Biology of Termites: a Modern Synthesis 9789048139767, 9048139767, 9789048139774, 9048139775

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Contents Preface

vii

List of Contributors

xi

List of Abbreviations

xii

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

Reflections on the Shaping of Strategic Cultures in Southeast Asia Chin Kin Wah

1

Asia-Pacific Security: Strategic Trends and Military Developments Derek da Cunha

20

Evolution of the Security Dialogue Process in the Asia-Pacific Region Daljit Singh

35

Managing “Strategic Unipolarity”: The ASEAN States’ Responses to the Post-Cold War Regional Environment Renato Cruz De Castro

60

National versus Regional Resilience? An Indonesian Perspective Dewi Fortuna Anwar

81

Disputes in the South China Sea: Approaches for Conflict Management Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan

98

Denuclearization in Northeast and Southeast Asia Mak Joon Num

114

Perceiving Japan: The View from Southeast Asia Lam Peng Er

134

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

9

Southeast Asian Perceptions of China: The Challenge of Achieving a New Strategic Accommodation Leonard C. Sebastian

158

Select Bibliography

183

Index

193

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Preface The conventional understanding of strategic issues in the modern world has been very much a Western-driven phenomenon. That is to say, Western strategists, thinkers and writers have tended to establish the principles of strategic concepts, and to develop theories around them. While there is utility in much Western strategic thought, it is also apt to note that some of it does not have full relevance or validity when applied to a regional setting that is far removed from the geographical boundaries of the Western world. The problem that arises here is that when one adopts Western concepts in understanding the dynamics of international security, Western interests and the Western point of view are invariably always taken as the point of reference. This is not necessarily wrong. But it is equally true to say that the conclusions derived from such an analytical approach may not have as much relevance to non-Western countries than is sometimes made out to be. This is partly because there is always a tendency by any analyst — whether Western or otherwise — to mirrorimage another country’s interests or capabilities (whether it be economic, military or diplomatic) against that of his own country. Thus, an American military analyst of China’s People’s Liberation Army (PLA) would likely be generally dismissive of PLA capabilities because he would compare those capabilities to U.S. military capabilities, and when that is done it is quite clear that the PLA falls short in every category of military power. But what relevance do those findings of PLA capabilities have for the states of Southeast Asia, for example? Probably very little. For the fact is that what is seen as generally obsolete Chinese military equipment in Western eyes is seen very differently in the eyes of Southeast Asian military analysts. A single example would suffice: a Chinese H-6 bomber, which is of 1960s technological vintage, armed with land-attack cruise missiles, also of 1960s technology, would likely face very little opposition, if any, if it were to launch an attack sortie against Philippine positions in the South China Sea. In such a context, Chinese military capabilities are hardly obsolete. And this is precisely the point, a certain context has to be established whenever the important subject of security is discussed. Regrettably, though, this is not always done. Many analysts tend to be a product of their countries’ geopolitical circumstance and historical legacy, and subconsciously or otherwise these realities tend to show through in their commentary on international security issues. Thus, it is well-known that many Canadian academics in the field

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

of international relations and security studies tend to be great advocates of multilateralism in international relations, giving credence to institutional structures as providing a panacea to security problems and issues. Yet, it should be asked: what conceivable threat does Canada face to its national security? It is difficult to arrive at any concrete answer to that question, simply because there is really no conceivable threat. That, however, has not prevented Canadian academics in hymning the virtues of multilateral security approaches to far-flung Southeast Asia. This a region where internal or external threats to the security of countries are all too apparent, and where traditional concepts in maintaining security — the notion of military build-ups and balance of power — are seen as key determinants in keeping the regional order quiescent and in equilibrium. But, unsurprisingly, the Canadian mind might find it difficult to accept this. Just like many of their Canadian counterparts, quite a number of Australian and New Zealand academics and security analysts tend to view the security concerns of Southeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific from a standpoint that emphasises the national interests of Australia and New Zealand, but not necessarily those of the states of Southeast Asia. Viewing their countries as being on the margins of Asia, and geographically removed from the main strategic areas of concern, most Australian and New Zealand commentators on Asia-Pacific security issues invariably articulate a conception of Asia-Pacific as a single operational entity in security terms. They do so, not because they are entirely convinced that the security concerns in one localised area of this sprawling region might directly affect another area, but rather because they desire that their countries be “players” in the geostrategic game. Commentaries on regional security issues by such analysts should therefore be treated with a degree of circumspection. In that connection, this volume is partly intended to serve as an antidote to much of the Western commentary on Asia-Pacific security issues by providing a range of perspectives on those issues from the Southeast Asian point of view. It is axiomatic that Southeast Asians have more of a vested interest in the security of their own region than do Westerners. The operative word in this volume is “perspectives”. For even within Southeast Asia there is no common view or consensus on the range of security issues that confront the Asia-Pacific in the post-Cold War era. This is symptomatic of the very fluid geopolitical situation that currently characterizes AsiaPacific security. It is also symptomatic of the different schools of thought that analysts in the region have chosen to subscribe to.

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

As characteristic of the free-wheeling nature of the discussion on security issues in this volume, some of the chapters adopt a conceptual and theoretical approach; some others are empirically grounded; yet others exemplify the virtue of the historical approach, seeing certain trends as essentially structural in nature and, therefore, enduring. This volume, thus, offers up a smorgasbord of perspectives on the multi-faceted security issues in the Asia-Pacific region. The volume is by no means comprehensive in its scope. Rather, it is a modest effort that deals with those issues which the individual chapter-writers feel are salient to an understanding of current geopolitical trends and what these might imply for the future. If anything, the objective of this volume is to encourage other analysts within Southeast Asia and, indeed, even those beyond, in Northeast Asia, to develop further some of the themes essayed here, and to do so from their own understanding of the security dynamics of the region, rather than what others from outside the region might say on the subject. If the volume were to achieve that objective, than it would have been a worthwhile exercise. Seven out of nine chapters contained in this volume were drawn from a collaborative project between the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore, and Germany’s Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik on the theme of Strategic Concepts and Strategic Cultures. Chapters Two and Four were written specially for this volume.

Derek da Cunha

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

List of Contributors Dewi Fortuna Anwar was formerly Assistant to the Minister State Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Indonesia. She serves on the Board of Directors of the Center for Information and Development Studies (CIDES) and is also an Associate Director of the Habibie Center in Jakarta. Chin Kin Wah is an Associate Professor in the Department of Political Science at the National University of Singapore. Derek da Cunha is a Senior Fellow at the Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS) in Singapore and Co-ordinator of its Regional Strategic and Political Studies (RSPS) programme. Renato Cruz De Castro is a Ph.D. candidate in the Government and International Studies Department of the University of South Carolina, and a faculty member of the Political Science Department of De La Salle University, Manila. Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan is Director-General of the Institute of Strategic and International Studies, Kuala Lumpur. Lam Peng Er is a Research Fellow, East Asian Institute, National University of Singapore. Mak Joon Num is Director of Research at the Maritime Institute of Malaysia, Kuala Lumpur. Leonard C. Sebastian is a Fellow at ISEAS. He is a member of CSCAPSingapore, and the Singapore Institute of International Affairs. Daljit Singh is a Senior Research Fellow at ISEAS and Co-ordinator of its Public Affairs Unit.

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

Abbreviations AFTA AMDA AMM APEC ARF ASEAN ASEAN-ISIS ASEM ASORR BMD CBM CPM CPP CSBM CSCAP CSCE CTBT EAEC EEZ FPDA ICBM IMF ISM KR NATO NFU NPT NSA ODA PACOM PACTAD PBEC PECC PLA PMC PRC RMA SAR SDP SEANWFZ SEATO SOM START THS UNCLOS ZOPFAN

— — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — — —

ASEAN Free Trade Area Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement ASEAN Ministerial Meeting Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation ASEAN Regional Forum Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies Asia-Europe Meeting ASEAN Seminar on Regional Resilience ballistic missile defence confidence-building measures Communist Party of Malaysia Communist Party of the Philippines confidence and security building measures Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty East Asia Economic Caucus Exclusive Economic Zone Five-Power Defence Arrangements intercontinental ballistic missile International Monetary Fund Inter-Sessional Meeting Khmer Rouge North Atlantic Treaty Organisation No First Use Non-Proliferation Treaty Negative Security Assurances Overseas Development Aid Pacific Command (US) Pacific Trade and Development Council Pacific Basin Economic Cooperation Pacific Economic Cooperation Council People’s Liberation Army Post-Ministerial Conference (ASEAN) People’s Republic of China Revolution in Military Affairs search and rescue Social Democratic Party Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation Senior Officials Meeting Strategic Arms Reduction Talks Theory of Hegemonic Stability United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

ISEAS DOCUMENT DELIVERY SERVICE. No reproduction without permission of the publisher: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 30 Heng Mui Keng Terrace, SINGAPORE 119614. FAX: (65)7756259; TEL: (65) 8702447; E-MAIL: [email protected]

The Shaping of Strategic Cultures 1

1 Reflections on the Shaping of Strategic Cultures in Southeast Asia Chin Kin Wah Amorphous as the concept may be, “strategic culture” has made its way into academic discussions on Asia-Pacific security — deserving an observation made in 1996 by one reviewer that, “ Culture is the newest fad sweeping the literature on international relations, security studies, and international economics.”1 Initially coined by Jack Snyder in a 1977 Rand Corporation study which sought to explain a uniquely Soviet mode of strategic thinking on the use of nuclear weapons,2 it was subsequently taken up by others like Colin Gray whose focus had been on American nuclear strategy, and Ken Booth whose primary intellectual concern was focused on the Soviet Union. The latter, in particular, found in the concept a useful warning against being trapped in an (essentially American) ethnocentric mode of thinking (i.e., seeing others in one’s own cultural prism) on strategic issues.3 In the ensuing years, the intellectual interest in strategic culture has been sustained and extended beyond the traditional focus on the superpower strategic relationship, to the study of China’s deterrence strategy, its approach towards nuclear weapons and styles of warfare.4 Jack Snyder himself has noted that some of the studies — with specific reference to the United States and the former Soviet Union — either exaggerated the differences in national styles and approaches or underestimated the potential for strategic convergence. Yet others, according to Snyder, have underrated the prospects for fundamental change in Soviet strategy. In affixing a “caveat emptor” to a concept developed by himself 13 years previously, Snyder pointedly warned in a 1990 publication, “As a rule, culture is an explanation of last resort. Cultural explanations tend to be vague in their

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logic, with causes that are quite distant in time and sequence from their purported consequences. Often, culture is a residual label that is affixed to ‘explain’ outcomes that cannot be explained in any more concrete way. Thus, culture, including strategic culture, is an explanation to be used only when all else fails.”5 That qualification notwithstanding, it should be noted that the strategic culture approach (rooted in the ideational, philosophical and cognitive influences) was essentially a reaction to what was perceived as the dominant structural-realist paradigm which seeks to explain a state’s security/strategic behaviour in terms of system structure or the distribution of state capabilities and resources. The security culture paradigm is focused on the “system of symbols (i.e., argumentation, structures, languages, analogies, metaphors, etc.) that acts to establish pervasive and long lasting... strategic preferences...”6 While the conceptual terrain of “strategic culture” is by no means settled, the term has been introduced in the 1990s with varying degrees of rigour, into reflections on Asia-Pacific security. There are several reasons for this development which go beyond the search for esoteric explanations or “residual labels”. To begin with, the cultural model of explanation has been resorted to in a wide range of studies on Southeast Asia. It has been traditionally applied (in a political culture framework) in comparative analysis of domestic politics within the region. The resurgence and dynamism during the late 1980s and early 1990s, of the region’s newly industrialising economies led to several attempts to provide explanations, including cultural explanations (focusing on the relevance or otherwise of Confucian values and work ethics), for that success story.7 In the postCold War period, the so-called East-West debate on human rights and democracy hinged on the dichotomy between the claim of universal values and the plea on behalf of cultural relativism, while the search for the middle-ground has led others to speculate more hopefully on the possible convergence of “Eastern” and “Western” approaches to the management of domestic societies. Samuel Huntington’s work on The Clash of Civilisations has, if anything, triggered an even more intense debate on the cultural dimension of international conflict. The intrusion of cultural analysis into the strategic literature in and on Southeast Asia can be accounted for in several ways. Firstly, the region has since the end of the Cold War, engaged in widening strategic dialogues. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), institutionalized in 1994 as an official-level hub, and involving both Western and Asian states, for wider Asia-Pacific security dialogues and co-operation, has become a market place of at times competing strategic ideas and strategic concepts. The

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The Shaping of Strategic Cultures 3

wider acceptance of the non-governmental Track Two CSCAP (Council on Security Co-operation in the Asia-Pacific) process, which allows for the engagement of regional think-tanks (with varying degrees of nongovernmental and academic inputs) in the security dialogues has also made it possible to provide further intellectual underpinnings to the search for security co-operation, and confidence and security building among states at a time of general peace but persisting regional uncertainties. This form of interactive process has, among other things, led to deeper reflections on whether there are indeed uniquely “non-Western” approaches and models to the management of security relationships more appropriate to the conditions of the Asia-Pacific; whether there is anything like an “Asian security paradigm”; and whether there exist different values pertaining to the security of this diverse region. These questions invariably lead back to a consideration of comparative strategic cultures and worldviews. Furthermore, at the national level, regional states are either in various stages of leadership and generational transitions (Indonesia and Malaysia), economic transitions (Vietnam, Laos and Myanmar) with attendant strains on entrenched national ideologies and state identities, or political transitions (Myanmar and, more significantly, Indonesia after the fall of Soeharto in 1998) in the face of internal pressure for deep economic as well as political reform. Considering that the dominant security concern in Southeast Asia relates to internal stability and security (issues which have risen in prominence again in the wake of the regional financial and economic crises sweeping through the region since mid-1997), there is consequently interest in the extent to which the dominant security culture of a state may inhibit or facilitate or even be transformed by what is recognizably a major defining moment in post-Cold War Southeast Asia. It is also not surprising that the more persistent efforts at understanding the strategic cultures of the region have been pursued by academics in Australia, a country which finds itself at the interface of a still dominant mode of “Western” strategic thinking which reflects a traditional emphasis on external threats and use of military force; and a Southeast Asian region that constitutes its immediate security environment and whose “security problematique” in both its external and internal dimensions, has long exercised the minds of Australian strategic planners. Australia’s increasing aspiration to an Asian identification8 has also emphasised a need to engage and fathom the Southeast Asian strategic mind-sets and world views. In this regard, two Australian publications, both deriving from a Canberra workshop held in late 1992 on “Comparative Perceptions on National

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Security” are worthy of mention. Anthony Milner and his team have jointly with the Japan Institute of International Affairs, published a report under the title “Perceiving National Security: A Report on East Asia and Australia” which attempted to explore “the possibility that security thinking operates within differing conceptual frameworks in the Asian region”. Desmond Ball for his part has attempted a more systematic comparative portrayal of the strategic cultures in the Asia-Pacific region in an article published in Autumn 1993.9 Since then, a further attempt to inject analytical rigour into the concept of strategic culture has been made by Alastair Iain Johnston in a 1995 article in International Security.10 Although essentially a theoretical piece which does not address the Asia-Pacific situation directly, it notes nevertheless that Ball’s work has been on the level of “first generation conceptualization” by which is meant that he sought to explain (very much in the mould of those who sought explanations for the differences in Soviet-American strategic thinking during the 1980s) in cultural terms why some Asian states, including some in Southeast Asia, tended to think differently (in comparison with Western powers such as the United States) about strategy, and placed different emphasis in their conceptualisations of national security.11 (Ball also indicated how Asian states tended to have different culturally based approaches and preferences in their handling of security relationships among themselves and with others.) In fairness, Ball himself has cautioned that: “There may not, in fact be any such [strategic] culture prevailing throughout this vast and disparate [Asia-Pacific] region” although he has sought at the same time to articulate “the nature and constituent elements” of what he considered to be the strategic culture of the region. Since the conclusion of the modest project from which this chapter is derived, a more concerted and comprehensive approach to the study of strategic cultures in the broader Asia-Pacific region has been attempted. Notwithstanding the uneven quality of its chapters, Ken Booth’s and Russell Trood’s edited volume provides by far the most systematic attempt at strategic culture analysis of the region.12 The volume embraces the working definition of strategic culture as provided by Booth in a 1990 publication which places the main referents on “a nation’s traditions, values, attitudes, patterns of behaviour, habits, symbols, achievements and particular ways of adapting to the environment and solving problems with respect to the threat or use of force”.13 THE CONSTITUENT ELEMENTS

At the most basic then, the term “strategic culture” would suggest the

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The Shaping of Strategic Cultures 5

relationship between culture and strategy, in particular, how the culture or world views of the political-military decision-makers influence their strategic choices at the highest political level (in terms of relating means to political ends) and military options and doctrines at the operational or tactical level. Ball himself, whose work has generally been reflective of the structural-realist tradition, seems to have borrowed without much questioning the definition of strategic culture as developed by the “first generational conceptualists” who held that “different countries and regions approach the key issues of war, peace and strategy from the perspectives which are both distinctive and deeply rooted, reflecting their different geostrategic situations, resources, history, military experience and political beliefs. These factors profoundly influence how a country perceives, protects and promotes its interests and values with respect to the threat or use (and I would add, the non-use) of force.”14 However, Ball also seems to reach out for a wider concept in his preferred usage of the term “security (rather than strategic) culture”. Given that most regional states have generally been more concerned with non-military and internal threats to their security, a definition of strategic culture (or more appropriately, “security culture”) that goes beyond the focus on the use of force or military power in interstate political relations, may be more analytically useful. The notion of security culture could also accommodate a consideration of political military culture (including “the habits of thought and action ... of particular national military establishments” or “the set of attitudes and beliefs held within a military establishment concerning the political objective of war and the most effective strategy and operational method of achieving it”),15 the organizational culture of the military as well as the area of civil-military relations (the mind-set of the military with respect to its role in society and politics). In effect, the security culture framework enables us to range over other levels of analysis below that of “grand strategy”. Hence, in this chapter, strategic culture is used in the wider “security culture” sense rather than in the narrow context of relating to the use of force or military power in inter-state political relations. Given the immense diversity of the region, what follows is necessarily a very selective, snap-shot exploration of the identifiable forms of strategic (or security) cultures in Southeast Asia. SHAPING OF SOUTHEAST ASIAN STRATEGIC CULTURES

A consideration of the different forms and characteristics of strategic cultures in the Southeast Asian region would necessarily entail a prior

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consideration of the various sources of such cultures and the mix of “constituent elements” derived from such sources which produce these unique characteristics in strategic mind-sets and world views. Within the region, these “constituent elements” are complex and diverse, given the mix of large and small states with varying geostrategic circumstances, varying historical experiences and memories, varying political cultures and domestic political systems; the variety of cultural and civilizational traditions (Islamic, Confucianist, Javanese); the different ethnic bases of their societies; and the different circumstances of their formal emergence into statehood. If there is one common characteristic among them it is that these are (with the exception of Thailand) primarily new states (i.e., creations of the post-World War II international order) with a majority of them (with the exception, perhaps, of Singapore) encompassing old and entrenched indigenous societies with strong cultural traditions. Maritime Southeast Asia

As with practically all the Southeast Asian states, geopolitical circumstance constitutes the primary element that shapes strategic culture (encompassing world-view, sense of vulnerability and strategic perspectives) and strategic doctrine. This is most coherently manifested in the case of Indonesia, a sprawling and ethnically heterogeneous archipelagic state with an obsession for territorial unity expressed through a unique archipelagic outlook (“Wawasan Nusantara”) which considers the seas as the binding rather than dividing elements in its territorial environs. Such a security outlook is reflected in its approach towards the UN Law of the Sea negotiations and its claim to sovereign rights (with due reciprocal recognition of the rights of maritime passage) over archipelagic waters. More importantly, “Wawasan Nusantara” encompasses the notion of “a single political, social-cultural, economic and defence entity”16 which, together with the concept of “national resilience”, defines a comprehensive and multidimensional approach to the management of security, covering all (and not just the military) aspects of national life. The doctrine of national resilience which provides the basis to Indonesia’s Defence and Security Doctrine (“Doctrin Hankamnas”), treats defence and security matters as an integral part of the nation’s development in which the military’s role as a socio-political force, born out of its historic role in the political struggle for independence, is legitimized by dwifungsi or the doctrine of dualfunction for the military. The comprehensive security approach is also reflected in the organization of the “total people’s defence” in which both the armed forces and the civilian population constitute a self-reliant force

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The Shaping of Strategic Cultures 7

to deal with threats to the country’s national integrity by conventional and non-conventional warfare. It could be said that the prevailing Javanesebased, Indonesian strategic culture is deeply rooted also in the historical experience of its national struggle for independence and the domestic political turbulence that followed in the period from 1950 to 1968.17 But the culture of national resilience has an external dimension too which expresses the strategic priorities of then President Soeharto’s “New Order” whose language of development stood in sharp contrast to the grand rhetoric of Sukarno which harked back to the Srivijaya and Majapahit empires. For the “New Order”, regional resilience is seen as the sum total of national resilience of the members of ASEAN which, in culturallyrooted “mandala” terms, is the immediate outer ring (in a series of radiating rings of security) that must be secured if the centre (i.e., Indonesia itself) were to be secure. At the other extreme in geostrategic circumstance is Singapore — an island city-state with the smallest territory in Southeast Asia that does not yield any defence in-depth. It is also the only Southeast Asian state with a numerically dominant ethnic Chinese population. Viewed against a predominantly Muslim neighbourhood (Malaysia and Indonesia) and with memories of the circumstances of its formal attainment of independence (marked by the acrimony of separation from Malaysia and the threatening effects of Indonesia’s policy of “Konfrontasi” — two critical defining moments of its history) deeply embedded in its national psyche,18 Singapore’s security culture is partly defined by a high sense of vulnerability which can be otherwise referred to as the “small-state syndrome”. Indeed, despite its considerable military capabilities and economic strength, the persisting image of constraints and vulnerability is often worked into and reinforced by official commentary on national security and projections on the future of the republic. A case in point was the recounting by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, during his 1995 National Day speech, of his dialogue sessions with several groups of Singaporeans which invariably began with a lesson in geography: I showed them a map of Southeast Asia which marked out the borders of Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore. Many had forgotten their geography. They never realised that Singapore was that small. They were awed by the size of Indonesia. Do you know that between last year’s National Day Rally and now, one Singapore has been born in Indonesia? My dialogue audience had also forgotten that the moment you take off from Changi Airport, you are flying in someone else’s airspace.19

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Recounting the public furore in the Philippines over the earlier hanging in Singapore of a Filipina maid convicted of murder, Goh Chok Tong noted that his dialogue participants felt that a possible reason why Singapore made for an easy target of Philippine invectives was “because they saw us as a soft target: tiny, helpless and rich. If we were as big as Indonesia, or even Malaysia, they doubted whether the Philippines would have cursed and sworn at us”.20 Such a self-image seems to have been compounded with some embellishment by B.J. Habibie, the immediate successor to Soeharto, who had publicly described the island state as a mere “red-dot” on the map. In terms of strategic doctrine, the unique security environment of Singapore together with a relative absence of fiscal constraints have led to a maximum deterrence strategic option with a powerful air force as the mainstay of external defence. Manpower constraints have also meant a greater reliance on the compensating advantages offered by modern technology with the result that “high-tech” and a modern managerial approach have become the defining hallmarks of the Singapore Armed Forces’ military culture. It should be noted however that Singapore’s maximum-deterrence strategy is paralleled by confidence-building with its immediate neighbours which serves to underline its special relationship with them, a process which had been in train long before the current fashion for confidence-building measures (CBM). Singapore’s deterrence strategy is also predicated upon an assumption that it would have to defend itself militarily should deterrence fail. In this respect, given the stated constraints, defence would necessarily involve the entire population. The introduction of national service (from the moment when Singapore had to develop a military force of its own) had already assumed that national defence could not be just the business of the professional military. In the initial years when conscription was being introduced, Singapore’s political élites had to address any negative dispositions on the part of its predominantly Chinese population, given their cultural (traditional) aversion towards military service. This stood in interesting contrast to the Malaysian situation where “a ready and willing pool of recruits within the indigenous Malay community” has made it possible for the government to dispense with a conscript army – a consequence of which has been the perpetuation of Malay domination of the military.21 Over the years, the value of national service as part of the security culture of Singapore has been assiduously cultivated, and the prestige and role accorded to reservists progressively enhanced, so that they are now effectively and organisationally treated as front-line forces.

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The Shaping of Strategic Cultures 9

Like Indonesia and Malaysia, Singapore’s approach towards national security is also comprehensive. This takes the form of a Total Defence strategy which sees national defence as the combined efforts at territorial, economic, civil and psychological defence involving the whole population. Geostrategic circumstance (and a traditional fear of being alone in a potentially hostile environment) has also defined in Singapore’s strategic culture and world-view a preference for a balance of external influence (the balance of power paradigm being still the preferred prism through which Singapore elites view the external strategic environment) through a process of engagement and involvement of friends and allies (the analogy often used is “having extra strings to the bow”). The conscious cultivation of external affiliations has successfully facilitated defence net-working (drawing upon the analogy of the spider’s web and which, inter alia, has provided access to overseas training facilities), not only with the traditional Commonwealth partners of the Five-Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) network, but also with other ASEAN states, Taiwan, the United States, France and Sweden. The balance of power paradigm stands in contrast to, but is able to coexist with, an alternative world-view exemplified in Indonesian and Malaysian advocacy of regional neutralization as expressed in a declaratory policy (since 1971) on ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality), with echoes of an earlier refrain which called for “Asian solutions to Asian problems”. Malaysia’s geostrategic circumstance has been twice transformed since its attainment of independence from Britain in 1957 — first, by the inclusion of Sabah and Sarawak in an enlarged federation in 1963 which effectively transformed Malaysia into a maritime state; and, subsequently, through the acquisition of an Exclusive Economic Zone (as provided for by the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea), which was further asserted through claims to islands in the South China Sea. Nevertheless the “maritime mind-set” had been slow in catching up with the dominant strategic culture which has been traditionally land-based and inwardly-directed. As one Malaysian analyst observed in 1988, few Malaysians recognized that their country had become a maritime nation by all definitions “perhaps because they are imbued with a continental mentality”.22 The inwardly directed nature of Malaysia’s strategic culture has been traditionally defined by its past major preoccupation with internal security and communist insurgency. The fact that, for almost 15 years after independence, Malaysia’s external security needs were met through a defence alliance (in practical terms amounting to a defence guarantee) with the former metropolitan power, Britain, had meant that it could

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10 Chin Kin Wah

concentrate its defence efforts on dealing with the internal security challenge while devoting its economic resources to national socio-economic development. The effect of such a strategic outlook on operational doctrine has been to emphasize the utility of less heavily armed but mobile land forces designed for counter-insurgency operations, with air and naval elements playing a supplementary, logistical role. This, in turn, has served to emphasize the centrality of the army in the military culture of the country. Despite the more outward maritime re-orientation in Malaysia’s strategic perspective, a lingering continental mind-set can still be encountered. A controversial former Chief of Defence Force had commented in a preretirement interview in early 1995 that it was not time for the air force or navy to hold the country’s number one military post. His argument (which reflected in part an undercurrent of inter-service rivalry) was that Malaysia’s defence strategy was land-based, and to be an effective Chief of Defence Force, one had to understand land-based strategy. As he put it, “In all wars it is the army that finally wins the battle. I believe that ultimately it is the man with the rifle and bayonet that will be able to defend the land territory or hold the ground.”23 His comment drew a sharp response from the Chief of Navy, Mohammad Shariff Ishak, who said that an understanding of land defence strategy was not the sole determinant of a CDF’s effectiveness, “If at all, a deeper understanding of the importance of naval and air strategic power would be a more important influence on one’s potential effectiveness.”24 He reiterated that Malaysia is a maritime state. Malaysia’s traditional preoccupation with internal security and stability has also led to an articulation of national security in a comprehensive context, not unlike that articulated in Indonesia and Singapore. This preoccupation with the domestic sources of insecurity has been reinforced by three important defining moments in the country’s post-independence history, namely, the racial riots of May 1969, the economic recession of 1985–86 and, more recently, the even more serious economic downturn of the late 1990s. As the Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad put it as long ago as 1986, “national security is inseparable from political stability, economic success and social harmony. Without these, all the guns in the world cannot prevent a country from being overcome by its enemies, whose ambitions can be fulfilled sometimes without firing a single shot.”25 However, Malaysia’s comprehensive security concept “has not been translated into official acceptance and formulation comparable to ‘national resilience’ in Indonesia or ‘total defence’ in Singapore”. One reason for this, in Muthiah Alagappa’s opinion, could have been the

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The Shaping of Strategic Cultures 11

perception, held rightly or wrongly by the armed forces and the police, that comprehensive security, if operationalized, would downgrade their professional role in national defence.26 As it is, Malaysia already has a strong culture of civilian control over the military. With the end of the Cold War (but given the resurgence of new tensions in the South China Sea over competing territorial claims) and the relinquishment of armed struggle by the Malayan Communist Party, Malaysia was able to devote much greater attention and resources to its external defence needs. That it was in a much better position to afford this, given its high economic growth from the late 1980s to the mid-1990s, did lead to investment in “big-ticket” air and naval assets which have since been put on hold as a result of the current economic crisis. It would be interesting to see how the balance of influence among the services is being affected, if at all, by these vicissitudes and with what implications on the military culture in Malaysia. Mainland Southeast Asia

In continental Southeast Asia, strategic circumstance has also important influence on the shaping of strategic culture in Thailand and Vietnam. In the case of the former, its strategic world-view has been traditionally defined by a deep concern with land-ward threats (from the direction of the Indochinese states), which emphasized the utility of obtaining security through a balance of power relationship and alliance or useful “correlation of forces” with friendly powers. For Thailand, the defining moments in its post-World War II external strategic circumstance had been the “fall” of Indochina to communist regimes in 1975 and the subsequent Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia in 1978, which effectively transformed Thailand into the front-line state of non-communist ASEAN. At the same time, the traditional concern with internal insurgency also meant that the army has a special developmental role which was formally recognized in the 1974 constitution. Another aspect of the strategic culture which partly accommodated the special place of the army in the management (or mismanagement) of trans-border relationships proved to be more controversial and less amenable to change. In the case of Vietnam, geostrategic circumstance has resulted in a special characterisation of China as a traditional source of threat to its security. If historical memories and historical analogies influence the shaping of a strategic culture or world-view, the Vietnamese case is quite revealing: the struggle against Chinese “colonialism” marked much of

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Vietnamese history prior to the arrival of the French. It has often been observed that Vietnam’s history with China is full of wars, skirmishes and the sacking of cities. Indeed, Vietnamese folk history contains many colourful exploits of the Trung sisters who overwhelmed Chinese invaders almost 2,000 years ago. It is instructive that these historically-rooted images again found saliency in Vietnam in the wake of the limited border war with China in 1979. Such a world-view would suggest a deep concern with the expansion of Chinese power. Indeed, Henry Kissinger once expressed the opinion that if ever the United States should return to a policy of containing China (something which he said America should not do), the only regional state that is likely to facilitate such a policy is Vietnam. And one might add that few Vietnamese would openly discount balance of power considerations vis-à-vis China behind their country’s membership in ASEAN. While acknowledging the legacy of its relations with China (the northward neighbour) as probably the most influential factor in shaping Vietnam’s strategic culture, David Elliott has also pointed to another dimension of Vietnamese strategic culture (or yet another of its several strategic cultures, as he prefers it) which is based on its historical experiences with equal or lesser states to the south.27 These different dimensions of strategic culture lend a unique character to Vietnam’s own sense of identity. The foregoing discussion on geostrategic circumstance touches on just one of the “elemental things” that lend shape to strategic (or the wider security) cultures in the region. Among other elements, one would consider the different colonial experiences ranging from the more benign British form of indirect rule in Malaysia, Singapore and Brunei (which made it possible to institutionalize a post-colonial defence responsibility on the part of the former colonial power, with long-lasting effects on the strategic cultures of the local client states), to the more overt and repressive Dutch and French varieties in Indonesia and Vietnam, respectively (which elicited a different form of reaction and resistance that shaped a different nationalistic mind-set). In the Malaysia and Singapore cases, the colonial tradition also bequeathed a culture of military professionalism which left the civilians holding the bottom line to security policies. This means in effect that the “unique expertise of the profession of arms may only be used for legitimate social purposes as sanctioned by the legally constituted government of the land. In other words, the military must submit to civilian authority and ... be politically neutral.”28 Elsewhere, in Indonesia, Myanmar and Thailand, different political cultures and historical experiences have led to the emergence of different forms of civil-military relations commonly marked by a dominant role

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(less so today in the case of Thailand with the deeper entrenchment of democracy and civil society, and increasingly challenged in the case of Indonesia but still stubbornly resisting change in the case of Myanmar) of the military in national life, with varying impacts on strategic cultures.29 Yet other forms of non-colonial external security overlay, as manifested in America’s defence linkages with the Philippines and Thailand during the Cold War era, have in different ways affected, distorted or exacerbated the sense of threat and values which define in part the local strategic cultures. In the Philippine case, external support has engendered a culture of strategic dependency, with long-term repercussions on local defence capabilities. In the case of Thailand, it has been observed at one time that, “Given the United States’ influence on the Thai armed forces’ planning, organization and training, it is almost inevitable that the latter has a propensity towards focusing on conventional capabilities, especially where its force modernization programme is concerned.”30 Implicit in this comment is a sense that some aspects of the Thai military culture could be driven by a logic and momentum derived from an American strategic culture. SOME OBSERVATIONS ON A CONCEPT

The above discussion on strategic cultures has obvious limitations with respect to the selective coverage of Southeast Asia and hence may not facilitate the distilling of too many meaningful generalizations about regional strategic cultures. Desmond Ball has more ambitiously characterised the common elements of strategic cultures in the AsiaPacific in the following way: longer time horizons and policy perspectives than those which characterize Western thinking and planning; reliance on bilateral rather than multilateral approaches to conflict resolution and security planning; an Asian way of war that places less emphasis on the holding of territory, and greater emphasis on the exercise of other forms of military, economic and cultural hegemony; commitment to the principle of non-interference in the internal affairs of other countries; styles of policy-making which favour informality of structure and modalities, form and process as much as substance and outcome; consensus rather than majority rule; and pragmatism rather than idealism; multi-dimensional or comprehensive approaches to security; and roles of the military that go beyond national defence.31 Such an exhaustive list contains many strategic culture-like concepts that pertain more to diplomatic styles and statecraft, and the Southeast Asian arena may not reflect all the above elements (encountered in a more diverse region and encompassing the major Asian powers as well) so

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neatly or comprehensively, though to be sure there is a diversity of worldviews and strategic perspectives which lend colour and character to the different national identities and self-images encountered within Southeast Asia. Furthermore, our original observation of the limited utility of strategic culture as a framework of analysis should be borne in mind. In this regard a number of qualifying observations should be considered. First, it is uncertain how far we ought to treat strategic culture as an independent variable even though we can identify the sources of that culture. We may know enough of what makes strategic culture but not enough of what strategic culture makes, i.e., how strategic culture (as opposed to say, non-cultural variables rooted in the structuralist-realist paradigm or the bureaucratic-organizational paradigm) really affects strategic doctrines and strategic choices. Second, and more importantly, strategic culture can also change over time. It may be amenable to manipulation or “re-construction” by strategic or political élites to provide justification and legitimacy to the status quo. Conversely, long-held aspects of strategic culture may act as an obstacle to innovation and change when changing realities call for adjustment. The culture of dwifungsi has come under increasing challenge in Indonesia where the image of the military was tarnished by its conduct (veering between helplessness or refusal to help and excessive use of force) in the wake of widespread civil disorder, ethnic and religious violence and the re-emergence of strident separatism in East Timor and Aceh. These developments have escalated since the collapse of the Indonesian economy in mid-1997 and the ensuing political and economic turmoil which, against a background of growing clamour for reform and political change, had forced Soeharto from office. It is too early to say whether this crucial defining moment in Indonesia’s history since the 1965 PKI abortive coup will lead to any fundamental change in the political-military culture characterized by the military’s domination of the decision-making process as expressed in dwifungsi, despite the growing constraints on the political role of the military.32 The unfolding turmoil may well emphasize in the minds of other groups in Indonesia the need for the military to play a central role in the stabilization of the country. And although Juwono Sudarsono, Indonesia’s first civilian Defence Minister in forty years, has spoken of the “irreversible” civilianization of the military, he has also warned on various occasions that: “The real danger is if the civilians do not get their act together and the whole political system stalls … then the army, as in Pakistan, could think of a creeping coup.”33 But even if dwifungsi is redefined or ceases to be the dominant military culture, it is unclear whether this will in turn re-shape the wider strategic culture and

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world-view of Indonesia, especially if a strong nationalistic streak continues to influence its perception of the powerful global players. Third, the internal building of a strategic culture can also involve a socalled demonization process or bogey-making that serves a justificatory function which, in the Indonesian case, could be seen in terms of deflecting demands for drastic changes in the role of the military. In October 1995, on the 30th year of the “New Order”, both the military and Soeharto himself sought to play up the threat from communism and communist-like “formless organisations”, in the wake of unfolding political dissent and opposition to Soeharto’s rule. On 20 October, Soeharto warned members of the ruling Golkar Party to look to history to ensure that a Communist revival would not recur in Indonesia.34 While such demonizing may well reflect the shadow-play of military politics and attempts by some factions in the Indonesian armed forces to deflect demands for fundamental changes to the dwifungsi role, it could also be indicative of a reluctance or inability to abandon an old mind-set, couched in the language of the past, when confronting new domestic political challenges. In Malaysia, the deep financial and currency crisis of the late 1990s (undoubtedly the most serious challenge to the political legitimacy of Mahathir) and the ensuing political crisis that followed the dismissal of then Deputy Prime Minister Anwar Ibrahim, also witnessed a demonization process of a kind at work, which focused on currency speculators like George Soros, “internal enemies” and the spectre of neo-colonialism.35 There were resounding echoes of the rhetoric encountered during the severe economic recession of the mid-1980s when official concern had been variously expressed over the “economic attack” on the country by the developed countries of the West. It has been observed that, “Although the term ‘attack’ may be misleading, the underlying concern (e.g., over the drastic decline in commodity prices, steep appreciation of the yen, adverse changes in capital flows and investments and inappropriate domestic economic policies) is real.”36 Indeed, one interpretation of Malaysia’s strategic culture (which is deemed to have been derived from the culture of the politically dominant indigenous group) has delved into the distant past and placed the deeply-rooted Malay perception of foreign domination and the “perfidy of the West” in the “original calamity” of the fall of the Malacca Sultanate to the Portuguese in 1511.37 In considering security culture it is useful to bear in mind that the articulation of threats can come about through a demonization process. Fourth, while pragmatism may be seen as one defining element of AsiaPacific strategic culture, it could also be looked upon as another overlay that serves to moderate an even deeper-rooted strategic culture. How

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Indonesia and Malaysia pragmatically but unobtrusively (through a process of creative ambiguity) sought to moderate or override (but not abandon) the ZOPFAN syndrome while developing unobtrusive security co-operation with the United States is worthy of some mention. The culture of pragmatism has also enabled Singapore to reconcile a strategy of deterrence with a policy of conscious confidence-building and cultivation of economic interdependence with its two immediate neighbours. One may also ask whether there is a culture of professionalism in military or security cooperation that cuts across traditional strategic cultures. A variant of the cultural-overlay factor has been observed in the Thai case where “tensions between different layers of culture” have made possible the existence of “opposing strategic directions”, whereby “the cultural reproduction of identifying enemies and the sacred duties of defending the nation with force” are moderated by “a layer of culture informed by ‘power assimilation’, the idea of social impermanence and the constant changes of the self.”38 Fifth, while strategic culture can admittedly be delimited and manipulated by the dominant political group, the symbolic “discourse” and deployed analogies can in certain cases also have a socializing effect on those who manipulate the process. Within ASEAN, it can be said that “discourse” has augmented a pervading security culture which de-emphasizes the use or threat of the use of military force in intra-mural relations. This is borne out in practice by the absence of violence among the old ASEAN members since the founding of the regional association. ASEAN, however, has expanded its strategic frontiers to include the whole of Southeast Asia. It remains to be seen whether the new members of ASEAN (Cambodia, Vietnam, Laos, and Myanmar), three of which had been protagonists of ASEAN in the past, will be effectively socialised into the mainstream ASEAN security culture. Perhaps the real test of the durability of this culture will come when future regional crises in inter-state political relations emerge. Notes 1

2

3

Michael J. Mazarr, “Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay”, Washington Quarterly 19, no. 2 (Spring 1996): 117. Jack L. Snyder, The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options (Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1977). Ken Booth, Strategy and Ethnocentrism (New York: Holms and Meier, 1979).

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5

6

7

8

9

Examples of such works are Lin Chong-Pin, China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition Within Evolution (USA: Lexington Books, 1988); Allen Whiting’s The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence (The University of Michigan Press, 1975); Zhang Shu Guang, Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations 1949–1958 (Cornell University Press, 1992) and Edward Boylan “The Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare”, Comparative Strategy 3, no. 4 (1982): 341–63. Alastair Iain Johnson, Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995), also offers a valuable critique of the various attempts in Western and Chinese strategic literature to apply the concept of strategic culture to analyze Chinese strategic thought and behaviour. Jack Snyder, “The Concept of Strategic Culture : Caveat Emptor”, in Strategic Power: USA/USSR, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen, p. 4 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990). Johnston, op. cit., p. 36. That cultural explanations can have their utility “when all else fails” is borne out in Stephen J. Morris’ attempt to turn ot political culture for explanations of Cambodia’s self-damaging actions (vis-à-vis its communist neighbour, Vietnam) during the regime of the Khmer Rouge, the behaviour of whose leaders “makes no sense from the perspective of any theory that incorporates a ‘rational actor’ assumption.” (Stephen J. Morris, Why Vietnam Invaded Cambodia: Political Culture and the Causes of War [Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1999], p. 16.) Morris provides an interesting construction of the mind-sets and cultural values behind a millenarian ideology which distorted the importance to that chiliastic and paranoid regime of subjective factors (e.g., revolutionary purity and willpower) over any objective calculation of military force. However, the sudden and dramatic economic downturn which plagued the East Asian economies since mid-1997 has spawned a range of explanatory literature which focused far more on structural causative factors rooted in a globalising economy and issues of governance. The resort to cultural analysis by comparison has been far more discerning and circumspect. This was most overtly expressed on the occasion of the 1995 ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting when then Australian Foreign Minister, Gareth Evans, sought cartographically to place his country at the centre of East Asia. Desmond Ball, “Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region”, Security Studies 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993): 44–74.

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11

12

13

14 15

16

17

18

19

20

Alastair Iain Johnston, “Thinking About Strategic Culture”, International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 1955): 32–64. Elsewhere, Johnston has sought to distinguish the so-called second generationists as those who recognize the possibility of disjunction between strategic culture (which could remain at the level of myths) and strategic behaviour. The “third generationists” who emerged in the 1990s for their part, tend to reflect a more rigorous but eclectic approach with respect to their methodology and empirical focus, although like the first and second generationists they challenge the traditional structuralrealist paradigm (see Johnston, op. cit., pp. 15–19.) Ken Booth and Russell Trood, eds., Strategic Cultures in the AsiaPacific Region (London, Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1999). Ken Booth, “The Concept of Strategic Cultures Affirmed”, in Strategic Power: USA/USSR, ed. Carl G. Jacobsen, p. 121 (London: Macmillan, 1990). Ball, op. cit., pp. 44–45. Yitzhak Klein, “A Theory of Strategic Culture”, Contemporary Strategy 10, no. 2, (Jan–Mar. 1990): 4–5, and cited in Stephen Peter Rosen, “Military Effectiveness: Why Society Matters”, International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995): 13. Dorodjatun Kuntjoro-Jakti and T.A.M Simatupang, “Indonesia: Defence Expenditures in the Period of the New Order, 1967–85”, in Defence Spending in Southeast Asia, ed. Chin Kin Wah, p. 113 (Singapore, ISEAS, 1987). See Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia’s Strategic Culture: Ketahanan Nasional, Wawasan Nusantara and Hankamrata”, Australia-Asia Papers no. 75 (Centre for the Study of Australia-Asia Relations, Griffith University, May 1996). One could say that former Prime Minister Lee Kuan Yew’s construction of Singapore’s history, through the first volume of his highly publicised memoirs which appeared in 1998, was also a significant contribution to the reinforcement of this public psyche, especially among young Singaporeans who have little awareness of Singapore’s turbulent past and might tend therefore to take independence for granted. (See Lee Kuan Yew, The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew [Singapore: Times Editions, 1998], especially his chapters on merger and separation.) Address by Prime Minister Goh Chok Tong, “Singapore National Day Rally 1995” (Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1995), pp. 26–27. Ibid.

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22

23 24 25 26

27

28

29

30

31 32

33

34 35

36

37

38

Chandran Jeshurun, “Malaysia: The Delayed Birth of a Strategic Culture”, in Booth and Trood, op. cit., p. 231. Hamzah Bin Ahmad, Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone (Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 1988), p. 3. Sunday Times, (Malaysia), 12 February 1995. Ibid. ISIS Focus, no. 17, August 1986, p. 17. Muthiah Alagappa, “Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries”, in Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global, ed. Robert A. Scalapino, Seizaburo Sato, Jusuf Wanandi, and Sung-joo Han. Research Papers and Policy Studies 26, p. 67 (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988). See David W.P. Elliott, “Vietnam: Tradition Under Challenge”, in Booth and Trood, op. cit., pp. 121–23. Muthiah Alagappa, “Military Professionalism and the Developmental role of the Military in Southeast Asia”, in Soldiers and Stability in Southeast Asia, ed. J. Soedjati Djiwandono and Yong Mun Cheong. (ISEAS: Singapore, 1988), p. 16. In Myanmar, a persisting concern over national disintegration and foreign domination and the entrenched role of the military in political life continue to be the hallmark of its security culture. Sukhumbhand Paribatra, “Thailand: Defence Spending and Threat Perceptions”, in Chin Kin Wah, ed., op. cit., p. 105. Ball, op. cit., pp. 46–47. The domestic law-and-order function of the military has also been redefined with the separation of the police force from the military.

Straits Times, 23 October 1995. In his 1999 New Year message, Prime Minister Mahathir renewed his warning that “certain powers” (including their leaders, media, traders, international agencies, rating agencies and banks) were out to colonize Malaysia. (Straits Times, 2 January 1999.) Muthiah Alagappa, “Comprehensive Security: Interpretations in ASEAN Countries”, op. cit., p. 66. Chandran Jeshurun, Malaysia: The Delayed Birth of a Strategic Culture”, in Booth and Trood, op. cit., pp. 228–29. Chaiwat Satha-Anand, “Thailand: The Layers of a Strategic Culture”, in Booth and Trood, op. cit., pp. 154–61.

