Black Faces in the Mirror: African Americans and Their Representatives in the U.S. Congress 9780691186351, 0691117861, 0691091552, 2002019846

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Black Faces in the Mirror

Black Faces in the Mirror A F R I C A N AMERICANS AND T H E I R REPRESENTATIVES I N T H E U.S. CONGRESS

Katherine Tate

PRINCETON

UNIVERSITY

PRINCETON

AND

OXFORD

PRESS

COPYRIGHT © 2003 B Y PRINCETON UNIVERSITY PRESS Published by Princeton University Press, 4 1 William Street, Princeton, N e w Jersey 08540 In the United Kingdom: Princeton University Press, 3 Market Place, Woodstock, Oxfordshire O X 2 0 1 S Y A l l Rights

Reserved

Second printing, and first paperback printing, 2004 Paperback I S B N 0-691-11786-1 T H E LIBRARY O F CONGRESS HAS CATALOGED T H E CLOTH E D I T I O N O F T H I S BOOK AS FOLLOWS Tate, Katherine. Black faces in the mirror : African Americans and their representatives in the U . S . Congress / Katherine Tate, p. cm. Includes bibliographical references and index. I S B N 0-691-09155-2 (alk. paper) 1. African Americans — Politics and government. 2. African Americans —Attitudes. 3. African Americans —Statistics. 4. African American legislators — Public opinion. 5. Legislators — United States — Public opinion. 6. Public opinion — United States. I . Title. E185.615 . T 3 7 2003 328.73'0089'96073-dc21

2002019846

British Library Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available This book has been composed in Sabon Printed on acid-free paper. c° www.pupress.princeton.edu Printed in the United States of America 10 9 8 7 6 5

Contents

List o fFigures a n d Tables Preface a n d A c k n o w l e d g m e n t s I . Introduction C h a p t e r 1 . T h e Puzzle of Representation II. Black M e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s

III.

vii ix 1 3 23

C h a p t e r 2 . B l a c k M e m b e r s o f Congress C h a p t e r 3 . T h e E l e c t i o n s o f B l a c k s to Congress

25 51

R e p r e s e n t i n g B l a c k Interests

71

C h a p t e r 4 . Legislative Styles a n d V o t i n g R e c o r d s C h a p t e r 5 . S y m b o l s a n d Substance

73 96

IV. T h e V i e w from Black Constituents C h a p t e r 6. B l a c k s ' E v a l u a t i o n s of H o u s e M e m b e r s : Does Race Matter? C h a p t e r 7. D e s c r i p t i v e Representation a n d B l a c k Political Empowerment C h a p t e r 8. D e s c r i p t i v e Representation a n d T r u s t i n Government V. Conclusion

111

113 132 143 153

C h a p t e r 9. T h e F u t u r e o f B l a c k Faces i n the U . S . Congress

155

A p p e n d i x A . T h e 1 9 9 6 N a t i o n a l B l a c k E l e c t i o n Study A p p e n d i x B . L i s t o f B l a c k M e m b e r s of the U . S . Congress

171 183

Notes

197

References

199

Index

207

Figures and Tables

FIGURES

1.1 Style a n d F o c u s o f E l e c t e d Representative 3.1 D O O N E S B U R Y © 1997 G . B . Trudeau 3.2 Percentage of W o m e n i n Congress a n d Percentage of W o m e n a m o n g B l a c k M e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s , 1 9 7 9 - 9 9 6.1 B l a c k Perceptions of W h i c h of T h r e e A c t i v i t i e s of Representatives are M o s t a n d S e c o n d - M o s t I m p o r t a n t 8.1 Percentage by R a c e of T h o s e A p p r o v i n g of the W a y Congress H a s H a n d l e d Its J o b , 1 9 8 0 - 2 0 0 0 8.2 Percentage by R a c e of T h o s e T r u s t i n g i n G o v e r n m e n t " M o s t o f the T i m e , " 1 9 5 8 - 9 6 8.3 B l a c k s ' E s t i m a t i o n s of W h a t Percentage o f the U . S . Congress a n d the U . S . P o p u l a t i o n Is B l a c k

13 51 61 128 144 146 150

TABLES

2 . 1 B l a c k M e m b e r s o f the H o u s e of Representatives i n the N i n e t e e n t h C e n t u r y by State 2 . 2 T h e C i v i l R i g h t s G e n e r a t i o n of B l a c k s W h o Served i n the House, 1 9 0 0 - 7 1 2.3 T h e N u m b e r o f A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s i n the U . S . Congress, 1947-99 2.4 O c c u p a t i o n s of M e m b e r s o f Congress, 1 9 6 9 - 9 5 2.5 L i s t o f B l a c k W o m e n E l e c t e d to the U . S . H o u s e of Representatives by State, Y e a r s Served, Degrees E a r n e d , O c c u p a t i o n , M a r i t a l Status, a n d N u m b e r of C h i l d r e n 3 . 1 Average D i s t r i c t s a n d E l e c t i o n C h a r a c t e r i s t i c s o f B l a c k a n d W h i t e M e m b e r s by P a r t y i n the 1 9 9 6 N B E S D a t a Set 3.2 Retirements a n d Reelection R a t e s i n the U . S . H o u s e o f Representatives for A l l I n c u m b e n t s a n d B l a c k I n c u m b e n t s 3.3 A f r i c a n - A m e r i c a n Representatives i n 1 9 9 9 4 . 1 Average N u m b e r o f C o m m i t t e e , Subcommittee, Staff Size, a n d P a r t y L e a d e r s h i p by R a c e and P a r t y of H o u s e M e m b e r in 1 0 4 t h Congress in N B E S Sample 4 . 2 T y p e s o f C o m m i t t e e Assignments by R a c e and P a r t y o f H o u s e M e m b e r i n N B E S Sample 4.3 Prestigious C o m m i t t e e Assignments by R a c e , Party, a n d Year Elected

28 35 38 39

42 58 59 67

75 77 78

viii

•

Figures and Tables

4 . 4 B i l l Sponsorship a n d V o t i n g S u m m a r i e s by R a c e a n d P a r t y of H o u s e M e m b e r i n the N B E S Sample 4 . 5 Votes o n K e y L e g i s l a t i o n i n 1 0 3 r d Congress by R a c e a n d P a r t y of H o u s e M e m b e r 4 . 6 " Y e a " Votes o n K e y L e g i s l a t i o n i n 1 0 4 t h Congress by Race and Party of House Member 4 . 7 B l a c k O p i n i o n o n P u b l i c Policies i n 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 9 6 4.8 Percentage o f B l a c k Respondents W h o s e Legislator's Vote o n W e l f a r e R e f o r m M a t c h e d T h e i r P o s i t i o n 6 . 1 B l a c k s E v a l u a t i o n s of T h e i r Representatives by the Legislator's R a c e and P o l i t i c a l P a r t y 6.2 T h e Effect o f D e s c r i p t i v e R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o n the M e m b e r ' s R a t i n g s by B l a c k s 6.3 C r o s s - t a b u l a t i o n of C h a r a c t e r of M e m b e r s o f Congress by the R a c e a n d P a r t y of B l a c k Respondent's Representative 6.4 M u l t i v a r i a t e A n a l y s i s of Representative's M o s t I m p o r t a n t Activity 7 . 1 B l a c k s ' K n o w l e d g e about H o u s e M e m b e r 7.2 B l a c k s ' K n o w l e d g e about U . S . Senators 7.3 P o l i t i c a l Interest M e a s u r e s a m o n g B l a c k s 7.4 Self-Reported V o t i n g P a r t i c i p a t i o n a m o n g B l a c k s i n the 1994 and 1996 House Elections 7.5 T h e Effect of D e s c r i p t i v e R e p r e s e n t a t i o n o n R e s p o n d e n t s ' K n o w l e d g e , Interest, a n d V o t i n g P a r t i c i p a t i o n 7.6 T h e I m p a c t o f D e s c r i p t i v e Representation o n R e s p o n d e n t s ' C a m p a i g n Interest, P o l i t i c a l Efficacy, a n d V o t i n g P a r t i c i p a t i o n 8.1 T h e Effect of D e s c r i p t i v e Representation o n Respondents' A p p r o v a l R a t i n g of Congress a n d Support for T e r m L i m i t s 8.2 R e g r e s s i o n A n a l y s i s o f B l a c k E s t i m a t i o n s of the Percentage of the U . S . P o p u l a t i o n T h a t Is B l a c k 9.1 Black Opinion on Majority-Minority Districts 9.2 B l a c k s ' W i l l i n g n e s s to C h a n g e P o s i t i o n o n R a c i a l R e d i s t r i c t i n g Items A . l Strata Weights A . 2 Pre-election Survey F i n a l D i s p o s i t i o n Codes a n d Response R a t e s A . 3 T h e Representativeness o f the 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 9 6 N B E S Weighted Samples A . 4 C r o s s - t a b u l a t i o n o f Perceived R a c e o f I n t e r v i e w e r by A c t u a l R a c e of I n t e r v i e w e r i n 1 9 9 6 N B E S A . 5 L i s t o f H o u s e M e m b e r s W h o s e D i s t r i c t s F e l l into 1 9 9 6 Sample

80 86 87 92 94

5

119 121 124 129 134 135 136 137 139 140

148 151 164 166 173 175 177 178 179

Preface and Acknowledgments

T H I S B O O K o n l y came about because of the financial support p r o v i d e d to me i n i t i a l l y by m y former chair, Paul B e c k , i n the D e p a r t m e n t of Political Science at the O h i o State University, a n d by the N a t i o n a l Sci­ ence F o u n d a t i o n ' s Political Science D i v i s i o n headed by F r a n k S c i o l i . T h e i r financial support funded the 1 9 9 6 N a t i o n a l B l a c k E l e c t i o n Study, w h i c h is at the heart of this book. I a m eternally grateful for this support. T h i s b o o k w i l l s p a r k controversy. T o quote one of the P r i n c e t o n U n i ­ versity Press r e v i e w e r s , " I expect this w o r k w i l l be c o n t r o v e r s i a l a n d m u c h discussed i n the fields o f politics, l a w , a n d race. L a w y e r s from both sides o f the racial r e d i s r i c t i n g debate w i l l alternatively cite a n d criticize portions of this book i n v o t i n g rights litigation. F o r e x a m p l e , v o t i n g rights l a w y e r s w i l l like a n d use the findings that s h o w b l a c k s v i e w black representatives more positively t h a n w h i t e representatives. H o w e v e r , members of the v o t i n g rights bar w i l l also vilify her for presenting data that s h o w s that black support for r a c i a l redistricting is w e a k . " Because there are some scholars w h o delight in it, I m u s t state f r o m the outset that I don't w i s h to be vilified by a n y group, left or right. Y e t w h i l e I don't c o u r t it, I don't s h r i n k from controversy either. I believe i n the integrity o f m y findings. O b v i o u s l y , I c a n n o t stop persons or groups f r o m selectively interpreting m y findings and/or arguments. T h u s , I w i s h to m a k e m y o w n political v i e w s plain from the outset so that those seeking to increase the n u m e r i c a l representation of p o l i t i c a l minorities in government might refer to them. S u c h references m a y be used in order to rebut a n y portion o f the book that implies opposition to the extension of the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t ( V R A ) or that is against its a p p l i c a ­ tion in case l a w . B l a c k s are shortchanged p o l i t i c a l l y by their n u m e r i c a l underrepresentation i n Congress. A s I argue in the c o n c l u d i n g chapter, the extension o f the V R A a n d a meaningful interpretation of it by the courts are short-term fixes for this c u r r e n t situation. A t present, it is clear that that the V R A needs to be r e n e w e d . H o w e v e r , I u l t i m a t e l y support m o v i n g to a p r o p o r t i o n a l representation system. M y ultimate position in this debate raises the question of h o w h i s t o r i c a l l y subordi­ nated and m a r g i n a l i z e d groups fare under different p o l i t i c a l systems, notably p r o p o r t i o n a l representation ones. T h i s question is one that I a m presently w o r k i n g o n . M a n y colleagues, friends, a n d family members gave me encouragement a n d support a l o n g the w a y , a n d I apologize for not singling each a n d

x

•

Preface and Acknowledgments

every one out. I w a n t to acknowledge several scholars w h o s e disserta­ t i o n committees I served o n ( n o w years ago) w h o contributed intellec­ t u a l l y to the project: V a l e r i a S i n c l a i r C h a p m a n at the U n i v e r s i t y of Rochester, C l a u d i n e G a y at Stanford U n i v e r s i t y , a n d D a v i d I a n L u b l i n at A m e r i c a n U n i v e r s i t y . F o r m e r d o c t o r a l students M i k i C a u l - K i t t i l s o n a n d K i m D e F r o n z o helped collect a d d i t i o n a l data for this project, w h i l e Stefanie C h a m b e r s , G l o r i a H a m p t o n , a n d Teresa T o d d assisted o n the 1 9 9 6 N a t i o n a l B l a c k E l e c t i o n Study. M y former O S U colleague a n d po­ l i t i c a l scientist Janet Box-Steffensmeier gave me tremendous support w h e n I w a s w o r k i n g o n this project as w e l l , especially as I t r a n s i t i o n e d f r o m m y o l d department ( O h i o State) to m y n e w one ( U C I r v i n e ) . A t U C I r v i n e , I especially w a n t to t h a n k the intellectual support p r o v i d e d to me by Bernie G r o f m a n , a v e r y distinguished v o t i n g rights scholar, a n d R u s s e l l D a l t o n , the director of the Center for the Study o f D e m o c ­ racy, as w e l l as U C I colleagues G a r a n c e G e n i c o t , C l a i r e J e a n K i m , K r i s t e n M o n r o e , K e v i n O l s o n , a n d J u d y S t e p a n - N o r r i s . Professors L u ­ cius J . B a r k e r , P a u l a D , M c C l a i n , M o r r i s F i o r i n a , G a r y K i n g , D i a n n e Pinderhughes, C h r i s t o p h e r Parker, F r e d r i c k H a r r i s , L u i s F r a g a , M a r k P e t r a c c a , a n d D a v i d M a y h e w p r o v i d e d c r i t i c a l feedback on different stages of the b o o k m a n u s c r i p t . T h e p o l i t i c a l science editor at P r i n c e t o n , C h u c k M y e r s , is a w o n d e r f u l editor a n d deserves special t h a n k s for m a k i n g the r e v i e w process speedy a n d professional. I appreciated the e d i t o r i a l assistance p r o v i d e d by L i n d a T r u i l o , m y brother E m o r y A n ­ d r e w T a t e , a n d production w o r k by E l l e n F o o s . I also w a n t to t h a n k S a r a h H a r r i n g t o n at Princeton U n i v e r s i t y Press for her help i n the p r o ­ d u c t i o n of this book, a n d especially helping me w h e n I needed it w i t h the book's figures a n d a r t w o r k . S a r a h h a d the dangerous job of trudg­ ing to the city's m a i n post office to collect the m a i l d u r i n g the a n t h r a x scare w h e n P r i n c e t o n U n i v e r s i t y ' s postal system w a s t e m p o r a r i l y shut down. Thank you all! F i n a l l y I need to acknowledge the u n w i t t i n g support p r o v i d e d to me by m y k i d s . I t is c o m m o n p l a c e for parents o f y o u n g c h i l d r e n to ac­ k n o w l e d g e them for h a v i n g distracted t h e m a n d caused some delay. A s the mother of t w o preschoolers, perhaps this has been the case for me as w e l l , but the a r r i v a l s of L u k e a n d Sophie also forced me to become greatly more disciplined i n m y professional life a n d greatly m o r e effi­ cient. T h e i r a r r i v a l forced me to m a k e a c l e a n separation o f m y w o r k life f r o m the rest of m y life. Because there w o u l d be no m o r e m i x i n g , w o r k felt m o r e like w o r k , a n d even, at times, became highly stressful a n d oppressive, but also because of t h e m , the rest o f m y life w a s a n i n c a l c u l a b l e i m p r o v e m e n t over m y o l d life. I t h a n k G o d a n d Jesus C h r i s t for these c h i l d r e n , a n d this b o o k is dedicated w i t h great love to them both.

CHAPTER

1

The Puzzle of Representation But, in spite of many centuries of theoretical effort, we cannot say what representation is. — Heinz Eulau, in T h e P o l i t i c s of R e p r e s e n t a t i o n

T o T H E A N C I E N T G R E E K S , d e m o c r a c y meant rule by the c o m m o n peo­ ple. F o r very p r a c t i c a l reasons, the A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l system is not a pure democracy, but a n indirect one. A m e r i c a n s participate in govern­ ment by selecting others to m a k e decisions for them. H o w the govern­ ment a c t u a l l y represents a n d does the people's bidding is a n i m p o r t a n t question. D e s i g n i n g a government w i t h l i m i t e d p o w e r s , the framers of the C o n s t i t u t i o n sought to ensure government-by-the-people or popular sovereignty t h r o u g h elections. B y granting only t w o - y e a r terms to legis­ lators in the H o u s e o f Representatives, the nation's founders arranged for the q u i c k replacement of l a w m a k e r s w h o failed to live up to constit­ uent expectations. I n addition to regularly scheduled elections or p o p u ­ lar c o n t r o l , there w a s the presumption that elected officials c o u l d be trusted to represent the w i l l o f the people because government officials w o u l d be d r a w n from the r a n k s of the people. A perfectly representative body w o u l d be s i m i l a r to the general population i n race, sex, ethnicity, occupation, religion, and other fundamental social characteristics. T h r o u g h the possession of social characteristics s i m i l a r to their constitu­ ents, representatives c o u l d be counted u p o n to share their political be­ liefs a n d interests. A s methods o f preserving p o p u l a r sovereignty, these propositions have their shortcomings. W i n n i n g a n election to the U . S . H o u s e of R e p ­ resentatives n o w u s u a l l y requires at least h a l f a m i l l i o n dollars, a n d generally those w h o spend the most w i n most often. T h e r e are n o w scholars w h o w o r r y that p o l i t i c a l equality a n d p o p u l a r sovereignty have been u n d e r m i n e d by the high cost o f w i n n i n g an election. T h u s , a n entire field has emerged devoted to the question o f h o w campaigns a n d money have impacted on the A m e r i c a n political system. T h a t the U . S . government is socially unrepresentative of the public — w i t h its members being wealthier, older, whiter, a n d o v e r w h e l m i n g l y male — has generated far less concern a n d little corresponding scholarship. Indeed, most c o n ­ gressional scholars have long assumed and argued that the social back-

4

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Chapter 1

g r o u n d o f legislators has little bearing o n their politics. I n the o p i n i o n of one set of leading congressional scholars, " M u s t Congress demog r a p h i c a l l y m i r r o r the populace to be a representative institution? P r o b ­ a b l y not. Legislators f r o m f a r m i n g districts c a n voice f a r m e r s ' concerns even though they themselves have never p l o w e d a field or m i l k e d a c o w ; whites c a n c h a m p i o n equal opportunities for m i n o r i t i e s . L e g i s l a t o r s c a n speak for voters of divergent s o c i a l r a n k or life s t y l e " ( D a v i d s o n a n d Oleszek 1 9 8 1 , 104). Nevertheless, as the numbers of w o m e n a n d r a c i a l m i n o r i t i e s w i n n i n g seats to the U . S . Congress have increased, the question o f w h e t h e r s u c h groups are equally or unequally represented i n government has gener­ ated some research. F o r w o m e n , s c h o l a r s h i p has seemingly reached a consensus that w o m e n ' s p o l i t i c a l interests have been underrepresented i n the past since w o m e n legislators are more likely t h a n their male counterparts to address " w o m e n ' s issues" (Swers 1 9 9 8 ; T h o m a s 1 9 9 4 ; D a r c y , W e l c h , a n d C l a r k 1 9 9 4 ) . I n contrast, the more l i m i t e d s c h o l ­ a r s h i p o n B l a c k s has yet to r e a c h s u c h a consensus. I n this book, I address the question of w h e t h e r or not the r a c i a l c o m ­ position o f government is relevant to the p o l i t i c a l representation of B l a c k s . L i k e w o m e n , A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s have made tremendous gains i n h o l d i n g elective office but still fall short of p r o p o r t i o n a l representation. C o n s t i t u t i n g 12 percent of the p o p u l a t i o n , B l a c k s h o l d about t w o per­ cent o f a l l elected offices i n the country. B l a c k s m a k e up about 7 percent of Congress —the chief l a w m a k i n g institution i n the U . S . g o v e r n m e n t a l system — w i t h thirty-eight members in the H o u s e o f Representatives but none c u r r e n t l y serving i n the Senate. T o d a y about one-third o f B l a c k s are represented i n W a s h i n g t o n by B l a c k officeholders. A r e these B l a c k s better represented i n W a s h i n g t o n by B l a c k s t h a n the t w o - t h i r d s not rep­ resented by B l a c k s ? M y goal i n this book is to present a b r o a d a n d balanced assessment of the value of descriptive representation for A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s . A n e w breed of e m p i r i c a l l y oriented scholars have pursued this question largely by e x a m i n i n g whether B l a c k representatives cast different r o l l - c a l l votes t h a n other representatives or file different sorts o f bills (see S w a i n 1 9 9 3 ; L u b l i n 1 9 9 7 ; W h i t b y 1 9 9 8 ; C a n o n 1 9 9 9 ) . H o w e v e r , m y b o o k brings substantially more data to this debate. P o l i t i c a l representation, as I briefly e x p l a i n i n the n e x t section, consists of three forms: substantive, descriptive, a n d s y m b o l i c . I n contrast to previous e m p i r i c a l studies, I consider a l l three forms i n m y assessment of the importance o f race i n p o l i t i c a l representation. A second unique a n d contrasting feature of m y book is that u t i l i z i n g a 1 9 9 6 n a t i o n a l telephone survey of B l a c k s , I address the question o f h o w i m p o r t a n t is descriptive representation f r o m both sides o f the rep-

The Puzzle of Representation

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5

resentative-constituent relationship, u n i q u e l y f r o m the vantage point o f B l a c k s themselves. D o B l a c k s feel that they are better represented in the U . S . system o f indirect d e m o c r a c y w h e n their representative is B l a c k ? I n a d d i t i o n , h o w does the race of the H o u s e representative i m p a c t their political behavior and attitudes? I n other w o r d s , does B l a c k representa­ t i o n in W a s h i n g t o n lead B l a c k s to become more i n f o r m e d a b o u t a n d more active i n n a t i o n a l politics? A n d does B l a c k representation affect attitudes that B l a c k s have about Congress as an institution more b r o a d l y ? T h e a n a l y s i s o f s u r v e y data a l l o w s me to address these c r i t i c a l questions that have been m u c h subject o f m u c h debate, especially w i t h i n the field o f m i n o r i t y v o t i n g rights. T h e s e are questions that have been subjected to fierce debate but w i t h o u t , to m y k n o w l e d g e , m u c h h a r d , e m p i r i c a l evidence. W h i l e touching on the n o r m a t i v e components of the debate over race and representation, m y book provides h a r d , e m p i r i c a l evidence as w e l l . T h e argument that I w i l l m a k e at the end o f this book is that it is the m a j o r i t a r i a n or district p l u r a l i t y system that the nation's founders i m ­ ported from G r e a t B r i t a i n that systematically encourages l a w m a k e r s to provide descriptive a n d s y m b o l i c representation as m u c h as substantive representation to their constituents. T h e reasons w h y all three c o m p o ­ nents o f p o l i t i c a l representation are stressed by A m e r i c a n legislators are several. F i r s t , l a w m a k i n g is a difficult a n d lengthy enterprise in the U . S . system. A t the end o f a t e r m , the t y p i c a l H o u s e member can c l a i m credit for passage o f o n l y one bill that they sponsored or, more likely, cosponsored. R a t i o n a l l y , therefore, A m e r i c a n legislators w o r k h a r d to convey to constituents that even in the absence of tangible or substantive policy outputs, their v i e w s a n d interests are still w e l l represented i n W a s h i n g ­ t o n through activities weighted t o w a r d the s y m b o l i c a n d descriptive. Second, U . S . legislators are also m u c h less confined by p a r t y member­ ships t h a n elected representatives under different electoral arrange­ ments. Legislators are credited less for w h a t their p o l i t i c a l party achieves than for w h a t they i n d i v i d u a l l y provide for constituents in the A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l system as a consequence. A s members of geograph­ ically defined spaces as w e l l as of p o l i t i c a l parties, A m e r i c a n legislators pursue their o w n p a r t i c u l a r i z e d goals, i n c l u d i n g p o r k barrel legislation, in a d d i t i o n to their party's ideological agendas ( A r n o l d 1 9 9 0 ) . R e l a t e d to this second point is that modern p o l i t i c a l campaigns are candidatecentered w i t h parties i n the b a c k g r o u n d ( A l d r i c h 1 9 9 5 ; Wattenberg 1 9 9 1 ). H o u s e members seeking reelection try to b u i l d a r e c o r d based on personal accomplishments as m u c h as they share the credit w i t h their political party. Candidate-centered c a m p a i g n i n g pushes the balance even further i n favor o f R i c h a r d Fenno's " h o m e s t y l e , " or the concen­ trated efforts by members of Congress to establish "personal ties" w i t h

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their constituents ( F e n n o 1 9 7 8 ) . M e m b e r s spend considerable time a n d resources t a l k i n g to constituents, p r o v i d i n g personal services to constit­ uents i n a d d i t i o n to the time that they spend o n C a p i t o l H i l l doing legislative a n d committee w o r k . A n d the campaign materials of H o u s e members reflect the strong emphasis of the " p e r s o n a l " over the " p o l i t i ­ c a l " i n fact. U l t i m a t e l y I w i l l argue that B l a c k s are not alone i n their strong appre­ c i a t i o n of being descriptively represented; a l l A m e r i c a n s place a strong v a l u e on it as it is a component of p o l i t i c a l representation c o n t i n u o u s l y stressed by members of those elected to the U . S . Congress. T h u s , i n describing a n d a n a l y z i n g the manner i n w h i c h B l a c k s are p o l i t i c a l repre­ sented i n the U . S . Congress, I provide n e w insights, broader a n d m o r e balanced coverage of the nature of representation i n the A m e r i c a n polit­ i c a l system t h a n congressional scholars have to date. T h u s , by p r o v i d i n g this e m p i r i c a l analysis of h o w B l a c k s are represented i n the U . S . C o n ­ gress, I m a k e a significant theoretical c o n t r i b u t i o n to the field of c o n ­ gressional studies i n establishing the very b r o a d nature of p o l i t i c a l rep­ resentation i n the U . S . Congress.

RACE AND T H EREPRESENTATION

DEBATE

D o e s the social b a c k g r o u n d a n d race o f the representative matter i n a representative democracy? W h i l e congressional scholars generally t h i n k not, the founding fathers e x p l i c i t l y expressed the hope that their gov­ ernment w o u l d be a descriptively representative body. J o h n A d a m s , a leading architect of the C o n s t i t u t i o n , e x p l i c i t l y conceived o f elected rep­ resentatives as " a portrait of the people at large i n m i n i a t u r e " ( W o o d 1 9 9 8 [ 1 9 6 9 ] , 1 6 5 ) . Still there is a debate over the degree to w h i c h the founding fathers t r u l y desired p o p u l a r representation. Some argue that J a m e s M a d i s o n intended a government composed of the s o c i a l elite w h e n M a d i s o n w r o t e i n T h e F e d e r a l i s t N o . 10 about the role of C o n ­ gress to "refine a n d enlarge" public o p i n i o n ( W o o d 1 9 9 8 ; F i s h k i n 1 9 9 5 ) . O t h e r scholars, notably R o b e r t C . G r a d y , contend that M a d i s o n w a s a true democrat a n d his tendency t o w a r d elitism w a s tempered by a strong preference for a government that reflected "the great body of the society, not . . . an inconsiderable p r o p o r t i o n of a favored c l a s s " as he w r o t e i n F e d e r a l i s t N o . 3 9 ( 1 9 9 3 , 1 7 - 1 8 ) . A r e v i e w of the R e v o l u t i o n ­ ary debates over representation is not especially clarifying. E v e n at the time o f the nation's founding, according to h i s t o r i a n G o r d o n S. W o o d ( 1 9 9 8 ) , there w a s "great c o n f u s i o n " c o n c e r n i n g the concept o f p o l i t i c a l representation. T h e p r o b l e m o f h o w best to represent the A m e r i c a n people i n a n elected government w a s so c o n t r o v e r s i a l at the time the C o n s t i t u t i o n

The Puzzle of Representation

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7

w a s drafted that it n e a r l y defied political s o l u t i o n . S m a l l states objected to legislative seats based solely o n p o p u l a t i o n , w h i c h is w h a t large states preferred. T h e " G r e a t C o m p r o m i s e " resulted i n a b i c a m e r a l Congress w h e r e each state legislature w o u l d send t w o senators a n d the l o w e r house seats w o u l d be allocated on the basis of the state's p o p u l a t i o n . W h i l e the conflict is treated as a s m a l l state/large state feud, at its core w a s the fear of democrats w h o believed that the Senate a n d presidency were c o n s t i t u t i o n a l devices to c u r b the political influences o f the l o w e r classes in this n e w democracy. A s " M o n t a z u m a " sarcastically declared i n the A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t Paper N o . 9, " w e have designated by the p o p u l a r name of the H o u s e o f Representatives. B u t to g u a r d against every possi­ ble danger f r o m this l o w e r house, w e have subjected every bill they bring f o r w a r d to the double negative of o u r upper house a n d presi­ dent." Because senators a n d the president w e r e to be chosen by the state legislatures or their electors, A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t s believed they w o u l d re­ m a i n positions largely c o n t r o l l e d by the members of the economic a n d social elite. Federalists w a n t e d a government s o m e w h a t r e m o v e d f r o m the masses, a n d designed a government that " f i l t e r e d " citizens' v i e w s t h r o u g h the indirect elections of senators a n d the president ( W o o d 1 9 9 8 ; F i s h k i n 1 9 9 5 ) . A n t i - F e d e r a l i s t s , i n contrast, w a n t e d a government closer to the people; they therefore sought frequent, direct elections a n d rota­ tion in office. A d d i t i o n a l l y , the B i l l of R i g h t s became the p r o c e d u r a l m e c h a n i s m that safeguarded the rights of the l o w e r classes by a govern­ ment w h o s e Senate w o u l d most likely be l i m i t e d to the social a n d eco­ n o m i c elite. T h e d i v i s i o n of the n a t i o n a l legislature into t w o houses, w h i l e it solved the immediate p r o b l e m o f the balance o f p o w e r a m o n g the thirteen original colonies, d i d not fundamentally resolve the p r o b l e m of h o w elected representatives w e r e to represent the people. T h e framers left the question o f h o w voters w o u l d elect representatives to the states. A n d in the beginning, o n l y five states chose to use districts, w h i l e the m a j o r i t y elected members o f Congress t h r o u g h at-large elections. I n 1 8 4 2 , C o n ­ gress passed legislation r e q u i r i n g single-member districts. T h i s move re­ sulted from p a r t i s a n c o m p e t i t i o n as the m a j o r i t y parties i n at-large elec­ tions states were electing delegations c o m p o s e d entirely of members f r o m the m a j o r i t y p a r t y ( B a r b e r 2 0 0 0 ) . T h u s , the methods of electing representatives w o u l d be a source o f c o n t i n u o u s debate throughout U . S . history. A m e r i c a n s h a d revolted against B r i t i s h rule because they felt that they were not represented i n the government. T h e B r i t i s h responded that A m e r i c a n s , as subjects of G r e a t B r i t a i n w e r e " v i r t u a l l y represented," as are those l i v i n g i n E n ­ g l a n d , since no one w a s " a c t u a l l y " represented ( W o o d 1 9 9 8 ) . V i r t u a l representation c l a i m s are elitist. H i s t o r i a n G o r d o n S. W o o d w r i t e s that

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w h i l e J o h n A d a m s h a d urged that representatives s h o u l d m i r r o r the people, " i n the same breath he h a d suggested that they m u s t also be ' a few o f the most w i s e and g o o d ' w h o , as the E n g l i s h defenders of v i r t u a l representation h a d i m p l i e d , w o u l d p r e s u m a b l y k n o w better t h a n the b u l k of the people w h a t w a s the proper interest of society" ( 1 9 9 8 , 1 8 0 ) . S u c h c l a i m s w e r e n a t u r a l l y challenged; one A m e r i c a n leader expressed the v i e w at the time N e w Y o r k w a s r a t i f y i n g its constitution that elected representatives need not be the "best sort," but preferably average m e n w i t h " c o m m o n sense a n d a n u n s h a k e n integrity" ( W o o d 1 9 9 8 , 1 8 0 ) . U l t i m a t e l y R e p u b l i c a n c l a i m s that A m e r i c a n s are a " s i n g u l a r a n d united people" that lay beneath c l a i m s of v i r t u a l representation w o u l d be contested as fair a n d equal representation increasingly i m p l i e d a c t u a l representation. Still from 1 7 7 6 to 1 7 7 8 , A m e r i c a n revolutionaries u n ­ c o n s c i o u s l y — i t seemed — embraced the n o t i o n of v i r t u a l representation because they assumed that people were " a homogeneous entity i n soci­ ety set against the r u l e r s " ( W o o d 1 9 9 8 , 6 0 7 ) . I n a few short years fol­ l o w i n g the R e v o l u t i o n , W o o d w r i t e s , A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l t h i n k e r s w o u l d recognize that their c o u n t r y w a s one c o m p r i s e d of m a n y p o l i t i c a l fac­ tions. A n d as s u c h , the p o l i t i c a l good w a s no longer a single "entity distinct f r o m its p a r t s " but formed i n the aggregation o f these c o m b a t ­ ive separate interests. Increasingly, representatives need not possess great abilities, as their role i n government w a s to represent faithfully the w i l l of the people as instructed. W r i t e s W o o d , " T h e representation o f the people, as A m e r i c a n politics i n the R e v o l u t i o n a r y era h a d made glaringly evident, c o u l d never be v i r t u a l , never inclusive; it w a s acutely a c t u a l a n d a l w a y s tentative a n d p a r t i a l " ( 6 0 0 ) . F o r W o o d , c l e a r l y a l l o f the v a r i o u s factions should be actually represented i n government, for at least some o f the time. Y e t the v e r y principle behind the c l a i m that A m e r i c a n s w e r e v i r t u a l l y represented i n E n g l i s h P a r l i a m e n t w a s used by A m e r i c a n s to dismiss arguments i n favor of granting suffrage to A f r i ­ cans, mulattos, a n d I n d i a n s i n Massachusetts ( 1 8 3 ) . I n s o f a r as legisla­ tors w e r e ultimately p u r s u i n g policies that served the interests of their c o m m u n i t i e s a n d o f the n a t i o n as a w h o l e , such groups w e r e v i r t u a l l y represented. R a c e , w h e n raised as a p o l i t i c a l p r o b l e m at the constitutional c o n v e n ­ t i o n , w a s only raised w i t h reference to the enslavement o f A f r i c a n s . E v e n then the matter of race a n d representation i r o n i c a l l y w a s debated o n l y over w h e t h e r the B l a c k slave p o p u l a t i o n should be used i n the a l l o c a t i o n of seats to the s l a v e - o w n i n g states to the H o u s e of R e p r e s e n ­ tatives. B l a c k s at the time the C o n s t i t u t i o n w a s ratified w e r e e x p l i c i t l y a n d u n a n i m o u s l y excluded f r o m the n e w government as noncitizens, even w h i l e the o r i g i n a l C o n s t i t u t i o n d i d not m a k e direct reference to race. T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n , the s h i n i n g document that sprung f r o m the D e c -

The Puzzle of Representation

* 9

l a r a t i o n o f Independence, sided w i t h the slave-owners a n d enshrined the practice o f s l a v e r y i n three p r o v i s i o n s , though, a l l w i t h o u t m e n t i o n i n g slavery or slaves. Slaves w o u l d be p a r t i a l l y counted i n the state's p o p u ­ l a t i o n , augmenting the p o l i t i c a l representation of slave-owners i n the H o u s e a n d i n the E l e c t o r a l College. Congress w a s forbidden as w e l l to b a n the i m p o r t a t i o n of slaves u n t i l 1 8 0 8 . T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n also i n ­ structed states to r e t u r n escaped slaves to their s l a v e - o w n e r s . It w a s o n the basis of these three passages contained i n the C o n s t i t u ­ t i o n that C h i e f Justice R o g e r B . T a n e y w o u l d argue w i t h the consent of the Supreme C o u r t ' s m a j o r i t y i n the 1 8 5 7 D r e d Scott decision that B l a c k people, even free B l a c k s , w e r e not U . S . citizens a n d h a d no rights under the C o n s t i t u t i o n . A l t h o u g h m a n y A m e r i c a n government t e x t b o o k s gen­ erally stress that slavery " e m b a r r a s s e d " the founding fathers, A l e x i s de Toquevilie's o w n observations were that few A m e r i c a n s s a w the blatant c o n t r a d i c t i o n between s l a v e r y — as w e l l as the country's treatment of free B l a c k s — a n d democracy. I t is truly difficult to imagine the founding fathers f a v o r i n g a government that i n c l u d e d B l a c k s as elected officials given not o n l y their acceptance of slavery but also the extent of their r a c i a l prejudices. A t the time he w r o t e the D e c l a r a t i o n of Independence, T h o m a s Jefferson o w n e d over 2 0 0 slaves. Still, Jefferson p u b l i c l y op­ posed slavery. J a m e s M a d i s o n became a staunch abolitionist w h o s a w the enslavement of B l a c k s as a vile c o n t r a d i c t i o n to a democratic sys­ tem. R a d i c a l R e p u b l i c a n s i n their effort to create a t r u l y color-blind d e m o c r a c y also advocated B l a c k officeholding, a n d t w e n t y B l a c k s , h a l f of w h o m h a d experienced slavery, w o u l d serve i n the U . S . H o u s e of Representatives d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . Nevertheless, rather t h a n o n l y the outcome of a terrible c o m p r o m i s e , or better still, a c a p i t u l a t i o n to slave-owners i n order to create a n d pre­ serve the U n i o n , the denial of i n d i v i d u a l rights a n d equality to B l a c k s reflected the i l l i b e r a l traditions that justified it. T h e s e same illiberal t r a ­ ditions that are enshrined i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n have also consigned a majority ( w o m e n , I n d i a n s , B l a c k s , a n d A s i a n i m m i g r a n t s ) to a n inferior a n d unequal status for a m a j o r i t y of A m e r i c a ' s history ( R . M . S m i t h 1 9 9 7 ) . T h e c l a i m that the C o n s t i t u t i o n w a s and is " c o l o r - b l i n d " has blinded liberals to the social and e c o n o m i c inequalities that w e r e either sanctioned by aspects o f the C o n s t i t u t i o n or encouraged. T h i s l i b e r a l creed that enshrines color-blindness (or gender- or class-blindness) ob­ scures then h o w m u c h r a c i a l group m e m b e r s h i p has affected a n d c o n ­ tinues to affect U . S . politics a n d the d i s t r i b u t i o n of p u b l i c goods ( P h i l ­ lips 1 9 9 5 ; R . M . S m i t h 1 9 9 7 ) . A n d , i n fact, outside of N e w E n g l a n d , m a n y states s u c h as O h i o , as they dropped the basic property qualifica­ tions d u r i n g the era of J a c k s o n i a n democracy, added the restriction o f race to the right to vote. E v e n n o r t h e r n states such as N e w Y o r k , P e n n -

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s y l v a n i a , a n d N e w Jersey, w h i c h h a d p r e v i o u s l y permitted free B l a c k s to vote, adopted n e w state constitutions confining the right to adult W h i t e males (Barber 2 0 0 0 ) . W h i g s w o u l d push for literacy requirements i n ­ stead of race, but in states w h e r e D e m o c r a t s controlled matters, the party line against B l a c k male suffrage held firm. A s h i s t o r i a n J . M o r g a n K o u s s e r ( 1 9 9 9 ) argues, B l a c k v o t i n g rights w e r e denied i n part as a consequence of intense party competition. It w a s the history of state-sanctioned d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against B l a c k s that alerted the courts to the importance o f B l a c k s h a v i n g the right to elect a "candidate of c h o i c e , " a n d implicitly, therefore, the importance of B l a c k s ' descriptive representation i n elected legislatures. W i t h o u t this history, their n u m e r i c a l underrepresentation i n government never w o u l d have w o n j u d i c i a l protection a n d remedy. T h e initial case v a l i d a t i n g the importance o f creating opportunities that gave minorities meaningful opportunities to elect one of their o w n to government i n v o l v e d m u l t i ­ member as opposed to single-member legislative districts. I n W h i t e v. R e g e s t e r , B l a c k s a n d L a t i n o s argued that m u l t i m e m b e r districts i n T e x a s w e r e used to dilute their v o t i n g strength, therefore denying them their F o u r t e e n t h A m e n d m e n t rights. I n 1 9 7 3 , the Supreme C o u r t u n a n i ­ m o u s l y r u l e d i n favor of the B l a c k a n d L a t i n o plaintiffs. T h e basis for declaring the m u l t i m e m b e r districts unconstitutional w a s vague, but no­ tably included the state's history o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against minorities. Seven years later, however, i n C i t y o f M o b i l e v. B o l d e n , the C o u r t w o u l d rule that election systems that are s h o w n to discriminate against minor­ ities are o n l y unconstitutional w h e n minorities can s h o w that they were purposefully created w i t h a r a c i a l a n i m u s against them. After testimony was offered about the history of d i s c r i m i n a t i o n i n A l a b a m a , however, the case w a s remanded. R a c i a l intent w a s p r o v e n , a n d the B l a c k p l a i n ­ tiffs prevailed i n M o b i l e . ( Y e t p r o v i n g r a c i a l intent w a s costly, a n d the legal standards for p r o v i n g it were vague, m a k i n g such intent v e r y diffi­ cult to effectively establish i n courts [ K o u s s e r 1 9 9 9 ] . ) T h u s , v o t i n g rights activists i n response to B o l d e n successfully pressed for modifica­ tion of the 1 9 6 5 V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t i n 1 9 8 2 (Pinderhughes 1 9 9 5 ) . T h e modification expressly prohibited v o t i n g procedures that afforded m i ­ norities "less opportunities t h a n other members of the electorate to par­ ticipate i n the p o l i t i c a l process a n d to elect representatives o f their c h o i c e " ( D a v i d s o n a n d G r o f m a n 1 9 9 4 , 3 5 ) . M i n o r i t i e s c o u l d never be fairly represented i n government, in other w o r d s , as long as the elec­ t o r a l system w a s biased against them. T h e 1 9 8 2 amendment of the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t unleashed a furious controversy. O n the one side, p o l i t i c a l conservatives such as A b i g a i l T h e r n s t r o m ( 1 9 8 7 ) argued that using the act effectively to force states to create m i n o r i t y - m a j o r i t y districts violates the principle of c o l o r b l i n d -

The

Puzzle of Representation

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11

ne s s a n d fairness. T h i s w a s also the argument used by Associate Justice S a n d r a D a y O ' C o n n o r in the 1 9 9 3 S h a w r u l i n g against a N o r t h C a r o ­ l i n a p l a n that h a d sent that state's first t w o B l a c k s to Congress since R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . L i b e r a l supporters countered conservative critics of the Act by a p p l y i n g the same logic of r a c i a l fairness, arguing that w i t h o u t it B l a c k s a n d H i s p a n i c s w o u l d never have w o n election to Congress i n the S o u t h i n the first place. V o t i n g rights activists like F r a n k M . P a r k e r ( 1 9 9 0 ) have pointed out the inherent r a c i a l bias of a system that perpet­ uates W h i t e p o l i t i c a l d o m i n a t i o n a n d the necessity of d r a w i n g m i n o r i t y m a j o r i t y districts to overcome that r a c i a l bias. Still others, such as L a n i G u i n i e r ( 1 9 9 4 ) , have rejected m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districts as a short-term fix, supporting instead the more r a d i c a l solution o f m o v i n g f r o m a sin­ gle-member p l u r a l i t y election system to a p r o p o r t i o n a l representation one. C o m p l i c a t i n g the debate have been the arguments developed a n d ad­ vanced by C a r o l M . S w a i n i n her a w a r d - w i n n i n g B l a c k F a c e s , B l a c k I n t e r e s t s ( 1 9 9 3 ) . D r a w i n g a distinction between descriptive a n d sub­ stantive political representation, she asked i f B l a c k elected officials w e r e necessary to advance B l a c k political interests? T h e question w a s both legitimate a n d timely. I n the 1 9 9 2 H o u s e elections, B l a c k s gained a rec­ o r d n u m b e r o f thirteen n e w seats i n Congress, largely through the U . S . Justice Department's enforcement of the 1982-amended V o t i n g R i g h t s Act. I n c l u d i n g the D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a ' s n o n v o t i n g delegate, this brought their n u m b e r i n the H o u s e to t h i r y - n i n e i n the 1 0 3 r d Congress. N o longer c o u l d the question of whether B l a c k elected officials w e r e necessary for B l a c k political representation be dismissed or evaded by v o t i n g rights liberals w h o had stressed the " p a u c i t y " o f B l a c k elected officials, and especially i n the South, as the p r i m a r y justification for the r a c i a l l y gerrymandered districts. B l a c k s w e r e n o w serving i n Congress f r o m five southern states that d u r i n g the twentieth century none h a d previously served: A l a b a m a , F l o r i d a , N o r t h C a r o l i n a , S o u t h C a r o l i n a , a n d V i r g i n i a . W e r e these B l a c k s representing their B l a c k constituents differently t h a n d i d whites? Based largely o n case studies of thirteen black a n d W h i t e H o u s e - m e m b e r s , the study concludes that b l a c k s d i d not need to be descriptively present i n Congress for b l a c k citizens to be fully represented i n government. F u r t h e r still, S w a i n argues that B l a c k s ' p u s h for descriptive representation undermines their substantive repre­ sentation i n W a s h i n g t o n . 1

THE

PUZZLE OF REPRESENTATION

D o e s race matter i n the p o l i t i c a l representation o f B l a c k s i n Congress? O b v i o u s l y the a n s w e r depends o n h o w interests are represented in C o n -

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gress. A l t h o u g h the issue o f p o l i t i c a l representation r e m a i n s o f enor­ m o u s interest to p o l i t i c a l theorists, interest i n this topic a m o n g congres­ s i o n a l scholars has lagged. I n the 1 9 7 0 s interest shifted f r o m a focus o n p o l i t i c a l representation to congressional elections (see M e z e y 1 9 9 3 ; F i o r i n a 1 9 7 4 ; M a y h e w 1 9 7 4 ) . T h e study o f elections still r e m a i n s one of the hot areas of research i n congressional studies. Since the theories of E d m u n d B u r k e i n the eighteenth century, c o n ­ gressional scholars have pointed out t w o different styles o f p o l i t i c a l rep­ resentation: delegate versus trustee. Delegate representatives t r y to re­ flect i n their representative role the v i e w s o f their constituents, w h i l e those acting as trustees serve by r e l y i n g o n their best judgment o f the issues. R o o t e d i n his r e p u b l i c a n i s m , B u r k e strongly believed that repre­ sentatives s h o u l d represent the country, not constituents n o r districts. N o t surprisingly, early surveys of legislators found that they d i d a little bit o f both. T h e issue is not a dead one. I t w a s raised quite seriously d u r i n g President C l i n t o n ' s i m p e a c h m e n t hearings as some o f his critics felt that members of Congress s h o u l d disregard the president's strong s h o w i n g i n o p i n i o n polls a n d vote a c c o r d i n g to their " c o n s c i e n c e . " A s u r v e y s h o w e d that members o f Congress thought that w h i l e they s h o u l d behave as trustees, they nevertheless acted as delegates since that is w h a t they thought the public w a n t e d ( D a v i d s o n a n d O l e s z e k 1 9 8 1 ) . Since B u r k e , p o l i t i c a l scientists have made a distinction between the focus ( n a t i o n v s . constituent) a n d style (delegate v s . trustee), as both are i m p l i e d i n B u r k e ' s v i e w o n the role of the elected representative. O f t e n times, a t w o - b y - t w o typology is presented to establish the four types o f legislative roles elected officials c a n assume ( M i l l e r a n d Stokes 1 9 6 3 ; T h o m a s s e n 1 9 9 4 ) , but the roles are each best depicted as single d i m e n ­ sions as s h o w n i n figure 1 . 1 . O n issue after issue, legislators m o v e be­ t w e e n a trustee role a n d delegate role, i n p u r s u i t o f n a t i o n a l or p a r t i c ­ u l a r i s t i c goals. After a l l , as legislators strive to b r i n g back " p o r k " to their districts, they also participate i n m a k i n g n a t i o n a l policy. E l e c t e d representatives fall somewhere o n this t w o - d i m e n s i o n a l space. I n the U n i t e d States, however, the idealized f o r m o f p o l i t i c a l representation is the instructed-delegate v e r s i o n , w h e r e representatives are not indepen­ dent, but constrained by elections, a n d strictly obey the w i l l o f their constituencies. M o r e o v e r , as m u c h as Congress along w i t h the president m a k e s n a t i o n a l l a w s , its members pursue their o w n p a r t i c u l a r i z e d goals as representatives o f geographically defined districts. L e g i s l a t o r s ' efforts to represent districts as w e l l as i n d i v i d u a l constituents m a k e the U . S . system o f government s o m e w h a t unique. T h e a c c u m u l a t e d evidence, nevertheless, suggests that even this typology fails to s h o w adequately the full role that members p l a y i n the U . S . Congress. U . S . legislators are also o p i n i o n leaders even i f the n o r m a t i v e v i e w casts t h e m as electorally

The Puzzle of Representation

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13

Trustee

Nation

District < ~

U.S. House Representative

V Delegate Figure 1.1. Style and focus of elected representative.

c o n s t r a i n e d agents. G r o u p s w i t h i n districts are also represented i n the activities o f m e m b e r s i n addition to the district a n d the n a t i o n as a whole. T h e role o f the elected representative is but one conceptual c o m p o ­ nent; another is the w a y i n w h i c h constituents are a c t u a l l y represented. I n 1 9 6 7 , p o l i t i c a l theorist H a n n a P i t k i n ' s seminal w o r k held that c i t i ­ zens are represented i n elected government i n three w a y s : descriptively, s y m b o l i c a l l y , a n d substantively. O n e is descriptively represented w h e n the representative belongs to y o u r social or demographic group. R e p r e ­ sentatives substantively represent their constituents t h r o u g h the r e a l i z a ­ t i o n o f their p o l i t i c a l needs. D e s c r i p t i v e representation d e v o i d o f a n y substance i m p a c t is " s y m b o l i c . " She concludes by discounting the v a l u e of descriptive or " p i c t o r i a l " representation. I n the end p o l i t i c a l repre­ sentation is best achieved w h e n legislators act " i n the interest o f the represented, i n a m a n n e r responsive to t h e m " ( 2 0 9 ) . T h e i n i t i a l e m p i r i c a l w o r k that emerged generally ignored s y m b o l i c a n d descriptive representation i n favor o f a m o d e l o f representation that w a s p u r e l y i n s t r u m e n t a l . W a r r e n M i l l e r a n d D o n a l d Stokes's s e m i n a l article p u b l i s h e d i n 1 9 6 3 searched for " c o n g r u e n c e " between constitu­ ents' beliefs a n d the legislator's v o t i n g behavior, a n d subsequent studies

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w o u l d interpret political representation as policy responsiveness or c o n ­ gruence. P o l i c y congruency, for good a n d b a d , w o u l d become the elu­ sive " H o l y G r a i l , " the chalice used by C h r i s t , i n e m p i r i c a l studies of political representation. T h e M i l l e r a n d Stokes study w a s r o u n d l y crit­ icized for its methodological shortcomings, w h i c h are discussed further i n chapter 6. O t h e r scholars have c o n c l u d e d that a one-to-one corre­ spondence between legislators' policy positions a n d constituent o p i n ­ ions need not exist o n a l l the issues, as the constituencies to w h i c h members are accountable are v a r i e d , a n d as the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g p r o ­ cess in Congress is quite c o m p l e x ( K i n g d o n 1 9 8 1 ; A r n o l d 1 9 9 0 ; Weissberg 1 9 7 6 ; F r o m a n 1 9 6 3 ) . Still others have found that policy c o n g r u ­ ence is achieved i n the aggregate, as the v o t i n g records of members o f Congress do faithfully c o r r e s p o n d to the majority sentiment i n the dis­ trict (e.g., Page a n d S h a p i r o 1 9 9 2 ) . Still others have sought to establish a l i n k between constituency service, committee position, a n d legislative activity a n d the H o u s e incumbent's electoral success, but to n o a v a i l (Fiorina 1989; Fiorina and Rivers 1989). P o l i t i c a l representation is m u c h m o r e t h a n policy representation, or even service to districts t h r o u g h p o r k barrel legislation or to i n d i v i d u a l constituents. Representation is p o w e r f u l l y s y m b o l i c , a c c o r d i n g to H e i n z E u l a u a n d P a u l K a r p s ( 1 9 7 8 ) . A s they note, B y e m p h a s i z i n g only one c o m p o n e n t of responsiveness as a substan­ tive concept, they reduced a c o m p l e x p h e n o m e n o n like representation to one of its components a n d substituted the c o m p o n e n t for the w h o l e . B u t i f responsiveness is l i m i t e d to one component, it c a n n o t capture the c o m p l e x i t i e s of the real w o r l d o f politics. . . . H o w else c o u l d one e x p l a i n that representatives manage to stay i n office i n spite o f the fact that they are n o t necessarily or a l w a y s responsive to the represented?" ( 6 0 - 6 1 ) . F o r E u l a u a n d K a r p s , constituents were s y m b o l i c a l l y represented t h r o u g h " p u b l i c gestures of a sort that create a sense o f trust a n d support i n the relationship between the representative a n d the represented" ( 1 9 7 8 , 6 3 ) . Congress is loaded w i t h acts o f s y m b o l i c representation. P o l i t i c i a n s routinely push for policies that they k n o w w o n ' t ever become l a w ( E d e l m a n 1 9 6 4 ) . L e g i s l a t o r s vote for legislation that w o n ' t ever be i m p l e ­ mented ( P r e s s m a n a n d W i l d a v s k y 1 9 8 4 ) . T h e average citizen, however, does not understand that certain resolutions (simple and c o n c u r r e n t ) , for e x a m p l e , don't m a k e l a w a n d are unenforceable by l a w . H o w e v e r , because 2 0 0 or m o r e s u c h s y m b o l i c resolutions are generally passed i n each Congress, there m u s t be p o l i t i c a l r e w a r d s a n d t a c t i c a l advantages associated w i t h them. S y m b o l i c legislation is also a b y p r o d u c t o f the A m e r i c a n legislative structure, w h e r e members are elected to represent

The Puzzle of Representation

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15

geographic c o m m u n i t i e s i n a d d i t i o n to their parties a n d constituents. E m p i r i c a l e x a m i n a t i o n of h o w members of Congress s y m b o l i c a l l y rep­ resent their constituents, a n d the electoral a n d political significance o f s y m b o l i c representation is still a fledging field that has o n l y recently t a k e n off ( C h a p m a n 2 0 0 2 ) . T h i s said, s y m b o l i c representation is one i m p o r t a n t reason w h y b l a c k s need to be descriptively represented i n the U . S . Congress. Since P i t k i n ' s s e m i n a l w o r k , a n e w group of political theorists, s t i m u ­ lated by the v o t i n g rights controversy, have begun to assert that descrip­ tive representation, something P i t k i n herself discounted, is a n i m p o r t a n t f o r m o f political representation. A n u m b e r have pointed out the impor­ tance of representatives " s t a n d i n g " for social groups ( Y o u n g 1 9 9 0 ; P h i l ­ lips 1 9 9 5 ; M . S. W i l l i a m s 1 9 9 8 ) . T a k i n g this a step farther, M e l i s s a S. W i l l i a m s ( 1 9 9 8 ) argues that fair representation m u s t include descriptive representation for m a r g i n a l i z e d social groups i n legislative bodies. A s the A m e r i c a n system o f government functions as a deliberative democ­ racy, m a r g i n a l i z e d groups m u s t take p a r t i n it (Phillips 1 9 9 5 ; M a n s bridge 1 9 9 9 ) . Such groups, these theorists contend, must be free to de­ fine their interests a n d defend them publicly. A n y other f o r m o f political representation short of descriptive representation might result i n the ne­ glect or d i l u t i o n o f their interests. M a n y w o m e n believe that the issue of s e x u a l harassment w a s not i n i t i a l l y t a k e n seriously because there w e r e no female members on the Senate J u d i c i a r y C o m m i t t e e at the time o f C l a r e n c e T h o m a s ' s c o n f i r m a t i o n to the Supreme C o u r t . N o t o n l y w i l l such groups n o w be h e a r d i n legislative c h a m b e r s , but the process i n w h i c h policy is w o r k e d out might become m o r e discursive a n d c o n ­ sensus-oriented ( M . S. W i l l i a m s 1 9 9 8 , 1 4 6 - 4 7 ) . T h e s e electoral m e c h a n i s m s , p s y c h o l o g i c a l a n d s t r u c t u r a l , however, failed to w o r k as theorized for B l a c k s i n the one-party South a n d w e r e generally w e a k i n the nation's t w o - p a r t y system ( F r y m e r 1 9 9 9 ) . W h e n the interests o f m i n o r i t i e s are defined as outside or c o n t r a r y to those o f the c o m m u n i t y , then legislators c a n safely ignore them. B l a c k s ' political history, W i l l i a m s contends, justifies the perception a m o n g B l a c k s that B l a c k representatives are m o r e t r u s t w o r t h y representatives t h a n are W h i t e legislators. W h i t e s c a n w i n trust f r o m B l a c k constituents, of course, but because of history, they are necessarily going to have to w o r k harder at establishing that trust. C o n g r e s s i o n a l scholar K e n n y W h i t b y w r i t e s that " [ h ] a v i n g members o f Congress w h o share the so­ ciological attributes o f the electorate is a p o w e r f u l s y m b o l o f represen­ t a t i o n " ( 1 9 9 8 , 6 ) . D e s c r i p t i v e representation r e m a i n s potently s y m b o l i c to B l a c k s today. I t represents their i n c l u s i o n i n the polity, the progress achieved i n A m e r i c a ' s race relations, a n d their p o l i t i c a l p o w e r i n the U . S . system.

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T h e battle between B l a c k a n d W h i t e legislators i n S o u t h C a r o l i n a over the state's Confederate battle flag illustrates the c o n t i n u i n g signifi­ cance o f s y m b o l s . T h i s flag flying over the S o u t h C a r o l i n a Statehouse s y m b o l i z e d W h i t e supremacy a n d Southern resistance to the U n i o n , a l ­ though its supporters m a i n t a i n e d that it represented "heritage," not hate. T h e flag w a s hoisted over the state c a p i t o l only i n 1 9 6 2 , however, d u r i n g the peak period of Southern resistance to the B l a c k c i v i l rights movement. T h e N a t i o n a l A s s o c i a t i o n for the A d v a n c e m e n t of C o l o r e d People ( N A A C P ) i n its efforts to force the W h i t e - d o m i n a t e d state gov­ ernment to remove the flag sponsored a boycott a i m e d at the state's t o u r i s m industry, a measure, a c c o r d i n g to media accounts, t h a t w a s d r a i n i n g m i l l i o n s of tourist dollars from that state. Seeking a c o m p r o ­ mise, i n M a y 2 0 0 0 , G o v e r n o r J i m H o d g e s b a c k e d a b i l l r e m o v i n g the flag from the dome of the statehouse, but a l l o w i n g a smaller one to be f l o w n o n a thirty-foot pole i n front near a m o n u m e n t to soldiers o f the Confederacy. T h i s c o m p r o m i s e legislation failed to satisfy the N A A C P , w h i c h has v o w e d to continue its boycott. T h e N A A C P president, K w e i s i M f u m e , a former member o f Congress, i n fact, singled out a n d crit­ icized the ten b l a c k state l a w m a k e r s (out o f thirty-three) w h o h a d v o t e d for the c o m p r o m i s e legislation. T h e w a r over r a c i a l s y m b o l s i n S o u t h C a r o l i n a p l a i n l y demonstrates that s y m b o l s matter not o n l y to B l a c k s but to m a n y W h i t e s as w e l l . A few months earlier, South C a r o l i n a finally agreed to recognize D r . M a r ­ tin L u t h e r K i n g , Jr.'s b i r t h d a y as a state holiday, but o n l y as p a r t o f a c o m p r o m i s e bill that created a state h o l i d a y called the " C o n f e d e r a t e M e m o r i a l D a y . " T o ignore the role that elected representatives play i n s y m b o l i c a l l y representing their constituents a n d to e x a m i n e o n l y the substantive legislative products is to miss a v e r y c r i t i c a l c o m p o n e n t o f h o w constituents are a c t u a l l y represented in the A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l system. F i n a l l y , Congress is an institution w i t h h i s t o r i c a l a n d m o m e n t o u s w e i g h t i n A m e r i c a n politics, a n d not s i m p l y because o f the collective output of its members as agents o f the p u b l i c . Rather, members of C o n ­ gress c a r r y great influence for the actions that they take as i n d i v i d u a l actors w i t h i n the " p u b l i c sphere." T h i s p u b l i c sphere, as conceptualized by D a v i d M a y h e w ( 2 0 0 0 ) , represents the p u b l i c consciousness. A s means of pressing u p o n the collective consciousness, members have a w i d e ar­ r a y o f activities to consider that c a n n o t be adequately captured by the C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s description of the legislature's functions. " W i t h the m e m ­ ber's j o b , " M a y h e w w r i t e s , "goes a license to persuade, c o n n i v e , h a t c h ideas, propagandize, assail enemies, vote, b u i l d c o a l i t i o n s , shepherd leg­ i s l a t i o n , a n d i n general cut a figure i n p u b l i c a f f a i r s . " T h e member's capacity to influence collective outcomes a n d possibly t r a n s f o r m society

The P u z z l e o f R e p r e s e n t a t i o n

•

17

t h r o u g h issue preference f o r m a t i o n is far greater t h a n his or hers a b i l i t y to m a k e l a w s . T h e presence or absence o f B l a c k s w i t h i n the C o n g r e s s , w i t h i n the U . S . Senate, therefore, has far greater consequences t h a n t e x t b o o k treatments of Congress generally suggest. I t is not s i m p l y a p r o b l e m of w h e t h e r electing B l a c k s c a n cost parties' their majorities, but significantly m o r e t h a n this. M e m b e r s of Congress possess a " p o w e r of o n e " i n a d d i t i o n to their c o n t r i b u t i o n as one o f 5 3 5 . T h i s b r o a d understanding o f Congress elevates the p r o b l e m of B l a c k p o l i t i c a l repre­ sentation as citizens are not o n l y represented t h r o u g h the enactment o f p u b l i c l a w s . Constituents are represented t h r o u g h m a n y m o r e activities t h a n bill i n i t i a t i o n a n d r o l l - c a l l votes.

POLITICAL REPRESENTATION: T H E VIEW FROM THE BLACK

ELECTORATE

A s the quote at the beginning of this chapter suggests, the concept of representation is elusive. L i k e power, it m a y elude a l l efforts t o w a r d a precise theoretical definition. Constituents are represented i n everything that legislators do i n their f o r m a l capacity as elected representatives. M e m b e r s of Congress engage i n three p r i n c i p a l , interrelated activities: (1) constituency service, ( 2 ) p o l i c y - m a k i n g , a n d (3) reelection. O u t of a l l of their activities, members substantively, s y m b o l i c a l l y , a n d descriptively represent their constituencies. Constituents are substantively repre­ sented by legislators i n the f o r m of p o l i c y initiatives, votes o n policy, a n d i n the f o r m o f constituency service. T h e y are represented i n activ­ ities b e l o w the floor level o f Congress, not as visible to the p u b l i c ( H a l l 1 9 9 6 ) . A t the same time, constituents c a n also be represented s y m b o l ­ ically. T h e y are represented by the " p o s i t i o n t a k i n g " that members of Congress engage i n , as described by D a v i d M a y h e w ( 1 9 7 4 ) . S y m b o l i c representation gives voice a n d recognition to the goals a n d values o f a key interest a n d s o c i a l group. Substantive a n d s y m b o l i c representation are not m u t u a l l y e x c l u s i v e categories but c a n o v e r l a p . A n d o f course, B l a c k legislators p r o v i d i n g substantive representation provide B l a c k constituents w i t h both. O f the three forms that p o l i t i c a l representation c a n take, w h i c h activities are recognized a n d valued most by constituents? P u b l i c k n o w l e d g e about Congress is a b y s m a l l y l o w . O r d i n a r y citizens do not a n d c a n n o t be expected to f o l l o w the legislative v o t i n g h i s t o r y of their representatives i n W a s h i n g t o n , w a t c h their floor speeches o n C - S p a n , a n d l e a r n about the interests f r o m w h o m they receive dona­ tions or the lobbyists w i t h w h o m they l u n c h . E m p i r i c a l w o r k i n c o n ­ gressional studies has generally focused o n elections, not representation. I m p o r t a n t determinants of the congressional vote are p o l i t i c a l p a r t y a n d ideology. F o r sure, political party is a n i m p o r t a n t element i n e v a l u a t i n g one's elected representative a n d in congressional elections ( M i l l e r a n d

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Stokes 1 9 6 3 ; E r i k s o n a n d W r i g h t 2 0 0 1 ) . I n l o w - i n f o r m a t i o n congressio­ n a l elections, party presents a clear choice. Some revisionist w o r k estab­ lished the importance of ideology a n d issues i n congressional elections. A l a n A b r a m o w i t z ' s analysis ( 1 9 8 4 ) s h o w s that ideology w a s a force i n the 1 9 8 0 a n d 1 9 8 2 H o u s e races. T h e more liberal the voter w a s , the more likely the voter w a s to vote D e m o c r a t i c . E r i k s o n a n d W r i g h t ( 2 0 0 1 ) s h o w that the member's ideology independent of p o l i t i c a l p a r t y is consistently l i n k e d to the vote decision i n the H o u s e elections. C a n d i ­ dates w h o s e ideologies are too extreme for their district generally are punished at the polls. W h i l e the evidence suggests that party a n d ideological records o f members do matter to their p o o r l y informed constituents i n elections, R i c h a r d Fenno's detailed case studies establish that members o f C o n ­ gress emphasize their personal qualities as m u c h as, a n d perhaps m o r e t h a n , their p o l i c y stands. R e a d i n g Fenno's H o m e S t y l e , one is s t r u c k by h o w m u c h members o f Congress stress their " d e s c r i p t i v e " representa­ t i o n o f constituents w h e n i n their districts. F e n n o quotes one congress­ m a n telling his audience, " I a m not e x a c t l y one of y o u , but w e have a lot i n c o m m o n , a n d I feel a lot like y o u . " I t m a y be that w i t h most members of Congress socially so u n l i k e the p o p u l a t i o n , members w o r k very h a r d at identifying w i t h their constituents a n d connecting w i t h t h e m at a personal level. S a m u e l L . P o p k i n ( 1 9 9 1 ) w r i t e s a b o u t h o w presidential candidates w i l l eat tacos i n M e x i c a n A m e r i c a n c o m m u n i t i e s to symbolize their support. S i m i l a r l y politicians d u r i n g the c a m p a i g n w i l l eschew suit jackets to b o n d s y m b o l i c a l l y w i t h the ordinary, w o r k ­ ing person. T h i s effort to identify a n d b o n d c a n be p o l i t i c a l l y costly, as w h e n a W a s h i n g t o n P o s t n e w s story quoted then-Georgia U . S . Senator W y c h e F o w l e r telling a B l a c k audience i n his reelection c a m p a i g n that " I ' m black — w h i t e o n the outside but b l a c k o n the inside." H i s R e p u b ­ l i c a n opponent P a u l C o v e r d e l l made copies o f the story a n d h a d it dis­ tributed to his supporters at political rallies ( M a c N e i l / L e h r e r N e w s H o u r transcript, 1 1 / 2 3 / 9 2 ) . C o v e r d e l l w e n t o n to defeat F o w l e r n a r r o w l y i n the 1 9 9 2 Senate race. Voters use demographic facts about candidates s u c h as their race, ethnicity, gender, religion, a n d social origins, as a " l o w - i n f o r m a t i o n s h o r t c u t " a c c o r d i n g to S a m u e l P o p k i n ( 1 9 9 1 ) to estimate their p o l i c y stands. Voters also use more i n f o r m a t i o n , w h e n a v a i l a b l e , s u c h as p a r t y affiliation a n d the candidate's qualifications, but descriptive characteris­ tics are not s i m p l y ignored. T h e public's i n a b i l i t y to f o l l o w a n d interpret W a s h i n g t o n politics m a y i n the end give special w e i g h t to the s y m b o l i c f o r m of representation, and specifically, then, to descriptive representation. W o r k by L a w r e n c e B o b o a n d F r a n k l i n D . G i l l i a m , J r . ( 1 9 9 0 ) has found that the descriptive representation o f B l a c k s is p o l i t i c a l l y e m p o w e r i n g ,

The Puzzle of Representation

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19

that i s , B l a c k s descriptively represented are m o r e interested a n d active i n politics t h a n B l a c k s w h o are not descriptively represented i n govern­ ment. T h e y contend that believing the system perhaps to be m o r e re­ sponsive to their needs a n d interests w h e n B l a c k s h o l d positions o f p o w e r i n government, B l a c k citizens become more p o l i t i c a l l y active. B l a c k elected officials represent a potent s y m b o l of B l a c k s ' i n c l u s i o n i n the polity, i n s p i r i n g m o r e B l a c k s to take p a r t i n it. S i m i l a r l y , N a n c y L . S c h w a r t z ( 1 9 8 8 ) , f o l l o w i n g a long line of theorists, argues that p o l i t i c a l representation c a n be e m p o w e r i n g , a vehicle t h r o u g h w h i c h citizens be­ come educated a n d become l i n k e d to their c o m m u n i t i e s . I f descriptive representation i n W a s h i n g t o n is found to e m p o w e r B l a c k s politically, the case for s t r u c t u r i n g elections to achieve their descriptive representa­ t i o n is strengthened. T h i s definition o f representation is a general one, not at a l l e x c l u s i v e to B l a c k s . I believe that legislators strive i n their everyday activities to represent their constituents descriptively as w e l l as substantively a n d s y m b o l i c a l l y . W h e t h e r constituents value that descrip­ tive representation as w e l l as substantive representation, however, or whether o n l y m a r g i n a l i z e d s o c i a l groups v a l u e descriptive a n d s y m b o l i c representation m o r e , is a n open question that I address i n the book's conclusion. T h e p r o b l e m of race a n d p o l i t i c a l representation generates a n u m b e r of c o m p l i c a t e d issues. People d o g m a t i c a l l y fall o n one side o f the fence, either opposed to the value a n d a l l means o f a c h i e v i n g descriptive repre­ sentation i n government for B l a c k s a n d other political m i n o r i t i e s , or i n favor. F o r those readers w h o already have made up their m i n d s i n this debate, I w o u l d l i k e to illustrate both the appeal a n d costs of descriptive representation through the a p p l i c a t i o n of a sports metaphor. W i t h respect to B l a c k descriptive representation, is it enough that B l a c k s identify w i t h a team a n d cheer it o n to v i c t o r y o n the sidelines, or, to t r u l y take part in the activity, must some o f the players on the field also be B l a c k ? W h a t happens to B l a c k supporters i f none of the players are ever members of their o w n race ? A r e they as enthused about the game as supporters w h o s e social groups are w e l l represented o n the field? W i l l they continue to s h o w up at the games even i f they receive shares i n the team's victories? W i l l they continue to care i f their t e a m w i n s or loses i n events? W h a t if, however, h a v i n g B l a c k members o n the field as players reduces the team's l i k e l i h o o d o f w i n n i n g ? After a l l , as m a n y contend, l i k e S w a i n ( 1 9 9 3 ) , the practice of constructing m a j o r i t y B l a c k congressional districts reduces the l i k e l i h o o d of other D e m o c r a t s w i n n i n g their seats. Some contend that the dozen or so m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts constructed i n the 1 9 9 0 r o u n d of r e d i s r i c t i n g helped the R e ­ p u b l i c a n p a r t y become the m a j o r i t y p a r t y i n the U . S . H o u s e o f R e p r e ­ sentatives i n 1 9 9 4 . B u t still, might B l a c k players b r i n g different strate-

20

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Chapter 1

gies ( a n d agendas) to the field, a n d might they seek to achieve different goals that w e r e not apparent before? I n short, is the race o f the players salient a n d i m p o r t a n t to the m a n y B l a c k spectators in the stands? T h i s is the central question that m y study takes up.

