Beyond states: The Global Compact for Migration and the role of non-state actors and cites 3658406895, 9783658406899

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Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik

Raphaela Schweiger

Beyond states The Global Compact for Migration and the role of non-state actors and cites

Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik Reihe herausgegeben von Danielle Gluns, Universität Hildesheim, Hildesheim, Deutschland Sascha Krannich, Justus-Liebig-Universität Gießen, Gießen, Deutschland Roswitha Pioch, Fachhochschule Kiel, Kiel, Deutschland Stefan Rother, Universität Freiburg, Freiburg, Deutschland

Migration ist eines der zentralen Globalisierungsphänomene des 21. Jahrhunderts. Entsprechend groß ist das Interesse an Fragen der politischen Regulierung und Gestaltung der weltweiten Migration, den Rechten von Migrantinnen und Migranten und der Integration von der lokalen bis zur globalen Ebene. Die Buchreihe ist interdisziplinär ausgerichtet und umfasst Monographien und Sammelwerke, die sich theoretisch und empirisch mit den Inhalten, Strukturen und Prozessen lokaler, regionaler, nationaler und internationaler Migrationsund Integrationspolitik befassen. Sie richtet sich an Wissenschaftlerinnen und Wissenschaftler, Studierende der Geistes-, Sozial-, Wirtschafts- und Rechtswissenschaften sowie an Praktikerinnen und Praktiker aus Medien, Politik und Bildung. Die Herausgeberinnen und Herausgeber werden in ihrer Arbeit durch einen wissenschaftlichen Beirat unterstützt, den die ehemaligen Sprecherinnen und Sprecher des Arbeitskreises bilden: Prof. Dr. Sigrid Baringhorst, Universität Siegen; Prof. Dr. Thomas Faist, Universität Bielefeld; Prof. Dr. Uwe Hunger, Hochschule Fulda; Prof. Dr. Karen Schönwälder, Max-Planck-Institut zur Erforschung multireligiöser und multi-ethnischer Gesellschaften, Göttingen; Apl. Prof. Dr. Axel Schulte i.R., Leibniz Universität Hannover; Prof. em. Dr. Dietrich Thränhardt, Universität Münster.

Raphaela Schweiger

Beyond states The Global Compact for Migration and the role of non-state actors and cites

Raphaela Schweiger Erlangen-Nürnberg, Germany This book is a revised version of a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy and Department of Theology of the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg in 2022, titled “The Role of Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in the Global Compact for Migration: An analysis of inclusion and influence.”

ISSN 2567-3076 ISSN 2567-3157 (electronic) Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik ISBN 978-3-658-40689-9 ISBN 978-3-658-40690-5 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer VS imprint is published by the registered company Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature. The registered company address is: Abraham-Lincoln-Str. 46, 65189 Wiesbaden, Germany

Entrance to the conference to adopt the Global Compact for Migration in Marrakech, December 2018 Source: Raphaela Schweiger, private

Foreword

This book is a product of a research that started shortly after the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. It is a revised version of a dissertation submitted to the Faculty of Philosophy and Department of Theology of the Friedrich-Alexander-University Erlangen-Nuremberg in 2022, titled “The Role of Non-State Actors and Local Authorities in the Global Compact for Migration: An analysis of inclusion and influence.” Especially the first phase, the conceptualization of this research in 2019, profited enormously from the numerous conversations with actors in the space who were closely involved in the GCM process and migration governance overall. The feedback, input and ideas made it possible to start this project in the first place, for which I am incredibly grateful. I thank all my (over 100) interview partners and survey participants for their trust, openness, and time—from local authorities, civil society, trade unions, the private sector, academia and think tanks, the UN system, international organizations, and governments. Especially in the light of the beginning of a global pandemic, with all consequences for each of our lives, I am incredibly grateful for their input and time. I am very grateful to my supervisors Professor Petra Bendel, and Professor Katrin Kinzelbach for being such encouraging mentors and supporters. In addition, I want to thank academic colleagues for their ongoing important feedback in this process, especially Dr. Janina Stürner-Siovitz, Johanna C. Günther, Tim Breitkreuz, Laura Bonn, Mojib Rahman Atal, and Yasemin Bekyol. I am grateful to my employer, the Robert Bosch Stiftung, for giving me the trust and flexibility to pursue this project besides my fulltime job.

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Further, such a project is not feasible without support from family and friends. I am incredibly thankful to my parents, Christine Schweiger, and Dr. Hans-Peter Dürsch, as well as to my partner Karim Brahimi for their ongoing support and encouragement. I also want to thank my friend Rachel Silverman, PhD, for her support in the final, editing stage of the book. December 2022

Raphaela Schweiger

Abstract

This book investigates the role and influence of non-state actors (NSAs) and local authorities in the process leading up to the adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM) in 2018. The GCM was ultimately a state-led negotiation process at the UN. This research draws upon methods from global climate negotiations, and offers methods that, for the first time, can be used to analyze the influence of NSAs and local authorities in international negotiations and processes on migration. This research builds on an extensive assessment of the state of the art on global migration governance and adds new perspectives and insights to it. The analysis of the role and influence of non-state actors and local authorities in the process leading to the adoption of the GCM is backed by data from an online survey of participating stakeholders, interviews with key actors, as well as hundreds of other primary sources obtained from the process itself. This research finds that the UN system’s willingness to onboard NSAs and local authorities was key to creating the GCM as it stands today. However, while the research finds little direct influence from NSAs during the negotiations, the first draft of the GCM was very much informed by the expertise and input of NSAs. Thus, NSAs significantly influenced some of the objectives and framing of the GCM. On the other hand, local authorities, while not significantly involved in the consultations, were able to make their case for further inclusion and recognition in migration governance going forward. The research shows that the influence of and opportunities for NSAs and local authorities to engage, stem from numerous opportunity structures arising before the GCM process started. Said opportunity structures began with the high numbers of refugees and migrants in 2015, which brought the topic of migration to the forefront of the

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agenda of states. This subsequently led to the topic of migration finally coming to the UN. UN ‘elites’ and like-minded allies spearheaded the inclusiveness of the process. Previous processes helped to pave way for the GCM process, such as the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), the negotiations of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), or the 2016 New York Declaration.

Contents

1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 In Brief: What is the GCM? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Why Research the Role and Influence of NSAs and Local Authorities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 Goals of this Book and Research Question . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4 Key Findings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.5 Overview of Chapters . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Key Concepts, Theory, and the Emergence of Global Migration Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Actors Other than States in the International (Governance) System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.1 Understanding Global Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.2 International Relations Theories and Actors Other than States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1.3 Non-state Actors’ Emergence in the International System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The Emergence of a Global Governance on Migration . . . . . . . . . 2.2.1 The Early Stages of Migration Governance: Building Norms and Institutions (1919–1989) . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.2 The Emergence of Conversations, New Approaches and Stock-taking on the Global Level (1990–2006) . . . . . 2.2.3 The Era of Migration and Development (2006–2015) . . .

1 3 4 5 7 8 13 14 15 16 20 21 24 27 34

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2.2.4 Setting up a New Architecture for Global Migration Governance: The New York Declaration, the GCM and GCR (2015–2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2.5 Post GCM and GCR: Insecure Times of Implementation, Review, and Follow-up . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Understanding the actors under investigation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.1 Non-state actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.2 Individual Non-state Actor Groups and their Role in Migration Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3 Similar but Different: Local Authorities as Actors in Migration Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Framework of Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Measuring Influence—A Broader Concept and Approach for Social Sciences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.1 Defining “influence” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.2 Influence in Relation to Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.3 How NSAs Exert Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1.4 How Actors Collaborate: Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Networks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Triangulation as an Approach to Assess Influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.1 Time Period and Actors Under Investigation . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.2 Data Types . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.3 Data Sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2.4 Analyzing NSA and City Influence in the GCM Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Methodological Challenges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 The Role and Influence of Non-State Actors in the GCM Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 The Access, Activities, and Opportunities for Non-State Actors to Transmit Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.1 The GCM Process and its Framework for Stakeholder Participation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.2 Previous Processes Preparing Stakeholder Engagement . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1.3 The Activities of Non-State Actors to Transmit Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

50 66 72 76 82 91 97 98 99 100 103 106 108 111 112 113 123 124 127 130 131 143 147

Contents

4.2 Leverages and Resources of Non-State Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 The Role of the Co-Facilitators . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 Non-state Actors Taking on the Role of Experts, Rather than Advocates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 Advocacy Coalitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.4 Multi-stakeholder Alliances . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.5 Challenges and Limitations to Participation and Access of NSAs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3 Goal Attainment of Non-State Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 Who Wanted and was Capable to Influence The Outcome of The Document? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 The Zero Draft Reflecting Issues Proposed by Non-State Actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.3 Examples of Thematic Goals of Nsas and Their Take-Up in the Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.4 Spotlight on other Topics, and Cross-Cutting Issues During the GCM Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.5 Does the Final Agreement Reflect Non-State Actors’ Goals and Principles? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Local Authorities in the GCM Process: A Similar but Different Case . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 The Access, Activities, and Opportunities for Local Authorities to Transmit Information . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.1 The Consultation Phase and the Absence of Local Authority Voices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.2 The Stocktaking: Local Authorities Visibly Stepping into the Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1.3 Local Authorities During the Negotiation Phase . . . . . . . . 5.1.4 The 5th Mayoral Forum and Local Authorities at the GCM Adoption Conference in Marrakech . . . . . . . . 5.2 The Leverages and Resources of Local Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.1 Advocates for Cities in the Process, UN System and Other Institutions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.2 The Role of Formal and Informal City Networks . . . . . . . 5.2.3 Cities Presenting Themselves as a Pragmatic Actor with new Perspectives and Ideas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2.4 Limitations to the Engagement of Local Authorities . . . .

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154 155 157 160 161 165 168 170 171 172 180 185 191 193 194 196 199 201 203 203 205 207 208

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5.3 Goal Attainment of Local Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.1 Clarifying and Specifying the References to Local Authorities in the GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.2 Recognizing the Perspective, Expertise, and Ideas of Local Governments in Specific GCM Objectives . . . . . 5.3.3 A role for Local Governments in in GCM Implementation, Review, and Follow-up . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3.4 Does the Final Agreement Reflect the Goals and Principals of NSAs and Cities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Summing Up: Non-State Actors’ and Local Authorities’ Influence in the Process Leading to the Adoption of the GCM . . . . . 7 Classification, Main Recommendations, and Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Opportunity Structures: An Approach to Explain how Migration has Been Brought to the un and Enabled Engagement of NSAs and Local Authorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 The First IMRF 2022—a way Forward for the GCM and its Inclusion of Stakeholders? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3 The way Forward: Recommendations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.1 Establish a More Systematic and Institutionalized role for NSAs and Local Authorities in the UN System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.2 Foster Multi-stakeholder Alliances for Global Migration Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.3 Strengthen Systemic Cooperation Between Actor Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.4 Connect Global Processes to the National and Local Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.5 Provide Resources to Bolster Diversity of Actors and Voices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.6 Find a Balance Between In-person and Virtual Meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.3.7 Test New Formats and Create Inputs that Spark Interest and ‘Stick’ . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4 Research Outlook . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.1 Clarification of Role and Understanding of Actors . . . . . . 7.4.2 NSAs and Cities in Migration Governance in Comparison with other Policy Fields . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Contents

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7.4.3 COVID-19 and Migration—how Relevant is the GCM? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.4 The Role of Non-state Actors in the Implementation, Review, and Follow-up of the GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.4.5 The war in Ukraine and its Consequences for Global Migration Governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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Abbreviations

AU BINGOs CGD CMW CoE COP COVID-19 CRC CRRF CSD CSO DCI EAR ECA ECE ECLAC ECOSOC ECRE ESCAP ESCWA EU EXCOM FAO GANHRI GATT

African Union Business International NGOs Center for Global Development Committee on Migrant Workers Council of Europe Conference of the Parties Corona Virus Disease Convention on the Rights of the Child Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework Civil Society Days Civil Society Organization Defense for Children International ego-perception (E), alter-perception (A) and researcher’s analysis (R) Economic Commission for Africa Economic Commission for Europe Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean Economic and Social Council European Council on Refugees and Exiles Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia European Union UNHCR Executive Committee Food and Agriculture Organization Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade

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GCIM GCM GCR GFMD GMG GONGO GRF HCHR HLD IAMM ICESCR ICM ICMC ICMPD ICPD ICRMW ICVA IDC IDM IDPs IGC IGO ILO IMRF INGO IO IOE IOM IPU IR IRC ISS ITUC MDGs MENA MFA MGI

Abbreviations

Global Commission on International Migration Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration Global Compact on Refugees Global Forum on Migration and Development Global Migration Group Governmentally Organized NGO Global Refugee Forum High Commissioner for Human Rights High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development International Agenda for Migration Management International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights Intergovernmental Committee for Migration International Catholic Migration Commission International Centre for Migration Policy Development International Conference on Population and Development International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families International Council of Voluntary Agencies International Detention Coalition International Dialogue on Migration Internally Displaced Persons Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum and Immigration Intergovernmental Organization International Labour Organization International Migration Review Forum International Non-Governmental Organization International Organization International Organization of Employers International Organization for Migration Inter-Parliamentary Union International Relations International Rescue Committee International Social Service International Trade Union Confederation Millennium Development Goals Middle East and North Africa Migrant Forum in Asia Migration Governance Indicators

Abbreviations

MICIC MLG MLOs MMC MMC MMP MNCs MNEs MPTF MSF MSF NATO NGLS NGO NHRI NIROMP NSA OECD OHCHR OSCE PANiDMR PDD PGA PICMME PICUM PSI QDA QUAGO QUANGO RCP SAR SDFRR SDGs SOLAS SRSG

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Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative Multi-Level Governance Migrant-Led Organizations Mayors Migration Council Mixed Migration Centre Mixed Migration Platform Multinational Corporations Multinational enterprises Multi-Partner Trust Fund Médecins Sans Frontières Multiple Streams Framework North Atlantic Treaty Organization Non-Governmental Liaison Service Non-Governmental Organization National Human Rights Institution New International Regime for Orderly Movement of People Non-State Actor Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe Pan African Network in Defense of Migrants Rights Platform for Disaster Displacement President of the UN General Assembly Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants Public Services International Qualitative Data Analysis Quasi-Governmental Organization Quasi-Non-Governmental Organization Regional Consultative Processes International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction Sustainable Development Goals International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea Special Representative of the Secretary-General

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SVR SWP TGO UAE UCLG UDHR UN UNCLOS UNCTAD UN DESA UNFCCC UNGA UNHCR UNICEF UNITAR UNRWA UNSG US VENRO WCDRR WEF GFCM WTO WWII

Abbreviations

The Expert Council on Integration and Migration / Sachverständigenrat für Integration und Migration German Institute for International and Security Affairs / Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik Transgovernmental Organization United Arab Emirates United Cities and Local Governments Universal Declaration of Human Rights United Nations United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs UN Framework Convention on Climate Change United Nations General Assembly United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations Children’s Fund United Nations Institute for Training and Research United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East United Nations Secretary-General United States of America Verband Entwicklungspolitik und Humantitäre Hilfe / Association of German Development and Humanitarian Aid NGOs United Nations World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction World Economic Forum—Global Future Council on Migration World Trade Organization World War II

List of Figures

Figure 2.1 Figure 2.2 Figure 2.3 Figure Figure Figure Figure

4.1 4.2 4.3 4.4

Figure 4.5 Figure Figure Figure Figure Figure

4.6 4.7 4.8 4.9 7.1

Figure 7.2

Phases of global migration governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . IOM’s path to the UN system . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Actors and dialogue formats in global migration governance today . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ‘Stages’ of influence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The three phases of the GCM processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Types of formats NSAs participated in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Number of consultations and events actors participated in . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Activities of NSAs to achieve their goals during the GCM process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The advocacy focuses of non-state actors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . NSAs use the GCM as a reference in their work . . . . . . . . . Ego-perception—success in achieving goals . . . . . . . . . . . . . Degree of involvement and goal achievement . . . . . . . . . . . . Stakeholders’ assessment of formats to participate in the GCM process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Stakeholders’ assessment of the strengths of actor groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

23 58 70 129 134 148 148 150 182 186 188 189 245 259

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List of Tables

Table 2.1 Table 2.2 Table 2.3 Table 2.4 Table 3.1 Table Table Table Table

3.2 3.3 3.4 3.5

Table 3.6 Table 4.1 Table 4.2

Table 4.3 Table 5.1 Table 7.1

GFMD overview of meetings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . The 23 GCM objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Ratification of international conventions and agreements on migration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Timeline of key milestones for global migration governance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Framework for analyzing NSA and city influence in the GCM process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Timeline and responses to the online survey . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Regional distribution of survey respondents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Type of actors participating in the online survey . . . . . . . . . . . Regional distribution of NSAs registered for the GCM adoption conference vs. survey participants . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Interview overview . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Overview of drafts of the GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Timeline of the GCM process: thematic sessions, multi-stakeholder hearings, and intergovernmental negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Timeline of activities: Initiative for Child Rights . . . . . . . . . . Timeline of the engagement of local authorities in GCM process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Typology of nongovernmental participation in intergovernmental organizations according to Ruhlmann (2019), applied to the GCM . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

39 62 65 72 110 116 117 117 118 121 139

142 165 202

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Introduction

The adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular migration (Global Compact for Migration, GCM) in 2018 was a core milestone for global migration governance. It is the first intergovernmentally negotiated document addressing human mobility in a holistic manner. The GCM, along with the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR), is the result of migration and refugee crises around the world, which put these issues high on the agenda of European governments beginning in 2015. The migration and refugee crises have led to a shift; while traditionally, the UN and most of its member states have been reluctant to discuss migration at the global level, the high numbers of refugees and migrants arriving in Europe in 2015 created an opening and opportunity to bring “one of the last outstanding global issues into the United Nations” (Newland, 2018). Even though the negotiations were state-led, actors other than states played a significant role – yet how influential these non-state actors (NSAs) and local authorities were remains unclear. This research analyzes the role and influence of NSAs and local authorities in the process leading to the adoption of the GCM.1 In his report to the General Assembly of the United Nations, ahead of the first International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) of the GCM, which took place in May 2022, the UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres stated:

1

Since its adoption, numerous articles on the GCM, often in conjunction with the GCR, have been published (see for example de Vries & Weatherhead, 2021; Garlick & Inder, 2021; Gottardo & Cyment, 2019; Jagon et al., n.d.; Kainz & Betts, 2020; McAdam & Wood, 2021; Oelgemöller, 2021; Pijnenburg & Rijken, 2021). Other authors looked at the roles of actor groups in the process, e.g., (migrant) civil society (Gottardo & Rego, 2021a; Rother, 2020; Rother & Steinhilper, 2019), or the role of cities (Stürner, 2020; Thouez, 2020).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 R. Schweiger, Beyond states, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5_1

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Introduction

The need for a cooperative framework on migration has never been more apparent, and the foresight of Member States and stakeholders in developing the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration has never been more evident (United Nations General Assembly, 2021).

This statement is important for two reasons. First, it reiterates the call for a multilateral cooperation on migration. Second, it highlights and emphasizes the role of ‘stakeholders’ – civil society, the private sector, academia, and many other types of actors – in the development process of the GCM. Neither of these aspects were self-evident within the UN system: First, because migration is framed as and considered an issue of national sovereignty, the UN has not handled migration the way it does with other issues. However, similar to other issues, multilateral cooperation and conversations on migration are still emerging (Rother & Steinhilper, 2019, p. 2; INT-GOV #14): For decades, the international system has had standards and institutions to facilitate cooperation and the maintenance of order on issues of finance and trade. More recently, it has developed a framework for dealing with climate change. But international migration remained a patchwork of unilateral, bilateral, and regional policies, long considered too divisive for general debate within the United Nations. With the Global Compact for Migration, a framework of common expectations and obligations has at long last emerged (Newland, 2018).

Thus, migration – before the adoption of the GCM – was one of the inherently global key policy areas that had not been brought to the UN system. After World War II (WWII), a refugee regime (with all its misgivings and challenges) emerged, and national governments made sure to keep regular migration and human mobility a matter of national sovereignty. Some exceptions are regional free movement agreements, such as in the EU and recently also in the AU (see e.g., Rother & Steinhilper, 2019, p. 2). Since the early 2000s, fora and processes about global migration issues – all of them non-binding – have evolved, yet the topic remained outside the UN system. One example is the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), created in 2006, which was deliberately not part of the UN system. Second, actors other than states – ‘stakeholders’ – are not new to global migration issues. Fora, like the GFMD, set up mechanisms for civil society and the private sector. However, the number of actors engaging globally on migration has been minimal and most opportunities to engage were outside the UN. Through existing networks and structures, stakeholders, especially from civil society and

1.1 In Brief: What is the GCM?

3

the private sector, stood ready to engage in the development of the GCM (INTGOV #14). Likewise, local authorities joined the discussion – though much later in the process. In this significant moment, when global migration issues came to the UN for a state-led negotiation, a broad set of stakeholders became involved. Today, the participation of stakeholders is part of the UN Migration Network, which has been mandated with GCM implementation, review, and follow-up. The process and the adoption of the GCM has changed international cooperation on four levels: first, it created a “common language” and a “reference point” for global migration issues; second, it created a “common infrastructure” with mechanisms in place for review, implementation, and follow up; third, it created “a more level playing field” with 23 objectives as a basis for cooperation between states and regions (Papademetriou et al., 2022); and fourth, as I argue here, actors other than states, including local authorities, put themselves on the radar as contributors to global conversations on migration at the UN. In this reseach, I look into the role and influence of NSAs and local authorities in the development process of the GCM. This work does not pose a ‘naïve’ look at the role and influence of actors other than states, including local authorities, in the international system. Rather, it looks at one very prominent process, the development of the Global Compact for Migration in 2017 and 2018, with a 360-degree perspective on all the stages and levels of influence actors can have.

1.1

In Brief: What is the GCM?

The development of the GCM followed the adoption of the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants in 2016. In this declaration UN member states agreed to develop two Global Compacts: one on refugees (GCR) and one on migration (GCM). The GCR was developed by the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) parallel to the GCM. The GCM is considered the more political negotiation as the topic was new to the UN system. The GCM was developed in three phases, which took place between 2017 and 2018: (1) consultations, (2) stocktaking, and (3) intergovernmental negotiations. Negotiations ended with an agreed outcome document in July 2018, and the GCM was adopted a few months later at an intergovernmental conference in Marrakech in December 2018. The GCM consists of 23 objectives, guided by ten principles. The GCM is not legally

4

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Introduction

binding, but states have “made political and moral commitments to pursue its aims” (Newland, 2018).2

1.2

Why Research the Role and Influence of NSAs and Local Authorities?

Since the early 2000s, in other global policy fields like climate change, where NSAs and local authorities increasingly engage as stakeholders, there is a track record of analysis and research about their role and influence. Because the New York Declaration and the subsequent GCM process brought migration to the UN for the first time, it is not surprising that research about the influence of these actors on the global level has been limited. With regards to the GCM, since its adoption in 2018 and within this emerging governance space, it is important to understand the dynamics between the UN, its agencies and member states, and NSAs and local authorities – especially because the negotiations of the GCM were state-led. Ultimately, it was up to the member states to negotiate the document. However, during the consultation and stocktaking phase, stakeholders were able to give input through official and unofficial formats.3 Depending on with whom I spoke during my research, the answers to the question varied – from a process that in its setup was too open to NSAs, to others stating it was not inclusive enough. Additionally, if the goal of the GCM process was to create commitments from governments about migration, the processes needed to be member state-driven (INT-GOV #19; INT-GOV #20; INT-GOV #17). Thus, researching the role and influence of actors other than states in the GCM process is a tracing of ideas, inputs, and leverages by stakeholders to a system that is ultimately led and dominated by states.

2

On the GCM, see section 2.2.4. Many researchers analyzed the character and content of the GCM, as well as its overall role for migration governance (Camacho & Salcedo, 2019; de Vries & Weatherhead, 2021; Frouws, 2021; Garlick & Inder, 2021; Giampaolo & Ianni, 2020; Gottardo & Cyment, 2019; Gottardo & Rego, 2021a; Guild & Basaran, 2020; Jagon et al., n.d.; Jaquemet, 2019; Kainz & Betts, 2020; Lavenex, 2020; J. McAdam & Wood, 2021; Newland, 2018, 2019; Oelgemöller, 2021; Pijnenburg & Rijken, 2021; Rother & Steinhilper, 2019). Authors also looked at the roles of actor groups in the process, e.g., (migrant) civil society (Gottardo & Rego, 2021a; Rother, 2020; Rother & Steinhilper, 2019), or the role of cities (Stürner, 2020; Thouez, 2020). 3 During the actual negotiations, stakeholders could listen from the balcony and intervene through other means. The GCM process was different “from processes that start outside of the UN that are already more inclusive” (INT-GOV #17).

1.3 Goals of this Book and Research Question

1.3

5

Goals of this Book and Research Question

This book offers a novel approach to the study of NSAs and cities in global migration governance. It analyzes more than one type of actor: it offers a 360degrees analysis of the role and influence of NSAs and local authorities in the consultation and negotiation process of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration. All combined, the increased global awareness of migration, the two recently negotiated compacts for refugees and migration, and the proclaimed participatory approach towards NSAs and cities create an important research topic. Assessing the impact of participatory political processes and determining which criteria are relevant for such processes needs to be studied. Further, there has been little research about global governance and the influence of NSAs or local authorities, especially at the global level – and even less in the field of migration. The GCM marks a new phase for international cooperation on migration; it provides new norms and formats for the collaboration of state and non-state actors as well as for cities. However, at this point, we know little about the role and influence of actors other than states, including local authorities, or how the negotiation process has potentially contributed to increased inter-sectoral and inter-regional collaboration. This research is valuable for three reasons: First, the research offers a method to analyze the transfer of influence from NSAs, (and local authorities) who specialize in one policy field (climate change), to the field of migration. I suggest using an analytical framework based on triangulation to get a 360-degree perspective on the influence of NSAs and cities in the field of global migration governance. This method allows to make conclusions about the influence of these actors across individual cases and examples, which is the overarching goal of my research (see also Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 65–66). I propose an analytical framework to assess the influence of NSAs and local authorities in the sphere of global migration governance, and thus, I also offer an implicit comparative perspective. Second, the research offers a broad yet critical perspective on actors other than states in the global migration governance system. This perspective includes the role of local authorities and thereby goes beyond looking at just one actor group, such as civil society. Further, I develop the knowledge and (theoretical) understanding of the role of NSAs and local authorities in global migration governance. The broad analysis of NSAs and city engagement in the GCM negotiation process serves as a starting point for potential further research. Third, the research offers a unique and critical assessment of the role and influence of actors other than states in the global migration system during the

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Introduction

process of negotiating the Global Compact for Migration. I thereby fill a gap in the research about the GCM process, which has been widely analyzed from other angles.4 My interest is in focusing on actors other than states and local authorities and their influence on the GCM negotiation process. In this book, I pose the following research question: How influential were non-state actors and local authorities in the development of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration? The following sub-questions help to answer the primary research question: (1) What opportunities did NSAs and cities have to transmit information? (access) (2) What did NSAs and cities do to transmit information to decision makers? (activities) (3) What kinds of leverage did NSAs and cities use to transmit information? (resources) (4) Did state negotiators discuss issues proposed by NSAs or cities (or cease to discuss issues opposed by them)? (5) Did NSAs and cities coin specific terms that became part of the negotiating jargon? (6) Does the final agreement reflect the goals and principals of NSAs and cities? (7) Does the final agreement contain text drafted by NSAs and cities? In this research, I not only analyze who influenced which part of the document and who brought in which kind of language, I also provide a deeper understanding of how individuals and organizations became part of the process and how they collaborated with each other, the UN, and its agencies and governments. To do so, I worked to get as broad a picture as possible of how the field has been working and evolving in recent years by speaking to the most influential actors in the international migration field including those who were directly involved in the negotiations.

4

While many interviewees and actors in the field highlighted the relevance of my research question and approach, based on my assessment of existing research, no other researcher has mentioned this research gap.

1.4 Key Findings

1.4

7

Key Findings

Backed by primary data from an online survey amongst participating stakeholders (n=68), 35 interviews with key actors (NSAs, local authorities, representatives and diplomats from national governments, UN representatives, and other observers of the process), and 432 primary sources from the process, I conclude that the answer to the question of how influential NSAs and local authorities were in the process leading to the adoption of the GCM must be answered in nuanced way.5 The process leading to the adoption of the GCM has shown that actors other than states, including local authorities, have become a core element in global migration governance. While the structure of their inclusion is still less institutionalized than in other fields, such as the climate arena, the process showed that NSAs had the opportunity to work alongside governments and International Organizations (IOs) - albeit with different levels of intensity. I find that the openness of the UN system to onboard NSAs and local authorities was key to obtaining the GCM as it stands today. However, while I could find little direct influence during the negotiations, I find that the first draft (zero draft) of the GCM was very much informed by NSAs, thus having significantly influenced some objectives and framing of the GCM. Through consultations (phase I) and the close relationship of stakeholders to the co-facilitation team, NSAs could inform this draft by presenting ideas, concepts, and framing to the process. From the diverse group of NSAs, my research shows there are several examples of proposed issues that became part of the negotiating jargon. One example is the concept of the Global Skills Partnerships, which was discussed, taken up, and agreed upon within the final document. Another example is the work done by the ‘initiative for child rights in the global compacts.’ They managed to make the issue of child sensitivity a cross-cutting issue in the GCM and were largely successful in contributing to the strong language used to discuss ending immigrant child detention. However, there are also examples of concepts important to stakeholders and other actors, such as UN human rights entities, that were left out of the final draft and instead replaced by a paraphrased, lighter language, as in the case of non-refoulement or firewalls. On the other hand, local authorities, while not significantly involved in the consultations, were able to make their case for further inclusion and recognition in migration governance going forward. Local authorities became visible only 5

A more substantive summary can be found in chapter 6, followed by a classification of the findings in chapter 7.

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Introduction

during the stocktaking meeting (phase II) and the negotiations (phase III). They were an important voice for many issues on the table. Most importantly however, they managed to advocate for a seat at the table, which they achieved and maintained throughout the post 2018 migration governance and governance going forward. One result was the institutionalization of the Mayors Migration Council, the Mayors Mechanism, and their strong recognition in the UN system. Several examples from the GCM process show that through the intervention of cities, clarifications about the character of local authorities were made. Local authorities also contributed ideas, such as a municipal I.D. card for all city residents, which should be independent from status. They also advocated for keeping certain commitments in the draft document during the negotiations, such as the objective on access to basic services for migrants. However, there were also several limitations to NSA engagement. The primary limit was the lack of interest from most governments; as such, their entry point via the co-facilitators was very important. Additionally, many NSAs and local authorities lacked the necessary resources. Ultimately, the organizations with clear and targeted goals, experience, and a trusted network within the UN system, and who acted in ‘non-dogmatic’ ways by presenting themselves with valuable expertise were most successful in influencing the outcome of the GCM. Additionally, input and recommendations from alliances was considered more credible and relevant to governments. I argue that the influence and the opportunities for NSAs and local authorities to engage in the GCM process stem from numerous opportunity structures arising before it started; the high numbers of refugees and migrants in 2015 brought the topic of migration to the forefront of the agenda of states, which subsequently led to migration finally being brought to the UN. UN ‘elites’ and like-minded allies spearheaded the inclusiveness of the GCM process, and previous processes helped pave the way for the GCM. These processes include the GFMD, the negotiations of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs), and the 2016 New York Declaration.

1.5

Overview of Chapters

This research is clustered into three main parts: First, the key concepts, theory, and the emergence of a global governance on migration are introduced in chapter 2. Second, the methodology as well as the analysis of findings from my

1.5 Overview of Chapters

9

research (chapters 3, 4 and 5). Finally, results from the research, which are summarized and put into context. In addition, I offer recommendations and a research outlook (chapters 6 and 7). Chapter 2 addresses key concepts and theory relevant to this research, as well as the emergence of the global migration governance. It provides the necessary conceptual and theoretical overview. I first discuss how actors other than states have emerged in the international governance system and how they are conceptualized in international relations theory (section 2.1). Second, I address how the international governance of migration has evolved and how the GCM fits into that governance (section 2.2). In this section, I cluster the emergence of a global governance about migration in five phases: the early stages of building norms and institutions (1919–1989); the post-cold war era and the early 2000s, where conversations, new approaches, and stocktaking took place at the global level; the era of migration and development (2006–2015); the set-up of a new architecture for global migration governance with the New York Declaration, and the Global Compacts on Migration and on Refugees; and the current (and insecure) period for implementation, review and follow-up. Also in this chapter, I define NSAs and local authorities in the context of this research, arguing that researchers must be distinct about the types of actors they are investigating (section 2.3). Chapter 3 offers the methodological approach to answer the research question. I first introduce the broad concept of understanding and measuring ‘influence’. Then, I define influence and its relationship to the concept of ‘power.’ I also assess how actors exert influence individually and in collaboration (section 3.1). Second, I introduce my methodological approach, which is based on the concepts of Betsill and Corell (2001) as well as Arts and Verschuren (1999). I propose applying an approach developed to analyze the influence of NGOs in global climate negotiations to the analysis of the GCM process. I thus transfer a proven methodology to a new policy space, that of global migration governance, using triangulation (section 3.2). Finally, I address methodological challenges (section 3.3). Chapters 4 and 5 are the core analysis chapters. The analysis is split into the role and influence of NSAs (chapter 4) and the role and influence of local authorities (chapter 5). I argue and find that local authorities form a similar but different case than NSAs. Both chapters are based on the alter- and egoperspective of actors (data gathered through an online survey and interviews), as

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Introduction

well as primary6 and secondary data. The combination of this gathered data provides evidence for both the broader context about the various types of NSAs and local authorities involvement as well as arguing for them as similar but different in their ways of operating and exerting influence. In addition, I also shed light on their limitations in influencing the outcome of the GCM. In chapter 4, I analyze the access, activities, and opportunities for NSAs to transmit information to the GCM process as well as the framework for stakeholder participation (section 4.1). I first argue that through the consultation phase and various other activities, NSAs were able to substantively transmit ideas, framing, and content to the process, specifically to the co-facilitators of the GCM. Previous processes, such as the GFMD and the New York Declaration, surely contributed to NSAs being able to organize and give input. Second, I evaluate NSA’s leverages, resources, and challenges (section 4.2). I find that a core leverage was the co-facilitators who were open to receiving input from the NSAs who presented themselves as experts rather than as advocates. This then helped their input to be recognized by governments. Further, I find that advocacy coalitions and multi-stakeholder alliances were a key part to accumulating inputs and demands for the process. Finally, I assess the goal attainment of NSAs. Here, I show a few key examples of successful and unsuccessful influences throughout the process (section 4.3). I find that when it came to influencing the actual negotiations, there were only a few key actors and very few were willing and capable to come to the process with clear goals. I show that the key influence point for NSAs was the zero draft, whereas during negotiations, important concepts such as ‘firewalls’ were dropped from the terminology. Other concepts, such as global skills partnerships were presented during the consultations and remained in the negotiated document until the final agreed outcome. Similarly, in chapter 5 I first look at the access, activities, and opportunities for local authorities. to transmit information during the process (section 5.1). I find that local authorities form a similar but different case than NSAs as they only visibly joined the process during stocktaking (phase II). In their joining, they organized in a lean and agile way throughout the negotiations. Second, I identify the main leverage points but also limitations of local authorities in the process (section 5.2). I find that local authorities had important advocates for their inclusion in the UN system and amongst the co-facilitators. Through formal and informal city networks they were able to organize quickly. With their particular 6

Primary data include interviews, the online survey, and documents, such as statements, position papers, agendas, etc., see section 3.2.3. Associated data can be viewed in the appendix in the electronic supplementary material (Appendix III: List of primary data).

1.5 Overview of Chapters

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role, they could present themselves to the negotiators as pragmatic actors with an important local perspective. Also here, I find limitations – especially in comparison to how cities are organized regarding migration today. Third, I analyze the goal attainment of local authorities in the process (section 5.3). I find that the main achievement of local authorities was their recognition as particular actors in the implementation, review, and follow up of the GCM. Local authorities also contributed ideas, such as the municipal I.D. card that is independent from their status for all city residents. They also advocated for keeping certain commitments in the draft document during the negotiations, such as the objective on access to basic services for migrants. In chapter 6, I develop criteria for successful influence and summarize my findings along the seven key questions guiding the analysis for both NSAs and local authorities. These seven criteria are: the activities to transmit information to decision makers, the opportunities to transmit information to the process, the leverages used by NSAs and local authorities, the issues proposed that were discussed by state negotiators, the terms and concepts that did and did not become part of the negotiating jargon, how far the goals and principles of NSAs and local authorities are reflected in the agreed outcome of the GCM, and what would have happened if NSAs and local authorities had not been part of the process. Finally, in chapter 7, I draw conclusions from my research. First, I put forward the concept of opportunity structures as an approach to explaining both how migration has been brought to the UN and enabled engagement of NSAs and local authorities (section 7.1). Second, I discuss the inclusivity of the GCM process as well as the follow-up and review processes, including the first International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), which took place in May 2022 (section 7.2). Further, based on my findings I develop a total of seven recommendations that are directed at different actors in the multilateral system (section 7.3). These recommendations are: First, the UN system should establish a more systematic and institutionalized role for non-state actors and local authorities (section 7.3.1). Second, multi-stakeholder alliances on global migration issues are useful to successfully bringing issues to the UN’s attention and should be fostered (see section 7.3.2). Third, systemic cooperation between actor groups must be strengthened, e.g., between civil society and local authorities (see section 7.3.3). Fourth, global processes will be more relevant when connected to national and local levels (section 7.3.4). Fifth, NSAs and local authorities must be provided with resources to participate in such processes to bolster diversity of actors and voices (section 7.3.5). Six, going forward, actors need to find a balance between in-person and virtual meetings (section 7.3.6). And seven, actors should use new

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Introduction

formats and create new inputs that spark interest and help information ‘stick’ (section 7.3.7). In the research outlook, I address five major issues where further research and discussion might be of particular interest (section 7.4): First, researchers must further clarify and understand the roles and types of actors engaging in global migration governance; this includes a better understanding of the role and influence of individuals in the international system (section 7.4.1). Second, there is a real opportunity for researchers to compare the role and influence of NSAs and local authorities in global migration governance with other global policy fields (section 7.4.2). Third, researchers must better understand the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on GCM implementation and global migration governance (see section 7.4.3). Fourth, researchers must expand on the role of non-state actors and local authorities in the implementation, review, and follow-up of the GCM (section 7.4.4). Fifth, considering recent developments, researchers must closely monitor the consequences of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine and the unfolding migration patterns to better understand global migration and refugee governance (section 7.4.5).

2

Key Concepts, Theory, and the Emergence of Global Migration Governance

The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM), adopted in 2018, marks “the first formal framework, negotiated and adopted by an overwhelming majority of states, of principles and objectives to guide international cooperation on migration” (Newland, 2019, p. 2). The recent adoption of the GCM clearly shows how the field of international migration policy has been both, contested and lesser concern for the international community. Reasons for this are varied, one major reason being that the management and regulation of migration has for a long time been—and still is—considered to exist exclusively within the sovereignty of each nation state. Some exceptions are regional free movements agreements, such as in the EU and recently also in the AU (see e.g., Rother & Steinhilper, 2019, p. 2). As opposed to the refugee protection regime that emerged after World War II (WWII), which has clear international guidelines and institutions responsible for the protection of refugees,1 international rules on migration and mobility are significantly less comprehensive or institutional. International cooperation on migration only recently emerged, starting in the early 2000s. Consequently, the involvement of actors other than states in global migration policy is relatively new. Other global policy fields, such as climate change or 1

However, it is being argued that the current refugee definition and the international protection framework is not sufficient and matching the needs of today, or, as Aleinikoff and Zamore (2019) put it “the international refugee regime is fundamentally broken.” Nevertheless, looking back in history, for refugees under the Geneva Refugee Convention, protection standards emerged rapidly after WWII whereas other frameworks for migrants or on human mobility overall were lacking.

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5_2. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 R. Schweiger, Beyond states, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5_2

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Key Concepts,Theory, and the Emergence of Global Migration …

human rights show a much longer history of non-state actor dedication and influence (see for example Arts & Verschuren, 1999; Betsill & Corell, 2001; Davies, 2019b; Dibden & Cocklin, 2005; Dupuits, 2016; Raustiala, 1997; United Nations Environment Programme, 2018). This chapter argues that advancing the topic of migration on the agenda of the United Nations and making a case for more cooperation and dialogue between states is, amongst other, the result of a few dedicated individuals. Peter Sutherland, who served as the first United Nations Special Representative of the Secretary-General for International Migration from 2006 to 2017, and his team are some of these individuals. National governments and their ambassadors— Switzerland being a prime example2 —also worked to push the topic of migration on a global scale. In addition to individual politicians and states, tragic and publicly discussed events such as the death of Alan Kurdi—a child who died in the waters between Turkey and the EU—contributed to creating spaces for debating migration on the global level (Walsh, 2019). This chapter provides a conceptual and theoretical overview. It first addresses how actors other than states have emerged in the international governance system and how they are conceptualized in international relations theory (section 2.1). Secondly, it analyzes how international governance of migration has evolved and where it stands today (section 2.2). Finally, NSAs and local authorities are defined in the context of this research (section 2.3).3

2.1

Actors Other than States in the International (Governance) System

[N]on-state actors have increasingly become protagonists at the international level (Marchetti, 2016, p. 79).

Actors other than states have played an increasing role in global politics and global governance. However, their recognition as actors in the global governance 2

For example, Switzerland launched the Berne Initiative in 2001 (International Organization for Migration, 2007), chaired the GFMD in 2011 and pushed the creation of the business mechanism of the GFMD (INT-IO #32). However, even though Switzerland co-chaired the negotiations of the GCM, it has thus far never adopted the document. 3 It is crucial to understand the concept of influence and how to measure it. This, however, is elaborated in chapter 3, which sets out that framework of analysis. The measuring and definition of influence, the relation to the concept of power, the tools how actors other than states exert influence in practice and how they collaborate, will be discussed in section 3.1.

2.1 Actors Other than States in the International (Governance) System

15

system alongside states has emerged slowly. International Relations (IR) theories only partly answer questions about their influence, often focusing on whether or not to acknowledge them as actors. In order to better understand the emerging role and theoretical embeddedness of NSAs, this chapter first defines global governance (section 2.1.1), then analyzes the roles of NSAs in theories of international relations (section 2.1.2), and finally looks at these actors’ emergence in the international system (section 2.1.3).

2.1.1

Understanding Global Governance

With the growing complexity of the international system as well as increasingly diverse actors becoming part of its structures, global governance remains a vague concept. James N. Rosenau coined one of the most common definitions of global governance and describes it as a broad set of human activity that refers to a transnational context: The United Nations system and national governments are surely central to the conduct of global governance, but they are only part of the full picture. […] global governance is conceived to include systems of rule at all levels of human activity–from the family to the international organization–in which the pursuit of goals through the exercise of control has transnational repercussions (Rosenau, 1995, p. 13).

Thus, global governance can be understood as a continuously evolving system of norms, rules, mechanisms, and institutions of international cooperation that allow for solving global challenges. Governance differs from government in that it lacks one single actor with decision-making authority (Ruhlman, 2019, p. 46; SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, p. 8). This means that the concept of global governance is a puzzle. There is […] a dense web of rules and institutions stretching across an anarchic system. Without a central organizer governance is multilayered, diverse, fragmented, and interesting. The public, private, and civil society spheres combine and collide in creative ways. As a result, diverse participants use a mixture of norms, rules, and tools of pressure or persuasion to influence one another. Yet, for several formational decades, the study of global governance focused on nation-states to the exclusion of non-state actors. Global governance thus became primarily a study of state-centric multilateralism (Ruhlman, 2019, p. 46).

Following Ruhlmann’s (2019) analysis of global governance, I argue that the system of state-centrism has been complemented by a complex engagement of

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NSAs and International Organizations (IOs) who act with their own agenda and for their member states in a multi-level system. Global governance as a concept has “never reached the status of a sound theory of world politics”(Zürn, 2013, p. 401). Some argue that “thinking about world politics as global governance” could at least come close to a theoretical perspective (Dingwerth & Pattberg, 2006, p. 189).4 Concept or theory, the change in global governance is closely linked and influenced by globalization as well as an increasing number of actors engaging in an ever more complex international system. However, global governance is not to be equated with multilateralism.

2.1.2

International Relations Theories and Actors Other than States

The present chapter gives a brief overview of how the most prominent IR theories perceive actors other than states without aiming to fully discuss the fundamentals of each theory. For IR theories, actors are predominantly groups and organizations: states and nations, international organizations and movements, transnational corporations, or interest groups. The state as a central actor in international politics is one of the basic assumptions of many IR theories. A theory must therefore first determine who the relevant actors are. Second, it must figure out their dispositions—i.e., the goals, decision-making processes, and actions. IR theories provide very different answers to these questions (Schimmelfennig, 2008, p. 51). IR theory has been researching NSAs since the 1970s; Keohane and Nye (1977; 1971) were some of the first writers who focused on the rising importance of NSAs. However, “[in] the 1980s it was relatively marginalized because of the revival of neoliberal institutionalism” (Marchetti, 2016, p. 79). Other relevant studies followed in the 1990s (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995) “but remained subordinated to interaction with states” (Marchetti, 2016, p. 79). IR theory only began researching the role of NSAs more thoroughly during the last few decades. The focus has largely been on transnational NGOs, along with their rising importance in global governance (Marchetti, 2016, p. 79), finding that that they “have grown in number and importance significantly” (Zürn, 2006, p. 31).

4

Also relevant is the concept of multi-level governance (MLG), “which was first formulated by Marks (1993) to explain the increasing prominence of subnational authorities in the decision-making and implementation processes of EU politics, is well suited to make sense of these shifts in governance. This applies also when supranational and sub-national actors are in the driving seat” (Panizzon & van Riemsdijk, 2019, p. 1226).

2.1 Actors Other than States in the International (Governance) System

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Thus, classical IR theories do not sufficiently help explain the roles and rising influence of NSAs in the international system: Realism as the leading IR theory after WWII, at least until the 1970s, assesses only states as relevant actors in the international system (Jacobs, 2006; Schimmelfennig, 2008, pp. 66–67). The IR theory of Neo-realism identifies states as the essential to the international system. Although neo-realists accept the reality that actors such as transnational corporations, Non-Governmental Organizations (NGOs), and international organizations have a certain significance, they are not considered in the equation of international politics. From the neo-realist perspective, NSAs do not exert any influence on the processes that decisively determine politics (Schörnig, 2006, p. 72; Waltz, 1979).5 The basic assumptions of Neo-liberalism, or Liberal Institutionalism, of the 1970s and 1980s remained close to the realistic world view—a system of states characterized by uncertainty and power. Institutionalism, however, assumes that the more interstate relations are interdependent and institutionalized, the greater the probability of peace and further international cooperation. Thus, the role of international organizations as vehicles for change became increasingly important and notable (Keohane & Nye, 1977; Schimmelfennig, 2008, pp. 89–112).6 Transnationalism, which initially used to be inherently interlinked with international independence as proposed by Keohane and Nye (1971), has—driven by James N. Rosenau and John Burton—developed far-reaching concepts of a “world society” (Burton, 1972) and a multi-centric system (Rosenau, 1990). Transnationalism therefore dropped the assumption that the relevant actors in international politics are rational and egoistic states. Rather, in addition to states, many other actors are relevant, and the dispositions of the various actors differ; neither do they strive exclusively for power (as realism assumes), nor primarily for welfare gain (as institutionalism claims). Regarding actors beyond states, transnationalists postulate that both national social organizations and their international umbrella organizations attempt to influence international politics. 5

The most prominent and leading realist author is Hans J. Morgenthau with its lead publication ‘Politics Among Nations’ (1948). The leading neorealist author is Kenneth Waltz with his ‘Theory of International Politics’ (1979). As both the realist as well as neo-realist theory debate the role of states and the insecurities and power in the international system, and do not give any further insight on the potential role, contribution or even influence of actors other than states in the international system, this is not further elaborated. 6 Among the most prominent representatives of neoliberal institutionalism are Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye with its work ‘Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition’ (1977), as well as Keohane’s piece ‘After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political Economy’.

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Moreover, transnational actors without a national organizational base are recognized as relevant. Transnationalism thus accepts that transnationally acting public and private civil society—and thus NSAs—form dense networks where they interact and exchange resources (Schimmelfennig, 2008, pp. 114–137).7 From a liberal perspective, the central explanatory factors of international politics are domestic actors, goals, power relations, and institutions, as well as the constellations of international structures and preferences that result from them. Liberalism follows the key assumption that the more widespread liberal democratic states are in the international system, the greater the probability of peace and international cooperation (Schimmelfennig, 2008, pp. 139–159). Another aspect raised by liberalists is the question of legitimacy and the “democratic deficit” of international institutions (Robert O. Keohane, 2002, p. 34). Zürn (2013, p. 414) argues “the rising number and importance of transnational NGOs […] can be seen as an institutional response to the deficits”.8 Constructivism, as one of the more recent and popular IR theories, promotes the assumption that a greater convergence of ideas of international actors combined with a stronger community between them, results in a greater probability of peace and cooperation. Constructivist theory does not consider particular actors,9 rather, it focuses on the dispositions of the actors. Constructivism acknowledges that NSAs play a role, but does not put them at the center of understanding or describing international politics (Schimmelfennig, 2008, pp. 161–185).10 Liberal theory, transnationalism, and constructivism, I argue, come closest to explaining the phenomenon of the rising role of NSAs in global governance. 7

Prominent literature associated to transnationalism is James R. Rosenau’s ‘Turbulence in World Politics’ (1990), or, Karl W. Deutsch’s ‘Political Community in the North Atlantic Area’ (1957). In addition, see literature referencing transnationalism as a theory, e.g., ‘Bringing transnational actors back in’ (1995), edited by Thomas Risse-Kappen (an analysis of the institutional prerequisites for the influence of transnational actors), and Anne Marie Slaughter’s ‘A New World Order’ (2005), which deals with trans-governmental networks. 8 There is a broad scientific debate about the (democratic) legitimacy of NSAs, especially NGOs, in global governance, which is closely related to the concept of power (see e.g. Willetts, 2010, pp. 126–128). 9 There exists a quite state-centered constructivism as proposed by Alexander Wendt (1999), as well as a transnational and network-focused constructivism as suggested e.g., by Thomas Risse and Kathryn Sikkink (1999). 10 Prominent literature stems from Alexander Wendt with his ‘Social Theory of International Politics’ (1999), as well as his papers ‘Anarchy is What a State Makes of It’ (1992) and ‘Collective Identity Formation and the International State’ (1994), as well as Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink with their ‘Activists beyond borders’ (Keck & Sikkink, 1998) (analysis of advocacy networks).

2.1 Actors Other than States in the International (Governance) System

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They accept actors other than states in the international system (Marchetti, 2016, pp. 13–15, 17; Schimmelfennig, 2008, pp. 138–159).11 Some representatives of these schools of thought have even put actors other than states at the center of their considerations (Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Risse-Kappen, 1995). However, the theoretical approaches do little to clarify the extent to which NSAs influence the emergence of international agreements. Thus, IR theories may be able to answer overarching questions and theorize the existence of NSAs; however, beyond that, they are limited in their ability to engage in in-depth research. Marchetti (2016, p. 8) argues that the emergence of NSAs in international relations goes beyond the explanatory patterns of existing IR theories. Further, that much can be summarized under the concept and theoretical framework of globalization,12 which is a multidimensional process of integration and convergence that relies on the creation of transnational networks and has the tendency to share and spread material and cognitive power across a plurality of differing actors (Marchetti, 2016, p. 8)

Thus, globalization has contributed to furthering and diversifying global governance, as [i]n times of global governance, it appears that negotiators have to justify the results of their negotiations to both the transnational sectoral publics and the national publics, which are increasingly interconnected. One can thus say that international politics are no longer a matter for a few corporative agents—in particular powerful states—which coordinate their interests in camera and arrive at common policies which then have to be implemented domestically. World politics are less a form of executive multilateralism, but rather developing into a form of multilateralism borne by society and accountable to both national and transnational publics (Zürn, 2006, pp. 42–43).

Therefore, it is natural to a changing global governance system with rising globalization that more and more diverse actors engage in the international system. 11

The classic text of the traditional liberal theory of international politics has been Immanuel Kant’s ‘Zum ewigen Frieden’ (1795). Ernst-Otto Czempiel in his ’Friedensstrategien’ (1998) offers an overview of liberal peace theories. Andrew Moravcsik’s ’Taking Preferences Seriously’ (1997) is the central text for the current version of liberalism. In addition, Mark Zacher and Richard Matthew discuss approaches in ’Liberal International Theory: Common Threads, Divergent Strands’ (1995). 12 On the history, emergence, characteristics of globalization see Marchetti (Marchetti, 2016, pp. 3–66).

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2.1.3

Key Concepts,Theory, and the Emergence of Global Migration …

Non-state Actors’ Emergence in the International System

Global governance as a system of rules, norms and actors on the international level emerged and has been evolving over the last centuries, particularly in the 20th century.13 International pressure groups interested in global issues have increased both in number and influence in the global governance system, particularly in Western Europe and North America. Their origins can be traced back to much older groups, such as the Society Against Slavery from England, which campaigned during the 19th century. These pressure groups have mainly focused on issues related to the environment, human rights, humanitarian aid, and disarmament (Woyke, 2000, p. 133). After WWII, more attention was paid to those actors. A major milestone was the 1945 United Nations (UN) Charter with then Article 71, where within the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) a consultative mechanism with NGOs has been established. This is considered a bold new start to NGO participation in global governance. But according to many voluntary associations that had participated in the work of the League of Nations, Article 71 only codified what existed as an informal practice before the war (Ruhlman, 2019, p. 47).14

Over time, actors other than states, in particular NGOs, have established themselves as relevant contributors to migration governance. Research increased notably after the end of the Cold War (Davies, 2019a, p. 1). Since the early 2000s, IR literature has been acknowledging “that non-state actors are able to influence global politics in an autonomous way” (Marchetti, 2016, p. 79), seeing NGOs, in particular, “as integral components of global governance, working alongside states, intergovernmental organizations and corporate actors, including multi-stakeholder initiatives” (Davies, 2019a, p. 3). NSAs, including NGOs, increasingly demand participation “in the international decision-making process or directly acquire authority, expertise and power to influence international affairs in parallel to and regardless of the state authority” (Marchetti, 2016, p. 74).

13

For an historical overview of the emergence of actors other than states in the international system, see e.g., Davies, 2019c; Götz, 2019; Ruhlman, 2019. 14 On the role of ECOSOC, see Noortmann, 2019, pp. 184–185.

2.2 The Emergence of a Global Governance on Migration

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Thus, one no longer looks at whether, but at how NSAs matter (Büthe, 2004; Davies, 2019a).15 To conclude, actors other than states have been playing a constantly growing role in international and global governance as well as in intergovernmental negotiations and organizations in recent decades with globalization at the center of this change (Hale, 2018; Marchetti, 2016; Nasiritousi et al., 2016).

2.2

The Emergence of a Global Governance on Migration

Global migration governance is different from the international institutional frameworks of the post-1945 era (Betts, 2010, p. 2).

International migration inevitably involves at least two countries. It therefore is a topic of international politics per se, and migration management necessarily requires cooperation between states. However, the structure of global migration governance has shown to be rather fragmented (Kainz & Betts, 2020; SVRForschungsbereich, 2016, p. 8).16 The adoption of the GCM in 2018 marks an important milestone, however it does not overcome the fragmentation that has developed over decades. 15

Davies (2019), however, rightly notes that “[m]uch of the early [NGO] literature projected a glowing picture of NGOs embodying the ‘rise of global civil society’ that not only represented in historic ‘power shift’ but potentially also an ‘answer to war’ and the source of ‘global democracy’. In the twenty-first century, critical perspectives became increasingly common, highlighting the deficits in NGOs’ effectiveness, accountability, and legitimacy” (Davies, 2019a, p. 1). 16 Reasons for the fragmentation and slow emergence of migration governance are diverse. Martin and Weerasinghe (2017, pp. 127–128) present five major reasons: (1) concerns about state sovereignty; (2) the dispute over migration in domestic politics; (3) the requirement to consider interests of other states; (4) the asymmetry between the global North and South; and (5) in comparison to other global policy fields, migration is “about people”. Kainz and Betts (2020, pp. 7–8) identified four “key turning points” that explain fragmentation in global governance: (1) the “Impasse at the UN and RCP [Regional Consultative Process] Expansion (1985–2001)”; (2) “New Mandate Creation and the first High-Level Dialogue (1999– 2006)”; (3) “Establishment of the Global Forum on Migration and Development and GMG (2006-8)”; and (4) New York Declaration and the Global Compact for Migration (2016–8)”. Fragmentation can be defined as “a patchwork of international institutions that are different in their character (organizations, regimes, and implicit norms), their constituencies (public and private), their spatial scope (from bilateral to global), and their subject matter (from specific policy fields to universal concerns)” (Biermann et al., 2009, p. 18 quoted from Kainz & Betts, 2020, p. 3)

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The definition of global migration governance is, of course, similar to the overall understanding of global governance posed by James Rosenau (1995) and described in section 2.1.1. For the purpose of this research, global migration governance is understood as the norms and organizational structures that regulate and facilitate states’ and other actors’ responses to migration. Its primary purpose is to ensure that states work collectively in ways that make them better able to fulfil their objectives than they would be acting alone (Betts & Kainz, 2017).

Migration governance entails three levels: (1) “Binding laws and norms, non-binding normative frameworks, and agreements”; (2) “Institutional actors and institutional frameworks and mechanisms”; and (3) “Processes such as dialogues and initiatives […] at the global level or that relate to governance” (Martin & Weerasinghe, 2017, p. 125). The definition and the various levels of governance of migration increasingly consider actors other than states as important contributors. I argue that responding to and shaping mobility is a task for the whole-of-government17 as well as the whole-of-society, which is increasingly recognized. Migration is an integral part of the globalized world and has a profound social and economic impact on countries of origin and destination worldwide, as reflected and acknowledged in the Global Compact for Migration. The role and importance of actors other than states, including local authorities, has increased, and thus been recognized more over the last few decades. With specific regards to the integration and inclusion of migrants in societies, as well as—but to a lesser extent so far—in international migration governance and its structures. However, migration is one of the last bastions of national sovereignty. Most states are therefore traditionally reluctant to set international standards in this area (SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, p. 6). The international regulatory framework for migration and mobility is still emerging, even with the Global Compacts both on Migration and on Refugees. Unlike for refugee protection, where there are multilateral frameworks in

17

On the importance and challenges for a whole-of-government approach to migration, see e.g., Angenendt et al. (2017) and Angenendt and Bendel (2017).

2.2 The Emergence of a Global Governance on Migration

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place, there is no uniform legal basis for migration (Betts, 2010, p. 2; SVRForschungsbereich, 2016, p. 6) and only recently, with the International Organization for Migration (IOM) becoming part of the UN system and the establishment of the UN Migration network, tasked with implementing the GCM, has a mandate and structure been set up. We thus find ourselves amid a new and still insecure phase of global migration governance. The adoption and consecutive implementation phase of the GCM (and GCR), the emergence of new institutions, such as UN Migration Network, and the re-definition of international processes, like the GFMD demonstrate this liminal phase. International migration governance can thus be characterized by three features: (1) a “thin layer of formal multilateralism governing migration”—having increased over recent years, in particular with the GCM negotiation process; (2) the “embeddedness” of migration in a “range of institutions […] that may not be explicitly labelled as migration, but nevertheless regulate and facilitate states’ responses to migration”; and (3) the increase and development of global migration governance through “informal networks” (Betts, 2010, p. 2). The emergence of a global governance on migration can be clustered into five phases, which serve as the structure for this chapter: (1) the early stages of a migration governance from 1919–1989 (section 2.2.1); (2) a global stock-taking phase from 1994–2006 (section 2.2.2); (3) an era of migration and development from 2007–2015 (section 2.2.3); (4) the New York Declaration and Global Compact processes from 2016–2018 (section 2.2.4); and (5) the implementation, follow-up and review phase of the GCM and GCR (since 2019) (section 2.2.5) (Figure 2.1).

Stocktaking (1990-2006)

Building norms and institutions (1919-1989)

Era of migration and development (2006-2015)

New York Declaration, GCM, GCR (2015-18)

Regional cooperation (1985-today)

Figure 2.1 Phases of global migration governance. (Source: own figure)

Follow-up, review and implementation (2019-today)

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2.2.1

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Key Concepts,Theory, and the Emergence of Global Migration …

The Early Stages of Migration Governance: Building Norms and Institutions (1919–1989)

The early 20th century provided institutions and frameworks for international migration and refugees that are still in place today. The first structures of migration governance were created during the inter-war years, starting in 1919 with the creation of the International Labour Organization (ILO). The ILO adopted several conventions on labor rights, which included the protection of migrant workers (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 2; The Nobel Peace Prize, 1969). The ILO in the 1920s and early 1930s significantly contributed to “implementing the Nansen travel documents as it assumed operational responsibility for refugees by matching displaced individuals with host countries’ labour needs inside and outside Europe” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 2). One of the major legacies of the eponym of the Nansen travel documents, Fridtjof Nansen, is the incorporation of the Nansen travel documents in the 1951 Refugee Convention allowing for free passage of displaced people in Europe (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 2; Hieronymi, 2003, p. 41).18 When WWII ended, Europe was left with approximately ten million displaced persons. A debate soon unfolded between the existing international organizations and national governments—primarily the United States (US)—about institutions that needed to be created to deal with the displaced people. The ILO and the UN developed a plan that envisioned the creation of a new international organization, one that would encourage international cooperation for the aid of migrants and refugees. The US, on the other hand, favored an intergovernmental organization with a limited mandate. Great Britain and Australia supported the US plan, as each of these three nation wanted to limit the influence of international organizations and thereby remain autonomous in their national migration policies (Karatani, 2005; SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, p. 9). At the suggestion of the US, the Provisional Intergovernmental Committee for the Movement of Migrants from Europe (PICMME) was founded in 1951. The PICMME was the predecessor to the Intergovernmental Committee for Migration (ICM), set up in 1980, which became today’s IOM, founded in 1989. Initially, the international community limited PICMME’s task to organizing the logistics for the transportation of migrants. When it came to the protection of refugees, on the other hand, there was more pressure to act, given the severe experiences of the Holocaust and World War II. In 1949, the international community created the United Nations Relief and Works Agency for Palestine Refugees in the Near East 18

On the role of the Nansen Document, see inter alia Otto Hieronymi (2003): “The Nansen passport: A tool of freedom of movement and of protection”.

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(UNRWA), followed by the establishment of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) in 1950. The Geneva Refugee Convention, adopted in 1951,19 cemented the system of making a distinction between refugees and migrants. With its 1967 protocol (UNHCR, n.d.), the 1951 Convention was expanded from Europe to a global scale,20 increasing also the funding of UNHCR (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 2; International Organization for Migration, 2020; Karatani, 2005; SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, p. 9). Until today, no similar instrument to the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention exists (GammeltoftHansen et al., 2017, p. 7), and apart from the Refugee Convention, there has been “little legislative framework setting out the rights of migrants outside of broad human rights frameworks” (Walsh, 2019, p. 231). Thus, the main and relevant structures emerging after WWII, which were related to the movement and the protection of refugees, hardly addressed international migration: The United Nations, from its foundation in the aftermath of the Second World War, has shied away from the subject of migration. It has been bandied around between different UN agencies like a political football (Walsh, 2019, p. 221).

The Cold War era did not create much change on the migration and refugee governance and legal frameworks: Refugee governance provided a means to serve Cold War interests, whether for refugees moving from East to West or across borders in the proxy conflicts in Africa, Latin America, and South-East Asia. […] However, while refugee governance operated at the multilateral level, other aspects of migration especially labour migration remained predominantly subject to the sovereign control of individual nation-states. With fewer technological opportunities than today for irregular or trans-continental mobility, there was little demand for wider migration governance (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 2).

However, with regards to the ‘embeddedness’ (Betts, 2010, p. 2) in other international norms, processes, and structures, some developments post World War II and during the Cold War era need to be mentioned. First, migration is reflected in international human rights norms, such as The Universal Declaration of Human

19

There is extensive literature on the 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention and its 1967 protocol, see e.g., the commentary, edited by Zimmermann et al. (2011). 20 E.g., addressing „displacement challenges from Chile in 1973 to the Indo-Chinese boat people crisis after 1975” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 2).

