marange diamond fields and indeed the entire extractive sector, together with the then army general, Constantino Chiwenga. Having violently captured the diamond fields through a military crackdown that left over 400 artisanal miners dead within a space of five weeks in 2008, Mnangagwa invited the Chinese to invest in the Marange diamond fields. According to The Zimbabwean (2015:1), the former ZANU-PF secretary for administration, Didymus Mutasa, noted that ‘Vice President Emmerson Mnangagwa colluded with the army and Chinese mining company Anjin Investments to steal diamonds from Marange’. Chinese corporations without any history in diamond mining were licensed to mine in the area. Mnangagwa stood by Mugabe’s side when the licence was handed over to Anjin’s directors. Another company, Canadile Mines, was long fronted by businessman Sam Pa, described by one source as ‘China’s trailblazer in Africa’ (Connett, 2015). Canadile was also licensed to mine

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diamonds in Marange in 2009. Sam Pa, who also had strong links to Zimbabwe’s Central Intelligence Organisation (CIO), led the secretive Hong Kong-based 88 Queensway Syndicate, which is notorious for its opaque projects in Africa, particularly in countries experiencing leadership challenges such as Zimbabwe, Angola, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and the Sudan. Indicative of his mysterious lifestyle, Pa has eight aliases with eight corresponding passports. He is also known as Antonio Famtosonghiu Sampo Menezes, Samo, Sam King, Sa Muxu, Tsui King Wah, Xu Songhua, Xu Jinghua, and Ghui Ka Leung. For many years he was the face of China in Zimbabwe, dealing with Mugabe’s security sector over which President Mnangagwa had firm control. But Pa fell foul of internal Beijing politics in 2015 and was jailed, with no subsequent news about him reaching the Financial Times and other periodicals that followed his case. As China looked at securing their economic interests in Zimbabwe, Mnangagwa was the natural heir apparent to the throne as he had dealt with the Chinese, albeit in Mugabe’s shadow, since independence from Britain in 1980. In meddling in the ZANU-PF succession battles, China was simply exercising the right of an imperial power, which Mugabe had conferred on her in the early 2000s through his ‘Look East’ policy which sought Chinese political, military, and diplomatic cover in the wake of targeted sanctions by Western nations. In 2008 Russia and China vetoed a United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolution that would have imposed sanctions on Mugabe and 11 senior members of his government. When Mnangagwa was sacked from government by Mugabe, Chiwenga went on an unexplained trip to China. On his return he called for a press conference where he announced the military was going to intervene to resolve the chaos in ZANU-PF. The China trip became the ‘smoking gun’ which pointed to China’s involvement in the coup, and possible offers of back-up should foreign intervention be needed. When the tanks rolled onto the streets of Harare, Mugabe found himself isolated. No one from the East or the West condemned the military coup even though it was evident that this is what it was. Countries that had blacklisted Zimbabwe for close to two decades suddenly changed their tone and promised cooperation. Mnangagwa returned the favour by dropping the controversial indigenisation portfolio when he named his cabinet in December 2017 and removed the local ownership requirement for foreign investment into the country, save for the diamond and platinum sectors. This earned him an invitation to the 48th World Economic

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Forum held at Davos, Switzerland in January 2018. Mnangagwa is now trying hard to appease both the West and the East while promising job creation. Every week government is announcing a new mega deal whose details are never revealed. Yet increasingly in 2018, the economy was paralysed by a lack of US dollars, suggesting that between promises made and vague investments undertaken, the fruits of the new pro-business attitude would simply not trickle down to the povo.

A coup that was not a coup Mnangagwa rose to power after the Zimbabwe National Army rolled tanks onto the streets of Harare and placed Mugabe under house arrest for more than a week during ‘negotiations’ for him to step down. Some cabinet ministers were detained while others survived apparent assassination attempts (BBC, 2018). The military took over the state broadcaster, Zimbabwe Broadcasting Corporation (ZBC) and all state media, key strategic institutions, and erected roadblocks throughout the country. The speaker of parliament, Jacob Mudenda announced on 21 November 2017 that Mugabe had resigned, paving the way for Mnangagwa’s ascendency three days later. While Chiwenga said the military intervened to defend the constitution, legal experts say this was an apparent military coup that was ultra vires the constitution (Brickhill, 2017). As already emphasised, while the military action had all the ingredients of a military coup, no one among the world leaders called it that. They called it a ‘military intervention’. The lukewarm response to the coup by world leaders and praise of the coup plotters by global news channels such as CNN and BBC enabled the smooth ascendency of Mnangagwa who, since his inauguration as president, has been welcomed on continental and international platforms. In January 2018, Britain’s newly appointed minister for Africa, Harriett Baldwin, touched down at Mugabe International Airport in Harare on a trip symbolic of the changing relations between Harare and its former coloniser. In April that same year Mnangagwa declared the two-decade row with Britain over, adding that Zimbabwe had attracted more than US$11 billion worth of investment commitments over the past four months (Mushanawani, 2018). However, in the immediate aftermath, the Zimbabwean economy remained mired in a deep crisis. No significant new projects have started in Zimbabwe since Mnangagwa’s take over.

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BRICS and their responses to the 2017 November coup The fall of Mugabe saw a scaling up of Russian and Chinese investments in Zimbabwe. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin was quick to send a congratulatory message to Mnangagwa upon his ascendency, and followed up by sending his powerful Foreign Affairs Minister, Mr Sergey Lavrov, to Zimbabwe where he signed some secretive agreements with the Mnangagwa government. Former special adviser to Mnangagwa, Cris Mutsvangwa did not divulge the details of the deals: ‘There are three deals signed, but there is a separate arrangement with the Ministry of Defence because we have always had cordial military relations with Russia’, said Mutsvangwa (Chidza, 2018). During the same visit Russia’s Deputy Minister of Industry and Trade in Russia, Mr Georgy Kalamanmov, also announced that Russia will soon be injecting US$400 million to ensure full operation of the US$3 billion platinum mining project that was commissioned in 2014. The deal involves a Russian consortium which includes an arms conglomerate and a Zimbabwean firm with links to the military. Darwendale is considered the largest single deposit of platinum in Africa. Russia also promised close military and technical cooperation with the Mnangagwa government (The Zimbabwe Mail, 2018). Moscow businessman and deputy chairperson of the Russian Federal Property Fund, Dmitry Mazepin, also visited Harare in February 2018, and announced his interest in the fertiliser manufacturing, agriculture, and mining sectors. However, there have been no further announcements on these so-called mega deals. In June 2018 the Zimbabwe state media also announced that Russia’s diamond mining giant, Alrosa, is interested in exploration ‘of various mineral deposits’ and diamond mining activities in Zimbabwe following a meeting between its CEO Sergey Ivanov and Mnangagwa in April of the same year (Towindo, 2018). Similarly, Chinese nationals were seen roaming the Marange diamond fields barely three weeks after the military coup. Anjin, which was a joint venture with the Zimbabwe National Army, and Jinan had been forced out of the lucrative Marange diamond fields by Mugabe’s government in February 2016 after the companies had refused to merge with the Zimbabwe Consolidated Diamond Company (ZCDC). Meanwhile the Supreme Court of Zimbabwe has upheld the High Court ruling which declared the eviction of Mbada Diamonds from Marange unlawful. Mbada Diamonds, fronted by

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Robert Mugabe’s former helicopter pilot, Robert Mhlanga, is a joint venture between Grandwell Holdings, a subsidiary of South Africa’s scrap metal company, New Reclam, and Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation. The return of the diamond mining firms has angered the Marange community which is intensifying its resistance to the continued pillaging of the diamonds by the ruling elites and their foreign benefactors. In April 2018, the Marange community staged a two-day protest against human rights violations by company security and the Zimbabwe government. Marange was declared a Protected Area by the Zimbabwe government – any visitor to the community must seek police clearance in Mutare first, which is difficult to obtain. With the help of the Centre for Natural Resource Governance the Marange community petitioned parliament in March 2018 but to date no response has been given. In November more than 5,000 members of the Marange community gathered near the diamond fields for their annual commemoration of the 2008 killings.

Business without human rights In the absence of competition from the West, China had been quietly profiting from Zimbabwe’s multi-billion diamond fields in Marange unchallenged. The EU had imposed ‘smart sanctions’ on Zimbabwe in February 2002 in an apparent response to the often-violent land reform programme that targeted white farmers, and the general decline in the rule of law. The sanctions had also been extended to the Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation (ZMDC), making it unlawful for ZMDC to sell minerals in Europe. But having seen firms from China, Russia, India, and South Africa profiting from Zimbabwe’s rich Marange diamond fields, the EU decided to change its policy in favour of engagement in 2011. This shows that in international politics, states are primarily guided by corporate interests as opposed to their espoused democratic and human rights ideals. While there was no evidence of genuine reforms, the EU began striking state companies and individuals off its targeted sanctions list. The lobby to remove Zimbabwean state companies from the EU sanctions list was led by the Antwerp World Diamond Centre, which benefited from marketing the Marange diamonds. On 25 September 2013, barely two months after the harmonised elections in Zimbabwe, the EU announced the lifting of sanctions on ZMDC (Antwerp World Diamond Centre, 2013).

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Western sanctions were imposed to force Zimbabwe to respect human rights, property rights, and the rule of law. BRICS nations, on the other hand, did not attach any conditionality to their engagements with Zimbabwe. When reports of human rights violations emerged in Marange around 2008, Kimberley Process Certification Scheme (KPCS), associated civil society organisations, called for continued monitoring of diamond mining and trade in Zimbabwe (Howard, 2015). The KPCS placed a ban on Zimbabwean diamonds trade in 2009 due to continued human rights violations and smuggling. In 2011 Russia, India, China, and South Africa, which are all members of the Kimberley Process, teamed up to fight for the lifting of the ban. As a result, the ban was lifted in 2011 (Howard, 2015). After 2013 both the Western nations and BRICS powers were working behind the scenes to normalise relations with ZANU-PF so that they could reserve a place at the table during the post-Mugabe scramble for Zimbabwe. Although the human rights situation in Marange remains grave, neither BRICS nations nor the EU or the US, which are very influential in the Kimberley Process, have dared to condemn the violations. Both camps have adopted a business approach to Zimbabwe where economic interests override their commitments to human rights and the rule of law. Currently ZCDC is making plans to evict more than 300 families in Kusena Village of Marange to pave the way for diamond mining. In October the villagers were tricked into signing ‘consent forms’ whereby they agreed to be paid US$1,000 per family as compensation. The stampeding of Russians, Chinese, and South Africans to Zimbabwe to share the spoils of the military coup points to continued pillaging of Zimbabwe’s natural resources by BRICS nations under Mnangagwa’s presidency. The speed at which some of the deals are being concluded, for instance the US$1.4 billion lithium deal of which government has not disclosed the identity of the investor nor the details of the contract, leaves no room for due diligence. The accelerated militarisation of the state under Mnangagwa could lead to more arms-for-minerals deals, which characterised Mugabe’s Look East Policy. In 2011 China gave Zimbabwe a US$98 million loan to build Zimbabwe’s defence academy (Kachembere, 2012). The loan was to be repaid using the proceeds from Anjin diamonds. Former finance minister during the Inclusive Government of Zimbabwe (2009–2013), Tendai Biti, said Anjin never remitted a single penny to treasury during his tenure. Of its 1,500 workers, 210 were brought in from China. In 2011 the company claimed to be the

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biggest diamond mining company in the world and yet contributed nothing to the Zimbabwean fiscus (The Independent, 2012). In 2015, the Zimbabwe National Army muscled its way to gain control of a US$4.8 billion platinum mine which it is operating through a joint venture between its subsidiary Pen East investments and a group of Russian investors who include the Russian defence conglomerate Rostec State Corporation. In February 2017, Mugabe revealed that one of the deals he had struck with China was an arms-for-minerals deal (The Source, 2017). Mugabe was quoted as saying, They [Zimbabwe’s military] felt I should raise the issue [relating to] the platinum claim they gave to a Chinese company to exploit so the money therefrom can be used to secure and pay the debt which they have [arising from] arms procured from China. (The Source, 2017:1)

As was the case with Mugabe’s administration, Mnangagwa’s deals are handled by the Office of the President (OP) and the details of the investments remain unknown to the public. But apart from the new deals, Mnangagwa is also resurrecting old deals with BRICS nations which had collapsed or been stillborn under Mugabe. His first cabinet was also full of ministers who worked with Mugabe in negotiating opaque deals with BRICS nations which left Zimbabwe poorer. Some of these have been redeployed to the party with full ministerial rewards.

New driver, same old, faulty bus Perhaps the most worrying phenomenon about Mnangagwa’s approach is his continuation of Mugabe’s style of management. Mugabe and his family personally negotiated deals which benefited them at the expense of Zimbabwe. Responsible ministries sometimes received orders from Mugabe to sign agreements that were of no value to the country but were of personal benefit to Mugabe and his family. Ironically, Mnangagwa appears to be perfecting Mugabe’s legacy by continuing with a culture of secrecy. This is also understandable given that Mnangagwa had been by Mugabe’s side since the days of the liberation struggle in the 1970s and occupied key security ministries from independence in 1980 up to the time he captured power from Mugabe in November 2017.

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Recently, government signed an agricultural deal with the Financial and Commodities Ecosystem (FinComEco) worth US$1.5 billion, which is touted to create 630,000 jobs. Commenting on the deal, Zimbabwe Commercial Farmers’ Union director Jeremiah Tavera stated that there was no involvement of stakeholders in the US$1.5 billion agricultural deal, adding that ‘as the public eye, we do not have the inner developments, the details, nitty-gritties, implementation or whether there are issues which those who want to provide the services still want to be addressed even after signing the agreement’ (Zwinoira, 2018:1) Government also signed a US$4.2 billion platinum investment deal with a questionable company, Karo Resources Limited, that has dual registration in Cyprus and Guernsey (a tax haven blacklisted by the EU) in December 2017 to clamp down on the estimated £506 billion lost to aggressive avoidance every year). The chair of Karo Resources, Mr Loucas Pouroulis, has previously been investigated by South African authorities for alleged commercial crimes. It is therefore hard to justify why the Zimbabwe government enjoys doing business with corporates of questionable scruples. No criteria have been set on how deals of national significance are negotiated. In early February 2018 Mnangagwa claimed that Zimbabwe had secured more than three billion dollars in foreign direct investment (FDI) in just seven weeks (Pindula News, 2018). In March of the same year presidential spokesperson George Charamba said investment pledges had now far surpassed the US$3 billion mark, promising to give details later. The Zimbabwe Investment Authority (ZIA) also claimed that in terms of projects they had actually licensed in the first quarter of 2018, they had attracted US$950 million in FDI. Perhaps the most incriminating evidence that Zimbabwe is still riding on the same old, faulty bus, albeit with a different driver, is the Beitbridge–Harare–Chirundu Highway scandal. In 2016 Minister of Transport Joram Gumbo awarded the US$2.7 billion tender to an Austrian firm, Geiger International. Close to three years later, no construction had started. On 5 April 2018, while addressing representatives of the Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Group in Anhui Province, China, Mnangagwa said his cabinet had resolved that the Harare–Beitbridge highway construction tender should be retendered. Barely three weeks later government announced that it had awarded the project to a new contractor (Newsday, 2018). The announcement was made by Masvingo Provincial Affairs Minister Josaya Hungwe, while Gumbo remained silent. The project cost

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announced in April had also been reduced from an initial US$2.7 billion to US$2 billion, thereby confirming public fears the initial cost had been inflated. There is no evidence of government inviting fresh tenders for the project. The fact that Mnangagwa announced cancellation of the Geiger International deal in China while addressing a Chinese company with whom he has a long friendship indicates that the new contractor is Chinese. The original selection of Geiger International itself had been controversial. On its website, Geiger International describes itself as ‘a leading supplier of security products, vehicular equipment, textile and housing products’, adding that it ‘has successfully been manufacturing, under license, military goods in its own factories in mainland China for over two decades’ (Geiger International, 2018:1). On construction projects, the company website states that ‘our regional head offices in Shanghai, China, run significant construction projects with some very competent and very powerful companies as joint partners in the following sectors …’ (Geiger International, 2018:1). It relies on subcontracting other players in the construction sector. With no competency of its own, the company has built a syndicate of Chinese companies, which it subcontracts for various projects that may entail inflating the costs. Geiger International has only been involved in one construction project – the stillborn Beitbridge–Harare–Chirundu Highway. When the government announced the estimated cost of the Beitbridge–Harare–Chirundu Highway dualisation project, there was an outcry from Zimbabweans who argued that the price was inflated. It was also revealed that local contractors would receive a 40 per cent share of the first phase of the project, valued at US$400 million. There were no criteria on how the local players were going to be selected. The fusion of fraudulent Austrian-Chinese companies with local ‘tenderpreneurs’, equally without capacity, meant that the project was primarily for the enrichment of the negotiators. Predictably, when the underhanded deals failed to materialise, the project fell through.

The Chinese connection Gumbo repeatedly stated that Geiger International is an Austrian company. But while its administrative office is based in Feldkirch, a medieval city in the western Austrian state of Vorarlberg, Geiger

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International moved to China and established its regional headquarters in Shanghai in the early 1990s. It claims on its website to be operating in China but using European standards. This is why the company has maintained that it is headquartered in Austria, ranked 16th on the Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index, to disguise its opaque operations in China. Geiger International has been part of China’s crusade to plunder Africa through negotiating corrupt deals with ruling elites on the continent. It is therefore no surprise that the tender was jointly awarded to Geiger International and China Harbour Engineering Company. This gave an impression of two international companies, one from Asia and the other from Europe, when in reality these are both Chinese companies of the same syndicate. In 2017, legislator Eddie Cross quizzed Gumbo over the awarding of the tender to Geiger, arguing that it is a very small company headquartered in a small Austrian village with no capacity to carry out such a big project: ‘I cannot find any record of it in Austria and all, none at all. It has an address in a small Austrian village but that is the only thing I can find’, said Hon Cross. Gumbo defended Geiger International as ‘a very big company’ with the capacity to deliver (National Assembly Hansard, 14 March 2017) In 2011, the World Bank blacklisted Geiger’s Chinese partner, China Harbour Engineering Company, alongside ten other Chinese companies for fraud and corruption. By the time the Beitbridge– Chirundu Highway award was made in 2016, information over the blacklisting of this company was now in the public domain. In awarding such a contract, or any contract for that matter, due diligence is a prerequisite. This means Gumbo was well aware they were engaging with criminals. Gumbo is also embroiled in yet another US$33 million tender scandal involving the Civil Aviation Authority of Zimbabwe, according to Kunambura (2018). In June 2018 government announced that the contract for the Beitbridge–Chirundu Highway had been awarded to Anhui Foreign Economic Construction Company (AFECC). AFECC is not new to Zimbabwe. Its presence in Zimbabwe can be traced back to 2009 when it formed Anjin Investments and Jinan. On its website AFECC boasts that ‘a Kimberley Process inspector, after inspecting Anjin mining area, expressed that Anjin was the best mining area he had ever seen’. That official was South Africa’s Abbey Chikane, whose monitoring mission in Zimbabwe was discredited after he had reported a civil society activist (co-author Maguwu) to the government for providing him with evidence of gross human rights

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violations in the Marange diamond fields (Bell, 2010). AFECC was the company responsible for garnishing the diamonds mined at Anjin as repayment for the US$98 million Zimbabwe Defence College loan (Chikuhwa, 2013)

Conclusion While the removal of Mugabe from power is a development welcomed by Zimbabweans, his successor, Mnangagwa, has proved beyond any reasonable doubt to be a darling of BRICS. As a result, BRICS firms are set to benefit in the post-Mugabe era more than Zimbabweans themselves. What remains clear is that the coup that brought Mugabe down was engineered and supported by China and South Africa, with Russia also endorsing Mnangagwa. The aftermath of the coup has also seen the opening of floodgates for the new scramble for Zimbabwean resources and investment opportunities, all to the detriment of Zimbabweans.

References Antwerp World Diamond Centre, 2013, ‘EU lifts sanctions on Zimbabwe Mining Development Corporation’. BBC, 2018, Professor Jonathan Moyo with Zeinab Badawi. Hard Talk. Available at: https://www.youtube.com/ watch?v=5PveqNHkhQU. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Bell, A., 2010, ‘Zimbabwe: Campaigners demand release of jailed diamond activist’. Available at: https://allafrica. com/stories/201006190007.html. Accessed on: 21 November 2018. Brickhill, J., 2017, ‘Coup and constitution in Zimbabwe Part 1: The military action is profoundly unconstitutional’. Available at: http://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/coupand-constitution-in-zimbabwepart-1-the-military-action-isprofoundly-unconstitutional/. Accessed on: 21 November 2018.

Chidza, R., 2018, ‘Russia promises ED military, political aid’. Newsday. Available at: https:// www.newsday.co.zw/2018/03/ russia-promises-ed-militarypolitical-aid/. Accessed on: 15 August 2018. Chikuhwa, J.W., 2013, Zimbabwe: The end of the first republic. Bloomington, IN: Authorhouse. Connett, D., 2015, ‘Sam Pa: The fall of China’s trailblazer in Africa’. The Independent. Available at: https://www. independent.co.uk/news/ business/analysis-and-features/ sam-pa-the-fall-of-china-strailblazer-in-africa-a6707031. html. Accessed on: 21 November 2018. Geiger International, 2018, ‘About us’. Available at: http://www. geiger-international.com/en/ about-us/. Accessed on: 14 November 2018.

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Howard, A., 2015, ‘Blood diamonds: the successes and failures of the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme in Angola, Sierra Leone and Zimbabwe’. Washington University Global Studies Law Review, 15(1), 137–159. The Independent, 2012, ‘Anjin not remitting diamond proceeds: Biti’. 18 May. Available at: https://www.theindependent. co.zw/2012/05/18/ anjin-not-remitting-diamondproceeds-biti/. Accessed on: 26 November 2018. Kachembere, J., 2012, ‘Zim not China’s favourite’. The Daily News, 3 December. Available at: https://www.dailynews.co.zw/ articles/2012/12/03/zim-notchina-s-favourite. Accessed on: 1 November 2018. Kunambura, A., 2018, ‘Zimbabwe: Minister sucked into US$33m shady deal’. The Zimbabwe Independent. Available at: https://www.theindependent. co.zw/2018/12/21/ministersucked-into-us33m-shady-deal/. Accessed on: 27 April 2019. Malaba, B., 2016, ‘More than $15 billion in diamonds looted, says Mugabe’. Africa Independent. Available at: https://www. africanindy.com/news/more-than15-billion-in-diamonds-lootedsays-mugabe-5008412. Accessed on: 18 November 2018. Mushanawani, 2018, ‘ED declares row with Britain is over’. The Herald. Available at: https://www. herald.co.zw/ed-declares-rowwith-britain-over/. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. National Assembly Hansard, 14 March 2017. Available at: https://www.parlzim.gov.zw/ national-assembly-hansard/ national-assembly-hansardvol-44-no-47. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Newsday, 2018, ‘New contractor gets Chirundu–BB Highway

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tender’. Newsday, 25 April. Available at: https://www. newsday.co.zw/2018/04/ new-contractor-gets-chirundubb-highway-tender/. Accessed on: 19 November 2018. Pindula News, 2018. ‘Zim secures 3 billion in foreign direct investment in 7 weeks claims Mnangagwa’. Available at: https://news.pindula. co.zw/2018/02/08/zim-secures-3billion-foreign-direct-investment7-weeks-claims-mnangagwa/. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. The Source, 2017, ‘President confirms use of minerals as collateral for arms deal with China’. Available at: https:// source.co.zw/2017/02/ icymi-zimbabwes-presidentmugabe-confirms-use-mineralscollateral-arms-.deal-china/. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Towindo, L., 2018, ‘Russian giant eyes Zim gems’. The Sunday Mail. Available at: http://www. sundaymail.co.zw/russian-gianteyes-zim-gems/. Accessed on: 3 November 2018. The Zimbabwe Mail, 2018, ‘Russia seeks military cooperation, diamond, platinum projects in Zimbabwe’. Available at: https:// www.thezimbabwemail.com/ zimbabwe/russia-seeks-militarycooperation-diamond-platinumprojects-in-zimbabwe/. Accessed on: 3 November 2018. The Zimbabwean, 2015, ‘Mnangagwa looted diamonds: Mutasa’. 31 March. Available at: http://www.thezimbabwean. co/2015/03/mnangagwa-looteddiamonds-mutasa/. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Zwinoira, T., 2018, ‘Scepticism over Mnangagwa’s China “mega deals”’. The Standard, 4 August. Available at: https://www. thestandard.co.zw/2018/04/08/ scepticism-mnangagwas-chinamega-deals/. Accessed on: 19 November 2018.

7 Sino-Zambian relations: responses from below Godfrey Hampwaye and Phineas Bbaala

Sino-Zambian relations constitute part of a geopolitical genus within international relations known as South–South relations. Its origins coincide with the founding of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) by some developing countries in 1955. This is even though Africans and Asians (including Chinese) had unofficial trade contacts on the shores of the Indian Ocean as far back as ad 618–907 during China’s Tang Dynasty (Muyakwa, 2009:5). With regard to formal Sino-African relations, the immediate aftermath of the Second World War is of critical relevance. The struggle for political independence and nationhood among the territories of Africa, Asia, and Latin America during this period cultivated a spirit of solidarity between countries in these regions. Developing countries were discontented with the exploitative architecture of the global order as evidenced by the slave trade, colonialism, and other forms of imperialism in which they had been turned into ‘client states’ of the developed world (Nkrumah, 1968:1–7). As a result, these developing countries sought to strengthen cooperation among themselves under the ambit of South–South relations. From the 1950s to the mid-1970s, China actively supported liberation movements and newly independent states (Pere, 2012:284–285) on the African continent. For instance, in Zambia and Tanzania, China is mostly remembered for its financing and construction of the 1,860-kilometre-long Tanzania–Zambia Railway (TAZARA). The US$455 million railway became the most expensive project undertaken overseas by China (Alden, 2007:72). The railway not only enabled Zambia to have a bypass passage to the east coast but critical access to external trade after the closure of the trade route to the south following the economic embargo imposed on colonial Zimbabwe, and the insecurity posed by the apartheid regime in South Africa. The Brazil, Russia, India, and China (BRIC) grouping arose from the South, as an organisation of major emerging economies

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in the developing world which sought to challenge the hegemonic, unipolar international system (led by the United States with support from its European allies) and supposedly to promote a more just world. South Africa was later invited to join this grouping to now form BRICS in April 2010. As of 2013, the BRICS accounted for 26 per cent of the world’s landmass, 42 per cent of the global population, nearly 28 per cent of the global economy, and 40 per cent of the global GDP (gross domestic product) estimated at US$18.486 trillion (Lumumba-Kasongo, 2015). Against the backdrop of two decades of reforms and growth between 1980 and 2000, which had seen a downturn in SinoAfrican contact, the relations were renewed. China’s return to Africa also followed a decade of the implementation of neoliberal policies, which created conditions favourable for foreign investment in the developing world. At the time, most African countries were desperate for development finance following the policy shift in favour of the structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) by their traditional donors in the North. In China’s new international engagements, the old policy of ‘economy serves diplomacy’ was replaced with a new one of ‘diplomacy serves economy’ (Anshan, 2007:69–93). China’s economic-leaning foreign policy, coupled with the Zouchuqu (going out) policy promulgated in the late 1990s, not only redefined but also reignited China’s re-engagement with the world at the dawn of the new millennium. Many African countries, including Zambia, witnessed an increase in the inflow of Chinese investments soon after. The chapter shows that China’s reconfiguration of its relations with African countries, including Zambia, at the turn of the new millennium, emphasises economic rather than political foreign policy objectives. This policy has received different responses from host countries of Chinese investment. Focusing on Zambia as one of the hotspots of anti-Chinese sentiments and protests, the chapter reviews the responses of labour, trade, consumer, and community groups to Chinese investment in Zambia.

Chinese investment in Zambia Since 2000, many sectors of the Zambian economy have seen an upswing in Chinese investment, following Zambia’s privatisation drive under the SAPs spearheaded by the international financial institutions (IFIs). Since 1971, when the price of copper at the

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London Metal Exchange collapsed, Zambia’s nationalised mining and other sectors had deteriorated due to a lack of recapitalisation. During the same period, the Zambian government borrowed heavily with the hope that the plunge in commodity prices would peter out in the short term. Alas, the shock lasted for a prolonged period of three decades during which Zambia’s per capita income fell by 50 per cent, leading to a fall from glory as a middle-income country in 1969 to the 25th most impoverished country in the world (Li, 2010) by 1990 with a staggering national debt of above $7 billion. The country’s economic woes had been exacerbated by the rise in oil prices leading to a severe shortage of foreign currency to support both critical imports and debt redemption. In 1991, when the Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD) formed government, privatisation of the Zambian economic sectors, including mining, was seen as a panacea for healing the country’s economic wounds. This was to be achieved through an anticipated recapitalisation of the economy from domestic private capital and foreign direct investment (FDI). Growth, employment creation, and increased government revenue from taxes and savings from reduced recurrent and capital expenditure were expected to trigger economic development. Following a shift in Sino-African relations from political to economic interaction at the turn of the new millennium, Sino-Zambian trade has generally been on the rise. For instance, Sino-Zambian trade jumped from $108 million in 2000 to $2.85 billion in 2010. Mostly, this was swung by Chinese FDI which rose quite fast during the first decade of the millennium to account for 47 per cent of Zambia’s total FDI by 2007 (Wu, 2014). During the same period, China officially became the second largest importer of Zambia’s copper ore (Eliassen, 2012). Zambia is so endowed with copper that it has the second largest reserves of the commodity in Africa. In October 2014, the Chinese Ambassador to Zambia, Yang Youming, put the value of Chinese investment in Zambia at over $3 billion. By the end of 2014, 550 Chinese companies were operating in Zambia and were responsible for the creation of nearly 50,000 local jobs in several key sectors including mining, construction, manufacturing, and agriculture, among others (Zambia Invest, 2014). Criticisms aside, China’s investment in Zambia has made a positive contribution to the country’s economy. In evaluating the contribution of Chinese investment to Zambia’s economy, one vital point to consider is the alternative financing that China

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provides to sectors that could not attract FDI from elsewhere. Indisputably, Chinese investment has been the single major factor responsible for the revival of the Zambian economy since 2000. Though the majority of ordinary Zambians may not sufficiently feel the direct trickle-down effect from Chinese investment, previously shut down sectors were revived, social and economic infrastructure built, jobs created, new and cheaper goods were being produced for the local and export markets, while various taxes were being paid to the Zambian government by Chinese firms. To comprehensively understand the nature, significance, and the unresolved issues in Sino-Zambian trade relations, the chapter reviews selected Chinese investments in the key sectors of the Zambian economy with a significant focus on the period 2000 to date.

Mineral extraction sector The privatisation of Zambia’s mining sector involved the dismantling of the mining conglomerate, Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines (ZCCM). As the world’s largest consumer of copper, it is not surprising that mining constitutes 88 per cent of China’s investment in Zambia (Li, 2010). The state-owned Chinese firm China Nonferrous Metal Mining (Group) Company (CNMC), through its subsidiary, the Non-Ferrous Company-Africa (NFCA), became the biggest Chinese investor in Zambia after it purchased the Chambishi Mine (Li, 2010) in the country’s Copperbelt Province for $20 million in 1998. At the time that the NFCA acquired the assets of Chambishi Mine, the latter ‘had been dead on its feet for 13 years, copper prices had hit rock bottom, and a Canadian investor had cancelled its purchase plan’ (Li, 2010:7). The firm resumed operations in 2000 after the NFCA had invested an initial amount of $132 million. When ranked by value of investment, CNMC was China’s 29th largest outward investor in 2006 (Li, 2010). In 2015, the NFCA announced the construction of the $832 million south-east ore body project in Kalulushi, which would create 5,000 local jobs in addition to the 3,000 employed at the time. Earmarked for commencement in 2017, the project was expected to increase the company’s production capacity from 30,000 to 100,000 tonnes per annum once completed. According to the then NFCA Corporate Affairs Manager, Nelson Jilowa (Zambia Daily Mail, 2015b) once all the

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projects were completed, the company’s accumulative investments would exceed $1.1 billion. In 2009, the NFCA bought off the closed Luanshya Copper Mine (LCM) after a joint venture of Bein Stein Resources Group (BSRG) of Switzerland and the International Minerals Resources (IMR) of Israel fell through on account of low copper prices (Li, 2010; Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation, 2009; Reuters, 2009; Namibian, 2009). Before BSRG and IMR, the Zambian government had to repossess the LCM from Binani, an Indian investor that failed to revive the mine after buying it in 1997. Addressing the former workers of the LCM in Luanshya in May 2009, Zambian President Rupiah Banda announced the sale of 85 per cent of the mine’s shares to the NFCA. He also said that the Chinese firm would reopen the Baluba Mine and take over the development of the Mulyashi Project. Speaking during the handover of the LMC, Zambia’s Mines Minister Maxwell Mwale disclosed CNMC’s intention to invest $400 million in reopening the Baluba Mine and developing the Mulyashi Project. The timing of the Chinese investment in the LCM seemed to send a message that, unlike investors from elsewhere, especially Western countries, China was prepared to take a risk in helping Zambia to recapitalise its mining sector and establish a long-term, win–win, development-based relationship. The Chinese were also keen on advancing this narrative and inculcating it in the minds of the locals. For instance, speaking at an event to launch the takeover of the LCM, CNMC’s Vice-President Tao Xinghu said: ‘Our investment in Zambia and Luanshya aims at long-term development rather than for profits in a short-term’ (Namibian, 2009; Reuters, 2009). Apart from the CNMC, the Zambian mineral extractive sector has attracted numerous small and medium Chinese mining firms which have kept a low profile making it difficult not only to know their exact number but also to account for their business activities. One such firm is the Maamba Collum Coal Mine in the country’s Southern Province. In 2000, the mine was bought by five brothers who are from China’s Jiangxi Province. The locals saw the opening of the mine as a dawn of a new lifeline in a poor, monoeconomy community. Another such firm is the Jinchuan Mining Group which spent $220 million in 2007 to acquire 51 per cent of Albidon Mining Company in Mazabuka’s Munali Hills area (Li, 2010). This also followed the withdrawal by other investors owing to low commodity prices.

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Construction and infrastructure sector Against the backdrop of CNMC’s investment in the Zambian mining sector, Zambia attracted other Chinese firms into other sectors of the economy. The construction sector was among those targeted by the Chinese. A study by Lindberg (2009) reveals that by 2008, 28 Chinese construction firms were registered for business in Zambia. Of these, 13 were state-owned, while 5 were privately owned, and 10 were unknown. Unlike the Zambian firms that dominate the sector only numerically, their Chinese counterparts enjoy easy access to Chinese government capital through the Bank of China (Centre for Chinese Studies, 2006) and the Export and Import (ExIm) Bank of China. The major Chinese firms in the sector include China Jiangxi, China Henan International Corporation (CHICO), China Geo-Engineering Corporation, and AVIC International. Since 2001, when it was engaged to construct the Football House for the Football Association of Zambia (FAZ) at the cost of $570,000, China Jiangxi has become one of the most prominent Chinese firms in Zambia. The firm is one of the largest Chinese overseas investors with a presence in more than 60 countries and regions with more than 200 contracting projects. Having had a presence in Africa since 1983, CHICO entered Zambia to become the first Chinese firm to invest in the country’s construction sector (Lindberg, 2009). Between 2004 and 2018, CHICO undertook various major construction works for the Zambian government ranging from road construction to electricity power stations. One of CHICO’s major contracts was the $492.5 million awarded by the Road Development Agency to construct and rehabilitate 406 kilometres of urban roads in Copperbelt Province (QFM, 2015; Zambia Daily Mail, 2015c) under a project dubbed Copperbelt 400 (C 400). AVIC International is another Chinese firm of significance. In 2011, it was awarded a tender to construct the 34-kilometre Mongu– Kalabo Road in the Western Province at the cost of $287 million. In June 2012, the Road Development Agency single-sourced AVIC International to design, rehabilitate, upgrade, and construct about 402 kilometres of selected urban roads in Lusaka for a contracted value of $348 million within a project cycle of 43 months (The Mast, 2017). In 2017, the firm commenced the construction of a $522 million Copperbelt International Airport in Ndola (Zambia National Broadcasting Corporation, 2017). The Zambian government has also contracted AVIC for many other infrastructure projects around the country including the construction of road toll plazas on major roads.

