Books, People, and Military Thought Machiavellis Art of War and the Fortune of the Militia in Sixteenth-Century Florence and Europe (Thinking in Extremes, 3) 9004432094, 9789004432093

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Books, People, and Military Thought

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004432000_001

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Thinking in Extremes Machiavellian Studies

Series Editors Filippo Del Lucchese (Brunel University) Fabio Frosini (Università degli Studi di Urbino) Vittorio Morfino (Università di Milano Bicocca) Editorial Board Étienne Balibar (Université de Paris-Ouest and Kingston University London) Thomas Berns (Université libre de Bruxelles) Alison Brown (Royal Holloway, University of London) Jean-Louis Fournel (Université Paris 8) Marie Gaille (Université Paris Diderot – CNRS) Andrea Guidi (Università dell’Insubria/ SFB 1015 Muße) Giorgio Inglese (Sapienza Università di Roma) Warren Montag (Occidental College) Gabriele Pedullà (Università degli Studi Roma Tre) John P. McCormick (University of Chicago) Peter Stacey (University of California, Los Angeles) Sebastian Torres (National University of Córdoba) Miguel Vatter (The University of New South Wales, Australia) Stefano Visentin (Università degli Studi di Urbino Carlo Bo) Yves Winter (McGill University) Jean-Claude Zancarini (ENS de Lyon, Triangle)

VOLUME 3

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Books, People, and Military Thought

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Machiavelli’s Art of War and the Fortune of the Militia in Sixteenth-Century Florence and Europe By

Andrea Guidi

LEIDEN | BOSTON

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The publication of this book has been funded by a Lila Wallace – Reader’s Digest Publications Subsidy at Villa I Tatti, and by the Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft (DFG, German Research Foundation) – Projektnummer 197396619 – SFB 1015. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Guidi, Andrea, author. Title: Books, people, and military thought : Machiavelli’s Art of War and the fortune of the militia in sixteenth-century Florence and Europe / by Andrea Guidi. Other titles: Machiavelli’s Art of War and the fortune of the militia in sixteenth-century Florence and Europe Description: Leiden ; Boston : Brill, [2020] | Series: Thinking in extremes, 2352-1155 ; vol. 3 | Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2020014924 (print) | LCCN 2020014925 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004432093 (hardback) | ISBN 9789004432000 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Militia--History--16th century. | Europe--History, Military--1492-1648. | Machiavelli, Niccolò, 1469-1527. Arte della guerra. | Military art and science--History--16th century. | Florence (Italy)--History, Military. Classification: LCC D214 .G845 2020 (print) | LCC D214 (ebook) | DDC 355.00945/51109031--dc23 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020014924

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 2352-1155 isbn 978-90-04-43209-3 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-43200-0 (e-book) Copyright 2020 by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Hes & De Graaf, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Rodopi, Brill Sense, Hotei Publishing, mentis Verlag, Verlag Ferdinand Schöningh and Wilhelm Fink Verlag. All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by Koninklijke Brill NV provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to The Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910, Danvers, MA 01923, USA. Fees are subject to change. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

Contents Contents

Contents List of Figures IX Abbreviations x x Introduction 1 1  Why New Research on Florentine Militias and on the Art of War? 1 2 Overview 6 3 Acknowledgements  9

Part 1 “Il modo dello armare presente”: Machiavelli and the Ordinanza of 1527-30 Introduction to Part 1: History and Historiography 13 1  History 13 2  Historiography 15 1 “Il modo dello armare presente” (“Fanterie d’oggi”), Section 1 Hand Firearms in Machiavelli, and in the 1528-30 Ordinanza 19 1  Hand Firearms at the Time of Machiavelli  19 1.1 Individual Firearms in the Documents of Machiavelli’s Time 20 2  Hand Firearms at the Time of the 1527-30 Ordinanza 25 3  Conclusions 31 2 “Il modo dello armare presente” (“Fanterie d’oggi”), Section 2 Comparisons and Relationships between Machiavelli’s 1506 Militia and the Ordinanza of 1528-30 35 1 A Shared Background 35 1.1 The Need for New, Large, Permanent Armies  40 2 Differences 41 2.1 The Separation between the City and the Country Battalions  41 2.2 The Role of the New Militia Battalions in the Structure of the Florentine Army  53 2.3 Different Infantry Battle Techniques  57

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3 “Il modo dello armare presente” (“Fanterie d’oggi”), Section 3 The Role of the Peasants: Innovations within the Machiavellian Militia 63 1  The Administration of Justice 64 2  Benefiting and Rewarding  67  3 Conclusions 70 4 “Il modo dello armare presente” (“Fanterie d’oggi”), Section 4 Infantry Battle Techniques and Infantry Tactics in Machiavelli’s Militia of 1506 and in 1521 Art of War 73 1  Ravenna as a Turning Point: From the Swiss Model in the 1506 Militia to the ‘Third Order’ of Infantry in the Prince, up to the Roman Archetype in the Art of War 76 2  Conclusions 95

Part 2 The Reception of Machiavelli’s Art of War and the Fortune of the Militia Concept in Europe Introduction to Part 2: A Brief Introduction to the Fortune of Machiavelli in the Sixteenth Century 101 1  Machiavelli and Machiavellism  101 2  Historiography on the Art of War and This Book  106 5 The Circulation of Machiavelli’s Art of War in Early-Modern Europe, and Its Influence on Cultures of Warfare and on Experiments with Organizing Militias 111 1 France 112 1.1 The First French Translation of the Arte della guerra and the Publication of French Military Treatises Inspired by Machiavelli  118 1.2 A Lost Latin Translation? 133 2  Basle, Switzerland and the German-Speaking World 139  2.1 Appendix: a Little-Known (Anonymous) Huguenot French Theorist of Military Doctrine in Basle 142 3  The Creation of Infantry Legions in Sixteenth-Century France 154  4 Spanish Provinces: The Uses and the Misuses of Machiavelli by European Sovereigns 163

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5  The Long-Standing Influence of the Art of War. Training and Discipline in the Late Sixteenth Century. The War in the Flanders and the Militia in England 170 6 Fortune, Misfortune, and the Decline of the Machiavellian Heroic Model of Military Glory in Early-Modern Europe 175  1 Collective Virtue: ‘Heroic’ Visions of the Infantry as ‘Warrior’: Contacts and Exchange of Ideas in Europe 176  2 Individual Virtue: The Machiavellian Concept of ‘Heroism’ and Its Transformations in Subsequent Military Thinking 188  3 The Declining Fortune of Machiavelli’s Concepts of Glory and Heroism 195 7 Conclusions 203 1  The Relationship between the Art of War, the New Standing Armies, the Wider Power Structures of European States, and the Connected Cultures of Warfare  203 3  Political Engagement and Civic Activism 211 Appendix 215 1 Introduction: Some Notes on the Military Documentary Production of the Time, and on the Available Documentation  215  1.1 Practical and Administrative Records: Production, Preservation and Availability 215  1.2 The Records of the Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia   from 1527 to 1530: Loss, Preservation and New Discoveries 219 1.3 Short Summary of the Sources Effectively Used in This Appendix 223 2 Documents 224 Bibliography 267 Index of Names 295

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FiguresFigures

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Figures 1

Holbein, Hans, the Younger. Battle Scene. c. 1524 (drawing, pen and ink and brush, grey wash, 28.6 × 44.1 cm). Kunstmuseum Basel, Wikimedia Commons 7 November 2017 177 2 Burgkmair, Hans, the Elder (or perhaps Leonhard Beck, Hans Schäufelein or Hans Springinklee). The Battle of Ravenna. c. 1513-18 (woodcut from Der Weiss Kunig). Austrian National Library Vienna, Wikimedia Commons 7 November 2017 182 2 bis The same illustration, my arrows added 183 3 Beck, Leonhard (?). St. Aubin du Cormieu. c. 1513-18 (woodcut from Der Weiss Kunig). Austrian National Library Vienna, Wikimedia Commons 7 November 2017 184 4 Mor, Anthonis (formerly attributed to Titian). Portrait of Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, 3rd Duke of Alba. 1549. Fundación Casa de Alba, Madrid, Wikimedia Commons 7 November 2017  194 5 Velázquez, Diego. The Surrender of Breda. c. 1635 (oil on canvas, 307 × 367 cm). Museo del Prado, Madrid, Wikimedia Commons 7 November 2017 198 6 Rubens, Peter Paul. The Consequences of War. 1637-1638 (oil on canvas, 206 × 342 cm). Pitti Palace, Florence, Wikimedia Commons 7 November 2017  200 7 Lupi, Simonzio. The Battle of Pavia, from The Triumphs of Emperor Charles V. c. 1556-1575 (miniature, 200 × 290 mm). British Library (London), ­A dditional 33733, f. 6, The British Library Online 7 November 2017  200

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Abbreviations

Abbreviations

Abbreviations ASF BL BNCF

Archivio di Stato di Firenze British Library Biblioteca Nazionale Centrale di Firenze

Please note: Unless otherwise noted, all quotations from the original text of the Art of War and the Discourses on Livy in the footnotes include the paragraph number, and are from: N. Machiavelli, L’arte della guerra. Scritti politici minori (“Edizione Nazionale delle Opere,” vol. III), ed. by J.-J. Marchand, G. Masi, D. Fachard (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2001); and N. Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio («Edizione Nazionale delle Opere» vol. II), ed. by F. Bausi, 2 vols. (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2001).

Introduction Introduction

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Introduction 1

 Why New Research on Florentine Militias and on the Art of War?

A study on the armies of the Florentine Republic in the early decades of the sixteenth century is not only an investigation in the history of warfare, it is also a way to understand important developments at the core of military and political thinking in Europe. Focusing on a crucial time for the establishment of military and institutional processes and regulations, some of which were quite long-lasting, this book examines previously unknown documentary evidence that places Machiavelli’s thought in the center not just of the Florentine experience, but of the development of military policies across Europe as well. Military reforms were already underway in Europe before the creation of Machiavelli’s militia and the publication of The Art of War. In 1445, French king Charles VII established fifteen so-called Compagnies d’Ordonnance: for the first time in Europe, a sovereign had collected sufficient funds and resources to pay his own soldiers rather than using troops raised by barons and the local aristocracy. Equally new, these troops remained in permanent service instead of being dismissed at war’s end. Less promisingly, however the Compagnies d’Ordon­nance were predominantly composed of heavy cavalry, in the traditional form of the lance.1 But in the meantime, a series of victories by the Swiss over the Hapsburgs had demonstrated the potential of the pike-equipped infantry phalanx in open-field battles. This new army model was beginning to replace the one based on cavalry chosen for the Compagnies d’Ordonnance. The pike, a long wooden shaft with a sharp iron head, was an exceptionally effective defense against the cavalry charges that had dominated battle fields until then. The length of the pike enabled the front of the phalanx to present the heads of their weapons to the enemy, thus creating an impassable barrier of steel sharp points. The next crucial development came during the Italian Wars (1494-1559), when new infantry techniques and indeed a new type of army were conceived. The descent of King Charles VII’s troops into the Italian peninsula in 1494 began a time of crisis and conflict characterized by a greater use of new gunpowder weapons and a switch from cavalry to infantry2 that lead to a massive 1 G. Parker, The Military Revolution: Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 69. 2 Cf. A.-C. Fiorato (ed. by), Italie 1494, Cahiers de la Renaissance italienne (Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 1994); D. Abulafia, eds., The French Descent into Renaissance Italy, 1494-5:

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004432000_002

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increase in infantry recruitment. It makes sense then that Niccolò Machiavelli saw the infantry as “the sinew of an army,” the ‘fundamental body’ around which to build the military strength of a state. During these wars, the creation of composite armies that incorporated Swiss, Germans, Gascons, French and Italians into a single unit became standard. Moreover, in the rapid course of events, the enemies of one campaign could become allies in the next. This competition and exchange between different methods and approaches helped to develop new tactics, particularly related to the increased use of gunpowder weapons. The commanders and soldiers involved in the wars – whether from France, Spain, the Hapsburg Empire, or the Italian States – tried out new combinations of infantry, cavalry and gunners and new methods of deploying field artillery. In the face of external aggression and shifting tactics, the Italian states’ capacity to regularly field military forces on a larger scale became more important. Nevertheless, as Michael Mallett has explained, Florence in particular was very slow to develop a permanent military establishment; in contrast, Venice already had a permanent force.3 Machiavelli’s solution was the militia of 1506,4 which he thought would provide a more effective home-grown military power. Paradoxically, however, because of Florence’s lack of a large infantry, he arrived at it by improving and expanding traditional features that had already been in place. For instance, he used the requirement that each household provide one armed infantryman, a traditional Quattrocento tool of Florentine recruitment. A similar logic can be seen in the countryside Ordinanza of 1527-30, an important measure that historians (both contemporary and later) have overlooked, focusing instead on the citizen militia, established just a year later in 1528. One reason, perhaps, for the dismissal of the countryside Ordinanza is the prevailing impression that the cities and villages of Florence-controlled territories had surrendered too quickly when an Imperial army invaded Tuscany. Indeed, the rapidity with which these territories surrendered has led twentieth-century historians such as Charles C. Bayley to argue that the Antecedents and Effects (Aldershot: Variorum, 1995); M.E. Mallet & C. Shaw, The Italian Wars, 1494-1559: War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe (Harlow, New York: Pearson, 2012). 3 J.R. Hale & M.E. Mallett, The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). 4 P.J. Jones, “The Machiavellian Militia: Innovation or Renovation?,” in La Toscane et les Toscans autour de la Renaissance: Cadres de vie, societé, croyances. Mélanges offerts à Charles-M. de La Roncière (Aix en-Provence: Presses Universitaires, 1999), 11-52; A. Guidi, Un Segretario militante. Politica, diplomazia e armi nel Cancelliere Machiavelli (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009); M. Hörnqvist, “Perché non si usa allegare i Romani: Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506,” Renaissance Quarterly, 55, 1 (2002): 148-191.

Introduction

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b­ attalions of the contado were actually partisans of the Medici.5 This capitulation gave the impression that a significant part of the city’s dominion – including infantrymen recruited from those areas – had surrendered voluntarily to Florence’s enemies.6 As peasants and inhabitants of Tuscan villages were subject to Florence but lacked the rights given to Florentine citizens, they had little incentive to defend the city.7 Thus, it is not surprising that Florentine historians such as Benedetto Varchi stressed the role of the city militia8 (in which he himself served)9 during the siege of Florence. Indeed, he barely mentioned the participation of the Ordinanza del contado in the last phases of the fight. Later historians also paid more attention to the citizen militia, especially in nineteenth-century Italian historiography, as the heroic fight of Florentine patriots against the greater forces of foreign invaders was seen as a mirror and harbinger of the events of the Risorgimento.10 By contrast, only a few chroni5

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C.C. Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence. The De Militia of Leonardo Bruni (Toronto: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1961), 296 & 300. More balanced in this matter is C. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1925), 167-168 & 227. Bayley’s accusations seem exaggerated, even given the general diffidence and suspicion among some Florentine commissioners toward the army in the territories, cf. A. Monti, La guerra dei Medici. Firenze e il suo dominio nei giorni dell’assedio (1529-1530): uomini, fatti, battaglie (Florence: Nuova Toscana Editrice, 2007), 58-59. However, at least a few officers of the Ordinanza were accused of disloyalty; Michele da Montopoli, captain of the Valdarno battalion, was accused of being a partisan of the Medici, as we understand from a letter sent to the general commissioner Tosinghi, ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 66, n. 83, Niccolò Cerretani to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Fucecchio, 14 Nov. 1529. Note, however, that the troops of the Ordinanza primarily defended the garrisons of Pisa and Livorno that were not involved in this capitulation, cf. infra chapter 2. On this topic, cf. P. Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Turin: Einaudi 1952), 439-440; G. Sasso, Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. I, Il pensiero Politico (Bologna: il mulino 1993), 205; and Guidi, Un segretario militante, 326 ff. For an introduction to the theme, cf. S.K. Cohn, Creating the Florentine State. Peasants and Rebellion, 1348-1434 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 1999). The Florence City Militia was created in 1528; see the City-Militia Act of 6 November 1528, in “Provvisione della milizia ed ordinanza fiorentina – 6 novembre 1528,” ed. by F. Polidori, Archivo Storico Italiano, serie I, tomo I, (1842), 384-409. Cf. S. Lo Re, La crisi della libertà fiorentina (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2006), 22-23, 75 & 105. See P.C. Falletti Fossati, Assedio di Firenze. Contributo, vol. I Studi, vol. II Documenti (Palermo: Giannone e Lamantia, 1885); also Francesco Ferruccio e la guerra di Firenze del 15291530, Raccolta di scritti e documenti rari pubblicati per cura del Comitato per le onoranze a Francesco Ferrucci, prefazione di Francesco Curzio (Florence: Stabilimento di Giuseppe Pellas, 1889); E. Albèri, L’Assedio di Firenze illustrato con nuovi documenti, (Florence: Tipografia all’insegna di Clio, 1840); G. Canestrini, “Documenti per servire alla storia della ­milizia italiana,” Archivio Storico Italiano, vol. XV (1851). For a general introduction to nineteenth-century Italian historio­graphy see A.M. Banti, “Telling the Story of the Nation

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clers – including Giuliano Ughi, who was born in the contado – noted that the Ordi­nanza’s battalions also defended Florence’s city walls.11 One of the goals of this book is a reassessment of the Ordinanza of 1527. A great part of the reason it has been overlooked is the loss of the documentation of the Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia (the council that governed this country militia) for the years 1527-30.12 The loss is particularly important because it was principally administrative records, in particular the missives sent to territorial military officers about the organization of the Republic’s country battalions. Unpublished letters and documents that were thought to be lost enable the reconstruction of at least part of the Nove’s letters from 1527 to at least 1529. In fact, contrary to what is generally thought even by modern-day historians, the Nove (the Nine of the Militia) were actually capable of organizing country-militia battalions on their own authority in the territories from July 1527 onward. The study of the organization and the training of these Florentine militias reveals aspects of the history of warfare related to both the tendency to recruit larger infantry corps and the bureaucratic needs connected to this kind of state mobilization. The story of these militias – particularly, but not exclusively the one conceived by Machiavelli in 1506 – connects to the broader circulation of thought, people and books and to European military reforms made during the early decades of the sixteenth century. Using the early sustained contact and exchange first between Florence and France and then among the States of the Italian peninsula, the Empire and German-speaking territories, this book connects the Tuscan militia experiments and the circulation of Machiavelli’s Art of War (a book that draws from the author’s experience in the formation of the 1506 battalions) to the military history of the period and the development of new cultures of warfare. I argue that the policies linked to the creation and uses of these infantry-based militias anticipate aspects of the so-called “military revolution,” including those associated with the emergence of the administrative bureaucracy in the early modern era.13 Practices relating to military techniques and administration, and the political, social and financial features in Risorgimento Italy,” in Nations and Nationalities in Historical Perspective, ed. by G. Hálf Danarson & A.K. Isaacs (Pisa: Edizioni Plus, 2001), 15-25. 11 «…All’ordinanze de’ bastioni stavono sì disposti, che stava un soldato forestiero et uno della milizia et uno del battaglione del contado», G. Ughi (fra’), “Cronica di Firenze,” in Francesco Ferruccio e la guerra di Firenze, 414. 12 Cf. infra the introduction to the Appendix of Documents. 13 A. Corvisier, “Armées, etat et administration dans les temps modernes,” in Histoire comparée de l’administration, (IVe–XVIIIe Siècles), Special issue of Revue belge de Philologie et d’Histoire, 63-4 (1985), Acts of the conference, 27 March-1st April 1977 (Munich, 1980): 555-69; S. Gunn, “War and the Emergence of the State: Western Europe, 1350-1600,” in F. Tallett & D.J.B. Trim, eds, European Warfare, 1350-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge

Introduction

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of these militias, constituted workshops in the revival of the ancient military tradition, one that Machiavelli took to a new level by adopting his new famous approach to the study of the past – looking at history in the light of the “experience of modern things.” Machiavelli’s key role in conceptualizing this new understanding of militias, the diffusion of his ideas and the way this blend of cultures and practices of war helped found aspects of early modern politics and armies that are still extant in governing processes and theoretical legitimizations of power is the other touchstone of this book. Niccolò Machiavelli’s Art of War (the Libro della Arte della guerra, 1521) played a prominent role in the formation of new cultures of war. Rooted in Machiavelli’s study of the ancients, the book had a specific purpose – to advocate for the paradigm of an exemplary infantry militia – but it was also influenced by his experience with the 1506 Ordinanza. Although it was an idealistic work, it was based on an acute interpretation of some of the real weaknesses of the military and political orders of the time, and it reached a large audience across the continent. In this way, the work both reflected and affected the perception of the need to reform both warfare and processes of state building in early sixteenth-century Europe. State militias were a forerunner of military conscription in early modern states such as Spain,14 and my research shows how Machiavelli’s ideas contributed to the creation of new larger armies and changes in the wider power structures of European states, in both monarchies and republics. The book thus touches upon important features of the warfare revolution and state building, including the problems of national and corporate identity and the loyalty of troops and militiamen. The Italian Wars created opportunities for technical developments and new military strategies, while the combination of heterogeneous methods of recruiting, and mobility within the ranks soon destroyed any sense of corporate identity.15 Machiavelli’s first objective was to tackle this problem, and his ideas had important effects on the development of the concept of military discipline, as well as on cultures of war and notions of military virtue and glory in the political and military literature of the sixteenth century. For one thing, Machiavelli re-shaped the conception of a patriot warrior. In the classical heritage, he was a hero. However, according to Machiavelli, this patriot must first and foremost be a leader of a community that includes both Uni­versity Press, 2010): 50-73; J. Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States 1550-1660 (London: Routledge, 2002). 14 L.R. García, “Types of Armies: Early Modern Spain,” in War and Competition between States, ed. by. Ph. Contamine (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000), 37-68. 15 Parker, The Military Revolution, 69

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Introduction

peasants and citizens. Machiavelli’s warriors have a specific task: to inspire and train their fellow militiamen and teach them how to work and act collectively. He saw the infantry militia as a collective body, both military and civic, that was generated by the positive influence of individual example and discipline, drill and training. The infantry was a powerful body, both the army’s “sinew,” and a collective force in need of discipline, which Machiavelli emphasized by stressing the need to return to classical understandings of warfare and militia. It was this vision that spread through Europe alongside the changes in military techniques. While the mainstay of medieval armies had been the noble cavalry, the new model made famous by the Swiss pikemen meant that early modern armies became more and more infantry based. This historical shift was still occurring in Machiavelli’s era, and his experiment with the Florentine militia were critically important in pushing the shift forward. This militia, I argue, was not only a political attempt to reform the institutions of the Florentine Republic, but also the cornerstone in the shaping of Machiavelli’s concept of the people in arms as the backbone of any army and the defender of the liberty of the state. The synthesis between this experiment and the revival of the classical tradition that characterizes The Art of War was crucial to the construction of this doctrine and, more broadly, to Machiavelli’s understanding of the connections between politics and the military. 2 Overview The first half of this book is a comparative exploration of two Florentine Renaissance militias in the Tuscan countryside: one promoted and created by Niccolò Machiavelli between 1506 and 1512, the other, the Ordinanza del contado from 1527 to 1530. This half also discusses the link between the former and the military techniques and tactics of Machiavelli’s Art of War (1521). The opening chapter focuses on the problem of documenting the number, quality and nature of the handguns available to Machiavelli’s 1506 militia and then to the 1527-30 Ordinanza. It provides a documentary response to the question of whether or not the evolution of new gunpowder weapons changed the nature, structure and composition of the Florentine militias in the first three decades of the sixteenth century, and if so, in what ways. Using little known and unpublished sources, chapter one provides detailed documentary evidence of the transition from a pike- and crossbow-equipped infantry, supported by a small number of schioppettieri (handgunners) in the 1506 militia of Machiavelli’s times, to an infantry of both pikemen and arquebusiers in the militia of 1527-1530. This evolution is in line with the technical development of

Introduction

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the Italian infantry in the early sixteenth-century, but it also lets us reconsider Machiavelli’s supposed inability (as seen by traditional historiography) to foresee the growing role played by firearms on the field of battle. The second chapter extends the comparison between Machiavelli’s militia of 1506 and the 1527-30 Ordinanza by using the increased use of new and more efficient firearms documented in chapter 1 to explain the evolution of the Floren­tine Renaissance militia. Unlike the pike, the arquebus could be used without much training, which let the Florentine authorities assign the country-militia infantry only certain military functions such as manning garrisons (for which this weapon was the most effective choice). These practical realities led the authorities to allocate mainly this kind of secondary task to the country battalions, whereas Machiavelli had given them a pivotal role – they were to make up pike-armed infantry battle formations. The gap occured even though the Provvisione of 1527 re-introduced the council of the Nine of the Militia as, at least in theory, Machiavelli had originally conceived it. In this regard, I argue that, contrary to what is generally thought, there is a possibility that Machiavelli (who returned to Florence in 1527, a few days before his death, just after the Republic’s renewal) was asked for advice on the Provvisione as he had conceived of it in 1506 during the popular regime. The third chapter shifts the analysis from the technical features to the political aspects of the Machiavellian militia project. It focuses on Machiavelli’s early writings on the militia (from 1506 to 1511) to show his view of the role of peasants and local communities subject to Florence. Here I argue that Machia­ velli knew that, in order to field military forces on an unprecedented scale and to maintain substantial permanent troops, the peasants’ role in the Florentine state would have to be reassessed, which today we connect to the formation of the Italian Regional state during the Renaissance. Machiavelli’s project shifted the militia’s role from temporary and ancillary to the main infantry force for the whole army. His insistence on benefiting and rewarding conscripts and on the need for fair and firm justice in the face of crimes or conflicts among the conscripts, or between them and citizens of Florence, can be seen as an acknowledgement of the conscripts’ importance in the politics of the Tuscan state. The fourth chapter provides a comparison of the infantry battle techniques adopted by Machiavelli for his militia with the modifications the model underwent for his 1521 book Art of War. The focus is on a number of little-studied interconnections between Machiavelli’s military ideas and his political thought: for Machiavelli, raising a large popular infantry militia force was not just a practical solution; it was part of his general tendency to side with the “people” against any aristocracy. My new reading of his works in conjunction

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Introduction

with new sources shows that Machiavelli’s almost passionate interest in infantry battle techniques as expressed in the Art of War can – indeed must – be associated with his radical political intent. In the second half of the book, I address the Art of War’s longstanding influence on military thinking and experiments with militias in early-modern Europe to the end of the sixteenth century, focusing on the book’s key role in the translation, copying and re-elaboration processes that marked the exchanges among early-modern cultures of warfare. Chapter five also provides littleknown evidence showing how Machiavelli’s military ideas reached many latesixteenth-century European thinkers through the practical and theoretical re-working of his ideas by Guillame du Bellay and other members of his intellectual circle. The reception and transformation of Machiavelli’s original concepts and ideas, in particular by the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre/ Discipline militaire – regardless of who the real author was – and the courtly milieu that developed around du Bellay’s literary circle favored a process of assimilation and digestion into a monarchical culture, thus facilitating the formation of what has come to be called Machiavellism, as well as reactions to it. Chapter six focuses on contacts and exchange among the Italian peninsula, German territories, France and England to show how at the beginning of the early-modern age a new military culture was ignited by the circulation of books, military thinking, and people. I show how the Art of War contributed to a culture of beliefs and cultural representations of the infantry as a force that was heroic and powerful, but at the same time, brutal, tragic and in need of discipline, particularly to avoid the disorder that might follow defeat. This chapter also illustrates the way that over the course of the sixteenth century, the reception of the original concept of heroism in Machiavelli’s works as a multifaceted and sometimes ambiguous mixture of military and political glory, discipline, leadership and wisdom arising from the Roman example evolved, eventually being replaced by simpler views of heroism. By the beginning of the following century a new model of honor and prudence had been born from the ruins of the controversial Machiavellian concept of heroism. Chapter seven examines the relationship between the Art of War, the new standing armies, the wider power structures of European states, and the interconnected cultures of warfare to demonstrate that the book’s role in the development of these cultures is larger than generally thought, with Machiavelli’s conception of a militia influencing and informing the formation of political engagement and civic activism in both republics and monarchies, notwithstanding modifications like those mentioned above. The book concludes with an appendix of primary sources found in the Florentine State Archives that have informed the first half of the book. They

Introduction

9

include extracts from transcriptions and reports of council meetings, government and financial materials, dispatches, orders and deliberations, dozens of letters and orders sent to marshals, commissioners, commanders of the army and city officers in the contado (countryside), as well as deliberations concerning the Florentine Ordinanza from 1527 to 1530. 3 Acknowledgements I wish to thank all the institutions and people who supported this research. Without their help, advice and support, this book would have never been published. The first part of the book is based on material I collected as a Fellow of Villa I Tatti, the Harvard University Center for Italian Renaissance Studies in Florence in the academic year 2011/12. My stay at the School of Historical Studies of the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton from January to June 2017 gave me the opportunity to study the material carefully. The second part arises from further research I carried out with the support of other institutions and funding, especially the Collaborative Research Center 948 working on the theme “Heroes – Heroizations – Heroisms” at the University of Freiburg and the Herzog August Bibliothek of Wolfenbüttel in Germany. In particular, an early version of the section “Fortune, Misfortune, and the Decline of the Machiavellian Heroic Model of Military Glory in Early-Modern Europe” was published as an article in the Collaborative Research Center 948 e-journal helden.heroes.héros. The introductions to the appendix of documents have benefited from research developed during my time at Birkbeck-University of London as a Post-Doctoral Fellow in the European Research Council’s project AR.C.H.I.ves – A comparative history of archives in late medieval and early modern Italy. I thank my former colleague Alessandro Silvestri for his useful revision of these sections. At the very last stage, my research benefitted also from the interdisciplinary discussions of the project Machiavellian Otium: Strategies of Retreat in Niccolò Machiavelli’s Letters from 1512 to 1527, funded by the Collaborative Research Center 1015 Otium. Boundaries, Chronotopes, Practices of the University of Freiburg. The publication of this book has been supported by a Lila Wallace – Reader’s Digest Publications Subsidy at I Tatti and by the Collaborative Research Center 1015, Freiburg. Thus my debt toward these institutions is even double. I thank the Director of I Tatti, Professor Alina Payne and the Award Committee for the support. I thank Brill as well as the editors of the series “Thinking in Extremes” – Filippo del Lucchese, Fabio Frosini and Vittorio Morfino – for

10

Introduction

accepting my work and offering continuous support, advice and patience as well as extremely useful comments. I also want to thank John M. Najemy, JeanJacques Marchand, Francesco Bausi, Anthony M. Cummings, Judith Frömmer and Marcello Simonetta for their advice and support. In addition, I thank Ronald G. Asch, Isabelle Deflers, and Sven Externbrink for the opportunity to present this research at the Historisches Seminar of Freiburg and at the Seminar für Mittlere und Neuere Geschichte at Göttingen University. Finally, thanks go to Christine Shaw and Gaetano Lettieri for their precious help and advice with an earlier version of some of the chapters.

11

Introduction

Part 1 “Il modo dello armare presente” Machiavelli and the Ordinanza of 1527-30

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Introduction

13

Introduction to Part 1

History and Historiography 1  History The so-called Italian Wars, which started in 1494 and continued until the middle of the sixteenth century, not only marked the beginning of a time of crisis, but the end of the first period of the Medici rule over Florence. When the French king Charles VIII entered Tuscany on his march to the Kingdom of Naples, over which he aimed to re-establish French rule, Piero de Medici signed a treaty with him. The people of Florence then rejected the treaty and exiled Piero after a popular uprising. The Medici regime collapsed, but the popular government established in 1494 did not last long. Particularly controversial was the radical spirit of the institutional reforms inspired by the Dominican friar Girolamo Savonarola, which attracted a strong opposition from both the aristocracy and parts of the so-called popolo. Within three years, Savonarola had lost most of his support, and Pope Alexander VI threatened Florence with excommunication if the city continued following him. In 1498, after Savonarola was declared a heretic, he was put on trial and burned at the stake. Internal conflict and the inability to prevent the disaggregation of territories formerly controlled by the Florentine republic undermined the military capabilities of the newly established government. This was partly due to the historical deficiencies of the Italian Renaissance state system. By the midfourteenth century, many small cities and local lordships surrounding the main Italian towns had been incorporated into larger territorial states ruled by a dominant city such as Florence, Milan and Venice. These territories were governed as subject communities, without participation in the central government. In addition, in Florence the public debt system was operated on the basis of redeemable government loans, the Monte comune, through a process that favored the financial aristocracy, which could lend on profitable terms.1 The problematic consequences of these contradictions emerged when Florence 1 See L. Marks, “La crisi finanziaria a Firenze dal 1494 al 1502,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CXII (1954), 40-72; A. Molho, “The State and Public finance: A Hypothesis based on the History of Late Medieval Florence,” The Journal of Modern History, 67, Supplement The origins of the State in Italy 1300-1600 (1995), 97-135; J. Barthas, “Machiavelli, from the Dieci to the Nove. A hypothesis based on the financial history of early modern Florence,” in From Florence to the Mediterranean and beyond: essays in honour of Anthony Molho, ed. by D. Ramada Curto et alia (Florence: Olschki, 2009): 147-166.

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Introduction To Part 1

faced another foreign invasion in 1512. In August, a Spanish army, supported by the Medici pope, entered Tuscany. The militia designed by the Florentine Secretary Niccolò Machiavelli was unable to offer effective resistance to the Spanish army, which sacked the nearby city of Prato. The Medici regime was restored by the Spaniards, with the ottimati of Florence favoring the Medici rule against the popolani.2 However, after fifteen years of Medici rule, the Republic had another comeback. In 1527, a newly formed popular government expelled the Medici from Florence. In 1526, the League of Cognac, led by the king of France and Pope Clement VII, was formed against Spain and Emperor Charles V. Because of the pope’s hostility to Charles, imperial troops laid siege to Rome in 1527. Before the peace was signed between Francis I and Charles V in 1529 (the Treaty of Cambrai, known as the Ladies’ Peace), news of the Roman siege brought political turmoil to Florence, as the Medici pope Clement VII could no longer control Florence’s institutions. A new Signoria was established, and Medici agents and governors were banned or removed from Florentine institutions. This political experiment, generally known as the Last Florentine Republic, ended just three years later in 1530, after another long siege, this time by a coalition between the same Medici pope Clement VII and the imperial forces of Emperor Charles V. This episode, according to one strain of historiography, marks the end of the era of the republican city-states and the final victory of despotism in early modern Italy.3 In Florence, the Medici significantly transformed the communal constitution and turned the former republic into a principality. The fall of one of the last communal regimes changed the Italian peninsula’s military approach. Those regimes had tried to revitalize old communal militias by turning them into territorial militias and transforming their objectives and organization according to ongoing developments of military theory and practice. Afterward, local militias flourished especially in ducal, princely or monarchical regimes on the peninsula. In the story of the collapse of Republican institutions in Florence and Tuscany, however, the evolution of military practice, technique and tactics was crucial, with Machiavelli’s military thinking playing a key role.

2 A useful summary of these events and their consequences can be found in J. Barthas, “Machiavelli,” International Encyclopedia of Political Science, ed by. B. Badie, D. Berg-Schlosser & L. Morlino (Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE, 2011), vol. 5, 1479-81. 3 On this topic, see P. Jones, “Communes and Despots: The City State in Late-Medieval Italy,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, Vol. 15 (1965): 71-96.

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15

2  Historiography The military and political aspects of the Machiavellian militia have been well studied (notably, Philip Jones and Mikael Hörnqvist; Ben Cassidy, Timothy J. Lukes and Timothy R.W. Kubik have looked at tactics found in Machiavelli’s works on the militia).4 But when it comes to the later militia of 1527-30, there are only a few works: Cecil Roth’s is filled with important insights, but it is now outdated.5 As well, the book on the last Florentine Republic makes extensive use of an administrative documentary trail that largely overlooks the Ordi­ nanza in the contado. Richard Trexler has studied the militia of the last Florentine Republic in Public Life in Renaissance Florence, paying special attention to military organization, but his interest is mainly in cultural rituals and the citizen militia.6 In a nutshell, while the Machiavellian militia in the country has been well investigated by the scholars mentioned above and my own Un segretario militante,7 the country militia battalions of the last Florentine Republic have hardly been studied. New militia levies in the contado were established after the restoration of the republic in 1527, then in the city from 1528. The Ordinanza in the contado, as it was under Machiavelli, was an amalgam of traditional aspects and new goals and purposes. But these phenomena have largely been studied from a literary and political point of view. For instance, Donato Giannotti’s project, written to create a new city militia in 1528, has been interpreted as the expression of an ideal and abstract democratic project and studied mainly in terms of its political aspects, not its military effects. Moreover, Giannotti’s contribution relates only to the city militia between 1528 and 1530, making it a partly in­ appropriate comparison with the Machiavellian militia of 1506, which was established as and remained a country-militia, despite some indications that Machiavelli intended to extend it to Florence proper. The sources in this book 4 P.J. Jones, “The Machiavellian Militia: Innovation or Renovation?,” in La Toscane et les Toscans autour de la Renaissance: Cadres de vie, societé, croyances. Mélanges offerts à Charles-M. de La Roncière (Aix en-Provence: Presses Universitaires, 1999), 11-52; M. Hörnqvist, “Perché non si usa allegare i Romani: Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506,” Renaissance Quarterly, 55, 1 (2002): 148-191; B. Cassidy, “Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in ‘The Art of War,” The Journal of Military History 67 (2003): 381-404; T. Lukes, “Martialing Machiavelli: Reassessing the Military Reflections,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Nov., 2004): 1089-1108. T. Kubik, “Is Machiavelli’s Canon Spiked? Practical Reading in Military History,” The Journal of Military History 16 (1997): 7-30. For political aspects of the military project by Machiavelli, also Barthas, “Machiavelli, from the Dieci to the Nove.” 5 C. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd., 1925). 6 R.C. Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance Florence (New York: NY Academic Press, 1980). 7 A. Guidi, Un Segretario militante. Politica, diplomazia e armi nel Cancelliere Machiavelli (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009).

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Introduction To Part 1

prove that the militia battalions in the contado of the last Florentine Republic were formally established in 1527 before Giannotti’s project and were seen as a recreation of the Machiavellian one, even though their practical objectives and role (with regard to the context of the Florentine army taken as a whole) differed somewhat from the original, as will be shown in the following chapters. In terms of contemporary documentation, discourses of Florentine citizens in honor of the militia and the texts of the laws about recruitment in the city (the Florentine Militia Acts of 1528 and 1529) were published in the nineteenth century and studied by Rudolf von Albertini in the twentieth.8 However, only a few administrative and military sources from 1527 to 1530 have been studied from the perspective of the organization of the country Ordinanza. The following chapters, therefore, introduce a new and more specific perspective on that subject, one that takes into account recent progress in military history studies, particularly, the work of Michael Mallett and Sir John Rigby Hale dedicated to the subjects of Venice, the Italian condottieri and the Florentine army in the fifteenth century.9

…

The events of the siege of Florence, in which the urban Florentine militia of 1528-30 was primarily involved, attracted a lot of interest in Italian historiography of the nineteenth and the first half of the twentieth centuries. Although the city’s army largely relied on mercenaries at that time, the majority of these studies, especially those written in the nineteenth century, follow a teleological narrative that highlighted the role of the citizen militia. This narrative comes from the idea that the Renaissance militia was a significant part of the development of an idealistic conception of Italian military virtue that culminated in the patriotic achievement of the national unity in the Risorgimento. The fourth centenary celebrations of the death of the militia captains like

8 R. von Albertini, Firenze dalla repubblica al principato. Storia e coscienza politica (Turin: Einaudi, 1970). 9 M. Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters. Warfare in Renaissance Italy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield 1974); M.E. Mallett, “Preparations for War in Florence and Venice,” in Florence and Venice: Comparisons and Relations, Acts of two conferences, Villa I Tatti 1976-1977, ed. by S. Bertelli, N. Rubinstein & C.H. Smyth, vol. I, Quattrocento (Florence, 1979), 149-164; J.R. Hale & M.E. Mallett, The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006). But also M. Mallett, “The Theory and Practice of Warfare in Machiavelli’s Republic,” in Machiavelli and Republicanism, eds., G. Bock, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

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17

Francesco Ferrucci exemplifies this kind of historiography.10 These publications are mainly useful today as repositories of historical information and collections of important documents.11 Italian studies published between the First and the Second World War are also often affected by a doctrinaire nationalism that again saw the Renaissance republican militias in the light of the nation’s military spirit.12 Precisely in reaction to these nationalist narratives and (mis-)appropriations of the story of the Florentine militia and the siege of Florence, Piero Pieri looked closely at the army of the last Republic of Florence.13 Still one of the best studies in the field, Pieri’s book focuses on citizenship and the lack thereof, blaming the latter for the military’s ineffectiveness. Pieri’s argument is acute, and it has been adopted by a long tradition of Machiavelli studies, particularly the work of Federico Chabod and Gennaro Sasso.14 My work relies on these works as well as on several books on politics, so­ciety and culture during the last Florentine Republic been published in the last few decades.15 But since the majority of these studies either consider the militia of 10

11

12 13 14 15

Francesco Ferruccio e la guerra di Firenze del 1529-1530, Raccolta di scritti e documenti rari pubblicati per cura del Comitato per le onoranze a Francesco Ferrucci, prefazione di Fran­cesco Curzio (Florence: Stabilimento di Giuseppe Pellas, 1889); also E. Albèri, L’Asse­ dio di Firenze illustrato con nuovi documenti, (Florence: Tipografia all’insegna di Clio, 1840); F.D. Guerrazzi, L’assedio di Firenze (Milan: Libreria editrice Dante Alighieri, 1869); G. Canestrini, “Documenti per servire alla storia della milizia italiana,” Archivio Storico Italiano, tomo XV (1851). For the specific case of Machiavelli in this narrative, cf. Introduction to Machiavelli nella storiografia e nel pensiero politico del XX secolo, ed. by C. Vivanti e L.M. Bassani (Milan: Giuffrè, 2006), IX. A notable case, is P.C. Falletti Fossati, Assedio di Firenze. Contributo, vol. I Studi, vol. II Documenti (Palermo: Giannone e Lamantia, 1885), which is a positivistic comprehensive study of the siege of Florence that made large use of primary sources. Still, it is characterized by an old approach to military issues and not specifically dedicated to the subject of militias during the period 1527-30. Cf. S.B. Galli, “Giuseppe Prezzolini: un ‘autobiografico’ interprete di Machiavelli,” and L. Mitarotondo, “Il Principe fra il Preludio di Mussolini e le letture del ‘Ventennio’,” in Bassani – Vivanti (eds.), Machiavelli nella storiografia, 41-58 and 59-78. P. Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Turin: Einaudi, 1952). Cf. F. Chabod, Scritti su Machiavelli, introduction by C. Vivanti (Turin: Einaudi 1993 [1964]), 336-338; G. Sasso, Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. I, Il pensiero Politico (Bologna: il mulino 1993), 205. For instance, J.N. Stephens, The Fall of the Florentine Republic (Oxford, Clarendon Press, 1983). See also H.C. Butters, Governors and Government in Early Sixteenth-Century Florence, 1502-1519 (New York: Clarendon Press, 1985). Amongst the most recent contributions on Florentine politics at this age, see S. Lo Re, La crisi della libertà fiorentina (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2006), and N.S. Baker, The Fruit of Liberty. Political Culture in the Florentine Renaissance, 1480-1550, I Tatti Studies in Italian Renaissance History (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2013)

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Introduction To Part 1

the years 1527-30 as a single entity or show no knowledge of historical developments concerning the country battalions, this work relies heavily on unpublished archival material collected at the Archivio di Stato in Florence. In particular, these sources provide documentary evidence showing that the country and the city militia were de facto conceived in different moments: first the contado, then the city. Moreover, the two military institutions were sustained by different ideological programs. I must add one caveat regarding the chapters on Machiavelli and the 1527-30 country Battalions. In order to judge the nature, aims, and limits of the 1527 Ordinanza it is important to consider the Medici’s decision to implement Machiavelli’s militia again in 1514, a subject that has not received sufficient scholarly interest16. There has been some attention paid to the Bande of Alessandro and Cosimo after 1532,17 but a comprehensive study of the period between 1514 and 1527 does not exist. My study also excludes this crucial period, and potentially, new research could modify some interpretations of the later phase of the history of the Florentine militia. However, it bears saying that, according to the Florentine authorities in 1527, the original militia of Machiavelli was “ruined” (“guasta”) by the Medici.18 16 17

18

On cultural aspects and festivities linked to the establishment of this Medici militia, see R.C. Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance Florence (New York-London: Academic Press 1980), 512. See for instance, J. Ferretti, “L’organizzazione militare in Toscana durante il governo di Alessandro e Cosimo I de’ Medici,” Rivista storica degli archivi toscani, I (1929): 248-75 & II (1930): 58-80, 133-51, 211-19; also F. Angiolini, “Le Bande medicee tra ‘ordine’ e ‘disordine’,” in Corpi armati e ordine pubblico in Italia (XVI-XIX sec.), ed. by L. Antonielli & C. Donati (Soveria Mannelli: Rubbettino Editore, 2003), 9-47. “Militie Novem Officialis Deputatio […] Atteso e’ magnifici et excelsi signori che al tempo del governo popolare insino all’anno 1512 veghiava nella città nostra el magistrato de’ Nove della Militia, el quale haveva la cura et il governo di tutta l’Ordinanza delle fanterie de’ battaglioni del contado et distretto di Firenze; il quale ufficio et magistrato fu dipoi levato via et guasta l’ordinanza predetta,” published in A. Guidi, “Machiavelli e il problema della milizia nella Firenze repubblicana del primo Cinquecento: aspetti teorici e sviluppi pratici,” Archivio Storico Italiano, y. 176, n. 655 (2018): 133. Italics added.

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Chapter 1

“Il modo dello armare presente” (“Fanterie d’oggi”) Section 1: Hand Firearms in Machiavelli, and in the 1528-30 Ordinanza 1

 Hand Firearms at the Time of Machiavelli

In the early decades of the sixteenth century, infantry military techniques began to shift from a model based on foot soldiers armed with pikes and crossbows and supported by a small number of handgunners, a model made famous by the Swiss in fields of battle all over Europe, to a new one characterized by the use of pikemen and a larger number of arquebusiers, i.e. soldiers armed with more advanced hand guns. Decade by decade, firearms were becoming more and more efficient. From the second decade of the fifteenth century onward, the so-called corned gunpowder or powder mixed with wine or spirits, then rolled into granules and dried, became common. This massively improved the powder’s combustion force, especially for the artillery. Niccolò Machiavelli’s military experience with the Florentine militia from the year 1506 on falls precisely into this period of transition. When he published his famous book on the Art of War in 1521, the shift toward new infantry military techniques based on the growing use of firearms was not yet complete, although it had proven successful on the battlefield on several occasions. When Machiavelli conceived his militia, firearms, particularly early handguns such as the schioppetto, were highly complicated to operate and would remain so for at least another two decades. Compared to medieval firearms, the schioppetto or scoppio was relatively easy to fire, but the same could not be said for the reloading process: “a time-consuming and difficult affair, especially in action.”1 Since they were forged with brass, a weak alloy of copper and zinc, they could not handle highly explosive powder,2 which limited their range.3 1 See B. Cassidy, “Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in ‘The Art of War,” The Journal of Military History 67 (2003): 392. 2 See B.S. Hall, Weapons & Warfare in Renaissance Europe. Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics (Baltimore and London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997), 134-51; M. Arfaioli, The Black Bands of Giovanni (Pisa: Plus, 2005), 9 and 65. 3 For example, see the documents concerning the casting of bronze schioppetti by a well-known artist of the time, Bernardino d’Antonio da Milano, considered one the masters of bronze

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Chapter 1

And since the schioppetto was not fitted with a matchlock or any similar mechanism, the shooter had to constantly carry a burning match cord to ignite the fire, which did not allow for much accuracy in shooting. For these reasons, the schioppetto was not at all effective in close combat against pikemen and swordsmen. Consequently, all these defects made them vulnerable to a quick battlefield assault, unless countermeasures like building entrenchments and fortifications were taken to keep enemy pike and sword infantry and cavalry units at a distance. Machiavelli was perfectly aware of this fact, as he explained in the Art of War: “It is true that the arquebuses [referring here to the early schioppetto, not the more refined arquebus that evolved from it] and the small artillery do much more harm than the (heavy artillery). The best remedy for these is to come to hands quickly [i.e. ‘act quickly’].”4 In fact, despite the rapidly changing nature of gunpowder weapons, the composition and military goals assigned to the infantry during the early years of his 1506 Florentine militia and even at the time of the composition of the Art of War saw the schioppetto as a substitute for crossbows rather than as crucial weapons. This is confirmed by the way Machiavelli refers to the “ordinary arming of the infantries of today,” when he points out that “they have among them arquebusiers, who, with the vehemence of their fire, do the office that the slingers and crossbowmen did anciently.”5 In the following chapter, an analysis of Florentine military and administrative sources of the early sixteenth century will demonstrate that this perception was the result of Machiavelli’s personal experiences gained from experimenting with a militia. 1.1 Individual Firearms in the Documents of Machiavelli’s Time There are a few references to the schioppetto or scoppietto (plural schioppetti) in the letters written by Machiavelli and other chancellors on behalf of the Florentine government to militia commanders and other military officials in their service. The fact that only this term is used suggests that only this rudimentary individual fire weapon was used in Florence at the time. Also telling is that within this official correspondence about the administration of the militia sculpture, see T. Mozzati, “Il fuoco e l’alchimista: Giovanfrancesco Rustici e la pratica del bronzo,” Proporzioni VI (2005): 162-63. 4 N. Machiavelli, Art of War (III, 134) trans. ed. and with a commentary by C. Lynch (Chicago and London: Chicago University Press, 2003), 74. Original version: “Verò è che assai più nuocono gli scoppietti e l’artiglierie minute, che quelle [l’artiglierie grosse]; alle quali è il maggiore rimedio venire alle mani tosto; e se nel primo assalto ne muoro alcuno, sempre ne morì […] i Svizzeri, i quali non schifarono mai giornata sbigottiti dalle artiglierie.” 5 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 27, 28), 35. Original version: “Questo è l’armare ordinario delle fanterie d’oggi […] Hanno tra loro scoppiettieri, i quali, con lo impeto del fuoco, fanno quello ufficio che facevano anticamente i funditori e i balestrieri.”

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and the mercenaries in Florence’s service handguns are mentioned significantly less than the artillery. In a relatively large sample of letters that includes hundreds written by Machiavelli and other chancellors from 1506 to 1512, or prior to the establishment of the militia and during its existence, there are only two references to arquebuses (which at this time were more likely to be of a large caliber and used in the defense of fortified walls) and nineteen to schioppetti, while references to the artillery amount to a more significant total of one hundred and one.6 This means that Machiavelli’s personal conception of firearms had not evolved past the late medieval understanding, which largely associated firearms with artillery and siege warfare. Firearms were only used in infantry warfare to provide support to other traditional weapons like the pike and the sword, or as an alternative to crossbowmen.7 With the beginning of the Italian Wars (1494-1559), this situation was changing rapidly, but Machiavelli’s experience with individual firearms probably did not change until he was sent to the battlefield of Marignano by the Medici pope in 1526 (i.e. five years after the 1521 publication of his Art of War) to assist Francesco Guicciardini, the General of the Papal Army. A reading of Machiavelli’s minor political and legislative writings concerning the militia supports this claim and allows us to re-think the many allegations of critics and scholars that he did not understand the importance of firearms and artillery. For instance, in the Militia Act of 1506, the Provisione de la Ordinanza, the list of weapons stocked ready for use in the warehouse of the 6 For the term “archibugi/archibusi,” see the letters written by Machiavelli on 9 May 1501 and 4 Jan. 1504, in N. Machiavelli, Legazioni. Commissarie. Scritti di governo, 7 vols. (“Edizione Nazionale delle opere”), (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2002-2011): vols. II, 87; and III, 472. For the terms “scoppietti” and “scoppettieri” (which peak in the months of February, March and April of 1509), see ibid., vol. III, letters from 30 May and 1 Jun. 1503, 111 and 116; ibid., vol. IV, 16 Oct. 1504, 235; ibid., vol. V, 30 Aug 1505, post 17 Jan. and 12 May 1506, 23 Feb. 1507, 107, 259, 331, 558; ibid., vol. VI, 18 May, 5 Oct. 1507; 24 Jan. 1508; 15, 18, 19, 28 Feb., 7 Mar., 16, 29 Apr. 1509, 45, 85, 127, 269, 272, 274-75, 280, 297, 321, 326, 330. There are no examples featured in the Appendix containing about one hundred additional letters by Machiavelli and other chancellors during the same years published in A. Guidi, Un Segretario militante. Politica, diplomazia e armi nel Cancelliere Machiavelli (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009), 393-445. Even a quick survey of a single volume of Machiavelli’s “Legazioni” and “Scritti di governo” yields a considerably larger number of examples of the term “artiglieria.” For further reference, see the letters of 14 and 29 May; 6, 11, 17, 18, 21, 29 June; 5, 8 July, and others from the following months, Machiavelli, Legazioni. Commissarie. Scritti di governo, vol. III, 67, 106, 127, 137, 148, 151-152, 154, 170, 179, 183, among others. Moreover, one should also take into consideration further references to specific artillery weapons such as “cannone” and “passavolante” in said volume, ibid., 135, 152. 7 M. Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters. Warfare in Renaissance Italy (Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield 1974), 158.

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Palazzo della Signoria, included only 500 schioppetti, compared to thousands of pikes and lances: “In addition to the arms allocated to militiamen, two thousand chest armors, five hundred schioppetti and four thousand lances shall be stored in the Palace of the Signori.”8 Moreover, as chapter 4 will explain in detail, the description of the composition of each battalion of the militia in the same document proves that the percentage of handgunners in the militia of 1506 did not amount to more than ten out of a hundred men, while pikes were at 70 out 100.9 It is true that Machiavelli himself left open the possibility of creating “3 or 4 battalions of handgunners,” though this was presented merely as an option according to the will of the changing members of the Nine, the council that administered the militia.10 It appears that it was not an option the authorities chose to take, since there are no extant documents concerning a militia comprised this way. And even so, the percentage of arquebusiers in the militia of 1506-12 would have remained extremely low during the entire period. Many years later, in the Art of War (1521), Machiavelli presented a concept of a special infantry battalion which he called the velites (veliti ordinarii), armed with schioppetti and other weapons, in accordance with the rapid development of battle technique11 and an effort to use these new and still rather complicated weapons effectively. Once again, however, his solution highlighted the value of traditional arms such as the sword and the pike, not firearms, which were still at a ratio of one to six in Fabrizio Colonna’s description of the infan­ try corps: “For if among six thousand infantrymen […] I had three thousand 8

Machiavelli, “Provisione della Ordinanza,” in id., L’arte della guerra. Scritti politici minori, ed. by J.-J. Marchand, G. Masi, D. Fachard (Rome: Salerno editrice 2001), 482-3. Translation mine. Original version: “Debbino sempre tenere nella munizione del Palazzo de’ Signori, oltre alle armi che saranno nelli descritti, almeno dumila petti di ferro, 500 scoppietti e 4 mila lance.” See chapter 4. 9 Ibid., 487: “Debbino detti offiziali mantenere gli uomini descritti con le infrascritte armi, cioè: tutti, per difesa, abbino almeno un petto di ferro e, per offesa, in ogni 100 fanti sia 70 lance almeno.” Cf. F.L. Taylor, The Art of War in Italy 1494-1529 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), 41. 10 Machiavelli, “Provisione della Ordinanza,” 487. Cf. A.H. Gilbert, “Machiavelli on Fire Weapons,” in Italica XXIII, 4 (1946), 275. In this article Gilbert falsely emphasizes the importance of the schioppetti in the Florentine infantry militia, probably the result of a misreading of a letter written by Machiavelli, in which a Florentine commissioner was ordered to provide a number of these weapons, but not to exceed a proportion of 10% per company (which Gilbert wrongly interprets as at least 10%). Cf. G. Canestrini, Scritti inediti di Niccolò Machiavelli risguardanti la storia e la milizia (1499-1512) (Florence: 1857), 327. The same request was made of Piero Guicciardini: “…quanti scoppietti vogliono […] avendo avvertenza che non passino 10 scoppietti per ogni cento uomini” (ibid., 325). Nevertheless, Gilbert noted that Machia­velli’s cavalry militia had very few mounted handgunners (ibid., 276). 11 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 148), 46-47. Original version: “L’armi leggieri sieno cinquanta fanti armati di scoppietti, balestra e partigiane e rotelle; e questi da uno nome antico si chiamino veliti ordinarii.” Cf. Cassidy, “Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive,” 388.

Hand Firearms in Machiavelli, and in the 1528-30 Ordinanza

23

infantrymen with shields like the Romans’ and two thousand pikes and a thousand arquebusiers like the Germans’, they would be enough for me.”12 As we have seen, this is the policy adopted at the time of the militia.13 Both Machiavelli’s minor political writings and the correspondence of the Florentine government, written by him and other chancellors, show that in Machiavelli’s perception, handguns were only supplementary to the standard, more traditional infantry weapons of the time. This is also confirmed by studies on Renaissance military organizations like those conducted by Piero Pieri and Frederick Taylor.14 Although handguns were among the instruments used against the mass of pikes from the very beginning of the Italian Wars,15 the idea that firearm and pike infantry units needed to work together in close cooperation spread slowly through Italy and was not widely established until the 1520s (i.e. after rather than before the Art of War came out). The tercios, established with the 1496 ordinance of Valladolid, inaugurated infantry units’ use of new tactical weapon combinations and were heavily employed in the Italian Wars.16 Regarding the use of handguns in this period, however, one should add that according to Michael Mallet, the tactical combinations of pikes, ditches and multiple arquebusiers used in 1503 at the battle of Cerignola were only perfected decades later, after the battle of Bicocca in 1522.17 Until then, infantry battle techniques based on pike formations remained prevalent.18 Even at Cerignola, the ditch, a passive obstacle protected by pikes and natural obstacles, was the main factor of success, as Machiavelli noted when he referred to the battle in the Art of War: “If you are much inferior in cavalrymen, order your army amidst vines and trees and similar impediments, as the Spaniards did in our times, when they broke [defeated] the French in the Kingdom at Cerignola.”19 Cerignola was more a victory of entrenchments than of firearms, since without 12 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 70), 39. Original version: “Perché in sei mila fanti, come io vi dirò poco di poi, io avessi tremila fanti con gli scudi alla romana e dumila picche e mille scoppiettieri alla tedesca, mi basterebbono.” See also Art of War (II, 28), 125 and 148. 13 See the deliberation of 2 Oct. 1507, in G. Canestrini, Scritti inediti, 362. 14 P. Pieri, Il Rinascimento e la Crisi militare Italiana, 1494-1530 (Turin: Einaudi, 1952), 25; Taylor, The Art of War in Italy, 41. 15 Pieri, Il Rinascimento, 527. 16 M. Mallett, “The Transformation of War, 1494-1530,” in Italy and the European Powers. The Impact of War, 1500-1530, ed. by C. Shaw (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 7-8. 17 Mallett, “The Transformation of War,” 7-8. 18 Pieri, Il Rinascimento, 400 and 432. 19 Machiavelli, Art of War (IV, 24), 87. Original version: ““se tu fossi assai inferiore di cavagli, ordina l’esercito tuo tra vigne e arbori e simili impedimenti, come fecero ne’ nostri tempi gli Spagnuoli, quando ruppono i Franzesi nel Reame alla Cirignuola.” The ditch as a fortification is mentioned several times in the Art of War, especially in the description of how to pitch a camp in the sixth book.

24

Chapter 1

the fortifications to protect the arquebusiers, the Spanish forces would have been cut down by the determined French assault, as Piero Pieri noted decades ago.20 While the quondam secretary in his Art of War did not foresee that the new defensive-counter-offensive principle – as described by Pieri – would come to dominate the battlefields, one should not forget that the Swiss model of infantry battle techniques was still used not only during the years of the militia, but when Machiavelli conceived the Art of War. In fact, in the minds of military writers, captains and commanders, the handgun remained an auxiliary weapon for infantry corps until at least the 1520s.21

…

The preceding section has shown that both Machiavelli and the Florentine authorities considered handgun units to be merely ancillary to the pikemen, the main infantry units. Machiavelli was thus in line with the times, and scholarship confirms that this was the general attitude toward firearms during Machiavelli’s years in the Florentine chancery. As Mallet notes, this was especially true in the case of Florence’s army, which lagged behind other Italian states in its use of handguns.22 Only a decade later, military tacticians came to consider hand firearms as primary battlefield weapons, but still conceived of them as used in strategic combination with other weapons or as defensive measures.23 Despite the fact that these weapons had proved their effectiveness earlier, it was only after the 1520s that they enjoyed a similar reputation as the pike.24 Although the Italian Wars are an important step in rise of handgun use, this was not a sudden switch, but a process of transition that took place throughout the Cinquecento, during which, given the poor performance of early arque­buses

20 Pieri, Il Rinascimento, 410-12. Also, Cassidy, “Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive,” 394. 21 Pieri, Il Rinascimento, 432. 22 Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters, 157. Although developments in military technology were encouraged by the Florentine authorities (see the recent contribution by F. Ansani, “Craftsmen, Artillery, and War Production in Renaissance Florence,” Vulcan 4 [2016]: 1-26), the number of handguns available to the Florentine militia was still very low. 23 Pieri argues that this process started with the battle of Pavia (1521) and had significantly accelerated by the battle of S. Quintino (1557), see Pieri, Il Rinascimento, 25, 400, 252, 43132; P. Pieri, Introduction to N. Machiavelli, Dell’arte della Guerra, (Roma, Edizioni Roma 1937), LII. 24 J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620 (London: Fontana, 1985), 47.

Hand Firearms in Machiavelli, and in the 1528-30 Ordinanza

25

such as the schioppetto, pikes and crossbows remained dominant.25 Piero del Negro also points out that the sword and pike were hugely important in infantry tactics as late as the beginning of the seventeenth century.26 This was the state of affairs in the use of and attitude toward hand firearms when Machiavelli developed and established his militia. Since firearms were especially important used in tactical combination with other weapons, it was the right strategy, not the weapon itself, that was key to success on the battlefield. In this context, one cannot accuse Machiavelli of neglecting handguns, since the way these still imperfect weapons were used was what mattered during the existence of the Florentine militia. There was a tendency to replace the crossbow with the handgun in the second half of the fifteenth century. Nevertheless, Machiavelli, in the guise of Fabrizio Colonna, explicitly states in the Art of War that the schioppetto was still a “new instrument” (“istrumento nuovo”) at the time, and, as such, not universally recognized as fundamental.27 While expressing hopes for a new study on the efficiency of this weapon, Michael Mallett pointed out that in Machiavelli’s time, handguns were frequently used to harry the enemy and protect the army’s flanks rather than as the main weapon.28 Machiavelli adopted this exact tactical model in the Art of War.29 The case of field artillery and its possible use in battle is a different problem, and probably the real deficit of the tactical model proposed by the Florentine secretary in his book. 2

 Hand Firearms at the Time of the 1527-30 Ordinanza

The nature and the composition of the Florentine militia in the fifteen years between Machiavelli’s and the new Ordinanza of 1527-30 changed along with the evolution of new gunpowder weapons. In the two militia acts, we see a transition from a militia equipped with pikes and crossbows and supported by a small number of schioppettieri, during Machiavelli’s time in office, to a militia

25

Cf. G. Parker, The Military Revolution. Military Innovation and the Rise of the West, 1500-1800 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1988), 17. 26 P. Del Negro, Guerra ed eserciti da Machiavelli a Napoleone (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2001), 27. 27 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 125), 45. 28 Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters, 158. 29 For example, Machiavelli, Art of War (III, 89), 71: “See how our light cavalrymen went to charge a band of enemy arqubusiers who wanted to wound the flank.” Original version: “Vedete come i nostri cavagli leggieri sono iti a urtare una banda di scoppiettieri nimici che volevano ferire per fianco.”

26

Chapter 1

equipped with both pikes and a growing number of arquebuses in the Ordinanza of 1527-30. It is not always easy to distinguish between the arquebus and the schioppetto. In the years of recruitment for the militia of 1506, the term “archibugi” often referred to weapons of a larger caliber, mostly used to defend fortified walls. In the following decades, however, this term also came to describe the new type of hand firearms used on battlefields. In the Florentine government documents written by Chancellor Machiavelli, the terms used to refer to the handguns are almost exclusively schioppetto or scoppio. The increased use of the term archibugio instead of schioppetto/scoppio/scoppietto in administrative documents of the 1527-30 militia indicates a shift from one model of handgun to another.30 This is confirmed by an explicit comparison between the arquebus and the scoppio made by the General Commissioner of the Ordinanza of 1527, Carlo Strozzi, precisely when the old Medicean battalions of the contado (i.e. the territory under Florentine’s rule) – the remainder of Machiavelli’s militia, which were disregarded during the years 1513-26 – were being restored and reformed. To the Lords Nine […] while reviewing [this battalion], I find a total of about 200 pikes and 180 schoppi, of which one cannot really make use, since they are so old and worn they cause more damage than bring benefit. In light of the number of conscripts and of the few, and useless weapons that they have, first and foremost the schoppi, I estimate that there is a need for at least 200 pikes and 100 arquebuses.31 30

31

Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the type of arquebus used in fortifications and citadels in these documents are often marked by the specification ‘wall-arquebus’ (archibusi da mura). Francesco Guicciardini, on the other hand, in his Storia d’Italia, written in the late 1530s, often uses the terms schioppi and arquebuses (archibusi) interchangeably. ASF, Signori Dieci di Balìa Otto di pratica, Legazioni e commissarie, missive e responsive 71, ff. 61v-62r. Translation mine. Original version: “Ai Signori Nove […] Truovo faccendo tale descriptione esservi tra tucto circa 200 piche et schoppi 180: poco o niente da servirsene per essere de’ vecchi, et così stazonati da fare più presto damno che utile. Atteso il numero de’ descripti et visto le poco arme vi sono, et quelle essere inutili maxime li schoppi iudicheria esservi di bisogno al mancho di 200 piche più et archibusi 100 […] Die 24 augusti 1527.” The arquebuses were provided later, as corroborated by a letter from the Nine of the Militia, presumably sent to Carlo Strozzi in Volterra, dated 4 Nov. 1527. Signori Dieci di Balìa Otto di pratica, Missive 12, f. 29r (lapis, in the right lower corner): “Magnifice vir etc. e’ si è ricevuta la tua de’ II del presente a noi grata per haverci dato notitia di quello che fa di bisognio per tenere fornita la bandiera nostra delle Pomerancie, della quale al continuo fa di bisognio di servirtene. Et però si è dato ordine al nostro proveditore che gli mandi et polvere et piombo secondo che advisi manchargli; et parimente si gli è dato commissione che attenda a fornire gli archibusi del tutto, perché di presente non ce ne è

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27

In the letter, Strozzi informed the Nine of the Militia that it was necessary to replace 200 old schoppi inherited from the Medicean battalion of Pomarance with 100 archibusi. Strozzi criticized the older firearms as of limited benefit in combat because they were worn and outdated. This shows not only that the 1527 Ordinanza was armed with this new type of firearm, the arquebus, but also that in contrast to Machiavelli’s time, the ratio of handguns to pikes had changed, so that there were 100 arquebuses to 200 pikes. In other words, at least one third of the battalion was now armed with a handgun. This trend was in line with the previous developments of the militia at the time of the Medici (1513-26), as shown by the increasing number of schoppi in use that Strozzi mentioned compared to the number of the times they were mentioned in Machiavelli. Still, Strozzi’s statement concerning the bad condition of the old schioppetti inherited from the preceding militia organization, should be read as direct confirmation that the Medici administration disregarded Machiavelli’s original militia battalions. In any case, Strozzi and the Florentine authorities armed the Ordinanza with a larger number of handguns than Machiavelli’s militia had had, as shown by several other documents of the time. When the Ordinanza of Val di Cecina was called into action two months later, Strozzi once again asked for more arquebuses.32 On 24 April 1529, Pasquino da San Benedetto, the captain of the battalion of Poggibonsi, provided an inventory of the resources available to the militia in a letter to the General Commissioner of the Ordinanza who succeeded Strozzi, Ceccotto Tosinghi.  Magnifice Vir et Benefactor observandissime etc., In obeyance to the order given to me by Your Lordship, I regard it as necessary to inform you of the following:  In Sangimignano and its countryside I find: 36 men armed with Your Lordships’ [i.e. the Nine, of which Tosinghi was a member] arquebuses and 87 with pikes; and armed with their own arquebuses 60 and their own pikes 15.  In Poggibonsi and its countryside I find: 30 men armed with Your Lordships’ arquebuses and 83 with pikes; armed with their own arquebuses 13 and pikes 7.33

32 33

de’ forniti di tutti li loro bisogni […] Die IIII Novembris MDXXVII. Novem Viri Militie populi et communis florentini.” ASF, Signori Dieci di Balìa Otto di pratica, Legazioni e commissarie, missive e responsive 71, f. 98r. For a transcription and analysis of this letter, see chapter 2. ASF, Strozziane, I serie, 67 f. 21r-v. “Magnifice Vir et Benefactor observandissime etc. Per seghuire l’ordine dato che mi commisse Vostra Signoria mi occorre dare notitia a quella

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Chapter 1

At that point, the percentage of arquebuses available to the troops was increased from around 30 to about 50 percent in proportion to the pikes, if one counts both those provided by the authorities and those brought by the conscripts themselves. These ratios, as Sir John R. Hale explains, are in line with the military developments in Italy of the time.34 Essentially, by the autumn of 1529, the arquebus was the main weapon of the Florentine forces in their fight against the Imperial forces invading Tuscany. This is also confirmed by the continuous requests for more arquebuses and arquebusiers in the letters sent to the General Commissioner Tosinghi as, for example, the letter sent by Strozzo Strozzi on 27 October 1529: It would be good to send us at least sixty arquebusiers by tomorrow, as this commander has only about 18 of them, and they have little practice with the weapon; and up to a hundred infantrymen would be even better, but if it is impossible from sixty [arquebusiers] to a hundred, I will recruit by force of law among the best […].35 Further documents support this point, including a letter sent by Bastiano Galeotti to Ceccotto Tosinghi, from Livorno on 13 November 1529, in which Galeotti suggested hiring both local professional soldiers and recruiting peasants (villani) from the area in order to have sufficient arquebusiers.36

…

However, it is worth examining exactly what kind of arquebus Strozzi, Tosinghi and the other commissioners of the Ordinanza were referring to. Unlike the schioppetti of Machiavelli’s time, the majority of the arquebuses given to the come: in Sancto Gimignano et suo contado io truovo 36 huomini essere armati di archibusi di Vostre Signorie et di piche 87, et trovarsi armati di loro archibusi 60 et piche 15; in Poggibonzi et suo contado truovo essere armati di archibusi 30 di Vostre Signorie et piche 83 et trovarsi armati di loro archibusi 13 et piche 7.” See Appendix 2.11. The battalions led by Pasquino da San Benedetto were probably among the ones mentioned by the General Commissioner of the Florentine army, Francesco Ferrucci, see Francesco Ferruccio, 180, 205, 208, 211, 217, 501. 34 Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 52. 35 Letter by Strozzo Strozzi to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Pontedera 27 Oct. 1529, ASF, Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 155. Original version: “bene sarebbe per tutto domani mandarci allo mancho sexanta archibusieri perché in facti questo Capitano ha pochi archibusieri che sono circha a dic[i]otto e anche poco pratichi; e se insino a cento fanti farà tanto meglio, ma non potendo da sexanta a cento, torrò fanti comandati li migliori.” See Appendix 2.37. 36 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 66 n. 81, for an extract of this letter see Appendix 2.39.

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29

battalions of 1527-30 were fitted with matchlocks, which meant the militiamen did not have to constantly handle a burning match cord. Instead, the lit cord was lowered toward the powder by a mechanism based on a lever and a serpentine; this left the arquebusiers’ hands free to shoot, which significantly improved accuracy. Transcripts of payments made by the Nine of the militia dating from June and July of 1529, prove that many of the arquebuses were fitted with metal serpentines, giving them a matchlock mechanism: Arquebuses 60, with their stock and serpentines.  Scoppietti 100, with their stock and serpentines. Powder bags 500, with dusters.37 Furthermore, Benedetto Varchi, a contemporary historian, mentions arquebuses with matchlocks when describing the siege of Volterra in 1530 and refers to serpentines (draghetti) in other sections of his Storia fiorentina.38 While the average arquebusier could not hope to defend himself in close combat against a foot pike or a knight, the weapon gave the soldier an advantage in range. Compared to earlier firearms, these arquebuses were made of more resistant alloys and had a smaller caliber, allowing the use of high efficiency gunpowder, which brought major advantages in both accuracy and effi­ ciency.39 The fact that the Florentine army was already using some arquebuses made of more durable alloys is confirmed by documents from before the Medi­ ci were expelled from Florence.40 The appointment of Vannoccio Biringuccio (often spelled Biringucci) by the Florentine authorities confirms that the Republic wanted to make up for the years that the Medici disregarded Machiavelli’s Ordinanza del contado. Biringuccio worked for the restored popular regime of 1527, as evidenced by a document in which his contribution was described as a big step forward in the

37

ASF, Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia, Entrata e Uscita, Debitori e creditori 18, f. 143 sin. Original version: Archibusi 60 co’ tinieri e draghetti; Scopietti 100 co’ tinieri e draghetti; Fiasche 500 con polverini.” See Appendix 2.17. 38 Cf. C. Quarenghi, “Tecno-cronografia delle Armi da fuoco italiane,” parte I, Atti del R. Is­ tituto d’incoraggiamento alle scienze naturali, economiche e tecnologiche di Napoli, II series, vol. XVII: 53-308, particularly 214. These draghetti are also frequently mentioned in other payments made by the Nine from the same period, e.g. ASF, Nove, Entrata e Uscita, Debitori e creditori 17, f. 111: “Draghetti da archibusi e schopietti.” 39 Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 134-151; Arfaioli, The Black Bands of Giovanni, 9 and 65. 40 See the new analysis of the documents pertaining to firearms in late Quattrocento Florence by F. Ansani, “Craftsmen, Artillery, and War Production,” 9.

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improvement of the army.41 In the following years, he was then nominated as “procurator to public artillery.”42 As mentioned by Bert Hall, in De la pirotechnica (1539-40) Biringuccio describes a much more efficient and precise model of arquebus with a long iron barrel forged as a single piece and operated using corned gunpowder.43 Finally, one may wonder if at least some of the arquebuses mentioned in the documents of the period 1527-30 were weapons of the new type armed with wheel-locks (a lock working by striking fire), which were in use during that period. Many scholars, including Sir John Rigby Hale and Marco Morin, assume that wheel-locks were already relatively widespread in 1517.44 Angelucci, a nineteenth-century historian, refers to wheel-lock arquebuses in use in Ferrara between 1518 and 1522.45 However, less well-known transcripts of orders for gunpowder weapons such as one issued by the Signori and described by Cecil Roth prove that some of these weapons were present in the arsenals of

41

ASF, Signori, Responsive 43, f. 128r-v + 135v, a letter by Francesco Petrucci “dalla rocchetta di Colle alli VII di ottobre MDXXVII”: “De poi che mandai ad Vostra Signoria Illustrissima Vannoccio Beringucci sono ogni giorno accresciuti al proposito nostro successi migliori […]” 42 ASF, Dieci, Miss. 108, f. 166r; approximate date: June 1530. And ASF, Dieci, Delib. Cond. Stanz. 66, f. 27v (see the document in Appendix 2.48): “Messer Vannoccio Berengucci da Siena col titolo di Procuratore delle artiglerie […] ch’el detto Messere Vannoccio habbi habbi havere cura delle artiglerie publiche et lor fornimenti.” For Biringuccio and the transition from the bronze age to the iron age of artillery, see T. Mozzati, “Florence and the Bronze Age. Leonardo and Casting, the War of Pisa, and the Dieci di Balia,” in Leo­ nardo and the Act of Sculpture (Paul Getty Museum, 2009), 196 and 201. For Biringuccio’s appointment by the Florentine republic, see R. Cianchi, “Figure nuove del mondo vinciano: Paolo e Vannoccio Biringuccio da Siena,” Raccolta Vinciana, XX (1964): 277-297; G. Chironi, “Cultura tecnica e gruppo dirigente: la famiglia Vannocci Biringucci,” in Una tradizione senese: dalla Pirotechnia di Vannoccio Biringucci al Museo del mercurio, ed. by I. Tognarini (Naples: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2000), 101-30. 43 Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 97-98. This was an issue already raised with bronze casting, see E. Lein, “Il problema della fusione in un getto o in parti separate dei bronzi del Rinascimento italiano,” in I grandi bronzi antichi. Le fonderie e le tecniche di lavorazione dall’età arcaica al Rinascimento (Siena: Nuova immagine editrice, 1999), 385-89. Cf. also A. Williams, The Sword and the Crucible: A History of the Metallurgy of European Swords up to the 16th Century (Leiden: Brill, 2012), 214-215. Arquebuses with an iron barrel are referred to in an inventory of the arsenal of the Otto di Pratica, which mentions “100 arcibusi di ferro in su’ tinieri co’ loro toppe,” ASF, Otto di pratica, Munizioni 2, f. 9r, record dating c. May 1527. 44 M. Morin, “The Origin of the Wheellock: A German Hypothesis. An alternative to the Italian Hypothesis,” in Art, Arms and Armour, ed. by R. Held (Chiasso: Acquafresca Editrice, 1979), 85. 45 A. Angelucci, Documenti inediti per la storia delle armi da fuoco italiane (Turin: 1869), 34344.

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the Florentine Republic.46 The weapons ordered on this occasion were brought to Florence by merchants from Brescia, a city under the authority of the Republic of Venice, whose army certainly adopted at least some German wheellock arquebuses at the time.47 In addition, the nine “archibusi a la moderna” (‘modern arquebuses’) mentioned in an inventory of the citadel of Pisa can also perhaps be ascribed to the wheel-lock category, especially since the same document lists “81 old-style iron arquebuses” (ferchibusi di fero a l’anticha) and seven “iron schioppetti” (ischoppi di fero a l’anticha), which are probably the previous type of arquebus, i.e. those predating the wheel-lock mechanism.48 3  Conclusions Under the influence of technological developments, the use of handguns increased in the context of the renewed Ordinanza of 1527-30. This led to a transition from an infantry equipped with pikes and crossbows and supported by a small number of schioppettieri (handgunners) in the militia of Machiavelli’s time to an infantry of both pikemen and arquebusiers in the militia of the last Republic. The texts of the city militia acts passed in 1528 and 1529 also confirm this, as they state that it was necessary to provide “as many arquebuses as possible.”49 Additionally, a comparison between the terms used to refer to the firearms in the earlier Militia Act from the time of Machiavelli and the renewed one from the late 1520s confirms that the old schioppetti were being replaced with the more efficient archibusi. Another key difference is the presence and absence of the crossbow, a weapon used primarily to support the infantry formation with missile fire during the late Middle Ages and in the militia of 1506.50 In the 1506 Ordinanza, it is mentioned among the weapons available to infantry militiamen: “The officers shall equip the militiamen with the following arms, that is: for defense, they shall have at least a chest armor each, and, for offense, they shall have at least 70 lances and 10 schioppetti in a hundred men, 46 47

48 49 50

See C. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic (London: Methuen, 1925), 194. See Morin, “Origin of the Wheellock,” 86; M.E. Mallett and J.R. Hale, The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State: Venice c. 1400 to 1617 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 382. On the production and distribution of arquebuses in northern Italy and Germany, see also: Mallett, “The Transformation of War,” 9. ASF, Strozziane, I serie, 66 n. 253. The “Provvisione for the city militia” of 6 November 1528 was published by F. Polidori, Archivio Storico Italiano, I (1842): 384-409 (quotation from page 402). Original version: “vi sia più archibuseri che sia possibile.” Cf. Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters, 153-54.

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and the rest can bring crossbows, swords, targoni and rotelle.”51 Machiavelli’s belief in the crossbow as a major missile weapon was confirmed by his addition of cavalry crossbowmen to the militia in the so-called Ordinanza de’ cavalli of 1511. However, there is no mention of the crossbow in the militia acts of 1528 and 1529. For other Italian Renaissance states like Venice and Milan, a large standing army using a combination of provigionati (mercenaries in almost permanent service), militias and condottieri with long-term contracts was nothing new at the end of the fifteenth century.52 Venice had already raised both a permanent force and native militias from the dominio, although these served mostly as supplements to the regular forces.53 More importantly, unlike the Florentine system of funding, the Venetian system was designed to avoid a reliance on loans.54 In contrast to this situation, as explained in the introduction to part I, a lack of a large standing army in Florence resulted from the policies of the Medici regime, which had shaped the financial system to favor the aristocracy by basing this system primarily on short-term mercenary contracts for the army.55 This is also what caused the aforementioned failure to introduce the new types of handguns during the Medici regime, as this weapon, which required less training than pikes, was generally used by militias, rather than by professional soldiers.56 As soon as this policy was revised by the popular regime installed after the Medici were banished, the Republic introduced a new policy that – through Machiavelli’s 1506 countryside militia project – aimed at “arming the people.”57 This militia adopted the German-Swiss tactical model based 51

Machiavelli, “Provisione della Ordinanza,” 487. Translation mine. Original version: “Debbino detti offiziali mantenere gli uomini descritti con le infrascritte armi, cioè: tutti, per difesa, abbino almeno un petto di ferro e, per offesa, in ogni 100 fanti […] 70 lance almeno, et 10 scoppietti, et il restante possino portare balestre, spiedi, rotelle, targoni et spade.” 52 See Mallett & Hale, The Military Organisation, 74-87. 53 Cf. ibid., 354. 54 Cf. Pieri, Il rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana, 115-16; L. Pezzolo, “Sistema di potere e politica finanziaria nella Repubblica di Venezia,” in Origini dello Stato: processi di forma­ zione statale in Italia fra Medioevo ed età moderna, ed. by G. Chittolini, A. Molho and P. Schiera (Bologna: il Mulino, 1994), 303-27. 55 J. Barthas, “Machiavelli, from the Dieci to the Nove. A hypothesis based on the financial history of early modern Florence,” in From Florence to the Mediterranean and beyond: essays in honour of Anthony Molho, ed. by D. Ramada Curto et alia (Florence: Olschki, 2009): 147-166; id. L’argent n’est pas le nerf de la guerre. Commentaire historique et critique sur ces paroles de Machiavel (Rome, École Française de Rome 2012), 173-179. See also A. Molho, “The State and Public finance: A Hypothesis based on the History of Late Medieval Florence,” The Journal of Modern History, 67, Supplement The origins of the State in Italy 1300-1600 (1995), 97-135; finally, L. Marks, “La crisi finanziaria a Firenze dal 1494 al 1502,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CXII (1954), 40-72. 56 Mallett, Mercenaries and their Masters, 157. 57 Cf. J. Barthas, “Machiavelli, from the Dieci to the Nove,” 147-66.

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on large infantry formations trained in the use of pikes (as Machiavelli writes in the Provisione della Ordinanza)58 with the addition of a small number of schioppettieri. In contrast, as the next chapter will explain, in 1527, the renewed Florentine republic opted to arm smaller battalions of the countryside militias with the arquebus. As Maurizio Arfaioli explained, the Italian states were not able to raise a mass infantry equivalent to the Landsknechte in the German-speaking areas or to the one that Machiavelli conceived and described. A few Italian city-states overcame the city ruling class’s suspicion of the subjects of the territories in order to raise a militia that had a large number of infantrymen who were the auxiliary corps of the army,59 but none managed to build the main body of their forces on them. As a consequence, the Italian states redesigned their infantry according to a different model, more moderate in scale and influenced by the development of handguns in the decades following the outbreak of the Italian Wars, especially from the 1520s onward. However, this model led to other types of infantry battle techniques. The Romagnol militia, for example, adopted a new model based on a combination of arquebusiers and light cavalry, with frequent use of firearms – a model more adaptable to practical military needs of a smaller number of foot soldier units than the one used by the Swiss. Using the experience gained from the factional fights that had raged in the region for decades, the Italians developed specific tactics for this new model of militia.60 The development of a new Italian infantry started with the arrival and spread of the new and more efficient arquebus, which the Spanish used especially effectively in the Italian Wars, as Mallett, Keen and other historians have shown.61 Handguns were pivotal to this tactical evolution, which brought about both differentiated roles for shooters and cavalry on the battlefield and the tactical combination of arquebusiers and pikemen. This com­ bination of units characterized the early-modern Italian infantry and distin­guished it from the Swiss model that Machiavelli had used as starting point. 58 59 60 61

N. Machiavelli, “Provisione della Ordinanza,” 484: “[…] Debbino tenere sempre connestaboli che rassegnino tutti gli uomini descritti, e li esercitino secondo la milizia e ordine de’ Tedeschi [...]” As shown by Mallett and Hale, The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State, 354. Venice was one of the few states to succeed in raising a militia in the subject territories. A. Bazzocchi, “Servizio militare e controllo del territorio. La milizia romagnola nell’età delle guerre d’Italia,” in 1512. La battaglia di Ravenna, l’Italia, l’Europa, ed. by D. Bolognesi (Ra­venna: Longo, 2014), 90. M. Keen, “The Changing Scene: Guns, Gunpowder, and Permanent Armies,” in Medieval Warfare: A History, ed. by M. Keen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 279-80 and 288-90.

