Boom – Crisis – Heritage: King Coal and the Energy Revolutions after 1945 9783110729948, 9783110734768

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Lars Bluma, Michael Farrenkopf and Torsten Meyer (Eds.) Boom – Crisis – Heritage

Veröffentlichungen aus dem Deutschen Bergbau-Museum Bochum

Band 242

Boom – Crisis – Heritage King Coal and the Energy Revolutions after 1945 Edited by Lars Bluma, Michael Farrenkopf and Torsten Meyer

Veröffentlichungen aus dem Deutschen Bergbau-Museum Bochum, Nr. 242 = Schriften des Montanhistorischen Dokumentationszentrums, Nr. 42 Sponsored by RAG-Stiftung, Essen

Editorial supervising: Chris Buchholz, Michael Farrenkopf and Torsten Meyer, Deutsches Bergbau-Museum Bochum

ISBN 978-3-11-073476-8 e-ISBN (PDF) 978-3-11-072994-8 e-ISBN (EPUB) 978-3-11-073003-6 ISSN 1616-9212 Library of Congress Control Number: 2021940701 Bibliographic information of the German National Library The German National Library lists this publication in the German National Bibliography; detailed bibliographic data are available on the Internet at http://dnb.dnb.de. © 2022 Walter de Gruyter GmbH, Berlin/Boston Cover image: Walsum colliery in Duisburg-Walsum, Germany, 1996; Photo: Brenneken/GVSt Copyright: Deutsches Bergbau-Museum Bochum Typesetting: Integra Software Services Pvt. Ltd. Printing and binding: CPI books GmbH, Leck www.degruyter.com

Preface “Boom – Crisis – Heritage. King Coal and the Energy Revolutions after 1945” was the title of an international conference held at the Deutsches BergbauMuseum Bochum (DBM), Leibniz Research Museum for Geo-resources, from 14th to 16th March 2018. It marked the end of the first phase of the large-scale research project “From Boom to Crisis. The German Coal Industry after 1945”. Funded by the RAG-Stiftung, Essen, seven academics did research in this project between 2015 and 2018, two further researchers were associated. The research project was split into two thematic lines. Under the direction of Lars Bluma (Mining History Research Department, today: Historical Centre Wuppertal), the specific innovation culture of Ruhr mining was discussed from economic, social and technical perspectives. The second topic, led by Michael Farrenkopf (Mining History Document Centre at the DBM), on the other hand, focused on the material and immaterial heritage of mining regions; in addition to the Ruhr region, the United Kingdom and the United States also came into view. Two conferences organised by the project team in 2017 reflected this dichotomous project structure, the results were published in the conference volume “Vom Boom zur Krise. Der deutsche Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945” (VDBM 241) edited by Juliane Czierpka and Lars Bluma as well as in the volume “Authentizität und industriekulturelles Erbe. Zugänge und Beispiele” (VDBM 238) edited by Michael Farrenkopf and Torsten Meyer. The conference “Boom – Crisis – Heritage. King Coal and the Energy Revolutions after 1945”, on the other hand, deliberately brought together the two project topics and thus wanted to clarify the thematic and methodological breadth of a modern mining history, which reflect the contributions gathered here. The organisation of the conference and the publication of its results would not have been possible without the generous financial support of the RAGStiftung, Essen. We would like to express our sincere thanks for this. Special thanks are due to Juliane Czierpka (Ruhr-Universität Bochum), who played a major role in the conception and organisation of the conference. We are indebted to Chris Buchholz (DBM) for his support in the editorial supervision of the conference proceedings. Finally, we thank the authors for their tireless patience in responding to the editors’ many “special requests”. Lars Bluma, Michael Farrenkopf and Torsten Meyer Bochum and Wuppertal, autumn 2021

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-202

Contents Preface

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Lars Bluma, Michael Farrenkopf and Torsten Meyer Introduction: “King Coal” and modern mining history

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Politics of coal Per Högselius The European energy system in an age of globalisation

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Alain Beltran Between political continuity and new deal: The energy sector in France in the 1960s 43 Douglas A. Yates The French oil industry under the Corps des Mines: From family firms to national champions to private multinationals 53 Brian Shaev Coal and common market: Forecasting crisis in the early European Parliament 71 Henning Türk From oil to coal? The International Energy Agency (IEA) and international coal policy since the end of the 1970s 81 Lars Bluma “Humanization of work”: A watershed in German hard coal mining? Sara-Marie Demiriz Qualifying the stranger: Educational policies for migrant workers in the West-German mining industry 107

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Jan Kellershohn Mobility and the crisis of intelligence: The mining industry and the negotiation of knowledge under “deindustrialisation” 119

Mining, heritage, legacy Michael Farrenkopf Short-term rise and decades of decline: German hard coal mining after 1945 131 Miles Oglethorpe Losing our mines: Scotland’s coal industry in context

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Andrea Pokludová and Petr Popelka From the “steel heart of Czechoslovakia” to post-industrial space: Boom, crisis and the cultural heritage of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district 161 Jörg Arnold Receding futures, shifting pasts: The British coal industry, generational change and the politics of temporality, ca. 1967–1987 179 Sigrun Lehnert The representation of coal mining in German post-war newsreels (East-West) 1948 to 1965 193 Gisela Parak Pulser for preservation: Bernd and Hilla Becher and the role of photography in industrial heritage 211 Malte Helfer The legacy of coal mining – A view of examples in France and Belgium 227 Barry L. Stiefel Black diamond heritage: A North American study of coal mining preservation 243

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Pia Eiringhaus How industrial heritage became green – Renaturalisation narratives in regional history culture 257 Torsten Meyer “Biofacts” – Recultivating the post-mining landscape in the Anthropocene 267 Timothy J. LeCain Mining the Anthropocene: How coal created the supposed ‘Age of Humans’ 283

Appendix List of figures List of authors

295 297

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Introduction: “King Coal” and modern mining history Carbon democracy and decarbonisation Everyone is talking about the process of decarbonisation; decarbonisation seems to be the binding buzzword on the way to a sustainable energy policy and an eco-social economic system. At first glance, this is supported by the German political decision to phase out the still active extraction of domestic lignite by 2038. A “deep decarbonisation”, i.e. the radical reduction of carbon dioxide emissions, means above all a profound change in energy systems and this as soon as the middle of the 21st century. As early as 1990, the Enquete Commission’s “Protection of Man and the Environment” by the German Bundestag propagated a reduction of greenhouse gas emissions in Germany by 80 percent by 2050. Current scenarios show that a significantly more efficient use of energy as well as an increased use of combined heat and power and renewable energies are key to contributing to a low-CO2 energy system. Reduced demand through changes in energy use behaviour (energy sufficiency) is also a significant factor in radically reducing CO2 emissions. In contrast, however, other economies still rely on coal as an energy source, and it remains central to the world’s energy supply. In 2019, global coal production reached around 8.1 billion tonnes, of which 7.1 billion tonnes was hard coal and around 0.8 billion tonnes was lignite. The major coal producers today are China, India, the USA, Indonesia, Australia, Russia, South Africa and Kazakhstan. China’s rise to a global economic power would have been inconceivable without its massive expansion in coal production. Even in Europe, the phase-out is far from secure, as shown by the ongoing coal boom in Poland, which derives over 80 percent of its energy needs from domestic coal. The US ex-president Donald Trump’s plans to revive the coal industry, which were derailed by the Corona pandemic, also underscore the contradictory nature of global, carbon-oriented energy policies.

Towards a modern mining history This current situation challenges established narratives of mining history, as painting it in black and white hardly seems appropriate anymore. Moreover, if mining history wants to free itself from its shadowy academic existence as a https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-001

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field of research, it needs a methodological-theoretical framework that ensures its connectivity to neighbouring disciplines. It may therefore come as no surprise that the Deutsches Bergbau-Museum Bochum, as the Leibniz Research Museum for Geo-resources, has repeatedly attempted to establish motivation for a new mining history that also opens up new subject areas. It was not until the 1960s and 1970s that mining history was able to emancipate itself from the canon of mining science disciplines and succeed as a historical sub-discipline within history departments. In the wake of the social, economic and technical history boom of the time, mining history also gained momentum. Particularly at the still young Ruhr-University in Bochum, a creative environment of historians emerged, such as Hans Mommsen, Wolfgang Köllmann, Wolfhard Weber and Klaus Tenfelde, who pursued the methodological orientation of mining history towards a modern social history, even though explicit mining history professorships were not denominated in Bochum or any other German universities.1 Mining history remained institutionally an unfinished discipline.2 As much as this phase of mining history was marked by a substantive and methodological awakening, its potential for connection to the questions of historical science remained limited in many respects. Its subject area, mining in the narrower sense understood as part of the primary sector or even more narrowly defined as one economic sector among many others, led to the primacy of economic-historical considerations. While this close connection between the two subjects initially proved to be a methodological and content-related opening, it subsequently also narrowed many perspectives.

Research agenda Nevertheless, new interest in mining history is currently developing,3 which is mainly fed by the current social debates on decarbonisation, resource economics and the social and ecological costs of mining outlined above. However, works such as Timothy Mitchell’s “Carbon Democracy” by no means lapse into

1 Only recently two assistant professorships on mining history have been established at the Ruhr-University Bochum, with one of them a joint appointment to the Head of Mining History Research Department at the Deutsches Bergbau-Museum Bochum. 2 Bluma, Lars. 2017. “Moderne Bergbaugeschichte.” Der Anschnitt. Zeitschrift für Montangeschichte 69, no. 2–4: 138–151, 139. 3 Berger, Stefan, and Peter Alexander, eds. 2019. Making Sense of Mining History. Themes and Agendas. London/New York: Routledge.

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an accusatory history of the decline of fossil economies.4 Rather, Mitchell’s study in particular highlights the enormous complexity that has characterised the development of carbon resources in the industrial age. In an innovative combination of material, economic and social history, he examines the manifold connections and alliances that fossil raw materials create: “We can better understand the relationship between spectacle and violence, and between other apparently disparate or discordant features of the politics of oil, by following closely the oil itself; [ . . . ], but because, in tracing the connections that were made between pipelines and pumping stations, refineries and shipping routes, road systems and automobile cultures, dollar flows and economic knowledge, weapons experts and militarism, one discovers how a peculiar set of relations was engineered between oil, violence, finance, expertise and democracy.”5 In particular, the formation of societies through oil has become a booming field of research, gaining attention in public discourse with catchy buzzwords such as “petrocultures”, “fossil-fueled capitalism” or “petromodernism”.6 But other raw materials extracted by mining have also been studied from this perspective. Sebastian Haumann’s history of limestone as a strategic raw material and Nora Thorade’s work on the material history of hard coal are current examples of a mining history oriented towards its material foundations, in which the categorical demarcations of modernity between the material and the social become increasingly permeable.7 In addition to this development of specific socio-technical formations of raw material extraction and use, the now precarious relationship between nature and society is also moving into the focus of mining history research. The so-called Anthropocene, actually a narrowly defined concept from the geosciences, has become a key term in this discussion. It is used to negotiate whether, when and in what way humanity has entered a new earth age, in which the “footprint” of humans has now left irreversible traces in the geological stratifications of the earth. Mining as a human activity, often characterised by profound interventions in the landscape but also in local, 4 Mitchell, Timothy. 2013. Carbon Democracy. Political Power in the Age of Coal. 2nd. Edition. London/New York: Verso. 5 Ibid., 253. 6 Wilson, Sheena, Adam Carlson, and Imre Szeman, eds. 2017. Petrocultures. Oil, Politics, Culture. Montreal et al: McGill Queen University Press; Klose, Alexander, and Benjamin Steininger. 2020. Erdöl. Ein Atlas der Petromoderne. Berlin: Matthes & Seitz; Morris, Ian. 2015. Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels. How Human Values Evolve. New York/Oxford: Princeton University Press. 7 Haumann, Sebastian. 2020. Kalkstein als “kritischer” Rohstoff. Eine Stoffgeschichte der Industrialisierung 1840–1930. Bielefeld: transcript; Thorade, Nora. 2020. Das schwarze Gold. Eine Stoffgeschichte der Steinkohle im 19. Jahrhundert. Paderborn: Schöningh.

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regional and ultimately global ecosystems, is virtually predestined to play a relevant role in the Anthropocene debate.8 Mining appears in this perspective as a techno-natural system in which “technologies are shaped by the environment on the one hand and deform the environment on the other”.9 However, the consequences of mining for the ecosystem are not only relevant to environmental history in terms of direct interventions in the landscape, but also with regard to the consequences of the consumption of fossil raw materials. The causes of today’s global warming can be historically traced back to the emergence of energy consumption centred on hard coal in the first half of the 19th century.10 However, whether this technonatural system actually made mining the determining actor of global processes, a central assumption of Anthopocene theory, remains debatable. Timothy LeCain, in his environmental history of US open-pit mining, has very clearly shown the continuing dependence of humans on the material resources of their environment.11 The anthropocentric worldview of Anthropocene theory is thus certainly shaken. One thing becomes additionally clear through this debate: mining history is becoming more global. Indeed, the New Global History offers interesting points of contact for mining history beyond the Anthropocene debate.12 With their complex spatial-social contact zones, the wide-ranging trade networks for natural resources, the emergence of global supply and value chains, the formation of international networks of mining experts and the overall transregional cultural contacts initiated by mining are worthwhile fields of research that also extend far

8 As an example of a mining historiography oriented towards environmental history, the following should be mentioned: Uekotter, Frank. 2013. “Bergbau und Umwelt im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert”. In Rohstoffgewinnung im Strukturwandel. Der deutsche Bergbau im 20. Jahrhundert, edited by Dieter Ziegler, 539–570. Münster: Aschendorff. From a didactic history perspective cf. Farrenkopf, Michael, and Regina Göschl. 2020. “Umweltgeschichte am Deutschen BergbauMuseum Bochum und aus geschichtsdidaktischer Perspektive.” Der Anschnitt. Zeitschrift für Montangeschichte 72, no. 3–4: 99–120. 9 Asrih, Lena, Nikolai Ingenerf, and Torsten Meyer. 2019. “Bergbau als techno-naturales System – Ein Beitrag zur modernen Bergbaugeschichte.” Der Anschnitt. Zeitschrift für Montangeschichte 71, no. 1: 2–18; see also Bluma, Lars. 2009. “Der Hakenwurm an der Ruhr. Umwelt, Körper und soziale Netzwerke im Ruhrbergbau des Kaiserreichs.” Der Anschnitt. Zeitschrift für Kunst und Kultur im Bergbau 61, no. 5–6: 314–329, 314–315. 10 Malm, Andreas. 2016. Fossil Capital. The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming. London/New York: Verso. 11 LeCain, Timothy J. 2015. “Against the Anthropocene. A Neo-Materialist Perspective.” International Journal for History, Culture, and Modernity 3, no. 1: 1–28. 12 Malzsh, Bruce. 2006. The New Global History. New York et al: Routledge.

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back into the pre-modern era.13 Here, cross-epochal questions and methods lend themselves to mining history. Such a network approach can be made particularly fruitful for a history of knowledge in mining that focuses on supra-regional, international exchange relations. Travelling mining experts, publications, correspondence, technical objects, etc. could be studied as mobilised, spatially transcending carriers of mining knowledge.14 However, a specific characteristic of every mining industry remains constitutive for its historiography: Mining is bound to a specific physical space, namely to the deposit.15 This results in an interesting field of tension between the locality of mining extraction and some processing steps located nearby and the globality of knowledge, distribution, consumption and the social and ecological consequences of mining. In this respect, two fundamental methodological challenges for a modern history of mining can be identified in the approaches briefly outlined here: the construction of space and materiality (as constituting specifics of mining) in the human fields of action of economy/trade, environment, technology/knowledge and society/culture, as well as their mutual interconnections and feedbacks. Especially with regard to the constituent specifics of space and materiality over longer periods of time, it seems significant for a modern mining history, in addition to a disciplinary anchoring of it at the universities, that the linkage with the non-university sphere in particular appears to be profitable. This applies primarily to the sources to be questioned, which for a modern history of mining cannot be limited to the classical written records. The cultural and social sciences in general have also been marked by a significant boom in material culture since the 1980s.16 In “material culture studies” with its focus on the material

13 As an example of the importance of hard coal with regard to the emergence of European infrastructures see: Heimsoth, Axel. 2019. “Steinkohle als Faktor der europäischen Infrastruktur. Gründe für die Verkehrsrevolution im Industriezeitalter.” Der Anschnitt. Zeitschrift für Montangeschichte 71, no. 4: 168–179. 14 Vogel, Jakob. 2013. “Aufklärung untertage: Wissenswelten des europäischen Bergbaus im ausgehenden 18. und 19. Jahrhundert.” In Staat, Bergbau und Bergakademie. Montanexperten im 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert, edited by Hartmut Schleiff, and Peter Konecny, 14–31. Stuttgart: Steiner; Klein, Ursula, and Emma C. Spary, eds. 2010. Materials and Experts in Early Modern Europe. Between Market and Laboratory. Chicago/London: The University of Chigaco Press. 15 Bluma. “Moderne Bergbaugeschichte”, 144–149; Asrih, Ingenerf, and Meyer. “Bergbau als techno-naturales System”, 14–15. 16 Hahn, Hans P., Stefanie Samida, and Manfred K. H. Eggert. 2014. “Einleitung: Materielle Kultur in den Kultur- und Sozialwissenschaften.” In Handbuch Materielle Kultur. Bedeutungen, Konzepte, Disziplinen, edited by Hans P. Hahn, Stefanie Samida, and Manfred K. H. Eggert, 1–12. Stuttgart: J. B. Metzler.

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contexts of individuals and social groups, the connection between a world of things and the self-image of people in society, i.e. their social identity, is included in the spectrum of empirical approaches. On the one hand, this presupposes for the research process the existence of mining-related material collections, mostly at museums;17 on the other hand, their analysis can and must certainly be further intensified beyond purely documentary evidence within the framework of a modern mining history.18 In addition, substantial contributions to a mining history related to the former mining area and thus to the space-specific factor of the deposit have been made at various industrial and mining museums, which very often owe their emergence in the course of the last decades to the deindustrialisation process of regions formerly characterised by heavy industry, especially in Europe.19 As already described at the beginning, mining history, especially in Germany, has initially made substantial contributions to a general history of industrialisation since the paradigm shift to a structural social history in the 1960s/70s. Class formation and class consciousness processes, strike movements and the shaping of industrial relations in the tripartite system of mining entrepreneurs, miners and the state formed the founding central thesis for a long time.20 Since the 1980s, this has been substantially differentiated by a particularly effective disciplinary economic and business history and, at least in part, by more culturalist approaches, for example in the form of the history of mentality and everyday life. The latter, in turn, owed much to the impetus of historical-cultural movements in coal and steel regions massively affected by structural change. It is therefore not surprising that the most recent overviews of the history of mining, especially the large-scale, four-volume “Geschichte des deutschen Bergbaus” (History of German Mining),

17 For Germany see: Farrenkopf, Michael, and Stefan Siemer, eds. 2020. Bergbausammlungen in Deutschland. Eine Bestandsaufnahme. Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter; Farrenkopf, Michael, and Stefan Siemer, eds. 2020. Perspektiven des Bergbauerbes im Museum: Vernetzung, Digitalisierung, Forschung. Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter; for Europe and especially on hard coal the European Coal Mining Museums Network is to be mentioned, see: https://www.chm-lewarde.com/en/usefulinformation/european-coal-mining-museums-network/ [Accessed March 25, 2021]. 18 Farrenkopf, Michael, and Stefan Siemer, eds. 2021. Materielle Kulturen des Bergbaus|Material Cultures of Mining. Zugänge, Aspekte und Beispiele|Approaches, Aspects and Examples. Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter (in press). 19 Farrenkopf, Michael, and Wiebke Büsch. 2019. “Zwischen Fördergemeinschaft, Lampenbörse und Zechenchronik. Formen und Konjunkturen einer Public Mining-History im westfälischen Ruhrgebiet.” In Public History in der Regional- und Landesgeschichte, edited by Katrin Minner, 267–294. Münster: Aschendorff. 20 Feldman, Gerald D., and Klaus Tenfelde, eds. 1989. Arbeiter, Unternehmer und Staat im Bergbau. Industrielle Beziehungen im internationalen Vergleich. München: C. H. Beck.

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very clearly represent this primarily economic-historical research setting of recent decades.21 This has tended to overcome an imbalance in the research of industrial mining history up to the turn of the era at the end of the Second World War, which existed until about ten years ago.22 In the meantime, the 1950s and 1960s – i.e. the transition from the post-war boom to the crisis in the coal industry – are also considered to be well researched at first glance.23 Currently, from an economic-historical perspective, a certain narrative of sacrifice is read out of the above-mentioned German standard works, especially with regard to the coal industry in the Ruhr, which sees it “as a blood witness to the circumstances and a fighter for the Ruhr region, which was in crisis in line with its key industries”.24 In this context, many aspects of the economic development of the Ruhr mining industry in its transformation from one of the most important coal producers in Europe to its relative insignificance have so far remained unexamined, and thus three important questions in particular remain unanswered: firstly, the question of the power relationship between the Ruhr mining industry and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC); secondly, the sales organisations for Ruhr coal that were at the centre of the dispute with the High Authority; and thirdly, the role of those companies that were equally active in both the coal and mineral oil business, the so-called zebras.25 It is certainly true that a modern history of mining can benefit from a more European or generally inter- and transdisciplinary comparative perspective when looking at the fossil energy source of hard coal for the period after 1945. A convincing example of this was recently provided by Franz-Josef Brüggemeier, who

21 Tenfelde, Klaus et al., eds. 2012–2016. Geschichte des deutschen Bergbaus, 4 vols. Münster: Aschendorff; see also: Bluma, Lars, Michael Farrenkopf, and Stefan Przigoda. 2018. Geschichte des Bergbaus. Berlin: L&H. 22 See the editors’ preface in: Farrenkopf, Michael et al., eds. 2009. Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945, 17–21, Bochum: Deutsches Bergbau-Museum Bochum. 23 Abelshauser, Werner. 1984. Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945. Wiederaufbau, Krise, Anpassung. München: C. H. Beck; Nonn, Christoph. 2001. Die Ruhrbergbaukrise. Entindustrialisierung und Politik 1958–1969. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht; Farrenkopf, Michael. 2013. “Wiederaufstieg und Niedergang des Bergbaus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland.” In Rohstoffgewinnung im Strukturwandel. Der deutsche Bergbau im 20. Jahrhundert, edited by Dieter Ziegler, 182–302. Münster: Aschendorff. 24 Czierpka, Juliane. 2021. “Von Drachen und Zebras. Desiderate der Wirtschaftsgeschichte des Ruhrbergbaus nach 1945.” In Transformative Moderne: Struktur, Prozess und Handeln in der Wirtschaft. Festschrift für Dieter Ziegler zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by Ingo Köhler, and EvaMaria Roelevink, 177–195. Dortmund/Münster: Ardey, 178. 25 Ibid.

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for the first time consistently examined the history of hard coal from a European perspective and one not limited to the process of mining and processing the raw material.26 Coal is seen here, entirely in the sense of material history, as a resource with specific physical and chemical properties that determined social developments in a fundamental, sometimes contradictory and often very conflictual way. However, hard coal was not only a cheap energy supplier and, as it were, a fuel for European industrialisation, it also had its downsides. In the Ruhr region before 1918, for example, miners were “ready to mine” by the age of 40, and for a long time unnoticed, the amount of carbon dioxide in the atmosphere also increased significantly. The devastating consequences of mining for the environment as well as its longer-term burdens on the mining regions and for the atmosphere on a global scale are associated with hard coal just as much as its sheer size, due to which it factually enabled European unification after two world wars as a kind of “carbon democracy”. It is also clear that, at least in Western European countries, the coal industry was exposed to the same substitution competition from the aforementioned alternative energy sources as in Germany. Although the individual countries have taken different paths to secure their energy needs over the last 70 years, since the 1960s this has generally been at the expense of the national coal production quotas. France and Belgium, for example, already found themselves burdened with high production costs in the first half of the 20th century in comparison to Great Britain and Germany – and here primarily the Ruhr mining industry. Their interest in the establishment of the ECSC in 1951 was therefore shaped on the one hand by the need to obtain cheap coal as an energy base for reconstruction, and on the other hand by the need to control the easier access of competing coal to the domestic market.27 The consequence, however, was that both in Belgium and France the willingness on the part of the state to reduce the domestic coal mining industry grew very early on in the late 1950s. Crucially, this willingness grew on the part of the states, which points to a fundamental change in the constellation of actors in the industrial relations of the European coal industry after 1945. Until then, the state had consistently been positioned as a kind of regulatory body for settling sometimes bitter conflicts between the mining entrepreneurs on the one hand and the miners or their trade unions on the other. There had already been massive tensions between entrepreneurs and miners since the beginning of industrialisation, which 26 Brüggemeier, Franz-Josef. 2018. Grubengold. Das Zeitalter der Kohle von 1750 bis heute. München: C. H. Beck. 27 Regul, Rudolf. 1953. “Die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl.” Jahrbuch des deutschen Bergbaus 46: 17–41.

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were temporarily defused as a result of the First World War. However, from the end of the 1920s onwards, the compromises that had been reached were gradually abandoned, especially by the employers. In order to finally overcome the historically established and quite disruptive relationship in the industrial relations of the coal industry, there was, in view of the devastating consequences of the Second World War, a great willingness throughout to nationalise the industry, which happened in France and Great Britain as early as the 1940s. Finally, if we consider that in Belgium there had been a well-balanced relationship between the state, entrepreneurs and trade unions since the 1930s and that in the countries of Eastern Europe controlled by the Soviet economic area the nationalisation of the primary industries was part of the programme of the socialist governments, only in West Germany did a private coal industry remain. However, since the introduction of co-determination in the coal and steel industry in 1951, the trade unions’ right to a say had also changed dramatically.28 With the transition to the mining crisis of the 1960s and at the latest with the founding of Ruhrkohle AG as a unified Ruhr mining company, the struggle for the continued existence of the coal industry essentially shifted to joint action by employers and trade unions to secure state subsidies, tax relief and other forms of industry support, which were ultimately decided by the state in governments and parliaments.29 This is a second, general European phenomenon. It is also relevant for the topics of a modern mining history that, parallel to the phase of structural change in the former coal and steel regions, there was also increased attention on and preoccupation in the historical sciences with questions of the creation of meaning and identity employed through memory. Ultimately, this is the period of contemporary history in which, in general, “the search for authenticity and the self-assurance through the authentication of tradition stocks obviously represents an outstanding phenomenon of the present”.30 According to Jan and Aleida Assmann, memory narratives are of central importance for both cultural and communicative memory.31 The many collieries 28 Ranft, Norbert. 1988. Vom Objekt zum Subjekt. Montanmitbestimmung, Sozialklima und Strukturwandel im Bergbau seit 1945. Köln: Bund. 29 Goch, Stefan. 2009. “Der Weg zur Einheitsgesellschaft Ruhrkohle AG.” In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet, edited by Farrenkopf et al., 284–302. 30 Sabrow, Martin, and Achim Saupe. 2016. “Historische Authentizität. Zur Kartierung eines Forschungsfeldes.” In Historische Authentizität, edited by Martin Sabrow, and Achim Saupe, 7–28. Göttingen: Wallstein, 10. 31 Assmann, Jan. 2011. Cultural Memory and Early Civilization: Writing, Remembrance and Political Imagination. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; Assmann, Aleida. 2011. Cultural Memory and Western Civilization: Functions, Media, Archives. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; see also: Berger, Stefan, and Joana Seiffert, eds. 2014. Erinnerungsorte: Chancen, Grenzen

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that have been closed down in recent decades have always been concrete physical places with specific topographical, architectural, technical and operationalsocial structures that have changed over time. As places of memory in the sense of Pierre Nora, however, they were always integrated into imaginary or immaterial forms of individual and collective narrative experience and memory, for example in the form of literature, music or other forms of visual art.32 On the one hand, the history of remembrance is oriented towards discourses of remembrance, on the other hand towards the thesis that there are large social groups within a society that form so-called archipelagos of remembrance, which in turn are linked to each other in various ways. For the Ruhr region, this now applies to numerous actors, organisations and structures of industrial heritage that have developed for a good half century largely parallel to the structural crisis of the Ruhr mining industry and, above all, with the physical preservation of former collieries and a corresponding cultural-touristic valorisation, in a certain sense represent or even celebrate “official forms of commemoration” of mining and its collieries.33 “Le roi est mort, vive le roi” – the oft-quoted French herald’s cry thus seems particularly appropriate for the post-mining history of King Coal. The industrial King Coal may be dead in many (Western) European countries, but the new, post-industrial King Coal lives on,34 it lives on in and through its legacies, its diverse heritage that has come down to us. In this respect, at least one thematic field is up for debate that a modern mining history, if it understands itself paradigmatically-programmatically, must not lose sight of – that of industrial heritage, which should be understood as a broad material, discursive and natural phenomenon.

und Perspektiven eines Erfolgskonzeptes in den Kulturwissenschaften, 11–38. Essen: Klartext, 14–18. 32 Nora, Pierre, ed. 1984–1992. Les lieux des memoire, 7 vols., Paris: Gallimard; see also: Farrenkopf, Michael. 2019. “Untertage. Erinnerungsort Zeche.” In Zeit-Räume Ruhr. Erinnerungsorte des Ruhrgebiets, edited by Stefan Berger et al., 348–368. Essen: Klartext. 33 Farrenkopf, Michael. 2020. “From mining region to industrial heritage – 50 years of documentation, protection, and management in the Ruhr Area, Germany.” In Lebenswerk Welterbe. Aspekte von Industriekultur und Industriearchäologie, von Wissenschafts- und Technikgeschichte. Festschrift für Helmuth Albrecht zum 65. Geburtstag, edited by Norman Pohl, Michael Farrenkopf, and Friederike Hansell, 193–204. Berlin/Diepholz: gnt. 34 We use the term “post-industrial” exclusively and deliberately to distinguish this era from the classical industrial age of Europe, characterised by coal and steel; it is evident that the talk of a post-industrial era is problematic from a global perspective. See. e. g.: Plumpe, Werner, and André Steiner, eds. 2016. Der Mythos von der postindustriellen Welt. Wirtschaftlicher Strukturwandel in Deutschland 1960 bis 1990. Göttingen: Wallstein.

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Brown coal and hard coal mining areas are characterised by mining industrial complexes, which are most expressively reflected in the integrated economy of the Ruhr region.35 Collieries, coking plants, power stations and downstream industries, especially the chemical industry, form an infrastructurally linked structural conglomerate that loses its economic functionality, at least in large parts, after the end of coal mining. And although many of these structural relics were never planned for eternity, one of their central building materials alone, steel, is ephemeral.36 This always raises the question of how societies want to deal with them, how and whether they prevent or accelerate the “disappearance of the buildings of the industrial age”.37 Efforts to preserve them are closely linked to the post-industrial field of industrial heritage.38 It is hardly surprising that society’s interest in preserving the material relics of the industrial age first broke out in the mother country of the industrial symbiosis of coal and steel, England. In the 1950s, a broad movement of actors formed here that brought forth new evaluations of industrial legacies, which also ran in disciplinary terms under the term “industrial archaeology”.39 Similar impulses were given by the Swedish “Gräv där du star” (Dig where you stand) movement, which addressed the emancipatory-critical potential of this material heritage even more decisively. Such movements contributed not least to the fact that since the 1970s/80s there has been a stronger institutional anchoring of the treatment of material industrial heritage, which increasingly rested on its own evaluation categories and replaced the dominant art-historical ones above all with technology-historical ones.40 This institutional “success story” has become fragile in recent decades: the already classic standard quote of “critical heritage

35 Krau, Ingrid. 2018. Verlöschendes Industriezeitalter. Suche nach Aufbruch an Rhein, Ruhr und Emscher. Göttingen: Wallstein; Lobbe, Klaus, and Roswitha Krück. 1976. Wirtschaftsstrukturelle Bestandsaufnahme für das Ruhrgebiet. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot; Köllmann, Wolfgang et al., eds. 1990. Das Ruhrgebiet im Industriezeitalter, 2 vols., Düsseldorf: Schwann. 36 Cf. Hauser, Susanne. 2001. Metamorphosen des Abfalls. Konzepte für alte Industrieareale. Frankfurt (Main)/New York: Campus. 37 Hassler, Uta, and Niklaus Kohler. 2004. Das Verschwinden der Bauten des Industriezeitalters. Lebenszyklen industrieller Baubestände und Methoden transdisziplinärer Forschung. Tübingen: Wasmuth. 38 E. g. on the Ruhr recently: Bednorz, Achim, and Walter Buschmann. 2020. Der Pott. Industriekultur im Ruhrgebiet. Köln: Taschen. 39 Cf. Cossons, Neil, ed. 2000. Perspectives on Industrial Archaeology. London: Science Museum. 40 See Meyer, Torsten, and Michael Farrenkopf. 2021. “Industriekultur.” In Handbuch Historische Authentizität, edited by Martin Sabrow, and Achim Saupe. Göttingen: Wallstein (in press).

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studies”, “There is no such thing as heritage”41 points to the fact that every form of inherited tradition is discursive in nature, that the authoritative, institutional discourse power at least makes alternative interpretations and appropriations difficult. But even within this discursive power, critical voices are increasingly being heard that deplore the industrial-heritage commodification, since critical interpretative potentials of the material industrial heritage are thereby lost.42 But how can modern mining history position itself within such debates, which are hardly manageable anymore and in which the immaterial heritage of the industrial age is also steadily gaining in importance?43 In order to formulate a perspective, it is worth taking a look at the neighbouring discipline of the history of technology, for which Heike Weber recently formulated concepts on technical temporalities, on the “time layers of the technical”.44 Weber points out five different objects of investigation. In a synchronic perspective, the focus is on specific regional or social technicisations, in a diachronic perspective on their “historical development paths”. Secondly, by questioning the simultaneity of different technologies, the polychronicity of technology can be examined. Thirdly, if temporal extrapolations of futures are associated with technology, these can be systematically thematised. With regard to material industrial heritage, however, the two dimensions of the “temporalities of technology itself” and the “afterlife” of technology seem to be fruitful. The topos “temporalities of technology itself” connects the momentum, the stabilising elements of existing technology, fourthly, with the technical proper times, “which are inscribed in

41 Waterton, Emma, and Laurajane Smith. 2009. “There is No Such Thing as Heritage.” In Taking Archaeology out of Heritage, edited by Emma Waterton, and Laurajane Smith, 10–27. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars; cf. also: Harrison, Rodney. 2013. Heritage: Critical approaches. New York: Routledge. 42 Meier, Hans-Rudolf, and Marion Steiner. 2018. “Denkmal – Erbe – Heritage: Begriffshorizonte am Beispiel der Industriekultur/Monument – Patrimony – Heritage: Industrial Heritage and the Horizons of Terminology.” In Denkmal – Erbe – Heritage: Begriffshorizonte am Beispiel der Industriekultur/Monument – Patrimony – Heritage: Industrial Heritage and the Horizons of Terminology, edited by Simone Bogner et al., 16–35. Holzminden: Jörg Mitzkat. 43 It should be remembered that in numerous old industrial, mining regions the relict tradition is highly fragmentary to marginal. Cf. e. g.: Golombek, Jana. 2020. “Performing Heritage – Urban Exploration und Rust Belt Chic als jüngere Phänomene einer authentischen Industriekultur im amerikanischen Rust Belt?” In Authentizität und industriekulturelles Erbe. Zugänge und Beispiele, edited by Michael Farrenkopf, and Torsten Meyer, 105–130. Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter, or the oral history-projekt “Menschen im Bergbau” (https://menschen-im-bergbau.de. Accessed March 25, 2021). 44 Weber, Heike. 2019. “Zeitschichten des Technischen: Zum Momentum, Alter(n) und Verschwinden von Technik.” In Provokationen der Technikgeschichte. Zum Reflexionszwang historischer Forschung, edited by Martina Heßler, and Heike Weber, 107–150. Paderborn: Schöningh.

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them [the technical artefacts] materially and through wear and transience, or which are attributed to them socially”.45 These proper times aim at the “durability, transience or persistence” of the technical.46 In contrast, the concept of “afterlife” addresses the fact that technology has “an ‘afterlife’ that was often neither considered nor known at the time of its introduction”.47 Weber characterises this “afterlife” on the one hand through “aftercare intervention”,48 and on the other hand through “de-creation”, the active disappearance of technology, its dismantling, removal and disposal; passive abandonment is not conceptually addressed.49 The fact that “deconstruction” is becoming increasingly relevant in the 20th and 21st centuries is due to the fact that the “growing number of relics of products and buildings [. . .] has not only become a cultural challenge”, but also a “technical and ecological challenge”.50 These considerations offer starting points for contouring the thematic field of material industrial heritage (of mining) as a component of a modern mining history insofar as they make it possible to link historicising object biographies with the process of the cultural “removal” of the objects, their musealisation. This processual linkage also allows a view of the polyphony of cultural “de-creation practice”, which is able to take into account the criticism of “critical heritage studies” and the established discourse of monument preservation mentioned earlier.51 It is also unsurprising that former mining districts are classified on a landscape scale as having monumental value or heritage value, as exemplified by the designation of the French “Bassin minier du Nord-Pas-de-Calais” (2012), the Swedish “Kopparbergslagen” (2001) or the German-Czech “Montanregion Erzgebirge/Krušnohoří” (2019) as an ennobled UNSECO World Heritage Site. These protections reveal that mining per se is a techno-natural system shaped by the essential interaction of nature and society.52 These interactions continue to exist in post-mining times and can be seen as another industrial-heritage theme of modern mining history. Here, the focus is on the critical reflection of established narratives, such as those of “industrial nature” or “from green to black to green”. 45 Ibid., 112. 46 Ibid., 113. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid., 114. 49 Ibid., 138. 50 Ibid. 51 Meyer, Torsten. 2021. “Kein Schrott!? – Über „Zeitschichten des Technischen“, „technische Eigenzeiten“ und den Wandel des Objektstatus einer Abraumförderbrücke im Niederlausitzer Braunkohlenrevier.” In Materielle Kulturen des Bergbaus, edited by Farrenkopf, and Siemer (in press). 52 Cf. Asrih, Ingenerf, and Meyer. “Bergbau als techno-naturales System.”

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For example, with regard to the discourse on “industrial nature”, it already seems critical that the phenomenon is less industrial than post-industrial in origin,53 and the still dominant narrative “from green to black to green” overlooks the fact that the post-industrial “green” is, at least phenomenologically, of a completely different nature than the pre-industrial one.54 If a modern mining history takes a critical look at this topic, it can also remain connectable from an environmental history perspective and enrich it in turn.

The structure of the volume The contributions to this volume tie in with this outlined thematic and methodological-theoretical field of modern mining history through different emphases.

Politics of coal “Politics of coal”, the first section of the volume, brings together contributions that deal with mining politics in various fields, from economics to corporate cultures to the social. The first chapter is by PER HÖGSELIUS, “The European energy system in an age of globalisation”. Beginning with energy crises in early modern Europe, HÖGSELIUS traces European supply strategies with fossil energy sources in the modern era. This was characterised by a massive increase in imports, led to a “globalisation of energy”, which was combined with “energy colonialism” and “energy transnationalism”. And while the “geography of politics” in the modern era certainly produced separatist tendencies, the “geography of energy” promoted cooperative networking. HÖGSELIUS also emphasises that one specific energy source eluded this European trend, lignite. Its extraction continues to be associated with the desire for energy policy autarky. This global-historical view is followed by a national-historical one in ALAIN BELTRAN’S contribution. In his chapter “Between political continuity and new deal: The energy sector in France in the 1960s”, he focuses on the transformation of the French energy system in the 1960s, highlighting in particular the development of newly explored natural gas fields and the exploration of Algerian

53 Cf. Golombek, Jana, and Torsten Meyer. 2016. “Das (post-)industrielle Erbe des Anthropozän – Überlegungen zu einer Weitung des Blickfelds.” Der Anschnitt. Zeitschrift für Kunst und Kultur im Bergbau 68: 198–215. 54 Ibid.

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oil. But these do not mark the specificity of the French energy sector, which, according to BELTRAN, lies above all in the fact that the state saw energy policy as a strategic field and national companies were decisive actors. BELTRAN thus echoes a political continuity that is also represented by the entrepreneurial leadership elites in the French energy sector, the so-called polytechnicians, who come from the academic elite forges of the Republic. The article by DOUGLAS A. YATES “The French oil industry under the Corps de Mines: From family firms to national champions to private multinationals” is devoted to this group of actors. It shows that the change in the corporate culture resonating in the title was strongly linked to formative actors and their changing motivations and self-understandings in the course of the 19th and 20th centuries. The two subsequent chapters by BRIAN SHAEV and HENNING TÜRK refer to crisis symptoms of the coal and energy market in the European and global context, focusing in particular on economic forecasting. “Coal and common market: Forecasting crisis in the early European parliament” is the title of SHAEV’S contribution, which looks at contemporary perceptions and the handling of the foreseeable coal crisis around 1957/58 at the European level. TÜRK, on the other hand, asks only at first glance provocatively “From oil to coal? The International Energy Agency (IEA) and international coal policy since the end of the 1970s”, because the IEA, which was founded in 1974, aimed to reduce dependence on oil. The expansion of nuclear energy and the increase of coal production were propagated. Both authors underline that the existing crisis awareness did little to change the way this phenomenon was dealt with; the cause seems to have been flawed forecasts and a very incomplete flow of information. As mentioned, “Politics of coal” covers not only the economy, but also social and cultural politics, especially in (former) coalregions. The contributions by LARS BLUMA, SARA-MARIE DEMIRIZ and JAN KELLERSHOHN explore these using the concrete example of the Ruhr region. BLUMA raises the question: “‘Humanization of Work’: A watershed in German coal mining?” He underlines that only an ambivalent answer to this question is possible. According to BLUMA, the German research project “Humanization of Work”, which was launched in 1974, did not mark a caesura on the one hand, since there was a lack of practical implementation of the research results. On the other hand, however, the programme can be attributed with exceptional significance, as ‘the worker’ was rethought and the principles of a more democratic world of work gained contours, which were also incorporated into this perspective. DEMIRIZ continues with her chapter “Qualifying the stranger: Educational policies for migrant workers in the WestGerman mining industry”, DEMIRIZ takes up the current political issue of integrating migrants. Her text focuses on the work of the “Revierarbeitsgemeinschaft für kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung” (REVAG). She is able to vividly show that

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cultural integration of migrants only seems possible if such initiatives are primarily supported by regional actors. KELLERSHOHN focuses on ‘knowledge’, the key category of the much-vaunted late-modern knowledge society. His chapter “Mobility and the crisis of intelligence: The mining industry and the negotiation of knowledge under ‘deindustrialisation’” discusses the connections between knowledge, social position and the future of work in a German-French comparison beginning in the late 1960s. KELLERSHOHN is able to work out that cybernetic models of thought are of essential importance for this discourse. He argues in principle for addressing the crisis in the coal industry as one of skill levels. The coal crisis made it possible for ‘qualification’ to become a socio-political imperative that is more relevant today than ever before, as the talk about “lifelong learning” emphatically reflects.

Mining, heritage, legacy By addressing the process of de-industrialisation, KELLERSHOHN’S contribution leads into the second section of the volume. Under the title “Mining, heritage, legacy”, this section brings together contributions that are united by the process of socio-economic structural change, even though they establish different highlights and emphases. The first three contributions, which focus on the period after the boom since the end of the Second World War for different countries and coal regions, provide the historical background foil of the following chapters. The chapter by MICHAEL FARRENKOPF “Short-term rise and decades of decline: German hard coal mining after 1945” traces the short boom period in the Ruhr area until the coal crisis of 1957/58. This was followed by a long period of decline, which was to be strategically intercepted by the politically motivated foundation of the “Einheitsgesellschaft Ruhrkohle AG” in 1968 by focusing on the development of other energies. MILES OGLETHORPE takes us to the British Isles with “Losing our mines: Scotland’s coal industry in context”. “Losing our mines” is, as OGLETHORPE convincingly explains, a double meaning: it refers not only to the closure of the mines, but also to the disappearance of their structural relics. He attributes the latter to the fact that mining activities in Scotland had a negative connotation throughout and that there was therefore no major lobby for the preservation of its relics. The contribution by ANDREA POKLUDOVÁ and PETR POPELKA mediates between the different focuses of FARRENKOPF and OGLETHORPE. With “From the ‘steel heart of Czechoslovakia’ to post-industrial space: Boom, crisis and the cultural heritage of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district”, the authors first outline the socialist ‘boom’ of the regional coal mining industry and then pursue the question of how the relics were preserved in the course of

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the rapid structural break after 1989. In contrast to Scotland, the authors show that in the post-socialist region, a multi-layered set of interests developed that favoured preservation. While the last two chapters focus on heritage and legacy, those by JÖRG ARNOLD, SIGRUN LEHNERT and GISELA PARAK have a decidedly mediatory character. Under the title “Receding futures, shifting pasts: The British coal industry, generational change and the politics of temporality, ca. 1967–1987”, ARNOLD discusses the “triumph, crisis and destruction” of the British coal industry. He uses these terms to highlight the different perceptions of the past held by groups of actors, which in turn led to different expectations of the future. Mining has always enjoyed media accompaniment, and LEHNERT takes up this interest in a systematic perspective using the example of newsreels. In “The representation of coal mining in German post-war newsreels (East and West) 1948 to 1965” she offers a comparative study of West and East German newsreels between 1948 and 1965. She shows the stereotypes about miners, as well as their party-political appropriation and media over-forming or alienation of important events in the German coalfields. Last but not least, LEHNERT makes clear which topics did not play a role, including first and foremost the negative environmental impact. PARAK’S chapter “Pulser for preservation: Bernd and Hilla Becher and the role of photography in industrial heritage” is devoted to the medium of photography. It contextualises this early industrial photography and asks about its aesthetics, whereby it becomes clear that the 1960s/70s seem to have had a special significance for industrial heritage conservation, which is fed not least by the programme of a photographic aesthetic. PARAK thus leads on to the contributions by MALTE HELFER, BARRY L. STIEFEL, PIA EIRGINHAUS and TORSTEN MEYER. HELFER’S chapter “The legacy of coal mining – A view of examples in France and Belgium” which outlines the similarities and differences in the strategies for preserving industrial heritage in the French and Belgian mining regions, whereas STIEFEL’S article “Black diamond heritage: A North American study of coal mining preservation” primarily addresses USAmerican examples. On the one hand, he emphasises the importance of “best practice” examples of industrial heritage conservation, on the other hand that of the UNESCO World Heritage Programme, which, in his opinion, both ensures a sensitised perception of heritage and contributes to the (institutional) strengthening of international industrial heritage conservation. The context-related, dominant narrative is “from black to green” or also “from green to black to green again” and is subjected to a critical revision in EIRGINHAUS’ chapter “How industrial heritage became green – Renaturalisation narratives in regional history culture” using the example of the Ruhr region. The focus is on the term “industrial nature”, whose ambiguous complexity leads to discursive variability. While the

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narrative of “heritage” is focused on here, MEYER’S contribution “‘Biofacts’ – Recultivating the post-mining landscape in the Anthropocene” brings the “legacy” of mining into focus. By emphasising that industrial nature, in particular, must be phenomenologically distinguished from nature, since it is populated by “biofacts”, the chapter virtually supports EIRGINHAUS’ critical observations. The contribution by TIMOTHY J. LECAIN “Mining the Anthropocene: How coal created the supposed ‘Age of Humans’”, which concludes the volume, takes a comprehensive, global look at the “legacy” of mining. LECAIN criticises the concept of the Anthropocene from the perspective of “new materialism” and ultimately pleads for the use of the term “Carbocene”. Against the backdrop of such a plea, a term like decarbonisation also gains new value.

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Hassler, Uta, and Niklaus Kohler. 2004. Das Verschwinden der Bauten des Industriezeitalters. Lebenszyklen industrieller Baubestände und Methoden transdisziplinärer Forschung. Tübingen: Wasmuth. Haumann, Sebastian. 2020. Kalkstein als “kritischer“ Rohstoff. Eine Stoffgeschichte der Industrialisierung 1840–1930. Bielefeld: transcript. Hauser, Susanne. 2001. Metamorphosen des Abfalls. Konzepte für alte Industrieareale. Frankfurt (Main)/New York: Campus. Heimsoth, Axel. 2019. “Steinkohle als Faktor der europäischen Infrastruktur. Gründe für die Verkehrsrevolution im Industriezeitalter.” Der Anschnitt. Zeitschrift für Montangeschichte 71, no. 4: 168–79. Klein, Ursula, and Emma C. Spary, eds. 2010. Materials and Experts in Early Modern Europe. Between Market and Laboratory. Chicago/London: The University of Chigaco Press. Klose, Alexander, and Benjamin Steininger. 2020. Erdöl. Ein Atlas der Petromoderne. Berlin: Matthes & Seitz. Köllmann, Wolfgang et al., eds. 1990. Das Ruhrgebiet im Industriezeitalter, 2 vols., Düsseldorf: Schwann. Krau, Ingrid. 2018. Verlöschendes Industriezeitalter. Suche nach Aufbruch an Rhein, Ruhr und Emscher. Göttingen: Wallstein. LeCain, Timothy J. 2015. “Against the Anthropocene. A Neo-Materialist Perspective.” International Journal for History, Culture, and Modernity 3, no. 1: 1–28. Lobbe, Klaus, and Roswitha Krück. 1976. Wirtschaftsstrukturelle Bestandsaufnahme für das Ruhrgebiet. Berlin: Duncker & Humblot. Malm, Andreas. 2016. Fossil Capital. The Rise of Steam Power and the Roots of Global Warming. London/New York: Verso. Malzsh, Bruce. 2006. The New Global History. New York et al: Routledge. Meier, Hans-Rudolf, and Marion Steiner. 2018. “Denkmal – Erbe – Heritage: Begriffshorizonte am Beispiel der Industriekultur/Monument – Patrimony – Heritage: Industrial Heritage and the Horizons of Terminology.” In Denkmal – Erbe – Heritage: Begriffshorizonte am Beispiel der Industriekultur/Monument – Patrimony – Heritage: Industrial Heritage and the Horizons of Terminology, edited by Simone Bogner et al., 16–35. Holzminden: Jörg Mitzkat. Meyer, Torsten. 2021. “Kein Schrott!? – Über „Zeitschichten des Technischen“, „technische Eigenzeiten“ und den Wandel des Objektstatus einer Abraumförderbrücke im Niederlausitzer Braunkohlenrevier.” In Materielle Kulturen des Bergbaus|Material Cultures of Mining. Zugänge, Aspekte und Beispiele|Approaches, Aspects and Examples, edited by Michael Farrenkopf, and Stefan Siemer. Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter (in press). Meyer, Torsten, and Michael Farrenkopf. 2021. “Industriekultur.” In Handbuch Historische Authentizität, edited by Martin Sabrow, and Achim Saupe. Göttingen: Wallstein (in press). Mitchell, Timothy. 2013. Carbon Democracy. Political Power in the Age of Coal. 2nd Edition. London/New York: Verso. Morris, Ian. 2015. Foragers, Farmers, and Fossil Fuels. How Human Values Evolve. New York/ Oxford: Princeton University Press. Nonn, Christoph. 2001. Die Ruhrbergbaukrise. Entindustrialisierung und Politik 1958–1969. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Nora, Pierre, ed. 1984–1992. Les lieux des memoire, 7 vols., Paris: Gallimard. Plumpe, Werner, and André Steiner, eds. 2016. Der Mythos von der postindustriellen Welt. Wirtschaftlicher Strukturwandel in Deutschland 1960 bis 1990. Göttingen: Wallstein.

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Ranft, Norbert. 1988. Vom Objekt zum Subjekt. Montanmitbestimmung, Sozialklima und Strukturwandel im Bergbau seit 1945. Köln: Bund. Regul, Rudolf. 1953. “Die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl.” Jahrbuch des deutschen Bergbaus 46: 17–41. Sabrow, Martin, and Achim Saupe. 2016. “Historische Authentizität. Zur Kartierung eines Forschungsfeldes.” In Historische Authentizität, edited by Martin Sabrow, and Achim Saupe, 7–28. Göttingen: Wallstein. Tenfelde, Klaus et al., eds. 2012–2016. Geschichte des deutschen Bergbaus, 4 vols. Münster: Aschendorff. Thorade, Nora. 2020. Das schwarze Gold. Eine Stoffgeschichte der Steinkohle im 19. Jahrhundert. Paderborn: Schöningh. Uekotter, Frank. 2013. “Bergbau und Umwelt im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert”. In Rohstoffgewinnung im Strukturwandel. Der deutsche Bergbau im 20. Jahrhundert, edited by Dieter Ziegler, 539–70. Münster: Aschendorff. Vogel, Jakob. 2013. “Aufklärung untertage: Wissenswelten des europäischen Bergbaus im ausgehenden 18. und 19. Jahrhundert.” In Staat, Bergbau und Bergakademie. Montanexperten im 18. und frühen 19. Jahrhundert, edited by Hartmut Schleiff, and Peter Konecny, 14–31. Stuttgart: Steiner. Waterton, Emma, and Laurajane Smith. 2009. “There is No Such Thing as Heritage.” In Taking Archaeology out of Heritage, edited by Emma Waterton, and Laurajane Smith, 10–27. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars. Weber, Heike. 2019. “Zeitschichten des Technischen: Zum Momentum, Alter(n) und Verschwinden von Technik.” In Provokationen der Technikgeschichte. Zum Reflexionszwang historischer Forschung, edited by Martina Heßler, and Heike Weber, 107–50. Paderborn: Schöningh. Wilson, Sheena, Adam Carlson, and Imre Szeman, eds. 2017. Petrocultures. Oil, Politics, Culture. Montreal: McGill Queen University Press.

Per Högselius

The European energy system in an age of globalisation Introduction This chapter places the rise and fall of the European coal industry into a broader global-historical perspective. I will try to zoom out and think through the history of energy in Europe. I do this not so much by starting from the traditional, nationcentred perspective, but rather by targeting the genuinely transnational character of the European energy system in the making. The analysis focuses partly on transnational connections within Europe itself, and partly on the connections between Europe and its “far reaches” in energy1 – that is, Europe’s energy links with the non-European world. Let us start by taking a look at an intriguing oil painting by the FlemishGerman artist Frans Hogenberg (1535–1590). It depicts a proud walled town in southern Germany, Schwäbisch Hall. In the 16th century, Schwäbisch Hall was an important hub in the European salt industry. Salt production was at that time known as one of the “fire industries”,2 because in northern latitudes brine could only be evaporated through heating. Heat generation required fire, and to make a fire the salt industrialists used massive amounts of firewood. Firewood was at the time by far the most important energy source throughout continental Europe. By the time Hogenberg created his painting (ca. 1580), however, the copious use of firewood in the salt industry had given rise to far-reaching deforestation and thus depletion of the locally available fuel. The painting actually documents this fuel crisis: there is basically no forest left in the local surroundings. It has all disappeared or, to use a modern term, the fuel reserves have been depleted.

1 Hecht, Gabrielle. 2004. “Colonial Networks of Power: The Far Reaches of Systems.” Annales Historiques de l’électricité 2: 147–157; Högselius, Per, Arne Kaijser, and Erik van der Vleuten. 2016. Europe’s Infrastructure Transition: Economy, War, Nature. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 2 Radkau, Joachim. 2008. Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment. New York: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-002

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Fig. 1: Frans Hogenberg, Schwäbisch Hall ca. 1580. Coloured copperplate engraving.

Remarkably, however, the salt industry, to judge from the painting, does not seem to be all that bothered by the disappearance of the forests. From Hogenberg’s painting we can see that the salt industrialists keep on working much like before, and that the salt industry continues to flourish. It seems as if the salt makers have found a way to cope with the local fuel crisis. If we look closer at the painting, we can see that they are able to continue evaporating the brine because they have managed to access excellent firewood resources from more distant forests, based on agreements with upstream localities. From these upstream sources, thousands of logs of firewood are transported downstream on the Kocher, the local stream. In Hogenberg’s painting we can see how the logs arrive in Schwäbisch Hall’s local harbour. In the historical annals of the city, we can read about how the firewood usually arrived in large batches during certain times of the year. These days became festive days of celebrations in the town, there was great excitement, and a lot of beer, wine and food was consumed.3

3 Radkau, Joachim. 1997. “Das Rätsel der städtischen Brennholzversorgung im ‘hölzernen Zeitalter’.” In Energie und Stadt in Europa: Von der vorindustriellen “Holznot” bis zur Ölkrise der 1970er Jahre, edited by Dieter Schott, 43–76. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 56–57.

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This is now almost half a millennium ago, and the world has changed a lot. However, the legacy of Schwäbisch Hall’s quest for access to remote sources of fuel is very much alive in our own age. One could even argue that Europe as a whole is in a similar position as Schwäbisch Hall was in the 16th century. Europe’s local energy sources have been – or are about to be – depleted. Our fuel reserves have been burnt up. They have been consumed. They are gone. And as far as we speak of fossil fuels, they are gone forever. To be sure, not 100 percent is gone, but what we see now in terms of ongoing fuel extraction is an endgame, we are turning the last pages of Europe’s fuel extraction book. All peaks in production lie in the past, and everybody who is still employed in nonrenewable primary energy production in Europe works in a declining industry. Half a century ago a country such as Germany was still able to produce impressive volumes of hard coal and even large volumes of oil and natural gas. Today basically nothing of this remains. Romania was once a world leading oil power and subsequently the country became a massive producer of natural gas as well. Today, however, almost nothing is left of these fossil fuel resources. Austria was, at one point, a major producer of both oil and gas; now there is nothing left. The situation is much the same in Italy, in France, in Spain – well, basically everywhere. Even the oil riches under the North Sea, which have functioned as a main guarantor of European energy security during the past 40 years, are being depleted at a rapid pace, with production now being less than half of what it was 15 or 20 years ago. And in the Netherlands, which in 1959 discovered the world’s largest natural-gas field, production is now rapidly being phased out due to a tragic course of depletion which has recently given rise to a series of strange earthquakes in the Groningen region.4 Europe’s energy resources have literally gone up in smoke. They have been squandered, and they will never reappear. They are gone forever. Remarkably, however, Europe’s energy users have hardly been affected at all by this radical race to depletion. On the contrary, European energy consumption is today higher than ever and there has been a tremendous growth in fuel use during the past 200 years. Just like Schwäbisch Hall’s salt industry in the 16th century, Europe has been able to continue burning copious amounts of fuel much like before – and even scale up consumption in ways that few people would have thought possible a few decades ago. How has this been achieved? The explanation is simple: just like Schwäbisch Hall, Europe has managed to cope with local energy scarcity by tapping into fuel reserves located elsewhere – that is, reserves

4 See e.g. Boffey, Daniel. 2018. “Gas field earthquakes put Netherlands’ biggest firms on extraction notice.” The Guardian, January 23, 2018.

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belonging to non-European regions of the world. These non-European energy sources have more than compensated for the depletion of Europe’s internal fuel deposits. For example, following the closure, in December 2018, of the last remaining German hard coal mines, Germany nowadays imports all of its hard coal needs. It also imports 89 percent of the natural gas that it burns, 96 percent of its oil and 100 percent of its uranium.5 The trend is the same in virtually every European country. Britain, for example, closed down its last underground coal mine in 2015, while France exited the coal industry in 2004. In my own country, Sweden, domestic coal production was already phased out in the 1950s, and domestic uranium production came to an end in the 1960s. There is no production of fossil fuels in Sweden today. And yet Sweden boasts a highly competitive steel industry which thrives thanks to imported coal and coke; my country has millions of car owners and lorry drivers who are able to fill up their petrol- and diesel-driven vehicles, and airplanes that are able to take off and land in a multitude of Swedish airports thanks to imported jet fuel. Natural gas heats towns and supplies industries with process heat in Sweden’s south and southwest, and nuclear power plants produce copious amounts of uranium-based energy for the benefit of Swedish households and energy-intensive industries.6 Most European countries, along with the most advanced nations in East and Southeast Asia are in more or less the same situation. They source their energy from remote locations, and the amounts of energy that they import are vast. The only difference really, compared to Schwäbisch Hall in the 16th century, is that the arrival of our much-needed fuel does not inspire any celebrations or festivities. We do not cry out for joy when the gas arrives from Russia; we do not sing the praise of Saudi Arabia’s petroleum when the supertanker is sighted at Marseilles; we do not gather to cheerfully watch the arrival of the coal ship from Colombia when it docks in the port of Hamburg; and there is no street party in La Hague on the French coast when the uranium oxides arrive from the Nigerien uranium mines in the Sahara desert. In fact, few people are aware that these shipments take place. And yet these flows are the very lifeblood of the European economy and of modern European life as we know it.

5 Germany does not extract uranium domestically. For the evolution of oil and gas import dependence of EU member states, see Eurostat. July 2018. “Energy production and imports. Statistics explained.” Accessed August 1, 2018. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained/. 6 For a detailed analysis of Sweden’s energy dependence history, see Kaijser, Arne, and Per Högselius. 2019. “Under the Damocles Sword: Managing Swedish Energy Dependence in the Twentieth Century.” Energy Policy 126: 157–164.

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Before continuing, I should mention that there is one very important nonrenewable energy source that goes against the overall pattern: lignite, or brown coal. Europe is a lignite superpower, producing over half of the world’s lignite. Germany to this day remains the world’s largest lignite producer. Russia, Turkey, Poland, Greece, the Czech Republic, Serbia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Hungary are also massive producers.7 Europe’s lignite resources have not been depleted, and as all other intra-European fossil fuels are disappearing, the strategic role of European lignite becomes ever more pronounced. It is an extremely dirty fuel, but historically this fact has been less important than the fact that it is a locally available fuel, thus stimulating its continuing excavation and combustion. Lignite’s key role in most of the countries mentioned can be traced back to a quest for energy security and energy autarky, and so governments have championed the expansion of lignite mining regardless of the economic and ecological costs. Nowhere would lignite production be able to thrive without heavy government subsidies, because cheaper energy is readily available for pick up in the nearest seaport. Yet in 2018, lignite still remains the backbone of the energy systems in several European nations, and the current political trend of nationalism and protectionism is likely to make its phase-out in Europe very difficult, especially in Eastern Europe. It is not unlikely that many, if not most, of the lignite-dependent countries will feature, in 15 to 20 years, a bizarre energy mix of heavily polluting lignite combined with wonderfully clean wind and solar energy.

Energy colonialism and energy transnationalism Europe has, with lignite as the main exception, become almost totally dependent on imported energy. Another way to express this is that the European energy system has gone through a radical globalisation process. Indeed, it is energy’s globalisation that largely defines the European energy system and its evolution over the past 150 years. Globalisation can, of course, refer to many different things, but let me here point to two particularly critical globalisation phenomena in the energy domain: I will refer to these as energy colonialism and energy transnationalism. I will argue that it is in the interaction between these two historical processes that we must try and discern the underlying dynamics of Europe’s long-term energy evolution.

7 See e.g. Euracoal. 2018. “Coal in Europe 2017.” European Association for Coal and Lignite. Accessed January 20, 2019. https://euracoal.eu/info/euracoal-eu-statistics/.

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Oil Let us start by looking at oil. The modern petroleum industry was spearheaded by American entrepreneurs in the 1850s and 1860s, and pretty soon American kerosene, which was used for lighting, reached European markets. However, a number of European entrepreneurs early on set out to challenge the Americans. They did so by turning to colonial oil resources. The most important colonial oil regions were Russia’s recently colonized Transcaucasian lands, the Dutch East Indies and the Middle East. Then, in the 1910s, oil started to be regarded as a strategically important energy source, mainly due to its role in propelling warships, tanks and airplanes, and as a result oil imports were increasingly identified as an issue for state agencies to look into.8 European governments decided that they wanted control over both oil imports and domestic distribution. And so they set out to acquire their own oil fields in distant parts of the world. The result was a new, aggressive form of European oil colonialism.

Fig. 2: Oil gusher in Baku, 1883. The oil fields in Russia’s southern colonial periphery fuelled the Russian Empire while also playing a key role in supplying Western and Central Europe with oil.

8 Yergin, Daniel. 1991. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. London: Simon & Schuster.

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Britain with its BP company led the way here, but France and other European nations were not far behind. After World War Two this trend continued at an accelerated pace, with Italy, for example, becoming very active from around 1954 in regions such as Egypt and Iran, and Spain, which in cooperation with the larger international oil companies tried but failed to find oil in the Spanish Sahara. In the 1960s, Germany entered the game through a company called Deminex.9 More surprisingly, even smaller nations, including Sweden, tried to find oil in foreign territories.10 Most amazingly, some of the countries behind the Iron Curtain also emerged as oil colonialists; this concerns not only the far-reaching involvement of the Soviet Union in third-world oil exploration projects, but also countries such as Bulgaria, which thanks to the friendship between its dictator Todor Zhivkov and his counterpart in Libya, Muammar al-Gaddafi, was able to tap into Libyan oil.11 So oil colonialism is definitely a major trait of both 19th- and 20th-century European oil history. But acquiring crude oil was only one of many challenges in putting the European oil supply system to work. Other tasks related to the need for refining, storing and distributing crude oil and refined oil products – and those activities did not come about in any automatic way. In terms of refineries, European governments strongly advocated that the oil must be refined domestically, not abroad. Some countries even created state-owned refining companies, which were then typically integrated with the exploration companies that were looking for oil in colonial regions. Italy’s ENI is a case in point here; Spain’s CAMPSA, a state import monopoly founded in 1927, is another. In any case, oil refining became very much a national affair.12 Most of Europe’s refineries were built along the coasts. At these locations imported crude oil from colonial regions was transformed into more valuable end products, which were then shipped to industrial users, filling stations, airports and so on by way of tanker, rail or truck. Subsequently refineries were also built in a number of landlocked locations in continental Europe. Let us look a bit more closely at these landlocked locations. The initial idea was that colonial crude oil could be unloaded in one or the other seaport and then transported by rail into Europe’s interior regions, where it would first be refined and then

9 Duffield, John S. 2015. Fuels Paradise: Energy Security in Europe, Japan, and the United States. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. 10 Kaijser and Högselius. “Under the Damocles Sword”. 11 Tchalakov, Ivan, and Tihomir Mitev. 2019. “Energy Dependence behind the Iron Curtain: The Bulgarian Experience.” Energy Policy 126: 47–56. 12 Högselius, Per, and Arne Kaijser. 2019. “Energy Dependence in Historical Perspective: The Geopolitcs of Smaller Nations.” Energy Policy 127: 438–444.

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distributed to users. But when oil consumption embarked on a path of very rapid, exponential growth in the 1950s, this ceased to be feasible, because oil transport put such an enormous stress on the European railway network. Instead, oil companies along with other actors such as petrochemical companies, industrial groups and regional governments joined forces in constructing very large and, above all, very long oil pipelines from the seaports to major industrial centres in continental Europe, such as Ludwigshafen and Ingolstadt (in Germany) and Schwechat in Vienna’s outskirts (in Austria). The most important oil pipelines in Western Europe went from Marseilles to Baden-Württemberg, from Rotterdam to the Ruhr, from Genoa to Ingolstadt and from Trieste to Ingolstadt and Vienna.13

Fig. 3: Ongoing oil-pipeline construction in Western Europe as of 1960. Europe’s oil supply relied on shipments mainly from non-European sources, especially (former) colonial or semicolonial domains. The need to transfer oil from overseas into Europe’s landlocked regions gave rise to transnational oil-pipeline construction as a new form of European integration.

Bavaria played a particularly interesting role here. Bavarian Minister of the Economy Otto Schedl pursued a forceful strategy that aimed to make Bavaria

13 Högselius et al. Europe’s Infrastructure Transition.

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independent in its energy supply from northern Germany and especially from the coal regions of the Ruhr, which he blamed for Bavaria’s economic backwardness. Imported oil from North Africa and the Middle East became his main tool in this struggle. However, in order to access foreign oil without becoming dependent on northern Germany, he needed to forge cooperation not only with crude oil exporters in regions such as the Middle East, but also with actors in Italy, Austria and Switzerland, which emerged as transit countries. The construction of oil pipelines from the Italian seaports to Bavaria, taking the route across the Alps, must be regarded as one of the most impressive feats in European oil history. But there are several other examples of landlocked regions that followed the same strategy, with actors forging cooperation with neighbouring European countries so as to enable imports of crude oil from faraway. Ludwigshafen, for example, accessed Middle Eastern oil not so much by way of Rotterdam or Hamburg, but rather through a cooperative venture with France, the cornerstone of which was the Central European Oil Pipeline from Marseilles. In Eastern Europe Czechoslovakia, Hungary, Poland and East Germany forged similar cooperation, albeit under a totally different political regime, with the Soviet Union, whose immense colonial oil riches they accessed through the Druzhba (“Friendship”) pipeline system.14 The point here is that oil pipeline construction in both Western and Eastern Europe became the basis for intense and fruitful cooperation between a large number of European countries. Or, somewhat differently expressed, the need to transfer colonial crude oil from European seaports into the continent’s interior – especially through oil pipeline construction – became the basis for a far-reaching European oil transnationalism. This transnationalism was dynamically co-produced with rapidly growing and ever more aggressive extractive activities in Europe’s colonial or quasi-colonial peripheries.

Natural gas Shifting our focus from oil to natural gas, the interaction between energy colonialism and energy transnationalism becomes more complex. It took much longer for natural gas to become a globalised fuel, mainly because gas was so much more difficult to transport over long distances as compared to transporting coal or oil. In the 21st century there is still no truly globalised market for natural gas.

14 Ibid.

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The breakthrough for natural gas as a fuel in Europe is, ironically as it may seem these days, directly linked to attempts to strengthen European energy independence. Natural gas was spearheaded in Europe by a number of countries and regions that did not possess any large domestic coal deposits, especially France, Italy, Austria and Bavaria. Actors in these regions early on promoted investments in natural gas as a way to overcome their looming coal import dependence. Their enthusiasm for natural gas was initially linked to the discovery of substantial domestic gas deposits. Natural gas, extracted from these local wells, quickly became a very popular fuel. As a matter of fact, natural gas became so popular among users that overall demand very quickly outpaced anything that the locally available sources were able to satisfy. In this situation the gas companies faced a delicate strategic choice: either they would have to disappoint their gas customers by telling them that, unfortunately, they had no more gas to offer, implying that the customers would have to switch back to coal or oil – or, they could try and meet the growing demand for natural gas by seeking access to foreign supplies. All gas companies in Europe chose the latter path, thus paving the way for a transition from domestic supplies to import dependence.15 But from where should the gas be sourced? Who could possibly supply Europe with more natural gas to compensate for the local supplies that were being depleted? The first large-scale project to be seriously discussed in this context targeted the European colonial periphery in North Africa, where an immense new gas field had been discovered at Hassi R’Mel, deep within the Sahara desert. The idea was to build a gas pipeline from this deposit through the desert and onwards across the Mediterranean into continental Europe. This idea became immensely popular not only in France, whose geologists had discovered the gas field, but also in Italy, Spain, Austria, Bavaria and even Britain. Potential British importers of the fuel thought that they could receive Saharan gas by way of transfer through Spain and France. Austria, in the same way, envisioned cooperation with Italy and Bavaria with Spain and France or with Italy and Austria, for accessing Hassi R’Mel gas. And so the quest for Saharan gas was not merely a vision of European energy colonialism; it also became a vision of European energy transnationalism, centring on far-reaching cooperation between a number of European countries to make the new natural gas system come about.16

15 Högselius, Per, Anna Åberg, and Arne Kaijser. 2013. “Natural Gas in Cold War Europe: The Making of a Critical Infrastructure.” In The Making of Europe’s Critical Infrastructure: Common Connections and Shared Vulnerabilities, edited by Per Högselius et al., 27–61. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. 16 Ibid.

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Fig. 4: “The integrated gas system of Western Europe”. This map from the Austrian oil and gas company ÖMV makes visible the ways in which the export pipelines from Siberia and Central Asia contributed to Western Europe’s internal integration.

Precisely at this time, however, further very important natural gas discoveries were made in Europe itself: in the Netherlands. There, the Groningen natural gas field turned out to be so immense that it seemed impossible for the Netherlands itself to make use of all the gas. For this reason, the Netherlands concluded agreements with Belgium, France and Germany for large-scale gas

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exports.17 This cooperation became another cornerstone in the emerging European gas transnationalism. But further and even more significant gas fields were being discovered in the Russian colonial periphery: in north-western Siberia. The gas discoveries there in the early 1960s made headlines in the Western media, and several West European gas companies started to consider the possibility of importing Siberian natural gas. And so by the early 1970s Western Europe was sourcing most of its gas from two colonial peripheries: Algeria and Siberia. Together with the gas from the Netherlands, these colonial gas streams made the European gas market highly competitive. In spite of the fact that Europe had very little indigenous gas – save the Groningen field and the smaller French field at Lacq – the competitive dynamics enabled the gas importers to utilise colonial gas from distant sources at highly favourable prices. Moreover, the gas transnationalism that was already becoming evident in the early Algerian and Dutch visions became increasingly pronounced because the long-distance pipelines from Siberia, from the Sahara and later on from other gas exporting countries forced Western Europe’s nations and regions to cooperate with each other in the construction of sprawling long-distance pipeline grids. In particular, the construction of gas pipelines from Siberia to Western Europe contributed to a process of European integration in natural gas.18

Uranium Uranium is another key fuel in the European energy system. It is the most internationalised energy source in the European fuel economy. Of the uranium that nuclear operators use 98 percent is imported from non-European uranium mines, mainly from Russia’s colonial peripheries, from the steppe lands of Central Asia, from first nations’ territories in Canada, from former French and British colonies in Africa and from Australia. From a technical point of view, some of Europe’s uranium needs could, theoretically, be covered through intra-European rather than colonial sources. From an economic and environmental point of view, however, governments and companies do not consider this to be feasible. For this reason, virtually all European countries, in their official statistics, indicate that there

17 Kaijser, Arne. 1999. “Striking Bonanza: The Establishment of a Natural Gas Regime in the Netherlands.” In Governing Large Technical Systems, edited by Olivier Coutard, 38–57. London: Routledge. 18 Högselius, Per. 2013. Red Gas: Russia and the Origins of European Energy Dependence. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

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are no uranium resources on their territories. The resources are not depleted in a physical sense; yet from an institutional, economic and environmental point of view they do not exist. Nuclear power plants can do little with uranium ore as such. The ore needs to go through various refinement processes, which are strongly internationalised. By the 1970s, for example, the Finnish nuclear operator TVO had built up a supply mechanism in which it first purchased crude uranium from Canada. This “yellow-cake”, as it is also called, was then shipped across the Atlantic to La Hague on the French coast for conversion – in the same facilities that processed France’s African uranium – into uranium hexafluoride. After that, the fuel embarked on another lengthy voyage, heading for the port of Riga in Soviet Latvia, where it was reloaded onto railway cars for transport to the Mayak nuclear complex in the eastern Urals. Enriched in the Soviet Union, the fuel reappeared a few weeks later in Leningrad. Next, it floated across the Baltic to the fuel element factory at Västerås, Sweden, after which it could eventually be transported, in its final form, to TVO’s nuclear power plant at Olkiluoto on the Finnish coast. For each step in the supply chain, TVO concluded a detailed contract with the respective supplier.19 An interesting side-effect of such complexity in European nuclear fuel supply was that it stimulated cooperation between different European countries in the nuclear field, sometimes, as in the Finnish case, also involving close links across the Iron Curtain. Many smaller European countries relied on France, Britain, the Soviet Union and later on Germany for conversion and enrichment of colonial uranium resources, while French, British and Russian reprocessing plants emerged as hubs for European spent fuel management. Some nuclear fuel cycle facilities, designed for processing colonial uranium, were even jointly built and operated by two or more European countries. The cooperation between Britain, Germany and the Netherlands in uranium enrichment is a case in point.20 European nuclear transnationalism thus went hand in hand with a uranium supply pattern rooted in close relations between Europe and its (former) colonies.

19 Högselius et al. Europe’s Infrastructure Transition. 20 Schrafstetter, Susanna, and Stephen Twigge. 2002. “Spinning into Europe: Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands – Uranium Enrichment and the Development of the Gas Centrifuge, 1964–1970.” Contemporary European History 11, no. 2: 253–272.

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Coal Now, what about coal? How has Europe’s coal import dependence played out in the global arena, and how has the globalisation of European coal interacted with European coal transnationalism? Coal is unique in European energy history because it is the only fuel for which a dynamic European market emerged long before the supplies were globalised. European coal transnationalism here preceded European coal colonialism. Britain early on emerged as a coal exporter of great significance for almost all other European countries; British coal was used in industrial steam engines, in locomotives, in town gas works and so on in such diverse places as St. Petersburg and Stockholm, Milan and Athens. It was a win-win relationship: Britain was able to boost its export revenues and the importing nations were able to industrialise through the combustion of British coal. Later, Germany also became a significant coal exporter. Poland, upon becoming an independent nation, joined in after World War One, and the intra-European coal trade grew increasingly complex. Many places, such as the Netherlands and northern Germany’s port cities, saw a healthy competition between British coal and Ruhr coal, and European coal was so abundant and prices so low that coal from elsewhere in the world was not able to compete in European markets before 1914.21 European coal transnationalism triumphed, and colonial coal relations were insignificant. In 1913, however, British coal production peaked and then started to decline, and in the Interwar years several other coal-producing countries understood that their coal deposits were likewise being depleted at an alarming rate. After World War Two, France, facing depletion, desperately sought access to German coal; this became a major motivation for creating the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in 1950, which further strengthened European coal transnationalism while also paving the way for (West) European political and economic integration more generally. But then in 1956 German coal production also peaked, and unsurprisingly intra-European coal became more and more expensive in the decades that followed. At the same time transportation costs, thanks to new oil-propelled ships, declined rapidly, while new institutional conditions in the world economy favoured trade. The effect was that coal from very far away started to become competitive in Europe. The intensifying European coal transnationalism that

21 Barbier, Edward. 2011. Scarcity and Frontiers: How Economies Have Developed through Natural Resource Exploitation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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had been institutionalized through the ECSC was thus counterbalanced – and challenged – by a surge in European coal colonialism. As a matter of fact, coal from overseas (post)colonial regions became so cheap that all the state subsidies that European governments poured into their coal industries did not have much of an effect. Steelworks, cement producers and power plants soon found themselves negotiating coal imports with producers from distant countries such as Colombia, South Africa, Australia and the United States. Today a vast majority of Europe’s hard coal is imported. Poland is the only remaining EU member state with any significant production.22

In the age of renewables What will happen if and when Europe manages to phase out its dependence on fossil fuels and uranium and replaces these energy sources by renewables? Will the trend towards ever growing European import dependence be reversed? Will Europe once again be able to produce most of its own energy, as in the age of firewood and charcoal? Or will we see the emergence of new, unexpected patterns of globalisation? One thing is clear: growing volumes of wind and solar energy creates a new reality in which electricity will play an ever more central role. Electricity is a refined form of energy and it is the least internationalised of all major energy sources. As of today, the European electricity system takes the form of a set of national and subnational grids that have been linked to each other on the margin only. This makes it very different from oil, gas, uranium and coal. Only 13 percent of all electricity in Europe was exported in 2016; most countries are more or less self-sufficient.23 It could have been different. Historically we find visions both of European colonialism and of European transnationalism in electricity system-building – visions that resemble the ones discussed above in the cases of oil, natural gas, uranium and coal. European electricity visionaries, especially in continental Europe, early on started dreaming about accessing electricity from faraway regions, notably from the colonial lands of northern Scandinavia, Russia, Asia and Africa – and about combining access to such colonial electricity sources with

22 See e.g. Euracoal. 2018. “Coal in Europe 2017.” European Association for Coal and Lignite. Accessed January 20, 2019. https://euracoal.eu/info/euracoal-eu-statistics/. 23 Eurostat. 2018. “Import and export of electricity. Statistics explained.” Accessed January 20, 2019. https://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-explained.

