Beyond Mexico 9780773573956

Citation preview

Beyond Mexico: Changing Americas, Volume 1

Jean Daudelin Edgar J. Dosman, Editors

Carleton University Press

Beyond Mexico

This page intentionally left blank

BEYOND MEXICO CHANGING AMERICAS Volume 1

Edited by Jean Daudelin and Edgar J. Bosnian

Carleton University Press & Canadian Foundation for the Americas

© Carleton University Press, Inc., 1995 Printed and bound in Canada

Canadian Cataloguing in Publication Data

Beyond Mexico (Changing Americas; 1) Includes bibliographical references. ISBN 0-88629-249-2 (bound) ISBN 0-88629-251-4 (pbk.) 1. Canada—Foreign relations—Latin America. 2. Latin America—Foreign relations—Canada. 3. Canada—Foreign economic relations—Latin America. 4. Latin America—Foreign economic relations—Canada. 5. Canada—Relations—Mexico. 6. Mexico—Relations-—Canada. I. Daudelin, Jean, 1960- . II. Dosman, Edgar J. III. Series. FC244.L3B49 1994 327.7108 F1029.5.L3B49 1994

C94-900807-9

Cover illustration: Original Art (sculpture) Las evocadones VI, 1992 by Paloma Torres. The publisher thanks Michael Bell for suggesting this artwork from the 'Terra Incognita" exhibit, shown at the Carleton University Art Gallery in 1993. Cover concept/execution: Carleton University Press and Cover to Cover/Coach House Printing Interior: EpiSet Corporation, Nepean, Ontario This edition is published as a collaboration between Carleton University Press and Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL). Carleton University Press gratefully acknowledges the support extended to its publishing program by the Canada Council and the financial assistance of the Ontario Arts Council. The Press would also like to thank the Department of Canadian Heritage, Government of Canada, and the Government of Ontario through the Ministry of Culture, Tourism and Recreation, for their assistance.

Carleton University Press 160 Paterson Hall Carleton University 1125 Colonel By Drive Ottawa, Ontario K1S 5B6 (613) 788-3740 Toll free number for orders in the U.S. only: 1-800-320-4606

Distributed in Canada by: Oxford University Press Canada 70 Wynford Drive Don Mills, Ontario M3C 1J9 (416) 441-2941 Toll free number for orders in Canada only: 1-800-387-8020

Changing Americas is a series of annual reviews published by Carleton University Press in collaboration with Canadian Foundation for the Americas. The present volume, Beyond Mexico, is our first publication in the series; the second volume is A New Policy for a Changing Hemisphere.

This page intentionally left blank

TABLE OF CONTENTS I

Introduction: The New Era in Canadian-Latin American Relations Jean Daudelin and Edgar J. Dosman

1

Mexico II

Sharing a Continent: Canadian-Mexican Relations since 1945

15

Stephen J. Randall

III

Rediscovering the Neighbourhood: Post NAFTA Mexican-Canadian Relations

35

Gustavo del Castillo V.

IV

Post-NAFTA: Can the United States, Canada and Mexico Deepen their Economic Relationship?

55

Leonard Waverman

V

Managing Canadian-Mexican Relations in the Post-NAFTA Era

81

Edgar J. Dosman

Beyond VI

La spirale du vide et du chaos: Essai sur la politique ha tienne de 1' tat canadien

101

Jacques Zylberberg

VII

Canada and Central America's Democratization Process

121

Elizabeth Spehar and Nancy Thede

VIII

Canada-OAS Relations: More of the Same?

151

Peter McKenna

IX

A Pathway to Urban Development: The Toronto-S o Paulo Municipal Professional Exchange Program

181

W. E. (Ted) Hewitt

X

Canada and Security Issues in Latin America

209

H. P. Klepak

XI

Changing Directions? Challenges Facing Canadian Non-Governmental Organizations in Latin America