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Chapter 2

“Il modo dello armare presente” (“Fanterie d’oggi”) Section 2: Comparisons and Relationships between Machiavelli’s 1506 Militia and the Ordinanza of 1528-30 1

A Shared Background

The two experiments with raising a militia under the last two popular governments of Florence in 1506-12 and 1527-30 arose from similar political and institutional circumstances, and the same city council of the Nine of the Militia (Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia) was in charge of both. First established in 1506 under Pier Soderini’s popular regime, the office of the Nine was restored in 1527, as soon as the Medici were banished from the city by the new popular Signoria. The institutional and military reforms of 1506 that culminated in the establishment of the Nine of the Militia were conceived by Niccolò Machiavelli. The reforms were not aimed solely at the administration of the military, as the legal framework of the Militia Act was a political effort to limit the control of Florence’s already existing city councils over the new battalions. The Ten of War (Dieci di Balìa e di Guerra), in particular, had been in charge of managing the army at the end of the Quattrocento. The Nine assumed many of the Ten’s tasks in military matters concerning the new militia and were granted a special judicial power to restrict the Eight of Ward’s (Otto di Guardia) peacetime jurisdiction over militia conscripts.1 In other words, Machiavelli’s reform was intended to curb any interference by the traditional and politically conservative city councils over day-to-day administration of the militia.2 These councils were 1 See A. Guidi, Un Segretario militante. Politica, diplomazia e armi nel Cancelliere Machiavelli, Istituto Italiano di Scienze Umane (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009), 349 ff. and 353-80. G. Antonelli, “La magistratura degli Otto di Guardia a Firenze,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CXII (1954), 28. As Antonelli explains, by, at the end of the fifteenth century, the Eight of Guard were “a magistrature hated by most of the population” and considered to be fully controlled by the oligarchy. 2 A. Guidi, Un Segretario militante, 353-80. Cf. J. Barthas, “Machiavelli, from the Dieci to the Nove. A hypothesis based on the financial history of early modern Florence,” in From Florence to the

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004432000_005

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composed of members of the Florentine oligarchy, the so-called ottimati,3 who opposed Machiavelli’s project for the introduction of the Ordinanza as they feared it could be used against them by Pier Soderini’s popular regime. Furthermore, both because of the traditional hostility of Florence’s citizens towards the peasants of the countryside and the ottimati’s fear of losing their privileges in the city’s subject territories, the city ruling class was uneasy about any policy that advanced the role of the militia conscripts in the defense of Florence. In particular, many members of Florence’s traditional ruling class were concerned about the long-term consequences of Machiavelli’s military project. As explained in the previous chapter, at the end of the fifteenth century, the fiscal and military policies of the Medici regime had shaped the Florentine financial system to favor the city aristocracy. Based on short-term mercenary contracts for the army, and financed through loans and public debt,4 the system meant that even though Florence lacked a large standing army, it still had indirect taxation, some of which the surrounding rural areas also paid.5 In his capacity as Secretary of the Republic, Machiavelli aimed to replace the mercenary system with a strategy of arming the peasants of the countryside. While this idea was not entirely original, it was innovative in terms of its systematic character and the scale of recruitment. The organization of the 1506 militia was based on a well-established tradition that Machiavelli as a chancellor had helped shape (e.g. the conscription of one man per household), but the reform effected unprecedented changes in the tools, practices and even documentary procedures

Mediterranean and beyond: essays in honour of Anthony Molho, eds., D. Ramada Curto, e N. Koniordos, (Firenze: Olschki, 2009), 152-5. 3 Cf. M. Mallett, “The Theory and Practice of Warfare in Machiavelli’s Republic,” in Machiavelli and Republicanism, eds., G. Bock, Q. Skinner and M. Viroli (Cambridge: Cambride University Press, 1990), 176, 179-80. For the composition of the city councils see J.-M. Rivière, L’espace politique républicain à Florence de 1494 à 1527: réforme des institutions et constitution d’une élite de gouvernement (PhD thesis, Univ. of Paris 8, 2005), 396 ff. 4 Cfr. Barthas, “Machiavelli, from the Dieci to the Nove,” 155 ff.; J. Barthas, L’argent n’est pas le nerf de la guerre. Commentaire historique et critique sur ces paroles de Machiavel (Rome: École Française de Rome, 2012), XII, 18 ff., 173-79; see also A. Molho, “The State and Public finance: A Hypothesis based on the History of Late Medieval Florence,” The Journal of Modern History, 67, (December 1995): 97-135. Supplement; The origins of the State in Italy 1300-1600 (1995), 97135; also L. Marks, “La crisi finanziaria a Firenze dal 1494 al 1502,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CXII (1954), 40-72. 5 Cf. S.R. Epstein, “Storia economica e storia istituzionale dello Stato,” in Origini dello Stato: processi di formazione statale in Italia fra Medioevo ed età moderna, ed. by G. Chittolini, A. Molho and P. Schiera (Bologna: il Mulino, 1994), 103-11; also in S.R. Epstein, Storia economica e storia istituzionale dello Stato (Bologna: Il Mulino, 1994).

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pertaining to the levy of men from the countryside.6 If one compares this reform to earlier attempts at military reform in Florence, the innovations become more evident. Previous proposals for a militia, such as that suggested by Domenico Cecchi in 1497, were informed by a fifteenth-century literary tradition that did not seriously consider the organizational and bureaucratic aspects of establishing such a military organism, and hence was more theoretical than practical.7 Given the strategic, fiscal and political importance of this military reform, the first step in 1506 was to overcome the resistance of traditional ruling class. Machiavelli first needed to reassure the city councils and the elites that this step was not intended as a threat against political opponents, and then to implement administrative measures that would convince the citizens of Florence that the peasants would not be able to use their new arms against the capital. Additionally, Machiavelli was fully aware that for this military reform to be more successful than previous temporary levies in the countryside (experiments often limited to auxiliary services and merely for temporary and defensive purposes), he would have to limit the direct control that the traditional city offices had over the new organism. Since the city oligarchy that provided the majority of members to the city councils was impervious to any real change, it was imperative to take the control of the new military organism away from them by creating the new office of the Nine.8 6

7 8

On this topic, see A. Guidi, “‘Per peli e per segni’. Muster Rolls, Lists and Annotations: Practical Military Records relating to the Last Florentine Ordinances and Militia, from Machiavelli to the Fall of the Republic (1506-1530),” Historical Research 89, no. 246 (November 2016): 673-86. Militia formations were occasionally re-shaped during the Quattrocento, see P.J. Jones, “The Machiavellian militia: Innovation or renovation?,” in La Toscane et les toscanes autour de la Renaissance: Cadres de vie, societé, croyances. Mélanges offerts à Charles-M. de La Roncière (Aix en-Provence: Publications de l’Université de Provence, 1999), 14. See Guidi, Un Segretario militante, 159 ff. At this point, it is important to mention and discuss the historiographical debate about the possibility that Soderini’s government could have established the militia to use it as a police force to oppress political opponents (i.e. the Florentine oligarchy). C. Dionisotti, “Machiavelli, Cesare Borgia e don Micheletto,” in Machiavellerie (Turin: Einaudi, 1980), 32. Dionisotti, was the first to suggest this possibility, followed by J. Barthas, “Machiavelli, from the Dieci to the Nove;” L’argent n’est pas le nerf de la guerre, passim; and R. Black, “Machiavelli and the Militia: New Thoughts,” Italian Studies 69 (2014): 41-50. The latter particularly emphasizes the role of Cardinal Francesco Soderini in this matter, even though other scholars consider Dionisotti’s suggestion unlikely: cf. G. Sasso, “Machiavelli, Cesare Borgia, don Micheletto e la questione della milizia,” in Machiavelli e gli antichi e altri saggi, vol. II, Milan: Ricciardi 1997; M. Hörnqvist, “Perché non si usa allegare i Romani: Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506,” Renaissance Quarterly 55, no. 1 (Spring 12002):: 148-91; and J. Najemy, “Occupare la tirannide»: Machiavelli, the Militia, and

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…

Chapter 2

Similar political circumstances surround the restoration of the Ordinanza del contado (country militia) in 1527. This later militia was modeled after Machiavelli’s original project, although it differed from its predecessor in some of its practical features, as the second part of this chapter will show. The reinstatement of the Nine of the Militia is evidence of the strong legacy of Machiavelli’s original. The fact that this council was granted judicial criminal authority over the conscripts indicates the political intent to give this office the power to administer justice directly. This intent is documented in a deliberation of the Signoria approved a few weeks after the creation of the Nine:  Auctoritas Novem Militie puniendi usque ad mortem […]  It is assigned to the Nine of the militia full authority and special power to judge and sentence delinquents even to death, including any other authority and prerogatives assigned to the same magistracy by any other act or law. Whose power assigned to the Nine, as aforementioned, is decided to be valid during the time of the present Signori, and even further, i.e. by the next month of August of the present year 1527.9

9

Guicciardini’s accusation of Tyranny,” in Della tirannia: Machiavelli con Bartolo, ed. by J. Barthas (Florence: Olschki, 2007),, 75-108. As extensively explained in Guidi, Un Segretario militante (see pages: 291-317), I tend to agree with the latter position, since a closer look at the use of the so-called bargello del contado during Machiavelli’s service in the chancery demonstrates that the choice to appoint don Miguel de Corella as Captain of the militia battalions was made in light of chancery and administrative practice, which Machiavelli himself had experienced during his service for the council of the Ten. This was first examined by Najemy, then discussed more extensively in my book Un Segretario militante mentioned above. (Incidentally, Black completely ignores this work in his later analysis of this subject). The allegations by the ottimati mentioned by Francesco Guicciardini can plausibly be seen as a result of their fear that the militia reform could damage their financial and political situation, which this book touches upon in this and other chapters. For more on this matter, see F. Guicciardini, Storie fiorentine, ed. by A. Montevecchi (Milan: Rizzoli, 1998), 425. In particular, the ottimati feared losing the benefits and privileges gained through their patronage and political influence in the contado. To achieve their goal of overthrowing Soderini, therefore, the ottimati circulated false political allegations, a tactic that is familiar to us today. Machiavelli certainly intended the militia as a political reform that would have an impact on Florentine politics and society, but it is unlikely that it was created as a direct military threat to the ottimati. ASF, Signori e collegi, deliberazioni in forza di ordinaria autorità 129, f. 126v (lapis, in the right higher corner). Translation mine. Original version: “Spettabili Nove di militia: pienissima auctorità et balìa di potere conoscere et punire tali delinquenti sino alla morte, inclusive altre et qualunche auctorità a decto magistrato per qualunche legge concesse et attribute. La quale autorità come di sopra si è decto [a’] spettabili Nove concesse vollono

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After the re-establishment of a popular regime in 1527, the governing principles of the Republic under Soderini and Machiavelli sparked a debate on the direction the new regime was to take. Once again, the crux of the debate was the relationship between the administration of tax revenue and the army’s financial needs. The idea that Soderini’s fiscal reforms were beneficial to the military successes of the Republic is clearly highlighted in the address delivered by Anton Francesco degli Albizzi at a Consulta (Advisory Council) in 1529: Throughout the existence of this city there has been no proper form of a republic, except for the one from the two [i.e. 1502] to the [15]12. At this time men lived universally safely and happily, not overly oppressed by taxation, despite excessive spending that was continuously done for the war against Pisa. However, the city was so well ordered that every expense made was useful.10 This address demonstrates not only that in the re-established Florentine Republic the political debate still focused on the same issues, but that both the restoration of the Nine and the founding of the militia were seen as key factors in developing a fairer fiscal system. Particularly important is the connection Albizzi establishes between the financial system Soderini instituted and the successful military campaign against Pisa, which brought the city under

10

che duri durante il tempo de’ presenti magnifici Signori et in più là, cioè per di qui al tucto el mese d’agosto proximo futuro del presente anno 1527.” These powers were confirmed the following August, see ibid., ff. 143r e 154v. See also A. Guidi, “Machiavelli e il problema della milizia nella Firenze repubblicana del primo Cinquecento: aspetti teorici e sviluppi pratici,” Archivio Storico Italiano (1, 2018): 106. A similar Provvisione dated 29 June is mentioned, but not transcribed by C. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic (London: Methuen & Co. Ltd, 1925), 81 (note 85). This might be the one in ASF: Miscellanea Repubblicana 18, f. 60v. ASF, Consulte e pratiche 72, ff. 87r-94r. Translation mine. Original version: “Perché in ­questa città in tutto il tempo della sua vita non fu mai forma di republica se non da’ dua al XII. Nel qual tempo li huomini vixono sicuri et contenti universalmente poco oppressati dalle graveze, non obstante una spesa excessiva che continuamente si sopportassi per conto di Pisa. Ma la città era in modo ordinata che quello si spendeva si spendeva utilmente.” A few extracts from this text were published by P.C. Falletti Fossati, Assedio di Firenze. Contributo, vol. I Studi, vol. II Documenti (Palermo: Giannone e Lamantia, 1885), vol. I, 55-57; A. Anzilotti, La crisi costituzionale della Repubblica fiorentina (Florence: B. Seeber Librai Editori, 1912), 90-91; also in R. von Albertini, Firenze dalla repubblica al principato. Storia e coscienza politica (Turin: Einaudi, 1970), 124; and Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 146-47 and 155 (note 90). It is worth mentioning that this discourse by Albizzi is virtually unique, as it is the only extant text of the speech given at a reunion of the so-called Consulte (the meetings of the advisory council). Usually, we only have reports of these meetings prepared by chancellors.

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Florentine control after years of independence. This was, without a doubt, a major achievement of Machiavelli’s militia. Furthermore, Albizzi’s reasoning draws directly from Machiavelli’s thought, and he is certainly one of the “sages” mentioned in the text (below). This is evidenced by the section in which Albizzi explains that a republic should not rely on the greats (“grandi”), as they are more concerned with their own ambition than with the common good: I share the opinion of those sages who had believed that a republic cannot be well-advised by the wealthy and powerful citizens, since their ambition, their personal friendships with princes, the desire to satisfy the one or the other among their clients, the will that everything pertains and depends on them, their avarice, the fact that they have investments here and there, makes them very cautious; any of these and many other similar reasons, can easily pervert their intellect. Therefore, they almost always provide bad advice to a republic.11 These ideas were expressed by Machiavelli in chapter 19 of the Prince, in Discourses on Livy I 37, 55, and finally in Florentine Histories (books III and IV). Such an early indication of the circulation of Machiavelli’s work does not come as a surprise, as Luigi Alamanni, who not only belonged to the same social circle as Albizzi but is also mentioned in his speech, is documented as being among the first readers of the Prince.12 1.1 The Need for New, Large, Permanent Armies Another characteristic shared by the militia experiments relates to contemporary military developments, namely the need for new, large, permanent armies, particularly infantries, levied from the population of both the contado and the city. As mentioned in chapter 1, the descent of the French army of King Charles VIII into Italy in 1494 initiated the period of war and crisis known as the Italian Wars. To withstand external aggression, Italian city-states had to have the 11

ASF, Consulte e pratiche 72, f. 87. Translation mine. Italics added. Original version: “...conformandomi col parere di quelli savi che hanno havuto opinione che le republiche non possino essere ben consigliate da e’ cittadini grandi et potenti, perché la ambitione loro, le amicitie private che indebitamente tengano co’ i principi, il desiderio del satisfare a questo o quello, il desiderare che ogni cosa sia riconosciuto et dependa da loro, la propria avaritia, lo havere le loro facultà in questa et in quella parte, il che gli fa molto respectivi, et molte altre simili cagioni o alchuna di epse possono facilmente pervertir loro l’intellecto. Et però da questi tali et quasi sempre mal consigliata la Republica.” 12 See infra chapter 5. Also, F. Bausi, Il principe dallo scrittoio alla stampa (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2015), 132, 136 and note. For another address presented at the Consulte which seems to draw from Machiavelli’s works, see Appendix 2.47.

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capacity to field military forces on an unprecedented scale and maintain a substantial number of permanent troops. The experiments with a peasant (countryside) militia between 1506 and 1530 reflect the political and military issues that drove the popular governments that had replaced the Medici to search for a way to manage the military system without the city’s traditional reliance on mercenaries, loans and public debt. The initial solutions were supplied by Machiavelli, who expanded the traditional requirement that each household provide one armed infantryman in order to overcome the lack of a large infantry – first of pikemen, later of arquebusiers. This policy also involved the adoption of simple and effective incentives, such as the use of pardons for petty offenses and awards such as tax relief or tax exemptions for militiamen. In this way, Machiavelli, one could say, enacted a paradox: he relied on and expanded traditional methods while changing their goals. In addition, the introduction of the militias helped reduce the costs of war as they were comprised of non-professional soldiers who were not required to be in arms unless called into action in a time of war and were not paid unless called for duty.13 2 Differences Further examination, however, reveals differences between the two militia experiments, some that are particularly interesting in light of both the development of Machiavelli’s political thought and the evolution of early modern armies. 2.1 The Separation between the City and the Country Battalions Some aspects of the 1506 Cagione dell’Ordinanza, the text designed to explain the aims of Machiavelli’s militia, suggest that the author adopted a new attitude toward the rural population involved in the militia project (particularly when viewed alongside the political theory articulated in Machiavelli’s major works). Some parts of the Cagione in particular focus on the idea that the militia, already raised in the contado in the months before, should expand to the city – suggesting that Machiavelli aimed to create a larger military organism that includes both the countryside and the city. Even though this idea, which appears in the final paragraphs of the Cagione, was not explicitly addressed by Machiavelli again during the existence of the militia, it implies that he strongly 13

See the opening section of chapter 4.

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believed in such a possibility.14 The actual Militia Act that was passed soon afterward did not contain any references to this idea, but this does not come as a surprise given the different characters of the two texts. The Militia Act resulted from decisions already taken and simply legislated the battalions raised in the contado in the previous months according to an existing Florentine military practice that Machiavelli expanded. The Cagione, in contrast, is a declaration of intent, a theoretical text, not a law intended to regulate an issue. Its contents let us speculate that Machiavelli might have taken further initiative to expand the new military organism to the city had the Republic not ended. Machiavelli’s consideration of this plan can be found in documents from 1511. Only a year before the sack of Prato that restored the Medici to Florence, Machiavelli had advocated for the establishment of a new section of the militia that would consist of a light cavalry battalion raised from villages and areas in the immediate vicinity of the city of Florence. Essentially, the 1511 recruitment area was much closer to the city walls of Florence than that covered by the infantry militia of 1506. This geographically redefined boundary implies that at least some citizens of Florence could eventually have joined the light cavalry battalion. Machiavelli personally received recommendations for the recruitment of inhabitants of Settignano, a small town very close to the City of Florence.15 Thus there are indications that his project was intended as a single military organism that would combine the new light cavalry with the already established infantry battalions of the contado. Still, the role that Machiavelli reserved for citizens in the Cagione was primarily to form the cavalry militia and command the infantry, thus maintaining a social separation.16 In any event, Machiavelli viewed this project as capable in the long run of creating shared military institutions between the city and its subject territories. 14

15 16

N. Machiavelli, “La Cagione dell’Ordinanza,” in L’arte della guerra. Scritti politici minori, (“Edi­zione Nazionale delle Opere,” vol. III), ed. by J.-J. Marchand, G. Masi and D. Fachard (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2001), 476: “Questo ordine bene ordinato nel contado, de necessità conviene ch’entri a poco a poco nella città e sarà facilissima cosa ad introdurlo e vi avvedrete ancora a’ vostri dí che differenzia è avere de’ vostri cittadini soldati per elezione e non per corruzione, come avete al presente: perché, se alcuno non ha voluto ubbidire al padre, allevatosi su per li bordelli, diverrà soldato; ma, uscendo dalle scuole oneste e dalle buone educazioni, potranno onorare sé e la patria loro. E il tutto sta nel cominciare a dare reputazione a questo esercizio, il che conviene si faccia di necessità, fermando bene questi ordini nel contado che sono cominciati.” See the letter sent to Machiavelli by Pietro Paolo Boscoli on 13 Aug. 1512, published in Guidi, Un Segretario militante, 129 and 449. “E perché la vostra città e voi avete ad essere quelli che militiate a cavallo e comandiate, non si poteva cominciare da voi, per essere questa parte piú difficile; ma bisognava cominciare da chi ha ad ubbidire e militare a piè: e questo è el contado vostro,” Machiavelli, “La Cagione dell’Ordinanza,” 471.

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The spirit of Machiavelli’s project as expressed in the Cagione re-emerges in the 1527 act (Provvisione) that re-established the Nine of the Militia. It is likely that the “sage citizens” who contributed “mature advice and very wise deliberation” to the revived Ordinanza, mentioned in the text of the reform,17 included people who were or had been close to Machiavelli or knew his works well. One may even speculate that, contrary to what has been suggested by historians until now, Machiavelli, who had just returned to Florence, was consulted on this matter in the days before his death.18 Indeed, the procedural sections of the 1527 Provvisione concerning the election to the Nine, which seem very similar to the ones Machiavelli required in 1506, may have come directly from the copy of the 1506 Militia Act preserved in the Chancery. The intellectual affiliation between the two texts can be observed in the resemblance between the sections of the Act concerning expanding militia recruitment to the city and the similar suggestions in Machiavelli’s Cagione.19 Machiavelli only expressed this hope in the Cagione, which was preserved solely in his personal archives. It is therefore clear that the chancellor who drafted the 1527 Provvisione had received advice from somebody with direct knowledge of Machiavelli’s ideas on the militia, possibly even Machiavelli himself. Machiavelli had hoped to be reinstated as Secretary of the Ten, but Francesco Tarugi da Montepulciano was elected to the post on 10 June 1527, i.e. only a day before the passing of the act for the restoration of the Nine. This sequence of events implies that a draft of the Provvisione had been prepared in the Chancery by another official in the days before Tarugi was elected to the office of the Ten, unless we acknowledge the remote possibility that he conceived and wrote the law in one day.20 As Giambattista Busini explained in an often quoted letter, Machiavelli was favored by Zanobi Buondelmonti and Luigi Alamanni, but other important members of the popular regime, especially Baldassarre Carducci and Niccolò di Braccio Guicciardini, considered him too close to the Medici pope and 17

18 19

20

Provvisione of 11 June 1527, published in Guidi, “Machiavelli e il problema della milizia,” 133; cf. also B. Varchi, Storia fiorentina (XI, 41), ed. by L. Arbib, 3 vols. (Florence: Soc. editrice del Nardi e del Varchi, 1843), Vol. 1, 245-46; and Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 74 and 81 (note 85). However, Roth only made a few references to the law, and did not publish the original text. Cf. R. Ridolfi, Vita di Niccolò Machiavelli (Florence: Sansoni, 1978), 391-92. Provvisione of 11 June 1527: «…ordinare et provedere che la città ancora lei habbi dentro a sé la sua ordinanza, acciò che stia armata et ordinata così la città come il resto del domino nostro» in Guidi, “Machiavelli e il problema della milizia,” 134. For the Cagione by Machia­ velli, see note 14. For the appointment of Francesco Tarugi, cf. P. Villari, Niccolò Machiavelli e i suoi tempi, illustrati con nuovi documenti (Florence: Le Monnier, 1882), vol. III, 364 and 477.

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preferred Donato Giannotti.21 Busini’s account is inaccurate, as it was actually Francesco Tarugi who was preferred to Machiavelli for the post. Giannotti was elected Secretary of the Chancery of the Ten only a couple of months later to replace the aforementioned Francesco who had just died.22 Nonetheless, the opposition to re-electing Machiavelli to the post seems very likely and explains the choice of Tarugi.23 Although the 1527 Ordinanza was modeled after Machiavelli’s original project, it closely followed a scheme that had created a de facto separation 21

22

23

G.B. Busini, Lettere di Giambattista Busini a Benedetto Varchi sopra l’assedio di Firenze, ed. by G. Milanesi (Florence: Le Monnier, 1861), 84: “Il Machiavello fuggì di Roma e giunse costì, essendosi recuperata la libertà. Cercò con grande instanza di entrare in suo luogo [Segretario] dei Dieci: Zanobi [Buondelmonti] e Luigi [Alamanni] lo favorivano assai, ma messer Baldassarri [Baldassarre Carducci], e Niccolò di Braccio [Guicciardini] lo disfavorivano, e l’universale per conto del Principe l’odiava: ai ricchi pareva quel suo Principe fosse stato un documento da insegnare al duca tôr loro tutta la roba, a’ poveri tuta la libertà. Ai Piagnoni pareva che e’ fosse eretico, ai buoni disonesto, ai tristi più tristo o più valente di loro; talché ognuno l’odiava. Ma Zanobi [Buondelmonti] e Luigi [Alamanni], come grati, si ricordavano dei beneficj ricevuti e della virtù loro, e non sapevano i vizj suoi, perché fu disonestissimo nella sua vecchiaja, ma oltre all’altre cose, goloso; onde usava certe pillole, auta la ricetta da Zanobi Bracci, col quale spesso mangiava, padre dell’Abatino. Ammalò come accade, parte per dolore, parte per l’ordinario: il dolore era l’ambizione, vedendosi tolto il luogo dal Giannotto, assai inferiore a lui, il quale vi fu messo e favorito da Anton Francesco [degli Albizzi] perché lo lodassi, da Tommaso [Soderini], perché prometteva esser mezzano di dare una figliuola a Francesco Nasi, da Niccolò [Capponi] per la medesima ragione: onde giuocò di due fave un lupino; da Alfonso [Strozzi] per amor di Tommaso [Soderini].” Tommaso Soderini and Alfonso Strozzi were related, as explained by Filippo de’ Nerli, Commentarij dei fatti civili occorsi dentro la città di Firenze dall’anno 1215 al 1537 (Trieste: Colombo editore, 1859), 39, 50, 62 and 86-88. I thank Marcello Simonetta for reminding me of the importance of this letter for a full understanding of the last weeks of Machiavelli’s life. P. Villari, Niccolò Machiavelli e i suoi tempi, illustrati con nuovi documenti (Florence: Le Monnier, 1882), vol. 3, 433. cfr. also D. Marzi, La cancelleria della Repubblica fiorentina (Rocca S. Casciano: Licinio Cappelli libraio editore di S. M. la Regina Madre, 1910), 328; C. Roth, The Last Florentine Republic, 77, 83 (note 112) & 92; Albertini, Firenze dalla repubblica al principato, 149, and Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, s.v. “Giannotti, Donato,” accessed April 2018 . Paolo Malanima follows the same line of reasoning in his entry “Carducci, Baldassare,” Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, s.v., accessed April 2018 . Furthermore, it is interesting to note that Anton Francesco degli Albizzi in the aforementioned discourse presented to a Consulte meeting evidently refers to Machiavelli’s works by mentioning the “sage men” who advised on the question of the opposition between aristocracy and the popolo of Florence. This expression is reminiscent of the passage of the 1527 Act for the renewal of the Nine that speaks of “wise” deliberation and advice given by several citizens (“sages”) on this subject. Cf. above in this chapter and note 11.

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between city battalions and those of Florence’s subject territories. The necessity of defending the Florentine territories from external enemies compelled the Florentine government to search for new solutions, mirroring the historical processes that elsewhere in Europe led to the formation of state militias as forerunners of the conscription system of the late early-modern national states. In 1528, the authorities of Florence went a step further and created two different entities. In fact, while in Machiavelli’s plans, citizens would have formed light cavalry battalions designed to incorporate the infantry already raised in the countryside, the 1528 city militia was mostly an infantry militia that was placed alongside the battalions of the contado. This bipartite scheme, on one hand, was the result of the traditional lack of trust in the loyalty of peasant troops raised in the subject territories. On the other, it stemmed from the revival of the medieval city militia system, which clearly separated the citizen militia created in 1528 from the one of the countryside. The outcome was the creation of two different army institutions24 that effectively resurrected the medieval militias instead of building a national army formed of different units and military corps, as Machiavelli had imagined. Whereas in 1514 the Medici rulers, following a suggestion from their advisor Paolo Vettori, had converted the original militia project into a force that – contrary to Machiavelli’s intentions articulated in the Cagione dell’Ordinanza of 1506 – deliberately excluded the City from recruitment,25 the restored popular government simply separated Florence from the contado, still dismantling the unity envisioned by Machiavelli’s original project, albeit in a different ­manner. 24 25

Cfr. Albertini, Firenze dalla repubblica al principato…, cit. p. 129. The 1514 Provvisione for a militia under the Medici regime was created after the Machiavellian one of 1506, with some modifications, especially relating to the administration of the battalions, which as a consequence of the abolition of the Nine was now assigned to the Eight. This provvisione was edited by G. Canestrini, “Documenti per servire alla storia della milizia italiana dal XIII secolo al XVI raccolti negli Archivj della Toscana e preceduti da un discorso di Giuseppe Canestrini,” Archivio Storico Italiano, tomo XV (1851), 328-336. The explicit exclusion of the city from the recruitment was suggested by Paolo Vettori to cardinal Giovanni de’ Medici published by Albertini, Firenze dalla repubblica al principato, 357: “Your contado and district were in a dreadful state, so much so that You in the city cannot win it back, but for the contado. If you were to arm them, and employ them to defend from foreigners and from magistrates on the inside who would have them killed, you would in fact become their lords [il contado e distretto vostro è stato malissimo, talmente che la città voi non ve la potete riguadagnare, ma sibene il contado. E se voi lo armate, e li armati intrattenete con il difenderli da’ rettori di fuori e da’ magistrati dentro che li assassinono, e che voi in fatto diventiate loro patroni].” Cf. also Roth, The Last Floren­tine Republic, 116-117; and Varchi, Storia fiorentina (book VI), 439

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These practical developments of the Ordinanza del contado project of 1527, therefore, should be interpreted through the lens of the historical processes that, especially from the second half of the sixteenth century onward, were transforming the country militias of the city-states on the Italian Peninsula into different military institutions. Essentially an extended arm of the lord’s family and clients that let them reach into the city and the territories, they were mostly used to advance the Signori’s power and control over the state.26 This kind of militia maintained social control and increased a lord’s personal power and the military forces under his command while also enabling the formation of a system of benefits and privileges granted by the lord to clients such as local nobles and communities.27 On one hand, these militias were increasingly playing the social and political role of bolstering the local clients of the Medici or were operating simply as an auxiliary or police force for the new popular regime of 1527, rather than as a proper military force. On the other, as they began losing the original part-time service scheme Machiavelli had envisioned, the Tuscan militias embarked on the processes that turned them into forerunners of the conscription system linked to the formation of permanent armies in the late early-modern period. The correspondence between the Florentine authorities and the commissioners of the battalions created in 1527 suggests that the militia was sometimes used for social control such as policing purposes. We can see this in a letter sent from Volterra by Carlo Strozzi, General Commissioner of the Ordinanza, to the Ten in Florence in September of that year, in which he suggests using the battalions already raised in that region against a criminal gang that operated in Val di Cecina and the Maremma: Some men from Bologna, Pistoia and Siena, all criminals, murderers and thieves […] are running the Siena country, up to Cecina valley and Your Maremma […] 26

27

With reference to the case of the Medici, the investigation of the role played by lower classes – including inhabitants of the territories – in Florentine festivities and culture made by Richard Trexler is illuminating. Trexler has shown how the Medici “were able to win to their side in the years after their return to Florence in 1512” the “structural element[s] of [the Florentine] society,” R.C. Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance Florence (New York-London: Academic Press, 1980), 515. For the particular case of Medicean Tuscany, cf. A. D’Addario, “I ‘Capitoli della militia’ e la formazione di un ceto di privilegiati alla periferia del principato mediceo fra XVI e XVII secolo,” in Studi in onore di Leopoldo Sandri (Rome, 1985), 347-380; for a general overview of this topic, P. Del Negro, Guerra ed eserciti da Machiavelli a Napoleone (Rome-Bari: La­ terza, 2007 [2001]), 14.

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 Having considered the great number of these assassins, and the help they receive from local inhabitants, and the place where they usually gather is beyond my jurisdiction I can find no better solution than to use the battalion against them, with Your Lords’ and the Nine’s permission and authority.28 Moreover, as mentioned above, the project of re-arming the Florentine militia during last three years of the Republic, from the institution of the Council of the Nine in June 1527, the recruitment and organization of the Ordinanza del contado in the following two months, to the Provvisione that established the city militia battalions in November 1528,29 was clearly founded on an institutional separation between the city and the countryside units. It must be noted, however, that, with the exception of the brief opening paragraph of the Provvisione of 11 June that reconstituted the Nine, there are no theoretical or preparatory writings for the 1527 Ordinanza del contado such as Machiavelli’s Cagione dell’Ordinanza and Donato Giannotti’s subsequent Discorso di armare la città di Firenze,30 written to promote and justify forming the 1506 militia and the 1528 city militia respectively. This is because, as already stated, the Ordinanza of 1527 was essentially reinstating the structure of 1506 Ordinanza inherited by the Medici, but considered ‘ruined’ (“guasta”),31 rather than creating a new military institution. Yet, a year later, in order to lay the theoretical and institutional foundations for the separate city militia of 1528, Giannotti seems to have briefly considered the problem of coordination between the two parts of the body, similarly to Machiavelli in the Cagione; he draws from Machiavelli when insisting that the captains of the countryside battalions should be citizens of Florence. He then 28

29 30

31

Letter from Carlo Strozzi to the Ten, Volterra 22 Sept. 1527, ASF, Dieci, Responsive 123, f. 469r-470v. Translation is mine. Original version: …certi Bolognesi, Pistolesi et Sanesi banditi tucti homini di mala vita homicidi et ladri […] corrono per una parte del sanese et val di Cecina insino per la maremma vostra […] Considerato il numero grande delli assassini, le adherentie de’ paesani, il loco dove si reducono ordinarie fuori di mia iurisdictione non truovo expediente alcuno né altro rimedio che valersi del battaglione con autorità di Vo­stre Signorie et ordine de’ Signori Nove…” Provvisione for the city militia of 6 November 1528, published by F. Polidori, Archivio Storico Italiano, I (1842): 384-409. D. Giannotti, Discorso di armare la città di Firenze (1528), in G.R. Sanesi, “Un discorso sconosciuto di Donato Giannotti intorno alla milizia,” Archivio Storico Italiano, s. V, vol. 8 (1891): 3-27. Cfr. G. Cadoni, L’utopia repubblicana di Donato Giannotti (Milan, Giuffrè, 1978), 50-95. See an extract of the “Militie Novem Officialis Deputatio […] quoted above in the introduction to part I. The whole document is published in Guidi, “Machiavelli e il problema della milizia,” 133.

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makes a quick reference to an abstract merging of the two bodies in a merely doctrinaire manner that nevertheless echoes Machiavelli’s reasoning on the general aims of the militia in the Cagione: in time it would be good to order that the captains of the battalions [of the country] were citizens […] Two positive effects would follow, the first would be that the Florentine militia would be unified as a single body, the second would be that what is now in the hands of foreigners [i.e. mercenaries] would be in hands of our fellow citizens…32 However, years later, during the exile Giannotti was forced into after the return of the Medici to Florence, he outlined in his Repubblica fiorentina the rules for raising what he calls a militia “di fuori” (i.e. external to the city), reflecting the traditional attitude toward the contado (the countryside of Florence) a territory seen as clearly separate from the city and from which only auxiliary forces should be raised.33 Hence, although Giannotti’s contribution to the military project of 1528-30 was innovative with regard to the city militia,34 his depiction of the country battalions is in line with the traditional view of them as merely auxiliary. Indeed, Giannotti explicitly used the term “auxiliary” to refer to these battalions (Repubblica fiorentina, ch. IV 1). All his terminology in this work alludes to a separation between the two bodies: “one’s own arms” are “divided” into internal and external to the city, whereby the latter are considered 32 Giannotti, Discorso di armare la città di Firenze, 23. Translation mine. Original version: “… col tempo saria bene ordinare che i capitani di dette battaglie [“del contado,” n.d.a.] fussero cittadini [...] di che seguiterebbe due beni: il primo che di tutta la milizia fiorentina si farebbe un corpo più unito; il secondo, che quella utilità, che perviene a’ forestieri, verrebbe in mano de’ nostri.” 33 D. Giannotti, Republica fiorentina, a critical edition and introduction by G. Silvano (Genève, Librairie Droz 1990), 221-225. 34 This analysis follows the comments made by Trexler, Public Life, 526-28, about Giannotti’s emphasis on the necessity of reforming the social structure of Florence by giving the youth more responsabilities, and especially about the 1528 militia. Cf. also H. Soldini, Les Républiques de Donato Giannotti. Une biographie d’un républicain florentin du XVIe siècle (Ph.D Thesis, European University Institute, Florence, 2014), vol. 1, p. 297. One can add to Trexler’s argument that the Florentine elite’s refusal to acknowledge the aspiration of the city’s lower classes weakened the political and military strength of the Florentine republic (Public Life, 532), reflects the traditional fears expressed by the same elite toward the inhabitants of the country. From another perspective, even Giannotti failed to recognize the latter point, as it will be explained below. Only the crisis due to the siege by Imperial forces in 1530 partly changed that conception among the ruling class, especially when a new generation of Florentine youth came to power, as explained by Trexler (ibid., 520 ff. and 544 ff.).

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“auxiliary.” His scheme is thus a far cry from the unifying model of the ancient Republic of Rome discussed and promoted by Machiavelli in his Discourses on Livy, i.e. a popular army based on the recruitment of new populations and on a large infantry, announced in the conclusion of the 1506 Cagione.35 In the chapter dedicated to the country militia, Giannotti uses the expression “scrivere soldati” (‘to enroll soldiers’) to describe the recruitment for these battalions.36 Unlike his suggestions for the so-called “milizia di dentro” (the ‘internal city militia’), in this chapter he is actually referring to an old Florentine tradition of occasional recruitment of mercenaries in the contado rather than to a proper part-time state militia such as the one Machiavelli created in 1506. Therefore, we can reiterate that the concept he was referring to has little to do with Machiavelli’s concept of a national infantry raised among the peasants from Florence’s subject territories. In any event, it is clear that the Provvisione that re-established Machiavelli’s Nine of the Militia in 1527 was written before the beginning of Donato Giannotti’s Chancery service, and that the first stage of recruitment for the new Ordinanza del contado was not implemented under his supervision. As stated above, Giannotti was elected Secretary of the Ten to replace Francesco Tarugi on 23 September,37 and there is evidence that recruitment for the new Ordinanza began earlier, under the control of the newly-elected Nine in August; perhaps even as early as July 1527.38 But even if Giannotti did have a role in implementing the later recruitment stages of the Ordinanza del contado, the theoretical framework of the “milizia di fuori” as subsequently elaborated in his Repubblica fiorentina is in line with the institutional and practical separation between countryside and city. Machiavelli’s 1506 project, on the other hand, was much more concerned with encouraging a more consistent and structured participation of the peasants in the defense of the Tuscan territories. In fact, at an early stage of development of the project, Machiavelli in the Cagione also discusses the issue of 35

36 37 38

See above note 14 for the passage of the Cagione in which, after the explanation that citizens better fit with a cavalry militia and have the right of command over the infantry, Machiavelli ends with the suggestion and hope that the same “well ordered orders of the contado” would “enter the city.” Italics added. D. Giannotti, Republica fiorentina, 221. See above, p. 44, note 22. This is proved by a document addressed to the Nine, dated 9 August 1527, that mentions the beginning of recruitment in Val di Cecina: ASF, Signori Dieci di Balìa Otto di pratica, Legazioni e commissarie, missive e responsive 71, f. 60v: “A’ Magnifici Signori Nove della Militia. Magnifici Domini observandissimi salutem. Hiarsera arrivò qui Ceo da Empoli deputato conestabole da Vostre Signorie per la descriptione della ordinanza di Val di Cecina […] die 9 augusti 1527.”

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offering rewards and benefits to the most adept conscripts to motivate them and give them a sense of participating in the defense of their state: “With regard to rewarding them, it is not necessary to think about it now, but it would be enough to give authority to somebody to do that, […] and then to come to the rewards as and when necessary, according to what they deserve.”39 The city councils correspondence personally written by Machiavelli as early as 1498 attests to a general policy of offering benefits to the population of the contado. In his Scritti di governo, Machiavelli often reminds Florentine officers to reward and provide benefits for peasants.40 Although these kinds of rewards were governmental policy at the time, the frequency with which Machiavelli mentions the practice to the Florentine authorities and militia officers during the militia’s formative years implies that he wanted to find the most suitable way to include the conscripts in a shared project for the defense of Florence’s subject territories.41 The scheme was gradual and pragmatic, with the declaration of intent in the Cagione de la Ordinanza followed by practical developments and the theoretical advancements of the so-called Ordinanza de’ cavalli of 1511. This was a legislative text that expanded recruitment to a region next to the city of Florence, showing that Machiavelli aimed to create a broader geographical and social foundation for the militia – one that included the city ­itself. Documents of this sort show that during his time as administrator of the militia, Machiavelli felt compelled to find ways of including the subjects of the contado in a shared project of defense against foreign invasions. The correspondence shows that Machiavelli was aware that this could only be achieved by developing in the militiamen a sense of belonging to a patria. It is worth noting, however, that Machiavelli’s persistent discussion of the role and needs 39 40

41

Machiavelli, “La Cagione dell’Ordinanza,” 476. Translation mine. Original version: “Quanto al premiarli, non è necessario ora pensarci; ma basterebbe solo darne autorità, come di sopra si dice, e dipoi venire a’ premii di mano in mano, secondo e meriti loro.” For instance, this is the case for a dispatch sent to the communities of Bagnone, Pestina, and Suggellina on 4 October 1499, in N. Machiavelli, Legazioni. Commissarie. Scritti di governo (“Edizione Nazionale delle opere”), I, ed. by J.-J. Marchand (Rome: Salerno 2002), 324: “E veramente noi conosciamo che di tutti e’ nostri fedeli voi sete fedelissimi, né desideriamo che venga tempo che la nostra città possa reconoscere e’ meriti de’ suoi fedeli per altro che per possere riconoscere e’ vostri, che sono degni di ogni premio e remunerazione. E perché noi siamo più desiderosi gratificarvi con le opere che commendarvi con le parole, non sareno molto lunghi, ma solo vi significhereno questo: che, come della fede vostra grandissima, noi ne siamo al presente commendatori, così per lo avvenire ne sareno ottimi remuneratori, il che sommamente noi desideriamo.” Cf. Guidi, Un Segretario militante, 333 and passim for examples of how this policy was enacted by the Florentine authorities during the years of Machiavelli’s service to the Republic.

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of the subjects of the Florentine state helped him develop a theoretical framework for including residents of both the city and the countryside within a single homegrown military force. It is this theory, of course, that Machiavelli later developed in his major political works. As the “Letters of Government” (Scritti di governo) written by Machiavelli reveal, policies aimed at incentivizing peasants were especially implemented in militia recruitment from 1506 onward, along with severe repercussions for insubordination and desertion.42 In this regard, the fact that the later cavalry Ordinanza of 1511 makes no reference to possible revolts against Florence by the population affected by the recruitment indicates that over the years there had been progress in conscripts’ attitudes toward the militia project, i.e. that a sense of belonging was spreading among the conscripts.43 Instances of insubordination became less frequent, as evidenced by decreased use of language related to insubordination, disobedience, rioting and punishment in the letters Machiavelli wrote on behalf of the Florentine authorities to captains and commanders of the militia starting in 1508, the years following the beginning of the infantry levy between December 1505 and the end of 1506.44 The problem of motivating the militiamen to defend the territory of Florence, however, re-emerged later when an Imperial army marched toward the city in 1529. At that time, there was a much stronger sense that the conscripts of the restored Florentine country militia were only motivated to defend what the villages they perceived as their homes, as highlighted in a letter a local captain sent to the General Commissioner of the 1527-30 Ordinanza: I moved to Bibbona together with his lord the captain of Campiglia, as I did not have enough strength to take my conscripts over there; and those who I had forced to move there are now back, and they allege that they don’t want to serve if not paid, and that they want to look after their homes rather than those of others.45 42 43

See again ibid., especially the chapters on discipline in the militia. For these aspects, cf. J.-J. Marchand , Niccolò Machiavelli. I primi scritti politici (Padova: Antenore, 1975), 338-339. 44 Guidi, Un Segretario militante, 274-275. 45 Letter of Bati di Benedetto Bati, Captain of the battalion of Campiglia, to the general commissioner Tosinghi, 10 Oct. 1529, ASF, Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 37. Translation mine; italics added. Original version: “Magnifico Signor Capitano etc. Io mi sono trasferito hogi in Bibona colla Signoria del Capitano di Campigla perché mai ho aùto forza di tirare questi mia descripti colà; et quelli che io v’avevo a mia forza sono ritornati, aleghandone non volere servire se non sono paghati et volere guardare casa loro et non d’altri.” Appendix 2.31. Cf. also Appendix 2.34, Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 69, a letter from the same Bati to the same Tosinghi, 15 Oct. 1529, by which the former explains that he could not force the

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In times of danger, the conscripts were willing to desert their posts unless Florence allowed them to protect their own households and villages. Although some battalions of the contado participated in the last battle of the Republican city,46 some small towns and country communities turned their back on Florence,47 the exact problem that, two decades earlier, Machiavelli’s project had tried to avoid. It is worth noting that, despite the defeat of Machiavelli’s militia in Prato in 1512, none of the captains of the militia defending the city walls during the Spanish siege raised an alarm about desertion. Though a few militiamen in Prato surrendered relatively quickly, and there were some accusations of cowardice, there were no signs of mass desertion; the loss was related to the bad strategic decision the Florentine authorities made by not deploying the bulk of their forces to Prato, as Machiavelli and General Commissioner Pierfrancesco Tosinghi had initially suggested.48 In 1529, in contrast, only strongholds of the territories that had mercenary companies remained

46

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conscripts to obey orders (“uomini forzati […] descripti et non paghati non c[i]e li posso ritenere, né i·modo alchuno stanno a ubidientia, et più presto sono vòlti guardare casa loro che casa d’altri, none stante l’ordine dato da’ vostri Capitani di dare loro lo scambio hogni 10 giorni, come avevano hordinato. Bisogna finalmente alla riparatione di questa terra fanti paghati et che stieno al quia di quello che è loro comesso […]”). For instance, in the spring of 1530, commissioners of the Ordinanza del contado were assigned to bring into the city of Florence the battalions of the territories, as shown by some payments by the Ten: “Francesco di Bartolo Zati, Tanai di Piero de’ Nerli, Girolamo di Napoleone Cambi et Niccolò d’Andrea Capponi, suti commissarii in diversi luoghi del dominio per levare le battagle et indirizarle a Firenze.” Appendix 2.52. Only non-Florentine chroniclers of the time, like Giuliano Ughi – himself born in the contado – noted that the Ordinanza’s battalions also participated in the defense of Florence’s city walls, G. Ughi (fra’), “Cronica di Firenze,” in Francesco Ferruccio e la guerra di Firenze del 1529-1530 (Florence: Stabilimento di G. Pellas, 1889), 414. This well-known event is documented not only by contemporary Florentine chroniclers, but by many primary sources, including a letter from Giovanbattista Vivini da Colle from Volterra to Leonardo Bartoli Vicario e Commissario of Lari, 14 Oct. 1529, in ASF, Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 62: “S’intende e’ Colligiani questo giorno havere mandato tre ambasciatori al Duca di Malphi per capitulare con sua Signoria come homo della Santità di nostro Signore et della cesarea maestà […] et anchora dicono la comunità di S. Gimignano essere a simili cimenti […] et come al Poggio imperiale si truova messer Giovanni Tedesco, già capitano della Signoria di Firenze sotto la nostra Ordinanza, con poca qualità de fanti, et per tutta la val d’Elsa manda che vadino a capitulare di modo che Gambassi, Montaione, Castelfiorentino tutti sono iti a trovare el cardinale de’ Pucci che si truova a Uliveto in Val d’Elsa rimettendosi in sua Signoria; et li Volterrani molto si sono ralegrati che li vicini loro sieno a simili patti che molti di loro dicono faranno el simile subito verrà el trombetto, quale pensano non manchi fra dua giorni, ma hanno grande paura della ciptadella perché di già ha volte l’artiglierie al Palazzo loro.” Appendix 2.32. Cf. A. Guidi, “Machiavelli al tempo del sacco di Prato alla luce di sei lettere inedite a lui inviate,” Filologia e critica XXXI/2 (2006): 274-287.

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faithful to Florence.49 As contemporary protagonist Giuliano Vaglienti remarked in the autumn of that year, the only remedy was the strategy adopted by Machiavelli over two decades prior, that is, giving the battalions “hope for a reward” (“speranza di premio”).50 The Role of the New Militia Battalions in the Structure of the Florentine Army When comparing the militia experiments of 1506 and 1527, it is important to consider the role of the new militia battalions in the structure of the Florentine army as a whole, especially their interaction with the extant professional military companies in Florence’s service. Firstly, while Machiavelli’s militia of 1506 was intended to gradually replace Florence’s mercenary forces, the country Ordinanza and the city militia of 1527-28 were always intended only to assist and support the mercenary forces that formed the bulk of the Florentine army.51 This difference provides insight into Machiavelli’s intentions. A militia that could replace the professional infantry forces in Florence’s service would need to be a large army that could call masses of people to arms. And, of course, Machiavelli’s project aimed to raise not only an infantry force, but a cavalry corps as well. The idea was to bring recruitment closer to the city and to create a comprehensive militia composed of different types of units, potentially capable of creating a complete military force. Instead, the authorities of the last Florentine Republic viewed both the city militia and the country battalions as mere supporters of the city’s mercenary forces. Evidence for this attitude can be found in documents detailing the political debate of those years, as another section of Anton Francesco degli Albizzi’s speech attests: 2.2

If we rely only on our ordnances for a militia we are misled, because these battalions are not used to face the enemy: a large part of them are forced

49

50 51

D’Addario, “I ‘Capitoli della militia’,” 349. D’Addario also mentions one of the most famous episodes of rebellion that took place at San Miniato al Tedesco, a territory in which a country battalion of the Ordinanza had been recruited since 1527, cf. Guidi, “Per peli e per segni,” 49. ASF, Strozziane, I serie, 65 n.70, letter of Giuliano Vaglienti to Ceccotto Tosinghi, 16 Oct. 1529. As explained by Albertini, Firenze dalla repubblica al principato, 129-130, the hope of the last Florentine Republic of 1527-1530 was in the mercenaries in the city’s service.

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to do so against their will, and what is more, the majority of them do not have a good captain. Therefore, we cannot rely on them [for our defense].52 That the city militia of 1528-30 was basically tasked with guarding the city walls of Florence is corroborated not only by the documents published by Polidori with the Provvisione of 1528,53 but also by memoirs and chronicles of contemporary Florentine historians who participated in the events with the city militia. Benedetto Varchi, for instance, notes that “together with the soldiers” battalions “went to watch the hill and the Bastion of San Giorgio at night.”54 Giannotti remarks: “And these youngsters [of the city militia battalions] are so brave that they deserve to be praised: they are occupied both day and night in watching the walls, carrying fagots and stretchers.”55 This merely ancillary role of the city militia in the years 1528-30 is also corroborated by an unpublished report of a session of the advisory councils (a Pratica) of 18 February 1530, during which Francesco Carducci, a member of the Ten, explained that this force had “no other goal” other than “guarding the city.”56 The only notable exception was a single battalion that saw battlefield 52

Speech made by Anton Francesco degli Albizzi at the Consulta of 19 Jul. 1529. ASF, Consulte e pratiche 72, f. 89v. Translation is mine. Original version: “Se noi facciamo fondamento nelle nostre ordinanze ci inganniamo, perché non sono ancora asuefacte ad vedere li inimici in viso: una buona parte vi s’è indocta contro alla sua voglia, et a questo si aggiugne lo essere quelle per la più parte mal capitanate. Però non è da farvi fondamento” (this small excerpt from the document was published by Falletti Fossati, Assedio di Firenze, vol. I, 55-56; a longer excerpt has now been published in Guidi, “Machiavelli e il pro­ blema della milizia”: 134-39). 53 Polidori, notes to “Provvisione per la milizia cittadina del 6 novembre 1528,” Archivio Storico Italiano I (1842): 391. 54 Varchi, Storia fiorentina (XI, 41), vol. 2, 216-17. Translation mine. Original version: “si stava il giorno ciascuna banda [della milizia fiorentina, n.d.a.] al suo gonfalone colle sue armi […] e la notte andava parte a guardare il Monte e ’l bastione di San Giorgio insieme co’ soldati.” Cf. S. Lo Re, La crisi della libertà fiorentina (Rome: Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, 2006), 22-23, 75 &105. 55 Letter from Giannotti to Ceccotto Tosinghi, the General commissioner of Pisa, 28 Oct. 1529, in D. Giannotti, Opere politiche e letterarie, collazionate sui manoscritti e annotate per F.L. Polidori, precedute da un discorso di A. Vannucci, vol. 2 (Florence: Le Monnier 1850), 404-405, especially p. 404. Translation mine. Original version: “E questa gioventù [della milizia n.d.a.] si porta sì valorosamente che merita grande commendatione: sta occupata il giorno e la notte in fare guardie, recare fascine e non che altro barellare.” 56 Speech made by Francesco Carducci at the Pratica of 18 Feb. 1530. ASF, Consulte e pratiche 73, f. 91v. Translation mine. Original version: “Et di già è quasi stabilito el modo al guardare la città dove haranno ancora a stare e’ vostri giovani, non essendo altro el fine della militia.” Further transcriptions from the same reports are in Appendix 2.44. Another version is in Consulte e pratiche 74, f. 37v.

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action, participating in operations and skirmishes outside the city walls when the Imperial forces lay siege to Florence.57 The Ordinanza of the country battalions of 1527 was given a similar task – it guarded the strongholds (piazzeforti) in Florence’s subject territories. This can be seen in contemporary documents, especially records of payments made by the Nine of the Militia to country battalion constables in August 1529, which show the assignment of some of the divisions to the garrisons of Pisa and Livorno during the advance of the Imperial forces through Tuscany: Ceo da Empoli, constable of the ordinanza battalion of Pomarance, allocated, with 88 infantrymen of the same battalion, to the garrison of Livorno […]  Captain Michele da Faenza, captain of the ordinanza battalion of Pescia sent to Pisa with 194 infantrymen of the same battalion to guard that city […]  Benedetto di Iacopo Rinucini, constable of the ordinanza battalion of Barga, went to Livorno to guard that place […]  El Guercio da Decomano, constable of the ordinanza battalion of Poppi sent to Livorno with 150 infantrymen of the same battalion […]  Giovanfrancesco di Alexandro Fedini, constable of the ordinanza battalion of San Gimignano sent to Livorno with 100 infantrymen of the same battalion to guard Livorno […]58 57 Cf. ASF, Dieci, Miss. 108, f. 168v: “Patenti di commissario a Dante da Castiglione alli XX di giugno 1530 […] per accompagnare il signore Stefano Colonna et le bande guidate da sua signoria et gli abbiano auctorità di menare infino in XX giovani della Ordinanza fiorentina, li quali lo debbino ubbidire in quelle factioni che saranno da lui ordinate.” The outcome of this mission was the following: ASF, Dieci, Miss. 107, f. 39r, c. 20 Jun. 1530: “A Lo­ renzo Carnesechi Commissario Castracari, el dì davanti […] Questa nocte passata li nostri soldati uscirono di Firenze et andorono ad assaltare quella parte de’ Lanzi che sono alloggiati a San Donato in Polverosa et guadagnate le trincee valorosamente hanno morto et ferito di loro circa 900; et se li nostri havessino atteso a seguir la victoria li harebbono messi tutti per mala via. Havevono guadagnata l’artiglieria, ma respedito al soccorso che vi sopragunse si ritirorono a salvamento con pochissimo danno, che tra morti et feriti non arrivono a XXV. Crediamo che li decti nimici habbino a diloggiare di quivi et ritirarsi o a Peretola o a Prato. Di quel che seguirà ne sarai avisato.” The adoption of this kind of warfare is confirmed by historians of the time such as B. Segni, Istorie fiorentine dall’anno 1527 al 1555 (Florence: Barbèra, Bianchi e Comp., 1857), 160: “Seguitandosi adunque così la guerra con varie sorte di Scaramucce ed assalti intorno alla città…” 58 ASF, Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia, Entrata e Uscita, Debitori e creditori 19, in this order f. 21; f. 58; f. 59; f. 60; and ibid. Translation is mine. Original version: “Ceo da Empoli conestabole de l’ordinanza delle Pomerance deputato con 88 fanti di dette ordinanze alla guardia di Livorno […] Capitano Michele da Faenza capitano de l’ordinanza di Pescia mandato a Pixa con 194 fanti di quella ordinanza per guardia di quella terra […] sono per una sua

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On one hand, the establishment of the Ordinanza del contado of the last Florentine Republic (1527-30) was motivated by a need for a larger infantry, especially gunners or arquebusiers, as the documents examined in chapter 1 confirm. On the other, however, it seems that the political and military impact of this organism relative to the Florentine army as a whole was less than what Machiavelli had envisioned in his earlier project. While the latter was intended to be a fully-fledged army force, the former only used the rural population to defend garrisons or support the professional infantry and cavalry serving Florence. The structure of the Florentine army in that period, in fact, seems to have been modeled after the military companies of the Italian peninsula in the late fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries. This was a hybrid army composed of professional soldiers in almost permanent service who were supported by infantry militiamen, often armed with arquebuses, people’s weapons whose use did not require much training, unlike the sword and the pike, which required substantial training.59 By contrast, Machiavelli’s country militia of 1506, at least in the mind of its creator, was largely aimed at replacing the mercenaries in Florence’s service, for reasons both political and military (despite accusations made against Machiavelli’s project by both contemporary critics like Bandello and by later scholarship). This is confirmed by the practical development of the militia project, particularly the addition of the cavalry militia in 1511, which Donato Giannotti did not include in the 1528 city militia scheme and considered only later on in his major works, particularly in Repubblica fiorentina. In sum, the militia after 1527 was primarily intended to provide a larger number of infantrymen, especially for manning garrisons and carrying handguns, in line with early modern military developments and the establishment of large permanent armies, particularly infantries. These developments were

59

paga e de’ detti fanti […] Benedetto di Iacopo Rinucini chonestabole de l’ordinanza di Barga n’è andato a Livorno con 100 fanti per guardia di quello luogo de’ dare a dì XXXI d’agosto […] El Guercio da Decomano conestabole de l’ordinanza di Poppi mandato a Livorno con 150 fanti di detta ordinanza a’ dì XXX d’agosto […] Giovan francesco de Alexandro Fedini conestabole de l’ordinanza di San Gimignano mandato a Livorno con 100 fanti di detta ordinanza a la guardia di Livorno de data a’ dì XXX d’agosto.” On this movement of battalions of the Ordinanza to Livorno, see also ASF Strozziane, I serie, 64 n. 50, letter of Matteo Bongianni to Tosinghi 18-19 Jul. 1529; also the payments to constables of the Ordinanza, August 1530, ASF, Dieci, Delib. Cond. Stanz. 66, f. 85v; extracts from both these documents in Appendix 2.20 & 2.19. Cf. B.S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare in Renaissance Europe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Uni­versity Press, 1997), 133; M. Arfaioli, The Black Bands of Giovanni (Pisa: Plus, 2005), 7-8; and also M.E. Mallett & J. Hale, The Military Organisation of a Renaissance state: Venice, c. 1400 to 1617 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984), 354.

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founded on mass levies of both inhabitants of the contado and the urban lower classes. However, when compared to Machiavelli’s experiment and its ideological potential, the 1527 version seems to be a step backward in terms of its role and function within both the Florentine state and its army. The militia of 1506 was clearly intended to be comprehensive and potentially revolutionary, although this radical and ideological import was only partially expressed in Machiavelli’s writings on the militia. It is only in his later work that he articulates more precisely the theoretical political and military ideas behind his militia. 2.3 Different Infantry Battle Techniques The two experiments are also distinguished by the different infantry battle techniques in which the militiamen were trained. Here, the research presented in the first chapter must be kept in mind, since in order to provide a clear picture of the military techniques in which these infantry battalions were trained, we must first understand the type of handgun each militia used. As explained in chapter 1, from 1506 to 1527, the tactical model put into practice by the two militias changed, thus changing their military objectives. Due to the rapid evolution of firearms, infantry battle techniques switched from the German-Swiss model conceived by Machiavelli for his 1506 Ordinanza to one based on the tactical use of handguns. Although there was a limited number of arquebusiers in use, Machiavelli’s militia was largely composed of infantrymen armed with pikes and trained to fight in infantry square formations.60 The battalions of 1527, in contrast, were trained mostly in the use of handguns and tactics based on skirmishes and ambushes rather than for the open-field battles for which the pike was still crucial. Even in Machiavelli’s time, many conscripts from the contado were probably auxiliaries, and a large number of them were ancillary to the professional troops. For example, many were simply marraioli and guastatori, i.e. pioneers and labourers used to dig defensive ditches or to build fortifications. Even in the quelling of the Pisan rebellion in 1509, the major success of Machiavelli’s militia, the conscripts were primarily used to create a barricade of men used to impede the city’s provisioning.61 Moreover, it is likely that at least some 1506 militiamen were used as a police force to prevent tensions between the population in the territories and the conscripts and mercenary troops. Nonetheless, 60 61

In this regard, see infra chapter 4; also A. Guidi, “Dall’Ordinanza per la Milizia al Principe: ‘ordine de’ Tedeschi’ e ‘ordine terzo’ delle fanterie in Machiavelli,” Bollettino di Italianistica, y. 12, n. 1 (2015): 7-18. Cf. M. Mallett, “Siegecraft in Late Fifteenth-Century Italy,” in The Medieval City Under Siege, ed. by M. Wolfe (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer, 1999), 254.

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Machiavelli’s militia was a long-term project supported by a carefully considered theoretical framework. This foundation is incorporated not only in the technical features of the Ordinanza, but also in the preparatory writing of the 1506 Cagione. The political works of Machiavelli confirm the ideological character of his militia project. As explained above, Machiavelli viewed the militia as a long-term and comprehensive military reform. A reading of Machiavelli’s major works supports this claim, showing that he intended to further develop the militia in order to replace mercenaries entirely. The intention to improve the original structure of the 1506 Ordinanza battalions is clearly evident in the discussion of the “third order” of infantry in Prince 26,62 which shows technical developments in infantry techniques, first and foremost in the use of the sword.63 Implementation of effective military training like the one adopted by the Swiss infantry formations required a lasting and comprehensive military reform, largely because of the difficulties in training militiamen to use the pike. In addition, the need to recruit the large number of men necessary to form the type of infantry battle formations used by the Germans and the Swiss caused organizational problems. One might thus conclude that the tactical model Machiavelli suggested for the militia battalions discloses his intentions to overhaul completely the military forces of the Florentine Republic through a long-term process involving the creation of a sizable skilled infantry raised from the countryside. This is particularly pertinent when one considers that this kind of goal also requires social reforms similar to the political and military orders of the Swiss cantons – an aspect that again could be connected to the development of Machiavelli’s most radical thinking.64 As shown in chapter 1, from 1527 onward, the introduction of new gunpowder weapons triggered a rapid change in the character, composition, and even the role of the Florentine militia. These changes are in line with the general shift in early modern European armies from infantries armed with pikes to ones armed with gunpowder-based weapons.65 In contrast to Machiavelli’s project, then, the troops of the 1527 Ordinanza were trained to use arquebuses, a skill that was also suitable for garrison duty. As a result, the country 62 63 64 65

Cf. chapter 3, especially the section on the battle of Ravenna. Cf. again Guidi, “Dall’Ordinanza per la Milizia al Principe,” 15 ff. Cf. B. Wicht, L’idée de milice et le modele suisse dans la pensée de Machiavel (Lausanne : L’age d’homme 1995). Cf. M. Arfaioli, The Black Bands of Giovanni, Pisa, 2005, and M. Keen, “The Changing Scene: Guns, Gunpowder, and Permanent Armies,” in Medieval Warfare: A History, ed by M. Keen (Oxford – New York: Oxford University Press, 1999): 273-291.

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battalions were not deployed in battlefield operations, but only in occasional skirmishes, in keeping with the methods being adopted at the time.66 Based on short fights and ambushes, the new methods used auxiliary units to provide support to the professional forces in charge of the main military operations. Under this arrangement, commanders tried to avoid big clashes of armies in the open field, exactly the kind of infantry battles Machiavelli saw as necessary to ensure victory. As firearm construction – which became increasingly efficient starting in the 1520s – advanced, the so-called Black Bands (bande nere) of Giovanni de’ Medici modernized Italian battle techniques by developing and perfecting this new method based on skirmishes. Some of the bande nere troops were put in command of the battalions of the contado and helped introduce these military techniques to the newly raised battalions of the Ordinanza in 1527, as documented by a note sent to the Council of the Ten of War in Florence by Ceccotto Tosinghi, General Commissioner of the Ordinanza: “Note for you, Your Highnesses the Ten […] these men look as capable, sufficient and trustable to be enrolled as captains: […] Messer Pierantonio della Ghisa: he brought the signs of the lord Giovanni de’ Medici, he is a notable man, and he comes from the remains of the bands of lord Giovanni.”67 This is supported by other contemporary documents, including a letter General Commissioner of the Ordinanza Carlo Strozzi addressed to the Nine on 2 November 1527, which clearly articulates the need for more arquebuses to be used in the operations (factioni) – which should be interpreted as quick skirmishes fought with handguns – that the local battalion of Val di Cecina was conducting against the Siena army: To their Highnesses the Nine. Magnificent Lords, these past days I wrote you about some actions fought by the Ordinanza of Val di Cecina, and about what happened on that occasion as well as about the fact that the battalion lacks arms. As these combats are increasing in number, and despite what their highnesses wrote to me in this regard that they are aware 66

67

This technique of skirmish was adopted on a larger scale during the Low Countries’ wars later in the century, cf. G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659. The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975 [1972]), 12. ASF, Strozziane, I serie, 67, f. 23r. Translation is mine. Original version: “Nota a voi Signori X, per Cecchotto Tosinghi, di homini mi paiono sufficienti et fedeli a condurre per Capitani: […] Messer Pierantonio della Ghisa: portava le insegnia del Signore Giovanni de’ Medici, homo qualificato et dalle reliquie del Signore Giovanni; farebbe la compagnia con prestezza; truovasi in campo della Legha.”

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of this, I don’t want to leave anything on my account concerning what might be easily fixed such as the lack of black powder, lead and mechanisms/appliances for arquebuses, and especially some more arque­buses.68 Two years later, in preparation for the impending march of the Imperial army on Tuscany, some units of the Ordinanza conducted raids meant to destroy country resources before the enemy could seize them. This task required a rapid movement of troops for which a cavalry battalion of arquebusiers was perfectly equipped. Thus the Ordinanza evolved over the years into a mixed corps of cavalry and infantry units that increasingly included semi-skilled or skilled soldiers. The cavalry units in particular bore little resemblance to a proper militia. They were a mixed military corps formed of conscripts and former professionals who, in order to obtain pardons or simply wages, had volunteered for Florence’s service.69 At the same time, many infantry militia units were deployed in garrisons and used only for defensive purposes, seeing little battlefield action. Some units that combined a partly professional cavalry with infantry battalions were used in military operations, for instance when a unit of the Ordinanza was sent to destroy a mill in Incisa Valdarno, as shown in two letters the Ten sent to the commissioners Giovanni Benci and Giovanni de’ Nerli, dated 23 and 24 September 1529 respectively.70 Then, in October, by order of Francesco Ferrucci and as part of a larger counter-offensive of the Florentine army in the Valdarno,71 the Ordinanza battalion of Pietrasanta mounted 68

69

70 71

ASF, Signori Dieci di Balìa Otto di pratica, Legazioni e commissarie, missive e responsive 71, f. 98r. Translation is mine. Original version: “[“A’ Signori Nove”]. Magnifici Domini etc. Scripsi alli giorni passati a Vostre Signorie di alcune factioni facte dalla ordinanza di Val di Cecina, et li ordini in quella occorsi et come a quel bataglione manchava arme; et benché quelle ne scripseno havelo ricordato a Vostre Signorie vedendo multiplicare le factioni non voglio manchare del debito mio, maxime a quelli disordini che al presente si possono riparare come è polvere, piombo, et feramenti di archibusi, et anchora qualche numero più di archibusi.” See Appendix 2.5 for the full text. The mixed composition of these battalions (both conscripts and volunteers paid for their services), in 1529 clearly emerges from documents published in Francesco Ferruccio, 160. They included both conscripts and professionals. In a letter sent from Francesco Ferrucci to Ceccotto Tosinghi on 28 Oct. 1529 (ibid., 168), the former informed the General of the Ordinanza about the desertion of a few men of “our infantries” (“fanti nostri”) from the unit of the commander Captain Alessandro Monaldi during an action against Castel­ fiorentino (see below). At the same time, other men from Pietrasanta joined the local battalion led by the same Alessandro in December of the same year, attracted by the promise of amnesty (ibid., 215). ASF, Dieci, Miss. 108, f. 117v. For this “blitz” against the Imperial garrison at Castelfiorentino cf. the correspondence of Francesco Ferrucci and other Florentine officers, published in Francesco Ferruccio, 164ff & 188ff; and A. Monti, L’assedio di Firenze (1529-1530). Politica, diplomazia e conflitto durante

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a quick assault on the Imperials and rebels who backed the Medici in Castel­ fiorentino, as Captain Alessandro Monaldi wrote to General Commissioner ­Tosinghi.72 In the short period between 1527 and 1530, the government of Florence did not have time to devise long-term solutions to create infantry battalions well trained in battle formation techniques. In addition, except for Machiavelli’s 1506 Ordinanza, it did not have a strong local military tradition to emulate, especially after the losses suffered by the troops sent to support the French ally at the disastrous siege of Naples. Thus the Republic restored Machiavelli’s earlier project, but it was compelled to convert it into a militia of infantry and mounted arquebusiers that could be rapidly and easily prepared for combat. Another difference was that, unlike the citizen militia, the authorities established the Ordinanza del contado battalions of 1527 as an extraordinary measure to cope with difficult situations. After the Florentine camp in Naples was decimated by a deadly pestilence, for instance, units were created simply to provide a temporary replacement for the professional forces lost on that occasion.

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le Guerre d’Italia, (Ph.D thesis, Universiy of Pisa, 2013), 132ff (now published as a book, Pisa: Pisa University Press, 2015). Letter of Alessandro Monaldi captain of the battalion of Pietrasanta to Tosinghi 25 Oct. 1529, ASF, Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 142. See Appendix 2.36.

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“Il modo dello armare presente” (“Fanterie d’oggi”) Section 3: The Role of the Peasants: Innovations within the Machiavellian Militia The role that peasants and local communities were to play in the new military institution is a theme of the utmost importance for the Machiavellian project in the militia of 1506. In his early writings, he approaches this question in innovative ways, regardless of the evolution it later underwent in his main political works written years after the preparation and implementation of the Ordinanza. First and foremost, the role played by Tuscan peasants in the state must be understood in the context of the historical phenomena that dominated the formation of the Florentine Renaissance state. This state was the result of a process of conflict and interaction among different powers and social groups in a period when the new political, military and social needs created by administering a larger territory and the formation of an increasingly centralized bureaucracy, both conflicted with and compromised with new needs of the peripheries and the local communities.1 Machiavelli’s militia project reflects the traditional separation between citizens and subjects. However, the beginning of the Italian Wars and the constant state of external aggression, which precipitated the states of the peninsula into permanent war, stimulated him to adopt a new approach toward the subjects that were included in the military project. Indeed, the Florentine secretary was conscious that fielding military forces on an unprecedented scale and maintaining substantial numbers of troops on a permanent basis meant reassessing the role of the Tuscan lower classes, including peasants living in rural areas. As explained above, one of the goals of his military project was to overcome the 1 For the conflictual formation of the Florentine state, see S.K. Cohn, Creating the Florentine State. Peasants and Rebellion, 1348-1434 (Cambridge, 1999); and for a useful overview on this topic also A. Gamberini, La legittimità contesa. Costruzione statale e culture politiche (Lombardia, secoli XII-XV) (Roma, Viella 2016). For the formation of a larger state and its documentary and bureaucratic aspects, see Scritture e potere. Pratiche documentarie e forme di governo nell’Italia tardomedievale (secoli XIV-XV), I. Lazzarini ed., “Reti Medievali – Rivista,” IX/1 (2008) and G.M. Varanini, “Public Written Records,” in The Italian Renaissance State, A. Gamberini & I. Lazzarini eds, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press 2012), 385-405.

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traditional separation between the city and the territories. Despite his efforts to create a sense of cohesion between these groups and the state’s approach to social justice, the impossibility of fully achieving this objective weakened the militia’s effectiveness.2 As peasants of Tuscan villages were subject to Florence, but were not Florentine citizens, they had no incentive to take part in the city’s defense.3 Machiavelli’s solution was simple. He wanted to improve on and eventually overcome the traditional Florentine policy assumption that to govern the subjects of the country, one should “benefit” them (i.e. “vezzeggiare” or “beneficare” in the local vernacular).4 Machiavelli intended to go beyond this conventional policy both politically and institutionally by improving the social position of the peasants of the contado within the Florentine state by constructing a completely new and distinct administration of justice for those recruited into the militia. Secondly, and paradoxically, Machiavelli pursued the same objective as the earlier Florentine military organization had: the assignment of benefits for all conscripts and special rewards for those who dis­ tinguished themselves militarily. His innovation lay in his methodical improvements and expansions to this policy, making it both larger and more systematic scale. 1

 The Administration of Justice

The first problem Machiavelli faced was linked to the Florentine élite: to use levies of men from the territories under Florence’s control, he had to create conditions the city’s ruling class would accept. As Machiavelli well knew, any effort to break the traditional boundaries that regulated the relationship between the citizens of Florence and the peasants, their subjects, would have been rejected by the citizens who voted on the militia project in the city 2 On the related theme of a hypothetical contribution that “marginal males of the city of Florence” could have given to the city’s “national defense,” see R.C. Trexler, Public Life in Renaissance Florence (New York: NY Academic Press, 1980), 512 ff. 3 On this aspect, in connection to the story of the Machiavellian militia, see P. Pieri, Il rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Turin: Einaudi 1952), 438-440 & 534; F. Chabod, Scritti su Machiavelli, introduzione di C. Vivanti (Turin: Einaudi 1993 [1964], 336-338; e G. Sasso, Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. I (Bologna: Il mulino 1993), 205. 4 Cfr. A. Guidi, Un Segretario militante. Politica, diplomazia e armi nel Cancelliere Machiavelli (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009), 329 onward. Cfr. also J.-J. Marchand, Niccolò Machiavelli. I primi scritti politici (Padova: Antenore 1975), 216. On this question, see G. Cadoni, “In margine a un dibattito sul terzo capitolo del ‘Principe’,” in Crisi della mediazione politica nel pensiero politico di N. Machiavelli, F. Guicciardini, D. Giannotti (Rome: Jouvence, 1994), 167-183, to pp. 178-179.

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councils. Nevertheless, he was equally aware that the administration of justice would have to be reformed in order to encourage peasants to participate in the Ordinanza and inspire them to be loyal to Florence, and that a key step was building fairer conditions for those who served in the militia. Treated as subject territories without participation in the central councils in the city, dominions were governed and administered by officials nominated in and sent out from the capital. The Florentine state, therefore, remained an association of communities and powers with a variety of local forms of autonomies and fiscal exemptions, usually the result of personal patronage given to a particular community by a ruling family of the dominant city, whether the Medici or others.5 Machiavelli’s project handled this structure in a pragmatic but innovative way. He left old rules in place, supervising a more organized and methodical adoption of already existing administrative procedures, including simple and effective tools such as amnesty for petty offenses and the distribution of awards to soldiers (tax relief, tax exemptions, and so on). At the same time, he conceived a new central council entitled to conduct its own policy, with powers in the administration of civil justice. This new council had a centralized and specific mandate and could overrule the local power exerted by Florentine families and lobbies. While this step toward the creation of a more modern state elsewhere encouraged the growth of local lords, or signori,6 Machiavelli oriented it differently. By promoting the role of peasants in the army, and therefore in the state, Machiavelli drew inspiration from the ancient Roman history, rather than from the desire to promote the lords’ power, as happened elsewhere on the peninsula. Machiavelli’s references to the pairing of “iustitia” and “armi” in the opening paragraphs of the Cagione dell’Ordinanza must be interpreted as a hint that he intended to promote this kind of ideological operation, reminiscent of a concept of rule based on justice and equality among citizens rather than on one family’s power or on the elites’ privileges over the people.7 The only way open to Machiavelli was institutional reform of the councils traditionally charged with administering the army. Machiavelli removed the 5 Cf. P. Jones, “Communes and Despots: The City State in Late-Medieval Italy,” in Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, Vol. 15 (1965): 71-96. 6 Cf. ibid., 90. 7 Machiavelli, “La Cagione dell’Ordinanza,” in L’Arte della guerra. Scritti politici minori, ed. J.-J. Marchand, G. Masi, D. Fachard, “Edizione Nazionale delle Opere” (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2001), 470. For the pairing of “iustitia” and “armi” cf. D. Quaglioni, “Machiavelli e la lingua della giurisprudenza,” Il Pensiero Politico, XXXII (1999), 176; C. Vivanti (ed. by), introduction to N. Machiavelli, Opere, vol. I (Turin: Einaudi, 1997), xxxviii; & Id., “‘Iustitia et armi’ nell’Italia di Machiavelli,” in Guerra e pace, “Storia d’Italia,” “Annali” 18, ed. W. Barberis (Turin: Einaudi, 2002), 339; also Guidi, Un segretario militante, 380-386.

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functions of recruiting, managing and commanding the militia divisions from the Dieci, and took away the power of administering justice for the conscripts from other city councils such as the Otto di guardia (Eight of Ward), which had traditionally been controlled by the most conservative Florentine ruling classes. As anticipated in previous chapters, Machiavelli created a new council of the Nove di Ordinanza e milizia (the Nine of the Militia) to take over these functions. The newly established office regulated the new infantry battalions and judged cases of insubordination, crimes committed by militiamen during their service and civil offenses committed by the latter against civilians. Most notably, as shown in chapter 2, the new council had the power to grant exemption from conviction in case of petty offenses. Machiavelli’s new law must be seen in the context of the reforms of the Florentine judicial institutions called for by the recently elected head of state Pier Soderini, who sought to respond to the lower-middle classes of Florence’s calls for justice. In particular, Soderini established the so-called Ruota (transformed into the Quarantia in the last Republic after 1527),8 which, like the reform that had introduced the Nine, was intended to go against the privileges of the oligarchy and to create a more efficient and equal administration of ­justice.9 As we have seen, the renewal of the administration of justice did not change the political status of the subjects of the contado. We can surmise that a hypothetical proposal for a complete overhaul of the institutional framework of the Florentine state would have been refused by the city’s ruling class. From the very beginning, Machiavelli had a sense of the problems involved in motivating Florence’s subject territories to defend the state, and the efforts he made to create a complicated mechanism of benefits, exemption and justice for the conscripts must be seen in the light of the theoretical ground developed in his Discourses on Livy and other major works. In the end, these efforts were still incoherent, supported by incomplete measures that could not overturn the traditional socio-political framework of Renaissance Florence. Yet the recruitment of the militia was certainly consistent with the democratic idea, also expressed in Machiavelli’s political works, that a popular army is a tool for the state’s survival and a step toward the inclusion of the masses of people in the 8 Cfr. G. Cadoni, L’utopia repubblicana di Donato Giannotti (Milan: Giuffrè, 1978), 76. The Provvisione for the city militia of 6 Nov. 1528 stated that, in times of war as well as during military training, penal justice should be reserved to the Nine, and in a next level of appeal to the Quarantia, cf. Archivio Storico Italiano, I (1842), 408. 9 Cf. A.K. Isaacs, “Politica e giustizia agli inizi del Cinquecento: l’istituzione delle prime Rote,” in Grandi tribunali e Rote nell’Italia di Antico Regime, ed. by M. Sbriccoli & A. Bettoni (Milan: Giuffrè, 1993).

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state, an idea founded on the example of the Romans’ systematic admission of their conquered nations to citizenship.10 Machiavelli’s problem was to find a way to adapt the achievements of the Romans to the political landscape of contemporary Tuscany, so he could keep his military reforms from being stalled or refused and fulfil the project in the spirit of the political exploits of the ancients. 2

 Benefiting and Rewarding

When considering the framework of the 1506 Ordinanza, we should not look for a direct and concrete application of the Roman model of admitting subjects to citizenship.11 In his writings on the militia, Machiavelli does not ex­ plicitly mention admission to citizenship as a political tool, although in the Cagione de l’Ordinanza he referred generally to the relationship that links good arms to good citizens, as in the ancient tradition of thinking. The question remains, then, how he intended to motivate subjects to participate in the militia. A careful reading of both the writings on the militia and the Scritti di governo suggests that Machiavelli’s initial goal was to grant special benefits and rewards to those contadini who distinguished themselves in military service.12 This policy was in line with an existing Florentine tradition that he intended to make larger and more systematic; it also drew on newly created institutional and judicial layers that conflicted with the traditional forms of the Florentine ruling class’ patronage for peasants. As far as the lower classes recruited for the militia, essentially Tuscan peasants, go, Machiavelli’s project should be seen as a long-term military reform based on a wider and more systematic concession to the conscripts of fiscal and work exemptions, immunity for petty offenses, and so on. This reform came alongside a policy of benefiting country dwellers that some Italian states adopted after 1494, in order to ensure a military force capable of contributing to their own defense. The Republic of Venice from at least the beginning of the sixteenth century had adopted this model,13 and the 10 11

12 13

Cf. G. Pedullà, Machiavelli in tumulto. Conquista, cittadinanza e conflitto nei “Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio,” (Rome: Bulzoni, 2011), 404, 477, 482 & 484. This line of reasoning follows E. Fasano Guarini, “Machiavelli and the crisis of the Italian republics,” in Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. by G. Bock, Q. Skinner, M. Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 39, in her analysis of a speech by Camillus quoted by Machiavelli. Cf. the brief but important intuition by Trexler, Public Life, 544, concerning Machiavelli’s awareness of the need to benefit the Tuscan contadini. Cfr. Mallett & Hale, The Military Organisation of a Renaissance State, 74-87 & 350-366.