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Fig. 5: Herman Sörgel’s Atlantropa vision. Atlantropa combined European energy colonialism in North Africa with intra-European transnationalism. The perceived connection between electricity grids and Europe’s political future is here made explicit through the argument that “only a joint, simultaneous chaining through a high-voltage grid creates a European Union”.

The European energy system in an age of globalisation

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a dynamic intra-European electricity transnationalism. In particular, there were intense attempts to construct what we would now call a European “supergrid”. Such visions were at the forefront of electrification debates especially in the years around 1930.24 Nothing came of those visions at the time. Since the 1990s, however, the old transnational electricity ideas have been revived, partly in the context of changing political landscapes in Europe and the world, and partly because of technological advances in wind and solar energy. On the one hand, we have seen visionary attempts in Europe to access massive volumes of solar energy from North Africa, the Middle East and Central Asia, most famously through what used to be call the Desertec project. Such a project would preferably be combined with massive wind energy supplies from the North Sea and elsewhere. However, the transition to wind, solar and other intermittent sources of electricity poses a huge challenge to electricity transmission grids. In this context, a number of grand visions are now taking form, centring on the construction of a European supergrid – that is, a grid that spans all of Europe and which does not necessarily respect national borders. The EU Commission, in particular, is very eager to see such visions materialise, because just like the electricity visionaries of the 1930s they think that greater European integration in electricity will also strengthen Europe’s political cohesion.25 And so electricity and the transition to renewable energy may, arguably, become a pathway for Europe in overcoming current separatist and protectionist trends in European and international politics. European electricity transnationalism may become a way for Europe to find its way in the current age of globalisation.

References Barbier, Edward. 2011. Scarcity and Frontiers: How Economies Have Developed through Natural Resource Exploitation. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Boffey, Daniel. 2018. “Gas field earthquakes put Netherlands’ biggest firms on extraction notice.” The Guardian, January 23, 2018. Duffield, John S. 2015. Fuels Paradise: Energy Security in Europe, Japan, and the United States. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press. Hecht, Gabrielle. 2004. “Colonial Networks of Power: The Far Reaches of Systems.” Annales Historiques de l’électricité 2: 147–157.

24 Lagendijk, Vincent. 2008. Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks. Amsterdam: Aksant. 25 Högselius, Per. 2019. Energy and Geopolitics. London/New York: Routledge.

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Högselius, Per. 2013. Red Gas: Russia and the Origins of European Energy Dependence. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Högselius, Per. 2019. Energy and Geopolitics. London/New York: Routledge. Högselius, Per, Anna Åberg, and Arne Kaijser. 2013. “Natural Gas in Cold War Europe: The Making of a Critical Infrastructure.” In The Making of Europe’s Critical Infrastructure: Common Connections and Shared Vulnerabilities, edited by Per Högselius et al., 27–61. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Högselius, Per, and Arne Kaijser. 2019. “Energy Dependence in Historical Perspective: The Geopolitcs of Smaller Nations.” Energy Policy 127: 438–444. Högselius, Per, Arne Kaijser, and Erik van der Vleuten. 2016. Europe’s Infrastructure Transition: Economy, War, Nature. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Kaijser, Arne. 1999. “Striking Bonanza: The Establishment of a Natural Gas Regime in the Netherlands.” In Governing Large Technical Systems, edited by Olivier Coutard, 38–57. London: Routledge. Kaijser, Arne, and Per Högselius. 2019. “Under the Damocles Sword: Managing Swedish Energy Dependence in the Twentieth Century.” Energy Policy 126: 157–164. Lagendijk, Vincent. 2008. Electrifying Europe: The Power of Europe in the Construction of Electricity Networks. Amsterdam: Aksant. Radkau, Joachim. 1997. “Das Rätsel der städtischen Brennholzversorgung im ‘hölzernen Zeitalter’.” In Energie und Stadt in Europa: Von der vorindustriellen ”Holznot” bis zur Ölkrise der 1970er Jahre, edited by Dieter Schott, 43–76. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag. Radkau, Joachim. 2008. Nature and Power: A Global History of the Environment. New York: Cambridge University Press. Schrafstetter, Susanna, and Stephen Twigge. 2002. “Spinning into Europe: Britain, West Germany and the Netherlands – Uranium Enrichment and the Development of the Gas Centrifuge, 1964–1970.” Contemporary European History 11, no. 2: 253–272. Tchalakov, Ivan, and Tihomir Mitev. 2019. “Energy Dependence behind the Iron Curtain: The Bulgarian Experience.” Energy Policy 126: 47–56. Yergin, Daniel. 1991. The Prize: The Epic Quest for Oil, Money and Power. London: Simon & Schuster.

Alain Beltran

Between political continuity and new deal: The energy sector in France in the 1960s France has long been an importer of energy, particularly coal in the inter-war period. While there was actually no energy policy before the First World War, it began to emerge in 1917 to 1918 in the oil sector in particular.1 Then, the period that began after the end of the Second World War was marked by strong state control (“étatisme”).2 In the field of energy, which is considered strategic, the state has control over practically all sectors. Indeed, the coal industry, gas and electricity industries have all been nationalized, with the government creating a public oil branch called ERAP (later Elf-Aquitaine). The energy departments of the Ministry of Industry are thus powerful,3 and this framework gives rise to a very particular administrative landscape. As such, public companies dominate the sector with the exception of the Compagnie Française des pétroles (CFP, now TOTAL), which is private (but with a high level of public participation) and still remains modest.4 This situation was disrupted in the 1960s by a new hierarchy between energies, even if the centralising structure remains relevant today.5

The energy situation in France at the beginning of the 1960s If we look at a map of French energy resources in the early 1960s, it has shown a certain stability since the beginning of the century:

1 Hotta, Takashi. 1990. “L’industrie du pétrole en France des origines à 1934.” PhD diss., Université Paris X. 2 Beltran, Alain. 1998. “La politique énergétique de la France depuis 1945: indépendance nationale et libéralisme tempéré.” In Les entreprises et leurs réseaux: hommes, capitaux, techniques et pouvoirs19/20è siècles, edited by Michèle Merger, and Dominique Barjot, 127–140. Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne; Vilain, Michel. 1969. La politique de l’énergie en France de la seconde guerre mondiale à l’horizon 1985. Paris: Cujas. 3 Kuisel, Richard F. 1984. Le capitalisme et l’Etat en France, Modernisation et dirigisme au XXè siècle. Paris: Gallimard. 4 Nouschi, André. 2001. La France et le pétrole. Paris: Picard. 5 Lucas, N.J.D. 1979. Energy in France. Planning, Policy and Politics. London: Europa Publications Ltd. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-003

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– Three large coalfields in the Nord Pas de Calais, Lorraine and Centre Midi, the first being by far the most important. – a new natural gas resource at the foot of the Pyrenees, which made it possible to build a network covering part of France; it is the natural gas also called Lacq gas, named after the town where the gas flowed from.6 – France has low oil resources (Landes, Paris region) and therefore has to rely on large imports. However, all French refineries are modern, mainly concentrated in Basse-Seine and at the Etang de Berre near Marseille. The CFP company can count on oil from Iraq even when the region shows signs of instability. – electricity production is increasingly thermal (coal, fuel oil, a little natural gas) because the hydroelectric developments are almost complete. This was the case with the one at Serre-Ponçon on the Durance river in 1960, as the 1960s were marked by a boom in trade policy by Electricité de France (EDF) that reached its peak in 1963 with the so-called “Compteur Bleu” electricity meter campaign. After much deprivation The French entered consumer society at the same level, starting with household appliances (refrigerators, ovens, vacuum cleaners).7

A change in data As in other countries, the 1960s redistributed the cards in a profound and sometimes brutal way in the energy field.8 The first sector affected was coal mining. While maximum French production had been reached in 1958 with 58 million tonnes, a figure higher than in 1929, and with imports of around 21 million tonnes, in 1960 there was a sudden halt. Indeed, French coal had always been of poor quality, expensive and insufficient (France is the world’s largest importer of coal between the interwar period). In 1960, the government therefore decided on a major mine closure programme (the “Jeanneney” plan). But these decisions were poorly understood in the different coalfields. In 1963, miners went on a

6 Beltran, Alain, and Jean-Pierre Williot. 2012. Les routes du gaz, Histoire du transport de gaz naturel en France. Paris: Cherche-Midi. 7 Comité d’histoire de l’électricité et de l’énergie. 2016. Histoires électriques EDF a 70 ans. Paris: Fondation EDF. 8 Puiseux, Louis. 1982. “les bifurcations de la politique énergétique française.” Annales ESC, juillet-août, N°4: 609–620.

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Fig. 1: French energy resources, ca. 1970.

massive strike and resulted in the only time that General de Gaulle’s popularity fell sharply. Miners (the “black mouths”) came to Paris, widely supported by public opinion. Indeed, the image of the miner remains heroic not only due to the harshness of their work and the risks involved but also by the memory of the attitude of the miners during the Resistance and the battle of post-war production where they accelerated the return to work to renew France’s economy as quickly as possible. The coal sector remains above all a labour industry. The staff of Charbonnages de France amounted to 173,000 people in 1965. Some regions were almost single producers and duly anxious about the end of the activity their wealth and reputation had been based on. The government of Prime Minister Georges Pompidou finally had to back down. Productivity efforts made it possible to increase production per worker from 1.3 tonnes in 1961 to 1.45 tonnes in 1965, an increase of 13 percent. But a few years later, a new plan for the closing

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of French coal mines was introduced in 1969. With the invasion of petroleum products, coal had no future: its production fell to 21 million tonnes in 1981 (with only 35,000 miners) even though the newly elected socialist government thought for a moment to boost coal production. The last well in Pas de Calais closed in 1990 and the last in France in 2004 (Lorraine). But the memory is deeply embedded in memories and landscapes, especially in the Nord-Pas de Calais region. It should be noted that the landscapes and buildings of the region were included on UNESCO’s World Heritage List in 2012. The typical northern habitat is considered remarkable by that international institution not only for its style but for the solidarity that united the workers in these neighbourhoods. In parallel with this beginning of the decline of coal, it is necessary to highlight the rise of liquid hydrocarbons.9 This change was facilitated not only by the abundance of oil (especially since France could benefit from Algerian oil discovered in 1956) but also by a scissor effect. Indeed, the price of N°2 heavy fuel oil fell by 17 percent between 1958 and 1965 while the price of coal from the Nord/Pas-de-Calais increased by 19 percent over the same period. Similarly, the price of heating oil fell by 13 percent at this time, while the price of domestic coal rose by more than a third. In many uses, oil replaced coal for both domestic heating and thermal electricity. Even though OPEC was created in 1960, oil prices steadily declined. This advantage, along with the rise of car mobility and oil heating no longer made coal competitive. However, in a country that is very dependent on foreign countries for its energy resources, coal-oil substitution has significantly increased France’s energy dependence: after the first oil crisis, it reached three quarters whereas it was only one-third in the early 1960s. Among industrialised nations, only Japan has such a high dependency ratio. Awareness of this fact explains the nuclear policies of the 1970s. Few people have emphasised the dangers of this dependence. Only a few long-term forecasts assumed that oil would eventually run out and that it must therefore find a substitute (France in the 1960s still believed in long-term planning, but this flexible planning had nothing to do with the Soviet model). In the early 1960s, coal still provided the bulk of primary energy consumption, but in the end oil took over in a movement that seemed irresistible.

9 Méo, Guy Di. 1990. Pétrole et gaz naturel en France. Lille: reproduction de thèses.

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The other turning point of the 1960s: The newcomers The 1960s were an energy revolution in France, but not only from the point of view of oil.

A new entrant With the discovery of a natural gas field at Lacq10 in the Pyrenees, France built a national network from the south to the Paris region and the centre. By the way, the city gas plants were closed (the last one in 1971). Insofar as Lacq gas was not sufficient to supply the country, and given the potential of this new energy, France entered into supply agreements with the Netherlands (before turning to the USSR). The gas turn was taken even as this energy remained in the loop to close the energy gap. In any case, it was the end of an industry that was more than a century old, and the beginning of a real boom for the Gaz de France company.

Algerian oil In 1956 (the same year in as discovering natural gas in Hassi r’Mel), in Hassi Messaoud, French and international companies found a huge oil field in the Sahara, nearly 1,000 kilometres from the coast.11 Once controlled, this oil was evacuated by Tunisia because the route was shorter and the oil situation complex in the context of the end of the Algerian war. The advantage of this oil, which was quite expensive, was that it could be paid for in francs and not dollars. France thus saw itself for a moment as a major oil power. During the negotiations that led to Algeria’s independence in 1962, the fate of Algerian oil finally led to a cooperative solution (known as ASCOOP) before the nationalization of hydrocarbons by Algerians in 1971. The French oil dream was short-lived. But during this period, the two national oil companies (Total and Elf-Aquitaine) also began to explore in “Black Africa”, Alaska, the Middle East.

10 Laurent, Agnès. 2006. L’épopée du gaz de Lacq. Paris: Cairn. 11 Saul, Samir. 2016. Intérêts économiques français et décolonisation de l’Afrique du Nord (1945/1962). Genève: Droz.

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New energies (renewables) These also made a breakthrough in the 1960s. Studies were being carried out in particular to determine France’s wind energy potential, while solar energy was the subject of major work between the CNRS and EDF (installation of a solar oven in the Pyrenees and then a power plant called Thémis). But it is especially in the hydraulic field that significant progress was visible. Indeed, after much hesitation, the world’s first tidal power plant was inaugurated in 1966 by General de Gaulle. This 200 MW unit used the force of the ebb and flow of the Rance12 River between Dinard and Saint-Malo to fill or empty a basin. It was necessary to develop very specific turbo-alternator groups called “bulb groups”. But the construction of a tidal power plant required the use of a very specific site: a narrow estuary. These sites are few in number, either in France or around the world. Another project in the Bay of Mont Saint-Michel was being studied but would never see the light of day. Although this project remained unique in the world for a long time (it has recently been taken on by a factory in South Korea), it did not lead to an industrial series.

Nuclear energy The situation was different for nuclear energy. After the first achievements of the French Atomic Energy Commission (CEA), Electricité de France inaugurated its first power plant, EDF1, in Chinon in 1965 on the banks of the Loire River.13 Its spherical shape has also remained unique, but in the years that followed other power stations were built on the banks of the Loire and Rhône rivers. They were part of a French nuclear reactor design called UNGG (natural uranium, gas, graphite) but at the end of the 1960s, France abandoned this technology to take Westinghouse patents for the so-called PWR (Pressurized Water Reactor) design. It still took three years of hesitation before changing reactors. The transition to a major nuclear programme was planned, but not before the 1980s.

12 Revue Contacts-Vie électrique, N°26 (novembre 1960), N°53 (mai 1965), N°63 (décembre 1966). 13 Hatch, Michael T. 1986. Politics and Nuclear power, Energy Policy in Western Europe. Kansas: University of Kansas.

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250 200 150 100 50 0

1949

1953

1957 Coal

1961 Oil

Gas

1965

1967

1968

Hydroelectricity, Nuclear

Fig. 2: Energy consumption, France, 1949–1968.

Europe and France: Which energy policies? Energy has had a fundamental important role in the creation of a unified Europe, whether it is the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) or for atomic energy, EURATOM. The six countries that signed the Treaty of Rome in 1957 had already initialled the two ECSC-EURATOM agreements in 1951. However, the decline of coal and the steel crisis did not allow the ECSC to play a leading role in the construction of Europe, while efforts to build a civil nuclear power industry were slowed down by national policies, starting with France, which played its own part by simply keeping Euratom informed.14 As early as the 1960s, the European Economic Community expressed its desire for a common energy policy but without going too far beyond expressions of intent (for example, the memorandum of 25 June 1962, the 1964 agreement as a “starting point”, the first orientation towards an EEC energy policy in 1969). Nevertheless, these various texts showed the desire to limit the EEC’s dependence on hydrocarbons and to provide strategic stocks in each country (which was set at the level of three months’ reserves). The example of France is not unique and the rise of oil, the arrival of natural gas (Italy, Netherlands for example), and the decline of coal can be found

14 Zijlstra, Kees. 1978. L’économie de l’énergie dans la communauté européenne. Paris: CNRS.

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in many Western countries. Nor can it be said that France is very far ahead in the nuclear field compared to its neighbours: Great Britain and even Germany have progressed faster and further in their nuclear respective experiments. The originality undoubtedly lay elsewhere (if we exempt the case of the Rance tidal power plant, which remains a unique case and not a long-term policy). On the one hand, France considers energy policy a strategic issue that is therefore a matter for the public authorities and is implemented by national companies. This desire stems from the consequences of the two world conflicts (the lack of oil in 1917 which led to strong state intervention, the shortages experienced in the Second World War, followed by the nationalizations of 1944 to 1946) and a centralized structure which is the country’s own. Decisions are also made by men with complementary profiles, often “polytechnicians” from prestigious schools. All this gives France a real energy policy that is long term. Admittedly, the 1960s marked a strong dependence on hydrocarbon imports, but by the following decade, the return to a state controlled, voluntarist policy, based on maximum independence and energy savings, showed real continuity in this field.

References Beltran, Alain. 1998. “La politique énergétique de la France depuis 1945: indépendance nationale et libéralisme tempéré.” In Les entreprises et leurs réseaux: hommes, capitaux, techniques et pouvoirs19/20è siècles, edited by Michèle Merger, and Dominique Barjot, 127–40. Paris: Presses de l’Université de Paris-Sorbonne. Beltran, Alain, and Jean-Pierre Williot. 2012. Les routes du gaz, Histoire du transport de gaz naturel en France. Paris: Cherche-Midi. Comité d’histoire de l’électricité et de l’énergie. 2016. Histoires électriques EDF a 70 ans. Paris: Fondation EDF. Hatch, Michael T. 1986. Politics and Nuclear power, Energy Policy in Western Europe. Kansas: University of Kansas. Hotta, Takashi. 1990. “L’industrie du pétrole en France des origines à 1934.” PhD diss., Université Paris X. Kuisel, Richard F. 1984. Le capitalisme et l’Etat en France, Modernisation et dirigisme au XXè siècle. Paris: Gallimard. Laurent, Agnès. 2006. L’épopée du gaz de Lacq. Paris: Cairn. Lucas, N.J.D. 1979. Energy in France. Planning, Policy and Politics. London: Europa Publications Ltd. Méo, Guy Di. 1990. Pétrole et gaz naturel en France. Lille: reproduction de thèses. Nouschi, André. 2001. La France et le pétrole. Paris: Picard. Puiseux, Louis. 1982. “les bifurcations de la politique énergétique française.” Annales ESC, juillet-août, N°4: 609–20.

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Revue Contacts-Vie électrique, N°26 (novembre 1960), N°53 (mai 1965), N°63 (décembre 1966). Saul, Samir. 2016. Intérêts économiques français et décolonisation de l’Afrique du Nord (1945/ 1962). Genève: Droz. Vilain, Michel. 1969. La politique de l’énergie en France de la seconde guerre mondiale à l’horizon 1985. Paris: Cujas. Zijlstra, Kees. 1978. L’économie de l’énergie dans la communauté européenne. Paris: CNRS.

Douglas A. Yates

The French oil industry under the Corps des Mines: From family firms to national champions to private multinationals Intelligentsia of the oil industry

Fig. 1: Charles de Gaulle and Pierre Guillaumat.

There has been a pattern of elite recruitment in France’s national petroleum corporations. French oil patrons were born in different times and places, knew different childhoods and friends, had unique life experiences. Still, it is possible to classify them according to their backgrounds and to paint their modal/type portraits. They were all men. All lived in Paris. Two-thirds went to École Polytechnique. Half were members of the Corps des Mines. A unique heritage of France’s oil industry has been its domination by the Corps des Mines, the foremost of the technical grand corps of the French State, attached to the ministry of industry and economy, whose mission has been to entice the brightest students in mathematics and physics to serve the government and train them for executive careers.1 Students who enter this grand corps are educated at the École Nationale Supérieure des Mines de Paris, with a special

1 Garçon, Anne-Françoise, and Bruno Belhoste, eds. 2013. Les ingénieurs des Mines: cultures, pouvoirs, pratiques. Paris: Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-004

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Tab. 1: Patrons of the French National Oil Companies. Presidency

Grande École

Grand Corps

Combat

Ernest Mercier

CFP –

Polytechnique

Naval

WWI

Jules Mény

CFP –

Polytechnique

Mines

WWI

Pierre Angot

SNPA –

Polytechnique

Mines

Victor de Metz

CFP-Total –

Polytechnique

Mines

Pierre Guillaumat

SNPA-Elf –

Polytechnique

Mines

WWII

René Granier de Lilliac

CFP-Total –

Polytechnique

Mines

WWII

Albin Chalandon

Elf Aquitaine –

Finances

WWII

François-Xavier Ortoli

Total –

ENA

Finances

WWII

Michel Pecquer

Elf Aquitaine –

Polytechnique

Mines

Serge Tchuruk

Total –

Polytechnique

Armament

Loïk Le Floch-Prigent

Elf Aquitaine –

Philippe Jaffré

Elf Aquitaine –

ENA

Finances

Thierry Desmarest

Total –

Polytechnique

Mines

Christophe de Margerie

Total –

Patrick Pouyanné

Total -pres.

Polytechnique

Mines

The French oil industry under the Corps des Mines

55

curriculum distinct from that of the school’s other ordinary students. Each year the mining corps recruits fifteen new members. Most of them are from École Polytechnique, usually the top 10 graduates in their promotion. After graduation, most of these “X-Mines” (as they are known within the elite milieu) get into top executive positions in the French administration and/or in the private sector. Many presidents and chief executive officers in France are members, and thus, being admitted is considered a significant fast-track for executive careers. For six decades historians and sociologists who have worked on France like Ellul (1964), Kuisel (1967), Suleiman (1978), and Feigenbaum (1985) have all written about domination of the French “technocratic elite.”2 It used to be fashionable to say that “technocrats” dominate French industry. But that idea has declined in recent years, for a variety of reasons, including major structural reforms to the political economy of France, especially privatization. Instead the dominant discourse today tends to extol the logic of recruiting within such grands corps. “It’s no accident that the X-Mines and X-Ponts have filled the halls of energy,” explains one professional association: “Rather it is testimony to the interest the State places on that sector. Polytechnicians who enter the grands corps d’Etat each year have a privileged place in the energy domain because, it seems, to run these enterprises, the State chooses to give priority to those managers it has trained itself.”3 When those words were written, 60 to 70 percent of top management slots in energy were filled by graduates from Ecole Polytechnique, Ecole des Mines, Ecole des Ponts et Chausses, Ecole Centrale, Ecole des Arts et Metiers who follow “the royal career path in the big French energy companies.”4 According to a more recent study5 of the forty top French corporations (known as the “CAC40”) 11 were Polytechnicians (27.5%), and 5 were members of Corps des Mines (12.5%), which are remarkable statistics given their limited numbers.

2 Ellul, Jacques. 1964. The Technological Society. New York: Knopf; Kuisel, Richard. 1967. Ernest Mercier: French Technocrat. Berkeley: University of California; Suleiman, Ezra. 1978. Elites in French Society. Princeton: Princeton University Press; Feigenbaum, Harvey. 1985. The Politics of Public Enterprise: Oil and the French State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 3 APEC. 1994. Les Métiers du Secteur de l’Energie. Paris, 44. 4 Ibid. 5 Auffret, Simon, and Mathilde Damgé. 2015. “Pas de femmes, peu d’étrangers . . . le profil immuable des patrons du CAC 40.” Le Monde, November 2, 2015. http://www.lemonde.fr/lesdecodeurs/article/2015/11/02/cac-40-tout-change-rien-ne-change_4801458_4355770.html. For further reading http://www.lemonde.fr/les-decodeurs/article/2015/11/02/cac-40-tout-change-rien-nechange_4801458_4355770.html#RUi3JXLZJzxLw3i1.99

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The State created several prestigious grandes écoles after the French Revolution.6 Designed to serve state needs of the army, the technical corps, or the civilian administration, the original function of these “great schools,” being independent of the university system, was to produce graduates endowed with scientific competence capable of synthesizing large quantities of information, but who are also interested in practical matters and able to take decisions, a type of technical intelligentsia more than the kind of humanistic intellectuals produced by the British public school system.7 Private industrial firms exerted a growing pressure on such elite institutions. Traditions emerged pulling graduates of the grandes écoles away from state service. The oldest of these traditions is “pantouflage,” the practice of civil servants trained at these state schools leaving public service to work in the private sector.8 Many members of the Corps des Mines have in this way left state service for more lucrative jobs in the energy sector, including the oil industry.9 This career pattern was especially tempting after nationalization when the energy sector fell under state control. The modal-type patron of the French national oil enterprises was a “soldierengineer.” As a boy he was good in math, won the highly competitive scientific entrance exams to Polytechnique, and graduated in the top ten of his class. Following the tradition of the major (i.e. number one in his class) he did his advanced studies at the École des Mines. After a couple of field assignments, he became a state engineer in the technical-administrative services of the Corps des Mines. He worked in the ministry of industry, in the minister’s cabinet or in one of the powerful agencies. When war was declared, he served as an officer, fought in combat, and was awarded the Croix de Guerre.10 He was ideologically conservative and rallied around politicians of the Right, but he was also willing

6 The largest part of the French elite is not trained, as elsewhere, in universities but at the grandes écoles, which are distinct institutions of higher education. To prepare for the competitive examinations allowing access to these schools, most students follow two- or three-year courses at classes préparatoires. 7 Bourdieu, Pierre. 1996. The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, trans. Lauretta C. Clough. Stanford: Stanford University Press. 8 Suleiman, Ezra N. 1978. Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival. Princeton: Princeton University Press. In American contexts, this concept is known by economists as the ‘revolving door.’ In slang usage at the École Polytechnique, the word pantoufle (‘slipper’) referred to the act of avoiding public service after study. 9 van Zanten, Agnès. 2009. “The Sociology of Elite Education.” In Routledge International Handbook of the Sociology of Education, edited by Michael W. Apple, Stephen J. Ball, and Luis A. Gandin, 329–339. London/New York: Routledge. 10 The Croix de Guerre, created in 1915, is a military decoration awarded only to those soldiers who distinguish themselves by acts of heroism involving actual combat with the enemy.

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to serve under the Left. Most of all he had an idea of himself as a servant of the state. There was a tradition of State service in his family. His father would have been a military officer, or a colonial officer, or a magistrate, or a state engineer, or whatever; he would have been someone who had worked in the public sector.11 The archetype was Pierre Guillaumat (1909–1991),12 a general’s son who became Charles de Gaulle’s energy tsar during the post-war Thirty Glorious Years of high economic growth. Guillaumat had been a mining corps engineer in Tunisia when war broke out and had joined the French Resistance. In North Africa he became one of the key men in the covert Gaullist intelligence community. After the Liberation he was named Director of Hydrocarbons in the Ministry of Industry. By the 1950s De Gaulle had simultaneously conferred upon Guillaumat the presidencies of all the most important energy enterprises in the public sector: BRP (oil), GDF (gas), EDF (electricity), CEA (nuclear) – as well as the Ministry of Armaments. His mission was to ensure French energy independence, and it was to accomplish this that he founded the Société Nationale d’Elf-Aquitaine, at one time France’s largest national oil enterprise, later absorbed into Group Total in 1999. Other “soldier-engineers” also knew the two world wars. Pierre Angot (1902–1945)13 and Jules Mény (1890–1945)14 were both arrested by the Gestapo and sent to their deaths in Nazi concentration camps. René Granier de Lilliac (1919–2009) was captured during the blitzkrieg and spent the war in German prison camps. Only Victor De Metz (1902–1992)15 remained a civilian throughout the German Occupation, running the Compagnie Française des Pétroles. After the war he resurrected this firm under the banner of Total and handed it over upon his retirement to his dauphin – and fellow Corps des Mines – Granier de Lilliac. Three other mining corps engineers who also inherited the presidencies of the national champions were: Michel Pecqueur at Elf-Aquitaine (1931–1995) a nuclear scientist who had helped build the French atomic bomb; Thierry Desmarest (b. 1945) who merged Petrofina and Elf into Total, and finally Patrick Pouyanné (b. 1963) currently CEO of Total, the fourth largest oil company in the world. The urban legend that the French oil industry has been dominated by the Corps des Mines does not lack examples. Informal connections and actions – networks, rather than formal rules and officially prescribed and claimed actions –

11 See Yates, Douglas A. 2009. The French Oil Industry and the Corps des Mines in Africa. Trenton/Asmara: Africa World Press. 12 Stoffaes, Christian. 1995. Pierre Guillaumat: la passion des grands projets industriels. Paris: Editions Rive Droit. 13 de Metz, Victor. 1947. “Pierre Angot 1902–1945.” Annales des Mines, June 1947: 10 [Obituary]. 14 Majorelle, Jeanne. 1948. “Jules Mény.” Annales des Mines 5: 2–5 [Obituary]. 15 Catta, Emmanuel. 1990. Victor de Metz: De la CFP au Groupe Total. Paris: Editions Total.

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are the norm in French political and social life. Such networks are not lobbies, since they go well beyond the strict alliance of economic interests, nor actual clubs, since they carefully avoid any sign of institutionalization. But school ties play an essential part in the operation of society. “While some are amusingly arcane, others – the connections that give the French nomenklatura its structure – are not insignificant when it comes to major decisions and nominations.”16 Inner circles dominate. They are France’s invisible organizational charts. There was another kind of French state oil patron, the inspecteur des finances, who studied administrative law and economics and passed a different kind of concours to enter another grands corps: the “finance inspectorate” of the Ministry of Finances. He too knew combat and was awarded the Croix de Guerre. But he was not a member of the engineering Corps des Mines, and this he felt the very moment that he entered the national oil company. The liberal maverick Albin Chalandon (b. 1920)17 who had fought as a commando in the French Resistance, but who had never gone to any grande école, fought the mining corps tooth and nail while president of Elf. Another, the discrete François-Xavier Ortoli (1925–2007),18 who had also fought in the Second World War as a commando in French Indochina, and who also had no privileged network inside the firm, preferred playing the more benign role of constitutional monarch while president of Total. Later the provocative Philippe Jaffré (1945–2007) was named as the president of Elf, having had no previous experience at all in the oil business. Jaffré was neither a soldier nor an engineer – a difference that mattered – for in the end the hostile take-over and merger of TotalFinaElf came to represent a personified battle between the winner, Thierry Desmarest, a mining corps engineer, and the loser, Philippe Jaffré, a finance inspector. Although largely unnoticed outside of France, such inter-elite rivalry is the very heart of the French oil story, and domination by the Corps des Mines, that industry’s heritage. Yet there was a third kind of French oilman: the “black sheep.” He was an intelligent and ambitious type, but had been rejected by the grands corps. He was an outsider, and brought his own team with him when he arrived at the top.

16 Coignard, Sophie, and Marie-Thérèse Guichard. 2000. French Connections: Networks Of Influence In France, trans. Keith Torjoc. New York: Algora, 7. 17 Chalandon, Albin. 1986. Quitte ou double. Paris: Grasset. 18 Bussière, Eric, and Pauline Massis Desmarest. 2016. François-Xavier Ortoli et l’Europe: réflexion et action. Brussels: Peter Lang.

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Loïk Le Floch-Prigent (b. 1943)19 and Serge Tchuruk (b. 1937),20 were two examples, working together to downsize French conglomerates before being named presidents of Elf and Total. More recently Christophe de Margerie (1951–2014)21 overcame his outsider handicap through a prestigious family background from the grande bourgeoisie. In fact, although he spent his whole career working for the company, as he rose to the top of Group Total, he earned the scorn of mining corps engineers who felt he had usurped the throne to their rightful kingdom. Michel Bénézit, for instance, became one of his harshest adversaries within the company. So as Margerie approached the age limit for retirement set by law in France, he named two ambitious “corpsards” to his executive committee, Patrick Pouyanné and Philippe Boisseau, giving each a branch to run, and establishing one of them would be named as his successor. In so doing he re-established the traditional order, and ensured a smooth transition after his own accidental death in a plane crash in 2014. Because of the hatred and envy felt by others in the management of the national oil enterprises, periodic attacks on the oil sector’s domination by the Corps des Mines have continued. But as Pouyanné’s legitimate succession suggests, they did not entirely succeed in dislodging this nomenklatura.

French family oil firms What is striking about these three types of oil patrons is how different they were from historical predecessors, “family patriarchs” such as Joseph Achille Le Bel (1847–1930)22 or Stephane Desmarais (1905–1992)23 who inherited their hundred-year-old family oil firms in which the mothers, fathers, sisters, brothers, cousins, sons, and daughters participated directly or indirectly. Although it is largely forgotten today, oil had been produced at Pechelbronn for 235 years

19 Le Floch-Prigent, Loïk. 2002. Affaire Elf, affaire d’État: Entretiens avec Éric Decouty. Paris: Cherche Midi. 20 Tchuruk was a member of the Corps des Armaments, but he was told that he would never get a security clearance because of his Polish wife, so he left the corps and went to America to work for Mobil Oil. 21 Boselli, Muriel. 2016. L’Énigme Margerie: Enquête sur la vie et la mort du magnat du pétrole français. Paris: Editions Robert Laffont. 22 Walther, René. 2007. Pechelbronn: A la source du pétrole, 1735–1970. Strasbourg: Editions Ronald Hirlé. 23 Rouwel, Christian. 2007. D’Azur à Total: Desmarais frères le premier grand pétrolier français. Toulouse: Edition Drivers.

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(1735–1970)24 more than a century before the first American oil wells were discovered in Pennsylvania. How did this Pechelbronn oil company manage to survive for such a lengthy duration? Family-based capitalism. From 1760 to 1867, the Le Bel family pursued a “dynastic” strategy of primogeniture and patrimonial capitalism. Starting with the patriarch Antoine Le Bel (1720–1789) who moved his family to Alsace in order to commercially exploit “rock oil” (then used primarily as medicine and lubricant), the firm he founded, Le Bel et Cie., was a patrimonial French family business, run by the eldest male heirs as part of the familial estate. They almost lost their business during the French Revolution, but thanks to the brave struggle by his widow Catherine Le Bel to keep the land, their son Marie-Joseph-Achille Le Bel (1772–1842) succeeded in inheriting both his ownership and control. The Le Bel family business then evolved into a fully integrated petroleum company, with operations flowing from upstream production to downstream refinement, transportation and distribution. His son Louis-Frédéric Le Bel (1807–1867) inherited the firm, improved it, and then passed it down to his son Joseph-Achille Le Bel (1847–1908) who, lacking a male heir, sold it to investors.25 In the end Pechelbronn oil was marketed under the modern brand name “Antar,” and by 1976 the company was merged into the new national champion Elf-Aquitaine. So too, Desmarais Frères survived for over a century as a dynastic family enterprise. Henri (1827–1887) and Charles Desmarais (1823–1878) founded their oil business in 1861 selling wholesale shipments of American kerosene to Parisians transported down the Seine from Le Havre.26 After the death of Charles, it was Henri’s two sons Paul (1864–1947) and Lucien Desmarais (1865–1934) who became the second generation of brothers to run this family oil enterprise. As Lucien had no sons, Paul’s son Stephane Desmarais (1905–1992) became the third generation to run the company. He had no brother. But he kept the firm’s fraternal name “Desmarais Bros.” while selling gasoline under the popular trademark of “Azur.” Although Stephane did produce a male scion capable of inheriting the family firm, Serge Desmarais (b. 1946) he was unable to preserve the business past the “three generations” lifespan,27 eventually selling out the firm to

24 Merckwiller-Pechelbronn Petroleum Museum has accumulated significant documentation. 25 de Chambrier, Paul. 1919. Historique de Pechelbronn 1498–1918. Neuchâtel, Switzerland. 26 Mejaud, Henri. 1961. Desmarais Frères: Un siècle d’industrie française du pétrole: 1861–1961. Paris: Desmarais Frères. 27 Despite the extraordinary longevity of some individual family firms, the average life-span across the sector is three generations. John Ward, who analyzed success rates in family business succession and, hence, the longevity of family firms, found that 30% of such firms survive through the second generation, while 13% survive the third generation and only 3% survive

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the other national champion CFP-Total. In the end, Stephane retired as one of Total’s corporate vice presidents. Family business was an important stage in the development of the French oil industry. It bridged the gap between old patrimonial enterprise and fully modern industrial capitalism. Paul and Lucien Desmarais had modernized their technology of refinement and distribution while preserving certain paternal traditions of organization. For example, they built houses for their Breton workers, who were employed for life, and who retired with their families in these colonies. Some of them worked at the brothers’ Le Havre refinery for over fifty years. But the wholesale invasion of the Anglo-American majors in the 20th century resulted in a bloody price war at the pump. Prices were slashed by Americanowned subsidiaries in a business war for client loyalty. Distribution of gasoline by the new pumps had completely replaced its distribution in five-liter cans. This kind of modern distribution technology was expensive. The majors had enormous financial means, much more than any of the traditional family firms – enough to buy most of them out. By selling more gasoline at the pump the majors were able to pay off their investments in the new technology. Desmarais Frères was particularly vulnerable to the price wars, because it had not yet raised money through public offerings of its stock. By the time Stephane took over the firm it was impossible for him to keep up with the majors. That was the main reason, his widow later told me, that he was forced to sell.28 Dynastic style also helped Conrad (1878–1936) and Marcel Schlumberger (1884–1953)29 to invent oil logging on their family estate and go into business on their father’s money, founding oil service giant Schlumberger, a major Fortune 500 firm. But Conrad had no male heir to inherit his company, and so after his death, it passed into the hands of its shareholders. The rise of the market economy challenged traditional economic arrangements based on paternalism and patrimonialism. As the extended family declined, and the nuclear family itself became less hierarchical, family firms were destined to separate managerial control from family ownership. The pattern for French family oil businesses was termination, absorption, or metamorphosis into publicly held national corporations.30

beyond that point. Ward, John. 1987. Keeping the Family Business Healthy: How to Plan for Continuing Growth, Profitability, and Family Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. 28 Desmarais, Gilberte, widow of Stephane Desmarais, interview with author (7 April 2000). 29 Schlumberger, Anne Gruner. 2007. The Schlumberger Adventure, trans. Anne Gruner Schlumberger and William Granger Ryan. New York: Arco Publishing. 30 The persistence of nepotism in business is commonplace. Something like 95 percent of all American businesses are still family owned or controlled, including about 40 percent of the

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National champions Despite their displacement in the oil industry, the great majority of the world’s enterprises today are still family firms.31 The age of the dynastic capital in the French oil industry was eclipsed by the rise of large integrated national enterprises, when a generational cohort of state technocrats like Ernest Mercier (1878–1955)32 and Jean Bichelonne (1904–1944)33 replaced old-fashioned patriarchal bosses. Today only their old patronymic family title – “patron” – remains, a vestigial remnant of that earlier dynastic era. Were 20th century successions of mining corps engineers simply a more modern version of 19th century dynastic rule? The analogy has some merit, but the argument is only poetical. One of the reasons that this corps has perpetuated its control over oil firms is its meritocratic system of concours (competitive examinations) which draw the best and brightest from the whole of France. The weakness of hereditary rule is that business genius is rarely genetic. Unlike other elite networks in France, engineering corps draw graduates from all around the country. The Le Bels and Schlumbergers were Alsatian. Mercier came from Algeria. Angot and Bichelonne came from Bordeaux. De Metz came from Lorraine, Guillaumat and Granier from the Loire, Chalandon from Lyon. Ortoli came from Corsica. Le Floch from Brittany, Tchuruk from Marseilles. Pouyanné from Normandy. Not only were their regional origins diverse, my genealogical research shows that their families of origin were comprised of individuals who themselves came from different regions. Many of them had or have strong provincial identities. De Metz and Granier are rooted by tradition in the provincial nobility of Lorraine and Brittany. The Chalandons were an old Lyonnais family; and the Ortolis, Corsicans for a thousand years. Regional identities followed these men through the stages of their careers, vestigial remnants of an older France that has not entirely died. The Corps des Mines has drawn great intergenerational strength from its diversity. A biological life course – represented in the age/time chart34 in Fig. 2 – is another important measure of deviation. The longest living French oil patron was

Fortune 500. Bellow, Adam. 2003. In Praise of Nepotism: A Natural History. New York: Doubleday, 8. 31 Landes, David S. 2006. Dynasties: Fortunes & Misfortunes of the World’s Great Family Businesses. New York: Penguin. 32 Kuisel. Ernest Mercier. 33 Sabin, Guy. 1991. Jean Bichelonne: Ministre sous l’Occupation. Paris: Editions France-Empire. 34 Adapted from Miller, Robert L. 2000. Researching Life Stories and Family Histories. London: Sage.

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Fig. 2: Age/Time: Life Course Chart of the French Oil Patrons (1847–2018).

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Albin Chalandon, who passed away in 2020 at the age of hundred. The shortest life span of the group was Pierre Angot, executed at only forty-three. Five oil patrons are still living, the rest are dead. Arranging their lives on an age/time chart we can better observe their cohort generations.35 Different generations shared different historical circumstances, worked in different oil markets, and fought in different wars. The Franco-Prussian War, World War I, World War II, Wars of Decolonization, and the Cold War stamped each cohort. But war marked each differently depending on their age during the hostilities. Was the French oil industry dominated by the Corps des Mines? The answer to that question lies in the analysis of a particular cohort generation of “soldier-engineers” who controlled the major French oil enterprises during and then after the World Wars. (See Tab. 1) I have called this historical cohort the “Croix de Guerre generation” because of the important role that the world wars played in their nationalistic industrial thinking.36 The Croix de Guerre cohort generation included men like Ernest Mercier, Jules Mény, Pierre Angot, Pierre Guillaumat, Jean Blancard, André Bouillot, Paul Moch, Yves Delavesne, Andre Giraud, Victor de Metz, Rene Granier de Lilliac, Gilbert Lugol, “soldier-engineers” who ran the national champions during the era of high rates of growth. These combat veterans of the World Wars knew one another, personally and professionally. Their impact continues to be felt today at the top levels of management as a heritage of the World Wars. French oil patrons, who are private businessmen, see themselves as national champions.

Private multinationals The fundamental transformation that revolutionized national oil firms was privatization. Starting in the 1980s the French national oil champions began to undergo a major process of privatization, undertaking by the government in a series of sell-offs that reflected both the imperatives of the European Community and the spirit of the times. Although the mining corps engineers continued 35 A cohort generation comprises a group of persons born during a limited time span of years that shares a common and distinct social character shaped by shared experiences through time. See Mannheim, Karl. 1952. “The Problem of Generations.” Unlike family generations, which are based on biological lineages, cohort generations are based on shared historical experiences. A cohort generation is a structural variable akin to social class. See Ryder, R. B. 1965. “The Cohort as a Concept of Study of Social Change.” American Sociological Review 30: 843–861. 36 Yates. The French Oil Industry and the Corps des Mines.

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to hold top management posts in the organization, Elf Aquitaine went through a metamorphosis from a national enterprise to a private multinational oil corporation, answerable less to the state, and more to their shareholders. Following this structural change there followed a gradual shift in the organizational flowcharts which reflected the new Zeitgeist. According to the liberal maverick Albin Chalandon, “When I first entered Elf, what I found was an enterprise that had been submitted to an unwritten inviolable rule that had built into the group a superimposition of castes. At the summit were the Ingénieurs du Corps des Mines, who had reserved for themselves all of the most important posts. Directly beneath them were a few members of the Ponts et Chaussées,37 who had somehow managed to get in. Their placement was natural, wasn’t it? Since they had graduated beneath their classmates at Polytechnique? Not as intelligent, but almost. Beneath them were seated the still-noble cohort of polytechniciens who hadn’t had the honour of being ‘mineurs.’ And finally, at the very bottom, the ‘non-X,’ whose intelligence was presumed to be mathematically inferior. These were the centraliens,38 and the Ingénieurs Civils des Mines,39 or from some school out in the boondocks. It didn’t matter. They were the commoners, and were deprived of all access to upper management.” “I was not an Ingénieur du Corps des Mines, and therefore I was considered to be someone who had stolen a position that had, by custom and by right, been reserved for one of their own. Their lives until then had been divided into privileged domains, like feudalism. There was [head of exploration and production] Gilbert Rutman, the ‘Lord of Pau’ and [head of refinement and distribution] Raymond Lévy, the ‘Lord of Paris.’ Each refused to penetrate into the domain of the other. It just wasn’t possible for them because that was their corporate culture. Rutman was not sufficiently structured. He was just not a good manager. That was his major problem. These were people who were intellectually very sharp, and were capable in many other ways. They knew their business. They knew lots of things. But neither of them was properly trained for the

37 The Corps des Ponts (bridges) is a French civil service corps trained at the École des Ponts et Chaussées, (founded in 1747, the oldest and one of the most prestigious grandes écoles). Most are top graduates of the École Polytechnique, the institutional rivals of the Corps des Mines. Historically, its primary mission has been to train engineering officials and civil engineers. 38 An engineer who graduated from the École Centrale de Paris, founded in 1829, one the oldest and most selective grandes écoles in France. 39 Graduates of the École de Mines who were not graduates of Polytechnique, thus not Corps des Mines, but simply known as ‘mining engineers’.

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kinds of posts they held. Lévy was not good in managing refinement and distribution because he wasn’t a salesman.” “I never missed an opportunity to remind my listeners that everyone was going to have his fair chance in the enterprise, even at reaching the very top. I reminded them that promotions were going to be given based upon their work performance, not upon their membership in this or that grand corps, nor on their graduation from this or that school, or on the possession of this or that degree. The law was competition. If you had talent, but didn’t have the right degrees, then you still had the right to pass over the others. When I left Elf, the wall had been breached. At the top ‘corpsards’ no longer were hoarding all the best posts.”40 François-Xavier Ortoli, named the president of CFP-TOTAL as a successor to René Granier de Lilliac, much to the surprise of company insiders who expected the job to go to a member of the mining corps Louis Dény, told me during an interview about his experience: “As you know, Louis Dény had thought that he was going to be named. The people from the Corps des Mines later said in the newspapers that my nomination had been political, which was true in part, because it was in fact the government who wanted me to be named. It was François Mitterrand and Laurent Fabius who proposed the job to me. But it was not true in the sense of being unfair. They thought that the CFP was a company that needed to evolve. Personally I liked Dény a lot, and was convinced that he would have made a good president. But the fact is they wanted someone else, not particularly me, but someone with a larger profile, and someone who was more independent from the company.”41 Philippe Jaffré had made a name for himself under the liberal minister Edouard Balladur. A prominent critic of the socialist’s nationalization program and the voice of privatization in the National Assembly, Prime Minister Balladur passed his first Law of Privatization in 1986. “Balladur was the first in France to call for privatization,” Jaffré explained. “You could say that Balladur stood somewhere between Margaret Thatcher and Alain Juppé. Balladur was somewhere between these two temperaments.” He had invited Jaffré (Sciences PoENA) to serve in his prime ministerial staff with two other “énarques” future CAC40 patrons Jean-Marie Messier and Michel Pébereau (X-ENA). The French newspapers called them the “Anglo-Saxons” and compared Balladur’s liberal reforms to those of Margret Thatcher and Ronald Reagan. “I wasn’t an AngloSaxon,” Jaffré protested. “It was just that we saw that the United States had a

40 Chalandon. Quitte ou Double, 203–204. 41 Ortoli, François-Xavier, interview by author (12 December 2000).

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financial market model that was more developed and better performing than our own. So we in the Ministry of Finances were broadly inspired by what they were doing in the United States. For example, the hostile take-over used to be forbidden in France, although it had existed in the United States for a very long time. Any corporate merger in France needed the approval of the government and was only authorized once the Ministry of Finances had agreed. Little-bylittle the authorization has no longer been required, and today, we’ve completely left behind that old state-centric model.” Ironically, it was precisely by means of a hostile takeover by Total that he was forced to retire from Elf. Before I left his office, I asked Philippe Jaffré if he thought the Corps des Mines had dominated the French oil industry. “Maybe that kind of thing once existed,” he laughed, “but it has diminished with the state’s role. People who still talk in terms of their grands corps don’t tend to have great responsibilities, so they tend to remain more attached to their rank and title. Many haven’t had remarkable careers, so for them, their corps is very important. In my opinion that’s all finished; and it only continues to exist in the minds of certain people. To be frank, a person’s real training comes during his professional career. Sure, his schooling has some importance, because it pushes him into one sector rather than another. But then he evolves. It seems to me that if someone is good or bad, then it is more the result of his chances, his energy; and the people he’s met – the people who have pushed him up at certain moments in his career.”42 Jaffré was not a member of the mining corps, nor was he interested in attributing his own career to his graduation from ENA. The year before Elf disappeared into Total, I had asked Jacques Puéchal, a member of the mining corps who had worked his whole career in Elf Aquitaine, and who was then president of its chemicals division Elf-Atochem, if the French oil industry was dominated by the Corps des Mines. He sat back and thought for a moment. “I have over the last twenty years taken into my company one student each year from the École des Mines to train them as interns. At the end of the year, they come to see me and we talk. They know that they are not going to come and work for me because they have no right to become a member of the company simply because they come from the Corps des Mines. But they have been listened to, and what they have done has been observed, and we have some ideas of their capabilities, and of their personalities. I’m not really doing this for the Corps des Mines, because the relationship between the university and industry is a priority in our business.”

42 Jaffré, Philippe, interview by author (21 February 2001).

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“If you look, for example, at the influence of the Corps des Mines,” he took out a piece of paper and drew two lines in the form of an axis, “you have three time periods: 1945–1960, 1960–1990, and 1990–2010. Now if you were to take the time period 1945–1960, you would certainly find that the Corps des Mines played an important role. Those were the famous ‘thirty glorious years’ of prosperity. But competition appeared in the next time period, and if you were to take a snapshot of Elf in 1999, I would say rather that Elf is dominated by ENA. So what I’m saying is that things are changing. Domination by the Corps des Mines? I would say that it’s no longer true. Maybe it had been true once, during the time period after the end of the Second World War, because everybody was looking for skilled people, and the competition was rather limited. But since then it’s become a lot harder.”43

References APEC. 1994. Les Métiers du Secteur de l’Energie. Paris. Auffret, Simon, and Mathilde Damgé. 2015. “Pas de femmes, peu d’étrangers . . . le profil immuable des patrons du CAC 40.” Le Monde, November 2, 2015. Bellow, Adam. 2003. In Praise of Nepotism: A Natural History. New York: Doubleday. Boselli, Muriel. 2016. L’Énigme Margerie: Enquête sur la vie et la mort du magnat du pétrole français. Paris: Editions Robert Laffont. Bourdieu, Pierre. 1996. The State Nobility: Elite Schools in the Field of Power, trans. Lauretta C. Clough. Stanford: Stanford University Press. Bussière, Eric, and Pauline Massis Desmarest. 2016. François-Xavier Ortoli et l’Europe: réflexion et action. Brussels: Peter Lang. Catta, Emmanuel. 1990. Victor de Metz: De la CFP au Groupe Total. Paris: Editions Total. Chalandon, Albin. 1986. Quitte ou double. Paris: Grasset. de Chambrier, Paul. 1919. Historique de Pechelbronn 1498–1918. Neuchâtel, Switzerland. Coignard, Sophie, and Marie-Thérèse Guichard. 2000. French Connections: Networks Of Influence In France, trans. Keith Torjoc. New York: Algora. Ellul, Jacques. 1964. The Technological Society. New York: Knopf. Feigenbaum, Harvey. 1985. The Politics of Public Enterprise: Oil and the French State. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Garçon, Anne-Françoise, and Bruno Belhoste, eds. 2013. Les ingénieurs des Mines: cultures, pouvoirs, pratiques. Paris: Institut de la gestion publique et du développement économique. Kuisel, Richard. 1967. Ernest Mercier: French Technocrat. Berkeley: University of California. Landes, David S. 2006. Dynasties: Fortunes & Misfortunes of the World’s Great Family Businesses. New York: Penguin.

43 Puéchal, Jacques, interview by author (19 February 1999).

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Le Floch-Prigent, Loïk. 2002. Affaire Elf, affaire d’État: Entretiens avec Éric Decouty. Paris: Cherche Midi. Majorelle, Jeanne. 1948. “Jules Mény.” Annales des Mines 5: 2–5 [Obituary]. Mejaud, Henri. 1961. Desmarais Frères: Un siècle d’industrie française du pétrole: 1861–1961. Paris: Desmarais Frères. de Metz, Victor. 1947. “Pierre Angot 1902–1945.” Annales des Mines, June 1947: 10 [Obituary]. Miller, Robert L. 2000. Researching Life Stories and Family Histories. London: Sage. Rouwel, Christian. 2007. D’Azur à Total: Desmarais frères le premier grand pétrolier français. Toulouse: Edition Drivers. Ryder, R. B. 1965. “The Cohort as a Concept of Study of Social Change.” American Sociological Review 30: 843–61. Sabin, Guy. 1991. Jean Bichelonne: Ministre sous l’Occupation. Paris: Editions France-Empire. Schlumberger, Anne Gruner. 2007. The Schlumberger Adventure, trans. Anne Gruner Schlumberger, and William Granger Ryan. New York: Arco Publishing. Stoffaes, Christian. 1995. Pierre Guillaumat: la passion des grands projets industriels. Paris: Editions Rive Droit. Suleiman, Ezra N. 1978. Elites in French Society: The Politics of Survival. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Walther, René. 2007. Pechelbronn: A la source du pétrole, 1735–1970. Strasbourg: Editions Ronald Hirlé. Ward, John. 1987. Keeping the Family Business Healthy: How to Plan for Continuing Growth, Profitability, and Family Leadership. San Francisco: Jossey-Bass. Yates, Douglas A. 2009. The French Oil Industry and the Corps des Mines in Africa. Trenton/ Asmara: Africa World Press. van Zanten, Agnès. 2009. “The Sociology of Elite Education.” In Routledge International Handbook of the Sociology of Education, edited by Michael W. Apple, Stephen J. Ball, and Luis A. Gandin, 329–39. London/New York: Routledge.

Brian Shaev

Coal and common market: Forecasting crisis in the early European Parliament This chapter investigates how the Interior Market Committee of the early European Parliamentary Assembly (before 1958 the Common Market Committee of the Common Assembly) grappled with the conflicting goal of raising wages and social benefits for coal miners while achieving the aim of the Paris Treaty, which created the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), to reduce energy costs for consumers. Further, it analyzes competing forecasts of the coal industry’s future and how various actors proposed dealing with the changing balance between energy sources and its potential impact on industrial and social policies in the leadup to the 1958 coal crisis, which began the sector’s terminal decline in Western Europe. The Common Market Committee is here conceptualized as a policy forum in which European deputies, often coal and steel experts like German social democrats Heinrich Deist and Gerhard Kreyssig, interacted with trade unionists and representatives of the High Authority, the ECSC executive, to propose, lobby for, and dispute solutions to the coal crisis emerging at national and supranational levels. The ECSC had the complicated task of reconciling conflicting objectives on coal that had different legal status in the Paris Treaty. Its legal mandate was to guarantee low prices for consumers as well as free and equal competition, but “freeing” coal prices in the mid-1950s generally resulted in higher prices, a challenge for Community policy. The ECSC was also required to ensure adequate provisioning of coal for all member states but low prices could curtail the investment needed to increase production to suit rising energy needs. The treaty set the goal of raising living standards and, to a lesser extent, of protecting employment in coal mining. To this community officials added the informal objective of raising coal miners’ living standards, which, added to maintaining employment, was a goal potentially at odds with its mandate of ensuring low energy costs. Further, state aids and subsidies, the simplest way of reconciling these competing objectives, were banned by the Paris Treaty. It is difficult enough for national governments to formulate energy policies that meet the interests of producers, workers, business consumers, and household consumers but the ECSC had the additional burdensome task of mediating between member states. The Common Market Committee was charged with defending consumers but, given the broader repercussions of ECSC policy, it sought to balance producer, worker, consumer, and national interests. This proved an almost impossible task. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-005

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Committee members shared the general consensus that miners should retain their status as highest paid among industrial workers. Deist justified this thusly, “the effort demanded of the men in the coal industry is greater than in other industries (large physical effort, lack of light, artificial air, elevated temperature)” and “this is why underground miners have the right to the highest salaries.”1 German Christian Democrat Wolfgang Pohle concurred that, “It is generally accepted that miners should occupy the summit of the salary pyramid.”2 Others pointed to the difficulty of retaining miners and attracting new employees. High Authority Commissioner Fritz Etzel said that, “No one contests that miners’ salaries should be situated at the summit of the salary pyramid and that a rise in salaries is necessary but current prices do not permit the raising of salaries.”3 The problem, as Deist pointed out, was that, “labor costs [we]re more important factors than in other industries,” covering 50–60% of production costs.4 Despite mechanization, productivity growth was lower in coal mining than in other industries and therefore tying salary increases to productivity would not permit high wages.5 In July 1954, Belgian liberal Roger Motz warned that it was necessary to “find a reasonable price of energy in Europe because otherwise [. . .] we will only displace unemployment from one industry to another.”6 The Socialist Group was especially interested in involving trade unionists in these discussions. Flemish trade unionist and former miner Nicolas Dethier and Antoine Krier, head of the liaison bureau of European mining and steel unions, attended a Socialist Group meeting in spring 1955. There the dilemma was clear in the remarks of René Evalenko, a Belgian Socialist, that, “It is necessary to have high salaries and low prices. These are contradictory problems for which a solution is difficult.” Deist followed that, “we need to agree in principle with every reduction in the price of coal if we do not want to make economic progress impossible.”7 The group came to the vague position that, “it is necessary that the policy

1 Deist, Heinrich. Remarque sur la politique charbonnière. Iere Partie, Document de travail pour la réunion du Groupe de travail pour les affaires économique et sociales. 12 April 1957. Groupe Socialiste au Parlement Européen (GSPE)-16, Historical Archives of the European Union (HAEU), Florence. 2 Compte rendu de la réunion. 16 March 1956. Historical Archives of the European Parliament (HAEP). Luxembourg. 3 Commission du marché commun, Compte rendu. 13 March 1956. AC AP PV MACO195603130010FR, HAEP. 4 Deist. Remarque sur la politique charbonnière. 5 Ibid. 6 Commission du marché commun, Compte rendu. 1 July 1954. AC AP PV MACO-195407010010FR, HAEP. 7 Compte-rendu analytique de la réunion du sous-comité des affaires économiques et sociales. 21 March 1955. GSPE-10, HAEU.

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of lower prices not be an obstacle to the continued rise in the living standard of workers.”8 This problem of reconciling high salaries with low prices came to a head most clearly in debates surrounding the German government’s decision in 1956 to award a “bonus” to coal miners, which the High Authority later ruled violated the treaty’s ban on state aids. In May, Christian democrat and future European Economic Community (EEC) Commissioner, Maan Sassen, stated that he was not in principle opposed to granting miners a bonus but rather only opposed state financing. Etzel made similar remarks, keeping the door open to approving another form of financing.9 In a July 1955 meeting with trade unionists prior to the announcement of the bonus, German social democrat Joachim Schöne said that, “one could arrive at the conclusion that the state should pay a part of miners’ salaries if one wishes to make compatible the decrease in coal prices with the rise or even maintenance of miners’ salaries.”10 A year later though, Schöne was less enthusiastic, complaining that the “state may pay considerable sums to miners in order to guarantee dividends to investors.”11 Dutch Labor deputy Gerard Nederhorst submitted a working document to the Socialist Group in June 1956 that stated, “we think that, in order to avoid a disastrous plunge in coal production and employment, the coal industry must benefit from subsidies, whether direct or indirect through the state financing of social charges” but “these subsidies are admissible only on the condition that the mining industry be nationalized.” For “as long as the mines are private property we should refuse state financing of social costs under whatever form [because] it will give benefits and dividends to holders of capital.”12 German deputies stated their opposition to the miners bonus but, Schöne said, as it had been given, “We can no longer envision eliminating it.”13 The issue posed a real dilemma, as Kreyssig reflected the next day that “if miners have the right to the highest salary, we should pose the question [. . .] of whether the coal

8 Remarques du groupe de travail socialiste sur le mémorandum de la Haute Autorité relatif à la politique charbonnière. April 1955. GSPE-10, HAEU. 9 Commission du marché commun, Compte rendu. 8 May 1956. AC AP PV MACO-195605080010FR, HAEP. 10 Compte rendu analytique de la réunion du sous-comité des affaires économiques et sociales. 7 July 1955. GSPE-10, HAEU. 11 Compte rendu analytique de la réunion du groupe socialiste. 7 May 1956. GSPE-12, HAEU. 12 Document de travail, Point 4 de l’ordre du jour de la réunion des 16 et 17 juin 1956: Le problème de la fiscalisation des charges sociales. Exposé introductif du camarade G.M. Nederhorst. GSPE-12, HAEU. 13 Compte rendu analytique de la réunion du groupe de travail pour les affaires économiques et sociales. 16 June 1956. GSPE-13, HAEU.

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industry can still compete with other industries” and, if the answer was no, then the only options were “a policy of subsidies or a protectionist policy.”14 Aware that socialization was not on the agenda, the next year socialist members advocated replicating the German bonus system on the supranational level because this would remove the discriminatory nature of state aid, an idea put forth again by European trade union organizations (CISL and CISC) and the High Authority after the ECSC ruled the bonus illegal in 1961. Unless another solution was found, Deist wrote that, “In rejecting the principle of subsidizing the coal industry (. . .) we must necessarily resign ourselves to a long-term rise in the price of coal” because miners’ salaries are “deteriorating the position of coal mining costs in relation to those of other industries.”15 Crucial in these debates were contrasting conceptions of the coal market and the ECSC’s legal powers to regulate coal and steel markets by means of (anti)cartel and pricing policies. Deist characterized the High Authority’s position as thinking that “the factors of stability inherent in the Common Market will automatically bring a certain stabilization” but he disagreed and supported instead “a political price” that “will absorb abnormal price variations on the world market.”16 Kreyssig and Schöne described coal as an “artificial market” and encouraged the High Authority to fix maximum prices, while Sassen opposed the socialist position.17 Later that year Etzel rejected Schöne’s statement that “a normal situation in the coal sector only exists in theory,” telling the committee “from about a year ago we can speak perfectly well of a normal situation in the common market for coal.”18 Committee members were responding to market conditions in which coal was increasingly scarce; a downturn in the coal market occurred in 1953–54 after the heated production prompted by the Korean War calmed down but, in late 1954, coal entered its last “boom” period and shortages re-appeared, especially during the tumult caused by the Suez War.19 Community officials had let their maximum price scheme fall for the Nord-Pas-de-Calais in 1955, but maintained it in the Ruhr where community prices

14 Compte rendu analytique de la réunion du groupe de travail pour les affaires économiques et sociales. 17 June 1956. GSPE-13, HAEU. 15 Deist. Remarque sur la politique charbonnière. 16 Commission du marché commun, Compte rendu. 12 March 1955. 17 Commission du marché commun, Compte rendu. 14 March 1955. AC AP PV MACO195503140010FR, HAEP. 18 Commission du marché commun, Compte rendu. 18 November 1955. AC AP PV MACO195511180010FR, HAEP. 19 Abelshauser, Werner. 1984. Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945: Wiederaufbau, Krise, Anpassung. Munich: C. H. Beck, 89–90.

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were lowest and did not cover production costs. Ludwig Erhard, Germany’s market-oriented Economics Minister was actually closer to the socialist view on this point, writing in the Frankfurter Allgemeiner Zeitung that, “one can hardly speak of a truly free market price” in coal and “freely formed prices would heavily aggravate the economy.”20 In 1956, the High Authority announced that it was ending its price controls, stating that “coal prices in the Ruhr are free for the first time in fifty or sixty years.”21 Kreyssig criticized this policy as “entirely liberal” and said that, rather than the price flexibility the High Authority desired, all he saw was “the tendency of coal prices to rise.”22 Coal was booming for the moment but he warned that, “If we want to draw the necessary conclusions from these facts, we should admit that the constant tendency of cost increases in the coal industry will reach one day the point in which [competition] will render the mines unprofitable and they will have to close.”23 Nederhorst drew similar conclusions in response to the High Authority’s first significant memorandum on coal policy, lamenting that, “The treaty does not foresee any solution.” Before 1958 there were already serious concerns about the High Authority’s inaction in coal policy. Already in 1954 Pohle noted that community coal faced growing competition from third-country coal imports and stronger competition from other energy sources. How would the High Authority address these issues, he asked?24 In 1956, Belgian Socialist August de Block said that, “after three years the High Authority still does not have a coal policy.”25 The Socialist Group did not hide its disappointment at the coal memorandum published by the High Authority. Trade unionists told the group that it “gives no indication of the future of the coal industry” and “[we] are extremely interested to know the predictions of socialist deputies on the future of the coal industry.”26 Socialist deputies picked apart the memo in internal meetings. There was nothing about maintaining

20 Extrait de la “Frankfurter Allgemeine”. 12 October 1957. GSPE-18, HAEU. 21 Communication. 26 March 1956. AC AP RP MACO AC-0018!56-mai0030FR, HAEP. 22 Compte rendu analytique de la réunion du groupe de travail pour les affaires économiques et sociales. 17 June 1956. 23 Commission du marché commun, Compte rendu. 23–24 April 1956. AC AP PV MACO195604230010FR, HAEP. 24 Commission du marché commun, Compte rendu. 27 October 1954. AC AP PV MACO195410270010FR, HAEP. 25 Compte rendu analytique de la réunion du groupe de travail pour les affaires économiques et sociales. 17 June 1956. 26 Compte rendu analytique de la première conférence préparatoire des membres socialistes des commission du marché commun et des investissements, des questions financières de la production. 12 March 1955; Compte rendu analytique de la réunion du sous-comité des affaires économiques et sociales. 7 July 1955. GSPE-10, HAEU.

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minimum capacities or what to do about coal imports, Nederhorst complained, saying later that, “the activities of the High Authority in elaborating a long-term coal policy do not inspire confidence.”27 The group charged its president, Guy Mollet (soon after French premier, 1956–57), to write a letter to High Authority President Jean Monnet. Mollet wrote that, “one finds no previsions on the evolution of future markets nor of price tendencies; the document limits itself to rather imprecise considerations” and “does not indicate export and [other] important perspectives” or provide “quantitative analysis of the volume of production capacity nor of expansion possibilities.”28 After receiving a short reply by René Mayer, Jean Monnet’s successor, the Group issued a press statement regretting that, “The High Authority response contains only one statistical document while the decisive questions touching on problems of coal policy remain without response.”29 Let down by the High Authority, the group charged Deist with preparing a forecasting report to inform the group’s policy discussions on coal, on which more below. In the meantime the High Authority made significant mistakes during the 1956 Suez crisis that, together with Erhard’s show of force against German coal, exacerbated the 1958 coal crisis.30 Responding to energy shortages, ECSC countries accumulated massive stocks of coal under High Authority encouragement and signed long-term contracts for large deliveries of US coal at a time of high freight rates, provoking calls to revise the contracts in the Common Market Committee.31 President Mayer told the committee that US imports would not be a major problem for community coal because freight rates would remain high, contradicting Deist’s prediction, accurate as it turned out, that freight rates would plunge once the crisis ended. This was but one of the forecasting mistakes the High Authority made on the eve of the coal crisis. Etzel claimed incorrectly that, “As for coal, demand is stronger than production and will remain so for a long time,” concluding that, “For this reason, the [need for] imports is structural.” The High Authority therefore proposed a “revision of the coal economy” and “the opening of new pits,” especially in the Ruhr, but also in other 27 Document de travail pour la réunion des 16 et 17 juin 1956: Quelques considérations critiques sur la politique de la Haute Autorité, par G.M. Nederhorst. GSPE-12, HAEU. 28 Copie d’une lettre du camarade Guy Mollet, président du groupe socialiste, adressée le 28 avril 1955 à Monsieur Jean Monnet, président de la Haute Autorité de la C.E.C.A. GSPE-10, HAEU. 29 Communiqué de presse. 18 February 1956. GSPE-12, HAEU. 30 Abelshauser. Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945, 89–90. 31 Perron, Régine. 1996. Le marché du charbon, un enjeu entre l’Europe et les États-Unis de 1945 à 1958. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 229; See Armengaud’s comments about US coal. 6 November 1956. AC AP PV MACO-195611060010FR, HAEP.

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coal basins. Perron writes that the High Authority predicted that coke deficits in the community would grow from 2.1 million tons in 1957 to 5.2 million in 1960, estimating that coking capacities would expand by 70% by 1960, another crucial mistake.32 The difficulty of satisfying increasing energy needs while addressing problems of coal’s competitiveness comes out starkly in the 38-page report Deist prepared for the Socialist Group.33 Its distribution in spring 1957 coincided with a downturn in the coal market that exploded into the coal crisis of 1958. That Deist considered the community’s powers to be inadequate can be deduced from the report’s introduction, which stated that, “The method adopted [. . .] will define the principles for a realistic coal policy without reference to the dispositions of the [Paris] Treaty”; only thereafter would he “examine whether its application is authorized by the treaty.” If not, socialists should consider “whether we should renounce certain points of view or demand a modification of the treaty.” Using 1955 as a baseline, he forecasted that coal production in absolute terms would increase slightly by 8–9% by 1965 and then stagnate in the following decade, while oil, hydroelectrical power and natural gas would more than double and atomic energy would enter the market. All told, coal would therefore decrease in relative terms from 69% of total community energy consumption to 49% over twenty years, while oil would increase from 18 to 30% and atomic energy from 0 to 7%. Further he predicted that freight rates would fall and Ruhr coal would be unable to compete with US coal on the Italian market, an important point considering that this was how the coal crisis developed. On the basis of his forecast, he reached the following conclusions: 1) coal could not adapt to the evolution of other energy sources; 2) it was not clear whether other energy sources would fulfill increasing energy needs in the near term; and 3) the community should therefore continue to increase its coal production capacity as much as possible. Given that coal prices could not compete in the medium or long term, there should be heavy state or supranational intervention (the authority here is left vague) “to assure that the coal economy evolves in conformance with economic and political decisions.” In other words, the community must not “abandon the coal industry to the free evolution of the market.” Deist’s memorandum provides insights into policymaking in the leadup to the 1958 coal crisis that illustrate my main arguments. First, Common Market Committee members and, in particular, its socialist members, made more realistic appraisals of the coal market’s future than did the High Authority. Information

32 Perron. Le marché du charbon, 266. 33 Deist. Remarque sur la politique charbonnière.

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was therefore available that may have better prepared the community executive as well as national governments for the crisis. Second, Deist’s assessment of consumption, production, and workers’ welfare provided an intellectual justification for removing the coal sector from the free market and reconciling lower prices with social and labor costs by means of state or community intervention. This was, in the end, what happened but not before protracted disputes within national politics as well as between member states. The final point is that, though Deist’s forecasts correctly captured the major trends and dynamics in European coal, they failed to predict the severity of the looming crisis. Coal fell to 36.3% of community energy consumption by 1965 and then to 22.4% by 1970, rather than to 49% by 1975 as Deist predicted.34 His policy prescriptions in 1957, which envisioned a future of subsidized coal, were therefore a far more expensive proposition than he and his colleagues realized. When the coal crisis broke out in fall 1958, the High Authority encouraged voluntary subsidies for coal stocks and increased community coal consumption and import limits. By early 1959, this policy was an evident failure. The committee’s draft report in March stated that, “One has the impression that the High Authority cannot escape the reproach of often not making concrete proposals until the last moment . . . ”35 Nederhorst stated that the High Authority has given “no indication of the policy that it is following” and “has entirely left the care for resolving the coal problems to governments.”36 Commissioner Paul Finet acknowledged that measures thus far were “insufficient” and announced that he would propose declaring a “manifest crisis.” The next month Commissioner Albert Coppé said that, “we are witnessing the cumulation of a cyclical crisis and the worst structural crisis of coal in Europe in the last hundred years.” The High Authority would ask the Council of Ministers to invoke articles 58, 74 and 95 of the Paris Treaty to authorize it to 1) freeze stocks; 2) install production quotas; 3) restrict imports; and 4) increase community benefits for workers.37 In April, there was a political clash on the committee between a joint Christian democrat-Liberal proposal that wrote of a “very difficult situation” in coal but rejected Community 34 Spierenburg, Dirk, and Raymond Poidevin. 1994. The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 488. 35 Rapport fait au nom de la Commission du marché intérieur de la Communauté sur des questions actuelles du marché charbonnier et sidérurgique par M. H.A. Korthals. March 1959. AC AP RP MACO.1958-A0-0017-590010FR, HAEP. 36 Commission du marché intérieur, Compte rendu. 20 February 1959. AC AP PV MACO195902200020FR, HAEP. 37 Commission du marché intérieur, Compte rendu. 21 March 1959. AC AP PV MACO195903200010FR, HAEP.

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interventionism against a socialist resolution that demanded the declaration of a manifest crisis.38 After compromise formulations failed over whether to use the word “crisis” (which carried legal implications), the socialists announced they would vote against the resolution, which called only for moderate community measures. In May, the plenary reinserted the term “crisis” and supported the High Authority’s more interventionist program39 but the executive was unable to reach agreement in the Council of Ministers. Spierenburg told the committee that national governments did not “want to create a precedent susceptible to being invoked one day in case of structural crises in other industries,” especially if “an analogous situation presents itself [. . .] in the steel sector.”40 The governments of the larger coal-producing nations, Belgium, France and Germany, wanted their coal-consuming counterparts to restrict imports, but the Dutch and Italian governments refused. The Council of Ministers deadlocked as opposition to interventionism and supranationalism mixed with the consumer-producer conflict. A similar cocktail felled the proposal for a European Miners Statute, a community proposal supported by the trade union federations (CISL and CISC) and the High Authority.41 In 1958 the German government led the way with a national intervention program of import restrictions, production quotas and state aids designed to support the sector’s heavy social costs. In the early 1960s the Belgian government, the coal sector of which had a special transition program and was never able to enter the common market, instituted national subsidies, as did the French. The High Authority, increasingly adrift as the EEC Commission entered operation, failed repeatedly to regain the initiative over national governments. In 1965, it had little option but to retroactively sanction the state aids instituted over the last seven years, a recognition of defeat.42

38 Commission du marché intérieur, Procès-verbal et Compte rendu. 15 April 1959. AC AP PV MACO-195904150010FR, HAEP. 39 Résolution sur des questions actuelles du marché charbonnier, Journal official des Communautés Européennes. 8 May 1959. 40 Commission du marché intérieur, Compte rendu. 19 November 1959. AC AP PV MACO195911190020FR, HAEP. 41 Verschueren, Nicolas. 2012. Fermer les mines en construisant l’Europe: une histoire sociale de l’intégration européenne. Brussels: Peter Lang. 42 Spierenburg and Poidevin. The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community, 605.

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References Abelshauser, Werner. 1984. Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945: Wiederaufbau, Krise, Anpassung. Munich: C. H. Beck. Perron, Régine. 1996. Le marché du charbon, un enjeu entre l’Europe et les États-Unis de 1945 à 1958. Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne. Spierenburg, Dirk, and Raymond Poidevin. 1994. The History of the High Authority of the European Coal and Steel Community: Supranationality in Operation. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson. Verschueren, Nicolas. 2012. Fermer les mines en construisant l’Europe: une histoire sociale de l’intégration européenne. Brussels: Peter Lang.

Henning Türk

From oil to coal? The International Energy Agency (IEA) and international coal policy since the end of the 1970s Introduction In winter 1979, the readers of the influential American journal Foreign Affairs were confronted with a gloomy scenario. Under the headline “Expanding World Use of Coal”,1 the executive director of the Paris-based International Energy Agency (IEA), Ulf Lantzke, forecast a huge energy gap in the year 2000. He expected a strong rise in energy consumption but only a slight increase in oil production. The resulting scramble for oil would drastically drive up prices and unfold negative effects on the world economy. Ulf Lantzke only saw one solution to avoid this scenario: the expansion of coal production and trade. Lantzke’s article was part of a larger campaign by the IEA to push coal as an alternative to oil.2 But why did the IEA, the central organization of the Western industrialized oil consuming countries, become active in an area that was not the primary task of this international organization? How did the IEA envisage the development of coal production and trade? What did it recommend to its member states? And how did the organization try to ensure that its recommendations were implemented? To answer these questions I will describe in the first part the founding of the IEA and its original tasks. The second part analyzes the development of its activities in the coal sector. And the final part concentrates on the implementation of the IEA’s recommendations.

1 Lantzke, Ulf. 1979. “Expanding World Use of Coal.” Foreign Affairs 58, no. 2: 351–373. 2 For further articles by Ulf Lantzke on this topic, see Bundesarchiv Koblenz (BaK), Nachlass Ulf Lantzke, vol. 20. Note: I would like to thank Rüdiger Graf for his comments on the first draft of this chapter. The research was funded by the DFG as part of the project “Die Internationale Organisation nationaler Energiepolitik: Großbritannien und die Bundesrepublik Deutschland in der Internationalen Energie-Agentur (IEA), 1974–1993”. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-006

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The founding of the IEA and its core tasks The IEA was founded in November 1974 after the first oil crisis. It was conceptualized under US leadership as an answer to the rising power of oil producing states. In this autonomous sub-organization of the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) in Paris, the Western industrialized countries (except France) gathered to coordinate their energy policy approaches. In the various bodies of the organization, the member states’ officials discussed their views with energy experts and representatives of the IEA secretariat, thereby developing a common view on the energy problems of the times and the possibilities of resolving these problems.3 The members expected the IEA to be effective in different time spans. In the short run, it should prevent the potential future use of the “oil weapon” with the help of a crisis mechanism that was elaborated in detail in the founding document. Additionally, the member states were to keep oil stocks corresponding to an average of 90 days oil consumption. In the long run, the IEA was supposed to help to reduce dependency on oil imports, especially from the Middle East. In these regards, the founding document only provided the framework with some general remarks about its aims.4 It was therefore crucial in the initial period of the IEA to fill this part of the IEA’s work with a concrete program. As the whole IEA project depended from the beginning on US-American leadership, it was no surprise that the US government took the initiative on that score by proposing a Long-Term Co-Operation Program (LTCP). After the establishment of the crisis mechanism, the US government saw “[a] viable long-term cooperative program to reduce dependency on imported oil” as “the essential second step in redressing the producer/consumer power balance”.5 After lengthy discussions, the Program was finally adopted in January 1976. The basic pillars of the Program were energy conservation, an expansion of nuclear energy and coal production, co-operation on the development of alternative energy sources and a floor price for the importing of oil to secure investment in alternative 3 For the founding of the IEA, see Türk, Henning. 2014. “The Oil Crisis of 1973 as a Challenge to Multilateral Energy Cooperation among Western Industrialized Countries.” Historical Social Research 39, no. 4: 209–230; Graf, Rüdiger. 2018. Oil and Sovereignty. Petro-Knowledge and Energy Policy in the United States and Western Europe in the 1970s. New York: Berghahn, 298–321. 4 “Agreement on an International Energy Program.” In Scott, Richard. 1994. The History of the IEA – the First 20 Years, vol. 1: Origins and Structure. Paris: OECD, 353–397, 379–381. 5 Anonymous. 2012. “Memorandum from the Chairman of the International Energy Review Group Working Group (Enders), 16. September 1974.” In Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII: Energy Crisis 1974–1980, edited by Office of the Historians, 21–25. Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 24.