237

Laura Macdonald

List of Contributors

257

LIST OF TABLES Table 1

Canadian Exports to Selected Latin American Countries, 1945-65

20

Table 2

Canadian Imports from Selected Latin American Countries, 1945-65

21

Table 3

Summary Market Data for Mexico, 1991-94

42

Table 4

Canada-U.S. Cross-border Anti-dumping Cases

63

Table 5

Canada-Mexico Agreements in Place

86

Table 6

Selected Indicators Comparison, Toronto-Sao Paulo

188

Table 7

Toronto-Sao Paulo Phase Agreement Projects in Order of Priority, 1987-93

192

Table 8

Toronto-Sao Paulo MPEP Project Outcomes, 1987-93

195

Table 9

Percentage of Total Canadian ODA by Region

241

This page intentionally left blank

This page intentionally left blank

I INTRODUCTION: THE NEW ERA IN CANADIAN-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS Jean Daudelin Edgar J. Dosman Une nouvelle ere pour les relations entre le Canada et I'Amerique latine. Resume : Depuis 1989,1'importance de I'Amerique latine pour la politique etrangere canadienne s'est accrue drastiquement. La signature de 1'Accord de libre echange nord-americain (ALENA) et 1'accession a 1'Organisation des etats americains marquent un point de non retour dans les relations du Canada avec les pays de 1'hemisphere. Des facteurs economiques sont au coeur de ce changement. Les menaces combinees que representent 1'emergence de blocs economiques continentaux, les tendances du grand voisin americain aux politiques unilaterales, ainsi que le spectre d'une structure commerciale en "hub-and-spoke" dans les Ameriques, ont fortement contribue a imposer 1'option hemispherique au Canada. Toutefois, les avantages politiques de celles-ci ne sont pas negligeables: la fin de la Guerre froide vient encore estomper la vocation europeenne du Canada et renforcer la predominance des Etats-Unis dans

1'environnement exterieur canadien. Dans ce contexte, les pays d'Amerique latine representent la possibilite d'une «troisieme option » politique tout-a-fait au diapason de 1'attachement du Canada au multilateralisme. Tant au niveau economique que politique, cette nouvelle etape des relations du Canada avec I'Amerique latine est marquee non seulement par une intensite plus grande mais aussi, plus fondamentalement, par un changement de nature. Les rapports d'aidant a aides font main tenant place a un partenariat fonde sur une communaute d'objectifs et d'interets. Le Canada et les pays de la region ne peuvent dorenavant avoir que des relations normales c'est-a-dire que, sans etre necessairement depourvues de tensions, celles-ci ne peuvent plus etre qu'essentiellement egalitaires. Dans ce nouveau contexte, le double defi du Canada est de donner a sa politique dans la region une coherence qui lui manque encore et, pour ce faire, d'approfondir sa connaissance encore tres fragmentaire de nos voisins du Sud.

BEYOND MEXICO

CANADIAN-LATIN AMERICAN RELATIONS have changed dramatically since the end of the Cold War. Ottawa's Latin American Strategy, launched in 1989, heralded the end of a decade of drift toward the region. There was little to indicate, however, that the economic and political frontiers of the Americas that are relevant to Canadians would move southward so quickly. The North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) had not yet been conceived; indeed, the ink was hardly dry on the Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement. Overall, there were few indications that longstanding Canadian hesitations regarding involvement in Latin America would be put to rest. Business remained nervous and Canadian banks were still limiting their exposure in the region. Security policy, still Cold War-driven, continued to avoid commitments in the Americas. Central America alone, supported by a groundswell of interest from Canadian nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), occupied foreign policy planners, but its civil wars only reinforced the broader (and totally inadequate) public vision of Latin America as a region of problems— debts, dictatorships, drugs and deforestation. Two developments provided the catalyst for change. Canada finallyjoined the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1990. A year later, the Canadian-Mexican-U.S. NAFTA negotiations were underway. Both developments, particularly NAFTA, triggered a process of discovery by Canadians of Mexico and Latin America unparalleled in post-1945 external relations. Indeed, if the operative word during the first years of this transition since 1989 is "discovery," the signing into force of NAFTA on January 1, 1994 is more appropriately "consolidation." A point of no return has been reached. Mexico is now an important bilateral partner, and as much a part of our new foreign policy environment as any country, with the obvious exception of the U.S. The events that shook Chiapas and then all of Mexico were front-page news for many days in Canada. For business and government, Mexico is as permanent a part of the geopolitical landscape as Western Europe. Beyond Mexico, Latin America and the Caribbean is now perceived as a region of growth and potential rather than economic and political crisis.1 This changed view has been marked by a quantum leap forward in Canadian hemispheric initiatives of all kinds— security and governance, trade and investment, environment, human rights, and so forth. Most important of all, Canadian 2

INTRODUCTION

interest in Latin America is matched by a reciprocal, growing, Latin American interest in Canada. CONVERGING INTERESTS BEYOND NAFTA

International and regional developments, particularly on the economic level, have been the conditioning factor behind this transition in Canadian-Latin American relations. For the first time, Canadian core interests are engaged in the Americas at three levels: international trade policy, market access, and regional governance. Even if Canadian foreign policy towards the Americas in the postNAFTA era is in its earliest stages, there is a growing realization that these interests will deepen relations in the coming years. Indeed, there is an increasing perception in every sector that a special impulse or intensity in the relationship will distinguish it in the future from relationships with other geographic regions such as Europe or Asia-Pacific. Trade Policy