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Florentine popular government had also cautiously initiated this process in 1494, before Machiavelli raised the policy to another level. However, we cannot totally exclude the possibility that some of the solutions envisioned by Machiavelli might have been different, especially with reference to militiamen from the small centers of the territories that had shown particular affection for Florence, as will be explained in more detail below. A similar intent informed the policy of creation of Borghi nuovi and franchi (‘new’ and ‘free’ boroughs) by the dominant cities of late medieval Italy in their surrounding areas, which in turn created new foundations for local fiscal exemptions and settlement policies that could attract a potentially valuable population in order to reinforce the local rural militia battalions.14 In the long run, this policy eventually led to admission to citizenship for some of those affected by these reforms That this is not just a hypothesis can be seen via the possibilities opened by the cavalry militia, the so-called Ordinanza de’ cavalli, the appendix to the ­original reform that Machiavelli conceived in 1511. This second militia was to be recruited in three different areas, one of which, the Valdarno di sopra, at the time constituted not only the small villages typically targeted for recruitment for the infantry battalions of 1506, but also small towns such as San Giovanni Valdarno and Montevarchi that are not far from Florence. As Machiavelli writes in the Cagione, these small towns could be trusted by the Florentine authorities more than those “nidi grossi” of the distretto (the provinces only recently incorporated into the dominion of Florence) like Arezzo. The discussion concerning the Roman policy of either admitting the subjected towns to citizenship, or totally destroying them, which Machiavelli mentions in connection to Arezzo in his Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati of 150215 might hint that he had considered the possibility of admitting at least 14 15

Cf. P. Grillo, Cavalieri e popoli in armi. Le istituzioni militari nell’Italia medievale (RomeBari: Laterza 2008), 123-24. N. Machiavelli, “Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati,” in Id., L’arte della guerra, 461-462: “Ma io vi ho solo a dire questo: quello imperio essere fermissimo che ha i sudditi suoi fedeli e al suo principe affezionati; ma quello che si ha a deliberare, bisogna deliberare presto, avendo voi tanti popoli sospesi tra la speranza e la paura, i quali bisogna trarre di questa ambiguità e preoccuparli o con pena o con premio […] E essendo dal consolo proposta la causa di ciascuna delle terre, fu deliberato per i senatori che i Lanuvini fossero cittadini romani, e renduto loro le cose sacre tolteli nella guerra; feciono medesimamente cittadini romani li Aricini, Nomentani e Pedani; e a’ Tusculani furono servati i loro privilegi, e la colpa della ribellione fu rivoltata in pochi dei piú sospetti. Ma e Veliterni furono gastigati crudelmente per essere antichi cittadini romani, e ribellatisi molte volte: però fu disfatta la loro città.” It is perhaps worth remembering that in the third chapter of the Prince, Machiavelli discusses the need to expand a lord’s consensus by

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some of the cavalrymen of the militia into citizenship. A discussion on the possibility of applying the Roman policy to Arezzo, as Giorgio Inglese points out, took place at that time in one of the city advisory council meetings.16 In any case, the fact that some inhabitants of Settignano, another borough very close to Florence, explicitly asked the Secretary to be admitted to the number of those already enrolled in this cavalry militia, might suggest that Machiavelli had seriously considered the notion that these militiamen would receive special recompense.17 The options considered by Machiavelli for this cavalry militia probably aimed at a revision of the statutes (i.e. the treaties signed by Florence with the territories under its control) that was more favorable to peasants and inhabitants of the small towns involved in the recruitment for the militia, thus enabling the initial goal of benefiting them.18 That Machiavelli may have had in mind this kind of reform is suggested in the Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana, in which he recommended a revision of the statuti to make them more favorable to the subjects.19

16

17 18

19

stimulating the faith and love of his subjects. This chapter is based on the assumption that there is a complex relationship of fear and reward between rulers and subjects; this assumption shapes the rule of either “vezzeggiare” or “spegnere” (either “benefiting” or “extinguishing”) subjects and men in general; because, although “uno sia fortissimo in sulli eserciti” (“however strong and powerful one’s army is”), without the support of the local population, it is impossible for a prince to govern and maintain his rule over a province. Cfr. G. Inglese, “1506,” in Machiavelli senza i Medici: scrittura del potere / potere della scrit­ tura (1498-1512) ed. by J.-J. Marchand (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2006), 257-258, and id., Per Machiavelli (Rome: Carocci, 2006), 19-21; the report of the discussion in the council is in Consulte e pratiche della Repubblica fiorentina 1505-1512, ed. by D. Fachard (Genève: Droz 1988), 77. This is highlighted in a letter from Pietro Paolo Boscoli to Machiavelli, see above chapter 2, note 15. L. Tanzini, Alle origini della Toscana moderna. Firenze e gli statuti delle comunità soggette tra XIV e XVI secolo, Biblioteca Storica Toscana (Florence: Leo S. Olschki 2007), 35-37, has described the process of revision of the so-called statuti and capitoli, as a dialogue between the central state and the local communities; this phenomenon effectively brought the peripherical local elites into the state (pp. 199-200). Machiavelli, “Del modo di trattare i popoli della Valdichiana ribellati”, in Id., L’arte della guerra, 463: “Io giudico ben giudicato che a Cortona, Castiglione, Il Borgo, Foiano si siano mantenuti i capitoli, sieno vezzeggiati e vi siate ingegnati riguadagnarli con i benefizii, perché io li fo simili a’ Lanuvini, Aricini, Nomentani, Tusculani e Pedani, de’ quali nacque da’ Romani un simile giudizio. Ma io non appruovo già che gli Aretini, simili a’ Veliterni e Anziani, non siano stati trattati come loro.” Italics added.

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 3 Conclusions Machiavelli’s reforms were innovative; however, as this chapter has demonstrated, his organization of the militia drew from a well-established chancery tradition. His innovations lay in the unprecedented changes in both the size and the systematization of existing military and administrative practices.20 Furthermore, he innovated the spirit of the militia by drawing inspiration from some aspects of classical antiquity and by innovating the communal tradition of levies of militiamen in Florence. He successfully extended and expanded tools already in use and shifted them from temporary and covering only ancillary functions to shaping the main infantry force for the whole of the army. One of the key features was to assign a new historical role to the peasants of the Florentine Republic in the defense of the state. Machiavelli’s insistence, in both his writings on the militia and Scritti di governo, on the policies of benefiting and rewarding as well as on the need for a fair but firm justice for the conscripts reveal his intentions in this area. The reference to the pairing of “justice” and “arms” in Machiavelli’s Cagione dell’Ordinanza was an invitation to develop new policies based on social equality, drawing directly from classical heritage. Given the political reality of Renaissance Florence, however, this invitation was realized in pragmatic and new systematic uses of traditional judicial and administrative policies, especially those that were realistically capable of creating more equality, even with the enduring division between citizens and subjects. This invitation in the Cagione especially highlights the need to reform justice, as it related to subvert a previous governmental practice connected to the administration of the populations interested by the militia project. Similar features and goals will appear later in the political thoughts Machiavelli expressed in his major political works. The heart of this reform was the effort to remove the conscripts from a system of patronage and power that both the city aristocracy and the Medici exerted in the territories. It helped the conscripts become a sort of new social group, with institutions specifically dedicated to them and a better defined and more clearly denoted role within the state through the military, as the episode of the first parade of the battalions on the streets of Florence exemplifies (the “most beautiful thing that had ever been ordained for the city of Florence,” as a contemporary chronicler described it).21 20 21

Cf. Guidi, Un Segretario militante, passim. The parade aroused a vast echo, as exemplifed by Luca Landucci and other Florentine chroniclers, see L. Landucci, Diario fiorentino dal 1450 al 1516, ed. by I. Del Badia (Florence, Studio Biblos, 1969 [re-print of 1883 issue]), 273. The importance of this episode as a social and political ritual has been highlighted by Trexler, Public Life, 511, which provides a

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translation of Landucci’s passage. Trexler also correctly points out that Soderini’s regime failed to take the opportunity to establish an urban militia alongside the rural one Machiavelli wanted. However, Machiavelli’s country militia had a widespread reputation as a new and important step, cf. B. Cerretani, Storia fiorentina, ed. by G. Berti (Florence: Olschki, 1994), 347: “In Firenze [...] si chominciò a penssare più churiosamente al favorire questa nuova militia, visto maxime quantto excellentemente riusciva […] Et hebbe tantta reputatione che tutta Italia vi pose l’ochio.”

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Infantry Battle Techniques and Infantry Tactics

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“Il modo dello armare presente” (“Fanterie d’oggi”) Section 4: Infantry Battle Techniques and Infantry Tactics in Machiavelli’s Militia of 1506 and in 1521 Art of War This chapter must begin by posing a simple question: how much practical knowledge did Machiavelli actually have of the infantry tactics and techniques of his times? As secretary of the authorities in charge of the conduct of war and warfare in Florence in 1506, Machiavelli conceived the theoretical framework and administrative structure of his militia project.1 In the years that followed, he conducted a series of levies of infantrymen from the territories under the city’s control. He also personally oversaw the military training of the conscripts, taking field trips to the country and corresponding constantly with the commissioners in command of the newly formed battalions. As explained in the previous chapters, the documents pertaining to the establishment of the militia and this correspondence indicate that Machiavelli wanted the conscripts to be instructed in the infantry techniques most famously adopted by the Swiss at the end of the fifteenth century. A more detailed analysis in this chapter will compare the 1506 militia and the military tactics Machiavelli developed later in the Art of War. In his texts on the militia dating from 1506 to 1511, Machiavelli does not extensively discuss infantry tactics. Nonetheless, a few passages provide strong hints of his intentions. His Provisione della Ordinanza or Militia Act of 1506 points out that “Constables shall muster the conscripts, and train them according to the order and militia of the Germans.”2 In light of the fact that in Machiavelli’s military mind German infantry techniques were first and foremost those of the German-Swiss (as he writes in the Art of War, “this mode of arming 1 On this topic, M. Hörnqvist, “Perché non si usa allegare i Romani. Machiavelli and the Florentine Militia of 1506,” Renaissance Quarterly, 55 (2002): 148-191; A. Guidi, Un Segretario militante. Politica, diplomazia e armi nel Cancelliere Machiavelli (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009), chapter III. 2 Machiavelli, “Provisione della Ordinanza,” in Id., L’arte della guerra. Scritti politici minori, ed. by J.-J. Marchand, G. Masi, D. Fachard, “Edizione Nazionale delle Opere” (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2001), 484. Translation is mine. Original version: “Debbino tenere sempre connestaboli che rassegnino tutti gli uomini descritti, e li esercitino secondo la milizia e ordine de’ Tedeschi.”

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was discovered by the German peoples, especially the Swiss”)3 this statement must be interpreted as “according to the ‘Swiss’ order.”4 Besides, the phrase repeats a concept expressed in an earlier dispatch from Machiavelli to one of the constables of the militia. In that letter he ordered – on behalf of the Florentine authorities – his correspondent “to muster and train them [i.e. the conscripts] according to the militia and orders of the Germans.”5 Moreover, the description of the arms to be assigned to militiamen in 1506 confirms this interpretation: “Shall the officers muster the militiamen with the following arms, that is: for defense, shall have at least a chest armour each, and, for offense, they shall have at least 70 lances in a hundred men”6. This is confirmed by a dispatch sent to a commissioner of the militia in April of the same year, in which Machiavelli more accurately refers to these weapons as “long lances.”7 These “lances,” in fact, are undoubtedly to be interpreted as pikes, as Machiavelli himself explains in the Art of War: “For their defense, the infantrymen have a breast[plate] of iron, and for offense a lance nine-braccia long, which they call a pike.”8 The same kind of weapons were stocked in the warehouse of the Palace of the Signori, ready for use: “In addition to the arms

3 N. Machiavelli, Art of War, trans. ed. and with a commentary by C. Lynch (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 2003), 35. Original version: “Questo modo dello armare fu trovato da’ populi tedeschi e massime dai Svizzeri.” 4 P. Pieri, introduction to N. Machiavelli, Dell’Arte della guerra (Rome: Edizioni Roma, 1937), vii-lxix: xiv, was of the same opinion about the tactical order adopted for 1506 militia, although he provided no documentation in support of this comment. He also observed that it was, later on, in the Art of War, that Machiavelli turned to the roman infantry model. 5 Letter of the Ten of War (written by Niccolò Machiavelli) to the commissioner Bernardo del Beccuto, 28 April 1506, in N. Machiavelli, Legazioni. Commissarie. Scritti di governo, ed. by J.-J. Marchand, A. Guidi, M. Melera-Morettini, 7 vols. (“Edizione Nazionale delle opere,” vol. v), (Rome Salerno editrice, 2008), vol. 5, 303. Translation mine. Original version: “E a messer Giliberto dirai che in questo primo mese li raguni [i “descritti” nell’Ordinanza] ogni domenica e li addestri secondo la milizia e ordine de’ Tedeschi.” 6 Machiavelli, “Provisione della Ordinanza,” 487. Translation mine. Original version: “Debbino detti offiziali mantenere gli uomini descritti con le infrascritte armi, cioè: tutti, per difesa, abbino almeno un petto di ferro e, per offesa, in ogni 100 fanti sia 70 lance almeno e 10 scoppietti, et il restante possino portare balestre, spiedi, rotelle, targoni et spade come meglio parrà loro.” Cf. F.L. Taylor, The Art of War in Italy 1494-1529 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1921), 41. Cf. also above, chapter 1. 7 Letter of the Ten (written by Niccolò Machiavelli) to Carlo del Benino in Fivizzano, 30 April 1506, Machiavelli, Legazioni, t. v, 309: “ordinerai che la metà di loro, o più, procaccino lance lunghe.” 8 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 26), 35. Original version: “Hanno i fanti per loro difesa uno petto di ferro, e per offesa una lancia nove braccia lunga, la quale chiamano picca,” Machiavelli, L’arte della guerra, 81. Cf. Pieri, introduzione a Dell’Arte della guerra, ix e xlvii.

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allocated to militiamen, two thousands chest armours, five hundreds arquebuses and four thousands lances shall be stored in the Palace of the Signori.”9 This documentary evidence shows that from 1506 on, Machiavelli aimed at creating infantry militia formations according to the tactical order of the square battles of the Swiss: a model founded on the use of pikes supported by men armed with shorter weapons in the back ranks and supplemented from outside by crossbowmen and handgunners.10 Originally and most famously developed in the first decades of the fifteenth century, this pattern subsequently dominated European battlefields.11 Moreover, the fact that Machiavelli only briefly mentions other weapons, including swords, and that he refers to them as ancillary arms that would be adopted, along with four others, by only 20 out of 100 men, indicates that first and foremost he wanted the newly created battalions to be trained in the use of pikes.12 Starting from the de facto formation of the militia in December 1505, Ma­ chia­velli urged local military officials to solicit the constables to “muster and review [the conscripts] on Sundays.”13 In some cases, he even called on them to drill the militiamen twice every eight days, as we learn from a dispatch in January to one of these constables, Bastiano da Castiglione.14 Given that this militia was made up of non-professionals, i.e. men not required to be in arms unless called into action in a time of war,15 men who were presumably continuing their own personal activities and work as civilians, this is a relatively high frequency of mustering and military training. If one considers that to teach 9

Machiavelli, “Provisione della Ordinanza,” 482-3. Translation mine. Original version: “Deb­ bino sempre tenere nella munizione del Palazzo de’ Signori, oltre alle armi che saranno nelli descritti, almeno dumila petti di ferro, 500 scoppietti e 4 mila lance.” 10 Cf. P. Del Negro, Guerra ed eserciti da Machiavelli a Napoleone (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 2007), 26; C.J. Rogers, “Tactics and the Face of Battle,” in European Warfare, 1350-1750, ed. by F. Tallett and D.J.B. Trim, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 206. 11 Cf. B.T. Carey, Warfare in the Medieval World (Pen & Sword, 2006), passim; Rogers, “Tactics and the Face of Battle,” 205-207. 12 See above note 7. Cf. also chapter 1. 13 Machiavelli, Legazioni, t. v, cit., p. 360. Translation mine. 14 Ibid., 263. Translation mine. Original version: “per questi princìpi, quando tu facessi le mostre ogni 8 dì dua volte, non ci pare troppo. […] e questo farai bene loro intendere, dicendo loro che questo si fa nel principio per addestrarli sì presto che passati 20 o 25 dì e’ saranno chiamati delli 8 o de’ 15 dì una volta.” 15 Cf. this passage from Luca Landucci describing the composition of the first battalions of the militia: “And these were soldiers who were to stay at home under obligation, until need arose for them to be deployed.” Translation by Hörnqvist, “Perché non si usa allegare i Romani,” 156. For this aspect of Machiavelli’s militia, cf. also J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 201.

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hundreds of men how to interact and coordinate in close formation is no easy task, and that the latter requires a great deal of practice, this mustering frequency can be read as another hint that Machiavelli intended to train the conscripts in the rules of the Swiss infantry square formations. These documents also confirm that Machiavelli thought of the militia as a long-term process for the creation of a large and well-drilled infantry of pikemen supported by a small number of arquebusiers: a force capable of facing the powerful infantry formations of Swiss, German and Spanish armies that dominated the battlefields of Italy at the time; an infantry capable of actually being the “sinew” of the Florentine army.16 1

 Ravenna as a Turning Point: From the Swiss Model in the 1506 Militia to the ‘Third Order’ of Infantry in the Prince, up to the Roman Archetype in the Art of War

Machiavelli’s stress on the infantry can be seen in the Art of War, the Prince and the Discourses: for him, the infantry was “the sinew of an army,” within the “fundamental body” that the state’s military strength would be built around. Already in chapter 26 of the Prince, written many years before the Art of War, he had discussed two of the infantries considered the most powerful when he was writing: the Swiss-German and the Spanish. And because of his conception of an army as a military force that relies mostly on the infantry, he saw battle on an open field, with two large infantry forces meeting and fighting, as the most important phase of war. During the Middle Ages, battles usually involved a mixture of cavalry and infantry and firearms and hand-to-hand combat. This was still the case during the Italian Wars, i.e. at the time of Machiavelli’s life and work. However, the nature of the mixture changed – with revolutionary consequences. At Agincourt, the infantry clash was not a fight of mass against mass, but the sum of many combats between individuals;17 after the Swiss innovated infantry tactics by renovating ancient battle techniques based on the coordination of men in a phalanx and introducing the pike, strategy and coordination between men became more and more important. 16

17

Cf. the notorious statement of Discorsi, II 10 “i danari non sono il nervo della guerra.” For a commentary on this statement by Machiavelli, cf. J. Barthas, L’argent n’est pas le nerf de la guerre: essai sur une prétendue erreur de Machiavel (Rome: Collection de l’École Française de Rome, 2011). Cf. J. Keegan, The Face of Battle (London: Jonathan Cape 1976), 100.

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The uses of firearms and passive obstacles and defenses introduced new strategic tools that required coordination among different corps, as seen in April 1503 when the French and Spanish battled at Cerignola for control of the kingdom of Naples, discussed above in the section on individual firearms. However, Cerignola was only the first battle in which commanders experimented with a variety of weapons and tactics. The battle of Ravenna in 1512 was another, as mentioned by Fabrizio Colonna at the beginning of book 2 of the Art of War. In 1511, the so-called Holy League, established by Pope Julius II with Spain, Venice and Henry VII of England, was created to drive the French out of Italy. The next year, the French troops, led by Gaston de Foix, besieged Ravenna, a small town on the Adriatic coast of Italy under the pope’s control. The Spanish force defending the city took up a defensive position not far from Ravenna. Pedro Navarro, the Spanish commander, used the strategy of creating a defensive line protected by fire and missile weapons that had been used at Cerignola in 1503. To force the Spanish to attack, the French artillery bombarded the enemy line with unprecedented fire (i.e. bullets, cannon, etc.), an example of the growing importance of cannons, another feature of the Italian Wars. The Spanish cavalry charged unsuccessfully. However, the Spanish arquebusiers, sheltered by a parapet as in Cerignola, defeated an advance by French crossbowmen. Afterward, an advance by the German pikemen (the Landsknechts) in French service, was more successful, although it was eventually stopped by Spanish swordsmen. Finally, the French cavalry, largely supported by artillery, exploited gaps in the Spanish defensive system to turn the flank of the swordsmen and win the battle. The French won thanks to superior coordination and combination of the various arms of their forces.18 Ravenna also demonstrated the importance of firepower. The first two hours of the battle consisted of heavy artillery charges, and it was French artillery that finally provoked the Spanish to charge too early. The battle of Ravenna proved the inanity of cavalry action against cannons.19 The key element in the battle was the strategic use of French artillery, which had a better strategic position, sheltered by the river Ronco, and by a hill. Most importantly, the French had a perfect tactical combination of cavalry and infantry, while the Spanish lacked coordination.20 For Machiavelli, this battle represented a 18 19 20

For a recent sketch of the battle, see M.E. Mallet & C. Shaw, The Italian Wars, 1494-1559: War, State and Society in Early Modern Europe (Harlow, New York: Pearson, 2012), 106-111. Extensively, Taylor, The Art of War, 180-215. Cf. B.S. Hall, Weapons & Warfare in Renaissance Europe. Gunpowder, Technology, and Tactics (Baltimore & London: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1997) 172. Cf., ibid., 173.

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decisive step in military structure, especially the Spanish use of swords, which he mentions in both the Prince and the Art of War.

…

Given its strategic and military importance and the high number of casualties, the battle of Ravenna became very famous.21 Nonetheless, we can ask how much knowledge Machiavelli had of the actual events. To what extent was he basing his comments on commonly-held opinions, rather than his own observations? It is hard to answer this fully for each of his many references to contemporary events or military techniques. However, we have some clues about Ravenna. Discussion of the consequences and, to some extent, the modes of the battle of Ravenna emerged very early in Machiavelli’s writings. Even before his major works, he mentioned it in some of his minor political and diplomatic texts, mostly arising from to the missions he carried out between 1510 and 1511; in the summer of 1512, after the battle, he added references to it. For instance, in the so-called Ritratto di cose di Francia, he added comments about logistics and technical aspects of the battle: “The same [i.e. the inability to manage/ govern the army on the battlefield] occurred to the Spanish at Ravenna,” writes Machiavelli: “if they had not approached the French [too early],” the French would have experienced deficiency in the army management and from a lack of supplies.22 This portrait of the events at Ravenna bears some resemblance to the content of the dispatches Florentine commissioner Niccolò Capponi sent from the field the day after the battle.23 Since Machiavelli was the secretary of the council of the Ten of War to whom the dispatches were addressed, it is highly 21

For a recent sketch of the place of the battle in the history of war and culture, cf. 1512 La battaglia di Ravenna, l’Italia, l’Europa, ed. by D. Bolognesi (Ravenna: Longo, 2014). 22 Machiavelli, Ritratto di cose di Francia. Translation mine. Original version in Id., L’arte della guerra, 546-66: 550: “Il medesimo interveniva a Ravenna alli Spagnuoli che, se non si accostavano a’ Franzesi, li disordinavano rispetto al poco governo e al mancamento delle vettovaglie che impedivano loro e’ Viniziani verso Ferrara; e quelle di Bologna sarebbono sute impedite dalli Spagnuoli; ma perché uno ebbe poco consiglio, l’altro meno iudizio, lo esercito franzese rimase vincitore, benché la vittoria fusse sanguinosa.” 23 Cf. the instructions that the Florentine authorities prepared for Capponi, in Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, ed. by G. Canestrini and A. Desjardins, vol. II (Imprimerie impériale, Paris 1861), 578-80. Cf. C. Guasti, Vite d’uomini d’arme e d’affari del secolo XVI, Barbèra, Firenze 1866, 229-30. The correspondence between Capponi and the Florentine authorities has been recently studied by S. Meschini, La Francia nel ducato di Milano. La politica di Luigi XII (1499-1512) (Milan: Franco Angeli, 2006), vol. 2, 894 ff.

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likely that they provided his first and most vivid impression of the battle.24 Capponi’s account of the events not only highlights the lack of provisions in the French camp, as Machiavelli did in the 1511/12 Ritratto di cose di Francia, but also stresses the strength of the impact the Spanish infantry made after the artillery fire.25 Niccolò Capponi may have provided a similar account of the events in a report of the battle written to the Florentine authorities, now lost, but which we know about from a letter sent by Jacopo Guicciardini to his brother, the historian Francesco. Not surprisingly, Jacopo stresses in his letter the “damages” the Spanish infantry caused the French. The content of the aforementioned dispatches by Capponi supports the hypothesis, first advanced by Jean-Claude Zancarini, that this report was probably the main source for Machiavelli’s account of the events of Ravenna given a few years later in his major works.26 Thus we see that Machiavelli’s report has some factual basis. Nonetheless, there is a long-standing tradition according to which Machiavelli invented everything about this episode. Authoritative work by nineteenth-century German military scholars Hans Delbrück and Martin Hobom is the main source for the idea that Machiavelli’s knowledge of early sixteenth-century battles was merely conceptual and speculative or “idealistic.”27 This image arose from the general perception of Machiavelli’s alleged lack of understanding of the importance of firearms and artillery, already discussed in the previous chapters. This kind of judgment runs up from the sixteenth century (see the remarks by the novelist Bandello in ch. 5), and has been prominent for centuries. Famous late nineteenth-century Italian scholars of Machiavelli such as Pasquale Villari made particular note of Machiavelli’s ignorance about the battle of Ravenna.28 The association between Machiavelli’s allegedly abstract ideas on battle techniques 24 25

26 27 28

Cf. A. Guidi, “Dall’Ordinanza per la Milizia al Principe: ‘ordine de’ Tedeschi’ e ‘ordine terzo’ delle fanterie in Machiavelli,” Bollettino di Italianistica, y. 12, n. 1 (2015): 7-18. Cf. this passage of the letter written by Niccolò Capponi to the Florentine authorities from the field of the battle on 13 April 1512, ibid., 13: “Et passati che furono li Franzesi cominciorono l’uno all’altro a trarre cum la artiglieria, la quale durò più d’una grossa hora, cum grandissimo danno dell’uno et altro exercito, ma molto più delli Spagnoli; in modo che veggendosi ammazare dalla artiglieria, sollecitorono di venire al fatto d’arme. Et ruppono gli Spagnoli cum tal impeto sopra li franzesi, quanto dire si possa” (italics added). J.-C. Zancarini, “‘L’incredibile celerità’ di Gaston de Foix,” in Città in guerra. Esperienze e riflessioni nel primo ’500: Bologna nelle “guerre d’Italia,” ed. by G.M. Anselmi & A. De Be­ nedictis (Bologna: Minerva Edizioni, 2008), 66. H. Delbrück, Geschichte der Kriegskunst im Rahmen der politischen Geschichte, 4 vols. (Berlin: Stilke, 1900-1920), vol. 1, 303-04; M. Hobom, Machiavellis Renaissance der Kriegs­ kunst (Berlin: K. Curtius, 1913), vol. 2, 548. P. Villari, Niccolò Machiavelli e i suoi tempi, illustrati con nuovi documenti (Florence: Le Monnier, 1882), vol. 3, 85-87.

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and his account of the events of Ravenna continued into modern days and was adopted, with some reasons, by Piero Pieri, one of the most important Italian military studies scholars.29 Just a couple of decades ago, Luigi Derla reprised this thesis using a rather incongruous reappraisal of Jacob Burckhardt’s famous historiographical assessment.30 Only recently have scholars such as Jean-Louis Fournel and Jean-Claude Zancarini pointed out that the Florentine secretary must have had better understanding of the real facts than previously thought.31 It is, however, important to bear in mind that Machiavelli was apt to alter the reality of events to construct an efficacious literary or political tool or image. In order to understand the peculiar terms in which Machiavelli uses the episode at Ravenna, it is necessary to jump forward to approximately 1513, after his dismissal from the Chancery, which followed the Medici’s return to Florence. The battle of Ravenna came back to Machiavelli’s mind for the composition of the last chapter of the Prince. He builds there, as he does later in the Art of War, a rather precise image, using the fact that, even though the Spanish were ultimately defeated, in one episode of the battle their infantry prevailed over the Germans in French service, as a fundamental part of his argument against the German “order” of infantry. According to the Prince, the battle at Ravenna was emblematic of the weaknesses of both models of infantry then considered the strongest: the SwissGerman and the Spanish. This is Machiavelli’s reasoning: first, if the Swiss-German “encounter with them [an infantry force], as resolute in the fight as they” he writes, “their morale falls apart, risking the battle”; second, “the Spaniards are not able to bear up against the […] cavalry,” i.e. they do not know how to confront a cavalry charge. The result is that “there are defects in both of them,” Machiavelli says. This is precisely the line of reasoning Fabrizio Colonna uses at the beginning of book 2 of the Art of War: And you have to understand this: infantries may have to fight against infantrymen and cavalrymen; and always will they be useless who are 29

30 31

P. Pieri, Guerra e politica negli scrittori italiani (Milan – Naples: R. Ricciardi, 1955), 44-47, but cf., especially, id., Il rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Turin: Einaudi 1952), 494-96. For a general discussion of the reactions to firearms during the Renaissance, see J.R. Hale, “Gunpowder and the Renaissance: An Essay in the History of Ideas”, in id. Renaissance War Studies (London: The Hambledon Press, 1983), 389-420. L. Derla, “Machiavelli: la guerra come opera d’arte,” Aevum, 70:3 (1996): 597-617, especially p. 600-01. This title draws on a famous historigraphical thesis expressed in J. Burckhardt, Die Kultur der Renaissance in Italien (Basel: 1860). For a general discussion, see the entry these scholars dedicate to the battle of “Ravenna” in Enciclopedia machiavelliana, vol. 2 (Rome: Treccani, 2014), 388-91, especially p. 391. But see also Guidi, “Dall’Ordinanza per la Milizia al Principe,” 15 ff.

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unable either to withstand cavalrymen or, being able to withstand them, nonetheless have to be afraid of infantries that are better armed and better ordered than they […] It has not yet happened with the German infantries [i.e. the Germans are not the best order of infantry, as the Roman used to be]. For one has seen them make a bad showing any time they have had to fight with men on foot ordered and obstinate like themselves […] Everyone knows how many German infantrymen died in the battle of Ravenna, which arose from the same causes. For the Spanish infantries had drawn within sword-range of the German infantry and would have completely consumed them if the German infantrymen had not been aided by the French cavalrymen. Nonetheless, the Spanish, having drawn together, retired to a secure place. I conclude, therefore, that good infantry must not only be able to withstand cavalrymen, but it must not be afraid of infantrymen. As I have said many times, this proceeds from arms and orders.32 Machiavelli had imagined in the Prince a so-called “third order”: a third model of infantry, a new tactical arrangement for an Italian infantry capable of confronting the armies that had invaded Italy and able to overcome “the defects,” as he calls them, of both the Spanish and Swiss-German infantries. The image of the “third order” so cleverly built by Machiavelli is in some ways a reconstruction of the battle that deliberately focuses only on one aspect. In fact, at Ravenna it was actually the combined action of artillery, tactical analysis of the site of engagement and troop movements that made the difference. Machiavelli was certainly aware of this. Not only had Capponi touched upon the artillery bombardment as a key element of the battle in his dispatch of 13 April, but Machiavelli himself stresses this particular feature in book II, chapter 17 of his Discourses, in which he famously discusses the role of artillery in modern warfare:

32 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 42 & 66-67), 36 & 39. Original version: “E avete ad intendere questo: che le fanterie possono avere a combattere con fanti e cavagli, e sempre fieno inutili quelle che non potranno o sostenere i cavagli, o, potendolli sostenere, abbiano nondimeno ad avere paura di fanterie che sieno meglio armate e meglio ordinate che loro […] Non è già così intervenuto alle fanterie tedesche, perché si è visto fare loro cattiva pruova qualunque volta quelle hanno avuto a combattere con uomini a piè, ordinati e ostinati come loro […] Concludo, adunque, che una buona fanteria dee non solamente potere sostenere i cavagli, ma non avere paura de’ fanti, il che, come ho molte volte detto procede dall’armi e dall’ordine.”

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For if the enemy comes upon you and has a little advantage from the country, as can easily happen, and finds himself higher than you, or if on his arrival you have not yet made your barricades and covered yourself well with them, he dislodges you at once and without you having any remedy; and you are forced to go out from your fortresses and come to fight. This happened to the Spanish in the Battle of Ravenna, where they had dug in between the Ronco River and a barricade. Because they had not raised it up high enough and the French had a little advantage in the terrain, they were constrained by the artillery to go out from their fortresses and come to fight.33 Nevertheless, in the Prince (as well as later in the Art of War years) Machiavelli pointed out other elements: i.e. the Spaniards not being able to resist the French cavalry and the Swiss being ravaged by the Spanish infantry, elements from which he arrived at the notion of a third order of infantry that can resist cavalry and does not fear infantry. In the Prince, the image of the third order is in some ways idealized, relying heavily on Machiavelli’s great capacity for rhetoric. The idea of a third order is founded on the strength of an efficient and captivating expression, a dynamic image that is both technical and literary, and supported by the persuasive power of a historical example: the battle of Ravenna. It is through the mirror of Ravenna that Machiavelli seems to have moved on from his militia of 1506, for which, as we have seen, he proposed to adopt the Swiss model. In effect, a series of battles from Cerignola to Ravenna had shown that the Swiss model of pikes needed revision. Ravenna particularly moved Machiavelli toward an acute and truthful analysis of the difficulties the Swiss model was undergoing, even though his proposal for a new order of infantry sometimes seems to be based on an idealistic view of the battlefield.34 33

34

N. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, trans. by H.C. Mansfield & N. Tarcov (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 1996), 165. Original version (II 17, 21-22): “se il nimico ti giugne addosso e abbia un poco di vantaggio del paese (come può facilmente intervenire), e truovisi più alto di te, o che nello arrivare suo tu non abbia ancora fatti i tuoi argini e copertoti bene con quegli, subito e sanza che tu abbia alcun rimedio ti disalloggia, e sei forzato uscire delle fortezze tua e venire alla zuffa. Il che intervenne agli Spagnuoli nella giornata di Ravenna; i quali essendosi muniti tra ’l fiume del Ronco e uno argine, per non lo avere tirato tanto alto che bastasse, e per avere i Franciosi un poco il vantaggio del terreno, furono costretti dalle artiglierie uscire dalle fortezze loro e venire alla zuffa.” It is worth remembering that in the eyes of the famous historian Francesco Guicciardini, Ravenna was the first modern battle, cf. J.-L. Fournel, J.-C. Zancarini, “Come scrivere la storia delle guerre d’Italia?,” in La “Storia d’Italia” di Guicciardini e la sua fortuna ed. by C. Berra & A.M. Cabrini (Milan: Cisalpino, 2012), 206.

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Machiavelli follows the same line of reasoning in the Art of War. It can be argued that the whole Art of War is dedicated to the construction of the “third order” as defined in the Prince, even though this expression never appears. To build this perfect infantry, however, in this work Machiavelli adds something to the scheme he laid out in chapter 26 of the Prince: he directly and deliberately contrasts his concept of a modern army with the ancient tradition of military thinking. A central role in the construction of this new scheme is given to the dialogue’s central character, Fabrizio Colonna. Machiavelli’s Colonna shows little of the point of view of a condottiere, leader of the cavalry formations of men-at-arms of the time. His remarks seem instead to combine the discussion of military techniques with a rhetoric of persuasion. The way that Colonna seems to be an “anomaly” has already been discussed. Machiavelli’s approach here may be explained by the literary strategy of “associating admirable positions to contradictory biographies” encountered in dialogues of the fifteenth century.35 A better explanation, however, as Timothy Lukes has argued, is that the character of Fabrizio must be interpreted in the light of Machiavelli’s conception of warfare.36 In particular, as John N ­ ajemy convincingly observed, the Colonna of Machiavelli’s Art of War “has more than one voice: while he advocates reforms that Machiavelli himself promoted, he also represents the inability of Italy’s warrior nobles to acknowledge their precarious loyalties, their choice of private advantage over public good, and their complicity in Italy’s subjugation to foreigners.”37 Najemy is right in pointing out that to interpret Fabrizio’s role in the dialogue one needs to consider different aspects, particularly military ones. Ma­ chia­velli’s Fabrizio unmasks the inability of the Italian condottieri to contribute to the construction of a better army in a state in which public interest is more important than the private interests of the local lords. Further, it is clear that Machiavelli selects Fabrizio Colonna especially because his role in the battle of Ravenna was of great significance.38 The real Fabrizio, in fact, had actually suffered prolonged artillery fire at Ravenna and at some point had disobeyed the Spanish captain Pedro Navarro’s 35 36 37

38

Cf. M. Colish, “Machiavelli’s Art of War: A Reconsideration,” Renaissance Quarterly, 51 (1998): 1151-1168. T. Lukes, “Martialing Machiavelli: Reassessing the Military Reflections,” The Journal of Politics, Vol. 66, No. 4 (Nov., 2004): 1096. J.M. Najemy, “Fabrizio Colonna and Machiavelli’s Art of War,” in Government and Warfare in Renaissance Tuscany and Venice, ed. by H. Butters, G. Neher (Amsterdam, Uni­versity Press, 2019). I thank the author for kindly allowing me to read this work before publication. Cf. Fournel & Zancarini, “Come scrivere la storia delle guerre d’Italia?”

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orders by leading his cavalry formations to attack, as Fabrizio Colonna’s remarks in Guicciardini’s Storia d’Italia document: Must we all shamefully die because of the obstinacy and malignity of a marrano? Does this entire army have to be destroyed without killing a single one of the enemy? Where are all the victories which we have against the French? Is the Honour of Spain and Italy to be lost because of one man from Navarre?39 Both contemporary historians and testimonies of the events such as that by Francesco Pandolfini, the Florentine commissioner to the French, explain that “the horse vanguard” led by Fabrizio Colonna “assaulted the French vanguard.”40 Colonna’s role in the Art of War is contradictory and provocative because, as Najemy has efficaciously explained, he is a recognized member of the Italian condottieri who, rather than pursuing his private interest as a mercenary (as one would expect), becomes in the book a promoter of military reforms of collective/public interest to Italian states against foreign invasion. But in the eyes of his contemporaries, this character has other provocative features. As a condottiere, Machiavelli’s Fabrizio is a protagonist of a cavalry world, but, in another contradiction, he advocates a model of battle that assumes that infantry is more important than cavalry. And there are further elements that arise from the Colonna’s role in the battle of Ravenna. The real Fabrizio Colonna claimed that he advised Navarro either to fortify the camp that had already been made in order to avoid giving battle too early, since the French had their camp already well “in arms,” or to anticipate the enemy’s action by attacking them before the bulk of the army crossed the river Ronco: 39

40

F. Guicciardini, The History of Italy, Trans. by Sidney Alexander (New York & London: Collier-Macmillan Ltd, 1969), 248. Original version, F. Guicciardini, Storia d’Italia. X, 13, ed. by E. Mazzali (Milan: Garzanti, 20062), vol. II, p. 1128: “Abbiamo noi tutti vituperosamente a morire per la ostinazione e per la malignità di un marrano? Ha a essere distrutto tutto questo esercito senza che facciamo morire uno solo degli inimici? Dove sono le nostre tante vittorie contro a’ franzesi? Ha l’onore di Spagna e di Italia perdersi per uno Navarro?”). Report of the battle by Francesco Pandolfini, in Négociations diplomatiques de la France avec la Toscane, documents recueillis par G. Canestrini et publiés par A. Desjardins, vol. II (Paris: Imprimerie impériale, 1861), 585. Original version: “lo antiguardo a cavallo assaltò lo antiguardo francese.” Cf. also The Right Joyous and Pleasant History of the Feats, Gests, and Prowesses of the Chevalier Bayard by the Loyal Servant, ed. by J. de Mailles, tr. by S. Coleridge, 2 vols. (London: John Murray – C. Roworth, 1825), vol. 2, 102-103. An interesting discussion of Fabrizio Colonna’s attack is in  (accessed December 2016).

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On Thursday the French encamped between the two rivers; and on Friday we got closer to the enemy by 7 miles. On the same Friday, the French gave battle. Our [soldiers] defended themselves very well, and damaged the French a lot. After we had this news, on Saturday we advanced our camp two miles from Ravenna, in sight of their camp […] Since we were so close, I was of the opinion that we could not lose the city […] and so I had the impression that it would had been better to fortify in that place, where our supplies were safe behind us and they [the French] would die of hunger. The Count Pietro Navarra came to tell the Lord Viceroy that a mile further there was strong position, and that therefore we should move our camp there immediately. As soon as he left, the Lord Viceroy called for me and the Count Monte Lione, and told me that they wanted us to immediately move to that position. I replied that that we could not get that position without giving battle, and that his lordship should think very well, since the French camp was in arms [well prepared], as it actually was. He replied angrily that he wanted us to do so  […]  And since from our camp to their bridge there was about a mile, before we could arrive there with our artillery and in good order, the enemy, who were encamped close to the bridge, were already passed it; that if we were to have gone forward before the daybreak and secretly, as I proposed, they would not have been able to pass it in time unless to our great advantage.41 41

Copy of a letter written a few days after the battle by Fabrizio Colonna to Camillo Colonna in M. Sanudo, Diarii (Venice: Visentini, 1886), vol. XIV, 176. Translation mine. Italics added. Original version: “El jovedì el campo francese se posse in mezo de li doi fiumi, e ’l venerdì ce acostamo vicini 7 milia. El dicto venerdì li francexi detero la bataglia, et li nostri se deffensorno molto ben non senza grande danno de’ francexi; et havendo nui tal nova, el sabato se spinsimo ad allogiar vicini doi milia di Ravena a la vista del campo loro, ita che era tra mezo nui et la terra, ben che era unde li doi fiumi in mezo. Et essendo nui cussì vicini, io era di parere che la terra non se potesse perdere, perché vedendo loro dar la bataglia, nui altri sempre li sariamo stati a le spale, et pigliando loro la terra sariano stati roti per lo disordine, et per questo mi pareva che ci fortificassemo in quel loco, dove tutte le vic­ tualie ce erano secure a le spale et loro se moriano da fame. El conte Pietro Navaro vene (dire) al signor vicerè che là avanti uno miglio era uno forte alogiamento, che subito ce andassemo ad alogiar; et partitose, el signor vicerè chiamò me et lo conte de Monte Lione, et me dise che volevano che andassemo subito a quello allogiamento. Io li risposi che tal allogiamento non se poteva far senza combatere; che sua signoria ce pensasse ben stando tutto lo campo francexe in arme, come lo stava. Me respose con colora, che voleva cusì […] e perchè dal nostro logiamento fina al loro ponte era cercha uno milio, prima che nui ce fossemo arivati con l’artelaria et con el campo in ordene, li nimici, quali alogiavano vizino al ponte, gierano pasati la magior parte; che se andavemo avanti zorno et secreto, come io dissi, non passavano a tempo senza nostro grandissimo avantagio.”

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Although Machiavelli does not mention these particular events in the Art of War, he was certainly aware of them. In any case, the tactics of either fortifying or preventing the enemy from shooting at you by attacking immediately are precisely the strategy Fabrizio advocates in the Art of War.42 This strategy resonates with the discussion about artillery in the Art of War, which is founded on the assumption that fortifications, natural impediments such as rivers and hills, are the only remedy against enemy fire: You have to understand that [if you] want an artillery piece not to harm you, it is necessary either to stay where it does not reach you or put oneself behind a wall or behind an embankment. There is nothing else that keeps it away […] Machiavelli’s reasoning continues, however, by explaining that Those captains who have arranged themselves to do battle cannot stay behind their walls or their embankments, nor where they are not reached. Thus, since they cannot find a mode that defends them, they need to find the one by which they are at least hurt; nor can they find another mode than occupying [the enemy artillery] immediately. The mode of occupying it is to go to find it quickly and [in] broken [order], not slowly and in mass. […] For, having put a thousand velites on its horns, I would order it that they go out together with the light cavalry and occupy the enemy artillery after our artillery has fired. Therefore I did not have my artillery fire again so as not to give the enemy time. […] For to want the enemy artillery to be useless, there is no other remedy than to assault it.43 In the second place, therefore, Colonna in the Art of War is the one who promotes the quick actions of the velites from the “horns” to “occupy” enemy’s artillery before it can massacre your army with unstopped fire on the field. 42 Guicciardini, The History of Italy, 246, explains: “For Fabrizio Colonna had advised them to charge the Enemy when he began to cross the stream.” Original version, Storia d’Italia, X, 13: “era stato consiglio di Fabrizio Colonna che si percotesse negli inimici quando cominciorno a passare il fiume,” cfr. Zancarini, “‘L’incredibile celerità’,” 60. According to Taylor, The Art of War, 181-182, other sources, perhaps also available to Machiavelli, agree on the fact that Fabrizio Colonna “wished to assault the French while they were engaged in crossing the river.” In effect, some passages of Machiavelli’s Art of War, resonate with the actual strategy suggested by the real Fabrizio to either camp in a different location or immediately attack the French at Ravenna. 43 Machiavelli, Art of War (III, 114, 118 & 121), 72-73.

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At that time, everybody knew that Fabrizio was commander of the vanguard of the Spanish army that suffered heavy losses during the French bombardment and consequently decided to attack the French.44 The historical facts of Colonna’s role at Ravenna connected the military techniques suggested by the character based on him to the idea the historical figure evoked among his contemporaries (i.e. the controversial image of a brave captain and its contradictions in the book) as well as his popularity. In the eyes of some of Colonna’s and Machiavelli’s contemporaries, Navarro had made a fatal mistake by not waiting behind the previously dug out embankments,45 whereas a large audience saw Fabrizio as a true hero because of his brave attack. Machiavelli hoped that Colonna’s rhetoric would motivate a commander in chief or governor to consider the possibility of building a new model of infantry and of avoiding the danger of a fearful and un-motivated militia. In a nutshell, Colonna is part of the Machiavellian response to firearms that informs the offensive strategy that is at the core of his military thinking and that requires the infantrymen to trained in ways that reinforce their audacity, drill, and motivation. Machiavelli’s solution in the Art of War was the same one he had adopted in the Discourses on Livy: i.e. combining “modern things” with the lesson of “the ancient ones.” Like all his works, the Art of War is a militant book that engages with the reality of the author’s times by proposing a combination of ancient military history and current military techniques, to offer Italian lords and governors a new – even idealistic – model of an army founded on a large infantry force. There is a gap between the theory Machiavelli developed in the Discourses and the practice of a militia imagined in the Art of War, but this contradiction can be explained by the different historical context. In the latter work, infantry was supposed to be constituted of peasants from the contado only. In theory, though, the military project of the Art of War does not exclude citizens from the militia, thus there is no ideological regress from the scheme presented in the Discourses on Livy, as some scholars have argued,46 but only a different practical intent. Just as he did with the militia he created in 1506, Machiavelli reserves for the city’s inhabitants the privilege of entering the ranks of the light cavalry militia. When at the beginning of the dialogue Cosimo Rucellai asks Colonna about whether the conscripts should be drawn from 44 45 46

Cf. the aforementioned reports of the battle by Francesco Pandolfini, in Négociations diplomatiques, 581-7. Cf. also C. Dionisotti, Machiavellerie (Turin: Einaudi, 1980), 359. Cf. J.-L. Fournel, J.-C. Zancarini, “Come scrivere la storia delle guerre d’Italia?,” 207; B.S. Hall, Weapons and Warfare, 172. F. Chabod, Scritti su Machiavelli, introduction by C. Vivanti (Turin: Einaudi, 1993 [1964]), 25-26 & 336-338; G. Sasso, Niccolò Machiavelli, 2 vols (Bologna: il Mulino, 1993), vol. I, 646651; F. Bausi, Machiavelli (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2005), 235.

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the city or the country, the latter replies by explaining that “since there are two kinds of soldiers, on foot and on horse, in this part my opinion would be that those on foot should be selected from the country and those on horse from cities.”47 In fact, as mentioned in the previous chapters, Machiavelli himself had anticipated this passage of the Art of War on the difference in recruitment reserved for citizens and peasants in the Cagione dell’Ordinanza, the text that he prepared at the end of 1506 to promote his military project. That project, of course, was also fundamentally based on infantry recruitment in the countryside. In the Discourses on Livy, Machiavelli builds the political framework for why a militia is needed. Since it is a theoretical work, there is extensive focus here on the political and civic aspects of military reform. In contrast, the militia of 1506-1512 was a pragmatic project that had practical goals and an ideological intent, as we know from the text of the Cagione. Still, the fact that the recruitment zone for the cavalry was getting closer to the city and that the law conceived by Machiavelli to establish the cavalry militia in 1511 allowed country dwellers to serve in the new cavalry battalions proves that he wanted a reform potentially capable of including the contado and the city in a common scheme.48 By cleverly using adjustments and amendments, the project could adapt to political developments and avoid the danger of stalling and refusal by both the city-aristocracy (which feared that the militia would be used by the popular regime of Pier Soderini as a political force), and the city’s ruling classes (which feared giving arms to peasants in any context).49 These developments of the militia in the years 1506-1512 show that the choice of recruiting only the horse cavalry from the city in the Art of War was more pragmatic than ideological (citizens are no longer “accustomed to being in the sun, fleeing the shade, knowing how to work a tool, digging a hole, carrying a load, and being without astuteness or malice”).50 This is especially 47 Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 141), 22. Original version: “Questi che ne hanno scritto, tutti s’accordano che sia meglio eleggergli del contado, sendo uomini avvezzi a’ disagi, nutriti nelle fatiche, consueti stare al sole, fuggire l’ombra, sapere adoperare il ferro, cavare una fossa, portare un peso, ed essere sanza astuzia e sanza malizia. Ma in questa parte l’opinione mia sarebbe che, sendo di due ragioni soldati, a piè e a cavallo, che si eleggessero quegli a piè del contado e gli a cavallo delle cittadi.” 48 Machiavelli, “Ordinanza de’ Cavalli,” in Id., L’arte della guerra, 524: “che al magistrato delli spettabili Nove d’Ordinanza s’intenda essere e sia dato autorità e potestà di potere collocare bandiere, e sotto quelle descrivere uomini per militare a cavallo in tutte le terre e luoghi del dominio fiorentino.” 49 Guidi, Un Segretario militante, 338, 343-344 & 385-386. 50 Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 141), 22. Original version: “sendo uomini avvezzi a’ disagi, nutriti nelle fatiche, consueti stare al sole, fuggire l’ombra, sapere adoperare il ferro, cavare

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true in light of the fact that when Machiavelli explains this decision, he refers to the practical expertise of the military writers of the past, rather than to an ideological scheme (“Those who have written about this are all in accord that it is better to select them from the country”).51 Similarly, the project for a specific peasant militia conceived by Machiavelli in the Art of War must be understood in light of its different historical and practical background. First and foremost, the book was to be published with the consent of the Medici, who would certainly not accept a citizen militia, which was traditionally and historically republican. The idea of divorcing the city from any military recruitment was explicitly suggested by Paolo Vettori, a close friend of Machiavelli and a counsellor of the family, to the cardinal Giovanni de’ Medici in 1513.52 In contrast, the Medici did not oppose new levies of men from the contado. Indeed, after their return to Florence in summer 1512, the Medici did not dismiss the Machiavellian militia in the contado; instead, they simply revised the parts of the Militia Act that referred to the previous republican institutions.53 Only later did the new regime actually dismiss the battalions Machiavelli had raised. And the regime adopted the same type of country-militia a couple of decades later, in the 1530s, when the dukes Alessandro and Cosimo I established the so-called bande of the contado.54 The Art of War was intended to provide a practical solution to governors like the Medici who did not trust their own citizens. The Medici were not keen to concede the right to bear arms to the citizens of Florence, and indeed, Machiavelli did not want all of them to join the militia, particularly not the Florentine aristocracy. The cavalry militia is not Machiavelli’s great interest in the Art of War. He imagines the militia as a large popular force with no place for the kind of aristocracy-led cavalry force that dominated warfare in the Middle Ages or for the urban prototype that still informed the mentality of the

51 52 53

54

una fossa, portare un peso, ed essere sanza astuzia e sanza malizia.” Ibid. Original version: “Questi che ne hanno scritto, tutti s’accordano che sia meglio eleggergli del contado.” Cf. the original speech by Paolo Vettori quoted above in chapter 2, note 25. The Medicean 1514 Provvisione for a militia in the country, written after the original one, had changes in the part about the recruitment of men. It was published by G. Canestrini, “Documenti per servire alla storia della milizia italiana dal XIII secolo al XVI raccolti negli Archivj della Toscana e preceduti da un discorso di Giuseppe Canestrini,” Archivio Storico Italiano, tomo XV (1851): 328-336; recently re-printed with an introduction by L. Tanzini (Reggello: FirenzeLibri 2007). On this Medicean militia in the country of the 1530s, see J. Ferretti, “L’organizzazione militare in Toscana durante il governo di Alessandro e Cosimo I de’ Medici,” Rivista storica degli archivi toscani I, II, (1929).

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Florentine ruling class.55 The kind of elitist archetype of citizen militia expressed in Leonardo Bruni’s De militia was the opposite of Machiavelli’s model of a large, popular infantry force.56 On this point (and this only) there was a convergence of interests between the evolution of Machiavelli’s military solutions for Florence and Tuscany and the Medicean regime of the time. In the model of country-militia the Medici established from the 1530s on, however, military service was intended to provide honors and rewards to those loyal to the family, not the state. The fidelity of the troops was not to the patria as Machiavelli intended, but to the lord. Machiavelli’s Art of War was a pragmatic effort intended to tackle a military problem, but it still relied on his ideal conception of a popular armed force as the backbone of any good army and a tool to improve the political order of the state. In order to solve the problem of the Italian states’ need for a large permanent army, particularly infantry, he improved and expanded traditional features of earlier military organization such as the requirement that each household provide one armed infantryman. As Fabrizio Colonna replies to Cosimo in book 1 of the Art of War: “Without a doubt a large number is better and more necessary than a small one; indeed, it is better to say, where one cannot order a large quantity, one cannot order a perfect militia.”57 Again at the end of book 7, Colonna points out that he “never believes that the reputation may be rendered by Italian arms, except […] by the means of those who have big states…”58 A new infantry, assembled according to the ancient orders, is possible only for those whose states were large enough to raise an infantry of fifteen to twenty thousand men.59 As with the 1506 militia, Machiavelli’s choice 55

Lukes makes some interesting points about this in “Martialing Machiavelli,” 1101-1102, although I argue that Machiavelli’s preference for infantry cannot be explained solely by his rejection of the old-fashioned and long obsolete model of an aristocratic-cavalry of citizens. 56 See C.C. Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence: The De militia of Leonardo Bruni (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1961); and the excellent work by J. Hankins, Civic Knighthood in the Early Renaissance: Leonardo Bruni’s De militia (ca. 1420). Working paper. Faculty of Arts and Sciences, Harvard University, accessed July 2019 . 57 Machiavelli, Art of War, 28 (I, 222). Original version: “Sanza dubbio egli è migliore e più necessario il numero grosso che il piccolo; anzi, a dire meglio, dove non se ne può ordi­ nare gran quantità, non si può ordinare una ordinanza perfetta.” 58 Machiavelli, Art of War (VII, 234), 163. Original version: “Né crediate mai che si renda reputazione alle armi italiane se non per quella via che io ho dimostra e mediante coloro che tengono stati grossi.” 59 Machiavelli, Art of War (VII, 199), 161 “No action may be done today […] but only by those who are princes of such large states that they can put together from their subjects at least 15 to 20 thousand youths.” On this point, cf. Najemy, “Fabrizio Colonna.”

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was to raise a popular rather than a mercenary army that would be based on a few well-paid soldiers and men-at-arms. This choice reveals his consistent ideas about the popular force and participation in the state, and further underlines his opposition to a model of a feudal state dominated by local condottieri with their own private armies and interests. In this he remained immutable, from the Prince to the Discourses, and, finally, the Art of War.

…

The Art of War is a militant book; nonetheless – as explained above – this does not mean that Machiavelli’s explanation of the events of Ravenna was completely abstract. Nor is it clear that the conclusions about military strategy he drew from this historical example were useless when it came to actually waging war on the field.60 It is necessary to examine the question thoroughly. Machiavelli had already focused on the tactical function of Spanish swordsmen in the Prince. In Ravenna, Machiavelli writes, the Spanish, with their bodily; agility and the help of their bucklers, had entered below among the Germans’ pikes and they were secure in attacking them without the Germans having remedy against it; and if it were not for the cavalry that charged them, they would have finished them all.61 Approximately ten years later, Machiavelli returned to the same concepts and the same episode, in book 2 of the Art of War, using similar words: Everyone knows how many German infantrymen died in the battle of Ravenna […] For the Spanish infantries had drawn to within sword-range of the German infantries and would have completely consumed them if the German infantrymen had not been aided by the French cavalrymen.62 60

S. Anglo, Machiavelli: The First Century: Studies in Enthusiasm, Hostility, and Irrelevance (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 571, insists that there is a gap between the new early-modern armies and what he defines as “the small-town humanism of the Arte della guerra.” 61 N. Machiavelli, The Prince: with Related Documents (ch. 26), ed. and translated by W. Connell, second edition (Boston – New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2016), 120. Original version: “gli Spagnuoli, con l’agilità del corpo e aiuti de’ loro brocchieri, erano entrati tra le picche loro sotto, e stavano sicuri ad offendergli, senza che e’ Tedeschi vi avessino remedio; e se non fussi la cavalleria che gli aiutò, gli arebbono consumati tutti (Italian edition, pp. 18990). 62 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 66), 39. Cf. also ibid. (II, 65): “I Tedeschi, con le loro picche basse, apersero le fanterie spagnuole; ma quelle, aiutate da’ loro brocchieri e dall’agilità

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Machiavelli gives an approximately correct account of the events, but he tends to make a paradigm out of the reconstruction of the battle of Ravenna by creating an image that applies to every situation and time. Modern scholars are aware that, if on this occasion the infantry clash was won by the Spanish, what actually counted the most in winning the day was the tactical combination of different forces and weapons on the field – the mix of cavalry, infantry, and particularly, artillery. Machiavelli’s image of Ravenna was a turning point in the development of his conception of an ideal infantry force. Book 2 of the Art of War in particular is devoted to a reconstruction of the Roman infantry techniques, which, according to Machiavelli, were based on swords and short lances such as the pilus. From that battle onward, he devoted all his efforts to finding a way to overcome the difficulties that he felt that the Swiss model of square formation of pikemen (i.e. infantry formations prevalently armed with long lances) had faced at Cerignola and Ravenna. As we have seen, Machiavelli fully adopted the Swiss model for his militia during the whole period from 1506 to 1512. He held this view until 1513, when he wrote the Prince, which gives us a strong indication that the 1512 battle of Ravenna was a turning point in his conception of military strategy. An attentive observer, he understood the changes going on the battlefields of the Italian Wars, which saw new experiments in tactical combinations of field artillery, handguns, cavalry and infantry. Chapter 26 of the Prince shows that the battle of Ravenna played a key role in changing his mind, and while his solution both in this work and in the Art of War was, in a way, idealistic – it was not wholly inaccurate. As Bert Hall argued, “Ravenna is sometimes cited for its novel element, the artillery duel, but its traditional aspects were the decisive factors. In the final analysis, heavy cavalry, knights in armor, still did what they were supposed to do: they dispersed hostile cavalry and then beset the enemy’s infantry forces. Clearly, the Spanish suffered from lack of careful coordination of all the forces at their commander’s disposal.”63 So even a contemporary scholar of firearms thought that tactics and the way firearms were used in connection with traditional forces and weapons was the real lesson of Ravenna. What really mattered was preventing enemy advance on the ground and forcing the enemy into a position where it could be bombarded with the slow

del corpo loro, si mescolarono con i Tedeschi, tanto che gli poterono aggiugnere con la spada; donde ne nacque la morte quasi di tutti quegli e la vittoria degli Spagnuoli.” 63 Hall, Weapons & Warfare, 173.

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but efficacious fire of arquebuses and artillery;64 or, the other way round, to let your army cross a small portion of ground quickly to prevent the enemy from using its firearms against you (as apparently the real Fabrizio Colonna wanted to do at Ravenna). Machiavelli’s solution focused on the latter, rather than, as Piero Pieri explained, opting for the tactical principle of defense and counterattack that soon proved more effective.65 This is not surprising, as others at the time also continued to value the plain Swiss model, despite the deficiencies shown at the battles of Cerignola and Garigliano (April and December 1503).66 That said, both the Prince and the Art of War show that Machiavelli was aware that the Swiss model needed revision. We should consider that all of this was new, still experimental and not yet established. At the beginning of the sixteeenth century, different solutions were proposed on fields of battle before a new general model had been definitely established. Machiavelli’s military theory exists in this framework. He picked up a solution that drew from the model of discipline, drill and military virtue of the ancients, then revised it in light of recent innovations in military strategy, among which he stressed in particular the use of swords by the Spaniards to improve the capability of infantry battle formations. A few decades later, Francesco Guicciardini perceived the shift in methods of waging war. Even so, when the same Francesco came to write the chapter on Ravenna in his History of Italy, he followed Machiavelli’s account of the events and stressed his view of military tactics. According to Guicciardini, the descent of the French army into Italy in 1494 was the start of a time when war was waged according the “modi delle offese”; only after 1521 did the “modi delle difese” became more important. Essentially, he notes a shift from an offensive way of waging war based on a quick military campaign on the field, to a defensive one based on fortified cities.67 As scholars such as Jean-Louis Fournel and Jean-Claude Zancarini have explained, Guicciardini’s opinions on the military developments of the wars in Italy were conditioned by his own experience with war, which began in approximately 1521,68 the same year Art of War was published. Both Machiavelli 64 65 66 67 68

Acute observations on this subject by B. Cassidy, “Machiavelli and the Ideology of the Offensive: Gunpowder Weapons in the Art of War,” The Journal of Military History, vol. 67, 2 (2003): 393-94. P. Pieri, Il rinascimento, 431. Cf. ibid., 431-432. In the words of Taylor, The Art of War, 44: Cerignola “is the successful defense of an entrenched camp against massed pikemen.” Cf. Fournel-Zancarini, “Come scrivere la storia delle guerre d’Italia?,” 181. Cf. ibid., 195.

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and Guicciardini perceived and created an image of war in accordance with their own experience: an image that, despite developments and experimentation on the battlefields, was still dominated by an idea of a quick and efficacious military campaign of an army fighting on open ground. This image was still valid until Ravenna and perhaps also afterward. In Discourses II 6, Machia­ velli had already elaborated on this point: the way to wage war that he describes here, to make wars “brief and big” (corte e grosse) corresponds precisely to the tactics of the French commander Gaston de Foix.69 The developments of field artillery and the invention of a perfected arquebus from the 1520s o­ nward were important steps in the history of tactical warfare. The latter, in particular, lead to the slow replacement of the pike by firearms, which subsequently led to a profound change in the order of infantry tactics,70 as chapter 1 demonstrates for Florence and Tuscany. Machiavelli and Guicciardini had very few written sources concerning the battle of Ravenna on which to rely, especially when compared to those available to military historians nowadays. And given the rapid changes in warfare, it becomes clearer that, lacking direct experience of the field, it would not be easy for anybody to have a clear understanding of all the innovations in a time of continuous crisis and revolution. Guicciardini could not understand the shift in warfare with the new tactical use of field artillery and combined forces until he had direct experience of conducting an army on the field from 1521 to 1530. Even after that experience, his attention was captured by a further shift in military strategy, when the new way of building fortified walls and bastions (the so-called trace italienne) proved that a fortified city could resist the prolonged artillery fire that at the beginning of the century had appeared inexorable. In the same way, Machiavelli later became aware of improvements in military engineering and strategy.71 For instance, the content of some of the dispatches Machiavelli sent during his mission to the camp of the league against the Imperials in 1526-1527 suggests that, like Guicciardini, he would have had a more precise image of developments in military techniques then. However, not only did this field experience come well after he wrote his major 69 70 71

P. Pieri, Introduction to N. Machiavelli, Dell’arte della Guerra (Rome: Edizioni Roma, 1937), LVII. Pieri also explains that this strategy is described in other sections of the same work, book 2, chapters 19, 24, 32; book 3, chapters 37. Cf. Pieri, Il rinascimento, 25, 400, 252, 431-432, 530. In particular, Pieri argued that this process started with the battle of Pavia (1521), and accelerated significantly at the battle of S. Quintino (1557). The so-called “Report on the fortifications of Florence” that he wrote in his own hand in 1526 shows a clear knowledge of the progresses of military engineering, cf. J.-J. Marchand, “Machiavelli cancelliere sotto i Medici,” Italianistica VII, 2 (1978), 235-248; for a recent account of this work, R. Black, Machiavelli (London: Routledge, 2013), 275-276.

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works, including the Art of War, but it is hard to imagine that he would have ever accepted the idea that the human factor, on which his strategy of offense was entirely based, was less important than a cannonball. 2  Conclusions Despite Machiavelli’s incomplete understanding of how the use of artillery and field fortifications on the battlefield was changing the face of infantry tactics, it would be a mistake to consider the Art of War to have only literary value and little relevance to military developments of the time. Nor did it just have a practical intent: it was neither a literary exercise, nor a handbook of battle techniques. Rather, it built up the paradigm of an exemplary infantry as a militant proposal, idealistic, yes, but also grounded in an acute interpretation of some of the weaknesses of the military “orders” (to use one of Machiavelli’s most famous words) of the Italian city states of the time, both those related to the political framework needed to support them (the awareness that without a large population, i.e. a large state, the opposite of the small Italian ones, any modern army can be effective), and those that refer to the necessity of motivating, instructing, and disciplining the infantry in order to win (i.e. the revival of the military virtue of the ancient Roman Republic as the greatest example of a people in arms, and the emphasis on the German and the Swiss as the greatest example of powerful modern infantry, needed to stimulate courage, audacity, obedience and drill). One of his colleagues in the Florentine chancery referred to Machiavelli as one of the greatest “prophets” of his times.72 The concept of an infantry force made up of well-trained peasants was intended as a resource against the foreign standing armies that were spreading over the peninsula and that dominated the battlefields of Italy. The Art of War was an ideological book that offered new solutions to the military weakness of the Italian states; it proposed a mixture of technical, cultural and political features, not all in line with the real developments of warfare, but all capable of improving the human factor on which every army relies.73 It bears repeating, however, that Machiavelli’s military proposals must be seen in the context of the techniques of conducting war that were in use in that particular moment in which he conceived the 72 73

Cf. Hörnqvist, “Perché non si usa allegare i Romani,” 172. For the modernity of Machiavelli’s reasoning on this aspect, cf. F. Gilbert, “The Renaissance of the Art of War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. by P. Paret, G.A. Craig, F. Gilbert (Princeton: Princeton University Press 1971), 11-32.

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book. In the first two decades of the sixteenth century, military techniques underwent rapid transformations. Nonetheless, this period was still dominated by features pertaining to a model of warfare in which the tactical use of traditional arms was considered key, especially for winning an infantry clash, as once again the example of Machiavelli’s reconstruction of the battle of Ravenna shows (an example, as we have seen, that is much nearer the facts then has generally been thought). Still, the problem of how stimulate the peasants to take part in this military project remained partly unresolved. As shown in chapter 3, peasants of Tuscan villages were subject to Florence, but not Florentine citizens, who were thus not incentivized to participate in the city’s defense. For the militia of 1506, Machiavelli tackled this issue by using traditional tools on a larger and more systematic scale, advocating rewarding conscripts, promoting them to higher positions in the army, and possibly allowing them to improve their social position in their local communities, rather than only using the rough discipline and punishment for insubordination, that became the norm in the later developments of early-modern armies. As subjects of a lord, however, militiamen could more easily achieve a role in the state, especially through a career in the army, as can be seen in the following decades in many Italian Signorie or principalities, for instance Piedmont. This also occurred in Medicean sixteenth-century Florence, where the ruling family adopted the policy of promoting people from the contado in the army and the local administration. Since the late Quattrocento, some of the Medici’s major supporters and military commanders of their battalions, such as Ramazzotto, were from the country. Some aspects of the Art of War can be seen as the mirror of the historical process of the creation of a Renaissance state, which formed a link between a lord and the mass of subjects all of whom were equal under the rule of a prince.74 It was under the rule of late-medieval Italian lords that the statutes that had previously regulated city life were extended from the dominant city to others and local city courts were opened to citizens of other communes from the territories. In Milan at the time of the Visconti, regional courts were created for the territories, and in a number of states including Florence, central appeal courts were introduced such as the so-called Ruota, and slowly the administration of finances centralized. All branches of government saw the increasing 74

For an overview of the problem of interpreting some aspects of the works of Machiavelli in the light of the creation of a new territorial state and the crisis of the so-called citystate, see E. Fasano Guarini, “Machiavelli and the crisis of the Italian republics,” in ­Machiavelli and Republicanism, ed. by G. Bock, Q. Skinner, M. Viroli (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 17-40.

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creation of the impersonal power of a specialized bureaucracy. It is in institutional reforms like these, as Philip Jones explained a few decades ago, that the beginnings of the so-called “Renaissance state” are to be found: a state that is unitary, absolute, and secular, with a new class structure and a bureaucracy.75 In Florence this was accelerated after the creation of a Duchy by the Medici in 1532, when a bureaucracy under the personal command of the duke was created. The advice to build an infantry force based on popular conscription in the Art of War must also be interpreted through the lens of these emerging historical developments.76 Of course, as Machiavelli explained in the Prince, this kind of rule can be either civic or despotic. Italian Signori like the Medici opted to base their power on the aristocracy, rather than on the people as Machiavelli had suggested. Still, when Machiavelli wrote the Art of War, the hypothesis to raise a peasant militia was an extraordinary opportunity for the Medici, although Machiavelli saw it as more than a simple military question and certainly not as a tool to control and repress the citizens of Florence, which was the way some of the other advisors to the family conceived it. In most cases, however, the unity of the subjects under the rule of a prince was based on the reach of the lord’s family and clients into the city and the territory and based on the centralization of authority, not the equalization of rule. This appears even more clearly in the policy of the Italian lords towards classes and corporations. The Signori were more concerned with authorizing than eradicating privilege. In the Art of War this problem is not the focus, and the issue is deliberately avoided. As a consequence, Machiavelli pragmatically shifts his focus from the discussion of the incentives based on a proper system of political inclusion and equality proposed in the Discourses on Livy to the only available countermeasures to the problem of stimulating and motivating the militiamen. i.e. discipline, drill and benefits as he originally had with the practical developments of the 1506 Ordinanza. If rights were not to be given, these were the only remaining tools to instruct and manage a popular infantry of peasants, subjects rather than citizens of Florence, on the fields of battle. At the same time, it is impossible to read the Art of War without taking into consideration the political project of both the Prince and the Discourses. However, while Machiavelli’s solution in the Art of War was not entirely feasible because of the deficiency of its political grounds, from a military perspective his proposal could have proved effective, especially compared to the 75 76

P. Jones, “Communes and Despots: The City State in Late-Medieval Italy,” Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, Fifth Series, Vol. 15 (1965): 92. On this point, see Lukes, “Martialing Machiavelli,” 1100-1103.

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actual solutions developed in Italy in the following decades. The dependence on mercenaries, evolved to rely on small cavalry and infantry formations, more adapted for skirmish and ambush than for large scale battle on the open field, became the only possible solution for the weak and divided Italian states (including Florence) in the face of foreign invasion, as shown in chapter 2. This solution would eventually prove ineffective, although brave and occasionally efficient, when facing the mass of Landskenechts and Spanish tercios that pushed their way into Italy. Cavalry and infantry formations like those used by the Black Bands of Giovanni de’ Medici eventually proved unsuccessful against the imperial invaders, especially because political and military disagreements often divided Italian governors and local powers. A side effect of this situation was that, with regard to the conscripted infantry militias, the armies of the Italian states remained anchored to a model based on an auxiliary role (mostly providing men for garrisons) for militias from the countryside, especially, but not only, in the Florentine republic. The history of Renaissance Italy, so deeply marked by the Sack of Rome of 1527 by Imperial troops, might have been different if the Italian Signori had gotten past their fears and divisions and taken up more of Machiavelli’s suggestions, especially when he proposed to raise a militia in Romagna in the summer of 1525 to face the growing danger of foreign armies spreading into the peninsula: a proposal that could not be realized because of Pope Clement VII’s lack of determination and the entrenched fear of arming subjects.77 77

Although enthusiastic about Machiavelli’s proposal to raise a militia in the Romagna, Pope Clement VII feared arming his subjects. He sent Francesco Guicciardini to Romagna to argue with Machiavelli against the proposed recruitment of peasants in that province precisely because of the many local divisions between small lords and factions. See O. Tommasini, La vita e gli scritti di Niccolò Machiavelli nella loro relazione col machiavellismo, 2 vols. (Naples: ristampa anastatica per l’Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici, il Mulino 1994-2003), vol. 2, 780-788 &1150; R. Ridolfi, Vita di Niccolò Machiavelli (Florence: Sansoni, 1978), 332-336; G. Lettieri, “Nove tesi sull’ultimo Machiavelli,” in R. Parrinello (ed.), Storia del cristianesimo e storia delle religioni. Omaggio a Giovanni Filoramo, Special Issue of Humanitas 72, 5/6 (2017): 1037-1038 & 1078.

Infantry Battle Techniques and Infantry Tactics

Part 2 The Reception of Machiavelli’s Art of War and the Fortune of the Militia Concept in Europe

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A Brief Introduction to the Fortune of Machiavelli in the Sixteenth Century 1

 Machiavelli and Machiavellism

Existing scholarship has established a fairly comprehensive picture of the circulation of Machiavelli’s major works in sixteenth-century Europe, especially with reference to the Prince and the Discourses on Livy. It is impossible to mention all the previous studies – from the pioneering research of Adolph Gerber to Giuliano Procacci’s recent work, as well as Sidney Anglo and others who have investigated manuscript and print translations and the reception of Machiavelli’s works and their influence on European political thought and culture.1 And of course, the recent wide-ranging editorial project of the Bi­­bliografia machiavelliana by Piero Innocenti and Marielisa Rossi must also be mentioned.2 Nonetheless, it might be useful to summarize the basics of Machiavelli’s reception and reputation in sixteenth-century Europe. Before delving into some of less well-known details of the reception of the Art of War, I will summarize some of the factors that led to a moral condemnation of what came to be called Machiavellism. The Prince, Machiavelli’s most famous work, reflected a new conception of politics derived from the political and military crisis of early-modern Italy. The fading of the cultural and ideological references of medieval Christianity and the semi-permanent state of war that saw an ever-increasing use of firearms increased the virulence of Renaissance conflicts. The Italian Wars highlighted the weaknesses of an Italian state system divided into several quarrelling 1 It is worth mentioning at least A. Gerber, Niccolò Machiavelli, die Handschriften, Ausgaben und Uber­setzungen seiner Werke im 16, und 17. 7ahrhundert eine kritisch-bibliographische Unter­ suchung, 3 vols. (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1912) (republished in Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1962); G. Procacci, Machiavelli nella cultura europea dell’età moderna (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1995); S. Anglo, Machiavelli: The First Century: Studies in Enthusiasm, Hostility, and Irrelevance (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005). 2 Bibliografia delle edizioni di Niccolò Machiavelli, ed. by Piero Innocenti & Marielisa Rossi, 3 vols. (Manziana [Roma]: Vecchiarelli editore, 2015-2018). It is important to mention the introductory chapters to these volumes, the one by the editors and the one by P. Procaccioli, “Prima e dopo il 1559. Dagli entusiasmi degli editori alle inibizioni dei censori, alle resistenze dei principi,” ibid., vol. I, 1-15.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004432000_008

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political entities. In this laboratory of politics and warfare, Machiavelli tried to provide a blueprint for a new empirical and secular culture; his starting postulate was that the use of force is necessary to politics. The Prince theorizes a monarchic/princely system founded on an unprecedented combination of the seemingly opposed concepts of force and civilization. It draws from the heritage of political cultures (noble, communal and republican) of the ancient Italian states, which Machiavelli knew from his diplomatic experiences in the Italian republics and principalities and the European courts. In the Prince, the states of the Italian peninsula became a global political paradigm. Paradoxically, however, the European spread of this paradigm was largely due to the emphasis on the more cynical of Machiavelli’s writings, which quickly drowned out his thinking development of a full doctrine of the military in politics and war. From the Prince onward, violence, unscrupulousness and the importance of the sovereign/ruler’s public image came to be associated with Machiavelli, partly obfuscating the importance of the Art of War as a proposal for a military reform. Circulated in manuscript and print from 1532 on, the Prince quickly became widely known; interpreted as both a defense of a monarch and a criticism of tyranny, it aroused both interest and hostility.3 The original was followed by a host of plagiarized versions as well as by other books that drew heavily on Machiavelli, the best-known of which was Nifo’s 1523 De regnandi peritia.4 These versions often distorted Machiavelli’s ideas, increasing their ambiguity and exaggerating the elements that made religious and political authorities condemn him as immoral. The Art of War and the Discourses on Livy, two other major works, were published in Italian in 1521 and 1531. Immediately after they were then translated, a tradition of open opposition to some of the Prince’s scandalous or equivocal contents spread in Europe, soon becoming known as anti-Machiavellism. Machiavelli’s name was included in the 1559 Index of prohibited books 3 Recent important contributions on the manuscript circulation and the first translations of this work in R. De Pol (ed by.) The First Translations of Machiavelli’s Prince. From the Sixteenth to the first Half of the Nineteenth Century, (Amsterdam-New York: Rodopi, 2010); F. Bausi, Il principe dallo scrittoio alla stampa (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2015); 4 Recent research by M. Simonetta, “Totto Machiavelli, Agostino Nifo e il mulo di Niccolò (con quattro lettere inedite di Totto a Francesco del Nero),” Interpres, 37 (2019): 267-275, suggests that Nifo’s operation was more an authorized commentary than plagiarism. On this subject, see also G. Pedullà, “Disputare con il Principe,” in Atlante della letteratura italiana, ed by G. Pedullà & S. Luzzatto (Turin, Einaudi: 2010), vol. 1, 796-803; and Id., “Aristoteles contra Machiavelli: Agostino Nifos De regnandi peritia und die Erstrezeption des Principe im Konigreich Neapel,” in Texturen der Macht: 500 Jahre „Il Principe,” ed. by J. Frömmer & A. Oster (Berlin, Kadmos: 2015), 157-196.

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of Rome, and in England, Cardinal Reginald Pole, in his Apologia ad Carolum Quintum (1539) claimed the book had been written by the “hand of Satan.”5 At the end of the century, in Shakespeare’s Henry VI, the character of the Florentine Secretary appears as a symbol of fraud and amorality. In the aftermath of the 1572 St. Bartholomew’s Day Massacre, anti-Machiavellism is strongly expressed in the Discours […] contre Machiavel o Anti-Ma­ chia­vel (1576) by French jurist and Huguenot Innocent Gentillet. Protestants blamed the massacre on the queen and her Italian councilors and advisers, who are criticized by Gentillet. By then Machiavellian has become an adjective meaning an unprejudiced acceptance of violence and force in political struggle. Although the Prince analyzes the bloodiest events of early sixteenth-century Italian courts, Machiavellism becomes a transnational category of political thinking linked to a brutal, amoral and cynical image of Italian politics (one epitomized by Caterina de’ Medici’s ambiguous role in the massacre of the French Huguenots), despite the fact that Machiavelli criticized violence as an end in itself or for merely personal ambition. While Machiavelli’s work, particularly the Art of War, had previously received a rather positive reception in France, from then on a more hostile tradition openly opposed to Machiavellian thinking began to be codified.6 The moral condemnation expressed in the Italian peninsula by the Catholic Church had only partially different results. One of the most virulent – and hypocritical campaigns against Machiavelli was conducted in the late sixteenth century by thinkers like Giovanni Botero who condemned the amorality of certain strategies and tools suggested in the Prince. In the Ragion di stato (1589), Botero recognized a fundamental point of the Florentine Secretary’s doctrine, the sovereign’s right to fully exercise his dominion; however, this could happen only within the boundaries marked by the Church’s religious precepts. The Prince received a similar reception in the Iberian context. One of the most vibrant refusals came from the Portuguese theologian and historian Jerónimo 5 Cf. V. Kahn, “Machiavelli’s Afterlife and Reputation to the Eighteenth Century,” in The Cambridge Companion to Machiavelli, ed. by J.M. Najemy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press 2010), 244. Cf. also A. Prosperi, “II principe, il cardinale, il papa. Reginald Pole lettore di Machiavelli,” Proceedings of the Conference of Firenze-Pisa 27-30 Oct. 1997 (Rome: Salerno editrice, 1998), 260. 6 There are several studies on the reception of Machiavelli’s works in France (focusing especially on the Discourses on Livy and the Prince); it is worth mentioning at least J. Balsamo, “‘Un livre escrit du doigt de Satan’ : la découverte de Machiavel et l’invention du machiavélisme en France au XVIe siècle,” in Le pouvoir des livres à la Renaissance, ed. by D. de Courcelles (Paris, 1998): 77-92 ; R. Gorris Camos, “Dans le labyrinthe de Gohory, lecteur et traducteur de Machiavel,” Laboratoire italien, 8 (2008): 195-229.

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Osório (De nobilitate civile 1542).7 In the German area the controversy against the Florentine’s works spread, as attested by the early German translation of Gentillet’s Contre Machiavel, printed by Georg Rabe in Frankfurt in 1580 with the title of Regentenkunst, oder Fuerstenspiegel.8 Another factor that influenced the reception of Machiavelli’s works was language. Medieval Specula principum, i.e. treatises on the education of the sovereign, were typically written in Latin. Machiavelli opted instead for the Italian vernacular, (except for the chapter titles of The Prince). The choice prefigured changes in early-modern Europe as first political and then military treatises started developing new lexical and expressive tools in the vernacular languages, which were better able to represent the reality of the continuous change and crisis of the early modern age.9 But Machiavelli’s influential choice meant his work required translation – had it been in Latin, a pan-European elite would have been able to read it – and the many translations sped up the process of appropriation and transformation. The first translation of the Prince – into French, by Guillaume Cappel, in 1553 – was followed by several others.10 The Art of War was translated into French by Jean Charrier in 1546. Furthermore, in the Iberian Peninsula, a book that drew heavily on the Art of War by Diego de Salazar (Tratado de re militari) appeared in 1536, and with the same processes of alteration and distortion. Then a Spanish translation of the Discourses by Juan Lorenzo Otevanti (Discursos de Nicolao Machiaveli, 1552) appeared. In 1560, the first English translation of the Art of War was published under the title of Arte of Warre. Finally, 7 8

9 10

Cf. Anglo, Machiavelli, 144. Very useful works on the circulation of Machiavelli’s works in the German-speaking territories are still the old Gerber, Niccolò Machiavelli, and W. Kaegi, “Machiavelli in Basel,” Basler Zeitschrift fuer Geschichte und Altertumskunde, 39, (1940): 5-52. Further important contributions on this subject by L. Perini, “Gli eretici italiani del Cinquecento e Machiavelli,” Studi Storici, 10 (1969): 877-910; A. Rotondò, “Pietro Perna e la vita culturale e religiosa di Basilea fra il 1570 e il 1580,” in id. Studi di storia ereticale del Cinquecento, 2 vols. (Florence: Olschki, 2008); and G. Almási, “Experientia and the Machiavellian turn in ­religio-political and scientific thinking Basle in 1580,” History of European Ideas, 42:7 (2016): 857-881. An important contribution to this field of study is a recent volume by M.-M. Fontaine & J.-L. Fournel (ed. by), Les mots de la guerre dans l’Europe de la Renaissance (Geneva: Droz, Travaux d’Humanisme et Renaissance, 2015). Cf. D. Bovo, “Il Principe di Guillaume Cappel,” in Studi machiavelliani, Verona, Facoltà di Economia e Commercio di Verona, 1972, 53-80. Also E. Balmas, “Jacques Gohory traduttore di Machiavelli,” in Studi machiavelliani (Verona: Facoltà di Economia e Commercio di Verona, 1972), 1-52; R. Pianori, “Le Prince de Gaspard d’Auvergne,” ibid., 81-102; M. Del Corso, Le traduzioni del Principe di Machiavelli in Francia nel XVI secolo (Padua: Cooperativa Alfasessanta, 1994).