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forms of energy.6 For the IEA, nuclear energy was the most promising alternative to oil, because it could replace the oil which was still used in the generation of electricity. Concrete proposals on coal policy were not formulated. So, how and why did the coal policy evolve into a major part of the IEA’s work?

The development of IEA’s coal policy The first more detailed mention of coal as an important part of the IEA’s strategy can be detected in the so-called “Group Objectives and Principles on Energy Policy”. The ministers of the member governments accepted these documents in a governing board session in October 1977. The “Group Objectives and Principles” rested on a predicted dramatic situation on the oil market in the middle of the 1980s due to a rise in demand and stagnating oil production.7 The IEA proclaimed that the expected gap in oil supply could only be closed by a reduction of oil imports.8 The IEA’s group objective therefore determined oil imports of 26 million barrels per day (mbd) in 1985–7 mbd below the projected demand. To achieve this aim, the ministers committed themselves to a strengthening of energy policies in their respective home countries on the basis of the adopted principles. In these principles the member states pledged to develop a national energy policy that was based on a coherent energy program. The main pillar of the principles was a price for energy that should “reach a level which encourages energy conservation and development of alternative sources of energy”.9 The members were to promote energy conservation and the use of atomic energy and coal instead of oil. The principles on energy policy described the expectations of the IEA and its members 6 “Long Term Co-operation Program.” In Scott, Richard. 1994. The History of the IEA – the First 20 Years, vol. 3: Principle Documents. Paris: OECD, 177–204; Kittel, Walter. 1976. “Das Programm für langfristige Zusammenarbeit.” Wirtschaftsdienst 56, no. 3: 123–128. 7 “Ministerial Decision on Group Objectives and Principles for Energy Policy 5–6 October 1977.” In Scott. History, vol. 3, 79–90. 8 In the first years of its existence, the IEA resorted very often to the forecasting of energy gaps. These expected gaps were used as a sort of trigger to activate certain policies of the IEA member governments. For the use of “energy gaps” as a political argument, see Geyer, Martin H. 2016. “Die neue Wirklichkeit von Sicherheit und Risiken: Wie wir mit dystopischen, utopischen und technokratischen Diagnosen von Sicherheit zu leben gelernt haben.” In Die neue Wirklichkeit. Semantische Neuvermessungen und Politik seit den 1970er Jahren, edited by Ariane Leendertz, and Wencke Meteling, 281–315. Frankfurt (Main): Campus, 284–288. 9 “Ministerial Decision on Group Objectives and Principles for Energy Policy 5–6 October 1977.” In Scott. History, vol. 3, 85.

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with regard to coal for the first time in a detailed way. The members wanted to apply a “strong steam coal utilization strategy”,10 and expand the international trade in steam coal. Therefore they promised to promote coal as “a major fuel for electrical power generation and in industrial sectors”,11 to enhance market stability and secure the necessary infrastructure for the international coal trade. One year later, in 1978, the IEA’s secretariat conducted and published a major study with the title “Steam Coal. Prospects to 2000”.12 It already contained the assumptions and expectations that executive director Ulf Lantzke would spread with his article in Foreign Affairs one year later. The IEA anticipated a growth of the economy in the OECD of 3.4 per cent per annum and a rise of energy consumption of 2.7 per cent per annum. Acting on this assumption, the IEA formulated a reference case based on the extrapolation of existing patterns of energy consumption. In comparison to this reference case the IEA described three scenarios about the future development of energy consumption. Two scenarios were based on different assumptions about the expansion of nuclear energy and the third scenario comprised the strong development of coal use. From the secretariat’s point of view, all three scenarios were alarming because the energy demand would not be met. The IEA therefore concluded: A massive substitution of oil by coal will be required of industrial societies and developing countries alike if they are to sustain in this century even modest economic growth in a setting of moderately increasing prices. This displacement of oil by coal, however, will in itself not be sufficient but must be accompanied by more rigorous energy conservation and supply development.13

The IEA further asserted that the expansion of coal use should rest upon an intensified world trade in coal, which depended on “the adoption and execution of coordinated government policies to facilitate coal development and usage”.14 10 Ibid., 86. 11 Ibid. 12 International Energy Agency. 1978. Steam Coal. Prospects to 2000. Paris: OECD. The countries with high cost coal, like West Germany and the United Kingdom tried to soften the wording of the study. From their point of view the study favored the position of low-cost coal countries like the US too much. See “Introductory Speaking Note for the informal meeting of the IEA Governing Board on 21 September 1978,” and “Deputy secretary D Le B Jones to Minister of State and Secretary of State, 25 September 1978, concerning IEA Governing Board meeting on 21./22. September 1978.” Both in The National Archives (TNA). FCO 96/1612; “Telex No. 523, 12. September 1978 von der OECD-Gesandtschaft an das Auswärtige Amt betr. Sitzung Governing Board am 21./22.9.1978.” In Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amts (PAAA), Zwischenarchiv, vol. 121291. 13 IEA. Steam Coal, 5. 14 Ibid.

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Why did the IEA commence these activities in 1978? One part of the explanation is internal. Lantzke had been the former head of the energy department in the West German Ministry of Economics. He had therefore been responsible to a large extent for West German coal policy and was an expert in this field. It therefore seemed fitting for him to use his expertise and push coal as an alternative to oil. Additionally, he was very ambitious and tried to enlarge the tasks of the IEA to make his organization a central player in international energy policy. He tried, for example, to secure a key role in the preparation of the World Economic Summits, the G7-meetings. Even his former colleagues from the West German Ministry of Economics complained about Lantzke’s ambitions in this regard.15 Besides, international nuclear energy topics were already negotiated and discussed in the International Atomic Energy Agency, the Nuclear Energy Agency (NEA) as the other already existing OECD sub-organization, and on the European level through the European Atomic Community. The IEA member countries were therefore not keen to duplicate the work in international nuclear policy and inhibited the secretariat’s ambitions in this regard.16 Contrary to this, international coal policy was a new field without any rivals for the IEA. The other part of the explanation is external. In the founding period of the IEA, the secretariat and most of the member states championed nuclear energy as the central substitute of oil. But between 1974 and 1978 it became clear that the rise of nuclear energy was slower than expected. In many societies of the member states we can detect a strong resistance to these technocratic, largescale projects.17 Additionally, the societies became more and more aware of the risks of nuclear energy. These developments delayed the expansion of nuclear energy and alarmed the IEA that now turned to coal as the new favorite energy source.

15 See Lantzke’s unpublished paper for the preparation of the G7-meeting in Bonn 1978 and the various negative evaluations by the West German economics ministry. In BaK, B102, vols. 201587 and 201592. 16 “Note by D.R. MacLennan about the International Energy Agency, 21 February 1979.” In TNA, Department of Energy EG 14/30. 17 See e.g. Kirchhof, Astrid Mignon, and Jan-Henrik Meyer. 2014. “Global Protest against Nuclear Power: Transfer and Transnational Exchange in the 1970s and 1980s.” Historical Social Research 39, no. 1: 165–190; Meyer, Jan-Henrik. 2014. “ʻWhere do we go from Wyhl?’ Transnational AntiNuclear Protest Targeting European and International Organizations in the 1970s.” Historical Social Research 39, no. 1: 212–235; Hughes, Michael L. 2014. “Civil Disobedience in Transnational Perspective: American and West German Anti-Nuclear-Power Protesters, 1975–1982.” Historical Social Research 39, no. 1: 236–253.

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The IEA used the impetus of its 1978 steam coal study to turn the following year into “the year of coal” for the IEA,18 as the IEA’s legal adviser Richard Scott later put it. Two events further accelerated the need for urgency from the perspective of the IEA and its member states. The first was the second oil crisis that began at the end of 1978 with the revolution in Iran, at this time the world’s second largest oil producer.19 The other was the accident in the nuclear power plant Three Mile Island, near Harrisburg in Pennsylvania, in March 1979.20 Both events illustrated two problematic trends: firstly, oil supply was still very insecure. Western industrialized countries still depended too much on supplies from untrustworthy states. And secondly, it became more and more difficult to justify the expansion of nuclear energy. The conclusion for the IEA was obviously to push coal as much as possible. Thus, the IEA developed a coherent framework for upgrading coal policy in the IEA. The governing board firstly adopted the “Principles for IEA Action on Coal” at the end of May 1979. In this document the member states pledged to establish coal “as a major energy source within the IEA group”.21 The aim of the IEA and its member states was not to push coal at all costs, but to expand world trade in competitive coal. They assumed that reliable and cheap coal producers like the US or the new member Australia should extract more coal and export it to the other countries that needed cheap coal.22 The “Principles for IEA Action on Coal” therefore demanded that “[c]ountries with the potential for large increases in coal production, in particular Australia, Canada and the United States will extend their coal production facilities and infrastructure to permit increased domestic use of coal as well as exports consistent with economic and social

18 Scott, Richard. 1994. The History of the IEA – the First 20 Years, vol. 2: Major Policies and Actions. Paris: OECD, 174. 19 The second oil crisis and its consequences are described in detail in Kohl, Wilfried L., ed. 1982. After the Second Oil Crisis. Energy Policies in Europe, America and Japan. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington; Parra, Francisco. 2010. Oil Politics. A Modern History of Petroleum. London: I.B. Tauris, 215–239; Yergin, Daniel. 1991. Der Preis. Die Jagd nach Öl, Geld und Macht. Frankfurt (Main): Fischer, 830–883. 20 Bösch, Frank. 2017. “Taming Nuclear Power: The Accident near Harrisburg and the Change in West German and International Nuclear Policy in the 1970s and early 1980s.” German History 35, no. 1: 71–95; Walker, J. Samuel. 2004. Three Mile Island. A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press. 21 “Ministerial Principles for IEA Action on Coal and Decision on Procedures for Review of IEA Countries’ Coal Policies.” In Scott. History, vol. 3, 218–230, 222. 22 Australia became a new member in May 1979. See Scott. History, vol. 1, 343.

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costs”.23 The document further proclaimed that “[a]ll IEA countries will enlarge their use of coal; where insufficient coal is available domestically, countries will seek long-term secure supplies of imported coal and provide security of access to markets”.24 By this, the IEA expected the production and use of coal to double until 1990 and to triple by the year 2000, compared to its production and use in 1976.25 The IEA also developed into a coordinating body between governments and industry. Analogous to oil policy, where the IEA worked closely with the International Industry Advisory Board of large multinational oil companies, the IEA founded a “Coal Industry Advisory Board” on 11 July 1979. It was composed of “individuals of high standing active in coal producer, user, trader, transportation or other energy-related enterprises”.26 The members were proposed by their home governments and appointed by the IEA governing board. Its first chairman was Nicholas T. Camicia, the President of The Pittston Company from the United States. In the following years the Coal Industry Advisory Board published studies about the development of the coal market and the future requirements for an expansion of coal trade,27 and it directly advised the IEA and the member states in the governing board. But how could the IEA secure the implementation of its recommendations?

The implementation of the IEA’s strategy As already mentioned, the IEA was founded as an autonomous sub-organization of the OECD in Paris. This did not just lead to the transfer of the OECD’s energy staff to the new organization. It also meant that the IEA applied the same policy instruments as its umbrella organization. A central policy tool of the OECD, that had no “hard power” to force the implementation of its decisions, was the peer review process.28 Teams, consisting of bureaucrats of the member states and

23 “Ministerial Principles for IEA Action on Coal and Decision on Procedures for Review of IEA Countries’ Coal Policies.” In Scott. History, vol. 3, 222. 24 Ibid., 223. 25 Ibid., 221. 26 “Decision of the Governing Board on the Establishment of an IEA Coal Industry Advisory Board (CIAB), 11. July 1979.” In Scott. History, vol. 3, 53–56, 55. 27 See e.g. International Energy Agency. 1980. Report of the IEA Coal Industry Advisory Board. Paris: OECD. 28 Marcussen, Martin. 2004. “Multilateral Surveillance and the OECD: Playing the Idea Game.” In The OECD and European Welfare States, edited by Klaus Armingeon, and Michelle Beyeler,

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experts of the secretariat, regularly visited the member states to check their performance. Additionally, the reviewed members had to come to Paris to justify their policy to the other members and the secretariat. Finally, the findings of the peer review process were published. The IEA already started to experiment with the peer review process with regard to energy conservation in 1976. The “Group Objectives and Principles on Energy Policy” of 1977 were the basis for an intensified peer review process that should be conducted every year.29 In the “Principles on Energy Policy” the member countries pledged to “strengthen their policies [. . .], taking into account the results of the reviews”.30 In 1979, the IEA also established a review process for the coal sector with the publication of “Decision of the Governing Board on Procedures for Review of IEA Countries’ Coal Policies”. It was a slimmed-down review procedure. Every two years, the IEA governing board would “assess the prospects for world coal production, trade and utilization and review the extent to which the main elements of national coal policies required to provide a co-operative framework within the IEA for expansion of coal use and trade have been adopted and implemented”.31 Additionally, the IEA countries were to inform the IEA secretariat about any decisions regarding coal policy, especially about governmental interference in the coal market. In the following years the IEA governing board would publish its reviews every two years.32

13–31. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Idem. 2004. “OECD Governance through Soft Law.” In Soft Law in Governance and Regulation. An Interdisciplinary Analysis, edited by Ulrika Mörth, 103–126. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar; Pagani, Fabrizio. 2002. Peer Review: A Tool for Cooperation and Change. An Analysis of an OECD Working Method. Paris: OECD. 29 For the strengthening of the process, see e.g. the 1978 review procedure discussed in: “Secretary of State to Embassies, 23. November 1977, Subject: Energy, IEA-SLT meeting on 14–16 November 1977.” Accessed August 1, 2018. https://file.wikileaks.org/oc/oc/2532/277210.pdf; “Embassy Paris to Secretary of State, 23. May 1978, Subject: Energy; IEA/SLT Meeting of May 18.” Accessed August 1, 2018. https://file.wikileaks.org/oc/oc/2694/131296.pdf. 30 “Ministerial Decision on Group Objectives and Principles for Energy Policy, 5–6 October 1977.” In Scott. History, vol. 3, 79. 31 “Decision of the Governing Board on Procedures for Review of IEA Countries’ Coal Policy.” In Scott. History, vol. 3, 228–230, 229. 32 International Energy Agency. 1981, 1983, 1987. Coal prospects and policies in IEA countries. Paris: OECD.

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Conclusion As we have seen, the IEA tried to become a major player in the international coordination of coal policy. It functioned as a think tank that conducted studies and developed recommendations on how to transform the coal market from a local or regional market into a large world market. In this way it wanted to establish coal as the most favorable alternative to oil. The approach of the IEA was to coordinate the requirements of the industry and the expectations of the member states. It thus developed its recommendations in close collaboration with coal companies and governments. One driving force behind this was the executive-director Ulf Lantzke who had been a coal policy expert as head of the energy department in the West German government. He was also very keen to establish his organization as a key player in international energy policy. Beside these internal aspects, international developments pushed the setting-up of an international coal policy. The delay in the expansion of nuclear energy and the second oil crisis made coal more attractive. The rise of the oil price, the deposits of coal in friendly and stable states and the large quantity of available coal were further aspects that spoke in favor of coal. The basis for the IEA’s work were gloomy predictions about the future energy market: and here the IEA was wide of the mark.33 Its expectations about the rise of energy consumption were far too high. Additionally, contrary to the assumptions of the IEA, the oil price fell drastically after 1982 with the low point in 1986.34 Thus, international coal production and trade developed further in the 1980s but never played such an immense role as the IEA expected at the end of the 1970s.

33 For critical reflections about the assumptions that underlie the energy prognosis, see Baumgartner, Thomas, and Atle Midttun, eds. 1987. The Politics of Energy Forecasting. A Comparative Study of Energy Forecasting in Western Europe and North America. Oxford: Clarendon Press. 34 Basosi, Duccio et al., eds. 2018. Counter-Shock. The Oil Counter-Revolution of the 1980s. London: I.B. Tauris.

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References Baumgartner, Thomas, and Atle Midttun, eds. 1987. The Politics of Energy Forecasting. A Comparative Study of Energy Forecasting in Western Europe and North America. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Basosi, Duccio et al., eds. 2018. Counter-Shock. The Oil Counter-Revolution of the 1980s. London: I.B. Tauris. Bösch, Frank. 2017. “Taming Nuclear Power: The Accident near Harrisburg and the Change in West German and International Nuclear Policy in the 1970s and early 1980s.” German History 35, no. 1: 71–95. Geyer, Martin H. 2016. “Die neue Wirklichkeit von Sicherheit und Risiken: Wie wir mit dystopischen, utopischen und technokratischen Diagnosen von Sicherheit zu leben gelernt haben”. In Die neue Wirklichkeit. Semantische Neuvermessungen und Politik seit den 1970er Jahren, edited by Ariane Leendertz, and Wencke Meteling, 281–315. Frankfurt (Main): Campus. Graf, Rüdiger. 2018. Oil and Sovereignty. Petro-Knowledge and Energy Policy in the United States and Western Europe in the 1970s. New York: Berghahn. Hughes, Michael L. 2014. “Civil disobedience in transnational perspective: American and West German anti-nuclear-power protesters, 1975–1982.” Historical Social Research 39, no. 1: 236–53. International Energy Agency. 1981. Coal prospects and policies in IEA countries. Paris: OECD. International Energy Agency. 1983. Coal prospects and policies in IEA countries. Paris: OECD. International Energy Agency. 1985. Coal prospects and policies in IEA countries. Paris: OECD. International Energy Agency. 1980. Report of the IEA Coal Industry Advisory Board. Paris: OECD. International Energy Agency. 1978. Steam Coal. Prospects to 2000, Paris: OECD. Kirchhof, Astrid Mignon, and Jan-Henrik Meyer. 2014. “Global Protest Against Nuclear Power: Transfer and Transnational Exchange in the 1970s and 1980s.” Historical Social Research 39, no. 1: 165–90. Kittel, Walter. 1976. “Das Programm für langfristige Zusammenarbeit.” Wirtschaftsdienst 56, no. 3: 123–8. Kohl, Wilfried L., ed. 1982. After the Second Oil Crisis. Energy Policies in Europe, America and Japan. Lexington (Mass.): Lexington. Lantzke, Ulf. 1979. “Expanding World Use of Coal.” Foreign Affairs 58, no. 2: 351–73. Marcussen, Martin. 2004. “Multilateral Surveillance and the OECD: Playing the Idea Game.” In The OECD and European Welfare States, ed. by Klaus Armingeon, and Michelle Beyeler, 13–31. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Marcussen, Martin. 2004. “OECD Governance through Soft Law.” In Soft Law in Governance and Regulation. An Interdisciplinary Analysis, edited by Ulrika Mörth, 103–26. Cheltenham: Edward Elgar. Meyer, Jan-Henrik. 2014. “ʻWhere do we go from Wyhl?’ Transnational Anti-Nuclear Protest Targeting European and International Organizations in the 1970s.” Historical Social Research 39, no. 1: 212–35. Office of the Historians, ed. 2012. Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) 1969–1976, vol. XXXVII: Energy Crisis 1974–1980, Washington D.C.: United States Government Printing Office.

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Pagani, Fabrizio. 2002. Peer Review: A Tool for Cooperation and Change. An Analysis of an OECD Working Method. Paris: OECD. Parra, Francisco. 2010. Oil Politics. A Modern History of Petroleum. London: I.B. Tauris. Scott, Richard. 1994. The History of the IEA – the First 20 Years, vol. 1: Origins and Structure. Paris: OECD. Scott, Richard. 1994. The History of the IEA – the First 20 Years, vol. 2: Major Policies and Actions. Paris: OECD. Scott, Richard. 1994. The History of the IEA – the First 20 Years, vol. 3: Principle Documents. Paris: OECD. Türk, Henning. 2014. “The Oil Crisis of 1973 as a Challenge to Multilateral Energy Cooperation among Western Industrialized Countries.” Historical Social Research 39, no. 4: 209–30. Walker, J. Samuel. 2004. Three Mile Island. A Nuclear Crisis in Historical Perspective. Berkeley: University of California Press. Yergin, Daniel. 1991. Der Preis. Die Jagd nach Öl, Geld und Macht. Frankfurt (Main): Fischer.

Lars Bluma

“Humanization of work”: A watershed in German hard coal mining? Introduction In 1974 the German ministry of labor and mainly the ministry of research and technology initiated a million D-Mark research program called “Humanization of work”. German historians embedded this program to improve working conditions especially in the discussion about the supposed structural break of the 1970s.1 Anselm Doering-Manteuffel and Lutz Raphael argue that the three decades after 1970 form a coherent epoch of the post-war period, a phase characterized by the phrase “after the boom”.2 These decades were shaped by the consequences of a profound economic structural break, which became visible by significant changes in work organization and production processes, which led to mass unemployment and several economic crises. The humanization program is accordingly understood and interpreted as an answer to this perception of crisis.3 In this context, this chapter discusses the humanization projects in the German coal industry, especially with regard to continuities and discontinuities.

The research program “humanization of work” Willy Brand, chancellor of the social liberal coalition, announced in his first government declaration in 1969 that the safety of work would be one main focus of the new government.4 In 1973, he extended this focus to the central idea of the

1 Müller, Stefan. 2016. “Humanisierung der Arbeitswelt 1.0. Historisch-kritische Befragung eines Reformprogramms der Neunzehnhundertsiebzigerjahre.” In Solidarität im Wandel der Zeiten – 150 Jahre Gewerkschaften, edited by Willy Buschak, 253–275. Essen: Klartext. 2 Doering-Manteuffel, Anselm, and Lutz Raphael. 2011. “Der Epochenbruch in den 1970erJahren: Thesen zur Phänomenologie und den Wirkungen des Strukturwandels nach dem Boom.” In Nach dem Strukturbruch? Kontinuität und Wandel von Arbeitswelten, edited by Knud Andresen, Ursula Bitzegeio, and Jürgen Mittag, 25–40. Bonn: Dietz. 3 Seibring, Anne. 2011. “Die Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens in den 1970er-Jahren: Forschungsstand und Forschungsperspektiven.” Ibid., 107–126. 4 Brandt, Willy. 1969. “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in Bonn am 28. Oktober 1969.” Accessed November 21, 2018. https://www.willy-brandt. de/fileadmin/brandt/Downloads/Regierungserklaerung_Willy_Brandt_1969.pdf, 24. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-007

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quality of life.5 In this he responded to the fact that since the mid-1960s, the perception had spread that Germany was in a growth and prosperity crisis. The improvement in working conditions hoped for by automation and mechanization had been proven to be wrong. Everywhere a gap was seen between the growing opportunities for self-realization in a wealthy consumer society and the backward conditions in industrial production. The reform efforts of the social-liberal government thus focused primarily on social policy and, above all, the Social Democratic party encouraged a reform euphoria and belief in progress, which aimed in particular at a democratization of society and thus also of economic life.6 In addition to topics such as prosperity, planning law and education policy, occupational health and safety became a central field of political intervention. However, the efforts were not limited to the classic medical and technical health and safety but included general issues of the human-oriented design of industrial production. This included dealing with new forms of work organization and technology as well as the involvement of employees in the shape of work processes – namely, the advancement of co-determination rights.7 Based on these very general considerations, in 1974 a government research program on the humanization of work was launched by the ministry of research and technology and the ministry of labor. In a large number of projects, entrepreneurs, scientists, trade unionists and employees were to work together on humane industrial production. In particular, new knowledge and research results from work and industrial sciences were to be incorporated into company practice. This transfer between science and practice was a very important aspect of the humanization program. The social democrat Hans Matthöfer, minister of research and technology, was one of the prominent promoters of the humanization project. In his book on “humanization of work and the productivity of the industrial society”, published in 1977, he pointed out that,

5 Brandt, Willy. 1973. “Bundeskanzler Brandt. Regierungserklärung des zweiten Kabinetts Brandt / Scheel vom 18. Januar 1973.” Accessed November 21, 2018. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/netz quelle/a88-06578.pdf, 31. 6 Seefried, Elke. 2017. “Partei der Zukunft? Der Wandel des sozialdemokratischen Fortschrittverständnisses 1960–2000.” In Zeitenwandel. Transformationen geschichtlicher Zeitlichkeit nach dem Boom, edited by Fernando Esposito, 193–225. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 7 Kleinöder, Nina. 2016. “Humanisierung der Arbeit”. Literaturbericht zum „Forschungsprogramm zur Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung, 12–16. (https:// www.boeckler.de/de/faust-detail.htm?sync_id=HBS-006267)

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Obviously, the value concepts related to the working world also change. More and more people are asking about the meaning of their work, which, while providing them with better material security, causes negative consequences and side effects, which may outweigh the increase in income. Such new needs are crucial for shaping the jobs of the future.8

In this context, Matthöfer also speaks of post-material demands beyond the traditional demands of the unions for more wages and shorter working hours. Although the humanization project was discussed in terms of a general social modernization discourse, there were also very concrete issues that needed to be resolved in the 1970s. First of all, the number of occupational accidents and diseases in West German industry remained very high compared to other industrialized countries. In addition, the psychological burden on industrial workers had increased considerably due to the mechanization of production systems.9 However, the technological modernization and rationalization process did not automatically lead to an improvement in working conditions, as had been hoped.10 The number of accidents at work had risen from 1949 to 1969 from about 1.1 to 2.3 million.11 From the 1970s, the number of accidents steadily but very slowly decreased. Only from the 1990s did a significant reduction occur. It is not surprising that a major focus of the program was on reducing health impairments and increasing occupational safety at work. Another point was that the classic assembly line work (from the perspective of entrepreneurs) had reached its limits. In order to meet the rapidly changing product needs of the consumer society, it required flexible small production lines and thus new forms of work organization. In Norway and Sweden, German entrepreneurs found models for a new form of industrial production in which self-directed, semi-autonomous group work with flexible working structures was practiced.12 The humanization program initiated research work in this field in

8 Matthöfer, Hans. 1977. Humanisierung der Arbeit und Produktivität in der Industriegesellschaft. Frankfurt (Main)/Köln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt, 20. 9 Funke, Hajo, Wilheilm Keuschen, and Peter Thoma. 1975. “Produktionsprozeß und Krankheit.” In Industriearbeit und Gesundheitsverschleiß. Diskussion und Ergebnisse der Tagung “Sicherheit am Arbeitsplatz und Unfallschutz”, edited by Hajo Funke, Brigitte Geißler, and Peter Thoma, 27–44. Frankfurt (Main)/Köln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. 10 Schaumann, Michael. 1974. “Bestandsaufnahme, Analyse und Entwicklungstrends im Produktionsbereich”. In Humanisierung der Arbeit als gesellschaftspolitische und gewerkschaftliche Aufgabe. Protokoll der DGB-Konferenz vom 16. und 17. Mai 1974 in München, edited by Heinz Oskar Vetter, 41–55. Frankfurt (Main)/Köln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. 11 Müller. Humanisierung der Arbeitswelt, 257. 12 Ibid., 260.

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Germany as well. Not only was efficiency and productivity to be in the foreground of these projects, but also job enrichment. In particular, group work was seen as a possibility for that.13 The activities should become more varied for the worker. Fatigue and boredom due to the rigid cycle of classical assembly line production was to be avoided. Moreover, it was hoped that there would be an increase in the qualification level of the industrial work. That is why such initiatives have often been flanked by training programs. The humanization program is usually divided into three phases:14 First, there was an expansive start phase from 1974 to 1978. At the end of this phase, the program met with considerable criticism. Among other things, the distribution of funds was targeted. For example, appraisers were involved in projects themselves and participated in the subsidies. It was criticized for the fact that the money was distributed according to a scattershot approach making the humanization program was more akin to a “self-service store”, which produced expensive research but few results. In addition, employers lamented an ideologization of the projects by unions. This crisis phase ended in 1982 with the election of the new conservative-liberal government. The program continued until 1989, but now the focus had shifted fundamentally. Work organization and democratic participation projects have been largely abandoned and instead there were mainly technically oriented projects and “humanization” meant, in this context, to overcome barriers to innovation.15 In 1989, a new program called “Work and technology” followed, which did without the unions and promoted purely entrepreneurial projects.

Humanization of work in German coal mining What about humanization in German coal mining? Let’s start with some facts and figures. Since the humanization program began in 1974, mining had played a special role, and not only in terms of the number of research projects and the amount of funding.17 A large part of the subsidies went to the hard coal industry, mainly to

13 Seibring. Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens, 113–116. 14 Kleinöder. Humanisierung der Arbeit, 9–22; Müller. Humansierung der Arbeitswelt, 264–267. 15 Müller. Humanisierung der Arbeitswelt, 266. 17 Winkler, Kurt. 1994. “HDA im Steinkohlenbergbau”. In Immer auf den Punkt. Beiträge zur Arbeitsforschung, Arbeitsgestaltung, Arbeitspolitik. Willi Pöhler zum 60. Geburtstag, edited by Karl Krahn, Gerd Peter, and Rainer Skrotzki, 151–163. Dortmund: Montania, 154.

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Gesamtaufwand (Mio DM) 13 12.0

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the Ruhrkohle AG founded as a consolidation company of German hard coal mining – at this time, even without the mines on the Saar. Between 1974 and 1984, a total of 75 projects with a financial volume of around 97 million D-Mark were started.18 The Ministry of Research and Technology provided these projects with a grant of 67 million D-Mark. Furthermore, from 1980 to 1983 additional funds of 50 million D-Mark came from fiscal equalization in Germany. From 1991, no new projects were approved and one year later, the funding program “Humane design of working conditions in mining” was discontinued. The following list shows the focus areas of the “Humanization” program in coal mining with details about the amount of funding and the numbers of projects.19

16 Hamm, Eduard, and Dieter Sonnenschein. Aktionsprogramm Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. Ergebnisse von Entwicklungsvorhaben der RAG und deren Umsetzung. 1974–1984. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum (hereafter montan.dok/BBA) 131/259, 3. 18 Ibid., 156. 19 Hamm and Sonnenschein. Aktionsprogramm, 4.

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Focus of projects between 1974 and 1984 (DM million / number of projects): 1. Ventilation, outgassing, air conditioning (36.5 / 10) 2. Ergonomics, reduction of physical and mental stress (20.9 / 24) 3. Accident prevention (11.1 / 9) 4. Dust Control, Pneumoconiosis Prevention (9.6 / 15) 5. Rock burst prevention (8.2 / 3) 6. Fire and Explosion Protection, Rescue (6.1 / 5) 7. Lighting, communication etc. (2.4 / 3) 8. Noise protection (2.0 / 6) Due to the underground working conditions, especially with the specific occupational risks of miners, it was obvious that the projects within the humanization program were primarily concerned with the improvement of occupational health and safety at work. Is there a way to judge the projects in terms of their success? At least as far as the technical side is concerned, this can be done by evaluating whether the measures to improve working conditions developed in the research projects were actually put into practice or not. The mining industry developed its own rating system for this, and therefore we have to take this into account with the ratings listed below:20 Unrestricted implementation: 64% Implementation limited to special conditions: 11% Implementation only after follow-up investigations: 11% Implementation not relevant: 7% Implementation not possible because no positive results: 7% However, the high proportion of successful projects has very pragmatic reasons: the Ruhrkohle AG made a preliminary selection in the planning of research projects in which projects with a high probability of success were preferred.21 That was a rational decision because the coal industry had to fund the projects with a co-payment. As a rule, the co-payment was 25 to 50 percent, so low-risk projects were preferred. Let’s take a look at some successful projects and get a more concrete idea of what humanization projects in mining were all about.22 The projects for air conditioning were particularly successful. Instead of the usual procedure with many decentralized underground systems, pilot installations were developed in which

20 Ibid., 10. 21 Ibid., 11 22 All examples in: Ibid., 5–8.

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the temperatures could be regulated at a central location for a larger area. Also, the so-called W ventilation, which had been developed in the humanization project “Testing an improved mine ventilation system”, quickly became state of the art. However, these projects show that improved ventilation and air conditioning did not always lead to an improvement in working conditions, as it now enabled areas to be exploited at a greater depth than previously possible. The number of hot workplaces were thus more likely to increase. The testing of inert gases to combat mine fires also prevailed in the hard coal industry. Ergonomic research on underground lighting devices became part of the norms and functional specifications. In dust control, new techniques could be developed such as new methods for watering and sprinkling in the longwall face as well as new dry dust extraction units and advanced measuring and control systems, all of which became standard very quickly. However, there were also failures here. Particularly difficult areas of ventilation are the face-gate intersections, as here significant dust loads for the miners could occur. Although a filter system could be developed that guaranteed almost complete dedusting, the dimensions of the system proved to be too large for practical use. Nevertheless, some research also led directly to changes in occupational health and safety regulations. For example, a low-noise hammer drill could be developed, which meant that no more hammer drills could be used which had a sound pressure level above 106 decibels. For the first time the noise that occurred during mining underground was now scientifically investigated in a systematic way. With the development of the rolling curve, a particularly accident-prone operating point, the already mentioned face-gate intersection could be defused because now continuous transport was possible there. Clearly these are all individual technical measures, but taken together they should have contributed to a noticeable improvement in working conditions. So here we are not dealing with spectacular large-scale projects but, above all, with developments oriented towards the sometimes very specific problems of mining practice. In this regard, in the case of accident prevention and the prevention of occupational diseases, one can certainly speak of a limited success of the humanization program within the coal mining industry. Work organization projects did not play a big role in mining because, unlike, for example, the automotive industry, mining did not involve boring and tiring work on an assembly line. Rather, the mechanization of mining has pushed back both heavy physical and monotonous work. The versatility of the work, the independence in the workmanship and the responsibility of the individual, were seen as positive features of miners’ work. But a big problem in the coal industry was so-called absenteeism and workforce fluctuation. The management assumed this was due to a general dissatisfaction of

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miners with their working conditions. After all, the accident figures were still far higher than in other industrial sectors. It gradually became clear that accident frequency was not only a technical problem, but also dependent on social factors: disturbed collegial relationships, lack of communication, bad cooperation, and job dissatisfaction.23 In addition, the reputation of miners` work had been damaged by the persistent crisis in the industry, making it difficult to find young and skilled technical workers. The solution to these problems was identified on three levels: first, wages, second, qualifications, and, third, working conditions. Thus, a direct link was perceived between the mining crisis and the humanization program.

Continuities and discontinuies The research content and methods of the humanization program were not particularly innovative. They did not differ from other parallel projects for improving working conditions. Here we can see a long history in the coal industry leading to a differentiated research landscape in the field of technical safety with many testing and research institutes. In 1980, for example, the year’s program of mining safety testing and research institutes lists 174 research projects and, in addition, 252 testing projects, but only 28 projects that were part of the humanization program.24 The above-mentioned fields of intervention (ventilation, accident prevention, etc.) had been intensively researched in the German coal industry since the last third of the 19th century. Here, the German insurance system, in particular the introduction of accident insurance by Bismarck played an important role. This social security system integrated miner`s accident but also health insurances (the Knappschaft) pursued especially in their hospitals’ medical research. Of course, the prevention of accidents and the prevention of occupational diseases has always been a plaything in the political conflicts between entrepreneurs and employees or unions. But since the end of the 19th century, there has been a continued expansion of research which was substantial organized and paid for by the mining companies in various of their own research institutions. In the case of the humanization program, it is obvious that many projects came from the portfolio of these well-established research institutions and they would have been implemented without government support.

23 Hagenkötter, Manfred. 1974. Soziale Einflüsse und Häufigkeit der Arbeitsunfälle im Ruhrbergbau. Dortmund: Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Unfallforschung, 72–74. 24 Jahresprogramm der bergbausicherheitlichen Prüf- und Forschungsinstitute 1981 auf Grundlage des Jahresprogramms 1980. montan.dok/BBA 120/2618.

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This is the case, for example, with projects to prevent coal dust production, some of which have direct precursors, and which were subsidized by the European Coal and Steel Community.25 Martha Poplawski, in her study of the humanization program, emphasizes the use of outside scientific expertise for mining.26 However, contrary to this assessment, it seems more appropriate to underline the importance of established occupational safety research within the mining industry itself. In this respect, a look at the research topics and institutions reveals more continuities than discontinuities. However, there is a special feature of the humanization projects, namely that they should also support participation and democratization in companies, although the unions were mostly not involved in the planning of the research projects but in their implementation. This was actually something new. It was also innovative that the results of the research were shared not only with management and engineers, but also with all other employees. For this purpose, the project “HdA Transfer” was founded with eight employees in 1980.27 Here, information about the research projects was collected, prepared, stored and disseminated, for example, through brochures, films, training events in the workforce and the publishing of the journal Informationen zur Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. This resulted in a project proposal for the foundation of a “Arbeitswissenschaftliches Zentrum Bergbau” (Center for Work Studies in Mining).28 This center would not only perform the above-mentioned tasks of the transfer agency, but also ensure that the findings were incorporated into the mining education system:

25 Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl – Hohe Behörde. 1966. Technische Staubbekämpfung im Bergbau, Band 1. Luxemburg: Veröffentlichungsdienste der Europäischen Gemeinschaften; Koch, Werner et al. 1983. “Staubbekämpfung im Bergbau.” Bergbau 7: 326–332. 26 Poplawski, Martha. 2019. “Humanisierung unter Tage? Das HdA-Programm und seine Umsetzung im westdeutschen Steinkohlenbergbau”. In Humanisierung der Arbeit. Aufbrüche und Konflikte in der rationalisierten Arbeitswelt des 20. Jahrhunderts, edited by Nina Kleinöder, Stefan Müller, and Karsten Uhl, 216–231. Bielefeld: transcript. 27 Fronz, D. M. 1980. “Umsetzung von Forschungsergebnissen zur Humanisierung im Steinkohlenbergbau.”. Glückauf 116, no. 24: 1280–1282; Hudewentz, Dietrich. 1981. “Humanisierung der Arbeit. Umsetzung von Forschungsergebnissen.” Bergbau 8: 551–555. See also Informationen zur Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens, Sonderausgabe anläßlich der Ausstellung in Bad Driburg bei der Fortbildungstagung der WBK. 10.-12.10.1983. montan.dok/BBA 120/2650; Projektgruppe Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens (HdA) innerhalb des Instituts für Betriebsführung im Bergbau. 1977–1985. montan.dok/BBA 120/6613. 28 Antragsskizze für ein Arbeitswissenschaftliches Zentrum Bergbau. montan.dok/BBA 120/ 4035; Antrag zur Errichtung eines Arbeitswissenschaftlichen Zentrums. August 1984. montan. dok/BBA 120/6616; Informationsblätter zum Forschungsvorhaben Arbeitswissenschaftliches Zentrum Bergbau (AZB) der WBK. 1987–1988. montan.dok/BBA 120/6615.

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In the context of education and training, key employees and supervisors in the company as well as occupational safety specialists, works councils and pit inspectors, engineers of the supply companies and safety officers are addressed. It should be ensured that knowledge in the field of work science is included in the training system of the mining industry. Alternative models and forms of knowledge transfer are to be developed, tested and evaluated.29

Therefore, a planned Center for Work Studies and Ergonomics was intended to co-operate with many different actors and institutions for knowledge transfer, as well as undertake their own research projects. Likewise, sociological research accompanying the projects was to be permanently installed.30 With this center, mining companies aimed to prepare for the future, as HR managers were aware that the necessary workforce could only be sustained if there was a permanent and visible improvement in workplace conditions. Again, humanization in the German mining industry was seen mainly as an instrument of personnel policy in a troubled industry. The center, which could have been an important hub of experts and miners, never achieved its original goals,31 but evolved into a network of occupational safety experts without the participation of workers or unionists. Another important impetus that emerged from the humanization program was the professionalization of occupational and social science research. Two major studies to assess the burden on miners should be mentioned here. On the one hand, a study on the occupational medical measurement of all physiological and biochemical parameters of the physical strain of the miners’ workplace and, on the other hand, a social scientific and empirical study on the influence of state measures (social and labor market policy) on the humanization of mining.32 Existing risk analysis methodologies, ergonomic analysis and literature analysis were now to be integrated to more efficiently enable corrective and preventative workplace design.33

29 Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Arbeitskreises “Ergonomie” am Mittwoch, dem 17. Oktober 1984, 3. montan.dok/BBA 120/6616. 30 Fronz, M. G. 1981. “Fachtagung über sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung im Programm Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens im Steinkohlenbergbau” Glückauf 117: 1327–1329. 31 Winkler. “HDA im Steinkohlenbergbau”, 162. 32 Schwarz, H. Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. Entwicklung und Erprobung von Methoden und Geräten zur Beurteilung der Belastung des Bergmannes. 1982. montan.dok/BBA 160/7146; Eschweiler Bergwerks-Verein AG, Kohlscheid (Rheinland). Forschung/Gutachten u.ä.; Döhl, Volker et al. 1982. Belastungsabbau unter Tage. Zum Einfluß öffentlicher Maßnahmen auf die Humanisierung der Arbeit. Essen: Verlag Glückauf GmbH. 33 Diskussionsprotokoll: Sachverständigenkreis-Sitzung. „Verbesserung und Umsetzung von wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen und Betriebserfahrungen. 30.05.1984“. montan.dok/BBA 120/6613.

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For the project participants, the takeover of a project was associated with additional management tasks. The application of modern management techniques and project management know-how has thus become increasingly important from this perspective as well. This corresponded with parallel social science studies on work organization in the coal industry, which, for example, dealt with the qualification and role of the Steiger (the foremen) since the 1970s. Certainly a form of institutional modernization can be observed here, but topdown-management remained the general rule.

Conclusion It must be emphasized that despite the impressive number of projects and available financial resources, the humanization projects only represent a small fraction of the research on improving working conditions in the coal industry. For example, in 1980 there were a total of 174 projects in this area, of which only 28 received support from the humanization program. But in the few humanization projects, the participation of employees and unions was implemented seriously. The failure of the Center of Work Sciences was that it lacked a comprehensive, innovative overall strategy in occupational safety. The humanization projects thus remained isolated within the wide scope of other research on the coal industry. For the Mining Union, the humanization program was therefore a lost opportunity.34 Contemporary criticism of the humanization program also came from another direction. The Federal Court of Auditors found that the program was a sacred cow of the trade unions, that research was subsidized by the watering-can principle, that reviewers themselves participated in the approved research funds and that, overall, only a few results had been achieved for a lot of money.35 But the conclusion of this chapter remains at least a bit ambiguous. A first result was that the humanization project was not a watershed, as democratizing and emancipative approaches were not implemented. However, a second result is that the humanization project was a watershed because the human as a resource was re-thought in the context of the coal crisis, albeit solely in terms of productivity and profitability, but also in a more scientific and empirical way. This result is quite ambivalent, but the common assumption that the humanization

34 Winkler. “HDA im Steinkohlenbergbau”, 162. 35 Bundeszentrum zur Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. montan.dok/BBA 120/949.

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project failed as a whole is a bit too simplistic and one-sided. Often, such judgements are also politically motivated. This article could only give an overview of the humanization program in the German coal industry. Unfortunately, there are no comparative perspectives that would place the experiences and outcome of humanization in Germany in an international context. Stefan Müller drew attention to the transnational dimension of the attempts at humanization in the 1970s, which was particularly popular in the Western industrialized countries and was implemented in many countries with a social democratic government.36 At present the transnational socio-historical as well as economic and scientific-historical aspects of the humanization project are also being intensively examined with regard to a debate about the present and future of good work that is still ongoing today.37 For mining, it would be worthwhile to initiate comparative studies first at a (Western) European level, especially since the foundation of the European Coal and Steel Community had provided an institutional framework that was active in the field of occupational health and safety even before the humanization projects. This could make similarities but also national differences in dealing with industrial workplaces more visible. In addition, it would be easier to assess whether there was an international exchange of knowledge by international institutions or whether the research results of the humanization project in German coal mining remained on a national level.

References Antrag zur Errichtung eines Arbeitswissenschaftlichen Zentrums. August 1984. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 120/6616. Antragsskizze für ein Arbeitswissenschaftliches Zentrum Bergbau. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 120/4035. Brandt, Willy. 1969. “Regierungserklärung von Bundeskanzler Willy Brandt vor dem Deutschen Bundestag in Bonn am 28. Oktober 1969.” Accessed November 21, 2018. https://www.willy-brandt.de/fileadmin/brandt/Downloads/Regierungserklaerung_Willy_ Brandt_1969.pdf.

36 Müller. Humanisierung der Arbeitswelt, 260. 37 Kleinöder, Nina, Stefan Müller, and Karsten Uhl. 2019. “Die Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. Einführung und methodische Überlegungen”. In Humanisierung der Arbeit. Aufbrüche und Konflikte in der rationalisierten Arbeitswelt des 20. Jahrhunderts, edited by Nina Kleinöder, Stefan Müller, and Karsten Uhl, 9–32. Bielefeld: transcript.

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Brandt, Willy. 1973. “Bundeskanzler Brandt. Regierungserklärung des zweiten Kabinetts Brandt / Scheel vom 18. Januar 1973.” Accessed November 21, 2018. http://library.fes.de/pdf-files/netzquelle/a88-06578.pdf. Bundeszentrum zur Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 120/949. Diskussionsprotokoll: Sachverständigenkreis-Sitzung. „Verbesserung und Umsetzung von wissenschaftlichen Erkenntnissen und Betriebserfahrungen. 30.05.1984. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 120/6613. Doering-Manteuffel, Anselm, and Lutz Raphael. 2011. “Der Epochenbruch in den 1970erJahren: Thesen zur Phänomenologie und den Wirkungen des Strukturwandels nach dem Boom.” In Nach dem Strukturbruch? Kontinuität und Wandel von Arbeitswelten, edited by Knud Andresen, Ursula Bitzegeio, and Jürgen Mittag, 25–40. Bonn: Dietz. Döhl, Volker et al. 1982. Belastungsabbau unter Tage. Zum Einfluß öffentlicher Maßnahmen auf die Humanisierung der Arbeit. Essen: Verlag Glückauf GmbH. Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl – Hohe Behörde. 1966. Technische Staubbekämpfung im Bergbau, Band 1. Luxemburg: Veröffentlichungsdienste der Europäischen Gemeinschaften. Fronz, D. M. 1980. “Umsetzung von Forschungsergebnissen zur Humanisierung im Steinkohlenbergbau.“. Glückauf 116, no. 24: 1280–2. Fronz, M. G. 1981. “Fachtagung über sozialwissenschaftliche Forschung im Programm Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens im Steinkohlenbergbau“ Glückauf 117: 1327–9. Funke, Hajo, Wilheilm Keuschen, and Peter Thoma. 1975. “Produktionsprozeß und Krankheit.“ In Industriearbeit und Gesundheitsverschleiß. Diskussion und Ergebnisse der Tagung “Sicherheit am Arbeitsplatz und Unfallschutz“, edited by Hajo Funke, Brigitte Geißler, and Peter Thoma, 27–44. Frankfurt (Main)/Köln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. Hagenkötter, Manfred. 1974. Soziale Einflüsse und Häufigkeit der Arbeitsunfälle im Ruhrbergbau. Dortmund: Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Unfallforschung. Hamm, Eduard, and Dieter Sonnenschein. Aktionsprogramm Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. Ergebnisse von Entwicklungsvorhaben der RAG und deren Umsetzung. 1974–1984. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 131/259, 3. Hudewentz, Dietrich. 1981. “Humanisierung der Arbeit. Umsetzung von Forschungsergebnissen.” Bergbau 8: 551–5. Kleinöder, Nina. 2016. “Humanisierung der Arbeit“. Literaturbericht zum „Forschungsprogramm zur Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. Düsseldorf: Hans-Böckler-Stiftung. (https://www.boeckler.de/64509.htm?produkt=HBS-006267&chunk=1&jahr=&). Kleinöder, Nina, Stefan Müller, and Karsten Uhl. 2019. “Die Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. Einführung und methodische Überlegungen”. In Humanisierung der Arbeit. Aufbrüche und Konflikte in der rationalisierten Arbeitswelt des 20. Jahrhunderts, edited by Nina Kleinöder, Stefan Müller, and Karsten Uhl, 9–32. Bielefeld: transcript. Koch, Werner et al. 1983. “Staubbekämpfung im Bergbau.“ Bergbau 7: 326–32. Informationen zur Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens, Sonderausgabe anläßlich der Ausstellung in Bad Driburg bei der Fortbildungstagung der WBK. 10.-12.10.1983. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 120/2650. Informationsblätter zum Forschungsvorhaben Arbeitswissenschaftliches Zentrum Bergbau (AZB) der WBK. 1987–1988. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 120/6615.

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Jahresprogramm der bergbausicherheitlichen Prüf- und Forschungsinstitute 1981 auf Grundlage des Jahresprogramms 1980. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/ Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 120/2618. Matthöfer, Hans. 1977. Humanisierung der Arbeit und Produktivität in der Industriegesellschaft. Frankfurt (Main)/Köln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. Müller, Stefan. 2016. “Humanisierung der Arbeitswelt 1.0. Historisch-kritische Befragung eines Reformprogramms der Neunzehnhundertsiebzigerjahre.” In Solidarität im Wandel der Zeiten –150 Jahre Gewerkschaften, edited by Willy Buschak, 253–75. Essen: Klartext. Niederschrift über die Sitzung des Arbeitskreises “Ergonomie“ am Mittwoch, dem 17. Oktober 1984, 3. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 120/6616. Poplawski, Martha. 2019. “Humanisierung unter Tage? Das HdA-Programm und seine Umsetzung im westdeutschen Steinkohlenbergbau”. In Humanisierung der Arbeit. Aufbrüche und Konflikte in der rationalisierten Arbeitswelt des 20. Jahrhunderts, edited by Nina Kleinöder, Stefan Müller, and Karsten Uhl, 216–31. Bielefeld: transcript. Projektgruppe Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens (HdA) innerhalb des Instituts für Betriebsführung im Bergbau. 1977–1985. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/ Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 120/6613. Schaumann, Michael. 1974. “Bestandsaufnahme, Analyse und Entwicklungstrends im Produktionsbereich“. In Humanisierung der Arbeit als gesellschaftspolitische und gewerkschaftliche Aufgabe. Protokoll der DGB-Konferenz vom 16. und 17. Mai 1974 in München, edited by Heinz Oskar Vetter, 41–55. Frankfurt (Main)/Köln: Europäische Verlagsanstalt. Schwarz, H. Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. Entwicklung und Erprobung von Methoden und Geräten zur Beurteilung der Belastung des Bergmannes. 1982. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 160/7146. Seefried, Elke. 2017. “Partei der Zukunft? Der Wandel des sozialdemokratischen Fortschrittverständnisses 1960–2000.“ In Zeitenwandel. Transformationen geschichtlicher Zeitlichkeit nach dem Boom, edited by Fernando Esposito, 193–225. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Seibring, Anne. 2011. “Die Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens in den 1970er-Jahren: Forschungsstand und Forschungsperspektiven.” In Nach dem Strukturbruch? Kontinuität und Wandel von Arbeitswelten, edited by Knud Andresen, Ursula Bitzegeio, and Jürgen Mittag, 107–26. Bonn: Dietz. Winkler, Kurt. 1994. “HDA im Steinkohlenbergbau“. In Immer auf den Punkt. Beiträge zur Arbeitsforschung, Arbeitsgestaltung, Arbeitspolitik. Willi Pöhler zum 60. Geburtstag, edited by Karl Krahn, Gerd Peter, and Rainer Skrotzki, 151–63. Dortmund: Montania.

Sara-Marie Demiriz

Qualifying the stranger: Educational policies for migrant workers in the West-German mining industry The history of heavy industry in general as well as the mining industry of the Ruhr area in particular is also the history of migration. Between the 1950s and 1970s, Western European industrialised countries recruited foreign workers at unprecedented levels. Whether in boom or in crisis ‘guest workers’ (Gastarbeiter) – mainly performing untrained and semi-skilled jobs – were needed to ensure the productivity of the coal mining industry of the Ruhr area and thereby functioned as an economic buffer (konjunktureller Puffer).1 As the term ‘guest workers’ itself implies, foreign workers from various European and non-European countries were to stay only for a determined period of time. Nevertheless, a significant number of them became permanent residents and a part not only of the workers’ milieu, but also of society – a fact that became especially evident after the halt to recruitment (Anwerbestopp) of 1973 and the family unification drive. Called to prevent a ‘crisis’ in the first place, migrant workers were themselves affected by crisis and the so-called ‘structural change’. Yet, immigration policy was not put into action; integration initiated by qualification programmes and immigration law for instance was not pushed forward – at least not on a federal level. The character of Germany as a ‘Country of Immigration’ was mostly denied or at least did not result in concepts of political action. Contrary to this, other players such as companies, trade unions, charity and welfare associations as well as local stakeholders of the cities (sometimes in cooperation with the immigrant communities) addressed much earlier social challenges which had been created by labour migration. Challenges were accepted and seized when they first became visible; therefore less at the national than at the local level.2 Based on these assumptions, this chapter will examine how the future of the ‘guest worker’ was negotiated through ‘education’ and ‘knowledge’ and to what extent these “instruments” were used in order to create equality of opportunity, to enable migrants to take part in community life and to prevent or at least support those suffering personal as well as economic crisis. 1 Cf.: Oltmer, Jochen. 2016. Migration vom 19. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter/ Oldenbourg, 58. 2 Cf.: Oltmer, Jochen, ed. 2018. Migrationsregime vor Ort und lokales Aushandeln von Migration. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-008

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The coal mining industry serves as a starting point in this venture. The Unternehmensverband Ruhrbergbau and the later founded Ruhrkohle Aktiengesellschaft are regarded as the ‘first reception centres’ for labour migration in the Ruhrgebiet: Here is where the ‘guest workers’ first arrived, here where they worked and, initially, spent their free time. Thereby the Ruhrgebiet is seen as an example for other regions, challenged not only by economical but also social crises during the 1960s and 1970s, that had to meet social change with new integration tools. In addition, the mining industry was seen as an economic heavyweight in the region, which pursued a far-reaching social and welfare policy and acted not only operationally, but also in terms of societal development.3 Focusing on the Revierarbeitsgemeinschaft für kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung (REVAG) as an educational institution operating within the coal mining industry, it will be argued here that the coal mining industry, though itself in decline and ‘crisis’, also affected and supported the social and professional integration of ‘guest workers’ within the Ruhr area deeply and widely – before federal policies reacted to the issues of immigration in a more general way. It will be shown that the REVAG was not only an agent of qualification and integration within the coal mining industry itself, but also supported joint projects and initiated cooperation with other social services and institutions.4 The REVAG – a joint task force of the different coal mining companies of the Ruhr area, the Ministry of Education (North-Rhine Westphalia) and the IGBE (Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau und Energie, the mining and energy workers’ trade union) – was originally established in 1949 to “extend adult education to the care of miners”.5 The institution was founded in response to the special situation and needs of the so-called Neubergleute – mostly young German men who had experienced horror and terror during World War Two and who afterwards came to the Ruhr area – lured by pay and additional care packages. They lived in dance halls, bowling alleys and Nissen huts – or the barracks of former prisoner of war camps. The newly organised care work was intended to free these – German – men from social isolation and provide orientation. It aimed to offer these German men a new perspective and a means of preventing conflict as well as criminality due to isolation and trauma. In accordance with the reeducation policy of the Allies, REVAG offered different kinds of learning courses.

3 Cf.: Knotter, Ad. 2015. “Migration and Ethnicity in Coalfield History. Global Perspectives.” International Review of Social History 60 (Special Issue): 13–39. 4 Special thanks to Jan Kellershohn and Anne Otto for clarifying annotations and distinct thoughts. 5 Revierarbeitsgemeinschaft für kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung e.V. (REVAG), ed. 1998. 50 Jahre Miteinander. REVAG 1948–1998. Bochum: Laupenmühlen Druck, 9.

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They basically were to be educated in democracy and to lift up the traumatised men as well as enable them to become respected citizens of the Federal Republic.6 Besides these social reasons, economic considerations also led to the founding of REVAG. The young men, who were newly recruited and trained to work in the mines, were to stay in the company as long as possible.7 Satisfaction in the workers’ leisure time was considered a crucial factor of a worker’s productivity. Therefore “conditions that endangered the work harmony within the coal mine and thus the production of the treasured coal”8 were to be improved and changed by the work of REVAG.9 Cultural education was thus regarded as a tool of integration. As such, the work of REVAG in the 1940s and 1950s began as a kind of integration work – although it was aimed at young German men and not at ‘guest workers’. Despite the support of REVAG, many men left the coal mining industry between 1945 and 1954. During the economic boom, “of the approximately 800,000 miners who were recruited and trained only 192,600 stayed connected with mining”.10 The rest switched the hard work within the coal mines for a less exhausting job in other sectors of industry or a job in smaller trades. Due to this emigration of workers as well as a change of residence from dormitories to private flats and houses, REVAG lost a large part of its target group. The newly recruited ‘guest workers’ who settled in the dormitories and picked up the work of the German Neubergleute quickly became its new one. The programme and cultural supervision did not change structurally. At first the experiences with the homeless German Neubergleute were transferred to the foreigner: sports, lectures, films and so-called working groups were still used, but now in order to integrate ‘guest workers’. The educational mission of REVAG as a kind of re-education and democratisation policy was also sustained. Lectures were given on issues like “The young man in the state”, “The task of the parties”, “Free economy, free man”,

6 Cf.: Asfur, Anke. 2000. “Die Revierarbeitsgemeinschaft für kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung im Kontext der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung des Ruhrgebiets von den Anfängen bis in die Mitte der sechziger Jahre.” Master of Arts. Ruhr University Bochum, 33–36. 7 Cf.: Kift, Dagmar. 2014. “Migration, Integration, Partizipation. Kulturelles Handeln und Identität im Ruhrgebiet nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg.” In Kulturelles Handeln im transkulturellen Raum, edited by Andreas Jacob, and Gordon Kampe, 61–87. Hildesheim/Zürich/New York: Georg Olms Verlag, 71. 8 Schmitz, Dagmar. Fachaufsatz. Wahrscheinlich Mitte bis Ende der 1980er. montan.dok/BBA 216/7. 9 Asfur. “Die Revierarbeitsgemeinschaft für kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung”, 91. 10 Cf.: Kift. “Migration”, 71.

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and “European Economic Community, cornerstones of European democracy”.11 Yet a new focus, which became a cornerstone in REVAG’s work, was learning German and getting to know German culture and customs. Although these initial REVAG-courses are not to be understood in terms of further education or job-training they were still part of a cultural education. They broadened the guest workers’ knowledge and were intended to help the men settle quickly and integrate them corporately, if not socially. Adequate accommodation, common rooms, assistance in payroll accounting, access to foreign magazines, as well as raising general awareness of the life situation and problems of the ‘new colleagues’ within the German core workforce, were understood as integrative measures.12 Under the banner “Help people to help themselves” REVAG tried to provide the guest workers with an initial orientation and to take away the feeling of being a stranger.13 During the early years REVAG mainly aimed at helping foreign workers to find their way in a new life-situation and to adjust to the German work- and life-style. In 1964 – after some difficulties – REVAG was able to offer its programme in different languages. The participation was judged as “surprisingly (sic!) good: Of all Turks working in the mining industry, RAG serves 68%, 62% of the Greeks, 43% of the Italian and 42% of the Spanish.”14 In the early 1970s, REVAG declared integration of the ‘guest workers’ as one major goal: “REVAG – in considering all possible measures – intends to help foreign workers achieve satisfaction and feel at home even outside of their new working environment.”15 Even though REVAG managed to spread its work within the working environment of the coal mining industry and was able to reach a number of foreign employees, they had to face challenges and difficulties in the process: Language courses did not bring the anticipated results right away, dealing with the different cultures was not always easy and being a social agent aiming for cultural and working integration started out as a top-down idea. Interpreters who were hired to

11 Cf.: Louis, Carl. Tätigkeitsbericht der REVAG. 1963. montan.dok/BBA 216/34. 12 Cf.: Stolzenburg, Otto. Vortrag über die Ausländerbeschäftigung in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, mit einer Statistik der einzelnen Nationalitäten von 1966/67, Tabelle Ausländer Ruhrrevier. 1967/67. montan.dok/BBA 252/54. 13 Cf.: Louis, Carl. Bericht über die Betreuung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer. 1963. montan. dok/BBA 216/34. For further information see: Demiriz, Sara-Marie. “Vom ‘Gastarbeiter’ zum Mitbürger – Integration durch Bildung in Nordrhein-Westfalen am Beispiel der Revierarbeitsgemeinschaft für kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung im Ruhrgebiet” (in press). 14 Louis, Carl. Bericht über die Betreuung ausländischer Arbeitnehmer. 1963. montan.dok/BBA 216/34. 15 REVAG. Situations- und Tätigkeitsbericht, “Kronenberg”. 1973. Ibid.

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ease communication problems and language boundaries often abused their power in order to benefit themselves. Thus, although REVAG’s migrant policy early on started out as an “integration-venture”, what integration meant and how it could be provided properly had to be negotiated. In these regards, the early integration policy of the West German coal mining industry reflected in the cultural and educational programmes of REVAG has to be understood as a profound learning process, from a rather paternalistic yet care-giving approach to an intercultural integration policy that was able to adjust to the changing circumstances between the 1960s and 1990s.16 In particular, the Kronenburger Conferences reflect the process of negotiating the future of the guest workers and their families – a process that shows the development from guest worker to fellow citizen. Here educational and social policies towards guest workers were discussed, experiences were shared and new strategies planned. Beyond that, Kronenburg served as internal further training. In Kronenburg, not only REVAG staff were gathered, but also representatives of the Ministry of Education, the mining trade union and employees of Ruhrkohle AG. Speakers included personalities from federal and state ministries, embassies, universities, coal mining companies and others. Thus, the meetings brought different stakeholders of the Ruhrgebiet, the state of North Rhine-Westphalia, but also of the federal government together. Impulses for the integration task came from the Ruhrgebiet, from the mining industry, and were perceived even on a national level. In 1975, Heinz Richter (Head of Division, Federal Board DGB, Department Foreign Employees) urged that the challenges of migration in the sense of integration could not be an issue for companies or trade unions, churches or other socially important organizations alone, but a task and a question that needed to be answered by the entire German society.17 Ruhrkohle AG appeared to Richter as a possible model for other companies and regions challenged by migration.18 The course offerings changed in content and adapted to new circumstances: structural changes, economic ups and downs of boom and crisis, family

16 Cf. also: Przigoda, Stefan, and Stefan Goch. 2010. “Wiederaufbau, ‘Wirtschaftswunder’, ‘Gastarbeiter’”. In Fremd(e) im Revier!? Zuwanderung und Fremdsein im Ruhrgebiet, edited by Klaus Wisotzky, and Ingrid Wölk, 248–249. Essen: Klartext, 249. 17 Richter, Heinz. Der Deutsche Gewerkschaftsbund zur Frage der ausländischen Arbeitnehmer. 40. Kronenburger Tagung. montan.dok/BBA 216/34. 18 Ibid.

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reunification, causing feminization and rejuvenation of the immigrant population,19 the changed housing situation and workforce reduction. It also changed due to the increasing proportion of foreign employees and the increasing numbers of young seniors due to take early retirement (Frühverrentung) in the mining industry.20 In this regards, the promotion of young people of the second generation, but also women and children was undertaken early: literacy courses for Turkish women and homework tutoring for the children of foreign miners were offered even before the German Anwerbestopp of 1973 caused a consolidation of residence. The courses were to function as an aid to settle in, to give first insights into German culture and society, and broaden the knowledge of migrant citizens. The future of young people, children and women, their chance to start an education, to be included in the working environment as well as society, were frequently discussed during the Kronenburger conferences from the mid-1970s and were steadily promoted by the REVAG.21 REVAG not only provided further education – language courses, alphabetisation courses, help for homework in school and vocational training –, but also aimed at creating frame conditions, facilitating foreign fellow citizens’ access to training and education. Derived from the experience of traditional educational practice with German workers it was believed that “mainly the conviction to be able to rise professionally or socially, decides whether workers participate in further education events or not”.22 With the support of REVAG, workers’ homes were set up and pedagogical staff as well as people with language skills were

19 Piorr, Ralf. 1998. “Einwanderer wider Willen in einem Einwanderungsland wider Willen . . . – Gastarbeiter und moderne Migration.” In Eine Reise ins Unbekannte. Ein Lesebuch zur Migrationsgeschichte in Herne und Wanne-Eickel, edited by Ralf Piorr, 201–216. Essen: Klartext, 204. 20 Cf.: RAG Sozialwesen. REVAG-Maßnahmen 1986. November 1987; REVAG-Tagung, Essen. 29.9.1987; Schmidt, Paul, Brief an Fritz Ziegler, Mitglied des Vorstandes der Ruhrkohle AG. 9.6.1987, all: montan.dok/BBA 216/31. For more information about the structural change and migrant labour cf.: Skrabania, David. 2015. “Ausländerbeschäftigung und -ausbildung im Ruhrbergbau. Maßnahmen der zuständigen Institutionen als Reaktion auf sich verändernde Bedingungen der Nachwuchswerbung 1956–1989.” Der Anschnitt 67, no. 2-3: 93–104. 21 Cf.: Goebels, Karl-Heinz. DGB, Abt. Ausländische Arbeitnehmer. Wie stellen sich die aktuellen Probleme der Ausländerpolitik dar – welche Alternativen bleiben für eine zukunftsorientierte Ausländerpolitik – Aussprache. 1985. montan.dok/BBA 216/22; and Bilgi 3/04. Beitrag über die REVAG und Kursleiter Paul Haasch. 1987. montan.dok/BBA 216/31. 22 Dr. Senzky, Klaus. Direktor der Volkshochschule Duisburg. Lehrbeauftragter Pädagogische Hochschule Rheinland. Wege der Erwachsenenbildung in der Aufgabenstellung zum ausländischen Mitbürger. REVAG, 40. Kronenburger Tagung. 1975. montan.dok/BBA 216/34.

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employed to ensure that even after a hard shift further learning and training could be made possible. The success of educational measures thus was highly linked to the acceptance of the latter. It (simply) depended on participation and commitment as first steps towards change. Providing and influencing both work and leisure time, cultural education and further education were understood as an element of ‘modern’ employee politics. As pointed out by mine director, Heinz Kegel, a board member of RAG, work and leisure time were regarded as two sides of a coin which influenced and interacted with each other: For no one can seriously believe that a person will be open-minded for relaxed entertainment and demanding employment in their leisure time, if his personality development is not possible or even exposed to permanent humiliation. He will not be able to simply erase these experiences, which has caused an outdated and incorrect understanding of hierarchy in him, at the factory gate. If our work within the leisure rooms should not remain a piecework, if it is to contribute to personal enrichment of life, this point has to be taken in consideration!23

Building on these basic convictions, the support work of REVAG constantly expanded over the years. While REVAG wanted to provide ways towards integration, preserving different cultures and the diversity of life-styles increasingly became a part of their policy. In particular, Paul Schmidt – Managing Director of REVAG – emphasised the distinct responsibility for the educational and training opportunities of foreign children and adolescents in the 1980s. He pointed out that “integration into the society of the Federal Republic of Germany must take place with simultaneous recognition and promotion of cultural autonomy”24 and be supported by all areas of social life. There was no German Leitkultur. In fact, recognizing the differences was given more importance than demanding assimilation. Knowing the cultural identity of their ‘target group’ also enabled REVAG docents, social workers and language teachers to find and implement new teaching methods that were able to reach women who have never learned to write or read. In an intercultural approach, they established access to people who might never have been in a classroom situation, but who needed language skills and at least an overall idea about ‘living in Germany’ in order to not only live a suitable life but

23 Kegel, Heinz. Bergwerksdirektor, Vorstandsmitglied der Ruhrkohle AG. Belegschaftspolitik im Deutschen Steinkohlenbergbau. 40. Kronenburger Tagung. 1975. Ibid. 24 Schmidt, Paul. Ausländische Kinder und Jugendliche in Bildung und Ausbildung – Möglichkeiten Gemeinsamer Kulturarbeit. Wahrscheinlich 1980er Jahre. montan.dok/BBA 216/55.

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be able to participate. Diversity and acceptance were seen as one major step towards integration and considered a vital instrument to break through learning barriers. The importance of REVAG for the cultural education of the guest workers – and maybe one could even speak of first intercultural approaches – steadily increased. The educational programme started by REVAG in the 1960s was not carried out by REVAG alone. As the federal state of North Rhine-Westphalia, the mining trade union (IGBE) and adult education centre (Volkshochschule, NRW) founded and supported REVAG’s work, it had always been a joint venture that was highly connected with the region as well as – more importantly – with mining structures and institutions. In addition, other institutions, education partners and institutions, which like REVAG took care of the social and economic needs of migrants, viewed education and further training as a tool for integration. These included the Arbeiterwohlfahrt (AWO), the Caritas, the Inner Mission, the youth social work (Jugendsozialwerk), various squire clubs, the Christian Youth Work, sports clubs, Regional Agencies for the Promotion of Children and Young People from Immigrant Families and Regional Agencies for Education, Integration and Democracy,25 the Joint Social Work of Churches in Mining,26 but also Turkish associations and educational institutions. Likewise, there were various collaborations with different scientific institutions such as the ‘Ruhr-universities’ or research institutions such as the Institute for Immigration Issues (Institut für Ausländerfragen) – which was also sponsored by the mining industry and the IGBE. In particular the IGBE, the AWO and the GSA, according to the current state of knowledge, seem to have worked closely with the REVAG and the institutions of the mining industry.27 The GSA as a form of social work initiated by that industry and carried out by the churches supported the operational integration of migrants, in particular by their conference offer.28 During the 1960s, these seminars were meant to be only “special issue” conferences in order to support German RAG-employees, who had to interact with “foreign-language” colleagues. These German men were mostly “home directors, trainers, personnel and social services staff as well as company supervisors who discussed the issues of learning time,

25 Regionale Arbeitsstellen zur Förderung von Kindern und Jugendlichen aus Zuwandererfamilien und Regionale Arbeitsstellen für Bildung, Integration und Demokratie (RAA). 26 Gemeinsame Sozialarbeit der Kirchen im Bergbau (GSA). 27 Cf.: Waltz, Viktoria. 2015. “Obektiv gesehen. ‘Der Bergbau braucht uns’”. In Glückauf Deutschland, edited by Viktoria Waltz/Verein für Internationale Freundschaft e.V. Dortmund, 31–35. Dortmund: assoverlag and Skrabania. Ausländerbeschäftigung und -ausbildung im Ruhrbergbau, 100. 28 Cf.: Jähnichen, Traugott, Norbert Friedrich, and Wolfgang Hertig eds. 2000. Den Wandel gestalten. 50 Jahre Gemeinsame Sozialarbeit der Konfessionen im Bergbau. Essen: Klartext.

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German lessons [and] learning underground”.29 Furthermore, they handled problems of accommodation and meals as well as difficulties regarding different cultural habits and performances. As early as 1972 the seminars were opened to “foreign-language” employees. In 1978 the conferences were named “Conference for Turkish and German employees”. They were held in order to give foreign workers as well as Germans a platform to express their fears and ideas regarding challenges that arose due to language and cultural differences.30 Above all, the exchange between foreign and German employees was reflected as a key element for integration and good cooperation. They were convinced that problems could only be solved together, and could even only be recognised in conversation. These newly proclaimed cooperative and inclusive approaches to migrants were also reflected in the employment of migrant tutors and docents e.g. Cengiz Camci as the first full-time Turkish lecturer of REVAG.31 The future of migrant workers was no longer to be negotiated from the outside but planned and discussed with them. Here, too, the old paternalistic approach gave way to a more participatory one. Whilst REVAG was still teaching German culture in the 1950s and 1960s, ‘transforming’ the foreign workers into ‘good Germans’, in the 1970s and 1980s cultural equality and co-work with migrant citizens were increasingly demanded. The work of Revierarbeitsgemeinschaft für kulturelle Bergmannbetreuung shows that qualification (professional and cultural education) had been regarded as one major tool aimed at a smooth working process as well as the integration of foreign workers into companies and society as a whole. Qualification and education in the sense of cultural education in a time of crisis and change were envisioned as suitable tools to prevent or at least support those suffering private and economical ‘crisis’ and ensure the future of the guest workers and their families as well as the future of the company. As reflected in the Kronenburg conferences, REVAG aimed at professionalizing its work: programmes should not remain experiments but, as it seems, be formed into structured guidelines and even social-(pedagogical) concepts. Educational programmes and integration strategies were formed around the working environment and deeply engaged with work structures. REVAG’s work was thus not an “emergency institution” designed for plugging the holes but for fighting causes.

29 Pohlmann, Dietrich. 2000. “Schritte auf dem Weg zur Integration. Die Tagungen für türkische und deutsche Mitarbeiter des Bergbaus.” In Den Wandel gestalten. 50 Jahre Gemeinsame Sozialarbeit der Konfessionen im Bergbau, edited by Traugott Jähnichen, Norbert Friedrich, and Wolfgang Hertig, 165–179. Essen: Klartext, 165. 30 Cf.: Ibid. 31 REVAG. 50 Jahre Miteinander, 23.

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REVAG was not only an agent of qualification and integration within the coal mining industry itself, but part of a wider network consisting of regional and national stakeholders and players. The coal mining industry – especially through REVAG, IGBE and GSA – helped to lay an early foundation for a more general immigration policy and built up a network of different pressure groups dealing with the issue of immigration in the Ruhrgebiet and NRW. The Ruhrgebiet thereby became an experimental ground for foreign education policy as well as for the negotiation process described above – some even envisioned it would serve as a model to other regions. While the national narrative declares a rather “late” (verspätete) German migration policy (in the 1990s), the presented analysis shows that at the local regional level, migration policy was put into action much earlier (the 1960s). In the light of these results, it seems vital to bring together national and local research in order to gain a more complete picture of West German migration policy.

References Asfur, Anke. 2000. “Die Revierarbeitsgemeinschaft für kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung im Kontext der gesellschaftlichen Entwicklung des Ruhrgebiets von den Anfängen bis in die Mitte der sechziger Jahre.” Master of Arts. Ruhr-University Bochum. Demiriz, Sara-Marie. Vom ‚Gastarbeiter‘ zum Mitbürger – Integration durch Bildung in Nordrhein-Westfalen am Beispiel der Revierarbeitsgemeinschaft für kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung im Ruhrgebiet (in press). Jähnichen, Traugott, Norbert Friedrich, and Wolfgang Hertig eds. 2000. Den Wandel gestalten. 50 Jahre Gemeinsame Sozialarbeit der Konfessionen im Bergbau. Essen: Klartext. Kift, Dagmar. 2014. “Migration, Integration, Partizipation. Kulturelles Handeln und Identität im Ruhrgebiet nach dem Zweiten Weltkrieg”. In Kulturelles Handeln im transkulturellen Raum, edited by Andreas Jacob, and Gordon Kampe, 61–87. Hildesheim/Zürich/ New York: Georg Olms Verlag. Knotter, Ad. 2015. “Migration and Ethnicity in Coalfield History. Global Perspectives.” International Review of Social History 60 (Special Issue): 13–39. Oltmer, Jochen, ed. 2018. Migrationsregime vor Ort und lokales Aushandeln von Migration. Wiesbaden: Springer VS. Oltmer, Jochen. 2016. Migration vom 19. bis zum 21. Jahrhundert. Berlin/Boston: De Gruyter/ Oldenbourg. Piorr, Ralf. 1998. “Einwanderer wider Willen in einem Einwanderungsland wider Willen . . . – Gastarbeiter und moderne Migration.” In Eine Reise ins Unbekannte. Ein Lesebuch zur Migrationsgeschichte in Herne und Wanne-Eickel, edited by Ralf Piorr, 201–16. Essen: Klartext. Pohlmann, Dietrich. 2000. “Schritte auf dem Weg zur Integration. Die Tagungen für türkische und deutsche Mitarbeiter des Bergbaus“. In Den Wandel gestalten. 50 Jahre Gemeinsame

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Sozialarbeit der Konfessionen im Bergbau, edited by Traugott Jähnichen, Norbert Friedrich, and Wolfgang Hertig, 165–79. Essen: Klartext. Przigoda, Stefan, and Stefan Goch. 2010. “Wiederaufbau, ‘Wirtschaftswunder’, ‘Gastarbeiter’”. In Fremd(e) im Revier!? Zuwanderung und Fremdsein im Ruhrgebiet, edited by Klaus Wisotzky, and Ingrid Wölk, 248–9, Essen: Klartext. Revierarbeitsgemeinschaft für kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung e.V. (REVAG), ed. 1998. 50 Jahre Miteinander. REVAG 1948–1998. Bochum: Laupenmühlen Druck. Skrabania, David. 2015. “Ausländerbeschäftigung und -ausbildung im Ruhrbergbau. Maßnahmen der zuständigen Institutionen als Reaktion auf sich verändernde Bedingungen der Nachwuchswerbung 1956–1989.” Der Anschnitt 67, no. 2-3: 93–104. Waltz, Viktoria. 2015. “Obektiv gesehen. ‘Der Bergbau braucht uns’”. In Glückauf Deutschland, edited by Viktoria Waltz/Verein für Internationale Freundschaft e.V. Dortmund, 31–5. Dortmund: assoverlag.

Jan Kellershohn

Mobility and the crisis of intelligence: The mining industry and the negotiation of knowledge under “deindustrialisation” “Structural change” and knowledge On July 1st and 2nd, 1968, the youth organisation of the German miners’ and energy workers’ trade union (IGBE) organised its annual meeting in Bochum, West Germany. Its entertaining programme could not mask the deep problems of the German mining industry. The loss of around 240,000 mining industry jobs between 1957 and 1968 cast a shadow on the pole marquees: the question of the future of miners’ jobs was omnipresent. A newspaper put the problem into words: The crisis, which has begun as a coal crisis, will end up as an employment crisis. The fact that last year only 21 students chose to study mining engineering illuminates the situation. Are exclusively the imbeciles striving for the mining industry?1

This marginal but emblematic example refers to a central nexus established during the 1960s: the nexus between knowledge, social inequality and the future of work. It was closely linked to the notion of “structural change”, which seemed to be a predictable process, clearly following the different economic sectors.2 Simultaneous with the reunion in West Germany, for instance, the American management consultant Peter F. Drucker stated “knowledge has become the very foundation of modern economy and modern society and the very principle of social action”.3 However, such interpretations do not reveal that Western societies evolved into “knowledgeable societies”.4 They instead show that the relation between knowledge, equality and future had to be renegotiated

1 Anonymous. 1967. “Fragen nach der Zukunft. Beat-Wettbewerb mit 15 Bands/200 Großzelte.” Ruhr-Nachrichten, July 1, 1967. 2 Fisher, Allan G. B. 1939. “Production, Primary, Secondary, Tertiary.” The Economic Record 15, no. 28: 24–38; Fourastié, Jean. 1949. Le Grand Espoir du XXe Siècle. Progrès Technique, Progrès Économique, Progress Social. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. 3 Drucker, Peter F. 1969. The Age of Discontinuity. Guidelines to our Changing Society. London: Heinemann, 347. 4 Lane, Robert E. 1966. “The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society.” American Sociological Review 31: 649–662. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-009

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via the prism of deindustrialisation. This process constituted a challenge to institutions concerned with education and work, especially in the mining industry. The Western historiography of coal after 1945 is a history of crisis, deeply embedded in national narratives of sacrifice, trust and betrayal.5 Particularly for France and West Germany, it is a story that emphasises explanatory concepts such as “structural change” or “conversion”. Thereby, the post-war history of the mining industry (and of heavy industry in general) is dominantly told by its end. Taking into account recent debates on the notion of crisis,6 this contribution argues that it is fruitful to break down metahistorical explanations and to analyse their internal logic and contradictions – on both the level of discourse and the level of practices. Thus, I argue that notions such as “structural change” and “crisis” opened a space for negotiating the entanglement between formerly more or less separate fields: economy and knowledge. Contributing to a renewed cultural history of “deindustrialisation”, the present chapter addresses the question of how the semantics of structural change and crisis reframed the relation between economy and knowledge. Which role did the individual worker play in this process? To answer these questions, the chapter draws on sources from the mining vocational training system in West Germany, France and the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) in the 1960s and 1970s. It initially explores how the idea of work changed at the time when French sociologists introduced the notion of mobility in the debates on “deindustrialisation”. Then the focus falls on the consequences of this perception on the respective regional scales of the French and German mining industries.