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

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20 Derek da Cunha

2 Asia-Pacific Security: Strategic Trends and Military Developments Derek da Cunha

INTRODUCTION

An assessment of the economic prospects of the Asia-Pacific region in 1996 would have come up with a glowing picture of economically vibrant economies attracting enormous amounts of investment capital from around the world.1 From the standpoint of 1996, the short and medium term economic prospects for most of the economies of the Asia-Pacific looked good. A year later, however, that optimism became less apparent. Currency crises and attendant stock market declines that afflicted South Korea and Hong Kong and five of the most dynamic economies of Southeast Asia — namely, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand — called into question the earlier upbeat assessment about the region’s economic prospects. The financial turmoil was also to have implications beyond merely the economic. Indeed, it was to have strategic implications, though these were not apparent throughout the whole of the Asia-Pacific region. Keeping the above backdrop in mind, this chapter analyses a number of broad regional strategic trends in recent years, speculating on their ultimate direction over the medium and long terms. The chapter first focuses on Northeast Asia. It will be noted that insofar as Northeast Asia is concerned, the Asian economic crisis, now over, had not really changed the course of strategic trends there. This was principally because apart from South Korea and Hong Kong, the economies of Northeast Asia were relatively insulated from the Asian financial contagion.2 The second part of this

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chapter looks at Southeast Asia by examining some aspects of the weapons procurement programmes of, and apparent changes in military doctrine by, a number of Southeast Asian states during the 1990s. It will attempt to ascertain how economic difficulties, occasioned by the depreciation of regional currencies and falls in stock markets, had impacted on defence budgets, with consequences for weapons acquisition programmes and the overall effectiveness of regional armed forces. THE EVOLVING STRATEGIC SITUATION IN NORTHEAST ASIA North Korea

The Korean peninsula remains the key focus of any assessment of security threats in the Asia-Pacific region simply because the peninsula remains one of the most militarized places in the world. Along its side of the 38th parallel, North Korea deploys the world’s largest commando force of more than 80,000 men at the van of a one-million-strong army and enormous concentrations of artillery well within range of many targets across the demilitarized zone,3 including Seoul (where about a quarter of South Korea’s population is located). The prospects for conflict on the peninsula have tended to ebb and flow in recent times as a result of a combination of factors. These have included North Korea’s severe and chronic famine; the North’s sharp economic decline and the attendant realization by the Pyongyang regime that as each year passes, and its weapons systems continue to degrade for lack of spare parts and maintenance, the conventional military balance on the peninsula continues to shift in favour of the South. As the conventional balance shifts, North Korea could well lean more heavily on its arsenal of weapons of mass destruction, including chemical weapons — the sort of weapons, the use of which would be abhorrent to the public conscience and a violation of the most fundamental norms and principles of humanitarian law. In its past conduct, however, the North Korean regime has shown itself oblivious to both the public conscience and humanitarian law. It is unclear how the onset of the financial crisis in South Korea in late 1997 and throughout 1998 would have affected North Korean calculations of the military balance on the peninsula. On the one hand, because of the crisis, the economic gap between the two Koreas had narrowed somewhat, albeit momentarily. As such, North Korea might well have felt less insecure. It could have considered less pressing any desire it might have had previously to initiate some kind of military action to forestall a widening of the already significant economic and military lead South Korea possessed

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over it. In other words, paradoxically, the financial crisis that set-in in late 1997 might well have had an indirect stabilizing effect on the Korean peninsula. Putting aside the security implications of the Asian economic crisis, a crisis which now no longer obtains, from the standpoint of June 2000 and the summit between North and South Korean leaders in Pyongyang, it appears that conflict on the peninsula is somewhat remote, though the situation could so easily change due to the unpredictable nature of the North Korean regime. Whatever the scenario, the longer term outlook for the Korean peninsula is unification of some sort between the two Koreas. This could result in a substantial drawdown of U.S. troops from both Korea and Japan. Such a drawdown would ultimately erode stability in Northeast Asia and the wider Asia-Pacific region. Japan

If the Korean peninsula is a more immediate security issue in Northeast Asia, uncertainty over the direction of Japanese strategic policy appears to be a potentially longer term issue of concern. In recent times there has been a perception of gradual policy changes affecting Japan’s strategic outlook — the sort of changes that could well prefigure a more assertive Japan in the future.4 Some of the changes that could well see a significant increase in Japanese military capabilities include Japan’s establishment of a Defence Intelligence Headquarters in January 1997 to co-ordinate all defence-related intelligence activities,5 suggesting a greater reliance by Japan on its own intelligence capabilities and, inversely, less on those of the United States. Yet another change has involved the guidelines to the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty; this could well see an enhanced role for Japan in the alliance relationship.6 Japanese statements about security issues have also witnessed a recent modification in tone. Previously, such statements spoke about the key concern of the Korean peninsula and then made reference to “other contingencies” — the phrase “other contingencies” was interpreted widely as an allusion to China. Now, however, the Japanese are more explicit, less coy, in their references to China. This has clearly been seen in the more recent White Papers on Defence put out by the Japanese Defense Agency.7 If the Japanese are now less constrained in articulating their concerns about China, they are equally less constrained when it comes to expressions of neo-nationalism. These expressions have been most vividly exemplified in the increasing number of Japanese politicians openly paying homage at

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the Yasukuni Shrine to Japan’s war dead, which include Class A criminals from World War II.8 While subtle and not-so-subtle changes to Japanese policies and attitudes might add up to merely piecemeal and fragmentary evidence of a Japan appearing to move in a certain direction,9 other evidence might seem more compelling. Here, the issue is not one of change, but rather a lack of it. This is illustrated in the Japanese Self-Defense Forces’ weapons programmes and the legacy left by the Cold War. The Japanese Maritime Self-Defense Force (JMSDF), for example, continues a warship-building programme that will see the induction into the fleet of more formidable Kongo-class destroyers equipped with the Aegis area defence system. This building programme was conceived during the height of the Cold War, essentially for contingencies against the Soviet Pacific Fleet. The continuation of this programme is significant. Indeed, it is as well to note that the Japanese navy deploys one of the largest fleets of major surface combatants in the world (just second to the U.S. Navy).10 During the Cold War that fleet was tasked, among other things, with the responsibility of establishing an anti-submarine warfare and air defence screen, covering the advance towards the Soviet coast of U.S. fleet striking carrier battlegroups. With the Soviet threat no more, the Japanese fleet has lost one of the key purposes of its existence. Yet, it continues to enhance its capabilities (including a plan to acquire specialized intelligence-gathering ships) and this might well be reflective of the Japanese navy staff’s increasing operational aspirations. The bottomline with regard to Japan, is that strategic competition with China could well be conceivable at some point in the foreseeable future.11 This would highlight the possibility of eventual full-scale Japanese rearmament. That rearmament could take place over the next 20 to 30 years, a period which would constitute ample time for Japan to shake off the yoke of the pacifist sentiment that currently is so firmly entrenched in its body politic. The question that then arises is what would Japanese rearmament actually look like. The acquisition of nuclear weapons, ballistic missiles, and long-range bombers would, in short, represent the key elements of Japanese rearmament. The Japanese have stockpiled sufficient plutonium to develop nuclear weapons,12 and they have civilian rocket and aerospace programmes that could, with relative ease, be converted to the production of ballistic missiles and long-range bombers that, in a 7-year crash programme, they could field in strength.13 A rearmed Japan, if it does become a reality (and this is still very uncertain), would likely be a consequence of two key developments: a

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unified Korea (mentioned earlier) and Japanese perceptions that the locus of power in the Asia-Pacific had shifted decisively away from the United States to China. It would seem then that the central issue is one of power — or, to be more precise, the exercise of power as founded on classical raison d’êtat, and how such an exercise can have causal effects of immense strategic magnitude. China

The steady accretion of economic and military power by China represents one of the key defining features of the contemporary world. In 50 years’ time, it is likely that China would be in the full plenitude of its power, and there is a confection of theories as to how Chinese power will impact upon the rest of the Asia-Pacific.14 One such theory is touched upon in the foregoing, that is, a possible response by Japan and the spawning of SinoJapanese strategic competition. Another theory has it that China will change internally politically, becoming a more democratic country and integrating itself irreversibly into the international state system as a status quo power and as a force for peace and stability. But rather than gaze into the opacity of the distant future by enumerating theories, it might be more fruitful to analyse the near future based on recent developments and current trends in the military sphere. The Chinese military exercises in and around the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 were probably one of the most significant security-related developments to take place in the Asia-Pacific in recent times, and for a number of reasons. First, the exercises were an egregious aspect of Chinese military demarche in relation to Taiwan.15 Second, they followed by just a year the Chinese encroachment on the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands. And, third, the exercises revealed, in the starkest possible way, the extent of the People’s Liberation Army’s (PLA’s) deficiencies in a whole gamut of operations. It would be appropriate to deal first with the initial two points by quoting a Malaysian analyst, who has said that in its diplomacy, particularly in relation to the South China Sea, China has engaged in what he calls a “three-steps-forward, two-steps-back strategy”.16 What he apparently means is that Beijing would, for example, advance into the South China Sea — such as it did onto Mischief Reef — and then, when there is a regional outcry, would appear conciliatory, that is to say, take two steps back, but without relinquishing the gains it made in its advance. If one accepts that particular theory then it would appear that in the immediate period following

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the discovery of the Chinese incursion onto Mischief Reef, Beijing had moved into the two-steps-back phase. This perhaps would seem to be illustrated by two events in 1997: in the first, the Chinese showed their conciliatory side by agreeing to co-chair with the Philippines, and in Beijing, an intersessional meeting of the ASEAN Regional Forum on Confidence Building Measures. This was an inspired move by China, even if the meeting itself had more than its fair share of problems. Secondly, during the sporadic episodes over the Diaoyutai/Senkakus earlier in the same year, the Chinese demonstrated admirable restraint in the face of what they saw as provocative expressions of Japanese nationalism. These aspects of responsible behaviour by Beijing did not appear emblematic of future Chinese conduct. This is because in late 1998, the Chinese renewed their assertiveness in the South China Sea by turning their “fishermen’s huts” on Mischief Reef into full-fledged fortifications. The Chinese had waited for the region to lower its guard — preoccupied as the Southeast Asian states were with the regional financial crisis — before making a further tactical move in the South China Sea. We now come to the third reason why the PLA exercises in March 1996 were significant — the deficiencies they revealed. Slowly but surely, the truth about the performance of PLA units during those exercises has been coming out into the open. Almost everything that could go wrong during the exercises did. For example, due to a communications lag, the PLA could only manoeuvre about 10 per cent of the approximately 150,000 troops it had deployed.17 More stark perhaps was the PLA’s inability to coordinate aircraft, warships and ground forces in combined arms operations.18 This was particularly apparent during bad weather, which led to almost a complete halt in the PLA’s air operational activity. The only aspect of the PLA exercises which went off without apparent problems was the launching of the Scud-type M-9 missiles, which hit their designated target-areas — symbolically, at the entrances/exits to the Taiwan Strait. PLA deficiencies are one reason, among several, why China has decided to invest billions of dollars to acquire advanced Russian weapons systems, from diesel-electric submarines, to multi-role combat aircraft,19 to highaltitude air defence systems,20 and so on. It is clear that Russian weaponry is making a material difference to Chinese military capabilities. However, the kinds of Russian weapons systems and quantities being delivered to China are not in themselves sufficient to have a significant impact on the regional balance of power. What would have such an impact is if the Chinese were, for example, to acquire between 80 and 100 Tu-26 Backfire bombers (about two air regiments) from the Russians. The maritime

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version of that formidable medium-range strike aircraft had been conceived by the Russians during the Cold War as one of their principal weapons systems intended to range out of the Russian landmass and strike at US carrier battlegroups. If Beijing were to acquire 80-100 Tu-26 Backfires, that would vastly magnify Chinese conventional military capabilities and have an appreciable effect on the regional balance — that is, if those capabilities are matched directly against the capabilities of the key regional balancer, the United States. United States

The deployment to the East China Sea in March 1996 of two U.S. battlegroups led by the aircraft carriers Independence and Nimitz was possibly the most significant U.S. military move in the region in a decade. It was also an event at once momentous and deceptive. That deployment was hailed by some observers as the United States providing a deterrent to the Chinese in relation to Taiwan. This writer would take a different view. The fact of the matter is that it had already been agreed at the highest levels of the American and Chinese governments that no untoward incident would occur during that deployment. Therefore, to describe the events in and around the Taiwan Strait in March 1996 as a classic example of Peking Opera,21 would not in fact be too far off the mark. The real objective of the American deployment, rather than intending to deter the Chinese, was to retrieve American credibility in the Asia-Pacific, which had suffered some erosion through Washington’s relative neglect of the region over the previous years. Washington’s credibility has indeed been retrieved, but there is a caveat. The fact is that if the Chinese had real intentions of engaging in actual military operations against Taiwan, they would not give any notice, let alone the several months notice to the international community of their planned exercises, and at least the Nimitz carrier battlegroup would not be seen anywhere near the East China Sea — it would still be sailing somewhere in the Arabian Sea. Here, the issue of warning time is important, and so too is the issue of the physical presence of forces to provide visibility and, ipso facto, a deterrent effect. But it is not quite clear whether the Americans are having that particular effect. In their rhetorical policy U.S. officials have said that the Chinese were so impressed by the U.S. carrier battlegroup deployment that Beijing had since begun to take countermeasures (such as the deal to acquire formidable Sovremenny class antiship destroyers from Russia –– a deal which in fact was negotiated before the Taiwan Strait episode).22 This is a feeble and unconvincing assertion.

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The most emphatic evidence in counterpoint to that assertion was China agreeing, in late 1996, to allow the U.S. Navy to continue to make port calls to Hong Kong after its reversion to China’s sovereignty on 1 July 1997.23 That Beijing specifically extended to the U.S. Navy rights to call into Hong Kong is very telling. In this writer’s opinion, what it says is that over the medium term, China would not be especially concerned with an American regional military presence, if only to forestall Japanese rearmament, which the Chinese would view with greater alarm.24 Here, Chinese realpolitik calculations of what they consider to be the greater and lesser evil become all too apparent. The question of the U.S. military presence in the Asia-Pacific region is a complex one that would require an essay in its own right rather than the cursory treatment given to it here. However, the key points to note are that: • Almost the entire U.S. military presence is hedged up in one corner of the Asia-Pacific, in Northeast Asia. By and large that presence has little utility to the rest of the region, simply because it is overwhelmingly ground force and air force in orientation, whereas the regional operating environment is largely maritime in nature. Only a single carrier battlegroup, the Independence (some 7,000 personnel) is deployed in Northeast Asia. • For a variety of reasons the United States does not want to restructure its regional presence, by redeploying naval units from the Atlantic to the Pacific, so as to make its Asia-Pacific presence more relevant to the operating environment. One reason for this is inter-service rivalry within the U.S. Armed Forces. Another reason is sociological — the very nature of U.S. society, which is still overwhelmingly Atlantic-centred in orientation. American society still looks across the Atlantic to Europe for social and cultural direction. The United States is not about to diminish the significance of Europe simply because of the Asia-Pacific’s economic ascendance. This is not least due to the power of the Eastern Establishment, that concatenation of cultural, economic, and political élites that gravitate around the U.S. East Coast. Such élites are quite happy to enjoy all the trade and investment opportunities that the AsiaPacific has to offer, but when it comes to security, it is largely an ironclad U.S. security guarantee to South Korea and Japan but, as the catchphrase has it, it is “strategic ambiguity” for the rest of the region, including Southeast Asia. It is for these reasons, among others, that since the mid-1980s there has been a robust military modernization and expansion programme by the ASEAN states, which was temporarily put on hold (by most of the countries,

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except Singapore and Brunei) during the Asian economic crisis in 1997 and 1998. It would appear that the attitude of the governments of the ASEAN states has been that if the United States does provide assistance in the event of conflict, this would in fact constitute a bonus, but — like any responsible government — they would not be banking on it in the formulation of any of their contingency plans. The Asian economic crisis of 1997–98 was however to result in a shift in the relative influence of the United States vis-à-vis the ASEAN states. In short, the U.S. position was considerably strengthened as Washintgon, through the International Monetary Fund, provided bailout funds to the stricken economies of Thailand and Indonesia. The desire of the ASEAN states to see the United States as a key determinant of their security — defined in the broadest sense — suddenly became more apparent. Whether this will continue to be the case as the ASEAN economies’ recovery from the Asian crisis picks up speed remains to be seen. WEAPONS PROCUREMENT AND MILITARY DOCTRINE IN SOUTHEAST ASIA Doctrinal Changes

Prior to the Asian economic crisis, there was an obvious trend by the ASEAN states to minister to their own security requirements, as they saw a United States treating the region with benign neglect. In that regard, within regional defence establishments, there were conscious attempts to modify defence doctrines to keep up with global trends. Thus, some of the ASEAN states began to lay stress on a range of conventional military operations, where prominence has been given to air and naval power, as witnessed in the induction into the various armed forces of a range of aircraft and warships since the mid-to-late 1980s. Many of the factors encouraging this build-up are well known and need not be repeated here.25 However, it would be remiss not to say that much of the air and naval acquisitions have been in recognition of some of the developments that have occurred in the South China Sea over the past decade. They have been part of a desire by some ASEAN states to extend outwards national defence perimeters. In pursuit of those objectives, there has been a steady and phlegmatic adaptation by some of the ASEAN states’ armed forces of a few military concepts made fashionable in the West and elsewhere. One of these has been combined arms operations — an alluring military concept but, as these armed forces have discovered, one which is not easy to put into practice. An example would be the use of land-based aircraft in

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support of naval forces by, for example, having fighters sortie out of airbases to cover the emergence of a naval strike force into the South China Sea. The common problems in applying such an eminently sound military concept are, generally, deficient command, control and communications (C3) systems (that might otherwise allow for co-ordinated and sustained operations), and equally deficient target detection, discrimination and acquisition systems. These problems have not, however, held back some of the ASEAN states’ armed forces from attempting to achieve some element of joint force operational proficiency. Other changes in military doctrine have also been attempted. As a result of technological innovations in weapons systems and related equipment, a significant reduction in armed forces manpower is now conceivable. This allows for the deployment of smaller, tactically adroit forces capable of achieving a far greater range of missions in pursuit of national security objectives. More significantly, in an era where rapid reaction is a key requirement for military establishments, it allows for swift and maximum force generation. Also, in consonance with developments among armed forces around the world, some national military doctrines in Southeast Asia are now deemphasizing defensive operations in favour of the offensive, as exemplified in the concept of “strike warfare”. The central idea that appears to be animating the movement to the emphasis on offensive operations is the fact that warning times for potential conflict are steadily being reduced, placing a premium on pre-emptive strikes. This is notwithstanding the increasing enhancement of intelligence capabilities by many states in the Asia-Pacific, including those in ASEAN. Moreover, the destructiveness of new missile systems, and their ability to achieve a saturation effect, allows for a devastating decapitating first strike to be launched on an enemy — a strike from which the enemy would not be able to recover or put together any kind of significant response. Attempts at adapting and applying new military concepts and doctrines have been accompanied by an increasing physical re-orientation of aircraft and warships by the ASEAN states towards the South China Sea. This is, for example, seen in the increasing number of routine patrols made by Malaysian air force aircraft and navy vessels across the expanse of the South China Sea since the early 1990s. This development is clearly intended to improve the reaction time of the Malaysian air force and navy in relation to South China Sea contingencies (such as those related to the Spratly Islands and Malaysia’s 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zones). A similar trend is noted by the Indonesian armed forces. The

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Indonesian armed forces have deployed more aircraft and warships for operations in and around the Natuna Islands since the mid-1990s.26 This effort culminated in a 17-day major air and sea exercise in September 1990. The exercise involved about 20,000 troops, more than 50 combat aircraft and some 30 warships.27 This represented a significant display of an external defence capability by a country whose armed forces have always been predominantly internally oriented. The Indonesians said that the exercise was intended to demonstrate their ability to defend the Natunas, its surrounding waters, and huge gas reserves (said to amount to 6.3 trillion cubic metres). National Interest and Symbolism

A large part of the weapons acquisitions made by the ASEAN states in recent years clearly reflects the individual national interests and security objectives of each state. Each of the states have different levels of insecurity and, as such, generally acquire the kind of weapons systems and in quantities that might ameliorate such insecurity. Thus, where national security is concerned, what might be at stake for some ASEAN states is, for example, just a few offshore islands; while for others, the security imperatives might be far more critical. In this kind of asymmetrical situation of threat perception (and reality), particular weapons systems might have more significance symbolically than operationally: they would clearly be reflective of a state’s level of insecurity or perception of threat to its security. To see weapons systems in merely operational terms tends to miss the point. They are also symbols — albeit expensive symbols — of state power. And in Asia, symbolism is as important, if not more important, than substance. CONCLUSION

The strategic situation in the Asia-Pacific is complex and continues to be fluid in the post-Cold War era. The fact that one refers to the current period as the “post-Cold War era” suggests that the international state system, particularly in the Asia-Pacific region, is still in a stage of transition towards something that is as yet indefinable. With that being the case, tried and tested approaches to security continue to be employed by Asia-Pacific states in attempting to enhance their security. In many respects, the Realist approaches of balance-of-power and self-help are the main mechanisms adopted by Asia-Pacific states. However, there is a division between the

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degree to which balance-of-power is employed in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. As the great powers are more apparent in Northeast Asia, and where residual elements of the Cold War still obtain (such as across the Taiwan Strait and on the Korean peninsula, albeit now the latter witnessing a thaw), the balance-of-power approach is much more in evidence there. In Southeast Asia, on the other hand, self-help — through an armaments build-up — and the shoring up of the geopolitical weight of ASEAN through its expanded membership in the last years of the 1990s, appears to be key elements by which the Southeast Asian states have opted to enhance their sense of security, individually and regionally. There is unlikely to be much change to this approach over the medium term. Between the two regions of the Asia-Pacific, it is clear that strategic developments in Northeast Asia could have more of a bearing and impact on Southeast Asia, than is the reverse. Two major issues could generate that impact: a precipitous U.S. military withdrawal from Northeast Asia as a result of Korean unification; and the coming into being of some element, if not full blown, Sino-Japanese strategic competition. Both of these developments would likely reverberate Asia-Pacific-wide. And the prospects of both occurring at some stage in the foreseeable future cannot be ruled out. To that extent, Asia-Pacific states are likely to find the new millennium a challenging time in the security realm — one that is likely to exercise the minds of officials in regional defence and foreign ministries for many years to come.

Notes 1

2

3

The key exception was, of course, Japan, which continued to suffer from indifferent economic prospects after the deflation of its bubble economy in 1989–90. The stock market in Hong Kong was, however, buffeted by the financial turbulence sweeping Southeast Asia, though the Hong Kong Government’s tenacious defence of the Hong Kong dollar ensured the continued peg of that currency to the U.S. dollar. One source has put the strength of the North Korean Special Purposes Forces at 88,000. However, like the rest of the North Korean armed forces, it is likely that the operational readiness of that force is low and continues to decline due to shrinking resources. See, The Military Balance 1999/2000 (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1999), p. 183.

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32 Derek da Cunha 4

5

6

7

8

9

10

11

12

William Dawkins, “Japan shoulders arms for Asian stability”, Financial Times, 10 June 1997, p. 7; and, Ralph A. Cossa, “In defense of Japan’s new regional role”, Asia Times, 16 January 1997, p. 7. See “Tokyo to set up giant military spy agency”, Straits Times, 24 May 1996, p. 22; “Japan to set up military intelligence agency next month”, Straits Times, 2 December 1996, p. 2; “Japan’s Defence Agency opens its biggest spy organization”, Straits Times, 21 January 1997, p. 18; and, “Tokyo ‘to beef up regional military intelligence’ ”, Straits Times, 13 August 1997, p. 16.. See, variously, Nigel Holloway and Sebastian Moffett, “Cracks in the armour”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 2 May 1996, pp. 14–16; “US ‘yes’ to defence guidelines under Tokyo charter”, Sunday Times, 5 May 1996, p. 1; “US-Japan defence pact won’t specify areas covered”, Straits Times, 5 September 1997, p. 26; and, “US and Japan seek backing on security”, Straits Times, 24 September 1997, p. 17. Kwan Weng Kin, “China a more serious threat than Russia, says Japan”, Straits Times, 20 July 1996, p. 3. See “8 Japan Cabinet members visit war shrine”, Straits Times, 16 August 1997, p. 22; and, “Japan war shrine visit shows right-wing’s rise”, Straits Times, 25 April 1997, p. 32. “Japan’s defense agency tests the waters”, Asia Times, 31 January 1997, p. 7. Prospective cuts to the Japanese Defence Agency’s budget for new weapons systems for the five-year period ending March 2001 will see earlier plans for 8 “escort” ships (that is, destroyers) being axed. This, however, will not significantly affect the JMSDF surface fleet’s numerical strength. (See “Japan to spend much less on weapons systems”, Straits Times, 8 August 1997, p. 24) Also, relative to the U.S. Navy, for example, the JMSDF surface fleet is maintained at a higher state of operational readiness. It would be able to put a higher percentage of vessels at sea at a moment’s notice than that of the U.S. Navy’s destroyer force. François Godement, “Weighing up the conflict factor between China and Japan”, Asia Times, 10 June 1997, p. 8. See also Derek da Cunha, “Strain Ahead Between China and Japan”, International Herald Tribune, 21 July 1993, p. 3. The ability of Japan to use its plutonium stockpile to produce nuclear weapons is examined in the essay by Jinzaburo Takagi, “Japan’s Plutonium Program: A Critical review”, in Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security, edited by Selig S.

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13

14

15

16

17

18 19

20

21 22

23

Harrison (Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996), pp. 69–85. For observations on the ability of the Japanese to switch with relative ease from civilian to military production see Derek da Cunha, “Japan pushes hard to beef up its military intelligence”, Straits Times, 4 July 1996, p. 44. For a more detailed and historical elaboration of the point, see Richard J. Samuels, “Rich Nation Strong Army”: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan (Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1994). For a Southeast Asian view of China, see Derek da Cunha, “Southeast Asian Perceptions of China’s Future Security Role in its ‘Backyard’ ”, in China’s Shadow, Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development, ed. Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard H. Yang (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 1998), pp. 115–26. Derek da Cunha, “Lessons from China’s military theatrics”, Straits Times, 27 March 1996, p. 26. That analyst is B. A. Hamzah, who works on maritime issues in Kuala Lumpur. Richard Halloran, “Glitches in the Chinese military machine”, Trends, No. 72 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996), supplement to the Business Times (Singapore), Weekend Edition, 31 August–1 September 1996, p. 1. Ibid. “Russia sells China licence to build Su-27 fighters”, Sunday Times, 4 February 1996, p. 3; and, “Deal to buy 72 fighter planes from Moscow back on track”, Straits Times, 8 February 1996, p. 18. Dough Tsuruoka, “Moscow sells advanced missiles to anyone with the cash to buy”, Asia Times, 14 December 1995, p. 6. I thank Stuart Harris for this characterization. The announcement in late 1996 that China would acquire two Russianmade Sovremenny-class anti-ship destroyers has been used by U.S. officials as somehow providing evidence of Beijing’s reaction to the U.S. carrier battlegroup deployment. What those U.S. officials conveniently fail to say, however, is that the Chinese and Russians had been negotiating the sale of those destroyers for two years — and more than a year before the Taiwan Strait episode. The first port-call by U.S. Navy warships to Hong Kong after its reversion from British to Chinese sovereignty on 1 July 1997 was made, symbolically, by the U.S. Seventh Fleet flagship, the USS Blue Ridge, in company with two escort vessels, USS Patriot and USS

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24

25

26

27

Guardian, in early August 1997. (See James Kelly, “Third US ship docks as PLA date set”, Hong Kong Standard, 6 August 1997; and, Wong Wai-Yuk, “PLA takes lunch on US warship”, South China Morning Post, 7 August 1997, p. 5.) See Michael Richardson, “What China doesn’t want with Japan is war (because it might lose)”, International Herald Tribune, 3 October 1996, p. 7. See also “US military presence in Asia in China’s interest, says Perry”, Straits Times, 7 December 1996, p. 2. For a detailed enumeration of such factors, see, for example, Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region”, International Security 18, no. 3 (Winter 1993/94): 81; and, Derek da Cunha, “The Need for Weapons Upgrading in Southeast Asia: Present and Future”, ISEAS Working Papers: International Politics and Security Issues, No. 1(96), (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, March 1996), pp. 13–15. See Derwin Pereira, “Indonesia to Deploy Jets to protect Natuna Gas Field”, Straits Times, 12 August 1997, p. 23. There is also an Indonesian intention to acquire a long-range radar balloon to keep a watching brief on the Natunas. See Michael Richardson, “Indonesia considers buying radar balloon to patrol gas field”, International Herald Tribune, 20 August 1997, p. 4. Alan Dupont, “Indonesian Defence Strategy and Security: Time for a Rethink?”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 18, no. 3 (December 1996): 289.

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Evolution of the Security Dialogue Process 35

3 Evolution of the Security Dialogue Process in the Asia-Pacific Region Daljit Singh

INTRODUCTION

There has been a proliferation of security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific since the end of the Cold War. Dialogue has taken a variety of forms: bilateral, multilateral, regional (embracing the entire Asia-Pacific), subregional, official and unofficial. There is also dialogue which deals only with specific disputes or problems. This chapter will focus on the origins and development of the present Asia-Pacific-wide multilateral security dialogue, both at the official and unofficial levels. Here, AsiaPacific is defined to cover East and Southeast Asia, Australasia, the South Pacific islands, Russia (because of its Pacific territories), Mongolia, as well as the United States and Canada because of the economic, security and political linkages of these North American states with East Asia and Australasia. Dialogues must have certain objectives. At the minimum, dialogues are meant to enhance understanding of participants’ thinking and policies and thereby reduce uncertainty. Among the more ambitious goals of dialogue would be to build new institutions to prevent or resolve conflict or a new security architecture to keep the peace. Supporters of security dialogue generally belong to the liberal camp of international relations scholars who believe that dialogue and engagement can, over a period of time, produce better understanding between states and prevent conflict. In contrast, the Realist school, having a more dismal view of human nature, believes that it is only power, operating as a deterrent or a potential

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coercive instrument, that secures and maintains peace. The liberal concept of security also tends to be broader than just military security and would take into account non-conventional aspects like the narcotics trade, transnational crime, migration of peoples and environmental threats. Post-Cold War Asia-Pacific multilateral security dialogue was preceded by economic dialogue, first in unofficial bodies and then between governments. The rapid economic growth of the region and the increasing economic interdependence within it, as well as growing economic and trade frictions, including those between Japan and the United States, generated interest in multilateral economic institutions. Economic dialogue first took place in unofficial bodies like the Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), the Pacific Trade and Development Council PACTAD) — both set up in the 1960s — and the Pacific Economic Co-operation Council (PECC) set up in 1980. Unofficial dialogue paved the way for the establishment in 1989 of the official Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum. Indeed, the networks established by both the unofficial and official economic dialogue helped to overcome the psychological and political inhibitions about Asia-Pacific-wide co-operation and facilitated the subsequent establishment of security dialogue. Also, the value of what has come to be known as Track Two dialogue was first clearly demonstrated in bodies like PBEC, PACTAD, and, in particular, PECC. As will be elaborated below, Asia-Pacific security dialogue, both official and unofficial, had a combination of motivations and objectives. However, the central reasons related to the strategic uncertainty that arose after the end of the Cold War and the many territorial and other disputes that existed in the region with the potential for conflict. If one had to list the four most important reasons, they would be to build better trust and confidence among Asia-Pacific states; to engage and integrate China, a rising power, into the regional and international order; to keep the United States engaged as an indispensable component of the Asia-Pacific strategic balance; and to build institutions to enmesh the countries of a region noted for paucity of common institutions and abundance of historical rivalries and contemporary disputes, in co-operative endeavours.

BACKGROUND Paucity of multilateral dialogue during the Cold War...

Security dialogue as such is not a new phenomenon in the Asia-Pacific region. Indeed, it flourished in the 1920s, but, needless to say, did not

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prevent the Sino-Japanese War in the 1930s and subsequently the Pacific War. During the Cold War there were links between the region’s military forces. For instance, starting from the 1970s, the U.S. Army hosted the Pacific Armies Senior Officers Logistics Seminar which, by the 1990s, brought together military officers from over 20 Asia-Pacific countries, and the Pacific Armies Management Seminar which eventually saw participation by senior officers from over 30 countries. However, these were between the “like-minded”, not across ideological divides, and they were not ventures in co-operative security as presently understood. Asia-Pacific-wide multilateral security dialogue as we know it today, with a large number of countries participating in a variety of different kinds and layers of dialogues is largely a post-Cold War phenomenon. Reasons of history, political and security culture, and strategic diversity precluded its earlier development. First, history. Before World War II, East Asia was dominated by the West and Japan, with many areas carved up into the empires of Britain, France, Japan, the Netherlands and the United States. Western colonialism returned to Indochina, Malaya, Burma and what is now Indonesia in the immediate aftermath of the War. Even before the countries of the region could free themselves from colonial rule, the region was caught up in the East-West Cold War, and later, from the 1960s, a simultaneous East-East Cold War between China and the Soviet Union. Thus, colonial and then Cold War divisions and constraints had prevented the development of any region-wide dialogue activities involving countries and institutes across ideological divides. External security in East Asia during the Cold War tended to be viewed mostly in the Realist framework of deterrence, containment and balance of power. Although the Cold War contest involved various dimensions of power — from economic to military and psychological — the most salient features of security in East Asia were the bilateral military alliances between regional countries and the great powers. These included the bilateral security treaties of the United States with Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines and Thailand, and the trilateral ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand, United States) alliance. (The treaty with Taiwan lapsed with the coming into force of the Taiwan Relations Act in 1979, while the U.S.New Zealand side of the ANZUS pact has been in abeyance since the 1980s). There were also bilateral treaties radiating out from the two communist great powers, the Soviet Union and China. The Soviet Union had military ties with China (until the early 1960s), North Korea, Mongolia and North Vietnam; while China developed its own alliances with North Korea and North Vietnam. Although, parallel to this, a broader, liberal

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concept of security was pursued in parts of Southeast Asia, which will be discussed below, but even its practitioners regarded U.S. military power in the region as critically important for deterrence, though this was not often stated publicly. Secondly, the political culture in East Asia has tended to favour strong states and strong leaders. In much of East Asia, democratic political development has been slow and difficult. According to some scholars, this state of affairs, combined with the reality of a strong sense of nationalism in much of the region, makes it more difficult to develop a regional security community.1 Finally, the enormous political and strategic diversity of the Asia-Pacific region made the development of region-wide security dialogue and co-operation difficult. ... as distinct from multilateral military initiatives

The relative absence of multilateral security dialogue and the salience of bilateral military alliances in the Asia-Pacific region during the Cold War did not mean that there was no security multilateralism of any kind. Indeed, there were significant multilateral initiatives through which countries worked together but, apart from the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in part of the sub-region of Southeast Asia, they were in the Realist mould, relying on military power and deterrence. Furthermore, they were initiated and dominated by the Western powers. They had varying degrees of success. Collective defence was attempted in the Southeast Asian sub-region through the Southeast Asian Collective Defence Treaty signed in Manila in 1954 to contain the spread of communism. Its organizational structure, the Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) was established in Bangkok in 1955. However, out of eight members of the Manila Pact, only two were Southeast Asian. The Treaty was not effective because of the different threat perceptions of members and its original raison d’être was felt to be no more after the U.S.-China rapprochement in the 1970s. The Treaty still exists on paper, but SEATO was disbanded in 1977. Other multilateral endeavours had better success. The U.S. led a multinational force under the auspices of the United Nations to defeat North Korean aggression against South Korea in 1950. The United Nations Command remains in South Korea to this day. In Southeast Asia, the Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement (AMDA, which became the AngloMalaysian Defence Agreement with the establishment of Malaysia in 1963), with which Australia and New Zealand were associated in 1959,

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was successful in resisting the Indonesian Confrontation against Malaysia and Singapore from 1963 to 1966. The Five-Power Defence Arrangements (FPDA) which replaced AMDA in the 1970s is more a consultative arrangement. However, with regular military exercises and an integrated air defence command for Peninsular Malaysia and Singapore, it has, to this day, helped to maintain co-operation between the militaries of the five countries and has underlined the inseparability of the defence of Singapore and Malaysia in the face of any external aggression. ASEAN and Asian Approaches to Security

Even during the Cold War, a dialogue process had become well established among the member states of ASEAN, set up in 1967. It had led, by the late 1970s, to the establishment of a limited security regime through the socialization of these countries into the norm of non-use of force or threat of force against each other that rendered inter-state armed conflict between ASEAN members highly unlikely. Other features of this security regime included non-interference in each other’s domestic affairs, and decisionmaking by consensus. The dialogue process in the ASEAN region embodied certain approaches to security which have been characterized as more Asian than Western and some of these were to be incorporated later in the new Asia-Pacific official dialogue forum, the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). Firstly, there is reluctance to establish elaborate institutional structures. Processes, it is said, are more important than structures. Though ASEAN’s structure, with its plethora of committees and meetings, is by no means slim, the power given to the central organizational machinery, the Secretariat and the Secretary-General, is limited. The rhetoric against institutionalization and the unwillingness to surrender significant sovereignty to a regional authority may reflect in part the relatively brief history of interaction of East Asian countries as modern independent states, as well as memories of old rivalries and animosities. Relatively loose regional mechanisms allow consultation, even co-operation among member states to reduce tensions, enhance reassurance and come together in an ad hoc fashion to deal with common external threats and challenges while retaining maximum autonomy of action. Secondly, many East Asian, and especially ASEAN, countries choose to regard the concept of security as more comprehensive than just military security, thereby allowing more latitude for the development of a dialogue process. The ARF, for instance, recognizes that “the concept of security

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includes not only military aspects but also political, economic, social and other issues”.2 This derives in part from the well-honed sensitivity of the power élites in many countries to the importance of non-military factors, especially economics, in relation to the domestic security threats they have faced in the past. Indeed, in the ASEAN countries it was for long an axiom that socio-economic development and political stability were the answers to the main security threat which they faced in the 1960s and 1970s — namely communist insurgency — as these would deprive the communists of exploitable economic, ethnic or social issues to win this kind of political warfare, just as decolonisation had deprived them of the most important political issue. The Indonesian concepts of national and regional “resilience” and “total people’s defence” illustrate this approach to security as does the Malaysian concept of “comprehensive” security. However, in part the emphasis on comprehensive security may also reflect sensitivities about addressing military security issues. In much of East Asia, there seems to be no tradition of open discussion of military security issues, which are regarded as sensitive. Cultural considerations of “face” and politeness may reinforce this tendency. ORIGINS OF POST-COLD WAR OFFICIAL MULTILATERAL DIALOGUE

The Cold War security thinking first came under challenge in the second half of the 1980s, starting, interestingly, with Mikhail Gorbachev’s 1986 Vladivostok speech calling for a Pacific conference “along the lines of the Helsinki conference” to build confidence and reduce the risks of superpower military confrontation in Northeast Asia. The call was taken up by Australia when Foreign Minister Gareth Evans, in July 1990, proposed a Conference for Security and Co-operation in Asia based on the European model of the same name (CSCE). He referred to “a future Asian security architecture involving a wholly new institutional process that might be capable of evolving in Asia, just as in Europe, as a framework for addressing and resolving security problems... Why should there not be developed a similar institutional framework — a ‘CSCA’ — for addressing the apparently intractable security issues which exist in Asia.”3 There were also calls for the establishment of a Northeast Asian security dialogue, by South Korea in October 19894 and then by Canada, whose Secretary of State Joe Clark proposed a North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue in September 1990. The proposals were opposed by the United States. In the U.S. view, the security of the region was based on U.S. “forward deployed forces, overseas

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bases, and bilateral security arrangements” that the United States had with East Asian countries.5 These, together with the clear naval superiority that the United States enjoyed in the Pacific, a maritime theatre, gave it a dominant overall position which it was not prepared to compromise by giving the Soviet Union a say in regional security through multilateralism. It was feared that Moscow would use multilateralism to reduce the operational flexibility of U.S. military forces in the Pacific, and hence their deterrent value. But with the Cold War coming to an end, the conditions for the establishment of multilateral Asia-Pacific security dialogue improved rapidly. One crucial change was in the attitude of ASEAN. The ASEAN states had been opposed to the imposition of the CSCE model on the region because of its legalistic and institutional approach and its concerns about human rights. They felt that the different situation in the AsiaPacific region — different geography, history, geopolitics, alliance relations, and political cultures — rendered European security concepts inappropriate. ASEAN opposition to the CSCE concept caused Australia to retreat from it but not from the idea that new approaches to security based on confidencebuilding and multilateral dialogue were needed to supplement the American alliance system. Gareth Evans, the Australian Foreign Minister, now suggested that the emphasis “should simply be on dialogue, rather than on trying to force the pace in any institutional way”.6 The end of the Cold War led to a reappraisal in ASEAN of the AsiaPacific security situation and ASEAN’s stance towards it. ASEAN concluded that some form of multilateral security forum was not only needed but was perhaps inevitable in view of the growing sentiment in favour of it. It was needed first and foremost to mitigate the strategic uncertainties of post-Cold War Asia-Pacific revolving around the changing weights of the major powers in the region and the relationships between them. After more than a decade of economic reforms and high growth rates, the power of China was rising relative to that of the other major countries. Some time in the first quarter of the 21st century, the Chinese economy was expected to be of the size of the American economy in GDP terms and then to surpass it. Japan’s weight was also expected to increase if it decided to translate more of its economic strength into political and military power. It was necessary to peacefully manage the rise of the emerging powers so that the dire consequences arising from the international community’s failure to manage the rise of Imperial Germany before World War I and of Japan before World War II could not be repeated. There were also uncertainties about the future of the U.S. military

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presence in the region, in view of the absence of any direct military threat to U.S. security after the end of the Cold War and the continuing domestic budgetary and social problems. The Americans left their bases in the Philippines in 1992 following the decision of the Philippine Senate in 1991 to close them. There were concerns that in the absence of a credible U.S. presence and commitment, there would be destabilizing rivalries and arms races in the region, as the major Asian powers scrambled to fill the power vacuum. Secondly, a security forum was needed for confidence-building because of unresolved conflicts and territorial disputes7 which had acquired greater salience in the absence of the constraints imposed by the Cold War. The most prominent were the situation on the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan issue and the territorial claims in the South China Sea, all potential flashpoints for major conflict. There were also a host of other territorial disputes, a significant portion of them maritime in nature like claims to islands, continental shelves and Exclusive Economic Zones, arising from the new international maritime regime that emerged from the successful completion of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Any of these could become the focus of tensions if political relations between claimant states deteriorated. The military modernization programmes that many countries had embarked upon reinforced the need for transparency and confidence-building. These modernizations, made possible by the rapid economic growth of the previous decade, were often just that. However, the fact remained that they were placing advanced conventional weapons in the armouries of states involved in various disputes. Thirdly, for ASEAN, Southeast Asian security could no longer be separated from the rest of East Asia because of the growing economic and strategic linkages between the two parts. The past decade had witnessed growing market-driven economic integration of Southeast and Northeast Asia. It was desirable to establish a security dialogue to sustain the benefits of economic growth and to better manage possible security spillovers and frictions arising from greater economic interactions and interdependence. Furthermore, the rise of China and signs of its growing nationalism meant that ASEAN would have to deal with a rising superpower of uncertain intentions located on its very borders. China’s disturbing territorial claims in the South China Sea, in the middle of Southeast Asia, provided a dramatic illustration of how East Asia was becoming involved in the security of Southeast Asia. Finally, there was another, though related, impulse: as in the years

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following the two world wars earlier in the century, a new international order was waiting to be shaped at the end of the Cold War. ASEAN wanted to make an input to help shape it, instead of just being a bystander in the march of history or, worse, a victim once again of a history marching to the tune of outside powers. If an Asia-Pacific-wide security grouping looked inevitable, sooner or later it was better for ASEAN to take the initiative and to have some control of the agenda instead of subjecting itself to other powers. In July 1991, the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC) decided that the ASEAN-PMC was an “appropriate base” for the discussion of regional security issues.8 The PMC then had as its members the six ASEAN countries and the seven dialogue partners (Australia, Canada, the European Community, Japan, New Zealand, South Korea and the United States). These included the main players in the Asia-Pacific region except for two, namely China and the Soviet Union, which somehow had to be involved. In January 1992, at the Fourth ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting in Singapore, the Association decided that “ASEAN could use established fora to promote external dialogues on enhancing security in the region... ASEAN shall intensify external dialogues in political and security matters by using the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC).”9 The call for security dialogue with outside powers reflected increased pragmatism and confidence among the ASEAN states. It also reflected some revision of the thinking underlying the 1971 Declaration pronouncing Southeast Asia as a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN). ZOPFAN, in rhetoric and as an ideal, meant keeping the major powers out of Southeast Asia, though the practice had not always conformed with the rhetoric. But now the rhetoric was to be brought closer to reality. As Indonesia’s Foreign Minister Ali Alatas said, “We can’t keep the four powers [the US, China, Japan and the Soviet Union] out of the region. But there must be an equilibrium between them and between them and Southeast Asia.”10 If the economic and strategic linkages that were enmeshing Southeast Asia more and more with East Asia and its major powers meant that ASEAN could not keep out the major powers, it wanted to at least try to “manage” their influence and role so that no great power dominated Southeast Asia. Meanwhile, U.S. policy too was catching up with the new realities. With the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991, it became difficult for those with Cold War mind-sets to continue to cite the Soviet threat as an excuse for not wanting to participate in multilateral security discussions; the growing regional sentiment in favour of such discussions

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made a change of thinking virtually inevitable. Although there were hints of the new thinking in 1992, it was left to the new Clinton Administration which assumed office in early 1993 to publicly support multilateral security dialogue and commit the United States to full participation. This support, however, was forthcoming only on the assumption that the new multilateralism would supplement and not weaken America’s bilateral alliances which, in the U.S. view (shared by many others in the region), remained critically important for regional security and stability. With the change in American thinking, the way was clear for the establishment of a multilateral security forum based on the ASEAN-PMC. China and Russia were invited to the AMMs/PMC first as “guests”, then as “consultative partners”, in preparation for their inclusion in the new forum which was to be called the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF). The ARF was launched at a dinner meeting in Singapore in July 1993 — all the prospective members were then in Singapore for the PMC: the then six ASEAN countries (Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore and Thailand); the three observers at the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (Vietnam, Laos and Papua-New Guinea); the seven dialogue partners of ASEAN (Australia, Canada, the European Community, Japan, South Korea, New Zealand and the United States); and China and Russia. The first formal meeting of the new organization was to take place a year later in Bangkok. It is never easy to establish a new scheme of things, and in particular a new security order in a region like the Asia-Pacific with its complex diversity and history of animosities and rivalries. What facilitated the birth of the ARF was the fact, apparent to all, that it was wanted by many different countries and was not the brainchild of any one great power. The fact that it would be based on the already existent ASEAN-PMC and that ASEAN, a grouping of small and medium-sized countries, would have a leading role no doubt also helped. Naturally, it would not have been possible to set up the ARF if it had not been in the interest of all members, and especially of the four great powers of Asia-Pacific. But hopes and expectations were different. America’s allies and friends in the region shared the view that the Forum would supplement existing bilateral security arrangements, help to tie down the United States further in the region (so that it is regarded as a regional rather than an outside power), and engage China. For America’s principal ally in the region, Japan, the ARF would also enable it, for the first time since World War II, to participate in regional security discussions with other Asia-Pacific countries. For Russia, much weakened in power and

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prestige compared to its Soviet incarnation, the ARF would provide a legitimate locus standi and say in Asia-Pacific security, something which the Soviet Union had sought in vain. To Australia and New Zealand, the ARF would be another vehicle, after APEC, to escape their antipodal isolation by being institutionally enmeshed in the East Asian region. Likewise, the ARF would enable Korea to be further linked to the broader Asia-Pacific region, something it had been striving to do for both economic and strategic reasons, given its unenviable geographic location between three great powers (Japan, China and Russia), each of which, sometime or other in past history, has had predatory designs on it. ASEAN for its part hoped the ARF would allow it to play a role to shape the new Asia-Pacific strategic environment. The one power that had misgivings about the ARF was China. Not clear of the ARF’s true purpose, Beijing must have wondered if it was meant to be a vehicle to criticize China’s external policies and to constrain its growing power. However, Beijing agreed to participate, probably calculating that the price of staying out of the club would be higher than the burdens of participation.11 THE ASEAN REGIONAL FORUM

The ARF meets at Foreign Ministers’ level once every year, immediately after the annual ASEAN Ministerial Meeting (AMM), which is held in rotation in ASEAN countries. Not only is the venue an ASEAN country but the Chairman of the ARF is also the Foreign Minister of the host ASEAN country, and ASEAN plays a major role in setting the agenda and the direction of each ARF meeting, in consultation with other members. This is an unusual state of affairs in view of the fact that ASEAN comprises a group of relatively small countries in a security organization containing all the world’s major powers (India was not a member of the ARF in the beginning but became one in 1996). The first formal meeting of the ARF was held in Bangkok in July 1994. At that stage there was no blueprint or road map. It was understood that the ARF would be developed by improvisation at a pace comfortable to all members and decisions would be by consensus. The meeting lasted only three hours and was taken up mostly with short formal statements by the heads of the 18 delegations. The second meeting in Brunei lasted the whole day. There were discussions on a number of topics, including resumption of nuclear testing in the region, the situation on the Korean peninsula, Myanmar and Cambodia, and even the tensions in the South

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China Sea. More importantly, the meeting made certain decisions regarding structure, methods and approaches. It outlined a three-stage approach for the ARF: Stage 1 would deal with confidence-building measures (CBMs); Stage 2 with the development of preventive diplomacy; and Stage 3 would see “elaboration of approaches to conflicts”, meaning conflict management and resolution, the wording having been chosen to meet Chinese reservations, since Beijing’s view is that conflicts should be resolved bilaterally by the parties directly involved in a conflict, outside the purview of the ARF. The ARF would start with confidence-building, and then proceed to the development of preventive diplomacy, though in certain areas the two stages could proceed in tandem. An annex to the Chairman’s Statement listed various CBMs for example, increase of dialogue on security matters at all levels — bilateral, subregional and regional — including high-level contacts and exchanges between military academies and staff colleges; voluntary submission to the ARF of an annual statement of defence policies; and encouraging participation in the United Nations Conventional Arms Register. The meeting also agreed to establish three intersessional working groups or meetings, each co-chaired by an ASEAN and a non-ASEAN country, to meet between the annual ARF meetings: the Inter-Sessional Working Group on Confidence-Building Measures; the Inter-Sessional Meeting (ISM) on Search and Rescue (SAR) Coordination and Cooperation; and the ISM on Peacekeeping Operations. Finally, the meeting agreed that while active and equal participation would be required of all members, “ASEAN undertakes the obligation to be the primary driving force”.12 The Brunei meeting also decided that the ARF process would move along two tracks — Track One activities would be carried out by governments, while Track Two would be carried out by institutes of strategic studies of member countries. There have been a number of developments since the Brunei meeting, though no significant change in organizational machinery. Firstly, there are four new ARF members: Cambodia joined in 1995, Myanmar and India in 1996, and the decision was taken in 1998 to admit Mongolia in 1999. Secondly, criteria for new members were considered and subsequently adopted by the Third ARF Meeting in Jakarta in 1996. New members would be admitted by consensus of all existing members. They should be in the geographical footprint of the ARF, have relevance for the security of the Asia-Pacific region and be committed to the goals and decisions of the ARF. Thirdly, there has been increased participation in the ARF