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China Jiangxi is also an important player in the construction sector and was awarded a mega-contract worth $1.2 billion to expand the two-lane Lusaka–Ndola Road into a dual carriageway (Daily Nation, 2017). This was in addition to the firm’s other contracts such as the expansion of the Kenneth Kaunda International Airport in Lusaka at the cost of $360 million. In early 2014, some reports claimed that the firm had created 350 local jobs in a 139-kilometre stretch of the Chipata–Vubwi and Vubwi–Chadiza roads it was contracted to lift to bituminous standard. The firm was expected to employ an additional 100 Zambian workers as the project advanced (Times of Zambia, 2014). The project cost K530 million (the approximate equivalent of $53 million as of 2018). The firm had also been contracted to undertake many other road projects around the country including the Ndola–Kitwe Dual Carriageway in the Copperbelt Province.

Manufacturing sector Apart from the investments in the mining and construction sectors, the textile and clothing (TC) subsector had defined China’s FDI in Zambia, particularly between 1995 and 2007. The Zambia– China Mulungushi Textile Joint Venture Limited (ZCMT) became the flagship of Chinese investment in the manufacturing sector in Zambia. The company was initially established in 1983 under the country’s socialist one-party state as one of the pillars of the country’s import substitution policy with an interest-free Chinese government loan of £11.17 million (Koyi, 2006:268). In 1995, the Zambian and Chinese governments agreed to turn it into a joint venture between the two countries. This followed Chinese Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit to Zambia during which he floated the request to transform the firm into a joint venture and resuscitate it. To form the joint venture, China’s initial $14.8 million loan and the $1.5 million earmarked to be spent on its overhaul were converted into 66 per cent equity with the Zambian government retaining 34 per cent shareholding in the firm. Despite spending about $20 million on technological improvements at the plant between 2000 and 2006, the firm was shut down again in June 2007. Official reasons given for its closure included, among other things, poor product quality, low efficiency, insufficient varieties of products, long delivery periods, and financial challenges. The Non-Ferrous Company-Africa (NFCA) proposed to the Zambian government to establish an industrial park for processing copper in Chambishi (Alves, 2011). The resultant Chambishi

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Multi-Facility Economic Zone (MFEZ) is located within the mining concession of the NFCA where it occupies more than 11.58 square kilometres of land. Other than providing support to its mining of copper and cobalt, the MFEZ was engaged in value addition processes. As part of Zambia’s desire for diversification of the economy from copper and China’s interest in the commodity, the Zambia–China Cooperation Zone (ZCCZ) was launched in 2007 following the formulation of new regulations to guide the operations of the MFEZs in 2006. This was meant to encourage investors to process Zambia’s natural resources locally. Due to the Chinese business strategy of investing in complementary businesses, Alves (2012) found that most of the 17 companies registered inside the Chambishi facility were subsidiaries of the developer [NFCA] or construction companies undertaking the outside infrastructure. Since 2006, other facilities were set up while the number of companies in each MFEZ had also grown. The Lusaka East ZCCZ was inaugurated by President Rupiah Banda and the Chinese minister of commerce in 2009. By 2015, the Chambishi and Lusaka East facilities had an investment value of $1.5 million with 50 companies operating there (Lusaka Times, 2015a). The Zambia Daily Mail (2017) reports that about 48 businesses had been set up at the two facilities with investment exceeding $1.5 million and job prospects of 8,000. Zeng (2016) puts the number of jobs created at 8,211. Of these jobs, over 207 were attributed to the ZCCZ.

Agricultural, land, and forestry sectors China’s investment in Zambia’s agriculture, land, and forestry, though highly diversified, is not anywhere near to their stakes in the mining or construction sectors. In fact, like their Zambian counterparts, Chinese investors in agriculture, land, and forestry are primarily on a medium scale. However, unlike other areas where Chinese investment data are relatively easier to obtain, the real size of Chinese investment in the Zambian agricultural sector is difficult to know. As Østvold (2013) correctly observes, different sources tend to provide different figures as to the number of Chinese farms in Zambia, for instance. However, based on piecemeal data from various sources, Østvold (2013) identifies nine prominent Chinese farms in the country cumulatively utilising over 8,500 hectares of land. Based on investment value, Østvold (2013) found that the four most prominent investors are the Zhongken Friendship Farm,

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Zhongken Estate Limited, Sunlight Limited Company, and China– Zambia Friendship Farm. Their products range from cereals to chicken and animal products with investment value ranging from $7,000 to slightly under $2 million.

Local responses to Chinese investment in Zambia China’s relations with Zambia have been under the spotlight since the dawn of the new millennium. Although the significant challenge facing Chinese investment in Zambia revolves around labour, trade, and consumer and community-related issues, it also faces questions about its apparent lack of transparency.

Transparency disputes Despite the positive figures representing Zambia’s exports of metals, recent reports challenge the official records regarding the leading destination for the country’s copper. Some analysts suggest that Switzerland, which the official government records show as the primary destination, was merely used as a transit point for Zambia’s copper destined for China. In a rare attack on official government data, the state-owned daily broadsheet, the Zambia Daily Mail (2015a) questioned the ‘discrepancies in our copper trade records … resulting from product misclassification, misallocation of trade partner country, and smuggling’. The newspaper appeared to blame the alleged irregularity on mistreatment of re-exports and goods in transit, between the country of origin and the country of destination. Challenging the government’s official export data, which put Switzerland as the main destination accounting for close to 60 per cent of Zambia’s copper exports in 2014, a Zambian think tank affiliated to the ruling party, Zipar (Zambia Institute for Policy Analysis and Research, 2018), expressed surprise at the large trade volume between Zambia and Switzerland. The think tank wondered how Switzerland, whose economy was driven by micro-technology, pharmaceuticals, banking, insurance, brokerage services, and tourism, could be the leading importer of copper from Zambia. While applauded by Zambian government officials, Chinese investment is a target of daily protests by local workers, traders, consumers, and community members. To this effect, Chinese investments in the country were increasingly dominating the thrust of African and foreign scholarship. The embroilment of Chinese

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investment in labour, trade, consumer, environmental, and other conflicts gives credence to a narrative of Chinese neo-colonialism. However, the embracing of Chinese investment by Zambia’s ruling elite against the feelings of the ordinary people is a dilemma well explained in Alden’s (2007) question as to whether China was Africa’s competitor, coloniser, or development partner. Whichever one of these best describes China, its methodology is also characteristic of a patron. This is partly explained by the fact that China’s investment agreements in Zambia, like elsewhere in Africa, are cast in secrecy and only known to a clique from the ruling elite that exhibits a clientelist attitude towards the Chinese. Rightly, some scholars have asserted that ‘Chinese investors often enter Zambia through “closed-shop” negotiations between the presidency and Chinese officials’ (Lusaka Times, 2010, cited in Haglund, 2010:3). Further, the Chinese firms appear more interested in establishing robust relations with senior government officials than developing community relations and engaging in corporate social responsibility (Haglund, 2009, cited in Haglund, 2010). The anti-Chinese perception and sentiments rose sharply in the lead up to Zambia’s general election in 2006 when opposition leader, Michael Sata, exploited it in mobilising disenchanted workers, traders, consumers, and other community members. He utilised it again to win the Zambian presidency in 2011. For instance, he once accused the Chinese of having used corruption to buy the Chambishi Copper Mine and the Sinazeze Coal Mine from the Zambian government. He further claimed that the Zambian government had dubiously given Chinese investors in the mining sector a 15-year tax holiday while excusing them from undertaking corporate social responsibility when no similar incentives had been extended to local and other foreign investors (Sata, 2007). Similar incentives had been extended to other investors across the sectors. There has also been a reluctance by the Zambian authorities to collect adequate revenue from mineral taxation. The Africa Progress Report (2013) indicates that in 2011, Zambia collected a paltry $240 million in taxes out of the $10 billion the country earned from mineral exports. This was despite the United Nations (2011) reporting that Zambian Human Development, as measured by the human development index (HDI), stood at 0.395 and was below the 0.42 recorded in 1990 before the mining sector was resuscitated. While there was consistent growth in Zambia’s HDI throughout the period 1995–2010, it was at a slow pace and failed to improve the quality of life of ordinary citizens significantly.

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One of the main arguments advanced by the Zambian government for its refusal to reintroduce the windfall tax in 2010 was that the sector employed many Zambians who would be out of work if the investors pulled out as a result. However, the efficacy of Chinese investment in creating quality jobs and other opportunities for Zambians remained a controversial topic. Chinese investment faces increased scrutiny and local protests because of substandard labour, trade, consumer, and community safety practices. In more specific terms, these are discussed below.

Employee remuneration, health and safety disputes Although one could argue that Chinese investment in Zambia has brought about positive economic benefits, this may not be the case for labour. There is overwhelming documentary evidence in support of the sentiments that the working conditions for the Zambians working in Chinese-owned companies were rather poor. However, this is not to say that companies owned by other nationals are better off. This calls for another study, although according to Li (2010) and Ndulo (n.d.), Chinese investors are just targets for criticism, especially from the Western media, as there is no significant difference with companies owned by other nationals regarding salaries given to workers. Indeed, the question of the developmental impact of Asian, especially Chinese investment in Zambia, has been a contested one. Those who support this position argue that thousands of jobs have been created as a result of these investments (ZDA, 2008; Nkolomba and Chaambwa, 2009; Carmody, 2011). The opposite argument regarding the developmental impact of Chinese investment hinges on the quality of jobs which have been created as well as the working conditions of the local people in these firms (Winter, 2015). This contradiction is qualified by the distinction between economic growth and development. Although economic growth can bring about improvements in the living conditions of the people through the ‘trickle-down’ effects, there is no guarantee that the poor will benefit (Fik, 1997). The genesis of the resentment of Chinese investments dates back to the mid-2000s, especially towards the presidential and general elections in 2006 (Beyongo, n.d.; Hess and Aidoo, 2013). As mentioned earlier, the anti-Chinese rhetoric formed the political backbone of Michael Sata’s campaign (Hampwaye and Kragelund, 2013). Many workers in Zambia, particularly those in urban areas, readily bought into Sata’s rhetoric, which he crafted to resonate with workers’ disenchantment with the poor working conditions in

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Chinese firms. Sata’s support base was predominantly the urban poor who attributed their socio-economic woes to the Chinese, accusing them of taking away their jobs and business opportunities. As expected, Sata and the PF performed better than the MMD in urban constituencies in all elections held from 2006 to 2011. In the 2008 presidential by-election that arose from the death of the incumbent, President Levy Mwanawasa, Sata bolstered his political support and that of his party by re-employing antiChinese populism. These messages resonated well with the workers and poor people’s feelings and perceptions about Chinese investors (Palitza, 2011). Although Chinese investment is spread across many sectors of the Zambian economy, the mining sector, as noted earlier, has been the epicentre of the most frequent and violent protests by Zambian workers (Pulitzer Center, 2013). This is not surprising as the mining sector has attracted the most substantial amount of Chinese investment to the country. Following the general election of 2011, Sata and his party, the PF, won and formed government. He received 43 per cent of the votes in comparison with his closest rival, the incumbent president of Zambia and MMD candidate, Rupiah Banda, who gained only 36 per cent (Asia News, 2011). At this point, the anti-Chinese campaigns had paid dividends as the people rallied behind the PF and its leader. However, to the surprise of many observers, upon assuming the office of president, Sata U-turned on his earlier criticisms of the Chinese as he embraced the same Chinese investors whom he had consistently criticised for a decade (Global Post, 2011). According to Asia News (2011): The new President last week said he would maintain strong diplomatic and trade relations with China and promised not to introduce new taxes on mines, but has repeatedly warned that foreign firms must ‘respect the law’ and criticized the ‘illegal’ work methods in Chinese mines. There is great uncertainty about his policy, especially towards China and the other big mining companies.

As Bello et al. (2014) put it, tensions between Zambian workers and Chinese managers have at times erupted into open conflict. As a result, the anti-Chinese protests had become a prominent peace and security issue in Zambia. Therefore, Winter (2015:15) affirms this narrative in asserting that:

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China’s growing influence in Zambia over the past decade has spurred labour-related protests, political instability, at times violence. Chinese companies are not only in charge of many of the copper mines that are central to the Zambian economy; they are also running restaurants, shops, and farms which many Zambians argue displace them and their right to work.

In April 2005, Zambia recorded the worst ever workplace disaster when a blast at the munitions plant, the Beijing General Institute for Research and Metallurgy (BGRIMM), a subsidiary of the NFCA in Chambishi, killed 50 Zambian workers due to alleged poor safety standards in Chinese-owned mines (Asia News, 2007; IRIN, 2007; Carmody, 2009; Human Rights Watch, 2011; Hampwaye and Kragelund, 2013; Hess and Aidoo, 2013; Leslie, 2016; Beyongo, n.d.). According to Carmody (2011), the bereaved families were paid a meagre $10,000 per worker killed in the accident. Alden (2007) reveals that the problem had started in 2004 when the local workers at the plant began to complain about the low pay of $65 per month and the subpar safety standards at the Chambishi Mine. The industrial relations atmosphere at the firm had further been poisoned when the firm, with apparent support from the Zambian government, banned workers from joining labour unions. The accident was followed by intensified workers’ strikes and protests, forcing the firm to allow unionisation in July 2005 (Alden, 2007). The following year, five workers were shot and injured by their Chinese supervisor during a protest for better conditions of service (Negi, 2008; Beyongo, n.d.). At a Chambishi smelter owned by the Chinese in the Copperbelt Province, hundreds of workers clashed with the police as workers were protesting over the delayed salary negotiations. The tension between the Chinese investors and the workers was so high that the planned visit to the mine of the President of China Hu Jintao in 2007 was cancelled for fear of more demonstrations (IRIN; 2007; Asia News, 2007; 2008; Hampwaye and Kragelund, 2013: Leslie, 2016). In October 2011, the NFCA summarily fired at least 2,000 striking workers at Chambishi Mine and JCHX Mining Construction Limited. The NFCA head of corporate communication, Nelson Jilowa, confirmed the dismissal of 1,000 workers from each of the two firms. They had been protesting for a fortnight demanding an increase of about K2,000 (about $200). However, they received only one-tenth of that (Times of Zambia, 2011).

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In October 2010 at Collum Coal Mine, located in the Sinazongwe District of Southern Zambia, perhaps the worst protests by miners were witnessed. About 11 miners were shot and wounded by their Chinese supervisors (BBC News, 2010; The Telegraph, 2010; Hampwaye and Kragelund, 2013; Leslie, 2016). The miners were once again protesting against poor pay ($100/month) and poor working conditions, including a lack of safety clothing (BBC News, 2010; Beyongo, n.d.; Okeowo, 2013). Regarding the working conditions, the Human Rights Watch Report of 2011 revealed shocking results regarding working conditions for miners in Chinese-owned mines. According to the report: Zambian workers recounted working 12 and even 18-hour shifts at Chinese mines, sometimes in extreme heat and contact with noxious chemicals. If workers refused to work in unsafe conditions, or tried to organize into unions, they faced being fired. (Global Post, 2011)

The 2010 workers’ protests at Collum Coal Mine were followed by other protests in 2012 which led to the death of one Chinese manager, and two other Chinese managers were critically injured (Okeowo, 2013; Pulitzer Center, 2013; Leslie, 2015). Following the protests in 2012, the Michael Sata-led Zambian government suspended the operations of the mine citing labour and safety violations and non-payment of taxes and royalties by the firm. A study conducted by Leslie (2015) revealed that the working environment created by the Chinese-managed companies left much to be desired. For example: The workers had few or no benefits and no sick leave or housing allowance. Two of the companies offered their employees transport allowance if they left work after six in the evening, but their employers avoided paying that by keeping the workers locked up in the factory and working until six the next morning. (Leslie, 2015: 11)

Such a working environment is not uncommon across the majority of Chinese-managed companies in Zambia. Apart from the protests of those working in the Chinese-owned mines, the dissatisfaction of workers in construction companies were been reported.

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Socio-economic displacement disputes Complaints have not only been limited to workers but to Zambian contractors as well, who have perceived Chinese construction firms as unfair competitors, taking away most of the business opportunities in the country. It is alleged that about 80 per cent of Zambia’s construction projects are given to Chinese contractors (Zambian Reports, 2017). According to the Zambian Reports (2017), the government of Zambia came up with an initiative for 20 per cent of the projects to be subcontracted to local contractors. Sadly, this initiative has not worked, with Zambian firms only receiving the opportunity to engage in low-level project activities which involve bush clearing, drainage, and providing and installing road signs (Zambian Reports, 2017). Local producers of basic goods such as handicrafts, fruits, and vegetables in Zambia were also facing stiff competition from low-quality, low-price goods produced by the Chinese (Alden, 2007; Bbaala, 2015). Chinese investments in Zambia have also been embroiled in the issue of land grabs. In 2015, thousands of residents of a farming area in Kalulushi in the Copperbelt Province protested over the allocation of some farmland to a Chinese company (Lusaka Times, 2015b). The residents had used the land in question for farming for a long time. In the same Kalulushi District, another scam emerged in 2016 where the Chinese were accused of grabbing land from the people, and it took the intervention of the Kalulushi District commissioner to stop the construction which the Chinese companies had started (Lusaka Times, 2016). Only recently, an economist cautioned against the continued appropriation of land by the Chinese (Lusaka Times, 2017a). He emphasised that shortly the issue of land in Zambia will become relevant as is the case in South Africa and Zimbabwe (Lusaka Times, 2017a). A significant proportion of prime land in and around Lusaka is owned by Chinese nationals (Lusaka Times, 2017a). Currently, a debate is raging over the alleged sale of the Natural Resources Development College (NRDC), located in the city of Lusaka, to AVIC International (Lusaka Times, 2017b). This disclosure has brought about some discomfort among certain sections of society as there are fears that the students’ academic programmes may be disrupted. It has been reported that the college will be relocated to another (Mumbwa) district to the west of Lusaka (Lusaka Times, 2017b) Connected to land grabs is the question of Chinese investments in the agricultural sector in Zambia. Indeed, China has long been

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involved in investing in agriculture in Africa as well as in Zambia (Brautigam and Zhang, 2013). It is argued that this was part of China’s emphasis on outward investment (Brautigam and Zhang, 2013). In the case of Zambia, it has been reported that by 2008, ‘a total of 23 Chinese farming investment proposals had been approved by the Zambian authorities, many from state-owned enterprises. The total projected value was $10 million (or $435,000 per farm on average)’ (Brautigam and Zhang, 2013:1684). Another complaint about Chinese investment in Zambia relates to the employment of Chinese nationals to work in Zambia in the Chinese-owned companies. This has become critical as even simple jobs such as bricklaying are being given to Chinese citizens when they can be done by Zambians (McGreal, 2007; Carmody, 2011). Other than the recruitment of Chinese citizens to work in Zambia, Zambians complained about the perception that Chinese goods were of poor quality and that they were killing local industries as these goods were also relatively cheap (Negi, 2008; Kragelund, 2012).

Conclusion Local communities have stood up against Chinese investment in Zambia. As already explained, the late President Sata mobilised the local people in his bid to woo voters to his side. After that, the people were indoctrinated in the way they viewed China and Chinese investments in Zambia. Practically anything Chinese was perceived negatively. Of all the economic sectors which were affected by this negativity, the mining sector seems to be the worst affected by the local people’s resistance to the so-called ‘slave’ conditions to which the workers have been subjected. Even when one considers the scale of these protests, the mining sector is leading. The justification is because the mining sector is the largest recipient of Chinese investment. Some flashes of demonstrations or protests have also been recorded in the construction sector. The resentment towards Chinese investment in this sector has not only been expressed by workers, but by the local contractors who feel unfairly treated in the way that contracts are being awarded. In the other sectors, protests have also been witnessed but on a more limited scale. While acknowledging the jobs that the Chinese investment in Zambia has created, the quality, remuneration, and other conditions of these jobs remain a matter of public debate and a source of industrial conflict. The situation is worsened by the fact that most

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Chinese firms employed locals on a casual or temporary basis, that they prohibited unionisation, and that workers had no real voice to speak on their behalf concerning their workplace predicaments. Although the Zambian government continued to cite legislation that is supposed to protect the interests of the Zambian workers, the Ministry of Labour and Social Services seemed either incapable or unwilling to monitor workers’ conditions in these companies. In the absence of a clear framework for mediated engagement, workers took it upon themselves to speak against the injustices through protests, strikes, and at times violence as witnessed at the Collum Coal Mine. Consequently, the workers’ actions could be justified as there were no other mechanisms at their disposal for channelling grievances. These expressions of their grievances by the Zambian workers (or the ‘responses from below’) were not without undesirable consequences as both lives and jobs have been lost. As long as the marginalisation of workers and lack of adequate government support continue, the same ugly scenes of protests will most likely persist.

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8 The Gupta leaks and intra-BRICS collusion Nicole Dodd and Justin van der Merwe

An elaborate corruption network spanning South Africa (SA), China, and India, with the United Arab Emirates (UAE) acting as a distribution point for proceeds, illicitly syphoned money and gold from South Africa. Evidence of this network was laid bare in what is perhaps the most prominent instance of whistle-blowing in South Africa’s history. The Gupta leaks comprise over 100,000 emails released to amaBhungane and Scorpio/The Daily Maverick (two investigative news organisations). The emails provided evidence of what had long been suspected – that the Guptas (an Indian expatriate family with continued ties to Indian business) were instrumental in large-scale ‘state capture’ in South Africa (Davis, 2018). The two whistle-blowers behind the Gupta leaks, who claim to be apolitical and only to be acting in the best interests of the public, had to flee the country following publication of the leaks. South African civil society, politicians, and the media took up the cause and prosecutions, resignations, and commissions of inquiry followed. The Gupta leaks have shown how resistance can challenge and overcome predatory BRICS elites and expose intra-BRICS collusion. The government– business–media (GBM) complex provides an analytical framework for understanding what transpired and the resistance that followed. The case reveals the modus operandi of predatory elites, and how they are ‘disciplined’, within systems of accumulation. The GBM provides an embodiment of the global system of accumulation by synthesising Harvey’s (1982) reworking of primitive accumulation and Gramsci’s (1971) conceptualisation of hegemony. The GBM can be considered a network of state, business, and media elites who cooperate, collude, or support each other for purposes of capital accumulation within a fixed space (Van der Merwe, 2016a; Van der Merwe and Dodd, 2019). The framework offers two heuristic applications: in descriptive and structural analysis. Descriptive analysis addresses the internal dynamics of the state but need not be directly linked to the borders of a specific state, whereas structural

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analysis is more suited to regional- or global-level inquiries into how wealth accumulation and power operates across space (Van der Merwe, 2016a; Van der Merwe and Dodd, 2019). In this chapter, we use the China South Railways (CSR) deal with Transnet, SA’s state-owned transport and logistics entity, to present a complete description of how the descriptive and structural levels of the GBM complex tessellate to enable corrupt practices and dispossession. At the descriptive level, Gupta-linked elites embedded within the state, media, and parastatals colluded with elites in China to defraud Transnet by inflating the cost of railway locomotives. At the structural level, they transferred funds in and out of South Africa, China, and India via the UAE using shell companies and illicit trade. South Africa lost hundreds of billions of rands because of these activities, money it is now trying to recoup. Followers of the ‘state capture’ debate in SA (a term used at a popular level to denote the influence held by private actors over state officials and resources), would recognise the usefulness of the government– business–media complex, adding further depth to analyses which are often overly inward-looking and too state-focused (Public Affairs Research Institute, 2017). Instead, what is normally called state capture, is simply an aspect of how the bigger system operates.

What is the GBM complex? The government–business–media complex synthesises the principles of accumulation and hegemony to capture the complementary relationship between discourse and capital accumulation in a single analytical framework. In the GBM, the state is understood to work in tandem with the private sector in efforts to expand accumulation over space. Class formations further reinforce these patterns of accumulation driving the interests of the elite. State elites play a role in how business configures itself across space, thereby enabling, facilitating, and guiding expansion. Business benefits, at least tacitly from state discourse, if not directly through infrastructure creation or public–private partnerships. Information and knowledge transfer further supports the expansion over space. Occasionally a disjuncture (at least on the surface) emerges between business and state discourses, such as when business is accused of improper behaviour which runs contrary to the state’s otherwise developmental rhetoric. In such a case, the subtly concealed business motives of the state are laid bare. The media, referring more broadly to information and

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knowledge exchanges over space, would then, in turn, play a role in buttressing accumulation through a type of cultural imperialism and hegemonic practice. The mainstream media can be said to have a freer or more privileged role as it can be critical of either sector or side with one sector against the other, mainly stemming from allegiances related to ownership. News networks might criticise government policies directly, or be seen to be cooperating with business, mainly when capitalist interests are under threat. The GBM uses a dichotomous classification of the ‘labour’ of elites and ‘workers’ within the state, capital, and, broad knowledge and information systems to describe processes of uneven development. The labour dichotomy comprises ‘affective’ and ‘infrastructural’ components, where the affective component describes discourse and consent-forming processes and the infrastructural component describes transactional processes which facilitate asymmetrical accumulation. In the GBM complex, affective labour is manifested in policy documents, speeches, summits, corporate social responsibility initiatives, aid, and publications across commercial research, academia, and the mainstream media. These channels are used to project a benign, if not overwhelmingly positive image of the state and its involvement in new spaces. On the other hand, the infrastructural component of the complex goes about facilitating capital accumulation, embedding means of extraction within targeted spaces. Infrastructural labour could take physical form through large-scale infrastructure development within these spaces but could also be effected through the signing of contracts, securing of intellectual property, trade agreements, or other binding transactional arrangements. Increasingly these are financial in nature. The relationship between the state, business, and civil society is a complex and dynamic one. Civil society unpacks and unravels much of the collusion between government and business and is therefore not always welcomed or appreciated. The same applies to labour organisations and trade unions. However, partnerships between the state and these organisations create the illusion of legitimate political contestation and a possible co-opting of the left wing, if they are not so powerful as to threaten investment or control by the elite. These organisations often need support from the state to survive. They can, however, offer resistance as they typically reside outside the material production of the state and may have the freedom to construct counter-narratives and assertions. As mentioned, there are two heuristic applications of the GBM concept. The first is in structural analysis (presenting a broader,

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more macro-level picture of how power works, and how wealth accumulation occurs across space), and the other is in descriptive analysis (within blocs and between blocs within a state but not necessarily fixed to the state boundaries). Structural analysis transcends countries and could be more appropriate for global and regional level inquiries, with a preference for sectoral systems approaches instead of country analysis. However, one could also say that countries have dominant GBM complexes with their own ‘modus operandi’ and variations of capitalist development. Therefore, it can be said that exchanges (valorisation and devalorisation) between sectors and elites happen between and within blocs. The reason the GBM is useful is that it helps to explain the geopolitics of capital accumulation. When there is a crisis of overaccumulation, capital can be moved across time, space, or through trickery such as accumulation by dispossession (Harvey, 1982). When a country is underdeveloped, other blocs and established powers will take advantage of spatial asymmetries, employing exploitative practices and building alliances with elites within the country. However, under such circumstances, revenue is unlikely to ‘stick’ within the territory, flowing out instead. Usually, accumulation by dispossession or complicity within the capitalist system is almost imperceptible because the system itself is robust enough to withstand a certain amount of unobtrusive rent-seeking behaviour by the elite. However, in underdeveloped environments, these behaviours are more evident. To sum up, the GBM can operate between blocs – where a bloc of elites will move into space, using it for exploitative purposes – or it can operate within a single bloc or space. When income enters a state or region, it may be inefficiently translated into development because of the dynamic of the GBM within that space. It is easier to think of a network of actors instead of thinking of it purely as a siloed and isolated phenomenon linked to physical territory (i.e. the nation-state). The BRICS entered the African market to move surpluses across space. Their encroachment into Africa, therefore, is a sign of growing surpluses and diversification built on the back of their economic growth and development.

A robber’s den: the UAE node as safe haven for BRICS’ collusion While this volume focuses on BRICS’ activities in Africa, it is also important to remember that these countries do not exist or operate in isolation.

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They function within the broader global capitalist system and are connected to other economies, many of whom are courting their business. The UAE is one such economy and is becoming increasingly important as a global trade and investment hub. The UAE diversified into financial and services sectors in anticipation of the downturn in the global demand for oil and had also aimed to draw trade in gold and diamonds away from Europe and establish itself as an alternative to more traditional centres such as Switzerland (Partnership Africa Canada, 2014). Its minerals trade makes the UAE an attractive economic hub between South Africa, India, and other countries. ‘Deviant globalisation’ includes the illicit trade in minerals and risks associated with money laundering (Gilman, Goldhammer, and Weber, 2011). The UAE is at risk of becoming complicit in the trade in conflict minerals and is particularly vulnerable to deviant globalisation for several reasons. First, they do not require much documentation, or verification of identity, to support hand-carried gold imports. Second, mineral and mineral-related deals can be transacted in cash. Finally, there is little oversight of gold transactions in the UAE. About half of the gold imported to the UAE is sold on to India as India is a major global centre for jewellery manufacturing. Countries such as the UAE integrate into existing trade flows and relationships, and any weaknesses in governance are vulnerable to exploitation during this process of incorporation. As will be discussed, these weaknesses can be exploited by emerging powers such as the BRICS. Most of the UAE’s imports from Africa comprise unclassified commodities and transactions (53.60 per cent), mainly comprising unwrought gold (World Bank, 2017). Even though this is explained partially by the fact that the UAE is a jewellery manufacturing and minerals trading hub, this activity still merits further investigation because the gold trade is often used as a vehicle for money laundering (Partnership Africa Canada, 2014). Money launderers avoid detection by breaking the trail of evidence. To do this, they make use of multiple organisations and representatives. Detection is also avoided by breaking the money into smaller amounts (usually below regulatory thresholds), changing its form (e.g. into gold or stock), and by using seemingly legitimate transactions. Through this process, illicitly obtained money is moved to where it can be safely and secretly stored. When such transactions are transnational in scope, the destination country also usually lacks stringent financial regulations. Gold is useful for money launderers because it suits this modus operandi.

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Gold is also favoured by money launderers because the transactions are frequently in cash and because gold is an ‘anonymous’ commodity (Financial Action Task Force, 2015). Cash for gold activities do not involve much start-up capital and can be set up and dissolved quickly, particularly in Free Trade Zones such as in the UAE. Gold proves to be exceedingly useful to money laundering operations (Financial Action Task Force, 2015) because it can be used for trade-based money laundering. Around 2015 the most significant percentage of SA’s revenue from exports to the UAE came from unclassified commodities and transactions (29.41 per cent), the bulk being from trade in unwrought gold (World Bank, 2017). This follows the general trend in the UAE’s trade with Africa, however, in 2015 there was a noteworthy discrepancy between the amounts reported as imported by the UAE ($468,664,912.00) and what SA reported exporting to the UAE ($10,339,249.00) (World Bank, 2017). The discrepancy adds to speculation about the nature of these transactions and points to smuggling and money laundering. These suspicions are supported by the evidence that there are illicit flows of minerals from other African countries to the UAE (Partnership Africa Canada, 2014; Pieth, 2002). This anomaly is particularly important when considered in conjunction with media and legal revelations that elites linked to South African SOEs and the now-infamous Gupta family have been using the UAE for money laundering. Before describing the Guptas and their role in facilitating illicit financial flows from SA, we will briefly discuss how the vulnerabilities in SA’s GBM created the conditions which were ripe for structural exploitation.

SA’s GBM complex Although there is a more extensive historical argument concerning the symbiotic nature of the relationship between government and business in SA (Van der Merwe, 2016b), a recent iteration of this relationship was particularly predatory. SA’s GBM was dominated by the Gupta family until recently. The Gupta family were ‘textbook’ GBM as their commercial gains were closely linked to their influence over government, while they simultaneously deployed counter-information through their now-defunct media outlets ANN7 and The New Age (for example, their campaign against ABSA bank and their damaging insertion into race relations in SA via Bell Pottinger) (Hunter and Saba, 2017). To ‘capture’ the state,

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the Gupta network relied on connections to various companies and collaboration with directors, ministers, and board members spread across key ministries and state-owned companies. However, the most worrying relationship was that of the Guptas with SA’s former president, Jacob Zuma. The relationship between the Guptas and the Zumas was lucrative for the Zuma family, and for other elites across the BRICS. The network between the Zumas and the Guptas formed the nerve centre of SA’s GBM and was enabled by President Zuma’s executive powers. For example, Zuma’s role in the Transnet deal might have been small, but it was crucial, as it was Zuma who appointed Malusi Gigaba, the catalyst for the Transnet locomotives deal (see below). In 2012 Malusi Gigaba was signalled as being a key player in the Gupta network when, as public enterprises minister he was tasked with overseeing a restructuring of state enterprise directorships as well as a major public infrastructure spending initiative (Van der Merwe, 2014). His involvement afforded him the opportunity to appoint Gupta-aligned partners as gatekeepers for lucrative state contracts (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017a). He went on to become the minister of home affairs in 2014, where he continued to favour the Guptas and their employees (Mathope, 2017). Gigaba then went on to head the finance ministry before returning to home affairs in 2018, and subsequently resigning from parliament.