Crisis, qualification and mobility Following Anson Rabinbach, the “human motor” as a central metaphor for understanding work faded in Europe during the 1950s and 1960s.7 Indeed, Western societies engaged in intense negotiations on the question of how to understand work in an anticipated “post-industrial” future. In this context, a new key notion

5 See e.g. for France Cooper-Richet, Diana. 2011. Le Peuple de la Nuit. Mines et Mineurs en France (XIXe-XXIe Siècle). Paris: Perrin, 437–501. 6 See e.g. Graf, Rüdiger. 2010. “Either-Or. The Narrative of ‘Crisis’ in Weimar Germany and in Historiography.” Central European History 43, no. 4: 592–615. 7 Rabinbach, Anson. 1992. The Human Motor. Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity. Berkeley: University of California Press, 299.

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emerged that irreversibly entangled work and qualification: The notion of “mobility” became the lens that concentrated fears and hopes of “de-industrialisation”. This can be traced back to the 1950s. When the first economic difficulties started to occur in the coal mines in the mountain range of the Cévennes in southern France, the French government and the management of the nationalised mining company, Charbonnages de France, decided to relocate around 5,000 miners to the coal district of Lorraine in the north-east of the country. This decision – imposed by force – prompted strikes and protests by the local trade unions due to, for instance, presumed difficulties of integration in the north. After their subsequent failure, these resettlements for reemployment became an intense object of study for French sociologists and psychologists.8 Amidst these experts, the young sociologist Serge Moscovici addressed “mobility” as the central issue.9 He stated that “immobility” – held responsible for the failed resettlement – should not be regarded as an “alleged mentality” of the “French worker”.10 In his words, there was no individual “disposition to mobility”; the “question of mobility” should not be treated “in relation with several properties attributed to a category of citizens”: Vocational training, the improvement of possibilities of social advancement and the material conditions are only the corollaries of a general action necessary for the movements of workforce.11

Thus, Moscovici identified vocational training and the level of qualification as one central factor determining the willingness to move and to be mobile. Undeniably, this moment is crucial, as it constitutes a central shift in the history of the concept of “mobility”. Since the introduction of the term in sociological debates by Pitirim A. Sorokin in the 1920s, “mobility” evoked the imagination of society as an equilibrated, stable and closed entity. In particular, the Chicago School of Sociology conceived of “mobility” as a “factor of disintegration, and rupture of equilibrium”.12 In France and Germany, sociologists, politicians and

8 See e.g. Cornuau, Philippe et al. 1957. Les Attitudes des Mineurs du Centre-Midi et l’Évolution de l’Emploi. Paris: Editions de l’Institut National d’Études Démographiques. 9 Moscovici, Serge. 1959. “La Résistance à la Mobilité Géographique dans les Expériences de Reconversion.” Sociologie du Travail 1: 24–36. 10 Ibid., 24. 11 Ibid., 31. 12 Vallez, Caroline, and Vincent Kaufmann. 2009. “Aux Racines de la Mobilité en Sciences Sociales. Contribution au Cadre d’Analyse Socio-Historique de la Mobilité Urbaine.” In De l’Histoire des Transports à l’Histoire de la Mobilité?, edited by Mathieu Flonneau, and Vincent Guigueno, 41–55. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 44.

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employers closely associated mobility with fluctuation and “rootlessness” until the 1950s. In this context, vocational training had fulfilled the task to control, settle and fix the human workforce to prevent a “social mobility, which was judged as destabilising, and consequently as inopportune”.13 After the Second World War, the high level of workforce fluctuation in heavy industry led to the establishment of a dense network of vocational training institutions by the churches, employers, teachers and trade unions in West Germany, especially in the Ruhr region.14 This shift already met contemporary criticisms,15 but in the new context of conversion, Moscovici’s argument marked a clear caesura on two levels: First, it completely inversed the signification of mobility. It was no longer perceived as a potential threat to stability, but as an aim to be achieved by policies. “Deindustrialisation”, “structural change” and – more broadly – technical progress required an increased “mobility”, “adaptability” and “flexibility” of the workforce. Traditionally, vocational training had aimed to foster a vocational identity by transmitting a defined set of skills and competences. Now, vocational training experts considered this perspective as obsolete. According to a Belgian ECSC-official in 1974, “preparing a vocation means [. . .] that vocational training [. . .] must strive to correspond to the changing needs of our society: Hence, vocational training is necessary to induce change”.16 “Mobility”, as opposed to the “immobility” of the past, developed into a widely shared political and economic aim. This corresponded to the perspective of experts such as Moscovici who did not conceive of mobility as a fixed individual disposition of character but as a factor that could be regulated, increased and improved by changing circumstances. Mobility and the government of mobility entered the realm of the feasible and produced, via the factor of vocational training, new requirements that the worker had to fulfil. Second, the success of the notion of mobility was based on the ambivalence between the spatial, social and individual (“mental” in German) dimension of

13 Lembré, Stéphane. 2015. “Le Savoir et le Changement. Une Résilience par la Formation Technique dans les Territoires Miniers du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais (du Milieu du XIXe Siècle aux Années 1930).” In Les Houillères entre l’État, le Marché et la Société. Les Territoires de la Résilience. XVIIIe-XXIe Siècles, edited by Sylvie Aprile et al., 69–80. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion, 80. 14 Roseman, Mark. 1992. Recasting the Ruhr, 1945–1958. Manpower, Economic Recovery and Labour Relations. New York: Berg; Meskill, David. 2010. Optimizing the German Workforce. Labor Administration from Bismarck to the Economic Miracle. New York: Berghahn. 15 Henretta, James A. 1977. “The Study of Social Mobility: Ideological Assumptions and Conceptual Bias.” Labor History 18, no. 2: 165–178. 16 Fotré, Guido. 1974. “Formation et Emploi dans la Société Industrielle. Un Impératif, Former au Changement.” Reflets, Perspectives de la Vie Économique 13, no. 1: 71–81, 74.

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mobility. “Mobility” meant both an “objective”, measurable and describable social fact on the one hand and the “mobilisation” of workers for the future on the other. It exemplified the incarnation of the normative power of a descriptive concept. Since Sorokin’s seminal distinction between the “social and geometrical space”, and between the “vertical” and the “horizontal” dimensions of social space in 1927,17 this ambiguity has been inherent in the concept of mobility. In discussing the reasons for mobility and the factors that equip individuals for social advancement, Sorokin, for instance, insisted on the decisive role of the body. He stated that “the upper classes are composed of people with higher intelligence than the lower ones”.18 Thereby, he engaged his argument in the debate on “heredity or environment”,19 which had become virulent since the studies by Francis Galton in the end of the 19th century.20 This focus implied an intense problematisation of the individual in the analysis of “mobility”: “Mobility”, popularised through “de-industrialisation”, represented a mode for describing social reality but also a way to problematise the subject. Why did several groups of workers not show an appropriate degree of mobility? How could workers’ mobility be increased? To what extent was the individual responsible for a lack of mobility? The commission on vocational training in the ECSC mining industry further promulgated the problematisation of this link between vocational training and mobility, which had emerged in France during the 1950s. At the 14th meeting of this commission on 5 March 1968 in Luxemburg, French, German, Belgian, Italian and Dutch employers, engineers, trainers and trade unionists discussed the problem of “structure and vocational training of the workforce in mechanised pits”.21 The report summarising these discussions insisted on the necessary role of mobility in the tension between “stability” and “dynamism”: The aims of vocational training [. . .] have become a moving target. To fulfil its end further, vocational training [. . .] must be a training for adaptation, which allows an essential professional mobility. Vocational training has to abandon the laws of statics [. . .] and must be subject to the laws of dynamics.22

17 Sorokin, Pitirim A. 1959. Social and Cultural Mobility. Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe, 4–9. 18 Ibid., 311. 19 Ibid., 317–331. 20 See Keller, Evelyn Fox. 2010. The Mirage of a Space between Nature and Nurture. Durham: Duke University Press; Goschler, Constantin, and Till Kössler, eds. 2016. Vererbung oder Umwelt? Ungleichheit zwischen Biologie und Gesellschaft seit 1945. Göttingen: Wallstein. 21 Fotré, Guido. Vocational Training. Sub-commission Vocational Training – Coal. Report on the XIV Meeting. 1968. 4198. IGBE-Archives. Archive in the House for the History of the Ruhr, Bochum, Germany. 22 ECSC. Structure and Vocational Training of the Workforce in Mechanised Pits, second part. [1968]. Ibid., 59.

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The ECSC being a central platform of knowledge production on industrial conversion,23 the “ideology of mobility” entered the discussions in West Germany. After the increase of unemployment in 1966/67, an avalanche of sociological studies began in the Ruhr Area: In 1968, the employment office in Dortmund queried “What about the mobility of unemployed workers?”,24 while the ministry of work conducted a study on the “reintegration of older unemployed workers”,25 and the West German Broadcasting Corporation released a documentary entitled “To move or to put down roots. Mobility in the Ruhr”.26 Miners played a crucial role in this dissemination of mobility: They became the target for the normalisation of mobility. These attempts to normalise mobility relied on two constitutive discursive elements that will be analysed next for both the German and the French cases: The “crisis” of intelligence and the negation of the body.

Reconfiguring the working body in times of “crisis” Simultaneous with the transnational discourse on mobility, vocational training experts who had contributed to framing this problematisation on a European scale implemented local reforms inside the vocational training systems. As such, they reshaped the global problematisation of crisis and qualification. On the national levels, this “crisis” of qualification resulted in legislation on lifelong learning and vocational training in almost every European country between 1968 and 1972. This striving for a high-skilled workforce, however, engendered unintended consequences. On the regional levels, constructing the skilled and “mobile” worker led to a distinction between workers who were apt and inapt for the coming production. The distinction emerged locally and did not enter transnational debates. Thus, it offers the possibility of shedding light on the effects of the transnational skilling imperative at the regional scale.

23 Leboutte, René. 2009. “A Space of European De-industrialisation in the Late Twentieth Century. Nord/Pas-de-Calais, Wallonia and the Ruhrgebiet.” European Review of History 16: 755–770. 24 Dortmund Employment Office. [1968]. Wie steht es um die Mobilität bei arbeitslosen Arbeitnehmern? Dortmund. 25 Forschungsinstitut für Sozialpolitik. 1969. Wiedereingliederung älterer Arbeitsloser in die Wirtschaft Nordrhein-Westfalens. Im Auftrag des Arbeits- und Sozialministers des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Düsseldorf. 26 Rau, Rudolf. 1967. Wandern oder Wurzeln schlagen. Mobilität im Ruhrgebiet. [Cologne].

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In both cases, the central question concerned the workers’ “educability”. The West German vocational mining schools started a class experiment for the vocational training of “learning-disabled” apprentices in 1969/70. The French Northern Coal Company (HBNPC) established “technical mining classes” (cours techniques miniers, CTM) in 1962. Both measures were aimed at creating a highskilled workforce – or at least at improving the selection of workers. They were justified by the narrative of the decline of intelligence. In 1962, Jean Aurel, the secretary general for work and social relations of the HBNPC, legitimised the introduction of the CTM due to the “growing difficulties” of vocational training.27 According to Aurel, the “intellectually talented youth” had fled the mining industry and companies could only recruit from the “quantitatively and qualitatively impoverishing mass of youth”. Therefore, “the number of candidates for selection decreases. The recruitment deficit of apprentices who have the appropriate qualities in intelligence and in character [. . .] indicates a deterioration of this recruitment crisis of foremen”.28 In West Germany, mining schoolteachers had discussed the topic of intelligence decline since 1965. In 1969, the “lack of talent” concerned around 2,000 apprentices. To explain this situation, a teacher elaborated on the different forms of “learning-disabilities”: The spreading width of reduced intelligence among these pupils reaches from “nearly normal” [. . .] until the limit of a “mental disability” for adolescents who are only “practically educable”. Beside the relatively large group of weak-minded adolescents, there is a smaller group of pupils who are a special problem [. . .] due to their behavioural disorders.29

This confuting of coal crisis and crisis of intelligence relied heavily on an image of disembodied work. In France and in Germany, the measures for reforming vocational training – the CTM and classes for “learning-disabled” pupils – both employed the narrative of disembodiment of work. In the French case, the vocational training engineers drew a line between physical, non-skilled work and high-skilled, cognitive work, corresponding in turn with the distinction between the mass of apprentices and the “elite” of the CTM, selected via an entry exam and psychotechnical testing. Under the heading “the brain takes over the muscle”,

27 Aurel, Jean. Letter to Monsieur Dumas, Inspecteur d’Académie de Lille. 26.7.1962. 2004 001 544. Charbonnages de France, Central Archives. Archives Nationales du Monde du Travail, Roubaix, France, 1. 28 Ibid. 29 Reek, A. Typescript on Teaching Problems of Apprentices with Insufficient Public-School Grades. 1969. Westfälische Berggewerkschaftskasse Records. montan.dok/BBA 120/6015, 1.

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the HBNPC stated that it aimed at recruiting “more specialised workers” who should replace the bygone “muscular man”.30 In the German case, the proportions were inverted and the teachers distinguished between the “normal”, considered as highly skilled, and the “learningdisabled” apprentices. They excluded the latter apprentices from being taught in a classroom. These “practically minded” pupils were asked to attend workshops separated from the “normal” apprentices.31 Therefore, school administrations hierarchised classes following a scale from “practical” to “cognitive” work. For instance, the curriculum for a lesson in handcrafting for “learning-disabled” apprentices emphasised and focused on the construction of a bird house, whereas it assessed “abstract” tasks such as the “basics of price calculation” as only facultative – and thereby restricted to more “talented” apprentices.32 The dichotomy of practical and cognitive work, motivated by the negation of the working body, implied a gradation of work and qualification. The proportionalities in Germany and France were inverted, the means different. However, the end remained the same. These factors constituted the lynchpins of an epistemic apparatus, set up to refine the thin line between the skilled worker and its unskilled brother. Thus, it is one main aspect of the “coal crisis” that it entangled economy and knowledge. From this moment on, the European mining elite reckoned the future of mining industry to be dependent on the qualification of its workforce.

Reassessing “deindustrialisation” The narrative of the mining industry’s rise and fall after 1945 might seem convenient, but it masks several ambiguities of the notion of “crisis”, as shown here by means of the notion of “mobility”. Spotlighting the aspect of workers’ qualification demonstrates that the attempts to create a skilled workforce were the corollary of “deindustrialisation”. At the same time, French and German vocational training experts legitimised these attempts by highlighting the alleged

30 “Les Houillères Créent des Cours Techniques Destinés à la Formation de leurs Cadres.” La Voix du Nord, September 16/17, 1962. 31 Report on an Experimental Class with Learning-Disabled Pupils at the Vocational Mining School Mitte. 1971. Westfälische Berggewerkschaftskasse Records. montan.dok/BBA 120/6024, 5. 32 Dembski, Otto, and Rolf Wessel. Report on the Experimental Class with Learning-Disabled Pupils at the König Ludwig School Office of the Vocational Mining School Mitte. 1971. 15459. IGBEArchives. Archive in the House for the History of the Ruhr, Bochum, Germany, attachment 1.

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peril of a decreasing intelligence and a negation of the working body. Thereby, “structural change” was shaped as a crisis of qualification. From this perspective, there was no “crisis” but a potential for acting on the qualifications of the individual. Furthermore, the measurement of work followed contemporary understandings of “practical” and “cognitive” work. “Structural change” is no anonymous development to a more abstract or “dematerialised” work. These criteria oriented contemporary modes of selection and categorisation. Finally, notions such as “structural change” in German, “deindustrialisation” in English or “conversion” in French should be reconsidered. The most significant consequence of these notions is that they disclosed new spaces of feasibility on a transnational level. One of which was the skilling imperative.

References Anonymous. 1962. “Les Houillères Créent des Cours Techniques Destinés à la Formation de leurs Cadres.” La Voix du Nord, September 16/17, 1962. Anonymous. 1967. “Fragen nach der Zukunft. Beat-Wettbewerb mit 15 Bands/200 Großzelte.” Ruhr-Nachrichten, July 1, 1967. Aurel, Jean. Letter to Monsieur Dumas, Inspecteur d’Académie de Lille. 26.7.1962. 2004 001 544. Charbonnages de France, Central Archives. Archives Nationales du Monde du Travail, Roubaix, France. Cornuau, Philippe et al. 1957. Les Attitudes des Mineurs du Centre-Midi et l’Évolution de l’Emploi. Paris: Editions de l’Institut National d’Études Démographiques. Cooper-Richet, Diana. 2011. Le Peuple de la Nuit. Mines et Mineurs en France (XIXe-XXIe Siècle). Paris: Perrin. Dembski, Otto, and Rolf Wessel. Report on the Experimental Class with Learning-Disabled Pupils at the König Ludwig School Office of the Vocational Mining School Mitte. 1971. 15459. IGBE-Archives. Archive in the House for the History of the Ruhr, Bochum, Germany. Dortmund Employment Office. [1968]. Wie steht es um die Mobilität bei arbeitslosen Arbeitnehmern? Dortmund. Drucker, Peter F. 1969. The Age of Discontinuity. Guidelines to our Changing Society. London: Heinemann. ECSC. Structure and Vocational Training of the Workforce in Mechanised Pits, second part. [1968]. 4198. IGBE-Archives. Archive in the House for the History of the Ruhr, Bochum, Germany. Fisher, Allan G. B. 1939. “Production, Primary, Secondary, Tertiary.” The Economic Record 15, no. 28: 24–38. Forschungsinstitut für Sozialpolitik. 1969. Wiedereingliederung älterer Arbeitsloser in die Wirtschaft Nordrhein-Westfalens. Düsseldorf. Fotré, Guido. Vocational Training. Sub-commission Vocational Training – Coal. Report on the XIV Meeting. 1968. 4198. IGBE-Archives. Archive in the House for the History of the Ruhr, Bochum, Germany.

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Fotré, Guido. 1974. “Formation et Emploi dans la Société Industrielle. Un Impératif, Former au Changement.” Reflets, Perspectives de la Vie Économique 13, no. 1: 71–81. Fourastié, Jean. 1949. Le Grand Espoir du XXe Siècle. Progrès Technique, Progrès Économique, Progress Social. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France. Goschler, Constantin, and Till Kössler, eds. 2016. Vererbung oder Umwelt? Ungleichheit zwischen Biologie und Gesellschaft seit 1945. Göttingen: Wallstein. Graf, Rüdiger. 2010. “Either-Or. The Narrative of ‘Crisis’ in Weimar Germany and in Historiography.” Central European History 43, no. 4: 592–615. Henretta, James A. 1977. “The Study of Social Mobility: Ideological Assumptions and Conceptual Bias.” Labor History 18, no. 2: 165–78. Keller, Evelyn Fox. 2010. The Mirage of a Space between Nature and Nurture. Durham: Duke University Press. Lane, Robert E. 1966. “The Decline of Politics and Ideology in a Knowledgeable Society.” American Sociological Review 31: 649–62. Leboutte, René. 2009. “A Space of European De-industrialisation in the Late Twentieth Century. Nord/Pas-de-Calais, Wallonia and the Ruhrgebiet.” European Review of History 16: 755–70. Lembré, Stéphane. 2015. “Le Savoir et le Changement. Une Résilience par la Formation Technique dans les Territoires Miniers du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais (du Milieu du XIXe Siècle aux Années 1930).” In Les Houillères entre l’État, le Marché et la Société. Les Territoires de la Résilience. XVIIIe-XXIe Siècles, edited by Sylvie Aprile et al., 69–80. Villeneuve d’Ascq: Presses Universitaires du Septentrion. Meskill, David. 2010. Optimizing the German Workforce. Labor Administration from Bismarck to the Economic Miracle. New York: Berghahn. Moscovici, Serge. 1959. “La Résistance à la Mobilité Géographique dans les Expériences de Reconversion.” Sociologie du Travail 1: 24–36. Rabinbach, Anson. 1992. The Human Motor. Energy, Fatigue, and the Origins of Modernity. Berkeley: University of California Press. Rau, Rudolf. 1967. Wandern oder Wurzeln schlagen. Mobilität im Ruhrgebiet. [Cologne]. Reek, A. Typescript on Teaching Problems of Apprentices with Insufficient Public-School Grades. 1969. Westfälische Berggewerkschaftskasse Records. montan.dok/BBA 120/ 6015. Report on an Experimental Class with Learning-Disabled Pupils at the Vocational Mining School Mitte. 1971. 120/6024. Westfälische Berggewerkschaftskasse Records. Montan. dok/ Mining Archive, Bochum, Germany. Roseman, Mark. 1992. Recasting the Ruhr, 1945–1958. Manpower, Economic Recovery and Labour Relations. New York: Berg. Sorokin, Pitirim A. 1959. Social and Cultural Mobility. Illinois: The Free Press of Glencoe. Vallez, Caroline, and Vincent Kaufmann. 2009. “Aux Racines de la Mobilité en Sciences Sociales. Contribution au Cadre d’Analyse Socio-Historique de la Mobilité Urbaine.” In De l’Histoire des Transports à l’Histoire de la Mobilité?, edited by Mathieu Flonneau, and Vincent Guigueno, 41–55. Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes.

Michael Farrenkopf

Short-term rise and decades of decline: German hard coal mining after 1945 Introduction The following contribution deals with the development of the German coal industry over the past 70 years and thus looks at a symbol of an “old industry” in the economic structure of North Rhine-Westphalia.1 It argues essentially taking the form of an overview, in which three phases are distinguished. True to the general reading, this is a first step in the restructuring and expansion of the industry until 1957/58, followed by the actual mining crisis in the 1960s, which is then followed by a long-lasting controlled settlement of the German coal industry. The remarks do not focus explicitly on current economic or even theoretical discussions of historical companies for specific reasons. This is mainly because this would hardly be possible given the current state of research. As well as we are informed today about the mining history of the 19th and early 20th centuries in the Ruhr district in particular, so poor is the research situation for the later periods. This statement seems to be justified, despite some very relevant work especially by Werner Abelshauser and Christoph Nonn to name just two.2 In any case, the history of the German coal industry since the 1970s, in particular, is a field rarely considered by mining historiography.3 1 Lauschke, Karl. 2004. “Wandel und neue Krisen: Die alten Industrien in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren”. In Strukturwandel und Strukturpolitik in Nordrhein-Westfalen, edited by Stefan Goch, 136–162. Münster: Aschendorff; concerning mining as well as iron and steel industry as so-called old industries also see Farrenkopf, Michael et al., eds. 2019. Die Stadt der Städte. Das Ruhrgebiet und seine Umbrüche. Essen: Klartext, 93–219. 2 Abelshauser, Werner. 1984. Der Ruhrkohlenbergbau seit 1945. Wiederaufbau, Krise, Anpassung. München: C. H. Beck; Nonn, Christoph. 2001. Die Ruhrbergbaukrise. Entindustrialisierung und Politik 1958–1969. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. 3 The Mining History Document Center at the German Mining Museum in Bochum started about ten years ago to focus more intensively on this deficient state of research. See for example Farrenkopf, Michael et al., eds. 2009. Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945. Katalog der Ausstellung des Deutschen Bergbau-Museums Bochum vom 6. Dezember 2009 bis 2. Mai 2010. Bochum: DBM; Farrenkopf, Michael. 2013. “Wiederaufstieg und Niedergang des Bergbaus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”. In Rohstoffgewinnung im Strukturwandel. Der deutsche Bergbau im 20. Jahrhundert, edited by Dieter Ziegler, 183–302. Münster: Aschendorff; Bluma, Lars, Michael Farrenkopf, and Stefan Przigoda. 2018. Geschichte des Bergbaus. Berlin: L + H Verlag. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-010

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Ultimately, all of this was the core argument for the interdisciplinary research project “From Boom to Crisis – German Coal Mining after 1945”, which has been carried out in Bochum since 2015 and whose interim results were considered for the conference “Boom – Crisis – Heritage. King Coal and the energy revolutions after 1945”.4

Development phases of the coal industry after 1945 Restructuring and expansion until 1957/58 Since 1945, the West German coal industry has only experienced one real phase of expansion during the 1950s. Reconstruction in the post-war years was also based largely on hard coal, but the associated growth rates resulted solely from the resumption of regular hard coal mining. Initially, these were counteracted by the war-related destruction of the mines above the ground, and in particular the structural burdens of extraordinary underground exploitation during the Second World War. In addition, there was a drastic lack of housing and very poor general supplies to and nutrition of the population.5

Fig. 1: War damage at the Zeche Osterfeld 1/2/3 in Oberhausen-Osterfeld.

4 Wand, Lisa. 2017. “Vom Boom zur Krise. Der deutsche Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945.” Der Anschnitt 69: 121–128. 5 Farrenkopf, Michael. 2018. “‘Es kommt auf jede Tonne an’ – Der Ruhrbergbau von 1945 bis Ende der 1950er Jahre”. In Josef Stoffels. Steinkohlenzechen – Fotografien aus dem Ruhrgebiet, edited by Heinrich Theodor Grütter, and Stefanie Grebe, 144–153. Essen: Klartext.

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Because of its vital function, the Allies confiscated the West German coal industry after the war. Already since 1946, however, the common conviction prevailed among the Western Allies not to settle it completely, but to restructure it for the democratic reconstruction of West Germany as an energy base. The Western Allies set the framework for the following “reorganization of the German coal, iron and steel industry” through Law No. 75 on 10 November 1948. Prioritizing efforts to increase production and stabilize the coal industry, the Allies postponed the rules of ownership by five years. The main goal of the reorganization of mine ownership remained to detach the mines from their previous group of companies and modes of cooperation.6 The expansion of the West German coal industry in the 1950s was based on a number of factors. On the one hand, the founding of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) was essential.7 Secondly, the abolition of the Ruhr statute and the dissolution of the International Ruhr Authority, which had existed since 1948, eased the previously existing restrictions on the production of West German hard coal.8 Not least in order to eliminate the carbon shortage that was persistent due to the Korean crisis, the state adopted the so-called Investment Assistance Act (Investitionshilfegesetz) at the beginning of 1952.9 At its core, this was an act of self-help by the German economy to consolidate or expand the basic industries. Fourthly, in the medium term, the adoption of the so-called Act of Montan-Codetermination (Montanmitbestimmungsgesetz) was of decisive importance, as it laid the foundations for a sectoral conflict settlement mechanism between mining entrepreneurs and unions as social partners and the state.10 The high demand for coal during the 1950s, which at the time covered an average of 70 percent of the primary energy demands of the Federal Republic of

6 Natzel, Benno. 1957. “Die Neuordnung des deutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ruhrbergbaus.” Glückauf 93: 789–797. 7 Regul, Rudolf. 1953. “Die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl.” Jahrbuch des deutschen Bergbaus 46: 17–41. 8 Farrenkopf, Michael, and Rainer Slotta. 2009. “Zur Geschichte des Ruhrbergbaus nach 1945 – ein Überblick”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945, 24–36. 9 Gesetz über die Investitionshilfe der gewerblichen Wirtschaft. Vom 7. Januar 1952. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum (montan.dok/BBA) 12/327; Anonymous. 1952. “Das Investitionshilfe-Gesetz.” Stahl und Eisen 72: 156–157. 10 Martiny, Martin. 1979. “Die Durchsetzung der Mitbestimmung im deutschen Bergbau”. In Glück auf, Kameraden! Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland, edited by Hans Mommsen, and Ulrich Borsdorf, 389–414. Köln: Bund; Ranft, Norbert. 1988. Vom Objekt zum Subjekt. Montanmitbestimmung, Sozialklima und Strukturwandel im Bergbau seit 1945. Köln: Bund; Seidel, Hans-Christoph, and Klaus Tenfelde. 2009. “Arbeitsbeziehungen und Sozialpolitik im Ruhrbergbau nach 1945”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945, 47–57.

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Fig. 2: Occupation soldiers at the Minister Achenbach colliery in Lünen-Brambauer, around 1945/46.

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Germany, arose fundamentally from the dynamic and steady export growth and the increasing general prosperity of the West German population. Both in private households and in the commercial sector, coal initially took on the dominant position as a fuel. In addition, there was continued demand for coal in the iron and steel industry. As a third and still significant contributor to coal use, the increasing electrification of both the commercial and private sectors had a lasting impact on coal demand.11 The expansion phase of the West German coal industry, based on this strong demand for coal, initially manifested itself in continued growth in overall coal output and employment. The hard coal mining in the Ruhr area had the largest share of this. Compared to 1947 and 1957, this almost doubled in production, while the total number of mining workers increased from about 348,000 to more than 494,000.12 Due to the general lack of workers in heavy industry and the heavy burdens of the miners’ profession, the growth in the workforce in the mining sector was only realized through a comprehensive recruitment policy by mining companies.13 The proportionally much greater increase in coal output compared to the workforce and, in particular, the shift capacity of miners, which increased by a third between 1947 and 1957, indicates that the expansion phase of the coal industry was at the same time the result of a profound rationalization of the industry. As a result, the mining companies sunk no fewer than 50 new shafts on the Ruhr until 1957, and they combined 37 mines into central conveyor systems.14 In addition, they implemented numerous technical and organizational innovations over and underground. The introduction of the so-called “Kohlenhobel” – a stripping coal extraction machine – was the first significant step towards full mechanization in coal mining at least during the 1950s.15

11 Farrenkopf, Michael. 2010. “Aufkommen und Bewältigung der Bergbau-Strukturkrise im Zeichen der Ruhrkohle AG.” Heimat Dortmund. Stadtgeschichte in Bildern und Berichten 1/2: 27–34, 28. 12 Figures from Huske, Joachim. 2006. Die Steinkohlenzechen im Ruhrrevier. Daten und Fakten von den Anfängen bis 2005. Bochum: DBM, 29. 13 Farrenkopf, Michael. 2009. “Wirtschaftswunder und erste Kohlenkrisen”. In Kumpel und Kohle. Der Landtag NRW und die Ruhrkohle 1946 bis 2008, edited by the president of the North Rhine-Westphalian state parliament, 49–95. Düsseldorf: Landtag NRW, 50–51. 14 Kroker, Evelyn. 1996. “Zur Entwicklung des Steinkohlenbergbaus in Nordrhein-Westfalen zwischen 1945 und 1995.” Glückauf 132: 457–485. 15 Bleidick, Dietmar. 2009. “Gewinnungstechnik im Ruhrkohlenbergbau nach 1945”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945, 342–350, 346–347; Böse, Christian, Michael Farrenkopf, and Andrea Weindl. 2018. Kohle – Koks – Öl. Die Geschichte des Bergwerks Prosper-Haniel. Münster: Aschendorff, 153–154.

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Fig. 3: Coal plane in the Ida seam of the Minister Stein colliery in Dortmund, 1950, photo by Kalwelis, 1950.

The mining crisis Nevertheless, the situation of the West German coal industry at the beginning of 1958 changed profoundly. While the Ruhr mining industry did not have to store any unsold coal in the summer of 1957, one year later it had to pile about 10 percent of the total production on coal dumps. From the end of February 1958, at least 16,000 miners had to repeat cancelled shifts. Nevertheless, the collapse heralded by the crisis came as a surprise. There were numerous reasons for the mining crisis of the 1960s, and its course is largely explained with regard to foreign and domestic policy patterns of action as well as with regard to general economic trends. Confined to key arguments, the main reason for both the mining and the ongoing structural crisis of the German coal industry was the superior competition of other energy sources, especially crude oil. The fact that from the end of the 1950s crude oil pushed into the energy market in completely new dimensions resulted from geopolitical changes because of the Second World War. The Third World oil producing countries exploited the loss of power of the old colonial states and the Cold War rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union seeking to gain control of their own natural resources at the expense of large oil companies. Consequently, they diverged to other regions, where they compensated for the resulting losses by opening new oil wells. This resulted in an oversupply of oil, with the consequence that in the second half of the 1950s, the industry led price dumping across global markets.16

16 Nonn, Christoph. 2009. “Der Höhepunkt der Bergbaukrise (1958–1969)”. In Kumpel und Kohle. Der Landtag NRW und die Ruhrkohle 1946 bis 2008, 96–124, 97.

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Fig. 4: “Öl für uns alle (Oil for us all)” board game, Ravensburger Spieleverlag, approx. 1960.

One of the deciding factors was sea freight rates, which rose considerably due to the closure of the Suez Canal in the winter of 1956/57, because the existing oil tankers on the way to Europe had to take the much longer sea route around the Cape of Good Hope. This, of course, had consequences for the price of oil and was therefore a substantial justification for both the mining companies and the state to not worry about a long-term secured sale of hard coal in the expectation of an overall increase in energy demand in the Federal Republic of Germany shortly before the onset of the crisis. Instead, on the contrary and then additionally problematic for the beginning of the mining crisis, long-term contracts for imported coal, especially from the United States, had been completed. It was then primarily the task of the “Notgemeinschaft deutscher Steinkohlenbergbau GmbH”, a crisis cartel founded in 1959, to replace these contracts. In the false expectation that the closure of the Suez Canal would last longer, the industry commissioned the construction of additional oil tankers, so that this cargo capacity after the rapid opening of the Canal would also be available. As a result, the freight rates for crude oil from the end of 1957 plunged even further below the previous level. Since the federal government had already abolished heating oil tariffs as a credo of Ludwig Erhard’s economic policy in 1956 and had significantly improved the import conditions for US imported coal, the crisis scenario for the German hard coal mining industry definitely opened up.17 Social unrest marked 1959, especially in the Ruhr area, in view of the prevailing crisis. In order to master the crisis and enforce protectionist measures for domestic hard coal on the political side, the tariff partners of the industry

17 Abelshauser, Werner. 1985. “Kohle und Marktwirtschaft. Ludwig Erhards Konflikt mit dem Unternehmensverband Ruhrbergbau am Vorabend der Kohlenkrise.” Vierteljahrshefte für Zeitgeschichte 33: 489–546; Nonn, Christoph. 2009. “Die Krise des Ruhrbergbaus bis zur Gründung der Ruhrkohle AG (1957/58 bis 1969)”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945, edited by Farrenkopf et al., 236–242.

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began to adopt the previously mentioned sectoral individualism.18 The mining trade union was one of the actors that recognized the structural character of the crisis at an early stage. For this reason, in 1959 the trade union was primarily involved in taking targeted structural adjustment measures and in cushioning the social hardships resulting from the shrinking process and not in a fundamental rejection of any pit closures.19 A relaxation of the mining crisis characterized the first half of the 1960s, primarily because of the continued general economic prosperity during this period. Coal mining’s total production remained at around 115 million tons during these years, with mining companies making efforts to minimize costs and increase productivity. In the sense of a so-called positive rationalization, the mining companies intensified efforts towards a widespread introduction of mechanized coal production. Moreover, they separated themselves as planned from no longer profitable degradable seams and fields.20 In the form of negative rationalization, however, there were also further mine closures, with a total of ten in the period in question.21 The fact that they were largely met without social protests had not only to do with the already described responsible action of the mining trade union,22 but due to the positive overall economic situation, the vast majority of miners generally had no trouble in finding a new job outside the mining industry. In fact, more miners migrated to new jobs in those years than was required by the process of shrinking and rationalization. In this respect, the hard coal mining industry had a need for miners in the first phase of the mining crisis despite the drastic reduction in the workforce.23

18 Nonn, Christoph. 1999. “Klassengegensatz und Branchenindividualismus. Gewerkschaften und Unternehmer im Ruhrbergbau vor und in der Kohlenkrise.” Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts zur Erforschung der europäischen Arbeiterbewegung (IGA) 22: 36–58. 19 Anonymous. 1981. “Heinrich Gutermuth, Bergbauwirtschaft heute und morgen. Referat, gehalten auf der 6. Generalversammlung der Industriegewerkschaft Bergbau (München 8.13. Juni 1958)”. In Deutsche Energiepolitik seit 1945. Vorrang für die Kohle, edited by Martin Martiny, and Hans-Jürgen Schneider, 125–139. Köln: Bund. 20 Hentrich, Werner, and Hans Zydek. 1964. “Das Gesetz zur Förderung der Rationalisierung im Steinkohlenbergbau. Erster Teil.” Glückauf 100: 51–63. 21 Hentrich, Werner, and Hans Zydek. 1963. “Die Richtlinien über die vorläufige Gewährung von Prämien für die Stillegung von Steinkohlenbergwerken.” Glückauf 99: 304–313. 22 Lauschke, Karl. 1984. Schwarze Fahnen an der Ruhr. Die Politik der IG Bergbau und Energie während der Kohlenkrise 1958–1968. Marburg: VAG. 23 Seidel, Hans-Christoph. 2011. “Kohlenkrise und Zechenstilllegungen im Ruhrgebiet”. In Schichtwechsel. Von der Kohlenkrise zum Strukturwandel, edited by Jana Golombek, and Dietmar Osses, 30–37. Essen: Klartext.

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The comparative easing of the crisis ended in the mid-1960s as the recession that had set in in the late summer of 1966 triggered the first general economic crisis in the history of the Federal Republic of Germany. The mining industry answered the coal demand, which drastically collapsed again, with a hitherto unprecedented wave of decommissioning. Between 1965 and 1968 alone, the number of pits fell from 90 to 58, and no less than 100,000 mining jobs were lost. In view of this, the damage caused by the decommissioning wave now appeared to those affected as almost incalculable. Only by foreshadowing this escalation in the Ruhr mining district did concepts take shape that aimed at a fundamental reorganization of Ruhr mining and offered a long-term energy policy option for the Federal Republic of Germany. In terms of corporate structure, they found their expression in the founding of “Ruhrkohle AG” in 1968/69 as a unified company of the Ruhr mining industry.24 The mining trade union had formulated the idea of a single company since the late 1950s, but it had initially linked it to the transfer of hard coal mining to common ownership. The company representatives had resisted this and in 1963, with the founding of the Rationalization Association of the German Coal Industry (Rationalisierungsverband des deutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus), agreed for the time being to adopt a more traditional and tempered form of concentrating entrepreneurial rights of disposal.25 However, in the wake of the acute crisis, at the end of 1966 the “Unternehmensverband Ruhrbergbau” as the leading Entrepreneurial Association was willing to announce the creation of a united company on a private-sector basis as a goal. The changes of government at federal and state levels at the end of 1966 then ushered in a process of corporatist crisis management, based on a further rapprochement of enterprise and union with the state, today called the Concerted Action Coal (Konzertierte Aktion Kohle). The “Ruhrkohle AG” in the beginning comprised 94 percent of the production of the Ruhr district and at least 75 percent of the total German hard coal production.26

24 Goch, Stefan. 2009. “Der Weg zur Einheitsgesellschaft Ruhrkohle AG”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945, edited by Farrenkopf et al., 284–302. 25 Spiegelberg, Friedrich. 1970. Energiemarkt im Wandel. Zehn Jahre Kohlenkrise an der Ruhr. Baden-Baden: Nomos, 107. 26 Hawner, Karl Heinz. 1968. “Der Weg zur Gesamtgesellschaft des Ruhrbergbaus.” Glückauf 104: 1123–1127.

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Fig. 5: Signing of the basic contract of “Ruhrkohle AG”, 18 July 1969.

Controlled settlement of the German coal industry With the founding of “Ruhrkohle AG”, the development of the West German coal industry entered into a third phase, which due to political decision ended in 2018 and which is summarized here as a controlled settlement of the entire German coal industry. With the start of the company, all industrial partners hoped that the unified company would adopt a planned, timely and socio-politically absorbed adjustment and shrinkage process, culminating in a consolidated coal-mining market that was competitive on the energy markets.27 Whereas the former goal was achieved, the latter remained an illusion from today’s perspective. This had to do primarily with the fact that German hard coal remained more expensive than crude oil or coal from other countries, in spite of burgeoning hopes, especially during the two oil crises in the 1970s. The energy programs of the state in the mid-1970s assumed a stabilization of the level of German coal production.28 Power generation laws (“Kohlepfenning”) and coking coal subsidies in the form of the so-called “Hüttenvertrag”, which was a metallurgical contract, were state instruments for a long-term securing of domestic coal sales.29 However,

27 Anonymous. 1968. “Das Gesetz zur Anpassung und Gesundung des deutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus und der deutschen Steinkohlengebiete.” Glückauf 104: 436–445; Kuhnke, HansHelmut. 1969. Die Ruhrkohle AG im Rahmen der Neuordnung des Steinkohlenbergbaus. Essen: Glückauf, 25–31. 28 Reichel, Wolfgang. 1995. “Vergangenheit und Zukunft des Ruhrkohlenbergbaus.” Glückauf 131: 359–365; Reintges, Heinz. 1980. “Deutsche Steinkohle zwischen Kohlenkrise und Renaissance.” Glückauf 116: 1212–1217. 29 Gatzka, Wolfgang. 1996. “Der Hüttenvertrag. Die Ablösung eines über hundert Jahre gewachsenen Verbundes durch einen Vertrag.” PhD diss., TU Berlin.

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it was not possible to compensate for the drop in sales in the heating market, which at least since the mid-1980s has played virtually no further role.30 Parallel to the continuing collapse of coalmines, “Ruhrkohle AG” concentrated in this phase on the exploration of reservoir areas in the northern Ruhr area and in southern Münsterland. On the one hand, the company again exploited rationalization potential by the use of highly automated, fully mechanical extraction technology. On the other hand, with the progress in achieving larger depths, the expense of their safe and logistically more complex operation increased. The further conflicts of interest between environmental and landscape protection on the one hand and the unavoidable land use demands of mining on the other saw “Ruhrkohle AG” attempt to defuse the situation by introducing the concept of so-called connecting mines. Even these measures could not prevent further steps to reduce production capacity during the 1990s. Decisions to minimize hard coal subsidies and the elimination of the “Kohlepfennig” in 1995 by the Federal Constitutional Court were the main reasons. Shortly before the turn of the millennium “Deutsche Steinkohle AG” as a subsidiary of “RAG Aktiengesellschaft”, which emerged from “Ruhrkohle AG”, represented all coalmines still producing in Germany.31 The basis of the final scenario was the hard coal financing law that the German government, the coal producing federal states of North Rhine-Westphalia and Saarland, the trade union IG BCE and the mining companies agreed on in 2007.32 This originally provided for a socially acceptable phase-out of subsidized hard coal mining by 2018, including a contract clause, according to which in 2012 it was to be examined whether the continuation in Germany of so-called reference mining as a domestic coal reserve was possible. Yet the ongoing discussions and the wish to cancel the coal subsidies as early as 2014 at European

30 Russel, Hans-Dieter. 1987. “Die Steinkohle im Wärmemarkt von morgen.” Glückauf 123: 503–506; Przigoda, Stefan. 2009. “Vom Hausbrand zum Wärmemarkt. Wandel und Verschwinden eines Absatzmarktes für Ruhrkohle”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945, edited by Farrenkopf et al., 429–438. 31 Beermann, Wilhelm. 1998. “Neuordnung des deutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus.” Glückauf 134: 483–488. 32 Frigelj, Kristian. 2009. “Der lange Weg zum Ausstiegsbeschluss – das Ende der SteinkohleSubventionen für Nordrhein-Westfalen”. In Kumpel und Kohle. Der Landtag NRW und die Ruhrkohle 1946 bis 2008, 166–253; Anonymous. 2008. “Rahmenvereinbarung ‘Sozialverträgliche Beendigung des subventionierten Steinkohlenbergbaus in Deutschland’ v. 14.08.2007”. In Neustrukturierung des RAG-Konzerns und Steinkohlefinanzierungsgesetz 2007, edited by Evonik Industries AG, n. pag. [Pkt. 1–3]. Essen: Evonik.

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Fig. 6: Campaign of Deutsche Steinkohle AG, 2005. The slogan is “Better if you don’t stand in the rain. Even with the energy supply”.

level, thus ending German hard coal mining earlier, saw the German parliament drop the contract clause from the hard coal financing law in 2011.33

Conclusion As a conclusion we may state that the rationality and transparency of the process gained through forming the integrated company is what distinguishes the long-term settlement of the German hard coal mining industry in the context of “Ruhrkohle AG” substantially from the previous mining crisis. The stabilization of social cushioning through general and social framework plans, as well as the pragmatically-oriented and persuasive work of the trade union, which has always

33 Wodopia, Franz-Josef. 2012. “Das Ende des deutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus als Ergebnis politischer Willensbildung”. In Der Saarländische Steinkohlenbergbau. Dokumentation seiner historischen Bedeutung und seines kulturellen Erbes, edited by Karlheinz Pohmer, 560–589. Saarbrücken: Krüger.

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been involved in decommissioning decisions, ensured that protests over mine closures gained a more or less symbolic character. Nonetheless, the mining trade union was able to mobilize a considerable potential for protest whenever the speed of the return process seemed to call into question its social compatibility. Even in 1997, for example, no fewer than 220,000 people were able to form a 100-km long “bond of solidarity” across the Ruhr area in order to oppose the Federal Government’s far-reaching subsidy reduction plans.34

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34 Lauschke, Karl. 2009. “Montanmitbestimmung und Arbeitskämpfe im Ruhrbergbau nach 1945”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945, edited by Farrenkopf et al., 455–461, 460.

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Farrenkopf, Michael. 2010. “Aufkommen und Bewältigung der Bergbau-Strukturkrise im Zeichen der Ruhrkohle AG.” Heimat Dortmund. Stadtgeschichte in Bildern und Berichten 1/2: 27–34. Farrenkopf, Michael. 2013. “Wiederaufstieg und Niedergang des Bergbaus in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland”. In Rohstoffgewinnung im Strukturwandel. Der deutsche Bergbau im 20. Jahrhundert, edited by Dieter Ziegler, 183–302. Münster: Aschendorff. Farrenkopf, Michael. 2018. “‘Es kommt auf jede Tonne an’ – Der Ruhrbergbau von 1945 bis Ende der 1950er Jahre”. In Josef Stoffels. Steinkohlenzechen – Fotografien aus dem Ruhrgebiet, edited by Heinrich Theodor Grütter, and Stefanie Grebe, 144–53. Essen: Klartext. Farrenkopf, Michael et al., eds. 2009. Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945. Katalog der Ausstellung des Deutschen Bergbau-Museums Bochum vom 6. Dezember 2009 bis 2. Mai 2010. Bochum: DBM. Farrenkopf, Michael, and Rainer Slotta. 2009. “Zur Geschichte des Ruhrbergbaus nach 1945 – ein Überblick”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945. Katalog der Ausstellung des Deutschen Bergbau-Museums Bochum vom 6. Dezember 2009 bis 2. Mai 2010, edited by Michael Farrenkopf et al., 24–36. Bochum: DBM. Farrenkopf, Michael et al., eds. 2019. Die Stadt der Städte. Das Ruhrgebiet und seine Umbrüche. Essen: Klartext. Frigelj, Kristian. 2009. “Der lange Weg zum Ausstiegsbeschluss – das Ende der SteinkohleSubventionen für Nordrhein-Westfalen”. In Kumpel und Kohle. Der Landtag NRW und die Ruhrkohle 1946 bis 2008, edited by the president of the North Rhine-Westphalian state parliament, 166–253. Düsseldorf: Landtag NRW. Gatzka, Wolfgang. 1996. “Der Hüttenvertrag. Die Ablösung eines über hundert Jahre gewachsenen Verbundes durch einen Vertrag.” PhD diss., TU Berlin. Gesetz über die Investitionshilfe der gewerblichen Wirtschaft. Vom 7. Januar 1952. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum/Bergbau-Archiv Bochum 12/327. Goch, Stefan. 2009. “Der Weg zur Einheitsgesellschaft Ruhrkohle AG”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945. Katalog der Ausstellung des Deutschen Bergbau-Museums Bochum vom 6. Dezember 2009 bis 2. Mai 2010, edited by Michael Farrenkopf et al., 284–302. Bochum: DBM. Hawner, Karl Heinz. 1968. “Der Weg zur Gesamtgesellschaft des Ruhrbergbaus.” Glückauf 104: 1123–7. Hentrich, Werner, and Hans Zydek. 1963. “Die Richtlinien über die vorläufige Gewährung von Prämien für die Stillegung von Steinkohlenbergwerken.” Glückauf 99: 304–13. Hentrich, Werner, and Hans Zydek. 1964. “Das Gesetz zur Förderung der Rationalisierung im Steinkohlenbergbau. Erster Teil.” Glückauf 100: 51–63. Huske, Joachim. 2006. Die Steinkohlenzechen im Ruhrrevier. Daten und Fakten von den Anfängen bis 2005. Bochum: DBM. Kroker, Evelyn. 1996. “Zur Entwicklung des Steinkohlenbergbaus in Nordrhein-Westfalen zwischen 1945 und 1995.” Glückauf 132: 457–85. Kuhnke, Hans-Helmut. 1969. Die Ruhrkohle AG im Rahmen der Neuordnung des Steinkohlenbergbaus. Essen: Glückauf. Lauschke, Karl. 1984. Schwarze Fahnen an der Ruhr. Die Politik der IG Bergbau und Energie während der Kohlenkrise 1958–1968. Marburg: VAG.

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Lauschke, Karl. 2004. “Wandel und neue Krisen: Die alten Industrien in den 1970er und 1980er Jahren”. In Strukturwandel und Strukturpolitik in Nordrhein-Westfalen, edited by Stefan Goch, 136–62. Münster: Aschendorff. Lauschke, Karl. 2009. “Montanmitbestimmung und Arbeitskämpfe im Ruhrbergbau nach 1945”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945. Katalog der Ausstellung des Deutschen Bergbau-Museums Bochum vom 6. Dezember 2009 bis 2. Mai 2010, edited by Michael Farrenkopf et al., 455–61. Bochum: DBM. Martiny, Martin. 1979. “Die Durchsetzung der Mitbestimmung im deutschen Bergbau”. In Glück auf, Kameraden! Die Bergarbeiter und ihre Organisationen in Deutschland, edited by Hans Mommsen, and Ulrich Borsdorf, 389–414. Köln: Bund. Natzel, Benno. 1957. “Die Neuordnung des deutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus. Ein Beitrag zur Geschichte des Ruhrbergbaus.” Glückauf 93: 789–97. Nonn, Christoph. 1999. “Klassengegensatz und Branchenindividualismus. Gewerkschaften und Unternehmer im Ruhrbergbau vor und in der Kohlenkrise.” Mitteilungsblatt des Instituts zur Erforschung der europäischen Arbeiterbewegung (IGA) 22: 36–58. Nonn, Christoph. 2001. Die Ruhrbergbaukrise. Entindustrialisierung und Politik 1958–1969. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Nonn, Christoph. 2009. “Die Krise des Ruhrbergbaus bis zur Gründung der Ruhrkohle AG (1957/58 bis 1969)”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945. Katalog der Ausstellung des Deutschen Bergbau-Museums Bochum vom 6. Dezember 2009 bis 2. Mai 2010, edited by Michael Farrenkopf et al., 236–42. Bochum: DBM. Nonn, Christoph. 2009. “Der Höhepunkt der Bergbaukrise (1958–1969)”. In Kumpel und Kohle. Der Landtag NRW und die Ruhrkohle 1946 bis 2008, edited by the president of the North Rhine-Westphalian state parliament, 96–124. Düsseldorf: Landtag NRW. Przigoda, Stefan. 2009. “Vom Hausbrand zum Wärmemarkt. Wandel und Verschwinden eines Absatzmarktes für Ruhrkohle”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945. Katalog der Ausstellung des Deutschen Bergbau-Museums Bochum vom 6. Dezember 2009 bis 2. Mai 2010, edited by Michael Farrenkopf et al., 429–38. Bochum: DBM. Ranft, Norbert. 1988. Vom Objekt zum Subjekt. Montanmitbestimmung, Sozialklima und Strukturwandel im Bergbau seit 1945. Köln: Bund. Regul, Rudolf. 1953. “Die Europäische Gemeinschaft für Kohle und Stahl.” Jahrbuch des deutschen Bergbaus 46: 17–41. Reichel, Wolfgang. 1995. “Vergangenheit und Zukunft des Ruhrkohlenbergbaus.” Glückauf 131: 359–65. Reintges, Heinz. 1980. “Deutsche Steinkohle zwischen Kohlenkrise und Renaissance.” Glückauf 116: 1212–7. Russel, Hans-Dieter. 1987. “Die Steinkohle im Wärmemarkt von morgen.” Glückauf 123: 503–6. Seidel, Hans-Christoph, and Klaus Tenfelde. 2009. “Arbeitsbeziehungen und Sozialpolitik im Ruhrbergbau nach 1945”. In Glück auf! Ruhrgebiet. Der Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945. Katalog der Ausstellung des Deutschen Bergbau-Museums Bochum vom 6. Dezember 2009 bis 2. Mai 2010, edited by Michael Farrenkopf et al., 47–57. Bochum: DBM. Seidel, Hans-Christoph. 2011. “Kohlenkrise und Zechenstilllegungen im Ruhrgebiet”. In Schichtwechsel. Von der Kohlenkrise zum Strukturwandel, edited by Jana Golombek, and Dietmar Osses, 30–7. Essen: Klartext.

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Spiegelberg, Friedrich. 1970. Energiemarkt im Wandel. Zehn Jahre Kohlenkrise an der Ruhr. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Wand, Lisa. 2017. “Vom Boom zur Krise. Der deutsche Steinkohlenbergbau nach 1945.” Der Anschnitt 69: 121–8. Wodopia, Franz-Josef. 2012. “Das Ende des deutschen Steinkohlenbergbaus als Ergebnis politischer Willensbildung”. In Der Saarländische Steinkohlenbergbau. Dokumentation seiner historischen Bedeutung und seines kulturellen Erbes, edited by Karlheinz Pohmer, 560–89. Saarbrücken: Krüger.

Miles Oglethorpe

Losing our mines: Scotland’s coal industry in context Introduction Today, when issues of sustainability and climate change dominate news headlines, it is difficult to believe that 60 years ago the Scottish economy was entirely dependent upon coal for its energy. This is, perhaps, especially surprising because Scotland is not well known for being a major centre of coal production, an industry which in the UK is more generally associated with Wales. It is true, nevertheless, that Scotland’s extraordinary industrial evolution in the 18th, 19th and early 20th centuries would have been impossible without a large and increasingly advanced coal industry. Scotland’s dominant industries, especially iron and steel, shipbuilding, engineering, railways, heavy ceramics, chemicals and textiles were all enormous energy users and relied on local supplies of high-quality coal. By the beginning of World War One in 1914, Scotland had matured into the ‘Workshop of the British Empire’, an achievement that would have been impossible without coal miners across the Ayrshire, Dunbartonshire, Lanarkshire and Stirlingshire coalfields.1 Yet, by 2002, a country which took 200 collieries into public ownership at nationalisation in 1947 had no surviving deep coal mines. The extent to which coal was an important part of life in Scotland is confirmed by the fact that over 100,000 people were employed in the mines and associated industries during the 1950s. The mines themselves were an integral part of the Scottish landscape, so much so that any traveller in central Scotland would inevitably find collieries located across the countryside and in villages and towns. The fact is that they were so pervasive that they were hardly noticed, and few people bothered to contemplate life without them. The purpose of this paper is therefore to provide an account of how such a hugely important industry disappeared within five decades. Rather than being a story of unremitting decline, it is one of initial confidence being overcome by sweeping technological change, industrial upheaval and a transformation of the UK’s energy markets.

1 Moss, Michael S., and John R. Hume. 1977. Workshop of the British Empire. London: Heinemann. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-011

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The age of King Coal In July 1946, the UK’s first majority Labour Government passed the ‘Coal Industry Nationalisation Act’ which created the National Coal Board (NCB) on 1st January 1947. The Act resulted in the main assets of the coal industry being taken into public ownership. This occurred in the context of deteriorating conditions in the coalfields following six years of war and the deep economic depression that had preceded.2 However, there was an atmosphere of optimism (see Fig. 1), especially in the Government and within the Unions, who believed that, after decades of campaigning for public ownership, major improvements in working and living conditions were now within reach.

Fig. 1: Celebrations of the creation of the National Coal Board (NCB) on 1st January 1947, Newcraighall Colliery near Edinburgh.

Across the UK coalfields, the assets transferred to public ownership included 1,500 working collieries and their associated assets (13% of which were in Scotland), 30 fuel and briquetting plants, 55 coke ovens and associated chemical by-product plants, 85 brickworks, 1,803 farms, 140,000 houses, 27,000 farm houses and cottages, numerous offices, 275 shops and business premises, several swimming baths, a cinema and a slaughterhouse. There were in addition thousands of miles of private mineral railways, wharves, depots, retail milk rounds, a holiday camp, a bicycle track, and 177,000 mainline railway wagons and locomotives.3 The new National Coal Board published a series of strategies, the first

2 Scottish Home Department. 1944. Scottish Coalfields: Report of the Scottish Coalfields Committee, cmd. 6575. Edinburgh: HMSO Edinburgh; Supple, Barry. 1987. The History of the British Coal Industry, Volume 4: 1913–1946, The Poltical Economy of Decline. Oxford: Clarenden Press. 3 Ashworth, William. 1986. The History of the British Coal Industry, Volume 5: 1946–1982, The Nationalized Industry. Oxford: Clarenden Press, 23–24.

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being the Plan for Coal,4 which initially allocated £635 million of spending over the following 15 years, a significant proportion of which was to occur in Scotland. As the list of transferred assets suggested, the NCB’s role extended beyond the production of coal to include a wide range of activities, including welfare. This expanded outside the workplace to include a medical service tackling health issues in the coal-mining communities, promoting health education and advising on medical aspects of safety such as dust-related diseases. A major benefit was the NCB’s statutory obligation to provide first-aid rooms at the surface of all coal mines, something that had not existed before. Indeed, a questionnaire distributed to colliery managers in 1948–49 after nationalisation revealed a shocking and extraordinary lack of medical facilities at the pithead, the full extent of some collieries’ cover being a nurse in a neighbouring village.5 At the pithead, working conditions improved very significantly as a result of the introduction new safety programmes by the NCB, reducing the incidence of accidents and establishing a health-and-safety culture which has since been emulated across many industries.6 Meanwhile, although the work of the Miners Welfare Fund (MWF) had, since the early 1920s, started the process of improving surface facilities at collieries, especially through the construction of pithead baths, most collieries still had poor facilities at best. It was against this background in 1947 that the NCB took over many of the responsibilities of the MWF, transferring them to the Coal Industry Welfare and Social Organisation (CISWO). The NCB also acquired large numbers of houses previously owned by the mining companies, but these were mostly transferred to local authorities. In some cases, such as the model mining village of Newtongrange near Edinburgh, the village fell into disrepair, and only survived as a result of community action, the imposition of a Conservation Area by Midlothian Council, and the intervention of a Housing Association. Nationalisation in Scotland brought 200 collieries into State ownership leaving a residue of approximately 100 smaller mines, usually employing less than 30 people in private ownership. Many of the older collieries were near to exhaustion, or were unsuitable for modernisation and so were marked for closure. With productivity already low following the end of World War Two, there was an urgent need for increased production, so a programme of sinking short-term surface drift-mines was commenced. These targeted inclined seams of coal

4 NCB. 1950. Plan for Coal, London: HMSO. 5 NCB. 1948. Colliery Questionnaire (data gathered from colliery managers after vesting day), Scottish Division. Unpublished. 6 Anonymous. 1952. “Removing Scenes of Squalor from Scottish Pit-heads: The Architect’s part in modernizing mining.” The Times, November 12, 1952.

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that were easily accessible from the surface and which required minimal capital expenditure. The number of operating collieries did not therefore fall, despite the closures, and the number of miners in Scotland increased during the first ten years following nationalisation.7 In 1955, the NCB published ‘Scotland’s Coal Plan’,8 which outlined a new phase of investment and modernisation. Older collieries were to be closed, and others were chosen for reconstruction, modernisation and development, examples being Bowhill, Frances and Valleyfield in Fife, Kames and Barony in Ayrshire, Polmaise 3 & 4 and Manor Powis in Stirlingshire, Cardowan and Bedlay in Lanarkshire, and Polkemmet and Kinneil in West Lothian. Many of these continued working successfully for the next two decades. However, the most ambitious part of the plan was for fifteen ‘new sinkings’, such as the showpiece colliery at Rothes.9 Responsibility for the design of the new generation of collieries and some of the larger reconstructions had fallen to the NCB’s Scottish Division production architect, Egon Riss. Born in 1901 and educated at the Wiener Technische Hochschule in Vienna, his early work had included the Tuberculosis Sanatorium in Lainz, Vienna, which was completed in 1931.10 Following his escape from Austria to the UK in 1938, he was recruited initially by the Miners’ Welfare Fund, joining the NCB in Scotland in 1947. The first new sinking project with which he was associated was Rothes Colliery which had been planned initially by the Fife Coal Company prior to nationalisation in 1947 (Fig. 2). The layout of the newly-designed surface buildings seems to have influenced the design of later collieries in Scotland, and possibly elsewhere in UK, and has similarities with new collieries in Germany, Poland and the Netherlands. Certainly, it reflects the desire of the NCB to project a dynamic, modern image, reflecting the confidence of the period. The new collieries varied in scale and design, some taking the form of substantial surface mines like Minnivey near Dalmellington in Ayrshire, but by far the most important were the ‘Superpits’ at Killoch in Ayrshire (Fig. 3), Bilston Glen and Monktonhall in Midlothian, and Seafield in Fife. All commenced production in the mid-1960s, and as directed by Riss, incorporated miners’ welfare at the heart of their design. The enormous towers and headframes on the surface

7 Oglethorpe, Miles K. 2006. Scottish Collieries – An Inventory of the Scottish Coal Industry in the Nationalised Era. Edinburgh: RCAHMS. 8 NCB. 1955. Scotland’s Coal Plan. Edinburgh: NCB Scottish Division. 9 NCB. 1958. Visit of Her Majesty the Queen and HRH The Duke of Edinburgh to Rothes Colliery on Monday, 30 June 1958. Edinburgh: NCB Scottish Division. 10 Robertson, G. W. 1988. Egon Riss – Architect, unpublished undergraduate honours dissertation, Mackintosh School of Architecture, Glasgow.

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Fig. 2: Amid scenes of great optimism, Her Majesty Queen Elizabeth formally opens Rothes Colliery on 30th June 1958.

reflected the huge investment both above and below ground, the latter involving large permanent roadways and bunkering facilities near the pit bottom to handle larger volumes of output and materials, and at the surface, large coal preparation facilities. The new Scottish super-collieries were, without doubt, industrial landmarks which represented the confidence in coal as a fuel of the future, and aligned well with ‘white-heat’ technology that was being promoted by the Labour government of the time. With the new superpits coming on line, together with the reconstructed collieries, it was possible to close many of the less productive mines in what became the largest closure programme in the history of the coalfields. Many miners were transferred to the new or reconstructed collieries, some of which employed over 2,000 people.11 As well as a being a major cultural transformation, the rapid change brought about a geographical shift from West to East, most of the new sinkings and modernisation programmes having been centred in Fife and the Lothians.

11 Halliday, Robert S. 1990. The Disappearing Scottish Colliery: A Personal View of Some Aspects of Scotland’s Coal Industry since Nationalisation. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 44.

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Fig. 3: Killoch Colliery, Ayrshire’s new superpit, and one of architect Egon Riss’s finer designs, seen here two years after production commenced in 1962.

Decline and fall The year 1967 proved to be pivotal for Scotland’s coal industry. It suffered the major psychological blow of losing its biggest colliery, Michael, following a fatal fire caused by underground spontaneous combustion in the coal seams.12 This occurred against a background of accelerating closures that had already reduced the number of operating collieries from 200 to 65. By 1987, this had fallen to eleven, and by 1997, only two were still in production.13 At the same time, the number of people working in Scotland’s mining industry had shrunk rapidly, although output per man had increased significantly. The causes of the steep downturn in the fortunes of the Scottish coal industry were rooted in a massive fall in demand. In 1947 when World War Two ended, coal was unchallenged and the national priority was to support the recovery of 12 Stephenson, H. S. 1968. Fire at Michael Colliery: Report on the causes of, and circumstances attending, the fire which occurred at Michael Colliery, Fife, on 9th September, 1967 (Cmnd. 3657). London: HMSO. 13 NCB. 1947–95. Shaft Register. Unpublished.

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mining to assist national post-War reconstruction. From the 1950s on, the position of coal was undermined by the diversification of energy sources, government policy and the internationalisation of the coal trade.14 The main drivers behind the demise of coal included declining urban air quality. Many cities were experiencing catastrophic smogs which were impairing health and killing thousands of people. The Government responded with clean-air legislation in 1956 and 1968, restricting the burning of coal in towns and cities by industry and domestic households. The British railway network was, meanwhile, being radically cut back following Richard Beeching’s ‘The Reshaping of British Railways’ report in 1963, and the surviving steam locomotives were being replaced by diesel and electric traction. Inevitably, smogs had helped to harm the reputation of coal, confirming it to be a ‘dirty’ fuel, so the industry responded by introducing ‘smokeless’ fuels and for the domestic market attempted to compete against newly introduced modern central heating systems. The NCB therefore embarked upon promotional campaigns marketing coal as being a clean fuel, an example being ‘Nuggets’, which were made at Niddrie near Edinburgh. Advertising publicity at the time depicted coal delivery men dressed in white overalls, like milkmen, emphasising the purity of the new fuel. Other marketing campaigns included the installation of a prototype coin-operated automatic vending machine, ‘The Fuelomatic’, which dispensed sacks of coal to passing passengers at St Andrew’s Bus Station in Edinburgh (Fig. 4). Despite the marketing initiatives, domestic demand for coal continued to decline in the 1960s and 1970s, further eroded by cheap heating oil, and affordable electricity brought by an expanding National Grid. Initially, this was not all bad news for the coal industry because the bulk of the UK’s growing electricity supply was generated by locally mined coal, and was sometimes referred to as ‘coal by wire’. However, increasing dependence on the electricity generation market subsequently proved to be a major weakness in the longer term, especially with the introduction of nuclear power in the 1960s. This was exacerbated by the fact that nuclear attracted a far greater government subsidy because of its links with the UK’s policy of maintaining nuclear weapons. However, one of the biggest setbacks was the discovery of oil and gas in the North Sea. Although production had commenced off the English coast in the southern North Sea in the 1960s, it

14 Hudson, R. 2002. “The Changing Geography of the British Coal Industry: Nationalization, Privatisation and the Political Economy of Energy Supply, 1947–97.” Transactions of the Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, Section A, 111, no. 3: 180–187.

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Fig. 4: The experimental ‘Fuelomatic’, a coin-operated vending machine installed at St Andrews bus station in Edinburgh, dispensing sacks of coal to passing passengers.

was the arrival of gas at Peterhead in Scotland from the UK/Norwegian Frigg field in 1977 which triggered the national switch-over from coal to natural gas. This resulted in the rapid closure of all of the UK’s town gas works and the conversion of over 30 million domestic gas appliances from town to natural gas. Meanwhile, the UK economy was rapidly de-industrialising, losing a large proportion of its heavy, high-energy-consuming industries, further undermining demand for coal. As the decline gathered pace, dependence on the electricity generators intensified. So, whilst in 1947, electricity generation consumed 15% of UK coal production, this had increased to over 50% by 1971.15 Although new coal-burning thermal power stations had been built all over the UK in the 1960s, often at or close to coal mines such as Barony, Kincardine, Cockenzie and Longannet in Scotland, there was no guarantee that these power stations would always burn Scottish or British coal. The election of Margaret Thatcher in 1979 brought the Conservative Party to power and ushered in period of Neo-liberal, monetarist policies which favoured freeing markets and withdrawing support from state industries, which were themselves earmarked for privatisation. UK steel and electricity-generating companies 15 Ashworth. British Coal Industry.

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were therefore no longer obliged to buy coal from the NCB, further undermining its position. A cross-Channel ‘Connector’ was also established which allowed electricity generated by France’s nuclear power stations to be brought into the National Grid, and further subsidies were awarded to the UK’s own nuclear industry. It is no surprise therefore that, from the mid-1980s, the decline of deep mining was on a terminal scale. From 1983 to 1987, coal imports to the UK increased from 4 to 10 million tonnes, and a desperate miners’ strike in 1984–5 failed to arrest the sequence of pit closures. Revised contracts with the electricity companies (now in private ownership) put even more pressure on mining costs, and new environmental legislation forced most coal-burning power stations to install costly flue-gas de-sulphurisation units. Scotland escaped relatively lightly in this respect because much of the locally-mined coal burned in its Longannet, Cockenzie and Kincardine Power Stations was naturally low in sulphur, but further setbacks occurred when the UK Government chose to issue licences for several natural-gas burning power stations, which resulted in the so-called ‘Dash for Gas’, and the accelerated depletion of the UK’s North-Sea gas reserves in subsequent years.

Obliteration Continuing deregulation in the 1980s and 1990s led to inevitable privatisation of the coal industry in 1994. At this time, only 15 collieries remained in production in the UK, two of which, Monktonhall and Longannet, were in Scotland. Miners and management were encouraged to buy-out the mines and to establish of miners’ co-operative modelled on the successful experience at Tower Colliery in Wales. Being a superpit, the huge scale of Monktonhall’s operating costs were an instant burden for the company formed by the miners, which had insufficient capital to support more than one coalface in production at any one time. The project eventually failed, the miners lost the redundancy payments that they had invested in the business, and the colliery buildings, a landmark on the east side of Edinburgh, were demolished in November 1997 and February 1998 (Fig. 5). This left the Longannet complex near Culross in Fife as Scotland’s last surviving deep coal mine. Taken over by the company Scottish Coal, it continued to supply Scottish Power, operators of the adjacent power station (the second biggest in the UK) until underground flooding in 2002 brought to an end centuries of deep coal mining in Scotland. Longannet Power Station subsequently continued to generate electricity using imported coal until 2016 when its closure signalled the complete cession of thermal electricity generation in Scotland.

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Fig. 5: The demolition of Monktonhall Colliery, Scotland’s last superpit, in November 1997.

What survives? Deep coal mining can leave a substantial mark on the landscape both because of the often substantial surface buildings and machinery required to extract the coal from the rocks below, and because of the infrastructure required to process and dispatch it to its consumers. In addition, large quantities of waste material are often generated, sometimes towering above the landscape in the form of spoil heaps, known as ‘bings’ in Scotland. In the second half of the 20th century, fewer but larger mines created even more imposing surface arrangements of buildings, and the associated infrastructure and spoil heaps were also often even more prominent. The first big closure programmes of the nationalised era in the 1940s and 50s did not necessarily result in instant demolition, and residual remains have survived in some places well into the 21st century. However, attitudes and regulations changed radically after the Aberfan Disaster in Wales on 21 October 1966 when a large spoil heap in the valley became unstable following heavy rain, causing a landslide which engulfed a local school leading to the deaths of over 140 children and staff in the buildings. The pace of land reclamation and demolition rapidly increased in the years and decades that followed, substantial spoil heaps routinely being eyed with suspicion. The eradication process was further encouraged by the propensity of some spoil heaps to catch fire because of spontaneous combustion in a process that often produced unpleasant environmental conditions for neighbouring communities. Entire mining landscapes therefore started to disappear in a process that was accelerated by the re-working of spoil heaps for residual coal, the use of the spoil as a source of clay for brickworks and for roads, and the introduction of contaminated land legislation. In addition, European funding aimed at encouraging land reclamation in mining areas intensified the process, as did a substantial increase

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in open-cast mining which was described as auto-cannibalism – the coal industry was eating its own past and identity. When privatisation inevitably occurred in the 1990s, it was standard practice for mine surface buildings to be demolished within a year of closure to maximise the potential value of land assets and minimise liabilities prior to being sold off. An immediate result of this policy was that older surviving structures such as the towers at Rothes Colliery, which had remained a local landmark since closure in 1962, were demolished, in this case depriving the local population of a valuable navigational aid in Glenrothes, a ‘New Town’ notorious for its bewilderingly homogeneous road network.

The continuing struggle Wherever it has been attempted in Scotland, preservation of the physical remains of coal mining has presented major challenges. The structures and buildings associated with deep coal mining were, in general, designed and built with a finite and specific purpose in mind, and long-term survival beyond the life of mining activity was not anticipated. For successful collieries, a working life of a few decades was expected, and this assumed continuous care and maintenance. In Scotland, the majority of mine surface buildings comprised a mixture of brick, steel and reinforced-concrete which, if neglected, deteriorated rapidly, particularly in the often inhospitable climate of the coalfields. Furthermore, attempts at preservation have also not always been received positively, especially where local communities have continued to associate the collieries with bad memories, neighbourhood conflict, bitter disappointment and betrayal. This, perhaps, explains the scarcity of successful preservation projects in Scotland. Compared with the Ruhr region in Germany or the Ostrava area in the Czech Republic, or the northern coalfields of France and Belgium, or even South Wales in the UK, very few recognisable coal mining sites have survived in Scotland. This renders the two most intact survivors – Prestongrange Industrial Museum in East Lothian and Lady Victoria Colliery in Midlothian all the more important. The latter is now home to the National Mining Museum Scotland, and is an outstanding example of a late 19th Century showpiece colliery the significance of which has been enhanced by the survival of the adjacent model village of Newtongrange, also built by the Lothian Coal Company in the 1880s. However, beyond these two examples, only six colliery headframes or winding towers can now be found in all of Scotland, where over 300 substantial collieries have operated in the last 100 years.

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Elsewhere in Scotland, there are examples of surface buildings surviving randomly as a result of re-use, for example as scrap yards. In the case of the Killoch supercolliery, conversion to deal with neighbouring open-cast coal preparation extended the life of the surface buildings, although the magnificent towers were demolished soon after the colliery closed. Sadly, even the finest architectural examples of pithead baths have mostly disappeared, with only few surviving into the 21st century. Surprisingly, it is often the earlier, ruinous remains of older collieries that have survived more successfully, such as the beam-engine houses in Fife at Kilmux and Thornton, the remains of the surface buildings and salt pans at Preston Island and of the Moat Pit near Culross, and the coke ovens at Woodmuir in West Lothian. To the west in Ayrshire, the substantial remains of early Newcomen engine houses at can be found at Auchenharvie near Stevenson and Caprington near Kilmarnock in Ayrshire.16 The recent UNESCO inscription of the Nord pas de Calais coalfield in France demonstrates that coal mining is much more than the collieries themselves. As was the case in France and across the European coalfields, Scotland’s coal communities have survived, together with buildings and amenities such as sports and leisure facilities, meeting halls, libraries, colleges, convalescent homes and miners’ welfare institutions. Poignant memorials to the thousands of miners who died as a result of accidents or work-related diseases can also be found in many mining communities. The same communities also fostered the beginnings of political movements, not least the Labour Party, which has its roots in the Scottish coalfields. A further unrecognised and often invisible legacy of the coal industry is the enormous range of heavy clay products manufactured in brick, tile, fireclay and refractory works often situated adjacent to or operating as part of Scottish collieries, in many instances, inherited by the NCB in 1947. These works were responsible for making a very significant proportion of Scotland’s building materials in the 20th century. So, although Scotland is not particularly well known for being a country of brick buildings, many of the buildings constructed in this period contain bricks, even if they are hidden behind a stone veneer or rendered façade. Moreover, coal companies often produced a variety of other clay products such as fireclay refractories (for which Scotland was world famous), drain pipes,

16 Hughson, Irene. 1996. The Auchenharvie Colliery: an Early History. Ochiltree: The Three Towns Local History Group, Stenlake Publishing; Whatley, Christopher Allan. 1977. “The Introduction of the Newcomen Engine in Ayrshire”. Industrial Archaeology Review 2, no. 1, 69–77.

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sewers and sanitary ware, and architectural products such as roof and roof ridge tiles, pavoirs, special facing bricks, chimney cans and wall copes.17 Nevertheless, as the iconic Zollverein Colliery in Essen demonstrates, it is the collieries themselves that continue to carry the most cultural resonance, and with them the identity and aspirations of the coal mining communities. For Scotland, this makes our last surviving coherent mine complex, Lady Victoria Colliery (Fig. 6) all the more important. For several years, its survival as the National Mining Museum Scotland has been in the balance as the public sector is starved of funding by a policy of economic austerity driven relentlessly by a UK Government based far away in London. So far, the Scottish Government in Edinburgh has maintained its support, and the hope is that incremental investment in sustainable projects will keep it open, helping it to keep Scotland’s extraordinary coal mining heritage alive for future generations.

Fig. 6: Lady Victoria Colliery, now home of the National Mining Museum Scotland. This is the only coherent surviving colliery complex in Scotland.

References Anonymous. 1952. “Removing Scenes of Squalor from Scottish Pit-heads: The Architect’s part in modernizing mining.” The Times, November 12, 1952. Ashworth, William. 1986. The History of the British Coal Industry, Volume 5: 1946–1982, The Nationalized Industry. Oxford: Clarenden Press. Douglas, Graham, and Miles Oglethorpe. 1993. Brick, Tile and Fireclay Industries in Scotland. Edinburgh: RCAHMS. Halliday, Robert S. 1990. The Disappearing Scottish Colliery: A Personal View of Some Aspects of Scotland’s Coal Industry since Nationalisation. Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press. Hudson, R. 2002. “The Changing Geography of the British Coal Industry: Nationalization, Privatisation and the Political Economy of Energy Supply, 1947–97.” Transactions of the Institute of Mining and Metallurgy, Section A, 111, no. 3: 180–7.

17 Douglas, Graham, and Miles Oglethorpe. 1993. Brick, Tile and Fireclay Industries in Scotland. Edinburgh: RCAHMS.

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Hughson, Irene. 1996. The Auchenharvie Colliery: an Early History. Ochiltree: The Three Towns Local History Group, Stenlake Publishing. Moss, Michael S., and John R. Hume. 1977. Workshop of the British Empire. London: Heinemann. NCB. 1948. Colliery Questionnaire (data gathered from colliery managers after vesting day), Scottish Division. Unpublished. NCB. 1947–95. Shaft Register. Unpublished. NCB. 1950. Plan for Coal, London: HMSO. NCB. 1955. Scotland’s Coal Plan. Edinburgh: NCB Scottish Division. NCB. 1958. Visit of Her Majesty the Queen and HRH The Duke of Edinburgh to Rothes Colliery on Monday, 30 June 1958. Edinburgh: NCB Scottish Division. Oglethorpe, Miles K. 2006. Scottish Collieries – An Inventory of the Scottish Coal Industry in the Nationalised Era. Edinburgh: RCAHMS. Robertson, G. W. 1988. Egon Riss – Architect, unpublished undergraduate honours dissertation, Mackintosh School of Architecture, Glasgow. Scottish Home Department. 1944. Scottish Coalfields: Report of the Scottish Coalfields Committee, cmd. 6575. Edinburgh: HMSO Edinburgh. Stephenson, H. S. 1968. Fire at Michael Colliery: Report on the causes of, and circumstances attending, the fire which occurred at Michael Colliery, Fife, on 9th September, 1967 (Cmnd. 3657). London: HMSO. Supple, Barry. 1987. The History of the British Coal Industry, Volume 4: 1913–1946, The Poltical Economy of Decline. Oxford: Clarenden Press. Whatley, Christopher Allan. 1977. “The Introduction of the Newcomen Engine in Ayrshire.” Industrial Archaeology Review 2, no. 1: 69–77.