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process by defence officials. Finally, another ISM, on Disaster Relief, was added in 1996 following the decision to do so, taken at the Third ARF Meeting in Jakarta in the same year. The ARF activities have remained confined to Stage 1 of the three stages outlined at the Second (Brunei) Meeting, namely Confidence Building. Efforts to move simultaneously to certain aspects of Preventive Diplomacy (Second Stage) have not been successful, largely because of China’s opposition. THE LIMITATIONS OF THE “ASEAN WAY”

The ARF seeks to follow the model developed quite successfully by ASEAN for intra-ASEAN confidence-building and harmony — the socalled “ASEAN way”. In the ASEAN model of confidence-building and development of a limited security regime, the emphasis has been on improving the political climate of relations through frequent dialogue and interaction between political leaders and official élites of member countries; shelving disputes which cannot be settled in the belief that the change of circumstances or attitudes would make a solution easier sometime in the future; refraining from interference in each other’s internal affairs and, generally, from debating differences between members in public; and making decisions through consensus. The implicit understanding developed through informal socialisation over time to refrain from the use of force or threat of force is also reinforced by a formal agreement, the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation, to which all ASEAN members are signatories. However, there are limits to the use of the ASEAN model in the ARF. The ARF is a much larger organization, with 23 members (North Korea became the 23rd member in July 2000), and what worked in the relatively cosy club like ASEAN when it had 5 or 6 members may not work in a grouping of 23 with much bigger cultural and strategic diversity. The different predispostions and aspirations of members also make for a different milieu. The very establishment of ASEAN reflected the end of an attempt by Indonesia to exercise hegemony in its neighbourhood. So the five founding members of ASEAN were relatively at ease about territorial boundaries and distribution of power within the geographical area covered by the new organization. This is not the case with respect to the ARF. While the ASEAN way of informality and flexibility are probably appropriate in the early stages of the ARF, there would also be the need to develop more structured and results-oriented approaches. There are nonASEAN countries, including Western ones, which favour such approaches,

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and the ARF cannot indefinitely postpone them without the risk of generating a sense of irrelevance of the ARF in the calculations of these states. So there has to be some fusion of the ASEAN and the “Western” ways. During the first five years of the ARF’s life, ASEAN has tried to steer the organization between the Western countries which want it to move faster, and China which has preferred a slow place. This has required patient and adroit diplomacy, reminding the Western members that a pace which is too uncomfortable for China could make it leave the organization, and persuading China that the pace advocated by ASEAN is a reasonable one. ASEAN has so far leaned more to China in balancing these interests, because of the crucial importance of getting China to participate actively, and now it may have to address more of the concerns felt by the Western countries and other non-ASEAN members. For instance, there has been a feeling that consultations by ASEAN with non-ASEAN countries have been insufficient and that the present channels for achieving this are inadequate. The need for a small secretariat, by whatever name it is called, may become pressing. There are some underlying tensions between ASEAN and several nonASEAN countries over the former’s leading role in the ARF. Indeed, the dominant powers in the region are the United States, Japan and China. There is also the feeling that ASEAN has relatively little interest, experience and expertise in dealing with the most serious security problems which are not in Southeast but in Northeast Asia. And, despite its recent expansion, ASEAN is not in a numerical majority in the ARF. However, the majority view in the ARF is still that ASEAN should stay in the driver’s seat and, given China’s strong support for it, little change can be expected for at least the time being. But pressures for more say for non-ASEAN states may continue, increasing the responsibility of ASEAN for greater consultations and more results in the ARF. ASSESSING PROGRESS

The participants were open and candid in expressing their views but this did not generate tension or dissension in the room ... The participants also displayed a high degree of comfort in their interactions with each other. The ARF is still a fairly young process. Its success was never preordained. It is therefore worth noting that the increasing level of comfort at the Third ARF demonstrates that the ARF is progressing at a good pace.13

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The above quotation is from the two concluding paragraphs of the Chairman’s Statement on the Third ARF Meeting in July 1996. It indicates what kind of entity the ARF is and how it judges its own progress. And note that the ARF is often described as a process, seldom as an organization or an institution, which implies that it is viewed as an evolving mechanism whose ultimate shape or structure is not clear. The ARF should be assessed for what it is and not what it is not. It is a co-operative security organization, not a collective defence like NATO or a collective security organization like the United Nations. As a co-operative security arrangement the ARF seeks security not against potential enemies but security with them. It is an arrangement in which potential adversaries are brought into a co-operative framework so that over time they can be socialized into a desirable international code of conduct, especially the principle of non-use of force or threat of force to settle disputes. This principle could, at a certain stage, be also reinforced in a document containing a code of conduct to which members become signatories. Any assessment of success would depend upon the criteria employed. The use of stringent criteria, e.g., whether the ARF is capable of preventing or resolving conflict, would rate it a failure. Yet, perhaps it is not unreasonable that the criteria should bear some relationship to the expectations of members when the ARF was established. The expectations were not high and, as the above quote shows, remain modest. Measured against such expectations, the ARF’s progress has indeed been satisfactory. What has the ARF process achieved in the first four years of its existence? Firstly, discussions, even on sensitive issues, have become more frank. Secondly, not only have dialogues and interactions increased with the setting up of the ISG and the ISMs, and with the convening of Track Two meetings, but a number of informational CBMs are being implemented. Thirdly, there has been increasing involvement of military officials at various levels of the ARF, a significant trend because of the critical need to get the militaries of member countries to understand and support the ARF process and to interact and network among themselves. Fourthly, ASEAN has dealt successfully with China’s sensitivities and suspicions of the ARF, so much so that China has now become not only a supporter of the ARF but also an adept player, as it has developed a professional élite who understand cooperative security and how to use it to advance China’s national interests. This is an important development, bearing in mind that one of the key objectives of the ARF has been to engage China. Fifthly, the ARF is a manifestation of new, if embryonic, institution-building in a region lacking in multilateral institutions. Indeed,

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the very establishment of the ARF, involving so many countries, including most of the world’s major powers, and in a region where there had never been such an organization before, was a signal achievement. It is easy to be sceptical about the ARF. Yet, the chances are that it is more likely to continue to exist and make gradual but incremental progress than to fail. There are a number of reasons for this, some already alluded to earlier: the uncertainties of the strategic environment and the need for dialogue and reassurance at a high level which the ARF helps to provide; the current relatively convergent interests of the major powers and their support for the ARF; the fact that the ARF is an offshoot of the ASEANPMC which has a proven track record; and the fact that region-wide multilateralism of this kind gives middle and smaller powers more freedom of action. Yet, while the discussions, activities and comfort levels have increased, the limitations of the ARF, at least as of now, are obvious. It is not in a position to act on the most urgent and critical security problems in the Asia-Pacific region, for example, possible conflict on the Korean peninsula, in the Taiwan Strait, over any of the other territorial disputes, or over nuclear proliferation.14 The ARF can at most have general discussions on such issues. China, for instance, does not want multilateral action to resolve disputes, regarding the ARF as a forum to discuss only AsiaPacific-wide issues, while the management or resolution of specific conflicts is done bilaterally by the parties directly involved. The same attitude may be evinced by other powers in the future when their national interests are at stake. The health of the triangular U.S.-China-Japan relationship is critically important for the ARF. Any regression to adversarial relations between the major powers will undermine the ARF, as smaller countries are forced to take sides or sit on the fence. Also, the ARF can make progress only if there is a will on the part of all players to make it work. This assumes not only that there be no adversarial relations between the more significant players, but also that all major players accept the existing status quo, or at least do not seek to change it by coercive means.15 A dialogue process would not have worked in the Indonesia-Malaysia-Singapore region while Indonesia was bent on “crushing” Malaysia during konfrontasi. Dialogue has obviously been less successful in South Asia than in Southeast Asia because of the adversarial dimension in India-Pakistan relations, though dialogue obviously remains important for the subcontinent. If any major power proves itself to be determined to alter the status quo in the AsiaPacific region through methods not in accord with existing international

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norms, then dialogue to socialize it into the existing norms of behaviour will probably not work. But dialogue and engagement will continue to have an important role so long as there is reasonable hope that all members can be made to see that it is in their own long-term interest to play by existing rules. In the Asia-Pacific region there is the rising power of China, which is dissatisfied with the existing status quo, believing that by virtue of its size and history it is entitled to a bigger place on the Asia-Pacific, and world, stage. It also has extensive territorial claims in the South China Sea. How China seeks to pursue its goals and, equally important, how the other major powers respond to its desire for more space, will be a central challenge of Asia-Pacific security in the early decades of the 21st century. So far there is no indication that the ARF itself has changed China’s bottom line in relation to policies on key issues such as the South China Sea. But the ARF will continue to be a place where Chinese officials, both civilian and military, will be exposed to the climate of regional and international thinking and norms on issues of significance to China and the world. And without the ARF, China may not have cultivated an interest in CBMs that it now has. But sovereignty remains a very important consideration in the region, and there is no evidence yet of serious willingness to limit it in favour of co-operative security. The ARF in its present form could also be adversely affected if an official Northeast Asian multilateral security forum were to be established. Such a forum would have all the great powers as its members. If they could deal more comfortably with one another in a smaller grouping, they may choose to accord less importance to the bigger and more unwieldy ARF. Needless to say, such a development could also reduce ASEAN’s role in broader Asia-Pacific security issues. THE NON-OFFICIAL DIALOGUE PROCESS

Official dialogue, often referred to as Track One dialogue, is confined to officials of governments. Non-official dialogue, conducted by nongovernmental organizations, should in theory be independent of governments, but in reality there are often varying degrees of governmental influence, representation or support. Non-official security dialogue often takes place in support of or parallel to official security dialogue. Non-official dialogue has been characterized as Track Two, Track Three or Track One-and-a-Half, depending upon the degree of governmental influence or involvement. However, the distinctions between the various

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“tracks” are often blurred as the precise degree of government influence is not always clear. In this chapter, for the sake of convenience, non-official dialogue with some governmental involvement will loosely be described as Track Two. Track Two dialogue is usually organized by nongovernmental organizations like think-tanks and involves scholars, journalists and others from the private sector who can make a contribution, as well as government officials taking part in their “personal capacity”. This format is intended to allow for more frank discussions and the involvement of non-governmental expertise. Among the earliest Track Two meetings that included political and security issues were the ASEAN-Japan Dialogue which began in the 1970s and the Quadrilateral Conferences between ASEAN, the United States, Japan and South Korea organized by the Institute of East Asian Studies of the University of California at Berkeley and CSIS, Jakarta, in the 1980s. The Kuala Lumpur Roundtable also began in 1987 (see below). Asia-Pacific Track Two security discussions then grew in response to the same anxieties about the post-Cold War world that gave rise to the ARF. Indeed, Track Two discussions contributed to the establishment of the ARF. Worth mentioning in this context are the contributions to regional security of the ASEAN Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ASEAN-ISIS),16 which was first organized as a sub-regional nongovernmental organization in Bali in September 1984. Initially, it represented four ASEAN think-tanks: Indonesia’s Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), Malaysia’s Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Singapore’s Institute of International Affairs (SIIA), and Thailand’s Institute for Security and International Studies (ISIS), plus individual representatives from the Philippines. In 1988, ASEAN-ISIS was formally launched in Singapore with a charter, and the Institute of Strategic and Development Studies (ISDS) of the Philippines became its fifth institutional member in 1991. From the beginning, ASEAN-ISIS had an informal link with the respective ASEAN governments, which was formalized with the establishment of an institutional relationship between ASEAN and ASEANISIS in 1993 when meetings between ASEAN-ISIS and ASEAN Senior Officials (SOM) began. Since then, ASEAN-ISIS has met regularly with ASEAN-SOM and made valuable inputs on subjects like the ARF, the role of the East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC), APEC, ASEAN-China relations, the code of conduct for the South China Sea, and a 2020 Vision for ASEAN. A second way in which ASEAN-ISIS has influenced decision-

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making in ASEAN has been by submitting various memoranda to ASEAN on important issues. Some of these Memoranda had significant influence on ASEAN policy. For instance, the first ASEAN-ISIS Memorandum, “A Time For Initiative: Proposals for the Consideration of Fourth Summit”, recommended, among other things, that Asia-Pacific political and security dialogue be established, based on the ASEAN-PMC, in which ASEAN should play “a central role”; that the other Southeast Asian states should accede to ASEAN’s Treaty of Amity and Co-operation; that ASEAN should be strengthened through regular summit meetings and a stronger Secretariat; and that ASEAN economic co-operation be strengthened, including through the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area (AFTA). All these recommendations were later adopted by ASEAN.17 ASEAN-ISIS has convened Track Two policy dialogues with countries outside Southeast Asia, including China, South Korea, and India. It also played a significant role in the establishment of the Council for Security Cooperation in Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), the body for Asia-Pacific-wide Track Two security dialogue. CSCAP originated from discussions organised in 1991–92 by ASEAN-ISIS, the Pacific Forum/CSIS, the Japan Institute of International Affairs and the Seoul Forum for International Affairs. At the third such meeting in Seoul in November 1992 these institutes decided that it was necessary to establish an Asia-Pacific-wide Track Two security forum with a coordinating council. CSCAP was established in June 1993, and these eight institutes, together with the Joint Center for Asia-Pacific Studies, Canada, and the Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australia, became its founding institutes. In December of the same year, a CSCAP Charter made up of articles and by-laws of the Council was drawn up. CSCAP is meant to provide a “structured process for regional confidencebuilding and security cooperation among countries and territories in the Asia-Pacific region”. It now has 17 members: Australia, Canada, China, the European Union, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, North Korea, the Philippines, Russia, Singapore, South Korea, Thailand, the United States and Vietnam. The Indian Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses (IDSA) remains an associate member. National CSCAP committees have been set up in member countries, comprising mostly representatives of think-tanks and governments. There are now five CSCAP working groups: on confidence and security building measures, maritime security co-operation, comprehensive and co-operative security, North Pacific Security Co-operation, and transnational crime. CSCAP was hobbled in the first few years by the problem of how to include China, crucial for CSCAP’s success, without Taiwan’s complete exclusion. This problem

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was resolved only in late 1996: China replaced Taiwan as a CSCAP member but Taiwanese scholars could continue to participate in the working groups in their individual capacity. The first general meeting of CSCAP was held in Singapore in June 1997. CSCAP, according to some, was to play a role in relation to the ARF that PECC played in relation to APEC, providing ideas, analysis and the backup network of an epismetic community. There is no doubt that CSCAP can marshal an impressive range of non-governmental expertise on security issues to assist the ARF. However, CSCAP has not yet been recognized by the ARF as its Track Two counterpart. Nevertheless, the work of its working groups continues, and the studies are made available to member governments through the national CSCAP committees. CSCAP has also organized some Track Two activities for the ARF. Even if CSCAP develops a formal institutional relationship with the ARF, it is unlikely to replace other Track Two activities. ASEAN-ISIS will still remain important for Track Two inputs to the ARF because of its relationship with ASEAN and ASEAN’s leading role in the ARF. There will probably continue to be different layers of Track Two activities at Asia-Pacific, as well as subregional, levels. By 1996, ASEAN-ISIS had expanded to include the Vietnamese Institute of International Relations and, in 1997, the Cambodian Institute for Cooperation and Peace. An important forum linked to ASEAN-ISIS has been the annual Kuala Lumpur Asia-Pacific Roundtable, in 2000 running into its fourteenth year. It was established by ISIS Malaysia but since 1994 has been co-ordinated by ASEAN-ISIS, though Kuala Lumpur remains the venue and ISIS-Malaysia provides the secretariat. As one of the earliest Asia-Pacific-wide Track Two fora on security issues, the Roundtable has played an invaluable role in socializing the security and political élites of the region to the need for dialogue. ASEAN-ISIS may also become involved in another Track Two mechanism, the Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation, as a Track Two partner of ASEM (Asia-Europe Meeting). There has been a dramatic increase in Track Two multilateral security dialogue in the Asia-Pacific region during the 1990s. By 1995, there were 83 known Track Two multilateral dialogues compared with 17 Track One meetings.18 Some, such as the Asia-Pacific Roundtable, CSCAP, and the Asia-Pacific Peace Research Association, are region-wide. Others like ASEAN-ISIS and the North Pacific Co-operative Security Dialogue, have a subregional focus. There are also ad hoc Track Two discussions on specific issues. The most prominent example of this has been the series of workshops on the South China Sea organized by Indonesia for the purpose

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of building confidence and avoiding conflict over the territorial claims in that area. Another is the Asia-Pacific Dialogue on Maritime Security. As a result of the proliferation of Track Two dialogue, there is probably considerable duplication of effort and lack of machinery for sharing of information between different Track Two endeavours, especially since the deliberations, conclusions and recommendations are not always published. Yet, there is no denying the fact that Track Two security discussions have their utility. Dialogues at the official levels may not be able to accommodate all countries and territories, while Track Two dialogues have the flexibility to do so. For instance, ASEAN-ISIS continues to hold Track Two dialogues with Taiwan, while Taiwanese representatives continue to participate, in their individual capacity, in the discussions of the working groups under CSCAP, even though they are not members of the CSCAP Steering Committee. North Korea is not a member of the ARF, but it is of CSCAP and also participates in the Asia-Pacific Roundtable in Kuala Lumpur. These fora allow North Korean representatives to be exposed to regional realities and opinion in an informal setting. Track Two dialogue has also been used to sound out and explore new ideas and to pave the way for the establishment of official co-operative security mechanisms like the ARF. As mentioned above, ASEAN-ISIS has made inputs to ASEAN-SOM and ARF-SOM, and some of the recommendations have been accepted by governments. The Track Two process can be particularly useful in initiating and promoting security dialogue between “non-like minded” countries separated by ideological or cultural barriers and reluctant to engage in such discussions at the official level. CONCLUSION

A few concluding observations would be in order. Firstly, while the focus of this chapter has been multilateral security dialogue, the importance of bilateral political and security dialogue should not be underestimated. For instance, the start in recent years of bilateral political/security dialogue between China and Japan, and between South Korea and Japan, is an important development in view of the historically troubled relationships of these countries. It is usually easier to focus on and deal with specific problems through bilateral than multilateral discussions. The former, indeed, has a longer and more fruitful history than multilateral dialogue, for example, the work of the border committees of Indonesia and Malaysia, and of Thailand and Malaysia, not to mention the many bilateral dialogues

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between ASEAN states at the political and heads-of-government level. So, bilateral dialogue will continue to have an important place in removing misperceptions, building confidence, even in cooperation and conflict management. Indeed, the ARF endorses all kinds of dialogue and exchanges, including bilateral, to build confidence and understanding. Secondly, the relevance, indeed contribution, of multilateral Asia-Pacific economic dialogue to security, needs to be noted. As mentioned earlier, non-governmental organizations like PBEC, PACTAD and PECC were the first forms of multilateral institution-building in the Pacific. The networking these bodies forged contributed importantly to the creation of a nascent sense of Pacific community. They paved the way for the establishment of the Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC) forum. There are a number ways in which APEC is relevant to Asia-Pacific security: it constitutes an important step forward in Asia-Pacific institutionbuilding; it endeavours to sustain growth in the region through closer economic cooperation and freer trade and investments. Perhaps most important, its informal annual leaders’ meeting has significance in transcending economics: by providing an occasion for the top political leaders of the region to meet annually in this way, APEC makes it possible for them to discuss any matter they want, including political and security affairs, in informal side meetings. Thirdly, the value of multilateral security dialogue will lie in networking, confidence-building and possibly limited preventive diplomacy through the good offices of the ARF Chair. These are important and worthwhile activities — in themselves as well as in so far as they help maintain benign conditions for economic growth and nurture a sense of a nascent Pacific community through embryonic security institution-building. Hopefully, the dialogue process, over time and in suitable conditions, can also produce a culture of moderation and restraint. Indeed, the crucial CBM that is needed is an agreement on the non-use of force so that violation of it will affect the prestige of a country. This is by no means assured, but so long as there is some hope of moderating behaviour through dialogue and cooperation over time, the effort is worthwhile continuing with, in the absence of any other alternative except balance of power. But in an imperfect world, co-operative security cannot be a panacea for security, as some liberal intellectuals may sometimes be inclined to believe. The ARF is unlikely to develop effective conflict management or resolution mechanisms, or even conflict prevention ones, certainly not any time soon, if at all. These tasks will continue to be more effectively dealt with by the parties directly involved or by ad hoc coalitions or groupings of

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countries created specifically for the purpose of conflict management or resolution. Fourthly, and as a corollary to the above, the dialogue process and cooperative security in Asia-Pacific can, in the foreseeable future, be only complements to and not substitutes for power arrangements to keep the peace. And at present the most important of the power arrangements are the bilateral military alliances between the United States and several regional countries and the forward-deployed U.S. military presence. That Asia-Pacific governments would not entrust their security principally to the ARF is obvious from developments in the region in recent years; for example, the military modernisation programmes of various states; the reinvigoration of America’s military alliances with Japan and Australia; the access arrangements given to U.S. military forces in Southeast Asia after their withdrawal from bases in the Philippines; and the conclusion of a new bilateral security agreement between Indonesia and Australia in December 1995. The last, before it became a casualty of the deterioration in Australia-Indonesia relations in 1999 as a result of the East Timor crisis, was truly remarkable: by entering into an agreement which amounted to a virtual security alliance with a military ally of the United States,19 Indonesia was making a radical departure from its traditional policy of non-alignment. The unstated reason was probably China and, in particular, China’s claims in the South China Sea. Indeed, it is difficult to see how the ARF could make any progress without a pre-existing power balance, even though it is also the purpose of the ARF, in the eyes of many, if not all, of its members, to help maintain the balance by keeping the US involved in the region. It is worth bearing in mind that over the past 30 years the ASEAN way could work within ASEAN only in an environment in which the threat of military aggression or coercion from stronger outside powers was checked by the countervailing power of another major power, the U.S., though for a period in the late 1970s and 1980s, China too played this role against Vietnam. ASEAN on its own was never equipped to cope with a significant external military challenge. It is true that alliances and balance of power did not prevent limited and proxy hot wars in the Asia-Pacific (the Korean and Vietnam wars) during the Cold War period, but they did help to prevent more extensive and deadly conflict between the major powers and the succumbing of more of East and Southeast Asia to communism. As the economic and military weight of the major Asian powers, and in particular of China, increases, the regional power balance will acquire a more Asian character during the

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first half of the 21st century, with Asians, for the first time in nearly two centuries, principally determining the destiny of East Asia, though even then the United States will remain one of the key players. The ARF and other dialogue and confidence-building processes can hopefully ease this transition and help to blunt the sharp edges of the changing balance. Notes 1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10 11

See for instance Paul Dibb, “The Emerging Security Architecture in the Asia-Pacific”, in The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific, edited by Denny Roy (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1997 and New York: St. Martin’s Press, Inc, 1997). Chairman’s Statement, Second ARF Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, July 1995. “Australia’s Asian Future”, Address by Senator Gareth Evans, Minister for Foreign Affairs and Trade, 19 July 1990. In October 1989, President Roh Tae Woo of South Korea, in an address to the UN General Assembly, called for a six-nation consultative conference to discuss security issues in Northeast Asia. Richard Solomon, “Asian Security in the 1990s: Integration in Economics; Diversity in Defence”, University of California, San Diego, 30 October 1990. Gareth Evans, “Australia’s Regional Security Environment”, in Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives, eds. Desmond Ball and David Horner (Canberra: Australian National University, 1992), p. 382. Desmond Ball has listed some two dozen conflicts or disputes over territory, sovereignty and secessionist movements in East Asia. See Desmond Ball, “Arms and Affluence: Military Acquisitions in the Asia-Pacific Region”, International Security, Winter 1993–94, pp. 88– 89. Joint Communique, 24th ASEAN Post-Ministerial Meeting, Kuala Lumpur, 19–20 July 1991. Singapore Declaration of 1992, released by ASEAN Heads of Government Meeting, Singapore, 27–28 January 1992. “Live and Let Live”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 11 July 1991. For early Chinese reactions, see Banning Garrett and Bonnie Glaser, “Multilateral Security in the Asia-Pacific Region and its Impact on Chinese Interests: Views from Beijing”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 1 (June 1994).

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13

14

15

16

17

18

19

The Chairman’s Statement, Second ARF Meeting, Bandar Seri Begawan, Brunei, July 1995. The Chairman’s Statement, Third ARF Meeting, Jakarta, Indonesia, July 1996. Indeed, there are analysts who believe the ARF will never be in a position to solve conflicts. For instance, according to Michael Leifer, “To question whether the ARF is actually capable of solving problems and conflicts is to make a category mistake”. See Michael Leifer, “The ASEAN Regional Forum”, Adelphi Paper, no. 302, July 1996. See Muthiah Alagappa, “Regionalism and Security: A Conceptual Investigation”, in Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region, eds. A. Mack and J. Ravenhill (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1994). For this account of the contributions of ASEAN-ISIS, I am much indebted to Carolina G. Hernandez. See her article, “Philippine Participation in Track Two Activities on Security-Related Issues: ASEAN-ISIS and CSCAP”, Foreign Affairs Quarterly, January– February 1999. Other ASEAN-ISIS memoranda include: The Environment and Human Rights in International Relations: An Agenda for ASEAN’s Policy Approaches and Responses, July 1992; Enhancing ASEAN’s Security Co-operation, 5 June 1993; Beyond UNTAC: ASEAN’s role in Cambodia, October 1993; Confidence Building Measures in Southeast Asia, December 1993; and The South China Sea Dispute: Renewal of a Committment for Peace, May 1995. In 1997, ASEAN-ISIS prepared draft papers on the principles to govern political relations with China and on a Vision for ASEAN for the ASEAN Ministerial Meeting of July 1997 and another paper on the future of the ARF for the 1997 ARF Meeting. Dialogue Monitor, no. 1 (July 1995) and no. 2 (January 1996), University of Toronto-York University Joint Centre for Asia-Pacific Studies, North York, Ontario, Canada. The agreement states, among other things, that the two countries would consult each other “in the case of adverse challenges to either party and to their common security interests and, if appropriate, consider measures which might be taken either individually or jointly and in accordance with the processes of each party”.

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

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60 Renato Cruz De Castro

4 Managing “Strategic Unipolarity”:1 The ASEAN States’ Responses to the Post-Cold War Regional Environment Renato Cruz De Castro A popular concept in the study of American foreign policy is the Theory of Hegemonic Stability (THS). Originally a theory formulated to explain the emergence of the global political economy, the THS is concerned with the formation and operation of the global economy in relation to the successive dominant and liberal states or hegemons in the international system.2 The THS contends that a world system or a global political economy can only be formed and maintained if there is a hegemonic power willing and capable of maintaining an international order. Thus, the theory sees the United States as a hegemonic power using its position as an umpire and policeman in a global system to protect the global economy against external antagonists, internal rebellions, and internecine differences, and to generally ensure that the ground rules of the international political economy are not impeded by friend or foe alike.3 The THS’ major limitation, however, is its lack of attention to the role of the client or less powerful states in the system. To the THS, less powerful states are mere objects of hegemony whose foreign policies are largely influenced primarily by the hegemon’s interests and actions. The THS assumes that hegemony is a one-way process whereby the hegemonic state provides certain public goods and formulates rules that less powerful states will automatically utilize and accept. To the THS, small states have no choice but to collaborate with the hegemon in the maintenance of the regime. The most they can do is to accept the benefits they could derive from the international regime and possibly secure a “free ride” by avoiding

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their share of payments to the maintenance of the international order.4 The THS ignores the possibility that the less powerful states in the system might have different views about the system, might have a different agenda from that of the hegemon, might try to modify the rules of the system to suit their own interests, might collectively bargain with the hegemonic power, and might influence the hegemon in its systemmaintenance role. Furthermore, the THS assumes that all client states are the same and are capable only of a single response to the hegemon — compliance to the norms and rules promulgated by the more powerful state. Basically, the THS discounts the possibility that less powerful states could also affect the hegemon’s policies through linkages, bargaining, adjustments, and collective actions intended to lessen their dependence on the hegemonic state.5 This chapter examines how five member states of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) — Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand – have viewed and are coping with the changes in U.S. post-Cold War policy towards East Asia. The chapter examines ASEAN’s five original members’ policies towards the United States during 1991–98. Specifically, it looks at four issues: the states’ individual foreign policy responses to the United States after 1991; the responses to the Clinton Administration’s Strategy of Enlargement; the formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and its effects on the ASEAN states’ power relations vis-à-vis the United States; and the efforts to develop an entente with the United States vis-à-vis the People’s Republic of China (PRC). THE RELUCTANT HEGEMON AND THE ASEAN STATES’ LINKAGE POLICY

In 1993, the Clinton Administration saw its primary foreign policy goal as opening-up the world economy and making it safe for U.S. business and its global system of capital accumulation. This implied that the United States would only focus on one aspect of American foreign policy — foreign economic policy. Washington conveyed a clear and simple message to the world: “The United States is not anymore the crusading superpower bent on preventing communist expansion. Rather, it is now like a big corporation competing in the global market place.”6 President Clinton stressed the need to lower defence spending so that the United States could save billions of dollars. Upon assuming office in January 1993, Clinton declared his plans to expedite reductions in the defence budget.

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President Clinton’s pronouncements and actions did not go unnoticed by America’s Asian friends and allies. These states were already anxious about the future of the American commitment to retain sufficient military forces in the post-Cold War Asia-Pacific region. Their anxiety stemmed from the view that there was a need for an active American security role in the region. Being the world’s leading military and economic power since 1945, the United States has been considered as the single most important player in ensuring the region’s strategic equilibrium. With the election of Bill Clinton as president, however, East Asian states assumed that the United States was about to relegate the role of ensuring a regional balance of power by withdrawing its forward-deployed forces from East Asia. Consequently, America’s friends and allies in the region became concerned that a sudden American security disengagement from East Asia would greatly accelerate a regional arms build-up and undermine confidence in the U.S. ability to support a balance-of-power in the region.7 Their alarm at the prospect of a sudden withdrawal of American forces was also due to concern that it might result in a power vacuum which could be filled by one of the region’s middle powers.8 Many East Asian governments also became confused as to how to assess their policy choices vis-à-vis the United States. This was because the United States seemed to be assuming the multiple roles of balancer, security partner, economic rival and collaborator.9 Like most East Asian states, the ASEAN states were disturbed by the end of the Cold War and the prospect of U.S. military retrenchment in East Asia. This was because, with the prospect of American military withdrawal from the region, they had to painfully refocus their attention from domestic concerns to external security, and to reassess their security ties with the United States. During the Cold War, the ASEAN states relied on the U.S. military presence to address their external security concerns. These states saw U.S. forward-deployed forces in the region as an important deterrent to Soviet naval capabilities in the Pacific, as a symbol of American military presence and political commitment in the region, and as an important element in the maintenance of a regional equilibrium that allowed countries in the Asia-Pacific to pursue their national development efforts to the utmost.10 Southeast Asian countries, like Indonesia, Malaysia, and the Philippines, could concentrate their time, resources, and attention containing internal security problems with the knowledge that their external security concerns were being met largely by the U.S. military presence in the region. The American military deployments at Clark Air Base and Subic Bay Naval Base in the Philippines provided a kind of general

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deterrence posture that buttressed the territorial status quo, supported the free flow of international commerce along the important water-ways in the region, and served to remind regional states that any untoward military move on their part, for whatever reason, should have to take the U.S. military presence into account.11 Consequently, the U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia enabled the ASEAN states to come out with diverse and different responses to their Cold War environment. Whether it was reliance on an alliance with the United States or neutrality and non-alignment, the ASEAN states assumed that the United States would bear ultimate responsibility for regional security. Either directly or indirectly, the American military presence in Southeast Asia maintained a regional order under which ASEAN’s two foreign policy responses (alliance or neutrality) to the Cold War proved effective and feasible. Hence, even avowed non-aligned countries, like Malaysia and Indonesia, regarded the U.S. military presence as a temporary balancing factor against communism.12 The collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 and the unexpected withdrawal of the U.S. military from naval and air bases in the Philippines created widespread regional anxiety that these events were the prelude to the creation of a dangerous “power vacuum”.13 The ASEAN states considered that this power vacuum would result from American military retrenchment from the Western Pacific as spurred by the declining Russian threat, American domestic economic and social problems, the Clinton Administration’s determination to give these problems priority over foreign policy, and the reemergence of isolationism as a recurring theme in American domestic politics.14 The ASEAN states lacked sufficient military forces to safeguard the region by themselves and, seeing no other power in Southeast Asia which could replace American forward-deployed forces, they feared that the power vacuum would be filled by certain middle powers in East Asia. The ASEAN states responded to these developments through a frenzied and bandwagon effort to ensuring a continued U.S. military presence in Southeast Asia.15 Previously reluctant to support the American military presence in Southeast Asia as it had been deemed a violation of the Zone of Peace, Freedom, and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) concept, Indonesia and Malaysia decided to endorse a continued U.S. regional military presence. In the wake of the U.S. military withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992, Indonesia found no inclination to be left out in the new co-operative defence arrangements with the United States, and so it agreed in principle to allow U.S. ships to be serviced at its ship-repair facilities in Surabaya, and was

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also amenable to allowing Washington use of its air weapons training range in South Sumatra.16 Like Indonesia, Malaysia had adopted a nonaligned foreign policy and had been vocal about ASEAN’s expression of a policy of non-alignment through its advocacy of the ZOPFAN Declaration in 1971. However, in 1992, Malaysia also offered repair and replenishment facilities at its Lumut Naval Base to encourage the continued deployment of U.S. fleet units to the region.17 Singapore has made the clearest and most consistent statement in Southeast Asia for a continued U.S. regional military presence. Under the terms of agreement formalized in November 1990, Singapore is currently hosting four F-16 fighter aircraft on a rotational basis and 200 personnel of the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s Logistic Command. The latter supports the U.S. Seventh Fleet’s role of securing the sea-lanes between the Indian and the Pacific Oceans, a role that is also very vital to Singapore’s maritime commercial interests. Furthermore, the policy has embedded American security interests in Singapore’s, with the arrangement serving as a deterrent against Singapore’s larger neighbours who might harbour hostile intentions towards the city-state. On the other hand, the Singapore policy has suited the current U.S. forward-deployed strategy of “places” not bases by providing access arrangements and operational cooperation, playing a key part in the United States’ “Swing Strategy” for its naval deployments between Northeast Asia and the Middle East. Eventually, all the ASEAN states joined the “bandwagon” linkage as Thailand allowed the United States transit rights in Thai ports. Even the Philippines, which earlier failed to ratify a new base agreement with the United States, allowed the U.S. Navy continued access to Subic Bay and naval air stations under the 1951 Mutual Defense Treaty that still binds the two countries as allies. The ASEAN states’ efforts to ensure continued U.S. military deployments in Southeast Asia indicated that they still considered the United States as the desirable alternative to either a Japanese, Chinese, or an Indian military presence in the region, and the only power that could balance both Japan or China in the South China Sea. For these states, Pax Americana is still preferred to any conceivable alternative, since any other option could spark a regional arms race and create instability of a kind that has not been experienced in East Asia for decades. Furthermore, a continued U.S. military presence has been deemed as the best possible option, since a distant U.S. has no territorial ambitions in contrast to the close-in-powers (such as China) who harbour territorial ambitions and are locked in their own game of local geopolitics. The United States has been regarded as the “principal outsider balancer” that is needed to check the more troublesome

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neighbouring states with whom it has a long history of contention and to keep the middle powers (Japan and China) in their proper places in the regional hierarchy of power. REACTING TO A RESURGENT HEGEMON

In the second half of 1993, the Clinton Administration outlined an ambitious agenda in the region that included the promotion of U.S. interests in regional security, economic cooperation, and the advancement of human rights and democracy throughout East Asia. This reflected a more comprehensive approach to East Asia as it meant an expansion of American interests beyond the Cold War policy of containment. The reference to regional security was a carry-over from the Cold War and was designed to underscore American power projection capabilities in the traditional realpolitik fashion. The two other components, economic cooperation and the promotion of human rights, reflected the United States’ new agenda for the post-Cold War era and mirrored the Wilsonian cum liberal tradition of an earlier age. In 1994, the Clinton Administration announced a more comprehensive and far-reaching foreign policy strategy called the “Strategy of Enlargement” — the enlargement of the world’s free community of market democracies.18 The strategy articulated some hallmarks of American domestic needs as it was concerned with domestic economic renewal, and more importantly it emphasized the importance of U.S. leadership in the world, the challenges to American interests and the need to deploy American resources where they could make a difference.19 The strategy of enlargement incorporates three major components — efforts to enhance U.S. security by maintaining a strong defence capability and the promotion of security measures; efforts to open up foreign markets and spur economic growth; and efforts to advance democracy. This new foreign policy strategy meant that the United States would adopt an extremely activist approach towards countries that had closed markets, apply sanctions against countries that violated human rights and have authoritarian regimes, and pursue high-profile efforts to ensure the security and prosperity of the world’s market democracies. The launching of this policy of enlargement, however, occurred at the time when most Southeast Asian economies were growing rapidly, enabling them to affect American ability to impose some of the objectives of the enlargement strategy on Southeast Asia. No longer dependent on the United States for aid and with their economies seemingly resilient enough to withstand

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American economic sanctions, some ASEAN states saw the Clinton Administration’s doctrine of enlargement as a campaign of interference, cultural imperialism and an irritant to most Southeast Asian states’ sensitivities.20 Furthermore, the U.S. government adopted a policy of short-term pressure tactics in pursuit of these objectives, instead of a more comprehensive strategy that could be better suited to the various milieus in which the United States was engaged. The Clinton Administration’s policy of enlargement created tensions between the United States and the three core states of ASEAN. The enlargement strategy became controversial in Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, as these states saw it as an attempt to impose an American interpretation of democracy and human rights on Asian societies, and a genuine threat to their regimes, as it could appeal to and strengthen dissident discontented elements within their societies.21 These states viewed the acceptance of Western-style values and institutions as inimical to their interests, in particular to domestic stability and national cohesion. Hence, they rejected the United States’ and other developed states’ political systems as models for their development, holding that economic development and the promotion of indigenous culture were more important and appropriate for their societies.22 Consequently, the three ASEAN states found themselves at odds with the United States over the issues of democracy, development, and human rights. Their main argument was based on the notion that there is no single set of policy tools which the United States or other developed countries could bring to bear to address the problems of authoritarianism and human rights abuses in the region. This is because each country’s situation is different and no genuine policy, such as democratic enlargement or commercial diplomacy, will work across-the-board.23 Although these three states have been stalwart supporters of a strong American military presence in Southeast Asia and have welcomed American business and investments, they have become apprehensive of the United States using its current global superiority to undermine certain legitimate aspirations they have in terms of political stability, economic development, and cultural uniqueness. They accept the United States as the global hegemon that provides almost unilateral security guarantees and enforces the operational ground rules of the global economy, i.e., a liberal trading order. However, they do not tolerate a hegemon that imposes on other states its own values of economic development, liberal and democratic political practices and structures, and the idea of a community of market democracies. This is simply because those values would undermine the

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basic political foundations of their regimes. More importantly, this would lead to the negative intervention of a big power in regional affairs since the usefulness of democracy as a value in foreign affairs, has been undermined by democracy’s association with foreign intervention. The three core ASEAN states impressed on the United States that, while they welcome and support U.S. realpolitik in terms of American military presence in the region, they could not tolerate its “moralpolitik”. Consequently, the U.S. State Department warned the White House that its aggressive unilateralism might have adverse consequences for American interests in East Asia. This might be in the form of weakened U.S. influence in APEC and other regional bodies like the ASEAN Regional Forum. The State Department also warned that pursuit of this policy would give more ammunition to Malaysian Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad’s proposal to create an Asian economic entity that excluded the United States.24 In a form of self-criticism of American foreign policy, the then Assistant Secretary of State for East Asian and Pacific Affairs, Winston Lord, described the White House policy towards East Asia in these terms: “A series of American measures, threatened or employed, risk eroding our positive image in the region, giving ammunition to those charging we are an international nanny, if not a bully.”25 An academic reiterated this observation when he noted: “The Clinton Administration’s multiple agendas in Asia seemed to invite misunderstanding, bewilderment, confusion, and even antagonism from old friends in the region.”26 MANAGING HEGEMONY: THE ARF

The ASEAN states’ most significant response to their post-Cold War international environment was the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1994. The ARF’s main significance stems from the fact that it is a corporate effort of ASEAN as a regional organization. Moreover, it highlighted ASEAN’s unprecedented readiness to assume a higher profile in the region’s security affairs. The ARF has two manifest functions: fostering constructive engagement and initiating preventive diplomacy.27 The ARF, however, also has a tacit but more significant objective – the preservation of a regional balance of power based on the balancing of military and political engagement by the United States.28 The ASEAN states’ major apprehension in the aftermath of the Cold War was that, with the emergence of middle powers (China and Japan), the regional status quo might be threatened by the possibility of their clashing and resorting to force to resolve disputes. The breakdown in the

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regional order could be preceded by one of the middle powers challenging international norms. The ARF is a loose, informal and ad-hoc multilateral forum whose primary aim is to preserve the immediate post-Cold War regional order against the shifting relative power relations between an external major power (the United States) and the key middle powers in East Asia. The ARF’s main objective has been to prevent East Asia from undergoing a potentially dangerous transition period that is usually characterized by shocks and strategic discontinuity. This scenario, however, can only be prevented through the creation of a co-operative security community and a regional policy of deterring any challenges to acceptable norms of behaviour. This cooperative security community can only be possible in a regional balance of power established by continued U.S. military and political involvement in regional security affairs, particularly in view of the weakness of multilateral institutions in East Asia. In establishing the ARF, the ASEAN states were largely motivated by a desire to ensure continued U.S. engagement in East Asia, given its special role in deterring the middle powers from impinging on ASEAN’s interests and on the general Southeast Asian space.29 Continued U.S. military presence in East Asia would obviate the need for Japan to have a security role in the region and this, in turn, would encourage China to conduct its regional relations with restraint and in accordance with the norm of non-aggression, a norm that has served the ASEAN states’ interests well since the late 1960s. Furthermore, the ASEAN states see the United States as the only possible counter-balance to China and the only power that could discourage the PRC from any radical shift from its programme of military modernization to a more assertive and expansionist regional policy. From the ASEAN states’ perspective, the ARF would be a means of keeping the United States involved on a multilateral basis in the region, reducing the likelihood that the ASEAN states would have to face a specific threat on their own, and subsuming ASEAN in a web of arrangements that would enable it to continue playing a major politicomilitary role despite the absence of any specific threat to the interests of the member-states. Moreover, by developing a regional security framework, the ASEAN states had hoped to lighten some of the United States’ security burdens in the region, with the expectation that this would persuade the American public to support continued American forward military deployments in East Asia.30 By taking the initiative to form the ARF, the ASEAN states could enhance their security, individually and collectively, determine membership invitations, shape the content and form of the dialogue, and gain important

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political advantage vis-à-vis the middle powers and, more importantly, with the region’s hegemon, the United States. These political advantages are in the form of: 1. Giving ASEAN an Asia-Pacific-wide role disproportionate to the member states’ capabilities. The ARF has followed ASEAN in adopting the principle of equal representation and, consequently, any form of special representation for the major powers has been ruled out as small countries have the same rights as big ones.31 Moreover, the ARF provides ASEAN the prerogative to take the leading role in defining the forum’s goals, scope and processes, a role that ASEAN would not likely have if the forum had originated from a major power or if that role had been determined, like so much else, by international politics.32 By creating their own security forum, the ASEAN states impressed on the Clinton Administration that while the American military presence is deemed important, America’s post-Cold War foreign policy goals might not always be compatible with their own. In the early 1990s, the Clinton Administration had placed democracy and human rights on its global agenda through its strategy of enlargement. From the ASEAN states’ point of view, however, this was simply a challenge to their regimes. Through the formation of the ARF, the ASEAN states are in a better position to insulate themselves from the Clinton Administration’s moves for democratization, preempting the American agenda from being part of a regional agenda, and providing the ASEAN states breathing space to define the means of how they would respond to these moves on the part of the United States. 2. Enabling ASEAN to put its imprint and substance to the ARF. The ARF has adopted ASEAN’s methods of preventing conflict through constructive engagement and informal consensus-building rather than through the more formal and goal-oriented approach seen as being characteristic of Western-style negotiations.33 Furthermore, the ASEAN states were able to sell their concept of comprehensive security vis-àvis Washington’s purely military security approach. This notion of comprehensive security states that regional security cannot be defined in purely military terms and that security depends primarily on individual states’ achieving political stability, economic development and national unity. Underlying the notion of comprehensive security is the belief that survival and prosperity are better served by all-around capabilities (economic, demographic, diplomatic, social) than by reliance on military power alone, the utility of which is perceived to be limited and

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increasingly more circumscribed.34 The practice of comprehensive security deliberately plays down the military dimension of security in intra-ASEAN relations as it has been able to emphasize non-military factors in interstate relations, such as political dialogue, economic cooperation, multilateral consultation, interdependence, and preventive diplomacy. Adherence to the notion of comprehensive security enables the ASEAN states to contain intrastate disputes, develop the means of cooperation and establish bonds of common interest that have sustained the regional organization for more than three decades. By bringing this concept to the ARF, the ASEAN states were able to help the United States recognize that its traditional military-oriented approach might have grown increasingly out-of-step with regional thinking and that a more complex U.S. relationship with the region had begun.35 More importantly, the ASEAN states were able to link their domestic concerns about political stability and national cohesion with their external concerns about manipulation and interference by outside powers.36 3. Mitigating U.S. hegemony in Asia-Pacific. The ARF’s major effect is that it has been able to mitigate U.S. hegemony by subjecting the United States to a multilateral relationship that makes it bound by collective decisions. During the Cold War, Washington had relied on bilateralism rather than multilateralism as the basis for security relations with its allies. This made the United States the hub of the Asia-Pacific security wheel, with the separate spokes represented by alliance partners — Japan, South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Australia and Thailand.37 This policy, however, has been modified by American membership in the ARF, as Washington now has to rely on the forum’s ministrations for its long-term security needs and would also have to co-ordinate its diplomatic activity with the other members of the ARF. Washington was initially lukewarm to the idea of a multilateral regional security forum, since bilateralism had provided the United States with the privilege of maintaining a system of separate protectorates that enabled Washington to control the various agendas of each relationship. Moreover, this also prevented the possibility that its Asian allies might gang-up on the United States when they did not like a particular policy. The Bush Administration stated that the network of bilateral security relationships, if properly nurtured and accompanied by forward U.S. military deployments, would allow the United States to perform the role of a regional balancer and honest broker.38 Fortunately, for the ASEAN states, the Clinton Administration broke away from its predecessor’s policy of bilateralism and endorsed the

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movement for multilaterlism. In a visit to Seoul, Korea, in 1993, President Clinton declared: “the U.S. support for regional security dialogues in Asia … is a way to supplement our [U.S.] alliances and forward deployment”.39 To the United States, participation in the ARF is seen as a complement to its bilateral alliances and forward military deployments, since it would help promote peace and security through confidence-building measures, enhancement of transparency and other forms of cooperation.40 However, the United States has viewed this measure as a long-term conflict-avoidance mechanism that is ill-equipped to resolve or handle security crises once they occur. To Washington, the ARF is just another opportunity for continued U.S. involvement in regional affairs and cannot be considered as a substitute to Washington’s leadership in the region made possible by American military engagement in East Asia. Nevertheless, American membership in the ARF has shown that despite the ASEAN states’ need for a U.S. military presence in the region, these states could still devise a political mechanism that can ensure their autonomy vis-à-vis a major power and subsume American hegemonic prerogatives within a multilateral security arrangement so as to manage it.