OVERVIEW OF T H E BOOK

I n the first h a l f o f the b o o k I consider the question o f w h e t h e r B l a c k members o f Congress are different f r o m their W h i t e counterparts. C h a p t e r 2 begins by focusing o n a n elemental but neglected aspect o f the question, n a m e l y the sociological characteristics of B l a c k s i n office c o m p a r e d to those o f W h i t e s . T h e nature o f o u r system requires that i n d i v i d u a l s have w e a l t h a n d education, a n d that they belong to c e r t a i n occupations as i n f o r m a l prerequisites for p u b l i c office. T h e higher the office, the higher the status demands. A r e B l a c k legislators m o r e l i k e the average B l a c k A m e r i c a n i n terms of their o c c u p a t i o n , w e a l t h , education, a n d gender or more like their W h i t e counterparts in the H o u s e ? I f B l a c k s legislators are u n l i k e their B l a c k constituents o n a l m o s t every social d i m e n s i o n but race, w h a t is the r e a l value o f descriptive represen­ tation? C h a p t e r 3 e x a m i n e s their elections to Congress. C e r t a i n l y , most B l a c k s i n Congress represent districts v e r y m u c h u n l i k e their W h i t e counterparts as they are m a j o r i t y - B l a c k or m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y in p o p u l a ­ t i o n . W h e t h e r the fact that B l a c k members are elected i n m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts gives t h e m a degree o f "electoral i m m u n i t y " is addressed i n this chapter. W h i l e ample n e w research has e x a m i n e d this, chapter 4 once again compares the p o l i t i c a l styles a n d v o t i n g records o f B l a c k legisla­ tors a n d W h i t e legislators through a n a n a l y s i s of their v o t i n g records. A departure f r o m past w o r k , however, is a c o m p a r i s o n of B l a c k m e m b e r s ' key votes i n the 1 0 4 t h Congress to a c t u a l p u b l i c o p i n i o n data o n A f r i ­ can A m e r i c a n s . C h a p t e r 5 addresses the issue of s y m b o l i c representa­ t i o n . Representation is m u c h more t h a n p o r k b a r r e l policies; the repre­ sentation o f B l a c k s through s y m b o l i c legislation is presented as a v a l u e d component o f h o w legislators elected to represent c o m m u n i t i e s a n d groups. W h e t h e r B l a c k legislators offer o n l y " s y m b o l s " a n d not sub­ stantive p u b l i c policies that benefit B l a c k s a n d the general p u b l i c is a charge that I also consider i n this chapter. T h e second h a l f o f the b o o k addresses the relevance that race has for B l a c k s i n terms of their p o l i t i c a l representation. C h a p t e r 6 e x a m i n e s the i m p a c t that race has o n h o w satisfied b l a c k s are w i t h their representa­ t i o n i n Congress. I n chapter 7, I determine w h e t h e r N a n c y S c h w a r t z ' s c l a i m s about the constitutive value o f p o l i t i c a l representation is v a l i d or

The Puzzle of Representation

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not. D o e s representation e m p o w e r B l a c k s ? D o e s h a v i n g B l a c k represen­ t a t i o n i n the H o u s e affect the attitudes that B l a c k s have about the insti­ tution? I n chapter 8, I e x a m i n e the l i n k between attitudes t o w a r d C o n ­ gress, p o l i t i c a l trust, a n d descriptive representation. C h a p t e r 9 presents m y c o n c l u s i o n s a b o u t the degree to w h i c h race affects the p o l i t i c a l rep­ resentation o f B l a c k s a n d the degree to w h i c h Congress must socially m i r r o r B l a c k s to be a representative governing body.

THE

1996

NATIONAL BLACK ELECTION

AND T H E1 0 4 ™

STUDY

CONGRESS

M u c h o f the data a n a l y z e d in this b o o k are f r o m the 1 9 9 6 N a t i o n a l B l a c k E l e c t i o n Study (Tate 1 9 9 8 ) . T h e 1 9 9 6 N B E S is a s u r v e y of 1,126 A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s modeled after the 1 9 8 4 N a t i o n a l B l a c k E l e c t i o n Study, the first-ever n a t i o n a l telephone survey o f a r a c i a l m i n o r i t y group ( J a c k s o n 1 9 9 3 ) . T h e 1 9 9 6 N B E S w a s designed w i t h an e x p l i c i t congres­ s i o n a l focus. Respondents were matched to their congressional districts t h r o u g h their telephone exchanges a n d a s k e d to evaluate their H o u s e representatives. A total o f 2 5 2 H o u s e districts fell into the 1 9 9 6 sample, i n c l u d i n g the districts of 3 4 of 3 9 B l a c k members of the H o u s e . A de­ s c r i p t i o n of the sample design a n d survey is presented i n A p p e n d i x A . T h e s e 2 5 2 H o u s e legislators w e r e p a r t o f the 1 0 4 t h Congress. T h i s Congress has a special place i n history because it w a s the first Congress w i t h a R e p u b l i c a n m a j o r i t y i n the H o u s e of Representatives i n forty years. I n fact, R e p u b l i c a n s controlled both houses i n the 1 0 4 t h C o n ­ gress. T w o B l a c k R e p u b l i c a n s w e r e also part o f this n e w R e p u b l i c a n majority, J . C . W a t t s of O k l a h o m a , a star of the R e p u b l i c a n freshman class, i n fact, and G a r y F r a n k s of C o n n e c t i c u t . T h e i r districts, less t h a n 2 percent B l a c k , d i d not fall into the 1 9 9 6 N B E S sample, however. T h e first 1 0 0 days o f R e p u b l i c a n leadership i n Congress w e r e staged for d r a m a . M a n y H o u s e R e p u b l i c a n s h a d c a m p a i g n e d o n the basis o f a " C o n t r a c t w i t h A m e r i c a , " a p o l i c y agenda consisting of ten legislative proposals, such as a balanced budget amendment a n d welfare r e f o r m . R e p u b l i c a n candidates pledged to b r i n g these contract items to the floor of the H o u s e for a vote i n the first 1 0 0 days of the n e w session. Presi­ dent C l i n t o n w o u l d veto the R e p u b l i c a n budget p l a n . W i t h H o u s e R e ­ p u b l i c a n s u n w i l l i n g to r e a c h agreement, the government w o u l d shut d o w n o n D e c e m b e r 1 6 , 1 9 9 5 through J a n u a r y 2 , 1 9 9 6 . T h e t w e n t y one-day s h u t d o w n is so far the government's longest one, d u r i n g w h i c h federal w o r k e r s d i d not receive full pay a n d most federal offices a n d museums w e r e closed over the C h r i s t m a s h o l i d a y (Sinclair 1 9 9 7 , 2 0 6 1 2 ) . T h i s s h u t d o w n , w r i t e s one j o u r n a l i s t , " w o u l d i n fact s u r v i v e as the

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most enduring a c c o m p l i s h m e n t [of the 1 0 4 t h Congress] . . . N o other Congress in the country's h i s t o r y h a d closed d o w n the government for three w e e k s " ( K i l l i a n 1 9 9 8 ) . T h i s w a s the political c o n t e x t the 1996 N B E S w a s conducted i n . T h e 1 9 9 6 N B E S w a s a t w o - w a v e panel study i n w h i c h 1,126 B l a c k s w e r e i n t e r v i e w e d shortly after the 1 9 9 6 n a t i o n a l conventions a n d the day preceding the N o v e m b e r election. E i g h t hundred s i x t y - n i n e B l a c k s w e r e reinterviewed shortly after the N o v e m b e r election. N o t o n l y were these B l a c k respondents asked to choose a president, they w e r e v o t i n g i n a n e w Congress: the 1 0 5 t h . R e p u b l i c a n s w o u l d retain their majorities i n Congress i n the 1 9 9 6 elections, but by a n even smaller m a r g i n .

C H A P T E R

2

Black Members of Congress

O N E W A Y T O R E P R E S E N T is to be s i m i l a r to those one is representing, but the U . S . Congress is far from representative i n this respect. A s pointed out i n chapter 1, B l a c k s and w o m e n are n u m e r i c a l l y under represented i n Congress. T o d a y ' s Congress is 88 percent n o n - H i s p a n i c W h i t e a n d 89 percent male. B u t another significant s o c i a l feature of Congress is the overrepresentation o f the economic and social elite. M a n y o f its m e m ­ bers are upper-middle class, w h o p r e v i o u s l y to being elected w o r k e d in law, business, or p u b l i c service. A significant m i n o r i t y elected to the U . S . Congress are m i l l i o n a i r e s . T h a t members o f Congress disproportionately belong to the socio­ economic elite is not a direct consequence of h o w Congress w a s de­ signed. A l t h o u g h T h o m a s Jefferson, J a m e s M a d i s o n , a n d A l e x a n d e r H a m i l t o n assumed a n d sought a republican government composed o f members from their o w n economic a n d social class, they deliberately rejected a " H o u s e o f L o r d s . " T h e architects of the A m e r i c a n govern­ ment imposed very few formal qualifications for h o l d i n g office i n the n a t i o n a l government. M e m b e r s merely h a d to be U . S . citizens for seven to nine years a n d meet the age requirement of twenty-five for the H o u s e a n d t h i r t y for the Senate. A s stated i n Federalist N o . 5 7 , " W h o are to be the objects of popular choice? E v e r y citizen w h o s e merit m a y r e c o m ­ m e n d h i m to the esteem a n d confidence o f his country. N o qualification of w e a l t h , o f b i r t h , o f religious faith, or of c i v i l profession is permitted to fetter the judgment or disappoint the i n c l i n a t i o n of the people." T o this bare-bones list, i n d i v i d u a l states imposed residency requirements a n d candidate filing fees. States w o u l d also, o f course, w r i t e into their o w n constitutions l a w s e x p l i c i t l y p r o h i b i t i n g w o m e n a n d B l a c k s from v o t i n g a n d h o l d i n g public office u n t i l Congress amended the U . S . C o n ­ stitution a n d enforced the political rights of these legally-subordinated groups ( M c C l a i n a n d Stewart 1 9 9 8 ) . I n contrast to the social characteristics o f legislators, p o l i t i c a l party a n d the demographic characteristics of the district that they represent are far more critical determinants o f the legislator's v o t i n g pattern (e.g., R . H . D a v i d s o n 1 9 6 9 ) . A t the same time, congressional scholars recog­ nize the i m p o r t a n t role social b a c k g r o u n d , n o t a b l y w e a l t h , plays in de­ t e r m i n i n g w h o a c t u a l l y runs for elective office i n the U n i t e d States. R u n n i n g for Congress takes a lot of money a n d a lot o f time. T o

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defeat a sitting H o u s e incumbent seeking reelection i n the 1 9 9 6 election cycle ( w h i c h few d i d ) , the average successful challenger spent m o r e t h a n $ 1 m i l l i o n ( O r n s t e i n , M a n n , a n d M a l b i n 1 9 9 8 , 7 8 ) . M a n y candidates r u n n i n g for Congress start out by using a p o r t i o n o f their o w n w e a l t h to finance their campaigns. W h i l e m u c h o f the m o n e y for p o l i t i c a l c a m ­ paigns comes f r o m P A C donations, m o r e t h a n h a l f is generated t h r o u g h i n d i v i d u a l contributions. W h o donates to p o l i t i c a l campaigns? Gener­ ally, the w e a l t h i e r do. A n d thus, it is useful to belong to the w e a l t h i e r classes a n d have a circle of friends a n d acquaintances w h o c a n afford to donate. M o n e y begets money. C a n d i d a t e s need to prove their p o l i t i c a l v i a b i l i t y by establishing their a b i l i t y to raise a lot o f money. Interest groups are m o r e likely to contribute to the candidate most l i k e l y to w i n , regardless o f the candidate's ideology. I t is also a fact that the m a j o r p o l i t i c a l parties w i l l deny c a m p a i g n funds to otherwise attractive c a n d i ­ dates i f their c a m p a i g n organizations are not (yet) sufficiently funded. A l l i n a l l , w e a l t h y i n d i v i d u a l s have a tremendous advantage over the average citizen i n financing their p o l i t i c a l campaigns. T i m e is also i m ­ p o r t a n t , a n d here is w h e r e o w n i n g y o u r o w n business or firm c a n facili­ tate a b i d for public office. A s the owner, y o u c a n determine the h o u r s that y o u ' l l w o r k a n d those that y o u ' l l spend o n the c a m p a i g n . A n d w h e n y o u ' r e the boss, y o u don't need to p u n c h a c l o c k , use up y o u r v a c a t i o n time, or quit to pursue p u b l i c office. E v e n w h i l e the b a c k g r o u n d characteristics of legislators is a nonissue for most i n the study o f Congress, it r e m a i n s n o r m a t i v e l y i m p o r t a n t to the issue of fair political representation for B l a c k s . A r e the B l a c k s w h o w i n seats i n the U . S . Congress closer i n s o c i a l b a c k g r o u n d to their W h i t e colleagues i n Congress, a n d , therefore, u n l i k e most of their B l a c k constituents? I f the a n s w e r is yes, then, the argument that B l a c k s need descriptive representation i n government become less c o m p e l l i n g . T h o s e a d v o c a t i n g descriptive representation often base their case o n c l a i m s that B l a c k legislators w i l l share the same experiences as the B l a c k s w h o m they represent. S u c h c l a i m s are patently less true if, i n fact, B l a c k m e m ­ bers belong to a homogeneously elite s o c i a l class. R e c o g n i z i n g that race w i l l still affect their life experiences, e c o n o m i c a l l y privileged B l a c k s still lead s t r i k i n g l y different lives f r o m the B l a c k p o o r or w o r k i n g class. I n this chapter, I e x a m i n e the social backgrounds o f B l a c k s elected to Congress d u r i n g three periods, R e c o n s t r u c t i o n to 1 9 0 0 , the C i v i l R i g h t s E r a , a n d the P o s t - C i v i l R i g h t s E r a . T h i s issue has garnered some pre­ v i o u s research ( S w a i n 1 9 9 3 ; B u t t o n a n d Hedge 1 9 9 7 ) . P o l i t i c a l scientist C a r o l S w a i n i n her r e v i e w of the s o c i a l b a c k g r o u n d s of B l a c k legislators concluded that B l a c k representatives "share b a c k g r o u n d s quite s i m i l a r to those of the w h i t e males i n C o n g r e s s , " except that a higher percent­ age of B l a c k H o u s e members h a d p r i o r officeholding experience ( 1 9 9 3 ,

Black Members of Congress

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27

8 6 ) . W h i l e m y investigation into this matter s o m e w h a t corroborates S w a i n ' s , I still report k e y differences between B l a c k a n d W h i t e legisla­ tors mostly o n social dimensions, such as slave experience, w h i c h S w a i n either glossed over, or those s u c h as m a r i t a l status, w h i c h she s i m p l y o v e r l o o k e d . N o t a b l y , I find that greater diversity of life experiences is brought into the H o u s e not o n l y because o f race, but because o f gender as w e l l . I find that B l a c k w o m e n legislators are r e m a r k a b l y u n l i k e their W h i t e male counterparts.

T H E FIRST BLACKS TO SERVE I N T H E H O U S E FROM RECONSTRUCTION TO

1900

A period lasting from 1 8 6 3 to 1 8 7 7 , R e c o n s t r u c t i o n c o m m e n c e d w i t h L i n c o l n ' s E m a n c i p a t i o n P r o c l a m a t i o n a n d i n c l u d e d the ratification o f the T h i r t e e n , F o u r t e e n t h , a n d Fifteenth amendments. O f a l l manner o f w a y s in w h i c h l i b e r a l R e p u b l i c a n s attempted to create a c o l o r - b l i n d de­ m o c r a c y d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , B l a c k p o l i t i c a l officeholding w a s per­ haps their most r a d i c a l p r o p o s a l . R e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d B l a c k officehold­ ing pretty m u c h ended w i t h the election o f President H a y e s . H a y e s w o u l d oversee the w i t h d r a w a l of federal troops from the S o u t h . W h i l e m u c h o f B l a c k officeholding w o u l d end once the troops left the region, B l a c k s w o u l d still w i n seats to Congress from 1 8 7 8 to 1 9 0 0 . T h e s e B l a c k s w e r e , w i t h o u t exception, a l l m e n as w e l l as a l l R e p u b l i c a n . Slavery, education, a n d w e a l t h w e r e the most i m p o r t a n t distinctions that separated B l a c k s of the nineteenth century from their W h i t e c o u n ­ terparts. M o s t B l a c k s w e r e slaves u n t i l L i n c o l n ' s E m a n c i p a t i o n P r o c l a ­ m a t i o n . M o s t B l a c k s w e r e b o r n a n d resided i n the S o u t h . M o s t were illiterate a n d poor. E a r l y historians w o u l d i n a c c u r a t e l y p o r t r a y the B l a c k s elected d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n as incompetent and c o r r u p t . W h i l e some indeed t o o k part i n the r a m p a n t c o r r u p t i o n of A m e r i c a ' s " G i l d e d A g e , " revisionists w o u l d later depict them as r e m a r k a b l e B l a c k m e n of political a c u m e n a n d courage. I t w a s , after a l l , a courageous act to r u n for public office as a B l a c k m a n i n the S o u t h . R o u g h l y 2 , 0 0 0 B l a c k s held public office i n the South d u r i n g R e c o n ­ struction ( F o n e r 1 9 9 6 ) . E v e n though it h a d been illegal i n the s l a v i n g h o l d i n g South to teach slaves to read a n d w r i t e , more t h a n h a l f o f these B l a c k officials w e r e ex-slaves a n d over 80 percent were literate. T w o B l a c k s sat i n the Senate a n d t w e n t y served in the H o u s e d u r i n g the 4 1 s t to 5 6 t h congresses (see table 2 . 1 ) . A l l represented states i n the S o u t h , i n c l u d i n g five states that, after most B l a c k s were disenfranchised, w o u l d not send another A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n to Congress for one h u n d r e d years. O f the t w e n t y b l a c k s w h o served i n Congress, ten h a d experienced slavery, w h i l e ten h a d been b o r n free. A l l w e r e literate. R o b e r t B r o w n

28

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TABLE

Chapter 2 2.1

Black Members of the House of Representatives in the Nineteenth Century by State State

Black Representative

Years

Served

Alabama

Jeremiah Haralson James T. Rapier Benjamin S. Turner

1875-77 1873-75 1871-73

Florida

Josiah T. Walls

1871-76

Georgia

Jefferson Long

1870-71

Louisiana

Charles E . Nash

1875-77

Mississippi

John R . Lynch

1873-77, 1882-83

North Carolina

Henry P. Cheatham John A . Hyman James E . O ' H a r a George H . White

1889-93 1875-77 1883-87 1897-1901

South Carolina

Richard H . Cain Robert C . DeLarge Robert B . Elliott Thomas E . Miller George W. Murray Joseph H . Rainey Alonzo J . Ransier Robert Smalls

1873-75, 1877-79 1871-73 1871-74 1890-91 1893-95, 1 8 9 6 - 9 7 1870-79 1873-75 1875-79, 1 8 8 2 - 8 3 , 1 8 8 4 - 8 7

Virginia

John M . Langston

1890-91

S o u r c e : M e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s S i n c e 1 7 8 9 (Washington, D.C.: Inc., 1977), p. 6.

Congressional Quarterly

E l l i o t t w a s perhaps the best educated a m o n g them. A l t h o u g h no r e c o r d of his attendance there exists, his congressional biography " b o a s t s " a n education at E t o n College i n E n g l a n d (Foner 1 9 9 6 , 7 0 ) . E l l i o t t w a s b o r n a n d educated i n the N o r t h a n d later m o v e d to South C a r o l i n a to establish a l a w practice i n 1 8 6 8 . H e served i n the U . S . H o u s e of R e p r e ­ sentatives from 1 8 7 1 to 1 8 7 4 . S i x of the ex-slave congressmen learned to read a n d w r i t e s o m e h o w during slavery. J o h n A . H y m a n ' s attempts at b o o k reading supposedly so enraged his o w n e r s that he w a s repeat­ edly sold a n d by emancipation h a d passed t h r o u g h eight o f t h e m ( C h r i s ­ topher 1 9 7 1 , 1 4 9 ) . T w o , J o h n L y n c h o f M i s s i s s i p p i a n d R o b e r t S m a l l s of South C a r o l i n a , were able to receive schooling o n l y after the w a r .

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E l l i o t t a n d O ' H a r a w e r e the only ones born outside o f region; the rest w e r e native sons o f the South. M a n y B l a c k officials d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n were teachers, ministers, businessmen, farmers, a n d artisans, the latter group consisting o f h i g h status slave trades that required skill a n d gave them relative indepen­ dence even d u r i n g slavery. A few of the B l a c k congressmen w e r e a r t i ­ sans. B o t h Joseph H . R a i n e y a n d R o b e r t C . D e L a r g e w e r e barbers, w h i l e Jefferson L o n g w o r k e d as a tailor. O f the three, only D e L a r g e had been free, the son a free B l a c k tailor. D e L a r g e , i n fact, h a d been able to attend a high school in C h a r l e s t o n . J o h n R . L y n c h w a s the slave son o f a L o u i s i a n a p l a n t a t i o n master w h o remained a slave until freed by the U n i o n army. H e w o r k e d i n the U n i o n a r m y until 1865 w h e n he took up photography as a trade. L y n c h served three terms in Congress, w h e r e he was its youngest member. L y n c h w o u l d later be admitted to the M i s s i s ­ sippi bar. H e w o u l d retire, however, from the military, a n d w r i t e books, i n c l u d i n g one entitled T h e F a c t s o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . O n l y one of the fourteen B l a c k congressmen began as a laborer. C h a r l e s E . N a s h of L o u ­ i s i a n a , born free, h a d a public school education. H e w o r k e d as a b r i c k ­ layer before enlisting i n the U n i o n army. After losing most of his leg d u r i n g battle, he held a post i n the customs house before w i n n i n g elec­ tion in 1 8 7 4 to Congress. After R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , he served as a postmas­ ter then w o r k e d as a cigar m a k e r i n N e w O r l e a n s u n t i l his death. T h e rest o f the B l a c k congressmen either w o r k e d i n f a r m i n g or w e r e professionals i n l a w , publishing, or the ministry. J o s i a h T . W a l l s o f F l o r ­ ida entered business after w o r k i n g for the U n i o n a r m y a n d obtaining some schooling i n the N o r t h . After serving only one term as F l o r i d a ' s only B l a c k R e c o n s t r u c t i o n congressman from 1 8 7 1 to 1 8 7 3 , he later practiced l a w and published a newspaper. A s noted earlier, E l l i o t t o f South C a r o l i n a w a s a lawyer, but he also helped edit the S o u t h C a r o l i n a L e a d e r , w h i c h A l o n z o J . R a n s i e r of South C a r o l i n a also helped edit. P r i o r to the w a r , Ransier, a free B l a c k , h a d w o r k e d as a c l e r k i n a p r o m ­ inent shipping house i n C h a r l e s t o n . R o b e r t Smalls published the B e a u ­ fort S t a n d a r d , another successful B l a c k newspaper in South C a r o l i n a . A s a twenty-three-year-old slave, S m a l l s h a d w o n his freedom a n d his family's by piloting a Confederate a r m y vessel into U n i o n hands ( C h r i s ­ topher 1 9 7 1 , 3 8 - 3 9 ) . T h e deed w a s w i d e l y publicized a n d so d a r i n g that the outraged Confederates offered $ 4 , 0 0 0 for his capture. R i c h a r d H . C a i n w a s a minister w h o also edited the S o u t h C a r o l i n a L e a d e r . C a i n had been born free a n d w a s educated i n O h i o . A convert o f the M e t h o d i s t E p i s c o p a l faith, he left it because o f the church's segregation­ ist policies to j o i n the A f r i c a n M e t h o d i s t E p i s c o p a l C h u r c h . H e later rebuilt the E m m a n u e l C h u r c h in C h a r l e s t o n into the state's largest A M E congregation. T h e c h u r c h operated as his political base. Serving o n l y

30

* Chapter 2

one t e r m , 1 8 7 5 - 7 7 , J e r e m i a h H a r a l s o n o f A l a b a m a w a s the R e c o n ­ struction Congress's second B l a c k minister. H a r a l s o n h a d w o r k e d as a field h a n d a n d h a d been sold once o n the a u c t i o n b l o c k . H e w a s also remembered as a gifted campaigner, using h u m o r to speak out against racism. I n terms o f w e a l t h , few o f the fourteen men w h o served i n Congress entered politics w e a l t h y or were as financially secure as their W h i t e counterparts. H e r e is w h e r e I s h a r p l y diverge f r o m C a r o l S w a i n ' s c o n ­ c l u s i o n that I n financial terms, too, b l a c k members of Congress [ d u r i n g R e c o n ­ struction] w e r e quite w e l l off. O n l y one b l a c k representative h a d a n estate w o r t h less t h a n $ 1 , 0 0 0 , w h i l e five h a d estates r a n g i n g i n v a l u e f r o m $ 5 , 0 0 0 to $ 2 0 , 0 0 0 — v e r y respectable fortunes for the time. B l a c k Congress members i n the nineteenth century, therefore, fit the standard profile of q u a l i t y candidates. J u s t like w h i t e members then a n d n o w , these b l a c k legislators w e r e not socially, economically, or educationally representative of their constituents ( 1 9 9 7 : 8 5 - 8 6 ) . 1

M y e x a m i n a t i o n o f the t w e n t y B l a c k H o u s e - m e m b e r s is consistent w i t h Foner's o v e r a l l c o n c l u s i o n , that they generally lived off their congres­ s i o n a l salaries a n d w e r e h a r d l y financially secure. A c c o r d i n g to histo­ r i a n E r i c Foner, the wealthiest o f the B l a c k s elected d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c ­ t i o n w e r e generally freedmen, of w h i c h o n l y h a l f o f those elected to the H o u s e w e r e . M o s t B l a c k legislators i n the H o u s e w e r e s m a l l business­ m e n . R o b e r t E l l i o t t , the Representative f r o m South C a r o l i n a , h a d to ask for s m a l l loans f r o m his W h i t e colleagues to p a y for d a i l y expenses ( F o n e r 1 9 9 6 , x x i i i ) . M o s t b l a c k elected officials relied o n their office for pay, concludes Foner. A few w o u l d die i n poverty a n d o b s c u r i t y as w e l l . A t the end o f his p o l i t i c a l career, J e r e m i a h H a r a l s o n of A l a b a m a m o v e d a r o u n d f r o m state to state, t a k i n g up a n u m b e r o f different jobs, i n c l u d ­ ing f a r m i n g a n d c o a l m i n i n g , before his death at seventy — reportedly i n Denver, although no death certificate exists i n that state. T h e basic pat­ tern w a s that B l a c k s returned to their s m a l l l a w practices or businesses i n the S o u t h . T h e moderately financially successful ones f o u n d a d m i n i s ­ trative posts i n government. J o h n A . H y m a n o f N o r t h C a r o l i n a h a d been p r o m i s e d a n administrative post after serving i n W a s h i n g t o n , but that never materialized. H e returned to manage his grocery store a n d f a r m , but eventually obtained a government job i n the C a p i t o l . H i s b i ­ ographer w r i t e s , " T h e r e w e r e brief, condescendingly c o m p l i m e n t a r y obituaries w h e n N o r t h C a r o l i n a ' s first N e g r o congressman died of a p a r a l y t i c stroke i n the nation's c a p i t a l o n September 1 4 , 1 8 9 1 , at the age of fifty-one." B l a c k officeholding w a s greatest i n S o u t h C a r o l i n a , w h e r e B l a c k s held

Black Members of Congress

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a clear m a j o r i t y of the state legislature's l o w e r house a n d , i n 1 8 7 2 , held four of the five posts i n the state's congressional delegation ( H o l t 1 9 7 7 ) . T h e biographies of the three B l a c k congressmen a n d t w o W h i t e s i n the C o n g r e s s i o n a l D i r e c t o r y printed in 1 8 7 8 r e a d as f o l l o w s a n d c a n be c o m p a r e d , beginning w i t h the b l a c k legislators: J o s e p h H . R a i n e y , o f G e o r g e t o w n , w a s b o r n at G e o r g e t o w n , S o u t h C a r o l i n a ( w h e r e both of his parents w e r e slaves, but by their i n d u s t r y obtained their freedom,) J u n e 2 1 , 1 8 3 2 . A l t h o u g h debarred by l a w f r o m attending s c h o o l , he a c q u i r e d a good education, a n d further i m p r o v e d his m i n d by observation a n d t r a v e l . H i s father w a s a bar­ ber, a n d he f o l l o w e d that o c c u p a t i o n at C h a r l e s t o n till 1 8 6 2 , w h e n , h a v i n g been forced to w o r k on the fortifications o f the Confederates, he escaped to the W e s t Indies, w h e r e he r e m a i n e d u n t i l the close o f the w a r , w h e n he returned to his native t o w n . H e w a s elected a D e l e ­ gate to the State C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n o f 1 8 6 8 , a n d w a s a m e m ­ ber o f the State Senate of S o u t h C a r o l i n a i n 1 8 7 0 , resigning w h e n elected to the F o r t y - f i r s t Congress as a R e p u b l i c a n to fill the v a c a n c y caused by the non-reception o f B . F . W h i t t e m o r e ; w a s elected to the F o r t y - s e c o n d , F o r t y - t h i r d , a n d F o r t y - f o u r t h Congresses; w a s a Presi­ dential E l e c t o r i n 1 8 7 6 , a n d w a s re-elected to the Forty-fifth Congress as a R e p u b l i c a n , receiving 1 8 , 1 8 0 votes against 1 6 , 6 6 1 votes for J . S. Richardson, Democrat. R i c h a r d H . C a i n , o f C h a r l e s t o n , w a s b o r n in G r e e n b r i e r C o u n t y , V i r ­ g i n i a , A p r i l 1 2 , 1 8 2 5 ; r e m o v e d to O h i o i n 1 8 3 1 , a n d settled i n G a l l i polis; received a l i m i t e d education entered the m i n i s t r y at a n early age; became a student at W i l b e r f o r c e U n i v e r s i t y , at X e n i a , O h i o , in 1 8 6 0 ; r e m o v e d to B r o o k l y n , N . Y . , w h e r e he discharged m i n i s t e r i a l duties for four y e a r s ; w a s sent as a m i s s i o n a r y to the freed m en i n S o u t h C a r o l i n a ; w a s chosen a member of the C o n s t i t u t i o n a l C o n v e n ­ tion o f South C a r o l i n a ; w a s elected a m e m b e r of the State Senate a n d served t w o years; edited a newspaper from 1 8 6 8 ; w a s elected to the F o r t y - t h i r d C o n g r e s s as a R e p u b l i c a n , receiving 2 1 , 3 8 5 votes against 1 6 , 0 7 1 votes for M . P. O ' C o n n o r , D e m o c r a t . Robert Smalls, of Beaufort, w a s b o r n at Beaufort, South C a r o l i n a , A p r i l 5, 1 8 3 9 ; being a slave, w a s debarred by statute f r o m attending s c h o o l , but educated himself w i t h such l i m i t e d advantages as he c o u l d secure; r e m o v e d to C h a r l e s t o n i n 1 8 5 1 , w o r k e d as a rigger, a n d led a seafaring life; became connected in 1 8 6 1 w i t h the " P l a n t e r , " a steamer p l y i n g i n C h a r l e s t o n H a r b o r as a transport, w h i c h he took over C h a r l e s t o n B a r in M a y , 1 8 6 2 , a n d delivered her a n d his services to the C o m m a n d e r o f the U n i t e d States B l o c k a d i n g S q u a d r o n ; w a s

32

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Chapter 2

appointed Pilot i n the U n i t e d States N a v y , a n d served i n that c a p a c i t y on the m o n i t o r " K e o k u k " i n the a t t a c k o n F o r t Sumter; served as Pilot i n the Quartermaster's D e p a r t m e n t , a n d w a s p r o m o t e d as C a p ­ t a i n for gallant a n d meritorious c o n d u c t D e c e m b e r 1, 1 8 6 3 , a n d placed i n c o m m a n d of the "Planter," serving u n t i l she w a s put out o f c o m m i s s i o n i n 1 8 6 6 ; w a s elected a member of the State C o n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n of 1 8 6 8 ; w a s elected a member o f the State H o u s e of Representatives i n 1 8 6 8 , a n d o f the Senate Senate, to fill a v a c a n c y , in 1 8 7 0 , a n d re-elected i n 1 8 7 2 ; w a s elected to the F o r t y - f o u r t h C o n ­ gress, a n d re-elected to the Forty-fifth Congress as a R e p u b l i c a n , re­ ceiving 1 9 , 9 5 4 votes against 1 8 , 5 1 6 votes for G . D . T i l l m a n . B e l o w are the biographies o f the t w o W h i t e D e m o c r a t s i n S o u t h C a r o ­ lina's delegation: D . Wyatt Aiken, of C o k e s bury, w a s b o r n at W i n n s b o r o , Fairfield C o u n t y , S o u t h C a r o l i n a , M a r c h 1 8 2 8 ; received a n a c a d e m i c educa­ t i o n at M o u n t Z i o n Institute, W i n n s b o r o ; graduated at the S o u t h C a r o l i n a College, C o l u m b i a , i n 1 8 4 9 ; taught school t w o years; settled u p o n a f a r m i n 1 8 5 2 , a n d has c o n t i n u e d until the present time to profess a n d practice f a r m i n g ; i n 1 8 6 1 entered the volunteer service o f the Southern Confederacy as a private; w a s appointed A d j u t a n t of the Seventh R e g i m e n t of Volunteers; w a s elected C o l o n e l o f the same w h e n re-organized at the e x p i r a t i o n o f their t e r m of serve; w a s re­ lieved f o r m service by reason of w o u n d s received o n the 1 7 o f Sep­ tember, 1 8 6 2 ; at A n t i e t a m ; w a s elected to the State L e g i s l a t u r e i n 1864 a n d again i n 1 8 6 6 ; w a s M a s t e r o f the State G r a n g e for t w o years a n d member o f the E x e c u t i v e C o m m i t t e e of the N a t i o n a l G r a n g e for s i x years; w a s a Delegate to the N a t i o n a l D e m o c r a t i c C o n v e n t i o n at Saint L o u i s that n o m i n a t e d T i l d e n a n d H e n d r i c k s ; w a s elected to the Forty-fifth Congress as a D e m o c r a t , receiving 2 1 , 4 7 9 votes against 1 5 , 5 5 3 votes for L . C a s s Carpenter, R e p u b l i c a n . R e - e l e c t e d . t h

John H . Evins, of S p a r t a n b u r g , w a s b o r n i n S p a r t a n b u r g D i s t r i c t , (now county,) S o u t h C a r o l i n a , J u l y 1 8 , 1 8 3 0 ; entered S o u t h C a r o l i n a College i n December, 1 8 5 0 , a n d graduated i n 1 8 5 3 ; studied l a w , a n d was admitted to practice i n 1 8 5 6 ; w a s a n officer i n the Confederate service, serving first as a F i r s t L i e u t e n a n t i n the Fifth S o u t h C a r o l i n a Regiment, a n d afterwards as a C a p t a i n i n the Palmetto Sharpshoot­ ers; w a s w o u n d e d , and being disabled f r o m active service n the field was appointed L i e u t e n a n t - C o l o n e l , a n d assigned to duty i n his o w n State; w a s a member o f the Legislature of S o u t h C a r o l i n a for t w o terms; a n d w a s elected to the Forty-fifty Congress as a D e m o c r a t ,

Black Members o f Congress

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33

receiving 2 1 , 8 7 5 votes against 1 6 , 0 7 1 votes for A . S. W a l l a c e , R e p u b ­ lican. R e - e l e c t e d . T h e biographies reveal vast social differences between the m e n that extend w e l l beyond merely their race. F i r s t , there w a s slavery. A l t h o u g h o n l y S m a l l s h a d been b o r n a slave, R a i n e y pointedly includes the fact that his parents have been plantation slaves w h o h a d purchased their freedom. Secondly, w h i l e both W h i t e representatives h a d college de­ grees, none of the B l a c k legislators h a d degrees. Because he h a d been raised i n the N o r t h , R i c h a r d C a i n had attended college before entering the ministry, w h i l e the other t w o B l a c k legislators point out that as B l a c k s i n the South they h a d been "debarred by l a w " from attending school. I n terms o f occupations, R a i n e y w a s a barber, C a i n a minister, a n d S m a l l s h a d become a captain because, as e x p l a i n e d earlier, of his courageous m u t i n y f r o m the Confederate a r m y d u r i n g the w a r . I n c o n ­ trast, A i k e n h a d w o r k e d as a school teacher before p u r c h a s i n g his f a r m , w h i l e E v i n s practiced l a w . L a s t but not least, the t w o W h i t e l a w m a k e r s w e r e D e m o c r a t s w h o both h a d been Confederate a r m y officers d u r i n g the w a r . I n contrast, a m o n g the B l a c k R e p u b l i c a n s o n l y S m a l l s c o u l d boast o f m i l i t a r y service d u r i n g the w a r , but h a v i n g served, o f course, o n the U n i o n side. R a i n e y h a d escaped Confederate conscription for the West Indies, w h i l e C a i n remained safely i n the N o r t h d u r i n g the w a r . T h e B l a c k men elected to the H o u s e of Representatives d u r i n g R e c o n ­ struction w e r e v a s t l y different from their W h i t e colleagues i n a n u m b e r of social dimensions. F i r s t a n d foremost, h a l f of the B l a c k s serving i n Congress d u r i n g this period h a d k n o w n slavery. T h i s alone separated t h e m socially a n d experientially from their W h i t e colleagues i n govern­ ment. Secondly, although a l l w e r e literate, few h a d educations c o m p a ­ rable to their W h i t e colleagues. N o n e of the B l a c k l a w m a k e r s i n the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n H o u s e h a d college degrees, i n fact. M o r e o v e r , the o c c u ­ pations that they had held prior to entering politics p r o v i d e d at best a modest l i v i n g for t h e m a n d their families. A few practiced l a w , repre­ senting the poorest in their c o m m u n i t y , w h i l e several o f t h e m w e r e i n trades, as barbers or tailors. T h e most financially secure found govern­ ment jobs after l e a v i n g office. H o w e v e r , even small economic success i n a profession or business put these B l a c k l a w m a k e r s a m o n g the elite of B l a c k A m e r i c a at the time. In the end, B l a c k members of Congress still appeared closer to their B l a c k constituents t h a n to their W h i t e colleagues. T h e s e m e n h a r d l y fit the profile of nineteenth-century W a s h i n g t o n politicians w h o alternated between public service a n d managing their families' estates a n d fortunes back home. H a d the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n not ended, these B l a c k men w o u l d

34

•

Chapter 2

have l i k e l y r e m a i n e d i n p u b l i c office, becoming the earliest type o f c a ­ reer p o l i t i c i a n that w e see i n W a s h i n g t o n today.

T H E CIVIL RIGHTS GENERATION OF BLACKS ELECTED TO T H E H O U S E

T h e C i v i l R i g h t s E r a covers 1 9 2 8 to 1 9 7 2 , w h i c h for some scholars represents the end of the B l a c k c i v i l rights m o v e m e n t ( M c A d a m 1 9 8 2 ) . After George W h i t e ' s election i n 1 8 9 8 , no B l a c k w o u l d be elected to Congress u n t i l 1 9 2 8 w i t h O s c a r D e Priest's election i n I l l i n o i s . D e Priest w a s a R e p u b l i c a n as w e r e a l l B l a c k s at this time. T h e G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n a n d F r a n k l i n D e l a n o Roosevelt's N e w D e a l agenda w o u l d eventually t u r n B l a c k s into R o o s e v e l t R e p u b l i c a n s — R e p u b l i c a n s w h o voted D e m ­ ocratic. D e Priest served as the lone B l a c k i n Congress, u n t i l his defeat by B l a c k D e m o c r a t A r t h u r M i t c h e l l i n 1 9 3 4 . M i t c h e l l w a s replaced by W i l l i a m L . D a w s o n i n 1 9 4 2 . T h e lone B l a c k representative D a w s o n w a s eventually joined by A d a m C l a y t o n P o w e l l of N e w Y o r k i n the 7 9 t h Congress i n 1 9 4 5 . D e t r o i t a n d P h i l a d e l p h i a sent the t h i r d a n d f o u r t h p o s t w a r B l a c k s to serve i n the H o u s e of Representatives by 1 9 5 8 . B y 1 9 6 8 , the number o f B l a c k s to serve c o n c u r r e n t l y i n the U . S . H o u s e increased to s i x for a total of seven, i n c l u d i n g E d w a r d W i l l i a m B r o o k e I I I , w h o w a s elected as a R e p u b l i c a n to the U . S . Senate f r o m M a s s a ­ chusetts i n 1 9 6 6 (see table 2 . 2 ) . I n contrast to the nineteenth-century B l a c k H o u s e representatives, none of the B l a c k s w h o served d u r i n g this most recent period w e r e elected i n the deep S o u t h . E x c l u d i n g W i l l i a m L . C l a y of M i s s o u r i , a l l fifteen came f r o m the N o r t h or West, a n d a l l represented u r b a n districts. B l a c k s w o u l d not w i n seats to Congress f r o m the deep South u n t i l 1 9 7 2 at the end o f the movement. W i t h the exception of D e Priest, a n d i n contrast to the B l a c k s elected to the U . S . Congress d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , a l l were D e m o c r a t s . A s the first three B l a c k s elected to Congress o f the twentieth century, D e Priest, M i t c h e l l , a n d D a w s o n w e r e a l l native sons of the S o u t h . D e Priest a n d M i t c h e l l were f r o m A l a b a m a , w h i l e D a w s o n w a s b o r n i n Georgia. S i x of the fifteen elected d u r i n g the C i v i l R i g h t s E r a h a d l a w degrees a n d w o r k e d i n l a w or i n fields related to l a w . Philadelphia's R o b e r t N . C . N i x w a s a successful c r i m i n a l attorney w h o s e father, a former slave, h a d a P h . D . i n mathematics a n d w a s dean of the faculty at S o u t h C a r o l i n a State College. T o ensure that his son h a d good educational opportunity, N i x ' s father nevertheless sent hime to N e w Y o r k , w h e r e he w a s raised by relatives. I n contrast, the father of J o h n C o n y e r s , Jr. w o r k e d i n one of the automobile plants i n D e t r o i t . After serving i n the m i l i t a r y d u r i n g the K o r e a n W a r , C o n y e r s returned to school to e a r n his l a w

Black Members of Congress TABLE

•

35

2.2

The Civil Rights Generation of Blacks Who Served in the House, 1 9 0 0 - 7 1 State

Years

California

Augustus F. Hawkins Ronald V. Dellums

1963- -90 1971- -98

Public servant Public servant

Illinois

Oscar De Priest Arthur W. Mitchell William L . Dawson George W. Collins Ralph H . Metcalfe

19291935194319701971-

Businessman Lawyer Lawyer Public servant Administrator

Maryland

Parren J . Mitchell

1971- -87

Professor/ Administrator

Michigan

Charles C . Diggs, Jr. John Conyers, Jr.

1955- -80 1965- -present

Businessman Lawyer

Missouri

William L . Clay

1969- -2000

Public servant

New

Adam Clayton Powell Shirley Chisholm

1945- -67, 1969- -82

Minister Educator

Ohio

Louis Stokes

1969- -98

Lawyer

Pennsylvania

Robert N . C . N i x

1957- -79

Lawyer

York

Served

Occupation

Black Representative

-35 -42 -70 -72 -78

69-70

degree. L o u i s Stokes o f O h i o also served i n the a r m y but d u r i n g W o r l d War I I a n d t h r o u g h the G . I . bill obtained his l a w degree. H e practiced law w i t h his brother C a r l , w h o a year earlier, i n 1 9 6 7 , h a d made history by becoming Cleveland's first elected B l a c k mayor. F o u r of the c i v i l rights generation of B l a c k elected officials — George C o l l i n s , A u g u s t u s H a w k i n s , W i l l i a m C l a y , a n d R o n a l d D e l l u m s — en­ tered Congress h a v i n g served i n their local and state governments. A l ­ though D e l l u m s , H a w k i n s , a n d C l a y had spent nearly all of their lives in politics, a l l started out in different occupations before pursuing polit­ ical careers. Before establishing a real estate firm w i t h his brother, H a w k i n s h a d failed i n another business venture. I n an interview, his wife stated that as a businessman, H a w k i n s never made that m u c h money — "he made only hundred dollars a m o n t h . I t took w e a l t h y or very dedicated people [to enter politics], a n d G us w a s never w e a l t h y " ( C h r i s t o p h e r 1 9 7 1 , 2 2 3 ) . L i k e H a w k i n s , W i l l i a m C l a y entered politics w i t h o u t h a v i n g a secure financial base. H i s biographer w r i t e s , " A f t e r finishing his m i l i t a r y h i t c h , C l a y m o v e d restlessly from job to job for several years. H e tried aeronautical c h a r t - m a k i n g , bus d r i v i n g , real es­ tate, a n d i n s u r a n c e " ( 2 5 0 ) . After serving in the St. L o u i s city legislature,

36

•

Chapter 2

C l a y took a job w i t h a u n i o n , a n d f r o m there r a n for Congress after a c o u r t order forced the state to construct a m a j o r i t y - B l a c k district a r o u n d St. L o u i s . D e l l u m s h a d a M a s t e r ' s degree i n s o c i a l w o r k , but served o n the Berkeley C i t y C o u n c i l . W h i l e the stereotype of the c i v i l rights B l a c k p o l i t i c i a n is that o f the fiery c l e r g y m a n , o n l y A d a m C l a y t o n P o w e l l , Jr. o f N e w Y o r k w a s a c t u ­ a l l y a B a p t i s t minister. A l t h o u g h a few of the B l a c k s elected to the H o u s e of Representatives d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n w e r e m i n i s t e r s , the ste­ reotype undoubtedly persists because of the v i t a l role B l a c k churches h a d played i n facilitating the elections o f B l a c k s . P o w e l l w a s b o r n into a financially secure family; his father w a s the leader o f a n established, w e l l - k n o w n B l a c k c h u r c h , the A b y s s i n i a n Baptist C h u r c h . U n d e r the leadership of P o w e l l , Sr., the c h u r c h h a d relocated to H a r l e m a n d be­ come prosperous. A s P o w e l l Jr.'s biographer notes, " T h e P o w e l l s lived w e l l " ( H a m i l t o n 1 9 9 1 , 7 6 ) . I n a d d i t i o n to free housing, a car, a n d e x ­ tended v a c a t i o n s , the parishioners gave their pastor a n a n n u a l s a l a r y o f $ 5 , 0 0 0 , w h i c h w a s five times the average a n n u a l i n c o m e of B l a c k s i n N e w Y o r k at that time. P o w e l l took over leadership of the c h u r c h after his father retired i n 1 9 3 7 . H e w a s a m o n g the few to inherit w e a l t h , w h i c h he then used to l a u n c h a n d advance his p o l i t i c a l career ( C h a r l e s Diggs J r . is another that comes immediately to m i n d . ) B u t m o r e t h a n h a v i n g inherited a n e c o n o m i c a l l y secure foundation, P o w e l l also gained an independent p o l i t i c a l base to m a k e his r a c i a l justice a d v o c a c y possi­ ble. P o w e l l ' s attempts to attach a n t i d i s c i m i n a t i o n measures to routine legislation m a k i n g its w a y out of the H o u s e were so w e l l established that they were listed in congressional records as the " P o w e l l A m e n d ­ m e n t s " (Singh 1 9 9 8 , 4 7 ) . I n 1 9 4 5 , P o w e l l demanded an end to the seg­ regation of the dining a n d rest r o o m facilities i n Congress, w h i c h the other B l a c k congressmen ( D e Priest, M i t c h e l l , a n d D a w s o n ) h a d quietly accepted. O s c a r D e Priest a n d C h a r l e s C . Diggs J r . of M i c h i g a n w e r e both b u s i ­ nessmen. D e Priest h a d started out as a house painter, but entered p o l i ­ tics i n C h i c a g o early, at the same time a c q u i r i n g real estate property, w h i c h , after his defeat by M i t c h e l l , he managed u n t i l his death i n 1 9 5 1 . Because o f u n r e s t r i c t e d e d u c a t i o n a l o p p o r t u n i t i e s i n the N o r t h for B l a c k s , the c i v i l rights generation o f B l a c k l a w m a k e r s w e r e v a s t l y bet­ ter educated t h a n their B l a c k predecessors. I n terms o f e d u c a t i o n , a l ­ t h o u g h h a r d l y w e a l t h a n d o c c u p a t i o n , the c i v i l rights g e n e r a t i o n o f B l a c k m e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s resembled their W h i t e c o u n t e r p a r t s . M o s t of the first B l a c k D e m o c r a t s elected to C o n g r e s s w e r e e x p e r i e n c e d p o l ­ i t i c i a n s , h a v i n g served i n their l o c a l or state g o v e r n m e n t s before enter­ ing C o n g r e s s .

Black Members of Congress T H E P O S T - C I V I L RIGHTS GENERATION OF BLACKS

•

37

ELECTED

TO T H E H O U S E

T h e p o s t - c i v i l rights p e r i o d begins w i t h President R i c h a r d N i x o n ' s suc­ cessful reelection i n 1 9 7 2 . N i x o n ' s r e c o r d o n civil rights w a s moderate. H o w e v e r , in a calculated b i d to w i n the W h i t e Southern vote, he ap­ peared to c a m p a i g n against c i v i l rights i n 1968 a n d 1 9 7 2 . B y 1 9 7 2 , the c i v i l rights m o v e m e n t h a d ended. D r . M a r t i n L u t h e r K i n g ' s assassina­ t i o n in 1968 h a d left the movement leaderless. T h e m a j o r civil rights organizations w e r e i n disarray. T h e V i e t n a m W a r a n d , later, Watergate redirected p u b l i c attention a w a y f r o m the m a n y civil rights injustices a n d r a c i a l p r o b l e m s that r e m a i n e d after l a n d m a r k civil rights legislation had passed. E v e n w i t h the end of the protest movement, B l a c k s h a d successfully put their energies into electoral politics (Tate 1 9 9 4 ) . T h e 1 9 6 5 V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t eliminated the barriers that Southern states h a d erected to prevent B l a c k s f r o m registering a n d v o t i n g . I n this regard, the act w a s extremely effective. B l a c k v o t i n g shot up in the South from 12 percent i n 1 9 4 7 to 6 2 percent i n 1968 ( A l t 1 9 9 4 ) . C o u r t challenges o n the basis of the act w o u l d also target electoral systems designed to l i m i t the effective­ ness of the B l a c k vote. It w o u l d take decades of litigation, but ultimately districts that h a d B l a c k v o t i n g majorities w o u l d be restored or created, and B l a c k s w o u l d eventually elect members of their o w n race to Congress. A d o l p h L . R e e d , Jr. ( 1 9 8 6 ) argues that w i t h the end of the civil rights movement a n e w type of B l a c k leader emerged. B l a c k leaders, even elected ones, h a d t r a d i t i o n a l l y come from the B l a c k c h u r c h . A s increasing n u m ­ bers of B l a c k s w o n elective office, he m a i n t a i n s , Black ministers were displaced as the n a t u r a l source of B l a c k p o l i t i c a l leadership. Reed's c l a i m that elected B l a c k officials are displacing B l a c k ministers as politi­ cal spokespersons r e m a i n s c o n t r o v e r s i a l . T h e R e v e r e n d Jesse J a c k s o n r e m a i n s strongly p o p u l a r in the black c o m m u n i t y a n d is still considered an i m p o r t a n t spokesperson for the c o m m u n i t y . H o w e v e r , the N A A C P recently asked former M a r y l a n d C o n g r e s s m a n K w e i s i M fume to head its organization a n d lead it out of b a n k r u p t c y and s c a n d a l . T h e first B l a c k s elected i n the post-Reconstruction South were B a r b a r a C h a r l i n e J o r d a n of T e x a s a n d A n d r e w Y o u n g o f G e o r g i a . T h i s generation o f B l a c k H o u s e representatives w o u l d be u n i f o r m l y better educated than the p r e v i o u s generations of B l a c k H o u s e members. J o r d a n , for e x a m p l e , graduated f r o m a segregated public high school in H o u s t o n , T e x a s , a n d earned her B . A . from T e x a s Southern U n i v e r s i t y i n 1 9 5 6 . She then ob­ tained a l a w degree f r o m Boston U n i v e r s i t y School of L a w in 1 9 5 8 and w a s admitted to the Massachusetts a n d T e x a s bars in 1 9 5 9 . She prac-

38

•

TABLE

The

Chapter 2 2.3

Number of African Americans in the U.S. Congress, 1947-99

Congress 79th (1945) 80th (1947) 81st (1949) 82nd (1951) 83rd (1953) 84th (1955) 85th (1957) 86th (1959) 87th (1961) 88th (1963) 89th (1965) 90th (1967) 91st (1969) 92nd (1971)

Number 2 2 2

2 2 3 4 4 4 5 6 7 10 14

Congress

Number

93rd (1973) 94th (1975) 95th (1977) 96th (1979) 97th (1981) 98th (1983) 99th (1985) 100th (1987) 101st (1989) 102nd (1991) 103rd (1993) 104th (1995) 105th (1997) 106th (1999) 107th (2001)

17 18 17 16 18 21 21 23 24 26 40 40 39 38 38

N o t e : Includes District of Columbia's nonvoting delegate. See Appendix A for a discus­ sion on who I counted in each Congress and Appendix B for a list of Black members by each Congress beginning with the 92nd Congress.

ticed l a w i n T e x a s where she ultimately r a n for public office. A n u m b e r of B l a c k s d u r i n g this period w o u l d earn their college degrees f r o m his­ t o r i c a l l y B l a c k colleges, i n c l u d i n g J o r d a n , J o h n L e w i s of G e o r g i a ( F i s k U n i v e r s i t y ) , K w e i s e M f u m e of M a r y l a n d ( M o r g a n State U n i v e r s i t y ) , A n ­ d r e w Y o u n g of G e o r g i a ( H o w a r d U n i v e r s i t y ) , M i k e E s p y of M i s s i s s i p p i ( H o w a r d U n i v e r s i t y ) , a n d C h a r l e s C . Diggs Jr. ( F i s k U n i v e r s i t y ) . Still some other B l a c k s of this current generation w o u l d earn degrees f r o m liberal private colleges s u c h as G r i n n e l l a n d A n t i o c h a n d p u b l i c institu­ tions, specifically the U n i v e r s i t y of C a l i f o r n i a . C o m p a r i n g the n u m b e r o f members o f Congress i n each o f seventeen o c c u p a t i o n a l categories from 1 9 6 9 to 1 9 9 4 (see table 2 . 4 ) , one finds that B l a c k members are concentrated i n the same occupations as W h i t e s . M o s t B l a c k members o f Congress — like most W h i t e members —have law degrees, a n d m a n y have been l a w y e r s , businesspersons, or public servants. I n addition, B l a c k members are as l i k e l y as W h i t e members to have been w a r veterans. O v e r a l l , it does not appear that B l a c k members of Congress come f r o m different occupations t h a n W h i t e members. M o s t B l a c k members o f Congress h a d more t h a n one occupation. F o r e x a m p l e . R e p . E v a C l a y t o n f r o m N o r t h C a r o l i n a o w n e d a consulting firm a n d h a d w o r k e d as a n executive for a nonprofit firm a n d as a university official before her election to the H o u s e . T h e most c o m m o n

0/5

—

Medicine

_

4/320

7/316

—

_

0/1

7/317

_

—

0/5 —

0/2

6/221

1/3

0/23

0/2

_

2/59

3/155 1/4

0/38

— —

93rd

-

7/307

-

—

0/5

0/2

6/221

1/3

2/64 0/3 0/24

—

1/5

5/140

0/31

—

—

94th

-

—

—

—

2/2

0/7

6/222

1/6

0/2 0/27

0/5 3/70

0/6

4/118

0/16

—

95th

-

—

_

3/6 —

0/5

4/205

0/4

1/11

0/2

0/10 2/57

1/6

6/127

0/19

—

—

96th

-

—

—

2/6 —

0/5

6/194

0/5

1/21

0/5

0/11 4/59

1/3

4/134

0/28

— —

97th

-

—

0/3

0/1

1/6

0/5

6/200

0/2

1/22

2/16 2/43 0/5

1/2

5/138

0/26

_

0/3

98th

-

—

0/3

0/1

0/5

2/8

5/190

1/2

1/20

0/6

1/16 3/37

1/2

5/147

0/29

0/4

—

99th

-

5/94

0/5

0/0

1/3

0/7

1/2 6/184

1/20

3/38 0/4

—

2/2

6/142

0/20

0/3

0/1

100th

-

5/94

0/4

0/0

0/4

0/8

1/2 7/184

1/17

3/42 0/4

—

2/2

7/138

0/3 0/19

0/2

101st

-

5/61

0/3

0/1

0/5

0/5

1/3 7/183

1/25

3/57 0/7

_

2/2

6/157

0/1 0/20

1/2

102nd

-

9/87

0/1

0/0

0/10 0/6

13/181

1/2

7/66 0/5 0/24

—

10/131 1/2

0/2 0/19

1/1

103rd

-

9/102

0/2

0/0

0/10

0/11

13/171

0/2

0/15

8/75 0/6

—

2/2

10/162

0/1 0/20

1/1

104th

N o t e : Entries in the table represent the number of Black members of Congress in the occupational category/the total number of members of Congress in the occupational category. Dashed entries indicate categories for which C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y did not code in that particular year. Source: Congressional Quarterly Almanac.

Veteran

Politics

Public Service/

Professional Sports

-

—

0/2

Law Enforce­ ment

Military

0/6

4/242

Law

1/3 4/236

0/3

Labor Leader

0/3 0/30

1/39

0/6

Engineering Journalism

—

1/2

2/61

0/2

3/159

ing Clergy

—

3/145

0/34

Agriculture Business/Bank­

1/59

0/36

_

Congressional Aide Education

— —

—

92nd

tainment

91st

Aeronautics

Acting/Enter­

Occupation

Congress

Occupations of Members of Congress, 1 9 6 9 - 1 9 9 5 : Black Members Compared to the Total

TABLE 2.4

40

•

Chapter 2

route for B l a c k members o f Congress w a s to practice l a w a n d then pur­ sue a career i n politics t h r o u g h l o c a l a n d state government. T h e occupational differences between B l a c k a n d W h i t e members o f Congress are s m a l l . A l t h o u g h there w e r e o n l y four B l a c k c l e r g y m e n elected to the H o u s e from 1 9 6 9 to 1 9 9 4 , the clergy is a n overrepresented occupation for B l a c k members. F u r t h e r m o r e , i n contrast to the s m a l l but consistent p r o p o r t i o n of W h i t e members o f Congress w h o w e r e farmers, engineers, or doctors, no B l a c k member in a n y given Congress emerged f r o m these occupations. O v e r time, as the n u m b e r of B l a c k members o f Congress increased, the v a r i e t y of occupations f r o m w h i c h they emerge has g r o w n . I n the 1 9 7 0 s , B l a c k members of Congress w e r e generally former aldermen or attorneys, but as more B l a c k s were elected to the H o u s e , the diversity o f occupations grew. F o r e x a m p l e , a newspaper publisher, a m o r t i c i a n , a n d a r a d i o - t a l k s h o w host w e r e elected. A l t h o u g h in the 1 9 7 0 s the propor­ tion of B l a c k members w h o w e r e former l a w y e r s w a s l o w e r t h a n the p r o p o r t i o n o f W h i t e members, by the 1 9 9 0 s , the p r o p o r t i o n o f B l a c k attorneys serving i n the H o u s e grew to m a t c h that o f W h i t e s . C l o s e r inspection reveals that B l a c k s do bring slightly different o c c u ­ pational experiences to their position i n Congress. W h i l e m a n y B l a c k members fall into the category of " p u b l i c s e r v i c e / p o l i t i c i a n , " this b r o a d category obscures subtle differences. R a t h e r t h a n a career solely i n p o l i ­ tics, m a n y B l a c k members have ties to less conventional forms of p u b l i c service, often rooted i n u r b a n problems. B l a c k s i n this category include former c i v i l rights activists, a H e a d Start official, c o m m u n i t y c o o r d i n a ­ tors, a n d social w o r k e r s . B y c o m p a r i s o n , some W h i t e s t r a d i t i o n a l l y be­ gin their congressional careers as legislative aides, w a i t i n g u n t i l their boss retires, then r u n n i n g for office.

AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN IN CONGRESS

A s t r i k i n g difference between W h i t e a n d B l a c k member o f C o n g r e s s is the higher p r o p o r t i o n of w o m e n found a m o n g B l a c k l a w m a k e r s relative to the total. I n the 1 0 6 t h Congress, 12 of the 38 B l a c k l a w m a k e r s are female representing 3 7 . 5 percent. I n contrast, o n l y 12 percent o f a l l the H o u s e representatives are female. T h e g r o w t h in the n u m b e r o f female B l a c k legislators is a relatively recent p h e n o m e n o n . W o m e n gained the right to vote i n federal elections o n l y i n 1 9 2 0 , a n d so, of course, a l l of the B l a c k s elected d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n w e r e m e n . T h e first B l a c k w o m a n elected to Congress w a s Shirley C h i s h o l m o f N e w Y o r k . H e r election in 1 9 6 8 came nearly fifty years after the first W h i t e w o m a n a n d n e a r l y 1 0 0 years after the first B l a c k m a n w e r e elected. I n 1 9 7 5 , C h i s ­ h o l m w o u l d be joined by t w o more B l a c k w o m e n , one the w i d o w of a

B l a c k Members of Congress

•

41

B l a c k congressman, w h o s e seat she w o n i n a special election. T h e n u m ­ bers o f B l a c k w o m e n to B l a c k men i n the H o u s e w o u l d r e m a i n consis­ tent w i t h the gender r a t i o i n Congress u n t i l 1 9 9 2 . W o m e n i n general made historic gains i n 1 9 9 2 , their numbers i n the H o u s e increasing f r o m 2 9 to 4 7 . B l a c k w o m e n also achieved r e c o r d gains that year. N o t o n l y d i d C a r o l M o s e l e y B r a un m a k e history by becoming the first B l a c k w o m a n ( a n d first B l a c k D e m o c r a t ) to be elected to the U . S . Senate, but the number of B l a c k w o m e n in the H o u s e w o u l d more t h a n double, f r o m four to nine. A m o n g B l a c k H o u s e members, w o m e n w o u l d repre­ sent 15 percent i n the 1 0 2 n d a n d increase to 2 5 percent i n the 1 0 3 r d . T a b l e 2.5 identifies each B l a c k w o m a n elected to the U . S . H o u s e of Representatives by n a m e , state, and terms served. Shirley C h i s h o l m w a s part of the new, more race-conscious genera­ tion o f B l a c k elected officials produced by the 1 9 6 8 a n d 1 9 7 0 elections produced. C h i s h o l m along w i t h the other t w e l v e B l a c k l a w m a k e r s i n the H o u s e then banded together to found the C o n g r e s s i o n a l B l a c k C a u c u s or C B C . She is perhaps best remembered, however, for r u n n i n g for the 1 9 7 2 D e m o c r a t i c presidential n o m i n a t i o n . She r a n to take ad­ vantage of the n e w groups that w e r e gaining p o w e r w i t h i n the D e m o ­ cratic party's rank-and-file a n d i n the " n e w p o l i t i c s " — not o n l y B l a c k s , but also feminists a n d the y o u n g ( G i l l 1 9 9 7 ; C h i s h o l m 1 9 7 3 ) . W e l l be­ fore Jesse J a c k s o n seized o n the same initiative to e m p o w e r B l a c k D e m ­ ocrats through his 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 8 8 presidential bids, C h i s h o l m hoped that her candidacy w o u l d forever cement, as it w e r e , the party's w a v e r ­ ing stance on the V i e t n a m W a r ( C h i s h o l m w a s opposed to it) a n d the party's role as the advocate of the oppressed a n d w e a k (the party w a s still d i v i d e d , a l t h o u g h its S o u t h e r n w i n g w a s s l o w l y l i b e r a l i z i n g ) . A l ­ though C h i s h o l m w a s a founding member o f the C B C a n d a charter member of the N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n for W o m e n ( N O W ) , neither group endorsed her. A few more progressive C B C members, s u c h as R o n D e l l u m s o f C a l i f o r n i a , supported her b i d . M o s t others C B C m e m ­ bers w e r e d o w n r i g h t hostile to her a n d her candidacy. W h i l e C h i s h o l m and her supporters felt it w a s s e x i s m that got i n the w a y of her earning support from her male B l a c k colleagues o n the H i l l , it w a s apparently more t h a n simple s e x i s m . After a l l , Jesse J a c k s o n failed to receive en­ dorsements f r o m B l a c k l a w m a k e r s i n his 1 9 8 4 bid for the D e m o c r a t i c party's presidential n o m i n a t i o n . A s in the case o f J a c k s o n , m a n y o f C h i s h o l m ' s C B C colleagues felt that the one-term c o n g r e s s w o m a n from N e w Y o r k h a d not yet paid her dues. H e r c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l a n d steam­ roller w o r k i n g style h a d alienated t h e m . W h i l e A d a m C l a y t o n P o w e l l h a d a similar, even m o r e extreme, m a n n e r a n d r a n into trouble w i t h his colleagues on C a p i t o l H i l l , D a w s o n of C h i c a g o , Diggs, a n d N i x , h a d no interest i n competing w i t h P o w e l l as the lone crusader for r a c i a l justice,

Served

1993-present 1993-present 1993-present

Carrie Pittman Meek

Corrine B r o w n

Cynthia A n n McKinney

Florida

Georgia

1991-present

Eleanor Holmes Norton

M a x i n e Waters Diane Edith Watson 1991-present 2001-present

1996-present

Juanita Millender-

McDonald

1998-present

1973-78

Years

Barbara Lee

Burke

Yvonne Brathwaite

Black Representative

District of Columbia

California

State J.D.

candidate

A.B., Ph.D.

B.S., M . S .

B.S., M . S .

B.A., M.A.,

J.D.

Divorced

Single College Lecturer

Divorced College Administrator

Separated

Married Single

College administrator

Lawyer

Social worker University professor

Married

B.A., M.S., Ph.D.

Married

aide/mental health Teacher/state legislator

Married

State legislator/legislative

Lawyer

Occupation

B.A.

B.S., M . A .

B.A., M.S.W.

A . A . , B.A.,

Degrees Earned

M a r i t a l Status upon Entering Congress

1

1

3

2

None

2

5

2

2

N u m b e r of Children

TABLE 2.5 List of Black Women Elected to the U . S . House of Representatives b y State, Years Served, Degrees Earned, Occupation, Marital Status, and Number of Children

B.A., J . D .

1995- -present

Sheila Jackson-Lee

S o u r c e : G i l l (1997, 8); and updated by author.

Lawyer

Married

Divorced

Single

Lawyer Nurse

B.S., M.P.A.

Married

Consultant

B.A., L L . B .

1973- -78 1993- -present

Eddie Bernice Johnson

Barbara Charline Jordan

Texas

Married

Teacher

Married

2

2

1

None

1

4

None

2

Separated/widowed Divorced

Purchasing Clerk Teacher/state legislator

Judge

B.A., J.D.

Ohio

B.A., M . A .

1999--present

E v a McPherson Clayton

North Carolina

1969--82

None A . A . , B.S., M . S .

Divorced

Stephanie Tubbs Jones

Shirley Chisholm

New York

1991- -96 1997- -present

3 2

Married

Clothing store owner, administrator

1

Teacher

Widowed

B.S., M . S .

Auditor

None

None

B.S., M . S .

Barbara-Rose Collins Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick

Michigan

1982- -84 1997- -present

1973--96

1993--present

Katie Beatrice H a l l Julia Carson

lins

Cardiss Robertson Col­

Indiana

Illinois

44

•

Chapter 2

i n contrast to C h i s h o l m ' s colleagues. M i s s o u r i congressman W i l l i a m C l a y ' s recollection o f his clashes w i t h C h i s h o l m i n the 1 9 9 0 are both v i v i d l y clear a n d direct: T h e y [those i n C h i s h o l m ' s c a m p ] alleged that other C a u c u s members w e r e either " m a l e c h a u v i n i s t s , " egotistical bastards, or envious eu­ nuchs. E l e c t e d officials are k n o w n to have u n u s u a l l y large egos, but the disagreement b l a c k members of Congress a n d hundreds o f state a n d l o c a l b l a c k elected officials h a d w i t h Shirley C h i s h o l m w a s a mat­ ter of politics, not ego. T h e c o n g r e s s w o m a n w a s difficult, i f not i m ­ possible to w o r k w i t h ( 1 9 9 2 , 1 9 8 ) . C l a y then goes o n to belittle her legislative record. S e x i s m still w a s a p a r t of it, however. C h i s h o l m m o v e d out front, to take a leadership position, at a time w h e n B l a c k w o m e n w e r e integral to the struggle for r a c i a l justice, but h a d served behind the scenes. T h e fact that w o m e n w e r e m o b i l i z i n g a n d o r g a n i z i n g p o l i t i c a l l y for gender equality w a s c r i t ­ icized by B l a c k c i v i l rights leaders as untimely. I f a n y t h i n g , B l a c k male leaders felt that C h i s h o l m ' s candidacy, rather t h a n p r o v i d i n g a f o r u m for B l a c k interests that h a d been suppressed a n d slighted w i t h i n the party, w a s itself divisive to the B l a c k political cause. C h i s h o l m ' s b i d w o u l d not earn a n endorsement f r o m the N a t i o n a l O r g a n i z a t i o n for W o m e n , either. N O W leaders gave several reasons for its n o n s u p p o r t of C h i s h o l m . T h e y c l a i m e d that C h i s h o l m , by her o w n a d m i s s i o n , w a s not a serious presidential candidate. A d d i t i o n a l l y , they m a i n t a i n e d , N O W , founded i n 1 9 6 6 , should r e m a i n n o n p a r t i s a n a n d refrain f r o m endorsing presidential candidates. I n 1 9 7 6 , however, the o r g a n i z a t i o n endorsed J i m m y C a r t e r ' s presidential b i d , a n d i n 1 9 8 4 it endorsed W a l t e r M o n d a l e ( M a n s b r i d g e 1 9 8 6 ) . W a s race a reason w h y N O W d i d not see her c a n d i d a c y as facilitating the p u s h for gender equality? N O W also ignored the c a n d i d a c y of Jesse J a c k s o n i n 1 9 8 4 and 1 9 8 8 as w e l l . F o r a n u m b e r of reasons, feminist-Black p o l i t i c a l co­ alitions, w h i l e sometimes successful, as i n b l o c k i n g the c o n f i r m a t i o n o f ultraconservative R o b e r t B o r k to the Supreme C o u r t i n 1 9 8 7 a n d i n electing C a r o l M o s e l e y B r a u n to the Senate i n 1 9 9 2 , are difficult to f o r m a n d sustain (see T a t e 1 9 9 7 ) . W h i l e C h i s h o l m ' s 1 9 7 2 presidential c a m p a i g n w a s historic a n d path b r e a k i n g , history w o u l d forget, a n d remember her mostly as the first B l a c k w o m a n elected to Congress. O t h e r B l a c k w o m e n w o u l d not j o i n C h i s h o l m i n the H o u s e u n t i l 1 9 7 2 , w h e n C a l i f o r n i a a n d T e x a s elected Y v o n n e B u r k e a n d B a r b a r a J o r d a n respectively. L i k e C h i s h o l m , Y v o n n e B r a t h w a i t e B u r k e ( D - C A ) w o u l d m a k e " f i r s t s . " She w a s the first female c h a i r o f the C o n g r e s s i o n a l B l a c k C a u c u s . She w a s also the first member of Congress to have a c h i l d w h i l e serving. B u r k e ' s decision to have a c h i l d w h i l e serving as U . S .