Andrea Pokludová and Petr Popelka

From the “steel heart of Czechoslovakia” to post-industrial space: Boom, crisis and the cultural heritage of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district Outline of the economic development of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district before 1948 The Ostrava-Karviná mining district is the most significant black coal mining area in the Czech Republic that contains 90 percent of local deposits of black coal. This district is a part of the Upper-Silesian coal district, the majority of which is located in neighbouring Poland. The whole area covers approximately 7,000 square kilometres, of which about 1,550 are located in the Czech Republic. The total area of the coal mine amounts to 320 square kilometres. Regular coal mining activity was launched in the mining district in the 1780s and 1790s, however, only to a very limited extent. Until the 1830s, coal mining grew very slowly and at an irregular pace with a maximum of 6,000 tonnes per year in the 1820s. In the 1830s, the region was still an agricultural area where coal mining played only a minor role.1 The foundation of the Vítkovice ironworks (Rudolfshütte) in 1828 was a primary incentive caused by the quickly growing demand for coal and was an impulse towards the development of the Ostrava-Karviná coal mining district.2 In 1847, the Emperor Ferdinand Northern Railway was extended from Ostrava to neighbouring Bohumín and thus brought a first-class transport connection to the Ostrava region. For the black coal from Ostrava, it also paved the way to distant markets in Vienna, Pest or in the Moravian sugar refinery regions.3

1 Popelka, Petr, Renata Popelková, and Monika Mulková. 2016. Black or Green Land? Industrialisation and Landscape Changes of the Ostrava-Karviná Mining District in the 19th and 20th Century. Ostrava: Ostravská univerzita, 32–33. 2 Myška, Milan. 1960. Založení a počátky vítkovických železáren 1828–1880 [Foundation and Beginnings of the Vítkovice Ironworks 1828–1880]. Ostrava: Krajské nakladatelství v Ostravě. 3 Popelka, Petr. 2015. “The Transport Revolution and Austrian Silesia 1742–1914.” In Creating an Interdisciplinary Paradigm Using the Example of Modernization in a Region (Austrian Silesia). Contributions for the XVII th World Economic History Congress in Kyoto, Japan from 1 to 7 August 2015, edited by Aleš Zářický, and Michaela Závodná, 79–95. Ostrava: Ostravská univerzita; https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-012

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The mass boom in railway construction within the Habsburg empire prompted an expansion which lasted until the 1840s and black coal played an important role. The demands on ironworks with respect to the construction of railway networks were large and only between 1851 and 1880 the length of the railway network under the Habsburg monarchy increased seven-fold. In the decade before 1872, the extraction of black coal grew by almost 1.2 million tonnes.4 In the course of the 1870s, fundamental changes took place in the structure of the newly emergent Ostrava-Karviná mining district. During the Industrial Revolution, the Czech lands evolved into the industrial nucleus of the whole of AustriaHungary and at the same time almost all its production of black coal was concentrated there (approximately 93 percent).5 The contribution of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district to the total amount of extracted black coal in the Czech lands even exceeded 65 percent before the First World War (9.8 million tonnes in 1913).6 The economy of the whole of the Ostrava industrial area took on a homogenous character in the last third of the 19th century. Traditional production led by the once dominant handiwork textile industry diminished and agriculture where the largest workforce used to be concentrated soon became a secondary source of livelihood.7 During the last third of the 19th century, pronounced construction activity changed the whole area and caused a huge influx of workers. In the last quarter of the 19th century, the rapid and extensive extraction of black coal prompted an influx of mainly unskilled workers who came mostly from the foothills of the Beskydy mountains but also from fairly distant Galicia. In 1910, about 120,000 people were employed in various industries in the Ostrava-Karviná region. Of this number, 43,000 were employed specifically in coal mining.8 Kárníková, Ludmila. 1961. Vývoj uhelného průmyslu v českých zemích do roku 1880 [Development of the Coal Industry in the Czech Lands to 1880]. Praha: Československá akademie věd, 61–66. 4 Myška, Milan. 2004–2005. “Eisenbahnen – Eisenhüttenindustrie – Wirtschaftswachstum. Der Einfluss des Ausbaus des Eisenbahnnetzes auf die Entwicklung des Eisenhüttenwesens in der Habsburgermonarchie 1830–1914.” Prager wirtschafts- und sozialhistorische Mitteilungen 7: 9–47. 5 Myška, Milan. 1970. Die mährisch-schlesische Eisenindustrie in der industriellen Revolution. Ostrava: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství. 6 Matějček, Jiří. 1969. “Dolování uhlí na území dnešní ČSR v letech 1880 až 1914 (Některé tendence vývoje).” [Coalmining on the territory of today’s CSR in 1880 to 1914 (Some tendencies of the development).] Průmyslové oblasti 2: 86. 7 Mulková, Monika, Renata Popelková, and Petr Popelka. 2016. “Black Land: The Mining Landscape of the Ostrava-Karviná Region.” In Landscapes and Landforms of the Czech Republic, edited by Tomáš Pánek, and Jan Hradecký, 319–332. Springer International Publishing. 8 Dokoupil, Lumír. 1967. Demografický vývoj ostravské aglomerace za průmyslové revoluce [Demographic Development of the Ostrava Agglomeration during the Industrial Revolution]. Ostrava: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství; Pitronová, Blanka. 1979. Haličské migrace na Ostravsko [Galician Migration to the Ostrava District]. Opava: Slezský ústav ČSAV; Dokoupil,

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The period before World War One meant the arrival of fundamental civilisation changes which are tightly connected to the process of urbanisation. Small local mostly rural towns were turning into lively industrial centres where rapid construction activities took place. Typical housing schemes (known locally as so-called “colonies”) were built for employees of mines and ironworks and these became a characteristic element of the local settlements and housing developments. Only at a considerably later stage, specifically in the last decade of the existence of the Habsburg monarchy and in the interwar period, cultural and local administration institutions were established in the region.9 The period from 1918 to 1945 was very turbulent for the Ostrava-Karviná mining district. The end of the First World War, the disintegration of AustriaHungary and foundation of new states in Central Europe introduced a new situation. The location of the mining district on the borders of Germany, Slovakia and newly arising Poland played an important role in the first years of Czechoslovakia’s existence. Until 1920, the conflict between Czechoslovakia and Poland over Cieszyn Silesia affected the running of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district, since both sides staked their claims to this strategic zone. The eastern part of the mining district was subordinate to an international committee that supervised a forced sale of coal to both parties involved in the conflict. The international agreement from July 1920 divided Cieszyn Silesia in such a way that Czechoslovakia received the whole of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district.10 The post-war crisis hit all the coal industry; the crisis in the interwar period was worse for the mining district in 1922 when the production reached only 67 percent of its pre-war levels. The situation started to improve only from 1923, mainly thanks to the demands from German entrepreneurs and in connection to the so-called Ruhr Crisis. Therefore, production in the mining district surpassed the pre-war maximum in 1924. In 1929, the significant boom culminated with 12.5 million tonnes of coal, which was an increase of 28 percent compared to 1913. The mining district experienced the beginning of the economic crisis in 1930 with the peak of the recession in 1934 when the total volume of the extracted

Lumír. 1986. Obyvatelstvo ostravské průmyslové oblasti do sčítání 1869 [Populace of the Ostrava Industrial District in the Census 1869]. Praha: Státní pedagogické nakladateství. 9 Myška, Milan. 1997. “K obecně historickým předpokladům konstituování Ostravy jako centra kulturní oblasti.” [On the general historical assumptions of the constitution of Ostrava as a centre of the cultural area] In Slezsko a severovýchodní Morava jako specifický region, edited by Sborník prací Filozofické fakulty Ostravské univerzity, 9–32. Ostrava: Filozofická fakulta Ostravské univerzity. 10 Machač, Jan, and Petra Langrová, eds. 2003. Uhelné hornictví v ostravsko-karvinském revíru [Coalmining in the Ostrava-Karvina Mining District]. Ostrava: Anagram, 94–95.

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coal dropped by 40 percent compared to 1929 when only a mere 7.5 million tonnes were extracted. A subsequent stimulation was only very gradual, but in 1937 it was replaced by a short-term boom which was driven by high demand from the Czechoslovak metallurgical and arms industries. A new phase in the development of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district came after the Munich Agreement. A thus far homogeneous territory of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district was divided between three political entities. The area of the Petřkovice mines was together with all of the Hlučín region (Hultschiner Ländchen) allocated to the German Reich. A larger section of the Karviná part of the mining district (about 57 percent of the overall volume of extracted coal) was annexed by Poland in October 1938 and after the occupation by the Nazis in September 1939 it was allocated to the Upper Silesian coalfield. The remaining part of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district remained part of the Czech-Slovak Republic, later the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia. The division of the mining district in the autumn of 1938 caused numerous complications. However, with respect to its subsequent development the rapid integration of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district into the context of the German war-time and centrally planned economy was most significant. The German Reich wished to maximise the production of the coalfield. Therefore, German mining experts prepared a development plan which was based upon experience from the Ruhr area and included modernisation of the existing mines and the construction of new ones. This ambitious plan was implemented only partially, mainly in the north-eastern part of the Ostrava Basin.11

Ostrava-Karviná mining district as the steel heart of Czechoslovakia (1945–1989) After the end of the Second World War, fundamental political, national and economical changes occurred on the territory of Czechoslovakia. The field of mining, which had been seen as a key segment of the national economy was included in the post-war nationalisation. This was legislatively anchored in Decree no. 100/1945 issued by the president of the republic. On 1 January 1946, a national company called Ostravsko-karvinské kamenouhelné doly was founded

11 Pavelčíková, Nina. 1990. Ostravská oblast v letech nacistické okupace 1938–1945. [The Ostrava District in the Years of the Nazi Occupation, 1938–1945]. Ostrava: Slezský ústav ČSAV.

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and it merged the property from all of the then existing mining companies in the Ostrava-Karviná mining district. A new era within the development of the mining district was launched after the political coup in February 1948. The Czechoslovak economy underwent an extensive structural reconstruction which brought a fierce preference for heavy and arms industries between 1949 and 1955.12 The Ostrava-Karviná mining district was to become a mining, metallurgical and energy base for arms production development for the whole Soviet bloc. The Ostrava agglomeration was declared the “steel heart of the republic” and huge investments into further development of both the heavy industry and also new amenities were planned there.13 The first five-year plan (1949–1953) mainly envisaged an enormous increase of steel production in the Ostrava area. This was connected to the construction of a new metallurgical giant (Nová huť) and also a power plant in OstravaTřebovice which at that time was the largest of its kind in the ČSR. Metallurgical production was increased in steps and accompanied by significantly growing demands on coal and coke production. The tasks which the state had planned for coal production were set on such an exaggerated level that they could not be met even with the new ways in which work was organised and by adopting exceptional measures. As a result, fatalities and extensive accidents in current mining operations increased in increments.14 Thanks to the exceptional measures, the extraction of coal increased from 13.5 to 16.2 million tonnes in the Ostrava-Karviná mining district between 1949 and 1953 but this was still not sufficient to fulfil the plan. Similar hectic development in this mining district occurred even during the second five-year plan (1956–1960) with a continuous yearly increase in coal production of more than a million tonnes. In 1960, the extraction of coal in the mining district exceeded 20 million tonnes for the first time. The OstravaKarviná mines used to produce approximately 37 percent of the overall production of coking coal in all European democratic countries.15

12 Jirásek, Zdeněk. 2014. “Ocelová koncepce” hospodářství českých zemí 1947–1953 [The “Steel Conception” of the Management of the Czech lands, 1947–1953]. Opava: Slezská univerzita. 13 Pavelčíková, Nina. 2010. “Mýtus Ostravy – ocelového srdce socialistického Československa.” [The Myth of Ostrava – Steel Heart of Socialist Czechoslovakia]. In Evropské město. Identita, symbol, mýtus, edited by Blanka Soukupová et al., 54–63. Bratislava: Zing Print. 14 Janák, Dušan, and Zdeněk Jirásek. 1996. Sovětští poradci a ekonomický vývoj ostravskokarvinského revíru [Soviet Advisors and the Economic Development of the Ostrava-Karvina Mining District]. Opava: Open Education and Science. 15 Machač and Langrová. Uhelné hornictví, 127–139.

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But after 1965 the situation changed rapidly. The pace of development in heavy industry slowed down due to Czechoslovak economic reforms. Metallurgy was rationalised and considerably decreased the quantity of coke necessary for blast furnaces. This meant that problems with coal sales occurred very shortly thereafter. After many years, during which coal extraction was repeatedly increased, the experience of a rapid setback exposed the fact that a concept for the mining industry as a whole was lacking. The disintegration of Czechoslovak economic reform and pressure from the Council of Mutual Economic Assistance (RVHP) catapulted the mining district back into the trajectory of increasing supplies of coal after 1968, and subsequently new problems soon arrived. A new concept of a long-term development for the mining district was elaborated, based upon the idea of maximising extraction. At the same time, this concept proved that the mining district was able to supply the maximum of 23.5 to 24 million tonnes of coal for a short time and when calling on all available investment and technologies. Nevertheless, in the years that followed, the maximum limit was repeatedly exceeded and this could not be sustained without economically unfavourable and improvised interventions. In addition to that, harsh conditions which limited or complicated further extraction started to be experienced in some of the mines. In the mid-1970s as much as one third of the extracted coal came from seams which were endangered by mining tremors and susceptible to ruptures of rock or gas.16 The development in the second half of the 1970s showed that the OstravaKarviná mining district inevitably reached beyond the zenith of its capacity. The worsening geological conditions, in which the extraction had to take place, was demonstrated in the unavoidable and gradual decreasing performance of the mining district. Yet its role in the Czechoslovak economy was still exceptional – especially if we realise that it provided 87 percent of the overall Czechoslovak extraction of black coal and all supplies of coking coal during this period.17 The 1980s was a time of unavoidable stagnation within the Ostrava-Karviná mining district. All prepared prognoses stated that demands on extraction needed to be reduced. The 1980s was therefore a period of seeking such a means of development of the mining district which could stabilise its operations. Despite this,

16 Martinec, Petr et al. 2006. Vliv ukončení hlubinné těžby uhlí na životní prostředí [Influence of the End of Deep Coalmining on the Environment]. Ostrava: Anagram, 22. 17 Gargulák, Miroslav, and Pavel Matušek. 1985. “Sociálně ekonomický vývoj ostravskokarvinského revíru po roce 1945.” [Socio-economic development of the Ostrava-Karvina Mining District after 1945.] Ostrava. Sborník k dějinám a výstavbě města 13: 199–254.

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the yearly performance of the mining district did not drop below 22 million tonnes of extracted coal until 1989.

Transformation of the economy after 1989 and its impact upon the structure of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district The change of political regime in 1989 created a milestone both in the political and the economic development of Czechoslovakia. The stagnating coalfield, which so far had worked upon the principles of an artificially maintained economy, underwent a dramatic change in the era when the market economy was launched. During the 1990s, fundamental property changes took place. On 31 December 1990, the state-owned OKD was closed down without liquidation and the joint-stock company Ostravsko-karvinské doly (OKD, a.s.) exclusively owned by the government was established as its legal successor. In the 1990s, a partial privatisation of OKD took place in the form of the so-called “coupon” privatization. In 1997, the state lost its position as the majority shareholder and in the following year the company was solely owned privately.18 After 1989 the economic position of the Ostrava-Karviná mines worsened rapidly. With respect to the price of fuel and increasing costs of mining, the Ostrava-Karviná mines had virtually no profit. The running of the majority of the mines was not cost-effective and there was no chance of rationalisation due to the unfavourable geological conditions. Therefore, a rapid reduction in excavation took place mainly in the Ostrava and Petřvald parts of the mining district. The first stage of the reduction was implemented between 1991 and 1992 and concerned four plants, three of which were in the Ostrava part and one in Petřvald. The second stage took place between 1993 and 1995 and all mines of the Ostrava part of the mining district were closed down. After 1995, the third stage followed and this hit the mines in the central and eastern parts of the OstravaKarviná mining district. Apart from the reductions, a restructuring programme of mining was also launched and this caused a significant concentration and modernisation of the excavation process but also a considerable reduction in

18 Formánek, Václav. 1997. “Transformace uhelného průmyslu v OKR do nových podmínek.” [Transformation of the coal industry in the OKMD into the new conditions.] Ostrava. Příspěvky k dějinám a současnosti Ostravy a Ostravska 18: 7–45.

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the numbers of employees. Their total number dropped by more than two-thirds between 1989 and 1995. In the course of the 1990s, the production of coal in the Ostrava-Karviná mining district dropped considerably, which was caused both by lower demand and also the need to close down non-profitmaking mines. The temporarily unsaturated market was flooded with Polish coal with which, due to its low prices, the coal from the Ostrava-Karviná mining district could not compete. In the mid-1990s, less than 15.6 million tonnes of coal were extracted here and in 2000 only 13.5 million tonnes of coal was extracted mostly from the Karviná part of the coalfield.19

Cultural heritage Government Resolution No. 267 from 22 July 1991, on the conception of the reduction of the loss-making in the mining of coal in the deep mines in the Czech Republic for 1991 and 1992 concerned the Ostrava-Karviná coal district in a targeted way. The ending of mining activities and the restructuring of metallurgy in Ostrava, compared to the other industrial regions in the Czech Republic was characterized by a number of specificities, which arose from the historical development of the centre of the industrial agglomeration, because Moravian Ostrava, unlike neighbouring Vítkovice, which we can consider to be a typical factory town, became a modern economic, administrative and cultural centre of the mining district in the interwar years. Poppet-heads and blast furnaces formed the typical panorama of the industrial city. But close to the square, modern shopping centres and banking houses sprang up like mushrooms, even following the plans of leading German architects.20 Moravian Ostrava was not only a city of miners and metallurgists, but a multi-ethnic locality with a successfully developing class of intelligentsia, small entrepreneurs and tradesmen. Only after February 1948 did the economic development of the region begin to orient exclusively towards heavy industry within the planned economy. The image of Ostrava as the “steel heart of the republic” and “the first city of

19 Machač and Langrová. Uhelné hornictví, 191–194. 20 Pokludová, Andrea. 2015. “The Development and Role New Elites in the Era of Modernization: The Case of Industrial City Ostrava.” In Creating an Interdisciplinary Paradigm using the Example of Modernization in a Region (Austrian Silesia), edited by Aleš Zářický, and Michaela Závodná, 209–229. Ostrava: Ostravská univerzita.

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socialism” was purposely formed by propaganda. The city still comes to terms with the heritage of communist propaganda with difficulty. The monuments of industrial culture – poppet-heads (of mines) and blast furnaces (iron and steel works) – preserved in-situ in the urban space and adjacent cultural landscape form the pillars in the transformation of the city into the cultural centrum of the region. From the perspective of the historian, the following outlines the history of this journey, including the significant milestones, concepts and key actors. The beginnings of the musealisation of mining in the region are earlier than the actual downturn of mining activities of the last third of the 10th and start of the 21st centuries. Already in 1902, the mayor of Moravská Ostrava (Gustav Fiedler)21 presented a plan to the public to establish a German Industrial and Trade Museum in the city, which would capture and preserve the historical milestones of mining development in the region for future generations.22 After years of preparation, the statutes of the museum were approved on 1 February 1906. Its establishment followed with a delay of several months on 4 June 1907. On this occasion, the local German newspaper Ostrauer Zeitung introduced to its readers the programme of the museum, which was conceived in a significantly modern way for its time: Das Industrie- und Gewerbe Museum für das Ostrau-Karwiner-Revier in Mährisch Ostrau ist einen Vereinigung mit dem Zwecke, einerseits die geologischen Beschaffenheit des Kohlenrevieres und die in diesem Reviere bestehenden Industrien entwicklungsgeschichtlich darzustellen, anderseits durch Pflege von Kunst und Kunstgewerbe zur Förderung der Kultur der Bevölkerung dieses Revieres beizutragen.23

The museum was divided into three departments: geological, industrial and artistic. Ethnographic themes such as the standard of living and housing of workers and customs, clothing and handicraft production of the autochthonic population

21 JUDr. Gustav Fiedler was connected with the industrial character of the town bit just the performance of the post of mayor but also the fact that he came from the family of Leopold Fiedler, an important mining engineer and mining counsellor of the Emperor Ferdinand Northern Railway in Moravská Ostrava. Przybylová, Blažena, and Josef Šerka. 1996. Muži s mocí: portréty starostů Moravské Ostravy 1861–1918 [Men in Power: Portraits of the mayors of Moravská Ostrava, 1861–1918]. Ostrava: Tilia, 21–22. 22 Šerka, Josef. 2001. “Počátky a činnost německého Umělecko-průmyslového muzea pro ostravsko-karvinský revír (1902–1923).” [Beginnings and activity of the German Museum of Decorative Arts for the Ostrava-Karvina Mining District (1902–1923).] In Ostrava: příspěvky k dějinám a současnosti Ostravy a Ostravska 20: 102. 23 Anonymous. 1907. “Einrichtung eines Industrie- und Gewerbe-Museum für das OstrauKarwiner Revier.” Ostrauer Zeitung, no. 126, June 5, 1907, 2.

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of the city on the threshold of the industrialisation process were also included in the collection concept. The initial idea of the collection building activity of the museum was immediately abandoned. Instead of a modern industrial museum, a traditional collection of art was created, which was integrated into the city museum for political reasons in the interwar years.24 We can see another of the roots of the regional history of mining museum management in the passion for collecting of the Silesian-Ostrava teacher Karel Jaromír Bukovanský, who for decades shaped a private ethnographic collection presenting the traditional life in the region, including the beginnings of the mining activity in the Silesian part of the Ostrava-Karviná mining district. At the end of his professional career, he sold his collection amounting to approximately 3,500 items to the Silesian-Ostrava city hall, in the spaces of which the museum of K. J. Bukovanský was opened in 1904. The history of mining was presented in the framework of an extensive national historical exposition. During World War One, Bukovanský’s valuable collection was stolen.25 The last of the interwar mining museums was established on the initiative of the supreme mining council run by Ferdinand Zach in 1905 at the District Mining Office. The collection mainly served the education of future technicians. It was planned to be made accessible to the public in the spaces of the newly built Mining Office, but because of the breakout of World War One the building was never realised. In 1923, the collection was shown to the public within the Industrial and trade Exhibition in Ostrava. After the exhibition ended, the Curatorium of the Mining Museum of the District Mining Office did not manage to install the exposition in any of the exhibition spaces; in 1926 the collection of the District Mining Office was handed over to the House of Art in Ostrava.26 Despite the fact that post-war communist propaganda placed the work of miners and metallurgists on a pedestal, the establishment of an industrial museum was postponed ad acta. In my opinion, the question of the interpretation of the beginning of the mining black coal in the region and the founding of the Vítkovice Ironworks were in the background. The authors of the theme, libretto

24 Barcuch, Antonín, and Kateřina Barcuchová. 2003. “Umělecko-průmyslové muzeum pro ostravsko-karvinský revír v letech 1924–1935.” [The Museum of Decorative Arts for the OstravaKarvina Mining District in 1924–1935.] In Ostrava: příspěvky k dějinám a současnosti Ostravy a Ostravska 21: 422–447. 25 Pokludová, Andrea. 2005. “Karel Jaromír Bukovanský – zakladatel prvního muzea na Ostravsku.” [Karel Jaromír Bukovanský – founder of the first museum in the Ostrava District.] In Přelom 19. a 20. století období vzniku městských muzeí a jejich vývoj ve 20. století. MuMB. 26 Anonymous. 1993. “Báňský úřad neznámý.” [“Unknown Mining Office”.] Ostravsko-karvinský horník, January 22, 1993.

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and screenplay of the exposition would have to come to terms with the process of the formation of civil society and liberal capitalism, with work migrations, a multi-ethnic and multi-confession composition of the population, the key role of the Viennese capital, concepts realised in the coal district of welfare capitalism and other themes, if the history and memory of the mining district was to be presented more complexly. Post-war museum management did not want to deal with this task and in the spirit in the ideology of the period was limited to constructing a distorted picture of the region’s history in the Museum of Revolutionary Struggles and Liberation, with an emphasis on the regional history of the Communist Party and the presentation of the liberation of the coal district by the Red Army within the Ostrava Operation. At the end of the 1960s, the technologically outdated and unprofitable mines in the mining district gradually began to close. The experts from the State Institute for the Reconstruction of Historical Towns and Objects were aware of their significance in the historical development of the region and formulated the historical value of the selected buildings and technical equipment.27 However, at the time of the normalisation of society, their proposals for heritage protection of the selected buildings were not accepted. One of the earliest poppet-heads, located almost in the historical centre of Moravská Ostrava, was torn down. The space of the mining companies and coking plants was redeveloped. The symbols of the beginnings of the industrial boom of the town thus remained preserved for future generations only in the visual sources and in the documentation of the building and technical stocks. Another crucial initiative leading to the preservation of the cultural heritage of the mining activities in the region came from the ranks of the mining engineers. It resulted in the establishment of the Mining Museum of the OKD in Ostrava on 15 August 1987; 2 September 1988 saw the contract on cooperation concluded between the National Committee of the City of Ostrava and the general directorate of the Ostrava-Karviná mines. A provisional depository was created in front of the bulldozers protecting the power centre of the Karolina coking plant28 (protected as a monument as of 26 November 1991 – used today to hold cultural events). The Anseln mine was selected for the building of the museum,29 one of the earliest deep mines in the

27 Kučová, Věra, and Miloš Matěj. 2007. Industrial Complexes in Ostrava to be Nominated for Inscription on the UNESCO World Heritage List. Ostrava: NPÚ, 7–8. 28 http://pamatkovykatalog.cz/?legalState=122373&action=legalState&presenter=LegalStates Results. Accessed August 27, 2018. 29 The first deep mine in the OKD was established in 1835. Extraction was ended in the mine in 1991. The tower from the beginning of the 20th century underwent a conversion in 2015; it had

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mining district still active at the time of the museum’s establishment. The existence of the museum at the Anseln mine was threatened at the beginning by the decline of the mining district, i.e. in 1991 to 1992. For purely economic reasons, the preservation of the first mining floor as a component of the exposition was not realised.30 The Mining Museum was opened to the public in 1993, symbolically on the day of St. Barbara. Under the name Landek Park, it is today part of the project of the Mining District Vítkovice (DOV).31 Mining machines are presented on the exterior and the exposition of the rescue equipment is valuable. The museum presents selected themes from the history of mining in the region and it is not a museum of the complete natural and cultural history of the district such as the Ruhr Museum in Essen. It was not until the era of the distinctive and mass phase of the decline of mining in the district (1991 to 1992) that cooperation fully developed from the mining technicians, who repeatedly, with the employees of the State Heritage Institute in Ostrava, called for the preservation of the technical monuments in the press: “We have remained the last large coal mining district in Europe, which has not managed to care for the preservation of the technical monuments of its long-term activity”.32 At the Ministry of Culture, a proposal was submitted to declare selected unique technical equipment cultural monuments (a group of the poppet-heads and engine rooms).33 A study was established at the Heritage Institute entitled “The reduction programme in mining in terms of the interest of the protection of the cultural heritage”.34 Despite efforts to rescue them, some of the unique poppet-heads were torn down (including those at the Petr Bezruč and Heřmanice mines). Some of the other mining localities became brownfields in the course of a few years after finishing their mining activities, with all the negatives that accompany these post-industrial spaces – ecological burden, excluded localities, the rise in criminality in their proximity, and depopulation. Part of the selected structures (poppet-heads, engine rooms, power generation centres, etc.) were able to enter the list of cultural monuments of the CR and years later be expensively re-converted, however not all are accessible to the public. been a monument since 1958. http://pamatkovykatalog.cz/?element=13230582&sequence= 41951&page=1679&action=element&presenter=ElementsResults. Accessed August 27, 2018. 30 Anonymous. 1992. “Hornické muzeum není v útlumu.” [The Mining Museum is not in decline.] Ostravsko-karvinský horník, February 28, 1992. 31 http://www.landekpark.cz/. Accessed August 27, 2018. 32 Today’s National Heritage Institute. 33 Anonymous. 1992. “Těžní věže zůstanou.” [“The mining towers remain.”] Ostravsko-karvinský horník, December 30, 1992. 34 Anonymous. 1992. “Neztratí Ostrava svou hornickou tvář?” [“Isn’t Ostrava losing its mining face?”] Ostravsko-karvinský horník, April 23, 1992.

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Despite the initial resistance of the local self-government, it was possible to establish the Industrial Museum with the exposition “Last working day of a miner” at the Michal mine. In 2011, the authentically preserved mine was incorporated into the network of the most important industrial heritage sites in Europe, i.e. European route industrial heritage,35 and part of the building’s revitalisation was carried out with money from the Norwegian Funds. Today, the Michal mine is not only one of the places of memory of the mining activities in the district, but also the place of the organisation’s numerous cultural events, such as exhibitions and concerts.36 From the perspective of monument care, they were selected as unique technical monuments37 and included in the collection of monuments nominated for inclusion in the UNESCO world cultural heritage list.38 However, the collection of industrial heritage in Ostrava is not part of the UNESCO list.39 In addition to the mining works, the coking plant and blast furnaces of the Vítkovice Ironworks were nominated, which along with the Hlubina mine represent an exceptional production complex, i.e. the preserved technological flow of coalmining, coke and iron production. Among the foreign experts, the uniqueness of the Ostrava industrial monuments was emphasised by the founder of the list for the industrial heritage of ERIH, Dr. Wolfgang Ebert, who considers Vítkovice “one of the most perfectly preserved industrial complexes in the world”.40 In 2008, the Vítkovice Ironworks complex was given the mark of European cultural heritage by then Minister of Culture Václav Jehlička, who on given occasions emphasised the significance of the industrial monuments in the region: “In the past, we understood monuments only as castles, chateaus and historic cities. Unlike Europe, we have neglected our industrial heritage. We have, therefore, decided that old Vítkovice also belongs among the most important European

35 https://www.erih.net/i-want-to-go-there/site/show/Sites/michal-mine/. Accessed August 27, 2018. The area of the Mine Anseln/Landek Park and Mining Area Vítkovice are also mentioned in the list. 36 https://www.dul-michal.cz/cs. Accessed August 27, 2018; Klát, Jaroslav, and Miloš Matěj. 2007. National Cultural Heritage Site Michal/Petr Cingr Coal Mine, Ostrava. Ostrava: NPÚ. 37 For the Indicative List, the most characteristic complexes were selected – Mine Anselm; Mine Michal; Mine Hlubina, the coking plant and blast furnaces of Vítkovice Ironworks and Vrbice Air Shaft. 38 The Ministry of Culture submitted it to the Tentative Lists of UNESCO on 6 July 2001. https:// whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1560/. Accessed August 27, 2018; Kučová and Matěj. Industrial Complexes; Matěj, Miloš. 2008. Ostrava’s Technical and Industrial Heritage. Ostrava: Repronis. 39 https://whc.unesco.org/en/tentativelists/1560/. Accessed August 27, 2018. 40 https://www.ceskatelevize.cz/porady/10318003501-zrezivela-krasa/411235100091001ostravske-hradcany/. Accessed August 27, 2018. Dokument Zrezivělá krása. Ostravské Hradčany.

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monuments”.41 The general director of the Vítkovice Society, Jan Světlík, at the granting of the award told the press: The UNESCO list places demands on the owners of the monuments such that we cannot yet meet even in cooperation with the city and region. The European heritage concentrates mainly on the circumstances and people connected with the historical places, on the vision and whole genius loci.42

In the following years, the owner of the Vítkovice Ironworks carried out an extensive project of revitalisation of the Vítkovice Mining Area, which fully corresponds with the concept of culture-led regeneration.43 As in the case of Zeche Zollverein, it was about creating a new cultural centre in the city. Within a few short years, MAV became a popular tourist destination in the region and a place for organising cultural events, such as the Colours of Ostrava Music Festival. For their specific urban panorama, Mining Vítkovice is called Ostrava’s Hradčany (Castle Town). The revitalisation that has been carried out still provokes discussion and attention amongst the professional public;44 the population of the city and tourists generally evaluate it positively. None of the above-mentioned cultural institutions is an industrial museum of the mining district like the Ruhr Museum, and there is no comprehensive museum presentation in the region of the landscape influenced by industrial production and the past of people living in the industrial region in their social ties and changes over time. The selected technical monuments are not places of memory in the true sense of the word – because they lack the stories of the people who worked here and experienced their everyday lives here. In regional history, these white spaces are gradually filled, but like our colleagues from monument care we narrowly focus on the second half of the 19th and beginning of the 20th centuries, without our research crossing into the period of the totalitarian regimes and the subsequent decline of the OKD.

41 https://cestovani.lidovky.cz/ostravske-hradcany-se-stanou-pamatkou-dhs-aktuality.aspx? c=A081201_152103_ln-cestovani_glu. Accessed August 27, 2018. 42 https://www.novinky.cz/kultura/155647-prumyslovy-areal-ve-vitkovicich-je-na-seznamukulturniho-dedictvi.html. Accessed August 27, 2018. 43 http://www.citego.org/bdf_fiche-document-558_en.html. Accessed August 27, 2018. Commercial-based cultural regeneration of brownfield areas in Ostrava, Gergely Olt, 2016. 44 Slach, Ondřej, and Tomáš Boruta. 2012. “What can cultural and creative industries do for urban development? Three stories from the post-socialist industrial city of Ostrava.” Quaestiones Geographicae 31, no. 4: 99–112; Marková, Blanka, and Iva Tichá. 2011. “The Impact of Globalization on Cultural Policy: A Case Study of the City of Ostrava.” In The Scale of Globalization. Think Globally, Act Locally, Change Individually in the 21st Century, edited by Tomáš Drobík, 207–212. Ostrava: University of Ostrava.

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The final phase of the decline of the coal district is taking place now, and outside the Ostrava part of the mining district in the Frýdec and Karviná districts where the mining works built in the second half of the 20th century are predominantly found. These objects are only protected monuments as the exception rather than the rule (the circular poppet-head of the Sviadnov mine). After the completion of mining, the liquidation of the skip headframes, reconstruction of the building of the mines and their biological re-cultivation are expected. The transformation into new industrial zones has not been so successful in the coal district as was anticipated at the beginning of restructuralisation. Commercial and shopping centres, such as Nová Karolina on the site of the coking plant, are created only rarely on the sites of former industrial activity. Part of the means for the preservation of the industrial heritage in the coal district arose from the budget of the OKD. But with the current economic problems of the owners of the successor companies, the public has asked whether the company will be able to fulfil to the letter the mining act in the liquidation of the mining works, let alone finance the conservation of industrial monuments. The MAV project is financed through foundations and the international grants that are acquired. In recent years, communities presenting the industrial heritage have been created on social media, which address the wider public and form significant pillars in the shaping of awareness about the cultural value of the monuments. The story of the coal district should not just be a history of coalmining and of production in the iron and steel works, but should be the story of the people and their culture influenced in their everyday lives in a multi-ethnic industrial milieu. From the perspective of the Western European history of industrial heritage, the Central European mining districts are often neglected, but without them the story of the European Boom – Crises – Heritage of coalmining would not be complete.

Conclusion The study presented introduces the reader in the first part with the history of coalmining in the Ostrava-Karviná Mining District. We elucidate the beginnings of the mining, i.e. the foundation of the earliest mining works and their role in the economic development of the region. It discusses the difficult integration of the mining district in the new conditions of the Czechoslovak state (1918–1938) and the subsequent impacts of the incorporation of the mining district into the economy of the Third Reich. The post-war development took place in the wake

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of the nationalization of the coal industry, which after 1948 became one of the crucial branches of the economy of the Eastern Bloc. The oil crisis did not have the same impact on the mining district as it had on mining districts in Western Europe, but the mining district as a whole was marked by obsolete technologies and unprofitability. From the perspective of global economics, the beginning of the decline of the mining in the 1990s was the logical outcome of global development. The mining district like those in Western Europe had difficulties coming to terms with the impacts of mining activities, i.e. the ecological burden, post-industrial landscape and industrial cultural heritage. In the study, we have outlined the history of the musealisation of the industrial heritage, monument protection and new utilization of the industrial buildings within the framework of the transformation of the city of Ostrava into the cultural centre of the region.

References Anonymous. 1907. “Einrichtung eines Industrie- und Gewerbe-Museum für das Ostrau-Karwiner Revier.” Ostrauer Zeitung, no. 126, June 5, 1907, 2. Anonymous. 1992. “Hornické muzeum není v útlumu.” [The Mining Museum is not in decline.] Ostravsko-karvinský horník, February 28, 1992. Anonymous. 1992. “Těžní věže zůstanou.” [“The mining towers remain.”] Ostravsko-karvinský horník, December 30, 1992. Anonymous. 1992. “Neztratí Ostrava svou hornickou tvář?” [“Isn’t Ostrava losing its mining face?”] Ostravsko-karvinský horník, April 23, 1992. Anonymous. 1993. “Báňský úřad neznámý.” [“Unknown Mining Office”.] Ostravsko-karvinský horník, January 22, 1993. Barcuch, Antonín, and Kateřina Barcuchová. 2003. “Umělecko-průmyslové muzeum pro ostravsko-karvinský revír v letech 1924–1935.” [The Museum of Decorative Arts for the Ostrava-Karvina Mining District in 1924–1935.] In Ostrava: příspěvky k dějinám a současnosti Ostravy a Ostravska 21: 422–47. Dokoupil, Lumír. 1967. Demografický vývoj ostravské aglomerace za průmyslové revoluce [Demographic Development of the Ostrava Agglomeration during the Industrial Revolution]. Ostrava: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství. Dokoupil, Lumír. 1986. Obyvatelstvo ostravské průmyslové oblasti do sčítání 1869 [Populace of the Ostrava Industrial District in the Census 1869]. Praha: Státní pedagogické nakladateství. Formánek, Václav. 1997. “Transformace uhelného průmyslu v OKR do nových podmínek.” [Transformation of the coal industry in the OKMD into the new conditions.] Ostrava. Příspěvky k dějinám a současnosti Ostravy a Ostravska 18: 7–45. Gargulák, Miroslav, and Pavel Matušek. 1985. “Sociálně ekonomický vývoj ostravskokarvinského revíru po roce 1945.” [Socio-economic development of the Ostrava-Karvina Mining District after 1945.] Ostrava. Sborník k dějinám a výstavbě města 13: 199–254.

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Janák, Dušan, and Zdeněk Jirásek. 1996. Sovětští poradci a ekonomický vývoj ostravskokarvinského revíru [Soviet Advisors and the Economic Development of the OstravaKarvina Mining District]. Opava: Open Education and Science. Jirásek, Zdeněk. 2014. “Ocelová koncepce“ hospodářství českých zemí 1947–1953 [The “Steel Conception” of the Management of the Czech lands, 1947–1953]. Opava: Slezská univerzita. Kárníková, Ludmila. 1961. Vývoj uhelného průmyslu v českých zemích do roku 1880 [Development of the Coal Industry in the Czech Lands to 1880]. Praha: Československá akademie věd. Klát, Jaroslav, and Miloš Matěj. 2007. National Cultural Heritage Site Michal/Petr Cingr Coal Mine, Ostrava. Ostrava: NPÚ. Kučová, Věra, and Miloš Matěj. 2007. Industrial Complexes in Ostrava to be Nominated for Inscription on the UNESCO World Heritage List. Ostrava: NPÚ. Machač, Jan, and Petra Langrová, ed. 2003. Uhelné hornictví v ostravsko-karvinském revíru [Coalmining in the Ostrava-Karvina Mining District]. Ostrava: Anagram. Marková, Blanka, and Iva Tichá. 2011. “The Impact of Globalization on Cultural Policy: A Case Study of the City of Ostrava.” In The Scale of Globalization. Think Globally, Act Locally, Change Individually in the 21st Century, edited by Tomáš Drobík, 207–212. Ostrava: University of Ostrava. Martinec, Petr et al. 2006. Vliv ukončení hlubinné těžby uhlí na životní prostředí [Influence of the End of Deep Coalmining on the Environment]. Ostrava: Anagram. Matěj, Miloš. 2008. Ostrava’s Technical and Industrial Heritage. Ostrava: Repronis. Matějček, Jiří. 1969. “Dolování uhlí na území dnešní ČSR v letech 1880 až 1914 (Některé tendence vývoje).” [Coalmining on the territory of today’s CSR in 1880 to 1914 (Some tendencies of the development).] Průmyslové oblasti 2: 86. Mulková, Monika, Renata Popelková, and Petr Popelka. 2016. “Black Land: The Mining Landscape of the Ostrava-Karviná Region.” In Landscapes and Landforms of the Czech Republic, edited by Tomáš Pánek, and Jan Hradecký, 319–32. Springer International Publishing. Myška, Milan. 1960. Založení a počátky vítkovických železáren 1828 – 1880 [Foundation and Beginnings of the Vítkovice Ironworks 1828–1880]. Ostrava: Krajské nakladatelství v Ostravě. Myška, Milan. 1970. Die mährisch-schlesische Eisenindustrie in der industriellen Revolution. Ostrava: Státní pedagogické nakladatelství. Myška, Milan. 1997. “K obecně historickým předpokladům konstituování Ostravy jako centra kulturní oblasti.” [On the general historical assumptions of the constitution of Ostrava as a centre of the cultural area] In Slezsko a severovýchodní Morava jako specifický region, edited by Sborník prací Filozofické fakulty Ostravské univerzity, 9–32. Ostrava: Filozofická fakulta Ostravské univerzity. Myška, Milan. 2004–2005. “Eisenbahnen – Eisenhüttenindustrie – Wirtschaftswachstum. Der Einfluss des Ausbaus des Eisenbahnnetzes auf die Entwicklung des Eisenhüttenwesens in der Habsburgermonarchie 1830–1914.” Prager wirtschafts- und sozialhistorische Mitteilungen 7: 9–47. Pavelčíková, Nina. 1990. Ostravská oblast v letech nacistické okupace 1938–1945. [The Ostrava District in the Years of the Nazi Occupation, 1938–1945]. Ostrava: Slezský ústav ČSAV.

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Pavelčíková, Nina. 2010. “Mýtus Ostravy – ocelového srdce socialistického Československa.” [The Myth of Ostrava – Steel Heart of Socialist Czechoslovakia]. In Evropské město. Identita, symbol, mýtus, edited by Blanka Soukupová et al., 54–63. Bratislava: Zing Print. Pitronová, Blanka. 1979. Haličské migrace na Ostravsko [Galician Migration to the Ostrava District]. Opava: Slezský ústav ČSAV. Pokludová, Andrea. 2005. “Karel Jaromír Bukovanský – zakladatel prvního muzea na Ostravsku.” [Karel Jaromír Bukovanský – founder of the first museum in the Ostrava District.] In Přelom 19. a 20. století období vzniku městských muzeí a jejich vývoj ve 20. století. MuMB. Pokludová, Andrea. 2015. “The Development and Role New Elites in the Era of Modernization: The Case of Industrial City Ostrava.” In Creating an Interdisciplinary Paradigm using the Example of Modernization in a Region (Austrian Silesia), edited by Aleš Zářický, and Michaela Závodná, 209–29. Ostrava: Ostravská univerzita. Popelka, Petr. 2015. “The Transport Revolution and Austrian Silesia 1742–1914.” In Creating an Interdisciplinary Paradigm Using the Example of Modernization in a Region (Austrian Silesia). Contributions for the XVII th World Economic History Congress in Kyoto, Japan from 1 to 7 August 2015, edited by Aleš Zářický, and Michaela Závodná, 79–95. Ostrava: Ostravská univerzita. Popelka, Petr, Renata Popelková, and Monika Mulková. 2016. Black or Green Land? Industrialisation and Landscape Changes of the Ostrava-Karviná Mining District in the 19th and 20th Century. Ostrava: Ostravská univerzita. Przybylová, Blažena, and Josef Šerka. 1996. Muži s mocí: portréty starostů Moravské Ostravy 1861–1918 [Men in Power: Portraits of the mayors of Moravská Ostrava, 1861–1918]. Ostrava: Tilia. Šerka, Josef. 2001. “Počátky a činnost německého Umělecko-průmyslového muzea pro ostravsko-karvinský revír (1902–1923).” [Beginnings and activity of the German Museum of Decorative Arts for the Ostrava-Karvina Mining District (1902–1923).] In Ostrava: příspěvky k dějinám a současnosti Ostravy a Ostravska 20: 102. Slach, Ondřej, and Tomáš Boruta. 2012. “What can cultural and creative industries do for urban development? Three stories from the post-socialist industrial city of Ostrava.” Quaestiones Geographicae 31, no. 4: 99–112.

Jörg Arnold

Receding futures, shifting pasts: The British coal industry, generational change and the politics of temporality, ca. 1967–1987 Introduction In Germany, the history of the coal industry after 1945 is often told as a tale of ‘boom – crisis – heritage’.1 According to this suggestive triad, the story of coal after 1945 was a story of decline, but also of redemption.2 As the short post-war boom gave way to a protracted crisis from the late 1950s, the status of the industry itself was transformed: To the extent that the industry’s function as a provider of the nation’s energy needs receded, the importance as a marker of regional identity increased. As heritage, King Coal lived on after the demise of the industry itself. His former abodes, the coal mines, came to sit alongside the abandoned palaces and castles of Germany’s dissolved nobility, littering the post-industrial landscape as identity sites and tourist attractions. Taking the German experience as a point of departure, this paper seeks to accentuate commonalities and differences in the British experience. It follows a dual structure: Part one outlines the story of King Coal as commonly narrated in popular histories and popular culture. As will be argued, the British story is not so much one of ‘boom – crisis – heritage’, but one of ‘triumph – crisis – destruction’. Part two shall try to complicate the dominant narrative by examining conflicting visions of the past and the future as they were articulated in the late 1960s and beyond and relate them to generational change. The paper argues that the inter-war past was reconceptualised during the period. As lived experience came to be infused with cultural memory, the ‘bad old days’ were transformed into a time of heroic sacrifice. More broadly, the paper contends that

1 ‘Boom – crisis – heritage’ was also the title of the international conference at which key ideas of this paper were first presented. I would like to thank the organisers and participants for three days of stimulating discussions. I also thank my colleague Dean Blackburn for his comments on an earlier version of this paper. For a fuller exposition see my forthcoming monograph, The British Miner in the Age of De-industrialisation: From loser to winner – and back again, c. 1967–1997. 2 Ziegler, Dieter, ed. 2013. Geschichte des deutschen Bergbaus. Bd. 4: Rohstoffgewinnung im Strukturwandel. Münster: Aschendorff. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-013

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there existed cyclical, in addition to linear understandings of time among mining communities, which have as yet been underappreciated by historical scholarship.

Triumph – crisis – destruction If we compare the German experience to Britain, a modified triad suggests itself. As commonly told, the story of King Coal in the UK is a story of ‘triumph – crisis – destruction’. At the beginning of this narration stands the taking of the coal industry into public ownership. When the flag of the National Coal Board went up across Britain’s coalfields on Vesting Day, 1 January 1947, Britain’s miners were witnessing the victorious climax of a fifty-year campaign for the removal from their industry of the hated coal owners. As promise, nationalisation would provide the nation with the coal that it so desperately needed at a price that it could afford, but also reward the people working in the industry with better working conditions, standards of living and security of employment. Within this narration, nationalisation is situated within, and forms a central component of, a broader narrative arc that views ‘1945’ as a decisive turning point in modern British history – the moment when the Labour government under Clement Attlee laid the foundations for Britain’s social democratic settlement.3 The moment of triumph proved short-lived. High hopes were soon followed by disappointment. As the 1950s gave way to the 1960s, the British coal industry came under intense pressure from alternative sources of energy. From its postSecond World War peak of 700,000 miners, employment contracted rapidly, to less than 300,000 by the early 1970s. Meanwhile the miners, elevated to heroic status only a few years previously, found themselves recast as “proletarian traditionalists”, with little place in Harold Wilson’s vision of a New Britain, except as a liability.4 In the popular narration, protracted decline gave rise to a radicalisation that culminated in the 1984/85 miners’ strike over pit closures. In this epic, but ultimately futile struggle, the miners took on not just the National Coal Board and the Conservative government of the day, but the tide of History itself. The miners’ strike, in this narration, signified “the proletarians’ last stand”.5 They

3 The Spirit of ‘45. 2013. Dir: Ken Loach. 4 Lockwood, David. 1966. “Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society.” Sociological Review 14: 249–267. 5 Offer, Avner. 2008. “British Manual Workers: From Producers to Consumers, c. 1950–2000.” Contemporary British History 22, no. 4: 537–571, 544.

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were, to use Tony Judt’s suggestive formulation, a “doomed community of industrial proletarians” whose cause had been “hopeless” from the beginning.6 In the eyes of many observers, both at the time and subsequently, the strike was as much a political and symbolic battle over the future of Britain as an industrial dispute. Just as Vesting Day had symbolised the onset of Britain’s social democratic experiment, so the defeat of the miners in 1985 marked the end of this political, social and cultural configuration.7 In the German narrative, crisis is partially ameliorated through heritage. But in the British context crisis is followed by destruction, or, as Paul Hardman, executive officer of the National Union of Mineworkers (NUM) put it at a conference marking the 70th anniversary of nationalisation in December 2017, “annihilation”.8 Destruction finds expression in two ways: Firstly, by the accelerated rundown of the coal industry after 1985, which is very much interpreted as a political vendetta against the miners, rather than as a project driven by economic considerations. Secondly, there exists the belief that the relative disregard, and lack of public funding, for mining’s industrial remains was likewise politically motivated. Not content with killing off the coal industry, the state was determined to eradicate all physical remains and memories as well.9 What we find in the UK is a narration of decline and fall that lacks the redemptive, or at the very least, soothing quality that the emphasis on heritage provides in the German example. Rather, we are confronted with a narration that views the post-1945 history of the coal industry through the prism of the 1984/85 miners’ strike; that collapses the 1960s into the 1980s (while disregarding the 1970s); and in which the subject of coal remains politically sensitive, culturally significant and emotionally charged even after the end of deep-coal mining in 2015. In what follows, I shall try to complicate this narrative by looking at the history of the British coal industry through the lenses of temporality and generation.10 The paper sketches conflicting visions of the past and the future

6 Judt, Tony. 2005. Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. London: Vintage books, 542. 7 Spirit of ‘45. 8 “By the People, for the People”. The Nationalisation of coal and steel revisited. 2017. National Coal Mining Museum for England, Overton. 7–8 December. 9 Former miner Paul Darlow in conversation with the author, 12 July 2018. 10 The starting point for any generational approach remains Mannheim, Karl. 1928. “Das Problem der Generation.” Kölner Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie 7: 157–185, 309–330. https://www.1000do kumente.de/pdf/dok_0100_gen_de.pdf. In a ground-breaking article, Jim Phillips has applied the generational approach to the Scottish coalfields: Phillips, Jim. 2017. “Generational Change in 20thCentury Britain: the Case of the Scottish Coalfields.” English Historical Review CXXXII, no. 557: 885–911. https://doi.org/10.1093/ehr/cex199. On temporality see Esposito, Fernando, ed. 2017. Zeitenwandel. Transformationen geschichtlicher Zeitlichkeit nach dem Boom. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

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as they were articulated from the late 1960s to the mid-1980s. While underlining the importance of generational change, the paper argues that the miners’ outlook during the late 1960s and beyond was shaped as much by cyclical as by linear understandings of time.

Shifting pasts In the literature on coal mining, it is common for writers to draw attention to miners’ preoccupation with the past.11 There were indeed many channels through which the past was transmitted: stories were passed on orally between workmates and inside mining families. Miners’ galas kept alive selective memories in ritualised form. Union histories, meanwhile, provided the scholarly backdrop to a group memory that emphasised collective struggles against adversity, the triumphs and tragedies of the miners as a collective body of workers and their union as protective shield and progressive sword. The past was not dead and gone but formed part of a living tradition, of what Pierre Nora would have recognised as milieux de mémoire.12 The past was not remembered as history but as a storehouse “rich with lessons for present-day miners”, as the executives of the NUM put it in a preface to an official miners’ history in 1961.13 Against this backdrop, the state employer argued that the past was best consigned to the museum. In its publicity and recruitment material of the 1960s, the National Coal Board (NCB) put forward the case that the contemporary coal industry was a ‘new’ industry that had nothing in common with the industry of old except the name.14 The past was of no relevance to the present, except as a liability which, unfortunately, still coloured public perceptions and exerted a damaging impact on workplace attitudes. The past represented a burden that needed to be overcome and left behind in order for the industry to take its rightful place in the technological age of the present. In essence, then, the less memory

11 Crick, Michael. 1984. Scargill and the Miners. Harmondsworth: Penguin, 147. Beckett, Francis, and David Hencke. 2009. Marching to the Fault Line: The Miners’ Strike and the Battle for Industrial Britain. London: Constable & Robinson; Patterson, Harry. 2014. Look back in Anger: The Miners’ Strike in Nottinghamshire 30 years on. Nottingham: Five Leaves. 12 Nora, Pierre. 1989. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire.” Representations 26: 7–24, 7. 13 Arnot, R. Page. 1961. The Miners in Crisis and War. London: George Allen & Unwin, 7. 14 NCB. [1958]. The Many Careers in Coal: the Basic Industry with Modern Ideas. London; Central Youth Employment Executive. 1968. Coalmining, 2nd ed. London; NCB. 1968. “So what’s New about Britain’s Coal Industry?” The Times, Feb. 2, 1968.

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there was and the more of the past could be shed, the better for the industry and the people working in it in the competitive environment of the late 1960s. Inside the labour movement, there was little of this outright disavowal of the past. Here, the late 1960s marked the onset of a crucial period of transition in which the central reference points for the mining communities – the interwar years with the general strike of 1926 – were starting to pass from lived experience into cultural memory. As Jan Assmann has shown in a different context, intergenerational memory rarely extends beyond three to four generations or 80 years, with 40 years typically marking a critical juncture in the transition from communicative to cultural memory.15 By the late 1960s, at around the time of the fortieth anniversary of the General Strike, there were still men active in the industry and in the labour movement who held personal memories of the events of 1926.16 Often, these were childhood memories or memories of early adolescence, which foregrounded the social consequences of the strike and the immediate impact on families over the political dimensions of the conflict. They were less concerned with the high politics of the strike and the exploits of miners’ leaders than with the hardship and suffering that it brought upon communities, families and individuals. As L. Bailey, Midlands delegate, put it at the 1968 Special Conference on the Union’s response to the Government’s fuel policy, One of the previous speakers mentioned the 1926 strike. I can remember it. I took part in it. We could not even win that one when we were engaged in a struggle against the coalowners [sic] who were bent on the exploitation of coal miners. We had right on our side in 1926, and we still could not win. I can remember the national leaders of that time coming round my local township, ‘Tighten your belts! We shall win. Not a penny off the pay, not a minute on the day.’ But history records it, gentlemen, that we went back with a few pennies off the pay and a lot of minutes on the day.17

For many of those with personal memories from the interwar period, the lesson to be drawn from the past was sombre: there was no guarantee of victory in an industrial conflict even when the cause was just. But whatever moral justification there existed for entering into confrontation with the employer, the hardship and the suffering were felt acutely by the miners, and crucially, also their families.

15 Assmann, Jan. 1992. Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen. Munich: C. H. Beck, 50–51. 16 In 1965/66, the average age in the industry stood at 43.3 years. The normal age of retirement was 65. 17 National Union of Mineworkers. 1969. Annual Report and Proceedings for the Year 1968. London, 104.

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More broadly, the present, despite all the imperfections and thwarted hopes, was incomparably better than the past. The contribution by Clifford Williams MP (1905–1987) to a House of Commons debate on the Labour government’s energy policy may serve to underline this point. Williams was a Member of Parliament for the Welsh mining constituency of Abertillery. He was also a former miner with 45 years of experience in the industry. To Williams, the present had not turned out as he had hoped; and many of the promises that had come with the nationalisation of the industry in 1947 had been frustrated. Yet the present was incomparably better than the past through which he had lived and whose darkness he presented in stark terms. “My god, if ever we worked under slave masters and brutality, then I and my colleagues experienced that for 30 years”, as Williams put it. The suffering of the interwar years in the Welsh valleys he likened to the suffering in the concentration camps of the Third Reich.18 Whatever misgivings Williams and many others of his generation harboured about the energy policy of the Labour government and however frustrated they felt about the recent decline of the coal industry, they were ready to qualify their concerns by pointing towards the progress in human and social terms that had been made since the end of World War II. “I shall never criticise the Coal Board or the Government that nationalised coal. Whatever the Board’s defects, it has been very good, and those old days must not be repeated”, as Williams emphasised.19 Twenty years later, by the time of the miners’ strike of 1984/85, there could be heard residues of this sentiment, but they were articulated by trade unionists who were nearing retirement age and who had, in any event, been marginalised culturally and politically. Roy Ottey, leader of the Power Group Area and a member of the NUM’s National Executive Committee may serve to illustrate this point. Ottey was born in 1924. In his memoirs he recalls a conversation with the NUM press officer Nell Meyers in September 1984 during which he related the events of the present to memories of the interwar years. “I told her how I had suffered in my young days from the consequences of the 1926 strike, and, more particularly, the aftermath. ‘We were paupers, bloody poor, and it hurts me to think of the miners and their families who are now suffering in the same way,’ I said”.20 Ottey resigned from the NEC shortly after. If the interwar years were remembered by many who had lived through them as a time of hardship, among younger activists, the dark past took on a distinctly

18 Hansard. 1967. HC Deb., 5th series, vol. 755, col. 1315–1316 (5 December 1967). 19 Ibid. For similar points of view see Paynter, Will [1903–1984]. 1972. My Generation. London: George Allen & Unwin, 166; Horner, Arthur [1894–1968]. 1960. Incorrigible Rebel. London: MacGibbon & Key, 227; Gormley, Joe [1917–1993]. 1982. Battered Cherub. London: Hamish Hamilton. 20 Ottey, Roy. 1985. The Strike: An Insider’s Story. London: Sidgwick & Jackson, 128.

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different hue. Yes, the miners may have been defeated in the end, but at least they knew how to fight! As a Scottish delegate put it at the 1968 Union delegate conference referred to above: “Over the years we have been selling copies of the histories of the respective miners [. . .] All these histories have been interspersed with glorious examples of the struggles of the respective miners in the areas in the fight for wages and conditions, for nationalisation, the 7-hours day and other conditions.”21 To a generation of miners who had been socialised in the nationalised industry of the 1950s and 1960s, the past itself had taken on a new meaning. The ‘bad old days’ of the interwar years were noted not so much for their suffering but for a rather different set of qualities – a heroic time of struggle and sacrifice. By contrast, the redeeming triumph of the older narrative arc, the nationalisation of 1947, was judged against the relative – as compared to other groups of industrial workers – and absolute – as measured in terms of size and employment – decline in the coal industry since the late 1950s. When the Yorkshire miners’ leader Arthur Scargill, born in 1938, campaigned for the national presidency of the NUM in 1981, his warning of ‘Never again!’ did not refer to the interwar years, but to the 1960s when miners had been turned into “industrial gypsies moving from area to area to find work”.22 The heroic interpretation of the interwar years reflected in no small part the way in which the labour movement had monumentalised the past in order to draw inspiration for the present: the past was a time of great suffering, but also of dramatic events, exemplary instances of collective solidarity, community spirit, endurance and bravery. By contrast, the present seemed humdrum, apathetic and alienated. If the past was a time of masculine bravery, the present was a time of emasculated acquiescence, or so it seemed to activists of a younger generation. If the struggles of the interwar years served as an inspiration to a generation of miners socialised in the nationalised industry of the 1950s and 1960s, then the sacrifices of those years still awaited their redemption in the present. The dreams and aspirations of the interwar years had yet to be fulfilled, the injustices to be put right, and the legacy of this earlier generation of class warriors to be fulfilled. These at least were the lessons that this new generation of radical trade unionists drew from the past and how they endowed the strike actions of the early 1970s with deeper historical resonance. The significance of the NUM’s victories in 1972 and 1974 derived not just from the change of the miners’ fortunes in the present, but also from the historical dimension of avenging past wrongs. As Scargill put it in a campaign speech in 1981:

21 National Union of Mineworkers. Annual Report for 1968, 93. 22 Scargill, Arthur. [1981]. Miners in the Eighties. Barnsley: NUM Yorkshire Area, 4.

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I was asked at the conclusion of the 1972 miners’ strike what was the most important victory that you won? And I thought for a few minutes. Was it the wages, was it one of the 12 additional conditions – none of them. One week after the strike, I walked in the centre of my home town, and a man in his 80s made his way across the traffic laden street to shake my hand, he was crying, he was choked, and he expressed a desire to thank me and the miners for wiping out the bitter memory of 1926. The greatest victory that we won was the restoration of the faith and the dignity of the National Union of Mineworkers.23

If the victories of the early 1970s had “wiped out” the defeats of the interwar years, then the strike of 1984/85 represented the moment when the miners finally stepped outside of history itself. While the interwar years, and in particular the strike of 1926, were still used as reference points, the dispute of 1984/85 came to be seen as of unprecedented historical significance in itself. As Scargill, who had been elected National President of the NUM in October 1981, expressed this sentiment eight months into the strike at a Special Delegate Conference in November 1984: “We have been the victims of the most sustained campaign by the establishment in the history of this Trade Union Movement. I suggest that if one looks back in history, there was nothing in 1926 that can even remotely compare with the battering that this Union has taken during the course of the past eight months. And we’re still here [. . .].”24 At the Presidential Address at the annual conference following the return to work, Scargill underlined the unprecedented nature of the 1984/85 strike, “Conference meets this year following the longest, most bitter and possibly most savage national strike ever seen anywhere in the world”.25

Receding futures If the past shifted between the 1960s and the 1980s, then so did expectations of the future. In the late 1960s, three different expectations of the future informed the public debate on the coal industry. Two of them were premised on linear understandings of time, the third on a cyclical understanding. The two linear visions focused on the coal industry in the first instance, rather than on the

23 NUM archives Barnsley, Box: A. Scargill. Speeches 1981-early 1982, undated speech starting with ‘On Tuesday of this week . . . ’ [February 1981]. 24 National Union of Mineworkers. 1985. Annual Report and Proceedings for the year 1984. Sheffield, 692. 25 National Union of Mineworkers. 1986. Annual Report and Proceedings for the year 1985. Sheffield, 491.

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people working in it, although both were cognisant of the serious implications for the miners themselves. They came in the shape of expert knowledge, extrapolating from recent trends projections for the future. The first of the two linear outlooks was the Labour Government’s projection as outlined in the White Papers on Fuel of 1965, and above all, of 1967.26 It projected further contraction of the coal industry, but held out the promise of a controlled run-down. It also gestured towards a stabilisation in the demand for coal in the more distant future, once the period of ‘transitional’ contraction had been overcome. The outlook refused to be drawn into any specific forecasts, let alone guarantees, about the time and level at which the industry would stabilise, beyond the rather vague assurance that there would remain a “substantial” coal industry for “as far as the eye could see”.27 In essence, the projection held out the rather vague promise that the difficulties of the present would be a transitory phenomenon, to be followed by a period in which a much reduced, but still sizeable industry would be able to hold its own and compete successfully in a transformed energy market. The second projection shared in common with the first many of the underlying assumptions, but held out – as spectre or, in some instances, as promise – terminal decline and the eventual extinction of the industry. This vision of the future came in the shape of a radical critique of the official forecasts, accusing the government of lacking the courage to acknowledge that the prospect of stabilisation in an undefined future was no more than a smokescreen behind which to hide the unpalatable truth that coal was doomed. This future was conjured up by trade unionists as a spectre and as a clarion call to start defending the industry by direct action if necessary. But it was also embraced as a promise by observers who held that the coal industry belonged to the past and had no rightful place in the technological age of the twentieth century, on social if not yet on environmental grounds.28 Both visions were, in the first instance, concerned with the future of coal as an industry, with energy demands and coal’s market share, rather than the people working in it. Yet both of them recognised that there was a close connection between the future of the industry and the future of miners collectively as well as individually. The Government’s vision argued that, whatever the rate of colliery closures and reduction in output of coal, the state would do its utmost to ensure that the disruptive impact on the mineworkers would be much less than 26 Ministry of Power. 1967. Fuel Policy (Cmnd. 3438). London: HMSO. 27 National Union of Mineworkers. 1968. Annual Report and Proceedings for the year 1967. London (address by the Minister of Power, Richard Marsh). 28 Winstanley, Michael MP. 1967. “Down With the Mine!” The Guardian, October 28, 1967.

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on the industry itself, by offering either transferal inside the industry or alternative (industrial) employment outside of it. Where neither was feasible, the vision held up the promise of temporary special assistance to miners over a certain age. Miners would either be able to find work outside the industry. Or, alternatively, miners would be transformed from, in the words of House of Lords peer Baron Arwyn, from “a drab, almost downtrodden, creature [into a] highly respected technician”.29 Whatever the future shape and size of the coal industry, this position held, for the individual coal miner there would open up a world of individual choice and opportunity. By contrast, those critics inside the Labour movement who held up the spectre of terminal decline argued that there existed a close link between the ‘death’ of coal as an industry and the ‘death’ of coal communities collectively as well as the degradation of miners individually. As Will Paynter, General Secretary of the NUM, put it in a frontpage contribution to the South Wales Area paper The Miner in winter 1967, “The stark reality is that the induced decay of coalmining means social death to many mining communities. I wonder if those who decide policies to precipitate the contraction of the coal industry have any idea as to what a pit closure means to the community built around it. It is the death of a creation that gave the community life and sustained that life no matter how deprived and anguished it might have sometimes been. It made possible their only happiness, too. Closure thus represents a disaster as poignant and harrowing as a death in the family.”30 Drawing on cultural memories of the interwar period and, to a lesser extent, contemporary sociological research, they pointed to the ‘soul-destroying’ and emasculating nature of unemployment. As Robert Woof, MP for Blaydon, put it in a debate on colliery closures on 14 March 1969, “There is nothing more devastating to the human soul than to find that one is not wanted when one is healthy, strong and anxious to gain an honest livelihood”.31 Public debate during the period was dominated by the two partially overlapping but ultimately sharply contrasting visions for the future of coal. Both subscribed to a linear temporality, albeit with different trajectories. By contrast, inside mining communities, there coexisted with these linear temporalities a cyclical understanding of time. The uncertainties of the present were a repeat of the uncertainties as they had existed in the interwar years; present insecurity no more than a return to the lack of security as it had characterised working 29 Hansard, HL Deb., 5th series, vol. 287, col. 1077 (12 December 1967). 30 Paynter, Will. 1967. “We Can’t Let a Vital Industry Be Strangled.” The Miner. Journal of the South Wales Area National Union of Mineworkers 12 (Nov/Dec). 31 Hansard, HC Deb., 5th series, vol. 779, col. 1723 (14 March 1967).

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class life since time immemorial. All those who had never bought into the hopes and aspirations attached to the nationalisation of the industry and who had held that (working-class) life would always remain precarious and insecure regardless of the promises that ‘they’ had made could feel vindicated. From this perspective, then, the challenge for the individual miner was the same as it had always been: to be street-wise, circumnavigate the traps and pitfalls that ‘they’ had set and eke out an existence for oneself and one’s dependants as best as possible, and try to enjoy the good things in life as long as they lasted. As the 1960s gave way to the 1970s, for a brief but significant period, the trajectories of the industry and the people working in the industry seemed to realign. The Plan for Coal, published in the wake of the oil crisis of 1973 and the miners’ strike of 1974, projected a new dawn not just for the coal industry, but also for the people working in it.32 As a National Coal Board recruitment spot for the South Wales Area from 1975 put it, “Get a job in Britain’s modern mining industry and get more out of life [. . .] Hey there miner / Living life the way you want to be / C’mon now, miner / There’s money – lots of money and security”.33 By the early 1980s, the two trajectories had begun to diverge sharply again under the Conservative government of Margaret Thatcher. While the Secretary of State for Energy, David Howell, could proclaim on 17 June 1980 that “coal’s prospects have never been better”,34 the Government’s Coal Industry Act put pressure on the Coal Board to step up the closure of collieries.35 Indeed, as a government-commissioned report by the Monopolies and Mergers Commission into the coal industry argued in 1983, the long-term future of the industry rested on the closure of ‘high cost’ pits, and by implication, on the destruction of the livelihood of tens of thousands of miners themselves: “An industry smaller but secure is preferable to a larger industry with an uncertain future. [. . .] We recognise that the closure of high cost collieries would have serious implications for employment in some of the most depressed regions of Great Britain”, as the report summed up the conclusions in rather understated terms.36 The Conservative 32 NCB. 1974. Plan for Coal. London: National Coal Board. 33 NCB. 1975. People Will Always Need Coal. https://player.bfi.org.uk/free/film/watch-peoplewill-always-need-coal-1975-online. 34 Conservative Research Department. 1980. Politics Today. No 12: Energy. London: Conservative Central Office, 208. 35 Howell, David. 2012. “Defiant Dominoes: Working Miners and the 1984–5 Strike”. In Making Thatcher’s Britain, edited by Ben Jackson, and Robert Saunders, 148–164. Cambridge et al.: CUP, 150–151. 36 The Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 1983. National Coal Board, vol. 1. (Cmnd. 8920). London: HMSO, 369.

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governments of the 1980s and 1990s never argued for the destruction of coal as an industry, but for what Bob Halsham, chairman of the National Coal Board from 1986 to 1990, termed “rapid and extensive reconstruction”.37 In the end, however, even by Halsham’s own admission, “reconstruction” became indistinguishable from “retrenchment” or,38 as the NUM had maintained all along, “annihilation”.

Conclusion There was a generational dimension to the miners’ outlooks and perceptions during the post-war period. As the interwar-period receded in time, lived experience was reworked into cultural memory. In the process, there emerged among miners who had been socialised in the 1950s and 1960s, to use Karl Mannheim’s famous phrase, a “generational unity” (Generationszusammenhang) that looked to the interwar period as a time of heroism and sacrifice. This reimagined past contrasted sharply with the defeatism and acquiescence that this generation of militants perceived to be omnipresent in the 1960s. While drawing on the interwar period for inspiration, they believed that through struggle they could prise open a bright future for the miners and their industry. Yet, as the hopes for a better tomorrow were shattered by industrial defeat and the accelerated rundown of the industry, non-linear, cyclical understandings of time came to the fore again: the present came to resemble the past, the wheel of fortune had come full circle.

References Arnot, R. Page. 1961. The Miners in Crisis and War. London: George Allen & Unwin. Assmann, Jan. 1992. Das kulturelle Gedächtnis: Schrift, Erinnerung und politische Identität in frühen Hochkulturen. Munich: C. H. Beck. Beckett, Francis, and David Hencke. 2009. Marching to the Fault Line: The Miners’ Strike and the Battle for Industrial Britain. London: Constable & Robinson. Central Youth Employment Executive. 1968. Coalmining, 2nd ed. London. Conservative Research Department. 1980. Politics Today. No 12: Energy. London: Conservative Central Office. Crick, Michael. 1984. Scargill and the Miners. Harmondsworth: Penguin.

37 Haslam, Bob. 2003. An Industrial Cocktail. London: Robert Hale, 123. 38 Ibid., 139.

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Esposito, Fernando, ed. 2017. Zeitenwandel. Transformationen geschichtlicher Zeitlichkeit nach dem Boom. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Gormley, Joe. 1982. Battered Cherub. London: Hamish Hamilton. Haslam, Bob. 2003. An Industrial Cocktail. London: Robert Hale. Horner, Arthur. 1960. Incorrigible Rebel. London: MacGibbon & Key. Howell, David. 2012. “Defiant Dominoes: Working Miners and the 1984–5 Strike”. In Making Thatcher’s Britain, edited by Ben Jackson, and Robert Saunders, 148–64, Cambridge et al.: CUP. Judt, Tony. 2005. Postwar: A History of Europe since 1945. London: Vintage. Lockwood, David. 1966. “Sources of Variation in Working-Class Images of Society.” Sociological Review 14: 249–67. Ministry of Power. 1967. Fuel Policy (Cmnd. 3438). London: HMSO. Mannheim, Karl. 1928. “Das Problem der Generation.” Kölner Vierteljahreshefte für Soziologie 7: 157–85, 309–30. National Union of Mineworkers. 1968. Annual Report and Proceedings for the Year 1967. London. National Union of Mineworkers. 1969. Annual Report and Proceedings for the Year 1968. London. National Union of Mineworkers. 1985. Annual Report and Proceedings for the Year 1984. Sheffield. National Union of Mineworkers. 1986. Annual Report and Proceedings for the Year 1985. Sheffield. NCB. [1958]. The Many Careers in Coal: the Basic Industry with Modern Ideas. London: National Coal Board. NCB. 1974. Plan for Coal. London: National Coal Board. NCB. 1975. People Will Always Need Coal. https://player.bfi.org.uk/free/film/watch-peoplewill-always-need-coal-1975-online. Nora, Pierre. 1989. “Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire.” Representations 26: 7–24. Ottey. Roy. 1985. The Strike: An Insider’s Story. London: Sidgwick & Jackson. Offer, Avner. 2008. “British Manual Workers: From Producers to Consumers, c. 1950–2000.” Contemporary British History 22, no. 4: 537–71. Patterson, Harry. 2014. Look back in Anger: The Miners’ Strike in Nottinghamshire 30 years on. Nottingham: Five Leaves. Paynter, Will. 1972. My Generation. London: George Allen & Unwin. Phillips, Jim. 2017. “Generational Change in 20th-Century Britain: the Case of the Scottish Coalfields.” English Historical Review CXXXII, no. 557: 885–911. Scargill, Arthur. [1981]. Miners in the Eighties. Barnsley: NUM Yorkshire Area. The Monopolies and Mergers Commission. 1983. National Coal Board, vol. 1 (Cmnd. 8920). London: HMSO. The Spirit of ‘45. 2013. Dir: Ken Loach. Ziegler, Dieter, ed. 2013. Geschichte des deutschen Bergbaus. Bd. 4: Rohstoffgewinnung im Strukturwandel. Münster: Aschendorff.

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The representation of coal mining in German post-war newsreels (East-West) 1948 to 1965 Introduction Before television was established in Germany,1 cinema newsreels were the only media to provide news through moving images. In the 1950s, people visited a cinema at least once a week to watch the latest film and the newsreels in the interludes. Through moving images, underscored by sound, newsreels could give the viewers the impression of being on the spot as news was happening. Although the effect on its viewers is not verifiable anymore, it is very likely that the impressive films shown – projected on a wide cinema screen – shaped their opinion. The West and East German newsreels focused on economic resurgence and provided an image of growing industry and its huge need for energy. Newsreels can be regarded as a historical source,2 as, then and now, newsreel images were used in documentaries and present a view of coal mining from those days. Until the coal sales crisis, at the end of the 1950s, coal mining was of great economic importance in West Germany. But even at the beginning of the 1960s, 117 shafts were in operation in the Ruhr region, some of them extracting 8,000 to 10,000 tons per day.3 The transport to neighbouring countries was ensured along the river Rhine and canals directly connected waterways and cities. At the beginning of the 1960s, approximately 420,000 people worked in mining in the Ruhr area.4 They received preferential treatment in housing (in special mining settlements), and the health service. Until the crisis started, they earned more than other industrial workers.5 In East Germany, several hard coal deposits 1 Television has been established in West Germany at the end of the 1950s, in East Germany at the beginning of the 1960s. 2 Paul, Gerhard. 2012. “Visual History. Version: 2.0.” Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte October 29, 2012. Accessed January 21, 2019. https://docupedia.de/zg/Visual_History_Version_2.0_Gerhard_Paul. 3 Zischka, Anton. 1961. Kohle im Atomzeitalter. Die Zukunft der Weltenergieversorgung. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann, 112. 4 Ibid., 114. 5 Miners earned 141 DM per week in 1958, but this changed in 1961 – they earned around 10 DM less than steel workers: Anonymous. 1952. “Bergarbeiter Löhne. Brüder zur Sonne.” Der Spiegel, no. 25, June 20, 1952, 30–33, 31. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-014

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existed,6 but brown coal deposits7 (opencast mining) were more important.8 Moreover, in the mid-1950s, brown coal production became more important for industry and energy supply. The pits were nationally owned enterprises, Volkseigene Betriebe (VEB) and thus, state controlled. In the GDR, miners were privileged in the health care system, received offers for cultural events,9 and high wages. However, the mining industries in the West and East faced the same problems: a huge demand for resources, e.g. water for washing hard coal, and technological challenges for providing fresh air (by Wettermaschinen) to the sites underground.10 In today’s analysis and interpretation of the newsreel reports, the most important question might be: Which details of coal mining and energy industry did the editorial team select to inform the viewers? Were problems and obstacles mentioned – beyond success in economic resurgence?11 A large number of German post-war newsreel films have been made accessible online,12 and using keywords like ‘coal’, ‘mining’, or ‘nuclear energy’, about 30 relevant reports from West German newsreels13 were traceable, and 40 reports from East German newsreels. From this it seems that coal mining and the energy industry were of greater importance in the East than in the West of Germany. But this assumption might be misleading, as the newsreels were only one part of the media system. The producers thought of ‘their’ newsreel as an audio-visual supplement to press and radio news. Newsreels

6 Close to Plötz, Doberlug-Kirchhain, Zwickau, Lugau-Oelsnitzer, Plauen, Saxony: Kauffeldt, Alfons et al. 1960. Industrie und Technik in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1945 bis 1955. Berlin: VE Verlag Technik, 13. 7 Ostelbisches Revier, Lower Lusatia (Niederlausitz) with the largest part of the deposits (estimated 22–23 billion tons) and at Westelbisches Revier (Mitteldeutsches Revier): Kauffeldt et al. Industrie und Technik, 46. 8 From 1946 to 1955, brown coal extraction was doubled (to 200 million tons), but hard coal extraction remained at the low level of 1946, lower, in fact than in pre-war period: Kauffeldt et al. Industrie und Technik, 46. 9 Kauffeldt et al. Industrie und Technik, 26–27. 10 Zischka. Kohle im Atomzeitalter, 115, 117. 11 The time frame 1948 to 1965 was chosen because in 1966/67 West Germany faced its first economic recession and the German Democratic Republic (GDR; DDR) announced it had economically outpaced the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG; BRD). 12 See the West German newsreels at www.filmothek.bundesarchiv.de, and the East German newsreels at www.progress-film.de. 13 Thirteen editions of Welt im Film, two of Welt im Bild, seven of Neue Deutsche Wochenschau, nine of Ufa-Wochenschau, and one of Zeitlupe.

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contributed to the ‘agenda’ of topics, which was conveyed by all media,14 telling the people what was important in Germany and in the world.