AN ENTENTE CORDIALE AGAINST THE PRC

Despite their differences with the United States over democratization and human rights issues, the ASEAN states have been able to engage the United States in an entente cordiale directed against the region’s preponderant resident power, the PRC. A major uncertainty for both the United States and the ASEAN states is the PRC’s long-term intentions and capabilities. This uncertainty was a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War. The retreat of Soviet power in East Asia removed the underlying strategic bases that had allowed the United States, the ASEAN states and China to overlook their strategic and ideological differences. Now that this strategic basis is gone, the differences have been emerging. This situation is complicated by the PRC’s rapid economic development that has pushed the U.S. and the ASEAN states to see China as an emerging hegemon that could potentially cause trouble, trigger an arms race and undermine regional stability. Since 1994, U.S. defence and intelligence agencies have become concerned with the PRC’s arms exports (especially to rogue Third World regimes), its continuing naval modernization, a new forward-looking maritime strategy, and overall economic and military potential to become a regional hegemon. The U.S. Defense Department has kept a keen eye on

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the PRC’s acquisition of enormous amounts of military technology for missile guidance systems, its planned acquisition of 2 Kilo-class submarines, and plans to build Su-27 fighters on a licensed co-production basis with Russia. In late 1994, an eyeball-to-eyeball naval confrontation between the U.S. aircraft carrier Kitty Hawk and a Chinese Han-class nuclearpowered attack submarine occurred in the Yellow Sea. The incident created a notion within the U.S. Navy that the Chinese navy’s strategy of “forward defense is already sailing across the bow of the U.S. Navy’s primary mission of forward presence in East Asia”.41 The Pentagon also revealed that simulation exercises conducted by its Office of Net Assessment indicated that China’s defence modernization has made the PRC a credible military threat to the United States.42 The emergence of this view within the U.S. government coincided with the revival of the notion of the “China threat” in Southeast Asia. Since the late 1980s, Beijing has been pushing ahead with the build-up of its naval and air power; and since 1992, it has been more unabashed in pursuing its territorial claims in the South China Sea.43 These moves have made the Southeast Asian states wary of the PRC’s long-term intentions and, consequently, the notion of China as a threat has been gaining currency in the region.44 The ASEAN states’ collective concerns about China were formalized and made public when ASEAN came out with the Spratly Declaration at the July 1992 ASEAN Ministerial Meeting. Although the declaration is just a statement of principles emphasizing restraint and joint development in the Spratly Islands, it nevertheless was obviously directed against Beijing and, more importantly, was a rallying point for ASEAN to have at least a semblance of a common security front vis-à-vis the PRC. The Clinton Administration had tried to avoid confronting the PRC. However, forces within the U.S. government have been pushing the Administration to respond to China’s unilateral moves in the South China Sea. Alarmed by some of the ASEAN states’ expressions of concern over China’s moves in the Spratly Islands, the U.S. Congress has introduced a number of resolutional calling for China not to use force or intimidation in the Spratlys; condemning China’s act of aggression against the Philippines; and asking the Clinton Administration to review the defence needs of democratic countries claiming territory in the South China Sea.45 Moreover, a number of American defence planners have become cognizant of the fact that the PRC’s naval modernization is not in itself likely to constitute a direct military threat to the United States; the Pentagon nevertheless views this matter as worthy of close monitoring. The Pentagon is disturbed that American interests in the Asia-Pacific region would be threatened if

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China’s military modernization undermines the regional balance of power, threatening American allies’ interests and precipitating a regional arms race.46 To America and its allies, “China’s military modernization coupled with territorial disputes and its perception of what a great power and how it should act make for an uncertain and profoundly dangerous future for Asia and the United States”.47 This resulted in an emergence of a view within the United States and regional defence community that sees China in a more threatening light and recommends that the United States pursue a subtle containment policy while pressuring the PRC on issues important to Washington.48 This image of the PRC is also very prominent in the American Congress, in private research institutions, and among some prominent academic China specialists.49 In June 1995, Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security, Joseph Nye, announced that if military conflict in the South China Sea interfered “with the freedom of the seas, then the US would be prepared to uphold freedom of navigation”.50 Although this warning could be directed at other claimant states to the Spratlys, it was most likely aimed at China. In the aftermath of the Philippine discovery of Chinese structures on Mischief Reef in February 1995, the United States also warned China that it would protect the sea-lanes and sought clarification from China as to the nature, extent and basis of its claims in the area. The United States Pacific Command (PACOM) has since kept a close watch on PRC moves in the Spratly Islands, as any naval base in that area would provide China with the capability to monitor and potentially interdict shipping transiting the South China Sea.51 While PACOM has refused to mention the PRC as a threat, it nevertheless sent a strong message to the Chinese. It explicitly stated in 1995 that the South China Sea/Spratly Islands dispute had become an area of concern for the United States and that Washington strongly opposed any use or threat of force to resolve competing claims in this part of East Asia.52 Growing American interest in the South China Sea dispute is best shown by the U.S. State Department’s “Statement on the Spratlys and the South China”, which enunciated Washington’s concerns over the pattern of unilateral actions and reactions in the Spratlys, its opposition to the use of force or the threat of force to resolve competing claims, and its fundamental interest in maintaining freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.53 This was directed at the PRC, which has applied a strategy of creeping occupation of the Spratly Islands, developing its power projection forces in the South China Sea, and impressing on the other claimant states its ability to use force in settling the disputes once and for all.54

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Washington’s emerging interest in China’s actions in the South China Sea showed a convergence of interests between the ASEAN states and the United States vis-à-vis China. The PRC’s current efforts to develop its power projection capabilities have made all the ASEAN states express their desire, albeit very quietly, that the United States should maintain a strong military presence in East Asia to balance off China. To these states, China presents a major strategic uncertainty, and only the United States is capable of ensuring that the PRC remains a status quo power in the region. To the ASEAN states, the United States is the only power capable and acceptable in playing the role of balancing off the PRC; and the U.S. government’s recent interest in the Spratlys dispute indicates an American response to this issue. However, the ASEAN states are still unwilling to join in any effort that could smack of an anti-Chinese alliance.55 While they have indicated their support for American engagement in East Asia, with a tacit hope that this engagement could balance the PRC, the ASEAN states have still shown a reluctance to be closely tied to the United States when it comes to dealing with China. The reluctance by members of ASEAN to be closely allied with the United States in an anti-China coalition stems from their doubts as to whether the United States would actually come to their assistance in the event that the PRC aggressively pursues its claims to the Spratly Islands. The ASEAN states are likely aware that the most they can expect from the United States is balance of a kind through judicious arms sales and an American interest in freedom of the seas. Moreover, as small powers, the ASEAN states do not have the capability to openly antagonize China without the prospect of dire consequences. They recognize that it would be better for them to engage China by trying to enmesh it in a normative order that may inhibit it from using force and encourage it to adhere to the pacific settlement of disputes. Although the ASEAN states would like to see the United States play a moderating role in the Spratlys dispute, they are unwilling to join any kind of anti-China coalition. They would rather have the PRC participate in a process of engagement that incorporates interdependence and consultation, which are designed to impress on the PRC that the cost of challenging the status quo by military means would be counter-productive.56 RESPONDING TO STRATEGIC UNIPOLARITY

Faced by the exigencies of the post-Cold War era, the ASEAN states have adopted a mixed policy of linkage, adjustment and collective action to

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mitigate an uncertain geopolitical environment. Since 1992, they have applied the policy of linkage to ensure a continued American military involvement in regional security affairs. This linkage strategy involved providing access to U.S. forces with the hope that a continued American security presence in Southeast Asia would prevent possible rivalry developing between the region’s middle powers. However, in late 1993, the Clinton Administration confronted the ASEAN states with its policy of enlargement. Alarmed by the prospect of a resurgent hegemon bent on imposing its values of human rights and democratization, Indonesia, Malaysia, and Singapore adopted a policy of adjustment by forming a coalition to uphold the “Asian concept of human rights” vis-à-vis democratic enlargement. Describing this aspect of ASEAN-U.S. relations, Robert J. McMahon has observed: “The ASEAN states wanted a relationship with the United States, but on their own terms.”57 The formation of the ARF represented the ASEAN states’ complex pattern of linkage, adjustment and collective action vis-à-vis the United States. By convincing the United States to participate in a multilateral regional security forum, ASEAN was able to ensure continued American participation in regional security dialogues. This multilateral mechanism also allowed these small states to exert some influence over U.S. foreign policy in East Asia and provided them with the possibility of using American hegemonic prerogatives to their own advantage. This possibility became very evident in the way ASEAN developed a common interest with the United States in relation to China. Initially reluctant to become involved in any confrontation with the PRC, political and bureaucratic forces within Washington, along with ASEAN’s expressions of concern over China’s moves in the South China Sea, forced the Clinton Administration to pay greater attention to the issue. The ASEAN states’ efforts to sustain an American military presence in the region, their corresponding moves to maintain their autonomy vis-à-vis Washington, their collective efforts to manage U.S. hegemony through a multilateral security forum and involve Washington in an entente coridale directed at the PRC, have all proved the wisdom of the dictum, that “smaller states must accept large power involvement as a fact of international relations and they must use it to their advantage.”58 Notes 1

The concept of “Strategic Unipolarity” refers to an international situation wherein the United States, by all calculation of national power, is

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unrivalled by other power centres in the world. This concept has been developed by Malaysia to describe the post-Cold War period. See K.S. Nathan, “Vision 2020 and Malaysian Foreign Policy: Strategic Evolution and the Mahathir Impact”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1995 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995), p. 230. See Robert Gilpin, The Political Economy of International Relations (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987), pp. 72–92; and Mark R. Brawley, Liberal Leadership: Great Powers and Their Challengers in Peace and War (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993), p. 3. Thomas McCormick, “Hegemony and the World System”, in Major Problems in American Foreign Policy Since 1914, Volume II, eds. Thomas G. Patterson and Dennis Merrill (USA: Heath and Company, 1989), p. 28. See Robert O. Keohane, International Institutions and State Power: Essays in International Relations (Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1989), p. 78. These concepts were culled from Charles E. Morrison and Astri Suhrike, The Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller States (New York, NY: St. Martin’s Press, 1983), pp. 11; and Donald K. Crone, The ASEAN States Coping with Dependence (New York, NY: Praeger Publishers, 1983). Stephen E. Ambrose and Douglas G. Brinkley, Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938 (Middlessex, England: Penguin Books, 1997), p. 402. See Paul Dibb, Towards A New Balance of Power in Asia, Adelphi Paper, no. 295, p. 37. Stephen W. Bosworth, “The U.S. and Asia in 1992”, Asian Survey XXXIII, no. 1 (January 1993): 102. Jonathan D. Pollack, “The United States in East Asia: Holding the Ring”, Asia’s International Role in the Post Cold War Era, Adelphi Paper, no. 275, p. 73. Jusuf Wanandi, “Security in Southeast Asia in the 1990s: US-ASEAN Relations from An Indonesian Perspective”, Evolving Pacific Basin Strategies: The 1989 Pacific Symposium, ed. Dora Alves (Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990), p. 245. Sheldon W. Simon, “US Strategy and Southeast Asian Security: Issues of Compatibility”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, no. 4 (March 1993): 302 Leszek Buszynski, “ASEAN Security Dilemmas”, Survival 34, no. 4 (Winter 1992–93): 96.

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Daljit Singh, “Political Order of Southeast Asia”, Southeast Asian Affairs 1992 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993), p. 4. Trevor Findlay, “The Southeast Asian and the New Asia-Pacific Dialogue”, SIPRI Yearbook 1994 (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 131. See Lam Lai Sing, “A Short Note on ASEAN-Great Power Interaction”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 15, no. 4 (March 1994): 459. For a more thorough discussion of Indonesia’s pragmatic position in view of the American military withdrawal from the Philippines in 1992 see Dewi Fortuna Anwar, “Indonesia: Domestic Priorities Define National Security”, in ASEAN Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), pp. 496–97 and Michael R.J. Vatikiotis, “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, no. 4 (March 1993): 364. Sheldon Simon, “The Parallel Tracks of Asian Multilateralism”, in Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium, eds. Richard J. Ellings and Sheldon Simon (New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 25. James M. McCormick, “Assessing Clinton’s Foreign Policy at MidTerm”, Current History 94, no. 593 (November 1995): 372. Larry Berman and Emily O. Goldman, “Clinton’s Foreign Policy at Mid-Term”, in The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals, eds. Colin Campbell and Bert A. Rockman (New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1996), p. 302. Sidney Jones, “Asian Human Rights, Economic Growth and United States Policy”, in Current History 95, no. 605 (December 1996): 425–26. Frederick Z. Brown, “The United States and Southeast Asia Enter a New Era”, Current History 94, no. 596 (December 1995): 402. Sheldon W. Simon, “Alternative Visions of Security in the Asia-Pacific”, Pacific Affairs 69, no. 3 (Fall 1995): 392. Sidney Jones, “Asian Human Rights, Economic Growth …”, p. 425. Susumu Awanohara, “About face: US Asia Policy Architect has a Change of Heart”, Far Eastern Economic Review 157, no. 2 (19 May 1994): 22. See also David Williams and Clay Chander, “U.S. Aide Sees Relations with Asia in Peril”, Washington Post, 5 May 1994, p. A38. Derek McDougall, The International Politics of the New Asia Pacific (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 1997), p. 27. James Clad, “Statement in Southeast Asian Security: Dragons, Dominoes and Dynamos”, in the Hearings before the Subcommittees on Inter-

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national, Economic Policy and Trade and the Asia and the Pacific Committee on International Relations, 30 May and 19 June 1996 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1996), p. 38. For more discussions of these two functions see Michael Antolik, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 2 (September 1994), pp. 122–23; and Simon S.C. Tay and Obood Talib, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Preparing for Preventive Diplomacy”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 19, no. 3 (December 1997): 256–57. Michael Leifer, The ASEAN Regional Forum, Adelphi Paper no. 302, p. 19. Alice Ba, “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Maintaining the Regional Idea in Southeast Asia”, International Journal LII, no. 4 (Autumn 1997): 637. David I. Hitchcock, Jr., “East Asia’s Security Agenda”, The Washington Quarterly 17, no. 1 (Winter 1994): 94. Malcolm Chalmers, Confidence-Building in Southeast Asia (Trowbridge Wiltshire: Redwood Books, 1996), p. 147. Ba, op. cit., p. 647. Chalmers, op. cit., p. 148. Muthiah Alagappa, “Asian Practice of Security: Key Features and Explanations”, in Asian Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998), p. 625. Sheldon W. Simon, “The Parallel Tracks of Multilateralism”, Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium (Armonk, New York: M.E. Sharpe, 1996), p. 23; and Andrew Mack and Pauline Kerr, “The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific”, The Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995): 127. Ba, op. cit., p. 648. Coral Bell, “The Future of American Policy in the Pacific”, in AsiaPacific Security: Less Uncertainty, New Opportunities, ed. Coral Bell (New York, N.Y.: St. Martins Press, 1996), p. 33. Jason D. Lewis, “Southeast Asia-Preparing for a New World Order”, The Washington Quarterly 16, no. 1 (Winter 1993): 196. David I. Hitchock, Jr., op. cit., p. 92. Assistant Secretary for East Asian and Pacific Affairs Winston Lord, “Southeast Asia Regional Security Issues: Opportunities for Peace, Stability, and Prosperity”, Statement Before the House International Relations Committee Asia and Pacific Subcommittee, 30 May 1996 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1997): 76–89.

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See Ulysses O. Zalamea, “Eagles and Dragons at Sea: The Inevitable Strategic Collision Between the United States and China”, Naval War College Review XLIX, no. 4 (Autumn 1996): 62–74. Nayan Chanda, “Winds of Change”, Far Eastern Economic Review 158, no. 25 (22 June 1995): 16. See International Institute of Strategic Studies, Strategic Survey 1992– 1993 (London: Brassey Ltd., 1993), p. 134. See Richard I. Grant, “China’s Domestic and Foreign Policies: An Overview”, in China and Southeast Asia: Into the Twenty-First Century, ed. Richard I. Grant (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993), p. 7. For an updated and comprehensive discussion of the different national perspectives on the PRC’s arms modernization, see Jonathan D. Pollack and Richard Yang, In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development (Santa Monica, California: Rand Corporation, 1998). Mark J. Valencia, China and the South China Sea, Adelphi Paper no. 298, p. 26. See Zalamea, op. cit., pp. 62–74. See William T. Pendley, “America and the Asia-Pacific”, Joint Force Quarterly no. 7 (Spring 1995): 38. David Shambaugh, “The United States and China: A New Cold War?”, Current History 94, no. 593 (September 1995): 244. Nigel Holloway, “The Enemy Within”, Far Eastern Economic Review 158, no. 15 (13 April 1995): 14–15. William J. Dobson and Taylor Fravel, “Red Herring Hegemon: China in the South China Sea”, Current History 96, no. 611 (September 1997): 262. E.D. Smith, Jr., “The Dragon Goes to Sea”, Naval War College Review XLIV, no. 3 (Summer 1991): 44. Richard C. Macke, USN, “Statement of the Commander in Chief United States Pacific Command Before the House International Relations Committee, 27 June 1995, on the Future of U.S. Foreign Policy in Asia and the Pacific”, 30 May and 19 June 1996 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1997), p. 366. US Department of State, “Spratly and the South China Sea”, 10 May 1995, in Hearings before the Subcommittees on International Economic Policy and Trade and Asia and the Pacific of the Committee on International Relations House of Representatives, US Interests in Southeast Asia, 30 May and 19 June 1996 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1997): 156–64. In February 1996, the PRC’s Central Military Commission set the

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requirement that the PLA “would comprehensively advance preparations for military struggle”. In the context of China’s disputes with the Philippines and Vietnam over the Spratlys, this meant that “the PLA should set eyes on local warfare under modern technology and consider that such conflict will happen sooner or later and is unavoidable”. Sing Tao Jih Pao, 12 January 1996, “PRC Military Said to Feel Spratly Conflict Unavoidable”, in Foreign Broadcast Information Service-China96-014 (22 January 1996), pp. 29–30. Alagappa, op. cit. p. 669. Michael Yahuda, “How Much Has China learned about Interdependence”, China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence, eds. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (New Fetter, London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 21–22. For a comprehensive discussion of U.S. and ASEAN joint efforts to balance the PRC, see Gerald Segal “East Asia and the ‘Constrainment of China’ ”, in East Asian Security, eds. Micheal E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones and Steven Miller (Cambridge, Mass: The MIT Press, 1996), pp. 159–87. Robert J. McMahon, The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), p. 215. Morrison and Suhrike, op. cit., p. 299.

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Indonesia: National vs Regional Resilience? 81

5 National versus Regional Resilience? An Indonesian Perspective Dewi Fortuna Anwar INTRODUCTION

The title “National Versus Regional Resilience” might suggest that the two concepts are inherently incompatible with each other. It implies that national resilience does not necessarily lead to regional resilience, and conversely regional resilience might not support the pursuit of national resilience. However, within ASEAN, national and regional resilience are seen to be bound together in a virtuous circle of cause and effect. National resilience is regarded as a prerequisite for regional resilience. Without the development of national resilience it is difficult to attain regional resilience. After all, a chain is only as strong as its weakest link. The presence of a weak and fractured state within a region, which can easily invite interventions from its immediate neighbours as well as from extra-regional powers, will clearly be detrimental to the security of the region as a whole. This was certainly demonstrated by the long drawn-out Cambodian conflict. At the same time, the existence of regional resilience allows each regional member to focus on its respective internal development, regarded as a prerequisite for national resilience. An unstable region will naturally make the members more concerned about possible threats from outside, forcing them to devote more of their scarce resources, which in many cases they can hardly afford, for the purposes of conventional defence. In countries where the most immediate security problems are internal in nature — which can be caused by a combination of factors, such as a weak sense of nationhood, a fragile political system and economic backwardness — diverting scarce resources from internal development programmes to

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support a strong military structure can actually lead to greater national instability and insecurity. On the other hand, when the regional environment is peaceful and stable, the regional members can focus their attention and resources on addressing domestic problems. In this way, regional resilience clearly facilitates the development of national resilience. The ASEAN states formally adopted the concept of national and regional resilience as a primary objective of regional co-operation at the first ASEAN summit in Bali in 1976. According to the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, “The stability of each member state and of the ASEAN region is an essential contribution to international peace and security. Each member state resolves to eliminate threats posed by subversion to its stability, thus strengthening national and ASEAN resilience.”1 The Declaration of ASEAN Concord clearly sees no contradiction between national and regional resilience. The development of national resilience is seen as a step towards the strengthening of regional resilience which, in turn, will contribute to international peace and security. Nevertheless, it must also be recognized that while regional resilience must be built upon national resilience, the latter does not automatically lead to the former. Regional resilience is not simply the sum total of all national resilience in a particular sub-region. National resilience can only be harnessed towards the development of regional resilience if there is close regional co-operation among all of the regional states. Without such co-operation the individual pursuit of national resilience may actually lead to regional tension and instability. THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE NATIONAL RESILIENCE CONCEPT

The concept of national resilience within ASEAN was first developed by Indonesia during the late 1960s, just a few years after the coming to power of the New Order government under President Soeharto. The concept, which in Indonesia is better known as ketahanan nasional, was developed by the military as a holistic security doctrine in response to the existing political and economic chaos in the country. This concept is very similar to the doctrine of comprehensive security in its multidimensional approach to security. Security is not merely seen in military terms, but encompasses a much wider spectrum, including economic, political and social aspects. The national resilience concept has two main characteristics. Firstly, it is basically an inward-looking security doctrine. The multi-dimensional security approach is not primarily directed against threats emanating from

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outside the country. As can be seen from the Declaration of ASEAN Concord quoted above, the stress is placed on the ability of each state to overcome subversion within its own borders. For most of the ASEAN countries this means an emphasis on economic development, since subversion and other anti-government activities is usually related to social and economic grievances. Most of a country’s social and political ills can be attributed to its lack of economic resources so that the state has had very limited means to satisfy popular demands. Therefore, as stated by General Soetopo Joewono, a former governor of Lemhanas (Indonesia’s Institute for National Defence), “the national goal of all ASEAN countries is economic development and increase of the welfare of the people that are considered sine qua non for enhancing national and regional resilience”.2 Secondly, the national resilience concept is characterized by a strong sense of nationalism. This is a reaction to the long history of colonialism that Indonesia and most of the ASEAN states had experienced. The development of national resilience is, therefore, also aimed at reducing external interventions in a country’s internal affairs. In Indonesia, this had led to a free and active foreign policy, and a refusal to become involved in international bloc politics during the Cold War period. This nationalism also emphasizes self-reliance in matters of defence, so that a country should not be dependent on the generosity or might of other powers for their security. One of the earliest and most important spokesmen for the concept of national resilience was former President Soeharto himself. During a state visit to Malaysia in 1970, the Indonesian president stated his belief that: “the national resilience concept is the only answer to the challenges posed by a world still dominated by tension. National resilience encompasses ideological resilience based on a nation’s own identity which receives the full support of the entire nation, economic resilience capable of meeting the nation’s own basic needs, social resilience which ensures a feeling of solidarity and harmony among the peoples, and an appropriate military resilience to face aggression from outside. Without national resilience we shall always be afraid.”3 In the same speech, President Soeharto argued that governments must be instilled with the belief that their peoples could achieve much for themselves, and that they were not simply helpless pawns in the international power game. Although the security problems faced by Indonesia had emerged from

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the very early days of independence, it was only under the New Order government that an integrated approach to national security, linking geographic, political, social and economic aspects in an all-encompassing national strategy, was formulated. From 1968 the Institute for National Defence (Lemhanas or Lembaga Pertahanan Nasional) began to introduce the concept of National Resilience (Tannas or Ketahanan Nasional).4 This concept has been enshrined in the Indonesian Guideline of State Policy (GBHN or Garis Besar Haluan Negara) since 1974. The Guideline of State Policy is issued every five years by the People’s Consultative Assembly, the highest body in the land, which also elects the President and the VicePresident. A book on “National Resilience” issued by Lemhanas defines “National Resilience as: “[T]he dynamic condition of a nation, integrally encompassing all aspects of national life. It contains perseverance and tenacity which enable the development of national strength to cope with all challenges, threats, obstacles and disturbances coming from outside as well as from within the country, directly or indirectly endangering the national identity, integrity, survival and the struggle for national objectives.”5 It is further stated that: “[T]he National Resilience concept covers the organization and implementation of a harmonious balance between welfare and security in the national life, which holistically encompasses all aspects of life based on the national philosophy, state ideology, constitution and National Outlook through the ASTAGATRA method. The National Resilience concept constitutes the basis in achieving National Resilience itself.”6 One of the most important characteristics of the National Resilience concept is that: “[I]t is basically inward-looking, or mainly directed to the nation itself; its objective is the attainment of its own national identity and character through self-reliance. This does not mean, however, that the nation should take on an attitude of isolationism or narrow nationalism. The inward-looking characteristics along with the maintenance of international relations will externally project a healthy competitiveness.”7

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Another characteristic of National Resilience is that it: “Does not support power politics or the confrontation of strength. Power politics is mainly built upon physical power, while National Resilience exploits other capabilities and assets of a nation such as its moral power. National Resilience stresses the importance of consultations and mutual respect among nations and among states while avoiding confrontation and antagonism.”8 Based on the National Resilience concept, all aspects of national life are ramified systematically in ASTAGATRA, or “Eight Aspects”, which consists of Trigatra, or “Three Natural Aspects” and Pancagatra, or “Five Social Aspects”. The three natural aspects approach looks into the relationships of the country’s geographical features, natural resources and the potential and capabilities of the people. The five social aspects approach integrates the dynamic factors of ideology, politics, economics, sociocultural as well as defence and security.9 The Lemhanas publication gives an elaboration of the components that form the “Three Natural Aspects” and the “Five Social Aspects”. The book also explains the relationship between the Trigatra and Pancagatra which form a complete entity known as ASTAGATRA. National Resilience in essence depends on the capability of a nation and state to utilise its natural aspects (Trigatra) as a basis for conducting all facets of national life (Pancagatra). A weakness in one field may result in weaknesses in other fields, thus influencing the overall condition. It is further stated that: “National Resilience is not the sum-total of all the aspects of resilience, but rather is an inter-related and integrative result determined by the dynamic conditions of national life in the fields of ideology, politics, economy, socio-culture, as well as defence and security.”10 The National Resilience concept is seen as both a means and an end. This concept contains two primary elements. The first is the ability to eliminate or destroy every threat, either from outside or from within the country, that endangers national interests. This is known as the security approach. The second is the ability to develop or improve the nation’s quality of life, which may be termed as the welfare or prosperity approach.11 According to A. Hasnan Habib, a noted Indonesian military thinker, a clear line cannot be drawn between the various national objectives existing in different dimensions. However, because of a country’s limited resources the government must decide on priorities. In Indonesia, since the ascent of the New Order government in 1966, the domestic dimension has received

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the first priority, without isolating the country from the outside world. “The leaders of the New Order realized that the domestic objectives can be reached more easily if the external forces and dynamics can be utilized.”12 The Indonesian defence establishment defines threat as anything that can negatively affect the attainment of national objectives and survival. This can be in the form of a threat, disturbance, obstacle or a challenge either from within or without the country. Threats are seen to cover a generally wide spectrum, from low-intensity conflict, sabotage, terrorism and subversion, to high-intensity threats, in the form of armed rebellions, limited warfare and open warfare, using either conventional weapons or weapons of mass destruction. Threats to national unity and political stability from within the country are believed to take four major forms. At the top of the list is the threat of mass uprising caused by socio-economic inequalities. Secondly, threats can come from particular groups in society whose aspirations have not been met. The third form of threats are separatist movements (as in Aceh). Finally, threats can come from armed rebellions to change the ideological foundation of the state, such as by extreme left (communist) or extreme right (Muslim fundamentalist) groups. Beyond the Indonesian Government’s continued suspicions of the extreme left (communist) groups, it can be seen that the government, particularly the army, also continues to harbour suspicions about political Islam. In recent years, particularly since the establishment of ICMI (Ikatan Cendekiawan Muslim Indonesia or the Association of Muslim Intellectuals) in 1990, which has received support from the government, relations between the government and Muslim groups have improved greatly. Nevertheless, the Armed Forces remain on watch for “fundamentalists”, particularly those suspected of trying to establish an Islamic state. Suspicions about the possibility of leftist subversion against the state have not vanished with the end of the Cold War. In fact, in recent years, there have been new “red scares”. The government has accused communist elements for inciting the large number of workers’ strikes and violent riotings that have shaken the country in recent years, particularly in the months preceding the 1997 general election. The major riot which shook Jakarta in July 1996, following the forceful takeover of the Indonesian Democratic Party’s (PDI) headquarters, was blamed by the authorities on the Partai Rakyat Demokrasi (PRD or People’s Democratic Party), a small leftist organization not recognized by the government. The government argued that the PRD, whose members are mostly students with radical ideas, is an intellectual heir of the banned Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI or the Indonesian Communist Party).

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The government’s wariness about threats from Muslim “fundamentalists” and leftist radicals stems from Indonesia’s turbulent history, particularly during the first two decades of the country’s independence. In recent years, new threats have emerged to add to the government’s long list of groups to be monitored. The global march towards democratization and greater concern for human rights has found echoes in Indonesia, particularly among Western-educated intellectuals, non-governmental organizations active in community development work, and people’s empowerment projects, as well as among independent journalists and university students. It was these groups that challenged Soeharto’s authoritarian system of government and demanded a more open, pluralistic and accountable political system in 1998, that precipitated Soeharto’s fall. Except for the possibility of armed rebellion, whether in the form of separatist revolts or movements to change the ideological basis of the state, most of these threats are nonmilitary in nature. As such they cannot simply be addressed by using military means, but demand a more comprehensive and holistic approach to security. Here, political stability and economic development are seen to be linked together in an endless chain of cause and effect. Threats to political stability from any one of the potential sources listed above would be a hindrance to the smooth development process, since some of the government’s attention and resources would be drawn away from development efforts. At the same time, a decline in economic growth can lead to political instability, particularly given the fact that the government’s political legitimacy rests mostly on its economic performance. This has led to a firm conviction among the Indonesian political élite, which seems to be shared by governments throughout ASEAN, that national resilience can only be built on the foundation of economic development. Therefore, economic problems, such as the economic crisis that hit the regional economies from July 1997, did in fact have wide-ranging social and political implications. These problems not only undermine the credibility of governments and dent their legitimacy but, even more seriously, they can easily lead to social and political unrest which, in the Indonesian case, led to President Soeharto’s fall. Although the national resilience concept also envisages the ability of a country to deal with all challenges and threats, whether they come from within or without the country, it is quite clear that the main thrust of the strategy is directed at overcoming internal sources of insecurity. While developing conventional military capabilities to meet possible threats from outside is not totally ignored, the military component of national resilience is not overly emphasized.

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This is not to say that the ASEAN states have no concerns about their external environment. In the years prior to the Asian economic crisis, several ASEAN states had increased greatly their defence spending, mostly to acquire modern military technology and big-ticket military items, such as fighter aircraft and warships. Besides the availability of resources due to high economic growth which these countries had enjoyed in the eighties up to the mid-nineties, these armament purchases were clearly also the result of a perceived need to improve conventional defence capabilities at a time of regional uncertainty. Nevertheless, the emphasis has always been on external threats that are non-military in nature, particularly in the form of infiltration and subversion which can weaken the fabric of a society from within. As a result of the Asian economic crisis, the ASEAN governments have had to re-emphasize the primacy of economics and the threat arising from the process of globalization. Therefore, the national resilience concept emphasizes the importance of building national cohesion to preserve a country’s national identity, including economic robustness, rather than building a huge military capability to repel a possible invasion. NATIONAL AND REGIONAL RESILIENCE

As indicated above, in the view of the ASEAN states, national and regional resilience are organically linked together. The development of national resilience would contribute to the emergence of regional resilience. Conversely, regional resilience facilitates the pursuit of national resilience. The notion of the linkage between national and regional resilience was first advanced by Indonesia’s Foreign Minister, Adam Malik, in 1972. At the Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) in Singapore that year, Malik stated that regional resilience could “enhance the capabilities and abilities of each member country and its people in all fields of national endeavour, in order to withstand and overcome all kinds of outside interference and adverse influences, harmful to its sound and harmonious development”.13 Indonesia’s concept immediately attracted the support of the other ASEAN states which added new elements to it. Tan Sri Ghazali Shafie, the former Foreign Minister of Malaysia, added the commitment to regional cohesiveness when he referred to regional resilience as “the ability of each state in the region to be fully committed to their organized inter-relatedness and interdependence as the first principle of foreign policy”. At the same meeting, Dr Thanat Khoman, Special Envoy of the National Executive Council of Thailand, elaborated on the idea. He argued that regional resilience is the:

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“[D]ynamic condition of a group of nations in a region which includes tenacity, sturdiness and endurance, enabling the development of each nation’s national resilience in the spirit of regional solidarity, co-operation and loyalty, capable of coping with all threats and challenges coming from within as well as from without, that directly or indirectly, endanger the existence, the national life and the struggle of those nations and at the same time endanger the interest of the region as a whole”.14 From these it can be seen that regional resilience is not simply the sum total of all of the regional members’ cumulative national resilience. For national resilience to be transformed to regional resilience there must be a strong commitment to regional co-operation, particularly within the framework of a regional organization. Within ASEAN, the development of regional resilience is, in fact, conceived to embody four critical elements. According to official documents these are: • National Resilience. The national resilience of each member country is considered an important element of regional resilience because it is recognized that the collective contribution of all nations is important to the viability of the region as a whole. • Level of Interaction. The level of interaction among member countries is the degree of total contribution of the sum of cohesiveness and attitude of accommodation. This interaction is necessary to enable the region to withstand pressure and eventually rebound to its original nature or state. • Degree of Commitment. The degree of commitment of each member country to the region is an important ingredient for regional resilience. The greater the degree of commitment of each country, the higher the resilience of the region. • Adaptive Capability. Adaptive capability is the ability and capacity of the region to adapt itself and respond accordingly to the changing environment. Based on the earlier views expressed by the founding fathers of ASEAN and the critical elements of regional resilience as specified above, the following definition of regional resilience has been put forward by ASORR (the ASEAN Seminar on Regional Resilience) which was organized in turn by the respective national defence institutes of the ASEAN states: “Regional Resilience is a dynamic condition within a region reflecting the state of the national resilience of each member country, the level of

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interaction among countries, their commitment to the region and regional adaptive capability in facing challenges and opportunities.”15

STEPS TOWARDS THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL RESILIENCE

As mentioned earlier, the concept of national and regional resilience has been formally incorporated into the Declaration of ASEAN Concord, signed by the ASEAN Heads of States/Governments at their first summit in Bali in 1976. Developing national and regional resilience is regarded as the primary objective of ASEAN co-operation. Towards this end the ASEAN countries have formulated a set of principles and rules which govern intra-ASEAN relations. These are basically aimed at maintaining harmonious relations among the members of ASEAN and enhancing their commitment towards the association. The rules and principles are regarded as two of the major components of regional resilience. ASEAN’s desire to develop regional resilience, where regional members will become masters in their own house, led to the introduction of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality) in Southeast Asia in 1971. The ZOPFAN concept, which was adopted in 1976 as the political objective of ASEAN, articulates the ASEAN countries’ determination to become much more self-reliant in their security, instead of depending on the military protection of external powers. In order to realize ZOPFAN, regional members must clearly maintain friendly relations with each other and ensure the development of a stable and peaceful regional order. The most important breakthrough made by ASEAN towards the development of regional resilience was the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia in 1976, forbidding the threat or use of force so that members must settle their disputes through peaceful means. Although many bilateral disputes have remained unresolved, it is now becoming unthinkable that an ASEAN state would go to war against another ASEAN state for whatever reason, leading observers to conclude that ASEAN has developed into some kind of a security community. The likelihood of conflicts breaking out between the members of ASEAN has also been minimized by the principles enshrined in the Bangkok Declaration which established ASEAN in 1967. The most important of these principles are respect for the sovereignty and territorial integrity of all states, and non-interference in each other’s internal affairs. Adherence to these principles has greatly facilitated the development of friendly relations among the ASEAN states. This situation stands in sharp contrast

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to the period before ASEAN was founded which was characterized by mutual suspicions and antagonisms, culminating in an open confrontation between Indonesia and Malaysia. However, the absence of conflict is by itself not sufficient for the development of regional resilience. A condition of peace is not only an end in itself, but also a means for intensive regional co-operation to take place. For ASEAN to develop into a viable and indivisible entity the member countries have to carry out co-operation in all areas so that they will become inextricably linked to each other in a spider’s-web of interdependence. To this end, ASEAN has adopted and carried out various regional programmes for co-operation, particularly in the political, economic and socio-cultural fields. Maintaining harmonious relations and creating interdependence among the ASEAN members, however, do not only take place within the framework of formal ASEAN co-operation. In fact, since ASEAN was not conceived as a security organization, important security relations have been developed outside the ASEAN framework. For instance, Indonesia and Malaysia have developed very close bilateral defence co-operation, including engaging in regular military exercises. Indonesia also has similar arrangements with all of the original members of ASEAN. Therefore, despite the fact that ASEAN is not a defence organization — for it specifically excludes security co-operation from its agenda — there already exists a web of bilateral and tri-lateral military ties within the association. These military ties and exercises serve many purposes, the most important being to get to know and understand each other, thus removing suspicions and misunderstandings. Bilateral and trilateral military co-operation is also important for dealing with common problems in border areas, including problems at sea, such as piracy, smuggling, drug-trafficking and navigational safety, and naturally involve the three Strait of Malacca states — Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore. ASEAN has not only prevented the outbreak of conflicts among the member countries but, equally important, it has helped to contain extraregional threats, which is an important aspect of regional resilience. Since the establishment of ASEAN, the members of the association have been committed to preventing their region from being used as a base by foreign powers against fellow ASEAN states. This fact has enabled the ASEAN governments to devote most of their attention and resources to their countries’ internal problems and development. As indicated earlier, this function of ASEAN has greatly contributed to the development of the members’ national resilience.

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CONSTRAINTS IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF REGIONAL RESILIENCE

Although national and regional resilience are conceived to move in tandem, with one supporting the other, there are nevertheless several major constraints to the full realization of regional resilience. Chief among these constraints is the fact that ASEAN was never intended to develop as a supra-national organization. ASEAN is composed of sovereign states, with each state guarding its sovereignty jealously. While the members’ commitment to the regional body is evidently strong, and over the years ASEAN has developed its own dynamics, there has never been any doubt that the primary objective of ASEAN is to facilitate the national development of its constituent members. In such a situation, regional interests are usually accorded priority only if they coincide with or promote national interests. At the same time, despite the existence of strong political will supporting regional co-operation, in reality it has not been that easy to carry out cooperation, particularly in the economic field. Although initially economic co-operation was conceived to be the mainstay of ASEAN, as can be seen from the Bangkok Declaration establishing the association, little progress has been made in this area. The differences in the members’ level of economic development, and the fact that most of the ASEAN economies are competitive rather than complementary, have made economic cooperation ASEAN’s weakest link. It was only at the Singapore summit in 1992 that the ASEAN Heads of States/Governments agreed to the establishment of an ASEAN Free Trade Area within 15 years, later advanced to the year 2003 (and subsequently brought forward to 2002). The lack of economic co-operation has meant that the level of functional linkages within ASEAN has not been very high, thus hampering the growth of a regional identity. While there is a growing intellectual and emotional attachment to ASEAN, the association’s constituents are still limited to the élite circles in the capitals of the ASEAN states. The development of regional resilience has also been hampered by the existence of a number of unresolved border and other territorial disputes among the ASEAN states. The existence of ASEAN and the signing of the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia, has defused intraregional conflicts and disputes. As mentioned earlier, it is now unthinkable that an ASEAN state would resort to force to settle a dispute with a fellow ASEAN member. Nevertheless, so far the existence of ASEAN has not led to the final resolution of disputes among the various member states. Although ASEAN provides for the creation of a High Council at the ministerial level to help resolve intra-ASEAN conflicts, to date the High

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Council has never been invoked. In part this is because there has never been a conflict serious enough to warrant the formation of the High Council. But the main reason has been the preference among the ASEAN states to settle their differences through bilateral channels. When bilateral negotiations fail to settle disputes, however, there is now a tendency for ASEAN members to take their cases to the International Court of Justice in the Hague. Malaysia and Singapore have decided to take their dispute over the Pedra Branca island (Pulau Batu Putih) to the International Court of Justice; and Indonesia and Malaysia have also decided to do the same after bilateral talks failed to resolve their dispute over the ownership of two small islands, Sipadan and Ligitan. These moves may be regarded as proof of the members’ lack of confidence in ASEAN’s ability to resolve conflicts between themselves. There are many other border disputes and overlapping claims which remain unresolved, particularly after the enlargement of ASEAN. The existence of these intra-regional disputes clearly acts as an irritant within ASEAN, which can have a negative impact on the level of interaction among member states and on their feeling of regional solidarity. Constituting a further obstacle to the development of regional resilience are the existing differences in the perception of threat among ASEAN members. Although Southeast Asia has been transformed from an area of conflict and instability into a relatively peaceful and prosperous region, one cannot deny the fact that some suspicions remain among ASEAN members. Smaller ASEAN countries continue to harbour underlying suspicions about their bigger neighbours, notwithstanding the basically close bilateral relations that have existed among these countries and their mutual commitment to ASEAN. Although never openly articulated, Singapore and Malaysia still regard Indonesia with a measure of suspicion, while Singapore does not completely trust Malaysia either, and vice versa. The persistence of these intra-regional suspicions has also led to differences in views regarding the most desirable regional order. For instance, for Indonesia regional resilience entails a more autonomous regional order in which the role of foreign military powers would be significantly reduced if not removed altogether. At Indonesia’s insistence, the 1967 Bangkok Declaration specified that foreign military bases were only temporary in nature and that they would only remain at the specific requests of the host countries. Furthermore, these bases should not be used against other countries in the region. For several other members of ASEAN, however, the presence of foreign military bases on their soil has been regarded as crucial for maintaining regional security. These bases, or at

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the very least the existence of security alliances with external military powers, are seen to provide the host countries with extra security guarantees, not only against possible threats emanating from outside the region, but more importantly against potential threats from their ASEAN neighbours. These differences in security perception among the ASEAN states are reflected in their views on ZOPFAN, first introduced by Malaysia in 1971 and officially adopted by ASEAN in 1976. The establishment of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) in Southeast Asia has been regarded as the main objective of ASEAN political co-operation. Nevertheless, the ASEAN members have not completely seen eye-to-eye with each other on how to achieve ZOPFAN. To Malaysia, ZOPFAN would be achieved through the major powers’ guarantee of Southeast Asian neutrality, while to Indonesia such a guarantee is anathema, since it only serves to legitimize the major powers’ roles in the region. Singapore, on the other hand, has been known to be rather lukewarm about ZOPFAN, preferring instead the presence of a balance of powers in Southeast Asia, but one which clearly leans towards the United States. These are some of the problems that continue to put constraints on the development of ASEAN resilience. Although the situation has improved significantly from the early years of ASEAN, tensions still exist in the relations between national and regional interests. In fact, over the past decade new sources of intra-regional tensions have emerged, the most prominent being the increasing movement of labour, legal and illegal, from the less affluent to the more affluent countries of ASEAN. The execution in 1995 of a Filipina maid accused of murder in Singapore led to the most serious bilateral conflict within ASEAN since 1968, which almost disrupted bilateral relations between Manila and Singapore. In fact, President Fidel Ramos of the Philippines threatened to quit ASEAN if the maid case was not resolved to his satisfaction. The influx of illegal Indonesian workers to Malaysia and the reports that some of these workers have been abused have also added an irritant to relations between Jakarta and Kuala Lumpur. The enlargement of ASEAN to now include the whole of Southeast Asia while, on the one hand, likely to contribute significantly to the development of regional resilience does, on the other hand, bring to the association new complications. ASEAN’s enlargement has closed the chasm that divided Southeast Asia into two separate political camps, and will now lead to a greater convergence of interests and policies among countries in the region. Nevertheless, there are also concerns that existing bilateral disputes involving the new members, which until recently had

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sometimes led to armed conflict or skirmishes, may erupt again and affect regional peace and stability. Of equal importance are the internal problems faced by some of the new members, like Cambodia and Myanmar. CONCLUSION

From the above analysis it can be seen that within ASEAN, national and regional resilience go hand in hand. The development of national resilience is a major component of the realization of regional resilience. At the same time, regional resilience facilitates the development of national resilience. Therefore, the question of national versus regional resilience does not really arise among the ASEAN states. The emphasis put on the attainment of national resilience is primarily due to the fact that most of the ASEAN states are new states with developing economies. For most of the ASEAN states, particularly during the early years of ASEAN, the greatest threats to national security came from within. Threats from outside have generally not been perceived in conventional military terms, but rather in the forms of infiltration and subversion which sought to exploit the internal weaknesses within a particular state. The national resilience concept, which was first developed in Indonesia, has been devised as a comprehensive and holistic security doctrine as a means to overcome these internal weaknesses. The national resilience concept is, therefore, essentially an inward-looking security doctrine, which emphasizes economic development as its key component. The development of regional resilience is clearly dependent on the ability of the regional members to achieve their respective national resilience. Nevertheless, it is also recognized that the existence of national resilience alone is not enough. For regional resilience to be achieved there must be three other critical components besides national resilience; these are: the level of interaction among all of the member countries, their collective commitment towards the regional association, and the adaptive capability of the regional association in facing changes in its strategic environment. In other words, the development of regional resilience cannot be separated from regional co-operation, which in the case of Southeast Asia has meant ASEAN. Although individually and collectively the ASEAN states have succeeded in strengthening their respective national resilience and in carrying out close regional co-operation to promote regional resilience, some tensions still exist between national and regional interests. In a way this has been unavoidable because ASEAN was never designed as a supra-national

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organization with central decision-making power. In fact, the reverse was the case. The creation of ASEAN was primarily aimed at assisting its members to protect their respective national sovereignty and territorial integrity. In short, ASEAN was initially dedicated towards the development of national resilience, for which regional harmony was seen as a prerequisite. At a time when most of the ASEAN states are still basically developing economies with limited capabilities, the emphasis put on national resilience is clearly necessary, particularly since it contributes directly to the development of regional resilience. As these countries become more developed, however, national resilience will be regarded as a given. In such a situation the pursuit of national resilience, if done outside the regional framework, will very likely lead to intra-regional tensions, particularly if the specific notion of national resilience includes the acquisition of military power projection capabilities. Here, one clearly needs to pay much greater attention to the development of regional resilience, both through the intensification of bilateral ties and the strengthening of ASEAN. In particular, there is a need to resolve the existing bilateral and territorial disputes among the ASEAN states, as well as to strengthen the linkages between the states by deepening regional economic co-operation. At the same time, the ASEAN states need to enhance existing bilateral security relations as well as to begin thinking about the possibility of developing an ASEAN-wide security network. In this way, the increasing defence capability of each member country can be fully harnessed towards the development of regional resilience. Otherwise, the increase in defence spending which has taken place, and which may continue to take place if the conditions permit and economies recover fully from the Asian financial crisis, might escalate into an arms race and become a new source of regional insecurity. Notes 1

2

3

Declaration of ASEAN Concord, Bali, 24 February 1976. ASEAN Documentation Series (ASEAN Secretariat, Jakarta). Gen. Soetopo Joewono, “Mutual ASEAN-Japanese Interests in the Field of Regional Security”. Fourth Japan-ASEAN Symposium. Jakarta, 3–5 September 1981. Speech at an official function in Kuala Lumpur, 18 March 1970. Information Bulletin, Indonesian Embassy, Singapore. No. 008/Pen/ Ind/70.

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5 6 7 8 9

10 11

12 13

14 15

Since 1994, Lemhanas has been referred to as Lembaga Ketahanan Nasional or the Institute for National Resilience. National Resilience. Lemhanas, Jakarta, 1988. Second Edition, p. 6. Ibid. Ibid., p. 7. Ibid., p. 8. Col. (Ret) Sudjai and Dr. Lie Tek Tjeng, “Promotion of the Concepts of National and Regional Resilience”. A working paper presented to visitors from Thailand’s National Defence College. Lemhanas, Jakarta, May, 1988. National Resilience, op. cit., p. 40. Lt. Gen. (Ret) A. Hasnan Habib, “Politik Militer 13 Tahun Pertama Orde Baru”, in Teknologi Strategi Militer (TSM) 1, no. 3 (1987): 11–17. Ibid. “ASEAN Regional Resilience Concept: Indonesian Perception”. Lemhanas mimeograph, no date. Ibid., pp. 2–3. Ibid., p. 7.

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98 Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan

6 Disputes in the South China Sea: Approaches for Conflict Management Mohamed Jawhar bin Hassan INTRODUCTION

The preoccupations in the Asia-Pacific region today are with economics, not security. The factors which most undermined peace in the region for most of the century — colonialism, major power rivalry, (Japanese) imperialism, and the ideological Cold War — have subsided. States are now more concerned with issues such as development, growth rates, employment, inflation, investment, trade, technology, human resource development, infrastructure and the environment. This is especially so in the wake of the Asian financial crisis. Nevertheless, the region is not without security problems, some of them major. The most pervasive security problems facing the region are those involving territory and sovereignty. Every state in the Western Pacific rim, from Russia in the north to Indonesia in the south, is involved. Of the territorial and sovereignty issues, Asia-Pacific security is particularly vulnerable in three areas: the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait, and the South China Sea. And of these three, the conflict in the South China Sea has the least destructive potential in terms of either the likely mobilization of firepower or potential casualties. THE SPRATLYS, THE CLAIMANTS AND THE CLAIMS

Four areas are in dispute in the South China Sea: the Paracels, which is contested by China, Taiwan and Vietnam; the Gulf of Tonkin, disputed by China and Vietnam; Pratas Island and Macclesfield Bank, contested by

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China and Taiwan; and the Spratlys, contested in whole or part by six littoral parties: China, Taiwan, Vietnam, Philippines, Malaysia and Brunei. This chapter discusses only the Spratlys, a group of 230 or so islets, sandbanks and reefs of which only three dozen features are above water level and none of which are more than half a square kilometre in area. China and Taiwan claim about 80 per cent of the entire South China Sea bounded by a U-shaped line that China made public in 1947 and which appears on official Chinese maps. (The China and Taiwan claims are in fact a single claim.) China believes that the Sea has been part of Chinese territory since at least the Qing or Han period. In July 1995, however, China issued a policy statement indicating that it was “ready to work together with the countries concerned to resolve appropriately the relevant disputes according to recognized international law, (and) the contemporary law of the sea, including basic principles and the legal regime defined in the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea [UNCLOS]”.1 In 1996 China ratified UNCLOS. Vietnam claims all the islands and features that are above sea level in the Spratlys. The Philippines claims all features (above sea level as well as submerged) in the area it calls Kalayaan (Freedomland). Malaysia claims seven features, while Brunei has laid claim to a 200-nautical mile exclusive economic zone (EEZ) which includes Louisa Reef, also claimed by Malaysia. The claimants cite various grounds for their claims. China, Taiwan and Vietnam base theirs on ancient discovery, continuous usage and effective occupation. The Philippines claim, as contained in a presidential decree of June 1978, cites “history, indispensable need and effective occupation and control”. Malaysia’s claim is based on the grounds that the features it considers Malaysia’s are located on its continental shelf. The largest number of features — 22 — is occupied by Vietnam. China occupies 9 (including Mischief Reef), the Philippines 8, Malaysia 3 and Taiwan one (Appendix 6.1).