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Rights (UDHR) (1948, Art. 13),21 with immigration being regulated by sovereign nation states. Second, in 1954, the first UN World Population Conference took place in Rome, indirectly addressing migration and population development. However it was a rather “technical” meeting, convening experts on the matter (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 2). Third, focusing on labor migration, several ILO Conventions address migrant workers, such as the Migration for Employment Convention (C97) from 1949 and the Migrant Workers Convention (C143) from 1975 (Martin & Weerasinghe, 2017, p. 132) (see Table 2.3).22 Additionally, Regional Consultative Processes (RCP) emerged. The first RCP was the Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum and Immigration (IGC) in 1985.23 Many more processes followed over the years, each becoming an integral part of cooperation between states on migration issues to date (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 4; Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, pp. 81–84, 2020a; Martin & Weerasinghe, 2017, p. 129; Thouez & Channac, 2006).24 Since the 1980s, regional mobility agreements emerged as part of regional (economic) integration projects (LebonMcGregor, 2020b, pp. 81–82). Betts and Kainz (2020, pp. 8–10) argue that the 21

“1. Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence within the borders of each State. 2. Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return to his country” (United Nations General Assembly, 1948, Art. 13). 22 In addition, two major areas of international mobility have been addressed by international norms during this phase. First, the aspect of family unity: “Protection of family unity is underscored by universal rights, including Articles 12 and 16 of the UDHR, Articles 17 and 23 of the ICCPR, and Article 10 of the ICESCR [International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights], as well as provisions in the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the Child and the ICRMW [International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families].” Second, the area of movement across borders on land and sea under international law, such as the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of Sea (UNCLOS); the 1979 International Convention on Maritime Search and Rescue (SAR); the 1974 International Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS); and the 1944 Convention on International Civil Aviation (Chicago Convention, Appendix 9) (Martin & Weerasinghe, 2017, p. 133). 23 The IGC was created “by 16 destination countries in the industrialized world, with a permanent secretariat, in order to facilitate information-sharing initially in relation to asylum and now, increasingly, in relation to migration in general” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 4). 24 Prominent examples are RCPs coordinated by the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD) (such as the Budapest process) or the regional consultative processes set up in the context of global meetings or stakeholder engagements, for example the GFMD or the UN Migration Network, who implemented the regional review processes ahead of the first IMRF (Guild & Basaran, 2020) and will prepare the process leading to the 2026 IMRF. Many authors have elaborated the development and analysis of RCPs (Betts & Kainz, 2017; Kainz & Betts, 2020; Lebon-McGregor, 2020a). On the role and emergence of RCPs, see also Lavenex et al., 2016; Lebon-McGregor, 2020b.

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emergence of RCPs in combination with diverging interests of states roles in migration, lead to minimal discussion about migration at the UN, all of which contributed to increased fragmentation in global migration governance.

2.2.2

The Emergence of Conversations, New Approaches and Stock-taking on the Global Level (1990–2006)

Reservations about putting migration on the UN’s agenda continued in the years after the Cold War. However, this changed in the early 2000s. The creation of new dialogue formats, initiatives, and reports as well as more diverse actors taking the stage caused new discussions about migration to occur: [A]fter a largely fruitless period in the 1990s with no UN agency giving migration a high priority, the turn of the millennium saw a striking surge of new actors, mandate creations, initiatives, working groups, dialogues and reports on migration-related issues (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 6).

This new phase of engagement laid the groundwork for increased conversations about international migration on the global level. Here, I argue that while the international community had continued reservations about putting migration on the agenda throughout the 1990s, there were some key structures, norms, and conversations that increased the visibility of migration issues. Further, I argue that the Doyle Report, the Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), the Global Migration Group (GMG), and in particular Peter Sutherland as the first Special Representative for Migration, appointed in 2005 were the main contributors pushing for a stronger migration governance throughout the early 2000s. The post-cold war era: reservations but steps forward In the 1990s, a variety of new norms and processes about migration were brought forth to the UN’s agenda. As a result of emerging norms, the international community in 1990 adopted the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW) (United Nations General Assembly, 1990). However it did not enter into force until 2003, because it lacked the necessary ratifications for over a decade (see Table 2.3) due to the fact that specific northern, migrant-receiving countries refused ratification (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 3; see also Rother & Steinhilper, 2019, p. 2; United Nations Economic and Social Council, 1999). The convention includes

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key human rights norms, such as the protection of migrant workers in host countries, independently of their legal status.25 In addition, two protocols supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime from the year 2000 that address both human trafficking (Palermo Protocol) as well as the smuggling of migrants (United Nations General Assembly, 2000) were introduced.26 The first mention of an intergovernmental conference on international migration can be found in the resolution of the UN General Assembly RES/48/113 from December 1993 on the “Convening of a United Nations conference for the comprehensive consideration and review of the problems of refugees, returnees, displaced persons and migrants” (Chamie & Mirkin, 2009, p. 1; United Nations General Assembly, 1993a). However, this conference was “deferred to a later date” (Chamie & Mirkin, 2009, p. 1), which in the form it was agreed upon in RES/48/113 never took place. Instead, following this resolution “member states were surveyed on four occasions 1995, 1997, 1999, and 2003 concerning their views on an international conference on international migration”—with a repetitive result of polarization and a reluctance of “migrant-receiving countries […] to bring migration into the United Nations” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 3). One mile-stone, however, was the UN’s ‘International Conference on Population and Development’ (ICPD) in Cairo, Egypt in 1994, that figured international migration quite prominently on the agenda; it also focused on the developmental aspects of migration (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 3; Chamie & Mirkin, 2009, p. 1;

25

The convention was adopted be the UN General Assembly on 18 December 1990 (United Nations General Assembly, 1990). However, it took until 2003 to get enough signatories for entering into force: “On 1 July 2003, the International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families entered into force. By 1 October 2005, 33 States had ratified it or acceded to it.” The ratifying countries are as of 2005: Algeria, Azerbaijan, Belize, Bolivia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Ghana, Guatemala, Guinea, Honduras, Kyrgyzstan, Lesotho, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Mali, Mexico, Morocco, Peru, Philippines, Senegal, Seychelles, Sri Lanka, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Timor-Leste, Turkey, Uganda and Uruguay (Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2005). To date, it has only been ratified by 56 states, from which only three are member states of the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), which are Chile, Mexico and Turkey (see Table 2.3) (United Nations, 2020). 26 Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (Palermo protocol) and Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (United Nations General Assembly, 2000). For an overview of other human rights norms referencing migration (indirectly), see Martin & Weerasinghe, 2017, pp. 129–134.

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Rother & Steinhilper, 2019, p. 2; SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, p. 16).27 Multiple conferences and fora followed, with the UN often acting as a “wingman” in strengthening migration governance (Thouez, 2019). The late 1990s allowed for new projects and positions on migration to begin. In 1997, the New International Regime for Orderly Movement of People project (NIROMP) started.28 During the same year, the Human Rights Commission established a working group on migration. In addition, the mandate of the UN Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants was created. The first special rapporteur was Gabriela Rodríguez Pizarro from Costa Rica, followed by Jorge A. Bustamante from Mexico in 2005, François Crépeau from Canada in 2011 and Felipe Gonzáles Morales from Chile in 2017 (Betts & Kainz, 2017; Kainz & Betts, 2020; OHCHR, 2021; Pécoud, 2021b; INT-IO #26).29 The early 2000s: migration making its way into the UN system The early 2000s contributed to additional norm building on migration in the international system—with Kofi Annan as the first UN Secretary-General who

27

25 years later, in late 2019, both the UN commemorated the importance of the ICPD, and the international community gathered again in Nairobi, Kenya, for ICPD25 (Butler et al., 2020; SDG Knowledge Hub, 2019). 28 NIROMP was launched by the UN, led by Bimal Ghosh, an academic and civil servant. The project terminated before the start of the Berne Initiative in 2001 (led by the Swiss government). The project developed proposals for new norms and a global migration regime, making migration safe and orderly (Geiger, 2012; Pécoud, 2021a). They were, amongst other, written down in Bimal Gosh’s book ‘Managing Migration: Time for a New International Regime?’ (Ghosh, 2000). 29 With regards to the human rights of migrants, several reports appear to be relevant, also being considered in future agreements: First, in 2013 the OHCHR report on ‘Improving Human Rights-Based Governance of International Migration’ was prepared in the lead-up to the 2013 High-Level Dialogue (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2013). Second, also in 2013, the report by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau, to the UNGA ‘Global migration governance’ (A/68/283) not only provides an overview on the global governance of migration at the time, but also puts forward recommendations on strengthened human rights standards implemented in the governance (United Nations General Assembly, 2013a). Third, in 2014, a report of the Secretary-General followed, titled ‘Promotion and protection of human rights, including ways and means to promote the human rights of migrants’ (A/69/277); the report was accompanied by OHCHR’s Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2014; United Nations General Assembly, 2014). Annual reports of the Special Rapporteur to the UNGA followed (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2021a).

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put migration on the international agenda (INT-NSA #4).30 The first years of the new decade brought numerous publications that surveyed “existing norms and legal frameworks”.31 Several dialogues were created, discussing “different aspects on what a desirable and feasible architecture of global migration governance might look like” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 4).32 Amongst them was the Berne Initiative, launched by the Swiss government and supported by IOM in 2001. This intergovernmental discussion process ended with the publication of the (non-binding) International Agenda for Migration Management. Also in 2001, on the occasion of the 50th annual meeting of the IOM Council, the International Dialogue on Migration (IDM) was established as a forum for exchange between states and international institutions (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 4; SVRForschungsbereich, 2016, p. 17). Finally, the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan in his report “Strengthening of the United Nations: an agenda for future change” in 2002 stated “that it is time to take a more comprehensive look at the various dimensions of the migration issue” (United Nations General Assembly, 2002, para. 39).33 Annan’s appointed advisor Professor Michael Doyle in his “Doyle Report” from 2002, proposed several options for migration governance, including “creating a new agency, designating a lead agency, bringing IOM into the UN, promoting issue-specific multilateral agreements, and launching a global commission” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 5; see also Green & Thouez, 2005; Newland, 2005; INT-NSA #4). Whereas IOM was included into the UN system much later, 30

Kofi Annan served as UN Secretary-General from 1997 to 2006. In 2003, Annan spoke at Columbia University, about the necessity for an international regime on migration (Carhart, 2003), and in 2004, held a speech at the European Parliament, where he “urged the European Union to better manage its legal immigration and strengthen the capacity of developing countries to give refugees adequate protection” (UN News, 2004). 31 Amongst such publications were: the “Berne Initiative’s publication on ‘Migration and International Legal Norms’ (2004) and ILO’s ‘Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration: non-binding principles and guidelines for a rights-based approach to labour migration’ (2005)” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 4). 32 These included “IOM’s international dialogue on migration policy (2001), UNHCR’s Global Consultation Process (2000–2002), the Hague Declaration on the Future of Asylum and Migration Policy (2002), the establishment of the Geneva Migration Group (2003) and the Berne Initiative’s ‘International Agenda for Migration Management (IAMM; 2004)” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 4). 33 With regards to international protection, during that time, UNHCR held Global Consultations on International Protection. They were structured in three circles. First, an event to commemorate the 50th anniversary of the Geneva Refugee Convention. Second, expert roundtables. And third, consultations within the EXCOM framework on issues not fully covered by the convention (UNHCR, 2001).

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Secretary-General Annan opted to establish the ‘Global Commission on International Migration’ (GCIM) that was in place from 2003 to 2005 (Betts, 2010, p. 1; Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 5; Walsh, 2019, p. 222; INT-NSA #4). One could argue that the international system was not ready yet and that it took more work and time to create the structures as proposed in the report and beyond: When Doyle finished his report at the end of 2002, Annan asked the UN membership if they were willing to take on the issue and create a better regulatory regime for migration. There was a very clear and unambiguous response: no. ‘There was so much skepticism about international co-operation on migration that we knew we would need a major campaign to educate the public about the value of orderly and safe migration,’ says Doyle (Walsh, 2019, p. 224).

The GCIM was composed of government officials and representatives from IOs, one trade union representatives, one Bishop, and one academic. It was funded by governments, IOs, and philanthropy. The final report, presented in 2005, covered thematic trends, such as the potential of labor migration, migration and development, irregular migration, integration and social cohesion, the protection of the rights of migrants and enhancing migration governance (The Global Commission on International Migration, 2005).34 Whereas some argue, that “[t]he commission gained very little traction” (Walsh, 2019, p. 222), it still led to some new structures that were implemented by Kofi Annan. Amongst the major consequences were the foundation of the Global Migration Group in 2006, whose task was to coordinate the work of UN agencies on migration (Global Migration Group, 2018a; SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, p. 17),35 as well as the appointment of the first Secretary-General’s Special Representative for Migration, Peter Sutherland. In addition, the report of the GCIM influenced the thematic set-up of the 1st High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (see below) (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 5).

34

The GCIM was in place from 2003 to 2005 and ended its work with the report “Migration in an interconnected world: New directions for action” (The Global Commission on International Migration, 2005). 35 The Global Migration Group grew out of the inter-agency Geneva Migration Group, founded in 2003 (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 7), and was in place from 2006 to 2018. It “was an inter-agency group bringing together heads of agencies to promote the wider application of all relevant international and regional instruments and norms relating to migration, and to encourage the adoption of more coherent, comprehensive and better coordinated approaches to the issue of international migration.” In 2018, the UN Migration Network was established as a successor of the GMG. (Global Migration Group, 2018a).

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Following the GCIM’s recommendation, for the first time in history, Annan appointed Peter Sutherland, a businessman and politician as UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General for Migration (SRSG) in 2005 (Thouez, 2019, p. 1250; INT-NSA #4). According to John Walsh (2019, pp. 222–224), who wrote about the life and legacy of Peter Sutherland and interviewed several of his companions, Annan wanted a “powerful personality to put migration on the international agenda.” Annan was able to win with this new personality:36 Peter Sutherland came to his post as SRSG with a remarkable CV. His experience in both the policy and business realms, and especially the successful negotiation of the Uruguay Round establishing the World Trade Organization, gave him the credibility in the eyes of many states (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 114).

Peter Sutherland and his team played a crucial role in developing global migration governance, prior to which “there has been little space at the UN to discuss migration” (Walsh, 2019, p. 228). Sutherland set two main objectives: First, getting IOM into the UN system and second, to create a coherent framework for international migration and putting it on the international agenda (Walsh, 2019, pp. 227–228). Both goals have been mostly achieved, even if some suggest there is still a long way to go. SRSG Sutherland and his team were the main actors behind the following important developments to strengthen international migration governance in the years between 2005 and 2017: first, the creation of the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) in 2007 (Walsh, 2019, pp. 227–228);37 secondly, the creation of an “Informals” group, working towards getting migration into the

36

Previously to being appointed SRSG, Sutherland had a longstanding career in business and politics: “Mr. Sutherland has served as Attorney General of Ireland; EC Commissioner responsible for Competition Policy; Director General of GATT [General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade] and then of The World Trade Organisation; Chairman of Goldman Sachs International; Chairman of the London School of Economics; a member of the UN Commission on Human Security; Chairman of the European Institute of Public Administration; and Chairman of BP plc. He has received numerous honours, including an honorary knighthood, as well as awards and honorary degrees for his work on regional and global interdependence. He currently serves as Professor in Practice at the London School of Economics in the School’s Institute of Global Affairs as well as the President of the International Catholic Migration Commission” (UN DESA, 2017). 37 For example, one interviewee stated: “when Peter died, there was this sense that, “If not for Peter Sutherland, the godfather of migration, and if not for the GFMD, none of this ever would have happened. ” It’s such a beautiful thing that we have this, precisely because of the GFMD process” (INT-IO #27).

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Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) and informing the New York Declaration and GCM process (see below);38 and finally, the “Sutherland Report” that has, in its final 2017 version, greatly influenced global migration governance and processes. The report, published after Sutherland’s passing (United Nations General Assembly, 2017a),39 represents “a lot of civil society views” (INT-GOV #18)40 and impacted the New York Declaration, the GCM, and the GCR (INT-NSA #4). Peter Sutherland is considered “massively influential, simply because he opened up that role and was there for a long time.” He met regularly with civil society and was “widely respected and listened to” (INT-NSA #11; see also INT-IO #27). Sutherland contributed to a new way of framing migration, with one “key feature” being his “portrayal [of migration] as a ‘triple win’ phenomenon, which is often attributed to Kofi Annan” (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 118) or in other words “he was just bringing together, if you like, a humane review of what should be in the Global Compact” (INT-GOV #18). Many developments in migration governance described in the following pages can be attributed to SRSG Sutherland and his team (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b; Walsh, 2019). In March 2017, Louise Arbour, the former High Commissioner for Human Rights (HCHR) followed Sutherland as SRSG. Arbour was a key figure during the GCM negotiation process (Thouez, 2019, p. 1250). All these formats and developments brought more NSAs into the global migration governance system—from academics, such as Michael Doyle, to the members of the GCIM. The early 2000s also marked a time, where the influence of civil society in the global migration field, “compared to its role in other 38

Here, I speak of ‘informing’ the New York Declaration process as I did not analyze the influence of the Informals, or more broadly non-state actors, in that process and no other research is known to have assessed this in detail. 39 Although the development of the report was supposed to start in 2012, the work started only in 2014. Its aim was to “to put together a comprehensive plan and set of guidelines on how countries could work together to ensure orderly safe migration” (Walsh, 2019, p. 247). The Sutherland report was finalized already towards the end of 2016 and Sutherland read the final draft of the document a few days before his passing. However, because the final document has not been formally approved, there was pushback from the UN system for a few months. Finally, the report was approved by UNSG Guterres and published in February 2017 (Walsh, 2019, pp. 249–250). 40 One example is the ask for ending immigration detention migrant children and their families (United Nations General Assembly, 2017a, pt. 52b; INT-IO #27). The second example is the recommendation to empower cities and local governments by systematically including them “in national delegations at international meetings on migration” (United Nations General Assembly, 2017a, pt. 76b; INT-GOV #18).

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fields, is just beginning to take form” (Thouez, 2003, p. 23, see also Kalm, 2010). One example is the launch of the Hague Process on the Future of Asylum and Migration Policy in 1999, which primarily brought together civil society actors for a debate on migration and refugees (SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, pp. 16– 17). Another example is the 2009 launch of the ‘Conversations’ initiative by the International Catholic migration Commission (ICMC), which convened actors from multiple migration sectors (International Catholic Migration Commission, 2009).

2.2.3

The Era of Migration and Development (2006–2015)

Whereas the 1990s were “a largely fruitless period” for global migration governance, the early 2000s led to “a striking surge of new actors, mandate creations, initiatives, working groups, dialogues and reports on migration-related issues” with “a largely uncoordinated fragmentation of global migration governance” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 6). The creation of new fora, such as the GFMD, led to more coordination as well as a shift in perspective towards a more developmental approach to global migration (SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, pp. 7, 13). The era of migration and development has also seen an increase in the engagement of NSAs, not only from civil society, but also the private sector, particularly through the GFMD. This chapter puts particular emphasis on the dialogues and processes. Specifically, the migration and development nexus between 2006 and 2015, which includes the High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development (HLD), the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the inclusion of migration in the 2030 Agenda, the rise of ‘minilateralism’ with the creation of several new initiatives by a smaller number of states, and the mainstreaming of migration into other global policy fields. Beyond these four major milestones, two other international norms were agreed upon during this time: In 2011, the Domestic Workers Convention (C189) was introduced but only entered into force in 2013 with the ratification of enough states. To date, the convention has been signed by 35 states (see Table 2.3). This convention at least “set out global minimum standards for domestic work” and builds a “window for social justice” (Oelz, 2014). Even though both ratification and implementation remain weak, the Convention sets out standards and guidelines to adhere to and

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to hold states accountable to. While domestic workers are a centuries old phenomenon, it seems that time was right to introduce a framework to address the issue and minimum standards. In 2012, the Kampala Convention, adopted by the African Union (AU), was the first instrument of international law that covers the protection and rights of internally displaced persons (IDPs).41 The Kampala Convention is unique in that sense and offers an important approach to address internal displacement on the African continent, which is driven by many reasons—disasters, conflict, and violence (IDMC, 2019). I argue that even though the GFMD and other developments described here have surely helped to put migration, with a particular emphasis on the developmental aspects, on the international agenda, the topic still “has not been on the agenda of the United Nations as a global intergovernmental conference in the same way as conferences on the environment, urbanization and women’s issues, amongst others” (Chamie & Dall’Oglio, 2008, p. 11). Migration governance even with the newly set up fora and processes lacked “an overarching vision” (Betts, 2010). In addition, even though the era of migration and development has led to an “emerging architecture of global migration governance,” it “was followed by a fragmentation of global migration governance within and outside of the UN system” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 6). The prominence of the topic was only brought on by the 2015 migration crises—however, with the structures in place, it was possible to react quickly. The High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development Under the auspices of the President of the UN General Assembly (PGA), the set up and institutionalization of the High-level Dialogue on Migration and Development marks an important milestone and momentum for global migration governance, with a particular focus on developmental approach to international migration (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 6; Thouez, 2019, p. 1243). The first HLD took place in September 2006.42 It “examined the relationship and synergies between international migration and development,” and resulted in the creation of 41

Beyond that, international norms for IDPs can be found in Art. 13 of the UDHR as well as the non-binding „Guiding Principles on Internal Displacement” (United Nations, 2004; United Nations General Assembly, 1948). Some IDPs are under UNHCR mandate (UNHCR, 2021b). In 2019, the UN Secretary-General has set up a High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement, which presented a report in 2021 (United Nations, 2022). 42 The 2006 HLD was agreed on by the UNGA in resolution A/RES/58/208 of 23 December 2003 (United Nations General Assembly, 2003). The meeting itself “was composed of four plenary meetings and four interactive round tables on such themes as migrant’s right, human

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the GFMD, with Belgium offering to host the first forum in 2007 (IOM, 2020a; Newland, 2013; United Nations General Assembly, 2006, para. 24). Belgium’s offer was surprising, and caused authors to give credit to SRSG Peter Sutherland for his “diplomatic creativity” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 5). However, the decision to convene a High-level Dialogue instead of a more formal international summit was based on a compromise between migrant-sending and migrant-receiving countries (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 5).43

The first HLD listed UN agencies and related organizations/rapporteurs as observers and civil society organizations (CSOs) and private sector organizations as partners. However, their setup and inclusion into UN processes was quite “improvised” (INT-NSA #4; IOM, 2020a). Thus, with the establishment of the HLD we saw the birth of […] sort of multilateral level advocacy by the civil society. […] [But] you know one of the one of my disappointments is with that world of advocacy around the at the multilateral level, it never really, to me, matured (INT-NSA #4).

The second HLD took place in October 2013 under the theme ‘Making Migration Work,’ and expanded the topics of discussion.44 This HLD was an important milestone for including migration and development into the 2030 Agenda (United Nations General Assembly, 2013b, para. 8). Three main observations are of trafficking and migrant smuggling, remittances, partnerships at the bilateral and regional levels” (IOM, 2020a). Thus, the “agenda focused narrowly on migration and development: on ways to maximize international migration’s development benefits and minimize its negative effects (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 5). 43 “While thematically linking migration issues with development issues increased the acceptance among states to discuss migration in a broader and more formal setting than in the framework of bilateral agreements or regional consultation processes, such discussions remained foremost between states’ ministries of Interior. At the time, the focus remained predominantly on migration and less on development. However, this set the stage for gradually including the development community into discussions on migration, and for instigating the shift to connect migration and development issues of international cooperation leading up to the Agenda 2030” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, pp. 5–6). 44 Topics discussed were 1) Protecting the human rights of all migrants; 2) Reducing the costs of labor migration; 3) Eliminating migrant exploitation, including human trafficking; 4) Addressing the plight of stranded migrants; 5) Improving public perceptions of migrants; 6) Integrating migration in the development agenda (including the post-2015 agenda); 7) Strengthening the migration evidence base; 8) Enhancing migration partnerships and cooperation (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 8).

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importance when it comes to the role of NSAs and local authorities with regards to the 2013 HLD: First, civil society and private sector representatives “were given an unusually large number of opportunities to speak” (Newland, 2013). Second, in comparison to the first HLD, civil society operated in a collaborative mode in the run-up to the second HLD, and was treated as a respected and valued partner. It presented a progressive but pragmatic five-year, eight-point plan for cooperation with governments that was received respectfully by the participating states (Newland, 2013).

Civil Society was able to interact with governments three months prior to the HLD in July 2013 by hosting panel discussions in June 2013 (High-Level Dialogue Civil Society, 2013). Third, during the HLD, “a small group of mayors came together at the UN for the first time,” announcing the Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development (Thouez, 2020). It took place for the first time in 2014 and starting in 2017, in conjunction with the GFMD (GFMD, 2020c; Stürner, 2020; Thouez, 2020). SRSG Sutherland played an important role, one that would “build support for the expanded HLD agenda” and include actors other than states, such as local authorities (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 8). This shift indicates that the inclusion of actors other than states, such as local authorities, has progressed between the first and the second HLD. In February 2019, a High-Level Debate on international migration and development in lieu of the 2019 High-Level Dialogue was held. The goal of the one-day meeting was to “inform the high-level political forum on sustainable development” that took place later that year, with regards to the goals and targets of the SDGs relevant to migration (United Nations General Assembly, 2019). Stakeholders from all sectors were able to participate in this meeting.45 The Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) As agreed during the first HLD in 2006, the first GFMD was held in Belgium in 2007. Sutherland as initiator of the GFMD faced several challenges in setting up the Forum: 45

„Governments, along with civil society organizations, the private sector and others, are already implementing various activities that contribute to achieving migration-related targets of the 2030 Agenda. The High-Level Debate will provide an opportunity to share experiences and best practices, including how stakeholders at the national and local levels are implementing the SDGs, their successes, challenges and lessons learned. These experiences could also help provide relevant examples for implementation of the GCM” (United Nations General Assembly, 2019).

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That initial forum was the first stake in the ground in terms of institutionalizing migration in the UN. […] [The next step was] finding countries to host it and figuring how to fund it. Then he [Sutherland] had to figure out its relationship with civil society groups (Walsh, 2019, p. 232).

The GFMD was set up as a “informal, non-binding, voluntary and governmentled” process (GFMD, 2020a). The ‘modus operandi’ of the GFMD was set in 2007; it specified the chairing arrangements, the support structure and funding, a steering group of committed governments, and the Friends of the Forum, a group which is “open to all States Members and Observers of the United Nations.” It also clarified that the GFMD “does not form part of the United Nations system,” but that connections exist throughout the steering group to ensure interconnectedness with the UN (GFMD, 2007). One major link between UN agencies and the GFMD was the SRSG (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 7; Walsh, 2019, p. 230).46 The GFMD has become the “most visible and high-profile state-led global process on migration outside the UN system,” and it works to “gradually build intergovernmental consensus around the value of multilateral discussions on migration” (Betts & Kainz, 2017, pp. 6, 8). Many people have identified the GFMD as “a pivot point in international cooperation on migration” (LebonMcGregor, 2020b, p. 49). Over the years, even if the GFMD did not directly lead to binding results, the cooperative spirit between the participating countries has led to an exchange of fair and sustainable policy and management approaches to migration. For example, internationally available knowledge and data has been consolidated and good practices have become globally visible as a result of the GFMD (SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, p. 5). In addition, the GFMD has also opened the space to address “non-traditional” issues without immediately politicizing them (INT-IO #25). However, there is criticism towards the GFMD. It ranges from it taking migration out of the UN system and turning a ‘blind eye’ towards human rights standards and international norms in general, to difficult power dynamics within the Forum (INT-IO #27; INT-NSA #16). Since 2007, under a rotating chairmanship of one or two countries, meetings of the GFMD have taken place almost annually (see Table 2.1). With an increasingly participatory approach, the GFMD structurally included actors other than states. From the beginning, there was inclusion of civil society through the Civil Society Days.47 Then, in 2015, there was inclusion of the private sector through 46

For an overview of the structure and governance, see GFMD (2020b). In the beginning, it “it was only through a series of pretty intense meetings with the Belgians and Peter that civil society was invited into, what became civil society days and Brussels in July of 2007” (INT-NSA #4).

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the Business Mechanism, and later the inclusion of mayors through the Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility and Development and the Mayors Mechanism. All three mechanisms, and thus the strategic inclusion of actors other than states, have in part been funded by the Swiss government, one of the co-facilitators of the GCM (INT-GOV #14). Whereas the meetings of states were held separately during the first years of the GFMD, such as in the Civil Society Days, the meetings have become increasingly interconnected. The meetings have shifted from a one-day ‘Common Space’ (2017) to a meeting agenda with a more inclusive approach (2020) (INT-IO #27; GFMD Mayors Mechanism, 2021b).48 Table 2.1 GFMD overview of meetings

CSD = Civil Society Days; BM = Business Mechanism; MM = Mayors Mechanism49 Sources: own table, based on GFMD, 2020; GFMD Civil Society Days, 2020b 48

Civil society for a long time has criticized the separation of the government meetings and the separate formats for civil society, the private sector, and mayors—which in recent years has drastically changed (INT-IO #27). 49 “In 2017, the Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration, and Development (“Mayoral Forum”) was held back to back with the GFMD Summit, in order to strengthen the links of local authorities with the GFMD. Following the success of this endeavor, in 2018 the GFMD approved a proposal to formalize the relationship between local authorities participating in the Mayoral Forum and GFMD through the establishment of a ‘Mayors Mechanism’ for the GFMD” (GFMD, 2020c).

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The Civil Society Days For the role of civil society in global migration governance, the GFMD has been and still is an important space. The GFMD, from the beginning, installed Civil Society Days (CSD) to exchange ideas with a plethora of international organizations, multilateral global and regional bodies (e.g. GMG), business actors, and broad civil society, including migrant organizations, trade unions, academia and non-governmental think-tanks (Liki´c-Brbori´c, 2018, pp. 769–770).

The CSD aimed at more inclusiveness and legitimacy of the GFMD, and since 2010, a ‘common space’ has allowed civil society to interact directly with governments (Liki´c-Brbori´c, 2018, p. 770). With the 2011 GFMD in Switzerland, civil society became more organized as ICMC started to host a secretariat to coordinate actors (INT-NSA #3; INT-GOV #14). Civil society thus identified the “GFMD process as a key place to lobby governments on the issues of migration” (INT-IO #27). However, there were also conflicts amongst civil society groups, e.g., between the unions, grassroots organizations, and other civil society groups (INT-IO #32). The Business Mechanism In 2015, during the Turkish Chairmanship of the GFMD, the Business Mechanism began (INT-NSA #21; INT-GOV #14).50 Preparations for the Business Mechanism had been under way since the Swedish GFMD Chairmanship 2013–2014 (Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2018). The goal of the Business Mechanism was to allow for a structural exchange, serving “as a platform for businesses to engage with Governments and other stakeholders on migration issues” (The Business Advisory Group on Migration, 2020).

50

The Business Mechanism “is jointly coordinated by the International Organisation of Employers (IOE) and the World Economic Forum - Global Future Council on Migration (WEF GFCM). Together they form the Business Advisory Group, which lead substantial work on a range of topics, particularly: the need for international skills mobility, fair recruitment and decent work, skills matching and certification recognition, the role of entrepreneurship and circular migration for development. A GFMD Business Secretariat is housed at the IOE, which was established in February 2016 as a pilot project under the Bangladesh Chairmanship of 2016“ (Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2018).

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The Mayors Mechanism Following the Mayoral Forums, the GFMD Mayors Mechanism was established in 2018 with the goal of formalizing “the relationship between the governmentled GFMD process and […] local authorities” (Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2020). The Mayors Mechanism, founded in 2018, is co-steered by the Mayors Migration Council (MMC)51 as well as United Cities and Local Governments (UCLG) and IOM (Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2020; Stürner, 2020; Thouez, 2018). To conclude, the GFMD has been a “catalyst” for “NGO level advocacy at the international level.” The inclusion of civil society in the GFMD “not a given” when it was set up and proposed to the Secretary-General. It was yet again Peter Sutherland who “pushed for civil society to be involved in the GFMD” (INT-NSA #4). Over the years, there is certainly greater awareness of the role of the stakeholders and a greater willingness to involve these stakeholders. Within the framework of the GFMD, but also in other processes. The actors are now more on the radar, they have also proven that they can organize themselves (INT-GOV #14).

However, while participation has increased, structural problems still exist in regard to representation, especially for migrant-led organizations whose inclusion continues to be contested (Germany & Morocco, 2017; Rother, 2019; Soykan & Senses, ¸ 2018).52 Further, for years, many actors criticized the separation of government and non-governmental meetings, as well as the lack of access to the government days (which has changed, especially with the 2020 GFMD, chaired by the United Arab Emirates (UAE) and taking place in 2021) (INT-IO #27).53 The migration and development perspective of the GFMD helped facilitate the 51

The Mayors Migration Council since its inception in 2018 has developed into an independent organization with a team supporting the MMC Leadership Board Mayors in their work to empower and enable “cities with access, capacity, knowledge, and connections to engage in migration diplomacy and policymaking at the international, regional, and national level” (Mayors Migration Council, 2020a). 52 For example, in their GFMD 2017 Concept Paper the German and Moroccan CoChairmanship states that they “are keen to promote more interactive discussion in outcome oriented formats with greater civil society as well as business participation and, thus, to generate more concrete results” (Germany & Morocco, 2017). 53 Also, the parallel processes set up in the early years of the GFMD, in particular the “complex dynamic between the GFMD and the GMG[,] shows that the initial creation of these two new institutional pillars did not directly result in greater coherence and coordination in addressing migration issues” (Kainz & Betts, 2020, p. 15).

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inclusion of references to migration in the 2030 Agenda (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 215), as shown in the following chapter. Migration in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development [T]he inclusion of migration in the SDGs marked a significant moment in the institutionalization of migration as a global policy issue (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, pp. 150–151).

Whereas the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) failed to include the topic of migration, the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (Sustainable Development Goals, SDGs) explicitly addresses migration and is seen by many as the crucial moment of bringing migration to the global (development) agenda (Betts & Kainz, 2017, pp. 8–9; Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 49; SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, p. 19). In the introduction to the SDGs, the international community, amongst others, “recognize[s] the positive contribution of migrants for inclusive growth and sustainable development” as well as the fact “that international migration is a multidimensional reality of major relevance for the development of countries of origin, transit and destination, which requires coherent and comprehensive responses” (United Nations General Assembly, 2015b, para. 29). The wording, to ‘ensure and facilitate safe, orderly and regular migration,’ which is reflected in both the New York Declaration of 2016 and the Global Compact for Migration of 2018, was first used in the SDGs. The wording can be found both in the Introduction to the SDGs (para. 29) as well as in target 10.7.54 Further, additional references to migration and development are included in the SDGs; for example in target 8.8 about labor rights, or target 10.c about reduction of costs for remittances (United Nations General Assembly, 2015b). Other goals throughout, while not directly mentioning migration, are also applicable to the situation of refugees and migrants (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 9; United Nations General Assembly, 2015b).55 For example, the 2015 Addis Ababa Action Agenda complements 54

Goal 10 aims at reducing inequality within and among countries. Target 10.7. aims at facilitating “ orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people, including through the implementation of planned and well-managed migration policies” (United Nations General Assembly, 2015b, target 10.7). 55 Additional references to migration and mobility in the SDGs can be found in target 3.c (health workforce recruitment), target 4.b (international scholarships), target 5.2 (violence against women, incl. trafficking), target 8.7 (forced labor, incl. human trafficking), target 16.2 (abuse, exploitation, trafficking, and all forms of violence against and torture of children), target 16.9 (legal identity for all), and target 17.18 (reliable, disaggregated data).

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Goal 17 of the SDGs, by referencing the human rights and fundamental freedoms of migrants (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 9; Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 149; United Nations, 2015b, para. 111).56 These mentions of migration clearly indicate migration was reflected throughout the SDGs and therefore “provide[d] a holistic and comprehensive framework to ground the migration-development nexus in the GCM” later on (Foresti & Hagen-Zanker, 2017). However, when the SDG process started in 2012, it was not assumed migration would feature prominently in the SDGs. Thus, [t]he inclusion of migration in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) in 2015 was a key milestone securing consensus among UN Member States that migration […] was indeed relevant to its mandate (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 1).57

Research gives various ideas as to the contributors that ensured migration was included in the 2030 Agenda. Also discussed are the roles different actors played, beyond states such as Sweden and Bangladesh, who wanted to see migration included (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 9).58 Lebon-McGregor (2020b, p. 151) argues that “a select group of individuals sought to insert carefully crafted paragraphs into key documents” throughout the process. Yet, the role of individuals in international relations remains a research gap (see section 7.4.1). For all actors the primary task […] was convincing development actors, and reluctant states of the salience of migration as an enabler of development, while simultaneously balancing the differing interests of GMG constituents through the incorporation of both a management and human rights perspective (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, pp. 140–141).

The first group that worked on including migration into the SDGs, and therefore mainstreaming migration into development policies, was comprised of UN agencies, the World Bank, and IOM (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 9). Although, these agencies had very different perceptions of why migration should be part of the 56

The Addis Ababa Action Agenda was agreed on during the Third International Conference for Development in July 2015 in Ethiopia (United Nations, 2015b) and adopted by the UNGA with resolution 69/393 (United Nations General Assembly, 2015a). 57 For an in-depth analysis of the process leading up to the adoption of the SDGs, the arguments made for why migration should be included, the several actors involved and a discussion of the reasons why migration has been included in the way we do find it in the agreed outcome of the SDGs, see chapter 6 of Elaine Lebon-McGregor (2020b). 58 For a human rights perspective on the SDGs, see for example “Sustainable Development Goals and Human Rights” (2020), edited by Kaltenborn, Krajewski and Kuhn.

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outcome. Whereas some organizations, like the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO), the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) or the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) brought forward quite pragmatic arguments about migration, others, such as the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) or the United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF), argued for the moral necessities of including migration (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, pp. 136–138). However, Not having migration in the MDGs made it harder for IOs to justify interventions in the area of migration. The inclusion of migration in the SDGs provided a ‘hook’ for various actors operating in the area of migration to legitimize their ever-expanding portfolios. The active role played by IOs to shape the language used to describe migration in the context of a new development agenda lends credence to the argument that IOs seek to influence states through constitutive power (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, pp. 151–152).

The second group that worked on migration started in 2012. This roundtable of trusted multi-stakeholders was organized by SRSG Sutherland. Called the Informals, they brought together government representatives, UN agencies, IOM (before it fully became part of the UN system), the Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), foundations, key civil society actors, and academics (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, pp. 141–142; INT-GOV #18; INT-NSA #4). This group met over the course of three years, building a “case for why and how migration refugees should figure in the SDGs” (INT-NSA #4).59 Sutherland’s goal was “to put migration, immigrant integration and refugee protection on the agenda” of the SDGs (Walsh, 2019, p. 237). With its multi-stakeholder approach informally sharing and exchanging information, amongst states, co-drafters of the SDGs, and civil society it was a very orchestrated effort to get migration, refugees into what became 10.7 and then a whole lots of debates about mainstreaming (INT-NSA #4).

The Informals group also played an important role in the GCM negotiation process (INT-NSA #4; see section 4.2.4 below). The third group, the Global Migration Group, who acted under the leadership of IOM (2013), ILO (2014), and the World Bank (2015) “prepared several position papers and made joint statements regarding the place of migration in 59

The group started small but grew to 70 to 80 people being on the general invitation list; however, meetings of all size took place (INT-NSA #4).

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the post-2015 development agenda.” They emphasized the importance of human rights for the “positive development impacts of migration” and further contributed to the effort to include migration (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 144). In 2014, the Swedish Chairmanship played a crucial role being well placed to “galvanize and communicate clear and consistent messaging to the negotiators” of the SDGs (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, pp. 144–145). Also, the 2014 GFMD Civil Society Days put the SDGs at the center of attention (GFMD Civil Society Days, 2014). In all, the GMFD became an important platform to push for the migration and development nexus (SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, p. 19). Thus, with the GFMD the migration-development nexus has become institutionalized, and pathdependently fed into the 2030 Agenda. Research on the role and influence of civil society on the SDG process finds that while “the SDGs reflect elements of the proposals formulated by civil society actors or ideas consistent with their recommendations,” their influence “on the framing of the issues addressed by the negotiations was poor” (Sénit, 2019). During the negotiations, technical NGOs and their experts advised on specific targets of the SDGs, such as climate issues, leading to the biggest assembly of civil society […] that had ever been seen at the UN because it was a huge agenda (INT-GOV #18).60

In the case of bringing migration into the SDGs, I argue that, influential governments, UN actors, and civil society, who were part of the (wider) Informals group convened by Sutherland, helped make the case for the issue of migration (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 128). However, the impact of civil society overall on the outcome of the SDG process may be considered less than the one of UN agencies, the SRSG, or even the Informals, as this assessment shows: When Sutherland took on the migration role in 2006, the NGOs and civil society groups focused on migration hadn’t trusted him because of his background. They viewed Sutherland as lacking wither experience or the right motives, and sometimes both. That had now changed. Civil society groups had themselves been trying, without much success, to include migration in the UN’s 2030 Sustainable Development Goals Agenda. The fact that Sutherland had succeeded, along with his wider efforts in the field of migration, triggered a change in attitudes. By 2015, Sutherland had gained

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Civil society, for example, could give input during sessions part of the negotiations in the mornings, before the official negotiations would start. These sessions were then attended also by member states (INT-GOV #18).

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profound respect among civil society groups. Unfortunately, he was having a much harder time gaining the same recognition at the state level (Walsh, 2019, p. 238).

Thus, I argue, “the inclusion of migration in the SDGs marked a significant moment in the institutionalization of migration as a global policy issue.” For some, it was even “the step required to bring IOM, mostly unaltered, into the UN” (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, pp. 10, 151–153). The rise of ‘minilateralism’: The Nansen Initiative and MICIC One particular feature of migration governance is the development of “minimultilateralism” (‘minilateralism’), a term used to describe “the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact” (Naim, 2009).61 Two prominent examples are the Nansen Initiative,62 launched in 2012 by Norway and Switzerland, and the Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative (MICIC),63 launched in 2014 at the GFMD in Sweden. Both are state-led consultative processes that worked towards non-binding principles and implementing best practices for migrants in vulnerable situations. Both processes, although being state-led, allowed for stakeholder participation (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 9; Martin & Weerasinghe, 2017, pp. 140–141; INT-NSA #23). Even though the initiatives were largely “complementary,”

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The description and idea stems from Moises Naim, put forward in Foreign Policy in 2009, meaning “a smarter, more targeted approach: We should bring to the table the smallest possible number of countries needed to have the largest possible impact on solving a particular problem. Think of this as minilateralism’s magic number” (Naim, 2009). See also Betts & Kainz (2017, p. 9). 62 The Nansen Initiative is “[b]ased on the outcome of the Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement in Oslo (June 2011), Norway and Switzerland pledged at the UNHCR Ministerial Conference in December 2011 to address the need for a more coherent approach to the protection of people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and the effects of climate change. The pledge was welcomed by several states and provides the basis of the Nansen Initiative” that was founded in 2012 (The Nansen Initiative, 2020). Since 2016 it is named Platform for Disaster Displacement (PDD), who also took part in the GCM process on behalf of their member states. 63 MICIC is „a state-led yet multi-stakeholder consultative process, launched in 2014, to improve the ability of States and other actors to be better prepared for, respond to and address consequences of crises on migrants caught in the affected countries” with the goal to “[i]mprove the capacity of States and other stakeholders to assist and protect migrants in countries experiencing conflict or natural disaster” (International Centre for Migration Policy Development, 2019).

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[t]he creation of separate initiatives to look at different aspects of the human rights of vulnerable migrants exemplifies a trend towards fragmentation on global governance. […] Such a cooperative fragmentation may enhance governance performance because a smaller number of actors are able to negotiate faster and achieve potentially more progressive and far-reaching agreements […]. However, a quick negotiation process with a limited number of actors may hamper future attempts to build inclusive global migration governance (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 10).

Whereas such minilateral initiatives could hinder or reduce the need or even the appetite for a more coherent global migration governance, they have in fact helped put migration on the international agenda and allowed willing states to act in situations of crisis. Principles and needs identified for the protection of refugees and migrants developed through the initiatives have been recognized in the New York Declaration. Further, minilateralism can help address existing gaps in international protection through its “ad-hoc nature.” The state-led nature inherently leads to quicker implementation and inclusiveness on the regional level (Martin & Weerasinghe, 2017, pp. 141–142).64 Mainstreaming of migration into other global policy fields Migration has, beyond the global development space, increasingly but slowly been included and therefore mainstreamed65 into other policy fields. Fields such as development, the urban agenda, climate change, and disaster risk reduction have all been impacted. However, in practice, the actual mainstreaming of policy and practice in these areas remains a challenge. Each issue is negotiated in a different policy arena, and thus has different funding streams, actors, and goals to achieve (see Bendel & Haase, 2010 for the intersection of climate and migration). I argue that for an issue to be mainstreamed into other policy fields, it needs a multitude of actors with knowledge and access to the respective policy fields. In addition, the recognition of the mainstreamed issue must exist in both policy fields. To get there, it needs actors who are consistently able to explain and influence agendas. However, if an issue is not considered relevant—or put differently, no opportunity structures exist—it will be difficult to mainstream. 64

My findings also show that platforms such as PDD and norms developed under these initiatives have also been reflected in the GCM and that these state-led platforms have played an important role during the GCM process (INT-NSA #9; INT-IO #25). 65 Mainstreaming can be understood as “the process of making something start to be considered normal” (Camebridge Dictionary, 2021). Thus, in the case of policy fields this means that one policy area as a cross-sectional issue—and at times implementation task—is considered in one or more policy areas, or existing policies and programs (see e.g., Bendel & Haase, 2010; Wellstead & Stedman, 2015).

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Through the SDG process, migration has become more strongly connected to the development space. However, even though migration has made it into the SDGs and the GFMD is looking at both migration and development, it is still difficult to mainstream development into migration policy and governance. This was true even during the GCM process (INT-NSA #9). Additionally, the global urban agenda increasingly includes migration and mobility into its portfolio. In 2016, the UN Conference on Housing and Sustainable Urban Development focused on both sustainable development and climate change implications. In both of these areas migration and mobility also factored into the discourse (Martin & Weerasinghe, 2017, p. 145; United Nations (Habitat III), 2016). The New Urban Agenda, adopted in 2016 in Quito, prominently features migration66 and mobility and commits to strengthening synergies between international migration and development at the global, regional, national, subnational and local levels by ensuring safe, orderly and regular migration through planned and well-managed migration policies, and to supporting local authorities in establishing frameworks that enable the positive contribution of migrants to cities and strengthened urban-rural linkages (United Nations (Habitat III), 2016 para. 28).

In 2010, the Conference of the Parties (COP) to the 1992 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) for the first time acknowledged climate induced displacement, planned relocation measures, and migration as a consequence of climate change and called on states to act. By 2018, the GCM recognized environmental migration in objective 2, a big success for those pushing for this issue (IOM, 2018b; Martin & Weerasinghe, 2017, p. 144). Since then, the interconnectedness of climate change and human mobility has garnered the attention of the global agenda as well as regional and national entities for implementation of programs.67 A huge success and milestone has been the 66

Points 20, 28, 34, 42, 57, 104, 157 and 159 refer directly to refugees, migrants, and/or migration governance both on the local, national and global level (United Nations (Habitat III), 2016). 67 Ever since the inclusion of the interlinkages between the climate crisis and human mobility in the Global Compact for Migration, initiatives and activities of both, the international community and national governments, as well as NSAs and local authorities have significantly increased: The report of the UN Secretary-General in his report ahead of the first International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) prominently addressed the risks of the climate crisis for people, including forced displacement and the need for more regular migration pathways (United Nations General Assembly, 2021). The Mayors Migration Council and C40 Cities established a Global Mayors Task Force on Climate and Migration who introduced

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acknowledgement of human mobility under the loss and damage section in the COP27 cover decision of November 2022, where the conference of the parties Notes with grave concern, […] the growing gravity, scope and frequency in all regions of loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change, resulting in devastating economic and non-economic losses, including forced displacement and impacts on cultural heritage, human mobility and the lives and livelihoods of local communities (The Conference of the Parties, 2022).

Finally, the Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030 (SDFRR), adopted at the Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction and endorsed by the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), explicitly references human mobility (Martin & Weerasinghe, 2017, p. 144; Sendai Framework for Disaster Risk Reduction 2015–2030, 2015).68 Even though mainstreaming migration is still new and raises several challenges, in a relatively short amount of time, and in line with other global developments, migration has been mainstreamed into policy fields. Catalyzed by the various displacement crises all over the world, the 2030 Agenda, and the intertwined processes described above, migration has been addressed at the UN level in ways not seen prior to 2015.

key recommendations at COP26 (Mayors Migration Council, 2021). Regional initiatives who address the intersection of climate change and migration are evolving, such as the Africa Climate Mobility Initiative (ACMI) (Schweiger, 2021). Both, UNHCR and IOM have put the consequences of the climate crisis high on their agenda (International Organization for Migration, 2022; UNHCR, 2021a). And most recently, at COP27 in November 2022, climate mobility featured much more prominently (Global Centre for Climate Mobility, 2022). These examples—and there are many more—show increasing awareness, such as research and activities in this area. Yet, migration as an adaptation strategy is not yet fully acknowledged by the international community, even less so national governments in their protection, migration, and climate adaptation frameworks. 68 The Sendai Framework “works hand in hand with the other 2030 Agenda agreements, including The Paris Agreement on Climate Change, The Addis Ababa Action Agenda on Financing for Development, the New Urban Agenda, and ultimately the Sustainable Development Goals. It was endorsed by the UN General Assembly following the 2015 Third UN World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction (WCDRR)”. It is the successor instrument to the Hyogo Framework for Action (2005-2015: Building the Resilience of Nations and Communities to Disasters (UNDRR, 2021).

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Setting up a New Architecture for Global Migration Governance: The New York Declaration, the GCM and GCR (2015–2018)

[A] series of migration crises around the world in 2015 demonstrated the limits of the existing international architecture, which led […] to IOM entering the UN as a ‘related agency’ and states to decide to negotiate two Global Compacts (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 69).

The global displacement crises of 2015, which lead to record numbers of asylum seekers, particularly in Europe in 2015, significantly helped put migration on the UN’s agenda and created “pressure for change” (Ferris & Donato, 2020, p. 76). Ideas and proposals that had been developed in previous years and had not been addressed by the UN were finally brought forward (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 10; Walsh, 2019, p. 237). Hence, the migration crisis of 2015 forced a shift in migration governance: Civil society actors, regions, and cities have provided hospitality and refuge to those in need, taking on some of the roles traditionally performed by national governments and international organisations. Thus, traditional linkages between governments, international organisations, and regional integration actors are being reshaped by migration flows (Panizzon & van Riemsdijk, 2019, p. 1225).

Four major milestones characterize the years between 2015 and 2018. First, the momentum-building and crisis response in 2015. Second, the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants. Third, IOM’s entry into the UN system. And fourth, the development and adoption of the Global Compacts on Refugees and the Global Compact for Migration. These four developments led to global migration governance receiving “an update” in 2018 (Newland, 2019, p. 1). This phase, I argue, though only spanning from 2015 to 2018, led to a major shift in global migration governance. However, the impact and implementation of this phase remain to be seen. Because of developments in migration, the UN was able to react relatively quickly and convene the international community to discuss the current movements of refugees and migrants. Thus, the development of the GCM and the GCR is “best understood as setting up an ‘architecture’ or ‘ecosystem’ for encouraging international cooperation” (Lavenex, 2020, p. 674). The shift in the migration field also allowed numerous NSAs to participate in the development of the New York Declaration formally and informally and both the GCM and GCR. Amongst the NSAs were civil society networks and NGOs, the business sector, and religious entities, especially churches (see e.g. MADE

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Network, 2019; UNHCR, 2018). In addition, cities emerged more and more as actors in migration governance during this time (Thouez, 2020). Addressing the migration and cooperation crisis at the UN in 2015 [I]t was not a crisis of migration or refugees, but it was a crisis of cooperation (INT-IO #31).

Following the severe displacement and growing attention to mass displacement and movement of people over the course of a few months, the UN made migration issues high on the agenda. The way the UN responded was quite unprecedented (INT-IO #31). In 2014 and 2015, with the rise of migration impacting European political events and debates, individuals within the UN system began bringing the topic of migration to the agenda. Peter Sutherland and his team were one component of this effort. He suggested the UN build a quartet to discuss the issue of refugees and migrants. The quartet would be composed of the High Commissioner for Refugees (Antonio Guterres), the High Commission for Human Rights (Prince Said), the Director General of IOM (William L. Swing) and SRSG Sutherland himself. In summer 2015, the quartet went to Berlin and spoke with German Chancellor Angela Merkel. Sutherland and others pushed Ban Ki-Moon as UN Secretary-General “to convene national and regional leaders to develop a plan of action.” Ban’s side resisted for a long time69 (Walsh, 2019, pp. 239–240; INTNSA #4). This resistance showcases how difficult it was to get migration on the agenda of the UN in 2014 and into 2015. However, over the course of 2015, the pressure grew and in September 2015, migration began to feature more prominently on the UN’s agenda. This shift was a result of the PGA, SRSG Sutherland and his team, and other UN stakeholders, which also included Ban Ki-Moon’s commitment to the issue: On September 30, 2015, during the High-Level segment of the 70th Session of the United Nations General Assembly, the Secretary-General convened a High-Level Side event titled “Strengthening cooperation on migration and refugee movements in the perspective of the new development agenda” (United Nations, 69

For example, “Sutherland wanted to arrange a meeting between Jean-Claude Juncker the president of the European Commission and Ban Ki-Moon, but Moon did not want to get involved”. On Ban Ki-Moon’s resistance, several theories exist: First, he might not have risked “another high-profile failure” under his time to serve as Secretary-General, like the climate summit in 2009. Second, “the majority of UN member states were unaffected by the Syrian refugee crisis”, which didn’t create too big of a pressure on the UN system to act (Walsh, 2019, pp. 239–241).

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2015a). The goal of this meeting was to have an informal setting rather than a General Debate and to bring “big voices in order to speak about the crisis.” This discussion would contribute to creating momentum and action from the international community (INT-IO #31). Amongst the panelists of the event were António Guterres, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, UN SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-Moon, German Foreign Minister Frank Walter Steinmeier, the Prime Minister of the Republic of Turkey, Ahmet Davuto˘glu, SRSG Sutherland, and the Director-General of IOM, William Lacy Swing (United Nations, 2015a). Both, Ban Ki-Moon as well as the President of the 70th session of the UN General Assembly, Mogens Lykketoft, emphasized in their statements that the situation in 2015 has been the biggest and worst humanitarian crisis relating to migrants and refugees since WW II (#UNGA-2015-Ban Ki-Moon; #UNGA-2015-Lykketoft). In this regard, one also should not underestimate the power of images. Walsh (2019, p. 245) describes the photo of the boy Alan Kurdi, which went around the world in 2015, as “pivotal in one of the biggest institutional shifts in the approach to migration” at the UN. In his speech of September 30, 2015, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon directly referred to the death of the boy on the coast of Turkey: Let us make sure that the heartbreaking death of Alan Kurdi—and so many other nameless tragedies—compel us to move forward together and see the long-term benefits of integrating refugees and migrants (#UNGA-2015-Ban Ki-Moon).

Ban in his statement also laid out eight guiding principles for the migration and refugee crisis: (1) saving lives; (2) protection; (3) non-discrimination; (4) preparedness; (5) responsibility sharing; (6) cooperation; (7) managed migration; and (8) the need to anticipate future challenges (#UNGA-2015-Ban Ki-Moon). Lykketoft, in this first of three statements to be made before the end of 2015, not only reiterated the importance of international cooperation, financing for humanitarian aid, and the importance of the Agenda 2030’s aspiration for ‘leaving no one behind,’ he also laid the groundwork for substantial changes to migration governance globally. Further, he brought up the inclusion of the IOM into the UN, which happened in 2016 (#UNGA-2015-Lykketoft; INT-IO #31): we must find ways to expand and intensify global cooperation in the area of migration. The International Organization for Migration, which is outside the UN System, must be brought into this discussion (#UNGA-2015-Lykketoft).

On November 20, 2015, a meeting of the General Assembly on Agenda Item 130 titled ‘Global awareness of the tragedies of irregular migrants in the

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Mediterranean basin, with specific emphasis on Syrian asylum seekers’ was held (Ferris & Donato, 2019; #UNGA-2015-Lykketoft-3; #UNGA-2015-Guterres). This meeting was of particular importance. For one, it is nearly impossible to get new items on the agenda on short notice because agreement from member states is needed (INT-IO #31). And two, because Turkey had for a long time reserved Agenda Item 130 for the situation in the Mediterranean. Turkey’s willingness to work with the PGA to focus on a formal meeting about migrants and refugees is thus notable. During the meeting, the Turkish government “spoke in support of convening a high-level plenary discussion at the UN General Assembly.” Additionally, “the Turkish deputy minister of foreign affairs raised many issues that subsequently made their way into the New York Declaration and the two global compacts.” Turkey, as chair of the 2015 GFMD, which took place in October 2015, was uniquely positioned to address the issue of migration and refugees also at the UN (Ferris & Donato, 2020). This abovementioned UNGA meeting followed an informal meeting of the UNGA the previous day, which offered “to Consider Ways to Advance a Comprehensive Response to the Global Humanitarian and Refugee Crisis” (#UNGA-2015-Lykketoft-2). There, the PGA addressed three main action points. First, “additional steps […] to provide protection to those who have been forcibly displaced.” Second, “predictable and adequate financing for humanitarian action,” in the lead up to the World Humanitarian Summit of May 2016.70 And third, “how best to enhance the support that is provided to those countries bearing the greatest burden in this global crisis” (#UNGA-2015-Lykketoft-2). Lykketoft reiterated these action points and needs for the international community the following day during the formal UNGA meeting (#UNGA-2015-Lykketoft-3). The November 20, 2015, meeting subsequently led to the decision to convene a one-day high-level meeting of the plenary of the General Assembly, within existing resources, on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants, on 19 September 2016 (#UNGA-2015-HLM Refugees and Migrants (A/70/L.34)).

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The World Humanitarian Summit took place in Istanbul on May 23 and 24, 2016. 180 UN member states were represented, including 55 Heads of State and governments. A total of 9000 participants accredited, with numerous NGOs, civil society, private sector and academia represented (Agenda for Humanity, 2016). The outcome document of the World Humanitarian Summit, presented by the UN Secretary-General also addressed the situation of migrants and refugees, particular referencing to the upcoming UNGA plenary meeting on 19 September 2016 (United Nations, 2016a).

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This decision was the basis for the adoption of the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants in September 2016. Thus, also during this phase we see there were committed individuals who wished to address the topic and use their leverage to do so in a strategic manner. The 2016 New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants the New York Declaration only came about because of the backdrop of the Syria crisis (INT-GOV #18).

On September 19, 2016, 120 heads of states convened in New York to address large movements of refugees and migrants. It was “a historic gathering during which global migration policy was addressed jointly with refugee policy at the UN for the first time” (Thouez, 2019, p. 1242). The summit resulted in the New York Declaration for Refugees and Migrants, which was adopted that same day by the UN General Assembly with 193 states in favor (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b). As described above, the “impetus” (Thouez, 2019, p. 1244) for the conference was the migration crisis emerging, as forced displacement was on the rise. A crisis that has increasingly impacted European countries since 2015 (see above; INT-GOV #18). Importantly, many European countries who were being impacted by the migration crisis resisted the idea of a Summit at the UN. Nevertheless, in December 2015, President of the General Assembly announced the Summit (Thouez, 2019, pp. 1244–1245; #UNGA-2015-HLM Refugees and Migrants (A/70/L.34)).71 Leading up to the Summit and throughout 2016, the New York Declaration was drafted; it was co-facilitated by Ireland and Jordan72 in consultation with numerous NSAs. Civil society had a special impact on the language and ideas used by the co-facilitators in the lead up to the summit (United Nations, 2016b; INT-GOV #17, #18, #19; INT-IO #31; INT-NSA #23). While the SDG negotiations offered a broad spectrum of inclusivity, especially for civil society, and were the model for the process leading up to the New York Declaration, the “atmosphere” towards the inclusion of civil society and other NSAs in the negotiations was quite different. It was less open and less willing 71

For an analysis of how the New York Declaration and the Leader’s Summit came about, see inter alia Thouez (2019). 72 One interviewee called the Irish Ambassador to the UN, David Donoghue, and one of the two co-facilitators of the New York Declaration, “the biggest contributor to the declaration of New York” (INT-GOV #19). Also, other diplomats valued the work of Ambassador Donoghue and his role during this process (INT-GOV #20).

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to include NSAs, especially those of developing countries.73 The reason for this was that “there was a lot of sensitivity about whether migration issues should be considered at all at the UN” (INT-GOV #18). A key platform outside formal negotiations was the work of Informals, similar to the SDG process in the past and as would happen again during the GCM process in the future. Convened by Peter Sutherland, the Informals offered a multi-stakeholder alliance to share information, knowledge, and ideas about the process (INT-NSA #4). The Summit in New York was attended by leaders from the UN System, Heads of State, Ministers, as well as representatives from civil society, the private sector, international organizations, and academia, all who also spoke at the UN. The framing and content of the Declaration reflected the goals and assessment of civil society. However, a significant gap that continued throughout the process of developing both compacts was the issue of IDPs (INT-NSA #3, #11, #23). The following day, on September 20, the US administration under the leadership of President Barack Obama held a conference dedicated to refugees that was co-hosted by Canada, Ethiopia, Germany, Jordan, Mexico, and Sweden (while the UN Summit addressed both, refugees, and migrants). Non-European countries were especially keen on having both refugees and migrants on the agenda. They were concerned about the ‘Eurocentrism’ of the so-called crisis and were concerned members would steer the focus to Syria and ignore global migrants and refugees (INT-IO #31).74 Obama’s Summit created international attention and pooled financial pledges to the refugee situation (United Nations, 2016b; Walsh, 2019, p. 250; INT-GOV #17). The New York Declaration can be considered a key milestone for global migration governance. It

73

For example, during the SDG negotiations, sessions that included civil society were built into the negotiations (‘Wednesday morning format’), while during the process leading to the New York Declaration, sessions with NSAs took place after formal negotiations (INT-GOV #18)—just like during the GCM process. 74 During the negotiations there was a lot of concern, e.g., from African countries that this process was driven by European interests who always resisted addressing migration at the UN—bot now with their own crises would want to address the issue. Thus, developing countries pushed strongly for including (almost) all aspects of human mobility into the New York Declaration, as well as to push for also a migration compact (INT-IO #31). One interviewee also noted that some governments were more ‘progressive’ on migration issues than some NGOs as there were concerns and divides, especially from actors focused purely on refugees (INT-GOV #17).

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was a big step forward in terms of breaking down the silos between member states, whereas before the New York Declaration, countries could be broadly divided into those that saw migration from a development perspective, from a human rights perspective, or from a management/ security perspective. The New York Declaration made very clear that no country can comprehensively address migration coming at it from only one perspective (INT-GOV #17).

Two major outcomes of the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants are relevant for future developments in global migration governance: First, states agreed on the comprehensive refugee response framework (CRRF).75 Second, the New York Declaration originated two major processes that eventually led to the adoption of two compacts: The Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (referred to as Global Compact for Migration, GCM) and the Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b). In addition, IOM became part of the UN system (see below). Hence, the Declaration served as a “roadmap” towards the GCM as well as the GCR (INT-IO #31). While the New York Declaration led to the development of two separate compacts with two separate processes, there were voices who called for the development of one comprehensive compact that would look at human mobility holistically (INT-IO #32; INT-NSA #23). The reasons for this are diverse. My interviews and some literature indicate that amongst the reasons were: (1) the fear of losing existing refugee protection standards set up in the post-1945 refugee regime; (2) conflicts between IOM and UNHCR and fears about the standing and financing of both organizations in the international system; (3) sensitivities and concerns from governments; and (4) “legal boundaries” that showcase “the messiness of ‘mixed migration’” (Oelgemöller, 2021; INT-IO #27, #31, #32; INT-NSA #23). Before the Summit, several milestones took place, in support of the cause: In January 2016, Karen AbuZayd was appointed as Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Summit on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants. Her role, along with to co-facilitators was to “undertake consultations with Member States and other relevant stakeholders in the lead up to the

75

The CRRF is a “comprehensive set of commitments to be implemented in situations involving large-scale movements of refugees. It lists a number of actions and best practices in four areas: reception and admission measures; support for immediate and ongoing needs; support for host countries; and enhanced opportunities for durable solutions” (UNHCR, 2016).