Black Members of Congress

•

45

H o u s e Representative w o u l d garner a d d i t i o n a l public attention because she w a s forty. A s biographer L a Verne M c C a i n G i l l w r i t e s , " T h e reality w a s that i n the 1 9 7 0 s , forty-year-old w o m e n w e r e not h a v i n g babies i n large n u m b e r s , a n d certainly not c o n g r e s s w o m e n . C o n v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m a n d taboos dictated that w o m e n a v o i d middle-aged pregnancies" ( 1 9 9 7 , 6 3 ) . One-termer E n i d Greene W a l d h o l t z ( R - U T ) w o u l d become the sec­ o n d i n 1 9 9 5 , a l t h o u g h a n F E C investigation o f c a m p a i g n finance abuse o v e r s h a d o w e d her pregnancy. I n contrast, the pregnancy o f N e w Y o r k C o n g r e s s w o m a n S u s a n M o l i n a r i ( R - N Y ) w h o met a n d m a r r i e d another representative f r o m her state's delegation w o u l d garner m u c h more at­ tention, especially since M o l i n a r i a n d her h u s b a n d w e r e p r o m i n e n t players w i t h i n the R e p u b l i c a n party, a n d they frequently brought their daughter ( S u s a n R o s e ) to p u b l i c events. B u r k e served only three terms, leaving, i n part, to "raise her daughter" ( 6 5 ) . ( B u r k e a c t u a l l y r a n again i n 1 9 8 0 for the L o s Angeles C o u n t y B o a r d o f S u p e r v i s o r s , n a r r o w l y losing to her R e p u b l i c a n opponent w h o r a n "the most openly racist c a m p a i g n i n the recent history of the L o s Angeles C o u n t y B o a r d of S u p e r v i s i o n s " [ K o u s s e r 1 9 9 9 , 9 4 ] ) . W a l d h o l t z lost her second bid as a result o f her husband's federal indictment. O f the three, M o l i n a r i served longest but quit the H o u s e i n 1 9 9 7 , after serving five terms, to devote more time to her family. B a r b a r a C h a r l i n e J o r d a n ( D - T X ) w a s another trailblazer. E l e c t e d i n 1 9 7 2 , she a n d A n d r e w Y o u n g o f G e o r g i a w o u l d be the first B l a c k s elected i n the p o s t - R e c o n s t r u c t i o n South. J o r d a n also served o n l y three terms, but w a s notable because, w r i t e s G i l l , o f the " q u a l i t y " o f those years i n elective office ( 1 9 9 7 , 4 0 ) . J o r d a n became k n o w n as a p o l i t i c a l moderate w h o w o r k e d w i t h other legislators p r i v a t e l y rather t h a n hash­ ing out their differences i n public. Y e t her impeccable persona, a n d her e x t r a o r d i n a r y a n d distinctive m a n n e r of speech, w o u l d m a k e her a lead­ ing figure d u r i n g the Watergate era of the 1 9 7 0 s w h e n President R i c h ­ a r d N i x o n , caught i n a maze of lies a n d obstruction of justice, resigned. C y n t h i a M c K i n n e y ( D - G A ) is the youngest o f the B l a c k w o m a n elected to Congress a n d w e a r s her h a i r i n A f r i c a n - s t y l e d braids as does C a r o l y n C h e e k s K i l p a t r i c k ( D - M I ) . A f r i c a n braids r e m a i n c o n t r o v e r s i a l i n the w o r k p l a c e . I t is generally unacceptable i n corporate A m e r i c a as w e l l as the m i l i t a r y . B l a c k professional w o m e n n o r m a l l y have their h a i r straightened as n a t u r a l B l a c k hairstyles invite p u b l i c d i s a p p r o v a l . (Vot­ ing rights l a w professor L a ni G u i n i e r w a s p u b l i c l y criticized not o n l y for her " r a d i c a l " p o l i t i c a l r e c o r d but also for h a v i n g " w i l d " hair.) M c K i n n e y ' s a n d K i l p a t r i c k ' s preference for braids, w h i l e clearly per­ s o n a l , has strong p o l i t i c a l i m p l i c a t i o n s . T h e occupations o f B l a c k w o m e n verge i n a direction u n l i k e most H o u s e members. A l t h o u g h some of the B l a c k w o m e n w e r e attorneys, a

46

•

Chapter 2

significant n u m b e r started out, l i k e C h i s h o l m , as teachers or as college a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . M a x i n e W a t e r s of L o s Angeles w a s a s o c i a l w o r k e r . T h e i r education backgrounds are consistent w i t h that o f the B l a c k m e n except that three o f the B l a c k w o m e n elected to C o n g r e s s — J u l i a C a r ­ son, C a r d i s s C o l l i n s , a n d B a r b a r a - R o s e C o l l i n s — l a c k e d college d i p l o ­ m a s . W i t h the e x c e p t i o n of O s c a r D e Priest, a l l other B l a c k members o f Congress of the twentieth century h a d degrees. T h e s o m e w h a t l o w e r r a n k i n g of B l a c k w o m e n legislators o n education m a y be the legacy o f a n u m b e r of things. W h i l e o n l y C a r d i s s C o l l i n s belongs to the generation of A m e r i c a n s w h o experienced the Second W o r l d W a r , the G . I . B i l l f r o m that w a r gave m e n , such as C o n g r e s s m a n L o u i s Stokes ( D - O H ) , unprec­ edented educational opportunities that the vast m a j o r i t y o f w o m e n w e r e e x c l u d e d f r o m . ( C a r d i s s C o l l i n s , incidentally, w o u l d represent her dis­ trict for twenty-four years, m a k i n g her the longest serving B l a c k w o m a n i n the U . S . Congress; C o l l i n s also " i n h e r i t e d " the district f r o m her late husband.) W h a t e v e r the reason, however, this fact m a k e s it p l a i n that B l a c k w o m e n legislators came f r o m less privileged b a c k g r o u n d s even i n c o m p a r i s o n to B l a c k m e n . Perhaps the single most s t r i k i n g difference between B l a c k w o m e n members a n d a l l other members o f the H o u s e relates to their m a r i t a l status. W i t h i n the U . S . adult p o p u l a t i o n , there are s t r i k i n g differences across race a n d gender o n the social d i m e n s i o n o f m a r i t a l status. A m o n g adults eighteen years a n d older i n the 1 9 9 8 C u r r e n t P o p u l a t i o n Survey, 3 1 percent o f B l a c k w o m e n are m a r r i e d a n d l i v i n g w i t h their spouse i n contrast to 4 0 percent o f B l a c k m e n , 5 7 percent of W h i t e w o m e n , a n d 6 1 percent of W h i t e men (see also P. N . C o h e n 2 0 0 1 ) . T h e 3 1 percent of m a r r i e d B l a c k w o m e n matches that for B l a c k w o m e n elected to the U . S . H o u s e of Representatives. O n l y one-third of the B l a c k w o m e n elected w e r e m a r r i e d w h e n they entered Congress. T h e r e m a i n ­ ing t w o - t h i r d s w e r e either w i d o w e d , separated, d i v o r c e d , or single. T o put this statistic i n perspective, i n the 1 0 6 t h , 86 percent o f the members are m a r r i e d , w h i l e 7 percent are d i v o r c e d . O f the m a r r i e d , Shirley C h i s ­ holm's h u s b a n d clearly h a d facilitated her entrance into N e w Y o r k p o l i ­ tics a n d into the H o u s e o f Representatives. H e r biographer w r i t e s that the " u n a s s u m i n g C o n r a d [ C h i s h o l m ] w a s a p o w e r f u l force behind the soon-to-be d y n a m i c p o l i t i c i a n " ( G i l l 1 9 9 7 , 2 1 ) . T h e y r e m a i n e d m a r r i e d for n e a r l y t h i r t y years, a n d it w a s o n l y at the end o f her congressional career that they d i v o r c e d . A s the most recent B l a c k w o m a n elected to the H o u s e , D i a n e E d i t h W a t s o n ( D - C A ) w h o w o n i n a special election to fill the late J u l i a n D i x o n ' s seat has never m a r r i e d . W a t s o n ' s career has been a long one, m a r k e d by " f i r s t s . " She w a s the first B l a c k w o m a n elected to L . A . B o a r d of E d u c a t i o n i n 1 9 7 5 a n d the first B l a c k w o m a n elected to the state senate i n C a l i f o r n i a i n 1 9 7 8 , w h e r e she might have r e m a i n e d longer h a d not t e r m limits ended her career. 2

Black Members of Congress

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47

C h i l d - r a i s i n g responsibilities have been identified as a p r i n c i p a l rea­ son w h y so few w o m e n choose to r u n for elective office. W a t s o n a n d C h i s h o l m , for e x a m p l e , h a d no c h i l d r e n . W o m e n generally postpone their p u r s u i t o f p u b l i c office u n t i l the c h i l d r e n leave the home. A n d , i n fact, w o m e n elected to the U . S . Congress are o n average older t h a n their males counterparts. T h i s p r o b a b l y delayed the entrance of another mar­ ried B l a c k c o n g r e s s w o m a n into politics — E v a C l a y t o n o f N o r t h C a r o ­ l i n a . She admits that she dropped out of l a w school because r a i s i n g four c h i l d r e n w a s m o r e t h a n she c o u l d handle. " I w a s n ' t super enough to be a super m o m . . . . M y h u s b a n d w a s supportive, but I felt e n o r m o u s l y guilty. I t h i n k I w o u l d do it differently n o w . I t h i n k I w o u l d k n o w h o w to d e m a n d m o r e o f m y h u s b a n d " ( G i l l 1 9 9 7 , 2 0 9 ) . She w o n her first a n d o n l y elected seat to the county's b o a r d of c o m m i s s i o n e r s i n 1 9 8 2 at the age of forty-eight. T e n years later she r a n a n d w o n a seat to the U . S . H o u s e o f Representatives. W i t h o u t w i s h i n g to exaggerate the point, to some extent, m a l e role expectations have changed along w i t h w o m e n ' s so that m e n do participate more i n the r a i s i n g o f c h i l d r e n . Sheila J a c k ­ son-Lee has frequently c o m m e n t e d o n the fact that she w o u l d n ' t have been able to r u n for office i f she h a d n ' t h a d the full c o o p e r a t i o n of her h u s b a n d . W h i l e she w o r k s i n W a s h i n g t o n representing her district, her h u s b a n d , a university administrator, is b a c k home i n T e x a s t a k i n g care of their t w o c h i l d r e n — a teenage daughter a n d preteen son. It is the large n u m b e r o f B l a c k w o m e n legislators w h o serve as single mothers, however, that m a k e s this group special. Since the U . S . C e n s u s finds that over h a l f of a l l B l a c k w o m e n head their o w n homes as single parents, this fact heightens the descriptive role o f B l a c k w o m e n repre­ sentatives. C y n t h i a M c K i n n e y (the youngest B l a c k female legislator) w o u l d r e t u r n to the G e o r g i a c o m m u n i t y of her f a m i l y a n d pursue a life in politics i n the aftermath o f her divorce a n d w i t h her infant son i n tow. H e r father, a state senator, encouraged her to r u n for Congress a n d continues to direct her campaigns. State Senator B i l l y M c K i n n e y has made headlines for the aggressive m a n n e r i n w h i c h he " p r o t e c t s " his daughter. O n e time he chased B l a c k R e p u b l i c a n G a r y F r a n k s , w h o h a d testified against the c r e a t i o n o f the m a j o r i t y - B l a c k district i n w h i c h his daughter represented, out of a meeting, threatening h i m the w h o l e time w i t h p h y s i c a l violence. F o r this, he w a s later fined $ 5 0 0 by a judge — a fine that he boasted w a s still v e r y m u c h w o r t h it ( G i l l 1 9 9 7 , 1 9 7 ) . I t must be noted that State Senator M c K i n n e y ' s reportedly anti-Semitic r e m a r k s w o u l d also cause his daughter considerable trouble i n the dis­ trict she represents, w h i c h contains m a n y J e w i s h voters. A s the D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a ' s n o n v o t i n g delegate to Congress, E l e ­ a n o r H o l m e s N o r t o n ' s m a r r i a g e p u b l i c l y collapsed as she r a n for C o n ­ gress. D e n y i n g r u m o r s that she a n d her h u s b a n d , both w e l l - k n o w n so­ cial figures i n D . C . , h a d separated after t h i r t y years of m a r r i a g e , she a n d

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her h u s b a n d nevertheless divorced shortly after her victory. N o r t o n ' s marriage, however, ended at a time w h e n her c h i l d r e n were g r o w n . M o s t of the B l a c k C o n g r e s s w o m e n , however, h a d marriages that ended w h e n their c h i l d r e n were v e r y y o u n g . C a r r i e M e e k , of F l o r i d a , endured t w o divorces that left her responsible for three c h i l d r e n to raise alone. B a r b a r a - R o s e C o l l i n s o f D e t r o i t h a d been separated f r o m her h u s b a n d after about ten years of marriage w h e n she became his w i d o w . T h e y h a d t w o children w h o m she w o r k e d full time to support. C o r r i n e B r o w n , also of F l o r i d a , never m a r r i e d , r a i s i n g her daughter, w h o m she h a d i n 1 9 6 4 , alone ( G i l l 1 9 9 7 ) . E v e n some of the successfully m a r r i e d B l a c k c o n g r e s s w o m e n e x p e r i ­ enced life as single parents. C a l i f o r n i a ' s M a x i n e W a t e r s , w h o s e second h u s b a n d , Sidney W i l l i a m s w a s the U . S . ambassador to the B a h a m a s , h a d m a r r i e d early w h e n she w a s o n l y nineteen. W h i l e the m a r r i a g e lasted fifteen years, it still ended i n divorce. B y the end o f the marriage, W a t e r s h a d been i n s c h o o l earning her bachelor's degree. I t w a s o n l y shortly after w i n n i n g a seat to the C a l i f o r n i a state assembly that she m a r r i e d W i l l i a m s , a former professional football player a n d l u x u r y car salesman. W h i l e Y v o n n e B u r k e h a d not the experience of solo parent­ i n g , her courtship a n d marriage w a s very s i m i l a r to that o f W a t e r s . B u r k e ' s first marriage at t w e n t y - f o u r ended in divorce after n e a r l y ten years. She bounced back f r o m divorce to serve i n the C a l i f o r n i a state legislature. T w o days after w i n n i n g the D e m o c r a t i c p r i m a r y for the T h i r t y - s e v e n t h Congressional D i s t r i c t , she m a r r i e d the c a m p a i g n aide o f the D e m o c r a t i c r i v a l she had beaten! ( O n e w o n d e r s i f B u r k e ' s bested p r i m a r y opponent had attended the w e d d i n g ? ) I also c o m p a r e d the single status o f B l a c k w o m e n to W h i t e a n d other m i n o r i t y w o m e n i n the H o u s e for the 1 0 6 t h Congress. A m o n g the fortyfour w o m e n legislators — W h i t e , A s i a n or L a t i n a — 2 7 percent w e r e presently u n m a r r i e d , either single, d i v o r c e d or w i d o w e d , a n d , in one case, gay. L i k e C o r i n n e B r o w n , one W h i t e legislator, L y n n W o o s l e y a n d her c h i l d r e n spent some time o n w e l f a r e . Regardless o f race a n d eth­ nicity, almost a l l (over 9 0 percent) o f the w o m e n serving i n the H o u s e are mothers. A large percentage o f w o m e n in the H o u s e , regardless o f race a n d ethnicity, also come f r o m the teaching profession. T h e differ­ ence between numbers o f B l a c k a n d W h i t e a n d m i n o r i t y w o m e n h a v i n g w o r k e d as teachers p r i o r to entering politics is relatively s m a l l . T h e per­ centage o f teachers a m o n g W h i t e , L a t i n a , a n d A s i a n w o m e n i n the H o u s e is 19 percent i n c o m p a r i s o n to 15 percent for B l a c k s . W h e n one i n ­ cludes i n s t r u c t i o n at the college or postgraduate level or w o r k i n college a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , the percentage of W h i t e a n d m i n o r i t y w o m e n w o r k i n g i n education shoots up to 2 8 percent, w h i l e a m o n g B l a c k w o m e n it increases to 3 1 percent, because both C a r r i e M e e k a n d C o r r i n e B r o w n

Black M e m b e r s o f C o n g r e s s

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w e r e college a d m i n i s t r a t o r s . C o n s t a n c e M o r e l l a a n d N y d i a V e l a z q u e z both taught at the u n i v e r s i t y level, w h i l e L o i s C a p p s and Z o e L o f g r e n w e r e part-time college a n d l a w school instructors. T h a t one-quarter to n e a r l y one-third of the w o m e n w o r k e d as teachers or i n education p r i o r to w i n n i n g office to the U . S . H o u s e of Representatives is a k e y differ­ ence i n the o c c u p a t i o n a l b a c k g r o u n d s o f m e n a n d w o m e n serving i n Congress. E d i t h Barrett's ( 1 9 9 5 ) analysis of the p o l i t i c a l priorities o f B l a c k w o m e n legislators based o n a m a i l survey o f 2 3 0 legislators f o u n d that B l a c k w o m e n legislators w e r e no different f r o m B l a c k male counter­ parts i n terms of h a v i n g a p r o - B l a c k legislative agenda. B l a c k w o m e n l a w m a k e r s were also m u c h l i k e their W h i t e female counterparts i n h a v ­ ing a p r o - w o m e n ' s p o l i c y agenda as w e l l . U n l i k e other race a n d gender groups, B l a c k w o m e n shared a strongly unified consensus o n w h i c h p o l ­ icies s h o u l d be priorities across the thirty-three states that B a r r e t t targeted.

CONCLUSION

Because h a l f o f t h e m h a d endured slavery, nineteenth-century B l a c k leg­ islators w e r e v a s t l y different from their W h i t e colleagues i n the H o u s e . A l l the B l a c k s serving i n Congress w e r e literate, but l a c k e d the f o r m a l p u b l i c a n d private education that m a n y of their W h i t e counterparts h a d received. I t w a s illegal to teach slaves to read a n d w r i t e i n s l a v e - o w n i n g states, a n d , thus, the best educated B l a c k members of Congress, those w h o h a d at least some high school and college experience, h a d been educated i n the N o r t h . M o r e o v e r , w h i l e some B l a c k s elected d u r i n g R e ­ c o n s t r u c t i o n w e r e w e a l t h y , the majority o f those w h o served i n the U . S . H o u s e of Representatives were o f modest means. M o s t members sur­ v i v e d o n the basis o f their congressional pay. After R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , the most prosperous h a d a d m i n i s t r a t i v e posts i n government. I n terms o f social status, education, o c c u p a t i o n , a n d w e a l t h , nineteenth-century B l a c k l a w m a k e r s contrasted greatly f r o m their W h i t e counterparts. B l a c k l a w m a k e r s i n the first three-quarters o f the t w e n t i e t h century w e r e t y p i c a l l y Southerners w h o h a d escaped the degrading a n d i m p o v ­ erished conditions o f the S o u t h for a fairer shot at economic prosperity i n the N o r t h . I t is this generation of B l a c k l a w m a k e r s w h o begin to resemble their W h i t e colleagues i n terms of education a n d o c c u p a t i o n . L i k e W h i t e s , B l a c k members of Congress come f r o m prestigious o c c u ­ pations. B a s e d o n a n analysis o f their biographies, these B l a c k legisla­ tors w e r e less l i k e l y to be as w e a l t h y as W h i t e s , however. T h e i r financial insecurity is reflected i n the n u m e r o u s occupations that B l a c k members held before w i n n i n g p u b l i c office. L i k e W h i t e members, however, the

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career choices o f B l a c k officeholders favored self-employment. B l a c k s either were l a w y e r s m a n a g i n g their o w n practices, or businessmen, or p u b l i c servants. T h e s e were occupations i n w h i c h they w e r e u l t i m a t e l y accountable o n l y to the people. B u t their social class, based on their education a n d their occupations sets t h e m apart f r o m most o f their B l a c k constituents. A r g u m e n t s for the necessity o f their presence i n Congress as B l a c k legislators w o u l d have to be largely based o n the race that they have i n c o m m o n w i t h their B l a c k constituents, not their class. A p a r t f r o m the slavery experience o f the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n E r a B l a c k officeholders, the single-parent experience o f B l a c k w o m e n is perhaps the most significant social characteristic that sets t h e m a p a r t f r o m W h i t e a n d even B l a c k male members o f Congress. W h y a n d h o w B l a c k w o m e n have w o n more seats proportionately t h a n W h i t e w o m e n i n Congress is a n issue I take up i n the n e x t chapter. H o w e v e r , it is the single-parent experience that the B l a c k female members o f Congress share most directly w i t h their B l a c k female constituents, as single w o m e n head over h a l f of a l l B l a c k families. B l a c k female legislators, therefore, o n the basis of their gender as w e l l as their race, m a k e a strong case about being socially " a u t h e n t i c " representatives o f their community. J a m e s B u t t o n a n d D a v i d Hedge's ( 1 9 9 7 ) m a i l survey o f 1 7 0 B l a c k a n d 1 6 2 W h i t e state legislators i n 1 9 9 1 - 9 2 (achieving a 4 0 a n d 3 4 percent response rate respectively) c o n c u r s that w h i l e both groups are s i m i l a r l y w e l l educated a n d have s i m i l a r p o l i t i c a l histories, there r e m a i n some k e y differences. F i r s t , a higher percentage o f b l a c k l a w m a k e r s w e r e educators p r i o r to entering politics ( 2 0 percent versus 9 percent) a n d female ( 3 1 percent versus 2 1 percent). B u t t o n a n d Hedge's research finds that w h i l e the t w o groups are fairly s i m i l a r o n a social level, there are v a s t differences i n h o w open they perceive the legislative process to be to their issues, a n d i n the degree to w h i c h B l a c k s have made prog­ ress. A l t h o u g h B l a c k l a w m a k e r s f r o m m a j o r i t y - W h i t e districts e x ­ pressed less r a c i a l pessimism t h a n those f r o m m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts, the r a c i a l m a k e u p of W h i t e legislators' districts h a d no i m p a c t o n their r a c i a l o u t l o o k . A n d indeed, w h i l e m u c h c a n be made o f the fact t h a t the backgrounds of B l a c k s a n d W h i t e s i n Congress are similar, s o c i a l class has not isolated t h e m f r o m r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . B u t t o n a n d H e d g e a s k e d their legislators i f they h a d ever experienced d i s c r i m i n a t i o n , a n d w h i l e 2 4 percent of the W h i t e l a w m a k e r s said that they h a d , a full 6 2 percent of the B l a c k legislators reported h a v i n g been d i s c r i m i n a t e d against. W h i l e 3 5 percent o f W h i t e legislators said that B l a c k s have achieved considerable progress i n jobs over the past ten y e a r s , o n l y 8 percent of the B l a c k legislators agreed.

CHAPTER

3

The Elections of Blacks to Congress Gary Trudeau s Doonesbury cartoon reprinted below makes t h e point that while Black members o f Congress may claim that their race m a k e s t h e m different f r o m their colleagues, the fact o fthe m a t t e r is t h a t they a r e n o different. T h e y m a y h a v e different b a c k g r o u n d s a n d c l a i m to h a v e different agendas d u r i n g the c a m p a i g n . B u t o n c e elected, they b e c o m e j u s t l i k e e v e r y b o d y else. T h e first a g e n d a o n t h e e l e c t e d official's m i n d , his o rher highest priority, is t o w i n reelection.

Doonesbury

BY G A R R Y TRUDEAU BUT THATS YOURPROBim NOT MINE! ICXMZHBRë W SHAKZ UP7WS& OlPMOm-S OFCfcPENP£NCYANPPe$PAIK-ANP pmAce TWMwrrHOPPOMNny

Figure 3 . 1 . D O O N E S B U R Y © 1 9 9 7 G . B . Trudeau. Reprinted with permission of U N I V E R S A L PRESS S Y N D I C A T E . All rights reserved. H o w H A V E B L A C K S W O N seats to the U . S . Congress, a n d has their race been a factor i n their elections? I n this chapter I s h o w that i n the R e c o n struction a n d the C i v i l R i g h t s a n d P o s t - C i v i l R i g h t s eras, B l a c k s , w i t h rare exception, have only w o n office i n m a j o r i t y - B l a c k H o u s e - d i s t r i c t s . T h e r e is considerable diversity, however, i n the w a y i n w h i c h B l a c k s have w o n office to the H o u s e even a m o n g these m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts.

THE

ELECTIONS OF BLACKS TO CONGRESS DURING

RECONSTRUCTION

A s D a v i d L u b l i n reports, the t w e n t y B l a c k s elected to the R e c o n s t r u c t i o n Congress f r o m 1878 to 1900 w o u l d w i n in districts w h e r e B l a c k s c o m m a n d e d the majority. " N o A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n , " he w r i t e s , " w o n election from a district w i t h a clear w h i t e m a j o r i t y d u r i n g the nineteenth c e n t u r y " ( 1 9 9 7 , 1 9 ) . B l a c k representation i n the H o u s e w o u l d

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peak at eight i n 1 8 7 5 d u r i n g the 4 3 r d Congress. B y the 4 5 t h Congress, o n l y three B l a c k s , all f r o m South C a r o l i n a , w o u l d be members. I n the 4 6 t h Congress, no B l a c k w a s seated i n Congress. T w o from South C a r o ­ l i n a returned in the 4 7 t h . T h i s w a s the Congress i n w h i c h members w o u l d t u r n a b l i n d eye t o w a r d the violent repression of B l a c k v o t i n g by W h i t e Southerners. T h e violence affected the balloting o f the 1 8 7 6 pres­ idential election between H a y e s a n d T i l d e n , as Southern states i n v a l i ­ dated the returns i n violence-torn (largely B l a c k ) counties, enough so that D e m o c r a t s from South C a r o l i n a a n d L o u i s i a n a disputed the results. T h u s , w r i t e s h i s t o r i a n E r i c Foner, " w i t h i n t w o m o n t h s of t a k i n g office, President H a y e s ordered federal troops s u r r o u n d i n g the South C a r o l i n a a n d L o u i s i a n a statehouses to r e t u r n to their b a r r a c k s " ( 1 9 9 0 , 2 4 4 ) . W h i l e " r e m o v i n g " federal troops from the South became the s y m b o l for the end o f R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , F o n e r goes o n to w r i t e that it " w a s as m u c h a cause of the crisis of 1 8 7 6 - 7 7 as a consequence, for h a d R e p u b l i c a n s been w i l l i n g to intervene i n defense o f b l a c k [voting] rights, T i l d e n w o u l d never have come close to c a r r y i n g the entire S o u t h " ( 2 4 5 ) . T h e suppression of B l a c k v o t i n g rights w a s evident even in the 1 8 7 6 elections, i n w h i c h R a i n e y , C a i n , a n d S m a l l s were reelected. R a i n e y a n d C a i n s w o n decisively over their D e m o c r a t i c r i v a l s , but Smalls's v i c t o r y over D e m o c r a t George T i l l m a n (brother of B e n j a m i n R . T i l l m a n , the racist governor of South C a r o l i n a f r o m 1 8 9 0 to 1 8 9 4 ) w a s contested. Smalls w a s eventually seated i n the 4 5 t h Congress, but i n 1 8 8 0 the seat w a s handed over to T i l l m a n . I n fact, i n 1 8 8 0 no B l a c k served in C o n ­ gress as R a i n e y a n d C a i n w e r e replaced by the t w o W h i t e D e m o c r a t s w h o m they h a d decisively defeated i n 1 8 7 6 . S m a l l s w o n a n d served again briefly i n 1 8 8 2 - 8 3 a n d f r o m 1 8 8 4 - 8 7 , but through violence, fraud, a n d redistricting, W h i t e s were w i n n i n g the w a r o f suppressing B l a c k v o t i n g rights i n the state. I n 1 8 9 0 , a n a l l - W h i t e D e m o c r a t i c dele­ gation w o u l d "represent" South C a r o l i n a . O n e o f these redeemers w o u l d include i n his b i o g r a p h i c a l statement that he " t o o k active part i n the memorable c a m p a i g n of 1 8 7 6 " w h e n South C a r o l i n a w a s r e c l a i m e d f r o m "carpet bag r u l e . " A l t h o u g h the D e m o c r a t s disputed the election results in 1 8 9 7 , George W a s h i n g t o n M u r r a y w a s the last B l a c k to repre­ sent South C a r o l i n a u n t i l 1 9 9 2 . N o r t h C a r o l i n a elected George H . W h i t e in 1 8 9 6 , a n d , s e r v i n g t w o terms, he w a s the last B l a c k sent to Congress u n t i l 1 9 2 8 . F o r about t w e n t y years, the 2 n d district of N o r t h C a r o l i n a h a d sent a B l a c k to W a s h i n g t o n . W h i t e segregationists t o o k over the state, although not e x ­ clusively through violence, as in the case of South C a r o l i n a . I n N o r t h C a r o l i n a , W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s also a b a n d o n e d their B l a c k allies. E v e n prominent W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s i n the state began to denounce George W h i t e a n d the principle o f B l a c k officeholding as "against c o m m o n

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sense." W h i t e k n e w that his last n o m i n a t i o n s h a d been contested w i t h i n his o w n party — his biography states that he w o n the n o m i n a t i o n i n 1 8 9 4 but w i t h d r e w i n the interest of " h a r m o n y i n his p a r t y . " I r o n i c a l l y , R o b i n T a l l o n ' s ( D - S C ) statement as to w h y he w o u l d not seek reelection i n 1 9 9 2 sounded m u c h like W h i t e ' s reason for his retire­ ment f r o m politics — for the " s a k e of r a c i a l h a r m o n y . " T a l l o n ' s S o u t h C a r o l i n a H o u s e district h a d been reconstituted w i t h a n e w B l a c k major­ ity d u r i n g the 1 9 9 0 r o u n d of r e d i s r i c t i n g . A W h i t e D e m o c r a t , T a l i o n h a d held this seat since 1 9 8 2 , largely t h a n k s to his support i n the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y . H o w e v e r , as the 1 9 9 2 c a m p a i g n season approached, c r i t i ­ c i s m mounted that his reelection w o u l d impede " m i n o r i t y political em­ powerment" (Canon 1999, 135). W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s i n N o r t h C a r o l i n a abandoned their B l a c k allies by the late 1 8 0 0 s . A t the same time, N o r t h C a r o l i n a D e m o c r a t s engaged i n voter f r a u d , but not i n e x c l u s i v e l y denying the franchise to B l a c k s . D e m o c r a t s , i n seeking to regain p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l of the state, a l l o w e d a n y b o d y to register, but w i t h the intention of counting as m a n y votes for the D e m o c r a t s regardless of the a c t u a l balloting ( A n d e r s o n 1 9 8 1 ) . T h e D e m o c r a t i c victories a c c u m u l a t e d at the expense o f the R e p u b l i ­ cans a n d Populists. O n e R e p u b l i c a n ' s c o m p l a i n t about voter fraud w a s included i n his congressional biography; he " w a s defeated for certificate of e l e c t i o n " to the 5 8 t h Congress by 183 votes i n an election w h e r e over 1,200 m e n w h o h a d not p a i d their p o l l taxes had voted. D i s a v o w ­ ing B l a c k voters a n d B l a c k officeholding, the R e p u b l i c a n s hoped i n v a i n to h o l d o n politically. B u t after h a v i n g been reduced to one district in 1 8 9 6 , the D e m o c r a t s of N o r t h C a r o l i n a w o u l d w i n b a c k s i x of the nine congressional districts in 1 8 9 8 . U s i n g violence a n d fraud t h r o u g h o u t the o l d confederacy, the D e m o ­ crats h a d returned a n d the period of B l a c k officeholding w a s over. T h e end o f B l a c k officeholding at the federal level w a s also cemented through the adoption of vote-dilutive devices as w e l l as r a c i a l g e r r y m a n ­ dering ( K o u s s e r 1 9 7 4 ) . Southern states enacted plans w h e r e b y a l l c o n ­ gressional districts h a d W h i t e voting-age majorities so that W h i t e politi­ cal d o m i n a t i o n c o u l d be preserved just in case B l a c k s got the franchise (Parker 1990).

MACHINES AND COURTS I N T H E CREATION OF MAJORITY-BLACK

DISTRICTS

B l a c k officeholding resumed i n the N o r t h i n the twentieth century. B y 1 9 0 0 , 8 0 percent o f B l a c k s still lived i n the S o u t h . T h e i r great m i g r a t i o n N o r t h e r n to u r b a n centers, however, created p o l i t i c a l j u r i s d i c t i o n s w h e r e they constituted a v o t i n g majority. I n fact, the g r o w t h i n n u m b e r 1

54

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Chapter 3

of B l a c k members o f Congress w o u l d closely t r a c k the g r o w t h i n the n u m b e r o f m a j o r i t y - B l a c k congressional districts. T h e first B l a c k s elected to Congress i n the t w e n t i e t h century w e r e elected i n N o r t h e r n u r b a n areas experiencing the greatest B l a c k g r o w t h . B l a c k officeholding w a s not a u t o m a t i c but spurred a l o n g by B l a c k par­ ticipation i n p o l i t i c a l machines that w e r e dependent o n the B l a c k vote i n cities such as C h i c a g o , N e w Y o r k , a n d P h i l a d e l p h i a . M a c h i n e leaders, s u c h as C h i c a g o ' s legendary R i c h a r d D a l e y r e w a r d e d B l a c k voters for their p o l i t i c a l l o y a l t y w i t h t w o congressional seats. After decades o f sat­ isfaction w i t h this arrangement, a few B l a c k machine leaders, s u c h as R a l p h M e t c a l f e , a n d the masses eventually revolted against the m a c h i n e ( G r i m s h a w 1 9 9 2 ) . D a l e y w o u l d select Bennett S t e w a r t , a w a r d alder­ m a n , to succeed Metcalfe i n 1 9 7 8 . S t e w a r t w o u l d last o n l y one t e r m , successfully challenged by B l a c k m a v e r i c k H a r o l d W a s h i n g t o n i n 1 9 8 0 . C a r d i s s C o l l i n s , w h o represented her B l a c k district for three decades, o w e d her seat to the D a l e y m a c h i n e t h r o u g h her late h u s b a n d , a m a c h i n e - c o n t r o l l e d B l a c k a l d e r m a n . I n the late 1 9 8 0 s , she, too, w a s challenged on the basis of her past relationship w i t h the m a c h i n e , but r u n n i n g o n her record, she retained her seat. M a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts i n u r b a n areas emerged as a consequence o f B l a c k m i g r a t i o n f r o m the S o u t h , but w i t h o u t m a c h i n e a i d , B l a c k s h a d to rely o n the courts to preserve their n u m e r i c a l majority. W h i t e d o m i n a t e d state legislatures, not o n l y i n the South but i n the N o r t h as w e l l , r a c i a l l y gerrymandered B l a c k s out of a v o t i n g m a j o r i t y i n areas w h e r e they c o u l d easily constitute a m a j o r i t y in congressional districts. I n C l e v e l a n d , for e x a m p l e , L o u i s Stokes w o u l d m a k e h i s t o r y becoming O h i o ' s first B l a c k C o n g r e s s m a n i n 1 9 6 8 , a n d yet, his district came about o n l y through a l a w s u i t that he himself initiated. Representing a B l a c k R e p u b l i c a n , Stokes successfully filed a v o t i n g rights d i s c r i m i n a ­ t i o n l a w s u i t against the O h i o Legislature c h a r g i n g it w i t h c r a c k i n g the B l a c k m a j o r i t y i n C l e v e l a n d a n d d e p r i v i n g it of the o p p o r t u n i t y to elect one of its o w n to Congress. Stokes' l a w s u i t w o n o n appeal before the U . S . Supreme C o u r t . T h e state w a s forced to create a n e w district that w a s 6 0 percent B l a c k , w h i c h p r o m p t e d its former W h i t e D e m o c r a t i c legislator to retire. Stokes's younger brother h a d been elected as the city's first B l a c k m a y o r i n 1 9 6 7 , a n d as a result, h a v i n g great n a m e recognition, L o u i s Stokes w o n 4 1 percent of the vote i n the D e m o c r a t i c p r i m a r y contest a m o n g thirteen other candidates. H e then w o n the gen­ eral election becoming the state's first B l a c k congressman. T h e first B l a c k s elected f r o m the S o u t h also w o n i n m a j o r i t y - B l a c k or m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districts ordered by the courts. B o t h W i l l i a m C l a y ' s a n d B a r b a r a J o r d a n ' s districts, for e x a m p l e , w e r e court-ordered ones. C o n g r e s s m a n A n d r e w Y o u n g w a s the e x c e p t i o n , as he w a s elected i n a

Elections of Blacks to Congress

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55

district w h e r e B l a c k s made up a plurality. H e vacated that district to become the first B l a c k secretary to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , a n d his district then elected W h i t e D e m o c r a t W y c h e F o w l e r . I n 1 9 8 2 , State Senator J u ­ l i a n B o n d pushed the G e o r g i a legislature to r e d r a w the district's b o u n d ­ a r y to create a firm B l a c k majority. W h e n F o w l e r decided to r u n for the U . S . Senate, B o n d w a s the l i k e l y successor, but he w a s defeated i n a bitter p r i m a r y by another B l a c k c i v i l rights activist, J o h n L e w i s , i n 1 9 8 6 . I n 1 9 8 4 L e w i s h a d failed to unseat C o n g r e s s m a n F o w l e r i n a district that n o w h a d a B l a c k majority. T h u s , i n addition to B l a c k elec­ t o r a l m o b i l i z a t i o n , B l a c k state legislators were c r i t i c a l i n pushing for redistricting plans that p r o v i d e d for districts w i t h B l a c k pluralities or majorities. R e d i s t r i c t i n g i n 1 9 7 2 also increased the B l a c k p o p u l a t i o n i n a M e m ­ phis district to 4 8 percent. T h i s increase permitted H a r o l d F o r d , Sr. to successfully challenge the district's R e p u b l i c a n representative w h o s e electoral safety h a d been undermined by his ties to the p o l i t i c a l l y em­ broiled N i x o n . F o r d n a r r o w l y beat the incumbent by 7 4 4 votes. T h e n , court-ordered redistricting i n 1976 gave F o r d a B l a c k m a j o r i t y i n his district. O n the heels o f R e y n o l d s v. Sims ( 1 9 6 4 ) affirming the one person, one vote principle, T e x a s w a s under attack from voting ligitation because o f the m a l a p p o r t i o n m e n t c a r r i e d through to its 1 9 6 0 redistricting plans. B a r b a r a J o r d a n , w h o h a d twice failed to w i n election to the State H o u s e , finally w o n in 1 9 6 6 after redistricting that h a d created t w o dis­ tricts i n w h i c h B l a c k s a n d H i s p a n i c s constituted the majority (Brischetto et a l . 1 9 9 4 ) . B a r b a r a J o r d a n ' s historic election to the U . S . Congress i n 1 9 7 2 w a s s i m i l a r l y facilitated by the fact that her district w a s the o n l y one i n T e x a s at the time w i t h o u t a W h i t e majority. ( W h i t e s were origi­ n a l l y o n l y 4 1 percent o f J o r d a n ' s H o u s e district.) T h u s , the electoral history o f the g r o w t h i n B l a c k officeholding i n the Post-Reconstruction a n d P o s t - C i v i l R i g h t s eras illustrates quite clearly that B l a c k p o p u l a t i o n g r o w t h c o m b i n e d w i t h either B l a c k p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n political machines and/or litigation under the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t led to m a j o r i t y - B l a c k dis­ tricts i n w h i c h B l a c k s w o n . T h e clear exceptions to w i n n i n g i n districts w h e r e B l a c k s represented the majority took place first, a n d most frequently, i n C a l i f o r n i a . A u ­ gustus F. H a w k i n s a n d R o n a l d V D e l l u m s w o n i n districts l a c k i n g B l a c k majorities. H a w k i n s h a d served i n the State A s s e m b l y a n d w a s greatly supported by i n his election by the d o m i n a n t W h i t e l i b e r a l p o w e r bro­ kers in the state. A l t h o u g h he identified as B l a c k , the quiet-spoken H a w k i n s w a s frequently m i s t a k e n for W h i t e . H a w k i n s also greatly deemphasized his race w h e n he w o n election to the U . S . H o u s e of R e p ­ resentatives f r o m L o s Angeles i n 1 9 6 2 . H e told one reporter once that

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"race w a s just not a factor." H i s district eventually became m a j o r i t y B l a c k , a n d his successor, Representative M a x i n e W a t e r s , regularly m a k e s race the issue. T h e other early C a l i f o r n i a H o u s e district to send a B l a c k to Congress w a s o r i g i n a l l y held by R o n a l d D e l l u m s . E l e c t e d to the Berkeley city c o u n c i l , D e l l u m s i n 1 9 7 0 challenged a s i x - t e r m D e m o ­ crat w h o h a d been s l o w to oppose the V i e t n a m War. D e l l u m s m o b i l i z e d the already-active base o f B l a c k s i n the district a n d campaigned o n the peace issue to decisively defeat the i n c u m b e n t w i t h 5 5 percent o f the p r i m a r y vote. D e l l u m ' s election differed notably f r o m that o f H a w k i n s as he w a s a p a r t y m a v e r i c k a n d independently pursued his seat to the U . S . Congress. D e l l u m ' s election w a s also special because the p o l i t i c a l m a k e u p of his district, w i t h a n extremely l i b e r a l base, is u n u s u a l . T h e t w o B l a c k men w h o w o n i n n o n m a j o r i t y B l a c k districts i n C a l i f o r n i a , however, a l l illustrated the lesson R u f u s B r o w n i n g , D a l e R o g e r s M a r ­ s h a l l , a n d D a v i d H . T a b b ( 1 9 8 4 ) stress i n their i m p o r t a n t book, P r o t e s t i s N o t E n o u g h : that B l a c k s c a n w i n o n l y through p o l i t i c a l m o b i l i z a t i o n a n d b i r a c i a l coalitions. A n o t h e r B l a c k member o f the H o u s e elected i n a m a j o r i t y - W h i t e dis­ trict i n 1 9 8 2 , K a t i e H a l l o f G a r y , I n d i a n a , however, served o n l y one t e r m i n Congress. I n contrast, A l a n W h e a t of K a n s a s C i t y , M i s s o u r i , also elected initially i n 1 9 8 2 , served s i x terms before a b a n d o n i n g his seat to m a k e a n unsuccessful b i d for the U . S . Senate. G a r y ' s B l a c k m a y o r R i c h a r d H a t c h e r chose K a t i e H a l l to fill the r e m a i n i n g t e r m o f a W h i t e D e m o c r a t , A d a m B e n j a m i n , J r . , w h o h a d died unexpectedly. A s the 1st district's party c h a i r m a n , H a t c h e r h a d the legal right to choose H a l l , w h o h a d been a tireless c a m p a i g n w o r k e r for h i m a n d for the D e m o c r a t i c party i n G a r y . H a l l ' s selection, nevertheless, angered the dis­ trict's three D e m o c r a t i c county c h a i r m e n w h o h a d w a n t e d the w i d o w o f A d a m B e n j a m i n Jr. to fill the seat. T h e y even w e n t to c o u r t over the matter a n d lost. H a l l w o n her first election i n 1 9 8 2 i n part because her opponents d i d not have enough time to challenge her effectively. She w o u l d lose the next. W h i l e some analysts have suggested that H a l l w a s "too l i b e r a l " a n d too focused o n " r a c e " to adequately represent her district, the fact that she d i d not belong to a broad-based b i r a c i a l c o a l i ­ t i o n w a s the key reason w h y she c o u l d not hang onto her seat i n 1 9 8 4 . A l a n W h e a t i n contrast represented a 75-percent W h i t e district for s i x terms before abandoning it to m a k e a p o o r l y timed r u n for the U . S . Senate. W h e a t ' s district w a s o n l y 2 3 percent B l a c k . T h e 1 9 8 2 H o u s e contest w a s a n open-seat one i n that the D e m o c r a t w h o represented the district for seventeen terms h a d retired. W h e a t took 3 1 percent of the p r i m a r y vote i n a c r o w d e d field o f eight D e m o c r a t s a n d seven R e p u b ­ licans. Y e t W h e a t ' s r a c i a l cross-over appeal c o u l d not get h i m to the U . S . Senate. I n a n open-seat contest for a retiring R e p u b l i c a n senator,

E l e c t i o n s o f Blacks to C o n g r e s s

*

57

W h e a t ' s R e p u b l i c a n opponent w o n 6 0 percent o f the total vote a n d c a r r i e d a l l o f the state's 1 1 4 counties. O n l y the city o f St. L o u i s gave W h e a t the m a j o r i t y share o f its vote.

COMPARING T H EDISTRICTS A N D ELECTIONS OF BLACKS AND WHITES T O T H E 104TH

CONGRESS

T a b l e 3 . 1 presents summaries o f the types o f districts a n d election char­ acteristics of the 2 5 2 B l a c k D e m o c r a t s , W h i t e D e m o c r a t s a n d W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s w h o fell into the N B E S sample. O n a l m o s t every d i m e n ­ sion, B l a c k D e m o c r a t s are significantly different from W h i t e D e m o c r a t s , w h o are i n t u r n different f r o m W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s . F i r s t , the average B l a c k p o p u l a t i o n i n districts that B l a c k D e m o c r a t s represent is 58 per­ cent as opposed to 14 percent for W h i t e D e m o c r a t s a n d 9 percent for W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s . A t the same time, B l a c k legislators represent dis­ tricts that are significantly poorer t h a n those represented by W h i t e s , w i t h W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n members representing o n average the wealthiest communities i n A m e r i c a . B l a c k s spent about $ 1 0 0 , 0 0 0 less o n their campaigns i n 1 9 9 4 t h a n W h i t e D e m o c r a t s d i d , but their m a r g i n o f v i c t o r y w a s significantly higher t h a n that for W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s a n d W h i t e D e m o c r a t s . T h e av­ erage m a r g i n o f v i c t o r y for B l a c k D e m o c r a t s w a s 5 6 percent w i t h a standard deviation of 2 3 percent, indicating that one-third o f the B l a c k candidates elected to Congress w o n w i t h 80 percent of the vote or more. Averages for the m a r g i n o f v i c t o r y i n the general election c a n be misleading since R e p u b l i c a n s m a y not even bother to challenge B l a c k s i n m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts. Because districts h a v i n g 3 0 percent or m o r e B l a c k s i n them are safe seats for D e m o c r a t s , R e p u b l i c a n s don't gener­ ally r u n i n t h e m ( L u b l i n 1 9 9 7 ) . W h e n the m a r g i n o f v i c t o r y i n the p r i m a r y races are c o m p a r e d across the three groups, one finds that W h i t e D e m o c r a t s enjoy higher margins of victories t h a n do B l a c k D e m o c r a t s . M a n y incumbents face no c h a l ­ lengers i n their p r i m a r i e s . T a b l e 3 . 1 presents the percentage of H o u s e members w h o w e r e not challenged i n the 1 9 9 4 p r i m a r i e s . T h e percent­ ages are roughly comparable across the three groups, w i t h 5 4 percent o f B l a c k s facing no challengers i n their p r i m a r i e s c o m p a r e d to 6 0 percent of W h i t e D e m o c r a t s . T h e t r u t h o f the matter is that the vast m a j o r i t y o f H o u s e incumbents w h o seek reelection are reelected. I n 1 9 9 0 , 88 per­ cent o f a l l incumbents seeking reelection w o n w i t h 6 0 percent or m o r e of the total vote. I n 1 9 9 6 , that percentage fell to a mere 7 4 percent. T a b l e 3.2 provides a clearer picture of the turnover i n the number o f blacks elected to the H o u s e . Because there w e r e so few B l a c k s serving i n Congress u n t i l the late 1 9 7 0 s , no B l a c k d u r i n g this period retired u n t i l

58

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Chapter 3

T A B L E 3.1

Average Districts and Election Characteristics of Black and White Members by Party in the 1996 N B E S Data Set (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)

Median Household Income* Per Capita Income* % Black in District* PAC Contributions in 1996 Individual Contributions in 1996 Campaign Expenditure in 1994 %Unchallenged in Primary Margin of Victory in Primary in 1994 Margin of Victory in General Election in 1994 Years in Office*

Black Democrat

White/Other Democrat

White/Other Republican

$24,302 ($6,567) $11,543 ($3,068) 58% ( 1 0 % ) $182,480 ($120,676) $162,424 ($145,160) $391,792 ($243,520) 54%

$29,493 ($7,266) $13,922 ($3,790) 14% ( 1 1 % ) $322,366 ($213,537) $344,321 ($356,596) $610,414 ($395,476) 60%

$33,643 ($8,873) $17,013 ($11,769) 9% (7%) $299,274 ($204,182) $478,332 ($509,358) $502,259 ($290,866) 50%

75%

(31%)

80%

(29%)

67%

(37%)

56% 10

(23%) (9)

26% 12

(20%) (8)

40% 8

(30%) (7)

N o t e : These figures are not based on all 435 members of the House, but only on those 252 members that fell into the N B E S sample randomly. *F-statistic prob. value < . 0 1 .

1 9 7 8 . After 1 9 7 8 , almost every Congress has h a d one or t w o retire­ ments, w i t h the 1 9 9 0 - 9 1 Congress h a v i n g four retirees, t w o o f w h o m were elected i n the " p r e c i v i l r i g h t s " period. F e w b l a c k s w h o have sought reelection to Congress have been defeated. N o t a b l y the few blacks defeated include the t w o elected i n m a j o r i t y - W h i t e districts, K a ­ tie H a l l a n d B l a c k R e p u b l i c a n G a r y F r a n k s . T h e other r e m a i n i n g B l a c k s w h o have suffered defeat are concentrated i n the C h i c a g o area, w h e r e machine-backed B l a c k s battled w i t h B l a c k m a v e r i c k s for c o n t r o l o f these districts. I n 1 9 9 2 , one such m a v e r i c k , G u s Savage w a s defeated, along w i t h C h a r l e s H a y e s . A l t o n W a l d o n , Jr., w h o w o n a special elec­ t i o n to fill a v a c a n c y caused by the death of the incumbent, n a r r o w l y beat out F l o y d F l a k e , w h o t w o m o n t h s later w o u l d defeat h i m to repre­ sent the district f r o m the 1 0 0 t h t h r o u g h the 1 0 5 t h Congresses. D u r i n g the 1990s, t w o B l a c k s convicted separately for fraud a n d s e x u a l m i s ­ conduct resigned from office. M o s t recently, i n 1 9 9 4 C h a k a F a t t a h ( D PA) defeated incumbent L u c i e n B l a c k w e l l i n the D e m o c r a t i c H o u s e primaries. I n the end, B l a c k H o u s e incumbents represent poorer districts, r u n

Elections of Blacks to Congress

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T A B L E 3.2

Retirements and Reelection Rates in the U.S. House of Representatives for All Incumbents and Black Incumbents Retirements Year 1970 1972

All Incumbents 6.9 9.2

Black

Percentage Reelected Incumbents

All Incumbents

Black

0

94.5%

100%

0

93.6

100 100

Incumbents

1974

10.1

0 ( 1 death)

87.7

1976

10.8

0

95.8

100

1978

11.3

1 8 . 8 (Nix, Met­ calfe, Burke) 6.3 (Jordan)

93.7

100

90.7

9 3 . 8 (Stewart defeated)

1980

7.8

1982

9.2

100

5.3

5.5 (Chisholm) 4 . 8 (Washington)

90.1

1984

95.4

1986

9.2

0

97.7

9 5 . 2 (Hall defeated) (Waldon, Jr. defeated)

4 . 3 (Mitchell) 1 6 . 6 (Hawkins, Crockett, Fauntroy, Gray) ( 1 death)

98.3

100

96.0

100

0

88.3

9 2 . 3 (Savage, Hayes defeated) 1 0 0 (resignations by Reynolds and Tucker) 9 4 . 9 (Franks, B . R . Collins defeated)

1988

5.3

1990

6.2

1992

14.9

1994

9.4

5 . 1 (Fields; Blackwell)

90.2

1996

9.6

2 . 6 ( C . Collins)

94.0

N o t e : These figures do not include members who died or resigned before the end of Congress. I show such numbers for deaths and resignations for black incumbents only. Source: Based on data in Vital Statistics o n Congress, 1 9 9 7 - 1 9 9 8 , Table 2-9, and com­ piled by author.

less expensive campaigns, a n d almost a l w a y s are reelected. Representing districts that are t y p i c a l l y 6 0 percent B l a c k , these districts are i n c r e d i b l y safe districts for D e m o c r a t s to h o l d a n d R e p u b l i c a n s generally do not challenge t h e m . W h i l e reelection rates o f b l a c k members i n general elec­ tions are t y p i c a l l y 1 0 0 percent, the m a j o r i t y o f t h e m almost a l w a y s face c o m p e t i t i o n i n their p r i m a r y races (see S i n g h 1 9 9 8 ) . F u r t h e r m o r e this reelection rate o f B l a c k members of Congress is not d r a m a t i c a l l y higher

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t h a n that o f their colleagues, the v a s t m a j o r i t y o f w h o m are reelected as w e l l . T o quote R o b e r t S i n g h , w h o has reached s i m i l a r c o n c l u s i o n s as m i n e , B l a c k m e m b e r s ' "electoral environments exaggerate the t r e n d s " readily apparent a m o n g their W h i t e colleagues ( 1 3 0 ) . B l a c k s i n m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts are l i k e their W h i t e colleagues i n their preoccupation w i t h w i n n i n g reelection. I n fact, because both the Senate a n d W h i t e H o u s e are pie-in-the-sky goals for t h e m , B l a c k m e m ­ bers m a y be even more invested i n keeping their seats than W h i t e s . A s M o r r i s F i o r i n a , a senior s c h o l a r o f C o n g r e s s , points out, w i t h a 9 0 per­ cent reelection rate, " C o n g r e s s today is occupied by career p o l i t i c i a n s . G e n e r a l l y speaking the o n l y congressmen w h o do not intend to spend the rest of their careers i n Congress are those senators w h o hope to move up to the presidency" ( 1 9 8 9 : 7 ) . C o n g r e s s i o n a l scholars h a v e l o n g argued that members of Congress residing i n " s a f e " districts are no less responsive to their constituents because members " r u n s c a r e d " a n d t a k e nothing for granted ( F i o r i n a 1 9 8 9 ; M a n n 1 9 7 8 ; J a c o b s o n 1 9 8 7 ) . S w a i n ' s ( 1 9 9 3 ) c o n c e r n that m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts give B l a c k members greater electoral i m m u n i t y t h a n W h i t e members is baseless.

THE

"OVERREPRESENTATION" OF BLACK WOMEN I N CONGRESS?

C h a p t e r 2 demonstrated that s o c i a l b a c k g r o u n d s a n d experiences o f B l a c k w o m e n elected to Congress w e r e significantly different f r o m their W h i t e a n d B l a c k male counterparts. B l a c k w o m e n members o f Congress deserve a special note i n this chapter as w e l l , because w i t h i n their race, they m a k e up a higher percentage of Congress t h a n w o m e n do i n the total m e m b e r s h i p . F i g u r e 3.2 displays the percentage o f B l a c k w o m e n a m o n g B l a c k members against the percentage of w o m e n a m o n g a l l members i n the H o u s e of Representatives. W h e r e a s w o m e n today m a k e up 12 percent o f Congress, B l a c k w o m e n are 3 4 . 5 percent o f the B l a c k members serving i n Congress. A r e B l a c k w o m e n s o m e h o w electorally advantaged relative to B l a c k m e n a n d W h i t e w o m e n ? W h i l e a substan­ t i a l literature has emerged attempting to m a k e e x p l i c i t those factors as­ sociated w i t h the high failure rates o f B l a c k m e n a n d W h i t e w o m e n i n w i n n i n g statewide, prestigious seats, little has been w r i t t e n a b o u t B l a c k w o m e n ' s p o l i t i c a l chances i n this arena (Tate 1 9 9 7 ) . T h e r e is a substantial literature seeking to e x p l a i n w h y w o m e n i n general are n u m e r i c a l l y underrepresented p r o p o r t i o n a l l y to m e n i n the U . S . Congress. T h e a n s w e r is that first, few w o m e n r u n , a n d secondly, few w o m e n w i n . I n both cases, c u l t u r a l a n d s t r u c t u r a l e x p l a n a t i o n s have been a d v a n c e d to e x p l a i n w h y few w o m e n r u n a n d few w o m e n w i n . W o m e n are socialized differently t h a n m e n a n d that e x p l a i n s w h y o n l y a handful ever consider r u n n i n g for p o l i t i c a l office. W r i t e D a r c y ,

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40%

Figure 3.2. Percentage of women in Congress and percentage of women among Black members of Congress, 1 9 7 9 - 9 9 . S o u r c e : Center for the American Women and Politics. W e l c h , a n d C l a r k , " T h e t r a d i t i o n a l role assigned to w o m e n m a k e s it difficult for t h e m to enter p u b l i c office. T h e role o f h o m e m a k e r a n d mother as t r a d i t i o n a l l y defined is isolated f r o m a n d perhaps m u t u a l l y exclusive of m a n y societal roles, i n c l u d i n g intensive p o l i t i c a l activity. M e n c a n be b r e a d w i n n e r s a n d p o l i t i c a l leaders as w e l l as fathers, but m o t h e r i n g has t r a d i t i o n a l l y been seen as a full-time j o b " ( 1 9 9 4 , 1 0 6 ) . A s they go o n to e x p l a i n , w o m e n ' s life experiences are generally differ­ ent than men's. W o m e n are burdened w i t h the t r a d i t i o n a l roles of c h i l d care responsibilities. W o m e n ' s role as h o m e m a k e r conflicts w i t h a pub­ lic, p o l i t i c a l role. E a r l y research o n gender a n d p o l i t i c a l officeholding found that w o m e n state legislators were m o r e likely to be elected i n districts close to the state c a p i t a l t h a n m e n , reasoning that closeness to the state c a p i t a l facilitated female legislative membership since service closer to home w a s p r o b a b l y less disruptive to family responsibilities t h a n long distances. A n o t h e r study found that female state legislators tended to be older t h a n male state legislators, suggesting that w o m e n defer p o l i t i c a l careers u n t i l after their c h i l d r e n become adults. Rejecting largely the s o c i a l i z a t i o n thesis as inadequate, R . D a r c y , Susan W e l c h , a n d J a n e t C l a r k ( 1 9 9 4 ) argue that because politicians tend to come f r o m the economic a n d social elite, this, too, negatively impacts u p o n w o m e n as p o l i t i c a l officeseekers. T h u s , a substantial part o f the underrepresentation o f w o m e n i n public office i n the U n i t e d States is

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because of their underrepresentation i n this eligible p o o l : the business a n d professional occupations f r o m w h i c h most officials are recruited. T h i s effect is strongest at the n a t i o n a l a n d state levels o f government. T h i s s t r u c t u r a l e x p l a n a t i o n posits that changing the o c c u p a t i o n a l distri­ b u t i o n o f w o m e n w o u l d influence their recruitment to p u b l i c office. A n o t h e r e x p l a n a t i o n for the underrepresentation o n w o m e n rests o n voter bias against w o m e n candidates. Surveys as late as 1 9 8 4 find that 6 percent o f A m e r i c a n s w o u l d refuse to vote for a qualified w o m a n of their o w n p a r t y for Congress. S i x percent is a s m a l l number, but i n the w o r l d of congressional elections w h e r e incumbents are a l m o s t a l w a y s returned to W a s h i n g t o n , such a disadvantage represents the p r o v e r b i a l last s t r a w b r e a k i n g the camel's b a c k for w o m e n congressional c a n d i ­ dates. A n d this 6 percent might be a n underestimate since some m a y not be w i l l i n g to a d m i t their prejudice against w o m e n i n a p o l l . R e s e a r c h e r s have e x a m i n e d this issue, a n d most, but not a l l , still argue that voter bias against w o m e n is not a factor. B i a s , they argue, is balanced out or negated by the c a m p a i g n . F u r t h e r m o r e , the congressional c a m p a i g n s o f w o m e n candidates are as w e l l financed a n d supported as those o f s i m i ­ l a r m e n . O t h e r researchers have reopened this issue, finding that gender bias is a serious p r o b l e m h a m p e r i n g the elections o f w o m e n ( K a h n 1 9 9 6 ) . A n o t h e r form o f gender bias comes f r o m p a r t y leaders. L i k e voter bias, the p r o m i n e n t researchers o n gender politics have c o n c l u d e d t h a t there is no evidence t h a t w o m e n are more l i k e l y t h a n m e n to face p o l i t i c a l l y i n v u l n e r a b l e incumbents as candidates i n congressional races. H o w e v e r , this early c o n c l u s i o n i s , a g a i n , being challenged by n e w re­ search o n the different patterns o f recruitment for w o m e n a n d m e n by p a r t y leaders ( S a n b o n m a t s u 2 0 0 2 ) . Perhaps the chief reason for the n u m e r i c a l underrepresentation o f A m e r i c a n w o m e n i n government is the U . S . election system, w h i c h c o n ­ fers not o n l y advantages to the e c o n o m i c a n d social elite but to p o l i t i c a l incumbents. First-past-the-post p l u r a l i t y systems w i t h single-member districts, used here i n the U n i t e d States, seem to disadvantage w o m e n . W o m e n tend to do better under p a r t y list systems of p r o p o r t i o n a l repre­ sentation. Second, p a r t y a n d legislative c o m p e t i t i o n , i n c l u d i n g the effect of i n c u m b e n c y a n d t u r n o v e r are i m p o r t a n t . F i n a l l y , the p o l i t i c a l culture o f a country, w h e t h e r egalitarian or t r a d i t i o n a l , p l a y s a role. M o s t but not a l l analysts argue that p r o p o r t i o n a l representation ( P R ) systems elect m o r e w o m e n t h a n do single-member district ( S M D ) systems, n e a r l y t w i c e as many, although there is considerable v a r i a t i o n w i t h i n election systems. W h y do more w o m e n get elected i n P R systems? I n singlemember districts, parties m u s t n o m i n a t e one candidate. W o m e n m a y appear as r i s k i e r choices t h a n m e n do, a n d l a c k i n g c o m p a r a b l e re­ sources, w o m e n find it difficult to self-nominate. I n the U n i t e d States,

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63

w o m e n candidates scramble to raise the e n o r m o u s a m o u n t s o f m o n e y needed to challenge incumbents or to contest the n e a r l y nonexistent open seats i n the H o u s e . B u t w h e n voters are presented w i t h a list o f candidates for each party, parties have a r a t i o n a l incentive to present a balanced ticket. I n p a r t y - l i s t / P R countries, w o m e n are added to the p a r t y list to broaden the general appeal o f the ticket a n d to give t h e m the o p p o r t u n i t y to be elected. A f f i r m a t i v e a c t i o n also caused parties to balance their tickets i n P R systems ( C a u l - K i t t e l s o n 2 0 0 1 ) . A m o n g twenty-five W e s t e r n democracies, the U n i t e d States is the fourth l o w e s t i n w o m e n ' s representation — o n l y 6.6 percent o f the H o u s e i n 1 9 9 0 . G i v e n this literature, one w o u l d imagine that B l a c k w o m e n c a n d i ­ dates suffer d o u b l y f r o m the p o l i t i c a l disadvantages that w o m e n a n d B l a c k s i n general face. Nevertheless, despite the d i s m a l prospects for w o m e n a n d B l a c k candidates, a n d given the large advantage accorded to incumbents a n d the negative effect of r a c i a l l y biased v o t i n g patterns, B l a c k w o m e n candidates m a y still have special advantages over their W h i t e female a n d B l a c k male counterparts. F i r s t , l i m i t e d evidence sug­ gests that B l a c k w o m e n are more i n c l i n e d to r u n for p o l i t i c a l office t h a n are W h i t e w o m e n . I n contrast to W h i t e w o m e n , B l a c k w o m e n have a m u c h longer t r a d i t i o n of simultaneously w o r k i n g a n d r a i s i n g families. T h u s , sex-role expectations m a y have a less d a m p e n i n g effect o n B l a c k w o m e n ' s p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n s . R e s e a r c h has found that B l a c k w o m e n tend to have higher levels of p o l i t i c a l a m b i t i o n than do W h i t e w o m e n ( D a r c y a n d H a d l e y 1 9 8 8 ) . B l a c k w o m e n delegates at a D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y state c o n v e n t i o n , for e x a m p l e , w e r e more l i k e l y t h a n W h i t e w o m e n delegates to express a desire to h o l d higher party positions a n d elected positions. T h i s m a y be due to A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n w o m e n ' s histor­ i c a l experience o f p a r t i c i p a t i o n a n d a c t i v i s m i n the c i v i l rights m o v e ­ ment. Researchers have also suggested that resources e x t a n t w i t h i n the A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n c o m m u n i t y help A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n w o m e n w i t h polit­ ical a m b i t i o n s to overcome i n d i v i d u a l disadvantages s u c h as l o w e a r n ­ ing p o w e r a n d single-parent status. T w o such resources are strong r e l i ­ gious orientation a n d f a m i l y b a c k g r o u n d ( P e r k i n s 1 9 8 6 ) . Second, a l t h o u g h B l a c k votes have been p i v o t a l i n the elections o f a n u m b e r of W h i t e female D e m o c r a t i c m a y o r s , as i n C h i c a g o a n d H o u s ­ t o n , B l a c k w o m e n candidates c a n m o r e l i k e l y depend o n their base o f support c o m i n g f r o m A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n voters t h a n c a n W h i t e w o m e n candidates. O f course, m a j o r i t y - B l a c k support is never a u t o m a t i c a l l y handed over to every B l a c k candidate w h o runs for p u b l i c office. B l a c k R e p u b l i c a n s in p a r t i c u l a r have o n l y been able to o b t a i n a one-quarter share of the B l a c k vote i n most electoral contests. A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n voters are m o r e likely to support B l a c k liberals, a n d t u r n o u t a m o n g B l a c k s tends to peak i n those elections i n v o l v i n g viable B l a c k candidates.

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L a s t l y , B l a c k w o m e n candidates m a y be better able to m o b i l i z e w o m e n voters as a w h o l e across r a c i a l barriers. N o t w i t h s t a n d i n g , the " w o m e n ' s v o t e " i n contrast to the " B l a c k v o t e " has h i s t o r i c a l l y been far m o r e elusive because w o m e n , for a v a r i e t y of reasons, are less l i k e l y t h a n B l a c k s to vote as a bloc. Indeed, the w o m e n ' s vote is a r e l a t i v e l y recent p h e n o m e n o n , first witnessed i n the 1 9 8 0 presidential election. P r i o r to 1 9 8 0 , there w e r e o n l y s m a l l differences ( 0 - 6 percent) i n the p r o p o r t i o n s of w o m e n a n d m e n v o t i n g D e m o c r a t i c . ( T h i s gap is also substantially smaller t h a n the r a c i a l gap that first emerged full b l o w n i n the 1 9 6 8 presidential election.) T h e existence o f a gender gap i n electoral politics o w e s m o r e to a shift i n the v o t i n g preferences o f m e n t h a n o f w o m e n , however. Nevertheless, the issue-based nature of w o m e n ' s support for the D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y a n d its candidates implies that w o m e n candidates, even D e m o c r a t i c female candidates, c a n n o t count o n a w o m e n ' s vote, since w o m e n are supporting D e m o c r a t s , not necessarily w o m e n . A t best, l i b e r a l female candidates are more l i k e l y to o b t a i n reliable support f r o m feminist voters, but feminists represent o n l y a m i n o r i t y o f female voters, estimated at f r o m one-tenth to about one-third o f the female p o p u l a t i o n . A l t h o u g h feminist organizations have become p r o m i n e n t fi­ n a n c i a l backers of female candidates, their endorsements have not i n ­ creased female support for their candidates. C o n t r a s t i n g the A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n vote to the w o m e n ' s vote, one might sense t h a t B l a c k voters are more receptive t h a n W h i t e w o m e n voters to the c a m p a i g n s o f A f r i ­ c a n A m e r i c a n w o m e n candidates. T h e w o m e n ' s vote is dependent o n c o n t e x t u a l factors that emphasize substantive, not s y m b o l i c , factors re­ lated to their vote. C a r o l M o s e l e y - B r a u n ' s historic election the U . S . Sen­ ate as its first B l a c k female a n d first B l a c k D e m o c r a t w a s based o n the w o m e n ' s vote a n d the A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n vote (Tate 1 9 9 7 ) . She captured the o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y o f the B l a c k vote a n d w e l l as 58 percent o f the female vote i n I l l i n o i s . T h e gender gap i n her Senate race w a s 9 percentage points, almost t w i c e the 5-point difference between w o m e n a n d men i n the 1 9 9 2 presidential election. W h i l e evidence suggests that B l a c k w o m e n are more l i k e l y to enter politics at higher rates t h a n W h i t e w o m e n , a n d that B l a c k w o m e n c a n benefit f r o m a B l a c k - a n d - w o m e n ' s - v o t e c o a l i t i o n , the single most impor­ tant fact that e x p l a i n s the higher percentage o f B l a c k w o m e n serving i n the U . S . Congress is the n e w opportunities created by the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t i n p r o v i d i n g n e w m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts from w h i c h to r u n . A s e x p l a i n e d earlier, a central reason w h y so few w o m e n are elected to Congress i n the U n i t e d States is l i n k e d to the single-member p l u r a l i t y system, w h i c h favors p o l i t i c a l incumbents. W i t h rare e x c e p t i o n , a l m o s t a l l the B l a c k w o m e n w h o have been elected to the U . S . H o u s e of R e p r e ­ sentatives have been elected i n n e w m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts. T h e largest surge in the numbers of w o m e n o c c u r r e d i n 1 9 9 2 w h e n thirteen n e w

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B l a c k l a w m a k e r s w e r e added to the H o u s e , a l l because o f the n e w B l a c k districts that h a d been created. A m o n g the thirteen n e w B l a c k l a w ­ m a k e r s five w e r e w o m e n . A not-so-insignificant n u m b e r o f w o m e n have been elected to fill c o n ­ gressional vacancies created by the deaths o f their husbands. F r e s h m e n i n the 1 0 6 t h Congress, M a r y B o n o ( R - C A ) a n d L o i s C a p p s ( D - C A ) are t w o o f the most recent e x a m p l e s o f w i v e s w h o successfully w o n the seats of their deceased husbands. O f the thirty-seven s u c h w o m e n w h o succeeded their h u s b a n d s i n the H o u s e , however, o n l y one w a s B l a c k : Cardiss Collins of Illinois. O n c e Shirley C h i s h o l m retired, C o l l i n s w a s the lone B l a c k w o m a n i n the H o u s e f r o m the 9 9 t h to 1 0 2 n d Congress, w h e n M a x i n e W a t e r s , B a r b a r a - R o s e C o l l i n s , a n d E l e a n o r H o l m e s N o r t o n were elected. A l l three B l a c k s w o n i n open-seat contests, h a v i n g prudently w a i t e d for the retirement o f the B l a c k Congressmen w h o m they succeeded. D i a n e E d i t h W a t s o n ( D - C A ) w o u l d w i n her seat to the 107th Congress i n a special election i n 2 0 0 1 to fill the v a c a n c y caused by J u l i a n D i x o n ' s unexpected death. I n fact, w i t h her election, the entire slate of C a l i f o r ­ nia's B l a c k H o u s e - m e m b e r s w a s n o w female, as i s , presently, that state's delegation to the U . S . Senate. W a t s o n w o n her election i n a race over­ f l o w i n g w i t h D e m o c r a t s , a n d thus, it w a s no easy seat to w i n . H e r v i c ­ t o r y w a s made harder by the fact that C o n g r e s s w o m a n M a x i n e W a t e r s endorsed the bid o f one o f her D e m o c r a t i c r i v a l s . A seasoned c a m ­ paigner and politician herself, having been the first B l a c k w o m a n elected to C a l i f o r n i a ' s state senate i n 1978 u n t i l t e r m l i m i t s k i c k e d i n , W a t s o n earned even m o r e congressional endorsements than her r i v a l , i n c l u d i n g those f r o m M i l l e n d e r - M c D o n a l d , Range!, L o r e t t a Sanchez, a n d E d d i e Bernice J o h n s o n , the 1 0 7 t h Congress's c h a i r of the C B C . T h u s a m i x t u r e o f strong a m b i t i o n , open seats, and n e w districts e x ­ p l a i n w h y B l a c k w o m e n are "overrepresented" in Congress. W i t h the l o w prospects of a d d i t i o n a l n e w B l a c k congressional districts being cre­ ated today, their rate o f entry to the H o u s e is expected to s l o w d o w n considerably, converging to the rate o f entry for w o m e n generally, w h i c h is slow. R . D a r c y , Susan W e l c h , a n d J a n e t C l a r k ( 1 9 9 4 ) argue that the o n l y w a y to speed up the election of w o m e n to Congress is through t e r m l i m i t s . I f t e r m l i m i t s w e r e imposed o n members of C o n ­ gress, B l a c k w o m e n w o u l d p r o b a b l y achieve n u m e r i c a l p a r i t y w i t h B l a c k m e n i n advance of W h i t e w o m e n reaching p a r i t y w i t h W h i t e m e n .

CAN BLACKS W I N I N WHITE-MAJORITY

DISTRICTS?