KEY PLAYERS AND THEIR INTERESTS

Besides the six claimants, the United States, and to some extent Japan, are the most significant players in the Spratlys. The nature of their interests conditions heavily the prospects for conflict management and dispute resolution. The interests of the claimants may be summarized as follows:

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• National sovereignty and territorial integrity. As is normally the case with states, all the claimants take this interest as supreme. It is one for which they are prepared to go to extraordinary lengths to assert and defend in the name of national prestige, honour and pride. The size and strategic or economic value of the claimed territories can be quite immaterial in this regard, and the miniscule features in the South China Sea give ample illustration of this. • Strategic value. The major sea routes which carry 25 per cent of global shipping lie some distance from the Spratlys proper, but control over the Spratlys would permit dominance over those routes. In normal circumstances this need not be threatening, as all states have a direct interest in keeping the sea-lanes open and flowing for their mutual benefit. When relations become tense or hostile, however, dominance over maritime routes can have significant implications. For the Southeast Asian states, the Chinese claim has another strategic dimension as well: the U-shaped territorial line that is still on official Chinese maps comes uncomfortably close to their shores, and it brings China to their doorsteps. • Economic prospects. No oil or gas has been discovered in the Spratlys, and the prospects for either are sometimes seriously questioned. Nevertheless China, in particular, and the other claimants, to some extent, believe that there could be large reserves of both.2 Oil supplies are believed to be a particularly pressing problem for China, whose energy needs are increasing sharply as a consequence of rapid economic development, and the South China Sea has been identified as one of the ten major locations in the world for oil and gas exploration. The United States’ interest in the South China Sea is linked to the diverse and far-flung interests it has in East Asia/Western Pacific as a regional and global power. Though the end of the Cold War and resource constraints have forced the United States to reduce its military commitment and presence in the region, the security of the sea-lanes in the vicinity of the Spratlys is of considerable concern to the United States. Washington’s security obligations to Japan (which include protection of supply routes) and its defence commitments to the Philippines (though, in the American view, not extending to the Kalayaan) also underpin its interests in the area, as do perceptions of America as a “balancer” to China in the region. Washington also has considerable economic interests with nearly all states in the region, and some American companies are involved in oil exploration activities in the area. Japan’s stake in the maritime routes near the Spratlys is greater even than that of the United States’. Seventy per cent of Japan’s oil imports, as

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well as other trade, pass through the Spratlys. Japan is also a major trading partner and investor in all the claimant states, and is involved in financing or operating some of the oil exploration efforts in the South China Sea. Like the United States, Japan is also apprehensive about China, and seeks greater regional and global influence. Political and security interests are therefore the primary concerns of all the major players in the Spratlys dispute. The economic value of the features has so far been negligible and will remain so until economically recoverable oil and gas deposits are discovered. Economic interests, however, do surround the issue of the Spratlys, deriving from the strategic trade routes located nearby and the oil and gas exploration activities being conducted close to the area.

THE POTENTIAL FOR CONFLICT

The Spratlys and the South China Sea have often been projected as the next military flashpoint for Southeast Asia following the resolution of the Cambodian conflict in 1993. Assuming that Cambodia does not slide back into major civil war in the near future, the Spratlys certainly assumes significance as the central potential tension point in the region. How serious conflict over the Spratlys can develop remains a matter of some conjecture, despite the many alarming predictions that prevail. Obviously, the likelihood of conflict cannot be ruled out. Territorial disputes — including those involving South Korea and Japan, and Japan and Russia — tend to arouse passions and induce much sabre-rattling. The clashes between China and Vietnam in the Paracels in 1974 and in the Spratlys in 1988 suggest that similar conflicts could also occur in the future. All claimants except Brunei have armed garrisons in the Spratlys. Those garrisons have been strengthened from time to time, and China, Taiwan, Malaysia and the Philippines, in particular, are enhancing their maritime military capabilities partly to enforce their claims to the Spratlys. There have been numerous minor incidents in the Spratlys, some of which could have led to an escalation of hostilities if circumstances had permitted. Arrests of fishermen in disputed waters, the planting of markers and their removal or destruction by rivals, shows of force by naval vessels, the firing of warning shots against approaching craft, prevention of passage or access to exploration and drilling fields are incidents which have occurred on many occasions in and near the Spratlys. The Mischief Reef incident of 1995 caused considerable alarm in the region and elsewhere. However, armed conflict did not occur, perhaps only because the Philippines

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was ill-equipped militarily to provide any credible challenge to Chinese naval vessels in the area. Circumstances Precipitating Conflict

Armed conflict in the Spratlys could be precipitated by a combination of circumstances, such as the following: 1. When China has developed sufficient military and logistic capabilities to dislodge other claimants and successfully sustain its occupation in the scattered and relatively distant features in the Spratlys. China could achieve these capabilities within the next 10 years or so. No other claimant has the potential to commit the kind of resources that will be required to develop this kind of capability. 2. When China is confident that intervention by outside powers is unlikely (such as in 1974 and 1988) or will be muted. 3. When relations between contending powers are severely strained and state behaviour becomes more aggressive or belligerent. The likelihood will be greatest in the case of China/Vietnam relations, given past history, proximity and the greater frequency of granting exploration rights by either party in contested areas. 4. When an unintended incident leading to loss of lives or extensive damage to property or vessels occurs, such as when action is taken by one country against the fishermen of another. 5. When a major oilfield or mineral resource is discovered. The economic impulse for conflict will then be greatly enhanced. 6. When one party feels that there has been extreme provocation, for instance by the building of structures by another party in unoccupied features that are the subject of dispute, or by exploration or drilling conducted in contested waters by companies granted rights by another claimant. Factors Preventing Conflict

There are, however, very strong constraints and disincentives for recourse to the use of force to resolve territorial conflicts in the area. These include the following: 1. Relations between all claimants are essentially good. In the case of Sino-Vietnamese relations, they have improved appreciably in recent years, despite occasional tensions over disputes in the Gulf of Tonkin in

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2.

3.

4.

5.

6. 7.

8.

9.

particular. In fact, in the agreement normalizing relations between Beijing and Hanoi, both parties undertook not to use force to resolve disputes on land or sea. All the claimants desire a peaceful regional environment in order to pursue their economic goals, which have been accorded the highest priority by all parties. The economic value of the Spratlys is at present still very low. No major oil reserves or mineral deposits have been discovered, to make risking conflict an acceptable and rewarding option. The prevailing mood in the region, despite the Mischief Reef and other incidents, is for political and economic co-operation, confidence-building measures and bilateral and multilateral engagement. Resort to force would be out-of-step with the current regional trend. Various processes and regimes which promote dialogue and co-operation and inhibit conflict are now in place and are being further developed. Vietnam’s entry into ASEAN and its subscription to the Treaty of Amity and Co-operation regime lessens the likelihood of conflict between her and other ASEAN states. The Treaty of Amity and Co-operation has been reinforced by the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea. The Philippines and China have agreed on a Code of Conduct (Appendix 6.2) and, as stated earlier, Vietnam and China have agreed not to resort to force in their border disputes. Though not fully productive as yet, the Indonesian-sponsored Workshops on Managing Potential Conflicts in the South China Sea provide an informal avenue to explore areas of agreement and co-operation. On a broader front, the ASEAN Regional Forum engages all claimants, as well as other regional states, in a common endeavour to fortify peace in the region. Vietnam’s membership in ASEAN constrains both Hanoi, as well as Beijing, from aggressive behaviour towards each other. China risks strong international censure, diplomatic isolation, loss of investment and assistance, and sanctions if it embarks upon a major military operation in the Spratlys. The reaction to China’s move on to Mischief Reef provided a foretaste of what can be expected. All claimants are becoming more interdependent with each other and with other powers in a flourishing web of trade, investment, financial flows and tourism. Prosperity and security are steadily becoming mutual and shared, and the costs to unilateral, aberrant behaviour is mutually damaging and high. The United States, still a power to be heeded despite various constraints on its desire and ability to act and become involved, has come out

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strongly against the use of force and any threat to the security of maritime routes. Taking into consideration both the factors tending towards conflict and those militating against it, it is assessed that the likelihood of a major outbreak of hostilities in the Spratlys in the foreseeable future is quite low. The potential is expected to be limited even when China has developed a blue-water navy because the disincentives on China are numerous and substantial. The more likely scenario for the Spratlys is isolated incidents such as seizure of fishing vessels, low-level confrontations, manoeuvres by Chinese vessels to test resolve and warn, and occasional occupation of unoccupied features. Tensions, however, could be raised by the discovery of major oil fields, a deterioration in bilateral relations and incidents caused by irresponsible conduct on the part of forces in the area, such as the planting of markers.

APPROACHES TO CONFLICT MANAGEMENT AND MECHANISMS FOR CONFLICT PREVENTION

The approaches adopted by the claimants appear to be influenced by consideration of several factors which impinge upon or are a part of the strategic environment surrounding the Spratlys. Among these would be the following: • • • • •

the maritime setting of the disputes; the relatively low conflict potential of the disputes; expectations regarding possible exploitable resources; the low, though varying, military capabilities of the disputing parties; the increasing military capabilities of some of the claimants, in particular China and Taiwan, but also to a much lesser extent Malaysia and most recently the Philippines; • heavy international interest in the maritime routes in the vicinity; • the special position of China, which is perceived as the most threatening power and the one most likely to initiate resort to force; and • the existing strategic balance among the major powers in the region, and the tremendous military reach and clout possessed by the United States. The conflict management approaches and mechanisms adopted by the claimants of course vary in some respects, but some generalizations can be made.

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Peaceful Negotiations. Negotiations aimed at resolving territorial disputes have essentially been bilateral in nature. The overwhelming differences in the relative size and bargaining strength of China and the other claimants, as well as the existence of ASEAN which provides a natural grouping for the Southeast Asian claimants, have also led to calls by some of the claimants from the latter to negotiate with China on a collective basis. This move has gathered momentum especially after the Mischief Reef discovery in early 1995, which unified the ASEAN states as never before. However, as is common with negotiations regarding territory, progress has been slow. Attempts have therefore been made for some time now to explore cooperation in various fields while setting aside the issue of sovereignty and forestalling conflict. Confidence-building Measures. These are being conducted at both Track One and Track Two fora, either dedicated to discussing issues surrounding the disputes or to more general subjects. Bilateral discussions, ASEAN (itself a confidence-building mechanism for members), the Indonesian-sponsored (Canadian-funded) Informal Workshops on the South China Sea, and the ASEAN-ISIS-organized Asia-Pacific Roundtable, constitute some of these processes. Specific measures for confidencebuilding, though much discussed (for instance, at the Informal Workshops), have not got off the ground yet. The reasons for this appear to be the lack of a sense of urgency and even necessity, given the relatively low tension levels in the area, the already generally cordial relations that exist among virtually all claimants, and the low importance and priority attached to confidence-building proposals, such as marine scientific research and environmental protection, which do not have sufficiently pressing and overwhelming rationales of their own, besides confidence-building, for states to consider them worthwhile. Military Deterrence. All the claimant states except Brunei have established a military presence on selected features of the Spratlys as a strategy to reinforce the legitimacy of their claims and to deter occupation by other claimants. More importantly, all states are enhancing their maritime military capabilities, partly to strengthen their capacity to surveil, police and defend the areas they claim, as well as to deter hostile moves by other parties. As stated earlier, Vietnam has the most extensive presence in the Spratlys, that is, on 22 features. China has a presence on only 9, the Philippines 8, Malaysia 3 and Taiwan one. There is no doubt, however, that China possesses by far the greatest military potential over the area, and that what deters it most is the likely political cost of expanded

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occupation and its as yet limited capability to successfully sustain and defend a presence over a widely dispersed area some distance from its southern base on Hainan Island. It may also be noted that the militarization of the Spratlys is still at a relatively low level, and that most of the claimants do not possess the resources to substantially enhance their presence to alarming levels in the near future. To some extent, this explains why military confidence-and-security-building measures (CSBMs) are not a pressing issue in the Spratlys. Preventive Security Regimes. There are a number of preventive security regimes which condition state behaviour over the Spratlys. The most important are those subsumed under ASEAN, namely the Declaration of a Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN); the 1976 Treaty of Amity and Co-operation in Southeast Asia; the 1976 ASEAN Concord; and the 1992 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea (Appendix 6.3). Together, the regimes embodied in these instruments exert significant normative pressures on the ASEAN claimants to moderate their behaviour, refrain from resorting to the military option, seek co-operative modes of conduct and explore peaceful resolution of disputes. It can be argued, however, that given the low levels of institutionalization and the relatively weak sanctions upon aberrant behaviour contained in these regimes, they are “soft” regimes. The non-activation of the ASEAN High Council provided for by the Treaty of Amity also weakens the force of this particular regime for the ASEAN claimants. Nevertheless, despite their “softness”, the regimes have proved remarkably successful in constraining conflict and enhancing co-operation and confidence among the ASEAN states. This indicates, perhaps, that a more rigorous regime, while probably desirable, has so far at least proved unnecessary. In any case, ASEAN has been gradually increasing its level of institutionalization over the years, and incrementalism would continue to be favoured by all its members who remain very state-centric in their approach. The ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and the Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP) have significant potential for reinforcing preventive diplomacy and security in the Spratlys in the future if regime-building progresses gradually in the years ahead. For the present, their writ is highly proscribed by China’s refusal to discuss the Spratlys in the ARF. The only moderating regime which embraces China is the bilateral Code of Conduct between it and the Philippines, agreed upon in 1995. Again, this is a “soft” regime. Therefore, there is a great need to develop and strengthen preventive regimes which firmly embrace China. Political and Diplomatic Constraints. More than military deterrence,

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claimants from among the ASEAN states utilize and rely upon their not inconsiderable diplomatic weight and influence to constrain China from becoming overly assertive in the Spratlys. Until the 1992 Declaration on the South China Sea, ASEAN studiously avoided being drawn into the bilateral disputes in the Spratlys, most of which involved its members. Beginning from the 1992 declaration and especially after the Mischief Reef incident, however, ASEAN has evinced greater collective interest in stabilizing the situation in the area. In this regard it has to be noted that ASEAN is unlikely to allow itself to be drawn into any bilateral controversy that may arise between a member and China if the member is responsible for initiating or aggravating the situation. Undue pressure exerted by China, however, may force ASEAN to intervene politically. ASEAN’s expansion to now include the whole of Southeast Asia is further adding to its political weight and diplomatic influence in the international community, and the potential constraints upon China have therefore increased. Strategic Balance. Most ASEAN states favour a continued American military presence and linkages in the East Asian region. None of them, except Singapore (and maybe the Philippines), however, is prepared to have any significant American military presence in Southeast Asia. This notwithstanding, it is believed that virtually all the ASEAN claimantstates see continuing American strategic-political interest, substantial economic presence, and military co-operation and reach as countervailing influences upon overwhelming Chinese power. This interest and perception prevails despite doubts regarding American commitment and staying power and the minimal likelihood of the United States getting militarily involved in the Spratlys in any foreseeable eventuality. Besides American presence, the interest of Japan and other regional and Western powers in the security and stability of the South China Sea in general is also a constraint and balance against destabilizing behaviour in the area, although they too are unlikely to get militarily involved. CONCLUSION

The security management controls, both deliberate as well as involuntary, that obtain and that are evolving in the Spratlys could obviously be further strengthened. There is still considerable room for further preventive diplomacy measures. Greater transparency in military matters including prior notification of military movements; a freeze on further military deployments and occupation of features in the Spratlys; enhanced military

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intercourse and co-operation among all claimants and especially with China (including regular meetings and dialogues and exchange of visits among senior military officials, the establishment of hotlines, and so on); a formal statement of support from China for the ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea; and the gradual strengthening of the ARF and CSCAP processes, would all bolster the security regime in the Spratlys. It is the view of this writer that although strategic culture has indeed played a part in influencing ASEAN’s approach to institution-building in the region (in its preference for informal processes, consensus, and low levels of institutionalization), ASEAN approaches have essentially been governed by Realist and pragmatic calculations which are entirely compatible with the demands and requirements of the objective situation. The view that the “soft” security regimes in Southeast Asia are due to the peculiar strategic culture of the region and not to a Realist appraisal of the nature of the security challenges confronting the region in the Spratlys (and the systemic and behavioural responses that are consequently required), is perhaps erroneous and could be ascribed to the following factors: • a threat assessment which considers the situation in the Spratlys and in Southeast Asia as more alarming than it really is or as ASEAN states think is warranted. The regimes are therefore considered too “soft” for the situation, and the approaches non-Realist; • a tendency to highlight the military dimensions of the problem, which seem more ominous, more than other aspects such as political relations and confidence-building; • a preference for focusing on management regimes with a high military content, partly because of experience and expertise in this field in the European theatre; • insufficient appreciation of the apprehensions regarding the creation of supranational controls and regulating processes among the relatively new nation-states of the region; and, • inadequate allowance made for the fact that multilateral security processes are new and still in the process of evolution in the AsiaPacific, including Southeast Asia. Over time, more elaborate and structured regimes may well be in place. When all is said and done, the Spratly Islands will continue to be a central security concern in Southeast Asia. It will exercise the diplomatic skills and military powers of states both within and outside the region for many years to come.

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Notes

The Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS) Malaysia expresses no institutional views and advocates no policies. The views and opinions in this chapter are entirely the personal opinion of the author concerned. 1 Asian Wall Street Journal, 13–14 October 1995. 2 A 1989 survey by China is reported to have indicated that the sea-bed contains 25 billion cubic meters of natural gas and 105 billion barrels of oil. China’s Geogology and Mineral Resources Ministry estimates that the Spratlys has oil and natural gas reserves of 17.7 billion tons.

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APPENDIX 6.1 Occupation of Islands in the Spratlys (January 1996)

China

Vietnam

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Subic Reef Gaven Reef Mischief Reef Kennan Reef Johnson Island Fiery Cross Reef First Thomas Shoal Cuarteron Reef Ladd Reef

Philippines 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Northeast Cay Thi Tu Island West York Island Lankiam Cay Loaita Island Nanshan Island Commodore Reef Flat Island

Southeast Cay South Reef Petley Reef Sand Cay Nam Yit Island Discovery Great Reef Sin Cow Island Central Reef West Reef East Reef Pearson Reef Alison Reef Cornwallis South Reef Pigeon Reef Spratly Island Prince of Wales Bank Prince Consort Bank Vanguard Reef Grainger Reef Rifleman Bank Amboyna Cay Berque Canada Reef

Malaysia 1. 2. 3.

Mariveles Reef Ardasier and Dallas Reefs Swallow Reef

Taiwan 1.

Itu Aba

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APPENDIX 6.2 People’s Republic of China/Philippines Code of Conduct

1.

Territorial disputes between the two sides should not affect the normal development of their relations. Disputes shall be settled in a peaceful and friendly manner through consultations on the basis of equality and mutual respect.

2.

Efforts must be undertaken to build confidence and trust between the two parties, to enhance an atmosphere of peace and stability in the region, and to refrain from using force or threat of force to resolve disputes.

3.

In the spirit of expanding common ground and narrowing differences, a gradual and progressive process of cooperation shall be adopted with a view to eventually negotiating a settlement of the bilateral disputes.

4.

The two sides agree to settle their bilateral disputes in accordance with the recognized principles of international law, including the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea.

5.

Both sides shall keep an open-minded attitude on the constructive initiatives and proposals of regional states to pursue multilateral cooperation in the South China Sea at the appropriate time.

6.

The two sides agree to promote cooperation in fields such as protection of the marine environment, safety of navigation, prevention of piracy, marine scientific research, disaster mitigation and control, search and rescue operations, meteorology, and maritime pollution control. They also agree that on some of the abovementioned issues, multilateral cooperation could eventually be conducted.

7.

All parties concerned shall cooperate in the protection and conservation of the marine resources of the South China Sea.

8.

Disputes shall be settled by the countries directly concerned without prejudice to the freedom of navigation in the South China Sea.

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APPENDIX 6.3 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea Issued at Manila on 23 July 1992

We, the Foreign Ministers of the member countries of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations, Recalling the historic, cultural and social ties that bind our peoples as State adjacent to the South China Sea, Wishing to promote the spirit of kinship, friendship and harmony among our peoples who share similar Asian traditions and heritage. Desirous of further promoting conditions essential to greater economic cooperation and growth. Recognizing that we are bound by similar ideals of mutual respect, freedom, sovereignty and mutuality of interests. Recognizing the South China Sea issues involve sensitive questions of sovereignty and jurisdiction of the parties directly concerned, Conscious that any adverse developments in the South China Sea directly affect peace and stability in the region,

Hereby, 1.

Emphasize the necessity to resolve all sovereignty and jurisdictional issues pertaining to the South China Sea by peaceful means, without resort to force,

2.

Urge all parties concerned to exercise restraint with the view to creating a positive climate for the eventual resolution of all disputes,

3.

Resolve without prejudicing the sovereignty and jurisdiction of countries having direct interests in the area, to explore the possibility of cooperation in the South China Sea relating to the safety of

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maritime navigation and communication, protection against pollution of the marine environment, coordination of search and rescue operations, efforts towards combating piracy and armed robbery as well as collaboration in the campaign against illicit trafficking in drugs, 4.

Commend all parties concerned to apply the principles contained in the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia as the basis for establishing a code of international conduct over the South China Sea,

5.

Invite all parties concerned to subscribe to this declaration of principles.

(Signed) HRH Prince Mohamed BOLKIAH Minister of Foreign Affairs Brunei Darussalam

(Signed) Paul S MANGLAPUS Secretary of Foreign Affairs Republic of the Philippines

(Signed) Ali ALATAS Minister of Foreign Affairs Republic of Indonesia

(Signed) WONG Kan Seng Minister of Foreign Affairs Republic of Singapore

(Signed) Datuk Abdullah bin Haji Ahmad BADAWI Minister of Foreign Affairs Malaysia

(Signed) Arsa SARASIN Minister of Foreign Affairs Kingdom of Thailand

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7 Denuclearization in Northeast and Southeast Asia Mak Joon Num INTRODUCTION

“Denuclearization” may be defined as political/normative attitudes towards nuclear disarmament, with a complete ban on nuclear weapons as the objective. The ultimate aim of denuclearization is to achieve a nuclear weapons-free world.1 Denuclearization is, therefore, linked to attitudes towards the acquisition of nuclear weapons, and to the process of nuclear arms control and disarmament. In this respect, “Realist” Northeast Asia shows a markedly different attitude as compared with a more multilateral Southeast Asia. This is reflected in the fact that the Asia-Pacific region includes within it five of the seven declared nuclear powers — the United States, Russia and China, in addition to India and Pakistan (if we include South Asia as part of the Asia-Pacific).2 Northeast Asia also contains a number of threshold nuclear powers — Japan, South Korea and Taiwan — while North Korea is suspected to be close to acquiring a nuclear weapons capability.3 On the other hand, there are no nuclear powers nor threshold nuclear states in Southeast Asia. This is probably because no Southeast Asian country possesses the technology needed for establishing an effective nuclear weapons capability, including warheads, launchers, and targeting systems. However, it is more than just technological capability and potential which accounts for such diverse attitudes to nuclear weapons between Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. This chapter argues that denuclearization, or attitudes towards nuclear weapons, is conditioned by national approaches to the whole notion of military power, i.e., whether states are Realists, or whether they are inclined more towards institutionalist approaches to security. The more

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utility and/or necessity a country sees in the possession of military power, the more likely it is to attempt to acquire nuclear weapons. Most Southeast Asian states have, so far, not found conventional military power to be especially useful. This is because the sub-regional security system has been based on external guarantors for its external defence, and on a multilateral framework of norms of socialization and acculturation for achieving intra-regional stability. Military power has been used primarily to address issues of state-building and national consolidation, including suppression of insurgencies. The ASEAN states, in particular, have relied on diplomacy and institution-building, rather than military power, to manage inter-state relations. Northeast Asia, on the other hand, has placed a premium on military power because of its recent history. These two contrasting approaches towards military power are important to an understanding of the prospects for denuclearization and nuclear arms control in Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia. China, again, like for so many other security issues, will set the tone and pace for denuclearization and any arms control process in Asia-Pacific.4 How China will behave in the future has been the subject of much analysis. Some analysts argue that China has become more internationally responsible as a result of economic interdependence. Others, however, maintain that China is still an irredentist and unsatisfied power, and that it will continue with its balance-of-power approach to international relations. For the moment, Beijing, as a minor nuclear power, is likely to continue building up its nuclear arsenal, or at the very minimum not reduce it in size.5 One reason for this is that Russia and the United States are leaders in nuclear technology and have such an “overkill” margin that they can afford to reduce substantially the number of nuclear weapons in their arsenal.6 A significant part of this chapter will therefore be devoted to China’s attitude towards nuclear arms control. The chapter examines China’s long- and short-term interests. In the near term, China sees great utility in the possession of nuclear weapons, partly to make up for the relative technological shortcomings of its conventional military power. In the long term, however, it is in China’s interests to ensure that nuclear proliferation does not take place in Asia. Nuclear proliferation will result in China being surrounded by a ring of potentially hostile nuclear states. This will be a drawback to China’s ambitions as a superpower when it becomes comprehensively strong, with powerful conventional forces. Thus, in the long run, it will be in China’s interests to support nuclear arms control and non-proliferation in Asia. Although there have been many areas of friction between China and the

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United States since the end of the Cold War, there could be common grounds for Sino-American co-operation, especially in discouraging nuclear proliferation in the Asia-Pacific.

THE UTILITY OF MILITARY POWER IN NORTHEAST ASIA

Northeast Asia and Southeast Asia display contrasting approaches towards the concept of military power because of their history. Northeast Asian states tend to place a greater premium on military power, especially military power to deter external aggressors as a result of their Realist history. The world-view of China and Korea has been conditioned by the fact that they regard themselves as independent, established nations with long military traditions. The need for military power to prevent foreign domination has been put to the test time and again. In recent history, both Korea and China (and indirectly Taiwan) have been defeated by a number of external enemies, including Japan. The military domination of China by European powers in the 18th and 19th centuries can also be partly attributed to the failure of Chinese military power to defeat the Europeans. The trauma of war and occupation, of being overrun by militarily superior forces, must certainly be an important reason why Northeast Asia, in general, still places great store on military power. The exception appears to be Japan. Ironically, Tokyo, the erstwhile militarist, appears to be the most pacifist today. But that can be explained by the military guarantee provided by the United States. Japan’s harsh and brutal colonization of Korea, Taiwan and, briefly, parts of China, has left a bitter legacy. China and Korea still harbour deep-rooted hatred for, and suspicion of, Japan.7 This probably engendered a “never again” attitude on the part of both China and Korea.

SOUTHEAST ASIA RELIES ON DIPLOMACY

Southeast Asia has also had its share of battles and bloodshed. However, its experience is very different from that of Northeast Asia. Indochina, Burma (now called Myanmar) and Malaya/Malaysia were occupied for fairly long periods by the French and British, who proved to be relatively benign colonizers. Indonesia suffered somewhat more under the Dutch. Overall, however, the European colonizers were arguably never as harsh as the Japanese during the latter’s era of the Greater East Asia CoProsperity Sphere of 1941–45.

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The nations of Southeast Asia, with the sole exception of Thailand, are all post-war states. The memory of pre-independence national military forces are recollected more as myths rather than history. In addition, while many of them suffered just as much as China during World War II, these states could not blame their militaries for failing to protect them. It was the British, French and Dutch forces which were defeated by the Japanese in World War II. Southeast Asia’s use and experience of military power is also markedly different from that of Northeast Asia. Guerrilla forces were employed to gain freedom from the French and Dutch, while Malaya and Burma were allowed their independence virtually bloodlessly. Instead of conventional battles, nearly every Southeast Asian state has been involved in either insurgency or counter-insurgency warfare or both. After their independence, the governments of Indonesia, Malaysia and Burma, and even Vietnam, have had to battle insurgents. The real fight in Southeast Asia has been to create nation-states out of a variety of highly diverse ethnic groups contained within very arbitrary state boundaries created by their erstwhile colonisers. Southeast Asia was therefore more pre-occupied with the process of national consolidation rather than preserving state frontiers against powerful external aggressors. Significantly, Southeast Asian states have never fought conventional battles of any significance against external aggressors. Indonesia’s “confrontation” against Malaysia (1963–66) was essentially a campaign of infiltration and small-scale skirmishes,8 while the Thai-Laotian “battle” of Ban Romklao was nothing more than a series of small battles along the Thai-Lao border from 1987 to 1989.9 Southeast Asia’s experience of conventional warfare is virtually non-existent. In other words, the experience of Southeast Asia has been such that lightly-armed counter-insurgency forces have been of the greatest value. Huge, powerful conventional military forces have therefore not been regarded as a priority. Southeast Asia’s preoccupation with nation-building and national consolidation has made the region inward-looking in terms of security. Military power is seen as vital for holding a nation together, not for defeating external aggressors or for changing the regional power balance. The militarily weak ASEAN members have instead relied on a variety of non-military instruments to deal with external threats. These instruments have included military alliances and/or alignments, adopting policies of non-alignment and other foreign policy and diplomatic initiatives.10 The ASEAN states’ reliance on non-military instruments is reflected in the concept of comprehensive security and national resilience, and in the

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unique multilateralism of the “ASEAN way”.11 The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN) concept was an additional attempt to keep Southeast Asia from turning into a superpower battleground.12 The Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons-Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty which developed out of the ZOPFAN initiative represents another ASEAN attempt at achieving regional stability through non-military means. Most Southeast Asian states may be described as militarily unambitious states today. As a result of the presence of external guarantors, they did not need to acquire any significant military capability, but only limited power, to deter relatively weak regional neighbours. Their military objectives are strictly limited, and they do not seek to redress the power balance by going nuclear. Instead, ASEAN demonstrates that multilateral security is very much part of the regional “culture”. The development of nuclear weapons is thus considered a political liability and an economic opportunity cost.13

NUCLEAR POWER: CRITICAL FOR CHINA

Most traditional nuclear arms control approaches have emphasized process, (that is, the forms of negotiations) rather than state policies and interests. When dealing with China, it is necessary to understand its attitude to arms control, and to take into account Beijing’s national interests and policies.14 China, and to a lesser extent North Korea, seems to have adopted a utilitarian approach to nuclear weapons. China, in particular, believes that it still requires military power to deter potential enemies, achieve strategic and foreign policy objectives, and to give it status as an international player of significance. Thus, it views nuclear weapons as indispensable components of its military arsenal. China decided to acquire its own nuclear deterrent in the 1950s because it could not depend on the Soviet Union’s nuclear umbrella.15 However, for China today, nuclear power is no longer purely about nuclear deterrence. China sees nuclear weapons as serving three very critical functions: • They serve as a deterrent in a nuclear-armed world of potential enemies. • They endow China with the status of a great power. • Nuclear weapons serve to make up for China’s present lack of conventional military strength relative to the United States, Japan and Russia. In short, nuclear weapons buy both soft power and hard power for the Chinese élite.16 It is noteworthy that China has only been actively involved in multilateral nuclear arms control negotiations in the past decade.17 Its

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accession to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and its pledge in 1993 to abide by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), have been interpreted either as evidence of China’s increasingly responsible international behaviour, or as China’s Realist appreciation of the fact that it can obtain security benefits from taking an active part in negotiating nuclear arms control regimes. The United States constitutes the focal point of Beijing’s arms control agenda. China presumably assumes the United States to be its primary threat, and also fears a hegemonic unipolar world dominated by the United States.18 Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) planners have noted that every potential flashpoint in Asia would inevitably involve the United States, since the latter is a global power.19 That U.S. nuclear strategy and nuclear arms control initiatives do form an important component of Chinese calculations is therefore undeniable. It is probable that China regards the United States as a significant potential nuclear adversary, at least in the near term, and often refers to the U.S. nuclear-targeting of China as evidence of potential U.S. hostility.20 However, whilst the perception of a new U.S. containment policy directed at China is one possible reason for the latter’s rather recent involvement in nuclear arms control negotiations, it does not satisfactorily explain China’s fundamental and consistent stand vis-à-vis denuclearization. CHINA’S ARMS CONTROL APPROACH

When dealing with China’s official position on nuclear arms control, three features stand out. The first is its insistence on, and commitment to, a “No First Use” (NFU) principle. China made a unilateral NFU pledge following its first nuclear test in 1964. Subsequently, for more than 30 years, China has urged the other four nuclear powers to adhere to this principle. The second point to note is China’s advocacy of Negative Security Assurances (NSA), that is, that the Nuclear Five should give assurances not to use nuclear weapons, or even nuclear threats, against non-nuclear countries and nuclear-free zones.21 The final feature is its proposal for a total ban, along the lines of the Chemical Weapons Convention, and elimination of all nuclear weapons. A number of analysts have interpreted the Chinese position on denuclearization as a cynical public relations exercise designed to earn international goodwill and respect. As two analysts have observed: China firmly opposes engaging in nuclear arms reductions talks among the five declared nuclear powers until the United

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States and Russia have drastically reduced their nuclear arsenals below the levels currently set by the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) II treaty, a prospect seen by the Chinese as years away. In the meantime, China will have an opportunity to qualitatively improve — if not quantitatively expand — its nuclear forces, thus narrowing the gap with Russia and the United States.22 China will not engage in arms reductions negotiations because of the vast disparity in numbers between the American and Russian nuclear arsenals (see Appendix 7.1) and the Chinese nuclear arsenals. In the coming decade, China’s emphasis will be on improving the survivability of its strategic deterrent, and on building up its second strike capability. All this will involve increasing numbers as well as quality.23 However, China’s stand on NFU and NSA, and its push for the complete elimination of all nuclear weapons eventually, is probably not entirely a public relations exercise. China has both long- and short-term objectives with regard to nuclear strategy and nuclear arms control.

CHINA’S SHORT-TERM NUCLEAR STRATEGY: A NON-DISCRETE APPROACH TO MILITARY POWER

In the short term, it can be argued that the possession of nuclear weapons today favours militarily weak states. The Cold War has demonstrated the limitations of nuclear weapons in achieving military and foreign objectives, apart from that of deterrence. However, the possession of even a limited number of effective nuclear weapons, and their associated launch and targeting capabilities, can prove to be a great military equaliser. It confers military power, albeit of a negative kind. In conventional military terms, while the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) is numerically the largest military force in the world, it is relatively unsophisticated, much of its equipment is obsolete, and it cannot compare with the American and Russian forces in terms of combat effectiveness.24 The possession of a nuclear capability, however, confers China with considerably more military power than its conventional forces alone would give it. Total military power for China, therefore, comprises both conventional and nuclear weaponry: Recent (Chinese) writings on nuclear strategy have also made the general point that the greater one’s military capabilities, the greater the awesomeness of the state ... Chinese leaders and

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strategists have agreed that nuclear weapons can play a critical role in improving China’s international status and its military power (author’s emphasis).25 Any attempt to deal with denuclearization in Northeast Asia must therefore take into account this Chinese approach towards total military power, that is, the incorporation of nuclear weapons and conventional weapons in Beijing’s calculation of total military power of conventional and nuclear strength. China has therefore adopted a two-tier national strategy. The first is to upgrade China’s nuclear capability to deter the big powers, while the second is to acquire sufficient conventional capability to handle regional conflicts.26 Thus, both nuclear and conventional weapons are considered to be vital and complementary weapons for China to achieve its national objectives.27 This “non-discrete” approach to military power was illustrated by Beijing’s “missile demonstration” (read nuclear demonstration) against Taiwan in the Taiwan Strait in March 1996.28 While the PLA has a huge force structure compared to that of Taiwan, the PLA is technologically relatively out-of-date and incapable of matching the sophisticated Taiwanese military, in particular the latter’s navy and air force. But what Beijing did not lack was a nuclear capability which it did not hesitate to demonstrate, albeit in a rather indirect way. This was swiftly followed by live-firing exercises to show off its conventional capabilities. The China-Taiwan spat of March 1996 demonstrated China’s approach to military power, which is to threaten to use all means at its disposal. Yet, China’s “nuclear” demonstration against Taiwan is not inconsistent with its NFU stand. This is because the NFU and NSA policies appear to apply only to non-nuclear states and nuclear-free zones. Taiwan, however, is regarded by Beijing as a Chinese province, and the NFU and NSA are silent on the use of nuclear weapons on Chinese territory. This could also explain China’s refusal to recognize the Southeast Asia Nuclear WeaponsFree Zone treaty. Apart from the fact that recognition would undermine China’s area claim to large tracts of the South China Sea surrounding the disputed islands and atolls, it would also preclude China from using nuclear weapons in what it claims to be its sovereign territory under its NSA policy. In contrast to China, one could argue that nuclear weapons have over the years diminished in utility for superpowers such as the United States.29 This is because the United States has developed highly accurate, lethal and effective conventional weapons, which was cogently highlighted in Operation Desert Storm in 1991 and in Kosovo in 1999.30 The technology gap between U.S. conventional forces and other conventional forces in the

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Asia-Pacific region is therefore huge. In conventional arms, the United States enjoys a qualitative preponderance which Asia-Pacific states would find extremely difficult to narrow. Therefore, the United States is at the forefront of the denuclearization initiative in the Asia-Pacific region because a world without nuclear weapons would leave the U.S. militarily dominant. The extent of America’s conventional strength, and more importantly, the utility and versatility of its conventional military forces, has not been lost on Chinese planners. China realizes that it cannot hope to match the United States in conventional terms, and that the technological gap between the two countries is enormous. In the short and medium terms, therefore, nuclear weapons represent the great equalizer for China. The attraction of nuclear weapons is that they are comparatively cheap and give the possessor tremendous military and political leverage. To that extent, China is at the moment more concerned with building up, rather than building down, its nuclear capability. Thus, the Chinese nuclear arsenal is likely to improve both qualitatively and quantitatively. This is because, while the advocates of nuclear “marginalization”, the most pro-disarmament school of thought in the United States, are pressing for a 1,000-deployed warhead ceiling by the year 2003,31 China is believed to have only between 200 and 500 strategic nuclear warheads at the moment. China may also develop theatre/ tactical nuclear weapons, to make up for its shortcomings in conventional weaponry “to fight ‘high-tech limited wars’ around China’s periphery”.32 But whether China will actually resort to tactical nuclear weapons in such limited wars is still open to debate. Some analysts see Chinese military power as no threat, since it is merely a reflection of China’s new-found status as a great power. Instead, China “wants to follow its own classic strategist, Sun-Tzu, and obtain its goals without actually having to use force”.33 NFU/NSA: A TIMELESS PANACEA?

An NFU/NSA convention would have been useful in the 1960s to 1980s to “protect” China from a devastating U.S. or Soviet nuclear first strike. The stress on NSA may be seen as a bid by China to play a leading role in the Third World in the 1960s and 1970s. However, China even today continues to portray itself as a potential victim of a U.S. nuclear first strike. For instance, China perceives five members of the Nuclear Seven as constituting a de facto military alliance today.34 Chinese officials, therefore, claim that China needs an NFU treaty more than any other nuclear power. A moral assurance from the United States that China

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“won’t become a (nuclear) victim” is thus essential.35 China’s backing for the NSA today is also to “demonstrate a leadership role”.36 The probability of a U.S. or even Russian nuclear first strike has, however, become increasingly remote. While the United States might be a nuclear giant, it has so far proven to be a responsible and transparent nuclear power. As for Russia, there is little reason for it to launch a nuclear first strike against China or any other nation. Thus, one can argue that neither the United States nor Russia is the primary objective of China’s continuing NFU/NSA strategy. The NFU and NSA policies, however, remain strategically relevant for China. Indeed, it may be said that the concept has been revitalized to protect China’s interests as the next superpower. It still serves its original purpose, which is to buy time for China to build up its nuclear arsenal. In the long-term, however, China’s fear is not U.S. or Russian nuclear strikes. China’s nightmare is nuclear proliferation in Asia. When China was trying to become a nuclear-weapons power between 1953 and 1964, it found non-proliferation to be an “imperialist nuisance”, but later wondered “whether proliferation in the Far East threatened her own security”.37 Proliferation could result in China being literally surrounded by a ring of nuclear powers — Korea, Japan, Taiwan, India, and Kazakhstan. Many of these powers would be potentially unfriendly to China. The Central Asian republics, for example, might support Xinjiang and other Muslim Chinese regions to break away. Sino-Indian rivalry and hostility has been well documented. But most of all, China fears a nuclearized Japan because of the latter’s technological potential as a nuclear power, and because of the traditional hatred and suspicion which China still harbours towards Japan. A nuclear-armed Japan might be China’s greatest regional rival, and might undertake initiatives detrimental to China’s interests, especially if the United States succumbs to one of its periodic isolationist moods and decides to withdraw from Asia.38 China’s firm, consistent stand on the NFU, the NSA, and a total nuclear weapons ban is part of the nation’s long-term strategy targeted at the threshold nuclear states of Asia-Pacific. A nuclear-free Asia constitutes the core of China’s long-term arms control objective, and it is in Beijing’s interest to ensure that threshold nuclear states in Asia will not develop their own nuclear deterrent. Many analysts have asserted that a “proliferation chain reaction” would result if North Korea were to go nuclear, causing South Korea and then Japan to go nuclear in turn.39 The worry over proliferation is not about how many weapons a state possesses, or the sophistication of such weapons. This is because the political impact of

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possession of the “first few items in a new nuclear arsenal will have a disproportionate influence, while a vast arsenal may be irrelevant if it no longer performs any strategic function”.40 As a somewhat minor nuclear power, it would be counter-productive for China to aid proliferation in its own region, although there have been allegations that China played a major role in Pakistan’s military nuclear programme.41 The fact that China has revived the NFU/NSA issue in recent years, putting it at the forefront of its international arms control negotiations, is significant. The importance that China attaches to NFU/NSA is reflected in the 1993 proposal by Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen, before the UN General Assembly, for an “international convention on unconditional non-first-use of nuclear weapons and the non-use and non-threat-of-use of nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states and nuclear-free zones.”42 The proposed convention, from China’s perspective, will hopefully prevent an expensive and highly destabilizing regional nuclear arms race from taking place. While the United States might be a nuclear giant, it has so far proven to be a responsible and transparent nuclear power. The new nuclear states in Asia may turn out to be more volatile, less transparent, and highly unpredictable. Thus, one can argue that the United States is not the ultimate goal of China’s current NFU/NSA strategy. The “protection” offered by an international NFU/NSA convention today against a U.S. first strike must be considered a bonus from China’s point of view. China’s NFU and NSA initiative is to give threshold nuclear states in the Asia-Pacific region a sense of assurance, and to prevent them from going nuclear. This is the Chinese concept of a nuclear “umbrella” or guarantee which will dampen nuclear-proliferation in Northeast Asia. It is very much in China’s interest, both in economic and strategic terms, to ensure that the rest of the Asia-Pacific region remains nuclear-free. Hence, China’s decision to accede to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) is also a means of making regional proliferation more difficult, since “... if a CTBT is reached by all states, many countries will not be able to develop nuclear weapons that might otherwise do so”.43 Beijing’s stand on the need for a nuclear weapons convention is also consistent with its long-term regional assessment and objectives. The utility of conventional military power is not lost on China. Many China analysts have pointed out the urgency with which China is addressing its conventional military deficiencies.44 China, one suspects, is determined to become a leading conventional military power. Its power projection capabilities, its air force and its navy, would then be able to dominate the region without having to rely solely on nuclear weapons. When China

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becomes a comprehensive superpower, the existence of nuclear-armed states on its periphery would become problematical for Beijing. The Chinese clearly understand the utility and disutility of nuclear weapons, and they have witnessed how small nuclear-armed states, even potential nuclear rogue states, can constrain a superpower like the United States. It is ironical that the American and Chinese perspectives on the nuclear issue are similar: Even if never used, a handful of nuclear weapons merely in the hands of an unfriendly country could change a regional balance of power against the United States. Thus, the major military danger now facing the United States in the post-Soviet World is not a particular country but rather a trend: nuclear proliferation.45 One can just as easily substitute the word “China” for “United States” in a future Asia-Pacific scenario. If one accepts the hypothesis that China’s ambition is to be the next superpower, then Beijing certainly does not relish the prospect of having to deal with recalcitrant, nuclear-armed states in any part of Asia. It is, therefore, far better to ensure a nuclear-free world when China becomes a new superpower. In that regard, while certain Chinese strategists might acknowledge that “the complete destruction of nuclear weapons is already impossible”,46 they refer merely to present-day conditions. Given China’s (oft-cited) sense of history and capacity for long-term planning, Beijing’s stand on NFU/NSA and a weapons ban must, therefore, be regarded as part of a grand strategic plan for the future. An understanding of China’s long-term and short-term objectives, and its approach to military power in general and nuclear weapons in particular, is critical to any assessment of denuclearization in the AsiaPacific region. In short, the key to the denuclearization of the Asia-Pacific in the immediate future appears to lie with China. While Russia is already actively involved in the process of nuclear disarmament with the United States, China appears to still regard nuclear weapons as essential and fundamental to its national power for the foreseeable future. NORTH KOREA’S BARGAINING CHIP

North Korea is the one country where considerable media attention has been focused on its so-called nuclear weapons programme. It has been alleged that North Korea’s nuclear programme was triggered by South Korea’s programme to establish a nuclear weapons infrastructure in the 1970s.47 It can be argued that nuclear weapons were initially meant to gain

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both hard and soft power for Pyongyang. However, after the death of Kim Il-Sung and the economic problems the regime is reported to be facing, North Korea is apparently using its “threshold” nuclear capability as a bargaining chip for economic assistance. In this regard, China has consistently denied providing assistance to develop Pyongyang’s allegedly secret nuclear programme, or to provide it with guided-missile technology. This is not surprising, since a nuclear Korea is regarded as the trigger which will put immediate pressure on Japan to go nuclear. In the context of China’s fear of regional nuclear proliferation, China can be expected to apply pressure on North Korea from developing a full-fledged nuclear weapons programme.

THE VULNERABILITY OF SMALL STATES

Against the backdrop of the above discussion, the question that arises is whether there is a geographic dimension to the acquisition of nuclear weapons? Are geographically large and populous nations — all other things being equal — less averse to the acquisition of weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, because they perceive that they can afford to take or sustain hits which would annihilate smaller countries? South Korea, Taiwan and Japan are all relatively small states with the majority of their population concentrated in a number of very large cities. This makes them especially vulnerable to nuclear attack. As such, while they have been described as threshold nuclear states, capable of going nuclear extremely rapidly, it would not be in their interest to go nuclear for so long as the US nuclear umbrella is there to protect them. Indeed, one could argue that these three nations would find it a political and strategic liability to acquire nuclear weapons. Various scenarios have been posited as to when South Korea and Japan would be forced to go nuclear but, on balance, they would favour a denuclearized world.

