Biopolitics and Gender 0866562508, 5619833054, 9780866562508, 9781136548840, 113654884X

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Biopolitics and Gender

Biopolitics and Gender Meredith W. Watts, Editor

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group NEW YORK AND LONDON

First Published by The Haworth Press, Inc., 10 Alice Street, Binghamton, NY 13904–1580 Transferred to Digital Printing 2009 by Routledge 270 Madison Ave, New York NY 10016 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon, OX14 4RN Biopolitics and Gender has also been published as Women & Politics, Volume 3, Numbers 2/3, Summer/Fall 1983. Copyright © 1984 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved. Copies of articles in this publication may be reproduced noncommercially for the purpose of educational or scientific advancement. Otherwise, no part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, microfilm and recording, or by any information storage and retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publisher. Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Main entry under title: Biopolitics and gender. "Biopolitics and Gender has also been published as Women & Politics, Volume 3, Numbers 2/3, Summer/Fall 1983"—Verso of t.p. Includes bibliographical references. Contents: Biopolitics and gender / Meredith W. Watts — Biology, gender, and politics / Denise L. Baer, David A. Bositis — Political ideology, sociology, and the U.S. women's rights movement / Susan Ann Kay, Douglas B. Meikle — [etc.] 1. Women in politics—United States—Addresses, essays, lectures. 2. Women's rights—United States—Addresses, essays, lectures. 3. Biopolitics—Addresses, essays, lectures. I. Watts, Meredith W. II. Women & politics. HQ1236.5.U6B56 1983 305.4'2 83-18597 ISBN 0-86656-250-8 Publisher's Note The publisher has gone to great lengths to ensure the quality of this reprint but points out that some imperfections in the original may be apparent.

Biopolitics and Gender Women & Politics Volume 3, Numbers 2/3 CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION: Biopolitics and Gender Meredith W. Watts Biology, Gender, and Politics: An Assessment and Critique Denise L. Baer David A. Bositis Androgens and Participation Menstruation and Participation Biopolitics as an Explanatory Paradigm Political Ideology, Sociobiology, and the U.S. Women's Rights Movement Susan Ann Kay Douglas B. Meikle Conflict within and between Ideologies in the U.S. Sociobiology Implications from Sociobiology for Reform Feminist Ideology and Policy Prescriptions Conclusions The Biopolitics of Sex: Gender, Genetics, and Epigenetics Glendon Schubert Sexual Dimorphism Sex Roles Political Behavior Conclusion

1 29

30 44 52 67

68 77 84 90 97 99 111 116 120

Sex, Endocrines, and Political Behavior Dean Jaros Elizabeth S. White

129

Power Structures and Perceptions of Power Holders in Same-sex Groups of Young Children 147 Diane Carlson Jones Power The Ethological Study of Dominance Leadership as a Power Phenomenon Sex Differences in Leadership and Dominance The Study The Power Hierarchies Relationships among Hierarchy Variables Perceptions of Power Holders Implications Explaining "Male Chauvinism" and "Feminism": Cultural Differences in Male and Female Reproductive Strategies Roger D. Masters Sexual Inequality as a Problem for Research Natural Selection and Cultural Norms Inclusive Fitness Theory and Gender Differences in Reproductive Strategy The Evolutionary Origins of Human Gender Roles The Causes of "Male Chauvinism" Sexual Discrimination in Industrial Societies Conclusions

148 148 149 150 153 156 158 158 160

165 166 167 174 180 184 198 202

EDITOR SARAH SLAVIN, Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, State University College at Buffalo, Buffalo, New York EDITORIAL BOARD KIRSTEN AMUNDSEN, Professor of Political Science, California State University at Sacramento BARBARA R. BERGMANN, Professor of Economics, University of Maryland at College Park MELISSA BUTLER, Associate Professor of Political Science, Wabash College ELLEN BONEPARTH, Associate Professor of Political Science, San Jose State University, San Jose, California IRENE DIAMOND, Women's Studies Program, University of California at Los Angeles JEAN BETHKE ELSHTAIN, Professor of Political Science, University of Massachusetts at Amherst JO FREEMAN, Brooklyn, New York WALTER R. GOVE, Professor of Sociology, Vanderbilt University MARTIN GRUBERG, Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin at Oshkosh LYNNE B. IGLITZIN, Associate Director of Undergraduate Studies; Lecturer in Political Science, University of Washington at Seattle JANE S. JAQUETTE, Associate Professor of Political Science, Occidental College at Los Angeles M. KENT JENNINGS, Professor, Political Science Department, University of California at Santa Barbara ALBERT K. KARNIG, Associate Professor, Center for Public Affairs, Arizona State University RITA MAE KELLY, Professor, Center for Public Affairs, Arizona State University JEANE J. KIRKPATRICK, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations J. STANLEY LEMONS, Professor of History, Rhode Island University NAOMI LYNN, Professor, Political Science Department, Kansas State University at Manhattan SUSAN GLUCK MEZEY, Political Science Department, DePaul University BETTY A. NESVOLD, Dean, San Diego State University KAREN O'CONNOR, Associate Professor of Political Science, Emory University; member of the Georgia bar JEWEL L. PRESTAGE, Professor and Chair, Political Science Department, Southern University VIRGINIA SAPIRO, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Wisconsin at Madison DEBRA W. STEWART, Associate Professor of Political Science, North Carolina State University at Raleigh KENT TEDIN, Associate Professor of Political Science, University of Houston SUSAN J. TOLCHIN, Professor of Public Administration, The George Washington University SUSAN WELCH, Professor and Chair, Political Science Department, University of Nebraska at Lincoln

BIBLIOGRAPHY EDITOR KATHLEEN A. STAUDT, Assistant Professor, Political Science Department, University of Texas at El Paso BOOK REVIEW EDITOR SHARON L. WOLCHIK, Visiting Assistant Professor of International Affairs and Political Science, Institute for Sino-Soviet Studies, Department of Political Science, The George Washington University EDITORIAL INTERN JUDY HARLA, State University College at Buffalo DATA BASES EDITOR ROBERT DARCY, Associate Professor of Political Science, Oklahoma State University at Stillwater

Biopolitics and Gender

INTRODUCTION

Biopolitics and Gender Meredith W. Watts

INTRODUCTION In general, the term "biopolitics" denotes a relatively young interdisciplinary approach with a focus on the contemporary life sciences—psychophysiology, brain science, ethology, endocrinology, or any number of others—as sources of insight and method for the analysis of political behavior. In the standard interpretation of "normal science" (cf. Thomas Kuhn), the life sciences can be usefully discussed in two parts: 1) as a body of knowledge developed through the accumulation of interrelated, replicable and replicated studies which have produced empirically verified and intersubjectively accepted findings, and 2) as the methodology employed in carrying out empirical analysis. The dichotomy between a corpus of knowledge and the methods for acquiring that knowledge is used in avoiding confusion over "substantive findings" on the one hand and the means (ranging from broad epistemology to specific dataMeredith W. Watts is affiliated with the Department of Political Science, University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee, Milwaukee, WI 53211. An earlier version of this paper was presented at the Western Political Science Association annual convention, San Diego, 1982. David Allen provided helpful comments on a preliminary draft of this material; Leila Fraser provided extremely helpful editorial and substantive assistance throughout the project. Others have provided extremely useful comments, including Denise Baer, Eloise Buker, Nancy McGlen and Virginia Sapiro. Sarah Slavin's thoughtful and incisive comments were extremely helpful throughout. I thank all these individuals for sharing their perspectives with me, and for helping me to broaden my own. © 1984 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.

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gathering techniques) commonly employed within a particular field for conducting research. It is commonly understood that one's predispositions and perceptions, among other influences, affect the manner in which research problems are defined and data are interpreted; indeed, it is difficult to maintain, particularly in the social sciences but also in the natural sciences, that substantive findings exist in an ethereal realm unguided by human purposes and visions, and even limitations and tendentiousness. It is, however, worthwhile to bear in mind this venerable distinction between substance and method to the extent that it reflects a real diversity among those involved in "biopolitics." As we see in this introductory review, and in the chapters which it precedes, the term "biopolitics" has been used to include, on the one hand, sociopolitical extrapolations from the "substance" of one or more of the life sciences and on the other hand, empirical studies which primarily borrow methods from the life sciences to examine hypotheses of more or less traditional interest to their "home" disciplines. In this volume, the papers by Kay and Meikle, Schubert, and Masters tend more toward the former category, while studies by Jones, and Jaros and White tend toward the second. The Baer paper offers a critique that deals with both areas, but standing in sharpest relief is a concern that social scientists make appropriate use of findings in such areas as endocrinology and that they be aware of limitations and conceptual difficulties involved in borrowing from those areas. As it currently stands, "biopolitics" can lay claim to only a small corpus of unique substantive contributions to the study of politics. What it does offer, however, is the perspective that life sciences are a useful (some would claim necessary) source of theory, substantive knowledge and methodological techniques appropriate to the study of certain aspects of human political life. It is probably not useful to digress too far into the etymology of the term biopolitics, and the intellectual content it denotes; for that, the interested reader might consult Albert Somit, Meredith Watts, Thomas Wiegele, and Samuel Hines1 for an overview of the growing body of literature and for points of departure to a variety of writings by still others. For a time the newsletter NOTES, published by the Center for Biopolitical Research at Northern Illinois University, kept track of developments; it has now been superceded by a journal, Politics and the Life Sciences, also published by the center under the general auspices of the Association for Politics and the Life Sciences. Any of these

Introduction

3

sources document the growing body of literature commonly referred to as "biopolitics." A generally useful, if not definitive orientation to the term appears in Wiegele's book, Biopolitics: Search for a More Human Political Science: Biopolitics is an orientation to political inquiry that acknowledges the person as a complex rational, emotional, biological creature. Although biopolitics has attempted to blend strands of knowledge from both the life sciences and the social sciences in an effort to better understand human political behavior, it does not attempt to reduce all political behavior to simply a discussion of biological aspects. Instead, biopolitical research has tried to demonstrate that many human activities, formerly believed to be exclusively rational or psychological in character, are frequently influenced and tempered by biological factors.2 As stated here, this orientation to the life sciences does not stem from a reductionist urge to express complex social and political phenomena in strictly biological terms. The expressed need is to enrich conventional studies of political life (and perhaps inspire some unconventional studies), rather than proposing to supplant any of the traditional concerns of the various academic disciplines typically concerned with such analysis: In acknowledging the impact of biological variables on political behavior, the political scientist is not in any way denying that people have intellects with rational powers of reasoning. Rather, it might be argued that political science has often been antihumanistic because it has not adequately taken into account the biological aspects of political behavior. By looking at the entire person as biological as well as an intellectual and emotional creature, we are assuming a much more humanistic approach. Biopolitics, then, can be viewed as an effort to restore humanism to political inquiry.3 If "biopolitics" is a contemporary development, it is by no means without precedents. Social scientists have shared concern for the findings of the life sciences. Although with quite different consequences, both Karl Marx and Herbert Spencer, for examples, were fascinated by Charles Darwin's evolutionary theory. Much more re-

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cently, social science has used certain of the techniques of the natural and life sciences. In one area of such methodological borrowing, psychophysiological measuring techniques and research designs have been employed by psychologists, sociologists and political scientists since the mid-1950s and even the 1930s. Certain concerns of such interdisciplinary research are new, but often a set of classic problems is being approached in a new way. B. Tursky and his associates have developed a theoretical rationale for the use of psychophysiological methods in political science,4 and have developed a research program that uses such psychophysiological indicators as heart rate and skin conductance response (SCR) to monitor individual arousal during presentation of political stimuli in a controlled experimental setting.5 In one study Tursky et al. conditioned subjects to respond to racial stimuli with increased SCR; after conditioning had taken place, stimuli of differing racial connotation were presented to determine (by the amplitude of the elicited SCR) which stimuli had racial meaning for a given individual.6 In another set of studies, I have used SCR in an experimental setting to examine the validity of attitude scales7 to explore the relationship between attitude/personality scales on individual arousal when shown videotapes of violent or aggressive social behavior,8 and to examine whether "Machiavellian" and "authoritarian" individuals were less aroused than their counterparts while viewing scenes of aggression and pathos. They were, generally, with relationships strongest for the sixth grade boys and college age male students in the studies conducted. There were apparently differences by sex of subject, but it was not possible to determine from the data whether the differences were due to differential validity of the attitude/personality scales by sex, or to differential physiological response by sex. In any event, this finding does not reflect favorably on the use of intersex comparisons on certain types of verbal selfreport scales.9 In yet another instance, Tursky and Milton Lodge used psychophysical theory and techniques to cross-validate response format in survey research instruments.10 Other contributors to the literature of biopolitics are interested in the potential importance for politics of brain structure, or the functioning of the endocrine system. (In fact, the papers in this volume contributed by Baer, Schubert, and Jaros focus on these particular topics.) Although less anatomical and more behavioral than the physiological studies, ethology—naturalistic observation of organisms in their environment—has inspired both theoretical and em-

Introduction

5

pirical analysis of human behavior. First developed to study other species, ethology's observational methods seem to provide new insight into human behavior and some useful counterpoint to the highly cognitive and mentalistic concerns of the sociopsychological perspective of contemporary social science. In one area, represented in this volume, techniques for analyzing dyadic interactions among, say, rhesus monkeys have been applied to the behavior of young humans. F. Strayer12 describes the construction of such an interaction matrix for the analysis of various target behaviors, typically competition, status, leadership or dominance related. The technique lies in part in its transferability from one species to another, and from one group to another, allowing comparisons of interaction structures across units of analysis.13 Though some of the original work oriented toward the ethological, naturalistic observation of animals (rhesus monkeys and chimpanzees), the methodology itself has been employed subsequently to compare group interaction patterns of humans. The method allows estimation of the extent to which dominance and hierarchy (to mention two commonly studied phenomena) are prevalent in a particular group. By varying age, sex composition, task assignments, and other features of the groups observed, researchers have accumulated evidence on the conditions of various cooperative, aggressive, leadership and related social behaviors.14 In this volume, Diane Carlson Jones reviews some of the recent literature in the area, and studies the behavior of young males and females in same-sex groups in leadership behavior and affect toward leaders.15 On this connection between the life sciences and political research Fred Strayer says: It is not surprising that, for most social scientists, the principle of genetic determinism does not seem useful as a potential conceptual link between human biology and the study of human social behavior. In contrast, the principles of individual adaptation and collective survival represent basic conceptual tools that are already widely used within both scientific disciplines. These two concepts seem likely to provide the necessary conceptual foundation for the elaboration of a viable interdisciplinary link between the biological and social sciences.16 . . . a group power structure represents a biologically adapted network of social relations that prescribes relative roles of as-

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sertion and acquiescence during conflict and thus eliminates potentially dangerous intragroup aggression that could ultimately reduce the reproductive fitness of some group members.17 Within biopolitics there are also individuals with an interest in the application of sociobiology to the study of political life. One example is Elliott White's edited volume Sociobiology and Human Politics.18 Sociobiology is a concern only of some in the area—and a general concern for the life sciences in general, or for biopolitics in particular, certainly does not require one to take a position on the core concepts, scientific validity or ideological predispositions of what goes under the name of sociobiology.19 Our concern for that field of study is, in this volume, primarily concerned with concepts and insights that may be of use in political research. Two papers included in this volume deal with sociobiology—one with an interpretation of caste and value ascribed to male and female offspring in India (Masters, "Explaining 'Male Chauvinism' and 'Feminism': Cultural Differences in Male and Female Reproductive Strategies," this volume); the other with an argument that sociobiology may be compatible (or may be made compatible) with feminist theory (Kay and Meikle). Both papers provide a number of proposals that add some new dimensions to the understanding of sociobiology and that are worthy of further discussion. They can be complemented usefully by a reading of the materials in White's volume, particularly the rather searchingly critical papers contributed by political scientists. As social scientists, we have to be concerned with finding a reasonable way to deal with such materials as sociobiology and ethology—and even more technical fields such as psychophysiology, neuromorphology, endocrinology and behavioral genetics—whose applications are at the intersections of social science and various life sciences. There is open concern that biological and evolutionary theorizing fulfill a perverse need to justify masculine domination, patriarchy, and biologically-determined sociopolitical and economic roles for males and females. It may, however, be that something will be lost by rejecting whatever insights result from the various interconnections between the life sciences and sociopolitical behavior. Science is likely to be treated as ideology where important questions of human equity and justice are concerned, but it may be useful to remain wary of both premature rejection or life science

Introduction

7

data. Certainly a minimal grounding in the literature in question is important for adequately assessing the relevance and possible contributions of the life sciences to political and social understanding, the various limitations of the study. Similarly, it makes sense to be extremely cautious about drawing premature ideological and macropolitical conclusions from biological literature. Political scientists, for example, tend to be deeply concerned with the broader implications of their academic work, and often feel pressure to draw macropolitical conclusions as a way of demonstrating the professional relevance of their research and theoretical interests—pressure that may be particularly salient for researchers who are not directly studying large political collectives and aggregates, or some conventionally-defined (and "obviously" political) activity or institution (e.g., international conflict, voting behavior, political leadership, party structure and leadership). But, whatever the temptations to generalize prematurely, the price is very likely premature rejection by others who are sensitive to the possible ideological and dispositional biases that might motivate such speculation. Likewise, in the case of biopolitics and gender (or biopolitics and sex roles), the topic of this introductory paper, there is a need to differentiate scientific from pre-scientific questions. When we entertain the idea of sex differences, both in morphology and culture, there is a set of questions that may be asked of each body of literature. Consider the "flow chart" of some relevant questions shown in Figure 1. In the chart, each block represents a question which can be treated as logically prior to the succeeding questions in the chart. The answer to each will condition out treatment of the next. For example, we would first want to determine whether the author asserts a nontrivial difference between different males and females. Secondly, does any difference asserted have a putative impact on political functioning (level 2). Thirdly, does the nature of the difference imply a more or less reliable criterion for discriminating between males and females? If the answers at each level are " n o , " then the author is likely not ascribing any discriminatory value, either negative or positive, to sexual difference. Though this chart is not exhaustive as a logical device, it does help us locate the papers in this symposium in some useful ways. For example, the paper by Baer accepts a certain level of difference at level one with respect to, say, endocrinology, but questions whether any political relevance (level 2) has been demonstrated. Jaros and White examine alleged differences associated with the

BIOPOLITICS AND GENDER

8

EVALUATING AN AUTHOR'S APPROACH TO THE "MEANING" OF SEX DIFFERENCES FOR POLITICS

Level Is there a difference asserted between the sexes?

1

Yes

No

Are the differences asserted to be relevant to politics?

2

Yes

No

Do the differences imply a differentiation based on sex?

No

3

Yes

Egalitarianism, or selection by prevalence of desired traits at the individual level, regardless of sex. "Discrimination" by some characteristic other than sex that is valued by the system.

Selection by sex, with possible exception of underclass members possessing characteristics valued in overclass members; i.e., selection by some traits only as exceptions to the primary basis of discrimination.

FIGURE 1.

Introduction

9

female menstrual cycle, and find no level 2 significance based on their attitudinal data. Kay and Meikle, and Masters, take concepts from sociobiology concerning differential reproductive strategies for males and females. The former analysis attempts to indicate ways in which feminist theorists might employ those concepts for reform; the latter paper uses the additional variables of social stratification and reliability of resources to provide a theoretical explanation of "male chauvinism." Diane Carlson Jones's study of leadership among children finds a relationship difference between dominance and sociometric preference ("liking") that could conceivably have relevance for males and females in authority roles. Schubert discusses a variety of sex differences, concluding that a preference for females in leadership roles is justified by those differences. It is often the case that an assertion of sex differences is rejected (or, for that matter, accepted) because of a belief that admission of differences at level 1 implies political relevance (level 2). That rejection is not logically necessary, because a sex difference need not make a political difference. Nor does it necessarily follow that the political relevance of some sex-linked phenomenon automatically implies differentiation of one or the other group into a sex-defined underclass from which only unusual individuals escape. Further, a negative answer at each level implies an equalitarian conception of the biological bases of political life—at least at the level of morphology and physiology. Certainly there are a number of possibilities, and the issues are complex, but it will be helpful to focus on what differences (if any) are asserted, and what differences (if any) for politics are implied. One oversimplification lies in the fact that authors are not always clear about their underlying motivations and unspoken assumptions. (See Figure 1.) Virtually nobody seems to propose a clear-cut choice between nature (innate difference) and nurture (environmental determinism) anymore—at least not in principle (in practice, our language is less apt to be so cautious). What does seem to be the case is: If sex differences are demonstrated to exist then 1) there will exist significant differences from one individual within as well as between the sexes, and 2) an individual's degree of development will be variably responsive to the developmental experiences of the individual. Ontogeny—the individual organism—is a product of characteristics of the species, and of the interaction of the individual with environmental and developmental history. That is, there will be

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an interaction between the predisposition of the organism (genetically, hormonally, etc.), which may be expected to amplify or diminish those biases. Although one might accept the proposition that certain sex-linked characteristics had an adaptive significance in the history of the species as a whole, we need not accept the inevitability of that trait for the specific individual. Further, if the evolution of the species biased the sexes in certain modal ways (as Schubert, in this volume, suggests is the case for brain lateralization), this does not indicate the extent of the physiological or behavioral "biasing" toward any particular trait in the individual, nor the way in which that bias is augmented or diminished in the process of the individual organism's maturation. It might be argued, for example (as it often is), that it was adaptive in the course of human evolution for females to develop a potential for certain nurturant traits that exceeds male potential, on the average. However, for a variety of reasons (e.g., physiological, developmental, situational), those characteristics might not reach a high degree of expression in particular individuals. For a similar variety of reasons, those characteristics might find a degree of expression in individual males that exceeds the mode for males, or for females. Indeed, assuming that all humans share in overlapping distributions of characteristics, and partake in most potentialities of the species in general, we might easily expect the emegence of modal characteristics that are more generally characteristic, actuarially, of the other sex. Lawrence Harper and Karen Sanders Huie argue that: as a result of at least 50,000 years of subsisting by hunting and gathering, hominids evolved biological predispositions toward gender-dimorphic behavior patterns appropriate to that mode of existence . . . because they share the same structural genes, both males and females probably develop the substrates necessary for performing behavior "typical" of the opposite sex. However, as a result of early (often embryonic) hormonal events associated with the development of anatomical/physiological dimorphisms, the behavioral thresholds of boys and girls are "biased" so that, on the average, they will engage in different activities.20 But here we are again, encountering the "hunter-gatherer" conception that has often served to emphasize the possibility of male

Introduction

11

dominance and sex differentiation in cultural, political and economic roles. This issue is too complex to deal appropriately with here; nor can I shed any new light on the anthropological discussion of the relative prevalence of male-dominated versus matriarchal systems in our human and protohominid past.21 From the perspective of this volume, it does not seem necessary to become embroiled in retrodictive speculation about the origins of the human species, although such critical analysis is of undisputed importance to many (including theorists in the social and behavioral sciences in general, and particularly individuals in certain areas of biopolitics and feminist theory). Examination of the available data on our evolutionary origins is only one means of exploration of the topic—another lies in the more immediate opportunities for empirical analysis of existing groups of humans and closely related species. Whatever the proposed sex-differentiation implied by, say, a hunting band or matriarchal model, we still have contemporary behavior that can be observed. Ethology provides some guidance in that area, as can be seen in the study of leadership relations in same-sex groups contributed to this volume by Jones. Other relevant studies in this area are reviewed by both Jones and Baer in their separate papers, although the wealth of cross-species data does not receive much attention in this volume. It may be worth mentioning that ethological study of one of the most male-dominated and hierarchical primate species—the rhesus monkey—has, in a recent analysis, been found to have a much more complex social organization than once was believed. Work by Jane Teas and her associates, indicates important female contributions to internal group order, transmission of status to offspring, coalition behavior, and active involvement in leadership succession. Since data from such species as the rhesus played some role in earlier ethological thinking about hierarchy and male dominance, surely revision of those models that give highly significant roles to the females of the species should enter our thinking as well. In other words, I am suggesting that resolution of questions about our evolutionary past, though important, does not necessarily have to precede revision of our conceptions of sex-role differentiation among primates—new empirical data produced by human ethologists and primatologists can be immediately useful. For example, the following conclusion differs somewhat from the malebased agonistic hierarchies that have tended to characterize much of the primatological literature:

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We believe it is a moot issue whether males or females are "more aggressive." Our data and others' suggest that a balance is struck in the rhesus troops between the females' greater number and social stability (leading, for example, to effective use of threat) and the males' individual aggression rates, possibly aiding their acceptance in the troop. We believe that only in the context of group dynamics can the role of aggression and sex be fully understood.22 Occasionally it seems difficult to discuss rationally our past because of our competing images of the present and future. Certainly our image of even the present is subject to continual alteration as new data are produced by the life sciences. Therefore, though Harper and Huie refer to the "hunter-gatherer" notion of human evolutionary history, we need not see this particular conception as precluding an interactionist approach to the development of sex differences. In fact, Harper and Huie see a link between biology and development in the acculturation of sex roles, suggesting "it is quite possible that traditional 'sex-role socialization' represents, in part, a convergence of congenital response biases and culturally prescribed roles." 23 Therefore, even if data from the life sciences indicate sex differences in, say, endocrine secretion and aggression or assertiveness, or in brain lateralization, or in predisposition to dominance or bonding in social groups, we still have made no prima facie case concerning the individual's suitability for a particular sociopolitical role. Janet Spence and Robert Helmreich argue this point with respect to occupational roles: The changing nature of work has . . . eliminated much of the adaptive significance between the sexes in the socialization of personality traits. Attention has been called, for example, to the implication of the shift in postindustrial societies from entrepreneurial to bureaucratic organizations . . . In bureaucracies, successful job performance places less premium on such conventionally masculine traits as aggressiveness and dominance and more on interpersonal skills that promote harmonious relationships and group cooperation—skills traditionally regarded as feminine. Men (and women) thus may require expressive, "feminine" characteristics as well as instrumental

Introduction

13

"masculine" ones to be maximally effective in the vocational sphere.2425 More specifically in the political realm of activity, Denise Baer points out that (this volume) we have often made too facile an assumption about aggressiveness or a "will to power" as a precondition for political activism and success. Reminding us of Harold Lasswell's analysis of decades ago, Baer suggests that aggression in the ethological sense is probably counterproductive in conventional politics. Only a limited portion of politics involves what some ethologists call "agonistic" encounters—interactions characterized by aggression and dominance-submission relationships. A greater portion of total activity is likely to involve cooperation, coalition behavior, and reciprocal exchange. The papers in this volume by Baer, and by Kay and Meikle, both apply, more or less, what Spence and Helmreich have suggested above with respect to contemporary bureaucratic society—namely, that maximal individual functioning very likely depends on the individual's possession of a variety of expressive and instrumental characteristics (many or most of which are "learned" or potentiated in the process of individual development, but which nevertheless rely on a diverse substrate of biological potential that will vary from one individual to another). If we conceive of each human as possessing a vast genetic repertoire, developed and modified by interaction with the culture, we come to the obvious conclusion that an individual would develop differently in a hunting band on the open savannah eons ago than in contemporary industrial society. The differences will not be entirely cultural—in the interaction model (often more technically called "epigenesis"), different components of the individual's genetic potential would be activated and developed by events and stimuli in the developmental process. We do not ordinarily reward skullcrushing Neanderthal behavior on the part of politicians (although there has been the occasional caning, duel, or fist fight among, for example, U.S. Senators and the like in years past). Naturally individuals would generally learn that skull-crushing is rarely appropriate, but it is also plausible that under certain circumstances phylogenetic potential (of the human species) for such behavior is muted in the course of ontogenetic (individual) development. In the area of culture and personality, Beverly Cook suggests that: There is no "natural" unfolding of all the possibilities of a

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genotype; rather, the individual phenotype meets the demands of cultural stereotypes, and other potentialities of the biological structure may never find expression in any available social role.26 Social scientists, to be sure, tend to be primarily concerned with "social" expressions of individuals' variability, but Benson Ginsburg provides a helpful—if more technical—description of the process that includes more than cultural phenomena: different environmental circumstances may activate varying components of the encoded genotype so that the effective genotypes are no longer the same . . . (among individuals of the same genotype). When one considers the gene pool of a population . . . its phenotypic potential depends on the combinations and permutations of the genes themselves, upon the interactions of each encoded genome with those developmental events that will determine which aspects will come to effective expression . . . and upon the reaction ranges of the effective genotype with environmental factors.27

PHYLOGENY, ONTOGENY AND CULTURAL INTERACTION What I have expressed thus far is admittedly only one of a variety of perspectives concerning the life sciences and political analysis. Quite a different perspective is presented by Ruth Hubbard and her co-authors, who criticize the study of biology as inherently ideological and male-oriented ("androcentric"): We do not know what immutable differences in behavior, nature, ability, or possibility exist between men and women. We know that they have different genitalia and at different times in their lives, different sex hormone levels. Perhaps there are some unchangeable differences; probably there are a number of irrelevant differences. But all these differences are likely to be trivial compared to the enormous influence of social context. And it is clear that, until social expectations of men and women are equal and just, until equal respect is pro-

Introduction

15

vided for both men and women, our answers to the question of immutable differences, of "true" nature, of who should be the scientist and who should be the secretary, will simply reflect our prejudices.28 It is valid to observe that science can be value-laden, even ideological, either by conscious desire or by the researcher's temperamental bias in the selection of research questions and interpretation of evidence. In particular, the study of "immutable" differences between males and females is particularly subject to bias. Hubbard and her co-authors seem also to imply that sex differences cannot or should not be studied until social prejudice against women is ended. Such a concern might well mitigate against a number of the suggested avenues of study discussed by the various contributors to this volume. It may be useful, however, to focus on the interaction of organism with environment as a model that avoids some of the problems analyzed by Hubbard. This would seem more appropriate in the sense that it is concerned less with "immutability" of differences than with the way in which biological potential of individuals reaches expression through interaction with the environment in a developmental process. According to Baer, we need to avoid the over-simplification implied in the "either-or" notion of the "nature" (biology)/"nuture" (learning, development) conflict. Certainly a determined search for "immutable differences," to the exclusion of environmental and developmental influences, would be such an objectionable oversimplification. But so too is an exclusive focus on "socialization." Either such view, as Baer indicates, "distorts our understanding of the developmental process by dividing behavior into innate and learned components,"29 whereas "the developmental process represents a continual interaction between genetic constitution and experience in the environment, not an overlay of innate and learned components." Likewise, Schubert proposes a "transactional, epigenetic approach" which claims an emphasis on reciprocal, developmental effects between the individual and its physical and sociocultural environments. We have only given the briefest parenthetical definition of "epigenesis" in the discussion above, although it is an important element in this introductory essay. Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass provide a more formal definition of the term epigenesis—and its traditional opposite, preformation—that may be helpful.

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[Epigenesis and preformation are] alternative interpretations, thought in Victorian times to be mutually exclusive, of the development of animals and plants. Preformationists believed that the adult simply enlarges or unfolds from a miniature precursor, e.g., homunculus; epigenesists that development results from the evocative influences of the ENVIRONMENT shaping the germ into its adult form. The truth is now known to lie somewhere between the two: the genetic instructions which are followed in development are certainly preformed— or at all events inherited—but their working out and realization is epigenetic in pattern, i.e., depends upon an interplay between environmental STIMULI and the effects of neighbouring CELLS upon the genetic programme built into them.30 To accept either of these positions (or some other terminology connoting this conceptual polarization) to the exclusion of the other is to limit unfruitfully the scope of inquiry. Between these disparate historical viewpoints is a contemporary intellectual compromise that seems more acceptable and realistic to social scientists with a concern for the life sciences and political life. This is not to say that individuals should not make personal and intellectual commitments to a focus on one or the other mode of explanation as a way of facilitating a particular piece of scholarly research or aspect of social policy. Such specialization seems natural and, for the most part, useful. Individuals will continue to demonstrate their preferences for one perspective or another, possibly casting wary eyes on the ideology and veracity of those making other intellectual and political commitments. Yet it would seem too great a limitation on intellectual inquiry to allow such specialization to hinder useful research in any area of scientific (including social scientific) investigation. Because of the strong social interests involved in considering any particular characteristics presumed to be sex-linked, it is difficult to select an example that would clarify the issue further. A fictional example may help. Novelist Jean Auel's Clan of the Cave Bear31 gives us a bit of fictional anthropology which, without proposing to be "real," provides a highly stylized "preformationist" view of sexlinked characteristics. However, we may wish to modify the sense of "sex-linked." The term generally means that there is disproportionate transmission of a trait by the sex of an individual (i.e., males or females will tend to predominate among carriers of the trait). Hemophilia is sex-linked in this sense, with males predom-

Introduction

17

inantly affected. But, "linked" does not necessarily mean "determined"—both sexes may to some degree be affected by the trait. In the case of Auel's speculative reconstruction sex differences are rigidly "sex-determined," to the eventual misfortune of the Clan. There is virtually no epigenesis among the people Auel describes— in fact, genetic determinism rigidifies human form and behavior in far more radical ways than the most rigid biological determinists would propose. In fact, it is a central premise of the novel that the people of the Clan are doomed by their immutably canalized biological heritage. The Clan people are described this way: The women relied on their men to lead, to assume responsibility, to make important decisions. The Clan had changed so little in nearly a hundred thousand years, they were now incapable of change, and ways that had once been adaptations for convenience had become genetically set. Both men and women accepted their roles without struggle; they were inflexibly unable to assume any other. They would no more try to change their relationship than they would try to grow an extra arm or change the shape of their brain.32 All those primitive people, with almost no frontal lobes and speech limited by undeveloped vocal organs, but with huge brains—larger than any race of man then living or future generations yet unborn—were unique. They were the culmination of a branch of mankind whose brain was develped in the back of their heads, in the occipital and the parietal regions that control vision and bodily sensation and store memory.33 And their memory made them extraordinary. In them, the unconscious knowledge of ancestral behavior called instinct had evolved. Stored in the back of their large brains were not just their own memories, but the memories of their forebears. They could recall knowledge learned by their ancestors and, under special circumstances, they could go a step beyond. They could recall their racial memory, their own evolution. And when they reached back far enough, they could merge that memory that was identical for all and join their minds, telepathically.34 The Clan could not conceive a future any different from the past, could not devise innovative alternatives for tomorrow.