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manuscript translations in English of the Prince and the Discourses were compiled starting from the sixteenth century.11 The association of Machiavelli with a form of politics considered ‘Italian,’ that is, cynical, brutal and based on political assassination, would be mitigated only between the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries by a sort of rediscovery of the Discourses on Livy. Although the Discourses came out just a month before the Prince, it had long been associated with pagan and anti-Christian ideas and condemned by both Catholic and Protestant thinkers. While not all readers saw the book as incompatible with religious belief,12 some sixteenth and seventeenth-century English readers and Dutch and American republicans interpreted the book as an anti-monarchical, anti-Christian and pro-republican manifesto. These readers contrasted the Discourses to the Prince’s narrative of bloody events and stories of the Italian Renaissance courts, seeing the former as more representative of Machiavelli’s real political thinking. This is an overview of the basic story of Machiavelli’s complicated reception, especially the Prince. However, the present study is concerned with more specific themes and topics that have received attention from different fields of historiography; it often engages or argues with that. I do not take up all the threads mentioned above, and I address others related to the reception of Machiavelli’s military.13 11

12 13

For a survey of Machiavelli’s works in English-speaking areas, see at least A. Petrina, Machiavelli in the British Isles: Two Early Modern Translations of «The Prince» (Farnham: Ashgate, 2009); Ead., “Machiavelli beyond the Channel: the first english translations of The Prince,” in Anglo-American Faces of Machiavelli. Machiavelli e machiavellismi nella cultura politica anglo-americana (secoli XVI-XX), ed. by A. Arienzo & G. Borrelli (Monza: Polimetrica, 2009), 51-74; Cf. Kahn, Machiavelli’s Afterlife, 249-251. Amongst these, it is important to mention the chapter dedicated to the Art of War by Anglo, Machiavelli. See also the recent: F. Verrier, “Machiavel, X, Y et les Légions,” in Les Guerres d’Italie. Histoire, Pratiques, Représentations, ed. by D. Boillet and M.F. Piejus (Paris: Université Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2002), 259-273 ; ead. “Les Discours sur la première décade de Tite-Live, un traité militaire en pointillé,” in Dialogue militaire entre Anciens et Modernes, ed. by Jean-Pierre Bois (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2004) accessed online May 2018: ; V. Lepri, “Machiavelli in The Quintesence of Wit and his English Military Readers,” in A. Arienzo & A. Petrina (eds.), Machiavellian Encounters in Tudor and Stuart England: Literary and Political Influences from the Reformation to the Restoration (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 45-58; F.R. Rodríguez de la Flor, “Maquiavelo en Flandes. El Arte de la guerra del Florentino y las ‘armas de España’,” Revista de la Sociedad de Estudios Italianistas 9 (2013): 159-177. Interesting contributions also in Militari e società civile nell’Europa dell’età moderna (secoli XVI – XVIII), ed. by C. Donati & B.R. Kroener (Bologna: il Mulino, 2007); Books for Captains and Captains in Books. Shaping the Perfect Military Commander in Early Modern Europe, ed. by M. Faini and M.E. Severini (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, in Kommission, 2016).

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 Historiography on the Art of War and This Book

Scholars such as Giuliano Procacci and Jean-Louis Fournel have pointed out that the French experiment with a militia established by an Ordonnance of Francis I of 24 July 1534 must be related to the circulation of Machiavelli’s Arte della guerra across Europe.14 Building on these and studies by Frédérique Verrier and others,15 the following chapters provide more insight about the relationship of the Art of War with important French books and texts connected to these military reforms. Another field of research, that of Piero del Negro, JeanClaude Zancarini and Fournel, has largely focused on Machiavelli’s role in creating a new way of writing and talking about war and warfare.16 In the following chapters, I build on this work through a detailed study of little known evidence of early circulation of Machiavelli’s military ideas in the French, Spanish and Imperial courts that looks at the circulation of books, images and people who knew Machiavelli’s works on the militia, for instance, the 1506 Florentine militia experiment. I will also argue that the continuous re-use and re-elaboration of both Machiavelli’s and ancient ideas on the militia linked to this circulation process was a constituent part of the method of collecting and re-using favored by military authors of the time. Because of this, I argue, it is difficult to apply a modern concept of authorship to many sixteenth-century military writings, although Machiavelli’s position in this history is singular because of both his widespread influence and the many ways he was read and mis-read. With a few significant exceptions, many of the studies dedicated to the circulation of Machiavelli’s works in Europe, e.g. Keith David Howard’s book on Is is worth mentioning the recent important contribution, mainly on the seventeenth century, which is outside the scope of this book, by D.R. Lawrence, The Complete Soldier: Military Books and Military Culture in Early Stuart England, 1603-1645 (Leiden: Brill, 2009). 14 Procacci, Machiavelli, 186 ff; J.-L. Fournel, “Dire la guerre à Florence aux temps des guerres d’Italie: la langue militaire et les langages de l’état de guerre,” in Guerre, circulations et transferts culturels de la Renaissance à l’Empire, Colloque 19-21 janvier 2015 Paris I (forthcoming, Il Pensiero Politico, 2020. I thank the author for allowing me to read an early version of this paper). Cf. also Id., “Il genere e il tempo delle parole: dire la guerra nei testi machiavelliani,” in The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy and Language, ed. by F. Del Lucchese, F. Frosini & V. Morfino (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 23-38. 15 See above note 13. 16 See for instance, P. Del Negro, “Una lingua per la guerra: il Rinascimento militare italiano,” in Storia d’Italia, Guerra e Pace (Turin 2002); J.-L. Fournel & J.-C. Zancarini, “La langue du conflict dans la Florence des Guerres d’Italie,” in M.-M. Fontaine & J.-L. Fournel (ed. by), Les mots de la guerre dans l’Europe de la Renaissance (Geneva: Droz, Travaux d’Humanisme et Renaissance, 2015), 259-84.

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Machiavelli in the Iberian peninsula, pay too little attention to the Art of War.17 In fact, the Art of War was one of the most successful military books of the early modern period, which I show through an analytic investigation of little known or previously unknown pieces of evidence that confirm that and that Machiavelli was as well-known as a military writer as he was as a notorious political thinker. As mentioned above, sixteenth-century military thinkers, ignited by Machiavelli’s evocation of the glory of the ancients, built on notions of the discipline and spirit of the Roman military to shape the model of a perfect captain and army. I will show, however, that Machiavelli can be found even in writings in which one would not expect him, especially since their authors often pretended either not to have read him or completely disagree with him about the foundations of military art. Anecdotes about the personal experience of the military reformer Lord of Langey, Guillaume du Bellay, shed new light on the transformation of Machiavelli’s military ideas by a specific French monarchical culture of the sixteenth century. It has been suggested that Du Bellay might be the author of Instructions sur le faict de la guerre, a text that draws heavily from Machiavelli’s Art of War. A new reading of this as well as other French works written to promote the establishment of the French militia Légions will reveal little known details of the process of copying, editing and digesting Machiavelli’s military thinking. Further, a deep investigation of biographical and bibliographical data little known to Machiavelli scholars supports a new hypothesis about a missing early translation of Machiavelli’s Art of War into Latin by Jean de Morel. Moreover, against a common and still current interpretation of the Art of War as a merely literary exercise, I argue that this dialogue had an impact on military policies and government larger than Machiavelli’s contemporaries like novelist Matteo Maria Bandello or modern scholars like Sidney Anglo have assumed. This argument draws on studies by Philippe Contamine and David Potter on the creation of the French légions during the early sixteenth century as well as those on the establishment of militias in Spanish Italy from the second half of the century on.18 In particular, I argue, relying on recent research 17 18

K.D. Howard, The Reception of Machiavelli in Early Modern Spain (Woodbridge: Boydell & Brewer 2014). Ph. Contamine, “Naissance de l’infanterie française,” in Quatrieme centenaire de la bataille de Coutras (Biarritz: J. & D. Editions, 1989): 63-88; D. Potter, Renaissance France at War: Ar­­mies, Culture and Society, c. 1480-1560 (Woodbridge: Boydell, 2008); V. Favarò, “Dalla ‘nuova milizia’ al Tercio spagnolo: la presenza militare nella Sicilia di Filippo II,” Mediterranea. Ricerche storiche, II 4 (2005): 235-262; L. Pezzolo, “Le ‘arme proprie’ in Italia nel Cinque e Seicento: problemi di ricerca,” in Saggi di storia economica, ed. by T. Fanfani (Pisa: Pacini, 1998), 55-72.

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by Geoffrey Parker and other scholars, that Machiavelli’s thinking and its reception influenced practical and technical aspects of warfare even more than it is usually assumed by studies dedicated to the organization of sixteenthcentury armies.19 The book also sheds new light on possible early contact and exchange between the Italian peninsula, France, the Empire and Spain and demonstrates how a specific military culture linked to Machiavelli’s legacy influenced important features of the revolution in warfare and state building, including problems of national and corporate identity and ideas about the fidelity of troops and militiamen. I argue that Machiavelli’s military thinking evolved from his personal experience with the Florentine militia, which shaped his ideal of a well-organized army and the administration it required, along with his conception of a division of duties and responsibilities within the militia ranks. This Machiavellian promotion of the concept of a state-militia (armi proprie) should be seen, I argue, as an early example of the connection between military administration and the emergence of bureaucracy in the early modern period as described by Steven Gunn and Jan Glete.20 There is an extensive literature connecting theory about militias to features of governing processes and theoretical legitimizations of power. In particular, John Pocock and Quentin Skinner have famously linked Machiavelli’s discourse on the militia to the foundations of republican ideas in modern western politics.21 The present study supplements the republican tradition of Machiavelli studies by showing how his ideal of the armi proprie was assimilated into a specific monarchical context: a process that facilitated the formation of so-called Machiavellism and reactions against it. In fact, I argue that the success of the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre (also known as du Bellay’s Discipline militaire) facilitated the modification of Machiavelli’s original conception of armi proprie and the expunging of its most radical aspects. In Machiavellism – not to be confused with Machiavelli’s actual thoughts – the ideal of the people or citizens in arms does not promote the political benefits of a nation in arms, but 19 20

21

Cf. in particular, G. Parker, “The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy,” The Journal of Military History, 71 (2007): 331-372. S. Gunn, “War and the Emergence of the State: Western Europe, 1350-1600,” in F. Tallett & D.J.B. Trim, eds, European Warfare, 1350-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 50-73; J. Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States 1550-1660 (London – New York: Routledge, 2002). J.G.A. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975); Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979).

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emphasizes instead the power of the king and his control over his subjects. The political and military vocabulary used in the Instructions and similar military treatises of the time reveals the intricate filtering and distillation of Machiavellian military thinking in and by monarchical contexts. The radical ideal of a people as citizens in arms willing to defend their freedom was sacrificed for the comfort and support of the increasingly powerful European monarchies.

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The Circulation of Machiavelli’s Art of War in Early-Modern Europe, and Its Influence on Cultures of Warfare and on Experiments with Organizing Militias The reception of Machiavelli’s Art of War in Europe during the early decades of the sixteenth century influenced the way military treatises were written. As John R. Hale explained, together with Battista della Valle’s Vallo: libro continente appertenentie ad capitani, the Art of War “set new standards for Europe as a whole,” especially given their innovative relevance to current practice and the diagrams in Machiavelli’s work.1 The Art of War also influenced contemporary experiments with militias established by military conscription in early modern Europe.2 Although there was a general trend toward larger and more permanent armies, based on mass levies of both citizens and peasants, Machia­ velli’s influence is unmistakable: first, because many military treatises appeared soon after the publication of Machiavelli’s book; second, because from the third decade of the sixteenth century on experiments in raising national militias took place all over Europe. France and Spain, particularly, were early sites for the reception of Machiavelli’s ideas. The armies of the two countries were involved in a decades-long fight in the Italian peninsula, at the time of the so-called Italian Wars (14941559). During this period, French and Spanish governors and commanders experimented with new ways of waging war and encountered militia experiments different from their own, along with wide-ranging political and military discourses in the Italian peninsula.3 However, it was not only in France and Spain that a revived interest in a militia can be connected to new cultures of warfare that built on both local 1 J.R. Hale, “Printing and Military Culture of Renaissance Venice,” in id., Renaissance War Studies (London: The Hambledon Press, 1983), 447. 2 For a general overview, cf. G.D. Rothenberg, “Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the ‘Military Revolution’ of the Seventeenth Century,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. by P. Paret, G.A. Craig, F. Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 32-63. 3 Cf. L. Pezzolo, “La rivoluzione militare: una prospettiva italiana 1400-1700,” in A. Dattero; S. Levati (eds), Militari in età moderna. La centralità di un tema di confine (Milan : Cisalpino 2006), 20.

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military traditions and ideas from the Art of War. In England, for example, Peter Whithorne’s 1560 translation (Arte of Warre) ignited new ideas concerning the necessity of a national force. In Switzerland the interest in Machiavelli connects with the history of Italian protestants who sought refuge in Basle and reveals the way that the Art of War’s reception in France influenced the fortune of Machiavelli’s military work in the German-speaking world. 1 France On the night of August 23-24, 1572, the slaughter of the Paris Huguenots in the so-called St. Bartholomew’s Day massacre generated a new phase in the reception of Machiavelli’s ideas in France. Although his works had previously been positively received, from then on Machiavelli was controversial, in large part because of the Discours […] contre Machiavel or Anti-Machiavel (1576) by Innocent Gentillet (a French Huguenot jurist who had fled to Geneva). Gentillet blamed the massacre on the queen of France, the Florentine Caterina de’ ­Medici, and her Italian counsellors, but from that moment, Machiavelli’s name was associated with the idea that Italian politics were based on violence and fraud. Scholars such as Jean Balsamo, Rosanna Gorris Camos, and Nella Bianchi Bensimon have studied the early translations of Machiavelli’s works into French, and their work shows the influence of his political thought on early sixteenth-century French culture.4 His ideas on the military, in particular, found a large audience, stimulating literature that drew heavily on his writing and strengthening the association between the militia and Roman discipline and virtue, which had a concrete effect on the creation of the French national army. The Instructions sur le faict de la guerre (1548) is one of the most famous and successful examples of the military treatises that drew heavily on Machiavelli. Appearing soon after the first official French version of the Art of War by Jean

4 J. Balsamo, “‘Un livre escrit du doigt de Satan’ : la découverte de Machiavel et l’invention du machiavélisme en France au XVIe siècle,” in Le pouvoir des livres à la Renaissance, ed. by D. de Courcelles, Études et rencontres de l’École des Chartes, 3 (Paris: Ecole des chartes, 1998), 77-92; R. Gorris Camos, “Dans le labyrinthe de Gohory, lecteur et traducteur de Machiavel,” Laboratoire italien 8 (2008), 195-229; N. Bianchi Bensimon, “La première traduction française,” in The First Translations of Machiavelli’s Prince. From the Sixteenth to the first Half of the Nineteenth Century, ed by. R. De Pol (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 25-51.

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Charrier in 1546;5 it was re-printed in the second half of the century and attributed to Guillaume du Bellay. Certain scholars, however, tend to assign it either to Raymond de Fourquevaux or Jacques de Vintimille.6 The book was intended to promote the French experiment with a militia, the so-called Légions established by an Ordonnance of Francis I of 24 July 1534, which, as Giuliano Procacci and Jean-Louis Fournel have argued, was directly stimulated by Machiavelli’s Art of War.7 By building on this and other literature, this section provides new insights on the circulation of Machiavelli’s military ideas in France during the first half of the sixteenth century.

…

To start, we must focus on the Florentine community of early sixteenth-century Lyon. Florentine immigrants helped make Lyon a banking center that often lent to the French kings,8 which meant that it was well-placed to shape state policies, including the creation of a national French infantry. Lyon was also a leading area for print diffusion, and printing enterprises were often led by Italians.9 As Frédérique Verrier has shown, an important pamphlet intended to promote the Ordonnance for the institution of the Légions by Francis I, the 5 Cf. J.R. Hale, “Printing and Military Culture of Renaissance Venice,” in id., Renaissance War Studies (London: The Hambledon Press, 1983), 447; Fournel, “Dire la guerre à Florence aux temps des guerres d’Italie: la langue militaire et les langages de l’état de guerre,” in Guerre, circulations et transferts culturels de la Renaissance à l’Empire, Colloque 19-21 janvier 2015 Paris I (forthcoming, in Il Pensiero Politico, 2020. I thank the author for allowing me to read an early version of this paper). As highlighted by S. Anglo, Machiavelli: The First Century: Studies in Enthusiasm, Hostility, and Irrelevance (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 31, early in 1548 Conrad Gesner had noted that Fourquevaux’s Instructions had been extracted from several other authors, including Machiavelli. 6 Cf. G. Dickinson, Instructions sur le faict de la guerre of Raymond de Beccarie de Pavie sieur de Fourquevaux (London: The Athlone Press, 1952); M. Tetel, “De l’auteur des Instructions sur le faict de guerre,” in Culture et pouvoir du temps de la Renaissance, ed. by L. Terreaux (ParisGenève: Slatkine – Champion, 1978), 274-275, argued that the Instructions could be the result of a combined work by Rabelais and Du Bellay; Finally, G. Procacci, Machiavelli nella cultura europea dell’età moderna (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1995), 184-206, argued that Du Bellay might be only the editor. The possible attribution of this work to Jacques de Vintimille has been recently proposed by Bianchi Bensimon, “La première,” 31. 7 Procacci, Machiavelli, 186 ff; J.L. Fournel, “Dire la guerre à Florence.” 8 Cf. Charpin Feugerolles, Les Florentins à Lyon (Lyon: Libr. ancienne de L. Brun, 1893); M. Cassandro, Le fiere di Lione e gli uomini d’affari italiani nel Cinquecento (Florence: tip. Baccini & Chiappi, 1979); J. Boucher, Présence italienne à Lyon à la Renaissance: du milieu du XVe à la fin du XVIe siècle (Lyon: Editions LUGD, 1994). 9 E. Balmas, “Librai italiani a Lione,” in Il Rinascimento a Lione, ed. by A. Possenti & G. Mastrangelo, 2 voll. (Rome: Edizioni dell’Ateneo, 1988), vol. I, 61-82, especially p. 67.

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so-called Familière institution, was printed in Lyon in 1536, i.e. only two years after the creation of the new French militia.10 Claude Cottereau’s De iure et privilegiis militum libri tres, which drew from both the Familière institution and the works of Machiavelli, was published in Lyon in 1539.11 In addition, Carlo Ginzburg has recently explained how the Florentine exile, antiquarian Gabriele Simeoni (1509-1575) discussed the theme of armi proprie in his Illustratione de gli epitaffi et medaglie antiche, published in Lyon in 1558.12 Simeoni had been chancellor in Florence during the last Florentine Republic, and was part of the administration of the “bande,” i.e. the Medicean ordinanza for a country militia, as is shown in the 1543 act by which he was hired by the Florentine Chancery.13 He had access to the original documentation of Machiavelli’s 1506 Florentine militia battalions, including the official Militia Act (which remained unpublished for centuries); indeed Simeoni himself prepared an inventory of the so-called Riformagioni, the Florentine republic state archives where these manuscripts were preserved.14 It makes sense then, that the anonymous Institution de la discipline militaire au royeaume de France, written to promote Henry II’s new Ordonnance for the Lègions – which drew extensively on Art of War in ideas about the military virtue of the ancients – was printed in the same city in 1559.15 So, too, the Institution de l’ordre militaire (1584) by the Lyonnais Pierre Savonne, who, like Machiavelli, insisted on discipline and order in order to enhance his argument that knowing the rules of mathematical arts makes a good captain.16 Existing studies have focused on the role played by Florentine immigrants in France, especially in Lyon. One key figure was Baccio del Bene, the son-inlaw of Biagio Buonaccorsi, colleague of Machiavelli and copyist of some of his works.17 Sidney Anglo, the historian who highlighted Baccio’s presence, also 10

Cf. F. Verrier, “Machiavel, X, Y et les Légions,” in Les Guerres d’Italie. Histoire, Pratiques, Représentations, ed. by D. Boillet and M.F. Piejus (Paris: Université Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2002), 260. 11 Cf. Verrier, “Machiavel, X, Y et les Légions,” 265. 12 C. Ginzburg, Nondimanco. Machiavelli, Pascal (Milan: Adelphi, 2018), 109. 13 See Legislazione toscana raccolta e illustrata dal dottore Lorenzo Cantini (Florence: nella Stamp. Albizziniana da S. Maria in Campo, 1800), vol. 1, 234. 14 Inventory of the Riformagioni prepared by Gabriello Simeoni in 1545: “Inventario di tutti i libri e scritture che si trovano insino a questo di 20 giugno 1545 nella cancelleria delle Riformagioni,” ASF: Inventari, Serie V, 638, f. 30v ff. 15 Cf. Verrier, “Machiavel, X, Y et les Légions,” 260 & 267 ff. Also Anglo, Machiavelli, 38. 16 Cf. ibid., 557. 17 For Biagio Buonaccorsi see A. Guidi, Un Segretario militante. Politica, diplomazia e armi nel Cancelliere Machiavelli (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009), 113 ff; D. Fachard, Biagio Buonaccorsi, sa vie – son temps – son oeuvre (Bologna: Massimiliano Boni editore, 1976).

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warned of the danger of basing hypotheses about his possible part in the circulation of Machiavelli’s writings on inadequate evidence.18 But we can note that other members of the Florentine community in Lyon had been actively corresponding with Machiavelli since his early missions to the French court. After all, in 1504 Machiavelli was sent to the French court in Lyon as informal ambassador of Florence. Some of these correspondents also worked as agents of the Republic of Florence. Some of their letters to Machiavelli are known (i.e. ­Ugolino Martelli to M., Lyon, 17 Jul. & 12 Aug. 1501; and Bartolomeo Panciatichi to M., Lyon, 26 Jul. & 24 Aug. 1510); others are still unpublished (e.g. Luigi della Stufa to M., Lyon, 27 Oct. 1502).19 There were other Florentines in Lyon who had exchange or contact with Machiavelli, including Luigi Alamanni, who took part in the renewal of the popular government in Florence in 1527-1530, when a new militia based on the Machiavellian model was established. Not surprisingly, Alamanni is known to have attended the so-called Orti Oricellari, named for the gardens of the Florentine Rucellai family, where Machiavelli lectured a group of young Florentines from 1516 to 1519 c. on Roman history and the ‘art of war’.20 Alamanni is documented as one of the earliest readers of Machiavelli’s works.21 Luigi Alamanni’s relevance to the dissemination of Machiavelli’s works in France goes beyond his mere presence in France; more important is the fact that king Francis I (who established the aforementioned Légions) appointed him ambassador to Charles V in 1544.22 Given his prominence at Francis I’s 18 Anglo, Machiavelli, 24-25. 19 BNCF, Carte Machiavelli, III, 43. 20 Among these youngsters was also Zanobi Buondelmonti, the dedicataire of Machiavelli’s Discourses. The Archives municipales de Lyon (i.e. the collection of the Archives de la Ville, Nommées and Affiches) contain records relating to Luigi Alamanni. For a biography of Alamanni, cf. H. Hauvette, Un exilé florentin à la cour de France au XVIe siècle: Luigi Alamanni (1495-1556) sa vie et son œuvre (Paris: Hachette & Cie, 1903). For the relationship between Zanobi Buondelmonti and Luigi Alamanni while in France, see the correspondence mentioned ibid., 484-485; for their connections with Marguerite de Navarre and the French court, see R. Cooper, Litterae in tempore belli: études sur les relations littéraires italo-françaises pendant les guerres d’Italie (Geneva: Droz, 1997), 172 ff. Incidentally, Cooper (p. 216-218 & 259-260) also provides new insights on the links between Marguerite, the Du Bellay family, and Jacopo Sadoleto, who had contact with Machiavelli. Sadoleto is a key figure for the circulation of Machiavelli’s works in France. Recently, G. Lettieri, “Nove tesi sull’ultimo Machiavelli,” in R. Parrinello (ed.), Storia del cristianesimo e storia delle religioni. Omaggio a Giovanni Filoramo, Special Issue of Humanitas 72, 5/6 (2017): 1034-1089, demonstrated convincingly that he possessed a copy of the Prince at least from 1517, when he was Bishop of Carpentras. 21 F. Bausi, Il Principe. Dallo scrittoio alla stampa (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2015), 132 & 136. 22 See Charpin Feugerolles, Les Florentins à Lyon, 12.

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court and his awareness of Machiavelli’s ideas, it is reasonable to conclude that he helped spread them to France. He may also have contributed to the movement of these ideas from France to the Hapsburg imperial court. Based on his reading of Francesco Sansovino’s Il simolacro di Carlo quinto imperadore (Venice, 1567), Sidney Anglo declared that the Hapsburgs “would have to be regarded as the most distinguished of Machiavelli’s early readers.”23 It is not accidental that Agostino Nifo’s (De regnandi peritia, published in 1523), which was actually a sort of re-rewriting of the Prince,24 was dedicated to Charles V. Building on Anglo, one should add that as early as 1516, Luigi’s brother Lodovico Alamanni, while in Rome, sent a discourse on the necessity of raising a homegrown military force to the Imperial ambassador Alberto Pio da Carpi; the discourse drew heavily from both Machiavelli’s 1506 militia project and the Prince. This correspondence shows the circulation of Machiavelli’s ideas between Florentine expatriates in France and other European courts. The Alamanni brothers disagreed about the Medicis (Luigi contra, Lodovico pro), and Lodovico, a friend and correspondent of Machiavelli, promoted the idea of a militia with the house of the Medici.25 One may wonder if Alberto Pio himself contributed to the diffusion of these ideas within the Hapsburg court. In any case, after being dismissed from the services of Charles V, the same Alberto became influential in the French court of Francis I in the decade immediately preceding the 1534 Ordonnance, a de­ cade that saw increasing advocacy for recruitment of francs-archers and

23 Anglo, Machiavelli, 19. 24 Cf. F. Bausi, “‘L’aureo libro moral’. Circolazione e fortuna del Principe prima della stampa (1516-1531),” in Machiavelli Cinquecento. Mezzo millennio del Principe, ed. by G.M. Anselmi, R. Caporali, C. Galli (Milan: Mimesis, 2015), 34-36. M. Simonetta, “Totto Machiavelli, Agostino Nifo e il mulo di Niccolò (con quattro lettere inedite di Totto a Francesco del Nero),” Interpres, 37 (2019): 267-275. 25 Machiavelli wrote to Lodovico Alamanni on 17 Dec. 1517. For the discourses prepared by Alamanni for Alberto Pio da Carpi, cf. R. von Albertini, Firenze dalla Repubblica al Prin­ cipato. Storia e coscienza politica (Turin: Einaudi, 1970) 33-35, 70-71, 385-390; also A. D’Addario, “I ‘Capitoli della militia’ e la formazione di un ceto di privilegiati alla periferia del principato mediceo fra XVI e XVII secolo,” in Studi in onore di Leopoldo Sandri (Rome: Ministero per i beni culturali e ambientali, 1985), 356. More recently, M. Coyle, Niccolò Machiavelli’s The Prince: New Interdisciplinary Essays (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1995), 27-28; M. Simonetta, “Alberto Pio da Carpi, un ‘diavolo’ diplomatico nelle corti d’Italia e d’Europa,” in Alberto Pio da Carpi e l’arte della diplomazia. Le “lettere americane” e altri inediti, eds. A.M. Ori & L. Saetti (Modena: Mc Offset, 2015), XIV. Finally, F. Bausi, “‘L’aureo libro moral’,” 27. Bausi (ibid., 26) explains that it is likely that Machiavelli himself decided to promote his Prince from 1515 onward.

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infantry units.26 Alberto Pio met with French intellectuals and courtiers, including Guillaume du Bellay, whose role in the publication and circulation of Machiavelli’s writings in France is documented.27 It is well-known that Machiavelli’s military ideas circulated in Jean du Bellay’s literary circle in Rome.28 In addition, David Potter stressed the connections to the military aspects of Rabelais’s works and his service as a doctor attached to du Bellay’s missions to Rome.29 Potter also documented an extensive correspondence about the French military campaigns during the Italian Wars, which, along with a huge amount of news and information, was exchanged between the Italian peninsula and France.30 In particular, it is worth mentioning a letter that exemplifies some of the military topics discussed in this correspondence: in 1535 Anne de Montmorency wrote to Jean du Bellay describing one of the first parades of the Légions, the force that king Francis I had created only a year before.31 Anne de Montmorency also bears looking at. He took part in the French campaigns in Italy and was very influential at court. In the years that followed, in fact, Anne would become the dedicataire of Jacques de Vintimille’s translation of Machiavelli’s Art of War (ca. 1540) and the Prince (1546).32 The connection with Lyon is again evident, as Vintimille was raised and educated in this city.33 In addition, the author of the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre actually addressed Montmorency in the book’s final section. Montmorency participated in the battle of Ravenna, which, as we have seen in chapter 4, was of key importance to Machiavelli’s Art of War and the Prince. Finally, Montmorency 26

Ph. Contamine, “Naissance de l’infanterie française,” in Quatrieme centenaire de la bataille de Coutras (Biarritz: J. & D. Editions, 1989): 70. 27 V.-L. Bourrilly, Guillaume du Bellay Seigneur de Langey (1491-1543) (Paris: Societé nouvelle de librairie et d’edition, 1904); Simonetta, “Alberto Pio da Carpi.” 28 Cf. Gorris Camos, “Dans le labyrinthe de Gohory”; Fournel, “Dire la guerre à Florence.” 29 D. Potter, Renaissance France at War: Armies, Culture and Society, c. 1480-1560 (Woodbridge: The Boydell Press, 2008), 310. 30 Ibid., 262-3. For a new light on Du Bellay’s intellectual circle in Rome and its early role in transmitting Machiavelli’s ideas to the French culture, see C. Zwierlein, “Un discorso politico sconosciuto di Claudio Tolomei del 1536: machiavellismo metodologico all’inizio della terza guerra asburgo-valois,” Il Pensiero Politico XLIV (2011): 369-396. 31 Anne de Montmorency to Jean du Bellay, Villers-Cotterets 26 July 1535, in Correspondance du cardinal Jean du Bellay, Vol. II, 1535-1536 ed. by R. Scheurer (Paris: Librairie Klincksieck, 1973), 30. 32 For these translations, see Procacci, Machiavelli, 126; Bianchi Bensimon, “La première,” 25, 31-33. Also, J.C. Zancarini, “‘Uno piccolo dono’: A Software Tool for Comparing the First Edition of Machiavelli’s The Prince to Its Sixteenth Century French Translations,” in The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language, ed. by F. Del Lucchese, F. Frosini, V. Morfino (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 39-55. 33 Cf. Bianchi Bensimon, “La première,” 27.

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was in touch with Gabriele Simeoni, whose interest in the Machiavellian concept of armi proprie as well as his direct involvement with the government of the militia battalions in Tuscany has already been mentioned.34 Despite being published as an anonymous work, the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre was later published as a work by Guillaume du Bellay,35 brother of the Cardinal Jean, with whom he had correspondence about the conduct of war and other military needs when he was governor of Turin in 1539.36 The Instructions was attributed by a modern scholar to Raymond de Beccarie de Pavie Lord of Fourquevaux. However, it is worth mentioning that, if the recent attribution of the Instructions to Jacques de Vintimille, proposed by Bianchi Bensimon, is to be considered true, this would even reinforce the argument of an early and broad circulation of Machiavelli’s Art of War in certain French intellectual circles.37 In a nutshell, events, printing enterprises, connections and exchange between people and across the Italian peninsula, France, and the Empire, often connected to the community of Florentine exiles in Lyon, document a process of circulation of military ideas ignited by Machiavelli’s writings on the militia in Europe, and especially in France between the second and the fourth decades of the sixteenth century. The First French Translation of the Arte della guerra and the Publication of French Military Treatises Inspired by Machiavelli Further evidence of the circulation of Machiavelli’s ideas on the militia in France can be seen by looking at book production of the time. The Instructions sur le faict de la guerre, as discussed above, draws heavily on Machiavelli and reveals the processes of exchange that informed and advanced early sixteenthcentury cultures of warfare.38 Books like this not only reveal the geographical 1.1

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See above in this chapter, p. 114. On the relationship between Montmorency and Simeoni, cf. J. Balsamo, “Gabriel Symeoni, figure de l’italianisme français,” and V. Bramanti, “Gli anni fiorentini (pochi) del fiorentino Gabriello Simeoni,” both in Gabriele Simeoni (15091570?). Un Florentin en France entre princes et libraires, ed. by S. D’Amico & C. MagnienSimonin (Geneva: Droz, 2016), 21-70 & 71-90. Dickinson (ed. by), Instructions. Cf. Fournel, “Dire la guerre à Florence.” Guillame du Bellay to Jean du Bellay, Turin 8 May 1538, in Correspondance du cardinal Jean du Bellay, Vol. III, 1537-1547 (Paris: Société de l’Histoire de France 2008), 99-102. Bianchi Bensimon, “La première,” 31. For a recent discussion of the processes of cultural transfer in European military cultures at the end of the sixteenth century, particularly in France and the Netherlands, cf. T. Schwager, Militärtheorie im Späthumanismus: Kulturtransfer taktischer und strategischer Theorien in den Niederlanden und Frankreich (1590 – 1660) (Berlin: De Gruyter, 2012), especially p. 53-76, for a survey of the existing literature on the wider subject of the

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range of Machiavelli’s works, but also the difficulties of applying the modern concept of authorship to military writings of the time. That stated, Machiavelli’s works have had a vast influence on contemporary and subsequent writers and thinkers, an influence commensurate with that of some authors of classical antiquity. As Michel Foucault put it, authors like Homer, Aristotle, and the Fathers of the Church “produit quelque chose de plus: la possibilité et la règle de formation d’autres textes.”39 Machiavelli, especially his military writings, belongs on this list. Facilitated by letter writing, the spread of printed books, and the movement of people, the exchange of ideas resulted in the circulation of interrelating and overlapping concepts and ideas that often ended up combined into the singular work of an individual. Clearly, there are different nuances and distinctions and singularities. The Instructions, however, is a case in which this process of copying, contamination and rewriting is rooted in the book’s very essence. The similarities between the elements on which its author builds his argument and the Art of War confirm that he drew specifically and heavily on Machi­a­ velli. One of the first issues in organizing a militia, according to both Machiavelli and the author of the Instructions, is the question of how to ensure troop discipline. The author of the Instructions shifted the focus of Machiavelli’s proposals from the exploits of the ancient militia to modern times, using material from many of Machiavelli’s works, primarily the Art of War, to reinforce his own argument and build a proposal rooted in the practical and technical needs linked to the specific problem of the reform of the French army. Specific differences in word choices, for instance the use of “élection” for the original Latinism “deletto” by Machiavelli, shed light on these differences.40 Most important is the use by the author of the Instructions’ of the expression “discipline militaire” for the rich vernacular Italian “milizia” (“militia”), which Machiavelli used to indicate “military service,” “life,” “practice,” as well as “military organization,” all of which come from the original Latin etymology.41 The French

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transmission of culture in early-modern Europe. Also Ead., “La theorie militaire dans l’Humanisme tardif aux Pays-Bas et en France,” in Teatri di guerra: rappresentazioni e discorsi tra età moderna ed età contemporanea, ed. by A. De Benedictis (Bologna: Bononia University Press, 2010), 149-71. M. Foucault, Dits et écrits, 1954-1988, vol. I, 1954-1969 (Paris: Gallimard, 1994), 804. For this topic, see the excellent analysis by Fournel, “Dire la guerre à Florence.” As will be explained in the chapter on the Spanish provinces, in the Art of War, the word “milizia” is sometimes used interchangeably with the term “Ordinanza,” which refers to an organization that aims at the systematic military conscription of the people, cf. G. Masi, “Arte della guerra,” in Enciclopedia machiavelliana, vol. 1 (Rome: Treccani, 2014), 116.

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translation correctly grasps the stress he put on this concept throughout the book,42 but omits the double role the word played for Machiavelli, for whom it meant both the militia of the Roman Republic as a historical military organization (praised by the same Machiavelli and inevitably recalled by the use of this term in the Art of War),43 while also underscoring the importance of discipline in the life of the infantry. The way it appears in the Instructions, although less rich, effectively calls attention to the need for a more efficient (because disciplined) French national (i.e directly controlled by the sovereign) infantry. This conversion is crucial, because (along with frequently using it in the body of the text) the Instructions eventually included “discipline” in its title, removing the original expression “faict de la guerre,” which was an alternate translation of militia. It is worth mentioning that contemporary translations of Machiavelli’s Prince also used “faict de la guerre” to translate “militia” in the sense of “military organization.”44 The retitling from Instructions into Discipline militaire marks the final stage of a revision process that begins with differences in language and gradually becomes a different way of thinking about the military.45 Notably, unlike the pragmatic Du Bellay who had a specific political agenda, sixteenth-century translators from Latin into French as well as other writers like Brantôme used the term milice either in the sense of “maniement des armes” or even “art militaire,” thus sticking more closely to Machiavelli’s original conception, or to refer to the Roman military practice.46 42

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By using the word “discipline” the author of the Instructions was following a precise statement by Machiavelli about what the king of France should have done, Art of War (I, 188), trans. ed. and with a commentary by C. Lynch (Chicago & London: Chicago UP, 2003), 25. Original version: “Quanto allo errore che fa il re di Francia a non tenere disciplinati i suoi popoli alla guerra.” There are many references to the Roman “militia” in the book: a summary is in Masi, “Arte della guerra,” 119. The following passage explicitly praise the Roman way of ordering a militia: “By the way of militia; not similar to that of the king of France, because it is dangerous and insolent like ours, but similar to those of the ancients who used to create the cavalry from their subjects,” N. Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 104), 19. Original version: “Per via d’ordinanza; non simile a quella del re di Francia, perch’ella è pericolosa e insolente come la nostra, ma simile a quella degli antichi,” Cf. the translations of the title of ch. 14 of the Prince, in (accessed Dec. 2019). Most famously, the intensive use the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre made of the expression “discipline militaire” for Machiavelli’s term “milizia” (“militia” in the original vernacular version), eventually infects the title of the 1592 edition: Discipline militaire de messire Guillaume Du Bellay, seigneur de Langey [...] premièrement faite et compilée par l’auteur, tant de ce qu’il a leu des anciens et modernes que de ce qu’il a veu et pratiqué ès armées et guerres de son temps, et nouvellement reveue et disposé (Lyon: Ben. Rigaud, 1592). See Brantôme, Discours sur les duels, 1578, VI, 297. The French milice is also used in both the commentary and text of some sixteenth-century translations of Livy, cf. Les Decades

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On the problem of discipline, the anonymous author of the Instructions points to the first recruitment of Swiss mercenaries into French service as the starting point of all issues concerning the discipline and fidelity of the troops.47 This line of reasoning exactly follows Machiavelli’s in both the Prince and the Art of War, where he uses it to explain the weaknesses of the French army. In chapter 13 of the Prince, Machiavelli criticized Louis XI for hiring the Swiss instead of maintaining Charles VII’s “national army” (as he called it). When considering the similar condemnation in the Instructions, it is important to bear in mind that Machiavelli’s hatred for mercenaries stems from the mutiny of the Guascon and Swiss in French service. Sent by the French king to support Florence’s military efforts to recover the city of Pisa in June 1500, these mercenaries mutinied when the Florentine authorities delayed their payment.48 This episode is mentioned in chapter 13 of the Prince. The author of the Instructions certainly learned these facts from that work. Perhaps he also knew of the diplomatic negotiations that took place between Florence and France that were intended to solve the issue of paying the troops sent by the king. Machiavelli himself was sent to the court as an ambassador of the Republic to negotiate with the French authorities.49 However, putting this specific historical episode aside, one should note that military thinkers of the time were very engaged with determining the best way to ensure the fidelity of the troops, both mercenary and homegrown. In France in particular, fear of allowing local militias to bear arms continued up to the early modern era, and whether the author was Fourquevaux, Guillame du Bellay or Jacques de Vintimille, the solution proposed by the Instructions for the problem of fidelity of the conscripts was similar to that prescribed by Machiavelli as far back as the creation of a countryside militia in Florence in 1506: i.e. regular rotation of the colonels. In his 1506 writing known as Ordinanza per la milizia, Machiavelli particularly insisted on this point in order to avoid any

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qui se trouvent, mises en langue françoise: la premiere par Blaise de Vigenere, la tierce par Jean Hamelin, le reste de la traduction d’Anthoine de la Faye (Paris: J. du Puys, 1583), 213, 222, passim. See Potter, Renaissance France at War, 97-99. As Potter explains, the “popular uprisings of the second half of the 14th century made nobles wary of allowing the ‘people’ to bear arms,” ibid., 98. N. Machiavelli, The Historical, Political, and Diplomatic Writings of Niccolò Machiavelli, trans. C.E. Detmold (Boston: J.R. Osggod, 1882), vol. 3, Diplomatic Missions (1498-1505), 2732. Cf. the dispatches from Machiavelli’s first mission to France in N. Machiavelli, Legazioni. Commissarie. Scritti di governo (“Edizione Nazionale delle opere”), I, ed. by J.-J. Marchand (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2002), 388-533.

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possible revolt led by commanders who had grown too close to the men they commanded.50 As Idan Sherer has shown for the Spanish tercios, officials of the army could barely control their soldiers, and often either joined mutinying soldiers or had a role in the revolt. In some instances, “the captains were directly responsible for the soldiers’ decision to mutiny.”51 Thus according to Machiavelli, the most efficacious way to avoid this was to prevent any close relationship between the colonels and the militiamen by periodically moving the colonels to another region. The fact that the author of the Instructions advised the adoption of the same mechanisms that Machiavelli had already put into practice in 1506 might suggest that the former had a wide knowledge of all of the latter’s military writings, included those considered merely administrative. It follows then that the author of the Instructions was not only a reader of Machiavelli, but had had at least indirect contact with him. This point will be investigated further in this chapter. Other evidence of Machiavelli’s military strategies within the Instructions can be found in its discussion of the use of firearms, particularly the arquebus. While the author approved of them, he also argues that their effect was often just noise, a statement that reflects Machiavelli’s preference for an offensive strategy based on traditional weapons rather than fire-arms. More specifically, the language draws on the irony Machiavelli points to when describing the “noise” of the arquebus, capable of scaring both peasants and the enemy’s horses: But I would want all the light cavalrymen to be crossbowmen with some arquebusiers among them who, although in the other managements of war are not very useful, are very useful in this: frightening peasants and removing them from a pass that had been guarded by them. For one arqubusier will make them more afraid than twenty other armed men […]  In our times, the Turk beat the Sophy in Persia and the Sultan in Syria with nothing but the noise of their arquebuses, which confused the cavalry with their unusual noises...52 50

Cf. P. Pieri, Il rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Turin: Einaudi, 1952), 437; C.C. Bayley, War and Society in Renaissance Florence. The De Militia of Leonardo Bruni (Toronto University of Toronto Press, 1961), 255; Guidi, Un Segretario militante, 239, 337-344. For the rotation of colonels in the Instructions, see Potter, Renaissance France at War, 99. 51 I. Sherer, “‘All of Us In One Voice Demand What’s Owed us’ Mutiny in the Spanish Infantry during the Italian Wars, 1525-1538,” Journal of Military History, 783 (2014): 904. 52 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 322 & IV, 60), 61 & 91. Original version: “i quali [i.e. the arquebusiers], benché negli altri maneggi di guerra sieno poco utili, sono a questo utilissimi: di

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Further evidence of the Instructions’ incorporation of Machiavellian themes and features lies in the discussion of the “élection” procedures intended to select men by age, provenance and abilities, which is reminiscent of the parts of the Art of War illustrating the so-called deletto (i.e. the selection of most valuable militiamen during drilling exercises, a word that directly translates into the French “élection”).53 In particular, the Instructions suggests recruiting men aged between seventeen and thirty-five, an indication that he was probably drawing from Machiavelli’s point in the Art of War that the Romans recruited men from eighteen to thirty-five, despite Fabrizio Colonna specifying in this work that he would raise men from between seventeen and forty.54 It must be noted that by recalling the Roman tradition, the Instructions explicitly differs from the French tradition of the francs-archers, which recent historical accounts suggest was based on a customary approach of approximately two or three decades.55 Machiavelli’s book surely played a role in the decision to abandon the local tradition in favor of the Roman one. To explain the new way of recruitment, the author of the Instructions drew from Machiavelli in re-affirming the principles that a new army needs men of every age, once again by reproposing the basics of the Roman military practices on which the Florentine secretary had focused. However, where Machiavelli’s proposals would work for any army, the French book, for all its borrowings, also provided technical and practical insights that were applicable specifically to the homegrown French infantry battalions.

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sbigottire i paesani e levargli di sopra uno passo che fusse guardato da loro, perché più paura farà loro un scoppiettiere che venti altri armati”; “Nei nostri tempi il turco ruppe il Sofì in Persia e il Soldano in Sorìa, non con altro se non con i romori degli scoppietti.” For the topic of the noise of the arquebus in Fourquevaux, cf. Potter, Renaissance France at War, 112, who however does not mention Machiavelli as a possible source of this passage of the Instructions. It must be noted that Potter refers to Machiavelli as a possible source for Fourquevaux only with regard to the theme of the fortresses (ibid., 158). 53 Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 120), 113. Original version: “Sendo pertanto necessario prima trovare gli uomini, conviene venire al deletto di essi, ché così lo chiamavano gli antichi; il che noi diremmo scelta.” For this topic in Fourquevaux, cf. Contamine, “Naissance de l’infanterie française,” 83; also Potter, Renaissance France at War, 116-117. None of them mentions Machiavelli as a source for Fourquevaux. 54 Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 144), 22. For this aspect, see Procacci, Machiavelli, 196; and J.-L. Fournel, “Le corps du soldat chez Machiavel,” in Mélanges en l’honneur de Marie-Madeleine Fontaine (Geneva: Droz, 2015), 149-162. 55 Cf. Potter, Renaissance France at War, 116-117.

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Another interesting but lesser known French military treatise is Le guidon de la guerre by Michel D’Amboise (1505-1547/1551).56 Born in Italy, son of Charles d’Amboise, Governor of Lombardy during the French occupation, Michel was a poet linked to the literary circle of the du Bellay family members as well as a former soldier who probably fought at Pavia in 1525 and was in touch with Anne de Montmorency.57 He was also linked to Guillaume and Jean du Bellay, as is made clear by a printed lamentation that he wrote in 1543 for the death of the Lord of Langey.58 Sir John R. Hale made a few notes on D’Amboise’s personality, rightly highlighting some of the many weaknesses of his book, including his bigotry.59 Nevertheless, D’Amboise’s treatise recalls Machiavelli’s doctrine on several points. In the first instance, one should note that the second edition of his book, printed in 1552, had a slightly different title than the first edition of 1543. For the second edition, the word “art” was added before “guidon,” while the term “mestier” (“suyure le mestier des armes,” vs. “suyure les armes”) was removed. It also had a long subtitle saying that these discourses were “Extracted both from ancient and modern books that touch upon the art of war.”60 Whether this was 56

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M. D’Amboise, Le guidon des gens de guerre ouquel est contenu l’art de scavoir mener et conduyre gens de cheval, & de pied, assieger villes, les assaillir, & defendre, faire rampars, bastillons, scoyadrons, entreprises, courses, & autres choses appartenantes à la guerre, utile & necessaire à tous capitaines, & autres desirans suyvre le mestier des armes / Faict & composé par Michel d’Amboise, Escuyer, seigneur de Chavillon, dict l’Esclave fortuné (Paris: Galliot du Pré, 1543). For recent research on the life and works of Michel d’Amboise, see “Michel d’Amboise. Édition critique des œuvres complètes de l’Esclave fortuné,” accessed online on May 2018 . C.-P. Goujet, Bibliothèque françoise, ou Histoire de la littérature françoise, vol. 10 (Chez P. J. Mariette [&] H.-L. Guerin, 1745), 343; Jacques George de Chaufepié, Nouveau dictionnaire historique et critique, pour servir de supplement ou de continuation au Dictionnaire historique et critique de Mr. Pierre Bayle, vol. 1 (Amsterdam – La Hate: Chez Z. Chatelain, 1750), 276. Deploration de la mort de feu messire Guillaume du Bellay Seigneur de Langei. En son vivant Chevallier de l’Ordre, Lieutenant pour le Roy en Piedmont. Et Capitaine, de cinquante hommes d’armes. A Reverendissime Cardinal, Messire Jehan du Bellay, Evesque de Paris. Par Michel d’Amboyse, Escuyer seigneur de Chevillon, dit l’Esclave fortuné (Paris: Felix Guybert, 1543). J.R. Hale, War and Society in Renaissance Europe, 1450-1620 (London: Fontana, 1985), 51 & 161. See also D. Potter, “Chivalry and Professionalism in the French Armies of the Renaissance,” in David J. B. Trim (eds.), The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Military Professionalism (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2003), 175, which highlights the way the book combines a “practical streak” with chivalric aspects. L’art et guidon de la guerre, contenant l’experience de mener & conduyre gens de cheval & de pied, assiger villes, les assalir & deffendre, faire ramparcs, bastillions, trenchées, batailles, batillons, escadrons, enterprises, courses, & autres choses appartenantes a la guerre, utile &

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the will of the author (who died around 1551) or, more likely, of the second publisher (as the author would probably not have not accepted them if he were alive)61 is impossible to say. Either way, the title change clearly hints at the desire to follow the wave initiated by the publication of the first French edition of Machiavelli’s Art de la guerre (1546) and the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre (1548), which stressed the need for a national infantry of non-professionals. To make this case, the idea of war as a profession was tempered by removing the word “mestier” (modern French métier), and adding the term “art,” which recalled Machiavelli’s book. These revisions recall Machiavelli’s conception of warfare as requiring a large, popular following, which was very different from the aristocratic vision of a restricted elite of noble warriors that would come to succeed it. In fact, the long discourse on the relationship between theory and practice in military thinking, and, more specifically, the question of whether practical experience should count more in battle than the reading of the ancient theory originated from the success of the Art of War. Specifically, the rhetoric used by Machiavelli in the preface of his dialogue, in which he himself ironically apologized for his lack of practical experience, is the origin of all the subsequent references to this discussion.62 Soon after the publication of Machiavelli’s book, for instance, Matteo Maria Bandello sarcastically criticized the complex mechanisms of Machiavelli’s infantry formation in one of his famous novels.63 The topic preoccupied military writers at least until the Thirty Years’ War, when Protestant military thinking absorbed the

necessaire a tous capitaines & autres, desirans suyure les armes. Extraict tant des anciens que moderne livres touchant l’art militaire (Paris: Arnoul l’angelier, 1552). 61 Cf. B. Sandberg, Warrior Pursuits. Noble Culture and Civil Conflict in Early Modern France (Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 2010), 13. Also, G. Chittolini, “Il ‘militare’ tra tardo Medioevo e prima età moderna,” in Militari e società civile nell’Europa dell’età moderna (secoli XVI-XVIII), ed. by C. Donati and B.R. Kroener (Bologna: il Mulino, 2007), 71-72. 62 Machiavelli, Art of War (Preface, 11), 4: “And although it is a spirited thing to deal with material of which one has not made a profession, nonetheless I do not believe it is an error to occupy with words a rank that many have, with greater presumption, occupied with deeds. For the errors I may make as I write can be corrected without harm to anyone, but those that are made by them as they act cannot be known except with the ruin of empires.” Italics mine. 63 O. Tommasini, La vita e gli scritti di Niccolò Machiavelli nella loro relazione col machiavellismo, 2 vols. (ristampa anastatica per l’Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici, Naples: il Mulino, 1994-2003), vol. 2, 239, explained that Bandello and many others after him, early after the publication of the Art of War, criticized the abstract nature of Machiavelli’s military doctrine; see also M. Simonetta, Rinascimento segreto (Milan: Franco Angeli 2004), 239; and Anglo, Machiavelli, 518.

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dichotomy between the old ‘art of war’ conceived as a merely practical matter and the theory of war drawn from the study of the exploits of the ancient.64 With regard to the last theme, it is obvious that the person responsible for the publication of this second edition of Le guidon de gens de guerre associated the book with the revival of the military doctrine of the ancients Machiavelli had ignited. It is equally clear that this editor (who took care of this new edition after the death of the author a year earlier in 1551) was aware that the book drew heavily from the most successful modern military authors of the time, including Machiavelli, even though d’Amboise did not list him as a source. Michel d’Amboise said as much in the preface “to the reader” in the original 1543 edition. He writes that his intentions were to follow “many who are expert and instructed in the military art who have also written about it,” and that he especially intended to build on “Frontinus, a very wise man,” but also “on the other writers who wrote about this matter.”65 D’Amboise then explains that he extracted these discourses “from the ancient lesson of those who have written about it, and also of many ancient captains and soldiers, with whom [he] share[d] the same opinion.” Equally, he claims that, “that he himself experimented with this matter.”66 D’Amboise paraphrases and reformulates the famous statement of The Prince, in which Machiavelli touts his knowledge “of the deeds of great men, which I have learned through long experience of modern things and constant reading about ancient things.”67 64

Cf. F. Cardini, Quella antica festa crudele. Guerra e cultura della guerra dal Medioevo alla Rivoluzione francese (Milan: Mondadori 1997) (original edition, Florence: Sansoni, 1982), 327. 65 D’Amboise, Le guidon des gens de guerre (quoted from the re-edition of Paris: Libraire militaire de J. Dumaine, 1878), 16: “Plusiers plus que expers, et instruytz en l’art militaire ont d’icelluy élégantement et vitilement escript:[…] Frontinus, homme de grand conseil […] Esquelz adiouster selon la puissance & faculté de mon petit esprit, en ensuyuant les autres escripvains (qui de ceste matière ont aussi escript) me suis aucunement persuadé n’estre mauuais & inutile […].” It is perhaps worth mentioning that according to the supplication at the beginning of the volume, this is apparently a translation from Latin into French. This confirms that the author compiled extracts from ancient military writers who wrote in Latin, or whose works circulated in Latin at this time, and that a previous version of the whole book was written in Latin in order to simplify the procedure of extracting (extirper, in the words of D’Amboise). 66 D’Amboise, Le guidon des gens de guerre, 16. Original version: “[…] l’ay extirpé, et prins de la lecture ancienne de ceulx qui en ont escript, & de maintz bons capitaines & souldards anciens: desquelz i’ay eu & sceu l’opinion. Pareillement d’vne partie moy-mefmes me suis trouué a l’experience.” 67 N. Machiavelli, The Prince: with Related Documents (Dedicatory Letter), ed. and translated by W. Connell, second edition (Boston – New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2016), 38.

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The last line of the preface to the reader of the second edition brings some changes to d’Amboise’s original phrase “me suis trouué a l’experience,” by adding the word “leur” (their): i.e. “a leur experience” (Italic added). This amendment again reinforces the idea of a comparison with the exploits of ancient captains as described by the classics instead of highlighting the fact that D’Amboise had his own experience in the military as the first edition had. Further echoes of Machiavelli can also be found in the rest of D’Amboise’s letter, especially in the vocabulary, meaning and purpose of the phrase “the variety of the times”: Hence, of the variety of the times one finds variable endeavors and ways of waging war. And thus all empires, governments and kingdoms vary [change] in the same way, and with them we [men] also move and change. And since in those [changes] new princes and governments follow, so men seek and teach new precautions and new ways of waging war, of guarding their own cities and conquering foreign ones.68 These lines draw heavily from Machiavelli’s belief, expressed in both the Art of War and the Prince, that his time period was one of extraordinary crisis and danger to which the wise should react by adapting to the changes and mutations generated by war, politics and society, in order to provide a counterbalance to corruption and decadence.69 D’Amboise is not just following a general trend of Renaissance philosophy, rather, he seems to draw from Machiavelli’s method to establish a precise connection between the changing of the times and the necessity of adopting different attitudes in order to adapt to this inevitable variation (specifically of military strategy, tactics and military tech­niques). Most interestingly, the vocabulary d’Amboise uses rephrases 68 D’Amboise, Le guidon des gens de guerre (edition quoted), 13-14. Original version: “Car de la variété du temps se treuuent industries et raisons variables de guerroyer. Et ainsi que toutes empires, gouuernemens, et régence se muent et changent en pareille sorte, avec eulx nous muons et changeons. Et comme en eulx suruiennent nouueaulx princes et gouverneurs, ainsi aux hommes suruient nouuelle cautelle et nouueaulx moyens de faire guerre, garder leurs villes, et expugner les estrangés se treuuent, et engendrent.” This passage of D’Amboise’s preface to the reader is analyzed, from another point of view and with a different purpose by N. Hacquebart Desvignes, “L’illustration technique dans les livres militaires français de la Renaissance. L’exemple du Discours de la Castramétation de Guillaume du Choul,” Réforme, Humanisme, Renaissance, 67 (2008): 67. 69 Cf. G. Ferroni, Mutazione e riscontro nel teatro di Machiavelli e altri saggi sulla commedia del Cinquecento (Rome: Bulzoni, 1972), 56-57; J.-L. Fournel, “Retorica della guerra, retorica dell’emergenza nella Firenze repubblicana,” Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, LXXXV (LXXXVII), (2006): 389-411.

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Machiavellian terminology, which makes large use of expressions formed by verbs such as to change, to mutate, to vary, and so on, in connection with the word tempi/tempo (times/time).70 Machiavelli’s use of this terminology has been connected to his service in the chancery, when an entire generation of Italian chancellors, politicians and thinkers were dealing with the political and military crisis triggered by the beginning of the Italian Wars in 1494. In this regard, one should note that Michel d’Amboise not only was the son of Charles, French governor of Lombardy, but that he was entrusted to Georges d’Amboise as a child after his father’s death in 1511. Both older d’Amboises are well known to Machiavelli scholars, as they met with the Florentine secretary on several occasions. Georges, the prime minister for the king of France, is famously mentioned in the third chapter of the Prince, as the protagonist of a real conversation Machiavelli had had with him.71 Clearly then, Michel d’Amboise was aware of the meanings associated with “tempi” by diplomats and chancellors of the early sixteenth century – and especially the particular way that Machiavelli used it in his political and military works72 – since he was raised by people who shared the same political culture of Machiavelli and even personally interacted with him. In the same quotation, one finds another Machiavellian concept, D’Amboise’s commitment to teaching “new ways of waging war” to “new princes.” Not only is the “new prince” the main subject and addressee of Machiavelli’s Prince, the entire Art of War is dedicated to promoting a new model of infantry-militia to Italian governors (in Machiavelli’s words, the “mode of selecting a new militia so as to make an army of it later”).73 Many chapters of the Prince are devoted to explaining the qualities that a ‘new prince’ should have, and how the same prince should react to changes in circumstances and necessities.

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Cf. A. Guidi, “‘Esperienza’ e ‘qualità dei tempi’ nel linguaggio cancelleresco e in Machiavelli (con un’appendice di dispacci inediti di vari cancellieri e tre Scritti di governo del Segretario fiorentino),” Laboratoire italien, 9 (2009): 223-272. Accessed online May 2018 . 71 See Machiavelli, The Prince (ch. 3), ed. by W. Connell, 45-46, and the letter sent by Machia­ velli to the Florentine authorities of 21 Nov. 1500. Cf. F. Chabod, Scritti su Machiavelli ­(Turin: Einaudi, 1964), 282-283; A. Guidi, “Attività diplomatica e scritti politici fino al 1512,” in Machiavelli, ed. by E. Cutinelli Rendina & R. Ruggiero (Rome: Carocci, 2018), 52. 72 At a count made on digital editions, the term “tempi” appears 223 times in Scritti di go­ verno and legazioni; 50 in the Prince; 176 in the Discourses; and 42 in the Art of War. See Guidi, “‘Esperienza’ e ‘qualità dei tempi’, 254. 73 Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 199), 26. Original version: “…modo dello eleggere una ordinanza nuova per farne di poi uno esercito.”

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Along with the many extrapolations and borrowings of Machiavelli’s work, there were also official French translations of the Art of War. Only a very few years before the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre and after the publication of Michel D’Amboise’s original edition of Le guidon de la guerre, the first official French version of Machiavelli’s Art of War came out, translated by Jean Charrier, the secretary of the President of the Parliament of Paris.74 Why did the secretary of the Parliament decide to translate Machiavelli? In a sort of entrepreneurial self-promotion, he took up Machiavelli’s book knowing that it was well known to the person to which he dedicated his translation, Henry the Dauphin, future king of France, who was married to Caterina of the Medici, who was, like Machiavelli, a Florentine. Among other possible reasons Charrier might have had to choose the Art of War, one of particular interest relates to the historical situation of early modern France. The Parliament of Paris had been very active in the formation of militias for the city’s defense,75 and it is conceivable that its secretary, having been involved in this kind of military recruitment, picked up the Art of War as a manifesto or proposal for the revival of a national force. It is also possible that Charrier intended to promote the role of the Parisian militias in the defense of the realm, and that Machiavelli’s book was chosen for its capacity to convince French readers that there were solutions to the issues of discipline and fraud that had historically been associated with a militia force. Charrier reveals his motivations explicitly, though involuntarily, when at the very beginning of his introduction, he stresses the idea that, as Anglo puts it, “without arms no city can avoid the yoke of servitude.”76 Despite drawing directly from some passages of Machiavelli’s text,77 this statement is somewhat misleading, since in the Art of War Machiavelli is urging the creation of a country militia, not a city militia. That being said, although the Art of War focuses on the recruitment of a militia from the countryside, Machiavelli’s project for a militia as expressed in works such as the Discourses on Livy certainly includes the city; and in the Art of War Machiavelli briefly mentions the fact that 74 75 76

77

Cf. Anglo, Machiavelli, 186 ff. R. J. Knecht, Renaissance Warrior and Patron: The Reign of Francis I (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994), 35-37. I adopt the translation by Anglo, Machiavelli, 187. J. Charrier, Preface to L’art de la guerre composé par Nicolas Machiavelli; l’éstat aussi et charge d’un lieutenant géneral d’armée, par Onosander, ancien philosophe platonique (Paris: Jean Barbé, 1546), non-numbered pages: “qui deuroit faire entendre l’vtilité que l’on peult avoir des armes, sans les quelles il n’ya cité si forte ne si libre, qu’elle ne se mette soubz le iouc de servitude.” For instance, “[…] cities need arms,” writes Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 172), 24. However, Machiavelli’s argument in this passage focuses on the polemic against mercenaries, rather than on the construction of a city militia.

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citizens should form the cavalry, which he conceived of as integrated with the infantry already raised in the country. The hypothesis that by translating the Art of War Charrier was promoting both himself and the role of the Parisian militias is reinforced by Nella Bianchi Bensimon’s work on Jacques de Vintimille, another translator of Machiavelli’s works (including an unpublished manuscript version of the Art of War). This scholar argues that, inspired by the comments of Machiavelli about the Parliament of Paris as an ideal institution for the defense of the king “against the ambition of the mighty/great,” Jacques de Vintimille also stressed particular features of The Prince by selecting the vocabulary most suited to elucidate Machiavelli’s anti-aristocratic political cause and to make it comprehensible to (but also feasible for) a French audience. For instance, Ventimille used “nobles” instead of the original word “potenti” (mighty, The Prince, ch. 19) to make the statement clearer and more relevant to a contemporary French reader and send the message that the king should promote urban militias, despite the aristocracy‘s opposition and fear.78 As Philippe Contamine has shown, even with the aristocratic concerns, the populations of the largest French cities were well armed.79 The dedication of the translation of the Art of War to the Dauphin of France, as well as the kind of lexical choices and the stress on the topics mentioned above, were therefore intended to promote this culture of local urban militias against the old tradition of aristocratic monopoly of war.80 As Michael Mallett has explained, until the beginning of the sixteenth century and Francis I’s military reform (discussed below) “the social gap amongst nobles and lower classes inhibited the arming of a peasant infantry in France.”81 Arguably, this meant that France lacked a strong infantry during the first stage of the Italian Wars 1494, and, according to some other scholars, forced French commander Gaston de Foix to adopt his celebrated strategy of “celerity” as the way to avoid involving his army in complicated infantry battles like Ravenna.82 The battle there high­lighted the 78 79 80 81 82

Bianchi Bensimon, La première, 48-49. Ph. Contamine, «L’armement des populations urbaines a la fin du moyen age: L’exemple de Troyes (1474)» in Pages d’histoire militaire medievale (XIVe-XVe siecles) (Paris: Academie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres, 2005). Ibid., 65. M. Mallett, “The Transformation of War,” in Italy and the European Powers The Impact of War 1500-1530, ed. by C. Shaw, 9. R. Bazzocchi, “Servizio militare e controllo del territorio. La milizia romagnola nell’età delle guerre d’Italia,” in 1512. La battaglia di Ravenna, l’Italia, l’Europa, ed. by D. Bolognesi (Ravenna: Longo, 2014), 91. But on this subject also cf. J.-C. Zancarini, “‘L’incredibile cele­ rità’ di Gaston de Foix,” in Città in guerra. Esperienze e riflessioni nel primo ’500: Bologna

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danger of being involved in an infantry clash with the Spaniards, despite the German infantry that served the French on that occasion. Valentina Lepri has recently documented the process by which editors and publishers in England selected maxims from Machiavelli’s work, an editorial phenomenon that meant the original content could be read differently depending on the context in which they were used.83 This is particularly true for military readers of Machiavelli, who were inclined to use their military knowledge to make up for a lack of understanding of the original Italian version or to deliberately intervene in the text. Charrier’s re-elaboration of the Machiavellian text is related to issues of clarity84 as well as to this process of digestion and modification in accordance with his own reasons and purposes. Although perhaps less invasive than others, Charrier, too, inclined to this digestion and reuse; indeed, sixteenth-century translations often originated from factional, political or personal needs. The purpose and personal interests of the translator were more important than any philological concerns, because the goal was to inform and persuade the reader about a cause addressed by the new text the translator had created. The interest in Machiavelli’s ideas about the need for a militia or a state army by people affiliated with the Parliament of Paris is further documented by the case of Jacques Gohory (1520-1576), who had been an advocate at the Parliament of Paris and who was often sent on missions to Rome. Gohory not only translated both the Discourses (1544) and the Prince (1571), but was also in touch with the same Anne de Montmorency who was involved with the earliest translations of the works of the Florentine.85 However, putting the personal motivations of Charrier and Gohory aside for the moment, the intentions of the first French translators of Machiavelli nelle “guerre d’Italia,” ed. by G.M. Anselmi & A. De Benedictis, (Bologna: Minerva Edizioni, 2008), 57-68. 83 Cf. V. Lepri, “Machiavelli in The Quintessence of Wit and his English Military Readers,” in A. Arienzo & A. Petrina (eds.), Machiavellian Encounters in Tudor and Stuart England: Literary and Political Influences from the Reformation to the Restoration (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 45-58. This process was already highlighted by Anglo, Machiavelli, 38 & 537 ff., for other non-British authors. 84 As noted by Anglo, Machiavelli, 187, Charrier made structural changes, reorganizing the whole text by dividing it into newly created chapters, and ignoring the original division into seven books. Anglo considers that these changes served Machiavelli’s intentions, and, might even have resulted in more clarity. 85 Cf. P. Denis and J. Rott, Jean Morély (ca 1524 – ca 1594) et l’utopie d’une démocratie dans l’Eglise (Geneva: Droz, 1993), 37. Also, Procacci, Machiavelli, 127-128. For a recent account of Gohory’s role in the circulation of Machiavelli’s ideas, cf. also G. Almási, “Experientia and the Machiavellian turn in religio-political and scientific thinking in Basle in 1580,” History of European Ideas, 42:7 (2016), 857-881.

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confirm that in the moment of transition, when the French were involved in a long fight in the Italian peninsula, Machiavelli’s book ignited new political reflections about the need for a national force or militia. The story of people and institutions on which this chapter has focused shows that the circulation of the Art of War generated a production of books, official translations, military projects and ideas, many of which were shaped by the authors, the translators or the editors’ personal ambitions and motivations, and in accordance with their political intentions. This is one reason, in fact, for the many translations and re-writings the book underwent. These kind of agendas can be seen in subtle language choices such as Charrier’s conversion of the term “milizia” to the old French “ost,”86 rather than “milice” (despite the latter being used, for instance, in sixteenth-century French versions of Livy).87 “Ost” is closer to the old local feudal military service that French nobles owed to the king than to the people’s participation in the army as in the ancient Roman Republic, which is what Machiavelli explicitly praises in the book.88 The most revealing transformation is that of “milizia” into “discipline militaire,” a choice made by both Charrier and the author of the Instructions, to render the original sense of military practice and organization.89 The use of different French words relates, of course, to the fact that Machiavelli uses militia in a number of ways. In both cases, however, these particular choices result from the desire to modernize the Art of War according to the specific needs of the 86

87 88

89

N. Machiavelli, L’art de la guerre (by Jehan Charrier), 10r: “Quand ie vouldrois dresser un ost en un pays ou il n’y auroit point d’armee…”; cf. Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 147), 22, quoted in the original version for comparison: “Quando io avessi ad ordinare una milizia dov’ella non fusse.” Italics mine. See above note 46. When asked how to manage an army, Fabrizio (alias Machiavelli) criticizes both the abolition of the French infantry Compagnies d’ordonnance established by Charles VII in 1445 and current king Louis XII’s policy of relying on professional soldiers and the feudal aristocratic cavalry, then praises the Roman militia. See this passage from Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 104), 19 quoted above note 43. See also N. Machiavelli, The Prince: with Related Documents (ch. 13), ed. and translated by W. Connell, second edition (Boston – New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2016), 81. It is important to point out that the French Légions had not been established when Machiavelli wrote the Art of War. N. Machiavelli, L’art de la guerre (by J. Charrier), 9v: “mais ces conditions en toute ne pourroyent estre plus contraires a la vraie discipline militaire”; cf. Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 129), 21, quoted in the original version for comparison: “i quali costumi non possono essere più contrarii ad una vera e buona milizia.” Italics added. Interestingly, the word “discipline” was used in only one case by sixteenth-century translators of the Prince to translate the term “ordine,” as explained by J.-C. Zancarini, “‘Et Favellar francese non gli spiace’. Sulle traduzioni francesi del Principe, XVI-XVII secolo,” in Machiavelli Cinquecento, Mezzo millennio del Principe, eds. G.M. Anselmi, R. Caporali, C. Galli (Milan-Udine: Mimesis, 2015), 73.

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French monarchy. And, in fact, this detail suggests that perhaps Charrier had read some of, or was made aware of the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre before its publication.90 1.2 A Lost Latin Translation? Another piece of this story is a missing Parisian translation of the Art of War into Latin, which might have formed the basis of a lost French version of the book.91 There are bibliographical references by Conrad Gesner documenting an edition of the Art of War translated from Italian into Latin by a certain Jean de Morel of Paris.92 The identity of this Morel is not clear. Philippe Denis and Jean Rott argued that in 1565 a work like the one mentioned by Gesner might have been offered to the authorities of Geneva by Jean Morély, Lord of Villiers. The authorities had accused Morély of publishing Traicté de la discipline chrestienne without obtaining permission. In his defense, Morély argued that he was not aware of the need to obtain permission, substantiating this with the evidence that he had published another work without approval from the Concistory.93 The possibility that this work might be a military book is documented by another letter sent by Nicolas Colladon, on behalf of the Concistory of Geneva, to the Church of Paris, in which he explains that Morély “un peu auparavant il avoit discouru de l’art militaire.”94 However, there is no clear reference capable of definitively associating this work by Jean Morély to a translation of the Art of War. Many other hypotheses can be advanced to explain the reference that he had “discoursed on military 90

In this regard, we should recall that, despite being published in 1548, the Instructions were probably prepared around 1538, cf. Procacci, Machiavelli, 186. 91 Cf. Denis – Rott, Jean Morély, 37. 92 Anglo, Machiavelli, 22-23. 93 Denis – Rott, Jean Morély, 38. Anglo, Machiavelli, 22-23, who does not mention the work by Denis and Rott, is skeptical about the possibility that this edition ever really existed. Nevertheless, the letter quoted by Denis and Rott confirms that Morély actually worked on a book of military theory. On the religious debate that followed the condemnation of Morély, cf. S.K. Barker, Protestantism, Poetry and Protest: The Vernacular Writings of Antoine de Chandieu (c. 1534-1591) (Aldershot: Ashgate Publishing, Ltd., 2013), 195-197. According to R.M. Kingdom, Geneva and the Consolidation of the French Protestant Movement, 1564-1572 (Geneva: Droz, 1967), 43, Jean Morély, Lord of Villiers, turned Protestant in 1547. Cf. ibid., 44 ff. for an account of Morély’s role in the religious controversies of the years 1564-1572. This analysis reveals how Morély’s Traicté de la discipline et police chrestienne is to be interpreted as an effort for a democratization of the church, in a combination of political activism, democratic goals, proposal for local rule and anti-clericalism that might have been nurtured by his reading of Machiavelli’s writings. (See, for instance, the insistence on the Roman republican heritage, ibid., 57-58). 94 Correspondance de Théodore Bèze, Tome VI “1565” (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 1970), 248.

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art.” First, it could be the result of a misunderstanding. The work mentioned might had been a military book conceived by Morély himself, instead of a translation of Machiavelli’s Art of War. Furthermore, this reference might relate to other works of Machiavelli. The presence of the word “guerre” in the title of the first French translation of Machiavelli’s “Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio” (N. Machiavel, Le premier livre de discours de l’estat de paix et de guerre, Paris, 1544), might have confused the Genevan authorities. It is unlikely, given that since the 1548 second French edition was completed with the second and third books of the Discourses, the phrase “…sur la première decade de Tite Live” was commonly added to the title.95 Nevertheless, one cannot completely exclude the possibility that this reference could be to a translation of the Discourses on Livy. It is perhaps worth remembering, for instance, that the 1608 catalogue of Maurice of Nassau’s library lists under the category “Militaire” an edition of Machiavelli’s Discours de l’éstat de paix et de la guerre printed in Rouens in 1579.96 However, if the second of these hypotheses applies (i.e. that it was Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy), one cannot link the work of Morély mentioned by the authorities of Geneva to the bibliographical reference made by Gesner, which clearly relates to the Art of War, since he explicitly refers to a work “in seven books” dedicated to Lorenzo Strozzi, whereas the Discourses are divided into three books and dedicated to Zanobi Buondelmonti and Cosimo Rucellai.97

95

N. Machiavel, Discours de l’estat de paix et de guerre […] sur la première decade de Tite Live (Paris: On les vend au Palais en la galerie par ou lon va en la Chancellerie en la boutique de Vincent Sertenas, Libraire, 1548). For this edition, see M.-T. Lenger, Contribution a la Biblio­graphie des éditions anciennes (XVIe et XVII siècles) des Oevres de Machiavel (Bruxelles: 1973), 34; Bibliografia delle edizioni di Niccolò Machiavelli, ed. by P. Innocenti & M. Rossi, 3 vols. (Manziana [Roma]: Vecchiarelli editore, 2015-2018), vol. I, “1506-1914,” 170173; and Anglo, Machiavelli, 23, for the errors of bibliographical works, which often confuse the edition of the Discourses with the Art of War. 96 Cf. The Seventeenth Century Orange-Nassau Library, ed. by A.D. Renting and J.T.C. Renting-Kuijpers (Utrecht: HES, 1993), 448 (and cf. ibid., 28, for an account of the 1608-1609 catalogue made by the viscount Dohna while he was a guest of Maurice of Nassau in which the 1579 edition of the Discours de l’éstat is listed). For the military reading of the Discourses on Livy in sixteenth-century France, see the excellent study of F. Verrier, “Les Discours sur la première décade de Tite-Live, un traité militaire en pointillé,” in Dialogue militaire entre Anciens et Modernes, ed. by Jean-Pierre Bois (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2004), accessed online May 2018: . 97 “Nicolai Machiavelli Florentini libri 7. Italici ad Laurentium Strossam patritium Philippi filium, per Janum Morelium Parisium Latine traducti elegantissime,” C. Gesner, Pandectarum sive Partitionum universalium (Zurich: 1548). Cf. Anglo, Machiavelli, 22.

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Moreover, a survey of the known editions of Machiavelli’s works suggests that only from the 1614 edition by Charles Chappellain onward did books named Discours de l’éstat de paix et de la guerre refer to a collective edition of Machiavelli’s three major works, often bound together in a single volume. Despite often being catalogued with no clear reference to the Art of War, volumes titled Discours de l’éstat de paix et de la guerre often refer to a collective edition bound together that includes that work. In contrast, the same bibliographies sometimes refer explicitly to a 1613 printing of the Prince included in the same volumes.98 In a nutshell, it was only from the beginning of the seventeenth century that the designation Discours de l’estat de paix et de guerre was used by some less attentive cataloguers to implicitly reference an edition of several of Machiavelli’s works bound together that included the Art of War.99 However, regardless of the possibility that the statement made by the authority of Geneva concerns a translation of the Art of War or the Discourses (or even something else written by Morély himself), a further hypothesis may be made: that the condemnation of the author by the religious authorities was a contributory factor in this work’s falling out of circulation (if it ever existed!). 98

99

N. Machiavel, Discours de l’estat de paix et de guerre, Paris: De l’Imprimerie de Charles Chappellain, ruë des Carmes, au Lyon noir, au Collège des Lombards, 1614; N. Machiavel, L’ Art De La Gverre: Tres-vtile & necessaire à tous Roys, Princes, Republiques, Seigneurs, Capitaines, Gentils-hommes, & autres suiuants les Armes, Traduict d’Italien en François, enrichy & augmenté de Figures, A Paris, de l’Imprimerie de Charles Chappellain, ruë des Carmes, au Lyon noir, deuant le College des Lombards, 1614. From this edition on (cf., for instance, the edition by Claude Rigaud, Paris, of the same year), these works were often bound together in a single volume along with the Prince (printed in 1613) to which many old bibliographical works refer with the title Discours de l’estat de paix et de guerre, a designation that is only sometimes followed by the reference to the Prince, and which, usually, in old bibliographical works, does not come with any reference to the Art of War. Cf. Anglo, Machiavelli, 562-563, and J.-C. Zancarini, “‘Et Favellar francese’,” 73. In addition to Anglo’s comments, it is important to point out that the dedicace “au lecteur” of this edition drew heavily on the one Jean Charrier wrote for the first French edition of 1546. Like Charrier’s, the dedication indicates that the translator has changed the original order of the discourse. In fact, Chappellain actually used Charrier’s original translation (which completely subverted the structure of the dialogue in Machiavelli’s original), limiting his own contribution to the “maximes” in the margins and perhaps a few amendments and changes (which Chappellain pointed out in the front page of the Discours de l’estat de paix et de guerre). From the 1614 Chappellain translation onward, several other French editions of the three mentioned works of Machiavelli dating to the first decades of the seventeenth century followed this model, usually bound together, but often mentioned under the general title of the Discourses: e.g. N. Machiavel, Discours de l’estat de paix et de guerre (Paris, Collet, 1629); N. Machiavel, Discours de l’estat de paix et de guerre (Paris, Chez Anthoine de Sommaville, 1629). Cf. Bibliografia delle edizioni di Niccolò Machiavelli, s.v. and Lenger, Contribution a la Bibliographie, 37.

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Yet, before moving to Geneva in 1554, Morély married the daughter of a procurator of the Parliament of Paris. A fact that, if he actually translated a work by Machiavelli, is further evidence that the Parliament was key to the French reception of his writings. It would not be surprising if a philosopher and a theologian such as Morély had written about the military. A similar scenario applies to the figure of Fran­ cesco Patrizi da Cherso, who in his Paralleli militari claimed the philosopher’s right to study disciplines not directly considered philosophical matters.100 Paralleli was yet another work that made use of Machiavelli’s military doctrine, e.g. the insistence on discipline, the condemnation of mercenaries etc. Furthermore, Patrizi was well known in the same Basle literary circles from which the Latin versions of Machiavelli’s writings originated, since his Historie was translated into Latin by the same Giovanni Niccolò Stopano who authored the former.101

…

However, given the confusion over the identity of this Morel mentioned by Gesner, it is essential to make further biographical hypotheses about him. Despite the hypothesis that it was Jean Morély, son of a Jean de Morel (who Latinized his name to Morelli), medic at the court of Francis I, author of a religious treaty,102 this translator could be a different Jean de Morel, the one from Embrun (Hautes-Alpes), who worked for the governor of the French Piedmont, the Lord of Langey, Guillaume du Bellay, in Turin.103 The latter Jean de Morel, who was Lord of Grigny – and who is not to be identified with the aforementioned medic of Francis I, who apparently died in

100

101 102 103

Cf. M. Muccillo, “Dall’ordine dei libri all’ ordine della realtà: ordine e metodo nella filosofia di Francesco Patrizi,” in Francesco Patrizi, Philosopher of the Renaissance, ed. by Tomáš Nejeschleba & Paul Richard Blum (Olomouc: Univerzita Palackého, Center for Renaissance Texts, 2014), 50. Francisci Patrici De legendae scribendaeque Historiae ratione Dialogi decem ex Italico in Latinum sermonem conversi Io. Nic. Stuphano interprete (Basileae: per Sixtum Henricpetri, 1570), cf. Muccillo, “Dall’ordine dei libri,” 30. Denis – Rott, Jean Morély, 17. Cf. also the J. Dupèbe introduction to M. Servet (Servetus), Discussion apologétique pour l’astrologie contre un certain médecin (Geneva: Librairie Droz, 2004), 13. Cf. P.G. Bietenholz, Basle and France. The Basle Humanists and Printers in Their Contacts with Francophone Culture (Geneva: Droz, 1971, 111); Cooper, Litterae in tempore belli, 108 ff. Also Contemporaries of Erasmus. A Biographical Register, 3 vols. (London, Toronto, Buffalo: Univ. of Toronto Press, 1986), vol. 2, 459.

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1543104 – had close ties with Italy because of his work in Turin with the du Bellay family. In addition to his service for the Governor of Piedmont, he was also preceptor of the sons of Caterina de’ Medici.105 Moreover, according to Peter Bietenholz, Morel studied in Basle in 1533-34 and was in touch with well-known intellectuals of the time, not only Erasmus, but others who had met with Machiavelli, including Jacopo Sadoleto, whose commentary on Romans was probably brought to Erasmus by Morel himself.106 Further evidence that this Morel might have been interested in a translation of Machiavelli is connected to Morel’s work for Guillame du Bellay. Jean worked as du Bellay’s secretary while he was governor of Piedmont in Turin between 1537 and 1541, before working as preceptor of Girolamo della Rovere.107 Morel was appointed by Du Bellay to conduct relationships and diplomatic affairs concerning the German-speaking area, particularly Basle.108 In 1536-37, Francis I of France even asked him to deal with the controversy between the “principals doctors of Germany who alienated themselves from the Church of Rome” and the Sorbonne.109 In addition, there is documentary evidence that, through the literary circles of the Du Bellay family, Morel was in touch with the same Jacques Gohory who translated the Discourses.110 Finally, while in Paris, Morel created his own intellectual circle in which he and his correspondent Charles Fontaine discussed the hypothesis that the author of Instructions sur le faict de la guerre was Guillame Du Bellay.111 Given the biographical and cultural background of this Morel, the attribution to him of the early translation of Machiavelli’s Art of War into Latin seems more reasonable. While he did not publish many works, he was apparently at the very center of the intellectual life of Paris; the city from which the earliest French editions of Machiavelli’s writings originated.112 .

104 Cf. Dupèbe introduction to M. Servet (Servetus), Discussion, 13. 105 R.J. Sealy, The Palace Academy of Henry III (Geneva: Droz, 1981), 13-15. 106 Bietenholz, Basle and France, 108 ff. Cf. Contemporaries of Erasmus, vol. 2, 459-460. 107 Cooper, Litterae in tempore belli, 118 ff. 108 Bietenholz, Basle and France, 108 ff. 109 Extract from a letter of Guillaume du Bellay to the “Messieurs les juge et gens du Roy à Embrun,” quoted in Cooper, Litterae in tempore belli, 119. 110 Letter without signature (probably written by the poet Joachim du Bellay, cousin of Guillaume) addressed to Jean de Morel, 27 Sept. 1555, mentioned in Cooper, Litterae in tempore belli, 369. For the translations by Gohory, see Gorris Camos, “Dans le labyrinthe de Gohory.” 111 Cf. L. Clark Keating, “The Salon of Jean de Morel,” in id. Studies in the Literary Salon in France (1550-1615) (Cambridge: 1941), 22-38; and Tetel, “De l’auteur des Instructions,” 273. 112 One might add that the group of poets who used to gather around Morel and du Bellay in Paris was initially called “la brigade,” before becoming “la Pléiade,” cf. L. Clark Keating, Joachim du Bellay (New York: Twaine, 1971), 53. This expression resembles the way

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There is more to say about the reference provided by Conrad Gesner. Gesner mentions the Latin translation by “Ioan. Morelium Parisium” in two different editions of his bibliographical work, dating from 1548 and 1555.113 From 1560 until his death in 1565, Gesner corresponded with Theodor Zwinger, professor at the University of Basle, who was involved with Pietro Perna’s editions of Italian books printed in the two decades from 1560 to 1580 (and published by the same printing enterprise from which the 1560 Latin version of Machiavelli’s Prince came out).114 This is the same Perna who was later a protagonist in the controversy generated by the 1580 edition of the Prince (which will be examined in the next section).115 Because the publication of Innocent Gentillet’s Contre Machiavel in 1576 had ushered in a general bias against Machiavelli that grew rapidly in Swiss Protestant areas, Perna tried to hide his participation in this printing enterprise by making an official statement to the authorities “that he did not know any Latin and therefore could not have known what the book contained.”116 In the light of the second Jean de Morel, Lord of Grigny’s links to Basle and Gesner’s contacts with the intellectual circles there, Gesner’s bibliographical reference to a translation into Latin by a certain Morel acquires authority and gives credibility to the view that the work actually existed. This is especially true when considering that Morel knew individuals involved with the publication of Machiavelli’s works and whose roles in the diffusion of Machiavelli’s military ideas are well known.