CONCLUSION

The prospects for denuclearization in Northeast Asia in the years immediately ahead will remain bleak until China feels militarily reassured. This is because of China’s approach to military power and its self-help attitude. China operates on the notion of a certain quantum of minimal military power that it perceives it needs. China, however, might be persuaded to at least slow down the rate of its nuclear weapons acquisitions

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if the more militarily advanced nations are prepared to help it acquire an effective ballistic missile defence (BMD) system, and to give it the technology to make its conventional military forces as sophisticated as the rest of the world’s. In other words, by expanding conventional military capabilities at the expense of a reduced (or slowed down) nuclear capability, China might perceive that the trade-off would not affect its total military power. Indeed, it might be tempted to do so because the total military power at its disposal would be more “usable”, since conventional military power can be used under a far wider range of circumstances than nuclear power. The United States, however, is unlikely to want to improve China’s conventional capability. In the short-term, therefore, one can expect the prospects of, not denuclearization, but an increase in the vertical nuclearization of Northeast Asia, accompanied by an increase in conventional military capability. In the long-term though, when China feels that it has a balanced panoply of conventional forces, when China is able to match the United States in all spheres, no one should be surprised if China becomes a leading and proactive actor in nuclear arms control negotiations and regimes. Whether China will succeed remains to be seen, especially if the smaller Northeast Asian states feel it necessary to come together to constrain and balance against China, the future superpower. Although it is generally assumed that the next nuclear confrontation will be between the United States and China, there is in reality a potential for these two powers to be allies in controlling long-term nuclear proliferation. Indeed, it has been argued that the U.S. should engage China as a great power with which Washington “shares a high-priority security interest in stemming the spread of the world’s deadliest weapons”.48 As the world’s leading conventional military power, the United States would be the main beneficiary if nuclear weapons could be “disinvented”.49 This applies equally to China when it achieves conventional superpower status. China would also feel the need to disinvent nuclear weapons and other weapons of mass destruction. In fact, as pointed out earlier, there is little fundamental difference in terms of aims between the U.S. “marginalization” school of nuclear disarmament and China’s NFU/NSA nuclear weapons ban strategy. It would therefore be helpful if both the United States and China recognise that they share some very common interests in discouraging proliferation. Their approaches, and the difference in time-scale, are of course very dissimilar.50 The United States must therefore realize that China is not necessarily its permanent, immutable nuclear adversary. At the same time, China must be more open and transparent, not only about

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its nuclear strategy, but also about its overall long-term interests and national objectives. In sharp contrast to Northeast Asia, Southeast Asia has gone ahead to draw up and sign a treaty declaring the region a nuclear weapons-free zone, in spite of opposition from the United States and China. The Southeast Asian states, which have never directly possessed nuclear weapons, have decided to remain firmly non-nuclear. This unilateral denuclearization reflects the attitude of most of the states in the region towards the use of military power against other states. In this sense, Southeast Asia today reflects the core values of ASEAN. The “ASEAN way” (political culture) includes important elements of preventive security or diplomacy. One of the primary avowed purposes of ASEAN, embodied in the Bangkok Declaration of 1967, is the “promotion of regional peace and stability”.51 The ASEAN Treaty of Amity and Co-operation of 1976 also stresses eschewing the use of force in resolving disputes, and emphasises noninterference in the internal affairs of another ASEAN member. The noninterference norm appears to have been adopted as a regional core value. Force, therefore, has little or no place in the conduct of ASEAN foreign affairs. The aversion to nuclear weapons by Southeast Asian states is therefore understandable. Hence the SEANWFZ Treaty can be regarded as another logical step in the development of the “ASEAN way”.

APPENDIX 7.1 The U.S.-Russian Nuclear Balance 1970 Nuclear Warheads Stockpile

1995 Nuclear Warheads Stockpile

2003 Nuclear Warheads Stockpile

26,000 U.S. 12,700 Soviet 38,700 Total

15,000 U.S. 25,000 Russian 40,000 Total

8,500 U.S. 5,000–10,000 Russian 13,000–18,000 Total

1970 Strategic Warheads Deployed

1995 Strategic Warheads Deployed

2003 Strategic Warheads Deployed

5,240 U.S. 2,220 Soviet 7,460 Total

7,770 U.S. 9,300 Russian 17,070 Total

3,500 U.S. 3,500 Russian 7,000 Total

Uncertainty in estimates means numbers are rounded. SOURCES: Arms Control Association; The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, November/December 1994 and January/February 1995 (Department of Defense). SOURCE: Cited in Joseph Cirincione, “The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Balance” in Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, May 1995, p. 205.

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Notes 1

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Joseph Rotblat et al., eds., A Nuclear-Weapon Free World: Desirable? Feasible? (Boulder: Westview Press, 1993), pp. 1–15; Graham Allison et al., eds., Cooperative Denuclearization: From Pledges to Deeds (Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University,1993). France and Britain are the other two members of the “Nuclear Five”. “Threshold nuclear powers” are industrially advanced countries fully capable of going nuclear if they should so decide. Such nations have been rather graphically described as capable of going nuclear almost at the turn of a screwdriver. Japan is, however, believed to be more than a threshold nuclear power. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal have described Japan as possessing a “recessed” deterrent capability based on nuclearcapable civilian rockets and guidance systems, and large stockpiles of fissile material that can be used for warheads. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security”, Survival 36, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 10. Banning N. Garrett & Bonnie S. Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control”, International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/ 96): 43. Estimates of the size of the Chinese nuclear arsenal range from a low of 200-plus warheads to approximately 450 warheads, although some “experts” estimate that China’s stockpile could actually be two to three times larger. See John Caldwell and Alexander T. Lennon, “China’s Nuclear Modernization Program”, Strategic Review, Fall 1995, p. 28. See Appendix 7.1. A 1992 agreement to accelerate the implementation of the U.S.-Russian Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (START I) should cut down the number of strategic nuclear weapon warheads deployed by each side from 6,000 to not more than 3,500, possibly by the year 2003. Stephen A. Cambone and Patrick J. Garrity, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy”, Survival 36, no. 4 (Winter 1994–95): 73. Barry Buzan and Gerald Segal, “Rethinking East Asian Security”, Survival 36, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 4. Harold James and Denis Sheil-Small, The Undeclared War (London: New English Library, 1973). Robert Karniol, “Thailand’s Armed Forces: From Counter-insurgency To Conventional Warfare”, International Defense Review 2 (1992): 102–103. For a comprehensive discussion of these instruments, see Muthiah Alagappa, The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand (Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1987), pp. 19–28.

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See Muthiah Alagappa, “Comprehensive Security: Interpretations In ASEAN Countries”, in Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global, ed. Robert A. Scalapino et al. (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988). First mooted in 1968 by Malaysia’s second Prime Minister, Tun Abdul Razak, the original idea was to persuade China, the United States and the Soviet Union to become the guarantors of a neutralized Southeast Asia. China demurred. The concept was adapted and refined by ASEAN Foreign Ministers in 1971 as the Kuala Lumpur Declaration, 1971. The ZOPFAN concept contains “ground rules” covering political co-existence, non-interference in the domestic affairs of nations, as well as a nuclear weapons-free clause in the ZOPFAN region. See B.A. Hamzah, ed., The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN): Revisited (Kuala Lumpur: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institute of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), Malaysia, 1991), pp. 6–8. Indonesia is the only ASEAN state with possible nuclear ambitions. It has been described as having “one of the most ambitious nuclear power programs in the world, proposing to build a new reactor every two years over the next 25 years. By that time, it “could have all the necessary infrastructure and materials to create nuclear weapons”. Joseph Cirincione, “The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Balance”, Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, May 1995, p. 205. Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms …”, p. 45. Lawrence Freedman, “Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons”, Survival 36, no. 4 (Winter 1994–95): 43. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence”, International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/ 96): 5. China agreed to the Limited Test Ban Treaty banning atmospheric nuclear tests in 1986, signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty in 1992, and agreed a year later to abide by the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty by 1996. David Shambaugh, “Growing Strong: China’s Challenge to Asian Security”, Survival 36, no. 2 (Summer 1994): 49. You Ji, “A Test Case for China’s Defence and Foreign Policies”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 4 (March 1995): 377. You Ji, “The PLA’s Military Modernization in the 1990s”, in China as a Great Power: Myths, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region, eds. Stuart Harris and Gary Klintworth (New York, N.Y.: St. Martin’s Press), p. 235.

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In the Geneva negotiations to conclude the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), China pressed for NFU and NSA commitments by nuclear-weapon states as one of three controversial provisions to be included in the treaty. Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control …”, pp. 54–55; also pp. 64–65. Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control …”, p. 48. You Ji, op. cit., pp. 242–44. You Ji, “A Test Case for China’s Defence and Foreign Policies”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 4 (March 1995). Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited …”, pp. 7–8. Yao Zhenyu, “The Guiding Principle for Our Army’s Weapons Programmes”, Journal of the PLA University of National Defence, no. 7–8 (1993), p. 29, cited in You Ji, “A Test Case for China’s Defence and …”, p. 378. Johnston puts forward the case that China is already moving towards limited deterrence, at least in doctrine if not in capability. Under this new “old” doctrine, nuclear weapons play a “critical role” in the deterrence of both conventional and nuclear wars. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited …”, p. 12. Melinda Liu and Sam Siebert, “Bracing for a Crisis”, Newsweek, 18 March 1996. China was reported to have fired three M-9 nuclearcapable ballistic missiles into the sea off Keelung, north of Taiwan. U.S. nuclear weapons is seen by some U.S. arms control specialists today as a “negative asset” unless it is traded in for greater political leverage against proliferation. Stephen Cambone and Patrick Garrity, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy”, p. 75. U.S. conventional precision-guided weapons, coupled with quantum improvements in surveillance, command, control, communications and intelligence capabilities and computing technology, have been described as being as effective as small nuclear weapons in destroying high-value targets, command centres, and concentrations of armoured vehicles. The impact of all these high-technology conventional weaponry and computing power, akin to the information revolution in the civilian sector, is so dramatic that some military theorists believe that it will transform the way wars are being fought. The RMA or “Revolution in Military Affairs” is the current buzz word in U.S. military circles. The “revolution” which the information revolution will bring with it means that numbers will no longer matter as much as the appropriate hightechnology platforms supported by a comprehensive network of

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intelligence and targeting systems. See Eliot A. Cohen, “Come the Revolution”, National Review, 31 July 1995, pp. 26–30. Cambone and Garrity, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy”, p. 91. Alastair Iain Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited …”, p. 27. James A. Kelly, “U.S. Security Policies in East Asia: Fighting Erosion and Finding a New Balance”, Washington Quarterly 18, no. 3 (Summer 1995): 27. Senior Foreign Ministry official, quoted in Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control”, p. 67. Opinion attributed to a Chinese university professor, cited in Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control”, p. 67. Attributed to a Chinese arms controller, quoted in Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control”, pp. 66–67. Rodney W. Jones, “China and the Non-Proliferation Regime: Renegade or Communicant?”, in Charles N. Van Doren and Rodney Jones, China and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Two Perspectives, PPN Occasional Paper Three (Centre for International Policy Studies, Dept. of Politics, University of Southampton, Southampton, 1989). It must be obvious to both South Korea and Japan that they are entirely dependent on the United States for a nuclear umbrella. There is no other ally to fall back on in the event of U.S. regional disengagement. This could engender a nuclear “self-help” attitude in these two key Northeast Asian states. Caldwell and Lennon, “China’s Nuclear Modernization Program”, p. 33. Freedman, “Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons”, p. 36. Rodney W. Jones, op. cit., p. 18. Cited in Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control”, p. 64. Attributed to a Chinese missile engineer at the Academy of Launch Vehicle Technology, quoted in Garrett and Glaser, “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control”, p. 59. The two authors, however, go on to note that many Chinese arms control specialists, both military and civilian, are “skeptical of the benefits to China of banning nuclear tests”. Ibid. You Ji, “A Test Case for China’s Defence …”, p. 243. Michael Mandelbaum, “Lessons of the Next Nuclear War”, Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995): 22. There are indications that the United States is more prepared to think about denuclearization, rather

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than just deterrence, nowadays. The “marginalizer” school of thought, which includes academics as well as U.S. government officials, is very close conceptually to China’s approach towards nuclear arms control. Their disarmament strategy envisages nuclear policy changes as a first stage, including, for instance, a “no-first use” policy. In the longer term, they argue for a broader process to delegitimize nuclear weapons and ultimately make nuclear weapons extinct. However, since they recognize that the knowledge of making the bomb can never be eliminated, the world may have to settle for “virtual elimination”, i.e., very small national stockpiles or even an international stockpile under United Nations control. See Cambone and Garrity, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy”, pp. 75–77. Zhang Jianzhi, “Preliminary Investigation of Questions Considering the Basic Theory of Disarmament”, in China and the International Disarmament Struggle, Current Affairs Press (Beijing, 1987), cited in Johnston, “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterrence”, p. 14. Joseph S. Bermudez, Jr., “North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal”, Jane’s Intelligence Review, Special Report, no. 9 (1996), p. 5. Zachary S. Davis, “China’s Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies: Boom or Bust for the NPT Regime”, Asian Survey XXXV, no. 6 (June 1995): 601. Cambone and Garrity, “The Future of U.S. Nuclear Policy”, p. 77. The United States is currently emphasizing counter-proliferation in addition to non-proliferation. Counter-proliferation involves using all instruments at the disposal of the United States to prevent proliferation. The military will also be actively involved in counter-proliferation strategy. Pilat and Kirchner have listed 13 elements in U.S. counterproliferation strategy, including diplomacy, deterrence, arms control, economic and military assistance to allies, sanctions and embargoes, intelligence and security assurances and guarantees. See Joseph F. Pilat and Walter L. Kirchner, “The Technological Promise of Counterproliferation”, Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Winter, 1995): 153–66. ASEAN, The ASEAN Declaration (Bangkok, 8 August 1967).

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8 Perceiving Japan: The View from Southeast Asia Lam Peng Er Japan aspires to play a political role commensurate with its status as the world’s second largest economic power. That Southeast Asia is a major arena in which Japan seeks to fullfil this aspiration can be seen from its various commitments: the disbursement of about one-third of its foreign aid to the region; the political linkage between aid and democratization; the “purchase” of friendship to support Tokyo’s future bid for a permanent seat in the UN Security Council; the unprecedented despatch of Japanese troops abroad since the end of World War II for United Nations peacekeeping operations in Cambodia; Tokyo’s proposal in 1991 to establish a regional forum to discuss security issues; and its urging China to exercise restraint with regard to pursuing Chinese territorial claims in the South China Sea. In the April 1996 Joint Declaration by President Clinton and Prime Minister Hashimoto, both partners agreed to a more expansive interpretation of Japan’s responsibilities within the framework of the U.S.-Japan Alliance and committed Tokyo to assist the United States in the event of regional instability in the broader Asia-Pacific region instead of Japan’s immediate neighbourhood. The U.S.-Japan strategic intent to jointly address regional hotspots is further codified in the 1997 “new guidelines”. Over the next two decades, the major strategic actors in the Asia-Pacific region are likely to be the United States, China and Japan. India and Russia, bedeviled by serious domestic problems, are unlikely to become dominant players in the region. However, whether Japan is able or willing to adopt a higher political profile in East Asia than it hitherto has is dependent not only on the promptings of its U.S. ally, and Japanese domestic party politics and public opinion, but also on the perceptions of Japan by its neighbours in Northeast and Southeast Asia. If Japan is unable

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to secure the understanding and support of the Southeast Asian states towards its desire to play a larger role, the country will find it much more difficult to fulfil its aspirations for status and security. This chapter raises two central questions. First, what are the domestic sources of the Southeast Asian states’ foreign policies towards Japan?1 Second, to what extent have shifts in the structures of the regional and international systems made an impact on the Southeast Asian states’ outlook towards Tokyo? Following on these two questions are two further ones. What would be the likely outcome if new configurations of power in East Asia were to emerge? Would the Southeast Asian states’ attitudes and actions towards Japan shift dramatically? The central argument here is that although the Southeast Asian states vary in terms of their dimensions of political regimes, ethnicity, experience of Japanese military occupation during World War II, level of economic development and size (see Table 8.1), they seek to establish good economic and political ties with Japan, because most of them are post-colonial capitalist states that are concerned with economic development, domestic political legitimacy and nationbuilding. While history, ethnicity, geography and regime-type do not impinge uniformly on the perceptions of the Southeast Asian states towards Japan, the most important domestic factor that shapes regional attitudes is the economic imperative to maintain good relations with Tokyo in order to fulfil their national agenda for economic development. Even though the Southeast Asian states are not homogeneous in their domestic structures and external outlook, they share a common concern for economic development. Good relations between the region and Japan is primarily underpinned by pragmatic and mutual commercial benefits, and not by any commonality of cultural values or political ideology based on “PanAsianism” or “liberal democracy”. Even though the international system has been transformed from a Cold War bipolarity to a nascent multipolarity, there is still a fundamental continuity in the regional strategic architecture — the U.S.-Japan Alliance. Despite speculation about the durability and post-Cold War utility of the Alliance, it has provided strategic stability and predictability to the region; it obviates the need for Japan to adopt an autonomous defence posture, and provides a counterweight to China. This relatively benign strategic milieu allows the Southeast Asian states to concentrate on nation-building and economic development. Notwithstanding a certain ambivalence about Japan’s “burden of history” and its aspirations to play a larger political role in the region, the Southeast Asian states view Japan positively as a key contributor of capital, technology and foreign aid, and a supporter of

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TABLE 8.1 Domestic Dimensions of Southeast Asian States Country

Regime

Major Ethnic Group

Economy & Per-Cap GNP (US$)

Size & Population (million)

Brunei

Absolute Monarchy

Malay

Rich $17,475

Tiny (5,800 sq km) 0.3

Cambodia

Monarchical/ Quasi-Demo

Khmer

Poor $215

Small (181,000 sq km) 10.2

Indonesia

Quasi-Demo

Malay

Poor $940

Large (1,925,000 sq km) 197.6

Laos

Communist

Lao

Poor $325

Small (236,800 sq km) 4.8

Malaysia

Monarchical/ Quasi-Demo

Malay

Mid $3,930

Mid (332,370 sq km) 20.3

Myanmar

Military

Burman

Poor $890

Mid (678,000 sq km) 47.2

Philippines

Democratic

Filipino

Poor $1,130

Mid (300,000 sq km) 68.5

Singapore

Quasi-Demo

Chinese

Rich $18,950

Tiny (616 sq km) 3.1

Thailand

Monarchical/ Quasi-Demo

Thai

Mid $2,680

Mid (514,000 sq km) 61

Vietnam

Communist

Viet

Poor $220

Mid (329,600 sq km) 75.5

SOURCES: J. Denis Derbyshire and Ian Derbyshire, Political Systems of the World (London: Chambers, 1989) and Asiaweek, 26 April 1996, pp. 56–58.

regional stability within the framework of the Alliance and various multilateral organizations. These organizations include the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), Asia-Pacific Economic Co-operation (APEC), the United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the World Bank, and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The predominant perception of Japan as a benign economic power is likely to persist insofar as the country remains tied to the United States.

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DOMESTIC STRUCTURES OF SOUTHEAST ASIA Regime-Type

Historically, with the exception of the Indochinese states and Myanmar, all the other Southeast Asian states have been staunchly anti-communist. Regardless of their regime-type, they were suspicious of the Soviet Union and China as supporters of communist insurgencies that sought to overthrow established governments.2 In the case of Thailand and Indonesia, their military remains influential in domestic politics and has traditionally been acutely sensitive towards perceived Maoist China’s support for communist movements in Southeast Asia. Especially in the case of Indonesia, its military establishment alleged that China supported a coup led by the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) against the government in 1965.3 This institutional memory is a key reason why Jakarta hesitated to establish diplomatic relations with Beijing and finally did so only in 1990. However, ideology was never a complicating factor between Japan, a non-communist state, and the Southeast Asian states. In the post-Cold War era, Japan has adopted an Overseas Development Aid (ODA) Charter that identifies relevant criteria for recipient countries before aid is disbursed.4 These include: democratization, human rights and an emphasis on economic and social development, rather than military power. Japan clearly seeks to play a political role commensurate with its economic status. Given its pacifist public opinion, lack of consensus within its political establishment, and the negative sentiment of China, Korea and Southeast Asia towards any hint of an enlarged military role for Japan, foreign aid as an instrument of Japanese foreign policy is more acceptable to its citizens and neighbours. Thus, alms rather than arms is a more practical foreign policy instrument. Nevertheless, this may also become a potential source of conflict between poor, authoritarian Southeast Asian regimes (especially Myanmar and Vietnam) and Japan. On the one hand, these countries desire ODA; on the other hand, they would view the application of Japanese pressure on them to democratize and to observe Tokyo’s definition of human rights as an infringement on their sovereignty. Thus, how these countries view Japan would be influenced, in part, by the manner in which Tokyo pushes its agenda of tying aid to democratization in Southeast Asia. Even though the Southeast Asian states have different types of political regimes, almost all of them have embraced some form of state and market capitalism. Although Vietnam is a formally Marxist state, it has adopted various capitalist measures, including inviting foreign capital, technology

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and managerial talent from abroad, especially Japan.5 Thus, most Southeast Asian states accept capitalism and, by extension, Japan, because it is usually one of the foremost providers of capital and technology in the region. Since economic performance is necessary to underpin the political legitimacy, stability and nation-building of these post-colonial regimes, these countries compete for foreign investments, especially from Japan.6 With the exception of the Philippines, there are no liberal democracies in Southeast Asia.7 Although Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and perhaps Cambodia, meet the minimum procedural requirements of a democracy (contestation and inclusion)8 through periodic elections that involve the adult population, they lack a strong civil society. Even in Western liberal democracies where public opinion matters in certain foreign policy issues, the direct impact of civil society on the state’s direction of foreign policy is often quite limited. This is even more so in Southeast Asia where the state often dominates civil society. Thus, civil society rarely impinges on the military-political élites’ perceptions of the great powers, including Japan. The élitist and technocratic perception that Japanese capital is needed for economic development, nation-building and regime legitimacy overrides mass prejudices against Japan and its people for its past and present behaviour in the region.9 As a result of the media publicity surrounding the 50th anniversary of the end of World War II in 1995, many citizens of Southeast Asian countries were reminded of the brutal occupation of the region by Japan, the country’s reluctance to apologize to East Asia for its atrocities on civilians, and the disgraceful treatment of “comfort women”. In certain Southeast Asian countries, mass culture, such as movies and television programmes about the Japanese occupation, history lessons and oral history from the older generation, have kept the collective memory of the Japanese Occupation alive. This, however, does not have a direct bearing on the political regimes’ requirement to maintain good ties with Japan. If Southeast Asia had liberal democratic regimes, then there would probably be more explicit protests and demonstrations by organized interest groups against Japan’s historical amnesia and the economic activities of Japanese companies that have caused deforestation, pollution and other environmental problems in the region. Level of Economic Development

Regardless of the level of economic development, the Southeast Asian states see Japan as a very important source of investment (Appendix 8.1),

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trade (Appendix 8.2), Japanese-style management and production knowhow, and as a provider of ODA. In 1974, violent riots erupted in Bangkok and Jakarta during Prime Minister Kakuei Tanaka’s visit to the region, in protest against alleged Japanese domination of the local economies and insensitivity towards the region.10 The riots shocked Japan into realizing that its relations with the region could not be taken for granted. Nevertheless, the Southeast Asian states have adopted the pragmatic approach of welcoming Japanese capital. The region receives the lion’s share of Tokyo’s foreign aid.11 Seeking to play a larger political role in Southeast Asia,12 Japan has offered to help in the reconstruction of war-torn Indochina, and also in the development of the Mekong Basin project. In the case of the Philippines, confronted with the problem of mass unemployment, the country sees Japan as another big market to absorb its surplus labour.13 Even though the region may be ambivalent towards Tokyo playing a larger political role, these countries also realize that they can benefit economically from their relationship with Japan. Impressed by Japan’s economic power, some Southeast Asian states have demonstrated great interest in Japan’s industrial and social structures and processes, and sought to adapt certain features to indigenous conditions in order to enhance their economic performance. For example, Malaysia has adopted a Look East Policy,14 while Singapore has conducted a Learn From Japan Campaign.15 Thus, driven by their intense desire to attain rapid economic growth, a number of Southeast Asian countries have adopted Japan as a successful model for state-led developmental capitalism.16 Southeast Asia’s reliance on Japanese investments, trade and aid does not necessarily mean that the region would fall into Tokyo’s economic and political orbit; the region’s countries also have strong economic ties with the United States, the European Union and among themselves. The four Asian “tigers” — South Korea, Taiwan, Hong Kong and Singapore — now have a greater stock of investment in Southeast Asia than Japan.17 It is unlikely that Japan will have an economic monopoly in Southeast Asia, because the regional states seek to avoid putting all their economic eggs in Japan’s basket.18 Moreover, the United States and the European Union have a significant economic stake in the region that precludes a Japanese economic monopoly there.19 Ethnicity and Japan’s Occupation of Southeast Asia

Most Southeast Asian states face the issue of integrating or assimilating

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ethnic minorities into the polity. Countries that have a Chinese minority, that often exercises an economic influence disproportionate to its numbers, include Malaysia, Indonesia, Thailand, the Philippines, Vietnam and Cambodia. (Table 8.2.) Only in Singapore do Singaporeans of ethnic Chinese descent constitute a majority. Native élites of these countries fear, in varying degrees (though more so in the past), that “overseas Chinese” domiciled in their countries might have divided loyalties that could be exploited by Beijing.20 In this regard, the Southeast Asian states obviously do not view Japan with suspicion. However, in states where there is a large ethnic Chinese presence, such as Singapore and Malaysia, there are strong collective memories of Japanese atrocities during World War II. When Japan invaded China in the 1930s, many overseas Chinese in Southeast Asia remitted funds to China to help it resist Japan. Not surprisingly, Japan treated the Chinese more harshly than other ethnic groups during the Occupation in Southeast Asia. The suspicion that Japan is not truly remorseful for its militaristic past, and perhaps may once again rise as a great military power, is not limited to Southeast Asia’s ethnic Chinese. Nonetheless, it is likely to be felt most intensely in countries where ethnic Chinese have stronger access to the media and the political establishment. Although all Southeast Asian states were occupied by Japan, they did not experience the same intensity of massive destruction, deprivation and suffering. Thailand escaped relatively unscathed by allying itself with

TABLE 8.2 Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia as Percentage of Total Population Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

16.0 1.0 3.0 0.4 29.6 1.4 1.3 77.7 8.6 1.5

SOURCES: Leo Suryadinata, “Ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia”, in Ethnic Chinese as Southeast Asians, ed. Leo Suryadinata (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1997).

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Japan in 1941.21 In the case of Myanmar and Indonesia, Japan fostered native paramilitary organizations in order to assist its war aims. Because many native Burmese and Indonesian nationalists were given military training by Japan, they were able to resist their former British and Dutch colonial masters who returned after Japan’s defeat in 1945. Thus, it is not surprising that Myanmar and Indonesia have less bitter memories about the Japanese Occupation than the other Southeast Asian states. Size

The ASEAN states subscribe to the declaratory ideal of ZOPFAN (Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality), a doctrine that envisages the region taking charge of its own destiny without interference from external great powers. In reality, individual ASEAN states have different strategic perceptions that are influenced by the size and “weight” of their countries. Let us examine the cases of the Indonesian giant, mid-sized Malaysia and Lilliputian Singapore. Indonesia, the largest Southeast Asian state in terms of population and geography, views itself a “natural” leader, not only within ASEAN and Southeast Asia, but also in the Non-Aligned Movement.22 However, there are certain tensions in its outlook towards the great powers. At the conceptual and idealized level, Indonesia does not welcome any great power exerting a strategic presence in the region. However, at the practical level, it welcomes the U.S.-Japan Alliance as necessary to balance China, especially when the latter is widely perceived to be an emerging great power. Indonesia therefore views Japan’s financial assistance and provision of logistic and military bases to the United States as arrangements that underpin regional stability.23 Nevertheless, Jakarta has occasionally pondered over a potential “China-Japan condominium”24 that might displace its “natural” leadership role in Southeast Asia. Although Malaysia is a mid-sized country with a relatively small population and modest level of economic development, it has ambitions to be a middle power with diplomatic clout. Especially under Prime Minister Mahathir Mohamad, the country has adopted a higher profile in regional and international affairs. The East Asia Economic Caucus (EAEC) was a Malaysian initiative. It was first conceived as a bloc of Asian countries that could exercise a counterweight to potential U.S. and European protectionism.25 Unlike ASEAN, Japan has not endorsed the EAEC because its American ally is against a regional grouping that excludes it. Malaysia attempted to court Japan and told it to stop apologizing for its militaristic past, and that it should work towards the future by endorsing the EAEC.

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Malaysia even tried to tempt Japan by offering it a “leadership role” within the EAEC. Since the EAEC cannot come into fruition without Japanese participation, Malaysia sees Japan as a potential ally to fulfil its own international aspirations. The micro-size and lack of strategic depth of Singapore contributes to a shared sense of acute vulnerability among its political leaders.26 Sensitive to the presence or potential presence of regional and extra-regional powers that dwarf the country, Singapore subscribes to a balance-of-power perspective. Its leaders often muse about a potential power vacuum emerging in the region that could be filled by China, Japan and India if the United States were to withdraw or significantly reduce its forces from East Asia. Whether the international system is bipolar or multipolar, Singapore adheres to a balance-of-power outlook; policies may change but its basic realpolitik assumptions about international relations do not. In that regard, Singapore’s perception of Japan’s strategic role is contingent on whether Tokyo remains tied to Washington, or acts as a counterweight to Beijing if the latter emerges as a regional hegemon or if Tokyo adopts an autonomous defence policy. How the Southeast Asian countries perceive Japan is also influenced by developments in that country’s domestic politics; Japan’s behaviour, role and attitude towards the region; the Southeast Asian countries’ system of alliances and security fora; and Japan’s relations with the United States and China. JAPANESE DOMESTIC POLITICS

The Southeast Asian states are not indifferent to political developments in Japan that may have implications for Tokyo’s foreign policy. First, Japanese public opinion, especially after Japan’s participation in UN peacekeeping operations in Cambodia, has become less sensitive and more supportive of an active Japanese political, though not military, role in the region, and has also shown less allergy to debating the hitherto taboo subject of revising the pacifist Japanese Constitution. If the nation were to revise Article 9 of the Constitution (which is interpreted as not allowing Japan to be involved in any military conflict other than the “defensive” defence of Japan), the Southeast Asian states are likely to react with great anxiety. Second, the Social Democratic Party (SDP), the former left-leaning main opposition party, and traditional sentinel against an increased military role for the country, has jettisoned its pacifist doctrine of unarmed neutrality in order to join various conservative ruling coalitions. However, this expedient move to have a taste of power has resulted in the SDP losing its ideological

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reason for existence. With the collapse of the SDP, and the coalition of two conservative parties — the Liberal Democratic Party and the Liberal Party, Japan’s political centre of gravity has shifted towards the right of the ideological spectrum. Despite their rivalry in other spheres, both conservative parties share a nationalistic desire for the nation to play a larger political role internationally. This impulse would almost certainly extend to Southeast Asia. JAPAN’S ATTITUDE, ROLE AND BEHAVIOUR TOWARDS SOUTHEAST ASIA

In 1977, Japan formulated the Fukuda Doctrine and signalled its intention to play an active political role in Southeast Asia, including acting as a diplomatic “bridge” to ease regional tensions between the ASEAN states and Vietnam.27 Because Japan aspires to a leadership role, including a permanent seat on the UN Security Council, it needs to gain the acceptance and the diplomatic support of the Southeast Asian states before it can achieve its objective. ODA is one such instrument to purchase political favours. However, it has only been in the past decade that Japan has succeeded in maintaining a more sustained and higher political profile in Southeast Asia.28 At the 1990 Tokyo Conference, it tried to promote an agreement among the Cambodian factions to cease armed hostilities. In 1991, then Foreign Minister Taro Nakayama startled the Southeast Asian governments at the ASEAN Post-Ministerial Conference when he publicly advocated a multilateral arrangement in Southeast Asia to discuss security issues and regional stability. Reactions from the region were initially ambivalent because the governments were not used to Japan taking an initiative on strategic matters and, more importantly, Japan did not engage in prior regional consultation before publicly announcing the proposal. Nevertheless, Southeast Asia welcomes Japan as a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum that seeks to promote confidence-building, institutionalize a habit of consultation, provide greater strategic transparency and peaceful conflict resolution, and to co-opt and socialize China to accept these regional norms. In September 1992, Tokyo dispatched troops abroad for the first time since the end of the Pacific War to Cambodia for UN peacekeeping operations, despite initial reservations from some of its neighbours. Japan also tried to play a political role to ease tensions in the South China Sea. In February 1995, the Philippines strongly protested at China’s construction of structures on the Philippine-claimed Mischief Reef, which is part of the

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disputed Spratlys chain in the South China Sea. After discussions with the Philippines, Japan approached China and urged it to resolve the dispute peacefully.29 Thus, Tokyo tried to play a “bridging” role between China and the Philippines to ease regional tension. Even though China rebuffed Japan’s diplomatic attempts, this event was significant because it showed that Japan was prepared to play a more active diplomatic role in Southeast Asia. Insofar as Japan’s diplomatic initiatives are anchored within the framework of the alliance with the United States and the ARF, the Southeast Asian countries would not be too unduly worried about Japan. However, in certain cases, the Alliance constrains Japan from acting in a manner that is preferred by the ASEAN states. Besides the EAEC issue, Japan has refused to endorse the Southeast Asian Nuclear Weapons Free Zone (SEANWFZ) treaty because of American objections. The United States is concerned that SEANWFZ would constrain the free passage of its navy through Southeast Asia’s waters. This is regrettable because the South Pacific and African countries already have succeeded in promoting their regional nuclear weapons-free zones. Being the only country that has suffered a nuclear attack, and also possessing a non-nuclear weapons policy, one would have expected Japan to be sympathetic to regional desires for a nuclear weapons-free zone. But Japan is not. If Japan has to choose between supporting the United States and the ASEAN states, the United States would take precedence. A Japanese diplomat, Nakatomi Hisashi, is very explicit about the manner that the Southeast Asian states are ranked in importance beneath other sets of countries. Such a view is not uncommon among Japan’s foreign policy establishment. This mind-set deserves to be quoted at length. Nakatomi candidly and revealingly writes:30 ... Japan continues to give top priority to its relationship with the US. Next to the US, it should maintain good relations with Russia, China and the Koreas, because they are important neighbouring countries to Japan. Third, Japan should have good relations with Europe, Canada, Australia and others, since they are its important trading partners. Nations in Southeast Asia, particularly NICs and ASEAN countries, are ranked as important as European countries, because to Japan, they are important not only in business but also in security.... We can arrange the countries according to their significance to Japan as follows: 1. The United States 2. China, South Korea (and North Korea in the future) and Russia

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3. European countries (including Canada, Australia and others) and the Southeast Asian countries 4. Others Japan’s relationship with a particular country is determined in accordance to the following order: 1>2>3>4 This inequation [sic] indicates that a country in group 4 cannot have a better relationship than a country in group 3, unless it has been moved to a higher group. In other words, Japan should take into account opinions of countries in higher groups to make decisions about its relationship with other countries. Allow us to apply this logic to our relations with Vietnam. In the current situation, Vietnam is put into group 3. This means Japan would cooperate with Vietnam like with other Southeast Asian countries, unless this co-operation does not damage its relationships with countries in group 1 and 2. Despite the Fukuda Doctrine’s promise of a heart-to-heart relationship between Japan and Southeast Asia, the Southeast Asian states have not been naive; they have been cognizant of the fact that Japan is closer to the United States than to them. Since Japan places priority on the Alliance, and has yet to show true remorse over its wartime Occupation of Southeast Asia, there remains an unavoidable emotional gap between Japan and its neighbours to the south. Nevertheless, Tokyo continues to pursue influence in the region. In January 1997, the Prime Minister of Japan articulated the so-called Hashimoto Doctrine that sought to redefine the nation’s relations with Southeast Asia. The centrepiece of his proposals was the institutionalization of a regular summit between the top leaders of Japan and Southeast Asia. In addition, Ryutaro Hashimoto also proposed regular bilateral security discussions between his country and the countries of Southeast Asia. In the same year, Tokyo sought regional leadership in two areas that are not anathema to the region. The first, was the Japanese initiative to propose the launch of an Asian IMF-type organization (an Asian Monetary Fund) to bolster the Thai baht, Malaysian ringgit and Indonesian rupiah in the wake of speculative attacks against these currencies. Although the idea was stillborn due to opposition from the U.S. and the IMF, Tokyo extended US$5 billion in financial assistance to Indonesia to help it tide over the currency turmoil. The second area was environmental assistance to deal with the Indonesia-originated smog (caused by forest fires) that shrouded Kalimantan, Sumatra, Malaysia and Singapore for months, and also a disastrous oil spill off the coast of Singapore.

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SOUTHEAST ASIA’S DEFENCE ARRANGEMENTS

Most Southeast Asian states have bilateral and multilateral defence arrangements between themselves and external powers. (Figure 8.1 highlights the countries in East and Southeast Asia that have bilateral strategic arrangements with the United States.) Especially for the Southeast Asian states which have security links with the United States, they appear not to be overly concerned about a potential “Japan threat” because Tokyo is aligned with Washington. Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia also have defence ties with American allies. Malaysia and Singapore are members of the Five-Power Defence Arrangements (along with Australia, New Zealand and Britain), while Indonesia concluded a defence arrangement with Australia in December 1995 (which was terminated during the East Timor crisis of 1999, when Australia led an international intervention force into the former Portuguese colony, which had been annexed by Indonesia in 1976). Because Japan’s defence establishment dovetails into U.S. force structures, and lacks offensive weapons like aircraft-carriers, long-range bombers, and nuclear warheads and delivery systems, it appears that the Southeast Asian states are presently not unduly concerned about Japan as a military threat, especially when it lacks autonomous strategic capability to project its power into Southeast Asia. In the case of Vietnam, when it had a strategic alliance with the Soviet Union, its relations with Japan were rather strained because the latter was an ally of the United States, and was aligned with China and ASEAN to isolate Vietnam diplomatically and economically.31 With the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, systems of competing FIGURE 8.1 U.S. Defence Ties with East and Southeast Asian States Country

Year

Type of Agreement

Japan South Korea Taiwan Philippines Thailand Singapore

1954 1960 1953 1979 1951 1951 1990

Brunei Malaysia Indonesia

1994 1984 1992

Mutual Defence Assistance Agreement Treaty of Mutual Co-operation and Security Mutual Defence Treaty Taiwan Relations Act Mutual Defence Treaty U.S. Mutual Security Act Memorandum of Understanding allowing U.S. rotational access to Singapore facilities Memorandum of Understanding on Defence Co-operation Bilateral Training and Education Co-operation Facilities for U.S. naval repairs

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alliances are no longer a complicating factor between Vietnam and Japan. Given Vietnam’s historical fear of China, and Japan’s anxiety that China may emerge as a regional hegemon, there is a common strategic interest between Hanoi and Tokyo to have good ties and to develop Vietnam to become a strong country that the Chinese will not find to be a pushover.32 SOUTHEAST ASIA AND THE MAJOR POWERS: THE UNITED STATES, CHINA AND JAPAN

After Vietnam’s occupation of Cambodia in 1979, Southeast Asia became polarized into two antagonistic blocs: the ASEAN states, aligned with the United States, China and Japan, opposing Vietnam-led Indochina supported by the Soviet Union. Thus, a regional conflict became intertwined with the Cold War. Although the Soviet Union, and the Cold War bipolarity, collapsed subsequently, the key pillar of the East Asian security architecture has remained in place: the U.S.-Japan Alliance. And even though the structures of the international system in East and Southeast Asia have evolved from bipolarity to a nascent multipolarity, the Southeast Asian states do not perceive Japan in a different strategic light, because it is still tied to the United States. There are two variables that have the potential to revolutionize the international system with its concomitant spillover effect on Southeast Asia’s strategic outlook towards the great powers, including Japan. They are: whether China will emerge as a regional hegemon, and whether Japan will remain tied to the United States.33 How Southeast Asia perceives Japan in future is likely to be contingent upon the matrix of the two variables (see Figure 8.2). FIGURE 8.2 Typology: Four Scenarios for 21st Century East Asia U.S.-Japan Alliance No

Yes 3

Yes

Pax Sinica

China as a Rising Hegemon

2 Balance of Power

4 No

Pax Nipponica

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Scenario 1: Pacific Community

In this scenario, the United States and Japan succeed in managing their differences over trade and burden-sharing in defence despite occasional hiccups, and remain committed to the Alliance. In the case of China, even though it has achieved significant economic growth, it eschews an aggressive, unilateral stance towards its neighbours because of its continuous need to maintain strong, stable and predictable economic ties with other great powers and Southeast Asia, and to avoid alarming its neighbours and forcing them to strengthen their defence arrangements with other external powers. Moreover, it accepts the norms of the international community and pursues its self-interest through peaceful diplomacy, bilaterally and multilaterally, in the ARF, APEC, CSCAP (the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific) and the UN. However, the U.S.-Japan Alliance continues to supplement these multilateral organizations and underpins regional security; the United States continues to remain influential not only as a significant military power in various bilateral alliances but also as an actor in the ARF and APEC. While the United States remains the key player in the region, it is unable and unwilling to act unilaterally without the support of its allies, because of the financial, political and military costs it may otherwise incur; unlike the halcyon days of Pax Americana, it cannot lay down the law for other states in the international system. If this scenario were to take place, the Southeast Asian states would probably feel comfortable with a non-nuclear Japan that is tied to the United States. Scenario 2. Balance of Power: The U.S.-Japan Alliance Facing China

In this scenario, China emerges as a great and formidable power that is prepared to advance its interests unilaterally and, if necessary, threaten to use force to resolve international disputes to its advantage. These include the Spratlys in the South China Sea, the Senkaku Islands (Diaoyutai) and the issue of Taiwan’s independence. Despite the demise of the Soviet Union, the U.S.-Japan Alliance has discovered a new reason for existence: a common interest to prevent China from dominating the region. After a period of difficult consensus-building in Japan, the country gradually accepts new and expands responsibilities to assist the United States within the framework of the Alliance, in the event of regional tension on the Korean peninsula, the Taiwan Strait and the South China Sea. On the part of China, it seeks to further strengthen its ties with Russia to balance off the Alliance, especially when it suspects that “engagement” is merely a

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euphemism for Chinese containment. Meanwhile, multilateral organizations, especially the ARF and APEC, have lost their saliency due to mutual suspicions, acrimony and a poor record of tangible results. The Southeast Asian countries, fearful of living in the shadow of a resurgent China, are likely to welcome a Japanese strategic role bonded to the United States that acts as a check to Chinese ambitions. Scenario 3: Pax Sinica

Beijing emerges as the greatest power in East Asia, reminiscent of the glory of the Ming Dynasty more than half a millennium earlier when the armada of Admiral Cheng Ho, in several expeditions, turned the region into a Chinese lake.34 China then was so overwhelming that it succeeded in constructing a “Gramscian hegemony” when it hoisted its norms of suzerainty and international relations on its neighbours without the need to resort to force explicitly. (During the splendour of the Ming Middle Kingdom, states, including Korea, Japan, Siam, Malacca, and to a certain extent Vietnam, voluntarily acknowledged China’s cultural, economic, military and political dominance and superiority.) By the third decade of the 21st century, China constitutes the largest economy in the world. It has also developed a formidable blue-water fleet, and a nuclear counterforce with ICBMs after numerous nuclear tests in the early 21st century. In the absence of the Alliance, Tokyo reluctantly but pragmatically accepts the role of a junior partner to Beijing, a similar role that it had played in the erstwhile U.S.-Japan Alliance. This scenario would be extremely unpalatable to the Southeast Asian states. Scenario 4: Pax Nipponica

Contrary to earlier regional expectations, China does not emerge as a regional hegemon because it cannot sustain its rapid economic growth, curb its population explosion, and is too pre-occupied with domestic problems, especially poor agricultural harvests, rural unrest, divisive regionalism, separatist movements by ethnic minorities, factionalized political leadership, weak political institutions and troubled civil-military relations. In contrast, Japan succeeds in overcoming its rough patch of economic stagnation, political uncertainty and social malaise of the 1990s. The country is led by a younger generation of more confident and assertive politicians and bureaucrats who see Japan as a “normal” state unencumbered by constitutional shackles and the Alliance. Over the years the U.S.

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military presence in East Asia is gradually downsized, because of leadership fatigue, economic constraints and a domestic public opinion that eschews expensive foreign commitments and heavy taxes. This process is accompanied by increasing reluctance among Japanese voters to tolerate the presence of U.S. bases and troops in their country. Subsequently, Tokyo presents the Asian countries with a fait accompli when it acquires a nuclear capability for its own defence, as it can no longer rely on the U.S. nuclear umbrella. In addition, it has developed its own “star wars” antinuclear defence system. Successive waves of Japanese capital and ODA continue to pour into the Southeast Asian economies, leading to further intertwining of those economies with Japan’s, and the advent of a de facto Greater East Asia Mutual Co-Prosperity Sphere, without the need for Japan to fire a single shot. Moreover, much of the regional trade becomes increasingly denominated in the Japanese currency, leading to the rise of a yen bloc. Japan emerges as the economic and political leader of the region in the absence of any other credible challengers. If such a scenario emerges, Southeast Asia would perceive Japan with apprehension. ***** Obviously, speculating about the future is a hazardous task, and if one turns out to be right, it may simply be due to pure luck, rather than intuition or prescience. Pax Sinica (Scenario 3) and Pax Nipponica (Scenario 4) are unlikely over the next quarter of a century, because it is in the selfinterest of the U.S. and Japan to strengthen their Alliance, especially in the wake of an emerging China. The Pacific Community (Scenario 1) and the Balance of Power (Scenario 2) are the more probable outcomes. Any speculation beyond that time-frame is purely fanciful. Thus, in Scenarios 1 and 2, the United States remains the key strategic player in East Asia, even over the first quarter of the 21st century. In the event of a great power attempting to dominate the region, the Southeast Asian states are unlikely to remain as passive pawns. To safeguard their sovereignty, they would probably rally together and seek external allies, to restrain any great power with hegemonic pretensions. CONCLUSION

Despite the differences in the characteristics of political regimes, ethnic structures, historical experiences, level of economic development and physical size, the Southeast Asian states’ view of Japan is not really very dissimilar. This simply cannot be attributed to a common strategic

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environment where there are external great powers that impinge on the region. Despite residual memories of Japan’s military occupation of the region, the countries of Southeast Asia have pragmatically chosen to maintain good relations with Japan, to serve their agenda of rapid economic development. With the exception of Vietnam and Laos, they are capitalist, post-colonial states that welcome Japanese investments in their economies. While viewing Japan’s economic role in the region positively, they are more ambivalent about any Japanese political role. However, their suspicions appear to be allayed by Japan’s continual commitment to its Alliance with the United States, and its preference for a non-confrontational, multilateral approach to seeking a larger political role through the UN, ARF and APEC. Notwithstanding the change from bipolarity to multipolarity in the international system, Southeast Asia has not radically transformed its outlook towards Japan. This is because, amidst systemic changes, the U.S.-Japan Alliance remains the linchpin of the security architecture in East Asia. Unless the Alliance unravels, and until Japan emerges as a nuclear power that can project its power into the region, the Southeast Asian states would view their relations with Japan as mutually beneficial, but not without trepidation.

APPENDIX 8.1 Foreign Direct Investment in Selected Southeast Asian Countries by Japan (In 100 million yen)

Indonesia Malaysia Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

1993

1994

1995

952 892 236 735 680 52

1808 772 683 1101 749 177

1548 555 692 1143 1196 192

SOURCE: Business Times (Singapore), 19 August 1996.

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APPENDIX 8.2 Japan’s Imports & Exports to Southeast Asia (In US$ millions) Exports

Brunei Cambodia Indonesia Laos Malaysia Myanmar Philippines Singapore Thailand Vietnam

Imports

1993

1994

1995

1993

1994

1995

131 50 6045 37 9690 100 4839 16672 12317 641

134 65 7674 34 12364 68 5893 19605 14700 644

128 77 9969 29 16802 158 7100 23006 19719 922

1415 86 12537 12 7676 71 2427 3619 6526 1073

1187 9 12883 31 8201 76 2671 4645 8181 1350

1342 7 14199 30 10545 94 3495 6846 10130 1716

SOURCE: International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1996 (Washington, D.C.: IMF, 1996), p. 268.