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All their knowledge, everything they did, was a repetition of something that had been done before. Even storing food for seasonal changes was the result of past experience.35 Memories in Clan people were sex differentiated. Women had no more need of hunting lore than men had of more than rudimentary knowledge of plants. The difference in the brains of men and women was imposed by nature, and only cemented by culture. It was another of nature's attempts to limit the size of their brains in a effort to prolong the race. Any child with the knowledge rightfully belonging to the opposite gender at birth lost it through lack of stimulation by the time adult status was reached.36 But nature's attempt to save the race from extinction carried with it the elements to defeat its own purpose. Not only were both sexes essential for procreation, but for day to day living; one could not survive for long without the other. And they could not learn each other's skills, they hadn't the memories for it.37 In this fictional scenario the race of the Clan is doomed. Frozen in behavior and morphology (physical structure) by genetic adaptation, members of the race are culturally and physiologically limited to a very narrow response range. Even behaviors typical of males and females are transmitted genetically. The fictional alternative to extinction is the introduction of genetic variation—Ayla, a blue-eyed member of another race known xenophobically by the Clan as simply "the Others," is orphaned by an earthquake and raised by the Clan to womanhood. She differs from her adopted clan in possessing a wide range of potentials—she excels at hunting and physical activities; she is far more physically active than the Clan women, though not as strong as most of the males; she lacks the genetic memory of "women's" knowledge of nature and healing, but has a vastly greater capacity for learning the lore of both men and women; and she can express a far wider range of emotions. She is, in other words, flexible and adaptive in both behavior and physical capability. Because of Ayla's heterodox form and behavior—she is almost literally from a different species—she is quite unsuited for mating. Yet sex is seen by the Clan as a "spiritual encounter"—an encounter in which the spirit of the male seeks to dominate the female's. Conception is a sign of victory. So Ayla is mated by a

Introduction

19

dominant male of the group seeking to demonstrate the power of his spirit and to demean her in the eyes of the others who have come to some positive appreciation of her strangeness. The child is a genetic hybrid and, although Ayla herself is eventually ejected from the Clan, she leaves behind a new wealth of genetic possibilities (and, presumably, story plots for future novels). What the Clan lacked was genetic and behavioral variability—morphology and behavior were locked into rigid canals long established in the phylogenetic development of their race. There was no significant opportunity for innovation at the level of ontogeny; that is, each individual's repertoire of behavior, and of physical and intellectual capacities, was limited and quite similar to others of the same sex. The Clan had evolved stability and rigid sexrole delineation—presumably adaptive for their traditional ecological niche. The price paid for the stability of over-adaptation was a vulnerability to even relatively minor changes in their ecology. Auel allows the Clan a genetic solution to its evolutionary impasse with the introduction of Ayla who enormously enriches the gene pool. Just as diversity of the gene pool, acted upon by the process of eipgenesis is the answer to rigid biological determinism in Auel's fictional people of the Cave Bear Clan, so I would contend that it is our preferred theoretical position in the biopolitical study of sex differences. Without presupposing the existence or not of any particular difference (for that matter, without making an a priori assumption that any particular difference will have direct political relevance), the epigenetic approach—described in various ways by Schubert and by Baer—provides a more flexible and ideologically non-tendentious framework for the study of potential sex differences. In fact we may reasonably proceed on the assumption of not only overlapping distributions of characteristics between the sexes, but also of overlapping physiological "substrata." Harper and Huie contend: It now seems clear that the substrata for most masculine and feminine activities are not physiologically mutually exclusive. Rather, they represent the functioning of independent, semiautonomous neural systems, both of which develop in all members of the species. Hence, sex differences in behavior simply represent the relative dominance or unequal development of one or the other of these shared systems.38

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Whether, as Harper and Huie suggest, there are two semiautonomous neural systems in each human organism, or whether there is one system that is predisposed in one direction or another by hormonal differences, is not a matter about which I could propose a competent judgment. It does seem to me conceptually reasonable to entertain the notion that all individuals share in the wide range of human potentialities, whether a particular potentiality is manifested as predominantly "male" or "female" in a particular setting. Neural substrates, endocrine systems, and brain lateralization and other physiological phenomena show, in varying measure, differential distributions by sex. Although the modal patterns for males and females display a "bias" or predisposition toward one or the other end of the overall population distribution (cf. Harper & Huie, below; evidence cited in Schubert), the presence of overlapping distributions is itself strongly suggestive of overlapping potentialities. As Denise Baer points out, the hormones "typical" of one sex (e.g., testosterone, estrogen) have counterparts in the other sex, and differentiation rather than exclusivity is to be seen in this patterning. Basically the above discussion proposes a middle-ground in the nature-nurture dichotomy by suggesting that sociocultural manifestations of sex roles in an individual represent the physiological bias of that person's genetic composition plus the operation of the environment (beginning at least in utero) through the process of interactive development (epigenesis). To be sure, the outcome of the debate over human origins—whether (or for how long) our progenitors existed in hunting bands (or, for that matter, whether any of those bands were led by females)—is important for our understanding of evolution as well as background for contemporary empirical research on group behavior. But, if there are significant sex-linked differences, and if those differences had adaptive significance for the evolution of the species, it is still a plausible surmise that the very flexibility of human behavior makes febrile indeed the argument that our evolutionary origins predestine any particular sexlinked differentiation of labor in contemporary society. I hope it is clear that I cannot speak on this matter for others in the area of biopolitics. This position seems generally more humane than arguing the "naturalness" of sex-discrimination from evolutionary history, less arduous than attempting to reinterpret the past in light of present sociopolitical concerns, and more generally in keeping with scientific evidence on behavioral genetics, the working of the process of epigenesis, and the common sense notion that our culture

Introduction

21

and behavior must in some sense be constrained, although not determined, by human biology. It is all well and good to be ecumenical, but it is quite another to imagine what sort of research might be implied by such an eclectic program. The authors of papers in this volume suggest a number of possibilities, ranging from theoretical speculation (e.g., Masters), to interpretation of physiological and neurological research (cf, portions of Baer, Schubert, Jaros & White), to a different methodological and theoretical slant in leadership and socialization studies (e.g., Jones; material reviewed in Baer), to an analysis of possible positive connections between sociobiology and feminist theory and practice (Kay and Meikle). The common question posed by these studies is: What difference for sociopolitical life do these sex differences (whatever they may be) make? If we choose to set aside (for lack of data, ideological unacceptability or yet some other reason) the hypothesis that males are better suited to bonding and leadership groupings because of evolutionary history, can we look about for hypotheses at a level we can more meaningfully examine and evaluate? I believe so. In this volume, a paper by Dean Jaros and Elizabeth White tests in preliminary fashion the hypothesis that the female menstrual cycle, through hormonal fluctuations, is related to attitudes and decision-making style. The results are almost entirely negative; and the one exception is in a direction opposite to that expected. Certainly other studies of this sort might seek valid data on the question about "what difference the differences make." In the Jaros and White study, the first data indicate that, at least for some differences, the answer is: "Not much.'' While it is too early to anticipate the results of future studies done in this spirit, the work seems worth doing (if only because it has the potential for putting to rest some pernicious nonsense, and for providing a realistic perspective on any such differences that may have sociopolitical significance). As Marvin Bressler suggests, "we cannot afford to spurn any intellectual resource that expands our understanding of who we are and what we might become. " 40 We will no doubt find that some things make a difference and some do not. The question is which is which? As Jaros and White find no connection between menstrual cycles and political attitudes, Beverly Cook found significant convergence in attitudes and selfconceptions of male and female trial judges. From this she generalizes that "incumbents of a political position will display common personality traits befitting the role requirements regardless of sex

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identity.' '41 Except for the focus on personality per se, this is entirely consistent with our position which posits substantial behavioral flexibility widespread overlaps in genetic potential within and between sexes, epigenetic interaction between genetic composition and the environment in which the individual develops, sociocultural establishment of role expectations, recruitment of ''appropriately" socialized individuals into those roles, and individual augmentation of expected characteristics after initial recruitment into a position. Given these components, neither the biological substrate nor the sociocultural pattern is candidate for dismissal from intellectual concern. What matters, rather, is which variables are of the greatest consequence in a given instance. In Cook's study, like that of Jaros and White, the consideration of biological (or biologically-relevant) data leads to the conclusion that biological variables appear to be of minimal consequence. Yet, Schubert cites evidence on physiology and brain lateralization that might point to sex-linked differences of greater putative significance. The actual experimental data on political behavior may not yet exist, but work in cognate areas suggests that there is, at the very least, something to be investigated. The question in this potentially volatile area of analysis, as in others already discussed herein, is not whether "biological" variables are allowable as matters of intellectual concern, but rather whether they are appropriately of interest in the explanation for some politically relevant question. Many social scientists choose to disregard biological variables because they do not hold much likely explanatory power for the particular problem defined by the investigator. As Bressler indicates: "Biology is, and will perforce remain, a necessary but insufficient explanation of human behavior. It is a curious sort of determinism and reductionism that acknowledges that most 'residual' variability falls outside its domain."42 That is, a particular biological variable may not pass the test of probable connectedness and relevance for the analysis of a particular research problem. Benson Ginsburg, a behavioral geneticist with an interest in biopolitics affirms the importance of the balance between biology and social science: there are emergent properties of human beings, particularly language and culture, that differentiate us from other primates . . . At the social and political levels, we are more than

Introduction

23

an aggregate of individuals, more than the sums of our individual natures. Even if we were only that, each of us is a product of complex biological and psychological interactions throughout our individual development, and both our biology and behavior are under significant social control. We, ourselves, constitute this society. To this extent, we are the determiners of our own natures and cannot legitimately turn to biology for excuses.43 Our understanding of the biological substrates of human behavior is increasing,44 and Ginsburg sees in the "confluence of our disciplines" hope for "understanding our immutabilities and our modifiabilities, and on applying this understanding to the optimizing of the human condition."45 The papers in this volume do not cumulatively subscribe to any particular dogma; they represent, rather, several perspectives on the general topic of "biopolitics and gender." They show various grounding in brain science, endocrinology, ethology, psychophysiology and such conventional interests as political attitudes, socialization, participation, social structure and political hierarchy. While there is no collective orthodoxy there is, I believe, a collective interest in approaching problems in some rather different ways than are traditionally delimited by conventional boundaries of academic disciplines. These papers are presented here in the hope of stimulating discussion and furthering responsible research. ENDNOTES 1. Albert E. Somit, ed., Biology and Politics (The Hague: Mouton, 1976); Albert E. Somit, "Review Article: Biopolitics," in Albert E. Smoit, ed. Biology and Politics, pp. 293-323 (reprinted from British Journal of Political Science, 2 (1972), 209-38); A. Somit, S. Peterson, and D. S. Goldfisher, The Literature of Biopolitics,. rev. ed. (DeKalb, Illinois: Center for Biopolitical Research, Northern Illinois University, 1980); Steven A. Peterson, Albert Somit, and Robert Slagter, "Biopolitics: 1980-81 Update," Politics and the Life Sciences, " 1 (1982), 52-57; Meredith W. Watts, "Editor's Notes and Introduction," in Biopolitics: Ethological and Physiological Approaches, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981), pp. 1-13. Thomas C. Wiegele, ed., Biology and the Social Sciences: An Emerging Revolution (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1982); Thomas C. Wiegele, Biopolitics: Search for a More Human Political Science (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979); Samuel M. Hines, Jr., "Biopolitics and the Evolution of Inquiry in Political Science," Politics and the Life Sciences, " 1 (1982), 5-16. Other useful statements in the area can be found in: Robert H. Blank, "Biopolicy: A Restatement of Its Role in Politics and the Life Sciences," Politics and the Life Sciences, 1 (1982), 38-42; Peter A. Corning, The Synergism Hypothesis: A Theory of Progressive Evolution (New York: McGraw-Hill, forthcoming); W. MacKenzie,

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Biological Ideas in Politics (New York: Penguin Books, 1978); Steven A. Peterson, "Biopolitics: A Bibliographical Essay," in Somit, Biology and Politics, pp. 279-291; S. Peterson and Albert Somit, "Methodological Problems Associated with a BiologicallyOriented Social Science," Journal of Social and Biological Structures 1 (1978), pp. 11-25; Glendon Schubert, "Politics as a Life Science: How and Why the Impact of Modern Biology Will Revolutionize the Study of Political Behavior," in Biology and Politics, ed. Albert Somit, pp. 155-195. For quite different uses of the term biopolitics, see Thomas L. Thorson, Biopolitics (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1970); Thomas L. Thorson, "Review of Biology and Politics," Politics and the Life Sciences, 1(1982), 71-73; and Sarah Slavin, "Biopolitics and Contemporary Feiminist Writings," paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association annual convention, Milwaukee, 1982. The critical responses to Samuel Hines (above) are also useful, and sketch some areas of disagreement over definition of the field and its goals. Also valuable on a broader set of issues is the special symposium issue devoted to "Law, Biology and Culture," Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 5(1982). 2. Thomas Wiegele, Biopolitics: Search for a More Human Science., p. 8 3. Ibid. 4. B. Tursky, M. Lodge, and D. Cross, "A Bio-Behavioral Framework for the Analysis of Political Behavior," in Biology and Politics, ed. Albert Somit. 5. See John C. Wahlke and Milton Lodge, "Psychophysiological Measures of Political Attitudes and Behavior," Midwest Journal of Political Science 16(1972), 505-37. 6. B. Tursky, M. Lodge, M. A. Foley, and R. Reeder, "Evaluation of the Cognitive Component of Political Issues by Use of Classical Conditioning." Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34(1976), 865-73. 7. Meredith W. Watts, "Psychophysiological Analysis of Personality/Attitude Scales: Some Experimental Results." Political Methodology, 7(1981), 81-102. 8. Meredith W. Watts and David Sumi, "Studies in the Physiological Component of Aggression-Related Attitudes," American Journal of Political Science, 23(1979), 528-58; Watts, "Individual Differences in Skin Conductance Response to Vicariously Modeled Violence and Pathos," in Watts, ed., Biopolitics: Ethological and Physiological Approaches, pp. 81-87. 9. Ross Buck, "Sex Differences in Psychophysiological Responding and Subjective Experience: A Comment." Psychophysiology, 18(1981), 349-50; see also B. Schwartz., S. L. Brown, G. Ahern, "Facial Muscle Patterning and Subjective Experience During Affective Imagery: Sex Differences," Psychophysiology, 17(1980), 75-82, and references in Watts and Sumi, "Studies in the Physiological Component of Aggression-Related Social Attitudes." 10. Milton Lodge and Bernard Tursky, "Comparisons between Category and Magnitude Scaling of Political Opinion Employing SRC/CPS Items," American Political Science Review, 73(1979), 50-66; Lodge and Tursky, "On the Magnitude Scaling of Public Opinion in Survey Research, American Journal of Political Science, 25(1981), 376-419. 11. Other techniques are evolving as well, as in the case of voice stress analysis for remote assessment of anxiety in political actors who are inaccessible for direct questioning or psychophysiological instrumentation. See Leonard Hirsch and Thomas Weigele, "Methodological Aspects of Voice Stress Analysis," in Watts, ed., Biopolitics: Ethological and Physiological Approaches, pp. 89-103. 12. F. F. Strayer, "The Organization and Coordination of Asymmetrical Relations Among Young Children: A Biological View of Social Power," in Watts, ed., In M. W. Watts, Biopolitics: Ethological and Physiological Approaches, pp. 33-49. 13. Ibid. Some related readings on ethology are: B. G. Campbell, "Ecological Factors and Social Organization in Human Evolution." in Primate Ecology and Human Origins, ed. Irwin S. Bernstein and Euclid O. Smith (New York: Garland STPM Press, 1979), pp. 291-312; any of the issues of the Human Ethology Newsletter, ed. June Lockard (Seattle:

Introduction

25

University of Washington). On the basis for cross-species comparison see: B. Mitchell, Behavioral Sex Differences in Nonhuman Primates (New York: Van Nostrand Reinhold, 1979); Glendon Schubert, "Ethological Politics," paper presented at the American Association for the Advancement of Science annual convention, Washington, D.C., 1982; Glendon Schubert and Albert E. Somit, eds., The Biology of Primate Sociopolitical Behavior (DeKalb, Illinois: Center for Biopolitical Research, 1982); Jorge J. Yunis and Om Prakash, "The Origin of Man: A Chromosomal Pictoral Legacy," Science, 215(March 1982), pp. 1525-29. 14. For a diverse set of papers in this area see Donald R. Omark, F. F. Strayer, and Daniel G. Freedman, eds., Dominance Relations: An Ethological View of Human Conflict and Social Interaction (New York: Garland STPM Press, 1980). One paper by a political scientist addresses some classic concerns of the discipline: Carol Barner-Barry, "The Structure of Young Children's Authority Relationships," in Donald Omark, et al., Dominance Relations, pp. 177-89. Two studies in that collection dealing with sex differences (or the lack thereof) are Carol L. Cronin, "Dominance Relations and Females," in Donald Omark, et al., Dominance Relations, pp. 299-310; Elizabeth Missakian, "Gender Differences in Agonistic Behavior and Dominance Relations of Synanon Communally Reared Children," in Donald Omark, et al., Dominance Relations, pp. 397-413. For other statements on the use of ethological research on human groups, see: Carol Barner-Barry, "An Observational Study of Authority in a Preschool Peer Group," Political Methodology, 4(1977), 415-49; N. BlurtonJones, "Ethology, Anthropology, and Childhood," Biosocial Anthropology, ed. R. Fox (London: Malaby Press, 1975); N. Blurton-Jones, M.C.R. Ferreira, M. Brown, M. Farquhar and L. MacDonald, "Aggression, Crying and Physical Contact in One-to Three-Year Old Children," Aggressive Behavior, 5 (1979), 121-33; 15. See also F. Strayer, "The Organization and Coordination of Asymmetrical Relations Among Young Children, pp. 33-34. 16. Ibid., p. 35. Fred H. Willhoite pursues the implications of primate hierarchy formation in "Primates and Political Authority: A Biobehavioral Perspective," American Political Science Review, 70 (1976), 1110-26. 17. Elliott White, ed., Sociobiology and Human Politics (Lexington, Massachusetts: D. C. Heath, 1981). 18. For those who wish to pursue further the relationship between sociobiology and politics, Elliott White's book is a useful source of commentary by social and life scientists. See also Meredith W. Watts, "Review of Elliott White, ed., Sociobiology and Human Politics. ''Politics and the Life Sciences, 1 (1982), 73-75, as well as other reviews presented in that volume. 19. Although conservative political and social views are often attributed to sociobiological reasoning, a broader perspective can be found in Fred Kort, "Natural Selection and Civil Rights and Liberties," paper presented at the Western Political Science Association annual convention, Denver, 1981, and Christopher Boehm, "The Evolutionary Development of Morality as an Effect of Dominance Behavior and Conflict Interferences," Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 5 (1981), 413-21. 20. Lawrence V. Harper and Karen Sanders Huie, "The Development of Sex Differences in Human Behavior: Cultural Impositions, or a Convergence of Evolved ResponseTendencies and Cultural Adaptations?" in The Development of Behavior: Comparative and Evolutionary Aspects, ed. Gordon M. Burghardt and Marc Bekoff (New York: Garland STPM Press, 1978), pp. 297-318. 21. For some recent approaches to the subject of evolution by female writers see Helen E. Fisher, The Sex Contract: The Evolution of Human Behavior (New York: Morrow, 1982); Sarah Blaffer Hardy, The Woman That Never Evolved (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981). For a somewhat earlier view and examination of the literature see Evelyn Reed, Women's Evolution (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1975). 22. Jane Teas, Henry A. Feldman, Thomas L. Richie, Henry G. Taylor, and Charles H. Southwick, "Aggressive Behavior in the Free-Ranging Rhesus Monkeys of Kathmandu,

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AND

GENDER

Nepal," Aggressive Behavior, 8 (1982), 63-77. This attention to female dominance and coalition behavior can also be seen in Glen Hausfater, Jeanne Altmann, and Stuart Altmann, "Long-Term Consistency of Dominance Relations Among Female Baboons (Papio cynocephalus), Science, 217 (1982), pp. 752-755. 23. Lawrence Harper and Karen Huie, "The Development of Sex Differences in Human Behavior" p. 314. 24. Janet T. Spence and Robert L. Helmreich, Masculinity and Femininity: Their Psychological Dimensions, Correlates, and Antecedents. (Austin: University of Texas Press, 1978), pp. 5-6. Related material, drawing heavily on the "androgyny" theory of Sandra Bern, is presented in Alexandra Kaplan, and P. Bean, Beyond Sex-Role Stereotypes: Readings Toward a Psychology ofAndrogyny, (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976). Whether there are differences in cognitive activity is analyzed in a series of papers in Michelle Andrisin Wittig and Anne C. Petersen, Sex-Related Differences in Cognitive Functioning, ed. Anne Petersen (New York: Academic Press, 1979). 25. Sex differentiation has manifold expression within and across cultures. Such studies as the following tend to focus less on the actual biological substrates of sex differences and to emphasize instead beliefs about biology (e.g., sex-trait stereotypes) and social structuring resulting therefrom: John E. Williams and Deborah L. Best, Measuring Sex Stereotypes: A Thirty-Nation Study (Beverly Hills, California: Sage, 1982); J. S. LaFontaine, ed., Sex and Age as Principles of Social Differentiation (New York: Academic Press, 1978). On the "micro-political" level of touch, gaze and movement, see Clara Mayo and Nancy M. Henley, eds., Gender and Nonverbal Behavior (New York: Springer-Verlag, 1981). Recent discussions of the "macropolitical" implications of sex differentiation appear in Virginia Sapiro, "Research Frontier Essay: When are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women." American Political Science Review, 75 (1981), 701-16; Irene Diamond and Nancy Hartsock, "Beyond Interests in Politics: A Comment on Virginia Sapiro's 'When are Interests Interesting? The Problem of Political Representation of Women,'" American Political Science Review, 75 (1981), 717-21. 26. See Beverly B. Cook, "The Personality and Procreative Behavior of Trial Judges: A Biocultural Perspective." International Political Science Association Review, 38 (1982), 56. 27. Benson E. Ginsburg, "The Genetics of Social Behavior," in Perspectives in Ethology, Vol. 3, ed. P.P.G. Bateson and Peter Klopfer (New York: Plenum, 1978), p. 4. 28. Ruth Hubbard, Mary Sue Henifrin, and Barbara Fried, eds., Women Look at Biology Looking at Women (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Schenkman, 1979), p. 200. 29. Denise Baer, with the assistance of David L. Bositis, "Biology, Gender and Politics: An Assessment and Critique," this volume. 30. Alan Bullock and Oliver Stallybrass, eds., The Harper Dictionary of Modern Thought (New York: Harper, Row, 1977), p. 494. 31. Jean M. Auel, The Clan of the Cave Bear (New York: Bantam, 1980). 32. Ibid., pp. 24-25. 33. Ibid., p. 28. 34. Ibid., pp. 28-29. 35. Ibid., p. 30. 36. Ibid., pp. 36-37. 37. Ibid., p. 37. 38. Lawrence Harper and Karen Huie, "The Development of Sex Differences in Human Behavior," p. 300. 39. See C. Wayne Bardin and James R. Catterall, "Testosterone: A Major Determinant of Extragenital Sexual Dimorphism," Science, 211 (March 1981), pp. 1285-94; Neil J. MacLusky and Frederick Naftolin, "Sexual Differentiation of the Central Nervous System." Science, 211 (1981), pp. 1294-1303; Christine LaCoste-Utamsing, and Ralph L. Holloway, "Sexual Dimorphism in the Human Corpus Callosum," Science, 216 (June 1982), pp. 1431-32; Maijaliisa Rauste-von Wright, Johan von Wright, and Marianne Frankenhaeuser, "Relationships Between Sex-Related Psychological Characteristics During Adolescence and

Introduction

27

Catecholamine Excretion During Achievement Stress," Psychophysiology, 18 (1981), 363-70; Anke A. Ehrhardt and Heino F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg, "Effects of Prenatal Sex Hormones on Gender-Related Behavior." Science, 211 (1981), 1312-18; and Meyer-Bahlburg and Ehrhardt, "Prenatal Sex Hormones and Human Aggression: A Review, and New Data on Progestogen Effects," Aggressive Behavior, 8(1982), 39-62. The extent of prenatal hormonal influence is not precisely known for humans, although the effects are apparently greater for physiological sex as opposed to gender identity: Gender identity depends largely on postnatal environmental influences, while sexdimorphic behavior and temperamental sex differences appear to be modified by prenatal sex hormones. A role of the prenatal endocrine milieu in the development of erotic partner preference . . . or of cognitive sex differences has not been conclusively demonstrated. Human psychosexual differentiation is influenced by prenatal hormones, albeit to a limited degree . . . (But) any conclusions drawn on the basis of human research studies have to remain tentative . . . (However) the development of gender identity seems to depend largely on the sex of rearing . . . " (Ehrhardt and Meyer-Bahlburg, "Effects of Prenatal Sex Hormones," p. 1317) 40. Marvin Bressler, "Biological Determinism and Ideological Indeterminacy," in Sociobiology and Human Politics, ed. Elliott White (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1981), p. 188. 41. Beverly Cook, "The Personality and Procreative Behavior of Trial Judges," p. 57. 42. Maria Bressler, "Biological Determinism and Ideological Indeterminacy," p. 186. 43. Benson Ginsburg, "What Will Students in Political Science Have to Know About Biology to Understand the New Dimensions of Their Discipline and to Advance the Frontiers of Knowledge," paper presented at the American Political Science Association annual convention, New York, 1978, pp. 1-2. 44. Reinterpretations of the biological basis of behavior are continually appearing. A recent example is Melvin Konner, The Tangled Wing; Biological Constraints on the Human Spirit (New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1982). 45. Benson Ginsburg, "What Will Students in Political Science Have to Know about Biology. . . " p. 14.

Biology, Gender, and Politics: An Assessment and Critique Denise L. Baer David A. Bositis

ABSTRACT. This paper analyzes the application of the biopolitical perspective to explanations of gender differences in political participation. Using the heuristic device of a causal model, two endocrine-based mechanisms proposed in political science literature are examined: 1) the linking of male androgens with more assertive kinds of political involvement; and 2) the linking of menstruation with cyclical mood changes and political behavior and attitudes. After a review of pertinent biological, psychological and political science literatures, both explanations are rejected. In the concluding section, an interactive biobehavioral paradigm is outlined, and several examples are suggested for further exploration of biological factors in political behavior and gender. In recent years, a number of researchers working in the area of biopolitics have advocated the desirability of reassessing the merits of biological and endocrine-based explanations for sex or gender1 differences in political behavior.2 The view that there are fundamental innate differences between men and women is not a new one. What is distinctive about the recent debate on the issue is the scientific and empirical reformulation of what was heretofore a primarily philosophical position. It should be noted at the outset that there is a wide variety of studies considering the possibility of a biological basis for sexrelated differences. As J. Parsons summarizes the literature, there are four basic clusters of evidence forming an empirical foundation for biological hypotheses: hormonal variations, infant and child development, and cross-cultural and comparative primate studies.3 Denise L. Baer is affiliated with the Department of Political Science, Southern Illinois University at Carbondale, IL 62901. David A. Bositis is affiliated with the Department of Political Science at George Washington University in Washington, D.C. 20006. © 1984 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.

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The present study will focus on the first type of evidence under the assumption that a biological factor—genetic or derived from evolutionary principles—must have a biological substrate in the form of a physiological difference or process which is susceptible of empirical examination. In this essay, two biological mechanisms that have been proposed in political science literature will be examined: 1) the linking of male androgens with more assertive kinds of political involvement; and 2) the linking of menstruation with cyclical mood changes and political behavior and attitudes. Both of these endocrine-based mechanisms represent physiological factors which are thought directly to constrain or structure political behavior distinct from any mediating environmental influences. ANDROGENS AND PARTICIPATION Relying upon a fairly well documented finding in animal studies that testosterone (the principal and most potent androgen) is related to physical aggressiveness,4 it has been suggested that this relationship may explain gender differences among humans.5 J. C. Davies, for example, has expressed this view in the context of redirecting political socialization research toward a consideration of organic and innate factors as well as the earliest environmental influences. It nevertheless seems evident that men generally are more assertive than women, that women generally are more nurturant than men, and that there is a clear relationship between these differences and the amounts of androgens and estrogens in the circulatory system.6 He goes on to hypothesize that both the greater amount and the more assertive kinds of behavior engaged in by men are due to the relatively higher testosterone levels found in men. As schematized in Figure I for ease of discussion, the biological mechanism suggested by Davies and others consists of five major causal links.7 The first and second linkages posit testosterone levels as antecedent cause to both aggression and assertiveness. These two causal links have been supported in the biopolitics literature primarily with reference to experimental studies with animals (involving injections of testosterone) and some indirect evidence based on

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Figure I Assumed Testosterone-Political Participation Casual Model

AGGRESSION (1)

TESTOSTERONE LEVEL

(4)

(3)

(2)

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

(5) ASSERTIVENESS

correlational studies with humans. These studies will be considered in some detail in this section. As correlational data alone cannot justify causal inferences, it should be noted that the causal reasoning for the first two links is based on an implicit analogy of human and animal behavior. Related to the analogy of animal and human behavior is the assumed similarity of aggressive and assertive behaviors, as indicated by the third link. If the range of animal behaviors explicated via the first causal linkage—and in the experimental studies this has been primarily increased fighting and aggressive sexual behaviors— is expanded to include the complex social behaviors in which humans engage, then it must subsume interactions more commonly labeled as "assertive." For this reason, the second causal linkage represents a necessary assumption, rather than a hypothesis supported by currently available experimental evidence. In other words, if testosterone is assumed to "cause" higher levels of aggressiveness, and aggressiveness and assertiveness are assumed to be similar behaviors, then testosterone will necessarily cause similarly high levels of assertiveness (See Figure II-A). In this context, it should be remembered that those studies which suggest that men tend to be more aggressive than women have relied on a definition of aggression as behavior intended to result in injury to a person or object—whether injury be physical, psychological or

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Figure II Assumed Relationships between Testosterone Level Aggressiveness and Assertiveness Case A: Aggressiveness = Assertiveness

(2)

AGGRESSION TESTOSTERONE LEVEL

ρ 12 ≠ 0 a n d ρ 23

(0 ASSERTIVENESS

implies ρ

12

1

= ρ

13

23

0

(3)

Case B: Aggressiveness = Assertiveness AGGRESSION TESTOSTERONE LEVEL

ρ 12 ≠ 0 a n d ρ

(1)

ASSERTIVENESS

does not imply ρ

12

= ρ 13

(3)

social.8 While the similarity of aggression and assertiveness is more often stipulated than argued or substantiated, this similarity is by no means self-evident. Some pertinent distinctions between aggression and assertiveness will be discussed. The focus of the forthcoming critique of the testosterone model will center on a proposed distinction between aggression and assertiveness. It should, however, be pointed out that the assumption that aggression plays a role in political behavior did not originate with the biopolitical perspective. In their discussion of the socialization of political activism, K. J. Gergun and M. Ullman note "it is commonly believed that political participation represents a socialized form of aggression."9 L. Milbrath invokes the imagery of battle in his typology of political participants: gladiators, spectators and apathetics.10 The psychoanalytic framework relied upon by many political scientists expressly provides a linkage between innate aggressive impulses and socialized outlets for displaced and possibly frustrated impulses. H. D. Lasswell, e.g., conceptualized "political man" as the externalization or displacement of essentially private

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and primitive needs onto public objects.11 To cite another example, in a recent non-biopolitical examination of various forms of political participation, E. N. Muller describes such behaviors as refusal to pay rent or taxes, participation in a wildcat strike, and participation in a group that wants to dislodge the government by violent means, as "aggressive" political participation.12 The contribution of the biopolitical perspective is to restate this often implicit assumption in more scientific form such that aggression represents an empirically defined set of behaviors that appear to have a biological or physiological cause. Finally, to return to the testosterone model, the assumed aggression/assertiveness differential is presented as accounting for participation differences between men and women, as depicted by the fourth and fifth linkages. This causal linkage has generally been supported with reference to political participation literature indicating that women tend to participate less and on lower levels than do men. The argument is that participation differentials covary with aggression/assertiveness differentials which are in turn explained by relative testosterone levels. Two aspects of this linkage which may be addressed by research evidence will be considered here. First is the implicit assumption that the power motive is a significant factor in political activity. Second is the notion that political participation is unidimensional and that there are uniform differences between men and women along this dimension. This latter point will be addressed in a later section. In assessing the first link which related testosterone and aggression, it might be helpful to note that discussions of the so-called male hormone (testosterone) and the so-called female hormonal groups (estrogens and progestogens) often obscure the fact that the "hormonal endowment in both sexes is qualitatively comparable and there is no known hormone which is unique to either sex." 13 Testosterone is a member of the group of hormones called androgens. Naturally occurring estrogens include estradiol, estrone, and estriol, while progesterone is the only member of the progestogen group "of any known behavioral importance."14 Both sexes produce all three types of hormones, although women tend to have relatively higher levels of estrogens and progestogens, while men tend to have relatively higher levels of androgens. The three hormonal groups are quite similar chemically, differing primarily in the number of carbon atoms in the molecule (estrogens have 18, androgens 19, and progestogens 21). These chemicals are also inter-

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convertible in the body, a fact which renders inferences as to the action of a single hormone problematic. The primary distinction in terms of hormonal effects lies in the development and maintenance of secondary sex characteristics such as breast development in women, and beard and chest hair on men. Other hormonal effects are less distinctive. For example, while testosterone is also responsible for increased protein metabolism and muscle development, estrogens cause some muscle development (although less than that produced by testosterone), and progesterone causes increased protein metabolism. These complementary physiological effects suggest that the behavioral consequences of hormonal manipulation may also be less distinctive. Hence, while it is testosterone which is usually investigated as a determinant of physical aggressiveness, an endocrine-based explanation must consider that other hormones may also increase aggression. Estrogen, e.g., has been found to increase aggression and fighting behavior in female rats.15 Other hormones associated with aggression in particular species include luteinizing hormone16 in starlings, and estradiol and progesterone in hamsters.17 Another consideration is that any explanation based on the presence of a hormone must consider the possibility that the effects of the hormone may be similar in all cases, i.e., if testosterone causes sexual and aggressive behavior, it should do so in both males and females. A recent study found no sex differences in aggression in rats following experimental injections of testosterone.18 Among humans, indirect evidence for the role of testosterone in sexual behavior for both men and women is indicated by the finding that the female sex drive is not significantly lowered after menopause, when estrogen and progesterone levels drop while testosterone levels remain unchanged.19 Lowered levels of androgen in both men and women have also been associated with a low sex drive.20 Finally, the results of several studies do indicate a relationship between testosterone levels and aggression in both men and women.21 Moreover, it has been suggested by one researcher in this area that men and women may have equal underlying bases for aggression due to an increased female sensitivity to testosterone. Among women, the finding that relationships between testosterone and aggression persisted at testosterone levels that are approximately 25 times lower than those found in males of comparable age is interesting. It is tempting to speculate that the absence of a

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servoregulatory control for testosterone in women may result in greater end-organ responsivity than occurs in men, despite the lower plasma level.22 A reinterpretation of aggression studies provides some indirect support for the argument that males and females are equally capable of aggressive behavior. It is true that the majority of studies among both children23 and adults24 find that males tend to engage in more aggressive behavior than do females. The important question, however, is whether the sex-related differences are consistent enough to justify the inference of a physiologically based aggressive drive or motivation in males, but not in females. In an extensive review of aggression studies among adults, A. Frodi, J. Macaulay and P. R. Thome concluded that consistent differences consonant with a hypothesized male aggressivity appeared only in self-report measures of general hostility or aggressiveness. Among the experimental studies, whether a sex-linked difference was found in aggressive behavior appeared to be related to situational factors (e.g., the sex of the instigator and the victim of aggression, the extent to which the aggressive act was justified by the experimentor), and to be mediated by subjective or attitudinal factors (e.g., sex role expectations, empathy with the victim, guilt and aggression anxiety).25 These results indicate that sex-related differences in aggressive behavior among adults are not consistent, and where found, are largely explicable through such learning-based factors as sex or gender role socialization. Among studies of aggression in children, in those studies assessing non-physical forms of aggression such as verbal behavior and hostile reactions to newcomers, girls are found to be as aggressive or more aggressive than boys.26 That gender role socialization may inhibit display of aggressive behavior even among children is suggested by several studies.27 For example, in one set of experiments, the social learning of aggression was found to be mediated by the sex of the model, and the sex-appropriateness of the model's behavior.28 In other research among children, no gender differences in aggressive behavior were found where the privacy of the aggressive act was assured,29 and when the aggressive act was justified by the experimentor.30 The finding that contextual factors (e.g., the observation setting, available targets of aggression, adult controls for provocation to aggression, and frequency of non-aggressive social interaction) may affect the observation and direction of