113 114

115

116

Machiavelli and his friends referred to themselves in their correspondence, cf. for instance the letter from Biagio Buonaccorsi to Machiavelli, Florence, 17 Nov. 1503 and the one from Filippo de’ Nerli to the same, Florence, 6 Sept. 1525, in N. Machiavelli Opere, vol. II, “Lettere, legazioni e commissarie,” ed. by C. Vivanti (Turin: Einaudi, 1999), 90 and 405. Cf. Anglo, Machiavelli, 22-23. A. Gerber, Niccolò Machiavelli, die Handschriften, Ausgaben und Ubersetzungen seiner Werke im 16, und 17. 7ahrhundert eine kritisch-bibliographische Untersuchung, 3 vols. (Gotha: F. A. Perthes, 1912) (republished in Turin: Bottega d’Erasmo, 1962), vol. 2, 65-68. Recent accounts on this edition are in C. Mordeglia, “The First Latin Translation,” in The First Translations of Machiavelli’s Prince. From the Sixteenth to the first Half of the Nineteenth Century, ed by. R. De Pol (Leiden: Brill, 2010), 59-82; Bibliografia delle edizioni di Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. I, 201. Cf. T. Zwinger, Carteggio / Korrespondenz, ed. by C. Gilly, s.v. “Gessner Conrad”; Also, C. Gilly, Theodor Zwinger e la crisi culturale della seconda metà del Cinquecento (forth­ coming), both consulted online at (accessed 23 April 2018), 228-229; Almási, “Experientia and the Machiavellian turn,” 857. Quoted from H.R. Guggisberg, Basel in the Sixteenth Century (St. Louis: Center for Reformation Research, 1982), 44.

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Ultimately, it appears more as if Jean de Morel Lord of Grigny should be the one identified as the Parisian “Morelium,” as in Gesner’s work. The story of the other Morely’s “discourses on the military art” in contrast, is much vaguer and requires us to overlook numerous loose threads. 2

 Basle, Switzerland and the German-Speaking World

Morel’s lost early translation aside, the role of Basle and Switzerland in the circulation of Machiavelli’s ideas in Europe is worth closer examination. Many scholars, notably Adolph Gerber, Walter Kaegi, Leandro Perini, Antonio Rotondò, and, more recently, Carlos Gilly and Gábor Almàsi, have shown Basle’s role as a gateway to the German-speaking world for Machiavelli’s writings and ideas.117 Paolo Procaccioli has recently argued that around 1548 the Bavarian Johannes Basilius Heroldt prepared a German translation of both the Prince and the Art of War.118 And as mentioned, it is known that the first Latin translation of the Prince by Silvestro Teglia was printed in Basle by Pietro Perna in 1560.119 Still, it is worth adding a few notes with respect to the Art of War. The controversy that surrounded the publication of Machiavelli’s works by Pietro Perna in Basle in 1580 helped end the era of Latin translations by Italian Protestants who sought refuge in the city.120 Following the publication of the Contre Machiavel by Gentillet in Geneva (1576), its translation into German by Georg Rabe (Regentenkunst, oder Fuerstenspiegel, Franckfurt/Straßburg: Jobin, 1580) made a final contribution to the diffusion of Anti-Machiavellism in the German-speaking territories. Yet even as the clamor generated by these books affected the reception of Machiavelli’s writings and contributed to a general 117 Gerber, Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. III, 123-127, 122 ff.; W. Kaegi, “Machiavelli in Basel,” Basler Zeitschrift fuer Geschichte und Altertumskunde, 39 (1940): 5-52; L. Perini, “Gli eretici italiani del Cinquecento e Machiavelli,” Studi Storici, 10 (1969): 877-910; A. Rotondò, “Pietro Perna e la vita culturale e religiosa di Basilea fra il 1570 e il 1580,” in id. Studi di storia ereticale del Cinquecento, 2 vols. (Florence: Olschki, 2008), vol. 2, 479-576; Gilly, Theodor Zwinger, 228; Almási, “Experientia and the Machiavellian turn.” 118 P. Procaccioli, “Prima e dopo il 1559. Dagli entusiasmi degli editori alle inibizioni dei censori, alle resistenze dei principi,” in Bibliografia delle edizioni di Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. I, 11-12. 119 See above, and note 114 for references. 120 On the controversy surrounding the publication of the Prince, cf. especially the letter by François Hotman to Rudolph Whalter, highlighted first by Tommasini, La vita e gli scritti, vol. 1, 605. Also Kaegi, “Machiavelli in Basel,” and A. Petrina, Machiavelli in the British Isles: Two Early Modern Translations of The Prince (London: Routledge, 2016), 82; and the recent Almási, “Experientia and the Machiavellian turn.”

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bias against his work, the publication of the Art of War into German reveals other features relating to the history of the text’s circulation. To understand the premises of the first translation of the Art of War into German, it is important to consider aspects of the publication of Machiavelli’s earlier works. The Art of War was scheduled to be printed earlier as part of a complete publication of Machiavelli’s writings by the same Perna who published the Prince in Basle. An important novelty of this project, though, is that it was to take place in Mümpelgardt, not Basle, with the support of the duke Frederick I.121 Mümpelgardt (now Montbéliard in France), was ruled by the House of Württemberg until the end of the eighteenth century and was an important printing city. Jacob Foillet, a former assistant in Perna’s printing enterprise in Basle, was particularly active in publishing Machiavelli’s writings here. Foillet printed one of the earlier Latin versions of the Discourses in Mümpelgardt. Translated by Giovanni Niccolò Stupano, the book came out in 1588, and was re-issued in 1591 with a dedicatory letter to Joannes Oschmolsky.122 Oschmolsky is an important and little-known figure in the publication of Machia­ velli’s writings in Switzerland. He studied in Vienna, where he registered as a student of the local university in 1525, and later in Basle and Leipzig.123 He knew Italian well, and probably spent many years in the peninsula. He is another link in the chain of people, ideas and books that connects Italy, France and the German-speaking world.

121

Cf. the recent account on this by Almási, “Experientia and the Machiavellian turn,” 865867. According to Mordeglia, “The First Latin Translation,” 79 (note 46), Kaegi (“Machiavelli in Basel,” 47-48), advanced the hypothesis that Perna published a Latin translation of the “Discorsi sull’arte della guerra” in 1598, perhaps in an edition by Niccolò Stupano, who, in the light of the controversy created in the occasion of the publication of his 1580 Latin version of the Prince, apparently preferred to remain anonymous. However, this seems to be either a misunderstanding of Kaegi’s essay by Mordeglia or a simple lapsus (“Discorsi sull’arte della guerra,” in the place of “Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio”), in light of the fact, explained above, that the Discourses were first published in French with the word “guerre” in the title: e.g. N. Machiavel, Discours de l’estat de paix et de guerre (Paris: 1548). 122 Nicolai Macchiavelli Florentini Dispvtationvm De Repvblica, quas Discursus nuncupa­ uit, Libri III. Qvomodo In Rebvspvb. ad Antiqvorvm Romanorum imitationem actiones omnes benè maléve instituantur: ex Italica Latini facti ad Generosum et Magnificum D. ­Ioannem Osmolki, Mümpelgardt: Per Iacobum Foilletum, typographum Mompelgartensem, M.D.XCI. 123 H. Barycz, “Der Pole Johannes Osmolski, ein Freund der Basler Gelehrten,” Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde 70 (1970): 146-147.

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It was in Mümpelgardt that the first German version of the Art of War was printed in 1619, in another translation by a citizen of Basle, Konrad Wieland.124 This translation of the Art of War came in a particular context: as political thinkers of the time faced the geo-political and military consequences of the early modern wars, they were both driven and inspired by the demands made on language by the new condition of almost permanent war. Vernacular languages of the time were highly permeable, and thus subject to the vast contemporary circulation and exchange of ideas and expressions that “favoured linguistic space for lexical ‘Europeanisims.’”125 At the same time, this work reveals the role of French culture as a vehicle for the reception of the Art of War into the late sixteenth-century German speaking world. Scholars such as Beatrice Heuser have argued that, from the sixteenth to the eighteenth century approximately, “German works were […] copying the approach of French works.”126 The early appearance of Machiavelli’s book in France and its subsequent re-use and re-shaping by French authors and thinkers increased interest in military discipline and militia among European military thinkers and, in particular, in studying the ancient way of making war. (A phenomenon related to the circulation and success of the Art of War as a military book, regardless of whether later European readers were aware that Machiavelli was the first to re-discover and emphasize the effectiveness of ancient infantry military tactics). In particular, Kaegi appropriately highlighted the fact that the Kriegskunst was translated from a French edition, not from the original Italian vernacular.127 Kaegi’s remarks show the tight linkage between the printing and book markets of Basle and France.128 The aforementioned Theodor Zwinger, who was 124 125 126 127

128

Kriegskunst des Herren Nicolaj Machiavelli in unser Muttersprach versetzt unnd gebracht. Durch H[ans] C[onrad] W[ieland] V[on] Basel (Mümpelgardt: Jacob Foillet, in Verlegung Ludwig Königs, 1619). Cf. Gerber, Niccolò Machiavelli, vol. III, 119-120. J.-L. Fournel, “Narrating the Italian Wars (1494-1540): Contaminations, Models and Knowledge,” in M. Mondini and M. Rospocher, eds, Narrating War: Early Modern and Contemporary Perspectives (Bologna – Berlin: il Mulino – Duncker & Humblot, 2013), 56. B. Heuser, The Strategy Makers: Thoughts on War and Society from Machiavelli to Clausewitz (Santa Barbara: Praeger, 2010), 6. Kaegi, “Machiavelli in Basel,” 49: “Bei Wielands Übersetzung spuert man, dass der unmittelbare Kontakt mit Italien und dem originalen Machiavelli bereits schwaecher geworden ist, denn Wieland uebersetz nicht mehr nach dem Italienischen, sondern aus zweiter Hand nach einer französischen Vorlage.” See Bietenholz, Basle and France. The phenomenon of sixteenth-century Italian books being published in France extends further than Machiavelli. For a general account, see Frank-Rutger Hausmann, ““Italia in Gallia” – Französische literarische Übersetzungen aus dem Italienischen im Zeitalter der Renaissance,” in Come l’uom s’etterna: Beiträge zur Literatur-, Sprach- und Kunstgeschichte Italiens und der Romania, “Festschrift für Erich Loos,”

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involved with the Basle edition of Machiavelli’s works, worked in a typographer’s in Lyon when he was young, before he moved to Padua.129 It is wellknown that Jacopo Corbinelli possessed a copy of the 1531 Giunti edition of the Discourses on Livy while in France, and that he planned the publication of the Ritratto di cose della Francia while in Lyon.130 Furthermore, the leader of the turmoil among the Italian Protestants in this city was the Lodovico Alamanni, who shared Machiavellian ideas on the militia with the Imperial ambassador Alberto Pio da Carpi in 1516. Alamanni even wrote to Theodore Beza to defend Jean Morély, the possible candidate for translator of the lost Latin translation of Machiavelli’s Art of War, who moved to Lyon to publish his Traicté de la discipline chrestienne.131 Beza is a well-known French theologian, a Protestant scholar who played an important role in the Reformation, succeeding Calvin as a spiritual leader of the Republic of Geneva. Further indications of the fundamental role of French military book production as a vehicle for the transmission of Machiavelli’s military ideas across other areas of Europe can be seen in the 1594 publication of the so-called Disciplina militaris/Discipline militaire printed for the first time as a work by Guillaume du Bellay (i.e. the aforementioned Instructions that has been attributed to Fourquevaux in modern times) also printed in Mümpelgart.132 The book of the Instructions/Discipline militaire was the main tool by which Machiavellian military doctrine was translated and transformed into a more technical handbook, a process that, since it avoided the issues of Machiavelli’s reputation, allowed his conceptualizion of warfare and many of his military ideas to reach a larger European audience. Appendix: a Little-Known (Anonymous) Huguenot French Theorist of Military Doctrine in Basle Even after the controversies caused by the diffusion of anti-Machiavellism into Protestant Europe, Machiavelli’s writings on war and warfare remained in the  2.1

ed. by G. Staccioli & I. Osols-Wehden (Berlin: Berlin Verlag Arno Spitz, 1994), 89-117; and J. Balsamo, Le livre italien à Paris au XVIe siècle (Geneva: Droz, 2015). 129 Gilly, Theodor Zwinger, 107 & 196. 130 Cf. G. Procacci, “Un ‘fuoriuscito’ lettore del Machiavelli: Jacopo Corbinelli,” in id. Machiavelli nella cultura europea dell’età moderna (Rome-Bari: Laterza, 1995), 459. 131 Cf. Bietenholz, Basle and France, 224. For the connection between Beza and some of the people involved in the translations of Machiavelli’s works in France, see Gorris Camos, “Dans le labyrinthe de Gohory.” 132 A.L. Puliafito, “Über Krieg und Landstreitkräfte: Jakob Zwinger an Gian Vincenzo Pinelli ‘di Basilea alli 6 d’Agosto 1594’,” Basler Zeitschrift für Geschichte und Altertumskunde 89 (1989): 33.

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air in Basle and spread even among Protestant writers who fully acknowledge Gentillet’s accusations of blasphemy and corruption. The anonymous Discours de la police et de discipline militaire, à l’imitation des anciens Grecs et Romains et selon qu’elle a esté observée par les plus advisez et experimentez capitaines de nostre temps (also called Traicté du moyen de tellement pollicer une armée à l’imitation des anciens Grecs et Romains, que avec peu d’hommes bien disciplinez et moyenne somme de deniers bien mesnagez, elle se pourra conserver et maintenir d’elle mesmes avec grand fruict) was written in the context of the War of Religion in France and dedicated to Henry of Bourbon, king of Navarre, who became king of France as Henry IV after his 1593 conversion to Catholicism.133 The author of this book identifies himself as a Protestant refugee in Basel, and signs his dedicatory discourse to Henry with the acronym: “F. D. D. R.”. Although it is not possible to identify this individual, he may be linked to Jacques Bongars’ political and cultural circle (or perhaps even was Bongars?). Bongars was a French Protestant who served as Henry of Navarre’s agent in several missions abroad. He was secretary and interpreter to François de Ségur-Pardaillan, Henry’s plenipotentiary to the German Protestants, and assisted Ségur-Pardaillan in raising troops to support the Huguenot army in France. In 1589, Bongars replaced Ségur-Pardaillan as plenipotentiary agent134 and had at least some knowledge of the military doctrine of Justus Lipsius. He is known for his study of Polybius and was an advisor of Henri de La Tour d’Auvergne, duc de Bouillon.135 In the light of his competences and interests, Bongars was an important part of the network dedicated to promoting “pan-protestant political and military solidarity across Europe.”136 It is in support of this cause that he wrote a famous 133

134 135 136

This treaty, printed by Sebastian Henric Petri’s printer shop at Basle (called Officina Henricpetrina), is very little known. It is mentioned only briefly in a few studies, one of which is P. Choné, “Miles timidus. Discipline militaire, morale et satire à la veille de la Guerre de Trent Ans,” in Krieg und Frieden im Übergang vom Mittelalter zur Neuzeit: Theorie – Praxis – Bilder = Guerre et paix du Moyen Âge aux temps modernes, eds. H. Duchhardt, P. Veit & P. Monnet (Mainz: Ph. Von Zabern, 2000), 170-171. A better-known, similar case is the one of another Huguenot, François de La Noue’s book Discours politiques et militaires du seigneur de La Nouë Nouvellement recueillis (Basle [Genève]: François Forest, 1587). For uses of the term police in sixteenth-century French books, see J.-L. Fournel, “L’écriture du gouvernement et de la force en France et en Italie au début du XVIe siècle” in Autour de Claude de Seyssel. Écrire l’histoire, penser la politique en France à l’aube des temps modernes (Rennes: Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2010), 99-116. Ph. Benedict, “French Protestants in the Service of the Crown, 1554-1612,” in Jacques Bongars (1554-1612). Gelehrter und Diplomat im Zeitalter des Konfessionalismus (Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck, 2015), 2. Cf. Schwager, Militärtheorie, 110 & 462-464. Benedict, “French Protestants.” 1.

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letter accusing the Austrian general Fabian de Dohna, chief of the Protestant army, of lacking military experience and blaming him for the army’s defeat by the Duke of Guise at Auneau (24 Nov. 1587).137 In the same letter, Bongars also accused a member of de Dohna’s entourage of betraying Henry de Navarre.138 This historical scenario fits perfectly with the subject and arguments of the aforementioned Discours de la police, which insists on the danger to France from its own compatriots’ (the League of Guise) betrayal, as well as risk posed to Henry IV (the Navarre) by untrustworthy military advisors. The author of this book mentions the ancient example of Catilina to stress the role of those “perturbateurs” who “avoyent conjuré contre l’éstat,”139 a scenario that fits perfectly with the preface’s initial argument (added to the book’s 1590 printing), in which the author insists on the risk that the king’s army of foreigners (i.e. the German and Swiss Protestants who did not join the French battalions of Henry in the fight against the League because of internal conflicts) will be undisciplined and disobedient. Machiavelli’s military doctrine is the background of the book. The argument of the first paragraph of the dedicatory letter is de facto a summary of some of the main themes of the Art of War, including the need to reinforce discipline and military virtue and to have a united and loyal army. The dedication of the Art of War in which Machiavelli argued that military orders, in his words, “are corrupt and separated […] from ancient modes,” comes immediately to the mind of a modern reader of the Discours de la police. Moreover, the entire Discours de la police, which comes with the subtitle “a l’imitation des anciens Grecs & Romains,” is intended to promote military reform based on a combination of ancient military doctrine and present experience, just as in the Art of War. The book’s introduction stresses its intention of studying both ancient and contemporary military examples in order to remedy the corruption of the military and the state. As in Michel d’Amboise’s Le guidon de la guerre, the concept expressed by Machiavelli’s famous statement in the dedication of the Prince, according to which he quotes his own “experience of modern things and constant reading about ancient things,” is paraphrased by this anonymous writer in his dedication, in which one reads that:

137 Cf. La France Protestant, vol 2, s.v. “Bongars, Jacques,” 818-819; also Joseph de Croze, Les Guises, les Valois, et Philippe II (Paris: Amyot, 1866), 23 ff. 138 Cf. La France Protestant, vol 2, s.v. “Bongars, Jacques,” 814-815. 139 Cf. Discours de la police, 4.

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Experience has learned from all the times, and recently has shown that for the preservation of the army, policy and discipline, and first and foremost obedience are necessary; and even without bringing the oldest examples, it is clear that disobedience and disdain of military law, not only impede the excellent effects that should have been provided by your army of foreigners […] but also […] seems to have turned it into a miserable state…140 Further comparisons between this paragraph and Machiavelli’s Discourses on Livy I 39 are even more revealing. In this chapter, Machiavelli explains that it is necessary to use the knowledge of both ancient and contemporary history in order to find remedies for the present days: Whoever considers present and ancient things easily knows that in all cities and in all peoples there are the same desires […] So it is an easy thing for whoever examines past things diligently to foresee future things in every republic and to take the remedies for them that were used by the ancients.141 Moreover, the passage from the introduction to the Discours de la Police (as in the previous citation) echoes a statement of Discourses II 20, “If past things are read well and those of the present are reviewed, it will be found that for one who has a good end from this, infinite ones were left deceived by it.”142 But the anonymous author of this treatise had a problem. He wants to convince the king that the battalions of foreign Protestants who wanted to support Henry of Navarre in his fight against the Catholic League can be trusted after 140

141

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Discours de la police, “Dedicatory Letter,” 2. Translation mine. Original version: “L’experience à appris de tout temps et fait veoir nagueres combien pour la conservation des Armees, la police et discipline, et sourtout l’obeissance sont necessaires, et sans amener les exemples de plus loin la désobéissance et le mespris des bonnes loix militaires, non seulement ont empesché les excellens effects, que devoit produire vostre armee d’estrangers […] mais aussi […] sembloit estre reduite en un calamiteux estat.” N. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy I 39, trans. H.C. Mansfield & N. Tarcov (Chicago: Chicago University Press, 1996), 83-84. Original version (I 39, 2-3): “E’ si conosce facilmente per chi considera le cose presenti e le antiche, come in tutte le città e in tutti i popoli sono quegli medesimi desiderii [...] In modo che gli è facil cosa a chi esamina con diligenza le cose passate, prevedere in ogni republica le future e farvi quegli rimedii che dagli antichi sono stati usati.” N. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy (II 20), 176. Original version (II 20, 13): “E se si leggeranno bene le cose passate e discorrerannosi le presenti, si troverà per uno che ne abbi avuto buono fine infiniti esserne rimasti ingannati.”

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the accusations of inexperience and disloyalty launched against the Austrian general Fabian de Dohna (who led the German battalions to defeat at Montargis and at Auneau against the Catholic troops of the Duke of Guise in the Autumn of 1587, while Henry of Navarre won the day at Coutras with his French Protestant army). The anonymous writer, therefore, needed to obviate the king’s mistrust of the foreign battalions of Huguenots who wanted to support the Protestant cause. In order to do that, he adopted a very pragmatic method of drawing from concepts and ideas originally elaborated by Machiavelli to promote the concept of the armi proprie (i.e. to build your own army in order to defend your homeland) as a state army. Decade by decade, these ideas were digested by several military writers in a process of consumption stimulated and developed by means of an increasingly direct reading of the same classical military theory originally, and most famously, promoted by Machiavelli’s Art of War, in a process that, later in that century, exhibited increasing tendencies to avoid the most disturbing and controversial aspects of Machiavelli’s thinking: especially after his condemnation by both the Catholic church and the Protestant Gentillet’s Contre Machiavel. The Discours de la police perfectly highlights the process by which contemporary Huguenot military writers joined the chorus of condemnation of Machiavelli while nonetheless building on and reelaborating and transforming his ideas.143 Another aspect of this process is the effort to “Christianize’ – in Sidney Anglo’s words –Machiavelli’s conceptualization of war in his Art of War.”144 The author of this anonymous book can be included in this group of military writers who insist on moral and religious concerns. Like other Catholic thinkers, the anonymous author wants to reconcile true Christianity with the military doctrine of the ancients that Machiavelli had originally emphasized. This effort is manifest in the author’s transformation of the ancient habit of addressing the soldiers with an oration, which he says must be done in the form of a prayer so that they believe they are fighting in the grace and for the glory of the true God.145 143

For the similar case of François de La Noue, see M.E. Severini, “Le Prince et le Capitaine, échos de Machiavel chez Loys le Roy e François de la Noue,” Seizième Siècle, 9 (2013): 247259. 144 Anglo, Machiavelli, 481. 145 “Or tout ainsi, Sire, que, Dieu exauça les oraisons de ces deux chefs, Capitaines & conducters de son peuple. Croyex, que si les imitez en leurs prieres, vous serez aussi favorisé & exaucé de ce Dieu, qui et le Dies des batailles […] & vous tenez pour tout asseuré, que ceste ardente priere prononcee devotement de votre bouche, a la teste de vostre armee allant à la charge, comme firent ces vaillans chefs & Capitaines […] que tous ceux […] seront à vostre exemple & imitation, encouragez, renforcez & animez par ces forces spirituelles,” Discours de la police, 174.

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Aware of the moral condemnation of Machiavelli’s writings, the author of the Discours de la police does not mention Machiavelli among his sources, which he lists in the opening chapter with the typical philological accuracy of this kind of literary production of the late sixteenth century; these sources are often quoted directly in the book. Yet this anonymous author does not condemn Machiavelli openly, in the way that, for instance, Huguenot military writer François de La Noue did (de la Noue is included on the list of sources). Perhaps, however, a reference to Machiavelli as a military author can be found in the allusion made by the Discours de la police author to some unspecified modern writers who wrote about war and warfare, yet were not “professors of arms.”146 The author conceded little importance to these authors compared to those considered experienced in the use of arms, but he seems to know more than he formally declares about these unspecified writers who were not “professors of arms.” A comparison with the way de La Noue – one of the anonymous writer’s main sources – strongly and openly attacked even some members of the French warrior nobility who brought back from their trips to the peninsula certain (again) unspecified “great” Italian blasphemers (he called them Italians who were “irreverent to God”), perhaps reveals that the author of the Discourse de la police felt some ambivalence about some of his sources.147 In any case, the anonymous writer of the Discours de la police also lists the Lord of Langey, Guillaume du Bellay, among his military authors.148 In fact, the 146 147

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“[…] plusieurs autres […] ne desdaignant que aucuns de ceux qui en ont escrit, n’ont esté en effect professeurs des armes,” ibid., 14-15. De La Noue is explicitly mentioned by the anonymous author, ibid., 89. Cf. de La Noue, Discours politiques et militaires, 6: “Depuis, ceste peste [the “irriverence de Dieux”] s’est introduite parmi la Noblesse, & specialement en tre les gens de guerre, qui aux voyages passes d’Italie en rapporterént, ce dit-on, les grands blasphemes,” Discours de la police, 13. Martin du Bellay is also mentioned as a source of this anonymous author: “Et entre nos Capitaines François Guillaume du Bellay Seigneur du Langey, & Martin du Bellay Roy d’Hyvetot son frere, se sont par leurs traitez tracé vn renom immortel.” Martin wrote memories that were published together with the remaining fragments of the Ogdoades by his brother Guillame their heir René: Les Memoires de Messire Martin Du Bellay, seigneur de Langey. Contenans le discours des choses memorables aduenues au royaume de France, depuis l’an M.D.XIII. jusques au trespas du roy François premier, auquel l’autheur a inseré trois livres, et quelques fragmens des Ogdoades de Messire Guillaume du Bellay, seigneur de Langey son frere. Oeuvre mis en lumiere et presenté au Roy par Messire René Du Bellay, Chevalier de l’Ordre de sa Majesté, baron de la Lande, heritier d’iceluy Messire Martin du Bellay (Paris: chez L’Huilier, 1569). It is perhaps not accidental that this work was re-printed in Geneva in 1594 by the publisher Jacques Chouet. On this work, see N. Guillod, “Jean Du Bellay, la tentation de l’histoire,” in Le cardinal Jean Du Bellay. Diplomatie et culture dans l’Europe de la Renaissance, ed. by C. Michon e L. Petris (Rennes: Presses universitaires François-Rabelais, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2013), 167-180.

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author praises Langey’s work, even offering anecdotes about his direct knowledge of Guillaume du Bellay’s military reforms. His knowledge, he says, was acquired when he was young, probably a soldier in Piedmont, when du Bellay was Governor there.149 This previously unknown evidence confirms that Machiavelli’s military ideas reached many late sixteenth-century European military thinkers by means of du Bellay’s practical and theoretical re-elaboration of Machiavelli’s writings on war and militia, and might be a further hint that Guillame is actually the true author, or one of them, of the Instructions, which is most likely the case.150 In fact, Du Bellay is frequently mentioned in the Discours de la police, with Machiavelli’s military doctrine often there in the background of these references. This is noticeable also when the anonymous writer discusses the review of soldiers without naming his sources, particularly when he asks whether a prince should build his army using his own subjects, a question that, of course, draws from Machiavelli’s discussion of armi proprie (one’s own arms) in the Prince and the Art of War. Once again, however, one should note that this theme was absorbed and digested by the Lord of Langey’s practical military reforms in Piedmont and incorporated by writings such as the Discipline militaire/Instructions sur le faict de la guerre.151 The anonymous author of the Discours de la police makes clear reference to the debate about the armi proprie when he discusses the necessity of using battalions of Swiss and German Protestants in the fight against the Catholic League: Some, wiser and better instructed (in my opinion) tried to harden their nation so much that they could get by with as little help from foreigners as possible, unless it was really necessary. Some others (like several of our kings) have been badly advised (I think) that it is dangerous to arm one’s own subjects, for fear of rebellion. To whom I reply (since I do not agree with this opinion) that if subjects are well disciplined and the king is 149 “De mon temps, & lors que le grand Roy François envoya prendre le Piedmont, il me souvient (encores que ie fusse sort ieune) que le Conte Guillaume faisoit marcher a la teste de chacune de ses bandes de Lansquenets, cinq ou six rangs de charpentiers & gens de mestier,” Discours de la police, 145. For a commendation of Du Bellay’s work in Piedmont, see ibid., 118-119. De La Noue, one of the authors mentioned by this anonymous author, also served in the French army in Piedmont, cf. Procacci, Machiavelli, 207. For the climate of social and religious reform that originated in the intellectual circle around Du Bellay in Piedmont, see ibid., 202-203. 150 Cf. above note 6. 151 Cf. Instructions sur le faict de la guerre, ch. 1, “Comment le Roy devroit faire ses guerres atout la force de ses subjctez,” 3 ff.

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good, fair and true to them, and a true father of his own people, and if he treats them well, such as our kings did, he does not have to fear any rebellion; especially since the French have acquired the honor and reputation of having always loved, honoured and obeyed their kings. This pernicious advice caused drain of public finances, the ruin of both the provinces and the substances of the poor French, while the foreign Reiter [i.e. the German and German-Swiss professional soldiers in the service of France] became rich.152 He agrees with those kings who were “wiser and better instructed,” who “tried to harden their nation so much that they could get by with as little help from foreigners as possible,” against some others who “badly advised that it is dangerous to arm one’s own subjects, for fear of rebellion.” Thus the anonymous author both draws from and participates in a debate originated by Machiavelli’s commitment to raising a homegrown military force, particularly his criticism of the French kings who enrolled foreign mercenaries in the army. Interestingly, as mentioned above the anonymous author does not provide his sources in this passage. Generally, he is meticulous in attributing sources to his arguments, as seen with du Bellay, and thus a correlation can be detected between passages with no sources identified and the undeclared presence of Machiavellian thought. At the time, it was dangerous to mention Machiavelli’s name, as the controversy generated by Pietro Perna’s publication of a Latin version of the Prince in Basle only a few years earlier proved. It is worth referring to the original passages of Machiavelli’s Art of War for a clear picture of the similarities and cross-references between it and the Discours de la police: As to the fear that such an order [i.e. ‘your own arms’] may take away your State by means of the individual who made its head, I respond that arms 152

Discours de la police, 67. Translation mine. Original version: “Aucuns, plus sages & mieux advisez (selon mon iugement) ont tasché d’aguerrir tellement leur nation qu’ils se sont passez le plus qu’ils ont peu de l’aide des estrangers, si ce n’a esté en grande necessité. Les autres (comme plusiers de nos Rois) ont esté conselleiz & mal (comme ie croy) qu’il est dangereux armer ses subjects, crainte de rebellion. A quoy ie responds (ne pouvant suyvre cest advis) que si les subjects sont bien disciplinez & que le Prince soit bon, iuste & vrai Roy, & pere de sono peuple, le traitant bien, comme ont fait nos Rois, il ne doibt craindre aucune rebellion, ayant le François acquis cest honneur & reputation, d’avoir de tout temps, aimé, honoré & obey à leurs Rois. Ce conseil pernicieux à fait espuiser les finances, ruiner les provinces & de la substance des povres François en enrichir le Reistre pillard estrangers.”

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carried, given by the laws and order on the back of one’s own citizens or subjects never do harm; rather, they are always useful.153 A simple comparison between this passage and the previous quotation from the Discours de la police reveals convergences and conceptual links such as not fearing your armed subjects. Further, the stress the anonymous writer puts in the dedicatory letter (as in the previous citation) on the role of “law” recalls Machiavelli’s vocabulary in this passage. Regardless of the incoherence of the anonymous author, who despite this theoretical acknowledgment of the importance of raising your own homegrown militia accepts the possibility of including German and Swiss battalions within Henry of Navarre’s army, this is a clear sign that Machiavelli’s legacy, echoed by the Instructions, was still powerful. Whether inherited directly or indirectly, the debate Machiavelli had originated was still open and still drawing from the original, despite the continuous process of rework and plagiarism his works had undergone. Specifically, the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre/Discipline militaire played a major role in transmitting this debate to the later Discours de la police, as well as many similar treatises.154 Indeed, the anonymous author of the Discours calls du Bellay one of the most important military writers of the time. The sequence from Machiavelli through the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre/ Discipline militaire to the Discours de la police is illustrated very clearly once again by the concept of armi proprie. Machiavelli writes: Because I have reasoned about this with some of you another time, I believe that you have considered how present wars impoverish the lords that win as much as those that lose. For if the one loses his state, the other loses his money and his belongings. This was not so anciently, for the winner of wars got rich.155 153 Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 171), 24. Original version: “Quanto al dubitare the tale ordine non ti tolga lo stato mediante uno che se ne faccia capo, rispondo che l’armi in dosso a’ suoi cittadini o sudditi, date dalle leggi e dall’ordine, non fecero mai danno, anzi sempre fanno utile, e mantengonsi le città più tempo immaculate.” Italics added. 154 This is a point sometimes overlooked by scholars of early-modern European armies. For instance, Potter, Renaissance France at War, 116-117, does not note Machiavelli’s influence on the way Instructions sur le faict de la guerre addresses the debate on foreign soldiers in the French army, or on the methods of selection of men. 155 Machiavelli, Art of War, (V, 95), 109. Original version: “Io credo che voi abbiate considerato, perché altra volta con alcuni di voi ne ho ragionato, come le presenti guerre impoveriscono così quegli signori che vincono, come quegli che perdono; perché se l’uno perde lo stato, l’altro perde i danari e il mobile suo; il che anticamente non era, perché il vincitore delle guerre arricchiva.”

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First, the proem to the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre takes up this Machia­ vellian concept: It seems to me that Princes may take arms rightfully in order to guard their subjects, and that subjects themselves too, may do the same in order to maintain their Princes ; and in this perspective it is legitimate to raise militiamen in the country and consequently wage war.156 Then in the first chapter, the author builds on that concept, adding a reference to the economic and financial benefits to the nation if it takes advantage of its king’s military victories, rather than letting foreigners profit: Moreover, I affirm that whenever a Prince might ever make well, he should raise and choose his own soldiers among his subjects […] because foreigners could never be loyal to a Prince, and since the Prince’s subjects could not be more trustworthy and brave. This is because the cause of the Prince is the same of the subjects, since if the one loses the war also the subjects pay great damage, while if the Prince wins his subjects get rich too, not the foreigners.157 This argument is repeated almost literally by the author of the Discours de la police in the already quoted lines blaming the “foreign pillager/reiter”: “This pernicious advice caused drain of public finances, the ruin of both the provinces and the substances of the poor French, while the foreign pillager/reiter enriched.” 156

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Instructions sur le faict de la guerre (proeme), 1. Translation is mine. Original version: “il me semble que les Princes peuvêt prendre iuſtement les armes pour la garde de leurs subiects & les subiects auſſi pour maintenir l’authorité de leurs Princes: & a ceste fin estre licite de faire levee de gens en un pais & conſequemment la guerre.” While an old translation of this book into English is available (Instructions for the Warres, trans. P. Iue, London, 1589), I have opted to provide new ones in modern English that are more adequate to the scientific purpose of the present work. Revised translations of a few passages from Iue’s version are provided by Heuser, The Strategy Makers, 35-49. Instructions sur le faict de la guerre (b. 1 ch. 1), 4. Translation is mine. Original version : “En outre ie dy que si vn Prince pretết iamais faire beau fait, il doit leuer & choisir ses gens de guerre parmy ses subiets […] que les estrangers ne pourrőt iamais seruir si loyalement vn Prince, que ses sujets ne le seruent plus fidelement & de meilleur coeur, à cause que la querelle du Prince qui les a en charge, n’est pas seulement le fait d’vn sujet particulier ne d’vn tiers, ains touche tous ceux qui l’endurent pour leur dit Prince, entant que s’il reçoit perte, il est infaliblement necessaire qu’elle redonde au grand dommage des subjets, veu qu’ils font la proye des vainqueurs, si leur dit Prince est vaincu : Et au contraire deuiennent tous riches, non les estrangers, si leur dit Prince est victorieux.”

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Moreover, further elements confirm the presence of Machiavelli’s themes and topics in the Discours de la police. In chapter 13, the author provides a statement of intentions that again resembles the association Machiavelli established between good military orders, discipline, and the benefits of having citizens in arms: In this war France will generate good soldiers, who will be good if they are well led, conducted and governed by good, virtous and brave chiefs and captains, who, by means of good examples and discipline, will make their soldiers virtuous and brave.158 This statement is clearly reminiscent of a famous passage in the dedication of the Art of War in which Machiavelli stresses the role of the good soldier and expresses his assumption that good orders (which means political, civic and social institutions) are disordered without military help. No society can flourish without good military institutions and values: […] good orders without military help are disordered […] And if in every other order of cities or kingdoms the utmost diligence was used to keep men faithful, peaceful, and full of the fear of God, in the military it was redoubled. For in what man should the fatherland look for greater faith than in him who has to promise to die for it? In whom should there be more love of peace than in him who alone can be harmed by war? In whom should there be more fear of God that in him who, submitting to infinite dangers everyday, has more need of His help? This necessity, well considered both by those who gave laws to empires and by those who were put in charge of military training, made the soldiers’ life praised by other men and followed and imitated with utmost attention.159 As both this and the previous quotation demonstrate, in the Art of War the subjects of a prince are paired with the citizens of a republic.160 Machiavelli’s original concept of armi proprie, which, though divested in the Art of War of its most radical and controversial connotations, still referred to a vision of the people in arms (if not citizens in arms as in the Discourses on Livy), in the In158

Discours de la police, 73. Translation mine. Original version: “Que en ceste guerre la France produira asses de bons soldats & seront bons, s’ils sont bien regis, conduits & gouvernez par bons, vertueux & valeureux chefs & capitaineis, qui par bon exempls & bonne discipline, rendront leurs soldats vertueux & valeureux.” 159 Machiavelli, Art of War (Preface, 4-8), 4. Italics added. 160 See above note 153.

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structions/Discipline militaire is turned into the different image of subjects of the king. The success of the Instructions/Discipline militaire among European readers facilitated the formation of a concept which, rather than the vision of nation in arms and the political and social benefits it has for the state, stresses the simple fact of whether or not the king is good at governing and leading his subjects. Still, the line of reasoning followed by the anonymous writer of the Discours de la police is to be related to the legacy left by the Art of War as well as by other writings of the Florentine secretary. In conclusion, these correspondences reveal how the use of Machiavelli in the sequence from the publication of the Art of War in French, through the systematic allusions and plagiarisms in books such as the Instructions and the Spanish Tratado de re militari, to later treatises such as the Discours de la police, worked as a filter, removing the most radical aspects of Machiavelli’s idea of citizens in arms from the concept of armi proprie. And these aspects were exactly those that were controversial in the growing European monarchies because of their republican connotations. The republican argument disappeared from the Instructions. Thus the reception, digestion and transformation of Machiavelli’s original concepts and ideas by du Bellay and the courtly milieu in which it was read favored a process of assimilation and digestion into a monarchical culture that facilitated both the formation of what came to be called Machiavellism and the reactions to it.161 A process of corruption and transformation of the original political and military doctrine of the Florentine secretary that, as a matter of fact, is also at the origin of the Discours de la police. This is the series of developments that led to the Machiavelli’s name being expunged from the sub­ title of the 1592 edition of the Discipline militaire, when the front page of the 1553 Parisian second edition had referred to him: “...extraictes des liures de ­Polybe, Frontin, Vegece, Cornazan, Machiauelle, & pluſieurs autres bons autheurs.”162

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As noted by Severini, “Le Prince et le Capitaine,” 251, military writers such as Le Roy began quoting from the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre in order to avoid the accusation of Machiavellism. The side effect (and huge consequence) of this process is that the Instructions – with its digested and slightly purified version of Machiavelli – gradually replaced Machiavelli’s original writings in the circulation of ideas. This process accelerated after the condemnation of Machiavelli by the religious authorities. Still, the process itself originated in the monarchical reading of Machiavelli by the circle of Du Bellay. Instructions sur le faict de la guerre, second edition, “a Paris, de l’imprimerie de Michel de Vascosan, demourant à l’enseigne de la Fontaine, Rue S. Iacques,” 1553.

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 The Creation of Infantry Legions in Sixteenth-Century France

Francis I, the king of France who was famous for his taste for Italian art and was personally involved in the Italian Wars, renewed and renovated the French army by creating the militia Légions. A brief historical overview of the Légions will be useful before considering the connections between this reform and Machiavelli. During the Italian Wars, French governors and commanders experimented with new ways of waging war. At the same time, their involvement in these wars meant they were confronted with militia experiments (aside from those they had already made) and the development of political and military discourses and practices of the militia in the Italian peninsula. It is not accidental, indeed, that one of the most efficient and long-lasting Légions was in Piedmont, established by Guillaume du Bellay and Anne de Montmorency during their institutional and military duty there.163 As we have seen, this kind of militia had already been in use in Italian city-states like Florence or Venice, and the evolution of military techniques and strategy during the early phase of the Italian Wars suggested to the French governors in Piedmont that the Légions could provide a strong infantry battalion (see the previous sections of this chapter, for instance, for Montmorency’s part in the French campaigns in Italy). A reading of the anonymous Familière institution – a pamphlet intended to justify and promote the reform of the Légions – confirms the circulation of military ideas and knowledge among the Italian peninsula, France and Spain in connection with Francis I’s military reforms. Indeed, in one section of this pamphlet, captains of the Légions are strongly advised to learn Italian and Spanish, and – then, but secondarily – other European languages: He will manage to speak and to write the most esteemed among the other languages of Europe, through the ordinary lecture/reading of the good books written in Italy, French and Spanish, which, in my opinion, are in high demand/in vogue; and, if possible, German, English and the others.164 163

164

For the effectiveness of the militia battalions raised by Du Bellay in Piedmont, see Potter, Renaissance France at War, 108. The same Potter (ibid., 114), however, argues that by the end of the 1530s the Légion recruited in the same region acquired a “reputation for indiscipline and unreliability.” Familière institution pour les legionaires, en suyvant les Ordonnances faictes sur ce sujet par le Roy composee nouvellement (Lyon: Jacopo Juste, 1536). Translation mine. Original version: “[…] se estudiera d’entrende parler et escrivre les autres langues plus estimées en notre Europe, par la lecture ordinaire des bons livres escripts en Italie, François et

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As Frédérique Verrier has shown, the author of this small book certainly knew the Discourses on Livy and the Art of War of Machiavelli. However, there is further evidence of the connection between the Légions and the military doctrine of the Florentine. First, a general remark: the use of the word “colonel” for the commanders of the infantry Légions in the Familière institution (a term that was a complete novelty to the French) shows the direct influence of Italian military practice;165 notably Machiavelli’s 1506 Florentine Militia Act made explicit use of this term in a key passage of the law.166 Such similarities can be found throughout Machiavelli’s main works. For instance, the anonymous writer’s discussion of the need for the wise man to ‘endure’ (“supporter”) the “changement de fortune” clearly recalls Machiavelli.167 While this language can be ascribed to a long literary tradition, including Cicero, mentioned immediately before, the image of “fortune” that “changes” was used by Machiavelli in the Prince. It appears most famously in the conclusion of chapter 14 but can also be found elsewhere, especially chapter 25, which is dedicated to the problem of how a wise Prince should stand against fortune.168 On the same page, the anonymous author explains that one can learn about this subject from those excellent writers who had written on important matters, full of erudition, who discern the way to achieve a good way of life, so that the one part consists of precepts and manners of good conduct, and the other one of histories. Then, after an explanation of how important it is to study the ancients, the author points out that somebody else was able to arrive at this ‘virtous’ state: Espaignol, lesquelles a mon avis sont au temps present de requeste, et se il est possible l’Alemande, Angloise et les autres.” 165 See Contamine, “Naissance de l’infanterie française,” 75, according to whom the term “fait alors son apparition officielle dans la langue française.” 166 On the presence of the term in Machiavelli’s 1506 Provisione della Ordinanza as well as on the importance of the passage about the “colonnelli” for the whole military project, cf. Guidi, Un Segretario militante, 341. See also above in this chapter, section 1.1. 167 Familière institution, 13. 168 For instance, see Machiavelli, The Prince (ch. 14), ed. by W. Connell, 84: “A wise prince should observe manners such as these, and never in peaceful times remain idle, but industriously make capital of them so as to be able to avail himself of them in adversities, so that fortune, when she changes, finds him prepared to resist them.” If on the one hand Machiavelli uses this image, on the other hand one should note that the reasoning of Machiavelli is very peculiar and differs from the philosophical tradition with rispect to the concept of Fortune, cf. Q. Skinner, The Foundations of Modern Political Thought (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1979), vol.I, 129.

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The former [how to “achieve a good way of life”] teach us what is either honorable or dishonest, or what is useful or damaging, which is sufficient in itself to be very good and greatly needed; however, for this to work, it must allow us to see how the ancients behaved, otherwise, the first part would render us so astonished that it would be impossible for us to reach the level of the virtuous. But being fired up by history, we do not find things difficult, as we see that others, in times passed, have ­succeeded.169 This argument generally recalls topics and themes of the humanist literary tradition, but it was made by Machiavelli in early writings on the militia such as the Cagione de la Ordinanza, as well as in the later major works like the Discourses on Livy and the preface to the Art of War. Another element that reveals the Art of War’s transmission into French cultures of war and its impact in the conception and making of the Légions can be found in Machiavelli’s critique of mercenaries. He thought that in post-Republic Rome, the citizen militia was turned into a professional army, separated from civil society, as he explains in the Art of War, book 1: For first Octavius, and then Tiberius, thinking more of their own power than of the public utility, began to disarm the Roman people so as to be able to command it more easily, and to keep those same armies continually at the frontiers of the Empire […] And because they then began freely to allow the men deputed in those armies to use the military for their art, their insolence suddenly arose from it, and they became formidable to the Senate and harmful to the Emperor.170 169

Familière institution, 13-14. Translation mine. Original version: “…excellens escripvains qui se soient entremps d’escrivre choses graves, remplies d’erudition, lesquels distinguent la façon de bien vivre en telle sorte, que l’une partie consiste en preceptes et maniere de soy bien gouverner et l’autre en histoires […] La premiere nous enseigne ce qu’est honorable ou deshonneste, ce qu’est utile, ou dommageable: la quelle convien que de soy se declaire assez pour très bonne et a nos grandement necessaire, neautmoins pour la mettre en oeuvre, si nous fault il congnoistre comment ils se sont conduicts les anciens, aultrement elle nous rendroit tellement estonéz qu’il nous se seroit impossible monter en ce degre que le verteux arrivent. Mais estànt eschauffés par l’histoire, n’estimons alcune chose difficile, puis que voyons quelque vung y estre aultresfois parvenu.” 170 Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 89), 17. Original version: “Ottaviano, prima, e poi Tiberio, pensando più alla potenza propria che all’utile publico, cominciarono a disarmare il popolo romano per poterlo più facilmente comandare, e a tenere continuamente quegli medesimi eserciti alle frontiere dello Imperio […] E perché allora ei cominciarono liberamente a permettere che gli uomini deputati in quelli eserciti usassero la milizia per loro arte, ne

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This was the cause of the corruption that finally led to the loss of liberty (“From which proceeded first the division of the Empire and ultimately its ruin”).171 Machiavelli then expresses one of his famous rules: Rome remained free for 400 years and was armed; Sparta for 800; many other cities have been unarmed and they have been free less than forty. For cities need arms; and when they do not have their own arms they hire foreigners. And foreign arms can do damage to the public good more quickly than one’s own, because they become corrupt more easily and can be used more quickly by a citizen who has become powerful. And, in part, he has material that is easier to manage, since he has to oppress unarmed men.172 A few years later, the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre – another work closely linked to the intellectual circle involved in conceiving the Légions – would draw on the same Machiavellian passages. The Instructions added lines that resemble Machiavelli’s pages on the role of the emperors Augustus (Gaius Octavius, or “Ottaviano” in Machiavelli’s language) and those who followed him, in professionalizing the army: Because after having reached the highest peak at the time of Augustus Caesar, the Roman Empire had a downturn [fell down, descended] when Roman citizens were expelled by host nations, as the Emperors relied on the force of mercenaries and of those who had been previously conquered.173 nacque subito la insolenza di quegli, e diventarono formidabili al senato e dannosi allo imperadore.” 171 Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 90), 18. Original version: “Dalle quali cose procedé, prima, la divisione dello Imperio e, in ultimo, la rovina di quello.” 172 Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 172-173), 24. Original version: “Stette Roma libera quattrocento anni, ed era armata; Sparta, ottocento; molte altre città sono state disarmate, e sono state libere meno di quaranta. Perché le città hanno bisogno delle armi; e quando non hanno armi proprie, soldano delle forestiere; e più presto noceranno al bene publico l’armi fore­ stiere, che le proprie, perché le sono più facili a corrompersi e più tosto uno cittadino che diventi potente se ne può valere; e parte ha più facile materia a maneggiare, avendo ad opprimere uomini disarmati.” 173 Instructions sur le faict de la guerre, b. I, ch. 1. Original version: “Car l’Émpire Romain apres auoir monté iusques au plus haut de la roue au temps d’Auguste Cesar print lors son tour quand les citoyens Romains furent reiectez des osts, que les Empereurs dresserent & qu’ils se fonderent sur la force des Mercenaires & de ceux qu’ils auoient autresfois surmontez.” That segment is identical in the 1553 edition, whereas it changes slightly in the 1592 edition: “Car l’Émpire de Rome apres auoir monté iusques au plus haut de la Roue au

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As Verrier explained, the Familière institution, too, draws from Machiavelli’s criticism of mercenaries. A reading of further sections of the anonymous book corroborates Verrier and provides further important clues to how this author builds on Machiavelli’s argument about cities that lost their liberty after taking somebody else’s arms to provide for their own military defense: […] many cities, kings and emperors who had called to their aid or service some foreign people found themselves in trouble […] some [the ‘cities’] have lost their liberty, and the others the state.174 However, it is important to focus more specifically on the impact of the Art of War on the Familière institution and the overall military and cultural program of the Légions. With their advent and the military humanism of the Art of War, the use of German and Swiss mercenaries diminished. In 1534, seven provincial militias of 6000 men each were stationed at the country’s frontiers.175 For the rest of the sixteenth century, equipping the nation with a permanent infantry was the constant preoccupation of the kings of France.176 The militia experiments envisaged by Francis I were actually the last in a series: after Louis XI temporarily abolished the francs-archers in 1481,177 his successors began a quest for a permanent infantry. Some experiments from 1503 onward, including those of the Marshal de Gié, show the persistence or

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temps d’Auguste commença de prendre son tour quand les Empereurs rebuterent de leurs armees les citoyens & naturels, & fe fonderent sur la force des Mercenaires & de ceux qu’ils auoient autresfois dontez.” According to Cooper, Litterae in tempore belli, 28, there are huge textual differences between the first edition and the 1592 version of the Instructions published as Discipline militaire and credited to du Bellay. However, no scholar has ever compared the two versions. The comparison between the two passages above reveals a shift in vocabulary from the medieval French “ost” in the 1548 Instructions (also used to translate Machiavelli’s “militia” into French by Charrier’s 1546 Art de la guerre), and the word “armée” in the 1592 Discipline militaire (for the term “ost,” see section above, “The first French translation of the Arte della guerra and the publication of French military treatises inspired by Machiavelli”). Familière institution, 6. Translation mine. Original version: “[…] plusieurs villes, roys et emperereurs aiant apellez en leur aide ou service quelque peuple estranger se sont mal trouveez […] en ont perdu la liberté, et les aultres l’estat.” Please note that Machiavelli uses the expression “perduto lo stato” (recalled by this passage of the Familière institution) in order to refer to those princes who lost their cities, at the end of book 2 of the Art of War (II, 313), 24: “The latter princes have no more time through having lost their states.” J.-M. Le Gall, “ François Ier et la guerre,” Réforme, Humanisme, Renaissance, n. 79 (2014): 35-63. However, for more precise numbers and description, see also Contamine, “Naissance de l’infanterie française,” 74. Contamine, “Naissance de l’infanterie française,” 64 See Potter, Renaissance France at War, 105.

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renovation of local military practices,178 but some developments resemble the military features and concepts found in Machiavelli’s works: the result was a contamination between tradition and innovation. Thus some relevant homegrown ideas about the militia and the military recall Machiavelli’s militia project. Because the confrontation on the fields of the Italian peninsula led to the circulation of military ideas, this kind of resemblance should not come as a surprise. In particular, as Philippe Contamine explains, although there were several calls for francs-archers in the 1520s, the real novelty in the construction of a French infantry was the recruitment of bands of “gens de pièd” during the first two decades of the century, the so-called “compagnons de guerre à pied”179 that overlapped with that of the francs-archers. It is fair to say that the stress on infantry originated from the spirit of the times, in which foot soldiers played an increasing role all over Europe, particularly during the Italian Wars. However, the earliest and probably most influential moment in the shift from military books focused on chivalry to new treatises focusing on infantry tactics came in Machiavelli’s works. In fact, after the publication the Art of War, infantry became the main concern of military writers. Frédérique Verrier has highlighted this point, demonstrating how the importance placed on infantry in the Familière institution is a true sign of the reception of Machiavelli’s writings into France. Verrier, however, relies on quotations from the Discourses and the Prince,180 when in Machiavelli’s works the most systematic expression of this argument is in the Art of War. Verrier does show the specific influence of Art of War on the 1534 Légions of Francis I as well as on the further militia reforms envisaged by Henry II (documented in a printed edition of the Ordonnance dating from 1558)181 by analyzing some topics pertaining to Machiavelli’s military doctrine. Nevertheless, in order to corroborate her work on the writings intended to promote the Légions, it is worth looking at specific elements of the practical and historical development of French militia battalions. This can be done by focusing on the original text of the first Ordonnance of Francis I (dated 24 July 1534 and transcribed from a manuscript by Jérémie de Billon in a book printed in Rouen in 1651),182 178 179 180 181

For an overview of these episodes, see ibid., 106-7. Contamine, “Naissance de l’infanterie française,” 72-73. Verrier, “Machiavel, X, Y et les Légions,” 261-262. Ordonnance du Roy sur le faict & reglement des Legionnaires (Paris: pour Iean Dallier […] et pour Vincent Sertenas […] à la Chancellerie, 1558). 182 “Ordonnances militaires touchant l’ordre, reglement, discipline, police & devoir de l’infanterie Françoise, avec leurs privileges. Le tuot diligentement recully du Code Henry, par le Capi­taine Sainct Chaman, Prevost du Regiment de Monsieur de Chappes,” attached to Jérémie de Billon, Les principes de l’art militaire, où il est sommairement traicté de la plus part des charges et des devoirs des hommes qui sont en une armée; Suite des principes de l’art

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rather than on the pamphlet of the Familière institution (dated 1536) intended to endorse it, which Verrier relied on and which is slightly different from the actual law.

…

We can begin with the Légions’ name itself, which echoes the revival and new interest in Roman military achievements inaugurated by the Art of War. But there are other, more specific aspects of the French experiment in infantry ­militia influenced by the Art of War and Machiavelli’s early writings on the militia in the Ordonnance. Machiavelli wanted the militiamen to stay home when not called into action, although they did have to attend regular Sunday trainings. The Machiavellian project, like the ones carried out in France from 1503 on, did more than create a virtuous infantry built on men who wanted glory and were motivated to defend or fight for their country. It also cost less to maintain a part-time militia than a permanent force.183 The Francs-archers of the late fifteenth century were paid all year long.184 The costs of the permanent battalions desired by Louis XI were so high that the project was abandoned in 1483 after the king’s death.185 After the formation of the so-called new bands of aventuriers, men were recruited on a part-time model, and by the 1520s, century infantry-battalions were only paid for the duration of a campaign.186 Despite some modifications – which tended to revert to the original model of granting tax exemptions to the Francs-archers and made them more costly militaire, où il est amplement traicté des devoirs du sergent-major (Rouen: chez Iean Berthelin, dans la court du Palais, 1641), 5-26: from now onwards quoted as “Ordonnance by François I à Sainct Germain en Laye, le 24 Iulliet 1534.” 183 For the revolutionary financial changes that the militia project of Machiavelli brought about for the Florentine republic, see L.F. Marks, “La crisi finanziaria a Firenze dal 1494 al 1502,” Archivio Storico Italiano, CXII (1954); S. Bertelli, “Pier Soderini ‘vexillifer perpetuus reipublicae florentinae’ 1502-1512,” in Renaissance studies in honor of Hans Baron, ed. by A. Molho and J. A. Tedeschi (Florence: Sansoni, 1971), 350-351; A. Molho, “The State and Public finance: A Hypothesis based on the History of Late Medieval Florence,” The Journal of Modern History 67, Supplement The origins of the State in Italy 1300-1600, (1995): 97-135; J. Barthas, “Machiavelli, from the Dieci to the Nove. A hypothesis based on the financial history of early modern Florence,” in From Florence to the Mediterranean and beyond: essays in honour of Anthony Molho, ed. by D. Ramada Curto et alia (Florence: Olschki, 2009): 147-166; id. L’argent n’est pas le nerf de la guerre. Commentaire historique et critique sur ces paroles de Machiavel, (Rome: Collection de l’École Française de Rome, 2012), XII, 18 ff. & 173-179. 184 Potter, Renaissance France at War, 108. 185 Ibid., 106. 186 Ibid., 109.

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than the 1510s and 1520s experiments discussed by David Potter – the 1534 Légions of Francis I were less costly in times of peace, as their exemption from the taille (the direct tax on the French peasantry and non-nobles) was very limited (c. 4 l.t.) and the legionnaires were only reimbursed for their biannual presence at the review. (They were paid higher wages [c. 5 l.t.] at times of war).187 The idea was to deal with the problems of quality and organization in previous recruitments by creating a compromise between old traditions and new needs. However, with respect to the possible mutual influence between Machiavelli’s military doctrine and these French militia experiments, one should consider that a comparative reading of the texts dedicated to establishing and promoting this 1534 Ordonnance and the Florentine secretary’s writings reveals important similarities. Consider the tools suggested by both texts to stimulate the infantry Légions. Machiavelli pointed out in both his 1506 Cagione de la ordinanza and the Art of War the necessity – both practical and moral – of letting militiamen hope for some form of reward. Similarly, the men of the Légions, as explained in the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre, should have been attracted “by hope of some future reward and honor, as well as by some ben­ efits that must be promised to those that will do their duties, and by the fact that during the time of their service they have the means to make a decent living.”188 Despite the fact that this resembled some of the approaches already adopted by the Francs-archers, the importance given to the fiscal exemptions adopted for the légionnaires was, arguably, intended to motivate them practically, thus aligning it with Machiavelli’s project. The same can be said of the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre. Regardless of the differences between these features of the Instructions and the actual implementation of the Légions that Potter pointed out,189 fiscal exemptions up to a taille of 20 solds appear in the first paragraphs of the opening chapter of both the 1534 and the 1558 Ordonnances’ texts, as if it was among the first measures that the French authorities substantially considered:

187 188

Ibid., 112-113, but see also Contamine, “Naissance de l’infanterie française,” 75-76. Instructions sur le faict de la guerre (b. I, ch. 1), 7v. Translation is mine. Original version: “Et a celle fine que ceste force ne mal contentast personne, il les y fauldroit attirer sur une esperance de quelque bien et honneur advenir et de quelques privileges que l’on prometteroit a ceulx qui feroient leur devoir, et que, pendant le temps qu’ilz serviroient, ilz eussent honnestement de quoy s’entretenir : par ce moyen n’y auroit personne qui se feit tirer l’oreille.” Cf. Contamine, “Naissance de l’infanterie française,” 83. 189 Potter, Renaissance France at War, 116-117.

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The footmen and chiefs will be free and exempt from all taxes and tributes. And where there will be men enrolled accustomed of paying taille higher than twenty solds per year, they will be exempt only for the aforementioned sum.190 Other shared practical details are the recruitment of 6000 infantrymen from each province in the legions of 1534, as Machiavelli, following the Roman tradition, suggested. It is notable, moreover, that both the pamphlet Familière institution and the text of the Ordonnance have sections devoted to the general review and parade of the Légions. A paragraph of the 1534 Ordonnance stated that: “All of the Légions will parade and review twice a year in times of peace, each one on its own in a place that will be noticed and ordered.”191 Similarly, the Familière institution dedicates a chapter to this theme, notable for its extensive use of capital letters, so many as to fill almost an entire page (one of the longest among the sections in uppercase characters).192 These details concerning the review of the Légions allow consideration of the possibility that the author of the first Ordonnance for Francis I was either directly or indirectly aware of Machiavelli’s Militia Act of 1506, known as Provisione de la Ordinanza, which stipulated that general review and parade of the militia battalions as a whole should take place precisely twice a year: “[The ­officers of the militia] shall each year twice, one in February the other in

190

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“Ordonnance by François I à Sainct Germain en Laye, le 24 Iulliet 1534,” 7. Translation mine. Original version: “Les quelz gens de pied & chefz seront enteriement francs & exemptez de toutes tailles & tribus pourueu toutesfois qu’il ne sera enrollé homme es bendes desdictes legions qui ayt accostumé de paier tailles plus hault de vingt solz par an. Et là ou aucuns d’eux auroient accostumé de payer plus grosse somme que les dits 20 sols, en ce cas ils ne seront quittes & exempts que de la dite somme tant seulement.” Ordonnance du Roy sur le faict & reglement des Legionnaires (1558 eds.), non-numbered pages: article 3. Original version: “Les quelz gens de pied & chefz seront enteriement francs & exemptez de toutes tailles & tribus pourueu toutesfois qu’il ne sera enrollé homme es bendes desdictes legions qui ayt accostumé de paier tailles plus hault de vingt solz par an.” Cf. Contamine, “Naissance de l’infanterie française,” 75; Potter, Renaissance France at War, 112-113. For a discussion of this topic in Machiavelli’s 1506 Ordinanza, cf. Guidi, Un Segretario militante, 274-75 & 333, and chapter 2 of this book; for the same topic in the Art of War, see chapter 4. “Ordonnance by François I à Sainct Germain en Laye, le 24 Iulliet 1534,” 11. Translation is mine. Italics added. Original version: “Tous lesquelles légions feront deux fois l’an leurs monstres en temps de paix, chacune à part au lieu qui sera advisé & ordonné.” Familière institution, 50 ff.

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September, whatever day they like, make general review of the battalions.”193 The resemblance to the Ordonnance here could be coincidental. Nevertheless, since this paragraph is one of the few that underwent slight modifications with the second project of an infantry militia of 1558 by Henry II (which said that the review could be once or twice a year), one can imagine that this mechanism was not inherited from local tradition. Briefly, the original system adopted by the 1534 reform might have drawn on Machiavelli on this point, while by the 1558 Ordonnance new needs had led to modifications.194  4

Spanish Provinces: The Uses and the Misuses of Machiavelli by European Sovereigns

The territorial militia units created in Spanish Italy throughout the second half of the sixteenth century seem to have been part of a general response to new military needs, one that drew extensively books such as the Art of War. The Iberian engagement in and contribution to the publication of books and pamphlets on military reform begins as early as that of the French. Particularly relevant to this study is the 1536 publication of the Tratado de re militari by Diego de Salazar, which drew heavily from the Art of War. The early publication of this work – before the translation of Machiavelli’s book into any other European language – shows how quickly Spain received Machiavelli’s military doctrine. A clear sign that the new ideas ignited by the Art of War had reached the Iberian Peninsula is the discussion on the military virtues of the ancients, which took place in the decades that followed the publication of Salazar’s book.195 193 N. Machiavelli, “Provisione della Ordinanza,” in id., L’arte della guerra. Scritti politici minori (“Edizione Nazionale delle Opere,” vol. III), ed. J.-J. Marchand, G. Masi, D. Fachard (Rome: Salerno editrice 2001), 487. Translation mine. Original version: “Debbino ogni anno 2 volte, l’una del mese di febbraio, l’altra del mese di settembre, in quale dí di detti mesi loro parrà, fare mostre grosse di tutte le loro bandiere.” 194 Cf. Ordonnance du Roy sur le faict & reglement des Legionnaires (1558 eds.), non-numbered pages: article 1, comma 8: “Tous lesquelles légions feront une ou deux fois l’an leurs monstres en temps de paix.” Italics added. 195 Cf. Saúl Martínez Bermejo, “Antigua disciplina: el ejemplo romano en los tratados militares ibéricos, c. 1560-1600,” Hispania LXXIV, n. 247 (2014): 357-384. Martínez Bermejo (ibid., 360), insists on the “double circulation” of the Art of War and the classical sources on which Machiavelli drew. However, the discussion about the relationship between theory and practice (cf. ibid., 362-363) certainly originated from the circulation and assimilation of Machiavelli’s novel thesis about the usefulness of reading the ancient sources, rather than from reading them directly. Anglo, Machiavelli, 528, has noted that “in a sense, Machiavelli” is “merely one arch of” the “bridge” built by the influence of Vegetius on

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The influence of the Art of War on the composition of Salazar’s Tratado and other Spanish military treatises of the time is not the only practical outcome of the diffusion of Machiavelli’s ideas through Iberian military culture. The creation of the territorial militia units in Spanish Italy, for instance, appears, on one hand, to be a pragmatic solution to the high costs of having to defend distant provinces, and, on the other, as the practical result of an ongoing debate about the military and the concept and functions of the militia. Another reason for the institution of local battalions of a part-time militia in Spanish Italy was the need for an increasingly large army capable of fighting the new type of war and defending the expanded territory under the monarchy’s control while the bulk of its forces were fighting elsewhere. The part-time militia model gave governments the ability to respond to these new needs while limiting the high cost of an army recruited on a voluntary basis. The sovereigns of France, Spain and, at a later stage, England had to opt for conscription, because it was less expensive.196 Whereas the militias in these nations were used mainly for defensive purposes, the battalions of the Spanish army fighting in Flanders were recruited from Spain’s Italian territories on an entirely voluntary system based on recruitment by commission, not by compulsion.197 Although methods of recruitment and military purposes varied, there is a common thread of the return to militia, with Machiavelli its source. The direct connection between the ideas propagated by Machiavelli’s book and the institutional framework of the new Spanish territorial battalions shows in the terminology of the law about the establishment of the militia in Sicily from the second half of the sixteenth century onward: “Ordinationi […] della militia di questo […] regno de Sicilia fatte per noi Juan de Vega [...] 1 Febrero, XII Ind. 1554,” AGS, Estado, leg. 1122, f. 51).198 The word “ordinationi” is key here. While it was a simple administrative term used in Spain, France and Italy at the time, it recalls the moment in the Art of War when Fabrizio Colonna gives the reader an indication of the book’s subject, i.e. “ordinare una military thinking. Nonetheless, the same scholar has explained that in several instances, the influence of Machiavelli’s modification of Vegetius is “unmistakable” (ibid.), and that “Machiavelli served as an intermediary between the ancients and their Renaissance imitators” (540). 196 This is the thesis advanced by L. Pezzolo, “Le ‘arme proprie’ in Italia nel Cinque e Seicento: problemi di ricerca,” in Saggi di storia economica. Studi in onore di Amelio Tagliaferri, ed. by T. Fanfani (Pisa: Pacini, 1998), 55-72. 197 G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659. The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge Studies in Early Modern History, Paperback edition, Cambridge University Press 1975 [1972]), 35-39. 198 Cf. V. Favarò, “Dalla ‘nuova milizia’ al tercio spagnolo: la presenza militare nella Sicilia di Filippo II,” Mediterranea. Ricerche Storiche, IV (2005): 238.

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milizia” (“to organize a militia,” literally “to put a militia in order”).199 The word, in fact, directly reminds us of Fabrizio’s suggestion to raise the military force literally “by means of an ordinance” (“per via d’ordinanza”).200 Machiavelli’s word use clearly refers to the “ordinanza,” “similar to that which is in our countries,” as the character of Cosimo Rucellai says to Colonna in their dialogue;201 i.e. similar to the 1506 Florence militia conceived by Machiavelli and known at the time as “Ordinanza per la milizia.”202 Machiavelli’s readers know well how his political and military discourse is based on the polysemic and constant use of “ordinanza,” “ordini” and the verb “ordinare.”203 This same language was regularly used by the Spanish authorities for legislation about the new militia units of Italy, like the Neapolitan “Ordenanças de la milizia” of 1563.204 The idea of the Romans as a model of perfect military discipline and virtue, which is at the core of Machiavelli’s military doctrine, also spread all over the

199

This expression comes at both the beginning and the end of the work, in books 1 & 7, Machiavelli, L’arte della guerra. Scritti politici minori (I, 218 & VII, 181), 69 & 280: “ordinare una milizia.” Translation mine. Please note that modern English versions of the original Machiavellian expression (such as “to order a military”) can be misleading, as they do not focus on the concept of a ‘militia’, cf. for instance, the modern edition by C. Lynch: Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 147), 22; (I, 218), 28 (VII, 181), 159. 200 Diego de Salazar, Tratado de re militari, hecho a manera de dialogo […] (quoted from the Brussels: 1590 edition, page 9), uses exactly this expression by Machiavelli. Again, modern English versions of Machiavelli may not allow a full understanding of the original ex­ pression (for instance, Lynch translates this passage with “By way of militia” Art of War [I.104], 19). In contrast, in the first English version of the book (1560), Peter Whitehorne correctly translated “By waie of ordinaunce,” N. Machiavelli, The Arte of Warre, written first in Italian by Nicholas Machiavell and set forthe in Englishe by Peter Whitehorne student at Graies Inne (London: 1560), 41 (quote from the 1905 reprint by David Nutt, London: Long Acre). 201 Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 148), 22. 202 See the writings known as “La Cagione dell’Ordinanza” and “Provisione della Ordinanza,” in N. Machiavelli, L’arte della guerra. Scritti politici minori, 466-492. 203 Many scholars have studied the uses of the term “ordini” in Machiavelli. To mention a few, J.H. Whitfield, “On Machiavelli’s Use of Ordini,” Italian Studies, 10 (1955): 19-39, DOI: 10.1179/its.1955.10.1.19; J. Najemy, “Arti and Ordini in Machiavelli’s Istorie fiorentine,” in Essays presented to Myron P Gilmore, ed. S. Bertelli and G. Ramakus (Florence: La Nuova Italia, 1978), 161-191; J.-J. Marchand, “Les institutions (ordini), les lois et les mœurs (costumi) chez Machiavel,” in Langues et écritures de la république et de la guerre. Études sur Machiavel, ed. by A. Fontana, J.-L. Fournel, X. Tabet, and J.-C. Zancarini (Genova: Name edizioni, 2004), 259-274. For a recent overview on this topic, see R. Ruggiero, “Ordini e leggi,” in Enciclopedia machiavelliana, vol. 2 (Rome: Treccani, 2014), 251-257. 204 Cf. V. Favarò, La modernizzazione militare nella Sicilia di Filippo II, Quaderni, Mediterranea. Ricerche Storiche, X (2009), 87. Italics mine.

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Spanish territories.205 It is well-known how some passages from the Prince on the positive rewards of military discipline and training were emphasized by Iberian readers such as Juan Pablo Mártir Rizo.206 The emphasis Juan de Vega placed on military review and training in his 1554 project for the militia battalions of Sicily, including the need for regular troop review – often on their own, and annually with all of the battalions in the province207 – recalls the mechanisms of the 1506 Florentine Ordinanza and seems to build on the Art of War’s insistence on discipline and training.208 In the 1570s, when the Viceroy of Sicily, the duke of Terranova, wrote a report on the progress of the new militia, he again insisted on the necessity of reinforcing military training and discipline by means of a Commander-in-chief (Capitano generale).209 This choice refers to the general problem of discipline and drill that Machiavelli addressed in the Art of War by drawing from a feature of the ancient military doctrine. Terranova also apparently followed another distinctive Machiavellian precept: According to Machiavelli’s military thinking in the Art of War and elsewhere, a good captain capable of giving an example of glory and virtue to his men was one of the secrets to ancient military success. The appointment of a Commander-in-chief had been a major point of concern for Machiavelli when he was working on the reforms connected to the implementation of the Florentine militia,210 and the subject is at the core of a minor piece he wrote in 1511 suggesting Jacopo Savelli be appointed general commander of the Ordinanza.211

…

Compared to other provinces, the Spanish territorial militias of Italy were unusual in their more systematic nature and the scale of their recruitment. Like 205 Cf. Martínez Bermejo, “Antigua disciplina”; F. Jacob, G. Visoni-Alonzo, The Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe: A Revision (London: Palgrave, 2016), 76. 206 Cf. K.D. Howard, The Reception of Machiavelli in Early Modern Spain (Woodbridge: Tamesis, 2014), 139. 207 Favarò, La modernizzazione militare; also ead., “Dalla ‘nuova milizia’ al tercio spagnolo,” 240 ff. The topics of discipline and training are discussed throughout Machiavelli’s Art of War. 208 For an account of the importance assigned to review and drill in the 1506 militia by Machia­velli, cf. Guidi, “Dall’Ordinanza per la Milizia al Principe: ‘ordine de’ Tedeschi’ e ‘­ordine terzo’ delle fanterie in Machiavelli.” Bollettino di Italianistica, y. 12, n. 1 (2015): 9-10. 209 Cf. Favarò La modernizzazione militare, 95 210 Cf. Guidi, Un Segretario militante, 277-288. 211 “Ghiribizzo circa Iacopo Savello,” in Machiavelli, L’arte della guerra. Scritti politici minori, 534-540.

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the Florentine militia conceived by Machiavelli, the organization of the militia in Sicily drew from an established tradition and brought unprecedented changes in both its size and systematization.212 The fact that the Sicilian ordnances for a militia changed the Island’s military organization so much show that the operation must have been supported not solely for political and pragmatic motives, but also because of strong ideological and cultural input. This is even more notable when one considers that the Sicilian battalions continued to be recruited for decades, even though they were not, from a strictly military perspective, effective. Indeed, there are Spanish governors’ reports that repeatedly highlighted their failures. The Spanish authorities’ persistence in recruiting local militias in Italy can thus be connected to the long-lived effects of the diffusion of Machiavelli’s ideas into both the cultural and the political environments of early modern Europe. The circulation of Machiavelli’s books in Spain, as in the rest of Europe, is a multifaceted phenomenon. Among the key features that characterized the Machiavelli’s reception, we must note the practice of removing the ideology of the militia and focusing instead on practical goals. Increased opposition to the anti-Christian aspects and other controversial elements in Machiavelli’ work meant re-use and re-writing, often focused on diluting the ideology of his original ideas on the militia. There is a double process at work: on one side the story of the militia in the Spanish provinces reveals the persistence of local military traditions. On the other, it documents the process by which the increasingly powerful sovereign used the militia to consolidate its power in these provinces. Particularly in southern Italy, this process came from a policy of including local baronies and their military forces in the state, although these goals were not always fully achieved in Sicily.213 The militia model was a way to include local powers and authorities in the administration of war and the

212 Favarò La modernizzazione militare, 90, follows this reasoning about the significance of the Sicilian case, although she seems to ignore the relevance of both the Machiavellian and Venetian experiments in a local part-time militia, as well as the French legions of Francis I in the early decades of the sixteenth century. 213 R. Ajello, “Dominazione spagnola e Principati italiani al tempo di Filippo II. Il fallimento dello Stato nel Mezzogiorno e le società regionali patrizie,” Frontiera d’Europa, 5 (1999/1), 66-67, Favarò, La modernizzazione militare, 90-98, and D. Ligresti, Le armi dei Siciliani. Cavalleria, guerra e moneta nella Sicilia spagnola (secoli XV-XVII), Quaderni, Mediterranea. Ricerche Storiche, X (2013), 87, explained there were some resistances to the introduction of the “new militia” in the second half of the sixteenth-century, and the experiment ended up in a failure.

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military, to keep them in dialogue with the capital and the monarchy.214 Moreover, despite their poor military value, these battalions helped reinforce the military capability of the provinces by ensuring the presence of a relatively stable military force. Without requiring a huge financial outlay, these forces still provided at least a first line of defense against enemy invasion.215 The structure of the militia battalions of the Spanish provinces of Italy was, however, a corruption of Machiavelli’s original idea of a part-time militia raised by conscription. The recruitment he envisaged had a two-step process, first general enrollment, then, and far more important, the selection (“deletto”) of the most virtuous men, which would not happen until the drill exercises.216 Thus the militias of Spanish Italy only partially resembled the powerful ‘popular army’ conceived by Machiavelli and must be seen as a tool – first for the Spanish monarchy to ensure a cheap defensive military force, next to create a process of exchange with local authorities and powers to coopt them into the state.217 Although inspired by a model that drew from the Art of War and was connected to local military traditions, military reforms such as the ones in Spanish Italy were intended first and foremost to enhance the monarchy’s control over the state. This crucial divergence from the original Machiavellian idea of the people in arms led to a corruption of the ideological message embedded in this concept. This process started even before the Machiavelli’s death, an early sign of the so-called Machiavellism. Probably the reason for the failure of these militia experiments (which often proved inefficient in battle) was that they could not be effective without the moral dimension that is central to the ideology of Machiavelli and that only political and social reform could have stimulated.

214

A process which has been clearly associated to seventeenth-century France by W. Beik, Absolutism and Society in Seventeenth-Century France. State Power and Provincial Aristocracy in Languedoc (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985). Cf. also Pezzolo, “La rivoluzione militare,” 15-62. For the case of Spain, cf. S. Brunet – J. Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, Introduction to Les milices dans la première modernité (Rennes: Presse Universitaries de Rennes, 2015), 15-17. 215 According to G. Hanlon, “La guerre des milices dans l’Italie du nord au debut de la guerre franco-espagnole (1635-1637),” in Les milices dans la première modernité, 118-119, these militias were used for temporary defensive purposes only: paid professional soldiers were too expensive to be used for this kind of purposes. 216 Cf. G. Masi, “Arte della guerra,” in Enciclopedia machiavelliana, vol. 1 (Rome: Treccani, 2014), 117. 217 A process that in Sicily was directly related to the creation of a light cavalry militia, to which the nobles should have contributed the most, cf. Ligresti, Le armi dei Siciliani, 99.

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This divergence began with the early readers of Machiavelli who helped convert the original concept of a militia as a popular army fighting for the benefit of the state, a people in arms defending its own liberty or simply their own “patria” (at least that is what they should have felt, according to Machiavelli), to the basic idea of military exercises to keep youngsters from politically dangerous behaviors, along with the method of re-using and re-shaping considered earlier with the example of the Discours de la police. The result would be, in the words Lodovico Alamanni addressed to the Medici, to turn the young generations from citizens to ‘courtesans.’218 The dismantling of the militia’s ideological and political role of a popular army fighting for its own liberty was also achieved through judicial tools, specifically the central authority’s power to call and dismiss militiamen at will.219 In France, the calling of militias in case of war, as well as their dismissal in a time of peace, was the instrument by which the monarchy was simultaneously able to implement a practice of distribution of honors and privileges to local authorities and develop policies to ensure social and political order. In this way, while in early-modern republican contexts such as the United Provinces, the militia was associated with the fight against absolutism and for national independence, it was slowly absorbed and transformed by European monarchies into something aimed at sustaining both the growing power of the state and the institutional and political interactions between the central authorities and the peripheries of the country (or the local communities). Early-modern sovereigns brought about continuous change in institutional and judicial rules, radically changing the role and function of the militia in the state. The monarchs achieved this by removing any possible influence of militias on politics, either by calling them only at the time of war and dismissing them soon afterwards,220 or by splitting them into different military corps. As in the 218

Cf. the discourse addressed by Lodovico Alamanni, an early reader of Machiavelli, to the Medici in 1516, known as “Discorso di Lodovico Alamanni sopra il fermare lo stato di Firenze nella devozione de’Medici,” in Albertini, 383: “E giovani facilmente si divezzarebbono da questa civiltà [i.e. the “free way of life” ensured by the previous popular regime] et assuefarebbonsi alli costumi cortesani, se ’l principe volessi.” In order to do so, continues Alamanni, in particular “quelli che fussino apti alla militia, potrebbe mettere fra le sue genti d’arme in compagnia di molti altri fiorentini che vi sono d’ogni ragione…” (italics added). 219 Cf. Les milices dans la première modernité, 15-17. 220 A similar scenario, according to which the monarchy was free to transgress laws and rules in dealing with these militias, is applied to the case of the Spanish provinces by S. García, “Milices locales et defense de la monarchie espagnole : le Pays Basque sous le regne de Philippe II (1556-1598),” in Les milices dans la première modernité, 138.

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Southern provinces of Italy, this separation (e.g. the companies of Barons, the light infantry, and the territorial and the urban battalions) increased the central authorities’ ability to control them and impose strict rules so they could not be used against the political and social order. 5

 The Long-Standing Influence of the Art of War. Training and Discipline in the Late Sixteenth Century. The War in the Flanders and the Militia in England

The Art of War’s influence on experiments with militias in early-modern Europe extends at least until the end of the sixteenth century. Machiavelli’s precepts about the mechanisms of infantry battle formations and training and discipline continued to shape military thought, even after the spread of firearms. In fact, for decades the example of the Roman legions influenced not only military treatises, but also the development of European military organizations, since discipline and perfect combination were necessary features of infantry battle formations at a time when fire weapons were difficult to recharge, requiring men to switch their positions simultaneously to sustain a relatively rapid rate of fire. In Iberian culture, the focus on military discipline was increasingly embedded in the construction of the Spanish Empire.221 The most relevant example of this process is in the way both sides’ conduct in the war in Flanders reflects their focus on the concepts of training and severity found in Machiavelli’s book.222 This argument is still a topic of debate. According to Sidney Anglo, the practical reforms initiated by Maurice of Nassau and his cousins cannot be related to specific aspects of the classical foundations of military theory.223 Nonetheless, Maurice’s correspondence clearly documents that he studied the classical foundations of military thinking, and that this study was linked to effective reforms that directly affected new infantry battle techniques.224 This can be seen in a letter Willem Lodewijk, Count of Nassau-Dillenburg wrote Maurice containing a long discussion of Aelianus’ and Leo’s books on tactics, which Lodewijk had earlier sent to Maurice.225 In fact, as Geoffrey Parker has 221 222 223 224 225

Cf. F.R. Rodríguez de la Flor, “Maquiavelo en Flandes. El Arte de la guerra del Florentino y las ‘armas de España’, Revista de la Sociedad de Estudios Italianistas 9 (2013): 167-168. For a recent analysis of this topic, see ibid., 159-177. Cf. Anglo, Machiavelli, 570. Cf. Rothenberg, “Maurice of Nassau,” 37 ff. Willem Lodewijk of Nassau to Maurice of Nassau, Groningen, 8/18 December 1594, partial edition Archives ou correspondance inédite de la maison d`Orange, ed. by G. van Prinsterer,

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documented, this letter is the origin of a new military technique that revolutionized the use of firearms on the battlefields of modern Europe: the so-called volley fire.226 The count’s comments on Aelianus and Leo in the letter reveal how important Roman infantry tactics were to “shape a battalion” according to this model, albeit somewhat revised in light of new military needs. Maurice of Nassau’s reforms, therefore, were actually based on ancient tactics laid out in the books of Aelianus and Leo emperor.227 Battle formations inspired by the Romans order of hastati, principes, and triarii were used on the field to find the combination that made for the most efficient volley.228 The very same military formations Machiavelli had scrutinized in his Art of War seven decades earlier, when hand firearms were much less efficient than they would become, which is why he focused on the pike rather than the arquebus. (So much for Machiavelli’s alleged military incompetence). Incidentally, Aelianus has been associated by scholars such as John R. Hale, Sidney Anglo, and, more recently, Gabriele Pedullà and others, with Machiavelli’s propensity for conceptualizing the mechanisms of infantry battle formations in geometric structures, as well as to his decision to include diagrams at

vol. I, 1584-99 (Utrecht: Kemink et fils., 1857), 334-36; complete edition by G. Parker, “The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs: Maurice of Nassau, the Battle of Nieuwpoort (1600), and the Legacy,” The Journal of Military History, 71 (2007): 331-372. The work mentioned by the count Willem Lodewijk of Nassau-Dillenburg is Cl. Aeliani, et Leonis Imp. Tactica, Sive De instruendis aciebus. The first edition of this book (a very bad one from a textual/philological perspective) was published in 1532; the next, much better, was by Franciscus Robortellus (Venice: 1552). Source W. Smith (ed.), A Dictionary of Greek and Roman biography and mythology, accessed online October 2017: . For a translation into Latin by Theodorus Gaza, see H. Köchly – W. Rüstow, Griechische Kriegsschriftsteller, vol. II.1 (Leipzig: Engelmann, 1855), 209 passim. 226 Parker, “The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs,” 338-341. For another recent discussion on the relationship between Count Willem Lodewijk and Maurice of Nassau, cf. also Schwager, Militärtheorie, 196 ff.; see especially p. 211 for the presence of Aelinaus’ book in Maurice’s library, and 227 ff. for a discussion about the reception of Aealinaus’ tactics. 227 Cf. Parker, “The Limits to Revolutions in Military Affairs,” 338-341; and Rothenberg, “Maurice of Nassau,” 41. On the influence of Aelianus on the Netherlandish military reformers, see also V. Ilari, “Imitatio, Restitutio, Utopia: la storia militare antica nel pesiero strategico moderno,” in Ermattung. Combat pour l’histoire militaire dans un pays refractaire, 2011, 89 ff., accessed online March 2018: . 228 Cf. J.-P. Bois, “Guerre antique, guerre moderne : un dialogue nécessaire” in Dialogue militaire entre Anciens et Modernes, ed. by J.-P. Bois (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2004) accessed online May 2018 .