Notes 1

Most articles on Southeast Asia’s perceptions of Japan focus primarily on the external strategic environment, though they do mention the collective memory of the Japanese Occupation of the region and the need for Japanese capital to develop economically. See, for example, Chin Kin Wah, “Regional Perceptions of China and Japan” in China, India, Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia, ed. Chandran Jeshurun (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993); Carolina G. Hernandez, “A Philippine Perspective On U.S.-Japan Relations and International Institutions After the Cold War”, in Peter Gourevitch, Takashi Inoguchi and Courtney Purrington, United States-Japan Relations and International Institutions After The Cold War (San Diego: University of California, San Diego, 1995); Furukawa Eiichi, “Changes in Southeast Asian Views of Japan”, Japan Echo XX, no. 3 (Autumn 1993); and Harry H. Kendall and Clara Joewono, eds., Japan, ASEAN, and the United States (Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1991). Harold Crouch focuses on the domestic structures of Southeast Asian state and society to identify how these in turn affect regional economic co-operation. See Harold Crouch, Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation (Singapore:

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2

3

4

5

6

7

8

9

10

Institute of Southeast Studies, 1984). To the best of my knowledge, there are virtually no “linkage” studies on the domestic structures of Southeast Asian states and their possible impact on strategic outlook and behaviour towards Japan. Justus M. van der Kroef, Communism in South-East Asia (London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981), pp. 217–60. Leo Suryadinata, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996), pp. 101–17. For a good account of Japanese ODA to Southeast Asia, see David Arase, Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid (Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995). See, for example, Melanie Beresford, “The Political Economy of Dismantling the Bureaucratic Centralism and Subsidy System in Vietnam”, in Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism, eds. Kevin Hewison, Richard Robison and Gary Rodan (St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993). See Muthiah Alagappa, “The Bases of Legitimacy” in Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia, ed. Muthiah Alagappa (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995), pp. 41–43. With the exception of Thailand, all Southeast Asian countries were colonized by Western imperial powers. However, Thailand, like its neighbours, also shares the concern for development. Even in the case of the Philippines, its version of democracy is extremely oligarchical and often based on patron-client relationships. Traditionally, its political parties are usually personality rather than policy based. See for example, Luzviminda G. Tancangco, “The Electoral System And Political Parties In The Philippines”, in Government and Politics of the Philippines, eds. Raul P. De Guzman and Mila A. Reforma (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988). See also Eric Gutierrez, The Ties That Bind: A Guide to Family, Business And Other Interests in the Ninth House of Representatives (Manila: Philippine Center For Investigative Journalism, 1994). See Robert Dahl, Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971), pp. 1–7. See the survey results (1983–92) on ASEAN public opinion on Japan conducted by the Japan’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, cited in Japan Echo XX (Special Issue), p. 75. Sueo Sudo writes: “When (Tanaka) visited Southeast Asia in 1974, unprecedented anti-Japanese movements took place, particularly in

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12

13

14

15

16

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Indonesia and Thailand. In Indonesia, for instance, a parade of thousands of students in the streets turned into a riot; Japanese cars were burnt and more than 50,000 stores and buildings damaged. Since Indonesia was the last stop as well as Japan’s most important trade partner in Southeast Asia, this riot finally brought home to Tanaka a very negative image both within and outside of Japan.” Sueo Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy (Singapore: Institute Of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992), pp. 71–72. In 1993, 29.9% of Japan’s ODA went to Southeast Asia. See Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan’s ODA Annual Report: 1994 (Tokyo: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1995), p. 109. For an analysis on Japan’s motivations to play a more active political role in the region, see Lam Peng Er, “Japan’s Search For A Political Role In Southeast Asia”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 1996 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996). See Joaquin Gonzalez and R. Holmes, “The Philippine Labour Diaspora: Trends, Issues, and Policies”, in Southeast Asian Affairs 1996 (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1996). David Camroux, ‘Looking East’ and Inwards: Internal Factors In Malaysian Foreign Relations During the Mahathir Era: 1981-1994, Australian-Asia Papers no. 72 (Center for the Study of AustralianAsian Relations, Faculty of Asian and International Studies, Griffith University, 1994). See also K.S. Jomo, ed., Japan and Malaysian Development: In the Shadow of the Rising Sun (London: Routledge, 1994); and Johan Saravanamuttu, “Malaysia’s Foreign Policy in the Mahathir Period, 1981–1995: An Iconoclast Come to Rule”, Asian Journal of Political Science 4, no. 1 (June 1996). Lim Chong-Yah, Learning From the Japanese Experience (Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982). Chalmers Johnson has called the Japanese model a Capitalist Developmental State. See Chalmers Johnson, MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975 (Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1986). Straits Times, 20 September 1996. The Straits Times reported that the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) in its 1996 annual report “... pointed out that together, the share of the 10 developing Asian economies in world trade now is equal to that of the European Union and the United States (18-19 per cent) and double that of Japan. It said exports among these East Asian countries at US$213 billion had almost caught up with their exports to the advanced economies, which

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18

19

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21

were at US$297 billion. This suggested that ‘there is a rapid process of integration taking place within the smaller countries of East Asia, a process in which even China is becoming involved to some extent’.” Lee Kuan Yew remarks: “The Japanese will not have a monopoly on the opportunities that arise from East Asia’s liberalization and development because East Asia is not homogeneous nor monolithic. In capital and technology transfer, trade and foreign investments, ASEAN, the NIEs and China would want to balance their dependence on Japan with that of the US and Europe. This is because East Asia’s history is one of intense rivalries and mistrust between Japan and China, Korea and the several ASEAN countries that suffered badly in World War II. Recent disputes between China and Vietnam, China and Taiwan, and Kong Kong against Japan and also, Japan and Korea over disputed islands, are illustrations of the sort of tensions which will continue to exist. Sovereignty of the Spratly Islands will remain a longstanding problem involving many Asian countries. Business Times (Singapore), 9 October 1996. Straits Times, 26 June 1996. At a seminar attended by U.S. ambassadors to various ASEAN countries, US-ASEAN Council President Ernest Bower predicted that ASEAN will overtake Japan as the US’ secondlargest trading partner by the year 2003 or 2004. The Straits Times reported: “Mr Bower said the region would have a population of 523 million at the turn of the century, a gross domestic product of US$1 trillion and a two-way trade with Washington of US$250 billion if current growth rates continued. Last year, the region had a population of 419 million, a GDP of US$545 billion and US$101 billion worth of two-way trade with the US, he said. The statement further quoted Mr Bower as saying that ASEAN was second to China in US growth markets around the world. He added that US exports to ASEAN countries last year reached about US$40 billion — more than three times US exports to China at US$11 billion.” Leo Suryadinata, ed., Southeast Asian Chinese and China: The PoliticoEconomic Dimension (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995). See Bruce Reynolds, Thailand And Japan’s Southern Advance: 1940– 1945 (New York: St Martin’s Press, 1994) and Kamon Pensrinokun, “Adaptation And Appeasement: Thai Relations With And The Allies In World War II”, in Thai-Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective, eds. Chaiwat Khamchoo and Bruce Reynolds, Asian Studies Monograph, no. 041, Institute of Asian Studies, Chulalongkorn University (Bangkok: Innomedia Co., 1988).

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Leo Suryadinata writes: “Indonesia’s size (in terms of population and territory) and natural resources have made its leaders believe that the country is destined to play a major role in international affairs.” Suryadinata, Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto, p. 7. On Indonesia’s perception of Japan, see special issue on Japan-Indonesia Relations in the 1990s in Indonesian Quarterly XXI, no. 4 (1993); Paridah Abdul Samad and Mokhtar Muhammad, “Japan In Southeast Asia: Its Diplomatic, Economic and Military Commitment”, Indonesian Quarterly XXII, no. 3 (1994); and Jusuf Wanandi, “Indonesia’s Future Strategic Environment: Relationship of the Great Powers”, Indonesian Quarterly XXX, no. 3 (1995). Jusuf Wanandi writes: “The best outcome for the region will be a friendly and normal relations among the three great powers. The USJapan alliance should not become a common front to isolate China. At the same time Japan and China should not become a condominium of East Asia ...” See Wanandi, “Indonesia’s Future Strategic Environment”, p. 264. On the origins of EAEC and its antecedent, see Linda Low, “The East Asian Economic Grouping”, Pacific Review 4, no. 4 (1991). On the fundamentals of Singapore’s foreign policy, see Obaid Ul Haq, “Foreign Policy”, in Government and Politics of Singapore, eds. Jon S.T. Quah, Chan Heng Chee and Seah Chee Meow (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985). See also Foreign Minister S. Jayakumar’s speech delivered at Georgetown University. S. Jayakumar, “Continued US engagement in region is in Southeast Asia’s interest”, Straits Times (Singapore), 23 April 1996, p. 28. Sudo, The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN, pp. 158–59. See, for example, Yukio Satoh, “Emerging Trends in Asia-Pacific Security: the Role of Japan”, Pacific Review 8, no. 2 (1995). See Lam Peng Er, “Japan and the Spratlys Dispute: A Case Study of Tokyo’s Foreign Policy Aspirations and Limitations”, Asian Survey XXXVI, no. 10 (October 1996). Hisashi Nakatomi, “A Note On The Japanese Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam”, Asia-Pacific Review (Hanoi), no. 1, (December 1993). See Masaya Shiraishi, Japanese Relations With Vietnam: 1951–1987 (Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1990), pp. 51–87. For a joint review of Vietnam-Japan relations, see Institute For International Relations, Asia-Pacific and Vietnam-Japan Relations (Hanoi: Institute For International Relations, 1994). For a review of

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Vietnam-Japan relations, also see Yoshihide Soeya, “Vietnam in Japan’s Regional Policy”, East-West Center Working Papers, Economic and Politics Series, no. 6 ( May 1995) and Ronald Bruce St. John, “Japan’s Moment in Indochina: Washington Initiative ... Tokyo Success”, Asian Survey XXXV, no. 7 (July 1995). Takashi Inoguchi has also identified four scenarios for the 21st century: Pax Americana, Phase 2 (continued U.S. hegemony with Japan playing a bigger supporter’s role), Bigemony (where the United States and Japan share a joint hegemony in the region), Pax Consortis (a concert of great powers in which no single actor can dominate the rest) and Pax Nipponica. See Takashi Inoguchi, “Four Japanese Scenarios for the Future”, in The International Relations of Japan, ed. Kathleen Newland (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire and London, 1990). Louise Levanthenes, When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–33 (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994).

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9 Southeast Asian Perceptions of China: The Challenge of Achieving a New Strategic Accommodation Leonard C. Sebastian Any assessment of Southeast Asian perceptions of China is fraught with difficulty. In straightforward terms, China may have a perception of Southeast Asia, and its own presence in the region, which is quite at variance with how Southeast Asian countries see themselves in relation to China and China’s role in Southeast Asia. It would be an egregious oversimplification to consider China as having only one perception with regard to all Southeast Asian countries. Consequently, it is impossible to disregard the different patterns of change in various Southeast Asian countries over the past twenty years, or to forget the issues of contention that have recently come to divide Southeast Asian countries on this matter. Nevertheless, in spite of the cultural and political diversities of Southeast Asia, and China’s growing awareness of them, it is still possible, and indeed necessary, to refer to, and specify, a general gap in mutual perceptions which underlines the complexities of their relations.1 One way or another, the immutable fact of geographical propinquity would be sufficient for Southeast Asian countries to feel concerned about China. In any part of the globe, small and fragmented states direct their attention towards larger neighbours who would, by their presence alone, become a source of apprehension. The states of Southeast Asia are only too well aware of the disparity that exists between themselves and a populous and relatively homogenous state with a long tradition of centralized rule. Size, organization and resources distinguish China from its southern neighbours who remain ethnically and politically divided and,

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in some cases, beset by the kind of mutual suspicions that prevent cooperation among them. More important, the states of the region are, by and large, the products of decolonization, Thailand excepted, and their legitimacy is questionable in the absence of the long tradition which characterizes China. On the basis of proximity alone, Southeast Asian leaders would be concerned about the actions of their giant neighbour, which could have disproportionate consequences for their own security. The observation of historian C. P. Fitzgerald seems as relevant today as it was a quarter century ago: “In Southeast Asia the realization of the fact of the new powerful China … is causing the nations of the region to explore the possibility of closer co-operation, but still dividing them as to whether this should be directed against Chinese influence, or seek to accommodate with it.”2 Hence, a common and consistent theme throughout this chapter examining the causes and nature of Southeast Asian perceptions of China will be the region’s need to overcome its intrinsic strategic vulnerability in dealing with the huge Chinese colossus. Paradoxically, however, this continuous sense of strategic vulnerability is tempered by an awareness of the opportunities that exist for economic and political cooperation presented by China which, when packaged and presented, highlights a conduct of diplomacy, while cautionary in tone, is optimistic in outlook. THE LOGIC OF PERCEPTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Political psychologists generally accept that perceptions or, in some instances, misperceptions and images play an important role in influencing inter-state relations for better or worse. The degree to which perceptions shape political judgment is, however, contentious. Historian A. J. P. Taylor contends that “men use the past to prop up their own prejudices”.3 Herbert Butterfield argues that, “Those who (in 1919) talked of ‘avoiding the mistakes of 1815’ were using history to ratify the prejudices they had already.”4 Such perspectives assert that historical experience does not affect the decision-maker’s perceptions. Rather, analogies are seized upon to emphasize pre-existing beliefs and preferences. Robert Jervis, though, with some justification, argues that what “one learns from key events in international history is an important factor in determining the images that shape the interpretation of incoming information.”5 To the extent that decisions of state are made by individuals, the manner in which these decision-makers perceive the external stimuli invariably feeds into their responses.

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Likewise, while experience and psychological conditioning are in themselves important tools of analysis, this should not negate the fact that the objective environment which shapes a state’s development, and the manner in which it selects its policy options, are equally critical. Hence, Stanley Hoffman is correct to assert that perceptions are “more than a part of political reality: They mold it, in so far as they are the springs and fuel of action. Moreover, they are themselves shaped by reality.”6 The study of Southeast Asian perceptions of China is important in as much as previous international events provide decision-makers with a range of imaginable situations which allow an ability to detect patterns and linkages. This point of view is clearly evident, as we shall see, in the perceptions of Vietnam and Indonesia of China. It is interesting to see how these two countries articulated their perceptions of China, which reflected strong historical memories, even as they have moved towards normalization of relations with that country. However, an inflexible understanding of the past, and a failure to comprehend changed circumstances, may result in a stagnant foreign policy insensitive to incoming information, with dire consequences. In a sense, this chapter articulates the desire of Southeast Asian countries to engage China on a multitude of issues founded on a principle of pragmatism. The Western Pacific is no longer a unipolar environment. China will be a great power to reckon with and, in this context, the states of the region, whether they like it or not, will have to make a virtue of necessity. Hence, in conceptual terms, this study builds on Jervis’ contention that historical events play an important role in determining perceptions, with one major modification: any analysis of perception must take into account the current operating environment and the impact of change; failure to do so will result in decision-makers falling into the trap of discussing policy in old terms without considering the ends they now serve. THE IMPACT OF HISTORY

Three historical factors, in particular, have shaped Southeast Asian perceptions of China. The first factor was past Chinese assumption of suzerainty over Southeast Asia. The second factor pertains to the issue of the ethnic Chinese in Southeast Asia, which for Malaysia and Indonesia formed a prism through which China has been viewed. The third factor was Maoist China’s support for revolutionary movements in Southeast Asia. At the outset, it is perhaps pertinent to summarize briefly the traditional

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images between the Southeast Asian countries and China. For centuries, before the mid-nineteenth century, China was the dominant political force in East and Southeast Asia, if not also the most advanced centre of civilization in this part of the world, due to its advanced level of technological and cultural development and its highly sophisticated political organization. As a consequence, Southeast Asian countries were more or less attracted to China as a source of inspiration and political legitimacy. China considered Southeast Asia as its natural sphere of influence. Such mutually congruent outlooks were concretely manifested in the now wellknown tributary system. The kingdoms of Southeast Asia, whether Angkor, Majapahit or Burma, developed trade relations with China, which the Chinese then defined in the context of their tributary system. The Chinese world-view spawned the myth of suzerainty which sustained the tribute system,7 whereby virtually all Southeast Asian countries voluntarily paid homage and tribute to China as their suzerain, in exchange for Chinese protection and assistance in times of need or crisis. In the case of a number of mainland Southeast Asian countries, China in fact did intervene from time to time, both politically and militarily, either at the invitation of local governments to restore internal order, or on its own initiative, in order to maintain stability and peace in the border areas. Champa, for example, appealed to the Emperor against Vietnam, and Malacca against Siam, which was a clear manifestation of the Emperor’s role in maintaining order around China’s periphery. Likewise, the historian D. G. E. Hall made reference to China’s “overlordship” of Southeast Asia, which created complications for Britain’s own position in Burma in the late Qing Dynasty and highlighted how such attitudes influenced the Kuomingtang in its regional outlook.8 Later, another historian, Wang Gungwu, was to contend that similar attitudes were reflected in the thinking of Taiwanese scholars and, in his opinion, became the basis for a populist Chinese interpretation of Southeast Asian history that still endures.9 Nevertheless, China’s relations with Southeast Asia during this early period were both stable and cordial, mainly because of China’s actual detachment from its tributary states. Although China made no pretence of concealing its Sino-centric world outlook, and took a genuine interest not only in pacifying the so-called “barbarians”, but also in spreading its Confucian culture southward whenever the opportunity arose, the kind of influence China wanted to cultivate was mainly cultural and only nominally political, and it also adopted an essentially laissez faire attitude towards these Southeast Asian states as long as they did not pose a security threat or cause trouble for China. In other words, China was more interested in

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attracting Southeast Asian states through the demonstrated superiority of its political and social organization and way of life, and through its own exemplary conduct, than in seeking political or economic domination or territorial aggrandizement through the use or threat of force. As a result, Southeast Asian states were basically in awe, but not in fear, of China. After all, though more advanced in political and social development, China was not very different systemically from the Southeast Asian states. Both practiced forms of the monarchical system. Although the volume of trade was insignificant, the two sides were complementary to, rather than competing with, each other in their production and supply of goods. As a consequence of all these, China’s image in Southeast Asia was respectful and benign, and its limited presence was also welcomed by the Southeast Asian states.10 The expansion of Western colonialism into Southeast Asia, and the concomitant decline of the Chinese Empire in the middle of the nineteenth century, ushered in a new era that brought the tributary system to an abrupt end, and China’s political influence in Southeast Asia during the ensuing 100 years or so did not cease but, in fact, expanded rapidly, except that it was now at the non-state level. This was a result of a long stream of migrants arriving in Southeast Asia, seeking a haven from the ravages of political turmoil and economic hardships. Such Chinese migrants eventually numbered several millions by the beginning of the twentieth century, thereby sustaining a stable flow of goods and people between China and Southeast Asia.11 In 1909, the imperial Government passed a nationality law according to the doctrine of jus sanguinis (citizenship by parentage) which, in 1929, was subsequently reaffirmed by the Kuomintang who regarded the Chinese of the region as Chinese citizens.12 However, by April 1955, the doctrine of jus solis (citizenship by birth) was affirmed by the People’s Republic through a dual nationality treaty with Indonesia. Ethnic Chinese living in Southeast Asia now had to become either local citizens of their country of residence or citizens of the People’s Republic of China, depending on their choice. Similarly, the PRC also dropped the term Huaqiao (Chinese sojourner), which was previously applied to all Chinese in the region, and retained it to describe only those Chinese who refused to opt for local citizenship.13 Under the dual nationality treaty, these Chinese remained citizens of the PRC. However, in some instances, China’s attempt to protect the ethnic Chinese communities in Southeast Asia often undermined the position of the local Chinese in these countries, as they often came to be regarded as a fifth column for Beijing. This was particularly evident in Indonesia when China’s responses to a retail trade

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ban imposed in 1959, and its alleged involvement in the events leading to the abortive coup of 30 September 1965, had disproportionate consequences for Indonesians of Chinese origin.14 The decline of the Chinese empire, and its inability to ward off Western imperialism in general and to come to the rescue of any Southeast Asian country in particular, did to a certain extent disillusion the Southeast Asian peoples and undermine the status of China as their teacher and protector. The Western colonial powers, with their superior military might, were now unmistakably the focus of admiration and model for emulation. The suspension of official contacts between indigenous political authorities in Southeast Asia and China during the colonial interregnum destroyed effectively whatever governmental linkages were remaining between them for more than a century. The end of World War II in 1945, and particularly the establishment of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, saw the succession of far-reaching political developments which began to unfold themselves in China and Southeast Asia, further widening the perception gap between them. Southeast Asia was shocked by events in China. The rise of a MarxistLeninist regime in China, and its initial close alliance with the Soviet Union, altered the essentially benign and inward-looking character of the Chinese nation. It not only rendered China ideologically and politically incongruous with its Southeast Asian neighbours, but also made it a menacing and destabilizing force in the entire region. The long series of armed conflict between China and its immediate neighbours, starting with the Korean War and culminating in the prolonged Second Indochina War, along with the upsurge of communist insurgency activities in many parts of Asia, merely demonstrated to Southeast Asia the militant and aggressive nature of all communist regimes, among whom China unmistakably belonged. In fact, China not only openly propagated its revolutionary model, but also lent eager support to all the insurgent movements in the region in its campaign against American imperialism. That the large proportion of communist insurgents in Southeast Asia were ethnic Chinese, who also identified themselves with China, only supplied further evidence of the ulterior motives China entertained in Southeast Asia. Chinese support for revolutionary movements in the region, though, ebbed and flowed according to the state of China’s relationship with the government in question.15 For example, when Thailand allowed U.S. base facilities during the Vietnam War, support for the Communist Party of Thailand (CPT) increased.16 Likewise, in an attempt to ensure Burma’s neutrality, and to remind its military leadership of the need to avoid

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alliance with the West, China offered the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) sufficient armed support throughout the 1970s.17 Interestingly, in the aftermath of Vietnam’s invasion of Cambodia in December 1978, support for the CPT and the BCP began to wane, as China in response sought ASEAN’s support. However, China continued to offer fraternal and moral support to revolutionary communist groups of the region, by allowing them to broadcast their propaganda from Chinese territory and providing their leaders with a safe haven when their predicament became perilous. Of a more recent nature, China’s seizure of the Paracel Islands from South Vietnam in 1974, the short invasion of northern Vietnam in 1979 and the 1988 naval clash in the Spratlys between Chinese and Vietnamese naval forces heightened awareness of Beijing’s willingness to use force to settle outstanding disputes. Such developments both startled and alienated Southeast Asian states from China. Indeed, for the first time in centuries, China became an immediate and serious threat to Southeast Asia, and this was acutely felt.

PERCEPTIONS DURING THE HEIGHT OF THE COLD WAR

More than any other event, the Cambodian conflict marked the critical stage in China’s relations with Southeast Asia, particularly the ASEAN states, as the idea of China as a stabilizing force co-existed with the intensified perception of threat. Vietnam’s alliance with the Soviet Union, which was announced on 3 November 1978, and its subsequent invasion of Cambodia in December of the same year intensified China’s efforts to improve relations with the region. China’s aim was the establishment of a regional coalition directed against Vietnam, and which could prevent it from consolidating its position in Cambodia. Deng Xiaoping’s only visit to Southeast Asia took place in October-November 1978 when he attempted to alert the region of the danger posed by Vietnam.18 As the region assumed a prominent role in China’s anti-Vietnam strategy, specific efforts were made to reduce support for insurgent groups. In this context, China formed a de facto alliance with Thailand in relation to Vietnam, as the then Thai Prime Minister Kriangsak Chomanand agreed in February 1979 to allow Chinese arms to be shipped through Thai territory to the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia. From that time onwards, the CPT ceased being a domestic threat to Thailand, as Chinese support attenuated and as Thai Prime Minister Prem Tinsulanonda’s amnesty programmes were initiated, effectively depleting the party’s ranks.

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China’s desire to build an anti-Vietnamese coalition in the region was directly linked to its leaders’ desire for stability along China’s southern border and attempted to ensure that peripheral areas would not be dominated by hostile coalitions linked to the Soviet Union. Such aims found resonance in Thailand and Singapore, who were particularly sensitive to territorial aggrandizement on mainland Southeast Asia by force of arms. The perception of the time was that there was nothing standing in the way to prevent a militaristic Vietnam from expanding its influence all the way down to peninsular Southeast Asia. That China became a guarantor for Thai security was a source of reassurance for those in the region, in Thailand, Malaysia and Singapore, who initially interpreted Vietnamese aims in terms of expansion and conquest. ASEAN leaders recognized China’s role in strengthening their diplomatic position over the Cambodian issue, and in their demands for a withdrawal of forces from Cambodia. Nonetheless, within Malaysia and Indonesia, the spectre of China as a threat to the region was raised by her involvement in the Cambodian conflict. First, China’s efforts to forge a united front against Vietnam aroused a negative response in these two countries who adopted the perspective that China’s actions drew Vietnam into Cambodia, and the Soviet Union into the region. Chinese pressure on Vietnam during 1977– 78, when the Khmer Rouge mounted incursions into the Parrot’s Beak salient, resulting in the deaths of numerous civilians, and placing it in the position of victim according to Malaysian and Indonesian opinion. A widespread view in these countries was that the problem of Soviet intrusion in the region was one related to Chinese inability to accept an independent Vietnam that had only recently completed its reunification.19 Second, China’s armed support for the Khmer Rouge after they had been toppled from power by Vietnam stimulated regional fears about China’s links with other insurgent groups in the region. Concerns regarding China were expressed in various ways and came to influence Malaysian and Indonesian views of the Cambodian issue. As a consequence of these events, Indonesia formed the view that Vietnam was a buffer against China, whereas previously its armed forces held a negative view of all communist powers as potential threats. Malaysia’s Prime Minister Tun Hussein Onn and President Soeharto of Indonesia affirmed the Kuantan principle when they met in the Malaysian city of the same name in March 1980. According to this principle, ASEAN would compromise with Vietnam over the Cambodian issue to allow it to break with the Soviet Union. Vietnam could then join a wider Southeast Asian community that would resist Chinese pressure, which was an underlying

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vision frequently expressed within Indonesia. The Kuantan principle was never translated into practical policy, as ASEAN unity demanded support for Thailand’s position. China’s efforts to influence these negative perceptions of its regional role were of little effect while the Cambodian conflict raged. China had indeed become a divisive issue for ASEAN, and one which periodically threatened the diplomatic unity of the organization. China’s fraternal links with the insurgent movements were the main stumbling blocks. Hence, any attempt by China to downplay its links with the insurgent movements were never convincing in Malaysia and Indonesia. The presence of Indonesian Communist Party politburo member Jusuf Adjitorop as an honoured guest at the May Day celebrations in Beijing in 1977, and the fact that the Chinese Government had lent support to the Revolutionary Front for the Independence of East Timor (Fretilin), which declared a short-lived republic in November 1975, would certainly not have endeared them to Jakarta. Similarly, the presence of CPM (Communist Party of Malaysia) leader Chin Peng in Beijing could not be construed in any way other than a blatant challenge to the government of Malaysia. The relationship between the Philippines and China during the Cold War has been generally problem-free. The Philippines “special” relationship with the United States, though, meant that the Philippines was directly or indirectly at war with China in the l950s. During the Korean War, Manila sent a Philippine Expeditionary Force to Korea under UN auspices. In the battle for the Quemoy and Matsu Islands in 1958 between the PRC and the Kuomintang regime in Taiwan, the Philippines became the staging ground for U.S. logistical support. However, other than Beijing’s fraternal links with the Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), which was of nuisance value, the Philippine perception of China seemed to be one of indifference. Perhaps, geography and the presence of the U.S. bases on Philippine soil insulated the country from the acute perceptions of threat felt by its Southeast Asian neighbours. Not surprisingly, the Philippines was one of the first ASEAN countries to establish formal diplomatic relations with China, on 9 June 1975. Consequently, Beijing’s support for the CPP waned. A month later, Thailand established diplomatic relations with China in July 1975. Singapore would not follow suit, in view of its regard for Indonesia and had vowed not to establish diplomatic relations with China until Indonesia, had done so. Malaysia established diplomatic relations with China on 31 May 1974, but Brunei had its own reservations about developing relations with communist powers, and awaited Indonesia’s move.

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China’s relationships with the socialist regimes of mainland Southeast Asia, specifically Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam, have ebbed and flowed between amity and enmity in the post-colonial period. The end of the war in Indochina set aside a long-standing conjunction of interests to reveal differences between disparate neighbours rooted in traditional antagonisms. Preoccupied with the prospect of Soviet encirclement, Beijing’s policies, particularly in Indochina, raised once again the perception of a hostile, threatening China. Vietnam suffers from the tyranny of its geography. It is located on China’s southern border. Vietnam’s history with China is full of wars, skirmishes and the sacking of cities. The struggle against Chinese “colonialism” had marked much of Vietnam’s history prior to the arrival of the French. Latter-day conflicts, namely the military confrontation in 1979 and the naval clash in the South China Sea in 1988, saw a replaying of these historical analogies in Vietnamese polemics, which served in turn to reinforce images of China as a constant external threat. Prior to technological developments brought by the twentieth century, Vietnam managed its relations with the Middle Kingdom through its participation in the tributary system.20 Only in the twentieth century did it become possible to counter-balance Chinese influence and pressures by the maintenance of an “over-the-horizon” alliance with the Soviet Union. Hierarchical and unequal tributary relations between China and Laos existed from the fourteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century. Laos’ relations with China in the twentieth century hardly existed until the French withdrew, and they turned on the degree to which Laos was involved in the Vietnam War. China was in favour of the neutralization of Laos in 1964, because that proposal promised to take Laos out of the conflict. The establishment of a pro-U.S. government which might admit American air bases to the northern provinces of Laos, adjacent to China, would be contrary to Chinese interests. Therefore, aid to the Pathet Lao to control this region and, if possible expand it, was in China’s interests. LaoChinese relations suffered most directly as a result of the Vietnamese invasion of Cambodia. Diplomatic relations were reduced to the level of chargé d’affaires, the Chinese aid programme to northern Laos was terminated, and trade across the Lao-Chinese border was reduced to a trickle of contraband. Hostile armies faced each other, a number of armed incidents occurred, and the airwaves were full of shrill denunciation and propaganda. Vientiane accused Beijing of training a full division of insurgents, namely Lao resistance groups, with all that that implied in terms of Chinese support for a possible invasion aimed at overthrowing

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the Lao Government and replacing it with a regime loyal to China.21 AntiChinese sentiment reached its peak during the period 1979 to 1983 when Lao foreign policy was closely identified with Vietnam. When Cambodia recovered full independence in 1954, relations were resumed by a Cambodian leadership which felt a sense of obligation as a result of the role played by China in bringing about the agreements by which France left Indochina. China approved the policy of neutrality which was the keystone of Prince Sihanouk’s political standpoint. China developed a plan of aid to Cambodia, partly to replace American aid programmes which had been discontinued. The fact that the two neighbours of Cambodia — South Vietnam and Thailand, were both allies of the US and traditional security threats to Cambodia, was the reason why Prince Sihanouk’s neutrality tended to be somewhat more tolerant of the communist side than the American side in the Vietnam War. Moreover, Prince Sihanouk believed that in the long run the Americans could not win the war, that Vietnam would be reunited under a communist government, and that the real interests of Cambodia were, therefore, best served by friendship with China, which would in the end be the only power able to restrain Vietnamese pressure upon his country.22 Two decades of turmoil following the Lon Nol coup in 1970 which saw Cambodia choose the United States as its patron; followed by the bloody Khmer Rouge period where the country aligned itself with China; and subsequently after the Vietnamese invasion, Cambodia became a client state adopting a foreign policy compatible to Vietnam. Unlike Vietnam, Burma has not had to struggle repeatedly for its national independence and cultural identity against its large northern neighbour. This is because of its relatively remote location from the centres of Chinese political power. There were periods when strong Chinese dynasties, namely the Yuan and the Qing, intervened in Burmese affairs. In more recent times, China has on several occasions posed a threat to the independent Union of Burma (1948–1962) and its socialist, military-ruled successor, the Socialist Republic of the Union of Burma (1974–1988). During the late 1940s and early 1950s, the civil war between Kuomintang and Chinese Communist Party forces spilled over into Burma. Although the Taiwan and the United States governments agreed to repatriate KMT troops at the insistence of the U Nu government, and 6,000 had been evacuated by 1954, Rangoon was obliged to make a deal with Beijing to allow 20,000 People’s Liberation Army soldiers to cross into Burmese soil in order to crush remaining KMT guerrilla units. For a brief time, there was a rift in relations between General Ne Win and his Chinese counterpart,

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CCP Chairman Mao Zedong, as a consequence of the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. In 1967, Beijing’s embassy in Rangoon began encouraging local Chinese to wear Mao badges and to participate in Cultural Revolution-style activities, such as Mao Zedong Thought study sessions. Ne Win’s regime prohibited such activities, and a confrontation soon emerged between local Burmese and Overseas Chinese, especially Maoist Chinese students. Burmese mobs in the capital city attacked the Chinese embassy and Chinese-owned shops. Bilateral diplomatic relations were suspended. The most important consequence of the rift was Beijing’s increasingly generous support for the Burmese Communist Party located in the northeastern part of the country bordering China. Through skillful use of personal diplomacy, Ne Win succeeded in normalizing relations between Rangoon and Beijing by the early 1970s. However, Chinese support for the BCP continued to be a point of irritation between the two countries, even as Burmese leaders once again described Sino-Burmese ties as those of pawkphaw (kinsmen). In the years leading up to the great Burmese political crises of 1988, however, Beijing lessened support for the BCP and began pressuring its leadership to consider retiring from the field of battle and settling in China on comfortable pensions. The breakup of the BCP in April 1989 — the result of ethnic minority resentment of the party’s aging Burman leadership — removed this irritant from Sino-Burmese relations. The isolation of Myanmar, as a consequence of a military takeover on 18 September 1988, effectively forced Myanmar to abandon its strict policy on non-alignment in favour of close, friendly and even dependent relations with its giant northern neighbour. PERCEPTIONS AT THE END OF THE COLD WAR ERA

The Paris Peace Conference of 1989–91 marked the end of the Cambodian issue as an international conflict and signaled the removal of a major obstacle in ASEAN-China relations. Firstly, the strategic conflict between China and the Soviet Union ceased being an issue for ASEAN when Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev elevated relations with China to frontrank position in his Asia-Pacific agenda. Secondly, China had played a crucial role in the Paris Conference which eventually, in 1990, resulted in the UN-sponsored peace settlement for Cambodia. China pushed the Khmer Rouge to accept the UN peace plan over 1989–1990 when they were inclined to resist all diplomatic pressure. Chinese armed support for the

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Khmer Rouge ceased in August 1990 when Premier Li Peng declared in Jakarta that China would not accept the Khmer Rouge in a dominant role in Cambodia and would not push the Khmer Rouge into power.23 China’s efforts in contributing to a comprehensive settlement of the Cambodian issue endeared it to ASEAN and removed much of the suspicion and resentment that had accumulated within the region in relation to its support of the Khmer Rouge. Thirdly, the ASEAN states became more conscious of China as a potential trading partner, which was emphasized by the short-lived recession of 1985. A direct trade agreement was signed by the Indonesian Chamber of Commerce and Industry (KADIN) and the China Council for the Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in Singapore on 5 July 1985.24 By the end of the Cambodia conflict, the ASEAN states had become receptive to the idea of expanded relations with China. The tension that had developed between Indonesia and Thailand, in relation to China’s strategic alliance with Thailand and its role over the Cambodian issue, could dissipate somewhat. Thailand’s relationship with China had introduced significant strains into ASEAN, in view of Indonesia’s suspicions of China, compelling Thai leaders to direct attention to the maintenance of ASEAN unity. ASEAN’s relations with China were dependent upon the Indonesia-China relationship and could improve only according to the pace of change of that relationship. Though initially lukewarm on the possibility of a normalization of ties, Foreign Minister Ali Alatas stressed that Indonesia could only assume a role in shaping regional security if it had established a working relationship with China. More specifically, Indonesia could not act as co-Chairman of the Paris Conference on Cambodia when it was first convened in July, without such a relationship with China as one of the key actors in the conflict. Alatas became a strong proponent of the restoration of relations after it had become clear that President Soeharto was behind the move. On 23 February 1989, President Soeharto and Chinese Foreign Minister Qian Qichen agreed in principle to normalise ties. Besides the security rationale for the move, there was pressure to expand trade relations with China, which was the most compelling argument in favour of the restoration of relations.25 Once Indonesia restored diplomatic relations with China on 8 August 1990, a chapter in the region’s history had closed. Singapore followed suit on 3 October 1990, and Brunei on 1 October 1991. China had established formal relations with all the ASEAN states and had ceased being regarded as a potential threat in a way that was characteristic during the Cambodia

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conflict. The end of that conflict and the subsequent collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991 also resulted in profound changes in the perceptions of the countries of mainland Southeast Asia towards China. In the post-Cold War era, Vietnam finds itself in a rather unique position. It is no longer dependent or subservient on any single power. It owes no homage to any particular model of foreign relations. It is free to design its own foreign policy framework. However, given geopolitical realities, Vietnam, like its Southeast Asian neighbours, must always take its northern neighbour into account. Since the normalization of party-toparty relations in November 1991 on the basis of shared ideology, the big issue for Vietnamese decision-makers was how to reach accommodation with their northern neighbour without provoking confrontation or reverting to a tributary-type relationship. The main issue of contention pertains to the South China Sea, as it involves not only conflicting claims between Vietnam and China, but conflicting claims with Taiwan, Malaysia, the Philippines and Brunei. The major recent diplomatic issue from the Vietnamese perspective was China’s decision in mid-1994 to sign a contract with the American oil company Crestone in an area within 200 nautical miles of what Vietnam considered to be its territorial waters. Nevertheless, events did indicate that Vietnam and China had managed to overcome existing irritants, and to codify their bilateral relations in a series of mutually beneficial accords. The two countries negotiated, and signed on 19 October 1993, an “agreement on the basic principles for the settlement of border issues” (for example, the land border, in the Gulf of Tonkin and the South China Sea). Before the issues are finally settled, both sides have agreed they should not take any action which complicates the disputes nor should they resort to the use of force or threaten the use of force. Vietnam and China reached agreement to set up joint working groups for the land border and for demarcating the Gulf of Tonkin. Vietnam has stated that the land border is a technical issue, and that China had agreed that it would return land along the border area if found to be on Vietnamese territory. High-level visits have been exchanged between the two countries, and in a two-year period since November 1991 fourteen separate agreements were negotiated and signed. Vietnam and China both need a stable and peaceful external environment, in order to carry out their domestic reform programmes, while integrating their economies with the world economy. In this context, both have a common interest in controlling and regulating border trade between them. While the value of China’s border trade with Vietnam is a small portion of total trade, it is especially significant for Guangxi province where Vietnam

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ranks as its second largest trading partner after Hong Kong. The border trade may play a significant stabilizing role in the relationship between the two countries. It is the major expression of shared material interest in cooperation. Hence, Vietnam is unlikely to pursue the path of alarmism or confrontation. Instead, the signs indicate that Vietnam will be sensitive to the nuances of China’s regional and global status. For example, Vietnam has been circumspect in its public reaction to China’s last nuclear test. Priority will continue to be given to developing breadth and depth in the bilateral relationship, with special attention given to economic ties. From the point of view of Vietnam, uneasy relations with China make little political sense. Given the disparity in size and resources between the two states, and the geographic relationship of the one to the other, Vietnam cannot conduct its foreign policy on a rational basis without some regard for the interests and sensibilities of its much larger neighbour. In the case of Laos and Cambodia, concerns regarding the ambitions of their larger neighbours, Thailand and Vietnam, have resulted in a closer relationship with China, ostensibly to allow themselves greater independence of action vis-à-vis their more powerful neighbours to the east and west. According to a Cambodian analyst, China now serves as the “strategic backbone of Cambodia’s security”.26 Laos’ weariness of Thailand, a legacy of border disputes resulting in serious outbreaks of fighting which occurred in mid-1984 and late 1987, has seen it develop stronger ties with China as a strategic counterbalance. China is also seen as a valuable source of economic aid and trade.27 Similarly, the new regime in Phnom Penh, after UN-sponsored and supervised elections in 1991, had returned to a foreign policy stance of neutrality similar to the period before 1970. Despite improved relations with Thailand and Vietnam, Cambodia has elected to make China its “special friend”.28 Implicit in Cambodia’s positive attitude towards China is the fact that China is seen as a credible strategic partner which could be used to keep both Thailand and Vietnam at bay, if necessary. Myanmar’s leaders have always been mindful that a contiguous land border shared with China has in the past been a source of conflict and contention. China is now seen more as a powerful ally than a threat. By the mid-1990s, relations between Beijing and Yangon had economic, ideological and military dimensions. As economic ties between the two countries continue to develop at a fast pace, their interests are likely to overlap considerably in the foreseeable future. In fact, the entire region may become enmeshed economically with China, as current economic ties are further enhanced through the institutionalising of a new economic growth triangle, namely, the “Greater Mekong Sub-region”.29

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INITIAL PERCEPTIONS AT THE DAWN OF THE POST-COLD WAR ERA

The challenge that confronted Southeast Asia-China relations in the early 1990s, particularly from an ASEAN perspective, was how the integration of China into the wider Asia-Pacific community could proceed without subordinating the interests of the regional organization, or those of its constituent members, to those of China. As early as 1993, Singapore’s Senior Minister Lee Kuan Yew, in Shanghai warned that the world would have to change its ways when China becomes an economic superpower, and declared that how a country the size of China would react after it had been marginalized for the past 200 years would depend upon how it was treated by the world.30 Singapore took the lead in being a vocal proponent of China’s integration into the Asia-Pacific region. Singapore’s position has constantly emphasized that China should be given a stake in the region and that ASEAN should allow it to assume a constructive role. Over this issue, Singapore has the support of the other ASEAN states, though in varying degrees, as the consequences of China’s economic transformation are assessed. The ASEAN states cannot associate with punitive or coercive Western policies directed towards China, which would introduce unnecessary tensions in the relationship with that country. Indeed, such tensions may have deleterious repercussions in the future when China’s position vis-à-vis the region is strengthened. At this point, perhaps, Western and ASEAN views of China may diverge. From ASEAN’s perspective, it is within the context of a constructive relationship that outstanding issues, such as the South China Sea or the Vietnam-China territorial dispute, may hopefully be resolved. Indeed, the idea of a constructive relationship with China is in itself intended to make China’s leaders more sensitive to regional security and political concerns through dialogue and public discussion. China’s position over the Khmer Rouge was altered as ASEAN’s interests were accommodated, and there is no reason why a similar dialogue may not affect China’s position over the above outstanding issues. This, at least, is the ASEAN expectation. The ASEAN effort to engage China in multilateral security dialogue can be understood in the above context. The actual process of engagement may act as a corrective mechanism which will make China more aware of the needs of the regional states and supportive of the idea of underlying security equilibrium, on the basis of which economic integration could be encouraged. China was a special guest of the 25th ASEAN Annual Ministerial Meeting (AMM) held in Manila in July 1992, which was

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attended by Foreign Minister Qian Qichen. At the 26th AMM in Singapore in July 1993, ASEAN foreign ministers decided to establish an AsiaPacific political and security forum (the ASEAN Regional Forum) which would be attached to the AMM, and would initially include 18 states as well as China and Russia (and as of 2000 the ARF has 21 states). NEW POINTS OF CONVERGENCE AND CONCERNS

At the dawn of the new millennium, how does Southeast Asia perceive China? Is it a constructive neighbour and partner? A friend in need? Or a potential threat? Since the end of the Cold War, both China and the countries of Southeast Asia have concentrated on strengthening their economic base. In their desire for prosperity, economic linkages will become even more intertwined in the areas of trade, investment, finance and technology. In mulitlateral fora, like the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum and the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF), China and ASEAN (which now includes all ten Southeast Asian states) have found themselves almost as de facto allies, articulating an “Asian way” in organising regional interactions. China and ASEAN are strong proponents of the principle of non-intervention, sharing perspectives that regional cooperation should adopt an informal, flexible, gradualist, consensus-based approach, rather than a more structured and binding format favoured by the West. ASEAN and China have also found mutualities in issues like “Asian values”, and the extent to which adherence to such value structures challenges Western approaches to matters pertaining to definitions of democracy and the practice of human rights. Such a partnership was evident through the 1993 Bangkok Declaration, which was a consensus among East Asian states (except Japan) on an Asian perspective of human rights to be articulated at the World Conference on Human Rights, held in June 1993 in Vienna. The Bangkok Declaration placed economic growth, social rights, and community interests ahead of individual freedoms and rights, calling on countries to respect different socio-economic, historical and cultural backgrounds, and emphasizing that no country should interfere in the domestic affairs of a country or impose its own notion of human rights. The Asian economic crisis, unleashed in mid-1997, opened a window of opportunity for China to play a positive role in its relations with the ASEAN states. China’s US$1 billion aid package to Thailand; its assurance not to devalue the yuan; and its extension of trade credit and offers of humanitarian aid have all been welcomed in policy circles as indications

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of China’s earnestness in attempting to play a constructive role in regional relations. Such expressions of concern for the well-being of the ASEAN states will help to enhance a new image of China and generate a “comfort level” previously unknown. Unfortunately, in some quarters, China did manage to ruffle a few feathers by commenting on Indonesia’s “internal affairs”, if one is to use the “measure” China employs to judge other states commenting on its internal affairs. Indonesia’s ethnic Chinese community was the target of much of the violence perpetrated during the May 1998 riots in Jakarta that preceeded the fall of Soeharto. After initially maintaining studied reticence for a period of two months, China’s strongest response came in the form of a front page commentary in the People’s Daily, urging Indonesian authorities to “face the facts solemnly” and take “strong steps” to punish those responsible for atrocities against the ethnic Chinese Indonesian population during the May riots. Such sentiments were echoed a few days later by the official All-China Women’s Federation, in a similarly stern statement. The Chinese foreign ministry took a more pragmatic line by locating its concern over the matter within humanitarian bounds, emphasising Chinese Indonesians “as members of the Indonesian family”, “who had over the years worked hard and made important contributions to Indonesia’s economic development and social stability”.31 While official statements were sensitively crafted to avoid controversy, statements outside the foreign ministry were less circumspect. No doubt, China was not alone in condemning the arson, looting and rape committed against the ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia, as leaders and private groups from many countries were to do so. That Beijing initially refused to comment or be drawn on the issue showed an awareness of the negative impact its expressions of concern could have on countries of the region. Nevertheless, the question that arises is China’s intentions behind its expressions of concern. It would be understandable, although not very politic, if China spoke out of ethnic solidarity, since it would be unlikely to assume “the motherland” acting nonchalantly while other Chinese groups mounted strenuous protests, or because it wanted to “keep up” with Taiwan, which was threatening to reduce investments in Indonesia. But if such statements were portents of an increasingly assertive China seeking to project its influence in the region, then there would be cause for worry. Given China’s declared ambition to become a world power in the next century, its neighbours cannot but want to decipher the intent and meaning of every move it makes. Thus, from the perspective of the Southeast Asian countries, most would agree that the challenge for China to assume fully its place

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among the global great powers will be assessed through the manner in which it contributes to the overall peace and stability of Asia and the Pacific. In this regard, China’s greater commitment to multilateralism is the positive side of a diplomatic agenda that has taken significant strides. Steps taken by China to adhere to international norms of behaviour and practices by signing the United Nations covenant on civil and political rights, which is regarded as the cornerstone for civil liberties, will have a beneficial impact on international perceptions of China. Together with its vigourous participation in multilateral and regional diplomatic activities to promote peace and stability, and its active participation in the ASEAN Regional Forum and various Track Two activities on Asia-Pacific securityrelated issues, past perceptions of China among the states of Southeast Asia are incrementally being altered in a positive way. ASEAN has particularly appreciated China’s support in its quest to set the agenda and play a leading role in the ARF process.32 The countries of Southeast Asia understand China’s position that it needs to be strong to maintain its independence, owing to its historical experience. However, concerns over China’s long-term intentions towards Southeast Asia, and worries about its rising economic power and consequent strengthening of its political and military influence, backed by weapons of significant strategic leverage, do exist and continue to generate uncertainty among Southeast Asian countries. This is an area where China has to make concerted efforts to reassure the regional states of its good intentions and willingness to address outstanding security issues without using force. Unfortunately, due to its irredentist agenda, the size of China in contrast with its ASEAN neighbours, its past history, and its position as a rising power in the region, the onus will be on China to make plain unequivocally, in deed rather than rhetoric, that no “Middle Kingdom” mentality hinders its interactions with its neighbours. The test case for Southeast Asia will be the South China Sea territorial disputes. Herein lies the need for a new strategic accommodation. While ASEAN’s relations with China are wide-ranging and should not be held hostage to the Spratly Islands dispute, China’s activities there have inevitably made it a barometer for assessing its strategic intentions. China’s creeping assertiveness in the South China Sea has indirectly led to the strengthening of bilateral defence and security ties between concerned ASEAN states and the Western powers. It could easily be assumed that Indonesia’s discovery in 1993 of Chinese maps which implied ownership of a major natural gas field 180 kilometres northeast of Natuna Island, in

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Indonesia’s exclusive economic zone, played a significant part in swaying former President Soeharto to formalize a consultative security arrangement with Australia. The now defunct Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security, signed in December 1995, came soon after the November PLA exercises targeting Taiwan; the agreement institutionalized the extensive array of defence ties that had already existed between Australia and Indonesia, and was a surprising development, on account of Indonesia’s longstanding commitment to the principle of non-alignment. This event was followed up on 3 January 1996 when a defence co-operation agreement between Great Britain and the Philippines was formalized through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU). The backdrop for this activity was the PLA’s seizure of Mischief Reef in the Spratly Islands, claimed by the Philippines, and the construction of naval support structures on them. Over and above such unilateral reactions from the countries concerned, corporately, the ASEAN states proactively reproached China on its creeping occupation in the South China Sea at an informal dinner held at the evening before the ASEAN-China senior officials meeting held in Hangzhou in April 1995. No doubt, China’s assertiveness in the South China Sea could also have had a bearing on the conclusion of a treaty signed by the ASEAN heads of state in December 1995, declaring to make Southeast Asia a nuclear weapons free zone. Over and above the territorial claims in the South China Sea, the question of “freedom of navigation” continues to remain fundamental, not only to ASEAN, but to other users of the sea lines of communication for commercial and strategic purposes. With this in mind, the undertaking of the Heads of State and Governments of the ASEAN states and the President of the PRC, as reflected in their Joint Statement of 16 December 1997, should restore confidence. In the statement, they undertook to resolve their differences through peaceful means without resorting to the threat or use of force. The parties to the statement agreed to resolve their disputes in the South China Sea through friendly consultations and negotiations, in accordance with universally recognized international law, including the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (which China ratified in May 1996). Through this statement, all the parties showed a willingness to embark on efforts to find solutions and reach agreement on avenues for co-operation in the areas concerned. Nothwithstanding China’s good intentions in such confidence-building measures, if China were to signal its readiness to sit down together with all the claimant states to discuss the feasibility of putting aside the territorial disputes, and agreeing on joint exploration and exploitation, while displaying a willingness — together with ASEAN — to move forward the ARF process from confidence-building to preventive diplomacy, the

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diplomatic victory for China, in its attempts to change traditional perceptions countries’ have formed of it, would be immense. Such actions would provide compelling evidence of China’s peaceful intentions. CONCLUSION

Uncertainty still surrounds China’s interaction with Southeast Asia. There is optimism that regional and global economic trends would create crosscutting networks within the Asia-Pacific region and would remove the above issues as obstacles or areas of tension. The principal question remains: as Southeast Asia and China forge their relationship in the postCold War era, will the relationship be based primarily on mutual advantage or defined in hierarchical terms? On this point, caution seems to be the order of the day. Not wanting to put their eggs in one basket, the integration of China with the rest of the region has been accompanied by a corresponding search for a security framework that would provide the countries of the region with a counterbalance. China’s smaller neighbours cannot expect economic trends to resolve all their dilemmas of national security. Economic growth and integration may not necessarily be a permanent constraint upon the ambitions of states, and might merely reflect a current phase that is unlikely to last. ASEAN policy over the recent years, while not a repudiation of the ZOPFAN concept, involves a measure of flexibility regarding great power accommodation. Implicit in the creation of a multilateral security framework is the involvement of Japan and the United States as partners, ensuring that the countries of Southeast Asia do not face China alone on major security issues. In time, a variant of the balance-of-power approach to security may emerge in the region, providing powers large and small alike with a sense of strategic equilibrium. How Southeast Asian perceptions of China in future will evolve will depend very much on domestic Chinese politics and the nature of the regime that will emerge. The hope in the region is that a reformist leadership will emerge that is secure enough to deflect pressures from nationalistic elements within the Chinese polity who advocate great power politics to advance China’s interests. Notes 1

Robert O. Tilman’s Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threats (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), which is now relatively dated, remains the major book-length study

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2

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5

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dealing with the issue of perceptions in the international relations of Southeast Asia. For more current studies on China-Southeast Asia relations, see the following: Jusuf Wanandi, “ASEAN’s China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement”, Survival 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996): 117–28; Amitav Acharya, “ASEAN and Conditional Engagement”, in Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China, ed. James Shinn (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996), pp. 220–48; Michael Leifer, “China in Southeast Asia: Interdependence and Accommodation”, in China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence, eds. David S.G. Goodman and Gerald Segal (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 156–71; Lee Lai To, “East Asian Assessments of China’s Security Policy”, International Affairs 73, no. 2 (April 1997): 251–62; Allen S. Whiting, “ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension”, Asian Survey XXXVII, no. 4 (April 1997): 299–322; and Yong Deng, “Managing China’s Hegemonic Ascension: Engagement from Southeast Asia”, Journal of Strategic Studies 21, no. 1 (March 1998): 21–43. C.P. Fitzgerald, China and Southeast Asia since 1945 (London: Longman, 1973), p. 99. A.J.P. Taylor, From Napoleon to Lenin (New York, NY: Harper and Row, 1966), p. 64. Herbert Butterfield, History and Human Relations (London: Collins, 1951), p. 177. Robert Jervis, Perception and Misperception in International Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976), p. 217. Stanley Hoffman, “Perceptions, Reality and the Franco-American Conflict”, Image and Reality in World Politics, eds. John C. Farrell and Asa F. Smith (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968), p. 57. Leonard Y. Andaya, in Nicholas Tarling (ed), The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia, Vol. 1 (Cambridge University Press, 1992), p. 340. D.G.E. Hall, A History of Southeast Asia (London: Macmillan, 1970), p. 866. Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas (Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991), p. 75. See two useful essays by Wang Gungwu entitled, “Early Ming Relations with Southeast Asia: A Background Essay”, and “China and Southeast Asia 1402–1424”, in his Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia (Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992), pp. 77–130. C.P. Fitzgerald, The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People (Canberra: ANU Press, 1972), p. xv. See also a useful study done by Wu Teh-Yao, Southeast Asia and China: Asian Neighbours, Occasional

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13 14

15

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23 24

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Paper No. 8 (Singapore: University of Singapore, Department of Political Science, September 1974). Tao-Tai Hsia and Kathryn A. Haun, Peking’s Policy Toward the Dual Nationality of the Overseas Chinese: A Study of its Development (Washington, D.C.: Law Library, Library of Congress, April 1976), pp. 12–14. Wang Gungwu, China and the Chinese Overseas, p. 224. On issues pertaining to the Chinese in Indonesia, see, Mary F. Somers, Southeast Asia’s Chinese Minorities (Melbourne: Longman, 1974), pp. 80–83; Leo Suryadinata, Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China (Singapore: Heinemann, 1978). Melvin Gurtov, China and Southeast Asia — The Politics of Survival (Lexington, MS: Lexington Books, 1971), p. 164. Peter Van Ness, Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation (Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1970), p. 137. Jay Taylor, China and Southeast Asia: Peking’s Relations with Revolutionary Movements (New York, N.Y.: Praeger, 1974). For a useful overview, see Lee Lai To, “Deng Xiaoping’s ASEAN Tour: A Perspective on Sino-Southeast Asia Relations,” Contemporary Southeast Asia 3, no. 1 (June 1981): 58–75. Leszek Buszynski, The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia (London: Croom Helm, 1986), p. 222. Anne Gilks, “The Breakdown of the Sino-Vietnamese Alliance 1970– 1979”, China Research Monograph, no. 39 (Berkeley, CA: Center for Chinese Studies, Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1992). “Laos accuses China of inciting confrontation”, New Straits Times, 18 February 1982. David P. Chandler, A History of Cambodia (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), p. 186 Straits Times, 9 August 1990. According to Dewi Fortuna Anwar, KADIN started to explore the possibilities of estabilishing direct trade with China since 1977. See “Indonesia’s Relations with China and Japan: Images, Perception and Realities”, Contemporary Southeast Asia 12, no. 3 (December 1990): 233. Hadi Soesastro, After the Resumption of Diplomatic Relations: Aspects of Sino-Indonesian Economic Relations (Jakarta: Centre for International and Strategic Studies, June 1991), p. 3.