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observed sex differences in aggression has also been replicated in a study of children observed in a natural setting.31 It may be hypothesized that while females may be inhibited from expressing overt aggression, they may not differ in aggressive drive or motivation. Can this line of reasoning be reconciled with the research commonly cited to support a relatively greater aggressive drive in males? Three types of research evidence have been referenced to support a biological basis for "male" aggression. First is the research conducted by J. Money, A. Ehrhardt and their associates at Johns Hopkins Medical Center on naturally occurring cases of children who, for various reasons, have deviated from the normal male and female differentiation and development.32 According to several authors—P. Corning and C. H. Corning,33 J. H. Crook,34 and J. Deardon,35 Money's and Ehrhardt's work indicates the causal effects of testosterone in producing aggressive behavior. One group of children studied were females born with masculinized external genitalia due to a prenatal exposure to androgens occurring through a malfunction of the mother's adrenal glands which then produced too much androgen, or as a result of the mother being injected with progestin (which has been found to have androgenic action on the fetus) during pregnancy (once used to prevent miscarriage). At birth, the infants were then raised as females, subsequently undergoing surgical feminization or cortisone treatment (or both). In comparison with a control sample matched on the variables of age, race, socioeconomic background and intelligence (IQ), Money and Ehrhardt describe the fetally androgenized females as engaging in more energetic play, scoring above average in IQ tests, and being more interested in masculine-associated clothing and toys. They also expressed little interest in infant care and feminine-associated clothing and toys, considering "themselves and were considered tomboys" by their mothers.36 Several problems exist in interpreting this research, the foremost being that the control sample was not matched on familiarity with the clinical setting or with the interviewers. The fact that the interviewers knew which individuals were patients and which were controls during the interview may have biased the responses. Despite methodological problems, it is noteworthy that there was no greater incidence of physical aggressiveness or fighting behavior among the fetally androgenized females. Finally, the whole set of Money's and Ehrhardt's work suggests that among genetic males who are then raised as females (including those with androgen-insensitive syndrome and gender reassigned

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cases), and among those with Turner's syndrome (individuals with only one sex chromosome, an X), the assigned sex is a more important determinant of gender identity and behavior than the genetic or prenatal hormonal sex.37 A second type of evidence cited in the biopolitics literature is that of research on infants or young children, with the assumption that at very young ages, learning and environmental effects are minimal. Research on children, according to Deardon, indicates that male infants as young as seven months display more aggressive and interactive dominant behavior than do female infants.38 A recent study of children aged seven months to forty-five months found no sexrelated differences in aggression in the infants aged seven to twelve months.39 Further, in considering research among infants, it should be noted that there are a number of inherent methodological problems including the identification of stable infant behaviors, the relating of infant responses to adult traits, and controlling for the effects of sex-related maturational rates and prenatal and delivery complications.40 With this caveat, variations in gross motor activity may be viewed as a precursor of aggression differences. Among infants prior to one year in age, however, research suggests that there are no consistent sex-related differences in activity level.41 This would appear to discount the early emergence of sex-linked differences in infants. Deardon also refers to a six-nation study which found that the greatest difference in the amount of aggressiveness and rough play was found among the younger age group (three to six) than among the older age group (seven to ten).42 Attributing this result to innate sex differences under the assumption that later socialization acts to minimize or mask these differences is untenable given the plausibility of alternative learning-based explanations. For example, cognitive-development theory would predict precisely this result. The greater aggressiveness of the younger boys may be due to the stereotypical and unidimensional thinking evident among children at the period of preoperational thought (ages two to six years) and the boys' attempt to model what they perceive as appropriate gender behavior. Various research indicates that children develop a stable gender identity very early—often before the age of three.43 Further, the results of one study suggest that parents may respond more negatively to cross-sex behavior among boys than among girls.44 If so, the effects of this differential reinforcement may be more evident among younger children who have not yet been exposed to the more

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egalitarian school environment. Hence, it is improbable that the effects of sex-role learning on gender-linked behavior can be discounted even at very early ages. Third, research has been cited to indicate the greater aggressiveness of women during the premenstrual phase of the menstrual cycle. For example, Corning and Corning refer to a study which found that a high proportion (62%) of the crimes of violence committed by female prisoners occurred during the premenstrual week (which represents about 25% of the normal monthly cycle). They also refer to the "well-known" phenomenon of tension and irritability occurring premenstrually.45 These behavioral and psychological changes, they suggest, are due to the effects of testosterone on women, which are most apparent during the premenstrual phase when the levels of progesterone and estrogen are lowest relative to testosterone levels. As will be discussed later in the section on menstruation, there is little empirical support for the belief that there are cyclical mood effects associated with the menstrual cycle.46 Research on behavioral changes occurring premenstrually, however, is mixed. In addition to the study of female prisoners, women in the pre-menstrual period have also been found to have less arm-hand steadiness,47 a greater probability of taking their children to a doctor,48 and a greater probability of being involved in both active and passive accidents.49 Given the lack of empirical support for any of the other possibly negative behavior changes which have been studied (e.g., reaction time, exam taking, cognitive skills, job absences, etc.), L. Gannon hypothesizes that a possible explanation for the disparate findings is an increase in physical arousal and activity premenstrually.50 The results of several studies have suggested that women do increase their activity premenstrually.51 Further support for this hypothesis is indicated by the finding of similar cyclical variation in the motor activity of female rats.52 If so, this might explain, for example, the greater likelihood of passive accidents premenstrually. Passive accidents are those accidents where the individual could neither prevent the accident nor was responsible for the accident. An increase in activity would increase the probability that a woman might engage in any type of behavior, not just the smaller subset of behaviors commonly labeled "aggressive." Thus, the available research evidence does not completely support an interpretation of greater aggression and irritability occurring premenstrually. A review of the research indicates that a direct relationship

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between testosterone and aggressiveness—particularly among humans—has not been established in biological research. It is, on the contrary, a controversial area of ongoing investigation.53 First, it must be emphasized that if there is such a relationship, it is not based on a neat dichotomy between male and female endocrine systems. It is important to note that while the biological explanation depends crucially upon an interpretation of the effects of the relative levels of androgens, estrogens, and progestogens, all of the cited research has been bivariate in nature. From a methodological standpoint, this type of research simply does not support inferences to a multivariate biological system. Second, there is some question concerning the "natural" causal ordering of testosterone and aggression. Much of the human and animal research in this area has been correlational, whereas animal research suggesting the antecedent status of testosterone has been accomplished through laboratory injections. One set of experiments on male rhesus monkeys placed in a variety of situations suggests an interactive paradigm may be more appropriate. Testosterone levels rose when the males were permitted access to sexually receptive females, and fell when they experienced defeat in aggressive encounters with an already established group of males.54 Among human males, testosterone levels have been found to rise following an increase in status accompanied by an elevation in mood and the perception that the status change occurred through their own effort, e.g., upon winning a decisive victory in a tennis match with a $100 prize, or upon graduation from medical school, but not upon a close victory in the tennis match or upon winning a $100 lottery.55 In other research, psychological stress has been related to lowered testosterone levels in young men.56 These studies suggest that the causally antecedent status often ascribed to testosterone in the biopolitics literature is no more than an assumption—as yet unsupported by any hard empirical evidence. While the precise effects of hormones on behavior can best be ascertained in further (and more methodologically rigorous) laboratory and field research, under the assumption that testosterone does cause aggression, the plausibility of the other two causal links can be better examined with more familiar social science theory and data. The third link posts aggression and assertiveness as being similar behaviors. Deardon, e.g., conceives of "aggression and statusseeking as forms of assertive behavior."57 Davies' discussion defines aggressive behavior as being "assertive with the intent to do

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harm," 58 i.e., as being only motivationally different rather than behaviorally different or socially different. The animal research typically cited, as, e.g., by Davies, measures aggressiveness primarily by fighting behavior.59 Studies among humans have often defined aggression as physically assaultive behavior or commission of a violent crime.60 Since these behaviors ill-fit an individual for success in politics, the plausibility of the causal linkage presumed by Deardon, Davies and others rests upon the similarity of aggressiveness and assertiveness. With reference to reinforcement or learning theory, we may distinguish aggression and assertiveness on other than a motivational basis.61 Aggression has a utilitarian value that differentiates it from other social behaviors. As A. Bandura emphasizes, aggression, at least in the short term, is self-reinforcing. By aggressive behavior, or dominance through physical and verbal force, individuals can obtain valued resources, change rules to get their own wishes, gain control over and extract subservience from others, eliminate conditions that adversely affect their well-being and remove barriers that block or delay attainment of desired goals.62 In this context, aggression may be defined as the active and energetic pursuit of one's goals without regard for the preferences of relevant others. Assertiveness, by contrast, consists of the expression of desires or goals even in the face of apparent disapproval or conflict. While assertive behavior is a necessary condition for success, it is not a sufficient one. To varying degrees, the reinforcement of assertive behavior requires taking into account the legitimate preferences of others and thereby persuading them to your position. Aggressive behavior, however, does not involve the willing acquiesence of others. It is this which differentiates aggression both behaviorally (in the sense of the potential for reinforcement) and socially (in the sense of the potential for persuasion and the alteration of preferences). Most social behaviors, however, require some reciprocity acceptable to the participants to be effective. It is in this light that assertive behavior and its relationship to political participation can best be understood. Unlike aggression, assertive behavior takes place in a reciprocal environment and consists of the clear and explicit presentation of one's preferences so as to maximally obtain the

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desired results. Success is achieved through enlightened mutual accommodation among participants, rather than through domination and the overcoming of opposition. Thus understood, assertive behavior is likely to be most effective in situations of dispersed power—such as in democratic politics—whereas aggressive behavior would not be. With this distinction in mind, the status of the assumed relationship between testosterone levels and assertiveness is changed and probably doubtful (See Figure II-B). According to the distinction between aggression and assertiveness outlined here, the importance of assertiveness (understood as personal initiative) in facilitating political participation (i.e., the fifth causal link) is not in question. The fourth causal link represents a somewhat different matter. This linkage related the higher levels of male aggressiveness with male dominance and higher levels of male political participation. Deardon, e.g., cites male behavioral tendencies as being ' 'concerned with status achievement in hierarchies of power." 63 Further, Corning and Corning suggest that: "much of what passes for spontaneous aggression among individual human males may in fact be various expressions of dominance competition, the particular stimulus for which is other males in a situation of dominance uncertainty."64 Elsewhere, P. Corning refers to the creation of dominance-submission hierarchies as a "cultural universal." 65 It should perhaps be noted here that the concepts of aggression and dominance, borrowed from ethology, have distinct meanings. F. F. Strayer points out that in early primatology studies, the two meanings were confused: these researchers employed dominance to describe classes of individual activity (dominance gestures), classes of social outcomes (dominance incentives), aspects of individual personality (dominance traits), forms of social interaction (dominance struggles), and social positions within the stable group (dominance roles or dominance status).66 In current usage, the concept of dominance is limited to the observed resolution of dyadic social conflict within a group. From these data (indicating which individual submitted and which individual dominated), the dominance status and ranking of the group members may be compiled. In some groups, dominance status may be negatively correlated with raw frequencies of aggressive

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behavior—depending upon whether the majority of dominance struggles occurred at the bottom rather than at the top of the status hierarchy.67 The import of these distinctions for the study of sex-related differences in aggression and dominance is illustrated by a recent ethological study of communally (Synanon) reared children who ranged from seven months to forty-five months in age. The Synanon study is an important one because the children comprised a stable group living together 24 hours a day, with little regular or daily contact with their parents, and minimal sex or gender role stereotyping or adult interference during free play. In terms of the dominance hierarchy, there was more fighting among similar ranked children than children ranked far apart in the hierarchy, and among low and middle ranked children as opposed to the children at the top of the hierarchy. Further, while the boys were on the average more aggressive than the girls, there were no gender differences in the individual rankings of mean aggressive behaviors. Opposed to earlier reports suggesting that boys and girls have separate hierarchies, or that dominance is not a useful concept in female social relations,68 E. A. Missakian found a single dominance hierarchy comprising both boys and girls. More importantly, there were no sex-related differences in dominance ranking: "Girls appeared in all rank categories, including the high ones." 69 The conceptual distinction between aggression and dominance, and the Synanon study, suggest that the explanation of political participation with reference to sex-related differences in dominance hierarchies may be problematic. Recall that in the experimental studies among animals, testosterone was linked with physical aggressiveness. However, even if aggressive behaviors purportedly caused by testosterone are expanded conceptually to include such human behaviors as interpersonal dominance and verbal manipulation not relying on threat of physical force, the fourth causal link is tenable only under the assumption that the power motive or drive is predominant in "political man." In evaluating this assumption, it is useful to recall H. Lasswell's distinction between "institutional" and "functional" definitions of "political man." 70 The institutional method of defining political types focuses upon those individuals in formal political or governmental roles such as elected officials or delegates to a national nominating convention. The functional method, by contrast, subsumes all those individuals who exercise political function regardless of their

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formal or institutional position. As Lasswell points out, while partially overlapping, the two methods do not define the same subset of individuals. It is probably that the most aggressive, power-lusting individuals in modern society find their way into business, and stay out of the legislature, the courts, the civil service, and the diplomatic service.71 Apropos of Lasswell's analysis, it would appear that those writing in the biopolitics literature are conflating two distinct conceptions of "political man." Their basic argument is that aggression is highly related to the exercise of power—essentially the functional approach. Yet, when substantiating that it is in fact the male of the species who is most concerned with the exercise of power, they turn to research employing an institutional definition of "political man." Deardon, e.g., refers to the M. K. Jennings and N. Thomas study of party elites,72 and mentions M. Duverger's observation concerning the low proportion of women at the higher levels of government.73 If, however, the power motive is not predominant in "political man" when institutionally defined, then the biological explanation which has been advanced fails to account for the underrepresentation of women in formal political and governmental positions. The research conducted in a variety of contexts on the question of the relationship between power motivation and political participation in the United States suggests that power and dominance are, at most, only weakly related to political activity.74 This has been found with respect to institutionally defined local politicians,75 state legislators,76 nominating convention delegates,77 and in studies of conventional political participation.78 Analyses of data from a study comparing politicians and businessmen found that individuals with strong orientations to power were more likely to be found in the business world.79 And, in a comparison of the power motivation of college undergraduates at various universities with their occupational preferences, those with a high power motivation tended to select careers in teaching, psychology, clergy and business rather than government and politics.80 Jeane Kirkpatrick points out that power is unlikely to be a significant incentive to political activity since the "volunteer character of American politics gives intraparty relations an egalitarian flavor that must be unattractive to many power seekers." 81 Even more im-

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portantly, in two studies which explicitly compared men and women, male and female politicians were not differentiated by their "dominance"82 or their "orientation to power." 83 The available research evidence does not support the notion of a predominantly power motivated character type prevalent in institutional political roles, nor does it appear that male and female political activists differ on this dimension. In summary, the explanation of gender differences in participation through a correlation with hormonal differences has been assessed by an examination of the implicit causal links. With reference to a wider body of biological and social science literature than is commonly cited in the biopolitics literature, the plausibility of the posited model has been questioned on the following grounds: 1) there appears to be no simple or direct causal relationship between plasma testosterone levels and aggression; 2) the basic similarity of the endocrine systems, and hence, the possibility that men and women have equal underlying biological bases for aggression; 3) the important distinction to be made between aggression and assertiveness, not only motivationally, but also behaviorally and socially; and 4) the important distinction between the functional and institutional methods of defining "political man," along with the finding that the power motive is not predominant among political elites when institutionally defined. At best, androgens as a structuring biological factor constitutes an unsupported hypothesis with no explicit participatory referents. This revised model of political participation presents quite a different picture of the significance of testosterone levels to political participation (See Figure III).

MENSTRUATION AND PARTICIPATION The menstrual cycle represents a second endocrine-based mechanism that has been proposed in biopolitical research. Menstruation is a natural and integral part of human reproduction. It is also a cyclical process occurring about every 28 days in adult females. In some women, the onset of menstruation involves physical discomfort and psychological changes, such as depression. While the proposal of androgens is an explanation of an apparent disparity in political behavior of men and women, the menstrual cycle is of interest for its potential to explicate regular variation in the political behavior of individual women. C. W. Sherif notes that:

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Figure III Revised Testosterone-Political Participation Casual Model

AGGRESSION

TESTOSTERONE LEVEL

POLITICAL PARTICIPATION

ASSERTIVENESS

the primary reasons that experiential and behavioral correlates of the cycle are at issue are social, including . . . powerrelated allegations that women are unfit physically, emotionally, or cognitively for socially significant responsibilities during the paramenstruum, the premenstrual, and menstrual phases combined.84 Rather than simply explaining an empirical relationship, the context of investigation concerning the menstrual cycle often involves the implication of female instability.85 Two studies have sought to investigate menstrual cycle related effects and their possible relationship to political attitudes and participation, one conducted by D. Jaros,86 and another by S. A. Peterson.87 In contrast to the arguments in the preceding section, these studies explore empirical relationships and are essentially exploratory in nature. As such, while reviewing research on the menstrual cycle for reports of cyclic variation in female moods, attitudes and behavior, neither study proposes a specific causal explanation for the possible effects of the menstrual cycle on political attitudes and behavior. Elsewhere in this volume, Jaros and E. S. White conceptualize the menstrual cycle as a natural experiment in varying endocrine levels, with more characteristic female behavior expected during the mid-cycle when the levels of "female" hormones (i.e., estrogens and progestogens) are highest. Both studies report nega-

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tive findings. In reviewing the two studies, Peterson concludes that learning-based explanations provide a more powerful explanation for gender differences in participation than do the physical and psychological variables associated with the menstrual cycle.88 Despite the negative findings of the Jaros and White, and Peterson studies noted above, the potential normative implications surrounding discussions of the menstrual cycle warrant a careful consideration of the extant biological and psychological research investigating the effects of the menstrual cycle. For example, in a recent text on biopolitics, T. C. Wiegle suggests that as the numbers of women in elite political roles increase, a potential area of biopolitical research might be "the question of whether female leaders might be able to tolerate the stresses of high level decision making as well as male leaders presumably handle them." 89 In considering the explanatory power of a paradigm based on the fact that females menstruate, and males do not, it would be useful again to utilize the heuristic device of a causal model. From the biological and psychological literatures, the two most common menstrual disorders are dysmenorrhea (cramping or abdominal pain during menstruation), and the "premenstrual syndrome" (usually any symptoms occurring prior to menstruation, often including depression, lethargy, irritability, water retention and weight gain).90 From the discussion above, it appears that there are two types of potential effects of possible political relevance that have been attributed to the menstrual cycle: 1) increased levels of stress, and 2) mood, attitude and/or behavior changes. For heuristic purposes, the strongest possible biological case for menstrual cycle effects will be assumed, as diagrammed in Figure IV. In this hypothetical case, all females who menstruate are considered to experience both the premenstrual syndrome and dysmenorrhea, and these two menstrual disorders in turn both result in cyclical periods of increased stress as well as mood, attitude and behavior changes. Even under these assumptions, it should be noted that the applicability of the model will be limited. A problematic aspect of any explanation based on menstruation is that such an explanation simply does not apply to several classes of females; e.g., prepubertal girls, post-menopausal women, pregnant women and nursing mothers. Many other women (e.g., athletes, ballet dancers and models) are amenorrhic because of low production of estrogen, a hormone necessary to the menstrual cycle.91 As some estrogen is normally produced in body fat (in addition to that produced in the ovaries and

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Figure IV Hypothetical Effects of Menstruation Casual Model

PREMENSTRUAL SYNDROME (e.g., tension, depression)

INCREASED STRESS

MENSTRUAL CYCLE

DYSMENORRHEA (e.g., pain, cramping)

MOOD, ATTITUDE and BEHAVIOR CHANGES

adrenals),92 women whose level of body fat goes significantly below the normal 17-22% are unlikely to produce sufficient amounts of estrogen to menstruate.93 Also, it has been recognized for some time that even among healthy women, anovulatory cycles may occur for various reasons.94 In the hypothetical model, stress is viewed as a dependent variable that is "caused" by the menstrual cycle. There is, however, some reason to question this causal ordering. Recent studies have suggested that periods of increased stress may result in the cessation of menstruation or amenorrhea.95 If stress is indeed a factor in amenorrhea, it is difficult to envision how the normal hormonal fluctuations could also result in increased stress. A second assumption of the hypothetical model is that the cyclic variance in hormonal levels results in corresponding cyclic changes in mood, attitudes, and behavior. What are the implications of this assumption? Is it reasonable to conclude that females are therefore unstable and consequently unfit for responsible political positions? Even if these cyclical fluctuations are true of all menstruating females (as is assumed in this hypothetical model), an interpretation of the effects of menstruation is problematic without a comparison to the range of effects attributable to other cyclic biological processes. While men do not menstruate, it is not true that men are therefore not subject to cyclical phenomena. Biological rhythms of varying

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lengths have been reported to exist among human beings. Circadian rhythms, for example, have been related to sleeping, waking, pain tolerance, asthmatic susceptibility, and identified in such biological processes as cell division, adrenal cortical activity and glucose tolerance.96 One researcher, analyzing data from individuals suffering from mental illness, has speculated concerning the existence of an innate monthly or near monthly cycle—distinct from the menstrual cycle—that is most apparent under stress.97 The existence of such a cycle might explain both the finding of a 28 day cycle not only among menstruating school girls, but also among prepubertal girls,98 and the finding of lunar cycles in the commission of violent crimes for both men and women.99 Further, testosterone levels in men have not only been reported to fluctuate on a daily basis with peak levels in the morning,100 but also to vary cyclically over a 20 to 30 day period.101 In addition to testosterone, follicle stimulating hormone and luteinizing hormone are released episodically in men, and possible diurnally.102 The influence of biorhythms on political behavior represents a relatively unexplored area in political science.103 Until a baseline for comparing the menstrual cycle to other biological cycles is developed, however, not only is the causal attribution of regular monthly fluctuations in mood, attitudes or behavior to menstruation suspect given the possibility of other monthly cycles, but the import of the range of effects is uninterpretable.104 As M. B. Parlee emphasizes, to report that females perform less well during certain phases of the menstrual cycle is incomplete and misleading since it is possible that that weaker performance "may at all times be better than the average performance of males." 105 The discussion thus far has considered the potential explanatory power of a hypothetical model based on menstruation, under the assumption that the model applies to all menstruating women. Let us now consider how reasonable that assumption is from an empirical standpoint. The notion that the menstrual cycle demarcates male and female on more than a physiological basis rests on the premise that there exist significant and identifiable phase-related effects occurring among most women (or among most cycles of any individual woman). In assessing this assumption, an important distinction should be made between research on samples of normal women and that conducted on clinical samples, i.e., those diagnosed as suffering from or who complain of a menstrual disorder. Since the explanatory power of

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any explanation derived from the fact that women menstruate and men do not is based upon effects experienced by the average menstruating woman, the emphasis of the proceeding discussion will be upon studies of normal samples. In a recent review of research assessing symptomatology in normal populations, L. Gannon concluded that the evidence does not support the concept that the menstrual cycle has significant effects on the lives of most women. Among the variables studied, physical ones (e.g., pain, swelling, weight gain) showed only minimal fluctuations; the psychological variables assessed (e.g., depression, anxiety, hostility, tension, restlessness, irritability) evinced little or no consistent variation; and the behavioral variables evaluated reflected no interpretable pattern such as a decrement in performance premenstrually. In assessing water retention and weight gain, Gannon also noted that the studies relying on self-report measures tend to show stronger results that those employing objective measures.106 Similarly, B. Sommer concluded that even though cycle effects have been reported for both self-report measures and for studies of social behaviors (e.g., commission of crime, suicide, hospital admissions, etc.), objective performance measures do not reflect any significant cyclic fluctuations.107 Insofar as there exists an expectation set for the reporting of menstrual related symptoms,108 this suggests that the physiological basis for the premenstrual syndrome may be weak. In the set of research on clinical samples, the two most prevalent menstrual disorders include dysmenorrhea and the premenstrual syndrome. While estimates of the incidence of these disorders have ranged as high as 100%,109 Parlee emphasizes that the scientific evidence in support of these estimates is weak. Given the broad and not always consistent use of "premenstrual syndrome" and its constituent "symptoms," estimates of the prevalence of "menstrual symptoms" or of the premenstrual syndrome are useless for most purposes.110 Yet, to the extent that there may be a slight trend toward negative affect among some women premenstrually,111 it is questionable whether this represents a directional phenomena of import. For example, in one study reporting significant phase effects, L.A. Wilcoxin, S. L. Schrader and C. W. Sherif found the negative affect variables to be associated to a significantly greater degree with the occurrence of stressful events than with the premenstrual phase.112

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This finding is consistent with the hypothesis discussed in the preceding section—of an increase in general activity premenstrually. In another study reporting significant phase effects with an elevation of depression and anxiety premenstrually, S. Golub compared these results with those of other groups (e.g., psychiatric patients, students taking an examination), and concluded that the menstrual phase effects were not clinically significant.113 This is supported by the finding that women suffering from menstrual disorders typically score within the normal ranges of personality and psychological tests.114 From a methodological standpoint, the body of research on the menstrual cycle simply does not support the causal attribution to menstruation of gender differences in political behavior. Most of the research has relied upon small nonrandom samples drawn from various institutional settings as schools, prisons and factories, and many studies have consciously utilized a selection bias toward women with regular menstrual cycles. In this context, Parlee stresses that: "data from particular groups cannot provide a basis for a generalization about all women or about any woman selected at random unless it is assumed that women are equally likely to be or become a member of the groups in which the data were collected."115 There has also been a great deal of procedural variability among the studies. Since hormonal assays are expensive and time-consuming, most studies have relied upon an indirect method of phase definition based upon an estimated date of ovulation about 14 days following the onset of menstruation. This has resulted in a great deal of variability in the number of phases identified and in their presumed length. This not only renders the comparison of various studies problematic, but raises the question as to whether the physiological phases have been correctly identified in the sample under study.116 Another area of procedural variability is in the assessment of menstrual symptoms. Many studies employ unvalidated questionnaires or unstructured personal interviews, often relying on retrospective data.117 If there is a class of behaviors and moods that are associated with certain cycle phases, then they should be measurable in more than one way. The conflicting results of various studies suggest that this is not the case. One standard questionnaire that has been used in a number of studies is the Menstrual Distress Questionnaire (MDQ) developed by R. H. Moos.118 A difficulty with the

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MDQ is that it does not consistently differentiate among cycle phases, although this may only reflect a lack of cyclic variability among women.119 More serious criticisms have been raised concerning the adequacy of the MDQ in assessing symptomatology in normal populations because of its overemphasis on negative symptoms, and its sensitivity to response biases, demand characteristics and stereotypic beliefs.120 Finally, a social psychological explanation for any increase in negative affect premenstrually cannot be discounted. Unlike most other biological cycles, menstruation is an overt physiological event that usually necessitates changes in personal hygiene. In many cultures, menstruation has been the source of much fear, superstition and taboo. Hence, any explanation for mood changes associated with the menstrual cycle should also take into account the various attitudes women may adopt toward menstruation—negative, positive or neutral,121 and any possible concern over pregnancy.122 For most women who engage in sexual intercourse, the onset of menstruation may elicit various emotions and feelings depending on whether pregnancy is desired. The role for a social psychological explanation is supported further by the finding that the incidence and severity of menstrual disorders and complaints is associated with certain structural variables. For example, age,123 marriage,124 childbearing,125 and religious denomination126 have been reported to be positively associated with the reporting of symptoms associated with the premenstrual syndrome, while age127 and parity or number of births128 have been negatively associated with dysmenorrhea. As in the previous section on androgens and participation, the bulk of the research on the menstrual cycle has assumed the causally antecedent status of hormonal levels, with a separate set of research investigating social psychological factors as an alternative explanation. A growing body of research suggests, however, that here also an interactive paradigm is more appropriate.129 As mentioned above, stress is a factor in anovulatory cycles and amenorrhea among human females.130 There is some evidence that under appropriate conditions, women living together over a period of time synchronize their menstrual cycles. In one study, college dormitory residents arriving from various parts of the country initially cycled on different schedules; by the end of the term, close friends were menstruating at about the same time of the month.131 Among primate females, considerable evidence suggests a similar inter-

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action: the presence of a dominant female may alter the hormonal secretions in subordinate females with the resultant effects including the suppression of ovulation, a reduction in the period of sexual receptivity, and even spontaneous abortion.132 In summary, several reasons have been adduced to explain the negative findings of two exploratory biopolitical studies which attempted to link menstruation and political attitudes and behavior. A hypothetical causal model was introduced to highlight the limits of menstruation as an explanatory paradigm, even under the most favorable assumptions. First, it was pointed out that many classes of women do not menstruate. Second, the inference that menstruation increases stress is unwarranted insofar as stress is a factor in amenorrhea. Third, a focus on menstruation ignores the possibility of other biological cycles. While menstruation is an overt event and one that can be more easily studied than other biorhythms, the lack of a baseline for interpreting the existence and range of effects attributable to the menstrual cycle renders research in this area problematic. The basic assumption of the hypothetical model—that menstruation exerts any directional influence of import on the moods or behavior of most women—is unsupported by the body of research on the subject. Although research has been conducted which does support the linking of the menstrual cycle to various moods or behaviors, methodological weaknesses and procedural variability among the studies limit generalization from nonrandom and clinical samples to the average woman. Finally, the overt nature of menstruation, its social and personal significance, and the cultural taboos which surround it, as well as the interaction of the environment and hormonal levels and processes, all suggest the need for at least consideration of social psychological factors in explaining any mood, attitude or behavioral changes associated with the hormonal fluctuations of the menstrual cycle.

BIOPOLITICS AS AN EXPLANATORY PARADIGM The discussion thus far has focused upon the internal plausibility of two biological mechanisms often advanced in the biopolitics literature to explain gender differences in political behavior. At this juncture, it will be useful to address some more general issues related to the application of the life sciences perspective to gender differences in political behavior.