International trade policy is a game of very high stakes for Canada. Not only is the country much more trade-dependent than the U.S. (27 percent vs. 11 percent of GDP),2 but a 70.37 percent concentration of trade with the U.S.3 increases its vulnerability still further. Trade policy is therefore a consuming passion in Canadian foreign policy, and it gives rise to a constant search for other trading nations which share fundamental interests: preventing the formation of exclusive regional trade blocs, limiting U.S. unilateralism, and preventing a hub-and-spoke arrangement in the Americas. Ottawa has found that key Latin American countries share these concerns and approaches to trade policy, providing an important basis for collaboration. At the broadest level both the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement and NAFTA were responses to regional economic integration in Europe (and less formally in East Asia). In this sense the North American continentalist option had a logic and dynamic. Mexico's interest in Canada accelerated sharply after 1985 because of its fear of exclusion from Canada-U.S. free trade; indeed Mexico made its decision to seek a bilateral trade agreement with the U.S. only when it became clear that Europe presented no viable option.4

3

BEYOND MEXICO

More recently, the European, U.S. and Japanese positions during the recently concluded GATT Uruguay Round negotiations showed that the quest for some hedge against this triad makes good sense. From this perspective also, the Canadian and Mexican policy of negotiation at both levels (NAFTA and the GATT) was entirely coherent—playing "two pianos," so to speak. These two countries could argue that regional free trade also contributed to strengthening the movement toward global trade liberalization; at the same time, NAFTA was a defensive option to ensure access to a large market—a point not lost on other Latin American countries also concerned with entering a globally competitive free trade area before it is too late. While it is not clear to what extent regional integration will impede or facilitate further trade liberalization in the post-Uruguay Round era, such a development is imperative for Canada, given its trade vulnerability. Canada therefore has an interest in the expansion of NAFTA in South America and the establishment of bridges to Asia-Pacific by including like-minded countries in trade policy, such as South Korea. Some Latin American countries (Mexico, Chile, and Colombia, among others) also recognize the need to prevent exclusive trade blocs and are moving in the same direction, generally speaking. The second threat is that of U.S. unilateralism. In spite of repeated professions of attachment to free trade, the Clinton Administration has not stopped its demands for "fair" trade practices from its partners. Leonard Waverman's chapter in this book shows quite clearly that, in spite of the Free Trade Agreement, Canada is still far from receiving "national treatment." This is even truer of countries which do not have such agreements with the United States. The institutionalization of trade relations through NAFTA rule-making has been seen in Canada as a partial protection against the U.S.'s bouts of commercial "moodiness," and as a way to contain them. This is another side of the continentalist logic, as both Mexico's and Canada's extreme dependence on the U.S. market makes them ready targets of U.S. unilateralism. Once again, though, support for integration is shown as a mostly defensive posture. The spectre of a "hub-and-spoke" trade system developing in the region is the third member of the threatening troika. Such a system develops when one country, the "hub," has contractually guaranteed access to many national markets, while the weaker 4

INTRODUCTION

"spokes" do not have free trade across the system. Productive investments and trade are thus controlled by the "hub," because it offers the widest trade opportunities. This is one of the reasons why Canada had little choice but to join NAFTA; otherwise, only U.S.-based plants would have had privileged access to the three markets. With the conclusion of NAFTA and the Uruguay Round, the issue of NAFTA expansion to South America, beginning with Chile, was important for both Canada and partners in the South. Chile is a showcase economy in Latin America and has a strong Canadian presence, but Chile was also a test-case for the future of NAFTA. The decision, taken at the Miami Summit, to progressively extend NAFTA to the whole hemisphere virtually ensures that a "hub-and-spoke" model will not apply to the Americas. This is a major step forward as a disorderly patchwork of agreements centred on the U.S. would have put smaller countries, including Canada, at a great disadvantage. Market Access Canada also faces problems in accessing stable and growing markets for its exports. Where are the new "third options?" Certainly not in Europe. Despite early efforts during the last 30 years to retain market share with Western Europe, trade in relative terms continues to decline. It is now clear that there are two growth areas for Canada: Asia-Pacific, the fastest growing area of the world economy, and Latin America. Asia-Pacific has been well known in Canadian trade circles for the last 15 years and this attention will continue to increase. Latin America is largely unknown, but a new dynamic is underway that signals a major advance in commercial relations. It is not a question of either Latin America or Asia-Pacific. The fact is these markets both deserve priority and should be seen as complementary rather than competitive. During the 1980s, Canadian-Latin American trade stagnated, with Canadian exports increasing by only 4 percent between 1986 and 1990. In contrast, exports to Asia, excluding Japan, almost doubled (89.4 percent). Between 1990 and 1992, however, the pattern changed as the recovery of Latin America took hold. In these two years alone, Canadian exports to that region grew by 21 percent, while those to Asia increased by only 7.4 percent. Nevertheless, the current value of trade with Latin America, barely recovering from the post1982 debt crisis in the region, is still only 2 percent of total exports.