G r e a t emphasis has been placed o n the elections of B l a c k s i n W h i t e m a j o r i t y districts, even t h o u g h they are e x c e p t i o n a l . M y case studies indicate that most b l a c k s got to Congress i n m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts,

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a n d that these districts were created a n d sustained either t h r o u g h B l a c k p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n p o l i t i c a l machines or t h r o u g h the courts. G r e a t l y m o r e extensive e m p i r i c a l evidence is p r o v i d e d by C h a n d l e r D a v i d s o n a n d Ber­ n a r d G r o f m a n i n Q u i e t R e v o l u t i o n ( 1 9 9 4 ) . T h e y s h o w that o n l y one percent of m a j o r i t y - W h i t e districts have elected B l a c k s to Congress over the past t w e n t y years. D a v i d L u b l i n ' s ( 1 9 9 7 ) analysis o f congressional elections f r o m 1 9 7 2 to 1 9 9 4 s h o w s that, c o n t r o l l i n g for a l l sorts o f district-level variables ( i n c l u d i n g region, percent-urban, m e d i a n i n c o m e , open-seat), the r a c i a l demographics o f the district basically predict the race o f the candidate w h o w i n s . O f the 5 , 0 7 9 elections L u b l i n a n a l y z e d over this t w e n t y - t w o - y e a r period, w h i t e s a n d other n o n - b l a c k s w o n 5 , 0 0 7 elections held i n m a j o r i t y - W h i t e districts ( 4 1 ) . B l a c k congressional victories i n W h i t e m a j o r i t y districts are becoming less e x c e p t i o n a l because o f recent c o u r t decisions that have t r a n s f o r m e d n e w m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts into m a j o r i t y - W h i t e ones. I n L o u i s i a n a , the district i n 1 9 9 2 that h a d first sent C l e o Fields to Congress w a s substan­ tially r e d r a w n , a n d like the W h i t e incumbents w h o h a d declined to seek reelection w h e n their districts became m a j o r i t y - B l a c k , Fields b o w e d out after serving t w o terms. H i s 1 9 9 5 gubernatorial b i d , w h i c h most c o n ­ sidered i l l advised, m a y have been his strategy of w i n n i n g W h i t e sup­ port a n d building a b i r a c i a l c o a l i t i o n f r o m w h i c h he c o u l d r e t u r n to W a s h i n g t o n . I t w a s instead a disaster. H i s R e p u b l i c a n challenger, M i k e Foster, referred to the race o f his D e m o c r a t i c opponent Fields as m u c h as he c o u l d to capitalize o n W h i t e s ' latent fears o f B l a c k leadership. H e did this subtly a n d ingeniously t h r o u g h a television advertisement that stated that the over-sixty-year o l d , b a l d , a n d overweight Foster w a s " n o t just another pretty face." H e t o l d a N e w Y o r k T i m e s reporter that people w e r e attracted to his 1 9 9 5 gubernatorial c a m p a i g n because he " l o o k f s ] a lot like them a n d t h i n k f s ] like a lot o f t h e m " (Sacks 1 9 9 5 ) . H i s expectation to w i n votes o n the basis of his p h y s i c a l appearance might not have been so strong h a d not his r u n o f f D e m o c r a t i c opponent been B l a c k . Still, Fields w a s r e m a r k a b l y the o n l y casualty o f the conservative s w i n g i n the Supreme C o u r t o n r a c i a l redistricting. I n 1 9 9 8 , five B l a c k s , i n c l u d i n g four incumbents, w e r e elected i n congressional districts w h e r e W h i t e s w e r e the majority. C y n t h i a M c K i n n e y ' s district w a s o r i g i n a l l y 6 0 percent B l a c k , but because of court rulings i n v a l i d a t i n g her district as " r a c i a l l y gerrymandered," it w a s r e d r a w n to being o n l y 3 7 percent b l a c k (see table 3 . 3 ) . D i s t r i c t s over 3 0 percent B l a c k are almost a l w a y s safe seats for D e m o c r a t s . A s a D e m o c r a t , she has not really been at r i s k of defeat from a R e p u b l i c a n challenger, although eventually she c o u l d suffer defeat i n a p r i m a r y . A s a B l a c k , she credits her ability to retain her seat, despite the r a d i c a l redistribution of the demographics o f her

T A B L E 3.3 African-American Representatives in 1999 Name Major Owens Elijah Cummings Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick Bobby Rush John Conyers Jesse Jackson Jr. E a r l Hilliard Danny Davis Robert Scott Bennie Thompson John Lewis James Clyburn Chaka Fattah William Jefferson Ed Towns Donald Payne Harold Ford Jr. Stephanie Tubbs Jones Albert Wynn Carrie Meek Gregory Meek s William Clay Alcee Hastings Sheila Jackson-Lee Eva Clayton Eddie Bernice Johnson Corrine Brown"" Charles Rangel Maxine Waters Julian D i x o n Sanford Bishop " Cynthia McKinney " Melvin Watt* Juanita Millender-McDonald Barbara Lee Julia Carson J . C . Watts ::

51

District

%Black

NY MD MI IL MI IL AL IL VA MS GA SC PA LA NY NJ TN OH MD FL NY MO FL TX NC TX FL NY CA CA GA GA NC CA CA IN OK

74.0% 71.0 70.0 69.7 69.1 68.5 67.5 65.6 64.4 63.0 62.3 62.3 62.2 61.1 60.7 60.2 59.2 58.6 58.5 58.4 56.2 52.3 51.6 50.9 50.3 50.0 47.0 46.9 42.7 40.3 39.2 36.6 35.6 33.6 31.8 29.8 7.1

11 07 15 01 14 02 07 07 03 02 05 06 02 02 10 10 09 11 04 17 06 01 23 18 01 30 03 15 35 32 02 04 12 37 09 10 04

% Latino 11.5% 0.9 4.3 3.6 1.1 6.6 0.3 4.3 1.3 0.5 1.8 0.5 1.6 3.4 19.7 12.3 0.7 1.1 6.4 23.0 16.9 0.9 9.4 15.3 0.3 17.1 3.4 46.4 43.1 30.2 1.7 3.2 0.4 45.1 12.0 1.2 3.9

% Minority 88.7% 73.5 75.4 74.4 71.5 75.8 68.1 73.2 67.1 63.9 65.1 63.1 66.3 66.5 83.1 75.2 60.8 60.9 69.8 82.9 80.0 54.4 62.1 69.4 51.4 69.5 51.2 96.4 92.2 78.8 41.5 43.6 37.3 90.0 60.1 31.0 17.2

N o t e : * originally elected from Black-majority districts. "Percent Minority" is the per­ centage in the total population who are not non-Hispanic whites. T h e table does not include the district of Eleanor Norton Holmes, D.C.'s nonvoting delegate to the House. S o u r c e s : Based on P o l i t i c s i n A m e r i c a 1 9 9 6 (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Quar­ terly, 1995); 1 9 9 0 U.S. C e n s u s of P o p u l a t i o n a n d H o u s i n g : 1 0 4 t h C o n g r e s s : C o n g r e s s i o ­ nal D i s t r i c t s of t h e United S t a t e s , S u m m a r y Tape File S u m m a r y Tape File 4 D ( C D - R o m ) . See also Lublin (1997).

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district, to her incumbency, w h i c h gave her a record to r u n o n a n d the ability to secure the now-requisite one m i l l i o n dollars for c a m p a i g n i n g . M e l W a t t of N o r t h C a r o l i n a w o n o r i g i n a l l y i n a m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y dis­ trict a n d w o n reelection i n 1 9 9 8 i n a r e d r a w n district w h e r e m i n o r i t y voters constituted slightly more t h a n one-third of the district's p o p u l a ­ t i o n . H e credits his v i c t o r y to his p o l i t i c a l incumbency, stressing that it w a s not because W h i t e r a c i a l fears t o w a r d B l a c k candidates have r a d i ­ c a l l y changed. A s he e x p l a i n e d to one N e w Y o r k T i m e s reporter, " T h e r e are still w h i t e s w h o under no circumstance w i l l vote for a b l a c k person. T h e y ' r e never going to t o u c h me, they're never going to be i n a r o o m w i t h me. A s far as they're concerned, I ' m not their c o n g r e s s m a n " (Sacks 2 0 0 0 ) . Is the future brighter for B l a c k candidates seeking election i n open, m a j o r i t y - W h i t e congressional districts? I n J u n e 2 0 0 1 , B l a c k D e m ­ ocrat a n d V i r g i n i a State Senator L o u i s e L u c a s sought to w i n the v a c a n t seat created by D e m o c r a t N o r m a n Sisisky's death i n a special election. T h i s district is 4 0 percent B l a c k a n d considered a safe district, therefore, for D e m o c r a t s . I t w a s an election i n w h i c h both parties spent m i l l i o n s . T h e contest w a s m a r k e d by r a c i a l overtones, a n d L u c a s lost n a r r o w l y to R e p u b l i c a n State Senator R a n d y Forbes by a 4 percent m a r g i n . T h e other B l a c k s elected i n districts w h e r e W h i t e s are the v o t i n g m a ­ j o r i t y are Sanford B i s h o p , J u l i a C a r s o n , a n d J . C . W a t t s . R o n a l d D e l ­ l u m ' s o l d district, n o w represented by B a r b a r a L e e , w a s once a district w h e r e W h i t e s made up the majority, but today, minorities are 6 0 per­ cent o f the district's p o p u l a t i o n . I n 2 0 0 0 C a l i f o r n i a became the o n l y state h a v i n g a B l a c k , L a t i n o , a n d A s i a n p o p u l a t i o n majority. A s i n the case of L e e , other B l a c k representatives are sometimes misreported as representing m a j o r i t y - " W h i t e " districts, s u c h as M a x i n e W a t e r s a n d C h a r l e s R a n g e l , w h e n i n fact W h i t e s are less t h a n 10 percent of their districts. L i t i g a t i o n forced T e x a s to r e d r a w its congressional districts for the 1998 elections, a n d the B l a c k population i n both Sheila J a c k s o n - L e e ' s a n d E d d i e Bernice Johnson's districts w a s reduced to a bare 5 0 percent. A l t h o u g h J o h n s o n easily w o n her reelection w i t h 7 0 percent of the vote, her district m a y have a slight W h i t e - v o t i n g majority. I n future reelection bids, F l o r i d a ' s three B l a c k H o u s e members are presently open targets for reducing the percentage o f B l a c k s a n d minorities in their districts. I n 1 9 9 6 , 9 5 percent of the thirty-eight B l a c k members o f the H o u s e elected w o n i n m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts or districts where B l a c k s a n d L a t i n o s constituted the majority. O n l y t w o B l a c k s served districts w i t h W h i t e majorities. I t is possible that i n the twenty-first century, as a conse­ quence of v o t i n g rights litigation, as m a n y as one-third o f the B l a c k s serving i n the H o u s e w i l l represent districts w h e r e W h i t e s are the majority.

Elections of Blacks to Congress

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69

T h e different w a y s t h r o u g h w h i c h B l a c k s have w o n office to the U . S . Congress c a n be simplified as e x e m p l i f y i n g essentially t w o basic ap­ proaches: B l a c k independent or b i r a c i a l / m u l t i r a c i a l c a m p a i g n styles. I n their ten-city study of C a l i f o r n i a n cities, R u f u s B r o w n i n g , D a l e R o g e r s M a r s h a l l , a n d D a v i d T a b b ( 1 9 8 4 ) argue that B l a c k s c o u l d m o r e fruit­ fully w i n office t h r o u g h a b i - or m u l t i r a c i a l a p p r o a c h . D a v i d T . C a n o n ( 1 9 9 9 ) c l a i m s that B l a c k candidates have w o n election to the U . S . C o n ­ gress both w a y s . C a n d i d a t e s such as Bennie T h o m p s o n ( D - M S ) a n d M a x i n e Waters ( D - C A ) he labels as " t r a d i t i o n a l " B l a c k politicians, w h i l e those w h o s e c a m p a i g n styles are equally oriented t o w a r d W h i t e s or b a l ­ anced between B l a c k s a n d W h i t e s i n the district, such as S a n f o r d B i s h o p ( D - G A ) or C l e o Fields, he labels as " n e w - s t y l e . " H e finds that it is not so m u c h the r a c i a l demographics o f the district that predict w h i c h type of B l a c k candidate w o u l d have the best chances o f w i n n i n g , as it is the field of candidates a m o n g w h i c h they compete. I f a p o o l of B l a c k c a n d i ­ dates competes against a W h i t e i n a s o l i d l y - B l a c k m a j o r i t y district, the t r a d i t i o n a l B l a c k w i l l w i n i f there is a r u n o f f election. I n a district w h e r e W h i t e s m a k e up at least 3 0 percent, w i t h multiple B l a c k candidates but no W h i t e candidates in the race, the new-type B l a c k w i l l w i n o n the basis of a b i r a c i a l c o a l i t i o n . C a n o n finds that these c a m p a i g n styles feed into their representation of the districts, a matter I explore further i n the n e x t chapter.

CHAPTER

4

Legislative Styles and Voting Records Blacks elected to Congress in the twentieth century, as a group, rate in the top percentile on all criteria used for measuring effective legislative performance. We are rated above the national average in educational attainment, intelligence, oratorical skills, and the ability to work amiably with colleagues. — Representative William Clay ( D - M O ) , in Just

Permanent

Interests

D o B L A C K S R E P R E S E N T their B l a c k constituents differently t h a n do W h i t e s ? C a r o l S w a i n ( 1 9 9 3 ) addressed this question e m p i r i c a l l y , a n a l y z ­ ing the legislative votes o f B l a c k a n d W h i t e members o f the H o u s e a n d t h r o u g h her field study observations o f thirteen B l a c k a n d W h i t e legisla­ tors. F r o m this she concludes that B l a c k D e m o c r a t s w e r e politically rep­ resented even w h e n their D e m o c r a t i c representatives w e r e W h i t e . I n fact, she asserts that W h i t e members o f Congress have represented their B l a c k constituents better t h a n some B l a c k members have ( 2 2 1 ) . Since S w a i n ' s study w a s first p u b l i s h e d , however, a n u m b e r o f other analysts have e x a m i n e d this question (e.g., C a n o n 1 9 9 9 ; L u b l i n 1 9 9 7 ; W h i t b y 1 9 9 8 ) , a n d there is considerable evidence that race does matter. B l a c k D e m o c r a t s have legislative records that are quite distinct f r o m the p o l ­ icy records o f W h i t e D e m o c r a t s . I n this chapter, I c o m p a r e B l a c k legislative behavior to that o f W h i t e s . I n a d d i t i o n to their s u m m a r y v o t i n g scores, I also e x a m i n e committee assignments, bill sponsorship, a n d i n d i v i d u a l votes on m a j o r legislation.

T H E LEGISLATIVE ACTIVITIES

OF BLACK ANDW H I T E HOUSE

MEMBERS

I n her investigation o f w o m e n members o f state houses, Sue T h o m a s ( 1 9 9 4 ) asks w h e t h e r w o m e n b r i n g to government a different style based o n their distinctive life experiences? Politics is after a l l the

premier

p o w e r game, but do w o m e n , h a v i n g been socialized as the

"gentler

s e x , " eschew the h a r s h e r " z e r o - s u m " aspects o f politics, w h e r e b y every­ one is either a w i n n e r or a loser, a n d w o r k i n a m o r e c o n c i l i a t o r y fash­ ion? H e r a n s w e r is not really: w h i l e w o m e n legislators w e r e c r i t i c a l o f

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the w a y s i n w h i c h business w a s conducted i n state government, they adapted to, as opposed to challenged, the d o m i n a n t legislative n o r m s a n d procedures. She quotes one female member of the W a s h i n g t o n H o u s e of Representatives, w h o stated, " I don't like the process, but i n order to m a k e a change, y o u have to get power, a n d i n order to get p o w e r y o u have to p l a y the s y s t e m " ( 1 2 2 ) . A n o t h e r earlier published study o f per­ s o n a l i n t e r v i e w s w i t h w o m e n i n statehouses found that w o m e n fre­ quently stressed the importance o f being " t o u g h " to be effective legisla­ tors ( B l a i r a n d Stanley 1 9 9 1 ) . I n a n i n t e r v i e w published i n the T h e N e w Y o r k T i m e s ( J u l y 1 5 , 2 0 0 0 ) , Representative M a x i n e W a t e r s ( D - C A ) said that some o f her W h i t e male colleagues i n the H o u s e find her "too aggressive." She encounters such labels, she believes, because o f her race a n d gender. H e r male c o l ­ leagues t h i n k that being female a n d a m i n o r i t y , Waters ought to behave more deferentially i n s t r i v i n g to represent her constituents i n W a s h i n g ­ ton. T h e life experiences o f B l a c k s are clearly expected to i m p a c t u p o n their p o l i c y agendas, but not necessarily their w o r k i n g styles i n W a s h ­ ington. L i k e w o m e n , B l a c k members o f Congress m a y have distinctive goals, but function no differently f r o m W h i t e members i n the w a y s i n w h i c h they advance such goals. T a b l e 4 . 1 displays the average n u m b e r o f years, committee a n d sub­ committee assignments, a n d staff size by the race a n d p o l i t i c a l p a r t y o f the 2 5 2 H o u s e legislators w h o s e districts fell r a n d o m l y into the 1 9 9 6 N B E S sample (the list of these legislators c a n be found i n A p p e n d i x A ) . W h i l e R e p u b l i c a n members h a d less seniority t h a n D e m o c r a t s , essen­ t i a l l y no differences emerged o n the basis o f race across these measures. H o u s e members are allocated a fixed a l l o w a n c e to hire staff, a n d w h i l e W h i t e D e m o c r a t s o n average employed one a d d i t i o n a l staff person over B l a c k D e m o c r a t s a n d R e p u b l i c a n s , this difference w a s not d r a m a t i c . N o t a b l y as w e l l , the same percentages o f B l a c k H o u s e members w e r e serving i n p a r t y leadership positions as w e r e W h i t e D e m o c r a t s i n the 1 0 3 r d Congress — a p p r o x i m a t e l y one-third o f those w h o s e districts fell in the sample. R e p u b l i c a n s i n the sample, however, w e r e less l i k e l y to h o l d leadership positions i n their p a r t y a n d i n Congress. Race a n dCommittee Assignments. A closer e x a m i n a t i o n o f the committee assignments o f B l a c k a n d W h i t e H o u s e - m e m b e r s reveals, however, a k e y difference a m o n g members based o n their race. M o s t o f the legislative w o r k i n Congress is done t h r o u g h committees. W h i l e members m a y submit legislation directly to the floor, i n general it must first pass through a committee before it c a n be voted o n the floor. C o m ­ mittees draft the a c t u a l language o f bills a n d resolutions, a n d report o n the legislation to the floor. T h e y also collect i n f o r m a t i o n t h r o u g h hear-

Legislative Styles, Voting Records TABLE

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75

4.1

Average Number of Committee, Subcommittee, Staff Size, and Party Leadership by Race and Party of House Members in the 104th Congress in N B E S Sample

Average Number of Years in House Average Number of Committee Assignments Average Number of Subcommittee Assignments Average Total Staff Size Average Total Staff Size at Home Percentage Party Leaders

Black Democrat

White Democrat

White Republican

10.2 1.8

12.3 1.6

7.6 1.9

2.7

2.5

3.3

14.8 7.7 27%

15.4 7.5 39%

14.7 6.5 21.5%

ings a n d h o l d investigations, but the p o l i c y m a k i n g process flows through committees. M a n y more bills are introduced t h a n Congress has time to consider, a n d most die w h i l e i n committee or subcommittee, a n d never m a k e it to the floor. T h e p i v o t a l role of committees i n the p o l i c y m a k i n g process m a k e s committee assignments i m p o r t a n t to the attainment o f m e m b e r s ' p o l i t i c a l objectives (Shepsle 1 9 7 8 ; H a l l 1 9 9 6 ; D e e r i n g a n d Smith 1997). M o s t n e w members of Congress a r r i v e k n o w i n g w h i c h committees they w a n t to serve o n since there is great competition for serving o n i m p o r t a n t ones. H o u s e rules l i m i t members to no m o r e t h a n t w o m a j o r committee assignments. A s s i g n m e n t to subcommittees, however, is less constrained by rules ( H a l l 1 9 9 6 , 1 1 4 ) . R e t u r n i n g members almost a l ­ w a y s retain their o l d assignments, w h i l e n e w l y elected members m u s t r a n k their preferences for committee assignments a n d hope that they get their top choice. K e n n e t h Shepsle ( 1 9 7 8 ) has referred to committee as­ signment procedures as the "giant j i g s a w p u z z l e " as m e m b e r s ' prefer­ ences m u c h be matched to overlapping a n d competing factors such as the needs of their parties, p a r t i s a n a n d geographical forces, rules a n d procedures, as w e l l as the member's expertise, reputation, a n d ability. D e e r i n g a n d S m i t h ( 1 9 9 7 ) retell the story o f C a r r i e M e e k ( D - F L ) , one of the n e w B l a c k faces i n Congress sent f r o m a n e w l y created m a j o r i t y B l a c k district. S h o r t l y after w i n n i n g her p r i m a r y , she traveled to W a s h ­ ington to meet w i t h H o u s e D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y leaders — i n c l u d i n g the D e m o c r a t i c H o u s e Speaker — a n d indicated her interest i n serving o n the H o u s e A p p r o p r i a t i o n s C o m m i t t e e — one of the most p o w e r f u l c o m ­ mittees i n Congress. I n her i n t e r v i e w w i t h the C Q reporter, she said that she "never a s k e d for a c o m m i t m e n t " f r o m the m a n y people she met i n

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W a s h i n g t o n , but sent t h a n k y o u notes r e m i n d i n g t h e m o f her interest i n A p p r o p r i a t i o n s ( 1 0 5 ) . A l t h o u g h freshmen u s u a l l y never get a seat o n A p p r o p r i a t i o n s , M e e k s d i d i n large measure because she a c t i v e l y c a m ­ paigned for it. T h e m o s t prestigious committees i n the H o u s e are those seen as the most influential or p o w e r f u l . T h e s e committees include the R u l e s , A p ­ p r o p r i a t i o n s , Budget, a n d W a y s a n d M e a n s C o m m i t t e e . A p p r o p r i a t i o n s is appropriately v i e w e d as p o w e r f u l because it initially determines w h o gets h o w m u c h . A s former R e p . S i l v i o C o n t e ( R - M A ) used to say, " I f y o u ' r e i n the butcher shop w h e n the hog gets slaughtered, y o u get to t a k e home the best b a c o n . " D e e r i n g a n d S m i t h ( 1 9 9 7 ) classify p o l i c y oriented committees, s u c h as C o m m e r c e , E d u c a t i o n a n d the W o r k f o r c e , a n d I n t e r n a t i o n a l R e l a t i o n s , as those that c a n address k e y p o l i c y do­ m a i n s . C o n s t i t u e n c y committees are those that c a n directly address the specific needs a n d concerns of a member's district, s u c h as A g r i c u l t u r e , P u b l i c W o r k s , a n d A r m e d Services. T h e committees that members gen­ erally don't w a n t include the Post Office a n d C i v i l Service C o m m i t t e e , Standards of Official C o n d u c t , a n d the D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a C o m m i t t e e . W h i l e no r a c i a l differences w e r e f o u n d i n the n u m b e r o f committee assignments, table 4 . 2 displays the percentages of B l a c k a n d W h i t e leg­ islators grouped by p a r t y serving o n prestigious, constituency, policy, a n d undesirable committees. W h i l e a large p l u r a l i t y of W h i t e D e m o ­ crats have assignments to prestigious committees ( 3 9 percent), o n l y 18 percent o f B l a c k s ' committee assignments c a n be considered prestigious. T h e m a j o r i t y of committees that B l a c k s serve o n are p o l i c y or constitu­ ency focused — a pattern that they a c t u a l l y share w i t h W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s . A n o t h e r difference is that w h i l e about 10 percent o f the committees that W h i t e D e m o c r a t s a n d W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s serve o n are " u n d e s i r a b l e , " about one-fifth of the committees that B l a c k s belong to are low-prestige committees. T h e higher percentage of B l a c k s h a v i n g undesirable assignments c a n be readily e x p l a i n e d by the fact that t w o out of the five committees have jurisdictions c o v e r i n g the Post Office a n d C i v i l Service a n d D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a . B l a c k s have l o n g been w e l l e m p l o y e d i n the r a n k s o f the federal c i v i l service a n d postal systems a n d m a k e up the m a j o r i t y o f residents i n the D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a . B l a c k members m a y consider these t w o committees as " B l a c k c o n s t i t u e n c y " committees, as desirable to t h e m as the " c o n s t i t u e n c y " committees that D e e r i n g a n d S m i t h ( 1 9 9 7 ) identify. T h e finding that significantly fewer committees that B l a c k s serve o n are as prestigious as those served o n by their W h i t e counterparts i n the H o u s e is tougher to account for. D o B l a c k s l a c k the a m b i t i o n to serve o n p o w e r f u l a n d influence committees? T h e story of C a r r i e M e e k of F l o r i d a discredits this as a possibility. A r e B l a c k s over-

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TABLE 4.2

Types of Committee Assignments by Race and Party of House Member in N B E S Sample (Weighted Percentages) Black Democrat Prestigious " Constituency Policy * Undesirable 4

White

Democrat

White

Republican

18%

39%

32%

59

50.5

51

59

40

53

21

10

12

N o t e : Committee types based on typology developed by Deering and Smith (1997). Includes only the 252 House members whose districts fell into the 1996 N B E S sample, including 34 of the 39 Black members of the 104th Congress. *p < .10.

l o o k e d or d i s c r i m i n a t e d against i n the allocation of seats to such c o m ­ mittees by p a r t y leaders? T h e last e x p l a n a t i o n seems o d d given that B l a c k s are proportionately represented i n p a r t y leadership positions. D u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n , however, no B l a c k legislator w a s assigned to an i m p o r t a n t committee (Singh 1 9 9 8 ) . T h e Speaker o f the H o u s e c o n ­ trolled the appointment process a n d p r e s u m a b l y chose not to appoint B l a c k s . R e p u b l i c a n s w e r e split, after a l l , over the issue of B l a c k officeholding, w h i c h w a s too r a d i c a l for m a n y to support. P l a c i n g a B l a c k m a n o n an i m p o r t a n t committee w o u l d give B l a c k s a measure o f p o w e r over their W h i t e colleagues i n Congress, w h i c h , at that time, w a s unimaginable. A n o t h e r scholar using a different measure for committee prestige finds no race difference i n the committee assignments o f B l a c k a n d W h i t e members ( F r i e d m a n 1 9 9 6 ) . T h i s measure of prestige, however, is problematic as it does not r a n k the D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a C o m m i t t e e assignment, a n d assumes a neat linear a n d equal drop i n committees' levels o f prestige from 1 to 1 9 . I n fact, b r a c k e t i n g the scale, F r i e d m a n reports that since the 1980s B l a c k s a n d w o m e n w e r e as likely as W h i t e males to get the top committee assignments. I t c o u l d be that the n e w generation of B l a c k elected officials, those elected to the 1 0 3 r d Congress notably, i n c l u d i n g C a r r i e M e e k , have been more openly ambitious in seeking top committee assignments. D i v i d i n g the B l a c k members into those elected before 1 9 9 2 and those elected in 1 9 9 2 and 1 9 9 4 , I c o m ­ pared the percentages o f B l a c k s serving o n prestigious committees. T h e results are s h o w n i n table 4 . 3 . T h e percentages reveal that M e e k ' s appointment to A p p r o p r i a t i o n s w a s a n a n o m a l y . N e w l y elected members generally l a c k the p o l i t i c a l clout to w i n appointments to h i g h l y coveted committees. W h i l e the 6.6

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T A B L E 4.3

Prestigious Committee Assignments by Race, Party, and Year Elected: (Percentage of Appointees within Their Respective Affiliations) Appointees t o Prestigious Committees Black Democrat White Democrat White Republican

Elected Prior t o 103rd Congress 29%

Elected t o 103rd/l 0 4 t h Congresses 6%

43

21

35

30

percent o f B l a c k s h a v i n g seats o n prestigious committees is still l o w e r t h a n the 2 1 percent o f W h i t e D e m o c r a t i c H o u s e members, the 15 per­ cent gap between the t w o groups is s o m e w h a t smaller t h a n the 2 1 per­ cent r a c i a l gap that exists i n the p r o p o r t i o n o f prestigious committee assignments as s h o w n i n table 4 . 2 . R e p u b l i c a n s , i n contrast, appointed as m a n y recently elected members (the freshmen of the 1 0 4 t h Congress w h o collectively shifted the balance o f p o w e r i n the H o u s e to the R e ­ p u b l i c a n p a r t y ) to prestigious committees as more senior members. A large gap between more senior W h i t e a n d B l a c k D e m o c r a t s reappears i n table 4 . 3 , however. W h i l e 2 9 percent o f B l a c k members elected before 1992 serve o n committees that are considered prestigious, 4 3 percent o f W h i t e D e m o c r a t s elected before 1 9 9 2 serve o n prestigious committees. E i t h e r B l a c k s did not w a n t to serve o n these committees or they w e r e d i s c r i m i n a t e d against by p a r t y leaders. I n the latter case, R o b e r t Singh ( 1 9 9 8 ) reports that early committee assignments for B l a c k members d i d s p a r k controversy. R o n D e l l u m ' s ( D - C A ) desire to serve o n the A r m e d Services C o m m i t t e e i n 1 9 7 4 w a s objected to by the D e m o c r a t i c Speaker. C B C members protested, a n d D e l l u m s ultimately received his assign­ ment. Shirley C h i s h o l m tells the story that she w a s o r i g i n a l l y assigned to A g r i c u l t u r e , but after protesting that there w e r e " n o trees i n B r o o k ­ l y n " w a s reassigned to the Veterans Affairs C o m m i t t e e (Singh 1 9 9 8 , 7 9 - 8 0 ) . T h e D e m o c r a t i c C a u c u s also refused the requests o f H a r o l d W a s h i n g t o n ( D - I L ) a n d J u l i a n D i x o n ( D - C A ) to serve o n the Budget C o m m i t t e e . T h u s , the absence o f B l a c k s o n prestigious committees i n the past c o u l d be a measure o f d i s c r i m i n a t i o n by party leaders. A t the same time, i n striving to service the needs of B l a c k A m e r i c a n s , B l a c k members m a y have initially been less interested i n p a r t i c i p a t i n g on p o w e r h o u s e committees t h a n serving o n committees that enhance their chances of w i n n i n g passage o n specific policy areas or p r o - B l a c k legislation. Since preferences m u s t be r a n k - o r d e r e d , a n d given the his­ t o r y o f r a c i a l d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against B l a c k members by p a r t y leaders i n committee assignments, B l a c k members m a y have found that requests for seats o n less sought-after committees w e r e a more " r e a l i z a b l e " a m b i t i o n .

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Race, Bill Sponsorship, and Legislation. W h i l e committee w o r k is understood to be the w a y members c a n enhance their influence i n the p o l i c y m a k i n g process, bill sponsorship is the most obvious a n d direct means for members to fulfill Congress's chief l a w m a k i n g function. L e g ­ islation introduced i n Congress c a n be o f t w o types: bills or resolutions. R e s o l u t i o n s c a n be p o l i c y statements w i t h o u t the force o f the l a w or a matter o f public l a w . B i l l s generally have m a n y multiple sponsors a n d greatly outnumber resolutions. D u r i n g the 1 0 5 t h Congress ( 1 9 9 7 - 9 8 ) , 7 , 5 2 9 bills a n d 2 0 0 j o i n t resolutions w e r e introduced in both H o u s e s . O f that t o t a l , 4 , 8 7 4 bills a n d 1 4 0 j o i n t resolutions originated i n the H o u s e o f Representatives. T h e s e bills w e r e n o longer read out l o u d as was customary, but published a n d referred to committee, w h e r e most then die. I n the 1 0 5 t h , about 5 percent o f the sponsored bills w e r e passed into l a w . T h e literature suggests that B l a c k s are less successful at l a w m a k i n g than W h i t e s . D r a w i n g u p o n a set of personal i n t e r v i e w s w i t h B l a c k H o u s e members, C a n o n suggests that they are less interested i n sponsor­ ing w i n n i n g legislation i f it does not directly represent their constitu­ ents' interests. A n o t h e r set o f i n t e r v i e w s w i t h state l a w m a k e r s found that B l a c k legislators t h i n k that they have a harder time representing B l a c k s i n the legislative process ( B u t t o n a n d Hedge 1 9 9 7 ) . I t is possible that as a consequence B l a c k l a w m a k e r s don't sponsor as m a n y bills as W h i t e legislators do. F i n a l l y , a recent study by B r a t t o n a n d H a y n i e ( 1 9 9 9 ) found that c o m p a r e d to their W h i t e colleagues, B l a c k state legis­ lators have been less successful i n getting their legislation passed. T h e data f r o m the 1 0 4 t h Congress strongly contradicts the v i e w that B l a c k legislators are less successful t h a n their W h i t e counterparts i n w i n n i n g passage of their legislation. A s table 4.4 s h o w s , w h i l e B l a c k D e m o c r a t s sponsored slightly fewer bills a n d resolutions t h a n their W h i t e counterparts, the difference is not s t r i k i n g . T y p i c a l l y B l a c k s sponsored about seven pieces o f legislation i n the 1 0 4 t h Congress, w h i l e W h i t e D e m o c r a t s sponsored ten a n d R e p u b l i c a n s about thirteen. Because R e ­ publicans h a d a greater chance o f w i n n i n g passage o f their legislation i n the R e p u b l i c a n - c o n t r o l l e d 1 0 4 t h Congress, it is not surprising that R e ­ p u b l i c a n members sponsored m o r e legislation t h a n D e m o c r a t i c m e m ­ bers d i d . R e p u b l i c a n members w h o s e districts fell into the 1 9 9 6 N B E S sample o n average got one piece o f legislation, bill or resolution, passed in the 1 0 4 t h Congress. D e m o c r a t i c members met w i t h m u c h , m u c h less success, although the B l a c k D e m o c r a t s success rate for bill sponsorship, one t h i r d o f that for R e p u b l i c a n s , w a s still s o m e w h a t higher t h a n the success rate for W h i t e D e m o c r a t s . B i l l success rate data f r o m the 1 0 3 r d Congress s h o w that B l a c k D e m o c r a t s w e r e as successful as W h i t e D e m ­ ocrats i n getting their legislation through Congress. T h i r t e e n percent o f all bills sponsored or cosponsored by B l a c k D e m o c r a t i c legislators w o n

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T A B L E 4.4

Bill Sponsorship and Voting Summaries by Race and Party of House Member in the N B E S Sample (Standard Deviations in Parentheses)

Average Number of Bills Spon­ sored in 1 0 4 Average Number of Bills that Became L a w in 1 0 4 CQ's Presidential Support I n ­ dex 1993 CQ's Presidential Opposition Index 1993 CQ's Presidential Support In­ dex 1992 CQ's Presidential Opposition Index 1992 A D A Rating 1994 A D A Rating 1993 A F L - C I O Rating 1994 A F L - C I O Rating 1993 C C U S Rating 1993 A C U Rating 1994 A C U Rating 1993 Poole-Rosenthal Index 1 Poole-Rosenthal Index 2

Black Democrat

White Democrat

7.2

9.8

(8.6)

(9.6)

White Republican 13.0

(11.2)

th

.24

(.59)

.16

(.45)

.94 (2.00)

th

79

69

32

16

29

74

79

78

40

12

20

60

90 90 89 95.5 12 8 3.5 -.698 -.014

69.5 73 75 88 27 21 20 -.336 .041

12 14 19 18 87 85.5 87 .644 -.014

N o t e : The four interest group ratings are from Americans for Democratic Action ( A D A ) , American Federation of Labor Congress of Industrial Organization ( A F L - C I O ) , Chamber of Commerce of the United States ( C C U S ) , and American Conservative Union (ACU). S o u r c e : Summaries were those reported in C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y and taken from Poole-RosenthaPs web site.

passage c o m p a r e d to 12 percent o f the bills sponsored by W h i t e legisla­ tors. I n the 1 0 3 r d Congress, w h i c h h a d a D e m o c r a t i c H o u s e majority, R e p u b l i c a n members fared significantly less w e l l , w i n n i n g passage for o n l y 5 percent o f the bills that they sponsored. T h e large standard deviations reveal that these averages cover up a great deal of intragroup v a r i a t i o n o n bill sponsorship. F o r e x a m p l e , five of the 3 7 N B E S B l a c k legislators failed to sponsor a n y legislation i n the 1 0 4 t h Congress. T h e 13.5 percent of B l a c k legislators, w h o d i d not sub­ mit a n y legislation i n the 1 0 4 t h , is m u c h higher t h a n the percentages o f W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s a n d D e m o c r a t s w h o also failed to sponsor a n y legis­ l a t i o n — less t h a n 1 percent a n d 5 percent respectively. T w o o f the B l a c k 1

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D e m o c r a t s w h o didn't sponsor a n y legislation, T u c k e r a n d R e y n o l d s , resigned after their c o n v i c t i o n s . O t h e r B l a c k members w h o didn't spon­ sor a n y legislation, W a t t ( D - N C ) a n d B i s h o p ( D - G A ) , w e r e dealing w i t h litigation over their districts' boundaries. Representative C u m m i n g s ( D M D ) w o n his seat to the 1 0 4 t h i n a special election. S t i l l , F o r d , J r . , albeit a freshman w h o " i n h e r i t e d " his father's district, failed to sponsor a n y of his o w n legislation i n the 1 0 4 t h . T h e B l a c k w o m e n H o u s e legislators, i n contrast, w e r e especially ac­ tive i n i n i t i a t i n g legislation. A l t h o u g h the average n u m b e r o f bills spon­ sored is seven for B l a c k D e m o c r a t s , M a x i n e W a t e r s ( D - C A ) sponsored t w e n t y - s i x pieces o f legislation, none o f w h i c h passed in the 1 0 4 t h C o n ­ gress. D . C . ' s n o n v o t i n g delegate, E l e a n o r H o l m e s N o r t o n , a n d H o u s e veteran C a r d i s s C o l l i n s surpassed W a t e r s by sponsoring thirty-one a n d thirty-eight bills respectively. B o t h w o m e n w e r e successful; H o l m e s w o n passage of three bills, w h i l e C o l l i n s w o n passage o f one. T h e s e w o m e n w e r e still surpassed i n p r o d u c t i v i t y by several R e p u b l i c a n a n d D e m o c r a t members. T h e highest n u m b e r of bills passed for an i n d i v i d u a l member i n the 1 9 9 6 N B E S sample in the 1 0 4 t h Congress w a s fifty-seven (spon­ sored by a R e p u b l i c a n ) . A l b e r t W y n n ( D - M A ) sponsored four pieces o f successful legislation. T h e highest n u m b e r o f bills passed for a n i n d i v i d ­ ual member i n the H o u s e w a s seventeen for H o u s e R e p u b l i c a n R o b e r t L i v i n g s t o n o f L o u i s i a n a . L i v i n g s t o n just happened to be the c h a i r m a n o f the C o m m i t t e e o n A p p r o p r i a t i o n s for the 1 0 4 t h a n d 1 0 5 t h congresses. I n the end, w h i l e 5 6 percent o f the H o u s e R e p u b l i c a n s failed to w i n passage for a n y of the legislation that they sponsored, 8 7 , 7 8 , a n d 8 0 percent o f the W h i t e , B l a c k , a n d L a t i n o D e m o c r a t s failed to sponsor a n y legislation that w a s signed into l a w by the president. W h a t types of bills sponsored by B l a c k D e m o c r a t s made it out of the R e p u b l i c a n - d o m i n a t e d Congress? M o s t l y s y m b o l i c legislation that nei­ ther distributed n o r redistributed tangible p u b l i c goods but conferred special recognition on persons or groups. F o r e x a m p l e , C a r d i s s C o l l i n s of I l l i n o i s got the Congress a n d president to approve n a m i n g one of Chicago's post offices o n the S o u t h side the " C h a r l e s A . H a y e s Post Office B u i l d i n g . " C h a r l e s H a y e s h a d represented this district u n t i l his defeat by B o b b y R u s h in the 1 9 9 4 D e m o c r a t i c p r i m a r y . T h e bill n a m i n g the post office after H a y e s had eighteen other cosponsors, i n c l u d i n g Representative R u s h . A l t h o u g h N o r t o n can't vote, she sponsored three successful pieces of legislation i n the 1 0 4 t h Congress, t w o o f w h i c h might be labeled " p o r k " spending projects. O n e bill transferred title o f a D . C . p a r k i n order to b u i l d a n e w family a n d c u l t u r a l l y oriented p a r k . A n o t h e r raised federal revenues spent o n c e r t a i n t r a n s p o r t a t i o n projects i n the D i s t r i c t . T h e t h i r d bill w o n n e w federal dollars for a second c o n ­ v e n t i o n center to be built i n the D i s t r i c t . N o r t o n ' s success might be

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p a r t l y due to the fact that Congress has a special responsibility for D . C . S t i l l , N o r t o n is a v e r y prolific legislator, h a v i n g initiated thirty-one bills a n d resolutions i n the 1 0 4 t h Congress. W h i l e most members fail to w i n passage of legislation that they spon­ sor, m o s t manage to w i n passage o f legislation that they cosponsor. F o r e x a m p l e , C o r r i n e B r o w n ( D - F L ) w a s one o f 78 cosponsors o f a b i l l designating a U . S . courthouse i n F l o r i d a the " S a m M . G i b b o n s " U . S . C o u r t h o u s e . A n d w h i l e E a r l H i l l i a r d o f A l a b a m a failed to w i n passage of a n y o f his bills or resolutions, i n c l u d i n g one to recognize a n d cele­ brate the 4 0 t h a n n i v e r s a r y of the M o n t g o m e r y B u s B o y c o t t ( H . R e s . 2 8 5 ) a n d one that w o u l d increase the income t a x deduction for h e a l t h insurance costs o f self-employed persons, he c a n be credited as a suc­ cessful cosponsor o f ten bills that became l a w i n 1 9 9 6 . O f these ten bills, the m a j o r i t y w e r e b i p a r t i s a n h a v i n g more 1 0 0 cosponsors a n d i n some cases w e l l over 3 0 0 . T h e bottom line is that i n terms o f sponsoring a n d passing legislation, the race differences that the previous literature alleges do not e x i s t i n the H o u s e . B l a c k D e m o c r a t s , i n fact, w e r e s o m e w h a t more l i k e l y t h a n W h i t e D e m o c r a t s to get their bills passed i n the U . S . C o n g r e s s . A t the same time, a higher percentage ( 1 3 . 5 percent) of B l a c k legislators t h a n W h i t e s failed to introduce a n y bills or resolutions o f their o w n d u r i n g the 1 0 4 t h Congress. T h i s c o u l d be due to the litigation i n w h i c h several members w h o failed to initiate bills w e r e e m b r o i l e d . C o s p o n s o r i n g is frequently done i n the U . S . C o n g r e s s , a n d w h i l e I d i d not have data o n cosponsoring by the race of the legislator, B l a c k members appeared to be as l i k e l y as W h i t e members to successfully sign o n a n d cosponsor legislation likely to pass the H o u s e a n d Senate, a n d be signed into l a w . T h e evidence presented here suggests that the legislative styles o f B l a c k members are essentially no different f r o m their W h i t e colleagues, except i n the types o f committees that they serve o n . E v e n o n this d i m e n s i o n , however, race differences m a y be fading as more B l a c k s w i n m o r e ap­ pointments to the p o w e r h o u s e committees i n Congress ( a n d , i r o n i c a l l y , since t w o o f the least-prestigious committees — Post Office a n d C i v i l Ser­ vice a n d D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a — i n w h i c h B l a c k s w e r e c l e a r l y overrepresented, w e r e abolished i n the 1 0 4 t h C o n g r e s s ) .

R E V I E W O F T H ER O L L - C A L L V O T I N G

LITERATURE

I n her b o o k , C a r o l M . S w a i n ' s ( 1 9 9 3 ) regression a n a l y s i s o f s u m m a r i e s o f H o u s e m e m b e r s ' floor votes i n the 1 0 0 t h Congress w e r e unaffected by the percentage o f the B l a c k s i n their districts or by the representa­ tives' race, once the p o l i t i c a l p a r t y o f the legislator w a s i n c l u d e d i n the m o d e l . P o l i t i c a l party, as opposed to race, predicted the v o t i n g b e h a v i o r

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of legislators, she concluded, a n d therefore B l a c k s c o u l d be effectively represented by D e m o c r a t legislators, regardless of their race. I n T h e P a r a d o x o f R e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( 1 9 9 7 ) , D a v i d L u b l i n analyzes s u m m a r i e s o f m e m b e r s ' floor votes o n legislation over a t w e n t y - y e a r p e r i o d ( 1 9 7 2 to 1 9 9 2 ) . H e finds that the r a c i a l c o m p o s i t i o n o f the dis­ trict is a n i m p o r t a n t predictor o f the legislator's r o l l - c a l l v o t i n g pattern even w h e n a host o f other controls, i n c l u d i n g p o l i t i c a l party, are i n ­ cluded i n the m o d e l . L e g i s l a t o r s , D e m o c r a t s as w e l l as R e p u b l i c a n s , are generally unresponsive to B l a c k s i n their district w h e n B l a c k s f o r m less t h a n 4 0 percent o f that district. T h u s , B l a c k s c a n expect to be substan­ tively represented o n l y w h e n they constitute 4 0 percent o f the district. D i s t r i c t s less t h a n 5 0 percent B l a c k , however, have u n t i l recently failed to elect B l a c k candidates. I n the end, L u b l i n ( 1 9 9 7 ) breaks w i t h S w a i n , i n arguing that B l a c k s are substantively better represented by members o f their o w n race. Y e t descriptive representation, he concludes, is o n l y p o l i t i c a l l y beneficial to B l a c k s w h e n it does not reduce the n u m ­ ber o f D e m o c r a t s elected i n the state's congressional delegation. H e ad­ vocates some balance between districts no greater than 5 5 percent B l a c k a n d districts less than that to facilitate their representation through the D e m o c r a t i c party. I n T h e C o l o r o f R e p r e s e n t a t i o n ( 1 9 9 8 ) , K e n n y J . W h i t b y first e x a m ­ ines the responsiveness o f legislators to the B l a c k population i n their districts o n v o t i n g rights a n d civil rights legislation. H e finds that legis­ lators w e r e not responsive to B l a c k constituents on v o t i n g rights bills but significantly so for fair housing legislation. M o r e t h a n the r a c i a l demographics o f the district, the legislators' political party, region, a n d the p r o p o r t i o n o f the district that is u r b a n h a d i m p o r t a n t effects o n their v o t i n g behavior. I n contrast to S w a i n , W h i t b y finds that the race o f the legislator had a n i m p o r t a n t i m p a c t o n the roll-call votes o n c i v i l rights legislation i n m a n y o f the congresses he a n a l y z e d from 1 9 7 3 to 1992. T h e effect o f the m e m b e r s ' race o n their votes is " p e r i o d i c , " he concludes, depending upon the content of the legislation. D a v i d T . C a n o n ( 1 9 9 9 ) has t a k e n up this issue in R a c e , R e d i s t r i c t i n g a n d R e p r e s e n t a t i o n . H i s analysis is significantly more comprehensive t h a n the previous studies I just r e v i e w e d . W h i l e he analyzes the Leader­ ship Conference o n C i v i l R i g h t s ( L C C R ) scores as d i d the others, he also e x a m i n e s the bills that members sponsored i n the 1 0 3 r d Congress, their floor speeches, a n d committee assignments. Representation is de­ fined a n d a n a l y z e d more broadly t h a n previous studies i n that the a n a l ­ ysis o f speeches a n d bills provides i n f o r m a t i o n on h o w members seek to advance their constituents' interests. A n o t h e r significant finding f r o m C a n o n ' s w o r k is that there are also differences between B l a c k members of Congress i n their v o t i n g records based on their representational styles.

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B l a c k s elected i n 1 9 9 2 w h o w o n by appealing to b i r a c i a l support w e r e s o m e w h a t less supportive (about s i x points less) o f the L C C R agenda i n the 1 0 3 r d as opposed to t r a d i t i o n a l B l a c k members w h o s e campaigns w e r e crafted chiefly to appeal to B l a c k s . M o s t recently, K e r r y L . H a y nie's ( 2 0 0 1 ) analysis of B l a c k s i n state legislators corroborates C a n o n ' s research. H a y n i e reports that w h i l e B l a c k state legislators are more l i k e l y to prioritize race-related policies, they also include other issues that are not r a c i a l a n d address broader constituency concerns as p a r t of their o v e r a l l legislative agendas. T a b l e 4.4 presents the presidential support measures as tabulated by C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y , as w e l l as standard interest group ratings a n d P o o l e - R o s e n t h a l indices for the 1 0 4 t h Congress by the race a n d p o l i t i c a l p a r t y of H o u s e members. T h e presidential support measures indicate the degree to w h i c h the legislator's v o t i n g record is i n accordance w i t h the president's announced position o n the bill at the time o f the vote, even though the president's position m a y have changed f r o m a n earlier one t a k e n . L e g i s l a t i o n that w a s extensively amended or o n w h i c h the president's position cannot be ascertained is e x c l u d e d . Presidential op­ position indicates the degree to w h i c h a legislator opposes the president o n pending legislation. T h e statistics establish that i n the 1 0 3 r d C o n ­ gress B l a c k D e m o c r a t s supported President C l i n t o n i n their votes to the same degree that W h i t e a n d other m i n o r i t y D e m o c r a t i c legislators d i d . T h e same is true w i t h respect to presidential opposition. T h e four interest group ratings s h o w n i n table 4 . 4 are A m e r i c a n s for D e m o c r a t i c A c t i o n ( A D A ) , a l i b e r a l D e m o c r a t organization; the A m e r i ­ c a n F e d e r a t i o n of L a b o r - C o n g r e s s o f I n d u s t r i a l O r g a n i z a t i o n ( A F L C I O ) , the l o b b y i n g a r m o f labor unions; the C h a m b e r of C o m m e r c e of the U n i t e d States ( C C U S ) , w h i c h represents l o c a l a n d state business i n ­ terests; a n d the A m e r i c a n C o n s e r v a t i v e U n i o n ( A C U ) , a group orga­ nized to further the cause o f " c o n s e r v a t i s m . " Because interest groups ratings are k n o w n to be biased, based o n the selection o f votes, PooleR o s e n t h a l indices are reported as w e l l . I n their study of r o l l - c a l l v o t i n g behavior a m o n g H o u s e members, K e i t h Poole a n d H o w a r d R o s e n t h a l ( 1 9 9 1 ) created t w o measures that c a n account for 80 percent or m o r e of the legislator's r o l l - c a l l votes — a stunning achievement. T h e first i n d e x captures partisanship, scaled s u c h that the higher the score, the m o r e l o y a l the R e p u b l i c a n member is to the ideological c o n s e r v a t i s m o f the R e p u b l i c a n party. T h e second measure boosts the e x p l a n a t o r y p o w e r of the first by c a p t u r i n g the residual differences i n the m e m b e r s ' v o t i n g behavior, largely rooted i n the i n t r a p a r t y conflict over c i v i l rights d u r i n g the 1 9 5 0 s , 1 9 6 0 s , and 1 9 7 0 s . Since the realignment o f the D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y as the party o f B l a c k s ( C a r m i n e s and S t i m s o n 1 9 8 9 ) , the second dimension has become increasingly less predictive o f legislative votes i n

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the 1 9 9 0 s . Poole ( 1 9 9 9 ) finds that the v o t i n g b e h a v i o r o f members is e x t r e m e l y stable. O n c e elected, members vote in a consistent fashion. I n contrast to the presidential support a n d opposition scores, large i n t r a p a r t y differences based o n race e x i s t across a l l the s u m m a r i e s o f r o l l - c a l l v o t i n g behavior. W h e t h e r the interest group is p r o - D e m o c r a t , pro-labor, or pro-business, B l a c k D e m o c r a t s are s t r i k i n g l y m o r e l i b e r a l or less conservative than W h i t e D e m o c r a t s . B l a c k s D e m o c r a t s ' v o t i n g b e h a v i o r as measured by Poole a n d R o s e n t h a l is significantly more c o n ­ sistent w i t h the liberal D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y agenda t h a n that o f W h i t e a n d other m i n o r i t y D e m o c r a t i c legislators. Differences w e r e slight o n Poole a n d R o s e n t h a l ' s second d i m e n s i o n , w h i c h captures votes o n issues that are not clearly p a r t i s a n . B u t even here, B l a c k D e m o c r a t s w e r e to the Left o f their W h i t e D e m o c r a t i c a n d R e p u b l i c a n counterparts. T h e data s h o w n i n table 4 . 4 establish c o n c l u s i v e l y that B l a c k D e m o c r a t i c legisla­ tors are distinctively more liberal i n their v o t i n g b e h a v i o r i n the H o u s e , even w h i l e they are n o less active i n p u r s u i n g their o w n legislative agenda a n d n o less successful i n w i n n i n g passage o f it.

COMPARING VOTES ON M A J O R LEGISLATION I N T H E 103RD A N D 104TH

CONGRESSES

T h e data s h o w n i n table 4 . 4 indicates that w h i l e B l a c k D e m o c r a t s gen­ erally cast more l i b e r a l votes on policy matters t h a n their W h i t e D e m o ­ cratic colleagues, as D e m o c r a t s , both groups are e q u a l l y l o y a l to the president, v o t i n g most o f the time i n a m a n n e r consistent w i t h the presi­ dent's public p o l i c y agenda. T h e nature o f the A m e r i c a n t w o - p a r t y sys­ tem is c h a r a c t e r i z e d by w e a k p a r t y discipline. W h i l e D e m o c r a t s voted mostly i n line w i t h the president, they did so o n l y three-quarters o f the time. I n p a r l i a m e n t a r y systems, legislators' r o l l - c a l l votes are w e l l over 90 percent i n accordance w i t h their party's p o s i t i o n . I n tables 4 . 5 a n d 4 . 6 , I identify the percentage of votes o n m a j o r legislation in t w o Congresses by the p a r t y a n d race o f the H o u s e m e m ­ bers. T h e t w o Congresses are c o m p a r e d because the 1 0 3 r d h a d a D e m o ­ cratic H o u s e m a j o r i t y w h i l e the 1 0 4 t h h a d a R e p u b l i c a n majority. T h e m a j o r i t y generally c o n t r o l s the flow o f legislation onto the H o u s e floor. T h e tables reveal t w o i m p o r t a n t facts. F i r s t , they s h o w h o w unified B l a c k members are i n their votes o n i m p o r t a n t p o l i c y matters, a n d h o w unified W h i t e members are based o n party. Secondly, they reveal the degree to w h i c h B l a c k s defect or are i n line w i t h their D e m o c r a t c o u n ­ terparts o n these issues. W h i l e the interest group ratings give the strong i m p r e s s i o n t h a t B l a c k members vote a l i k e , the figures presented i n tables 4 . 5 a n d 4 . 6 s h o w that o n a subset o f issues, B l a c k members themselves w e r e d i v i d e d .

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T A B L E 4.5

Votes on Key Legislation in 103rd Congress by Race and Party of House Member (Percent in Support) Democrats 103rd Congress Legislation H R 2518: Appropriations Vote on Hyde-AntiAbortion Amendment H R 3355: Omnibus Crime Bill (House conference vote) H R 3540: N A F T A Implemen­ tation H R 5110: Trade Bill H R 2520: Grazing Fees H R 2: Motor Voter H R 1: Family Leave H R 4296: Assault Weapons Ban H R 2264: 1994 Budget Rec­ onciliation H R 1025: Brady Handgun Bill S 636: Abortion Clinic Access

White/ Other

Intraparty Voting G a p

Republicans

43.5%

-43.5%

89%

28

74

-46

26

24

42

-18

75

53 92 100 97 97

67 87 93 87 81

-14 5 7 10 + 16

68 28 11 23 22

100

82.5

Black 0%

17.5

0

92

69

+ 23

31

100

74

+ 26

22

S o u r c e : Calculated by author as reported in the Library of Congress's legislative web site, Thomas (http://thomas.loc.gov/).

T h e y w e r e divided ideologically over the matter o f free trade a n d c r i m e c o n t r o l , both policies pushed t h r o u g h the 1 0 3 r d Congress by the presi­ dent w i t h c r i t i c a l support f r o m the R e p u b l i c a n party. T h e o m n i b u s c r i m e bill w o n favor w i t h o n l y one-fourth o f the B l a c k D e m o c r a t i c members o f the H o u s e , but w i t h three-quarters o f that a m o n g W h i t e members. B l a c k defection from the c r i m e b i l l that w a s signed into l a w by the president w a s especially bitter. B l a c k s along w i t h H i s p a n i c D e m ­ ocratic legislators h a d preserved a n amendment i n the H o u s e to a l l o w defendants i n capital cases to use statistical evidence to argue that the death penalty w a s being imposed i n a r a c i a l l y d i s c r i m i n a t o r y fashion. Different members of Congress h a d been t r y i n g to get a r a c i a l justice l a w passed since 1 9 8 8 . T h e Senate rejected it that year, again i n 1 9 8 9 , a n d again i n 1 9 9 0 . Attempts i n 1 9 9 1 also failed, but by then a clear m a j o r i t y i n favor of such legislation h a d coalesced i n the H o u s e . T h e H o u s e floor vote h a d been 2 1 2 to 2 1 7 against s t r i k i n g the p r o v i s i o n , a

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4.6

" Y e a " Votes on Key Legislation in 104th Congress by Race and Party of House Member Democrat 104th Congress Legislation H R 3734: Budget and Welfare Reform H R 2202: Illegal Immi­ gration Deterrence H J Res 1: Balanced Budget Amendment H R 125: Repeal Assault Weapons Ban H R 1833: Partial Birth Abortion Ban H R 9 6 1 : Clean Water H R 2099: H U D appro­ priations H R 2425: Cut Medicare H R 2491: G O P Budget H R 3610: Defense Freeze H R 2854: Farm Bill H R 1227 (amendment): Increase M i n . Wage

Black

White/Other

Intraparty Voting G a p

Republicans

3

59

-56

98

8

64

-56

97

5.5

42

-36.5

99

5.5

34

-29

78

5.5

34

-28.5

92

5.5 0

26 16

-20.5 -16

85 87

0 0 47

2 2 44

-2 -2 + 3

97 96 81

31 100

28 94

+ 3 + 6

92 40

Source: Calculated by author as reported in the Library of Congress's legislative web site, Thomas (http://thomas.loc.gov/). v i c t o r y that h a d not been possible three years earlier. R e p u b l i c a n s a l o n g w i t h a sizeable m i n o r i t y o f D e m o c r a t s opposed the p r o v i s i o n c l a i m i n g that it w o u l d lead to " r a c i a l q u o t a s " i n sentencing. R e s p o n d i n g to the threat to tie up the legislation through filibuster i f the bill retained its racial justice p r o v i s i o n i n the Senate, President C l i n t o n dropped his sup­ port o f it. T h u s , the final bill emerged s h o r n o f the " R a c i a l Justice A c t . " E l e v e n members o f the thirty-eight B l a c k D e m o c r a t s voted against it. T h e other twenty-seven caucus members decided that the c r i m e bill's promise o f more police, more prisons a n d more m o n e y for c r i m e pre­ vention w a s too i m p o r t a n t to jeopardize by h o l d i n g out for the r a c i a l justice p r o v i s i o n . Free trade legislation i n the 1 0 3 r d Congress also divided B l a c k s , but in this case D e m o c r a t s more generally. S i x t y - s e v e n percent o f f e l l o w D e m o c r a t s w o u l d vote for H R 5 1 1 0 — a trade bill that passed i n the

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1 0 3 r d —but o n l y 5 3 percent o f B l a c k D e m o c r a t s d i d . B l a c k opposition to free trade legislation is not tied to issues of race, but stems f r o m broader concerns about protecting U . S . w o r k e r s f r o m unfair e c o n o m i c competition a b r o a d . M o s t recently, 7 o f the 3 6 B l a c k D e m o c r a t s i n the 1 0 6 t h Congress voted against a free trade p r o v i s i o n for A f r i c a a n d the C a r i b b e a n basin. O n other bills i n the D e m o c r a t - c o n t r o l l e d 1 0 3 r d C o n g r e s s , B l a c k D e m o c r a t s voted solidly i n f a v o r o f their party's legislation t h a t h a d been b l o c k e d under the previous set of R e p u b l i c a n presidents, i n c l u d i n g M o t o r - V o t e r , the B r a d y B i l l i m p o s i n g a w a i t i n g p e r i o d for g u n pur­ chases, a n d f a m i l y leave. T w o B l a c k s , however, have indicated their op­ p o s i t i o n to g u n c o n t r o l legislation: E a r l H i l l i a r d o f A l a b a m a a n d S a n ford B i s h o p o f G e o r g i a . H i l l i a r d a n d B i s h o p voted against the B r a d y B i l l i n the 1 0 3 r d , w h i l e H i l l i a r d voted against the assault w e a p o n s b a n a n d to repeal the assault w e a p o n s b a n i n the 1 0 4 t h that failed i n the Senate. W h i l e B l a c k D e m o c r a t s have consistently favored a b o r t i o n rights, t w o B l a c k D e m o c r a t s ( F l a k e o f N Y a n d Jefferson of L A ) have voted w i t h R e p u b l i c a n s a n d a substantial m i n o r i t y o f D e m o c r a t s to b a n so-called p a r t i a l - b i r t h abortions. T h i s a n t i - a b o r t i o n measure failed to w i n enough votes to bypass President C l i n t o n ' s veto. T h e crime c o n t r o l spending b i l l w a s a n aberration, w h i l e trade policy, defense spending, a n d f a r m b i l l legislation (the latter t w o passed i n the 1 0 4 t h Congress) represented general splits w i t h i n the D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y based o n ideology a n d region. B l a c k m e m b e r s ' steadfast l o y a l t y to their party's p o l i c y agenda (seen i n the r o l l - c a l l v o t i n g behavior of the H o u s e ' s t w o B l a c k R e p u b l i c a n s as w e l l ) w o u l d be tested more severely i n the 1 0 4 t h as President C l i n t o n i n his " t r i a n g u l a t i o n " strategy w o u l d support certain bills that already h a d strong R e p u b l i c a n b a c k i n g . Indeed, some w o u l d accuse C l i n t o n i n 1 9 9 6 of h a v i n g stolen the R e p u b l i c a n party's p l a y book. T h e 1 0 4 t h C o n g r e s s , as e x p l a i n e d i n chapter 1 , has a special place i n h i s t o r y i n that it w a s the first w i t h a R e p u b l i c a n m a j o r i t y i n the l o w e r c h a m b e r i n forty y e a r s . O n key components o f the R e p u b l i c a n s ' " C o n t r a c t w i t h A m e r i c a , " B l a c k D e m o c r a t s l i n e d up solidly against it w i t h o n l y one or t w o defections, n o t a b l y B i s h o p of G e o r g i a . T h e s e bills i n c l u d e d not o n l y the p a r t i a l b i r t h a b o r t i o n b a n , but the balanced budget amendment as w e l l . P a r t y defection w a s more r a m p a n t a m o n g W h i t e a n d other m i n o r i t y D e m o ­ cratic legislators, 4 2 percent of w h o m voted for the balanced budget amendment, a n d 3 4 percent for the p a r t i a l - b i r t h a b o r t i o n b a n a n d for repealing the assault w e a p o n s ban. A n d w h i l e R e p u b l i c a n s w e r e able to w i n passage o f N A F T A over the objections of the H o u s e ' s D e m o c r a t i c majority, D e m o c r a t s i n the 1 0 4 t h w e r e able to raise the m i n i m u m w a g e t h r o u g h strict p a r t y discipline a n d defections of m a n y H o u s e R e p u b l i ­ cans ( 4 0 percent).

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I n the 1 0 4 t h , t w o bills that w o n passage a n d that most severely tested D e m o c r a t s w e r e welfare reform a n d i m m i g r a t i o n c o n t r o l . T w i c e before, President C l i n t o n h a d vetoed welfare r e f o r m bills that ended the s i x t y year guarantee o f government support for p o o r families w i t h c h i l d r e n o n the grounds that they w e r e considered too d r a c o n i a n . W h i l e they imposed the five-year l i m i t that C l i n t o n a p p r o v e d of, they didn't p r o ­ vide m u c h financial support to states to help welfare recipients find jobs. H o w e v e r , the t h i r d welfare r e f o r m bill that cleared Congress w a s not m u c h different f r o m the first t w o . I t turned over the responsibility for welfare to the fifty states; it limited i n d i v i d u a l s to five years o f sup­ p o r t over their lifetime a n d required h a l f o f the state's welfare recipients to be w o r k i n g or t r a i n i n g for a job by 2 0 0 2 . F u r t h e r m o r e , food stamps a i d w a s cut. C l i n t o n h a d originally sought to increase federal spending o n welfare p r o g r a m s by 9.3 b i l l i o n d o l l a r s . T h e welfare bill C l i n t o n signed cut $ 5 6 billion f r o m federal welfare funds. M o r e o v e r , legal i m m i ­ grants w h o had w o r k e d less t h a n ten years i n the c o u n t r y w e r e barred f r o m M e d i c a i d . ( L a t e r legislation w o u l d restore the eligibility of those legal i m m i g r a n t s c u r r e n t l y receiving M e d i c a i d , but still bar noncitizens from M e d i c a i d . ) Single jobless adults w o u l d be able to collect food stamps only for three months each year over a three-year p e r i o d . O n l y Sanford B i s h o p of G e o r g i a w o u l d vote to end " w e l f a r e as w e k n o w i t ; " a l l other B l a c k D e m o c r a t s w o u l d vote against it. N e v e r t h e ­ less, welfare reform w o u l d receive majority support a m o n g W h i t e a n d other m i n o r i t y D e m o c r a t i c legislators — a full 6 0 percent. T h a t along w i t h 98 percent o f the R e p u b l i c a n vote, a n d a l o n g w i t h the president's promise not to veto this v e r s i o n , enabled it to become n a t i o n a l l a w on A u g u s t 2 2 , 1 9 9 6 . W h i l e p r o m i n e n t W h i t e D e m o c r a t s , n o t a b l y in the Senate, w o u l d denounce the president's move to eliminate the "safety net," the B l a c k members o f Congress, i n c l u d i n g Senator C a r o l M o s e l e y B r a u n , w e r e notably muted i n their opposition. O n e reason for this is that the C B C h a d also been hit organizationally. O n c e the R e p u b l i c a n s w o n c o n t r o l o f the H o u s e , the C B C found itself defunded. B l a c k m e m ­ bers o f Congress were also m i n d f u l that this w a s a n election year. N o t only d i d they not w a n t to endanger the reelection o f President C l i n t o n , but their dependence o n the p o w e r of the W h i t e H o u s e h a d increased sharply. B l a c k H o u s e legislators were also r u n n i n g for reelection them­ selves, and they found that blacks were d i v i d e d w i t h most i n favor o f welfare r e f o r m . T h u s , they voted w i t h their conscience but kept quiet. Jesse J a c k s o n also opposed the b i l l , but lined up w i t h a l l the other D e m o c r a t i c leaders to support B i l l C l i n t o n ' s reelection b i d . T h e reasons for J a c k s o n ' s support as w e l l as that f r o m B l a c k D e m o c r a t s i n general are s t r a i g h t f o r w a r d enough. R e p u b l i c a n c o n t r o l o f C o n g r e s s , i n fact, increased their dependence on the g o o d w i l l o f the president. M o r e o v e r ,

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especially at the 1 9 9 6 N a t i o n a l C o n v e n t i o n , D e m o c r a t s w e r e q u i c k to point out that R e p u b l i c a n N e w t G i n g r i c h ' s leadership i n the H o u s e w a s m o r e dangerous t h a n a n ideologically moderate D e m o c r a t as president. Increasing i m m i g r a t i o n is seen as h a r m f u l to the interests o f B l a c k s because their rates o f u n e m p l o y m e n t are higher t h a n the n a t i o n a l aver­ age, a n d i m m i g r a n t s compete w i t h citizens i n the job m a r k e t . T h a t s a i d , the vast m a j o r i t y of B l a c k members voted u n l i k e their W h i t e D e m o ­ cratic counterparts to oppose H . R . 2 0 0 2 , w h i c h w a s a n a m e n d m e n t a i m e d at deterring illegal i m m i g r a t i o n by b a r r i n g the c h i l d r e n o f illegal i m m i g r a t i o n s f r o m the p u b l i c s c h o o l system. I t w a s s i m i l a r to P r o p o s i ­ t i o n 1 8 7 , a 1 9 9 4 c o n t r o v e r s i a l l a w adopted i n C a l i f o r n i a pushed by the R e p u b l i c a n party, but w o n m a j o r i t y support a m o n g W h i t e D e m o c r a t s . Senate m a j o r i t y leader a n d R e p u b l i c a n presidential nominee B o b D o l e b a c k e d H R 2 0 0 2 , but c o u l d not muster enough support i n the Senate. W h i l e 9 7 percent of the H o u s e R e p u b l i c a n s voted for the illegal i m ­ migration-deterrence measure, a full 6 4 percent o f W h i t e D e m o c r a t s also d i d . I n contrast, o n l y three of the t h i r t y - s i x B l a c k D e m o c r a t s sup­ ported the measure. P a r t of the p r o b l e m w a s that D e m o c r a t s w e r e d i ­ vided over the measure o f denying education to c h i l d r e n o f u n d o c u ­ mented w o r k e r s , although most w o u l d support measures m a k i n g it harder for i m m i g r a n t s to enter the c o u n t r y illegally. W h e n the m a j o r i t y i n the H o u s e voted i n favor o f this b i l l , President C l i n t o n d i d not c l a i m that he w o u l d veto the b i l l , since it w o u l d increase the n u m b e r of Bor­ der P a t r o l officers, for e x a m p l e . H e d i d , however, state his o p p o s i t i o n to the p r o v i s i o n denying education to the c h i l d r e n of illegal i m m i g r a n t s . T h e b i l l died i n the Senate i n part because Presidential contender B o b D o l e ' s c a m p a i g n advisers insisted that the amendment be retained a n d the bill not pass so that C l i n t o n c o u l d not take credit for passing a n t i illegal i m m i g r a t i o n legislation i n the c a m p a i g n . T h e p r o v i s i o n w a s also a p o p u l a r c a m p a i g n issue for D o l e i n states like C a l i f o r n i a . T h e votes o n key legislation s h o w greater diversity i n the v o t i n g pat­ terns o f B l a c k legislators that the interest group ratings obscure. Several B l a c k members elected i n the S o u t h have cast votes like moderate D e m ­ ocrats. F o r d , Jr. ( D - T N ) a n d B i s h o p ( D - G A ) , i n fact, belong to the " B l u e D o g s " H o u s e c o a l i t i o n , a group of twenty-nine D e m o c r a t s w h o c o n ­ sider themselves economic conservatives a n d w h o endorse b i p a r t i s a n cooperation w i t h the R e p u b l i c a n party. Some past members o f the Blue D o g s c o a l i t i o n have favored R e p u b l i c a n legislation so m u c h that they later s w i t c h e d parties. T h e group gets its n a m e f r o m the paintings de­ picting a blue dog by a w e l l - k n o w n L o u i s i a n a painter. T h e Blue D o g c o a l i t i o n of conservative D e m o c r a t s is considered to be influential, espe­ cially i n congresses h a v i n g R e p u b l i c a n majorities. F o r d ' s a n d B i s h o p ' s membership i n this c o a l i t i o n defies the pattern documented here o f

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B l a c k D e m o c r a t s ' u n s w e r v i n g l o y a l t y to the D e m o c r a t i c party's legisla­ tive agenda. T h e i r district c o m p o s i t i o n s , however, are quite different, as F o r d Jr.'s district has a solid B l a c k majority, w h i l e B i s h o p ' s does not. Nonetheless, both are Southerners, a n d , h a v i n g been elected i n the 1990s w h e n m a j o r i t y - B l a c k districts w e r e being attacked, they m a y par­ ticipate i n the Blue D o g c o a l i t i o n for strategic as w e l l as ideological grounds.

POLICY CONGRUENCY AND BLACK PUBLIC

OPINION

T h e statistics presented i n tables 4 . 5 a n d 4 . 6 establish that B l a c k D e m o ­ crats are generally unified o n economic a n d r a c i a l issues, but d i v i d e d s o m e w h a t , as are a l l D e m o c r a t s generally, over trade policy, the e n v i ­ ronment, f a r m legislation, a n d defense. B l a c k D e m o c r a t s have been sig­ nificantly more p r o - D e m o c r a t i c i n their votes than fellow D e m o c r a t s , except i n the 1 0 4 t h C o n g r e s s , on welfare reform, c r i m e a n d i m m i g r a ­ tion legislation. H o w w e l l do these votes represent B l a c k p o l i c y interests? T h e 1 9 9 6 N B E S found B l a c k s to have s o m e w h a t more conservative opinions o n social p o l i c y matters w h e n c o m p a r e d to B l a c k o p i n i o n i n the 1 9 8 4 N B E S ( J a c k s o n 1 9 9 3 ) . W h e n asked w h e t h e r federal spending o n c r i m e , food stamps, a n d M e d i c a r e s h o u l d be increased, decreased, or kept about the same, more B l a c k s i n 1 9 9 6 said spending s h o u l d be de­ creased, except in the area of c r i m e . O n e of the most s t r i k i n g pieces of evidence that B l a c k s have become more conservative is reflected i n their attitudes t o w a r d w e l f a r e . I n 1 9 8 4 , n e a r l y h a l f of the B l a c k s ( 4 9 percent) polled felt that spending on food stamps s h o u l d be increased, w h i l e o n l y 11 percent thought it s h o u l d be decreased. T w e l v e years later, however, that near-majority w a s cut d o w n by 28 percent, w h i l e one in five i n the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y thought spending on food stamps s h o u l d be cut. T h e r e w a s a less d r a m a t i c but still significant d r o p i n the p r o p o r t i o n of B l a c k s w h o felt that federal spending o n M e d i c a r e s h o u l d be increased. W h e r e a s 7 9 percent of B l a c k s thought m o r e federal dollars s h o u l d go to M e d i c a r e i n 1 9 8 4 , o n l y 6 9 percent did i n 1 9 9 6 . A s in the case of food stamps, most i n the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y today feel that the spending levels for M e d i c a r e s h o u l d r e m a i n at their present levels. O n l y o n the matter of a federal p r o g r a m guaranteeing a job a n d a m i n i m u m s t a n d a r d o f l i v i n g for A m e r i c a n s d i d B l a c k o p i n i o n not m o v e in a conservative d i ­ rection. H e r e , the percentage of B l a c k s f a v o r i n g s u c h a p r o g r a m i n ­ creased by about 7 percent over the t w e l v e - y e a r period, s u c h that a m a j o r i t y ( 5 2 percent) n o w favors it. B l a c k s ' attitudes o n welfare r e f o r m m a t c h their v i e w s o n spending levels for w e l f a r e p r o g r a m s . A solid m a j o r i t y ( 6 7 percent) in the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y favors the n e w l a w l i m i t i n g welfare recipients to five years

T A B L E 4.7

Black Opinion on Public Policies in 1984 and 1996 1984 Guaranteed Jobs Support Oppose Minority A i d Support Oppose Affirmative Action Support Oppose School Busing Support Oppose Most Important Problem Crime Discrimination Unemployment Crime Spending Increase N o Change Decrease Food Stamps Spending Increase N o Change Decrease Medicare Spending Increase N o Change Decrease

1996

45% 32 N = 580

52% 32 N = 919

59 28 N = 915

51 35 N = 927

61 39 N = 831

58 42 N = 817

50 50 N = 832

57 43 N = 826

17 20 63 N = 851

41 25 35 N = 848

60 31 9 N = 838

64 31 6 N = 844

49 40 11 N = 837

21 59 19.5 N = 838

79 19 2 N = 847

69 29 3 N = 844

N o t e : Due to rounding error, cell entries may not sum to 1 0 0 % . "Guaranteed Jobs" and "Minority A i d " are each measured on 7-point scales. For these policy areas, "sup­ port" includes values 1 through 3; "oppose" includes values 5 through 7. S o u r c e : 1984 and 1996 N B E S .