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A central difficulty found in the biopolitics literature discussed here is an impoverished and somewhat dated conceptualization of the problem to be explained. Very few of the authors cited here even made any effort to substantiate the posited less participation of women, preferring instead to speak of "male dominance" and "dominance hierarchies." Where political participation literature is cited, it typically consists of either very dated works such as The Civic Culture133 or such inappropriate references as when Deardon cites F. I. Greenstein's 1958 study of New Haven grade schoolers134 to support a statement of gender differences among adults. In light of the historical character of the political participation of women,135 and the possibility that the early research was marred by sexist biases,136 such citations are inexcusable given the vast outpouring of published research on the political participation of women over the past decade. More seriously, this reliance on dated literature is impoverished in that it implicitly relies on the Milbrathian characterization of political participation as hierarchical and presumes all political acts to be "equal." 137 According to Milbrath's typology of participants (spectator, transitional or gladiator), essentially one is or is not a political "combatant." While perhaps useful to highlight some gross mass and elite differences, the hierarchical view of participation blinds us to some crucial aspects of the political participation of women. For example, longitudinal studies have found the political participation of women to be increasing and to be linked to education, employment, social class, generation cohort and feminist consciousness.138 While comparison of citizens at the mass level find women participating at a slightly lower rate than do men (on the average),139 studies of politically active individuals have found that once women cross the threshold into political activity, women tend to be more active than men.140 The S. Verba and N. Nie reconceptualization of political participation, by contrast, emphasizes the psychological dimensions of political behavior and illuminates distinctive modes of political participation.141 Relying on Verba's and Nie's conceptual framework, we find that women do participate on an equal or near equal basis with men in two modes of activity: voting,142 and in community groups and communal activity.143 Putting aside parochial participation, the underrepresentation of women in campaign activity in particular, and to a smaller extent as "complete activists" (i.e., active in all modes), as documented by Verba and Nie and others,144

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becomes a problem to be explained—at least in part—with references to the differing psychological dimensions of each mode. In another typology developed by S. Barnes and M. Kaase, which included unconventional modes of political participation, while women are found to be overrepresented among the inactives, women are also overrepresented among the protestors—those who eschew conventional political activity, but are willing to engage in such activities as demonstrations, strikes, the occupation of buildings, etc.145 Neither of the two biological mechanisms considered here illuminates these aspects of the political participation of women. Although the research evidence indicates that in some areas or situations, women are equally or more active than comparable men, the thrust of the biopolitical explanations examined here has been to consider the question of why women have been less participatory than men. Further, as the explanations focus on what are often seen as "innate" differences between the sexes, a reliance on biological factors may be seen as fostering a complacent attitude toward extant differences and continuing areas of sex discrimination. Given these considerations, is it reasonable to conclude that the application of biopolitics to gender differences in political behavior is simply sexism in another guise?146 Before drawing this conclusion, it would be worthwhile to examine the role of biological variables in explanations of behavior. With reference to the studies considered here, a difficulty in the application of biopolitics lies in the gap between what is promised and the concrete ways that biological explanations are argued and researched. In general, the use of biological variables in comprehending gender-linked differences has not been presented in terms of an alternative paradigm. Instead, the biological emphasis identifies a set of additional variables that may account for any residual differences between males and females remaining after environmental causes have been examined.147 Yet the actual application of biological variables has been in the form of a complete explanation, whether it is the relative level of androgens or the effects of the menstrual cycle. The recurrence of a 'nature' versus 'nurture' dichotomy is also evident in Peterson's recent conclusion that learning-based variables provide a better explanatory paradigm.148 There are two basic problems with the conceptualization of behavior along a nature/nurture dichotomy. First, from a theoretical perspective, the nature/nurture dichotomy distorts our understand-

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ing of the developmental process by dividing behavior into innate and learned components. As J. Archer points out, conceptualizing behavioral characteristics in this fashion implies that "there are two separate variables bearing an additive relationship to one another, rather than their being . . . abstractions from a process that involves both components at the outset."149 If two different populations are living in similar environments, but exhibit different behaviors, then these behavioral differences may be usefully understood as innate—as due to genetic constitution. Innate in this sense refers to the capacity for genetic selection at the species level.150 This conception of the genome, however, does not imply anything about the extent to which environmental experience in the developmental process may modify behavior at the individual level. It should be remembered that "nature selects for outcomes,"151 i.e., the process of natural selection does not care whether the outcome is arrived at through genetic selection or through learning and experience with environmental consistencies. The developmental process represents a continual interaction between genetic constitution and experience in the environment, not an overlay of innate and learned components. Second, from a methodological standpoint, the inherent danger in conceptualizing explanatory paradigms in this fashion is the commission of what H. M. Blalock calls the "Durkheimian type of fallacy."152 As Blalock cautions concerning the rejection by some sociologists of psychological variables in sociological research, The mere fact that suicide rates may vary from country to country, or by religious denomination does not mean that "psychological variables" can be ruled out theoretically, in general, or for any other types of units.153 We can analogize to the present problem: unless one wishes to argue for a biological determinism, then we must assume that biological variables are similarly distributed across various samples. Organizing data for analysis in such a way that biological variables are canceled out does not mean that they are therefore irrelevant. Conversely, an emphasis on biological mechanisms does not imply that learning cannot greatly modify behavior. Gender represents a special case of this potential problem, as the morphological differences consist of a binary choice, yet the physiological (e.g., hormonal) and behavioral differences consist of overlapping distribu-

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tions. Hence, how one defines gender, and how one operationalizes gender and gender-based differences, may artificially suggest one type of explanation (e.g., biological, learning) over another. As these considerations indicate, the underlying problem in political socialization is not one of finding a new explanatory construct for explaining behavior—innate versus learned—but of finding the developmental explanation which links the two. So long as only one or the other category of variables is studied, we will never know their relative importance. The attribution of relative importance depends on 1) the extent to which a given independent variable varies; and 2) the proportion of the variation in the dependent variable explained by the independent variable, either directly or indirectly. Another analogy might be appropriate here. The notion of a "funnel of causality," as advanced in The American Voter,154 incorporates a basic distinction between proximate and distal variables. In political behavior, we are centrally concerned with the political participation of adults whose life experiences include at least 18 years of learning. Given the skills and knowledge prerequisite to engaging in the complex behaviors of politics, we may infer that learned behavior should dominate our perceptual field of important proximate variables. Hence, for most political behavior research, no justification is needed for excluding biological variables (political socialization research is another matter).155 If biopolitics is to add to our general knowledge of political behavior, it is incumbent on those researchers employing the life science perspective to explain and justify the linkages between the proximate variables commonly studied in political science, and the distal biological variables they wish to introduce. There are two possible routes that such a linkage might take. First, rather than identifying a direct link between physiological states and political behavior, a biopolitically oriented researcher might explore the different learning experiences structured by the obvious morphological differences between men and women. For example, Sherif has noted that despite the lack of empirical support, there is a fairly wide public acceptance of the notion that most if not all women are "incapacitated" during menstruation.156 Although most women are not ill during menstruation, what sort of a learning experience are they exposed to when they are able to claim an incapacity that they do not actually have in order to avoid or defer a responsibility (e.g., an exam, a day of work, etc.), or to gain the

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assistance of someone? Is it possible that such an option—claiming an illness due to menstruation—encourages women to learn "helplessness" and to learn to manipulate others? If so, this might explain why women tend to express aggression and power needs in more indirect or covert ways. Another example might be to explore the effects of motherhood. As only women experience pregnancy, labor and childbirth, and women, rather than men, have the biological capacity to breastfeed infants, the experience of being a parent may be qualitatively different for women. While a number of studies have identified a differentiation in political roles taken by mothers and fathers,157 research has yet to be conducted which explicitly compares male and female differences in the socialization of new parents. One way to explore the dimensions of this difference would be to investigate whether the experiences and consequences of being a mother differ among women as well. An exploratory study by C. B. Flora and N. Lynn indicates that they do, and appear to be related to such factors as the degree of anticipatory socialization, the extent of the husband's involvement in child care, and the type of personal interaction networks (e.g., child-centered, job-related, voluntary organizations).158 Second, the linkage might be provided in the form of a developmental explanation. To illustrate a possible biological link: The more intense participation of female political elites as compared to male elites remains as yet unexplained by the extant learning-based approaches. L. Milbrath and M. L. Goel have reported that "sociable personalities are more likely to enter politics and to take leading roles once they enter it." 159 A majority of studies have reported that women tend to be relatively more socially oriented than men.160 Could a possibly greater sociability in females be traced to gender-related differences found among young infants? Infant girls have been reported to respond and interact more positively with their mothers.161 Similarly, infant girls tend to vocalize more to faces than infant boys.162 Females have also been found to excel in verbal skills, attributed by some at least as due to differential brain lateralization.163 From these data, a plausible hypothesis is that although females may learn a disinclination to engage in politics, when they overcome this socialization disadvantage, a perhaps innate sociability disposition and greater verbal skills facilitate a more active involvement. These three examples—while certainly no more than interesting

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speculation at this point—do, however, indicate that the two biological mechanisms considered and rejected here should not preclude a continued investigation into the relevance of biological factors in political behavior research. It has been argued that neither biological nor psychological variables may be ruled out on theoretical grounds. And while it may appear that an emphasis on biological differences between men and women may reflect sexist attitudes, that is not necessarily the case. On the contrary, the introduction of biologically-based factors into our explanations may be useful to comprehend some as yet unexplained aspects of male and female participation. NOTES 1. As we have discussed more extensively elsewhere (D. L. Baer and D. A. Bositis, "The Political Socialization of Gender: What Contribution Biology," Politics and the Life Sciences, 1 (January, 1983). forthcoming, 'sex' and 'gender' have relatively distinct meanings in the social sciences. 'Sex' explicitly refers to the biological distinction between men and women. Further, the term often carries the connotation of reproduction and social relationships between individual men and women related to 'mating.' The use of the term 'sex' also implies that any differences between men and women are innate. In order to avoid any such connotations, the term 'gender' has also been employed in the social sciences. Gender has usually been taken to mean the psychological and cultural aspects of sexuality, exclusive of the biological distinction. This implies that while gender may be based in the biological differences, it receives its social definition of the proper role behavior from the culture of the society, not from any inherent differences. Since the present study explicitly considers the possibility that gender differences may be biologically based, an attempt has been made to minimize use of both terms in order to avoid any prejudging of the issue. Where the term gender is used in the text, it should not be taken to imply that any observed differences between men and women on social or political dimensions are solely derived from life experiences. 2. J. H. Crook, "Darwinism and the Sexual Politics of Primates," Social Science Information, 12 (1973), 7-28; J. Deardon, "Sex-Linked Differences of Political Behavior: An Investigation of Their Possibly Innate Origins," Social Science Information, 13 (1974), 19-46; G. Schubert, "Politics as a Life Science: How and Why the Impact of Modern Biology will Revolutionize the Study of Political Behavior," in Biology and Politics, ed. A. Somit (Paris: Mouton, 1976). 3. J. Parsons, "Psychosexual Neutrality: Is Anatomy Destiny?" in The Psychobiology of Sex Differences and Sex Roles, ed. J. Parsons (New York: Hemisphere, 1980). 4. E.g., R. L. Conner and S. Levine, "Hormonal Influences on Aggressive Behavior, '' in Aggressive Behavior: Proceedings of the International Symposium on the Biology of Aggressive Behavior, eds. S. Garattini and E. B. Sigg (New York: Wiley, 1969); B. A. Barr, J. L. Gibbons and K. E. Moyer, "Male-Female Differences and the Influence of Neonatal and Adult Testosterone on Intraspecies Aggression in Rats," Journal of Comparative and Physiological Psychology, 90 (1976), 1169-83. 5. P. Corning and C. H. Corning, "Toward a General Theory of Violent Aggression," Social Science Information. 11 (1972), 7-35; J. Crook, "Darwinism"; J. Deardon, "Sex-Linked Differences"; G. Schubert "Politics as a Life Science"; J. C. Davies, "Political Socialization: From Womb to Childhood," Handbook of Political

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Socialization, ed. S. A. Renshon (New York: Free Press, 1977), pp. 142-71; J. C. Davies, "Biological Perspectives on Human Conflict," in Handbook of Political Conflict, ed. T. R. Gurr (New York: Free Press, 1980), pp. 19-68. 6. J. Davies, "Political Socialization," p. 153. 7. The levels of the sex hormones vary greatly throughout the developmental process. A distinction is often made between the 'activating' effects of circulating levels of testosterone among adults and the 'organizing' effects of testosterone on the brain and the genitals during prenatal and neonatal life. Presumably, the organizational effect is a useful distinction when the early effects do not require later hormone treatment to become apparent. For example the Money and Ehrhardt research (to be discussed later in this section, see footnote 32) discusses organizational effects on humans. However, the import of this distinction is unclear for present purposes as the normal male development includes both effects. An additional consideration is raised by L. Rogers who points out that organizational effects vary from species to species: "unlike rats and guinea-pigs, the effects of early androgens in primates may not be permanent" ("Male Hormones and Behavior," in Exploring Sex Differences, ed. B. Lloys and J. Archer (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 175. For an analysis of sex differences in aggression employing this distinction see T. Tieger, "On the Biological Basis of Sex Differences in Aggression," Child Development, 51 (1980), 943-63. 8. A Frodi, J. Macaulay and P. R. Thome, "Are Women Always Less Aggressive Than Men? A Review of the Experimental Literature," Psychological Bulletin, 84 (1977), 634-60. 9. "Socialization and the Characterological Basis of Political Activism," in Handbook of Political Socialization, ed. S. A. Renshon (New York: Free Press, 1977), p. 415. 10. L. Milbrath, Political Participation (Chicago: Rand McNallay, 1965). 11. H. D. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1930). 12. E. N. Muller, Aggressive Political Participation (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1979). 13. A. M. Briscoe, "Hormones and Gender," in Genes and Gender, ed. E. Tobach and B. Rosoff (New York: Gordian Press, 1978), p. 45. 14. L. Rogers, "Male Hormones," p. 186. 15. F. H. Bronson and C. Desjardins, "Aggression in Adult Mice: Modification by Neonatal Injections of Gonadal Hormones," Science, 161 (1968), 705-06; N. G. Simon and R. Gandelman, "The Estrogenic Arousal of Aggressive Behavior in Female Mice," Hormones and Behavior, 10(1978), 118-27. 16. Luteinizing hormone and follicle stimulating hormone were first named for their role in stimulating ovulation in females; both, however are present in chemically identical form in males as well. 17. L. Rogers, "Male Hormones," pp. 160-61. 18. N. E. Van de Poll, F. de Jonge, H. G. van Oyen, J. van Pelt and J. P. C. de Bruin, "Failure to Find Sex Differences in Testosterone Activated Aggression in Two Strains of Rats," Hormones and Behavior, 15 (1981), 94-105. 19. W. H. Masters and V. E. Johnson, Human Sexual Inadequacy (Boston: Little, Brown, 1979). 20. J. Bremar, Asexualization: A Follow-Up Study of 244 Cases (New York: MacMillan, 1959); R. M. Rose, "The Psychological Effects of Androgens and Estrogens: A Review," in Psychiatric Complications of Medical Drugs, ed. R. I. Shader (New York: Raven Press, 1972); K. E. Moyer, "Sex Differences in Aggression," in Sex Differences in Behavior: A Conference, ed. R. C. Friedman, R. M. Richart and R. L. Van de Wiele (New York: Wiley). 21. H. Persky, K. D. Smith and G. K. Basu, "Relation of Psychologic Measures of Aggression and Hostility to Testosterone Production in Man," Psychosomatic Medicine, 33 (1971), 265-77; R. Rose, Psychological Effects"; Moyer, "Sex Differences"; H. Persky, "Reproductive Hormones, Moods and the Menstrual Cycle," in Sex Differences in Behavior, ed. R. C. Friedman, et al.

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22. H. Persky, "Reproductive Hormones," p. 465. See also the concluding statement in A. Mazur and T. H. Lamb, "Testosterone, Status and Mood in Human Males," Hormones and Behavior, 14 (1980), 244. 23. R. M. Oetzel, "Annotated Bibliography," in The Development of Sex Differences, ed. E. E. Maccoby (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1966); E. E. Maccoby and C. Jacklin, Psychology of Sex Differences (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1974). 24. A. Frodi, J. Macaulay and P. Thome, "Are Women Always Less Aggressive." 25. Ibid. 26. R. Oetzel, "Annotated Bibliography"; N. D. Feshbach, "Sex Differences in Children's Modes of Aggressive Responses Toward Outsiders," Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 15 (1969), 249-58; N. D. Feshbach and G. Sones, "Sex Differences in Adolescent Reactions Toward Newcomers," Developmental Psychology, 4 (1971), 381-86. 27. S. Feshbach, "Aggression," in Carmichael's Manual of Child Psychiatry, ed. P. H. Mussen (New York: Wiley, 1970). 28. A. Bandura, D. Ross and S. A. Ross, "Transmission of Aggression Through Imitation of Aggressive Models," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 63 (1961), 575-82; A. Bandura, D. Ross and S. A. Ross, "Vicarious Reinforcement of Imitative Learning," Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 67 (1963), 601-07. 29. S. K. Mallick and B. R. McCandless, "A Study of Catharsis of Aggression," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 6 (1966), 591-96. 30. D. B. Levanthal, K. M. Shemberg and S. K. Van Schoelandt, "Effects of Sex-Role Adjustment upon the Expression of Aggression," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 8 (1967), 393-96. 31. D. E. Barrett, "A Naturalistic Study of Sex Differences in Children's Aggression," Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 25 (1979), 193-203. 32. A. A. Ehrhardt, R. Epstein and J. Money, "Fetal Androgens and Female Gender Identity in the Early Treated Adrenogenital Syndrome," Johns Hopkins Medical Journal, 122 (1968) 160-67; J. Money and A. A. Ehrhardt, Man & Woman, Boy & Girl: The Differentiation and Dimorphism of Gender Identity from Conception to Maturity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1972); J. Money and P. Tucker, Sexual Signatures: On Being a Man or a Woman (Boston: Little, Brown, 1975). 33. P. Corning and C. Corning, "General Theory of Violent Aggression." 34. J. Crook, "Darwinism." 35. J. Deardon, "Sex-Linked Differences." 36. A. Ehrhardt, R. Epstein and J. Money, "Fetal Androgens," p. 166. 37. A. A. Ehrhardt, N. Greenberg and J. Money, "Female Gender Identity and Absence of Fetal Gonadal Hormones: Turner's Syndrome," Johns Hopkins Medical Journal, 126 (1970), 237-18; J. Money and A. Ehrhardt, Man & Woman. It should perhaps be noted that in considering Money's and Ehrhardt's work (and that of others), some researchers [e.g., S. W. Baker, "Biological Influences on Human Sex and Gender," Signs, 6 (1980), 80-96; and R. W. Goy and B. S. McEwen, Sexual Differentiation of the Brain (Cambridge, Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1980), pp. 54-58] have made a distinction between gender identity and sexual orientation on the one hand, and gender role behavior on the other hand, such that the latter is not determined by chromosomes or gonadal or prenatal hormones, but by rearing, whereas gender role behaviors are determined by prenatal and gonadal hormones. This distinction involves an interpretive fallacy which we have critiqued elsewhere (D. Baer and D. Bositis, "Political Socialization of Gender"), and presumes that such historically and culturally defined behaviors as interest in frilly clothes and appearance are isomorphic with only one sex in all societies and historical eras. 38. Research cited by J. Deardon, "Sex Linked Differences," includes L. M. Terman and C. C. Miles, Sex and Personality (New York: - 1954), and R. R. Sears, L. Rau and R. Alpert, Identification and Child Rearing (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1965). 39. E. A. Missakian, "Gender Differences in Agonistic Behavior and Dominance Relations of Synanon Communally Reared Children. 40. J. Parsons, "Psychosexual Neutrality."

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41. R. Q. Bell, G. M. Weller and M. F. Waldrop, "Newborn and Preschooler: Organization of Behavior and Relations Between Periods," Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development 36 (1971), Serial No. 142; J. Kagan, Change and Continuity in Infancy (New York: Wiley, 1970); K. A. Clarke-Stewart, "Interactions between Mothers and Their Young Children: Characteristics and Consequences," Monographs of the Society for Research in Child Development, 38 (1973), Serial No. 153; E. Maccoby and C. Jacklin, Psychology of Sex Differences. 42. As discussed by R. G. D'Andrade, "Sex Differences and Cultural Institutions," Development of Sex Differences, ed. Maccoby. Original not referenced by Deardon. 43. J. Money and A. Ehrhardt, Man & Woman', L. Nadelman, "Sex Identity in American Children: Memory, Knowledge, and Preference Tests," Developmental Psychology, 10 (1974) 413-17; B. I. Fagot and I. Littman, "Stability of Sex Role and Play Interests from Preschool to Elementary School," Journal of Psychology, 89 (1975) 285-92; G. Fein, N. K. Johnson, L. Stork and L. Wasserman, "Sex Stereotypes and Preferences in the Toy Choices of 20-Month-Old Boys and Girls," Developmental Psychology, 11 (1975), 527-528; J. Money and P. Tucker, Sexual Signatures. 44. L. M. Lansky, "The Family Structure Also Affects the Model: Sex-Role Attitudes in Parents of Pre-School Children," Merrill-Palmer Quarterly, 13 (1967), 139-50. 45. Study cited by P. Corning and C. Corning, "General Theory of Violent Aggression," p. 16, was J. H. Morton, H. Addition, R. G. Addison, L. Hunt and J. J. Sullivan, "A Clinical Study of Premenstrual Tension," American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 65 (1953), 118291. 46. M. B. Parlee, "The Premenstrual Syndrome," Psychological Bulletin, 80, (1973) 454-65; B. Sommer, "The Effect of Menstruation on Cognitive and Perceptual Motor Behavior: A Review," Psychosomatic Medicine 35 (1973); 515-534; L. Gannon, "Psychological and Physiological Factors in the Development, Maintenance and Treatment of Menstrual Disorders," Psychosomatic Disorders: A Psychophysiological Approach to Etiology and Treatment, ed. S. N. Haynes and L. R. Gannon (New York: Praeger, 1981). 47. E. Zimmerman and M. B. Parlee, "Behavioral Changes Associated with the Menstrual Cycle," Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 3 (1973), 335-44. 48. R. H. Tich, "The Relationship between a Mother's Menstrual Status and Her Response to Illness in her Child," Psychosomatic Medicine, 37 (1975), 943-63. 49. K. Dalton, "Menstruation and Accidents," British Medical Journal, (1960) 1425-26. 50. L. Gannon, "Menstrual Disorders." 51. M. Altmann, E. Knowles and H. D. Bull, "A Psychosomatic Study of the Sex Cycle in Women," Psychosomatic Medicine, 3 (1941) 199-225; J. S. Weiner and F. Elmadjian, "Excretion of Epinephrine and Norepinephrine in Premenstrual Tension," Federation Proceedings, 21 (1962), 184; N. M. Morris and J. R. Udry. Variations in Pedometer Activity During the Menstrual Cycle," Obstetrics and Gynecology, 35 (1970), 199-201; P. G. Stenn and V. Klinge, "Relationship between the Menstrual Cycle and Bodily Activity in Humans," Hormones and Behavior, 3 (1972), 297-305. 52. P. R. Messent, "Female Hormones and Behavior," in Exploring Sex Differences, ed. B. Lloyd and J. Archer, (New York: Academic Press, 1976); W. W. Beatty, "Gonadal Hormones and Sex Differences in Nonreproductive Behaviors in Rodents; Organizational and Activational Influences," Hormones and Behavior, 12 (1979), 112-63. 53. E.g., see P. M. Monti, W. A. Brown and D. P. Corriveau, "Testosterone and Components of Aggressive and Sexual Behavior in Man," American Journal of Psychiatry, 134 (1977) 692-94; D. Olweus, A. Mattson, D. Schalling and H. Low, "Testosterone, Aggression, Physical and Personality Dimensions in Normal Adolescent Males," Psychosomatic Medicine, 42 (1980), 253-69. 54. R. M. Rose, J. W. Holaday and I. S. Bernstein, "Plasma Testosterone, Dominance Rank and Aggressive Behavior in Rhesus Monkeys," Nature, 231 (1971) 366-368; R. M. Rose, I. S. Bernstein and T. P. Gordon, "Consequences of Social Conflict on Plasma Testosterone Levels in Rhesus Monkeys," Psychosomatic Medicine, 37 (1975), 50-61. 55. A. Mazur and T. Lamb, "Testosterone, Status and Mood."

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56. R. M. Rose, P. G. Bourne, R. O. Poe, E. H. Mougly, D. R. Collins and J. W. Mason, "Androgen Responses to Stress II," Psychosomatic Medicine, 31 (1969), 366-68; L. E. Kreuz, R. M. Rose and J. R. Jennings, "Suppression of Plasma Testosterone Levels and Psychological Stress," Archives of General Psychiatry, 26 (1972), 479-82. 57. J. Deardon, "Sex-Linked Differences," p. 32. 58. J. Davies, "Political Socialization," p. 153. 59. F. H. Bronson and C. Desjardins, "Aggression in Adult Mice: Modification by Neonatal Injections of Gonadal Hormones," Science, 161 (1968), 705-06; R. W. Goy, "Early Hormonal Influences on the Development of Sexual and Sex-Related Behavior,: The Neurosciences: Second Study Program; ed. F. O. Schmitt, et al; New York: Rockefeller University Press, 1970). 60. E. G. K. Moyer, "Sex Differences." 61. Defining aggressive behavior primarily on the basis of motive renders the differentiation of individual behaviors problematic. The behavioral definition proposed here is intended to subsume those instances where the motive is harm or injury to another. By contrast, assertiveness—or the communication of one's legitimate preferences in order that others may recognize them—will not, under normal circumstances, result in harm to others. 62. A. Bandura, Aggression: A Social Learning Analysis (Englewood Cliffs: New Jersey Prentice-Hall, 1973), p. 2. 63. J. Deardon, "Sex-Linked Differences," p. 33. 64. P. Corning and C. Corning, "General Theory of Violent Aggression," p. 12. 65. P. Corning, "The Biological Bases of Behavior and Some Implications for Political Science," World Politics, 23 (1971), 312-70. 66. F. F. Strayer, "The Organization and Coordination of Asymmetrical Relations Among Children: A Biological View of Social Power, in Biopolitics: Ethological and Physiological Approaches, ed. M. W. Watts (San Francisco: Jossey Bass, 1981). 67. Ibid. 68. See discussion in, e.g., L. Tiger and H. T. Fowler, Female Hierarchies (Chicago: Beresford, 1978); C. L. Cronin, "Dominance Relations and Females," in Dominance Relations: An Ethological View of Human Conflict and Social Interaction, D. R. Omark, F. F. Strayer and D. G. Freedman, (New York: Garland, 1980). 69. E. Missakian, "Gender Differences," p. 412. 70. H. Lasswell, Psychopathology and Politics. 71. Ibid., p. 45. 72. "Men and Women in Party Elites: Social Roles and Political Resources," Midwest Journal of Political Science, 12 (1968), 469-91. 73. The Political Role of Women (Paris: UNESCO, 1955). 74. This generalization is limited to studies of conventional political activity, as little work has been done in the area of unconventional or protest activity. Interestingly, S. H. Barnes and M. Kaase found that women were more likely to engage in protest activity—an indication that to the extent there may be a sex difference in unconventional participation, it favors women [Political Action (Beverly Hills: Sage, 1979), pp. 183-84]. 75. R. P. Browning and H. Jacob, "Power Motivation and the Political Personality," Public Opinion Quarterly, 28 (1964), 75-90; D. G. Winter, The Power Motive (New York: Free Press, 1973), pp. 102-05. 76. J. D. Barber, The Lawmakers: Recruitment and Adaptation to Legislative Life (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1965). 77. J. Kirkpatrick, The New Presidential Elite (New York: Russell Sage Foundation, 1976), p. 111. 78. R. Lane, Political Life (Glencoe, Ill.: Free Press, 1959); L. Milbrath and M. L. Goel, Political Participation, 2d ed. (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1977), p. 79. 79. R. Browning and H. Jacob, "Power Motivation;" D. Winter, Power Motive, pp. 102-05. 80. D. Winter, Power Motive, pp. 105-110. 81. J. Kirkpatrick, Presidential Elite, p. 111.

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82. E. Costantini and K. H. Craik, "The Social Background, Personality and Political Careers of Female Party Leaders," Journal of Social Issues, 28 (1972), 225. 83. J. Kirkpatrick, Presidential Elite, pp. 410-11. 84. C. W. Sherif, "A Social Psychological Perspective on the Menstrual Cycle, in The Psychobiology of Sex Differences and Sex roles, ed. J. Parsons (New York: Hemisphere, 1980), p. 246. 85. D. N. Ruble, J. Brooks-Gunn and A. Clarke, "Research on Menstrual Related Psychological Changes: Alternative Perspectives," The Psychobiology of Sex Differences and Sex Roles ed. J. Parsons (New York: Hemisphere, 1980), pp. 227-228. 86. D. Jaros, "Sex Psychophysiology and Political Behavior," a paper presented at the Midwest Political Science Association convention Chicago, 1976. 87. S. A. Peterson, "The Menstrual Cycle and Politics: A Preliminary Exploration," Social Science Information, 17 (1978), 992-1001. 88. S. A. Peterson, "The Biopolitics of Political Behavior," a paper presented at the annual International Society of Political Psychology convention, Washington, D.C., 1979. 89. T. C. Wiegele, Biopolitics: Search for a More Human Political Science (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1979). 90. L. Gannon, "Menstrual Disorders." 91. R. E. Frisch, G. Wyshak and L. Vincent, "Delayed Menarche and Amenorrhea in Ballet Dancers," New England Journal of Medicine, 303 (1980) 17-19; R. E. Frisch, et al., "Delayed Menarche and Amenorrhea of College Athletes in Relation to Age of Onset of Training," Journal of the American Medical Association, 246 (1981) 1559-63. 92. A. Nimrod and K. J. Ryan, "Aromatization of Androgens by Human Abdominal and Breat Ft. Tissue," Journal of Clinical Endrocinology and Metabolism, 40 (1975), 367-72. 93. R. E. Frisch, "Fatness, Puberty and Fertility," Natural History, 89 (1980), 16-27. 94. I. de Allende, "Anovulatory Cycles in Women," American Journal of Anatomy, 98 (1959), 293-305. 95. H. Fries, S. J. Nillius, F. Pettersson, "Epidemiology of Secondary Amenorrhea," American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 118 (1974), 473-79; Frisch, et al., "Delayed Menarch and Amenorrhea of College Athletes"; K. B. Singh, "Menstrual Disorders in College Students," American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 140 (1981), 299-302. 96. G. C. Luce, Biological Rhythms in Psychiatry and Medicine, Public Health Service Publication No. 2088 (Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 19). 97. C. P. Richter, "Periodic Phenomena in Man and Animals: Their Relation to Neuroendocrine Mechanisms (a Monthly or Near Monthly Cycle)," in Endocrinology and Human Behavior, ed. R. P. Michael (London: Oxford University Press, 1968). 98. K. Dalton, The Premenstrual Syndrome (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1964). 99. A. Lieber and C. Sherin, "The Case of the Full Moon," Human Behavior, 1 (1972), 29. 100. G. Luce, Biological Rhythms. 101. C. H. Doering, H. C. Kraemer, H. K. H. BrodieandD. A. Hamburg, "A Cycle of Plasma Testosterone in the Human Male," Journal of Clinical Endocrinology and Metabolism, 40 (1975), 492-500. 102. J. C. Hoffman, "Biorhythms in Human Reproduction: The Not-So-Steady States," Signs, 1 (1982), 829-44. 103. See e.g., K. D. Bailey, "Biological Time and Political Behavior," a paper presented at the annual American Political Science Association meeting New York City 1978. 104. While most research on cyclic variation has been confined to women, a recent exploratory study using male subjects suggests there may indeed be a relationship between mood, behavior and hormonal levels in men (B. B. Houser, "An Investigation of the Correlation Between Hormonal Levels in Males on Mood, Behavior, and Physical Discomfort,"

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Hormones and Behavior, 12 (1979), 185-97). Houser found a pattern across individuals in positive and negative moods, and central nervous system motor functioning related to levels of testosterone, luteinizing hormone and follicle stimulating hormone, but concluded that there may be no pattern within individuals. 105. M. Parlee, "Premenstrual Syndrome," p. 461. 106. L. Gannon, "Menstrual Disorders." 107. B. Sommer, ''Effect of Menstruation.'' 108. R. K. Koeske and G. F. Koeske, "An Attributional Approach to Moods and the Menstrual Cycle," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 31 (1975), 473-78; D. N. Ruble, "Premenstrual Symptoms: A Reinterpretation," Science, 197 (1977), 291-92. 109. R. H. Moos, Menstrual Distress Questionnaire Manual (Palo Alto, California: Social Ecology, 1968, 1977). Another recent high estimate is found in R. L. Reid and S. S. C. Yen, "Premenstrual Syndrome," American Journal of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 139 (1981) 85-104. Citing "general consensus," Reid and Yen suggest that 70-90% of all women have recurrent symptoms of premenstrual syndrome, and 20-40% suffer from a temporary physical or mental incapacity. 110. M. Parlee, "Premenstrual Syndrome," p. 459. 111. R. C. Friedman, S. W. Hunt, M. S. Arnoff and J. Clarkin, "Behavior and the Menstrual Cycle," Signs, 5 (1980), 719-38; L. Gannon, "Menstrual Disorders." 112. L. A. Wilcoxin, S. L. Schrader and C. W. Sherif, "Daily Self-Reports on Activities, Life Events, Moods and Somatic Changes during the Menstrual Cycle," Psychosomatic Medicine, 38 (1976) 399-17. 113. S. Golub, "The Magnitude of Premenstrual Anxiety and Depression," Psychosomatic Medicine, 38 (1976), 4-12. 114. L. Gannon, "Menstrual Disorders." 115. M. Parlee, "Premenstrual Syndrome," p. 456. 116. B. Sommer, "Effect of Menstruation," L. Gannon, "Menstrual Disorders." 117. M. Parlee, "Premenstrual Syndrome." 118. R. Moos, Questionnaire Manual. 119. L. Gannon, "Menstrual Disorders." 120. M. Parlee, "Premenstrual Syndrome"; J. Brooks, D. Ruble and A. Clarke, "College Women's Attitudes and Expectations Concerning Menstrual Related Changes," Psychosomatic Medicine, 39 (1977), 288-98; D. Ruble, "Premenstrual Symptoms"; L. Gannon, "Menstrual Disorders." 121. J. Brooks, D. Ruble, and A. Clarke, "College Women's Attitudes." 122. A. Sherif, "A Social Psychological Perspective." 123. K. Dalton, Premenstrual Syndrome; R. Moos, Questionnaire Manual; S. Golub, "Premenstrual Anxiety and Depression"; S. Golub and D. M. Harrington, "Premenstrual and Menstrual Mood Changes in Adolescent Women," Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 41 (1981), 961-65. 124. A. Coppen and H. Kessel, "Menstruation and Personality," British Journal of Psychiatry, 109 (1963), 711-21. 125. R. Greene and K. Dalton, "The Premenstrual Syndrome," British Medical Journal, (1953), 1007-14. 126. K. E. Paige, "Women Learn to Sing the Menstrual Blues," Psychology Today, September, 1973, pp. 41-46. 127. R. Moos, Questionnaire Manual; S. Golub and D. Harrington, "Premenstrual and Menstrual Mood Changes." 128. R. Moos, Questionnaire Manual. 129. A. J. Dan, "The Menstrual Cycle and Sex-Related Differences in Cognitive Variability," in Sex-Related Differences in Cognitive Functioning, ed. M. A. Wittig and A. C. Petersen (New York: Academic Press, 1979). 130. S. Matsumoto, M. Igarash and Y. Nagaoka, "Environmental Anovulatory Cycles," International Journal of Fertility, 13 (1968) 15-23; H. Fries, S. Nillius, and D. Pet-

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tersson, "Epidemiology of Secondary Amenorrhea"; R. Frisch et al., "Delayed Menarch and Amenorrhea," Sing, "Menstrual Disorders." 131. M. K. McClintock, "Menstrual Synchony and Suppression," Nature, 229 (1971), 224-5. 132. S. B. Hrdy, The Woman That Never Evolved (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 44, 106-08. 133. G. Almond and S. Verba, The Civic Culture (Boston: Little, Brown, 1963). 134. F. I. Greenstein, Children and Politics (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University Press, 1965). 135. K. Andersen, "Working Women and Political Participation, 1952-1972," American Journal of Political Science, 19 (1975), 439-53. 136. S. C. Bourque and J. Grossholtz, "Politics as Unnatural Practice: Political Science Looks at Female Participation," Politics and Society, 4 (1974), 225-65. 137. Milbrath, Political Participation. 138. M. Lansing, "American Woman," Women in Politics, ed. J. S. Jaquette (New York: Wiley, 1974) Anderson, "Working Women and Political Participation"; S. Welch, "Women as Political Animals: A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Participation Differences," American Journal of Political Science, 21 (1977), 711-31. 139. S. Verba, N. H. Nie and J. Kim, Participation and Political Equality (Cambridge, England; Cambridge University Press, 1978), pp. 234-37; S. Barnes and Kasse, Political Action, pp. 171-89. 140. G. Almond and S. Verba, Civic Culture; M. Jennings and N. Thomas, "Men and Women in Party Elites"; E. Constantini and K. Craik, "Female Party Leaders"; S. Verba and N. Nie, Participation in America (New York: Harper and Row, 1972); A. Kornberg, J. Smith, M. Clarke and H. Clarke, "Participation in Local Party Organizations in the United States and Canada," American Journal of Political Science, 17 (1973); 23-47, M. M. Lee, "Toward Understanding Why Few Women Hold Public Office: Factors Affecting the Participation of Women in Local Parties, A Portrait of Marginality, ED. M. Githens and J. Prestage (New York: McKay, 1977); H. G. Clarke and A. Kornberg, "Moving up the Political Escalator: Women Party Officials in the United States and Canada," Journal of Politics, 41 (1979) 442-77. 141. S. Verba and N. Nie, Participation in America. 142. M. Lansing, "American Woman"; G. Pomper, Voter's Choice (New York: Dodd, Mead, 1975), S. Verba and N. Nie, Participation in America', S. Baxter and M. Lansing, Women and Politics: The Invisible Majority (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 1980). 143. R. Lane, "Political Life," G. Almond and S. Verba, Civic Culute; S. Verba and N. Nie, Participation in America. 144. In the Verba and Nie study, the largest sex difference (with females underrepresented) is in the mode of campaign activity (-14%), as measured by their scale (Participation in America). When their scale is broken down into discrete activities as has been done by others, there is apparently some decrease in the sex differences for individual acts (S. Welch, "Women as Political Animals") In one of the more common campaign related activities engaged in by citizens (about 40% in the Verba and Nie study), however, that of persuading others how to vote, there remains a substantial sex difference (Welch, "Women as Political Animals"), that has been attributed by one researcher to childhood socialization (R. Rapoport, "The Sex Gap in Political Persuading: Where the Structuring Principle Works," American Journal of Political Science, 25 (1981), 32-47. 145. S. Barnes and M. Kaase, Political Action, pp. 183-184. 146. On this point see also M. Goodman and L. E. Goodman, "Is There a Feminist Biology?" International Journal of Women's Studies 4, (1981), 393-413; D. Baier and D. Bisitis, "Political Socialization of Gender." 147. J. Davies, "Political Socialization"; S. Peterson, "Menstrual Cycle and Politics." 148. S. Peterson, "Biopolitics of Political Behavior."