BRICS’ Dubai pipeline: the Transnet–CSR deal Consistent with our use of the GBM concept, this section explores how predatory behaviour at the global level can exploit vulnerabilities at the local level. What follows is a detailed example of how capital is syphoned from Africa, in this case, to financial secrecy jurisdictions in the UAE and beyond to BRICS countries. This case involves Transnet and China South Railway Locomotives and Rolling Stock Corporation (CSR), a Chinese state-owned rolling stock producer (Adachi, 2013). As highlighted, the Gupta family deliberately positioned their associates at Transnet to gain influence over its procurement processes. Then, they engineered kickbacks from CSR in return for influencing Transnet’s locomotives acquisitions in CSR’s favour. The revenue from these kickbacks totalled 21 per cent or R5.3 billion and was channelled offshore via the UAE. The deals comprised three Transnet contracts for 95, 100, and 359 locomotives (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017a). These

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three Transnet contracts amounted to R2.7 billion, R4.4 billion and R18.1 billion respectively. The first and second were awarded via expedited processes and the third via a full tender (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017a). In 2013, Transnet gained access to a $5 billion China Development Bank loan arranged by Brian Molefe, and so access to large amounts of foreign exchange to pay for the locomotives was never in doubt (D’Sa and Bond, 2018). However, before we begin to describe what transpired, there is one event that must be described as it ‘closes’ the circle between Transnet (South Africa), CSR (China), and the Gupta family’s use of the UAE as a financial staging post. In May 2015 in Shenzhen, China, Salim Essa, a Gupta business partner, concluded a business development services agreement with a firm named CSR (Hong Kong) Co Ltd. This subsidiary of CSR hired Essa’s company Tequesta Group Ltd (solely owned by him and formed in Hong Kong in 2014) to ‘provide advisory services’ for ‘Project 359’ in SA. Essa claimed in this contract that he had ‘a familiarity with [the] regulatory, social, cultural and political framework’ in SA needed to win locomotives contracts with Transnet. The contract did not require evidence of Tequesta’s assistance in securing contracts with Transnet, noting instead that ‘it is understood that the project would not have materialised without the active efforts of Tequesta to provide the services listed above’ (Mail and Guardian, 2017). The contract specified that Tequesta would be paid an advisory fee of 21 per cent of the contract value. The fee amounted to approximately R3.8 billion. The same type of agreement was set in place for two further Transnet orders from CSR and Tequesta made approximately R1.5 billion from these deals (Mail and Guardian, 2017). Tequesta was not the first company to offer this service as the contract mentions that the agreement replaces a similar arrangement with JJ Trading FZE also known as JJT. The contract mentioned that 3.9 per cent of the locomotives’ contract value had already been paid to JJT (Mail and Guardian, 2017). JJT is JJ Trading FZE, an Emirati company trading in jewellery, precious stones and metals and is associated with Piyoosh Goyal who was another Gupta partner (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017a). Goyal was implicated in money laundering and graft cases in India (Goyal, 2017). We have already indicated the key gatekeeping role played by Malusi Gigaba within Zuma’s presidency and the Gupta network. Gigaba’s appointment as minister of public enterprises made him responsible for SA’s state-owned companies (Eskom, Alexkor,

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Denel, Safcol, South African Airways, and Transnet). Gigaba appointed three Gupta associates at Transnet: Iqbal Sharma, Brian Molefe, and Anoj Singh. Each man played a role in Transnet’s awarding of contracts to CSR (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017a). Gigaba appointed Iqbal Sharma to the board of Transnet as a nonexecutive director in December 2010. After unsuccessfully trying to appoint him as board chair, Sharma was made the head of the newly formed Board Acquisitions and Disposals Committee (Public Affairs Research Institute, 2017; Transnet, 2014). Sharma was a business associate of Salim Essa, is a close friend and business partner of the Guptas, and Duduzane Zuma, Jacob Zuma’s son’s business partner (Office of the Public Protector, 2016). Gigaba also appointed Molefe as Transnet’s CEO in February 2011. Molefe is a close associate of the Guptas, who are said to have had a hand in his appointment (Public Affairs Research Institute, 2017). Gupta-owned media outlets even announced that Molefe would be appointed before Transnet made any public statements to that effect. Anoj Singh’s placement as chief financial officer (CFO) followed in July 2012 (Molefe, 2012). These three appointments meant that key decision makers within the procurement process were linked to the Guptas just before Transnet issued their largest locomotives tender to date in July 2012 (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017a). Sharma presided over the tender process as head of the Board Acquisitions and Disposal Committee. The Gupta network was already influencing procurement in October 2012, when Transnet announced that (Gupta-favoured) CSR had won an ‘accelerated’ tender to supply 95 electric locomotives (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017a). A national treasury report found that ‘Transnet officials went out of their way to assist China South Rail (CSR) in their bid to be appointed for the supply of 95 locomotives’ (Fundudzi, 2018:2). Officials emailed CSR documents before CSR had started the tender process. The forensic report also revealed that a CSR official, Pan ‘Alton’ Wang, communicated with Brian Molefe during the tender process, and that this information was shared with the Gupta network. Transnet officials including Molefe and his successor as CEO, Siyabonga Gama, changed the prescribed conditions of the bid after it had closed, breaking several laws in the process. CSR should have been disqualified for several reasons: they received bid documents without following the correct process; they contacted Molefe; they did not comply with South Africa’s Black Economic Empowerment criteria; and they did

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not submit all required documents. Minister Gigaba also compromised the procurement process by signing the Transnet–CSR deal as a witness (Fundudzi, 2018). CSR failed to deliver the 95 locomotives within the agreed-upon timeframe. The second expedited order for 100 locomotives highlights the Gupta network’s intervention on behalf of CSR. In October 2013 Iqbal Sharma emailed Rajesh Gupta, leaking a Transnet memo which encouraged Transnet to purchase 100 electric locomotives from a Japanese company (Mitsui) without tender, ostensibly as a stopgap until the full tender for 359 locomotives was awarded. Sharma drafted a letter on behalf of the director-general of the department of public enterprises which rejected the expedited procurement process, and CSR received the contract (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017a) without submitting a proposal. Molefe and Singh did not exercise due diligence when deciding to change from the Mitsui locomotives to the CSR locomotives. As a result, Transnet overspent by R1.2 billion. They did not alert government about the transaction, even though they should have, because the transaction exceeded R2 billion, which is the threshold for notification (Fundudzi, 2018). Molefe did not obtain government approval before releasing a request for proposals (RFP) for the provision of 1,064 locomotives to Transnet (Fundudzi, 2018). The minister only granted approval after the RFP had been advertised. In March 2014 Molefe announced a split tender award for Transnet’s largest locomotives contract. A forensic report commissioned by treasury later found that ‘Molefe and other Transnet officials contravened section 57 of the PFMA in that they failed to take effective and appropriate steps to prevent irregular expenditure and fruitless and wasteful expenditure’ (Fundudzi, 2018:4). The R50 billion contract for 1,064 locomotives was split between CSR, Bombardier, General Electric, and China North Rail (Public Affairs Research Institute, 2017). CSR won the contract for 359, or 60 per cent, of the 599 electric locomotives which Transnet sought (Creamer, 2017). The forensic report compiled by treasury notes that ‘(t)he evaluation team amended the evaluation scores which changed the ranking in favour of CSR’ (Fundudzi, 2018:4). We now shift our attention to where the proceeds were channelled. The descriptive and structural levels are particularly useful as they highlight how the malpractices at the local level can be exploited by financial regulatory loopholes at the global level.

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Enter the UAE The following section follows the trail of money from Transnet to CSR, on to JJT, then Accurate Investments in the UAE, and finally back to the Zuma family in SA. What emerges is that the Guptas are using the UAE as a financial space to process and disburse kickbacks; for money laundering; and as a space in which to secretly interact with and reward their affiliates in government. The UAE was used as a hub for activities involving South African, Chinese, and Indian resources and elites. In May 2014, just after the locomotives contracts were awarded, company documents submitted to the Ras al-Khaimah Investment Authority indicate that an Indian national, Vivek Sharma, transferred ownership in a company, Venus Ltd, to Anoj Singh, then CFO of Transnet. Vivek Sharma and his father are both Gupta associates (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017a). Ras al-Khaimah investment authority provides a highly secretive offshore company jurisdiction and is a zero per cent tax haven. It is also home to Gupta company Accurate Investments (Comrie, 2016). Transfer of share ownership in secretive tax havens is used to exchange funds without attracting suspicion in affected countries. This device could, therefore, have been an indirect route for the disbursement of a kickback to Singh for the Transnet deal. Money used to buy a mansion for President Zuma’s fourth wife was channelled via Accurate Investments in the UAE (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017b). Singh later stayed at the Oberoi Hotel, Dubai, at the Gupta’s expense in June 2014. Tony Gupta had a booking at the same hotel over the same period. South Africa’s state security agency also investigated an account opened in Dubai in Malusi Gigaba’s name. The account was opened when he was minister of public enterprises (Letsoalo and Pillay, 2014). To hide the Gupta’s involvement, kickbacks were not paid directly to Gupta companies. Instead, CSR paid the fee for the first 95 locomotives to a company initialled ‘CGT’. CSR made further payments to a company initialled ‘JJT’ after that. Later both companies were replaced by Tequesta, the company formed by Salim Essa in 2014 (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017b). JJT and CGT kept 15 per cent of the CSR payments for themselves and paid the rest onwards as ‘expenditures’ to Accurate Investments (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017b). CGT, JJT, and then Tequesta successively served as fronts for the Guptas. There is evidence that CSR paid money over to the Guptas via JJT and Accurate Investments in the UAE (amaBhungane and

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Scorpio, 2017b). This money would have needed to be laundered. Real estate is a typical way of storing and laundering large sums of money, as is trade in gold. Perhaps then it is no coincidence that in July 2015 the Guptas bought a ten-bedroom mansion in Dubai (amaBhungane and Scorpio, 2017c). The Guptas also sold R50 million in gold in December 2015 in Dubai’s tax-free zone (Jika, 2017) where they are involved in the management of two different gold bullion and jewellery companies namely Empresse Bullion LLC and Manish Jewellers. Events in SA also lend credence to suspicions that the Guptas were laundering money both domestically and in the UAE. ABSA, one of SA’s largest banks, closed the Gupta’s accounts in December 2015 claiming that it has a responsibility to implement controls which prevent the bank from being used for money laundering or other unlawful activities. They had been contemplating this closure since 2014 (Minister of Finance vs Gupta Companies, 2016). ABSA also closed Duduzane Zuma’s transactional accounts around the same time (Hunter and Saba, 2017). As already mentioned, the 2015 trade data suggest that there were some unclassified gold-related transactions between SA and the UAE. These could point to the Gupta’s first movement of capital from SA (Hogg, 2016). They had mining interests in SA, as well as jewellery and bullion interests in the UAE so presumably had the required licensure to trade in unwrought gold and, by extension, engage in trade-based money laundering. It is possible that the Guptas used their companies in SA and the UAE to trade fictional gold, using it as an opportunity to return currency to SA, and channel kickbacks from CSR to state officials within SA without attracting attention. Thus, capital could have been moved to the UAE with the transactions being classified as gold sales and masked as regular sales. A paper trail of fictional invoices and receipts may have been used to hide money being laundered. The United Nations has noted concern about SA’s exposure to invoice fraud in international gold trade (Peyper, 2016; UNCTAD, 2016). By April 2016, four South African banks had closed the Gupta’s company accounts. Their auditor and sponsor also cut ties with them because of suspicious and unusual transactions (Minister of Finance vs Gupta Companies, 2016). The family was rumoured to be moving its wealth from SA to the UAE and, in the same month, Gupta luggage bound for Dubai was scanned showing that the luggage contained what looked like stones. Gupta staff removed the box before it could be inspected, later claiming that the box contained

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nuts and wheat (Jika, 2017). Many Gupta family members left SA for Dubai three days later, providing another opportunity to move money and valuables to Dubai (Hogg, 2016). South African companies and individuals investing abroad must apply for tax clearance if the invested amount exceeds specified thresholds and the returns are not likely to be remitted to SA. This is potentially why so many intermediaries have been involved in the Gupta’s business transactions. In 2017 SA’s then minister of finance, Pravin Gordhan, applied to the courts to proscribe the power of the minister of finance to intervene in actions related to the closure of compromised bank accounts. He did this to block those pressurising him to re-open Gupta-linked accounts and to ensure his successors could not do so either (Minister of Finance vs Gupta Companies, 2016). In 2017 India’s Bank of Baroda announced that it too would be closing Gupta accounts after mounting pressure from their parent company in India (Marrian and Quintal, 2017). ABSA bank has also asked Tobeka Madiba-Zuma, one of former president Zuma’s wives, to explain millions of rands worth of bank transactions on her account (Hunter and Saba, 2017). In April 2017 and following considerable political pressure President Zuma finally signed the Financial Intelligence Centre Amendment Bill that would ensure national compliance with international anti-money laundering policies (Marrian and Quintal, 2017). The amendment encourages financial institutions to closely monitor the accounts of prominent politicians and politically exposed persons and take appropriate action. Gigaba, in his capacity as minister of finance, then stalled the implementation of the amendments until June 2017 (Steyn, 2017), allowing further time to move money out of SA. In June 2017 the Gupta’s remaining sponsor on the Johannesburg Stock Exchange ended their agreement (Laing, 2017) recording concern about the associated risk related to the company and its shareholders. Their decision was justified as the Gupta’s auditors highlighted reportable irregularities in their financial activities. The scope within which the Guptas and their flagship company could operate was finally constrained. In January 2018, in the wake of the Gupta leaks and the revelations of several politicians, President Zuma initiated a Commission of Inquiry into state capture (Department of Justice and Constitutional Development, 2018). Then, on 14 February 2018, President Jacob Zuma finally relented to pressure from his political party and society at large and resigned.

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The Guptas left the country following rumours that they would be arrested. They are believed to be residing either in India or in Dubai (Bateman, 2018). India has also begun to act against the Guptas. In March 2018, they raided at least six of their properties in India, also searching a temple they were building in their hometown. The raids were to do with tax irregularities and with allegations that they had smuggled the proceeds of crime and illicit funds into the country (Bateman, 2018). Following investigations into the CSR deal, a Transnet report tabled in 2018 suggested that the company should lay corruption charges against Molefe, Singh, Sharma, and Essa (Mashego, 2018). The report also recommended that the parastatal should recoup from Molefe the money lost because of the CSR deal and its over-inflated costs. The report pushed for disciplinary action against Gama and other executives. Gama resigned in disgrace in October 2018. The year 2018 saw SA and the UAE conclude an extradition treaty ensuring that SA can extradite the Guptas and Zumas (Evans, 2018). The countries also agreed to tighten up loopholes that have been exploited by money launderers and gold smugglers in the past. CSR seems to have escaped censure for its role in the matter.

Conclusion The modus operandi of the UAE appears to be to act in a manner which is overwhelmingly part of, or complementary to, the BRICS’ involvement in Africa. Countries such as the UAE become resting places for products and proceeds that are being sourced from or rerouted between Africa and the BRICS. For example, gold moves (sometimes illegally) between Mozambique, SA, and the UAE, with India being the ultimate destination and money is moved between China, India, and SA, via the UAE. Our application of the GBM concept at the descriptive level demonstrated how the two levels tessellate to exploit Africa’s weaknesses. In the Transnet case, SA’s malleable state elites and resource dependency created a lucrative opportunity for accumulation by dispossession at the structural level. Besides the contacts and exchanges described in this chapter there are fora which facilitate this intra-BRICS collusion. The same people operate within these channels affording them unprecedented access. Brian Molefe, for example, chaired the BRICS Business

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Council before resigning in 2016. Siyabonga Gama served on the same council and was fired in late 2018. Both Molefe and Gama secured loans for Transnet and Eskom from the New Development Bank. The demise of South African SOEs can, therefore, be plotted against the connections formed and cultivated by BRICS fora. The Gupta network inserted itself into BRICS activities, opening easy channels of finance and influence, and subverted these resources in service of a fortunate few. Resistance from whistle-blowers, journalists, civil society organisations, and academics, in this case, managed to exert pressure on the Guptas, effect change in political leadership, and may lead to prosecution. It is unlikely that this will be the last time that SA will face threats of state capture. But the country will certainly be better prepared to resist it in future.

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article/2017-06-01-guptaleaksthe-r331m-dubai-mansion. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Bateman, B., 2018, ‘Numerous documents seized during raids at Gupta properties in India’. Eyewitness News, [online]. Available at: https://ewn. co.za/2018/03/06/numerousdocuments-seized-during-raidsat-gupta-properties-in-india. Accessed on: 1 November 2018. Comrie, S., 2016, ‘On the trail of Tegeta’s offshore shareholder’. City Press, 17 May. Available at: http://city-press.news24.com/ News/on-the-trail-of-tegetasoffshore-shareholder-20160507. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Creamer, T., 2017, ‘Transnet splits R50bn, 1 064 locomotives contract between four global rail groups’. Engineering News. Available at: http:// www.engineeringnews.co.za/ article/transnet-splits-r50bn1-064-locomotives-contractbetween-four-global-railgroups-2014-03-17. Accessed on: 20 November 2018.

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Goyal, R., 2017, ‘SBI graft case: Lessons to be learnt’. Available at: http://www. allbankingsolutions.com/PressRelease-Views/SBI-graft-case. htm. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Gramsci, A., 1971, Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Quentin Hoare and Geoffrey Nowell Smith. London: Lawrence and Wishart. Harvey, D., 1982, The limits to capital. Oxford: Blackwell. Hogg, A., 2016, ‘Guptas have gapped it: Heavily laden jet left Thursday from Lanseria for Dubai’. Finance 24. Available at: http://www.fin24.com/BizNews/ guptas-have-gapped-it-heavilyladen-jet-left-thursday-fromlanseria-for-dubai-20160410. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Hunter, Q. and Saba. A., 2017, ‘Bank guns for Zuma wife’. Sunday Times. Available at: https://www.pressreader.com/ south-africa/sundaytimes/20170611/2814792 76393552. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Jika, T., 2017, ‘Guptas strike it rich selling gold’. Sunday Times, 9 July. Available at: https://www. timeslive.co.za/sunday-times/ investigations/2017-07-08guptas-strike-it-rich-sellinggold-in-dubai/?device=mobile. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Laing, R., 2017, ‘Guptaowned Oakbay dropped by JSE sponsor River Group’. The Sowetan. Available at: http://www.sowetanlive. co.za/news/2017/06/06/ gupta-owned-oakbay-droppedby-jse-sponsor-river-group. Accessed on: 18 November 2018. Letsoalo, M. and Pillay, V., 2014, ‘The mystery Gigaba bank account’. The Mail and Guardian. Available at: https://mg.co.za/ article/2014-06-12-the-mystery-

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gigaba-bank-account. Accessed on: 16 November 2018. Mail and Guardian, 2017, ‘Tequesta business development services agreement’. Available at: https://cdn.mg.co.za/content/ documents/2017/06/01/17060 1locoagreement.pdf. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Marrian, N. and Quintal, G., 2017, ‘Bank of Baroda joins peers in closing Gupta accounts’. Business Day. Available at: https://www.businesslive. co.za/bd/national/2017-03-02guptas-about-to-lose-their-lastbank-in-sa/. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Mashego, A., 2018, ‘Transnet must “lay criminal charges against Molefe”, other Gupta generals: damning report’. City Press, [online]. Available at: https:// www.news24.com/SouthAfrica/ News/damning-report-chargegupta-generals-20180617-2. Accessed on: 1 November 2018. Mathope, G., 2017, ‘How Gigaba allegedly made home affairs a Gupta lapdog’. The Citizen, 1 July. Available at: http://citizen.co.za/news/ news-national/1530585/ how-gigaba-allegedly-madehome-affairs-a-gupta-lapdog/. Accessed on: 23 July 2017. Minister of Finance vs Gupta Companies, 2016 80978/16 1. Pretoria High Court. Molefe, B., 2012, ‘Anoj Singh appointed Transnet CFO’. Politics Web. Available at: http://www. politicsweb.co.za/opinion/anojsingh-appointed-transnet-cfo. Accessed on: 20 November 2018. Office of the Public Protector, 2016, ‘State of capture.’ Johannesburg: Office of the Public Protector. Available at: http://cdn.24.co.za/files/Cms/ General/d/4666/3f63a8b78d2 b495d88f10ed060997f76.pdf. Accessed on: 23 July 2017.

Partnership Africa Canada, 2014, All that glitters is not gold: Dubai, Congo and the illicit trade of conflict minerals. Ontario: Partnership Africa Canada. Available at: http:// dspace.africaportal.org/jspui/ bitstream/123456789/34455/1/ All%20That%20Glitters.pdf?1. Accessed on: 23 July 2017. Peyper, L., 2016, ‘Invoice fraud rife in SA gold exports – UN report’. Finance 24. Available at: http://www.fin24.com/Economy/ invoice-fraud-rife-in-sa-goldexports-un-report-20160720. Accessed on: 23 July 2017. Pieth, M., 2002, ‘Financing of terrorism: following the money’ in Financing terrorism. Dordrecht: Springer, pp. 115–126. Public Affairs Research Institute, 2017, Betrayal of the promise: How South Africa is being stolen. Johannesburg: Public Affairs Research Institute. Available at: http://pari.org.za/wp-content/ uploads/2017/05/Betrayal-of-thePromise-25052017.pdf. Accessed on: 23 July 2017. Steyn, L., 2017, ‘New FICA is just waiting for Gigaba’. Mail and Guardian. Available at: https://mg.co.za/ article/2017-06-09-00-newfica-is-just-waiting-for-gigaba. Accessed on: July 2017. Transnet, 2014, ‘Board of directors and its committees report back’. Transnet. Available at: http:// www.overendstudio.co.za/ online_reports/transnet_ar2014/ financials/cg_bod.php. Accessed on: 23 July 2017. UNCTAD, 2016, ‘Trade misinvoicing in primary commodities in developing countries: The cases of Chile, Côte D’Ivoire, Nigeria, South Africa and Zambia’. New York: United Nations. Available at: http://unctad.org/en/ PublicationsLibrary/suc2016d2_

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en.pdf. Accessed on: 23 July 2017. Van der Merwe, J., 2014, ‘Regional parastatals within South Africa’s system of accumulation’. New South African Review, 4, 332–348. Van der Merwe, J., 2016a, ‘Theorising emerging powers in Africa within the Westernled system of accumulation’ in Van der Merwe, J., Taylor, I., and Arkhangelskaya, A. (eds.) Emerging powers in Africa: A new wave in the relationship? Cham: Springer, 17–38. Van der Merwe, J., 2016b, ‘An historical geographical analysis

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of South Africa’s system of accumulation: 1652–1994’. Review of African Political Economy, 43(147), 58–72. Van der Merwe, J. and Dodd, N., 2019, The political economy of underdevelopment in the global South: The government–business– media complex. London: Palgrave Macmillan. World Bank, 2017, ‘World Integrated Trade Solution (WITS) | Data on Export, Import, Tariff, NTM’. Available at: http://wits. worldbank.org/. Accessed on: 20 November 2018.

9 The Belt and Road Initiative and Eastern Africa István Tarrósy1

This chapter deals with the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), the ambitious vision of China to increase its connectivity with the African continent, across which it has managed wide-scale engagements since the launch of the Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) summitry in 2000. This complex geopolitical tool for enhancing China’s position has been substantially gaining ground in Africa. However, this has not been without adverse outcomes. Via infrastructure development projects, African states arguably enter dynamics that reproduce dependency – this time, on China (Taylor, 2014). While Africans also need to engage in meaningful trade, strategies for cooperation on the African side seem to be weak or missing. This is evident when we look at recent Chinese infrastructure developments and the responses and perceptions to these projects by locals in Kenya, Ethiopia, Tanzania, and Rwanda. Attention will be directed towards China’s strategy of offering attractive loans that indebt African governments over the long term. Case studies will include railway projects in Kenya and Ethiopia, airport extensions in Kenya and Tanzania, and building projects in Rwanda. The chapter will argue that among the multiple local views towards increasing Chinese presence, there is growing resistance in some localities, such as from the Kenyan group called ‘Save Lamu’, which attempted to stop a China-backed coal-fired power plant (see French, 2015, for a detailed discussion of local views). While the ‘charm offensive’ (Kurlantzick, 2007) is still part of China’s pragmatic foreign policy, execution of the BRI has made inadequate provisions for the management of local resistance and fears. Backed by field trips and interviews in all the four countries, as well as based upon media coverage/news analysis, this contribution will cover both the Chinese and the African angles and shed light on these struggles. 1 The author holds the János Bolyai Research Scholarship and his work is supported therefore by the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.

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China going global along one belt and many routes By the end of the 1990s, China appeared assertively on the international stage by fostering its ‘Going Global’ strategy, which later offered a foundation for launching its Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The Chinese government explicitly urged both state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and private firms to penetrate markets globally, taking advantage of a dynamic new phase of world trade and the hunger of developing regions for investments in infrastructure. President Xi Jinping’s leadership has been pushing the new initiative – formally called the ‘One Belt One Road’ (OBOR), 一带一路 in Mandarin, built on the ancient first Silk Road network from the Han dynasty – also with the aim to improve and strengthen its geopolitical position in its immediate neighbourhood, as well as in a larger regional, global context. Two routes exist: one by land stretching across the ancient Silk Road network (and well beyond) and a maritime route (see Figure 9.1). The two are connected, resulting in ‘one belt’, and the BRI is a well-planned smart power strategy, which aims to wrap the entire world, not only Eurasia and Africa, and which has become the leitmotif of China’s foreign policy (Brînză, 2018). A report published by the research and strategic advisory think tank China Policy in April 2017 clearly shows the systematic and

Figure 9.1 – The Belt and Road Initiative Maritime Route

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strategic development of China’s global expansion. After bidding farewell to the Mao-era mind-set of self-reliance, the new strategy frames China’s ambitions for global leadership and cooperation (China Policy, 2017:3). Following its joining of the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 2001 and having experienced (and survived with confidence) the global financial crisis in 2008–2010, China’s BRI focuses on building up infrastructure, trade, investment, and human linkages across Eurasia (China Policy, 2017:7), connecting almost all regions of the world to a ‘peacefully rising’ Middle Kingdom of the 21st century. Africa is one of the target continents, where Chinese engagement has a long history. The official Chinese communication dates Sino-African relations back to Han times (206 bc to ad 220) when the Chinese reached Egypt by overland routes (Jalata and Mathews, 2017:73). One of the leading symbols of today’s Chinese Africa policy is Admiral Zheng He, who in the early 15th century – more than 70 years earlier than the first European (the Portuguese Vasco da Gama) reached the Swahili shores – realised influential voyages across the Western Ocean and, thereby, China–Africa relations were brought to a new historic level (Li, 2017: 253). Admiral Zheng He is frequently referred to in both the political and public discourses of historically long friendly ties, and at the same time has been used as an ‘item’ to confirm Chinese ‘aspirations of centrality’ (Taylor, 2006:2). Since 2000, when the first FOCAC was held in Beijing, the real pragmatic face of China has been dominating Sino-African relations, which also signals a new era in Africa’s interaction with the outside world (Alden, 2007:2). Chinese political and business actors, together with entrepreneurs have regarded Africa as a continent of economic potential populated by consumers, as well as a place for Chinese companies to gain experience, and establish and expand business ventures into the global arena (Alden, Large, and Oliveira, 2008:7). As Africa welcomes any competition that shakes up the Western, Lebanese, and Indian business monopolies (Michel and Beuret, 2009:7), with its highly enhanced, complex, and, at the same time, focused engagements, China is welcomed by most African governments. With China’s accelerated involvement in African development; more and more Africans say that China has won the ‘new scramble’ for Africa. This engagement, however, has stirred mixed reactions. African leadership sees this relationship as a golden opportunity. However, Africa’s people have yet to see if they (or just their leaders) would benefit in

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the long run (Chidaushe, 2007:107). Despite these misgivings, it must be noted that China has recently built the sorely needed infrastructure that can enhance Africa’s connectivity across global networks. Local Africans certainly praise this input. At the same time, the deals that finance such projects raise several questions, of which the same local population is hardly aware. Their governments need to start to repay the ‘soft loans’ provided by China, but in a growing number of cases, their budgets are unable to cover them. Such scenarios may, therefore, reproduce more dependency. The rise of new dependencies has already been discussed by scholars such as Taylor, (2014), and as a ‘sub-imperialist logic’ of behaviour, by Bond (2015) and Van der Merwe (2016). Another direct consequence of China’s Africa policy needs further attention: the rapid rise of Chinese migrants in Africa and the consequences of their presence in different African localities. There has been a marked rise in the number of Chinese people on African soil since the launch of FOCAC, precipitating multiple local views and perceptions. In the following section, we will look into who these Chinese nationals are and what challenges they present both for the Africans and the Chinese government in the long run.

More Chinese migrants, more questions for Africa Many authors, including Mohan and Tan-Mullins (2009), Park (2013), and Li (2017), mention that data about Chinese presence in Africa is somewhat speculative. Figures are elastic and estimates of the number of Chinese migrants range from one to two million. There are several factors to consider in this regard. First, the term ‘Overseas Chinese in Africa’ can mean various things, with broad and narrow definitions, including distinctions between earlier and more recent migrants, and between those from mainland China as opposed to those from Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Macau (Li, 2017:275). Apart from the numerous Mandarin terms (such as Huaqiao 华侨, Huayi 华裔, Haiwai Huaren 海外华人), ‘the Chinese’ are a diverse group both culturally and linguistically (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009:591). During the last few decades the presence of Chinese nationals in Africa has demonstrated a changing pattern: as opposed to the flow of contracted workers of large state-owned companies driven by the central will of the Chinese government, recently,

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migration has moved to being largely independent of state action (Mohan and Tan-Mullins, 2009:592). So far, much less attention has been paid to these people and gaining a better understanding of their intentions and activities. French also confirms that while large-scale projects completed by big, government-owned companies dominate the headlines about the advancing Chinese agenda in Africa, the reality is more meaningfully shaped by the deeds of countless smaller actors (2015:5). They also contribute to an expanding circle of perceptions, which accommodate many views and reactions to the Chinese, which vary from country to country and within countries (Park, 2013:131). In an interview, Denise A.O. Kodhe, director general of the Institute for Development and Leadership in Africa (IDEA), based in Nairobi, Kenya, presented the increasingly vocalised view that China’s entry into Africa is based on a strategy to tie African governments down with massive loans so that the Chinese get what they want. These loans in Kenya are running into billions of Schillings, and as Kenyans, we are really worried when this money will be paid back and if not paid, what will happen.2

As for interactions between Chinese and Africans on the ground, Kodhe thinks that in some cases Chinese investors bribe their way through and are not interested in establishing long-term social relationships to bring themselves closer to the people of Africa. In short, it is a marriage of convenience, which is likely to explode at some point.

It is not only the Africans that do not know the extent and nature of Chinese migration to Africa. Chinese authorities also do not have a complete picture of the growing Overseas Chinese population in Africa. From the African perspective, Hannah Postel (2016) articulates a valid point when she says that better understanding the Chinese communities on the continent is necessary for African countries to make this growing trend as productive and sustainable as possible – for the sake of Africa’s planned longterm development.

2 Recorded by the author on 6 May 2018.

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Chinese infrastructure projects linked to BRI: financial challenges, tensions, and emerging sentiments across East Africa Kenya The issue of knowledge and technology transfer has been prominent in the discourse of Sino-African relations for a long time. Africa needs to learn how to run and maintain the projects that had been put together by Chinese actors. In the case of infrastructure projects, who operates a light rail or railway, in the long run, does affect local perceptions. In an exclusive report in The Standard, Wafula (2018) reveals the enormous challenges of the working conditions at the 385-km-long Standard Gauge Railway (SGR) of Kenya. This railway line, which is very much a BRI project, connects Nairobi with Mombasa on the coast and is the largest single infrastructure development project in the country at present. Those who were trained two years ago in anticipation have remained assistant shunting drivers, since the launch of Madaraka express, and only sit and watch as the Chinese drivers drive to the coast and back. ‘We just sit at the back and watch. There is no actual transfer of skills that is happening here’, an assistant locomotive driver who has been with the SGR for over a year now told The Standard (Wafula 2018). In addition to the lower wages for the same jobs, together with the more menial tasks allocated to them, local Kenyan workers do not see the path of development for themselves and their country under such circumstances. As for the environment, there are further negative consequences, which have alarmed wildlife activists: more and more animals are being run over by the train, and there are no safety or protective measures. Already at the end of 2015 Nelson summarised some of the most critical local opinions in the Kenya Monitor: both Nairobi residents and the Conservation Alliance of Kenya (CAK) opposed the routing of the SGR. Their biggest concern was that the railway would affect the national park it runs through and cause unacceptable social impact by displacing thousands of people from their homes, including ancestral homes, causing a loss of open spaces, affecting air quality, increasing pollution, affecting health negatively, and reducing recreational space. These detrimental effects are in addition to causing irreparable ecological damage through habitat degradation, especially through the loss of rare indigenous forests and wildlife, and the reduction of the rich biological diversity of the city (Nelson, 2015). Their voices were not heard.

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The other crucial question also connected with this railway project concerns its finances and financial sustainability. In a Sunday article, referring to data from the Kenyan Treasury, the Business Daily (2018) emphasised that loan repayments to China’s ExIm Bank – which lent US$3.233 billion to build the railway – will more than triple from July 2019 as the five-year grace period that Beijing extended to Kenya in March 2014 for the project funds comes to an end. Another more recent instance of local experience with a Chinafunded project seems to be the country’s first coal-fired power plant in the historic port town of Lamu. The New York Times reports that while Kenyan officials say that the plant will help meet the country’s fast-growing demand for electricity and draw investment, critics worry that it will damage the area’s fragile marine ecosystem, threaten the livelihoods of fishing communities, and pollute the air (Sengupta, 2018). The multinational Chinese company Power China is behind the scenes and is ready to ‘help’ as soon as the ongoing lawsuit which was filed by a local group in the Kenyan National Environmental Tribunal in November 2016 is over. The plant would also be connected to one of the largest multifaceted infrastructure developments in Kenya. The Kenya Port Authority translates this as one of the flagship infrastructure projects identified by the government in Kenya Vision 2030, which is the development of a new transport corridor linking a new and modern Port of Lamu with landlocked Ethiopia and South Sudan. For many local households whose land has been acquired for the project the promised financial compensation seems to be insufficient when they think about their future. One activist of the group Save Lamu said: ‘You can never get enough compensation to evacuate everyone’ (Sengupta, 2018).

Ethiopia There are numerous examples of the tangible manifestation of China’s Africa policy all across Africa. Recent large-scale projects have directed the spotlight on Ethiopia. There, Chinese presence has already been overwhelming. They have developed the first modern light railway (tram) system of sub-Saharan Africa in the capital, Addis Ababa. The Chinese were also instrumental in the Addis– Djibouti railway connecting the landlocked country to the maritime trade routes of the Gulf of Aden and the Red Sea (see Tarrósy and Vörös, 2018a; 2018b). These initiatives yet again aim at improving the country’s port access, with land having been acquired to set up a logistics facility in the Lamu Port, Kenya. One of the main

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features of Ethiopia’s developmental state is the construction of large projects, such as railways, highways, hydroelectric dams, and, more recently, the plan for the expansion of the capital city, known as the ‘Addis Ababa Master Plan’ (Záhořík 2017:259). The construction of the light rail system started in December 2011 after securing funds from China’s Export-Import Bank (ExIm Bank). The final cost of the railway was US$475 million, 85 per cent of which was covered by a substantial concessional loan from ExIm Bank, China. It took three years for the China Railway Group Limited (CREC – the acronym of the parent company meaning China Railway Engineering Corporation) to finish the two-line, 34.4-km system. Trial operations started in February 2015, while the lines started to operate by 20 September and 9 November 2015 respectively. The original plan was to ease the overburdened traffic situation in the capital, but according to Tesfaye (2015), it failed to do so. The number of those using the tram – around 110,000 daily passengers in a city of around seven million inhabitants – shows it has limited relevance: with very low ticket prices, the train is comparable to the cost of a bus trip. However, the light rail is overcrowded with a limited network. The number of trams should be increased, but according to the news and locals, the system is limited because of power issues and even with the recent increase in the number of trams it runs infrequently or with single cars. Promises were made to install a dedicated power grid, but even it fails to power the system. The Addis–Djibouti railway is an almost 760-km-long railway connection between the capitals of Ethiopia and Djibouti, constructed between 2011 and 2016, financed by the Ethiopia government and by a loan from China’s ExIm Bank. Details again are not entirely clear, but according to the Embassy of Ethiopia in Brussels (2016), the total construction budget reached US$4.5 billion, at least US$0.5 billion more than was initially planned. According to various sources, ExIm Bank provided a loan of around US$2.4–3.0 billion. In 2017, the Ethiopian Railway Corporation (ERC) faced financial issues without finishing the project and the connecting infrastructure on time. Anberbir (2017) reported that the ERC had a stunning US$3.7 billion in debt by the end of 2016, and had already started to repay those loans before the railway connection was functional. As was the case with the Light Railway System, this railway is also operated by a Chinese company, in this case, a consortium of two companies, CREC and the China Civil Engineering Construction

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Corporation (CRCC), which were responsible for the construction as well. Their job now is to operate and maintain the line and to also train local personnel for an undisclosed fee until 2023. This project, similar to the Light Railway System, fails to meet its original goals, which has financial consequences as well. While the light railway was mainly constructed to ease the traffic issues, this railway was built to help the landlocked country to reach maritime trade routes, also to import much-needed fuel, as well as to boost the economy. Failing to generate the income to repay the loans might have negative consequences on the ERC and future projects as well, not to mention on the Ethiopian government.

Tanzania Neighbouring Tanzania also has a massive port project – the Port of Bagamoyo, which is roughly planned to be completed between 2020 and 2021. Set to be the largest port in East Africa, Bagamoyo is an important junction on China’s new Maritime Silk Road. It is not surprising that part of the necessary funding will come from a Chinese entity, the China Merchants Holdings International, which partnered for the project with Oman’s State Government Reserve Fund. Some say that the project presents an opportunity to test the potential of this Maritime Silk Road as a game changer for Africa’s development (Léautier, Schaefer, and Wei, 2015). The US$10 billion project will contain another Chinese element adapted to the Tanzanian context: an Export Development Zone (EDZ), a kind of special economic and trade area, with an industrial city and even more infrastructure connectivity. Some locals, however, feel threatened and think that their natural habitats will be endangered – in particular, such rich ecosystems as the nearby mangrove swamps, as well as the fishing waters that provide income to many families. Trade imbalances that heavily favour China may also fuel rising negative sentiments about the Chinese. The Chinese have not been consuming as much of either Tanzania’s or Kenya’s products as Africans have spent on Chinese goods. As Omondi (2018) underlines, Kenya has even made overly generous concessions which have allowed China to bring products such as onions and fish into the country which can easily be locally sourced. Bagamoyo, however, is only one of the 12 ports – the so-called Strategic Maritime Distribution Centres (SMDCs) – along the Maritime Silk Road. Out of the 12 strategic ports seven are located along African coastal regions. The entire concept (or geopolitical vision) is about a network with China in the centre (as the real

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Middle Kingdom again) and all other partnering actors, who are interested in facilitating trade for their own sake. Eyler (2014) rightly points out that this growing network’s ocean-bound cargo fleet’s ships, whether coming or going, are never empty, and China, sitting at the helm of this network, receives the lion’s share of income and resources from trade. Although the SMDCs collectively are not explicitly part of BRI, the broader SMDCs (presented in Figure 9.2) contextualise BRI within a bigger network of Chinese shipping, significantly expanding the reach of China’s trade. China’s expertise in infrastructure development assists developing countries in clearing their infrastructure backlogs, thereby facilitating enhanced trade. It concentrates on modernising and constructing transportation networks linking hubs, ports, or important cities in order to allow fast and undisturbed trade (Krukowska, 2016:159–160). BRI is at the centre of a vast maritime and trade network, therefore, which, as a vehicle may also contribute to raising the geopolitical importance of the African coastal regions.