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of benefits over the course of their lives; o n l y 3 0 percent oppose it. B l a c k s are d i v i d e d , however, o n the f a m i l y cap policy, w h i c h , under w a i v e r s from the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , states enacted. U n d e r this n e w policy, welfare payments are not increased for welfare recipients w h o have a d d i t i o n a l c h i l d r e n w h i l e o n w e l f a r e . A b o u t h a l f (48 percent) favor such a policy, w h i l e 4 6 percent oppose it. Support for r a c i a l p r o g r a m s , i n c l u d i n g affirmative a c t i o n , although r e m a i n i n g quite h i g h , also slipped slighly i n the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y over the past decade. W h e r e a s 5 9 percent favored the idea of federal a i d to minorities i n 1 9 8 4 , o n l y 51 percent did i n 1 9 9 6 . O p p o s i t i o n to m i n o r i t y a i d increased by 7 percent d u r i n g this p e r i o d . B l a c k support for affirma­ tive action slipped as w e l l , falling by three percentage points. O n c r i m e , 6 4 percent s a i d spending s h o u l d be increased in 1 9 9 6 , i n contrast to 6 0 percent i n 1 9 8 4 . T h e g r o w t h i n the p r o p o r t i o n o f B l a c k s f a v o r i n g a n e x p a n s i o n of federal efforts on c r i m e corresponds w i t h other attitudinal shifts in the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y . M o r e today t h a n in 1 9 8 4 v i e w c r i m e as the single-most i m p o r t a n t p r o b l e m in the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y relative to u n e m p l o y m e n t or d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . I n 1 9 9 6 , a large p l u r a l i t y ( 4 1 percent) of B l a c k s r a n k e d c r i m e first a n d u n e m p l o y m e n t a n d d i s c r i m i n a t i o n as second a n d t h i r d . I n 1 9 8 4 , o n l y 17 percent h a d placed c r i m e above the other t w o problems; c r i m e , i n fact, came i n t h i r d for h a l f of the sample. H o w e v e r , i n 1 9 9 6 d i s c r i m i n a t i o n fell to t h i r d place w h i l e u n e m p l o y ­ ment dropped to second. W h i l e B l a c k legislators voted o v e r w h e l m i n g l y against welfare r e f o r m , legislation a i m e d at c u r b i n g illegal i m m i g r a t i o n , a n d stricter c r i m e c o n ­ t r o l measures, B l a c k o p i n i o n w a s far more divided on these issues. T h e majority of B l a c k s (66 percent) favored the five-year life-time l i m i t for welfare benefits for p o o r families. T h e vast majority ( 7 6 percent) also felt that welfare benefits s h o u l d not be provided to i m m i g r a n t s i m m e ­ diately, but rather, i m m i g r a n t s should w a i t a year or more to receive t h e m . I n the 1 9 9 6 survey, B l a c k s w e r e asked w h e r e they stood on c r i m e c o n t r o l o n a scale from 1 to 7, w h e r e I w a s c r i m i n a l s s h o u l d be appre­ hended a n d locked u p , and seven w a s the government s h o u l d do m o r e to prevent c r i m e . B l a c k s were r o u g h l y split between the t w o extremes, w i t h 4 5 percent f a v o r i n g the tougher method of l o c k i n g c r i m i n a l s up. T h e public o p i n i o n poll data suggest t w o things. F i r s t a n d most i m ­ mediately, B l a c k s are very divided i n o p i n i o n o n most s o c i a l a n d eco­ n o m i c p o l i c y matters, more so than B l a c k legislators. Secondly, B l a c k o p i n i o n has become s o m e w h a t more conservative over time. T h i s m a k e s the distinctively l i b e r a l policy representation o f B l a c k s less representa­ tive o f their real p o l i c y interests. I n fact, w h e n one compares w h e r e B l a c k s stand o n welfare reform a n d the a c t u a l votes by the 2 5 2 H o u s e legislators in the 1 9 9 6 N B E S , o n l y 4 9 . 5 percent o f B l a c k s w e r e repre-

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T A B L E 4.8

Percentage of Black Respondents Whose Legislator's Vote on Welfare Reform Matched Their Position (Number of Respondents in Parentheses)

Black Constituents

Representative: Black Democrats

Representative: White/Other Democrats

Representative: White/Other Republicans

N o Congruency

66%

61.5%

30%

Policy Congruency

34

38.5

70

N

100 (260)

100 (205)

100 (303)

S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S and as compiled by author from the Library of Congress's Thomas web site.

sented by legislators w h o voted a c c o r d i n g to their position o n welfare r e f o r m . W h e n one e x a m i n e s further the congruency between B l a c k pub­ lic o p i n i o n a n d legislative votes o n welfare r e f o r m , one finds that R e ­ publicans more t h a n B l a c k D e m o c r a t s , or even W h i t e D e m o c r a t s , repre­ sented more accurately B l a c k o p i n i o n o n this issue (see table 4 . 8 ) . R e s e a r c h o n the matter o f the p o l i c y representation o f citizens i n the U . S . Congress has found congruency to be fairly l o w (e.g., M i l l e r a n d Stokes 1 9 6 3 ) . J o h n K i n g d o n ( 1 9 8 1 ) contends that perfect p o l i c y c o n ­ gruency is difficult to obtain, because of the m a n y constituencies to w h o m elected representatives are accountable, a n d because o f the m a n y c o m p l i c a t e d facets i n v o l v e d i n the d e c i s i o n - m a k i n g process. T h e de­ cades of scholarship o n the v o t i n g behavior o f members o f Congress suggests that members seek to a v o i d " r i s k y " or u n p o p u l a r votes. W h i l e the p a r t i c i p a t i o n of S a n f o r d B i s h o p ( D - G A ) i n the conservative B l u e Dog c o a l i t i o n m a y not present a big electoral r i s k since his district is m a j o r i t y - W h i t e , it ultimately m a y be a p r o b l e m for H a r o l d F o r d , J r . , whose conservative votes o n budgetary matters c o u l d become the basis for a challenge. M e m b e r s must e x p l a i n their votes on policies that do not correspond w i t h their constituents' opinions. C a n B l a c k members justify their votes against welfare r e f o r m to their B l a c k constituents? P r o b a b l y yes. W h i l e the idealized f o r m of p o l i t i c a l representation i n the U n i t e d States is that elected leaders should f o l l o w a n d not lead, recent s c h o l ­ arship i n public o p i n i o n has s h o w n that elite o p i n i o n has a strong i m ­ pact o n mass public o p i n i o n (Page a n d S h a p i r o 1 9 9 2 ; Z a l l e r 1 9 9 2 ) . T h a t leaders influence p u b l i c o p i n i o n has been incorporated i n a m o d e l of p o l i t i c a l representation developed by J a m e s H . K u k l i n s k i a n d G a r y M . Segura ( 1 9 9 5 ) . T h e y argue that as m u c h as citizens direct the actions

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of representatives they also represent a n audience i n the p o l i c y - m a k i n g process. A s m u c h as members o f Congress t r y to emulate a n d respond to their constituents' interests, they direct t h e m i n a more l i b e r a l or more conservative d i r e c t i o n . R e p r e s e n t a t i o n is a d y n a m i c process, there­ fore. C l e a r l y , B l a c k leaders attempt to direct B l a c k s i n a more l i b e r a l direction by their votes. Y e t as more o f t h e m have w o n office, some are also p u s h i n g B l a c k interests i n a more conservative d i r e c t i o n , n o t a b l y o n gun c o n t r o l legislation. T h e type of data I w o u l d need to e m p i r i c a l l y test the K u k l i n s k i - S e g u r a m o d e l of d y n a m i c p o l i c y representation do not presently e x i s t , however. T h e p o l i c y - m a k i n g process remains at the heart of representational government. S t i l l , it m a y not be the process most v a l u e d by constitu­ ents. I n fact, as H i b b i n g a n d T h e i s s - M o r s e ' s ( 1 9 9 5 ) w o r k s h o w s , it is the endless debating, b i c k e r i n g , m u d s l i n g i n g , confusion, a n d bargaining that the public sees i n v o l v e d i n legislative w o r k that e x p l a i n the public's l a c k of confidence i n Congress. A n d it m a y be that the ongoing efforts by i n d i v i d u a l members o f Congress to connect to their constituents, as established i n Fenno's s e m i n a l ( 1 9 7 8 ) w o r k , a c c o u n t for the generally quite high p u b l i c evaluations members of Congress receive. I n their ef­ fort to b u i l d trust, loyalty, a n d support i n their districts, s y m b o l i c acts m a y go further t h a n substantive a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s .

CHAPTER

5

Symbols and Substance To point to congressional symbolism is not, of course, to denounce it. The Constitution does not require, nor does political theory decisively insist, that legislative processes enshrine high standards of instrumental rationality. By some defensible criteria it is perfectly proper to put laws on the books and then not to enforce them. Among other things doing so may offer a murky way of maximizing governmental satisfaction of popular preferences; Prohibition is a case in point. — David R . Mayhew, in C o n g r e s s : T h e E l e c t o r a l C o n n e c t i o n

W H I L E T H E P E R C E P T I O N o f B l a c k legislators is that they are not v e r y successful i n w i n n i n g passage o f the bills that they sponsor, I establish i n chapter 4 that the opposite it true. B l a c k members o f Congress are just as successful i n bill attainment as W h i t e members of Congress are. T h i s stereotype o f B l a c k l a w m a k e r s i n Congress being less successful at b i l l attainment exists because o f their l i b e r a l p o l i c y agendas. Because p u b l i c p o l i c y - m a k i n g is a process o f coalitions a n d c o m p r o m i s e s , B l a c k m e m ­ bers are seen as too ideologically extreme to be successful at it. P a r t of the reputation is based o n studies o f the C o n g r e s s i o n a l B l a c k C a u c u s ( C B C ) . E a r l y studies have characterized the C B C as cohesive but inef­ fectual. A s R o b e r t Singh w r i t e s i n his i m p o r t a n t w o r k o n the C B C , " A s an interest group for b l a c k s , the C B C ' s i m p a c t o n p u b l i c p o l i c y has been — and remains — m a r g i n a l " ( 1 9 9 8 , x v i i ) . Singh attributes its l a c k o f policy success not only to the institutional features of the A m e r i c a n legislative system, but also to the g r o w i n g diversification of B l a c k m e m ­ bers' interests ( 1 9 9 8 ; Barnett 1 9 8 2 ) . O t h e r studies challenge the nega­ tive depiction of the C B C (Bositis 1 9 9 4 ; C a n o n 1 9 9 5 ) . Still, the larger question is whether B l a c k representation i n the H o u s e c a n deliver a n y ­ thing o f substance to B l a c k constituents, or whether at most B l a c k legis­ lators represent symbols that do n o t h i n g to i m p r o v e the lives o f A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n constituents. T h e c r o w n i n g achievement of the C B C i n Singh's analysis w a s the i m p o s i t i o n of sanctions against South A f r i c a a n d the c o m m e m o r a t i o n of D r . M a r t i n L u t h e r K i n g , Jr.'s b i r t h d a y as a n a t i o n a l

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holiday, w h i l e its " A l t e r n a t i v e B u d g e t " legislation faced i g n o m i n i o u s de­ feat after defeat. T o typecast B l a c k legislators as " s y m b o l i c " legislators l a c k s perspec­ tive. M u c h of the legislation initiated i n Congress c a n be labeled s y m ­ bolic, as the quote f r o m political scientist D a v i d M a y h e w indicates (see also A r n o l d 1 9 9 1 ) . B l a c k legislators provide B l a c k constituents w i t h the greatest a m o u n t of " s y m b o l i c " representation, but also initiate a n d par­ ticipate in p r o v i d i n g their B l a c k constituents w i t h policies o f substance, n a m e l y those that distribute or redistribute tangible public goods. L e g i s ­ lative success needs to be evaluated o n a broader plane than h o w pre­ v i o u s scholars have defined it. W h e t h e r one considers s y m b o l i c legisla­ tion i m p o r t a n t or not, members o f Congress i n general spend a great deal o f energy p r o v i d i n g it to constituents. I n the end, i f B l a c k s are to w i n their fair share of s y m b o l i c representation, B l a c k faces need to be a visible part o f the U . S . C o n g r e s s .

SYMBOLIC

LEGISLATION

F e w bills m a k e it out o f Congress and become p u b l i c l a w . I n d i v i d u a l members are beating large odds then i f one o f their bills, a m o n g the thousands, becomes l a w . W h a t types of bills become l a w s ? W h i l e the p u b l i c might imagine that i n the competition of bills a n d resolutions o n l y the most pressing and i m p o r t a n t public policies become a matter of n a t i o n a l l a w , a r e v i e w of the 4 6 6 l a w s enacted d u r i n g the 1 0 3 r d Congress reveals a different story. T h e first fifty l a w s were H o u s e reso­ lutions. B e l o w are ten e x a m p l e s of such resolutions: 1. H . J . R e s o l u t i o n 7 5 : A j o i n t resolution designating J a n u a r y 16, 1994, as " N a t i o n a l G o o d Teen D a y . " 2 . H . J . R e s o l u t i o n 7 8 : A j o i n t resolution designating the w e e k s be­ g i n n i n g M a y 2 3 , 1 9 9 3 , a n d M a y 1 5 , 1 9 9 4 , as " E m e r g e n c y M e d i ­ cal Services W e e k . " 3. H . J . R e s o l u t i o n 7 9 : A j o i n t resolution to authorize the president to issue a p r o c l a m a t i o n designating the w e e k beginning o n N o ­ vember 2 1 , 1 9 9 3 , and N o v e m b e r 2 0 , 1 9 9 4 , as " N a t i o n a l F a m i l y Week." 4. H . J . R e s o l u t i o n 1 3 1 : A j o i n t resolution designating D e c e m b e r 7 of each y e a r as " N a t i o n a l P e a r l H a r b o r R e m e m b r a n c e D a y . " 5. H . J . R e s o l u t i o n 2 2 0 : A j o i n t resolution to designate the m o n t h of A u g u s t as " N a t i o n a l Scleroderma A w a r e n e s s M o n t h . " 6. H . J . R e s o l u t i o n 1 7 5 : A j o i n t resolution designating O c t o b e r 1993 a n d O c t o b e r 1994 as " I t a l i a n A m e r i c a n Heritage a n d C u l ­ ture M o n t h . "

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Chapter 5 7. H . J . R e s o l u t i o n 1 2 7 : A j o i n t resolution to authorize the presi­ dent to p r o c l a i m the last F r i d a y of A p r i l 1 9 9 3 as " N a t i o n a l A r ­ bor D a y . " 8. S. J . R e s o l u t i o n 2 2 : A joint resolution designating M a r c h 2 5 , 1 9 9 3 , as " G r e e k Independence D a y : A N a t i o n a l D a y o f C e l e b r a ­ t i o n of G r e e k a n d A m e r i c a n D e m o c r a c y . " 9. S. J . R e s o l u t i o n 2 1 : A j o i n t resolution to designate the w e e k be­ ginning September 1 9 , 1 9 9 3 , as " N a t i o n a l H i s t o r i c a l l y B l a c k Colleges a n d Universities W e e k . " 1 0 . S. J . R e s o l u t i o n 1 9 : A j o i n t resolution to a c k n o w l e d g e the 1 0 0 t h a n n i v e r s a r y o f the J a n u a r y 1 7 , 1 8 9 8 , o v e r t h r o w o f the K i n g d o m of H a w a i i , a n d to offer a n apology to N a t i v e H a w a i i a n s o n be­ h a l f of the U n i t e d States for the o v e r t h r o w o f the K i n g d o m o f Hawaii.

J o i n t resolutions are essentially bills by another name, h a v i n g a slightly different w r i t t e n format. L i k e bills that are introduced, these j o i n t reso­ lutions require the president's r e v i e w a n d likely signature to become l a w . I n contrast, simple a n d c o n c u r r e n t resolutions m u s t pass one or b o t h chambers of Congress to be enacted, but do not go to the presi­ dent. C o n c u r r e n t a n d simple resolutions pertain generally to the opera­ tions of Congress, but are additionally used to give a n o p i n i o n o f the Congress, but w i t h o u t the force of l a w (the so-called "sense o f C o n ­ gress" language). U p o n a d o p t i o n , simple resolutions are published i n the C o n g r e s s i o n a l R e c o r d , a d o c u m e n t undoubtedly that a rare few i n the public consults. S y m b o l i c policies, however, are still p u b l i c policies, but of a different sort. I n general, public policies are classified according to the k i n d s of objectives or results they seek. Scholars generally agree that p u b l i c p o l i ­ cies w i t h domestic (as opposed to foreign) p o l i c y objectives seek either to regulate the behavior of i n d i v i d u a l s a n d corporations; protect c o n ­ sumers; foster competition i n the corporate marketplace; or redistribute w e a l t h , property, legally prescribed advantages, or c i v i l rights a m o n g classes of people or ethnic groups. S y m b o l i c policies are those that do not distribute or redistribute a n y p u b l i c good or regulate i n the stan­ d a r d sense, but reflect their constituents' interests a n d concerns. V a l e r i a Sinclair C h a p m a n ( 2 0 0 2 ) defines s y m b o l i c legislation as "legislation sponsored w i t h the objective of g i v i n g psychological reassurance to c o n ­ stituents that representatives are w o r k i n g i n their interests a n d are re­ sponsive to their needs." M o s t concretely, s y m b o l i c legislation c a n : 1 . provide p o l i t i c a l cover — to conceal a v o t i n g r e c o r d that otherwise c o u l d be interpreted as c o n t r a r y to the objectives o f the s y m b o l i c bill,

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2 . initiate or augment a larger p o l i t i c a l objective or agenda, 3 . persuade fellow members on core principles before specific bills are i n t r o d u c e d , 4 . cultivate support i n the W h i t e H o u s e , 5. speak to a n d address the concerns of groups a n d constituents that otherwise w o u l d not get addressed. It is s o m e w h a t p r o b l e m a t i c to question the political motives o f m e m ­ bers of Congress, but Senator S t r o m T h u r m o n d ' s resolution designating a w e e k i n September 1 9 9 3 as " N a t i o n a l H i s t o r i c a l l y B l a c k Colleges a n d U n i v e r s i t y W e e k " s m a c k s of p o l i t i c a l cover. After a l l , T h u r m o n d w a s i n i t i a l l y a strict segregationist, h a v i n g been elected governor of S o u t h C a r o l i n a f r o m 1 9 4 7 to 1 9 5 1 . A s a delegate to the D e m o c r a t i c party's 1 9 4 8 n a t i o n a l c o n v e n t i o n , he participated i n the D i x i e c r a t revolt of Southern members w h o w a l k e d out to express their displeasure at Presi­ dent T r u m a n ' s moderate c i v i l rights stands. I n 1 9 4 8 , he r a n for presi­ dent as the States' R i g h t s D e m o c r a t i c candidate, w i n n i n g four states i n the S o u t h . Because o f his strong opposition to the D e m o c r a t i c party's liberalizing r a c i a l p o l i c y v i e w s , he s w i t c h e d to the R e p u b l i c a n party i n 1 9 6 4 . R e s o l u t i o n s l i k e this one by T h u r m o n d c a n provide cover against criticism that his opposition to affirmative action and p u b l i c policies that benefit A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s is m o t i v a t e d by r a c i a l a n t i p a t h y t o w a r d Blacks. W h i l e some resolutions m a y indeed offer politicians " p o l i t i c a l cover," others appear to be focused on p o l i c y a n d constituents. " F a m i l y A w a r e ­ ness W e e k , " for e x a m p l e , m a y be a w a y that the member c a n c l a i m k i n s h i p a n d support for A m e r i c a n families. T h e three standard types of p o l i c y — distributive, regulatory, and redistributive — engage different types of politics ( M o r r o w 2 0 0 0 ) . S y m ­ bolic resolutions are debated a n d legislated differently as w e l l . D i s t r i b u ­ tive policies, for e x a m p l e , are generally v e r y p o p u l a r because they dis­ tribute p u b l i c goods, like price supports for farmers a n d contracts for defense suppliers, to a vast a r r a y of groups. I n fact, " p o r k b a r r e l " p o l i ­ tics refers to distributive public policies. P o r k barrel politics gets its name from the practice of slave o w n e r s w h o w o u l d h a n d out rations of salt p o r k p a c k e d in w o o d e n barrels to their slaves. O f course, d i s t r i b u ­ tive policies become more c o n t r o v e r s i a l in times of fiscal stress. Because regulatory policies are technical a n d n o r m a l l y a p p l y to a s m a l l set of i n d i v i d u a l s or groups, they are less p u b l i c , although the politics sur­ r o u n d i n g them c a n be as fierce as that s u r r o u n d i n g redistributive p o l i ­ cies. I n contrast, s y m b o l i c resolutions a n d bills that confer s y m b o l i c recognition on groups (designating post offices after c o m m u n i t y leaders and k n o w n ethnic or r a c i a l leaders) are v e r y often passed through a

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suspension o f the rules. N o n c o n t r o v e r s i a l bills, those " n a r r o w i n i m p a c t or m i n o r i n i m p o r t a n c e , " are generally considered under a suspension of rules (Sinclair 1 9 9 7 , 2 0 ) . W h i l e there is generally a floor vote, debate is generally l i m i t e d to forty minutes, a n d the vote is sometimes t a k e n by voice only. F u r t h e r m o r e , no a m e n d m e n t s are a l l o w e d , a n d a t w o - t h i r d s vote is required for passage. T h e s e rules are designed to speed up the process, prevent o b s t r u c t i o n i s m , a n d save time. I n this w a y , s y m b o l i c r e s o l u t i o n is e x c e p t i o n a l l y easy to pass —passage that is often h i d d e n f r o m full v i e w o f the m e d i a a n d the A m e r i c a n p u b l i c . T h e A m e r i c a n p o l i t i c a l system is k n o w n to have a distributive p o l i c y bias. Policies that distribute s m a l l goods across a w i d e a r r a y o f groups a n d interests are more l i k e l y to be passed t h a n those r e d i s t r i b u t i n g as­ sets or those regulating a business. I n this w a y , s y m b o l i c resolutions are l i k e distributive p u b l i c policies. R e c o g n i z i n g the c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f I t a l i a n A m e r i c a n s does not m e a n that the c o n t r i b u t i o n s o f G r e e k A m e r i c a n s w i l l never w i n recognition i n Congress as w e l l . I n contrast to " p o r k , " s y m b o l i c policies do not cost t a x p a y e r s m u c h , i f a n y t h i n g . T h u s , s y m ­ bolic policies are a cheap w a y to distribute some n o n m a t e r i a l p u b l i c goods to constituents.

SYMBOLIC PUBLIC POLICIES I N THE

103RD

CONGRESS

I n the 1 0 3 r d , Representative J o h n L e w i s sponsored a b i l l ( H R 1 9 3 3 ) that became p u b l i c l a w that p r o v i d e d for the establishment o f a M a r t i n L u t h e r K i n g Jr. F e d e r a l H o l i d a y C o m m i s s i o n a n d a N a t i o n a l Service D a y to promote c o m m u n i t y service. R e p . Bennie T h o m p s o n successfully sponsored a b i l l designating a post office i n J a c k s o n the " M e d g a r W i l e y E v e r s Post O f f i c e . " H e also got t h r o u g h a bill ( H R 4 4 5 2 ) designating another office i n R u l e v i l l e , M i s s i s s i p p i , the " F a n n i e L o u H a m e r U n i t e d States Post O f f i c e . " T h e rules w e r e suspended, chiefly l i m i t i n g debate, a n d the H o u s e passed the legislation w i t h o u t controversy. I n a d d i t i o n to T h o m p s o n , B a r b a r a - R o s e C o l l i n s a n d E l e a n o r H o l m e s N o r t o n rose up to speak i n f a v o r o f this b i l l . T h r e e W h i t e colleagues, i n c l u d i n g B a r n e y F r a n k o f Massachusetts, made statements endorsing this measure. J a m e s C l y b u r n a n d W i l l i a m C l a y also h a d i n t r o d u c e d legislation ( H R 4 5 4 3 a n d 4 5 5 1 ) designating post offices after a B l a c k federal judge a n d B l a c k w o m a n c i v i l rights advocate a n d educator. C o n s i d e r e d u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l , such bills, as e x p l a i n e d earlier, pass easily t h r o u g h the H o u s e . Some B l a c k legislators have introduced legislation recognizing W h i t e citizens i n the 1 0 3 r d as w e l l . M i s s o u r i Representative A l a n W h e a t , for e x a m p l e , i n t r o d u c e d legislation designating a post office after a W h i t e congressman, w h i l e Representative B a r b a r a - R o s e C o l l i n s o f M i c h i g a n got a federal courthouse n a m e d after a W h i t e federal judge. R o b e r t

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Scott, a f r e s h m a n elected i n V i r g i n i a , h a d a federal courthouse after former Supreme C o u r t Associate Justice L e w i s E P o w e l l , Jr. W h i t e legis­ l a t o r s , however, d i d not succeed in the 1 0 3 r d i n s y m b o l i c a l l y recogniz­ ing B l a c k s . Representative E l i o t E n g e l o f N e w Y o r k asked for n e w court­ house under c o n s t r u c t i o n i n W h i t e P l a i n s , to be n a m e d after T h u r g o o d M a r s h a l l ; it died i n a Senate committee. T h e p o i n t is that i n the flood o f legislation passed g i v i n g s y m b o l i c recognition to groups a n d interest or­ ganizations, B l a c k legislators chiefly have w o r k e d t o w a r d the recogni­ tion o f B l a c k s .

SUBSTANTIVE LEGISLATION I N T H E 103RD CONGRESS

W h i l e the m a j o r i t y o f legislation B l a c k s w o n in the 1 0 3 r d w a s generally s y m b o l i c , some substantive bills that they sponsored w o n passage. N o ­ tably, t w o bills sponsored by B l a c k c h a i r s were pertinent to B l a c k inter­ ests. Subcommittee C h a i r m a n L o u i s Stokes sponsored legislation i n ­ creasing federal funding for H U D funding, V A , a n d other independent agencies, i n c l u d i n g the N a t i o n a l Science F o u n d a t i o n . W i l l i a m C l a y , c h a i r m a n o f the Post Office a n d C i v i l Service C o m m i t t e e , successfully a d v a n c e d the " F e d e r a l E m p l o y e e s P o l i t i c a l Activities A c t o f 1 9 9 3 " in the 1 0 3 r d C o n g r e s s . T h i s bill repealed the H a t c h A c t o f 1 9 3 9 , w h i c h prohibited federal employees from r u n n i n g for p u b l i c office in partisan elections, h o l d i n g an office i n a political party, or actively c a m p a i g n i n g for a candidate i n p a r t i s a n activities. R e p . C l a y h a d i n i t i a l l y introduced the H a t c h A c t reform legislation i n 1974. R e p u b l i c a n s opposed repeal­ ing the A c t because they felt that federal employees, w h o m they recog­ nized generally to be D e m o c r a t s , w o u l d be pressured to engage i n c a m ­ paign activities. C o m m o n C a u s e also opposed repealing the H a t c h A c t . But despite the c o n t r o v e r s i a l nature o f this b i l l , it sailed t h r o u g h the H o u s e a n d Senate a n d w a s signed into l a w . Other, m i n o r bills, less centrally tied to B l a c k interests, but o f a sub­ stantive nature, i n c l u d e d one sponsored by veteran H o u s e member C a r ­ diss C o l l i n s ( D - I L ) that imposed tougher toy safety standards on toy m a n u f a c t u r e r s ( H R 9 6 5 ) . Representative A l a n W h e a t ( D - M O ) w o u l d get a b i l l passed that e x p a n d e d the H a r r y S. T r u m a n N a t i o n a l H i s t o r i c Site i n M i s s o u r i ( H R 4 8 6 ) , by a u t h o r i z i n g the Secretary o f the I n t e r i o r to acquire the T r u m a n F a r m H o m e a n d a d d it to the N a t i o n a l Site. W h e a t asked for an u n c o n t r o v e r s i a l measure (rules suspended) to create a special district o f five counties across t w o states to w o r k cooperatively o n c u l t u r a l issues ( H R 4 8 9 6 ) . C o n g r e s s m a n J o h n C o n y e r s ' s ( D - M I ) ser­ vice on G o v e r n m e n t O p e r a t i o n s led h i m to petition for the extension o f funding for the K e n n e d y A s s a s s i n a t i o n R e c o r d s C o l l e c t i o n A c t o f 1 9 9 2 . I n contrast, the one bill passed that directly pertained to m i n o r i t i e s ,

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the M i n o r i t y H e a l t h I m p r o v e m e n t A c t of 1 9 9 4 , w a s sponsored by Sena­ tor T e d K e n n e d y . Senators C a r o l M o s e l e y B r a u n a n d O r r e n H a t c h w e r e its cosponsors. I t passed the H o u s e w i t h o u t difficulty. T h e D i s t r i c t o f C o l u m b i a ' s n o n v o t i n g delegate to the H o u s e , E l e a n o r H o l m e s N o r t o n , bears special mention because o f her high degree of b i l l attainment, m a n y of w h i c h were substantive. N o r t o n has a clear advantage, h o w ­ ever, over other B l a c k members; Congress bears a n i n s t i t u t i o n a l m i s s i o n to oversee her district.

T H E LEGISLATIVE OBJECTIVES OF BLACK

MEMBERS:

SYMBOLIC, SUBSTANTIVE, OR BOTH?

W h i l e the v o l u m e of s y m b o l i c legislation i n bill attainment by B l a c k members is larger than the substantive p o l i c y bills, B l a c k members clearly are focused o n substantive legislation. E v a C l a y t o n o f N o r t h C a r o l i n a is one such legislator, a l t h o u g h her bill attainment r e c o r d is l o w . I n the 1 0 5 t h , she sponsored seven bills a n d amendments, a l l sub­ stantive, pertaining to credit to farmers, assistance for l o w - i n c o m e w o r k i n g families, a n d a registration r e f o r m w h e r e b y voter registration applications w o u l d be a u t o m a t i c a l l y sent to students d u r i n g e n r o l l m e n t w e e k . I n the 1 0 3 r d Congress, she sponsored five bills, o f w h i c h o n l y one, a p r o p o s a l that a w e e k i n M a r c h be designed as " S m a l l F a m i l y F a r m W e e k " w a s s y m b o l i c . E v a C l a y t o n ' s w e b link on legislative activ­ ities showcases t w o bills related to f a r m i n g that she sponsored i n the 1 0 5 t h . T h e first proposes giving relief to farmers faced w i t h the l a c k o f access to credit because of the 1 9 9 6 F a r m B i l l , a n d the second lifts the statute o f l i m i t a t i o n s , a l l o w i n g farmers to sue for allegations o f past d i s c r i m i n a t i o n . C l a y t o n emphasizes h o w her legislative agenda is de­ signed to benefit residents of her state. O t h e r s , like R e p . C h a k a F a t t a h ( D - P A ) , propose a m i x o f substantive a n d s y m b o l i c legislation. Fattah's legislative initiatives i n the 1 0 6 t h included a resolution recognizing A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n m u s i c , one that w o u l d require states to equalize funding for p u b l i c education, a n d one that w o u l d require states to provide a m i n i m u m level of health-care access as a requirement for p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n federal health-care p r o ­ grams. C h a k a ' s legislative agenda reflects his c o n c e r n for u r b a n devel­ opment a n d equal opportunities i n p u b l i c education. F i n a l l y w h i l e B l a c k members introduce a great deal o f s y m b o l i c legis­ l a t i o n , they nevertheless stress mostly their substantive p o l i c y agendas i n their newsletters to constituents, i n press releases, a n d o n congres­ s i o n a l w e b pages. F o r e x a m p l e , C o r r i n e B r o w n ( D - F L ) , elected to the 1 0 3 r d , describes her legislative agenda on her congressional w e b page as i n c l u d i n g t r a n s p o r t a t i o n policy, M e d i c a i d a n d hospitals, a n d h u m a n

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rights i n L a t i n A m e r i c a . T h e s e agendas are presented i n a w a y that s o m e w h a t deemphasizes their l i b e r a l ideological d i m e n s i o n , w h i l e stressing their importance to the residents of her state. Y e t here is the complete list o f bills that R e p . B r o w n sponsored i n the 1 0 5 t h : 1 . H . C O N . R E S . 1 2 9 : A c o n c u r r e n t r e s o l u t i o n expressing the sense of the Congress that a postage stamp s h o u l d be issued to h o n o r Z o r a Neale Hurston. 2 . H . C O N . R E S . 2 9 8 : A c o n c u r r e n t resolution expressing deepest c o n ­ dolences to the State a n d people o f F l o r i d a for the losses suffered as a result o f the w i l d l a n d fires o c c u r i n g i n J u n e a n d J u l y 1 9 9 8 , expressing support to the State a n d people of F l o r i d a as they over­ come the effects of the fires, a n d c o m m e n d i n g the heroic efforts of firefighters f r o m across the N a t i o n i n battling the fires. 3 . H . R E S . 1 7 3 : A resolution h o n o r i n g the i n a u g u r a l season o f the U n i t e d States w o m e n ' s professional basketball leagues. 4 . H . A M D T . 1 5 9 : A n amendment to express the sense of Congress c o n c e r n i n g the rights of prisoners i n A n d e a n countries. A n o t h e r B l a c k member w h o s e legislative initiatives are generally s y m ­ bolic is Alcee H a s t i n g s , also of F l o r i d a . B u t C o n g r e s s m a n Hastings's w e b site showcases o n l y his substantive interests. T h e site boosts that the C o n g r e s s m a n "has helped secure funds for r o a d construction a n d h i g h w a y repairs i n his district, authored legislation to protect P o r t E v ­ erglades, a n d amended the F o r e i g n A i d A u t h o r i z a t i o n B i l l urging the A r a b League to repeal the economic boycott against I s r a e l . H e strongly supports e n v i r o n m e n t a l protection, but gives careful c o n s i d e r a t i o n to legislation that m a y disproportionately i m p a c t the jobs of his constit­ uents. H e recently i n t r o d u c e d legislation to help protect jobs a n d employee rights a n d legislation that w o u l d p r o h i b i t visiting foreign nationals f r o m p u r c h a s i n g or possessing firearms." C o n s i d e r i n g the leg­ islative agendas o f B l a c k members of C o n g r e s s , it is difficult to clas­ sify t h e m as either s y m b o l i c legislators, substantive legislators, or h y b r i d s . W h y is so m u c h of the legislation that Congress passes s y m b o l i c ? R i c h a r d H a l l ( 1 9 9 6 ) argues that legislative w o r k in W a s h i n g t o n is both "selective a n d p u r p o s i v e . " M e m b e r s o b v i o u s l y derive clear electoral benefits f r o m passing s y m b o l i c legislation. A t the same time, s y m b o l i c legislation is rooted in the A m e r i c a n electoral system. H a v i n g singlemember districts a n d a w e a k p a r t y system creates incentives for m e m ­ bers to engage legislative activities that confer benefits to groups. T h e v o l u m e o f s y m b o l i c legislation is due to the ease o f passing such bills, i n contrast to concrete p u b l i c policies, a n d because bill passage is w h a t is expected o f legislators i n the district-form system of p o l i t i c a l representation.

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T h e a m o u n t of substantive legislation initiated by B l a c k members of Congress is about equal to or more t h a n that of s y m b o l i c legislation. Still, a l l i n d i v i d u a l members of Congress are sponsors of s y m b o l i c legis­ l a t i o n , not o n l y B l a c k members. T h e r e are bills recognizing I t a l i a n A m e r ­ icans, surgeons, the classical m u s i c industry, and a l l manners o f groups. But w i t h o u t B l a c k members i n Congress, it is doubtful that B l a c k s w o u l d o b t a i n their fair share of s y m b o l i c legislation.

THE

CONGRESSIONAL BLACK

CAUCUS

A s one o f its founding members, Representative W i l l i a m C l a y ( D - M O ) offers a r i c h l y informative account o f the birth o f the C o n g r e s s i o n a l B l a c k C a u c u s i n J u s t P e r m a n e n t I n t e r e s t s ( 1 9 9 2 ) . I n 1 9 6 9 , thirteen B l a c k s were serving i n the H o u s e d u r i n g a period of r i s i n g B l a c k m i l i ­ tancy. President N i x o n , w r i t e s C l a y , perceiving his reelection mandate "to repeal a l l o f the J o h n s o n G r e a t Society p r o g r a m s " ( 1 9 9 2 , 1 2 6 ) , h a d the effect o f w a v i n g a red flag i n front o f a n impatient a n d ideologically charged b u l l . A s a means o f l a u n c h i n g their counteroffensive, the thir­ teen B l a c k House-members first formed the " D e m o c r a t i c Select C o m ­ mittee," but i n 1 9 7 1 it w a s renamed C o n g r e s s i o n a l B l a c k C a u c u s ( C B C ) . T h e founding members h a d considered m a n y names, a n d some others w a n t e d to open the door to other m i n o r i t y legislators, n o t a b l y C h i canos, Puerto R i c a n s , a n d J e w i s h members. B u t as C l a y w r i t e s , these proposals w e r e rejected, as ultimately " i t w a s u n a n i m o u s l y agreed that the C a u c u s be composed o f only black members a n d that the w o r d ' b l a c k ' r e m a i n i n the n a m e " ( 1 2 1 ) . Its thirteen founding members w e r e : Representatives Shirley C h i s h o l m , W i l l i a m C l a y , George C o l l i n s , J o h n C o n y e r s , R o n a l d D e l l u m s , C h a r l e s Diggs, Augustus H a w k i n s , R a l p h Metcalfe, P a r r e n M i t c h e l l , R o b e r t N i x , C h a r l e s R a n g e l , L o u i s Stokes, a n d the D . C . delegate, W a l t e r F a u n t r o y . O r g a n i z e d to m a x i m i z e their collective influence i n Congress, the C B C ' s mission w a s to represent the concerns of A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s . E a r l y o n , the C B C ' s organizational style w a s characterized as combat­ ive. Rebuffed by President N i x o n i n their efforts to set up a meeting for over one year, members of the C B C boycotted N i x o n ' s J a n u a r y 1 9 7 1 State of the U n i o n address. T h e o n l y A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n legislator to attend w a s Senator E d B r o o k e o f Massachusetts, then the only B l a c k R e p u b l i c a n member of the U . S . Congress. T h e standoff c o n t i n u e d through the second year of President N i x o n ' s second a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . F i n a l l y , i n M a r c h 1 9 7 1 , a meeting w a s granted, d u r i n g w h i c h the C B C presented the president w i t h s i x t y p o l i c y recommendations. N i x o n ' s re­ sponse to this list w a s m i x e d , but polite. W h i l e the C B C w a s described as a "concrete manifestation o f b l a c k

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p o l i t i c a l p o w e r " ( B a r n e t t 1 9 8 2 ) w i t h i n a short period o f time, m a n y B l a c k legislators, i n c l u d i n g some o f the C B C ' s o r i g i n a l founders became c r i t i c a l o f the o r g a n i z a t i o n . B y C l a y ' s account, the disagreements a n d points of d i s u n i t y w e r e r e a l enough but frequently petty. I n a chapter entitled, " T h e C B C A l m o s t S e l f - D e s t r u c t s , " he recounts h o w one m e m ­ ber w o u l d resign i n h i g h d r a m a because the C B C failed to reserve enough tables at a legislative w e e k e n d for his c a m p a i g n c o n t r i b u t o r s , o n l y to rejoin " u n c e r e m o n i o u s l y " four m o n t h s later. O t h e r s w o u l d e x ­ press their grave concerns that a c o n t r i b u t i o n to the o r g a n i z a t i o n w a s accepted f r o m the C o o r s C o m p a n y , w h o s e founder w a s a w e l l - k n o w n p o l i t i c a l conservative. T h e n there w a s the presidential bid o f one o f the C B C ' s founding members, Shirley C h i s h o l m ( D - N Y ) , w h i c h as noted i n chapter 3 , p r o v o k e d disunity a m o n g C B C members. Beneath a l l o f these issues w a s o b v i o u s l y a larger conflict between the organization's interests i n representing B l a c k interests a n d members' o w n political goals. M u c h feuding t o o k place d u r i n g President C a r t e r ' s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n . A s members rose i n seniority, their l o y a l t y to the organi­ zation w a s stretched a n d tested by other members w h o w a n t e d unre­ lenting a n d u n c o m p r o m i s i n g resistance to p u b l i c policies that w e r e per­ ceived as h a r m f u l to or dilutive of B l a c k interests — resistance that c o u l d jeopardize senior m e m b e r s ' o w n standing in the H o u s e . B i l l G r a y ( D P A ) ' s service on the Budget C o m m i t t e e a n d his elevation to C h a i r i n 1985 illustrated this tension w e l l . C h a i r m a n G r a y clearly became a n advocate for the D e m o c r a t i c leadership's budget a n d a target for C B C ' s c r i t i c i s m . T h e conflict w a s rooted in the o r g a n i z a t i o n style that the C B C w o u l d adopt. W a s the C B C a p a r t y w i t h i n a party, or a n o r g a n i z a t i o n outside o f the D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y ? I t is instructive that the motto o f the C B C is " B l a c k people have no permanent friends, no permanent enemies . . . just permanent inter­ ests." C h a r l e s Diggs ( D - M I ) , one o f its founding members, w o u l d c l a i m that the "issues a n d concerns of this caucus are not partisan o n e s " (quoted i n C h a m p a g n e a n d R i e s e l b a c h 1 9 9 5 ) , i m p l y i n g that the C B C is a p a r t y outside o f the D e m o c r a t i c o r g a n i z a t i o n , w i l l i n g to a l i g n itself w i t h a n y interest w i t h i n Congress that w i l l p r o m o t e the interests of B l a c k s . T h u s , the C B C c o u l d c o n c e i v a b l y vote across party lines w i t h R e p u b l i c a n s i n w h a t e v e r issue w a s i n the interest of A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s . P o l i t i c a l disunity w i t h i n the D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y w a s i n j u r i o u s to members w h o w a n t e d to advance w i t h i n the party r a n k s . W h i l e seniority is a factor i n committee assignments, so is party unity. T h u s , as B l a c k s rose in seniority a n d began to covet positions o f p o w e r o n k e y committees, the type o f strategy exemplified by the C B C ' s m o t t o w a s professionally dangerous. T h e C B C ' s p o l i t i c a l a p p r o a c h , however, w a s not premised o n a " b a l -

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ance of p o w e r " equation w h e r e b y B l a c k members w o u l d p o s i t i o n them­ selves i n between the t w o m a j o r parties a n d vote depending o n w h i c h group's legislation p r o m i s e d the most by w a y o f benefits for B l a c k s . T h i s , i n fact, is the a p p r o a c h often t a k e n by the Blue D o g s , a group o f conservative D e m o c r a t s . Instead, the C B C ' s strategy o f B l a c k p o l i t i c a l independence is not u n l i k e that described by R o n a l d W a l t e r s ( 1 9 8 8 ) i n his analysis o f Jesse J a c k s o n ' s presidential bids. T h e C B C w o u l d orga­ nize B l a c k m e m b e r s ' votes as a bloc, w h i c h c o u l d be used to b a r g a i n w i t h the larger D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y to ensure that its p o l i c y agenda m o v e d closer to that o f B l a c k s . F u r t h e r m o r e , the C B C w o u l d issue p o l i c y state­ ments that c o u l d become p a r t of the D e m o c r a t i c party's legislative agenda. B y r u n n i n g inside o f the D e m o c r a t i c party, J a c k s o n c o u l d help m o b i l i z e a core segment of B l a c k voters w h o c o u l d be used as b a r g a i n ­ ing chips w i t h the n a t i o n a l D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y o r g a n i z a t i o n ( W a l t e r s 1 9 8 8 ; T a t e 1 9 9 4 ) . I n a d d i t i o n , J a c k s o n ' s c a n d i d a c y c o u l d put B l a c k is­ sues o n the n a t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l agenda a n d o n the party's p o l i c y p l a t f o r m . ( T h e p r o b l e m is that as a bargaining vehicle for B l a c k D e m o c r a t i c vot­ ers, J a c k s o n ' s t w o presidential bids w e r e not especially successful [Tate 1 9 9 4 ] . ) L i k e J a c k s o n ' s bids, the C B C ' s strategy w a s entirely intraparty, as they sought to negotiate w i t h the larger D e m o c r a t i c party, a n d not organize a n e w f r o m outside o f it. Still, i n these negotiations w i t h the D e m o c r a t i c party, h o w far s h o u l d the C B C be prepared to go? T h i s w a s the d i l e m m a t h a t dogged m e m ­ bers d u r i n g the C a r t e r presidency. W r i t e s C l a y , " A l t h o u g h Congressw o m a n C h i s h o l m ' s 1 9 7 2 bid for the presidency posted a more serious threat to the continued existence o f the C o n g r e s s i o n a l B l a c k C a u c u s t h a n a n y previous bone of contention, the s t o r m she aroused w a s m i ­ nuscule i n relation to w h a t happened d u r i n g President J i m m y C a r t e r ' s 1 9 8 0 c a m p a i g n for reelection" ( 1 9 9 2 , 3 0 2 ) . President C a r t e r ' s presi­ dency w a s a disappointment o n almost a l l fronts. H e h a d snubbed m a n y members of Congress. I n 1 9 7 9 he w o u l d a b r u p t l y remove A n ­ d r e w Y o u n g , the former B l a c k H o u s e member f r o m G e o r g i a , f r o m his post as the U . S . A m b a s s a d o r to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s , for secretly meeting w i t h representatives of the Palestine L i b e r a t i o n O r g a n i z a t i o n ( P L O ) — a m o v e that w o u l d anger members o f the C B C . B l a c k members o f the H o u s e , however, w e r e especially irritated by the fiscal c o n s e r v a t i s m he practiced as president. W h i l e N i x o n h a d begun to dismantle k e y J o h n s o n - e r a p r o g r a m s , C a r t e r continued their d i s m a n t l i n g especially i n p r o g r a m s that benefited large u r b a n areas, w h i c h also happened to be the areas that sent B l a c k s to Congress. B l a c k members w e r e also i n ­ censed by President C a r t e r ' s w e a k support of the H u m p h r e y - H a w k i n s bill ( H . R . 2 0 ) , legislation that w a s intended to c o m m i t the federal gov­ ernment to full employment. I n the b i l l , government w a s to be the e m -

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ployer of " l a s t resort," creating p u b l i c service jobs like those t h a t h a d been created d u r i n g the G r e a t D e p r e s s i o n . A u g u s t u s F. H a w k i n s ( D - C A ) w a s its H o u s e sponsor, w i t h H u b e r t H . H u m p h r e y sponsoring it i n the Senate. T h e subsequently revised a n d gutted legislation that President C a r t e r signed into l a w i n 1 9 7 8 h a d e l i m i n a t e d the o r i g i n a l p r o v i s i o n that p r o v i d e d for government jobs. T h e reaction to the C a r t e r administration among B l a c k H o u s e members w a s s h a r p l y d i v i d e d . A c c o r d i n g to C l a y , at a M a y 1 9 7 9 C B C regional event, " C o n g r e s s m a n J o h n C o n y e r s announced o n opening night that he w a s o r g a n i z i n g a ' d u m p President J i m m y C a r t e r c a m p a i g n . H e t o l d a l o c a l reporter, T h e facts are that President C a r t e r has not lived up to his promise. H e double-crossed us.' C o n g r e s s m a n Diggs characterized C o n y e r s ' r e m a r k s as 'premature,' a n d C o n g r e s s m a n H a r o l d F o r d a n ­ nounced, ' I ' m e m p h a t i c a l l y against s u c h a m o v e . F u r t h e r m o r e , I ' m a supporter of the president' " ( 1 9 9 2 , 3 0 3 - 4 ) . C o n y e r s w o u l d be joined by C o n g r e s s w o m a n C a r d i s s C o l l i n s i n denouncing the President for his h a r s h c u t b a c k s i n federal s o c i a l p r o g r a m s for y o u n g a n d senior citizens. R e p u b l i c a n R o n a l d R e a g a n w o u l d defeat President C a r t e r i n 1 9 8 0 . W h a t is interesting is that the C l i n t o n presidency a n d his reelection b i d did not invite the same k i n d of p o l a r i z e d perspectives as did the C a r t e r presidency. Y e t C l i n t o n ' s first-term policies c o u l d be characterized as more conservative t h a n C a r t e r ' s . O n e d r a m a t i c change that o c c u r r e d i n the intervening period between the t w o presidencies w a s the sharp i n ­ crease i n discipline that the m a j o r parties had achieved through r e f o r m (Rohde 1991). 5

T h e C B C ' s o w n alternative budget, w h i c h it h a d developed as the liberal alternative to the D e m o c r a t i c leadership's budget, also e x e m ­ plifies this inherent conflict as it clearly w a s a product f r o m " o u t s i d e " o f the party. A s one set of scholars put it, the strategy of presenting this alternative budget to the floor for vote "directly challenged the author­ ity of the Budget C o m m i t t e e " ' a n d w a s a " c l e a r affront to the c o m m i t ­ tee s y s t e m " ( C h a m p a g n e a n d R i e s e l b a c h 1 9 9 5 , 1 4 6 ) . A s it turns out, the p o w e r f u l Budget C o m m i t t e e w a s the least l i k e l y one to encounter budgetary proposals that h a d reached the floor w i t h o u t its a p p r o v a l , thus m a k i n g the C B C ' s tactic especially s t r i k i n g . A l t e r n a t i v e l y , Singh ar­ gues that the " C B C budget w a s r a r e l y seen as an affront to either a p a r t i c u l a r committee or the system but w a s v i e w e d by D e m o c r a t i c leaders as p o l i t i c a l l y essential to submit for floor c o n s i d e r a t i o n . " I n the end, C B C members were "too i m p o r t a n t a p a r t of the D e m o c r a t i c c o a l i ­ t i o n to i g n o r e , " he w r i t e s ( 1 9 9 8 , 1 5 0 ) . T h u s , this alternative budget w a s still a strategy w i t h i n the party. T h e C B C ' s legislative strategy is one that w a s closely f o l l o w e d by Jesse J a c k s o n i n his 1 9 8 4 a n d 1988 presidential bids. A s I note i n m y

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analysis of these bids, J a c k s o n "presented himself as both a n insider a n d a n outsider. . . . A s a n insider, he r a n as a D e m o c r a t i c a n d chose not to become a p o l i t i c a l independent. A s a n outsider, he challenged p a r t y rules a n d disregarded p a r t y n o r m s " (Tate 1 9 9 4 , 1 4 5 ) . After h a v i n g been its most v o c a l critic, J a c k s o n i n 1 9 9 6 w o u l d fall i n line w i t h a l l the other p a r t y leaders, giving his most r i n g i n g endorsement ever to C l i n t o n for reelection as president (Barker, J o n e s , a n d T a t e 1 9 9 8 ) . A s the membership r a n k s of C B C g r e w a n d as members achieved greater seniority, their allegiances transferred increasingly to that o f the party. I n Singh's ( 1 9 9 8 ) a n a l y s i s of strategic budgetary battles between D e m o c r a t i c leaders a n d C B C members, those rising fastest i n the party's r a n k s a n d w h o w e r e c h a i r s o f their o w n committees a n d subcommittees w e r e the most l i k e l y to vote for the D e m o c r a t i c budget i n 1 9 8 6 . T h e i r allegiances w e r e not o n l y d i v i d e d between their p a r t y a n d the C B C , but also between their positions as chairs of committees a n d their o w n re­ election a n d constituency interests. A s Singh notes, even C o n y e r s ( D M I ) , w h o s e positions most consistently corresponded to those of the C B C , voted i n 1 9 8 8 to i m p e a c h A l c e e H a s t i n g s , the first B l a c k federal judge i n F l o r i d a — even as the C B C refused to adopt a p o s i t i o n c o n ­ d e m n i n g H a s t i n g s , w h o w o u l d later w i n election i n 1 9 9 2 to the H o u s e . T h e transfer of allegiance to a more solid position w i t h i n the D e m o ­ c r a t i c p a r t y d i d not come about o n l y because o f the g r o w i n g selfinterest of B l a c k members, but as the D e m o c r a t i c p a r t y leadership w i s e l y began to appoint B l a c k s to i m p o r t a n t committees. E a r l y B l a c k members w e r e put o n u n i m p o r t a n t committees, deliberately or thought­ lessly, as w a s the case o f C h i s h o l m . B u t i f the function o f party leaders is to "keep the peace" by p r o v i d i n g members meaningful opportunities to influence the legislative process ( S i n c l a i r 1 9 8 3 ) , p a r t y leaders w i s e d up a n d began to integrate B l a c k s better. A p p o i n t i n g G r a y c h a i r of the Budget C o m m i t t e e i n the 9 9 t h Congress in 1 9 8 5 , a n d then as the party's m a j o r i t y w h i p (the t h i r d - r a n k i n g party leadership p o s i t i o n ) , w a s a b r i l ­ l i a n t w a y to w i n votes for the leadership's budget initiatives w i t h , per­ haps, less w h e e l i n g a n d dealing o n the part of p a r t y officials. W h i l e G r a y attempted to b r i n g fellow C B C members q u i c k l y into the party fold, his stronger l o y a l t y to the p a r t y w a s affirmed by v o t i n g "present" or abstaining o n the C B C alternative budget floor vote. W h i l e some m a y interpret G r a y ' s preference for the party's agenda over that o f the C B C as a reflection o f an ideological shift, the reason behind his choice, a g a i n , p r o b a b l y l a y i n the incentive a n d disincentive devices that the party leadership h a d at its disposal. I n their efforts to ensure p a r t y disci­ pline, committee c h a i r s w e r e made accountable to the p a r t y t h r o u g h a regular secret ballot at the beginning o f each Congress ( R o h d e 1 9 9 1 ) . T h u s , party c h a i r s c o u l d be dumped i f the leadership felt they w e r e not

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sufficiently supportive. T h u s , u n i t y is challenged not o n the basis o f ideology but as i n d i v i d u a l members rise i n the r a n k s a n d strive to w i n greater p o l i c y influence over the legislative process o n their o w n ( C h a m ­ pagne a n d R i e s e l b a c h 1 9 9 5 ; Singh 1 9 9 8 ) . W h i l e some scholars have suggested that the increasing n u m b e r s o f B l a c k s to the H o u s e w o u l d undermine the p o l i t i c a l s o l i d a r i t y o f B l a c k s as they brought into Congress diverse v i e w s a n d perspectives, the appar­ ent d i v i s i o n is less the manifestation of g r o w i n g ideological d i s u n i t y t h a n cross-cutting allegiances a n d a matter of p o l i t i c a l strategy. T h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l a p p r o a c h that characterized the early C B C is no longer supported by the m a j o r i t y o f B l a c k H o u s e members. T h e additions of B l a c k members from the S o u t h add not ideological dissension but dif­ ferent constituency concerns, diluting the o v e r a r c h i n g u r b a n interests of the previous C a u c u s members. T h e c o n f r o n t a t i o n a l strategy w o u l d s i m i l a r l y lose its appeal a m o n g the H o u s e R e p u b l i c a n s w h o , d u r i n g the h o l i d a y p e r i o d over 1 9 9 5 to 1 9 9 6 , h a d advocated shutting d o w n the government to pressure the president to support their p r o v i s i o n s . T h e hard-line H o u s e R e p u b l i c a n s were notably freshmen, w i s h i n g to r e t a i n their ideological p u r i t y over the t w i n i n s t i t u t i o n a l imperatives of c o m ­ promises a n d c o a l i t i o n s . O n c e the public began to blame the R e p u b l i ­ cans i n Congress for the three s h u t d o w n s , they changed strategies, yielding finally to i n s t i t u t i o n a l imperatives. A s R i c h a r d F e n n o put it, " Y o u can't possibly r u n a r e v o l u t i o n t h r o u g h the budget process" ( 1 9 9 7 , 3 9 ) . Fifteen " d e t e r m i n e d " R e p u b l i c a n s , nevertheless, voted against the c o m p r o m i s e budget legislation i n defiance (Sinclair 1 9 9 7 , 2 1 2 ) . B l a c k members w o u l d become ardent proponents o f institutional rules, nota­ bly the seniority system (Bositis 1 9 9 4 ) . U n d e r it, as D a v i d Bositis e x ­ p l a i n s , even non-centrists c a n advance to c h a i r m a n s h i p , as d i d R o n D e l l u m s ( D - C A ) i n the case o f A r m e d Services. I f the D e m o c r a t s regain c o n t r o l of the H o u s e i n 2 0 0 4 or closely thereafter, C h a r l e s R a n g e l ( D N Y ) is i n line to assume the c h a i r m a n s h i p of the p o w e r f u l W a y s a n d Means Committee. Policies that appealed to C B C members d u r i n g the C l i n t o n a d m i n i s ­ tration w o u l d lose w h i l e more conservative a n d b i p a r t i s a n measures w o u l d be adopted. W h i l e s u c h a t u r n h a d ignited a strong o u t c r y a m o n g B l a c k members d u r i n g the C a r t e r a d m i n i s t r a t i o n , there w a s no open t a l k a m o n g B l a c k members about m o u n t i n g a c a m p a i g n to " d u m p C l i n ­ t o n " as the 1996 N a t i o n a l D e m o c r a t i c C o n v e n t i o n a p p r o a c h e d . T h e r e are m a n y reasons for this, i n c l u d i n g C l i n t o n ' s persistently strong s h o w ­ ing a m o n g B l a c k voters. R e p u b l i c a n s w i n n i n g c o n t r o l o f the H o u s e i n 1 9 9 4 added more pressure o n B l a c k s to stick together. Because B l a c k members lost their committee a n d subcommittee c h a i r m a n s h i p s under R e p u b l i c a n c o n t r o l , B l a c k D e m o c r a t s ' dependence on the president i n

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the legislative process increased ( W a l t o n 1 9 9 7 , 3 2 3 - 3 6 ) . B u t as impor­ tant as these t w o p o l i t i c a l forces w e r e , the i n s t i t u t i o n a l pressures that came to bear o n B l a c k members h a d their greatest i m p a c t i n m o d e r a t i n g the p o l i t i c a l style o f the C B C . I n this regard, C a u c u s s o l i d a r i t y o n the floor m a y prove m o r e elusive, as members are cross-pressured to vote w i t h p a r t y leaders or committee members. A c c e p t i n g R o b e r t Singh's ultimate c o n c l u s i o n that the C B C , i n s t i t u ­ t i o n a l l y w e a k , has amassed at best a "modest r e c o r d " i n d e l i v e r i n g p u b ­ lic policies of substance to the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y , I challenge the i m p l i c a ­ tions o f its increasing irrelevance to the interests of A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s . Singh's c o n c l u s i o n s , after a l l , are predicated on the a s s u m p t i o n that po­ l i t i c a l representation is e x c l u s i v e l y substantive, p o l i c y representation. Representation as I have defined it, however, is far more encompassing a n d includes s y m b o l i c representation as w e l l . T h e C B C ' s p r i m a r y a i m is to give voice a n d recognition to the interests o f B l a c k s a n d p o o r A m e r i ­ c a n s . I n the marketplace of ideas a n d ideologies, this voice a n d recogni­ t i o n has v i t a l currency. Social groups compete for the p o s i t i o n i n g o f their groups' interests a n d u l t i m a t e l y o f their group's r a n k w i t h other interests a n d s o c i a l groups. Some traces o f the old-style protest b e h a v i o r of the C B C still r e m a i n . I n the 1 0 4 t h , after R e p u b l i c a n s replaced the p o r t r a i t of the late D e m o c r a t i c c h a i r m a n o f the R u l e s C o m m i t t e e w i t h the p a i n t i n g o f an ardent segregationist, H o w a r d S m i t h o f V i r g i n i a , B l a c k members staged a "successful sit-in, demanding the p o r t r a i t be r e m o v e d " (Payne 1 9 9 7 , x x i x ) .

CONCLUSION

W h i l e Representative Fattah's ( D - P A ) b i l l i n the 1 0 6 t h Congress to rec­ ognize A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n m u s i c a n d its c o n t r i b u t i o n to A m e r i c a n society m a y seem inconsequential, it must be understood as one s y m b o l c o m ­ peting w i t h other symbols i n this larger m a r k e t p l a c e . I t is legislation that is literally i n competition w i t h other bills, i n c l u d i n g those recogniz­ ing "classical m u s i c . " W i t h o u t B l a c k members t a k i n g p a r t i n the legisla­ tive process, the s y m b o l i c interests s u c h as the congressional medals to R o s a P a r k s , w o u l d not be there. M a r t i n L u t h e r K i n g ' s b i r t h d a y becom­ ing a n a t i o n a l h o l i d a y s y m b o l i z e d the role he p l a y e d i n t r a n s f o r m i n g the c o u n t r y into a true democracy. A s a n a t i o n a l holiday, it becomes diffi­ c u l t to d i m i n i s h his place i n h i s t o r y a n d the role o f A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s generally i n A m e r i c a . T h e i r absence w o u l d contribute further to the s y m b o l i c m a r g i n a l i z a t i o n o f B l a c k s ' place i n A m e r i c a n society a n d i n history.

CHAPTER

6

Blacks' Evaluations of House Members: Does Race Matter?

W H A T D O B L A C K S T H I N K o f their elected representatives i n W a s h i n g t o n ? W h a t do they expect f r o m them? I n this chapter I t u r n to the v e r y questions that the 1 9 9 6 N B E S s u r v e y w a s designed to address. A total of 2 5 2 H o u s e districts fell into the sample, i n c l u d i n g the districts o f 3 4 of 3 9 B l a c k members o f the 1 0 4 t h Congress. I n a l l , these B l a c k legisla­ tors represented 3 3 percent of the B l a c k respondents. I n this chapter, I e x a m i n e the performance ratings of these legislators to determine w h a t i m p a c t , w h e t h e r any, their race has o n their constituent evaluations. N e x t , I determine i f being descriptively represented i n W a s h i n g t o n pos­ itively impacts o n w h a t B l a c k s t h i n k of their elected representatives i n Congress more generally or not. F i n a l l y , I l o o k at w h a t focus — n a t i o n a l , constituency service, or l o c a l — B l a c k s t h i n k that representatives ought to concentrate o n i n Congress a n d w h y .

How A

A R EREPRESENTATIVES

EVALUATED?

REVIEW OF T H E LITERATURE

E l e c t e d representatives s h o u l d be judged o n h o w w e l l they represent their constituents. B u t , then, w h a t is representation? I n chapter 1 , I ar­ gued that p o l i t i c a l representation constitutes e v e r y t h i n g that the legisla­ tor does i n his or her f o r m a l capacity as a n elected representative. H o u s e members generally are engaged in three p r i n c i p a l activities: ( 1 ) constitu­ ency service, (2) p o l i c y m a k i n g , a n d (3) reelection. E v e r y t h i n g means ev­ erything, i n c l u d i n g acts that do not m a t e r i a l l y benefit the constituents but are " s y m b o l i c . " Representation also c a n be constitutive a n d e m ­ p o w e r i n g ; this is a n issue that I take up i n the n e x t chapter. T h i s defini­ t i o n of representation, however, presents a p r o b l e m . H o w m u c h of "ev­ e r y t h i n g " that members of Congress do a c t u a l l y filters d o w n to the constituent? H o w m u c h a n d w h i c h parts o f it do constituents consider w h e n e v a l u a t i n g the performance o f their representatives? E m p i r i c a l w o r k i n congressional studies has generally focused o n elections, not representation. E l e c t i o n s are the p r i n c i p a l m e c h a n i s m to ensure p o l i t i c a l representation. T h e t w o , v o t i n g a n d feeling represented i n government, are not the same, however. W h i l e voters w h o don't feel

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adequately represented i n W a s h i n g t o n are m o t i v a t e d to vote against i n ­ cumbents, they m a y also still support incumbents out o f p a r t i s a n loy­ alty. Constituents w h o don't feel represented m a y not even vote. A n d indeed, i n terms of h o w legislators v i e w their districts, they r a t i o n a l l y w r i t e off some c o m m u n i t i e s i n their focus on m a i n t a i n i n g support i n the segments that reelect them ( F e n n o 1 9 7 8 ) . Votes i n the aggregate i n c o n ­ gressional elections have largely been characterized as r e v o l v i n g a r o u n d the economy a n d presidential popularity. V o t e r s i n congressional elec­ tions, i n fact, pay little attention to the legislator's performance i n office a n d to local concerns. T h i s v i e w is contested, w i t h some s u r v e y research scholars emphasizing the i m p o r t a n c e of the congressional candidate's p o l i t i c a l party, ideology, a n d personal characteristics as c r i t i c a l determi­ nants of the congressional vote ( N i e m i a n d Weisberg 1 9 8 4 , 1 9 9 - 2 0 9 ) . I base the e m p i r i c a l model of m e m b e r s ' evaluations presented i n this chapter o n this latter literature. E a r l y survey w o r k established that A m e r i c a n s k n o w v e r y little about their representatives i n W a s h i n g t o n . M u c h w a s made of the 1 9 5 8 survey that revealed that o n l y about h a l f o f the electorate k n e w the n a m e o f their representative in the H o u s e . I n this study, M i l l e r a n d Stokes ( 1 9 6 6 ) c o n c l u d e d that being k n o w n a m o n g voters carries a " p o s i t i v e v a l e n c e " for candidates. W h e n a s k e d to rate candidates r u n n i n g for C o n g r e s s , voters w o u l d rate higher those candidates they k n e w by n a m e . G i v e n that so m a n y A m e r i c a n s w e r e unable to identify their elected represen­ tatives i n W a s h i n g t o n , M i l l e r a n d Stokes concluded that voters generally evaluated members of Congress o n the basis of their p a r t i s a n s h i p . P o l i t ­ i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n m i d t e r m congressional elections w a s also a p a r t i s a n affair, as o n l y strong partisans generally turned out a n d v o t e d . F o r sure, p o l i t i c a l party remains a n i m p o r t a n t element i n e v a l u a t i n g one's elected representative a n d i n congressional elections ( M a n n a n d Wolfinger 1 9 8 0 ; E r i k s o n a n d W r i g h t 2 0 0 1 ) . I n l o w - i n f o r m a t i o n congressional elections, p a r t y presents a clear choice. A l l things being e q u a l , constituents judge members o f Congress belonging to a r i v a l p a r t y m o r e h a r s h l y t h a n those belonging to their o w n p o l i t i c a l party. T h o m a s M a n n ' s ( 1 9 7 8 ) revisionist w o r k established that the p u b l i c k n e w the names of m a n y more members o f Congress a n d congressional candidates t h a n the M i l l e r a n d Stokes' ( 1 9 6 3 ) study i m p l i e d . F i r s t , w h i l e m a n y c o u l d not spontaneously recall the name o f their elected representatives i n W a s h i n g t o n , most, i n fact, 9 0 percent or m o r e , c o u l d recognize their names. Secondly, the public's ratings of their representa­ tives w e r e not a l w a y s positive, but meaningfully based o n their personal image, ideology, a n d issue stances. Issue-based v o t i n g i n congressional elections is p r o b l e m a t i c , since members of Congress m a y strategically a v o i d t a k i n g clear stands o n issues (Page 1 9 8 1 ) . Since the congruency

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studies c o u l d not establish a direct l i n k between the legislator's v o t i n g b e h a v i o r a n d the constituent's p o l i c y preferences ( M i l l e r a n d Stokes 1 9 6 3 ) , T h o m a s M a n n argued that p o l i c y issues m a y not be direct deter­ m i n a n t s o f the congressional vote, but are mediated t h r o u g h other fac­ tors s u c h as presidential popularity. Some revisionist w o r k established the importance o f ideology a n d issues i n congressional elections. A l a n A b r a m o w i t z ' s analysis ( 1 9 8 4 ) s h o w s that ideology w a s a force i n the 1 9 8 0 a n d 1 9 8 2 H o u s e races. T h e more l i b e r a l the voter w a s , the more l i k e l y the voter w a s to vote D e m o ­ c r a t i c . E r i k s o n a n d W r i g h t ( 2 0 0 1 ) also s h o w that the member's ideolog­ i c a l records (as measured by r o l l - c a l l votes) are consistently l i n k e d to the vote decision i n H o u s e elections. Binder, M a l t z m a n , a n d Sigelman ( 1 9 9 8 ) also s h o w that ideological congruence impacts o n the a p p r o v a l ratings of U . S . Senators. C a n d i d a t e s w h o s e ideological stands are too extreme for their district generally are punished at the polls. Scholars n o w contend that in the end, w h i l e generally u n i n f o r m e d , citizens c a n meaningfully judge i n c u m b e n t members o f Congress a n d candidates o n the basis of their party, personality, a n d ideology. P u b l i c o p i n i o n a n d legislative responsiveness happens i n the aggregate, a c c o r d i n g to E r i k ­ s o n a n d W r i g h t ( 2 0 0 1 ; see also Page a n d S h a p i r o 1 9 9 2 ) . W h i l e i n d i v i d ­ u a l voters w i t h little i n f o r m a t i o n m a y m i s t a k e n l y vote for or against incumbents, incumbents w h o stray too far f r o m the majority's prefer­ ences o n policies are r i s k i n g their reelection. F o r J o h n K i n g d o n ( 1 9 8 1 ) a n d D o u g l a s A r n o l d ( 1 9 9 3 ) , legislators' v o t i n g decisions are influenced by p u b l i c o p i n i o n because legislators m o n i t o r the state o f p u b l i c o p i n ­ i o n i n their districts a n d vote accordingly. R a t h e r t h a n r e l y i n g o n " i n ­ s t r u c t i o n s " from their constituents, legislators are " c o n t r o l l e d agents" w h o anticipate constituent opinions i n their districts. F u r t h e r w o r k by T h o m a s M a n n a n d R a y m o n d Wolfinger ( 1 9 8 0 ) o n the 1 9 7 8 N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n Study w o u l d d o w n p l a y the role o f issues, ideology, a n d even p a r t y i n congressional elections to stress candidate image a n d reputation. " V o t e r s , " they w r i t e , "appear to judge candidates a n d incumbents i n p a r t i c u l a r on the basis o f their perceived character, experience, a n d ties to the l o c a l c o m m u n i t y . " C a n d i d a t e factors are c o n ­ sidered to be i m p o r t a n t generally i n the v o t i n g decision, especially i n light o f the w a n i n g influence o f the p o l i t i c a l parties (Wattenberg 1 9 9 6 ) . Voters judge the competence of candidates, i n a d d i t i o n to their p o l i t i c a l party, a n d their stands o n the issues. S a m u e l P o p k i n ( 1 9 9 1 ) argues c o m ­ petency, defined as a measure of a b i l i t y to handle the j o b , is c r u c i a l to voters for several reasons, i n c l u d i n g that it indicates the p r o b a b i l i t y of the candidate "getting things d o n e " once elected. B i l l sponsorship a n d bill attainment are t w o w a y s that members o f Congress establish their r e c o r d of a c c o m p l i s h m e n t .

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P o p k i n argues that demographic facts about the candidate, s u c h as gender, race, a n d personal history, are other i m p o r t a n t cues that voters use i n their v o t i n g decision. Voters l o o k to these demographic facts to ascertain not o n l y competency but also the representativeness o f c a n d i ­ date. H o w likely is the candidate going to represent m y side o n the issues? H o w m u c h is the candidate like me, i n other w o r d s ? C a m p a i g n s are structured to emphasize the personal history of a candidate to the e x c l u s i o n of issues, i n fact, stressing things s u c h as the length o f their m a r r i a g e , their w a r service, a n d their ties to the c o m m u n i t y . E m p h a s i z ­ ing personal qualities, s u c h as " I a m t r u s t w o r t h y , h a r d w o r k i n g , success­ f u l , " is the m a n n e r i n w h i c h m a n y members of Congress present them­ selves b a c k home to their constituents. W h i l e members also stressed their stands o n the issues i n meetings i n their districts to their constitu­ ents, more stressed their personal qualities ( F e n n o 1 9 7 8 ) . T h e race o f the legislator, therefore, provides i n f o r m a t i o n to constitu­ ents. B l a c k legislators w i l l l i k e l y stress their race i n contacts w i t h a n d in c a m p a i g n efforts before B l a c k constituents, w i t h the belief that belong­ ing to the same race w i l l be v i e w e d positively by their B l a c k c o n s t i t u ­ ents. W h i l e P o p k i n points out h o w candidates seek to use their p e r s o n a l attributes to their electoral benefit i n presidential campaigns, estimating its electoral i m p a c t has p r e v i o u s l y not been done. I n this chapter, I de­ velop a m o d e l that estimates the effect of one's race o n the performance ratings for incumbent H o u s e legislators.