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149. J. Archer, "Biological Explanations of Psychological Sex Differences," in Exploring Sex Differences ed. B. Lloyd and J. Archer, (New York: Academic Press, 1976), p. 251. 150. D. S. Lehrman, "Semantic and Conceptual Issues in the Nature-Nurture Problems," in Development and Evolution of Behavior, eds. L. R. Aronson, E. Tobach, D. S. Lehrman and J. S. Rosenblatt (San Francisco: W. H. Freeman, 1970). 151. Ibid., p. 28. 152. H. M. Blalock, Causal Inferences in Nonexperimental Research (New York: Norton, 1972), p. 113. 153. Ibid. 154. A. Campbell, P. E. Converse, W. E. Miller and D. E. Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960). 155. D. Baer and D. Bositis, "Political Socialization of Gender." 156. A. Sherif, "A Social Psychological Perspective." 157. E.g., M. K. Jennings, "Another Look at the Life Cycle and Political Participation," American Journal of Politics, 23 (1979)755-71; N. E. McGlen, "The Impact of Parenthood on Political Participation," Western Political Quarterly, 3 (1980), 297-313. 158. C. B. Flora and N. Lynn, "Women and Political Socialization: Considerations of the Impact of Motherhood," in Women in Politics, ed. J. S. Jaquette. 159. L. Milbrath and M. Goel, Political Participation, p. 11. 160. R. Oetzel, "Annotated Bibliography." 161. L. Beckwith, "Relationships Between Infants' Social Behavior and Their Mothers' Behavior," Child Development, 43 (1972), 397-411; R. Clarke-Stewart, Interactions between Mothers and Their Young Children." 162. J. Kagan, Change and Continuity in Infancy. 163. J. A. Sherman, Sex-Related Cognitive Differences: An Essay on Theory and Evidence (Springfield, Illinois: Charles C. Thomas, 1978); M. P. Bryden, "Evidence for Sex-Related Differences in Cerebral Organization," in Sex Related Differences in Cognitive Functioning, ed. M. A. Wittig and A. C. Petersen (New York: Academic Press, 1979).

Political Ideology, Sociobiology, and the U.S. Women's Rights Movement Susan Ann Kay Douglas B. Meikle

ABSTRACT. An analysis of ideology in the United States reveals a major barrier to political and economic equality, where previously excluded groups are found to be characteristically different from historical and current participants in the area of political or economic access. This analysis is used to describe why sociobiological research threatens U.S. women's rights advocates (reform feminists) pursuing equality with men. It is argued, however, that by providing a contrast to the dominant ideological assumptions about human nature, and by providing supporting arguments for some reform feminist proposals, sociobiology merits the attention of reform feminists. Women's rights advocates (reform feminists) in the United States seek, among other goals, political and economic equality between women and men without a radical restructuring of U.S. politics or economics. In this quest it is not surprising that they are suspicious of scientific research which seems to suggest that present inequality is a result of something so fundamental as evolved biological characteristics.1 One reason for feminists to be suspicious is the potential for abuse of such research,2 but we will argue that a more insidious problem for reform feminists is the dominant political thought pattern in the U.S. We believe we can show how U.S. political ideology supports political and economic structures which will effect equality only if human beings are invariant across the sexes on Susan Ann Kay and Douglas B. Meikle are affiliated with Miami University at Oxford, OH 45056. © 1984 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.

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certain relevant biological characteristics. We hope that our examination of that ideology will help to explain, especially to those who are engaged in or about to embark on biological research, just why such research can be a sensitive and controversial political question for reform feminists. We will also argue, nevertheless, that reform feminists constructing their challenge to the dominant ideology may find insights from the conflict between sociobiological constructs of human nature and those of the dominant ideology. Sociobiology—a discipline attempting, in part, to explain sociopolitical behavior, yields a different perspective on human nature than that upon which the dominant ideology is grounded. We do not suggest that the end goals of any ideology ought to be built on any one scientific notion of what human nature is like. Scientific "facts" are, after all, not static. Moreover, we do not believe there is anything inherently "sweet . . . to life when it accords with the adaptive wisdom of evolution."3 We will suggest, nevertheless, that those who admit the possibility that humans vary on biological characteristics which may be related to access to the political and economic arenas, are in a position to engage in creative, conscious efforts to overlay the biological underpinnings with new social structures. One may then be forced to choose between settling for a goal of constantly narrowing the gap between females and males, or seeking a more radical restructuring of the social, political, and economic arenas in the U.S. CONFLICT WITHIN AND BETWEEN IDEOLOGIES IN THE U.S. Political ideologies are typically explicated in philosophical analyses and diffuse throughout a group or nation over time in ways which may cause their normative elements to be obscured. Ideology may become more a way of thinking and perceiving facts than a consciously admitted structure of values.4 By examining the philosophies, however, we may begin to unravel some of the contemporary effects of U.S. ideology.5 John Locke, Adam Smith and other philosophers—to whose works we are able to trace the ideological thought patterns of the U.S.—were envisioning a relatively homogeneous group of participants in the political and economic arenas: men like themselves, neither noble nor wage-laborer, generally congenial and coopera-

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tive, profoundly moral with enough faith in rationality to believe they could agree on what "moral" meant, well fed, well educated, self-assured, efficacious individuals. Assuming such homogeneity, they could assert that "all men are created equal" and proceed to write about a remaining characteristic in human nature which they saw either as the motive force of the economy or a problem in the distribution of political power—self-interest, competitiveness and acquisitiveness. Thomas Jefferson, James Madison and the other Founders to whom we can more immediately trace U.S. political ideology assimilated many of the earlier philosophers' ideas. Assuming the notion of equality as well as the idea of the economy as self-regulating through the competitive nature of man, they observed a more fractious public than did the philosophers, and concentrated on the political task at hand. This task they saw as keeping competitive, acquisitive, self-interested equals from becoming unequal in their acquisition of political power. The U.S. political tradition, therefore, has emphasized more the competitive, acquisitive "nature of man" than the cooperative aspects of that nature. Economics, politics and ideology in the U.S. continue to reflect that notion of human nature and the philosophies which grew out of it. The structure of government assumes competition for power and is fragmented to avoid individual (or majority) control of that power; the structure of the economy assumes competition for economic success. We will suggest several specific elements of the ideology which may cause problems for reform feminists. The Public/Private Division The philosophers assumed a radical division between public and private spheres, and they concentrated their efforts more on the former than on the latter.6 Although originally the public realm was primarily conceptualized as a government which was to do no more to the "private" market than stabilize it, we suggest that at least in contemporary thought patterns, the concept of a private sphere encompasses such things as home, family, human personality development and the like, while references to a public sphere may spill over from the political into the economic sphere. We will use the term "public" to refer to both. The dominant ideology purports to value equal political participation, but suggests little or no procedure for ensuring it beyond a

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theoretically open political arena which any citizen may enter. Such mechanisms as equal suffrage, for whichever groups of citizens have won the right to vote, do not ensure equal political participation unless all citizens approach the public political arena as squally as the homogeneous participants originally envisioned by the philosophers.7 Similarly, the dominant ideology purports to value equal opportunity to compete within the open marketplace where the quality and price of the product are the primary determinants of success. Equal opportunity alone, however, is not a mechanism to assure that individuals approach the marketplace with equal capability of engaging in whatever marketing behaviors are tacitly assumed. The ideology assumes equal potential for competitiveness even as it assumes inequality in the ability to produce a meritorious product. Anything that takes place in the private sphere to ensure equality when individuals approach a public sphere could safely remain rela:ively ignored in the philosophical origins of U.S. ideology. There was seemingly no need to be overly worried about variations among potential participants in the public spheres. A casual glance at the programs sponsored by contemporary governments may suggest that the ideology has been modified sufficiently to allow public aid to private needs in order to bring potenial participants into equality as they approach public arenas. Food stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children may be adduced as examples. Such programs, however, may more likely be pragmatic adjustments to the radical public/private split. They provide subsistence level, minimal additions to the individual's private ife without addressing the fundamental absence of public mechansms to lift the privately rooted capacities of all people up to the evels necessary to be equal public participants.8 One program that does address the private capacity of individuals o participate in the public arenas is public education. Regardless of he original intent in establishing it, we view public education less a charitable, humanitarian program, and more a permanent modification of the public/private dichotomy, than the programs menioned above. It is the public provision to the entire citizenry of the previously, privately nurtured skills to approach the political and economic arenas somewhat equally. Over the long run, if not curently, public education seems to have had more support in public )pinion than have the more humanitarian aid programs. We suspect

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that public support will normally be stronger for a program which, under the ideology, may be considered a findamental public rightequivalent to the vote or to equal opportunity—of all citizens. Feminists have not failed to address the private origins of public discrimination.9 There is great variation among individuals in their abilities to enter the public realm. Much of that variation is traceable to the personality and psychology of the individual—aspects of human development surely grounded in what the philosophers would regard as the private, pre-public realm. Into this realm, the philosophers built little or no public, political or economic mechanism for raising everyone up to the level of public participation.10 An example may help to clarify the ideological dilemma posed by differences between the feminist and the dominant ideologies. If reform feminists deny the public/private dichotomy and argue that "the personal is the political," as many do, how logically do they then assert that political action is inappropriate on the part of those who wish to restrict private choices, as in the case of family planning? If reform feminists accept the dichotomy, how do they get out of the logically uncomfortable position of having to argue that such things as abortion are private while child care should be public? In the case of public education, reform feminists may add to their current argument for nonsexist education that it is a modification of the tradition which will prepare women to approach the public spheres equally (without opening the logical doors for others to use the curriculum of public education to espouse their own private philosophies with which reform feminists may be in complete disagreement). The clear link between education and the equality valued by the dominant ideology may yield more public support than would be garnered by a proposal to effect equality more directly and immediately by addressing the private realm. If reform feminists' best hope for widespread and enduring support lies with an institution under such current attack as education, it merely indicates the difficulty faced by these feminists in any other policy area. Decision makers and the public, having been socialized to the public/private distinction, may find difficulty in supporting the "public" policies which address the very source of the public inequality for which the traditional ideology has no redress. To imagine the difficulty which will face reform feminists if inequality is traced to something so very "private" as biology is to begin to understand the very threatening nature of sociobiological research.

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Individual vs. Group Rights The conflict between the reform feminist goal of equality and the dominant political ideology extends beyond the public/private dichotomy into the tradition of radical individualism as well. While the traditional ideology speaks to civil rights and liberties guaranteed to individuals, there is little evidence in the ideology—once the vote and equal protection of the laws have been won by the members of a group—of a mechanism to relieve the entire group from any discrimination which does not stem directly from statutory law.11 In the application of the tradition, even sex discrimination by law is not redressable so long as it is reasonably, substantially and fairly related to the purpose of government. The burden to prove that a law is intentionally and directively discriminatory, moreover, rests largely with the victim of discrimination except in the cases of discrimination based on race, and religion, and sometimes national origin and alienage. As we saw with the problems of assuming the equality of participants in the public arena, those involved in the development of the U.S. tradition did not have to be overly concerned with individual versus group designations of justice or rights or liberties. They seemed to be assuming a single class and a single sex. Certainly they did not have to worry that the structure they were constructing might be biased against the participation of some group they considered to be citizens. Feminists assert, however, that access to the elite levels of public action is very much limited by such characteristics as credibility or appearance which may be differentially distributed among groups in the population.12 It may be argued that it is not the group characteristics per se which potentially hinder public participation, but the values which the culture attaches to the group characteristics. We suggest, however, that a fuller explanation would take into account the possibility that the structure of U.S. politics itself, as opposed to the values espoused by the culture, may facilitate entry of individuals with certain characteristics such as a high energy level, gregariousness, fearlessness, dominance and so forth. For many reasons, these characteristics may be differentially distributed across groups. Feminists may argue that women as a group have been discriminated against or that women as a group deserve compensatory public programs to overcome whatever factors have kept women

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from achieving equal participation in the public realm. Their proposals, however, may well fall on ears trained by the dominant ideology to find the evidence and proposals irrelevant so long as individual women do, in fact, succeed in the presence of "reasonably" discriminatory laws or in the absence of specific policy supports. The problem may be exemplified by a popular button used in the campaign for ratification of the equal rights amendment. Carrying the slogan "59 cents," the button may have provided collective solidarity within reform feminist groups as a symbol that women earn less than 60% of what men earn. It may not, however, effectively activate the sympathies of decision makers, public opinion or of some reform feminists, because it may appear to those who are imbued with the dominant ideology to be asserting a group, rather than an individual, definition of equality. Sociobiological evidence of sex differences which may relate to public participation can only hinder feminists in their attempts to effect change within the context of the dominant ideology; it cannot help them. If certain biological characteristics are found to be related to access to the political or economic arenas, and if those characteristics are differentially distributed among women and men, the tradition of radical individualism will offer as few mechanisms to overcome differences between biologically designated groups as it now offers to overcome differences between sociologically designated groups. As long as some women have, and some men lack, whatever biological characteristics may be found to be associated with access to the public arenas, reform feminists will find that evidence of average group differences is irrelevant in confrontation with an ideology not speaking in terms of group justice. The only hope offered by biological science would be to identify individuals who require compensatory education and training—something, as we will detail later, sociobiology does not purport to be able to offer. With one small bit of illogic, proponents of the dominant ideology may, however, turn biological findings of differences between the sexes into justifications for denying equal protection of the laws to those who already shoulder the burden of demonstrating themselves to be equal. The logically impossible, but not practically improbable reasoning yields: "All individuals are created equal; women are not equal; therefore, women are not individuals deserving the equal protection of the laws." In addition, proponents of the dominant

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ideology may twist the tradition of individualism to refuse compensation to the sex which is, on average, disadvantaged: "All groups which are created equal should be politically supplied with the means to achieve equal access to public arenas; women are not created equal; therefore, equal access to public arenas is of no political concern." If proponents of the dominant ideology pay attention to popularizers of biological data, who tend to overstate the differences between the sexes, the problem is compounded. Limited Government Even if reform feminists could get past the problem of group justice, advocates of programs to compensate women for whatever predispositions may be found to be related to public access will confront another problematic aspect of the dominant ideology: liberty as the limitation of government power. The originators of the tradition were more interested in limiting the power acquisitive aspects of human nature than they were in channeling its cooperative aspects. Freedom or liberty was something which existed and had to be protected against government interference; it was not something to be worked toward collectively. A government with power to bring about desired social goals is a government which can only interfere with freedom as long as freedom is defined only as the individual's right to self-determination, rather than as the right to freedom from want and the like. Even on such fundamental questions as equal participation in politics or equal opportunity to enter the economic arena, there is little reason for the ideology to specify mechanisms through which the power of government could be used positively to insure equality—as long as there is assumed to be no particularly large variation across the individuals or groups in their capacities to participate. Although persistent proposals for positive, cooperative action toward designated social goals do sometimes make their way through the U.S. political system, reform feminists still face decision makers and a public who, socialized to the notion of limited government, will find it quite easy to assert that government can do nothing to address the identified problems. Any sociobiological evidence that the structure of the system disadvantages potential participants in the public arenas will prove to be of little use to reform feminists if decision makers have already determined to assert the limitations of government.

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Individual vs. Family An additional area of potential conflict between the dominant ideology and reform feminist goals centers on the lack of clarity, in the dominant ideology, or the question of just what the basic unit of society is assumed to be: the individual or the family. Certainly the rhetoric of individualism is a consistent theme. But, all those individuals whom the originators of the ideology saw competing equally in the public arenas had elaborate infrastructures to provide not only the necessary psychological grounding for participation, but also certain economic services as well.13 It may not be unreasonable to suggest that the presence of families was what allowed equally well fed, self-assured, efficacious individuals to venture into the public worlds envisioned by the philosophers—one individual representative per family. Ideological ambiguity over the basic unit of society is currently evidenced by the Internal Revenue Code's taxation of "families," not individuals; by the Social Security system's taxation of individuals but calculation of benefits for families; by the conflict between individual rights and proposals for so-called "family protection" acts; and even by laws which insufficiently protect against within-family violence. Reform feminists seem, however, much more likely than the tradition to recognize that the so-called "traditional family" is a rather recent historical invention,14 and to assume that the individual is the basic unit of society. To use what the tradition explicitly says about individualism, rather than what the originators of the tradition seemed to assume, is a logical means of gaining one's own goals without overthrowing the dominant ideology itself. Conflict is, nevertheless, to be expected, given the ambiguity of that dominant ideology. We cannot help but suspect that, when reform feminists argue for such things as societal responsibility for child care, they may trigger some inchoate antagonism derived from a desire to protect not the so-called "traditional family" but the basic ideology itself—an undefined fear (if this "family vs. individual" ambiguity is exposed) that the superstructure will be suspect as well; that the political and economic arenas will be revealed not to be as neatly separated from the private family as the dominant ideology would have it; that public arenas cannot guarantee the ideologically valued equality but can only reflect whatever equality is grounded in the private realm. Thus, women who seek public child care so that all may individually participate in the economic arena are frequently

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and derogatorily labeled "selfish," even as self-interest is glorified (for males) as the presumed motive force of the economic arena. Sociobiology may assist reform feminists in examining the ambiguity surrounding whether the family or the individual constitutes the basic unit of society, if only because it explicates some of the relationships between individuals, families and larger groups, and because it relates the characteristic social organization for a species to the environment in which the species evolved. At the very least, sociobiology may offer a more complex understanding than the overly simple notions in the U.S. philosophical tradition. A naive reading of sociobiology, which might extrapolate "women should be in the home" from "in many cases females provide necessary nurturance," is as much a threat to reform feminists as any part of the dominant ideology. A Reform Feminist Dilemma Ideology in the U.S. women's movement presently appears to be somewhat inconsistent on the basic question of what humans are like—especially on the question of differences between females and males. In part, this inconsistency may be explained by the existence within the movement of multiple approaches to change. Reform feminists tend to argue, possibly because they have to in order to make progress within the dominant ideology, that biological differences are irrelevant. Socialist feminists, especially those who accept the designation "Marxist," generally assume a natural equality between the sexes which would emerge in the presence of radically restructured economic institutions. Radical feminists tend to argue from the basis of assumed inherent and important differences between the sexes. There are other voices as well.15 Apparent inconsistency, even within the reform tradition, may arise as ideas are diffused across the permeable and ill-defined boundaries between segments of the women's movement. Reform feminists seem to be less likely than more radical feminists to eschew hierarchy as inherently masculine. They seem to be less likely than more radical feminists to organize their own groups nonhierarchically or to assert the importance of inherent differences between female and male. But, they may be heard speaking in such terminology, and borrowing such non-hierarchical structures as consciousness-raising groups, even as the utility of hierarchy in political strategy is also advocated.16 Inconsistencies may arise as

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reform feminists try to integrate aspects of the wider range of feminist thinking into the dominant ideology acquired through political socialization at a young age without complete understanding of its ideological nature or content. It is not surprising to find reform feminists sometimes denying the relevance of biological differences between the sexes, even as they also ask, "What do we do with our bodies?"17—a private subject with potentially public ramifications, an individual characteristic that allows women to be designated as a group. And, it is not surprising that reform feminists sense a threat from sociobiological research which may be used to argue that any discrepancy between female and male access to the political or economic arenas is innate, private, individual and not addressable by any positive governmental action. Reform feminists—in the process of constructing an ideology of equality which does not disavow all aspects of the dominant ideology in the U.S.—face a complicated task. Their ability to engage in this task, we believe, is enhanced by a thorough understanding of what human beings are like. We will, therefore, turn to sociobiological theory which we believe will highlight the differences and similarities between contemporary conceptions of human nature and those assumed in the dominant ideology. SOCIOBIOLOGY Sociobiology is a body of evolutionary theories examining and explaining the relationship between the social behaviors and the reproduction of organisms. According to this perspective, if a particular behavior is genetically influenced, either by predisposing the organism to engage in certain patterns of behavior or by establishing the propensity to learn certain behaviors, and if that behavior assists the offspring of an individual to survive to reproduce itself (reproductive success), the gene or gene complex associated with such behaviors will be disproportionately represented or maintained in subsequent gene pools.18 The sociobiological approach is sufficiently general to encompass all sexually-reproducing species, including humans, if certain caveats are kept in mind. Specifically, it is important to remember that at no time do genes express themselves in the absence of an environment, nor does the environment influence an organism without in-

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fluencing to some extent gene expression and reproductive success.19 Especially in the study and understanding of humans, whose capacity to conceptualize and to learn has resulted in cultural environments that change far more rapidly than does genetic material, it is important to comprehend the environment in which selection has occurred. Much of human evolutionary history occurred in environments not completely understood, and which may have been very different from current ones. Present environments may now be overlaid with cultural characteristics so diverse as to appear unrelated to genes and reproductive success. We must, therefore, be especially cautious in generalizing about human behavior. Sociobiology is, nevertheless, a branch of contemporary biology which is sufficiently explanatory and unified to give rise to falsifiable hypotheses concerning heritable, genetic bases of behavior or predispositions toward certain behaviors.20 It is that aspect of sociobiology which makes it attractive to anyone concerned with complete and adequate explanations and descriptions of "human nature." One does not have to engage in an almost random, inductive search for natural characteristics: the theories provide direction. It is important to note, however, some things that sociobiology does not purport to do; 1) It does not explain human behavior by assuming no influence of culture. Explanations of behavior may, without a doubt, rest on cultural factors as proximate causes. Sociobiology merely enriches the explanations by considering the influence of hereditary factors. It is not a theory of biological determinism. Without invalidating the theory, cultural factors may, and do, act to reduce, exacerbate or leave unchanged genetic propensities or potentials.21 2) It does not require that individual organisms think consciously in terms of reproductive success. Nor does it suggest that humans cannot determine for themselves whether to engage in actions associated with reproductive success. Unfortunately, the words which have been used to discuss theories of reproductive success include terms like strategy, choice, investment and selection in a language of convenience which connotes, especially to lay readers, that organisms are conscious of and/or interested in the influence of their behaviors on their reproductive success. We have not ourselves avoided this problem, and are burdened by such language without being able to supply an alternative. 3) It does not allow specific explanations of the behavior of par-

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ticular individuals.22 Evolutionary theories are stated as statistical, population phenomena. No theory about the evolution of a particular characteristic predicts that every single individual will possess the characteristic to the same degree, and every proposition is probabilistic in form such that to apply the statistical generalization to an individual case is fallacious. Such a theory predicts that individuals in a population will possess the characteristic to varying degrees. Variations around the averages of all characteristics may be extensive and, considering the large increase in human population size which has occurred in the last 200 years, the variation may have recently increased. That is, such a population increase, in the context of decreased and different forms of selection, has probably resulted in an increase in genetive variability. 4) Sociobiology is not an inherently prescriptive body of theories. It does not state how organisms should behave, but how and why they behave as they do. Although sociobiology treats the evolutionary aspects of a wide range of behaviors, in this paper we limit our discussion to themes later to be related to the potential for conflict between reform feminists and the dominant ideology. We do not assert that sexual selection and parental investment, on which we will elaborate, have dominated all of life and evolution. We assume, however, that these have been very significant components of human evolution—in particular, for two reasons. First, unlike other species, humans do not have a breeding season characterized by obvious physical signals of ovulation and by female sexual receptivity indicated by behaviors only during that season. Human females have relatively concealed ovulation and tend to be continually (not continuously) sexually receptive.23 Given these two characteristics of human females, we expect that behaviors related to sexual selection may be rather constant aspects of the human social environment and may not be restricted to specifically reproductive situations. Second, the lengthy period of gestation and offspring dependency among humans, as compared with other species, suggests that behaviors associated with child care are not likely to be confined to brief periods in the life of the adult or specifically just to those individuals who have dependent offspring. While little is yet known about the complex neurological and hormonal mediators between genes and behavior, it may be that evolved predispositions are not entirely manifest until elicited by hormonal changes during pregnancy or by the presence of one's own offspring.

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Sexual Selection Speaking generally of all sexually reproducing species, Charles Darwin defined sexual selection as: 1) selection of mates (usually by females) and 2) competition among members of the same sex (usually males) for access to members of the opposite sex (intrasexual competition). He hypothesized that sexual selection has resulted in the evolution of different physical characteristics and behavioral strategies for females and males (i.e., sexual dimorphism). Males are often larger than females; they have "weapons" for intrasexual competition such as horns or long canine teeth; frequently they have bright colors or such ornamentation as plumage or fur with which to attract females; and they are behaviorally intolerant of other males. Males who are successful at fathering more than the average number of offspring are probably able to do so because females "choose" those characteristics or because those characteristics advantage the possessor of them in intrasexual competition.24 Females who have similarly high reproductive success probably accomplish it by virtue of different characteristics than those described for males. They are more likely to contribute to their offspring's reaching reproductive maturity by directly investing in the development and maturation of those offspring.25 Sex specific, reproductively successful characteristics, whether behavioral or physical, are maintained in the population when offspring are likely to inherit those characteristics and to be themselves relatively reproductively successful as a result. Two important points must be stressed. First, the above propositions do not argue that environmental influences on organisms are unimportant during development—just that fundamental differences between the sexes with regard to reproduction may evolve by natural selection "working" on genes within populations. Second, the most reproductively successful strategies of females and males are not apt to be exactly the same. A. J. Bateman elaborated on the theory of sexual selection by arguing that males compete for females because females expend much more energy in the production of their enormous (compared with spermatozoa) ova. He reasons that, since males produce numerous, metabolically inexpensive spermatozoa, their reproductive success (RS = production of reproductively successful offspring) is not influenced so much by their ability to produce spermatozoa as by their attractiveness to females and/or by their ability to

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exclude other males from mating. The RS of females, in contrast, is more influenced by females' ability to invest in the metabolically more expensive ova than by their ability to gain access to the relatively unlimited spermatozoa. Both influences on the RS of males (attractiveness to females and exclusion of other males) will act to eliminate or reduce the RS of some individuals and heighten the RS of others. Female RS does not usually depend on excluding other females from mating or, because of the scarcity of ova, on being selected from among numerous possessors of the necessary gametes. Female RS is, therefore, usually less variable than that for males.26 Robert Trivers expanded Bateman's idea into a more general notion of parental investment (PI) which he defines as: any investment by a parent in an individual offspring that increases the offspring's chance of surviving (and reproducing) at the cost of the parent's ability to invest in other offspring . . . Where one sex invests considerally more than the other, members of the latter will compete among themselves to mate with members of the former.27 Because the RS of the less investing sex will be increased by securing as many mates as possible, characteristics associated with intrasexual competition will tend to evolve in that sex. But, where investment is equal, sexual selection should operate similarly on the two sexes. There, because of the relatively equalizing influence of PI on the variance in the RS of both sexes, sexual dimorphism will not evolve to the same extent.28 In species in which female PI is so sufficient that PI on the part of the male would probably have no significant effect on the success of offspring, we expect the evolution of behaviors associated with females' selection of males with the highest probability of RS (i.e., the fittest available mates). Conversely, if ecological and offspringrearing circumstances are such that PI by males can significantly increase the changes of successful development and survival of offspring, and males are not able to monopolize mating, we expect the evolution of behaviors associated with females' selection of investing mates and males' investment in offspring. In either case, the degrees to which we expect males to pursue several mates, and females to choose mates, is related to the difference in the amounts of PI that each parent gives to offspring.29

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In most mammalian species, the obligatory investment by females is very great, due to relatively long gestation and difficult parturition, as well as to metabolically expensive lactation. Because of the larger investment by female mammals relative to males, PI (as opposed to monopolizing mates) on the part of the male increases his RS relatively little. Accordingly, most mammals are polygynous, and the degree of sexual dimorphism is positively correlated with the degree of polygyny. In mammalian species under unusual or severe ecological constraints, or with relatively complex social development and learning, investment by males can have a significant effect on the success of offspring; and the sexes in such species (e.g., gibbons) can be very monogamous and not very dimorphic. Because of the investment on the part of males, females in those species probably compete for males more frequently than do females in species in which fewer investing behaviors have evolved among males.30 Parental Investment as a Basis for Human Sex Differences Taking both the greater female investment and the contribution of the male PI into account among humans: 1) we expect human females, on average, to be somewhat more predisposed than males toward nurturance and gentleness and less predisposed than males toward competiveness and aggression; 2) we expect the differences between the sexes not to be very large. There is reason to suspect that manners in which each sex invested in offspring differed considerably, even if the amounts of investment were more similar. In early hominid evolution males may have been more reproductively successful acting in a defensive role, than acting to nurture the infant more directly, especially when females had nursing infants. Slight differences in size and body structure might also have made the male the more likely active defender of offspring, while lactation would have made the female more closely tied to the infant. The propensity for differential PI on the part of the two parents may also have varied with the age of the offspring. The probability of maternal investment may be greatest at the early ages of the off-

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spring when dependency on the mother for sustenance is greatest. In terms of offspring development, direct paternal involvement with the offspring was, in evolutionary terms, probably more interchangeable with maternal investment at later stages of offspring development. If adaptive patterns of investment by female and male parents occurred at different periods during offspring development, when the infant required different forms of parental care, it is likely that investment associated behaviors would have evolved differently for females and males. Such circumstances as differential ways and times of investment suggest the hypothesis of some differences in the evolution of personality characteristics of human females and males. Competition as a Basis for Female/Male Similarity Having hypothesized potential differences between the sexes, we now turn to a potential basis for similarities. We have chosen to focus primarily on the potential for competitive and hierarchical behaviors because of our earlier suggestion that sociobiology provides hypotheses which predict only limited differences between the behaviors of females and males. There is a basis for assuming the evolution of cooperative or non-hierarchical behaviors alongside those we have chosen to point out.31 The conflict oriented behaviors are, however, of more concern to us, given the normative assumptions of the dominant and feminist ideologies. There is little reason to expect that human females have not evolved behavioral propensities associated with conflict similar to those of males. Throughout most of human evolution there probably has been competition among females (and males) within and between social groups. If females in the hominid ancestry of human beings were in close proximity to other females most of the time, conflict could have resulted as they, acting in their self-interests, sought food, water, space and to fill other needs. In addition to those resources over which human females may have competed, they may also have competed for mates. Because human males could have invested significant amounts in offspring, their investment probably was influential and limiting to the reproductive success of females. Hence, we would expect females to tend to compete for males based on the degree to which the males appeared able and willing to invest in offspring as well as on other behavioral and physical attributes of males. Since females probably

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invested more, it is unlikely that their reproductive strategy was based on conflict as much as was that of males. A ritualized, hierarchical organization of dominance is one means by which organisms, whether female or male, may behave according to their self-interests without a new potentially, damaging interaction each time conflict occurs over the interests of two organisms. Dominance hierarchies are observed, in differing degrees, among females and males in nearly every primate species.32 To the extent that human females and males shared the same groupings, it is unlikely that completely different mechanisms would have evolved for the two sexes; however, to the degree that females were less conflictual, they may have been somewhat less inclined toward hierarchy as a mechanism to resolve conflict But, popularizers of a biological perspective on human behavior have probably over-emphasized hierarchy as an almost exclusively male charateristic.33 IMPLICATIONS FROM SOCIOBIOLOGY FOR REFORM FEMINIST IDEOLOGY AND POLICY PRESCRIPTIONS The sociobiological approach suggests a more varied picture of human "nature" than the assumed uniformity which apparently undergirds the dominant U.S. political ideology. At the very least, it suggests the hypotheses that women on average may be somewhat different from men on average in basic predispositions—somewhat less competitive for mates than males, somewhat more predisposed toward nurturance of the young than males, and somewhat less oriented toward aggressive behaviors than males. If we assume for the moment that personality predispositions which may have evolved from sexual selection, parental investment, or competition for resources exist, we may further hypothesize that such personality predispositions may have generalized into other areas of human behavior through human linguistic and cultural abilities and that many aspects of culture are overlays of the basic predispositions themselves. Given those two assumptions, we can speculate on the political consequences of the biological differences. The dominant ideology specifies an "open door" to the political and economic arenas as a definition of equality. To the extent, however, that the structure of the political or economic spheres advantages those who are innately more predisposed toward competitive, aggressive, hierarchy ascending behaviors, any group less in possession of such characteristics is disadvantaged.