Rwanda For any investment, a politically and economically stable and secure environment is a prerequisite. Some actors are less cautious than others, but security is of utmost importance to each of them. To be

Figure 9.2 – Strategic Maritime Distribution Centres

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able to attract foreign direct investment (FDI), Africa needs to work out policies and daily behaviours which can convince any possible investor to enter their markets. African countries differ regarding their levels of armed conflict and the openness and regional integration of their markets. This affects what they can offer for their potential trade partners and investors. Although Chinese actors had shown bravery in some cases in the past to enter unreliable markets, today, the Going Global strategy of the People’s Republic of China advocates more caution and calculation in any investment or acquisition scheme. Those countries with more safeguards (and still with ‘room to manoeuvre’ for the sake of the best deal) can expect larger volumes of Chinese money and engagement. One of the best examples for this is the small landlocked East-Central African country of Rwanda. One of the vehicles of the country’s transformation is the Rwandan Development Board (RDB). It focuses on investment promotion and contributes to a services-oriented economy for the future. As Yvette Mutoni, former head of investment promotion in RDB, explained in an interview, tourism has been planned to become one of the main drivers of a brighter future. In particular, conference tourism with all the newest and modern facilities in Kigali City is meant to position Rwanda as the leading actor in East Africa.3 To be able to attract more companies into this sector the RDB offers a one-stop centre to register any company in the country: in just about six hours on the ground floor of the RDB building, all the necessary paperwork can easily be done, for instance. Also, the government has been making progress in bringing down the costs of running any business, especially concerning electricity costs. Another significant step to attract FDI is to provide transparent procurement procedures. Proposals are double checked in all sectors, and the state organ responsible for all this is the Rwanda Standards Board (RSB), governed by the board of directors, which is composed of major stakeholders from government, industry, and academic institutions, as well as consumer associations. With regard to construction, especially that of the badly needed physical infrastructure across the country, the role of external actors was highlighted in an interview with President Kagame in the Cabinet Meeting Room in the Presidency Compound on 24 March 2015. President Kagame acknowledged that the ‘Chinese are everywhere, 3 Interview recorded by the author on 24 March 2015, in the headquarters of the RDB.

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in Europe, as well. If this is good for Europe, why cannot it be good for Africa?’ He also added that if ‘things go wrong [in a project, for instance], it is not only the Chinese’ fault because if things do not have ownership, things cannot be going into a good direction’.4 Paul Kagame certainly referred to his firm belief in ‘home-grown solutions’, which presuppose an able African agency to make decisions on behalf of the society. All these statements also highlight the stubborn approach required for the future: African countries need to go their own way in a systematic and also self-critical manner, always learning from both their past and the current successes and failures of others. China, from this angle, is undoubtedly a point of reference for many, including Rwanda. The important thing missing, as many analysts agree, is African countries’ China Policy, a comprehensive approach towards China’s engagements with African countries. Under such circumstances, individual countries could well be encouraged to develop their national policies on China (Chidaushe, 2007:111). These policies should be firm and confident. Rwanda’s government has been accelerating its policy on localising the industrial sector. Its ‘Made in Rwanda’ initiative aims to increase the export of more locally made products worldwide. In Kigali, a Special Economic Zone was established, which also hosts a Chinese-owned textile factory. As Jarvis (2018) reports, this Chinese investment and industry knowledge have helped to develop a state-of-the-art textile factory that manufactures clothing for both the international and national markets. According to Jolly Rubagiza, deputy director general of the Rwanda Management Institute, the Chinese presence in Rwanda is not very much visible in everyday business as it may be in other East African countries. Only a few restaurants and retail businesses, but still limited. Most of the Chinese are into road and building construction, therefore, Rwandan people do not seem to be that grieved.5

Prospects for changing negative perceptions? Who is expected to change these negative perceptions after all? First, as the four cases have shown, there are similarities and apparent differences at the same time among different localities. Therefore, their 4 Interview recorded on 24 March 2015, in Kigali. 5 Interview recorded by the author on 21 May 2018.

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perceptions differ about the ‘other’, in our discussion, the ‘other’ being ‘the Chinese’. Second, to provide an effective response, both government and individual contexts must be examined. From the Chinese government’s perspective, when African civil society organisations point at worrisome developments regarding either social or environmental impact, China is often quick to react and offer to fund a ‘social good’ such as building a hospital or providing financial assistance towards solving the perceived problem (Rebol, 2010:173). It is also true that China’s general approach towards African partnerships is to offer ‘package deals’, including infrastructure development, financial aid or developmental assistance. With this, they incorporate soft power elements such as a Confucius Institute and a quota of scholarships; a new stadium; a hospital and/or several new schools, all for a longer term mining concession or large-scale investment project. At the individual level, local African businesses can tap into and learn from their Chinese counterparts’ business networks (Bräutigam, 2003:447). For African actors, such relations can help to achieve better and more enhanced connectivity. African networks can take advantage of specific kinds of global trade links to form very helpful connections with networks in other parts of the world (Bräutigam, 2003:467) – in our discussion, via a dense network of Chinese businesses and individuals. For African governments, the development of ‘African agency’ is a key task to decide upon the best pragmatic deals while managing healthy competition between many external actors. Amid rising concerns caution needs to be taken to ensure that China is not another version of an imperialist state (Chidaushe, 2007:113). For the individual Chinese, to build up and run a profitable business is the core objective. However, their behaviour, the relationships they form with Africans, the way they conduct their business, their respect or lack thereof for the law, for local customs, for the environment, and, above all, for the people, will do more to determine China’s image (French, 2015:6).

Conclusion Africa’s prospects may be bright if there is proper connectivity into global structures, there are confidently managed societies, with improved leadership, and there is better governance. Many of the continent’s countries have been fostering complex and intensive relationships with China, which have continuously deepened and strengthened since the founding of the People’s Republic in 1949

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(Stewart and Li, 2014:24). China has a clear and well-articulated strategic policy towards the continent, where countries partnering with China have yet to translate their recognition of China’s importance into explicit China strategies (Omondi, 2018, referring to a 2017 McKinsey report). African governments obviously welcome China-built infrastructure projects. The question frequently asked, however, will stay with us: Can Africa decide what the best option is, and under what circumstances any such development should take place? As Su (2017) underscored in a piece in The Diplomat, African states are likely to require more than just portions of their limited budgets to complete repayment. We may not agree with Su’s view on ‘a brand-new type of neocolonialism’, but we can also point out African vulnerability, which is – in these cases in relation to Chinese infrastructure loans – which surely escalate African dependence on China. The four cases from East Africa presented some challenging scenarios for both African governments and local communities. Although the much-needed railway connections, together with the new ports and additional infrastructure developments are all part of China’s comprehensive ‘Belt and Road’ vision, they also enhance Africa’s participation in global processes. Many lessons, however, need to be learnt about how to manage disappointment and frustration, and how to demand proper behaviour from any external actor on African soil. So far, the BRI has not paid attention to such ‘soft’ requirements. The recent eastern African examples will most probably push the Chinese government to consider these aspects, too. China might become increasingly reactive to avoid being associated with negative headlines (Rebol, 2010:174–175) and compel its business entities and citizens to ‘behave’.

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10 Africa at the precipice: lessons from Brazil Mbekezeli Mkhize and Vukile Sibiya

Globally, many states are undergoing transitions at varying paces. Such transitions have resulted in the eruption of tensions, and an outbreak of social protests, uprisings, and the destruction of property. Nilsen (2016:269) regards uprisings as part of ‘world-historical conjunctures when subaltern groups mobilise around social movement projects that destabilise hegemonic power relations in the capitalist world system’. Not surprisingly, as part of pursuing transitions at a global scale, Vanden, Funke, and Prevost (2017) posit that there has been an increase in protests worldwide including in Latin America, across Africa (particularly as part of the Arab Spring), the United States (US), and Europe. The African Development Bank reported that protests increased by 350 per cent between 2000 and 2011 (in Bond, 2016:2). At the time of the Arab Spring, public protests grew immensely. More recently in the North, there was a surge of protests over Donald Trump’s reckless and inhumane immigration policies. In June 2018 in the US, hundreds protested against what appeared to be a ‘zero tolerance’ immigration policy. Trump’s initiative specifically targeted Muslim-majority countries. While primarily in solidarity, protests were staged against Trump in the United Kingdom (UK) – particularly in London. Trump elicited social protests from the outset at his inauguration. Protests are not solely confined to recent years, and not only to the West and Africa. In Latin America, the Zapatista Army of National Liberation (EZLN) (otherwise popularly known as Zapatistas) organised and staged an uprising in the southern Mexican state of Chiapas. The protests were aimed at forcing the government to inform the general public, and the world at large about the events that were taking place in Chiapas (Olesen, 2004:89). While primarily a solidarity network protecting the interests of indigenous people against repressive measures by local and national authorities, the network succeeded in raising its concerns. Within the BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa)

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states, the Brazilian protests of 2013 took centre stage in Latin America. Similarly, owing to uneven development trajectories Abahlali Basemjondolo (shack dwellers’ movement) was formed in Africa to protect, and advance the interests of shack dwellers and the poor in Durban – with several branches in the Eastern Cape, Western Cape, Mpumalanga, and Gauteng (Ngongoma, n.d.:1–2). Worldwide, protests have been primarily used to directly respond to economic and political crises. Because of the intensification of social struggles against deepening economic and political exclusion, scholarly interest in social movements has been piqued. At the heart of this burgeoning literature is the common understanding that social struggles are frequently a result of shifting geopolitical arrangements, popular mobilisation, and globalisation (Smith, Plummer, and Hughes, 2016:3). Social movements are traditionally considered collective actions that seek to respond to social struggles such as inequality, poverty, oppression, and unmet demands – be they social, political, economic, or cultural. Thus, it is no surprise that a wave of protests has emerged in the global South against neoliberalism, globalisation, and environmental crises (Altmann, Demirhisar, and Mati, 2017:1). Intensifying neoliberalism and globalisation have typically exacerbated social problems in the global South. Though there might be slightly different concerns being expressed, depending on the circumstances on the ground, the social movements are widely perceived as ‘anti-globalisation’ or ‘alter-globalisation’ movements (Ghimire, 2005:2). In other words, the common denominator among these social movements is that, although they have brought together different social forces with differing, and often contradictory agendas, the heart of these struggles is mostly anti-neoliberal and anti-capitalist (Sutcliffe, 2012:52). Another common feature of these protests is their criticism of the global economic and political systems that owe their allegiance to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank. Various theoretical lenses (such as resource mobilisation theory, relative deprivation theory, new social movement theory, human needs theory, conflict theory, and political process theory) have been used to explain the emergence and rationale behind collective/protest action during different periods. However, given the scope of the chapter, such theoretical lenses will not be critically engaged with or defined, although they expound and elucidate the foundations of protests. Bond (2016), and Arnould, Tor, and Vervaeke (2016:1) note that the first decade of the 21st century saw the African continent going

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in the opposite direction of the ‘Africa Rising’ narrative, which had promised inclusive economic growth and prosperity. Originating with the widespread protests in the Arab world, a wave of demonstrations was expanding globally at the time. North Africa and the Arab world saw protests and uprisings taking place over claims relating to globalisation, neoliberalism, political exclusion, and the lack of civil and political rights in Libya, Tunisia, Egypt, Morocco, and Algeria. Because of the political upheavals, the situation became unbearable on the ground. The protests began in Tunisia in 2008 with the protests being led by the unemployed. By 2011 Africa was seeing a surge of protests. While social protests adversely affected African countries to varying degrees, the national uprisings in Libya, Tunisia, and Egypt proved to be significant. These culminated in the toppling and ultimate killing of yet another long-standing dictator (Muammar Gaddafi) in Libya. Egypt’s former dictator (Hosni Mubarak) was also toppled and ousted during the Arab Spring uprisings of 2011. During the national uprisings of 2010/11, the long-standing dictator (Ben Ali) was also forcibly removed in Tunisia (Weipert-Fenner and Wolff, 2016:1). The national revolutions in the Arab world have led to lasting regional instability. In Africa, the number of protests in 2012 was two and a half times higher than it was in 1996 (African Development Bank cited in Bond, 2014:53). Notwithstanding the range of root causes of the protests in Africa, the increase is directly proportionate to the increase in the cost of living (particularly in Chad, Guinea, and Niger) (Arnould, Tor, and Vervaeke, 2016). The variety of causes also include: protests over rigged elections or attempts by leaders to extend their constitutional term limits (such as in Burkina Faso, Burundi, the DRC, Gabon, Togo, Uganda, and, quite recently, Zimbabwe); student protests (South Africa and Uganda); and outbreaks of unrest over police violence, extortion, corruption, and impunity (Chad, Kenya, Senegal, and Uganda) (Arnould, Tor, and Vervaeke, 2016:2). This chapter focuses on two sources of protest in the global South: mega-events and state corruption. The two are often linked. A reflection on the comparative experiences of Brazil and mainly South Africa will form the basis of this chapter as they have both hosted mega-events and are contending with endemic state corruption. Mega-events present noteworthy moments where global capital and global elites interact with the local level and are currently among the most prominent vehicles in which neoliberalism is injected into the global South. Corruption is a pervasive systemic factor in the

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global South, which, when combined with poverty and inequality, creates conditions where protests are near-inevitable.

Mega-events within the protest milieu From a practical standpoint, Ren (2017:895–896) highlights that hosting mega-events is traditionally an attempt to show the world that ‘after years of feudalism, colonialism, and underdevelopment; countries from the global South have reached the global stage’. Consequently, Maharaj (2015:983) in this context considers the hosting of global sporting events as an attempt ‘to promote the status and power of the post-colonial nation-state’. This triumphalism might be signalled prematurely as, in many respects, despite varying degrees of success, the hosting of mega-events by emerging powers has shifted attention from serious domestic challenges. What motivates and inspires emerging powers to host these events, even to the detriment of their people, to some extent continues to be a puzzle. Empirical research on emerging powers has thus far proven that hosting megaevents might have positive spinoffs in the form of substantially enhanced urban transformations (de Queiroz Ribeiro and dos Santos Junior, 2017; and Ren, 2017), the construction of world-class infrastructure (Ren, 2017), and job creation (Costas in Bin, 2017:924), but mega-events have also had debilitating consequences for the host countries (Ren, 2017; Becerril, 2017; Bin, 2017; Ivester, 2017). Though host countries have mostly welcomed and emphasised the positive spinoffs, these events inevitably lead to the reinforcement of neoliberalism and commodification, far outweighing the benefits (de Queiroz Ribeira and dos Santos Junior, 2017:909). In a similar vein, Ren (2017:895) concurs that mega-events effectively promote neoliberalism and intensify the marginalisation of the poor. In response, these deleterious effects result in the swift and often abrupt formation of social movements in the global South. Mega-events have also had a negative social impact, exemplified by forced evictions and relocations in Rio de Janeiro (Brazil) (Becerril, 2017:939). There were forced removals of residents (especially the poor) from several favela communities across the city of Rio. These forced removals occurred in preparation for the 2014 FIFA Football World Cup and the 2016 Olympics. In preparation for the 2016 Olympic Games, the community of Vila Autódromo (a small favela in the western part of the city of Rio) was removed as part of the infrastructure plan designed to prepare the city for the Games (Ivester, 2017:970).

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Similarly, in Cape Town (South Africa) people were forcibly removed from their homes to the Tin Can Town (also known as Blikkiesdorp) in Delft. People were taken from the streets and placed into designated areas. According to Kingdon (2010:1), Blikkiesdorp was built in 2008 for an estimated R32m (£2.9m) to provide ‘emergency housing’ for about 650 people who had been illegally occupying buildings. The residents were evicted ahead of the 2010 FIFA Football World Cup. Kingdon (2010:1) reports that the removals were done by the City of Cape Town to impress wealthy foreigners at the expense of its impoverished people. In the main, especially in the case of Brazil, evictions were done in the name of developing distinctive cityscapes to attract investment capital and global tourism to Rio (Ivester, 2017:971). Two similar views are worth mentioning regarding the underlying reasons for forced evictions and relocations. First, Becerril (2017:939) mentions capital accumulation and the neoliberal paradigm as the underlying reasons behind the evictions. Second, Freitas (2017:953) maintains that ‘under a neoliberal spatial regime, acknowledging the rights of informal residents does not necessarily lead to increased access to the opportunities that cities produce’. It was argued that such removals would effectively put an end to a ‘fragmented’ and ‘disorderly’ urban space (Magalhães cited in Ivester, 2017:971). However, the views indicate that evictions are only done under the guise of improving the lives of the poor, while actually serving an economic agenda. Most BRICS and African countries grapple with social/economic inequality and yet demonstrate ambitions to host major events (Olympic Games in Beijing, 2008; Sochi, 2014; Olympic Games in Brazil, 2016; FIFA World Cup in South Africa, 2010; and Brazil, 2014, respectively). The hosting of mega-events, however, has seldom run smoothly in the BRICS countries, most of which have been plagued by social protests. Research demonstrates that BRICS countries have had to grapple with unparalleled social protests which erupted before, during, and after the mega-events (Winters and WeitzShapiro, 2014; Santos and Guarnieri, 2016; Amnesty International, 2014; Mexi and Boursier, 2017). Russia had its fair share when protesters entered the stadium during the 2018 FIFA Football World Cup final between France and Croatia. The protesters were dressed like security officials and interrupted the match. The protest was staged in the presence of Russian President, Vladimir Putin. It later emerged that protesters were advocating for the release of political prisoners. During the 2014 Sochi XXII Winter Olympic Games, the protests around gay rights failed to attract significant Western media

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attention (Ekberg and Strange, 2017:533). Consequently, in light of the absence of interruptions, the Games were generally considered a great success (Ekberg and Strange, 2017). In other BRICS countries, mega-events have attracted international attention, making them an attractive outlet for marginalised citizens to express their confusion and anger. Neither South Africa nor Brazil could manage, or resolve, the grievances raised by marginalised communities (stemming from the fallout relating to the lack of basic services and rising levels of corruption) in the lead-up to the events, and generally. This led to the formation of several grassroots movements in both countries, and their mega-events were marred by social protests (albeit to varying degrees), occasionally providing an outlet for the disenchanted citizens to voice their grievances. Governments were criticised vehemently for diverting attention away from the challenges of social inequality and poverty (Kingdon, 2010; Ivester, 2017; and Becerril, 2017). For the BRICS, taking the lead in mega-events may appear at first glance to be a genuine investment and development opportunity. However, such events only benefit a select few. Drawing from the concept of sub-imperialism, the BRICS countries’ ambitions are not necessarily about serving their respective national constituencies or continents but about entrenching expanded rounds of capital accumulation. Symbolically, this is often typified by active involvement in mega-events at the expense of responding to internal woes. The rationale behind this view is understood through the lens of ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Although, as mentioned, one orthodoxy is that mega-events generally bring urban transformations and urban development (Ren, 2017), a more incisive body of literature merely views mega-events as a tool for ‘accumulation by dispossession’. Underpinned by the arguments advanced by Harvey (2004), accumulation by dispossession has become a useful analytical framework through which to interpret urban transformations brought about by mega-events (Ren, 2017:895). Harvey introduced this concept in order ‘to refer to the policies followed by capitalism under neoliberal governments aiming at transferring public wealth into an increasingly concentrated private sector’ (Caceres, 2015:116). Levien (2011:456) regards accumulation by dispossession as a repackaging of ‘primitive accumulation’ precisely because the concept ‘captures the diverse dispossessions being generated today by fully developed industrial and financial capitalism’. Put differently; the concept typically emphasises new clandestine and covert

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strategies devised by capitalist countries to gain access to public assets. When broken down, ‘accumulation’ provides a conceptual basis for capitalism. In contrast, the ‘dispossession’ framework traditionally treats cities as sites of capital accumulation. The dispossession framework can be broken down into three types, namely: redistributive dispossession; expanding dispossession via capitalisation and proletarianisation; and capitalist expansion via commodification (Bin, 2017:924). For example, in preparation for the 2016 Olympic Games, Bin (2018:5) states that redistributive dispossessions were seen in subsidies and fiscal exemptions offered by both the local and federal governments through undertaking to grant budget resources to procure the properties needed to meet the demands of the 2016 Olympic Games, which entails cash settlements to those who were evicted.

At the same time, the national government took a decision to exempt the organisers of the Games and their associates from paying taxes on all activities incidental to the organisation and the realisation of the Games. Bin (2018:6) concludes that such dispossession (the cash settlements to those evicted) can be interpreted as redistribution because the means of subsistence is not converted into capital and direct producers were not converted into members of the working class. Expanding dispossession via proletarianisation manifested itself through urban interventions where construction of facilities threatened fishing communities with displacement from their fishing sites and small business persons were evicted from their business sites to make room for new urban projects, thereby forcing them to join the labour force. In the case of expanding via capitalisation, these sites were then converted into means of production by constructing urban infrastructure and real estate projects, while commodification which excludes evictions derives from the ‘destruction of environment reserves to make room for real estate projects or for-profit transportations systems’ (Bin, 2018:7).

Event-catalysed social protests in Brazil and South Africa June and July 2013 saw more than half a million protesters take to the streets in major cities in most parts of Brazil in what became

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known as the Tropical Spring – initially demonstrating against what appeared to be an unreasonable increase in bus, subway, and train fares (Mexi and Boursier, 2017:3). It should be emphasised that, while the wave of Brazilian protests started as a response to exorbitant fare increases, an array of grievances was later raised as the catalyst of the protest action. The complaints included concerns regarding ongoing poor governance, corruption, the rising cost of living, police brutality, and substandard provision of social services (Winters and Weitz-Shapiro, 2014:138). To this end, Alonso and Mischke (2017) add more grievances such as the precarious/dilapidated state of public infrastructure, corruption, and state spending on mega-events such as the Football World Cup and the Olympic Games. Spending on these events was done to the detriment of the poor, who then organised protest action. The communities felt that they were neglected and not recognised by the government in its spending. Brazil witnessed anti-World Cup protests before and during the tournament. The protesters carried placards saying ‘FIFA go home’ in the streets of Sao Paulo and Rio expressing their dissatisfaction with the tournament. In the same breath, the South African crowd in Durban chanted ‘Get out FIFA mafia’ (Veith, 2010). In Brazil, the police dispersed the rioting crowd using grenades and teargas (The Guardian, 2014). The police clashed with protesters just a few hours before the start of the tournament. Such protests and demonstrations ended in violence and injuries (Winter and Teixeira, 2014). While the situation was not conducive in Brazil before the tournament, the number of protests dropped after the opening match on June 12 (Folha de S. Paulo newspaper cited in Phillips, 2014:1). One reason that was put forward was that although the Brazilian population was not happy with the hosting of the 2014 tournament, sport in the country remains a cultural staple. Similar developments are apparent in South Africa and are worth mentioning. For example, as was the case in South Africa in reaction to the FIFA Football World Cup tournament, Brazilian protesters were infuriated by the amount of money that the government spent on preparing for the FIFA Football World Cup, as well as the 2016 Olympics. Brazil injected much capital into preparing for the two mega-events. During the tournament, airport workers managed to go on strike even though it was called off quickly (BBC News, 2014). Striking teachers also caused a great deal of traffic and other disruptions. The protests embarrassed the local organisers in Brazil. The common denominator between South Africa and Brazil is that

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protesters were of the view that the money could have been spent on the poor and marginalised communities instead of supporting the tournament which would only benefit a select few. Generally, South Africa seems to have had similar experiences in comparison with Brazil. To begin with, it is worthwhile to point out that the 2010 FIFA Football World Cup coincided with several significant events. First, the global financial recession of 2008. According to Duncan (2014), at the time of the recession, the Anti-Privatisation Forum (APF) was very active in challenging the government. In 2009, the APF voice effectively disappeared, and shortly after that (2010–2011) the African National Congress (ANC) and the Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU) took centre stage. The protesters mainly condemned the ANC for failing to provide the basic services that were promised during election campaigns. At the same time, COSATU felt betrayed by the ANC-led government when it discontinued with and diverted from pro-poor economic policies to basically neoliberal economic policies, which favour the rich. The year 2008 was also marked by violent xenophobic protests. Xenophobic incidents were characterised by looting and destruction of property that belonged to the foreign nationals. Second, it is essential to accentuate that protests marked Zuma’s ascension to power in 2009. The number of protests then significantly increased in South Africa between 2009 and 2012, with the number of social protests doubling during that time (Duncan, 2014). Qualitatively, in the same period, these protests became increasingly violent and militant. In other words, the FIFA Football World Cup took place at a time of increasing protests when the ‘mood’ among South Africans was generally bad. Against the backdrop of rising inequality, poverty, and unemployment (commonly referred to as triple challenges), thousands protested World Cup spending in 2010. The protests (especially riots) mainly occurred in townships such as Brits (North West), and squatter camps in Mamelodi East (Gauteng) (The Telegraph, 2010). To this end, one of the protesters mentioned that ‘If the government could spend millions of rands and prepare for the World Cup so quickly, it’s a disgrace that people are still living in squalor in squatter camps’ (protester quoted in The Telegraph, 2010:1). The protester further mentioned that ‘The soccer means nothing to us because we won’t be able to watch it anyway, since we don’t have electricity’ (The Telegraph, 2010:1). Consequently, the protests prompted World Cup stadia to be brought under the control of the South African Police Service (SAPS) in Cape Town, Port

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Elizabeth, Johannesburg, and Durban (Veith, 2010:1). Concerns raised were: lavish spending on the tournament; the sacking of security staff; and ill-advised spending priorities (Veith, 2010:1). As expected, protesters were of the view that the government could have spent the money on the poor who are living below $2 a day instead of on the tournament. One of the protest organisers mentioned that ‘If we have money for stadiums, we should not have any homeless people or people having to live in shacks’ (a protest organiser quoted in Veith, 2010:1). Such protests negatively affected and embarrassed the Local Organising Committee which spoke positively about South Africa during preparations. Similarly, Eskom employees were threatening to go on strike eight days before the start of the FIFA Football World Cup tournament. While it might have been widely perceived as an opportunistic move, it is crucial to point out that Eskom employees were generally demanding salary increases. Just a year before the tournament (2009), South Africa’s biggest trade union threatened to go on strike. Because 50,000 construction workers were directly affected by this, the strike had the potential to halt the economy and the construction of stadia in preparation for the tournament (Macharia, 2009). The unions were demanding a 13 per cent salary increase. It is also worthwhile to note that South Africa was no different when it came to challenges relating to corruption linked to the 2010 FIFA Football World Cup. For example, WBHO Construction, Group Five, Murray & Roberts Holdings, and Steffanutti Stocks construction companies were found to have been involved in collusive tendering while building stadia for the event. As part of the settlement agreement, they paid a total of R1.5 billion towards South Africa’s government development projects (Brandt, 2017:1). Also, Kaizer Chiefs Football Manager, Bobby Motaung, and five other coaccused were charged with fraud, corruption, and forgery relating to the R1.2 billion Mbombela stadium construction tenders (Mashego and Yende, 2016:1). Hartley (2016) gives a detailed account of the corrupt activities in the awarding of the FIFA Football World Cup to a host nation. His work indicates that most host nations have either paid a bribe to the FIFA Executive Committee or have promised to pay once the tournament has been hosted. What remains crucial and unique about the Brazilian protests as opposed to most protests in the developing world is that many actors (youths, civil society, students, and residents) took part – signalling different grievances countrywide. Another crucial difference is that most communities in Brazil stood up and expressed

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their disenchantment with the government by organising protests during the tournament and eventually clashing with the police. Furthermore, the active participation of the youth in the Brazilian protests is remarkable because the protests were not about issues directly related to the youth (Alonso and Mischke, 2017:144). The youth mostly joined in out of solidarity. A similar wave of student protests (widely referred to as the #FeesMustFall and #RhodesMustFall movements) emerged in South Africa around 2015–2016. These protests, however, explicitly focused on student concerns such as academic exclusion, lack of student access, and lack of accommodation. The students’ demands included the call for free education, and the complete removal of statues that were associated with colonialism, imperialism, and apartheid.

Lessons to be learned by Africa from its South American twin (Brazil) While it can be argued that Brazil and most African states have had similar experiences regarding protest action, some questions remain like how Brazil succeeded in addressing its difficulties in a uniquely ‘Brazilian way’ (White, 2013:117). The pertinent question is, what lessons can South Africa, and possibly other African states, learn from Brazil? This question relates to dealing with issues such as corruption and other social challenges. Starting with the first similar experience, it is crucial to emphasise that both South Africa (and other African states) and Brazil have had to grapple with issues of neoliberalism and inequality. Neoliberalism is at the centre of economic, social, and political contradictions in many developing countries (Brazil and South Africa included). To this end, de Queiroz Ribeiro and dos Santos Junior (2017:911) contend that neoliberalism inevitably triggers conflicts and contradictions. Frequently, while a move to free market-oriented policies may lead to income generation as opposed to a centralised government-led intervention, transitional challenges associated with the move often create social and economic inequality – thereby widening the gap between the rich and the poor. Inequality seems to be standing out as one of the main contributors to protests. In Brazil, inequality and poor infrastructure stood out as the main challenges facing the Brazilians in the 2013 protests. In South Africa, finding sustainable and long-lasting solutions to different forms of inequality (be they economic or social) has proven to be elusive.

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The second similar experience is that South Africa (and other African states) and Brazil have had presidents who have been implicated in, charged, and in Brazil’s case sentenced for, corrupt activities. Former Brazilian leader Luiz Inácio Lula da Silva was given a 12-year jail term for corruption. Da Silva was arrested in April 2018 on charges relating to corruption and money laundering. These include, but are not limited to, accepting a beachfront apartment from a construction firm in exchange for favours. Da Silva was also nominated as a presidential candidate for the October 2018 presidential elections while serving a 12-year sentence for corruption. The former South African president (Jacob Zuma) was accused of spending an exorbitant amount of money to cover ‘security’ upgrades to his homestead in Nkandla. More than R240 million of taxpayers’ money was spent on renovations and security upgrades. Because prices were inflated and the money was used irresponsibly and unlawfully, Zuma was subsequently ordered to pay R7.81 million towards the costs that were incurred on ‘non-security’ upgrades. Unlike in Brazil, no arrests were made, however. The interesting difference is that while Lula da Silva became Brazil’s first ex-president to be jailed on a criminal conviction, Jacob Zuma has not been implicated by the much-criticised Arms Procurement Commission which was set up to investigate allegations of fraud, corruption, impropriety, or irregularity in the Strategic Defence Procurement Packages (SDPP) or ‘Arms Deal’. The Arms Deal involved South Africa’s procurement of four frigates, three submarines, helicopters, jet training aircraft, and Gripen fighter jets in 1999. The Deal was initially estimated to cost R30 billion (Jordan, 2012:1), but the total cost later ballooned to an estimated R70 billion (Jordan, 2012). In response, a commission was established to investigate allegations of a multiplicity of corrupt practices that engulfed the procurement process. It should be noted that corruption charges have been reinstated and Jacob Zuma appeared before the Pietermaritzburg High Court where he faces charges of corruption, fraud, money laundering, and racketeering related to alleged bribes during the deal (Eyewitness News, 2018). The other startling difference is that Brazilian protests in the main were large scale and involved more than one million people taking part in street demonstrations (Vicino and Fahlberg, 2017:1001). Given this magnitude, the protests were then dubbed the ‘Brazilian Spring’. While protest action has been traditionally widespread, particularly Mass Democratic Movements (MDM) around the 1980s,

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a large number of protests in South Africa have recently become more localised. This, by implication, indicates that more recently, issues that are being raised tend to be unique to a particular locality, and not the country as a whole (Mottiar, 2013). What is slightly similar in the South African case is the Fees Must Fall movement and its associated protests. This distinct, radical, impactful, and nationwide series of protests affected all higher education institutions in the country. Because Brazil has the highest rate of urbanisation in the world (Vicino and Fahlberg, 2017), it is understandable why most protests there were taking place in urban spaces. Protests are centred on urban transformations in Brazil due in part to the fact that 80 per cent of Brazil’s inhabitants were already staying in urban areas by 2000 (Vicino and Fahlberg, 2017:1002). These protests have typically had no specific spatial (geographical) focus. However, in South Africa, the intensity of protests does not differ between rural or semi-rural spaces and urban or semi-urban areas. In Brazil, unlike in most African states where a state of lawlessness is slowly creeping in, bold steps were taken, and a high level of decisiveness became evident when the former president (Dilma Rousseff) was impeached. Following a surge of social protests, a hugely controversial impeachment process unfolded. Different views were expressed by various scholars concerning the rationale behind the impeachment of the president – debating whether it was merely a political ploy based on spurious grounds or a decision based on the president’s inability to provide basic services to the poor. Firstly, Santos and Guarnieri (2016:485) critically explored the conditions that gave rise to the impeachment. In their exploration, they discovered that Rousseff’s impeachment could not be understood without being viewed jointly with the protests that grew in the second half of her first term in office (2011–2014). This view holds that the impeachment is inextricably linked to the countrywide protests that came to be known as the ‘June 2013 protests’, mentioned above. At that juncture, Rousseff’s approval ratings of her leadership diminished drastically – inevitably paving the way for various reactions, particularly from the poor. A diminishing Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and rising inflation had infuriated the Brazilians. Admittedly, a second view that was expressed in this context attributes the impeachment solely to the uncontrollable political crisis that existed in Brazil (Avritzer, 2017:352). This political crisis can be interpreted in two ways: first,

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the collapse of the coalition presidential system associated with the ascension of a conservative group within the National Congress led by Edwardo Cunha, second, the crisis of representation expressed by the increase of illegal campaign financing and the influence of money in Congress. (Avritzer, 2017:352)

Avritzer (2017) further contends that the coalition-based presidential system was marred by rising costs and dysfunctional nominations for top administrative positions. While Brazil’s democracy is relatively young compared to the industrialised countries, a third view was expressed: that the said political crisis was mainly attributed to an institutional crisis (Júnior, 2017:365). The institutional crisis manifested itself through considerably weakening the legitimacy of the key institutions of democracy. Brazil acted swiftly by impeaching the president. Similar dissatisfaction and popular responses arose in South Africa (though with a different outcome) when former President Jacob Zuma tried to challenge one of the key democratic institutions (the Office of the Public Protector) through a review process. The president did this after realising that his name was implicated in the Public Protector’s report known as the ‘State of Capture’ report. The report gave a detailed account of the nature and extent of large-scale corruption in South Africa. While he failed in challenging the Office of the Public Protector, Jacob Zuma has managed to overturn some charges laid against him including a rape charge. Although he managed to overturn several other charges by citing political meddling, some of these have since been reinstated (Eyewitness News, 2018). Contrary to Brazil’s successful yet controversial impeachment, attempting the removal of the president through a parliamentary process in South Africa has proven to be a futile exercise. First, after several motions of no confidence against the former president, Jacob Zuma, the president continued and survived. Persistent calls for the president to step down through tendering a resignation did not initially yield the intended results. However, despite him being so obstinately intent on keeping his presidential position, significant changes started to unfold after the ANC’s National Elective Conference wherein the then former deputy president (Cyril Ramaphosa) was elected as the leader. In the aftermath of the 54th National Elective Conference in Nasrec (Johannesburg), infighting and pressure within the former president’s (Jacob Zuma) political party intensified – thereby calling for

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him to resign. The president eventually succumbed to pressure and resigned as per the order of the ruling party’s National Executive Committee (NEC). Though it was perceived as a monumental victory, it only happened after failed attempts by his party’s integrity committee to force him to step down. A trend of presidents not finishing their terms of office in South Africa and Africa is also developing. This after the former president (Thabo Mbeki) resigned in 2008 after mounting pressure from his political party. Virtually the same as in South Africa, significant changes also took place in leadership in Brazil when a new president (Jair Bolsonaro) with a strong military background was elected. This new development (widely described as precarious and regressive for Brazil) has attracted attention from the international community. While he has not been in office for a long time, the president (Jair Bolsonaro) is already widely described as a far-right, pro-gun, and pro-torture populist (The Guardian, 2018:1). Such a description is primarily based on his military background (as a former paratrooper/army captain). In the main, Bolsonaro’s policy directions have been completely opposed to Brazil’s current policy position. This is based on the fact that he adamantly and defiantly defends dictatorship, unfairly criticises women, and is in full support of the relaxation of gun laws (The Guardian, 2018). Inevitably, in a long run, the relaxation of gun laws suggests that most people will easily possess guns which can subsequently have serious political repercussions or consequences for the country. Brazil can possibly expect more social protests. However, going forward, it will certainly be interesting to see whether these descriptions are genuine or are based on spurious grounds. Second, former President of Zimbabwe, Robert Mugabe, was finally removed from office in what became known as a soft coup that was orchestrated by the military. Not only did this receive attention from the international community, but it was arguably a landmark achievement in the fight to advance and consolidate multiparty rule in Zimbabwe. Mugabe’s reluctance to leave office prompted him to be given an option to resign or face impeachment. After his removal as president of the country, Mugabe echoed the sentiment that it was a coup, stating: ‘I say it was a coup d’état – some people have refused to call it a coup d’état … We must undo this disgrace we have imposed on ourselves’ (IOL Africa News, 2018:1). Emmerson Mnangagwa was appointed as acting president of Zimbabwe after that. Mnangagwa later won the highly contested 2018 presidential elections. In the aftermath of the elections, violence broke out, and

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the protests led by the Movement for Democratic Change Alliance (MDC-Alliance) took place throughout the country. The opposition did not want to accept the results arguing that gross irregularities marred the election. Third, in 2017, Kenya was forced to rerun its highly contested presidential elections after the Supreme Court nullified the first results based on the number of irregularities and illegalities that were found. This was the first time that a court invalidated the re-election of an incumbent president in Africa (International Foundation for Electoral Systems (IFES), 2017). The opposition party leader (Raila Odinga) spearheaded the move to nullify the results. The current president (Uhuru Kenyatta) managed to win the controversial rerun of the elections by a landslide victory (98.25 per cent) after the opposition leader refused to participate, and consequently only received a meagre 0.96 per cent of the vote (Said-Moorhouse, Cullinane, and Duggan, 2017). In 2015, a similar incident happened in Burundi when President Pierre Nkurunziza won the presidential elections for the third time in a row. The opposition party boycotted the election, which was marred by unprecedented violence.