5

BEYOND MEXICO

Current developments, aside from NAFTA itself, suggest the prospect of a rapid increase in trade and investment between Canada and Latin America. First, despite the low numbers, Latin America imports much more per capita from Canada than Asia (U.S.$5.63 vs. U.S.$2.25). Moreover, exports to Latin America and the Caribbean include a much higher component of manufactured products than of primary goods (55.8 percent and 41.5 percent vs. 30.3 percent and 63.4 percent respectively) .5 It is a market open to Canadian technology, indeed one that welcomes it as an alternative to the U.S. Similarly, a common culture and shared values open the region to the export of the full range of Canadian services. The spectacular growth of Canadian business interests in Mexico and Latin America since 1989 demonstrate both the relative ease of entry as well as broadly shared consumer tastes underpinning the new commercial relationship. Second, structural changes in both the Canadian and Latin American economies facilitate greater commercial interest and interaction. Canadian companies have had to adapt to global competition; more businesses have to export to survive. The legendary sluggishness of the protected Canadian private sector is changing.6 At the same time Latin American countries have opened their economies, dramatically expanding the regional import market to U.S.$150 billion. Although the Latin American and Caribbean market is intensely competitive, Canadian businesses now realize the potential of this growing area. Conversely, Mexicans sold products to Canada worth $3 billion in 1993—an indicator that the country is no longer a minor trading partner. Third, and reflecting the above, Canadian investment has returned to Latin America as companies enter the region for the long haul. The current estimate for Latin America and the Caribbean is between $15 and $16 billion. Not only does it mark the definitive break with the gloom of the 1990s, but it covers many sectors and countries from Chile to Cuba. Business from every part of the country is active throughout Latin America, and is based on a much larger number of small and medium-sized firms than before. There is already, in these early stages, a foundation for future growth which previously did not exist. It is worth noting, for example, that 420 companies took part in Expo-Canada—held in Mexico City, March 22-25, 1994—the largest trade show mounted outside Canada. 6

INTRODUCTION

Official trade promotion resources in Ottawa are in the process of being reallocated from Western Europe to strengthen commercial relations with Latin America. It has not escaped attention that export promotion initiatives in Latin America have yielded more per dollar invested than any other region including Asia. Major new programs such as Access North America have been developed with the private sector. Ministers in the trade field want to visit the region. In short, a framework is emerging for a new era in commercial relations. The Political Dimension Despite the emergence of converging interests in trade policy and commercial relations since 1989, the accompanying evolution of the political relationship with Latin America and the Caribbean has been even more remarkable. As Gustavo del Castillo, Stephen Randall and Peter McKenna make clear in their respective chapters, Canada's involvement in hemispheric institutions has taken a sharp turn. Hal Klepak demonstrates how quickly Canada has become engulfed in hemispheric security issues. Moreover, in and outside the OAS, Canadians have been vocal and active in human rights, democratic development, and the environment. At both the bilateral and the multilateral levels, political issues in the Americas have gone from the periphery to the centre of Canadian foreign policy concerns, adding a new dimension to foreign policy and altering relations with the United States. The withdrawal of Canadian forces from Europe, following the end of the Cold War, underlines one reason for this southward trend in foreign policy: the comforting post-war Atlanticist pillar of Canadian foreign and defence policy—of which NATO was a component—has been severely weakened. Moreover, the European connection with and interest in Canada has been eroded as the Community itself has turned inward. Internationally, Canada faces the 1990s with diminishing options for diversifying its external relations. In these circumstances, the U.S. relationship has taken on an even greater importance in the post-Cold War era. Even before 1989, the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement signalled the end of the European "third option," and at the same time initiated a new approach to the management of the U.S. relationship, the perennial challenge of Canada foreign policy. 7

BEYOND MEXICO

But if the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement increased the salience of that relationship, it also created a powerful initiative to develop and institutionalize relations with Mexico and the other countries of the Americas, and also to reinforce hemispheric institutions. NAFTA itself suggests the well-known multilateral Canadian instinct is at work, but this time in co-operation with a major country of the one region (Latin America) that Ottawa deliberately kept at arm's length after 1945. Circumstances had changed; after some hesitation, both Mexico and Canada realized the political as well as the economic importance of a trilateral NAFTA rather than separate bilateral deals with the U.S. If the continental reframing of our foreign policy in the CUSFTA gave the United States even more importance than it already enjoyed, it also created incentives to develop and institutionalize our relationship with the other countries of the region, and to reinforce the hemispheric institutions already in place. Mexico and Latin America generally share with Canada the problem of dealing with a neighbouring superpower in the absence of other great powers to balance this overwhelming influence. Canada therefore has a strategic interest in the Americas which is qualitatively different from its concern with other regions of the world. The U.S. factor in the post-Cold War order locks both Canadians and their Latin American and Caribbean counterparts into a common search for political balance through community building— a process likely to be even more complex than that in Europe—and compels them to develop a shared vision and workable inter-American institutions for a New World society. Unlike Europe, the countries of the Americas are only beginning a serious institutional response to integration. NAFTA has at least set this process in motion. This long-term strategic interest in managing the U.S. relationship, shared by Canada and its regional neighbours, implies a fundamental change of attitude. Latin American countries can no longer be seen primarily as vacation spots or aid recipients; they appear increasingly as trade partners and competitors. And while there is certainly some potential for conflict in the new relationship, it is also clearly more egalitarian; it is a "normal" relationship between states, each with its share of assets and problems. Similarly, the process of economic integration also generates a transnational approach to social, economic and political issues throughout the 8