History of German post-war newsreels After the Second World War, the Western Allies introduced their own newsreels in Germany, using them for re-education purposes – in particular, the BritishAmerican production Welt im Film. In 1949, the Federal Government and its Press Office sought to inform people about West Germany’s progress through a new newsreel – without any foreign influence. At the end of 1949, Neue Deutsche Wochenschau (NDW) was introduced, directed only by Germans. Beginning in 1952, after Britain’s and America’s withdrawal from newsreel production in Germany, the Welt im Bild was produced as the successor to Welt im Film. In 1956, the Welt im Film became Ufa-Wochenschau and in 1963, NDW was renamed Zeit unter der Lupe (for short Zeitlupe).15 Whereas in West Germany several productions existed in a competitive newsreel market, in East Germany only Der Augenzeuge was produced by the state-controlled production company Deutsche Film AG (DEFA).16 That newsreel is considered the mouthpiece of the East German government and the socialist party, Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands (SED). According to its first editor in chief, Kurt Maetzig, Der Augenzeuge was to be an educator of the people (“echter Volkserzieher”).17 Der Augenzeuge was distinguished by its well-designed political reports (gestaltete politische Sujets) in showing political relations.18 Each edition had to pass a committee, consisting of SED-representatives and a Soviet advisor.19

14 Agenda Setting Approach by Bernard Cohen. His main finding is that the media has no major impact on what people think but what they think about: Cohen, Bernard. 1963. The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. 15 Both, Neue Deutsche Wochenschau/Zeitlupe and Welt im Bild/Ufa-Wochenschau were produced by Deutsche Wochenschau GmbH in Hamburg. Furthermore, the Fox tönende Wochenschau returned to the German newsreel market (after it was eliminated in the Nazi era), and the French-influenced Blick in die Welt was distributed in particular in the former French occupation zone (Southwest Germany). 16 Der Augenzeuge was produced from 1946 until 1980. 17 Chefredakteur Maetzig, quotet in Jordan, Günter. 1990. “DEFA Wochenschau und Dokumentarfilm 1946–1949.” PhD diss., Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (unpubl.). 18 Jordan. DEFA-Wochenschau und Dokumentarfilm, 93. 19 Jordan, Günter. 1996. “Der Augenzeuge.” In Schwarzweiß und Farbe. DEFA-Dokumentarfilme 1946–92, edited by Günter Jordan, and Ralf Schenk, 271–293. Berlin: Filmmuseum Potsdam & Jovis Verlagsbüro, 275.

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Characteristics of German post-war newsreels Newsreels were completely compiled and edited films. One edition contained about eight to 15 reports (approximately 10 minutes of viewing time, at 300 metres of film in length). The topics were entertaining and informative, including fashion shows, animal stories, technology, and new inventions, fairs, folk festivals, disasters, sports, state visits, and political events. The reports were underscored by music, sound, and textual commentary in different tones from factual to ironic, addressing the viewers directly or indirectly. The order of the reports was intentionally chosen and the transitions from one story to the next provided associations for supporting the viewer’s understanding of the reports. Because of the weekly editions,20 topicality was low, and due to various economic and political influences on the newsreels, the objectivity was low as well.21 The newsreel had to please different groups of people and thus, attractiveness and exclusiveness were sometimes seen as more important than topicality. Every Friday, when the cinema program changed, a new edition was delivered to the cinemas.22 The newsreels’ design depended very much on media-technology, and so in the 1940s and 1950s heavy cameras were mostly used. For recording original sound, a special (and heavier) camera as well as a sound specialist with additional equipment was needed. This effort was only made for reports about prominent individuals and important incidents. However, in the 1960s, handheld cameras and mobile sound recording devices were widely used. Spontaneous interviews (and thus more authentic seeming) became much easier. For governments, newsreels were used foremost as a presentation function for conveying a good reputation – especially, as most newsreel companies were members of an exchange network, The International Newsreel Association (INA). Single pictures, single reports, or whole editions were delivered to newsreel

20 From 1957 to 1960, DEFA in East Germany produced two editions a week, A and B-version (released on Friday or Tuesday) – but only a few cinemas presented both: Mügler, Ralph. 1959. “Aufgabe, Bedeutung und Methoden des aktuellen Filmberichts als einer spezifischen Form der Bildjournalistik – dargestellt an der DEFA-Wochenschau „Der Augenzeuge“ von Januar 1958 bis März 1959.” Diplomarbeit zum Staatsexamen, Universität Leipzig (Dipl. Exam), 25. 21 Lehnert, Sigrun. 2013. Wochenschau und Tagesschau in den 1950er Jahren. Konstanz: UVK, chapter 4 and 5. 22 The circulation was organised by a professional film distributor. Not every cinema received the latest edition. After a week, the edition was passed from one cinema to another, which had booked a lower level (the so-called “Staffelsystem”). This way, the topicality of the presented edition depended on the cinema. Thus, the newsreels had to include entertaining stories, which were still interesting for the audience even some weeks later.

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partners in foreign countries. Even between the West German newsreels and Der Augenzeuge (East German newsreel) an exchange agreement existed.23 The newsreels edited those pictures and reports and underscored them with new text, music and sound. In this way, they were used for Cold War propaganda.

Miners as heroes In the newsreel reports (no matter whether East or West), the coal miner clearly stood for a great capacity for human productivity, endurance, and a willingness to make sacrifices, whereas in December 1948, the British-American Welt im Film shows the ongoing recruitment of young men for coal mining.24 In East Germany, obviously another way had been found to motivate young miners, namely by presenting them as a paragon. The coal miner Adolf Hennecke and his working performance became a myth for decades. When he exceeded his planned output for over 380 percent on 13 October 1948, Der Augenzeuge did not directly report about this heroic day but later showed Hennecke meeting the president of the Coal Head Office, Gustav Sobottka.25 The commentary highlights that Hennecke was a member of the SED. He seems here to be treated like a colleague, is offered a cigarette, and explains his performance – but the dialogue sounds well prepared.26 Hennecke declares, recorded in original sound, that he intended to demonstrate that the increased performance was possible through new organised processes, and that he wished that many workers would follow his example. Not only the person, but also the name “Hennecke” was to symbolise idealistic and motivated work under socialism for the state and community. The commentary says that such willingness to engage in “our” pioneer

23 Beginning in 1953, exchanges with Blick in die Welt and in 1954 with Neue Deutsche Wochenschau were established: Letter of Bundesminister für Wirtschaft, Bonn to Neue Deutsche Wochenschau GmbH, Hamburg, from 8. November 1954, Hauptstaatsarchiv Hannover, Bestand: Oberfinanzdirektion Hannover, 06.05.05. 24 Welt im Film No. 185 from 10.12.1948 a banner was shown: “The 20,000st volunteer from the US-zone for the Ruhr mining industry” (“Der 20.000. Freiwillige aus der US-Zone für den Ruhrbergbau”). In the film, the 20,000st volunteer of the American Zone is congratulated and gets equipment and an extra ration of tobacco. The second part of the report shows the honouring of old miners who give young miners their equipment (Werkzeug, Lampe and Pickel), the 250,000st retrainee (Umschüler) was presented as one who changed their jobs to mining. 25 Der Augenzeuge No. 132/1948. 26 At the end of the film scene, Sobottka concluded Hennecke’s statements by repeating the main points.

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work carried the name Hennecke.27 By offering them a heroic example, the audience was directly addressed. After that record-breaking event, Aktivist was a term used for extraordinarily hard-working people and thus as being a role model for others.28 By exemplifying Hennecke’s and other coal miners’ performances, Der Augenzeuge supported the image of the activist movement (Aktivistenbewegung). Beginning in 1950, every year miners were given awards as “Respectable Miner of the GDR” (Verdienter Bergmann der DDR) on the “Day of miners” (Tag des Bergmanns).29 At those ceremonies, Adolf Hennecke was mostly present to congratulate the men – and women.30 In the reports on the ceremonies, miners were mentioned by their names and the great importance of the miners’ work is highlighted, often underscored by traditional marching music (for example the Steigermarsch). The workplace at the pit and the ceremonial stage was alternated to illustrate the reason for being awarded.31 According to the newsreels’ reports, the miners in the GDR worked reliably and fulfilled the plans even under hard conditions, for example in winter. The commentary declared the miners patriots and praised their selflessness and voluntary work for keeping the important briquet production and the transport of coal going, despite severe frost.32 Additionally – as a pattern – the commentary mostly defined aims of the workers in the GDR to be German unification, peace, increased performance, and friendship with the Soviet Union.33 This heroisation was even stronger in the event of mining accidents. Coal miners faced several risks underground, from inrushing of water, gas explosions (Schlagwetter), and rockfalls to mudslides in opencast mining. Although, numerous accidents had occurred,34 Der Augenzeuge only reported about the serious accident at the VEB Steinkohlenwerk (a publicly owned hard coal pit)

27 Der Augenzeuge No. 132/1948. 28 Der Augenzeuge No. 34/1950 reports on the brown coal area of Welzow (Kohlerevier Welzow) stating that the Hennecke-Monat had been announced – providing perpetual shift work for activists (Aktivisten) on reaching the planned performance of energy plants. 29 Reports, for example, in Der Augenzeuge No. 28/1951, No. 28/1952, and No. B56/1958. 30 Der Augenzeuge highlighted the equal status of men and women in the world of work in the GDR, even in industry jobs and hard work, e.g. in Der Augenzeuge No. 28/1952. 31 Der Augenzeuge No. 28/1952. 32 Der Augenzeuge No. 10/1954 with a report on the brown coal mining in Domsdorf; the miners had to blow the coal. 33 For example in Der Augenzeuge No. 28/1952. 34 Kroker, Evelyn, and Michael Farrenkopf. 1999. Grubenunglücke im deutschsprachigen Raum. Katalog der Bergwerke, Opfer, Ursachen und Quellen. Bochum: Deutsches Bergbau-Museum.

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Karl Marx in Zwickau, Saxony, in February 1960.35 The report in edition No. A19/1960 showed injured miners in a hospital, visited by the Prime Minister (Ministerpräsident) Otto Grotewohl. According to the commentary, he was assured by the miners that it had done everything possible for a successful rescue operation.36 As the socialist state considered itself responsible for the wellbeing of all workers, the newsreel obviously tried to prevent a bad light being put on the government. In West Germany, the coal miner was a symbol of endurance, sacrifice and performance power as well – but was so idolised as a hero. In May 1950, NDW No. 17 reported about an accident at Zeche Dahlbusch.37 The commentary highlights the destiny of all people of the Ruhr area, and “the tears of women, mothers, and children” – apart from the “big politics” of those days.38 The dead miners were symbolised by showing a list hanging at a window.39 In the same edition, it reported on a meeting of the Federal President (Bundespräsident Theodor Heuss) with the former French Prime Minister Paul Reynauld about the question of a European Coal and Steel Community. The newsreel seems to express that things would change soon, and coal and steel were important for a strong Europe. Whereas in the GDR the miners were awarded every year, official awards in the FRG were rare. In August 1951, the NDW No. 87 reported on a young miner who saved the life of two others. He received the first post-war decoration of the FRG, the Bundesverdienstkreuz. The NDW No. 401 from 4 October 1957 reported on just such an honour, a new series of charity stamps “Helper of Mankind” (“Helfer der Menschheit”) with mining motifs which was presented to the Federal President. The West German newsreel covered three big coal mining accidents: at Zeche Dahlbusch in May 1950 (NDW No. 17 and Welt im Film No. 260), at the same pit in August 1955 (NDW No. 289 and Welt im Bild No. 163 – but only on the funeral of the miners), and on the great “disaster” of Völklingen, Saarland, in 1962. The newsreel highlighted the tragedy of the mining accident not only with sombre 35 It was the worst mining accident in the history of the GDR: 123 miners died from gas explosions (Schlagwetter): Reichert, Steffen. 2010. “Katastrophe auf ‘Karl Marx’”. Spiegel Online, February 18, 2010. Accessed January 21, 2019. http://www.spiegel.de/einestages/ddr-grubenunglueck-a-948729. html. 36 Edition not available online, accessible only at Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde. 37 The report was the main feature; by the order, the importance of the incident was expressed. 38 On 9 May 1950, in a speech the French Foreign Minister Robert Schuman suggested the establishment of a European Coal and Steel Community (EGKS). 39 NDW No. 17 from 23 May 1950. The report was followed by a story about a new fishery protection ship as an emergency helper. A sailor had an accident and was rescued. So, the newsreel showed a happy ending to keep up the good mood of viewers.

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music, but also by the journalist on the spot who, using modern portable equipment, interviewed an injured miner who described in detail what he had experienced. The commentary calls the dead miners “elite”,40 and the Federal President is shown giving a speech in which he explains the dangers of mining. At the end, the interviewed miner said he would continue his work and remain in the job. Not only the interview, but also the speech was reported in original sound by the newsreel and thus both were very impressive.41 With the title “young people today” (Jugend heute), the Ufa-Wochenschau No. 11 from 10 October 1956 reported on young miners (trainees) who extracted 25 tons of coal for needy persons in Lower Saxony in extra shifts at the Friedrich Heinrich AG hard coal pit in Kamp-Lintfort. They accompanied the transport to Hanover, Lower Saxony (Niedersachsen). The trainees were filmed working underground, taking a shower and wearing uniforms to present the coal to the Governor (Ministerpräsident) of Lower Saxony, Heinrich Hellwege. It seems that the report aimed to strengthen the image of miners’ jobs and of young people.42

Coal as a symbol of survival The people’s opinion in the GDR was not just influenced by mass media, but additionally through numerous posters and banners in the streets. By filming them, the messages were doubled as viewers in the cinema might have seen the banners both in real life and in the films. For example, on the award ceremony for miners (Aktivisten) from the Welzow brown coal area, Lower Lusatia, at a stage under the banner “We work for peace” (Wir schaffen für den Frieden), the poster “coal is the bread of industry” (Kohle ist Brot der Industrie) is clearly recognisable.43 In the same edition, on the occasion of the first tapping of steel in the GDR, Präsident Wilhelm Pieck said: “Steel is bread and more steel makes more bread”. The message to the viewers was that steel and coal guaranteed food for all. In Der Augenzeuge No. A1/1958, the viewers could learn how mining also served the energy sector. The coal consumption of the large “Elbe” power station, Vockerode in Saxony (Sachsen-Anhalt) was highlighted.44 By this example,

40 Original quote: “Die Steiger- und Hauer Elite [. . .] wird zu Grabe getragen”. 41 Ufa-Wochenschau No. 290 from 14.2.1962. The report is more than six minutes long, and takes up more than half of the edition. 42 Besides this are reports on “Halbstarke” and unacceptable dancing of “Rock’n’Roll”. 43 Der Augenzeuge No. 34/1950. 44 The edition is not available online, and accessible only at Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde.

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the audience was informed that their households were provided with electricity made possible through a great amount of coal extraction. Particularly during the blockade of West Berlin in 1948/1949, coal was a symbol of survival. The East and West German newsreels reported from the beginning to the end of the Berlin blockade about coal supply, whether transportation by train or ship to East Berlin, or by plane from the Western Allies to West Berlin. Der Augenzeuge highlighted that the miners in Saxony did extra shifts in solidarity with Berlin,45 and showed the allegedly disadvantaged West with empty coal cellars.46 It was not only adults who seemed to show great solidarity. The newsreel reports on boys and girls from the youth organization Junge Pioniere who delivered coal to old people in winter – followed by a report on coal transports from special railway stations.47 Reading from the newsreel reports, the transport and distribution systems to the cities and at the mining area seemed to be as important as the coal extraction itself. The mining waste, which was caused by uncovering the coal, had to be removed as soon as possible to maintain a good pace and fulfil the state extraction plan.48 Coal was delivered by lorries and the transportation was referred to as a “lifeline” (Lebensader) for the brown coal mines – but this was threatened due to insufficient material.49 Especially in reports from 1956, the commentary criticised the poor material, old tracks and ties, and highlighted the importance of brown coal for fulfilling the economic plans for the chemical industry and exports.50 Therefore, according to the commentary, everything had to be done to activate and increase the co-determination of workers, in order to fulfil the plans. In an obviously staged scene, workers discuss that

45 Der Augenzeuge No. 136/1948. 46 Der Augenzeuge No. 122/1948; Lehnert, Sigrun. 2018. “Die Berliner Luftbrücke in der Kinowochenschau. Welt im Film versus Der Augenzeuge.” In Die Berliner Luftbrücke: Erinnerungsort des Kalten Krieges, edited by Corine Defrance, Bettina Greiner, and Ulrich Pfeil, 286–305. Berlin: Christoph Links Verlag. 47 Der Augenzeuge No. 8/1963. It is demonstrated, that coal supply is ensured by teamwork. 48 Kauffeldt et al. Industrie und Technik, 36–37. 49 In Der Augenzeuge No. 33/1956, original quote: „Die [. . .] Gleise sind Quelle vieler Störungen [. . .] die Folgen sind Schwierigkeiten bei der Planerfüllung. Vernachlässigung der Gleisanlagen, aber auch fehlendes und schlechtes Material führen zu Störungen, die mit viel Zeitaufwand und Mühe behoben werden müssen. [. . .] der Werkverkehr muss rollen – er ist die Lebensader der Braunkohlengruben.“ 50 In Der Augenzeuge No 50/1956, original quote: „Es geht um die Erfüllung der Pläne in einem der wichtigsten Zweige unserer Produktion: Braunkohle! Das ist Hausbrandversorgung, das ist Ausgangsprodukt unserer Chemieindustrie, das ist wesentlicher Teil unserer Exportpläne.“

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topic.51 It is highly likely that the critique of ineffective transport conditions in coal mining was tolerated, because of the III. Conference of the SED (III. Parteikonferenz der SED) in March 1956. The conference’s result comprised the instructions for the next Five-Year-Plan (Fünfjahresplan). Those aims being modernisation, mechanisation, and automation for an increased overall performance of more than 50 percent in the GDR by 1960.52

The power of the mining industry The reports made the power of the mining industry very clear. In the BritishAmerican newsreel Welt im Film No. 197 from March 1949, the third report is titled “Performance curve increasing” (Leistungskurve steigt), and the commentary sounds optimistic that coal mining would be possible or a further 2,000 years. This indeed seemed plausible: Beginning in December 1955, guest workers (Gastarbeiter) were systematically recruited to overcome a shortage of workers, but still many positions were unfilled.53 In that situation of tension, the unions (Gewerkschaften) demanded a further reduction of working hours with a complete wage adjustment.54 Furthermore, they showed their power in the coal miner’s strike in Ruhr area in 1955, which was caused by a thoughtless and compromising speech by mining director, Herman Reusch, who had labelled the law on co-determination from 1951 the result of the union’s pressure (“blackmailing”).55 The strike lasted only a single day, but it was highlighted in

51 In Der Augenzeuge No 50/1956, commentary’s original quote: „Die Diskussion über die Arbeiterkomitees ist im Gange. Die weitere Förderung der schöpferischen Aktivität der Arbeiter in den Betrieben ist das Ziel.“ 52 Steiner, André. 2007. Von Plan zu Plan. Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung, 84–86; Anonymous. 1956. “Auch die Zone will automatisieren.” Die Zeit, no. 24, 21 November 1956. Accessed January 21, 2019. https://www.zeit.de/1956/ 24/auch-die-zone-will-automatisieren. 53 But the Italian miners were omitted from the newsreels and were not mentioned or shown in the films. 54 Although until 1957 over 8,000 Italians were recruited, at the same time over 10,000 positions were unfilled: Nonn, Christoph. 2001. Die Ruhrbergbaukrise. Entindustrialisierung und Politik 1958–1969. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 38. 55 Original quote: „Das Mitbestimmungsrecht für Kohle und Eisen ist das Ergebnis einer brutalen Erpressung durch die Gewerkschaften. Es ist in einer Zeit durchgesetzt worden, in der die Staatsgewalt noch nicht gefestigt war.“ Anonymous. 1958. “Rein kommst du nicht.” Der Spiegel, no. 24, June 11, 1958, 22–25, 22.

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NDW56 as well as in Der Augenzeuge.57 The East German newsreel used film material from the West German newsreel, but of course the message was different.58 The report on the strike comes second in the edition. The main feature is about miners in France and Belgium who had to endure social hardships due to joblessness and exploitation during war production. Der Augenzeuge makes clear that the European Coal and Steel Community causes misery for miners. But the reason for the strike was not explicitly mentioned. In NDW, a short report on the strike is included in fourth position after a report about a meeting of the employer’s association discussing rationality and modesty as a basis for economic peace. Due to the order of the two reports, the message seems to be that miners threatened industrial peace (Arbeitsfrieden). The commentary mentions the economic damage for the mining industry and loss of earnings for the workers caused by the strike.59 But the situation on the coal market started to become worse in 1957/58. The prizes declined, and the coal heaps of unsold coal increased. There were several reasons for this including, for example, the liberalisation of the coal market and long-term contracts for coal imports from the USA. Another reason was the increased use of oil, supported by elimination of the oil taxes.60 The end of the Suez Crisis and the reopening of the Suez Canal allowed low prices for cargo space and thus the oil price declined.61 Additionally, the mild winter saw households buy less coal for heating and so the energy plants (Elektrizitätswerke) also reduced demand.62 In 1959, the dramatic coal sales crisis was repeatedly reported on. The West German Ufa-Wochenschau No. 136 from 3 March 1959, however, refers to general difficulties in the Western European mining industry and explains the crisis as a “natural” consequence of new up-and-coming energy sources. Miners, who were once privileged should thus be retrained for other jobs. In contrast, Der Augenzeuge No. B72/1959 shows detailed and extensive coverage of the demonstrations by miners in Dortmund and Oberhausen (Ruhr area) against

56 NDW No. 261 from January 28, 1955. 57 Whereas the East German newsreel reported very often about strikes in West Germany, to illustrate the disadvantages of capitalism, the West German newsreels reported much less often about work stoppages: Lehnert, Sigrun. 2018. “Arbeit, Freizeit und Streik in der KinoWochenschau West- und Ostdeutschlands von den 1950er- bis Mitte der 1960er-Jahre.” ArbeitBewegung-Geschichte 1/2018: 110–134. 58 Der Augenzeuge No. 5/1955. 59 NDW No. 261 from 28 January 1955. 60 Anonymus. 1958. “Verkaufen statt verteilen.” Der Spiegel, no. 11, 12 March 1958, 28–30. 61 Nonn. Die Ruhrbergbaukrise, 28. 62 Ibid., 75.

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unpaid shifts (Feierschichten) and mass dismissals (Massenentlassungen). However, this demonstration was omitted in the West German newsreels. In the same year, the East German newsreel reported on the blossoming mining industry in the GDR, with new cities being built for the miners, and their privileged life. Der Augenzeuge filmed a worker leaving for his shift and waving goodbye to his wife at the window of one of the houses. He was mentioned by name to give a factual example.63

Politicised coal and steel and the cold war Coal mining related topics were political topics as well. The Welt im Film No. 178 in October 1948 highlighted the great importance of coal mining for fulfilling the Marshall Plan (official American European Recovery Program, ERP) and thus as a key for West Germany’s reconstruction.64 But, the GDR was excluded from the ERP, as it had joined the community of socialist countries instead. In the 1950s, Europe was finally separated in two – which is also reflected in reports on the German steel industry. In 1951, Der Augenzeuge showed, how socialist states worked together in steel production – “German steel of peace” (deutscher Friedensstahl) was presented, made from Soviet ore and Polish coal.65 Similarly, in 1953 the NDW highlighted iron which was made from French and Belgian ore, Dutch and German coal produced in Luxembourg, under Italian control, as the commentary says. At first, the viewers see the furnace and the Cowper (Winderhitzer) followed by the procedure’s next step, the tapping. The raw iron then flew in forms for shaping bars, and is prepared for transport to the steel plant.66 Although the iron production is shown, the camera took pictures from the first piece of free traded ‘European steel’, as it was labelled by the commentary, held in the hand of a delegate of the European member states. This demonstrates how the newsreels served the viewer’s understanding by showing a result, whereas the full process is not depicted.67 Although, Der Augenzeuge

63 Der Augenzeuge No. B52/1959. 64 Report on the visit of Clay und Robertson, the military governors of the British and American Zone in Ruhr area, at mining and steel industry plants. For a first step in independence, West Germany got concessions in coal mining. 65 Der Augenzeuge No. 40/1951, report on the first furnace at the new Eisenhüttenkombinat Ost. 66 Thanks to Malte Helfer, University of Luxembourg, for identifying the procedure in the newsreel film. 67 NDW No. 171 from May 3, 1953. The previous report is on the decoration of industrial workers with the Bundesverdienstkreuz.

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criticised the European Community,68 at the same time, it referred to this conglomerate, as the construction of the biggest brown coal combine (Braunkohlekombinat) in Europe was announced.69 In the same year, in West Germany, Europe’s biggest digger in brown coal mining was reported on.70 “Europe” and “European” obviously served as a vessel or model for supporting superlative images. The fight of two different economic and political systems was not only depicted by reports on a meta-perspective of Europe and the world, but on political debates from a macro- and micro-perspective regrading German topics. Der Augenzeuge reported on alleged calls from miners in the FRG to accept the GDR’s offer of taking four million tons of coal to help West German miners. And it was claimed that Bundeskanzler Konrad Adenauer (the Federal Chancellor) was not interested in helping the miners and the coal industry as he had refused the offer. Additionally, the Western economic miracle (Wirtschaftswunder) was discredited.71 In the 1960s, when a lot of coal mines in West Germany went bankrupt, Der Augenzeuge reported on the left-wing activism of coal workers in the FRG showing demonstrations with banners saying that only “Sozialisierung”, transforming mining industry in to collective property, could save the coal mining industry.72 Unions and the Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD), the social democratic party in West Germany, had supported the idea of Sozialisierung for years.73 But, giving up privately owned coal mining was no option for Adenauer as this would have been too close to the GDR’s system.

End of the coal mining era? According to the newsreel reports, the end of the coal era was recognisable early on. In 1952, Welt im Film reported on the first nuclear laboratories in the USA,74 68 For example, in Der Augenzeuge No. 5/1955: Miners are indicated as “victims” of the Coal and Steel Community. 69 In Der Augenzeuge No. 36/1955. 70 NDW No. 296 from 14.10.1955. 71 Der Augenzeuge No. A 79/1958, report titled “Aus Westdeutschland”, commentary text with wordplay: The politics of Bonn’s „Wirtschaftswunders“ reveals itself as many ships without cargo are waiting in the harbour. The „Erhard’sche Wirtschaftswunder“ forced them to wait for work („verdammt sie zum Feiern“). 72 Der Augenzeuge No. 47/1964. Edition not available online, accessible only at Bundesarchiv Berlin-Lichterfelde. 73 Anonymous. 1952. “Sozialisierung: Gespenst mit Schlips.” Der Spiegel, no. 24, 11 June 1952, 9–12; Anonymous. 1958. “Wir haben einen Plan.” Der Spiegel, no. 19, 7 May 1958, 18–27. 74 Welt im Film No. 352 from 1 March 1952 and No. 366 from 7 June 1952.

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used foremost for scientific medical or physical experiments. In Ufa-Wochenschau No. 21 from December 1956, in a report titled “Atoms for Peace” (Atome für den Frieden), Europe’s biggest nuclear reactor in Harwell (Great Britain) was presented, and the nuclear physicist Otto Hahn predicted the end of coal era. He says in a speech: “In a few decades time, we have to use other sources of energy than coal and oil”. In 1956/57, the East and West German newsreels reported on scientific exhibits on new energy forms,75 but there were also reports on radioactive contaminated milk in Great Britain as a consequence of a nuclear accident.76 The danger of nuclear energy was made clear, but simultaneously, people, politicians, and scientists seemed to be fascinated by the new possibilities offered by nuclear technology. At the same time, in 1957, Der Augenzeuge No. A47 showed in detail the construction of the first nuclear reactor in the GDR, Rossendorf, close to Dresden, Saxony, which was, as the commentary says, built with the outstanding help of the Soviet Union. But in 1958, it was still reporting on record-breaking success in coal extraction in the GDR. The miners committed themselves to do extra work and the commentary claimed in a motivating way: “[A]s we work today, we will live tomorrow”. The edition also contains a report on usual celebrations with parades on the “miner’s day” (Tag des Bergmanns).77 In January, the UfaWochenschau combined pictures from the first and second atomic reactor in the FRG.78 Die first reactor was built in Munich and the second for research purposes in Frankfurt am Main. In newsreel reports in the East and West, nuclear research was generally highlighted. Parts of this Ufa-Wochenschau report was used in the monthly magazine Deutschlandspiegel.79 This is revealing, as the Deutschlandspiegel was specially produced for German consulates abroad. But soon, the newsreel declared that Europe’s coal mining industry was fighting for its existence.80

75 Ufa-Wochenschau No. 50 from 10 July 1957 exhibition in Amsterdam, the Netherlands, “Vom Wasserrad zum Atomreaktor.” Der Augenzeuge No. 49/1956 Soviet exhibition on nuclear energy in Leipzig, Saxony, GDR. 76 Ufa-Wochenschau No. 65 from 23 October 1957. 77 Der Augenzeuge No. B56/1958. 78 Ufa-Wochenschau No. 78 from 22 January 1958. 79 Deutschlandspiegel No. 42 from 27 March 1958. 80 In Belgium, France and Great Britain and in the Ruhr area, day by day tens of thousands tons of black coal was extracted, but just a fraction of it was sold, cf. Ufa-Wochenschau No. 136 from 3 March 1959.

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Conclusion Obviously, in the newsreel reports some aspects were highlighted whereas others were neglected. In this way, a special ‘framing’ in order to lead the viewer’s understanding was achieved. The viewer’s cognitive patterns were appealed to by those frames in combination with indirect, subtle messages and different strategies of cinematic narration (e.g. using camera settings and film montage). Additionally, the reports’ positions in the edition contributed to the frame building.81 Whereas the East German newsreel observed the West very well, the Western newsreel seemed to ignore the coal mining industry of the GDR. Der Augenzeuge highlighted the connection between the West German coal mining industry and the European Coal and Steel Community (Montanunion) in a negative way, highlighting unsold coal heaps, the joblessness of miners, and wage losses for miners which were all presented as problems. The Montanunion, the capitalist system, the exploitation of workers, and separation of Germany were identified as reasons for these.82 The Sozialisierung of the mining industry and German reunion through a system of socialism were indirectly communicated as the solution to such problems. As a moral assessment, it was mentioned that the Federal Government behaved passively, refusing to help the miners, and inhibited the reunion process in West Germany. The agents responsible were seen to be the rich mining directors, one party set against the miners, with the latter fighting for regular work and wages. Europe and the Montanunion was of course also a big topic in all West German newsreels. It was claimed that unsold coal heaps and economic damage were caused by customs, traditional political barriers and frontiers in Europe. The obstacles could be removed by the association of West European states, acting as one country. It was assessed that West Germany needed good relationships and cooperation, so politicians and other decision makers were deemed responsible. West and East German newsreels presented reports on nuclear power, and they framed this topic in relation to industry and world peace. Increasing new industry, reconstruction, and (planned) economic growth turned out to be the

81 Robert Entman points out four frame-elements which could be highlighted by media or not: definition of problems or topics, explaining of reasons, showing solutions, and (moral) assessment. But, not all elements need to occur for the building of frames: Entman, Robert. 1993. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4: 51–58. According to Lars Harden (2002) agents (Akteure), for example, politicians as responsible persons, are also part of framings: Harden, Lars. 2002. Rahmen der Orientierung. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag, 88. 82 For example in Der Augenzeuge No. 5/1955.

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reasons for energy needs. Obviously, the peaceful usage of nuclear power would solve problems.83 All newsreels seemed to predetermine that nuclear weapons did not have a role in a peace and freedom loving society (as both German states wanted to be recognised by the world community) and were just symbols of prestige and power.84 Scientists should take responsibility for conducting research towards the peaceful usage of nuclear energy in the future. Regarding the depiction of miners, the differences are remarkable: In the East of Germany, the miner became a symbol of socialistic work. In the West German newsreel, the heroic work of miners is mostly obvious in the case of serious mining accidents. The East German newsreel showed miners in action, their faces in close-ups, doing underground work and at award ceremonies. In the West German newsreels, however, miners are rarely depicted in their hard work routines,85 while awards were rare as well. Whereas Der Augenzeuge shows workers discussing to explain to viewers the level of commitment in the mining industry (although it seems to be staged), in the West German newsreel, miners were given a reputation as troublemakers and participants at demonstrations or strikes. Reading such reports, it is no wonder that miners in the FRG felt unacknowledged for their dangerous work.86 Additionally, in times of coal crises, they faced shortages in work, in wages, and faced the fear of being dismissed.87 The workers in the GDR, however, according to the films, enjoyed the work and the solidarity. Regarding the newsreel’s communication design, similarities in editing and montage are recognisable due to the common film tradition. In East and West popular and traditional melodies of mining songs like “Glück auf” are heard, but in reports about accidents there is funereal music. A very special feature indeed was the usage of jazz by Der Augenzeuge in the 1960s, which sometimes did not fit very well with industrial topics. The final question is: What is missing, what was omitted from the cinema screen? In all the newsreels, background information on the reasons for coal

83 Der Augenzeuge No. 6/1955, No, 34/1955, in Ufa-Wochenschau No. 136 from 3 March 1959. 84 Zeitlupe No. 809 from 27 July 1965. 85 UFA-Wochenschau No. 136 from March 3, 1959 is an exception: the report on the distressed mining industry shows miners working underground. But the report was edited mainly from material of the French newsreel Gaumont and the Belgian newsreel Belgavox, so French and Belgium miners are shown. 86 Because of the high risk and the high number of registered mining accidents in the FRG in 1958 (around 187.000) the miners felt like “moderne Sklaven”, modern slaves, not as human beings: Anonymous. 1963. “Lengede: Aus der Gruft.” Der Spiegel, no. 46, November 13, 1963, 23–36, 33. 87 Anonymous. 1958. “Feierschichten: Lohn der Angst.” Der Spiegel, no. 52, December 24, 1958, 27.

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heaps and strikes as well as on environmental damage caused by coal mining is low.88 Furthermore, most of the registered mining accidents were never shown to the public. Even some very serious accidents were not mentioned, for example the fire at VEB Steinkohlenwerk “Martin Hoop” in Zwickau, Saxony in 1952 (where 48 miners died and a trial over the catastrophe followed), and the mining accident at Zeche Sachsen in Hamm, in the Ruhr area, which left 37 dead miners on 9 March 1962.89 Only those disasters with many victims seemed impossible to avoid mentioning, as it is today.

References Anonymous. 1952. “Bergarbeiter Löhne. Brüder zur Sonne.” Der Spiegel, no. 25, June 20, 1952, 30–3. Anonymous. 1952. “Sozialisierung: Gespenst mit Schlips.” Der Spiegel, no. 24, June 11, 1952, 9–12. Anonymous. 1956. “Auch die Zone will automatisieren.” Die Zeit, no. 24, November 21, 1956, Accessed January 21, 2019. https://www.zeit.de/1956/24/auch-die-zone-will-automatisieren. Anonymous. 1958. “Verkaufen statt verteilen.” Der Spiegel, no. 11, March 12, 1958, 28–30. Anonymous. 1958. “Wir haben einen Plan.” Der Spiegel, no. 19, May 7, 1958, 18–27. Anonymous. 1958. “Rein kommst du nicht.” Der Spiegel, no. 24, June 11, 1958, 22–5. Anonymous. 1958. “Feierschichten: Lohn der Angst.” Der Spiegel, no. 52, December 24, 1958, 27. Anonymous. 1963. “Lengede: Aus der Gruft.” Der Spiegel, no. 46, November 13, 1963, 23–36. Cohen, Bernard. 1963. The Press and Foreign Policy. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Entman, Robert. 1993. “Framing: Toward Clarification of a Fractured Paradigm.” Journal of Communication 43, no. 4: 51–8. Harden, Lars. 2002. Rahmen der Orientierung. Wiesbaden: Deutscher Universitäts-Verlag. Jordan, Günter. 1990. “DEFA Wochenschau und Dokumentarfilm 1946–1949.” PhD diss., Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin (unpubl.). Jordan, Günter. 1996. “Der Augenzeuge.” In Schwarzweiß und Farbe. DEFA-Dokumentarfilme 1946–92, edited by Günter Jordan, and Ralf Schenk, 271–93. Berlin: Filmmuseum Potsdam & Jovis Verlagsbüro. Kauffeldt, Alfons et al. 1960. Industrie und Technik in der Deutschen Demokratischen Republik 1945 bis 1955. Berlin: VE Verlag Technik. Kroker, Evelyn, and Michael Farrenkopf. 1999. Grubenunglücke im deutschsprachigen Raum. Katalog der Bergwerke, Opfer, Ursachen und Quellen. Bochum: Deutsches BergbauMuseum. Lehnert, Sigrun. 2013. Wochenschau und Tagesschau in den 1950er Jahren. Konstanz: UVK.

88 But the growth of population and destruction of the environment became more and more problematic in mining regions: (among others) Zischka. Kohle im Atomzeitalter, 121. 89 Thanks to Dr. Jörn Lindner, Historian in Buchholz for hints on translations of typical German expressions and confirming of theses.

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Lehnert, Sigrun. 2018. “Die Berliner Luftbrücke in der Kinowochenschau. Welt im Film versus Der Augenzeuge.” In Die Berliner Luftbrücke Erinnerungsort des Kalten Krieges, edited by Corine Defrance, Bettina Greiner, and Ulrich Pfeil, 286–306. Berlin: Christoph Links-Verlag. Lehnert, Sigrun. 2018. “Arbeit, Freizeit und Streik in der Kino-Wochenschau West- und Ostdeutschlands von den 1950er- bis Mitte der 1960er-Jahre.” Arbeit-BewegungGeschichte 1/2018: 110–34. Mügler, Ralph. 1959. Aufgabe, Bedeutung und Methoden des aktuellen Filmberichts als einer spezifischen Form der Bildjournalistik – dargestellt an der DEFA-Wochenschau “Der Augenzeuge” von Januar 1958 bis März 1959. Diplomarbeit zum Staatsexamen, Universität Leipzig (Dipl. Exam). Nonn, Christoph. 2001. Die Ruhrbergbaukrise. Entindustrialisierung und Politik 1958–1969. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Paul, Gerhard. 2012. “Visual History. Version: 2.0.” In Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, October 29, 2012. Accessed January 21, 2019. https://docupedia.de/zg/Visual_History_Version_2.0_ Gerhard_Paul. Reichert, Steffen. 2010. “Katastrophe auf ‘Karl Marx’”. Spiegel Online, February 18, 2010. Accessed January 21, 2019. http://www.spiegel.de/einestages/ddr-grubenunglueck-a948729.html. Steiner, André. 2007. Von Plan zu Plan. Eine Wirtschaftsgeschichte der DDR. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. Zischka, Anton. 1961. Kohle im Atomzeitalter. Die Zukunft der Weltenergieversorgung. Gütersloh: Bertelsmann.

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Pulser for preservation: Bernd and Hilla Becher and the role of photography in industrial heritage Bernd and Hilla Bechers’ oeuvre is one of the few to have resonated with and significantly influenced both the modern art system and the broader public sphere. The German couple dedicated their life’s work to documenting industrial buildings such as pithead towers, preparation plants, blast furnaces, or water towers. The Bechers started this large-scale documentation project at a time when many of these buildings were put out of service and faced demolition, such that one contemporary commentator described the Bechers’ work as an “iconography of the disappearing”.1 The Bechers have also been considered “industrial archaeologists”2 and “history writers” – which is crucially different to being called “historians”.3 Yet another association has declared the Bechers’ work an act of coming to terms with the past.4 Despite their enormous success, more than one industrial historian has claimed the reception of the Bechers’ work to be based on a major misunderstanding. Since first appearing, the photographs have caused considerable controversy: do they belong in the art world or are they of special use to industrial archaeology? It’s a question of interpretation.

The formative years The Bechers’ rapid rise to success was sealed by their works’ instant presence in many of the world’s best-renowned galleries and museums. An early bibliography listed an impressive 47 international reviews for the years 1958

1 Celant, Germano. 1974. “Hilla and Bernd Becher: Archaelogical-Industrial Monuments and the Perception of Anonymous Sculpture.” In Bernd and Hilla Becher, edited by La Jolla Museum of Contemporary Art, w.p. San Diego: La Jolla Museum of Contemporary Art. 2 “Die amerikanische Architektur-Zeitschrift Forum hat sie Fotografen-Archäologen genannt.” See: Honnef, Klaus. 1975. “Die Arbeit des Fotografen.” In Bernd und Hilla Becher: Fotografien 1957 bis 1975, edited by Rheinisches Landesmuseum, 7–42. Bonn: Rheinisches Landesmuseum, 34. 3 Ibid. 4 Buchloh, Benjamin H. D. 1997. “Warburgs Vorbild? Das Ende der Collage/Fotomontage im Nachkriegseuropa.” In Deep Storage. Arsenale der Erinnerung; Sammeln, Speichern, Archivieren in der Kunst, edited by Ingrid Schaffner, and Matthias Winzen, 50–60. München: Prestel, 58. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-015

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to 1975.5 Moreover, several solo shows prior to 1977 were displayed in highly prestigious institutions.6 Why did the Bechers’ work win such renown so quickly? Obviously, the work touched upon a pivotal topic. Since the early 20th century, industrial sites had become a huge theme explored by modernist photographers such as Germaine Krull, Alfred Renger-Patzsch, or Charles Sheeler, to mention just a few. Moreover, since the 1920s, less well-known photographers had started to capture industrial scenes that were beginning to disappear amid a new wave of international competition. Bernd Becher was born in the Siegerland, where in the 1910s photographer Peter Weller had taken pictures of the vanishing ore mines. Around the same time, photographer Karl August Reymann photographed the Saxonian silver mines outside Freiberg. These early endeavors are linked to the era’s feeling of anxiety and loss of traditional, pre-industrial forms of living. But they also coincided with some of the first attempts to preserve industrial sites. By 1932, Conrad Matschoss and Werner Lindner’s work on “technological cultural monuments” had synthesized and expressed these tendencies.7 In 1966, the British Council granted the Bechers a fellowship that allowed them to travel to British sites of industrialization, particularly those in South Wales, were they stayed for three months.8 Having acquired this new, transnational experience, Hilla Becher was asked in 1969 to contribute to the British magazine Industrial Archaeology. In her article, Hilla acknowledges the assistance that the couple received from the National Coal Board when shooting their work and, more importantly, mentions the criteria of urgency as being key to their selection of subjects.9 The article also reveals a lively interest of British industrial archaeologists in the Bechers’ work.

5 Heckert, Virginia. 1987. “A Photographic Archive in Industrial Architecture. The Work of Bernd and Hilla Becher.” Master Thesis, University of California, Santa Barbara, pdf of her thesis provided by Virgina Heckert. 6 Selection of exhibitions: 1967 Die Neue Sammlung, Munich, 1968 University of Southern California, Stedelijk vam Abbemuseum, Eindhofen, Städtisches Museum, Mönchen-Gladbach, 1970 Modern Museet, Stockholm, 1972 International Museum of Photography, Rochester, 1974 National Gallery of Canada, Ottawa, Arts Council of Great Britain, 1975: Rheinisches Landesmuseum, Bonn, Museum of Modern Art, New York (again up to 1975). Out of participations in groups show, I only mention 1972 documenta 5, 1975 the New Topographics-show, International Museum of Photography at George Eastman House, Rochester, and again 1977 Documenta 6, Kassel. 7 Matschoss, Conrad, ed. 1932. Technische Kulturdenkmale. München: Bruckmann. 8 See: Becher, Hilla. 1969. “Documenting Industrial History by Photography.” Industrial Archaeology: The Journal of the History of Industry and Technology 5: 373–377, 375. 9 Ibid., 376.

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Zeche Zollern and the institutionalization of industrial heritage practice In Germany, the “discovery” of the Bechers coincided with fledgling attempts to institutionalize industrial archaeology as an academic practice in the late 1960s and early 1970s. Since the outbreak of the post-war coal crisis in 1958, many mines in the Ruhr district were put out of service. A good portion of these was still highly effective, yet foreign hard coal and oil offered cheaper sources of energy. As a result, the industrial buildings that shaped the landscape were about to disappear. However, proposals in 1969 to demolish the unique engine hall at Zeche Zollern II/IV prompted a response.10 In March 1969, two months before the oft-quoted article entitled “The discovery of the year” in the magazine Bauwelt,11 the Bechers were commissioned to document the site.12 As a result in 1977, a book of photographs was published that resulted from this commission. Each of the mine’s pieces of infrastructure or buildings was captured one after the other in both close ups and panoramas. The book treats each building on its own merits and doesn’t focus on the most characteristic or exemplary forms. In addition to documenting the juvenile ornamentation of the engine hall at great length, working-class quarters were depicted. And this is a topic that never again appeared in the Bechers’ self-edited work. The catalogue’s two texts use photographs as illustrations and refer to the mine in terms of the history of industrial architecture and the history of technology.13

10 Parent, Thomas. 2006. “‘Maschinen zum Schrottpreis’: Interessenkonflikt in den Pionierjahren der Industriekultur am Beispiel der Zeche Zollern II/IV (1970–73).” In Technik, Arbeit und Umwelt in der Geschichte. Günter Bayerl zum 60. Geburtstag, edited by Torsten Meyer, and Marcus Popplow, 405–424. Münster: Waxmann; Parent, Thomas. 2004. “Die Entdeckung des Jahres 1969: Zur Geschichte der Maschinenhalle der Zeche Zollern II/IV und zur Frühgeschichte der Technischen Denkmalpflege in Nordrhein-Westfalen.” In Technikgeschichte im Ruhrgebiet – Technikgeschichte für das Ruhrgebiet, edited by Manfred Rasch, and Dietmar Bleidick, 155–176. Essen: Klartext. 11 Anonymous. 1969. “Die Entdeckung des Jahres.” Bauwelt 60, no. 21, illustrated with photographs by D. Hagenbach: 735–739. 12 Original quotation: Lange, Susanne. 1998. “Die Industriephotographie von Bernd und Hilla Becher. Eine monografische Untersuchung vor dem Hintergrund entwicklungshistorischer Zusammenhänge.” PhD diss., Goethe-University Frankfurt (Main) [Manuscript], 184, 186, 190 and 198. Here: Derenthal, Ludger. 2003. “Die Dokumentation der Zeche Zollern 2. Arbeiten an der Grenze zur Typologie.” In Bernd & Hilla Becher. Typologien industrieller Bauten, edited by Armin Zweite, and Bernd Becher, 253–262, Munich: Schirmer/Mosel, 256. 13 See: Conrad, Hans Günther. 1977. “Zollern 2. Ein technik- und wirtschaftsgeschichtliches Kulturdenkmal.” In Zeche Zollern 2. Aufbruch zur modernen Industriearchitektur und Technik, edited by Bernd Becher, Hans Günther Conrad, and Eberhard G. Neumann, 153–210. Munich:

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Threatened by demolition, Zeche Zollern in 1969 was considered to be in urgent need of documentation. It is however not the only example in the Bechers’ work where photographic documentation just slightly predates the date of demolition. Imminent need for action applied also in the Bechers’ views of Zeche Concordia (Oberhausen, closed 1968), Zeche Hannibal (Bochum-Hofstede, closed 1973), and Zeche Hannover (Bochum, closed 1967 to 1973). In contrast to Zeche Zollern, these three mines were actually demolished, and publications on them appeared around 30 years later.14

Networks and protagonists In 1967, Wend Fischer, director of the Neue Sammlung in Munich, had exhibited the Bechers’ photographs. His introduction to the exhibition reveals the common difficulties that architectural historians have had with industrial buildings. Fischer perceives the photographs as documents that verge on architectural discourse. A winding tower is not to be considered a building, but a piece of machinery.15 Fischer claimed any attempt to preserve such architecture to be hopeless, as the landmark buildings of the industrial revolution were not to be treated as monuments (Kunstdenkmäler).16 Another important solo show that brought the work of the Bechers to public attention ran from January to March 1969 at the Städtische Kunsthalle Düsseldorf. It was during the course of this exhibition that the Bechers were asked to document Zeche Zollern II/IV.17 Entitled “Anonymous Sculptures: A Comparison of the Forms of Industrial Buildings”,18 in the exhibition catalogue the Bechers emphasized the style of architecture as being determined by engineering and

Prestel; Neumann, Eberhard G. 1977. “Zollern 2. Bauentwicklung und kunstgeschichtliche Bedeutung.” In Zeche Zollern 2, edited by Becher, Conrad and Neumann, 211–317. 14 SK-Stiftung Kultur. Photographische Sammlung, ed. 2000. Bernd und Hilla Becher. Zeche Hannibal. Munich: Schirmer/Mosel; Conrath-Scholl, Gabriele, ed. 2007. Bernd und Hilla Becher. Zeche Concordia. Linz: Oberösterreichische Landesmuseen; Conrath-Scholl, Gabriele, ed. 2010. Bernd und Hilla Becher. Zeche Hannover. Munich: Schirmer/Mosel. 15 Fischer, Wend. 1967. Industriebauten 1830–1930. Eine fotografische Dokumentation von Bernd und Hilla Becher. Munich: Die Neue Sammlung. 16 Ibid. 17 See Parent. “‘Maschinen zum Schrottpreis’”, same quotation as in Derenthal. “Zeche Zollern 2”, 256. 18 In the original: Becher, Bernhard, and Hilla Becher, eds. 1969. Anonyme Skulpturen. Formvergleiche industrieller Bauten. Düsseldorf: Städtische Kunsthalle.

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the buildings’ functionality as the basis of their stylistic principle. Karl Ruhrberg, the Kunsthalle’s director, offered a significantly different understanding of the importance of these types of buildings from Fischer. Ruhrberg highlighted photography’s potential to trigger a pang of conscience in the viewer that could help make the case for preservation: “At last, someone has got up and drawn attention to these vital structures so as to vividly preserve them if earmarked for demolition”.19 As Thomas Parent has pointed out, Ruhrberg and his assistant were the driving forces behind the petition against the demolition of Zeche Zollern’s engine hall that was submitted to the Prime Minister in late October 1969. Parent has also stated that broad concern regarding Zeche Zollern II/IV had started to grow since 1966, with Hans Paul Koellmann being another significant player in this regard. Thus, there were overlapping interventions and several protagonists involved. In this context, the Bechers’ photography made an important contribution to further publicity, six months before the petition that was also signed by the Bechers.20

Architectural photography in the 1960s As described, the Zeche Zollern book of 1977 represents a utilization of photography to raise awareness of industrial buildings and industrial heritage. Photographs were understood as visual inventories. When the book was published, the debate to turn the site into a technical museum was still going on. The year 1967 has been identified as a turning point in the Bechers’ methodology.21 At first, most catalogues showed a series of views of a given location arranged sequentially, as seen in the Zeche Zollern book. Early catalogues presented views of industrial landscapes (See Fig. 1). The ensemble of buildings and their spatial relationships determined by modes of production would be depicted and quite often views that included the surroundings or the mine’s environment were presented too.22 As exemplified by the article in Industrial Archaeology of 1969, characteristic types or forms of

19 Ruhrberg, Karl. 1969. “Anonymität als Stilprinzip. Fotos industrieller Bauten von Bernhard und Hilla Becher.” In Anonyme Skulpturen: Formvergleiche industrieller Bauten, edited by Bernhard and Hilla Becher, 3–5. Düsseldorf: Städtische Kunsthalle, 3 (translation by the author). 20 Many of the people who campaigned for the preservation were also members of the German Werkbund. 21 Celant. “Hilla and Bernd Becher.” 22 Adriani, Götz, ed. 1977. Bernhard und Hilla Becher. Typologien industrieller Bauten 1963–1975. XIV. Bienal Internacional de São Paulo: República Federal da Alemanha.

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Fig. 1: Bernd and Hilla Becher, Puits de Courriers No 9.

architectures and structures would be paired up in order to draw visual comparisons. This already involved comparing international examples of structures with similar functions (See Fig. 2). From 1967 onwards, views of buildings would be exclusively grouped as tableaux of similar kinds of forms accompanied by captions indicating where and when each photograph was taken. Later, this information was omitted (See Fig. 3). During the crucial years 1967 to 1970, Bernd Becher received numerous stipends from the Fritz Thyssen Foundation that amounted to the considerable overall sum of around DM 300,000.23 Dr. Ernst Coenen, then chairman of the foundation, also wrote letters of recommendation to open doors for the couple in France.24 These letters would certainly have identified arguments why the foundation and architectural historians considered the Bechers’ photographic documentation of German, French and Belgian mines as valuable. Unfortunately, the correspondence cannot be accessed due to data protection. More

23 Email and telephonic communication with the Fritz Thyssen Stiftung on 25 and 26 January 2018. 24 Confirmed by email.

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Fig. 2: Bernd and Hilla Becher, Gas holder, Iron ore washing plant and Screening plant.

details are also expected to emerge once the private letters and writings from the Bechers’ estate become accessible.25 During the time the Bechers received support, the Fritz Thyssen Foundation also commenced a massive program on the subject of 19th-century art. Willy Weyres, professor at RWTH Aachen, was influential in promoting this program and, like Coenen, a dedicated supporter of the Bechers’ work. One of the outcomes of the Bechers’ fellowship was the 1971 book The Architecture of Winding and Water Towers: Nineteenth-Century Industrial Architecture (See Fig. 4).26 In addition to the Bechers’ photographs, it featured two doctoral theses that provide insights into the then new topic of industrial buildings in architectural history: one on the evolution of the winding tower and the other on requirements

25 The written material is not currently accessible and has first to be sorted through by the family; confirmed via email of 13 October 2017 from Gabriele Conrath-Scholl of the Die Photographische Sammlung/SK Stiftung Kultur der Sparkasse Köln Bonn. 26 In the German original: “Die Architektur der Förder- und Wassertürme: Industriearchitektur des 19. Jahrhunderts”.

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Fig. 3: Bernd and Hilla Becher, Water towers.

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Fig. 4: Bernd and Hilla Becher, Graf Bismarck.

for and enhancements to water towers.27 It is worth recalling that the 1977 book on Zeche Zollern was published in the same series.28 I want to discuss the intersection of photography and its architectural employment a little further. As clarified by the 1971 book, the Bechers’ photographs continued to serve as illustrations highlighting evolutions in construction across different historical periods and the changing style of industrial buildings. In this regard, a series of three reviews, each in separate issues of the magazine Architectural Review, is revealing. A March 1967 review of the Bechers’ images of water towers, for example, pointed out distinctions in the towers’ construction by repeating the information that the Bechers provided;29 as did the second article as well as the third.30 For a trade journal, this comes as a surprise. All three reviews present the Bechers’ work as documenting a succession of styles in industrial

27 Schönberg, Heinrich. 1971. “Die technische Entwicklung der Fördergerüste und –türme des Bergbaus.” In Die Architektur der Förder- und Wassertürme. Industriearchitektur des 19. Jahrhunderts. Studien zur Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts, edited by Bernd and Hilla Becher, Fritz-ThyssenStiftung, Arbeitskreis Kunstgeschichte, 245–324. Munich: Prestel; Werth, Jan. 1971. “Ursachen und technische Voraussetzungen für die Entwicklung der Wasserhochbehälter.” In Die Architektur der Förder- und Wassertürme, edited by Becher et al., 325–428. 28 Becher, Bernhard, Hilla Becher, and Hans G. Conrad, eds. 1971. Zeche Zollern 2. Aufbruch zur modernen Industriearchitektur u. Technik; Entstehung u. Bedeutung e. Musteranlage in Dortmund um die Jahrhundertwende. Munich: Prestel. 29 Anonymous. 1967. “Water Towers.” Architectural Review 141: 227–230, 228. 30 Anonymous. 1968. “Pithead Archaeology.” Architectural Review 143: 155–157, 156; Anonymous. 1968. “Wooden Colling Towers.” Architectural Review 143: 472–476, 473.

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architecture resulting from technological enhancements. The aesthetics of the photographs were not discussed at all. The focus remained on the images’ novelty in shedding light on the evolution or genesis of industrial forms. The emergence of the Bechers’ work into the public sphere also took place at the very moment when architectural historians and industrial archaeologists started publishing initial primers categorizing industrial buildings. Rainer Slotta’s Technische Denkmäler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland, published in 1975, is to be mentioned here,31 among other publications.32 These primers used single photographs to provide a visual impression of a given site or to put it simply: they merely served as illustration. None of the primers made use of photographs as sources of comparison. Meanwhile, the three Architectural Review articles suggest a lack of knowledge on the part of the reviewers, explaining why architects were fascinated with the Bechers’ photographs. By traveling to and researching the sites themselves, the Bechers were a step ahead. Moreover, their photographs opened a new field of expertise by offering visual information on mines in different regions and periods. Despite generally being understood as illustrations, the Bechers’ photographs have supported and even enabled the recognition of different forms of industrial architecture. A 1973 review was the first to point out the similarity between the Bechers’ typologies and the art historical methodology used to analyze forms founded upon works such as Heinrich Wölfflin’s slide projections and his reflections on the impact of photographic reproduction on art history.33 In 1969, Thomas Grochowiak, then director of the Ruhrfestspiele Recklinghausen, praised the Bechers for directing the audience’s attention to peculiar

31 Slotta, Rainer. 1975. Technische Denkmäler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bochum: Deutsches Bergbau-Museum. 32 In his survey on industrial heritage preservation, Axel Föhl points to a publication of 1972 edited by the Rheinisches Denkmalamt in Bonn as the first of its kind. See Föhl, Axel. 2015. “Industriedenkmalpflege im 20. Jahrhundert.” Accessed January 23, 2018. http://denkmalpraxismo derne.de/industriedenkmalpflege-im-20-jahrhundert/. Also see Landeskonservator Rheinland, ed. 1972. Technische Kulturdenkmäler. Arbeitersiedlungen 1. Bonn: Landschaftsverband Rheinland; Lehmann, Klaus Michael, and E. G. Neumann, eds. 1975. Industrie-Architektur in Westfalen. Zeugen der Technikgeschichte. Münster: Vereinigung Westfäl. Museen; Günter, Roland. 1975. Oberhausen. Die Denkmäler des Rheinlandes. Düsseldorf: Schwann; Föhl, Axel. 1976. Technische Denkmale im Rheinland. Köln et al.: Rheinland-Verlag; Drebusch, Günter. 1976. IndustrieArchitektur. München: Heyne. 33 Masheck, Joseph. 1973. “Unconscious Formalism. A Response to André’s Note on the Bechers.” Artforum 11, no. 7: 74–75. Quoted here after Derenthal. “Zeche Zollern 2”, 256.

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architectural objects that even experts were yet to fully understand.34 He ended with a plea to preserve industrial sites: “I am certain: whoever has seen the photographic series of Bernhard and Hilla Becher now has a different way of seeing when walking or driving through an industrial area. We should try by all means to preserve this visual pleasure for our successors”.35 In this respect, the Bechers’ photographs helped to make the preservation case, though their artistic intention was never identical with that of industrial archaeology.

Conclusion This chapter could have ended by bringing to attention that the Bechers’ photographs enabled architectural historians and future industrial archaeologist to recognize and study the evolution of water and winding towers. In this regard, the strength of the Bechers’ photographs is not based on what one single photograph depicts, but how a group of views can be used to compare objects time transcendingly. The Bechers’ work started in the unsettled and volatile years between the outbreak of the coal crises in 1958 and its climax in 1968, between “boom” and “bust”, or “crisis” at the very least. It offers a testimony to a growing awareness of these sites as “heritage” and photography’s potential to preserve and enhance knowledge. Pictures by other photographers of the same period and area suggest a totally different perspective. The photographs of Josef Stoffels still convey a notion of boom in the hard coal industry after World War Two. In this pictorial example, Stoffel’s view of Zeche Graf Bismarck’s winding tower (demolished in 1968) – contrary to the Bechers’ photograph – offers an impression of an industrial landscape that is still prospering (See Fig. 5).36 Photographer Anton Tripp has in turn portrayed the social distress and political upheaval among discharged miners and recorded the workers’ perspective. Here, a view of the demonstration against the closure of Zeche Graf Bismarck in 1966 can be seen (See Fig. 6).

34 Grochowiak, Thomas. 1969. “Über eine noch nicht zu späte Erkenntnis.” In Anonyme Skulpturen, edited by Bernhard and Hilla Becher, 6–8, 8. 35 Ibid., 8. 36 The photographs were printed in Stoffel’s survey of 1959. Hermann, W., and Josef Stoffels, eds. 1959. Die Steinkohlenzechen. Das Gesicht der Übertageanlagen in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahrhunderts. Essen: Industriedruck AG, 136.

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Fig. 5: Josef Stoffels, Graf Bismarck.

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Fig. 6: Anton Tripp: Letzte Schicht auf der Zeche Graf Bismarck, Schachtanlage 1/4, Gelsenkirchen, 29. September 1966. Miners with black flags as a sign of protest against the closure next to the last mine car.

These examples demonstrate, that a photographer’s perspective and personal intention is crucial in order to understand photographic meaning. The Bechers’ photographs certainly are no representation of mining, but they helped to spark the institutionalization of industrial heritage. In 1971, Ulrich Greiner, in his article in the daily FAZ, severely criticized the Bechers’ work for neglecting any social and political aspects of the mining industry and accused them of suppression and concealment.37 Later authors have emphasized the ahistorical nature of the Bechers’ typologies.38 In particular, this is related to the moment they started to leave out the dates and places where and when the pictures had been taken. Indeed, the Bechers’ later work to a certain degree is ahistorical. However, it certainly has a political notion. First, it prompted and argued for immediate action. Second, in comparison to other timely representations of mining or representations of miners its focus on buildings rather than

37 Greiner, Ulrich. 1971. “Ein Förderturm ist ein Förderturm. Die Entdeckung technischindustrieller Bauten durch die Kunstfotografie.” FAZ November 6, 1971, 28. 38 Glasenapp, Jörn. 2006. “Die Familie der Fördertürme oder: Bernd und Hilla Bechers fotografischer Neoplatonismus.” Fotogeschichte 26, no. 100: 3–8, 6.

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on human labor avoided contributing to the highly politically and ideologically charged connotations that mining imagery provided during and after World War Two.

References Adriani, Götz, ed. 1977. Bernhard und Hilla Becher. Typologien industrieller Bauten 1963–1975. XIV. Bienal Internacional de São Paulo: República Federal da Alemanha. Anonymous. 1967. “Water Towers.” Architectural Review 141: 227–30. Anonymous. 1968. “Pithead Archaeology.” Architectural Review 143: 155–7. Anonymous. 1968. “Wooden Colling Towers.” Architectural Review 143: 472–6. Anonymous. 1969. “Die Entdeckung des Jahres.” Bauwelt 60, no. 21, illustrated with photographs by D. Hagenbach: 735–9. Becher, Bernhard, and Hilla Becher, eds. 1969. Anonyme Skulpturen. Formvergleiche industrieller Bauten. Düsseldorf: Städtische Kunsthalle. Becher, Bernhard, Hilla Becher, and Hans G. Conrad, eds. 1971. Zeche Zollern 2. Aufbruch zur modernen Industriearchitektur u. Technik; Entstehung u. Bedeutung e. Musteranlage in Dortmund um die Jahrhundertwende. Munich: Prestel. Becher, Hilla. 1969. “Documenting Industrial History by Photography.” Industrial Archaeology: The Journal of the History of Industry and Technology 5: 373–7. Buchloh, Benjamin H. D. 1997. “Warburgs Vorbild? Das Ende der Collage/Fotomontage im Nachkriegseuropa.“ In Deep Storage. Arsenale der Erinnerung; Sammeln, Speichern, Archivieren in der Kunst, edited by Ingrid Schaffner, and Matthias Winzen, 50–60. München: Prestel. Celant, Germano. 1974. “Hilla and Bernd Becher: Archaelogical-Industrial Monuments and the Perception of Anonymous Sculpture.” In Bernd and Hilla Becher, edited by La Jolla Museum of Contemporary Art, w.p. San Diego: La Jolla Museum of Contemporary Art. Conrad, Hans Günther. 1977. “Zollern 2. Ein technik- und wirtschaftsgeschichtliches Kulturdenkmal.” In Zeche Zollern 2. Aufbruch zur modernen Industriearchitektur und Technik, edited by Bernd Becher, Hans Günther Conrad, and Eberhard G. Neumann, 153–210. Munich: Prestel. Conrath-Scholl, Gabriele, ed. 2007. Bernd und Hilla Becher. Zeche Concordia. Linz: Oberösterreichische Landesmuseen. Conrath-Scholl, Gabriele, ed. 2010. Bernd und Hilla Becher. Zeche Hannover. Munich: Schirmer/Mosel. Derenthal, Ludger. 2003. “Die Dokumentation der Zeche Zollern 2. Arbeiten an der Grenze zur Typologie.” In Bernd & Hilla Becher. Typologien industrieller Bauten, edited by Armin Zweite, and Bernd Becher, 253–62, Munich: Schirmer/Mosel. Drebusch, Günter. 1976. Industrie-Architektur. München: Heyne. Fischer, Wend. 1967. Industriebauten 1830–1930. Eine fotografische Dokumentation von Bernd und Hilla Becher. Munich: Die Neue Sammlung. Föhl, Axel. 1976. Technische Denkmale im Rheinland. Köln et al. Rheinland-Verlag. Föhl, Axel. 2015. “Industriedenkmalpflege im 20. Jahrhundert.” Accessed January 23, 2018. http://denkmalpraxismoderne.de/industriedenkmalpflege-im-20-jahrhundert/.

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Glasenapp, Jörn. 2006. “Die Familie der Fördertürme oder: Bernd und Hilla Bechers fotografischer Neoplatonismus.” Fotogeschichte 26, no. 100: 3–8. Greiner, Ulrich. 1971. “Ein Förderturm ist ein Förderturm. Die Entdeckung technischindustrieller Bauten durch die Kunstfotografie.” FAZ November 6, 1971, 28. Grochowiak, Thomas. 1969. “Über eine noch nicht zu späte Erkenntnis.” In Anonyme Skulpturen. Formvergleiche industrieller Bauten, edited by Bernhard and Hilla Becher, 6–8. Düsseldorf: Städtische Kunsthalle. Günter, Roland. 1975. Oberhausen. Die Denkmäler des Rheinlandes. Düsseldorf: Schwann. Heckert, Virginia. 1987. “A Photographic Archive in Industrial Architecture. The Work of Bernd and Hilla Becher.” Master Thesis, University of California, Santa Barbara. Hermann, W., and Josef Stoffels, eds. 1959. Die Steinkohlenzechen. Das Gesicht der Übertageanlagen in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahrhunderts. Essen: Industriedruck AG. Honnef, Klaus. 1975. “Die Arbeit des Fotografen.” In Bernd und Hilla Becher: Fotografien 1957 bis 1975, edited by Rheinisches Landesmuseum, 7–42. Bonn: Rheinisches Landesmuseum. Landeskonservator Rheinland, ed. 1972. Technische Kulturdenkmäler. Arbeitersiedlungen 1. Bonn: Landschaftsverband Rheinland. Lange, Susanne. 1998. “Die Industriephotographie von Bernd und Hilla Becher. Eine monografische Untersuchung vor dem Hintergrund entwicklungshistorischer Zusammenhänge.” PhD diss., Goethe-University Frankfurt (Main). Lehmann, Klaus Michael, and E. G. Neumann, eds. 1975. Industrie-Architektur in Westfalen. Zeugen der Technikgeschichte. Münster: Vereinigung Westfäl. Museen. Masheck, Joseph. 1973. “Unconscious Formalism. A Response to André’s Note on the Bechers.” Artforum 11, no. 7: 74–5. Matschoss, Conrad, ed. 1932. Technische Kulturdenkmale. München: Bruckmann. Neumann, Eberhard G. 1977. “Zollern 2. Bauentwicklung und kunstgeschichtliche Bedeutung.“ In Zeche Zollern 2. Aufbruch zur modernen Industriearchitektur und Technik, edited by Bernd Becher, Hans Günther Conrad, and Eberhard G. Neumann, 211–317. Munich: Prestel. Parent, Thomas. 2004. “Die Entdeckung des Jahres 1969: Zur Geschichte der Maschinenhalle der Zeche Zollern II/IV und zur Frühgeschichte der Technischen Denkmalpflege in Nordrhein-Westfalen.” In Technikgeschichte im Ruhrgebiet – Technikgeschichte für das Ruhrgebiet, edited by Manfred Rasch, and Dietmar Bleidick, 155–76. Essen: Klartext. Parent, Thomas. 2006. “‘Maschinen zum Schrottpreis’: Interessenkonflikt in den Pionierjahren der Industriekultur am Beispiel der Zeche Zollern II/IV (1970–73).” In Technik, Arbeit und Umwelt in der Geschichte. Günter Bayerl zum 60. Geburtstag, edited by Torsten Meyer, and Marcus Popplow, 405–24. Münster: Waxmann. Ruhrberg, Karl. 1969. “Anonymität als Stilprinzip. Fotos industrieller Bauten von Bernhard und Hilla Becher.” In Anonyme Skulpturen: Formvergleiche industrieller Bauten, edited by Bernhard and Hilla Becher, 3–5. Düsseldorf: Städtische Kunsthalle. Schönberg, Heinrich. 1971. “Die technische Entwicklung der Fördergerüste und –türme des Bergbaus.” In Die Architektur der Förder- und Wassertürme. Industriearchitektur des 19. Jahrhunderts. Studien zur Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts, edited by Bernd and Hilla Becher, Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung, Arbeitskreis Kunstgeschichte, 245–324. Munich: Prestel. SK-Stiftung Kultur. Photographische Sammlung, ed. 2000. Bernd und Hilla Becher. Zeche Hannibal. Munich: Schirmer/Mosel.

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Slotta, Rainer. 1975. Technische Denkmäler in der Bundesrepublik Deutschland. Bochum: Deutsches Bergbau-Museum. Werth, Jan. 1971. “Ursachen und technische Voraussetzungen für die Entwicklung der Wasserhochbehälter.” In Die Architektur der Förder- und Wassertürme. Industriearchitektur des 19. Jahrhunderts. Studien zur Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts, edited by Bernd and Hilla Becher, Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung, Arbeitskreis Kunstgeschichte, 325–428. Munich: Prestel.

Malte Helfer

The legacy of coal mining – A view of examples in France and Belgium Following the end of coal mining in Belgium (1992) and France (2004), 2018 marks the end of hard coal mining in Germany as well. This contribution looks at the legacy of coal mining of Germany’s French-speaking neighbours and presents the most important remaining coal mining heritage sites as well as some extraordinary converted sites in France and the Belgian province of Wallonia.

Fig. 1: Closing of the French, Belgian, Dutch and German hard coal mining basins.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-016

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France Nord Pas-de-Calais As a result of the severe damage and destruction during the Second World War, nearly all French coalmines were nationalised in 1946. The state company Charbonnages de France (CdF) was founded, and in the different districts subsidiaries were set up. In Nord-Pas-de-Calais, the most important French coal basin where coal mining dates back to the end of the 17th century, 18 companies were merged to form the state company Houillères du bassin du Nord et du Pas-de-Calais (HBNPC). The basin consisted of the very small Picard district (1692–1949), as well as the large districts Nord (1716–1990) and Pas-de-Calais (1841–1990). Mining peaked in 1959 at 59 million tons with 360,000 employees. The recession began in the early 1960s with the adoption of the Jeanneney plan. In 1990, pit 9 in Escarpelle and pit 10 in Oignies were the last mines of the basin to close.1 In 2012, UNESCO added the Nord-Pas-de-Calais coal basin, including 353 properties at 109 individual sites, to its World Cultural Heritage list.2 The five most important sites of the basin are the four best-preserved former mines as well as one of the oldest mining settlements in the area.

The historic mining centre in Lewarde Located in Lewarde, near Douai, is the central mining museum of the basin NordPas-de-Calais and the most important one in France. It opened in 1984 on the site of the Delloye pit. The mine was closed in 1971 and was selected two years later by the state mining company to host a future mine museum, even though mining in the basin continued for another 20 years. It was selected thanks to its location in the centre of the coalfield and because it was representative of the interwar period. When the other pits closed one by one, material and documents went to Lewarde; such was the origin of a documentary resource centre for three centuries of mining history in the north, with a collection of 7,000 pieces of work, 550,000 photographic documents and more than 500 films.

1 Debrabant, Virginie. 2007. Les trois âges de la mine: De l’apogée au déclin, vol. 3: 1914–1990. Lille: La Voix du Nord. 2 UNESCO. 2012. “Nord-Pas de Calais Mining Basin.” Accessed December 8, 2017. https:// whc.unesco.org/en/list/1360/.

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Fig. 2: The Historic Mining Centre in Lewarde is the most important coalmining museum in France.

In 1982, the Mining History Centre Association was created, comprising the French Ministry of Culture, the Nord-Pas de Calais Regional Council, the Nord Departmental Council and the state company HBNPC. Today the mining museum has 150,000 visitors per year. It presents the installations of a pit of the interwar period and has reconstructed galleries on the surface with a simulation of a shaft ride. Furthermore, there is a cultural centre on present and future energies.3

Pithead 11-19 in Loos-en-Gohelle, city of Lens The small town of Lens was an important coal mining town with several mines, the last of which closed in 1986. The pithead 11-19 in Loos-en-Gohelle, a quarter in the North of the city of Lens, forms an important ensemble consisting of the mine pit with a headframe from the 1920s and a concrete extraction tower from 1960, the only one of its kind preserved in this basin. A mining town, characterised by art deco architecture, and two massive heaps at a height of 186m, among the highest in Europe, complete the ensemble. The site has been developed as a reference point for sustainable development since 2000. It houses the Centre for Environmental Initiatives Chaîne des Terrils (slag heap chain) and some other environmental institutions and initiatives.

3 Centre historique minier Lewarde. “Le plus important musée de la mine en France.” Accessed December 8, 2017. http://www.chm-lewarde.com.

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Pithead 9-9bis in Oignies The 9-9bis site in Oignies is dedicated to music and logistics. It hosts a major concert hall, with further plans to establish recording studios, rehearsal rooms, residences and seminar rooms for the education of musicians. Near this cultural and musical centre, the Logistics Campus, a technological training centre, has been developed.

Pithead Arenberg in Wallers: Film and image industries The three mining towers and the impressive architecture of the Arenberg pithead, the mining towns and their facilities (school, church, party hall) form the fourth important ensemble. Three years after its closure in 1989, Claude Berri’s film Germinal, based on the famous novel by Emile Zola, was shot at the site, and since then it has become a popular location for cinematic productions. It is destined to become an economic pole dedicated to the film, television and image industries.

Cité des Électriciens in Bruay-La-Buissière Cité des Électriciens (The city of electricians) in Bruay-La-Buissière is one of the oldest mining towns of the basin, was built in 1856, and completely renovated in 2013. It is destined to become, in addition to the rehabilitated housing, a cultural and tourist centre, an artists’ residence and a research and interpretation centre on the habitat and mining landscapes of the basin.4

The Louvre Lens – Example of a cultural conversion The following two examples are not heritage sites, but remarkable former coal mining sites. In 2012, just 500 metres away from site 11-19, at pit 9, in the middle of the mining city of Lens, with a population of 40,000, a spectacular event happened: The Louvre museum opened its first satellite branch, the Louvre-

4 Mission bassin minier Nord-Pas de Calais. 2012. “Bassin minier Nord-Pas de Calais patrimoine mondial – Reconversion des grands sites.” Accessed December 15, 2017. http://www.bassinmin ier-patrimoinemondial.org/les-cinq-grands-sites-de-memoire/.

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Lens. In the heart of the abandoned coal basin, Japanese architects created an ultramodern museum building. It is a lighthouse project, with an investment of more than 100 million euros, that is focused on bringing high culture and visitors to this declining region, improving the industrial north’s economy, as well as relieving the crowded Louvre in Paris. When announcing the selection of Lens for the Louvre branch, France’s Prime Minister Jean-Pierre Raffarin said the move came in recognition of “what this region has given our country and what this country owes to this region”.

Fig. 3: The Louvre Lens – example of a successful cultural conversion of a former coal mine site.

Lens was chosen from a shortlist of six cities in the coal basin, because it was the least cultural place, the only cultural element being the local football team. There was hope for a kind of Bilbao effect, and the Louvre-Lens is a success story: In its first year it had 900,000 visitors. Now, around half a million visitors per year come to Lens to see the exhibitions, among them 60,000 from the coal basin, thus reaching the local population too.5

Loisinord, Noeux-les-mines – Example of a leisure site conversion In 1996, on the tip of Noeux-les-mines, a ski slope was installed. A synthetic carpet allows it to be used all year round. Two ski lifts carry 30,000 skiers and

5 Gentleman, Amelia. 2004. “Lens puts new angle on the Louvre”. The Guardian, December 1, 2004.

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snowboarders per year, two-thirds during the winter, to the top of the 74 metrehigh heap. While its success is only mediocre, the second part is much more successful: Just a few steps from the ski slope, an artificial lake with a nautical base has been set up for summer sports.

Centre-Midi In the south of France, numerous mining companies in many minor coal basins, some of which were very small and scattered throughout the South, were nationalised in 1946, and then merged in 1969 with the state company Houillères du bassin Centre-Midi (HBCM), based in St. Etienne. The largest of these basins were Loire, with a total production of 600 million tons of coal, and Cévennes with 200 million tons. The last mine of the basin, Gardanne in Provence, closed in 2003. The four mine museums created here are only of local or regional importance.

Lorraine The Lorraine basin is the continuation of the Saar basin to the west. Coal mining was not successful before 1856 because of an overburden of water-bearing sandstone. During nationalisation in 1946, all companies of the basin were incorporated in the state company Houillères du Bassin de Lorraine (HBL). The basin reached its production peak with over 15 million tons in 1964 with around 40,000 employees. A total of 850 million tons were produced in the Lorraine basin overall. In 2004, the La Houve mine was the last French coal mine to close.

Musée les Mineurs Wendel The Carreau Wendel site in Petite-Rosselle is the most complete pit head in France and one of the three French anchor points of the European Industrial Heritage Road. The No. 2 shaft headframe is the oldest metal headframe in the basin and was classified as a historical monument in 1998. In 1985, the association Centre de Culture Scientifique, Technique et Industrielle du Bassin Houiller Lorrain (CCSTI) was created. The target was to unite local heritage conservation associations and cultural initiatives in the basin and authorities from all political levels, from the communes to the state, in order to save the industrial heritage of the basin and to develop culture and tourism in the declining region. In 1988, this association was

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entrusted with the small Vuillemin pit, and later became the driving force for the development of a mining museum at the Carreau Wendel site. The Wendel mine stopped in 1989. Two years later the decision was made to build a coal mine museum for Lorraine on this site. It opened in 2006 and demonstrates the mining techniques used in Lorraine in flat, sloped and steep seams.6

Belgium Wallonia Belgian coal reserves are divided into two major deposits: the huge Walloon coal belt and the Campine district in Flanders, which joins the Dutch Limburg and the German Aachen coal districts. Walloon coal mining dates back to the 11th century. When the early Industrial Revolution crossed from England to the continent, Wallonia was the first region affected. The introduction of the steam engine (Newcomen) in 1720, only eight years after the very first one in England, and 80 years earlier than in the Ruhr region, allowed for early advances into the depths. In the middle of the 19th century, with access to superregional markets, first by canals and later by a rapidly growing railway network, the Borinage in western Wallonia became the most important coal mining area of the continent. The other Walloon basins took off later, from west to east: following the Borinage were the Centre, the Pays Noir around Charleroi and finally Liège, where the upturn did not start until 1830. The first wave of decommissioning came about in the wake of the global economic crisis of 1929/30. After the Second World War, production peaked a second time in the so-called coal battle in the early 1950s. However, due to unfavourable storage conditions, a consequent mechanisation was not possible. The European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC) Treaty from 1951 exposed expensive Walloon coal to competition with its neighbouring countries, and the next wave of closures began. The coal crisis forced further rationalisation and closure of most of the Walloon mines from 1957 onwards, the last of which was Sainte Catherine du Roton in 1984. In the Campine or Limburg districts in Flanders, on the other hand, where coal was only discovered at the beginning of the

6 Guiollard, Pierre-Christian et al. 2001. Les chevalements des houillères françaises. Fichous: Guiollard; Musée les Mineurs Wendel. “Musée les Mineurs Wendel.” Accessed December 10, 2017. http://www.musee-les-mineurs.fr.