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Summit” (#UNSG-2015-Appointment of Karen AbuZayd).76 In April 2016, the UN Secretary-General, in preparation for the September high-level meeting put forward a report ‘In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants’ that contained background and recommendations (#Report-SRSG2016-LargeMovements (A/70/59)). It was also informed by NSAs by providing information and input (INT-IO #27). And in July 2016, the UNGA adopted the modalities resolution for the Summit (#NewYorkDeclaration-2016-SummitModalitiesResolution). IOM’s entry into the UN system One major change for the global governance on migration has been IOM’s 2016 entry into the UN system (Geiger, 2017; United Nations General Assembly, 2016a). The IOM’s entry can be seen as a “sea-change in terms of the UN’s role in migration” (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 215). The decision was made in the same session when the New York Declaration was adopted (Newland, 2018). Figure 2.2 shows IOM’s long and complex journey to the UN system.77 Several factors led to IOM becoming part of the UN system. First, the migration and refugee crisis of 2015 provided a “window of opportunity” to bring “migration into the political limelight.” Second, “the reframing of migration as a development issue” and the inclusion of migration into the SDGs. Third, the “the threat of IOM’s exclusion and […] of the creation or appointment of a new lead agency for migration within the UN” (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, pp. 183–184). And fourth, due to the forementioned issues, neither resistance by the largest donor of IOM, the United States, nor the resistance of other countries such as Germany, held up (Thouez, 2019, pp. 1248–1249).78 IOM’s entry into the UN system, whereas welcomed by many, also presented two primary questions and challenges. First, the relationship with other agencies of the UN, such as UNHCR, OHCHR, the United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN DESA) and others needed (and maybe still needs) to be clarified. Second, the concrete mandate and role in the UN system needed to be worked out (Betts & Kainz, 2017, p. 11). 76

AbuZayd’s role and appointment was also due to changes in leadership of UNHCR and to have one person leading on the process as well as a strong disagreement between agencies— IOM and UNHCR on how to address migration globally. She also helped put together the Secretary-General’s report ahead of the September Summit (INT-IO #31; INT-IO #32). 77 For an extensive analysis of IOM’s way into the UN System, with a particular focus on UN-IOM relations, see Lebon-McGregor (2020b, pp. 155–184). 78 For the consequences of the change of IOM’s role to a related agency, see Thouez (2019, pp. 1248–1250) and Geiger (2017).

2

Figure 2.2 IOM’s path to the UN system. (Source: own figure, based on Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 158)

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The Global Compact on Refugees The Global Compact on Refugees (GCR) was adopted by the UNGA in December 2018.79 It focuses on practical measures to support the global refugee system, e.g. through the Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF), which had already been decided on during the New York Declaration in 2016 (UNHCR, 2018). In 2016, the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants tasked UNHCR to apply the CRRF in collaboration with states and consultation with stakeholders with the following four objectives: (1) “ease pressures on the host countries involved”; (2) “enhance refugee self-reliance”; (3) “expand access to third-country solutions”; and (4) “support conditions in countries of origin for return in safety and dignity” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b, para. 18). In addition, governments agreed to “work towards the adoption in 2018 of a global compact on refugees, based on the comprehensive refugee response framework and on the outcomes of the process,” led by UNHCR (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b, pt 19). One particularity of the development of the GCR is that some of its instruments have already been “tested in practice in parallel with the negotiations” through the CRRF in the pilot countries (Angenendt & Biehler, 2018, p. 3).80 Further, [t]he GCR articulates an important transformation in traditional refugee-hosting models. It builds upon widespread recognition of the inadequacy of costly and open-ended ‘care and maintenance’ approaches to refugee management, which address only the basic assistance and protection needs of refugees, neglecting opportunities for greater social and economic development (Crawford & O’Callaghan, 2019, p. 1).

As planned, in 2018, the UNGA affirmed the GCR as a non-binding global framework for more predictable and equitable responsibility sharing in recognition that solutions to refugee situations require international cooperation. The CRRF is incorporated into the Global Compact and the two frameworks share the same four objectives. The CRRF has been rolled out

79

In comparison to the GCM it was much less contested. 181 countries voted in favor. Only the US voted against the GCR. The Dominican Republic, Eritrea and Libya abstained (Lavenex, 2020, p. 681). 80 As the CRRF has been gone to implementation right after the adoption of the New York Declaration, there is a broad set of literature and evaluation of its implementation so far (see e.g., Angenendt & Biehler, 2018; Crawford & O’Callaghan, 2019). Also cities have become partners in its implementation (Stürner, 2020).

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in 15 countries in Africa, Asia and South America thus far (Crawford & O’Callaghan, 2019, p. 2).

In comparison to the GCM, the GCR, which was agreed upon in 2018, is less visionary. Rather, it “complements existing international refugee law” and puts the burden and responsibility sharing at center (Lavenex, 2020, p. 684). The negotiation process of the GCR was led by UNHCR (Angenendt & Koch, 2017, p. 21), which was a new structural set up in the UN system. The negotiation process engaged not only states, but also other stakeholders, such as partners of UNHCR, civil society, and refugees themselves. Those stakeholders could give input in five thematic sessions, culminating in a stocktaking exercise which occurred in 2017. This was then followed by six formal consultations on the drafts of the GCR throughout 2018 (Türk, 2019, p. 577). This process, one quite similar and parallel to the development of the GCM, was led by the UN. However, the “drafting of the GCR was less inclusive and bottom up” than the GCM (Lavenex, 2020, p. 681). The negotiation process of the GCR was led by UNHCR (Angenendt & Koch, 2017, p. 21), which was a quite new structural set up in the UN system. The negotiation process engaged not only states, but also other stakeholders, such as partners of UNHCR, civil society and refugees themselves. Those stakeholders could give input in five thematic sessions, culminating in a stocktaking exercise in 2017, followed by six formal consultations on the drafts of the GCR in 2018 (Türk, 2019, p. 577)—quite similar and parallel to the development of the GCM, led by the UN. However, the “drafting of the GCR was less inclusive and bottom up” than the GCM (Lavenex, 2020, p. 681). One major exception—even though the compacts were developed in two separate processes—was that the GCR would also address the reality of mixed migration movements and protection needs beyond the Geneva Refugee Convention. While this is very much reflected in UNHCR’s mandate—e.g., by also addressing climate induced-mobility, IDPs and people fleeing violence—and has been actively included in the first draft, “the final version of the GCR leaves the decision to offer protection on wider grounds to the states” (Lavenex, 2020,

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p. 682).81 However, the GCR has influenced refugee policies and debates since its adoption.82 The Global Compact for Migration [The GCM] has brought one of the last outstanding global issues into the United Nations (Newland, 2018).

The GCM, like the GCR, emerged „from the multiple global migration crises of 2015 and 2016, which convinced even the wealthiest destination countries that they cannot handle the chaos and danger of unplanned large-scale migration on their own” (Newland, 2018). On December 19, 2018, the GCM negotiations resulted in a document consisting of 23 objectives (see Table 2.2) that were adopted by the UNGA with resolution 73/195 (United Nations General Assembly, 2018). Earlier that month, states committed to the GCM during an intergovernmental conference held in Marrakech (United Nations, 2018b). The GCM is different from the GCR as it represents a politically negotiated agreement and is therefore even more relevant to global migration governance. It has created new structures of reporting, reviewing, and follow-up through the UN Migration Network and the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) (see section 2.2.5). However, it is a “totally aspirational” document (INT-NSA #4). The GCR is a much more practical agreement focusing on implementation of certain measures and tools in the pre-defined refugee protection space. In addition, “the elaboration of the GCM was much more inclusive and participatory than the GCR” (Lavenex, 2020, p. 680).83 Thus, while the UNHCR was responsible for the creation of the GCR, the GCM was negotiated directly at the UN 81

Paragraph 61 of the GCR reads as follows: “Mechanisms for the fair and efficient determination of in- dividual international protection claims provide an opportunity for States to duly determine the status of those on their territory in accordance with their applicable international and regional obligations (A/RES/72/150, para 51), in a way which avoids protection gaps and enables all those in need of international protection to find and enjoy it. In the context of large refugee movements, group-based protection (such as prima facie recognition of refugee status) can assist in addressing international protection needs, where considered appropriate by the State” (United Nations, 2018a, para. 61). 82 See for example on Europe “The EU Pact on Migration and Asylum in light of the United Nations Global Compact on Refugees”, edited by Carrera & Geddes (2021). 83 Lavenex (2020, p. 680) explains this with the “existence of a prior refugee regime,” where UNHCR was in the position to take over leadership for the process—for the GCM in “contrast, leadership on migration was missing,” as IOM did not have a “normative mandate,” was “new to the UN system” and the “director general changed during the GCM preparation.”

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level, with the ambassadors of Mexico and Switzerland acting as co-facilitators (INT-NSA #12). The GCM was developed in three main phases: (I) the consultation phase, (II) the stocktaking phase,84 and (III) the intergovernmental negotiations phase (IOM, Table 2.2 The 23 GCM objectives GCM objectives for safe, orderly and regular migration 1

Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies

2

Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin

3

Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration

4

Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation

5

Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration

6

Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work

7

Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration

8

Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants

9

Strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants

10 Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration 11 Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner 12 Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral 13 Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives 14 Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle 15 Provide access to basic services for migrants 16 Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion 17 Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration (continued) 84

In December 2017, the UN Secretary-General in his report ‘Making Migration work for all’ emphasized towards the end of the consultation phase, entering the negotiations: “I wish to express my gratitude to all Member States, entities of the United Nations system and other stakeholders that have contributed to the consultation phase of the global compact process.

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Table 2.2 (continued) GCM objectives for safe, orderly and regular migration 18 Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences 19 Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries 20 Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants 21 Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration 22 Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits 23 Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration Source: Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (United Nations General Assembly, 2018)

2018a; Newland, 2017, p. 7). Throughout the process, but especially in phases I and II, both NSAs as well as local authorities were able to contribute to the process and influence outcomes of the GCM. As the role and influence of these actors is the key question of this research, the GCM process will be extensively analyzed in chapter 4’s discussion of NSAs and chapter 5’s discussion of local authorities. The negotiations ended as planned with an agreed outcome of the GCM in July 2018, however the adoption was planned for December 2018 at the Marrakech conference. Whereas the negotiated text of July 2018 was agreed upon by 192 out of 193 member states of the UN (all member states except the United States who did not participate in drafting the agreement because they feared it would violate their sovereignty) (Newland, 2018), the UNGA resolution in December 2018 was only adopted by 152 member states; 5 countries voted against the GCM (Czech Republic, Hungary, Israel, Poland, and the United States), 12 abstained (Algeria, Austria, Australia, Bulgaria, Chile, Italy, Latvia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Romania, Switzerland, and Singapore) and others were not present for the vote. Thus, between July and December 2018, states increasingly pulled back from the agreement. Said states were influenced by internal debates that, like the US […] I welcome the decision of the General Assembly that the Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration will take place in Morocco in December 2018” (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 84).

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already experienced during negotiations, feared the Compact would violate their sovereignty (Lavenex, 2020, pp. 674, 681). With its broad and far-reaching objectives, the GCM covers almost all aspects of international migration and “largely replicate[s] the approach of various international migration fora since the 1990s” (Lavenex, 2020, p. 683). However, some aspects are left out, such as IDPs (INT-NSA #3). The vision of the GCM can be summarized as twofold: cutting down on the negative factors that compel people to leave their homes—from poverty and a lack of opportunity to high crime rates and climate change—while amplifying the benefits that migration can bring individuals, communities, and countries of origin and destination (Newland, 2018).

The GCM’s objectives are so broad and diverse, that some observers fear states would rather ‘cherry-pick’ the objectives that suit their interests and goals rather than work towards comprehensive implementation (Kainz & Betts, 2020, p. 18; Lavenex, 2020, pp. 686–687). The GCM is not a legally binding contract. Rather, it represents a political declaration of intent by states, adopted by an UNGA resolution, who “made political and moral commitments to pursue its aims” (Newland, 2018; see also Walsh, 2019, p. 250).85 However, the GCM could qualify as ‘soft law’ and thereby create some pressure to implement (Deutscher Bundestag Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 2018, p. 31).86 Further, it establishes “benchmarks against which State behaviour can be measured” (Martin & Weerasinghe, 2017, p. 126). While the GCM

85

The character of the GCM and GCR can be compared to the SDGs or the Paris Agreement on Climate Change in its non-binding, however normative character (Lavenex, 2020, p. 674) 86 In addition, soft law can contribute to the emergence of legally binding international law (hard law) by being incorporated into international treaties or by developing into customary international law over time. At present, neither the migration pact itself nor its planned endorsement as a UN resolution can be used to infer the general legal conviction necessary for the emergence of customary international law. Rather, other indications would have to emerge over time that would lead to the conclusion that the states recognize the migration pact as a whole or individual of its obligations as legally binding. In addition, the necessary legal conviction (opinio iuris) would have to be accompanied by a corresponding general practice of the states. On the other hand, soft law can also have a steering effect through the concretization of applicable international or national law. At the international level, this involves the possibility of specifying and concretizing obligations under international treaties. At the national level, it is about the consideration of ‘soft law’ by authorities and courts (Deutscher Bundestag Wissenschaftliche Dienste, 2018, p. 31).

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Table 2.3 Ratification of international conventions and agreements on migration Agreement

Date

Entered into force on

Ratifications/ in favor87

ILO: Migration for Employment Convention (Revised) (No. 97)

01 Jul 1949

22 Jan 1952

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (The 1951 Geneva Refugee Convention)

28 July 1951

22 April 1954

145

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

31 Jan 1967

4 Oct 1967

146

53

ILO: Convention concerning 24 Jun 1975 Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (No. 143)

09 Dec 1978

28

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW)

18 Dec 1990

1 July 2003

57

ILO: Convention on Domestic Workers (No. 189)

16 Jun 2011

05 Sep 2013

35

New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants and Comprehensive Refugee Response Framework (CRRF)

19 Sep 2016

–

193

Global Compact on Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (GCM)

19 Dec 2018

–

152

Global Compact on Refugees (GCR)

19 Dec 2018

–

181

Source: own updated table based on SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, p. 15

87

The number of ratifications was researched and updated in September 2022. The New York Declaration, the GCM and GCR as non-binding agreements did not need ratification, however as important norm-building milestones have been included in this overview. These numbers reflect the votes in favor of the agreements in the respective UNGA sessions.

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affirms existing international provisions [, it] also points out some fields where references to international law are ambiguous and a few issues such as labor migration, for which the compact encourages the elaboration of new international agreements (Lavenex, 2020, p. 683).

Thus, the relevance of the GCM will depend on its implementation and review process, both at the international (UN) level as well as at regional and national levels (Lavenex, 2020, p. 674). However, the agreement led to one major success: “it has brought one of the last outstanding global issues into the United Nations” (Newland, 2018).

2.2.5

Post GCM and GCR: Insecure Times of Implementation, Review, and Follow-up

Migration has never had a coherent multilateral governance framework and the mere existence of the GCM does [not] […] immediately change this (Kainz & Betts, 2020, p. 18).

The adoption of both compacts in December 2018 left the international community with non-binding institutions and processes that changed the collaboration and structures of migration governance: The GCM process set in motion a range of institutional changes in the global governance landscape on migration—some of which addressed the fragmented nature of global migration governance by repurposing already existing fora. […] Despite these changes, mainstreaming migration within the UN system remains a challenge and the centre of gravity for consequential decision-making continues to lie with states (Kainz & Betts, 2020, p. 17).

The non-binding character of the commitments “means that their actual impact on what happens on the ground remains to be seen” (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 220). The implementation, review, and follow up of the GCM In the context of the Global Compact for Migration, two major changes and processes have been set up: the UN Migration Network88 and the International 88

In addition, in its December 2016 resolution, the UNGA decided on the continued effort on migration and development. The resolution on international migration and development decided “to hold the third High-level Dialogue on International Migration and Development

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Migration Review Forum. Yet, in the online survey, taken at the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, between February and September 2020, stakeholders referred to the slow start of implementation processes, fearing that national governments would not put GCM implementation high on their agenda. In addition, stakeholders were concerned with the lack of indicators and the formal process of measuring progress, as the GCM was not “designed to create accountability” (Online Survey #Q18). The UN Migration Network, coordinated by IOM, was tasked with supporting governments, coordinating states, relevant stakeholders (meaning NSAs), “UN agencies, and other members such as the World Bank Group or the UN University” in implementing the GCM (Kainz & Betts, 2020, p. 17).89 Formally the Network is the successor of the Global Migration Group (Global Migration Group, 2018b; Lebon-McGregor, 2020a, p. 144). Additionally, through the Mayors Migration Council’s seat at the decision-making mechanism for the Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF), cities have become a relevant stakeholder for the network (Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund, 2020, p. 10). The Network has now established itself as the leading “engine of the GCM within the United Nations” (Kainz et al., 2020, p. 7). Through IOM joining the UN system and the UN Migration Network rooted within IOM, other UN agencies are now also in a position of pushing international norms and standards about migration into the Network’s agenda (INT-IO #27). Additionally, as agreed on in the GCM, the International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), which takes place every four years, has become a structure for states to come together on a regular basis to review to progress made so far. The first IMRF took place in May 2022 in New York. In 2020, the regional review processes started, coordinated by the UN Migration Network (Guild & Basaran, 2020; Kainz et al., 2020).90 Preparations for the IMRF happened on several levels:

in the first half of 2019, early enough to inform the high -level political forum on sustainable development which will review the Goals and targets relevant to migration of the 2030 Agenda” (#UNGA-2016-MigrationDevelopment (A/RES/71/237), para. 34). 89 The UN Migration Network is formally coordinated by the director-general of IOM. It is responsible for the UN Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund, for establishing a knowledge platform and a so-called Connection Hub as part of their task to build and strengthen capacities (Kainz et al., 2020, p. 7). 90 For a detailed analysis of the progress on the implementation of the GCM and the work of the UN Migration Network see e.g. Guild & Basaran, 2020; Kainz et al., 2020; Newland, 2019, 2020.

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In October 2020, the UN Secretary-General presented a first report ahead of the IMRF on the status of the implementation of the GCM in the context of the COVID-19 pandemic (United Nations General Assembly, 2020). There, he emphasized the importance of a “cooperative framework on migration” (United Nations General Assembly, 2021). Another report has been put forward by the UN Secretary-General with key recommendations for the IMRF, followed by a briefing for member states and stakeholders at the UN in late 2021 (The President of the UN General Assembly, 2022a; United Nations General Assembly, 2021). The UN Migration Network set up several formats ahead of the forum; for example, the IMRF Dialogue Series looked at different objectives of the GCM (January and April 2022). During ‘Migration Week,’ several events dedicated to the GCM took place (February 2022). Member states and stakeholder briefings were held via the United Nations Network on Migration (2022c). Additionally, the UN Migration Network launched a Pledging Initiative for the GCM in late 2021, which asked for “measurable commitment[s] to advance the implementation” of the GCM (United Nations Network on Migration, 2021a). Interactive discussions and knowledge sharing was encouraged on an ongoing basis via the Migration Network Hub (United Nations Network on Migration, 2022c).91 Further, key to GCM implementation is the ‘Champion Countries Initiative’, which to date has more than 20 member countries, from Africa, Asia, Latin America, Western Europe, and North America, that agreed to demonstrate and galvanize support for implementation of the GCM (Kainz et al., 2020, p. 7; United Nations Network on Migration, 2020).92 They received dedicated support and began spearheading national processes (United Nations Network on Migration, 2022a). However, there are difficulties in the process of becoming a Champion Country. For example, it is lacking publicly available criteria for

91

In addition, IOM with the UN Migration Network introduced the Migration Governance Indicators (MGI) to help governments map the implementation of GCM objectives. The tool was already introduced in 2016 (Guidance Note on Migration Governance Indicators, 2021). 92 As of April 2022, Champion Countries include Azerbaijan (January 2022), The People’s Republic of Bangladesh (October 2020), Canada (October 2020), Costa Rica (November 2021), Ecuador (October 2020), Egypt (June 2021), El Salvador (December 2020), The Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (October 2020), Ghana (October 2020), The Republic of Honduras (March 2021), The Republic of Indonesia (December 2020), Luxembourg (January 2022), Mali (December 2021), Mexico (October 2020), The Kingdom of Morocco (October 2020), Nepal (October 2020), Niger (September 2021), Nigeria (April 2021), Panama (March 2022), The Republic of the Philippines (October 2020), Portuguese Republic (December 2020), and, The Kingdom of Thailand (October 2020) (United Nations Network on Migration, 2022a).

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becoming a champion or existing implementation plans that are in place (Guild & Atak, 2022). For both the IMRF progress declaration and facilitation process, the ambassadors of Bangladesh and Luxembourg were appointed co-facilitators (The President of the UN General Assembly, 2022c). Shortly after taking up their roles, the ambassadors began consulting with stakeholders. In addition, in some national contexts, stakeholders have been consulted about their national implementation report (which is voluntary). The first IMRF itself took place in May 2022 at the UN in New York. It resulted in a progress declaration, adopted by the UN General Assembly (United Nations General Assembly, 2022). The agenda was clustered into four multistakeholder roundtables, a policy debate, and a plenary, structured around GCM objectives. A total of 19 in-person and 50 virtual side events took place (United Nations Network on Migration, 2022b). Based on previous processes, civil society actors, as well as mayors and their organizations, were able to push for concrete progress on particular issues, such as climate mobility, or ending child immigration detention (Huckstep & Dempster, 2022; International Detention Coalition, 2022). Yet, while all this is happening on the intergovernmental level, in coordination with regional and subregional actors as well as stakeholders, in comparison to the Paris Agreement, for example, “there is no obligation to draft ambitious and progressive action plans” (Lavenex, 2020, p. 686). The GCM has a non-binding nature. It is a result of voluntary national reviews that include NSAs and cities who are important to the process but have little ability to push forward any process or actively lobby governments to act. The outlook in section 7.2 addresses most recent developments and reflections of global migration governance going forward, and the role of NSAs and local authorities (Figure 2.3). The follow-up and review of the GCR The adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees in 2018 was followed by the Global Refugee Forum (GRF) in 2019.93 The next GRF will take place in December 2023. It serves as the structure for follow-up and review of the GCR and is similar to the GCM process (Lavenex, 2020, p. 687). Like the IMRF, the GRF is

93

The first GRF “did not reveal great ambition. One of its main outputs was the publication of the contributions made by states, international organizations, local governments, civil society, business, and refugees on a public platform” (Lavenex, 2020, p. 687).

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UN-led UN Secretary General

UNCTAD

Actors

UNODC UNESCO UN General Assembly

UNICEF

UNHCR UNDESA

UNDP ILO

World Bank OCHCR

UN Migration Network (coordinated by IOM)

inter-state

UNFPA UNITAR

other NGOs

Cities States

UN Regional Committees

IOM

Private Sector

Dialogues

UNU WHO FAO UN Women

UN High-level Dialogue on Migration and Development

International Migration Review Forum

Global Refugee Forum

Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD)

Regional consultative processes

Bilateral negotiations

Figure 2.3 Actors and dialogue formats in global migration governance today. (Source: own, updated figure based on SVR-Forschungsbereich, 2016, p. 16)

held every four years. In addition, every two years the High-level Officials Meeting is held. This meeting between the Forum and the High Commissioner reports annually to the UN General assembly (UNHCR, 2020b).94 The CRRF continues to remain a relevant framework for implementation, however, its implementation appears to be closely linked to the pledges made at the GRF (UNHCR, 2019a, 2019b). The GCR—like the GCM—puts an emphasis on capacity building, both for states and other actors. In addition, through responses to specific situations, the international response should be improved (Lavenex, 2020, pp. 687–688). More coherent and yet fragmented? Migration governance going forward Another major challenge for migration governance are mixed movements—yet given the setup of the two compacts, the issue is rarely addressed and leaves a gap (Ferris & Donato, 2020, p. 128). Initially, there was hope that even though the two compacts were negotiated separately, the international community would focus on the intersections between them. On topics such as mixed migration movements or climate-induced mobility, this has remained modest to date; conversations on shared issues take place in isolation, in the context of one or the other compact, and national implementation plans do not identify room for closer coordination of efforts or combined funding. This widening gap is in part a result of lingering concerns from UNHCR and some governments that bringing refugee and migration issues too closely together would either dilute the 94

The first Progress Report on the GCR has been published in July 2020 (UNHCR, 2020a).

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traditional protection space carved out for refugees or dramatically expand the obligations placed on countries to protect other people on the move. Divided responsibility for refugee policy and migration policy within governments also explains some of the problem[s], and the separation is replicated within the UN system (Kainz et al., 2020, p. 2).

Even though much can be said about the processes of implementation and review—some of which are delayed because of the COVID-19 pandemic—the effects and outcomes will only be seen in a few years’ time.95 Sandra Lavenex who analyzed whether the compacts would contribute to a new and substantiate architecture, argues that the compacts are unlikely to deliver on experimentalist expectations. If well orchestrated and inclusive, however, they may help preserve some of the normative substance that has been guiding liberal democracy after 1945 (Lavenex, 2020, p. 675).96

The main task for more coherence in migration governance sits with the UN system, its relevant agencies, especially UNHCR and IOM, as well as the donor governments. Part of such a substantive architecture must also be actors other than states who work on implementation and review of the compacts and pressure their governments to do so. Yet, both the GCM and the GCR “are likely to fall short in ensuring meaningful refugee, migrant, and host community participation in implementation” (Ferris & Donato, 2020, p. 131). Additionally, the GFMD needs to find its place and role in global migration governance. Regardless, it will remain a place to exchange ideas about issues of migration and development outside of the UN. The inclusive structures of the GFMD have increasingly been reflected in the work of the UN Migration Network and GCM implementation, with similar actors engaging.

95

There are multiple challenges for GCM implementation that need to be addressed, from the “need to bring countries together with collective action […] beyond […] the North–South divide”, to focusing “ more on implementation of the GCM in the global north, ensure[ing] more accountability by all states”, as well as to “work towards more evidence-based monitoring and reporting on GCM implementation” (Frouws, 2021). 96 Lavenex works with the concept of global experimentalist governance and defines this (quoted from De Búrca, Keohane, and Sabel 2014, p. 478) as “an institutionalized transnational process of participatory and multilevel problem solving, in which particular problems (and the means of addressing them) are framed in an open-ended way, and subjected to periodic revision by various forms of peer review in light of locally generated knowledge” (Lavenex, 2020, p. 476)

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Further, the effects of the COVID-19 pandemic, geopolitical developments, and new migration patterns as well as protection needs will impact migration governance going forward (see research outlook in section 7.4; Betts, 2022) (Table 2.4)

2.3

Understanding the actors under investigation

Even though the study of NSAs has evolved in recent years, “[a]uthors often struggle to find accurate terms that reflect the type of organizations they are studying” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 66). In this research, I want to be specific about which concepts and definitions of NSAs used. Thus, in this chapter I address the general definition of NSAs, which includes understanding the coalition building of these actors in the international system (see section 2.3.1) as well as their emergence and standing in global migration governance (see section 2.3.2). In addition, I clarify the role of cities as ‘local governments’ (see section 2.3.3).

Table 2.4 Timeline of key milestones for global migration governance 1919

ILO

1949

ILO Migration for Employment Convention (Revised; No. 97)

1950

UNHCR

1951

PICMME (today’s IOM)

1951

Convention relating to the Status of Refugees (The 1951 Refugee Convention)

1954

First UN World Population Conference, Rome

1967

Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees

1975

Convention concerning Migrations in Abusive Conditions and the Promotion of Equality of Opportunity and Treatment of Migrant Workers (ILO)

1985

First Regional Consultative Process (RCP): Intergovernmental Consultations on Asylum and Immigration

1990

International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families (ICRMW)

1994

International Conference on Population and Development, Cairo

1997

New International Regime for Orderly Movement of People (NIROMP)

1997

Working Group on Migration established by Human Rights Commission (continued)

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Table 2.4 (continued) 1997

Mandate creation Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, appointed by the UN Commission on Human Rights (Gabriela Rodríguez Pizarro, Costa Rica)

1999

Launch of The Hague Process on the Future of Asylum and Migration Policy

2000–2002 UNHCR Global Consultations on International Protection 2000

Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons Especially Women and Children (Palermo protocol) and Protocol against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime

2001–2004 Launch of the Berne Initiative 2002

‘Doyle Report’ on International Migration

2003–2005 Global Commission on International Migration (GCIM), co-chaired by Switzerland and Sweden 2003

Establishment Geneva Migration Group (later Global Migration Group)

2004

ILO conference with focus on migration

2005

Appointment of Jorge A. Bustamante as Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants (OHCHR)

2005

ILO Multilateral Framework on Labour Migration

2005–2017 Appointment of Peter Sutherland as the first Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration 2006–2018 Establishment of the Global Migration Group (GMG) 2006

1st UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development

2007

1st Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD meeting overview, see Table 2.1)

2009

Launch of ICMC’s ‘Conversations on the Global Governance of Migration’

2011

Nansen Conference on Climate Change and Displacement

2011

ILO: Convention on Domestic Workers (No. 189)

2011–2017 Appointment of François Crépeau (Canada) as Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants (OHCHR) 2012

Launch of Nansen Initiative (today Platform for Disaster Displacement)

2013

2nd UN High-Level Dialogue on International Migration and Development

2013

OHCHR Report: Migration and Human Rights: improving human rights-based governance of international migration

2013

Report by the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, François Crépeau: Global migration governance (A/68/283) (continued)

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Table 2.4 (continued) 2014

Launch of Migrants in Countries in Crisis Initiative (MICIC)

2014

Report of the Secretary-General: Promotion and protection of human rights, including ways and means to promote the human rights of migrants (A/69/277); the report was accompanied by OHCHR’s Recommended Principles and Guidelines on Human Rights at International Borders

2014

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on human rights of migrants in the post-2015 development agenda (A/69/302)

2015

Nansen Initiative: launch Agenda for the Protection of Cross-Border Displaced Persons in the Context of Disasters and Climate Change (Protection Agenda)

2015

Sendai World Conference on Disaster Risk Reduction

2015

Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)

2015

Addis Ababa Action Agenda

2015

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on recruitment practices and the human rights of migrants (A/70/310)

2015

UNGA High-Level Side event “Strengthening cooperation on migration and refugee movements in the perspective of the new development agenda”

2015

UN General Assembly meeting on “Global awareness of the tragedies of irregular migrants in the Mediterranean basin, with specific emphasis on Syrian asylum seekers”

2016

Appointment of Karen AbuZayd as Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Summit on Addressing Large Movements of Refugees and Migrants

2016

Humanitarian World Summit Istanbul

2016

Report of the Secretary-General: In safety and dignity: addressing large movements of refugees and migrants (A/70/59)

2016

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on developing the Global Compact on Migration (A/71/285)

2016

IOM becomes part of the UN system

2016

UN High-level Meeting on Addressing Large Scale Movements of Refugees and Migrant and adoption of the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants

2016

Resolution adopted by the United Nations General Assembly: International migration and development (A/RES/71/237)

2017

Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration (A/71/728); “Sutherland Report” (continued)

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Table 2.4 (continued) 2017

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on the 2035 agenda for facilitating human mobility (A/72/173)

2017

Appointment of Louise Arbour as Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration

2017

Appointment of Felipe Gonzáles Morales as Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants (OHCHR)

2017

Report of the UN Secretary-General ‘Making migration work for all’

2018

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on access to justice for migrant persons (A/73/178/Rev.1)

2018

Adoption of the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and the Global Compact on Refugees

2018

Adoption of the Global Compact on Refugees

2018

Establishment of the UN Migration Network

2019

High-Level Debate on International Migration and Development

2019

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on good practices and initiatives on gender-responsive migration legislation and policies (A/74/191)

2019–2021 UN Secretary-General’s High-Level Panel on Internal Displacement 2019

United Nations Network on Migration, 1st Annual Meeting (annually)

2019

1st Global Refugee Forum (December 2019), held every 4 years

2020

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on ending immigration detention of children and seeking adequate reception and care for them (A/75/183)

2020

Regional Reviews of the Global Compact for Migration

2020

Report of the UN Secretary-General on the Implementation of the GCM

2020

United Nations Network on Migration, 2nd Annual Meeting

2021

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on the impact of COVID-19 on the human rights of migrants (A/76/257).

2022

Report of the UN Secretary-General ahead of the first International Migration Review Forum (A/76/642)

2022

1st International Migration Review Forum, held every 4 years

2022

Report of the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants on the impact of climate change on migration

2023

2nd Global Refugee Forum

Source: own table based on Betts, 2010, 2011; Betts & Kainz, 20x17; Lebon-McGregor, 2020; Walsh, 2019 as well as own research and primary data collected

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I argue that the broad definition and understanding of NSAs best covers the diverse participation of actors in the GCM process and the variety of actors who more broadly contributed to global migration governance. Since the early 2000s, numerous groups have emerged and shifted the field of migration through their contributions to migration governance. Thus, it is crucial we look beyond civil society, classical NGOs, and the private sector.

2.3.1

Non-state actors

The definition of non-state actor (NSA) includes a wide variety of actors. I follow the understanding of Bas Arts who defines NSAs as all those actors that are not (representatives of) states, yet that operate at the international level and are potentially relevant to international relations (Arts, 2003, p. 5).

NSAs therefore include any “individual or organization that has significant political influence but is not allied to any particular country or state“ (Oxford Dictionary, 2019). The concept “comprises individuals as well as entities, the latter spanning a large range of organizations and institutions on the global, regional, sub-regional as well as the local levels” (Wagner, 2009). Authors refer to a broad spectrum of actors, ranging from international gatherings, global terrorist groups, social movements, international NGOs, epistemic communities, think tanks, cyber organizations, philanthropic foundations, stars of charitable work, transnational corporations, banks, rating agencies, major global media players, alternative media, new media, global cities, and liberation movements to global standard setting bodies (Arts, 2003, p. 5; Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 66; Marchetti, 2016, p. 74). NSAs therefore “cannot be identified by common sociological features” and most of them “possess some form of legal capacity” (Wagner, 2009). Other studies refer to non-governmental actors, non-governmental organizations, transnational actors,97 civil society actors or other terms (Nasiritousi et al., 2016, p. 113). However, the term ‘non-state actors’ still reflects the broadest set of actors. As with every concept, there is criticism towards the term. Peter Willetts (2010, p. 22) argues, that 97

“A transnational actor is defined in academic usage as any private group from within one country that engages in activities in another country, involving another private group, the foreign government, or an intergovernmental organization. Thus, transnational actors include not just NGOs but also companies, criminals, and terrorists” (Willetts, 2010, p. 23).

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[n]on-state actors is a loaded term because it privileges “states” and downgrades other actors. […] Because “non-state” is ambiguous and clearly implies a less influential actor, use of “non-state actors” should be abandoned. We can instead refer to governments and transnational actors, including NGOs, interacting in various types of international organizations.

Bearing this in mind, I commit to the term and concept of NSA as it best describes the variety of actors other than states who engage globally. Further, it is key to note that the current configuration of the global governance system, especially the multilateral system, is governed by states. I define NSAs for the purpose of this research as any group, organization, or powerful individual98 that is neither a sovereign state nor governed by states. This definition does not include armed or terrorist groups (Büthe, 2004; Marchetti, 2016; Nasiritousi et al., 2016; Wagner, 2009).99 Some would add local authorities to this broad definition of NSAs. However, I argue they have a different character (see section 2.3.3).100 I also exclude global media players or new (social) media from this research as neither acted as stakeholders in the GCM consultation or negotiation process. Media was an important actor in the final negotiation phase and between the end of the negotiations and the adoption of the GCM. However, assessing the role 98

Some definitions of non-state actors do not include individuals into their definition (Marchetti, 2016; Nasiritousi et al., 2016). However, I follow the broad definition of nonstate actors, including powerful individuals (Wagner, 2009) as they appear to have played a role in the global migration policy field. 99 For an international negotiation process like the GCM global armed and/or terrorist groups are not a relevant actor when it comes to migration (although migrants can be affected by these actors while on the move, being one reason to flee their home). However, as these groups are not legitimate stakeholders, they are excluded from this research. This is also led by the distinction developed by Peter Willets, differentiating between legitimate and illegitimate actors: legitimate ones being companies and NGOs, illegitimate being “criminals and terrorists” (Willetts, 2010, p. 23). I argue that the question of legitimacy in global governance and the access of non-state actors to the global policy level is a complex one, see e.g. Willetts, 2010, pp. 126–128. 100 Another research project in the migration field adopts a somewhat different understanding of non-state actors, which includes cities and international organizations: “PACE adopts a broad understanding of non-state actors, including media, experts, international organisations (IOs) including international city networks and cities themselves, civil society organisations (CSOs) and militant networks mobilised pro or against migrants, as well migrant-led organisations (MLOs) and more ad hoc informal mobilisations” (Agence National de la Recherche, 2020). As argued previously, for the purpose of this research, it is of utmost important to be distinct about the nature of the actors. I argue that both IOs as well as local governments differ from other non-state actors, that are considered stakeholders by the UN.

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of media and their influence on the GCM process would be a different research topic altogether.101 Why not speak of NGOs? Some argue that NGOs, who are the most prominent example of NSAs influencing the international sphere, would be a more correct concept to use in this research project. Indeed, NGOs are a crucial group within the broad definition of NSAs. However, even broad understandings of NGOs exclude for profit organizations, transnational corporations, and individuals. I thus briefly define NGOs and clarify the distinction to NSAs: UN Charter Article 71 identifies the role of NGOs and since their inception, they have been part of the international system (United Nations, 1945). Oftentimes the term ‘NGO’ is used as an equivalent to the term ‘civil society organization’ (Götz, 2019, p. 19). However, definitions of NGOs even in their broadest understandings do not include the private sector:102 In its broadest usage the term NGO is applied to any non-state, non-profit, and noncriminal organization, however large or small and regardless of its field of work (Davies, 2019a, p. 2).

NGOs have both “considerable normative power” as well as in some cases “considerable economic muscle,” as “up to two thirds of emergency relief funds may be channeled through NGOs” (Davies, 2019a, p. 1). Others would refer to and use a definition posed e.g. by Peter Willets, defining an NGO as “any organization that has, or is eligible to have, consultative status with the Economic and Social Council of the United Nations” (ECOSOC)

101

One example of an analysis of communication on the GCM is the paper by Matthias Ecker-Ehrhardt (2020) on the UN communication on the GCM on Twitter. In addition, much was reflected on why the GCM has been ‘trolled’ by right wing groups and how this has poisoned a debate in many national contexts about the pact (see e.g. Cerulus & Schaart, 2019). 102 For a broader understanding of NGO in the international system, see Götz (2019, p. 20): “‘NGO’ is a technical expression stemming from international law, which has gained currency in IR while other disciplines and fields use alternate terms for the same phenomenon. Examples include civil society, social movement organization, advocacy network, voluntary agency, think tank, pressure group, non-profit organization, or third sector organization.” There is numerous research and analysis on the role of NGOs in the UN system (Dellmuth, 2020; Global Policy Forum, 2013; Martens, 2006).

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(Willetts, 2010, p. 30).103 However, this understanding excludes a broad range of actors because the process to obtain ECOSOC status is complex and limited to NGOs that have undergone an in-depth application process (UN ECOSOC, 2019). Some authors emphasize the special feature of the broad understanding NGOs: In contrast to often broadly conceived ‘non-state actors’, ‘non-governmental organizations’ are customarily restricted to the secular, professionally run, and transnationally involved segment of civil society. However, both expressions are lexically based on a similar negation that leaves a considerable range of alternatives. Thus, academic, business, criminal, or religious organizations are occasionally subsumed under the term NGO (Götz, 2019, p. 19).

Götz (2019) subsumes business organizations under the term NGOs. However, I assert the importance of being distinct about the type, purpose, and goal of actors. For this reason, I stick to the general, broadly recognized understanding of NGOs. Further, due to the application of ECOSOC guidelines used for defining NGOs and because many of the organizations under investigation are NGOs, this research does not use the term NGO but instead NSA (UN ECOSOC, 2019). Additionally, this research includes for profit business organizations, who have been part of the GFMD and have acted as stakeholders in the GCM consultation and negotiation process (The Business Advisory Group on Migration, 2020).104 To conclude, due to the diversity of actors engaged in the GCM process, as well as migration governance in general, NGOs, even in their broadest understanding, while a crucial element to this research, are not the only NSAs being analyzed.105

103

For a definition and the role of non-governmental organizations in international politics and the UN system, especially their role in the ECOSOC of the UN see Willetts (2010, pp. 6– 31). For some authors, as well as according to the UN ECOSOC guidelines this would also include Business International NGOs (Archer, 2001, p. 40). 104 For the definition and understanding of the private sector and Business International NGOs (BINGOs), see below. In a broad definition, business associations (e.g. the International Chamber of Commerce) are understood as an NGO (Davies, 2019a, p. 2). 105 Much has been written about the constitution and construction of NGOs (see DeMars & Dijkzeul, 2019) or the role of NGOs in international law (see Noortmann, 2019). Also, the sectors, in which NGOs play prominent roles have been widely studied, such as the international development field (see Yanacopulos, 2019) or the work and role of humanitarian NGOs (Roth, 2019). In this context, also the North-South divide and hierarchy has been extensively analyzed and criticized (see for example Davies, 2019a, p. 3). While this is being well acknowledged, this research will not go into the particularities of NGO research.

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Distinction: International Organizations and state-led platforms For IR scholars it is important to distinguish “formal IOs from alternative forms of organizations.” One major difference between the two being the lesser degree of independence international organizations have in comparison to NSAs. Apart from the UN and its agencies, regional bodies, such as the European Union (EU), the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe (OSCE) as well as the World Bank (and its regional entities) are considered IOs. These entities are “vehicles of cooperation” for nation states (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, pp. 4–5). The purpose of international organizations can be described as the following: States use formal international organizations (IOs) to manage both their everyday interactions and more dramatic episodes, including international conflicts (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 3).

Whereas rationalist and institutionalist perspectives consider states as “principal actors in world politics” who use international organization for implementing “shared goals” (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, p. 6), there are a growing number of organizations that cannot be clearly assigned to either the state (public) or the non-state (private) sector. For these organizations, independence, autonomy, and legitimacy are highly contested issues: Independence means the ability to act with a degree of autonomy within defined spheres. It often entails the capacity to operate as a neutral in managing interstate disputes and conflicts. IO independence is highly constrained: member states, especially the powerful, can limit the autonomy of IOs, interfere with their operations, ignore their dictates, or restructure and dissolve them. But as in many private transactions, participation by even a partially autonomous, neutral actor can increase efficiency and affect the legitimacy of individual and collective actions. This provides even powerful states with incentives to grant IOs substantial independence (Abbott & Snidal, 1998, pp. 4–5).

Several authors consider Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs/ IOs) to be NSAs (such as the UN and its agencies, NATO or the World Trade Organization (WTO)) arguing they “are rather autonomous from states in making decisions and policies, given their expertise, formal authority, independent personnel and ties to NGOs” (Arts, 2003, p. 5). With consideration to this issue, I remain committed to the analysis and assessment posed by Bas Arts that IGOs and IOs should be excluded from the definition of NSAs. According to Arts, IGOs and IOs are

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not NSAs because “they are established by states, formally ruled by states and instrumental to state interests” (Arts, 2003, p. 5; see also Furtak, 1997). There are, however, increasingly blurred lines between NSAs and IOs. To navigate the flurry of changing organizations, Archer’s categorization helps to better understand the nature of international organizations. He presented three categories of transnational organizations (Archer, 2001, pp. 38–40): (1) the “genuine INGO [International Non-Governmental Organization] […] with only non-governmental members”; (2) the “hybrid INGO which has some governmental, some non-governmental representation”; and (3) the “transgovernmental organization (TGO) which results from ‘relations between governmental actors that are not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of their government’” (Keohane and Nye (1971), p. xv, quoted from Archer, 2001, p. 40). Other terms used for these hybrid forms of organizations are ‘quasi-governmental Organization’ (QUAGO), ‘governmentally organized NGO’ (GONGO), and ‘quasi-non-governmental organization’ (QUANGO). These terms and organization react to the often and fluid transition in political practice between state (administrative) organizations and private (corporate) organizations (Götz, 2019, p. 19; Hasmath et al., 2019; Schubert & Klein, 2018). Examples from the past also show that NGOs have been merged with governmental organizations and have “transform[ed] their status from non-governmental to intergovernmental organizations, as happened with Interpol” (Davies, 2019a, p. 6).106 As types of actors become even more blurred, so too does an increasingly multi-level governance of migration. The increase in migration governance has been exceptionally influential to the migration system, including the policy processes and practical action taken by civil society, cities and others since the

106

For an in-depth discussion of the blurring lines between civil society and states with some organizations, see Hasmath et al. (2019). They argue that “there are increasingly blurred lines between state and civil society sectors in developing and developed contexts globally. As NGOs have grown in number and scope, and with an expansion of their role in local and global governance this century, the character and function of NGOs have diversified, permeating a multitude of political, economic and socio-cultural contexts. So, too, has their relationship with states, where collaboration between both actors are expected more than ever to deliver a range of services, partially due to decentralization and cuts in state budgets” (Hasmath et al., 2019, p. 268).

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displacement crises of 2015 (Hasmath et al., 2019; Panizzon & van Riemsdijk, 2019). For this research, I apply the following distinction to assess, whether an actor is non-state (and therefore part of my sample): International Organizations and state-led (and/or state-initiated) platforms funded and steered by states are excluded from the definition of NSAs. Organizations that are funded by states but do not involve states in their steering activities (or have diversified their decision-making processes so that states do not hold majority votes) are considered NSAs. For example, state-led international organizations, aside from international organizations and UN agencies, include the International Centre for Migration Policy Development (ICMPD)107 and the Platform for Disaster Displacement (PDD)108 . When it comes to assessing the alter-perspective of these actors, the views of said international organizations is as important as any other viewpoint, e.g., from an UN agency. To conclude, for the purpose of this research I distinguish between international bodies whose members consist primary of states (IOs, IGOs), and organizations who are not state lead but may have governments as members (INGOs) (Ahrne & Brunsson, 2009, p. 41). The latter are considered NSAs for the purpose of this research.

2.3.2

Individual Non-state Actor Groups and their Role in Migration Governance

As the term ‘non-state actor’ incorporates many different groups of actors, partially overlapping in their definition, here I give a short overview of my understanding of the main groups of actors as well as how they emerged in global migration governance.109

107

ICMPD is an International Organization and holds UN Observer Status (see International Centre for Migration Policy Development, n.d.). States join ICMPD by a declaration under international treaty law (Deutscher Bundestag, 2020). 108 “The Platform on Disaster Displacement is a State-led initiative working towards better protection for people displaced across borders in the context of disasters and climate change” (see Platform for Disaster Displacement, 2020). 109 As this research applies a broad perspective to non-state actors, only a short definition and overview of the actors is given. For in-depth role assessment and discussion, when available, I refer to relevant authors and literature. An analysis of current engagement strategies,

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The Modalities Resolution110 for the GCM negation process was quite broad regarding stakeholders involved. It included “civil society, the private sector, academic institutions, parliaments, diaspora communities and migrant organizations” (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 6). On the other hand, local authorities were framed as separate contributors (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 8). This difference highlights how local authorities not only had different roles in the consultation and negotiation process, but they were also considered a different type of actor altogether. I clarify the role of local authorities in section 2.3.3. This chapter looks at the diverse actors involved in global migration governance and assesses their character and definition, traits that often overlap. These actors include civil society, religiously affiliated organizations, National Human Rights Institutions and their umbrella organization, the private sector, trade unions and worker’s organizations, academia, think tanks and epistemic communities, philanthropy, and individuals. Civil Society Civil society has been a key player in the international migration space for many years. Using the broad definition of the UN, I define civil society as: the “third sector” of society, along with government and business. It comprises civil society organizations and non-governmental organizations (United Nations, n.d.-a).

This understanding of civil society includes organizations listed below. Important to note, the classification of an organization does not always stem from a legal definition, which varies from country to country, but often the ego-perspective of actors in the space.111 Civil society has engaged in migration governance globally in several ways and roles. They can and have served as: external actors, uninvolved in government-led policy processes (e.g. the early stages of the GFMD Civil Society Days), observers (e.g. through the Global Migration Group), formal participants e.g., through the UN Migration Network, or in engagement towards and during the first International Migration Review Forum in May 2022 is not considered at this point. 110 On the access for non-state actors the GCM process, and the role of the Modalities Resolution, see section 4.1. 111 Organizations that fall under the definition of civil society of the UN, can apply for consultative status with the ECOSOC (UN ECOSOC, 2019; United Nations, n.d.-a). On the role of civil society in international relations and governance, see e.g., Peña (2019). The role and access to ECOSOC for non-state actors is discussed in section 4.1.

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or stakeholders in processes (e.g. NGOs that are accredited to the ECOSOC of the UN, or the GCM consultation process), Constituents, and core government structures (e.g. the International Labour Organization’s tripartite decision making structure) (see Banulescu-Bogdan, 2011, p. 7; Ruhlman, 2019). Civil society is a key player in the GFMD today and was listed as a stakeholder in both the New York Declaration (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b para. 15) and the Modalities Resolution for the GCM process.112 At times, other actors such as academia or trade unions have been considered part of civil society. During my research, several interviewees noted that all actors involved in the GFMD Civil Society Days would and should be considered ‘civil society.’ Whereas others critically reflected on the lack of a distinction about the definition of civil society actors (INT-NSA #1, #3, #16). Religiously affiliated organizations Increasingly more civil society organizations and NGOs, in international relations are described as “religious,” “spiritual,” or “faith-based.”113 These organizations often “present themselves as a distinct group that provides an emphasis on ethics or values as well as a particular access to the grassroots level” (Lehmann, 2019, p. 397). In international migration governance, one finds numerous organizations that can be identified as religiously affiliated and who connect their work on the global level with local engagement. For example, the Civil Society Days of the GFMD is coordinated by the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC), who also executes programs for the protection of migrants (ICMC, 2020).114 ICMC and many other organizations of similar types were active stakeholders in the GCM negotiation process. Another example are catholic faith-based organizations who cooperate with the Holy See on migration issues, as the Church “itself engages in society at every level” (INT-GOV #20). These organizations consider themselves to be part of civil society (INT-NSA #10). 112

The stakeholders listed to which this characteristic can be ascribed, are “civil society”, “diaspora communities”, “migrant organizations” (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 6). 113 For further context, see Karsten Lehmann (2019), who extensively discussed the rise, role and criticism towards religiously affiliated NGOs, as well as the state of the art of current research. 114 Another example is the Civil Society Action Committee, who understands itself as a global platform for civil society engagement on migration policy and governance. Amongst its members it has numerous organizations, who can be ascribed to the category of religiously affiliated NGOs (or civil society), such as ICMC, the Lutheran World Federation (LWF), Caritas Internationalis, or, ActAlliance (members list as of July 2020) (Civil Society Action Committee, 2020).

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National Human Rights Institutions and the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions National Human Rights Institutions (NHRIs) and their umbrella organization, the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI) are a pillar of human rights implementation and monitoring worldwide. The GANHRI represents more than 110 NHRIs. The work of the NRHIs is based on the Paris Principles of the UN. It guarantees independence of membership and sets guidelines for diversifying the decision-making structures within the organization. NRHIs are usually funded by governments (Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit, 2018; Deutsches Institut für Menschenrechte, n.d.; Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions, n.d.; United Nations General Assembly, 1993b, 1994). Thus, NHRIs are building a bridge between governments and civil society, as they are funded but not steered by governments. Because they are committed to independence from states in their positioning and decision-making, I consider them NSAs. Further, they participated as stakeholders in the consultation phase of the GCM and are explicitly mentioned in the Modalities Resolution.115 NRHIs and the GANHRI are on one hand considered stakeholders, but on their other, due to their status, encouraged to set up participation and preparation formats. The Private Sector The private sector can be broadly defined as any “businesses and industries that are not owned or controlled by the government” (Camebridge Dictionary, 2014b). This includes multinational enterprises (MNEs) and multinational corporations (MNCs). These corporations and their umbrella organizations are often titled Business International NGOs (BINGOs) and are considered one type of transgovernmental organization (Archer, 2001, p. 40). In addition, trade associations are often considered NGOs and are recognized by the UN (Doh et al., 2019, p. 361). The integrated Civil Society Organizations (iCSO) System of the UN lists the private sector as a separate type of actor with 88 registered organizations (United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs. NGO Branch, n.d.).116 Further, due to the increasing use of the private sector for consulting by 115

„national human rights institutions compliant with the Paris Principles [are invited] to register with the Secretariat in order to participate in the intergovernmental conference and its preparatory process, including the informal interactive multi-stakeholder hearings [.] […] the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions and regional human rights institution networks [are invited], to organize global and regional consultations and to contribute views to the preparatory process” (United Nations General Assembly, 2017a, para. 9). 116 Number of private sector organizations as of November 15, 2020.

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international organizations and the UN, the UN applies a broad definition to civil society. The growing involvement of the private sector in the field of international migration dates to the early 2000s. In 2005, IOM established a Business Advisory Board that understood itself as a “a sounding board and influence multiplier.” Its aim was “for IOM and the private sector to form an active and effective partnership in the development, planning and implementation of mobility policies and practices” (International Organization for Migration Business Advisory Board, 2006; see also World Economic Forum, 2013). In 2013, IOM held a roundtable “to consult with the private sector […] as part of a wide range of consultations on the role of population dynamics in the post-2015 development framework” (World Economic Forum, 2013, p. 6). Several corporations started investing in and financially supporting international processes on migration. The corporations funded research and meetings, specifically ones related to labor mobility (INT-NSA #21).117 Since 2015, when the private sector became a key pillar of the GFMD, their engagement in global migration issues has significantly increased. In 2009, during the GFMD, a prior case for stronger engagement of the private sector had been made (INT-NSA #21; Global Forum on Migration and Development, 2009). Currently, the private sector is involved in the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development. The UN Private Sector Forum, which is held annually and includes national governments and CEOs, has increasingly focused on migrants and refugees in recent years (Hinrichs & Juzwiak, 2017). The 2016 New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants invited not only “civil society, including refugee and migrant organizations,” but also the private sector “to participate in multi-stakeholder alliances to support efforts to implement the commitments [of the Declaration]” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b para. 15).118 These invitations laid the groundwork for the private sector’s increased engagement in GCM consultation and negotiation processes, specifically regarding mobility and labor migration. Some of the key international business organizations and platforms are: the World Economic Forum Global Future Council on Migration, the International Organization of Employers (IOE),

117

From example, amongst such corporations were Microsoft, Western Union, or Fragomen. The engagement of the private sectors was and is channeled through the International Organization of Employers (IOE). 118 The New York Declaration emphasizes the importance of the private sector several times (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b, para. 15, 39, 54, 69, 85).

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as well as individual corporations (World Economic Forum Global Future Council on Migration, 2017). However, there are gaps in the private sector’s level of engagement: International efforts, for example by the World Economic Forum, the International Organization for Migration (IOM) or the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD), have tended to focus on a relatively small group of companies that either have a direct business interest in migration (for example Western Union) or plan to develop one, or individual champions for migration at a senior level. Significant gaps in representation of private sector interests remain, including most prominently: [1] Nationally-owned companies from developing countries and regions[;] SMEs[;] Companies without a direct business interest in migration that may still benefit for example through a diverse workforce[.] In addition, in many companies that do actively participate but on the basis of individual champions, an interest in migration policy has not necessarily been institutionalized beyond these individuals. As a result, representation by the private sector in migration policy has been limited and is not necessarily sustainable (Dos Reis et al., 2017, p. 2).

The reasons for these engagement challenges are two-fold: One, many corporations do not have or do not want to invest resources for their staff to come to UN meetings. Two, private sector groups, with the help of other actors, such as think tanks like the Migration Policy Institute, had to make a case for being recognized as actors on international migration (INT-NSA #21). Still, today it is widely acknowledged that the “private sector plays an important role in achieving development outcomes and [that] its engagement can help strengthen the link between displacement, migration and sustainable development” (Bisong et al., 2020). To conclude, there are diverse types of private sector actors who have brought forward their claims to be included in global migration governance in the last decade and beyond. Trade unions and workers’ organizations A trade union is defined as an organization that represents the people who work in a particular industry, protects their rights, and discusses their pay and working conditions with employers (Camebridge Dictionary, 2014c).

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While in the international migration space trade unions and workers’ organizations are often considered part of civil society (GFMD Civil Society Days, 2020a),119 they differ in their constituency and ways of working: It has been pointed out that unions are membership organizations, have democratic constitutions, follow an instrumental rationality, are tied to the workplace and are formal and bureaucratic in their modes of administration. In contrast, many CSOs are informal, community-based and value-rational and aspire to serve client groups who may not in fact be members or formally in control of the organization (Heery et al., 2012).

Trade unions are part of the core governance structures in the ILO and able to directly influence workers issues (such as the private sector) (INT-NSA #8, #16; Banulescu-Bogdan, 2011, p. 7). Because workers’ rights and human rights are key issues for trade unions the GFMD outside UN structures is a cause for much criticism (INT-NSA #16). A look at the literature and statements about and from civil society and trade unions within the migration space show that their role and constituency remain quite unclear. In a statement dating back to 2007 from Building and Wood Workers International, the then still unclear role becomes evident: Unfortunately, the trade unions were not mentioned in the GFMD 2007 Report except in the introduction. I hope we were lumped with the civil society in that report but this panel today clearly indicates that trade unions are clear stakeholders in migration (Añonuevo, 2007).

Since then, labor unions, trade unions, and workers’ organizations have become an integral part of the Civil Society Days of the GFMD. However, this has only occurred alongside the inclusion of a broad set of other actors.120 Trade unions have not been explicitly mentioned as stakeholders in the Modalities Resolution for the GCM negotiation process, in contrast to the private sector, academia, and civil society which has (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b). 119

This has also been reflected in my interviews: Especially from representatives from civil society, trade unions were considered a key part of civil society. However, there has been tension around the configuration and the role of unions, for example in the GFMD, from the very beginning in 2006 (INT-IO #32; INT-NSA #1, #3, #16). 120 „Participation in the GFMD Civil Society Day is open to all sectors of civil society, including diaspora and migrant organizations, human rights, faith-based and development NGOs, labour unions and representatives from academia, think tanks and the private sector” (GFMD Civil Society Days, 2020a).

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This omission reflects the tensions that have existed since the early 2000s with the founding of the GFMD and the problems that existed then with the role of trade unions within the governance and content of the Forum (INT-NSA #16). To conclude, both national and international trade unions have increasingly played a role in international fora, such as the GFMD, about migration. Specifically, in the GCM process, while critical of the outcome of the negotiation process, “trade unions have welcomed the recognition of their role” (International Trade Union Confederation, 2018). Academia The role of academics can be quite different when it comes to international processes. Academia is considered a broad and institutionalized space for research. It is “the part of society, especially universities, that is connected with studying and thinking, or the activity or job of studying” (Camebridge Dictionary, 2014a). Academia should be independent and not influenced or driven by political agendas. Academic institutions were explicitly listed as a relevant stakeholder of the GCM consultation process (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 6). However, like with trade unions, in the migration space and during in the New York Declaration, academia is considered part of civil society (GFMD Civil Society Days, 2020a; United Nations General Assembly, 2016b para. 69).121 Epistemic Communities Epistemic communities in international relations are science-based interest groups and are defined as “a network of professionals with recognized expertise and authoritative claims to policy-relevant knowledge in a particular issue area” (Clunan, 2016). They share norms, beliefs, and strategies for engaging in the policy space and targeting the political discourse (Bendel & Haase, 2010, p. 37).122

121

Individual academics in some cases closely collaborate with civil society or understand themselves as part of civil society, as this interview quote shows: “You always have in migration a number of lead academics who have traditionally been partnering with us, with government, preparing documents for NGOs etc. So, you have that category of academics. And those I would say are natural allies. I’m not sure that beyond the usual suspect, I mean people teaching migration, teaching refugee law” (INT-NSA #1). 122 “The concept of epistemic community was first introduced by John Ruggie and then refined by Peter M. Haas. These scholars focused on the role played by networks of actors and the consensus they hold about causes and effects on state policy and interstate cooperation” (Clunan, 2016).

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Think Tanks Think tanks are important actors in global migration governance and have also shown themselves to be a key actor during the GCM process. Although they do research, they do not work according to academic standards. Rather, think tanks are defined as non-commercial research institutions that, in comparison to purely academic institutions, aim to influence public debate and political decisions in a field. Think tanks set their own research and policy agenda, they are permanent organizations, and they are formally independent (Bertram & Hoffmann, 2020, p. 11).123 Think tanks were not listed as separate actors during the GCM process, yet they were highly involved. They are presumably a hybrid actor between academia and civil society. Philanthropy Philanthropy is a complex yet historical concept of supporting charitable causes.124 As a social concept, philanthropy can be understood as “a relation, movement, organization, or other such social entity larger than the individual that embodies an explicitly defined charitable cause or good” (Sulek, 2010, p. 204). Foundations, often being the organizational structures for charitable causes or goods, can take on different legal forms as the term ‘foundation’ is not legally secured. Thus, both public and private125 foundations, with their financial opportunities, are often considered part of civil society and/or NGOs (Davies, 2019a, p. 1). Although, there are large international NGOs which have the budgetary muscle to invest in similar spaces as foundations do. Importantly, because of the different nature of giving and the financial opportunities allowed, foundations are distinct from other civil society actors. By being able to invest money into dedicated areas of work, they can influence the direction of other non-governmental organizations and set desired agendas with their financial incentives.

123

Excluded from such a definition can be consulting firms, temporary expert committees, governmental think tanks, which act according to directives, as well as institutes, which primarily carry out contract research (Bertram & Hoffmann, 2020, p. 11). 124 For an in depth discussion of the meaning and historical understanding and development of the term Philanthropy, see Marty Sulek (2010). 125 There are differentiations in public and private foundations. One major distinguishing feature between those types of foundations “is where they derive their financial support. While a public charity gets its funding from the general public, a private foundation usually has one source of funding, typically an individual, family, or corporation” (Foundation Source, 2020).

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Some foundations have even been engaged in the negotiation process of GCM since its inception. For example, the Open Society Foundations and the MacArthur Foundation were part of the Informals multi-stakeholder group convened by SRSG Peter Sutherland and his team. These foundations have also supported the process leading to the Sutherland Report (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 141; United Nations General Assembly, 2017a). Individuals Finally, individuals do not constitute a stakeholder group. Important, however is “that individuals can drive specific ideas is not new in the literature” (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, p. 114). The emergence of migration governance (see section 2.2) has clearly shown that individuals—in or beyond their function— have helped put migration on the international agenda. In her research, Elaine Lebon-McGregor (2020b, p. 114) found that most of her interviewees “identified Peter Sutherland as being a, if not the key figure in global migration governance.” In addition, both the GFMD as well as the SDG negotiation process have shown that particular individuals within IOs have actively shaped global migration narratives to ensure that both the human rights of migrants and the multifaceted relationship between migration and development have been included in a political declaration, and hence accorded legitimacy (Lebon-McGregor, 2020b, pp. 151–152).

Thus, the role of individuals is a particular case of actors to watch out for.

2.3.3

Similar but Different: Local Authorities as Actors in Migration Governance

The city, always the human habitat of first resort, has in today’s globalizing world once again become democracy’s best hope (Barber, 2013, p. 3).

Within the context of global governance, sub-state actors, which mainly include subnational governments126 and cities, have become increasingly relevant voices. They have their own agendas, specifically in the fields of international climate change and human rights issues (De Nictolis, 2020, p. 175; Hale, 2018). 126

A nation-state can be subdivided into 1) “central/ federal government and related public entities”; 2) federated government (“states”) and related public entities; 3) local government (i.e. regional and local governments and related public entities); 4) and social security funds” (OECD, 2018).