INTRODUCTION

Americas, and it widens the scope for coalition building. The NGO sector has a long and extensive involvement in Latin America, and both trade unions and the private sector are adopting a continental outlook. Similarly the Canadian-Latin American constituency is growing fast and diversifying. Such changes give a new meaning to the word "co-operation," as is made clear in Laura Macdonald's contribution to this book: local issues and political advocacy across borders will now make up a central part of the agenda of non-governmental organizations. Once again, the concept of "partnership" replaces a "North-South" perspective, and this is true for actors in both Canada and Latin America. THE SEARCH FOR COHERENCE

The implication of community building is the need for coherence in Canada's new policy toward the Americas. Not only trade and commercial relations, but also democracy and human rights, ODA, security—in short, the full range of interests—are already engaged in the Americas. The challenge facing the 1994 foreign policy review was to reach out to the various constituencies in the search for a consensus on Canadian interests in the region and the strategic initiatives required for their achievement. "Coherence," "strategic initiatives," "priorities"—these are all essential, of course, but Canadians and Latin Americans are in the first stages of acquaintance. Thus the first requirement of a coherent policy is to identify the issues. One implication of the speed at which we are entering the Americas is the relative lack of perspective and depth in our understanding of the region. To re-orient regional priorities from Europe towards Latin America, Canadians must overcome a profound knowledge gap. Although well on their way to more stable and democratic political arrangements, and to more predictable economic processes, Latin American countries are currently far from being as reliable and steady partners as Western Europe. The events in Chiapas, the assassination of Donaldo Colosio, which took most observers by surprise, and the recent peso crisis, should remind us that Mexico is not France or Britain, nor even Italy. And while, for instance, the Brazilian economy is once again promising, a monthly inflation rate of more than 40 percent, as recently as last spring, 9

BEYOND MEXICO

should warn us about the enthusiasm of financial columnists regarding that country's stock market. The point here is not to recoil with terror, but to maintain perspective: the fact that Canada has little choice and much to gain by a full partnership with Latin America should not keep us from understanding the problems that may be involved. In their turn, Latin Americans will want to know about the constitutional and other problems facing Canada. The objective of this volume, therefore, is to stimulate debate on the issues, challenges and policy alternatives facing Canada in the Americas. Serious resource problems will limit capabilities in the 1990s, and some options have already had to be exercised— adherence to NAFTA for example. Yet, it is pointless to discuss the "if s" of further integration in the Americas. The more useful debate should focus on the direction it should take, on the ways it could be broadened, deepened and improved, and on how domestic social policy can more effectively balance the costs of adjustment. Other issues, such as regional security and hemispheric institutionbuilding, require study and definition to permit Canada to initiate policy in the mutual interest. The first part of the volume examines NAFTA, the principal debate in Canadian-Latin American relations. The chapters are designed to provide context—historical, political, bureaucratic and a Mexican perspective—in order to facilitate debate on the future of trilateral relations. Part two goes beyond Mexico in addressing current important themes in Canadian-Latin American relations: the continuing drama in Haiti; Canadian approaches to democratization in Central America; the OAS; municipal cooperation (Sao PauloToronto) ; security co-operation between Canada and Latin America; and, finally, the challenge of NGOs in the region. The editors wish first to thank all the authors for their contributions and Michelle Hibler, FOCAL's Director of Communications, for the major role she played in the preparation of this volume. Similarly Juanita Montalvo, FOCAL's Director of Programs, as well as members of her team—Frances Phillips, Wendy Drukier, Elisabeth Karner, Marta Monies, Christina Laur, Julia Madriz and Andrea Clements—were always available to assist the editors. Maureen Johnson from the North-South Institute, as well as Noel Gates, edited the manuscript with their usual professionalism and patience. Hal Klepak was a source of constant advice, good humour and 10

INTRODUCTION

support. Deep thanks are also due to the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs, whose Military and Strategic Studies Program awarded Jean Daudelin a post-doctoral fellowship which allowed him to devote as much time as was necessary to this endeavour. Finally we wish to thank Carleton University Press, particularly John Flood and Jennie Strickland, for their comments and support for the publication of this first Annual Review. We, of course, take responsibility for errors and omissions. Jean Daudelin Edgar J. Dosman FOCAL, December 1994

NOTES 1. Some countries, particularly in the Caribbean and Central America, are not included in this promising vision. But most of the larger countries are perceived to have emerged from the "lost decade" of the 1980s. 2. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), International Trade 1993 Statistics (Geneva 1993), 12. 3. International Monetary Fund, Direction of Trade Statistics Yearbook, 1993 (Washington B.C.), 123. 4. See Gustavo del Castillo's chapter in this book. 5. Statistics Canada, 1991. These data include Japan. Excluding Japan, the percentages are 44.5 and 45.3 respectively. 6. External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "From a Trading Nation to a Nation of Traders," Policy Planning Staff Paper, No. 92/5 (Ottawa, 1992).