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20th century, conditions for mechanisation were more favourable, and the last Flemish mine, Zolder, continued working until 1992.7 In Wallonia, there were over 400 mines with far more than a thousand shafts in 1850, but if one crosses the Walloon coal belt today, it is difficult to find even one old winding tower. The former landmarks shaping the rural scenery just disappeared. Only very few of these most characteristic of all the remains of mining have survived to the present day. In most cases, only memorial stones bear witness to the former shafts. It is only at a second glance that you realise that you are in what was once a huge coal district with half a million miners: the countless miners’ houses or settlements, most of which have been more or less transformed, and the stockpile chain with hundreds of peaks, representing powerful landscape markers in a territory with very low relief. The chain stretches not only over 200 kilometres across the whole of Wallonia, but also continues to the west until the Monts d’Artois in northern France and to the east to the German coal basin of Aachen. In each of the Belgian coal basins a museum site has been set up, in the Couchant de Mons/Borinage at Grand Hornu, in the Centre at Bois-du-Luc, in the Pays Noir at Bois du Cazier, in the Liège basin at Blegny-Mine, and at Beringen in the Flemish Campine basin. Since 2012, the four Walloon museum sites have formed the World Heritage Site “Major Mining Sites of Wallonia”.8

Couchant de Mons basin Grand Hornu Grand-Hornu is a former mining complex of the workers’ housing estate west of Mons in the Couchant de Mons basin (Borinage) in the Walloon province of Hainaut. The emblematic neo-classical complex is an unusual architectural testimony to the early Walloon mining industry. In 1810, the French industrialist Henri De Gorge acquired the concession and expanded the mine. He developed a large architectural project with a model workers’ housing estate – 70 years before the idea of the garden city in England – in order to attract and retain

7 Helfer, Malte. 2008. “Aufschwung und Niedergang des Steinkohlenbergbaus in der Großregion SaarLorLux.” GR-Atlas – Atlas der Großregion SaarLorLux, Vol. 4. Luxemburg: Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Luxembourg. 8 UNESCO. 2012. “Major Mining Sites of Wallonia.” Accessed December 8, 2017. https:// whc.unesco.org/en/list/1344/.

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workers. He died one year after the completion in 1831. Grand Hornu at that time produced around 120,000 tons a year with 1,500 employees. (a)

(b)

Fig. 4: (a) Courtyard and main entrance to the central Grand-Hornu complex, built by Henri de Gorge between 1810 and 1830. (b): Main entrance to the central Grand-Hornu complex (Painting: Edwin Toovey, 1852).

Surrounded by a large oval courtyard within a large square, the steam engine workshop, various other workshops and warehouses, an iron and copper foundry, a coke oven, a lamp room, stables, a hay warehouse and an administration building, the so-called engineering house, are all grouped together. The central buildings of the mine are surrounded by the workers’ housing estate, one of the oldest in the world, built in 1822. It consists of 425 houses in rows along wide straight paved streets. Each house had a bread oven, a well and a garden. The

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rent consisted of a daily deduction from the weekly wage. In 1829, there were 2,500 inhabitants. Until 1954, all these houses were identical, with the exception of the foreman’s house. The facades were originally yellow with a black base, but only one house in the Rue de Gorge still has this design today. On the left side of the street, you can also see some transformed windows in the basement. Communal facilities supplemented the settlement: a school, a hospital, a festival hall and green areas. The castle, which was completed in 1832 after the death of Henri de Gorge, was never inhabited. It was mainly used for prestigious visits, such as those made by King Leopold I of Belgium in 1832 and 1854. The 12 shafts, which were sunk between 1778 and 1843, the deepest one reaching 998 metres, were spread all over the town. The coal from the various shafts was collected and sorted in situ before it was sold in Belgium and France. There are almost no traces of the pits left today. In 1954, the mine was abandoned as part of the ECSC measures, the workers’ houses were mostly sold to their inhabitants, and in 1969, the decision to demolish the mine was taken. However, nothing happened, and two years later, a local architect bought the remains of the mine in order to save it; he restored some buildings and installed his offices there. Finally, 20 years later, in 1989, the province of Hainaut bought the site and the castle to develop a cultural and seminar centre. Today, there is a museum of design and modern art and a training centre for new technologies, and since 1992 the site has been part of the UNESCO World Heritage list.9

Crachet-Picquery In the Crachet Picquery mine in Frameries near Mons, which closed in 1961, the Parc d’ Aventures Scientifiques was opened in 2000, a technical and scientific adventure youth centre, designed by the world-famous French architect Jean Nouvel.

9 Robert, Yves. 2002. Le Complexe industriel du Grand-Hornu. Paris: Scala.

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Centre basin Bois-du-Luc Bois-du-Luc with the Saint-Emmanuel pit is one of the oldest coal mines in Belgium, located in La Louvière in the heart of the Centre basin. The Société du Grand Conduit et du Charbonnage de Houdeng created in 1685 is one of the oldest examples of a capitalist structure, bringing together miners and bourgeois financiers. In 1779, the company installed a Newcomen fire machine, and in 1846 the society opened the famous Saint-Emmanuel pit. Today, Bois-du-Luc is known in particular for the workers’ town, one of the most notable surviving remnants of industrial paternalism in Belgium. The socio-industrial complex includes the pithead with offices and workshops, the extraction shafts from 1846 with an extraction machine from 1842 and a headframe from 1913, housing all occupational categories, from miners to the director, as well as religious, health, educational and cultural infrastructures. The site is surrounded by several tips. The workers’ town took up the idea of an urbanistic complex at the service of the industry from Grand Hornu. Between 1838 and 1853, the company built 162 workers’ houses. The settlement forms a trapezium shape, divided into four parts by two axes, with the open spaces inside the squares serving as gardens. This urban concept joined many housing units in a limited space, and allowed for the supervision of workers at all times. Self-sufficiency determined the way of life and work: workshops around a courtyard manufactured and repaired what was needed for mining and living.

Fig. 5: Main entrance with “guillotine doors” of Bois-du-Luc.

Social facilities ensured both the well-being and the docility of the workers: With groceries, mills, butcheries, breweries, a hospital, schools and libraries, a

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church, a café, a party hall, and a park, everything needed was on site. While most of the buildings were built in the neo-classical style, the church, hospice, hospital, electric substation and the doors had an eclectic style, influenced by medieval defensive architecture. Numerous leisure activities and services (water distribution, mutual insurance, savings bank) completed the urbanistic work. Bois-du-Luc was the first city to receive electric lighting in Belgium. In 1973, the Société du Bois-du-Luc stopped after 300 years. The SaintEmmanuel pit was already closed in 1959 by the decision of the European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC). The inhabitants of the workers’ town could buy the houses from the Walloon Region, and the National Housing Institute undertook their restoration. In contrast to Grand Hornu, all houses here remained original until today. On the other side, the dilapidated mining part of the site was almost forgotten. But in 1979, thanks to the efforts of Father Robert Pourbaix, descendant of two signers of the contract from 1685, and the Circle of Industrial History and Archaeology of the Hainaut region (CHAI), the site was bought and restored by the state. In 1983, the first Belgian ecomuseum opened in Bois du Luc. It is a museum of life and work in the early industrial era, not only taking in account coal mining, but also the tangible and intangible memories of all early industrial sectors. Soon it will also host the industrial archives of the neighbouring basin, Couchant de Mons (Sauvegarde des Archives Industrielles du Couchant de Mons, SAICOM). Since 2000, visitors have been able to discover all the workings of coal mining, by a route called “Between Man and Machine”. Following a miner’s story, the visitors discover the offices, workshops, and the pithead and end up in the miners’ city in an exceptionally conserved working-class house.10

Fig. 6: Street in the workers’ town of Bois-du-Luc.

10 Bois du Luc. “Ecomusée Bois-du-Luc.” Accessed January 14, 2018. http://www.ecomusee boisduluc.be.

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Pays Noir basin Bois du Cazier In the Pays Noir, the Black Country around Charleroi, the Bois du Cazier mine at Marcinelle dates back to a concession of 1822. It is best known in Belgium as the location of the worst mining disaster which occurred in 1956 and in which 262 miners, more than half of them Italian migrant workers, were killed. Thus, Italian immigration to Belgium stopped, mining safety regulations were revised all across Europe and a Mines Safety Commission was established in Belgium. The disaster was the subject of a 2003 documentary film, “Inferno Below”. The mine closed in 1967. It was listed as a national monument in 1990, and opened as a museum in 2002, dedicated to the catastrophe of 1956, as well as to the history of the region through the industrial revolution. The site features the headframes and several buildings, memorials to the disaster, an industrial museum of the Pays Noir and, furthermore, a glass museum presenting this other important old industry of the region.11

Liège basin Blegny-Mine In the Liège basin, in 1980, the Argentau-Trembleur mine in Blegny was the last one to close. The Province of Liège, and in particular the province governor, has been committed to preserving the site. In 1978, two years before the closure, the conversion was decided upon and in 1980, the Province of Liège bought the site. The first visitors arrived only two months after discontinuation of its use. The museum profits from the combined actions of the Province of Liège, the French community, the Tourist Federation of Liège, the council authorities and two local associations. The ERDF fund contributed to the remodeling of the settings and the setup of a welcome infrastructure. As something special, BlegnyMine gives its visitors access to underground galleries through the original shaft, even though they are only between 30 and 60 metres below ground level.

11 Le Bois du Cazier. “Le Bois du Cazier.” Accessed January 14, 2018. http://www.leboisducaz ier.be.

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The museum welcomes around 100,000 visitors per year, totaling more than 3 million up to the present day.12

Fig. 7: Hasard de Cheratte, Liège basin.

Hasard de Cheratte The coalmine of Hasard de Cheratte in Visé in the Liège coal basin is an extraordinary site. The huge brick extraction tower of 1907, in the style of medieval architecture, was the first of its kind in Belgium as well as the first with electric extraction engines. From the 1950s on, it served only as an aeration shaft until the closing of the mine in 1977. There is a company town from 1925 nearby, consisting of 200 houses with gardens and a castle for the director.13 At the closure of the mine, a regional social housing company purchased and restored the company town. The mine site was sold very cheaply soon after the closure to a real estate developer who began to demolish it. Fortunately, several protection decrees by Belgium and the Walloon region in 1978, 1982 and 1992 prevented the total destruction of the site. The impressive ruins became a very popular playground for so-called urban explorers with dozens of people entering the site over weekends. In 2008, the owner filed for a building permit for the partial demolition of the site to build housing and shops, but the opposition was too strong, and the project was suspended. In 2013, finally, after more than 30 years of controversy between the owners and the authorities, the

12 Blegny-Mine. “Blegny-Mine.” Accessed January 14, 2018. http://www.blegnymine.be. 13 Gaier, Claude. 1988. Huit siècles de houillerie liégeoise. Histoire des hommes et du charbon à Liège. Liège: Perron.

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government expropriated the owner and the site became public. The economic development agency of the Province of Liège is now responsible for developing the site, in a manner respecting the preservation order. In 2017, the rehabilitation of Hasard Cheratte started. Since then, it has been possible to explore the mine buildings using Google Street View. There are also some virtual expositions on the mine on Google Arts and Culture. These are indeed exciting approaches to a virtual documentation of the mine, but they can only complement the physical preservation of the structures.14

References Blegny-Mine. “Blegny-Mine.” Accessed January 14, 2018. http://www.blegnymine.be. Bois du Luc. “Ecomusée Bois-du-Luc.” Accessed January 14, 2018. http://www.ecomuseebois duluc.be. Debrabant, Virginie. 2007. Les trois âges de la mine: De l’apogée au déclin, vol. 3: 1914–1990. Lille: La Voix du Nord. Gaier, Claude. 1988. Huit siècles de houillerie liégeoise. Histoire des hommes et du charbon à Liège. Liège: Perron. Gentleman, Amelia. 2004. “Lens puts new angle on the Louvre”. The Guardian, December 1, 2004. Guiollard, Pierre-Christian et al. 2001. Les chevalements des houillères françaises. Fichous: Guiollard. Helfer, Malte. 2008. “Aufschwung und Niedergang des Steinkohlenbergbaus in der Großregion SaarLorLux.” GR-Atlas – Atlas der Großregion SaarLorLux, Vol. 4. Luxemburg: Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning, University of Luxembourg. Le Bois du Cazier. “Le Bois du Cazier.” Accessed January 14, 2018. http://www.leboisducazier.be. Mission bassin minier Nord-Pas de Calais. 2012. “Bassin minier Nord-Pas de Calais patrimoine mondial – Reconversion des grands sites.” Accessed December 15, 2017. http://www.bassinminier-patrimoinemondial.org/les-cinq-grands-sites-de-memoire/. Morkitu – patrimoine industriel. “Cheratte, le Charbonnage du Hasard.” Accessed January 22, 2018. http://tchorski.morkitu.org/5/cheratte-01.htm. Musée les Mineurs Wendel. “Musée les Mineurs Wendel.” Accessed December 10, 2017. http://www.musee-les-mineurs.fr. Robert, Yves. 2002. Le Complexe industriel du Grand-Hornu. Paris: Scala. UNESCO. 2012. “Major Mining Sites of Wallonia.” Accessed December 8, 2017. https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1344/. UNESCO. 2012. “Nord-Pas de Calais Mining Basin.” Accessed December 8, 2017. https://whc.unesco.org/en/list/1360/.

14 Morkitu – patrimoine industriel. “Cheratte, le Charbonnage du Hasard.” Accessed January 22, 2018. http://tchorski.morkitu.org/5/cheratte-01.htm.

Barry L. Stiefel

Black diamond heritage: A North American study of coal mining preservation In recent decades there has been growing interest in the preservation of the built environment associated with coal mining in parts of Asia, Australia, Europe, and North America. This is in contrast to the past where the focus has been on the negative impacts of coal mining operations threatening to damage or destroy heritage sites. Therefore, this study turns to coal mining areas as a common theme of material culture and cultural landscape worthy for preservation interventions on its own merit. Now that coal mining heritage and associated sites are considered worthy of preservation, what can we learn from the North American examples in Canada and the United States? I have found that there is an emphasis on promoting economic revitalization by local and regional governments through tourism to replace the economic loses of the mining activities lost following the closure of their respective mines. In some instances, there are also issues of socio-cultural and political reconciliation needed due to histories of labour exploitation. Moreover, the cultural landscape of each locality was also irrevocably scarred by the ecological destruction caused by the mining activities, creating profound environmental and social justice issues for the resident population. By assessing the way coal mining heritage sites have been preserved (or not) through the North American experience we can reflect upon what approaches for the preservation of coal-themed heritage could be considered for future applications in other parts of the world, as a contrast to what has been implemented in Europe by national governments and promoted by UNESCO through the World Heritage Convention programme.

Contextualizing the preservation of mining heritage The bulk of past studies on coal heritage in North America are local and regional histories, such as A Guide to Historic Coal Towns of the Big Sandy River Valley, by George D. Torok, which focuses on this area of Tennessee, in the United States1

1 Torok, George D. 2004. A Guide to Historic Coal Towns of the Big Sandy River Valley. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-017

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as well as King Coal: A Social History of Coal Mining in Alberta, by Khalehla Litschel2 in Canada. In 2011, Michael V. Conlin and Lee Jolliffe co-edited Mining Heritage and Tourism, which includes multiple chapters that touch on the subtopic of coal mining in Canada, Vietnam, and the United Kingdom. In their edited volume, Conlin and Jolliffe prompted an academic discussion on “the conversion of mining valued for industrial purposes to mining valued for its heritage and tourism aspects,” which sets it apart from traditional histories strictly about mining. A number of journal articles have also been produced on the topic. One of significant interest to this study was Henry Cleere’s “The World Heritage Convention As a Medium for Promoting the Industrial Heritage”, which was published in 2000 by IA: The Journal of the Society for Industrial Archaeology.3 This article conducts a review of UNESCO World Heritage recognition of industrial heritage up until that point, ending with the Blaenavon Industrial Landscape in the United Kingdom, which was the first coal-based site to make the World Heritage List. As can be seen, the scholarly interest in studying the preservation of coal-related heritage has been a phenomenon of the twenty-first century. The preservation of coal mining heritage is an extension of industrial heritage, which informally began in the early twentieth century. By 1920 The Newcomb Society was established as “the oldest society in the world specialising in the history of engineering and technology” in the United Kingdom, along with the biannually published International Journal for the History of Engineering and Technology.4 Multiple regional chapters of this organization were founded, including one in the United States by 1923. After World War II industrial heritage became more formally documented and preserved through academic-based and government heritage conservation programs. In 1955, British archaeologist Michael Rix coined the term “industrial archaeology,” and a series of conferences specific to the topic occurred over the subsequent years. In 1963 the National Survey of Industrial Monuments was established in the United Kingdom.5 The United States also created a separate division of the heritage documentation program, the Historic American Engineering Record in 1969, based on the original

2 Litschel, Khalehla. 2018. King Coal: A Social History of Coal Mining in Alberta. Vicoria, BC: Friesen Press. 3 Cleere, Henry. 2000. “The World Heritage Convention As a Medium for Promoting the Industrial Heritage.” IA. The Journal of the Society for Industrial Archaeology 26, no. 2: 31–42. 4 The Newcomen Society. 2011. “The Newcomen Society for the Study of the History of Engineering and Technology.” Accessed February 1, 2018. http://www.newcomen.com/. 5 Buchanan, Angus. 2015. “The Origins and Early History of the AIA.” Accessed February 1, 2018. http://industrial-archaeology.org/about-us/history-of-aia/.

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Historic American Building Survey founded in 1933.6 Other learned societies soon emerged that carried the study of industrial heritage further, including the Society for Industrial Archaeology in the United States in 1971, the Association for Industrial Archaeology in the United Kingdom in 1973, the International Committee for the Conservation of the Industrial Heritage also in 1973, and the Comité d’information et de liaison pour l’archéologie in France in 1979.7 While the institutionalized study and preservation of industrial heritage began in the Anglophone world, spreading to a lesser extent into the Francophone sphere (which is significant in Quebec), there were activities taking place elsewhere. For example, in 1978, Poland’s Wieliczka and Bochnia Royal Salt Mines were among the first grouping of heritage properties listed onto the UNESCO World Heritage List which was a site used for salt extraction from the thirteenth into the twentieth centuries.8 More industrial sites would follow, but not until 2000 was the Blaenavon Industrial Landscape added to the World Heritage List as the first coal miningthemed site. The period of significance of Blaenavon is from the late eighteenth to the twentieth century, which is an approximate reoccurring period of significance at other coal heritage-related sites.9 The shared timeframe for the period of significance of coal mining heritage across the globe is vital for contextualizing how the industrialization of modern civilization occurred across geopolitical boundaries because it was an experience shared by many across the developed world. UNESCO’s Global Strategy of 1994 called for numerous changes to World Heritage policy in order to bring about a better balance of representation. Among the recommendations was the encouragement of industrial heritage listings.10 However, considering that there are several World Heritage Sites associated with coal mining-associated heritage (and growing), as well as many other sites related to industrial heritage as a better represented type of world heritage, this can be seen

6 National Park Service. 2016a. “Historic American Engineering Record (HAER).” Heritage Documentation Programs. Accessed February 1, 2018. https://www.nps.gov/hdp/haer/index.htm. 7 SIA. 2017. “Mission.” Society for Industrial Archeology. Accessed February 1, 2018. http://www. sia-web.org/about/mission/; Martin, Patrick. 2018. “About.” The International Committee for the Conservation of the Industrial Heritage. Accessed February 1, 2018. http://ticcih.org/about/; Le CILAC. 2018. “Qui sommes-nous?” Comité d’information et de liaison pour l’archéologie. Accessed February 1, 2018. http://www.cilac.com/le-cilac-l-association/qui-sommes-nous.html. 8 UNESCO. 2018a. “Wieliczka and Bochnia Royal Salt Mines.” World Heritage List. Accessed February 1, 2018. http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/32. 9 Torfaen County Borough Council and Cadw. 2000. Nomination of the Blaenavon Industrial Landscape for Inclusion in the World Heritage List. Torfaen County, UK: Cadw. 10 UNESCO. 2018b. “Global Strategy.” World Heritage List. Accessed February 1, 2018. http:// whc.unesco.org/en/globalstrategy/.

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as a response by multiple state parties to the Global Strategy in Asia, Australia, and Europe. However, within North America the preservation of coal miningthemed heritage sites began before 1994, and by a more localized-grassroots interest than that by a central government policy or agenda, which continues unto the present. Presently, there are no coal mining-themed heritage sites in Canada or the United States on the World Heritage List, nor on their respective tentative nomination lists for consideration. The citizenry in European countries, as well as Australia and some Asian countries expect their national government to be responsible for the decision-making process, financial support, and stewardship for heritage sites. This is in contrast to Canada and the United States, where the preservation of heritage sites is a prerogative of the private citizen and non-government advocacy organizations formed by the people for such undertakings. Therefore, local, state, and provincial governments are more regularly involved with preservation activities than the federal governments.

Coal mining heritage preservation prior to 1994 in North America The earliest coal-themed site for which North American heritage preservationists appeared to have taken an interest was the Coal Cove archaeological site near Port Graham, Alaska. This interest occurred in 1970 under the Alaska Heritage Resources Survey due to its history as a coal mining operation by the Russian American Company during the mid-nineteenth century. The coal “boom” in Port Graham ended in 1865. In November 1978, Coal Cove was added to the National Register of Historic Places as the Coal Village Site. It took the form of an archaeological site largely left un-interpreted, leaving very little for visitors to experience if or when they came.11 Today, Port Graham is a village of less than two hundred people, which is a popular destination for tourists interested in nature and wildlife, but nothing industrial heritage-related ever evolved to replace the economic vacuum when coal mining ceased. In the following years, additional coal mines would be added to the National Register of Historic Places, including Elkins Coal and Coke Company Historic

11 Kennedy, Michael. 1975–78. “Coal Village Site (AHRS SSITE SEL-021).” National Register of Historic Places Nomination Form. Anchorage, AK: National Park Service.

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District in Preston County, West Virginia in 1983; the Lafayette Coal Mining Era Buildings in Boulder County, Colorado also in 1983; Phillips-Sprague Mine in Raleigh County, West Virginia in 1988; and Pocahontas Exhibition Coal Mine in Tazewell County, Virginia in 1994. The Elkins Coal and Coke Company Historic District and Pocahontas Exhibition Coal Mine were also listed as a National Historic Landmarks, a more distinguished heritage listing within the United States. Today, coal mines and related infrastructure on the National Register of Historic Places can be found scattered across the United States (including Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Missouri, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Utah in addition to the states already mentioned).12 By 1992, industrial-related heritage became so in demand in the United States that the National Park Service published a reference bulletin on “Guidelines for Identifying, Evaluating, and Registering Historic Mining Properties” in order to improve the quality of nominations being made by citizens, local, and state governments.13 This contrasts with the international equivalent guidelines that were not created until decades later, in 2011, the “Joint ICOMOS – TICCIH Principles for the Conservation of Industrial Heritage Sites, Structures, Areas and Landscapes” (also known as The Dublin Principles),14 which most other countries utilize for the preservation of their industrial heritage. The National Register of Historic Places program is jointly administered between the National Park Service and state-level historic preservation offices. Presently, the National Register of Historic Places has more than 96,000 listings so quantifying the number of sites associated with coal mining heritage is challenging but is likely several dozen based on the surveys of the various databases conducted. This contrasts with the more prestigious National Historic Landmark program, which also needs Congressional approval for site designation. Two of the approximate 2,600 landmarks have been verified as associated with coal mining heritage.15

12 National Park Service. 2015. “NP Gallery Digital Asset Search.” National Register of Historic Places. Accessed February 6, 2018. https://www.nps.gov/nhl/find/searchnoms.htm. 13 Noble, Jr. Bruce J., and Robert Spude. 1997. “Guidelines for Identifying, Evaluating, and Registering Historic Mining Properties.” National Register Bulletin. Washington, DC: National Park Service. 14 Joint ICOMOS – TICCIH Principles for the Conservation of Industrial Heritage Sites, Structures, Areas and Landscapes. 2011. Adopted by the 17th ICOMOS General Assembly in Dublin, Ireland. 15 National Park Service. 2016b. National Historic Landmarks Program: List of National Historic Landmarks by State. Washington, DC: Department of the Interior.

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Fig. 1: Rail tracks within the underground passages at the Phillips-Sprague Mine, a restored mine on the National Register of Historic Places open for guided tours, once operated by the Phillips Family in the late 1800s in what is now New River Park in Beckley, West Virginia.

Canada’s recognition of its coal mining past through heritage designation began in 1972 with the creation of Morden Colliery Historic Provincial Park by the British Columbian government. Morden mine on Vancouver Island had been a centre of coal extraction during the 1910s and 1920s. In 2013, Morden Colliery Historic Provincial Park was also bestowed a listing on the Canadian Register of Historic Places.16 Since its establishment in 1972 the provincial government has maintained the four-hectare “small, undeveloped day-use park” as a historical education tool for local visitors and tourists because it “contains the only remaining coal tipple on the Island”.17 In 2003, a non-governmental friends society was established “dedicated to the preservation of the most complete above-ground remains of an historic coal mine on Vancouver Island and the earliest of two such reinforced concrete structures in North America”.18 The Port Graham, Alaska’s Coal Village Site never evolved into a tourist destination. It is at the Morden mine where the earliest encountered instance of the “culturalisation and touristification processes in relict energy landscapes as

16 BC Heritage Branch, and BC Parks. 2018. “Morden Colliery.” Canada’s Historic Places. Accessed February 9, 2018. http://www.historicplaces.ca/en/rep-reg/place-lieu.aspx?id=19592&pid=0. 17 British Columbia Parks. 2018. “About this Park.” Morden Colliery Historic Provincial Park. Accessed February 9, 2018. http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/bcparks/explore/parkpgs/morden/. 18 Larocque, Sandra, and Mike Larocque. 2016. “Friends of the Morden Mine.” Accessed February 9, 2018. http://www.mordenmine.com/.

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well as subsequent reuse”19 in North America took place in relation to the “boom – crisis – heritage” phenomenon related to coal mining. The Port Graham and Morden coal mining sites contrast greatly to other coal mining-related heritage sites where buildings and other features are removed relatively soon after mining operations have ceased, so that there is no opportunity even to rehabilitate neglected industrial archaeology ruins. One such example was Qullissat, Greenland, the only location where coal mining took place on the island from 1924 to 1972. All local inhabitants were relocated elsewhere, and the structures demolished, except for the church that was moved to a nearby town.20 Indeed, Qullissat exemplifies the European prerogative to heritage conservation as being the purview of the central government, which is Denmark. Other Canadian coal mine-related sites were recognized in 1989 with the Atlas Coal as a Provincial Historic Resource by the Alberta government, followed by the Nordegg/Brazeau Collieries Mine Site in 1993. In 1998 the Springhill Coal Mining Site in Nova Scotia was designate as a National Historic Site, expanding Canadian coal mining heritage preservation to its eastern half. The Atlas No. 3 Coal Mine and Nordegg Mine were also elevated to National Historic Sites in 2001, a more esteemed heritage designation. Presently, there are six coal mining-related sites recognized by the Canadian Register of Historic Places, of which half are also National Historic Sites, dispersed across Alberta, British Columbia, and Nova Scotia. On the Canadian Register of Historic Places there are approximately 13,000 properties and 1,000 National Historic Sites.21 The reasons for the heritage recognition of the Coal Village Site and Morden mine in Alaska and British Columbia during the 1970s are multi-fold. One was the “institutionalization of a preservation policy for the tangible remains of the industrial era” during this period, as Torsten Meyer identifies.22 Here, the public wanted to preserve an element of the past as they witnessed their present state of coal mining confront one calamity after another as the carbon-based energy economy reeled from that decade’s Energy Crisis, labour strikes, and mine closures. Saving a piece of the long-gone halcyon days gave hope that better times 19 Meyer, Torsten. 2017. “Boom – Crisis – Heritage: Internationale Fachtagung am DBM.” Deutsches Bergbau-Museum Bochum. Accessed February 9, 2018. https://www.bergbaumu seum.de/de/73-sgm-boom-krise/838-news2017-11-08. 20 Andersen, Astrid, Lars Jensen, and Kirsten Hvenegård-Lassen. 2016. “Qullissat: Historicising and Localising the Danish Scramble for the Arctic.” In Postcolonial Perspectives on the European High North, edited by G. Huggan, and Lars Jensen, 93–116. London: Palgrave Macmillan. 21 Parks Canada. 2017. “National Historic Sites.” Accessed February 9, 2018. https://www.pc. gc.ca/en/lhn-nhs; Parks Canada. 2018. “Canada’s Historic Places.” Accessed February 9, 2018. http://www.historicplaces.ca/en/home-accueil.aspx. 22 Meyer. Boom – Crisis – Heritage.

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could be ahead, and one means of accomplishing this was through localized heritage tourism. Cleaning up industrial heritage sites related to coal extraction and use also fit within another political-sensitive agenda of the 1970s: heightened environmental regulations. Another contributing reason for the inhabitants of both Alaska and British Columbia to take a preservation interest in their coal mining-related historic structures may have been nostalgic interest in each place’s history, coinciding with the passage of significant century anniversary milestones. The year 1967 marked the hundredth anniversary of both Alaska’s purchase by the United States and the founding confederation of Canada; and 1971 was the centenary of British Columbia’s joining the Canadian confederation. As David Lowenthal identified in his 1984 magnum opus, The Past is a Foreign Country: [a]n ordered chronology yields manifold rewards. We celebrate anniversaries, count up the days since important events, and base expectations on calendric regularities. We segment the past into equal or unequal intervals, marking off period in our own lives along with those in other histories. Sequence clarifies, places things in context, underscores the uniqueness of past events, and forms them in into the lineaments of a true landscape. But it remains a landscape we can now observe only from beyond, framed in an inalterably determined temporal grid.23

Lowenthal’s general observations area applicable to the series of events on early coal mining preservation in North America, from the 1970s through the 1990s. Indeed, more coal mining sites across each country were recognized with heritage value after the first precedents in Alaska and British Columbia, because many North Americans identified with the past mining experience that was being strained by the increasing closure of coal mines. The events associated with the preservation of coal mining heritage sites coincided with the late twentieth century’s energy crisis as demand for coal and coal mining slumped into decline. This social phenomenon also appears to reflect Alois Riegl’s theory of age value, where people become increasingly enamoured by things and places as they either become older, rarer, or more exotic – and even more so when these factors combine together.24 Coal mines were becoming older through the progression of time, and rarer as they disappeared due to closure, destruction, and neglect. With the rise of a new generation unfamiliar with the activity of coal mining, these places and artefacts became exotic for a growing number of people that fancied this historical past, which sometimes entailed a familial or neighbourly connection. 23 Lowenthal, David. 1984. The Past is a Foreign Country. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 63, 184. 24 Crane, Susan A. 2000. Collecting and Historical Consciousness in Early Nineteenth-Century Germany. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.

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Expanded coal mining heritage preservation after 1994: A West Virginia example While coal mining-associated heritage sites are located across Canada and the United States, the highest concentration in North America is clustered in the Appalachian Mountain region of West Virginia and the bordering areas of Kentucky, Ohio, Pennsylvania, Tennessee, and Virginia. From the establishment of Morden Colliery Historic Provincial Park in 1972 until the mid 1990s, coal mining heritage preservation and tourism development was exclusively a local endeavour with some provincial or state assistance, and in many instances, it continues to be so. Indeed, despite a high level of heritage designation coal mining-related properties were regularly neglected. A study published in 1997 on the treatment of historic places in West Virginia found Elkins Coal and Coke Company National Historic Landmark District, designated in 1983, to be “overgrown and the remaining structures are in a state of decay”.25 The local appreciation of coal mining-related heritage to one of shared national identity underwent a change in 1996, when the U.S. Congress passed the National Coal Heritage Area Act, adding 5,300 square miles of West Virginia, where coal mining was historically concentrated, to the National Heritage Areas Program.26 Currently, there are 55 National Heritage Areas that are coordinated by non-government entities that partner with the National Park Service on grassroots heritage preservation and economic development through tourism. The significance of the National Coal Heritage Area is that “the history and culture of the area has been shaped by its mountainous terrain and the limited transportation it allowed. The communities of the region today retain much of their original form as coal mining company towns, a form shaped by local traditions, immigrant labourers, and the single-employer social dominance of the coal mining industry. There are few regions of the country where a single enterprise so profoundly influenced local ways”.27 However, according to internal procedures for heritage designation, sites and landscapes only listed as National Heritage Area are not eligible for the country’s tentative list for World Heritage consideration. They must be designated as National Landmarks, National Monuments, or National Parks.

25 Carpenter, Megan M. 1997. Preserving a Place for the Past in Our Future: A Survey of Historic Preservation in West Virginia, 100 W. Va. L. Rev., 423. 26 National Park Service. 2017. “Preserving History.” Coal National Heritage Area West Virginia. Accessed February 12, 2018. https://www.nps.gov/coal/index.htm. 27 Cremin, Dennis H. 2004. “From Heartland to Nation: The National Heritage Area Movement at Twenty.” History News 59, no. 2: 11–15, 11.

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Quantifying how many people visit the various individual coal mining-related historic sites that are networked within the heritage area is difficult due to the number of locations, property management, and ownership within such a large cultural landscape. This is in addition to the numerous monuments and plaques to coal miners and important historic events scattered across West Virginia. At the Canyon Rim Visitor Center managed by the National Park Service as a place of heritage area administration and exhibition, about 300,000 tourists visit a year.28 A major proponent for the National Coal Heritage Area in the U.S. Senate was Jay Rockefeller of West Virginia, who advocated in a news release: “Tourism is such an important part of West Virginia’s economy, creating jobs and enriching people’s lives . . . . Our state has so much to offer, whether it’s a tour of . . . a trip back in time through the Beckley Exhibition Coal Mine,

Fig. 2: The West Virginia Coal Miner statue by sculptor Burl Jones, completed in 2002 at the state capitol in Charleston, West Virginia.

28 National Park Service. 2018. “Canyon Rim Visitor Center.” National Coal Heritage Area. Accessed February 12, 2018. http://www.coalheritage.org/page.aspx?id=29.

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or a day spent fishing on mountain streams in the Monongahela National Forest. These historic, cultural and natural treasures need to be preserved for – and enjoyed by – future generations”.29 But the emphasis on heritage activities for National Heritage Areas continues with coordinated local partnerships, where the federal government only provides resources as a director.

Conclusion As of this moment neither Canada, Mexico, Greenland, nor the United States, has advocated that their coal mining heritage is of outstanding universal value for tentative consideration to the World Heritage List. Thus far, coal mining heritage, as part of world heritage, has been a prerogative of the nations of Europe, Australia, and Asia with Chile in South America just recently taking an interest. This is likely due to a combination of differences in age value for industrial heritage and heritage preservation policies in North America in contrast to Europe, Australia, and Asia. In Canada and the United States heritage preservation activities are generally considered a realm of local and regional government. Combined with an earlier appreciation for industrial heritage in these countries – for the national narratives of both the United States and Canada perceive themselves as being very young countries – it was socially more feasible to accept this type of heritage for preservation, especially at a time of significant anniversary milestones; coupled with the zeitgeist of the 1970s Energy Crisis, which rendered many long-mined coal landscapes obsolete and susceptible to demolition or neglect. Also, due to the differences in governmental approaches and expectations for heritage preservation is why in Europe there is a preference for creating static museums on industrial heritage in contrast to Canada and the United States where (with the exception of archaeological sites) the preference is on the adaptive reuse of places as “living” historic districts.

29 Targeted News Service. 2013. “Rockefeller Says Heritage Area Bill Will Strengthen Tourism, Economic Opportunities in WV.” Infotrac Newsstand. Accessed January 24, 2018. http://link.ga legroup.com/apps/doc/A348490636/STND?u=cofc_main&sid=STND&xid=aeece985.

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References Andersen, Astrid, Lars Jensen, and Kirsten Hvenegård-Lassen. 2016. “Qullissat: Historicising and Localising the Danish Scramble for the Arctic.” In Postcolonial Perspectives on the European High North, edited by G. Huggan, and Lars Jensen, 93–116. London: Palgrave Macmillan. BC Heritage Branch, and BC Parks. 2018. “Morden Colliery.” Canada’s Historic Places. Accessed February 9, 2018. http://www.historicplaces.ca/en/rep-reg/place-lieu.aspx? id=19592&pid=0. British Columbia Parks. 2018. “About this Park.” Morden Colliery Historic Provincial Park. Accessed February 9, 2018. http://www.env.gov.bc.ca/bcparks/explore/parkpgs/morden/. Buchanan, Angus. 2015. “The Origins and Early History of the AIA.” The Association for Industrial Archaeology. Accessed February 1, 2018. http://industrial-archaeology.org/ about-us/history-of-aia/. Carpenter, Megan M. 1997. Preserving a Place for the Past in Our Future: A Survey of Historic Preservation in West Virginia, 100 W. Va. L. Rev. Cleere, Henry. 2000. “The World Heritage Convention As a Medium for Promoting the Industrial Heritage.” IA. The Journal of the Society for Industrial Archaeology 26, no. 2: 31–42. Crane, Susan A. 2000. Collecting and Historical Consciousness in Early Nineteenth-Century Germany. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. Cremin, Dennis H. 2004. “From Heartland to Nation: The National Heritage Area Movement at Twenty.” History News 59, no. 2: 11–5. Joint ICOMOS – TICCIH Principles for the Conservation of Industrial Heritage Sites, Structures, Areas and Landscapes. 2011. Adopted by the 17th ICOMOS General Assembly in Dublin, Ireland. Kennedy, Michael. 1975–78. “Coal Village Site (AHRS SSITE SEL-021).” National Register of Historic Places Nomination Form. Anchorage, AK: National Park Service. Larocque, Sandra, and Mike Larocque. 2016. “Friends of the Morden Mine.” Accessed February 9, 2018. http://www.mordenmine.com/. Le CILAC. 2018. “Qui sommes-nous?” Comité d’information et de liaison pour l’archéologie. Accessed February 1, 2018. http://www.cilac.com/le-cilac-l-association/qui-sommesnous.html. Litschel, Khalehla. 2018. King Coal: A Social History of Coal Mining in Alberta. Victoria, BC: Friesen Press. Lowenthal, David. 1984. The Past is a Foreign Country. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Martin, Patrick. 2018. “About.” The International Committee for the Conservation of the Industrial Heritage. Accessed February 1, 2018. http://ticcih.org/about/. Meyer, Torsten. 2017. “Boom – Crisis – Heritage: Internationale Fachtagung am DBM.” Deutsches Bergbau-Museum Bochum. Accessed February 9, 2018. https://www.bergbaumuseum.de/de/73-sgm-boom-krise/838-news2017-11–08. National Park Service. 2015. “NP Gallery Digital Asset Search.” National Register of Historic Places. Accessed February 6, 2018. https://www.nps.gov/nhl/find/searchnoms.htm. National Park Service. 2016a. “Historic American Engineering Record (HAER).” Heritage Documentation Programs. Accessed February 1, 2018. https://www.nps.gov/hdp/haer/index.htm.

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National Park Service. 2016b. National Historic Landmarks Program: List of National Historic Landmarks by State. Washington, DC: Department of the Interior. National Park Service. 2017. “Preserving History.” Coal National Heritage Area West Virginia. Accessed February 12, 2018. https://www.nps.gov/coal/index.htm. National Park Service. 2018. “Canyon Rim Visitor Center.” National Coal Heritage Area. Accessed February 12, 2018. http://www.coalheritage.org/page.aspx?id=29. The Newcomen Society. 2011. “The Newcomen Society for the Study of the History of Engineering and Technology.” Accessed February 1, 2018. http://www.newcomen.com/. Noble, Jr. Bruce J., and Robert Spude. 1997. “Guidelines for Identifying, Evaluating, and Registering Historic Mining Properties.” National Register Bulletin. Washington, DC: National Park Service. Parks Canada. 2017. “National Historic Sites.” Accessed February 9, 2018. https://www.pc.gc.ca/en/lhn-nhs. Parks Canada. 2018. “Canada’s Historic Places.” Accessed February 9, 2018. http://www.historicplaces.ca/en/home-accueil.aspx. SIA. 2017. “Mission.” Society for Industrial Archeology. Accessed February 1, 2018. http://www.sia-web.org/about/mission/. Targeted News Service. 2013. “Rockefeller Says Heritage Area Bill Will Strengthen Tourism, Economic Opportunities in WV.” Infotrac Newsstand. Accessed January 24, 2018. http://link.galegroup.com/apps/doc/A348490636/STND?u=cofc_main&sid=STND&xid= aeece98. Torfaen County Borough Council and Cadw. 2000. Nomination of the Blaenavon Industrial Landscape for Inclusion in the World Heritage List. Torfaen County, UK: Cadw. Torok, George D. 2004. A Guide to Historic Coal Towns of the Big Sandy River Valley. Knoxville: University of Tennessee Press. UNESCO. 2018a. “Wieliczka and Bochnia Royal Salt Mines.” World Heritage List. Accessed February 1, 2018. http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/32. UNESCO. 2018b. “Global Strategy.” World Heritage List. Accessed February 1, 2018. http://whc.unesco.org/en/globalstrategy/.

Pia Eiringhaus

How industrial heritage became green – Renaturalisation narratives in regional history culture Introduction – The making of industrial nature Until the 1980s, the Ruhr was dominated by images of desolate and depressing landscapes, determining its perception as West Germany’s black and dirty region. During the last decades, this imagery has been changing. Not only were former pits, worker settlements and production buildings transformed into touristic heritage sites, but also industrial landscapes have become internationally representative park complexes, ecological model projects and innovative recreational areas. The Ruhr is now a “green metropolis”, as Essen’s 2017 appointment as European Green Capital and prelude to the Green Decade has impressively demonstrated.1 Every erosion, also the industrial one, has its wonders going beyond birch trees and old brickwork, bushes and dried grasses. The IBA would not be the inventive IBA, if they did not locate also this phenomenon and found a way to derive benefit from it: They call it “industrial nature”.2

This quotation from the exhibition “Other places are beautiful as well”, conceptualised and realised by the Landschaftsverband Rheinland in 1999, shows that the concept of industrial nature plays a vital role for what is understood, communicated and advertised as green metropolis Ruhr. Industrial nature is an ecological term, originally used to describe the new vegetation on industrial production areas.3 The term itself and its main symbolism, however, was coined and shaped by the International Architecture Exhibition at Emscher Park (Internationale Bauausstellung Emscher Park, IBA), a programme for structural changes in the

1 Grüne Hauptstadt Europas Essen. 2017. “Grüne Hauptstadt Europas – Essen 2017 ist voller Erfolg”. Press release from 18 January 2018. Accessed August 11, 2018. https://www.essen.de/ meldungen/pressemeldung_1136992.de.html. 2 Landschaftsverband Rheinland. 1999. “Schön ist es auch anderswo . . .” Fotografien vom Ruhrgebiet 1989–99. Heidelberg: Umschau-Braus Verlag, 10. 3 Oligmüller, Rainer. 2002. “Natur und Landschaft im Wandel. Potenziale, Inwertsetzung, Belastung”. In Die Emscher-Lippe-Region. Kreis Recklinghausen, Stadt Bottrop, Stadt Gelsenkirchen, edited by Heinz Heineberg et al., 9–33. Münster: Aschendorff. In international context see Storm, Anna. 2014. Post-Industrial Landscape Scars. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-018

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Ruhr from 1989 to 1999.4 In this context, it was ascribed multiple symbolic meanings, evolving around semantics of reconquering nature, industrial heritage and smokestack nostalgia, new nature aesthetics and romanticised imagery, and finally greening as the ecological and economic promise of successful structural change. While the extreme development from ecological crisis to environmental heritage is narrated as a straightforward success story from black to green, this chapter aims at historicising this coherent narrative by demonstrating contradictions, ruptures and ambivalences of the region in ecological transition. Considering the decisive role of societal and cultural conceptions of nature, the aim is, first, to reveal the constructedness and variable functionality of the neologism industrial nature. It has become an empty signifier, the heart of a discursive formation, gathering manifold elements around without having a genuine meaning on its own.5 It is argued, second, that representations of regional greening are constituted around the four pillars of reconciliation, identification, ecology and aesthetics. To shed light on how these pillars were formed and made effective, the chapter draws on various material and topographical concepts from exemplary application fields.6 With a view to practical implications, it aims to show, third, that this IBA-based greening narrative was fully adapted and reproduced regional history culture. This obscures the fact that environmental historical developments were non-linear, complex and ambivalent. While using terminologies of ecology, greening and nature in various contexts, history culture remains surprisingly indolent to findings from environmental history or landscape theory, as Harald Welzer and others have argued in the context of cultural studies as well.7 Integrating the ecological dimension of deindustrialisation memory cultures requires explaining and historicising the complex interplay between ecology and society as a relevant development in post-industrial societies.

4 Reichert, Christa et al. eds. 2010. Internationale Bauausstellung Emscher Park: Impulse: Lokal, Regional, National, International. Bottrop: Klartext. 5 Laclau, Ernest, and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso. 6 In particular, the Route Industrial Nature, the Duisburg North Landscape Park and the Zollverein Park, and the Ruhr Museum, part of the world heritage site Zeche Zollverein in Essen. 7 Welzer, Harald et al. 2010. “KlimaKulturen”. In KlimaKulturen: Soziale Wirklichkeiten im Klimawandel, edited by Claus Leggewie et al., 15. Frankfurt (Main)/New York: campus.

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From decline to reconciliation From an etymological perspective, the term reconciliation is genuinely time transcending. The connotation of a past conflict and its appeasement in the present corresponds to the ecological transformation of the Ruhr from past environmental crisis to present green heritage. Environmental reconciliation, narratively manifested in the three-step model of decline, reconquer and reconciliation is the first discourse pillar of regional greening. In regional history culture, the model is made effective in the generic saying that “nature has reconquered industrial areas”, which originates in early IBA conceptualisations and has,8 with view to recent information material on industrial nature,9 fully succeeded. It is stated that [i]ndustrial activities have fundamentally changed the Ruhr landscapes. On formerly agricultural areas, numerous pits, steelworks and slag heaps emerged. After their shutdown, nature has rapidly reconquered industrial wasteland. What lives and grows on this soil, we call industrial nature.10

While in the past the sustained disturbance of nature was emphasised, recent representations prolong this story of decline to a positive ending. Heavy industries have not destroyed, but neutrally “changed” the landscapes, as the brochure describes. This creates a specific relation between narrative time and narrated time,11 which systematically compresses regional environmental history to convey particular events of the greening plot: the final rebalance of formerly “imbalanced human-nature-relations”.12 The significant narrative vanishing point is the essentialisation of nature. In the Ruhr, “the age-old cycle of nature is repeated: growth, decay and new growth”,13 as stated in information material on the Duisburg Landscape Park. Regional reconciliation narratives convey the idea that in the Ruhr, former dichotomies between region and environment, thus between culture and nature,

8 Eröffnungsveranstaltung Route Industrienatur im Rahmen der Duisburger Radfahrtage am 13.6.1999 im Landschaftspark Duisburg Nord, Pressemitteilung, 6.6.1999. IBA 1178 A, 1. Archive for Social Movements, Bochum, Germany. 9 See pars pro toto Ganser, Karl, and Jörg Dettmar. 1999. IndustrieNatur: Ökologie und Gartenkunst im Emscher Park. Stuttgart: Verlag Eugen Ulmer. 10 Kommunalverband Ruhr. 2001. Themenflyer zur Route Industrienatur. Essen: Klartext. 11 Scheffel, Michael et al. 2010. “Time”. In The Living Handbook of Narratology, edited by Peter Hühn et al. Hamburg: University Press. 12 Hauck, Thomas. 2014. Landschaft und Gestaltung: Die Vergegenständlichung ästhetischer Ideen am Beispiel von Landschaft. Bielefeld: transcript, 20. 13 Winkels, Ralf, and Günter Zieling. 2010. Landschaftspark Duisburg-Nord: From Ironworks to Theme Park. Duisburg: Drei Punkte Verlag, 53.

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have become obsolete. While this perception is almost a commonplace in environmental history and landscape research, it is presented as innovative feature in regional history culture, thus made a legitimising means to reinforce the success story of ecological extreme transformation. This becomes particularly evident when locating discursive paradoxes: the imagery of powerful, untouched nature, as the notion of “reconquering”, is opposed to the conceptual understanding of a hybrid, anthropogenic industrial nature. Environmental historians emphasise there is nothing like original nature, and the landscape theorists Olaf Kühne and Detlev Ipsen, for instance, reinforce the societal and cultural constructedneness of landscape perceptions.14 Despite these critical notions, the Ruhr nature is presented as confidently artificial when distinguishing the region from other ‘conventional’ landscapes; it is depicted as romantically natural when embedding the industrial past in the broader history of nature. The continuous culturalisation of nature becomes evident, but remains unquestioned.

From deformation to identification The rise and fall of the Ruhr industries was and still is a constituting element of regional identification.15 The Ruhr landscapes, a visible result of industrial deformation, used to play a minor role in the process of forming and re-shaping regional identities. The IBA, however, aimed at changing these perceptions. It envisioned precisely the aesthetic potential of industrial wastelands. By re-interpreting coalfields and slag heaps as industrially shaped cultural landscapes, the IBA adapted the most problematic element of the Ruhr’s structural change to the popularising concept of industrial heritage.16 Landscapes were explicitly communicated as “unique feature of the Ruhr”, as “green backbone to compensate for regional polycentrism”, or even as “green response to people’s decentralised orientation needs”.17 This explicit promotion of not only industrial heritage, but

14 Arndt, Melanie. 2015. “Umweltgeschichte, Version: 3.0”. Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 10.11.2015. Accessed August 24, 2018. http://docupedia.de/zg/Umweltgeschichte_Version_3.0_Melanie_ Arndt; Schönwald, Antje. 2015. “Die Transformation von Altindustrielandschaften”. In Transformation und Landschaft: Die Folgen sozialer Wandlungsprozesse auf Landschaft, edited by Olaf Kühne et al., 63–73. Wiesbaden: Springer, 67. 15 Berger, Stefan et al. 2015. “Erinnerung, Bewegung, Identität: Industriekultur als Welterbe im 21. Jahrhundert”. Forum Geschichtskultur Ruhr 2: 23. 16 Reichert et al. eds. Bauausstellung, 92. 17 Ministerium für Umwelt, Raumordnung und Landwirtschaft des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Ökologieprogramm im Emscher-Lippe-Raum: 1991–1995 [1991]. IBA 408 B, 17. Archive for Social

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also industrial nature characterises the element of identification as the second constituting pillar of the regional greening discourse. However, instead of engaging critically with findings from environmental history, industrial nature and ecological transformation remain a self-evident background development to promote industrial heritage. The range and effectiveness of the interplay between industrial heritage and industrial nature becomes particularly obvious when looking at the Ruhr Museum in Essen, an internationally representative regional museum re-opened in 2010. In its permanent exhibition titled “Nature, Culture, History”, the museum not only displays industrial nature,18 but it makes it a significant part of what is officially preserved and presented in the self-declared “memory of the region”.19 For instance, the section “present: phenomena” systematically embeds industrial nature in other ‘cultural phenomena’, like the Ruhr cities, industrial architecture, football, kiosks or religious life. Likewise, photographs of allegedly typical Ruhr scenes are shown next to various industrial nature herbaria.20 This explicit exhibition topography reinforces the construction of a normative set of regional identification points. It further demonstrates the functionality of industrial in this process: only a culturalised industrial nature can mediate landscapes especially when they were too ugly for industrial heritage, for instance in the case of slag heaps.

From destruction to biodiversity Ecological arguments for “completely new biotic communities” and “important habitats for endangered species” accompany representations of industrial nature.21 The discourse of the formation of ecology is the third pillar relevant for assigning meaning to the empty signifier. For the future vision of the green

Movements, Bochum, Germany. Same argumentation in Regionalverband Ruhr/RVR Grün. 2014. Trägerschaft für den Emscher Landschaftspark: Evaluierungsbericht 2014. Essen: Klartext, 10. 18 Borsdorf, Ulrich, and Theodor Grütter. 2010. Ruhr Museum: Natur, Kultur, Geschichte, Begleitband zur Dauerausstellung. Essen: Klartext, 46. 19 Borsdorf, Ulrich. 2003. “Das Ruhr Museum: Die Grundidee. Eingangsreferat zum Grossen Ratschlag”. In Grosser Ratschlag: Stellungnahmen aus der Wissenschaft zu einem Ruhrmuseum auf Zollverein, edited by Aufbaustab Ruhr-Museum, 106–111. Essen: Klartext, 106. 20 Borsdorf and Grütter. Ruhr Museum, 46. 21 Eröffnungsveranstaltung Route 1. Regionalverband Ruhr. 2016. Natur erleben. Exkursionen und Aktionen, Touren und Seminare. Essen: Klartext. Regionalverband Ruhr. 2009. Broschüre Industrienatur: Neue Vielfalt auf alten Brachen, (Themenheft 24). Essen: Klartext.

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metropolis, it is essential to show that the new Ruhr is in line with broader claims for ecological consciousness, nature protection and greening, responding accordingly to the ecological turn as a relevant meta-frame of the 21st century. Environmental historians such as Frank Uekötter have provided differentiated analyses of ecological developments from past and present, redefining the alleged past dichotomy between economy and ecology, thus challenging the success story of Western environmentalism.22 While Uekötter claims differentiated perspectives on ecological developments, greening narratives in regional history culture instead produce radical distinctions between past and present. They create binary structures of ‘dirty’ vs. ‘clean’, ‘black’ vs. ‘green’, ‘bad example’ vs. ‘model example’. However, explaining the Ruhr’s complex ecological history and integrating these developments into present-day memory discourses requires a stronger exchange between disciplines as well as a more heterogeneous agency. Providing a platform for alternative actors with alternative memory narratives, would make ecological ambivalences and contradictions more visible, thus contributing to differentiating between success stories of environmentalism. The storytelling becomes evident when looking at the exhibition section “present: signs of the times” in the Ruhr Museum. There, prehistoric exhibits are displayed together with personal, everyday objects, originating from the time of high industrialisation, accordingly the peak phase of environmental damage. Their museological dialogue with “geological witnesses, who function to display the eternity of the geological era” creates a new context of meaning.23 In the exhibition catalogue, it is stated: In the Ruhr, two layers of time are emerging, a cultural and a natural, a subjective and an objective, a short and an eternal. This entanglement can be hardly found in any other place.24

Here, the perspective on regional greening is widened. Time-transcending elements are used to narrate the end of the industrial age based on the example of the local history of a region. This “glocalisation” of industrial nature not only corresponds to the self-understanding of the institution as a museum of international standing.25 It also shows that the greening narrative was adapted to the

22 Uekötter, Frank. 2003. Von der Rauchplage zur ökologischen Revolution. Eine Geschichte der Luftverschmutzung in Deutschland und den USA 1880–1970. Essen: Klartext. 23 Borsdorf and Grütter. Ruhr Museum, 161. 24 Ibid. 25 Robertson, Robert. 1998. “Glokalisierung: Homogenität und Heterogenität in Raum und Zeit.” In Perspektiven der Weltgesellschaft, edited by Ulrich Beck, 192–220. Frankfurt (Main): Suhrkamp.

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representative status of the world heritage site Zeche Zollverein. Stating that this specific entanglement “can be hardly found in any other place” implies that especially and solely in the Ruhr, the damaged relations between region and environment were successfully restored. The term of environmental damage, however, is dependent on societal ideals,26 which makes the claim for reconciliation obsolete. It becomes evident that museological glocalisation results neither in relating historical developments back to critical environmental discourses, nor in bringing environmental history and memory culture into dialogue. It instead functions to depict the Ruhr as a versatile pioneer and ecological showcase for a successful and extreme transformation. The Ruhr becomes a local model example of complicated global processes.

From ugly to innovative Re-interpreting industrial wastelands requires dismissing, but at least aestheticising well-established associations.27 The IBA provided the initial impetus to refrain from classical beautiful landscapes, trying to redefine relevant categories of nature and landscape aesthetics. This meant not only changing landscapes, but also social viewing habits. In line with postmodern concepts of radical plurality and multiple coding,28 plastic art installations were built within the Zollverein park complex, and sculptures, designed by the artist Ulrich Rückriem in 1999, function as highlights in the industrial forest. In Essen, formerly oppositional elements, such as industrial relicts, high culture and nature, were explicitly integrated, and accordingly reconciled aesthetically.29 These contradictory accentuations gave rise to new understandings of landscape variety and appeal: creative differences were not neglected, but confidently staged as visual enrichment. Modern dichotomies of beauty and ugliness became obsolete. They were converted into one final contrast relevant for aesthetic reality constructions: innovative vs. noninnovative.

26 Uekötter, Frank. 2013. “Bergbau und Umwelt im 19. und 20. Jahrhundert.” In Geschichte des deutschen Bergbaus, Bd. 4: Rohstoffgewinnung im Strukturwandel: Der deutsche Bergbau im 20. Jahrhundert, edited by Dieter Ziegler, 539–570. Münster: Aschendorff, 539. 27 Hauser, Susanne. 2003. “Ästhetik der Revitalisierung.” In Die Brache als Chance: Ein transdisziplinärer Dialog über verbrauchte Flächen, edited by Dieter Genske, and Susanne Hauser, 3–26. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer, 21. 28 Kühne, Olaf. 2006. Landschaft in der Postmoderne: Das Beispiel des Saarlandes. Wiesbaden: Springer, 8. 29 Planergruppe Oberhausen. 2016. Willkommen im Zollverein Park. Essen: Klartext, 4.

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This integration allows two problematic images to be overcome at once: the one of the old “industry-protecting region” and the one of the formerly cultureless working-class.30 Again, the distance between old and new, past and present respectively, is kept as big as possible. The more profound the past conflict is, the more significant the present appeasement. The more accentuated the past environmental imbalance is, the greater the final transformation. Accordingly, history culture narratively constructs the new Ruhr and in doing so, it constantly and to a considerable extent re-creates the old.

Conclusions The concept of industrial nature was analysed here from a cultural historical perspective. The IBA re-interpreted societal viewing habits and made nature a helpful partner to mediate formerly ‘damaged landscapes’ in the Ruhr. Concepts like “Natur auf Zeit” (temporary nature), however, demonstrate that natural processes are still controlled by society, even when nature is allegedly left to herself.31 For cultural purposes, nature has been systematically anthropomorphised, aestheticised and artificialised as well as made effective for socio-cultural longings for wilderness and romanticised nature. Regional greening remains a cultural product. In this way, the green metropolis tells not only a success story of regional transformation, but also prolongs the story of humans mastering nature. Solely its form has changed; it became reconciling, environmental-friendly. In the Ruhr, a dialectic tension arises between culturalisation and naturalisation: past culturalisation in the form of industrialisation was rather arbitrary, spontaneous and highly chaotic. Mining industries emerged where nature provided natural resources as coal, as the disordered industrialisation of the Northern Ruhr has demonstrated.32 In contrast, the alleged “wild renaturalisation” of post-industrial spaces is planned down to the last detail. Reconciling greening practices are product and manifestation of controlled nature development.

30 Brüggemeier, Franz-Josef, and Thomas Rommelspacher. 1992. Blauer Himmel über der Ruhr: Geschichte der Umwelt im Ruhrgebiet: 1840–1990. Essen: Klartext, 122. 31 Gerndt, Helge. 2001. “Naturmythen. Traditionales Naturverständnis und modernes Umweltbewußtsein.” In Natur - Kultur. Volkskundliche Perspektiven auf Mensch und Umwelt. 32. Kongreß der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde in Halle vom 27.9. bis 1.10.1999, edited by Rolf Wilhelm Brednich, Annette Schneider, and Ute Werner, 57–76. Münster: Waxmann, 64. 32 Goch, Stefan. 1997. “‘Der Ruhrgebietler’. Überlegungen zur Entstehung und Entwicklung regionalen Bewußtseins im Ruhrgebiet”. Westfälische Forschungen - Zeitschrift des LWL-Instituts für westfälische Regionalgeschichte 47: 585–620, 596.

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While renegotiating the relation between culture and nature is discussed in environmental history, these debates are becoming more important in memory culture. While the field is mainly concerned with explaining social and cultural developments – how pits became heritage, physical work became nostalgia, and currywurst became ritual – the concept of industrial nature and its ambivalences are gaining relevance as subject of regional memory discourses. Fundamental paradoxes and problematics of ecological success stories are to be adressed in different ways. Industrial nature can no longer be self-evident accentuation to discuss industrial heritage. With a view to the relevance of the environmental dimension of deindustrialisation and global ecology as significant meta-narrative of Western societies in the 21st century, discussions on structural change and post-industrial memory landscapes require a more differentiated engagement with greening traditions, representations and practices.

References Arndt, Melanie. 2015. “Umweltgeschichte, Version: 3.0”. Docupedia-Zeitgeschichte, 10.11.2015. Accessed August 24, 2018. http://docupedia.de/zg/Umweltgeschichte_Version_3.0_Melanie_ Arndt. Berger, Stefan et al. 2015. “Erinnerung, Bewegung, Identität: Industriekultur als Welterbe im 21. Jahrhundert.“ Forum Geschichtskultur Ruhr 2: 15–23. Borsdorf, Ulrich. 2003. “Das Ruhr Museum: Die Grundidee. Eingangsreferat zum Grossen Ratschlag.“ In Grosser Ratschlag: Stellungnahmen aus der Wissenschaft zu einem Ruhrmuseum auf Zollverein, edited by Aufbaustab Ruhr-Museum, 106–12. Essen: Klartext. Borsdorf, Ulrich, and Theodor Grütter. 2010. Ruhr Museum: Natur, Kultur, Geschichte, Begleitband zur Dauerausstellung. Essen: Klartext. Brüggemeier, Franz-Josef, and Thomas Rommelspacher. 1992. Blauer Himmel über der Ruhr: Geschichte der Umwelt im Ruhrgebiet: 1840–1990. Essen: Klartext. Eröffnungsveranstaltung Route Industrienatur im Rahmen der Duisburger Radfahrtage am 13.6.1999 im Landschaftspark Duisburg Nord, Pressemitteilung, 6. 6.1999. IBA 1178 A. Archive for Social Movements, Bochum, Germany. Ganser, Karl, and Jörg Dettmar. 1999. IndustrieNatur: Ökologie und Gartenkunst im Emscher Park. Stuttgart: Verlag Eugen Ulmer. Gerndt, Helge. 2001. “Naturmythen. Traditionales Naturverständnis und modernes Umweltbewuβtsein.” In Natur - Kultur. Volkskundliche Perspektiven auf Mensch und Umwelt. 32. Kongreβ der Deutschen Gesellschaft für Volkskunde in Halle vom 27.9. bis 1.10.1999, edited by Rolf Wilhelm Brednich, Annette Schneider, and Ute Werner, 57–76. Münster: Waxmann. Gesellschaft Internationale Bauausstellung Emscher Park: Internationale Bauausstellung Emscher Park und die Einbeziehung von Künstlern: Bestimmung einer Position [1991]. IBA 110 A. Archive for Social Movements, Bochum, Germany.

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Goch, Stefan. 1997. “‘Der Ruhrgebietler’. Überlegungen zur Entstehung und Entwicklung regionalen Bewuβtseins im Ruhrgebiet”. Westfälische Forschungen - Zeitschrift des LWL-Instituts für westfälische Regionalgeschichte 47: 585-620. Grüne Hauptstadt Europas Essen 2017. “Grüne Hauptstadt Europas – Essen 2017 ist voller Erfolg”. Press release from 18 January 2018. Accessed August 11, 2018. https://www. essen.de/meldungen/pressemeldung_1136992.de.html. Hauck, Thomas. 2014. Landschaft und Gestaltung: Die Vergegenständlichung ästhetischer Ideen am Beispiel von Landschaft. Bielefeld: transcript. Hauser, Susanne. 2003. “Ästhetik der Revitalisierung.“ In Die Brache als Chance: Ein transdisziplinärer Dialog über verbrauchte Flächen, edited by Dieter Genske, and Susanne Hauser, 3–26. Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer. Kommunalverband Ruhr. 2001. Themenflyer zur Route Industrienatur: Essen. Kühne, Olaf. 2006. Landschaft in der Postmoderne: Das Beispiel des Saarlandes. Wiesbaden: Springer. Laclau, Ernest, and Chantal Mouffe. 1985. Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical Democratic Politics. London: Verso. Landschaftsverband Rheinland. 1999. “Schön ist es auch anderswo . . .”. Fotografien vom Ruhrgebiet 1989–99. Heidelberg: Umschau-Braus Verlag. Ministerium für Umwelt, Raumordnung und Landwirtschaft des Landes Nordrhein-Westfalen. Ökologieprogramm im Emscher-Lippe-Raum: 1991–1995 [1991]. IBA 408 B. Archive for Social Movements, Bochum, Germany. Oligmüller, Rainer. 2002. “Natur und Landschaft im Wandel. Potenziale, Inwertsetzung, Belastung“. In Die Emscher-Lippe-Region. Kreis Recklinghausen, Stadt Bottrop, Stadt Gelsenkirchen, edited by Heinz Heineberg et al., 9–33. Münster: Aschendorff. Planergruppe Oberhausen. 2016. Willkommen im Zollverein Park. Essen: Klartext. Regionalverband Ruhr. 2009. Broschüre Industrienatur: Neue Vielfalt auf alten Brachen, (Themenheft 24). Essen. Regionalverband Ruhr. 2016. Natur erleben. Exkursionen und Aktionen, Touren und Seminare. Essen: Klartext. Regionalverband Ruhr/RVR Grün. 2014. Trägerschaft für den Emscher Landschaftspark: Evaluierungsbericht 2014. Essen: Klartext. Reichert, Christa et al. 2010. Internationale Bauausstellung Emscher Park: Impulse: Lokal, Regional, National, International. Bottrop: Klartext. Robertson, Robert. 1998. “Glokalisierung: Homogenität und Heterogenität in Raum und Zeit.“ In Perspektiven der Weltgesellschaft, edited by Ulrich Beck, 192–220. Frankfurt (Main): Suhrkamp. Scheffel, Michael et al. 2010. “Time”. In The Living Handbook of Narratology, edited by Peter Hühn et al., Hamburg: University Press. Schönwald, Antje. 2015. “Die Transformation von Altindustrielandschaften.” In Transformation und Landschaft: Die Folgen sozialer Wandlungsprozesse auf Landschaft, edited by Olaf Kühne et al., 6–74. Wiesbaden: Springer. Storm, Anna. 2014. Post-Industrial Landscape Scars. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Welzer, Harald et al. 2010. “KlimaKulturen.“ In KlimaKulturen: Soziale Wirklichkeiten im Klimawandel, edited by Claus Leggewie et al., 7–20. Frankfurt (Main)/New York: campus. Winkels, Ralf, and Günter Zieling. 2010. Landschaftspark Duisburg-Nord: From Ironworks to Theme Park. Duisburg: Drei Punkte Verlag.

Torsten Meyer

“Biofacts” – Recultivating the post-mining landscape in the Anthropocene Introduction Industrial opencast lignite pits are leaving landscapes that have been referred to as “moonscapes”,1 even as “battlefields”.2

Fig. 1: Post-mining landscape in Lower Lusatia, 1951.

Today the reuse of dumps and heaps, as well as residual holes, is a special political and planning challenge. Knowledge-based practices of land reclamation and recultivation play a crucial role for solving it. Hybrid research teams at universities and non-university research institutions developed and are still developing the knowledge base of these practices.3 The structure of these teams reflects the complexity of tasks in the field of land reclamation and recultivation.4 A variety 1 See Bernhardt, Christoph. 2002. “Von der ‘Mondlandschaft’ zur sozialistischen ‘Erholungslandschaft’? Die Niederlausitz als Exerzierfeld der Regionalplanung in der DDR-Zeit.” In Die Niederlausitz von 18. Jahrhundert bis heute: Eine “gestörte” Kulturlandschaft?, edited by Günter Bayerl, and Dirk Maier, 301–323. Münster et al: Waxmann; Meyer, Torsten. 2005. “Der Senftenberger See oder das Ende der ‘Mondlandschaft’?” Jahrbuch für Regionalgeschichte 23: 113–142. The contribution arose from my collaboration in the project “From Boom to Crisis. The German Coal Industry after 1945” funded by the RAG Stiftung. 2 Sieferle, Rolf Peter. 1997. Rückblick auf die Natur. Eine Geschichte des Menschen und seiner Umwelt. Munich: Luchterhand, 8. 3 On the concept of hybrid research teams see e. g.: Maier, Helmut. 2007. Forschung als Waffe. Rüstungsforschung in der Kaiser-Wilhelm-Gesellschaft und das Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Metallforschung 1900 bis 1945/48. Göttingen: Wallstein. 4 As an example, the Research Center Landscape Development and Mining Landscapes (Forschungszentrum Landschaftsentwicklung und Bergbaulandschaften) could be named: Brandenburgische Technische Universität Cottbus – Senftenberg. 2018. “Forschungszentrum Landschaftsentwicklung und Bergbaulandschaften (FZLB).” Accessed January 21, 2019. https://www.b-tu.de/fzlb/. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-019

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of knowledge stocks, from forestry and agricultural sciences to soil science and geology, or water management, is needed to successfully implement knowledgebased practices. Such hybrid research teams emerged not earlier than the 1950s institutionally, as prior to that individual protagonists were responsible for the production and distribution of recultivation relevant knowledge stocks. This chapter focuses on the emergence of such hybrid teams by discussing the works of Wilhelm Knabe in particular. In the 1950s, Knabe played a crucial role in the discussion of recultivation in the Lower Lusatia lignite mining district. The region had an outstanding economic importance for the GDR, as between 55 to 60 percent of the industrial useable lignite was deposited in the region.5 The designation of the newly formed political district of Cottbus (1952) to the “coal and energy center of the GDR” in 1957 reflected this essential importance.6 Against this sketched background, the chapter starts with a short outline of the history of the Lower Lusatia lignite mining district until the 1950s. Hereafter follows insights into the academic post-mining landscape research in the region in the early 1950s. In a second step, the analytical concept of “biofacts” will be presented and discussed by referring to the works of Wilhelm Knabe.

The Lower Lusatia mining district – A brief history Five coal seams exist in the Lower Lusatia mining district. The first Lusatian seam has already been mined for its most part. Up to 20 meters thick it appeared near the surface, especially in the area of the city of Senftenberg. This

5 Pätz, Herbert et al. 1986. Kohle – ein Kapitel aus dem Tagebuch der Erde. Leipzig: Teuber, 119. The study Entwicklung der Braunkohlenindustrie 1954–1960 gave a figure of 60 %. See Forschungsauftrag PKB Kohle, Berlin-Weißensee. Entwicklung der Braunkohlenindustrie 1954–1960. BArch DG 2/VS-KE Ministerium für Schwerindustrie (Verschlußsachen) Nr. 56 Perspektivplan BK (1954–1960), Mappe 1, fol. 15. The importance of lignite for the GDR reflects an undated manuscript of the Staatliche Plankommission. It mentioned that 90 % of the needed energy is directly or indirectly produced from lignite. See Anonymous. Die Bedeutung und Aufgaben des Bergbaues. Unpubl. (before 1958). BArch DE 1 SPK, Nr. 3898, fol. 16–90, fol. 23. 6 For the region a lot of investments were planned – not only for the development of the lignite mining but also for new buildings as a lot of devastation would take place. See Ministerium für Kohle und Energie. HV Braunkohle: Perspektivplan des Reviers Senftenberg für die Zeit von 1957–1962. 21.03.1957. BLHA Rep. 901 VVB Braunkohle, Nr. 52, s. p. On the planning processes see Kind, Gerold. 1997. “Territorialentwicklung und Territorialplanung in der DDR. Ergebnisse und Auswirkungen auf die Raumstruktur Deutschlands.” In Regionale Strukturen im Wandel, edited by Annette Becher, 17–104. Opladen: Leske & Budrich.

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seam established the first boom of lignite mining in the region. Currently, the second, Miocene seam is being mined which is up to 14 meters thick, and composed of dark, mostly stratified brown coals. Its spatial distribution amounts to approximately 3,600 to 4,000 square kilometers.7

Fig. 2: The Lower Lusatian mining district in 1958.

The systematic mining of the first seam began in the middle of the 19th century.8 The brown coal was initially mined in very small open cast pits but

7 See Bramer, Horst et al. 1991. Physische Geographie. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen. Gotha: Hermann Haack, 177; Pätz et al. Kohle, 119–120. 8 The following according to: Baxmann, Matthias. 2004. Vom “Pfützenland” zum Energiebezirk. Die Geschichte der Industrialisierung in der Lausitz. Dresden: Verlag der Kunst, 63–78; Bayerl, Günter. 2003. “Die Niederlausitz. Industrialisierung und De-Industrialisierung einer Kulturlandschaft.” Blätter für Technikgeschichte 65: 89–163 (re-published in: Bayerl, Günter.

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went straight over to underground mining. Until the 1880s, the mined coal mainly served to supply the local industry with fossil fuel. After the integration of the mining district into the German railway network and the rapid spread of the new briquette press technology, the national market gained more and more importance. The increasing demand led to a return to opencast pits and even before the turn of the 20th century, the first wave of mechanization began in overburden operations. Lignite opencast pits already showed industrial dimensions before the beginning of the First World War. The loss of hard coal mining districts after 1918 strengthened the regional development path, as lignite enjoyed considerable economic significance. In the 1920s, mechanization and rationalization in the regional brown coal industry progressed, and land use grew steadily. The Lower Lusatia district was assigned a central economic-political function by the autarky policy of the National Socialist government.9 Since the beginning of the 20th century, the regional industrial development has increasingly been based on the mining of the second seam. The exposure of the pit “Marga” in 1906 near the city of Senftenberg heralded a structural spatial change for the region. In the 1930s, the historic nucleus mining district, located around the city, had become one of the “most important in Germany”.10 This economic success story was connected with the problem of groundwater lowering. Over decades, the Lower Lusatia district developed into a “water emergency area” (Wassernotstandsgebiet), as in addition to the lowering of groundwater all surface waters were highly polluted which did not allow any further use.11 Furthermore, tertiary soils on the heaps and dumps increased due to the mining of the second seam. These soils are hostile to plants because of their high pyrite content. Thus, the recultivation of post-mining landscapes was newly challenged as recultivation in the very early 20th century had been carried out on dumps and heaps created by overburden soils from the first seam. These soils are less hostile to plants. Thus existing, formalized knowledge on recultivation proved to be increasingly obsolete. 2011. Peripherie als Schicksal und Chance. Studien zur neueren Geschichte der Niederlausitz, 255–325. Münster et al: Waxmann). 9 See Petzina, Dietmar. 1968. Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich. Der nationalsozialistische Vierjahresplan. Düsseldorf: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt. 10 Jurasky, Karl. A. 1936. Deutschlands Braunkohlen und ihre Entstehung. Berlin: Gebrüder Bomtraeger, 115. 11 See Institut für Wasserwirtschaft der DDR. 1981. Abschlußbericht zum Thema 4.3.6.1. des Planes Wissenschaft und Technik 1981. Weiterführung der Analyse der Umweltbelastung und komplexe Einschätzung des Umweltzustandes im Bezirk Cottbus unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Gebietes Senftenberg/Lauchhammer. Printed as manuscript. Berlin.

Fig. 3: Land use around the city of Senftenberg in the 1930s.

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The end of the Second World War marked a significant turning point for regional land reclamation and recultivation efforts. On the one hand, the existing private mining companies were nationalized and thus recultivation activities were planned and directed by the state. On the other hand, an awareness emerged that successful recultivation needed multi-disciplinary knowledge stocks.12 Fostered by the state-organized planning, an institutionalization of hybrid-research took place.

“Landscape diagnosis of the GDR” and research project F3-322 The foundation of the GDR (1949) was accompanied by an, albeit short-term, ecological turnaround.13 The study “Balance Disturbances in Landscapes” (Gleichgewichtsstörungen in der Landschaft) by the landscape architect Reinhold Lingner (at the Institute for Architecture of the German Academy of Sciences) could be seen as the starting point. Based on Klettwitz’ plane survey sheet (approximately 12,000 hectares), ecological disturbance should be analyzed. Already one year later, in 1950, this study was extended to the “Landscape investigation of the Lower Lusatia lignite mining district” (Landschaftsuntersuchung des Niederlausitzer Braunkohlenreviers). It was carried out on the basis of 15 plane survey sheets covering about 123,000 hectares. The “Landscape investigation” marks a conceptual turning point in the field of recultivation as hitherto, recultivation had been seen as isolated individual measures. Now it was intended to take stock of an entire area. Based on these, complex reclamation and recultivation plans were to be formulated and these plans were seen as the basis for a consistent post-mining landscape. At the same time, this study was a pilot project for the comprehensive research project “Landscape diagnosis of the GDR” (Landschaftsdiagnose der DDR) covering all East German states.14

12 See Knabe, Wilhelm. Erfahrungen bei der Planung und Durchführung von Rekultivierungsprojekten in europäischen und nordamerikanischen Tagebauen. Manuscripte of a lecture, undated (1964). Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis. Deposita Wilhelm Knabe, vorl. Sign. 140. 13 The following, including all quotes, according to: Meyer, Torsten, and Axel Zutz. 2010. “Rekultivierung von Braunkohlentagebauen in der Niederlausitz 1920–1960. Institutionalisierungen und Interventionen als Wegbereitung des Senftenberger Seengebietes.” In Paradigmenwechsel und Kontinuitätslinien im DDR-Städtebau. Neue Forschungen zur ostdeutschen Architektur- und Planungsgeschichte, edited by Frank Betker, Carsten Benke, and Christoph Bernhardt, 273–328. Erkner: IRS. 14 See: Hiller, Olaf, ed. 2002. Die Landschaftsdiagnose der DDR. Zeitgeschichte und Wirkung eines Forschungsprojekts aus der Gründungsphase der DDR. Berlin: TU Berlin; Huff, Tobias. 2015. Natur und Industrie im Sozialismus. Eine Umweltgeschichte der DDR. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 38–66.