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Put differently, cities have experienced a “political renaissance” and their importance has grown “as political actors in comparison to the power of nation-states” (De Nictolis, 2020, p. 170). Further, cities have recently emerged as relevant transnational actors and stakeholders, particularly during and after the GCM negotiation process (Stürner, 2020; Thouez, 2020; INT-NSA #12; INT-GOV #14). The role of mayors and city leaders in global level migration issues started with the Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development (referred to as the ‘Mayoral Forum’). Prior to the Mayoral Forum, city leaders had only addressed migration with other cities. The Mayoral Forum was set up in 2013 during the UN General Assembly’s Second High Level Dialogue on Migration and Development (4th Global Mayoral Forum, 2017a).127 To date, six Mayoral Forums have been held.128 The New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants “recognize[d] the particular needs of local authorities, who are the first receivers of migrants” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b, para. 54). The 2017 Sutherland Report recommended to systematically include “[r]epresentatives of local authorities […] in national delegations at international meetings on migration, including the GFMD, UN High Level Dialogues, and the 2018 intergovernmental migration conference” (Report of the Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Migration. A/71/728, 2017, para. 76 b). In the modalities resolution of the GCM, however, local authorities were not listed as stakeholders alongside civil society or the private sector (see United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 6) but rather as contributing entities in a different section of the document [The General Assembly] Underlines that relevant stakeholders, including civil society, scientific and knowledge-based institutions, parliaments, local authorities, the private sector and migrants themselves, will be able to contribute views, in particular through informal dialogues to which they will be invited by the co-facilitators; the intergovernmental nature of the negotiations, however, will be fully respected (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 8).

127

The Mayoral Forum “provides an incubating space where local leaders can share practical and inventive solutions for governing migration, protecting rights and promoting inclusive urban economic growth [and] […] acts as a bridge, opening access for cities and regional governments to policy circles where they can inform, and be informed by, national and international policy-making” (4th Global Mayoral Forum, 2017a). 128 The following Mayoral Fora have been held: (1) Barcelona (2014), (2) Quito (2015), (3) Quezon City (2016), (4) Berlin (2015), (5) Marrakech (2018), (6) Quito (2020) (4th Global Mayoral Forum, 2017a; 6th Mayoral Forum, 2020; Marrakech Mayors Declaration, 2018)

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Nevertheless, as requested for many years prior, the mention of cities, framed as ‘local authorities,’ made it into the Modalities Resolution of the GCM. The reasons for this were two-fold: first, cities were not considered a ‘negotiating party’ in the process and yet there was a strong desire for the UN system to include them. This desire came specifically from co-facilitators and other advocates for cities. Second, there have been recent developments around city diplomacy on migration, leading up to the GCM, for example during the 2017 4th Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration, and Development in Berlin (INT-GOV #14; INT-GOV #24; GFMD, 2020c).129 As seen in the ‘Marrakech Mayors Declaration’ presented at the Intergovernmental Conference to adopt the GCM in December 2018, cities elevated their voices and insisted they were an integral part of future global migration governance (see Marrakech Mayors Declaration, 2018).130 This 2018 declaration as well as the Mayoral Forum itself constitutes the foundation of the GFMD Mayors Mechanism as well as the Mayors Migration Council (MMC). The December 2018 announcements by the GFMD Mayors Mechanism and the MMC combined with strong engagement from city leaders has pushed city participation in international migration governance to the center (Acuto, Kosovac, Pejic, et al., 2021, p. 2; Kaminis et al., 2018; Stürner, 2020; Thouez, 2020). This shift constitutes part of a global trend: Cities have long been shunned by international bodies such as the United Nations, and city leaders have also struggled to raise capital, including from financial institutions like the World Bank. When they participated in global agenda-setting at all, their involvement was often passive and channeled through national governments. But now the tide is turning (Muggah & Thouez, 2018).

Whereas cities are not non-state by nature nor traditional actors in global migration governance, they have emerged as actors throughout the GCM negotiation process (Stürner, 2020; Thouez, 2020) and therefore are included in this research. The influence of cities in the GCM negotiation process will be analyzed in chapter 5. There, I argue that local authorities form similar but different cases than NSAs.131 More so, at this point in time, clarifying the status and role of 129

For a more detailed analysis, see chapter 5. This Declaration has been adopted at the 5th Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development in December 2018 in Marrakech and was adopted by a record number of over 150 mayors (Migration4Development, 2018). 131 On the important role of cities in the development and implementation of the Global Compact on Refugees, see Brandt and Henderson (2018). 130

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cities in the international system has become necessary—for both the precision of this research and for future analysis of cities in international (migration) governance. While some authors would add cities and municipalities to the broad set of NSAs (see e.g. the framing of Hale, 2018, p. 2; Marchetti, 2016, p. 16), I argue that while similarities exist so too do important differences. Those differences support the need for a clear distinction and definition of the role of cities in the international governance system. In my research, I ask: what characterizes cities as actors in the international governance system and what makes them distinct from other NSAs? Cities as subnational actors are part of but also distinct from national government. ‘Cities’ can be broadly defined as “local governments” (Acuto & Rayner, 2016, p. 1150). They are part of the diverse multi-level governance system and must implement national and international decisions as well as norms. However, local governments are also transgovernmental actors who are “not controlled by the central foreign policy organs of their government” (Keohane and Nye (1971), p. xv, quoted from Archer, 2001, p. 40). Cities increasingly engage in city networks and international fora, creating more “’hybrid’ (public-private) governance arrangements” that develop new forms of cooperation between actors and “push beyond government politics” (Acuto & Rayner, 2016, pp. 1159–1160).132 Cities, in comparison to states, do not hold legal standings in international relations. They are institutions with their own agenda, which may differ from their national governments’ agenda. For example, due to high or low percentages of diversity, geographic positions, and economic or social conditions, cities will have different political viewpoints and majorities. These factors are driving the positioning and international engagement of cities. Put differently, since the 1980s, cities have become objects of international and transnational regulation, and they have also begun enforcing international legal norms and standards. This transformation is part of an emerging global order that reconfigures cities and utilizes them in order to advance various, often conflicting ideological and political commitments (Blank, 2006, p. 875).

This means that cities can act as subnational actors not only in the national but also the international legal sphere: “Small localities such as villages, towns, and suburbs [just as mega cities] […] feel the push and pull of globalization” and they “are subject to the same norms of international law and treaties” (Blank, 132

For the emergence of city diplomacy and the role of international city networks, see Acuto (2019) and Acuto and Rayner (2016).

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2006, pp. 878, 933–934). Hence, like other NSAs, municipal actors are part of the multi-level governance system. However, they are—in their role as local governments—responsible for the implementation of national policies and legal norms (Panizzon & van Riemsdijk, 2019). In comparison to nation states, cities “hold neither similar claims to representation […] nor sovereign migration policy competencies” (Stürner, 2020, p. 5). Cities are also quite different from NSAs, such as civil society. City leaders are elected or appointed. In either case, mayors are accountable to their local population—which civil society is not.133 Cities have the responsibility to provide public goods and services to their inhabitants. They need to address global challenges on the local level (Global Parliament of Mayors, 2020a). Regarding the Global Compact on Refugees it was argued that although local civil society organizations play a critical role in responding to the needs of refugees and host communities, local governments have unique legal responsibilities and mandates toward residents in their jurisdiction. As governments, municipalities can and should have a distinct role in migration and displacement governance discussions (Brandt & Henderson, 2018).

This also applies to the broader context of migration and mobility. The challenging role cities play also offers a space for opportunities. Cities are both “principal implementers” as well as “frequent innovators” for best practices and solutions for migrants and refugees (Thouez, 2018). In addition, cities, unlike NGOs, have not been considered consultative parties for the ECOSOC of the UN (UN ECOSOC, 2019). Thus far, the MMC and the Mayors Mechanism of the GFMD are the only global mono-thematic platforms for mayors to engage issues of migration as part of their city diplomacy. Other city networks may also see migration as one of their many issues. For example, the UCLG, has put a strong emphasis on migration and mobility in recent years (UCLG, 2021). Further, while the Global Parliament of Mayors is not part of the UN system, it is increasingly engaging with 133

According to the Encyclopedia Britannica, “Mayors are either appointed or elected. In Europe, until about the middle of the 19th century, most mayors were appointed by the central government. With the rise of representative government, more and more countries adopted the practice of electing the mayor. This practice takes a variety of forms. In most European countries the mayor is elected by the local council from among its members and is usually the leader of the majority party or of one of the largest parties. In Switzerland, Canada, New Zealand, the Philippines, and Japan, most mayors are popularly elected” (The Editors of Encyclopaedia Britannica, 2019). Also, some examples from history show how mayors even in dictatorships, like Chile under the Pinochet regime, were key to providing services on the local level (González et al., 2020).

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the inter-state system (Global Parliament of Mayors, 2020b; Muggah & Thouez, 2018). However, “[t]he increasing activities and role of cities in the international arena puts a growing pressure on their institutional and administrative capacity” (De Nictolis, 2020, p. 175). This will surely be a factor in the sustainability of cities engagement in international discussions of migration. To conclude, to be very clear, cities are not NSAs by nature because they are part of multi-actor, multi-level governance systems. But at the same time, they are also responsible for implementing national and international migration policy decisions and norms. For the purposes of this research, I frame the actors under investigation as NSAs and local authorities. Fur future research and debate it will be of utmost importance to further clarify and discuss the changing “relationship between the city and the state” and cities’ role in the international system (Curtis, 2018).134

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Several authors research and reflect on the historical configurations and the future of city diplomacy (Acuto, Kosovac, & Hartley, 2021; Kosovac et al., 2021; Stürner-Siovitz, 2021; Thouez, 2022). In the climate space, C40 Cities is the leading entity of global megacities to engage on climate change through city diplomacy, with to date 97 engaged cities (C40 Cities, 2020). C40 Cities also collaborates with the Mayors Migration Council. In addition, regional city diplomacy efforts are emerging, such as the EU-AU Mayors Dialogue, or on particular issues, such as climate migration.

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Influence is to the study of decision-making what force is to the study of motion – a generic explanation for the basic observable phenomena (James March (1955, p. 432) cited from Dür, 2008).

Measuring political influence and assessing the role NSAs played during a defined negotiation process like the GCM is not an easy methodological task. The global level is a particularly complex field to analyze decision making and influence of NSAs (Arts and Verschuren 1999, p. 411). The main goal of this research is to assess the influence of NSAs and cities on the outcomes of the GCM negotiation process. It looks at not only the negotiated document, which was adopted in December 2018 and is considered the outcome of the GCM, but also examines the processes of collaboration and cooperation, the governance structures, as well as the developments and advancement of NSAs and local authorities. The study of influence of political decision-making, particularly on the global level, has been researched and methodologies have been debated. This is especially true in the evolution of climate change and human rights policies. Various methodological approaches have been developed, tested, and adapted with regards to an analysis of NSA influence. These methods will be of use in my analysis of the role of NSAs and cities in the GCM process. In the field of global migration, little research has been done so far. A major reason for the lack of research is that the engagement of a diverse set of actors in global governance is newly emerging in comparison to other global policy fields. By adapting the study of influence of NSAs on global political negotiations processes, like the GCM, to the Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5_3.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 R. Schweiger, Beyond states, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5_3

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migration field, I will be contributing to the overall research on global migration governance. This chapter offers the methodological approach to answer the research question: how influential were NSAs and cities in the development of the Global Compact for Migration? To answer this research question, a framework of analysis is built by addressing three major issues: (1) The broader concept to measure influence (section 3.1); (2) The methodological approach of triangulation (section 3.2); and (3) Methodological challenges (section 3.3).

3.1

Measuring Influence—A Broader Concept and Approach for Social Sciences

Measuring the influence of political actors is not new to political science. Since the 1950s, power sharing and the measuring of power of different political actors has become a popular research topic. With a bit of a decline in the 1970s and 1980s, measuring and assessing influence of NSAs has been a consistent aspect of social science research (Arts & Verschuren, 2004, p. 495). It is crucial to understand the nature of political processes. “Nevertheless, because of the difficulties inherent in measuring interest group influence, it has been addressed by only a small number of studies” (Dür, 2008, p. 559). David Lowery (2013, p. 1) makes it even more explicit: All too often, research on the influence of interest organizations in democratic politics produces null findings. […] Simply put, we all look for it [influence], but rarely find evidence of it.

One reason for the difficulty in creating a methodology may be that policy outcomes are shaped in many different forms and ways by many different actors, e.g. through “direct lobbying” or “outside lobbying” (Dür, 2008, p. 561). This research will attempt to methodologically assess the influence of NSAs in a defined process through a multi-perspective approach. By using triangulation and adapting methodological tools from policy fields that have been used for research for many years, I hope to do the work that has not been done before. This chapter first defines influence (section 3.1.1), then looks at the relation between influence and power (section 3.1.2) and finally assesses current research on how NSAs can exert influence (section 3.1.3).

3.1 Measuring Influence—A Broader Concept and Approach for Social Sciences

3.1.1

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Defining “influence”

When looking at the term ‘influence’, one finds that it is a complicated concept. Defining influence forces researchers “to think carefully about the types of evidence” that are needed. On the other hand, “[w]ithout a clear understanding of what is meant by influence, scholars often appear to be presenting evidence on an ad hoc basis” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 68). However, many papers addressing influence of different types of actors do not incorporate a (proper) definition of influence (see e.g. Raustiala & Bridgeman 2007; Rother & Steinhilper 2019). Both, the methodological work of Betsill and Corell (2001) as well as Arts and Verschuren (2004) help contextualize influence and develop a definition for research about influence. Arts and Verschuren (2004, p. 497) define influence as the extent that (a) an actor’s preferences are realized during the bargaining, and (b) this realization can be ascribed to this actor.

They apply a very narrow understanding to influence; suggesting influence requires the ability to trace the realization of a goal, such as the outcome of a negotiation, back to one individual actor. Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 72) add to the definition by including NGOs as a group of actors when analyzing and defining influence: [T]he notion of NGO influence has two dimensions: (1) the intentional transmission of information by NGOs and (2) alterations in behavior in response to that information. To assess NGO influence […], researchers must thus look for evidence related to what information and knowledge was transmitted by NGOs and whether negotiators responded by altering their behavior.

This definition was applied to their analysis of NGO influence in international environmental negotiations. On this basis I suggest the following definition of influence in the context of the negotiations of NSAs and cities in the negotiations of the GCM: Influence of NSAs and cities is based on three dimensions: (1) the opportunities offered for NSAs and cities to transmit information to negotiating governments and actors; (2) the actual transmission of information by NSAs

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and cities to negotiating governments and actors,1 and (3) changes in negotiating behavior by governments, based on information given to them by NSAs and cities.2 Key to my definition of analysis, is the addition of opportunities to the framework. To assess the ability for NSAs and cities to transmit information to governments, a framework for participation and consultation is required. Based on my findings (see chapter 4 and 5) I argue that the level of openness within the process of participation is the basis for actors other than state to be able to influence the outcomes of negotiations. These three dimensions also build the groundwork for my framework of analysis (see section 3.2).

3.1.2

Influence in Relation to Power

Power has always been an elusive concept for statesmen and analysts of international politics; now it is even more slippery (Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 9).

The study of influence is closely linked to the concept of power in international relations. The challenge to define influence as a concept, as shown above, is reiterated here: influence is intimately linked to another crucial concept that has also proven hard to define—power. Explanations of influence may vary depending on how influence is perceived to relate to power and the context in which the influence is exercised (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 72).

IR scholars have long focused on states as the main actors exercising power in the international system. In particular, neoliberal institutionalists (Robert O. Keohane, 1998; Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 1977, 1987) discussed interdependence— understood as mutual influence between states or other actors—and power in

1

Information transmitted by NSAs, or local authorities always come with a certain framing. However, the framing of that information is not analyzed in detail—yet the how of information presented is an important part of how proposals and information from NSAs and local authorities are taken up by other actors. 2 Betsill and Corell follow the definition of Knoke (1990) in that influence occurs “when one actor intentionally transmits information to another that alters the latter’s actions from what would have occurred without that information.” (Knoke, 1990, p. 3 quoted from Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 74).

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the international system.3 From a neoliberal institutionalist perspective, power can be understood as the ability of an actor to get others to do something they otherwise would not do (and at an acceptable cost to the actor). Power can be conceived in terms of control over outcomes. In either case, measurement is not simple (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 1977, p. 10).

Other scholars, such as Holsti (1988, p. 141 quoted from Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 72) understand power as the “general capacity of a state to control [another states’] behavior.” Waltz (1986, p. 333), who takes a neo-realist perspective, assumes that states can be distinguished from one another on the basis of wealth as their means of power. However, in order to determine the power of a state, it is not only about adding up weapons systems and soldiers, but also about adding economic and social factors, which can impact state power. Accordingly, power is to be understood as a unit of account of states in comparison with each other (Schörnig, 2006, p. 72). Thus, power by many IR scholars is understood in the context of “state power” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 72–73). But if the inter-state system is increasingly opening up to actors other than states—how do power and influence relate? And how can actors other than states examine influence?4 Most NSAs (except terrorist groups), and NGOs in particular, that work in the international system are not only non-governmental, but also non-violent. Since states are perceived to monopolize legitimate use of violence in the international system, NGOs rely on other forms of power in pursuit of their goals. Although some NGOs […] have considerable economic resources to leverage, most NGOs rely especially on the power of the persuasiveness of their ideas and the credibility of their expertise (Davies, 2019a, p. 5).

The way NSAs, including NGOs, exert influence must be discussed and will be in the following section 3.1.3. However, the relationship between power and influence is complex:

3

One particular characteristic of interdependence is that costs mutually occur for each of the actors (Robert O. Keohane & Nye, 1977). 4 For an extensive discussion of influence in relation to power, see inter alia David Lowery (2013) and Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell (2001).

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While influence is a relationship between actors and emerges in the political process, power refers to capability—the aggregate of political resources available to an actor. Power may be converted into influence, but there may also be cases where it is not converted to its full extent or at all. Conversely, power (as traditionally defined) is not a precondition for exerting influence (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 73).

This means that actors other than states in a multi-level governance system can exert influence even if they don’t have power in the traditional sense. More so, influence can be linked to a “more dynamic understanding of agency” (Nasiritousi et al., 2016) as well as more dynamic roles of NSAs in the international system. Nasiritousi et al. (2016) argue “that agency can be understood by studying the different roles that actors are perceived to perform.” This very much relates to the question of “perception, impression and views” of actors in the system as seen by “experts and public opinion” (Nasiritousi et al., 2016). A practical example shows the difference between state and NSAs’ perceptions and the consequences for influence (and thus power) in international negotiations: negotiations would break down, for example, if a government would try to use force or threaten punishment in a meeting room; a nonstate actor attempting to use a similar influence tactic would lose their right to attend the meeting. Nonstate actors can only try to influence the talks by persuading or convincing government representatives, who have the formal power to make the decisions, to accept the nonstate actors’ perspective (Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 73–74).

Thus the “moral […] authority” (Risse, 2000, p. 22) of NGOs or NSAs in a broader sense is closely linked to their “communicative power” and “perceived expertise” (Davies, 2019a, p. 5). As a result, NGO literature shows that Increasingly, NGOs are being recognized for their roles as political actors in their own right, setting transnational standards, providing services traditionally undertaken by governments, and directly influencing the behavior of individuals. However, NGOs may also serve as channels for the projection of power of other actors both governmental and corporate, and may be vulnerable to cooptation when they participate in joint projects with other actors (Davies, 2019a, p. 6).

To conclude, While influence is a relationship between actors and emerges in the political process, power refers to capability—the aggregate of political resources available to an actor.

3.1 Measuring Influence—A Broader Concept and Approach for Social Sciences 103 Power may be converted into influence, but there may also be cases where it is not con- verted to its full extent or at all. Conversely, power (as traditionally defined) is not a precondition for exerting influence (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 73).

While it seems logical to attribute influence to actors other than states, and power to states, scholars argue that states should overcome that logic and focus more on an “influence world,” in addition to hard power politics (Alterman, 2021).

3.1.3

How NSAs Exert Influence

NSAs and cities have increasingly engaged in global policy fields. Due to the nature of the migration space, NSA (and NGO) engagement is on the rise. On the other hand, NSAs and cities, have for many years, played a more prominent role in the broad array of policy spheres. For example NSAs and cities have had a significant impact on policies on climate change, trade, health and diseases, peace and conflict, humanitarianism, (gender) equality, and human rights (Davies, 2019a, p. 1; Kalm, 2010, p. 134). All those “issue-areas […] involve movement across borders [and] states have developed institutionalized forms for cooperation in order to meet these challenges more efficiently”(Kalm 2010, p. 134). Bas Arts (2003, p. 3) exemplifies how NSAs have been established and operated in these global policy fields: (1) non-governmental organizations co-writing drafts of international treaties (e.g. Amnesty International and the Anti-Torture Convention); (2) scientists determining how policy-makers should interpret a policy issue (such as in the case of global warming); (3) business lobbies forcing their preferences in international negotiations (see the contents of the WTO Agreement on Trade-Related Intellectual Property Rights, or TRIPs); (4) protestors blocking the opening and continuation of a WTO conference (Seattle, USA, 1999); and (5) terrorist networks affecting the security policy doctrine of the most powerful country in the world.

Based on existing research and methodological explorations, it is possible to identify various roles NSAs have taken in the international system.5 We can also

5

Most research however exists on the role of NGOs in the international system and their way of exerting influence (Betsill & Corell, 2001; Davies, 2019a).

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get an understanding of how NSAs (and cities) exert influence by looking at other global policy fields such as climate change6 or human rights.7 The roles of NGOs and NSAs in world politics are diverse: they liaise with intergovernmental organizations, they engage in “transnational advocacy networks,” they contribute to “international conventions,” and they participate in “politics beyond the state (Davies, 2019a, p. 1).8 Nasiritousi et al. (2016, p. 113) propose a total of nine dimensions that are key to the work of NSAs in the international governance system, which include: 6

Already in the early 2000 s it was argued that “[g]overnments have granted nonstate actors access to international climate policy […] [and] are now a significant part of the political landscape” (Raustiala, 2001, p. 95). Since then, the forms of non-state actor participation and influence emerged significantly. Today, “non-state climate action has become a core feature of international climate governance and has reached a large scale” (Hale, 2018, p. 3). Thus, there have been numerous methodological approaches and tools to measure influence in the climate and environmental policy field (Arts & Verschuren, 1999, 2004; Betsill & Corell, 2001), however with methodological challenges that also apply to this research and are addressed in this chapter. In addition, literature addresses the role of actors other than states in international climate change governance which could serve as basis for a future comparison of non-state actor and city engagement in global policy fields, including migration governance (Arts & Verschuren, 1999; Bäckstrand et al., 2017; Betsill & Corell, 2001; Bodansky, 2001; Dibden & Cocklin, 2005; Dupuits, 2016; Hale, 2018; Higgot et al., 2000; Hoffmann et al., 2020; Kalm et al., 2004; Levaï, 2018; Merdan, 2018; Nasiritousi, 2019; Nasiritousi et al., 2016; Newell, 2000; Pattberg, 2004; Raustiala, 1997, 2001; Raustiala & Bridgeman, 2007; Rosenow-Williams & Gemenne, 2016; Saucedo Dávila, 2019; Scheler, 2020; SDG Knowledge Weekly, 2018; Smit & Kuramochi, 2020; United Nations Environment Programme, 2018; van der Ven et al., 2017; Willetts, 2010; Zou & Wang, 2021). In the climate change arena also cities play a critical role (De Nictolis, 2020, p. 175). 7 Similarly to the climate change space, also human rights governance has experienced a strong engagement of NSAs, in particular NGOs (Carpenter et al., 2014; Davies, 2019a; Gottardo & Cyment, 2019; A. M. Murdie & Bhasin, 2011; A. M. Murdie & Davis, 2012; A. Murdie & Peksen, 2014; Polizzi & Murdie, 2019; Reiners & Liese, 2015; Schimmelfennig, 2008), but also cities (De Nictolis, 2020, p. 175; Hale, 2018). Reiners and Liese (2015), for example, find that NSAs have always played a central role in international human rights policy. In their article, they illustrate how different NSAs support but also challenge the protection of human rights in all phases of the policy cycle and which strategies they use to exert influence. One particularity of the human rights space relevant for other global policy fields and the engagement of the inter-state system with actors other than states, is a strong encouragement of the Human Rights Council to work with and protect the rights of civil society, directed towards states as well as UN agencies (United Nations General Assembly. Human Rights Council, 2018b, 2018a). 8 Much has been written about the various roles of NGOs in world politics (Davies, 2019b; Götz, 2019; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Ruhlman, 2019; Willetts, 2010).

3.1 Measuring Influence—A Broader Concept and Approach for Social Sciences 105 influence the agenda, propose solutions, provide information and expertise, influence decisions and policy makers, awareness raising, implement action, evaluate consequences of policies and measures, represent public opinion, and represent marginalized voices (Nasiritousi et al., 2016, p. 113).

This shows the broad variety of ways NSAs engage in the multi-level governance system. However, not all NSAs have the ability and authority to “influence the outcome of events,” rather, “only some will be authoritative in the activities that they carry out” (Nasiritousi et al., 2016, p. 112). So, what are the indicators to determine whether NSAs and local authorities had influence on a negotiated outcome of an international agreement? First, there must be an assessment of the goal attainment of actors. Keck and Sikkink identify five levels of “goal achievement”:9 (1) issue creation and agenda setting; (2) influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations; (3) influence on institutional procedures; (4) influence on policy change in “target actors” which may be states, international organizations […]; and (5) influence on state behavior (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

This means that “it is important to ask whether political outcomes reflect the objectives” of NSAs and cities in an international negotiation process (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 71). Hence, my research and data gathering, both in the interviews as well as the online survey focuses on the goals and goal attainment of actors (see section 3.2). Very practically this means I identify whether the negotiated outcome—the GCM—reflects the goals of participating NSAs and cities, because if they influenced the negotiations, it is logical to expect congruence between ideas contained in the information submitted by NGOs [non-state actors and cities] during negotiations and the ideas embedded in an international agreement. An agreement may contain specific text drafted by NGOs [non-state actors and cities] or reflect a general principle or idea introduced by NGOs [non-state actors and cities] during the negotiations (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 75).

Second, assessing “access to negotiations and resources” is an important factor in understanding the influence of NSAs and cities. As such, “researchers must also

9

However, Keck and Sikkink (1998) developed this with regard to advocacy networks. Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 75) use this approach with regard to NGOs (see also Davies, 2019a). Thus, I take the liberty of expanding this understanding to NSAs and cities.

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consider whether NGOs were successful in their efforts to shape the negotiations” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 71). This means that information provided by NGOs [non-state actors and cities] may affect the debates leading to an agreement by placing items on the agenda or by forcing decision-makers to address particular issues in greater depth than they may otherwise have done. Another procedural indicator of NGO [NSA and city] influence is if delegates give serious consideration to a […] proposal even if they do not ultimately include that proposal in the final agreement. NGOs [non-state actors and cities] can also be said to have been influential if evidence can be found suggesting they have shaped the jargon used by state decision-makers during the negotiations. […] Establishing jargon is a way for NGOs to influence how negotiators and observers perceive various issues and proposals in a negotiation (Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 75–76).

Third, an assessment of the “effects” of the participation of NSAs in the negotiation process must happen. For example, assessing the impact NSAs had on the agenda (Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 71, 75). This also means looking at unintended effects and consequences as well as the behavior of other actors, such as IOs and governments. Finally, assessment must include an indicator of influence NSAs and cities have “if state decision-makers establish new institutions to address issues raised by NGOs during the negotiations” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 75). This process would include follow-up and review processes that include areas of particular importance to stakeholders other than states and IOs (Davies, 2019a, p. 6). In conclusion, examples from other international policy fields, such as climate change and human rights show how NSAs have taken on various roles and exerted influence in international negotiations, also for their role in follow-up and review processes (Arts & Verschuren, 1999; Betsill & Corell, 2001; Davies, 2019a; Keck & Sikkink, 1998; Ruhlman, 2019).

3.1.4

How Actors Collaborate: Transnational Advocacy Coalitions and Networks

NSAs and local authorities do not act in silos. They collaborate to achieve their goals. My analysis in chapter 4 and 5 will elaborate how actors leveraged their goals during the GCM process. Using an IR perspective, I suggest two approaches emerged to explain actor collaboration regarding international policy issues: the advocacy coalition framework and transnational advocacy networks.

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Advocacy coalitions, a framework introduced by Paul Sabatier in the late 1980s, act and work at the policy-making level, for example, through agendasetting. They can work through non-state actors to influence national or international policy, or use a multi-stakeholder approach, including governmental or IO actors with similar interests and goals (Bendel & Haase, 2010; Hale, 2018; Sabatier & Weible, 2007).10 In 1998, Keck and Sikkink introduced the concept of transnational advocacy networks. They argue that such networks build “new links among actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations” and that “they multiply channels of access to the international system.”11 The goal of these networks is to change state and IO behavior. The networks are characterized by communication and exchange that is “voluntary, reciprocal, and horizontal.” Transnational advocacy networks can include NSAs, IOs and “parts of the executive and / or parliamentary branch of government” unlike most advocacy networks consisting of NGOs (Keck & Sikkink, 1998, pp. 1–38). Because both approaches reflect individual and institutional advocacy efforts, “norm entrepreneurs” must “bring the normative concerns to the attention of policy makers in powerful states” (Sikkink, 1998, p. 519). Norm entrepreneurs, or “policy broker[s]” (Sabatier, 1988, p. 154) are usually individuals but in some cases are institutions with strong individuals leading the effort. Both approaches show the growing recognition and deepened understanding of advocacy networks and coalitions in the international system. Further, both approaches recognize individuals and institutions acting with their own norms 10

Sabatier and Weible, based on Sabatier’s initial theory of the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) understands it as the following: “The ACF argues that policy participants will seek allies with people who hold similar policy core beliefs among legislators, agency officials, interest group leaders, judges, researchers, and intellectuals from multiple levels of government. If they also engage in a nontrivial degree of coordination, they form an advocacy coalition. Coordination involves some degree of working together to achieve similar policy objectives. The ACF argues that advocacy coalitions provide the most useful tool for aggregating the behavior of the hundreds of organizations and individuals involved in a policy subsystem over periods of a decade or more. In any given policy subsystem, there will generally be two to five advocacy coalitions” (Sabatier & Weible, 2007, p. 196). Thus, they leave it open whether governments are part of an advocacy coalition or not. Hale, on the other side states that “[a]dvocacy coalitions are driven by sub-state/non-state actors which come together to leverage their own voice and actions to engage with national governments in support of stronger national policies” (Hale, 2018, p. 12). 11 In their book “Activists beyond borders. Advocacy Networks in International politics” beyond a theoretical derivation and explanation of the concept, they investigate human rights advocacy networks in Latin America, environmental advocacy networks, and transnational networks on violence against women (Keck & Sikkink, 1998).

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beyond their institutional capacity or mandate. In my analysis, I make a distinction between networks and coalitions that include IOs and governments and those who don’t. I refer to advocacy coalitions as collaboratives of NSAs. Whereas, if several groups of actors, including actors from the UN system or national governments, are involved, I use the term multi-stakeholder alliances. These two terms are quite different, especially in the complex international system. One is a group of similar actors coming together to influence policy and the other is an alliance of different groups of actors, including governments.

3.2

Triangulation as an Approach to Assess Influence

Finding an appropriate approach and method for answering my research question is a highly complex process. In many research projects, particularly in the field of migration, only the perspective of one group of actors (e.g. civil society) is considered when studying influence, (see e.g. Rother and Steinhilper 2019). I, however, intend to go a step further by offering a comprehensive assessment of the participation and influence of NSAs and cities in the GCM process. Whereas research about individual actors has been a tool to analyze the role of NGOs or NSAs in global climate negotiations (see Arts & Verschuren, 1999, 2004; Betsill & Corell, 2001), using it for global migration processes is new. In my analysis, I use triangulation to adapt and further develop the methodological approaches introduced by Arts and Verschuren (1999) and Betsill and Corell (2001). Both groups of scholars have developed models to assess NGO influence in global climate negotiations, and in doing so, built the foundation for further research to be done in the field. Triangulation—the mixing of data and/or methods—offers an appropriate approach for my research. In general, triangulation is defined as the mixing of data or methods so that diverse viewpoints or standpoints cast light upon a topic. The mixing of data types, known as data triangulation, is often thought to help in validating the claims that might arise from an initial pilot study. The mixing of methodologies, e.g. mixing the use of survey data with interviews, is a more profound form of triangulation (Olsen, 2004, p. 3).

The advantage of methodological triangulation as a “combination of different methods in one study […] may sometimes resolve problems that cannot be tackled in studies that rely on only one method” (Dür 2008, p. 569). In the case of this

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research, triangulation resolves many of the questions that arise with the multidimensionality of studying influence in a global process. In particular, studying influence that involves states and international organizations as well as a broad set of non-state and sub-state stakeholders. Of course, triangulation also causes methodological problems and risks (see section 3.3) To answer my research question, I use triangulation to analyze (1) data type, (2) data source and (3) the methodology used to analyze the data (see Table 3.1). I differentiate between the intentional transmission of information by NSAs and cities in the GCM negotiation process, which includes any opportunities created by the process or the system to transmit information (dimension 1), and the behavior of other actors (dimension 2). This approach stems from the methodological framework developed by Betsill and Corell (2001). In addition, I use the EAR model,12 as introduced by Arts and Verschuren (1999). The model uses three perspectives, when looking at influence: “(1) political players’ own perception of their influence; (2) other players’ perceptions of the influence brought to bear; and (3) a process analysis by the researcher” (Arts & Verschuren, 1999, p. 411).13 The EAR model is a very practical tool to assess the influence of NSAs, which is the core interest of my work. Arts and Verschuren (1999) illustrate the use of this instrument by looking at the political influence of global NGOs on the Climate Convention. The model is designed to understand influence in stakeholder procecesses of international organizations: There is one particular decision-making situation relevant to our assessment methodology, which we label the ‘stakeholder methodology’. In this case there is a set of stakeholders who try through formal and informal bargaining practices to influence a decision that must be taken by a set of formal decision makers. Examples of this are procedures in international organizations such as the United Nations […] (Arts & Verschuren 1999, p. 416). 12

EAR stands for: ego-perception (E), alter-perception (A) and researcher’s analysis (R) (Arts and Verschuren 1999, p. 416). 13 Arts and Verschuren (1999) go a step further when analyzing the influence of individual actors in international environmental negotiations by developing numeric datasets. They developed a formula taking into account the variables relevant to measure the extent of political influence of an actor A (PI): PI = GA x AS x PR. Political influence of an actor A can be measured by multiplying the goal achievement of actor A (GA), the extent to which goal achievement can be ascribed to actor A (AS) and (as an optional but relevant factor) the political relevance of the policy outcome (PR). Political relevance has been added by Arts and Verschuren (1999) as an additional variable that helps to contextualize the results. As I look at a much broader set of actors, I do not use these numeric tools of assessing influence, however, I am inspired by their methodological approach and understanding.

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Table 3.1 Framework for analyzing NSA and city influence in the GCM process

Source: own table, based on methods adapted from Arts & Verschuren (1999) and Betsill & Corell (2001, p. 79).

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The GCM process, with its formal and informal stakeholder participation, is quite well suited to this methodology. However, this model remains focused on the assessment of individual actors rather than a big set of actors. Therefore, I use the EAR model as cross-cutting approach to analyze the role of numerous actors (Arts & Verschuren, 1999, 2004; Betsill & Corell, 2001). This “method shopping” (Dür, 2008, p. 570) allows me to have a 360-degree perspective on the influence and level of participation NSAs and cities had in the GCM negotiation process.

3.2.1

Time Period and Actors Under Investigation

The time period under investigation extends from January 2017 until July 2018, which is the timeframe for both the consultation, stocktaking and negotiation phase of the GCM. At times, the research does look back to 2015/16. In these moments, I look for information regarding the development and negotiation of the New York Declaration, which precedes the GCM, and regarding the role of the GFMD and its inclusion of NSAs. The time frame between July and December 2018 is relevant because the GCM was only formally adopted in December 2018. The research also includes data from the post GCM adoption phase after December 2018. NSAs analyzed in this research include any type of stakeholders—e.g., NGOs, civil society, private sector—that was registered for the GCM negotiation process and/or its adoption conference. Additionally, local authorities were included as sub-state actors.14 With regards to the scope of analysis, “it would be impossible to analyze the activities and effectiveness of all the (sub)national players around the world” (Arts & Verschuren, 1999, p. 417), who also addressed the GCM process. Therefore, the actors under investigation are NSAs and local authorities that actively engaged on the global level during the GCM negotiation process (registered stakeholders) (ego-perspective). In addition, key players, such as decision-makers such as governments and International Organizations (e.g., co-facilitators, representatives from the UN, its agencies, or other international organizations) who are relevant to the process are part of the research (alter-perspective).

14 See section 2.3.3 for the role of cities in the multi-level governance system as well as in the GCM consultation and negotiation process.

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3.2.2

3

Framework of Analysis

Data Types

In order to analyze data about NSA and city influence, two issues must be addressed: (1) the intentional transmission of information and (2) the behavior of other actors (Betsill & Corell, 2001).15 With regards to the intentional transmission of information, NSA and city participation must be analyzed by assessing whether or not NSAs and cities contributed relevant information to the negotiation process (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 79). Questions that help analyze this dimension focus on activities, access, and resources, e.g.: 1. What opportunities did NSAs and cities have to transmit information? (access) 2. What did NSAs and cities do to transmit information to decision makers? (activities) 3. What kinds of leverage did NSAs and cities use to transmit information? (resources) These questions will be answered using ego- and alter-perspective analysis as well as an analysis of the set-up of the negotiations process, e.g. the analysis of the involvement of NSAs and cities listed in the Modalities Resolution of the GCM (see United Nations General Assembly, 2017b). The second dimension is the goal attainment of the actors being researched (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 79). A goal could, for example, refer to the achievement or enhancement of a certain value or the prevention of an undesirable value’s inclusion in the GCM. Methodologically the researcher has to compare the initial policy goal of the actor and the actual policy outcome (e.g., from documents, survey, and interviews) (Arts & Verschuren, 1999). Questions that help to analyze this dimension relate to both the process itself as well as the outcome of the negotiations, e.g.: 1. Did NSAs and cities coin specific terms that became part of the negotiating jargon? 15

Arts and Verschuren (1999) developed six areas of non-state actor influence, which are also reflected in the model proposed. The areas include (1) the goal achievements by governments and other relevant players; (2) the access of NSAs to the political arena and (key) countries; (3) the interventions different NSAs made with regard to the topic under consideration; (4) number and intensity of the interventions; (5) the adaption of non-state actor views or proposals by governments, and (6) possible effects of external events and autonomous developments.

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2. Did state negotiators discuss issues proposed by NSAs or cities (or cease to discuss issues opposed by them)? 3. Does the final agreement contain text drafted by NSAs and cities? 4. Does the final agreement reflect the goals and principals of NSAs and cities? To understand both NSA and city participation and goal attainment, it is important to include various perspectives and data types; these data types include ego- and alter-perception as well as an analysis of various documents and versions of the GCM. The different data sources will help indicate the levels of cooperation and collaboration among actors, governments, and IOs. In turn, this will give an indication of how global governance on migration emerged as a result of the process.

3.2.3

Data Sources

For the analysis, various data types are being used to answer the research question (see Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 79): Primary and secondary texts Primary and secondary texts serve as major sources of data for the analysis. Primary texts include items such as: draft versions of the GCM, country statements and positions, summaries of stakeholder hearings, consultations and negotiations, the final agreed upon outcome of the GCM, and NSA lobbying materials. A total of 432 documents considered texts have been collected.16 Primary data (as well as interview sources) are tagged with a “#” when being quoted. Secondary texts include items such as: commentaries, academic and media reports, and press releases commenting on the process and its outcomes. Secondary texts are used to contextualize findings and are not listed separately. Secondary data is used and quoted as per usual citation.

16

The associated data can be viewed in the appendix in the electronic supplementary material (Appendix III: List of primary data).

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Online Survey directed at NSAs A main source of data for the ego-perception of actors is an online survey. The online survey I used was directed to stakeholders involved in the negotiations process and its main goal was assessing the ego-perception of these actors.17 Survey design The survey is based on the approach developed by Arts and Verschuren (1999), who claim a core element to assessing the influence of key actors in a process is the ego-perception of said actors. In other words, assessing their “own influence or lack of it” (Arts & Verschuren, 1999, p. 416). Contradictory to the belief that assessment of a few key actors involved in the process would be enough for analysis, in my research, I aspired to include as many actors as possible. This included actors with varying levels of engagement. I included a multitude of actors because the GCM process allowed more new actors to engage on the global level than ever before. Specifically, the GCM process included numerous actors not registered with the United Nations ECOSOC Chamber (The President of the UN General Assembly, 2018). Beyond the other data sources, such as interviews and primary and secondary texts, the online survey offered access to a much broader group of stakeholders. The survey also offered a mix of qualitative and quantitative methods. The technical advantages of web survey tools are clear: responses can be administered and stored digitally, and they allow short survey periods as well as the possibility for complex filtering and analysis. My choice to use a web survey tool is because the tool was easily accessible, offered various questioning techniques, and a mix of methods and tools. Free web survey tools (such as Google Forms) did not suffice. Instead, the broadly and internationally known tool SurveyMonkey was chosen (Sincero, 2012; Surveymonkey, 2020). For the implementation of the survey, I used a procedure relying on fully selfrecruited participants who adhered to a certain criterion (participation as stakeholder in the negotiation process). This was only feasible because there was an accessible list of e-mail addresses for the target group.18 In order to prevent non-response, 17

The associated data can be viewed in the appendix in the electronic supplementary material (Appendix I: Online survey: The role of non-state actors in the Global Compact for Migration negotiations). 18 Based on an official list of registered stakeholders (without ECOSOC status) to the adoption conference of the GCM in Marrakech (The President of the UN General Assembly, 2018) as well as ECOSOC stakeholders that have a relation to migration, an e-mail list was put together. The list was continuously expanded based on recommendations and hints from actors in the field throughout this research. Upon finalization the list included 439 e-mail-addresses.

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additional communication channels were used (mixed-mode survey), for example Social Media Networks or e-mail lists of networks in the field.19 Although this process took significant effort, it also helped achieve a high response rate (Bandilla, 2016; Diekmann, 2009, pp. 520–530). The survey was designed to understand the goals, the perceived goal achievement, the tools used to exert influence, and a self-assessment of each actor’s own influence (Arts & Verschuren, 1999). As with the interviews (see below), the “comparison of NGO goals with outcomes provides more concrete evidence of NGO influence than a focus limited to activities, access and/or resources” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 71). The survey was sent to a broad variety of NSAs.20 All questions were aligned to the methodological approach and the research question. The broad outreach to actors and the collection of their responses also allowed me to get a better understanding of who the key actors were amongst the participants in the GCM negotiation process. In addition to the ego-perception, the survey also asked for the perception of other actors involved (e.g., how civil society perceived the private sector and vice versa) and thereby indirectly produced data on the alter-perception of other actor groups (of NSAs). After having developed an initial draft survey, I conducted a pretest with four experts as well as other non-expert readers and thus adapted the survey accordingly.21 The draft questions were adapted in several loops; first they were simplified and then made more concise and accurate as this would lead to higher response and completion rates. The questions were arranged from the easiest questions to answer (demographic and geographic data) to the most complex questions. The survey had 20 questions and was answerable in 15–20 minutes, depending on the level of detail respondents provided (Sincero, 2012).22 In the process of collecting 19

Mainly LinkedIn and Twitter were used to reach more stakeholders. Some NGOs only communicated via Facebook and the survey was sent to their Facebook pages. The survey was inter alia shared with Civil Society Action Committee who shared it with their broad network. 20 As cities were not on the official stakeholder list, cities themselves did not participate in the survey. Findings with regards to cities were generated by asking other actors about the role of cities (state and NSAs) as well as interviews with city representatives. 21 Feedback included inter alia that the questions designed really aim at advocacy questions, for registered stakeholders from academia or Think Tanks that understood themselves more as observers, the survey is only partly answerable. In addition, the survey was reduced to fewer questions. 22 Thus, the survey took respondents more than the recommended response time of five to ten minutes.

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answers, a dearth of response came from actors in Latin America and the Caribbean. This lack led to a decision to translate the survey into Spanish. Survey responses In total, the survey produced a total of 68 valid responses (see Table 3.2). Respondents came from five world regions: 14% from Africa, 14% from Asia, 3% from Latin America and the Caribbean, 22% from North America and 48% from Europe (see Table 3.3). However, the analysis of individual responses shows that several organizations are registered in Europe or North America but execute activities in other world regions. This is typical for the international migration space, both when it comes to civil society organizations, particularly NGOs and academia (IOM, 2020b, p. 139). Table 3.2 Timeline and responses to the online survey Responses23

Time Period of the Survey

English Survey

63

February 2020—September 2020

Spanish Survey

5

June 2020—September 2020

68 invalid Responses

16

Source: Online Survey

The average time respondents spent on the survey was 22 minutes24 for the English survey and 31 minutes for the Spanish survey. The English survey received the most responses during February, March, and April 2020. The Spanish survey received the most responses during July 2020. A total of 66 respondents (n = 68) indicated the country they were residing in. Two respondents indicated two countries of residence/work, leading to 67 country responses counted. Participants came from 23 different countries, namely Bangladesh, Belgium, Cameroun, Canada, Colombia, France, Germany, Ghana, Hungary, India, Italy, Lebanon, Nepal, Nigeria, Philippines, Qatar, Senegal, Switzerland, The Netherlands, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, the United Kingdom, and the United States of America. 23

The number refers to the respondents that completed the survey (valid responses). Responses were counted as invalid if the survey was not completed. 24 In this average time spent for the survey (information provided by the SurveyMonkey) included responses that were counted as invalid and therefore also entails responses of people that only spent little time on the survey page.

3.2 Triangulation as an Approach to Assess Influence Table 3.3 Regional distribution of survey respondents

Region Africa Asia Europe Latin America and The Caribbean North America Oceania

117 N = 68 9

% 14%

9

14%

32

48%

2

3%

15

22%

0

0%

Source: Online Survey

Table 3.4 Type of actors participating in the online survey

Type of actor

n = 67

%

Civil Society

36

54%

Private Sector

4

6%

Think Tank

6

9%

Academic Institution

5

7%

Trade Union or Workers’ Organization

2

3%

Foundation

6

9%

Religious Organization

2

3%

Individual

0

0%

Other

6

9%

Source: Online Survey

Respondents came from several sectors (see Table 3.4), with a majority, 54%, identifying as part of civil society. 9% of respondents indicated they were from a foundation and 9% from a think tank. 6% of respondents came from the private sector. Trade union/workers’ organization and religious organization each amounted to 3%. In the ‘Other’ category (9%), the following answers were given: “Private sector AND civil society, Cooperative, Philanthropy, NGO, National Human Rights Institution, Trade Association.” Some other answers could be added to one of the categories listed in the table below, however, I want to show the exact answers given by respondents. A total 42% (n = 28) of respondents indicated they were in consultative status with the ECOSOC of the United Nations. 9% (n = 6) did not know if their organization held that status. 49% (n = 33) responded they were not in consultative status with ECOSOC. 90% (n = 60) of the respondents were registered as a stakeholder in

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the consultation and negotiation process of the GCM and/or in the GCM adoption conference in Marrakech. 7% (n = 7) indicated they were not listed as a stakeholder but participated through other means. How representative are the survey data? From available statements and participant lists, it was possible for me to reach a majority of actors who were involved in the process. Two official lists of actors involved are available, a list of stakeholder organizations that have applied to participate in the preparatory process of the GCM, and a list of those stakeholders approved to participate in the intergovernmental conference to adopt the GCM. Both lists stem from a letter by the then-President of the UN General Assembly. The list included in the letter provides information about the set of actors involved (The President of the UN General Assembly, 2017a, 2018). In both cases these actors were registered for the process or conference but are not ECOSOC stakeholders nor registered through other means. Table 3.5 Regional distribution of NSAs registered for the GCM adoption conference vs. survey participants Region

Registered organizations for the intergovernmental conference to adopt GCM (n = 170)

Africa

23 (14%)

77 (19%)

9 (14%)

Americas

49 (29%)

106 (27%)

27 (25%)

Asia

34 (20%)

74 (19%)

9 (14%)

Europe

60 (35%)

134 (34%)

32 (48%)

4 (2%)

5 (1%)

0 (0%)

Oceania

Registered organizations for the intergovernmental negotiations (n = 396)

Survey participants (n = 68)

Source: own list based on The President of the UN General Assembly, 2017a, 2018; Online Survey

Table 3.5 shows the regional distribution of stakeholders registered for the GCM process and the adoption conference in comparison to survey respondents. Whereas responses from the African continent are almost equivalent percentagewise, there is a slight under-representation from the Americas and Asia in the survey. As described previously, responses to the English survey from Latin American and the Caribbean countries was not as high as expected and so a Spanish survey was sent out. Even then, the responses were not as high as compared to other regions. The reasons for this lack are varied; some responded they were not able to make time for the survey

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due to the Coronavirus pandemic. Europe on the other hand is over-represented. A general reason for the slight imbalance might also be the available networks and contacts of the researcher, who is based in Europe. Nevertheless, the data shows that survey responses are generally representative of the regional distribution of stakeholders listed as participants of the GCM adoption conference.25 Interviews with key players Interviews were conducted with representatives (key players) from two major groups: (1) Non-state actors and city representatives from organizations/ local authorities registered, or engaged and who were considered key players in the process (ego-perspective) (2) Representatives from governments, the UN, and its agencies, and other IOs who were part of the negotiation process (alter-perspective) Whereas the online survey is the primary source of data on the ego-perception of NSAs, the additional interviews with key actors from government, IOs, NSAs and local authorities26 helped contextualize and deepen the understanding of the process. These interviews also helped to answer the research question. Criteria for identifying key actors were (1) “that the player has been involved in the entire decision-making process,” and/ or (2) “that he had an important position as […] a stakeholder” (Arts & Verschuren 1999, p. 417). Stakeholder in this sense describes NSAs and does not refer to the stakeholder definition in the UN system. Interviewees from the group “non-state actors” included actors from academia, civil society, foundations, the private sector, think tanks, and trade unions. Interviews were also used as a tool for actor groups who could not be reached via the survey. These actors included the private sector as well as regional perspectives that were not covered by the survey. The interview guidelines focused on the role of 25

Representativeness is defined as the ability to draw accurate conclusions about a population (or group relevant to the study) from a sample. In a narrower sense, a sample is representative if all the individuals in the population (or in my case of all participating stakeholders) have the same chance of being included in the sample. Representativeness is not sufficient as the sole quality characteristic of a statistic. In general, the term is also often used to indicate that a sample is a complete reduced mirror image of the population, which thus also correctly reflects all (essential) characteristics of the population. Since this can never be completely verified, this usage in the narrower sense is not applicable (Statista, 2022). 26 As mentioned above, cities did not participate in the survey.

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the actor, the goal of the actor, the actor’s goal achievement, and the perception of other actors in the field—similar to the survey (Arts & Verschuren, 1999).27 Some interview participants were not only advocates for their own goals but were also able to analyze the process or role of other groups of actors. Therefore, the affiliation of an interviewee to the group ego- or alter-perspective was not always distinct. I addressed this in the interviews by asking about the role of each individual that I interviewed. Interviews with key players from government, the UN or UN agencies were crucial to understanding the alter-perspective of NSAs and cities. This meant assessing the “perception that other key players B,…, Z have of A’s influence or its lack” (Arts & Verschuren 1999, p. 416). In addition to asking stakeholders themselves about other actor groups, the interviews also aimed at getting the perspective of key government, UN, and other IO representatives on the influence and role of the stakeholders with whom they engaged. Therefore, the interview guideline not only asked about how they perceived their own role and relationship with stakeholders involved, but also asked their perspective on which stakeholders did or did not influence the process and outcomes of the GCM negotiations. The interviews were conducted in a semi-standardized manner based on interview guidelines (Gläser & Laudel, 2010, p. 41), which differed between interviews on egoand alter-perspective. The timeline for interviews was February 2020 to December 2020, and open-ended questions were the primary question type. I informed each interviewee about the objectives, the method, and the use of the data. All interviewees participated voluntarily. Participants were notified that the interview could stop at any time and permission for direct quoting was obtained before any publication of said data via an interview consent form. Interviewees received the interview consent form before their interview. The consent form clarified the use of the data and assured a pseudonym for any interview data. Further, I informed participants that the interview data would only be used for this research project (Gläser & Laudel, 2010, pp. 48–56). Whereas I could conduct the first interviews in person, due to the Corona-Pandemic and resulting travel restrictions, other interviews took place via phone or video conferencing tools. Interviewees were selected based on the criterion of being a key player (see above), from various groups of NSAs as well as governments and the UN. A second criterion was the availability and willingness of those key players to give an interview. In total, I reached out to 47 individuals for an interview. I asked a maximum of three times. Some people were willing to be interviewed, but the interview never 27

The associated data can be viewed in the appendix in the electronic supplementary material (Appendix II: Interviews).

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Table 3.6 Interview overview28 No.

Category

When

Reference

Format

1

Non-State Actor

02/2020

INT-NSA #1

In-Person

2

Non-State Actor

02/2020

INT-NSA #2

In-Person

3

Non-State Actor

02/2020

INT-NSA #3

Video Call/Phone

4

Non-State Actor

02/2020

INT-NSA #4

In-Person

5

Non-State Actor

03/2020

INT-NSA #5

Video Call/Phone

6

International Organization

03/2020

INT-IO #6

Video Call/Phone

7

Non-State Actor

03/2020

INT-NSA #7

Video Call/Phone Video Call/Phone

8

Non-State Actor

03/2020

INT-NSA #8

9

Non-State Actor

03/2020

INT-NSA #9

Video Call/Phone

10

Non-State Actor

04/2020

INT-NSA #10

Video Call/Phone

11

Non-State Actor

04/2022

INT-NSA #11

Video Call/Phone

12

Non-State Actor

05/2020

INT-NSA #12

Video Call/Phone

13

Non-State Actor

05/2020

INT-NSA #13

Video Call/Phone

14

Government

06/2020

INT-GOV #14

Video Call/Phone

15

Non-State Actor

06/2020

INT-NSA #15

Video Call/Phone

16

Non-State Actor

06/2020

INT-NSA #16

Video Call/Phone

17

Government

06/2020

INT-GOV #17

Video Call/Phone

18

Government

06/2020

INT-GOV #18

Video Call/Phone Video Call/Phone

19

Government

06/2020

INT-GOV #19

20

Government

07/2020

INT-GOV #20

Video Call/Phone

21

Non-State Actor

07/2020

INT-NSA #21

Video Call/Phone

22

Government

07/2020

INT-GOV #22

Video Call/Phone

23

Non-State Actor

07/2020

INT-NSA #23

Video Call/Phone

24

Government

08/2020

INT-GOV #24

In-Person

25

International Organization

09/2020

INT-IO #25

Video Call/Phone

26

International Organization

09/2020

INT-IO #26

Video Call/Phone

27

International Organization

09/2020

INT-IO #27

Video Call/Phone (continued)

28

For pseudonymization of interview data the interview transcripts, names of interviewees, their organization, country, or age are not shared in this publication. Used quotes from interviews conducted in other languages than English have been translated for this publication. To ensure pseudonymity to interviewees, original quotes are left out.

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Table 3.6 (continued) No.

Category

When

Reference

Format

28

International Organization

09/2020

INT-IO #28

Video Call/Phone

29

Non-State Actor

09/2020

INT-NSA #29

Video Call/Phone

30

International Organization

09/2020

INT-IO #30

Video Call/Phone

31

International Organization

10/2020

INT-IO #31

Video Call/Phone

32

International Organization

10/2020

INT-IO #32

Video Call/Phone

33

Local authority (city)

10/2020

INT-CIT #33

Video Call/Phone

34

Local authority (city)

11/2020

INT-CIT #34

Video Call/Phone

35

Local authority (city)

12/2020

INT-CIT #35

Video Call/Phone

happened as a result of issues like the interviewee’s failure to confirm the date or an interviewee missing the interview. Only one person declined the interview, yet that person had since left the position they held during the GCM negotiations. Many individuals had changed positions since their involvement in the process, some even switched roles during the process, such as from civil society to an international organization, and others held many different positions. The list of interviewees (see Table 3.6) represents the perspective and position the person had during the majority of the time period under investigation (GCM process). Some interviewees, although ascribed one category, really represent multiple perspectives. These hybrid actors, and the unique position they hold, are addressed in the interviews. These positions are made specific here in order to maintain the anonymity guaranteed to the respondents. Examples of hybrid actors are people who represented multiple networks and actor groups, individuals who switched positions during the time, e.g., from civil society to an IO, and actors from the UN system or governments who left their post to work on the stakeholder side (INT-NSA #4, #9, #13, #23; INT-GOV #18—these sources do not reflect hybrid actors but interview sources where this phenomenon is described). Researcher’s analysis and observation Prior to an assessment of ego- and alter-perception, a researcher must “check […] the validity of these [ego- and alter-]perceptions, based on a reconstruction of the player’s goal achievement, which should be the result either of their own interventions or of anticipation” (Arts & Verschuren 1999, p. 416). This researcher’s observations during the process, combined with the support of expert interviews and document analysis helped me to contextualize the findings and test my hypotheses.

3.2 Triangulation as an Approach to Assess Influence

3.2.4

123

Analyzing NSA and City Influence in the GCM Process

Whereas Betsill and Corell (2001) suggest using process tracing in order to discover the casual mechanisms NGOs used to influence negotiations, I suggest a broader and more flexible approach to the analysis of data.29 I mix a variety of tools, as offered by Qualitative Data Analysis (QDA) (Rädiker & Kuckartz, 2019). Given the mixed method approach of QDA, I am able to analyze all data sources (primary texts, online survey results, interview data) to deductively answer the following questions: (1) (2) (3) (4)

What opportunities did NSAs and cities have to transmit information? What did NSAs and cities do to transmit information to decision makers? What kinds of leverage did NSAs and cities use to transmit information? Did NSAs and cities coin specific terms that became part of the negotiating jargon? (5) Did state negotiators discuss issues proposed by NSAs or cities (or cease to discuss issues opposed by them)? (6) Does the final agreement contain text drafted by NSAs and cities? (7) Does the final agreement reflect the goals and principals of NSAs and cities? These questions offer a step-by-step analysis that serves to answer the following broad question: What were the causal mechanisms that linked NSA and city participation to GCM negotiations and what was their influence? The second dimension suggested by Betsill and Corell (2001) is a counterfactual analysis that in a very particular way analysis the behavior of other actors. The guiding question for this analysis is: What would have happened if NSAs and cities had not participated in the negotiations? The answer to this question

29

Process tracing “requires building a logical chain of evidence linking NGO transmission of information, actors’ use/non-use of that information, and the effects/non-effects of that information. Researchers can draw on evidence related to what NGOs were doing (activities and resources), how they tried to transmit knowledge and information to negotiators (access), whether delegates responded to that information, and whether those responses were consistent with the NGO position (goal attainment)” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 71–72). Process tracing thus is a tool to track non-state actor activity in a negotiation process. This research, as described previously, goes further by including a broad set of actors into its research. Thus, tracing of the advocacy activities of individual actors is not possible. Rather, an overall assessment is possible on the role, engagement and potentially influence of actor groups. Therefore, a broad methodological approach that both deductively and inductively analyzes the various data sources is needed.

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is also deducted from the Qualitative Data Analysis tools provided by evaluative methods (Loi & Rodrigues, 2012). For the deductive analysis of the material in MaxQDA the questions posed are used as the major categories to code all data sources; additional sub-categories help to contextualize findings in these categories. In order not to miss any other findings from the broad set of data, the data sources are also analyzed inductively. This allows for additional results beyond the predefined research framework. Hence, based on triangulation, which includes 68 survey responses, 35 interviews, 432 primary sources as well as secondary data, I assess the role and influence of NSAs and local authorities in the GCM.

3.3

Methodological Challenges

The chosen methodological approach to analyzing the influence of NSAs and cities in the GCM negotiation process poses several methodological challenges. These challenges have been identified by other researchers who have examined the role and influence of NSAs and NGOs in other policy fields. The first challenge is that influence “may not exist;” thus making it difficult to measure or analyze the reasons for the non-existence. Second, influence can be “difficult to document” as it may happen through unmeasurable means. Third, actors “themselves may be reticent to claim credit” as they may be unsure if they influenced the process and/or have no real proof of their success. Fourth, it is hard to “isolate the effects of NGO action in a dynamic policy process” from other (external) effects and causes (Stroup, 2019, pp. 39–40). Arts and Verschuren (2004, p. 399) define alternative causes as a mix of influence from other bargainers, external factors, and autonomous developments.30 In addition, researchers tend to rely too heavily on evidence about what NGOs did during the negotiations (e.g. activities, access, resources) and often neglect evidence about how other actors (e.g. states) behave (Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 74–75). 30

While Arts and Verschuren (Arts & Verschuren, 2004) pose a mathematical approach to the analysis of individual actors’ influence, I follow the approach suggested be Betsill and Corell (2001). Alternative causes will be analyzed in the researcher’s analysis and conclusion of this project. Arts and Verschuren (2004, p. 499) define alternative causes (AC) as the sum of the influence of other bargainers (OB), external factors (EF) and autonomous developments (AD), leading to the formula: AC = OB + EF + AD.

3.3 Methodological Challenges

125

Finally, as I have included broad range of actors in my analysis, I am unable to analyze individual organizations. With this broader context of NSA and city influence, I risk not being able to assess the specific roles of individual actors. However, I believe the broad context brings a lot of opportunity to the migration field, whereas previous, more narrowly focused research has not done so. Previous research found that when attempting to analyze the influence of actors in a policy process, the set-up of research lead to an analysis of fewer cases than intended due to the complexity of research (Dür, 2008). In the set-up of the research, I aimed to address all these challenges, e.g., when setting up the Online Survey, the interview guidelines, and the methodological framework.

4

The Role and Influence of Non-State Actors in the GCM Process

While it is not a new phenomenon that actors other than states engage in international negotiations, the process leading up to the adoption of the GCM brought new elements and new actors to global migration governance. The GCM is the first agreement relating to migration, albeit non-binding, negotiated by UN member states that included a broad range of NSAs in the preparatory process. Little analysis has yet been done on the influence of NSAs and local authorities on the negotiated and agreed upon outcome of the GCM.1 Given the GCM is a political document, negotiated by states (United Nations General Assembly, 2018, para. 16), its implementation relies heavily on the willingness of states and its intergovernmental organizations. However, it also relies on the support and even pressure of NSAs and local authorities. Implementation happens on several levels: within the international community and the UN System, where the UN Migration Network is tasked with supporting GCM implementation, as well as within national governments, local authorities, and NSAs. Thus, as argued before, for the purposes of understanding the evolution of and changes to global migration governance, it is important to understand the role NSAs and local authorities played during the negotiation processes and what influences they had on the negotiated outcome. 1

As elaborated previously, there is numerous methodology and findings on the role and influence of non-state actors in other global policy fields, such as climate change, the SDGs or human rights (Arts & Verschuren, 1999, 2004; Betsill & Corell, 2001; Polizzi & Murdie, 2019; Sénit, 2019).

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5_4.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 R. Schweiger, Beyond states, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5_4

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As shown in section 2.3.3 above, local authorities form a similar yet different case than other actors in global migration governance. Thus, my analysis is split into two sections, NSAs (this chapter) and local authorities (chapter 5 below), followed by a summary of findings in chapter 6. Importantly, methods and findings from this chapter about NSAs also serve as a basis for chapter 5. As outlined in section 3.2, NSAs opportunities, activities, and leverages are the first layer needing to be assessed in order to understand their influence on the GCM negotiation process (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 79). The three guiding questions for the analysis are (1) What opportunities did NSAs have to transmit information?; (2) What did NSAs do to transmit information to decision makers?; and (3) What kinds of leverage did NSAs use to transmit information?. Dimension two looks at the goal attainment of actors. Four questions guide this analysis: (1) Did NSAs coin specific terms that became part of the negotiating jargon?; (2) Did state negotiators discuss issues proposed by NSAs (or cease to discuss issues opposed by them)?; (3) Does the final agreement contain text drafted by NSAs?; and (4) Does the final agreement reflect the goals and principals of NSAs and cities?. The analysis is based on what I call the ‘stages’ of influence (see Figure 4.1). Each stage is analyzed in a step-by-step process before coming to an overall conclusion and analysis of findings. I argue influence is generated on the different levels and stages that NSAs and local authorities acted on. Based on the alter- and ego-perspective of actors, as well as primary2 and secondary data, I was able to gather evidence on a broad context for which the various types of NSAs operated and exerted influence. I was able to do the same for local authorities as a similar but different case. I also highlight the limitations their influence had on the agreed outcome of the GCM (for framework of analysis and methodology see chapter 3). As such, this chapter is clustered into three main parts: First, the access, activities, and opportunities for NSAs to transmit information, including the GCM process and its framework for stakeholder participation (section 4.1). Second, the leverages and resources of NSAs as well as their challenges (section 4.2). And finally, the goal attainment of NSAs (section 4.3). One interviewee posed the challenge of measuring the influence of civil society and other NSAs:

2

Primary data include interviews, the online survey, and documents, such as statements, position papers, agendas, etc., see section 3.2.3. The associated data can be viewed in the appendix in the electronic supplementary material (Appendix III: List of primary data).