11

This page intentionally left blank

MEXICO

This page intentionally left blank

II SHARING A CONTINENT: CANADIAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS SINCE 1945 Stephen J. Randall

Les relations entre le Canada et le Mexique depuis 1945 Resume : La signature de 1'accord de libreechange nord-americain (ALENA) en 1993 marque I'aboutissement d'une longue marche vers 1'acceptation par le Canada de son appartenance privilegiee au continent americain. Quatre ans apres 1'accession du Canada au statut de membre a part entiere de 1'Organisation des Etats americains, cet accord met pratiquement fin a son refus traditionnel de choisir entre 1'Amerique et 1'Europe. L'importance, pour cette veritable conversion, de 1'intensification des relations avec le Mexique ne saurait etre sous-esumee. Cinquante ans apres 1'etablissement de relations diplomatiques entre les deux pays, le Mexique occupe maintenant une position privilegiee au sein des partenaires internationaux du Canada. Les deux pays ont pris fait et acte d'une communaute d'interets et d'orientations de politique etrangere qui existait deja de longue date. Au coeur de celleci se trouve bien sur leur relation privilegiee mais quelques fois difficile avec

les Etats-Unis. L'importance cruciale du marche americain pour leur economic, de meme que la volonte des deux pays de proteger leurs ressources naturelles des velleites americaines, definissaient d'emblee des interets materiels communs. Petites puissances, le Canada et le Mexique se sont par ailleurs attaches a moderer dans 1'hemisphere, tout specialement dans les Caraibes et en Amerique centrale, les tendances les plus extremes d'une politique americaine par trop surdeterminee par la guerre froide. C'est dans ce contexte que se sont developpees, au-dela d'echanges economiques qui demeurent fondamentaux, des relations diversifiees, couvrant les domaines de la culture, de la science et de la technologic, ainsi que du tourisme. Plus recemment, une dimension strategique est venue s'ajouter, avec la volonte commune aux deux pays de s'attaquer aux problemes que posent le trafic des stupefiants et les flux de refugies. L'ALENA est en somme venu intensifier un interet et une comprehension mutuelle que cet eventail de relations avait d'ores et deja etablis.

BEYOND MEXICO

CANADA'S CONCLUSION IN 1993 of a trilateral trade agreement with the United States and Mexico marked not so much the culmination of Canada's relationship with the nations of the Americas as another stage in its evolution. Caught between its own European colonial heritage and a longstanding U.S. hegemony in the western hemisphere, Canada has for most of the twentieth century occupied an ambiguous position in the Americas. For several decades prior to joining the Organization of American States (OAS) in 1989, Canadians debated the merits of Canadian membership. The North American Free Trade Agreement was also the subject of extensive controversy in Canadian society. Behind this apparent historical uncertainty in both policy and public attitudes toward the Americas, Canada has become increasingly an "American" nation since the end of World War II, with growing bilateral and multilateral ties in the hemisphere.1 Mexico, on which this volume focuses, effectively illustrates the nature and extent of Canadian involvement in the area. To the extent that the past informs the present and shapes the future, it is useful to survey the development of the Canada-Mexico relationship since 1945, noting the factors that have driven the bilateral relationship and the ways in which the two countries may evolve in the future. Several considerations have shaped the bilateral relationship. By far the most significant has been the historical relationship of both countries with the United States and the U.S. economic, political and strategic hegemony in the region. Nothing has been as important in the formation of the Canada-Mexico dynamic as the presence and policies of the United States; nor is that reality likely to alter in the foreseeable future. No matter whether it was the interest of Canada and other Latin American countries in Canadian participation in the inter-American system, expanded Canada-Latin America trade and investment linkages, such Cold War considerations as relations with Cuba since 1959, or the Central American crises of the 1980s, few developments have been unaffected by U.S. policy. Both small powers (although Canada is generally considered a middle power, the term has lost much of its early Cold War meaning) , Canada and Mexico have a vested interest in tempering the more extreme inclinations in U.S. hemispheric policies. Both nations have given an almost religious devotion to multilateralism since 1945, seeing their own salvation largely within the context of the 16