Conclusion This chapter has argued that the involvement of the BRICS (notably Brazil and South Africa) countries in mega-events can be interpreted as an attempt to assert themselves as regional hegemons and is used to advance neoliberalism and globalisation. This is particularly so because instead of addressing local concerns such as poverty and inequality, these countries have shifted scarce state resources to hosting mega-events. The hosting of these events has continued unabated notwithstanding massive protests, corruption, rising social inequality, and abject poverty. Therefore, using ‘accumulation by dispossession’, BRICS’ strong commitment to hosting mega-events suggests nothing but a ploy to rob the poor and enrich the already wealthy. The only way in which to raise these concerns has been through social protests. The chapter argued that social protests are a global phenomenon and are mainly geared towards fighting capitalism, globalisation, and neoliberalism. It is thus not surprising why opposition to neoliberalism and globalisation features high on the agenda of social movements in both Africa and Brazil.

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Brazil and South Africa are confronted with severe large-scale corruption. The heads of state have been implicated in corruptionrelated activities. However, a valuable lesson is that Brazil’s legal and political system seems to be more efficient and decisive than the South African one. This assertion is supported by Brazil’s successful arrest of the former president and the impeachment of a president. To the African continent, these classic examples can go a long way in terms of addressing most challenges such as a weak justice system in Africa. Strengthening the legal system is also crucial to arrest the perpetrators of violence – be it election violence or political violence. This also serves to deal with presidents who refuse to leave office even if their terms have expired. Because of the growing cost of living, the citizens of both continents find it difficult to be patient.

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Santos, F. and Guarnieri, F., 2016, ‘From protest to parliamentary coup: An overview of Brazil’s recent history’. Journal of Latin American Cultural Studies, 25(4), 485–494. Smith, J., Plummer, S., and Hughes, M.M., 2016, ‘Transnational social movements and changing organizational fields in the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries’. Available at: https://pdfs. semanticscholar.org/adc1/ bcfb92536386b7f66de 3f922c33a5c00c957.pdf. Accessed on: 25 June 2018. Sutcliffe, J., 2012, ‘Labour movements in the global South: A prominent role in struggles against neoliberal globalization?’ Interface: A Journal for and about Social Movements, 4(2), 52–60. The Telegraph, 2010, ‘World Cup could be disrupted by violent housing protests’. 10 March, Available at: https:// www.telegraph.co.uk/sport/ football/world-cup/7413494/ World-Cup-could-be-disruptedby-violent-housing-protests.html. Accessed on: 13 November 2018. Vanden, H.E., Funke, P.N., and Prevost, G., 2017, The New Global Politics: Global Social Movements in the Twenty-First Century. London: Routledge. Veith, M., 2010, ‘Thousands protest against World Cup spending’. Mail & Guardian,

16 June. Available at: https:// mg.co.za/article/2010-06-16thousands-protest-against-worldcup-spending. Accessed on: 20 September 2018. Vicino, T.J. and Fahlberg, A., 2017, ‘The politics of contested urban space: The 2013 protest movement in Brazil’. Journal of Urban Affairs, 39(7), 1001–1016. Weipert-Fenner, I. and Wolff, J., 2016, ‘Unemployed Movements in Global South: The cases of Argentina and Tunisia’. Available at: https:// www.academia.edu/32319118/ Unemployed_Movements_ in_the_Global_South_The_ caseof_Argentina_and_Tunisia_ Working_Papers. Accessed on: 16 June 2018. White, L., 2013, ‘Emerging powers in Africa: Is Brazil any different?’ South African Journal of International Affairs, 20(1), 117–136. Winter, B. and Teixeira, M., 2014, ‘Brazil police, protesters clash as World Cup begins’. Reuters, 12 June, Available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/ us-brazil-worldcup-protests/ brazil-police-protestersclash-as-world-cup-beginsidUSKBN0EN1DD20140612. Accessed on: 5 October 2018. Winters, M.S. and Weitz-Shapiro, R., 2014, ‘Partisan protesters and nonpartisan protests in Brazil’. Journal of Politics in Latin America, 6(1), 137–150.

11 Indian land acquisitions in Ethiopia: a wolf in sheep’s clothing? Lwando Mthamo and Mbekezeli Mkhize

The global economy experienced a recession in 2008 which resulted in food shortages in some parts of the world. To remedy this food security threat, some developed and developing countries were compelled to acquire vast tracts of land, mainly from the global South, for agricultural purposes. Against this backdrop, this chapter explores Indian land acquisitions in Ethiopia and seeks to decide whether India’s actions are different from other international powers that have vested interests in Africa. Also, the chapter evaluates whether India’s purported solidarity with Africa strengthens or undermines progressive combined political forces in different African countries. Despite being one of the world’s oldest and biggest democracies, India is silent on Ethiopia’s dismal human rights record against its citizens who resist the statesanctioned forced land dispossessions and stand up for the right to land ownership. The Ethiopian case is remarkable because Ethiopia is a focal point of land grabs in Africa (Kaschika, 2011:24). States in the international system purport to act in ways that protect and advance the national interest of their citizens in all their interactions with other state actors. The actions of the Ethiopian government illustrate how, in some cases, the state apparatus is used by the ruling elite to advance their own interests. The phenomenon of land grabbing is not new in Africa when one considers colonialism. Almost all African countries have experienced land grabs in one way or another. While most studies (cf. Borras Jr et al., 2012:845; Anseeuw, n.d.:3; Hall, 2011; Odusola, 2014) posit that land grabs are taking place in many parts of the world (Latin America, the Caribbean, Australia, Europe), it has become apparent that Africa is by far the softest target. With 948 land acquisitions covering 161.7 million hectares located in Africa, it makes the continent the biggest target. Odusola (2014:1) posits that in 2009 about two-thirds (39.7 million hectares) of land was acquired in subSaharan Africa – representing 48 per cent of the total land projects or deals. Africa’s land is typically seen as under-utilised, free, cheap, available, and empty (Chasukwa, 2013; Future Agriculture, 2011).

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Although land grabs are occurring globally, as mentioned there is an evident North–South dynamic that resembles the land grabs that underwrote colonialism and imperialism (Okuro, 2015:106). This implies that land grabs are intertwined with neo-colonialism, even exhibiting the same patterns of dispossession. Harvey (2003:74) argues that accumulation by dispossession involves the commodification and privatisation of land, the forceful expulsion of peasant populations from their land, and the conversion of various forms of property rights into exclusive private property rights. The Indian land acquisitions in Ethiopia are an example of accumulation by dispossession. The chapter seeks to understand why African countries (Ethiopia in particular) have become fertile ground for contemporary land acquisitions. It does this by attempting to respond to the following questions: Why is Africa the primary target of land grabs? Why did India specifically target Ethiopia? What are the responses from the grassroots movements in Ethiopia? The purpose of this chapter is therefore five-fold. First, it begins by providing an overview of Indian land acquisitions in Ethiopia. Second, the chapter discusses the land grabs that are taking place beyond Ethiopian borders in an attempt to identify similarities and differences. Third, the chapter discusses the land grabs that are taking place between African states (intra-continental land grabs). Fourth, it looks at the role of the European Union in the land grabs in the global South. Fifth, the chapter analyses the resistance from grassroots movements.

Indian land acquisitions in Ethiopia: an overview India’s relationship with Ethiopia in particular, and Africa in general dates back to the era of colonialism. After gaining its independence, India embarked on a campaign to assist colonised nations in attaining their independence. Ethiopia is an exception to this because it is one of the few countries in Africa that were never colonised or only partially colonised. However, its participation and membership in the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) created space for it to interact with India. Even during this period, India had commercial interests in Ethiopia and the first Indian company in Ethiopia was a textile mill set up in 1959 by the Birla Group (Athukorala, 2009:130). The rise of liberalism compelled India to revise its outlook on foreign issues. One key feature of India’s foreign policy is

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the acquisition of resources that are pivotal for its economic growth (Hules and Singh, 2017:334). In the aftermath of the Cold War, many countries embarked on economic liberalisation to meet the demands of globalisation. Beyene (2011:91) asserts that economic liberalisation, globalisation, and the increasing role of sovereign funds took centre stage focusing on maximising profits and securing energy and food security for their countries. India was no exception to this global phenomenon and accordingly initiated a revision of its own economic policies. The shift in policy affected India’s approach towards African countries. Taylor (2012:782) argues that both economic and political considerations now motivate contemporary Indo-African relations. The issue of land ownership in Ethiopia is highly contentious. The bone of contention emanates from the fact that the government holds all the rights to land ownership. In turn, this renders the peasants vulnerable to land grabs and displacement through their lack of ownership of the land upon which their livelihoods depend. Edelman, Oya, and Borras (2013:1521) argue that historically, land grabbing has been created and informed by earlier processes of political contention, long-standing patterns of land tenure and use, and pre-existing social formations. The government of Ethiopia has retained the land ownership policies of the previous regimes. Tura (2018:248) asserts that the Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF), which came into power in 1995, continues with the policy of state ownership of land that was adopted in 1975. However, the EPRDF, when it ascended into power, had applied measures that sought to redress the imbalances of the past as far as land ownership is concerned. To achieve this objective, the government decentralised power by granting power to federal states to administer their own land (Hall et al., 2015). As mentioned, in 2008 the world experienced a global recession which ultimately resulted in food insecurity in some countries and triggered a global rush for agricultural land. This culminated in developed and developing countries acquiring vast tracts of land in the underdeveloped countries. Furthermore, neoliberal conditions have resulted in the rise of a global corporate food regime that relies upon the narrative of global development and has become one of its main tools for accumulation by dispossession (Caceres, 2015:118). India as a populous developing country was no exception to this land rush. Regarding Indian activities in Ethiopia, Rahmato (2014:32) asserts that due to the extent of the dominance of Indian capital in

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Ethiopia, the land rush of 2008–2011 may well be described as the ‘Indian Scramble for Ethiopia’. Furthermore, Indian engagements in South–South cooperation positioned it to invest in agricultural projects in the global South. For Anwar (2014:40), Indian interests in Africa are informed by the need to improve food security in India through production and access to food grains, diversifying sources of natural resources, and securing new markets. India’s strategy of South–South cooperation encompasses extracting critical resources for its economy while maintaining the principles of solidarity, respect, non-interference in domestic affairs, and sustainable development (Hules and Singh, 2017:344). African governments engaged in development strategies which had investor attraction as their objectives. Hall et al. (2015:10) point out that African governments involved in land deals vary in democratic credentials, strategies for attracting FDI and the levels of land concentration they control. However, as different as they can be in form, land grabs have the same effect on the peasant population, i.e. dispossession and displacement. The purpose of the pursuit of foreign direct investment (FDI) was to boost the stagnant economies of the countries concerned. This was visualised through the promotion of investor-friendly land market policies in the form of low land rents, tax waivers, and limited restrictions on production and exports (Moreda, 2017:699). The Ethiopian government’s policies offered no exception to this trend. Paradoxically, these land acquisitions, which were intended to boost the food security of foreign countries, occurred in the context of severe food shortages in Ethiopia. Hules and Singh (2017:346) argue that foreign companies, through their land acquisitions, reinforce food insecurity and dependence on foreign aid. Moreover, the government prioritised foreign investments regardless of their impact on land tenure for the indigenous people (Beyene, 2011:98). Hules and Singh (2017:346) observe that land grabs by foreign multinational companies (MNCs) in Ethiopia perpetuated food insecurity and deepened dependence on international food aid. This culminated in discontent among the peasants and fuelled animosity towards the government. As already mentioned, India’s land acquisitions in Ethiopia have been met with resistance from certain quarters of Ethiopian civil society. Such resistance emanates from the fact that the Ethiopian government in its quest to entice investors disregarded the welfare of the peasants. The government overlooked the impact of the massive land acquisitions on the livelihoods of the peasants.

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Moreover, the Ethiopian government does not ensure that the Ethiopian people reap tangible benefits from land acquisitions. In this context, Tura (2018:254) argues that private investors should be obliged to produce crops that would contribute to meeting the local and national food priorities. That is, the government should put measures in place to ensure that the relationship between investors and the country is mutually beneficial. Yassin (2010:38) argues that land acquisitions should fulfil the investment gap of the country, and the investment objectives of investors should be reconciled with the investment priorities of the country. The Ethiopian government views land purchases by foreign companies as a crucial aspect of Ethiopia’s development objectives. Regardless of the government’s motives, the outcomes of its land acquisition programme have had dire consequences for the peasants. According to the Oakland Institute (2016:5), the Ethiopian government’s development strategy is detrimental to the coping strategies of the indigenous people, destroys natural resources, and impacts the livelihoods of millions. The above observations support the notion that land acquisitions are only for the benefit of the ruling elite. The post-independence leaders of underdeveloped countries’ conduct have exacerbated the underdevelopment of their countries. Aseka (1993:203) argues that ‘the relationship between imperialism and underdevelopment is defined as the extent to which the state protection holds back the development of the productive force’. Frequently, this manifests itself through the ruling elite’s protection of the owners of the means of production for their selfish interests and to the detriment of the working class. By and large, this is the case regarding the Ethiopian land deals. The unequal trading terms between developed and underdeveloped countries continue to aggravate underdevelopment in the global South. This is informed by the fact that the profits gained from the exploitation of the underdeveloped countries are repatriated to the economies of the developed countries, and little is ploughed back into the economies of the underdeveloped countries (Olutayo and Omobowale, 2007:104). Inevitably, this perpetuates a situation where there is insufficient revenue for governments to implement development programmes. Thus, MNCs are one of the primary causes of underdevelopment in underdeveloped countries. One of the factors that contribute to this is the fact that there are no policy commitments to protect Ethiopian peasants and pastoralists from the growing number of land grabs taking place (Grain, 2013:6).

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As highlighted, the Ethiopian government embarked on a campaign to attract investors to Ethiopia at all costs, with the Ethiopian government viewing international investments and land lease deals as a means of boosting development (Cochrane, 2011). This had negative repercussions for Ethiopia’s peasantry. This is partly due to the top-down approach by the government when it comes to land deals. Rahmato (2014:33) points out that decision-making is not inclusive since all major economic decisions are made by the elite with no prior consultation with the public and stakeholders. Land is a pivotal issue for most Ethiopians who depend on agricultural production for their income and subsistence (Mohammed and Inoue, 2014). Inevitably, this has led to discontent and resistance.

Land grabs beyond Ethiopian borders The issue of land grabs is not unique to Ethiopia, but the circumstances under which land grabs occur differ from country to country. The developed countries from the North and recently countries from the South, in their quest for food security, have descended upon the lands of the global South. Land grabs are a common occurrence in Africa and Latin America, albeit on a different scale. Borras and colleagues (2012:859) argue that the extent of Latin American land acquisitions by investors from outside the region, especially those involving foreign governments, is not as significant as it is in Africa. The reason for this discrepancy lies in the insecurity of peasant land tenure coupled with rampant corruption in Africa. This has resulted in foreign capital seizing control of vast amounts of land either by outright purchase or via long-term leases and removal of peasants from the land (Magdoff, 2013:7).

Latin America Land grabs in Latin America have assumed a character of their own, which is different from the other regions of the global South. This is because, in Latin America, the leading investors in land and agriculture are domestic elites (Borras et al., 2012:861; Garcia, 2017). This partially neutralises the effect of the land grabs in the sense that there are no repatriations of profits from the periphery to the core countries, as is the case in Africa. However, the neoliberalism that informs the land grabs and the development trajectory has the same adverse effect on the livelihoods of the peasant population even in Latin America. Amin (2017:612) argues that what he

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terms ‘lumpen development’ has culminated in a social disorder of growing poverty and exclusion, migrant labour, unemployment, and oppression of women. Thus, the development aspirations of the Latin American governments via land investments have had dire consequences for the land-dependent local populations. Brazil, for example, is one of the countries in Latin America that has been plagued by land grabs. In Brazil, the struggle against the skewed distribution of land has been ongoing for a long period (Grain, 2015). The situation is exacerbated by the lack of a clear, coherent, and well-coordinated land use policy. Reydon et al. (2015) posit that in Brazil one of the major problems pertaining to land use is the lack of regulatory mechanisms regarding the use and occupation of rural and urban land. In Brazil, local companies are also complicit in land grabs. For example, Suzano, a Brazilian pulp and paper company, invested heavily in the Mapito region and the states of Maranho, Piaui, and Tocantins to the detriment of local farmers who suffered strong pressure to sell or lease their land (Wilkinson, Reydon, and Di Sabbato, 2012:433).

Tanzania Land grabs have occurred throughout the African continent and Tanzania is no exception to this. Tanzania has responded to the global land rush by allocating land for agricultural and energy production through foreign and domestic direct investments (Massay, 2017:122). This is informed by the notion that African governments viewed land deals as a foundation and catalyst for economic growth. In most cases, the Tanzanian state’s approach to land grabbing has been conducted under the guise of nature conservation (Exner et al., 2015:654). The Tanzanian government has used nature conservation as a guise for land grabs. These government-led conservation processes culminated in the dispossession of land and the destruction of the livelihoods of the peasants and capital accumulation by capitalists (Benjaminsen and Bryceson, 2012:336). Thus, the tendency of African governments to prioritise the interests of foreign investors over those of the local people is also present in Tanzania. Hall (2011:15) argues that in its alacrity to boost tourism, the Tanzanian government has excluded the local people from beaches, marine resources, game farms, safaris, and hunting. Kenya In Kenya as in other countries in the global South, particularly in Africa, the majority of the population is land-dependent. Land grabs

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in Kenya can dispossess multitudes of small-scale farmers since more than 60 per cent of the population are small farmers (Okuro, 2015:115). Thus, even in Kenya, the section of society that stands to lose the most in land deals is the peasants who depend on the land for their livelihoods. The Kenyan government, in line with the conduct of most governments involved in land deals, lacks transparency and accountability when brokering these deals (Klopp, 2000:9). The lack of transparency and accountability creates fertile ground for corruption. Klopp and Lumumba (2014:58) argue that those who stand to benefit from these processes regarding soliciting payments and accessing land are bureaucrats, politicians, and their financiers as well as the lawyers, surveyors, and developers who assist them.

Intra-continental land grabs: an African experience Historically, land grabs have been understood to be between the countries of the North and those from the South. However, recent times have seen the emergence of intra-continental land grabs. The process of African states acquiring land in other African states for commercial agriculture is a novelty in Africa. In 2004, the Republic of Congo (Brazzaville) granted 10 million hectares of fertile land to South African farmers to grow staple food crops for export (Okuro, 2015:107). The South African farmers acquired the land for free, were exempt from taxes and import duties for five years, and could repatriate the profits (Brand SA, 2009). South African agricultural companies are gradually expanding into other African states in pursuit of cheap access to productive lands. An example is the two South African companies Illovo and Tongaat Hulett that are engaged in land acquisitions for sugar cane and ethanol production in numerous countries in the South African Development Community (SADC) region (Hall, 2011:15). Another case in point is that of Libyan land acquisitions in Mali. In 2008 Libya and Mali reached an agreement for the lease of 100,000 hectares of prime agricultural land for 50 years to a Libyan company Malibya (Larder, 2015:842–843). The Libyan agricultural investment in Mali was informed by food security concerns emanating from the fact that Libya lacks sufficient arable land. Libya sought to harvest mainly rice to be exported to Libyan consumers. In return, Libya had promised to develop irrigated crops (Grain, 2012:4). The construction of an irrigation canal by Malibya caused displacement and disrupted the livelihoods of the local people who

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had inhabited the land in question (Oakland Institute, 2011:28). Ultimately, the consequences of the Libyan land grabs in Mali were not much different from those caused by the countries from outside the continent.

The role of the European Union in land grabs in the global South In most cases, land grabs are shrouded in controversy and secrecy. As a result, many European countries avoid being directly involved in land deals. De Schutter (2011:252) argues that some rich countries shield the land deals they are involved in from public scrutiny to ensure that they benefit as much as possible, often to the detriment of the local people directly affected by the investment. The European Union (EU) as the continental body responsible for European affairs is taking the lead in encouraging member states to invest in agriculture. Interestingly, the role of the EU in land grabs had been downplayed mainly since many investors and companies of EU origin have multiple foreign branches making it difficult to link them to the EU (Hands on the Land for Food Sovereignty Alliance, 2017:10). This helps explain the low-key role of the EU as far as narratives about land grabs are concerned. However, the EU through its energy policies is directly and indirectly encouraging land grabs for the production of agro-fuels (Graham et al., 2010:5). Moreover, it is argued that land acquisitions for agro-fuel production are a clear case of land grabbing as they involve the concentration of land for commercial export purposes (EuropAfrica, 2011:6). Thus, the EU’s role in land grabbing needs to be explicitly acknowledged.

Resistance from grassroots movements The Ethiopian government in its eagerness to lure investors to invest in the Ethiopian economy had overlooked the impact of the land deals on the livelihoods of the land-dependent rural majority. This has been met with resistance by the rural peasantry. Various underlying factors cause the resistance. Chief among these is the lack of consultation and transparency concerning land deals. Rahmato (2014:33) argues that the leasing out of large parcels of

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land to investors while excluding local people consolidates state power to the detriment of the small land users. The government is taking decisions that are crucial to the livelihoods of peasants without consultation. This exclusion was institutionalised into the state structure. Lavers (2016:1098) argues that the rise of the importance of agricultural investments led to the federal government’s re-centralised control at the expense of the regional administrations. Characteristically, this served to ensure that decision-making was based on the top-down approach. Ethiopian civil society started to mobilise to protest the land deals effectively. Nally (2015:343) argues that the politicisation of land grabs through the work of civil society organisations in exposing foreign investors has culminated in efforts to regulate investments. When the aggrieved Ethiopian peasants and civil society groups tried to protest this injustice, they were brutally suppressed by their government through state-sponsored violence. India, under the veil of South–South cooperation, successfully acquired vast tracts of Ethiopian land for meagre prices. Ethiopian activists even went to Delhi to urge Indian investors and corporations to stop buying land and to actively prevent human rights abuses being committed by the Ethiopian authorities (Vidal, 2013:2). Thus, the Indian government is faced with difficult choices to support the investors and companies and help them shape policies of inclusion in order to make successful land deals (Micheal and Baumann, 2016:129). The approach to resistance occurs in many forms and differs from case to case. In accordance with this, Hall et al. (2015:471) argue that social groups that are expelled from their lands through land deals do not necessarily mobilise and embark on resistance. This is informed by various factors such as the circumstances under which the land dispossession occurs. Edelman, Oya, and Borras (2013:1519) point out that people are not automatically expelled from their lands as some are absorbed into contract farming schemes. Effectively, this neutralises the resistance to land deals as they are mutually beneficial to both parties. However, investors in some instances trigger local resistance to land deals through their conduct towards the local people. Hindeya (2018:28) argues that in some cases local resistance occurs due to investors’ failure to deliver on promised benefits to local people. The Ethiopian government is complicit in triggering local resentment towards land deals. This is illustrated by the government’s failure to reinvest the profits gained from leasing land to private investors

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by rehabilitating and economically empowering local people (Tura, 2018:254). Inevitably, this results in resistance by the local people as there are no concessions that accrue to them for their land. In response to the local people’s resistance, the government has resorted to coercive measures (Oakland Institute, 2013:8). These coercive measures include suppression of protests by military force and unlawful abduction of the leaders of the resistance movements. Micheal and Baumann (2016:127) argue that the increasing level of local resistance, including violent unrest against land deals, highlights the failure of Ethiopia’s strategy. This is informed by the fact that land is a precious asset in Ethiopia, hence land leasing is highly contentious (Nalepa, 2013:1). Therefore, the decision by the Ethiopian government to enter land deals without the consent of the majority whose livelihoods stand to be adversely affected by these deals called for resistance. Furthermore, Borras and Franco (2013:1732) observe that struggles against expulsion from the land have accompanied the histories of peoples worldwide, whether in the context of ‘primitive accumulation’ or ‘accumulation by dispossession’. The land grabs occurring in Ethiopia are a classic example of the notion of accumulation by dispossession. Harvey (2003:145) posits that the monopoly of violence and the authority to define what is legal confers to the state the powers to propagate and support accumulation by dispossession. In Ethiopia, the state through the introduction of policies and legislation aimed at advancing Indian companies’ interests has been at the forefront of accumulation by dispossession of its peasant population. This results in the collapse of the pre-capitalist modes of social reproduction which then force the peasants to be dependent on the markets (Negi and Auerbach, 2009:101). The Ethiopian peasants found themselves in a position where they were compelled to either seek work in the Indian-run plantations or to migrate to the urban areas for better employment opportunities. Conflicts ensued among the various groups affected by land deals due to class interests. In accordance with this Hall et al. (2015:472) observe that many of these conflicts are between smallholders whose livelihoods are under threat from a land deal, absentee plot holders who eagerly agree to lease land to investors, and landless and migrant workers who gladly welcome the arrival of cooperatives that promise to provide employment. Thus, the issue of land deals and how they are administered is a cause for conflict between the class divisions evident among the poor local people. This serves as an advantage

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to the government and foreign companies. This is informed by the fact that without unity the local people have no power to resist the land deals. Developing countries need to take the lead in ensuring that their resources are beneficial to the indigenous people. Magdoff (2013:16) argues that countries need to take control of their agriculture away from international and market forces and support the development of national food sovereignty based on family-size farms or larger farm cooperatives. This would potentially culminate in equitable access to land and the eradication of poverty. In Ethiopia, this would be the ideal way to ensure cordial relations between the peasants and the state. There are a few cases whereby a government has introduced reforms in favour of the local people. Bolivia is one of the few countries that introduced land reforms which influenced how resources are allocated, and social differences are addressed (Fontana, 2014:298). In the African context, Malawi is one of the countries that had implemented land reform programmes for the benefit of the rural peasantry. The Malawian government’s land reform programme drastically raised land holdings, agricultural output, and the crop-specific land productivity of beneficiary groups (Mendole and Simtowe, 2015:66). These examples illustrate the feasibility of land reforms when there is political will from the government.

Conclusion This chapter has demonstrated the role of the Indian government and MNCs in encouraging the displacement and accumulation by dispossession of Ethiopian peasants. The complicity of the Ethiopian government in facilitating the land deals that displaced and dispossessed Ethiopians is a cause for concern. In its quest to attract foreign direct investments through the leasing of land the government prioritised foreign interests over the interests of its citizens. Furthermore, in its dealings with the government of Ethiopia, the Indian government pursued its national interests, especially economic interests, and disregarded the consequences of their actions on the Ethiopian people (Taylor, 2012:783). India has successfully extracted vital resources for its economy with scant consideration for the consequences of their actions on the human rights of the Ethiopians. It has been able to achieve this through projecting principles of solidarity, respect, and non-interference in the internal

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affairs of another state. However, India’s conduct in Ethiopia has been contrary to these stated principles. This is informed by the fact that Indian state-supported MNCs’ activities in Ethiopia are characterised by the pursuit of self-interests with no regard for Ethiopian peasants.

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Edelman, M., Oya, C., and Borras, S.M., 2013, ‘Global land grabs: Historical processes, theoretical and methodological implications and current trajectories’. Third World Quarterly, 34(9), 1517–1531. EuropAfrica, 2011, ‘(Bio) fueling injustice? Europe’s responsibility to counter climate change without provoking land grabbing and compounding food insecurity in Africa’. The EuropAfrica 2011 Monitoring Report on EU Policy Coherence for Food Security. Exner, A., Bartels, L.E., Windhaber, M., Fritz, S., See, L., Politti, E., and Hochleithner, S., 2015, ‘Constructing landscapes of value: Capitalist investment for the acquisition of marginal or unused land. The case of Tanzania’. Land Use Policy, 42, 652–663. Fontana, L.B., 2014, ‘Indigenous peoples vs peasant unions: Land conflicts and rural movements in plurinational Bolivia’. Journal of Peasant Studies, 41(3), 297–319. Future Agriculture, 2011, ‘Land grabbing in Africa and the new politics of food’. Policy Brief 41. Available at: www.futureagriculture.org. Accessed on: 5 October 2018. Garcia, V.V., 2017, ‘Land grabbing in Mexico: Extent, scale, purpose and novelty’. Revista Mexicana de Ciencias Forestales, 8 (44). Graham, A., Aubry, S., Künnemann, R., and Suárez, S.M., 2010, Land Grab Study. Available at: https://afriqueeurope-interact.net/files/englisch_ _10_fianetal_land_grab_study_ europeaninvolvement.pdf. Accessed on: 8 November 2018. Grain, 2012, ‘Land grabbing and food sovereignty in West and Central Africa’. Available at: http://www. grain-4575-landgrabbing-and-food-sovereignty-

in-west-and-central-africa.pdf. Accessed on: 4 October 2018. Grain, 2013, ‘The G8 and land grabs in Africa’. Available at: http://www.grain.org/article/ entries/4663-the-g8-and-landgrabs-in-Africa.pdf. Accessed on: 2 October 2018. Grain, 2015, ‘Foreign pension funds and land grabbing in Brazil’. Available at: https://www. grain.org/article/entries/5336foreign-pension-funds-and-landgrabbing-in-Brazil. Accessed on: 31 November 2018. Hall, R., 2011, ‘The many faces of the investor rush in southern Africa: Towards a typology of commercial land deals’. Initiatives in Critical Agrarian Studies Review Paper Series No. 2. Hall, R., Edelman, M., Borras, S.M., Scoones, I., White, B., and Wolford, W., 2015, ‘Resistance, acquiescence or incorporation? An introduction to land grabbing and political reactions “from below”’. Journal of Peasant Studies, 42(3–4), 467–488. Hands on the Land for Food Sovereignty Alliance, 2017, Land grabbing and human rights: The role of EU actors abroad. Heidelberg: FIAN International for the Hands on the Land for Food Sovereignty Alliance. Harvey, D., 2003, The ‘new’ imperialism: Accumulation by dispossession. New York: Oxford University Press. Hindeya, T.W., 2018, ‘An analysis of how large-scale agricultural land acquisitions in Ethiopia have been justified, implemented and opposed’. African Identities, 16(1), 18–34. Hules, M. and Singh, M., 2017, ‘India’s land grab deals in Ethiopia: Food security or global politics?’ Land Use Policy, 60, 343–351. Kaschika, T., 2011, ‘Land grabs in Africa’. Oxfam International.

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Klopp, J.M., 2000, ‘Pilfering the public: The problem of land grabbing in contemporary Kenya’. Africa Today, 47(1), 7–26. Klopp, J.M. and Lumumba, O., 2014, ‘Kenya and the “global land grab”: A view from below’ in Kaag, M. and Zoomers, A. (eds.) The global land grab: Beyond the hype. London: Zed Books. Larder, N., 2015, ‘Space for pluralism? Examining the Malibya land grab’. Journal of Peasant Studies, 42(3–4), 839–858. Lavers, T., 2016, ‘Agricultural investments in Ethiopia: Undermining national sovereignty or tool for state building?’ Development and Change, 47(5), 1078–1101. Magdoff, F., 2013, ‘Twentyfirst-century land grabs: Accumulation by agricultural dispossession’. Monthly Review, 65(6), 1–18. Massay, G.E., 2017, ‘Energy and food demands, drivers of land grab: A case of Rufiji River Basin in Tanzania’. Belo Horizonte, 5(2), 121–131. Mendole, M. and Simtowe, F., 2015, ‘The welfare impact of land redistribution: Evidence from a quasi-experimental initiative in Malawi’. World Development, 72, 53–69. Micheal, A. and Baumann, M.M., 2016, ‘India and the dialectics of domestic and international “land grabbing”: Historical perspectives, current debates, and the case of Ethiopia’. India Review, 15(1), 112–135. Mohammed, A.J. and Inoue, M., 2014, ‘A modified actor-poweraccountability framework (MAPAF) for analysing decentralised forest governance: Case study from Ethiopia’. Journal of Environmental Management, 139, 188–199.

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Moreda, T., 2017, ‘Large-scale acquisitions, state authority and indigenous local communities: Insights from Ethiopia’. Third World Quarterly, 38(3), 698–716. Nalepa, R.A., 2013, ‘Land for agricultural development in the era of “land grabbing”: A spatial exploration of the “marginal lands” narrative in contemporary Ethiopia’. The Land Deal Politics Initiative. Nally, D., 2015, ‘Governing precarious lives: Land grabs, geopolitics, and “food security”’. The Geographical Journal, 181(4), 340–349. Negi, R. and Auerbach, M., 2009, ‘Primitive accumulation, capitalism and development’. Human Geography, 2(3), 89–107. The Oakland Institute, 2011, ‘Understanding land investment deals in Africa: Country report: Mali’. Available at: https:// allafrica.com/download/resource/ main/main/idatcs/00021029:0d0f 31641207deae38bb314ff8a1bccd. pdf. Accessed on: 5 October 2018. The Oakland Institute, 2013, ‘Unheard voices: The human rights impact of land investments on indigenous communities in Gambella’. Available at: https://www.oaklandinstitute. org/unheard-voices-humanrights-impact-land-investmentsindigenous-communities-gambella. Accessed on: 3 October 2018. The Oakland Institute, 2016, ‘Miracle or mirage? manufacturing hunger and poverty in Ethiopia’. Available at: www.oaklandinstitute.org/ miracle-mirage-manufacturinghunger-poverty-ethiopia. Accessed on: 29 April 2019. Odusola, A.F., 2014, ‘Land grab in Africa: A review of emerging issues and implications for policy options’. International Policy, Centre for Inclusive Growth, New York. Working Paper 124.