4 The Role and Influence of Non-State Actors in the GCM Process Figure 4.1 ‘Stages’ of influence. (Source: own graph, based on Betsill & Corell, 2001)

Activities used to transmit information

Leverages used to transmit information

State negotiators discussed issues

Coin terms that became part of the negotiating jargon final agreement contains text drafted by stakeholders Outcome reflects goals and principles of non-state actors and cities

Overall assessment of influence of NSAs and local authorities in the GCM process

Access and opportunities to transmit information

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I mean, one can reasonably think that without a civil society, we would have had a much weaker global compact, but it’s very difficult to prove it. Because sometimes it was not necessarily what the civil society said at a general meeting, but rather that they had conversations with different states and were able to influence those states, so the states brought the perspective before the plenary, for instance. So, it’s very difficult to determine that (INT-IO #26).

My research takes up this exact question. The goal of chapters 4 and 5, based on my framework of analysis, is to shed light on the assessment of statements like this, and one’s from other interviewees; interviewees that are comprised of actors other than states, including local authorities. I aim to show the roles they played and to what degree they influenced the outcome of the GCM. The research goes beyond looking at formal access to the process, but instead investigates the leverages, challenges, and goal attainment of NSAs when it came to bringing ideas and suggestions to negotiation of the GCM. In this chapter, I argue that the opportunities NSAs had to contribute information to the negotiation process was significant, especially during the consultation and stocktaking phase. Various NSAs of all kinds informed the zero draft of the GCM, which was based on the input and ideas presented during the consultation and stocktaking phases. Actors used numerous forms of leverage such as: close exchanges with the co-facilitators, advocacy coalitions and multi-stakeholder alliances, and by presenting themselves as experts. Previous processes helped gain the momentum and capacity to engage in this more strategic manner. Due to the broad consultation process, I find that NSAs had the greatest influence on the zero draft of the GCM; a document introduced by the co-facilitators in early 2018. However, their influence on any specific text of the final, agreed upon outcome was limited. This is the result of two important factors; one, the nature of a state-led negotiation processes, and two, I was only able to a few examples where actors managed to change text during the negotiations.

4.1

The Access, Activities, and Opportunities for Non-State Actors to Transmit Information

This chapter assesses the access, activities, and opportunities for NSAs to transmit information.3 Therefore, I differentiate between access given as part of the 3

As Betsill and Corell (2001, p. 71) note: “NGO activity, access to negotiations and resources are all part of the story about how NGOs influence global environmental negotiations. They clearly address the ways that NGOs participate and attempt to shape the

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formal process, e.g., through sessions and hearings, and informal activities that provided access to NSAs. The chapter is divided into three main sections: First, a discussion about the GCM process and its framework for stakeholder participation. This includes a look into the access NSAs had in the three main development phases of the GCM (see section 4.1.1). Second, an analysis of the various roles that existed in previous processes of global migration governance that enabled opportunities for NSAs (see section 4.1.2). Third, a discussion about the activities of NSAs and how they transmitted information during the GCM process (see section 4.1.3). Throughout the three sections, I find that the GCM process offered NSAs various opportunities to transmit information to negotiators, especially during the consultation phase. This is not to say NSAs are not a singular group but rather, they are a diverse set of organizations with diverse interests. Further, it is important to note the consultation phase was designed for the purpose of providing groups such as NSAs the opportunity to contribute information; this is the result of previous processes as well as external circumstances and crises that helped build momentum and opportunities. Thus, the consultation phase offered NSAs a space for significant engagement and, as a result, their activities during the consultation phase was wide-ranging.

4.1.1

The GCM Process and its Framework for Stakeholder Participation

The GCM was supposed to be developed “through an open, transparent and inclusive process of consultations and negotiations” (Rother & Steinhilper, 2019; United Nations General Assembly, 2016b). However, the actual negotiation of the GCM was in the hands of UN member states and excluded actors other than states from formal conversations. In comparison to the SDG process that was very inclusive, during the GCM process, there was “pushback” from a broad set of governments to be inclusive. However, the preceding consultation and stocktaking phase was an opportunity to share information and “progressive ideas” to inform GCM negotiations (INT-IO #31). This chapter investigates the access NSAs had to the negotiation process and where and how it was possible to contribute ideas and information. negotiating process and outcome. However, to get a more accurate indication of NGO influence, researchers must also consider whether NGOs were successful in their efforts to shape the negotiations.”

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The 2016 New York Declaration provides both the basis and framework for the decision to implement the development of two global compacts—the GCM and the GCR. It also provides the framework for stakeholder participation for negotiations of the GCM and GCR.4 The New York Declaration was envisioned to include a broad set of stakeholders into its process and acknowledged “the importance of multi-stakeholder dialogues” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b, para. 55). Following New York, when laying out the process for the development of the GCM and the GCR, the UNGA committed to “a State-led process with the involvement of all relevant stakeholders” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b, para. 52). The appendix of the New York Declaration lists the NSAs meant to be involved in the process, specifically the preparatory phase. The NSAs listed were those that had previously been involved with the GFMD.5 The Modalities Resolution As with every intergovernmental negotiation, the modalities resolution of the GCM was the key document setting up stakeholder engagement. Thus, while negotiations were state led, the participation of NSAs was ensured to be done an inclusive manner:6 What I think is honestly the foundation for the success of the GCM […] is the modalities resolution. You would be hard pressed to find a U.N. mandated intergovernmental process that is as inclusive of non-state actors as the modalities resolution of the GCM (INT-GOV #17).

4

The involvement of stakeholders in the New York Declaration was even more explicit with regard to the CRRF, stating that it “should involve a multi-stakeholder approach that includes national and local authorities, international organizations, international financial institutions, civil society partners (including faith-based organizations, diaspora organizations and academia), the private sector, the media and refugees themselves” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b, para. 66). With its much more practical approach the GCR and the CRRF therefore had to include many stakeholders from early stages. A comparison between the two Compacts and stakeholder involvement is, however, not possible within the range of this research. 5 The Appendix states that “Civil society, the private sector, diaspora communities and migrant organizations would be invited to contribute to the process for the preparation of the global compact” (United Nations General Assembly, 2016b, para. 15 Appendix II). 6 However, another government representative claimed that “the approach to civil society was not more generous for the GCM than there had been to the New York Declaration” (INTGOV #18). This shows also different perceptions on the role and uniqueness of the GCM amongst government representatives.

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The modalities resolution defined the set of actors and groups that were to participate in the process by delegating the task to the PGA: [The UNGA] Reiterates the importance of the effective participation of all relevant stakeholders, including civil society, the private sector, academic institutions, parliaments, diaspora communities and migrant organizations in the intergovernmental conference and its preparatory process, and: (a) Invites non-governmental organizations that are in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council to register with the Secretariat in order to participate in the intergovernmental conference and its preparatory process; (b) Requests the President of the General Assembly to draw up a list of other relevant representatives of relevant non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, academic institutions, the private sector, diaspora communities and migrant organizations who may attend and participate in the preparatory process, taking into account the principles of transparency and of equitable geographical representation, and with due regard to the meaningful participation of women, and to submit the list to Member States for their consideration on a non-objection basis no later than April 2017; (c) Requests the President of the General Assembly to draw up a further list of other relevant representatives of relevant non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, academic institutions, the private sector, diaspora communities and migrant organizations who may attend and participate in the intergovernmental conference, taking into account the principles of transparency and of equitable geographical representation, and with due regard to the meaningful participation of women, and to submit the list to Member States for their consideration on a non-objection basis no later than April 2018; (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 6)

Additionally, national human rights institutions compliant with the Paris Principles (United Nations General Assembly, 1993b), the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions, and regional human rights institution networks were listed as stakeholders and invited to participate in the process (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 9). Notably, local authorities were not listed as stakeholders in paragraph 6 of the Modalities Resolution. However, the contribution of their perspectives through informal dialogues was considered important (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 8). This represents the setup of the consultation phase; a phase that largely took place without the presence and perspective of local authorities (see chapter 5 below). Initially, stakeholder engagement in the GCM process was primarily the responsibility of the PGA, specifically handing it over to the Non-Governmental Liaison Service (NGLS) before moving it to the SRSG’s office. Thus, on the UN side,

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access to the process was steered by the PGA’s office (INT-IO #31; INT-IO #6). The PGA was also responsible for drawing together a list of organizations participating in the process (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 6). This led to an allowance of stakeholders, that had not been registered through ECOSOC. This made the process accessible to more diverse actors, especially during the consultation phase. Still, every organization participating in the process had to be vetted by the UN (on the challenges to accessing the process, see section 4.2.5 below). My survey amongst NSAs finds that 42% of respondents were in consultative status with ECOSOC (Online Survey #Q4).7 Access for NSAs to the three phases of the GCM process The model process for the GCM were the SDG negotiations.8 First, because SDG negotiations were a very inclusive process, and second, because the GCM stems from one of the SDG targets (10.7). Due to the difficulty of the topic, it was useful to start with a consultation phase that looked at migration from a variety of perspectives and informally get all negotiating parties on board (INT-GOV #14; INT-IO #31). Consequently, the development of the GCM was clustered into three phases (see Figure 4.2) and in total lasted over two years. Between the end of phase III, the intergovernmental negotiations, in July 2018 and the adoption of the GCM in December 2018, there was a five month gap.9 During this time, many countries,

Phase I: Consultations April to November 2017

Phase II: Stocktaking November 2017 to January2018

Phase III: Intergovernmental negotiations FeburarytoJuly 2018

Figure 4.2 The three phases of the GCM processes. (Source: own illustration based on United Nations General Assembly (2017, para. 14))

7

The survey question was: “Are you in consultative status with the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) of the United Nations?”; 28 responded with ‘yes’, 33 responded with ‘no’, and 6 responded ‘I don’t know’ (Online Survey #Q4). 8 The SDGs were just adopted about a year before the New York Declaration. Both, the SDGSs as well as the New York Declaration have been co-facilitated by the then Ambassador of Ireland to the UN, David Donoghue (United Nations System Staff College, 2021). 9 Interviewees assessed the length of the very differently. One civil society representative experienced it as “record speed”, being “almost too heavy and too fast” (INT-NSA #23), whereas one government representative assessed it as a “more complicated but leisurely process” in comparison to other negotiations (INT-GOV #18).

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especially in Europe, had heated debates about the agreed outcome of the GCM and general migration policies (see, e.g. Boucher & Gördemann, 2021). While the design of the process proclaimed to be participatory in nature, the final negotiation process was left to state negotiators (phase III). Throughout the process, interactions between state negotiators with NSAs and local authorities was built into the design (INT-GOV #14). Phase 1: The consultation phase The consultation phase consisted of a series of informal thematic sessions, regional consultations, and stakeholder consultations (United Nations, n.d.-b). The goal of this phase was for governments to understand the phenomenon of migration because we cannot negotiate something that we don’t understand. So it was about facts, evidence, data, and civil society was front and center in putting that forward (INT-GOV #17).

At core of this phase were the six thematic sessions held between May and October 2017 (see Table 4.2). These sessions served as the main entry point for all types of NSAs, registered as stakeholders, to be included in the process (United Nations, n.d.-h). During these thematic consultations, which took place in Geneva, Vienna, and New York City, NSAs were invited to provide input and to attend events; some even (co-)hosted side events (Online Survey #Q6; INT-NSA #10). UN agencies were important contributors during these consultations and provided briefing papers for the thematic sessions (INT-IO #30; INT-IO #27). Certain countries also included NSAs and local authorities in their delegations (INT-GOV #17). Also, during the consultations, side-events hosted and co-hosted by governments, UN agencies, and NSAs took place. For some participants, the number of side events was overwhelming (INT-GOV #24; INT-NSA #21), For governments, the consultation phase helped them garner the knowledge and expertise to start the process of forming said government’s opinion. The other advantage for governments was that at this phase, things were not yet political. Rather, it still was a collecting of ideas that could be brought to the process (INT-GOV #24; INT-GOV #20). One interviewee emphasized that “actual[ly] listening to experts […] helped at least educate a little bit on some of the issues” (INT-GOV #19). As such, this phase helped governments access information and knowledge and allowed NSAs to provide input and practical ideas to these governments. For this phase of the process, organizers asked member states to moderate the panels and/or chair sessions while civil society and NSAs acted as panel participants and presented ideas that governments could respond to. In addition, during the thematic sessions, NSAs could take the floor and contribute to the conversation. Their

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contributions were included in the summaries the co-facilitators provided after each thematic session. These summaries served as the basis for the stocktaking (phase II) and the zero draft of the GCM, which was presented in February 2018 (INTGOV #17; #TS1-2017-Summary; #TS2-2017-Summary; #TS3-2017-Summary; #TS4-2017-Summary; #TS5-2017-Summary; #TS6-2017-Summary). Between July 2017 and May 2018, five multi-stakeholder hearings took place as both preparation and input for the intergovernmental conference (United Nations, n.d.-d; United Nations General Assembly, 2017b).10 These hearings provided space for NSAs and cities to intervene and present their perspectives into the negotiation phase. However, these meetings were the responsibility of the PGA and not the cofacilitators. Because of that, there was at times a ‘disconnect’ between the hearings and the consultations (INT-GOV #14). Respective Regional Economic Commissions organized regional consultations that took place between August and November 2017 (United Nations, n.d.-f).11 In addition, civil society held a total of seven regional consultations between August and November 2017. During these consultations, the goal was to include as many perspectives from the regions as possible (MADE Network, 2019; United Nations, n.d.-e; INT-NSA #3, #10; INT-IO #32; Online Survey #Q6).12 However, because this research focuses on the influence at the global level, any findings regarding regional activities or potential leverage points that influenced negotiations are only 10

The UN website counts this as part of the consultation phase (United Nations, n.d.-d). The UNGA, in its Modalities Resolution, requested “the President of the General Assembly, as part of the preparatory process for the intergovernmental conference, to organize and to preside over four days of informal interactive multi-stakeholder hearings, between April 2017 and June 2018, with representatives of non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, academic institutions, parliaments, diasporas, migrants, migrant organizations and the private sector, and also requests the President of the Assembly to prepare a summary of the hearings, to be made available as an input for the intergovernmental negotiations” (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 30). 11 Meetings were held by (1) the Economic Commission for Latin America and the Caribbean (ECLAC), (2) the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), (3) the Economic Commission for Africa (ECA), (4) the Economic and Social Commission for Asia and the Pacific (ESCAP) and (5) the Economic Commission for Europe (ECE) (United Nations, n.d.-f). 12 Civil Society chose a different regional configuration, having set up regional civil society consultations in (1) Asia, (2) Middle East and North Africa (MENA), (3) Africa, (4) North America, (5) Europe, (6) Latin America & the Caribbean, and (7) Pacific (MADE Network, 2019). There was criticism and discussions amongst civil society as the budget to do so came from IOM (INT-NSA #3). Two respondents from the survey indicated they participated in online consultations (Online Survey #Q6).

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considered but not explicitly addressed. Regional contributions were not asked about in the survey or interviews. One observation on the process is, however, that there were processes that were building on the ground in terms of civil society consultations that were building up during the consultation period. And I think that was kind of one of the big differences for this process, as opposed to some other processes and some other negotiations that have happened, in which kind of the civil society landscape was more, you know, the New York and Geneva organizations not necessarily organized among themselves, but really reflecting their own institutional opinions (INT-NSA #5).

Even though not formally part of the process, the GFMD and the GFMD Civil Society Days in 2017 in Berlin marked important milestones in the GCM preparatory phase. There, both, the GFMD Civil Society Days and the Global Conference on Children on the Move prepared recommendations for the Global Compact(s) (MADE Network, 2019).13 Phase 2: Stocktaking The stocktaking phase had the purpose to wrap up and assess the “inputs received during the consultation phase” before going into the negotiation phase in 2018 (United Nations, n.d.-g; INT-GOV #18; INT-NSA #9).14 While this phase formally started in November 2017 and ended in January 2018, the most important event occurred during the stocktaking event in Puerto Vallarta, Mexico in December 2017. Before the stocktaking meeting, civil society came together for two days—with about 60 delegates—to coordinate and prepare for collective input (INT-NSA #3). The stocktaking meeting offered an opportunity to exchange ideas and offer input. A ‘suggestion box’ was available throughout the meeting that both stakeholders and governments could use to write up “public policies or interventions or actions that they thought should be included” in the zero draft of the GCM. Civil society actors contributed the majority of the over 500 suggestions (INT-GOV #19). NSAs (and for the first time local authorities, see chapter 5 below) were visibly present during the first day of meeting during a session focused on revisiting phase I (#PuertoVallarta-2017-Agenda; INT-GOV #14, #19; INT-NSA #8, #21).15 Experts 13

The 4th Mayoral Forum took place on the margins of the GFMD and marked an important moment for cities to elevate their voices and to request to be heard during the process (4th Global Mayoral Forum, 2017c) (see chapter 5). 14 During the Stocktaking, the US withdrew from the process, which led to US cities stepping up and engaging publicly, see section 5.1.2. 15 During this panel, civil society (through Mr. Mamadou Goita, Chair of the Pan African Network in Defense of Migrants Rights (PANiDMR), and Mr. Ignacio Packer, International

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from places such as think tanks helped design the sessions and moderated some of the breakout sessions (INT-NSA #9). For an event taking place outside of Geneva or New York, where many organizations had a presence, there was a “large representation of civil society” (INT-GOV #18). However, according to my survey data it was the phase with the lowest turnout overall and from NSAs in particular (see Figure 4.3). Still unsure how the zero draft would look, and if it would include the input NSAs provided during the consultations, Puerto Vallarta became a moment for NSAs to strategically think about next steps and how to best move into the negotiation phase (INT-IO #32; INT-IO #26). Phase 3: The intergovernmental negotiations While stakeholders were actively included in the consultation and stocktaking phase, the modalities resolution had not foreseen their participation in the intergovernmental negotiations (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, paras. 14, 21, 22).16 The six rounds of intergovernmental negotiations held in New York from February to July 2018 marked the final and most intensive phase of the GCM process. The starting point for the negotiation phase was the zero draft of the GCM, which had been presented by the co-facilitators in February 2018 (Angenendt & Koch, 2017; Lavenex, 2020). The negotiations, just as the consultation and stocktaking phases had been, were led by co-facilitators—the UN Ambassadors from Switzerland and Mexico and their teams (Lavenex, 2020, p. 681). Six Drafts were presented during the first half of 2018 and by July 2018, member states had agreed on the final draft (see Table 4.1). The negotiations were member states-only; however, NSAs still visibly engaged. NSAs were offered opportunities to transmit information to individual (friendly) governments as well as co-facilitation teams (INT-GOV #20). NSA representatives from various types of organizations and regions were present during negotiations and could listen from the balcony during the chamber sessions, which had been accessible for stakeholders (INT-GOV #14): Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA)), Private sector (through Mr. Karl Cox, GFMD Business Mechanism), Trade Unions (through Ms. Chidi King, Director of Development of the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC)), Parliaments (through Ms. Gabriela Cuevas Barrón, President of the Inter-Parliamentary Union (IPU)), National Human Rights Institutions (through Mr. Luis Raúl González Pérez, President of the National Human Rights Commission of Mexico on behalf of the Global Alliance of National Human Rights Institutions (GANHRI)) represented the broad group of stakeholders (#PuertoVallarta-2017Agenda). 16 Government representatives during the interviews emphasized the importance of member states-only during negotiations. However, they did claim phase I and phase II were crucial to the process and success of the GCM (e.g., INT-GOV #20).

4.1 The Access, Activities, and Opportunities for Non-State Actors to Transmit … 139 Table 4.1 Overview of drafts of the GCM Version

Date

Code Source

Zero Draft

February 5, 2018

#GCM-2018-ZeroDraft

Zero Draft Plus

March 5, 2018

#GCM-2018-ZeroDraft-Plus

Draft Rev 1

March 26, 2018

#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev1

Draft Rev 2

May 28, 2018

#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev2

Draft Rev 3

June 29, 2018

#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev3

Final Draft

July 11, 2018

#GCM-2018-FinalDraft

Agreed Outcome

July 13, 2018

#GCM-2018-AgreedOutcome

Source: own table

the negotiations were, strictly speaking, just the member states standing up and delivering statements. And so, the physical presence was just the NGO representatives who were on the balcony. […] I didn’t get the impression that it was packed each time. You know, that varied a bit, depending, I suppose, on the stage of the negotiations (INT-GOV #18).

In addition, before every round of negotiations, the co-facilitators held informal dialogues for stakeholders. During these informal sessions, stakeholders could comment on the negotiations, current drafts, and offer ideas to both the co-facilitators as well as to participating governments (INT-GOV #14, #19, #22; INT-IO #6, #25, #32; INT-NSA #8). Very few governments attended these sessions and so the input and messages offered by stakeholders mainly reached the co-facilitation team (see also section 4.2.5 on the challenges and limitations): The small downbeat there, perhaps also a larger downbeat, was that there were actually relatively few government representatives in the room. So, during the one or two hours that the civil society organizations had the opportunity to talk directly with the co-facilitators and make their presentations, there were usually relatively few countries that participated (INT-GOV #22).

This lack of government presence created a challenge for NSAs to influence the negotiations and individual member states, if there are no member states willing to hear them out, then their message won’t come across. They will maybe publish stuff in their websites and in the media, social media. But it won’t gain momentum through the negotiations (INT-GOV #19).

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Still, these sessions offered the opportunity to comment in real time on the negotiation process. Conversely, the Multi-Stakeholder Hearings that continued throughout the negotiation phase “were usually an echo of what had already been said and just before the formal negotiation” (INT-IO #30). In addition to the informal dialogues, the co-facilitators also met and listened to stakeholders in between consultations, negotiations, and other meetings. At times, the co-facilitators even advised the stakeholders on how to strategically engage (INT-NSA #21; INT-GOV #14): And then during the negotiations, I must say, that was excellent. But also, because we went back to them again and again, and said: ‘Don’t just use the meetings, the dialogs, to put forward your quasi maximum positions. Come to us, make compromise proposals as well. If you really want to fight for certain issues, you also have to be aware that you have to deviate from your maximum positions and help us to find formulations that ensure that certain issues that are important to you are anchored and perhaps presented in a more nuanced way’. Perhaps some terms are left out, but still, yes, the concept is represented, for example, the firewalls, that was a huge issue (INT-GOV #14).

In addition to the co-facilitators, some governments informally exchanged ideas with NSAs before and after the negotiations, e.g., through lunches with civil society from their own country or bilateral exchanges with stakeholders after the negotiation rounds. During these informal meetings, government representatives shared their views on the negotiations and blockages and stakeholders could give their input as well (INT-GOV #24; INT-GOV #22). Another opportunity for idea exchange occurred during side-events, which provided NSAs a chance to contribute to the negotiations, especially after the 3rd round. Often, side events were held with UN agencies or governments (INT-GOV #24).17 The role and input of NSAs and local authorities was particularly impactful during the final negotiation phase. The co-facilitators brought in representatives from civil society, business, NRHI, and one mayor in to speak during the final round of negotiations (INT-IO #6): I think in July we had the last negotiation session. And I really remember […], because, the co-facilitators, we are actually going to end the negotiation session early because we’ve come to agreement on it. But they turned to Earth, and they said it. We would like to end it with the stakeholders taking the floor. So, the last thing would be 17

See e.g., #GCM-NEG4-SideEvent-Xenophobia; #GCM-NEG4-SideEventPoliticalParticipation; #GCM-NEG4-SideEvent-InitiativeChildRights; #GCM-NEG6SideEvent-EthicalRecuritment.

4.1 The Access, Activities, and Opportunities for Non-State Actors to Transmit … 141 the word from the stakeholders. […] I think four or five speakers from different stakeholder groups who then took to the floor. And that was really, I think, quite powerful that […] stakeholders got the last word before the co-facilitators closed, and chert, we have a compact agreed to now (INT-IO #6).

To conclude, during the negotiation phase, stakeholders had limited access to the formal process and thus fewer formal means to transmit information. The negotiation phase “was missing the direct face-to-face encounters with civil society, which we had got for the SDGs” (INT-GOV #18). Thus, the activities (see section 4.1.3) and leverages (see section 4.2) of NSAs became even more important. The adoption conference in Marrakech While the negotiations terminated in July 2018, the adoption of the GCM did not occur until December 2018 in Marrakech. Which was then followed by a UNGA resolution later that month (United Nations General Assembly, 2018; see also Section 2.2.4). Several heads of states came to Marrakech, including then German Chancellor Angela Merkel (Schultheis & Calamur, 2018). NSAs and local authorities participated as stakeholders during the conference to adopt the GCM (The President of the UN General Assembly, 2018). Before the adoption conference, the GFMD took place in Marrakech, which enabled a link between the two. This link included the GFMD Civil Society Days and the GFMD Business Mechanism. At the closing of the GFMD, the Civil Society Chair shared ten Commitments to GCM implementation with all of the participating governments and stakeholders present (#GFMD-2018-CSD-Committments-Chair; INT-NSA #5, #21). Because the two events were linked, stakeholders were also able to host side events and do media work for the GCM (INT-NSA #9). Prior to the conference, many countries, especially in Europe, had quite heated political and public debates about the GCM (see e.g. Schultheis & Calamur, 2018). Questions were raised as to whether or not it would be useful to wait until December 2018, since the outcome had already been agreed upon in July (INT-NSA #9; INTGOV #14). While the adoption conference did not influence the agreed outcome of the GCM, it did have important implications regarding the GCM’s recognition.

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Table 4.2 Timeline of the GCM process: thematic sessions, multi-stakeholder hearings, and intergovernmental negotiations 05/2017 Thematic Session 1: Human rights of all migrants, social inclusion, cohesion, and all forms of discrimination, including racism, xenophobia and intolerance 05/2017 Thematic Session 2: Addressing drivers of migration, including adverse effects of climate change, natural disasters, and human-made crises, through protection and assistance, sustainable development, poverty eradication, conflict prevention and resolution 06/2017 Thematic Session 3: International cooperation and governance of migration in all its dimensions, including at borders, on transit, entry, return, readmission, integration, and reintegration 06/2017 Thematic Session 4: Contributions from migrants and diasporas to all dimensions of sustainable development, including remittances and portability of earned benefits 07/2017 Informal interactive multi-stakeholder hearing (full day) No. 1 09/2017 Thematic Session 5: Smuggling of migrants, trafficking in persons and contemporary forms of slavery, including appropriate identification, protection and assistance to migrants and trafficking victims 10/2017 Thematic Session 6: Irregular migration and regular pathways, including decent work, labour mobility, recognition of skills and qualifications, and other relevant measures 10/2017 Informal interactive multi-stakeholder hearing (full day) No. 2 12/2017 Global Compact for Migration Preparatory meeting, Puerto Vallarta, Mexico (Stocktaking phase) 12/2017 Informal interactive multi-stakeholder hearing (half day) No. 3 02/2018 Informal interactive multi-stakeholder hearing (full day) No. 4 02/2018 First round of intergovernmental negotiations 03/2018 Second round of intergovernmental negotiations 04/2018 Third round of intergovernmental negotiations 05/2018 Fourth round of intergovernmental negotiations 05/2018 Informal interactive multi-stakeholder hearing (half day) No. 5 06/2018 Fifth round of intergovernmental negotiations 07/2018 Sixth round of intergovernmental negotiations (continued)

4.1 The Access, Activities, and Opportunities for Non-State Actors to Transmit … 143 Table 4.2 (continued) 12/2018 Intergovernmental Conference to Adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration, Marrakech 12/2018 Resolution adopted by UNGA on 19 December 2018 (A/RES/73/195): Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration Source: own table, based on United Nations, n.d.-h, n.d.-c, n.d.-d

4.1.2

Previous Processes Preparing Stakeholder Engagement

One clear finding is, I argue, that previous processes have paved the way for the inclusion of NSAs (INT-IO #32). Amongst these important processes are the GFMD, the SDGs, and the New York Declaration; these all laid ground for the acknowledging NSAs significant contributions to the GCM process: If the whole drive in the Global Forum and the SDGs, being the two biggest processes that open the way for the Compact, if they had not been multistakeholder, there would never have been a Global Compact for Migration. No doubt about it. If Peter Sutherland had not been around, there might not have ever been a Global Compact for Migration either. So, I think that the engagement of civil society and others, private sector, especially, in those other two processes, were important for them to open the way for the Global Compact (INT-NSA #23).

Thus, opportunities to transmit information to the GCM process stemmed from the many prior processes where NSAs (and to limited extent local authorities, see below) had previously engaged—or had the access to engage. The role of the GFMD The GFMD process, with its increasing participation of civil society and private sector, proved to be a key mechanism and a “good model” (INT-GOV #19) for preparing stakeholder involvement in the GCM process. One interviewee stated in that regard to the GCM process, “I’m sure that GFMD was an example for the GCM to open up” (INT-NSA #8). As such, I argue that the GFMD helped build a ‘track record’ for NSA contribution. It increased their visibility amongst governments and organizational structures, which allowed them to engage more fully: Thanks to the GFMD process, civil society and the private sector have actually found a self-organization to coordinate themselves globally and to contribute positions to global processes. Until now, this was mainly the GFMD, because at the UN the topic of migration was not really, yes, regularly dealt with (INT-GOV #14).

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Many civil society actors who were active in the GFMD, also participated in the GCM process (Online Survey #Q6). The GFMD Civil Society Days, coordinated by ICMC, was a crucial point of leverage that allowed civil society members access and information about the GCM process (INT-NSA #3, #10, #29; INT-GOV #14, #20; INT-IO #25). While it “was pretty much the same people for a long time,” the Civil Society Days helped create “this sort of NGO level advocacy at the international level” through the GFMD process (INT-NSA #4). In the case of the private sector, the GFMD Business Mechanism, coordinated by IOE, was the key vehicle to engage in the GCM process (INT-NSA #8, #21; INT-GOV #14): we would not have been able to participate without the steadfast involvement, engagement, and credibility, enabled by the IOE […] to the GFMD, because the IOE recognized that it’s not just the GCM, but the GFMD has really significant participation from civil society. That’s an important bridge for civil society and companies to work together (INT-NSA #21).

Through the GFMD, it became quite “common to open to other stakeholders, […] with civil society, business, mayors” (INT-NSA #8). For governments, the GFMD and the SDG processes offered a good ‘exercise’ to work with both civil society and the private sector (INT-NSA #23). The GFMD prepared alliances on specific topics that became especially relevant for the New York Declaration, and the GCM process prepared them to discuss topics such as the rights of children on the move (INT-NSA #3; see below). The SDG process The GFMD enabled the engagement of various actors in migration and development spaces during the SDG negotiations (INT-NSA #11, #23, #29). The setup of the SDG negotiations, which was followed by the New York Declaration (both of which were co-chaired by the Ambassador of Ireland to the UN), can both be identified as ‘enablers’ for stakeholder participation in the GCM process. One interviewee stated: for instance, when we worked earlier before the Global Compact, we did a lot of work in terms of the Sustainable Development Goals. It was almost like a six-year rolling program and then the Global Compact and some of the same issues came up (INTNSA #29).

As argued above, the multi-stakeholder group Informals that had come together to work on getting migration into the SDGs (and the Addis Ababa Action agenda)

4.1 The Access, Activities, and Opportunities for Non-State Actors to Transmit … 145

also played a critical role in the GCM process. Further, they were responsible for bringing NSAs and governments to the table (INT-NSA #4). The SDG process, described as “the biggest assembly of civil society […] that had ever been seen at the UN” (INT-GOV #18) served as the model for setting up stakeholder engagement in the GCM process (INT-GOV #14).18 The New York Declaration The New York Declaration was an important interim step between the SDGs and the GCM process; “however, there was definitely a change of mood between the openness of the member states towards civil society involvement in the New York Declaration negotiations and what we had seen during the SDG negotiations” (INTGOV #18; see also INT-IO #31). Civil society strongly engaged in the process of the New York Declaration (INT-NSA #3, #5, #7). This engagement led to a database of NGOs who worked on migration at the global level. It also helped to build trust and working relationships between NSAs, governments, and government diplomats (INT-GOV #17).19 In summary, for NSAs, first for civil society and later the private sector, previous processes helped prepare the foundation for substantive recognition as relevant actors in the GCM process.20 Old vs. new (non-state) actors? Many NSAs, such as civil society, the private sector, and trade unions, had a longstanding presence and personal connections among the UN actors and agencies in 18

However, while the SDG process may have been very inclusive to civil society, the private sector according to one interviewee has not been able to contribute as strongly as they wished or were not recognized in the same way as civil society. The interviewee also found that the GCM process was more open to businesses than the SDG process was—mainly due to the previous experiences and work through the GFMD Business Mechanism (INT-NSA #21). 19 For other actors, the “push to shape the Global Compact was the Sutherland Report”, with the hope and ambition to see many things reflected in the GCM (INT-NSA #4). The Sutherland Report was effectively done in the fall of 2016, but only was published in 2017 due to the illness of Peter Sutherland. 20 For example, one interviewee stated: “I would like to think, because of the years of common experiences, civil society has had, in particular in the Global Forum since 2007 and in international high level dialogues in all related processes, the SDGs, I think both civil society and states, certainly the states leading on any of these efforts, had an experience of working together, of listening and sometimes arguing quite directly, but at least to looking at the same question in good faith and sometimes looking at it several times together, often from slightly different, or very different corners of the issue, but also coming together with an increased sense of the other’s challenges on the issue” (INT-NSA #23).

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both Geneva and New York. They also had similar relationships with governments when they joined the GCM process. Other, newer NSAs who joined had made previous connections in UN related processes—usually as experts, consultants, or in another capacity (INT-NSA #2, #3, #15). Further, the co-facilitators and their governments were also well connected in the global migration space and thus were able to make contacts quickly (INT-GOV #14).21 However, within the migration field, particularly among NSAs engaging in global migration governance, a few individuals dominated. This group of experienced, well connected, and established organizations have predominantly focused on the GFMD and its mechanisms (INT-GOV #20; INT-IO #26; INT-NSA #11).22 In other words, the actors know each other. Thus, the migration space prior to the GCM could be seen as a ‘club’ of a few, active, but also dominant NSAs. These NSAs were mainly from civil society and include diaspora organizations (INT-NSA #10, #29; INT-IO #27). While the New York Declaration brought together NSAs to discuss global migration and refugee issues, the GCM process opened the global migration space even more and attracted more organizations to engage. This openness brought increased movement and engagement of actors from different regions and areas of work, including faith-based groups, organizations working on migrant workers’ rights, and people focusing on topics such as gender issues. With increased engagement, it became harder to coordinate activities among stakeholder groups. Further, for new actors coming in, it was difficult to build or create networks or find entry points to contribute (INT-NSA #7, #9, #10, #13, #23). One interviewee assessed that the key actors, that influenced the Global Compact from civil society, you know, it was still largely the ones that have been involved for years (INT-NSA #4).

My data and analysis repeatedly confirm this sort of exclusion. However, there are some exceptions and examples where actors who, without standing networks, were 21

This goes hand in hand with an evolution of particularly civil society actors in the migration space in the years ahead of the GCM, the New York Declaration and SDGs. One interviewee contested that between 2008, and 2015, in the case of the Americas, especially Latin America, the number of NGOs working on the global level and with the UN, has increased significantly, with an increased visibility of the topic globally (INT-IO #26). 22 Amongst such actors are ICMC, the Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants (PICUM), the International Detention Coalition (IDC), Act Alliance, the IOE. There are no official numbers of how many actors work on global migration issues, yet the registered stakeholders for the GCM process, or the adoption conference give an indication of it being about 150–200 organizations—yet only a smaller part of it has a longstanding, and continuous engagement globally (The President of the UN General Assembly, 2018).

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able to quickly contribute in meaningful ways; for example, offering an expertise on a specific issue that had not previously been addressed (INT-NSA #13, #15). It was especially important for governments to hear from new and ‘fresh’ perspectives, including those from the private sector (INT-GOV #24).

4.1.3

The Activities of Non-State Actors to Transmit Information

NSAs implemented a variety of activities that contributed information throughout the GCM process. These activities were diverse and began on a mix of different levels; they were also closely interlinked to level of access and opportunities NSAs had to transmit information during the process (see above). From my data I could identify five main activities of NSAs: (1) meetings and events of varying nature; (2) briefings, statements, and reports submitted to the process, some of which offered language suggestions; (3) engagement with representatives from governments and UN (agencies); (4) coordination and strategizing in coalitions with peers; and regional and national activities. The groups that were most visible and recognized by governments were civil society, the private sector, and at later points, local authorities (INT-GOV #14). Attending and holding meetings and events of different kinds NSAs participated in all sorts of formal and informal meetings that took place as part of the process. They also participated in other events such as informal conversations on both the regional and national level (see Figure 4.3). Most actors participated in more than five events during of the process, a number that indicates how many actors had significant involvement and investment in the process (see Figure 4.4). Further, NSAs hosted, co-hosted, and participated in side-events, lunches, and other events that occurred alongside the more formal events. These side-events helped convene relevant actors and stakeholders in discussion about specific topics (INT-NSA #21). At times, these private events, which took place under the Chatham House Rule, became important spaces to have difficult conversations (INT-NSA #11). Another strategy NSAs used was to put their speakers on the panels of formal events (INT-NSA #8). The final strategy used by NSAs was to engage in conferences connected to but not specifically linked to the GCM process, “but where GCM was a topic that was being covered and a number of the representatives were present anyway” (INT-NSA #15). These side meetings allowed them additional opportunities for informal conversations.

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Individual conversations with UN or government representatives

37

Regional events

26

Events organized by other stakeholders

46

GCM adoption conference in Marrakech

39

UN roundtable(s) or negotiations

29

GCM stocktaking event Puerto Vallarta, Mexico

23

Stakeholder hearing(s) organized by the UN

41 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

40

45

50

Figure 4.3 Types of formats NSAs participated in. (Source: Online Survey #Q6)

More than 5

31

3-5

18

1-2

16

None

2 0

5

10

15

20

25

30

35

How many stakeholder consultations and events aligned with the GCM negotiation process did you/your organization attend on the global level? Figure 4.4 Number of consultations and events actors participated in. (Source: Online Survey #Q7)

Briefings, statements, and reports submitted to the process, including language suggestions NSAs of all types produced numerous written briefings, statements, and submissions throughout all phases of the GCM process (Online Survey #Q6). The co-facilitators, who drafted the GCM, received documents from governments, civil society, the

4.1 The Access, Activities, and Opportunities for Non-State Actors to Transmit … 149

private sector, and other actors involved. According to my sources, these documents were read and helped structure all draft versions of the GCM. The documents also included direct language suggestions for drafts of the GCM, especially the for the zero draft (INT-GOV #18; INT-IO #32).23 When the zero draft came out, “a lot of NGOs would have given their comments on that,” a process that continued over the course of negotiations (INT-GOV #18). At times, however, the amount of submitted comments was overwhelming. As such, only actors with direct access and contact to the co-facilitation team were able to contribute (INTGOV #14, #17, #19; INT-NSA #2, #8, #10, #11, #13, #21). In some cases, as a way for their contributions have more weight, groups of actors sent joint position papers to the co-facilitators as well as to SRSG Louise Arbour (INT-GOV #19; INT-IO #25; INT-NSA #3, #16). Engagement with governments and UN (bodies) My data show that all kinds of NSAs, throughout the process, addressed both government and UN representatives. While most actors participated in formal events and stakeholder meetings (n = 57), less respondents (n = 37) indicated they had direct conversation with the co-facilitators, met with officials from national governments (n = 39), or met with members of the UN and its agencies (n = 40) (see Figure 4.5).

23

See e.g., #IDC-2018-ZeroDraft; #MMP-2018-ZeroDraft; #MMC-2018-ZeroDraft; #Südwind-2018-ZeroDraft; #GCM-NEG6-JointCivilSocietyStatement. 24 Several answer choices were possible.

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Aligning with other stakeholders

41

Conversations with the co-facilitators

37

Meetings with officials from the UN and its agencies

40

Individual meetings with officials from national governments

39

Participation in formal events and stakeholder meetings

57 0

10

20

30

40

50

60

What ways did you use to achieve your goals and push forward your topics and ideas?

Figure 4.5 Activities of NSAs to achieve their goals during the GCM process42 . (Source: Online Survey #Q12)

The actors who reached out to government and UN representatives did so strategically, approaching them at events and in individual conversations to suggest specific language or help with technical expertise (INT-GOV #17; INT-NSA #1, #2, #5, #11, #13, #15). Thus, NSAs targeted governments on various levels to achieve their goals. One civil society representative described their way of working during the negotiation phase as the following: the main target for us was state delegations. As in: if we want to have this text or this included in the draft, they are the ones negotiating this. So, we need to engage with them to make sure that they are equipped with the technical expertise that we can provide for them to negotiate this specific thing (INT-NSA #2).

The best relationships NSAs had with governments were with so-called ‘friendly governments,’ i.e., governments with both a tradition of working and speaking with NSAs and being receptive to their input. The GCM also allowed for “trust building” with governments, which had not been approached before (INT-NSA #5). Thus, NSAs addressed UN ambassadors and their teams as well as groups of states at the missions in New York (INT-NSA #5, #7, #11, 15, #23). For example, to target the African Group on a specific issue, one respondent reached out to the Ambassador of Comoros to the UN, who then chaired the African Group (INT-NSA #11). Other NSAs worked with a specific group of states interested in children (INT-NSA #7). In turn, governments with a tradition of working and exchanging with civil society enabled NSAs to present ideas and approaches throughout the process, even if those

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ideas did not always align with the government’s position (INT-GOV #24). Other governments had experience taking on different actors as part of their delegations (e.g., the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development or the GFMD), and thus had long-standing relationships with these actors. This allowed them to work closely together during the GCM process (INT-NSA #29). In addition, NSAs wanted to address and work with UN bodies. Not only did NSAs reach out to UN agencies—UN agencies also reached out and coordinated components with NSAs (INT-NSA #10, #16, #21; INT-IO #27, #32).25 In 2017, at the beginning of the consultation process, IOM established the role of a civil society liaison for the Global Compact. This liaison worked directly with the team at IOM responsible for the GCM process. The purpose of the liaison was to support the engagement of civil society during the GCM process and to serve as interlocutor between civil society (and other NSAs) and the UN system. However, two challenges came with this role: First, not all civil society groups were supportive of IOM establishing such a role. Second, IOM was not the leading entity of the GCM process, which made its influence smaller than if the liaison had come from somewhere else (INT-IO #32; INT-IO #6). Further, OHCHR also had a civil society outreach component in their work. This outreach involved NGOs in technical roundtables and other formats relating to the GCM (INT-IO #27). NSAs reached out to national governments and regional entities; a process divided amongst the regional distribution of organizations (INT-NSA #1, #5, #8, #9, #11). The then co-chairs of the GFMD, Germany and Morocco, were also important actors (INT-NSA #5, #11). Actors also reached out to SRSG Louise Arbour, in her role as SRSG and Secretary-General of the intergovernmental conference to adopt the GCM.26 She was considered influential to the process (INT-IO #25, #30; INT-NSA #9, #21). Many actors also attended the SRSG’s briefing sessions (Online Survey #Q6; INT-GOV #19; INT-IO #26). Coordination and strategizing in coalitions amongst peers Civil society organized in several coalitions—some new, some already existing—to coordinate and strategize with peers about ways to impact the process. The following 25

UN agencies, having their own goals and interests, engaged in the process. For example, UNICEF regarding children, OHCHR ensuring the human rights of migrants were covered, and the PDD including links between climate change and migration (INT-GOV #18; INT-IO #27, #32; INT-NSA #9). Nevertheless, the influence of agencies cannot be assessed here as they have a distinct and different role than non-state actors. 26 Louise Arbour in her role as SRSG for Migration was appointed Secretary-General of the conference to adopt the GCM in April 2017 (The President of the UN General Assembly, 2017b).

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organizations or initiatives were amongst the most prominent and visible ones in the process (INT-GOV #14; INT-NSA #1, #2, #5, #11, #23; INT-IO #6): the NGO Committee on Migration, the Civil Society Action Committee, and ICMC, which served as a coordinator for civil society (just as in the case of the GFMD).27 These coalitions also attended the negotiations and engaged directly with governments and the co-facilitators (INT-GOV #14; INT-NSA #23). To do so, they would share information, develop common statements, and discuss tactics and strategies before formal meetings (INT-NSA #1, #2, #7, #11). Additionally, they divided their work and the topics they wanted to intervene on: But then it was also a lot about dividing up our work. As in: detention is kind of covered by the IDC, access to services by PICUM, so really like coming together, sharing a bit the intel […], strategizing together and then also letting each one of us focus on our specific topic. With sort of this feeling, hey, by coming together we know that we are covering all the topics so we can focus on our topic, and we know for sure that the others are doing their bit (INT-NSA #2).

Thus, it appears that civil society was the most organized and supported group of stakeholders during the process (INT-NSA #11). The engagement of individual actor groups who are organized on different levels of governance was often channeled through umbrella organizations such as IOE for the private sector and the International Trade Union Confederation (ITUC) for trade unions (INT-NSA #8, #16, #21). Civil society and the private sector, through the GFMD, had both experience and coordination mechanisms in place to help self-organize during the GCM process (INT-GOV #14). Activities on the regional and national level Even though not part of the scope of this research, I have found that regional and national activities were an important part of the process and have been closely linked to global activities. During the consultation and stocktaking phase, regional civil society consultations, in conjunction with global coordination mechanisms, helped create 27

The NGO Committee on Migration was created in 2006 and has over 50 member NGOs. It seeks “to realize justice for migrants, refugees, stateless persons, internally displaced persons, and trafficked persons” (NGO Committee on Migration, 2021). The Civil Society Action Committee was created in 2016 to organize advocacy for the New York Declaration; it has since expanded its work and mandate for the GCM and GCR process. It is co-convened by ICVA, the NGO Committee on Migration, and ICMC (Civil Society Action Committee, 2021). Since 2011, ICMC coordinates the civil society engagement at the GFMD through the Civil Society Days (ICMC, 2021).

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mechanisms for exchange and information. They offered input and perspectives from regional and local actors. Further, these consultations led to an increase of “engagement of actors that are traditionally outside of Geneva” (INT-NSA #5; see also INT-IO #6; INT-NSA #7; INT-GOV #14). During the regional consultations, civil society developed recommendations and connected with each other. They also nominated focal points for each region. Even though there were numerous challenges in terms of resources, both time and finances,28 the focal points led to increased coordination and mobilization and also helped “process building on the ground” (INT-NSA #5). The private sector also held regional meetings where they invited governments from different regions to present ideas. This happened primarily during phase I and II of the process (INT-NSA #8). Through regional outreach, actor groups, who were (also) represented by umbrella organizations at the negotiations made sure to inform all relevant organizations at the regional and national level (INT-NSA #16). In addition, regional advisors from UN agencies helped to connect with NSAs more locally, especially in Asia, Africa, and the Middle East (INT-IO #28). During the actual negotiations, regional and national (strong) organizations, with standing relationships to their government on a specific issue, would be allowed to directly approach a UN member state on the national level (INT-NSA #1, #5, #11, #23). A civil society representative shared their logic for engaging more regional and national organizations as the following: of course, you are able to push the agenda with the missions [in New York]. But sometimes there are also some limits to what the mission can and cannot do, because if the position is coming from capital, you also need to […] have access at the capital level (INT-NSA #5).

28

The regional civil society consultations, as well as bringing regional delegates to the UN, has been funded by IOM (INT-NSA #3).

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Also happening on the national level, civil society and other NSAs organized consultations to inform about the process, e.g., in Cameroon,29 Switzerland,30 or Germany31 (Online Survey #Q6). However, not all regional actors were able to help as the speed of negotiations happened quickly. Further, the resources were not always there, and the regional actors were not able to jump in and support as needed. It also became evident during the negotiations that there was often a strong disconnect between events happening at the global level of the UN and what was considered relevant at the local or national level. This in turn led to challenges mobilizing more local and national resources (INT-NSA #5, #10). At times, ideas that came from national NSAs were supported by national governments. National governments consulted national experts on the GCM and thus NSAs could influence on that level as well (INT-GOV #19, #24).

4.2

Leverages and Resources of Non-State Actors

Key aspects of studying influence are determining if and how actors made best use of their leverages, and what kind of leverages were used by NSAs.32 To identify the leverages, I consider something a leverage when both the ego- and alter-perspectives align. I identify four key leverages used by NSAs: (1) The co-facilitators enabled access and opportunities for NSAs to transmit information and have been keen on including NSAs as much as possible (section 4.2.1);

29

One survey participant stated: „Et en prélude à l’adoption du pacte modial à Marraketch, nous avons organisé un Forum sur les migrations au Cameroun sous le thème: “Migrations: enjeux et perspectives”, durant lequel nous avons invité les autorités, la société civile et les organismes comme le HCR et OIM. Nous y avons avons obtenus de très bons résultats“ (Online Survey #Q6). 30 Via the Swiss Civil Society Platform on Migration and Development (Online Survey #Q6). 31 Via the Association of German Development and Humanitarian Aid NGOs (VENRO) (Bertelsmann Stiftung, 2018). 32 Keck and Sikkink (1998, pp. 23–24), introduce the term “leverage politics,” to describe “moral leverage” (whereby government/IO behavior “is held up to the light of international scrutiny”) and “material leverage” (linking an “issue to money or goods”) (see also Davies, 2019a, pp. 5–6).

4.2 Leverages and Resources of Non-State Actors

155

(2) NSAs took on the role of experts, rather than advocates, and were able to influence the GCM process through their practical, technical, and academic expertise (section 4.2.2); (3) NSAs built advocacy coalitions amongst peers, such as the Civil Society Action Committee, and were able to engage jointly and strategically with the co-facilitators and governments (section 4.2.3); (4) Multi-stakeholder alliances and formats, involving civil society, government representatives, UN agencies, philanthropies, and others proved to be key to leveraging influence during the process. Prominent examples were the GCM Informals and the Initiative for Child Rights in the Global Compacts (section 4.2.4). In addition, I find that organizations and initiatives had very different resources when engaging in the process. Such resources include staff capacities available and funding. Further, there were numerous limitations to engaging in the process (section 4.2.5).

4.2.1

The Role of the Co-Facilitators

The first major source of leverage NSAs used to transmit information to the GCM process were the co-facilitators. In consultation with UN member states, the co-facilitators33 built the architecture of the process and were responsible for the leadership, management, strategic alignment, and content of the process. From the perspective of NSAs, the co-facilitator’s most important role was them being the ‘pen-holders’ of the all drafts including the final negotiated document (INT-GOV #14, #17, #19; INT-NSA #9). The co-facilitators were perceived as progressive and aligned with many of the positions NSAs brought to the process: And I would say on a number of occasions there were closer to NGO or the likeminded governments than to the kind of average government positions (INT-NSA #1).

Not only did NSAs actively address the co-facilitators and offer ways to exchange information informally throughout the process and the negotiations (INT-IO #6, #26), but the co-facilitators also encouraged, strengthened, and advocated for the 33

The co-facilitation team consisted of the Ambassadors from Mexico and Switzerland, as well as two team members from each country, which made a co-facilitation team of six people (INT-GOV #14, #17, #19; INT-NSA #9).

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inclusion of NSAs (and local authorities, see below) in the process (INT-GOV #14, #19; INT-IO #32). Thus, the co-facilitators became key entry and influence points for NSAs to contribute information and ideas. In turn, the input NSAs provided was considered, and parts were included in the zero-draft and emerging drafts of the GCM (INT-GOV #17, #18, #19; INT-NSA #5; INT-IO #31).34 The co-facilitators put a particular emphasis on the inclusivity of the process and made time for NSAs inclusion (INT-GOV #14, #19). Thus, the process became more accessible and has been perceived as more inclusive: I would say just the co-facilitators, both Ambassador Camacho and Ambassador Jürg Lauber did everything they could to include them as much as possible. But there are limits to that conversation (INT-GOV #20).

While there were limitations to being inclusive on a broader level, especially during negotiations and having access to the process, the co-facilitators tried to balance out the systemic limits (INT-GOV #22; see section 4.2.5). Even though, or even because of these limitations, the co-facilitators actively encouraged NSAs to engage (INT-NSA #2; INT-GOV #19). Further, they appeared to be “always open to meet.” In fact, one interviewee described the relationship as “excellent” (INT-NSA #1). In addition, the co-facilitators offered countless formats to have exchanges with stakeholder groups and individual actors (INT-NSA #3, #5, #21, #23): we worked a lot with the co-facilitator’s team in New York and the and we would meet on a regular basis […]: The co-facilitators would offer the space to meet other stakeholders […]. But then also for some civil society leaders, also more one to one conversations or small group conversations, which, of course, they were extremely helpful to understand why some wording wasn’t in in such a version of the text (INTNSA #3).

Even during the negotiations, the co-facilitators were open to input and had civil society and other actor’s position on their radar: So, there you can see the kind of issues that civil society you brought up. […] when the actual negotiations got underway around that time, the Swiss and Mexico would already have known what was on the minds of civil society (INT-GOV #18).

34

The co-facilitators could be addressed with written input, and they would read and look at document sent and provided during the process and made sure issues they addressed were at least considered.

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During their informal stakeholder meetings, the co-facilitators spent significant time advising and strategizing with civil society (INT-NSA #3, #5; INT-GOV #14). Because the co-facilitators and their governments, Mexico, and Switzerland, had a track record on international migration, many actors already had relationships with them. As such, actors could more easily access them and prepare interventions over several years (INT-NSA #11; INT-GOV #14, #19; INT-IO #31; see also section 4.1.2). After being appointed co-facilitators, they held informal meetings with smaller well-known actors and continued doing this throughout the process (INT-NSA #1, #11; Online Survey #Q6).

4.2.2

Non-state Actors Taking on the Role of Experts, Rather than Advocates

civil society voices were the ones that needed to bring in the expertise and the ones that were on the ground, and also, to shake up ideas and go from being business as usual (INT-GOV #17).

The second key leverage point for NSAs was the practical, technical, and academic expertise that they could contribute to the process. They were especially able to do this during the consultation phase—which helped the co-facilitators and individual governments throughout the GCM process. In this role, the actors could be technical and practical experts on specific topics that were being negotiated. As a result, they influenced the co-facilitators and individual governments while drafting the GCM. Throughout the process, especially during the consultation phase, NSAs presented themselves as actors with expertise, practical knowledge, and concrete ideas (INT-GOV #19; INT-NSA #23), as this example from one civil society representative shows: [One] consultation in Vienna, in September of 2017, was largely focused on human trafficking, among other issues. And there were […] frontline civil society actors, with the full experience, including experience of working with governments and partnering with governments, not just in advocacy, but in programming, practical stuff. And what we kept hearing back from co-facilitators and other states in those consultations was, ‘When you bring civil society your firsthand experience, either from your own lives or your communities or from the work you do at the front line, that really helps us. Even if it’s not pure, valid data. It’s not from an academic rigor, it’s from real life, that really helps, especially if we have a sense that you’re telling us a story that’s not only real, but it’s representative (INT-NSA #23).

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Governments appreciated these contributions during the consultation phase: And we had some extremely important recommendations. We had testimonies even from child migrants. We had migrant workers organizations there. We had other organizations like Stop Funding Hate that highlighted the role of media in presenting these toxic narratives towards migration, things that were honestly off the radar of most, if not all governments. And bringing their expertise into the conversation was very helpful in that regard (INT-GOV #17).

In addition, NSA input offered learning opportunities for diplomats: the truth is, I didn’t know much of anything about migration. And, you know, I was the diplomat. I’m just doing my job. And but at some point, I began to realize that civil society was excited to have us there and to share what they knew. […] I met with everybody from the migration field and really began to study what they were proposing and to see whether that fit within our proposals. And I would say about 90 percent of the time it did. And so, I was able to take what they had to say and translated into kind of our own proposals (INT-GOV #20).

Civil society brought this ‘frontline experience’ to the process and played a “striking role” during the consultation phase (INT-GOV #22). Further, the private sector was able to raise awareness on the practicalities and feasibility around various issues (e.g., remittances, labor migration, etc.) (INT-NSA #8, #15, #21). Some of the input coming from NSAs during the consultation phase created surprising and memorable moments for governments. These moments, such as testimonies from Indigenous peoples who are in danger of losing their land due to climate change, brought a different touch to the intergovernmental space (INTGOV #24). Apart from firsthand and practical experience, academic and think tank input proved to be another crucial element of expertise relevant to governments (Online Survey #Q6; INT-NSA #9, #11; INT-GOV #24). NSAs actively reached out to governments and UN bodies to offer their advice and technical expertise on specific issues, especially during and after Puerto Vallarta: we really used the stocktaking in Puerto Vallarta, to connect with a number of negotiators in New York from different countries to tell them: listen, we do have specialists on women rights, on child rights, we have the trade unions for migrant rights on regularly regular issues. We do have specialists in our group. You have an open line to call. Because a negotiator in New York, […] having to cover so many topics, of course, has to go back to capital and so on with many, many more teams. But sometimes find themselves too thin with in terms of specialists. And this led us to have a number

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of conversations and really sometimes forgetting that we were different teams, with some of the negotiators in providing information and exchanging and so on. It’s really interesting to see how this community […] has created good relationships between negotiators from member states and civil society leaders (INT-NSA #3).

In turn, governments reached out to actors for specific expertise (INT-NSA #2; INT-NSA #3; INT-NSA #11; INT-NSA #15; INT-GOV #19; Online Survey #Q9). One practical reason for this was their lack of expertise and staff (INT-NSA #7; INT-NSA #13; INT-GOV #14; INT-GOV #20). There were many, many examples in New York, during the negotiations, civil society was addressed by governments who said: hey, can you explain to us briefly what this discussion about non-refoulement is actually about? They don’t always have the experts directly on site, and then you could get together and explain a lot of things (INT-NSA #10).

Likewise, the co-facilitators found experts they could reach out to during the drafting process of the GCM (INT-NSA #9, #11). Through this work with various (friendly) governments, “civil society, was also good for creating coalitions in between different member states” (INT-NSA #10, #13).35 Interest groups perceived of this technical expertise were seen as different than ‘classical’ advocacy, as it was informal and targeted. Also, during the negotiations, NSAs helped find alternatives and compromises for issues that governments were debating. These alternatives were considered to be coming from an expert perspective rather than an advocacy perspective (INT-NSA #11; INT-GOV #14, #17). Through this “informal influence,” individual experts from different types of NSAs could work directly with governments during the negotiations (INTNSA #9). In addition, this influence led to more robust and stable relationships between NSAs and governments (INT-NSA #10): I think that that in a different world, we would recognize civil society as the true experts. And when they give you a recommendation, they have field experience to back it up. And most diplomats sitting in the room, for the most part, were not experts on migration topics. They are representing their capital. Some countries decided to send experts. Brazil made a wonderful job doing that, for example. And I think that changed the tone in the room. To be honest. If it weren’t because some member states 35

It must be noted that also UN agencies provided expert advice and input to governments, to co-facilitators and other actors within the UN system on the process and on the issues negotiated (INT-NSA #10). The appreciation of expertise explicitly went also beyond CSOs—for example, the private sector has been perceived as a key expert on skilled workers and their mobility schemes (INT-GOV #24).

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took it so seriously that they sent their own experts, the conversation would have been super boring because, I mean, they received their instructions from their capital and they are just political (INT-GOV #19).

4.2.3

Advocacy Coalitions

The third source of leverage for NSAs was advocacy coalitions amongst stakeholder groups36 like the Civil Society Action Committee and the group who worked together during the GFMD Civil Society Days, via ICMC: effective were the organizations that coalesced in different coalitions in providing their kind of joint statements where all of their issues were covered, because that was useful in the sense that we could have one document and say, here’s what civil society is saying (INT-GOV #17).

Governments and other observers considered it particularly effective when a group of stakeholders came together and solved disagreements prior to offering out proposals or positions (INT-GOV #14, #17, #19, #20): The sharing of information, consultations, input, absolutely effective, and so, the disagreements amongst themselves, arguments are borne out there. At the end, you get common positions or positions that, generally, we can agree with. Everybody can put their name to, although some organizations may then go on and make further declarations (INT-NSA #11).

One example of a joint civil society statement is the ‘Ten Acts for the Global Compact—A civil society vision for a transformative agenda for human mobility, migration and development,’ which was put forward in October 2017 (#CivilSociety-2017-10Acts; INT-NSA #3).37 This statement was widely received: “Everybody read their ten action points. Everybody. Everybody read them” (INT-GOV #20).38 36

On advocacy coalitions and transnational advocacy networks, see section 3.1.4. “The document was drafted by a core group of members of, and in consultation with the 50 organizations and networks that are part of the civil society Action Committee (established in 2016 for the UN Summit for Refugees and Migrants and its follow up) and the Steering Committee of civil society for the Global Forum on Migration and Development” (#CivilSociety-2017-10Acts). 38 It must be noted that there is debate within civil society whether and how to speak with one voice as the various positions, expertise, and standing towards groups like IOs is quite diverse (INT-NSA #10). As this is not core of my research, I will not elaborate in any more 37

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Such advocacy coalitions go a step further than coordination amongst different stakeholders or networks. They build on each other’s strengths by sharing thematic and/or regional responsibilities when it came to approaching governments or IOs (INT-IO #27; INT-NSA #1, #2, #23) About the Civil Society Action Committee

The Civil Society Action Committee is an advocacy coalition that was created in 2016 to organize support for the New York Declaration. It has since expanded its work and mandate to include the GCM and GCR processes. It is co-convened by the International Council of Voluntary Agencies (ICVA), the NGO Committee on Migration, and the International Catholic Migration Commission (ICMC) (Civil Society Action Committee, 2021). The main goal of the Action Committee was to “to share information between organizations that are involved in both [compacts] and then […] identify the key possible synergies or joint action” (INT-NSA #7). The Committee held meetings with governments, and the co-facilitators and took on a convening role themselves (INT-NSA #5). It has become one of the main spaces for civil society to come together and strategize (INT-IO #6; INTNSA #5). The committee stayed active over the course of the GCM and GCR process. Over time, the number of organizations within the Action Committee grew and their working methods had to be adapted (INT-NSA #7; INT-IO #6). The Committee also worked closely with the Initiative for Child Rights in the Global Compacts (INT-IO #32).

4.2.4

Multi-stakeholder Alliances

As discussed in chapter 2, multi-stakeholder formats and exchanges on global migration issues emerged in recent years and have proven to be influential during the GCM process. Thus, the fourth type of leverage I identified were multistakeholder alliances that influenced the outcome of the negotiations. Formats like the GCM Informals or the Initiative for Child Rights in the Global Compacts helped strategically put forward ideas in trusted, albeit influential groups, that consisted of a broad variety of non-state-actors, UN agents, and government representatives. detail. Here, I argue that based on my ego- and alter-perspective findings, advocacy coalitions have been proven highly effective in the GCM process.

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The ‘GCM Informals’ The first prominent example of an alliance is the Informals group, created already in 2012 by Peter Sutherland and his team. The objective of the Informals was “to discuss and strategize how to lobby governments to have key references to migration included in the SDGs.” The Informals also convened representatives from governments in the UN system, international organizations, civil society, foundations, and experts from the field (Lebon-McGregor, 2020, pp. 55, 141).39 Leading up to the GCM, the group was renamed into GCM Informals and throughout the process, they met regularly thus forming an informal network (INTNSA #4, #9; INT-GOV #18; INT-IO #30; Online Survey #Q6). For the GCM process, this group enabled regular communications with a diverse group of policymakers, CSOs, academics, UN actors and governments to share insights on the GCM process/their priorities and to combine forces during the negotiations and with a view to supporting the eventual implementation of the Compact (Online Survey #Q9).