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the end of the book.229 In Hale’s words, Machiavelli’s use of diagrams “set new standards” for Europe.230 One can add that since Jean Charrier’s first French translation of the Art of War in 1546, Machiavelli’s book was immediately associated with the classical military theory of a Greek who studied the Roman army, as we find this edition issued with Onasander’s Strategikos.231 A work, not surprisingly, mentioned in Leo’s Tactica.232 Further, Charrier’s preface explicitly drew from Machiavelli’s suggestion that one needs to renovate ancient military craft and discipline to create a good militia, mentioning many writers praised and acclaimed by the Florentine: not only Aelianus and Onasander, but also Frontinus, Vegetius and others.233 Relatedly, the first English translation of Onasander was by the same Peter Whytehorne who, only three years earlier, had translated the Art of War.234 Evidently Maurice of Nassau, one of the greatest military reformers of his time, studied the classical foundations of military tactics exactly as Machiavelli did in the Art of War. This underscores the fact that Machiavelli’s book was a forerunner in the re-discovery of ancient military thinking, and that the same reflections on the best possible tactics of infantry battle formations were made by Machiavelli and again by military commanders a century later, as they were using the same sources.

…

Further evidence of the impact of the model of discipline and drill that the Art of War most famously epitomized is in the development of the English militia in the same period. This militia, was better trained to march in short ranks 229 See J.R. Hale, “A humanistic visual aid. The military diagram in the Renaissance,” Renaissance Studies, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1988): 285; and especially I. Eramo, “Disegni di guerra. La tradi­ zione dei diagrammi tattici greci nell’Arte della guerra di Niccolò Machiavelli,” in Scienza antica in età moderna. Teoria e immagini, ed. by V. Maraglino (Rome: Carocci, 2012), 41. Also, G. Pedullà, “Machiavelli the Tactician: Math, Graphs, and Knots in the Art of War,” in F. Del Lucchese, ‎F. Frosini, ‎V. Morfino (ed.), The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language (Leiden: Brill, 2015), 87 ff. 230 J.R. Hale, “Printing and Military Culture of Renaissance Venice,” 447. 231 L’art de la guerre composé par Nicolas Machiavelli; l’éstat aussi et charge d’un lieutenant géneral d’armée, par Onosander, ancien philosophe platonique, trans. by J. Charrier (Paris: Jean Barbé, 1546). Cf. Ilari, “Imitatio, Restitutio, Utopia,” 97. 232 Cf. introduction to Onasander, Strategikos (Cambridge: Loeb Classical Library edition, Harvard University Press, 1928). 233 Charrier, introduction to L’art de la guerre, 3. 234 Onosandro Platonico, of the generall captaine and of his office, translated out of Greke into Italyan by Fabio Cotta, a Romayne; and out of Italyan into Englysh by Peter Whytehorne (London: William Seres, 1563).

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(shot in front, followed by pikes, billmen and halberdiers, drums and fife in the middle, more pikes and shot in the back) than is usually thought, particularly the battalions known as the “trained bands.”235 These men were expected to react to “orders for manoeuvres” (such as the one for withstanding a cavalry charge and so on) sounded by drummers, who also counted “Italian variations” among the many themes they played.236 In fact, these English militia experiments are also connected with the new European military culture ignited by the circulation of the Art of War and the later military literature that insisted on the concepts of discipline and training and on the revival of the Greek and Roman military traditions on which Machiavelli had founded his ideal army.237 The significance of this theoretical reflection emerged in British military thinking from the second decade of the sixteenth century on.238 There is concrete evidence that people and governors who had read Machiavelli had a specific role in the creation of the English militia. As John R. Hale has explained, England had no standing professional force. After 1544, increasing tensions in Europe, the revolt in the kingdom, and the monarchy’s growing power over feudal lords lead to the raising of levies.239 A group of English military treatises that can be ascribed to the last period of the reign of Henry VIII, recently studied by James Raymond, included charts and tables similar to those in the Art of War. The treatises also express a “preference for selection in military recruitment” and focus on regular training and obedience, features that could well have been the result of reading Vegetius, as Raymond has suggested, but that were also at the core of Machiavelli’s book. This same scholar, in fact, mentioned the Art of War as a possible source for the author or authors of the manuscripts, even though he explains that there is no direct evidence to confirm this hypothesis.240 Indeed, one must agree with Raymond that “an amalgam of different people’s ideas, experiences and scholarship” was probably involved in producing these manuscripts. Still, it was in this atmosphere of the revival of a national force, sanctioned by the 1558 Militia Act, that Peter Whitehorne began his translation of the Art of War. In 1560, Whitehorne dedicated this translation 235 L. Boynton, The Elizabethan Militia, 1558-1638 (London/Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1967), 113 & 117-118. 236 Cf. ibid., 118 237 For this aspect see also J. Raymond, Henry VIII’s Military Revolution: The Armies of Sixteenth-Century Britain and Europe (London-New York: Tauris, 2007), 67. 238 Cf. ibid., 76. 239 Ian F.W. Beckett, The Amateur Military Tradition, 1558-1945 (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1991), 18-19 240 Raymond, Henry VIII’s Military Revolution, 10.

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to Queen Elizabeth.241 From this point on, the work strongly influenced Tudor commanders.242 The annotations that Gabriel Harvey, a contemporary reader, made to a copy of the 1560 Peter Whitehorne translation, especially his list of authors of military writings, which included Caesar, Vegetius, and Machiavelli, confirm that after the first English translation, this work was officially grouped with books considered the kind of literature every English soldier or commentator should consult to design a battle formation.243 This does not mean, however, that the revival of the ancient military tactics ignited by the Art of War had not reached England earlier, before its translation into English, either as part of a new cultural wave or through exchanges and discussions among the soldiers and the commanders who fought on the battlefields of Italy and Europe. 241

Cf. J.R. Hale, “On a Tudor Parade Ground: the Captain’s Handbook of Henry Barrett 1562,” in id., Renaissance War Studies (London: The Hambledon Press, 1983), 247; H. Webb, Elizabethan Military Science: The Books and the Practice (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press, 1965), 4-13. 242 A.J. Hodgkins, Rebellion and Warfare in the Tudor State: Military Organisation, Weaponry, and Field Tactics in Mid-Sixteenth Century England (PhD Thesis, University of Leeds, 2013), 42, 121. 243 Cf. Grafton & Jardine, “Studied for Action: How Gabriel Harvey Read His Livy,” Past and Present 129 (1990): 74.

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Fortune, Misfortune, and the Decline of the Machiavellian Heroic Model of Military Glory in Early-Modern Europe Machiavelli’s doctrine says that the military and political orders of the ancients are capable of stimulating a positive interaction between the people, the state and the military institutions. As has been shown, his assumption that the imitation of Roman military virtue (“virtù”) creates good government and a wellordered society had a deep impact on the political and military debates in early modern Europe. An important feature of this model, Machiavelli indicates, is heroic and glorious military examples that can motivate a militia. This chapter focuses on how he develops and uses these heroic examples in his Art of War. It draws attention to the significance of Machiavelli’s case within a broad literary, artistic, geographical and political context by providing new insights about the diffusion of new models of military heroism in the sixteenth century. The question of heroism allows for an interdisciplinary perspective and highlights the global importance of the Machiavellian notions of military virtue. Machiavelli’s take on heroism is twofold. First, he participates in and contributes to a new concept of collective heroism that spreads all over Europe, drawing from the practice of making the infantry the army’s central body, not the cavalry. This can be seen through focusing on Machiavelli’s account of the Battle of Ravenna (building on the research presented in ch. 4) and its relation to visual representations of what proved to be an exemplary infantry-battle in early modern military thinking. Contemporary drawings and engravings share Machiavelli’s views about the infantry’s role in the Battle of Ravenna, views that helped shape the image of the foot soldier as a brutal yet powerful force that needed to be disciplined and trained to be ‘heroic.’ Secondly, Machia­ velli’s writings present us with models of individual heroism that are highly ambiguous. As an analysis of the character of Fabrizio Colonna in the Art of War will demonstrate, the Machiavellian notion of individual heroism is not essentialist, but context-dependent. The Machiavellian hero is not defined by well-established military qualities such as fearlessness and courage, but by the idea of “glory” conceived of as the ability to make the right decision at the right moment or to create consent among one’s fellow soldiers. Finally, this chapter shows that, over the sixteenth century, new cultural and social models

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gradually replaced these concepts of military heroism and war and were eventually shaped by the increasing opposition to Machiavelli’s doctrine.  1

Collective Virtue: ‘Heroic’ Visions of the Infantry as ‘Warrior.’ Contacts and Exchange of Ideas in Europe

According to Machiavelli, martial virtue may be the collective virtue of a nation in arms as it fights for its survival or aims to conquer other territories. However, it is only the people in arms that can be well disciplined as well as glorious and thus become a truly collective force. Mercenaries, in contrast, according to Machiavelli, cannot match either the strength or the determination of troops serving their own country (“you cannot have more faithful, more true, or better soldiers,” The Prince, ch. 26).1 Through military discipline, the patriot warrior learns to be a citizen and to display both civic and military virtue.2 Part of a collective body,3 this warrior is created by the positive influence of discipline (“For without this discipline observed and practiced with utmost care [and] diligence, never was an army good,” Art of War),4 and encouraged by political and civic inclusion, and by the feeling of having served his homeland. Warriors should benefit from having enrolled in the army, with those who have distinguished themselves in battle possibly even receiving citizenship.5 To Machiavelli, this model demonstrates the superiority of infantry over cavalry: i.e. the superiority of the people in arms over the elite cavalry of the Middle Ages. Consequently, Machiavelli’s writings completely overturned not only the previous cultural tradition of chivalry as an aristocratic way to think of war, but also the humanistic view of the militia as an exercise of individual 1 N. Machiavelli, The Prince: with Related Documents (ch. 26), ed. and translated by W. Connell, second edition (Boston – New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2016), 119. 2 Cf. Pocock, The Machiavellian Moment: Florentine Political Thought and the Atlantic Republican Tradition (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975), 201. 3 For this concept of “collective body” in Machiavelli’s writings, see F. Gilbert, Machiavelli and Guicciardini: Politics and History in Sixteenth-Century Florence (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1965), 179-80. 4 N. Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 140), trans. ed. and with a commentary by C. Lynch (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 2003), 46. S. Anglo, Machiavelli: The First Century: Studies in Enthusiasm, Hostility, and Irrelevance (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 543, provides an example of the success of this concept summarized by Peter Whitehorne, in a passage from a letter of Sir John Smythe which draws from Whitehorne’s translation of Machiavelli: “as one saith, the feirce and disordered men been much weaker, then the fearfull and ordered, for that order expelleth feare from men, and disorder abateth feirceness.” 5 On this subject, see the previous chapters, and A. Guidi, Un Segretario militante. Politica, diplomazia e armi nel Cancelliere Machiavelli (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009), 168-185 & 259-277.

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Figure 1

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Holbein, Hans, the Younger. Battle Scene. c. 1524 (drawing, pen and ink and brush, grey wash, 28.6 × 44.1 cm) Kunstmuseum Basel, Wikimedia Commons 7 November 2017

virtues.6 On the contrary, Machiavelli emphasizes the role of infantry – especially a home-grown popular infantry – as a powerful collective of warriors that shapes its own destiny and that of the nation through military glory.7 The idea of this collective force, which is embedded in Machiavelli’s view of armies and war, originated from and at the same time contributed to a cultural environment characterized by a dramatic, tragic and heroic martial vision of powerful infantry clashes.8 This model can be seen in early sixteenth-century visual culture, for instance, in Hans Holbein’s Battle Scene (fig. 1), which, with 6 Cf. ibid., 169 ff., and Guidi, “Les conclusions ‘galliardes’ du Secrétaire florentin: esprit de finesse, initiative et efficacité politique dans l’activité pratique de Machiavel,” in Essere uomini di ‘lettere’. Segretari e politica culturale nel Cinquecento ed. by A. Geremicca and H. Miesse (Florence: Cesati, 2016), 58-59. 7 A recent survey of Machiavelli’s general conception of “glory” is in A. Ryan, On Machiavelli: The Search for Glory (New York-London, Liveright Publishing Corp., 2013), although this work barely engages with the features of Machiavelli’s concept of military glory highlighted in this chapter. Acute observations on Machiavelli’s stress on infantry as a collective organization that needs discipline and drill are in J.-L. Fournel, “Le corps du soldat chez Machiavel,” in Mélanges en l’honneur de Marie-Madeleine Fontaine (Geneva: Droz, 2015), 149-162. 8 For this kind of heroic vision of infantry associated to the Holbein’s engraving, cf. M. Rogg, Landsknechte und Reisläufer: Bilder vom Soldaten: ein Stand in der Kunst des 16. Jahrhunderts (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002), 124.

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its strong emphasis on the use of swords and daggers among the pikes at close distance, resembles Machiavelli’s reconstruction of the Battle of Ravenna in 1512. Differently from the Middle Ages,9 in the early sixteenth century open-field battles began to be characterized by large opposing infantry formations that generally led to massive casualties. In this type of war, the pike played an important role. It was the pike that famously permitted the Swiss infantry formations to dominate the field of war during the second half of the fifteenth century. However, as explained in chapter 4, Machiavelli saw the Battle of Ravenna (fought between the Papal and the Spanish troops of the Holy League and the French in April 1512) as important in the history of warfare because of the Spaniards’ innovative and peculiar tactic of shortening the distance and engaging in hand-to-hand combat with the German infantry in French service. Machiavelli saw this as the key to their success, saying that every “prince” should follow suit, by shaping what he called a “third order” of infantry, a sort of a multi-task infantry battle formation that would always succeed.10 The battle was well-known for the number of casualties left on the field. In fact, it was so famous that for centuries afterward a notorious image of a “monster of Ravenna” was interpreted as an omen of the event:11 an image that proves that, at the time, the battle of Ravenna was perceived as exceptionally important. Machiavelli’s stress on the Spanish tactics of closing the distance and using the sword appears in the commentary on the battle he made first in The Prince (1513), which was circulated in manuscript from at least 1515 onward,12 and then in the Art of War in 1521.13 Ravenna was key to the formation of Machiavelli’s image of a motivated infantry because it provided evidence for his famous assertion that firearms were not fundamental to winning a battle; in fact they would be useless without a motivated, trained and audacious infantry. So potent was Machiavelli’s depiction of Ravenna that military thinkers continued using it decades later: in 1587 Francesco Patrizi cited it to support his

9

For the medieval model of infantry clashes see chapter 4, section “Ravenna as a turning point.” 10 Cf. Machiavelli, The Prince (ch. 26), ed. by W. Connell, 119-20. 11 L. Morgan, The Monster in the Garden: The Grotesque and the Gigantic in Renaissance Landscape Design (University of Pennsylvania Press, 2015), 70-71. 12 For a detailed examination of the early manuscript circulation of the Prince, cf. F. Bausi, Il principe dallo scrittoio alla stampa (Pisa: Edizioni della Normale, 2015), 30 ff. See also chapter 5, section “France.” 13 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 66), 39. Quotations from this page above, chapter 4, note 62.

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aversion to artillery.14 The aspects of war that carried the most weight for Machiavelli, as Felix Gilbert correctly pointed out many years ago, were the “human qualities needed in war: courage, obedience, enthusiasm, and ferocity”:15 military technology changed, but these remained. In accordance with his method of emphasizing specific aspects of famous historical episodes,16 Machiavelli picked out a detail in the larger battle to shape an image of Ravenna that illustrated and proved his military doctrine, i.e. the audacity of the Spanish swordsmen and the effect of an innovative use of swords on a battle’s outcome. Instead of emphasising the French bombardment of the enemy line with unprecedented artillery fire – a key to the battle’s outcome and an example of the growing importance of cannons on the battlefield – Machiavelli opted to highlight the mass heroic action by the Spanish swordsmen to support his idea of a motivated and well-drilled infantry. In light of the singularity of Machiavelli’s description (it is found only in written sources that draw directly from his work),17 one cannot simply note that Holbein’s work drew on the representation of an infantry battle that had informed the portrayal of Ravenna in the Prince and in the Art of War, but can also advance the hypothesis that there were closer cultural links between the two.18 Holbein was likely to have been commissioned either during his stay in England on the occasion of the festivities held at Greenwich by Henry VIII to welcome a French diplomatic delegation in 1527 or during the painter’s trip to France in 1523-24.19 It is conceivable, in particular, that Holbein’s choice of 14 15 16 17 18

19

Cf. A. Perifano, “Penser la guerre au XVIe siècle: science, art ou pratique?” in Les Guerres d’Italie. Histoire, Pratiques, Représentations, ed. by D. Boillet and M.F. Piejus (Paris: Université Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2002), 246. F. Gilbert, “The Renaissance of the Art of War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machia­ velli to the Nuclear Age, ed. by P. Paret, G. A. Craig, F. Gilbert (Princeton: UP, 1971), 24. J.-J. Marchand, Niccolò Machiavelli. I primi scritti politici (Padova: Antenore, 1975), 111. On the singularity of this representation of the battle of Ravenna by Machiavelli, cf. Pedullà, “Machiavelli the Tactician,” 95. It can be added, perhaps, that at least one of the two opposing infantries in Holbein’s drawing can be identified as German. A soldier on the right seemingly wears the cross of St Andrew, identifying him as a landsknecht. For the distinct “X” slashing popularly interpreted as representing the Holy Roman Empire, cf. M. Rogg, Landsknechte und Reisläufer: Bilder vom Soldaten: ein Stand in der Kunst des 16. Jahrhunderts (Paderborn: Schöningh, 2002), 275; R. Wohlfeil, “Esercito e società nella prima età moderna (secoli XVI e XVII),” in Militari e società civile nell’Europa dell’età moderna (secoli XVI-XVIII), ed. by C. Donati, B.R. Kroener (Bologna: il Mulino, 2007), 203. The date of Holbein’s drawing is uncertain, but it was most likely produced between 1524 and 1527. According to Kemperdick, Müller, et al., Hans Holbein die Jahre in Basel (Munich: Prestel, 2006), 320-22, it might have been commissioned for a reception offered by the King of England, Henry VIII, to the French ambassadors in 1527, or during Holbein’s trip to France in 1523/24. There is documentary evidence that suggests that Henry VIII

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s­ ubject might have been inspired by some kind of exchange with members of the French mission. This makes sense, given that the French ambassador at Greenwich was the aforementioned Anne de Montmorency, a protagonist in the battle of Ravenna and the dédicataire of the earliest French manuscript translations of both Machiavelli’s Art of War and the Prince.20 In addition, the ambassador was accompanied by cardinal Jean du Bellay,21 brother of Guillaume to whom the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre was originally attributed (as discussed in ch. 5), despite being a near plagiarism of Machiavelli’s Art of War.22 Finally, it must be noted that Ravenna – occupied by Venetian troops after the sack of Rome in May 1527, i.e. almost simultaneously with the Greenwich celebrations – must have been mentioned often in the English court during Du Bellay’s mission, for the restitution of the city to the Papal states was a major topic of discussion between Henry and the ambassadors.23

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commissioned some works (see S. Foister, “Holbein as Court Painter”, in Henry VIII. A European Court in England, ed. by D. Starkey (London – Greenwich: Collins and Brown & National Maritime Museum, 1991), 58-63; ead., “Holbein’s Paintings on Canvas: The Greenwich Festivities of 1527,” Studies in the History of Art, Vol. 60, Symposium Papers XXXVII: Hans Holbein:Paintings, Prints, and Reception (2001), 110; ead., Holbein and England (New Haven: Paul Mellon Centre for Studies in British Art, Yale University Press, 2004), 122; M. Rosen, The Mapping of Power in Renaissance Italy (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), 74. I argue that if Holbein’s Battle scene was actually produced in England, it might have drawn inspiration from exchanges and contact between Holbein and members of the French delegation. However, there is still a possibility that, as suggested by Kemperdick, the drawing was commissioned by Henry VIII to present a disturbing image to the ambassadors of France, something he apparently did with a work representing the Battle of Guinegate of 1513. If this is actually the case, however, it must be noted that this battle was fought by England in the context of its membership of the same Holy League called up by the Pope against the French in 1511. Despite the French victory, given the subsequent death of their Commander-in-Chief Gaston de Foix, the great number of ca­ sualties, and the disorganization of the army that followed it and caused the French to be driven out of Italy soon afterward, Ravenna was not a pleasant image for any French man. See chapter 5, section “France.” Cf. Bourrilly & Vassiere, Ambassades en Angleterre de Jean du Bellay (Paris: 1905), passim. See also the correspondence between Cardinal Du Bellay, Anne de Montmorency, and the French king Francis I, published in J.S. Brewer (eds), Letters and Papers, Foreign and Domestic, Henry VIII, Vol. 4, 1524-1530, “Appendix: 1524-1527” (London: His Majesty’s Stationery Office, 1920), 3079-3129. Another hint of the connection between this drawing and the French delegation might be the fact that the paper has a French watermark. According to Kemperdick, Müller, et al., Die Jahre in Basel 1515-1532 (München: Prestel, 2006), 321, Holbein used French papers during his trip to France circa 1523-24 and then during his stay in England between 1526 and 1528, then again after 1532. However, one should also consider that many other drawings by Holbein have a French watermark too. Cf. Bourrilly & Vassiere, Ambassades en Angleterre de Jean du Bellay, xx & 86. See also Brunelli “Gambara, Uberto,” in Dizionario Biografico degli Italiani, Vol. 52. (Rome: Istituto

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The other possibility is that the drawing was conceived by Holbein while in Lyon, where the works and the ideas of Machiavelli circulated very early, as the examination of Ludovico Alamanni and other Florentine expatriates in chapter 5 shows.24 In any case, these personal contacts and the exchange across Italian culture, France, German artists, and England are hints that a new military culture that shared common beliefs and visual representations of infantry as a heroic and tragic force, was ignited by the circulation of books, military thinking, and people at the beginning of the early-modern age. Further indications of a connection between Machiavelli’s depiction of Ravenna and the German-speaking culture, might be in the similarities between the important role of swords in the combat scene by Holbein and an earlier portrayal of the battle that also puts this weapon at the center of the composition: a woodcut by either Hans Burgkmair the Elder (1473-1531, figs. 2 & 2 bis), or one of the other artists involved in Marx Treitzsaurwein’s Der Weiss Kunig (i.e. Leonhard Beck, Hans Schäufelein, and Hans Springinklee).25 Holbein was younger than Burgkmair, but they lived in Augsburg and Basle at same time.26 A comparison with other pieces in the series of sketches by Burgkmair underscores the importance of swords in the Ravenna image. There are no swords at all in the other battle woodcuts conceived for Der Weiss Kunig by Burgkmair and the other artists (for instance, the Kampf der Reisigen und Fußknechte by Burgkmair, the battle of Crema, and the unknown Battle attributed to Leonhard Beck, also in Der Weiss Kunig). Others just show an occasional sword at the side of foot soldiers, with no use of the weapon (e.g. the battle of St. Aubin du Cormier, fig. 3). The series of texts and textual sketches by Treitzsaurwein and the woodcuts by Burgkmair and the others, were conceived to celebrate the Emperor Maximilian I (who collaborated on the work with comments and personal notes),

24

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26

della Enciclopedia Italiana, Treccani 1999), 22 Nov. 2017 . See sections “France,” and, for Lodovico, “Basle, Switzerland and the German-Speaking World.” For an account of Holbein’s relationship to printing enterprises and the book market in Lyon, see P.G. Bietenholz, Basle and France. The Basle Humanists and Printers in Their Contacts with Francophone Culture (Geneva: Droz, 1971), 40-41, 218. Cf. Dodgson, Catalogue of Early German and Flemish Woodcuts Preserved in the Department of Prints and Drawings in the British Museum (London, Printed by Order of the Trustees of the British Museum, 1911), Vol. II, 396-398, for the authorship of some of the woodcuts in Der Weiss Kunig. For Burgkmair’s influence on Holbein, see A. Woltmann, Holbein and His Time, Trans. by F.E. Bunnett (London: Bentley and Sons, 1872), 30, 88-89. Also A. Hyatt Mayor, Prints & People. A Social History of Printed Pictures (New York: The Metropolitan Museum of Art, 1971), s.v. “Holbein.”

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Figure 2

Burgkmair, Hans, the Elder (or perhaps Leonhard Beck, Hans Schäufelein or Hans Springinklee). The Battle of Ravenna. c. 1513-18 (woodcut from Der Weiss Kunig) Austrian National Library Vienna, Wikimedia Commons 7 November 2017

and were created starting from roughly 1500 and running for at least a decade and a half. However, the preparatory materials must have been completed by the year 1516, when the proofs of the book were printed (although they were not published until the eighteenth century).27 27

Cf. R. Kroll & W. Schade (eds.). Hans Burgkmair, 1473-1531: Holz­schnitte, Zeichnungen, Holz­ stöcke: Ausstellung im Alten Museum (Berlin: Staatliche Museen zu Berlin, Kupferstich­ kabinett und Sammlung der Zeichnungen, 1974), s.v., and A. Kagerer, Macht und Medien um 1500: Selbstinszenierungen und Legitimationsstrategien von Habsburgern und Fuggern (Berlin-Boston: Walter de Gruyter GmbH & Co KG, 2017), 78-79 ff., J. Blunk, Das Taktieren

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Figure 2 bis The same illustration, my arrows added.

Based on the resemblance between Machiavelli’s commentary on the Spaniards’ use of swords in the Prince (composed in 1513) and the woodcut of the Battle of Ravenna prepared at the court of Maximilian I, one might advance a first hypothesis that Machiavelli either consulted the same sources or heard about the event from reports coming from persons who were on the field that mit den Toten: die französischen Königsgrabmäler in der Frühen Neuzeit (Köln Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2011), 221; The Last Knight: The Art, Armor, and Ambition of Maximilian I (New York: Metropolitan Museum of Art, 2019), 222.

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Figure 3 Beck, Leonhard (?). St. Aubin du Cormier. c. 1513-18 (woodcut from Der Weiss Kunig) Austrian National Library Vienna, ­W ikimedia Commons 7 November 2017

day.28 A few years before the battle, during his 1508 mission to the court of the Emperor in Tyrol, Machiavelli met with a number of Maximilian I’s counselors, including Luca Rinaldi (1451-1513), Bishop Matthäus Lang von Wellenburg (1468-1540), Paul von Liechtenstein (d. 1513), Zyprian von Sarnthein, and Duke Ulrich von Württemberg.29 (Incidentally, during that mission the Florentine secretary asked one of his correspondents, Cesare Mauro, the chancellor of the Este ambassador, to search for some “chartae” in Köln, probably in order to prepare the usual final mission report on the military and political institutions of the country visited).30 Finally, Pigello Portinari, Maximilian’s secretary, had 28 29 30

For an examination of one of the Florentine sources used by Machiavelli, see above, chapter 4. For these historical figures, see J. Hirschbiegel, Nahbeziehungen bei Hof – Manifestationen des Vertrauens: Karrieren in reichsfürstlichen Diensten am Ende des Mittelalters (Köln – Weimar, Böhlau Verlag, 2015), 127, 143 & 228. For the letter of Cesare Mauro to Machiavelli, Köln, June 1508, cf. Marchand, Niccolò Machiavelli, 280; K. Voigt, “Die Briefe Antonio de’ Costabilis und Cesare Mauros von der Gesandtschaft Ferraras zu König Maximilian I. (1507/08),” Römische Historische Mitteilungen 13 (1971): 81-136; E. Taddei, “Der Römische König Maximilian aus der Sicht der estensischen Gesandtschaft und das Beispiel eines problematichen Lehensverhältnisses in Reichsitalien,” in Maximilian I. (1459-1519): Wahrnehmung – Übersetzungen – Gender, ed. by H. Noflatscher, M. Chisholm, B. Schnerb (Innsbruck – Wien – Bozen: StudienVerlag, 2011), 102.

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corresponded with Machiavelli.31 Machiavelli actually mentioned Luca Rinaldi in chapter 23 of the Prince (“man of Maximilian”), as one of the sources he used to create his psychological sketch of the Emperor, referring to conversations they had during his diplomatic mission to Tyrol.32 Not only did these figures of the court of Maximilian I have contact with Italy and Machiavelli himself at an early stage, but there are well-known links between the chief master of the woodcut works, Hans Burgkmair, and Italy.33 Thus, it is reasonable to think that all these people knew of the battle from the same sources. In light of the portrayal of the battle by the artist who made the woodcut representing Ravenna, it can again be said that, as argued in ch. 4, Machiavelli’s reconstruction of the battle was probably more accurate than scholars have generally thought. Der Weiss Kunig was distinctive at the time for the accuracy of its historical reconstruction, a feature specifically desired by Maximilian I, who asked for “a work based on historical sources.”34 Moreover, the counselors of the Emperor, Paul von Liechtenstein and Zyprian von Sarnthein, made comments about the accuracy that suggest that Maximilian I himself went through the pages and made corrections.35 Yet since it is not possible to find any German document that confirms this representation of Ravenna as a sword battle,36 one may even, although very cautiously, advance a second hypothesis, i.e. that Burgkmair or somebody else at court read or heard about this detail of the ­Battle of Ravenna, directly or indirectly, from Machiavelli’s Prince during the years of preparation of the Weiss Kunig. The greater number and centrality of 31

Portinari to Machiavelli, 12 Dec. 1509. Cfr. O. Tommasini, La vita e gli scritti di Niccolò Machiavelli nella loro relazione col machiavellismo, 2 vols. (Naples: ristampa anastatica per l’Istituto Italiano per gli Studi Storici, il Mulino, 1994-2003), vol. 1, 530-31 & 703-4, who documents a mission of Portinari to Florence in 1511 as an agent of Maximilian I. Portinari still had a connection with the Emperor’s court in the Summer of 1512 (i.e. after the Battle of Ravenna) as explained by Baldassarre Carducci, the Florentine ambassador to Naples, on 24 August, cf. ibid., 744. 32 Machiavelli, The Prince (ch. 23), ed. W. Connell, 112. 33 D. Landau and P.W. Parshall, The Renaissance Print, 1470-1550 (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994), 198 ff. 34 Cf. Kagerer, Macht und Medien, 80: “ein historisches Quellenwerk schaffen.” 35 Cf. the Brief from Zyprian von Sarnthein to Paul von Liechtenstein, 3 Apr. 1509, quoted in Hirschbiegel, Nahbeziehungen bei Hof, 127. Cf. The Last Knight, 221-22. 36 See P. Pieri, introduction to N. Machiavelli, Dell’arte della Guerra, ed. by P. Pieri (Rome: Edizioni Roma, 1937), VII-LXIX. Especially with reference to the German sources, the case of Coccinius’ De bellis italicis, written for the history of the Emperor Maximilian I himself, is emblematic of the fact that no other source gives the same account of the events as Machiavelli, cf. A. Krieger, Über die bedeutung des 4. buches von Coccinius’ schrift De Bellis Italicis für die Geschichte Kaiser Maximilians des I. (Karlsruhe: Druck von Friedrich Gutsch, 1886), 54-55.

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swords in the woodcut of this battle compared to other drawings in the book does not seem simply random. As explained above, the name of Machiavelli must had been well-known at the imperial court at the time. In fact, Treitzsaurwein’s family was from Tyrol, so he might have been at the court at the time of Machiavelli’s mission.37 Thus, in the light of the fact that forces hired by the Emperor Maximilian (the eponymous “White King”) took part in it, it would not be surprising if Marx Treitzsaurwein himself had investigated the representations of the battle in literary and historical writings of the time and had heard about the Machiavelli’s singular interpretation. As explained earlier, there is clear evidence that the Imperial Ambassador Alberto Pio da Carpi was aware of Machiavelli’s Prince from at least 1516,38 and we know that Machiavelli’s patron in the Medici family, Giuliano Duke of Nemours, in 1515 had received a set of armor from the Emperor as a diplomatic gift.39

…

The episode of the swords aside, Machiavelli’s focus on Ravenna and on Roman military tactics later in the Art of War, contributed (from its publication in 1521 onward) to the development of a new visual representation of an infantry fighting fiercely at short distance with pikes, swords, and daggers, which was quite different from contemporary portrayals of battles with two opposing fronts of pikemen in geometric formation. The view found in works like Holbein’s can be connected to another aspect of Machiavelli’s influence on military cultures, too: i.e. to a view of infantrymen as destructive and brutal, a powerful force that can avoid disorder and subsequent defeat only when disciplined. This idea may also be linked to the circulation of cultures of war between the Italian peninsula and the rest of Europe. Other Holbein works, particularly the engraving known as Bad War, which modern commentators believe refers to the wars in Italy, suggest as much. Significantly, this engraving shows the dangerous result of long pikes being uncoordinated and disorganized, evoking another distinctive Machiavellian point: the need for training and discipline. This kind of representation of a clash of infantry as a heroic and frantic sword battle, might, as explained, have reached Holbein when he was in Lyon or in Greenwich, or through Burgkmair. The swordsmen in close combat 37 Hirschbiegel, Nahbeziehungen bei Hof, 126. 38 See chapter 5: section “France” (especially note 25). Cf. F. Bausi, “«L’aureo libro moral». Circolazione e fortuna del Principe prima della stampa (1516-1531),” in Machiavelli Cinquecento. Mezzo millennio del Principe, ed. by G.M. Anselmi, R. Caporali, C. Galli (Milan: Mimesis, 2015), 27. 39 See The Last Knight, 224.

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in the woodcut of the Battle of Ravenna (attributed to Burgkmair) must have particularly struck Holbein. In any case, this kind of imagery may be further evidence of the circulation of Machiavelli’s military ideas in the artistic and intellectual circles Hans Holbein frequented. It makes sense that Machiavelli’s insistence on discipline would prompt new kinds of imagery. The Art of War stresses the role of corporals and sergeants in ensuring “the cohesion of the army,”40 that is, perfect coordination among the different ranks of a battle formation: “in the armies one observes two orders: one, what the men in each battalion must do; the other, what the battalion must then do when it is with the others in one army.”41 There are other examples of the impact of concepts and topics developed in Machiavelli’s Art of War, especially on representations of war and battle in German warfare cultures; relatedly, these cultures are crucial to Machiavelli’s military thinking. He saw the Swiss and the Landsknechts’ sense of corporate identity as closest to the martial spirit of the Romans who had fought for the glory of their homeland. For the German-Swiss, the highest reward was honor in battle and freedom for their communities, not the financial gain that motivated the Italian condottieri.42 Machiavelli’s main character in the dialogue, Fabrizio Colonna, provides evidence for this kind of discipline and cohesion by mentioning the virtuous “example” of Germany: in it there is much virtue through there being many principalities and republics, and all that is good in the present military depends on the example of those peoples, who, since they are altogether jealous of their states and since they fear servitude (which is not feared elsewhere), all maintain themselves lords and honored.43 However, even though Machiavelli associates heroism with the collective force of a popular infantry, he also conceives of virtue and glory as specifically individual achievements.

40 Pedullà, “Machiavelli the Tactician,” 85. Cf. also Fournel, “Le corps du soldat.” 41 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 160), 47-48. 42 Cf. D. Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012), 61. 43 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 314), 61.

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Individual Virtue: The Machiavellian Concept of ‘Heroism’ and Its Transformations in Subsequent Military Thinking

In Machiavelli’s writings, images of glory and heroism are often associated with individuals, both his contemporaries and notable characters of ancient and biblical history. A famous example of a political or religious leader who is seen as a virtuous and glorious founder of a new state by the force of arms is the peculiar Machiavellian figure of the “armed” prophet Moses.44 Another type of hero is a military commander who can set an example for his soldiers or his fellow citizens in arms: such a commander is seen as capable of leading more reliable and loyal troops. Machiavelli’s example is Valerius Corvinus, who wanted his men to follow his “deeds,” not his “words,” and “not only discipline, but also example.”45 However, for Machiavelli, different kinds of individual virtuous behavior may produce the same outcome.46 The “hardness of Manlius Torquatus and the kindness of Valerius Corvinus acquired for each the same glory.” Both Manlius and Valerius lived in Rome, with like virtue, with like triumphs and glory, and each of them, in what pertained to the enemy, acquired it with like virtue; but in what belonged to the armies and to their dealings with the soldiers, they proceeded very diversely. For Manlius commanded his soldiers with ­every kind of severity, without interrupting either toll or punishment; Valerius on the other hand, dealt with them with every humane mode and means and full of familiar domesticity […] Nonetheless, with so

44 Machiavelli, The Prince (ch. 6), ed. by W. Connell, 53-54. 45 N. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy (III 39), Trans. by H.C. Mansfield & N. Tarcov (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 1996), 297. Original version (III 38, 3), Machiavelli quotes Livy: “Facta mea, non dicta, vos, milites, sequi volo, nec disciplinam modo, sed exem­plum etiam a me petere.” 46 Cf. F. Verrier, “Les Discours sur la première décade de Tite-Live, un traité militaire en pointillé,” in Dialogue militaire entre Anciens et Modernes, ed. Jean-Pierre Bois (Rennes: Presses universitaires de Renne, 2004), 131-140: “Deux capitaines peuvent obtenir les mêmes résultats avec des qualités et des moyens opposés: la cruauté et la violence d’Hannibal, l’humanité et la bonté de Scipion, la sévérité de Manlius Torquatus, l’humanité de Valerius Corvinus. Nul jugement de valeur n’est porté, le seul critère étant la pertinence et l’efficacité du moyen en fonction des circonstances et des résultats,” accessed online August 2018: .

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much diversity of proceeding, each produced the same fruit, both against the enemies and in favor of the republic and of himself.47 Machiavelli’s extraordinary acumen consists precisely of his understanding that heroism must “accord to the needs of the times” (i.e. the prevailing political and military situation) in order to achieve true “glory,” and fulfil the purpose of motivating the people to defend their country. In addition, glory and heroism are not achieved exclusively by military virtue understood as courageous performance. After Livy’s histories, Machiavelli explains how “[s]peaking to his soldiers,” Valerius said that the consulate was “the reward of virtue, not of blood.”48 True glory may also be achieved through cleverness, ambiguity, and even by ignominy (which can be a virtue under certain conditions). This concept, for instance, is embodied in the way Machiavelli writes about Lucius Lentulus, who, after explaining that “the life of Rome consisted in the life of [its] army,” argues that “the fatherland is well defended in whatever mode one defends it, whether with ignominy or with glory.”49 These distinctions distanced the Machiavellian concept of heroism from the model of honor and glory as defined in the western cultural tradition of chivalry. Another difference: Machia­ velli did not conceive these feats as available only to the nobility. Machiavelli’s idea of individual heroism therefore amounts to a concept of “glory” achieved by benefitting one’s own homeland, or by pursuing great achievements without any moral restraints, rather than according to a prior to conception of nobility of honor and spirit. On the other hand, Machiavelli understands that, as Ronald Asch points out, “no hero is imaginable […] without a community which […] acknowledges 47 Machiavelli, Discourses (III, 22), 264-265. Original version (III 22, 1-4): “E’ furno in Roma in uno medesimo tempo due capitani eccellenti, Manlio Torquato e Valerio Corvino; i quali, di pari virtù, di pari trionfi e gloria, vissono in Roma, e ciascuno di loro, in quanto si apparteneva al nimico, con pari virtù l’acquistarono, ma quanto si apparteneva agli eserciti ed agl’intrattenimenti de’ soldati, diversissimamente procederono: perché Manlio con ogni generazione di severità sanza intermettere a’ suoi soldati o fatica o pena, gli comandava; Valerio, dall’altra parte, con ogni modo e termine umano, e pieno di una familiare domestichezza, gl’intratteneva. Per che si vide che, per avere l’ubbidienza de’ soldati, l’uno ammazzò il figliuolo, e l’altro non offese mai alcuno. Nondimeno, in tanta diversità di procedere, ciascuno fece il medesimo frutto, e contro a’ nimici ed in favore della republica e suo.” 48 Machiavelli, Discourses (I, 60), 121. Original version (I 60, 1): “Valerio detto, parlando ai suoi soldati, disse come il consolato era ‘praemium virtutis, non sanguinis.’” 49 Machiavelli, Discourses (III 41), 301. Original version (III 41, 1): Che la patria si debbe difendere o con ignominia o con gloria.”

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him.”50 Consequently, according to Machiavelli a political or military leader sometimes must wear a disguise to acquire either reputation or consent and attain real glory. An exemplary case of these new, unheard of forms of heroism in Machiavelli’s works is the ambiguous figure of Cesare Borgia: a military and political leader whose pursuit of glory and remarkable achievements along with his merciless and cold-blooded attitude toward both those who conspired against him and those who acted against the benefit of the people make him a special kind of hero. Nevertheless, Borgia’s failure to understand the risk of trusting the new Pope Julius II after the death of his father, Pope Alexander VI, and his inability to foresee danger also make him an anti-hero who serves as an example of unwise conduct. Glory is therefore not just bravery, force, or nobility. It is also wisdom and the ability to make the right decision according to the moment and occasions that fortune offers. Another example of the ambiguous construction of Machiavellian heroism is the character who has the majority of the dialogue in the Art of War, Fabrizio Colonna. Machiavelli’s Fabrizio is different from the contemporary standard of a military commander. We saw in chapter 4 how, due to his key role in some of the main battles of the Italian Wars, one might consider him a military hero. Street poets such as Giraldo Podio da Lugo referred to him as a new Hector.51 At the same time, however, he is also a counter-hero, as he reveals the incompetence of Italy’s warrior nobles in the face of invading enemies.52 There are other contradictions: the real Colonna was a cavalry leader who promotes the superiority of infantry over cavalry throughout the Art of War. Equally ironic is the situation according to which the dialogue’s protagonists, especially Colonna, are talking about war, fortifications and fierce battles in the comfortable 50 51

52

R. Asch, “The Hero in the Early Modern Period and Beyond: An Elusive Cultural Construct and an Indispensable Focus of Social Identity?,” Helden. Heroes. Héros. E-Journal zu Kulturen des Heroischen, 1 (2014), Special issue: Languages and Functions of the Heroic: 7. Cf. G. Schizzerotto, Otto poemetti volgare sulla battaglia di Ravenna del 1512 (Ravenna: Edizioni della Rotonda, 1968), 159-173; F. Bonali-Fiquet, “Témoignages français et italiens sur la bataille de Ravenne (1512),” in “Regards croisés,” special issue of Transalpina (Études italiennes), no. 1 (1996), ed. by M. Colin (Caen: Presses universitaires de Caen 1996): 87; M. Rospocher, “Songs of War. Historical and Literary Narratives of the ‘Horrendous Italian Wars’ (1494-1559),” in Narrating War: Early Modern and Contemporary Perspectives, edited by M. Mondini, M. Rospocher (Bologna-Berlin: il Mulino, Duncker & Humblot, 2013), 87; M. Rospocher – R. Salzberg, “Street Singers in Italian Renaissance Urban Culture and Communication,” Cultural and Social History, Vol. 9, Issue 1 (2012): 15-16. On this subject, see the discussion of J.M. Najemy’s thesis in “Fabrizio Colonna and Ma­ chia­velli’s Art of War,” in Government and Warfare in Renaissance Tuscany and Venice, ed. by H. Butters, G. Neher (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 2019), in chapter 4, section “Ravenna as a Turning Point.”

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and pastoral Rucellai Gardens.53 Finally, Colonna paradoxically advocates the strategy of an immediate cavalry charge to neutralize the enemy’s firearms, despite being the historical protagonist of an actual battle that, according to modern historians, proved the ineffectiveness of cavalry action against full artillery fire. As mentioned, at the Battle of Ravenna, after suffering prolonged artillery fire, Fabrizio disobeyed the Spanish captain Pedro Navarro’s orders by sending his cavalry formations to attack. The attack came too late, and was disorganized. Fabrizio also claimed to have advised Navarro, to either set up camp in a different location and prepare a fortified defense by avoiding battle or to anticipate the French action by attacking them before the bulk of the army crossed the river Ronco. As the remarks attributed to Colonna in Francesco Guicciardini’s Storia d’Italia testify, everyone at the time knew that he had contravened his superior’s command.54 Modern readers of the Art of War should consider the implications of this episode for both the construction of Fabrizio’s character and how it was perceived by the readers of the time. Despite losing the battle and being criticised by public opinion (as we know from a letter in which the real Colonna, trying to defend his reputation, argues against other possible versions of events of the battle),55 Fabrizio became an important character for Machiavelli, who imbued him with the contradiction and polemical potential typical of his writing. In fact, the contradictions of Machiavelli’s Fabrizio in the Art of War create the heroic character of a mercenary who paradoxically promotes a home-grown militia infantry counter to his own interests as a condottiere. Ravenna shows the diversity of ideas about what constitutes a military hero. Multiple heroes became famous after the battle, including the classically tragic figure of Gaston de Foix who died on the field and was celebrated for it by the French. Fabrizio Colonna is a very different kind of hero, and given the ambiguity of his actions, a controversial one. Brantôme and Gentillet later used this controversial aspect to justify their accusations that Machiavelli knew nothing about military practice.56 Ultimately, the construction of the character of Fabrizio as an individual ‘hero’ is part of the aforementioned Machiavellian

53 54 55 56

See W.A. Rebhorn, Foxes and Lions: Machiavelli’s Confidence Men (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1988), p. 165. F. Guicciardini, The History of Italy, trans. S. Alexander (New York: Collier-Macmillan Ltd, 1969), 248. For the original version, Storia d’Italia X, 13, see above chapter 4, note 42. Cf. the reports of the battle and the letter of Fabrizio Colonna transcribed by Sanudo, Diarii, discussed above in chapter 4, section “Ravenna as a Turning Point.” Cf. Verrier, “Machiavel, X, Y et les Légions,” 260.

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response to firearms versus audacity, drill, and motivation, which informs the strategy of offense that is at the core of his military thinking. In any case, the Machiavellian model of a fearless and wise military commander capable of ambiguous behaviours and taking autonomous decisions, was not entirely distant from the exploits of real historical figures of the time, a testimony to its influence on cultures of warfare of the early modern era. The famous Instructions sur le faict de la guerre praises the way Anne de Montmorency – the aforementioned French commander at Ravenna – defended Provence against the Imperial invasion in 1536. Montmorency ordered the destruction of any possible resource left in the country and showed no respect for Christian ethics that proscribed the use of violence against civilians.57 The Spanish army in Flanders was guided by another, even more famous hero, Alessandro Farnese, who resembles the central character of Machiavelli’s dialogue on the Art of war. Farnese embraced the offensive tactics Machiavelli suggested in the Art of War in the Battle of Gembloux in 1578: fighting against the Orange army of the Dutch states, he opened with an immediate attack, the exact strategy Colonna advocates in the book, when he explains why artillery is not essential in an open battle and calls for the quick actions of the “velites” from the “horns” to “occupy” the enemy’s artillery before they can recharge and shoot again. Such a strategy obviously requires a level of bravery and confidence that can only be acquired by discipline and having virtuous examples to follow. Moreover, like Colonna, Farnese disobeyed his superior’s command in taking this action. And during the wars in the Flanders he promoted a reform intended to prevent punishment procedures from being abused, thus seemingly following the Machiavellian model of a military captain who is tough with insubordinates in order to motivate his soldiers, but capable of showing some understanding and humanity with troops.58 In a nutshell, despite the different shades and revisions this model underwent, more than half a century after Ravenna Alessandro Farnese acquired even more glory than the real Fabrizio Colonna by making the same heroic choice of questioning the orders of his commander and adopting an offensive strategy (this time with a successful outcome, though). It is not surprising then that Balthazar Ayala dedicated his De iure et officiis bellicis et disciplina militari (1582) to Alessandro Farnese, using this historical figure to set up his model of 57

Cf. B. Dereulle, “The Sixteenth-Century Antecedents of Special Operations ‘Small War’,” in Small War and Insurgencies in Theory and Practice, 1500-1850, ed. by B. Heuser (London: Routledge, 2016), 24. 58 Cf. V. Lavenia, “‘Casus militares’. Coscienza e guerra in alcuni testi minori del Seicento,” in Predicazione, eserciti e violenza nell’Europa delle guerre di religione (1560-1715), ed. G.C. ­Civale (Turin: Claudiana, 2014), 350.

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a perfect military captain just as Machiavelli did with the example of Colonna. Ayala’s stated aim in the book, incidentally, was to “discover how the Romans attained the heights of military glory.”59

…

The influence of Machiavelli’s military models can be seen in subsequent famous military commanders. As some passages of Peter Whitehorne’s “Epistle Dedicatorie” in his early translation of the Art of War into English highlight (1560), Machiavelli’s reasoning about the virtues of the Romans stimulated a discussion about military glory that stresses bravery, discipline and individual honor: “Wherfore, sith the necessitie of the science of warres is so greate […] and the worthinesse moreover, and honor of the same so greate, that as by prose we see, the perfecte glorie therof, cannot easely finde roote, but in the hartes of moste noble couragious.”60 This kind of thinking is embodied in other heroic military figures of the time, such as the Duke of Alba, the governor of the Spanish Netherlands. Alba’s command over his troops was based on the model of discipline that had been associated with the Romans since the publication of Machiavelli’s Art of War and its subsequent epigones. The already mentioned marginalia ­Gabriel Harvey added to a copy of the 1560 Peter Whitehorne translation of the Arte of Warre confirm this interpretation. Not only does Harvey list the authorities in the field of military literature (as noted by modern scholars),61 but his comments also confirm the chain that contemporaries saw as linking Machiavelli to the “old Roman most worthie Discipline & Action” and both of them to the “Spanish Discipline vnder ye Duke of Alva & ye Prince of Parma.”62 The Duke’s 1549 portrait by the Netherlandish painter Anthonis Mor, in which Alba is represented as a proud and fearsome general in an imperious posture, highlights this kind of cultural military model (fig. 4). At the same time, the vocabulary Whitehorne uses in the dedicatory letter to Queen Elizabeth suggests the formation of a concept of heroism that 59 Anglo, Machiavelli, 551 60 N. Machiavelli, The Arte of Warre, written first in Italian by Nicholas Machiavell and set forthe in Englishe by Peter Whitehorne student at Graies Inne (London: 1560), 6-7 (quote from the 1905 reprint by David Nutt, London: Long Acre). 61 D.R. Lawrence, The Complete Soldier: Military Books and Military Culture in Early Stuart England, 1603-1645 (Leiden: Brill 2009), 56. 62 Harvey’s marginal notes to the Arte of Warre by Machiavelli, quoted from A. Grafton & L. Jardine, “Studied for Action: How Gabriel Harvey Read His Livy,” Past and Present 129 (1990): 74.

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Figure 4 Mor, Anthonis (formerly attributed to Titian). Portrait of Fernando Álvarez de Toledo, 3rd Duke of Alba. 1549 Fundación Casa de Alba, Madrid, Wikimedia Commons 7 November 2017

diverges slightly from Machiavelli’s notion of a glorious figure. For Whitehorne, “perfect glory” lives only “in the heart of the most noble courageous.” Essentially, through a rhetoric stressing a particular feature of the book, the ambiguity of Machiavelli’s examples of virtue becomes a different kind of pattern, according to which a military leader must be first and foremost noble. Similarly, in Mor’s portrait of Alba, while the duke looks like a proud and victorious general, he also looks like a noble aristocrat. Thus, a subtle retreat from Machiavelli’s ambiguity was beginning, with the idea that a hero is somebody who is, or should be brave, severe, but, most importantly, noble.63

63

Cf. F. González de León, “Soldados platicos and Caballeors: The Social Dimension of Ethics in the Early Modern Spanish Army,” in The Chivalric Ethos and the Development of Mili­ tary Professionalism, ed. By D.J.B. Trim (Leiden – Boston: Brill, 2003), 257-58.

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The Declining Fortune of Machiavelli’s Concepts of Glory and Heroism

A significant part of the increasing opposition to Machiavelli’s doctrine focused specifically on his heroes as (anti-heroic) ambiguous role models. This crisis over the exemplarity of heroes became a crucial point in the reaction against the most controversial aspects of Machiavelli’s complex and multi-faceted ideal of military glory and virtue. Catholic political and military thinkers refused to acknowledge that a governor or a general could be ‘glorious’ if he did not respect Christian ethical precepts.64 Jeronem Osório (De nobilitate civili, 1542) was one of the first to confront Machiavelli’s ideas on virtue and war, despite remaining fundamentally ambiguous on the question of military virtue.65 After giving a catalogue of rules of recruitment and training of an army, Antonio Possevino (Il soldato christiano con l’instruttione dei capi dello essercito cattolico, Rome, 1569) compares the military virtue of the Romans (as in Machiavelli’s view) with the glory of the miles Christi who is in pursuit of the glory of God.66 Gregorio Nunes Coronel (De optimo rei publicae statu, 1597) argued against Machiavelli’s portrayal of Moses as a leader who acquired authority and reputation through his military actions.67 After the publication of the Contre Machiavel by Innocent Gentillet (1576) and the 1580 publication by Georg Rabe of Regentenkunst, oder Fuerstenspiegel, a German edition of Gentillet’s book, the diffusion of so-called ‘anti-Machiavellism’ that questioned Machiavelli’s model of virtue and glory spread into European Protestant culture. Many of these writers, however, extracted and extrapolated maxims and sentences

64 65 66 67

Cf. Merlin, “Tra storia e ‘institutio’: principe e capitano nel pensiero di Giovanni Botero,” in Il ‘Perfetto Capitano’. Immagini e realtà (secoli XV-XVII), ed. by M. Fantoni (Rome: Bulzoni, 2001), 310. Cf. Anglo, Machiavelli, 531-33. See G. Brunelli, Soldati del papa. Politica militare e nobiltà nello Stato della Chiesa. 15601644 (Rome: Carocci, 2003). Cf. C.L. Wilke “Une ideologie a l’œuvre. L’Antimachiavélisme au Portugal (1580-1656),” Corpus. Revue de philosophie, 31 (1997): 54. Moses is an emblematic figure who highlights the process that Machiavelli’s concept of military glory underwent during the course of the Sixteenth and the beginning of the Seventeenth century. If Machiavelli’s Moses, like other non-Christian leaders such as Romulus, Theseus and Cyrus, was an ambiguous figure of a prophet who could not have reached glory without arms, a century later, in line with the new ideals of pacifism and order that spread into Europe, thinkers like James Harrington turned Moses back into the more traditional figure of legislator (cf. N. Matteucci, “Machiavelli, Harrington, Montesquieu e gli ‘Ordini’ di Venezia,” Il pensiero politico III 3, 1970: 359).

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from his works in order to either avoid the Inquisition or simply dilute the strength of ideas considered immoral or radical.68 At the same time, the state of permanent war and insecurity that characterized Europe from the beginning of the sixteenth until the middle of the seventeenth century contributed to profound social and cultural changes in the way people, especially intellectuals and artists, perceived war. This also affected the model of military glory that Machiavelli had influenced. As mentioned above, while at the beginning of the early modern era the highest military ranks pursued an ideal of honor and bravery, later on countless acts of cruelty and robbery by both individuals and groups contributed to a general climate of fear of the soldier, and created, as Machiavelli put it, those “sinister opinions regarding them [which] ha[d] arisen that ma[d]e [men] hate the military and flee association with those who practice[d] it.”69 In response, generals and commanders rarely followed the ideal of a virtuous captain as an exemplary figure for their fellow-citizens or companions in arms (like Machiavelli’s Valerius Corvinus who attained glory by being “familiar with the soldiers”).70 Instead they embraced a model of aristocratic honor according to which soldiers are rough (or even ruthless) human material in need of discipline, and only the noble elite deserves honor. This model can be compared to a sort of formal game of chivalric rules and connected to the transformations that the definition of nobility underwent from the second half of the sixteenth century onward.71 68

See V. Lepri, “Machiavelli in The Quintessence of Wit and his English Military Readers,” in A. Arienzo & A. Petrina (eds.), Machiavellian Encounters in Tudor and Stuart England: Literary and Political Influences from the Reformation to the Restoration (Farnham: Ashgate, 2013), 45-58. 69 Machiavelli, Art of War (Preface, 9), 4. Original version: “Ma per essere gli ordini militari al tutto corrotti e, di gran lunga, dagli antichi modi separati, ne sono nate queste sinistre oppinioni, che fanno odiare la milizia e fuggire la conversazione di coloro che la esercitano”. 70 Machiavelli, Discourses (III, 22), 267. Original version (III 22, 22): “In modo che Valerio poteva far nascere da lui ogni umanità, dalla quale ei potesse acquistare grado con I soldati e la contentezza loro.” 71 See R. Asch, Nobilities in Transition, 1550-1700: Courtiers and Rebels in Britain and Europe (London: Arnold Publishers, 2003). For the changes that occurred in captains’ attitudes toward battle during the sixteenth and seventeenth century, cf. the excellent survey by A. Spagnoletti, “Onore e spirito nazionale nei soldati italiani al servizio della monarchia spagnola,” in Militari e società civile nell’Europa dell’età moderna (secoli XVI-XVIII), ed. by C. Donati & B.R. Kroener (Bologna: il Mulino, 2007), 211-253; in the same book, cf. also F. Göse, “Riflessioni sulla professionalizzazione degli ufficiali nobili di alcuni territori tedeschi dell’Impero nel secolo XVII,” 105. Finally, cf. the recent contribution by G. Breccia, “Virtus Under Fire. Renaissance Leaders in a Deadlier Battlefield,” in Books for Captains and Captains in Books. Shaping the Perfect Military Commander in Early Modern Europe,

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Thinkers like Giovanni Botero set the theoretical basis for this cultural and social move from the original meaning of Machiavellian military virtue as a civic concept of a popular army fighting for freedom or for the common good to the idea of military exercises as a tool to channel the energy of youngsters and the lower classes away from immoral and politically dangerous behaviors.72 According to Botero’s Della ragion di stato (1589), these military exercises can subtly prevent the subversion of the social and political order by shifting the vigor of youngsters toward a less dangerous activity. Botero demonstrates this by re-elaborating on the Machiavellian discussion of the Romans under Romulus.73 Thus at the turn of the century, in reaction to the spreading image of ruthless infantry soldiery and the indiscriminate violence of modern warfare, the highest ranks of the army embraced an aristocratic military code of sorts for which nobility of spirit and rank went beyond alignments, even crossing enemy lines. From this perspective, “heroism” is recognized as a military membership, i.e. as group or corporate identity.74 This sense of identity as nobility is mirrored in portraits of the time such as Diego Velázquez’s The Surrender of Breda (1634-35) in which the Spanish Commander Ambrogio Spinola shows a sense of humanity toward the defeated adversary (fig. 5). This is not only the result of a new conception of the soldier capable of Christian compassion,75 but also of respect toward an enemy, in this case the Prince of Orange, who was also a noble warrior.76 At the same time, the terrible consequences of conflicts in terms of the number of casualties, the idea of soldiers being left dead or dying on the fields,

72

73 74

75 76

eds. M. Faini and M.E. Severini (Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag, in Kommission, 2016): 21-34 This kind of transformation of the original ideology of Machiavelli started as early as the return of the Medici into Florence, after the end of the popular regime. See again chapter 5, sections “France” and “Spanish Provinces” (notes 25 and 218), for a reference to Lodovico Alamanni and the discourse he addressed to the Medici in 1516. Cf. the reading of a chapter from Botero’s Della ragion di stato by F. Cardini, Quella antica festa crudele. Guerra e cultura della guerra dal Medioevo alla Rivoluzione francese (Milan: Mondadori 1997) (original edition, Florence: Sansoni 1982), 94. For this sense of corporate identity between enemies, cf. H.Th. Gräf, “Ruolo e funzione delle testimonianze autobiografiche per la storia militare,” in Militari e società civile nell’Europa dell’età moderna (secoli XVI – XVIII), ed. by C. Donati; B.R. Kroener (Bologna: il Mulino, 2007), 302. Cf. F.R. Rodríguez de la Flor, “Maquiavelo en Flandes. El Arte de la guerra del Florentino y las ‘armas de España’, Revista de la Sociedad de Estudios Italianistas 9 (2013): 173. See González de León, “Soldados platicos and Caballeors,” 260. For Spinola’s comments about the ‘nobility’ of some of his former adversaries in war, cf. Lawrence, The Complete Soldier, 96.

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Figure 5

Velázquez, Diego. The Surrender of Breda. c. 1635 (oil on canvas, 307 × 367 cm) Museo del Prado, Madrid, Wikimedia Commons 7 November 2017

as well as the new “calculated use of terror and atrocity to subdue civilians”77 that was embedded in the early-modern conception of war, shaped an increasingly diffused sense of piety and efforts to reduce the effects of indiscriminate war. The concept of “prudence” – i.e. caution on the battle field – replaced the Machiavellian idea of “prudenza” as ‘wisdom’, becoming the new code of conduct for the “perfect captain.”78 At the same time, Jean Bodin and Justus Lipsius stressed the concept of war as application of force by legitimate authority and in the interest of the state. While in Machiavelli’s view personal achievements capable of contributing to the common good of the fatherland were always valuable, no matter the means, Lipsius’ ideal army was made up of officers who were not motivated by their own individual glory. Instead of being indi77 78

Cf. A. Phillips, War, Religion and Empire. The Transformation of International Orders (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 132. Cf. D. Frigo, “Principe e Capitano, pace e Guerra: figure del ‘politico’ tra Cinque e ­Seicento,” in Il ‘Perfetto Capitano’, 273-304: 281 ff.

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viduals capable of disobeying a superior’s command to achieve glory as Fabrizio Colonna and Alessandro Farnese had, Lipsius’ officers were to be good professionals who both commanded and obeyed. His officers are above all professionals who can set an example for soldiers and use constant training and exercise to turn them into equally disciplined troops.79 At the end of this period, images promoting peace, notably the works of Peter Paul Rubens, recalled the devastation and terror caused by the Thirty Years’ War.80 Rubens’ the Consequences of War (1638-1639) portrays a furious and destructive Mars failing to be controlled by a desperate and frustrated Venus rather than the heroic figure of a proud and fearsome soldier, thus illustrating the changing view of war (fig. 6). A century after the portrait of the Duke of Alba and the contemporary representation of Fabrizio Colonna by Guicciardini as a soldier in pursuit of honor and glory, and far from Machiavelli’s ambiguous and ideological version of Fabrizio, Rubens turned the Roman heritage Machiavelli used to sustain images of glory and military heroism into a tool to illustrate the dark side of war. Over a century, the reception of the Machiavelli’s concept of heroism as a multifaceted and sometimes ambiguous mixture of military and political glory (like Cesare Borgia in the Prince, or Fabrizio Colonna in the Art of War), discipline, leadership and wisdom arising from the example of the Romans, underwent different phases. Simpler views of glory and heroism spread into society and military culture. First, military commanders and writers emphasized the need for order and military exercises as a key for success in battle. Inspired by Machiavelli’s evocation of the glory of the ancients, military thinkers built on the notions of the discipline and the spirit of the Roman army to shape a model of the perfect captain as a tough commander-in-chief capable of ordering an army through punishment and drills, like the Duke of Alba. This model also shaped visual representations of sovereigns as heroic military commanders, as seen in Simonzio Lupi’s portrayal of Emperor Charles V as a triumphant mounted figure at the Battle of Pavia in a miniature of a sixteenth-century manuscript (fig. 7).81 79

Cf. G.D. Rothenberg, “Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the ‘Military Revolution’ of the Seventeenth Century,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. by P. Paret, G.A. Craig, F. Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 35. Göse, “Riflessioni sulla professionalizzazione,” 111-112, highlights the same aspects in his analysis of the social features of military careers in seventeenth-century Imperial territories. 80 Cf. L. Rosenthal, Gender, Politics, and Allegory in the Art of Rubens (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), 5. 81 BL: Additional 33733, f. 6. For this kind of imagery of Charles V, see M. Fantoni, “Il ‘Perfetto Capitano’: storia e mitografia,” in Il ‘Perfetto Capitano’, 61.

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Figure 6

Rubens, Peter Paul. The Consequences of War. 1637-1638 (oil on canvas, 206 × 342 cm) Pitti Palace, Florence, Wikimedia Commons 7 November 2017

Figure 7

Lupi, Simonzio. The Battle of Pavia, from The Triumphs of Emperor Charles V. c. 1556-1575 (miniature, 200 × 290 mm) British Library (London), Additional 33733, f. 6, The British Library Online 7 November 2017

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By the beginning of the seventeenth century, the diffusion of new pacifist ideas in Europe in combination with the growing reaction to the ideological and ambiguous components of Machiavelli’s military model of glory, which were seen as connected to his anti-Christian views on politics and ethics, paved the way for a completely new prototype of a military hero. This new hero was to be praised for his piety as well as for his sense of empathy toward peers and the enemy, rather than for determination, strength and sometimes even cruelty in the service of the common-good of the “fatherland,” or the people. A new model of honor was born from the ruins of the Machiavelli’s controversial concept of heroism.

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Conclusions

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Conclusions 1

 The Relationship between the Art of War, the New Standing Armies, the Wider Power Structures of European States, and the Connected Cultures of Warfare

The Art of War reflects the need to reform both warfare and the state-building process in sixteenth-century Europe. At the same time, the book’s circulation among the military and intellectual elites of the continent helped shape new cultures of warfare and politics that directly influenced the way sovereigns and governments tackled the financial and social issues that arose from early-modern states’ increasing need for larger armies. The militia model conceived by Machiavelli in this book was a forerunner to the formation of the early-modern conscript army. Even though Machiavelli’s project relies on part-time conscription, the structure of the military organization as conceived in the Art of War actually implies the formation of a state militia that was very different from the medieval city militias, and was thus a first step toward the new model of army.1 Machiavelli envisaged a two-step recruitment: the first a general conscript call, the second the selection (deletto) of the most valiant after the conscripts had participated in drill exercises or review.2 Still, he definitely wanted to raise a large number of men,3 explicitly connecting the new military needs of modernity with “those who are princes of so large states that they can put together from their subjects at least 15 to 20 thousand youths.”4 Aware of the developments occurring in the new central monarchies of Europe,5 Machiavelli refers to ancient military doctrine to describe a model of army only larger state formations could achieve. In the Art of War, the word Ordinanza (as a noun but also with a determinative function) is used in the sense of a militia, an organization that aims at the 1 L.R. García, “Types of Armies: Early Modern Spain,” in War and Competition between States, ed. by Ph. Contamine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 61. 2 Cf. G. Masi, “Arte della guerra,” in Enciclopedia machiavelliana, vol. 1 (Rome: Treccani, 2014), 117. See also above chapter 5, p. 123 and 168. 3 N. Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 28) trans. ed. and with a commentary by C. Lynch (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 2003), 28. Cf. above chapter 4, p. 90. 4 Machiavelli, Art of War (VII, 199), 161. 5 J. Lindegren, “Men, Money, and Means,” in War and Competition between States, ed. by Ph. Contamine (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2000), 143, writes: “In sum: war losses during the early modern period depended on the forces’ size and the length of time they were mobilized.”

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004432000_011

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systematic military conscription of the people.6 In English and other European languages, the term only designated the “disposition of troops in battle”;7 in the Art of War, Machiavelli uses the word to conceptually link the idea of a national army to the idea of compulsory enrollment. He draws this association between the term and his concept of a conscript military force from both a Florentine tradition of local levies for a militia (to which he himself contributed) and Charles VII’s “lance” organization of the French compagnies d’ordonnance in 1445. We can see the influence of the latter tradition in chapter 13 of the Prince in which Machiavelli refers to the “ordering of the men-at-arms and of infantry” (“l’ordinanza delle gente d’arme e delle fanterie”) and by his reference to the same compagnies in book 1 of the Art of War “By the way of militia [“Per via d’ordinanza” in the original Italian]; [which are] not similar to that of the king of France”).8 Obviously, the term Ordinanza also connects to a general medieval legislative and institutional tradition, already associated with military organizations. Nonetheless, it is incontrovertible that Machiavelli helped give this vocabulary a new meaning as a term of military administration increasingly associated with the levy of infantry state militias and, generally, military conscription. This is exemplified, for instance, by the reforms of the local battalions of Spanish Italy, and by the Ordonnance of Francis I, the successor of Charles VII on the French throne, which on 24 July 1534 instituted the Légions that have been examined in the previous chapters.

…

It is undeniable that there are conceptual connections between the Machiavellian part-time conscription, a state militia and the early-modern conscript army. However, scholars such as Sidney Anglo argue on practical grounds that the combination of artillery, small fire-arms, and movements of armies on the field, along with the permanent military administrations that came into in the mid-sixteenth-century, testifies to the gap between the new early-modern armies and what Anglo defines as “the small-town humanism of the Arte della

6 Masi, “Arte della guerra,” 116. 7 Oxford English Dictionary, s.v. “Ordinance” & “Ordonnance.” 8 See N. Machiavelli, The Prince: with Related Documents (ch. 13), ed. and translated by W. Connell, second edition (Boston – New York: Bedford/St. Martin’s, 2016), 81; and Id., Art of War (I, 104), 19.

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guerra.”9 But this interpretation of Machiavelli’s work as a merely literary effort does not take into account the timing of the composition of the Art of War. In the first instance, while at the time the book was conceived handguns were already important, using them tactically was even more significant, as we have seen. At the time of writing, in the second half of the 1510s,10 what counted most in warfare was still the “human qualities;”11 i.e. exactly the qualities to which Machiavelli directed his efforts. Handguns alone were worth little; it was having the tactical know how of how best to use them in combination with traditional arms such as the pike that mattered. The simple strategy of hiding in defense behind a trench and an earth parapet made the uses of arquebuses very significant. However, equally important was the ability to win by holding your pikes in good and firm order against a cavalry charge or by winning a battle with swords and daggers when two infantry formations, as often happened, clashed on the open field, and pikes were not enough to gain the day. As Piero Pieri has pointed out, it is clear that at the beginning of the sixteenth century the arquebusiers, in particular, were still considered ancillary to traditional arms.12 In this context, studying the mechanisms of ancient infantry formations was not a mere literary exercise, regardless of how abstract and wrong the infantry mechanisms proposed by Machiavelli may have proven to be or how weak his knowledge of the organization of the Roman phalanx. Only later in that century, with the development of more efficient small firearms such as the musket, did radically new tactics and military techniques emerge.13 The infantry square formations tended to get smaller and more flexible to allow the

9

10 11 12 13

S. Anglo, Machiavelli: The First Century: Studies in Enthusiasm, Hostility, and Irrelevance (Oxford: Oxford University Press 2005), 571. In the same direction, more balanced observations have already been made by G. Barberi Squarotti, “L’Arte della guerra o l’azione impossibile,” in Id., Machiavelli o la scelta della letteratura (Rome: 1987), 231-62, according to whom this dialogue has a utopist and literary nature that nonetheless reveals the author’s willingness to actually reform the military institutions of the time. For a recent account of the composition of the book, cf. Masi, “Arte della guerra,” 110. Quotation from, F. Gilbert, “The Renaissance of the Art of War,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. by P. Paret, G.A. Craig, F. Gilbert (Princeton: University Press, 1971), 24. P. Pieri, Il rinascimento e la crisi militare italiana (Turin: Einaudi, 1952), 432. According to G. Parker, The Spanish Road to the Netherlands, the musket was introduced only in the middle of the sixteenth century, and employed for the first time in a larger scale by the Duke of Alba during his campaigns in the Flanders, visit (accessed Oct. 2017).

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handguns to shoot more easily while retaining the mass cohesion needed to resist a cavalry charge by presenting pikes.14 Furthermore, despite these later developments, the strategies adopted for reinforcing discipline and spirit by ancient military commanders were still used for comparison and study when applied to the mechanisms of the new infantry formations: i.e. the close and switching ranks of musketeers and shooters.15 Generals and captains of the late sixteenth century, including the Duke of Alba and the Italian commanders of the Spanish army in Flanders, did not look at the Art of War (and especially its epigones like Fourquevaux/Du Bellay or Salazar) as a literary divertissement. Despite the new developments, military institutions, sovereigns and governors were still profiting from ideas and proposals imagined by Machiavelli and then re-elaborated by many. All over Europe, the Art of War’s discussion on the necessity of improving discipline, virtue and confidence among militiamen and soldiers generally inspired strategists to new readings of the classics. Governors like Juan de Vega, who conceived the organization of the local militia battalions of the Spanish provinces of Italy, learned much from the suggestions about shaping the structure of the militia either in the Art of War itself or books that drew heavily from it such as Salazar’s Tratado de re militari. Similarly, as noted in chapter 5, the very name Légions that King Francis I assigned to the new French infantry Ordonnance in the 1530s was certainly stimulated by Machiavelli’s praise of the Roman model in his book (a tribute by no means diminished by the fact that he also suggests a combination between the Roman model and the GermanSwiss). This literary/military paradigm was the foundation of the condemnation of any recourse to foreign troops that largely influenced Fourqueavaux/Du Bellay. It is no coincidence that among the books documented in Maurice of Nassau’s library – the famous military reformer of the Low Countries – was a copy of the Discourses and the Prince as well as the Instructions sur le faict de la guerre.16 Nor is it by chance that Maurice’s correspondence discussed the 14

15

16

Cf. F. Cardini, Quella antica festa crudele. Guerra e cultura della guerra dal Medioevo alla Rivoluzione francese (Milan: Mondadori 1997) (original edition, Florence: Sansoni 1982), 127. For a summary of recent scholarship on this theme, cf. D. Parrott, The Business of War: Military Enterprise and Military Revolution in Early Modern Europe (Cambridge: University Press, 2012), 146. Cf. G.D. Rothenberg, “Maurice of Nassau, Gustavus Adolphus, Raimondo Montecuccoli, and the ‘Military Revolution’ of the Seventeenth Century,” in Makers of Modern Strategy from Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age, ed. by P. Paret, G.A. Craig, F. Gilbert (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1986), 48. Cf. Anglo, Machiavelli, 567, who did not note that the 1608 catalogue of Maurice’s library listed the edition of Machiavelli’s Discours de l’éstat de paix et de la guerre printed in

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t­actics of the Romans, or that one of his correspondents sent him a copy of Aelianus. The military achievements of commanders such as the Prince of Orange and a few others came from their ability to balance theory and practice, humanistic culture and military experience, in a time when military writers were endlessly debating about the balance of the two concepts.17 As scholars like Gabriele Pedullà and Jean-Louis Fournel have explained, the stress that Machiavelli’s book put on infantry tactics helped modernize warfare.18

…

It is especially Machiavelli’s conceptualization of war and warfare, so consequential to his humanist-driven political culture and context, that continued to influence European cultures of warfare. The analysis of the nature of warfare and the subsequent explanation of the changing features needed in warfare, embedded in the idea of a “third order” of infantry in chapter 26 of the Prince and then in the elaboration of an integrated strategic and comprehensive response to these transformations contained in the Art of War lasted throughout the early modern era. While the long discussion of the organization of the militia, especially its hierarchy and ranks, may seem technically inaccurate and tedious to a modern reader, it foresaw the way that early modern armies were characterized by a precise hierarchical order among files and units and an equally precise division of tasks made possible by the severe discipline that the commanders and sub-commanders were required to guarantee and oversee.19 The stress in the Art of War on the explanation of the ranks of the militia, from the general commander to the battalion commanders, the constables and the centurion, and finally down to the capidieci (“caporals” commanding “ten” men), hints at the importance Machiavelli assigned to this ­element.

17

18

19

Rouens in 1579 and bound together with the Prince, as indicated in The Seventeenth Century Orange-Nassau Library, ed. by A.D. Renting and J.T.C. Renting-Kuijpers (Utrecht: HES, 1993), 448. Cf. Cardini, Quella antica festa crudele, 128. For a recent account of this debate in Spain, see Saúl Martínez Bermejo, “Antigua disciplina: el ejemplo romano en los tratados militares ibéricos, c. 1560-1600,” Hispania LXXIV, n. 247 (2014): 357-384, and cf. again Rothenberg, “Maurice of Nassau,” 34 ff. G. Pedullà, “Machiavelli the Tactician: Math, Graphs, and Knots in the Art of War,” in F. Del Lucchese, ‎F. Frosini, ‎V. Morfino (eds.), The Radical Machiavelli: Politics, Philosophy, and Language (Leiden: Brill, 2015); J.-L. Fournel, “Le corps du soldat chez Machiavel,” in Mélanges en l’honneur de Marie-Madeleine Fontaine (Geneva: Droz, 2015), 149-162. Cf. again Rothenberg, “Maurice of Nassau,” 34 ff, and Cardini, Quella antica festa crudele, 124.

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This hierarchy was intended to guarantee the impeccable combination of ranks and rows that would become extremely important, particularly for the late-sixteenth-century infantry formations of musketeers, i.e. for the complicated mechanisms that regulated the growing use of hand firearms. The accent Machiavelli put on training and discipline was intended to perfectly regulate the mechanisms of infantry battle formations. Fabrizio Colonna explicitly declares this, then continues to remind the reader of it (for instance, in book 2: “As I said to you, to know how to keep files well is of the first importance in training a battalion”).20 Every rank is explained and discussed in the Art of War, aiming precisely at the goal of keeping ranks united and coordinated that becomes key to every early modern army.

…

Conceptualizing warfare also means considering the state and military structures needed to cope with the newly powerful forces involved in the open-field battles of the time. By the end of the fifteenth century and the beginning of the Italian Wars, the vast number of operations required to enroll, move and pay troops through the peninsula led to a sudden and significant acceleration in documentary and organizational practices needed to administer a massive army, the endless production of missives, orders, payments, memos and annotations, muster rolls, billeting and pay lists, safe conducts, lists of prisoners, and so on. These were early aspects of the part of the so-called “military revolution” associated with the emergence of the bureaucracy,21 in which Machiavelli had been involved for several years at the time when, for instance, he personally led the operations needed for the recruitment of the 1506 Florentine militia (e.g. the documentation required to ensure the conscription of one man per household). These developments brought unprecedented changes in both size and systematization of the previous military tradition of levies in the Tuscan territory.22 The same developments were explicitly recalled by Machiavelli’s 20 Machiavelli, Art of War (II, 174), 49. Original version: “la prima importanza che è nell’eser­ cizio delle battaglie, è sapere tenere bene le file.” 21 Cf. A. Corvisier, “Armées, etat et administration dans les temps modernes,” in Histoire com­parée de l’administration, (IVe-XVIIIe Siècles), Acts of the conference, 27 March-1st April 1977 (Munich: Artemis Verlag, 1980): 555-69; J. Glete, War and the State in Early Modern Europe: Spain, the Dutch Republic and Sweden as Fiscal-Military States 1550-1660 (London; New York: Routledge, 2002); S. Gunn, “War and the Emergence of the State: Western Europe, 1350-1600,” in F. Tallett & D.J.B. Trim, eds, European Warfare, 1350-1750 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 50-73. 22 On these developments, see A. Guidi, “‘Per peli e per segni’. Muster Rolls, Lists and Notes: Practical Military Records relating to the Last Florentine Ordinances and Militia, from

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suggestion in the Art of War, in the words of Fabrizio Colonna and Cosimo Rucellai, to “make a militia similar to that which is in our countries.”23 Machiavelli’s obsessive concern for details is the essence of his process of conceptualization of warfare in the Art of War. In fact, it was this attention to details that captured the attention of early-modern military governors and captains, despite Machiavelli’s often-criticized tendency to abstraction in the mechanisms of infantry battle formations. Incidentally, the difference between the Art of War and the political works of Machiavelli lies in precisely this feature: while in both the Prince and in the Discourses the question of the militia is not fully articulated and developed in its technical characteristics, in this dialogue, Machiavelli’s primary aim is to discover and define the perfect form of militia. And according to the doctrine of the Art of War, perfection, as Giorgio Masi explained, lies in the way the militia is organized.24 It is in the deletto, the selection process and its features, and above all in the correct administration of the selection that this commitment to perfection can reach the desired outcome. Ethics, institutions, customs, and discipline and training must all converge toward this ultimate goal. Therefore, recruitment must be controlled and arranged by either a prince or a republic, with the help of the military ranks. It cannot be left to individuals or feudal lords. Despite the persistent role of private enterprises in the early-modern recruitment system, a “state-controlled military establishment” was growing in sixteenth-century Europe.25 Machiavelli’s Art of War saw the military neither as an ‘art’ in the sense of a profession, as in the world of the Italian condottieri, nor as the chivalric game of the Middle Ages, nor as a corporate military aristocratic identity, but as a transformation of a political community. It is this that made the book a turning point: the people become a collective force that is the only thing that can ensure the survival of a political entity. One might argue that this was a political achievement that should be ascribed to the Art ‘of State’ rather than of War.26 While the reality of early-modern warfare was rooted in a strong interconnection between the support of private enterprise and the state’s creation of a control apparatus, early modern Machiavelli to the Fall of the Republic (1506-1530), Historical Research (2016): 677; and A. Guidi, Un Segretario militante. Politica, diplomazia e armi nel Cancelliere Machiavelli (Bologna: il Mulino, 2009), 203-204. Moreover, see ahead Appendix 1.1. 23 Machiavelli, Art of War (I, 148), 22. See above for a discussion of this point. 24 Masi, “Arte della guerra,” 117. 25 Parrott, The Business of War, 30. 26 Machiavelli famously referred to his own experience with politics, diplomacy and government as Secretary of the Florentine chancery by using the expression “studio dell’arte dello stato” in a letter written to Francesco Vettori on 10 December 1513.

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wars proved difficult to win without the organization of forces and human resources that only politics and institutions, in other words, the emerging state could guarantee.27 At the end of book 7, Machiavelli has Fabrizio Colonna advise the reader as follows: “never believe that the reputation may be rendered by Italian arms, except […] by means of those who have big states.”28 This statement does not refer just to the need for a large infantry, but, more broadly, to the idea that waging war on the field required structures, institutions and resources that only big states could guarantee. Local feudal lords and enterprises continued raising their own militias through­out the sixteenth century, and some, particularly the German Lantz­ chenecht, remained very efficient.29 Nonetheless, later developments related to the formation of national armies in modern history – or the concept of a modern democratic army – are the ultimate transfiguration of the prophetic Machiavellian image of a citizen and peasant militia as an army of the peoplein-arms fighting to rule themselves. This ideology, with rare but significant historical episodes, successfully proved its capacity to motivate an army. A notable example of its success was the last Florentine Republic’s defense against the Imperial forces when they laid siege to Florence in 1530; the model held, even though, because of the wide gap between the Imperial and the Florentine forces, the Empire eventually won. It has been argued that military modernization led to important developments in both constitutional and absolute states. In particular, militias reinforced late medieval and early-modern constitutional regimes.30 In this respect, the new conceptualization of the militia, and the idea of a militia itself, connect to longstanding political questions such as how to stimulate the people to take part in the military defense of the state and the loyalty of either militiamen or soldiers to a patria that concerned governing processes and the theoretical legitimizations of power in both the early-modern and modern eras.31 Machiavelli’s answer to this problem, from the creation of the 1506 militia on, had two sides: stimulating virtue in the peasants by rewarding conscripts 27 Cf. Parrott, The Business of War, 13 passim. 28 Machiavelli, Art of War (VII, 234), 163. 29 Parrott, The Business of War, 55-57. 30 B.M. Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change. Origins of Democracy and Autocracy in Early Modern Europe (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 24-25. 31 For acute observations on this topic and an overview of some of the changes from the late Middle Ages to the early modern era and distinctions between different geographical areas, see G. Chittolini, “Il ‘militare’ tra tardo Medioevo e prima età moderna,” in Militari e società civile nell’Europa dell’età moderna (secoli XVI-XVIII), ed. by C. Donati and B.R. Kroener (Bologna: il Mulino, 2007), 73-78.