SHARING A CONTINENT

major international organizations of the Cold War era, whether the United Nations or the Organization of American States. Historically, Canada has had a less troubled relationship with the United States than has Mexico, but some similarities of experience between the two countries have tended to push them together to seek common cause, whether it has been the quest to ensure access for their exports to U.S. markets, efforts to protect their natural resources, or the desire to temper U.S. Cold War policies in the Caribbean and Central America. During the half century since Canada and Mexico established formal diplomatic relations in 1944, contacts between the people of the two countries have ranged from trade and foreign investment to scientific and technological co-operation and through extensive (though largely one-way) tourism and cultural linkages. The latter have included formal bilateral agreements and such smaller initiatives as the development of Canadian studies programs in Mexico, Mexican studies in Canada, and "study abroad" programs in Mexico initiated by Canadian universities.2 Relations have been overwhelmingly economic in nature, rarely political, and only tangentially strategic. Using a broad definition of strategic considerations, that dimension of the relationship may have altered in the past decade with growing concern over such developments as the implications for both societies of the narcotics trade and of flows of refugees or immigrants from Central America. Another factor that has shaped the bilateral relationship has been Mexico's historical perception of its own importance in the hemisphere as a leader of the other Latin American states. Mexico has historically taken considerable initiative not only within the inter-American system, by opposing the United States on critical issues at times, but also seeking advantage in closer ties with the U.S.'s northern neighbour, whether during World War II or more recently in the trilateral trade discussions. It was not mere coincidence that both Mexican and Canadian governments maintained contacts with Castro's Cuba when the United States broke ties and pressured the rest of the hemisphere to follow suit. The debate in both countries over the North American Free Trade Agreement also served to heighten mutual awareness and understanding between the two countries. Such contacts 17

BEYOND MEXICO

and developments have, of course, been incremental in the course of the century, as such scholars asJ.C.M. Ogelsby, Herman Konrad, James Rochlin, Chris Armstrong and H.V. Nelles, among others, have noted in their analyses of the development of the earlier trade, investment and diplomatic patterns in the bilateral relationship.3 World War II served, ironically, as both catalyst and impediment to an expanded Canadian role in the hemisphere. On the one hand, Canadian involvement in the European war prior to U.S. entry placed some strains on the relationship with the then neutral and isolationist United States. Even with the U.S. entry into the war following the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the Roosevelt administration remained opposed to the idea of an expanded Canadian diplomatic role in the hemisphere, perceiving this as an extension of British imperial power in the Americas, rather than as a simple Canadian initiative. Hence, officials of the Franklin Roosevelt administration in 1941 reacted very negatively when Mackenzie King's Liberal government considered joining the Pan-American Union (the precursor of the Organization of American States). Nonetheless, the King government had found considerable interest in Latin America, and within the Canadian business community, in a more formal Canadian involvement in the region; as a result, by the end of the war Canada had established diplomatic relations with most Latin American countries.4 In that development Mexico was an important player. Once the King government indicated a desire to open new diplomatic posts in Latin America, Mexico showed considerable interest in expanding relations. Canada already had a trade commissioner in Mexico City, but clearly that post was inadequate to meet the major diplomatic issues that arose in wartime. As early as 1940, Mexican representatives in Washington opened discussions with Canadian officials on the possibility of establishing formal diplomatic ties. This initiative coincided with a Canadian trade mission to Latin America and with growing support for an expanded Canadian role in the hemisphere from key figures in the Department of External Affairs— including Hugh Keenleyside, Jean Desy (then ambassador to Brazil) and Escott Reid, who had been a member of the trade mission. Especially important was the support of O.D. Skelton, the main architect of much of Canada's foreign policy in this period and King's closest confidant.5 18

SHARING A CONTINENT

At that stage, Canada and Mexico were hampered in their desire to expand relations by the ongoing controversy between Great Britain and Mexico over Mexico's nationalization in 1938 of British and most of the other foreign-owned oil companies operating in the country. Mexico's refusal to meet British demands had led Britain to rupture diplomatic relations, and since Britain had been the normal conduit for formal diplomacy between Mexico and Canada, that rupture left the two American nations without effective means of negotiation. Yet there were competing national interests. Britain, the United States and Canada were equally interested during the war in ensuring that Latin American countries adhered to a pro-Allied stance. Leading political groups in Argentina and Chile were strongly proAxis, and the controversy over the oil nationalization, which included boycotts of Mexican oil by American and British firms, threatened to push Mexico into the opposing camp.6 Further, there was the North American scope of the mutual defence agreements reached by King and Roosevelt at Hyde Park and Ogdensburg, and both administrations wished to retain Mexican co-operation. Yet, distracted by more pressing wartime issues, the Bang government was not aggressive on the Latin American connection, and the situation was compounded by the fact that King's Minister of Trade, James A. MacKinnon, who had led the 1941 trade mission and was enthusiastic about Mexico, did not have King's ear.7 The result was that the question of opening a legation in Mexico dragged on through the war years. Indeed, other Latin American countries received priority over Mexico, with legations opening in Brazil, Argentina, and Chile several years before one was established in Mexico. As the war wound up to a climax in 1944, and with the restoration of British-Mexican diplomatic relations, Canada and Mexico were better placed to formalize their own relationship. That year Canada appointed its first ambassador to Mexico, W.F. Turgeon, previously ambassador to Argentina; Mexico reciprocated with the appointment of Francisco del Rio y Canedo.8 At the time that formal diplomatic ties were established, the linkages between the two countries were minimal. Although they shared some strategic interests during World War II and the early Cold War, the main area of contact was economic and remained so for the next two decades. In 1945, Mexico was the second largest 19