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To the extent that some discrimination may be a result of the mismatch between biologically rooted characteristics and the structure of the political arena, the recently defeated equal rights amendment could not have brought about completely equal participation in the public arenas, even had it passed. The E.R.A. would have eliminated laws which discriminated on the basis of sex, but would have done nothing toward changing the very structures which themselves may be baised or toward allowing compensatory education and training for the disadvantaged. Neither will the recent emphasis on electoral strategy proposed by the National Organization for Women completely and alone equalize the numbers of women in elected offices, if our hypotheses are correct, and even if a completely non-biased electorate were suddenly in evidence.34 The self-confidence in competition, the selfassertion in self-promotion, the hierarchical organization apparently requisite for success may be somewhat unequally distributed across the sexes. A popular text on elections suggests that the winner of at least the presidential contest is expected to be "strong, assertive, dominant . . . (and have) boldness and decisiveness."35 Certainly these expectations are a matter of socialization and culture, but might they not also be examples of the cultural overlay of the biological predispositions? If so, the sex less possessing of such characteristics is disadvantaged in electoral aspects of the public arena. It is tempting to speculate whether strong political parties which value cooperation, bargaining, mutual support and social solidarity might not, if sexism were not a factor, provide a more likely recruitment channel for women than the currently loosely organized parties which require "self-starting" candidates to enter primaries. Similarly, it is tempting to speculate whether a parliamentary system in which leaders work their way up in close contact with members of their parties might not be more advantageous for the recruitment of women than the electoral "free for all" characteristic of contemporary U.S. politics. Feminists, as we mentioned above, frequently propose nonsexist education (in the most general sense of education) as a means to equalize participation of women and men in the public arenas. When it comes to equalizing biological differences, however, it may be worth asking whether nonsexist education may not turn out to be reflective of the dominant ideology's emphasis on equal opportunity and the "open door." To educate female and male children equally has the potential to equalize culturally determined differences between the sexes, and we do not wish to dismiss that lightly. Equal

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education, however, may be insufficient to equalize whatever biological predispositions may be present. Like the equal rights amendment, equal education does not address the potential need for compensatory training to provide that those who reach the "open door" are equally capable of competing in the structures beyond the door. In the face of potential sociobiological evidence of overlapping differences between the sexes, what is the reform feminist to do? One tactical, political approach is to coopt from sociobiology the concept of the overlapping variability of the characteristics of each sex, and use it in conjunction with the U.S. ideological emphasis on individualism to undermine the tendency among the general public and decision makers to think in starkly dichotomous terms about the sexes. Once the notion "men are this way, women that way" is eroded, the inappropriateness of legislating differently for the two sexes may become more apparent. A tactical advantage in this approach is that one is asking neither the public nor a policy maker to deny female/differences. One is asking that a smaller, and much more probable, step be taken: recognition of such differences as existing but not differentiating all women from all men. There are, however, severe shortcomings in this approach. It is fine when seeking the repeal of laws discriminating on the basis of sex. It is less useful when seeking positive action to accomplish equality of individuals' potential for success in the public arenas, in terms other than individual freedom. Even if the U.S. did not have a tradition of a limited government separate from the private sphere, policies designed to compensate those with fewer of the behavioral or personality characteristics found related to success in the public arenas would have to identify those individuals to be compensated. The biological sciences in general, and sociobiology in particular, because its explanations are at the population level, are not in a position to identify individuals who should receive compensatory training. An emphasis on individualism may also undermine reform feminist recruitment efforts for membership in their own groups. To some extent, reform feminists' quest for recruits has succeeded as individuals have recognized sex as the basis for discrimination and have developed an "out group consciousness."36 Making the individualism argument to the larger public, and reverting to an argument based on women as an identifiable group when seeking converts, are tactically difficult and may lead to inconsistencies in the ideological approach. If reform feminists also argue that their own

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groups ought to be non-hierarchically structured because women have different political modes of operation than men, they will be caught in the additional apparent illogic of asserting to outsiders female similarity with males while internally asserting the importance of the difference. In contrast to the tactic of coopting the assertion of overlapping variations between the sexes is the tactic of emphasizing the average differences between females and males.37 Feminists have made such arguments—that women ought to be "let in" to the political and economic arenas because they are different from men, that women's more humane or humanitarian approach to problems would "clean up" or reform politics or the economy.38 But, this approach falters if the very structure of the public arenas is itself built on characteristics more likely to be found among men than among women. Without reform of the structures of the political or economic arenas, the goal of equal participation of women and men is only approachable, not realizable, unless a government of limited power can be convinced to engage in compensatory education and training of the disadvantaged group. It is clear, we believe, that the hypotheses derived from the evolutionary perspective provide one element of a challenge to the apparent assumptions about human nature in the dominant ideology and to the capacity of a political structure resting on that ideology to allow for completely equal participation of females with males in the public arenas. It is not so clear, however, that sociobiological hypotheses suggest that radical feminists are more correct in their assumption that women are inherently and completely different from men. That assumption may be no more a complete "match" for female human nature than the dominant ideology's apparent assumption that all (male) potential participants in the public arenas are equally competitive and aggressive. This is not to say that feminist ideology should not include organizational structures presumed to be more compatible than current structures with female characteristics. Within feminist groups, non-hierarchical organizations, for example, may serve either as a philosophical commitment to egalitarianism or as a consciously selected tactical maneuver designed to compensate for the lack of training in assertion which has been the experience of many women. A less hierarchical arrangement of the larger political and economic spheres than is now in evidence may well be a desirable philosophical goal. But, one should not expect such organizational forms

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to function without understanding that one may be attempting to overcome biological predispositions, any more than one expects complete equality to result from opening the present structures. Some groups that engaged in the past in non-hierarchical organizational forms were beset by the emergence of leadership despite their avowed antagonism to such hierarchical behaviors. Frequently, the leadership seemed invidious in form, in part because it was foisted upon the groups by media selection of "stars," but also in part because it sometimes operated covertly.39 There is a sociopsychological explanation for the emergence of such organizational hierarchy and leadership; but we believe attention to the sociobiological hypotheses above may provide a more complete explanation. Such an explanation may serve to allow feminists to understand what may appear to be group disruptive behaviors, not as signs of philosophical, ideological failure or as insufficient control of prior socialization, but as the emergence of "normal" behaviors which may be influenced by specific compensatory education. If we observe a ritualized dominance hierarchy as one mechanism for reducing intra- or inter-group conflictual behaviors, those feminists who are formulating new structures may be more alert, not only to the need for some other method of conflict resolution, but also for some mechanism of compensatory training for individuals to work within that new structure. In addition to offering hypotheses that the political capabilities of humans are likely to be more varied across potential public participants—especially when one includes both women and men—than those anticipated by the founders of the U.S. ideology, and less varied between men and women than assumed by radical feminist challengers to that ideology, sociobiology offers insights and support to many assumptions which underlie the policy proposals of reform feminists. Feminists have challenged the traditional notion that the rearing of children is solely the private responsibility of the mother of those children.40 The sociobiological concept of parental investment may contribute to the evidence underpinning that challenge. It may also serve to highlight the varying forms of parental investment as well as the possible relationship of those forms to the age of the child.41 Policy proposals for paternal responsibility in child rearing may be improved by sponsors who recognize that "normally" paternal investment may occur less when children are very young than when they are older. In Sweden, for example, where it is governmental policy to recognize and encourage equal parental roles by offering partial pay

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for parental leaves of absence, primarily when children are quite young, fewer fathers than mothers accept the opportunity.42 There is a ready economic explanation: females typically lose proportionately less of the family income taking time from their generally lower-paying jobs than males do. An additional factor may, however, be the average father's relatively lower interest in parental investment at that time. A policy which allowed more individual choice in exercising the interchangeable parental roles throughout the youth of the child might go further toward securing the stated political goal of equal parental involvement with offspring. Recognition of such "natural" propensities may also lead policy evaluators away from discarding a program simply because it does not produce the desired precisely equal division of labor. Feminists, as we mentioned earlier, have also demonstrated that the so-called "traditional nuclear family" is a rather recent historical invention. Sociobiological hypotheses which relate the normal form of social organization for a species to the environmental constraints under which the species evolved may be adduced in further support of that contention. Emphasizing the environments in which certain behaviors evolved calls attention to the much changed contemporary environment and the need for conscious political strategies adapted to this new environment. The link between political or economic environments and the private family sphere may become somewhat clearer from a sociobiological perspective. Similarly, the link between the young and adults other than biological parents may be somewhat clarified from a sociobiological perspective. Selection is thought to result in the evolution of investing behaviors displayed toward other (often young) individuals who share some identical genes as a result of common descent.43 Such investment benefits the RS of the younger individual directly and of the older individual indirectly. In non-human primates, "alloparenting," behaviors through which adults of either sex but usually females care for the young, are well documented.44 Such reasoning and evidence may be added to arguments that, given the contemporary reduced probability of consanguineous involvement with children, culturally constructed substitutes—such as societal responsibility for child care—are needed for the welfare of the child. The shift of focus from the mother's economic rights to the child's capacity to function in the larger system may increase the probability of securing policy change within the dominant ideology. Feminists will probably find sociobiological theories and data of

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more use in clarifying their own thinking than in arguing for changed public policy. It is likely that many decision makers who have strongly socialized views of appropriate gender roles are also likely to be hostile to arguments for change based on evolutionary theory. There is no reason, however, that reform feminists may not coopt whatever explanations are of use to them for their own ideological prescriptions and then use whatever language is more appropriate in public arguments for their policy positions. CONCLUSIONS We have intentionally not defined the somewhat vague terms which we have used to refer to the personality and behavioral characteristics which may have evolved similarly and differently for female and male humans. Sociobiology points the direction for research into those characteristics and differences; but the work on human beings has barely begun. For the purpose of our argument, it is sufficient that sociobiology leads us to expect a more variable "human nature" than that implied in the dominant political ideology in the U.S. We are not led to expect that each single individual will have the same tendency toward, or predisposition to, learn such behaviors as dominance, deference, assertiveness, altruism, aggressiveness, nurturance, cooperation or competition—however those terms may be operationalized. Neither are we led to expect that females, on average, will possess those characteristics in exactly the same degree as males, on average. To the extent that those characteristics are related to success in politics and economics, public arenas structured for a different and homogeneous set of participants will discriminate against those lacking requisite characteristics. We could be making much the same argument in absence of sociobiological theory and data. We need not posit inherited differences and similarities between the sexes to argue that women have had different socialization and learning experiences than men, or to argue that the results of socialization and learning do not clearly differentiate women and men into two separate, non-overlapping groups. We do not need to posit inherent differences between the sexes to argue the intransigence of culturally prescribed gender roles which keep women from equal participation in the public arenas. Our description of the dominant political ideology in the

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U.S., and explanation of how it discriminates against those who are different from the political participants assumed by the Founders, will hold regardless of the source of the differences. Yet, a focus on possible biological, evolutionary origins for the differences between females and males can serve to emphasize the immensity of the task facing reform feminists in their search for equality in the public arenas. We hope to have made clear that the short term interests of reform feminists are probably threatened by any findings that females and males are inherently different. Reform feminists will find it easier to gain legal equality, at least, if they can argue that women are no different from men. We hope also to have shown that it would be to the long range advantage of reform feminists to admit there may be evolutionarily and genetically-based behaviors, and sex differences in those behaviors, and to incorporate that possibility into their ideology. The existence of such biologically-based sex differences in behaviors may require prescription of differently structured political and economic arenas or at least compensatory public policies in order to achieve the goals of equality. Reform feminists would be aided in this endeavor were sociobiologists and other students of animal behavior more alert to reform feminist arguments that politically (and economically) relevant activities are not limited to those implied by the dominant ideology.45 Sociobiologists, enthologists and their popularizers (perhaps because they, if in the U.S., are as unconsciously socialized as anyone to the dominant ideology) seem to think that politics encompasses only leadership, power, conflict, hierarchy, defense and aggression. They emphasize "man, the political decision maker." 46 They may be falling prey to the temptation to define politics solely by these indicators and then to reify the definition, overlooking many cooperative, noncombative, acquiescent, persuasive or subordinate behaviors which may well be part of a more inclusive definition of politics and more related to the "glue" which holds a society together. There is little doubt that sociobiology may be misread as one more theory justifying the structure of privilege long after the utility of that structure is past. But, we feel that alone is not reason to discard it.47 Few scientific theories are inherently more sexist than the scientists who interpret them or the popularizers who disseminate them. Not to recognize and deal with biological factors

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evolved for a very different sort of life may itself by maladaptive. Survival—and reaching the goal of equality—may depend on using the cultural and political potential humans have genetically acquired to adapt successfully in a changing environment. REFERENCES 1. Charlotte G. O'Kelly labels such research "partially . . . a backlash to feminist demands and successes . . . an attempt to find scientific justification for the Western sexual stratification system. See her Women and Men in Society (New York: D. Van Nostrand, 1980), p. 29. See also Naomi Weisstein, "Tired of Arguing About Biological Inferiority?" Ms., 11 (November 1982), pp. 41-42 + ; Sarah Blaffer Hrdy, The Woman That Never Evolved (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1981), pp. 1-3. 2. See Nancy Tooney, "The 'Math Gene' and Other Symptoms of the Biology Backlash," Ms., 10 (September 1981), pp. 56, 59. 3. David P. Barash, Sociobiology and Behavior (New York: Elsevier North-Holland, Inc., 1977), p. 310. 4. Two near-definitive studies of this phenomenon are Philip E. Converse, "The Nature of Belief Systems in Mass Publics," in Ideology and Discontent, ed. David Apter (New York: Fred Press, 1964), ch. 6; Sandra L. and Daryl J. Bern, "Case Study of a NonConscious Ideology: Training the Woman to Know Her Place," in Beliefs, Attitudes, and Human Affairs, ed. D. J. Bern (Belmont, California: Brooks/Cole, 1970), pp. 89-99. 5. Susan Kay's thinking on the origins and content of the dominant ideology was stimulated by the following works: H. Mark Roelofs, Ideology and Myth in American Politics: A Critique of a National Mind (Boston: Little, Brown, 1976); Roberta Hamilton, The Liberation of Women: A Study of Patriarchy and Capitalism (Winchester, Massachusetts: Allen and Unwin, 1977); Zillah R. Eisenstein, The Radical Future of Liberal Feminism (New York: Longman, 1981). 6. On this point see also Jean Bethke Elshtain, Public Man, Private Woman: Women in Social and Political Thought (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1981), ch. 3, esp. pp. 116-31. 7. We are more concerned with equality at elite levels of participation than at mass levels. There are only small differences between men's and women's political participation at the mass level. See Susan Welch, "Women as Political Animals? A Test of Some Explanations for Male-Female Political Participation Differences," American Journal of Political Science, 21 (November 1977), 711-30. 8. See Mark Roelofs, Ideology and Myth in American Politics. He would argue that such policies stem from the Protestant heritage which, although never completely integrated with the dominant capitalist heritage, emerges at periods of intense humanitarian concern only to subside when some minimal action, without fundamental change, seems to have been taken to correct the immediate problems. We suggest that the incomplete merger of the two heritages explains why U.S. respondents sound more traditionally capitalist on broad, general survey questions and more economically liberal on specific policies. They may respond from either set of traditions. This incomplete integration may also explain inconsistency within sets of responses or across time if people vacillate between ideological approaches. See Lloyd A. Free and Hadley Cantril, The Political Beliefs of Americans (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1968); Everett Carl Ladd, "Opinion Roundup," Public Opinion, 4 (February/March 1981), 19-31. (If we are correct, ideology has greater impact among the mass public than suggested by Philip Converse, "Belief Systems.") In addition, evidence of conventionally defined ideology among the U.S. electorate is increasing. See Norman H. Nie, Sidney Verba, and John Petrocik, The Changing American Voter, enlarged edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1979), pp. 110-73.

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9. For example see Patricia Huckle, "The Womb Factor: Pregnancy Policies and Employment of Women," in Women, Power and Policy, ed. Ellen Boneparth (New York: Pergamon Press, 1982), pp. 144-61. Marian Lief Palley points out that feminists have had more policy success seeking role equity than role changes. We would suggest the former presents more nearly public questions in our terminology, and the latter more nearly private. See Palley's "Beyond the Deadline," PS, 15 (Fall 1982), 588-91. 10. For example see Rita Mae Kelly and Mary Boutilier, The Making of Political Women (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1978). Kelly and Boutilier apply a Maslovian psychological development model (in which adult personality is partly explained by personality characteristics developed as early as infancy in the satisfaction of biological needs), in the context of varying family structure, to explain the degrees to which women enter elite political roles. 11. On this point see also Vernon Van Dyke, ' 'Human Rights and the Right of Groups,'' American Journal of Political Science, 18 (November 1974), 725-41. For those who suggest affirmative action represents evidence of a "group right," we would counter that, unless it is in the form of court-mandated quotas, it merely opens the door for individual advancement. 12. See for example Ann Bowman, "Physical Attractiveness and Electability: Looks and Votes," forthcoming Women & Politics, 4:1. Cf. Idy B. Gitelson and Alan R. Gitelson, "Adolescent Attitudes Toward Male and Female Political Candidates: An Experimental Design," Women & Politics, 1 (Winter 1980/1981), 53-64, who find less discrimination against female candidates from adolescent "voters." 13. See Jean Elshtain, Public Man, Private Women. 14. See Roberta Hamilton, The Liberation of Women. While unlikely to consider herself a "reform" feminist, Hamilton details the differences between feudal and capitalist families. See also Sheila M. Rathman, Women's Proper Place: A History of Changing Ideals and Practices 1870 to the Present (New York: Basic Books, 1978). 15. This particular categorization of types of feminism is not uncommon. A useful discussion of it can be found in Claire Knoche Fulenwider's Feminism in American Politics: A Study of Ideological Influence (New York: Praeger, 1980), pp. 24-30. 16. On non-hierarchically structured groups see Joan D. Mandle, Women and Social Change in America (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton Book Co., 1979), pp. 171-73; Jo Freeman, The Politics of Women's Liberation (N.Y.: McKay, 1975), pp. 103-29. On inherent differences see for example Shulamith Firestone, The Dialectic of Sex (New York: Bantam Books, 1970), especially pp. 205-42 on "freeing women from the tyranny of their reproductive biology.'' 17. Alice J. Dan, in her part of several authors' contributions to "Viewpoint: Considering 'A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting,' " Signs, 4 (Summer 1979), 695-717, quotation at 698, recognizes that "many feminist researchers believe it is counterproductive to focus on sex differences." Dan suggests: "If we value ourselves, however, we must develop theory about our biological differences and not merely devalue them" (pp. 698-99). 18. E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975). 19. Ibid. 20. Michael Ruse, Sociobiology: Sense or Nonsense (Boston: D. Reidel Co., 1979). 21. Ibid. 22. See Alexander Rosenberg, Sociobiology and the Preemption of Social Science (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1980), who states: "this genetically allowed variation in behavior is so great that no stateable laws about individual behavior can be discovered" (p. 177). 23. R. D. Alexander and K. M. Noonan, "Concealment of Ovulation, Parental Care, and Human Social Evolution,'' in Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior: An Anthropological Perspective, ed. N. Chagnon and W. Irons (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1979), pp. 436-53. 24. Charles Darwin, On the Origin of Species (London: John Murray, 1859); The Descent of Man and Selection in Relation to Sex (London: John Murry, 1871). 25. Ibid.

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26. A. J. Bateman, "Intrasexual Selection in Drosophila," Heredity, 2 (December 1948), 349-68. 27. R. L. Trivers, "Parental Investment and Sexual Selection," in Sexual Selection and the Descent of Man, ed. Bernard Campbell (Chicago: Aldine, 1972), pp. 136-79, quotation at p. 139. 28. Ibid. 29. Ibid. 30. Ibid. 31. See for example R. B. Hames, "Relatedness and Interaction Among the Ye'kwana: A Preliminary Analysis," in Evolutionary Biology and Human Social Behavior, ed. Chagnon and Irons, pp. 238-50. 32. E. O. Wilson, Sociobiology: The Abridged Edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1980), pp. 137-45; Sarah Hrdy, The Woman That Never Evolved, ch. 6; Alison Jolly, The Evolution of Primate Behavior (New York: Macmillan, 1972), pp. 169-74. 33. For example Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, The Imperial Animal (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1971), p. 48, admit female hierarchy, calling it "not as clear and more volatile," and then proceed several pages as if males alone were in hierarchy. See also Robert Ardrey, African Genesis (New York: Dell Publishing Co., 1961), pp. 108-18, who certainly seems to imply only male hierarchies. 34. For various N.O.W. strategies see National N. O. W. Times, the newsletter of the National Organization for Women. 35. Stephen J. Wayne, The Road to the White House: The Politics of Presidential Elections, post-election edition (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1981), p. 194. 36. Audrey Seiss Wells and Eleanor Curti Smeal, "Women's Attitudes Toward Women in Politics: A Survey of Urban Registered Voters and Party Committee-Women," in Women in Politics, ed. Jane Jaquette (New York: Wiley, 1974), pp. 54-72. See also Janet K. Boles, "Building Support for the ERA: A Case of Too Much, Too Late'." PS, 15 (Fall 1982), 572-77, especially p. 577, where Boles suggests knowledge that ratification was remote may have stimulated membership in N.O.W. 37. There is then the problem of self-fulfilling expectations, as Marian Lowe mentions in her critique, "Sociobiology and Sex Differences," Signs, 4 (Autumn 1978), 123. 38. William Chafe, The American Woman: Her Changing Social, Economic, and Political Role, 1920-1970 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1972), pp. 12-14; Aileen S. Kraditor, The Ideas of the Woman Suffrage Movement 1890-1920 (New York: Doubleday, 1965), pp. 51-53. Both of these references are to the early twentieth century, but the reader may recall similar arguments in the 1974 aftermath of Watergate and the slogan "Clean up politics; elect women." 39. Jo Freeman, The Politics of Women's Liberation. See also her "The Tyranny of Structurelessness," in Women in Politics, ed. Jane Jaquette, pp. 202-14. 40. For example see Jill Norgren, "In Search of a National Child-Care Policy: Background and Prospects," Western Political Quarterly, 34 (March 1981), 127-42; for a later version see Ellen Boneparth, Women, Power and Policy, pp. 124-43. 41. Compare our perspective on the parenting behaviors which can be expected from males to that of Alice Rossi, who suggests females will have an easier time than males learning child care behaviors. See her "A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting," Daedalus, 106 (Spring 1977), 1-31. For the reactions of several authors to Rossi's argument see "Viewpoint: Considering A Biosocial Perspective on Parenting," see note 17 above. 42. Annika Baude, "Public Policy and Changing Family Patterns in Sweden 1930-1977," in Sex roles and Social Policy, ed. Jean Lipman-Bluman and Jesse Bernard (Beverly Hills, California: Sage Publications, 1979), pp. 145-75. See also Letty Cattin Pogrebin, "A Feminist in Sweden: I Have Been the Future and It (Almost) Works," Ms., 10 (April 1982), pp. 66, 69-70+. 43. W. D. Hamilton, "The Genetical Evolution of Social Behavior, Parts I and II," Journal of Theoretical Biology, 1 (July 1964), 1-52.

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44. Thelma E. Rowell, et al., "'Aunt'—Infant Interaction in Captive Rhesus Monkeys," Animal Behavior, 12 (2-3, 1964), 219-26. But see Sarah Hrdy, The Woman That Never Evolved, pp. 97-98, for the suggestion that the infant does not always benefit. 45. Nancy McWilliams, "Contemporary Feminism, Consciousness Raising, and Changing Views of the Political," in Women in Politics, ed. Jane Jaquette, pp. 157-70. See also Glendon Schubert, "Sexual Differences in Political Behavior," in Male-Female Differences: A Biocultural Perspective, ed. Roberta Hall (New York: Praeger, forthcoming). 46. For example see Lionel Tiger and Robin Fox, The Imperial Animal, pp. 50, 129, 134. 47. See Elizabeth Rice Allgeier and A. R. Allgeier, "Sociobiology, Learning Theory, and Feminism: Parallel Perceptions About Human Sexuality?" Journal of Communication, forthcoming.

The Biopolitics of Sex: Gender, Genetics, and Epigenetics Glendon Schubert

ABSTRACT. Contrary to the environmental determinism presumed by most social science commentators, and to the genetic determinism propounded by advocates of hardcore "sociobiology," the position of this paper is the transactional, epigenetic approach commonly accepted in the life sciences. For the study of humans, this last approach requires a focus upon the reciprocal effects between genotype and both physical and sociocultural environments throughout development. Discussed are: the biology of human sexuality, sex roles and political behavior. The conclusion proposes the development of political models and practices that will take better advantage of the characteristic differences between female and male brains in political thinking and behavior, and that will require a major reversal of the contemporary ratio in sex representation in political roles. According to Donald Symons,1 an anthropologist, "information about human sexuality comes from anthropology, sociology, psychology, economics, biology, psychiatry, history, fiction, autobiography, and personal experience." Political science is conspicuously absent from his list; and this we may, not unreasonably, infer to reflect the view—no doubt widespread among other social scientists as well as among biologists—that political science writing on gender politics has nothing to do with sex. I think Symons is right; and I think the reason political scientists provide no information about human sexuality, in their work on gender politics, is that they do not study sex. Indeed, many social scientists (and even some biological scientists) seem confused about the difference between sex and gender. I hope that, whatever else I may accomplish in this paper, at least I succeed in explicating the difference. Glendon Schubert is a Professor of Political Science at the University of Hawaii at Manoa. The author wishes to thank Eloise Buker, James Dator, Deolores Nabkel, Glenn Paige, and Phyllis Turnbull for helpful comments and suggestions on the initial draft of this paper. © 1984 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.

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Lauren Harris states "we are past the stage—or should be—of arguing whether human variation is a product of nature or nurture." 2 In political science, however, we clearly are not beyond the potential for argument premised on the nature/nurture dichotomy.3 I do agree that we should be; and the intended purpose of this paper is to argue the necessity for a transactional approach to the study and practice of the politics of sexual equalitarianism. Such an approach is well exemplified by Anne Peterson,4 who discussed a transactional model of sex-related differences in human biopsychosocial development, which she then relates to empirical research on cognition and personality, as does Judith Bardwick.5 What we ought to be considering is how nature predisposes nurture—and, with equal emphasis, how nurture impinges upon and makes explicit the possibilities inchoate in nature—in the development of human, like all other, organisms.6 To assert with Aristotle that by nature humans are political animals,7 is to accept the conjoint influence of both culture and biology upon human nature;8 and this acceptance means that either environmental or biological determinism is equally onesided, incomplete, myopic and bound to be at best a partial and inadequate explanation of human behavior, including human political behavior.9 As one who has not hesitated to condemn the shortcomings of biological determinism,10 I feel an equally strong obligation to criticize monistic claims in behalf of exclusively cultural explanations for existing sexual differences in political behavior. The academic world of political science remains trifurcated among devout environmental determinists, an equally devout but primarily biologically trained cohort of genetic determinists, and a large middle group of skeptics whose socialization has been almost exclusively to a non-biological social science perspective, yet who are sensitive to their own psychophysiological needs and capacities. This paper is addressed primarily to that plurality, subsuming the persons who occupy the middle ground. In such an approach, it seems necessary to begin with a discussion of "what is sex?" Zella Luria, a psychologist at Tufts, states that "what we come to identify as male and as female are . . . two overlapping biological ranges . . . [and therefore] male and female behavioral ranges also show such overlap . . . [and] are wide within both sexes . . . [, which] is widely accepted within all cultures"11 (emphasis in the original). Similarly, Deborah Waber, a psychiatrist at The Children's Hospital Medical Center in Boston, asserts that "the question of biological bases for sex-related differences can be more

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fruitfully approached if one conceptualizes the sexes as differentially arrayed along continuous biological dimensions."12 Anne Petersen, a psychiatrist at the University of Chicago, presents such a conceptualization with a graph of an inverted U-curve based on empirical data for the dimensions of sex in relation to spatial ability, commenting with regard to her sexual dimension:13 androgynous is used here to mean intermediate between extremely masculine and extremely feminine when these are placed on a continuum. With psychological androgyny, traits are considered to be masculine or feminine and an individual who possesses both kinds of qualities is considered androgynous. With somatic characteristics, it is unlikely that an individual would have both extremely masculine and extremely feminine appearance. Hence, we hypothesize a single dimension.14 Because we shall subsequently consider the interrelationship between sex and laterality (infra), we may note the corresponding observation of Louise Carter-Saltzman, a psychologist at the University of Washington, that "people do differ in the extent to which their right or left hand dominates in manual activities, . . . and there is an increasing tendency to classify individuals along a continuous dimension of hand preference for various tasks." 15 Clearly the biological point of view posits not a nominal dichotomy, but rather a set of pairs of intersecting continuous variables. What are the relevant pairs of variables for which differentiation by sex ("sexual dimorphism") might have some political significance? SEXUAL DIMORPHISM "In all known populations," according to Roy D'Andrade, males differ from females not only in primary sex characteristics, but also in secondary characteristics, males tending, on the average, to have greater height, more massive skeletons, a higher ratio of muscle to fat, more body hair, etc. However, these differences hold only within particular populations; sex typing on the basis of secondary characteristics from unknown populations is extremely unreliable.16

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As defined by Robert Goy and Bruce McEwen,17 the term dimorphism refers to the existence of two distinct forms within a single species. The term sexually dimorphic behavior, by extension, implies two different forms of behavior exhibited by the male and female. These same authors also summarize three generalizations propounded by Anke Ehrhardt, a psychologist at the Psychiatric Institute of Columbia University, formerly John Money's principal associate at Johns Hopkins in much of the basic research on which her statement is based: First, gender role behaviors, which by definition are different but overlapping between males and females, are subject to influences of prenatal hormones and are determined independently of genetic sex, sex of rearing or of gender identity. Second, gender identity is always concordant with sex of rearing and is the variable most strongly dependent on social environmental factors. Third, the outcome of prenatal virilization or of other disturbances of sexual development is not homosexuality.18 In this context virilization means androgenized and is intended quite literally as the development of such psychological characteristics as clitoral enlargement or labial fusion,19 or of such probable psychological structural effects as enlarged cortical lateralization.20,21 Goy and McEwen also elaborate on some of the processes involved in postnatal sexual development of prenatal hormonally-disturbed individuals: The term "defeminization" has been adopted and widely used to refer to hormonal effects involving the suppression of female-typical behavior in genetic females only. The term "masculinization" is now generally reserved only for hormonal effects involving the enhancement of male-typical behaviors in genetic females. For the genetic male, complementary terms of "feminization" and "demasculinization" have been brought into usage . . . The real advantage of the use of [these] terms . . . lies not alone in the conceptualization of these as independent processes. The use of these terms encourages questions about spontaneous bisexuality that might be overlooked with a different theoretical framework.22

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Sex versus Gender Sex is a biological term that relates to the fundamental reproductive strategy of a species,23 gender an analytical concept for that most quintessentially cultural of sciences: linguistics.24 In his classic work on The Philosophy of Grammar, Otto Jespersen25 has a chapter on "Sex and Gender." But, before reaching it, he discusses syntatic categories, making the point that (for example) in Semitic languages gender is an attribute of verbs as well as nouns; while in Aryan languages only nouns (and pronouns) have gender.26 Jespersen27 distinguishes between the gender of grammar, which has syntatic words in the categories masculine, feminine and neuter and the sex of nature, which has notional categories for male or female beings, and for sexless things. Among the many examples that he proffers, I have selected the following:28 Hamitic languages are classified, first by "compromising names of persons, of big or important things, and of males," and second, by reference to small things, and females . . . [thus] A woman's breast is masculine, a man's (because smaller) feminine . . . Words . . . are in one language masculine, in another feminine." The arrangement is chaotic and presents no one single criterion. "It is better," says Jespersen, "to keep sex and gender apart than to speak of 'natural and grammatical gender,' as is often done." 29 Mary Ritchie Key, in her more recent book on Male/Female Language, remarks that Indo-European languages, save the Armenian, categorize their linguistic systems along masculine and feminine grammatical lines. In some the gender system is very prominent—every tree, table, chair, and stone has either a masculine, feminine, or neuter assigned to it. In others, such as English, the gender system is evident only in a few pronouns.30 My colleague James Dator (who taught, and did research in political science for six years in Tokyo) informs me (personal communication) that no gender/sex designations are to be found in the Japanese language: "In fact, it is difficult even to indicate the sex of the person you are talking about (etc.) even if you want to indicate it . . . Ah, but status; that is indicated in almost every word; certainly every sentence." Key purposely distinguishes gender and sex in his study, using the terms feminine and masculine for gender-based references and male and female for sex-based ones.31 Not least, the Encyclopaedia Americana32 states that:

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GENDER, . . . in grammar, is a means of classifying words based on characteristics such as sex (masculine, feminine, or neuter), manner of existence (animate or inanimate), and rank in the scale of creation (as, rational or nonrational). Any of these classes would be called a gender of the language . . . Grammatical gender is an arbitrary and irrational classification that often has nothing to do with objective fact . . . In Old English, the word for "woman" is masculine, and word for "maiden" is neuter. Today, even such political concepts as "motherland" and "fatherland" are neuter, in the sense that they have lost their gender. Once the sex/gender dichotomy is postulated, sex tends to be understood to imply genetic determinism; at the same time gender is taken to suggest an exaggerated presumption of cultural determinism. The position taken here is that the only standpoint consistent with contemporary research in the field of the biology of human sex differences is one that is transactional and epigenetic: that very little of human differences and similarities is to be explained either as genetically determined, or as culturally determined. Almost all will be found to involve the reciprocal effects, developmentally (from conception onwards), of genotype through phenotype in relation to environment—and vice versa.33 Such an integrationist paradigm demands a common language if discourse for the discussion of both genetic and epigenetic effects; and this requires us to eschew gender in favor of sex—whatever may be its biocultural setting. The androgynization of cultural roles—that is, sexual egalitarianism—ought to be undertaken in the light of realistic recognition of the relative advantages and disadvantages that either maleness or femaleness implies for the optimal—or even the satisfying—performance of particular roles. Whether females ought to be obligated, be required, or have a constitutional right to miliary service as front-line infantry combat troops (to invoke the anachronistic but extremely popular example), or to selection as President of the United States, on the basis of parity with—or perhaps in preference to—males, both such matters should be dealt with as empirical questions. It is entirely possible that women can outperform men in most military roles, and particularly those in support of tactical nuclear or space satellite warfare; and it seems hard to believe that women would not have done at least as well as the majority of male U.S. Presidents during the twentieth century—and can be expected to do

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far better than men during the twenty-first, for reasons to be considered below. A practical argument in favor of referring to sex as gender—an innovation promulgated by John Money a generation ago—is that to do so is in tune with such current usage. For example, the recent book entitled Sex-Related Differences in Cognitive Functioning, edited by Michele Wittig and Anne Petersen, "had its beginnings during the organization of a symposium, the 'Determinants of Gender Differences in Intellectual Functioning,' which was presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Association in 1976."34 Perhaps it was more politic to call sex "gender" for purposes of the APA program; but it was also more scientifically useful and correct to speak of sex instead of gender, and of cognition instead of intellect, and to get rid of determinancy, when it came to publishing the book and an appeal to a broader, more interdisciplinary scientific audience. There is a problem in such gross inconsistency in the use of gender terminology by its friends, social scientist and biologist alike. Thus Roger Masters, a political scientist, states that "The gender of offspring, like all other traits, is subject to natural selection"; 35 his reference is incorrect on both of the underlined scores. Sex, not gender, is subject to natural selection—and at that, is subject to only very weak selection pressure, at least in the human species during recent millenia. Moreover, relatively few of the species traits—by no means all—are subject to natural selection, because selection pressures have long since ceased with regard to most specific traits, for reasons made clear by Charles Boklage (below). Confusion in this area is by no means limited to political and other social scientists. Ehrhardt, a long-time and leading psychologist authority in the field of the biology of sex differences among humans, has criticized the semantic confusion rampant across several disciplines in the use of gender conceptualism, for which her recommended solution is to refer "to gender identity as the basic identification with one sex or the other." 36 But if gender identity means sex identity, why would there not be a gain in clarity, to say nothing of parsimony, to call "the basic identification with one sex or the other" simply sex identity? This, indeed, is the policy supported by Eleanor Maccoby, an equally long-time and leading psychologist authority in the field, who has explained that she prefers "to reserve the term sex role for the sociological definition: a set of expectations held by others for the incumbent of a position."37

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Alternatively, her colleague, Beatrix Hamburg asserts that "'Sex role' is a modal term that describes the clusters of behaviors that are performed characteristically or more frequently by one sex rather than another."38 The International Political Science Association has designated its relevant research committee as one on "Sex Roles and Politics."39 The present paper follows the definitional practices favored by Maccoby, Hamburg, and the IPSA. Genetic Variation There are many genetic sex-linked differences, including some of critical importance to the survival of the species (e.g., gamete production). The importance of certain others may be less intuitively obvious, and more dependent on environmental effects for optimal development. Spatial ability, for example, is a recessive genetic trait depending upon epigenesis for its expression or suppression.40 But, most sexual differences are in relation to an overwhelmingly preponderant communality of structures, function and behaviors common to the species genotype. As Boklage has explained: "Genomic" includes "genetic," but goes beyond it, in that most of the genome is not polymorphic . . ., not subject to the Mendelian segregation of viable variants, and thus not capable of showing effects that can ever be defined as genetic. Evolutionary change leading to speciation is necessarily genetic at its inception and throughout the operation of selective forces, but the achievement of speciation implies the fixation of basic species-specific traits into a nonsegregating, hence, "nongenetic" condition.41 Interestingly, from conception on, males are apparently more vulnerable than females to "environmental insult and developmental difficulty"42—including culturally instigated insult and difficulties.43 Can an underlying cause be found to explain this pervasive male vulnerability? Perhaps it is due to the fact that, unlike the female, to differentiate a male morphologically, physiologically and neurologically, androgen must be present in sufficient amount and at the appropriate times. If androgen is not available, demasculinization or feminization may ensue. Since male development is more complex than female development, it follows that there are more oppor-