However, because of the way the group was put together, not all world regions were represented; most participants came from western countries (INT-IO #30). With the objective “to provide a platform for advocacy and coalition-building on a range of issues,” the following topics were discussed during GCM Informals meetings: safe migration: protecting vulnerable migrants; regular migration: unlocking the potential of circular mobility; orderly migration: working together for safe borders and returns; local leadership in the implementation of migration and refugee policies; strategic partnerships to shape migration drivers and outcomes; and followup and review to sustain momentum within and outside the multilateral system (Online Survey #Q9).40 39

Until 2015, when the SDGs were adopted by the international community, “[t]he efforts of this group thus helped to galvanize efforts to create consistent messaging around the relevance of migration to any discussions of development at the global policy level” (LebonMcGregor, 2020b, p. 144). This Informals Group, formed by Peter Sutherland’s team was crucial for processes on international migration; starting with the negotiations of the New York Declaration on Refugees and Migrants and then also with the GCM negotiation process. With the dissolvement of Peter Sutherland’s team, the Informals were convened by a private foundation (see above). 40 In addition, according to a survey respondent, this also “included specific consultations or ah-hoc working groups” on the following aspects: Complementarity between the GCM and GCR, addressing climate change and migration (framed as ‘future-proofing the GCM’ in one Informals dialogue), cross-border protection for children on the move, partnerships for skills mobility, return and reintegration, financing and resource mobilization for implementation,

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The primary goal of the GCM Informals during the GCM process was “to set the tone” (INT-IO #31) in the spirit of the Sutherland Report. Some members were also championing the role of cities and the nexus between climate and migration during the GCM process (INT-NSA #4; INT-GOV #18; INT-IO #31). Generally, it was refreshing to have such a diverse group of actors together. Academia foundations, civil society, different member states were even part of it, UN agencies. […] it was useful to find a safe environment with all of the right interlocutors to speak about these issues, air them out under Chatham House rules, so to speak. And then be able to go in and do the same thing through the formal process. So, it’s useful to have a parallel mechanism to do that. If anything, just to air out ideas and see what reactions they get, and then fine tune them for when they go into the process (INT-IO #30).

Another particularity is the open information sharing within the group: One of the things that is sort of obvious now is like we give a lot of information in these meetings up and they encourage others to give a lot of information. And it was so different than your typical sort of, UN bureaucracies that people still [unclear] protect information because it’s a major source of their power (INT-NSA #4).

The convening of this group—but also the Initiative for child rights (see below)—has shown that different stakeholders have a lot of access and a lot of informal influence […] depending a little bit on their individual capacities or even […] the individuals that work within the organization (INT-NSA #9).

Initiative for Child Rights in the Global Compacts In comparison to the GCM Informals, the Initiative for Child Rights in the Global Compacts was a public strategic advocacy coalition. Further, it was a multi-stakeholder partnership that brought together more than 30 CSOs, UN agencies, foundations, trade unions, and experts “with the common aim to ensure that children’s rights are at the very heart of the two global compacts” (#InitiativeChildRights-About).41 Launched in June 2017, at a conference which the role of cities in implementation, follow up and review, as well as follow-up and review structures for the GCM (Online Survey #Q9). 41 It was co-chaired by Save the Children and Terre des Hommes and launched during the global conference about children on the move in 2017. It was launched by like-minded organizations committed to ensuring child rights in the global compacts (#InitiativeChildRightsAbout); see also https://www.childrenonthemove.org.

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took place before the GFMD in Berlin, the Initiative put forward common statements and language suggestions for the GCM drafts. Members of the initiative also liaised with key decision makers (see Table 4.3) pertaining to their role in the system.42 The Initiative garnered attention and recognition for the GCM, especially from UN member states (#InitiativeChildRights-About; INT-NSA #2, #3; INT-IO #32), and demonstrated itself as a key lever for NSAs. According to my interviews, the initiative, and its member organizations, both from different non-state groups as well as UN agencies such as UNICEF, were particularly effective at advocating on the children’s agenda, particularly on issues of child detention, on, you know, on issues related to children of vulnerable migrants and trafficking and abuse of children and on migration (INT-NSA #9).

Actors perceived the initiative’s work as well thought through, coherent, substantive, and capable of bringing forward clear suggestions, recommendations, and conclusions for the text of the GCM. They offered concrete position papers and briefings. These contributions led to delegations negotiating the GCM considering the initiative’s contributions. Another helpful aspect (similar to advocacy coalitions) were the positions and expertise brought together through common statements. These statements made it easier for governments to use them (INT-GOV #22).43 The achievements of these initiative during the GCM process will be analyzed below.

Members of the initiative are: Caritas Internationalis, Child Fund Alliance, Committee on Migrant Workers (CMW), Committee on the Rights of the Child (CRC), Cross-Regional Center for Refugees and Migrants, Defense for Children International (DCI), Destination Unknown Campaign, Global Partnership to End Violence Against Children, ICMC, ICVA, IDC, IOM, International Rescue Committee (IRC), International Social Service (ISS), Mercy Corps, The MHPSS Collaborative for Children and Families in Adversity, Migrant Forum in Asia (MFA), Mixed Migration Platform (MMP), Lumos, NGO Committee on Migration, Norwegian Refugee Council, OHCHR, UNHCR, Plan International, PICUM, Public Services International (PSI), Save the Children, SOS Children’s Villages, The Special Representative of the Secretary-General on Violence against Children, Terre des Hommes, UNICEF, World Vision. 42 The initiative was developed by civil society groups starting in 2016. It brought other partners on board over the coming months and worked with them to shape the initiative. They also reached out to strategically relevant governments starting in 2016, which made the 2017 initiative come to no surprise of anyone. The private sector was also approached, but only few joined the initiative (INT-NSA #3). 43 Another important leverage was surely that the initiative looked at both compacts (INTNSA #3; #InitiativeChildRights-AdvocacyTimeline). Nevertheless, this exceeds the scope of this research.

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4.2.5

165

Challenges and Limitations to Participation and Access of NSAs

While numerous opportunities, activities, and levers of NSAs to transmit information to the process and influence the outcome of the GCM can be identified, there were also many limitations. First, most governments showed little interest in them. Second, access to the process proved to be challenging for some NSAs. And third, many actors lacked the necessary resources—both financial and non-monetary resources such as network capability. Little interest from most governments part of [the] member states, like, they could not care less (INT-GOV #19).

Table 4.3 Timeline of activities: Initiative for Child Rights65 07/2018

Initiative statement given during 6th round of negotiations at Multi-Stakeholder Dialogue with the Co-Facilitators

07/2018

Written statement “key issues at stake for children in the GCM Draft Rev. 3”, including suggestion of language to the third draft of the GCM

06/2018

Initiative language suggestion for GCM Draft Rev 2

05/2018

Briefing: Child-Rights Compliant Returns as part of Sustainable Solutions for Migrant Children, and Side Event during the 4th round of negotiations: The Human Rights of Children in the Context of Return

04/2018

Joint statement on Draft Rev 1 of the GCM

03/2018

Joint statement on key issues at stake for children in the GCM zero draft plus

02/2018

Joint statement on the zero draft of the Global Compact for Migration

10/2017

Joint statement for thematic session 6 on the Global Compact for Migration

06/2017

Initiative launches at the Global Conference on Children on the Move

Sources: own table based on #InitiativeChildRights-AdvocacyTimeline; #InitiativeChildRights-Statement-Round6; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft3; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft2; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft2-Return; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft1; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-ZeroDraft-Plus; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-ZeroDraft; #TS6-2017-InitiativeChildRights; #GCM-NEG4SideEvent-InitiativeChildRights

44

GCM timeline; the initiative also worked strategically and parallel and conjunction with the GCM, on the GCR process, which is not considered here (see #InitiativeChildRightsAdvocacyTimeline).

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During the GCM process, there were numerous opportunities to transmit information to various decision makers, especially the co-facilitators also known as the ‘penholders.’ These opportunities occurred during direct meetings and conversations between NSAs and governments. However, there was little government interest in NSA input during the negotiation phase. One example of this can be seen in the little interest governments had joining the informal consultations with stakeholders (INT-GOV #19, #22):45 member states were invited to the civil society hearings, and you would be surprised of how unpopular they were for member states, and they did not want to listen to them in this space that was created for multi-stakeholders. And I think that what that was a very sad part of the story. Like, if you are going through six months of negotiations and before that, you have public consultations and traveling and listening to experts and producing the summaries and meetings with NGOs. And you would see maybe a couple of member states sitting, listening for what they had to say. But the room was mostly comprised of NGOs. So, it just became a little bit of an echo chamber (INT-GOV #19).

This is not surprising as many UN member states, “tend to be very uncomfortable with civil society” (INT-GOV #19). Thus, the lack of interest governments had in meeting with NSAs is a limitation that impacts many of the processes and negotiations at the UN. However, its arguable that the limited interest from most governments deepened the relationship between NSAs and the co-facilitators. The informal and direct (technical) conversations between NSAs, in their role as experts, with governments and alliances seems to have been better entry points than formal meetings (see above; INT-GOV #14). Interestingly, none of my interviews with NSAs mentioned the minimal interest and participation. Access to the UN and different responsibilities First, for some actors it was difficult to get registered as a stakeholder during the process (INT-NSA #16, #21), given that the UN has a very complicated system to have accredited NGOs participating, and that already reduces the participation in this is a very thick barrier and obstacle for more participation (INT-GOV #19).

The Modalities resolution required stakeholders to register beforehand and set out the standards and principles to do so. This limited the number and actors who were 45

See section 4.2.1 for the opportunities offered by the co-facilitators during the negotiations.

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able to participate. Thus, participation from NSAs was “sometimes limited by UN rules on who could be an observer or not and what an observer could do or not” (INT-NSA #23). While access proved to be difficult at times, the co-facilitators tried to balance out some of the difficulties accessing the process (INT-NSA #23; INT-GOV #19). The challenges are known, documented, and became evident during the GCM process; for example, obtaining ECOSOC status (INT-GOV #19, #22; INT-NSA #21).46 Second, while the co-facilitators were responsible for the negotiations during all three phases of the process, according to the Modalities Resolution the PGA was mandated to conduct Multi-Stakeholder Hearings (INT-GOV #18; #GCM-2017FinalDraft-Modalities). Each of the entities had different criteria for inviting and accepting stakeholders to participate. They put together speakers, lists, and panels. This led to disappointments amongst stakeholders, especially civil society, as well as confusion and ‘disconnect’ between the two main entities (INT-GOV #14; INT-IO #6). For the Multi-Stakeholder Hearings, it was suggested that it was precisely these hearings, these official meetings, that ultimately did not, yes, make the difference, but rather the informal conversations, dialogs, contacts (INTGOV #14).

Thus, while official meetings and hearings are important to offer access and generate opportunities, the key work and moments of leverage happened during the four key leverage points identified earlier in this chapter. Additionally, at times, stakeholders were unsure of who was the right target to influence; for example, SRSG Arbour and how or if to address her and her team. The assessment of Louise Arbour’s influence on the GCM process and outcomes were different (INT-NSA #9, #11; INT-GOV #19). Lack of resources For many actors a lack of resources to engage in the process has shown to be a challenge. Organizations and initiatives had very different resources, both in terms of staff capacity as well as funding. The organizations who received financial support got it from a variety of sources (INT-NSA #3, #13). Apparently, the main resource needed was time, as

46

For an analysis of barriers for NGOs to access the UN system, particularly obtaining the ECOSOC status, see e.g., Zettler (2009, pp. 5–9).

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it was organizations chipping in, others finding donors, not needing very much resources because the main resources were the time that different leaders were taking and their organizations also allowing them to take time to work on this (INT-NSA #3).

Those who were working locally and who were not focused on global advocacy work, had to prioritize their work because as “a member of a frontline organization and on advocacy we would have never spent that money” (INT-NSA #13). Additionally, new organizations who came in lacked networks. Most of the newer organizations came from regional, national, or local levels and for them, financial support was of particular importance. To help increase representation from different regions throughout the process, IOM covered some of the travel costs, e.g., to the Puerto Vallarta Stocktaking meeting. IOM also funded the regional civil society consultations (INT-NSA #3, #5; INT-IO #32). However, the funding from IOM created tension among civil society and concerns about “vested interests.” Still, “they were really happy to have their air flight paid by someone” (INT-NSA #3). Further, foundations and governments supported events, travel, initiatives, and alliances throughout the process (INT-NSA #13; INT-IO #32; INT-GOV #19). In the case of the private sector, companies hosted and financed lunches and other events (INT-NSA #21). To conclude, it was “an issue of resources” that impacted who was able to participate and ultimately inform and influence the GCM process (INT-GOV #19).

4.3

Goal Attainment of Non-State Actors

my feeling was that they were able to influence. And they were well organized. But ultimately, it comes down to the degree of ambition on the part of the member states (INT-GOV #18).

This work looks at overall influence and the role of NSAs (and local authorities) in the process leading to the adoption of the GCM. Key to this assessment of

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influence is understanding what the goal attainment looks like for NSAs.47 This includes four layers of influence: (1) Did NSAs coin terms that became part of the negotiating jargon? (2) Did state negotiators discuss issues proposed by NSAs (or cease to discuss issues opposed by them)? (3) Does the final agreement contain text drafted by NSAs? (4) Does the final agreement reflect the goals and principals of NSAs and cities? This chapter draws its findings from interviews, the online survey, as well as primary and secondary data. Before diving into examples of the ideas and language that was or was not taken up by state negotiators in the final document, it is important to note that the NSA influence on most governments was minimal. Their input was given to numerous ‘friendly governments’ (whose number and contacts for NSAs increased slightly throughout the process), as well as to the co-facilitators. One reason for lack of influence was the little interest governments had in NSAs (see section 4.2.1 and 4.2.5). Subsequently one interviewee stated that NSAs had [n]o influence on governments. With the exception of a couple of governments who are looking for ideas […]. Africa, no influence. Asia, no influence. In Latin America, close to zero (INT-IO #31).48

Because the GCM process was ultimately an intergovernmental negotiation, the wording and agreed upon outcome was developed by states. It was inspired and influenced by the consultation process; some governments and the co-facilitators included input from NSAs. However, it is not possible to trace all the inputs and ideas that fed into the process, or to trace the origin of all GCM objectives. In this chapter, I argue that there were few actors willing and capable of significantly influencing the process (see section 4.3.1). I further argue that NSAs had the greatest influence on the zero draft of the GCM; this influence was had 47

As elaborated in chapter 3, following the approach of Betsill and Corell (2001), “it is important to ask whether political outcomes reflect the objectives of NGOs. A comparison of NGO goals with outcomes provides more concrete evidence of NGO influence than a focus limited to activities, access and/or resources.” They further argue that NSAs do at times publicly demand something, whereas they have a different agenda off the record (Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 71, 75). Both is reflected and considered in the subsequent analysis, based on the insights received through the survey and interviews. 48 On the positioning of African governments on global processes, including the GCM, see Adeoye (2020).

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through their close work with the co-facilitators and the input they gave during the consultation and stocktaking phase (see section 4.3.2). To better understand and illustrate the work of NSAs during the negotiation, I analyze a few of the NSAs thematic goals during the process (section 4.3.3). I picked four traceable examples of NSA advocacy and investigated the way they were included in the negotiations. I found that state negotiators and others discussed (1) the concept of ‘firewalls,’– a key part of civil society’s advocacy— which was taken up in the zero draft but fell out during the negotiations; (2) the concept of ‘Global Skills Partnerships,’ put forward by Michael Clemens and others, which was included in the agreed outcome of the GCM; (3) the principle of non-refoulement, which is not named in the outcome document; and (4) child rights and ending child immigration detention, pushed by the multi-stakeholder initiative for child rights in the global compacts, which shows up in significant ways in the final document. A criterion for picking these examples is that they have both, ego- and alter-perspective data available.49 In section 4.3.4 I highlight other example topics, ideas, and goals that were important to NSAs during the process.

4.3.1

Who Wanted and was Capable to Influence The Outcome of The Document?

Having now shown the various activities and leverage points of NSAs, it is also important to show that numerous NSAs had no interest in or intent to influence the outcome of the GCM process. Still, they participated in events and formats. From my data I suggest the intentions of NSA can be clustered into five different groupings (Online Survey #Q6; INT-IO #6): – – – – –

Type 1: Learning from others Type 2: Inform themselves and a broader network about the process Type 3: Familiarize with the UN system and such processes Type 4: Academics who saw their role as observational Type 5: The role of a coordinator to an actor group with no need or intent to influence or inform the process

Having observed international processes, not only on migration but also on climate change, this list is of no surprise. These moments serve as a platform 49

GCM Objectives 4, 7 and 15 are discussed from the lens of local authorities in section 5.3.

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for NSAs to network, make their own work visible, and advocate for themselves. None of these forms of engagement lead directly to influencing negotiation outcomes.50 Thus, amongst actors participating in the process, there were a limited number who had both a goal and a clear strategy to influence the final document of the GCM. One interviewee assessed the overall capability of influencing the negotiations as very little: I don’t know how to say it. On a scale between zero and 10, in the climate crisis, that we gave to civil society, the capacity to influence, to capture the imagination of people respected by the global citizens, I will give them a seven over 10, on migration, one, and I’m generous (INT-IO #31).

While this does not reflect the overall assessment, it shows that a very critical assessment and classification of influence is needed. Further, that this phase was the ‘playing field’ of experienced and well-resourced NSAs.

4.3.2

The Zero Draft Reflecting Issues Proposed by Non-State Actors

Given the nature of the process, state negotiators discussed issues proposed by NSAs. They did so through consultations and stocktaking that actively included NSAs (see above). My findings overwhelmingly show that the zero draft was heavily influenced by the ideas, expertise, and input of NSAs during the consultations and the stocktaking phases, as this diplomat pointed out: The thematic sessions were a big deal. But, you know, the UN is a strange place […]. There are a lot of that stuff, like the thematic sessions don’t seem to be that important. Yeah. And then they are later on because, you know, the material is produced. You are reading it. You do get a sense for the arguments that may be made, and you get a general sense for the feeling of the room, as we love to say. And those thematic sessions help a lot for the feeling of the Global Compact later on (INT-GOV #20).

50

For example, at the global processes on climate change, like the conference of the parties (COP), the so called ‘circus’ is a key element of NGO engagement. “Access rights to information and participation are embedded in the Paris Agreement.” NGOs and civil society take on the role of monitoring state obligation and influence. However, not all organizations participating at COP are capable of doing so (Aguilar & Schvartzman, 2021).

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Thus, NSAs influenced not only particular goals, but also the overall framing of the GCM. This very much relates to the finding that one key point of leverage was the openness and accessibility of the co-facilitation team. They read all the written input including the minutes in preparation for the zero draft (see section 4.2.1 above; INT-GOV #14, #17, #18, #19; INT-NSA #2, #7, #9, #12; INT-IO #30).51 In addition, members of the migration field reacted to the zero draft in a very positive way—it “was a positive surprise for civil society” (INT-NSA #2). However, even after the publication of the zero draft, actors came forward with additional comments (INT-GOV #18). The strategy of the co-facilitators was to introduce a progressive zero draft, informed by the input received during phases I and II of the process, all while knowing that the negotiations would lead to the weakening of some language (INT-IO #26; INT-GOV #14; INT-NSA #2).

4.3.3

Examples of Thematic Goals of Nsas and Their Take-Up in the Negotiations

This section investigates four examples of non-state actors’ goal achievement: (1) Firewalls; (2) Global Skills Partnerships; (3) The principle of non-refoulement; and (4) Child rights and ending child immigration detention. Firewalls The concept of ‘firewalls’ describes a policy that “aims at avoiding any provision of support and information to immigration enforcement authorities that might lead to deportation” (Lacroix et al., 2020, p. 8).52 Firewalls between public services, such as “health care, education, housing, labour inspection, local police,” and immigration enforcement is key to providing migrants rights, without fear of them being arrested, deported, or detained (Crepeau & Atak, 2016, pp. 143–144). Having the concept and notion of firewalls in the GCM was a “top priority” of civil society and the inclusion of firewalls was the result of input given by civil society during phases I and II of the process (INT-GOV #14, #19; Online Survey 51

The co-facilitation team, for example, did go through all suggestions, made a „catalogue and organized [them] thematically”—“It helped us at least for the zero draft in making sure that those categories were taken care of. So maybe it was not like a copy paste of their suggestions, but it helped us inspire an approach” (INT-GOV #19; see also INT-GOV #14, #17). 52 Amongst the examples are the municipal ID cards in New York City. In Europe, organizations like the European Council on Refugees and Exiles (ECRE) or PICUM advocated for the policy (Lacroix et al., 2020, p. 8).

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#Q9; Civil Society Action Committee, 2017 Pt. 4.4). In the declaration of the Global Mayoral Forum in 2017, cities also demanded that firewalls “be established where needed” (4th Global Mayoral Forum, 2017b). The “appearance of the notion of firewall in the GCM [zero draft] is a rare of example of grassroots […] mobilisation whose outcome has been upscaled at the global level” (Lacroix et al., 2020, p. 9). However, the term ‘firewalls’ was deleted from the document during negotiations. While in the zero draft, there were three mentions of the concept (in Objectives 6, 7 and 15), in Draft 1 there is only one mention of firewalls—in Objective 6. Draft 2 excludes the language completely and the term was never re-introduced. The opposition by many governments, especially European ones, to including ‘firewalls’ in the document, led to a close exchange between the co-facilitators and civil society during the negotiations. Civil society was advised to offer compromises that would still include the values and meaning of firewalls, but not use the specific term (INT-NSA #7; INT-GOV #14; INT-IO #31). Further, governments who were not opposed to the concept worked with civil society on this: because the issue of firewalls […] was the subject of very intensive debate, and we also had very regular exchanges with civil society and considered what the best strategy would be, i.e., we would go full in, so we would really try to keep the word firewall in the text. We know that very many European states were against it. Or let’s also try to develop language together, which actually brings the essence of firewalls without actually needing this word—I think we did that relatively well in the end. (INT-GOV #22).

Even though objective 15 and other GCM objectives use weaker language e.g., basic access to services, the disappearance of ‘firewall’ from the negotiated document is considered “a lost battle for civil society” (INT-NSA #1). Throughout the negotiations, civil society repeatedly expressed “several concerns […] including on weakened phrasing in the text about issues such as personal data ‘firewalls’” (van Haasen, 2019, p. 14; see also INT-GOV #18). To keep in the compromise, and to have wording about non-discriminatory access to basic services (Objective 15), local authorities were key to the negotiation process (see below; Lacroix et al., 2020, pp. 8–9; Stürner-Siovitz, 2022, p. 187).53 53

The GCM still entails some elements of granting migrants’ access to basic services, such as housing, education, and healthcare independent from states. Yet these are mentioned with significantly weaker language, as the final version of objective 15 shows: “We commit to ensure that all migrants, regardless of their migration status, can exercise their human rights through safe access to basic services. We further commit to strengthen migrant-inclusive service delivery systems, notwithstanding that nationals and regular migrants may be entitled to more comprehensive service provision, while ensuring that any differential treatment must be

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Global Skills Partnerships Global Skills Partnerships refer to “a migration model that ensures mobility contributes to development for all.”54 This model is based on a concept by Michael Clemens, from the Center for Global Development (CGD), and has been used by several actors (Center for Global Development, 2021a). The concept was introduced during the consultation phase and included in the zero draft of the GCM with a wide support from actors such as governments, think tanks, the private sector, and foundations (Online Survey #Q9; INT-NSA #11; INT-GOV #18, #24). The concept was also used in Objective 18 and remained in the document until the final draft. Throughout the negotiations, paragraphs were added. This allowed for more details and actors relevant to its implementation to be included in the text. Michael Clemens, from the CGD with an outstanding reputation amongst governments and NSAs, put forward an approach supported by think tanks, academics, the private sector, private foundations, and governments. They all pushed for global skill partnerships (Online Survey #Q13; INT-GOV #18, #24). The concept was also discussed during a side-event in the third round of negotiations (#GCM-NEG3-SideEvent-IOM). The success of keeping this concept in the document comes from the need and willingness for member states to create and have skilled workers. Further, it works towards alliance-building and assistance for diverse actors—governmental and nongovernmental—to support the approach for global skills partnerships (Online Survey #Q9, #Q13, INT-NSA #8). The principle of non-refoulement The principle of non-refoulement, under international human rights law55 guarantees that no one should be returned to a country where they would face torture, cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment and other irreparable harm. This principle applies to all migrants at all times, irrespective of migration status (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018b). based on law, proportionate, pursue a legitimate aim, in accordance with international human rights law” (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft, para. 31). 54 “A Global Skill Partnership is a bilateral labor migration agreement between a country of origin and a country of destination. It is a way to regulate how migration happens in a context where the labor forces are shrinking in countries of destination but growing rapidly in countries of origin, resulting in increased labor market pressure. The model can address legitimate concerns about the impact of migration on both sides.” (Center for Global Development, 2021b). 55 See also Bendel (2012, pp. 11–16) for a discussion of the principle of non-refoulement under European law and in the EU system.

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The principle of non-refoulement is not reflected in the agreed upon outcome of the GCM. However, it was a key goal for civil society, human rights activists, think tanks, and academia (INT-NSA #1, #3, #5, #7, #10; Online Survey #Q9). In addition, OHCHR put out a technical note addressed to member states on the topic. There, OHCHR states that [s]tates have a legal obligation under international human rights law to uphold the principle of non-refoulement, including to ensure that a range of practical and human rights-based protection mechanisms are in place (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018a).

OHCHR further argues that non-refoulement should be reflected in GCM objectives 8, 11 and 21 (Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights, 2018a). The principle of non-refoulement was introduced in Draft 2, however, in Draft 3 it was erased and replaced by “a way to capture the right to non-refoulement without explicitly stating it” (#GCM-NEG6-MMC).56 Because there are strong links to international human rights law, the change in Draft 3 could be a consequence of the technical note by OHCHR and thus illustrates the strong role of UN agencies. The reason non-refoulement was deleted is due to the opposition of several governments, amongst them China and Russia. On the other hand, governments like Liechtenstein and the EU were strongly in favor of its inclusion (INT-NSA #1, #3, #5). Some civil society actors worked on compromises to the text, albeit not everyone was convinced of this being the right approach: I mean, we were extremely sad and angry when the non-refoulment wording got cut out of the draft. […] So, what then civil society tried to do was establish language that would be the same as long as the definition of non-refoulment, although that there was some debate within civil society also about whether we should actually do that and whether this would be compromising. But at least there was work to do to limit the damage, let’s say, in that sense (INT-NSA #7).

In addition, they helped governments unfamiliar with the concept, who at times were lost during expert discussions (INT-NSA #10). Another interviewee reflected on the final text of Objective 21 the following way: And to some extent, we managed to have this text, which was proposed by the cofacilitators. To some extent a number of countries and NGO kept saying “we need to have to principle of non-refoulement”, and then the Russia and China and alikes 56

Associated data can be viewed in the appendix in the electronic supplementary material (Appendix V: Comparison of draft versions of the GCM).

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being a little bit ideologically oriented saying we don’t want to have the principle, but they were more thinking of ensuring that the word would not be mentioned. So then the let it go to text, which is not bad at all, because it was not called principle of non-refoulement, but it was non-returnability for human rights reasons, which is a position that we, at least part of civil society, including us, were promoting as a kind of totally acceptable compromise (INT-NSA #1).

In this example, my data allows me to analyze the ‘lost battle’ of many actors, such as UN human rights entities, to bring non-refoulement into the negotiation process. I also show the politics behind the issue and how little influence NSAs had in comparison to major governments like Russia and China, who opposed the matter. The final text does entail a paraphrasing of non-refoulement in objective 21 by referring to existing human rights standards. Descriptions of NSA advocacy in this case only come from ego-perspective data, which does not allow me to draw concrete conclusions about any successful attempt to influence on the matter. Child rights and ending child immigration detention As described in section 4.2.4 above, multi-stakeholder alliances have proven to be an effective leverage for NSAs. Amongst them was the Initiative for Child Rights in the Global Compacts. This alliance has repeatedly been identified by NSAs, IOs, and governments as an efficient and strategic multi-stakeholder alliance (INTNSA #3, #9; INT-IO #32; INT-GOV #22).57 Here, I analyze goal achievement with regards to implementing the right of the child in the GCM, with a particular focus on ending child immigration detention. As this was a multi-stakeholder effort, multiple perspectives advocated for this goal. The issue of children’s rights had strong allies within the inter-state system during the GCM negotiations. For example, during round four of the GCM negotiations, the “Group of Friends of Children and the SDGs,” consisting of 42 member states,58 put forward a statement about the rights of children which was reflected in the final GCM document (#GCM-NEG4-GroupOfFriends-ChildrenSDGs).

57

The strength of the initiative was its perspective on both compacts. Here, I only focus on their advocacy and goal attainment in the GCM. 58 This statement was brought forward on behalf of the Group of Friends of Children and the SDGs, consisting of Andorra; Antigua and Barbuda; Armenia; Belarus; Benin; Bulgaria; Chile; Croatia; Ecuador; Ethiopia; Egypt; Estonia; Ghana; Guatemala; Guyana; Honduras; India; Indonesia; Ireland; Jamaica; Japan; Jordan; Kazakhstan; Kenya; Lithuania; Luxembourg; Lesotho; Malta; Mexico; Nigeria; Pakistan; Panama; Peru; Romania; Senegal South Africa; Trinidad and Tobago; Tunisia; Turkey; United Arab Emirates; Uganda; Uruguay (#GCM-NEG4-GroupOfFriends-ChildrenSDGs).

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Following the introduction of each draft of the GCM, the initiative put forward a statement laying out their comments and suggestions for subsequent drafts.59 After the introduction of the zero draft, the initiative had numerous suggestions. However, when the document was first introduced by the co-facilitators, they were pleased with it: The zero draft offers an encouraging step towards a Compact that places the human rights and best interests of all migrant children at its core. We are ready to work with the Co-Facilitators and other stakeholders to ensure that the already strong child rights-focused elements of the text are retained and strengthened where necessary. You can count on our continued full support in the process ahead (#InitiativeChildRights-2018-ZeroDraft).

One important overall achievement of the initiative was to ensure child sensitivity was acknowledged as a basic, cross-cutting principle of the GCM.60 This speaks to the continuous input and strong presence of the initiative for children’s rights during the consultation phase of the GCM process. In my subsequent analysis I focus on the key advocacy demands of the initiative, namely ending child immigration detention:61 Objective 13 of the GCM refers to immigration detention as a measure of last resort and in that section, there are references to the vulnerability of families and children. The introduction to the objective in the zero draft of the GCM stated “it should be clear that this should not apply to child immigration detention, which is

59

#InitiativeChildRights-2018-ZeroDraft; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-ZeroDraftPlus; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft1; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft2Return; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft2; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft3; #InitiativeChildRights-Statement-Round6. 60 “The Global Compact promotes existing international legal obligations in relation to the rights of the child, and upholds the principle of the best interests of the child at all times, as a primary consideration in all situations concerning children in the context of international migration, including unaccompanied and separated children” (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft, para. 15). 61 There are other traceable examples of the initiative, such as the reference to the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC). In the commentary section of the zero draft, the zero draft plus, and Draft 1, the initiative demanded the CRC to be included in the GCM preamble (#InitiativeChildRights-2018-ZeroDraft; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-ZeroDraftPlus; #InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft1). Ultimately, the reference was made as part of Draft 2 of the GCM (as a footnote, listing also other human rights treaties) and remained in the final document (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev 2; #GCM-2018-FinalDraft).

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never in the best interest of the child” (#InitiativeChildRights-2018-ZeroDraft).62 The key argument for the initiative was that in “the New York Declaration Member States already committed to work towards ending immigration detention of children” and thus national governments should commit to concrete measures and action plans “how they intend to phase out immigration detention of children in law, policy and practice” (#InitiativeChildRights-2018-ZeroDraft-Plus). References to children are made in paragraphs a) and g) (paragraph h of the final draft) of objective 13 of the GCM. These references are the focus of my analysis here. The evolvement of objective 13, para. a) of the GCM ultimately included families and children as part of a focus group offered alternatives to detention.63 The initiative in the commentaries of objective 13 in the zero draft, the zero draft plus, and Draft 1 focused more broadly on the theme. In its commentary on Draft 2, objective 13, para. g) the initiative suggested direct text edits in the draft’s word document. They proposed the following addition (underlined): […] that States promote, implement and expand alternatives to detention, favouring non-custodial measures and community-based care arrangements, especially in the case of children and families (#InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft2).

In Draft 3, this wording was taken up and it remained in the final document. Objective 13, paragraph g (later h) is the key part of the GCM that addresses measures to end child immigration detention. The paragraph in draft 2 was drastically changed from a clear commitment to ending child immigration detention to 62

The full comment on Objective 13 in the zero draft was: “While the title of Objective 13 refers to detention as a measure of last resort, it should be clear that this should not apply to child immigration detention, which is never in the best interest of the child. We also welcome the call to provide alternatives to immigration detention that include access to services and allow children to remain with family members or guardians in non-custodial contexts but it is important to highlight that these alternatives to detention should be consistent with children’s rights and their best interests. We emphasise that detention has a profound and negative impact on child health and wellbeing both in the short and long term. The Initiative has produced a roadmap to end the immigration detention of children that can support Members States’ efforts to achieve the New York Declaration’s commitment to work to end such a harmful practice. Members of the Initiative stand ready to work with other stakeholders to identify sustainable and child-sensitive solutions to achieve this goal. Now more than ever, it is urgent that the Compact calls on governments to develop national and regional action plans with time-bound milestones outlining how they intend to phase out immigration detention of children in law, policy and practice, starting by investing in alternatives to detention” (#InitiativeChildRights-2018-ZeroDraft). 63 Associated data can be viewed in the appendix in the electronic supplementary material (Appendix V: Comparison of draft versions of the GCM).

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“ensuring availability and accessibility” thereof. The commentaries of the initiative show that they worked to keep the paragraph in and to encourage states to keep the commitments they made in the New York Declaration.65 In the final negotiation round in July 2018, the initiative stated that: The very nature of the GCM is to build on the commitments of the New York Declaration. Therefore, we appreciate the efforts to fully reflect this in the current wording of Draft Rev. 3 and urge you to ensure that the commitment to work to end child immigration detention stays in the Compact, protecting the rights and best interests of the child, by ensuring the availability and accessibility of effective alternatives to detention as the way forward. We also call for the inclusion of the language from the New York Declaration, which reaffirms that children should not be criminalized or subject to punitive measures because of their migration status or that of their parents (#InitiativeChildRights-Statement-Round6).

I argue, the goal of keeping this paragraph in the final document was achieved. In terms of NSA goal attainment—and in this case also IOs like UNICEF who were invested in both the issue and the initiative—I argue that while the wording about ending child immigration detention was not as strong as actors wished for, the GCM still reflects the goals and principles of NSAs (see e.g., #GFMD-2018CSD-Committments-Chair; INT-NSA #2, #3; Online Survey #Q9): 65

On the zero draft plus, the initiative suggested: “KEEP paragraph 28g calling to end the practice of child detention and provide alternatives. […] ADD recommendation in paragraph 28g for Member States to develop regional or national road maps with time-bound milestones outlining how they intend to end the practice of child immigration detention.” In addition, the suggested alternative language which was not taken up (#InitiativeChildRights-2018ZeroDraft-Plus). On draft 1 the initiative stated: “While the title of Objective 13 refers to detention as a measure of last resort, it should be clear that this should not apply to child immigration detention, which is never in the best interest of the child. […] We emphasise that detention has a profound and negative impact on child health and wellbeing both in the short and long term. Now more than ever, it is urgent that the Compact calls on governments to develop national and regional action plans with time-bound milestones outlining how they intend to phase out immigration detention of children in law, policy and practice, starting by investing in alternatives to detention” (#InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft1). On draft 2, the imitative suggested to move text within paragraph to keep it in line with the Guidelines for the Alternative Care of Children (#InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft2). This was not taken up. On draft 3, the initiative commented: “We strongly urge States to retain the current wording of paragraph H in full. Not only does this wording uphold child rights and the best interests principle, it also sets the ground to use the very nature of the GCM to progressively work in a collaborative manner to fulfil this in practice by placing the focus on alternatives to detention” (#InitiativeChildRights-2018-Draft3).

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And as a result, in the text of the global compact, it is a very clear text, both in relation to child detention and, not to go as far as UNICEF [and NSAs] wanted, but still is quite advanced (INT-NSA #9).

One NSA representative reiterated this, stating that “we were all very happy of the outcomes that we got by coming together and really working on that together” (INT-NSA #2). I must also note that while there was weakening of the language throughout the negotiations, the negotiations occurred without participation from the United States. The US is regularly criticized for harsh immigration detention measures, especially for children and families. Measures were particularly stringent during the Trump administration and have not changed much under the current Biden administration (Cheatham & Roy, 2021). The language of the final document was already weakened because several governments were concerned, they would be unable to live up to the standards. As a result, I argue that if the US had been part of the negotiations, language on ending child detention or any detention at all, would have become significantly weaker or even removed entirely. My data indicates that during the GCM process, NSAs played a crucial role in the overall work done to end immigration detention. This occurred in part because NSAs offered alternatives to detention as feasible and more cost-efficient tools for national governments (INT-NSA #2, #7; INT-GOV #18; Online Survey #Q9, #Q10, #Q11).

4.3.4

Spotlight on other Topics, and Cross-Cutting Issues During the GCM Negotiations

In this section I highlight the numerous cross-cutting issues and topics that, based on my data, were relevant to NSAs. However, for these issues, a 360-degree analysis was not possible. Overall, the goals and topics NSAs brought to the GCM process were diverse and went beyond the 23 GCM objectives (see Online Survey #Q9; #Q10). As Figure 4.6 illustrates, NSA focus varies with regards to the 23 GCM objectives. NSAs primarily focused on objective 5 (to enhance the availability and flexibility of pathways for migration), objective 15 (to provide access to basic services for migrants), and objective 23 (to strengthening international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly, and regular migration). No NSAs prioritized objective 9 (to strengthen the response to smuggling of migrants), objective 11 (to manage borders), objective 14 (to enhance consular protection, assistance,

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and cooperation throughout the migration cycle), and objective 22 (to look at portability of social security entitlements). While this summary does not give a full picture because respondents were only asked to indicate their three most important goals, the summary does illustrate the thematic prioritization of advocacy work during the GCM process—especially during the negotiation phase.

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The objectives are: (1) Collect and utilize accurate and disaggregated data as a basis for evidence-based policies; (2) Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin; (3) Provide accurate and timely information at all stages of migration; (4) Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation (5) Enhance availability and flexibility of pathways for regular migration; (6) Facilitate fair and ethical recruitment and safeguard conditions that ensure decent work; (7) Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration; (8) Save lives and establish coordinated international efforts on missing migrants; (9) Strengthen the transnational response to smuggling of migrants; (10) Prevent, combat and eradicate trafficking in persons in the context of international migration; (11) Manage borders in an integrated, secure and coordinated manner; (12) Strengthen certainty and predictability in migration procedures for appropriate screening, assessment and referral; (13); Use migration detention only as a measure of last resort and work towards alternatives; (14) Enhance consular protection, assistance and cooperation throughout the migration cycle; (15) Provide access to basic services for migrants; (16) Empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion; (17)Eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration; (18) Invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of skills, qualifications and competences; (19) Create conditions for migrants and diasporas to fully contribute to sustainable development in all countries; (20) Promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants; (21) Cooperate in facilitating safe and dignified return and readmission, as well as sustainable reintegration; (22) Establish mechanisms for the portability of social security entitlements and earned benefits; (23) Strengthen international cooperation and global partnerships for safe, orderly and regular migration.

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Figure 4.6 The advocacy focuses of non-state actors68 . (Source: Online Survey #Q10 (Question: What were the three most important goals you worked/advocated for within the agreed outcome of the GCM?))

Cross-cutting issues: Gender, non-regression, and development A key issue for civil society was to ensure the gender-responsiveness of the GCM. Here, I only have data from the ego-perspective, however, I take away two things: First, in large parts, the final agreement of the document reflects the goals and principles of civil society, however, with important gaps (#Marrakech-2018-Gottardo).66 66

One key gap identified is: “Despite the fact that gender has been mainstreamed in the document and it is part of the guiding principles, at the GCM there is not a specific objective on gender, as it is the case with the SDGs” (#Marrakech-2018-Gottardo).

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Second, civil society who worked on gender had little resources, yet they found that the framing of gender issues has shifted to a more progressive language (INT-NSA #13): On gender I think we did a pretty good job. […] I mean not only us, this is not attributed to only civil society I think. UN Women and member states also pushed for this but if you look at the compact now, the compact is pretty good in terms of gender. It is quite gender-responsive, […] it’s almost everywhere and I think one of our biggest successes was that at the beginning of the negotiation there was this issue as seeing women as victims of ... the kind of poor migrant women and children and we were trying to change the narrative from poor migrant women and children to agents, like women are agents. But you can’t look at them only from a lens, they are a reality, they are much more than that. So, I think that reality, no one was talking that way, they started the kind of thing that was very patronizing kind of way, that doesn’t make justice to what the reality of migrant women (INT-NSA #13).

The principle of non-regression67 was another aspect important to civil society, especially with the Latin American block: there was something coming from the Latin Ameri-can Region, like the nonregression clause. That was not in the zero draft and that civil society pushing for that. And that element is there because civil society brought it up into the negotiations. […] So basically, one of the principles of the GCM is that no states could go below the existing legal standards to implement any part of the Compact or to claim that they are implementing the Compact. So that principle was not in the Compact, it was brought up by the Latin American Block, which is like this regional coalition and it’s now part of the Compact. (INT-NSA #2).

Non-regression was only introduced in Draft 2 of the GCM as part of the vision and guiding principles. It remained in the final agreed upon document. A third topic brought in throughout the process was the developmental aspects of migration. These ensured that the Agenda 2030 was integrated and embedded in the GCM. In this sense, the discussion, both with governments as well as civil society, was not always easy (Online Survey #Q9; INT-NSA #9).

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“The Global Compact is based on international human rights law and upholds the principles of non-regression and non-discrimination. By implementing the Global Compact, we ensure effective respect, protection and fulfilment of the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration status, across all stages of the migration cycle. We also reaffirm the commitment to eliminate all forms of discrimination, including racism, xenophobia and intolerance against migrants and their families.” (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft, para. 15).

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Demands for a more rights based GCM While “non-state actors were pivotal when it came to supporting the more human rights-based approaches” (INT-IO #30), and numerous NSAs pushed for a strong reflection of human rights in the GCM, actors had hoped for more (Online Survey, #Q9, #Q10; INT-NSA #10, #16, #23). While NSAs “wanted to have a […] clear statement that all of this is in conformity with human rights law,” ultimately during the negotiations some governments feared “that there would be some occasions, where it wouldn’t be in conformity with human rights law and in an absolute sense” (INT-GOV #18). Still, the GCM is “based on international human rights law” and its implementation “ensure[s] effective respect, protection, and fulfilment of the human rights of all migrants, regardless of their migration status” (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft, para. 15). As criticism, one interviewee notes that human rights are acknowledged as “cross cutting” and reflected in the principles, but “not [in] one of the objectives” (Online Survey #Q10).68 In addition, NSAs worked towards the rights of particular groups of migrants, such as women, workers, and children (Online Survey #Q9; #Q11; INT-NSA #10, #16, #23; #GFMD-2018-CSD-Commitments-Chair). Climate mobility: emerging issue but driven by the inter-state system The intersection between climate change and migration is reflected in objective 2 of the GCM titled “Minimize the adverse drivers and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin” (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft). While two survey respondents and one non-state interviewee indicated that climate migration was a priority for them during the process (Online Survey #Q9; INT-NSA #7), I argue that NSAs did not actively influence the shaping of Objective 2, especially its section on climate migration. Nevertheless, a “stronger climate displacement agenda” does reflect the goals and principles of civil society (#GFMD-2018-CSD-CommittmentsChair). The multi-stakeholder group GCM Informals placed the topic high on the agenda and strategically discussed it amongst governments, IOs, and non-state partners (INT-NSA #4). As discussed earlier, the Informals had a significant leverage to influence the GCM process (see section 4.2.4).

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It is to note here, that throughout GCM objectives (also the descriptions and commitments of objectives) refer to human rights law and standards. Yet, in none of the formulated, onesentence objectives ‘human rights’ are mentioned. These are the objectives that are listed and referred to by national governments when quoting their work on GCM implementation.

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While there was no big movement from civil society, the private sector, or other NSAs, my data hints at a strong push by individuals within the UN system and IOs who played a crucial role (INT-IO #25, #31, #32; INT-NSA #9; INT-GOV #18). Remittances GCM objective 20 aims to “promote faster, safer and cheaper transfer of remittances and foster financial inclusion of migrants” (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft). On this issue, diaspora organizations, academics, and the private sector intervened and brought forward proposals –each with different approaches and goals. Many engaged in the field for years and were able to bring concrete demands and proposals to the consultations and the co-facilitators. Many of those actors had also engaged during the SDG process or in regional conversations about remittances. During negotiations, the issue was sensitive due to several reasons: first, because there were countries in the room who rely heavily on remittances as part of their national strategy; and second, because intervention from the private sector was perceived as them coming forward with their own interests; for example, when it comes to fees for remittances (INT-NSA #11, #15, #21, #29; INT-GOV #20; Online Survey #Q9).

4.3.5

Does the Final Agreement Reflect Non-State Actors’ Goals and Principles?

Previously, I showed the individual goals of NSAs and the final document, which reflected some of those goals and principles on a thematic level. Here, I look at the GCM as a whole. While the zero draft received very positive responses from NSAs (see above), the agreed outcome document was lacking and there were key parts where NSAs wanted more. During the negotiation process, no single goal was removed, thus the overall ideas and principles remained (INT-GOV #14). One example of civil society’s support for the GCM can be seen in the ten commitments, a document put forward by the Chair of the GFMD Civil Society Days in 2018. Amongst other statements, it includes the commitments “to interpret and implement the compact in accordance with human rights principles and to work to ensure that migrants are at the heart of all policies that affect them” (#GFMD-2018-CSDCommittments-Chair; INT-NSA #5). In addition, my data shows that many actors who participated in the process felt their goals and ideas were reflected in the GCM. 88.5 % of Survey respondents use the GCM as a reference in their work (Online Survey #Q19; see Figure 4.7).

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Figure 4.7 NSAs use the GCM as a reference in their work. (Source: Online Survey #Q19)

Some suggest the broad set of objectives in the document is a weakness. They argue it is too comprehensive and fear implementation will result in cherry-picking ideas. Actors also criticized several specific aspects of the GCM, including its human rights standards and the weaknesses in its implementation, review, and follow-up process (Online Survey; INT-NSA #7; INT-GOV #18). In addition, many actors criticized the notion of irregular migration whereas many civil society organizations worked towards a lens on mixed migration movements (Online Survey #Q9; INT-GOV #18; INT-NSA #5).69 69

The term “mixed movements” is used twice in the final draft and four times in the zero draft. The term “irregular” was used eight times in the zero draft and 15 times in the final draft (#GCM-2018-ZeroDraft; #GCM-2018-FinalDraft). One interviewee stated: “I think in terms of some of the issues that were of common advocacy and common concerns was the whole issue of regular, irregular migration. And that’s something that’s kind of gross civil society together to say, no, you cannot go to divide the compact between regular and irregular migrants. The whole issue of including, you know,

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Thus, while the overall GCM reflects some of the NSAs goals and principles, they also wish parts had been stronger and had more specific rights-based wording. The survey data, which asked actors for their ego-perception in how far they had achieved their goals, gives some indication of how strong the GCM objectives and principles align with the goals of NSAs. Figure 4.8 shows the individual responses of survey participants to the question asking about how successful they as stakeholders assess their goal achievement throughout the process. The average answer to that question is a 6.16 (on a scale of 0 (none) to 10 (very much)). While some indicate no success (0) and some indicate great success (10), most respondents exist somewhere in the middle. The average level of engagement (Online Survey #Q 14) is a bit higher than the assessment of goal achievement, at 6.46 Points. Looking at individual answers to both questions, there seems to be a correlation between the level of engagement and estimates regarding their own goal achievement (self-assessment). This correlation is showcased in Figure 4.9. Few respondents estimated their goal achievement was higher than their involvement in the process. Most cases estimated their goal achievement a bit lower than their involvement in the process. Figure 4.9 shows the degree of involvement (in blue) in correlation to individual goal achievement (in orange). In most cases degree of involvement is higher than goal achievement, only few respondents indicated a lower degree of involvement than goal achievement. Without generalizing this too broadly, the data implies that group of actors who engaged significantly also see their goals and principles reflected in the GCM, at least partly.

migrants, mixed migration, what we call mixed migration, is what’s really looking closely at migrants in vulnerable situations, looking more closely around, you know, people who are not traditions exactly refugees, but in either of kind of international protections, but in need of certain kinds of protections as well. And that was kind of a disappointing outcome of the compact that you see the different drafts, how it went down in terms of the language (INT-NSA #5).

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5

Local Authorities in the GCM Process: A Similar but Different Case

[M]ayors have aspecial role, they were invited at different moments by the co-facilitator to do that (INT-IO #6)

Local authorities as actors in the development process of the GCM form a similar but somewhat different case in comparison to other stakeholders. Cities who have dealt with the arrival and integration of newcomers for years, all while global debates about migration have been happening, wanted to bring their views and perspectives to the GCM process: And it also has to do with the fact that […] we were looking at the GCM/GCR process starting after the […] New York declaration. We were under the impression that cities were totally out of the loop and that we needed to do something to really make sure that the voice of cities was heard (INT-CIT #34).

Why do they form a similar but different case? First, because the structure of their involvement was not clearly set up (like with civil society and the private sector). Local authorities, in comparison to many NSAs, in the migration field and beyond, have shorter track records on the global level. Second, because the coordination and collaboration of local authorities in the process only started after the end of the consultation phase in late 2017. Further, their collaboration was separate from other stakeholders. Cities were forced to rely on existing structures and networks about migration and human mobility. Previous processes, experiences, and networks were fundamental for cities’ ability to contribute to the GCM

Supplementary Information The online version contains supplementary material available at https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5_5.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 R. Schweiger, Beyond states, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5_5

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process.1 And finally, because their character and perception as stakeholders are different than other NSAs, such as civil society (see also section 2.3.3).2 In this chapter, I argue that local authorities, while only coming in during phase II of the process, contributed an important voice and perspective to the negotiations. This was able to happen even though they are a comparatively small group of cities with very specific advocacy goals. Local authorities initially organized during the consultation phase and then stepped up their contributions during the stocktaking meeting in Puerto Vallarta. They did this at the same time the US left the negotiation process, which opened space for US cities to step in. Behind city engagement were strong organizers and supporters, both from the co-facilitation team and the UN system, who helped create momentum and opportunities to engage. The advocacy goals of cities were focused on three main areas: (1) clarifying the role of local authorities as distinct to other actors; (2) recognizing local authorities’ perspectives in particular objectives of the GCM; and (3) being prominently considered as a relevant stakeholder in the follow-up, review, and implementation of the GCM. I argue that in all three areas, local authorities have, for the most part, achieved their goals. Points (1) and (3) were of the greatest success. However, per my findings, local authorities did not provide substantial language to the GCM negotiators. The agreed outcome of the GCM still reflects the goals and principles of local authorities. Further, it led to new structures and ways for local authorities to engage in implementation, review, and follow-up. This is now done through the Mayors Migration Council, the Mayors Mechanism, and the MMC’s seat on the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund—structures that now allow for quite different and more powerful engagement of local authorities in processes like these. This chapter is divided into three main sections: First, I look at the access, activities, and opportunities of local authorities to transmit information to the process (section 5.1). Second, I identify the leverage points and limitations of local authorities in the process (section 5.2). Third, I analyze local authorities goal achievement throughout the process (section 5.3).

1

For an understanding of global urban governance and the emergence of global structures for cities to engage in the multilateral system, see e.g., Pejic and Acuto (2022). 2 Therefore, representatives from local authorities did not participate in the survey. However, NSAs who pushed for city participation did participate in the survey. Further, this chapter relies on interviews with city representatives and alter-perspective on cities during the process, both from NSAs and governmental/IOs, as well as primary data.

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5.1

The Access, Activities, and Opportunities for Local Authorities to Transmit Information

Access, activities, and the opportunities for local authorities to transmit information to the process have, I argue, been contrary to the engagement of most other non-governmental stakeholders—who have found themselves at very different starting points (INT-GOV #14). While local authorities were barely visible in the beginning of the consultative process, more and more city representatives and mayors engaged in the process throughout the stocktaking and negotiation phase. In the setup of stakeholder engagement, local authorities are not prominently featured. The Modalities resolution for the GCM in Paragraph 6, where the UNGA issued the invitation and the process for stakeholder involvement,3 does not consider local authorities as stakeholders. However, in paragraph 8 the UNGA acknowledges local authorities as important in contributing their perspective, through informal dialogues: relevant stakeholders, including civil society, scientific and knowledge-based institutions, parliaments, local authorities, the private sector and migrants themselves, will be able to contribute views, in particular through informal dialogues to which they will be invited by the co-facilitators; the intergovernmental nature of the negotiations, however, will be fully respected; (United Nations General Assembly, 2017b, para. 8).4

This makes local authorities distinct from other non-governmental stakeholders in the process. For the process, the co-facilitators recognized that cities are not non-state by nature (see also section 2.3.3). The argument was that cities did not form a negotiating party and therefore were considered stakeholders—“although of course they have a somewhat different character than civil society or even the private sector” (INT-GOV #14). In my analysis of access, activities, and opportunities for local authorities to transmit information during the GCM process, I find that while local authorities did not play a major role during the consultation phase, their engagement 3

Listed actors include non-governmental organizations, civil society organizations, academic institutions, the private sector, diaspora communities and migrant organizations. 4 This is also reflected in the GCM stakeholder guidelines: “The co-facilitators for the intergovernmental negotiations will invite relevant stakeholders, including civil society, scientific and knowledge-based institutions, parliaments, local authorities, the private sector and migrants themselves to contribute views on the global compact, in particular by holding informal dialogues. When possible, such dialogues will be held at the margins of the informal thematic sessions” (#GCM-Stakeholder-Guidelines).

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increased significantly after the stocktaking meeting (see Table 5.1). In addition, previous processes helped provide the groundwork for engagement in the GCM process (see section 4.1.2).

5.1.1

The Consultation Phase and the Absence of Local Authority Voices

Cities, to be honest, are featured but not sort of consistently from the beginning, […]. They were not seen as a major topic, but they became more important towards the end (INT-GOV #18).

In the consultation phase, voices of local authorities, unlike other stakeholders, were largely absent (INT-GOV #14, #17, #18; INT-CIT #34). The reason for this is that “unlike civil society and the private sector, cities were not really organized […] at the time the Global Compact process began” (INT-GOV #14). Only the final and sixth informal thematic consultation, in October 2017, lists a representative from local authority. That authority was the Secretary of labor and employment promotion for the Mexico City Government who spoke on irregular migration and regular pathways (#TS6–2017-Agenda). During this first phase of the process, the perspective of local authorities was represented by governments and other actors; cities did not speak for themselves (INT-GOV #14): But it was still the UNITAR, […] IOM that were framing the narrative of cities on migration. And it was not yet the voice of cities (INT-CIT #34).

In addition, some side-events addressed cities. These events include one during a thematic session on “the role of local authorities in promoting inclusion of refugees and migrants,” and one during a thematic session on “Migrants’ contributions to cities” (#TS1–2017-SE-UN; #TS4–2017-SE-Belgium; INT-NSA #5). However, the first event did not include city representatives on the panel.5 Consequently, for governments and other stakeholders during the process, it 5

According to the invitation, this event was led by the following speakers: H.E. Mr. Jürg Lauber Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of Switzerland to the United Nations, H.E. Mr. Juan José Gómez Camacho Ambassador Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Permanent Representative of Mexico to the United Nations, H.E. Ms. Louise Arbour, Special Representative of the Secretary-General on International Migration and Secretary-General of the International Conference on Migration and H.E. Mr. Maurizio Enrico Serra, Permanent Representative of Italy to the International Organizations in Geneva (#TS1–2017-SE-UN).

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became “evident that there was a very strong local dimension to migration management” and therefore they needed to be heard and included in the process (INT-GOV #17). Subsequently, cities organized alongside the consultation phase, using existing structure to prepare their advocacy for the GCM process.6 The 4th Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development,7 which took place on the sidelines of the June 2017 GFMD in Berlin, and was hosted by the Mayor of Berlin (4th Global Mayoral Forum, 2017a), formed an important milestone for local authorities to be heard during the GCM process. While the GFMD was not formally part of the GCM process, and the Mayors Forum only took place on the margins of the GFMD, it did serve as an important organizing moment for mayors and cities to connect with the GCM process and be visible to governments (INT-GOV #24). The ‘Berlin Declaration’ of the Forum,8 presented in Berlin at the GFMD in 2017 by Mayor Beouinde of Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso, was submitted to the preparatory process of the GCM (4th Global Mayoral Forum, 2017c, 2017a; #GFMD-2017-MayorBeouinde). The Declaration demanded “[g]reater access [for cities] to where policy decisions are made,” suggesting that cities “have had little or no voice in global forums where priorities on the agendas of human mobility are determined at the national, regional and the international level” (4th Global Mayoral Forum, 2017b, p. 5). Of particular importance to national governments was the hint that cities should engage more structurally in the GCM development process (INT-GOV #18, #24). In September 2017, mayors gathered at a ‘Global Mayors Summit on Refugee and Migration Policy and Practice’ in New York on the margins of the UN General Assembly. A total of 33 cities exchanged and engaged with speakers and discussion partners, including SRSG Louise Arbour, the cofacilitators of the GCM (#NewYorkCity-GlobalMayorsSummit-2017-Program; #IOM-IDM-2018_New York City). The goal of the Summit was to inform national and international decision-makers of their [cities’] perspectives and priorities on these issues, bringing their voices to the international arena and 6

The engagement was building on both, existing city networks, like Metropolis and UCLG, as well as European city networks, since 2015, bringing migration onto the agenda and positioning themselves. 7 The Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development was set up in 2013 on the margins of the High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development. SRSG Peter Sutherland was the main driver behind the 2013 HLD, and thus also helped bring forward the Mayoral Forum (INT-GOV #18; INT-CIT #34). 8 Mayoral Declaration on Migrants and Refugees: Meeting Needs, Protecting Rights and Fostering Empowerment (June 2017).

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engaging with them on the global compacts (#NewYorkCity-GlobalMayorsSummit2017-Program).

This summit also served as an opportunity to share good practices and values of different cities on the topic of migration. This was done first and foremost by the host city, New York (#IOM-IDM-2018_New York City; #NewYorkCityGlobalMayorsSummit-2017-Program). For New York City, who has been leading city coordination around the GCM process (see below), this was a starting point “to strategically engage on the Global Compacts” (#IOM-IDM-2018_New York City; INT-CIT #35). All these activities took place outside the formal stakeholder consultation process of the GCM. Further, they prepared the groundwork for more structured engagement during the stocktaking meeting and negotiation phase. To external observers and other stakeholders, local authorities may not have been visible. However, they used the time after the 4th Mayoral Forum to coordinate and prepare for the Stocktaking meeting and negotiation process. Nevertheless, I find that during the consultation phase, there was very little activity or opportunity for local authorities to transmit information to the process.

5.1.2

The Stocktaking: Local Authorities Visibly Stepping into the Process

While the consultation phase was set up along themes, the Stocktaking was set up primarily along regional dimensions. These ranged from the individual and human dimensions to the community level and then from the local/subnational dimension to the national, regional, and global level (#PuertoVallarta-2017-Agenda; INTGOV #17): And there, what we found was that national governments didn’t have best practices. The best practices were coming from city governments. And then the mayors became very involved in phase two (INT-GOV #17).

Phase two finally offered a space for local authorities to contribute. In fact, at the Stocktaking Meeting in December 2017, local authorities became visible for the first time during the process (INT-GOV #14). So, what did cities do during the stocktaking meeting/phase? And what opportunities were given to them to transmit information? First, and most importantly, visibility was had as a result of the Metropolis city network, which put forward

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a position paper “on the role they wanted to play in the GCM.” This paper was backed by 136 city members and 12 non-member local authorities (Online Survey #Q13; #Metropolis-2017-GCM-GCR; #Metropolis-2017-GCM-GCR-News; INT-CIT #34).9 In this paper, Metropolis cities requested to Give cities a seat at the table in the discussions that will lead into the negotiations of the Compacts. A first opportunity to enable city participation is in the Compacts consultation phase, notably in Mexico and Geneva in December 2017. Acknowledge their contributions to Compact stocktaking sessions and provide a space for cities in the negotiations to follow (#Metropolis-2017-GCM-GCR).

Subsequently, the paper was sent to the UN Secretary-General, SRSG Louise Arbour and UNHCR’s Filippo Grandi (#Metropolis-2017-GCM-GCR-News). It was presented as a keynote “on the human, community and local/sub-national dimensions” (via video) by Mayor Valérie Plante from the City of Montréal, Canada, during the Puerto Vallarta Stocktaking Meeting in December 2017 (#PuertoVallarta-2017-Agenda; Online Survey #Q13). In her video statement, Mayor Plante emphasized that the inclusion and participation of cities in the meetings and programs of the various UN international bodies, including the GCM. She also suggested it is crucial for cities to have opportunity to share their policy priorities and experiences managing migration within their own communities (#PuertoVallarta-2017-MayorPlante). Second, the November 2017 Mechelen Declaration put forward by UCLG, submitted at the Puerto Vallarta meeting, offered the visions and requests from cities for the negotiation process (#MechelenDeclaration-2017). It was supported by IOM, UN-Habitat, and UCLG. The Declaration discussed recent milestones on migration and sustainable developments; it put forward commitments made by local authorities relating to migration and other themes discussed during the consultation phase (#MechelenDeclaration-2017, Appendix). Finally, the Global Parliament of Mayors (GPM) presented a statement at the Puerto Vallarta meeting, calling for “for protection and empowerment of migrant children” (#GPM-2017-MigrantChildren). This statement was in line with other non-state and IO actors advocating for the rights of migrant children (see above). While the activities of different city networks as well as access to the Puerto Vallarta meeting, could have been one-off engagements, the opposite happened. 9

Cities that are not members of Metropolis, endorsing the position paper, were: New York, Chicago, Washington, Philadelphia, Pittsburg, Sacramento, Madison, Buffalo, Milwaukee, St. Louis City, Richmond, San José, Montgomery County (#Metropolis-2017-GCM-GCRNews).

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Prior to starting the intergovernmental negotiations, the withdrawal of the US from the negotiation process, created momentum for more cities to engage. Further, it created an interest and a rationale for other negotiating governments to work more closely with local authorities, particularly ones from the US. The withdrawal of the US from the GCM process pushed further municipal engagement On December 2, 2017, the Trump administration announced the US withdrawal from the Global Compact for Migration process citing concerns about US sovereignty (Cambridge University Press, 2018; Wintour, 2017). This announcement came just days before the official start of the Puerto Vallarta Stocktaking Meeting on December 4, 2017 (#PuertoVallarta-2017-Agenda). This major change, which had other effects on the GCM development process, was a “catalyst” (INT-NSA #12) for a growing number of local authorities to engage—in particular, mayors from the United States (INT-GOV #14, #17, #18; INT-CIT #34; INT-NSA #12): the withdrawal of the US from the process actually had a certain boosting function here, because cities in the US in particular reacted to it (INT-GOV #14).

As a result, the Metropolis city network was able to directly approach US cities after the announcement, just days before Puerto Vallarta (INT-NSA #12). Their approach resonated with US local authorities: And what was good about it is that we were able to bring in American cities […]. So, it really was because Trump withdrew from the negotiation of the GCM that they said we really need to find a platform to say that we disagree (INT-CIT #34).

The main message was “the U.S. government is out, but cities are still in” (INTNSA #12): While our national government may decline to engage the international community on this urgent challenge, it is imperative that cities join the discussion [around the GCM development] (New York City, Commissioner for International Affairs, quoted from Byron, 2017).