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with benefits and fiscal exemptions and developing policies intended to include them in a common patria, while at the same time imposing severe discipline on them. This model, eventually deprived of its most radical political connotations by so-called Machiavellism and the epigones of the Art of War, influenced political and military thought for centuries. 2

 Political Engagement and Civic Activism

The Art of War not only has a strong ideology in its effort to teach governors and monarchs about the military institutions of the Romans in order to build a new popular militia; it has a specific purpose. As explained in the previous chapters, through the creation of an ideal militia, Machiavelli offered the Medicis and other Italian governors who did not trust their own citizens a solution capable of undercutting the old model of an army dominated by condottieri with their private armies and their private interests. In so doing, the book also set new standards for European sovereigns who needed to reinforce their authority over the state and the remnants of the feudal system by promoting the idea of a state militia and military conscription while reinforcing their political position through the savings realized by a part-time military. Initially the reception of Machiavelli’s ideas led to the creation of new larger armies controlled by central authorities. Military conscription allowed the French and Spanish sovereigns to set up a cheap defensive system on the peripheries of their states. Then, from the end of the sixteenth century on, conscription became a remedy for the decreasing proportion of volunteers in armies like the Spanish troops in Flanders.32 These features led to important changes in the wider power structures of European nations. The conceptualization of a militia relates to aspects of state building, including the question of how and when to use a popular army. Consequently, it involves moral, political and even juridical concerns. It is not surprising that after Machiavelli used classical Roman history to consider the meaning, the causes and the consequences of war, Alberico Gentili’s De iure belli laid the ground for a juridical interpretation of war and peace grounded in the empirical study of historical precedent rather than the ethical or religious ideals that had dictated the medieval doctrine of the just cause of war. According to Gentili, building on Machiavelli’s reasoning on the use of force in politics 32

Cf. G. Parker, The Army of Flanders and the Spanish Road, 1567-1659. The Logistics of Spanish Victory and Defeat in the Low Countries’ Wars (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1975 [1972]), 218.

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and international relations, the traditional distinction between just and unjust war should be made along juridical lines, considering the need for security and autonomy as well as the inevitable striving for power and conquest: factors that, from then on, were considered perfectly legitimate by both the emerging absolute monarchs and those engaged in the new national uprisings against foreign domination or the dominion of a king on his own nation. At the same time, militias became the only resource for the last European republics in their struggle for independence, as seen in the cases of the Dutch Republic and the last city-state Republics of Italy. Furthermore, the raising of state militias resulted in the rise of new bureaucratic, military and power structures. This occurred in both republican and monarchical regimes, and cannot be confined only to a Republican context nor interpreted only in the light of resistance to the absolute power of the monarchs.33 The defense of the peripheries of the early-modern European monarchies was often entrusted to local militias, controlled by the sovereign via judicial and institutional tools that permitted their quick dismissal. Local militias became a tool in the hands of both the French and Spanish sovereigns, used to secure the nation in cases of war and emergency and for public and social order purposes.

…

However, the reception of Machiavelli’s thoughts on the militia also contributed to the diffusion of important ideas on political engagement and civic activism by local communities and city institutions in early modern monarchical regimes. Starting earlier than has been recognized, Machiavelli’s military ideas helped diffuse important ideas about political demands and social instances connected to projects for military reform such as the effort of some Parisian intellectual and political circles to promote the role of the city’s militias in the newly centralized national army. One point must be highlighted. The political aspects of the reception of Machiavelli’s works into Europe are usually connected to the diffusion of his major political writings such as the Prince and the Discourses on Livy. However, scholarship has overlooked the way that Machiavelli’s ideas on the militia as specifically promoted in the Art of War spread into European monarchical regimes and how they affected demands for political and social advancement in early modern history. This needs to be considered separately because 33

S. Brunet – J. Javier Ruiz Ibáñez, introduction to Les milices dans la première modernité (Rennes: Presse Universitaries de Rennes, 2015), 15.

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non-democratic societies such as the early-modern absolute monarchies have different levels of political engagement and mobilization than do democratic ones.34 In this regard, the story of the militia in early-modern Europe testifies to its channeling into less democratic and more practical goals by the emerging monarchs, while also showing how political communities and those at the peripheries of the state used discussion about and/or participation in the militia to claim local or particular rights. The French translation by Charrier and the re-writing by Fourquevaux/Du Bellay examined in chapter 5 show how the circulation of the Art of War was connected to cultural ideas and political engagement that concerned the advancement or preservation of the rights of local communities and institutions such as the Parliament and the city militias it controlled, in a monarchical regime. In particular, the book was probably used to promote the role of the latter and the contribution of the institutions of Paris to the army of the king, against the privileges of the aristocracy and its opposition to allowing the people to bear arms. Therefore, although the growth of the military in late-seventeenth- and eighteenth-century Europe generally favored the state and paved the way to Absolutism, in late Renaissance monarchies, and especially in France, Machia­ velli’s conception of a militia was used by local institutions that controlled militias to take on the monarchy and claim their own role in the state. Machia­ velli’s project supported the inclusion of the people through the military and the social reforms required to set up a true militia-army, therefore encouraging the political conflict that took place in France at the center and the peripheries rather than supporting the absolute power of the king. Machiavelli’s original militia project encouraged the growth of the state, not of Absolutism, even though in the long run the monarchical institutions prevailed in domestic conflicts in almost all the early-modern European monarchies.35 Machiavellism, so called, slowly channeled the political content of Machiavelli’s military doctrine into a tool in the hands of the monarchs. Still, in the context of the growing sixteenth-century French monarchical regime, the Machiavellian project could also grant local institutions opportunities for political development. Renaissance France, a paradoxical “century and a half” during which provincial institutions, armed aristocracy, and town militias “composed a powerful

34 35

G. Rivett, “Activism, Mobilisation and Political Engagement: Comparative Historical Perspectives,” Journal of Historical Sociology, 28, 1 (2015), DOI: 10.1111/johs.12063. For the conflict between constitutional instances and the absolute monarchs, see Downing, The Military Revolution and Political Change, 74-78.

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counterpoise” to the monarchs, was the perfect place for the reception of Machiavelli’s theories about the vital importance of a militia-army.36 36

Ibid., 114-115.

Appendix Appendix

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Appendix 1

Introduction: Some Notes on the Military Documentary Production of the Time, and on the Available Documentation

Practical and Administrative Records: Production, Preservation and Availability With the commencement of the Italian Wars at the end of the fifteenth century, a vast number of military operations related to the enrollment, movement and payment of troops throughout Italy led to a sudden acceleration in documentary practices and the production of missives, orders, payments, memos and annotations, as well as muster rolls, billeting and pay lists, safe conducts, lists of prisoners, and so on. This production of records by or about Italian armies was the result of two different levels of administration and communication that generated two corresponding types of documentation: low-level documents recording the daily running of an army at war, which I will call practical records; and the official correspondence between the central governing bodies and military officials in the field, including orders and instructions, which I will call administrative records. The administrative records are often still available in Italian archives, as they were usually preserved by the chancelleries that produced them. They include deliberations, orders and letters sent from city-magistracies to military officers, all part of the extensive and growing communication network built by the Italian city-states from the thirteenth century onwards.1 For Florence, they include dispatches, orders and deliberations sent to condottieri, marshals, commissioners, commanders and city officials in the territories under Florence’s control,2  1.1

1 Cf. I. Lazzarini, “Scritture dello spazio e linguaggi del territorio nell’Italia tre-quattrocentesca. Prime riflessioni sulle fonti pubbliche tardomedievali,” Bullettino dell’Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo e Archivio Muratoriano, 113 (2011): 137-208, esp. 170 ff.; and Ead., “Le pouvoir de l’écriture. Les chancelleries urbaines et la formation des Etats territoriaux en Italie (XIVe-XVe siècles),” Histoire Urbaine, 35 (2012): 31-49. 2 Cf. W.J. Connell, “Il commissario e lo stato territoriale fiorentino,” Ricerche Storiche, 18 (1988), 591-617; H. Lang, Cosimo de’ Medici, die Gesandten und die Condottieri. Diplomatie und Kriege der Republik Florenz im 15. Jahrhundert (Paderborn: Ferdinand Schöningh Verlag, 2009), 324325; also J.R. Hale, “Renaissance Armies and Political Control. The Venetian Proveditorial System (1509-1527),” Journal of Italian History, 2 (1979), 11-31.

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004432000_012

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as well as chancery registers of contracts (such as the condotte)3 and registers of payments to soldiers. Studies of Florentine Renaissance military organization usually draw on administrative records, in particular payment registers, which are mainly preserved in the archival collections of the Camera del Comune (especially the series called Uscita and the series Stipendiati del Comune, which include payments for both army captains and the condottieri).4 The 1506 and 1527-30 militias, however, were regulated by the office of the Dieci di Balìa (also known as di libertà e pace) as well as by a newly established council, the Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia, Machiavelli’s brainchild. Over the decades, in fact, the Dieci di Balìa assumed greater authority in military matters.5 The documents it produced thus increased in both number and variety, leading in turn to an increase in records of military expenses.6 This growth can be seen in the wider archival practices of the magistracy itself, beginning with the Dieci’s books of accountancy, known today as the Entrata e uscita, commissioned in 1369. These were followed by the registers of military deliberations, including the employment contracts (condotte) of mercenaries and their funding from 1384 on,7 as well as the Debitori e creditori series, with holdings from 1424 onwards. By 1413 the chancery of the Dieci was also producing a wider series of Missive (still extant in the archives of Florence), separate from other diplomatic records, which further developed the communication network between officials and military commissioners in the territories, along with other new series such as the Ricordanze from 1425 and the Sommari di missive e responsive and the Ricordi from 1478.8 The impressive increase by the end of the fifteenth century in the number of copy-registers for the Missives of the Dieci is clear evidence of the acceleration 3 For more about the condottieri and documentation relating to the condotte, i.e. the contracts that regulated their service to the Italian city-states, see D.P. Waley “Condotte and Condottieri in the Thirteenth Century,” Proceedings of the British Academy, 61 (1975): 337-71. 4 For a general overview of these records, see W.P. Caferro, “Continuity, Long-Term Service, and Permanent Forces: A Reassessment of the Florentine Army in the Fourteenth Century,” The Journal of Modern History, 80, n. 2 (2008): 219-251, esp. 222-223 (note 16). 5 Cf. G. Pampaloni, ‘Gli organi della Repubblica fiorentina per le relazioni con l’estero’, Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, XX, 2 (1953), 261-96: 270 ff; G. Guidi, Il governo della città repubblica, 3 vols (Florence: Olschki, 1981), Vol. II, 203-12. For the period up to 1454, see also, Lang, Cosimo de’ Medici, 69-79 6 Cf. Pampaloni, ‘Gli organi della Repubblica fiorentina’, 284. 7 Now in the series Deliberazioni, Condotte e Stanziamenti. On the Deliberazioni of the Dieci, cf. A. Molho, Florentine Public Finances in the Early Renaisssance, 1400-1433 (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1971), 12-13; Caferro, “Continuity,” 222-3; and cf. Lang, Cosimo de’ Medici, 75-6. 8 Cf. Guida generale degli Archivi di Stato italiani, 4 voll. (Rome: 1981-1994), vol. 2, s.v. Firenze, 54.

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in the production of military records brought about by the Italian Wars. Despite the inevitable losses in this series, it is notable that, out of a total of 108 registers (which end in 1530), only 30 date from 1413 to 1494, and only 14 of the 48 registers of the diplomatic records of the Dieci, known as the Legazioni e commissarie, date from before 1494.9 Among the most widely studied and published of these records are those relating to Niccolò Machiavelli’s chancery career, when from 1498 to 1512, alongside his diplomatic responsibilities, he was in charge of administering Florence’s territories and thus responsible for the correspondence between the city magistrates and territory officials. The dispatches written by Machiavelli, known in modern editions as the “scritti di governo,” attest to both the frequency and extent of the city’s network of documentary information. For instance, from just 1498 to 1505, less than half of Machiavelli’s fifteen years in the chancery, he produced an astonishing 5493 documents, all written in his own hand, consisting mostly of communications prepared on behalf of the Dieci, the Signoria, and the new council of the Nove that he had conceived.10 Autograph documentation of the Dieci and the Nove has been largely studied by Machiavelli scholars from a literary and biographical perspective; military history has been largely overlooked11 – a gap the present work hopes to fill. The other kind of written records, described above as practical – that document low-level, day-to-day administration of the army in the field – is less studied. This is because, first of all, their fragmentary preservation. We have lost almost all the original lists produced by the military ordinances in late-medieval and early-Renaissance Italy and sent back and forth to ensure that men 9

10

11

This estimate is based on registers listed in the inventories of the Florentine State Archives in the collection Archivi della Repubblica. Note that, from a certain point onward, the Dieci took over diplomacy from the Signori authority. Not surprisingly, the Legazioni e commissarie of the Signori date mostly from before 1494. Note also that Marzi, La Cancelleria, 529-30, dates to 1441 the beginning of the series of the Second chancery (which probably refers to the series now called Signori, Missive). This total includes the dispatches from Machiavelli’s diplomatic missions. Nonetheless, the majority of them are the so-called “Scritti di governo,” including those relating to his administrative or military missions (“Commissarie”) to the Florentine Contado. On the composition and number of Machiavelli’s chancery autographs, cf. A. Guidi “Indice cronologico degli autografi,” in N. Machiavelli, Legazioni. Commissarie. Scritti di governo (‘Edizione Nazionale delle Opere’), 7 vols., ed. by Jean-Jacques Marchand et al. (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2002-11), Vol. VII (1510-27), and the postfaces to N. Machiavelli, Legazioni, Commissarie e scritti di governo, 4 vols, ed. by Fredi Chiappelli & Jean-Jacques Marchand (Bari: Laterza, 1971-85). The first investigation focusing on military history was the research I did for my monograph: A. Guidi, Un Segretario militante. Politica, diplomazia e armi nel Cancelliere Machiavelli (Bologna: Il Mulino, 2009).

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were mustered and paid properly. For Florence, the remaining chancery registers of the early sixteenth century Ordinanze of the contado usually provide only the number of payments per company. (There are only a few exceptions for Machiavelli’s militia, the sole remaining register of the “distribution of weapons” and the lists attached to a dispatch published by Sergio Bertelli).12 But the other reason is that, much as chancellors and notaries at the time discarded many of these documents (as we will see below), historians of earlymodern Italian military organizations have, with some significant exceptions, neglected those that are extant.13 While the majority of these Florentine practical documents concerning the militias of the early sixteenth century were lost, a few original lists, notes and muster rolls directly relating to the last republican militia have survived in private archives or in archival collections separated from those of the Florentine state. One of these collections, originally a private family archive, but moved at 12

13

Cf. N. Machiavelli, Lettere di cancelleria, ed. by S. Bertelli (Milan: Giovanni Salerno editore, 1970), pp. 386-411. However, it is important to point out that the lists published by Bertelli were rather rough copies/drafts prepared in the Chancery of the originals used for recruiting by Machiavelli. The list preserved in the remaining register of the “Distribution of weapons,” in contrast, is a copy of a document prepared during a mission, then sent to Florence to be recorded in the Chancery, see A. Guidi, “‘Per peli e per segni’. Muster Rolls, Lists and Notes: Practical Military Records relating to the Last Florentine Ordinanze and Militia, from Machiavelli to the Fall of the Republic (1506-1530),” Historical Research, vol. 89, no. 246 (November 2016): 681 & 685. Historians of the late-Middle Ages have done important research on this subject, for Florence and elsewhere: for instance, see W.P. Caferro, ‘Warfare and Economy in Renaissance Italy 1350-1450’, Journal of Interdisciplinary History, XXXIX, 2 (2008): 167-209. See also Molho, Florentine Public Finances; F. Bargigia & G. de Angelis, “Scrivere in guerra. I notai negli eserciti dell’Italia comunale (secoli XII-XIV),” Scrineum. Rivista, 5 (2008), 19-87; F. Bargigia, “I documenti dell’esercito: l’esempio del Libro di Montaperti,” in P. Grillo, eds, Cittadini in armi. Eserciti e guerre nell’Italia comunale, (Padova: Rubbettino, 2011), 71-82; M. Vallerani, “Logica della documentazione e logica dell’istituzione. Per una rilettura dei documenti in forma di lista nei comuni italiani della prima metà del XIII secolo,” in Notariato e medievistica. Per i cento anni di Studi e ricerche di diplomatica comunale di Pietro Torelli, ed. G. Gardoni and I. Lazzarini (Rome: Istituto storico italiano per il medioevo, 2013); finally I. Lazzarini, “L’ordine delle cose e l’ordine dei testi. Liste, indici e inventari nei registri di governo dei principati italiani del tardo Medioevo,” in Écritures grises. Les instruments de travail administratif en Europe méridionale (XIIe-XVIIe siècles). II. Instrumenter l’action administrative, ed. A. Fossier et al. (Rome: École française de Rome, 2019). Important research on Renaissance and early-modern Italian armies by G. Brunelli, Soldati del papa. Politica militare e nobiltà nello Stato della Chiesa. 1560-1644 (Rome: Carocci, 2003), and N. Covini, L’esercito del duca. Organizzazione militare e istituzioni al tempo degli Sforza (1450-1480) (Rome: Istituto Storico Italiano per il Medio Evo, 1998). In contrast, there are just a few studies on early modern lists and other practical records in early sixteenth-century Florence, for which see Guidi, “Per peli e per segni,” 673-686.

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the end of the nineteenth century to the Archivio di Stato di Firenze, is the Carte Strozziane, named after the Florentine bibliophilist Carlo Strozzi (1587-1670), who compiled them in the 17th century. Strozzi collected documents and records produced by old Florentine magistracies, Republic officials, and private citizens that had been preserved in private archives or had gotten separated from the main official archives delle Riformagioni such as those stored, rather haphazardly, in the rooms called “de’ Prestanzoni.”14 The present book has drawn heavily on these lesser-known sources.15 The Records of the Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia from 1527 to 1530: Loss, Preservation and New Discoveries Although the books containing chancery copies of official orders and instructions given by the Nove between 1506 and 1512 (during Machiavelli’s time in the office) are complete and available in the Florentine archives, very few from the last republican period have survived. One can only speculate about why the Missive as well as the Deliberazioni and Notificazioni of the Nove are missing for the period 1527-30. Some of the Nove’s records were added later to the archives of the Dieci, who, as explained above, had similar duties. This does not seem accidental, in the light of the fact that the Dieci had the authority to supervise the actions of the Nove during the years 1527-1530.16 In this regard, it is worth noting, perhaps, that in 1793, the Florentine archivist Filippo Brunetti – who was in charge of inventorying the Riformagioni (the archives of Republican Florence) – did not assign any specific label, reference, or shelf mark to the letters of the Nove,  1.2

14

15 16

Cf. the Act by which Carlo Strozzi was officially put in charge of listing, collecting and reor­ganizing the records stored in the rooms called “de’ Prestanzoni,” published by C. Guasti, “introduction” to Le carte strozziane del regio Archivio di Stato in Firenze, 2 vols., (Florence: Tipografia galileana 1884-1891), Vol. 1, X-XI. For an extensive analysis of the primary sources discussed here, see also Guidi, “Per peli e per segni.” This power to supervise is explicitly mentioned in the Provvisione of 11 June 1527 that created the Nove: “Aggiugnendo anchora che quando paresse loro a proposito col partito et licentia nondimancho precedente de’ magnifici Signori et delli spettabili Dieci di Libertà, obtenuto per detti dua magistrati secondo gl’ordini et non altrimenti, possino quanto al corpo dentro et li cittadini et li huomini della città descriverli et ordinare et provedere che la città ancora lei habbi dentro a sé la sua ordinanza, acciò che stia armata et ordinata così la città come il resto del domino nostro, alla obedientia nondimancho de’ magnifici Signori et del magistrato delli spettabili Dieci predetti, a’ quali s’aspetta simile cura in ogni caso et occorrentia che venisse di havere a comandare a dette ordinanze.” Quotation in: A. Guidi, “Machiavelli e la milizia nella Firenze repubblicana del primo Cinquecento: aspetti teorici e sviluppi pratici,” Archivio Storico Italiano, no. 655 (y. 176), 1 (2018): 134.

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as he did for those of the Dieci and the Otto.17 In fact, the registers of the Nove were de facto considered by early-modern archivists to be a section of the archives of the Dieci. Hence, in order to make any suggestion about the Nove’s missing records for 1527-1530, it is necessary to follow the archival traces of the Dieci. Florentine historian Benedetto Varchi (1503-1565) claimed that some of the Dieci’s records from 1527-30 were moved to Rome at the request of Clement VII (himself a Medici) after the fall of the Republic,18 whereas another famous Florentine, the chancellor Donato Giannotti (1492-1573), suggested that they were lost when the historian Francesco Guicciardini (1483-1540) took them home to use them in the composition of his Storia d’Italia.19 Giannotti was skeptical about the possibility that Benedetto Buondelmonti – created Gonfaloniere by the Medici when their regime was re-established – could have sent the records to the pope, evidently referring to Varchi’s statement and ­accusation: I do not know anything about the books of the Ten [Dieci] that you are looking for, neither do I believe that Benedetto Buondelmonti would send them to the Pope, as the latter would not find them useful for any purposes. I know for a fact that [Francesco] Guicciardini took the writings of that Magistracy, so maybe they could have remained amongst his personal belongings. Therefore, you should get in touch with his relatives, if you have not done so yet…20 17

18

19 20

Brunetti assigned the same shelf mark (Classe X – Carteggio Universale della Repubblica) to the official correspondence of the Republic (up to 1532), but he gave specific marks, namely numbers 3-6, to the Dieci and the Otto: “La classe decima comprende il carteggio universale della Repubblica fiorentina, il quale è diviso in otto distinzioni […] La terza distinzione ha raccolte tutte le lettere scritte in nome del Magistrato dei Dieci della Balìa o della Guerra, e la quarta quelle scritte al Magistrato medesimo. […] Nella quinta sono riunite tutte le lettere scritte in nome del Magistrato degli Otto di Pratica […] e nella sesta quelle scritte al detto Magistrato,” F. Brunetti, “Prefazione all’Inventario ragionato ed istorico dei codici dell’Archivio delle Riformagioni,” in C. Rotondi, L’Archivio delle Riformagioni fiorentine (Rome: Il Centro di Ricerca Editore, 1972), 80. Some files relating to the Militia were mentioned in a partial inventory of one of the rooms of the Archivio delle Riformagioni in 1785, ASF: Inventari 651, cf. Rotondi, p. 39. B. Varchi, Storia fiorentina (Proemio), ed. by L. Arbib, 3 vols. (Florence: Soc. editrice del Nardi e del Varchi, 1843), Vol. 1, 48. “…non ritrovandosi nella Segreteria alcuni libri publici, ne’ quali erano le cose dello stato e della guerra più segrete e più importanti notate; perciocché furono, secondoché coloro dicevano a cui la cura di esse toccava, a papa Clemente, il quale istantissimamente gli chiedeva, dopo l’assedio in diligenza mandati subito.” Cf. M. Lupo Gentile, Studi sulla storiografia fiorentina alla corte di Cosimo I de’ Medici, (Pisa: Tip. Successori Fratelli Nistri, 1905), 98 ff. Giannotti to Benedetto Varchi, 16 June 1547, in D. Giannotti, Opere politiche e letterarie, annotate da F.L. Polidori, con un discorso di Atto Vannucci, 2 vols. (Florence: Le Monnier

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Since they are not (now), and were not (or at least were no longer at the time of Giannotti’s letter) in Guicciardini’s family archives, the question of what became of the Dieci’s records immediately after the regime change remains. When Florence became a principality, the shift to a new regime required a division of the old republican archives from the new ones of the Medicean chancery and secretariat. The former, called Riformagioni, lost its political and administrative functions and became just a repository of historical records. A closer look at surviving documents allows for a better understanding of the story of these records and helps us understand how so many of the Nove’s letters were lost. It is commonly assumed that all the republican records were locked up and remained in the Riformagioni during the following centuries, and this was true for the majority. However, some records – including the correspondence of the Nove and the Dieci, which relate specifically to the administration of the army and the territories under the city’s control– were entrusted to and used by the magistracy of the Nove Conservatori del Contado, which was created after the establishment of the Medicean principality and given administrative functions. The correspondence of the Dieci and the Nove remained in those archives for centuries, with the archives of the Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia already merged with those of the Dieci, and then, after the fall of the Republic, those of the Dieci were merged with the Otto di Pratica (not surprisingly, since one of the four archival volumes of the series of the Nove’s missives actually belongs to the Otto);21 finally a great part of all these archives (with the exception of the

21

1850), Vol. 2, 422. Translation is mine. Original version: “Delli libri delli Signori Dieci che vorresti ritrovare, io non ho notizia alcuna, né trovo qua chi me ne possa dare informazione. Né anco credo che Benedetto Buondelmonti li mandasse al papa, perché non so a che se ne avesse potuto servire. So bene che tutte quelle scritture di quel magistrato vennero alle mani del Guicciardino, e forse saranno tra le cose sue restate. Però, se non l’avete fatto, potrete informarvi dagli eredi suoi…” It is the fourth volume of the series: ASF, Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia, Missive 4. This is confirmed by many documents of the time. In 1562 duke Cosimo I was preparing documentary evidence for a precedence case with the Este family of Ferrara. He writes to his ambassador Alfonso Quistelli with suggestions about where the required documents might be found. Some records of the Dieci, he said, might perhaps be preserved in the archives of the Otto di Pratica, which replaced the Dieci after the end of the Republic in 1530: “…vedete in fra le scritture de’ X già della guerra pervenute forse tra quelle delli Otto di Pratica…” ASF: Mediceo del Principato 216, f. 135. Another short section of this letter is published in O. Rouchon. “Scrittoio, tesoro, archivio, le duc Côme Ier et le secret des écritures,” I Tatti Studies (2013): 299.

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Deliberations and a few letters, which remained in the Riformagioni)22 were combined with those of the Nove Conservatori del Contado.23 Moreover, perhaps due to the disorder generated by all these transitions, some documents of the Signoria, the Dieci and the Otto were separated from the rest until the reorganization of the Archivio delle Riformagioni at the end of the eighteenth-century.24 It was at that point that the majority of the archives of the Nove Conservatori del Contado finally joined the Riformagioni (along with a few others, including the Strozzi collection and the archives of Giovan Battista Dèi),25 but some of the Nove’s papers were separated from the rest at different times by archivists or chancellors. In these circumstances, it is not surprising that some of the Nove’s records were lost. Nonetheless, it is precisely among the Nove’s records that were separated from the main archives that we find originals and copies of some letters the Nove sent to officials in the contado in November 1527, including the ones published in this Appendix. Written by the secretary of an official or later by a subsequent chancellor, they provide evidence that the Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia had its own official correspondence and that at least some of their records were combined with those of the Dieci.26 Moreover, a few originals of the 22

23

24 25

26

The “external” Letters of the Dieci – those sent outside the Florentine state – are mentioned in the 1545 inventory of the Riformagioni prepared by Gabriello Simeoni: “Inventario di tutti i libri e scritture che si trovano insino a questo di 20 giugno 1545 nella cancelleria delle Riformagioni,” ASF: Inventari, serie V, 638, f. 30v ff. Cf. A. Anzilotti, “Cenni storici sugli archivi delle magistrature sopraintendenti al dominio nell’Archivio di Stato di Firenze,” Archivio Storico Italiano XLIV (1909), 357-368, p. 360; P. Benigni & C. Vivoli, “Progetti politici e organizzazione di archivi: storia della documentazione dei Nove conservatori della giurisdizione e del dominio fiorentino,” Rassegna degli Archivi di Stato, 43 (1983), 32-82, pp. 58-60. For a general, but incomplete and obsolete overview of this kind of document, cf. Marzi, La cancelleria, 531-532. The archives of the Otto, Nove and Dieci were still in the Nove Conservatori del Contado’s archives in 1746, as reported by Del Teglia to Pompeo Neri, cf. ASF Regia Consulta, parte I, 454, f. 656v (I thank Francesca Klein for her advice on this matter). While they are mentioned in 1783 inventories of the different archival series of the Riformagioni by Pagnini, ASF, Inventari, serie V, 649, Inventario dei codici e filze che si conservano nell’Archivio di Palazzo di S. A. R. il Granduca di Toscana fatto nell’anno 1783, tomo III, f. 107, they were actually found and inventoried by Pagnini in 1773, cf. Anzilotti, “Cenni storici,” 364. Cf. also Inventari, serie V, 663 (Brunetti, 1793), f. 78v: “Dieci di Balìa […] Filza CLII Registro di lettere ai commissari dal 2 aprile 1528 al 1 marzo 1529…” and f. 104v (111v): “Otto di pratica […] Filza LXXVIII Registro di lettere ai commissari e giusdicenti del dominio dal dì 8 aprile 1527 al 24 luglio 1528.” Finally, see the introduction to the inventories of Brunetti in 1793, above note 17. ASF, Signori Dieci di Balìa Otto di pratica, Missive 12, f. 29r, 49r. These are later copies of the originals sent to commissioners of the Militia in the territories or copies made by chancellors or archivists, not the usual copies for the official Chancery registers.

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letters the Nove sent to Ceccotto Tosinghi, a commissioner of the Ordinanza in the contado, dated May 1529, are still available in the State Archives of Florence.27 1.3 Short Summary of the Sources Effectively Used in This Appendix This appendix of documents is the result of the study I conducted at the Florentine State Archives. They include extracts from transcriptions and reports of council reunions, government and financial material, dispatches, orders and deliberations, hundreds of letters and orders sent to marshals, commissioners, commanders of the army and city officers in the contado and deliberations concerning the army. In particular, these documents belong to the following archival series preserved in the collection called Archivi della Repubblica: ‒ ‒ Missive: letters sent to Florentine officers and commissioners of the militia, which were held by the Signori, Dieci di Balìa and Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia. ‒ ‒ Deliberazioni, condotte e stanziamenti: payments, contracts and deliberations from the Dieci and the Nove, concerning the Florentine army in general. ‒ ‒ Notificazioni e querele of the Dieci: legal actions and proceedings. ‒ ‒ Deliberazioni in forza di ordinaria (+ speciale) autorità: deliberations, instructions and orders given by the Signori in collaboration with other magistracies (Signori & Collegi). ‒ ‒ Entrata e uscita / Debitori e creditori: books of account that belonged to the Dieci. ‒ ‒ Consulte: the transcriptions of the advisory councils’ sessions. 1.3.1 Particular Series Originating from Archival Reorganizations – Signori Dieci di Balìa Otto di pratica, Legazioni e commissarie, missive e responsive: This collection brings together documents and records produced by old Florentine magistracies, officials of the republic and private citizens, previously preserved in family archives or kept apart from the main official archives of the Riformagioni. In particular, file 71 (to which a significant number of documents published in this Appendix belong) includes two distinct sections bound together: the first contains copies of letters sent by Giovanni Ridolfi, Florentine commissioner in Castrocaro, to the Eight (Otto), the Ten, the Priors 27

See, for instance, the letter sent from the Nove di Ordinanza e Milizia to Ceccotto Tosinghi, 13 May 1529, ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 67, f. 42r.

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of Florence, and other magistracies and individuals; the second includes copies of dispatches sent to the same institutions by Carlo Strozzi, commissioner of the Ordinanza in Volterra from July 1527 to January 1528.28 A few replies to these letters are in the same archival series, in the collection Missive, file number 12. – Carte Strozziane: My research extended to the vast collection called Carte Strozziane (which consists of hundreds of files). Many of the texts included in this Appendix come from these files, which contain original letters, orders and deliberations of the magistracies and commissioners, muster rolls and lists of infantry men used on the field and, as described above, collected later by members of the Strozzi family. This collection also contains sources that are of particular interest for this research, including the quadernuccio by Ceccotto Tosinghi, General Commissioner of the Ordinanza.29 This notebook represents a specific model of record keeping, one that characterized documentary practices related to the work of both diplomatic envoys and commissioners sent on a mission with a specific military or administrative goal. During these missions they tended to write their own memories and notes, as well as – sometimes – copies of letters sent and received.30 2

Documents

2. 1

Letter from Gasparre Mariscotti to the gonfaloniere Niccolò Capponi, Marradi, 6 August 1527 ASF: Signori, Responsive 43, f. 70r-v. Illustrissimi Princeps et Excellentissime Domine post commendationibus etc.,  non ho scripto a Vostra Signoria poiché qua è el commessario, né anche mi è accaduto. Solo a questi dì intesi era venuta a Ravenna 16 pezi di artiglieria et vi aspectavano marraiuoli: dicono che e’ vogliono spianare intorno et fortificarla. Questo intesi così per transito et può non essere, 28

Cf. M. del Piazzo (ed. by), Signoria, Dieci, Otto. Legazioni e commissarie, missive e responsive. Inventario sommario (Quaderni della “Rassegna degli Archivi di Stato”) (Rome: Ist. Poligrafico dello Stato, 1960), 49. 29 For this particular quadernuccio of Ceccotto Tosinghi, cf. Guidi, “Per peli e per segni,” 682. 30 Cf. I. Lazzarini, “Argument and Emotion in Italian Diplomacy in the early Fifteenth Century: the case of Rinaldo degli Albizzi (Florence, 1399-1430),” in The Languages of Political Society. Western Europe 14th-17th Centuries, ed. by A. Gamberini, J.-Ph. Genet, and A. Zorzi (Rome: Viella, 2011), 339-363.

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pure io lo credo. Di qui a Ravenna sonne miglia 40. Le ricolte qua gene­ ralmente sono buone, dove e’ soldati non … [lacer.] Pure qui a Marradi per ancora sta in soldi 35 incirca lo staio, ma a Braxichella31 … [lacer.] è più charo. Non so se è perché non vadia fuori o perché e’ si volga a Ravenna, dove la Signoria Vostra ha a pensare che si volgerà el grasso di questo piano se e’ Venetiani la tengono.  Qui si è facta la descriptione della ordinanza et el commissario è hora a Firenzuola.  Altro non mi accade dire alla Signoria Vostra, se non ch’io mi raccomando a quella et prego el Signore la conservi felicissima. In Marradi, a dì 6 di agosto 1527. Servulus Gasparre Mariscottus

Letter from Carlo Strozzi to the Nine of the Militia in Florence, Volterra, 24 August 1527 ASF: Signori Dieci di Balìa Otto di pratica, Legazioni e commissarie, missive e responsive 71, ff. 61v-62r.  2.2

A’ Signori Nove.  Magnifici Domini honorandissimi etc. Scripsi a Vostre Signorie alli 15 del presente dando notitia a quelle come insieme con Ceo conestabile su l’Ordinanza di Val di Cecina mi ero32 transferito ad Ripomarancie et che si era facto la descriptione delli homini di quello loco, et che per allhora non si mandava la copia di tali descripti perché al continuovo si attendeva ad copiarla e reducerla in buona forma. Hora si manda con la presente a Vostre Signorie la copia di tali descripti comune per comune, et prima sono li buoni, cioè apti a l’arme, contrassegnati et infermi et absenti, digià li stradioti, et ultimo li mancho apti; che sono insieme in tutto 949: de’ quali, per servirsene in ogni evento in su li confini di Siena o in verso la maremma vostra et piaggia di Bibbona, se ne trarrebbe un numero di 600; et quando se ne havessi ad servire el più lontano, non volendo ­lasciare il paese sfornito si farebbe una compagnia di 300 electi quando fussino bene armati.  Truovo faccendo tale descriptione esservi tra tucto circa 200 piche et schoppi 180: poco o niente da servirsene per essere de’ vecchi et così stazonati33 da fare più presto damno che utile. 31 32 33

Today known as Brisighella. Followed by “-no,” struck-through. Followed by “et.”

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 Atteso il numero de’ descripti et visto le poco arme vi sono, et quelle essere inutili maxime li schoppi iudicheria esservi di bisogno al mancho di 200 piche più et archibusi 100; delle quale arme, quando Vostre Signorie ne provegghino, penso che quelle sieno utilmente per servirsi di tale ordinanza nel modo descripto et in ogni loro ocorrentia; di che ne le exhorto quanto posso, perché li homini descripti per tale ordine niente vagliono senza l’arme; et maxime che il capitano Ceo dice34 non solamente bisognando non se ne potrebbe servire, ma etiam non li può fare exercitare nella militia come si conviene in tale exercitio militare. Pertanto di nuovo prego Vostre Signorie sieno contente al provedere presto de’ 100 archibusi et anchora delle piche. /  Per mio debito, et etiam se pur venisse ad proposito a Vostre Signorie, ne occorre dare notitia a quelle come qui si truova dua maestri di archibusi che fanno bottegha di per sé; et per quanto ritraggha dal capitano Ceo sono perfectissimi maestri di tale arte. Et questo dico ad fare se Vo­ stre Signorie volessino farne fabricare che penso sarieno benissimo servite; et che a ghara lavorerebbono; non presupponendo però che di questi da fabricarsi se ne havesse ad provedere tali descripti, perché insurgendo movimento a l’arme di guerra in su questi confini non sarebbono forse35 a tempo di potersene contare.  Rimandasi a Vostre Signorie el registro vecchio; et al capitano Ceo si è dato un’altra copia della descriptione nuova copiata l’un da l’altra; et nel registro vecchio sarà la copia de’ descripti nuovi.  Die 24 augusti 1527. Letter from Carlo Strozzi to the Priors of Pomarance, Volterra, 9 September 1527 ASF: Signori Dieci di Balìa Otto di pratica, Legazioni e commissarie, missive e responsive 71, f. 73r  2.3

Alli priori di Ripamarance.  Prudentes viri et amici charissimi salutem. Siamo a hore VII in circa di nocte, et in questo puncto mi è facto intendere come hiersera a hore una in Casole si preparavano36 alcuni fanti per venire alli dimani da questa banda et particularmente dove non ho notitia; et pertanto all’havuta della presente farete di havere ad voi il capitano di bandiera con li altri de34 35 36

Followed by “non essend-,” struck-through. “forse” added between the lines. Followed by “circa 50 in 60 fanti,” struck-through.

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scripti et li farete mettere in ordine et li manderete subito a quelli passi dove giudicharete li inimici possino venire ad puntare, ad maneggiare per levare et impedire e’ loro disegni; facendovi intendere che advertiate li nostri che quando non fussi vero37 e che li inimici non passassino di qua per fare lo affare decto, che se in alcuno modo, non interessa,38 su e fora el dominio et iurisdictione nostra ad innovare contra li Sanesi cosa alcuna. Ma solo intendo che si stia vigilante et si vada a’ passi dove potrieno venire a questa banda per impedire e’ disegni loro.  Et con la presente sarà una a decti castelli che subito la manderete. El 9 septembre 1527. 2. 4

Extracts of a Letter from Francesco Petrucci to the Signori, “Rocchetta di Colle,” 7 October 1527 (“alli VII di ottobre MDXXVII”) ASF: Signori, Responsive 43, ff. 128r-v + 135v Da poi che mandai ad Vostra Signoria Illustrissima Vannoccio Beringucci sono ogni giorno accresciuti al proposito nostro successi migliori […]  Essendo usanza mia con li signori et patroni, fra li quali Vostra Signoria Illustrissima il primo loco far più con li effecti che con le parole, solo li domando humilmente ultima resolutione; et ad tale effecto mando mes­ ser Vannoccio Beringucci, al quale Vostra Signoria Illustrissima si degnarà prestare la medesima credenzia che a me stesso dava, et in lui confidare quanto in me proprio. Bon Servitor Francesco Petrucci

Letter from Carlo Strozzi to the Nine of the Militia, Volterra, 2 November 1527 ASF: Signori Dieci di Balìa Otto di pratica, Legazioni e commissarie, missive e responsive 71, f. 98r  2.5

A’ Signori Nove.  Magnifici Domini etc. Scripsi alli giorni passati a Vostre Signorie di alcune factioni facte dalla ordinanza di Val di Cecina, et li ordini in quella occorsi et come a quel bataglione manchava arme; et benché quelle ne scripsono haverlo ricordato a Vostre Signorie vedendo multiplicare le factioni non voglio manchare del debito mio, maxime a quelli disordini che al presente si possono riparare come è polvere, piombo, et feramenti di 37 38

Followed by “questa,” struck-through. “non interessa” added between the lines.

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archibusi, et anchora qualche numero più di archibusi. Perché Vostre Signorie hanno ad intendere che quando s’hanno ad operare a’ confini de’ Sanesi truovano di molto fuoco. Et quando si conduxino alle supradecte factione manchare loro la polvere et le pallottole, in modo che hebbeno ad ritrarre per tal defecto con poco honore. Pertanto prego Vostre Signorie sieno contente provedere et presto perché questa sera ho havuto ad acchattare un poco di piombo della Cittadella; et volendo polvere da schoppi non ve n’è, che volenteri l’harei comprata. Alia non sint. Volateriss, die 2 novembris 1527. Extract of a Letter from the Nine of the Militia to Carlo Strozzi in Volterra, Florence, 4 November 1527 ASF: Signori Dieci di Balìa Otto di pratica, Missive 12, f. 29r  2.6

Magnifice vir etc.,  e’ si è ricevuta la tua de’ II del presente a noi grata per haverci dato notitia di quello che fa di bisognio per tenere fornita la bandiera nostra delle Pomerancie, della quale al continuo fa di bisognio di servirtene. Et però si è dato ordine al nostro proveditore che gli mandi et polvere et piom­bo secondo che advisi manchargli; et parimente si gli è dato commissione che attenda a fornire gli archibusi del tutto, perché di presente non ce ne è de forniti di tutti li loro bisogni […]  Die IIII Novembris MDXXVII. Novem Viri Militie populi et communis florentini. 2.7 Patent for Babbone da Brisighella, 28 August 1528 ASF: Dieci, Miss. 108 ff. 78r-79r Patente di taxe per la persona di messer Babbone da Bersighella […] per governatore delle infrascripte battaglie dell’ordinanza del dominio nostro: Pescia; Vico pisano; Barga; Pietra sancta; Fivizano et Castiglione; Scarperia et Barberino; Borgo a S.to Lorenzo, Vicchio et Decomano; Ponte a Sieve, Cascia; Firenzuola et Pancaldoli;

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Marradi et Palazuolo; Castrocaro et Portico; Galeata; Val di Bagno; Poppi, Pratovecchio, Castel S.to Nicolò; Bibbiena, Castelfocognano, Subbiano; Modigliana. Et havendo decto messer Babbone a transferirsi et stantiare quel tempo bisognerà in quei luoghi dove esse sono descritte per visitarle et exerci­ tarle nell’arte della guerra, habbiamo deliberato che in luogo delle taxe che si dànno alli stipendiarii nostri per coperta, strame, legne et per il cancelliere, tutti quelli luoghi dove le battaglie sotto poste a suo governo sono descritte gli paghino scudi uno il mese ad ragione di X paghe l’anno. Et perché in alchuno luogo è una battaglia, alchuni altri sono più a farne una intera come di sopra si vede, vogliamo che quelli luoghi che concorreno a fare una battaglia intera concorrino ancho insieme al pagamento d’uno ducato il mese. Et quelle che sole fanno una battaglia intera, faccino anchora il pagamento intero dello ducato il mese. Tal che al dicto messer Babbone, prevenghino tali ducati il mese. Queste sono le batta­ glie alle quali è proposto. Però lo significhiamo a tutti voi camarlinghi, ufitiali et altri magistrati et huomini de’ sopradecti luoghi o a chi el pagamento […] Announcement Concerning the Oath of the City Battalions, 16 January 1529 ASF: Signori e collegi, deliberazioni in forza di ordinaria autorità 131, ff. 10v-11r.  2.8

Die XVI mensis Ianuarii 1528  […]  Dicta die.  Bamnum Iuramenti Ordinantiae.  E’ Magnifici Signori et Gonfaloniere insieme ragunati, servatis etc., deliberorno farsi et mandarsi lo infrascripto bando nella città di Firenze ne’ luoghi publici, per uno de’ loro banditori, sotto questo tenore, cioè:  E’ Magnifici et Excelsi Signori, Signori Priori di Libertà et Gonfaloniere di Iustitia del populo fiorentino, atteso come per il magistrato delli spettabili Nove della militia fiorentina si è dato perfectione a’ capituli delle compagnie et a tutti gli altri offitii che in quelle si contengono, et deside­ rando dare la sua perfectione a tutto quello che per la legge di decta

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Ordinanza si dispone, et havendosi a dare el giuramento a tutti li descripti di quella da anni 18 insino in 50 per e’ venerabili Gonfalonieri et Dodici et spectabili Nove della Militia, quartiere per quartiere, et acciò che ciascuno di decti descripti possa et debba intervenire a tal giuramento etiam quelli che per qualche loro occupatione si trovassino absenti della città et infra il dominio ne possino havere piena notitia: per tanto fanno publicamente bandire notificare et expressamente comandare a tutti et ciascheduno de’ descripti nella decta Ordinanza et così beneficiati come non beneficiati della città d’anni 18 insino in 36 che in quelli dì, hore et luoghi che di sotto si diranno, si debbino personalmente rappresentare ciascuno sotto il gonfalone che gli è toccho per sorte che questo anno debba militare; et tutti quelli de l’anni 36 in 50 che si sono facti descrivere si debbono personalmente rapresentare ogniuno sotto quelli gonfaloni in e’ quali furono descripti et in nelle chiese principali del quartiere di tale gonfalone dove furno descripti, nelli iusti giorni et chiese cioè:  Addì XXV del presente mese a hore XIIII, tutti e’ gonfaloni del quartiere di Sancto Spirito nella chiesa di Sancto Spirito.  Addì XXVI del presente mese a hore XIIII, tutti e’ gonfaloni del quartiere di Sancta Croce nella chiesa di Sancta Croce.  Addì XXVII del presente mese a hore XIIII, tutti e’ gonfaloni del quartiere di Sancta Maria Novella nella chiesa di Sancta Maria Novella.  Addì XXVIII del presente mese a hore XIIII, tutti e’ gonfaloni del quartiere di Sancto Giovanni nella chiesa di Sancto Lorenzo. /  Notificando a ciascheduno che in decti dì, hore et luoghi come di sopra non si rappresenteranno resteranno condamnati in fiorini XXV d’oro applicati al magistrato delli spectabili Nove della Militia secondo che per la legge si dispone; et tutti quelli che per non si essere rappresentati a fare e’ capitoli et gli altri offiti39 di decte compagnie ei fussino apunctati, rapresentandosi a tale iuramento gli saranno perdonate tali appunctature; et non comparendo saranno incamerati di tutte: et quelli che non venissino là, in specchio ne saranno gravati in havere et in persona et non se ne accepterà scusa nessuna. Et acciò che meglio ciascuno possa sapere quello che habbia a fare si farà appiccare la copia del presente bando alla porta delle sopradecte chiese.  Fu bandito per Corso di Biagio banditore, de’ dì 16 di gennaio 1528.40

39 “offiti” MS “offitiali”. 40 Actually 1529, according to the Florentine style of dating ab incarnationis.

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 2.9 Letter from Ceccotto Tosinghi to the Nove, 17 March 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 67 f. 3r-v A’ dì 17 de marzo 1528. Alli Signori IX.  Magnifici etc. la presente è per dare adviso ad Vostre Signorie di quanto per infino ad quest’hora s’è exequito circa la commissione datami da Vostre Signorie. Io partii di costì a’ dì XV del presente et arrivai ad hore 2 de nocte ad Empoli; et subito spacciai uno a posta qui al Vicario faccendoli intendere che duessi far comandamento a tutti castelli, communi et ville del suo vicariato che el dì sequente dovessino comparire in San Miniato tutti li loro homini da età di anni 18 per infino in 40 con loro arme et panni così li descripti come li non descripti.  Arrivai dipoi la mattina qui ad hore 2 del giorno et trovai che il decto Vicario rinspetto l’haver occupato li cavallari in una iustitia non haveva per anchora exequito: fu di bisognio caedolare per mio comandamento tutti li decti communi et lochi; et questa sera che siamo alli 17 ad hore 2 de nocte habbiamo finito di rassegnare dicti homini con grandissimo tedio et poca nostra satisfactione per le male qualità et debolezze loro: de sorte che si in futuro non troviamo homini de altra maniera fo iudicio che poco recapito se ne possa fare, perché dal commissario de Montopoli in fuora non ci ho trovato homini di nervo alcuno, né apto al mestiere, ansi41 tutti sgarbati et mala cera; ma in decto Montopoli certamente per una cinquantina de homini li ho trovati tutti soldati et da comparire in ogni perfecta militia.  Non voglio mancare di fare intendere a Vostre Signorie la poca obbedienzia ho trovata qui in questa terra, che non ne faccendo demonstratione mi pareria che l’honore di cotesto magistrato et etiam el mio proprio rimanessi molto leso et non passasse sensa42 somma mia vergogna: per che subito alla arrivata mia commissi et feci mandare un publico bando che ogni et qualunche homo de San Miniato da anni 18 per infino 40 dovessi con sua arme et panni comparire personalmente ad hore 15 del dì se­ guente davanti el mio alloggiamento per deversi rassegnare, sotto la pena de l’arbitrio per vedere chiaramente si vi si fusse possuto trovare qualche bona sorte de homo da guerra. Comparsene rari, et sensa43 arme alla sfilata et mal volentieri come la biscia allo incanto, et la maggior parte de quelli venneno ad scusarsi di gran lungha doppo l’hora deputata: qual 41 42 43

Sic, for “anzi.” Sic, for “senza.” Sic, for “senza.”

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che per non far troppo gran numero di delinquenti per poterli più facilmente punire et non metter tanta carne al foco le ho accettate in maggior parte. /  Et circa X o vero 12 sono quelli che restano in contumacia quali non haveva o vi era alcuna legitima da scusarsi, né si sono possuti scusare: per el che ci fo pensiero di confinarli per qualche mese ad Livorno o in altro loco secondo che per di qua domattina mi risolverò.  Domattina alla ponta del dì mi partirò de qui per essere in Val di Calci per rassegnare la Battaglia del Vicariato di Vico, dove penso trovar ad ordine tutti li homini da rassegna, perché al Vicario scrissi facessi tutti li communi citare al dovere comparire nel modo et ordine come di sopra; et tengo risposta da Sua Signoria haverlo già facto con bene diligentia: Dio ci dia gratia che li homini che noi habbiano ad trovare sieno di miglior sorte, che pure spero habbia ad essere. Et di quanto per me si exe­ quirà giornalmente se ne darà adviso ad Vostre Signorie. Finalmente io trovo molti homini de questi altri communi; et hanno disubbidito alle rassegne; et perché trovo e’ più haverlo facto per povertà ci voglio havere consideratione: non già che io li voglia lasciare impuniti, perché si perderebbe tanto di reputatione che mal volentieri potrebbonsi correggere; et la maggior parte di decti disubedienti sono de quelli che non erono descritti, che in verità tutti sono miserabili … [lacer] et da non possersi toccar né in havere né in persona per essere debolissimi in tutt’a dua questi casi, del che non sarò più tedioso con Vostre Signorie si non che de continuo me ricomandarò ad quelle pregandole che quando è qualche cosa di nuovo costì si degnino farmene44 partecipe.  Vostre Signorie mi fariano grande piacere advisarmi chi quelle habbino substituito in la mia commessaria delle Battaglie; et iudicherei fussi molto ad proposito che Vostre Signorie mandassino quelli archibusi, picche et polvere che remanemo avanti che mi parti’ de queste rasegnie, acciò li possi a mio senno consignare. Et ad quelle me ricomando. Letter from Ceccotto Tosinghi to the Vicar of Vicchio, Certosa, 20 March 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 67 f. 4v 2. 10

Magnifice tamquam frater etc.,  Questa sera con el nome di Dio ho finito di rivedere et rassignare que­ sta battaglia. Et per non ci essere capitano, né cancelliere, né lista et 44

“farmene,” MS. “f-,” lacer.

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havermi hauto ad referire alle liste de’ sindichi, fe’ ignorantemente e da qualche uno con rustica malitia. Ci ho durato grandissima fatica. Nondimanco, ne son molto contento, perché mi è vita, ci ho trovato optimo nervo et homini da promettersene ogni bona speranza. Mandonsi ad Vostra Signoria tutti li inobbedienti pontati, e’ quali secondo la leggie si posson condennare in soldi XX l’uno. Ma perché li temporali sono sinistri et quasi tutti li homini si moron di fame, si non fussi per mettere male usanza et per fare al tutto perdere la obbedienza, serei di parere si perdonasse loro. Ma s’ha ad considerare che molto più saria il danno della inob­ bedientia, che el frutto della clementia. Et però la Signoria Vostra ne deliberarà quanto intorno a ciò li parrà ad proposito, admettendo le scuse et considerando la povertà secondo parrà alla prudentia vostra: et quello caverete di decte condemnatione rimetterete al magistrato dei Nove. Né altro dico. Domattina mi parto per a Pescia ad exequire li altri mandati. Dovunche sarò, sarò alli comandi di Vostra Signoria, alla quale mi reccomando.  In la Certosa, a’ dì 20 di marzo. Letter from Pasquino da San Benedetto (Captain of the Battalion of Poggibonsi) to Ceccotto Tosinghi, San Gimignano, 24 April 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 67 f. 21r-v  2.11

Magnifice Vir et Benefactor observandissime etc.,  Per seghuire l’ordine dato che mi commisse Vostra Signoria mi occorre dare notitia a quella come:  In Sancto Gimignano et suo contado io truovo 36 huomini essere armati di archibusi di Vostre Signorie45 et di piche 87, et trovarsi armati di loro archibusi 60 et piche 15.  In Poggibonzi et suo contado truovo essere armati di archibusi 30 di Vostre Signorie et piche 83 et trovarsi armati di loro archibusi 13 et piche 7.  Truovo essere fuora della Battaglia mia da Poggibonzi et prima:  Francesco di Luigi sta a Firenze una picha; Giovanni di Bernardo da Tonda sta a Radda una picha; Aghostino Luchini sta in quel di Colle una picha; Mariano di Matteo sta a Barberino una picha; Sano di Francesco Lessi sta a Barberino una picha.

45

The Nine of the Militia.

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 Et alsì per ordine di Vostra Signoria si fece socti46 dì 21 del presente comandamenti in scriptis a: Jacopo di Bartolomeo vocato Papone per conto d’uno archibuso haveva; et a Meo dello Stiaccia per trovarsi col Signore Octo et portato via uno archibuso; a Tano d’Antonio Tani per conto d’uno archibuso di Salvadore suo fratello, et alsì che lui vendessi a’ pegni di Giovanni Leoncini per comperare del ritracto uno archibuso, che infra 4 giorni dovessino havere rimessi gli archibusi decti altrimenti infra 6 giorni dipoi dovessino presentarsi dinanzi all’ufficio di Vostre Signorie socto pena dell’arbitrio di quelle.  Et più Pierfrancesco di Girolamo da Poggibonzi ha uno archibuso et sta costì in Firenze drento alla porta a San Piero Ghactolini in una casa a pigione.  Appresso si pregha Vostra Signoria si ricordi di farci provedere di polvere et piombo quanto pare a quella per possere exercitare questi archibusieri, et alsì di uno tamburo per Poggibonzi; et ogni cosa desiderrei si consegnassi a Bartolomeo di Lazero Ciulli da San Gimignano apportatore delle presenti perché lui me le farebbe condurre. /  Bernardino Meligha da Poggibonzi è quello che si portò via uno archibuso per il quale ne fu gravata monna Ginevra sua madre, et per lettere de l’ufficio di Vostre Signorie el potestà di Poggibonzi le ha renduti e’ pegni che non ci sarà modo potersene valere. Nec plura. A Vostra Signoria mi raccomando et ne si faccendo le mute la pregho mi facci havere licentia come le dixi di andare infino a casa. Quae felicitas valeat. Ex Sancto Gemignano, die 24 Aprilis 1529.  Servitor Pasquinus de Sancto Benedectum Capitaneus etc.

Letter from Alessandro Monaldi Captain of the Battalion of Pietrasanta to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Pietrasanta, 28 May 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 67, f. 63r  2.12

Molto magnifico Signore et patrone mio,  di chontinuo a Vostra Signoria mi rachomando. Per Barzotto da Seraveza servitor di Vostra Signoria vi fo intendere chome io vo tuttavotta47 cholochando li archibusi in·omini suficienti et seguitando l’ordine di Vostra Signoria a tale che a l’auta de le piche sarà in ordine la bataglia, che per dugento omini profetti i·ne la guera le Signorie Vostre se ne potrano

46 47

Sic, for “sotto.” “tuttavotta,” sic, for “tuttavolta”

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servire. E quando le Signorie Vostre ce adoperano48 li rivedrete sempre quel in che per la prima arette ritratti e senza fraulde nisuna et mancho romori di ruberia o altre insolenzie. Io non penso in altro se non fare quelo sia servizio di Vostra Signoria per la quale e’ Dio filice chonservi. Io so che questi archibusi per essere male in asetto, chostoro avere male el modo. Mi chostano per l’onore mio. Qualchosa lo fo volentieri, inperò, queli ch’àno el modo a fare loro le spese li vo isttrebuendo,49 e a omini, che per i·un trato chon presteza li posa fare levare per seguitare la mente di Vostra Signoria. Quela si richorddino a mettere in chariera in quela conta de la vechia … [lacer.] 25 omini da bene di questa bataglia … [lacer] di maggio 1529.  Servitor Alesandro Monaldi

Letter from Alessandro Monaldi Captain of the Battalion of Pietrasanta to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Pietrasanta, 7 June 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 67 f. 74r-v  2.13

Molto magnifico Signore et patrone mio,  di chontinuo a Vostra Signoria mi rachomando, per farvi intendere chome di qui pasan fanterie asai a la sfilata. La magiore parte di dite fanterie sono del paese fiorentino. Sono tute per Gienova, da Pesa50 e Mottacharlo51 e Val di Nievole asai; di questa bataglia ce n’è iti parechi; el Signore Chomisario et Chapitano di questa tera à fato di nuovo isturare loro l’orechio cho’ nuoi52 bandi, e queli sono iti si li à fati citare a le chase loro in ischritto; pocho pare se ne churino siché m’è parso daverne notizia … [lacer.] Ne seguiate quelo pare a Vostra Signoria; e si no’ si chonfinano o dìesi loro qualche gas[t]igo non ve potrete servire a’ vostri bisogni. Io sono chavalchato per tutto questo dimino53 di Petra Santa dove sono omini di questa bataglia a fare loro intendere che se nesuno sarà tanto ardito d’andare a pigliare danari fuori del dimino fiorentino si troverà in bando e perderano e’ beni. Farò dal chanto mio ogni chosa che non s’abino a partire. Apreso priego che la Signoria Vostra mi voglia fare dare tanto di polvere che sia una pignita54 di dieci quatrini a chausa di 48 49 50 51 52 53 54

Sic, for “adopereranno.” Sic, for “distribuendo.” Sic, for “Pescia.” Sic, for “Montecarlo.” Sic, for “nuovi.” Sic, for “dominio.” Sic, for “pigniatta.”

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dimostrare ch’io li vogli servire. Sono certo el Proveditore ve la consaderà55 … [lacer] e siatene certo non … [lacer]  Questo Idio felice vi56 conservi.  Alisandro Monaldi

   Io ò schritto in bottega di Nicholino: si rachomanda a la Signoria Vostra. Apreso arei charo d’intendere s’io ò a mandare per le piche: che Vostra Signoria me lo faci intendere, si posa dare richapito per chi l’abi a portare. Announcement that Every Conscript Must Present Himself at the General Review of the City Militia, Florence, 12 June 1529 ASF: Signori e collegi, deliberazioni in forza di ordinaria autorità 131, f. 98v  2.14

Die XII mensis Iunii 1529.  [...] Bamnum Mostre et Rassigniae Ordinantiae Generalis.  Item prefati Excelsi Domini et Vexillifer simul adunati etc et servatis etc deliberaverunt…  E’ Magnifici et Excelsi Signori, Signori Priori di Libertà et Gonfaloniere di Iustitia del popolo fiorentino havendo deliberato insieme co’ loro Venerabili Collegi et li spectabili Nove della Militia et Ordinanza Fiorentina che in questa festività di San Giovanni si debba fare la mostra generale di tucta l’Ordinanza et milizia della città tucti a quattro e’ quartieri insieme secondo che la leggie di decta militia si dispone. Et volendo che a tal mostra nessuno debba manchare, et acciò che quelli che per alcune loro faccende particulari si trovassino absenti della città purché sieno in sul dominio ne possino essere57 advisati. Pertanto fanno publicamente bandire, notificare et comandare a tutti et ciascuno delli descripti nella decta Ordinanza della città da anni XVIIII insino in XXXVI che il dì di Santo Giovanni proximo personalmente con tucte le loro arme ciascheduno a hore XVIII di decto dì si debba rappresentare ogniuno sotto la sua bandie­ ra et alle piaze principale di quel quartiere, dove secondo l’ordine di decta militia gli è toccho per sorte questo anno a militare, per fare quel tanto che da’ comessarii et capitani di decta militia a ciascheduno sarà ordinato. Notificando a ciascheduno che per decti commessarii si farà la rasseg55 56 57

MS. “consa-,” lacer., “-rà.” “felice vi,” MS. “f-,” lacer. “essere” missing in the MS.

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nia consueta gonfalone per gonfalone et tutti quelli che in su tal mostra si troverranno absenti et inobbedienti saranno per loro appunctati et resteranno condemnati in uno ducato d’oro per ciascuno; et più relegati et confinati nella città di Firenze per uno mese proximo dal dì di tale rassegnia, e’ quali confini sieno tenuti et debbino observare sotto pena di fiorinii X d’oro per ciascuno applicati al magistrato delli spectabili Nove. Notificando etiam a ciascheduno che per tal conto non se ne accepterà scusa nessuna, sen·none delli amalati, le quali scuse debbino essere facte alli Spettabili Nove per loro partito a provare infra otto giorni dal dì di tale rassegnia et non altrimenti.  Dicta die 12 eiusdem Bamnum per Dominicum Barlacchinum Bamnitorem in locis publicis civitate Florentiae […] Extracts of a Letter from Alessandro Monaldi Captain of the Battalion of Pietrasanta to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Pietrasanta, 13 June 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 67 n. 84r-v  2.15

Molto magnifico Signore et patrone mio,  di chontinuo a Vostra Signoria mi rachomando. Più volte ò schritto a Vostra Signoria circha a questa Bataglia di forni’la in feramenta d’arme e polvere a ciò ve ne posiate valere, perché sapete che è e quanto la ­pottrebe fare buono efecto bisogniando; e tanta miseria non mi pare el propo­sito. Io ò aùto 59 archibusi che me n’è stati riportati 1- … [lacer.]; e tuttavolta li fo rasettare, e da me non mancherà in chosa alchuna fare quelo si potrà. Le piche e polvere vi rachomando58 al presente; et òne ischritto a li ­Signori Nove, et la59 Signoria Vostra no’ si ischordi fare che abiamo tanto quanto di sopra si è schritto.  […]  Vi prometto che se Vostra Signoria farà che questa Bataglia àbi suo dovere d’arme che in oltra a eserci omini da bene el paese [è] galiardo, e diti aversari vengino per questa volta si mosterà quanto si potrà fare chontro a chi ci verà per ofendere. Et perché io ragionai a la Signoria Vostra quando fusti qui di quela strada che si chondusceva e’ marmi per la fabrica di Santa Maria dal Fi[o]re60 che sarebe bene qua starne una parte a ciò che 58 59 60

MS. “ra-,” lacer., “-mando.” “et la,” MS. “e-,” lacer. For this road (“strada”), see L. Marino, Cave storiche e risorse lapidee: documentazione e restauro (Florence: Alinea Editrice, 2007), 39-42; E. Scigliano, Michelangelo’s Mountain:

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ci venissi per molestare el paese non avesi quela chomodità di dita strada. Apreso molti luogi et pasi fare fare tagliate et isbarare dove fussi più a proposito. Apreso di giorno ordineremo quando nula61 rinfreschi che si facia fumi; et di note62 fuochi et che si facino in luogo che ’ nostri paesi habino a vedere et tengasi le velette et la notte ischolte. […] 2. 16 Letter from the Nove to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Florence, 15 June 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 67, f. 90r-v Magnifice Vir etc.,  Essendosi per nostri Excelsi Signori fatta deliberatione di fare la mostra generale di tutta la città con tutte quelle solemnità che a quella si convenghono et conoscendo noi non havere el numero de’ tamburini che bisogniano per adornare tale mostra, e’ quali sono de’ primi membri, come sai, della Militia, et giudichando noi non havere più dextro et più expedito modo a potercene servire che havergli da te, quale conosciamo essere tanto zelante et desideroso che questa Milizia si vadia alla giornata ampliando quanto alchuno altro. Pertanto ci è parso scriverti le presente significhandoti che non potresti fare cosa che fussi più grata et accepta a questo magistrato et etiam a tutto l’universale che mandarci tutti quelli tamburini che ti sarà possibile di mandare con i lor tamburi, per potercene servire per il dì di santo Giovanni quando s’à ad fare la prefata monstra, e’ quali vorremo che ci fussino al più lungho la vigilia di santo Giovanni di buona hora. El numero di quanti ne vorremo non ti si manda, rendendoci certi che farai ogni sforzo di mandarne il più che potrai. Bene è vero che noi pensiamo havere di bisognio di XXXX in chircha et non ce ne troviamo che XVIII o venti, siché come s’è detto ne manderai il più che potrai.  Apresso desiderando noi che la prefata monstra sia più copiosa di gente et che de’ descripti in quella ne manchi minor numero che sia possibile: pertanto trovandosi in coteste bande alchuno fiorentino et che fussi descripto in detta nostra Militia / farai ogni hopera et diligentia che per honorare questa hopera si transferischino qui a Firenze, perché ci sarà cosa grata. Et per sentire anchora qualche parte di questo magistrato63 ci

61 62 63

The Quest For Perfection in the Marble Quarries of Carrara (New York: Free Press, Simon and Schuster, 2007), 197. Sic, for “nulla.” Sic, for “notte.” Tosinghi had been a member of the Nove.

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rendiamo certi che farai ogni tuo sforzo. Vale. Ex Palatio Florentino, die XV Iunii MDXXVIIII.  Novem Viri Militiae Populi Florentini 2. 17 Payments of the Nine of the Militia, Date Unclear ASF: Nove, Entrata e Uscita, Debitori e creditori 18, ff. 141-152 Bandiere di n° 1, 2, 3, cioè Forano, Monte a San Sovino e Civitella oggi sotto Bernardino da Ornano64 nostro capitano, de dare addì 17 di giogno le infrascritte arme consegnatemi Anton Francesco Davanzati proveditore vechio chome al suo libro giallo S.a f. 14 […] Piche 300… […] Fiasche 92; con polverini… 12 p.a di forme…” [f. 143] Archibusi 60 co’ tinieri e draghetti Scopietti 100 co’ tinieri e draghetti Fiasche 500 con polverini [f. 145] 92 Lancette da Scopietti [f. 152] 6 piastra di forme da archibusi. Copy of a Letter from Giannozzo Capponi Captain and Commissioner of Pietrasanta, to the Dieci, 24 June 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 67 f. 107 (bis) r-v 2.18

Copia di lectera scripta per me alli Signori X quale si manda ad Vostra Signoria perché possa in ogni evento fare fede non ho manchato richor­ dare le necessarie provvisioni per salvatione di questa provincia.  Magnifici Signori mia, observandissimi, presupponendosi le fanterie cesaree dovere sbarchare alla Spetie65 non si potrà in quelli tempi provvedere alle cose desiderava dilatione di tempo a mecterle ad effecto. Onde si ricorda alle Signorie Vostre questa battaglia non essere iusta provvista di piche alcuna, non ci si trova fra li archibuseri libra di polvere in modo che se con brevità occorressi valersi di questa battaglia per tro64 65

“Ornano,” barely legible. Today known as La Spezia.

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varsi in tale disordine sarieno questi inutili. Iudicano ancora a pro­posito stare in su la guerra, ché altrimenti in su una giunta della armata non so come si potessino comandare. Sarebbe ancora a proposito tenere di qua XV o 16 cavalli per potere fare scoperte, rivedere guardie alla campagnia, fare schorte et che altro occorressi. Alle fortezze si segue fare molte necessarie reparationi, ma bisogna al tempo pensare a chi le defenda.  Et perché le occorrentie pare ricerchino quelli si trovono a preposti in alcun loco parlino a sua Signoria liberamente, pertanto ne dirò quello ne senta. Per altra mia detti notitia del sito del paese et sue qualità; et concludevo che sanza grosso numero di fanteria pocho si poteva in questo sito sperare. Ultimamente d’avanti hieri chiamai VI homini della terra, fra’ quali ve n’è 4 suti capitani di fanteria et li altri sperimentati con el capitano della Battaglia. Et discorrendo come si potessi difficultare el transito delli Imperiali et co’ che numero, si concluse universalmente sanza grossa massa non si potevono impedire. Quanto si poteva fare di bono saria che con 1500 fanti oltre a’ paesani in alcuno loco alquanto strecto si poterebbono nel marcare la fanteria per fiancho conbatterla et farli qualche notabile danno. Et in ogni et i·tuto66 ritrarsi a salvamento rispecto al Monte. Habbiamo alsì cum li prefati circundato dentro et di fora la terra et examinato se si potessi fortificare, et la resolutione è stata che essendo di sito de mura molto debile non concedendo el tempo potere fare drento li bastioni cum mille fanti oltre alli terrazzani67 battuta dalla artiglieria et combattuta non si defenderia. Et el simile farebbe quando ancora ne fussi fuora altri 2000 per prestare loro favore. Agiunto che per defensione della terra bisognerebbe debita artiglieria, concludevasi adunque che quella fanteria sarebbe più a proposito tenerla fuora et della terra fare pocho fondamento. Delle fortezze quella di Pietra Santa per essere singnoreggata68 dal monte et potere el nimico rappresentarsi ad essa coperto quella battendo insino alla radice se n’à a ragionare come di debile; et quando non sperassino buon soccorso pochi giorni si salve­ rebbe. Mutrone è molto più gagliardo et con 50 compagni da ogni exercito si defenderà buon numero di gorni essendoci munitione et vettovaglia che di questa non vi si trova di sorte alcuna. Et così concludevasi che la detta fanteria saria di buon fructo nel modo decto, et quando fussi la provincia di tal presidio abandonata tutto homo si volgeria alli favori imperiali. Et io sanza potere fare alcun buon fructo sarei et sanza obedientia et 66 “et i·tuto,” barely legible. 67 Terrazzani: local inhabitants (‘inhabitants of a city’), cf. Machiavelli, Art of War (VII 90). 68 Sic.

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in pericholo, il che reputo saria contra la intentione di Vostre Signorie. Pertanto priegho quelle provveghino a quanto ad epse sarà / di bisogno, et ne commetine quello s’abbi a seguire. Alle quali mi rachomando. Die XXIIII Iunii. 2. 19 Payments to Constables of the Ordinanza, August 1530 ASF: Dieci, Delib. Cond. Stanz. 66, f. 85v & 86v Al capitano Michele da Faenza conestabile dell’Ordinanze di Pescia mandato a Pisa con 194 fanti di detta Ordinanza per guardie di quella terra, fiorini secentoventitre d’oro lire sei piccioli, sono per una sua paga e di detti fanti a ragione di ducati 20 per sua provisione lire 20 per fante et lire 352 piccioli per li caporali di detta compagnia, fattoli pagare di detta somma ducati dugento d’oro per le mani del vicario di Pescia Antonio Bartoli.  […]  A Ceo da Empoli conestabile dell’Ordinanza di Pomerance deputato con 88 fanti di detta Ordinanza alla guardia della terra di Livorno lire dumilasettantasei piccioli sono per una sua paga et di detti fanti, rasse­ gnati et pagati in detto luogo per le mani di detto commissario sotto dì X di luglo proxime passato, a ragione di lire 20 per fante, 10 per conto di capisoldi et ducati 20 per sue persone. In tutto lire 2076 piccioli.  A Benedetto di Iacopo Rinuccini conestabile dell’Ordinanza di Barga mandato a Livorno con 100 fanti di detta Ordinanza per guardia di quel luogo, fiorini trecentotrentaquattro d’oro, lire due piccioli […] Extract of a Letter from Matteo Bongianni to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Florence, 18-19 July 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 64 n. 50 2. 20

[…]  Noi fumo consigliati della pancha di mandare uno commessario spe­ zia­le a Livorno per tôrre brigha alla Signoria Vostra. Et perché non ­havessi avere diferenza cho’ lochali, ci parve mandarvi Berto suo fratello con pocha spesa, che se gli dà ducati 1 0/2 el giorno per aviso. Chome per la Signoria Vostra si sa,69 Nigi non è troppo a grado; e’ fa per amiciximo di messer Andrea Doria e si disegna di levarlo. Per ogni buono rispetto parebbemi mettere innanzi qualchuno che fuxi per tale locho. Chome da voi avendone alle mani nessuno, e’ s’è ordinato a Betto Rinuccini capita69

“si sa” added between the lines, to replace “harà visto.”

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no dell’Ordinanza di Bargha pigli 100 compagni [e] si transferisca a Livorno chon essi o per la guardia della terra o della fortezza. Et è venuto in considerazione se fuxi bene mettere alla guardia della terra Ivo Biliotti con 200 fanti, e 50 ne mettesi sotto suo capo nella fortezza e Betto mandare costì con li 100; e per aventura per il magistrato se ne domanderà parere a Vostra Signoria, quale examinerà quello li pare di fare, confortando levare Nigi, e se è homo che merita premio in altro luogho preporlo […] Extracts of a Letter from Ciaio Ottaviani 70 to Ceccotto Tosinghi, 24 July 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 64 n. 79

2. 21

Magnifice Domine mi singularissime,  più fa non ho scripto a Vostra Signoria sì non havendo havuto cosa degna di quella, sì che per essere malato grave del braccio dextro, adeo è manchato per poco non ne sono stato impedito. Nondimeno, al presente, Dei gratia, sono libero et maxime che speravo venire costì a servitii di Vostra Signoria. Et se sabato passato havevo cavalcatura ne venivo subito, che havevo havuto licentia di Sandro Biliotti  […]  Qui si attende a votare e’ fossi ad fornire e’ bastioni et gittare in terra le case de’ borghi che altre volte si eron disegnate et si era dato ordine di fare octo mila fanti, et Bernardo Strozzi digià haveva facto la compagnia et dipoi le cose si sono raffredde; a Dio piaccia non bisogni.  […]  2.22

Extracts of a Letter from Giannozzo Capponi to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Pietrasanta, 27 July 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 64 n. 83 Nota di quanto sia di manchamento nella fortezza di Pietra Sancta, el restante vi si trova.71  Signor Commissario,

70 71

Signed “C. Octavianus notarius,” cf. C. Guasti, eds., Le carte strozziane del R. Archivio di Stato in Firenze (Florence: Galileina, 1884), vol. I, 341. “Nota ... trova,” written on the back side. In particular, it is pointed out: “150 homini per defenderla quando sia combattuta.”

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più tempo fa detti piena notitia a’ Signori X del sito di questa provincia et per altre della qualità della terra et se si poteva defendere et cum questo numero di fanteria, alsì delle qualità delle fortezze et loro bisogni et come facevo molte necessarie riparazioni concludendo 1500 fanti ci mandassino potrebbono pigliare occhasione di fare alli imperiali qualche notabile danno.  […]  Alli homini non si omette dimonstrare quanta fede tenghino di loro e’ nostri Signori. Et non si mancherà al pensare a loro indennità. Et perché Vostra Signoria possa intendere quanto se possa sperare delle cose di qua, sarà con questa copia di dua mia alli Signori X. Et alsì perché sia noto, non ho manchato apertamente parlare. Et alla Signoria Vostra mi raccomando. Da Pietra Sancta, alli XXVII di luglio 1529.  […]  Delle piche se ne truova in rocha 7 in 800, et dichono vi è quelle solevano havere li homini della Ordinanza, a’ quali non se n’è date poi si fece nuova descriptione: per potersi valere delli homini sarebbe bene darne qualche dozina. Parendo ordinate, el provveditore scriva sieno conse­ gnate. Non essendomi commodo manderò per altra quella copia.  Iannozzum Capponibus Capitano et Commissario

Letter from the Dieci, Written by Their Chancellor Donato Giannotti, to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Florence, 9 August 1529 (“ad hore 24”) ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 64 n. 148.  2.23

Magnifice vir etc.  Noi ti scrivemo ista mattina come noi havevamo deliberato che mandassi alla guardia di Livorno Ivo Biliotti con tutta la sua compagnia, il che ti replichiamo per la presente, perché havendo noi fede in lui et sapendo quanto egli sia a proposito in quello luogo tanto importante ci pare che la electione d’uno caporale quale è lui sia optima et da starne con lo animo sicuro. Vogliamo bene che non obstante quello ti si è scripto per la decta nostra di stamane tu non mandi altrimenti a Livorno el Ricovero ma lo ritenga costì per la guardia della città. Et quanto allo arrivo della presente egli si trovassi in Livorno lo richiamerai per la guardia di cotesto luogo. Et perché tutto il pensier nostro è volto al guardare bene Livorno come terra importante, vogliamo che tu ordini che per guardia della terra non sieno manco che fanti 400 in 450 in facto et vivi. Et però quando le compagnie del decto Ivo, del Rinuccino et del Fedino non fussino tante che ascen­ dessino al decto numero darai commissione al decto Rinuccino et al

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Fedino che acreschino le loro, tanto che vi sia il numero sopra decto. Ma advertirai che sieno vivi et in facto et quando pure ti ponessi danno a crescer altrimenti le compagnie alli sopradecti ma da eleggiere un altro capo con quelli fanti che bisognassi acrescer lo farai, rimettendoci in tutto alla prudentia et parere tuo. Et questo è quanto ci occorre dirti circa le guardie da deputarsi per quella terra. Ma perché bisogna anchora pensare alla sicurtà della forteza, però vogliamo che tu vegha se la ha la sua guardia abastanza / et non la havendo vi acrescierai quel numero che ti parrà necessario […]  2.24 Extract from a Report of the Pratica of 10 August 152972 ASF: Consulte e pratiche 71, f. 63r-v Giovanni Girolami: Quanto alla fortificatione se ne rimette alli spettabili Nove. / Venendo e’ vicini alle mura, pensa che sia da fare quello che hanno usato altre città, cioè fare grattugie che sono buchi alle mura onde si traggono li archibusi. 2. 25 Payments of the Dieci to the Captain Raffaello Ricoveri, Florence 1529 ASF: Dieci, Delib. Cond. Stanz. 66, f. 110r Al capitano Rafaello Ricoveri conestabile dell’Ordinanza di S. Miniato condotto in Pisa con 150 fanti di detta Ordinanza lire tremilaquattrocentodue piccioli sono per una sua paga et di detti fanti a lire 20 per fante, 10 per conto di capisoldi et ducati 15 per sua persone, li quali se li sono pagati in questo modo, cioè ducati 150 per le mani di Niccolò Cerretani vicario di S. Miniato per fare decte compagnie et condurle a Pisa et il restante che sono lire 2832 per Cechotto Tosinghi Generale commissario a Pisa sotto dì 13 d’agosto passato. Extracts of a Letter from Pieradovardo Giachinotti, General Commissioner in Livorno, to Ceccotto Tosinghi, 16 August 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 64 n. 188  2.26

Magnifice vir etc.,

72

This session of the Pratiche was introduced by a report on the “gente a piede e a cavallo” of Florence by Raffaello Girolami as speaker of the Council of the Dieci.

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 questa mattina si è ricevuto la farina mandata, la quale habbiamo pesata diligentemente et trovato solo sacca 263,73 et in tutto di libre 38,279. Et Vostra Signoria dice dovere essere sacca 264 a libre 38,883. Viene a manchare uno sacco et al peso manco 609 libre: però, acciò che per Vostra Signoria si possi trovare in chi è lo errore, vi si manda particularmente il peso et da chi sia ricevuta  […]  Arrivò il Guercio con la compagnia per il quale habbiamo fatto questo giorno la rassegnia et pagatogli secondo la vostra et quello che di bocca ne ha detto il vostro cancelliere. Èssi rassegnato tredici paghe doppie et la persona sua per tre paghe morte, el restante, infino alla somma di centocinquanta paghe, et alla persona del capitano fatti buoni 15 scudi et fiorini 300 per e’ capisoldi di che si è preso fede di ricevute, / a doppio per mandarne una a’ Signori Dieci.  […]  Habbiamo inteso come Vostra Signoria aspecta a Firenze adviso degli archibusieri del capitano Ivo. Quella si degni subito, quando ne habi dire, darcene aviso, perché il prefato capitano ne dimanda spesso. Ricordasi a Vostra Signoria la legnia pei bastioni, quali si van finendo el più si può, che non si manca di diligentia. Quella li ordini presto.  […]  Userà ogni diligentia si storni in parte il mercato: e ci è necessità di fare corbelli et zappe, che questi poltroni di questi villani vengono qua a mano giunte. […]  Il capitano Quercio male volentieri resta contento a 15 scudi, che mi pare habbia il torto, di che maxime la compagnia non mi piace troppo universalmente. […]  Que bene valeat, ex terra Liburni, die XVI Augusti MDXXIX. Letter from Matteo Bongianni to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Florence, 19 August 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 64 n. 202 2. 27

Magnifico viro cognato honorando,  II giorni sono per Giovanni Schurcola riceve’ una di Vostra Signoria de’ XVI° di questo sutami ghrata per intendere del buono essere di quella ch’el simile è a tutti noi Iddio lodato. E del quale Schurcola sono stato raghugliato la chausa che fu rimosso da Monte Pulciano, che se’ così fuxi 73

“263” struck-through, replaced by “CDXVII.”

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li sarebbe suto stato fatto al prefacto villania; e bisognia abbi patientia. Raffaello Girolami sarà capitato costì. Vostra Signoria gl’arà parlato et inteso el tutto et operato qualchosa per lui, benché pocho sarà, non sendo qui. Ma chredo a ogni modo detto Schurcola sarà presto spedito con la sua battaglia, e io per amore vostro l’ò favorito e favorirò sempre; e chome dicho spero sarà spedito e lui e degli altri, che bisognerà sovenire Mala­ testa di più fanti che non ha; che chiede sua Signoria di nuovo aiuto che ha paura che la piena non si volti a ·llui; e digià dice che in Sixi74 v’è entrato 600 fanti 200 cavalli75 e vorebbe irli a trovare. Non credo per noi s’achonsenta di mettere a pericholo de’ nostri fanti, ma bene per mettere in chasa a Malatesta qualche cento di fanti; et disegnaxi, oltre alli 2000 fanti che ha, di dargli, quando n’abbi di bisogno, qualche chompagnia di queste nostre battaglie fra ’ quali vi dovrà essere quella dello Schurchola. […] /  E spero in Dio, che non ci abandonerà. E qui vegho ben volti li animi a preservare questa libertà. Soprattutto s’attende a solecitare questi ripari e maxime in 4 luoghi, cioè el Monte et le foce d’Arno et fra la porta a Santo Friano et Sancto Petris Ghattoli chon homini comandati, benché fanno pocho.  […]  In Firenze, a’ dì XVIIII d’aghosto 1529, a ore 3 di mattina, Cognato, Matteo Bongianni

Extract of a Letter from Giovan Battista Tanari da Arezzo to the Dieci, 6 September 1529 ASF: Dieci, Responsive 123, f. 407r-v 2. 28

Magnifici Signori mia, etc.,  per dare notizia a le Signorie Vostre chome domenicha mattina chomparsi di buona ora in Perugia, et subito mi trasferi’ al signore Malatesta, el quale mi vede’ molto volentieri. Esposi al tucto l’ordine di Vostre Signorie, et voi molto ringraziò quelle e rimase sechondo me sodisfatto.  Et dipoi lo chonfortai a volersi difender da questi comuni nimici chon quelle ragione che n’sono da dire, ch’erene pure da dire assai. Trovai sua signoria molto gagliarda a la difesa sua e di coteste signorie, ma quando si 74 “Sixi,” ancient Italian vernacular for “Assisi.” 75 Cf. C. Bontempi, Ricordi della città di perugia dal 1527 al 1550 di Cesare di Giovannello Bontempi, continuati sino al 1563 da Marcantonio Bontempi, ed. by F. Bonaini, A. Fabretti and F. Polidori, Archivio Storico Italiano, 16, N. 2 (1851), 334-336.