A M O D E L OF EVALUATING REPRESENTATIVES I N WASHINGTON

T h e literature o n congressional elections suggests that the f o l l o w i n g three factors are used i n the vote decision: party, ideology, a n d candidate q u a l i ­ ties. A l l three are relevant i n h o w representatives are evaluated. B u t u n l i k e candidates w h o m a y l a c k previous officeholding experience, H o u s e i n ­ cumbents c a n be evaluated for competency i n a v a r i e t y of w a y s . T h e legislator's p o l i t i c a l p a r t y is i m p o r t a n t i n h o w constituents m a k e evaluations. A l l things being equal, constituents o f the same p a r t y are going to rate representatives of the same party higher t h a n members belonging to the r i v a l party. I n U . S . legislative politics, p a r t y member­ ship is not a perfect predictor of the legislator's v o t i n g r e c o r d . Ideology is therefore i m p o r t a n t . R o l l - c a l l votes are the p r i m a r y basis o n w h i c h one c a n determine the legislator's political ideology. C o m p e t e n c y is established i n m a n y w a y s by legislators, t h r o u g h b i l l sponsorship, seniority, p a r t y c h a i r m a n s h i p s , a n d staff. A l t h o u g h few bills m a k e it out of committee a n d a c t u a l l y become p o l i c y or l a w , voters m a y still value p o l i c y a c t i v i s m or the aggressive p u r s u i t or at least a r t i c -

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u l a t i o n o f tangible p o l i c y goals. Voters m a y also favor l a w m a k e r s w h o have been successful i n the p u r s u i t o f their p o l i c y goals. H o w e v e r , i n a d d i t i o n to determining h o w m a n y bills i n a given Congress are spon­ sored by the member, I also consider the p r o p o r t i o n of bills t h a t become l a w as a d d i t i o n a l measures of competency. T h e legislator's seniority and p a r t y leadership posts c a n enhance his or her influence i n Congress, M y study identifies members o f Congress as leaders i n the 1 0 4 t h Congress i f they held a party leadership post. Seniority is measured as the number o f years the member has served i n the H o u s e since first elected. C o m m i t t e e w o r k is another w a y legislators attempt to represent their district. F i r s t , there are c h a i r m a n s h i p s that clearly a m p l i f y legislative influence i n Congress. N o n e of the D e m o c r a t s i n this R e p u b l i c a n - d o m i n a t e d Congress held c h a i r s . I n terms o f the numbers of committees that members served o n , most members served o n t w o , although a few served o n one or three. T h e type of committee that the member serves o n m a y affect the type o f policies he or she c a n c l a i m credit for, a n d hence, m a y influence his or her standing i n the district. C h r i s t o p h e r D e e r i n g a n d Steven S m i t h ( 1 9 9 7 ) have identified congressional committees that w e r e either ( 1 ) policy oriented, (2) c o n ­ stituency service oriented, ( 3 ) prestigious, and/or (4) undesirable. T h e type of committee a member belonged to w a s e x a m i n e d to see i f it affected his or her r a t i n g . F o u r sets o f d u m m y variables w e r e created o n the basis of the D e e r i n g - S m i t h classification a n d w e r e a n a l y z e d . Staff a l l o w a n c e s are the same for a l l members i n the U . S . H o u s e o f Representatives, a n d typically, H o u s e members e m p l o y about t w e n t y people o n their personal staffs. Because c a s e w o r k is time c o n s u m i n g , the member's personal staff size might be a useful i n d i c a t o r of constitu­ ency service. O f the t w o measures of legislative staff that w e r e e x a m ­ ined here, the n u m b e r of staff employed w i t h i n the district, as opposed to the n u m b e r w o r k i n g at the C a p i t o l , w a s e m p l o y e d i n the a n a l y s i s . I n addition to legislative and committee w o r k a n d constituency ser­ vice, members of Congress devote considerable time to reelection activ­ ities. H i g h l y rated members o f Congress might be the most effective campaigners, especially since name recognition a n d a p p r o v a l ratings are strongly correlated. C a m p a i g n a c t i v i t y c a n include c a m p a i g n e x p e n d i ­ tures a n d m a r g i n of victory, i n this case the 1 9 9 4 election. T h o s e w h o w i n by high m a r g i n s might be better k n o w n a n d better l i k e d t h a n those w h o w i n n a r r o w l y . S i m i l a r l y , incumbents w h o spent the most o n their last campaigns might also be better k n o w n , although it is not clear that they are also the best l i k e d . I collapsed c a m p a i g n expenditures into three categories: l o w , moderate, a n d h i g h . H i g h scores constituted e x ­ penditures over $ 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 i n 1 9 9 4 .

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B l a c k attitudes t o w a r d their representatives are l i k e l y to be affected by the legislator's: 1. 2. 3. 4.

p o l i t i c a l party, race, legislative r e c o r d , specifically r o l l - c a l l votes a n d bill sponsorship, committee w o r k , i n c l u d i n g the n u m b e r of committees, c h a i r m a n ­ ship, or type of committee service, 5. legislative position, such as seniority a n d p a r t y leadership, 6. staff size, 7. c a m p a i g n activity, such as m a r g i n of v i c t o r y a n d c a m p a i g n e x ­ penditures.

A s noted earlier, 2 5 2 districts fell into the 1 9 9 6 N B E S sample. T h e complete details c o n c e r n i n g h o w the sample w a s d r a w n a n d the re­ sponse rate are presented i n a p p e n d i x A . O f the t h i r t y - f o u r A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n H o u s e - m e m b e r s w h o s e districts w e r e represented i n the s a m ­ ple, a l l w e r e D e m o c r a t s a n d none w e r e R e p u b l i c a n . T h e 1 9 9 6 N B E S c o n t a i n e d a significant n u m b e r o f questions about the B l a c k respon­ dents' elected representatives i n Congress. T h e first measure w a s one o f recognition, w h e t h e r the respondents k n e w the name, party, a n d race o f the legislator representing t h e m i n the U . S . H o u s e o f Representatives. T h e s e items are a n a l y z e d i n the n e x t chapter. F o l l o w i n g recognition, they w e r e a s k e d to rate their representative o n a feeling scale t h a n r u n s f r o m zero to one h u n d r e d . O n l y respondents w h o recognized their rep­ resentatives' names rated t h e m . After a n u m b e r of other questions, they w e r e then a s k e d w h e t h e r they a p p r o v e d or disapproved of the represen­ tative, m a k i n g reference to the legislator by n a m e , once a g a i n . R e s p o n ­ dents, a full 4 5 percent, w h o expressed a l a c k of k n o w l e d g e a n d f a m i l ­ i a r i t y w i t h their representative i n W a s h i n g t o n w e r e s k i p p e d f r o m a f o l l o w u p battery of evaluative items p e r t a i n i n g to their H o u s e legislator. T h e other 5 5 percent of respondents w e r e asked the r e m a i n i n g ques­ tions about their representatives, such as h o w m a n y years h a d their representative been i n the H o u s e , h o w often h a d he or she supported President C l i n t o n ' s legislative proposals, a n d w h e t h e r they h a d ever contacted their legislator or anyone i n his or her office? T h i s a p p r o a c h accounts for the s m a l l n u m b e r of cases for the battery of items regard­ ing the legislator's perceived qualities a n d a c c o m p l i s h m e n t s , s u c h as helpfulness a n d h a v i n g done something special for the respondent's district. P r e l i m i n a r y results s h o w n i n table 6 . 1 reveal a statistically significant l i n k between the representative's race a n d his or her ratings by B l a c k constituents. E v e n c o n t r o l l i n g for p a r t y m e m b e r s h i p , B l a c k legislators

Does Race Matter? TABLE

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119

6.1

Blacks' Evaluations of Their Representatives by the Legislator's Race and Political Party R a c e a n d P a r t y of T h e i r Representative

Black Democrat

White Democrat

White/Other Republican

Approve/disapprove of represen­ tative's job?* Strongly approve Not strongly approve Not strongly disapprove Strongly disapprove

60% 24 9 7

36% 37 14 12

25% 27 19 29

Would representative be helpful?* Very Somewhat Not very Depends

46 42.5 8 3

24.5 52 21 2

17 54 25 4

Rep. done anything special for district?* Yes No

36 64

20 80

11 89

How good a job does rep. do in keeping in touch?* Very good Fairly good Fairly poor Poor

41 44 8 8

23 41 16 20

15 40 23 23

Is rep. a problem-solver/prestigeseeker?* Problem solver Both Prestige seeker

70 4 26

48.5 5 46

28 3 68.5

N o t e : Weighted data. *Chi-square sig. level (two-tailed) < . 0 1 . S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

received significantly higher ratings o n average t h a n their W h i t e c o u n ­ terparts. A full 6 0 percent strongly a p p r o v e d of their legislator's perfor­ mance w h e n that legislator w a s a B l a c k D e m o c r a t as opposed to o n l y 3 6 percent w h e n the legislator w a s a W h i t e D e m o c r a t . I n contrast still, o n l y one-quarter o f the respondents represented by W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s strongly a p p r o v e d o f their performance, w h i l e nearly 3 0 percent strongly disapproved. B l a c k s represented by B l a c k D e m o c r a t s w e r e also signifi-

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cantly more likely t h a n B l a c k s represented by W h i t e s to consider their representatives helpful, i n t o u c h , a n d more l i k e l y to solve problems. W h e n asked i f they h a d a p r o b l e m that their representative c o u l d do something about, h o w helpful w o u l d that representative be, the vast m a j o r i t y ( 8 8 . 5 percent) of those represented by B l a c k D e m o c r a t s felt that their legislator w o u l d be s o m e w h a t to v e r y helpful. O n l y 1 1 per­ cent felt that their B l a c k D e m o c r a t i c representative i n W a s h i n g t o n w o u l d not be v e r y helpful or that their help w o u l d "depend." A t the same time, 7 6 . 5 to 7 1 % of those respondents believed that their W h i t e legislator, either R e p u b l i c a n or D e m o c r a t , w o u l d be v e r y or s o m e w h a t helpful. T h e B l a c k constituents of B l a c k D e m o c r a t s , however, w e r e s t r i k i n g l y more l i k e l y to believe that their representative h a d done something " s p e c i a l " for the district i n contrast to those represented by W h i t e s . F i n a l l y , a solid m a j o r i t y ( 7 0 percent) of the B l a c k constituents of B l a c k D e m o c r a t s believed their representative to be a " p r o b l e m s o l v e r " as opposed to a "prestige seeker." F e w e r B l a c k s , 4 8 . 5 percent, repre­ sented by W h i t e D e m o c r a t s characterized their representative as a p r o b ­ l e m solver. A full 6 8 . 5 percent of respondents represented by W h i t e Republicans denounced them as m a i n l y preoccupied w i t h w i n n i n g prestige. A l t h o u g h results s h o w n i n table 6 . 1 suggest that B l a c k s i n districts that have B l a c k representatives are significantly more satisfied w i t h their representative, it is not clear that the reason is entirely due to the race of representative. I t c o u l d also be that other p o l i t i c a l characteristics of H o u s e members beyond race a n d p o l i t i c a l affiliation e x p l a i n these pre­ l i m i n a r y results. I t is i m p o r t a n t to consider different characteristics of H o u s e members beyond their race a n d to c o n t r o l for t h e m i n the statis­ tical analysis. D a t a corresponding to these eight factors for the legislators w h o s e districts fell into the 1 9 9 6 N B E S sample w e r e collected by the a u t h o r a n d appended to the data set. Because the dependent measures are attit u d i n a l l y a n d b e h a v i o r a l l y l i n k e d to k e y s o c i a l characteristics of the re­ spondent, such as age, gender, a n d educational attainment, a d d i t i o n a l variables w e r e included as controls. T h e s e variables w e r e the n u m b e r o f years the respondent h a d lived i n his or her c o m m u n i t y , age, education, a n d gender. T a b l e 6.2 presents the results of a regression a n a l y s i s o f five depen­ dent measures: (1) the representative's a p p r o v a l r a t i n g , (2) h o w helpful the representative is perceived to be, (3) w h e t h e r the representative has done a n y t h i n g special for the district, (4) h o w good a job the represen­ tative does i n keeping i n t o u c h , a n d ( 5 ) w h e t h e r the representative is perceived to be a problem-solver or prestige-seeker. I n terms of the relative weight of race a n d p a r t y affiliation o n B l a c k attitudes t o w a r d their representatives, p o l i t i c a l p a r t y appeared to over-

6.2

2.624** .431** .724** -.160 .001 -.001 .037 .037 -.097 .000 .005 .059 -.187 663 .14

N o t e : * statistically significant at .05. '•""statistically significant at . 0 1 . S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

Independent variable Intercept Member's Race (Black) Party Match Party Leader Committee Chair Years of Seniority # of Home Staff # of Bills L a w Campaign Spending R's Residency R's Age R's Education R's Gender (male) N R-squared .374 .136 .140 .128 .216 .007 .024 .045 .085 .002 .004 .034 .113

SE

Member's Approval Rating (1-5)

-2.138** .374** .206* -.178 .099 -.006 - .005 -.018 .010 -.001 .001 .000 -.069 538 .06

.301 .112 .114 .105 .178 .005 .019 .036 .068 .001 .003 .029 .093

SE

Member's Rating o n Helpfulness and Problem Solving

-3.892** .761** .390* -.423** .333 .005 .002 -.096 -.078 .002 .017** .048 -.024 512 .18

.399 .147 .152 .141 .236 .007 .026 .056 .090 .002 .004 .038 .123

SE

Member's Rating on Keeping i n Touch

The Effect of Descriptive Representation on the Member's Ratings by Blacks ( O L S Estimates)

TABLE

-5.632** .679** .317 -.335* .184 -.002 .007 -.062 -.018 .002 .010* .147** .060 564 .10

.457 .170 .175 .159 .267 .008 .029 .055 .103 .002 .005 .043 .142

SE

Member's Rating on Anything Special f o r District

-5.000 .819** .898** -.270 .188 -.002 -.008 .034 -.081 .000 .020** .164** -.197 486 .19

.555 .208 .211 .195 .323 .010 .036 .072 .124 .003 .006 .053 .170

SE

Member's Rating as P r o b l e m S o l v e r v. P r e s t i g e Seeker

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s h a d o w race i n the o v e r a l l e v a l u a t i o n o f the legislator's a p p r o v a l , but race mattered m o r e w h e n members w e r e rated on specific aspects of their service a n d representation. A s s h o w n i n table 6 . 2 , B l a c k s w h o h a d B l a c k s representing t h e m i n Congress w e r e s o m e w h a t m o r e a p p r o v i n g of their performance t h a n B l a c k s represented by W h i t e s . A l l things be­ ing equal, B l a c k s represented by B l a c k s i n Congress gave t h e m a p p r o v a l ratings about one-half p o i n t higher o n average t h a n B l a c k s represented by W h i t e s . T h e p o l i t i c a l p a r t y o f the legislator h a d a n even larger i m ­ pact o n the legislator's a p p r o v a l r a t i n g , however. C o n s t i t u e n t s repre­ sented by their members o f the p o l i t i c a l p a r t y that they identified w i t h (legislators w h o s e p a r t y " m a t c h e d " their constituent's, i n other w o r d s ) , got ratings n e a r l y one point higher t h a n those legislators w h o s e p a r t y didn't m a t c h the respondent's. T h i s w a s not the case, however, for the other four e v a l u a t i o n m e a ­ sures. I n every other instance, the effect of the legislator's race w a s greater t h a n that of the legislator's p o l i t i c a l party. B l a c k s represented by B l a c k s i n W a s h i n g t o n gave t h e m significantly higher m a r k s w h e n it c a m e to helping constituents w i t h problems, keeping i n t o u c h , d o i n g things for the district, a n d c a r i n g more about w o r k i n g o n behalf o f their c o n ­ stituents t h a n a c c r u i n g prestige i n W a s h i n g t o n . O n l y one of the legislator characteristics impacted u p o n B l a c k e v a l u a ­ tions o f their representatives. P a r t y leaders got especially l o w ratings for keeping i n t o u c h w i t h their constituents. C o m m i t t e e c h a i r m a n s h i p s , se­ niority, district staff size, bill attainment, a n d c a m p a i g n spending w e r e unrelated to the a p p r o v a l ratings o f legislators. E x c e p t for age a n d , to a lesser extent, education, respondent c h a r a c ­ teristics introduced i n the regression models w e r e generally unrelated to B l a c k attitudes t o w a r d their representatives. O l d e r B l a c k s tended to give their representatives higher ratings t h a n younger B l a c k s , for reasons that are not i m m e d i a t e l y clear. College-educated B l a c k s , like the elderly, gave their representatives higher m a r k s o n a c h i e v i n g things for the dis­ trict a n d s o l v i n g problems. I n s u m , descriptive representation turns out to be v e r y i m p o r t a n t to B l a c k s , as B l a c k s w e r e generally m o r e a p p r o v i n g of their legislator w h e n that representative w a s B l a c k . P o l i t i c a l party also mattered w h e n it came to judging the legislator's performance a m o n g the 1 9 9 6 B l a c k re­ spondents, but race mattered a great deal m o r e . T h e failure to find that the ideology o f legislators, their legislative records, seniority, a n d service related to B l a c k s ' evaluations o f their per­ formance are perhaps statistically rooted. T h e s e factors m a y be i n d i ­ rectly tied to B l a c k evaluations, a n d a nonrecursive, simultaneous struc­ t u r a l equation model might better establish their i m p a c t . T h i s c o u l d be a n intractable methodological p r o b l e m w i t h survey research m e t h o d o l -

Does Race Matter?

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123

ogy; F i o r i n a a n d R i v e r s ( 1 9 8 9 ) go so far as to suggest that it requires a c o n t r o l l e d e x p e r i m e n t w h e r e b y legislative votes and service are m a n i p u ­ lated to ascertain their effects. A t the same time, it c o u l d be that these factors don't matter m u c h once the legislator obtains a reputation i n the district for being " l i b ­ e r a l , " or " h a r d w o r k i n g , " etc. (see F i o r i n a a n d R i v e r s 1 9 8 9 ) . M y a n a l ­ ysis s h o w s that c e r t a i n factors do matter, n a m e l y race a n d party. Voters rely h e a v i l y o n p o l i t i c a l p a r t y a n d certain demographic factors, such as race, to m a k e inferences about the legislator's performance. O n l y i n the long r u n w o u l d deviations from casting l i b e r a l votes — s u c h as accusations by challengers that the i n c u m b e n t is too " o l d " a n d " o u t of t o u c h " — matter decisively i n competitive races.

DESCRIPTIVE REPRESENTATION A N D ITS IMPACT ON BLACK CONSTITUENTS'

EVALUATIONS

M o r e t h a n t w o decades ago, R i c h a r d F e n n o ( 1 9 7 8 ) pointed out that w h i l e most A m e r i c a n s l o a t h Congress, they still l i k e a n d respect their i n d i v i d u a l representatives i n this legislative body. T h a t people like their representative i n W a s h i n g t o n but loath Congress is a persistent finding i n the field of congressional scholarship ( H i b b i n g a n d T h e i s s - M o r s e 1 9 9 5 ) . B l a c k s are no exception to this pattern. S i m p l y c o m p a r i n g B l a c k s ' attitudes t o w a r d their representatives i n Congress to those o f W h i t e s i n 1 9 9 4 , one finds that B l a c k s are neither more or less satisfied w i t h their o w n representatives i n Congress t h a n W h i t e s . I n the 1 9 9 4 survey, about 87 percent o f B l a c k s as opposed to 8 1 percent o f W h i t e s a p p r o v e d of their H o u s e legislator's performance i n office (the 6-percentage point difference is not statistically significant). T r e n d data from as far back as 1980 support this pattern; B l a c k a p p r o v a l ratings of their i n c u m b e n t H o u s e legislators w e r e consistently h i g h a n d closely t r a c k e d that of W h i t e s . I n a d d i t i o n , data f r o m the 1978 to 1 9 9 0 N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n Study s h o w that B l a c k s are no less l i k e l y t h a n W h i t e s to say that they w o u l d a s k their representative i n W a s h i n g t o n to help t h e m w i t h a per­ sonal problem. I n c l u d e d i n the 1 9 9 6 s u r v e y w e r e a battery o f questions about m e m ­ bers of C o n g r e s s , w h e t h e r they w o r k to serve the people or generally serve themselves. A s expected, m o s t B l a c k s v i e w e d the members of C o n ­ gress favorably. A m a j o r i t y thought that members of Congress are i m ­ p o r t a n t c o m m u n i t y leaders. A b o u t h a l f felt that they keep i n close c o n ­ tact w i t h their constituents a n d d i d a good job representing the diverse interests w i t h i n the U n i t e d States. I n contrast, o n l y a m i n o r i t y felt that members of Congress w e r e not preoccupied w i t h their reelection a n d c a m p a i g n money. M o s t felt that once elected, members of Congress

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T A B L E 6.3

Cross-tabulation of the Character of Members of Congress by the Race and Party of Black Respondent's Representative Black Democrat Race and Party Respon­ dent's Representative "Members of Congress are only interested in reelection." (Percent who disagreed.) "Members of Congress keep in close touch with people in their district." "Members of Congress are important leaders in their community." "Members of Congress do a good job repre­ senting the diverse in­ terests of Americans." "Members of Congress are only interested in raising campaign money from big cor­ porations and interest groups." (Percent who disagreed.)

White Democrat

White/Other Republican

N

28.5%

30%

28%

(1,147)

49

44

41

(1,125)

72

68

75

(1,144)

49

54

48

(1,133)

39

35.5

33

(1,116)

N o t e : Weighted data. *Chi-square sig. level (two-tailed) < .05. **Chi-square sig. level (two-tailed) < .01. S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

spent a n inordinate a m o u n t o f time a n d energy o n their n e x t reelection bid a n d special interests c a m p a i g n donors. Because H o u s e members are elected every t w o years, this perception that they are preoccupied w i t h c a m p a i g n i n g is not misplaced. D o B l a c k s represented by B l a c k s express more positive evaluations about members of Congress i n general t h a n those represented by W h i t e s ? T a b l e 6.3 displays a cross-tabulation of these items by the race a n d p a r t y o f the respondent's representative. I n short, the a n s w e r is no; h a v i n g a B l a c k representative has no bearing o n the attitudes B l a c k s express about members o f Congress i n general.

Does Race Matter?

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125

T h e m u l t i v a r i a t e results (not s h o w n here) indicate that the race of one's representative has no effect o n the opinions one has about m e m ­ bers o f Congress i n general. B l a c k s represented by B l a c k s w e r e no more positive i n their evaluations about members o f Congress's behavior t h a n those not represented by B l a c k s . A t the same time, judgments c o n c e r n ­ ing members of Congress w e r e significantly related to age, gender, a n d the respondent's feelings about the responsiveness of government or e x ­ t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l efficacy. O l d e r B l a c k s a n d w o m e n w e r e more positive t h a n younger B l a c k s a n d m e n i n their attitudes about h o w members of Congress generally behave. A s one might expect, those w h o generally thought government to be responsive to people like themselves w e r e also more positive i n their evaluations. T h e s e e v a l u a t i o n s , however, w e r e unrelated to the respondent's level of education, p o l i t i c a l interest, or p a r t y affiliation. W h i l e B l a c k s express greater satisfaction w h e n represented by B l a c k s as opposed to W h i t e s , this representation does not affect their attitudes about members o f Congress more generally. Because B l a c k s represented by B l a c k s do not t h i n k more h i g h l y o f members o f Congress t h a n those represented by W h i t e s , the higher ratings that B l a c k legislators receive f r o m their B l a c k constituents over W h i t e legislators m a y reflect their a c t u a l performance i n office. W h e t h e r the race of the representative, then, still affects the attitudes B l a c k s have about Congress as a n institu­ t i o n a n d their level of trust i n government are questions I explore i n chapter 8.

T H E BURKEAN D I L E M M A A N D T H EREPRESENTATIVE'S

FOCUS

T h e B u r k e a n d i l e m m a refers to a n idea proposed by the eighteenthcentury p o l i t i c i a n E d m u n d B u r k e : elected representatives s h o u l d act as a trustee for their district, deciding w h a t policies best serve that district, rather t h a n behave as delegates, v o t i n g o n l y a c c o r d i n g to the majority's preferences. B u r k e ' s point o f v i e w has its supporters and detractors. D e m o c r a t i c theory, however, favors a delegate role for legislators, but some scholars, s u c h as J a m e s F i s h k i n , still advocate a trustee r e l a t i o n ­ ship between legislators a n d constituents. T h e i m p e a c h m e n t vote o n President B i l l C l i n t o n ' s behavior i n the M o n i c a L e w i n s k y affair w a s a m o d e r n - d a y reflection of the B u r k e a n d i l e m m a . P u b l i c o p i n i o n polls s h o w e d that the m a j o r i t y of A m e r i c a n s w e r e against i m p e a c h m e n t even after Special Prosecutor K e n n e t h Starr released his d a m a g i n g report about the president. Nevertheless, some R e p u b l i c a n members o f C o n ­ gress voted to r e c o m m e n d i m p e a c h m e n t of the president by the Senate against the m a j o r i t y w i s h e s o f their district, arguing that their vote w a s a "vote o f conscience."

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B u r k e ' s p h i l o s o p h y m i x e s the p r o b l e m o f style w i t h focus. Style refers to the question of w h o s h o u l d the legislator f o l l o w — the m a j o r i t y w i t h i n the district or h i m or herself? F o c u s , however, has to do w i t h w h e t h e r the legislator responds to l o c a l or n a t i o n a l pressures. R o g e r H . D a v i d ­ son's research found that h a l f of the legislators s a w themselves as either pure delegates or pure trustees, w i t h about h a l f expressing a m i x o f both. I n terms of focus, D a v i d s o n f o u n d that most members o f C o n ­ gress w e r e p a r o c h i a l at heart. T h e y generally cast votes a n d acted o n behalf o f the good o f their district. N e a r l y 3 0 percent, however, c l a i m e d that their votes reflected w h a t w a s best for the country. D e m o c r a t i c theory, once again, favors a l o c a l a p p r o a c h . T h e aggregation o f the l o c a l good w o u l d then w o r k best for the c o u n t r y as a w h o l e . T h e question of style a n d focus is one that B l a c k legislators h a v e addressed as w e l l . W h o are their constituents, a n d w h o m do they repre­ sent i n Congress? W h e n A d a m C l a y t o n P o w e l l o f N e w Y o r k w a s one o f t w o B l a c k s serving i n W a s h i n g t o n , he dealt w i t h problems f r o m B l a c k s a l l over the country, and not just those o f w h o h a d elected h i m , his H a r l e m constituents ( H a m i l t o n 1 9 9 1 ) . P o w e l l ' s t w e n t y - y e a r r e c o r d i n Congress w a s k n o w n for its u n c o m p r o m i s i n g a d v o c a c y o f r a c i a l justice, a n d not for its service to his district. N o t every B l a c k sent to W a s h i n g ­ t o n s a w their responsibilities as n a t i o n a l . Schooled i n politics by the D a l e y m a c h i n e of C h i c a g o a n d h a v i n g been a n integral p a r t o f it, the other B l a c k C o n g r e s s m a n o f that e r a , Representative W i l l i a m D a w s o n ( 1 9 4 3 - 7 2 ) , s a w his legislative responsibility as f u n d a m e n t a l l y l o c a l . D a w s o n m a i n t a i n e d a complete silence o n the n a t i o n a l p r o b l e m o f race discrimination. C a r o l S w a i n ' s research w o u l d reveal s i m i l a r differences a m o n g recent B l a c k members o f Congress. George C r o c k e t t of M i c h i g a n , w h o served i n Congress from 1 9 8 1 to 1 9 9 0 , t o o k r a d i c a l - l i b e r a l , highly controver­ sial stands o n foreign policy. C r o c k e t t , i n fact, became c h a i r m a n o f a subcommittee of the H o u s e ' s F o r e i g n A f f a i r s C o m m i t t e e . M i k e E s p y , w h o became M i s s i s s i p p i ' s first p o s t - R e c o n s t r u c t i o n B l a c k C o n g r e s s m a n w h e n he w a s elected i n 1 9 8 6 , s a w his responsibility as l o c a l . H i s c a m ­ paign literature stressed service to his district. S w a i n w r i t e s , " I n these letters he has c l a i m e d credit for m i l l i o n s of dollars that have come to the district. H e w a s responsible for the c r e a t i o n o f a N a t i o n a l C a t f i s h D a y , w h i c h aids the catfish farmers i n his district, a n d for legislation e x p l o r i n g w a y s to develop the M i s s i s s i p p i R i v e r . D u r i n g trips a r o u n d the country, he has personally signed up deals for orders of catfish, soy­ beans, a n d cotton w o r t h thousands of d o l l a r s " ( 1 9 9 3 , 8 4 ) . E s p y re­ signed i n 1 9 9 2 to head the D e p a r t m e n t of A g r i c u l t u r e i n the C l i n t o n Administration. T h e C o n g r e s s i o n a l B l a c k C a u c u s w o u l d declare its m i s s i o n as n a -

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t i o n a l w i t h a p r i m a r y focus o n the needs a n d interests o f B l a c k A m e r i ­ cans. O n e o f its founding members, C o n g r e s s m a n W i l l i a m L . C l a y of M i s s i s s i p p i e x p l a i n s that the organization's purpose w a s logically de­ fined as protecting the interests o f B l a c k s , because " w e understand that the destiny o f each o f us is i n e x t r i c a b l y b o u n d to the destiny o f 3 2 m i l l i o n other b l a c k brothers a n d sisters, a n d that their struggle a n d o u r struggle are i r r e v o c a b l y tied one to the o t h e r " ( 1 9 9 2 , 3 5 3 ) . P o l i t i c a l reality w a s s u c h that the C B C f o u n d it difficult to m a i n t a i n B l a c k u n i t y o n a l l o f the issues. B u t even still, w h e t h e r B l a c k or W h i t e , w h a t for B l a c k constituents is the proper role o f the elected representative? T h e A m e r i c a n N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n Study w o u l d include i n its s u r v e y a question a b o u t the proper role of the representative, one that w a s repli­ cated i n the 1 9 9 6 N a t i o n a l B l a c k E l e c t i o n Study. B l a c k respondents i n the 1 9 9 6 survey w e r e given the f o l l o w i n g instructions: " H e r e is a list of some activities that occupy Representatives as p a r t o f their j o b . W e w a n t to k n o w w h i c h of the f o l l o w i n g three activities y o u t h i n k is the m o s t i m p o r t a n t : (1) helping people i n the district w h o have personal problems w i t h the government; (2) w o r k i n g i n Congress o n bills c o n ­ cerning n a t i o n a l issues; or (3) m a k i n g sure the state/district gets its fair share o f government m o n e y and project." M o s t B l a c k s , nearly h a l f ( 4 7 percent), felt that legislators s h o u l d be bringing the m o n e y b a c k home to the district or state. O n l y 2 0 percent felt that legislators s h o u l d have a n a t i o n a l focus. T h e r e m a i n i n g 3 3 percent felt that legislators s h o u l d be engaged i n constituent service. W h e n asked w h i c h of the r e m a i n i n g t w o activities is the n e x t most i m p o r t a n t p a r t o f the representative's j o b , relatively few chose w o r k i n g o n n a t i o n a l bills. T h r e e - q u a r t e r s o f the respondents felt the t w o l o c a l responsibilities, helping the district or the constituent, w a s second-most i m p o r t a n t . T h e survey findings stand at odds w i t h the stated m i s s i o n of the C B C . J o h n s o n a n d Secret ( 1 9 9 6 ) i n t e r v i e w e d t w e l v e A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n H o u s e members a n d found that w h i l e they expressed a strong c o m m i t m e n t to their districts, they also reported h a v i n g a c o m m i t m e n t to represent Blacks nationwide. F u r t h e r m u l t i v a r i a t e a n a l y s i s reveals i m p o r t a n t s o c i a l d i v i s i o n s i n the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y over the preferred focus o f the elected representative. T a b l e 6.4 displays these findings. F i r s t , the race of the respondent's rep­ resentative d i d not affect B l a c k s ' response to this question. N o r d i d the race consciousness o f the respondent have a n y i m p a c t . I n other w o r d s , being represented by B l a c k s or h a v i n g r a c i a l s o l i d a r i t y w i t h B l a c k repre­ sentatives d i d not m a k e B l a c k s m o r e l i k e l y to support a n a t i o n a l focus over a district or constituency focus. Second, o n l y those h a v i n g some college experience or college degrees felt that representatives s h o u l d p r i ­ m a r y w o r k o n bills that concerned the n a t i o n . I n fact, this same g r o u p —

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50%

40%

30%

20%

10%

0% Helping people in the district

Working on bills Getting the district's share concerning national issues of government money

Figure 6 . 1 . Black perceptions of which of three activities of representatives most and second-most important. (Total number of responses: 1,154.) S o u r c e : 1996 NBES.

the college educated — felt m o r e strongly that representatives s h o u l d not be o v e r l y preoccupied w i t h p o r k b a r r e l legislation or w i t h p r o c u r i n g federal dollars for the district a n d state. T h i r d , the respondent's f a m i l y income also affected B l a c k responses to this item i n a predictable w a y . T h e B l a c k poor w e r e m o r e l i k e l y to favor legislators w o r k i n g o n s o l v i n g the problems o f their constituents t h a n the B l a c k affluent. A t the same time, the high-income B l a c k s w e r e more likely than their l o w - i n c o m e counterparts to favor legislators w o r k i n g on bringing home federal dollars. E a c h group p r e s u m a b l y sees these contrasting activities as more being beneficial to their economic c o n d i t i o n . T h e affluent might benefit from the projects a n d dollars that legislators c a n bring to the district a n d state. I n the M i k e E s p y case, they might be the o w n e r s o f the catfish f a r m that E s p y personally helped i n e x p a n d i n g its m a r k e t share. T h e poor might need a i d i n secur­ ing government benefits or other such p r o g r a m s designed to assist t h e m or help o n legal matters. S w a i n found a great deal of v a r i a t i o n i n h o w the c a s e w o r k of members of Congress i n her study w a s performed, re­ p o r t i n g that " [ s j o m e b l a c k members ( a n d a few w h i t e s ) r u n their offices like social welfare agencies. Some become actively i n v o l v e d i n legal mat­ ters and w i l l even w r i t e to parole boards; others steer clear o f s u c h

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T A B L E 6.4

Multivariate Analysis of Representative's Most Important Activity — Constituency Service, National Bills, or Money for District Constituent Service b Constant Education Age Sex Rep.'s Race Party I D Race I D Income

N a t i o n a l Bills SE

b

SE

Money for District b .351**

SE .092

.086

.133

.075

-.001

.011

.023*

.009

-.003*

.001

-.001

.001

.016

.032

-.007

.028

-.009

.034

-.039

.032

-.016

.027

.056

.033

.001

.011

-.003

.009

.002

.012

.006

.014

.008

.012

-.015

.015

-.013*

.006

.003

.006

.009

.007

.516**

-.016 .004**

N

956

956

956

R-squared

.02

.01

.02

.011 .001

S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S . "Statistically significant at .05. * * Statistically significant at . 0 1 .

m a t t e r s " ( 1 9 9 3 , 2 1 9 ) . T h i s became a basis of c o m p l a i n t for some of the B l a c k representatives a n d their staffs, S w a i n found. Some c o m p l a i n e d directly to her as her quotes m a k e clear: " ' B l a c k constituents are diffi­ cult to help because they w a i t u n t i l the eleventh hour. T h e y appear at the office shortly before an eviction or job loss.' ' B l a c k constituents are so demanding. T h e y w a n t us to turn over the w o r l d i n a minute, a n d then they w o n d e r w h a t took us so l o n g " ( 1 9 9 3 , 2 1 9 ) . Lastly, the i m p a c t of age m i r r o r e d that o f income. L i k e the affluent, the elderly felt that serving constituents w a s less v i t a l t h a n bringing m o n e y b a c k home to the district. O l d e r B l a c k s p r e s u m a b l y w a n t e d their representatives i n W a s h i n g t o n to focus on the economic conditions i n the c o m m u n i t y , a n d less on their personal needs. 5

CONCLUSION

T h e question of whether race matters to B l a c k s i n terms of their politi­ cal representation i n W a s h i n g t o n turns c r i t i c a l l y on h o w p o l i t i c a l repre­ sentation is defined. P o l i t i c a l scientist V . O . K e y Jr. f a m o u s l y once de­ scribed p u b l i c o p i n i o n as the invisible, t h i r d person (or p h a n t o m ) i n the C h r i s t i a n T r i n i t y , the H o l y G h o s t . I f public o p i n i o n c a n be l i k e n e d to the H o l y G h o s t , then p o l i t i c a l representation is the H o l y G r a i l , the fa­ m o u s and fabled chalice used by C h r i s t at the L a s t Supper a n d h o t l y sought after i n the m e d i e v a l period a n d since. Representation, as the

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b o o k m a k e s p l a i n , is as elusive as the concept o f power. T h e definition I provide covers representation m o s t b r o a d l y as everything that the elected representatives do i n their f o r m a l c a p a c i t y to address the needs a n d concerns of their constituents. C i t i z e n s are represented w h e n their needs a n d concerns are being addressed a n d met. T h e p r o b l e m is t h a t h o w do voters keep t r a c k o f " e v e r y t h i n g " ? W a s h i n g t o n is a maze o f events a n d issues that no single person c o u l d ever c r e d i b l y follow. W h i c h o f the m a n y things that legislators do are most pertinent to c o n ­ stituents? W h a t do constituents grab o n to? P r e v i o u s scholarship has s h o w n that w i t h respect to the congressional vote, p a r t y matters to the voters. Voters as a rule support candidates belonging to their o w n party. T h e l a w m a k e r ' s p o l i t i c a l ideology affects the vote but e m p i r i c a l l y this has been s h o w n m o s t l y i n the aggregate. Ideologically extreme candidates, a p a r t f r o m party, are p u n i s h e d at the polls ( E r i k s o n a n d W r i g h t 2 0 0 1 ) . C o n s t i t u e n c y service a n d legislative activity, s u c h as bill sponsorship, however, do not directly affect the vote. T h i s presents a puzzle since members devote so m u c h time a n d m a n y resources o n such activities. I f voters don't r e w a r d their representatives for service, w h y w o r k so h a r d o n these things? D i s c u s s i n g this p r o b l e m , M o r r i s F i o r i n a a n d D o u g R i v e r s ( 1 9 8 9 ) t h i n k that the e m p i r i c a l w o r k o n the i m p a c t of service a n d legislative w o r k is flawed, that the legislator's service a n d l a w m a k i n g efforts w o r k through the voters' perceptions o f their representatives. T h u s , they argue, direct efforts o f service o n the congressional vote are h a r d to establish because incumbents rely o n their reputation for service, w h i c h m a y be presently strong or w e a k . " T h o s e w h o are w e a k e s t , " they w r i t e , "devote the most effort to it; those w h o already have established a reputation for constituency service c a n afford to allocate their resources a n d efforts i n other a r e a s " ( 1 9 9 1 , 4 3 ) . A m e r i c a n s don't k n o w that m u c h about their representatives i n W a s h ­ ington, and yet a large m a j o r i t y of A m e r i c a n s express satisfaction w i t h the person w h o represents t h e m i n the H o u s e of Representatives. B l a c k s are no exception here; most B l a c k s approve o f their representative's per­ formance i n office. O f the m a n y factors that e x p l a i n B l a c k s ' satisfaction w i t h their representative's job is race. B l a c k s w e r e more l i k e l y to give high m a r k s to H o u s e members w h e n that member w a s B l a c k t h a n W h i t e . Political party, as one might expect, w a s i m p o r t a n t as w e l l . B l a c k s e x ­ pressed greater satisfaction w h e n represented by someone f r o m their o w n party. T h e effect of descriptive representation, however, w a s equal a n d most times greater t h a n the i m p a c t o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t y for these e v a l u a t i o n measures. Ideology a n d competency measured by seniority, c h a i r m a n ­ ship, a n d s u c h , w e r e not statistically related to e v a l u a t i o n measures. T h i s is not to conclude that the legislator's ideology or v o t i n g b e h a v i o r doesn't matter. N o doubt it does, but its i m p a c t m a y be indirect, mediated through p a r t y a n d race, perhaps. W h i l e c h a i r m a n s h i p s do enhance the

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legislator's a b i l i t y to get things done i n a system that w o r k s s l o w l y a n d incrementally, constituents do not find that this benefits t h e m directly. W h y are B l a c k s m o r e satisfied w i t h their p o l i t i c a l representation i n W a s h i n g t o n w h e n their representatives are B l a c k ? M e m b e r s of Congress are elected to represent the 6 0 0 , 0 0 0 or so people i n their districts, dis­ tricts that are diverse a n d c o m p l e x . B l a c k s are s i m p l y delighted w h e n their representative turns out to be B l a c k , because they feel B l a c k repre­ sentatives are going to be more representative o f their interests. T h i s c o u l d be a m i s t a k e . A l i b e r a l B l a c k i n J . C . Watts's district i n O k l a h o m a w o u l d not be w e l l represented o n p o l i c y matters by this conservative B l a c k R e p u b l i c a n . I n the end, although I ' v e defined representation b r o a d l y as e v e r y t h i n g the legislator does i n W a s h i n g t o n , it m a y be that representation f r o m the vantage point of the voter is s i m p l y "being like m e " o n t w o salient dimensions: race a n d party. F o r voters, t r y i n g to determine i f the legislator is " l i k e t h e m " o n other dimensions, a n d judg­ ing the legislator's competency, is too difficult. A l s o , t r y i n g to determine their competency is not as e m o t i o n a l l y satisfying as figuring out h o w m u c h the legislator a n d constituent are a l i k e . Being descriptively represented i n W a s h i n g t o n o n the basis o f race does not have a n y i m p a c t o n w h a t B l a c k s t h i n k of members more gener­ ally. I n chapter 8, I determine w h e t h e r descriptive representation is re­ lated to the attitudes B l a c k s have about Congress a n d about t e r m limits. M o s t B l a c k s t h i n k that members o f Congress s h o u l d be w o r k i n g for the district, not the constituent and not the n a t i o n more broadly. T h i s v i e w stands at odds w i t h the C B C ' s m i s s i o n to represent B l a c k s n a t i o n ­ ally. College-educated B l a c k s w e r e most l i k e l y to endorse the C B C mis­ sion i n this study. T h e v i e w that members of Congress s h o u l d be w o r k ­ ing on behalf of their districts fits w i t h the rationale behind h a v i n g geographically based single-member districts as opposed to a propor­ tional-representation system. W h i l e it seems that the pro-district v i e w might be stronger i n r a c i a l l y homogeneous districts that have elected B l a c k s , it w a s not. R a c e i n the end embodies value a n d i m p o r t a n c e to B l a c k s because B l a c k members, as chapters 4 a n d 5 establish, are r a c i a l l y distinctive i n h o w they represent their constituents. B u t race m a y also be v a l u e d by B l a c k constituents i n part because o f the w a y i n w h i c h the electoral system w o r k s . Single-member geographically based districts encourage the s y m b o l i c p r o m o t i o n o f groups both w i t h i n a n d outside o f these districts, as s h o w n in chapter 5. P u r e p o l i c y representation c o u l d be achieved under a proportional-representation, p a r l i a m e n t a r y system that encourages strict party discipline a n d eliminates l o c a l i s m . T h a t race c o u l d v e r y w e l l be less relevant i n the p o l i t i c a l representation of citizens under a different p o l i t i c a l system is a matter I discuss at length i n the book's c o n c l u s i o n .

CHAPTER

7

Descriptive Representation and Black Political Empowerment

I N PAST CONGRESSIONAL

S T U D I E S l i t e r a t u r e , p o l i t i c a l representation

is

generally understood as i n s t r u m e n t a l . P o l i t i c a l theorist N a n c y S c h w a r t z ( 1 9 8 8 ) strongly criticizes this v i e w o f representation because, a m o n g other things, it ignores the " t r a n s f o r m a t i v e " role o f politics. C i t i z e n s are t r a n s f o r m e d , that i s , k n i t t e d into the p o l i t y as they take p a r t i n demo­ c r a t i c politics. S c h w a r t z f o r m a l l y defines representation as "the standing a n d acting for a n objective entity — a constituency o f citizens — w h i c h is constantly i n the process o f becoming itself" ( 1 4 3 ) . T h e goal o f the elected representative is not s i m p l y to c o n v e y the m a j o r i t y sentiment, but also to help b r i n g constituents into the process a n d to unite t h e m into a coherent p o l i t i c a l w h o l e . U l t i m a t e l y she sides w i t h E d m u n d B u r k e , w h o felt quite passionately that representatives s h o u l d lead their c o n ­ stituents a n d n o t a l w a y s act i n favor o f the district's interests but those of the entire country. A self-described political c o m m u n i t a r i a n , Schwartz's definition o f representation is also rooted i n a republican view, i n w h i c h A m e r i c a n s are not s i m p l y ruthless i n d i v i d u a l i s t s , as l i b e r a l theorists de­ pict t h e m , but a n organic w h o l e , a c o m m u n i t y w h o i n the ideal f o r m are collectively engaged i n the p u r s u i t o f the c o m m o n good ( M o n r o e 1990).

R e p u b l i c a n i s m presents a p r o b l e m to A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s since their race precluded them f r o m membership i n the c o m m u n i t y as it w a s founded. T h i s n a t i o n , after a l l , w a s so v e r y long believed to be as R o g e r s S m i t h w r i t e s , " a w h i t e n a t i o n , a Protestant n a t i o n , a n a t i o n i n w h i c h true A m e r i c a n s w e r e n a t i v e - b o r n m e n w i t h A n g l o - S a x o n ancestors" ( 1 9 9 7 , 3 ) . B l a c k s w e r e f o r m a l l y e x c l u d e d f r o m membership i n the r e p u b l i c , a n d , once brought i n as citizens, most w e r e denied the right to p a r t i c i ­ p a t i o n i n civic r e p u b l i c a n i s m u n t i l 1 9 6 5 . B l a c k s since have become i n ­ corporated into the political process ( B r o w n i n g , M a r s h a l l , a n d T a b b 1 9 8 4 ; R . C . S m i t h 1 9 8 1 ; T a t e 1 9 9 4 ) . T h e i r i n c o r p o r a t i o n —or e m ­ p o w e r m e n t as some have called it — has led some v o t i n g behavior s c h o l ­ ars to see i f B l a c k s have become more p o l i t i c a l l y i n v o l v e d as a result. L a r r y B o b o a n d F r a n k G i l l i a m ( 1 9 9 0 ) , i n a s e m i n a l article, w r o t e , " B l a c k s in h i g h e m p o w e r m e n t areas s h o u l d feel m o r e trusting o f government, express higher levels o f efficacy, a n d become more knowledgeable about

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politics t h a n B l a c k s i n l o w e m p o w e r m e n t areas." T h e y contend that B l a c k citizens, perhaps believing the system to be m o r e responsive to their needs a n d interests w h e n B l a c k s h o l d positions o f p o w e r i n gov­ ernment, become m o r e p o l i t i c a l l y active w h e n represented by B l a c k s . B l a c k elected officials represent a potent s y m b o l o f B l a c k s ' i n c l u s i o n i n the polity, i n s p i r i n g more B l a c k s to take p a r t i n it. It m a y also be that B l a c k officeholders are m o r e t h a n s y m b o l s that d r a w B l a c k s i n . R a t h e r , B l a c k elected officials change the p o l i t i c a l e n v i ­ r o n m e n t in concrete w a y s that i n t u r n lead B l a c k s to participate m o r e . B l a c k s are brought into politics by these elected officials, w h o consider them their " p r i m a r y constituency," to use R i c h a r d Fenno's ( 1 9 7 8 ) w o r d s , representing their strongest supporters. C a n d i d a t e s , a l o n g w i t h parties a n d interest groups, w o r k to motivate their supporters to go to the polls. T h e i r role i n p r o m o t i n g political p a r t i c i p a t i o n , as Rosenstone a n d H a n s e n ( 1 9 9 3 ) show, significantly outweighs the i m p a c t of trust as a m o b i l i z i n g agent. R e c e n t w o r k by C l a u d i n e G a y ( 2 0 0 1 ) also establishes that B l a c k voter p a r t i c i p a t i o n increases i n some (but not a l l ) H o u s e dis­ tricts represented by B l a c k s . I n general, the race of the congressional i n c u m b e n t has n o large a n d consistent effect o n B l a c k voter turnout. A t the same time, G a y found that i n districts represented by B l a c k s , W h i t e voter p a r t i c i p a t i o n u n i v e r s a l l y decreases. I t m a y be that W h i t e s are not less politically efficacious as m u c h as they are less central to the re­ election activities o f the B l a c k H o u s e incumbent i n m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districts. T h i s chapter e x p l o r e s the b e h a v i o r a l i m p a c t of descriptive representa­ t i o n . D o e s being represented i n W a s h i n g t o n by a B l a c k member em­ p o w e r B l a c k s —that is, m a k e them more k n o w l e d g e a b l e , deepen their p o l i t i c a l interest, a n d encourage them to become more politically active?

POLITICAL KNOWLEDGE, CAMPAIGN

INTEREST,

AND POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

A s ample s c h o l a r s h i p has s h o w n , political k n o w l e d g e a m o n g the A m e r i ­ can p u b l i c is e x t r e m e l y l o w . B l a c k s are no e x c e p t i o n i n this regard. A s s h o w n i n table 7 . 1 only 14 percent k n e w the name o f their representa­ tive i n the H o u s e , although 7 3 percent recognized their representative's name a n d c o u l d evaluate h i m or her. N e a r l y h a l f or 4 2 percent c o r r e c t l y identified the p o l i t i c a l party of their representative, a n d nearly t w o thirds o f the B l a c k sample k n e w their representative's race. B l a c k s a c t u ­ a l l y k n o w more about their representative i n the H o u s e t h a n their rep­ resentatives i n the Senate. T a b l e 7.2 indicates that w h i l e a p p r o x i m a t e l y the same percentage of the sample c o u l d n a m e their senators ( 1 1 per­ cent), o n l y 2 8 percent c o r r e c t l y identified one or both o f their parties.

134

•

TABLE

Chapter 7 7.1

Blacks' Knowledge about House Member (Weighted percentages) Percent in sample w h o could correctly:

Total Sample

Black Democrat

White Democrat

White Republican

Recall Member's Name Recognize Member's Name Identify Member's Party Identify Member's Race Claimed to Remember Names of House Candidates who Ran in 1996 Elections

14% 73 42 67

23% 84 57 79

10% 68 37 65

8%** 66.5** 33 57**

37

41

30

38

N o t e : N = 1,119. **The differences in the groups' percentages are statistically significant (p < .01). S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

T h i s n u m b e r contrasts w i t h the 4 2 percent o f the B l a c k respondents w h o k n e w the p a r t y o f their H o u s e legislator. P o l i t i c a l k n o w l e d g e goes up considerably w h e n one takes into ac­ c o u n t the race of the H o u s e legislator. A s s h o w n i n table 7 . 1 , w h i l e o n l y 14 percent of the sample c o u l d spontaneously name their representative in the H o u s e , nearly one quarter o f the respondents i n districts repre­ sented by B l a c k s c o u l d correctly recall their names. I n contrast, o n l y 10 percent o f those represented by W h i t e legislators, a n d o n l y 8 percent of those i n districts held by W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s , k n e w their names. T h e same pattern holds for name recognition, a n d identification o f the m e m ­ ber's p o l i t i c a l p a r t y a n d race. B l a c k H o u s e members have significantly higher name recognition a m o n g their B l a c k constituents t h a n do W h i t e members. W h e r e a s 68 percent o f those represented by W h i t e D e m o ­ cratic legislators recognized their name w h e n presented w i t h it, 8 4 per­ cent of the respondents represented by B l a c k legislators recognized their legislator's name. I n the case o f p o l i t i c a l party, the p o l i t i c a l party o f the B l a c k legislators w a s correctly identified by 5 7 percent of their constitu­ ents i n contrast to one-third o f the sample represented by W h i t e R e p u b ­ licans. A b o u t 80 percent o f the sample k n e w the race o f their B l a c k legislators as opposed to 6 5 percent i n the case of W h i t e D e m o c r a t s . B e i n g descriptively represented i n Congress d i d not increase one's k n o w l ­ edge about H o u s e candidates r u n n i n g i n the 1 9 9 6 elections. W h e r e a s B l a c k s represented by B l a c k s were s o m e w h a t more l i k e l y than B l a c k s represented by W h i t e s to say that they k n e w the names of H o u s e c a n d i ­ dates i n the 1 9 9 6 elections, this difference w a s not statistically significant. W h i l e descriptively represented B l a c k s appear to be more f a m i l i a r w i t h the H o u s e members that represent them t h a n nondescriptively rep-

Black Political Empowerment

•

135

T A B L E 7.2

Blacks' Knowledge about U.S. Senators (Weighted Percentages) Percent in sample w h o could correctly:

Total Sample

Black Democrat

White Democrat

White Republican

Recall Both Senators' Names Recall One Senator's Name Identify Both Senators' Party Identify One Senator's Party

11% 13 8 20

12% 13 8 26

11% 11 9 15.5

9% 14 8 19*

N o t e : N = 1,119. *The differences in the groups' percentages are statistically significant (p < .05). S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

resented B l a c k s , this does not translate into more k n o w l e d g e about the elected officials w h o represent them i n the U . S . Senate. B l a c k s i n H o u s e districts represented by B l a c k s were no more l i k e l y t h a n B l a c k s i n dis­ tricts held by W h i t e s to k n o w the p o l i t i c a l parties o f their senators, for e x a m p l e , as s h o w n i n table 7.2. T h e single exception to this w a s i n the case of correctly identifying at least one of the senators' p o l i t i c a l party. T w e n t y - s i x percent of B l a c k s i n B l a c k - l e d districts correctly identified one of their senator's p o l i t i c a l parties as opposed to 19 percent o f B l a c k s in districts led by W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s . B l a c k s expressed a great deal of interest i n the 1 9 9 6 election, a n d especially so i n the presidential race. A l t h o u g h C l i n t o n led his R e p u b l i ­ can opponent, B o b D o l e , by a comfortable m a r g i n i n the months lead­ ing up to the election, the vast majority of B l a c k s ( 7 9 percent) said that they were v e r y m u c h or s o m e w h a t interested i n the 1 9 9 6 campaigns (see table 7 . 3 ) . E i g h t y - f o u r percent said that they cared a "good d e a l " about w h o w o n the presidential election. T w o questions a s k e d i n the postelection f o l l o w - u p survey asked respondents h o w m u c h of the n e w s did they pay attention to d u r i n g the c a m p a i g n for president a n d the campaigns for election to Congress. V a s t l y more B l a c k s expressed inter­ est i n n e w s pertaining to the presidential c a m p a i g n t h a n congressional races. W h e r e a s only 2 2 percent said that they p a i d v e r y little or no attention to the n e w s about the c a m p a i g n for president, almost half, or 4 5 percent, expressed little to no interest i n the n e w s about the H o u s e campaigns. In three o f the four interest measures, the race of the H o u s e legislator of the respondent h a d a significant impact. B l a c k s represented by B l a c k D e m o c r a t s i n the sample were significantly more l i k e l y to express great interest i n the 1 9 9 6 campaigns a n d the n e w s coverage i n the presiden­ tial race. T h e y were also more likely to care a great deal about w h o w o n the presidency. Ironically, w h i l e descriptive representation signifi-

TABLE

7.3

Political Interest Measures among Blacks Total Sample

Black Democrat

White Democrat

White Republican

"Would you say that you are very much interested, somewhat interested, or not much interested in the polit­ ical campaigns this year?" Very much interested Somewhat interested Not at all interested

30% 49 25

37% 43 21

29% 41.5 30

25%** 49 26

"Would you say that you personally care a good deal about who wins the presi­ dential election this fall, or that you don't care very much who wins?" Care a good deal Don't care very much

84 16

90 10

81 19

81** 19

" H o w much attention did you pay to the national news shows about the cam­ paign for president?" A great deal Quite a bit Very little None

23 37.5 37 3

28 39 30 2.5

17.5 37 44 2

21* 37 38 4

" H o w much attention did you pay to the news about the campaigns for elections to Congress —that is the House of Representatives?" A great deal Quite a bit Very little None

45 30 12 13

39 32 13 17

49 29.5 12 9

49 28 12 12

N o t e : The differences between groups' percentages are statistically different (**p < .01;

*p < .05). Source: 1996 NBES.

Black Political Empowerment

•

137

T A B L E 7.4

Self-Reported Voting Participation among Blacks in the 1994 and 1996 House Elections Sample

Black Democrat

White Democrat

* Voted for a House Candi­ date in 1996

60%

65%

52.5%

60%*

Remembered Voting in the Election for the U.S. House of Representatives in 1994

45

52

40

43*

White Republican

N o t e : Experimental question wording was used in 1996 post-election survey. H a l f of the sample was read the names of candidates and asked if they had voted for one of them following the standard A N E S version; the other half was asked simply if they had voted for a candidate for Congress. The latter version yielded a lower estimate of voter partici­ pation in House elections. *p < . 0 1 , chi-square test. S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

cantly boosted interest a m o n g B l a c k s i n the 1 9 9 6 election a n d the presi­ dential race, it d i d not increase their interest i n the campaigns for elec­ t i o n to the U . S . H o u s e of Representatives. H e r e , w h e r e 2 5 percent of B l a c k s represented by B l a c k D e m o c r a t s reported i n the aftermath of the 1996 elections o f h a v i n g h a d very little to no interest i n the n e w s cover­ age of the H o u s e campaigns, 2 4 percent o f B l a c k s represented by W h i t e R e p u b l i c a n s expressed this v i e w as w e l l . In the preelection survey, B l a c k s were asked i f they had voted i n the 1994 m i d t e r m H o u s e elections, a n d 4 5 percent of the sample reported voting. I n the postelection reinterview, respondents were a s k e d i f they had voted i n the 1996 n a t i o n a l elections, a n d specifically in the H o u s e election. S i x t y percent reported v o t i n g for a candidate for Congress. T h e s e figures, s h o w n i n table 7.4, are e x c e p t i o n a l l y high. A b o u t h a l f of the A m e r i c a n public turned out to vote in the 1 9 9 6 presidential elec­ t i o n . B l a c k p a r t i c i p a t i o n w a s slightly less t h a n that. Political participa­ t i o n i n m i d t e r m elections w a s lower, w i t h about 4 0 percent of the eligi­ ble electorate casting votes. T h e r e is a strong correlation between descriptive representation a n d turnout in congressional elections. B l a c k s represented by B l a c k s w e r e about 10 percentage points more likely to report h a v i n g voted i n c o n ­ trast to B l a c k s represented by W h i t e s in Congress (see table 7 . 4 ) . T h e p r e l i m i n a r y results lend considerable support to the Black empower­ ment thesis developed by B o b o a n d G i l l i a m ( 1 9 9 0 ) . B l a c k s represented

138

•

Chapter 7

by B l a c k s i n Congress are considerably more k n o w l e d g e a b l e , m o r e i n ­ terested, a n d more active t h a n B l a c k s represented by W h i t e s .

REGRESSION

ANALYSIS OF KNOWLEDGE,

POLITICAL

INTEREST,

EFFICACY, AND VOTING

Scales of the k n o w l e d g e , interest, a n d voter p a r t i c i p a t i o n measures w e r e created a n d a n a l y z e d as dependent measures i n regression models. B e ­ cause descriptive representation competes w i t h the i m p a c t o f p o l i t i c a l party, i n a d d i t i o n to the member's race, the p o l i t i c a l p a r t y o f the H o u s e legislator w a s m a t c h e d to the respondent's a n d included i n the a n a l y s i s . I t is presumed that being presented i n Congress by one's o w n p o l i t i c a l p a r t y is as transformative a n d affirming as being descriptively repre­ sented o n the d i m e n s i o n o f race. B e y o n d the member's p o l i t i c a l p a r t y a n d race, t w o other v a r i a b l e s pertaining to the H o u s e member w e r e incorporated into some o f the models. Because constituents m a y be m o r e f a m i l i a r w i t h senior m e m ­ bers o f Congress as opposed to n e w c o m e r s , seniority w a s i n c l u d e d i n the regression a n a l y s i s of respondents' knowledge a b o u t H o u s e m e m ­ bers. I n a d d i t i o n , because competitive races have been s h o w n to i n ­ crease name recognition, p o l i t i c a l interest, a n d higher levels o f voter p a r t i c i p a t i o n (Patterson a n d C a l d e i r a 1 9 8 3 ; E . S m i t h 1 9 8 9 ) , m a r g i n of v i c t o r y w a s considered as w e l l i n t w o of the regression models. A n u m b e r of key demographic variables w e r e i n t r o d u c e d i n the re­ gression analysis as c o n t r o l s . P r e v i o u s research has established that edu­ c a t i o n is i m p o r t a n t l y connected to both p o l i t i c a l k n o w l e d g e ( E . S m i t h 1 9 8 9 ) a n d to p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n (Verba a n d N i e 1 9 7 2 ; Wolfinger a n d Rosenstone 1 9 8 0 ; Rosenstone a n d H a n s e n 1 9 9 3 ; V e r b a , Schlozm a n , a n d B r a d y 1 9 9 5 ) . E d u c a t i o n increases one's appetite i n politics as w e l l as one's ability to manage the abstract concepts i n v o l v e d i n f o l l o w ­ ing politics. F a m i l y income is i n c l u d e d in the analysis as w e l l . A s V e r b a , S c h l o z m a n , and B r a d y establish i n their i m p o r t a n t w o r k , p o l i t i c a l par­ t i c i p a t i o n is costly i n terms of both time a n d money. Affluent A m e r i c a n s have m o r e time a n d m o n e y to invest i n politics. E r i c S m i t h ( 1 9 8 9 ) h y ­ pothesizes that like education, affluence e x p a n d s one's opportunity to be socialized to express greater interest i n politics. A g e a n d gender are also related to p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n . E x c e p t for the v e r y o l d a n d i n ­ f i r m , older A m e r i c a n s are more l i k e l y t h a n the y o u n g to vote a n d take part i n politics. R e c e n t a n a l y s i s found gender not to be strongly tied to p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , yet it w a s i n c l u d e d i n this a n a l y s i s . L e n g t h of residency i n the c o m m u n i t y w i l l increase one's f a m i l i a r i t y w i t h members of C o n g r e s s , the vast m a j o r i t y of w h o m , after a l l , are reelected every t w o a n d s i x years. R e s i d e n c y m a y boost one's interest i n politics as w e l l .

Black Political Empowerment TABLE

*

139

7.5

The Effect of Descriptive Representation on Respondents' Knowledge, Interest, and Voting Participation (OLS Estimates) R's K n o w l e d g e about House Member Independent

variable

Constant Member's Race (Black) Party Match Member's Seniority Member's Margin of Victory R's Gender (Male) R's Education R's Age R's Residency R's Race Identification R's Family Income R's Region (South) N Adjusted R-squared

R's K n o w l e d g e a b o u t U.S. S e n a t o r s

b

Sig. L e v e l

b

Sig. L e v e l

.011 .534 .253 .003 -.411 .139 .139 .015 .006 -.015 .064 -.142 946 .194

.955 .000 .003 .470 .005 .071 .000 .000 .000 .658 .000 .066

-1.54 .134 -.004 N/A N/A .485 .249 .019 .002 .073 .047 -.163 966 .193

.000 .146 .963 N/A N/A .000 .000 .000 .092 .047 .005 .045

S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

T h e r e m a y also be regional differences i n B l a c k p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n , interest, a n d k n o w l e d g e . Finally, race identification, w h i c h has been s h o w n to increase B l a c k s ' rates o f political participation (Tate 1 9 9 4 ) was included i n the a n a l y s i s . Strong race identifiers m a y also express more interest i n the c a m p a i g n as G u r i n , H a t c h e t t , a n d J a c k s o n ( 1 9 8 9 ) found. G i v e n its role i n B l a c k political p a r t i c i p a t i o n , it is possible that race identification might increase one's ability to recognize or recall names of members of Congress. T h e results o f the regression analysis are s h o w n i n tables 7.5 a n d 7.6. T h e c o l u m n s present the unstandardized regression coefficients (b) a n d the p r o b a b i l i t y levels attached to the t-statistics for each coefficient. B l a c k e m p o w e r m e n t in the district w a s s h o w n o n l y to increase voter k n o w l e d g e about the H o u s e member. I t w a s not significantly related to k n o w l e d g e about the respondent's U . S . Senators. I t h a d no i m p a c t o n c a m p a i g n interest, the respondent's level o f p o l i t i c a l efficacy, or their rate of p a r t i c i p a t i o n in the past t w o congressional elections. I n contrast, political p a r t y h a d a w i d e r i m p a c t on B l a c k p o l i t i c a l attitudes a n d be­ havior. B l a c k s represented i n Congress by members of their o w n p a r t y

140 TABLE

•

Chapter 7 7.6

The Impact of Descriptive Representation on Respondents' Campaign Interest, Political Efficacy, and Voting Participation (OLS Estimates) R's C a m p a i g n Interest (2-10)

Independent variable Constant Member's Race (Black) Party Match Member's Margin of Victory R's Gender (Male) R's Education R's Age R's Residency R's Race Identification R's Family Income R's Region (South) N Adjusted R-squared

b

Stg Level

3.975 -.087

.000 .637

.745 .849 .111 .192 .035 -.002 .177 .049 .150 946 .096

R's P o l i t i c a l Efficacy (1-5)

R's V o t i n g Participation ( 0 - 2)

Sig. Level

b

Sig. Level

2.641 .096

.000 .386

-.712 .065

.000 .326

.000 .004

.077 N/A

.487

.113 .051

.078 .626

.484 .000 .000 .446 .012 .129 .335

.013 .017 -.005 -.001 .082 .050 .168 692 .017

.900 .599 .131 .416 .071 .015 .088

-.041 .132 .017 .003 .078 .027 .138 697 .213

.479 .000 .000 .000 .003 .020 .015

b

N o t e : The low and high values of the dependent variables are shown in parentheses. S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

were more likely to k n o w w h o their representatives w e r e , a n d they w e r e more l i k e l y to express more interest i n the c a m p a i g n . T h e coefficient for descriptive representation i n the case o f k n o w l e d g e about the H o u s e member w a s still t w i c e that of the coefficient for the p a r t y m a t c h v a r i ­ able, nevertheless. As one might expect, education, age, a n d residency turned out to be the most i m p o r t a n t determinants of B l a c k s ' level of k n o w l e d g e about their legislators, voter p a r t i c i p a t i o n , a n d to a lesser extent, p o l i t i c a l i n ­ terest. Predictably, better-educated B l a c k s w e r e the most knowledgeable. College-educated B l a c k s w e r e also m o r e l i k e l y t h a n those h a v i n g o n l y a high school education to express strong interest i n the 1 9 9 6 p o l i t i c a l campaigns a n d to vote. F a m i l y income w a s also found to correspond to these measures i n a s i m i l a r fashion. Affluent B l a c k s k n e w m o r e about their representatives i n Washington than poor B l a c k s . H i g h - i n c o m e B l a c k s

Black Political Empowerment

•

141

w e r e more l i k e l y to report feeling p o l i t i c a l l y effective a n d to have voted i n the 1 9 9 4 a n d 1 9 9 6 elections. O l d e r B l a c k s , h a v i n g witnessed politics for a longer period of time, w e r e more l i k e l y to k n o w w h o their representatives w e r e i n W a s h i n g ­ t o n , express strong interest i n the c a m p a i g n , a n d vote. A g e , however, w a s unrelated to p o l i t i c a l efficacy. T h e longer one lived i n the c o m m u ­ nity, the more one k n e w about one's representative i n Congress a n d the more l i k e l y one w a s to have voted. L e n g t h of residency in the c o m m u n i t y w a s statistically unrelated to political interest a n d to p o l i t i c a l efficacy. A s shown i n previous w o r k ( G u r i n , Hatchett, and Jackson 1989; Tate 1 9 9 4 ) , race identification w a s significantly related to B l a c k political i n ­ terest a n d to voter p a r t i c i p a t i o n i n congressional elections. R a c e identi­ fication, however, w a s unrelated to p o l i t i c a l knowledge and to p o l i t i c a l efficacy. Being strongly race-committed does not increase B l a c k s ' a w a r e ­ ness of w h o is representing them in W a s h i n g t o n ; n o r does it promote a sense of p o l i t i c a l effectiveness. F i n a l l y , B l a c k Southerners w e r e generally less knowledgeable t h a n B l a c k s residing in other parts o f the country. B l a c k Southerners were also less likely to report feeling efficacious i n the p o l i t i c a l process a n d less likely to report h a v i n g voted i n the past t w o elections. T h e findings o v e r a l l establish that except for p o l i t i c a l k n o w l e d g e , there is no e m p o w e r m e n t effect associated w i t h being represented by a person of one's o w n race in the U . S . H o u s e of Representatives.

CONCLUSION

W h i l e B l a c k s descriptively represented in Congress k n e w significantly more about their representatives in W a s h i n g t o n than B l a c k s represented by W h i t e s , A s i a n s , or L a t i n o s , descriptive representation w a s not found to be p o l i t i c a l l y e m p o w e r i n g . B l a c k s represented by B l a c k s w e r e not significantly more interested in p o l i t i c a l c a m p a i g n s , efficacious, or more l i k e l y to vote than B l a c k s represented by W h i t e s or other r a c i a l groups. T h e fact that being represented by one's o w n p o l i t i c a l party w a s em­ p o w e r i n g for B l a c k s is a n e w finding that underscores the failure o f B l a c k officeholding, at least at the congressional level, to e m p o w e r B l a c k s . T h e r e are t w o c o m p e l l i n g reasons w h y m y study failed to find a n e m p o w e r i n g effect for descriptive representation. F i r s t , it is possible that the b e h a v i o r a l effect o f B l a c k e m p o w e r m e n t is greatest at the local level of government. B l a c k s represented i n l o c a l governments, i n t o w n s a n d cities h a v i n g B l a c k m a y o r s , m a y feel more efficacious a n d be more p a r t i c i p a t o r y than B l a c k s i n c o m m u n i t i e s l a c k ­ ing strong levels of B l a c k officeholding. R e l a t e d to this is the possibility that B l a c k leadership i n executive offices m a y be more e m p o w e r i n g t h a n

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leadership i n legislative offices ( G a y 2 0 0 1 ) . Jesse J a c k s o n ' s presidential bids d i d inspire B l a c k s to mobilize a n d t u r n out to vote, at least i n the 1 9 8 4 presidential election (Tate 1 9 9 4 ) . Second, the b e h a v i o r a l i m p a c t of descriptive representation as a n e m ­ p o w e r i n g agent m a y be t e m p o r a r y a n d w e a r off once the B l a c k office­ holder secures his or her electoral base. I n a l o n g i t u d i n a l a n a l y s i s o f election data f r o m t w e n t y - s i x major A m e r i c a n cities, D a v i d L u b l i n a n d K a t h e r i n e T a t e ( 1 9 9 5 ) found that B l a c k office-seeking generally m o b i ­ lizes u r b a n voters. U r b a n voters t u r n out at significantly higher rates w h e n B l a c k candidates compete for the m a y o r ' s seat. C o n t r a r y to c o n ­ v e n t i o n a l w i s d o m , t u r n o u t for first-time B l a c k office seekers w a s not significantly higher t h a n t u r n o u t i n elections i n v o l v i n g B l a c k candidates generally. T u r n o u t , however, w a s about 4 percent less i n races i n v o l v i n g i n c u m b e n t B l a c k m a y o r a l office seekers. Since the vast m a j o r i t y o f i n ­ c u m b e n t H o u s e legislators that seek reelection w i n , congressional c a n d i ­ dates' reelection campaigns m a y no longer inspire voters to participate.

CHAPTER

8

Descriptive Representation and Trust in Government

C H A P T E R 6 E S T A B L I S H E S that B l a c k s ' evaluations o f their representatives i n W a s h i n g t o n are generally h i g h , but this is not the case w i t h respect to their o p i n i o n of the U . S . Congress as a w h o l e . I n the 1 9 9 6 N B E S , a full 70 percent d i s a p p r o v e d of the w a y that Congress w a s h a n d l i n g its j o b . B l a c k s are no e x c e p t i o n here, but q u i n t e s s e n t i a l ^ A m e r i c a n in l o v i n g i n d i v i d u a l members o f Congress a n d h a t i n g Congress i n general. A n d like most A m e r i c a n s , a large B l a c k m a j o r i t y ( 7 2 percent) also favors i m p o s i n g term l i m i t s o n W a s h i n g t o n legislators. T h o s e a d v a n c i n g the cause of the descriptive representation o f B l a c k s i n government have frequently c l a i m e d that the absence o f B l a c k s i n government under­ mines B l a c k s ' trust i n government a n d faith i n p o l i t i c a l system. H o w ­ ever, the fact that a m a j o r i t y o f B l a c k s continues to distrust government even as the n u m b e r s o f B l a c k s elected to Congress have increased d r a ­ m a t i c a l l y over the past three decades stands at odds w i t h such c l a i m s . I n this chapter, I determine w h e t h e r there is a direct l i n k between the de­ scriptive representation o f B l a c k s i n W a s h i n g t o n a n d their attitudes to­ w a r d government, a n d notably, Congress.