Prominent examples of dozen or so US cities who engaged in the effort to co-sign the Metropolis position paper were: Chicago, Washington, Atlanta, and New York City—who led the way (Byron, 2017; #Metropolis-2017-GCMGCR-News). Following the announcement by the Trump administration, the

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co-facilitators received numerous letters from US mayors stating their “vested interest in participating and wanted to contribute” (INT-GOV #17). Immediately after the Puerto Vallarta meeting, a much more strategic mobilization of cities started around what the asks were going to be of these documents and particular the GCM. This effort to mobilize US cities was led by New York City and used existing networks in the effort. This move was followed by a growing interest from other cities and city networks such as: Cities of Migration, UCLG, and think tanks like Brookings (INT-NSA #12; INT-CIT #34).10 The Stocktaking phase combined with the US withdrawal provided the base for more local authorities to coordinate efforts to engage in the subsequent stateled negotiation process. This momentum “redefined the potential and reinforced the voice of cities as a representative of citizens who have, you know, something to say on this issue” (INT-NSA #12).11

5.1.3

Local Authorities During the Negotiation Phase

As a result of the momentum created by the Stocktaking Meeting and the exit of the US from the negotiations, cities became more active and visible throughout the negotiation phase (INT-GOV #14, #17; INT-CIT #34). Apart from the position papers, submissions, and speaking engagements, which occurred throughout the negotiation phase, city representatives also had conversations with the cofacilitators and diplomatic missions in New York who were engaged in the negotiations (INT-CIT #35). In February 2018, UCLG put forward a commentary on the zero draft of the GCM, reinforcing the Mechelen Declaration and asking for local and regional authorities to be involved in the process (#UCLG-2018-ZeroDraft).

10

One interviewee pinpointed the SDG process and US cities supporting SDG implementation as contributing factors to organizing cities: “When it was clear that nothing much was happening […] in the US at the federal level. And, you know, it was linked also to the implementation of the SDGs that some cities with Democrat administrations were already very active on the SDGs, like New York and with the same liberal sentiments they wanted to show what they could do in relation to migrants and migration issues. So that’s why that agenda sort of was probably more active in 2018 than in 2017” (INT-GOV #18). Local authorities from the US submitted Voluntary Local Reviews to the SDG process, amongst them were Los Angeles, Pittsburgh, and Orlando (UN DESA, 2022). 11 On these developments, see also Bendel and Stürner (2019), where they discuss the “Two-way ‘Glocalisation’ of Human Rights or: How Cities Become International Agents in Migration Governance”.

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Starting in early 2018, local authorities organized an “informal coalition” of about 40 cities that “sent detailed comments and requests for changes on the GCM draft text to the cofacilitators in April 2018” (Online Survey #Q13; #GCM2018-CitiesSubmission). This April 2018 submission to the co-facilitators (dated May 14, 2018) referred to Draft 1 of the GCM and put forward concrete requests, language suggestions, and examples of good practices in cities. (#GCM-2018CitiesSubmission).12 Many of the mayors engaging in this coalition were from the US and joined as a result of the US administration’s withdrawal from the process. In May 2018, city engagement and visibility notably increased. On May 7, 2018, a “small group of city officials […] met with the cofacilitators and others in a […] informal dialogue” (Online Survey #Q13). City representatives, speaking on behalf of their cities, were present during informal dialogues with stakeholders (INT-GOV #14). Mayors and representatives from local authorities spoke during the formal sessions of the negotiation phase. Mayor Marvin Rees, from Bristol, UK, was the first Mayor to speak during the formal negotiations; this occurred during the fourth round of hearings on May 15, 2018 (Morris, 2018; Online Survey #Q13). As with the Multi-Stakeholder Hearings, the fifth hearing, which 12

The submission was signed by 41 mayors or local authority departments, many of the from the United States. The list of cities includes: Mohammed Adjei Sowah, Mayor, Accra, Ghana; Dr. Andreas Hollstein, Mayor, Altena, Germany; Giorgos Kaminis, Mayor, Athens, Greece; Keisha Lance Bottoms, Mayor, Atlanta, USA; Steve Adler, Mayor, Austin, USA; Ada Colau Ballano, Mayor, Barcelona, Spain; Jesse Arreguin, Mayor, Berkeley, USA; Marvin Rees, Mayor, Bristol, United Kingdom; Office of Immigrant Affairs, Cambridge, USA; Pam Hemminger, Mayor, Chapel Hill, USA; Rahm Emanuel, Mayor, Chicago, USA; Michael B. Hancock, Mayor, Denver City and County, USA; Riley H. Rogers, Mayor, Dolton, USA; Ann-Sofie Hermansson, Mayor, Gothenburg, Sweden; Peter Muldoon, Mayor, Jackson, USA; Bobby J. Hopewell, Mayor, Kalamazoo, USA; Jennifer S. Musisi, Executive Director, Kampala City, Uganda; Eric Garcetti, Mayor, Los Angeles, USA; Paul R. Soglin, Mayor, Madison, USA; Manuela Carmena, Mayor, Madrid, Spain; Francisco de la Torre Prados, Mayor, Mâlaga, Spain; Giuseppe Sala, Mayor, Milano, Italy; Jacob Frey, Mayor, Minneapolis, USA; Francoise Schepmans, Mayor, Molenbeek, Belgium; Isiah Leggett, County Executive, Montgomery County, USA; International Relations Office, Montreal, Canada; David Briley, Mayor, Nashville-Davidson, USA; Toni N. Harp, Mayor, New Haven, USA; Bill de Blasio, Mayor, New York City, USA; Libby Schaaf, Mayor, Oakland, USA; James Kenney, Mayor, Philadelphia, USA; William Peduto, Mayor, Pittsburgh, USA; Adrian O. Mapp, Mayor, Plainfield, USA; Jorge Elorza, Mayor, Providence, USA; Melvin Carter III, Mayor, Saint Paul, USA; Immigrant Rights Commission, San Francisco, USA; Pauline Russo Cutter, Mayor, San Leandro, USA; George Van Dusen, Mayor, Skokie, USA; Joseph A. Curtatone, Mayor, Somerville, USA; Pete Buttigieg, Mayor, South Bend, USA; Giorgos Dimarelos, Deputy Mayor, Thessaloniki, Greece (#GCM-2018-CitiesSubmission, Pos. 23–63).

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took place in May 2018 and was titled “Migration—What’s Really Going On: Lessons from the field,” invited a representative from Toronto, Canada, who spoke about the city’s approach to welcoming newcomers (#GCM-MultiStakeholder5Summary). Finally, a representative from New York spoke during the sixth and final round of formal negotiations, which took place from July 9–13, 2018, and was where the GCM was finalized by member states (Online Survey #Q13).

5.1.4

The 5th Mayoral Forum and Local Authorities at the GCM Adoption Conference in Marrakech

Alongside the GCM adoption conference in Marrakech and the 2018 GFMD, which took place days before the adoption conference, Mayors gathered at the 5th Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development. They adopted the Marrakech Mayors Declaration, which was subsequently presented at both the Intergovernmental Conference to adopt the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration and at the United Nations General Assembly to adopt the Global Compact on Refugees (#Marrakech-2018-MayorsDeclaration): we continued to work together throughout, between 2017 until Marrakech. And we worked together to develop the Marrakech declaration. And we decided to link it to the process of the GFMD, to link it to the UCLG work so that it would have a broader reach (INT-CIT #34).

While this was no longer an opportunity to influence the outcome of the GCM, it had great relevance to GCM implementation (see section 5.3.3 below). Prior, in October 2018, the Global Parliament of Mayors, in its annual meeting, committed to working with all relevant partners, including the soon to be established Mayors Migration Council on GCM implementation (#GPM-2018-BristolDeclaration). At the adoption conference, Mayors were present and spoke on several occasions. This happened most notably during the main dialogues on both days of the conference, and was represented by Manuela Carmena Castrillo, the Mayor of Madrid (#GCM-conference-2018-Agenda). In addition, Mayors continued to showcase themselves as pragmatic actors who questioned migration governance structures: When in Marrakech, you know, the mayor of Kampala basically in a very, you know, honest and not even threatening way, was asking Filipo Grandi about why he was getting his data from the government of Uganda, not asking the cities since all the

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refugees are there, you know, just like putting into question the intergovernmental system in the way that it operates and its disregard for what’s happening at the city level (INT-NSA #12).

With regards to future processes, new mechanisms and structures were announced on the margins of the 2018 GFMD, the Mayoral Forum, and the adoption conference. First, the GFMD Mayors Mechanism was established and launched (GFMD Mayors Mechanism, 2021a). Second, the Mayors Migration Council (MMC) was founded and received a seat at the UN Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund (MPTF) (see section 5.3.3 below) (Table 5.1). Table 5.1 Timeline of the engagement of local authorities in GCM process 06/2017 Fourth Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development, Berlin 09/2017 Global Mayors Summit on Refugee and Migration Policy and Practice, hosted by the City of New York 10/2017 Sixth informal thematic consultation: Panel representation of the. Secretary of labor and employment promotion at the Mexico City Government 11/2017 Mechelen Mayors Declaration (UCLG) 12/2017 Metropolis position paper on the GCM and GCR 12/2017 Keynote by Mayor Valérie Plante of the City of Montréal, Canada during the Puerto Vallarta Stocktaking Meeting 12/2017 Statement by the Global Parliament of Mayors: GPM calls for protection and empowerment of migrant children 02/2018 Statement by UCLG, reinforcing the Mechelen Mayors Declaration 04/2018 Cities’ submission to the co-facilitators of the GCM (formally dated 05/2018) 05/2018 Mayor Marvin Rees of Bristol, UK, speaks during fourth formal negotiation 05/2018 Fifth Multi-Stakeholder Hearing: presentation from a representative from the city of Toronto, Canada 07/2018 Representative from the City of New York speaks during final round of formal negotiations 10/2018 Global Parliament of Mayors Annual Summit 2018 Declaration (“Bristol Declaration”) (continued)

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Table 5.1 (continued) 12/2018 Mayoral presence at the GCM adoption conference and 5th Mayoral Forum on Human Mobility, Migration and Development with the adoption of the Marrakech Mayors Declaration, followed by – creation of the GFMD Mayors Mechanism – creation of the Mayors Migration Council – MPTF seat for MMC (UN Migration Network) Source: own table

5.2

The Leverages and Resources of Local Authorities

While local authorities dealt with several structural hurdles and challenges regarding their engagement in the process (see section 5.2.4), I identified three main leverage points that significantly helped them engage in the process: (1) Local authorities had strong advocates for a more important role in the process and the wider UN system (see section 5.2.1). (2) Formal and informal city networks allowed them to coordinate and react quickly to developments (see section 5.2.2). (3) Cities presented themselves as pragmatic and relevant actors. These perspectives were recognized by the many stakeholders and governments involved (see section 5.2.3). Although important, the leverages were smaller than those of (strong) civil society organizations and their networks and had numerous limitations (see section 5.2.4).

5.2.1

Advocates for Cities in the Process, UN System and Other Institutions

There were powerful advocates for the role of cities, both from within the UN system as well as other institutions, such as philanthropies. Those who worked on bringing cities into the process prepared the foundation for many years to come. In this section, I first argue that participation from mayors and city representatives was greatly influenced by pushes from the co-facilitation team (INT-GOV 14, #17; INT-CIT #35; INT-NSA #12). The co-facilitators wanted to have a mayoral presence at the Stocktaking meeting and throughout the negotiations

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to ensure their voices and perspectives were heard (INT-GOV #14). Thus, inclusion was a strategic priority. While some municipalities actively engaged in the process, others were directly approached for input: we were in fact approached by UN. So, it was not us doing anything proactively. We were approached by UN, and we were asked if we would like to participate and provide input. And that input ended up being only that one presentation at the UN headquarters (INT-CIT #33).

Switzerland, for example, has been known and observed to champion work around cities and migration and so it came as no surprise that they included local authorities in the negotiation process (INT-GOV #14, #22). In fact, representatives from local authorities had regular conversations with the co-facilitators during the negotiation process (INT-CIT #35). I also argue that few individuals within the inter-state system pushed for cities to be part of the process or be recognized as actors in migration governance: it was this perfect marriage of people who really knew the interstate system and were able to open the door to on the on the intergovernmental side. And people who were receptive to hearing from cities and on the city side knew enough of the cities and the networks to make it happen (INT-NSA #12).

Connected to this, are the Mayoral Forum, set-up in 2013 as part of the UN system (UNITAR), and the Open Society Foundations, which helped the cofacilitators make quick connections with interested cities. An individual working for both entities, in close collaboration with the co-facilitators and local authorities, would be considered the leading non-city actor capable of getting local authorities into the GCM process (INT-GOV #14, #18, #22; INT-CIT #34; INT-NSA #9, #12): I must admit that if you have to pinpoint, I think there was a lot of individuals that did a lot in that process, that it’s pretty shadowed, but they were really incremental. And I think that the role of Colleen Thouez with the first mayoral forum until now and OSF. She really is behind everything (INT-CIT #34).

The influential multi-stakeholder group GCM Informals (see section 4.2.4) also discussed the role of cities in the GCM and made a push for significant city participation (INT-GOV #18; INT-NSA #4).

5.2 The Leverages and Resources of Local Authorities

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205

The Role of Formal and Informal City Networks

Cities that engaged ahead of the Stocktaking meeting and in the negotiation phase worked with each other through formal and informal networks (Online Survey #Q13). Amongst the formal networks engaging in the process were Metropolis and UCLG, both who attended Puerto Vallarta in December 2017 (see above; INT-CIT #34). Metropolis’ engagement was led by the city of Montreal, whose mayor was the vice president of Metropolis. Montreal hoped Metropolis would endorse the position paper: We worked with Metropolis. We did write a Declaration, a position paper on migration and said, OK, let’s see if the Metropolis cities would endorse it. […] And that time Montreal was at the vice presidency of Metropolis (INT-CIT #34).

Using formal city network structures was important at various moments, such as during preparation for the stocktaking meeting; however, when it came to the fast pace of the negotiation phase, cities used more informal networks and structures to coordinate: we were able to have the endorsement of the members of Metropolis. And at the same time, we were working with a small coalition of cities. […] It started with those meeting in New York, but also with the participation in the GFMD process. And we kind of set it apart and said, OK, we need to work together. So, there was Milan, L.A., […] Quito, Sao Paulo. So, we started organizing meetings every week, every two weeks, working on this small group like this, trying to push, our ambassador was there as well. […] We really added the narrative of saying that was shaped like this: Please provide us with resources (INT-CIT #34).

This informal network of approximately 40 cities, led by New York, worked on a submission for the co-facilitators. It never formed a formal coalition or organization. Regular communication resulted in a text, created by consensus, that they brought forward to the process (INT-CIT #35; INT-NSA #7; #GCM-2018CitiesSubmission). This informal way of organizing was of particular importance for US cities, who joined the process after the US withdrawal (see above): And what was good about it is that we were able to bring in American cities that are really organized in America or in the US, but […] they don’t participate a lot in big networks or in particular city networks (INT-CIT #34).

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This network “continued to work together” from 2017 until the Marrakech Declaration. Through previously existing networks amongst cities, they were able to get more than 150 mayors to endorse the declaration (INT-CIT #34). Thus, I argue that given the short timeframe and the late start of municipal engagement, it was necessary to work in a small coalition of experienced and resourceful cities. These cities had the political backing and power of their mayor to engage, which was a key factor: It’s really difficult to engage internationally if you don’t have the support of your own administration or the elected officials. And it’s really hard for elected officials to get involved as well because they’re being criticized every single minute. […] you need a really strong mayor able to really say: ‘yes, it’s important what I’m getting there. I bring it back home and it’s important to my citizens that we bring that together.’ You really need to develop internally and a narrative and supportive to the work saying by working locally, regionally and internationally, really brings a richness (INT-CIT #34).

In addition, many of the cities that engaged already had experience from other policy fields and were able to engage diplomatically at the UN level. As such, it was easier for them to steer and move through the inter-state system (INT-CIT #34). Such cities were also characterized by a strong interest from and backing by their mayor (INT-NSA #12; INT-CIT #34). This small number of cities, those who were politically interested and capable of leading the effort, pushed their agenda through using external circumstances and previously proven effective processes. These exemplify key levers of engagement by local authorities during the process.13 While the small number of cities that engaged in the process may seem problematic, because of the short timeframe between the stocktaking phase (December 2017) and the agreed outcome of the GCM (July 2018), having a small, willing, committed, and capable coalition of cities was indeed valuable.

13

Other regional city networks, such as European ones, were interested and engaged in the process (INT-GOV #14). Nevertheless, I argue that the actual influence that was there was channeled through the small coalition of cities from around the world who coordinated closely around the negotiation process.

5.2 The Leverages and Resources of Local Authorities

5.2.3

207

Cities Presenting Themselves as a Pragmatic Actor with new Perspectives and Ideas

Finally, I argue that cities presented themselves as relevant and pragmatic actors that experience the daily impacts of migration in their cities: And we thought that we had to reverse that narrative and say we’re doing a lot. You have to consider us as a partner and hear what we have to say (INT-CIT #34).

Thus, cities wanted to inform the process and were ready to commit to many of the GCM principles (see e.g., the Marrakech Mayors Declaration). Further, they wanted to continue engaging during GCM implementation, e.g., through the Mayors Mechanism or the Mayors Migration Council (INT-CIT #35). As actors who spoke from experience, cities brought ‘groundedness’ and ‘reality’ to the process (INT-GOV #14; INT-CIT #35). When Marvin Rees, the Mayor of Bristol spoke during the negotiations, everybody went silent. He was interviewed by the BBC in three other outlets at the U.N. Immediately following, he was asked to come up to the panel with the ambassadors and present it to the state. So, it was like it wasn’t just they came and spoke from the floor, you know, in the General Assembly. It stopped and he went up, you know, and the media was all over him. And it was just it was like it was a turning point that whole period, November 2017 through Marrakech (INT-NSA #12).

Cities came into the process as recognized actors: And, you know, they saw themselves as in the frontline and they were the first places. More and more migrants, of course, are settling in cities. So civil society were very happy to see them come in (INT-GOV #18).

Local authorities were able to bring pragmatic framing to issues of migration during the GCM process; their viewpoints strengthened their role as actors on the ‘frontline’ of migration and in the process and in global migration governance overall (INT-CIT #34, #35; INT-NSA #23, #12). This point was made by StürnerSiovitz (2022), who analyzed role played by local authorities in international processes on migration.

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Limitations to the Engagement of Local Authorities

Local authorities had limited resources in terms of time, structure, and the organization needed to engage in the GCM process. Many cities were occupied with managing migration and integration in their cities. They were also working with their own national governments; international engagement was an add-on that not many could take on to (INT-CIT #33). For actors willing to work with cities, it was difficult to coordinate or find a “central point of contact […] that we could strategize with,” even though cities had become more active during the process (INT-NSA #7; see also INT-NSA #5): it was also a little bit capacity from their side that limited, say very much in that strategizing within the process, because it was very, very intense to get to be in it. So, you either have to be it or you weren’t. I would say and I think for the colleagues from New York, they were doing this in addition to their jobs. And so, it was yeah, it was tricky to have a […] deep, deep strategic linking with them (INT-NSA #7).

Actors found that cities had not (yet) built a movement with a strong presence in the process: I don’t think there was […] enough numerical presence first to kind of, you know, create this kind of momentum. And then second, I don’t think they were organized in that sense of them. You know, as a movement during the negotiations. So maybe there were a few participations, but it wasn’t really kind of a strong presence, to be honest, during the negotiation phase (INT-NSA #5).

Apart from a formal speaking slot at a session during the negotiation phase, one participant from a local authority suggested there was little space to engage or connect beyond the meeting: I was somewhat disappointed in New York that I did not have an opportunity outside of that scheduled time to present and discuss, respond to questions, that there was no other opportunity to provide input and to interact with others. It was very time-limited (INT-CIT #33).

As compared to the structures seen today, the organization and engagement of cities in the GCM process was parallel to the self-organization process of cities. As of today, this is the Mayors Migration Council, which was founded on the

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margins of the GCM adoption conference. Prior to that, city networks and organizations, such as UCLG or Metropolis, did engage, but did not have a particular focus on migration issues: But very specifically this coordination, advocacy mechanism or platforms […] didn’t exist then, which is why cities weren’t really that vocal in the beginning (INT-GOV #14).

This led to the increased efforts needed to create contacts within cities by knowing who is involved, who takes on each role, who is best to speak with, etc. (INT-GOV #14).

5.3

Goal Attainment of Local Authorities

Local authorities’ advocacy goals can be narrowed down to three major areas, which were put forward on the May 14, 2018 submission, after Revised Draft 1 of the GCM had been shared by the co-facilitators (see #GCM-2018CitiesSubmission).14 These advocacy goals form the basis for the analysis of goal attainment by local authorities during the process: (1) Clarifying and specifying the references to local authorities in the GCM (section 5.3.1); (2) Recognizing the perspective, expertise, and ideas of local governments in specific GCM objectives during negotiation (section 5.3.2); and (3) Negotiating a role for local governments in in GCM implementation, review, and follow-up (section 5.3.3). With regards to advocacy success and goal attainment in general, observers describe it as small but impactful: I would definitely say, you know, that I would say that at least 80 percent came from the governments, at least. And I think that the cities didn’t get much in. But what they got in was quite fundamental. […] And, you know, in terms of the, so not in the impact, but in the content, like the quality. I mean, the quantity of impact is probably 10, 15 percent. But the fundamental. And there are other references that I think are important that are in there because of the city’s view (INT-NSA #12). 14

In addition, both, the Mechelen Declaration from November 2017 by UCLG as well as the declaration from the 4th Mayoral Forum in June 2017 form relevant documents submitted by cities to the process—however, during the consultation phase. Major asks were to be heard and included in the negotiation process. This has been achieved, e.g., by the speech of Mayor Rees of Bristol and other municipal engagements. In addition, local authorities participated in informal sessions with stakeholders and Multi-Stakeholder Hearings during the process (see above).

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Clarifying and Specifying the References to Local Authorities in the GCM

The first ask by the coalition of 41 cities, was to clarify and specify the references to local authorities in the March 26, 2018, Draft 1 of the GCM: The GCM should clearly define the term “local level.” In the current draft GCM, local level is an ambiguous term that refers to a range of actors. Community based organizations, religious communities, and local businesses all play a role in immigrant inclusion, but their respective roles are distinct from the legal responsibilities and democratic mandate of local government. Reference to local authorities should be discrete from other local actors in future drafts to better clarify roles and responsibilities (#GCM-2018-CitiesSubmission).

While references to the ‘local level’ stayed mostly similar throughout the draft versions of the GCM, no changes can be directly linked to the cities’ submission.15 However, there is a noticeable and evolving language on the role of local authorities in the implementation section of the GCM. While in the Zero Draft Plus,16 Draft 1, and Draft 2 of the text speaks about ‘cities and local communities,’ from Draft 3 onwards the language changes to a more concrete ‘local authorities and communities.’17

15

See for example, Objective 4, para. 20 g of Draft 3 and the Final Draft [Obj. 4, para. 19 g in Draft 1 and Draft 2; Obj. 4, para. 19 g in the Zero Draft and Zero Draft Plus]: Until Draft 2, the documents refer to the ‘city’ level, whereas from Draft 3 onwards, both the ‘local level’, as well as the role of the ‘municipality’ is clearly distinguished: “Build upon existing practices at the local level that facilitate participation in community life, such as interaction with authorities and access to relevant services, through the issuance of registration cards to all persons living in a municipality, including migrants, that contain basic personal information, while not constituting entitlements to citizenship or residency” (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev3, Objective 4, para. 20 g). Another example is the implementation section: Until Draft 1 it is referred to the ‘subnational levels’, whereas from Draft 2 onwards, the document refers to the ‘local levels’ (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev1, para. 38; #GCM-2018-Draft-Rev2, para. 40). 16 Para. 41 of the Zero Draft Plus does not yet exist in the Zero Draft. 17 See versions of the GCM: #GCM-2018-ZeroDraft-Plus, para. 41; #GCM-2018-DraftRev1, para. 42; #GCM-2018-Draft-Rev2, para. 43; #GCM-2018-Draft-Rev3, para. 44; #GCM-2018-FinalDraft, para. 44; #GCM-2018-AgreedOutcome, para. 44.

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The second significant language suggestion by the coalition of local authorities was the inclusion of the local level into the whole-of-government principle laid out in the visions and guiding principles of the GCM (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft, para. 15): The guiding principle in paragraph 14 [para. 15 in the agreed outcome] should clarify that a whole-of-government approach must include multilevel governance perspectives. A whole-of-government approach will be critical to the success of GCM implementation; its description must account for the cooperation and collaboration needed vertically across all levels and sectors of government, and horizontally across local governments and sub-regions. Cities are already coordinating both regionally and globally to address major challenges and find effective policy solutions (#GCM2018-CitiesSubmission).

Following this concrete suggestion, the second draft of the GCM contained the additional reference to “all sectors and levels of government” (#GCM-2018-DraftRev2). This change can be seen in the following overview: 14. […] The Global Compact considers that migration is a multidimensional reality that cannot be addressed by one government policy sector alone. To develop and implement effective migration policies and practices, a whole-of-government approach is needed to ensure horizontal and vertical policy coherence across all sectors of government. (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev1, para. 14)

15. […] The Global Compact considers that migration is a multidimensional reality that cannot be addressed by one government policy sector alone. To develop and implement effective migration policies and practices, a whole-of-government approach is needed to ensure horizontal and vertical policy coherence across all sectors and levels of government. (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev2, para. 15; #GCM-2018-Draft-Rev3, para. 15; #GCM-2018-FinalDraft, para. 15; #GCM-2018-AgreedOutcome, para. 15)

Even though a minor edit, it is considered a major success of local authorities in their contribution to specific language suggestions during the negotiation process. In addition, not only did Draft 2 include this change when presented in late May 2018, the language also stayed in the agreed outcome of the final document (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev2; #GCM-2018-Draft-Rev3; #GCM2018-FinalDraft; #GCM-2018-AgreedOutcome). Importantly, this achievement contributed to a better understanding—intentional or not—to the role and character of local authorities as key actors in migration governance:

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early on in the documents, the text and the recognition of cities during the negotiations of GCM, there was language around non-state actors. And it was one of the points, in fact, that I really encourage. […] And I remember it’s exactly what it says now that local government is not local actor, that there is a fundamental difference between the two places where elections take place at the municipal level. These are elected officials representing the views of the people. And so, whether intentionally or unintentionally, and I think is just more just, you know, a paradigm shift in our understanding of what local government is and what it represents. It’s first and sometimes I did think it was intentional. There was a lot of mushy language around local actors, non-state actors, you know, like an almost and sometimes even confusing local governments as non-state actors and like making a point none. No, it’s at all the same thing (INT-NSA #12).

Further, cities felt that in the final draft, local authorities were reflected more significantly as actors, than in the beginning: The only thing we can say is that at first in the first draft, there was no mention of local authorities. And in the last draft there they are mentioned, were stated. And if we look at the, I don’t know, how representative it is in terms of influence, but at every people coming on stage add a value and a lot of UN leaders came and said: Cities are important, cities are partners. I have the feeling, but I don’t know how to measure that (INT-CIT #34).

It was risky to bring in elected local officials to speak during the negotiations or consultations happening on the sidelines. This risk was taken on by the cofacilitators and Ambassadors who did bring in mayors to speak: You know, the conversations between the Mexican government and the city of Los Angeles around the fact that they were more important trading partners, you know, that Los Angeles or California and Mexico were as important trading partners as like, you know, two thirds of Mexican trading partners or, and that they wanted to engage, given the difficult political climate between the two governments. So, these types of conversations and you were looking around the room and I was totally, fully anticipating the rest. It was during the negotiation. After all, this was a consultation during negotiations, which means that it can derail negotiations, it can do all sorts of things. The Russians and the Americans, who is going to say something? You know, who is going to say something about why these representatives who are elected at the local level are in this forum that is fundamentally Interstate one. And it was risk. It was a risk taken on the part of the ambassador of Spain. And incidentally, it was coach cofacilitator by the ambassador of Bangladesh who was also very nervous (INT-NSA #12).

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I argue that this ‘risk’ was taken on purpose with the goal to advocate and showcase a more inclusive global governance on migration. Both co-facilitators, but especially Switzerland, have long pushed for stronger mayoral engagement on the global level. Additionally, advocates for city engagement on the global level have increasingly pushed for this topic to become mainstream and have added it bit by bit throughout the global negotiation process. At this point, opportunities were there for local authorities (see section 5.2.1). However, as elaborated in section 2.3.3, the discussion about the character of local authorities is just emerging. The GCM process undoubtedly offered a significant contribution to an acknowledgement of local authorities’ role and added value to global debates. The concrete advocacy around the recognition and correct referencing has been an important step for local authorities.

5.3.2

Recognizing the Perspective, Expertise, and Ideas of Local Governments in Specific GCM Objectives

As their second major advocacy goal, local authorities put forward concrete requests during the consultation and stocktaking phases (e.g., Mechelen Declaration, Global Mayors Summit, 4th Mayoral Forum, Metropolis Declaration), as well as during the negotiation process (in particular, through the cities’ submission to the co-facilitators). The statements and declarations put forward during the consultation and stocktaking phases helped create an understanding about whether or not the GCM represents the goals and principles of local authorities. In some cases, the statements and declarations showcase ideas that became part of the GCM. The submission from April 2018, put forward to the co-facilitators, offers an opportunity to trace the suggestions and see if they were incorporated into the negotiation process. All interviewees considered this submission the most influential and concrete document put forward by cities in the process (INT-NSA #12; INT-CIT #34, #35). However, we must always consider that there are multiple factors and actors contributing to such a process. In this analysis, I look at objectives 4, 7, and 15 as prominent examples of city advocacy during the GCM process. I also acknowledge that local authorities provided input for other objectives during the negotiation process as well.

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Objective 4: Ensure that all migrants have proof of legal identity and adequate documentation Objective 4 of the GCM commits “to fulfil the right of all individuals to a legal identity” (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft, Obj. 4, para. 20). According to a government representative involved in the process, “the notion of having an I.D. card that is not linked to migration status comes directly from New York City” (INT-GOV #17).18 The New York municipal ID card (IDNYC) was presented during several occasions at both the consultation and negotiation phases, such as during the New York City Global Mayors Summit in September 2017 (#NewYorkCity-GlobalMayorsSummit2017-Program). On March 2018, in New York, during the Opening Session of IOM’s International Dialogue on Migration, IDNYC was re-introduced by the Deputy Commissioner of New York City’s Mayor’s Office for International Affairs. This introduction demonstrates close links with the GCM process, which was attended by stakeholders who state: Through the outstanding work of our key partner, the Office of Immigrant Affairs, NYC launched our municipal ID card, ID NYC, in 2015. IDNYC welcomes all New Yorkers, regardless of their documentation status, to participate fully as a member of an integrated community. Today, over 1.2 million New Yorkers have an IDNYC card – including many UN colleagues. IDNYC is so successful because the card is available to all New Yorkers, not only immigrants and other vulnerable residents. In fact, an outside review found that 77% of immigrants with IDNYC say the card has increased their sense of belonging in the city (#IOM-IDM-2018_New York City).

The changes in Objective 4 show that in Draft 2 of the GCM, local authorities have been added as actors “to ascertain a migrant’s legal identity upon entry, during stay, and for return, as well as to ensure effective migration procedures, efficient service provision, and improved public safety.” They also made other changes to objective 4 throughout the negotiations, in particular paragraph g) (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft, Obj. 4, para. 20), as shown here:

18

The system is called IDNYC and “is a card for all New Yorkers, from all backgrounds, and from all five boroughs. […] immigration status does not matter. The free, municipal identification card for New York City residents, ages 10 and up, provides access to a wide variety of services and programs offered by the City” (City of New York, 2021).

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Zero Draft / Zero Draft Plus

We commit to equip migrants with proof of legal identity and other relevant documentation, including birth, marriage and death certificates, at all stages of migration in order to end statelessness and avoid other vulnerabilities. We further commit to ensure this documentation allows all migrants to have access to services and exercise their human rights, and States can identify a person’s nationality upon entry and for return. (#GCM-2018-ZeroDraft, Obj. 4, para. 18; #GCM-2018-ZeroDraft-Plus, Obj. 4, para. 19) […] Institute an identification card for all persons residing in a particular country or city, regardless of their nationality, ethnicity, migration status or any other characteristic, to access services, conduct business and participate in community life (#GCM-2018-ZeroDraft, Obj. 4, para. 18 g; #GCM-2018-ZeroDraft-Plus, Obj. 4, para. 19 g)

No mention of local authorities in objective 4, reference to city in objective 4, para. 19 g

Draft 1

We commit to provide all our nationals with proof of legal identity that allows States to identify a migrant’s nationality upon entry, on stay, and for return, as well as to facilitate migrants’ access to relevant documentation, including birth, marriage and death certificates, at all stages of migration, in order to end statelessness and avoid other vulnerabilities. We further commit to ensure this documentation is recognized, enables migrants to exercise their human rights and facilitates access to those services to which they may be entitled. (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev1, Obj. 4, para. 19) […] Institute an identification card for all persons residing in a particular country or city, regardless of their nationality, ethnicity, migration status or any other characteristic, to access services they may be entitled to, conduct business and participate in community life (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev1, Obj. 4, para. 19 g)

No mention of local authorities, wording changed in comparison to Zero Draft Plus

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Draft 2

We commit to provide all our nationals with proof of birth registration, nationality and travel documents, allowing national and local authorities to ascertain a migrant’s legal identity upon entry, on stay, and for return, as well as to ensure effective migration procedures, efficient service provision, and improved public safety. We further commit to ensure migrants’ access to adequate documentation and civil registry documents, including birth, marriage and death certificates, at all stages of migration, as a means to empower migrants to effectively exercise their human rights. (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev2, Obj. 4, para. 19) […] Institute registration cards, containing basic information, that can be used to participate in community life, interact with authorities, conduct business, as well as to access relevant services, and are available to all persons residing in a particular country or city, while not constituting entitlements to citizenship or residency (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev2, Obj. 4, para. 19 g)

Newly formulated, including the reference to local authorities in objective 4; minor changes in Obj. 4, para. 19 g but no more explicit referencing to local authorities

Draft 3/ Final Draft

We commit to fulfil the right of all individuals to a legal identity by providing all our nationals with proof of nationality and relevant documentation, allowing national and local authorities to ascertain a migrant’s legal identity upon entry, during stay, and for return, as well as to ensure effective migration procedures, efficient service provision, and improved public safety. We further commit to ensure, through appropriate measures, that migrants are issued adequate documentation and civil registry documents, such as birth, marriage and death certificates, at all stages of migration, as a means to empower migrants to effectively exercise their human rights. (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev3, Obj. 4, para. 20; #GCM-2018-FinalDraft, Obj. 4, para. 20)

Obj. 4 re-formulated in Draft 3; Obj. 4, para. 20 g now clearly hints to good practices from municipalities; no changes from Draft 3 to Final Draft

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[…] Build upon existing practices at the local level that facilitate participation in community life, such as interaction with authorities and access to relevant services, through the issuance of registration cards to all persons living in a municipality, including migrants, that contain basic personal information, while not constituting entitlements to citizenship or residency (GCM-2018-Draft-Rev3, Obj. 4, para 20 g; #GCM-2018-FinalDraft, Obj. 4, para 20 g; #).

The overview above shows the evolution of objective 4, including paragraph g, which in its final version, clearly references existing practices from municipalities such as New York City. Further, it explicitly references the local level as an actor able to issue registration cards. Cards that do not replace the citizenship or residency process. As such, it’s clear the role of local authorities was notable during the negotiation process. To conclude, there is evidence to suggest that objective 4, para 20 g in the agreed outcome of the GCM is based on the good practices put forward by New York, which also inspired the broader framing of objective 4, para. 20 of the GCM. Objective 7: Address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration Local authorities, in their submission, acknowledged the importance of objective 7 to the GCM and the need to “address and reduce vulnerabilities in migration.”19 They asserted: Safeguarding human rights is at the heart of good governance at all levels. Objective 7 requires close coordination with local authorities, who are critical to safeguarding immigrant rights. Local authorities play an especially vital protection role in contexts where overbroad immigration enforcement instills fear and deters immigrants from exercising their rights (#GCM-2018-CitiesSubmission). 19

Objective 7 in the agreed outcome of the reads as follows: “We commit to respond to the needs of migrants who face situations of vulnerability, which may arise from the circumstances in which they travel or the conditions they face in countries of origin, transit and destination, by assisting them and protecting their human rights, in accordance with our obligations under international law. We further commit to uphold the best interests of the child at all times, as a primary consideration in situations where children are concerned, and to apply a gender-responsive approach in addressing vulnerabilities, including in responses to mixed movements” (#GCM-2018-AgreedOutcome, Obj. 7, para 23).

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Cities also proposed a specific textual edit: Paragraph 22i20 references local authorities in rights protection, but language should be strengthened by referencing all levels of government in paragraphs 21b through 2lh (#GCM-2018-CitiesSubmission).

Even though the sub-items and action points of Objective 7 changed and expanded quite drastically, no additional references were made to ‘all levels of government’ throughout the following versions of the GCM. However, what turned out to be objective 7, para. 23k remained almost unchanged in the final agreed outcome of the GCM: Involve local authorities and relevant stakeholders in the identification, referral and assistance of migrants in a situation of vulnerability, including through agreements with national protection bodies, legal aid and service providers, as well as the engagement of mobile response teams, where they exist (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft, Para 23k).21

Thus, while the edited suggestions were not considered in the GCM development, local authorities’ role in addressing and reducing vulnerabilities remained in the negotiated document. Objective 15: Provide access to basic services for migrants Objective 15 was one of, if not the major advocacy priority for local authorities in the broader debate around ‘firewalls’—as was for civil society (see above; INT-NSA #7, #12, #23). While there were developments during the negotiation process, mostly Western governments who wanted to take out or drastically reduce the content of objective 15 (INT-NSA #12), the key message from cities to the co-facilitators and state negotiators was to maintain the language in the final text committing to ensure non-discriminatory access to services such as health and education regardless of migration status, particularly Objective 15 (Online Survey #Q13).

20

“Involve local authorities and stakeholders in the identification, referral and assistance of migrants in a situation of vulnerability, including through agreements with national protection bodies, legal aid and service providers, as well as the engagement of mobile response teams, where they exist” (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev1, Obj. 7, para 22i). 21 Throughout the process, minimal edits were made to this paragraph, namely in Draft 1 and Draft 3, that are however not relevant to the role of local authorities.

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In their submission of April 2018, the coalition of cities demanded: Objective 15 must remain in the GCM in its entirety to ensure the safety of immigrants and their host communities. Facilitating access to basic services and protecting the human rights of all residents is more than an aspiration, it is fundamental to good governance and safety for all. Socially and economically integrated cities are more resilient and dynamic, which benefits all residents. Local authorities should be incorporated into this objective as key stakeholders, as they are frequently the primary providers of direct services (#GCM-2018-CitiesSubmission).

This goal was clearly achieved, as objective 15 remained part of the agreed outcome of the GCM. Additionally, cities proposed three edits to objective 15 in Draft 1 of the GCM. These objectives were also important to civil society because “in the GFMD, we hadn’t seen a discussion on access to services regardless of status before, it hadn’t been so deeply discussed in that context” (INT-NSA #7). First, cities suggested that they “explicitly name local authorities as stakeholders” throughout objective 15 “[i]n order to ensure equal access to basic services, Objective 15 and related commitments require building and supposing local governments’ capacity and resources” (#GCM-2018-CitiesSubmission). With regards to this suggestion, no direct references were made to local authorities in subsequent drafts of the GCM. One clarification was made in regard to service points for migrants at the local level: Establish one-stop-shops to offer information on and facilitate access to a range of gender-responsive and child-sensitive services to migrants, including early language learning, health care, educational opportunities, skills training and financial services (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev1, Obj. 15, para 30d)

Establish and strengthen holistic and easily accessible service points at local level, that are migrant inclusive, offer relevant information on basic services in a genderand disability-responsive as well as child-sensitive manner, and facilitate safe access thereto (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev2, Obj. 15, para 30d)

Second, cities suggested more coherent integration among different paragraphs and objectives: Confidentiality policies that protect personally identifying information in service provision and law enforcement, such as referenced in paragraph 22h, should be linked in future drafts for coherence, specifically, paragraphs l9f, 22h and 30c (#GCM-2018CitiesSubmission).

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While this complex request is hard to trace and I cannot create a clear case for successful take-up in the drafts of the text, I do find a reference added to privacy rights in Draft 2 of the GCM on Objective 15, para. 30c, as well as in Objective 7, para. 22h: Abolish requirements to prove citizenship or nationality at service delivery centres to ensure that stateless migrants are not precluded from accessing basic services nor denied other basic human rights (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev1, Objective 4, para. 19f)

Review and revise requirements to prove nationality at service delivery centres to ensure that migrants without proof of nationality or legal identity are not denied their human rights (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev2, Objective 4, para. 19f)

Develop predictable migration policies that prevent migrants from falling into an irregular status due to legal and practical impediments in the country of destination, in order to reduce precariousness of status and related vulnerabilities, including by ensuring that public services are independent from immigration enforcement (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev1, Objective 7, para. 22h)

Ensure migrants’ access to public or affordable independent legal assistance and representation in legal proceedings that affect them, including during any related judicial or administrative hearing, in order to safeguard that all migrants, everywhere, are recognized as persons before the law and that the delivery of justice is impartial and non-discriminatory (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev2, Objective 7, para. 22h)

Develop, reinforce and maintain necessary capacities and resources to deliver necessary services to all migrants, regardless of their migration status, and ensure that personal data is not reported to immigration enforcement authorities, and migrants are not apprehended at places of service delivery (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev1, Objective 15, para. 30c)

Ensure that cooperation between service providers and immigration authorities does not exacerbate vulnerabilities of irregular migrants by compromising their safe access to these services or infringements to privacy rights, and that they are not apprehended at places of service delivery, including hospitals, schools and courts (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev2, Objective 15, para. 30c)

Third, local authorities suggested that Paragraph 30b protection from discrimination should include ‘language spoken’. States should ensure that constitutional protections from discrimination are extended to everyone in their territory, regardless of status (#GCM-2018-CitiesSubmission).

In this case, the comparison between Objective 15, para 30b in Draft 1 and Draft 2 clearly shows that, amongst other things, ‘language’ was added. The addition

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remained in the text until the negotiated outcome.22 However, it must be noted that this section was enhanced widely and includes causes for discrimination, such as disability (added in Draft 3). On a broader note, with regards to the role of cities and objective 15, the issue of access to services for all migrants regardless of status was at the heart of city advocacy, along with numerous NSAs. It was considered a major issue to be debated during the negotiation process—the protection and offering of services to all (vulnerable) migrants, regardless of status: This protection gap [for vulnerable migrants] was again fully evident during the negotiations of the GCM as two of the most contentious issues pertained to the distinctions between refugees/migrants and to the treatment of undocumented migrants. […] city advocacy, helped influence language in the GCM – and to overcome a major point of discord between states namely on the services offered to documented versus undocumented migrants (#IntegratingCities-2018-Thouez).

For local authorities it was of particular importance to ensure non-discriminatory access to public health and public education respectively – what cities continue to advocate for namely: equal access to city services regardless of migration or document status (#IntegratingCities-2018-Thouez).

This is reflected in Objective 15, paragraphs (e) (provide inclusive and equitable quality education to migrant children and youth, as well as facilitate access to lifelong learning opportunities) and (f) (incorporate the health needs of migrants in national and local health care policies and plans) of the agreed outcome of the GCM (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft, Obj. 15, para e, f). According to someone closely working with cities during the GCM process, the work around objective 15, paragraphs e and f, was one of the biggest impacts you’ve had. […] it’s like a quick analysis of what I know happened because of cities and what I know wouldn’t have happened if they hadn’t been there. I mean, there’s an intervening variable there in the advocacy that cities did to get that language in - non-discriminatory access. And in the negotiations, what carried the day was, one, I think, a general misunderstanding or lack of attention or fatigue to that language in the text by the Australians, by the Austrians, for the 22

“Enact laws and take measures to ensure that service delivery does not amount to discrimination against migrants on the grounds of race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth, disability or other grounds irrespective of cases where differential provision of services based on migration status might apply” (#GCM-2018-AgreedOutcome, Objective 15, Para 31a).

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Europeans, by others. And the real support from the […] two ambassadors and their countries that fundamentally believed in decentralization, federal systems of power at local level, and the turning point in which we find ourselves in international diplomacy, but also in this policy area and the need for local governments to play a role (INT-NSA #12).

This means, that while interventions by cities did not only convince some national governments, they also showed how the co-facilitators played a major role in including their messages throughout negotiations (see also above). The non-discriminatory language was brought in by city representatives who spoke at the UN during the process while speaking to other objectives of the GCM: the biggest message, the most important message was that we are we are ready to welcome migrants. We are a city with open arms. And if migrants want to come, we will welcome them. But we also need to work together because we may be the final destination, but that road from where migrants leave to when they come to [CITY], there needs to be cooperation along the way. And then when they arrive, there needs to be cooperation between multiple players to make their life, their journey and then their life more successful. Interviewer: And do you feel this message resonated also from the discussion that you had afterwards and also what’s now part of the Global Compact? A: I think it did (#INT-CIT 33).

The importance of objective 15 becomes evident in the Marrakech Mayors Declaration of 2018, listing it as one of four priority objectives for local authorities: Provide migrants with safe access to essential services (Objective 15): guaranteeing residents’ equal access to City services regardless of migration or legal status; supporting information, referral mechanisms and outreach initiatives about available services; and advocating for access to education for all children and adolescents, regardless of migration or legal status (#Marrakech-2018-MayorsDeclaration).

My findings are backed by parallel research that took place by Janina Stürner-Siovitz, who found that “[i]nterviewed city representatives considered the final phrasing of GCM objective 15 an important success of their agenda-setting activities” (StürnerSiovitz, 2021). Thus, not only did local authorities strongly advocate for objective 15’s existence and for it to remain in the GCM, but also that its inclusion reflects their goals and principles and is therefore a major milestone for GCM implementation. Civil

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society actors were also strongly committed to objective 15 (#GFMD-2018-CSDCommittments-Chair, Para. 4).23 To conclude, this collective advocacy helped to overcome one of the major debates throughout the negotiations and ensure that the GCM relates to both regular and irregular migrants (Online Survey #Q13).

Here, it must be stated, it is more difficult to prove the existence of text remaining in the agreed outcome due to interventions as compared to proposals made and taken up by the negotiators. Evidence suggests that local authorities engaging in the process have contributed to keeping and strengthening objective 15 that remains a priority for cities engaging internationally.24

5.3.3

A role for Local Governments in in GCM Implementation, Review, and Follow-up

The third major advocacy goal of local authorities was the meaningful recognition of the role of local authorities in international migration governance including in the implementation, follow-up, and review of the compact (Online Survey #Q13).

This became evident in the various statements, speeches, and submission from city leaders throughout the process (#GFMD-2017-MayorBeouinde; #PuertoVallarta-2017-MayorPlante; #Metropolis-2017-GCM-GCR; #GCM-2018CitiesSubmission; #GCM-2018-MayorRees-Bristol). The cities’ submissions emphasized the importance of local authorities and put forward concrete demands regarding the involvement of local authorities in the follow-up and review of the GCM:

23

4. “We commit to mobilize, advocate, and lobby governments to bridge the gap between regular and irregular migrants at the local and national levels. We also commit to provide services to all migrants regardless of status and with a special attention to the most vulnerable migrants.” One survey participant also criticized about Objective 15: “Separation between access to public services, including labor law enforcement mechanisms, and immigration control has been diluted and weakened” (Online Survey #Q11). 24 However, as one interviewee noted: “I do think that the non-discriminatory language, for instance, would have definitely been on the table with the US involved. It might not have made its way into the final draft. I don’t I don’t know that. I can’t tell you” (INT-NSA #12).

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As agents responsible for migration policies at the local level, successful implementation of the GCM will rely on the active participation of local authorities. Local authorities should be explicitly named as key stakeholders in current and future GCM implementation plans to reflect their wealth of experience in immigrant inclusion and the responsibilities they hold to constituents to ensure safe, thriving communities for all residents. Local authorities should likewise be consistently and systematically consulted in GCM follow-up and review processes, including through the mechanisms proposed in paragraphs 45-47 (#GCM-2018-CitiesSubmission).

Also, Marvin Rees, Mayor of Bristol in his speech at the UN demanded from member states to ensure Mayors are fully, formally and explicitly recognized as partners in the refinement, implementation and review of the Compact. Such recognition can help this process to move from commitments to actions, and unlock not only the enthusiasm but also the innovation and leadership of the global networks of cities (#GCM-2018MayorRees-Bristol).

To assess the success of local authorities with regards to both process and outcome, one must not only look at the negotiated outcome of the GCM but also the implementation, follow up, and review process. There are numerous indicators to recognize successful advocacy for local authorities as relevant actors in the review, follow-up, and implementation of the GCM. First, with the introduction of Objective 23 in the second Draft25 of the GCM, local authorities were recognized as important for implementation and for migration governance: Involve and support local authorities in the identification of needs and opportunities for international cooperation for the effective implementation of the Global Compact and integrate their perspectives and priorities into development strategies, programmes and planning on migration, as a means to ensure good governance as well as policy coherence across levels of government and policy sectors, and maximize the effectiveness and impact of international development cooperation (#GCM-2018Draft-Rev2, Obj. 23, para. c).

This text remained the same throughout the negotiations. Second, the implementation section of the GCM emerged and was refined over time in the negotiation process. While we can see that the subnational level is

25

No objective 23 in the Zero Draft, Zero Draft Plus and Draft 1 of the GCM.

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one of the implementing levels repeatedly mentioned,26 we can also observe an evolution of language regarding cities and their framing as local authorities (see section 5.3.1 above). All of this led to the agreed outcome: We will implement the Global Compact in cooperation and partnership with migrants, civil society, migrant and diaspora organizations, faith-based organizations, local authorities and communities, the private sector, trade unions, parliamentarians, National Human Rights Institutions, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement, academia, the media and other relevant stakeholders (#GCM-2018FinalDraft, para. 44).

Third, the section on follow-up and review, as it emerged, in Draft 3, for the first time mentioned local authorities (#GCM-2018-Draft-Rev3). This clearly speaks to the request made by cities in their submission and during other occasions. Additionally, local authorities became part of the modalities resolution for the International Migration Review Forum: Adequate space should be reserved during each roundtable for participation of nongovernmental stakeholders and representatives of local authorities, as well as of regional processes, platforms and organizations (#IMRF-Modalities, para. 21d).

This refers to a demand put forward by the cities to the co-facilitators (#GCM2018-CitiesSubmission). Thus, local authorities, along with other stakeholders, were framed as prominent actors in the implementation, follow-up, and review of the GCM process. Further, their distinct role as subnational actors was also recognized. One interviewee reflected on the influence of local authorities moving forward: But the impression [was] that we did have an influence, but how big I don’t know. Maybe something more direct that we can have, we’re able to observe, is that with the MMC. […] The fact that we went at a certain point at the UN talk and expressed the importance of having cities in the review process, I think had a direct influence because the text was released two weeks after (INT-CIT #34).

This highlights that not only content-related but also process-related goals such as the inclusivity of governance is of great importance.

26

“For the effective implementation of the Global Compact, we require concerted efforts at global, regional, national and local levels, including a coherent United Nations system” (#GCM-2018-FinalDraft, P. 32: 26).

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Outlook: The effects of the role of local authorities in the GCM process on migration governance today While this research focuses on the GCM process, it is necessary at this point to look beyond the agreed outcome. Inclusion and involvement during the GCM implementation, follow-up and review were clear advocacy goals. The creation of the Mayors Migration Council (MMC), and the Mayors Mechanism, which is costeered also by the MMC, became vehicles for cities’ participation in global and regional governance processes on migration. Even though there were active city networks focusing on integration and migration, “it was clear that there needed to be something very specific, dedicated to migration” (INT-IO #32). Thus, not only was the MMC established as a new, independent entity, but it also became one of three non-governmental stakeholders in the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund. The Fund was set up as an element of the UN Migration Network, coordinated by IOM (United Nations Network on Migration, 2021b). With the UN Migration Network being a key player in support of GCM implementation, the creation of the MMC is considered a great achievement for the role of cities. The MMC was also considered an accepted vehicle, and thus a huge success, for cities to gain structural access to processes around migration on the international level (INT-CIT #34; INT-NSA #12). The setup of the Mayors Mechanism is another indicator for the recognition of cities as important actors in state led processes (#IntegratingCities-2018-Thouez).27 Compared to where cities stand today in terms of visibility, access, representation, and their overall role in migration governance (see e.g., Stürner-Siovitz, 2021; Stürner, 2020; Thouez, 2020), their involvement and contribution was minimal. However, the GCM process and local authorities stepping up on migration issues, created a window of acceleration, or, as one city representative put it: we were a teenager trying to become adult, if compared to the states, we didn’t want to come into the multilateral, […] with the approval of our states or because our state invited us to speak. So, we wanted our own voice (INT-CIT #34).

For a GCM-like process today, city engagement would look very different, as with all mechanisms, it helped elevate the role and voices of cities on migration issues for the international community: I think the only thing that relates to the stakeholders is that the timing was perhaps a bit too early for the cities, but the result was not bad, and the cities used the GCM 27

As of 2022, the Mayors Mechanism also works beyond the GFMD and is active, amongst other, in the process leading to the International Migration Review Forum.

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as a platform to draw attention to themselves, and that was perhaps the impetus that made it possible for cities to be organized. So ultimately the process also had something good for the cities. Of course, it would have been easier if they had been better organized right from the start. Then they might have been more involved. It would have been less ad hoc (INT-GOV #14).

At the first International Migration Review Forum, held in May 2022, the Mayors Migration Council, the Mayors Mechanism, and UCLG organized a strong municipal presence at the UN, in conjunction with concrete commitments by cities to implement the GCM (Mayors Migration Council, 2022). In addition, already during the GCM process, cities proved to be relevant actors, not only to other stakeholders, but also governments: the success was actually very great, because the response was very good, also to the input from the cities. Of course, not all countries are equally enthusiastic about the extent to which cities are involved, because decentralization varies greatly. But basically, it was very well received, because it just has this groundedness and reality and so on (INT-GOV #14).

Finally, I argue that the process offered structural opportunities—or opportunity structures—for local authorities to create change at the international level: So, migration, why migration? Really, because we felt that cities were out of the loop, that there weren’t really dedicated networks that we’re dealing with it. And also, that we were working locally a lot on the integration of migrants with the newly put in place the newcomers office. So, to that idea to make a connection between what we were doing locally and internationally was important and that feeling that we had to be heard in that process of the construction of the GCM, elaboration of the GCM and GCR. So that’s all we started. And that’s why it was important to us, it was a good place to really push for a seat at the table (INT-CIT #34).

Looking at the recent report of the UN Secretary-General on GCM implementation, the role of local authorities (or, local governments, as put there) is featured and prominently acknowledged as “allies to promote and implement the Compact” (United Nations General Assembly, 2021, para. 16).

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Local Authorities in the GCM Process: A Similar but Different Case

Does the Final Agreement Reflect the Goals and Principals of NSAs and Cities?

There are several indicators that the GCM clearly reflects the goals and principles of local authorities. The Marrakech Mayors Declaration of 2018 clearly reflects this stating that local authorities “commit to [a]dvance the principles and objectives of both Compacts in unison” (#Marrakech-2018-MayorsDeclaration). More specifically, with regards to the GCM, local authorities endorse and commit to implementing: objective 2 (to minimize the adverse and structural factors that compel people to leave their country of origin), objective 7 (to address and reduce vulnerabilities), objective 15 (to provide migrants with safe access to essential services), objective 16 (to empower migrants and societies to realize full inclusion and social cohesion), and objective 17, (to eliminate all forms of discrimination and promote evidence-based public discourse to shape perceptions of migration) (#Marrakech-2018-MayorsDeclaration). To date, local authorities refer to the GCM as a key document (Mayors Migration Council, 2020b). The reflection of city goals in the GCM creates a sense of ownership and identification with the document, and thus, with implementation, review, and follow-up. At the IMRF; a total of 12 mayors and their delegations were present to launch a ‘Call to Local Action for Migrants and Refugees’, specifically using the GCM as a reference (Mayors Migration Council, 2022).

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Summing Up: Non-State Actors’ and Local Authorities’ Influence in the Process Leading to the Adoption of the GCM

The analysis in chapters 4 and 5 shows the many ways in which NSAs and cities attempted to influence the outcome of the GCM negotiations. I undertook the analysis along the ‘stages of influence’ (see Figure 4.1). The analysis shows that local authorities and NSAs had many leverage points in common, especially their entry point and influence via the co-facilitators. In addition, local authorities and NSAs worked together during the negotiation phase to maintain the commitments that had been laid out in the zero draft, especially with regards to Objective 15 of the GCM. Further, the process opened negotiations to a broad set of stakeholders, including the private sector and cities, which had not previously been the norm for UN participation processes. This new inclusion was possible due to previous developments such as the GFMD mechanism, which enabled the participation of civil society and the private sector, as well as the SDG process and the New York Declaration. The main entry points were through the consultation phase (‘NSAs as experts’) and the stocktaking phase (speaking roles, expert input, position papers), while the formal negotiation phase was for member states only. This phase was the ‘playing field’ of experienced and well-connected actors. In comparison to other actors, such as civil society, there are two major differences when it comes to local authorities: First, NSAs had their peak engagement and contribution during the consultation phase. There, they brought in ideas and approaches, which were reflected in the zero draft of the GCM. On the other hand, local authorities only stepped up during the stocktaking phase and intervened during the negotiations with very distinct roles and advocacy goals. Second, there is a significant difference in terms of number of actors: only a limited number of local authorities worked on the GCM process. While the zero draft was very much informed by ideas and concepts coming from a diverse group of NSAs, I argue that cities had limited influence on © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 R. Schweiger, Beyond states, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5_6

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the agreed outcome of the GCM. However, the impact local authorities had as actors in global migration governance must not be underestimated. The process brought a recognition of cities as actors in the governance space beyond local implementers: I think […] we had to prove our value working as cities, entering the multilateral space on our own, not to be confused with the voice of civil society, not wanted to be one of the civil society voice (INT-CIT #34).

With the support of powerful individuals from the UN system, financial and knowledge-based resources provided by foundations and donors, as well as mayors who wished to engage and lead on issues, local authorities gained structural access to intergovernmental processes about migration (similarly, but still much smaller, to the climate change arena with C40 and other networks). The most prominent examples and indicators are the set-up (and recognition) of the MMC, the seat of the MMC in the Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund, the role of local authorities in the IMRF modalities, and the set-up of the GFMD Mayors Mechanisms. Criteria for ‘successful’ influence My data also indicate a few criteria for ‘successful’ influence in a process like the GCM. One stakeholder described the way of working as follows: The aim is to make sure to try to get those views, those opinions, those thoughts, those approaches to be integrated both in the letter and the spirit of the compact. That, in essence, is the code and that would have been the case with many, the member states, the different non-state actors. If the views that you have as to what you think is best for the topic, to try to get those in. Of course, it’s not as easy as, “Here’s what I think. Can you get it in?” It involves the discussions and negotiations. Sometimes you change your mind, sometimes you improve your position. But in essence, that that was the aim (INT-NSA #11).

Of course, actors can only be successful in their advocacy when there are sufficient opportunity structures. Yet, there are four points I draw from my analysis that characterizes ‘successful’ influence: First, the clearer the goal and the mandate of the actor, the more targeted proposals, expertise, and knowledge could be brought into the process. Those organizations were able to formulate their ask, provide the reasons for it, and then bring in on-the-ground expertise and knowledge from research and policy work to support the process (INT-NSA #2, #11).

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Second, the more experience and knowledge actors had about the UN system, the more strategically and purposefully they could use the existing networks to achieve their goals. Beyond experience, I found that success relied heavily on knowledge of the UN system, e.g., how to best suggest language, how to reach out to the co-facilitators, and/or what is most useful to them. Those with trusted networks including diplomats and decision makers were able to reach out at critical moments during the process. Third, the less dogmatic actors presented themselves, the more credible they were regarded by diplomats. Hence, actors who presented themselves with their expertise, rather than with purely advocacy goals, were seen as more credible by governments and the negotiators (INT-GOV #17; INT-NSA #11; see also section 4.2.2). Finally, when input and concerns were cumulated and contextualized into alliances, they were perceived as more relevant and credible by diplomats— be it only one actor group or a multi-stakeholder group. While this was at times difficult, especially for civil society, such collaborations were very much valued by governments (see section 4.2.3 and 4.2.4). To summarize, I present my findings alongside the methodological questions and ‘stages of influence’ for both NSAs and local authorities: Activities to transmit information to decision makers NSAs used a variety of ‘tools’ to transmit information to decision-makers, in this case national governments, diplomats, and the co-facilitators. They attended formal and informal meetings throughout the process; they also hosted events and meetings such as side-events and informal gatherings under the Chatham House Rule. Actors submitted briefings, statements, and reports to the process including suggestions about language for the text. Many stakeholders directly and strategically reached out to representatives from national governments and the UN system. Another way they participated was to coordinate with their peers, i.e., their own actor group. Prominent coordination mechanisms were the NGO Committee on Migration, the Civil Society Action Committee and the ICMC. In addition, umbrella organizations such as the IOE and ITUC offered important coordination opportunities for the stakeholder groups. Finally, numerous activities took place on regional and national levels worldwide (see section 4.1.3). The activities of local authorities during the GCM process can be described as straightforward and coordinated, but only amongst a small group of cities. Compared to other actor groups, cities did not work in large coalitions, but rather smaller ones. Based on their experience during previous processes and events, local authorities coordinated in preparation for the stocktaking meeting and the negotiation

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process; this was unlike other stakeholders, who had significant engagement during the consultation phase. The stocktaking meeting, during which the US administration left the process, and US cities stepped up, gave a clear push for a coordinated engagement in the negotiation phase. The activities that happened relied heavily on individual city leaders and actors within the UN system who pushed for stronger city engagement (see section 5.1). Opportunities to transmit information to the process Formally, NSAs, as set out in the modalities resolution, had access to the consultation and stocktaking phase (phases I and II) of the process. There, stakeholders had the opportunity to speak, provide information, and bring in new ideas. The formats for this were the formal parts of phases I and II. Additionally, numerous informal meetings occurred as did other forms of engagements, which included the co-facilitation team. During the state-led negotiations, NSAs showed visible engagement and were also offered opportunities to transmit information to both individual (friendly) governments and the co-facilitation teams. Some of the stakeholders were present in New York and listened from the balcony during the chamber sessions. The co-facilitators offered an informal format before each round of negotiation, titled ‘informal dialogues for stakeholders.’ During these sessions stakeholders had the opportunity to comment on negotiations, drafts of the GCM, and also offer ideas to the co-facilitators as well as to participating governments. However, the turnout of government representatives in these sessions was minimal (see section 4.1.1). In addition to the formal and informal access, I suggest the opportunities for NSAs were created through longstanding processes leading up to the GCM. These previous processes showed an increasingly inclusive attitude towards NSAs. Such processes were: The GFMD, with its mechanism for civil society and the private sector, the SDG negotiations and the adoption of the Agenda 2030, and the New York Declaration. Each paved the way for the inclusion of stakeholders in the modalities of the process as well as a buildup of capacities and structures for a limited amount of actor groups to engage meaningfully and with leverage throughout (see section 4.1.2). While the access and opportunities for local authorities were few, they were well used. Cities were not formally part of the consultation phase; however, city leaders used several opportunities to be visible and share their message. Examples can be seen with the Mayor of Montreal during the Stocktaking meeting or the Mayor of Bristol, who was the first Mayor to speak at the UN during formal negotiations. Cities got into the negotiation process just ‘in time’ (INT-GOV #22). In addition, the presence of local authorities was fostered by the co-facilitators and other individuals

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within the UN system. Thus, while formal access was limited, the access they had, was well used (see section 5.1). The leverages to transmit information For the broad and diverse group of NSAs, I identified four key leverages. First, the co-facilitators enabled access and opportunities for NSAs to transmit information. Likewise, they were keen on including NSAs as much as possible throughout the process. Second, NSAs took on the role of experts, rather than advocates, and thus were able to influence through their practical, technical, and academic expertise. Third, actors built advocacy coalitions amongst peers, such as the Civil Society Action Committee, and were thus able to engage jointly and strategically with the co-facilitators and governments. Finally, I identified multi-stakeholder alliances and formats, involving civil society, government representatives, UN agencies, philanthropies, and others, as a key leverage points to influence the process. Prominent examples were the GCM Informals, stemming from the SDG process and the Initiative for Child Rights in the Global Compacts. I also found that organizations and initiatives had very different resources available to help them engage in the process. This is in regard to both staffing capabilities as well as funding. There were numerous limitations and hindrances to having significant engagement within the process (see section 4.2). The resources of local authorities were limited and, at the time, much smaller than those of the NSAs. Local authorities lacked coordination and structure as well as access to the process. Nevertheless, their levers were powerful. First, they had powerful allies who knew the interstate system. Likewise, the co-facilitators had a strong interest in bringing cities on board. Second, in addition to existing city networks, there was a small and agile informal group of capable, willing, and resourceful cities to lead and engage in the process. Finally, cities could play a particular and pragmatic role that offered an otherwise missing perspective to the process and thus showed them to be relevant actors (see section 5.2). Were issues proposed discussed by state negotiators? Through consultations and the close relationship of stakeholders to the cofacilitation team, my findings show that the zero draft of the GCM was very much informed by input, ideas, and concepts brought up by NSAs in phase I and II of the process. We could call this the ‘power of minutes’ that served as basis for the initial draft of the GCM. The initial discussions of state negotiators in early 2018 were very much informed by NSAs, even if they did not listen to them during the consultation phase (see section 4.3.2).