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The Lower Lusatia study identified and evaluated the cultural landscape changes by comparing current mapping of the area with the plane survey sheet (Urmeßtischblättern) of 1846. Furthermore, the new planning methodology of surveying local farmers was applied. The results of this stock-taking are considered as follows: Due to the “capitalist predatory economy” (Reinhold Lingner), fundamental disturbances of the water balance, significant water pollution, agricultural yield losses and other negative effects had occurred. There was no complaint about the industrialized landscape itself – on the contrary, the postmining landscape was described as “often not without charm” (häufig nicht ohne Reiz). Within a “generous replanning” (grosszügige Neuplanung), the social significance of the post-mining landscape as a place of recovery was to be taken into account, a “special planning task” (spezielle Planungsaufgabe) to be carried out by landscape architects in close cooperation with city planners, geographers, water managers, spa specialists, architects and economists etc. From this stocktaking, Ligner’s team deduced an “action program” (Aktionsprogramm) for the Lusatian mining district. However, this was not adequately supported by the Central Committee of the Socialist Unity Party of Germany (Sozialistische Einheitspartei Deutschlands). Only the demand for soil protection and the implementation of so-called “operative groups” (Operativgruppen) was included in a Central Committee decision of 1 June 1953.15 Already one month later, such an “operative group” was established for the Lower Lusatian mining district. At the Humboldt University Berlin, the research project F 3-322 “Improvement of the recultivation of dumps by researching its conditions with the help of pot and field experiments and review of previous measures in Lower Lusatia” (Verbesserung der Rekultivierung von Abraumkippen durch Erforschung der Voraussetzungen hierfür mit Hilfe von Gefäß- und Freilandversuchen und Überprüfung bisheriger Maßnahmen in der Niederlausitz) started. It was led by the well-known landscape architect Georg Pniower.16 The overall objective of this project was the development of scientific planning principles for the recultivation and afforestation of heaps and dumps. The research results were to be made available to the participating institutions of mining, forestry, water management and land culture.

15 See: Knoth, Nikola, and Kerstin Nowak. 1993. “Eine ‘grüne’ SED? Aus dem Protokoll einer ZK-Sekretariatssitzung.” Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 35, no. 4: 72–79. 16 On Pniower see Fibich, Peter, and Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn. 2004. Vom Sonnenrund zur Beispiellandschaft. Entwicklungslinien der Landschaftsarchitektur in Deutschland, dargestellt am Werk von Georg Pniower (1896–1960). Hannover: TU Hannover; Giese, Helmut, and Siegfried Sommer. 2005. Prof. Dr. Georg Pniower. Leben und Werk eines bedeutenden Garten- und Landschaftsarchitekten – eine Dokumentation. Dresden: TU Dresden.

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The “biofacts” of Wilhelm Knabe Wilhelm Knabe (1923–2021) was the scientist in charge of the F 3-322 research project. He had studied at the Forestry College Tharandt (near Dresden) and, in contrast to the protagonists acting before the Second World War, he had a scientific background.17 In detail, the aims of the research project were as follows: The so-called “cultural value” of individual overburden layers/soils were to be evaluated scientifically. Data for selecting the adequate type of wood for afforestation and for future recultivation planning by the mining sector would be prepared. Thus, false investments by the mining industry should be avoided and agricultural and forestry yields on recultivated heaps and dumps should be increased. The applied methods included chemical-physical soil investigations, pot and field experiments as well as the ex-post evaluation of older, still existing recultivated areas.18 This experimental culture highlighted that future plants on heaps and dumps were primarily to be seen as objects – not as biological creatures. It also pointed out that substantial anthropogenic intervention was needed to form life on the “new land” (Knabe). These relationships are accurately mirrored by the use of the term “biofact”. The concept of “biofacts” has been developed by Nicole Karafyllis,19 and epistemologically it aims at the foundation of an outstanding philosophy of

17 See: Knabe, Wilhelm. 1957. “Untersuchungen über die Voraussetzungen der Rekultivierung im Braunkohlenbergbau.” PhD diss., Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. In 1959, Knabe fled from the GDR. Since 1961 he worked at the Institut für Weltforstwirtschaft der Bundesforschungsanstalt für Forst- und Holzwirtschaft (Reinbek near Hamburg). Between 1966 and 1976 he was Oberregierungsrat and Regierungsdirektor at the Landesanstalt für Immissions- und Bodennutzungsschutz (Essen). Since 1976 until his retirement in 1987 he was Regierungsdirektor at the Landesanstalt für Ökologie, Landschaftsentwicklung und Forstplanung (Düsseldorf and Recklinghausen). Knabe was one co-founder of the German Party Die Grünen in 1979/1980. He became one of their candidates for the European Parliament in 1979 and co-speaker of Die Grünen in 1982. See Heinrich Böll Stiftung, Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis. 2008. “Liste Parteitage Die Grünen (1979–1993)”. Accessed March 19, 2021. https://www.boell.de/sites/default/files/ uploads/2008/08/bdk_1979-1993_die_gruenen.pdf?dimension1=division_agg. 18 Programm F3 – 322 und Schriftwechsel. 1953/1954. Pniower Nachlass im Archiv der Humboldt Universität Berlin, Kasten 6 Mappe 4, Forschungsauftrag Rekultivierung von Kippen 1953/54. 19 See e. g. Karafyllis, Nicole, ed. 2003. Biofakte. Versuch über den Menschen zwischen Artefakt und Lebewesen. Paderborn: Mentis; Karafyllis, Nicole. 2004. “Stichwort: Biofakt.” Information Philosophie 32, no. 4: 40–43; Karafyllis, Nicole. 2007. “Growth of Biofacts: the real thing or metaphor?” In Tensions and Convergences. Technological and Aesthetic (Trans)Formations of Society, edited by Reinhard Heil et al., 141–152. Bielefeld: transcript.

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biotechnology. From a phenomenological perspective “biofacts” are created by man and as such are thus partially artifacts. On the other side, they are also subject to biological growth, are therefore essentially ephemeral. “Biofacts” entered human history with the Neolithic Revolution. But in the 20th century, the ‘mechanization of the living’ (Technisierung des Lebendigen) acquired “a new quality through its much greater dimension, systematization, and depth of engagement”.20 The ‘mechanization of the living’ was transformed into the ‘technology of the living’ (Technologisierung des Lebendigen), meaning that a “complex architecture of means and purposes” emerged.21 The typology of “biofacts”, which is determined by the moment of technical control of growth, reflects this change as well and distinguishes the three following types: 1. before the “biofact” comes into being, 2. during its growth and 3. for reproduction purposes.22 Type one and type three are products of a technical modernity in which those kinds of “biofacts” are man-made through genetic engineering and cloning. Type two is historically older, and stems from the Neolithic Revolution. Nevertheless, it also underwent significant modifications in the 20th century. In view of herbal “biofacts”, which are of interest in the following only, these changes were rooted, for example, in the spread of artificial fertilizers and in the pronounced object character of the herbal.23

“Recultivation” and “cultural value” – Terming the soil Knabe’s research is based on two essential terms, those of “recultivation” and the “cultural value” of soils. Above all, he developed these terms in his dissertation (1957), in which he is mainly interested in the prerequisites for a successful recultivation. Thus, he discussed the preferable anthropogenic formation of overburden as prospective herbal livelihood only. In the words of Knabe, recultivation had to be understood as “predominantly biological and agriculturaltechnical measures of soil culture for the reintegration of degraded land in the

20 Karafyllis, Nicole, and Karin Zachmann. 2017. “Einleitung. Pflanzliche Biofakte: Geschichten über die Technisierung der Agrikultur im 20. Jahrhundert.” Technikgeschichte 84: 95–106, 99. 21 Ibid. 22 Breitwieser, Lukas, and Karin Zachmann. 2017. “Biofakte des Atomzeitalters. Strahlende Entwicklungen in Ghanas Landwirtschaft.” Technikgeschichte 84: 107–133, 110. 23 See on fertilizers Uekötter, Frank. 2010. Die Wahrheit ist auf dem Feld. Eine Wissensgeschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft. Bielefeld: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

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cultural landscape [. . .]. A new plant cover has to be man-made, the initially dead overburden soil should be transformed into a fertile soil and if possible, plant and animal production should begin.”24 Conceptually, a distinction is made between the technical operation of land reclamation by the mining industry and the “biofactorial” operation of recultivation, a distinction that gained significant contours in the 1950s. The second important term is that of the “cultural value” of overburden layers/soils. By using this term, Knabe tried to raise the awareness of mining actors to the demands of recultivation. Knabe notes: “The term ‘cultural value’ was only impressed at the beginning of this work and published for mining practice. It is intended to characterize the suitability of an overburden layer for the growth of plants and thus the value of this layer for soil culture.”25 This general phrase already underlines an important interest of Knabe’s – to integrate the mining industry as an active partner for recultivation planning. This becomes – for example – evident in the assessment of overburden layers/soil.26 Knabe simply offers a classification according to three criteria: “A) agriculturally usable strata B) forestry usable strata (except those of class A) C) culturehostile and infertile strata”.27 This classification was sufficient as it was able to express the need to treat soil layers individually while moving the overburden “in the interest of a successful [future] recultivation”. In the mid-1950s, Knabe’s demand seemed to be illusory due to the region’s dominant use of overburden conveying technology; as the already mentioned overburden conveyor bridge did not allow a separation of soils (overburden layers) – but it was not illusive at all. At the same time an engineering working group developed a so-called unit overburden conveyor bridge (Einheitsförderbrücke) that would technically allow the separation of soils.28 Indeed the bridges introduced into mining practice from 1959 were not equipped with the proposed technology for economic reasons. But the question remains, how did Knabe evaluate the soil? Or more precisely: What methods did he use to identify the “cultural value” of the soils?

24 Knabe. Untersuchungen, 2. 25 Ibid., 4. 26 Ibid., 35. 27 Ibid. 28 See Fleischer, R. 1954. “Die Anpassung der Förderbrückenbetriebe an die Vorschriften der Wiedernutzbarmachungsverordnung.” Bergbautechnik 4, no. 4: 184–192. To Knabe these works were known.

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On soils and fertilizers Soil evaluation is based on practical experience from agriculture and forestry, as well as on experimental methods for the identification of its specific “cultural value”. Knabe’s method was to use field experiments but he also counted above all on so-called pot experiments. In Germany, these were first used by him in 1952, and in the United States since 1951 by Grandt.29 Furthermore, as Knabe pointed out, [t]he necessary supplement to the pot and cultivation experiment is the analysis of the soil and other locational factors. The soil analysis of overburden layers, however, is of great importance even without comparative cultivation experiments, as such studies have so far been absent and thus no comparative material existed.30

As part of his research, such pedological analyzes were carried out by the laboratories of the Berlin Geological Commission and the Institute of Garden and Land Culture (Humboldt University Berlin).31 For the first time in Germany, Knabe correlated the results of these analyzes with the previously mentioned pot experiments. As in the case of soil investigations, the different overburden layers were separated from each other before being tested on their “cultural value” in serial experiments. An impression of what that entailed is given by the experiments for the overburden of the “Tatkraft” mine, which Knabe carried out in 1952 to 1954: For the pot experiments, eight Mitscherlich pots were filled with one of the eight soils (overburden layers). Four pots of the same soil remained unfertilized, the other four received a liming and complete fertilization. The addition of fertilizer aimed for an accurate formulation of instructions for the production of “biofactic” livelihoods. Mustard (Sinapis), yellow lupine (Lupinus luteus L.), stone clover (Melilotus albus) and Waldstaudenroggen (Secale multicaule) had been used as experimental plants in 1952. In later experiments (1953 to 1954) Knabe used other lupine species, oat, etc.32 Using these particular plants seems to have been more than just a matter of methodological considerations. They all play an important role in soil improvement. Although Knabe did not formulate this explicitly, this selection might have been determined by practical considerations, as since the early 1930s there had been intense discussions to start forestry recultivation with a phase of mineral

29 Knabe. Untersuchungen, 44. 30 Ibid., 45. 31 See ibid., 48–51. 32 Ibid., 108–110.

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Fig. 4: Pot experiment in 1952.

and green manure in order to optimize forest yields.33 Thus, the experimental plants are not the “biofacts” of Knabe, but its relevance for soil improvement could be seen as conditio sine qua non for the production of the following trees.

On trees Traditionally, recultivation in Lower Lusatia was characterized by forestal “biofacts”. The reason for this was threefold: on the one hand, the mining companies had acquired the land under peculiar circumstances. Thus, no obligations for the so-called topsoil recultivation existed by contract. The first law regulations for Prussia date back to 1932 and for Germany to 1939. On the other hand, the introduction of the overburden conveyor bridge since the 1920s was connected with the problem of separate storage of overburden. And thirdly, the (top-)soils themselves were considered to be agriculturally infertile. Since the 1920s, these considerations had been associated with a picture of the regional post-mining landscape as “original” forest.34 Knabe tied in with this tradition. For him, practical recultivation meant planting trees. These trees could not just be addressed as “biofacts” because of the improved soil measurements that were tested in the serial experiments, but also

33 See Steinhuber, Uwe. 2005. “Einhundert Jahre bergbauliche Rekultivierung in der Lausitz: ein historischer Abriss der Rekultivierung, Wiederurbarmachung und Sanierung im Lausitzer Braunkohlenrevier.” PhD diss., University of Olomouc, 192–193. 34 See Maier, Dirk. 2002. “‘Machen Sie der Niederlausitz diese Freude! Sie ist doch schon in der Eiszeit zu kurz gekommen!’ Facetten der Wahrnehmung einer Landschaft seit 1850.” In Die Niederlausitz vom 18. Jahrhundert bis heute: Eine “gestörte” Kulturlandschaft?, edited by Günter Bayerl, and Dirk Maier, 119–147. Münster et al.: Waxmann.

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Fig. 5: Plants on heaps in 1957.

because they would not be viable on the “new land” without further anthropogenic interventions. This becomes evident in an article by Knabe,35 the topic of which is the technical, anthropogenic fitting of the trees, and the production of their viability. The following general modification of the “living” can be cited, without going into more detail regarding the differentiation of these interventions in coniferous and deciduous trees: First: Only trees of tree nurseries between 2 to 3 years old should be planted on the heaps and dumps. These trees already have, one could say “by nature”, a “biofactic” character. Second: The breeding in tree nurseries must already be adapted to later living conditions. That means, for example, using less mineral fertilizer. Third: “Schooling” of trees must be done without the breeding of knot-free trunks. On the contrary, the lower branches must be preserved, as this promises a better growth on the heaps and dumps. Fourth: Anthropogenic assistance is needed in planting these “biofacts” on the “new land”. For example, the root blending guarantees a better growth of the “biofacts”.

35 Knabe, Wilhelm. 1955. “Pflanzenqualität und Pflanzmethode für Kippenaufforstungen.” Forst und Jagd 5, no. 4 & 5: 162–164, 205–207.

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Fifth: These “biofacts” must be maintained and nurtured, at least during the first years of their lives on the “new land”.

Conclusion Summing up, three concluding theses can be formulated: 1. The research projects of the early 1950s, those of Wilhelm Knabe especially, mark a watershed in the history of recultivation by opening up the era of hybrid research groups. Thus, recultivation was conceptually expanded from afforestation or top-soil recultivation only to become a widespread “ecological” issue.

Fig. 6: “Biofactial” forest on a heap (1951).

2.

Industrial post-mining landscape, especially in previous opencast mining districts, could not exist without the “biofactic” if they wanted to reflect the state of the “natural”, which is usually desired by the public. But what appears as “nature” is phenomenologically by no means “nature”. Thus, the narrative from “Black to Green” could be misleading contextually.

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The concept of “biofacts” should be constitutive for the discourse on “industrial nature”, but until now it does not play a significant role. The same applies to the discourse on the “Anthropocene”.36 Thus, the concept of “biofacts” could enrich both discourses and might provide new contours.

References Baxmann, Matthias. 2004. Vom “Pfützenland” zum Energiebezirk. Die Geschichte der Industrialisierung in der Lausitz. Dresden: Verlag der Kunst. Bayerl, Günter. 2003. “Die Niederlausitz. Industrialisierung und De-Industrialisierung einer Kulturlandschaft.“ Blätter für Technikgeschichte 65: 89–163 (re-published in: Bayerl, Günter. 2011. Peripherie als Schicksal und Chance. Studien zur neueren Geschichte der Niederlausitz, 255–325. Münster et al.: WAXMANN). Bernhardt, Christoph. 2002. “Von der ‘Mondlandschaft’ zur sozialistischen ‘Erholungslandschaft’? Die Niederlausitz als Exerzierfeld der Regionalplanung in der DDR-Zeit.” In Die Niederlausitz von 18. Jahrhundert bis heute: Eine “gestörte” Kulturlandschaft?, edited by Günter Bayerl, and Dirk Maier, 301–23. Münster et al.: WAXMANN. Bramer, Horst et al. 1991. Physische Geographie. Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Brandenburg, Sachsen-Anhalt, Thüringen. Gotha: Hermann Haack. Breitwieser, Lukas, and Karin Zachmann. 2017. “Biofakte des Atomzeitalters. Strahlende Entwicklungen in Ghanas Landwirtschaft.” Technikgeschichte 84: 107–33. Fibich, Peter, and Joachim Wolschke-Bulmahn. 2004. Vom Sonnenrund zur Beispiellandschaft. Entwicklungslinien der Landschaftsarchitektur in Deutschland, dargestellt am Werk von Georg Pniower (1896 – 1960). Hannover: TU Hannover. Fleischer, R. 1954. “Die Anpassung der Förderbrückenbetriebe an die Vorschriften der Wiedernutzbarmachungsverordnung.” Bergbautechnik 4, no. 4: 184–92. Giese, Helmut, and Siegfried Sommer. 2005. Prof. Dr. Georg Pniower. Leben und Werk eines bedeutenden Garten- und Landschaftsarchitekten – eine Dokumentation. Dresden: TU Dresden. Hiller, Olaf, ed. 2002. Die Landschaftsdiagnose der DDR. Zeitgeschichte und Wirkung eines Forschungsprojekts aus der Gründungsphase der DDR. Berlin: TU Berlin. Huff, Tobias. 2015. Natur und Industrie im Sozialismus. Eine Umweltgeschichte der DDR. Göttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Institut für Wasserwirtschaft der DDR. 1981. Abschlußbericht zum Thema 4.3.6.1. des Planes Wissenschaft und Technik 1981. Weiterführung der Analyse der Umweltbelastung und komplexe Einschätzung des Umweltzustandes im Bezirk Cottbus unter besonderer Berücksichtigung des Gebietes Senftenberg/ Lauchhammer. Printed as manuscript. Berlin. Jurasky, Karl. A. 1936. Deutschlands Braunkohlen und ihre Entstehung. Berlin: Gebrüder Bomtraeger.

36 See critical on this topic the article by Timothy LeCain.

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Karafyllis, Nicole, ed. 2003. Biofakte. Versuch über den Menschen zwischen Artefakt und Lebewesen. Paderborn: Mentis. Karafyllis, Nicole. 2004. “Stichwort: Biofakt.” Information Philosophie 32, no. 4: 40–3. Karafyllis, Nicole. 2007. “Growth of Biofacts: the real thing or metaphor?” In Tensions and Convergences. Technological and Aesthetic (Trans)Formations of Society, edited by Reinhard Heil et al., 141–52. Bielefeld: transcript. Karafyllis, Nicole, and Karin Zachmann. 2017. “Einleitung. Pflanzliche Biofakte: Geschichten über die Technisierung der Agrikultur im 20. Jahrhundert.” Technikgeschichte 84: 95–106. Kind, Gerold. 1997. “Territorialentwicklung und Territorialplanung in der DDR. Ergebnisse und Auswirkungen auf die Raumstruktur Deutschlands.” In Regionale Strukturen im Wandel, edited by Annette Becher, 17–104. Opladen: Leske & Budrich. Knabe, Wilhelm. 1955. “Pflanzenqualität und Pflanzmethode für Kippenaufforstungen.” Forst und Jagd 5, no. 4 & 5: 162–4, 205–7. Knabe, Wilhelm. 1957. “Untersuchungen über die Voraussetzungen der Rekultivierung im Braunkohlenbergbau.” PhD diss., Humboldt-Universität zu Berlin. Knabe, Wilhelm. Erfahrungen bei der Planung und Durchführung von Rekultivierungsprojekten in europäischen und nordamerikanischen Tagebauen. Manuscript of a lecture. Undated (1964). Vorl. Sign. 140. Deposita Wilhelm Knabe. Archiv Grünes Gedächtnis, Berlin, Germany. Knoth, Nikola, and Kerstin Nowak. 1993. “Eine ‘grüne’ SED? Aus dem Protokoll einer ZKSekretariatssitzung.” Beiträge zur Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung 35, no. 4: 72–9. Maier, Dirk. 2002. “’Machen Sie der Niederlausitz diese Freude! Sie ist doch schon in der Eiszeit zu kurz gekommen!’ Facetten der Wahrnehmung einer Landschaft seit 1850.” In Die Niederlausitz vom 18. Jahrhundert bis heute: Eine “gestörte” Kulturlandschaft?, edited by Günter Bayerl, and Dirk Maier, 119–47. Münster et al.: WAXMANN. Maier, Helmut. 2007. Forschung als Waffe. Rüstungsforschung in der Kaiser-WilhelmGesellschaft und das Kaiser-Wilhelm-Institut für Metallforschung 1900 bis 1945/48. Göttingen: Wallstein. Meyer, Torsten. 2005. “Der Senftenberger See oder das Ende der ‘Mondlandschaft’?” Jahrbuch für Regionalgeschichte 23: 113–42. Meyer, Torsten, and Axel Zutz. 2010. “Rekultivierung von Braunkohlentagebauen in der Niederlausitz 1920–1960. Institutionalisierungen und Interventionen als Wegbereitung des Senftenberger Seengebietes.” In Paradigmenwechsel und Kontinuitätslinien im DDRStädtebau. Neue Forschungen zur ostdeutschen Architektur- und Planungsgeschichte, edited by Frank Betker, Carsten Benke, and Christoph Bernhardt, 273–328. Erkner: IRS. Pätz, Herbert et al. 1986. Kohle – ein Kapitel aus dem Tagebuch der Erde. Leipzig: Teubner. Petzina, Dietmar. 1968. Autarkiepolitik im Dritten Reich. Der nationalsozialistische Vierjahresplan. Düsseldorf: Deutsche Verlagsanstalt. Sieferle, Rolf Peter. 1997. Rückblick auf die Natur. Eine Geschichte des Menschen und seiner Umwelt. Munich: Luchterhand. Steinhuber, Uwe. 2005. “Einhundert Jahre bergbauliche Rekultivierung in der Lausitz: ein historischer Abriss der Rekultivierung, Wiederurbarmachung und Sanierung im Lausitzer Braunkohlenrevier.” PhD diss., University of Olomouc. Uekötter, Frank. 2010. Die Wahrheit ist auf dem Feld. Eine Wissensgeschichte der deutschen Landwirtschaft. Bielefeld: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht.

Timothy J. LeCain

Mining the Anthropocene: How coal created the supposed ‘Age of Humans’ Among humanists and social scientists, the final two or three decades of the twentieth century have been dominated by a post-modern cultural turn that emphasized the power of human social groups, discourse, and ideas to construct the world. Today, however, post-modern thinking is increasingly giving way to more materially oriented theories and methods. It appears we are in the midst of what I have somewhat flippantly termed a “neo-materialist flip,” a shift in academic theory which tends to turn the old social constructivist theories and methods on their anthropocentric heads.1 This rapidly evolving neo-materialist theory proposes that humans and their cultures must be understood not just as the masters and shapers of matter, but also the products of matter. Humans certainly construct their world, as the post-modernists suggested, yet neomaterialists stress that they do so as embodied material creatures who have already been deeply shaped by the very world they claim to construct. Such was certainly the case with the material at he heart of this conference: coal. Once humans threw their lot in with coal and other hydrocarbons, these powerfully creative materials became increasingly embedded into every aspect of human existence, whether biological or cultural. Yet if humans in a very literal and material sense became “coal people,” understanding and acting on the world through the coal they mined and used, it makes little sense to think of some purely abstract, ideational, or linguistically rooted human “culture” that is constructing that world. Accordingly, we should set aside the self-obsessed hubris inherent in the post-modern project and embrace instead a more humble and materially grounded understanding of our species as a creature inextricably entangled with an array of vibrant material things.

1 While they do not all explicitly embrace the new materialist or neo-materialist name, some key works include: Coole, Diana, and Samantha Frost. 2010. The New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press; Bennett, Jane. 2010. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham, NC: Duke University Press; Descola, Philippe. 2013. Beyond Nature and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press; and Hodder, Ian. 2012. Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships between Humans and Things. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. Note: A small part of the material in this chapter was first published in LeCain, Timothy J. 2017. The Matter of History: How Things Create the Past. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-020

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Such neo-materialist ideas, however, do not always accord well with the set of new ideas swirling around the concept and neologism of the Anthropocene. First used informally by the ecologist Eugene Stoermer back in the 1980s, the term only began to gain wide use when it was popularized by the atmospheric scientist Paul Crutzen, with Stoermer’s support, beginning in 2000.2 The Anthropocene has since quickly escaped its somewhat circumscribed geological meaning to become a popular environmental catchword, often closely linked with global climate change. The term has also been widely adopted by humanists, social scientists, and many other non-geologists, who have found it to offer a useful means of bringing their disciplines into a deeper dialogue with geology, climatology, and other sciences. Derived from the Greek roots anthropo-, for “human,” and –cene, for “recent,” this “Recent Human” era is meant to suggest that anthropogenic changes to the planet have become so pronounced as to constitute a new geological epoch. While it has gained many backers, the term remains controversial among scientists and humanists alike. Some argue that it is grossly premature to declare a new geological epoch based on a few centuries of events since the advent of the coal-fired British industrial revolution (Crutzen and Stoermer’s proposed starting date), mere nano-seconds on the geological time scale. Others argue that significant anthropogenic effects on the planet can be traced back well before the nineteenth century, perhaps even to the advent of agriculture in the Neolithic, which would roughly coincide with the start of the already accepted geological term for the modern age, the Holocene or “Entirely Recent” epoch.3 A few geologists have objected (as I do here) to the inherent anthropocentrism of the term itself, fearing that it strengthens the very human hubris that must be overcome if we are to find a path to a more ecologically viable place of humans on the planet.4

2 The first seminal article was, Crutzen, Paul J., and Eugene F. Stoermer. 2000. “The Anthropocene.” Global Change Newsletter 41: 17–18. The lineage of the term is well explained in Steffen, Will et al. 2011. “The Anthropocene: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 369: 842–867. 3 Stromberg, Joseph. 2013. “What Is the Anthropocene and Are We In it? Efforts to Label the Human Epoch Have Ignited a Scientific Debate Between Geologists and Environmentalists.” Smithsonian Magazine. Accessed May 15, 2014. http://www.smithsonianmag.com/sciencenature/what-is-the-anthropocene-and-are-we-in-it-164801414/?no-ist. 4 Visconti, Guido. 2014. “Anthropocene: Another Academic Invention.” Rendiconti Lincei 25: 381–392; Gibbard, Philip L., and Michael J. C. Walker. 2014. “The Term ‘Anthropocene’ in the Context of Formal Geological Classification.” Geological >Society of London Special Publications 395: 29–37; and Finney, Stanley C., and Lucy E. Edwards. 2016. “The ‘Anthropocene’ Epoch: Scientific Decision or Political Statement?” GSA Today 26 (doi: 10.1130/GSATG270A.1). Accessed September 05, 2018. https://www.geosociety.org/gsatoday/archive/26/3/pdf/i1052-5173-26-3-4.pdf.

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In 2016 a working group of the International Commission on Stratigraphy recommended that the Anthropocene epoch and term be formally recognized, yet at this date the broader geological societies have yet to approve doing so. Debates are ongoing. Clearly there is a pressing need for a broadly capacious term that can capture all of the many complex ways that human beings have and still are changing the planet. However, I fear the Anthropocene is a misleading and counter-productive choice for that term. Just to be clear, my objection is obviously not to the material reality that large-scale and dangerous planetary change is occurring. Rather, I find the proposed name itself deeply problematic, as I fear the term that will inevitably, if perhaps not intentionally, reinforce the very same set of high modernist, anthropocentric, and deeply Promethean beliefs that caused many of our environmental problems in the first place. By contrast, my preferred neo-materialist framing of the issue would emphasize that we humans derive much of what we like to think of as our power, intelligence, and creativity, from the material things around us, like coal and oil – in other words, from the very material world we claim to dominate and control.

The Age of Man? Thus from a neo-materialist perspective, the concept of the Anthropocene suffers from a clear and potentially dangerous flaw: its fundamentally anthropocentric framing of and explanation for the biogeochemical phenomena it proposes to label. Consider that until now geologists have never deemed it necessary to single out any single creature in naming some 4.5 billion years of the planet’s existence. So what could justify doing so now based on changes that have occurred over the past two-hundred or even two-thousand years, mere snippets in the vast ages of the Earth gone by? The answer, at least in part, is that the term Anthropocene is not intended to be solely descriptive in a scientific sense, but to also be both explanatory and politically useful. Crutzen no doubt seized on the term precisely because he wanted to push-back against the powerful influence of climate change deniers by emphasizing the human role in creating global warming. Certainly this is why it is of so much interest outside of the geological community. The term offered a powerful and easily understood stamp of scientific authority to the growing realization that humans were causing transformative changes to the planet’s atmosphere, with potentially catastrophic consequences. The Anthropocene is the “Age of Humans,” at least to some advocates, because humans have created it, perhaps even with some degree of intention. Inevitably, the Anthropocene term tends to emphasize the ways in which humans shaped

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the material world rather than the ways in which humans were a product of that material world. Thus an entirely reasonable and scientifically grounded political goal – to stress the human role in climate change as a means to facilitate political action to cut carbon emissions – led to a term that tended to foster a much broader and more problematic anthropocentric understanding of the world. Yet I argue that it is precisely this conventional modernist and anthropocentric understanding of the human place in nature and historical causality that we need to escape, not reinforce. Humans have obviously become quite powerful – powerful enough to populate nearly every habitable niche on the planet and influence its fundamental biogeochemical cycles. But rather than crediting humans alone, neo-materialism suggests that they accomplished these things only at the price of throwing their lot in with a lot of other things, like coal and oil, whose powers and potentialities they only vaguely understood and certainly did not really control. Likewise, once such partnerships were made, these vibrant things began to shape humans and their cultures in all sorts of unexpected ways, many of them not necessarily for the better. In sum, neo-materialist theory pushes us to consider how the planet has made humans rather than the other way around. The earth is not in human hands, it suggests: humans are in the earth’s hands. Simply to avoid a misleading anthropocentrism would be reason enough to reject the name “Anthropocene,” even if we recognize the need for some sort of holistic term encompassing the manifold changes of the modern era. Yet this historic moment offers a rare opportunity to embrace a term for the modern age that would support, rather than undermine, a more humble understanding of the human place on the planet. By de-centering the human to instead emphasize the many ways in which the material world both creates and entraps them, neo-materialist theory offers a possible alternative, one in which the present predicament is understood as resulting in part from the partnerships humans formed with powerful material things whose potentialities often pushed them in directions they neither envisioned nor intended. A compelling example can be found with the historic human relationship to coal, oil, and other hydrocarbons. Once people learned to burn wood and other plant matter, it took no great leap of the imagination to realize they could also burn deposits of soft easily ignited bituminous coal or peat in the regions where these were readily available. The first known intensive use of coal was in the Song dynasty (960–1279) when the Chinese began using it to smelt iron. By the 17th Century, inhabitants of the city of London were increasingly using coal for heat. This thoroughgoing familiarity with burning coal for heat primed the British to see coal as a possible fuel for the new heat- or steam-engines developed in the early 1700s in order to power pumps that dewatered tin, copper, and of

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course, coal mines. When Thomas Newcomen built the first successful engine in 1712 to dewater the Conygree Coalworks just west of Birmingham, England, humans were able to transform the energy of coal into mechanical power that could do many types of useful work. Prior to this, they had primarily relied on wind and water to power ships and mills, energy sources that were ultimately powered by the solar energy that heated the atmosphere and drove the hydrological cycle. Given the technologies of the time, these energy sources were inherently limited and tied to specific regions, presenting a bottleneck to human growth and power. However, once Newcomen, Watt, and others developed a way to burn coal to create mechanical power, humans bypassed these limits because they could tap the solar energy of millions of years of organic growth that had been compressed into coal, and thus do much more than just keep them warm. The resulting industrial societies were of course founded on intensive use of stored solar energy in fossilized biomass, increasing their energy consumption by three or four times that of earlier agrarian societies. Fundamentally, the rapid growth of human numbers and inventiveness after this industrial revolution was fueled by coal.5 Consider, for example, the centrality of coal in creating and shaping human power. In contrast with Michel Foucault’s constructivist concept of power as primarily a matter of knowledge production and the bounding of acceptable thought, neo-materialism emphasizes that all social power is really a form of energetic or material power.6 As the historian Edmund Russell and several colleagues have recently argued, the ability of some humans to control and direct the planet’s finite flows of energy sources provides the essential material basis for their ability to exert control over other humans. “All power, social as well as physical,” they argue, “derives from energy.” The social power wielded by the owner of a network of grain silos, they note, emerges from the degree to which the owner is able to control how the energy stored in wheat or corn flow through a society.7 Or as the archaeological theorist Ian Hodder puts it, “Power is the differential flow of matter, energy and information through entanglements.”8 Nor are these energetic and other material means of manufacturing and enforcing consent merely empty carriers whose material properties are irrelevant to the

5 Steffen et al. “Anthropocene”, 846–848; Crosby, Alfred. 2007. Children of the Sun: A History of Humanity’s Unappeasable Appetite for Energy. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. 6 Foucault, Michel. 1995 [1977]. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New York: Vintage. 7 Russell, Edmund et al. 2011. “The Nature of Power: Synthesizing the History of Technology and Environmental History.” Technology & Culture 52: 246–259, 248. 8 Hodder. Entangled, 214.

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content. Rather, when humans use things like coal or oil to generate social power, these things demand that humans conform to their material potentials and needs, thus shaping the way power is created and exercised. In his muchadmired revisionist take on the American Ludlow Massacre of 1914, Killing for Coal, the historian Thomas Andrews makes a good case that the material nature of coal – the demands it exacted and the possibilities it created among the miners who worked in and with it – played a central role in fostering solidarity and power among coal workers.9 Pursuing a related vein, Timothy Mitchell’s provocative 2011 book, Carbon Democracy, insists that the material nature of coal not only helped create modern democracy, but in an even deeper sense constituted that democracy.10 Democratic thought and practice are not primarily a product of the spread of an abstract idea, he argues, but are rather in and of themselves material phenomena. To transform coal into useful and profitable commodities involved “establishing connections and building alliances,” Mitchell writes, “connections and alliances that do not respect any divide between material and ideal” or even between the “human and nonhuman.”11 In understanding the human affair with coal, the archaeological theorist Ian Hodder’s concept of an entangling process of material domestication offers a useful alternative to the standard narratives that often stress heroic human inventiveness or social changes. Humans may like to believe that they or their ancestors deliberately and consciously chose to use essentially passive raw materials like coal for their own purposes, and in a limited sense this is true. Obviously coal deposits did not force humans to extract and burn them any more than the wild wheat plants forced humans to select those with the biggest grain heads and carry them back to their settlements, thus beginning the process of domestication and settled agriculture. But to therefore conclude that humans alone were responsible for the course of events that resulted from burning and domesticating coal is equally nonsensical, and can only be sustained by placing humans and their cultures firmly outside of the material realm. As Hodder suggests, humans initially “domesticated” material things like coal to meet very limited and immediate needs. Yet once they began to experience the tremendous ability coal had to increase their power and shape their thoughts and practices, they became increasingly entangled in sustaining and maintaining the resulting relationships. Indeed, as Timothy Mitchell argues, the material nature of coal even helped to create phenomena like democratic states that humans 9 Andrews, Thomas G. 2008. Killing for Coal: America’s Deadliest Labor War. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. 10 Mitchell, Timothy. 2011. Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. London: Verso. 11 Ibid., 7.

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subsequently insisted were solely the product of their own ideas. Once the intimate human partnership with coal was launched, we increasingly became not just people who used coal, but people who were made by coal. As I suggested earlier, it is not too much to argue that the humans whose fates were so closely tied to this particular material thing in some sense should be understood as “coal people.” A neo-materialist perspective thus asks us to recognize that critical historical events like the British Industrial Revolution were the product not only of humans and an immaterial culture of abstract ideas and narratives, but also of the material things they partnered with, like coal and, later, other hydrocarbons. Yet if other non-human material things played such an important role in creating the modern changes to our global environments and cultures, why would we wish to name the resulting epoch solely after ourselves? Indeed, by overestimating the role of humans in creating global environmental problems, the concept of the Anthropocene also encourages us to overestimate the human power to fix them. There is reason to fear that this is precisely what is now happening. As the Australian ethicist Clive Hamilton notes, almost as soon as the idea of the Anthropocene was proposed, the so-called “ecopragmatists,” such as Michael Shellenberger and Ted Nordhaus of the “neogreen” Breakthrough Institute, began to argue that humans can engineer a “Good Anthropocene.” Some advocates of this optimistic view – what Hamilton aptly calls the Promethean position – suggest that humans can manage the effects of global warming through immense geo-engineering projects of an entirely unprecedented scale and scope. For example, some suggest it might be feasible to spray huge volumes of sulphate aerosol particles into the upper atmosphere, thus reflecting more of the sun’s heat back into space.12 Buoyed by such technical optimism, one advocate of the Promethean approach concludes, “we must not see the Anthropocene as a crisis, but as the beginning of a new geological epoch ripe with human-directed opportunity.”13

The case for Carbocene Yet if the “Anthropocene” term is fatally flawed, what might be some less anthropocentric alternatives for the modern age of massive global chance? As I have suggested, my own preference would be the “Carbocene,” the epoch of

12 Hamilton, Clive. 2014. Earthmasters: The Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 25–35, 57–71. 13 Quoted in ibid., 203.

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coal and other hydrocarbons like oil and natural gas. A more technically accurate term would be the “Hydrocarbocene,” though whether the modest increase in accuracy justifies the substantial increase in awkwardness is questionable. More importantly, the briefer Carbocene term would offer a fitting echo of the ancient Carboniferous Period, an era that geologists first named for the thick strata of rich British coal deposits that, having sat more or less quietly for some 300 million years, rumbled back to life in the eighteenth century to fuel that nation’s industrial revolution. Similar strata of coal from the Caboniferous around the world subsequently did the same for many other industrializing nations. The etymological symmetry between the Carbocene and Carboniferous could thus serve as a useful reminder that our modern hydrocarbon-fueled era of abundance was a product not just of humans, but rather of the solar power accumulated over the course of 50 million years that supposedly clever humans managed to burn through in the matter of just a few centuries. It is also no exaggeration to say that almost every other major change in global conditions associated with the modern era – population growth, increased agricultural output, habitat destruction, species extinction, plastics, etc. – derive in significant part from the abundant energy generated by burning coal, oil, natural gas, and other hydrocarbons. The Carbocene would also better capture the broader role of the many carbon-based medicines, dyes, and chemicals that have been and still are being synthesized from the rich soup of organic compounds found in hydrocarbon materials like coal tar, a byproduct of making coke and coal gas once thought to be worthless but that eventually helped to ignite the explosion of synthetic chemicals in the twentieth century. The term would also point squarely towards the immense release of bags, containers, toys, and countless other plastic gewgaws and things into the earth’s lands and oceans, all of them derived from hydrocarbons and all of them slated to endure for hundreds of thousands of years. Some of these plastics have already begun to be incorporated into the geological strata, giving rise to a new geological mineral termed “plastiglomerate.” Finally, the Carbocene would offer a salutary reminder that we “Anthropos” are, at our most basic level, creatures whose very existence depends on the innovative abilities of amino acids, proteins, enzymes and other organic compounds, all of which are built around the element carbon, one of the most extraordinarily creative and useful things on the planet. To my mind, there would be an elegant modesty and symmetry were the most creative species heretofore produced by the earth to formally recognize its inescapable debt to carbon: the extraordinary elemental substance that helped create them and fuel their creative efflorescence.

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Conclusion From this neo-materialist perspective, it seems clear that the vast beds of coal here in the Rhur fueled not only a regional industrial and economic “Boom,” but also played a role in a much broader global boom of modernization – a shift in the material nature of human society that was powerful enough to convince some of us that humans had slipped the surly bonds of nature and become god like in their ability to reshape the world. Yet if we often forgot or chose to ignore the material things that had fueled our rise to power, the coal itself did not. Indeed, the Crisis that followed the economic Boom in the Ruhr, and many other similar booms elsewhere, might be read as a larger crisis of modernity: we humans were forced to confront the reality that we could not so easily dominate coal and our other material partners, because these were never truly “ours” in the first place, that they had agencies and potentialities that we did not fully understand and only imperfectly controlled. Coal was not merely a “raw material” to humans used, but rather was the very stuff from which a radically new and often breathtakingly arrogant human culture and society emerged. In this sense, the greatest “Heritage” of the Rhur region might well be its potential to convey a much needed message to the contemporary world: that we live not in the Anthropocene, an age made solely by humans, but in the Carbocene, an age made by the intimate partnership between humans and coal. What better place could there be to challenge our dangerous tendency towards anthropocentrism than here in the Rhur, where many of the modernist illusions of unbounded human power and separation from material nature had their origins?

References Andrews, Thomas G. 2008. Killing for Coal: America’s Deadliest Labor War. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press. Bennett, Jane. 2010. Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Coole, Diana, and Samantha Frost. 2010. The New Materialisms: Ontology, Agency and Politics. Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Crosby, Alfred. 2007. Children of the Sun: A History of Humanity’s Unappeasable Appetite for Energy. New York: W. W. Norton and Company. Crutzen, Paul J., and Eugene F. Stoermer. 2000. “The Anthropocene.” Global Change Newsletter 41: 17–8. Descola, Phillipe. 2013. Beyond Nature and Culture. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

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Finney, Stanley C., and Lucy E. Edwards. 2016. “The ‘Anthropocene’ Epoch: Scientific Decision or Political Statement?” GSA Today 26 (doi: 10.1130/GSATG270A.1). Accessed September 05, 2018. https://www.geosociety.org/gsatoday/archive/26/3/pdf/i1052-5173-26-3-4.pdf. Foucault, Michel. 1995 [1977]. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prisons. New York: Vintage. Gibbard, Philip L., and Michael J. C. Walker. 2014. “The Term ‘Anthropocene’ in the Context of Formal Geological Classification.” Geological Society of London Special Publications 395: 29–37. Hamilton, Clive. 2014. Earthmasters: The Dawn of the Age of Climate Engineering. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hodder, Ian. 2012. Entangled: An Archaeology of the Relationships between Humans and Things. New York: Wiley-Blackwell. LeCain, Timothy J. 2017. The Matter of History: How Things Create the Past. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Mitchell, Timothy. 2011. Carbon Democracy: Political Power in the Age of Oil. London: Verso. Russell, Edmund et al. 2011. “The Nature of Power: Synthesizing the History of Technology and Environmental History.” Technology & Culture 52: 246–59. Steffen, Will et al. 2011. “The Anthropocene: Conceptual and Historical Perspectives.” Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society 369: 842–67. Stromberg, Joseph. 2013. “What Is the Anthropocene and Are We In it? Efforts to Label the Human Epoch Have Ignited a Scientific Debate Between Geologists and Environmentalists.” Smithsonian Magazine. Accessed May 15, 2014. http://www.smithso nianmag.com/science-nature/what-is-the-anthropocene-and-are-we-in-it-164801414/? no-ist. Visconti, Guido. 2014. “Anthropocene: Another Academic Invention,” Rendiconti Lincei 25: 381–92.

List of figures Per Högselius Fig. 1 Wikimedia Commons. Originally published in Georg Braun and Frans Hogenberg, Civitates orbis terrarum, Vol. 3, Köln 1581 26 Fig. 2 Photo: Kochne W. & Co./Swedish National Museum of Science and Technology 30 Fig. 3 Oil and Gas Journal. 31 October 1960 32 Fig. 4 ÖMV-Zeitschrift, no. 3/1980, 37 35 Fig. 5 Sörgel, Hermann. 1938. Die drei großen “A”: Grossdeutschland und italienisches Imperium, die Pfeiler Atlantropas. München: Piloty & Loehle, 91 40 Alain Beltran Fig. 1 Atlas général Bordas. Paris: Bordas, ca 1970, 34 Fig. 2 © Alain Beltran, 2018 49

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Douglas A. Yates Fig. 1 Anonymous. 1992. Pierre Guillaumat. Réalités industrielles Special Number September 1992 53 Fig. 2 Yates, Douglas A. 2009. The French Oil Industry and the Corps des Mines in Africa. Trenton/Asmara: Africa World Press 63 Lars Bluma Fig. 1 Hamm, Eduard, and Dieter Sonnenschein. Aktionsprogramm Humanisierung des Arbeitslebens. Ergebnisse von Entwicklungsvorhaben der RAG und deren Umsetzung. 1974–1984. Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum beim Deutschen Bergbau-Museum Bochum/Bergbau-Archiv 131/259, 3 97 Michael Farrenkopf Fig. 1 © Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum (montan.dok) beim Deutschen Bergbau-Museum Bochum 024901870010 132 Fig. 2 © montan.dok/Karl-Richard, Arnold and Hans-Erich Haarmann, Werne 134 Fig. 3 © montan.dok 023500132001 136 Fig. 4 © montan.dok 030006210001 137 Fig. 5 © Montanhistorisches Dokumentationszentrum (montan.dok) beim Deutschen Bergbau-Museum Bochum/Bergbau-Archiv (BBA) 131/889 140 Fig. 6 © montan.dok/BBA W 1015 142 Miles Oglethorpe Fig. 1 SC706648, David Spence Collection, East Lothian Council 148 Fig. 2 National Mining Museum Scotland, 1998.603, SC706681 151 Fig. 3 Crown Copyright: HES, SC381683 152 Fig. 4 Crown Copyright: HES, SC706324 154 Fig. 5 Campbell Drysdale, National Mining Museum Scotland, 1998.400.iv, SC445874 156 Fig. 6 © Miles Oglethorpe, Historic Scotland, 2014 159

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Gisela Parak Fig. 1 Rheinisches Landesmuseum, ed. 1975. Bernd und Hilla Becher: Fotografien 1957 bis 1975. Bonn: Rheinisches Landesmuseum, 73 216 Fig. 2 Becher, Hilla. 1969. “Documenting Industrial History by Photography.” Industrial Archaeology: The Journal of the History of Industry and Technology 5, 356 and 357 217 Fig. 3 Adriani, Götz, ed. 1977. Bernhard und Hilla Becher, Typologien industrieller Bauten 1963–1975. XIV. Bienal Internacional de São Paulo: República Federal da Alemanha, 21 218 Fig. 4 Becher, Bernd, and Hilla Becher, eds. 1977. Die Architektur der Förder- und Wassertürme: Industriearchitektur des 19. Jahrhunderts. Studien zur Kunst des 19. Jahrhunderts / Fritz-Thyssen-Stiftung, Arbeitskreis Kunstgeschichte. Munich: Prestel, 50 219 Fig. 5 Hermann, W., and Josef Stoffels, eds. 1959. Die Steinkohlenzechen: Das Gesicht der Übertageanlagen in der zweiten Hälfte des Jahrhunderts. Essen: Industriedruck AG, 137, © Fotoarchiv Ruhr Museum 222 Fig. 6 © Fotoarchiv Ruhr Museum T4035-29 223 Malte Helfer Fig. 1 © Malte Helfer, 2018 227 Fig. 2 © Malte Helfer, 2002 229 Fig. 3 © Malte Helfer, 2012 231 Fig. 4 (a) © Malte Helfer, 2002. (b) http://www.grand-hornu-images.be Fig. 5 © Malte Helfer, 2002 237 Fig. 6 © Malte Helfer, 2002 238 Fig. 7 © Malte Helfer, 2002 240

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Barry L. Stiefel Fig. 1 West Virginia Collection within the Carol M. Highsmith Archive, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division 248 Fig. 2 West Virginia Collection within the Carol M. Highsmith Archive, Library of Congress, Prints and Photographs Division 252 Torsten Meyer Fig. 1 Private-Archive Wilhelm Knabe, film K1_51, pictures 23–28 267 Fig. 2 Knabe, Wilhelm. 1961. “Die Rekultivierung im Rheinischen und Lausitzer Braunkohlenrevier. Köln und die Rheinlande.” In Festschrift zum 33. Dt. Geographentag in Köln, 353–74. Wiesbaden 269 Fig. 3 Brandenburgisches Landeshauptarchiv Potsdam, Rep. 3 BI L, Nr. 1390, s. p Fig. 4 Private-Archive Wilhelm Knabe, film G V_52, picture 26_a 278 Fig. 5 Private-Archive Wilhelm Knabe, film II_57, picture 20 279 Fig. 6 Private-Archive Wilhelm Knabe, film K1_51, picture 18_19 280

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List of authors Prof. Jörg Arnold, Ph.D. is Assistant Professor in Contemporary History (permanent post). He received his BA in 1997 (Southampton), acquired his Staatsexamen in 2002 (Heidelberg) and made his PhD in Modern German History in 2007 (Southampton). His research interests contain social and cultural history of de-industrialisation, British coal mining since 1945, World War Two bombing and memory and urban history. Among others, his most important publications are: Arnold, Jörg, ed. 2018. “Britain and the end of coal.” Special issue, Contemporary British History 32, no. 1. Arnold, Jörg. 2016. “Vom Verlierer zum Gewinner – und zurück. Der ‘coal miner’ als Schlüsselfigur der britischen Zeitgeschichte.” Geschichte und Gesellschaft 42, no. 2: 266–97. Arnold, Jörg. 2016. The Allied Air War and Urban Memory: The Legacy of Strategic Bombing in Germany (Studies in the Social and Cultural History of Modern Warfare 35). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Prof. Alain Beltran is currently Professor at the University Paris-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Research Director (Directeur de recherche) of the National Center for Scientific Research (CNRS) and President of the Committee for the history of energy. His main research fields include the history of Energy in the 19th-21st centuries (oil and gas, electricity, energy savings), business history (especially state-owned companies), networks and territories and patent history. Dr. Lars Bluma is director of the Zentrum für Stadtgeschichte und Industriekultur Wuppertal. He is chairman of the Netzwerk für Industriekultur Bergisches Land e.V. He obtained his PhD in 2004 from Ruhr University Bochum with a thesis on Norbert Wiener and the origin of cybernetics. After several years as a research fellow at the Ruhr University he was involved in a three year research project (2007–2009) dealing with the history of the miner`s mutual benefit society in Germany (Knappschaft). Within this research project, which was supported by the Leibniz-Gemeinschaft, he finished a study about the healthcare policy in German mining. His last research projects on “Industrialization and the miner`s body. Biopolitics in mining at the Ruhr, 1890 – 1980” and “Participative risk policy? – Risk regulation of silicosis in coal mining in West Germany and Great Britain” has been supported by the German Research Foundation (DFG). From 2012 to 2018 he was head of the Mining History Department at the Deutsches Bergbau-Museum Bochum. His primary research interests are history of industrialization, mining history and history of technology and science. His publications include: Bluma, Lars. 2020. Friedrich Engels. Ein Gespenst geht um in Europa. Begleitband zur Engelsausstellung 2020. Remscheid: Bergischer Verlag. Bluma, Lars. 2019. “The History of Medicine Meets Labour History. Miners’ Bodies in the Age of Industrialization.” German History 37, no. 3: 345–58. Bluma, Lars. 2017. “Moderne Bergbaugeschichte.” Der Anschnitt. Zeitschrift für Montangeschichte 69, no. 3: 138–51. Bluma, Lars, and Judith Rainhorn, eds. 2014. A History of the Workplace. Environment and Health at Stake. New York/London: Routledge.

https://doi.org/10.1515/9783110729948-022

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Bluma, Lars. 2013. “The Hygienic Movement and German Mining 1890–1914.” European Review of History – Revue europeen d`histoire 20, no. 2: 177–96. Dr. Sara-Marie Demiriz studied modern history, political science and cultural studies at the University of Münster, Demiriz became a research fellow at “Religion and politics” – Cluster of Excellence at Münster University (2009–2012). She earned her doctoral degree (Dr. phil.) in 2015 with a thesis on “Sacralised politics in the Turkish Republic. Kemalist state and personal cult in national holidays and memorial days 1923–1938”. From 2013 to 2015 she worked as research fellow at the “Institut für Stadtgeschichte Gelsenkirchen” revising and renewing the permanent exhibition of the Documentation site “Gelsenkirchen in the times of national socialism”. Between 2016 and 2018 she was fellow and postdoctoral researcher of the History of the Ruhr Foundation Bochum, working on the interaction of “migration and education” related to the labour migration after 1945 in the Ruhr Area. From 2018 to 2020 she was Wissenschaftliche Referentin of the “Planungsgruppe Geschichte, Politik und Demokratie Nordrhein-Westfalens” (Landtag NRW) and is now research fellow of the Foundation Haus der Geschichte Nordrhein-Westfalen in Düsseldorf. Her research interest includes cultural history, migration studies, the study of nationalism, the study of national socialism and the history of science. Her publications include: Demiriz, Sara-Marie, Jan Kellershohn, and Anne Otto, eds. Transformationsversprechen. Zur Geschichte von Bildung und Wissen in Montanregionen. Essen: Klartext, (in press). Demiriz, Sara-Marie. 2020. “Einwanderung ins Ruhrgebiet. Migration als Motor von Wissen und Wissenschaft.” In Forschung, Kultur und Bildung. Wissenschaft im Ruhrgebiet zwischen Hochindustrialisierung und Wissensgesellschaft, edited by Jens Adamski et al., 435–52. Essen: Klartext. Demiriz, Sara-Marie. 2020. “The Image of Atatürk in Early Republican National Celebrations.“ In Kemalism as a Fixed Variable in the Republic of Turkey, edited by Lutz Berger, and Tamer Düzyol, 27–44. Baden-Baden: Ergon. Demiriz, Sara-Marie, and Stefan Goch. 2019. “Schon immer und immer weiter ein Schmelztiegel das Ruhrgebiet ein Vorreiter von Integrationspolitik?” Forum Geschichtskultur Ruhr, no. 2: 25–32. Demiriz, Sara-Marie. 2018. “Vom ‘Gastarbeiter’ zum Mitbürger – Integration durch ‘Bildung’ in Nordrhein-Westfalen am Beispiel der Revierarbeitsgemeinschaft für kulturelle Bergmannsbetreuung im Ruhrgebiet.” Geschichte im Westen 33: 227–55. Demiriz, Sara-Marie. 2018. Vom Osmanen zum Türken. Nationale und Staatsbürgerliche Erziehung durch Feier- und Gedenktage in der Türkischen Republik 1923–1938. Baden-Baden: Ergon. Pia Eiringhaus, M. A./M. Ed. joined Martin Luther University Halle-Wittenberg in November 2018. She is working towards her doctorate in the context of the DFG-funded project ‘Precarious kinship. Negotiations about adoption and incest after 1945ʹ, which explores the post-1945 history of adoption in the Federal Republic of Germany. Before, Pia Eiringhaus was a researcher at the Institute for Social Movements in Bochum and she spent the autumn of 2018 as a Research Fellow at the University of Sao Paulo, Brazil. She completed her history and teaching degree at Ruhr-Universität Bochum in March 2017. Her research interests are contemporary German history, the history of education and the family, and cultures of history and memory around structural change and deindustrialisation.

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Recent publication: Eiringhaus, Pia, Bettina Hünersdorf, and Till Kössler. 2021. Zur Familialität von Pflegeund Adoptivfamilien. Sozialpädagogische und historische Perspektiven (DGfE-Sektion Sozialpädagogik und Pädagogik der frühen Kindheit, Conference in Lüneburg 23 – 24th May 2019) (forthcoming 2021). Dr. Michael Farrenkopf studied history, journalism and art history at the Universities of Mainz and Berlin between 1987 and 1994. Between 1995 and 1998 he was research fellow at Deutsches Bergbau-Museum Bochum (DBM), working on a comprehensive history of the cokemaking industry (published in two volumes in 2003). 1999/2000 he wrote his PhD thesis at the Technical University of Berlin on the topic “Fire Damp and Coal Dust. The explosion risk in the industrial Ruhr mining (1850–1914)”, published 2003 in German language, for which he received the Young Investigator Award of the Georg-Agricola-Gesellschaft zur Förderung der Geschichte der Naturwissenschaften und der Technik e.V. (now Georg-Agricola-Gesellschaft für Technikgeschichte und Industriekultur e.V.). Since 2001 he is head of the Mining History Document Centre at DBM, between 2001 and 2010 he was also editor in chief of the mining history magazine DER ANSCHNITT. Since 2003 he is lecturer at the history faculty of the RuhrUniversity Bochum, since 2014 also lecturer at the Institute for industrial archaeology and history of science and technology at the Technical University Bergakademie Freiberg in Saxony. Since 2014 he is member of the steering committee and since 2020 he is vice director of DBM. His latest publications include: Farrenkopf, Michael, Andreas Ludwig, and Achim Saupe, eds. 2021. Logik und Lücke. Die Konstruktion des Authentischen in Archiven und Sammlungen (Wert der Vergangenheit). Göttingen: Wallstein. Farrenkopf, Michael, and Torsten Meyer, eds. 2020. Authentizität und industriekulturelles Erbe. Zugänge und Beispiele (Veröffentlichungen aus dem Deutschen Bergbau-Museum Bochum 238/Schriften des Montanhistorischen Dokumentationszentrums 39). Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter. Farrenkopf, Michael, and Stefan Siemer, eds. 2020. Perspektiven des Bergbauerbes im Museum: Vernetzung, Digitalisierung, Forschung (Veröffentlichungen aus dem Deutschen Bergbau-Museum Bochum 235/Schriften des Montanhistorischen Dokumentationszentrums 37). Berlin/Boston: DeGryuter. Farrenkopf, Michael, and Stefan Siemer, eds. 2020. Bergbausammlungen in Deutschland. Eine Bestandsaufnahme (Veröffentlichungen aus dem Deutschen Bergbau-Museum Bochum 233/Schriften des Montanhistorischen Dokumentationszentrums 36). Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter. Farrenkopf, Michael et al., eds. 2019. Die Stadt der Städte. Das Ruhrgebiet und seine Umbrüche. Essen: Klartext. Bluma, Lars, Michael Farrenkopf, and Stefan Przigoda. 2018. Geschichte des Bergbaus (Veröffentlichungen aus dem Deutschen Bergbau-Museum Bochum 225/Schriften des Bergbau-Archivs 31). Berlin: L&H. Priv.-Doz. Dr. Malte Helfer Université du Luxembourg, is senior researcher at the Institute of Geography and Spatial Planning at the Luxembourg University since 2012. Before he became project manager of the projects LUXATLAS and WEBATLAS at the Luxembourg University from 2007–2012, he was assistant professor at the Department of Geography at the University of Saarland 2002–2007. Malte Helfer acquired his PhD at the Faculty of Philosophy, Saarland

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University in 1993, worked as scientific assistant at the Department of Geography at the same university (1993–1995) and gained a bursary of habilitation from the DFG (Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft) from 1995 to 1998. He qualified as a professor (habilitation) for human geography in 1999 at the Faculty of Philosophy of the Saarland University. A scientific assistant job at the Department of Geography of the Saarland University form 1998–2002 and as associate lecturer at the Institut d’Etudes Politiques de Paris “Sciences Po Paris” at the same time (2001–2003) complete his CV. His main research topics are geographic information systems and web mapping, the Greater Region SaarLorLux, industrial history and cultural and industrial heritage. His latest publications: Helfer, Malte. 2017. “La représentation de la littérature de la Lorraine dans l’espace – utilisation d’un système d’information géographique via Internet.” In Actes numériques des Journées d’Étude Internationales “La Lorraine des Écrivains: Création littéraire et Territoire”, 1./2. Décembre 2016, Metz (Conference). Helfer, Malte et al. 2017. La Lorraine des écrivains. Une géolocalisation de la littérature. http://lalorrainedesecrivains.univ-lorraine.fr/. Helfer, Malte et al. 2015. Bildungsbericht Luxemburg 2015. Band 1: Sonderausgabe der Chiffres Clés de l’Education Nationale. http://www.men.public.lu/catalogue-publications /themes-transversaux/statistiques-analyses/bildungsbericht/2015/band-1.pdf. Helfer, Malte. 2015. Die Industrialisierung der Großregion SaarLorLux. In Lebenswirklichkeiten und politische Konstruktionen in Grenzregionen. Das Beispiel der Großregion SaarLorLux: Wirtschaft – Politik – Alltag – Kultur, edited by Chrisitan Wille, 3–20. Luxembourg: Transcript. Helfer, Malte. 2013. “Die Industrielandschaften der Großregion.” Mutations. Mémoires et perspectives du Bassin Minier 6: 69–78. Helfer, Malte. 2013: “Aufschwung und Niedergang des Steinkohlenbergbaus in der Großregion.” In Im Reich der Mitte 2 / Le berceau de la civilisation européenne 2, edited by Eva Mendgen, 69–73. Saarbrücken: Hartung-Gorre. Helfer, Malte. 2012. “Die Entwicklung des Eisenbahnverkehrs in der Großregion von 1838–2012. Zeitgesteuerte GIS-Karte der Entwicklung des betriebenen Eisenbahnnetzes der Großregion mit Kommentar.” In GR-Atlas – Digitaler multidisziplinärer Atlas für Luxemburg und die Großregion, edited by Geoffrey Caruso, Malte Helfer and Michel Pauly. http://gr-atlas. uni.lu. Prof. Per Högselius is Professor of History of Technology and International Relations at KTH Royal Institute of Technology, Stockholm. His teaching and research mainly focuses on energy, natural resources and technological infrastructures in historical perspective, and especially on how experiences from different countries and regions in these fields can be brought together in genuinely transnational narratives and analyses. His books include the award-winning Red Gas: Russia and the Origins of European Energy Dependence (2013), Europe’s Infrastructure Transition: Economy, War, Nature (2016, co-authored with Arne Kaijser and Erik van der Vleuten), and most recently Energy and Geopolitics (2019). In Sweden, Per Högselius is also known as an author of more popularly oriented history books and of shorter essays published in Svenska Dagbladet, a leading Swedish daily. Selected publications: Högselius, Per. 2019. Energy and Geopolitics. London/New York: Routledge/Earthscan.

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Högselius, Per, Arne Kaijser, and Erik van der Vleuten. 2016. Europe’s Infrastructure Transition: Economy, War, Nature. Making Europe Series. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Högselius, Per. 2015. Die deutsch-deutsche Geschichte des Kernkraftwerkes Greifswald: Atomenergie zwischen Ost und West [The German-German history of the Greifswald nuclear power plant: atomic energy between East and West], 2nd edition. Berlin: Berliner Wissenschafts-Verlag. Högselius, Per. 2013. Red Gas: Russia and the Origins of European Energy Dependence. Basingstoke/New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Högselius, Per et al., eds. 2013. The Making of Europe’s Critical Infrastructure: Common Connections and Shared Vulnerabilities. Basingstoke and New York: Palgrave Macmillan (as paperback 2016). Högselius, Per, and Arne Kaijser. 2007. När folkhemselen blev internationell: Elavregleringen i historiskt perspektiv [The internationalization of electricity: deregulation in historical perspective]. Stockholm: SNS Förlag. Högselius, Per. 2007. Östersjövägar [Baltic Sea Paths]. Stockholm: Atlantis. Högselius, Per. 2005. The Dynamics of Innovation in Eastern Europe: Lessons from Estonia. Cheltenham, UK/Northampton, MA, USA: Edward Elgar. Jan Kellershohn, M. A. is research officer at the Institute for the History of Saxony-Anhalt, LDA Saxony-Anhalt, Halle (Saale). He was a fellow of the History of the Ruhr Foundation from 2017 to 2020 and earned his PhD in 2020 at Ruhr-University Bochum with a dissertation on the negotiation of knowledge as a transformational resource in deindustrialisation in the Ruhr Area and Northern France. From September to December 2017, he was fellow of the German Academic Exchange Service at the University of Lille, France. His research interests include the cultural history of trade unionism and strike, labour history, the history of deindustrialisation and vocational training. Recent publication: Kellershohn, Jan. 2018. “‘Automatisierungsverlierer’. Kybernetische Pädagogik, ‘Lernbehinderung’ und der Körper des Bergberufsschülers in den 1960er Jahren.” Body Politics 6, no. 9: 175–199. Prof. Timothy James LeCain, Ph.D. is Professor of History at the Department of History and Philosophy of the Montana State University in Bozeman, MT. He earned his PhD in History in 1998 at the University of Delaware and his BA in History in 1987 at the Montana State University. Timothy LeCain is the author of The Matter of History: How Things Create the Past (Cambridge, 2017), which argues for a less anthropocentric theory and method that emphasizes the central role of things like cattle, copper, and silkworms in making both humans and history. LeCain’s first book, Mass Destruction, won the 2010 best book prize from the American Society for Environmental History. LeCain has been an invited research fellow at the Rachel Carson Center in Munich, Germany, and the Center for Advanced Study in Oslo, Norway. Publications: LeCain, Timothy James. 2018. “Natural Born Humans: Putting Culture, Science, and Religion Back Into Nature.” Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature, and Culture 11: 420–34. LeCain, Timothy James. 2017. The Matter of History: How Things Create the Past. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

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LeCain, Timothy James. 2017. “Copper and Longhorns: Material and Human Power in Montana’s Smelter Smoke War, 1860–1910,” In Mining North America, 1522–2012: An Environmental History, edited by John McNeill and George Vrtis, 166–90. Berkeley: University of California Press. LeCain, Timothy James. 2016. “The Persistence of Things: Copper and the Evolution of Space in Modernist America and Japan.” Jahrbuch für Wirtschaftsgeschichte [Yearbook for Economic History] 57: 169–86. LeCain, Timothy James. 2016. “Heralding a New Humanism: The Radical Implications of Chakrabarty’s Four Theses.” In Whose Anthropocene? Revisiting Dipesh Chakrabarty’s ‘Four Theses’, edited by Robert Emmett, and Thomas Lekan, 15–20. http://www.environmentandsoci ety.org/sites/default/files/2016_i2_final.pdf. LeCain, Timothy James. 2015. “Against the Anthropocene: A Neo-Materialist Perspective.” History, Culture, and Modernity 3: 1–28. LeCain, Timothy James. 2009. Mass Destruction: The Men and Giant Mines that Wired America and Scarred the Planet. New Jersey: Rutgers University Press. Dr. Sigrun Lehnert independent media scholar in Hamburg, earned her PhD with a work on “Wochenschau und Tagesschau in den 1950er Jahren” (about transitions from cinema to early post-war television news) at the University of Hamburg. The following book has been published in 2013 by UVK Verlag, Konstanz. In her post-doc project, she compares among others West and East German newsreels on topics of the economic resurgence 1950–1965; her research interests are film and television history, newsreels, documentary film, archiving, and film heritage. research-blog: www.wochenschau-forschung.de. Recent Publications: Lehnert, Sigrun. 2021. “Genosse Münchhausen, Der Augenzeuge und der Kalte Krieg. Satirefilm und Wochenschau als mediale Weggefährten”. In Film zwischen Polit-Komödie und Gesellschafts-Satire, edited by Hans Manfred Bock et al., 79–92. München: edition text + kritik. Lehnert, Sigrun. 2020. “(Re-)presentation of Everyday Heroes in German Post-war Newsreels (West-East)”. academic quarter 20 (Spring). URL: https://journals.aau.dk/index. php/ak/article/view/5854/5161. Lehnert, Sigrun. 2019. “Music and Voice in German Newsreels of the 1950s/1960s”. BCS eWic Journal, RESOUND 19.15: 91–98. URL: https://www.scienceopen.com/document_file/ 8c304027-adb9-4634-821d-009bd8f1b69f/ScienceOpen/091_Lehnert.pdf. Dr. Torsten Meyer is senior scientist at Deutsches Bergbau-Museum Bochum. Prior to that he was researcher and senior researcher at the University of Hamburg, the Brandenburg University of Technology Cottbus and the Swiss Federal Institute of Technology Zurich. He is mainly interested in Construction History (18th-20th century), History of Industrial Landscape and Industrial Heritage (20th-21st century). He was member of the editorial board of the “Enzyklopädie der Neuzeit” (2005–2012) and since 2017 he is editor (together with Marcus Popplow) of the “Studien zur Geschichte von Technik, Arbeit und Umwelt” (formerly “Cottbuser Studien zur Geschichte von Technik, Arbeit und Umwelt”, founded by Günter Bayerl). His latest publications include: Farrenkopf, Michael, and Torsten Meyer, eds. 2020. Authentizität und industriekulturelles Erbe. Zugänge und Beispiele (Veröffentlichungen aus dem Deutschen Bergbau-Museum

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Bochum 238/Schriften des Montanhistorischen Dokumentationszentrums 39). Berlin/Boston: DeGruyter. Hassler, Uta, Torsten Meyer, and Christoph Rauhut. 2019. Versuch über die polytechnische Bauwissenschaft. Munich: Hirmer. Meyer, Torsten. 2019. “1922 – Ein ‘turning point’ in der Geschichte der Rekultivierung von Bergbaufolgelandschaften.” Der Anschnitt. Zeitschrift für Montangeschichte 71: 206–22. Asrih, Lena, Nikolai Ingenerf, and Torsten Meyer. 2019. “Bergbau als techno-naturales System.” Der Anschnitt. Zeitschrift für Montangeschichte 71, no. 1: 2–18. Dr. Miles K. Oglethorpe is Head of Industrial Heritage at Historic Environment Scotland, the public body responsible for safeguarding and promoting the historic environment in Scotland. After graduating from the University of Durham, he completed his PhD at the University of Glasgow, subsequently moving to Strathclyde University’s Scottish Industrial Archaeology Survey Unit in 1983. In 1985 he joined the Royal Commission on the Ancient and Historical Monuments of Scotland in Edinburgh, from where he moved to the Scottish Government heritage agency, Historic Scotland, in 2007. He has since fulfilled a number of key roles there, including Head of Education, Outreach and Publications, Deputy Chief Inspector, and Head of Policy. He has been a Board member of The International Committee on the Conservation of the Industrial Heritage (TICCIH) since 2003, is a technical assessor for the International Council on Monuments and Sites (ICOMOS), and is a Fellow both of the RSA (Royal Society for the encouragement of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce) and of the Society of Antiquaries of Scotland. He has edited, authored and co-authored a number of books and papers relating to industrial heritage, and energy in particular. Of these, his book, Scottish Collieries: An Inventory of the Scottish Coal Industry in the Nationalised Era (2006) is the most significant, containing the fruits of many years’ work on Scotland’s coal industry. He has also worked with international partners on industrial heritage, notably in Norway and Japan, and most recently led the team responsible for preparing the successful World Heritage nomination for the Forth Bridge (inscribed in 2015). He is currently co-ordinating the development of an Industrial Heritage Strategy for Scotland, which aims to embrace issues of sustainability and the re-use of industrial buildings and structures. He also teaches at the University of Edinburgh for Edinburgh College of Art’s postgraduate conservation course, and is co-supervising a doctoral thesis at the University of Glasgow. Priv.-Doz. Dr. Gisela Parak is an art and cultural historian with a special focus on the history of photography. She received her PhD in 2008 from LMU Munich and was awarded postdoctoral fellowships by the Smithsonian American Art Museum, the Terra Foundation for American Art, the Volkswagen Foundation and the German Historical Institute in Washington, D.C. to work on her second book. From 2013–2016, she was appointed director of the Museum für Photographie Braunschweig and taught at Braunschweig Technical University. From 2016 to 2019, she headed the research project “Bergbaukultur im Medienwandel – Fotografische Deutungen von Arbeit, Technik und Alltag im Freiberger Raum” at Technical University Freiberg. Since July 2019, she oversees the research focus “Visual history” at the German Maritime Museum at Bremerhaven. Selected publications: Parak, Gisela. 2020. “Der Bergmann als Prototyp des ‘Soldaten der Arbeit’. Fotografische Strategien der Inszenierungen des ‘Völkischen’ im Medium Zechen-Zeitschrift”. In Industrielle

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Arbeitswelt und Nationalsozialismus. Der Betrieb als Loboratorium der ‘Volksgemeinschaft’ 1920–1960, edited by Frank Becker, and Daniel Schmidt, 210–22. Essen: Klartext. Parak, Gisela. 2020. “Fotografische Erbeaneignung und Traditionspflege in der DDR. Die Kreiskommission Fotografie Freiberg”. In Im Moment. Neue Forschungen zur Fotografie aus Sachsen und der Lausitz, edited by Silke Wagler, and Kai Wenzel, 140–53. Dresden: Sandstein. Parak, Gisela. 2019. Der Freiberger Bergbau um 1900. Arbeit, Alltag und Technik im Spiegel der Fotografie. Münster: Aschendorff. Parak, Gisela. 2019. “Heinrich Börner und Emil Treptow. Fotografie als Wissenstransfer”. In Bilder aus den Bergwerks- und Hüttenbetrieben. Auftragskontexte fotografischer Repräsentationsalben 1890–1920, edited by Gisela Parak, 71–89. Halle (Saale): Mitteldeutscher Verlag. Parak, Gisela. 2018. “Renger-Patzschs ‘Eisen und Stahl’ und die Sinnhaftigkeit der Industriearbeit”. Kritische Berichte 4 (Industriefotografie): 70–9. Parak, Gisela. 2018. “‘Industrielandschaft’ und ‘Bergbaulandschaft’ in der Fotografie der 1920er und 1930er Jahre. Beispiele aus Sachsen und dem Ruhrgebiet”. Der Anschnitt 3–4: 102–18. Doc. PhDr. Andrea Pokludová, Ph.D. Associate Professor of Department of History and Researcher of Centre for Economic and Social History at the University of Ostrava. Field of Research: Social and urban history of 19th and 20th Century. Member of the International board European Association for Urban History (EAUH). Doc. PhDr. Petr Popelka, Ph.D. Czech historian, Associate Professor and Researcher of Centre for economic and social history at the University of Ostrava. His research fields include modern economic and social history, the history of entrepreneurship and companies during the industrial revolution, the genesis of the modern traffic infrastructure in Central Europe and the landscape changes in the modern age. Selected publications: Cibulka, P., P. Kladiwa, A. Pokludová, P. Popelka, and M. Řepa. 2021. Čas změny. Moravský a lezský venkov od zrušení poddanství po Velkou válku. Praha: Masarykův ústav. Popelka, P., E. Hiebl, J. Pál, and L. Fasora, L. (eds.). 2019. Elitenforschung in der Geschichte des 19. und 20. Jahrhunderts: Erfahrungen und methodisch-theoretische Inspirationen. Wien: LIT Verlag. Popelka, P., L. Fasora, and E. Hiebl (eds.). 2017. Generationen in der Geschichte des langen 20. Jahrhunderts. Methodisch-theoretische Reflexionen. Wien: LIT Verlag. Kladiwa, P., P. Kadlec, D. Gawrecki, A. Pokludová, and P. Popelka. 2016. Národnostní statistika v českých zemích 1880–1930. Mechanismy, problémy a důsledky národnostní klasifikace. Díl I., II. Praha: NLN. Popelka, P., R. Popelková, and M. Mulková. 2016. Black or Green Land? Industrialisation and Landscape Changes of the Ostrava-Karviná Mining District in the 19th and 20th Century. Ostrava: Ostravská univerzita. Popelka, Petr. 2013. Zrod moderní dopravy. Modernizace dopravní infrastruktury v Rakouském Slezsku do vypuknutí první světové války. Ostrava: Filozofická fakulta Ostravské univerzity.

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Popelka, Petr. 2011. Zrod moderního podnikatelstva. Bratři Kleinové a podnikatelé v českých zemích a Rakouském císařství v éře kapitalistické industrializace. Ostrava: Filozofická fakulta Ostravské univerzity. Brian Shaev Ph.D. is University Lecturer at the Institute for History at Leiden University. After completing a history PhD at the University of Pittsburgh (2014), he has been International Research Fellow at New Europe College, postdoctoral researcher at the Centre for European Research at the University of Gothenburg (CERGU), and visiting researcher at the Max Planck Institute for European Legal History. Noteworthy publications include a comparative history of the Schuman Plan in International Review of Social History (2016), an article on the Algerian war and European integration in French Historical Studies (2018), a comparative history of socialist policies on trade liberalization, customs unions, and the Treaties of Rome in Contemporary European History (2018), and a co-edited book under contract Social Democracy and the History of European Competition Policy: Politics, Law and Regulation. Currently he is researching socialist policies on free movement of workers and migration in the 1940–1960s and is co-leader of a grant project financed by the Jan Wallanders och Tom Hedelius Stiftelse on municipal policies on migrant integration in post-war Europe. Prof. Barry L. Stiefel, Ph.D. is an Associate Professor at the College of Charleston, where he is a member of the Department of Art and Architectural History, Urban Studies Program, Historic Preservation and Community Planning Program, and the joint Graduate Program in Historic Preservation with Clemson University. He earned his doctorate in Historic Preservation from Tulane University, Master of Urban Planning from the University of Michigan, Graduate Certificate in Historic Preservation from Eastern Michigan University, and a Bachelor of Science in Environmental Policy (with a minor in Anthropology) from Michigan State University. Stiefel’s research interests are in how the sum of how local preservation efforts affects regional, national, and multi-national policies within the field of cultural resource management and heritage conservation. He has published numerous articles and books, most recently including Community-Built Art, Construction, Preservation, and Place (2017, co-edited with Katherine Melcher and Kristin Faurest); Human Centered Built Environment Heritage Preservation: Theory and Evidence-Based Practice (2018, co-edited with Jeremy C. Wells); and Sustainable Heritage: Merging Environmental Conservation and Historic Preservation (2018, co-authored with Amalia Leifeste). Priv.-Doz. Dr. Henning Türk is a specialist in 20th century international history at the Centre for Contemporary History (ZZF) in Potsdam. He is currently working on a project funded by the German Research Foundation (DFG) about “The International Organization of National Energy Policy: Great Britain and Western Germany in the International Energy Agency (IEA), 1974–1993”. His main publications in this field of research are: Türk, Henning. 2014. “The European Community and the Founding of the International Energy Agency (IEA).” In: Europe in a Globalizing World. Global Challenges and European Responses in the “long” 1970s, edited by Claudia Hiepel, 357–72. Baden-Baden: Nomos. Türk, Henning. 2014. “The Oil Crisis of 1973 as a Challenge to Multilateral Energy Cooperation among Western Industrialized Countries.” Historical Social Research 39 (4): 209–30.

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Türk, Henning. 2018. “Reducing dependence on OPEC-oil. The International Energy Agency’s energy strategy between 1976 and the mid-1980s.” In: Countershock. The Oil Counter-Revolution of the 1980s, edited by Giuliano Garavini, Duccio Basosi and Massimilian Trentin, 241–58. London/New York: I.B. Tauris. Prof. Douglas A. Yates is a political scientist from Boston University who has taught international relations at the American University of Paris and the American Graduate School in Paris, as well as Anglo-American law at the Université de Cergy-Pontoise. From his location in Paris he has become an expert on French African affairs. He has published extensively on the history of the oil industry in France and particularly francophone Africa, including The Rentier State in Africa: Oil-Rent Dependency and Neocolonialism in the Republic of Gabon (1996), the 3rd and 4th editions of the Historical Dictionary of Gabon (2006 & 2018), The Scramble for African Oil: Oppression, Corruption and War for Control of Africa’s Natural Resources (2012) and, the basis for his chapter in this present volume, a biographical history of French petroleum enterprises, The French Oil Industry and the Corps des Mines in Africa (2009), which has an updated second edition coming out next year. Parallel to this research, Prof. Yates has been involved in developing a political theory of contemporary dynasties, publishing notably the article for Oxford Online Bibliographies, “Modern Dynastic Rule” and is currently writing a scholarly monograph on “dynastic republics.”