RACIAL DIFFERENCES I N ATTITUDES TOWARD CONGRESS OF POLITICAL

AND LEVELS

TRUST

O v e r - t i m e data f r o m the A m e r i c a n N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n Studies ( A N E S ) reveal that r a c i a l differences i n citizens' a p p r o v a l ratings of Congress are m i x e d , w i t h B l a c k s a n d W h i t e s alternating across some o f the years as the group expressing the highest levels o f a p p r o v a l or d i s a p p r o v a l . T h e question, " D o y o u approve or disapprove of the w a y the U . S . C o n ­ gress has been h a n d l i n g its j o b ? " appeared i n the 1 9 8 0 A N E S a n d has been a s k e d since. S t i l l , o n the w h o l e , B l a c k s tended to give Congress slightly higher ratings t h a n W h i t e s a n d other groups over the sixteenyear p e r i o d , as s h o w n i n figure 8 . 1 . I n 1 9 8 0 a n d again i n 1 9 9 4 , B l a c k a p p r o v a l ratings o f Congress were significantly higher t h a n that o f other r a c i a l groups by margins of 15 a n d 2 6 percent. O n l y in t w o s u r v e y s , 1982 a n d 1 9 8 4 , were B l a c k s more d i s a p p r o v i n g o f Congress t h a n w e r e W h i t e s a n d other groups by margins a p p r o x i m a t i n g 10 percent. I n 1 9 9 6

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70.0%

Figure 8.1. Percentage by race of those approving of the way Congress has handled its job, 1980-2000. S o u r c e : 1980-2000 A N E S .

both groups w e r e a p p r o x i m a t e l y split between a p p r o v a l and disap­ p r o v a l o f the U . S . Congress. J o h n R . H i b b i n g a n d E l i z a b e t h T h e i s s - M o r s e ' s ( 1 9 9 5 ) e x p l a n a t i o n for w h y Congress as a political institution systematically lags behind other institutions i n the public's eye establishes a l i n k between k n o w l e d g e , interest, p o l i t i c a l involvement, a n d a p p r o v a l . S i m p l y put, the more one k n o w s about Congress, the less impressed one is, w h i l e the less one k n o w s , the more favorable one is t o w a r d Congress. T h i s relationship between knowledge a n d a p p r o v a l for Congress is c o m p l i c a t e d by other attitudinal factors, o f course. T h o s e surveyed w h o felt that Congress w a s r u n by special interests, for e x a m p l e , expressed the most consis­ tently negative attitudes t o w a r d Congress. H i b b i n g a n d T h e i s s - M o r s e conclude that the public contempt for the legislative process i n W a s h ­ ington is the u n d e r l y i n g cause of the public's negative attitude t o w a r d Congress as a n institution. A s m u c h as m a n y A m e r i c a n s dislike parties even though they r e m a i n highly p a r t i s a n , they are also p a r a d o x i c a l i n that they staunchly support democratic processes w h i l e c o n d e m n i n g such processes i n action. A c c o r d i n g to H i b b i n g a n d T h e i s s - M o r s e , the "media's eagerness to report any a n d a l l events m a k e s it possible for citizens to v i e w democratic processes w i t h a l l blemishes revealed . . . features [that are] extremely u n p o p u l a r w i t h the vast m a j o r i t y of c i t i ­ zens, w h o y e a r n for simple government a n d visibly equitable representa­ tion" (159).

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B l a c k s i n those surveys h a d slightly less negative v i e w s o f Congress t h a n d i d W h i t e s . T h i s c o u l d be based on t w o factors. F i r s t , u n t i l 1 9 9 5 , the H o u s e o f Representatives h a d a D e m o c r a t i c majority. Since m o s t B l a c k s are D e m o c r a t s , this c o u l d e x p l a i n the higher ratings o f Congress by their r a c i a l group. R e s e a r c h by H i b b i n g a n d T h e i s s - M o r s e ( 1 9 9 5 ) , a m o n g others, establishes that R e p u b l i c a n s are less a p p r o v i n g o f C o n ­ gress, w h i c h for the past forty years u n t i l the 1 9 9 4 elections, w a s d o m i ­ nated by D e m o c r a t s . A t the same time, as discussed i n chapter 7, B l a c k s are generally less knowledgeable about congressional politics t h a n are W h i t e s , i n almost every instance. I n 1 9 9 4 , for e x a m p l e , more t h a n threequarters ( 7 6 percent) o f W h i t e s were correct i n identifying D e m o c r a t s as the m a j o r i t y i n the H o u s e o f Representatives i n 1 9 9 3 c o m p a r e d to only about one-half or 5 4 percent of B l a c k s . M o r e W h i t e s than B l a c k s k n e w that T h o m a s F o l e y w a s Speaker o f the H o u s e in 1 9 9 3 a n d that the D e m o c r a t s w e r e the Senate majority i n 1 9 9 3 . I t turns out that po­ litically knowledgeable a n d i n v o l v e d A m e r i c a n s tend to be the most c r i t i c a l o f C o n g r e s s . B l a c k s m a y be s o m e w h a t more a p p r o v i n g of C o n ­ gress because o f their l o w e r levels of p o l i t i c a l i n f o r m a t i o n . B l a c k s , however, w e r e just as l i k e l y as W h i t e s to favor twelve-year t e r m limits for members o f C o n g r e s s . T h r e e - q u a r t e r s o f B l a c k s a n d 7 9 percent of W h i t e s endorsed t e r m l i m i t s , w h i l e r o u g h l y o n l y 2 0 percent o f B l a c k s opposed it. D i s l i k e of Congress is the logical extension o f the public's general distrust of government. Since the 1 9 7 0 s , trust in government a n d confi­ dence i n its ability to "do w h a t is r i g h t " has s h a r p l y fallen off. I n 1996 there w a s not a significant difference in trust in government between B l a c k s a n d W h i t e s . H o w e v e r , this w a s not a l w a y s the case. B l a c k s gen­ erally have expressed l o w e r levels o f trust i n government t h a n W h i t e s since the question first appeared i n the 1958 A m e r i c a n N a t i o n a l E l e c ­ t i o n . W h e n a s k e d " H o w m u c h of the time do y o u t h i n k y o u c a n trust the government i n W a s h i n g t o n to do w h a t is right —just about a l w a y s , most o f the time, or o n l y some o f the t i m e ? " roughly 10 to 2 0 percent fewer B l a c k s t h a n W h i t e s felt that government c o u l d be trusted " m o s t of the t i m e . " T h e results are s h o w n in figure 8.2. W h i l e i n a few years such as 1 9 6 4 and 1 9 6 8 the r a c i a l gap n a r r o w s significantly, it e x p a n d s again d u r i n g the 1 9 7 0 s . I t is o n l y i n 1 9 9 0 that w e see an emerging trend suggesting that B l a c k s are becoming no more distrustful o f government than are W h i t e s . T h i s trend o f decreasing r a c i a l differences i n p o l i t i c a l trust is mostly based on the continued decrease in the r a n k s o f W h i t e s expressing trust, not a rise i n the percentage o f B l a c k s expressing greater trust. M u c h research a n d debate has focused o n the e x a c t m e a n i n g of this d r a m a t i c decline i n trust o f government i n the U n i t e d States, w h i c h fol­ l o w e d the great w a v e of c i v i l rights protest, the V i e t n a m W a r , a n d Presi-

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1958

Chapter 8

1966

1970

1974

1978

1982

1986

1990

1994

Figure 8.2. Percentage by race of those trusting government "most of the time," 1 9 5 8 - 9 6 . S o u r c e : 1958-96 A N E S .

dent N i x o n ' s resignation. O n the one side, there is the v i e w that the great loss of faith i n government signaled deep a l i e n a t i o n a m o n g the A m e r i c a n people a n d represented a p o l i t i c a l crisis ( M i l l e r 1 9 7 4 ) . O n the other h a n d , w r i t e s J a c k C i t r i n ( 1 9 7 4 ) , the decline i n trust w a s a logical reaction to the p o l i t i c a l turbulence o f the 1 9 6 0 s a n d 1 9 7 0 s a k i n to dis­ gruntled baseball fans shouting " K i l l the u m p i r e . " T h i s debate is rooted i n D a v i d E a s t o n ' s ( 1 9 6 5 ) s e m i n a l distinction between t w o forms o f po­ litical trust, diffuse a n d spécifie. P o l i t i c a l support that is diffuse is a n e v a l u a t i o n o f the p o l i t i c a l system as a w h o l e a n d its p o l i t i c a l c o m m u ­ nity, w h i l e specific support is based o n citizens' evaluations o f p o l i t i c a l actors a n d their performance. D i s s a t i s f a c t i o n w i t h the p o l i t i c a l a u t h o r i ­ ties, a n d even k e y authoritative institutions, such as Congress, is n o t as serious as a w i d e s p r e a d loss o f confidence i n the regime. I n the end, public o p i n i o n researchers grappling w i t h this question reject a " c r i s i s i n d e m o c r a c y " perspective, even as they advocate re­ forms to restore the public's faith i n government. T h e crisis perspective is rejected because the public still e x h i b i t s strong faith i n the d e m o c r a t i c process. Decades o f public surveys find n o great loss of confidence i n

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147

the n a t i o n . D a t a reported by R o p e r analysts E v e r e t t C a r l l L a d d a n d K a r l y n H . B o w m a n ( 1 9 9 8 ) , for e x a m p l e , s h o w that the o v e r w h e l m i n g m a j o r i t y ( a p p r o x i m a t e l y 9 0 percent) o f A m e r i c a n s w o u l d not w a n t to m o v e a n d settle i n another country, even i f they w e r e "free to do s o . " I n a 1 9 9 7 survey, 8 3 percent agreed w i t h the statement that the " U n i t e d States is the greatest n a t i o n o n e a r t h . " People, however, are fundamen­ t a l l y dissatisfied w i t h the w a y government is actually r u n . A n o t h e r reason w h y the a l a r m i s t perspective is rejected is that dissat­ isfaction w i t h the performance of government is not related to other forms o f mass p a r t i c i p a t i o n . V o t e r t u r n o u t has declined over the last forty years, but again, this decline is not interpreted as a rejection of the democratic process. A s reported i n L a d d a n d B o w m a n ( 1 9 9 8 ) , 8 7 to 89 percent o f A m e r i c a n s surveyed t h i n k that government c a n have a posi­ tive i m p a c t o n people's lives ( 9 1 ) . W h e n asked to rate the job that the federal government does i n r u n n i n g its p r o g r a m s , more t h a n h a l f ( 5 3 percent) gave the government " o n l y f a i r " m a r k s as opposed to 2 per­ cent w h o said " e x c e l l e n t . " A n o t h e r 2 3 percent said " g o o d , " w h i l e 2 1 percent said "poor." T r u s t i n government has declined not only because o f the negative c h a r a c t e r i z a t i o n of government in the media a n d because m a n y p o l i t i ­ cians c a m p a i g n against government a n d as outsiders to W a s h i n g t o n , but because the scope o f the problems that W a s h i n g t o n must " s o l v e " has m u l t i p l i e d . C l e a r l y the federal government has e x p a n d e d i n size because its p o l i t i c a l agenda has e x p a n d e d . A l l in a l l , l o w ratings of Congress, support for term l i m i t s , a n d the absence of great trust i n the p o l i t i c a l system are not s y m p t o m s o f w i d e ­ spread alienation or frustration w i t h A m e r i c a n democracy. P o l i t i c a l trust, a c c o r d i n g to W i l l i a m G a m son ( 1 9 6 8 ) , is "the p r o b a b i l i t y . . . that the p o l i t i c a l system (or some part of it) w i l l produce preferred outcomes even i f left u n t e n d e d " ( 5 4 ) . A m e r i c a n s believes in the integrity o f the democratic process, but still a c c o r d little trust to their government. T h e survey data s h o w that B l a c k s i n the 1 9 5 0 s a n d 1 9 6 0 s w e r e less trusting of government t h a n W h i t e s were as a group, and no doubt this r a c i a l difference existed because of these groups' different p o l i t i c a l e x p e r i ­ ences. T o d a y , however, both groups express little trust i n government, i n spite o f B l a c k s ' a b i l i t y to elect more B l a c k s to Congress.

T H E LINKS AMONG BLACK REPRESENTATION, ATTITUDES

TOWARD

CONGRESS, A N D TRUST IN GOVERNMENT

I n a p r e l i m i n a r y a n a l y s i s (not s h o w n here), being descriptively repre­ sented i n W a s h i n g t o n w a s unrelated to B l a c k s ' attitudes t o w a r d C o n ­ gress, o p i n i o n t o w a r d t e r m limits, a n d their feelings of p o l i t i c a l trust.

148 TABLE

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Chapter 8 8.1

The Effect of Descriptive Representation on Respondents' Approval Rating of Congress and Support for Term Limits (OLS Estimates) Rs

Independent variable Constant Sex (male) Education Income Party identification (Rep-Dem) Ideology (Con-Lib) Knowledge Scale Efficacy Media Use Percent Congress is Black Represented by Black N Adjusted R-squared

Approval R a t i n g of Congress S)

R s L e v e l of Trust in Government (1--4)

R's L e v e l of Political Efficacy (1-5)

b

Sig. Level

b

Sig. Level

b

Sig. Level

2.061 -.115 -.015 -.023 .033

.000 .356 .709 .361 .464

1.963 .011 -.031 .005 .013

.000 .801 .033 .602 .427

2.723 .056 .029 .039 -.016

.000 .600 .397 .073 .666

-.041 -.076 .109 -.021 .023

.181 .067 .021 .473 .000

-.020 -.005 .080 .024 .005

.077 .745 .000 .025 .002

-.033 .050

.207 .154

-.004 .005

.875 .195

.008 630 .061

.854

-.010 631 .007

.928

.085 587 .073

.502

N o t e : The low and high values of the dependent variables are shown in parentheses. S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

T h u s w h i l e B l a c k s trust B l a c k representatives to be more responsive to their p o l i t i c a l needs t h a n W h i t e members, this trust does not translate into expressing greater confidence i n government a l w a y s to do w h a t is right. But w h e n the measure of h o w w e l l B l a c k s w e r e descriptively repre­ sented i n Congress w e r e added to the regression models, a different picture emerged. T h e m u l t i v a r i a t e analysis results are s h o w n i n table 8.1. N o n e of the predictor variables turned out to be statistically related to B l a c k support for t e r m limits, a n d thus, its results are not s h o w n . I n the survey, however, B l a c k respondents w e r e a s k e d w h a t percent o f the members of Congress do they t h i n k is B l a c k ? B l a c k s w h o h a d h i g h esti­ m a t i o n s o f B l a c k representation i n Congress w e r e significantly less c r i t i ­ cal of Congress a n d more trusting of government. A t the same time, B l a c k s represented by B l a c k s i n Congress w e r e no m o r e a p p r o v i n g o f Congress or trusting.

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W h i l e H i b b i n g a n d T h e i s s - M o r s e ( 1 9 9 5 ) f o u n d that i n c o m e , sex, party identification, a n d e x t e r n a l p o l i t i c a l efficacy w e r e i m p o r t a n t deter­ m i n a n t s of p u b l i c attitudes t o w a r d Congress, o n l y political efficacy w a s statistically related to B l a c k a p p r o v a l or d i s a p p r o v a l ratings. C o n t r a r y to w h a t one m i g h t expect, p o l i t i c a l l y knowledgeable B l a c k s , those w h o c o u l d identify their senators a n d representatives i n W a s h i n g t o n by n a m e , party, or race, d i d not have significantly m o r e negative o p i n i o n s o f C o n ­ gress t h a n less knowledgeable B l a c k s . B l a c k s w h o reported spending a lot of time reading the newspaper a n d w a t c h i n g television w e r e also no more l i k e l y t h a n l o w media users to disapprove of Congress. M o r e v a r i a b l e s t u r n e d out to predict B l a c k s ' level o f political trust. College-educated B l a c k s a n d self-described p o l i t i c a l conservatives e x ­ pressed significantly l o w e r levels o f p o l i t i c a l trust t h a n B l a c k highschool graduates a n d self-identified liberals. A s i n the case o f attitudes t o w a r d Congress, p o l i t i c a l l y efficacious B l a c k s w e r e more trusting t h a n B l a c k s w h o reported l o w levels of efficacy. H i g h media users w e r e also more trusting of government t h a n l o w e r m e d i a users. I n the end, however, w h i l e being descriptively represented i n Congress did not i m p r o v e B l a c k s ' attitudes t o w a r d Congress or levels o f p o l i t i c a l trust, believing B l a c k s to be n u m e r i c a l l y w e l l represented there d i d . H o w w e l l do B l a c k s feel represented i n Congress? W h e n a s k e d directly, f o l l o w i n g the battery o f questions pertaining to their attitudes t o w a r d the representatives i n W a s h i n g t o n , w h a t percentage o f representatives i n Congress is B l a c k , the average response w a s 13 percent. T h i s is more t h a n the 7 percent that B l a c k s currently m a k e up, but not grossly in error. T h e standard deviation o f the average guess to this question w a s 13 percent, w h i c h means that t w o - t h i r d s o f the sample estimated the percentage of B l a c k s i n Congress to be somewhere between zero a n d slightly over one-quarter! F i g u r e 8.3 presents the d i s t r i b u t i o n of B l a c k s ' estimates o f the percentage o f Congress that is B l a c k . C o m p o u n d i n g this problem is the respondents' estimation o f w h a t percentage o f the c o u n t r y is B l a c k , w h i c h w a s asked just p r i o r to the question o f w h a t percentage of Congress is B l a c k . W h e r e a s the average guess of 13 percent for Congress w a s only 6 percentage points higher t h a n the t r u t h , B l a c k estimations o f their percentage i n the p o p u l a t i o n w e r e significantly higher t h a n the t r u t h . T h e average response to the question " W h a t percent of the U n i t e d States is B l a c k " w a s 4 0 percent. T h e 1 9 9 0 U . S . C e n s u s estimates the B l a c k U . S . p o p u l a t i o n to be 12 percent. T h e s t a n d a r d deviation for this measure w a s 2 2 percent, so that t w o - t h i r d s o f the sample estimated the B l a c k U . S . p o p u l a t i o n to be somewhere between 18 percent a n d 6 2 percent. W h e r e a s n o one esti­ mated Congress to be 1 0 0 percent B l a c k , some of the respondents guessed that the U . S . p o p u l a t i o n is 7 0 , 8 0 , 9 0 , or even 100 percent Black.

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B

c

CD "D C

o

CL CO

o o

m

m

H—

O

c CD

2 CD CL

Less than 10%

10% to

2 0 % to

3 0 % to

4 0 % to

19%

29%

39%

49%

5 0 % to 100%

Percent of Group Believed to Be Black Figure 8.3. Blacks' estimations of what percentage of the U.S. Congress and the U.S. population is Black. S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

T h e consequence of B l a c k s ' grossly inflated v i e w s o f their representa­ t i o n i n the c o u n t r y is that most B l a c k s t h i n k that B l a c k s are m o r e u n derrepresented i n W a s h i n g t o n as elected officials t h a n they a c t u a l l y are. T h e scores range f r o m 0 (zero) — indicating that regardless o f their n u m ­ bers i n the p o p u l a t i o n , no B l a c k is presently serving i n Congress — to 1.0, w h i c h means that regardless o f their numbers i n the p o p u l a t i o n , a m a t c h i n g p r o p o r t i o n of B l a c k s is elected to Congress. T h e average esti­ m a t i o n of B l a c k representation is far less t h a n p r o p o r t i o n a l . Based o n the average guess for the p r o p o r t i o n o f the U n i t e d States a n d the C o n ­ gress that is B l a c k , results indicate that one-third o f the B l a c k p o p u ­ l a t i o n is proportionately represented i n Congress, w h i l e i n reality the figure is closer to 6 0 percent. M o s t B l a c k s feel n u m e r i c a l l y v e r y underrepresented i n n a t i o n a l government, a n d based o n the estimates p r o ­ vided i n the survey, m o r e so t h a n they a c t u a l l y are. T h i s perception o f underrepresentation i n Congress is translated into greater d i s a p p r o v a l of Congress a n d less trust o f government a m o n g B l a c k s . W h i l e B l a c k s ' estimations o f their p r o p o r t i o n i n Congress are o n a v ­ erage not b a d , their estimations o f their p r o p o r t i o n w i t h i n the o v e r a l l p o p u l a t i o n are e x t r e m e l y inflated. T o determine w h a t type o f B l a c k re­ spondent gave the highest estimates o f the B l a c k U . S . p o p u l a t i o n , re­ gression analysis w a s performed. T h e results are s h o w n i n table 8.2. A s

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8.2

Regression Analysis of Black Estimations of the Percentage of the U.S. Population That Is Black R's E s t i m a t i o n of t h e U S . B l a c k Population (0-100%)

Independent variable Constant Sex (male) Education Income Political knowledge scale Media use Age South Represented by Black N Adjusted R-squared Source:

b

Sig. L e v e l

67.379 -8.768 -4.121 -.855 -1.475 - .097 -.037 2.905 5.080

.000 .000 .000 .002 .009 .774 .450 .026 .000 939 .205

1996 N B E S .

one might expect, education w a s strongly related to these estimations o f the B l a c k p o p u l a t i o n . H a v i n g a college degree resulted i n significantly l o w e r estimations of the size of U . S . p o p u l a t i o n . H i g h - i n c o m e B l a c k s w e r e also more likely to give better estimates t h a n l o w - i n c o m e B l a c k s . B l a c k m e n also gave estimates were roughly 8 percent l o w e r i n contrast to those supplied by B l a c k w o m e n . Southern B l a c k s gave more inflated estimates than those made by B l a c k s l i v i n g outside o f the South. N e i t h e r age n o r media use impacted on the estimates B l a c k s gave. F i n a l l y , B l a c k s represented by B l a c k s in W a s h i n g t o n gave estimates that were 5 per­ centage points higher t h a n those given by B l a c k s represented by W h i t e s .

CONCLUSION

Being descriptively represented i n Congress h a d no bearing o n w h e t h e r Congress w a s doing a good job or not. N o r w a s descriptive representa­ t i o n related to support for p o l i t i c a l r e f o r m a n d trust i n government more broadly. S t i l l , B l a c k s w h o believed B l a c k s to be n u m e r i c a l l y strong in Congress h a d m o r e positive v i e w s o f Congress a n d greater trust t h a n those B l a c k s w h o felt B l a c k s were n u m e r i c a l l y w e a k . Because, as C h a p ­ ter 6 established, B l a c k s believe B l a c k legislators are generally better representatives t h a n are W h i t e s , h a v i n g more B l a c k s i n Congress is logically going to translate into a "better" Congress. Still, B l a c k s w h o

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overestimated their p r o p o r t i o n of the U . S . p o p u l a t i o n m a y be less k n o w l ­ edgeable about government a n d therefore, under H i b b i n g a n d T h e i s s M o r s e ' s m o d e l , less c r i t i c a l of Congress. I n the end, it is not clear that h a v i n g more B l a c k s added to C o n g r e s s w o u l d t r u l y i m p r o v e B l a c k s ' evaluations o f Congress's performance or t r u l y raise their levels of trust i n government. D e s c r i p t i v e representa­ t i o n , however, m a y still affect citizens' perceptions of the system's legit­ i m a c y a n d their c o m m i t m e n t to the p o l i t i c a l system. M o r e w i l l be s a i d a b o u t this i n the n e x t a n d final chapter.

CHAPTER

9

The Future of Black Faces in the U.S. Congress But we cannot deduce what is politically fair from abstract principles of political equality: we have to draw on empirical judgements of what is likely to happen as well as what seems in principle to be fair. — Anne Phillips, in T h e P o l i t i c s of P r e s e n c e

T H I S B O O K B E G A N w i t h a simple question: D o B l a c k s need to be descrip­ tively represented i n Congress to be fairly represented? C a r o l M . S w a i n ( 1 9 9 3 ) and Stephan T h e r n s t r o m and A b i g a i l T h e r n s t r o m ' s ( 1 9 9 7 ) c o n ­ tention that race doesn't matter is consistent w i t h the o p i n i o n of most congressional scholars w h o c l a i m that the social characteristics of m e m ­ bers have little bearing on their capacity to represent. M o s t gender scholars reject this view, however. A n d n o w a n e w group of empirically m i n d e d congressional scholars, n o t a b l y K e n n y J . W h i t b y ( 1 9 9 8 ) and D a v i d T . C a n o n ( 1 9 9 9 ) , finding that B l a c k members of Congress are more l i k e l y to p u s h successfully for legislation that addresses the r a c i a l concerns of B l a c k s , argue that B l a c k s need to be n u m e r i c a l l y part of representative government i f their group is to be fully represented. T h e findings that I report i n chapters 4 a n d 5 further corroborate a n d e x ­ p a n d o n the w o r k of these scholars. T h u s , w h i l e U . S . legislators are capable o f speaking for a "divergent r a n k " of social groups, the over­ w h e l m i n g e m p i r i c a l evidence indicates that w i t h respect to B l a c k s , at least, they n o r m a l l y don't. B l a c k members i n Congress have been the most consistent spokespersons for a n d c h a m p i o n s of B l a c k interests. I n light o f the unique features o f the U . S . Congress w h e r e b y members ad­ vance n a t i o n a l as w e l l as p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c concerns, for B l a c k s to be fully represented, their interests must be understood as s y m b o l i c as w e l l as substantive. I also substantiate the v i e w that race matters i n the political represen­ t a t i o n f r o m the other side of the representative-legislator equation. R a c e matters to B l a c k constituents. A l l things being e q u a l , B l a c k constituents believe that they are better represented i n Congress w h e n their represen­ tative is B l a c k . B l a c k constituents recognize that B l a c k members strive to represent the interests of B l a c k s m o r e so t h a n W h i t e members do. T h e y , therefore, credit B l a c k members w i t h doing more for t h e m be-

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cause of their race t h a n legislators w h o represent t h e m solely o n the basis o f their political party. H a v i n g s h o w n through e m p i r i c a l means that race is related both i n the behavior o f legislators a n d i n the o p i n ­ ions of their B l a c k constituents, the question that I t u r n to i n the last chapter of m y b o o k is appropriately n o r m a t i v e . R a c e matters, but s h o u l d it i n a representative d e m o c r a c y ? A n d s h o u l d the government, either t h r o u g h the extension a n d enforcement o f the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t or t h r o u g h electoral reform, see to it that B l a c k s a n d other m i n o r i t i e s are descriptively represented? I base m y a n s w e r s to these questions o n the e m p i r i c a l findings reported i n this b o o k . A s the quote f r o m p o l i t i c a l theorist A n n e Phillips suggests, fair representation must be based, not o n l y o n o u r principles, but o n w h a t w e k n o w about the e m p i r i c a l or a c t u a l q u a l i t y of political representation i n the U n i t e d States.

M I R R O R REPRESENTATION: T H EN O R M A T I V E

DEBATE

I n a recently published article, J a n e M a n s b r i d g e ( 1 9 9 9 ) begins her case for the descriptive representation of w o m e n a n d minorities by noting, " D e s c r i p t i v e representation is not p o p u l a r a m o n g n o r m a t i v e theorists." T h e o r i s t s opposed to descriptive representation assert that it does not guarantee substantive representation, w h i c h acts i n the interest of the represented. Consequently, i n their view, those a d v o c a t i n g descriptive representation are guilty o f " e s s e n t i a l i s m , " falsely a s s u m i n g that m e m ­ bers o f these groups have a n essential identity that no others c a n repre­ sent. W h i l e a case for the political cohesiveness of B l a c k s c a n be e m p i r i ­ c a l l y made, it is still often stretched too far. A n d , indeed, even scholars seeking w a y s to open the political process to more m i n o r i t y groups find it problematic w h e n the focus becomes o n l y that o f electing m o r e m i ­ n o r i t y officeholders. T h u s , L a n i G u i n i e r ( 1 9 9 4 ) w o r r i e s that the p u s h for " n u m b e r s " has replaced the c o n c e r n for ensuring that B l a c k politi­ cal interests are fully represented, a n d for this reason advocated propor­ t i o n a l representation systems. I n T h e B o u n d a r i e s o f B l a c k n e s s , C a t h y J . C o h e n ( 1 9 9 9 ) establishes h o w m u l t i p l e , cross-cutting identities w i t h i n the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y , n o t a b l y those o f B l a c k gays a n d lesbians, have not been equally reflected in the politics of Blacks but rather marginalized. It is also essentialism that Stephan T h e r n s t r o m a n d A b i g a i l T h e r n s t r o m ( 1 9 9 7 ) object strongly to as w e l l , but for quite another reason. T h e argument that B l a c k s c a n o n l y be represented i n government by B l a c k s , they contend, reinforces the social a n d political significance o f r a c i a l group membership i n society: R a c i a l classifications deliver the message that s k i n c o l o r matters — profoundly. T h e y suggest that w h i t e s a n d b l a c k s are not the same,

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and that race a n d ethnicity are the qualities that really matter. T h e y i m p l y that i n d i v i d u a l s are defined by blood — not by character, social class, religious sentiments, age, or education. B y no demographic or other measures are A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s t r u l y a people apart. . . . A n d yet i f both they a n d w h i t e s believe they are, it m a y w e l l come true (492). I n the m i n d s o f critics, those p u s h i n g for the descriptive representation of B l a c k s a n d other social groups exaggerate the p o l i t i c a l distinctiveness of B l a c k s a n d therein contribute to the r a c i a l divide. I t is this fear o f " B a l k i n i z a t i o n of the r a c e s " that Associate Justice S a n d r a D a y O ' C o n ­ nor i n the 1 9 9 3 S h a w r u l i n g used to i n v a l i d a t e a N o r t h C a r o l i n a p l a n that h a d sent that state's first t w o B l a c k s to Congress since R e c o n s t r u c ­ t i o n . S u c h reasoning suggests, i n short, that a d v o c a t i n g greater n u m e r i ­ cal representation for B l a c k s contributes rather t h a n ameliorates the race p r o b l e m i n the U n i t e d States. A further c r i t i c i s m springs out of the r e p u b l i c a n v i e w that govern­ ment ought to consist of i n d i v i d u a l s w i t h a higher level o f talent a n d interest i n politics t h a n the average person. R a t h e r t h a n m i r r o r i n g the p u b l i c demographically, representatives belong to a "select" group o f citizens. L o g i c a l l y , one s h o u l d expect c e r t a i n groups not to be r u l i n g government, such as J . R o l a n d Pennock's ( 1 9 7 9 ) famous group o f " m o ­ r o n s . " M e m b e r s o f the p o l i t i c a l a n d social elite —as opposed to the av­ erage i n d i v i d u a l — s e r v i n g i n government w i l l i n theory be m o r e l i k e l y to produce the best p u b l i c policies a n d l a w s even as they actively represent the w i l l o f the people. T h i s w a s the d o m i n a n t view, i n fact, at the time of the nation's f o u n d i n g a m o n g federalists. But, even i f the talent p o o l is a c k n o w l e d g e d to be broader t h a n the groups presently reflected i n government ( a n d indeed, on this point of political equality there exists w i d e consensus, as A n n e Phillips points out, although there is little agreement on the matter of social or eco­ n o m i c equality [ 1 9 9 5 , 3 0 ] ) , it is not clear w h i c h groups ought to be affirmatively represented. L a n g u a g e m i n o r i t i e s were added as groups protected under the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t i n its 1 9 7 5 e x t e n s i o n . T h e basis for the i n c l u s i o n of "language m i n o r i t i e s " s u c h as L a t i n o s a n d A s i a n A m e r i c a n s , for e x a m p l e , w a s w h o l l y unjustified a c c o r d i n g to A b i g a i l T h e r n s t r o m ( 1 9 8 7 ) . F o r her, the h i s t o r y of L a t i n o s a n d A s i a n s i n the U n i t e d States is not at a l l c o m p a r a b l e the h i s t o r y of state-sanctioned d i s c r i m i n a t i o n against B l a c k s . A n d no l a w exists to augment the n u m ­ bers of w o m e n serving i n elected government, a l t h o u g h w o m e n are vastly n u m e r i c a l l y underrepresented i n government. T h e o r i s t s w h o c h a m p i o n the cause o f descriptive representation, s u c h as J a n e M a n s b r i d g e , A n n e P h i l l i p s , M e l i s s a W i l l i a m s , a n d I r i s M a r i o n

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Y o u n g , do often counter c r i t i c i s m s by presenting their o w n lists of costs to society imposed by the n u m e r i c a l underrepresentation o f p o l i t i c a l m i ­ norities in government. T h e v e r y first cost is to the deliberative function of a representative democracy. I n a deliberative system, policies are dis­ cussed a n d debated a m o n g a l l segments of the society before the major­ ity's o p i n i o n o n the matter is determined. I n this system, M a n s b r i d g e ( 1 9 9 9 ) w r i t e s , " A l t h o u g h a representative need not have shared person­ a l l y the experiences of the represented to facilitate c o m m u n i c a t i o n a n d b r i n g subtlety to a deliberation, the open-ended q u a l i t y of deliberation gives c o m m u n i c a t i v e a n d i n f o r m a t i o n a l advantages to representatives w h o are existentially closest to the issues." It is not enough that a few minorities take part in deliberation, but their members must constitute a " c r i t i c a l m a s s " so that they become w i l l i n g enough to enunciate m i n o r i t y positions. M i n o r i t i e s must also be interspersed across the w i d e a r r a y of committees a n d subcommittees a n d other levels of government. D e s c r i p t i v e representation advances the substantive representation o f m i n o r i t i e s s u c h as B l a c k s t h r o u g h the de­ liberative function of democracy. M i n o r i t y groups must be able to a r t i c ­ ulate and defend their o w n interests i n a d e m o c r a c y ( W i l l i a m s 1 9 9 8 ) . T h u s J a m e s F i s h k i n ( 1 9 9 5 ) advocates the full a n d equal p a r t i c i p a t i o n of a l l groups as a necessary component o f his p l a n for deliberative democracy. M a n s b r i d g e overturns the argument that by a d v a n c i n g the cause of descriptive representation society essentializes groups. T h e n u m e r i c a l underrepresentation of groups, she contends, is a n u n d e r l y i n g cause of essentialism i n that t o k e n representatives are forced to represent a l l members despite their groups' i n t e r n a l differences. W h e n m o r e m e m ­ bers of these underrepresented groups get elected, their groups' i n t e r n a l differences are exposed a n d a broader v i e w of these groups c a n f o r m . I n this w a y , she w r i t e s , T h e appointment of C l a r e n c e T h o m a s to the Supreme C o u r t o f the U n i t e d States m a y have served as a milestone i n the e v o l u t i o n of the process i n the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y , as some A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n o r g a n i z a ­ tions . . . opposed T h o m a s ' s n o m i n a t i o n i n spite o f his descriptive characteristics. . . . T h e decision of m a n y w o m e n ' s groups not to sup­ port a l l w o m e n candidates for election represented a s i m i l a r mile­ stone a m o n g U . S . feminists. T h e a c c u m u l a t e d e m p i r i c a l evidence fully supports M a n s b r i d g e ' s c l a i m s . A s C a n o n ( 1 9 9 9 ) a n d m y w o r k show, B l a c k legislators are not a m o n o l i t h i c v o t i n g bloc i n the U . S . H o u s e o f Representatives. I n the 1 0 6 t h , t w o B l a c k s are members of the B l u e D o g c o a l i t i o n , a g r o u p o f conservative D e m o c r a t s . T h e y represent the interests of e c o n o m i c c o n -

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servatives. O t h e r B l a c k s represent w o m e n , farmers, a n d small-business o w n e r s . A n d , i n fact, B a r b a r a Lee's ( D - C A ) lone dissent f r o m the H o u s e r e s o l u t i o n a u t h o r i z i n g the use of a r m e d force against the terrorists w h o a t t a c k e d A m e r i c a o n September 1 1 , 2 0 0 1 , w i l l r e m a i n h i s t o r i c . L e e h a d no support i n her dissent f r o m a n y m e m b e r o f the C B C . T h i s p o l i t i c a l a n d p o l i c y diversity w o u l d not be quite as evident a m o n g o n l y five or ten B l a c k legislators. T h i s diversity c a n o n l y come about as B l a c k m e m ­ bership i n Congress reaches a critical mass that permits B l a c k members to defend their groups' interests broadly. B l a c k s still believe that members o f their o w n race do a better job o f representing t h e m t h a n W h i t e s . A s critics o f descriptive representation contend, B l a c k s ' reliance o n race as a p o l i t i c a l cue c a n m i s l e a d t h e m . O n c e conservative Supreme C o u r t nominee c l a i m e d that the Senate hearings o n his c o n f i r m a t i o n h a d become a "high-tech l y n c h i n g , " B l a c k o p i n i o n rallied to support C l a r e n c e T h o m a s ' s c o n f i r m a t i o n as retiring T h u r g o o d M a r s h a l l ' s replacement ( M a n s b r i d g e a n d T a t e 1 9 9 2 ) . I t w a s o n l y once Associate Justice T h o m a s ' s conservative j u d i c i a l r e c o r d on affirmative a c t i o n a n d legal rights emerged that the o p i n i o n o f the l i b ­ eral B l a c k m a j o r i t y became appropriately negative. A t the same time, B l a c k s have rejected B l a c k candidates i n favor of W h i t e candidates a n d incumbents. I n 1 9 9 0 , Peter R o d i n o o f N e w Jersey managed to w i n re­ election i n a r a c i a l l y divisive election i n w h i c h his B l a c k opponent had the endorsement of the p o p u l a r a n d n a t i o n a l l y k n o w n B l a c k c i v i l rights figure Jesse J a c k s o n . A s part of R o d i n o ' s reelection strategy, however, he p r o m i s e d to retire i f elected to one m o r e t e r m . M o r e o v e r , cities that are solidly B l a c k that h a d p r e v i o u s l y elected B l a c k m a y o r s have since elected W h i t e s . T h e c r i t i c i s m that descriptive representation m a y not i m p r o v e the policy representation o f B l a c k s finds some e m p i r i c a l support i n m y study o f the 1 0 4 t h Congress. B l a c k legislators i n the 1 0 4 t h d i d not vote on issues i n the m a n n e r most directly representative of their B l a c k c o n ­ stituents' v i e w s o n k e y issues. A s s h o w n i n chapter 4 , the m a j o r i t y of B l a c k s w h o favored the five-year lifetime l i m i t on welfare benefits w r o n g l y believed that their B l a c k representative i n the H o u s e voted i n favor of w e l f a r e reform. T h e vast m a j o r i t y of B l a c k House-legislators opposed welfare r e f o r m . T h e d y a d i c m o d e l o f representation developed i n the pioneering study by M i l l e r and Stokes ( 1 9 6 3 ) considered only the B u r k e a n components of p o l i t i c a l representation — that representatives w e r e either delegates or trustees, f o l l o w e r s of their constituents' w i l l or independent agents. N e w w o r k i n p u b l i c o p i n i o n suggests strongly that representatives w i l l a l w a y s be both. T h i s reconceptualization of p u b l i c o p i n i o n complicates the m o d e l o f p o l i t i c a l representation, g i v i n g it a d y n a m i c quality, ac-

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c o r d i n g to K u k l i n s k i a n d Segura ( 1 9 9 5 ) . P u b l i c o p i n i o n a n d legislative p o l i c y m a k i n g " p l a y o n a n d reinforce each other." T h i s n e w understand­ ing o f p o l i t i c a l representation as a d y n a m i c process gives greater m e a n ­ ing to the long-standing r e p u b l i c a n v i e w s that representation s h o u l d "enlarge a n d refine" the electorate. Because I don't have over-time p a n e l study data, I c a n n o t directly assess h o w m u c h p o l i t i c a l leaders lead c i t i ­ zens a n d h o w m u c h they themselves are responding to their constitu­ ents' collective w i l l . B l a c k members of Congress defend a n d act o n a set of interests that most other members o f Congress don't t a k e u p . A s p o l i t i c a l leaders, they have the o p p o r t u n i t y not o n l y to pass legislation that benefits B l a c k s but also to change public o p i n i o n i n w a y s favorable to their group. R a d i c a l R e p u b l i c a n s d u r i n g R e c o n s t r u c t i o n a d v o c a t i n g B l a c k officeholding, i n fact, understood this. N o t o n l y w o u l d B l a c k s i n government best be able to defend their n e w l y w o n p o l i t i c a l rights, but their presence i n government w o u l d very p o w e r f u l l y a n d s y m b o l i c a l l y represent the cause of r a c i a l equality. Perfect policy congruency, therefore, c a n be considered the elusive " H o l y G r a i l , " the chalice used by C h r i s t that has never been f o u n d . N o one w i l l ever attain it, especially given A m e r i c a ' s w e a k p a r t y structure. P o l i c y congruency is attainable o n l y i n the aggregate i n a d y n a m i c p r o ­ cess w h e r e b y leaders s i m u l t a n e o u s l y persuade a n d follow. Constituents still feel fully represented despite the l a c k of perfect p o l ­ icy congruency because of a l l the other activities that representatives undertake i n order to represent their constituents. R e p r e s e n t a t i o n , after a l l , is more t h a n substantive, policy representation. I t is also p o w e r f u l l y s y m b o l i c . M e m b e r s of C o n g r e s s , as 1 s h o w i n chapter 5, seek to repre­ sent their constituents s y m b o l i c a l l y t h r o u g h resolutions that give recog­ n i t i o n or voice to groups. Because the U n i t e d States has a district-based system, citizens expect to see their groups represented i n government. O n l y B l a c k legislators w e r e found to be the most l i k e l y to seek the s y m b o l i c representation of A f r i c a n A m e r i c a n s . F i n a l l y , to a l l o f t h i s , I a d d m y " p o w e r of o n e " argument. A s M a y h e w ( 2 0 0 0 ) argues, C o n ­ gress's h i s t o r i c a l legacy a n d c o n t i n u i n g i m p a c t i n the U n i t e d States is n o t o n l y the p r o d u c t of its collective w i l l but springs forth by the ac­ tions u n d e r t a k e n by its i n d i v i d u a l members. T h e r e c a n be n o substitute, therefore, for descriptive representation i f outcomes i n Congress also c r i t i c a l l y depend u p o n i n d i v i d u a l actors. T h e evidence that descriptive district-based representation e m p o w e r s B l a c k s is slight. B l a c k s are m o r e knowledgeable about their representa­ tives w h e n that representative is B l a c k , but they are neither m o r e effi­ cacious nor m o r e l i k e l y to vote t h a n B l a c k s represented by W h i t e s . F i n a l l y , those w h o are most concerned about the n u m e r i c a l underrepresentation of B l a c k s i n government h a v e l o n g argued that descriptive

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representation is a n i m p o r t a n t c o m p o n e n t o f p o l i t i c a l trust. J a n e M a n s bridge ( 1 9 9 9 ) argues that descriptive representation enhances the r e l a ­ tionship between the representative a n d constituent a n d contributes to the government's p o l i t i c a l legitimacy. N u m e r i c a l l y underrepresented groups w h o see themselves i n government are more l i k e l y to feel i n ­ cluded i n the polity, e m p o w e r e d , a n d m o r e v a l u e d i n society, she argues. D e s c r i p t i v e representation also enhances the legitimacy o f government policies i n the eyes of the underrepresented group. She w r i t e s , " H a v i n g h a d a voice i n the m a k i n g of a p a r t i c u l a r policy, even i f that voice is t h r o u g h one's representative a n d even w h e n one's v i e w s d i d not p r e v a i l , also m a k e s that p o l i c y m o r e legitimate i n one's eyes." M y study found only p a r t i a l c o n f i r m a t i o n of this c l a i m . W h i l e B l a c k s represented i n W a s h i n g t o n by B l a c k s w e r e more knowledgeable about their representa­ tives, they were no more active i n politics t h a n B l a c k s represented by W h i t e s . N o r d i d I find i n m y analysis o f the 1 9 9 6 N B E S a direct r e l a ­ tionship between the trust in government a n d the descriptive representa­ t i o n o f B l a c k s i n Congress. B l a c k s , however, expressed higher levels of trust i n government w h e n they believed that B l a c k s constituted a large percentage of Congress. A s I e x p l a i n i n chapter 8, w h i l e most B l a c k s ' estimates o f that percentage i n the U . S . Congress w e r e fairly accurate, their estimates o f their o w n percentage i n the U . S . p o p u l a t i o n w e r e not. B l a c k s believing that Congress is made up of a v e r y high ( 2 0 , 3 0 , 4 0 percent) percent o f B l a c k s , a n d w h o also tended to rate Congress more f a v o r a b l y and e x h i b i t higher levels o f p o l i t i c a l trust, m a y be the least familiar a n d most r e m o v e d f r o m Congress. I therefore argue that i n the end, it is not clear that h a v i n g more B l a c k s added to Congress w o u l d t r u l y i m p r o v e B l a c k s ' evaluations o f Congress's performance or t r u l y raise their levels o f trust i n government. S e y m o u r M a r t i n L i p s e t c l a i m s that groups w i l l accept a p o l i t i c a l sys­ tem as legitimate i f that system is founded o n the values that they sup­ port. B l a c k s , i n spite of their terrible history i n the U n i t e d States, accept the values o n w h i c h this c o u n t r y w a s founded. T h e y also believe i n the constitutional devices that w e r e adopted to ensure their rights as minor­ ities i n a m a j o r i t y - r u l e system. T h e C o n s t i t u t i o n ' s B i l l of R i g h t s a n d its separation o f p o w e r s p o w e r f u l l y affirmed their faith i n the democratic process because i n the end the courts did finally e x t e n d the C o n s t i t u t i o n to B l a c k citizens, albeit t w o centuries late. T h e r e is a promise of democ­ r a c y contained i n the C o n s t i t u t i o n , a n d the m e c h a n i s m o f the separa­ t i o n o f p o w e r s u l t i m a t e l y forced Congress a n d the states to fulfill that p r o m i s e . Independent sources of p o w e r s —checks and balances —made this promise believable. O t h e r systems l a c k i n g alternative sources o f p o w e r are not as credible. T h u s , m y failure to find a direct l i n k between legitimacy a n d descriptive representation is mostly l i k e l y unique to the

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U n i t e d States alone. O t h e r democracies that are not fully representative of their p o p u l a t i o n base m a y not w i n the trust a n d faith f r o m its e x ­ cluded minorities, as found i n the U . S . case. T h e U n i t e d States might constitute the " d e v i a n t " case i n the absence of a l i n k between descrip­ tive group-based p o l i t i c a l representation a n d legitimacy.

THE

VOTING RIGHTS

CONTROVERSY

T h e data suggest that B l a c k s , however, are w i l l i n g to accept being n u ­ m e r i c a l l y underrepresented i n A m e r i c a n government w i t h o u t this l a c k of descriptive representation u n d e r m i n i n g their faith i n the democratic process. B l a c k s r e m a i n confident that they w i l l be able to see themselves reflected i n Congress. I s this confidence misplaced? J . M o r g a n K o u s s e r in C o l o r b l i n d I n j u s t i c e ( 1 9 9 9 ) w r i t e s about h o w this c o u n t r y failed B l a c k s i n the first R e c o n s t r u c t i o n a n d is possibly failing them again i n the second R e c o n s t r u c t i o n . R a c e has clearly been this country's severest test o f its p o l i t i c a l integrity. T h e i r o n y is that B l a c k s w a n t it both w a y s , as does the W h i t e majority, i n that they w a n t color-blindness — a desire based on the belief that they w i l l continue to be descriptively repre­ sented i n government regardless. W h e t h e r B l a c k officeholding i n the H o u s e w i l l r e m a i n high is a n open question as the p r i n c i p a l m e c h a n i s m used to achieve their current h i g h rates, the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t ( V R A ) , w i l l expire i n 2 0 0 7 unless Congress acts to renew it. M y 1 9 9 6 survey reveals, however, that liberal support in the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y for r a c i a l redistricting a n d m i n o r i t y - m a j o r i t y districts is w e a k . T h e 1 9 9 6 N a t i o n a l B l a c k E l e c t i o n Study ( N B E S ) car­ ried three items that measured B l a c k attitudes t o w a r d m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districts a n d r a c i a l redistricting. T h e three questions highlighted differ­ ent aspects of the debate over m i n o r i t y - m a j o r i t y districts. A t its core is one's acceptance or a v e r s i o n to color-conscious policies. I n W h o s e V o t e s C o u n t s ? , T h e r n s t r o m ( 1 9 8 7 ) denounces the extended use of the V R A as the basis for creating maj o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districts because it violates the A m e r i c a n constitutional ideal of "color-blindness." T h e l a w i s , i n her o p i n i o n , just another f o r m o f affirmative action i n the p o l i t i c a l a r e n a . Supporters of the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t argue that color-conscious redis­ tricting is the o n l y w a y that B l a c k s a n d L a t i n o s c a n w i n election. T h e first question of the 1 9 9 6 N B E S e x p l i c i t l y raises the " c o l o r conscious­ ness" issue by a s k i n g i f districts s h o u l d be d r a w n " w i t h o u t regard to r a c e . " I t reads, Some people t h i n k that districts s h o u l d be d r a w n so that B l a c k s , H i s panics, and W h i t e s a l l have their o w n representatives in government. O t h e r people t h i n k that districts should be d r a w n w i t h o u t regard to

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race. W h i c h one do y o u t h i n k is best —districts d r a w n so that B l a c k s , H i s p a n i c s , a n d W h i t e s a l l have their o w n representatives i n govern­ ment, or districts should be d r a w n w i t h o u t regard to race? T h e second question does not e x p l i c i t l y d r a w attention to the raceconscious means o f creating m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districts to the respon­ dent. I t asks more s i m p l y instead w h e t h e r B l a c k s a n d H i s p a n i c s s h o u l d be v o t i n g majorities or spread evenly across a l l of the districts. I t taps the degree to w h i c h h a v i n g some m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districts is w o r t h ­ w h i l e to the respondent. I t reads, Some people t h i n k that B l a c k a n d H i s p a n i c voters s h o u l d be the vot­ ing majority i n at least some congressional districts. O t h e r people t h i n k that B l a c k a n d H i s p a n i c voters should be spread evenly across a l l congressional districts. W h i c h do y o u think is best — B l a c k s a n d H i s p a n i c s s h o u l d represent majorities i n some congressional districts, or B l a c k s a n d H i s p a n i c s should be spread evenly across a l l congres­ sional districts? T h e p r o b l e m of r a c i a l redistricting is more c o m p l i c a t e d t h a n the j u x ­ taposition of race-conscious redistricting versus the social good of h a v ­ ing a few districts w h e r e minorities are v o t i n g majorities a n d w h e r e minorities c a n w i n elections. It is w i d e l y believed that the n u m e r i c a l representation of B l a c k s a n d H i s p a n i c s w o u l d be enhanced under a differ­ ent electoral system — i f the United States switched from a single-member plurality system ( S M F ) to one where seats were allocated proportionately to vote ( A m y 1 9 9 3 ; G u i n i e r 1 9 9 4 ) . C h a n g i n g to a p r o p o r t i o n a l repre­ sentation system w o u l d have the advantage of being race-neutral w h i l e still a d v a n c i n g the cause o f increasing the n u m e r i c a l representation of minorities. T h u s , a t h i r d consideration is whether one is w e d d e d to the current electoral system or w i l l i n g to cast it aside for one that w o u l d enhance m i n o r i t y descriptive representation. It reads, Some people t h i n k that election rules should be changed so that the n u m b e r o f B l a c k s and H i s p a n i c s i n Congress is equal to their p o p u l a ­ tion i n the country. O t h e r people t h i n k that election rules s h o u l d re­ m a i n as they are. W h i c h one do y o u t h i n k is best —election rules should be changed so that the n u m b e r of B l a c k s and H i s p a n i c s i n Congress is equal to their population in the country, or that election rules should r e m a i n as they are? B l a c k s i n this survey e m p h a t i c a l l y rejected a race-conscious redistrict­ ing process. A s s h o w n in table 9 . 1 , a w h o p p i n g 79 percent of B l a c k s felt that districts s h o u l d be d r a w n " w i t h o u t regard to r a c e , " rejecting the idea that some districts s h o u l d d r a w n so that B l a c k s a n d H i s p a n i c s have their o w n representatives i n W a s h i n g t o n . A full 6 9 percent thought that

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T A B L E 9.1

Black Opinion on Majority-Minority Districts Congressional districts are redrawn every ten years by state legislatures, but how they should be drawn has become very controversial. Please tell me, if you were choosing, which type of district do you think is best? 1 ) Some people think that Black and Hispanic voters should be the voting majority in at least some congressional districts. Other people think that Black and Hispanic voters should he spread evenly across all congressional districts. Which do you think is best —Blacks and Hispanics should repre­ sent majorities in some congressional districts, or Blacks and Hispanics should be spread evenly across all congressional districts? Majorities in some

25%

Spread evenly

69

Don't know

6

2 ) Some people think that districts should be drawn so that Blacks, His­ panics, and Whites all have their own representatives in government. Other people think that districts should be drawn without regard to race. Which one do you think is best — districts drawn so that Blacks, Hispanics, and Whites all have their own representatives in government, or districts should be drawn without regard to race? Minorities have own representatives

18%

Districts drawn without regard to race

79

Don't know

3

3) Some people think that election rules should be changed so that the number of Blacks and Hispanics in Congress is equal to their population in the country. Other people think that election rules should remain as they are. Which one do you think is best — election rules should be changed so that the number of Blacks and Hispanics in Congress is equal to their pop­ ulation in the country, or that election rules should remain as they are? Election rules that favor minorities

60%

Election rules remain as they are

35

Don't know

5

S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

minorities s h o u l d be spread evenly across congressional districts instead of concentrated so that some contained B l a c k a n d H i s p a n i c majorities. A t the same time a large m a j o r i t y ( 6 0 percent), w h e n a s k e d i f election rules s h o u l d change to favor the election of m i n o r i t i e s , endorsed change. T h i s latter o p i n i o n suggests that a B l a c k m a j o r i t y w o u l d have supported

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v o t i n g rights activist L a n i G u i n i e r ' s ( 1 9 9 4 ) efforts to t u r n a w a y f r o m m i n o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districting i n favor o f a p r o p o r t i o n a l representation system i f she h a d been confirmed by the Senate to head the Justice D e ­ partment's C i v i l R i g h t s D i v i s i o n . A t the same time, B l a c k attitudes o n r a c i a l r e d i s r i c t i n g a n d electoral r e f o r m as methods o f achieving greater B l a c k descriptive representation w e r e very unstable. W h i l e only 5 percent or fewer expressed no o p i n i o n o n these measures, suggesting that most people c o u l d a n s w e r the ques­ tions a n d w e r e n ' t confused, w h e n given f o l l o w - u p i n f o r m a t i o n a n d a s k e d if their position w o u l d change, m a n y changed their m i n d s . C h a n g i n g one's position in response to a counterargument indicates one's emo­ tional or intellectual attachment to the issue. I n a d d i t i o n , one's suscep­ tibility to the counterargument can reveal the reasons w h y o p i n i o n c a n change. Regardless of the position taken — color-blind versus colorconscious, p r o - m i n o r i t y descriptive representation or not —about h a l f or more o f the respondents said that they w o u l d change their p o s i t i o n in light of the counterargument. ' T a b l e 9.2 s h o w s the rate of change for B l a c k s t a k i n g the liberal or conservative side o n the r a c i a l r e d i s r i c t i n g items. T h i s table reveals that an a s y m m e t r y exists a m o n g B l a c k s o n this issue as w e l l . W h e r e a s S n i d e r m a n and P i a z z a ( 1 9 9 3 ) found that it w a s harder to t a l k W h i t e conservatives out of their opposition to affirmative a c t i o n , here it is s o m e w h a t harder to t a l k B l a c k liberals out o f their support for minor­ ity-majority districts. T h e results reveal that 4 3 percent of liberals w o u l d change positions i n response to the counterargument, versus 5 7 percent of conservatives; and on the second measure, 4 1 . 5 percent versus 5 0 percent. T h e e x a c t opposite w a s true, however, for B l a c k o p i n i o n on the t h i r d measure. O n this issue, conservatives w h o w a n t e d to keep the election rules as they are were significantly less impressed by the counterargument ("that minorities i n Congress w o u l d a l w a y s be less t h a n their p o p u l a t i o n i n the c o u n t r y " ) a n d stayed firm c o m p a r e d to the liberals. A l t h o u g h i n the m i n o r i t y on this last question, 6 3 percent of minorities w h o took the conservative position a n d didn't w a n t the elec­ t i o n rules to change stayed firm. F o r groups intending to seek the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t ' s r e n e w a l , the study's findings s h o u l d cause a l a r m bells to r i n g . T h o s e i n favor o f the act's r e n e w a l , however, have a n advantage over their r i v a l s insofar as B l a c k l i b e r a l support is stronger a n d more certain t h a n is B l a c k opposi­ t i o n . B l a c k s opposed to r a c i a l r e d i s r i c t i n g practices a n d m i n o r i t y m a j o r i t y districts, after a l l , w e r e found to be most susceptible to the counterarguments in contrast to liberals on t w o o f the three measures. T h u s finding an appealing frame for the act's extension w i l l have larger p o l i t i c a l payoffs t h a n it w i l l for the groups actively seeking its demise. A n o t h e r advantage that liberals have over conservative groups is the

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Blacks' Willingness to Change Position on Racial Redistricting Items

Those Who Said Their Position Would Change in Light of the Counterargument Minorities in Some Districts vs. Minorities Spread Evenly Minorities Have O w n Repre­ sentatives vs. D r a w Districts Without Regard to Race Election Rules That Favor M i ­ norities vs. Election Rules Remain as They Are

Liberal Position Originally Taken

Conservative Position Originally Taken

41.5%

50%

43

57

51

37

S o u r c e : 1996 N B E S .

role that r a c i a l identification plays i n support for racial redistricting a n d m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districts. M a k i n g r e n e w a l a civil rights cause w i l l therefore d r a m a t i c a l l y boost support i n the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y . T h e ability o f Black leaders to present a strong a n d unified force i n favor of extending the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t is a n open question. B i g c i v i l rights organizations have deteriorated to a point w h e r e their o w n sur­ v i v a l is at stake. T h e N A A C P h a d suffered from the revelation that a former president h a d used the organization's funds to keep a former female employee from filing a s e x u a l harassment l a w s u i t against h i m . B l a c k civil rights organizations also suffer from not o n l y a financial crisis but also a political one. A s the controversy over the n o m i n a t i o n of C l a r e n c e T h o m a s to fill T h u r g o o d M a r s h a l l ' s place o n the Supreme C o u r t illustrated, B l a c k organizations are not ready to speak w i t h a united front o n n e w emerging issues. G i v e n that this is a n issue greatly d i v i d i n g W h i t e a n d B l a c k D e m o c r a t s , some B l a c k c i v i l rights groups m a y choose to r e m a i n silent on the question for their o w n strategic purposes. T h e C o n g r e s s i o n a l B l a c k C a u c u s ( C B C ) , however, is c l e a r l y going to aggressively push for the V R A ' s r e n e w a l as though its m e m ­ bers' lives depended on it. T h e fiscal a n d p o l i t i c a l state of the C B C as 2 0 0 7 approaches is also questionable, depending on whether the D e m o ­ crats regain p o l i t i c a l c o n t r o l o f the H o u s e . A s public opinion scholars have argued ( Z a l l e r 1 9 9 2 ; Page a n d S h a ­ p i r o 1 9 9 2 ) , political leaders c a n exert a large influence o n public o p i n ­ ion. T h e president's position o n r e n e w i n g the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t w i l l be p i v o t a l here. O p p o s i t i o n to its r e n e w a l by a R e p u b l i c a n president c o u l d

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help m o b i l i z e B l a c k s p o l i t i c a l l y i n favor of its extension, since B l a c k s r e m a i n staunchly l o y a l to the D e m o c r a t i c party, a n d debate w o u l d be­ come h i g h l y p a r t i s a n . O p p o s i t i o n by a D e m o c r a t i c president, at the same time, might w i n B l a c k s ' a p p r o v a l i n a m a n n e r not u n l i k e the de­ bate over welfare r e f o r m . A m a j o r i t y of B l a c k s ( 6 0 percent) i n the 1 9 9 6 N B E S favored the n e w welfare l a w guaranteeing o n l y five years of life­ time support to families i n poverty. B l a c k support for it, given their liberal profile as a group a n d given that most B l a c k s a n d m a n y D e m o ­ crats i n the H o u s e voted against the welfare r e f o r m legislation, w a s surprising. President C l i n t o n ' s w h o l e h e a r t e d p u r s u i t a n d b a c k i n g of welfare r e f o r m , t a k e n together w i t h his strong p o p u l a r i t y i n the B l a c k c o m m u n i t y , is a principle factor that e x p l a i n s that B l a c k support (Barker, Jones, a n d T a t e 1 9 9 8 ) . H a d a R e p u b l i c a n president sought a s i m i l a r r e f o r m of the welfare p r o g r a m , his or her legislation w o u l d have likely met w i t h deep s k e p t i c i s m a n d serious opposition f r o m B l a c k s . B l a c k s still value descriptive representation, even i f they don't favor race-conscious means t o w a r d achieving descriptive representation. O n e other question i n the 1 9 9 6 N B E S survey illustrates the majority's prefer­ ence for descriptive representation. B l a c k s w e r e asked h o w strongly they agreed or disagreed to the f o l l o w i n g statement: " I t is not i m p o r t a n t for the president to appoint a n a d d i t i o n a l B l a c k person to serve as a justice o n the Supreme C o u r t . " A m a j o r i t y of B l a c k respondents dis­ agreed, w i t h 4 1 percent v o i c i n g strong disagreement. I n contrast, 13 percent of the respondents strongly endorsed this statement w h i l e 18 percent s o m e w h a t agreed w i t h it.

POLITICAL R E F O R M , T H ECOURTS, A N D T H EFUTURE O F BLACK

FACES

T h e U n i t e d States has a system of p o l i t i c a l representation that encour­ ages the v i e w that A m e r i c a n s s h o u l d see themselves reflected i n govern­ ment. N o t virtually, but actually. A m e r i c a ' s w e a k p a r t y system means that p o l i t i c a l parties w i l l never fully provide perfect representation since D e m o c r a t s are not a l l a l i k e i n their interests a n d v o t i n g records. Because members of the H o u s e are elected f r o m districts, the policies that they promote reflect not o n l y u n i v e r s a l concerns but strongly p a r t i c u l a r i s t i c ones. So distinctive is the A m e r i c a n n a t i o n a l legislature that D a v i d M a y h e w considers the t e r m legislature as applied to the U . S . Congress " u n f o r t u n a t e , " arguing that the Congress is a c t u a l l y a "representative a s s e m b l y " ( 1 9 7 4 , 8 ) . I m p l i e d i n this statement is that Congress is a n aggregation of independent deputies, w h o s e allegiances cross over a w i d e a r r a y of interests, f r o m those of their parties to their o w n stake i n reelection a n d p o l i t i c a l advancement. T h e A m e r i c a n system is a " m i x ­ ture," concludes M i l l e r a n d Stokes, "to w h i c h the B u r k e a n , instructed

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delegate, a n d responsible p a r t y models a l l c a n be said to have contrib­ uted elements" ( 1 9 6 3 , 5 6 ) . R a c e obtains its p r o f o u n d significance i n the p o l i t i c a l representation of A m e r i c a n s not o n l y because of its societal impact but also institutional one as w e l l . Because members of Congress are m u c h more t h a n "instructed delegates," B l a c k faces become neces­ sary for their fair a n d equal p o l i t i c a l representation i n government. W i l l B l a c k s be able to obtain a c t u a l p o l i t i c a l representation i f the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t is not enforced or renewed? T h e Supreme C o u r t i n a series of 5 - 4 decisions has recently already rendered the act less effec­ tive, first i n the S h a w v. R e n o decision, w h i c h has made it difficult to m a x i m i z e B l a c k a n d m i n o r i t y officeholding w i t h o u t jeopardizing D e m o ­ cratic incumbents. T h e n i n J a n u a r y 2 0 0 0 , the high court i n a 5 - 4 deci­ sion limited the p o w e r of the U . S . Justice D e p a r t m e n t under the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t to force states to increase the number of districts i n w h i c h minorities represented voting majorities. Previously, under the act, the Justice D e p a r t m e n t c o u l d deny preclearance to states w h o s e electoral plans it deemed r a c i a l l y discriminatory. T h e only recourse left for states denied that preclearance w a s to submit a n e w p l a n or appeal their case to the D . C . Federal C o u r t of A p p e a l s . I n the majority decision w r i t t e n by the C h i e f Justice, the U . S . A t t o r n e y G e n e r a l a n d judges c a n o n l y block redistricting plans that w e a k e n the voting strength of minorities. T h e case arose i n Bossier P a r i s h , L o u i s i a n a , where a school b o a r d re­ fused to adopt a redistricting p l a n that w o u l d have contained t w o B l a c k m a j o r i t y districts. T h e legally contested p l a n h a d twelve districts, none w i t h a B l a c k majority. T h e C o u r t ' s decision sided w i t h the school b o a r d . T h e implications for the r o u n d of redistricting i n 2 0 0 0 that began for congressional districts is that regardless of w h a t the census figures re­ v e a l , the Justice D e p a r t m e n t a n d courts cannot compel states to create a d d i t i o n a l opportunities for minorities to w i n seats. F u r t h e r m o r e , some of the existing m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districts might retroactively be held to violate the S h a w v. R e n o test a n d thus m a y be held ineligible for use as a baseline standard for retrogression. T h i s area of l a w is l i k e l y to re­ m a i n unclear u n t i l cases i n v o l v i n g Section 5 preclearance denials are resolved i n the n e x t r o u n d of redistricting. A s M a r k E . R u s h points out, " A s long as single-member districts re­ m a i n the remedy of choice i n implementing the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t ( V R A ) , gerrymandering controversies w i l l a b o u n d " ( 1 9 9 8 , 2 6 1 ) . T h e alterna­ tive to r e n e w i n g the V o t i n g R i g h t s A c t is changing the electoral system. I n general, a proportional-representation ( P R ) electoral system is seen as a w a y to advance m i n o r i t y descriptive representation a n d get out of the " p o l i t i c a l t h i c k e t " o f court litigation over r a c i a l gerrymandering. T h e biggest advantage o f s w i t c h i n g to P R is that it offers a " r a c e - n e u t r a l " w a y i n w h i c h m i n o r i t y descriptive representation c a n be advanced. P R

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is not panacea as there are n u m e r o u s versions o f P R systems, some o f w h i c h c o u l d l i m i t m i n o r i t y officeholding. H o w e v e r , w h i l e P R m a y not y i e l d absolute p r o p o r t i o n a l representation, it offers a more secure basis o f descriptive representation i n government for p o l i t i c a l m i n o r i t i e s t h a n possible under district-based forms of p o l i t i c a l representation. O n e must, i n fact, question the real motives of those w h o oppose m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districts because it is rooted i n a color-conscious practice, but then w h o also oppose P R as a c o l o r - b l i n d alternative to increasing the rates of m i n o r i t y p o l i t i c a l officeholding. T h e p o l i t i c a l e m p o w e r m e n t o f m a r g i n a l i z e d ethnic a n d r a c i a l groups under different electoral systems has not been researched as t h o r o u g h l y as it c o u l d be, especially since it requires c r o s s - n a t i o n a l data o n m i n o r ­ ities. I n contrast, there is ample scholarship on the effects of different electoral systems o n rates of female officeholding. B y h a v i n g to prepare candidate lists, p o l i t i c a l parties are given more incentives to strive for gender balance, a n d they place more w o m e n on their tickets. A s n o r m a ­ tive theorists point out, however, the p r o b l e m o f race a n d ethnicity i n democratic states is quite distinct from that of gender (Phillips 1 9 9 5 ) . C e r t a i n l y in the U n i t e d States, for e x a m p l e , the political divisions be­ tween W h i t e s a n d B l a c k s are significantly greater t h a n those between m e n a n d w o m e n , even w h i l e there exists a well-documented gender gap i n U . S . p o l i t i c a l behavior. A l l this is to argue that even i f the system w e r e to be reformed to one less biased in favor o f the status quo a n d entrenched interests, but more reflective of a l l interests, r a c i a l a n d eth­ nic conflict w o u l d still m a k e penetrating the democratic systems difficult for B l a c k s a n d other m a r g i n a l i z e d m i n o r i t y groups. I n the 1 9 9 6 N B E S survey, a full 6 0 percent of B l a c k s endorsed elec­ t o r a l reform as a means of a d v a n c i n g their descriptive representation i n Congress. T h e r e is ready-made B l a c k support for r e f o r m . C o n t r a r y to w h a t one might expect, some B l a c k members of Congress, i n c l u d i n g J a m e s C l y b u r n o f S o u t h C a r o l i n a , the C h a i r m a n o f the C B C i n the 1 0 6 t h , strongly favor m o v i n g from a w i n n e r - t a k e - a l l district system to a P R or c u m u l a t i v e v o t i n g system. B u i l d i n g a movement for r e f o r m , h o w ­ ever, w o u l d r u n steeply u p h i l l against a history a n d t r a d i t i o n in favor o f keeping single-member districts. A n d prospects for reforming the elec­ t o r a l system to P R are extremely low. A s R i c h a r d E n g s t r o m e x p l a i n s , for p o l i t i c a l a n d not constitutionally required purposes, " T h e A m e r i c a n experience w i t h electoral systems has been severely t r u n c a t e d " ( 1 9 9 8 , 2 4 2 ) . T h u s l a w professor L a n i G u i n i e r ' s w r i t t e n a d v o c a c y o f P R sys­ tems, based o n sound e m p i r i c a l evidence as w e l l as the principle o f "race n e u t r a l i t y " a n d fairness, cost her an appointment by President C l i n t o n to head the Justice Department's C i v i l R i g h t s D i v i s i o n . T h e idea of scrapping the continuously litigated Section 2 of the V o t i n g R i g h t s

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A c t for a n a t i o n a l s w i t c h to P R w a s denounced as too r a d i c a l not o n l y by U . S . Senators but by a m a j o r i t y w i t h i n the m e d i a as w e l l . District-based representative d e m o c r a c y promulgates the belief that government s h o u l d m i r r o r the p o p u l a t i o n , w h e n it, effectively, does not. A n d the value of grouping interests into a single entity — the district — over other methods o f representing citizens is not e m p i r i c a l l y w e l l sup­ ported. A l t h o u g h a l o n g line of theorists suggest that district-based rep­ resentation is e m p o w e r i n g , B l a c k descriptive representation w a s not, as results i n chapter 7 bear out. B u t , i n fact, p a r t i s a n c o n t r o l instead c a n significantly raise or l o w e r B l a c k s ' rates o f voter p a r t i c i p a t i o n . U n d e r a P R system, fewer groups w o u l d feel unrepresented ideologically i n gov­ ernment as more parties w o u l d serve i n government. R a t e s o f p o l i t i c a l p a r t i c i p a t i o n w o u l d l i k e l y increase under a P R system. B l a c k s as a polit­ ically cohesive n u m e r i c a l m i n o r i t y w o u l d be able to enjoy higher levels of descriptive representation i n a P R system. I n the end, arguments made by n u m e r i c a l l y underrepresented groups such as B l a c k s a n d w o m e n that reforms s h o u l d be adopted to insure their a c t u a l presence are rejected, less by the long-standing c l a i m s of v i r t u a l representation ( w h i c h e m p i r i c a l l y have been s h o w n to be false for these groups) t h a n by the n o t i o n that elections guarantee their repre­ sentation. E l e c t i o n s h i s t o r i c a l l y have been a poor m e c h a n i s m to g u a r a n ­ tee the representation of B l a c k s because of k e y features of the A m e r i c a n electoral system. A s s u c h , as long as W h i t e candidates can p l a y o n r a c i a l fears and w i n on the basis of r a c i a l - b l o c v o t i n g , the o n l y a v a i l a b l e means B l a c k s have to secure their descriptive representation is through the courts. W h i l e the Supreme C o u r t has repudiated m a j o r i t y - m i n o r i t y districts o n the basis of " p r i n c i p l e , " it c o u l d sustain t h e m on the basis of p o l i t i c a l p r a g m a t i s m . A s m u c h as the D e c l a r a t i o n o f Independence established the principles guiding this n a t i o n , the c o u n t r y w a s founded o n the basis of p o l i t i c a l p r a g m a t i s m . B l a c k s are not likely to w i t h d r a w f r o m politics and revolt i f even fewer numbers o f B l a c k s serve i n the H o u s e a n d it begins to resemble Congress's l i l y - w h i t e upper chamber, the U . S . Senate. E v e n w i t h o u t race c o n t i n u i n g to e x i s t as a p o l i t i c a l fault line w i t h i n the U n i t e d States, even w i t h o u t A m e r i c a ' s r a c i a l history or its legacy, our system creates a reasonable demand for descriptive representation for all i n government. District-based p o l i t i c a l representation is the p r i n ­ ciple of homogeneity a n d consensus. A m e r i c a is a diverse n a t i o n a n d therefore w e either change the system better to reflect its diversity, or the courts must fulfill their assumed c o n s t i t u t i o n a l role of protecting the interests of p o l i t i c a l m i n o r i t i e s , i n c l u d i n g w o m e n . S u c h interests under the current p o l i t i c a l system c a n o n l y be advanced i n a n a t i o n a l assembly that effectively m i r r o r s the p o p u l a t i o n .