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Okuro, O.S., 2015, ‘Land grabs in Kenya: Risks and opportunities’ in Vubo, E.Y. (ed.) Environment, agriculture and cross-border migrations. Dakar: Codesria. Olutayo, A.O. and Omobowale, A.O., 2007, ‘Capitalism, globalisation and the underdevelopment process in Africa: History in perpetuity’. Africa Development, 32(2), 97–112. Rahmato, D., 2014, ‘The perils of development from above: Land deals in Ethiopia’. African Identities, 12(1), 26–44. Reydon, B.P., Fernandes, V.B., Bueno, A.P., Benatti, J., Simiqueli, R., and Treccanni, J., 2015, ‘Land grab in Brazil caused by lack of land governance’. Paper prepared for presentation at the 2015 World Bank Conference on Land and Poverty. The World Bank, Washington, DC, March 23–27. Taylor, I., 2012, ‘India’s rise in Africa’. International Affairs, 88(4), 779–798.

Tura, H.A., 2018, ‘Land rights and land grabbing in Oromia, Ethiopia’. Land Use Policy, 70, 247–255. Vidal, J., 2013, ‘Indian investors are forcing Ethiopians off their land’. The Guardian, 7 February. Available at: https://www.theguardian.com/ global-development/2013/ feb/07/india-investors-forcingethiopians-off-land. Accessed on: 29 April 2013. Wilkinson, J., Reydon, B., and Di Sabbato, A., 2012, ‘Concentration and foreign ownership of land in Brazil in the context of global land grabbing’. Canadian Journal of Development Studies, 33(4), 417–438. Yassin, A., 2010, ‘Large scale transnational land acquisition in Ethiopia-is it an acceleration for development? The case of the Bako and Gambella region in Ethiopia’. MA Thesis, Graduate school of Development Studies, International Institute of Social Studies.

12 Rosatom and nuclear power in South Africa: assistance and resistance1 Eldar Salakhetdinov and Vasily Sidorov

South Africa is the largest producer of electricity in Africa and the only African state that has a nuclear power plant (NPP) – Koeberg in the Western Cape. However, from 2007 onwards the country began to experience an electricity shortage that became one of the main factors limiting economic growth. Today, most trade turnover between Russia and South Africa comprises minerals and agricultural products (Federal Customs Service, 2016). However, the recent decline in commodity prices necessitates diversification within the economy and an increase in the knowledge-based component of trade. To achieve these goals, Russia and South Africa have agreed to cooperate in the spheres of science, technology, and innovation (STI) within the framework of BRICS. Current cooperation between South Africa and Russia in the field of STI is not extensive, but there are a number of current and potential projects which could intensify partnership in this area. One of the most promising but also controversial spheres of cooperation was Rosatom’s proposed nuclear project in South Africa. Nuclear power was seen as one way to secure long-term electricity supply and to diversify the energy mix of South Africa.

Electricity in South Africa Africa is no stranger to acute energy shortages (ESI Africa, 2016). Increased industrialisation and fast-growing populations have induced a sharp increase in electricity demand that is likely to continue for the next several decades (International Energy Agency, 2014:79). 1 Article prepared with the support of RFFI grant no. 16-07-00038 ‘South Africa – Russia’s Strategic Partner’.

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This is also largely true regarding South Africa, the country with the most developed energy infrastructure in Africa. Since 1990, South Africa started a programme to electrify the country. These efforts led to impressive progress: in 1990 only 35 per cent of the country’s population had access to electricity supply, by 2013 this figure had increased to 85 per cent (90 per cent in cities, 77 per cent in rural areas) (World Energy Outlook, 2015). However, growth in power generation did not keep up with growing energy consumption. In 2007, the country slid into an energy crisis. Intense power shortages had an adverse impact on the economy and impeded GDP growth. One estimate suggests that the cost of underinvestment into electricity generation and infrastructure to the South African economy exceeded the sum of $20 billion during the period 2008 to 2014 (Frost & Sullivan, 2016:6). Furthermore, electricity shortages had a negative effect in the form of tariff increases. In the period from 2007 to 2015 prices in South Africa rose by 45.1 per cent overall. Eskom’s (the South African Electricity Supply Commission) tariffs, since the beginning of the energy crisis, increased by 300.7 per cent and continue to grow (Frost & Sullivan, 2016:7). Today, South Africa no longer faces a critical energy shortage. Nevertheless, this happened not entirely because of attempts by South African leadership to increase electricity generation but also due to the closure of many energy-consuming factories. However, it is forecast that by 2021 South Africa will again face electricity shortages without developing further generating capacity (Njobeni, 2016). Almost all electricity is produced and supplied by the state-run company Eskom. South Africa has the following electricity mix: coal – 79 per cent; gas turbine – five per cent; hydroelectricity – four per cent; imported hydroelectricity – four per cent; nuclear – four per cent; wind – two per cent; and solar – two per cent; with around 49 GWt of total generating capacity (Frost & Sullivan, 2016:4). South Africa’s situation is further complicated by the need to substantially reduce the role played by coal-fired power plants (which today produce the bulk of the country’s electric power) by 2030 in compliance with the Paris climate agreement (Zelenin, 2016). The country is threatened by significant penalties if it fails to comply ($5 for a ton of CO2) (Polikarpov, 2016). Currently, South Africa is one of the top 20 countries in terms of volume of CO2 emissions into the atmosphere (EDGAR – Emission Database for Global Atmospheric Research, 2017).

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Therefore, the energy question is an important and acute problem for South Africa. Without solving it, neither further economic growth nor the improvement of citizens’ welfare will be possible. These reasons prompted the South African government to actively look for new generating capacity. However, this quest for new generating capacity is hindered by a lack of consensus among leadership regarding what type of power stations are needed and who should build them. The situation is further aggravated by an unstable political situation, significant corruption, and fierce internal political competition.

Is nuclear power the solution? In October 2010, South Africa’s Department of Energy and Mineral Resources released a draft Integrated Resource Plan (IRP) for 2010–2030. The plan is in effect a road map for the development of the South African electricity sector. The IRP in general, and its section dedicated to development of nuclear power, has been a subject of great dispute. As a result, the plan has been edited and revised several times, with the 2016 version of the plan envisioning that by 2050, construction of new power plants of different types should increase the generating capacity of South Africa by about 125 GWt. (solar – 17.6, wind – 37.4, nuclear – 20.4, gas turbine – 35.9, other sources – 15.2). Therefore, the total new capacity to be created would roughly double the existing generating capacity (Department of Energy, 2016:26). The envisaged expansion of generating capacity at the time included a plan to build additional nuclear power. The first stage of the nuclear project assumed construction of two NPPs at Thyspunt in the Eastern Cape Province, and Duynefontein in the Western Cape Province (near the only operating South African NPP at Koeberg). Both locations already received approval from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (Polikarpov, 2016), with nuclear commissioning taking place as early as 2026 (JoematPettersson, 2016). On 20 December 2016 Eskom issued a request for information (RFI) from parties interested in taking part in the construction of new NPPs in South Africa (Eskom, 2016). At the same time, the Department of Energy proposed delaying new atomic reactors by 14 years as, at that moment, the country did not have the necessary financial resources to build new NPPs (Burkhardt and Cohen, 2016).

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Since the proposal to build NPPs is the most contentious and discussed part of the IRP it would be helpful to consider the arguments of supporters and opponents of such a project. Concern was caused by environmental problems associated with the extraction and utilisation of uranium ore, as well as the high cost of nuclear technology. Proponents argue that constructing NPPs in South Africa could be an improvement on the current energy mix. As mentioned, South Africa is the only African country that has an operating NPP (Koeberg). In the long run, nuclear power is capable not only of overcoming forecast electricity shortages in South Africa, but can also aid the smooth transition from old, worn-out, coal-fired power plants that pollute the environment, to carbon-neutral technologies. Supporters of nuclear power further argue that nuclear power has no serious competitors, in particular, when it comes to providing energy for larger countries with overall populations greater than 10–20 million. Even Brazil, a country that generates most of its electricity using renewable resources, plans to build new nuclear reactors2 (World Nuclear Association, 2017b). Advocates of nuclear power might further argue that nuclear energy is environmentally friendly compared to fossil fuels and can provide stable electricity prices for many decades. An important advantage of NPPs is low operational costs. When it comes to fuel, the price of uranium makes up 20–30 per cent of the overall operating costs. Among coal-fired power plants, fuel constitutes 70–80 per cent of operating costs, and among gas-fired power plants, 80–85 per cent. Thus, the cost per kilowatt hour (kWh) of electricity at a fossil-fuelled power plant is subject to larger market volatility. Although the production cost of the electricity generated by coal-fired power plants will usually be lower than that of NPPs, this is only the case if production costs are taken on their own, without accounting for penalties for environmental pollution. In addition, initiating large-scale projects such as the construction of NPPs may also have a positive macroeconomic effect and will stimulate expansion of industrial and investment activity in the nuclear and connected sectors. To an extent, South Africa could also boost electricity output through developing renewable energy plants (primarily wind and solar). However, today, production costs for renewable energy are

2 Almost all of Brazil’s renewable energy comes from hydro power plants, which produce the cheapest energy. But it is impossible in South Africa due to far more limited hydro potential.

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usually higher than that of NPPs, and the volume of electricity generated is significantly lower (Polikarpov, 2016). Proponents of renewable energy rightly say that the cost of wind and solar electricity is comparable in price to nuclear energy, if we take into account the significant costs of the construction and utilisation of NPPs. However, this does not detract from the main drawback of existing wind and solar power stations – that they, unlike NPPs, are unable to provide constant, stable electricity generation (24 hours a day). In this regard, renewable sources of energy cannot be the main or sole source of electricity for the national grid, at least for now in South Africa. In general, sources of alternative energy are highly promising and are increasingly becoming more affordable and accessible. Overall, it is possible for nuclear and renewable electricity sources to complement each other in South Africa. Nuclear power could be effective on a nationwide basis as one of the main sources of electricity, with renewable power making more sense as a supplementary source.

Nuclear power’s competition and opposition in South Africa The future of new nuclear construction projects in South Africa heavily depends on the political and economic situation in the country. Contestation over the nuclear tender is not only economic but is also geopolitical. It is speculated that the country that builds the new NPPs in South Africa will obtain considerable influence over this economic and political gateway to Africa for the next 50–100 years (Polikarpov, 2016). South Africa’s atomic project has attracted widespread contestation and backlash from various interest groups. This resulted in the insistence that due diligence is strictly followed, and the country’s legislated procurement processes are applied. In South Africa, as a rule, large contracts are only awarded after a tendering process. Accordingly, South Africa’s NPPs are being subjected to the same procurement procedure. This is unlike countries such as India and Turkey, where intergovernmental agreements suffice (President of Russia, 2011). The South African government has consciously turned to the East and Brazil, Russia, India, and China, with the African National Congress (ANC) seeking to lessen the country’s dependence on the West. The Russian government would hope to capitalise on this.

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This is also occurring at a time of emerging intra-BRICS competition in Africa, and especially with China. The Chinese already exhibit a high degree of control over many strategically important spheres in South Africa. However, the ANC position is under threat and the South African opposition parties are far more sceptical of Russia. Among the ANC’s top leadership, many individuals were connected with the Soviet Union and such people are absent from the opposition parties. The largest opposition party, the Democratic Alliance (DA), considered the nuclear project to be corrupt and strongly opposed Rosatom’s involvement in the construction of South Africa’s NPPs. Former leader of the DA, Helen Zille, stated that ‘all evidence points to a done deal with the Russians … which means future generations of South Africans will still be paying this trillion-rand bill through electricity prices they simply cannot afford’ (Zille, 2014). In any case, the DA is generally pro-Western and does not see Russia as an important partner. The second-largest opposition party, the Economic Freedom Fighters (EFF), opposes the construction of new NPPs in South Africa (Ndlozi, 2015). At the same time, it is reasonable to believe that the EFF takes advantage of the political situation and could change its view in the future. The EFF has been highly critical of alleged non-transparency and corruption of the nuclear decisionmaking process, not of nuclear technology per se (Mathebula, 2017). If South Africa eventually decides to build new NPPs then it has a limited number of potential partners. Today, three major companies in the world have the technological capability to construct NPPs: American-Japanese Westinghouse, Russian Rosatom, and French Areva. However, after Westinghouse filed for bankruptcy in March 2017, only the last two companies mentioned are seriously in contention to receive the contracts. Areva’s main advantage is that the existing two-reactor NPP in Koeberg was constructed using its technology and began operation in 1984–1985. The company thus has traditional ties among the South African energy ‘establishment’. There were reasons to believe that Areva and China General Nuclear Power Group (CGN) were prepared to cooperate with each other to jointly build NPPs in South Africa (CGN, 2017). The influential Chinese lobbyists in South Africa could have been interested in new NPP construction in the country under the auspices of Areva. This arrangement would be similar to the Hinckley Point C NPP construction project in the United Kingdom

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(UK) where the Chinese financed a third of the development (BBC, 2015). However, the Hinkley Point C project was being implemented within a country that is a member of NATO and (for the time being) the European Union (EU). It is far from certain whether the Chinese would have agreed to be Areva’s junior partner in the construction of South Africa’s NPPs. Besides, one cannot pass over the growing discontent among South African society concerning the growing Chinese ‘dominance’ inside the country. This is one of the reasons for emerging Sinophobia in South Africa. For example, well-known South African politician Julius Malema, current leader of EFF, accused China of using South Africa to extract Africa’s wealth of mineral resources without offering anything in return (Pietersen, 2011). There are also many claims that Chinese businesspeople have bribed South African officials (as in the case of the Transnet contract with China South Railway to buy new locomotives where 21 per cent of the contract consisted of suspicious ‘advisory fees’ (amaBhungane, 2017a)). The allegedly wide use of such methods causes concern since this erodes national sovereignty and leads to a desire to reduce dependence on the Eastern partner. At the same time, it should be noted that Areva faces a multitude of problems. The company’s single nuclear reactor in Finland is years behind schedule (after winning the initial tender). As a result, the tender for a new Finnish NPP was won by Rosatom (Ivanter and Semikashev, 2017:5). Today, Areva is in the process of restructuring and should be transformed into two companies. The first will concentrate on the nuclear fuel cycle and the second will specialise in nuclear engineering in cooperation with the French electricity company Elictricite de France (EDF). Russian academics Ivanter and Semikashev argue that (2017:5): ‘Considering restructuring and lack of reference record, French companies cannot be the competitor to Rosatom in the medium term as an integrated supplier of complete solutions for NPP construction in foreign countries’. In summary, despite some promising potential long-term benefits of the nuclear project, its implementation is doubtful. The main reason is prosaic – no finance was provided in the South African budget for NPP construction, the same was true for government funds. Thus, the project was seen as unaffordable for the South African treasury. The possibility of using government employees’ pension savings was discussed, but it is unlikely that the South African government will make such a move given the aggressive political resistance to the proposal. Most of the media were also against NPP construction, frequently describing such a project as

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potentially corrupt and from positions of nuclear alarmism. The nuclear project is also opposed by renewable energy business as well as most environmentalists. For example, the chair of the South African Renewable Energy Council (SAREC) says that evidence from practice shows that nuclear power makes no rational sense (Moyo, 2017). SAREC further stated that new-build renewable energy is now significantly cheaper than new-build coal or nuclear power (Green Business Guide, 2016). The South African Wind Energy Association also shares this view and considers that estimated wind prices are much lower than that of nuclear (South African Wind Energy Association, 2016). According to a Greenpeace representative in South Africa, nuclear energy is an outdated technology that is being rejected and turned away from in many parts of the world. Richard Halsey, a member of the environmental body ‘Project 90 by 2030’, explains that since renewable energy, by its nature, is made up of a larger number of smaller individual generators, there is less room for corruption compared to mega projects such as nuclear, where only a handful of companies handle big tenders (Moyo, 2017). Opponents of nuclear energy also point to a possible danger for nature and society associated with the extraction and utilisation of nuclear material. Recognising the validity of these concerns, it is worth noting that uranium mining is already being carried out in South Africa, and modern mining methods allow avoiding any offsite pollution (World Nuclear Association, 2017a). No one disputes that South Africa needs new energy capacity. Today, per capita electricity consumption of South Africa is two to three times lower than similar indicators in Russia and Western countries (The World Factbook, 2017). The country’s economic growth largely depends on the growth in electricity generation with forecasted energy demand growth at two to three per cent per year (Eskom, 2017:5–6). A lack of consensus and financial shortages make it unlikely that an easy solution will be found.

Could Rosatom win? In 2012, Rosatom opened its official representative office in Johannesburg. On 22 September 2014, at the margins of the 58th session of the IAEA Conference in Vienna, Russia and South Africa signed an Intergovernmental Agreement (IGA) on Strategic Partnership and Cooperation in Nuclear Energy and Industry.

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The document was signed by the Director General of Rosatom Mr Sergey Kirienko on behalf of the Russian government and by then Minister of Energy Ms Tina Joemat-Pettersson on behalf of the South African government (Rosatom, 2014). During the project’s negotiation, Rosatom offered favourable terms for South Africa. In particular, Rosatom was prepared to offer a high degree of localisation in terms of construction work which would have varied depending on the number of nuclear reactors built (30 per cent if only one or two power units were erected, and up to 60 per cent for the construction of seven or eight reactors) (Polikarpov, 2014:22). Previously it was reported that Russia could grant a long-term loan that would cover up to 85 per cent of the financial cost of the South African NPP construction project (Mironova, 2013). However, after the sharp fall of the ruble’s value in 2014 such possibilities were no longer discussed. The planned cost for the nuclear project’s full execution was not officially announced, but according to preliminary estimates, the price tag would have been around $50 billion (Polikarpov, 2016). The expected operational life of Rosatom’s NPPs constitutes 60–70 years, and theoretically, their operation can be extended up to 100 years (Polikarpov, 2016). In this respect it is interesting to see what conditions Russia has proposed to another African state, i.e. Egypt, for construction of an NPP. In December 2017 Egypt and Russia signed a contract to build Egypt’s first NPP. The El Dabaa four reactor nuclear plant with a total capacity of 5 GWt should be completed by 2029. The construction costs are estimated at around $20 billion, 85 per cent of the costs are to be covered by a Russian government loan, while Egypt should cover the remaining 15 per cent in the form of instalments. The Russian loan has a repayment period of 13 years, with an annual interest rate of 3 per cent. During the construction, VVER-1200 technology of the ‘3+’ generation will be used, which today corresponds to the highest, so-called ‘post-Fukushima’ safety standards. The first power unit should be commissioned in 2026. The construction of the first unit assumes a 20 per cent localisation of equipment and services. It is expected that the degree of localisation will increase with construction of the subsequent units (RIA Novosti, 2017). A number of Egyptian opposition politicians noted that the benefits of building a nuclear power plant are controversial and criticised the government for forcibly relocating El Daaba’s people without paying fair compensation (El Sharnoubi, 2017).

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Nigeria and Ghana are also interested in the development of nuclear power to address the energy shortage. In 2017 Russia and Nigeria signed agreements on construction and operation of an NPP and a research centre housing to conduct multi-purpose nuclear research. The parties also signed a roadmap for cooperation in the field of peaceful usage of nuclear technologies, but specific details such as the time and place of construction were not disclosed. According to the president of the Nigerian Atomic Energy Commission (Nigatom), Simon Mallam, ‘We have a roadmap and that is by the mid-2020s. We hope we can get a commercial plant and add three more in five to 10 years’ (Awodipe, 2018). The government of Ghana, in turn, showed interest in the technologies of small nuclear reactors with a capacity of 1–1.2 GWt. However, the prospect of the construction remains vague (Government of Ghana, 2015). If Rosatom’s offer were to be accepted by South Africa, then, in the future, South African companies may have been able to acquire the knowledge of, and participate in, the construction of NPPs in other countries (first in the African continent), potentially turning South Africa into the ‘nuclear hub’ of Africa. During interviews, Russian diplomats expressed the opinion that if Rosatom’s project were to succeed it could become the driving force that would attract Russian business to South African and African markets. Currently, Rosatom is the only nuclear vendor in the world that offers the full nuclear energy cycle. Other potential bidders do not control many components of the ‘nuclear chain’, being dependent on contractors and subcontractors (Polikarpov, 2016). It is also of importance that Rosatom is viable as it has global orders for NPPs secured for the next 15 years. In South Africa, former president Zuma is considered to be a sympathiser of the Russian president Vladimir Putin and that is one of the reasons why Rosatom was seen as the frontrunner for the NPP construction tender. However, over the last few years the situation has changed significantly. Zuma became a ‘lame duck’ president, and his association with Russia brought more reputational harm than good for Russia. Also, Zuma was seen as a corrupt politician (he currently faces corruption charges related to a South African arms deal in the late 1990s) and resigned as president in February 2018. The public is particularly angry because of the former president’s ties to the Gupta family – nouveau riches from India. There is credible evidence that the former South African president illegally assisted them to win state tenders, and that the family had an

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excessive influence over the country’s political situation bordering on being a threat to national sovereignty (amaBhungane, 2017b). Therefore, the argument was that the Guptas and the Zuma family were highly interested in building new nuclear power units, since they owned a sizeable slice of the country’s uranium mining business, in particular the Shiva uranium mine in the North West province – the country’s largest uranium resource. In September 2016, information emerged in the Western and South African media that Putin reached a secret agreement with Zuma to award the South African NPP construction tender to Rosatom (Graham, 2016). This was denied by Russian authorities, besides which, the new state president, Cyril Ramaphosa says that South Africa cannot afford a nuclear build at the moment. ‘We have to look at where the economy is – we have excess power and we have no money to go for a major nuclear plant building’, Ramaphosa told reporters at the World Economic Forum in Davos (Dahinten and Burkhardt, 2018). The 2018 draft of the IRP suggests that nuclear energy has been dropped from the country’s short-term energy plans (Creamer, 2018). Zuma’s alleged nuclear deal with Russia was met with broad resistance. On the one hand, the question of honesty and transparency in respect to the nuclear tender was a cause for concern. For example, cabinet reshuffles in the South African government (replacements of Minister of Finance P. Gordhan with M. Gigaba, Minister of Energy T. Joemat-Pettersson with M. Kubayi and then with D. Mahlobo etc.) could be evidence of Zuma and his entourage’s (primarily the notorious Gupta family) trying to reduce resistance to the atomic project and to ensure access to state resources. On the other hand, the negative anti-nuclear campaign seems to be primarily directed against Russia, but not its competitors. In this case, the trial that took place over the nuclear project is very telling. In October 2015, environmental activists sued the South African government at the Western Cape High Court demanding that the planned nuclear programme be declared illegal (eNCA, 2017). On 26 April 2017 in the court’s judgment, the existing South African nuclear programme was invalidated. The court decided ‘that Mr Zuma’s government gave Russia special favors including indemnity for nuclear accidents and favorable tax treatment’ (Cotterill, 2017:1) and, therefore, the intergovernmental agreement with Russia was unconstitutional. The request for information (RFI) for the NPP tender was also cancelled as a result of the court case. A pro-Russian perspective suggests that the court’s decision demonstrated a bias

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against Rosatom’s involvement because there was no repeal of IGAs on nuclear power with France and China (that were signed at the same time as the IGA with Russia in 2014) as the main competitors of Russia in the tender process. Rosatom acknowledged Eskom’s decision to terminate its RFI and said that the court ruling had no direct relation to it, confirming ‘its willingness to participate in any further procedures that may be brought forward by the relevant authorities … and remains committed to participating in a transparent and competitive procurement procedure should and when it arises’ (le Cordeur, 2017:1). The South African government disagreed with the court’s judgment but decided not to appeal it. Rather, the government plans to amend the existing programme (including IGAs) in accordance with the court’s ruling (Yelland, 2017). Clearly, the authorities see that it is easier to respond to the complaints made than to launch an appeal. Whatever further developments in this area are going to bring, Russia and South Africa already cooperate in the sphere of nuclear energy. Rosatom’s subsidiary, Techsnabexport (better known overseas as Tenex), supplies Koeberg power plant with enriched uranium fuel. South Africa is one of the largest customers of Tenex, which provides about 40 per cent of the uranium fuel needed by Koeberg (Korendyasov, 2016:5). Since the value of the South African uranium fuel delivery contract exceeds $10 million, 30 per cent of the contract value has to either be reinvested into the South African economy or to be used to stimulate South African exports (by acquiring South African goods or services) according to the Programme of National Industrial Participation (Department of Trade and Industry, 2017). Notably, in 2016, Tenex began buying nuclear reactor components from the Nuclear Energy Corporation of South Africa (Necsa) (Herbst, 2016).

Conclusion In the modern world, the energy industry is the basis for having a properly functioning economy and a viable state. An energy partnership between Russia and South Africa could be in the interests of both countries. For Russia, the advantages of cooperation will be entry into new promising markets of African countries that will give impetus to the development of Russian technologies and will promote economic diversification. South Africa is also interested

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in the participation of Russian business as a means of attracting foreign direct investment and of developing the national energy sector. One of the most promising projects to strengthen mutual partnerships in the energy sector is NPP construction, based on Russian technologies. However, the existing format of cooperation does not satisfy both parties. Non-transparency of decision-making processes regarding the nuclear project, its viability and relevance, suspicious cabinet reshuffles, and many other issues, caused concern that a Gupta–Zuma linked network lobbied this project due to their corrupt interests. In Russian, there is an informal term that distinctly describes such behaviour – ‘raspil’. It means pocketing of special-purpose budgetary resources. The South African public does not want to see ‘raspil’ of government funds. From the Russian side, the situation looks somewhat different. There is a suspicion that the hand of the West influences opposition to the nuclear project. Russians perceive that the West as a competitor (if not an enemy) does not want to allow Russian influence to strengthen globally, and in South Africa in particular. Excessive focus on cooperation with former president Zuma on the Russian side was largely determined by the fact that Russian leadership tends to concentrate on negotiating with leaders rather than with a wider range of actors. This is due to the concentration of power in the hands of the Russian president and the overestimation of the powers of the South African president, as well as the perceived simplicity of negotiating with only one or two individuals. Russia needs to expand dialogue beyond South Africa’s leadership and to begin to cooperate more with other national institutions. Regardless of whether the nuclear project is implemented, Russia– South Africa cooperation has good potential for development. South Africa is a country with a high level of industrial and technological development, and despite the country’s economic and political challenges, Russian projects have strong potential for implementation on equal and mutually advantageous grounds.

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13 GEAR past, BRICS future: South Africa protests Mbekezeli Mkhize

Defined by Peter Alexander (2010) as a ‘rebellion of the poor’, service delivery protests and strikes in South Africa have been indicative of the decline in the ruling party’s capacity to govern as well as worsening inequality. Growing impatience has aggravated this protest action, along with the slow pace of social and economic transformation and a neoliberal policy orientation. These events reached a head during the 2012 Marikana massacre where more than 30 citizens were gunned down. This chapter attempts to build on these themes by highlighting the growing protests in the country at a time when the elite are becoming increasingly dictatorial. BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa) is viewed as an alternative to Western influence, more so with the recent downgrade of South Africa’s investment status being used as a rationale for ‘looking East’. However, what substantive benefits will this bring for the poor or is it further assimilation into neoliberalism? Despite a peaceful transition to democracy, post-apartheid South Africa is plagued by severe socio-economic challenges. Consequently, more than 8,000 group events as defined by the ‘Gatherings Act’ have occurred since 1998. Almost 10 per cent of these were unrest incidents where violence and destruction occurred (Mottiar and Bond, 2012). Hough (2009) points out that these incidents create a precarious or unstable socio-political environment. Hough further points out that unless something is done, there is ‘revolutionary potential’ in them. As argued by relative deprivation theorists, the discrepancies in living conditions and unmet expectations have potentially fuelled frustration and anger in societies and led to protests. The poor and marginalised communities are the ones who are relatively deprived in post-apartheid South Africa (Buhlungu and Atkinson, 2007:31). Despite anger among the poor, the ruling party (African National Congress – ANC) continues to raise expectations by making promises which are mostly unrealistic and unachievable within

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the timeframes given (Qobo, 2014). In its 54th National Elective Conference in Nasrec (Johannesburg, 16–20 December 2017), the ruling party resolved to expropriate land without compensation as part of an advancing radical socio-economic transformation agenda. There is no guarantee that the ANC will stick to this resolution and incorporate it into their election manifesto in the 2019 general elections. This resolution is largely seen as an attempt to silence and leverage opposition parties such as the Economic Freedom Front (EFF) and Black First Land First (BLF). Parliament adopted a resolution to amend Section 25 of the Constitution to explicitly make provision for expropriation without compensation on 15 November 2018. The mismatch between expectations and reality has evinced several questions from scholars. Heller (2001:131) asks two pertinent questions regarding the birth of democracy in a country, and the promises it brings, regarding addressing key challenges: what difference does democracy make to development; and, consequently, can democracy help redress the severe social and economic inequalities faced by developing countries? Marais (2011) asks the pertinent question, is South Africa pushed to the limit? Consequently, I asked, is South Africa’s 20 years of democracy in crisis (Mkhize, 2015)? Essentially, these questions make scholars doubt the effectiveness of democracy as a panacea to a country’s problems. While it remains difficult to respond convincingly and satisfactorily to the questions posed, it is worth noting that democracy and changes in the economic policy direction failed to redress the legacy of apartheid in South Africa. A neoliberal macroeconomic policy shift forcibly diverted South Africa from the ANC’s original vision based on social democracy and economic freedom. This neoliberal shift failed to achieve sufficient redress. However, the shift, as Qobo (2014:103) observed, came at a time when there was a global turn to neoliberalism and South Africa was almost compelled to comply in order to be accepted by Western countries. Given that South Africa was intent on being accepted by the West to the detriment of locally relevant economic policies, such behaviour reinforced ongoing socio-political developments. Ongoing socio-political developments such as corruption, social inequality, poverty, and unemployment, illustrate that the country’s development remains in limbo (Eze, 2017). Statistics South Africa (2017) announced that more than 30 million people are living in poverty. The failure of past initiatives and the ongoing challenges have created socio-economic and political instability which has

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subsequently led to social protests and strikes. Given these challenges, interaction with the other BRICS members could offer useful development opportunities. Against this backdrop, the purpose of this chapter is to explore the possible options (such as the BRICS) that can be used by the South African government to address its socio-economic and political challenges. BRICS’s positioning in the global political economy places its members in a vital and influential position. The chapter contributes to a body of knowledge relating to the recent corruption challenges facing the country – especially the diminishing powers of the ‘Chapter 9’ institutions, and the fact that ‘looking East’ may provide solutions. Due in part to its widespread and undisputed influence throughout the country, corruption cannot be divorced from South Africa’s socio-economic challenges. Nattrass (2014) argues that patrimonialism and corruption are fundamental problems in South Africa. Though this could be the case, Kalombo (2005:44) cautions that it is difficult to define corruption partly because of its secret nature. Corruption is among the oldest and most confusing phenomena in human society. Moreover, currently, despite burgeoning scholarly works on the phenomenon, there is no doubt that corruption is a hotly contested terrain. Consequently, corruption is understood differently by different people, although there are common elements. Tanzi (1998) defines corruption as the abuse of public power for private benefit. Voskanyan (2000) mentions that corruption is a dysfunctional influence in any political order, in any given country, and that it exists in every country in the world.

Theoretical perspectives Although South Africa is endowed with mineral resources, many unanswered questions remain regarding what causes poverty, unemployment, and social inequality. In a utopian society, abundant resources should be able to enhance self-reliance and self-sufficiency. In an attempt to come to terms with the underlying reasons relating to these complexities, this chapter then borrows largely from the theories of corruption – particularly neopatrimonialism, which is widely perceived and understood as an increasing impediment to African states (Van de Walle, 2007; O’Neill, 2007). In this regard, Van de Walle (2007:1) views African political dynamics as being characterised by a set of informal institutions labelled as ‘big man

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politics’, ‘personal rule’, ‘politics of the belly’, or neopatrimonialism. These labels arguably come as no surprise given the corrupt practices (irregular procurement and cadre deployment in South Africa) that have been reported in the literature (Hyden, 2007). Despite many approaches and strategies spanning from modernisation theory to neoliberal market theories and good governance, it remains unclear what can work for Africa (Hyden, 2007). This is not to say that only African countries are affected by corruption. Transparency International (2015:1) highlights its pervasiveness stating that ‘not one of the 168 countries assessed in the 2015 index gets a perfect score and two-thirds score below 50, on a scale from 0 (highly corrupt) to 100 (very clean)’. Corruption and its associated problems have led to South Africa being downgraded by two credit rating agencies, namely Standard & Poor’s (S&P) and Fitch, both of whom downgraded the country to ‘junk’ status. It is not surprising that South Africa was eventually downgraded since most of its leading companies have migrated to London, New York, and Melbourne (Bond, 2016a:618). These events present a negative outlook of the country’s economy. On a more concrete level, the cost of national lending has increased due to the rating downgrades. The rating downgrades were linked to former President Zuma’s impulsive and ill-conceived cabinet reshuffles, and also the State of Capture Report (see ‘Corruption and institutional challenges’, below). This reshuffle saw finance minister, Pravin Gordhan, and his deputy, Mcebisi Jonas, removed from office. Through the lens of neopatrimonialism, it becomes clear that, although corruption affects all countries worldwide, most postcolonial states (sub-Saharan states included) fell into the same trap after independence in which the practice of uneven distribution of resources inherited from the colonial institutions became the order of the day. This, in turn, led to poor governance, cronyism, and populist politics, just to mention a few problems. Francisco’s (2009:1) analysis of neopatrimonial behaviour suggests that unequal distribution of resources amounts to patron–client networks which are inevitably centred on a powerful individual or political party. This individual and/or political party is then able to misuse aid and/or state budgets to benefit a few individuals at the expense of many. Cromwell and Chintedza (2005:3, in Francisco, 2009:1) purport that, like corruption, neopatrimonial politics tends to divert public resources for private gain. Ugaz (2015:1) warns that ‘public sector corruption is not simply about taxpayer money going

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missing. Broken institutions and corrupt officials fuel inequality and exploitation – keeping the wealth in the hands of an elite few and trapping many more in poverty’. This, in turn, poses a serious threat to development programmes and initiatives. Neopatrimonial politics adversely affects policy design and implementation in favour of a few individuals who want to enrich themselves at the expense of the citizens. Closely related to neopatrimonial politics is the ‘bad apple theory’. While corruption impacts negatively on society as a whole, bad apple theory focuses on the corrupt individual and his/her ability to lure, manipulate, and influence others. According to De Graaf, the ‘bad apple’ is typically found to have a defective character and a predisposition toward criminal activity. In practice, this is characterised by human weaknesses such as greed and an unabated need for power (De Graaf, 2007:49). Greed is to a large extent considered to be a cause of various forms of corruption. Corrupt officials are desperately looking for material gains. Just like in neopatrimonial politics, the individual and set of individuals think(s) about their own ‘bellies’.