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27

28 29

30 31

32

See Sorpong Peou, Cambodia after the Cold War: The Search for Security Continues, Working Paper No. 96 (Clayton, Vic: Monash University, Centre of Southeast Asian Studies, 1995), p. 7. Murray Hiebert, “Look to the North”, Far Eastern Economic Review, 6 August 1992. See Peou, op. cit., p. 4. China, Cambodia, Laos, Myanmar, Vietnam and Thailand have agreed to institutionalise their economic co-operation along the Mekong Basin by setting up a ministerial-level committee. See “Panel on Mekong basin tie-ups to be set up”, Straits Times, 16 September 1994. For further details on the Myanmar-China relationship, see Andrew Selth, “Burma and the Strategic Competition Between China and India”, Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 2 (June 1996): 213–30. Straits Times, 15 May 1993. This was not the first instance when China’s foreign ministry has felt compelled to comment on Indonesian issues relating to that country’s ethnic Chinese minority. Similar comments were made in early 1994 when the ethnic Chinese community in Medan were victims during a bout of rioting that rocked the city premised on labour issues. For a useful discussion on China’s role in the ASEAN Regional Forum, see Rosemary Foot, “China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought”, Asian Survey XXXVIII, no. 5 (May 1998): 425–40.

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Select Bibliography This bibliography only includes those sources directly referenced in the text and endnotes of each chapter.

Books and Monographs Alagappa, Muthiah. The National Security of Developing States: Lessons from Thailand. Dover, Mass.: Auburn House, 1987. ———, ed. Political Legitimacy in Southeast Asia. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1995. ———, ed. ASEAN Security Practice: Material and Ideational Influences. Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1998. Allison, Graham et al., eds. Cooperative Denuclearisation: From Pledges to Deeds. Cambridge, Mass.: Center for Science and International Affairs, Harvard University, 1993. Alves, Dora. Evolving Pacific Basin Strategies: The 1989 Pacific Symposium. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1990. Ambrose, Stephen E. and Douglas G. Brinkley. Rise to Globalism: American Foreign Policy Since 1938. Middlesex, England: Penguin Books, 1997. Arase, David. Buying Power: The Political Economy of Japan’s Foreign Aid. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1995. Ball, Desmond and David Horner, eds. Strategic Studies in a Changing World: Global, Regional and Australian Perspectives. Canberra: Australian National University, 1992. Booth, Ken. Strategy and Ethnocentrism. New York: Holms and Meier, 1979. Booth, Ken and Russell Trood, eds. Strategic Cultures in the Asia-Pacific Region. London: Macmillan and St. Martin’s Press, 1999. Brawley, Mark R. Liberal Leadership: Great Powers and their Challengers in Peace and War. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1993. Brown, Michael E. and Sean M. Lynn-Jones, eds. East Asian Security. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1996. Butterfield, Herbert. History and Human Relations. London: Collins, 1951. Buszynski, Leszek. The Soviet Union and Southeast Asia. London: Croom Helm, 1986. Campbell, Colin, and Bert A. Rockman. The Clinton Presidency: First Appraisals. New Jersey: Chatham House Publishers, 1996. © 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore

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Chalmers, Malcolm. Confidence-Building in Southeast Asia. Trowbridge, Wiltshire: Redwood Books, 1996. Chandler, David P. A History of Cambodia. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993. Chin Kin Wah, ed. Defence Spending in Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1987. Crone, Donald K. The ASEAN States Coping with Dependence. New York: Praeger Publishers, 1983. Crouch, Harold. Domestic Political Structures and Regional Economic Co-operation. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1984. da Cunha, Derek. “The Need for Weapons Upgrading in Southeast Asia: Present and Future”. ISEAS Working Papers: International Politics and Security Issues, No. 1(96). Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, March 1996. Dahl, Robert. Polyarchy: Participation and Opposition. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1971. De Guzman, Raul P. and Mila A. Reforma, eds. Government and Politics of the Philippines. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1988. Dibb, Paul. Towards a New Balance of Power in Asia, Adelphi Paper 295. New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995. Ellings, Richard J., and Sheldon Simon, eds. Southeast Asian Security in the New Millennium. New York: M. E. Sharpe, 1996. Farrell, John C. and Asa F. Smith. Image and Reality in World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press, 1968. Fitzgerald, C. P. The Southern Expansion of the Chinese People. Canberra: Australian National University, 1972. ———. China and Southeast Asia Since 1945. London: Longman, 1973. Gilpin, Robert. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 1987. Goh Chok Tong. Singapore National Day Rally 1995. Singapore: Ministry of Information and the Arts, 1995. Goodman, S. G. and Gerald Segal, eds. China Rising: Nationalism and Interdependence. London: Routledge, 1997. Gourevitch, Peter et al. United States-Japan Relations and International Institutions After the Cold War. San Diego: University of San Diego, 1995. Grant, Richard I., ed. China and Southeast Asia: Into the Twenty-First Century. Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1993.

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Gurtov, Melvin. China and Southeast Asia — The Politics of Survival. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books, 1971. Gutierrez, Eric. The Ties that Bind: A Guide to Family, Business and Other Interests in the Ninth House of Representatives. Manila: Philippine Center for Investigative Journalism, 1994. Hall, D. G. E. A History of Southeast Asia. London: Macmillan, 1970. Hamzah, B. A. The Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN): Revisited. Kuala Lumpur: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and Institute of Strategic and International Studies, 1991. ———. Malaysia’s Exclusive Economic Zone. Kuala Lumpur: Pelanduk Publications, 1988. Harris, Stuart, and Gary Klintworth, eds. China as a Great Power: Myth, Realities and Challenges in the Asia-Pacific Region. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995. Harrison, Selig S., ed. Japan’s Nuclear Future: The Plutonium Debate and East Asian Security. Washington, D.C.: The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1996. Hewison, Kevin et al., eds. Southeast Asia in the 1990s: Authoritarianism, Democracy and Capitalism. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1993. Hsia, Tao-Tai, and Kathryn A. Haun. Peking’s Policy Toward the Dual Nationality of the Overseas Chinese: A Study of its Development. Washington, D.C.: Law Library, Library of Congress, April 1996. International Institute for Strategic Studies: The Military Balance 1999/ 2000. London: International Institute for Strategic Studies, October 1999. Jacobsen, Carl G., ed. Strategic Power: USA/USSR. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1990. James, Harold, and Denis Sheil-Small. The Undeclared War. London: New English Library, 1973. Jervis, Robert. Perception and Misperception in International Politics. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976. Jeshurun, Chandran, ed. China, India, Japan and the Security of Southeast Asia. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1993. Johnson, Chalmers. MITI and the Japanese Miracle: The Growth of Industrial Policy, 1925–1975. Tokyo: Charles E. Tuttle, 1986. Johnston, Alastair Iain. Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1995. Jomo, K. S., ed. Japan and Malaysian Development: In the Shadow of the Rising Sun. London: Routledge, 1994.

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Kendall, Harry H. and Clara Joewono, eds. Japan, ASEAN and the United States. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1991. Keohane, Robert O. International Relations and State Power: Essays in International Relations. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1989. Klein, Yitzhak. “A Theory of Strategic Culture”. Comparative Strategy 10, no. 2 (January–March 1990). Leifer, Michael. The ASEAN Regional Forum. Adelphi Paper 302. New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1996. Levanthenes, Louise. When China Ruled the Seas: The Treasure Fleet of the Dragon Throne, 1405–33. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1994. Lee Kuan Yew. The Singapore Story: Memoirs of Lee Kuan Yew. Singapore: Times Editions, 1998. Lim Chong-Yah. Learning from the Japanese Experience. Singapore: Maruzen Asia, 1982. Lin Chong-Pin. China’s Nuclear Weapons Strategy: Tradition Within Evolution. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath & Co., 1988. Mack, A. and J. Ravenhill, eds. Pacific Cooperation: Building Economic and Security Regimes in the Asia-Pacific Region. St. Leonards, NSW: Allen & Unwin, 1994. McMahon, Robert J. The Limits of Empire: The United States and Southeast Asia Since World War II. New York: Columbia University Press, 1999. Morrison, Charles E. and Astri Suhrike. The Strategies of Survival: The Foreign Policy Dilemmas of Smaller States. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1983. Paterson, Thomas G. and Dennis Merrill, eds. Major Problems in American Foreign Relations Volume II Since 1914. Lexington, Mass.: D.C. Heath and Company, 1989. Pollack, Jonathan D. and Richard Yang. In China’s Shadow: Regional Perspectives on Chinese Foreign Policy and Military Development. Santa Monica, CA.: Rand, 1998. Quah, Jon S. T. et al., eds. Government and Politics of Singapore. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1995. Reynolds, Bruce. Thailand and Japan’s Southern Advance: 1940–1945. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1994. ———, ed. Thai-Japanese Relations in Historical Perspective, Asian Studies Monograph, No. 041. Bangkok: Chulalongkorn University, 1988.

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Roy, Denny, ed. The New Security Agenda in the Asia-Pacific. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997. Samuels, Richard J. Rich Nation Strong Army: National Security and the Technological Transformation of Japan. Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1994. Scalapino, Robert et al., eds. Asian Security Issues: Regional and Global. Berkeley: Institute of East Asian Studies, University of California, 1988. Shinn, James, ed. Weaving the Net: Conditional Engagement with China. New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1996. Shirashi, Masaya. Japanese Relations with Vietnam: 1951–1987. Ithaca, New York: Southeast Asia Program, Cornell University, 1990. Snyder, Jack L. The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options. Santa Monica: Rand Corporation, 1977. Soesastro, Hadi. After the Resumption of Diplomatic Relations: Aspects of Sino-Indonesian Economic Relations. Jakarta: Center for International and Strategic Studies, June 1991. Somers, Mary F. Southeast Asia’s Chinese Minorities. Melbourne: Longman, 1974. Sudo, Sueo. The Fukuda Doctrine and ASEAN: New Dimensions in Japanese Foreign Policy. Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, 1992. Suryadinata, Leo. Indonesia’s Foreign Policy Under Suharto: Aspiring to International Leadership. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1996. ———, ed. Southeast Asian Chinese and China: The Politico-Economic Dimension. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1995. ———. Pribumi Indonesians, the Chinese Minority and China. Singapore: Heinemann, 1978. Tarling, Nicholas, ed. The Cambridge History of Southeast Asia. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992. Taylor, A. J. P. From Napoleon to Lenin. New York: Harper and Row, 1966. Taylor, Jay. China and Southeast Asia: Peking’s Relations with Revolutionary Movements. New York: Praeger, 1974. Tilman, Robert O. Southeast Asia and the Enemy Beyond: ASEAN Perceptions of External Threat. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987. Valencia, Mark J. China and the South China Sea Disputes, Adelphi Paper 298. New York: Oxford University Press for the International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1995.

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Van Der Kroef, Justus M. Communism in South-East Asia. London and Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1981. Van Doren, Charles N. and Rodney Jones. China and Nuclear NonProliferation: Two Perspectives. PPN Occasional Paper Three. Southampton: Centre for International Policy Studies, University of Southampton, 1989. Van Ness, Peter. Revolution and Chinese Foreign Policy: Peking’s Support for Wars of National Liberation. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1970. Wang Gungwu. China and the Chinese Overseas. Singapore: Times Academic Press, 1991. ———. Community and Nation: China, Southeast Asia and Australia. Sydney: Allen & Unwin, 1992. Whiting, Allen S. The Chinese Calculus of Deterrence: India and Indochina. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press, 1975. Zhang Shu Guang. Deterrence and Strategic Culture: Chinese-American Confrontations 1949–1958. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992.

Articles Antolik, Michael. “The ASEAN Regional Forum: The Spirit of Constructive Engagement”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 2 (September 1994). Anwar, Dewi Fortuna. “Indonesia’s Relations with China and Japan: Images, Perception and Realities”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 12, no. 3 (December 1990). Ba, Alice. “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Maintaining the Regional Idea in Southeast Asia”. International Journal LII, no. 4 (Autumn 1977). Ball, Desmond. “Strategic Culture in the Asia-Pacific Region”. Security Studies 3, no. 1 (Autumn 1993). Bermudez, Joseph S. “North Korea’s Nuclear Arsenal”. Jane’s Intelligence Review Special Report No. 9 (1996). Bosworth, Stephen W. “The US and Asia in 1992”. Asian Survey XXXIII, no. 1 (January 1993). Boylan, Edward S. “The Chinese Cultural Style of Warfare”. Comparative Strategy 3, no. 4 (1982). Brown, Frederick Z. “The United States and Southeast Asia Enter a New Era”. Current History 94, no. 596 (December 1995). Buzan, Barry, and Gerald Segal. “Rethinking East Asian Security”. Survival 36, no. 2 (Summer 1994).

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Buszynski, Leszek. “ASEAN Security Dilemmas”. Survival 34, no. 4 (Winter 1992–93). Caldwell, John and Alexander T. Lennon. “China’s Nuclear Modernization Program”. Strategic Review, Fall 1995. Cambone, Stephen A. and Patrick J. Garrity. “The Future of US Nuclear Policy”. Survival 36, no. 4 (Winter 1994–95). Cirincione, Joseph. “The Non-Proliferation Treaty and the Nuclear Balance”. Current History: A Journal of Contemporary World Affairs, May 1995. Davis, Zachary S. “China’s Nonproliferation and Export Control Policies: Boom or Bust for the NPT Regime”. Asian Survey XXXV, no. 6 (June 1995). Dobson, William J., and Taylor Fravel. “Red Herring Hegemon: China in the South China Sea”. Current History 96, no. 611 (September 1997). Dupont, Alan. “Indonesian Defence Strategy and Security: Time for a Rethink?” Contemporary Southeast Asia 18, no. 3 (December 1996). Eiichi, Furukawa. “Changes in Southeast Asian Views of Japan”. Japan Echo XX, no. 3 (Autumn 1993). Foot, Rosemary. “China in the ASEAN Regional Forum: Organizational Processes and Domestic Modes of Thought”. Asian Survey XXXVIII, no. 5 (May 1998). Freedman, Lawrence. “Great Powers, Vital Interests and Nuclear Weapons”. Survival 36, no. 4 (Winter 1994–95). Garrett, Banning and Bonnie Glaser. “Multilateral Security in the AsiaPacific Region and its Impact on Chinese Interests”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 1 (June 1994). ———. “Chinese Perspectives on Nuclear Arms Control”. International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96). Hitchcock, David I., Jr. “East Asia’s Security Agenda”. Washington Quarterly 17, no. 1 (Winter 1994). Johnston, Alastair Iain. “Thinking About Strategic Culture”. International Security 19, no. 4 (Spring 1995). ———. “China’s New ‘Old Thinking’: The Concept of Limited Deterence”. International Security 20, no. 3 (Winter 1995/96). Jones, Sidney. “Asian Human Rights, Economic Growth and United States Policy”. Current History 95, no. 605 (December 1996). Karniol, Robert. “Thailand’s Armed Forces: From Counter-insurgency to Conventional Warfare”. International Defense Review, no. 2 (1992). Kelly, James A. “Security Policies in East Asia: Fighting Erosion and Finding a New Balance”. Washington Quarterly 18, no. 3 (Summer 1995).

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Lam Lai Sing. “A Short Note on ASEAN-Great Power Interaction”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 15, no. 4 (March 1994). Lam Peng Er. “Japan and the Spratlys Dispute: A Case Study of Tokyo’s Foreign Policy Aspirations and Limitations”. Asian Survey XXXVI, no. 10 (October 1996). Lee Lai To. “East Asian Assessments of China’s Security Policy”. International Affairs 37, no. 2 (April 1997). ———. “Deng Xiaoping’s ASEAN Tour: A Perspective on Sino-Southeast Asia Relations”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 3, no. 1 (June 1981). Low, Linda. “The East Asian Economic Grouping”. Pacific Review 4, no. 4 (1991). Mack, Andrew, and Pauline Kerr. “The Evolving Security Discourse in the Asia-Pacific”. Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995). Mandlebaum, Michael. “Lessons of the Next Nuclear War”. Foreign Affairs 74, no. 2 (March/April 1995). Mazarr, Michael J. “Culture and International Relations: A Review Essay”. Washington Quarterly 19, no. 2 (Spring 1996). McCormick, James M. “Assessing Clinton’s Foreign Policy at Mid-Term”. Current History 94, no. 593 (November 1995). Nakatomi, Hisashi. “A Note on The Japanese Foreign Policy Towards Vietnam”. Asia-Pacific Review no. 1 (December 1993). Pendley, William T. “America and the Asia-Pacific”. Joint Force Quarterly no. 7 (Spring 1995). Pilat, Joseph F. and Walter L. Kirchner. “The Technological Promise of Counterproliferation”. Washington Quarterly 18, no. 1 (Winter 1995). Satoh, Yukio. “Emerging Trends in Asia-Pacific Security: The Role of Japan”. Pacific Review 8, no. 2 (1995). Selth, Andrew. “Burma and the Strategic Competition Between China and India”. Journal of Strategic Studies 19, no. 2 (June 1996). Shambaugh, David. “Growing Strong: China’s Challenge to Asian Security”. Survival 36, no. 2(Summer 1994). ———. “The United States and China: A New Cold War?” Current History 94, no. 593 (September 1995). Simon, Sheldon, W. “US Strategy and Southeast Asian Security: Issues of Compatibility”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, no. 4 (March 1993). ———. “Alternative Visions of Security in the Asia-Pacific”. Pacific Affairs 69, no. 3 (Fall 1995). Smith, E. D., Jr. “The Dragon Goes to Sea”, Naval War College Review XLIV, no. 3 (Summer 1991).

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Tay, Simon S. C. and Obood Talib. “The ASEAN Regional Forum: Preparing for Preventive Diplomacy”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 19, no. 3 (December 1997). Vatikiotis, Michael R. J. “Indonesia’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 14, no. 4 (March 1993). Wanandi, Jusuf. “Indonesia’s Future Strategic Environment: Relationship of the Great Powers”. Indonesian Quarterly XXX, no. 3 (1995). ———. ASEAN’s China Strategy: Towards Deeper Engagement”. Survival 38, no. 3 (Autumn 1996). Whiting, Allen. “ASEAN Eyes China: The Security Dimension”. Asian Survey XXXVII, no. 4 (April 1997). Yao Zhenyu. “The Guiding Principle for Our Army’s Weapons Programmes”. Journal of the PLA University of National Defence, nos. 7– 8 (1993). Yong Deng. “Managing China’s Hegemonic Ascension: Engagement from Southeast Asia”. Journal of Strategic Studies 21, no. 1 (March 1998). You Ji. “A Test Case for China’s Defence and Foreign Policies”. Contemporary Southeast Asia 16, no. 4 (March 1995). Zalamea, Ulysses O. “Eagles and Dragons at Sea: The Inevitable Strategic Collision Between the United States and China”. Naval War College Review XLIX, no. 4 (Autumn 1996).

Newspapers and Magazines Asia Times Asian Wall Street Journal Business Times (Singapore) Far Eastern Economic Review Hong Kong Standard International Herald Tribune National Review New Straits Times Newsweek South China Morning Post Straits Times Sunday Times (Singapore)

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Index Aceh, 14, 86 Adjitorop, Jusuf, 166 Aegis area defence system, 23 Alagappa, Muthiah, 10 Alatas, Ali, 43, 170 Anglo-Malayan Defence Agreement, 38 Anglo-Malaysian Defence Agreement, 38 ANZUS, 37 Arabian Sea, 26 ASEAN, 9, 11, 12, 16, 29, 38, 39, 41, 42, 43, 48, 51, 53, 56, 57, 60, 63, 64, 66–72, 81, 83, 87–90, 92–6, 103, 105–8, 114, 128, 136, 140, 141, 143, 146, 147, 164–6, 170, 173, 174, 176, 178 Annual Ministerial Meeting, 44, 45, 72, 88, 173 confidence-building model, 47 extending national defence perimeters, 28 geopolitical weight enhanced, 31 High Council, 92, 93, 106 Institutes of Strategic and International Studies (ISIS), 52–4, 105 military intelligence capabilities, 29 military modernization, 27, 88 national resilience, 7, 81, 87–9, 95 non-interference principle, 39, 90, 91 Post-Ministerial Conference (PMC), 43, 44, 53, 143

Secretariat, 39 Secretary-General, 39 security culture of, 16 senior officials meeting (SOM), 52, 55 ASEAN-China relations, 169, 177 ASEAN Declaration on the South China Sea, 103, 107, 108, 111 ASEAN Free Trade Area, 53, 92 ASEAN-Japan Dialogue, 51 ASEAN Regional Forum, 2, 25, 39, 44, 45, 47–50, 54–8, 61, 67–71, 74, 75, 103, 106, 108, 117, 118, 136, 143, 144, 148, 149, 151, 174–7 confidence-building measures, 46 conflict management, 46 intersessional working groups, 46 preventive diplomacy, 46 senior officials meeting (SOM), 55 ASEAN Seminar on Regional Resilience, 89 ASEAN Way, 47, 118, 128 Asian Development Bank, 136 Asian economic crisis, 28 Asian Monetary Fund, 145 Asian pragmatism, 13 Asian security paradigm, 3 Asia-Pacific, 4, 57, 62, 69, 72, 98, 108, 114, 115, 122, 124, 125, 134, 136, 178 community, 173 non-proliferation in, 115

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Index

a single security operating entity, viii security dialogues, 2, 35 strategic diversity, 38 Asia-Pacific Dialogue on Maritime Security, 55 Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC), 36, 45, 52, 54, 56, 67, 148, 149, 151, 174 Asia-Pacific Peace Research Association, 54 Asia-Pacific Roundtable, 52, 54, 55, 105 ASTAGATRA, 85 Atlantic Ocean, 29 Australasia, 35 Australia, 37, 38, 41, 43, 44, 45, 53, 57, 70, 145, 146, 177 Asian identification of, 3 regional interests of, viii Australia-Indonesia Agreement on Maintaining Security, 177 Australia-Indonesia relations, 57 Australian academics, viii, 3 Western thinking of, 3 Australian strategic planners, 3 authoritarianism, 66 balance of power, viii, 9, 11, 12, 30, 31, 37, 62, 114, 142 Ball, Desmond, 4, 5, 13 ballistic missile defence (BMD), 127 Ban Romklao, 117 Bangkok Declaration, 90, 92, 93, 128, 174 bilateral military alliances, 37, 38 Booth, Ken, 1, 4 Britain, 9, 37, 116, 117, 141, 146, 161, 177

Brunei, 28, 44–7, 99, 101, 105, 136, 140, 146, 166, 170, 171 colonial experience of, 12 Burma, 37, 116, 117, 161, 163, 168 Burmese Communist Party (BCP), 164, 169 Bush Administration, 70 Butterfield, Herbert, 159 Cambodia, 11, 16, 45, 46, 95, 136, 138, 140, 147, 165, 167, 168, 169, 170, 172 Vietnamese invasion of, 164, 167 Cambodian conflict, 81, 101, 166 Canada, 35, 43, 44, 53, 144, 145 what threat to, viii Canadian academics, vii Central Asian republics, 123 Champa, 161 Chemical Weapons Convention, 119 Cheng Ho, 149 Chin Peng, 166 China, 11, 22, 24, 27, 37, 42, 43, 44, 45, 48–51, 53–5, 57, 61, 64, 66–8, 71, 72, 74, 98–101, 104–8, 114–7, 119, 121–8, 134, 135, 137, 142–4, 147, 148, 158–60, 162, 165, 166, 170, 173–6, 178 arms control policy/attitude, 118, 119 communist party, 168 Cultural Revolution, 169 exercise of military demarche, 24 expansion of power, 12 deterrence strategy of, 1 engagement by region of, 36 as irredentist power, 115 as Middle Kingdom, 167, 176

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Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security 195

military modernization, 73 navy, 72 Negative Security Assurances (NSA), 119, 120, 122–5, 127 No First Use (NFU) principle, 119, 120, 122–5, 127 realpolitik calculations, 27 Russian weapon systems acquired, 25 steady accretion of power, 24 styles of warfare, 1 China-Japan condominium, 141 China-Japan strategic competition, 23, 24, 31 Chomanand, Kriangsak, 164 civilizational traditions Confucianist, 6 Islamic, 6 Javanese, 6 Clark Air Base, 62 Clark, Joe, 40 Clinton Administration, 44, 62, 63, 65, 69, 70, 72, 75 multiple Asian agendas, 67 Strategy of Enlargement, 61, 65 Clinton, William J., 71, 134 Code of Conduct, Philippines and China, 103, 106, 111 Cold War, 2, 10, 13, 23, 31, 35–43, 57, 63, 65, 67, 70, 71, 83, 98, 100, 116, 120, 135, 146, 147, 178 combined arms operations, 28 comfort women, 138 command, control and communications (C3), 29 Communist Party of Malaysia (CPM), 166 Communist Party of the Philippines (CPP), 166

Communist Party of Thailand (CPT), 163, 164 Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT), 119, 124 Conference for Security Cooperation in Asia (CSCA), 40 Conference for Security Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), 40, 41 confidence-building measures (CBMs), 8, 41, 42, 53, 56, 105 confidence and security building, 3 conflict resolution bilateral approaches to, 13 multilateral approaches to, 13 Confrontation, see Konfrontasi Confucian values and work ethics, 2 conventional warfare, 7 Council for Asia-Europe Cooperation, 54 Council on Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific (CSCAP), 3, 53–5, 106, 108, 148 creative ambiguity, 16 cultural relativism, 2 currency crisis, 20 strategic implications, 20 Declaration of ASEAN Concord, 82, 83, 90, 106 Deng Xiaoping, 164 denuclearization, 114, 121, 122 Diaoyutai, 25, 148 diplomatic styles, 13 East Asia, 35, 37, 40–3, 45, 57, 62–5, 68, 71, 74, 75, 100, 107, 134, 138, 146, 147, 150, 151, 161

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Index

American interests in, 67 political culture, 38 US engagement in, 68 East Asia Economic Caucus, 52, 141, 142 East China Sea, 26 East Timor, 14, 57, 146, 166 economic transition Laos, 3 Elliott, David, 12 environmental threats, 36 Europe, 27 European Community, 43, 44 European powers, 116 European security concepts, 41 European Union, 53, 139 Evans, Gareth, 40, 41 Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), 9, 29, 42 F-16 fighter aircraft, 64 Far East, 123 Fitzgerald, C. P., 159 Five-Power Defence Arrangements, 9, 39, 146 France, 9, 12, 37, 116, 117 Fretilin, 166 Fukuda Doctrine, 143, 145 generational change/transition Indonesia, 3 Malaysia, 3 geopolitical circumstances, vii geopolitical situation being fluid, viii Goh Chok Tong, 7 Gorbachev, Mikhail, 40, 169 Gramscian hegemony, 149 grand strategy, 5

Gray, Colin, 1 Greater East Asia Co-Prosperity Sphere, 116 Greater Mekong Sub-region, 172 Guangxi province, 171 Gulf of Tonkin, 98, 102, 171 Habib, Hasnan, 85 Habibie, B. J., 8 Hainan Island, 106 Hall, D. G. E., 161 Han-class submarine, 72 Han Dynasty, 99 Hashimoto Doctrine, 145 Hashimoto, Ryutaro, 134, 145 Helsinki conference, 40 historical experiences, 6, 7 historical legacy, vii historical memories, 6 Hoffman, Stanley, 160 Hong Kong, 20, 27, 139, 172 human rights, 66 East-West debate, 2 Huntington, Samuel, 2 Ibrahim, Anwar, 15 ICMI, 86 Imperial Germany, 41 Independence aircraft carrier, 26, 27 India, 45, 46, 123, 134, 142 Indian Ocean, 64 Indochinese states, 11, 37, 137, 139, 147 fall to communist regimes, 11 Indonesia, 7, 9, 10, 12–14, 16, 20, 28, 37, 44, 53, 55, 57, 61–4, 66, 82, 83, 87, 91, 93, 116, 136, 137, 138, 140, 141, 146, 160, 165, 166, 170, 176, 177

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as an archipelagic state, 6 Chinese community in, 175 civil-military relations, 12 civilianization of the military, 14 colonial experience of, 12 concept of national resilience, 6 defence establishment, 86 Doctrin Hankamnas, 6 dwifungsi, 14, 15 Golkar Party, 15 Javanese-based strategic culture, 7 management of security, 6 military’s tarnished image, 14 Muslim fundamentalists, 86, 87 national resilience of, 81–5 New Order, 7, 15, 82, 83, 85, 86 PKI abortive coup, 14 political transition, 3 territorial unity, 6 total people’s defence, 6 Wawasan Nusantara, 6 Western-educated intellectuals, 87 Indonesian Communist Party, see Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI) Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI), 86 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), 149 international conflict cultural dimension of, 2 International Court of Justice, 93 International Monetary Fund, 28, 136 international relations, vii multilateralism in, viii International Security, 4 Ishak, Mohammad Sharif,10

Jakarta, 46, 47 Japan, 22, 27, 36, 37, 42–5, 48, 52, 53, 55, 57, 64, 67, 68, 70, 99–101, 107, 116, 118, 122, 126, 134–8, 141–8, 151 Article 9 of the Constitution, 142 Defence Intelligence Headquarters, 22 economic power of, 139 neo-nationalism in, 22, 25 peacekeping operations in Cambodia, 134, 142, 143 possible rearmament of, 23, 27 US bases in, 150 White Paper on defence, 22 Japan Institute of International Affairs, 4, 53 Japanese Defense Agency, 22 Japanese imperialism, 98 Japanese Maritime Self-defense Force, 23 increasing operational aspirations, 23 Jervis, Robert, 159 Joewono, Soetopo, 83 Johnston, Alastair Iain, 4 Kalayaan, 99, 100 Kalimantan, 145 Kazakhstan, 123 Khmer Rouge, 164, 165, 168, 169, 170, 175 Khoman, Thanat, 88 Kilo-class submarines, 72 Kim Il-Sung, 126 Kissinger, Henry, 12 Kitty Hawk aircraft carrier, 72 Konfrontasi (Confrontation), 7, 39, 50, 117 Kongo-class destroyers, 23

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Index

Korean peninsula, 31, 42, 45, 98, 116, 148 conventional military balance on, 21 unified, 24 Korean War, 57, 163, 166 Kosovo, 121 Kuala Lumpur Roundtable, see Asia-Pacific Roundtable Kuantan principle, 165, 166 Kuomintang, 161, 162, 166, 168 land-attack cruise missile, vii Laos, 16, 136, 140, 167, 172 foreign policy of, 168 Lee Kuan Yew, 173 Lemhanas, 83, 84 Li Peng, 170 liberal democracy, 135 Liberal Democratic Party, 143 Ligitan, 93 Lon Nol, 168 Lord, Winston, 67 Louisa Reef, 99 Lumut Naval Base, 64 M-9 missiles, 25 Macclesfield Bank, 98 Mahathir Mohamad, 10, 15, 67, 141 Majapahit empire, 7, 161 Malacca Sultanate, 15 Malaya, 37, 116, 117 Malayan Communist Party, 11 Malaysia, 7–10, 15, 16, 20, 44, 53, 55, 61–4, 66, 83, 91, 93, 94, 99, 101, 104, 105, 117, 136, 138–42, 145, 146, 160, 165, 166, 171 air force, 29

centrality of the army, 10 civilian control of military, 10 colonial experience, 12 comprehensive security, 10, 40 counter-insurgency operations, 10 geostrategic circumstances of, 9 inter-service rivalry, 10 internal security challenge, 10 inwardly-directed strategic culture, 9 land-based strategy, 10 Look East Policy, 139 Malay domination of the military, 8 maritime mind-set, 9, 10 naval patrols, 29 operational doctrine, 9 racial riots, 10 Malik, Adam, 88 Manila, 38 Manila Pact, 38 Mao Zedong, 169 Matsu, 166 McMahon, Robert J., 75 Mekong Basin, 139 Middle East, 64 military options and doctrines operational and tactical level, 5 military technology, vii Milner, Anthony, 4 Ming Dynasty, 149 Ming Middle Kingdom, 149 mirror-imaging capabilities, vii Mischief Reef, 24, 25, 99, 101, 103, 105, 107, 143, 177 arrest of fishermen in, 101 China’s fortifications on, 25 Chinese navy vessels around, 102

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Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security 199

Mongolia, 35, 37, 46, 53 multilateral security dialogue, 36, 37, 41, 43, 51, 56 Myanmar, 13, 16, 45, 46, 95, 136, 137, 140, 141, 167, 169, 172 civil-military relations, 12 political transition, 3

Northeast Asia, 20, 27, 31, 40, 42, 48, 51, 64, 114–7, 121, 124, 127, 128, 134 nuclear disarmament, 114 Nuclear Five, 119 Nuclear Seven, 122 nuclear weapons, 1 Nye, Joseph, 73

Nakatomi, Hisashi, 144 Nakayama, Taro, 143 national ideologies, 3 national resilience, 40, 81, 82, 83 national security, viii national sovereignty, 1000 nationalism, 38, 42, 83 Natuna Island(s), 30, 176 Ne Win, 168 Netherlands, 37, 117 as a colonial master, 141 New Zealand, 37, 38, 43, 44, 45, 53, 146 interests of, viii New Zealand academics, viii Nimitz aircraft carrier, 26 Non-Aligned Movement, 141 non-conventional warfare, 6 Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), 119 non-Western approaches to security management, 3 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 49 North Korea, 21, 37, 47, 53, 55, 114, 118, 123, 125, 126, 144 commando force, 21 famine in, 21 North Pacific Cooperative Security Dialogue, 40, 54 North Vietnam, 37

Office of Net Assessment (US Defense Department), 72 Onn, Hussein, 165 Operation Desert Storm, 121 Overseas Development Aid (ODA), 137, 139, 143, 150 Pacific Armies Management Seminar, 37 Pacific Armies Senior Logistics Seminar, 37 Pacific Basin Economic Council (PBEC), 36, 56 Pacific Economic Cooperation Council (PECC), 36, 56 Pacific Ocean, 2, 64 Pacific Trade and Development Council (PACTAD), 36, 56 Pacific War, 143 Pakistan, 14 nuclear programme of, 124 Pan-Asianism, 135 Papua-New Guinea, 44 Paracel Islands, 98, 101, 164 Paris Peace Conference, 169 Parrot’s Beak, 165 Partai Komunis Indonesia (PKI), 86, 137 Partai Rakyat Demokrasi (PRD), 86 Pathet Lao, 167

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Index

Pax Americana, 64, 148 Pedra Branca (Pulau Batu Putih), 93 People’s Daily, 175 People’s Liberation Army, vii, 25, 119, 120, 177 combined arms warfare, 25 deficiencies of, 24 H-6 bomber, vii Philippine Expeditionary Force, 166 Philippines, 8, 20, 25, 44, 53, 61, 62, 64, 70, 99, 101, 104–7, 136, 138–140, 143, 144, 146, 166, 171, 177 defence linkages with US, 13, 37 positions in the South China Sea, vii strategic dependency of, 13 US bases in, 166 US military withdrawal from, 42, 63 piracy at sea, 91 political cultures, 6 post-Cold War era, 2, 30, 36, 37, 52, 61, 62, 65, 67–9, 135, 137, 171 post-World War II, 6, 11 power vacuum, 63 Pratas Island, 98 preventive and security regimes, 106 Pulau Batu Putih, see Pedra Branca Qian Qichen, 124, 170, 174 Qing Dynasty, 99, 161, 168 Quemoy, 166

Ramos, Fidel, 94 Rand Corporation, 1 Realist approach, 30, 35, 37, 38, 108, 114, 116, 119 realpolitik, 65, 67 Russia, 26, 44, 53, 63, 72, 98, 100, 114, 115, 125, 134, 144, 148 Pacific territories of, 35 Russian nuclear first strike, 123 Sabah, 9 Sarawak, 9 Scud-type missiles, 25 Second Indochina War, 163 security conceptual approach to, iv external threats to, viii internal threats to, viii, 5 non-military factors, 40 theoretical approach to, iv security culture, 5, 15 security studies, viii Senkaku Islands, see Diaoyutai Shafie, Ghazali, 88 Sihanouk, Prince, 168 Singapore, 6, 7, 10, 20, 28, 44, 53, 61, 64, 66, 88, 91, 93, 136, 138, 139, 140–2, 145, 146, 165, 170, 173 armed forces’ culture, 8 Changi Airport, 7 Chinese population of, 8, 140 colonial experience of, 12 defence links, 9 economic interdependence of, 16 geostrategic circumstances, 9

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Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security 201

Learn From Japan Campaign, 139 maritime interests of, 64 Muslim neighbourhood, 7 national service, 8 realpolitik assumptions of, 142 as a red dot, 8 security culture, 8 sense of vulnerability, 7 small-state syndrome, 7 strategic doctrine of, 8 Total Defence strategy, 9 Sino-American cooperation, 116 Sino-Burmese relations, 169 Sino-Indian rivalry, 123 Sino-Japanese War, 37 Sino-Vietnamese relations, 102 Sipadan, 93 Snyder, Jack, 1 Social Democratic Party (Japan), 142, 143 Soeharto, 7, 14, 15, 82, 83, 87, 165, 170 Soros, George, 15 South Asia, 50 South China Sea, vii, 11, 25, 28, 29, 46, 51, 52, 54, 57, 72, 75, 98, 100, 106, 111, 121, 143, 144, 148, 166, 171, 173 workshops on managing potential conflicts, 103 South China Sea, 9, 24, 28, 29, 42, 64, 72, 73, 99, 107, 111, 176 South Korea, 20, 27, 40, 43, 44, 52, 53, 55, 70, 100, 114, 123, 139, 144 South Pacific, 35, 144 South Sumatra, 64

South Vietnam, 164, 168 Southeast Asia, 2, 4, 5, 13, 14, 31, 35, 38, 42, 43, 48, 50, 53, 57, 63–6, 68, 72, 75, 90, 94, 100, 105, 107, 108, 114–8, 128, 134, 135, 137, 138, 139, 141–9, 151, 158, 160, 163, 165, 167, 171, 178 armaments build-up in, 31 authoritarian regimes in, 137 Chinese minority in, 140 civil society in, 138 continental, 11 conventional military power in, 115 industrializing economies of, 2 internal stability of, 3 Japanese Occupation of, 138, 140, 145 maritime, 6 nation-building in, 117 post-war states, 117 security problematique of, 3 socialist regimes of, 167 Southeast Asia Nuclear WeaponsFree Zone (SEANWFZ), 118, 121, 128, 144 Southeast Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO), 38 Southeast Asian Collective Defence Treaty, 38 Soviet-American strategic thinking, 4 Soviet nuclear first strike, 122 Soviet Pacific Fleet, 23, 62 Soviet strategic thinking, 1 Soviet Union, 1, 37, 41, 43, 45, 63, 71, 118, 137, 146–8, 163–5, 167, 169, 170

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Index

Sovremenny class destroyer, 26 Spratly Declaration, 72 Spratly Islands, 24, 29, 72, 73, 74, 98, 100, 102, 104–8, 144, 176, 177 Chinese maps of, 100 Chinese naval vessels in, 104 economic value of, 103 military deterrence in, 105 oil potential of, 100 preventive diplomacy measures needed for, 107 unoccupied features of, 104 Srivijaya empire, 7 state identities, 3 statecraft, 13 Strait of Malacca, 91 Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), 120 strategic concepts, vii strategic convergence, 1 strategic culture, 1–6, 14 cognitive influences, 2 ideational influences, 2 philosophical influences, 2 strategic doctrine, 6, 14 strategic perspectives, 6 strike warfare, 29 structural-realist paradigm, 2, 5, 14 Su-27 fighters, 72 Subic Bay Naval Base, 62, 64 Sudarsono, Juwono, 14 Sukarno, 7 Sumatra, 145 Sun-Tzu, 122 superpowers strategic relationship, 1 Surabaya, 63 Sweden, 9

symbolism significance in Asia, 30 Taiwan, 9, 37, 42, 54, 55, 70, 98, 99, 101, 104, 105, 114, 116, 123, 126, 139, 148, 168, 171, 175, 177 Taiwan Relations Act, 37 Taiwan Strait, 31, 98 crisis of 1996, 24, 25, 26 Tanaka, Kakuei, 139 Taylor, A. J. P., 159 territorial integrity, 100 Thailand, 6, 11, 12, 13, 20, 28, 37, 44, 53, 55, 61, 64, 70, 117, 136, 137, 138, 140, 146, 158, 164, 165, 168, 172, 174 civil-military relations, 12 defence linkages with US, 13 as a front-line state, 11 internal insurgency, 11 land-ward threats to, 11 National Executive Council, 88 trans-border concerns, 11 Thai-Lao border, 117 Theory of Hegemonic Stability, 60 think-tanks, 3, 51 Third World, 71, 12 threshold nuclear states, 114 Tinsulanonda, Prem, 164 Track One, 46, 105 Track Two dialogue, 2, 36, 46, 49, 51, 53, 54, 55, 105, 176 Track Three, 51 transnational crime, 36 Treaty of Amity and Cooperation, 47, 53, 90, 103, 128 Trood, Russell, 4 Tu-26 Backfire bomber, 25, 26

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Southeast Asian Perspectives on Security 203

United Nations (UN), 38, 49, 124, 136, 151, 166 covenant on civil and political rights, 176 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, 6, 9, 42, 99, 111, 177 archipelagic waters, 6 rights of maritime passage, 6 United Nations Conventional Arms Register, 46 United Nations Security Council, 134, 143 United States, 1, 4, 9, 16, 24, 26, 31, 35–8, 40, 43, 44, 48, 53, 57, 58, 61, 64–8, 70, 71, 73–5, 94, 99, 100, 101, 103, 104, 107, 114–6, 118, 119, 122, 125, 127, 128, 136, 139, 141, 142, 144–9, 163, 168, 178 Atlantic-centred nature of, 27 bilateral regional alliances, 44 containing China, 12 conventional forces, 121 Eastern Establishment, 27 forward-deployed strategy, 64 hegemonic power, 60, 70 military capabilities of, vii military presence in Southeast Asia, 63 naval superiority in the Pacific, 41 nuclear strategy, 119 policy of strategic ambiguity, 27 security pillar, 28 strategic culture, 13 withdrawal from Philippine bases, 57 US Congress, 72, 73

US Defense Department, 71, 72 US-Japan Alliance, 134, 135, 141, 147–9, 151 US-Japan Security Treaty, 22 US Navy, 23, 27, 72 Swing Strategy of, 64 US Pacific Command, 73 US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty, 64 US Seventh Fleet’s Logistic Command, 64 US State Department Vietnam, 11, 44, 57, 98, 99, 101, 102, 103, 105, 117, 136, 137, 140, 143, 145–7, 149, 160, 161, 165–7, 171, 172 China as a traditional threat to, 11, 12 colonial experience, 12 geostrategic circumstance of, 11 history of, 12 Marxist state, 137 membership in ASEAN, 12 sense of identity, 12 strategic culture, 12 Vietnam War, 57, 163, 167 Vladivostok, 40 Wang Gungwu, 16 Western colonialism, 37, 162, 163 Western imperialism, 163 Western interests, vii Western liberal democracies, 138 Western Pacific, 98, 100, 160 Western point of view, vii Western powers, 107, 176 Western strategic thinking, 13 World Conference on Human Rights, 174

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Index

World War I, 41 World War II, 23, 37, 42, 44, 117, 135, 138, 162 Japanese atrocities, 140 Xinjiang, 123 Yasukuni Shrine, 23 Yellow Sea, 72 Yuan Dynasty, 168 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (ZOPFAN), 9, 16, 43, 63, 90, 94, 106, 118, 140, 178

© 2000 Institute of Southeast Asian Studies, Singapore