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On the other hand, in the case of local authorities, I found only a few examples of issues they proposed that became part of the GCM. For example, the municipal ID card, as reflected in objective 4. In addition, and important for cities, the whole area of implementation, review and follow up, including local authorities, was discussed, and included in the process. However, in comparison to other stakeholders who prominently engaged in the consultation phase, the propositions from local authorities discussed by state negotiators were little (see section 5.3). Did terms and concepts become part of the negotiating jargon? Does the final agreement contain text drafted by NSAs and local authorities? From the diverse group of NSAs, there are several examples of proposed issues that became part of the negotiating jargon. One example is the concept of the Global Skills Partnerships, which was discussed, taken up, and agreed upon within the outcome document. Another example is the work done by the Initiative for Child Rights in the Global Compacts; they managed to make the issue of child sensitivity a cross-cutting issue in the GCM and were also largely successful in contributing to the strong language used to discuss ending immigrant child detention. However, there are examples of concepts important to stakeholders and other actors, such as UN human rights entities, that were left out of the final draft and instead replaced by a paraphrased, lighter language, as in the case of non-refoulement or firewalls. Yet even these conversations were important. While the final agreement does not include the proposed framing, it is procedural indicator of NGO influence is if delegates give serious consideration to an NGO proposal even if they do not ultimately include that proposal in the final agreement (Betsill & Corell, 2001, pp. 75–76).

The co-facilitators were the penholders, and they worked closely with some of the more engaged stakeholders during the negotiations. While I know there were language suggestions used and edited by the co-facilitators, I cannot trace any text drafted by a non-governmental party that made it directly into the GCM. As for local authorities, I suggest they contributed to the recognition of their role by being distinct from other stakeholders who engaged in international governance about migration. Several examples show that through the intervention of cities, clarifications about the character of local authorities were made. In addition, local authorities may have contributed to increasing the relevance and prominence of nondiscriminatory access to basic services (objective 15); there are indications that they contributed to keeping this section in the agreed outcome. Nevertheless, because the engagement and involvement of local authorities started late and had little focus on

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advocacy, local authorities did not coin any of terms in the negotiating jargon. The same can be argued for the final document—my data does not indicate any textual contributions by local authorities to the agreed outcome of the document. Rather, they made concrete requests and suggestions for keeping certain parts in the text or suggested slight edits to the text (see section 5.3). Does the final agreement reflect the goals and principles of NSAs and local authorities? As Betsill and Corell note: The most direct indication of NGO influence is indeed whether the final agreement reflects NGO goals. If NGOs influenced the negotiations, it is logical to expect congruence between ideas contained in the information submitted by NGOs during negotiations and the ideas embedded in an international agreement (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 75).

Overall, I find the GCM does reflect the goals and principles of NSAs; 88% percent of survey participants indicated that they use the GCM in their advocacy work (see Figure 4.7). In addition, the average assessment of goal achievement by actors is close to being equivalent to their level of engagement (see Figure 4.9). However, I also show that a few key strategic goals were not achieved during the negotiations, e.g., relating to ‘firewalls’ or ’non-refoulement’ (see section 4.3). While there are criticisms of various kinds about the document, my findings suggest that most actors agree the GCM is a way forward; it will strengthen global migration governance and it commits to supporting its implementation—even if many actors would like it to go further, both in terms of wording as well as in action and practice. In the case of local authorities, the GCM strongly reflects the goals and principles of cities. As can be seen in the Marrakech Mayors Declaration and the strong engagement by cities since the GCM adoption, e.g., through the Mayors Migration Council (see section 5.3.4). What if NSAs and local authorities had not been part of the process? It is also important to ask whether the process and outcome of a negotiation would have been different without NSAs or local authorities (Betsill & Corell, 2001; Corell & Betsill, 2007). I used a counterfactual analysis, having built into the interview a question asking: ‘what if NSAs and local authorities had not been part of the process?’ While this type of question is methodologically challenging, from my interviews and analysis of the process, it serves as a tool to corroborate other findings. Hence,

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if the negotiation would have been different if NSAs or local authorities were not present, then this underscores or reinforces the finding that they had an observed effect inferred from the analysis—and vice versa: if the negotiation would have been the same, even without the work and presence of NSAs or local authorities, then it is more likely that they had little, if any, influence. I can show three ways in which the GCM process would have looked different without NSAs—of course, this is highly hypothetical: First, the process would have been shorter as phase I and phase II would not have been necessary. Phases I and II were designed to get broad input from actors other than states. Thus, the negotiations would have happened in 2017, directly following the New York Declaration. However, if they would have really happened is debatable, as the international community had just come together the year before, in 2016, to discuss migration. I’m not sure you would have gotten there, honestly. Because I think in some respects, civil society and non-state actors played the very fundamental role of bridging very different views. And so that was that. I think there’s even the question of whether it would have existed (INT-IO #32).

Second, the compact would not have had so much “breadth and depth” (INT-IO #32). The zero draft of the GCM was derived from the input given by stakeholders during phases I and II of the process, which included all their expertise, ideas, and knowledge. Further, the co-facilitators made a very deliberate decision to base the zero draft on the input that had been given. These phases took out some of the political sensitivities. Being able to listen to experts and inputs of all kinds, before heading into the negotiations helped (see section 4.3.2; INT-GOV #24; INT-IO #32). Third, a purely political negotiation would have led to the ‘smallest common denominator’ (INT-GOV #24). While some things were left out or changed, the zero draft’s structure did remain very much in place. It also included new approaches and ideas, which had been informed by actors other than states (see section 4.3.2). In the case of local authorities, on the other hand, I argue that the process created a momentum and window of acceleration to be recognized and acknowledged by the multilateral (migration) system. While it is methodologically difficult to prove, I argue that the process accelerated the inclusion of cities much faster than it would have happened without the GCM process (INT-GOV #14). Yet, one interviewee argued that the process might have come too early for cities to engage properly: It was of course still a little bit at the beginning—how should I say—so the whole issue is the local actors. I think if you look now at what has happened in the last two years, how the cities have organized themselves, a lot has happened, so from the cities’

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point of view, the negotiations probably came one, two years too early (INT-GOV #22).

To conclude, I suggest that overall, negotiations would have been substantively different if NSAs had not been part of the process. In addition, local authorities would not be as involved in global migration governance as they are today without their inclusion and engagement in the GCM process. This reinforces my findings of influence and effects of those actors on the negotiations and its outcome.

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Classification, Main Recommendations, and Conclusion

In this research, I have analyzed the mechanisms linking NSA and city participation in the GCM process to their influence, or lack thereof. The process leading to the adoption of the GCM has shown that actors other than states, including local authorities, have become a core element of global governance and played a key role in global migration spaces. While the structure of their inclusion is still less institutionalized than in other fields, such as the climate arena, the process showed that NSAs had the opportunity to work alongside governments and IOs— albeit with different levels of intensity.1 The roles and strategies NSAs—and to a certain extent also local authorities—applied during the GCM process, such as taking on the role of experts, concrete language suggestions, are not much different from the behavior of NSAs in other global policy fields, such as human rights, or climate change. In these policy fields, NSAs engage as agenda setters, apply blaming and shaming strategies, try to convince diplomats of their proposals, work in alliances, engage in global and regional norm and standard setting processes, as well as the implementation of those norms, and use their expert authority (Corell & Betsill, 2018; de Vries & Weatherhead, 2021; Murdie & Peksen, 2014; Polizzi & Murdie, 2019; Reiners & Liese, 2015).2 In this final chapter I reflect on key findings from the research and classify them. Then, I put forward recommendations for actors in the governance system and for future research. 1

The overall developments have been described by several authors (see e.g., Aguilar & Schvartzman, 2021; Davies, 2019a, p. 3; Ruhlman, 2019). 2 However, there are also significant differences. For example, the human rights regime is merely based on the relationship between individuals, or a collective, and the state, given its nature, and the regime is rights based (Reiners & Liese, 2015). In the climate change regime, the economic and financial dimension plays a huge role (Corell & Betsill, 2007). © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Fachmedien Wiesbaden GmbH, part of Springer Nature 2023 R. Schweiger, Beyond states, Studien zur Migrations- und Integrationspolitik, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-658-40690-5_7

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I argue that both, the topic of migration coming to the UN and the engagement of NSAs and local authorities have been enabled by opportunity structures on different levels (see section 7.1). The inclusivity of the GCM process was ensured to a certain degree, yet the decision-making processes sat with states. Thus NSAs, and to a lesser degree local authorities (due to their lacking recognition as actors), mainly focused on accessing and providing information. The first International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) in May 2022 has been a big milestone, with a progress declaration adopted, and both NSAs and local authorities participating in the event. Yet, there remain major challenges regarding the overall inclusion of these actors, and the governance structures going forward. Thus, following Kuyper et al. (2018), I argue that moving forward, evolving global migration governance and any future processes must reflect three main dimensions: justice, legitimacy, and effectiveness (see section 7.2). Further, based on my findings I put forward seven recommendations, each of which address different audiences: governments, the UN system, donors, funders, NSAs, and local authorities (see section 7.3). Finally, this research offers a methodological approach to assessing and measuring influence of NSAs and local authorities in multilateral negotiation processes regarding migration, i.e., the development of the GCM. It provides an overview and assessment on the broad field of stakeholders. However, it does not offer a deep dive into individual actor groups or even individual actors. Thus, this research represents an initial methodological take on the study of influence in the migration space. In the research outlook, I discuss some opportunities for future research based on this project and its findings (see section 7.4).

7.1

Opportunity Structures: An Approach to Explain how Migration has Been Brought to the un and Enabled Engagement of NSAs and Local Authorities

Throughout my research, I found several moments of opportunity for NSAs and local authorities to engage in the process and bring in new ideas (see chapter 4 and 5). Further, I found that the high numbers of refugees and migrants in 2015 brought the topic of migration to the forefront of the agenda of Western states (which, I argue, was a result of the crisis in management and collaboration, rather than a crisis of people moving). This new space offered opportunities to (finally) bring migration to the UN for discussion (see section 2.2.4). I suggest looking into the events leading up to the GCM negotiation process and the involvement

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of NSAs and local authorities in the process from the perspective of political opportunities. Doug McAdam (1997, p. 27) offers four key dimensions to political opportunities, based on a synthetization of four approaches: (1) “the relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system;” (2) “the stability or instability of that broad set of elite alignments that typically undergird a polity;” (3) “the presence or absence of elite allies;” and (4) “the state’s capacity and propensity for repression.” While I am aware that McAdam’s approach was not developed for the analysis of governance processes at the global level, I believe it can be applied to the international system. Applying this theoretical approach of political opportunities, I argue that not only does the existence of GCM, but also the involvement of actors other than states, stems from opportunity structures arising from 2015 onwards: First, I argue that the institutionalized political system became more aware of migration issues in 2015. This happened for both the UN and its member states.3 In 2015, there was a historic opening for the topic; during the SDG negotiations, migration had become an increasingly important issue for a few member states—a fact that was driven by changing migration patterns from Syria to Europe and throughout the Mediterranean. The perceived loss of control over migration within Europe pressured European governments to act with a feeling that ‘something has to happen.’ In section 2.2.4, I showed the events and pressure that was increasing within the UN system in 2015 that called for them to address migration and refugees. Ultimately, the images of Alan Kurdi and the changes in attitude—i.e., the feeling of a loss of control—by European governments about the crisis caused a changed. Additionally, attitudes at the highest UN level as well as amongst UN member states changed: As a result of a mass flow of Syrian refugees and African migrants across the Mediterranean, which peaked in 2015, European States wanted something done at the international level. The United Nations (UN) General Assembly responded by convening a ‘high-level plenary meeting on addressing large movements of refugees and migrants’ the following year (Aleinikoff, 2018, p. 611).

3

The first dimension of opportunity structures—the “relative openness or closure of the institutionalized political system”—refers to the “formal legal and institutional structure of a given polity” (McAdam, 1997, p. 27).

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Further, the process of the New York Declaration, co-facilitated by the same diplomat as the SDG process—Ambassador David Donoghue from Ireland— opened the UN system for inclusion of NSAs, especially civil society, to offer input and advice and also coordinate more strategically on the global level.4 Hence, the formats—meaning “the way these meetings are structured, how access is granted”—is key to “which political opportunity structures they provide” (Rother, 2022, p. 2). Second, I argue that UN ‘elites’ aligned—albeit slowly—to push for a migration debate at the UN.5 Ban-Ki Moon who had long been reserved, changed his mind in light of the developments on migration routes to Europe. McAdam argues that the emergence of new allies within a previous unresponsive political system is […] likely to be linked to the rise of a narrow and generally institutionalized reform movement (McAdam, 1997, p. 30).

This is exactly what happened in 2015; the UN Secretary-General, as well as powerful UN member states saw a sudden need and thus had an interest in bringing refugee and migration issues to the UN. People working on this agenda beforehand had contributed to the structures in place and were able to then pave the way to make this happen. Peter Sutherland was an important voice, and the Sutherland Report was an important part of making change happen. His personality, his own work, and the work of his team went beyond the usual execution of such a role. Likewise, many others, such as the PGA and individuals working on the respective teams, agreed that a migration debate at the UN needed to happen. This is a space that more detailed consideration and further research would be beneficial—especially on the role of individuals and how or why specific individuals and different personalities matter (see section 7.4.1 below). While Western states agreed this should be for refugees, other governments argued for a broader focus on migration. This debate led to the New York Declaration and the development of both compacts.

4

Generally, the UN Charter (1945) sets out in Art. 71 that the UN system can consult “with non-governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.” Yet, the ‘how’ is what I am arguing here for that varies from process to process, as elaborated in this research. See also recommendation 7.3.1. 5 The following two sections stem from the theoretical assumption that the “informal structure of power relations” are a significant characteristic of a system (D. McAdam, 1997, p. 27).

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Third, I argue that ‘elite allies’ fostered the inclusion of NSAs and local authorities in the process and as consultants. As shown in chapters 4 and 5, both NSAs and local authorities had powerful advocates for their inclusion and use as consultants within the UN system and amongst the co-facilitators. Further, both, NSAs and local authorities were able to seize the opportunity, activate and work through their networks, and provide input and expertise. In addition, the withdrawal of the US from the negotiations, just before the Puerto Vallarta Conference (phase II, Stocktaking), was an impetus and key opportunity for local authorities to engage in the negotiation process (phase III).6 It is clear there were opportunity structures for both the discussion of migration at the UN and subsequently, for the possibility of NSAs and local authorities to intervene and influence the debates.7 However, it is hard to assess if opportunities to influence the global migration agenda are higher or lower today. Yet, I want to lay out indications from my findings: The openness of governments for creating the most inclusive process was lower than during the SDG process and the New York Declaration. The public and political debates in several states (especially in Europe) after agreeing to the outcome of the July 2018 negotiation, but before the adoption conference in Marrakech in December 2018, led to the withdrawal of some governments from the document. It also caused these governments to lower their desire to publicly debate international migration issues regarding the GCM. On the other hand, the creation of the UN Network on Migration, with its inclusive structures and in preparation for the IMRF, the opportunities to transmit information for NSAs were made possible. Yet, how receptive national governments and the overall UN system are to the topic migration (beyond refugee issues) and the inclusion of actors other than states in its formal processes, remains to be seen and is highly volatile. I further argue that the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the unfolding war, and the internal and cross-border displacement creates both known and unknown issues for migration governance moving forward. Surely, such a crisis of geopolitical scale will affect broad understandings of governance as well as migration and refugee governance in particular. Yet, at this point, the how is unclear (as of December 2022), as I argue also in the research outlook in section 7.4.5. 6

Just less than half a year before the first International Migration Review Forum (IMRF) took stock of GCM implementation in May 2022, the United States issued a statement in support of the vision of the GCM (United States of America, 2021). 7 As a comparison, research on environmental movements and their opportunity structures at the UN found that the formal institutional structures are rather open with very integrative, yet divided elites. Yet the output structure in terms of implementation is rather weak (Van Der Heijden, 2006, pp. 33–34).

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The First IMRF 2022—a way Forward for the GCM and its Inclusion of Stakeholders?

The adoption of the Progress Declaration is a landmark decision that reaffirms the Global Compact as the only comprehensive and sufficiently ambitious framework for international migration governance (Shahid, 2022).

The first IMRF happened in May 2022 and marked a critical milestone for migration governance (see section 2.2.5)—this makes it worth looking into the tendency to include stakeholders and their assessment of inclusion during the GCM process. This allows me to characterize and assess the role of stakeholders in the GCM development, implementation, and review process. Looking back: the inclusivity of the GCM process Overall, more than half of the participating stakeholders who responded to my online survey assessed the GCM formats as positive or very positive (Online Survey #Q16; see Figure 7.1). Amongst the positive notes, stakeholders highlighted the accessibility and openness of the co-facilitators throughout the process, the formats for stakeholders, the possibilities to engage with governments, and the openness and “buy-in” of many different organizations (Online Survey #Q17). Survey participants emphasized the importance of engaging actors other than state from the early stages and throughout processes like the GCM. In addition, they called for more inclusivity; more and diverse voices from grassroots organizations, migrants, the private sector, and local authorities were considered an added value for the implementation, review, and follow-up of the GCM. For this to happen, the possibilities to engage need to be made transparent. (Online Survey #Q17). Local and regional governments have been especially demanding that the structures change so that they can be included as stakeholders in the process. They request, the President of the General Assembly to provide adequate space for local and regional governments to participate in and contribute to the IMRF discussions through a transparent and inclusive process (Mayors Migration Council et al., 2022).

They demanded a clear, legitimate, and defined role for local authorities in future engagements; this is the key to their inclusivity at the UN.

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Very negative

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Figure 7.1 Stakeholders’ assessment of formats to participate in the GCM process. (Source: Online Survey #Q168 )

Has the IMRF delivered on stakeholder inclusivity? The UN Migration Network having taken up its work in 2019, offers a broad set of stakeholders—with and without ECOSOC status—the possibility to engage. This happens in conjunction with the engagement of governments and the UN system. For the IMRF, overall, through the UN Migration Network’s continuous work with stakeholders, including the Mayors Mechanism and the Mayors Migration Council, structures have been put in place for meaningful (also virtual) engagement of actors other than states in the lead-up (and follow-up) to the first IMRF. As such, I argue, stakeholders could act and intervene more strategically based on their experiences during the GCM process.9 Yet, the IMRF faced several challenges to deliver meaningful participation: Access was limited due to practical challenges, such as visa issues for some nongovernmental participants, lack of resources for many actors to travel to New York, and the short-notice announcement of the in-person meeting due to the Covid-19 pandemic. 8

Survey question: How do you assess the provided formats by the UN for stakeholder participation? (e.g., stakeholder hearings, roundtables, GCM adoption conference). 9 For example, the International Detention Coalition (IDC) co-led the workstream on alternatives to detention, and through that was able to intervene strategically at the IMRF (International Detention Coalition, 2022).

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However, limitations to access were also more structural: In March 2022, civil society actors in an open letter to the President of the General Assembly expressed their concerns on the shrinking space for full, meaningful, self- organized civil society representation and participation in the United Nations in general, and more specifically in the upcoming International Migration Review Forum (Africa-Europe Diaspora Development Platform et al., 2022).

Concretely the group of 19 endorsing civil society organizations10 demanded (1) “access to the negotiating meeting room” during the consultations for the progress declaration ahead of the IMRF, (2) “in-person and virtual meetings by co-facilitators with civil society and other stakeholders immediately prior to or during each of the negotiating sessions” at the IMRF itself, (3) “[f]ull participation in the entire IMRF”, (4) “active in-room opportunities for multiple civil society delegates to interact with member states”, and (5) an “equal number of delegates” (Africa-Europe Diaspora Development Platform et al., 2022). Also, the Mayors Migration Council and the Mayors Mechanism actively pressed for the participation of mayors at the IMRF. Having participated in the IMRF, I argue that some of the structural challenges, pressed by civil society and mayoral actors have been resolved, as access was given to all spaces. However, the setup allowed few direct and personal interactions, as non-state actors, while being able to listen and sit on the balcony, had little space for conversations with governments. In addition, during the Multi-Stakeholder Hearing only few government representatives attended, replicating a pattern from the GCM process of little interest in the input of NSAs. In addition, even though funds for travel of stakeholders were provided, practical issues and timing did not allow for meaningful participation, especially of grassroot and migrant-led organizations. The IDC in its analysis of the IMRF writes that [w]hile purposeful efforts have been made to address the limited adequate mechanisms for engaging civil society in UN and global processes, particularly directly 10

Those organizations are: Africa-Europe Diaspora Development Platform, Asylum Access, Building and Wood Workers’ International, Civil Society Action Committee, Education International, Global Coalition on Migration, International Detention Coalition, International Domestic Workers Federation, International Federation of Settlements and Neighborhood Centers, Lutheran World Federation, Migrant Forum in Asia, Migration Youth and Children Platform, National Network for Immigrant and Refugee Rights, NGO Committee on Migration, Pacific Women Indigenous Network, Pacific Islands Association, Platform for International Cooperation on Undocumented Migrants, Public Services International, Scalabrini International Migration Network, Women in Migration Network.

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impacted people and communities – this is a systemic issue that requires a systemic solution. An entire mindset shift regarding leadership, equity, and accountability is needed to transform these systems and ensure meaningful participation and representation moving forward (International Detention Coalition, 2022).

Hence, when it comes to formal processes taking place within the UN system, there are steps to be taken to include actors other than states in more significant ways (see recommendation in section 7.3.1). In the case of local authorities, in comparison to the GCM process, access and a seat at the table was largely offered. Organized by the Mayors Mechanism, the Mayors Migration Council and UCLG, mayors and their delegations were visibly present at the UN. They jointly put forward a total of 70 concrete actions to implement the GCM (Mayors Migration Council, 2022). Mayors themselves, and representatives from their organizations, were largely represented on panels, and in high-level conversations. For example, a delegation of Mayors from the Mayors Migration Council11 met with Abdulla Shahid, the President of the UN General Assembly on the margins of the IMRF to discuss the inclusion of local authorities. Core of this meeting was the role of local authorities in the UN system and the implementation of the GCM: The delegation thanked the President of the 76thGeneral Assembly for setting a precedent for the inclusion of local authorities in discussions of urban planning and migration and recognizing the fundamental role they play in the implementation of the 2030 Agenda and Sustainable Development Goals. They stressed the need for greater coordination between the local and the global and ensuring that cities have adequate support and resources to mitigate and adapt to new and existing challenges. The President of the General Assembly thanked the delegation for their continuous support and their indispensable contribution to the work of the United Nations. He reiterated the need to engage local actors and ensuring that their voices are heard (The President of the UN General Assembly, 2022b).

Thus, the recognition of mayors and local authorities at the IMRF was a core achievement for municipal engagement, that is reflected in being mentioned as a distinct 11

“The delegation included Ms. Valérie Plante, Mayor of the city of Montréal, Canada; Mr. Erias Lukwago, Lord Mayor of Kampala Capital City Authority, Uganda; Ms. Yvonne Aki-Sawyerr, Mayor of Freetown, Sierra Leone; Md. Atiqul Islam, Mayor of Dhaka North, Bangladesh; Mr. Phillippe Rio, Mayor of the city of Gringny, France; Ms. Emilia Saiz, Secretary-General of the United Cities and Local Government (UCLG); as well as Ms. Vittoria Zanuso, Executive Director of the Mayors Migration Council” (The President of the UN General Assembly, 2022b).

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stakeholder—as local authorities and local governments—by the PGA and in the Progress Declaration (Shahid, 2022; United Nations General Assembly, 2022). Ultimately, the success of the IMRF depended on the ‘buy-in’ of national governments. In the lead-up to the IMRF, the political support within national governments’ priorities was weak on the most parts. The Russian invasion of Ukraine and the consequences of a war with the fastest growing refugee crisis since WW II additionally has shifted the attention of many governments to the unfolding refugee situation, one that is not covered by the GCM in particular (Schweiger, 2022). Yet, the forum has created new commitments and buy-in on several levels: First, it is a success in a sensitive political climate that a Forum on migration took place at all, resulting in a progress declaration that has been unanimously adopted by the UNGA. Second, it has contributed to establishing momentum and a process moving towards the next IMRF in 2026.12 Third, it has put to test the work of the UN Migration Network, the inclusion of stakeholders, including cities, and while there are numerous challenges (see above), it serves as a basis for actors to work strategically to improve stakeholder access and inclusion. Finally, while the progress declaration may not be strong in its wording, climate mobility has been centered as an issue at the IMRF,13 leading way for wider debates and other processes, such as the COP27 and COP28, as well as the 2022–2023 GFMD (Huckstep & Dempster, 2022; Mayors Migration Council, 2022; Ober, 2022). Introducing a typology to assess inclusiveness Ruhlmann (2019, p. 48) introduced a typology that can be applied to both the GCM development process (decision-making) as well as the implementation and review (and accountability) of the GCM. This typology serves as the basis to assess the inclusivity of the process, which is then added to Ruhlmann’s initial typology in Table 7.1.14 The overview illustrates the degree of inclusivity based on the following criteria: transparency (do stakeholders have access to information or opportunity to observe?), voice (can stakeholders provide information?), and vote/action (do stakeholders participate in decision-making or hold institutional powers similar to states?). These criteria are weighed against the decision-making that happens during 12

For an analysis of next steps towards IMRF 2026, see e.g., Schweiger (2022, pp. 5–6) and Val (2022). 13 The Center for Global Development finds that “Of the 64 in-person and virtual side events, 10 had ‘climate’ or ‘environment’ in their title, and these topics were frequently mentioned within the high-level roundtables and country statements” (Huckstep & Dempster, 2022). 14 However, Ruhlmann introduced the typology with regards to NGO participation in intergovernmental organizations, not negotiations. Thus, naturally in the case of negotiations, actors other than states don’t have a vote.

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the GCM process and the implementation and accountability, which in the case of the GCM, is the IMRF during which states assess progress. I argue that during the GCM process, NSAs and local authorities were given transparency, access to information, and the opportunity to observe. In addition, they had a voice and were able to provide information throughout the process,

Table 7.1 Typology of nongovernmental participation in intergovernmental organizations according to Ruhlmann (2019), applied to the GCM

Transparency NGOs have access to information or opportunity to observe

Decision-making Deliberation about, and selection of policy or programming options

Implementation Deliberation about the means of enacting chosen policies, programs, and participation in execution of tasks

Accountability Mechanisms of review and oversight process to seek remedy for grievance15

Disclosure of documents and records, possible opportunity to attend and observe meetings

Disclosure of documents and records, possible opportunity to attend and observe meetings

Disclosure of documents and records, possible opportunity to attend and observe mechanisms of institutional oversight

NSAs and local authorities were able to attend and observe meetings throughout all phases of the GCM process, as well as in the lead-up to the IMRF and the IMRF itself

At UN level, Stakeholders are through the UN invited to attend Migration Network, the IMRF NSAs and umbrella organizations of local authorities (Mayors Mechanism, MMC) have access to documents and can attend meetings (continued)

15

The IMRF is considered as an oversight mechanism of the GCM and takes place every four years. One criticism towards the GCM and its follow-up and review process are the minimal oversight and lack of indicators given (such as in the case of the SDGs); also progress reports on the GCM are voluntary.

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Table 7.1 (continued)

Voice NGOs provide information

Vote/ Action NGOs participate in decision-making, or hold institutional powers similar to states

Decision-making Deliberation about, and selection of policy or programming options

Implementation Deliberation about the means of enacting chosen policies, programs, and participation in execution of tasks

Accountability Mechanisms of review and oversight process to seek remedy for grievance

In addition to the ability to attend meetings, there were opportunities to make statements (written or oral). Most robust inclusion of membership and right to participate fully in discussions

Consultation, and cooperation, with civil society groups and NGOs in the field prior to and during implementation

Ability of NGOs to submit information to oversight mechanisms, and to report to panels, investigators, and ombudsman

During phase I and II of the GCM process, stakeholders could make written and oral statements. During phase III input could only be provided informally; at the IMRF, the possibility to provide information was given during dedicated sessions

Stakeholders are an acknowledged part of the UN Migration Network responsible for implementation; actors are consulted and offered cooperation

Stakeholders are invited to submit information, e.g., ahead of the progress declaration of the IMRF by the co-facilitators as well as through the UN migration network

Representatives from civil society hold some institutional power to participate in decision-making, such as a voting

Full partnership with civil society or NGOs in the implementation phase. Possibly delegation to NGOs

Representatives from civil society hold institutional power to influence final decision of oversight body, such as a vote (continued)

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Table 7.1 (continued) Decision-making Deliberation about, and selection of policy or programming options

Implementation Deliberation about the means of enacting chosen policies, programs, and participation in execution of tasks

Accountability Mechanisms of review and oversight process to seek remedy for grievance

Intergovernmental negotiations do not allow for NSAs and local authorities to participate in decision-making (during GCM process, as well as IMRF)

Partnerships for implementation have been set up, e.g., through the MPTF, where stakeholders sit equally on the decision-making board along with states, donors, and the UN Migration Network

The IMRF is an intergovernmental forum where stakeholders have no voting right or official power to influence final decision

Source: Types of nongovernmental participation in intergovernmental organizations according to Ruhlmann (2019, p. 48) with additions from the author (fattened)

albeit not during negotiations. NSAs and local authorities were not involved in any decision-making of the process. Looking at GCM implementation, review, and follow-up, coordinated by the UN Migration Network, stakeholders were given the opportunity to observe and provide information. The Network sets up working groups consisting of non-state partners as well as UN agencies. Further, it holds quarterly briefings and annual meetings involving all types of actors, including governments. In addition, stakeholders have a vote in the ‘Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund,’ where they have three seats16 — as do member states, donors, and representatives from the UN system (Migration Multi-Partner Trust Fund, 2021; United Nations Network on Migration, 2021c).

16

Stakeholders are represented by the Mayors Migrations Council, the Special Rapporteur on the human rights of migrants, and the International Detention Coalition (Migration MultiPartner Trust Fund, 2021).

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Further, I argue that the inclusivity of the process has been greatly ensured; this is reflected in the review and follow-up of the process. However, there are limitations. The limitations refer to the access NSAs and local authorities had to the negotiation process, i.e., they were excluded. Other processes, which are not purely intergovernmental have shown to be more inclusive. For example, by hosting stakeholder hearings as part of the formal negotiations instead of informal before and after sessions. In addition, during the follow-up and review process, specifically at the IMRF, NSAs and local authorities have no voting or power, as the forum is intergovernmental and only allows input and participation from stakeholders. Justice, legitimacy, and effectiveness of global migration governance Going forward, I argue, global migration governance will have to ask key questions relating to justice, legitimacy, and effectiveness. Jonathan W. Kuyper, Björn-Ola Linnér, and Heike Schroeder (2018) introduce the concept of ‘hybrid multilateralism;’ it is defined as a multilateralism that encompasses both state and non-state actors. They draw from the developments of global climate change governance, where non-state actors have become integral participants. I argue that going forward, migration governance will have numerous learning opportunities from the global climate processes and the role of non-state actors (see also section 7.4.2). Here, I reflect on three key areas of climate governance, for global migration governance moving forward (Kuyper et al., 2018): First, I argue, global migration governance will need to reflect on questions of justice. This entails agency (“who makes decisions on behalf of whom”), access to benefits and rights (especially of “marginalized and vulnerable” groups), and allocation of funding and responsibilities (Kuyper et al., 2018, pp. 8–9). The questions of justice will encompass topics such as: are migrant-led organizations equally represented and given access to processes and funding? What will be the role of mayors in the international system? Can local and regional governments directly access international funding to serve their city residents? (Mayors Migration Council et al., 2022; Rother, 2020). Second, legitimacy is a defining element of a global governance system and needs to be considered. What is right and just will be a core issue for the emerging and

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evolving global governance on migration going forward.17 One core aspect to legitimacy is participation, which “ensures that stakeholders are given a say in how rules and regulations are formed.” Another dimension to legitimacy is representation. If NSAs and local authorities get more access and governance takes on more and more hybrid forms, “the legitimacy of representational claims need to be scrutinized.” In the international system, equal representation of stakeholders is a key challenge and will never be achieved to its full extent. Yet, there are measures that can be taken to strengthen representation. For example, national governments can bring local authorities, civil society, and other stakeholders together as part of their national delegations to international negotiations, which happened already during the GCM process, as well as in the case of the first IMRF (Shahid, 2022). Groups that are not well represented, such as grassroots organizations or migrant-led organizations, often lack resources to travel and participate. Specific mechanisms can support their participation (see recommendation in section 7.3.5). In the case of local authorities, who are similar and also different from other stakeholders, it must be considered that they represent their constituents at the local authorities and are accountable as elected or appointed leaders (see section 2.3.3).18 This can strengthen their legitimacy and credibility as they represent their city inhabitants. Yet, city diplomacy vehicles, such as the Mayors Migration Council, the Global Parliament of Mayors, 17

Jürgen Habermas defines legitimacy broadly: “Legitimacy means that there are good arguments for a political order’s claim to be recognized as right and just; a legitimate order deserves recognition. Legitimacy means a political order’s worthiness to be recognized. This definition highlights the fact that legitimacy is a contestable validity claim; the stability of the order of domination (also) depends on its (at least) de facto recognition. Thus, historically as well as analytically, the concept is used above all in situations in which the legitimacy of an order is disputed, in which, as we say, legitimation problems arise. One side denies, the other asserts legitimacy. This is a process” (Habermas (1973): Communication and the evoluation of society, quoted from Franck, 1988). For a distinction between the terms legitimacy, legitimation and justification, see for example Schweiger (2016, pp. 18–19). For a legal analysis of the legitimacy and status of NGOs in the UN system, see for example Von Bernstorff (2007, pp. 20–36). An approach to normative legitimacy is discussed by Kinzelbach and Kozma (2009). 18 A special, but emerging case, as this research has shown, are local authorities. Cities act “as actors in contemporary world politics” (Gongadze, 2019). Yet, their ‘legitimate’ status as actors in the international system must evolve further. Mayors—or local and regional governments—do not have access to the UN system as stakeholders. Just like NSAs, they do not hold any legal status in the international system. They have a very different mandate and configuration, as elaborated in section 2.3.3. Going forward it will be crucial to discuss, deepen and critically reflect the status of local and regional governments in international law and international relations, along with their legitimacy in the international system. On the latter, see also Aust and Nijman (2021).

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or C40 Cities are not a representation of all cities worldwide; rather these are tools to bring perspectives of select cities into international processes. Each of these entities is anxious to have a diversity of cities and mayors in terms of region, gender, size of the city, etc. Core to legitimacy is also accountability, meaning that “participating stakeholders—and their representatives—need to hold those who make decisions accountable” (Kuyper et al., 2018, pp. 9–11). This means that in the case of an evolving global migration governance, there needs to be an investigation into the different type of actors, their interests, their intents, and their base of representation. This information will allow their claims to hold the international system and national governments accountable.19 Additionally, at the international level, NGOs and NSAs have no legal status. They are ‘only’ registered and subject to national law in their countries of origin or registration (Deloffre & Schmitz, 2019, pp. 607– 608).20 This means that NSAs will have to define and justify their purpose, goals, and the relevance of their actions as right and just. Finally, the effectiveness of global agreements is crucial: Effectiveness of an international agreement can be defined as the function of the ambition and stringency of Parties’ commitments in combination with the levels of state’s participation and their compliance with what has been agreed (Kuyper et al., 2018, p. 11).

Key to effectiveness is transparency over goals, implementation, measurement, and NSA involvement. In the case of the Paris agreement, Kuyper et al. (2018, p. 13) argue that there is little research and data on outcome performances of NSAs. However, this is a key pillar to the effective and goal-oriented process. Thus, researching the effectiveness of non-state action is and will be a key pillar to studies on global governance. For an emerging global migration governance, NSA activities and effectiveness—which one could translate into their influence and role—remain a key task for researchers of international relations. In addition, NSAs themselves must reflect about their outcome performance. During my interviews I found very few actors who

19

NGOs are also criticized for having internal challenges, referring to their “internal democracy,” minimal “standards of transparency and accountability,” “ineffectiveness and inefficacy,” and “counterproductive outcomes” (Davies, 2019a, p. 8). 20 In addition, Deloffre & Schmitz (2019) lay out four key challenges for INGOs regarding their legitimacy: purpose, performance, process, and people, all of which could– individually or together—lead to others challenging their legitimacy. They recommend that NGOs to be aware of all these challenges, trade-offs, and consequences.

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critically and systematically reflected on their own work during the GCM process. They had neither the tools, time, nor resources to do so.

7.3

The way Forward: Recommendations

My findings allow me to formulate seven recommendations that address different elements of migration governance as well as stakeholder engagement and roles. They are targeted towards different actor groups—stakeholders, governments, donors, and the multilateral system. The recommendations are: (1) Establish a more systematic and institutionalized role for non-state actors and local authorities in the UN system (see section 7.3.1); (2) Foster multi-stakeholder alliances for global migration issues (see section 7.3.2); (3) Strengthen systemic cooperation between actor groups (see section 7.3.3); (4) Increase the relevance of global processes by connecting them to the national and local level (see section 7.3.4); (5) Provide resources for non-state actors and local authorities to bolster diversity of actors and voices (see section 7.3.5); (6) Find a balance between in-person and virtual meetings: combine the best of both worlds (see section 7.3.6); (7) Test new formats and create inputs that spark interest and ‘stick’ (see section 7.3.7). Beyond these recommendations, and in addition to GCM implementation and stakeholder engagement, there are several political questions that will influence migration governance going forward. Amongst these political questions are: Is migration only high on the UN’s agenda in times of crisis? Is ‘crisis’ defined by crises in Western states (as it was in 2015/16 when Europe suddenly was center of refugee movements)? What effects will the Russian invasion of Ukraine, the war, and the subsequent high number of refugees have on the status of migration and refugees at the UN? Are we really witnessing a more inclusive governance, as the spaces for civil society (and media) are significantly shrinking in many countries in the world? Is this translating into the UN system, and how? Some of these questions may be answered through academic research. However, there also needs to be political and societal debates and observations outside the ‘bubbles’ of progressive actors who are pushing migration and inclusive processes at the UN.

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Classification, Main Recommendations, and Conclusion

Establish a More Systematic and Institutionalized role for NSAs and Local Authorities in the UN System

The process leading up to the adoption of the GCM has shown to be an example of the complexities of including actors other than states in the UN system. In addition, because migration is still considered a topic of national sovereignty, there have been few examples of governments working with NSAs (and even less so with local authorities) on the global level. The GCM process surely helped, at least for some friendly governments, to broaden their perspective and interest in exchanging with NSAs (see e.g., INT-NSA #5)—yet multi-stakeholder approaches and formats at the UN prove to be challenging. Drawing from the GCM process, I argue that the UN is overdue for creating a systematic and institutionalized role for NSAs and local authorities (see also Online Survey #Q17). Three elements are core to the creation of this: First, for every UN process, the modalities of stakeholder engagement need to be re-negotiated. Importantly, it depends on the topic, the co-facilitators of the modalities, the PGA, and many other issues in order to define stakeholder engagement and get states to agree to it (INT-GOV #19). Going forward, I suggest the UN system establish more substantive standards for intergovernmental negotiations and processes to include stakeholders and recognize different types of actors (see e.g., differences between SDG and GCM process). An inclusive approach would be to have NSAs’ and local authorities’ input built into formal sessions and negotiations so that member states would listen to them—instead of sessions before or after the negotiations, as it happened in the case of the GCM negotiations (Online Survey #Q17).21 Second, the multilateral system must re-evaluate and re-define its multistakeholder approach: Under the ECOSOC branch, there are a multitude of actor types. I argue that the UN system needs a more distinct definition and understanding of actors, clearer rules, and increased transparency about how to engage and work with them (e.g., is civil society different from private sector?). Finally, more reflection of the changes in the multilateral system, and the actors other than states who are engaging those changes, needs to happen. The 21

For example, one survey respondent stated: “The format of the negotiations for the GCM meant that civil society and other stakeholders were not allowed the floor (except if the co-facilitators allowed for it, at specific times), but could listen in the same room as states negotiated the text. This meant that the official negotiations were open (as opposed to formats in other processes such as the GFMD where states are very separate from civil society). This openness also meant that it was clear when stakeholders’ suggestions were picked up by states as we could hear it directly” (Online Survey #Q17).

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GCM process put mayors and local authorities on the radar, just as other processes have, e.g., global climate change processes. I argue, going forward, mayors will engage more and be more vocal about a multitude of global policy issues. To make their voices heard at the UN, they need to be recognized as stakeholders with very distinct roles. I believe this should occur in two parallel streams: One, governments begin including local authorities in their delegations (as advisors and experts); second, by granting them access as stakeholders to the UN system (in the case of the migration space, via the Mayors Migration Council and the Mayors Mechanism). Fora like the GFMD and more recently the IMRF have already showcased what this could look like and have become much more inclusive in recent years.22

7.3.2

Foster Multi-stakeholder Alliances for Global Migration Issues

Multi-stakeholder alliances have shown themselves to be key vehicles and provide added value to inform and influence a multilateral process (see section 4.2.4). Such alliances can build trust amongst different non-governmental and governmental actors and allow information and ideas to circulate in very different spheres. The buildup of such alliances takes time. They rely on the individuals (and their personalities) leading such groups and the participants learning how to work together to share information. Therefore, such alliances cannot be built ad-hoc but instead need time to be built up so they can share their levers during times of crisis or key decision points in a process.23 Such alliances may be built by all types of actors and should include diverse voices such as those from migrants, refugees, local authorities, and the private sector.

22

For example, Stürner-Siovitz (2021, p. 265) in her research on the role of cities in migration governance finds that “cities demand a stronger institutionalization of municipal access and participation in intergovernmental policy processes addressing migration and displacement.” 23 The Informals group is one key example for this as it started already in 2012 under the leadership of Peter Sutherland, taking on its work during several global processes: the SDG negotiations, the New York Declaration and the GCM process (see above).

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Strengthen Systemic Cooperation Between Actor Groups

For civil society, the private sector, and other types of NSAs, the process has also created access to and opportunities for new and different ways to engage on migration at the global level. Thus, a previously ‘closed shop’ of actors who dominated the GFMD, and other global formats has become more open. This broadened set of stakeholders that engage via the UN Migration Network and through global and regional migration processes. However, during the process, actors were very focused on their own peer group—e.g., civil society talked to civil society, and the private sector talked to the private sector. Further, local authorities were very focused on coordinating amongst themselves. Their action and advocacy were targeted towards governments and the UN system—consequently, active coordination with other stakeholder groups fell short (INT-CIT #35; INT-NSA #3, #7, #8, #9, #13, #16, #21, #23, #29; INT-IO #6, #25). A more systematic cooperation between stakeholder groups could, I argue, in the future, create more leverages with regards to visibility, pressure towards governments, and targeted advocacy for specific topics in multi-stakeholder settings. Thus, a more systematic cooperation between the private sector, civil society, and local authorities would give stakeholder engagement a more institutional basis. In addition, actor groups should do more to build on each other’s strengths and roles. My survey data (see Figure 7.2) shows the assessment of participating stakeholders on the individual strengths of actor groups (or the perceived lack thereof). One remarkable finding from this data is the assessment about who can best influence the international migration agenda. More than half of the respondents indicated that neither the actors nor intergovernmental organizations play the most significant role. This shows how actors have presumably realistic egoperceptions and that the assessment of their own ability to influence international migration policy agenda is minimal. Yet, with a more strategic approach. their influence will be improved and strengthened.

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Figure 7.2 Stakeholders’ assessment of the strengths of actor groups. (Source: Online Survey #Q15)

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Classification, Main Recommendations, and Conclusion

Connect Global Processes to the National and Local Level

The GCM process sparked national and local engagement and discussions on migration. Likewise, actors were able to bring their perspectives and inputs to the UN (INT-IO #28). While this was driven by NSAs and IOs, in future processes, an even more strategic engagement from the local level would increase the relevance of global processes. In addition, it would bring voices from the ground to fora on the global level and contribute to a different sort of framing and debate. Local and national consultations and feedback could strategically feed into such a process:24 The consultations cannot happen in NY- they have to start in the countries that are affected the most and from there the discussions in NY can start. As most negotiators do not have grasp of what is happening really and are on the hand pushing for agendas that are not really sustainable. (Online Survey #Q17).

While this is a difficult task, I believe it is also part of a strategy to increase the relevance, credibility, and future of the multilateral system. Local authorities and their mayors, in conjunction with civil society—including migrant-led organizations –, the private sector and other relevant local partners, such as national/local branches of IOs, could be an important contributor here.

24

One respondent to the online survey stated that one could “[d]esign national, regional, and sub-regional discussions and conversation, town hall meetings and public consultations to deepen the conversation and deliver on the commitments. Design a call for participation in selected countries and regions to advocate for inclusive participation of more voices from ‘un-heard, underrepresented,’ people” (Online Survey #Q17). Another respondent stated that “[m]any migrant advocacy groups represent region-specific migration processes—such as advocates for asylum seekers from sub-Saharan Africa in Italy or advocates for Central Americans in California. It is difficult for them to influence discussions at the *global* level, but they are and can be more successful at influencing bilateral relationships between origin countries and destination countries in a specific region. The GCM could have set in motion a range of forums for the negotiation of bilateral answers to region-specific problems, where stakeholders including civil society could be more influential than they can be in strictly global forums. But this did not appear to be a priority of the negotiators” (Online Survey #Q17).

7.3 The way Forward: Recommendations

7.3.5

261

Provide Resources to Bolster Diversity of Actors and Voices

My findings show that influence during this process was on the one hand created through the submission of statements and reports, but in large parts through the informal mechanisms with the co-facilitators, diplomats, or other actors. Therefore, it was crucial to be in New York or Geneva to make or sustain personal contacts as well as to listen to the negotiations directly. This requires resources in terms of time (which then creates a lack of time for other types of work), travel costs (which are very high if actors need to be in New York or Geneva), and networks and expertise of the UN system. Thus, more funding and financing strategies must exist to allow for stakeholder participation, especially for smaller groups and organizations (Online Survey #Q17). Importantly, funding mechanisms be set up from the beginning, with enough time to apply and prepare for a meeting, and in a transparent manner.25 For the continued and expanding engagement of actors of all kinds, resources and funding for diverse migration governance is needed. Such support can come from private funders; however, it should also be of interest of the international system—the UN and its agencies—and national governments to include diverse actors and perspectives systematically and continuously. Thus, there needs to be a dedicated mechanism to cover the travel costs of NSAs and local authorities. This could be funded by governments sitting within the UN Migration Network or funded by a private NGO with clear, non-discriminatory criteria of accessing resources.26

25

For example, one survey participant stated that “[t]he key challenge we faced was lack of resourcing to engage in a lengthy, complex and intense GCM process while simultaneously managing our ‘core’ advocacy through existing channels (i.e., other EU, CoE [Council of Europe] and UN processes as well as at national level). As a small Secretariat of just 4–5 persons, we would have needed at least an additional half- or full-time post to do really effective monitoring and advocacy around the GCM” (Online Survey #Q17). 26 For the IMRF, with the help of private donors, a mechanism for travel was created, yet the criteria mentioned in this recommendation have not been met, mainly due to the short-notice announcement of the in-person forum.

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Classification, Main Recommendations, and Conclusion

Find a Balance Between In-person and Virtual Meetings

Since 2020, hybrid and virtual formats have not only been a way to work together, but also have significantly improved (for example via the UN Migration Network, or during the 2020 GFMD). Therefore, actors without the time to travel or cover expensive travel costs could have the possibility of listening in or speaking at global events. In the online survey, conducted in the first half of 2020—a time where virtual formats were on the rise due to the COVID-19 pandemic, but also with the hope that a return to in-person meetings would happen soon—respondents suggested more online formats as a means of saving time and travel for stakeholders and allow for wider participation. Online formats would also provide other tools to gather input, such as field surveys (Online Survey #Q17).27 However, there are some disadvantages; a “digital format also increases possibilities for control while reducing the possibility for networking and direct exchange with actors who are physically present.” Online formats would allow for continuity, while in person meetings contribute to direct exchanges (Rother, 2021). This all calls for a hybrid future. Going forward, the UN system can and should use the best of both worlds. Online formats in the best possible way to convene strategically and gather input from diverse stakeholders, while also convening in-person for key moments that allow networking and the direct engagements of stakeholders within the multilateral system. Hybrid, in person, and virtual engagement in such processes needs resources of all kinds (see above).

7.3.7

Test New Formats and Create Inputs that Spark Interest and ‘Stick’

The GCM process also highlighted the overall weakness of debates and conversations in the multilateral system. Too “many people want to speak, the meetings are lengthy, too generic, and usually people who report/summarize will do so with their own subjective ‘twist’” (Online Survey #Q17). In this context, an added value of different stakeholders is to bring in new knowledge, ideas, and best practices (see section 4.1.3). My findings also show that the interventions that sparked new thinking and brought unusual perspectives to the room were the 27

One respondent stated, for example that “only professional bureaucrats can afford to spend time and money on conferences and round tables in NY or even nicer places like Mazatlan” (Online Survey #Q17).

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ones that stuck with governments (see e.g., INT-GOV #24). Hence, I argue that format, framing, and general ‘how’ of presentations made a huge difference in regard to how input was taken up by governments and negotiators. Stakeholders should use new formats and more creative ways of presenting findings where appropriate. This would also balance out some “NGO representatives that starts mimicking delegates” of governments (INT-GOV #19). In addition, at least for consultative processes and multi-stakeholder formats, more innovative and substantive formats should be developed. Because the UN system is difficult to change, NSAs should actively seek to find new ways to deliver content, hold discussions, conversations, and offer consultations (Online Survey #Q17). This is also where the framing of issues becomes a window of opportunity for strategically seizing opportunities on the side of NSAs and local authorities.

7.4

Research Outlook

Finally, I believe the research on stakeholder engagement in the migration field must be expanded. Existing research shows the emergence, role, and challenges of NSAs and local authorities in the global migration governance system (Gottardo & Cyment, 2019; Gottardo & Rego, 2021b; Lacroix et al., 2020; Schierup et al., 2018; Stürner-Siovitz, 2021; Stürner, 2020; Thouez, 2019, 2020). As the field continues to evolve, more and diverse research perspectives will help to further define and understand the space. As migration has—through the adoption of the GCM with its follow-up and review processes—become a true issue of global governance, governance research must step up and include migration and its processes into its discipline. For example, over the past few years, journals like Global Governance, have included increasingly more articles related to migration (and refugees). In the preparations for the first IMRF, academics focusing on global governance indicated their interest in working more deeply within the field of global migration governance, which will ultimately lead to more diverse and more in-depth research on the issue. Going forward, IR and global governance studies must also systematically analyze migration policies to follow the most recent developments. The methodological tools applied for this research offer several opportunities to deepen individual issues, continue the research about the influence of NSAs and local authorities in the migration space, compare other policy issues, and critically reflect on various developments. This research offers an initial take on the role and influence of NSAs on local authorities in global migration governance.

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By analyzing the 2017 and 2018 process of developing the GCM, I’ve transferred methodological tools applied and tested in research on NGOs about global environmental processes. In this final subchapter I address five major issues and spaces where further research and discussion might be of particular interest: (1) Further clarify and understand the role and types of actors engaging in global migration governance, including a better understanding of the role and influence of individuals in the international system (see section 7.4.1); (2) Compare the role and influence of NSAs and local authorities in global migration governance with other global policy fields (see section 7.4.2); (3) Better understand the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic on GCM implementation and global migration governance (see section 7.4.3); (4) Deepen and expand research on the role of non-state actors and local authorities in the implementation, review and follow-up of the GCM (see section 7.4.4); (5) Closely monitor the consequences of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine for global migration and refugee governance (see section 7.4.5).

7.4.1

Clarification of Role and Understanding of Actors

My research has shown the complexity of the types and understandings of different NSAs and local authorities. It has also shed light on the complexities and gaps for a structural engagement of actors in the UN system. Going forward, researchers need to more critically assess the role of individual actor groups and develop approaches that fulfill the criteria of equitable and inclusive access and accountability to the UN system. In addition, the role of local authorities in the UN system will evolve, which demands further research. Further, I argue that IR research and policy studies on migration need to look closer into the role of individuals in the international system—both individuals that stretch their institutional capacity, as well as individual actors. There is the figure of the political entrepreneur in the Multiple Streams Framework (MSF), who may well be an individual, not just a collective actor (Kingdon, 1984). Studies on political style can also be helpful for this purpose (see e.g., Deichmann, 2021). This deserves some further methodological considerations: We sometimes tend to forget that it is individual human beings who make the decisions and carry out the actions that constitute international relations. […] policies

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are more likely to emerge when the analysis of international relations gives some consideration to the role of individual actors (Kelman, 1970, p. 1)

One evident example is Peter Sutherland, former Special Representative of the SG on migration. There are also many other individuals in the UN system and from the field of stakeholders have shaped the way of working and access for NSAs (INT-GOV #18; INT-NSA #9). Thus, not only do institutions matter, but so do individuals (and personalities). This has been rarely addressed in political science and demands more interdisciplinary research.28

7.4.2

NSAs and Cities in Migration Governance in Comparison with other Policy Fields

Academic interest in the role of NGOs in global environmental politics has also risen dramatically over the past decade, with virtually every study of international environmental issues mentioning NGOs as important actors (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 65).

This research used methodological approaches developed to analyze the role of NGOs in global climate change processes. Regarding climate change, there is an abundance of literature analyzing the various roles, agency, and influence of NSAs since the early 2000s (see e.g., Arts & Verschuren, 2004; Corell & Betsill, 2018; Dupuits, 2016; Nasiritousi et al., 2016; Newell, 2000; Saucedo Dávila, 2019): The international relations literature on non-state actors broadly agrees that they play an important role in global environmental governance. While much of the early literature was concerned with exploring whether non-state actors represent a challenge to 28

For example, political psychology is starting to look into personality preferences in political election processes with an interdisciplinary approach of political science, behavioral science, and psychology, finding that “personalities matter” (Blais et al., 2021). Individual, smaller research projects also investigate the role of individuals for policy change, such as in a study by Heather Lovell on the case of UK low energy housing (Lovell, 2009). In research on diplomacy, increasingly ‘do-it-yourself’ politics and the human dimensions, interactions and networks of diplomats are acknowledged and discussed, albeit carefully. A study by the German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) argues that “Ultimately, it is this human dimension that will be the critical leverage point in enhancing diplomacy’s effectiveness in tomorrow’s online-offline diplomatic spaces” (Stanzel, 2018). Thus, researchers increasingly make the case for looking more closely at individuals and personalities in international relations (see e.g., Gebhard, 2016).

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state power, in recent years the focus has shifted to empirical documentation of their activities and examining their influence in international governance (Nasiritousi et al., 2016).

This research, however, has not compared the findings to the most recent findings on NSA influence in global climate change processes29 (or other global policy fields, such as human rights). Going forward, this type of research would help to better understand the mechanisms of influence of actors other than states and deepen the knowledge about the characteristics of NSA (and local authority) behavior in the international system. A comparison of the two, or more likely, a comparison of global policy fields and an assessment of the role and influence of local authorities and NSAs would offer several new perspectives to researching global governance and the characteristics of actors other than states. Better understanding the dynamics and roles of actors will help critically assess how actors can intervene in the best possible way, even more when working outside of their silos. Through my research, there is, for the first time, an opportunity to include migration governance as a case methodologically.30 29

For example, there is extensive analysis by Betsill & Corell (2001) on how non-state actors engage in global climate change processes; due to my findings and data based on their methodology for global migration governance in the case of the GCM, a comparison can be drawn on the ‘how’ actors work. Betsill & Corell (2001) describe it as the following for climate change processes: “NGOs participate in global environmental politics in a number of ways: they try to raise public awareness of environmental issues; they lobby state decisionmakers hoping to affect domestic and foreign policies related to the environment; they coordinate boycotts in efforts to alter corporate practices harmful to nature; they participate in international environmental negotiations; and they help monitor and implement international agreements. It is important to recognize that these activities are carried out by a wide range of NGOs in different political arenas that may involve unique goals, strategies, and political dynamics. […] We argue that it is important not to collapse conclusions in the literature about these organizations and their different spheres of activity. For instance, while NGOs may be central in the development of a global civil society, it is entirely possible that they are less successful in shaping new international institutions to address environmental issues. Students of NGOs need to employ a multifaceted view of the role of NGOs” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 67). 30 For example, one dimension would be, how actors work and exert influence, which is similar to how actors acted during the GCM process. Betsill and Corell note: “In reality, the relationship between NGO access and influence in international environmental negotiations is more nuanced than suggested in much of the literature. The increasing frequency of closed meetings means that NGOs, to promote their positions, must use more indirect strategies to keep abreast of negotiations they can no longer observe. Common strategies include developing and using informal relationships with state delegates, lurking in the corridors, talking

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Furthermore, mayors, local, and regional governments have increasingly put themselves on the radar in several global policy fields, including climate change and migration (at times even jointly on both issues). Because of that, they can be a “resource to bring global governance closer to the people, and an asset in the implementation of global agreements” (Chatham House, 2021). This lens can help to better understand the dynamics and challenges for cities to engage on the global level. Specifically, in climate change where mayors have set up significant organizations to intervene in global processes (such as C40 Cities or the Global Covenant of Mayors) and the migration space, where with the creation of the Mayors Migration Council after the GCM process, a city diplomacy entity has been created (C40 Cities, 2020; Hale, 2018; Mayors Migration Council, 2021): After the 2009 United Nations Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen concluded without an agreement on climate action, mayors around the world developed their own innovative solutions (Kaminis et al., 2018).

Having shown the opportunity structures for local authorities to engage in the GCM process, we now have a basis to compare the mechanisms for opportunity structures in other policy fields. Further, a comparison could look at the “architecture” of negotiations as well as their implementation, review, and follow up, because the GCM architecture bears resemblance to that adopted for the SDGs or the 2015 Paris Agreement in climate policy. In contrast to the latter, however, there is no obligation to draft ambitious and progressive national action plans, and states’ review of implementation will only be ‘voluntary’ (Lavenex, 2020, p. 686).

Beyond a contribution to IR studies, for migration research such an analysis and comparison will help assess and allow for better understanding of the current stance and role NSAs have in global migration governance. My data offer opportunities for further research in this regard. Finally, beyond a comparison with other global policy fields, researchers could compare the role of NSAs and local authorities in regional bodies, such as the EU or the AU, with global migration governance.31 to state delegates on cellular telephones, and even searching trash cans and copy machines in hopes of retrieving documents being worked on behind closed doors” (Betsill & Corell, 2001, p. 70). 31 For example, on the role of civil society in EU migration policy, see Banulescu-Bogdan (2011).

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7.4.3

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Classification, Main Recommendations, and Conclusion

COVID-19 and Migration—how Relevant is the GCM?

The importance of international migration for post-pandemic economic recovery is routinely overlooked, even in arguments for international solidarity as a matter of self-interest (Newland, 2020, p. 16).

The years since the adoption of the GCM have been shaped by the COVID19Pandemic—“health, lockdown, and economic impacts of COVID-19 all had immediate cyclical implications for migration” (Betts, 2022, p. 133). The UN Secretary-General in his reports on GCM implementation has emphasized the ever growing importance of the GCM and its objectives to protect migrants of the worsening hardships amplified by the Pandemic (United Nations General Assembly, 2020, 2021). Yet, Kathleen Newland, in an analysis put forward in October 2020, finds that states have not reacted to the COVID-19 pandemic in a coordinated, multilateral manner—even though the challenges are global. She believes the UN Migration Network and the GCM objectives are incredibly important during the Pandemic and in a post-pandemic world. An additional challenge due to the Pandemic is the phenomenon of immobility—and for this, the GCM and its tools do not offer any answers (Newland, 2020). Further, Rother (2022, p. 1) argues that the pandemic has influenced these deliberations in two major regards: First, by creating new and intensifying existing challenges for a rights-based approach to migration; and second, by thoroughly affecting the access to and forms of deliberations within spaces of global migration governance.

Surely, “the COVID-19 outbreak fundamentally shifted the way human mobility is managed” from travel restrictions to an increase in public-health considerations when managing migration (Kainz, 2020). There are two major risks for GCM implementation, both of which were accelerated by the COVID-19 pandemic. As Lena Kainz (2020) argues, they are: First, the implementation plans may be less ambitious; this includes processes for review and follow-up of the GCM on the national and regional level. Second, due to competing obligations and priorities emerging from the Pandemic, financing to implement the GCM, e.g., through the UN Multi-Partner Trust Fund, might be lowered or not given priority by national governments. For researchers, it might be of importance to assess the heightened or lowered ambitions of national governments regarding GCM implementation, review, and follow-up in the light of the COVID-19 pandemic. More broadly, the future scenarios for global migration governance, impacted by the pandemic could be

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further discussed (for scenarios for migration governace 2050, see Betts, 2022). In addition, the role of stakeholders in this situation might be of particular interest: have stakeholders been able to engage with national governments on GCM implementation? Have virtual and hybrid formats increased access to stakeholders (e.g., the UN Migration Network) or have they created more distance to policy makers (see, e.g. Rother, 2021, 2022)? And, has the IMRF managed to bring new life into the GCM for managing migration multilaterally in a post-pandemic world?32

7.4.4

The Role of Non-state Actors in the Implementation, Review, and Follow-up of the GCM

The UN Migration Network has been established to work with national governments, the UN system, and all relevant stakeholders to implement the GCM. Further research could investigate the opportunities to transmit information to the Network, as well as the 2022 IMRF, and the processes for NSAs and local authorities to assess their role and influence. This could also be done in comparison to UN agencies and governments, in order to analyze the particular influence on the IMRF outcomes. The methodological tools and frameworks provided by this research offer grounds to do a deep dive comparison to the GCM process. NSAs and local authorities (or their city diplomacy vehicles) must be better equipped with the tools and resources needed to assess their role and influence in order to advance their advocacy strategies. Researchers as well as evaluation institutes can be of help in this regard.

7.4.5

The war in Ukraine and its Consequences for Global Migration Governance

In the light of the Russian invasion to Ukraine in February 2022,33 I also pose the question about the consequences of war and how the ongoing unfolding refugee situation will impact global migration governance, in conjunction with 32

Also other authors have highlighted the importance of a strong global migration governance for an inclusive pandemic recovery (Gamlen & Frouws, 2021; Papademetriou et al., 2022). 33 On the lessons learned from 2015 and preparedness of Europe for high numbers of refugees, see e.g., Beirens (2022). On the role of the IMRF and the GCM in the new geopolitical setting, see e.g., Schweiger (2022).

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other emerging or forgotten crises. While the GCM does not cover refugee issues, many of the questions arising will need to be addressed by national governments and the EU. These questions are especially relevant in lieu of what the international community agreed to in the GCM. For example, topics such as access to basic services and non-discrimination policies. The invasion also highlights other political issues: will another ‘refugee crisis’ in Europe increase the relevance of global governance and joint action on migration? Will formerly GCM reluctant governments change their attitude? Or will a regional crisis draw away attention from global processes? The geopolitical scale of Russia’s invasion in Ukraine in whatever form it takes going forward, will influence migration and refugee governance. How it will impact governance will not be answered by this research, but I want to alert other researchers to carefully watch and analyze the effects of this war on global migration processes and governance going forward. Further, more broadly, it is key to monitor and evaluate the developments in both, global migration governance and in the global refugee regime. While there were political reasons for the development of two compacts, the gaps between the global refugee protection regime and what is addressed under migration governance are becoming more and more imminent, for example, when it comes to mixed migration movements.

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