Causes of social protests, poverty, and social inequality revisited Though in most parts of post-colonial Africa, democracy was regarded as ‘the era of the beautiful bride’, the future of democracy became uncertain in South Africa in the 21st century (Kagwanja, 2008: xv–xvi). While South Africa was viewed as one of Africa’s few success stories shortly after democracy was attained, South Africa’s international standing began to wane in the following decades (Sidiropoulos, 2008). The implementation of the capitalist agenda created many hardships after the advent of democracy. Although the fall of Soviet-style socialism might have created fertile ground for capitalism to flourish globally, capitalism is not inherently democratic, and democracy is not automatically capitalist (Merkel, 2014:109). As it is a rules-based and rights-based system, capitalism invariably does two things if implemented, namely: it leads to opaque and unequal societies; and it excludes people who were previously colonised (Rehbein and Souza, 2014:18). Although practical realities imply that capitalism and socialism are at loggerheads, their combination was virtually inescapable in South Africa. At any rate, part of the reason capitalism was so deeply entrenched

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was that settler colonialism dominated and created an enabling environment for capitalism to grow (Southall, 2007:68). Concerning the dispossessed class, capitalism’s growth was in stark contrast to the notion of inclusive growth and appeals for transformation. These arguments are supported by the fact that South Africa remains one of the five most unequal societies in the world (Kotze, 2016:5), despite its relatively peaceful democratic transition (Buhlungu, 2010; Eze, 2017). This unequal structure is based on an economy where White people are still wealthier than their Black counterparts (Freund, 2007:662; Southall, 2007:68). Control of the economy largely remains as it was under apartheid. The status quo remains partly because capitalism and democracy create socio-economic inequality (Merkel, 2014:109). As Karl Marx observed, for capitalism to flourish unhindered there is a need for two competing classes, namely: one owning and controlling the means of production and the other dispossessed and only needed for providing labour (Wisman, 2015:1). Irrespective of the democratic system, wealth inequality and inequality in ownership become the harsh reality. It is within this context that the White minority became wealthier, while the Black majority had to bear the brunt of the negative consequences of capitalism. It is thus not surprising that, more recently, plans to reverse this dire and disproportionate situation created irrevocable and deeper divisions within the ruling party in the run-up to the Nasrec conference. One grouping (ostensibly in support of the former president Jacob Zuma) referred to the White-dominated economy ambiguously as ‘White monopoly capital’ (WMC) and appealed for immediate ‘radical socio-economic transformation’. The other group (ostensibly led by the then deputy president Cyril Ramaphosa) attributed the country’s challenges to corruption and looting of state resources. Even though the origin of the term WMC is shrouded in controversy, the United Kingdom-based public relations firm, Bell Pottinger, is believed to have strategically coined and spread the term WMC, in part, to achieve political ends. The insinuation is that Bell Pottinger used this term as part of a campaign commissioned by the Gupta family (via their company OakBay). Gupta family members are the president and his son, Duduzane’s, close associates (Hosken, 2017). Cyril Ramaphosa’s group condemns the Gupta family as having unlawfully and unethically benefited from government contracts and tenders. As a result, this relationship might furnish sufficient reasons for why the two groups might have colluded in coining WMC.

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Corruption and institutional challenges: systemic causes of protests? Since the ANC’s National Elective Conference of 2007 (in Polokwane), the party has been weakened by rising levels of corruption and factionalism. Dr Blade Nzimande (2017), the former minister of higher education and current secretary-general of the South African Communist Party (SACP), contends that corruption and factionalism pose a significant threat to the ANC. The ANC is deeply divided and is in the process of disintegrating potentially due to the politics of patronage. Regarding the Corruption Index of 2016, South Africa was among the hardest hit countries in sub-Saharan Africa after failing to improve its score (Transparency International, 2016:12). This is despite the effectiveness of democracy-supporting ‘Chapter 9’ institutions (so-called because of the chapter in which they appear in the Constitution), more specifically, the public protector and the auditorgeneral, who remain key in the safeguarding of South Africa’s democracy (Murray, 2006). Suttner contends that ‘throughout the 20 years of democracy, there has been irregularity in the performance of ministers and public servants’ in South Africa (2014:17). This has inevitably resulted in widespread patronage and corruption – wherein people who are not qualified but who are politically connected can hold key positions, not only in government but also in state-owned enterprises (SOEs). In the process, these individuals are granted tenders which are beyond their scope of knowledge and expertise. As a consequence, they are often unable to deliver on the required basic services. Part of the problem is caused by the unaccountable, erroneous, and impromptu processes that are being followed in appointing the Heads of Departments (HoDs) and members of the Senior Management Service (SMS) in government. In this regard, government delegated authority and powers to the ministers to appoint these professionals (Muthien, 2014). This, in turn, allows the panel of ministers to surreptitiously ‘politicise’ the appointments and purposely not follow the policy guidelines (Public Service Commission, 2006 and Department of Public Service and Administration, 2013, in Muthien, 2014:131). This is done in such a way that the appointments are consistent with the ruling party’s agenda, sometimes also referred to as ‘cadre deployment’. As expected, candidates are not always appointed by merit, and service delivery suffers immensely. Over the years, it has become practically impossible to deal decisively with this challenge partly because the nature of South

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Africa’s democracy is such that citizens are unable to hold elected representatives directly accountable. The reason for this is that the country adopted a more party-based rather than a constituencybased democracy (Williams, 2006:198). This has reduced individual accountability. Williams (2006) further purports that under this constitutional arrangement the party is ‘everything’, and the constituency is ‘nothing’. This in turn unwittingly politicises, centralises, stifles, and thwarts broader community participation. To this end, it is believed that debates around ‘good governance’ and participatory democracy have become more necessary regarding tackling issues relating to political transformations (McEwan, 2003:470). The reality is, as Heller (2001:137) observed, that institutions of democracy cannot function effectively without a sustained institutional transformation. South Africa’s experience presents the opposite. The independence of these institutions is increasingly under siege. Sustained political interference remains a thorny problem. For example, the public protector’s remedial action recommended that the former president must swiftly appoint a Commission of Inquiry to investigate the allegations of ‘State Capture’ implicating the president, his son, and the heads of SOEs. The former president then deliberately disregarded the remedial action. Instead, he advocated for the review of the ‘State of Capture’ report. This not only renders the public protector’s office less influential in supporting and consolidating democracy, but it renders the office feeble and unable to hold other key government officials accountable. The required commission was gazetted in January 2018 and began in the same year. Following the former president’s reluctance to appoint the Commission, the South African public (including opposition parties, civil rights groups, SACP, and COSATU) marched on the street calling for the president to step down. He did not step down. When Thuli Madonsela’s term of office expired, her successor, the newlyappointed public protector, Busisiwe Mkhwebane, could not match the predecessor’s work ethic and has already been accused of siding with the former president. Mkhwebane is not completely supportive of the ‘State of Capture’ report. Due to a high level of dissatisfaction with the former president, there have been eight motions of no confidence against him, but none succeeded. He was subsequently recalled by the National Executive Committee of his own party and resigned on 14 February 2018. Together, these challenges have not augured well for the country but instead have caused South Africa to be perceived to be the protest capital of the world (South African History Online, n.d., in Mkhize, 2015:192).

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Economic policies: RDP, GEAR, BEE, ASGISA, NGP, IPAP, NDP, and what next? Once democracy was attained, South Africa’s socio-economic structure needed to be restructured to ensure equal and fair redistribution given the high poverty rates and massive social inequality at the time. As a result, restructuring the economy meant ‘economic transformation’. Part of the attempts to achieve ‘economic transformation’ can be found in the implementation of the Reconstruction and Development Programme (RDP) adopted in 1995. The purpose of the RDP was to restructure the economy from a pro-White and pro-wealthy orientation to a pro-poor orientation (Terreblanche, 2008:107). It could be argued that worsening inequality has partly given rise to the Zuma-led camp seriously calling for the newly publicised ‘radical socio-economic transformation’. Though not yet defined within academic debates, concerns around ‘economic transformation’ (or rather ‘radical socio-economic transformation’) have always been the cornerstone of the governing party’s policy and rhetoric during the liberation struggle and particularly after 1994 (Qobo, 2014:96). The founding principle of ‘economic freedom’ can be found in the Freedom Charter’s call to ‘transfer the economy from the minority to the people as a whole’ (African National Congress Youth League, 2011, in Kotze, 2016:12). However, within the different camps in the ANC, there is not even consensus on what essentially constitutes ‘radical socio-economic transformation’, and the correct modalities which need to be used to bring it about. In the same breath, ‘economic freedom’ is currently not uniformly understood across different sectors. The Economic Freedom Index (in Kotze, 2016:5) ranks South Africa at 72nd out of 178 countries in 2015. Confusion around what constitutes ‘economic freedom’ has led to the supposition that it is based on racial oppression and economic exclusion (widely known as colonialism of a special type (CST)) of Black people (Wolpe, 1990; Nkwinti, 2016:11; and Bundy, 1989 cited in Bond, 2010:6). Nkwinti (2016:13) contends that CST is characterised by three interrelated but antagonistic contradictions, namely, race, class, and patriarchal power relations. Wolpe (1990) considers class, race, and the apartheid state as being inherently unfair. Kotze (2016:12) cautions that although ‘economic freedom’ has dominated the political discourse, it has not yet been subjected to normative and philosophical analysis in relation to democratisation.

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Similarly, widespread poverty and social inequality are attributed to the economic programme that was adopted and implemented which differed significantly from the ANC’s original vision and initial proposals (Habib and Padayachee, 2000:246). The RDP primarily sought to: provide a viable planning framework for the transition from apartheid to democracy; ensure nation-building; improve living standards; and provide proper healthcare (Williams, 2006). Its successor, Growth, Employment and Redistribution (GEAR), is believed to have stripped citizens of their substantive citizenship (Miraftab, 2009:36). Concerning the loss of substantive citizenship, citizens became the fee-paying customers of public and private providers of basic services (Miraftab, 2009:36). Miraftab states that the post-GEAR situation materially excluded citizens, although they were included symbolically in governance and decision-making. Although the implementation of GEAR was in keeping with global trends at the time (since the macroeconomic approach was a globally dominant capitalist and neoliberal agenda), it continued to create many economic hardships for countries, particularly developing ones. Many scholars (Qobo, 2014; Southall, 2007; Buhlungu, 2010; and Mottiar, 2013) are of the view that the objectives of GEAR were mostly unrealistic. Most of GEAR’s targets regarding higher growth rates and job creation were simply not achieved and, instead, SA’s unequal economic situation was exacerbated (Nattrass, 2014:56; and Qobo, 2014:105). The fundamental challenge was that GEAR was more reminiscent of structural adjustment than the redistributive development which South Africa desperately needed (Muthien, 2014:130). GEAR also caused deeper divisions and misunderstandings among the tripartite alliance partners (Congress of South African Trade Unions (COSATU); SACP; and the ANC). This was especially evident in the last years of Thabo Mbeki’s administration (Sidiropoulos, 2008). COSATU and the SACP were genuinely advocating for more socialist and pro-poor economic policies. However, in general, these alliance partners’ efforts were impeded by a lack of political accountability, lack of participatory and/or direct democracy, and corruption (Pithouse, 2007; Habib, 2013; Ngwane, 2011; Mottiar and Bond, 2012). Qobo (2014:104) argues that GEAR was oversold; raising unrealistic expectations about what was possible over a short period. According to Qobo (2014: 104), GEAR sought to achieve the following:

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improve the competitive profile of the economy, expand the private sector for capital formation, ensure infrastructure development and service delivery, ensure flexibility in the labour market, ensure fiscal reduction, achieve growth rates of six percent by 2000 and improve the employment rate through the creation of 400 000 jobs per annum.

However, instead of achieving these elusive targets, massive job losses and structural unemployment were some of the unintended consequences, further aggravated by the negative effects of globalisation (Buhlungu, 2010). On a positive note, Chagunda (2006) rightly points out that GEAR managed to reduce high government debt and stabilise inflation. Correspondingly, the attainment of democracy also paved the way for the rapid growth of the ‘black middle class’ (Southall, 2017:231). However, the transition to democracy benefited those who were close to the ruling party, the ANC. Black Economic Empowerment (BEE), Broad-Based Black Economic Empowerment (BBBEE), and Affirmative Action (AA) were some of the salient but hugely contested policies which created an enabling environment for the Black middle class (Southall, 2004). Because GEAR was criticised for its lack of broader sectoral engagement, the Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative of South Africa (ASGISA) was adopted and implemented in July 2005, after the realisation that GEAR was not achieving its targets. ASGISA sought to ‘frame government’s microeconomic reform strategy and focus attention on specific sectors of the economy’ (Qobo, 2014:105). Aligned with the Millennium Development Goals and Poverty Reduction Strategies (McGrath and Akoojee, 2007), ASGISA intended to halve poverty by 2014 as well as to achieve sustainable economic growth at six per cent per annum by 2009 (Qobo, 2014; McGrath and Akoojee, 2007:421). These targets were not achieved. Since it was mainly Thabo Mbeki’s brainchild, it disappeared during the shift in the political order within the ANC and government (Qobo, 2014). After the disappearance of ASGISA, the New Growth Path (NGP) was introduced with the aim to create five million jobs by 2020. The government kept on shifting the target dates from creating 400,000 jobs in 2000 (GEAR); to halving poverty by 2014 (ASGISA); to creating five million jobs by 2020 (NGP). While the NGP calls for the restructuring of the economy as a means

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of dealing with poverty and social inequality, there is little hope that it will bring positive results. Poorly formulated and abruptly implemented policies, presumably in pursuit of the ‘radical socioeconomic transformation agenda’, are finding resistance on the ground owing to a lack of broader participation. For example, the new mining charter introduced by former mineral resources minister, Mosebenzi Zwane, stipulates that there must be an increase of 4 per cent to 30 per cent Black ownership in the mines within a year. The new mining charter was not positively accepted and as a consequence was stalled by stakeholders such as the Chamber of Mines of South Africa and trade unions. Centred on ‘radical economic transformation’, the Industrial Policy Action Plan (IPAP) of 2016/7–2017/8 is entrenched in government’s overall policy and plans to reduce poverty, inequality, and unemployment. Advancing the interests of the New Development Plan (NDP, a plan based in the presidency spanning all departments), the IPAP seeks to diversify the economy and catalyse inclusive growth (Portfolio Committee on Trade and Industry, 2016). To add to the above continuous shifts of target dates, the NDP now unconvincingly points to 2030. It remains unclear if there is any correlation between the speeds with which policies are changed, their content, and fundamental changes on the ground.

Citizen participation compromised: a hindrance? Davidson’s (1967) wheel of participation model highlights the importance of four things which determine and enhance meaningful community/public participation, namely: empowerment, participation, consultation, and information. Despite the emphasis on effective citizen participation, the ruling party has mostly been condemned for not consulting with citizens at the national, provincial, and local government level (McKinley, 2012). The structural constraints within local government structures have increasingly stifled participation (Benit-Gbaffou, 2008). What typically happens is that participatory approaches are now aimed at serving the interests of those in power (Sinwell, 2009). In this case, the ANC enjoys the privilege of being in power regarding formulating the agenda for all three tiers of government. This, in turn, has caused participatory spaces to be mostly centralised, politicised, and state-led (Winkler, 2011). This state of affairs has, in turn, propelled Cornwall (2004) to advocate for the opening up of ‘spaces’ for participation to encourage public participation. ‘Spaces’ are traditionally defined as centres of meaning expressing the intentions and aspirations constructed by

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human experience (Penderis, 1996). Thus, when ‘spaces’ of participation are being interfered with and suppressed, it results in localised political protests. Owing to a lack of basic services, there has been significant growth of ‘invented’ spaces of participation, and fewer ‘invited’ spaces of participation in the country. On the one hand, ‘invented’ spaces are those spaces which are mostly occupied by grassroots movements with the aim of challenging the status quo (Miraftab, 2004). In these spaces, people often come together in collective actions, and self-help initiatives to express their discontent (Cornwall, 2004). On the other hand, ‘invited’ spaces are those spaces that follow official channels and are often procedural. These are created by the state through legal and constitutional guarantees (Miraftab, 2004). Post-apartheid South Africa has witnessed the creation of multiple ‘invented’ spaces of participation wherein citizens express themselves violently and militantly through burning tyres, barricading roads, and destroying and vandalising property. These violent demonstrations are mainly caused by the exclusion of citizens from actual decision-making processes (Mkhize, 2015:200). The ruling party not only excludes citizens in decision-making processes, but it also disregards its tripartite alliance partners. The unilateral implementation of GEAR and the hurriedly formulated new mining charter epitomises the disregard of the tripartite alliance partners. These and many other cases have inadvertently caused disunity in the alliance. This inevitably leads to unabated unilateral decision-making which is usually inimical to the interests of the poor.

Unfavourable climate, unfavourable consequences, and unfavourable responses South Africa’s unstable socio-political landscape has led to the birth of various movements after democracy (Nyamnjoh, 2017:256–277). Activism and grassroots resistance has dominated the discourse of these movements. Historically, the social protests have been located within several movements which have raised different concerns. Firstly, there was the Mass Democratic Movement (MDM), which fought for the ushering in of democracy in the 1980s–1990s. Secondly, there was an emergence of New Social Movements (NSMs) in 2000. Unlike its predecessors, the NSMs sought to challenge neoliberal economic policies, and issues relating to quality of life were also raised. Dalton and Kuechler (1990:11) assert that these

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groups wanted greater opportunities to participate in the decisions affecting their members’ lives through direct democracy or increased reliance on self-help groups. Thirdly, the other set of organisations (starting after the 2009/10 period) has been described as local political protests or ‘popcorn protests’. These protests raise locally-based concerns, and they do not last long. Finally, nationwide student protests over lack of accommodation, failures of the National Student Financial Aid schemes (NSFAS), and academic exclusions occurred between 2009 and 2015. Importantly, the earlier incidents of student protests were followed by a new wave of nationwide student protests in 2015–2016. These included Rhodes Must Fall (RMF) and Fees Must Fall (FMF), which were both calling for more concrete transformation and decolonisation in South African universities. First, at Wits University, students protested over issues relating to accommodation, funding, and registration. Second, at the University of Cape Town and Rhodes University, students protested over the removal of a Cecil John Rhodes statue. Third, at Stellenbosch University, students protested over the language policy which was not inclusive. The Fees Must Fall movement called for the scrapping of fees in all public educational institutions, as some students (mainly Black) from poor backgrounds could not afford to register. The December 2017 NASREC ANC Elective conference resolved to usher in free education progressively. This resolution was further emphasised when the newly elected President Cyril Ramaphosa delivered the 2018 State of the Nation Address (SONA). The budget speech explained that R36 billion would have to be raised to roll out free education especially for first degrees Unfulfilled aspirations in an emerging democracy ignited sociopolitical instability and revolt in South Africa (Kotze, 2016). From Abahlali baseMjondolo (shack dwellers) in Durban to ‘poo’ protests in Cape Town, to ‘popcorn’ protests across the country, to student protests, the post-apartheid South Africa has seen all kinds of protests, which did not augur well for the country’s economy. The protest movements have leveraged any and all power they may have to be heard. Using the tactics employed by the Landless People’s Movement (LPM), Abahlali baseMjondolo advised residents to boycott elections to pressurise the government into providing basic services. In what became known as the ‘poo’ protest, protesters forced the government to provide water and sanitation in June 2013 when they dumped human waste at Cape Town International Airport.

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Throughout the country, students have burnt down valuable property and infrastructure at universities, which has caused substantial damage to the economy. Key demands included decolonisation of education, free education, elimination of institutional racism, and improved student access and accommodation (Nyamnjoh, 2017:256–277). Suttner (2014:24) posits that South Africa will not be able to address its challenges unless it fights its crises of leadership and ‘ungovernability’. The following are the serious crises identified by Suttner (2014:24–25) as crippling the economy and creating instability. A crisis of legality – from top to bottom government is surrounded by allegations and proof of wrongful use of power benefitting individuals and denying basic needs to communities. A crisis of violence – while earlier police ministries sometimes saw police use force as necessary, this has been more a marked feature of the Zuma administration, manifested in the Marikana massacre of 2012. The police often used force as a first resort and did not try to negotiate with the crowds. Gratuitous violence – gratuitous police violence and murder resulting in the dragging of Mozambican taxi driver, Mido Macia, handcuffed behind a police van. De-politicisation of grievances – political issues are reduced to questions of law and order and grievances are not addressed. Internal divisions – protests related to internal ANC disputes where disgruntled aspirant councillors help stoke up protests. Threat to governability – the level of protests has reached such intensity that it has been difficult to sustain governability in many parts of the country. The key challenge has been violent and militant protests, which apparently have two dimensions: the residents burning down buildings and destroying infrastructure, and the police officials responding violently to the protests. The police officials’ responses have been reminiscent of the past regarding employing sectarian and authoritarian approaches in handling the social protests. National Commissioner of Police, Bheki Cele, previously advocated for the ‘shoot to kill’ slogan, which emphasised that police be transformed

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into a paramilitary force with military ranks and discipline (Duncan, 2012). This implies a swift return to the apartheid conceptualisation of policing and does not bode well for the protection of human rights, police legitimacy, the rule of law, and police reforms. The change to more apartheid-style policing had devastating consequences. In April 2011, Andries Tatane, an innocent civilian, was killed by the police during a service delivery protest. This incident was followed by the killing of Mido Macia in 2012. In the same year, police brutality increased when they shot and killed 34 striking Lonmin miners. Standoffs between the police and protesters have been reported in many protests in the country. More recently, the Fees Must Fall and Rhodes Must Fall movements that engulfed universities were characterised by militant and violent behaviour including acts of criminality such as looting, vandalism, and destruction of property (Nyamnjoh, 2017).

Is BRICS an option for South Africa? African states lack finance for development. As a result, it is not surprising that the BRICS platform raises a myriad of expectations regarding helping to solve some of Africa’s problems. The key question remains whether South Africa’s involvement in the BRICS bloc is in the interests of the poor or not. This question elicits mixed responses. The proponents argue that some degree of influence, whether social, political, or economic, will be obtained through active involvement in the bloc (Besada, Tok, and Winters, 2013; Daniel and Virk, 2014). Robinson (2015) argues that the bloc seeks to transform the existing international order, which is exploitative and asymmetric, into a more broad-based global system. A similar view is echoed by Bertelsmann-Scott, Friis, and Prinsloo (2016) after the formation of the New Development Bank (NDB). They lament the lack of transformation in the international financial institutions (IFIs) (Bertelsmann-Scott, Friis, and Prinsloo, 2016:7). The BRICS in this context, supposedly, will be seen as a sustainable alternative to the Bretton Woods influences of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund (IMF). Despite this commitment, it is unclear how and to what extent BRICS will be an ‘alternative’ to Bretton Woods given its ongoing support for the neoliberal agenda. Critics of BRICS thus come from within and outside the BRICS. From within, the adversaries posit that with the establishment of the NDB, one of the objectives was to reach an understanding of what

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sustainable development entails and how it should be brought about. However, there is still no common position on sustainable development (Bertelsmann-Scott, Friis, and Prinsloo, 2016). The activities of BRICS members are sometimes harmful ecologically and environmentally. A lack of common positions on many key issues characterises the BRICS alliance. The classic example was when they could not agree on the nominee for the presidency of the World Bank. Bond (2016b:8) notes that ‘The Brazilians nominated a progressive economist, Jose Antonio Ocampo; the South Africans nominated neoliberal Nigerian finance minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala; and the Russians supported [Jim Yong] Kim’. Jim Yong Kim was Barack Obama’s nominee. China and India did not raise their hands but were subsequently rewarded when India’s Kaushik Basu was made World Bank Chief Economist and the Chinese Jin-Yong Cai also obtained a key position. South Africa’s position – especially its choice for a neoliberal candidate, is not only indicative of reinforcing neoliberalism but also shows a lack of autonomy and firm stance, seemingly opting for an African candidate. The establishment of the NDB is also a bone of contention – especially its association with the IMF and World Bank. The NDB and the Contingent Reserve Arrangement (CRA) (in particular CRA) are at odds with the anti-imperialism agenda. Instead of distancing itself from the IMF, the CRA ‘actually empowers the IMF because, if a member country is in need of more than 30% of borrowing quota, it must first go to the IMF for a structural adjustment loan and conditionality before accessing more from the CRA’ (Bond, 2016a:613). This then makes the BRICS members subservient to the IMF and weakens their autonomy. Scholars argue that this might continue to be the case because the NDB is currently not financially stable – having $100 billion in its coffers while the World Bank has $250 billion (Bertelsmann-Scott, Friis, and Prinsloo, 2016). Scholars argue that this money can be exhausted quickly in times of desperate financial need. Under these circumstances, BRICS is collaborating with and advancing imperialist expansion. In contradistinction, this collaboration is aimed at improving sub-imperialism to stabilise its international financial power (Bond, 2016a). The BRICS members are therefore accused of having double standards. BRICS could be viewed as nothing but a sub-imperialist platform. Taylor (2016) cautions of the BRICS’ paradoxical involvement in Africa, arguing that BRICS’ involvement deepens Africa’s dependence on the global economy. Wenzel (2016)

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speaks of one-sided extraction and exportation of resources – with Africa being the victim. This is evidenced by the BRICS members’ strategies for seeking regional domination. BRICS does not provide ‘alternative’ solutions but is a sub-imperialist strategy with aspirations for regional dominance. Based on the double standards and lack of consistency in the manner in which the BRICS countries conduct themselves, it has become clear that the bloc is not advancing the interests of the poor. Instead, BRICS members are concerned primarily with their own regional dominance (subimperialism) at the expense of genuinely challenging the status quo (imperialism from Bretton Woods). There are many examples of these ambitions. For example, South Africa’s ambition for regional dominance and influence can be seen through its implementation of projects such as the New Partnership for Africa’s Development in 2001 and African Peer Review Mechanism in 2005 (Bond, 2016b:4).

Conclusion and policy recommendations The chapter highlighted the socio-economic and political challenges confronting South Africa. These challenges have resulted in both unfavourable climates and responses (social protests, militarism, and violence). In theory, capitalism and democracy made many promises. Certainty concerning democracy’s role in development and redress remains elusive, although, as the paper argued, strong democracy-supporting institutions need to be built and supported so that they will independently and impartially fulfil their oversight roles. This (along with plans to reduce corruption at the individual, organisational, and societal level) will help fight corruption and all other malpractices that rob poor and marginalised communities of basic services. As argued by the neopatrimonial theorists, corruption is not simplistic. Its multi-layered nature requires not only multi-dimensional responses but also strong political will and a strong criminal justice system. A strong judiciary is imperative regarding guarding against corruption especially among senior government officials. These officials, as the ‘bad apple theory’ argues, are the ones who manipulate and divert public resources into private hands. South Africa is currently one of the most corrupt and unequal societies in the world. The poor and marginalised communities typically feel the adverse consequences of corruption and social/

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economic inequality. A variety of protest demonstrations not only attest to dissatisfaction among the poor but also show the ‘revolutionary potential’ and the rebellious nature of the disgruntled citizens. Economic policies implemented by the government have not sufficiently helped the poor, but instead continue to widen the gap between the rich and the poor – maintaining the apartheid status quo. Recent downgrades by the credit rating agencies provide evidence of the precarious nature of the South African economy. However, the election of the new president, the possible reinstatement of the corruption charges against the former president, the cabinet reshuffle where broad public participation was encouraged, and numerous arrests made by the Hawks thus far are early indicators of the significant change in senior leadership structures in government. A new resolution on the land issue accompanies these largely positive interventions. The ANC resolved to expropriate land without compensation in the Nasrec conference. There have been mixed reactions regarding this resolution, especially its adverse effects on food security, economic growth, and employment creation. Notwithstanding these changes, it is premature to predict whether these changes will bring a corrupt-free, stable, and economically viable country. Considering these circumstances, the chapter sought to find out whether the BRICS can be viable development partners. The BRICS bloc is a viable option in theory, but in practice, it is plagued by many challenges and flaws. For example, there is no common position among members on what sustainable development is and how it can be achieved. Lack of self-sufficiency, indecisiveness and inconsistencies, lack of unity among members, and double standards are some of the inhibiting challenges that weaken the relevance of BRICS in the global political economy. On many occasions, BRICS members portray themselves as a viable ‘alternative’ to Bretton Woods (anti-imperialist agenda), but at the same time, there are instances where they are working with the imperialists. This re-legitimises neoliberalism and reinforces the Bretton Woods dominance in the global political economy. The fact that there is room for using the IMF as a bailout in cases where the NDB and CRA cannot fully support struggling economies also makes the BRICS permanently subservient to the Bretton Woods institutions. While members want to be seen as assisting emerging economies, their assistance is mostly conditional and is an attempt to expand regional dominance.

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14 Conclusion Justin van der Merwe, Nicole Dodd, and Patrick Bond

What if anything is different in the 21st century? The same patterns of (sub)imperialism create the same problems for the continent. Africa remains a site for extraction, dumping, and discarding. However, much like the rest of the developments we have seen this century, these practices are accelerated. Infrastructure and logistics, technology and communication, and deceptively attractive financial instruments are luring leaders into ever-accelerating cycles of dispossession. Now, the spectre of debt peonage to would-be allies faces Africa’s profoundly mismanaged economies. Soon, like an illfated echo, the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank will be approached and neoliberalism will likely prevail, just under a more right-winged, neo-fascist vanguard. The question will not be whether to resist or not, the question will be who, if any, are truly allies of the dispossessed? Chapter 2 argued that sub-imperialism has elicited responses from local communities which can be characterised as counterimperialist. These responses (or discourse in the form of text, talk, and practice) stem from regional actors and are generally aimed at exposing the unevenness in the relationship between the subimperial and peripheral state. Notably, such responses arise when there is a disjuncture between the sub-imperialist state’s rhetoric (either through state sanctioned channels or its broader cultural media) on the one hand, and its actions and business dealings within these territories on the other. Counter-imperialism can stem from both official and recognised channels and actors (government, businesses, and media actors) within the region but also from concerned citizens and groups (NGOs, think tanks, independent media houses, academia, and trade unions). Those outside of official channels voice their positions via social protest, and by partnering with established bodies to pursue the class interests of local business and labour. Media platforms have opened up avenues for more expressive and collaborative actions.

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Resistance may be stifled by the powerful and through co-optation of those who are supposed to act in their best interests. Such clampdowns may involve violent suppression using the state apparatus. However, critical engagement and more protective actions may follow as those involved in conscientising government and other parties are persistent, creative, and resourceful in their efforts to move these matters into the public realm. The bigger theoretical point relates to understanding the unfolding geographies of resistance in Africa and the periphery. This can be done by joining the dots of social protest across these spaces. The issues which bind these groups and their informal networks across space and time are dynamic, and are not fully catered for by the existing institutions. Historically, African regional institutions and avenues embodying counter-geopolitical movements were formed in response to apartheid South Africa, in solidarity against Western colonialism, and against superpower interference during the Cold War. More broadly global Southern bodies and movements like the Bandung conference of 1955 and the Non-Aligned Movement also served this purpose. However, the threats facing Africa and the periphery at the moment are financial, developmental and economic, and technological in nature and potentially stem from new sources such as China and the BRICS. New responsible geographies of resistance need to counteract these threats, hence the need for more agile and responsive mechanisms for critical engagement and action. Chapter 3 turned to critically assessing ‘BRICS from the middle’. The chapter began by discussing the 2018 BRICS summit which took place in Sandton, South Africa (known for its white-collar corruption) amid much self-congratulation. However, the location and rhetoric did little to conceal the fact that BRICS remains riddled with deep-seated corruption and colludes with African elites. The business-driven goals of BRICS, although stated otherwise, subvert some of the more idealistic vehicles of cooperation. The academy in South Africa has adopted a subservient attitude to BRICS. This is in part because it is benefiting from funding for research. The lack of intellectual backbone and mediocrity demonstrated by some academics is concerning, even against the bigger concerns of BRICS’ plundering of resources, ecological degradation, and rights violations in Africa. Assimilated academics have collectively lowered their expectations of the BRICS. These patterns of assimilation are also to be seen in finance, trade, and climate politics, as BRICS countries continue to strengthen the dominance of existing Western institutions and agreements.

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The world’s largest proletariat lives within the BRICS states. Although divided and weakened, South Africa’s working class has been ranked as one of if not the most confrontational workforce in the world. But this is not true for the BRICS as a whole as militancy remains uneven throughout the bloc and in some instances the labour movement is very weak. BRICS countries and their hinterlands continue to fit unevenly into global production chains where the major beneficiation happens in the North and worker pay remains poor in most BRICS countries, but this differs from sector to sector. Unions at ‘the middle’ remain particularly susceptible to assimilation despite their stated class objectives. Worryingly, these trends suggest further support and not a challenging of some of the deeper class inequalities and forces of the imperialist system. Chapter 4 explained how the BRICS reproduce familiar uneven trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) relations with Africa. These relationships are fundamentally skewed in favour of the BRICS. In contrast with common perceptions, Africa’s trade with the West (EU and US) and India is more equitable than trade with Brazil, Russia, China, and South Africa. The general trade patterns with the BRICS echo old patterns: heavy reliance on the export of raw materials, and the importation of manufactured goods and materials. One notable exception to this trend is Africa’s dependence on food imports from the BRICS. Cashstrapped African states are at risk of courting debt disguised as infrastructure investment. Several of the BRICS-led investments are overtly focused on profit-taking and accelerating dispossession rather than on actual local development, especially in the infrastructure sector. The precariousness of Africa within these relationships is exacerbated by the unfolding debt crisis linked primarily to China’s ambitious One Belt One Road initiative and its issuing of easy money to vulnerable African lenders. Ports, airports, bridges, railways, and roads are springing up on the continent as much-needed infrastructure development becomes a seductive means for selling Chinese credit. Loans are accrued over the long term. Some states in Africa, notably Zambia, are already defaulting on certain payments leading to threats of Chinese acquisitions of state-owned enterprises and assets. The resultant loss of sovereignty and power remain worrying in this scenario. Africa’s use of its natural resources to collateralise loans, and the preferential sale of its resources in exchange for development favours is undermining the continent’s economic and human development.