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viene a ristretto sua signoria ricerca le vostre signorie che ancora lo servino di fanti 800 di quel che si può, una parte batalioni e una parte altre fanterie; e dice che poi si rende sicuro de le cose di Perugia.  […]  A’ dì 6 di setembre 1529 in Arezo. Giovanbatista Tanari in Arezo

 2.29 Notes about the Ammunition Stored for the Garrison of Pisa, 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 66 n. 225 Richordo delle munitioni che si trovano in cittadella nuova di Pisa cioè salnitro e polvere fine e grossa e piombo e ferro, e prima:  […]  14000 piombo lame dodici grosse e pani 29 di libre 14000 incirca  6000 ferro nuovo, libre semila incirca  2000 salnitro macinato, libre dumila incirca  2500 salnitro sodo, libre dumilcinquecento incirca  6 zholpho macinato e sodo, botte sei  torce di cera, non ce n’è rimasti o pochi  […]  Fune d’archibusi, poche  Panelle, non ce n’è nissuno che è di grande importantia  […]  Sochi e suchellini, non ce n’è nissuno che sono d’importantia  […]  Candele di sevo, non ce n’è rimasta nessuna  Ferri da piche, non ce n’è nissuno  Piche, ce n’è forse 150 cattive  Archibusi da mano, non ce n’è più che nove  Archibusi da mura, ce n’è rimasti circa cinquanta Extract of a Letter from the Dieci to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Florence, 9 October 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 28 2.30

Magnifice Generali Commissarie etc.,  Perché noi habbiamo mutato proposito di servirci di cotesti fanti per guardia di Pistoia, però non è necessario che gli mandi là altrimenti o che ne soldi degl’altri. Siché non hai a muovere detti fanti, ma ritenerali costì per guardia di cotesta città.

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 Come ti scrivemmo per l’ultima nostra, la fede che habbiamo in te è stata e sarà sempre grande. Però ci rimectiamo a te circa il provedere la cittadella nel modo che ne scrivi per la tua de’ VII. Il che molto ci satisfa. Et mettendola ad effetto, l’aproverremo così questa come ogn’altra cosa. Et però per la presente non ci occorre dirti molto.  Li nimici per ancora si trovano con la massa dell’exercito a Fighine, et benché ancora non si possa sapere il disegno loro, pure le coniecture et inditii che habbiamo delli andamenti loro ci dimostrano che sieno per risolversi di venire accamparsi alla città. Fanno ogni dì scorrerie qui vicino et hoggi sono scorsi fino a Pazolatico. Noi attendiamo a star provisti et ci troviamo in essere sino al numero di VIIm fanti forestieri oltre a quelli della nostra Ordinanza. In Prato habbiamo mandato tante forze che sono bastanti ad difenderlo gagliardamente.  […] Letter from Bati di Benedetto Bati, Captain of the Battalion of Campiglia, to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Campiglia, 10 October 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 37  2.31

Magnifico Signor Capitano etc.  Io mi sono trasferito hogi in Bibona colla Signoria del Capitano di Campigla perché mai ho aùto forza di tirare questi mia descripti colà; et quelli che io v’avevo a76 mia forza sono ritornati aleghandone non volere servire se non sono paghati et volere guardare casa loro et non d’altri; et ancho perché gli omini di Campigla non si sono voluti guardare, perché ànno portato via tute le loro robe a Piombino et a Suvereto et ancho le persone loro. Hogli voluti provedere di bastioni et ripari, né ànno voluto, et quasi disperati si sono abandonati. Visto adunque io non vi fare hopera buona, et chosì el Capitano, ci siamo partiti et venuti in Bibona dove chostoro si voglino guardare, et maxime perché s’intende per la volta di Maxa sono arivati di molti cavalli et alla coda di quelli venghano fanterie, il perché bisogna la Signoria Vostra per il presente latore ci provegha di monitione d’ogni sorta et maxime di polvere grossa et fine et pionbo, a ciò ci posiamo77 difendere. Et da Vostra Signoria del continovo mi rachomando. Facta in Bibona a’ dì 10 d’otobre per lo vostro servitore. Bati di Benedetto Bati, Capitano della Battaglia di Campiglia

76 77

MS. “ha.” “posiamo,” sic, for “possiamo.”

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Extract of a Letter from Giovanbattista Vivini da Colle to Leonardo Bartoli Vicar and Commissioner of Lari, Volterra, 14 October 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 62  2.32

[…]  S’intende e’ Colligiani questo giorno havere mandato tre ambasciatori al Duca di Malphi per capitulare con sua Signoria come homo della Santità di nostro Signore et della cesarea maestà […] et anchora dicono la comunità di S. Gimignano essere a simili cimenti […] et come al Poggio imperiale si truova messer Giovanni Tedesco, già capitano della Signoria di Firenze sotto la nostra Ordinanza, con poca qualità de fanti; et per tutta la val d’Elsa manda che vadino a capitulare, di modo che Gambassi, Montaione, Castelfiorentino tutti sono iti a trovare el cardinale de’ Pucci che si truova a Uliveto in Val d’Elsa rimettendosi in sua Signoria; et li Volterrani molto si sono ralegrati che li vicini loro sieno a simili patti, che molti di loro dicono faranno el simile subito verrà el trombetto, quale pensano non manchi fra dua giorni, ma hanno grande paura della ciptadella perché di già ha volte l’artiglierie al Palazzo loro […] Letter from Andrea Borgognoni to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Campiglia, 15 October 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 65 2. 33

Magnifice Commissarie etc.,  non tanto con dispiacere et maravigla la Signoria Vostra intese l’essermi absentato di Campigla, quanto più stavo admirato non dar prima, secondo lo scrivere mio, favore et aiuto a questo luogho, sì dalla Signoria Vostra come per ’ Signori X, li quali ne risposeno non potere in modo alchuno, essendo la ciptà nostra tanta affatichata. Né si può dire ch’el mio fussi più presto offitio da nimico che di buon ciptadino, perché forzato et non altrimenti fu el partire nostro per li evidenti pericoli ne’ quali incorreno, come ne intenderà dalli mandati commissari, indi di boccha mia, li quali questa nocte a cinque hore insalutato hospite si sono partiti, che ne ha dato admiratione et gran sospecto, né si possono drento quietare. Sonmi riducto in Campigla dove, innanzi alla venuta loro, come chi ben considera alli futuri danni, m’ero preparato, con quelli tanti de’ scripti potevo havere, ritornare. Né mi parve faticha, in prima, col capitano della battagla ridurli dalle case loro. Sono stati qui li commissari et hanno visto et conosciuto quel che si può fare. Attenderò a ·ffare l’uffitio mio et li capitani seguiranno l’ordine dato per preservatione di questo locho, come

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debitamente dhebbon fare: né preservar si può in modo alchuno se la Signoria Vostra, e presto, non ci manda altri fanti paghati, perché li bat­ tagloni de’ scripti et senza soldo non si possono tratenere; e li homini di qui al tutto sono disperato se questo effecto non segue. La Signoria Vostra è prudentissima et provederà al tucto, alla quale mi raccomando. Que bene valeat. Ex Campiliae, die XV Octobris MDXXIX. Andreae Borghognoni, capitano et commissario

Letter from Bati di Benedetto Bati, Captain of the Battalion of Campiglia, to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Campiglia, 15 October 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 69  2.34

Magnifice Vir Salutem etc.  Io mi sono transferito in Campiglia dove inanti alla venuta de’ Capitani m’ero preparato ritornare con quelli tanti de’ Bataglioni che io potevo avere. Né il partir mio fu senza causa maxime che da mia et dagli omini di qui fumo lasciati soli et non con picholo sospecto del quale non si dà partichulare aviso alla Signoria Vostra, perché il lungho sarebbe, et daranne notitia da’ decti sua Capitani, li quali questa nocte a 5 hore senza altro dirne si partirno di qui che n’àno dato amiratione non pichola a tuto questo populo, et sono in modo insospetiti che hogni minimo numero di fantarie torebono questa terra; maxime anchora perché non provista se none di uomini forzati, li quali bene che sierno descripti et non paghati non ce li78 posso ritenere, né i·modo alchuno stanno a ubidientia, et più presto sono vòlti guardare casa loro che casa d’altri, none stante l’ordine dato da’ vostri Capitani di dare loro lo scambio hogni 10 giorni, come avevano hordinato. Bisogna finalmente alla riparatione di questa terra fanti paghati et che stieno al quia di quello che è loro comesso: la terra, et è d’importantia, come Vostra Signoria sa ed è a ogn’ora minacciata. Li ho­ mini di qui si tenghono79 abandonati, però l’opera nostra pocho ci vale se ·lla Signoria Vostra presto non provede. Potrebesi paghare questi mia descripti o80 veramente tirarli costà, et di chostì mandarne in questo locho, el quale secondo le forze mia quanto più mi sarà possibile andrò defen­ dendo, e fare quel tanto che la Signoria Vostra me inposerà, alla quale del continovo mi rachomando. Facta in Campilia, a dì 15 d’otobre 1529, per lo Vostro servitore, Bati di Benedecto Bati, capitano della bataglia di Campilia

78 79 80

“ce li” MS. “cieli.” “tenghono” MS. “tenghano.” “o,” MS. “ho.”

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Extract of a Letter from Giuliano Vaglienti to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Place Not Specified, 16 October 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 65 n.70  2.35

Magnifico commissario,  […]  non potendo Vostra Signoria mandarvi altra gente che in factum vi bisognerebbe, non conoscio Vostra Signoria possa fare altro che scrivere al Bertalaccio facci el debito suo, et darli speranza di premio. Et al capitano che solleciti che al tempo venghino li scambi dell’Ordinanza, et dirli che facci intendere a gl’omini di Campigla che per Vostra Signoria non resterà ch’el capitano Prete non sia restituito et conosciuto pur che lui si porti bene; et in facti è di importanzia se possibile a levarlo di là, et lui, per quello disse, lo desidera. Anchora credo ch’el cavare quelli cavalli da Piom­bino non sarebbe se non bene. Ma insomma la sicurtà di Campigla sarebbe cento archibusieri pagati con un capitano da bene, ché altri mezi li dubito  […] Giulano Vagliente

Letter from Alessandro Monaldi, Captain of the Battalion of Pietrasanta, to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Place Not Specified (Empoli?), 25 October 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 142  2.36

Molto magnifico Signore et patrone mio,  ècci che fumo al … [lacer.] de lo signore chomisario Francesco Feruci dopo desinare a ore 19; e’ comandò a tre chapitani chole nostre bande che fusimo in ordine di potere conbatere di che a un trato fumo in asato81 e avio’ci a la volta di Chastelo Fiorentino: et di là feci che vedesimo d’atachare la bataglia a dita tera, et quela trata siono de’ nimici; aviamoci chola guida e fumo ischoperti da li nimici apreso82 a Chastelo Fiorentino a dua miglia, di che ci ordinamo chon 50 omini ch’atachasino la bataglia e a dita tera e no a le spale. Atachato la bataglia molta galiarda, Piramo Bartoluci fu el primo a ’ntrare drento. Et da le finetre le don’e cho’ sasi e 81 82

“asato,” sic, for “assetto.” “apreso” MS. “a peso.”

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omini gridando “Pale! Pale!”83 e in pario in pario noi spuntamo; e’ soldati e abimo morti e schoso la tera per nostra ch- … [lacer.] sacho di chavali, muli et mule et azine;84 et rasatatoci85 … [lacer.] usimo86 fuori chole no­ stre insegne el capitano Franchoso, el Fadino87 ed io, et siamo tornati vettoriosi. Rimandateci el medicho che n’abiamo di bisognio. Al signore conte88 mio onorando, mi rachomandate a’ vostri figlioli. Servitor Alesandro Monaldi Capitano F

Extract of a Letter from Strozzo degli Strozzi to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Pontedera, 27 October 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 155  2.37

Magnifico Commissario,  in questo punto vi habiamo scripto per uno homo a posta e dectovi li nimici essere al Ponte di Sacho […] e per anchora non ci danno impaccio. E bene che sieno scorso qua presso, una spia habiamo fra loro dice che il mazo grosso sia a Lari con il Signore Camillo; e à preso uno e strettamente li domandò89 di Ponte ad Era e che gente e’ avevano, e dixe havavano cento fanti e cinquanta cavagli; e lui rispose io ò mandato per cinque bande e vorò provare questo Ponte ad Era, però questo aviso ci è in que­sto punto. Siché, Magnifico Signor Commissario, Vostra Signoria è pruden­ tissima e bene sarebbe per tutto domani mandarci allo mancho sexanta archibusieri perché in facti questo Capitano ha pochi archibusieri che sono circha dicotto90 e anche poco pratichi; e se insino a cento fanti, farà tanto meglio, ma non potendo da sexanta a cento, torrò fanti comandati li migliori. Troverrò, ma bisogna Signor Commissario che facciate una lectera al Vicario di Vicopisano che ci dia più favore: primo e’ ci scriva delle cose ragonevole un poco più caldamente, benché lui sta in lecto malato più mesi fa, ma il cavaliero tutto governa.  Io voglio ricordare a Vostra Signoria non per presuntione ma per la factione della patria che habia cura de’ Cascinesi perché intendo per molte vie, e varie persone sparlano molto dicendo che subito che 83 84 85 86 87 88 89 90

“pale,” sic, for “palle” – i.e. the Medici insignia of red balls. “azine,” sic, for “asini.” “rasatatoci” sic, for “riassettatoci.” “usimo,” sic, for “uscimmo.” “Fadino,” sic, for “Fedino.” Ercole Bentivogli, Governor of the Florentine army. “domandò,” followed by “di Peccioli,” struck-through. “dicotto,” sic, for “diciotto.”

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veggano il trombetto imperiale si vogliano dare; e hieri addì 26 dua Ca­ scinesi lo dixono a dua di questa Terra, homini di fede. Però mi parrebbe ne cavassi / quel Papricco che intendo alsì lui circha a quindici dì fa lui il simile. Vostra Signoria è prudentissima e in quella si rimetta. Sappi Vostra Signoria che questa Terra si fa fortissima e è luogho da non si perdere così presto, essendo guardata da ragionevol gente. Per aviso, bene mi pare a ·pproposito che havendo a mandare qui altra banda quella vi mandi uno homo da bene che io lo possa maneggare, e non voglia con da più di me. E di questo in verità mi lodo assai. Vedete d’uno altro quando lo mandassi in qualche parte che riconoscha da me tutto vi si dice, non per boria alcuna ma per havere homini che io li possa comandare.  Li homini qui della Terra sono tutti disposti di morire per la Signoria, e li cinque del Ponte ad Era herano confinati per me, io li ò rimessi alli preghi dal Capitano Brogio; e siamo qui tutti frategli e non ci è rimasto una donna che tutte sono andate via […] Letter from Strozzo degli Strozzi to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Pontedera, 30 October 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 65 n. 172  2.38

Magnifico Commissario,  tengho dua vostre, per le quale desidereresti intendere le forze degli nimici. Di che vi dico che in Lari non è più che 6 o 8 cavagli e così 8 o 10 compagni, tutte persone preste. Però quegli di Pecciòli non possano ca­ valcare per qualche banda, bisogna venghino qui a passare. E anchora vi dico che ò fuora le sentinelle e homini di sorte che non penso mi habino a sforzare il ponte, ad Dio piacendo. Ma per anchora ò poche gente, ma ò dato opera che ve ne vengha91 neo comandati, e penso domani fermare più di XX archibusieri che si spenderà poco in tenerli. Però Vostra Signoria resti avisato di tutto.  In Peccoli ò tenuto uno homo dua giorni et penso sarà qui hoggi. Ma sappi Vostra Signoria che in Peccoli non vi è più che cinquanta cavagli fra buoni e cattivi, e così 150 compagni; et hevi92 uno numero grande di villani per rubbare, che agiunghano al numero di più che 300: per questi non istimo niente perché tutti fuggiranno e rubano le cose de’ Fiorentini e vanno con le prede via; e dicesi che aspectano 400 archibusieri per venire alla volta di questa terra, però Vostra Signoria sappi che per de91 92

“vengha,” followed by “che.” “hevi,” sic, for “èvvi.”

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fendere questa terra non ne ò paura che se non piantano artiglieria non penso mai ci habino a entrare. E di poi anchora penso tenerla ma vorei quanto dico di sopra, e parendo a Vostra Signoria che il conte93 cavalcassi con tutti cotesti homini d’arme, e con essi una banda, non li mandate poltroni che habino a ·ffugire, ché io impiecherò e’ capitani. E questo vi sia per aviso. E così se havessi qualche parte di quegli da Cascina, ché penso non mi mancheranno […] /  Ponte di Sacho è ito per accordarsi ma penso non s’acorderà; et acor­ dandosi penso non habia a tenere: e questo vi sia per aviso. Habesti le lance, uno barile di polvere dal Ponte di Sacho, che furno 16 lance. E tutto si tiene a di presso. Per questo latore vorrei mi mandassi qualche poco di polvere da archibusi che fussi fine, e così qualche94 di piombo. Mandasi per parechi archibusi. Se Vostra Signoria ne manda da mura, harò caro che si potranno rimandare da Peccoli se sia possibile. Né altro per questa di Ponte ad Era, alli XXX d’octobre 1529. Strozo Strozi, Commissario

Extract of a Letter from Bastiano Galeotti to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Livorno, 13 November 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 66 n. 81  2.39

[…]  io mi trovo al presente per poca una buona banda fra la quale mi trovo setanta buoni archibusieri da fare ogni fazione, e qui ci stiamo come onbre. E che sia il vero ieri mattina ci fu fatto in su gli ochi a un miglio uno bottino di dumila ducati di bestie da farsi 20 cavalli e 30 archibusieri tra soldati e villani. E questo comesario non volle mai che noi andassino a ricatallo con dire ogni cosa a buon fine e rendomi cierto lo riavavamo se lui voleva darci licenzia.  […] Extract of a letter from Girolamo Corbinelli to Ceccotto Tosinghi, Cascina, 14 November 1529 ASF: Strozziane, I serie, 66 n. 86  2.40

[…] subito si mandò il bando, secondo m’avisava, che ognuno tornasse alle sua bande; et subito comparse qui li nominati in la interclusa lista, 93 94

Ercole Bentivogli, Governor of the Florentine army. “qualche,” followed by “lib-” struck-through.

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parte della banda del Tinto95 et parte della banda della buona memoria di Hercole,96 e’ quali promissano subito che anco si poteva passare essere alle lor bande, quanto97 altrimenti non me ne scrivesse Vostra Signoria. E sono quasi tutti archibusieri et di qui della terra,98 altri soldati forestieri non sappiamo ci sia.  […]  Della banda della buona memoria di Hercole:  Cecho da Cascina  Rocho da Pisa  Io. Baptista da Cascina  Nicolò di Bastiano da Cascina  Michelangelo di Mariotto da Cascina  Giulio del Fracassa da Cascina  Vincente di Francesco da Cascina  Cecho d’Alchamo  Antonio dal Ponte di Sacho  Neri da Prato. Announcement That Every Peasant Living in Florence Must Enroll in the City Militia, Florence, 12 January 1530 ASF: Signori e collegi, deliberazioni in forza di ordinaria autorità 132, f. 109r  2.41

Die XII mensis Ianuarii 1529.  […] Bando che e’ contadini si faccino descrivere.  […]  e’ Magnifici et Excelsi Signori et Gonfaloniere di iustitia del popolo fiorentino fanno publicamente bandire et comandare a ogni et qualunche persona quale di presente si truova nella città di Firenze, così contadini come quelli che habitano e’ sobborghi et altri luoghi et similmente a tutti gli artigiani di qualunche sorte quali non sopportino graveze et non fussino descripti ne’ libri delle decime da anni XVIII a cinquanta­ cinque, che per tutto dì 14 a 15 del presente si debba ciascuno rappresentare al suo populo o uno parrocchia dove di presente habitano a farsi 95 96 97 98

Tinto da Battifolle, cf. D. Guerrazzi, L’assedio di Firenze (Milan: Libreria editrice Dante Alighieri, 1869), 631. Ercole da Brisighella, cf. Mambrino Roseo da Fabriano, L’Assedio di Firenze: poema in ottava rima, dichiarato con note critiche, storiche e biografiche (Florence: Pellas, 1894), 179. “quanto,” sic, for “quando.” That is, from Cascina.

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descrivere dove in ciascuna di decte chiese o vero parrochie sarà per loro Signorie deputato uno che gli scriverà per fare dipoi quel tanto che da decti Excelsi Signori sarà loro ordinato. Sotto pena, a qualunche non si farà scrivere, della loro indignatione.  2.42 Payments Concerning Firearms, Florence, 31 January 1530 ASF: Dieci, Delib. Cond. Stanz. 66, f. 168v Et a’ dì 31 detto, fiorini 9. 1. 18, a Giovanni di Sertagio Barducci, sono lire 4 soldi 2 per libre 590 di carbone macinato a soldi 40 el cento et lire 6 per 3 madioni de polvere hauti da lui et consegnati tutto a Baccio Casabasso maestro di fare polvere. Et a’ dì 3 di febraio lire 7 soldi 9 a Gherardo di Giovanni torniaio per valuta di 18 paia di caze de artiglerie99 haute da lui per soldi 8 el paio. Et a’ dì 5 detto lire 5. 10 a Michele da Settignano sono lire 4 soldi 10 per 180 palle di prieta morte per covertare di piombo et lire 1 per un paio di forme da falconetto. […] Et a’ dì 8 detto fiorini 148. 2. 17 a Baccio Casabasse maestro di fare polvere, sono lire 994. 13 per fattura di libre 6631 di polvere fine a soldi 3 la libra fatta di libre 5167 di salnitro per raffinatura di libre 1200 di polvere grosse venuta da Prato lire 3. 17 / lire 14. 17 per 27 opere messe a più fuochi lavorati et lire 25 soldi 10 per olio perronio, carboni, bambagie, aceto et trementine per 45 trombe et 500 pi­ gnatti lavorati per lui et messi in munitione. Announcement That Every Peasant Living in Florence Must Enroll in a Militia and Bring Their Own Digging Tools, Florence, 12 February 1530 ASF: Signori e collegi, deliberazioni in forza di ordinaria autorità 132, f. 150r  2.43

Die XIII mensis Februarii 1529. Bando che e’ contadini si rappresentino co’ loro ferramenti.  […]  e’ Magnifici et Excelsi Signori et Gonfaloniere di iustitia del popolo fiorentino fanno publicamente bandire et comandare a qualunche contadino che si truova nella città di Firenze da età d’anni 15 fiino in anni LX che alli XV del presente dua ore100 davanti la levata del sole ciascuno di loro si rappresenti personalmente nel quartiere della sua habitatione, cioè quelli del quartiere di Santo Spirito in sulla piaza di Santo Spirito, 99 100

The “caza” is the ‘sponge’ used in cannon operations, cf. A. Angelucci, Documenti inediti per la storia delle armi da fuoco italiane (Turin: Tip. Cassone, 1869), 292. “ore” missing in the MS.

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quelli di Santa Croce in sulla piaza di Santa Croce, quelli di Santa Maria Novella in sulla piaza di Santa Maria Novella, quelli del quartiere di San Giovanni in sulla piaza di San Marco, colli interi ferramenti, cioè pala, vangha o zappa. Nelle quali piaze saranno li commessarii deputati a loggare li soldati di decti quartieri per pigliare la descriptione di ciascuno di decti contadini che si rappresenteranno, et comanderanno loro quello che habbino a fare. A ciascuno di loro sarà data una poliza soscripta di uno di decti commessarii, in sulla quale poliza dipoi che decti contadini haranno facto quel tanto che sarà suto loro comandato da decti commissarii, ciascuno di loro ne faranno fede; et qualunche contadino sarà trovato senza la decta poliza et fede di havere obedito s’intenda essere incorso in pena di dua tracti di fune et di più d’essere isvaligiato di tutti e’ panni et tute robe che havessi adosso.  Notificando di più a ciascuno di decti contadini che li prefati Excelsi Signori vogliono tre opere da ciascuno di loro fra otto dì prossimi colli sopra detti ferramenti in quelli luoghi dove da sopradecti commissarii sarà loro ordinato […]  2.44 Extracts from a Report of the Pratica of 18 February 1530 ASF: Consulte e pratiche 73, f. 91r Die XVIII februarii MDXXIX [...]  Cino di Cino per li XII [...] Quanto alla ordinanza della guerra, se ne referischino a e’ Dieci et a e’ Signori. Quanto a ordinare la città loro non vogliono mancare di ricordare che quando si venissi a quelli termini che sonassi la campana che e’ religiosi et altri orassino et che e’ sia bene che la militia et e’ capitani di quella havendo a stare in ubidienza del capitano che questo non ….101 ma che delli altri popolani che possono pigliare l’arme le si dieno sotto e’ gonfaloni, pensando che per questa via sieno ordinate sotto il loro gonfalone. Et perché spesso accade che chi non può andare con l’arme si sta in casa, per non dare sbigottimento et perché e’ si possa stare sicuramente che se ci fussi di cattivo animo, che si faccino ritenere senza rispetto andandone el resto. Et perché e’ sanno che queste cose non si possono fare sanza danari, pensano che a Vostre Signorie non manchi modi di riscuotere […]”  [f. 91v ]  Francesco Carducci per li spettabili Dieci: […] et perché la experientia di tanti valenti soldati et experimentati può darvi quelli consigli che 101

Left blank in the MS.

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bisognano al modo del ordine della città, pare che si debbino essere come da loro sarà ordinato. Et di già è quasi stabilito el modo al guardare la città dove haranno ancora a stare e’ vostri giovani, non essendo altro el fine della militia; et però ciascuno exorti e’ frategli e’ figluoli che hora è tempo che ognuno mostri la virtù sua; et se poi e’ sia giudicato bene dare l’arme a e’ non descritti che bisognerà farlo con ordine acciò che e’ non nascessi scandalo…  [f. 93r]  Giovambattista Cei per il bue: […] et perché la militia possi intervenire a ogni difesa et vadino a uso di soldati et sciolghensi da ogni altra cura et la guardia di Palazo si facci per e’ più vechi, el populo o parte, et così e’ contadini giovani; et che si sottoponghino a e’ commissari, e’ quali servino in questi tempi gratis.  [f. 94r]  Messer Baldo Altoviti per la vipera: […] giudicano essere il meglio che il populo si trovi mescolato co’ e’ cittadini che separati.  2.45 Extracts from a Report of the Pratica of 18 February 1530 ASF: Consulte e pratiche 74, ff. 36r ff Die XVIII Februarii MDXXIX. Relatione della Pratica nel consiglio maggiore del popolo.  Fu fatta per l’Eccellenza del Gonfaloniere proposta che trovandosi la città nel termine ch’è di presente et veggendosi gl’inimici stringersi verso la città, si consigliassi per loro quello che gli pareva da fare in benefitio della città, massime quant’alla cosa de’ danari. Al che, ristrect(t)osi insieme Gonfalonere per Gonfalone et consultatosi fu referito: /  Cherubino Fortini per li XVI Gonfalonieri.  Per l’Eccellentia del Gonfaloniere, per quello s’è possuto raccorre s’è visto che vogliono consiglio sopra quello che si possa ricordare per la defensione della libertà. Occorrono loro tre cose: prima che defensione si faccia col ricorrere a Dio con le orationi; secondo per i soldati forestieri; tertio per noi. […] Circa al secondo, le Signorie Vostre et e’ Xci fino a qui hanno operato commendabilmente; confortano che si seguiti; et che a questi particolari sono pocho instrutti; et se ne referiscono. Circa de’ cittadini bisogna che con le persone et danaio sopperischino; et circa la militia ex numero ponga da canto la cappa; et che si ordinino a’ luoghi loro. Et perché potrebbe occorrere molti tumulti, ricordano che quelle pensino di quelli fussino scandalosi o havessino malignità o havessino arme in casa, che le si riduchino in luogo atto; et che chi fosse di quell’animo si

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metta in luogo che non possa / essere nocivo, né essergli nociuto, et non descritti sotto gonfaloni sieno a’ luoghi dove parrà a Vostre Signorie. Et perché il nervo del tutto sono e’ denari,102 loro dicono haver pagato et pagarlo di contanti; et dicono che oltre alle impositioni in su le nuove da porli pagheranno quel tanto che sarà possibile a benefitio della città; et chi non harà altro porterà a nienti. Et perché molti sono retinenti al pagare, che si usi ogni rimedio che si paghi, confortando che forzatamente si faccino paghare pigliando grano o altro opportuno a questi tempi. Et confortonvi al pigliare più animo, et che voi andiate gagliardi alla difesa, sperando l’aiuto da Dio et una eterna gloria.  Cino di Cino per li XII.  […] /  Quant’alla Ordinanza della guerra, se ne referiscono a’ Xci et a’ Signori. Quant’all’ordinare la città, loro non vogliono mancare di ricordare che quando si venissi a quelli termini che sonassi la campana, che i religiosi et altri orassino; et che sia bene che la militia et i capitani di quella, ha­ vendo a stare a obbedienza del capitano, di questo non ….103 ma che d­ egli altri populani che possono pigliare l’arme se gli dieno sotto e’ gonfaloni, pensando che per questa via sieno ordinati sotto il loro gonfalone. Et perché spesso accade che chi non può andare con l’arme si sta in casa per non dare sbigottimento et perché si possa stare sicuramente se ci fussi alcuno di cattivo animo, che si faccino ritenere senza rispetto andando il resto. Et perché sanno che queste cose non si posson fare senza danari, pensano che a Vostre Signorie non manchi modo di risquotere, sperando che ciascuno si doverrà spogliare del suo et farlo comune, et che ciascuno lo facci con effetto; et quando bisogni altro modo si offeriscono./  Francesco Carducci per li Spectabili Xci.  Come ciascuno vede i nimici, oltr’all’havere occupato ’l dominio, hanno assediato la città et si approssimano per ultima potentia per conseguire il loro effetto. Et per questo è di necessità che quello che è stato consigliato per il passato si rimetta ad effetto, perché bisogna infatti

102

103

Cf. the notorious opposite statement by N. Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy (II 10), trans. by H.C. Mansfield & N. Tarcov (Chicago & London: Chicago University Press, 1996), 147, quoted in the original version for comparison (II 10, 1, p. 362): “i danari non sono il nervo della guerra.” Italics added. For a commentary on this topic, cf. J. Barthas, L’argent n’est pas le nerf de la guerre: essai sur une prétendue erreur de Machiavel (Rome: Collection de l’École Française de Rome, 2011). Left blank in the MS.

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havere buona copia di valenti soldati et eccellenti capitani; un capitano generale che secondo la forma ….104  Et perché l’esperienza di tanti soldati valenti et sperimentati può darvi quelli consigli che bisognano, el modo dell’ordine della città pare che si debba come da loro s’ànno ordinato; et di già è quasi stabilito el modo del guardare la città, dove haranno anchora da stare i vostri giovani, non essend’altro il fine della militia; et però ciascuno esorti e’ fratelli et i figliuo­li che hora è tempo che ogn’uno mostri la virtù sua; et se poi fia ­giudicato bene il dar l’arme a’ non descritti, che bisognerà farlo con ­ordine, acciò che non nascessi scandolo; et però bisogna considerarlo molto bene; et che sieno sottoposti a persone che l’habbino a tenere. Non mancheranno d’esequire quanto giudicheranno conveniente come per fin qui hanno fatto con ogni diligenza / […] Havete l’esito di Roma, et altri luoghi: e’ gli è pur meglio restar nudo et morire generosamente con gloria che venire alle mani delli inimici […] /  Francesco del Benino per la Sferza.  Tutti unitamente sono d’animo che Vostre Signorie faccino risquotere da’ debitori del comune con ogni rimedio / quant’al difendere la libertà, son d’animo di metterci la vita; et che si diano l’armi a’ minuali […]  [f. 40v]  Giovambattista Cei per il Bue.  […]  Et perché la militia possa intervenire ad ogni difesa, che vadino a uso di soldati et sciolgansi d’ogni altra cura; et la guardia del Palazzo si faccia per i più vecchi; che si armi il populo o parte, et così i contadini giovani; et che si sottoponghino a’ commessarii, e’ quali servino in questi tempi gratis. […] /  Giovanni di Tomaso Rucellai per il lion nero.  Par loro che sia venuto il tempo che la nostra militia habbi a sanarci o darci la morte. […] /  Messer Bardo Altoviti per la Vipera.  Le cose di questa città sono in termine che s’ha di bisogno più d’aiuto che di consiglio, et che horamai ciascuno si debba uscire di cerimonie; et che questo si facci è una indubitata certezza della vittoria. Facendo el debito suo, harebbono da ricordare più cose: prima che si ricorra a Dio per impetrar gratia per questa impresa tanto giusta; secondo, quant’alla preparatione della città, ricordano che andandosi ristringendo le cose, che si pensi a dare l’arme a chi non l’ha; et giudicono esser il meglio che il 104

Left blank in the MS.

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popolo si trovi mescolato co’ cittadini che separati; che si aggiunga commissarii; altri ricordano che si assicuri de’ sospetti, rimurar porte et altre cose; et circa denari, quasi tutti dicono haver sodisfatto, li altri dicono di farlo, benché / tutti dicono che chi non ha rispetto né alla patria né a Dio, col non voler pagare; et che senza rispetto di casa da costoro si tragghino quelli che si può per benefitio della città; et di più s’offeriscono di fare una sottoscritione nel gonfalone di quello che si potrà…. /  Messer Alessandro Malegonnelle per il Leon Bianco.  Considerando la proposta del Gonfaloniere, la quale in sé comprende, se a loro occorre cosa alcuna in utilità del governo; et per sé non par da disputare della defensione, trovandosi in Firenze. […] Ricordano che essendosi vista buona intentione ne’ giovani, che non si manchi che la militia stia alle bande nelli alloggiamenti sono capaci; quando saranno insieme penseranno alla virtù et debito loro; et però confortono / che si confortino e’ giovani di già detti a voler mostrare la virtù loro; et che il populo si armi andandone il tutto, pure se ne rimettono; et che si dia loro e’ capi cittadini, et che si mescolino con li esperti soldati; che si deputino e’ cittadini che habbino cura alle porte et alle cose senza premio. Quant’al denaio, essendo l’impresa vana, insino a qui loro son disposti di pagare chi non ha pagato li danari; et considerato che qui tocca a ogn’huomo et che visto il pericolo sono parere che questi Padri predicatori ci animischino, et voltassino gl’animi a sovvenire al comune; et che animischino ogn’uno a questo secondo che questi che hanno debito paghino; non pagando che si truovono molte robbe ne’ monasteri che sono superflue, essendosi vissuto sanz’esse. […] Payments Concerning Firearms and Vannoccio Biringucci, Florence, May 1530 ASF: Dieci, Delib. Cond. Stanz. 66, f. 196r (in the left margin)  2.46

Et a’ dì 7 di maggio detto ducati 420 d’oro a messer Vannoccio da Siena per manifactura di libre 42230 a pagamento 42000 di materia per lui gittata alla Sapientia105 nella colubrina grande di libre 18m, in un’altra di li105 This document confirms that Biringuccio’s most famous cannon was cast at the Sapi­ enza. Cf. Biringuccio, De la Pirotechnia, book 6 (Venice: per Venturino Roffinello, ad instantia du Curtio Navo et Fratelli, 1540), 83: “Et io per simil modo feci in Firenze al tempo dell’assedio in servizio di quella Repubblica, la culatta de una doppia colubrina.” Cf. also: B. Varchi, Storia fiorentina (book X), ed. by L. Arbib, 3 vols. (Florence: Soc. editrice del Nardi e del Varchi, 1843), Vol 2, 214; E. Ferretti, “La Sapienza di Niccolò da Uzzano: l’istituzione e le sue tracce architettoniche nella Firenze rinascimentale,” Annali di Storia

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bre 6120 et in 4 meze colubrine106 et dua sacri di libre 18110 da dì 24 di novembre passato sino a dì 21 de’ presente come particularmente appare per uno libro tenuto da Domenico di Girolamo Martelli commissario sopra tal maneggio a 38 deposto per lui appresso al proveditore.  2.47 Extracts from a Report of the Pratica of 8 May 1530 ASF: Consulte e pratiche 74, ff. 77v-78r Die VIII Maii MDXXX. Relatione della pratica nel consiglio degli 80.  […] medesima materia del giorno davanti107 […]  Bernardo da Castiglione per Santa Maria Novella.  La esperienza delle cose passate insegna le presenti et future.108 Al tempo de’ Romani Capua ciptà antica di sorte che la faceva parentado con i Romani e che a a stanza loro persono l’aiuto de’ Sanniti, non obstante che loro havessino questi benefitii, quando furono rotti a Canne si ribellorono: e’ Romani vi andorono a campo, et Annibale vi andò per aiutarli et in un tempo medesimo quelli di dentro uscirono fuori. Tamen e’ Romani resistettono all’uno et all’altro.109 Noi siamo stretti in quel medi Firenze, IV (2009): 116, accessed Apr. 2018 ; ead., La sede della Sapienza a Firenze: l’Università e l’Istituto geografico militare a San Marco (Florence: IGM, 2009), 63; A. Monti, L’assedio di firenze (1529-1530). Politica, diplomazia e conflitto durante le Guerre d’Italia (PhD thesis, University of Pisa, 2013), 103104. 106 Two of these culverins are among the weapons mentioned in the “Ordini e provvisioni per guardia della Città di Firenze e per assaltare il campo – Un ruolo dell’Ordinanza Fiorentina,” in Francesco Ferruccio e la guerra di Firenze del 1529-1530 (Florence: Stabilimento di Giuseppe Pellas, 1889), 364: “Due colubrinotte di quelle di Vannozzo.” 107 I.e. “se soldare o no alcuni mercenari spagnoli che avevano abbandonato il campo imperiale.” 108 Bernardo da Castiglione’s entire address at the Pratica echoes Machiavelli’s Discourses in several places. In particular, this passage recalls book I ch. 39, Machiavelli, Discourses on Livy, 83-84; quoted in the original version for comparison (I 39, 2-3): “E’ si conosce facilmente per chi considera le cose presenti e le antiche, come in tutte le città e in tutti i popoli sono quegli medesimi desideri [...] In modo che gli è facil cosa, a chi esamina con diligenza le cose passate, prevedere in ogni republica le future e farvi quegli rimedii che dagli antichi sono stati usati.” Cf. also Discourses (II 20, 13): “E se si leggeranno bene le cose passate e discorrerannosi le presenti, si troverà per uno che ne abbi avuto buono fine infiniti esserne rimasti ingannati.” 109 Bernardo da Castiglione’s address is again reminiscent of famous passages of Machiavelli’s works. Machiavelli extensively discusses the episodes mentioned by Bernardo in Discourses II 19, II 20 and II 21, and mentions Hannibal and Cannae in several chapters. In Discourses III 6 (a chapter on the subject “Of Conspiracies” see cited edition p. 218 and

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desimo modo; et fuggire el pericolo: noi ci possiamo difendere con la forza, con diversione, con impedire le vettovaglie: le forze non sono sufficienti, con un Papa et con Cesare; con la diversione è dubbia; restono impedire le vettovaglie che è cosa sicura: et a questo bisogna come Vol­ terra pigliare Arezo, et presto, perché non bisogna differirla. Et volendo soldare, bisogneria un mese, et atteso il detto de’ capitani: XVII sono d’animo che / si piglino con più cellerità che sia possibile et con più vantaggio, et che tal vantaggio si dia per via di donativo (et havendo havere e’ danari quivi, stimiamo che non vi doverranno entrare in ogni modo, et che così come quivi le vettovaglie si impedissino altrove); cinque soli che no. Appointment of Biringuccio da Siena to the Post of Procurator of the Artillery in Florence, 17 May, or June 1530 ASF: Dieci, Delib. Cond. Stanz. 66, ff. 27v-28r  2.48

A’ dì XVII decto.  E’ prefati Signori X etc., adunati in suffitiente numero etc., cognoscendo le molte virtù et buone qualità del magnifico messer Vannoccio Berengucci da Siena et la experientia et scientia sua nel gittare et maneggiare artiglerie, et sappiendo di quanta importantia et utilità publica sia havere 234-35), Machiavelli contrasts the example of Arezzo and Val di Chiana with the conduct of the consul Rutilius at Capua against the legions who conspired with the Samnites to take the city, as narrated by Livy. Quoted in the original version (III 6, 189): “In esemplo ci sono i Romani; i quali, avendo lasciate due legioni di soldati a guardia de’ Capovani contro ai Sanniti, come altrove dicemo, congiurarono quelli capi delle legioni insieme di oppri­ mere i Capovani.” Notably, a manuscript copy of Discourses III 6 is preserved among the State papers of the former Florentine republican chancery (ASF: Dieci, Carteggio, Responsive 119), in a collection that was still part of the government archives at the time of Castiglione’s address. Although the dispatches collected in this file are mainly written by Machiavelli, the archival series it is part of contains only letters sent by diplomatic envoys. Therefore, it is unusual to find this copy here with three other chapters of the Discourses. See F. Bausi, “Nota al testo”, in N. Machiavelli, Discorsi sopra la prima Deca di Tito Livio, ed. by F. Bausi, 2 vols. (Rome: Salerno editrice, 2001), vol. 1, 806-07; and C. Pincin, “Sul testo del Machiavelli: «I Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio»,” Atti dell’Accademia delle scienze di Torino. Classe di scienze morali, storiche e filologiche, XCVI (1961 62): 74-76. Castiglione was a member of the Dieci (Ten) when he addressed the Pratica, see G. Cambi, Istorie, 4 vols. (Florence: Cambiagi, 1786), vol. 4, 78, the same office that had produced and to which is entitled the file mentioned above. As a consequence, I argue that there might be a link between the echoes of Machiavelli in Castiglione’s address to the Pratica and the presence of the manuscript versions of the Discourses in the Dieci’s archives. Cf. also above note 78, and the address by Cherubino Fortini (Appendix 2.45, and note 72), who advised raising funds for the war by direct taxation and donations.

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una persona simile sopra tal maneggio, per lor solenne partito et in ogni miglior modo deliberorno et deliberando conduxono a provisione el prefato:  Messer Vannoccio Berengucci da Siena col titolo di Procuratore delle artiglerie et di maestro di getti per tempo et termine di due anni da co­ minciare questo dì, uno fermo, et l’altro a beneplacito delle parte, con questo che qualunche di dette parte volessi disdire lo anno del b­ eneplacito lo habbi a fare almeno dua mesi avanti la fine dello anno fermo; et non faccendo per alcune di dette parte come di sopra, detto Messer ­Vannoccio s’intende raffermo per detto anno del beneplacito, nel medesimo modo et con li medesimi pacti con provisione di ducati dieci el mese a X mesi l’anno; et con conditione che di tutti e’ getti che farà ne debba essere sa­ tisfacto a consueti et ragionevoli prezi non obstante la sopra detta provisione, et etc., con conditione ch’el detto Messere Vannoccio habbi havere cura delle artiglerie publiche et lor fornimenti, et ministri, et rivedere et procurare a qualunche bisognassi referendo el magistrato loro ciò che occorressi, così intorno alle artiglerie come / a’ fornimenti et lor ministri predetti; et che durante la presente condotta detto messer Vannoccio habbi lo alloggiamento della Sapientia, dove al presente alloggia et lavora con tutte quelle stanze et habitationi che fino a qui ha tenute, per suo uso et delle artiglerie predette, et questo in ogni miglor modo. Mandantes etc. Extract of a Patent for the Commissioner Dante da Castiglione (“alli XX di giugno 1530”) ASF: Dieci, Miss. 108, f. 168v  2.49

[…] per accompagnare il signore Stefano Colonna et le bande guidate da sua signoria et gli abbiano auctorità di menare infino in XX giovani della Ordinanza fiorentina, li quali lo debbino ubbidire in quelle factioni che saranno da lui ordinate. Extract of a Letter from the Dieci to Lorenzo Carnesecchi Commissioner of Castracaro, Florence (“el dì davanti), Approximately 20 June 1530 ASF: Dieci, Miss. 107, f. 39r  2.50

A Lorenzo Carnesechi Commissario Castracari, el dì davanti.  […]  Questa nocte passata li nostri soldati uscirono di Firenze et andorono ad assaltare quella parte de’ Lanzi che sono alloggiati a San Donato in

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Polverosa et guadagnate le trincee valorosamente hanno morto et ferito di loro circa 900; et se li nostri havessino atteso a seguir la victoria li harebbono messi tutti per mala via. Havevono guadagnata l’artiglieria, ma respedito al soccorso che vi sopragunse si ritirorono a salvamento con pochissimo danno, che tra morti et feriti non arrivono a XXV. Crediamo che li decti nimici habbino a diloggiare di quivi et ritirarsi o a Peretola o a Prato. Di quel che seguirà ne sarai avisato.  2.51 Extracts from a Report of the Pratica of 6 July 1530 ASF: Consulte e pratiche 74, f. 99r-100v Die VI Iulii MDXXX[X] Relatione della Pratica nel Consiglio degli Ottanta.  Fu fatta proposta per la Excellentia del Gonfaloniere che essendosi fatta la discriptione del populo fussi consigliato se era bene armarli et come e esser bene capitanarli et come et che si consiglassi quanto a e’ grani del modo di cavarli di casa a’ ciptadini et quando et con che ordine, sopra a che fu referito et prima:  Antonfrancesco Davanzati per li Gonfalonieri.  Prima quanto a l’armi giudicano che sia necessario atteso in che termine si truova la ciptà et che si debbe fare una canova110 di quelli che fussino a proposito et quelli si capitaneassino con e’ Capitani che voi havete che non hanno la compagnia et questi potriano attendere a que­ sto. È vero che gl’è venuto in consideratione che fussi bene che questi tali che fussino deputati ad essercitarsi si destribussero alle bande pagate, perché giudicano / che da per loro non fariano quel frutto che mescolati. Tamen hanno in consideratione se quelli ciptadini li volessero ricevere et però pigliano de l’un modo et de l’altro. […]  Leonardo Zati per li XIIci.  […] giudicano che sia bene dar loro le armi quanto fussi di bisogno. Il modo di dare loro le armi se ne raportano di darle / al Gonfaloniere o suo sergente o in qualunque altro modo vi piacessi. f. 100r-v  Giovanni […] Morelli per Santa Croce.  Circa l’armar la ciptà che questo / più presto si faccia. Circa il particulare la maggior parte vorrebbe che da’ XVIII a’ quaranta si mettessino alla militia et di questo resto vedessino quelli huomini che fussino di patir quelli di già si che si potesseno et farlo far loro sotto e’ Gonfalonieri; et 110

“canova,” MS. “capova”.

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perché il Gonfaloniere qualche volta saria impedito consiglane che o per via di Luogotenente o d’uno deputato da lui (quello habbia a essere deputato altri si rimetteno) a Vostre Signorie et Spettabili Dieci.  […]  Messer Pagolo Bartoli per santa Maria Novella.  Giudicando essere salutifero l’augumentare il numero de’ defensori consigliano che si dia l’arme a’ descripti, fatta iusta et ordinata distributione, considerato / [f. 101r] et considerati li essercitati et terrazzani,111 a che si rimettono al consiglio de’ X et VIIII. […] Payments for Salaries and Expenses of the Commissioners. No Date, Approximately Spring 1530 ASF: Dieci, Delib. Cond. Stanz. 66, f. 189v  2.52

A spese et perdite di fanti et guastatori fatte fino al magistrato passato et per loro alli infrascripti suti commissarii per farli lor buoni a l’incontro di quello sono debitori per detto conto et prima a:  Francesco di Bartolo Zati  Tanai di Piero de’ Nerli  Girolamo di Napoleone Cambi  et Niccolò d’Andrea Capponi,  suti commissarii in diversi luoghi del dominio per levare le battagle et indirizarle a Firenze. 111

For a famous example of the use of the word “terrazzani” to describe ‘inhabitants of a city’ (not only the citizens) in a fight against a sieging army, cf. Machiavelli, Art of War (VII 90). Cf. also above note 37.

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Index OfIndex Namesof Names

295

Index of Names Abulafia, David 1 Aelianus (Aeliani), Claudius 170-72, 207 Ajello, Raffaele 167 Alamanni, Lodovico 116, 142, 169, 181, 197 Alamanni, Luigi 40, 43-44, 115-16 Alba, Duke of (see Toledo). Albèri, Eugenio 3, 17 Albertini, Rudolf von 16, 39, 44-45, 53, 116, 169 Albizzi, Anton Francesco degli 39-40, 44, 53-54 Albizzi, Rinaldo degli 224 Alexander VI (Pope, see Borgia, Rodrigo) Alexander, Sidney 84, 191 Almási, Gábor 104, 131, 138-40 Altoviti, Baldo 258, 260 Amalfi, Duke of (see Piccolomini) Angelucci, Angelo 30, 256 Angiolini, Franco 18 Anglo, Sidney 91, 101, 104-5, 107, 113-16, 125, 129, 131, 133-35, 138, 146, 163, 170-71, 176, 193, 195, 204-6 Ansani, Fabrizio 24, 29 Anselmi, Gian Mario 79, 116, 131-32, 186 Antonelli, Giovanni 35 Antonielli, Livio 18. Antonio dal Ponte di Sacco (Militiaman) 255 Anzilotti, Antonio 39, 222 Arbib, Lelio 43, 220, 261 Arfaioli, Maurizio 19, 29, 33, 56, 58 Arienzo, Alessandro 105, 131, 196 Aristotle (Greek philosopher) 102, 119 Asch, Ronald G. 10, 189-90, 196 Augustus (Emperor), Gaius Octavius 157 Ayala, Balthazar 192-93 Babbone da Brisighella 228-29, Badie, Bertrand 14 Baglioni, Malatesta 246 Baker, Nicholas Scott 17 Balmas, Enea 104, 113 Balsamo, Jean 103, 112, 118, 142 Bandello, Matteo 56, 79, 107, 125 Banti, Alberto Mario 3 Barbé, Jean 129, 172,

Barberi Squarotti, Giorgio 205 Barberis, Walter 65 Barducci, Giovanni di Sertagio 256 Bargigia, Fabio 218 Barker, Sara K. 133 Baron, Hans 160 Barrett, Henry 174 Barthas, Jérémie 13-15, 32, 35-38, 76, 160, 259 Bartoli, Antonio (Vicar) 241 Bartoli, Leonardo (Vicar and Commisioner) 52, 249 Bartoli, Paolo 266 Bartolo da Sassoferrato 38 Bartolucci, Priamo (Militiaman) 251. Barycz, Henryk 140 Barzotto da Serravezza 234 Bassani, Luigi Marco 17 Bati, Bati di Benedetto 51, 248, 250 Bausi, Francesco 10, 40, 87, 102, 115-16, 178, 263 Bayle, Pierre 124 Bayley, Charles Calvert 2-3, 90, 122 Bazzocchi, Alessandro 33, 130 Beck, Leonhard 181-82, 184 Beckett, Frederick William 173 Beik, William 168 Benci, Giovanni 60 Benedict, Philip 143 Benigni, Paola 222 Bentivogli, Ercole (Count, Governor of the Florentine army) 252, 254 Berg-Schlosser, Dirk Berg 14 Bernardino d’Antonio da Milano 19 Bernardino da Ornano (Captain of the militia) 239 Bernardo da Castiglione (see Castiglione) Berra, Claudia 82 Bertalaccio (Captain) 251 Bertelli, Sergio 16, 160, 165, 218 Berthelin, Jean 160 Berti, Giuliana 71 Bettoni, Antonella 66 Bèze (Beza), Théodore 133, 142 Bianchi Bensimon, Nella 112-13, 117-18, 130 Bietenholz, Peter G. 136-37, 141-42, 181

© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2020 | doi:10.1163/9789004432000_014

296 Biliotti, Ivo (Captain) 242-43 Biliotti, Sandro 242 Biringucci, Vannoccio 29-30, 227, 261, 263-64 Biringucci, Paolo 30 Black, Robert 37-38, 94 Blum, Paul Richard 136 Blunk, Julian 182 Bock, Gisela 16, 36, 67, 96 Bodin, Jean 198 Boillet, Danielle 105, 114, 179 Bois, Jean-Pierre 105, 134, 171, 188 Bolognesi, Dante 33, 78, 130 Bonali-Fiquet, Françoise 190 Bonaparte, Napoleon 25, 46, 75 Bongars, Jacques 143-44 Bongianni, Matteo 56, 241, 245-46 Bontempi, Cesare di Giovannello 246 Borgia, Cesare 37, 190, 199 Borgia, Rodrigo (Pope Alexander VI) 13, 190 Borgognoni, Andrea (Captain and Commissioner) 249 Borrelli, Gianfranco 105 Boscoli, Pietro Paolo 42, 69 Botero, Giovanni 103, 195, 197 Boucher, Jacqueline 113 Bourbon, Henry III of, King of Navarre (King of France Henry IV) 137, 143-46 Bourrilly, Victor-Louis 117, 180. Bovo, Dante 104 Boynton, Lindsay 173 Bracci, Zanobi 44 Bramanti, Vanni 118 Brantôme, Pierre de Bourdeille 120, 191 Breccia, Gastone 196 Brewer, John Sherren 180 Brogio (Captain) 253 Brunelli, Giampiero 180, 195, 218 Brunet, Serge 168, 212 Brunetti, Filippo 219-20, 222 Bruni, Leonardo 3, 90, 122 Bunnett, Fanny Elizabeth 181 Buonaccorsi, Biagio 114, 138 Buonarroti, Michelangelo 237 Buondelmonti, Benedetto 220-21 Buondelmonti, Zanobi 43-44, 115, 134 Burckhardt, Jacob 80 Burgkmair, Hans 181-82, 185-87

Index Of Names Busini, Giambattista 43-44 Butters, Humphrey C. 17, 83, 190 Cabrini, Anna Maria 82 Cadoni, Giorgio 47, 64, 66 Caesar, Gaius Iulius 174 Caferro, William P. 216, 218 Cambi, Giovanni 263 Cambi, Girolamo di Napoleone (Commissioner) 52, 266 Camillo (Signore Camillo, see Colonna). Camillus, Marcus Furius 67 Canestrini, Giuseppe 3, 17, 22-23, 45, 78, 84, 89 Cantini, Lorenzo 114 Caporali, Riccardo 116, 132, 186 Cappel, Guillaume 104 Cappelli, Licinio 44 Capponi, Giannozzo (Captain and Commissioner) 239, 242 Capponi, Niccolò 44, 78-79, 81, 224 Capponi, Niccolò d’Andrea (Commissioner) 52, 266 Cardini, Franco 126, 197, 206-7 Carducci, Baldassare 43-44, 185 Carducci, Francesco 54, 257, 259 Carey, Brian Todd 75 Carnesecchi, Lorenzo 55, 264 Casabasse, Baccio (gunpowder artisan) 256 Cassandro, Michele 113 Cassidy, Ben 15, 19, 22, 24, 93 Castiglione, Bastiano da 75 Castiglione, Bernardo da 262-63 Castiglione, Dante da 55, 264 Cecchi, Domenico 37 Cecco d’Alcamo (Militiaman) 255 Cecco da Cascina (Militiaman) 255 Cei, Giovambattista 258, 260 Ceo da Empoli (Connestabile) 49, 55, 225-26, 241 Cerretani, Bartolomeo 71 Cerretani, Niccolò 3, 244 Chabod, Federico 17, 64, 87, 128 Chaman, Sainct 159 Chandieu, Antoine de 133 Chappellain, Charles 135 Chappes, monsieur de 159 Charles V (Emperor, see Hapsburg)

297

Index Of Names Charles VII (King of France, see Valois) Charles VIII (King of France, see Valois) Charpin Feugerolles 113, 115 Charrier, Jean 104, 113, 129-33, 135, 158, 172, 213 Chiappelli, Fredi 217 Chironi, Giuseppe 30 Chisholm, Michael 184 Chittolini, Giorgio 32, 36, 125, 210 Choné, Paulette 143 Chouet, Jacques 147 Cianchi, Renzo 30 Cicero, Marcus Tullius 155 Cino di Cino 257, 259 Ciulli, Bartolomeo di Lazero 234 Civale, Gianclaudio 192 Clark Keating, Louis 137 Clausewitz, Carl Philipp Gottlieb von 141 Clement VII (Pope, see Medici, Giovanni de’) Coccinius (see Köchlin) Cohn, Samuel K. 3, 63 Coleridge, Sara 84 Colin, Mariella 190 Colish, Marcia L. 83 Colladon, Nicolas 133 Colonna, Camillo (Signore Camillo) 85, 252 Colonna, Fabrizio 22, 25, 77, 80, 83-87, 90, 93, 123, 164-65, 175, 187, 190-93, 199, 208-10 Colonna, Stefano 55, 264 Connell, William J. 91, 126, 128, 132, 155, 176, 178, 185, 188, 204, 215 Constabili (Costabili), Antonio 184 Contamine, Philippe 5, 107, 117, 123, 130, 155, 158-59, 161-62, 203 Cooper, Richard 115, 136-37, 158 Corbinelli, Girolamo 254 Corbinelli, Jacopo 142 Corella, Miguel de (don Micheletto) 37 Cornazzano (Cornazan) 153 Corso di Biagio (banditore) 230 Corvinus, Valerius 188-89, 196 Corvisier, André 4, 208 Cotta, Fabio 172 Cottereau, Claude 114 Covini, Maria Nadia 218 Coyle, Martin 116 Craig, Gordon A. 95, 111, 179, 199, 205-6 Cummings, Anthony M. 10

Curzio, Francesco 3, 17 Cutinelli Rendina, Emanuele 128 Cyrus II of Persia (Cyrus the Great) 195 D’Addario, Arnaldo 46, 53, 116 Dallier, Jean 159 D’Amboise, Charles 124 D’Amboise, Georges 128 D’Amboise, Michel 124, 126-29, 144 D’Amico, Silvia 118 Dante da Castiglione (see Castiglione) Dattero, Alessandra 111 d’Auvergne, Gaspard 104 Davanzati, Anton Francesco (Provveditore) 239, 265 de Angelis, Gianmarco 218 De Benedictis, Angela 79, 119, 131 de Billon, Jérémie 159 De Chaufepié, Jacques George 124 de Courcelles, Dominique 103, 112 De Croze, Joseph 144 Deflers, Isabelle 10 de la Faye, Anthoine 121 De La Noue, François 143, 146-48 de La Roncière, Charles-M. 2, 15, 37 Del Badia, Iodoco 70 del Beccuto, Bernardo 74 del Bene, Baccio 114 del Benino, Carlo 74 del Benino, Francesco 260 Delbrück, Hans 79 Del Corso, Mario 104 del Fracassa, Giulio, da Cascina (Militiaman) 255 della Ghisa, Pierantonio 59 della Stufa, Luigi 115 della Valle, Battista 111 dello Stiaccia, Meo (Militiaman) 234 Del Lucchese, Filippo 9, 106, 117, 172, 207 Del Negro, Piero 25, 46, 75, 106 del Nero, Francesco 102, 116 Del Piazzo, Marcello 224 del Teglia, Benedetto Bartolomeo 222 De Mailles, Jacques 84 de Morel (see Morel, Jean) Denis, Philippe 131, 133, 136 De Pol, Roberto 102, 112, 138 Dereulle, Benjamin 192

298

Index Of Names

Derla, Luigi 80 Desjardins, Abel 78, 84 Detmold, Christian E. 121 de Vigenere, Blaise 121 Dickinson, Gladys 113, 118 Dionisotti, Carlo 37, 87 Dodgson, Campbell 181 Dohna, Fabian de 144, 146 Donati, Claudio 18, 105, 125, 179, 196-97, 210 Doria, Andrea 241 Downing, Brian M. 210, 213 Du Bellay (family) 115, 124, 137 Du Bellay, Guillaume 8, 107-8, 113, 117-18, 120-21, 124, 136-37, 142, 147-50, 153-54, 158, 206, 213 Du Bellay, Jean (Cardinal) 117-18, 124, 147, 180 Du Bellay, Joachim 137. Du Bellay, Martin 147 Du Bellay, René 147 du Choul, Guillaume 127 Duchhardt, Heinz 143 du Puys, Jacques 121

Foillet, Jacob 140-41 Foister, Susan 180 Foix, Gaston de 77, 79, 94, 130, 180, 191 Fontaine, Charles 137 Fontaine, Marie Madeleine 104, 106, 123, 177, 207 Fontana, Alessandro 165 Forest, François 143 Fortini, Cherubino 258, 263 Fossier, Arnaud 218 Foucault, Michel 119 Fournel, Jean-Louis 80, 82-83, 87, 93, 104, 106, 113, 117-19, 123, 127, 141, 143, 165, 177, 187, 207 Fourquevaux, Raymond de Beccarie de Pavie 113, 118, 121, 123, 142, 206, 213 Francesco di Luigi (Militiaman) 233 Francis I (see Valois-Angoulême) Frigo, Daniela 198 Frömmer, Judith 10, 102 Frontinus 126, 153, 172 Frosini, Fabio 9, 106, 117, 172, 207

Elizabeth I (Queen of England) 174, 193 Epstein, Stephan R. 36 Eramo, Immacolata 172 Erasmus of Rotterdam 136-37 Ercole da Brisighella (Captain) 255 Este (family) 184, 221 Externbrink, Sven 10

Galeotti, Bastiano 28, 254 Galli, Carlo 116, 132, 186 Galli, Stefano B. 17 Gambara, Uberto 180 Gamberini, Andrea 63, 224 García, Luis Ribot 5, 203 García, Susana Truchuelo 169 Gardoni, Giuseppe 218 Gaza, Theodorus 171 Genet, Jean-Philippe 224 Gentili, Alberico 211 Gentillet, Innocent 103-4, 112, 138-39, 143, 146 191, 195 Gerber, Adolph 101, 104, 138-39, 141 Geremicca, Antonio 177. Gesner (or Gessner), Conrad 113, 133-34, 136, 138-39 Gherardo di Giovanni (artisan) 256 Giachinotti, Pieradovardo (General Commissioner of Livorno) 244 Giannotti, Donato 44, 47-49, 54, 56, 64, 66, 220, 243 Gié (see Rohan) Gilbert, Allan H. 22 Gilbert, Felix 95, 111, 176, 179, 199, 205-6

Fachard, Denis 22, 42, 65, 69, 73, 114, 163 Faini, Marco 105, 197 Falletti Fossati, Carlo Pio 3, 17, 39, 54 Fanfani, Tommaso 107, 164 Fantoni, Marcello 195, 199 Farnese, Alessandro 192, 199 Fasano Guarini, Elena 67, 96 Favarò, Valentina 107, 164-67 Fedini, Giovan francesco d’Alessandro (Captain) 55-56, 243-44, 252 Ferretti, Emanuela 261 Ferretti, Jolanda 18, 89 Ferroni, Giulio 127 Ferrucci (Ferruccio), Francesco 3, 4 17, 28, 52, 60, 251, 262 Filoramo, Giovanni 98, 115 Fiorato, Adelin-Charles 1

299

Index Of Names Giliberto (“spagnolo,” Spaniard), messer 74 Gilly, Carlos 138-39, 142 Gilmore, Myron P. 165 Ginzburg, Carlo 114 Giovanni Battista da Cascina (Militiaman) 255 Giovanni di Bernardo da Tonda (Militiaman) 233 Girolami, Giovanni 244 Girolami, Raffaello 244, 246 Glete, Jan 5, 108, 208 Gohory, Jacques 103-4, 112, 117, 131, 137, 142 González de León, Fernando 194, 197 Gorris Camos, Rosanna 103, 112, 117, 137, 142 Göse, Frank 196, 199 Goujet, Claude-Pierre 124 Gräf, Holger Th., 197 Grafton, Anthony 174, 193 Grillo, Paolo 68, 218 Guasti, Cesare 78, 219, 242 Guercio da Dicomano (Captain) 55-56, 245 Guerrazzi, Francesco Domenico 17, 255 Guggisberg, Hans Rudolph 138 Guicciardini, Francesco 21, 26, 38, 64, 82, 84, 86, 93-94, 98, 176, 191, 199, 220-21 Guicciardini, Jacopo 79 Guicciardini, Niccolò di Braccio 43-44 Guicciardini, Piero 22 Guidi, Andrea 2-3, 15, 18, 21, 35, 37-39, 42-43, 47, 50-54, 57-58, 64-65, 70, 73, 79-80, 88, 114, 122, 128, 155, 162, 166, 176-77, 208-9, 217-19, 224 Guidi, Guidubaldo 216 Guillod, Nathalie 147 Guise, Henry, Duke de (see Lorraine) Gunn, Steven 4, 108, 208 Gustavus Adolphus (King of Sweden) 111, 199, 206 Guybert, Felix 124

Hannibal 262 Hapsburg (family) 2, 116 Hapsburg, Charles V (Emperor) 14, 115-16, 199-200 Hapsburg, Maximilian I (Emperor) 181, 183-86 Hapsburg, Philip II (King of Spain) 107, 164-65, 167 Harrington, James 195 Harvey, Gabriel 174, 193 Hausmann, Frank-Rutger 141 Hauvette, Henri 115 Held, Robert 30 Henric Petri, Sebastian 143 Henric Petri, Sixtum 136 Henry II (King of France, see ValoisAngoulême) Henry III of Navarre (King of France as Henry IV, see Bourbon) Henry IV (King of France, see Bourbon) Henry VII (King of England, see Tudor) Henry VIII (King of England, see Tudor) Henry, Duke de Guise (see Lorraine) Heroldt, Johannes Basilius 139 Heuser, Beatrice 141, 151, 192 Hirschbiegel, Jan 184-86 Hobom, Martin 79 Hodgkins, Alexander James 174 Holbein, Hans 177, 179-81, 186-87 Hörnqvist, Mikael 2, 15, 37, 73, 75, 95 Hotman, François 139 Howard, Keith David 107, 166 Hyatt Mayor, Alpheus 181

Hacquebart Desvignes, Nicolas 127 Hale, John R. 2, 16, 24, 28, 30-33, 56, 67, 80, 111, 113, 124, 171-74, 215 Hálf Danarson, Guðmundur 4 Hall, Bert S. 19, 29-30, 56, 77, 87, 92 Hamelin, Jean 121 Hankins, James 90 Hanlon, Gregory 168

Jacob, Frank 166 Jardine, Lisa 174, 193 Jones, Philip J. 2, 14-15, 37, 65, 97 Julius II (Pope) 77, 190 Juste, Jacopo 154

Ilari, Virgilio 171-72 Inglese, Giorgio 69 Innocenti, Piero 101, 134 Isaacs, Ann Katherine 4, 66 Iue, Paul 151

Kaegi, Werner 104, 139-41 Kagerer, Alexander 182, 185

300 Kahn, Victoria 103, 105 Keegan, John 76 Keen, Maurice 33, 58 Kemperdick, Stephan 179-80 Kingdom, Robert M. 133 Knecht, Robert J. 129 Köchlin (Coccinius), Michael 185 Köchly, Hermann 171 Kroener, Bernhard R. 105, 125, 179, 196-97, 210 Kroll, Renate 182 Kubik, Timothy R.W. 15 Landau, David 185 Landucci, Luca 70, 75 Lang, Heinrich 215-16 La Tour d’Auvergne, Henri de, Duke of Bouillon 143 Lavenia, Vincenzo 192 Lawrence, David R. 106, 193, 197 Lazzarini, Isabella 63, 215, 218, 224 Le Gall, Jean-Marie 158 Lein, Edgar 30 Lenger, Marie-Thérèse 134-35 Leo (Emperor) 171 Leo X (Pope, see Medici, Giulio de’) Leoncini, Giovanni 234 Lepri, Valentina 105, 131, 196 Le Roy, Loys 146, 153 Lessi, Sano di Francesco (Militiaman) 233 Lettieri, Gaetano 10, 98,115 Levati, Stefano 111 Liechtenstein, Paul von 184-85 Ligresti, Domenico 167-68 Lindegren, Jan 203 Lipsius, Justus 143, 198-99 Livy 40, 49, 66-67, 82, 87-88, 97, 101-3, 105, 120, 129, 132, 134, 140, 142, 145, 152, 155, 156, 174, 188-89, 193, 212, 259, 262-63 Lo Re, Salvatore 3, 17, 54 Lodewijk, Willem, Count of NassauDillenburg 170-71 Loos, Erich 141 Lorraine, Henry III de, Duke de Guise 137, 144, 146 Louis XI (King of France, see Valois) Louis XII (King of France, see Valois-Orléans) Luchini, Agostino (Militiaman) 233

Index Of Names Lukes, Timothy J. 15, 83, 90, 97 Lupi, Simonzio 199-200 Lupo Gentile, Michele 220 Luzzatto, Sergio 102 Lynch, Christopher 20, 74, 120, 165, 176, 203 Machiavelli, Niccolò – NOT INDEXED Machiavelli, Totto 102, 116 Magnien-Simonin, Catherine 118 Malanima, Paolo 44 Malatesta (see Baglioni) Malegonnelle, Alessandro 261 Mallett, Michael E. 2, 23-24, 77 Mambrino Roseo da Fabriano 255 Mansfield, Harvey C. 82, 145, 188, 259 Maraglino, Vanna 172 Marchand, Jean-Jacques 10, 22, 42, 50-51, 64-65, 69, 73-74, 94, 121, 163, 165, 179, 184, 217 Mariano di Matteo (Militiaman) 233 Marino, Luigi 237 Mariscotti, Gasparre 224-25 Marks, Louis F. 13, 32, 36, 160 Mars, mythical god of war 199 Martelli, Domenico di Girolamo 262 Martelli, Ugolino 115 Martínez Bermejo, Saúl 163, 166, 207 Martir Rizo, Juan Pablo 166 Marzi, Demetrio 44, 217, 222 Masi, Giorgio 22, 42, 50-51, 65, 69, 73, 119-20, 163, 168, 203-5, 209 Mastrangelo, Giulia 113 Matteucci, Nicola 195 Mauro, Cesare 184 Maximilian I (Emperor, see, Hapsburg) Mazzali, Ettore 84 Medici (Family) 3, 13-14, 18, 27, 29, 32, 35-36, 41-42, 45-48, 61, 65, 69-70, 89-90, 94, 97, 116, 169, 186, 197, 211, 220, 252 Medici, Alessandro (Duke) 18, 89 Medici, Caterina de’ (Queen of France) 112, 129, 137 Medici, Cosimo (il Vecchio) de’, 215-16 Medici, Cosimo I de’ (Duke) 18, 89, 220 Medici, Giovanni de’ (as Cardinal) 45, 89 (as Leo X, pope) 14 Medici, Giovanni de’ (condottiere) 59, 98 Medici, Giuliano de’ (Duke of Nemours) 186

Index Of Names Medici, Giulio de’ (Clement VII, pope) 14, 21, 43, 220 Medici, Piero de’, 13 Meliga, Bernardino, da Poggibonzi 234 Merlin, Pierpaolo 195 Meschini, Stefano 78 Michelangelo di Mariotto da Cascina (Militiaman) 255 Michele da Faenza (Captain and Connestabile) 55, 241 Michele da Montopoli 3 Michele da Settignano (Blacksmith) 256 Micheletto, don (see Corella) Michon, Cédric 147 Miesse, Hélène 177 Mitarotondo, Laura 17 Molho, Anthony 13, 32, 36, 160, 216, 218 Monaldi, Alessandro (Captain) 60-61, 234-37, 251-52 Mondini, Marco 141, 190 Monnet, Pierre 143 Montauto, Otto (Signore) 234 Montecuccoli, Raimondo 111, 199, 206 Montesquieu, Charles-Louis de Secondat, Baron of 195 Montevecchi, Alessandro 38 Monti, Alessandro 3, 60, 262 Montmorency, Anne de 117-18, 124, 131, 154, 180, 192 Mor, Anthonis 193-94 Mordeglia, Caterina 138, 140 Morel (Morelli), Jean de, Lord of Grigny 107, 133-34, 136-39 Morelli, Giovanni 265 Morély, Jean, Lord of Villiers 131, 133-36, 139, 142 Morfino, Vittorio 9, 106, 117, 172, 207 Morgan, Luke 178 Morin, Marco F. 30-31 Morlino, Leonardo 14 Moses 188, 195 Mozzati, Tommaso 20, 30 Muccillo, Maria 136 Müller, Christian 179-80 Murray, John 84 Mussolini, Benito 17 Najemy, John M. 10, 37-38, 83-84, 90, 103, 165

301 Nasi, Francesco 44 Nassau, Maurice of (Prince of Orange) 108, 111, 134, 170-72, 197 199, 206-7 Navarre, Henry III of (future King of France as Henry IV, see Bourbon) Navarre, Marguerite de 115 Navarro, Pedro 77, 84-85, 87, 191 Navo, Curtio 261 Neher, Gabriele 83, 190 Nejeschleba, Tomaš 136 Neri da Prato (Militiaman) 255 Neri, Pompeo 222 Nerli, Filippo de’, 44, 138 Nerli, Giovanni de’, 60 Nerli, Tanai di Piero de’ (Commissioner) 52, 266 Niccolino 236 Nicolò di Bastiano da Cascina (Militiaman) 255 Nifo, Agostino 102, 116 Noflatscher, Heinz 184 Nutt, David 165 Octavius, Gaius Octavius (see Augustus) Onasander 129,172 Ori, Anna Maria 116 Orange (House) 134, 170, 192, 207 Orange, Prince of (see Nassau, Maurice of) Osmolski, Johannes 140 Osols-Wehden, Irmgard 142 Osório, Jeronimo 104, 195 Oster, Angela 102 Otevanti, Juan Lorenzo 104 Ottaviani, Ciaio 242 Pagnini, Gian Francesco 222 Pampaloni, Guido 216 Panciatichi, Bartolomeo 115 Pandolfini, Francesco 84, 87 Papone (nickname), Jacopo di Bartolomeo (Militiaman) 234 Paret, Peter 95, 111, 179, 199, 205-6 Parker, Geoffrey 1, 5, 25, 59, 108, 164, 170-71, 205, 211 Parrinello, Rosa Maria 98, 115 Parrott, David 187, 206, 209-10 Parshall, Peter W. 185 Pasquino da San Benedetto 27-28, 233

302 Patrizi, Francesco da Cherso 136, 178 Payne, Alina 9 Pedullà, Gabriele 67, 102, 171-72, 179, 187, 207 Pellas, Giuseppe 3, 17, 52, 255, 262 Perifano, Alfredo 179 Perini, Leandro 104, 139 Perna, Pietro 104, 138-40, 149 Petrina, Alessandra 105, 131, 139, 196 Petris, Loris 147 Petrucci, Francesco 30, 227 Pezzolo, Luciano 32, 107, 111, 164, 168 Philip II (see Hapsburg) Phillips, Andrew 198 Pianori, Renata 104 Piccolomini, Alfonso, Duke of Amalfi 52, 249 Piejus, Marie-Françoise 105, 114, 179 Pieri, Piero 3, 17, 23-24, 32, 64, 74, 80, 93-94, 122, 185, 205 Pincin, Carlo 263 Pinelli, Gian Vincenzo 142 Pio, Alberto da Carpi 116-17, 142, 186 Pocock, John G.A. 75, 108, 176 Podio, Giraldo, da Lugo 190 Pole, Reginald (Cardinal) 103 Polidori, Filippo Luigi 3, 31, 47, 54, 220, 246 Polybius 143, 153 Portinari, Pigello 184-85 Possenti, Antonio 113 Potter, David 107, 117, 121-24, 150, 154, 158, 160-62 Prete (see Ramazzotti) Prezzolini, Giuseppe 17 Procacci, Giuliano 101, 106, 113, 117, 123, 131, 133, 142, 148 Procaccioli, Paolo 101, 139 Prosperi, Adriano 103 Pucci, Lorenzo (Cardinal) 52, 249 Puliafito, Anna Laura 142 Quaglioni, Diego 65 Quarenghi, Cesare 29 Quistelli, Alfonso 221 Rabe, Georg 104, 139, 195 Rabelais, François 113, 117 Ramada Curto, Diogo 13, 32, 36, 160 Ramakus, Gloria 165

Index Of Names Ramazzotti, Melchiorre (“Capitano Prete,” Ramazzotto) 96, 251 Raymond, James 173 Rebhorn, Wayne A. 191 Renting-Kuijpers, Joke T.C. 134, 207 Renting, Anne-Dirk 134, 207 Ricoveri (Ricovero), Raffaello (Captain and Connestabile) 243-44 Ridolfi, Giovanni 223 Ridolfi, Roberto 43, 98 Rinaldi, Luca 184-85 Rinuccini, Benedetto (Betto) di Iacopo (Connestabile) 55-56, 241 Rivett, Gary 213 Rivière, Jean-Marc 36 Rocco da Pisa (Militiaman) 255 Rodríguez de la Flor, Fernando R. 105, 170, 197 Roffinello, Venturino 261 Rogers, Clifford J. 75 Rogg, Matthias 177, 179 Rohan, Pierre de, Marshal de Gié 158 Romulus (legendary founder and first king of Rome) 195, 197 Rosen, Mark 180 Rosenthal, Lisa 199 Rospocher, Massimo 141, 190 Rossi, Marielisa 101, 134 Roth, Cecil 3, 15, 30-31, 39, 43-45 Rothenberg, Gunther 111, 170-71, 199, 206-7 Rotondi, Clementina 220 Rotondò, Antonio 104, 139 Rott, Jean 131, 133, 136 Roy (see Le Roy) Rubens, Peter Paul 199-200 Rubinstein, Nicolai 16 Rucellai (famly) 191 Rucellai, Cosimo 87, 115, 134, 165, 209 Rucellai, Giovanni di Tomaso 260 Ruggiero, Raffaele 128, 165 Ruiz Ibáñez, José Javier 168, 212 Rustici, Giovanfrancesco 20 Rüstow, Wilhelm 171 Rutilius (Roman consul) 263 Ryan, Alan 177 Sadoleto, Jacopo 115, 137 Saetti, Luciana 116

Index Of Names Salazar, Diego de 104, 163-65, 206 Salerno, Giovanni 218 Salzberg, Rosa 190 Sandberg, Brian 125 Sandri, Leopoldo 46, 116 Sanesi, Giuseppe R. 47 Sansovino, Francesco 116 Sanuto (Sanudo), Marino 85 Sarnthein, Zyprian von 184-85 Sasso, Gennaro 3, 17, 37, 64, 87 Savonarola, Girolamo 13 Sbriccoli, Mario 66 Schade, Werner 182 Scheurer, Rémy 117 Schiera, Pierangelo 32, 36 Schizzerotto, Giancarlo 190 Schnerb, Bertrand 184 Schwager, Therese 118, 143, 171 Scigliano, Eric 237 Scipio, Publius Cornelius (Scipio Africanus) 188 Scurcola, Giovanni (Captain and Connestabile) 245-46 Sealy, Robert J. 137 Segni, Bernardo 55 Ségur-Pardaillan, François de 143 Seres, William 172 Sertenas, Vincent 134, 159 Servet (Servetus), Michel 136-37 Severini, Maria Elena 105, 146, 153, 197 Seyssel, Claude de 143 Shaw, Christine 2, 10, 23, 77,130 Sherer, Idan 122 Silvano, Giovanni 48 Simeoni (Syméoni), Gabriello (Gabriel) 114, 118, 222 Simonetta, Marcello 10, 44, 102, 116, 117, 125 Skinner, Quentin 16, 36, 67, 96, 108, 155 Smith, William 171 Smyth, Craig Hugh 16 Smythe, John 176 Soderini, Francesco 37 Soderini, Piero 35-39, 66, 71, 88, 160 Soderini, Tommaso 44 Soldini, Hélène 48 Sommaville, Antoine de 135 Spagnoletti, Angelantonio 196 Spinola, Ambrogio 197

303 Springinklee, Hans 181-82 Staccioli, Giuliano 142 Starkey, David 180 Stephens, John N. 17 Strozzi (family) 224 Strozzi, Alfonso 44 Strozzi, Bernardo (Captain) 242 Strozzi, Carlo (Florentine bibliophilist) 219 Strozzi, Carlo (General Commissioner of the Militia) 26-27, 46-47, 59, 224-28 Strozzi, Lorenzo 134 Strozzi, Strozzo 28, 252-53 Stupano, Giovanni Niccolò 136, 140 Tabet, Xavier 165 Taddei, Elena 184 Tagliaferri, Amelio 164 Tallett, Frank 4, 75, 108, 208 Tanari, Giovan Battista 246-47 Tani, Salvatore d’Antonio 234 Tani, Tano d’Antonio (Militiaman) 234 Tanzini, Lorenzo 69, 89 Tarcov, Nathan 82, 145, 188, 259 Tarugi, Francesco, da Montepulciano 43-44, 49 Taylor, Frederick Lewis 22-23, 74, 77, 86, 93 Tedeschi, John A. 160 Tedesco, Giovanni 52, 249 Teglia, Silvestro 139 Tetel, Marcel 113, 137 Theseus (mythical king and founder-hero of Athens) 195 Tiberius (Emperor), Claudius Nero 156 Tinto da Battifolle (Captain) 255 Toledo, Fernando Álvarez de, Duke of Alba 193-94, 199, 205-6 Tolomei, Claudio 117 Tommasini, Oreste 98, 125, 139, 185 Torelli, Pietro 218 Torquatus, Manlius 188-89. Tosinghi, Francesco (Ceccotto) (General Commisioner) 3, 27-28, 51, 53-54, 56, 59-61, 223-24, 231-35, 237-38, 241-45, 247-54 Tosinghi, Pierfrancesco 52 Treitzsaurwein, Marx 181, 186 Trexler, Richard C. 15, 18, 46, 48, 64, 67, 70-71 Trim, David J.B. 4, 75, 108, 124, 194, 208

304 Tudor, Henry VIII (King of England) 173, 179-80 Ughi, Giuliano (fra’) 4, 52 Uzzano, Niccolò da 261 Vaglienti, Giuliano 53, 251 Vallerani, Massimo 218 Valois, Charles VII (King of France) 1, 121, 132, 204 Valois, Charles VIII (King of France) 13, 40 Valois, Louis XI (King of France) 121, 158, 160 Valois-Angoulême, Francis I (King of France) 14, 106, 113, 115-17, 129-30, 136-37, 154, 158-59, 160-62, 167, 180, 204, 206 Valois-Angoulême, Henry II (Dauphin, then King of France) 114, 159, 163 Valois-Orléans, Louis XII (King of France) 132 Van Prinsterer, Groen 170 Vannucci, Atto 54, 220 Varanini, Gian Maria 63 Varchi, Benedetto 3, 29, 43-45, 54, 220, 261 Vascosan, Michel 153 Vassiere, Pierre de 180 Vega, Juan de 164, 166, 206 Vegetius, Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus 153, 163-64, 172-74 Veit, Patrice 143 Velázquez, Diego 197-98 Venus (mythical goddess of love) 199 Verrier, Frédérique 105-6, 113-14, 134, 155, 158-60, 188, 191 Vettori, Francesco 209 Vettori, Paolo 45, 89 Villari, Pasquale 43-44, 79

Index Of Names Vincente di Francesco da Cascina (Militiaman) 255 Vintimille, Jacques de 113, 117-18, 121, 130 Viroli, Maurizio 16, 36, 67, 96 Visconti (Family) 96 Visoni-Alonzo, Gilmar 166 Vivanti, Corrado 17, 64-65, 87, 138 Vivini, Giovanbattista, da Colle 52, 249 Vivoli, Carlo 222 Voigt, Klaus 184 Waley, Daniel Philip 216 Webb, Henry 174 Wellenburg, Matthaus Lang von, Bishop 184 Whalter, Rudolph 139 Whitehorne (or Whytehorne), Peter 165, 172-74, 176, 193-94 Whitfield, John H. 165 Wicht, Bernard 58 Wieland, Durch Hans Conrad (Von Basel) 141 Wilke, Carsten Lorenz 195 Williams, Alan 30 Wohlfeil, Rainer 179 Wolfe, Michael 57 Woltmann, Alfred 181 Württemberg (House of) 140 Württemberg, Ulrich von, Duke 184 Zancarini, Jean-Claude 79-80, 82-83, 86-87, 93, 106, 117, 130, 132, 135, 165 Zati, Francesco di Bartolo (Commissioner) 52, 266 Zati, Leonardo 265 Zorzi, Andrea 224 Zwierlein, Cornel 117 Zwinger, Jakob 142 Zwinger, Theodor 138-39, 141-42.