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tunities for an error to be made. A second possibility, not mutually exclusive of the first, is that the male Y chromosome carries much less genetic information than the second X carried by the female. Due to less information on the Y chromosome, sex-linked characteristics such as color-blindness, baldness and hemophilia are more common in males than females. Thus life-long vulnerabilities found in males can most probably be traced back to one or both sources of maleness: androgen and the Y chromosome. A final contributing factor may derive from the much more narrow definition of masculinity than feminity in Western cultures and consequent rigidity in rearing male offspring.44 Hormones Sexual differentiation begins with the presence of a Y chromosome in a fertilized ovum (because it has been penetrated by a male gamete carrying a Y chromosome, as about half of spermatozoa do). The presence of the Y chromosome in the cells of the developing fetus causes male ovaries to form; these testes secrete androgens that virilize the developing fetal brain. For most genetic males the result is a phenotypic male infant at birth.45 But, Richard Green comments that: the pioneering work [of the Oregon Field Primate Research Center Group, here represented by the writings of Goy and McEwen] demonstrated that just as androgenic (male) hormones differentiate the basically female genital structures in a male direction, the same potential for hormonal action exists within the brain. These findings are frequently overlooked by those who point only to postnatal socialization as affecting sextyped behaviors. These "social scientists" would like to see [such neuro-endrocrinological] findings . . . erased from the passages of scientific history.46 A recent discussion in Science points out that "the characteristically different circulating concentrations of male and female steroid hormones in men and women appear to be partial determinants of certain sexually dimorphic behaviors, interacting in a complex way with psychological and socio-cultural factors as well as with other biological factors." This complex interaction is emphasized by findings about the presence of testosterone and aggression

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in males, about emotion and the menstrual cycle in females, and also about sex role reversal at puberty in pseudohermaphrodites.47 Milton Diamond and Arno Karlen have concluded that observation of certain hormones revealed a consistent hormonal difference between homosexuals and heterosexuals.48 Contrary to Sigmund Freud's culturally-premised theory that the female form is secondary to the priority and primacy of the male template, the relevant biological facts are, as Maggie Scarf has explained, in the absence of interfering factors such as testosterone, that: the fetus would always develop along female lines . . . Nature ha[s] some fundamental bias in favor of producing females. Femaleness thus could not be—as Freud had suggested—some state of incompleted maleness; it appeared to be the basic form of life . . . [and] testosterone must not only be present in utero in order for normal male differentiation to occur; it must be present during a sensitive "critical" period. Thus, "testosterone by its presence or absence sets [a] behavioral potential; and posnatal experiences are actually acting upon a physiologically biased substrate"49 as exemplified by Dawson's statement (to which emphasis has been added) ''of the inability of younger male children to align the vertical with the body" 50 until increased testosterone corrects this perceptual difficulty at puberty. Brain Lateralization It is also the case that the specific hormonal catalyst provoking relatively extreme cortical lateralization51 in the male brain—and consequently also in male thinking and behavior—is testosterone, which is responsible for male aggressiveness as well as for male reproductive behavior, per se. Indeed, "homosexual men may possess, at least in part, a predominantly female-differentiated brain, possibly based on androgen deficiency during brain differentiation."53 It is claimed that sufficient information has now become available to consider the male and female brain "as basic biological variants of brain type." 54 Further, it has been asserted that "females and left-handers have similar cerebral organization." 55 A review of the recent research literature concludes that there are

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three leading hypotheses, for all of which there is considerable support: 1. Right hemisphere lateralization takes place earlier in males. 2. Left hemisphere language lateralization is greater and begins earlier in females, while bilateral spatial representation takes place in males. 3. The male eventually equals and then surpasses the female in degree of left-hemisphere lateralization so that in adulthood, language is bilaterally represented among females. The overall consequence is greater lateralization in males. Recent work57 confirms Jeannette McGlone's58 finding concerning "the positive case of the test-specific laterality effect": that for males but not for females left-hemisphere damage significantly reduces scores on verbal tests and right-hemisphere damage significantly reduces scores on nonverbal tests. Petersen reports on a study of Deborah Waber, to the effect that: later maturing males and females tended to be better at spatial ability than verbal ability; the brains of later maturing subjects were also more lateralized. Similarly, early maturing subjects showed verbal superiority and less lateralization. Since girls mature physically about 2 years earlier than boys, girls will tend to be verbally superior and spatially inferior and their brains will tend to be less lateralized than those of males. Waber's hypothesis is intuitively appealing as it organized much of the existing evidence into a single explanation for both males and females.59 In other words, it is that most characteristically human of perhaps all of the evolutionary constraints in the species genetype60 neoteny, that influences strongly the typically greater lateralization of human male brains. The relevant findings have been summarized as follows: The male brain is more lateralized for both verbal and spatial cognitive processes; these functions are more bilaterally organized in the female brain. In addition, certain verbal-linguistic processes are more efficient in the female pattern (i.e., verbal fluency, fine motor coordination), whilst the male configura-

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tion is superior for those processes least prone to verbal mediation (i.e., the transformation of spatial images or figure/ ground gestalt discrimination). These effects are independent of cultural influences . . . but they are age-dependent, becoming more evident at puberty. Thus their origin is to be found in those androgen-mediated neurohumoral interactions which in the third month of intrauterine life determine both anatomical and cognitive sexual differentiation—an embryological priming that becomes reactivated at puberty . . . The female brain . . . [is] more symmetrical than the male.61 From an ontogenetic point of view, females will develop righthemisphere language facility earlier, while males are developing right-hemisphere spatial facility, so that males later overdevelop left-hemisphere language control.62 Females appear not to achieve the equivalent of male right-hemisphere spatial development because of a pre-commitment of part of the right hemisphere for language development. Phylogenetically male left-hemispheric imbalance can be viewed as yet another instance of male vulnerability—a price paid for manipulospatial survival skills dependent on relatively greater and earlier male right-hemispheric development.63 Epigenetic Variation Symons characterizes humans as "a species with only moderate sex differences in structure," but one which nevertheless "exhibits profound sex differences in psyche. "64 He observes that it is typical for "monogamous" mammals to evince few secondary sex differences,65 and for pair-bonded monogamous mammals to be characteristically hyposexual—so humans must be atypical, at least in the latter respect.66 Diane McGuinness asserts that "large differences between the sexes consistently appear in certain sensory, motor, and cognitive tasks . . . [and] in all studies where a sex difference is observed, males show greater 'laterality' than females."67 Jeannette McGlone adds that ' 'most children prefer the right hand for writing and other skilled motor acts, but there are more right-handed girls than boys . . . Among right-handers, girls show more consistent preferences for the right side and greater relative right-handed superiority in strength and dexterity than do boys." 68 Marian Annett69 concurs. It should not be assumed that any of these differences

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is a consequence of direct genetic determination. Very much to the contrary, as Reinisch and associates emphasize: The data presented implicate gonadal hormones in the processing or perception of sensory information. Thus, it is possible that due to the differences in the endocrine systems of males and females during the prenatal, perinatal, and postpubertal phases of life, there is a differential sensitivity to and perhaps differential processing of sensory information. Such sensitivity and processing differences are a function of genetic and thereby of gonadal and hormonal sex. Expressed simply, such differences may underlie many, if not all, of the sexrelated differences described in the behaviors of animals and humans.70 Females are uniformly more advanced than males in the maturational rate of neuro-motor functions.71 Males tend to have better spatial skill than females; no more than a fourth of all females surpass the average performance of males on a variety of tests. The better and best males outperform the better and best females, in a variety of spatial tasks ranging from chess to tennis.72 Harris73 reports that for girls intellectual development is linguistically mediated, whereas for boys nonverbal skills are much more important.74 Eleanor Maccoby and Carl Jacklin suspect that differences in social relations—"boys travel in larger groups whereas girls more often establish close friendships in twos (or sometimes threes)"— reflect upon the existence of dominance patterns.75 Maccoby and Jacklin also remark that hormonal influences affect ''the amount of [aggressive] behavior (including fighting, rough-and-tumble play, and threat behavior), during childhood, and the way sex hormones produced at adolescence and adulthood will affect the individual. " 76 They conclude that differences between the sexes in the expression of aggression are basically a cross-cultural phenomena, with boys physically and verbally more aggressive.77 The latter is, however, a finding to which at least one political scientist has taken exception. John Dearden78 reports that boys are more aggressive than girls in every way except in speech. Political scientist Denise Baer has reasoned that "if testosterone causes sexual and aggressive behavior, it should do so in both men and women," and produced research supporting her reasoning.79 Among those she cites is Harold Persky who found that "relation-

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ships between testosterone and aggression persisted at testosterone levels that are approximately 25 times lower [for women] than those found in males of comparable age." 80 By implication, females are much more sensitive, in their responsivity to testosterone, than males with much smaller amounts of the hormone producing equivalent levels of aggression—at least up to a point. This is possibly the case, as Persky speculated, because of the absence of a servoregulatory control for testosterone in women, resulting in greater end-organ responsivity despite the lower plasma level. Baer also makes the interesting suggestion that "assertive behavior is likely to be most effective in situations of dispersed power—such as in democratic politics—whereas aggressive behavior would not." 81 This hypothesis finds support in the recent findings of another biopolitical scientist, James Schubert.82 Persky also reported that plasma testosterone levels showed a marked elevation (of, on average, almost 50%) at midcycle for his subjects, who were healthy young female undergraduates.83 Contrary to both the folklore and a substantial amount of scientific writing about menstrually caused female anxiety, depression, hostility and irritability84 these coeds were not so much as moderately emotionally disturbed individuals. Menopausal changes in hormone production are just as important to human development as are those of the first trimester of pregnancy and of puberty. The effects of mid-life hormonal decrements are toward androgynization for both sexes. According to Goy and McEwen: older women become more assertive and confident while older men display softened, more nurtural qualities. The consequence of these age-related changes is a lessening of sex differences, and this fact raises questions regarding the explanation that sex differences are exclusively based on social training and sex role expectations. Long decades of reinforcement and training have preceded the blurring of gender [sic] differences in old age. The increased hormonal differentiation of the sexes beginning in puberty and its lessening in the postmenopausal and postclimacteric years are a more "efficient" explanation than the socialization theory commonly offered by social scientists. Reinforcement and learning theories are not powerful explanatory concepts for the menopausal reversals in behavior and personality.85

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SEX ROLES Reproductive Behavior Anthropologist Donald Symons argues that there are huge modal differences in the "sexual feelings" of men and women, and that these differences can best be explained in terms of the evolutionary history of the species and the extraordinarily different constraints upon and opportunities for reproduction typically experienced by human males and females. The result has been that males seek to maximize diversity in their mating behavior, females do not. With or without grounds, males more than females tend to be sexually jealous. Males become sexually aroused at the very sight of females; not vice-versa. Males experience "autonomous desire for sexual intercourse" and base sexual desirability primarily on youth and appearance. In Symon's judgment86 few sex differences affecting sexuality are reciprocal between the sexes; such differences frequently disrupt the bonds of matrimony; and in general the effect of sexuality is to divide rather than to unite men and women. This pessimistic view impels Symons to the conclusion that: there is a female human nature and a male human nature, and these natures are extraordinarily different, though the differences are to some extent masked by the compromises heterosexual relations entail. Men and women differ in their sexual natures because throughout the immensely long hunting and gathering phase of human evolutionary history the sexual desires and dispositions that were adaptive for either sex were for the other tickets to reproductive oblivion.87 Diane McGuinness, in her review of Symon's book, moderately emphasizes differences: "The sexual needs and proclivities in males and females are similar." She continues, "but each operates under a different set of constraints."88 An emphasis unlike Symons' is provided by Julian Davidson, whose discussion of the details of physiological response in human copulatory behavior, for both males and females, results in a much more androgynous description of human sexuality than tends to characterize most discussions of the subject. Females as well as males experience erection (for example), and there are many other shared aspects of the general vasocongestion affecting the pelvic

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region. Penile erection (and consequently male potency) is in no sense an isolated mechanism that functions solely to make insemination biologically possible; instead, it is associated with a complex syndrome of other physiological events, including psychoneurological factors. Potency applies also to females, who can copulate but cannot fully experience arousal and orgasm without it.89 Although clinicians describe the major sexual dysfunction of males as impotence, and that of females as anorgasmy, this does not imply a truly physiological sex difference. Many of the cases of anorgasmy must be due to a failure of physiological changes that are necessary conditions to the onset of orgasm, so that many cases of supposed anorgasmy are really instances of female impotence, a condition "not yet adequately recognized in our male-dominated society because it does not preclude coitus, unlike make impotence." 90 Indeed, Davidson continues, "the only major physiological differences in the sexual response between men and women relate to anatomical differences and to differences in reproductive function—intromission and insemination versus receptivity and conception." Even in that respect, the "physiologic similarities in [both] genital and particularly extra-genital autonomic and somatic effects far outweigh the differences in sexual response between the sexes. We do not know of any sex differences in the neuromuscular components of sexual activity."91 Davidson reports that when confronted with the task of endeavoring to identify the sex of the authors of verbal descriptions of orgasmic experiences, a panel of judges who evaluated the protocols was unable to make the differentiation, thereby attesting, according to Davidson,92 to the close resemblance of the orgasmic experience in men and women. Even the female prostate may not be entirely vestigial; and if it is indeed found to be secretory, at least in some females, then that would remove "the last barrier to consideration of the hypothesis that no qualitative differences exist between the male and the female sexual response."93 Davidson also points out that "it is . . . not reasonable to suppose that . . . [sexual] physical sensations are mere epiphenomena of emotional experience . . . The dual role of the sexually responding tissues as receptors and effectors makes it possible to view physical sensations in sex simultaneously as cause and effect . . ." 94 Further, this supposition may not be limited to sexual sensations. On a more cultural level, Beatrice Whiting, a Harvard anthropologist (and author, with John Whiting, of Children of Six

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Cultures), testifies "I know of no [human] society where copulation is public." 95 Her ethnographic knowledge on this subject is limited to field observations, because of a widespread entertainment phenomenon, ranging in time from the earthy burlesque of an earlier day, to the "sex acts" that can be viewed today (for a price) in locales as diverse as Copenhagen and Honolulu. It is reported that "in no human society are all sexual relationships casual and impersonal." 96 This formal, adult relationship exists in contrast to the great majority of other mammalian species, for which pair-bonding is either absent or a relatively temporary affair. Of a pessimistic note is the somewhat rhetorical question of why humans select the mates they do for long-term alliances, the reply seems to be "Mainly because they're what's available."97 Nurturant Behavior Diane McGuinness puts it most succinctly: "females are nurturant and empathetic,"98 unlike males. The physiological bases for such behavior are described by Goy and McEwen: Infant crying stimulated oxytocin secretion in the mother than triggers uterine contractions and nipple erection preparatory to nursing. Females show pupil dilation when shown pictures of a baby while males do not. These and other research findings are consistent with the theory that there are two innate orientations to the female—one involving sexual attraction to men and the other a care-giving attachment to the child—while the male has only the innate sexual attraction to the female and learns most parenting behavior from females.99 Evelyn Reed was commenting upon research on simians, but there is no evident reason why her epigenetic logic should not apply also to humans, in her remark that the effect of the mother's involvement in child care activities is to render "the females the more intelligent, capable, and resourceful sex. " 100 On the other hand, and more generally, John Ehrhardt has argued that "child custody claims by heterosexuals against homosexuals or transsexuals are based on no evidence that heterosexuals are better parents." 101 Several studies have commented upon the relative failure of Israel's ideologically based social experiment in sexual social egalitarianism—using the Kibbutzim as instruments for the elimina-

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tion of sexual differences in familial, economic, and political roles alike. The failure has been attributed primarily to the insistence of women upon close association with their own respective infants and young children; their preference for the performance of traditional wifely household tasks over work in the fields; and their aversion to their equal opportunity to share in the public interest roles of governing the collective farms.102 Equally persuasive systematic evidence to the contrary does not seem to be available, for any society; but in the absence of replication of the Kibbutzim findings, on a cross-cultural basis, it is possible that the critics of those findings are correct in their refutations: the Kibbutzim were never more than enclaves within a primarily deeply traditional society. Majoritarian conflicting role models were continuously impinging upon the consciousness—female and male alike—of the subjects of the experimentation. Social Roles The orthodox social science position has been well stated by one of its leading proponents, Lawrence Kohlberg, in his assertion that ' 'basic sex-role stereotypes . . . lead to the development of masculine-feminine values in children."103 In the not unreasonable and more recent reformulation of Sharon Nash, ' 'among the most salient social factors we are exposed to are sex-role prescriptions regarding appropriate and inappropriate behavior. Social psychological explanations should be viewed as supplementary to biological explanations of intellectual sex-related differences."104 Thus, for example, the natural disadvantage in verbal skills such as reading, under which most males labor because of their greater cortical lateralization, is frequently exacerbated because of the not uncommon cultural prejudice that reading is a "feminine activity" in which boys are not expected to excel. Such sex-role prescriptions are likely to vary, in both intensity and extensiveness, across cultures.105 On the other hand, a naive but popular view is that there is no fundamental bias in the battle of the sexes, that all symmetries are the products of arbitrary cultures. Anyone who seeks support for this view in the ethnographic literature will be disappointed. Many asymmetries between the sexes are so cross-culturally consistent that we cannot reasonably maintain that they are arbitrary . . .

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Not only is polyandry rare but it never entails a simple reversal of the relationship between the sexes found in polygynous societies.106 Previously remarked upon is the tendency, confirmed for a number of cultures and settings as a real behavioral difference, for boys to form numerically larger groups than girls. Dominance is apparently a greater issue for boys' than for girls' groups." 107 Economic Roles Pierre Van den Berghe claims that "in virtually all societies, men have monopolized war, hunting, fishing, and running public affairs, and women have primarily nurtured young children . . ., carried water, gathered fuel, harvested fruits and nuts, and transformed food for general consumption."108,109 Lila Leibowitz adds that "the one method of systematic hunting in which contemporary peoples usually observe a standardized division of labor along sexual lines is that in which hunters . . . track, pursue, and kill big, mobile animals. Women rarely take part in this sort of hunting.110 Further, it has been asserted111 that the relevance of sex to the division of labor in any human society is one of the few great generalizations of cultural anthropology. Sex typing is ostensibly always strong for certain important economic and ritualistic activities in all societies, although which functions are selected for such sex-typing does vary across cultures. More generally, often the same activity will be assigned to females in some cultures, to men in other cultures, and not typed according to sex in still other cultures. But, to the extent that sex typing of economic roles exists, its almost universal effect is prejudicial to females. Van den Berghe claims that economically, "women in industrialized societies are the most exploited group, a massive and permanent proletariat in the literal as well as the conventional sense."112 Further, as Harris explains, the study of sex differences in human cognition is so politicized, both within and outside the scientific community. Among other unfortunate effects of this politicization has been the making of many uninformed social pronouncements about sex differences in society . . . there are those who, noting the neuropsychological evidence, will see the differences in sex . . . technical-scientific fields as biologically fitting and

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therefore both fundamentally immutable and socially justified. Their counterparts on the other side, rejecting the same evidence, will see the same differences as purely and wholly an accident of our social history, and therefore unjust and changeable—complete parity of the sexes in every field of human endeavor being the ostensible goal. Surely, neither position is defensible.113 POLITICAL BEHAVIOR Evolution ''The public forum is a male forum," says Evelyn Reed,114 quoting Lionel Tiger's Men in Groups, "in which females do not participate."115 It has also been argued that "men are everywhere the more political sex," 116 "although individual women may outrank individual men, men as a group invariably wield more power and status than do women."117 Has it always been this way? Not according to Evelyn Reed, who has argued forecfully for the Morgan/Marx/Engels view of matriarchy as a major contributor to human political evolution.118,119 As Reed summarizes her position: Contrary to current myths about their status, women have not always been the inferior sex they are today. In the beginning the females were the advantaged sex; they were the mothers, responsible for the survival of the species. Unlike males . . . females could bond together for the protection of themselves and their offspring. This nurturing, cooperative trait enabled females to make the great advance from the maternal brook in the animal world to the maternal clan system in the human world. . . Yet, it is commonly believed that no evidence exists to support the existence of matriarchies.120121122 Attitudes Both culturalists, and biologists agree that there are many often basic differences in the outlooks of women as compared to men; disagreement arises over why sexual differences in attitudes exist. A typical social science finding is that sex role stereotypes about male

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competition are positively valued, more so than is the case for stereotypes of females. Nonetheless young girls themselves regard the characteristics of their sex and positively ascribe negative characteristics to males.123 For another example, females, unlike males, are found to be attracted to males sharing beliefs. Men are not similarly attracted.124 A more characteristically biological type of hypothesis is that at the most basic level, it is possible that environmental stimuli have different "meanings" for males and females. Thus, it may be that males and females are essentially quite different creatures whose perceptions of the world differ markedly, even when confronted with similar physical environments.125 Denise Baer reports on a finding ' 'that political parties were more salient groups for boys than for girls." 126 Ann Bowman found in regard to candidates that "for males, physical attractiveness and electability are highly associated. For females, a strong negative relationship exists. Thus attractive women bear an extra burden in campaigning for public office."127 Both male and female evaluators indicated voting support more for attractive male than for attractive female candidates, but females tended to accept physical attractiveness of both male candidates and female candidates more than did male raters—that is, females were more favorably impressed with attractive male candidates, but they also reacted less negatively than men to attractive female candidates. Baer also reports that female respondents tend to be less psychologically involved in politics, according to various studies investigating political culture and participation in mass publics.128 Such important studies as that by Angus Campbell, et al.,129 concluded that women were involved in politics less than men because of the women's lesser sense of "political efficacy"—an assertion that to anyone other than a political psychologist might smack of tautology. But, such indices as "political efficacy" scores were diligently tracked through time by the University of Michigan enterprise. Political efficacy scores increased for employed women, soaring from a base close to that of housewives in 1952, to a level almost on a parity with men twenty years later. Over time the scores for the housewives actually decreased.130 Moreover, after 1960 employed women almost equalled men in their participation in campaign activities. On the other hand, although admittedly these findings are

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based on studies of 20 to 25 years ago, women tended to be less supportive of political parties as agencies for representing conflicting interests; women were opposed to war, and also to the use of force to resolve civil disorders and social problems; women were less tolerant of civil liberties and minority rights; and even college educated women tended to conceptualize politics in ideologized and especially in public benefit terms. Moreover, females in positions of party leadership were less ambitious than men in such roles, for personal power, prestige and influence; the females were less selfreliant in decision making; and they were less interested in public office holding. The authors of all of the above studies are males; and their investigations were made before the escalation in political feminism during the past two decades. Replications today have revealed different and more precise findings about the levels of female political consciousness. A recent study reports that ' 'not only are working women more aware of feminism than housewives, they also react more favorably to it," 131 because women employed outside of the home perceive feminism to be more in their self-interest than do women whose exclusive employment remains inside their homes. Consequently, gainfully employed women are more supportive of feminism"132 than housewives and men. Actually, these data show that unaware working women demonstrated in 1976 the same level of support as aware men,133 a finding which suggests sexual differences in perceived self-interest independent of the reinforcement provided by the feminist movement. Undoubtedly feminism entails negative effects for some men, but there are also such effects for women because ' 'the diffusion of feminist ideology among working women made them more sensitive to discrimination in the market place and, as a result reduced the satisfaction they felt with their lives." 134 But what is perceived to be negative psychologically may well be politically positive.135 Another recent study by Virginia Sapiro, is based on data for a cross-cultural survey of the attitudes of political party members, classified by sex. Men saw less opportunity for young adult women "to succeed in life" than did women, in the United Kingdom, France and Italy; only in West Germany did women see less opportunity for women than did men. So, in three of the four countries surveyed, men gave more feminist replies than women did. However, only for France did the political party variable scale (left equals least opportunity perceived), but there it did so independently

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for both male and female respondents.136 What these data seem to show is a low correlation between feminist and more general political ideology (at least as dispersed among the rank and file of political party members), as well as slight female support for feminism, in the major countries of Western Europe today. In Canada, Jean Laponce137 reported that, for a group of undergraduates, females indicated more conservative political party preference than males; but females indicated less support than males, in a nonpartisan election, for the "official" candidate sponsored by the prevailing establishment.138 Masters claims that it is "the least secure groups in American society that are most likely to consider abortion illegal under all circumstances, and to oppose drafting women in the armed services." On these and related issues, positions such as the above are typical among non-white, less educated, lower income, less well employed respondents who are found in rural areas.138 The specified attributes must highlight the gap between the social characteristics of the political masses and like-minded political elites, because they proffer a poor fit for either the Reagan Administration or the justices of the United States Supreme Court, both of which have been quite conspicuously positioned in the vanguard when it comes to such policy choices as limiting abortion to those who can afford it and refusing to legalize the military service of women on the same basis as men. In a study of the political participation of Norwegian women, William Lafferty139 reports that: the primary political effects of [female] culture in terms of attitudes and values are manifest in a general lack of political interest on the part of women: a lack which can be traced to preadult socialization. Otherwise, the effects of the culture appear to rest solidly in the role expectations and role competence accompanying the partriarchal division of labour and its organizational infrastructure. Of greatest importance here, is the other-directed caring associated with the female mode of domestic labour, and the effects this seems to have on occupational, organizational, and political choice . . . [This study] indicates an explanation of sexual variance in political involvement on the basis of three interrelated aspects of the female experience: first, a tendency to be socialized away from traditional "politics" during early socialization; second, a with-

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drawal from nearly all types of extra-familial involvement during the early phases of marriage and childrearing (the exception being activity in other-directed service associations); and, third, a systematic channelization into "female" activity areas which are both weak in influence in their own right, and without the political "spin-off" effects attaching to activity in male-dominated occupational organizations.139 Several empirical findings about sexual differences in U.S. political participation are reported by Baer. The virtual equality between service by women and by men in community-level affairs is often explained on the basis of the positive correlation between the functions of local government, and the components of the traditional nurturant female role. The same explanation is offered for the large disparity between female and male participation in campaigns and other elite political activities, which are seen as demanding "a high toleration of conflict, a high psychological involvement in politics, and a sophisticated orientation and conceptualization for optimally successful role performance"140 On a hopeful note: "studies of politically active individuals have found that once women cross the threshold into political activity, women tend to be more active than men." 141 This finding suggests that the feminist strategy is probably correct: by making more women aware, and by reinforcing their comprehension of existing sexual differences in political participation, more women than before may become catalyzed into the role of political activist. CONCLUSION The attitudes and associated behaviors relating to both aggressiveness and sexual potency in primate males are transactionalized in the brain in complex ways that we are only beginning to understand.142 The male attitudes and behaviors that define the major problems of both international and domestic politics, on a global basis, are mixed up with male aggressiveness and sexuality as well as with the bifurcation in structure and function of the male brain. What we most need in my opinion, is a less male (e.g., lateral ized) theory of politics. Our present theories reflect largely the tendencies toward polarization and dichotomization that come readily to the type of mind that was naturally selected for human males. Up to 10,000 years BC, those males lived in habitats where their task was to cooperate together in small groups of related individuals, in con-

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frontation with large animals and an often hostile natural environment. To encounter a strange human male was to confront the most dangerous enemy of all. The ethnocentrism and group paranoia, the fear of strangers, the reliance upon physical strength to both achieve and justify social superiority, all may have made good sense for males confined to life in hunting bands. Today, however, the only wild animals, and either prey or predators, that most humans can conceivably confront are other humans. This expands enormously the possibilities for defining other humans as enemies. Certainly, such primordial attitudes and behaviors describe well the relationships among the "major powers," 143 the other principal industrialized countries; and those third-world aspirants that emulate to the extent possible the role models supplied by the "firsts" and "seconds." Equivalent bifurcations often are conceptualized to catalyze social divisions among classes or subcultures within a political society; and the "enemy within" usually is deemed to be and treated as far more dangerous than the outlander. How might models of politics based on the female brain differ? They would place much greater emphasis upon a search for the solution to social conflict, by means of reliance upon language and verbal skills in lieu of competition to demonstrate physical superiority in the exercise of gross motor skills. There would surely be reinforcement of the holologic approach in political thinking,144 and hence of more complex and better integrated consideration of the working out of the interrelationships of consequences, in considering the multifaceted dimensions of questions of biosocial as well as of economic policy. The natural abilities of the female brain to integrate across multiple sensory modalities, and to make balanced use of the capacities of both cerebral hemispheres, ought to be highly facilitative of hological political thinking. The major contribution that women have made to political activist nuclear protest groups such as the Clamshell Alliance has been described: The widespread sympathy for pacifism (44 percent) and feminism (50 percent) registered among Seabrook demonstrators is consistent with ideology prevalent in Clamshell since its founding in 1976. From that time to the present, the Alliance has taken increasingly explicit anti-militarist positions, including a 1977 revision of the group's manifesto, "Declaration of Nuclear Resistance," to include a demand for an end to nuclear weapons spending and the endorsement of a series of

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disarmament protests in 1978. Feminism has been an important influence on the ideology and decision-making style of numerous activist groups over the past decade, among them the Clamshell Alliance. Many feminists have promoted decision-making styles which seek to overcome hierarchy and male domination in political groups. This has been particularly evident in Clamshell. Much of the effectiveness of such groups may be due to their decentralized, democratic, heterogeneous organizational structure.145, 146 It is far too narrow a goal for a humanitarian public policy, to delimit the politics of sex by equating it with the elimination of the discrimination against either sex, or against any position on hypothesized sexual continua of economic, social, psychological, legal or political rights. Given the wide variation in cognitive and associated behavioral traits that, according to contemporary brain science, distinguishes human females from males, notwithstanding even greater variation within each sex (including their substantial region of communality and overlap), I believe it ought to be the case that in addition to the many political roles that can be played with acceptable ability by either women or men, there are other political roles that women ought to be deemed far more biologically qualified than men to fill. Many might join the author147 in preferring to have a female U.S. President, for example, and not least because hers would be the hand on the hot-line in the event of either a fail-safe scenario or an escalating nuclear confrontation. Certainly this would be an attractive alternative to the status quo, in which the incumbent is a gun-collecting male who deems guns an especially appropriate gift to bestow upon foreign military autocrats.148 It is not even impossible that there may be some political roles for which males are better qualified, biologically and especially neurologically, than females. One obvious way to implement the female brain model of politics will be to reverse what has long been perceived to be the natural order of political hierarchy, which heretofore has been understood to require males in virtually all important elite political roles, assigning women to primarily non-policy-relevant and non-executive positions as clerks, typists and office cleaners. Reversal of that structure will put predominantly females in the policy and executive roles, and predominantly males in the more menial capacities. Evidently this will raise, among other questions, that of what other sex-

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linked differences, in human social behavior, are entailed by the proposed reversal in roles? In the process of substituting female for male brains in policy roles, would we be throwing baby out with the bath? It can be argued, in the light of the political evolutionary experience considered above, that there are strong genetically-based physiological reasons why any policy of female political dominance can have no chance for successful implementation. On the other hand, humans already are well advanced into a maladapted feedback cycle which we are destroying, at an exponentially escalating pace, the very habitat to which we are biologically adapted—the habitat to which we are psychologically adapted having already disappeared.149 If that be true, the most self-destructive thing we as a species can do is to continue to fail to disrupt the feedback loop, reinforced as it is by our continuing (and virtually unmitigated) efforts to seek aggressive, competitive, hunting-band men-in-groups solutions to the social, economic and political problems that beset us globally as a species. It is true that a nuclear war will probably break the loop, but it is likely also to become the instrument for demonstrating with finality how poorly adapted our species was. Promoting the assumption by women of not merely a larger, not just an equal, but a predominant role in political affairs may not break the loop either. But, it might. And, it proffers a far less dangerous and costly alternative for political action, than does either conservative defense of the status quo, or the radical escalation of male power politics that counsels despair by usually touting such escalation as the only viable direction in which change can conceivably take place. The alternative proposed here is the conceptualization of political relationships, and also their praxis, in ways closer to those terms in which females think and behave (instead of, as at present and in the past, the way males do). This alternative is likely to lead to a less hostile, more cooperative and better integrated definition and practice of politics. NOTES 1. Donald Symons. The Evolution of Sexuality (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979), p. 66. 2. Lauren Julius Harris, "Sex Differences in Spatial Ability: Possible Environmental, Genetic, and Neurological Factors," in Asymmetrical Function of the Brain, ed. Marcel Kinsbourne (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1978), p. 406.

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3. See Manfred Henningsen, "Comments on Some Implications of Evolutionary Biology for Political Science," Occasional Papers in Political Science 1:2, 82-85 (Honolulu: University of Hawaii at Manoa, Department of Political Science). 4. Anne C. Petersen, "Biosocial Processes in the Development of Sex-Related Differences," in The Psychobiology of Sex Differences and Sex Roles, ed. Jacquelynne E. Parsons (New York: Hemisphere/McGraw-Hill, 1980), pp. 31-55. 5. Judith M. Bard wick, Psychology of Women: A Study of Bio-Cultural Conflicts (New York: Harper, Row, 1971). 6. Beatrice Whiting, "Contributions of Anthropology to the Study of Gender, Identity, Gender Role, and Sexual Behavior," in Human Sexuality: A Comparative and Developmental Perspective, ed. Herant A. Katchadourian (Berkeley: University of California Press) pp. 320-31. 7. See Glendon Schubert, "Biopolitical Behavior: The Nature of the Political Animal," Polity, 6 (1973), 240-75. 8. Roland Pennock and John W. Chapman, eds., Human Nature in Politics (New York: New York University Press, 1977) 9. Glendon Schubert, "Ethological Politics," paper presented at the annual Association for the Advancement of Science convention, Washington, D.C., 1982. 10. Glendon Schubert, "The Sociobiology of Political Behavior," in Sociobiology and Human Politics, ed. Elliott D. White (Lexington, M: D.C. Heath/Lexington, 1981), pp. 193-238; Glendon Schubert, "Infanticide by Usurper Hanuman Langur Males: A Sociobiological Myth," Social Science Information, 20 (forthcoming). 11. Zella Luria, "Psychological Determinants of Gender Identity, Role and Orientation," in Human Sexuality, ed. Herant Katchadourian, pp. 163-93. 12. Deborah Waber, "Cognitive Abilities and Sex-Related Variations in the Maturation of the Cerebral Cortical Functions," in Sex-Related Differences in Cognitive Functioning: Developmental Issues, ed. Michele Wittig and Anne Petersen (New York: Academic Press, 1979), pp. 161-86. 13. Anne C. Petersen, "Hormones and Cognitive Functioning in Normal Development," in Sex-Related Differences, ed. Michele Wittig and Anne Petersen, p. 205. 14. Ibid. 15. Louise Carter-Saltzman, "Patterns of Cognitive Functioning in Relation to Handedness and SexRelated Differences," in Sex-Related Differences, ed. Michele Wittig and Anne Petersen, pp. 97-118. 16. Roy G. D'Andrade, "Sex Differences and Cultural Institutions," in The Development of Sex Differences, ed. Eleanor Maccoby (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1966), pp. 173-204 (emphasis added). 17. Robert W. Goy and Bruce S. McEwen, Sexual Differentiation of the Brain (Cambridge, Massachusetts M.I.T. Press, 1980), p. 1. See also Beatrix A. Hamburg, "The Psychobiology of Sex Difference; An Evolutionary Perspective," in Sex Differences in Behavior, ed. Richard C. Friedman, Ralph M. Richart and Raymond L. Vande Wiele (New York: Wiley, 1974), pp. 373-92. 18. Robert Goy and Bruce McEwen, Sexual Differentiation, p. 58. 19. Anke Ehrhardt and Susan W. Baker, "Fetal Androgens, Human Central Nervous System Differentiation, and Behavior: Sex Differences," in Sexual Differences, ed. Richard Friedman et. al., pp. 33-51. 20. Susan W. Baker and Anke Ehrhardt, "Prenatal Androgen, Intelligence, and Cognitive Sex Differences," in Sexual Differences, ed. Richard Friedman, et al., pp. 53-76. 21. Susan W. Baker, "Biological Influences on Human Sex and Gender," Signs; 6 (1980), 80-96. 22. Robert Goy and Bruce McEwen, Sexual Differentiation, p. 5. 23. George C. Williams, Sex and Evolution (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1975). 24. Eric Lenneberg, The Biological Foundations of Language (New York: Wiley, 1968).