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Chapter 5 challenged the fallacies surrounding China’s role in Africa and questioned whether Sino-African interaction constitutes positive collaboration or not. The authors presented a detailed exposition of the genesis of China’s capitalism and its role in the global economy. China’s failure to develop its domestic consumer market has resulted in a co-dependent relationship with the US and EU, as China is reliant on their markets. Even the rest of Asia has been subsumed into an economic system that is driven by this nexus. The global system remains dominated by these dynamics and is overwhelmingly imperialist. This chapter, and the text in general, indicates that under these conditions, Africa remains a supplier of raw materials and markets and has little scope to challenge its global position. For 20 years the West unsuccessfully tried to oust Mugabe. China managed to do so in three. Chapter Six described how it achieved this by using economic leverage that it had built up while Zimbabwe was ‘out in the cold’ in relation to the international community. The BRICS stepped in when the West attempted to sanction Zimbabwe, effectively becoming Zimbabwe’s international custodians. Unlike the West, they appeared to not impose any conditionality in the relationship. Despite the environmental degradation, displacement, dispossession, labour violations, and human rights violations that marked the relationship, it continued. This was partially because Zimbabwe needed the BRICS’ international influence, financial power, and business to prop up Mugabe’s regime. Zimbabwe’s diamonds, specifically those in the Marange mines, were central to this alliance. Russia, India, China, and South Africa all continued to trade with and profit from Zimbabwe’s diamond mines. They even successfully exerted pressure on the international community and managed to reopen international trade in Zimbabwean diamonds. The BRICS propped up Mugabe’s regime until his policies turned against them, however. The BRICS countries, notably China, Russia, and South Africa, were involved prior to, during, and after the Zimbabwean coup. The regime change was arguably engineered to secure Chinese financial interests in the country. To provide leverage, China stalled nine mega deals with the condition being that Mugabe be removed before they would continue. Mugabe responded by revoking Chinese access to Zimbabwean diamonds in the Marange mines. Previously, Zimbabwe had lost $15 billion in tax revenue from the Marange mines because of Chinese tax evasion and corruption. Emmerson Mnangagwa was implicated in this. He, the military, and Chinese mining firm Anjin, are

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accused of colluding to steal diamonds from Marange. Anjin is not the only questionable Chinese company involved in Marange, but the relationship is worth noting because the diamonds were used as collateral against a $98 million loan to build Zimbabwe’s Defence College. Chinese miners returned to Marange within weeks of Mugabe’s ouster. The BRICS’ role in the Zimbabwean coup points to the bloc’s economic and political influence on the continent. Mnangagwa has abandoned some of Mugabe’s more controversial policy stances. The newly reincarnated Zimbabwe appears to be open for business, courting investment and trade with both the BRICS and the West, and welcoming international engagement. However, it seems that Mnangagwa’s Zimbabwe is still firmly in China’s debt. Mnangagwa’s military background also suggests that there could be more arms-for-minerals deals under his leadership. He also seems to be reinvigorating murky deals and contracts that had stalled under Mugabe. Zimbabwe could be open for business, but it could just as easily be interpreted that Zimbabwe is being sold to the least prescriptive bidder. In this case, the BRICS stand out as the most likely winners. Chapter 7 highlighted the uneven and exploitative relationship between Zambia and China. Despite a long history of cooperation between Africa and China, especially through key infrastructure such as the Tanzania–Zambia Railway (TAZARA), Zambia emerges as a microcosm or exemplar of the best and worst of Chinese influence on the continent. From about 2000, Zambia has been a consistent focus for Chinese companies and investment which have managed to kick-start the Zambian economy but also had debilitating consequences in terms of labour conditions and the stifling of local businesses. China’s involvement has arguably even impacted negatively upon Zambian citizens’ overall quality of life as a concurrent drop in its human development accompanied China’s rise in the country and continent. China’s involvement in Zambia spans key economic sectors such as in the mining, construction, textile and manufacturing, and agricultural sectors, and is regularly the dominant player in these sectors. It has acquired Zambian assets and mines though both state-led and private acquisitions within these sectors. The local responses to Chinese business and investment in Zambia have been particularly vociferous turning the country into one of the most contested areas in Sino-African relations across the continent. Protest against China’s dominance in the country

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occurs almost daily and in various sectors but mainly in mining. The lack of transparency behind Chinese involvement in Zambia is a major concern to locals who find out about the deals made with China only after they have already been struck. The lack of transparency and outright corruption have been used by local politicians such as Michael Sata (at least initially) to heighten Sinophobia as an electioneering tactic. Problems relating to conditions of labour mostly centre on pay disputes and health and safety conditions at Chinese-owned mines and other large companies. A trend of protest against, and violent backlashes from, Chinese mine owners is apparent in Zambia, exemplified by the protesting workers shot at the Collum Mine. Another example is when a blast at a munitions plant killed 50 Zambians due to alleged poor safety standards on the mines. Economic displacement of local businesses has also occurred in the areas of construction where Chinese contractors are dominant and crowd out the local competition. Land grabs and the use of Chinese labour instead of local labour are further typical complaints in the country. The China South Railways case (Chapter 8) illustrated how elites across the BRICS work in concert to enrich themselves at Africa’s expense. BRICS elites use sophisticated tactics to exploit loopholes in international trade and financial systems. They also identify weaknesses in governance and oversight within countries and then use these as a means of gaining access to state contracts. In this specific case, the now-infamous Guptas ensured that key government officials were appointed who could ensure that their clients would be awarded state contracts. In turn, they facilitated kickbacks from suppliers to decision makers. These deals and transactions took place in offshore sites with lax financial controls and high levels of secrecy. Gold and other minerals were likely used as a means of moving money from country to country. The case involved three BRICS countries: South Africa, China, and India. China wants to secure major contracts in Africa and seems to be prepared to resorting to bribery to do so. Proceeds of this crime were eventually repatriated to India. China and India (albeit indirectly) profited at South Africa’s expense with the Guptas at the centre of these activities. The One Belt One Road initiative (BRI) discussed in Chapter 9 is China’s new geopolitical vision for the world. Africa is nominally involved in the initiative through the maritime route which touches the East Coast and moves along the Red Sea and up the Suez Canal. However, Chinese influence is such that any activity

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tends to resonate throughout the continent and penetrates adjacent areas and countries. This is particularly the case with BRI, which is seeking to enhance connectivity across the continent. Infrastructure projects (airports, railways, and other projects) linked to the initiative are mushrooming throughout East Africa, further raising the spectre of the unfolding debt trap linked directly to this initiative. Possible misperceptions stem from a lack of understanding concerning the intentions of Chinese migrants coming to Africa, of which very little is actually known, as well as the various modes (state-led and private) in which China interacts with the continent. In Kenya, projects linked to the BRI centre on the building of the Standard Gauge Railway, with limited transfer of knowledge and skills taking place. The project has also alarmed environmentalists as it moves through a national park, and also caused displacement of people from their homes. The financial sustainability of the project has been questioned. The coal-fired plant in Lamu, Kenya has also caused concern because of the likelihood of ecological degradation in the port city, which has led to the formation of the group ‘Save Lamu’. In Ethiopia, the first light railway system (or tram system) is historical but has limited utility for the locals. The Addis–Djibouti railway is operated by the Chinese and has failed to generate sufficient connectivity for the landlocked state, which was its original goal. Failure to achieve these objectives may impact on the likelihood of repayment to China’s ExIm (Export-Import) bank. In Tanzania, a key docking zone for the BRI, another major port is being built, which China has partially funded. A special economic zone is planned in Tanzania, which some locals are concerned will affect local livelihoods and also impact nearby ecosystems. Rwanda has attracted interest from China because of its need for infrastructure upgrades but raises issues like a lack of a coherent African policy to manage these relations and stands particularly vulnerable to influence from China. Chapter 10 discusses two key themes which have led to protests in the global South: the hosting of mega-events and corruption. Focusing mainly on Brazil and South Africa, the chapter compares these two countries’ comparative experiences. Making appearances in the global North and South, protest cultures seem to be on the increase as nationalism is rising and right-wing populists come to power. In Brazil the 2013 protests just before the 2014 FIFA Football World Cup were key in creating a nationwide turn to protest action. Although the protests started off as being directed at typical urban struggles (transport costs and traffic congestion)

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they soon transformed into protests directed at Brazil’s hosting of mega-events more generally. This was particularly the case as Brazil was also hosting the Olympics in 2016. Protests also preceded and occurred during South Africa’s hosting of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The overriding concern of the protests throughout the two countries was government’s spending on white elephants such as stadia instead of directing these funds at meeting the needs of the indigent. Forced removals and community displacement took place in both Rio de Janeiro and Cape Town. The extent of the spending and the prioritisation of profit above local development were sharp reminders of the dispossessing effects of such global events when hosted in developing environments. Forced evictions, proletarianisation, commodification and privatisation of land, and the legislated and agreed-to protection and securing of foreign business interests and sponsors are just some of the key dispossessing qualities of such events. These events are underwritten and managed by the host nations’ state apparatus. Mega-events therefore become a form of neoliberal ‘shock therapy’ injected into global Southern cities, yet are bizarrely still actively courted by these countries because of their supposed developmental spin-offs. Brazil and South Africa also share the problem of high-level and endemic state corruption. Brazil has arguably handled these matters more effectively with at the least the successful prosecution of a former president (Lula da Silva) and the impeachment of another (Dilma Rousseff). In South Africa, attempts at impeachment (motions of no confidence in parliament) have failed and government has attempted to prevent potential corruption prosecutions linked to the 1990s Arms Deal by using Commissions of Inquiry (although charges have now been reinstated due to court charges levelled by the opposition party the Democratic Alliance). Subtle party and political pressures on politicians to resign have also failed. The broader themes of African leaders overstaying their welcome and clinging to power, disputing results of elections, and clouding the ensuing transitions in their countries (Zimbabwe and Kenya in recent history) are common. The continent can draw lessons on how to prevent this from places like Brazil and elsewhere. That said, the future of Brazil’s democracy seems unknown based on the 2018 election of Jair Bolsonaro, who is well known for his strong rightwing convictions. Land grabs in Ethiopia have been the focus of several analyses, and is the focus of Chapter 11. Although normally considered a part of how Northern countries underdevelop Southern countries,

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emerging powers are increasingly guilty of land grabs in Africa and the periphery. Of all the emerging powers, India demonstrates a particularly strong interest for acquiring land in Ethiopia, typically using its apparent benign image on the continent and ‘South–South solidarity’ to get its way. This is achieved through multinational corporations in the country who perpetuate or create cycles of dependency and exploitation. However, the Ethiopian government is also to blame. It is eager to attract investment and does so at the expense of locals. It holds the rights to land ownership in Ethiopia putting the peasants who work on the land and rely on it for their livelihood in a particularly vulnerable position, as well as causing degradation of the environment. Land grabs are a global phenomenon occurring in Latin America (although not with the same amount of external ownership) and especially in Brazil. Similar overtures occur in Tanzania (linked to nature conservation and causing displacement of locals) and in Kenya, where many are still dependent on the land for their income and survival. Intracontinental land grabs have also occurred, as well as between the EU and Africa. Resistance in Ethiopia, although gaining in significance, has resulted in violent state-led clampdowns on protesters. Unity and class awareness between protesters are sometimes limited because of the relative seductiveness of the contracts stemming from privatisation. Resistance can also arise in respect of broken promises made by the investors. Accumulation by dispossession as a slight updating on primitive accumulation is apparent because of the opportunistic behaviour of the Ethiopian state and elite when peasants are expelled, sometimes forcefully, from their land and are thereby forced to contend for wage labour in the urban centres. Chapter 12 presented some of the potential benefits flowing from ‘BRICS from the middle’ collaboration in the area of science, technology, and innovation. The proposed Russia–South Africa nuclear deal was framed in this way. The potential benefits were, however, outweighed by the sheer weight of the likely fiscal burden on South Africa should the deal go ahead, as well as the edifice of corruption just underneath it. Because of recurring energy shortages in South Africa power-generating capacity needed to be built. One of the options (expressed in the Integrated Resource Plan, 2016) among others, was to invest in nuclear power. This, plus the use of renewable energy sources, would help to attain an optimal energy mix in South Africa. There is debate about whether nuclear power is a suitable source of energy for developing nations. However, it was not so much scepticism about the science behind nuclear power

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that emerged as the main problem in South Africa but, rather, as mentioned, the overall costs and the nature of the decision-making process involved. Although Rosatom is a viable nuclear build contender in a fairly small field globally (Westinghouse, Areva), from the outset, the proposed deal always seemed to be tilted in Russia’s favour. The picture is particularly concerning when assessed against the broader backdrop of Russia’s nuclear diplomacy throughout Africa. In this sense, South Africa became a litmus test and warning for what may play out in other African countries in the near future. The proposed Russian nuclear build in South Africa was particularly tainted by the likelihood of a ‘sweetheart’ agreement between the Russian President Vladimir Putin and the then South African President Jacob Zuma. The Gupta family were key instigators and possible masterminds behind the deal because of their involvement in uranium mines in South Africa. The shuffling of pliable cabinet members into key ministries (Minerals and Energy, State-Owned Enterprises, and Finance) where they could push through the deal was particularly evident. It is largely thanks to resistance ‘from the middle’ and ‘below’ that the nuclear deal was halted after a court ordered that the awarding of the tender was irregular. The nuclear deal in its former iteration was therefore stopped. A scaled-down version of the deal may still appear in the future. South Africa became a global darling following the end of apartheid. However, a series of economic and political missteps, as well as endemic corruption have changed global perceptions. Chapter 13 discussed how, from a policy perspective, South Africa chose a path reminiscent of structural adjustment programmes, choosing a neoliberal macroeconomic policy orientation over socialism. The combination of capitalism and democracy applied in South Africa failed to redress apartheid’s legacy and deepened the economic exclusion of Black South Africans. Domestically, the ruling elites’ policy blunders and corrupt political tendencies resulted in poor governance, cronyism, and populism. Today, the country faces significant socio-economic challenges as there is severe inequality and more than 30 million South Africans live in poverty. This has given rise to a sharp increase in protest activities, a situation that has been worsened by a lack of proper platforms for public participation. These conditions might suggest that the country has ‘revolutionary potential’. Mkhize explored whether lessons and inputs from the BRICS alliance might improve the country’s economic outlook, thereby reducing unrest and instability. He noted that despite the myriad expectations, South Africa’s involvement in the BRICS is

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unlikely to be in the interests of the poor. This is partially because the bloc reinforces the existing international order, and lacks unity. BRICS could even be viewed as collaborating with, and advancing imperialist expansion, acting as sub-imperialists wanting to achieve regional dominance. What can Africa do to address the challenges raised in this volume? In the short term, as currency and debt repayment crises hit, re-imposing exchange controls could ensure control of financial flows, quickly followed by lowered interest rates to boost growth. Government would then have to conduct an audit of ‘Odious Debt’ before any further repayment of scarce hard currency. This should be accompanied by improved management of imports – to serve national interests, not the interests of elite consumers. These measures would need to be accompanied by the adoption of an ecologically sensitive industrial policy aimed at import substitution, sectoral re-balancing, meeting social needs, and true sustainability. Once finances are secure, it would be possible to increase state social spending, paid for by higher corporate taxes, cross-subsidisation, and more domestic borrowing. The medium- and longer-term economic development strategies would reorient infrastructure to meet unmet basic needs, and then expand, maintain, and improve the energy grid, plus water and sanitation, public transport, health, education, recreational facilities, and universal access to the internet. In places like South Africa and Nigeria that have an excess reliance on extraction and burning of fossil fuels, it would be vital to adopt what have been termed ‘Million Climate Jobs’ strategies to generate employment for a genuinely green ‘Just Transition’.

INDEX

ABSA bank xv, 157, 163, 164 Accelerated and Shared Growth Initiative South Africa xv, 248, 250, 259 accumulation by dispossession 1, 12, 16, 30, 31, 34, 38, 155, 165, 192, 202, 208, 209, 217, 218, 219 capital 21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 30, 31, 34, 35, 38, 39, 73, 98, 101, 102, 103, 104, 105, 107, 108, 110, 111, 112, 152, 153, 154, 155, 191, 192, 193, 213 overaccumulation, crisis of 29, 31, 34, 35, 36, 155 primitive 30, 45, 152, 192, 217, 272 Africa East 11, 16, 175, 178, 180, 181, 183, 270 rising 36, 45 sub-Saharan 7, 29, 84, 176, 207, 246 West 3 African National Congress xv, 7, 23, 47, 59, 61, 100, 195, 227, 228, 240, 241, 246, 248, 249, 250, 251, 253, 254, 258, 261, 262 African Union xv, 38, 42, 109 agriculture 16, 78, 79, 123, 134, 139, 147, 212, 214, 215, 218, 220 farming 147, 218 Amin, Samir 25, 26, 42, 74, 93, 212 Angola 24, 69, 78, 88, 95, 121 anti-capitalist 17, 22, 23, 43, 188 Arab Spring, the 12, 17, 23, 187, 189 arms trade 80

Asia 14, 22, 102, 109, 113, 129, 132, 143, 144, 148, 151, 238, 267 East 101, 102, 104, 105, 108, 109 AVIC International 137, 146 Bahamas, The 33 Bandung Conference 25, 111, 265 Bank of China 137 Black Economic Empowerment xv, 160, 250, 262 Bolsonaro, Jair 2, 47, 79, 94, 201, 204, 271 Bond, Patrick vii, xi, 1, 2, 7, 13, 17, 25, 30, 32, 36, 37, 43, 47, 52, 57, 58, 60, 66, 67, 75, 82, 87, 88, 94, 102, 107, 110, 112, 113, 159, 167, 173, 183, 187, 188, 189, 203, 240, 243, 248, 256, 257, 259, 261 Brazil xv, xix, 2, 8, 10, 16, 47, 55, 56, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 69, 73, 76, 78, 79, 80, 88, 95, 100, 119, 132, 150, 187, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 213, 220, 222, 226, 227, 239, 240, 266, 270, 271, 272 BRICS Academic Forum 8, 14, 48, 49, 50, 51, 53 Business Council 4, 47, 50, 51, 61, 67, 166 intra-BRICS collusion 16, 152, 165 Trade Union Forum xv, 14, 48, 59, 60, 61, 63, 64, 67, 68 Cape Town 3, 22, 52, 184, 191, 195, 204, 253, 259, 260, 261, 262, 271

276

INDEX

Chambishi Mine 135, 144, 151 China xv, xvi, xvii, xix, 3, 4, 5, 8, 10, 14, 15, 16, 18, 22, 24, 26, 27, 30, 31, 32, 33, 35, 43, 44, 46, 47, 48, 49, 51, 52, 55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 69, 73, 74, 75, 76, 79, 83, 84, 85, 87, 88, 89, 90, 93, 94, 95, 96, 97, 100, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 120, 121, 124, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 131, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 143, 144, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 152, 153, 158, 159, 160, 161, 165, 166, 170, 171, 172, 173, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 185, 187, 227, 228, 229, 234, 238, 240, 256, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269, 270 China Development Bank 4, 51, 90, 159 China Henan International Corporation 137 China Nonferrous Metal Mining xv, 135 China South Railways xv, 4, 16, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 165, 269 China–Africa relations xvi, 97, 100, 105, 109, 111, 112, 113, 114, 185 Chiwenga, Constantino 120, 121, 122 Choppies 33, 45 class 12, 21, 22, 25, 27, 30, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 49, 61, 63, 64, 107, 112, 141, 190, 193, 211, 217, 245, 248, 250, 264, 266, 272 middle 30, 35, 250 working 36, 59, 193, 211, 266 coal 54, 55, 58, 61, 79, 170, 176, 185, 224, 226, 230, 270 Cold War 39, 80, 209, 265

colonialism 27, 39, 44, 51, 52, 109, 132, 141, 190, 197, 207, 208, 245, 248, 265 commodities 6, 35, 58, 83, 84, 85, 93, 101, 105, 110, 156, 157 construction 16, 32, 58, 75, 79, 90, 127, 128, 132, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 145, 146, 147, 177, 178, 180, 181, 190, 193, 196, 198, 214, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 231, 232, 233, 235, 268, 269 Contingency Reserve Arrangement xv, 1, 32, 56, 87, 88, 256, 258 copper 54, 71, 134, 135, 136, 138, 139, 140, 144 corruption 4, 16, 50, 51, 129, 153, 167, 196, 198, 228, 230, 232, 235, 243, 244, 257, 273 counter-hegemonies 11, 39 Da Silva, Lula 198 debt 1, 4, 14, 23, 26, 32, 34, 44, 56, 57, 65, 73, 87, 88, 89, 93, 94, 126, 134, 177, 250, 264, 266, 268, 270, 274 democracy 22, 52, 55, 64, 200, 205, 240, 241, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 252, 253, 257, 261, 271, 273 Democratic Alliance xv, 228, 271 Democratic Republic of Congo, the 21, 121 Department of International Relations and Cooperation (DIRCO) South Africa xv, 50, 51, 53, 55 dependency 34, 36, 41, 45, 88, 93, 112, 165, 170, 173, 272 development xv, xvi, 1, 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 15, 17, 24, 25, 26, 28, 29, 31, 34, 35, 40, 41, 42, 43, 44, 56, 71, 74, 75, 78, 79, 82, 84, 85, 87, 88, 98, 100, 103, 105, 106, 107, 109, 110, 112, 119, 130, 133, 134, 136, 141,

INDEX

142, 154, 155, 159, 170, 172, 174, 175, 176, 178, 179, 182, 183, 184, 188, 192, 196, 201, 209, 210, 211, 212, 218, 221, 222, 225, 229, 232, 234, 235, 236, 241, 244, 249, 250, 255, 256, 257, 258, 259, 266, 268, 271, 274 human xvi, 74, 87, 141, 266, 268 underdevelopment 34, 44, 46, 77, 190, 211 diamonds 58, 120, 124, 125, 129, 131, 156, 267 discourse 7, 39, 153, 154, 175, 248, 252, 264 Djibouti 22, 32, 88, 89, 176, 177, 185, 270 Economic Freedom Fighters xv, 228 education 34 Egypt 22, 23, 45, 172, 189, 231, 238 elections 60, 124, 143, 189, 198, 201, 202, 204, 241, 253, 271 electricity 32, 60, 137, 176, 180, 195, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 238 emerging powers 29, 46, 49, 87, 156, 169, 190, 272 environment 6, 10, 23, 30, 38, 60, 82, 87, 104, 106, 145, 175, 179, 182, 193, 226, 240, 245, 250, 272 Eskom xv, 90 Essa, Salim 159, 160, 162, 165 Ethiopia 6, 16, 38, 44, 82, 94, 170, 176, 177, 184, 185, 186, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 270, 271, 272 Eurasia 171, 172 Europe 34 European Union xv, 14, 22, 34, 35, 48, 57, 76, 82, 93, 97, 100, 103, 105, 106, 108, 110, 114, 124, 125, 127, 129, 130, 156, 181,

27 7

187, 203, 207, 208, 215, 229, 266, 267, 272 ExIm Bank 176 export development zone xv, 178 exports xv, 27, 37, 54, 79, 83, 90, 93, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 111, 112, 135, 140, 181, 214, 215, 266 Fees Must Fall xvi finance 1, 26, 29, 31, 32, 36, 42, 48, 51, 53, 56, 61, 64, 74, 79, 87, 105, 133, 158, 164, 166, 173, 229, 243, 255, 256, 265 financialisation 26, 28, 31, 32, 86 flexigemony 22 food security 207, 209, 210, 212, 214, 219, 221, 258 forestry 16, 139 Forum on China–Africa Cooperation xvi, 97, 100, 105, 109, 113, 170, 172 G20 xvi, 25, 47, 64 Gama, Siyabonga 50, 69, 160, 165, 166, 172 gas 55, 79, 82, 105, 224, 225, 226 geo-governance 22 geopolitics 7, 12, 39, 43, 53, 60, 62, 155, 221 Ghana 149, 232, 237 Gigaba, Malusi 158, 159, 161, 162, 164, 167, 168, 233 global financial crisis, the 22, 29, 172 global North 7, 104, 105, 106, 109, 270 global South 7, 8, 10, 27, 31, 36, 46, 74, 188, 189, 190, 206, 207, 208, 210, 211, 212, 213, 215, 265, 270 globalisation 28, 29, 32, 33, 39, 40, 45, 66, 156, 188, 189, 202, 209, 250 deviant 156 gold 36, 83, 85, 152, 156, 157, 163, 165, 167, 168 unwrought 156, 157, 163

278

INDEX

Gordhan, Pravin 164, 233, 243 government–business–media complex, the xvi, 46, 152, 153, 154, 155, 157, 158, 165 affective labour 25, 154 descriptive level analysis 153, 165 infrastructural labour 25 structural level analysis 153, 161, 165 Goyal, Piyoosh 159, 167 Gramsci, Antonio 45, 152, 167 grassroots movements 192, 208, 215, 252 Growth, Employment and Redistribution plan xvi, 240, 248, 249, 250, 252 Gupta family, the 4, 16, 33, 50, 51, 53, 66, 71, 152, 153, 157, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 163, 164, 166, 167, 168, 232, 233, 235, 245, 273 leaks 33, 152, 164 Habib, Adam 249, 260 Harvey, David 12, 17, 22, 30, 31, 34, 40, 42, 44, 45, 53, 73, 95, 102, 110, 114, 152, 155, 167, 192, 204, 208, 217, 220 hegemony 2, 31, 43, 45, 107, 152, 153 hinterland 3, 21, 29, 39, 62 human rights 5, 10, 42, 80, 124, 125, 129, 207, 216, 218, 255, 267 imperialism 6, 8, 13, 15, 21, 27, 30, 34, 35, 38, 39, 42, 43, 44, 46, 47, 56, 62, 67, 98, 101, 106, 107, 109, 110, 111, 112, 132, 154, 192, 197, 208, 211, 256, 257, 259, 264 anti- 2, 7, 8, 23, 47, 52, 258 counter- 13, 39, 41, 42, 264 inter- 8 sub- 6, 7, 8, 173, 256, 264, 274

imports 138, 178, 214, 237, 274 India xv, 4, 5, 10, 15, 24, 30, 33, 47, 49, 52, 54, 55, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 73, 74, 76, 82, 83, 88, 93, 95, 100, 119, 124, 125, 132, 150, 152, 153, 156, 159, 164, 165, 166, 187, 205, 207, 208, 209, 210, 216, 218, 220, 221, 222, 227, 232, 238, 240, 256, 266, 267, 269, 272 Industrial Policy Action Plan xvi, 248, 251 infrastructure 1, 24, 26, 35, 74, 75, 79, 85, 90, 97, 105, 110, 135, 137, 139, 153, 154, 158, 170, 171, 172, 173, 175, 176, 177, 178, 179, 180, 182, 183, 190, 193, 194, 197, 205, 224, 250, 254, 266, 268, 270, 274 international development assistance xvi, 100, 101 International Minerals Resources xvi, 136 investment 5, 22, 23, 27, 28, 37, 38, 41, 61, 63, 73, 74, 78, 80, 82, 83, 93, 94, 96, 97, 100, 101, 102, 106, 110, 120, 121, 122, 127, 130, 131, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 142, 143, 147, 151, 154, 156, 162, 172, 176, 179, 180, 181, 182, 184, 191, 192, 211, 214, 215, 220, 226, 235, 240, 266, 268, 272 foreign direct xvi, 22, 37, 41, 63, 74, 78, 83, 85, 97, 101, 104, 111, 127, 134, 135, 138, 180, 210, 218, 219, 235, 266 Japan 49, 79, 104, 108 Jim, Irvin 60, 256 Jinping, Xi 48, 66, 171 Jintao, Hu 144, 148 Joemat-Pettersson, Tina 231, 233

INDEX

Kenya xv, 6, 16, 21, 32, 170, 174, 175, 176, 178, 184, 185, 189, 202, 204, 205, 213, 221, 222, 270, 271, 272 Kenyatta, Uhuru 202, 205 Kyrgyzstan 32 labour 5, 21, 22, 25, 34, 41, 60, 61, 62, 63, 65, 69, 72, 74, 79, 87, 93, 103, 104, 105, 106, 107, 108, 133, 140, 142, 144, 145, 154, 193, 213, 245, 250, 264, 266, 267, 268, 269, 272 land 3, 30, 35, 36, 38, 55, 58, 61, 82, 124, 139, 146, 150, 171, 176, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 218, 219, 220, 221, 222, 241, 258, 271, 272 grabs 3, 30, 36, 38, 146, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 212, 213, 214, 215, 216, 217, 219, 221, 272 Lao 32 Latin America 14, 43, 44, 132, 187, 203, 206, 207, 212, 219, 272 Lavrov, Sergey 123 Lonmin 4, 36, 50, 59, 65, 70, 255 Luanshya Copper Mine xvi, 136, 151 Lusaka East Zambia–China Cooperation Zone 139 Mahlobo, David 233 Maldives 32 Marikana massacre, the 36, 43, 59, 63, 240, 254 Maritime Silk Route Initiative xvi, 109, 111 Marx, Karl 30, 245 media xvi, 2, 11, 17, 18, 39, 40, 41, 42, 45, 46, 47, 51, 68, 100, 122, 142, 152, 153, 154, 157, 160, 167, 170, 191, 229, 233, 237, 264

279

mega-events 16, 189, 190, 191, 192, 194, 202, 204, 205, 270 FIFA Football World Cup 190, 191, 194, 195, 196, 203, 204, 205, 206, 270 Olympics 190, 194, 204, 271 minerals 36, 79, 81, 82, 84, 110, 136, 141, 156, 229, 242, 251 Mnangagwa, Emmerson 5, 16, 119, 120, 121, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 130, 131, 201, 267, 268 Molefe, Brian 50, 51, 70, 159, 160, 161, 165, 168 money laundering 71, 156, 157, 159, 162, 163, 164, 198 Mongolia 32, 115 Montenegro 32 Movement for Multi-Party Democracy xvi, 134, 143 Mozambique 24, 79, 88, 165 MTN 4, 11, 50, 70, 85 Mugabe, Robert 5, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 125, 126, 130, 131, 201, 204, 267, 268 Multi-Facility Economic Zone xvi, 139 Chambishi 135, 138, 139, 141, 144, 151 multinational corporation xvi, 41, 219 Nacala logistics corridor 79 Namibia 21 National Student Financial Aid Scheme xvii nationalism 1, 270 neo-colonialism 21, 80, 141, 208 neoliberalism 2, 8, 17, 22, 26, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34, 35, 37, 38, 39, 40, 42, 43, 44, 47, 48, 53, 58, 59, 61, 62, 64, 73, 79, 80, 87, 102, 133, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 195, 197, 202, 206, 209, 212, 240, 241, 243, 249, 252, 255, 256, 258, 264, 271, 273 neopatrimonialism 242, 243 NEPAD xvi, 38

280

INDEX

New Development Bank xvi, 1, 7, 8, 9, 31, 48, 51, 54, 56, 70, 87, 88, 166, 255, 256, 258, 259 New Growth Path xvi, 248, 250 Nigeria 6, 11, 22, 32, 56, 85, 168, 232, 236, 274 Non-Aligned Movement, the xvi, 25, 48, 132, 208, 265 Non-Ferrous Company-Africa xvi, 135, 136, 138, 139, 144 Nzimande, Blade 246, 261 Odebrecht 58, 78, 79 Odinga, Raila 202 oil 55, 79, 82, 87, 88, 134, 156 One Belt One Road Initiative, the xv, xvii, 10, 16, 22, 24, 26, 32, 35, 68, 109, 111, 170, 171, 172, 175, 179, 183, 269, 270 Pakistan 32, 57 Panama Papers, the 33, 68 parastatal 60, 165 periphery 1, 14, 19, 21, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 30, 34, 35, 36, 38, 42, 212, 265, 272 Petrobras 78 port Bagamoyo 22, 178, 184 Lamu 22, 170, 176, 184, 270 power nuclear xvii, 4, 15, 16, 22, 58, 81, 90, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 239, 272, 273 privatisation 28, 31, 37, 38, 57, 61, 133, 135, 208, 271, 272 ProSavana 79 No to ProSavana campaign 79 protests 3, 6, 8, 10, 11, 12, 16, 17, 18, 21, 30, 34, 36, 48, 51, 61, 68, 69, 133, 140, 142, 143, 144, 145, 147, 148, 186, 187, 188, 189, 190, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 201,

202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 217, 240, 242, 246, 252, 253, 254, 257, 270 service delivery 240, 246, 250, 255 Putin, Vladimir 50, 68, 72, 123, 191, 232, 233, 273 rail 166, 175, 177, 185 Addis–Djibouti railway 177, 270 light railway system 176, 177, 270 locomotives 16, 33, 51, 153, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 166, 229, 235 standard gauge xvii, 175, 184, 185, 186 recession, the global 209 Reconstruction and Development Programme xvii, 248, 249 remuneration 1, 38, 44, 51, 81, 126, 144, 145, 147, 159, 196, 198, 266, 269 Rongji, Zhu 138 Rosatom 16, 22, 58, 81, 90, 223, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 236, 238, 273 Rousseff, Dilma 53, 199, 203, 271 rural 95, 105, 106, 199, 213, 215, 218, 220, 224 Russia xii, xv, 4, 5, 8, 15, 17, 22, 29, 47, 55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 63, 73, 76, 80, 81, 82, 88, 90, 94, 100, 119, 121, 123, 124, 125, 130, 132, 150, 187, 191, 223, 227, 228, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 238, 240, 266, 267, 272 Rwanda xvii, 16, 170, 179, 180, 181, 184, 270 Sata, Michael 141, 142, 143, 145, 147, 151, 269 Save Lamu 170, 176, 270 semi-periphery 1, 21, 25, 30, 34, 35, 36 Sharma, Iqbal 160, 161, 165

INDEX

Sierra Leone 32, 43 Singh, Anoj 57, 160, 161, 162, 165, 168, 209, 210, 220 smuggling 125, 140, 157 South Africa xi, xii, xv, xvi, xvii, xix, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 14, 15, 16, 17, 21, 22, 23, 24, 27, 33, 36, 37, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 54, 55, 58, 59, 60, 61, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 74, 76, 84, 85, 86, 88, 90, 94, 100, 113, 114, 119, 124, 125, 127, 129, 132, 133, 146, 148, 149, 150, 152, 156, 157, 158, 159, 160, 162, 163, 164, 165, 166, 168, 169, 187, 189, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195, 196, 197, 198, 199, 200, 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 214, 219, 223, 224, 225, 226, 227, 228, 229, 230, 231, 232, 233, 234, 235, 236, 237, 238, 240, 241, 242, 243, 244, 245, 246, 247, 248, 249, 250, 251, 252, 253, 254, 255, 256, 257, 259, 260, 261, 262, 265, 266, 267, 269, 270, 271, 272, 273, 274 South African Communist Party xvii, 61, 246, 247, 249 South Korea 31, 104, 108 Southern African Customs Union xvii, 38, 42 Southern African Development Community xvii, 38, 42, 214 South–South cooperation 112, 210 solidarity 3, 6, 76, 101, 272 spatial fix 28, 110 Special Economic Zones xvii, 11, 113, 181, 205 Sri Lanka 32, 89, 94 state capture 16, 70, 152, 153, 164, 166, 237 strategic maritime distribution centre xvii

281

strikes 59, 63, 104, 167, 194, 196, 205 structural adjustment programmes 34, 133, 273 Sudan 6, 43, 121, 176 Switzerland 122, 136, 140, 156, 169, 262, 263 Taiwan 31, 173 Tajikistan 32 Tanzania xvii, 16, 38, 44, 132, 170, 178, 213, 219, 220, 221, 268, 270, 272 Tanzania–Zambia Railway xvii, 132, 268 tax 4, 33, 50, 57, 70, 82, 104, 127, 141, 142, 162, 163, 164, 165, 210, 233, 267 Taylor, Ian 10, 18, 22, 25, 30, 34, 36, 43, 45, 46, 94, 169, 170, 172, 185, 186, 209, 218, 222, 256, 262 Temer, Michel 2, 50, 53, 66 Tequesta 159, 162, 168 think tanks 8, 264 trade xvii, xix, 1, 5, 7, 8, 11, 14, 28, 32, 40, 48, 51, 53, 54, 56, 58, 59, 60, 61, 64, 65, 73, 74, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 80, 82, 84, 85, 86, 87, 93, 97, 101, 104, 108, 110, 125, 132, 133, 134, 135, 140, 142, 143, 153, 154, 156, 157, 163, 170, 171, 172, 176, 178, 179, 180, 182, 196, 223, 264, 265, 266, 267, 268, 269 Transnet 3, 4, 9, 16, 50, 51, 66, 153, 158, 159, 160, 161, 162, 165, 166, 167, 168, 229 Trump, Donald 47, 57, 64, 71, 187 Turkey 56, 227 United Arab Emirates xvii, 4, 33, 152, 153, 155, 156, 157, 158, 159, 162, 163, 165, 167

282

INDEX

Dubai 158, 162, 163, 165, 166, 167, 168 United Kingdom xvii, 187, 228, 245 United States xvii, 14, 27, 28, 31, 32, 34, 35, 37, 43, 48, 53, 57, 71, 76, 77, 79, 80, 81, 83, 84, 85, 86, 88, 93, 95, 97, 100, 103, 105, 106, 107, 108, 109, 110, 112, 114, 122, 125, 126, 127, 128, 129, 130, 132, 133, 134, 151, 187, 266, 267 urban 105, 106, 107, 137, 142, 190, 191, 192, 193, 199, 204, 206, 213, 217, 270, 272 USSR xvii, 7, 24, 228, 244 Vale 9, 58, 79 valorisation 11, 155 Van der Merwe, Justin 16, 18, 21, 24, 25, 28, 29, 30, 33, 35, 36, 37, 39, 45, 46, 73, 74, 81, 86, 88, 90, 96, 152, 157, 158, 169, 173, 186 Vavi, Zwelinzima 59, 60 Vedanta Resources 82 Wallerstein, Immanuel 106 welfare systems 34 World Bank 55, 56, 64, 87, 93, 107, 129, 149, 151, 156, 157, 169, 188, 222, 255, 256, 264 World Economic Forum xvii, 33, 59, 63, 72, 122, 233

world systems theory core 35 periphery 35 semi-periphery 35 World Trade Organisation xvii, 30, 48, 56, 65, 107, 113, 172 Xiaoping, Deng 103 Zambia xi, xvii, 3, 21, 22, 32, 43, 85, 88, 89, 132, 133, 134, 135, 136, 137, 138, 139, 140, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 146, 147, 148, 149, 150, 151, 168, 266, 268 Zambia Consolidated Copper Mines xvii, 135 Zambia Road Development Agency 137 Zambia–China Mulungushi Textile Joint Venture Limited xvii, xix, 138 ZANU-PF xvii, 120, 121, 125 Zapatista xvi, 18, 45, 187 Zedong, Mao 103, 172 ZESCO 32, 44, 89 Zimbabwe xi, xvii, 5, 6, 11, 15, 21, 36, 58, 72, 81, 88, 89, 119, 120, 121, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 132, 146, 189, 201, 267, 268, 271 Zuma, Duduzane 160, 163, 245 Zuma, Jacob 1, 5, 36, 158, 160, 164, 198, 200, 204, 245, 260, 273

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