APPENDIX

A

The 1996 National Black Election Study

I N 1 9 8 4 , a national telephone survey o f voting-eligible A f r i c a n A m e r i ­ cans w a s conducted by the P r o g r a m for R e s e a r c h on B l a c k A m e r i c a n s at the U n i v e r s i t y of M i c h i g a n under the direction o f J a m e s S. J a c k s o n . M o d e l e d after the U n i v e r s i t y o f M i c h i g a n ' s l a n d m a r k N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n Studies w i t h its pre- a n d post-election i n t e r v i e w components, the 1984 N a t i o n a l B l a c k E l e c t i o n Study ( N B E S ) represented the first-ever n a ­ t i o n a l p o l i t i c a l survey o f a r a c i a l m i n o r i t y group. I n 1 9 8 8 , a reinterview of the o r i g i n a l 1 9 8 4 N B E S respondents w a s conducted, but i n 1 9 9 2 , a data set c o m p a r a b l e to the 1 9 8 4 N B E S or its 1 9 8 8 reinterview d i d not exist. W i t h funds from O h i o State U n i v e r s i t y a n d the N a t i o n a l Science F o u n d a t i o n ( S B R - 9 5 0 7 4 6 9 ) , a survey modeled after the o r i g i n a l 1 9 8 4 N B E S w a s conducted i n 1996 by K a t h e r i n e T a t e at O h i o State U n i v e r ­ sity. T h i s 1996 B l a c k telephone survey, called the N a t i o n a l B l a c k E l e c ­ t i o n Study or N B E S , w a s designed to provide the t h i r d of a n ongoing time series of B l a c k p o l i t i c a l attitudes a n d behavior d u r i n g the 1 9 9 6 n a t i o n a l elections. T o facilitate r a c i a l group c o m p a r i s o n s as w e l l , the survey also c a r r i e d m a n y items contained in the Center for Political Studies' 1 9 9 6 N a t i o n a l E l e c t i o n Study. T h e telephone survey w a s c a r r i e d out by M a r k e t Strategies i n Southfield, M i c h i g a n . Telephone i n t e r v i e w i n g began J u l y 19 a n d ended N o ­ vember 4 , 1 9 9 6 . A total o f 1,216 i n t e r v i e w s w i t h voting-eligible B l a c k s w a s completed. I m m e d i a t e l y f o l l o w i n g the election, 8 5 4 respondents w e r e r e i n t e r v i e w e d ; the post-election r e i n t e r v i e w i n g ended J a n u a r y 6, 1 9 9 7 . L i k e its 1 9 8 4 - 8 8 N B E S a n d 1 9 9 6 N E S counterparts, the 1 9 9 6 N B E S w a s designed to explore the electoral behavior a n d attitudes of B l a c k s i n the presidential election. H o w e v e r , u n l i k e the o r i g i n a l N B E S , the 1 9 9 6 study also h a d an e x p l i c i t congressional focus. Respondents w e r e matched to their congressional districts a n d asked to evaluate their H o u s e representatives. A total o f 2 5 2 H o u s e districts fell into the s a m ­ ple, i n c l u d i n g the districts of 3 4 o f the 3 9 B l a c k members o f Congress. I n a l l , 3 1 percent of the B l a c k respondents were represented by these B l a c k legislators. A n u m b e r o f i n d i v i d u a l s participated i n the design a n d i m p l e m e n t a ­ t i o n of the study. K a t h e r i n e T a t e w a s the p r i n c i p a l investigator of the study. F r e d Steeper a n d J u d i t h P e r r y directed the pre- a n d post-election surveys at M a r k e t Strategies. K e v i n Cooper, also of M a r k e t Strategies,

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designed the sample. D o c t o r a l students T e r e s a T o d d , G l o r i a H a m p t o n , a n d Stefanie C h a m b e r s at O h i o State U n i v e r s i t y assisted i n the develop­ ment a n d i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of this survey. A n a d v i s o r y b o a r d w a s created at O h i o State U n i v e r s i t y to p r o v i d e i n p u t into the development o f the study; its members w e r e P a u l B e c k (chair o f the P o l i t i c a l Science D e p a r t ­ ment), Janet Box-Steffensmeier, G r e g o r y C a l d e i r a , Aage C l a u s e n , T h o m a s N e l s o n , W i l l i a m E . N e l s o n (Political Science a n d B l a c k Studies), S a m u e l Patterson, a n d H e r b e r t Weisberg ( D i r e c t o r of the P o l i m e t r i c s L a b ) . N a ­ t i o n a l E l e c t i o n Study researchers, most n o t a b l y Steven Rosenstone, V i r ­ ginia S a p i r o , a n d K a t h y C i r k s e n a , shared i n f o r m a t i o n a n d their exper­ tise. Special t h a n k s also go to K a r i n M . C l i s s o l d of M a r k e t Strategies a n d G a r y J a c o b s o n at U n i v e r s i t y o f C a l i f o r n i a - S a n D i e g o for their expertise a n d advice.

SAMPLE

DESCRIPTION

L i k e the o r i g i n a l 1 9 8 4 N B E S , the 1 9 9 6 N B E S is a full-coverage, dispro­ portionate p r o b a b i l i t y r a n d o m - d i g i t - d i a l telephone survey. H o w e v e r , there are t w o i m p o r t a n t differences between the t w o samples. F i r s t , w h i l e the 1 9 8 4 study sampled f r o m three strata, the 1 9 9 6 s u r v e y w a s a stratified r a n d o m sample w i t h four strata. T h e s e four strata w e r e 1. M e t r o p o l i t a n statistical areas w i t h populations o f one m i l l i o n or m o r e a n d B l a c k populations of 15 percent or m o r e (n = 6 0 0 , esti­ m a t e d incidence = 2 2 % ) . 2 . T h e Southern states ( A l a b a m a , F l o r i d a , G e o r g i a , L o u i s i a n a , M i s ­ sissippi, S o u t h C a r o l i n a , T e x a s a n d V i r g i n i a ) , e x c l u d i n g the M S A s that fall into Strata 1 ( n = 4 0 0 , estimated incidence = 2 3 % ) . 3 . Telephone exchanges serving the r e m a i n i n g c o n t i n e n t a l U n i t e d States w i t h 5 percent or greater B l a c k p o p u l a t i o n ( n = 1 7 5 , esti­ m a t e d incidence = 1 7 % ) . 4 . A l l r e m a i n i n g telephone exchanges i n the continental U n i t e d States w i t h B l a c k populations less t h a n 5 percent ( n = 2 5 , estimated incidence = 1 . 4 % ) . Strata 3 a n d 4 are essentially the 1 9 8 4 N B E S ' s t h i r d s t r a t u m split into t w o . Telephone exchanges serving i n the above strata w e r e pooled, a n d a random-digit d i a l sample w a s generated independently w i t h each p o o l . T h i s is not a self-weighing design, so the data set requires weight­ ing. T h e basis for the strata weights is s h o w n i n table A . l . T h e full-coverage design o f the N B E S surveys is unique; by c o m p a r i ­ s o n , for cost a n d efficiency reasons, n e a r l y every other B l a c k telephone s u r v e y sample today is targeted (limited i n most instances to telephone exchange areas that are 15 to 2 5 percent or m o r e B l a c k ( C l i s s o l d a n d

Appendix A TABLE

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173

A.l

Strata Weights U.S. B l a c k Population (N) Strata Descrip­ tion Large M S A s Southern States Balance ( 5 % Black or more) Balance (less than 5 % Black)

P e r c e n t of Total Pop.

SelfWeighting

Sample Size (n)

Weight

13,238,232

.43144357

519

606

0.86

7,169,510

.23365952

280

410

0.68

8,677,847

.28281732

339

175

1.94

1,597,988

.05207959

62

25

2.48

Tate 1 9 9 7 ) . B l a c k s l i v i n g in predominantly W h i t e c o m m u n i t i e s are a u ­ t o m a t i c a l l y e x c l u d e d i n targeted samples as locating a n d securing inter­ v i e w s w i t h B l a c k respondents l i v i n g i n such c o m m u n i t i e s is costly. F o r e x a m p l e , w h i l e i n t e r v i e w s w i t h B l a c k s f r o m Strata 1 cost a b o u t $ 1 0 0 each to complete, i n t e r v i e w s i n Strata 4 (an area that w a s less than 5 percent B l a c k ) were four a n d one-half times more costly. A second sample difference between the 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 9 6 N B E S is that w h i l e the 1 9 8 4 N B E S generated numbers using the M i t o f s k y - W a k s b e r g design, the 1 9 9 6 survey w a s a list-assisted sample. T h e phone numbers sampled f r o m the four strata underwent a series o f screenings to i n ­ crease the w o r k i n g n u m b e r rate. T h e first stage o f screening purged k n o w n business phone n u m b e r s . T h e r e m a i n i n g numbers w e r e identi­ fied as either listed or unlisted. T h e unlisted numbers were screened for an operator intercept signifying a n o n w o r k i n g number. T h e screenings were performed in-house and the systems used were part of the G E N E S Y S system. After screening, the sample files were sent to the M a r k i n g Systems G r o u p to have the 1 0 5 t h congressional district appended. (Definitions for the 1 0 5 t h Congress were appended to a l l states except T e x a s , w h e r e large-scale redistricting o c c u r r e d . Because the n e w districts w e r e not yet available at the time of the field starting date, the 1 0 4 t h Congress w e r e appended to T e x a s . ) T h i s w a s done by first determining w h e t h e r the phone n u m b e r w a s listed. I f it w a s listed, the census b l o c k w a s deter­ m i n e d a n d an " e x a c t " match w a s made. I f the number w a s not listed, the congressional district serving the p l u r a l i t y o f the exchange w a s

174

•

Appendix A

appended. T h e r e is a flag i n c l u d e d that distinguishes between e x a c t matches a n d plurality-based m a t c h e d . M e m b e r s of telephone households w e r e eligible to participate i n the study i f a member w a s B l a c k a n d at least 18 years or age or older. T h e race of the household member w a s determined using this screener: " B e ­ cause w e are interested i n the opinions of different demographic groups i n the country, the first question I need to ask is: I s there a n a d u l t 18 years o f older l i v i n g i n y o u r h o u s e h o l d w h o is a B l a c k A m e r i c a n ? " W h i l e the 1 9 8 4 N B E S used the K i s h selection method, B l a c k respon­ dents w e r e chosen f r o m eligible telephone households o n the basis of h a v i n g h a d the most recent birthday. U s i n g the last-birthday m e t h o d as a means of selection is less i n t r u s i v e t h a n the K i s h g r i d , w h i c h requires the complete e n u m e r a t i o n o f the household, f r o m w h i c h one person is r a n d o m l y selected. S a l m o n a n d N i c h o l s ( 1 9 8 3 ) f o u n d that samples d r a w n using the last-birthday method w e r e just as representative as those w h o s e respondents w e r e chosen by the K i s h selection m e t h o d . Because potentially sensitive questions are not a s k e d i n the screening, some believe that the n e x t - b i r t h d a y m e t h o d i m p r o v e s the c o o p e r a t i o n rate, although previous research f o u n d that differences i n the response rates between the t w o methods are not statistically significant ( O l d e n d i c k et a l . 1 9 8 8 ) . T h e 1 9 9 6 N B E S P i l o t utilized a r a n d o m - s p l i t of both selection methods a n d found that the last-birthday technique yielded a slightly higher, although not statistically significant, response rate t h a n the K i s h grid method.

RESPONSE RATES A N D T H EREPRESENTATIVENESS O F T H E SAMPLE

Response rates c a n be calculated a n u m b e r o f different w a y s . T a b l e A . 2 presents the dispositions of attempted calls i n the preelection s u r v e y so that a n y f o r m u l a c a n be applied to calculate the study's response rates for c o m p a r a t i v e purposes. T h e o v e r a l l response rate for the preelection study w a s 6 5 percent. T h i s response rate adjusts for the p r o p o r t i o n o f respondents w h o s e eligibility for the study w a s undetermined. I t w a s estimated t h r o u g h screening that r o u g h l y 15 percent of those contacted were B l a c k households. T h u s , o n l y 15 percent o f the 1,446 respondents of undetermined status (those w h o refused to a n s w e r the race screening i t e m , those too busy to participate, or households w i t h a n s w e r i n g m a ­ chines) w e r e included i n the d e n o m i n a t o r o f the refusal rate estimate as potential B l a c k respondents w h o w e r e lost. Strata 4 h a d the l o w e s t re­ sponse rate of 5 7 percent. Because the incidence rate w a s less t h a n 2 percent i n this s t r a t u m , a n d B l a c k s w e r e difficult to find t h r o u g h a r a n ­ dom-digit d i a l sample, eligible B l a c k respondents w h o i n i t i a l l y refused to participate i n the study w e r e offered $ 5 0 for completing the interview.

Appendix A

* 175

TABLE A.2

Pre-election Survey Final Disposition Codes and Response Rates Strata 1

Strata 2

Completed Interviews

606

412

Determined Status: Refusals Callbacks

227 181

Undetermined Status: Callbacks Refusals Non-contacts Unanswered Numbers

Strata 3

Strata 4

Total

175

25

1,218

144

54

14

439

106

47

11

345

46

38

7

3

94

600

361

179

306

45

38

25

25

133

352

210

91

121

774

203

113

63

160

539

855

501

274

410

1,446

2,040

Noneligible Numbers

4,080

3,187

1,568

2,807

11,642

Noneligible Respondents

5,732

4,395

1,963

4,200

16,290

12,100

9,000

4,213

7,762

33,075

Total Records Incidence or Screening Rate

.208

.178

.184

.015

.153

Response Rate

63%

66%

67%

57%

65%

N o t e ; T h e study's total response rate is calculated as completed interviews/[completed interviews + determined status + (incidence""undetermined status summed for strata 1 t h r o u g h 4)]

Phone numbers w e r e determined to be " u n a n s w e r e d " if, after at least six attempts, no contact w a s made. " U n a n s w e r e d " numbers were at­ tempted at least once o n the w e e k e n d , w e e k d a y s between 8 a . m . a n d 5 p.m., a n d w e e k d a y s after 5 p . m . T h e r e w a s no l i m i t to the n u m b e r of c a l l b a c k s to " l i v e " n u m b e r s . A n u m b e r w a s considered live i f contact was made, that is, i f at a n y time the c a l l w a s a n s w e r e d . T h u s , for e x a m ­ ple, a n s w e r i n g machines belonging to households w e r e considered live numbers. I n the postelection survey, 7 0 percent of the 1,218 o r i g i n a l preelection respondents w e r e r e i n t e r v i e w e d for a total o f 8 5 4 i n t e r v i e w s . T h e recontact rate across the four strata w a s 7 0 percent for Strata 1, 7 3 per­ cent for Strata 2 , 6 4 percent for Strata 3, and 6 3 percent for Strata 4 . O f those w e were unable to recontact, 1 9 4 h a d telephones that were disconnected or out of service, or the i n d i v i d u a l no longer lived there, or w a s permanently u n a v a i l a b l e . T h e r e m a i n i n g 1 7 0 w e r e refusals or callbacks.

176

•

Appendix A

T H E REPRESENTATIVENESS O F T H E SAMPLE

Because the 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 9 6 N B E S surveys w e r e conducted by tele­ phone, B l a c k respondents w e r e not as representative of the general B l a c k adult p o p u l a t i o n as a face-to-face s u r v e y w o u l d have been. F o r c o m p a r ­ i s o n purposes, table A . 3 presents the demographic characteristics o f both the 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 9 6 N B E S respondents a n d the M a r c h C u r r e n t P o p u l a t i o n Survey data f r o m the U . S . C e n s u s , w h i c h is a face-to-face survey. W h i l e C P S is designed to t r a c k e m p l o y m e n t a n d u n e m p l o y m e n t patterns i n the U n i t e d States, a second stated purpose o f the C P S is to collect m o n t h l y i n f o r m a t i o n o n the demographic status o f the p o p u l a ­ t i o n . Based o n i n t e r v i e w s w i t h 4 0 , 0 0 0 or m o r e households, the C P S samples therefore, are designed to be h i g h l y representative o f the U . S . p o p u l a t i o n . T h e C P S data s h o w n i n table A . 3 are for B l a c k respondents 18 years of age or older, yielding 1 0 , 3 1 3 respondents i n 1 9 8 4 a n d 8 , 7 2 3 respondents i n 1 9 9 6 . T h e poor a n d least educated are generally f o u n d i n households w i t h ­ out telephones. A s expected, then, l o w - i n c o m e a n d less-educated B l a c k s are generally underrepresented i n the N B E S surveys. I n a d d i t i o n , both the 1 9 8 4 a n d 1 9 9 6 surveys overrepresent B l a c k w o m e n by 3 to 5 per­ cent. B l a c k w o m e n are generally overrepresented i n surveys, i n c l u d i n g face-to-face surveys, because m e n are less l i k e l y t h a n w o m e n to be attached to B l a c k households. T h u s , the overrepresentation of B l a c k w o m e n i n the N B E S telephone samples is l i k e l y c o m p o u n d e d by differ­ ent response rates for B l a c k m e n a n d w o m e n i n telephone surveys. T h e N B E S samples are c o m p a r a b l e to the C P S studies for age, a l t h o u g h i n the N B E S , respondents 5 5 years of age a n d older are s o m e w h a t overrepresented. A g a i n , as i n the case for w o m e n , the elderly m a y be m o r e cooperative w h e n asked to participate i n phone surveys t h a n those i n the m i d d l e - t w o age categories. T h e 1 9 9 6 N B E S sample is very s i m i l a r to the o r i g i n a l 1 9 8 4 sample. B o t h overrepresent B l a c k w o m e n , middle-income a n d educated B l a c k s , a n d w o r k i n g B l a c k s . T h e 1 9 9 6 N B E S , however, m a y be slightly less representative t h a n the 1 9 8 4 sample i n its overrepresentation o f m i d d l e income B l a c k s a n d the B l a c k elderly.

T H E RACE-OF-INTERVIEWER

EFFECT

T h e 1 9 9 6 N B E S used W h i t e , B l a c k , a n d A s i a n telephone i n t e r v i e w e r s . T h e a c t u a l race of the i n t e r v i e w e r w a s self-coded (see table A . 4 ) . A b o u t h a l f of the preelection i n t e r v i e w i n g ( 4 9 % ) w a s performed by W h i t e i n ­ terviewers, w h i l e B l a c k conducted 4 4 percent of the i n t e r v i e w s . H i s ­ panic a n d A s i a n i n t e r v i e w e r s w h o coded themselves as belonging to a n -

TABLE

A3

The Representativeness of the 1984 and 1996 N B E S Weighted Samples 1984 NBES

1984 CPS

1996 NBES

1 9 9 6 CPS

Gender: Male Female

37.8% 62.2

42.8% 57.2

37.4% 62.6

40.7% 59.3

Age: 18-24 25-34 35-54 55+

20.2 28 29.6 22.2

19.8 24.6 30.1 25.4

15.9 25.1 41.6 17.4

15.4 21.8 38.6 24.2

13.1

17.8

2.5

8.8

Educational Attain­ ment : Elementary: 0 - 8 years High school: 1-3 years High school: 4 years College: 1-3 years College: 4 + years

14.8

17.9

9.1

18.4

31.1 23.7 17.4

36.8 17.3 10.2

29.4 37.4 21.7

34.3 26.4 12.2

Family Income : less than $10,000 $10,000-29,999 $30,000-49,999 $50,000 or more

29.7 49.7 20.6 -

37.3 42.6 20.1 -

11.6 43.0 25.1 20.4

22.0 36.0 21.5 20.4

Region South Non-South

59.0 41.0

56.2 43.8

55.1 44.9

53.1 46.9

48.6

48.7

36.5

44.5

28.9 11.8 10.7

31.6 10.4 9.3

40.1 5.5 17.9

35.7 8.3 11.6

60.0 13.5

53.1 9.5

72.8 8.0

57.1 6.5

25.4

37.4

18.7

36.5

45.2

44.3

44.1

47.5

1

2

3

Marital Status: Married (includes separated) Never married Widowed Divorced Labor Force Status: Working Unemployed (ineludes laid off) Not in labor force Home-Ownership: Rent

178 TABLE

•

Appendix A A.3

(Continued) 1984

Own Other

4

NBES

1 9 8 4 CPS 53.7 1.9

48.8 6.0

1996

NBES

53.3 2.6

1 9 9 6 CPS 50.8 1.7

'In contrast to the 1996 C P S , the 1984 C P S education categories did not indicate whether the respondents had actually graduated. T h e income categories in the 1984 N B E S ranged from less than $10,000 to $40,000 or more at intervals of $10,000, while the income categories in the 1986 N B E S ranged from less than $10,000 to $105,000 or more at intervals of $5,000 and $10,000. As defined by the U.S. Bureau of the Census, the South represents Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. T h e other category for the census represents those not paying "cash rent."

other r a c i a l or ethnic group completed 8 percent of the i n t e r v i e w s . T h e use o f both B l a c k a n d W h i t e i n t e r v i e w e r s i n the 1 9 9 6 N B E S is consis­ tent w i t h that for the 1984 N B E S , although none o f the i n t e r v i e w e r s i n the 1 9 8 4 preelection study coded themselves as belonging to another group that w a s neither W h i t e n o r B l a c k . I n the 1 9 8 4 preelection study, 4 6 percent of the i n t e r v i e w s w e r e conducted by W h i t e s a n d 5 3 % by B l a c k s . T h e r e m a i n i n g 1 percent of the preelection i n t e r v i e w s i n 1 9 8 4 w e r e conducted by interviewers w h o s e race w a s not coded. Respondents were asked, however, a final question at the end o f the 1996 survey to gauge whether they h a d placed interviewers i n a r a c i a l category or not. T h i s question read, " W e ' d like to k n o w w h a t k i n d of

T A B L E A.4

Cross-tabulation of Perceived Race of Interviewer by Actual Race of Interviewer in 1996 N B E S (Numbers Shown in Parentheses) Self-coded White Perceived Race of Interviewer White Black Other Don't K n o w Refused/NA

71.5 9.8 8.2 10.1 0.4

(411) (56) (47) (58) (2)

100%

R a c e of I n t e r v i e w e r Black

Other

22.0 (116) 62.9 (333) 4.6 (24) 9.6 (51) 0.9 (5)

63.4 (61) 10.7 (10) 5.4 (5) 18.2 (17) 2.3 (2)

100%

100%

Appendix A

•

179

things people c a n tell just from listening to a person's voice over the telephone. D u r i n g the interview, d i d y o u t h i n k I w a s W h i t e , B l a c k , or someone o f another g r o u p ? " E x a m i n i n g the issue for the first time for a B l a c k telephone survey, G u r i n , H a t c h e t t , a n d J a c k s o n ( 1 9 8 9 ) found that the a c t u a l race of the interviewer is less i m p o r t a n t than w h a t the re­ spondent perceives the race of that interviewer to be. T h u s , the perceived-race-of-interviewer measure (as opposed to the actual race o f the interviewer) should be introduced into the analysis of the data as a po­ tential c o n t r o l measure for response bias. NAMES A N D DISTRICTS O F REPRESENTATIVES W H O F E L L INTO

1996

NBES SAMPLE

F i n a l l y , table A . 5 presents the names of the U . S . H o u s e whose districts fell into the 1996 N B E S sample.

TABLE

representatives

A.5

List of House Members Whose Districts Fell into 1996 Sample State a n d District Codes 1.01 1.02 1.03 1.04 1.05 1.06 1.07 5.02 5.04 6.01 6.05 6.07 6.08 6.09 6.11 6.14 6.18 6.19 6.21 6.23 6.26 6.27 6.28

Representatives

State a n d District Codes

Representatives

Callahan, Sonny Everett, Terry Browder, Glen Bevill, Tom Cramer, Robert Bachus, Spencer Hillard, Earl F. Thorton, Ray Dickey, Jay Riggs, Frank Matsui, Robert T. Miller, George Pelosi, Nancy Dellums, Ronald R . Pombo, Richard W. Eshoo, Anna Condit, Gary Randanovich, George Thomas, Bill Gallegly, Elton Berman, Howard Moor head, Carlos Drier, David

6.32 6.33 6.34 6.35 6.37 6.38 6.40 6.42 6.50 6.51 8.01 8.02 8.05 8.06 9.01 9.02 9.03 10.01 11.01 12.01 12.02 12.03 12.04

Dixon, Julian C . Roybal-Allard, Lucille Torres, Esta ban E . Waters, Maxine Millender-McDonald, Juanita Horn, Steve Lewis, Jerry Brown Jr., George E . Filner, Bob Cunningham, Randy Schroeder, Patricia Skaggs, David E . Hefley, Joel Schaefer, Dan Kennelly, Barbara Gejdenson, Sam DeLauro, Rosa Castle, A l Michael N . Norton, Eleanor Holmes Scarborough, Joe Peterson, Pete Brown, Corrine Fowler, Tillie

TABLE

A.5

State a n d District Codes 12.05 12.06 12.07 12.08 12.09 12.10 12.11 12.12 12.13 12.14 12.15 12.16 12.17 12.18 12.19 12.20 12.22 12.23 13.01 13.02 13.03 13.04 13.05 13.06 13.07 13.08 13.09 13.10 13.11 17.01 17.02 17.04 17.05 17.06 17.07 17.09 17.10 17.11 17.12 17.13 17.14 17.15

(Continued)

Representatives

State a n d District Codes

Thurman, Karen L . Stearns, Cliff Mica, John L . McCollum, Bill Bilirakis, Michael Young, C.W.Bill Gibbons, Sam M . Canady, Charles T. Miller, Dan Goss, Porter J . Weldon, Dave Foley, M a r k Meek, Carrie Ros-Lehtinen, Ileana Johnston, Harry Deutsch, Peter Shaw Jr., Clay Hastings, Alcee L . Kingston, Jack Bishsop Jr., Sanford Collins, Mac Linder, John Lewis, John Gingrich, Newt Barr, Bob Chambliss, Saxby Deal, Nathan Norwood, Charlie McKinney, Cynthia A . Rush, Bobby L . Jackson Jr., Jesse Gutierrez, Luis V. Flanagan, Michael Hyde, Henry Collins, Cardiss Yates, Sidney Porter, John Edward Weller, Jerry Costello, Jerry F. Fawell, Harris W. Hastert, Dennis Ewing, Thomas

17.16 17.18 17.20 18.01 18.03 18.04 18.10 20.02 20.03 21.01 21.02 21.03 22.01 22.02 22.03 22.04 22.05 22.06 22.07 24.01 24.02 24.03 24.04 24.05 24.06 24.07 24.08 25.02 25.07 25.09 26.03 26.07 26.09 26.10 26.11 26.12 26.14 26.15 27.03 27.04 28.01 28.02

Representatives Manzullo, Donald LaHood, R a y Durbin, Richard J . Visclosky, Peter J . Roemer, T i m Souder, M a r k E . Jacobs, Andrew Jr. Brownback, Sam Meyers, Jan Whitfield, Edward Lewis, R o n Ward, Mike Livingston, Robert Jefferson, William J . Tauzin, W. J . Billy Fields, Cleo McCrery, J i m Baker, Richard Hayes, Jimmy Gilchrest, Wayne T. Ehrlich, Robert L . Cardin, Benjamin L . Wynn, Albert R . Hoyer, Steny H . Bartlett, Roscoe Cummings, Elijah Morella, Constance Neal, Richard E . M a r key, Edward J . Moakley, Joe Ehlers, Vernon J . Smith, Nick Kildee, Dale E . Bonior, David E . Knollenberg, Joe Levin, Sander M . Conyers Jr., John Collins, Barbara-Rose Ramstad, J i m Vento, Bruce Wicker, Roger Thompson, Bennie

TABLE

A.5 ( C o n t i n u e d )

State a n d District Codes 28.03 28.04 28.05 29.01 29.03 29.05 29.06 31.02 32.01 34.01 34.02 34.04 34.07 34.08 34.09 34.10 34.11 34.12 36.01 36.03 36.04 36.05 36.06 36.07 36.09 36.10 36.11 36.12 36.15 36.16 36.17 36.18 36.19 36.20 36.21 36.24 36.26 36.27 36.28 36.30 37.01 37.02

Representatives

State a n d District Codes

Representatives

Montgomery, G.V. Parker, M i k e Taylor, Gene Clay, William L . Gephardt, Richard McCarthy, Karen Danner, Pat Christensen, Jon Ensign, John Andrews, Robert E . LoBiondo, Frank A . Smith, Christopher H . Franks, Bob Martini, Bill Torricelli, Robert G . Payne, Donald M . Frelinghuysen, Rodney Zimmer, Dick Forbes, Michael J . King, Peter T. Frisa, Daniel Ackerman, Gary Flake, Floyd H . Manton, Thomas J Schumer, Charles C . Towns, Edolphus Owens, Major R . Velazquez, Nydia M . Rangel, Charles B . Serrano, Jose Engel, Eliot L . Lowey, Nita M . Kelly, Sue W. Gilman, Benjamin A . McNulty, Michael R . McHugh, John M . Hinchey, Maurice D . Paxon, Bill Slaughter, Lousie M . Quinn, Jack Clayton, E v a Funderburk, David

37.03 37.04 37.05 37.06 37.09 37.10 37.12 39.01 39.03 39.04 39.10 39.11 39.13 39.16 39.17 39.19 40.01 40.02 40.06 42.01 42.02 42.03 42.07 42.08 42.09 42.13 42.14 42.16 42.17 42.18 44.01 45.01 45.02 45.03 45.04 45.05 45.06 47.03 47.05 47.07 47.08 47.09

Jones, Walter B . Heineman, Fred Burr, Richard Coble, H o w a r d Myrick, Sue Ballenger, Cass Watt, Melvin Chabot, Steve H a l l , Tony Oxley, Michael G . Hoke, Martin R . Stokes, Louis Brown, Sherrod Régula, Ralph Traficant Jr., James LaTourette, Steven C . Largent, Steve Coburn, Tom Lucas, Frank D . Foglietta, Thomas M . Fattah, Chaka Borski, Robert A . Weldon, Curt Greenwood, James C . Shuster, Bud Fox, Jon D . Coyne, William J . Walker, Richard S. Gekas, George W. Doyle, Mike Kennedy, Patrick J . Sanford, M a r k Spence, Floyd D . Graham, Lindsey Inglis, Bob Spratt Jr., John M . Clyburn, James E . Wamp, Zach Clement, Bob Bryant, E d Tanner, John Ford, Harold E .

TABLE

A.5 ( C o n t i n u e d )

State a n d District Codes 48.01 48.03 48.04 48.05 48.06 48.07 48.09 48.10 48.11 48.18 48.22 48.24 48.25 48.26 48.27 48.29 48.30 51.01

Representatives Chapman, Jim Johnson, Sam H a l l , Ralph M . Bryant, John Barton, Joe L . Archer, Bill Stockman, Steve Doggett, Lloyd Edwards, Chet Jackson-Lee, Sheila Delay, Tom Frost, Martin Bentsen, Ken Armey, Dick Ortiz, Solomon P. Green, Gene Johnson, Eddie Bernice Bateman, Herbert H .

State a n d District Codes 51.02 51.03 51.04 51.05 51.06 51.07 51.08 51.09 51.10 51.11 53.06 53.07 54.02 54.03 55.01 55,02 55.05 55.06

Representatives Pickett, Owen B . Scott, Robert C . Sisisky, Norman Payne Jr., L . F. Goodlatte, Robert W. Bliley Jr., Thomas J . Moran, James P. Boucher, Rick Wolf, Frank R . Davis I I I , Thomas M . Dicks, N o r m McDermott, J i m Wise, Bob Rahall I I , Nick J . Neumann, M a r k W. Klug, Scott L . Barrett, Thomas M . Petri, Tom

APPENDIX B

List of Black Members of the U.S. Congress

O V E R T H E C O U R S E o f m y research, I found that the numbers of B l a c k s elected to Congress v a r i e d slightly from source to source. T h i s w a s highly frustrating because I didn't k n o w w h i c h numbers were the cor­ rect ones. T h e inconsistency I t h i n k stems f r o m whether one counts the n u m b e r elected or the n u m b e r w h o served. I t also depends o n whether one counts, as I do, the n o n v o t i n g delegate f r o m the D i s t r i c t of C o l u m ­ bia w h o first joined the 9 2 n d Congress. So beginning w i t h the 9 2 n d Congress, m y numbers are a u t o m a t i c a l l y elevated by one. I count only those w h o served, not the n u m b e r elected. I n a few i n ­ stances B l a c k s w e r e elected but failed to serve i n certain congresses. F o r e x a m p l e , A d a m C l a y t o n P o w e l l w a s reelected to 9 0 t h Congress, but by a 3 6 5 - 6 4 vote, the H o u s e voted to exclude h i m . Some sources report that s i x B l a c k s served i n the H o u s e of the 9 0 t h Congress, w h e n i n fact o n l y five did. H e w o u l d w i n re-election to the 91 st Congress as w e l l , a n d Congress w o u l d by a vote of 2 5 2 - 1 6 0 a l l o w h i m to take office. ( I n 1969, i n a 7 - 1 decision, the Supreme C o u r t w o u l d rule that P o w e l l h a d been u n l a w f u l l y excluded from the 9 0 t h Congress.) A n o t h e r e x a m p l e is the case of A n d r e w Y o u n g o f G e o r g i a , w h o w o u l d w i n his t h i r d t e r m to the 9 5 t h Congress but resign i n J a n u a r y to become the nation's first B l a c k ambassador to the U n i t e d N a t i o n s . T h u s , I don't count Y o u n g as h a v i n g served i n the 9 5 t h Congress. To support the numbers I report i n chapter 2 , I present the list o f B l a c k members w h o m I count as h a v i n g served i n each congress, start­ ing w i t h the 9 2 n d Congress, i n the tables below. 92ND CONGRESS, 1971-72:

BLACK

REPRESENTATIVE

California

Ronald Dellums Augustus Hawkins

Illinois

Ralph Metcalfe George Collins

Maryland

Parren Mitchell

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. Charles Diggs

184

•

Appendix B

Missouri

William Clay, Sr.

New

Shirley Chisholm Charles B . Rangel

York

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Pennsylvania

Robert N i x

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Walter Fauntroy

SENATE:

Edward R . Brooke ( R - M A )

93RD CONGRESS, 1973-74:

BLACK REPRESENTATIVE

California

Ronald Dellums Yvonne Burke Augustus Hawkins

Georgia

Andrew Young

Illinois

Ralph Metcalfe

Maryland

Parren Mitchell George Collins

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. Charles Diggs

Missouri

William Clay, Sr.

New

Shirley Chisholm Charles B . Rangel

York

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Pennsylvania

Robert N i x

Texas

Barbara Jordan

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Walter Fauntroy

SENATE:

Edward R . Brooke ( R - M A )

9 4 T H CONGRESS, 1975-76:

BLACK REPRESENTATIVE

California

Ronald Dellums Augustus Hawkins Yvonne Burke

Georgia

Andrew Young

Illinois

Ralph Metcalfe Cardiss Collins

Maryland

Parren Mitchell

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. Charles Diggs

Appendix B Missouri

William Clay, Sr.

New

Shirley Chisholm Charles B . Rangel

York

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Pennsylvania

Robert N i x

Tennessee

Harold Ford

Texas

Barbara Jordan

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Walter Fauntroy

SENATE:

Edward R . Brooke ( R - M A )

95TH CONGRESS, 1977-78:

BLACK REPRESENTATIVE

California

Ronald Dellums Augustus Hawkins Yvonne Burke

Illinois

Ralph Metcalfe Cardiss Collins

Maryland

Parren Mitchell

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. Charles Diggs

Missouri

William Clay, Sr.

New

Shirley Chisholm Charles B . Rangel

York

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Pennsylvania

Robert N i x

Tennessee

Harold Ford

Texas

Barbara Jordan

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Walter Fauntroy

SENATE:

Edward R . Brooke ( R - M A )

96TH CONGRESS, 1979-80:

BLACK REPRESENTATIVE

California

Ronald Dellums Augustus Hawkins Julian D i x o n

Illinois

B. Stewart Cardiss Collins

Maryland

Parren Mitchell

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. Charles Diggs

•

185

186

•

Appendix B

Missouri

William Clay, Sr.

New

Shirley Chisholm Charles B . Rangel

York

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Pennsylvania

William H . Gray I I I

Tennessee

Harold Ford

Texas

Mickey Leland

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Walter Fauntroy

97TH CONGRESS,

1981-82:

BLACK

REPRESENTATIVE

California

Ronald Dellums Augustus Hawkins Julian Dixon Mervyn M . Dymally

Illinois

Gus Savage Harold Washington Cardiss Collins

Maryland

Parren Mitchell

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. George Crockett

Missouri

William Clay, Sr.

New

Shirley Chisholm Charles B . Rangel

York

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Pennsylvania

William H . Gray I I I

Tennessee

Harold Ford

Texas

Mickey Leland

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Walter Fauntroy

9 8 T H CONGRESS, 1983-84:

BLACK

REPRESENTATIVE

California

Ronald Dellums Augustus Hawkins Mervyn M . Dymally Julian Dixon

Illinois

Gus Savage Harold Washington Cardiss Collins

Indiana

Katie H a l l

Appendix B Maryland

Parren Mitchell

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. George Crockett

Missouri

William Clay, Sr. Alan Wheat

New

Ed Towns Major R . Owens Charles B . Rangel

York

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Pennsylvania

William H . Gray I I I

Tennessee

Harold Ford

Texas

Mickey Leland

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Walter Fauntroy

9 T H CONGRESS, 1985-86:

BLACK

187

REPRESENTATIVE

California

Ronald Dellums Augustus Hawkins Mervyn M . Dymally Julian D i x o n

Illinois

Gus Savage Charles Hayes Cardiss Collins

Maryland

Parren Mitchell

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. George Crockett

Missouri

William Clay, Sr. Alan Wheat

New

E d Towns Alton R . Waldon, Jr.* Major R . Owens Charles B . Rangel

York

•

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Pennsylvania

William H . Gray I I I

Tennessee

Harold Ford

Texas

Mickey Leland

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Walter Fauntroy

"Won special election in 1986 to fill seat created by death; he served only two months before his defeat by Flake in the regular November election.

188

•

Appendix B

100TH CONGRESS, 1987-88:

BLACK

REPRESENTATIVE

California

Ronald Dellums Augustus Hawkins Mervyn M . Dymally Julian Dixon

Georgia

John Lewis

Illinois

Gus Savage Charles Hayes Cardiss Collins

Maryland

Kweisi Mfume

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. George Crockett

Mississippi

Mike Espy

Missouri

William Clay, Sr. Alan Wheat

New

York

E d Towns Floyd Flake Major R . Owens Charles B . Rangel Louis Stokes William H . Gray I I I

Ohio Pennsylvania Tennessee Texas D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Harold Ford Mickey Leland Walter Fauntroy BLACK

REPRESENTATIVE

California

Ronald Dellums Augustus Hawkins Mervyn M . Dymally Julian D i x o n

Georgia

John Lewis

Illinois

Gus Savage Charles Hayes Cardiss Collins

Maryland

Kweisi Mfume

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. George Crockett

Mississippi

Mike Espy

Missouri

William Clay, Sr. Alan Wheat

101ST

CONGRESS, 1989-90:

Appendix B N e w Jersey

Donald Payne

New

E d Towns Floyd Flake Major R . Owens Charles B . Rangel

York

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Pennsylvania

William H . Gray I I I

Tennessee

Harold Ford

Texas

Mickey Leland

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Walter Fauntroy

102ND CONGRESS, 1991-92:

BLACK

REPRESENTATIVE

California

Ronald Dellums Maxine Waters Mervyn M . Dymally Julian D i x o n

Connecticut

Gary Franks

Georgia

John Lewis

Illinois

Gus Savage Charles Hayes Cardiss Collins

Louisiana

William Jefferson

Maryland

Kweisi Mfume

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. Barbara-Rose Collins

Mississippi

Mike Espy

Missouri

William Clay, Sr. Alan Wheat

N e w Jersey

Donald Payne

New

Ed Towns Floyd Flake Major R . Owens Charles B . Rangel

York

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Pennsylvania

Lucien E . Blackwell

Tennessee

Harold Ford

Texas

Craig Washington

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Eleanor Holmes Norton

•

189

190

•

Appendix B

103RD CONGRESS,

1993-94:

BLACK

REPRESENTATIVE

Alabama

E a r l Hilliard

California

Ronald Dellums Maxine Waters Julian Dixon Walter R . Tucker I I I

Connecticut

Gary Franks

Florida

Corrine Brown Carrie Meek Alcee L . Hastings

Georgia

John Lewis Cynthia McKinney Sanford D . Bishop, Jr.

Illinois

Mel Reynolds Bobby L . Rush Cardiss Collins

Louisiana

William Jefferson Cleo Fields

Maryland

Albert R . Wynn Kweisi Mfume

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. Barbara-Rose Collins

Mississippi

Bennie G . Thompson

Missouri

William Clay, Sr. Alan Wheat

N e w Jersey

Donald Payne

New

E d Towns Floyd Flake Major R. Owens Charles B . Rangel

York

North Carolina

Eva Clayton Melvin Watt

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Pennsylvania

Lucien E . Blackwell

South Carolina

James Clyburn

Tennessee

Harold Ford

Texas

Eddie Bernice Johnson Craig Washington

Virginia

Robert Scott

Appendix B D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Eleanor Holmes Norton

SENATE:

Carol Moseley Braun ( D - I L )

04TH CONGRESS,

1995-96:

BLACK

REPRESENTATIVE

Alabama

Earl Hilliard

California

Ronald Dellums Maxine Waters Julian D i x o n Walter R . Tucker I I P

Connecticut

Gary Franks

Florida

Corrine Brown Carrie Meek Alcee L . Hastings

Georgia

John Lewis Cynthia McKinney Sanford D . Bishop, Jr.

Illinois

Mel Reynolds** Bobby L . Rush Cardiss Collins

Louisiana

William Jefferson Cleo Fields

Maryland

Albert R . Wynn Kweisi Mfume***

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. Barbara-Rose Collins

Mississippi

Bennie G . Thompson

Missouri

William Clay, Sr.

N e w Jersey

Donald Payne

New

Ed Towns Floyd Flake Major R . Owens Charles B . Rangel

York

North Carolina

Eva Clayton Melvin Watt

Ohio

Louis Stokes

Oklahoma

Julius Caesar ( J . C.) Watts

Pennsylvania

Chaka Fattah

South Carolina

James Cl y burn

Tennessee

Harold Ford

•

191

192

•

Appendix B Eddie Bernice Johnson

Texas

Sheila Jackson-Lee Virginia

Robert Scott

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Eleanor Holmes Norton

SENATE:

Carol Moseley Braun ( D - I L )

"Resigned in October 1995 and Millender-McDonald elected. **Resigned in October 1995 and Jackson, Jr. elected. * * * Resigned in February 1996 and Cummings elected.

105TH CONGRESS, 1997-98:

BLACK

REPRESENTATIVE

Alabama

Earl Hilliard

California

Julian D i x o n Ronald Dellums* Juanita Millender-McDonald Maxine Waters

Florida

Corrine Brown Alcee L . Hastings Carrie Meek

Georgia

Sanford Bishop John Lewis Cynthia McKinney

Illinois

Danny Davis Jesse Jackson, Jr. Bobby L . Rush

Indiana

Julia Carson

Louisiana

William Jefferson

Maryland

Elijah Cummings Albert R . Wynn

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick

Mississippi

Bennie G . Thompson

Missouri

William Clay, Sr.

New

Jersey

Donald Payne

New

York

Floyd Flake Major R . Owens Charles B . Rangel Ed Towns

North Carolina

Eva Clayton Melvin Watt

Appendix B Ohio

Louis Stokes

Oklahoma

J . C . Watts

Pennsylvania

Chaka Fattah

South Carolina

James Clyburn

Tennessee

Harold Ford, Jr.

Texas

Sheila Jackson-Lee Eddie Bernice Johnson

Virginia

Robert C . Scott

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Eleanor Holmes Norton Carol Moseley Braun ( D - I L )

SENATE: * Resigned and Barbara Lee elected I 106TH CONGRESS,

1999-2000:

r

special election April 7, 1998. BLACK

REPRESENTATIVE

Alabama

Earl Hilliard

California

Julian D i x o n Barbara Lee Juanita Millender-McDonald Maxine Waters

Florida

Corrine Brown Alcee L . Hastings Carrie Meek

Georgia

Sanford Bishop John Lewis Cynthia McKinney

Illinois

Danny Davis Jesse Jackson, Jr. Bobby L . Rush

Indiana

Julia Carson

Louisiana

William Jefferson

Maryland

Elijah Cummings Albert R . Wynn

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick

Mississippi

Bennie G . Thompson

Missouri

William Clay, Sr.

New

Jersey

Donald Payne

New

York

Gregory W. Meeks Major R . Owens

•

193

194

•

Appendix B Charles B . Rangel Ed Towns

North

Carolina

Eva Clayton Melvin Watt

Ohio

Stephanie Tubbs Jones

Oklahoma

J . C . Watts

Pennsylvania

Chaka Fattah

South Carolina

James Clyburn

Tennessee

Harold Ford, Jr.

Texas

Sheila Jackson-Lee Eddie Bernice Johnson

Virginia

Robert C . Scott

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Eleanor Holmes Norton

107TH CONGRESS, 2001-2002:

BLACK

REPRESENTATIVE

Alabama

Earl Hilliard

California

Diane Edith Watson* Barbara Lee Juanita Millender-McDonald Maxine Waters

Florida

Corrine Brown Alcee L . Hastings Carrie Meek

Georgia

Sanford Bishop John Lewis Cynthia McKinney

Illinois

Danny Davis Jesse Jackson, Jr. Bobby L . Rush

Indiana

Julia Carson

Louisiana

William Jefferson

Maryland

Elijah Cummings Albert R . Wynn

Michigan

John Conyers, Jr. Carolyn Cheeks Kilpatrick

Mississippi

Bennie G . Thompson

Missouri

William Clay, Jr. (son of William Clay, Sr.)

Appendix B N e w Jersey

Donald Payne

New

Gregory W. Meeks Major R . Owens Charles B . Rangel Ed Towns

York

North Carolina

Eva Clayton Melvin Watt

Ohio

Stephanie Tubbs Jones

Oklahoma

J . C . Watts

Pennsylvania

Chaka Fattah

South Carolina

James Clyburn

Tennessee

Harold Ford, Jr.

Texas

Sheila Jackson-Lee Eddie Bernice Johnson

Virginia

Robert C . Scott

D i s t r i c t of C o l u m b i a

Eleanor Holmes Norton

•

195

* O n December 2000, D i x o n died of a heart attack. In a special election, Diane Edith Watson won his district to join the 107th Congress.

Notes

CHAPTER

I

T H E PUZZLE OF REPRESENTATION

1. North Carolina's last Black representative actually served until 1901. CHAPTER 2 BLACK MEMBERS OF CONGRESS

1. Swain based her conclusions on historian Terry Seip's T h e S o u t h R e t u r n s t o C o n g r e s s (Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1983), pp. 2 7 - 2 9 . 2. This figure was reported in "Capital Questions," with C-Span scholar I I ona Nickels (website: http://www.c-span.org/questions/weekl51.htm). CHAPTER 3 T H E ELECTIONS OF BLACKS TO CONGRESS

1. The legislative history and the racial demographics of the districts that sent the first northern Blacks to Congress are difficult to piece together. I n addition to Lublin's (1997) account, I've largely relied on information published in var­ ious editions of Congressional Quarterly's P o l i t i c s i n A m e r i c a and historical accounts. CHAPTER 4 LEGISLATIVE STYLES AND VOTING

RECORDS

1. Janet Box-Steffensmeier and Tobin Grant graciously provided me with these data for the 103rd Congress. CHAPTER 9 T H E F U T U R E O F B L A C K F A C E S I N T H E U.S. C O N G R E S S

1. In the Sniderman and Piazza (1993) thought-experiment study on which these items were based, the rate of change to the counterarguments on affirma­ tive action were comparatively low, about 20 percent.

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Index

Abramowitz, Alan, 115 Adams, John, 6 Affirmative action, 165 Africa, 88 Africans, 8 Age, effect of, 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 , 125, 129, 1 3 8 141, 1 5 1 , 1 7 6 - 1 7 7 Aiken, D . Wyatt, 32, 33 Alabama, 1 1 , 34, 28, 30, 82, 88, 172 American Conservative Union ( A C U ) , 80, 84 Americans for Democratic Action ( A D A ) , 80, 84 American Federation of Labor Congress of Industrial Organization ( A F L - C I O ) , 80, 84 American National Election Study, 115, 123, 127, 143, 145 Anti-Federalists, 7 Antioch College, 38 Arnold, Douglas, 115 Asians, 9, 48, 68, 1 4 1 , 157 At-Large elections, 7 Bahamas, 48 Balanced budget amendment, 2 1 Barrett, Edith, 49 Beaufort, S.C., 31 Beck, Paul, 172 Benjamin, Adam, Jr., 56 Berkeley, C . A . , 56 Bill of Rights, 7 Bills. See legislation Binder, Sarah A . , 115 Bishop, Sanford, Jr., 68, 69, 8 1 , 88, 89, 94 Blacks, 4, 25; voters, 64 Blackwell, Lucien, 58, 59 Blue Dogs House coalition, 90, 94, 106, 158 Bobo, Lawrence, 18, 132, 137 Bond, Julian, 55 Bono, Mary, 65 Bork, Robert, 44 Bositis, David, 109

Bossier Parish, L . A . , 168 Boston University School of L a w , 37 Bowman, K a r l y n H . , 147 Box-Steffensmeier, Janet, 172, 197 Brady, Henry, 138 Braun, Carol Moseiey, 4 1 , 44, 64, 89, 102 Brooke, E d w a r d William I I I , 34, 104 Brooklyn, N . Y . , 3 1 Brown, Corinne, 42, 48, 82, 1 0 2 - 1 0 3 Browning, Rufus, 56, 68 Burke, Edmund, 12, 125 Burke, Yvonne Brathwaite, 42, 44, 48, 59 Button, James, 50 Cain, Richard H . , 28, 29, 3 1 , 33, 52 Caldeira, Gregory, 172 California, 35, 4 1 , 42, 44, 46, 48, 55, 56, 68, 90 Candidate-centered campaigning, 5 Canon, David X , 69, 79, 83, 84, 155, 158 Capps, Lois, 49, 65 Caribbean, 88 Carson, Julia, 4 3 , 46, 68 Carter, Jimmy, 44, 106, 107 Chambers, Stefanie, 172 Chamber of Commerce of the United States ( C C U S ) , 80 Charleston, S.C., 29, 31 Chapman, Valeria Sinclair, 98 Cheatham, Henry P., 28 Chicago, I . L . , 4 1 , 54, 58, 63, 126 Chisholm, Conrad, 46 Chisholm, Shirley, 35, 4 1 , 4 3 , 44, 46, 47, 59, 60, 78, 104, 108; activities in C B C , 105-106 Census (U.S.), 149, 176 Christ, Jesus, 14, 129, 160 Churches (Black), 29, 36, 37 Cirksena, Kathy, 172 Citrin, Jack, 146 Civil Rights E r a , 26, 34, 5 1 , 55; Post-, 26, 37, 5 1 , 55 Civil Rights Movement, 37, 145 Clark, Janet, 6 1 , 65 Clausen, Aage, 172

208

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Index

Clay, William L . , Sr., 35, 36, 44, 54, 73, 100, 1 0 1 , 127; account of C B C , 1 0 4 107 Clayton, E v a , 38, 43, 47, 102 Cleveland, O . H . , 35 Clinton, William (Bill), 12, 88, 89, 109, 118, 125, 167, 167, 169; and adminis­ tration of, 93, 109, 126 Clissold, K a r i n M . , 172 Clyburn, James, 100, 169 Cohen, Cathy J . , 156 Cokesbury, S.C., 32 Collins, Barbara-Rose, 43, 46, 48, 60, 100 Collins, Cardiss, 4 3 , 4 6 , 54, 60, 8 1 , 1 0 1 , 1 0 7 Collins, George W , 35, 104 Common Cause, 101 Confederate flag, 16 Confederate Memorial Day, 16 Congress (U.S.), 5 - 6 , 2 1 , 1 0 9 - 1 1 0 , 125, 161; (42" ), 3 1 ; (43 ), 3 1 , 52; (44 ) 3 1 , 32; (45 ), 3 1 , 32, 52; (46 ), 52; (47 ), 52; (58 ), 53; (79 ), 38, (80 ), 38; (81 ), 38; (82 ), 38; (83 ), 38; (84 ), 38; (85 ), 38; (86 ), 38; (87 ), 38, (88 ), 38, (89 ), 38, (90 ), 38, 183, (91 ), 38, 39; (92 ), 38, 39, 183; (93 ), 38, 39; (94 ), 38, 39; (95 ), 38, 39, 183; (96 ), 38, 39; (97 ), 38, 39; (98 ), 38, 39; (99 ), 38, 39, 65, 108; (100 ), 38, 39, 58, 82; (101*), 38, 39; (102" ), 38, 39, 4 1 , 65; (103 ), 1 1 , 38, 39, 4 1 , 77, 78, 80, 83, 9 6 - 9 7 , 102; (104 ), 20, 2 1 - 2 2 , 38, 39, 78, 79, 80, 8 1 , 82, 110, 117, 159, 173; (105 ), 38, 22, 58, 79, 102; (106 ), 38, 40, 46, 65, 110, 158; (107 ), 65; major legislation, 8 5 - 9 1 ; "Powell amendments," 36; public ap­ proval of, 123, 1 4 3 - 1 4 9 , 151 d

rd

th

th

th

th

th

st

,,d

th

rd

th

th

th

th

th

st

th

th

th

lld

rd

th

th

th

th

th

th

th

Coverdell, Paul, 18 Cummings, Elijah, 81 Current Population Surveys, 46, 176 Crockett, George, 59, 126 Daley, Richard, 54, 125 Darcy, R . , 60, 65 Davidson, Chandler, 66 Davidson, Roger H . , 126 Dawson, William L . , 34, 35, 4 1 , 126 De Priest, Oscar, 34, 35, 36, 46 Declaration of Independence, 9 Deering, Christopher, 7 5 - 7 7 , 117 DeLarge, Robert C , 28, 29 Deliberative democracy, 15, 1 5 8 - 1 5 9 Dellums, Ronald V., 35, 36, 4 1 , 55, 56, 68, 78, 104, 109 Democratic party, 53, 56, 167; difficulties with C B C , 1 0 5 - 1 1 0 ; Dixiecrat revolt, 99; intra-party conflicts, 8 4 - 8 5 ; Denver, C O . , 30 Detroit, M . I . , 34, 48 Diggs, Charles C , Jr., 35, 36, 38, 4 1 , 104, 105, 107 Discrimination (racial), 50 District of Columbia. See Washington, D.C. D i x o n , Julian, 46, 78 Doonesbury, 5 1

d

rd

th

th

th

th

Congressional Black Caucus ( C B C ) , 4 1 , 44, 65, 89, 96, 1 0 4 - 1 1 0 , 126, 127, 131, 159, 166, 169; alternative budget, 97, 1 0 7 - 1 0 9 C o n g r e s s i o n a l D i r e c t o r y , 31 C o n g r e s s i o n a l Q u a r t e r l y , 80, 84 Congressional Record, 98 Connecticut, 2 1 Constitution (U.S.), 6, 8, 9, 161 Conte, Silvio, 76 Contract with America, 2 1 , 88 Conyers, John, Jr., 34, 35, 1 0 1 , 104 Cooper, Keven, 171

Easton, David, 146 Education; effect of, 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 , 125, 1 2 7 128, 131, 1 4 0 - 1 4 1 , 1 4 8 - 1 4 9 , 1 5 1 , 176-177 Electoral college, 9 Electoral systems, 6 2 - 6 3 , 1 3 1 , 1 6 1 - 1 7 0 Elliot, Robert B., 2 7 - 2 8 , 29, 30 Engel, Eliot, 101 England. See Great Britain Engstrom, Richard, 169 Erikson, Robert S., 115 Espy, M i k e , 38, 126, 128 Eulau, Heinz, 3, 14 Evins, John H . , 32,33 Fattah, Chaka, 58, 102, 110 Fauntroy, Walter, 59 Federal Employees Political Activities Act of 1993, 101 Federalists, 7, 157 F e d e r a l i s t N o . 9, 7

Index F e d e r a l i s t N o . 10, 6 F e d e r a l i s t N o . 39, 6 Feminists, 64, 158 Fenno, Richard, 18, 95, 123, 133 Fields, Cleo, 59, 66, 69 Fiorina, Morris, 123, 130 Fishkin, James, 125, 158 Fisk University, 38 Flake, Floyd, 58, 88 Florida, 1 1 , 28, 29, 42, 48, 68, 82, 103, 108, 172 Foley, Thomas, 145 Foner, Eric, 30, 52 Forbes, Randy, 68 Ford, Harold, Jr., 8 1 , 90, 94 Ford, Harold, Sr., 55, 107 Fort Sumter, 32 Foster, Mike, 66 Fourteenth Amendment, 10 Fowler, Wyche, 18, 55 Franks, Gary, 2 1 , 47, 58, 59, 100 Gamson, William, 147 Gary, I . N . , 56 Gay, Claudine, 133 Gender, 155; effect of, 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 , 125, 1 3 8 - 1 4 1 , 1 4 8 - 1 4 9 , 1 5 1 , 1 7 6 - 1 7 7 . See a l s o women and men Georgetown, S.C., 31 Georgia, 28, 34, 37, 38, 42, 55, 89, 106, 172, 183 Gerrymander (racial), 1 1 , 5 3 - 5 5 , 66 Gibbons, Sam M . , 82 G i l l , L a Verne M c C a i n , 45 Gilliam, Franklin D . , Jr., 18, 132, 137 Gingrich, Newt, 89 Grady, Robert C , 6 Grant, Tobin, 197 Gray, William (Bill), 59, 105, 108 Great Britain, 5, 7 - 8 , 28 Great Compromise, 7 Greenbrier County, V.A., 31 Grinnell College, 38 Grofman, Bernard, 66 Guinier, L a n i , 45, 156, 165, 169 Gurin, Patricia, 179 H a l l , Katie Beatrice, 4 1 , 56, 58, 59 H a l l , Richard, 103 Hamer, Fannie L o u , 100 Hampton, Gloria, 172

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209

Hansen, M a r k , 133 Haralson, Jeremiah, 28, 30 Hastings, Alcee, 103, 108 Hatch Act of 1939, 101 Hatch, Orren, 102 Hatcher, Richard, 56 Hatchett, Shirley J . , 179 H a w k i n s , Augustus F,, 35, 55, 56, 59, 104, 107 Hayes, Charles, 58, 59, 81 Hayes, Rutherford, 52 Haynie, Kerry L . , 84 Hedge, David, 50 Hibbings, John, 95, 144, 145, 149, 152 Hilliard, E a r l , 82, 88 Hispanics. See Latinos Home ownership, effect of, 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 House of Representatives (U.S.), 47; com­ mittees in, 7 4 - 7 9 ; Speaker, 77; terms in, 3, 8. See a l s o Congress Houston, T . X . , 37, 63 H o w a r d University, 38 Humphrey, Hubert H , 107 Humphrey-Hawkins bill, 1 0 6 - 1 0 7 Hurston, Z o r a Neale, 103 H y m a n , John A . , 28, 30 Illinois, 34, 35, 43 Income, its effect, 128-129, 1 3 9 - 1 4 0 , 148, 1 5 1 , 1 7 6 - 1 7 7 Indiana, 43 Indians (American), 8, 9 Jackson, James S., 1 7 1 , 179 Jackson, Jesse L . , Jr., 37, 4 1 , 44, 89, 159; presidential bids, 106 Jackson-Lee, Sheila, 43, 47, 68 Jacksonian democracy, 9 Jacobson, Gary, 172 Jefferson, Thomas, 9 Jefferson, William, 88 Jewish (voters), 47 Johnson, Eddie Bernice, 43, 65, 68 Johnson, James B., 127 Johnson, Lyndon; Great Society programs, 104, 106 Jones, Stephanie Tubbs, 43 Jordan, Barbara C , 37, 4 3 , 44, 4 5 , 54, 55, 59 Justice Department (U.S.), 1 1 , 165, 168, 169

210

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Index

Kansas City, M . O . , 56 Karps, Paul, 14 Kennedy, Ted, 102 Key, V . O . , 129 Kilpatrick, Carolyn Cheeks, 4 3 , 45 King, Martin Luther, Jr., 16, 37; holiday, 16, 96, 110 Kingdon, John, 94, 115 Korean War, 34 Kousser, J . Morgan, 10, 162 Kuklinski, James H . , 9 4 - 9 5 , 160 Labor force participation, 177 Ladd, Everett Carll, 147 Langston, John M . , 28 Latinos, 10, 1 1 , 48, 55, 68, 8 1 , 1 4 1 , 157, 162,164 Leadership Conference on Civil Rights ( L C C R ) , 83, 84 Lee, Barbara, 42, 159 Legislators (U.S.), 3, 5, 2 5 - 2 7 ; activities, 5, 17, 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 ; bill sponsorship, 73, 7 9 - 8 2 ; biographies of, 3 1 - 3 3 , 49, 53; campaign spending, 3, 2 5 - 2 6 , 5 7 - 5 8 ; committee assignments, 73, 7 4 - 7 9 ; edu­ cation, 3 4 - 3 5 ; effect of race, 1 2 1 - 1 2 5 , 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 , 1 3 4 - 1 4 2 ; effect of service, 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 , 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 ; elections, 25; inter­ est group ratings, 8 0 - 8 2 ; marital status, 4 6 - 4 9 , 50; margin of victory, 5 7 - 6 0 ; name recognition, 1 3 4 - 1 3 8 ; occupa­ tions, 29, 33, 35, 3 8 - 4 0 , 4 5 - 4 6 , 4 8 49; policy congruency, 9 3 - 9 5 ; public evaluations of, 1 1 3 - 1 3 1 ; qualifications of, 25; role, 1 2 - 1 3 ; voting records, 73, 8 2 - 9 1 ; wealth, 30, 3 3 - 3 4 , 36 Legislation, 14, 79; Brady Bill, 88; crime bill, 8 6 - 8 7 ; immigration, 90; Medicaid, 89; minimum wage, 88; motor-voter, 88; N A F T A , 88; partial-birth abortion ban, 88; pork barrel, 5, 12, 8 1 , 9 9 100; free trade, 8 7 - 8 8 ; sponsorship of, 7 9 - 8 2 ; symbolic, 8 1 , 9 6 - 1 0 0 ; welfare reform, 8 9 - 9 0 Lewinsky, Monica, 125 Lewis, John, 38, 55, 100 Lincoln, Abraham, 27 Lipset, Seymour Martin, 161 Livingston, Robert, 81 Lofgren, Zoe, 49 Long, Jefferson, 28

Los Angeles, C . A . , 4 5 , 46, 55 Louisiana, 28, 52, 66, 8 1 , 88, 90, 168, 172 Lublin, David, 5 1 , 66, 83, 142, 197 Lucas, Louise, 68 Lynch, John R . , 28 Machines (political), 54 Madison, James, 6, 9 Maltzman, Forrest, 115 M a n n , Thomas, 114, 115 Mansbridge, Jane, 1 5 6 - 1 5 8 , 161 Marital status, 4 6 - 4 9 , 177 Marshall, Dale Rogers, 56, 68 Marshall, Thurgood, 1 0 1 , 159, 166 Maryland, 35, 37, 38 Massachusetts, 34, 38, 104 Mayhew, David, 1 6 - 1 7 , 96, 97, 160, 167 McKinney, Billy, 47 McKinney, Cynthia A n n , 42, 45, 47, 66 Media use, effect of, 137, 1 4 8 - 1 4 9 , 151 Meek, Carrie Pitman, 42, 48, 75, 76, 77 M e n , 25, 6 0 - 6 1 , 65; legislators, 25, 4 1 , 46 Metcalfe, Ralph H . , 35, 54, 59, 104 Mfume, Kweisi, 16, 37, 38 Michigan, 35, 36, 4 1 , 4 3 , 100 Millender-McDonald, Juanita, 42, 65 Mitchell, Arthur W., 34, 35, 36 Mitchell, Parren J . , 35, 59, 104 Miller, Thomas E . , 28 Miller, Warren, 13, 14, 114, 159, 167 Mississippi, 28, 29, 38, 126, 127, 172 Missouri, 35, 44, 100 Mobile, A . L . , 10 M o b i l e v. B o l d e n , 10 Molinari, Susan, 45 Mondale, Walter, 44 Montazuma, 7 Montgomary Bus Boycott, 82 Morella, Constance, 49 Morgan State University, 38 Mulattos, 8 Murray, George W , 28, 52 Nash, Charles E . , 28 National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ( N A A C P ) , 16, 37, 166; president, 16 National Organization for Women ( N O W ) , 4 1 , 44

Index National Black Election Study (1984), 2 1 , 171; (1996), 2 1 , 22, 8 1 , 9 1 , 113, 118, 120, 1 6 1 , 162, 167, 1 7 1 - 1 8 2 Nelson, Thomas, 172 Nelson, William E . , 172 New Jersey, 10 New Orleans, L A . , 29 New York, 8, 4 1 , 4 3 , 46, 88, 101 New York, N . Y . , 9, 34, 36, 54

N e w York

T i m e s , 6 6 , 68, 74

Newspapers (Black), 29 Nichels, Ilona, 197 Nichols, John Spicer, 174 N i x , Robert N . C , 34, 35, 4 1 , 59, 104 N i x o n , Richard, 37, 45, 5 5 , 1 0 4 , 1 0 6 , 1 4 5 North, 36, 49, 54 North Carolina, 1 1 , 28, 30, 38, 4 1 , 4 3 , 47, 52, 53, 68, 102, 157 Norton, Eleanor Holmes, 42, 47, 48, 65, 8 1 , 100, 102 O'Connor, Sandra Day, 1 1 , 157 O ' H a r a , James E . , 28, 29 Ohio, 9, 3 1 , 35, 4 1 , 4 3 , 54 Oklahoma, 2 1 , 131 Palestine Liberation Organization ( P L O ) , 106 Parks, Rosa, 110 Parliament (English), 8 Philadelphia, P.A., 34, 35, 54 Phillips, Anne, 155, 157 Pennock, J . Roland, 157 Pennsylvania, 9 - 1 0 Perry, Judith, 171 Piazza, Thomas, 165, 197 Pitkin, Hanna, 13 Policy congruency, 14 Poole, Keith, 80, 8 4 - 8 5 ; Popkin, Samuel L . , 18, 115, 116 Popular sovereignty, 3, Population (U.S.), estimations of, 1 4 9 150 Populists, 53 Political efficacy, effect of, 1 4 8 - 1 4 9 Political ideology, 1 6 5 - 1 6 6 , effect of, 18, 148-149 Political interest, 133, 1 3 5 - 1 4 2 , 144; ef­ fect of, 125, 1 3 9 - 1 4 1 Political knowledge, 1 3 3 - 1 4 2 , 1 4 4 - 1 4 5 , 1 4 8 - 1 4 9 , 151

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211

Political party; effect of, 1 7 - 1 8 , 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 , 125, 1 3 9 - 1 4 1 . See also Democratic party and Republican party Political participation, 1 3 7 - 1 4 2 Political representation, 6, 1 7 - 2 0 , 132, 1 5 5 - 1 6 2 ; Burkean, 1 2 - 1 3 , 1 2 5 - 1 2 6 , 159, 1 6 7 - 1 6 8 ; definition of, 4, 13, 113, 1 5 9 - 1 6 2 ; descriptive, 3 - 4 , 1 5 - 1 6 ; ef­ fect of descriptive, 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 , 1 3 4 - 1 4 2 , 1 4 7 - 1 4 9 , 1 5 1 - 1 5 2 ; policy congruency, 9 1 - 9 5 , 160; substantive, 4, 16, 1 8 - 1 9 ; symbolic, 4, 1 4 - 1 6 , 1 8 - 1 9 , 9 7 - 1 0 0 , 160; virtual, 7 - 8 Political trust, 1 4 3 - 1 5 2 Powell, Adam Clayton, 34, 35, 36, 4 1 , 126, 183 Powell, Lewis E , Jr., 101 Proportional representation. See election systems Proposition 187, 90 Public opinion; on affirmative action, 9 1 93; on crime, 9 1 - 9 3 ; on food stamps, 9 1 - 9 2 ; on guaranteed jobs, 9 1 - 9 2 ; on immigration, 9 1 - 9 3 ; on Medicare, 9 1 92; on members of Congress, 1 1 3 - 1 1 6 ; racial redistricting, 1 6 2 - 1 6 7 ; on welfare reform, 9 1 - 9 5 Public policy, 9 9 - 1 0 0 , 1 0 2 - 1 0 4 . See also legislation Race, 156, 162, 170; effect of, 1 2 1 - 1 2 2 , 127, 1 3 0 - 1 3 1 , 1 3 3 - 1 3 4 ; interviewer ef­ fect, 1 7 6 - 1 7 9 ; and political trust, 146; relations, 15 Racial identification; effect of, 127, 1 3 9 141 Racial Justice Act, 88 Rainey, Joseph H . , 28, 29, 3 1 , 33 Rangel, Charles, 65, 68, 104, 107 Ransier, Alonzo J . , 28 Rapier, James T . , 28 Reagan, Ronald, 107 Reconstruction, 9, 25, 26, 29, 33, 36, 49, 5 1 , 52, 55, 77, 162 Redistricting, 55, 68 Reed, Adolph, Jr., 37 Region, effect of, 151 Republican Party, 12, 2 1 , 5 2 - 5 3 , 160; intra-party conflict, 8 4 - 8 5 Republicanism, 132 Residency, 112, 1 3 8 - 1 4 1

212

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Index

Resolutions, 9 7 - 9 8 . See a l s o legislation Revolution (American), 8 Reynolds, M e l , 59, 81 R e y n o l d s v. S i m s , 55 Rivers, Doug, 1 2 1 , 130 Rodino, Peter, 159 Rosenthal, H o w a r d , 80, 8 4 - 8 5 , Rosenstone, Steven, 133, 172 Roosevelt, Franklin Delano, 34 Roosevelt Republications, 34 Rush, Bobby, 81 Rush, M a r k E . , 168 Salmon, Charles T . , 174 Sanchez, Loretta, 65 Sapiro, Virginia, 172 Savage, Gus, 58, 59 Schlozman, K a y Lehman, 138 Schwartz, Nancy L . , 19, 20, 132 Scott, Dred, 9 Scott, Robert, 1 0 0 - 1 0 1 Secret, Philip E . , 127 Segura, Gary M . , 9 4 - 9 5 , 160 Senate (U.S.), 25, 4 1 , 56, 60, 65, 135, 165, 170; Judiciary Committee, 15 Sex. See gender Sexism or sexual harassment, 15, 44 S h a w v. R e n o , 1 1 , 168 Shepsle, Kenneth, 75 Sigelman, Lee, 115 Singh, Robert, 60, 78, 96, 1 0 7 - 1 0 8 , 110 Single-member districts. See election systems Sisisky, Norman, 68 Slavery, 27, 33, 49, 50 Smalls, Robert, 28, 29, 3 1 , 52 Smith, Eric, 138 Smith, H o w a r d , 110 Smith, Rogers, 132 Smith, Steven, 7 5 - 7 7 , 117 Sniderman, Paul, 165, 197 South, 15, 27, 29, 34, 37, 49, 54, 172 South Africa, 96 South Carolina, 1 1 , 16, 28, 30, 3 1 , 52, 53, 99, 169, 172 South Carolina College, 32, 34 St. Louis, M . O . , 35, 36 Starr, Kenneth, 125 Steeper, Fred, 171 Stewart, Bennett, 54, 59 Stokes, Donald, 13, 14, 114, 159

Stokes, Louis, 35, 46, 54, 1 0 1 , 104, 157 Supreme Court (U.S.), 44, 54, 66, 159, 166, 167, 168, 183 Swain, Carol M . , 11, 2 6 - 2 7 , 30, 60, 79, 82, 83, 126, 1 2 8 - 1 2 9 , 155 Tabb, David H . , 56, 68 Talion, Robin, 53 Taney, Roger B . , 9 Tate, Katherine, 142, 171 Term limits, 145 Texas, 37, 38, 4 1 , 4 3 , 44, 47, 68, 172, 173 Texas Southern University, 37 Theiss-Morse, Elizabeth, 95, 144, 145, 149, 152 Thernstrom, Abigail, 10, 155, 156, 157, 162 Thernstrom, Stephan, 155, 156 Thomas, Clarence, 13, 159, 166 Thomas, Sue, 73 Thompson, Bennie, 69, 100 Thurmond, Strom, 99 Tilden, Samuel J . , 52 Tillman, Benjamin, 52 Tillman, George, 52 Todd, Teresa, 172 Trudeau, Gary, 5 1 Truman, H a r r y S., 101 Tucker, Walter R . , I l l , 59, 81 Turner, Benjamin S., 28 Union army, 29 United Nations, 55, 106, 183 University of California, 38 Urban centers, 53, 54 Velazquez, Nydia, 49 Verba, Sidney, 138 Vietnam War, 37, 4 1 , 145 Virginia, 1 1 , 28, 3 1 , 66, 1 0 1 , 110, 172 Voting Rights Act (1965), 10, 1 1 , 37, 55, 64, 156, 157, 165, 166, 168 Waldholtz, Enid Greene, 44 Waldon, Alton, Jr., 58, 59 Wallace, A . S., 33 Walls, Josiah T , 28, 29 Washington, D . C . , 1 1 , 17, 30, 33, 34, 42, 47, 66, 102, 114, 126, 130, 147, 1 6 1 , 183

Index Washington, Harold, 54, 59, 78 Watergate, 37, 45 Waters, Maxine, 42, 46, 48, 56, 68, 69, 74, 81 Watson, Diane Edith, 42, 46, 47, 65 Watt, M e l , 68, 81 Watts, J . C , 2 1 , 68, 131 Weisberg, Herbert, 172 Welch, Susan, 6 1 , 65 Welfare reform, 2 1 , 9 1 - 9 5 , 167 West Indies, 31 Wheat, Alan, 56, 100, 101 Whitby, Kenny J . , 15, 83 White, George H , 28, 34, 52 Whites, 15, 52, 56, 57, 65, 68, 8 1 , 1 4 1 , 169, 170, 1 7 7 - 1 7 8 ; legislators, 15, 25, 3 1 - 3 3 , 36, 39, 48, 49, 77, 134 W h i t e v. Regester, 10

•

213

White Plains, N . Y . , 101 Wilberforce University, 31 Williams, Melissa, 157 Williams, Sidney, 48 Wo 1 finger, Raymond, 115 Women, 9, 15, 25, 159, 168, 170; elec­ tions of 6 0 - 6 3 , 65; legislators, 4, 25, 4 0 - 4 9 , 50, 7 3 - 7 4 ; traditional roles, 61-62 Wood, Gordon S., 6 - 8 Woosley, Lynn, 48 Wright, Gerald C , 115 Wynn, Albert, 81 Xenia, O . H . , 31 Young, Andrew, 37, 38, 54, 106, 183 Young, Iris Marion, 1 5 7 - 1 5 8