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25. Otto Jespersen, The Philosophy of Grammar (New York: Norton, 1924). 26. Ibid., p. 53. 27. Ibid., p. 55. 28. Ibid., pp. 227-28. 29. Ibid., p. 226. 30. Mary Ritchie Key, Male/Female Language (Metuchen, New Jersey: Scarecrow Press, 1975). 31. Ibid., p. 79. 32. Encyclopaedia Americana (Chapman: 11). 33. Michele Wittig, "Genetic Influences on Sex-Related Differences in Intellectual Performance: Theoretical and Methodological Issues," in Sex-Related Differences, ed. Michele Wittig and Anne Petersen, pp. 21-65. 34. Michele Wittig and Anne Petersen, Sex-Related Differences, ed., p. xv. 35. Roger Masters, "Explaining 'Male Chauvinism' and 'Feminism': Differences in Male and Female Reproductive Strategies," (this volume, emphasis added). 36. Anke Ehrhardt, "The Interactional Model of Sex Hormones and Behavior," in Human Sexuality, ed. Herant Katchadourian, 115-133. 37. Eleanor Maccoby, "Gender Identity and Sex-Role Adoption," in Human Sexuality, ed. Herant Katchadourian, pp. 194-203. 38. Beatrix Hamburg, "Psychology of Sex Differences," p. 374. 39. Jeanne Marie Col, "IPSA-Sex Roles and Politics Research Committee," PS, 4 (1981), 120-21. 40. Lauren Harris, "Sex Differences" pp. 486-87; Michele Wittig, "Genetic Influences," in Sex-Related Differences, ed. Michele Wittig and Anne Petersen, p. 31. 41. Charles E. Boklage, "The Sinistral Blastocyst: An Embryologic Perspective on the Development of Brain-Function Asymmetries," in Neuropsychology of Left-Handedness, ed. Jeannine Herron (New York: Academic Press, 1980), pp. 115-37. 42. June M. Reinisch, Ronald Gandelman and Frances Spiegel, "Prenatal Influences on Cognitive Abilities: Data from Experimental Animals and Human Endocrine Syndromes," in Sex-Related Differences, ed. Michelle Wittig and Anne Petersen, pp. 215-36. 43. E. M. Widdowson, "The Response of the Sexes to Nutritional Stress," Proceedings of the Nutrition Society, 35 (1976), 175-80. 44. June Reinisch, et al., "Prenatal Influences,", p. 220. 45. See Susan Baker, "Biological Influences" Susan Baker and Anke Ehrhardt, "Prenatal Androgen." 46. Richard Green, "The Behaviorally Feminine Male Child: Pretranssexual? Pretransvestite Prehomosexual? Preheterosexual?" in Sex Differences, Richard Friedman, et al., pp. 301-14. 47. Robert T. Rubin, June M. Reinisch and Roger F. Haskett, "Postnatal Gonadal Steroid Effects on Human Behavior," Science, 211 (1981), 1319. Also see Anke Ehrhardt and Heino F. L. Meyer-Bahlburg, "Effects of Prenatal Sex Hormones on Gender-Related Behavior," Science, 211 (1981), 1312-1617; Florence Ledwitz-Rigby, "Biochemical and Neurophysiological Influences on Human Sexual Behavior," in The Psychobiology of Sex Differences and Sex Roles, ed. Jacquelynne Parsons, pp. 95-104. 48. Milton Diamond and Arno Karlen, Sexual Decisions (Boston: Little, Brown, 1980). Cf Anke Erhardt and Heino Meyer-Bahlburg, "Effects of Prenatal Sex Hormones." 49. Maggie Scarf, "He and She: Sex Hormones and Behavior," in Personality: Biosocial Bases, ed. David R. Heise (Chicago: Rand McNally, 1973), pp. 88-105. See also Robert Goy and Bruce McEwen, Sexual Differentiation, pp. 2-3; John Dawson, "An Anthropological Perspective on the Evolution and Laterlization of the Brain," in Evolution and Lateralization of the Brain, ed. Stuart J. Dimond and David A. Blizzard, Annals of the New York Academy of Sciences, 299 (1977), 432; Peter M. Wolff, "A Difference that May Make No Difference," Behavioral and Brian Sciences, 3 (1980), 250-51. 50. John Dawson, "An Anthropological Perspective," p. 433. 51. Deborah Waber, "Cognitive Abilities," p. 170.

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52. Neil J. MacLusky and Frederic Naftolin, "Sexual Differentiation of the Central Nervous System," Science, 211 (1981), 1294-1303; Stuart Damond and Karlen, p. 229. 53. S. Robert Goy and Bruce McEwen, Sexual Differentiation, pp. 67-69. 54. Stuart J. Dimond, "Concluding Remarks: The Diversity of the Human Brain," in Evolution and Lateralization Stuart Dimond and David Blizzard, pp. 161-79. 55. Katherine Kocel, "Age-Related Changes in Cognitive Abilities and Hemispheric Specialization," in Neuropsychology of Left-Handedness, Jeannine Herron, pp. 293-302. Also see Jerre Levy and J. M. Levy, "Human Lateralization from Head to Foot: Sex-Related Factors," Science, 200 (1978), 1291-92. 56. Lauren Harris, "Sex Differences," pp. 450, 453, 640. 57. James Inglis and J. S. Lawson, "Sex Differences in the Effects of Unilateral Brain Damage on Intelligence," Science, 212 (1981), 693-95. 58. Jeannette McGlone, "Sex Differences in the Cerebral Organization of Verbal Functions in Patients with Unilateral Brain Lesions," Brain, 100 (1977), 775-93. 59. Anne Petersen, "Hormones," p. 207. 60. Cf. Glendon Schubert, "Glaciers, Neoteny, and Epigenesis: A Review Essay," Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 4 (1981), 287-96. 61. P. Flor-Henry, "Evolutionary and Clinical Aspects of Lateralized Sex Differences," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980), 235-36. 62. Cf. Jerre Levy and J. Levy, "Human Lateralization." 63. Beatrix Hamburg, "Psychobiology of Sex Differences," pp. 386-90. 64. Donald Symons, Evolution of Sexuality, p. 21. 65. Ibid., p. 26 Cf. Robert Goy and Bruce McEwen, Sexual Differentiation, p. 44. 66. Donald Symons, Evolution of Sexuality, p. 107. 67. Diane McGuinness, "Review of The Evolution of Human Sexuality. By Donald Symons" Journal of Social and Biological Structures, 3 (1980), 311-16. 68. Jeannette McGlone, "Sex Differences in Human Brain Asymmetry: A Critical Survey," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980), 215-26. 69. Marian Annett, "Sex Differences in Laterality—Meaningfulness versus Reliability," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980), 227-28. 70. June Reinisch, et al., "Prenatal Influences," p. 236. 71. Deborah Waber, "Cognitive Abilities," p. 167. 72. Lauren Harris, "Sex Differences," pp. 405, 408. 73. Ibid., p. 475. 74. Ibid., pp. 425,435, 437. 75. Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin, The Psychology of Sexual Development (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1974), pp. 225-26. Also see Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Sex, Evolution and Behavior (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1978), p. 250-76. 76. Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin, Psychology of Sexual Development, p. 244. 77. Ibid., p. 352. 78. John Dearden, "Sex Linked Differences in Political Behavior: An Investigation of their Possibly Innate Origins," Social Science Information, 13 (1974), 19-46. 79. Denise Baer, "Disentangling Gender Differences: An Inquiry into Biological and Learning Based Explanations," paper presented at the annual Midwest Political Science Association Convention, Chicago, 1980. 80. Harold Persky, "Reproductive Hormones, Moods, and the Menstrual Cycle," in Richard Friedman, et al., Sex Differences, pp. 455-66. 81. Denise Baer, "Disentangling Sex Differences," p. 22. 82. James Schubert, "Malnutrition and Political Violence: Frustration-Aggression or Anemia-Passivity?" paper presented at the Western Political Science Association annual convention, Denver, 1981. 83. Harold Persky, "Reproductive Hormones," p. 464. 84. Alice S. Rossi and Peter E. Rossi, "Body Time and Social Time: Mood Patterns by

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Menstrual Cycle Phase and Day of Week," in Psychobiology of Sex Differences, ed. Deborah Parsons, pp. 269-304. 85. Robert Goy and Bruce McEwen, Sexual Differentiation, pp. 61-62. 86. See also Stephanie Shields, "Sex and the Biased Scientist," New Scientist, 80 (1978), 752-54; Shields, "Nineteenth-Century Evolutionary Theory and Male Scientific Bias," in Sociobiology: Beyond Nature/Nurture?, (Boulder, Colorado Westview Press, 1980). 87. Donald Symons, Evolution of Sexuality, p. 181. 88. Diane McGuinness, "Review." See also Beatrix Hamburg, "Psychobiology of Sex Differences," pp. 381-86. 89. Julian Davidson, "The Psychobiology of Sexual Experience," in The Psychobiology of Consciousness, ed. Julian M. Davidson and Richard J. Davidson (New York: Plenum Press,) pp. 271-332. 90. Ibid., p. 318. 91. Ibid., p. 142. 92. Ibid., pp. 293, 308-09. 93. Ibid., fn. 4. 94. Ibid., p. 288. 95. Beatrice Whiting, "Contributions of Anthropology," p. 326. 96. Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Sex, Evolution and Behavior, p. 266. 97. Ibid., p. 278. 98. Diane McGuinness, "Review," p. 312. 99. Robert Goy and Bruce McEwen, Sexual Differentiation, p. 61. 100. Evelyn Reed, Sexism and Science (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1978), p. 12. 101. Anke Ehrhardt, "Interactional Model," p. 159. 102. Melford Elliot Spiro, Kibbutz: Venture in Utopia, augmented edition (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1975), pp. 122-23, 221-35; Lionel Tiger and Joseph Shepfer, Women in the Kibbutz (New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich, 1975); Pierre van den Berghe, Age and Sex in Human Societies: A Biosocial Perspective (Belmont, California: Wadsworth Press, 1973). 103. Lawrence Kohlberg, "A Cognitive-Developmental Analysis of Children's SexRole Concepts and Attitudes," in Eleanor Maccoby, and Carol Jackman p. 165. 104. Sharon C. Nash, "Sex Role as a Mediator of Intellectual Functioning," in SexRelated Differences, ed. Michele Wittig and Anne Petersen, p. 264. Sex-Related Differences, ed. 105. Ibid., p. 281 106. Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Sex, Evolution and Behavior, pp. 268-269. 107. Ibid., p. 250. See also Eleanor Maccoby and Carol Jacklin, Psychology of Sexual Development, p. 353. 108. Pierre Van den Berghe, Age and Sex, p. 53. 109. Evelyn Reed, Sexism and Science, p. 19. 110. Lila Leibowitz, Females, Males, Families: A Biosocial Approach (North Scituate, Massachusetts: Duxbury Press, 1978), p. 17. 111. Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Sex Evolution and Behavior, p. 248. 112. Pierre Van den Berghe, Age and Sex, p. 110. 113. Lauren Julis Harris, "Lateralized Sex Differences: Substrates and Significance," Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 3 (1980), 237. 114. Evelyn Reed, Sexism and Science, p. 81. 115. Lionel Tiger, Men in Groups (New York: Random, 1969), p. 57. 116. Martin Daly and Margo Wilson, Sex, Evolution and Behavior, p. 270. 117. Pierre Van den Berghe, Age and Sex, pp. 4, 60. 118. Evelyn Reed, Sexism and Science, pp. 114-26. 119. Evelyn Reed, Women's Evolution (New York: Pathfinder Press, 1975). 120. Evelyn Reed, Sexism and Science, p. 122.

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121. Martin Daly and Marge Wilson, Sex, Evolution and Behavior, p. 269. 122. Pierre Van den Berghe, Age and Sex, p. 53. 123. Sharon Nash, "Sex Role," p. 289. 124. Martin Daly and Marge Wilson, Sex, Evolution and Behavior, p. 280. 125. June Reinisch, et al., Prenatal Influences," p. 234. 126. Denise Baer, "Disentangling Sex Differences," pp. 10-11. 127. Ann Bowman, "Physical Attractiveness and Electability: Looks and Votes," Women & Politics, 4:1, forthcoming. 128. Denise Baer, "Disentangling Sex Differences," pp. 4-5. 129. Angus Campbell, Philip Converse, Warren Miller, and Donald Stokes, The American Voter (New York: Wiley, 1960). 130. Denise Baer, "Disentangling Sex Differences," p. 16. 131. Keith T. Poole and Harmon L. Zeigler, "The Diffusion of Feminist Ideology," paper presented at the Western Political Science Association annual convention, Denver, 1981, p. 21. 132. Ibid., p. 25. 133. Ibid., p. 27. See Table 10. 134. Ibid., p. 35. 135. Ibid. See also Denise Baer, "Disentangling Sex Differences," p. 22, James Schubert, "Malnutrition and Political Violence." 136. Virginia Sapiro, "Left, Right, and Center on the Woman Question: Mass Attitudes in France, Italy, West Germany, and Britain," paper presented at the Fourth Annual Scientific Meeting of the International Society of Political Psychology, Mannheim, 1981. 137. Jean LaPonce, "Voting for X: of Men, Women, Religion and Politics: The Use of an Election Experiment for the Comparative Analysis of Conservative Behaviour," Social Science Information, 19 (1980), 955-69. 138. Roger Masters, this volume. 139. William M. Lafferty, "Sex and Political Participation: An Exploratory Analysis of the 'Female Culture,'" European Journal of Political Research, 8 (1980), 323-47. 140. Denise Baer, "Disentangling Sex Differences," p. 8. 141. Ibid., p. 25. 142. Michael McGuire, "Social Dominance Relationships in Vervet Monkeys: A Model for the Study of Dominance Relationships in Human Political Systems,: paper presented at the Shambaugh Conference on Biobehavioral Studies of Politics, University of Iowa, Iowa City, 1980. 143. See Ralph Pettman, Biopolitics and International Values: Investigating Liberal Norms (New York: Pergamon Press, 1981). 144. Ibid pp. 140-46; Meredith W. Watts, ed., Biopolitics: Ethological and Physiological Approaches (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1981). 145. Neil H. Katz and David C. List, "Seabrook: A Profile of Anti-Nuclear Activists, June 1978," Peace and Change, 1 (1981), 59-68. 146. Ibid., p. 67, fn. 20. 147. Glendon Schubert, "Politics as a Life Science: How and Why the Impact of Modern Biology Will Revolutionize the Study of Political Behavior," in Biology and Politics, ed. Albert Somit (The Hague: Mouton, 1976), pp. 186-87. 148. Glendon Schubert, "The Rhetoric of Constitutional Change," Journal of Public Law, 16 (1967), Part IV: "A Proposal for Disarmament." 149. Glendon Schubert, "The Sociogiology of Political Behavior."

Sex, Endocrines, and Political Behavior Dean Jaros Elizabeth S. White

ABSTRACT. While political behavioral differences between men and women appear to have been exaggerated, some continue to be validly observed. Evidence from several disciplines suggests that such differences may be biological in origin, mediated through the endocrine system. Variance in concentrations of certain hormones may have behavioral consequences. Since an experimental test in which these concentrations would be directly manipulated is not feasible, a design was developed which relies on the naturally-occurring hormonal variance of the female menstrual cycle. Subjects responded to a survey instrument and also supplied physiological data including, for women, location in the menstrual cycle. Hypothesized differences in the responses of women experiencing diverse concentrations of key endocrines failed to appear. According to conventional wisdom, men and women are at least partly different kinds of political creatures. Behavioral and attitudinal sexual divergences have been reported for a number of years. Men, we have been told, participate more in certain political activities, especially office holding and occupying leadership roles.1 Concomitantly, they have higher levels of political efficacy and senses of citizen duty.2 Women reportedly are more attentive to local political events than to national or international affairs.3 They also are supposedly more oriented toward candidates' personal characteristics, especially their protective qualities,4 perhaps as a specific manifestation of a general political security orientation.5 Women allegedly display a greater antipathy toward policies employing military force and a lesser support for wars;6 they are more favorably disposed to education, social welfare and minority rights.7 Dean Jaros is affiliated with Northern Illinois University. Elizabeth S. White is affiliated with University of Iowa. © 1984 by The Haworth Press, Inc. All rights reserved.

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There is reason to question the validity of many of these generalizations. Some may have applied to earlier times, if at all. Others, particularly those focusing on leadership positions, are accurate today. Further, at least small relationships consistent with these notions continue to be reported in sources that cannot be accused of anti-feminist bias.8 Explanatory tasks still confront us. To deal with sexual differences, political scientists have in recent years invoked differential socialization patterns or distinctive cultural roles.9 This approach, consistent with the dominant disciplinary paradigms of recent decades, is a valid one. Some sexual differences might originate environmentally. Entertaining this possibility may contribute to better comprehension of behavioral processes. There is some reason, however, to consider an additional explanation which stresses biological roots of male-female political differences. Such an approach risks unpopularity. A great deal of effort is devoted to eliminating women's inequitable political status today. If this status is a result of culture and learning, it can be changed through educational programs and resocialization. If women's status were biological in origin, it might suggest immutability. An appeal to biological explanation could justify the status quo by invoking innate characteristics of the species. Someone attempting such a justification could insist efforts at change are futile and contrary to natural order. Some biological approaches do seem anti-feminist. Ethologists may be quite argumentative about women's social roles;10 other writers have waxed polemical about the biologically ordained inevitability of male social dominance.11 Interestingly, the association of biological thinking and anti-feminist polemics is countered occasionally by attempts to assert female superiority on the basis of inherent, natural qualities.12 More generally, extreme attempts to employ biological rationales for various kinds of elite domination and the resultant political tragedies hardly need comment. However, no such unfortunate implications need attach to biological approaches. Given the acknowledged importance of environmental variables in human behavior, no one can responsibly deny the possibility of social change, no matter how committed to biological interpretations they may be. Indeed, one can argue that any understanding which emerges from biological approaches would facilitate the informed pursuit of development of strategies for social change. Social scientists have paid more attention to

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biology in recent years; sociologists are "bringing beasts back in," 13 while political scientists delve into "biopolitics."14 The reason for this interest may be the great many observations unexplained by the environmental paradigms. Remaining male-female political behavioral differences may parallel sexual differences that other disciplines strongly suggest are biological in origin. Three general categories encompass most of these general sexual differences. First, females often seem to be less overtly aggressive.15 Allegedly this phenomenon occurs across a wide variety of behavior. Women's unwillingness to support wars could be a manifestation of this phenomenon. Second, females supposedly are more nurturant than males.16 Women show more concern with interpersonal relations and with the well-being of self and others; they are more actively sympathetic. Women's response to personal characteristics of political figures, support for social welfare policies, and political security orientation could be direct parallels. Finally, there may be some cognitive differences between men and women. Males are allegedly more reactive to novel or complex stimuli.18 A male drive to act upon or modify the environment is inferred from differential activity levels. Females may react more to immediate than to remote objects in their purview. Reportedly greater male political participation and characteristic female focus on local politics may be consistent with these general observations. Though these parallels are interesting, we still need evidence that the general behaviors in question—even if accurately described— are not learned. After all, we would expect learning differences to be pervasive. There are, however, four bodies of empirical evidence and one theoretical argument which suggest that existing sex differences may have a biological component. To be sure, the evidence and arguments vary in quality and persuasiveness. They have, however, achieved prominence in the scholarly literature and consequently can—and should—serve as the basis for new empirical propositions. First, there is cross-cultural evidence, some of it provided by political scientists themselves. Using Gabriel Almond and Sidney Verba's five-nation data, John Deardon shows greater political responsiveness in men than women regardless of nation.19 National environment does not preclude the impact of sex. Peter Corning and Margaret Mead, among others, note from anthropological literature that males are generally more aggressive than females.20 An in-

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teresting variant of the cultural argument comes from the Israeli Kibbutz. The whole socialization process of these communities supposedly features the norm of radical sexual equality. Despite formal discouragement, however, many "traditional" sexual behavioral differences remain.21 When characteristic sexual differences persist in the face of cultural diversity and survive intense environmental antagonism, many conclude that this is attributable to biology. Stronger evidence supporting biologically determined sexual differentiation derives from other species than the human. One cannot argue that animals undergo the same type of sexually differentiated socialization as humans, yet male-female distinctions noted above seem to have counterparts among other species.22 Among primates, males typically are more aggressive at play, are more concerned about establishing dominance hierarchies, engage more in exploratory behavior, are more active generally, more often direct and regulate encounters with other groups and defend the community. Female primates seem primarily concerned with maternal behavior and nurturing the young. These patterns are present even among "stable and peaceful" species not characterized by highly ritualized social practices.23 It is possible that such patterns could stem from learning, even in non-human species. Harry Harlow, however, doubts this possibility. He specifically shielded a group of new-born rhesus monkeys from any contact with adults or older members of the species. The animals were "cared for" and derived sustenance from cloth "surrogate mothers." Culturally insulated, these rhesus monkeys still developed characteristic sexual patterns. To quote Harlow, it is illogical to interpret these sex differences as learned, culturally ordered patterns of behavior because there is no opportunity for acquiring cultural heritage, let alone a sexually differentiated one, from an inanimate cloth surrogate.24 It has also been argued that such differences, to the extent that they actually exist, are an artifact of an incidental variable—the relative sizes of the different sexes within species. Supposedly, males are able to emerge as more dominant simply because they are physically larger. But again, very responsibly collected evidence casts doubt on this interpretation. For example, even in species where females are characteristically larger, males remain more aggressive.25

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Thus, similarities of sexual differences in behavior between animals and humans cannot be attributed to similar stimuli. They suggest reason enough to examine a common biology—perhaps mediated by a common series of hormones. Third, both humans and animals evidence sex differences of the type under discussion almost from birth forward. "The earlier sex differences can be observed, the more likely is their genetic origin because the effect of environmental factors is minimal in the early stages of development."26 At the age of 71 hours, boys are more active than girls, though differential rates of prenatal development would lead us to expect the opposite. At the age of twelve weeks, boys look longer at visual stimuli. At the same age, girls prefer photographs of faces to line drawings. At five months, boys are more responsive to novel stimuli.27 These types of sex differences often are most pronounced in younger children rather than older. That is, there is an inverse correlation between length of time children have been exposed to their cultural milieu and the strength of sex differences.28 Endocrinology offers a final category of evidence. If sex differences are biological in origin, they most likely become manifest through the hormonal system. Males and females of all species do have hormonal system differences; there is ample evidence that this has behavioral consequences. Manipulation of sex hormones seems to produce behavioral changes consistent with the patterns we have been examining. The obvious example is the castration of stallions and bulls to render them less aggressive and therefore more useful as domestic animals. A cessation of the production of androgens appears to eliminate a characteristically male behavior pattern. Although adjusting sex hormone levels in mature organisms can produce behavioral changes, the operation of such a dynamic appears to be dependent on a primary hormonal process occurring at an early developmental stage. This primary process is sometimes said to produce a characteristically male or female brain.29 There is apparently a "critical period" near birth during which sex hormone production affects the neural circuits of the hypothalmus, which gland subsequently regulates the entire endocrine system's operation. These circuits determine an organism's sensitivity to sex hormones throughout life. The critical element appears to be testosterone, an androgen secreted by the testes. If it is present in the critical period, the organism becomes psychically male; if not, psychically female. Artificial and rogenization of female fetuses of

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several species results in permanent impairment of the organism's ability subsequently to perform female sexual behavior. Of greater significance is the fact that such androgenization of female fetuses also results in a "masculization" of other forms of social behavior such as aggressive play.30 Rats of both sexes subjected to sexually atypical testosterone levels during the critical period subsequently display activity patterns characteristic of the opposite sex. The considerably less extensive evidence on humans also suggests that early sex hormone secretion has an organizing influence on the central nervous system. Several pathologies can cause female fetus androgenization.31 Usually this does not result in anything so severe as a total sex-reversal; and corrective measures are available to deal with most undesirable consequences.32 But, such females display more "masculine" social behavior in later life than do other females, being more physically active, preferring boys' toys and modes of play, and being less interested in marriage and motherhood.33 Sex hormones appear to play a two-fold role in social behavior. They organize the central nervous system during an early critical period. The consequence of that organization is differential sensitivity to the same sex hormones at subsequent life cycle stages. That is, if testosterone is present in the early period, the organism is thereafter responsive to androgens. If testosterone is not present, the organism is thereafter responsive to female hormones, notably estrogens and progesterone. It is probably because of this differential sensitivity that many of the behavior effects discussed above are manifested. Thus, The sex hormones seem to exert a double action on the central nervous system. First, during fetal or neonatal life, these hormones seem to act in an inducive way on an undifferentiated brain . . . to organize it into a male or female type of brain. And second, during adult existence the gonadal hormones act on the central nervous system in an excitatory or inhibitory way, and are thus concerned with the expression of overt patterns.34 These overt patterns seem similar to sex-typed political behavior patterns. One might entertain the hypothesis that the latter are also partly hormone induced. One can also justify testing hypotheses about biological origins of

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sex differences in political behavior by appealing to current theory. The kinds of empirical evidence cited above can be interpreted from the perspective of natural selection and evolution. The societal specialization of labor implied by sex differences in behavior may be adaptive. If some members of a species are motivated to perform aggressively against non-group members while other members exhibit an innate drive to nurture the young, the chances for the survival of that species may be enhanced.35 That sexual differentiation may have had survival value for some species at some times does not mean this is true for the human species presently. One could even argue that it has become maladaptive. Evolutionary theorists have, however, been impressed by patterns of sex differences in social behavior. These patterns may be similar to others known to have a genetic base; one could infer from the similarity that sex differences are originally biological in origin. Though the general hypothesis may be reasonable enough, developing an empirical test of it is problematic. Cross-cultural examinations may produce evidence consistent with the hypothesis, but they do not generate strong tests. Common learning patterns may prevail across cultures in subtle or hidden ways. The strategy of examining infants prior to cultural exposure is foreclosed. Judith Bardwick notes that infants are not especially sexy;36 neither are they very political. Cross-species research would not prove illuminating because animals do not exhibit political behavior—at least not of the type we isolate as interesting in humans. Examining variance in hormone levels probably is the most viable strategy for dealing with the hypothesis. Ideally, manipulation of testosterone concentrations in a strict experimental design would be preferred. This or similar intrusion into the human body, though technically possible, would be extremely difficult and costly, and would not be justified by the preliminary nature of the thinking on the topic. A feasible alternate is to tap naturally occurring variance in sex hormone levels. The only hormonal variance about which a great deal is known and which occurs with measurable regularity is that attendant upon the female menstrual cycle. Such variance could be tested for association with political variance. Such a proposition is not as bizarre as it sounds. There are two basic reasons for this. First, as we indicated earlier, normal adult females have been isolated from testosterone during the critical fetal period. This results in their being sensitive to the female hormones, especially estrogens and progesterone. If we were to artificially

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reduce the level of female hormones in women, we would expect a decline of characteristic female behavior. During the menstrual cycle, considerable variance in levels of estrogens and progesterone occurs naturally. The effects of high levels could be to stimulate female behavior considered characteristic, and the effects of low levels could be to inhibit it. If this were the case, we could take it for evidence that male-female behavior differences are hormonally induced. Variance in critical sex hormones could produce variance in behavior parallel to that still observed between the sexes. During the menstrual cycle progesterone levels and those of key estrogen compounds are at their lowest levels immediately preceding onset of menstruation and during the menstrual period itself. While estrogen levels describe a double-peaked curve when graphed over the entire cycle, it is the case that during mid-cycle—near the time of ovulation—one or both of the key hormone compounds is at a high level or is rising to a high level.37 More "characteristic" female behavior might be expected at mid-cycle, less during menstruation and immediately before. There do appear to be behavioral changes attendant upon the menstrual cycle, some of which parallel the male-female differences discussed above. Whether menstrual symptoms such as depression, irritability, decreased intellectual and physical performance capabilities, etc., are real bodily phenomena admittedly is a controversial subject.38 There may be no physiological mechanisms operating to produce such symptoms; the occurrence of these symptoms may be a function of socially mediated expectations about menstruation. Undoubtedly there is validity to this argument. There is a body of empirical evidence, however, which suggests that the contrary proposition also has validity. While recent works rightly stress the complex interaction of menstruation-related variables with psychological and sociocultural variables in accounting for women's behavior, a wide variety of investigations employing diverse methodologies do report at least small effects.39 Research on birth control pills speaks to the point. Birth control pills artificially reduce the magnitude of changes in hormone levels normally experienced with the cycle. Carefully controlled, double-blind studies show that women who take the pill report lower levels of commonly experienced menstrual symptoms.40 Peter Corning argues that premenstrual and menstrual women are more likely to perform aggressive and violent behavior thought characteristic of men.41 Violent crime, prison and boarding school

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misdemeanors, and expression of hostility all seem to be accentuated prior to and during menstruation.42 Suicide attempts and suicide threats are also significantly more likely at these times.43 There is evidence too that typical female nurturance and interest in interpersonal relations is attenuated during premenstrual and menstrual periods. Many survey investigations show declines in variables like "social affection."44 Betty Little and Theodore Zahn demonstrate a decline in "positive warmth" and show the decline to be associated with autonomic nervous system changes which in turn are correlated with variance in hormone levels.45 There are other kinds of data consistent with the idea that menstrual hormone variance affects behavior thought characteristic of females. Therese Benedek and Boris Rubinstein report that psychoanalytic interviews conducted at high progesterone segments of the cycle reveal an accentuated wish to bear children and to care for them.46 A recent study employing semantic differential scales shows that for a group of women, the concept of ''I'' was closer to ''man" at premenstruation than at ovulation; exactly the opposite held for the concept "woman." 47 Thus, one could argue, without too many intervening steps of reasoning, that political behavior patterns believed to distinguish females from males may be less prominent among premenstrual and menstrual women than among women at other stages of the cycle. Specifically, menstrual and premenstrual women may be more "man-like" in their support for aggressive foreign policy postures. They may also indicate greater interest in political activity, less interest in local political affairs, less candidate orientation, less security orientation and diminished support for social welfare policies. To test the hypothesis, volunteers were solicited in undergraduate classes at the University of Kentucky in the winter of 1976. The project was presented as an investigation of possible connections between health states and political orientations. We accepted 293 females and 114 males as subjects. Subjects were asked to complete a survey instrument and to respond to a health questionnaire. The survey instrument contained the following variables: 1) Measures of aggression, a single-item indicator of support for the use of U.S. troops in the Angolan civil war, an index of willingness to use force in response to a renewed oil boycott by the producing nations and a single-item query on the use of the death penalty; 2) Measures of political involvement, political efficacy scale developed for use by University of Michigan Survey Research Center, a conventional

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political participation index composed of SRC items, a protest index composed of SRC political hostility items and a single yes-or-no item as to whether subjects were able to express preferences among 1976 presidential primary candidates; 3) Measures of interest in local affairs, a single-item indicator of the level of public affairs most attended—local state, national or international—and Thomas Dye's48 Local-Cosmopolitanism Scale; 4) Measures of candidate orientation and security orientation, an adaptation of the Survey Research Center's scheme for evaluating preferred candidates focusing on most and least preferred 1976 presidential primary hopefuls; 5) Social welfare support measures, the Survey Research Center's Social Welfare Scale and a single-item dealing with support for proposed legislation to compensate victims of crime at public expense. The medical questionnaire contained many items regarding physical symptoms. Data on males were discarded, and most of those on females were not examined. They were included in the instrument only to imbed questions about menstruation in a plausible general matrix. From inquiries about date of onset of last menstrual period, expected date of next onset and irregularity of cycle, it was possible to locate women in the cycle. Using conventions in Sam Silbergeld, et al., and George Glass, et al., a classification scheme for this particular study was devised.49 Subjects who were within five days of the onset of their next period were classified as premenstrual; those within the five day period beginning with the day of onset of the most recent period were classified as menstrual. All others were classified as simply mid-cycle. This study design may be questioned on a number of points. First and most apparent, there is likely to be some error in the assignment of subjects to the appropriate classifications. More generally, one can raise questions about the appropriateness of rather standard social science methodologies to studies of women. While we cannot claim immunity to such considerations, this design does at least permit a fairly direct approach to an important research problem. Findings are reported in four parts. First, male-female differences on all survey items or dependent variables are assessed. Second, women who were premenstrual or menstrual on the day of data collection are compared with those who were at mid-cycle. Third, the comparison among women is repeated with a control for the use of birth control pills. Fourth, data are presented on 24 subjects who were remeasured on the political variables 2 weeks after the initial

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administration; intra-individual variance should occur in relation to cyclical change. Data are reported in Table 1. Fifteen dependent variables are examined.* If no relationship between the sex or hormone-related independent variable and the dependent political orientation variable is observed, "NR" is entered in the appropriate cell in the table. If there is a discernible relationship in the expected direction but not of sufficient magnitude to reach statistical significance, " E D " is entered. That is, the ED relationships are likely to have occurred as the result of chance alone; they are suspect on that account. If there is a discernible relationship in the direction opposite that expected, " O D " is entered. If significant relationship is observed, a Chisquare or Smirnov test (D) notation (depending on the level of measurement of the variable in question) is entered. 1. Male-female differences. Male-female political differences among a college population may be relatively small compared to the population at large. Even if biological explanation has some validity, environmental influences, especially educational influences, cannot be discounted. Exposure to a collegiate environment and other influences implied by attending college—for example, relative affluence—could have a homogenizing effect. If one is to attempt a biological explanation, however, some differences must remain. If there were no differences, there would be no phenomena to explain. As the first column of the table indicates, some frequently observed sex differences are to some degree repeated here. There is at least one significant relationship in four of the five categories of dependent variables. Moreover, there are twice as many " E D " relationships as there are " O D " relationships. The lack of relationship in security directed responses stems from high non-response. Few respondents—men or women—viewed candidates in these terms. Unlike their counterparts in previous elections, 1976 candidates may simply not have been evocative of this dimension. On the other *The candidate evaluation variables were generated as follows: subjects were asked if they had formed judgments as to most preferred and least preferred presidential primary contenders. If they had, they were asked to indicate reasons for them. The overwhelming number of respondents indicated no more than one reason, so only the first mentioned was coded. Survey Research Center coding format was followed. Security orientation scoring followed. Paula Feltner and Leneen Godlie, "Impact of Personality and Socialization," pp. 680-93. If a candidate was described as weak in leadership, poor in protective qualities, unstable, fanatic, dangerous, extreme or as specifically not having these qualities, the response was determined to be security oriented (Variables 10 and 12). All other responses were classified as issue oriented or candidate oriented. This distinction forms the basis for Variables 11 and 13.

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Menstrual Cycle Controlling for use of Birth Control Pills

Sex Dependent Variables

Used

Not Used

Aggression: 1. Angola intervention 2. Oil boycott force

NR 2

X =21.15, 4 df p< .001

ED NR

D=.531, p