BEYOND MEXICO

Table 1

Canadian Exports to Selected Latin American Countries 1945-65 (Millions of Canadian Dollars)9 Country

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

6.0

13.4

6.8

19.4

32.7

16.7

15.8

11.5

19.8

17.5

Colombia

5.0

14.8

22.7

16.6

17.4

Cuba

4.5

18.0

17.5

13.0

52.6

Mexico

8.2

17.6

37.1

38.0

51.0

Venezuela

4.1

25.5

30.8

35.3

73.0

Argentina Brazil

Latin American importer of Canadian goods, following Brazil (See table 1). In 1946, Trade and Commerce Minister MacKinnon returned to Mexico with a trade mission, and the following year the two countries concluded a trade agreement extending most favoured nation status to each other. Mexican purchases from Canadian producers continued to rise, more than doubling by 1950. By that date Cuba had surpassed Brazil, and Venezuela—with its large-scale purchases of Canadian goods—had moved into first place as Canada's most significant customer in the region. Mexico, however, overtook the others by 1955 and held the lead for another decade. In terms of Canadian imports, Venezuela has consistently been, since World War II, the major Latin American exporter, primarily of crude oil for refining in eastern Canada. Mexico held second place in 1945, 1950 and 1960, occasionally falling to third place behind Venezuela and Brazil in intervening and subsequent years. Clearly, Canadian trade with Latin America as a whole, and with Mexico specifically, was a small portion of the country's overall trade in the twenty years that followed World War II. In 1945 Canadian exports to Latin America were less than 2 percent of total Canadian exports; by 1965 they had risen to only 3.7 percent. Canadian imports from the region were slightly more important, ranging from

20

SHARING A CONTINENT

Table 2 Canadian Imports from Selected Latin American Countries 194565 (Millions of Canadian Dollars)

1945

1950

1955

1960

1965

Argentina

7.3

10.9

4.4

19.4

5.4

Brazil

7.6

28.2

30.7

19.8

35.6

11.7

13.3

22.2

16.6

16.8

7.5

4.1

10.0

13.0

5.3

Mexico

13.5

33.0

28.8

38.0

27.2

Venezuela

17.3

87.3

187.3

35.3

254.7

Country

Colombia Cuba

5 percent of total Canadian imports in 1945 to a high of 6.7 percent in 1955, prior to falling off significantly to only 3.5 percent in 1960. Comparatively small as that trade was, many Canadian officials and business interests continued to view Latin America as a promising area for trade and investment. That was the main attraction of the region throughout the 1950s, although concerns over Cold War defence intensified after the Cuban revolution in 1959.10 In early 1953, C. D. Howe, Canada's Minister of Trade and Commerce, led another highly successful goodwill trade mission to Latin America; he visited eight countries, including the relatively insignificant Haiti and the Dominican Republic.11 Howe had a longstanding involvement in Latin American business, having negotiated a large grain elevator contract with Argentina in the early 1930s, and he saw Latin America, including Mexico, as an area of potential growth. That perception was reflected in his report that "as in Canada, the whole area is in the process of economic expansion with higher production, rising living standards and increasing import requirements. We are natural trading partners, each in need of what the other can supply."12

Howe's delegation spent five days in Mexico, meeting with, among others, members of Mexico's government and business elite, 21

BEYOND MEXICO

including officials of the Bank of Mexico, the Chamber of Commerce and the Association of Importers and Exporters. F. L. Marshall, president of the Canadian Inter-American Association, reported that most of the Canadian businessmen who participated found there was an active interest in their products among Mexicans and they made arrangements to expand their relations.13 Bilateral aviation contacts between Canada and Mexico provided one area of discussion and also an opportunity to enhance the ties between the two countries in the early 1950s. At that stage, neither country had the airline capacity to fly between Canada and Mexico, so they concluded an agreement appointing KLM temporary carrier between Montreal and Mexico City, with the proviso that the arrangement would be cancelled once Mexican or Canadian airlines began flights.14 Canadian officials saw considerable longer-term potential in such an agreement, in particular the access such an agreement would provide to the rest of Latin America. L. D. Wilgress, Canadian Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, observed that more than twenty other countries, including the United States, had been attempting for years to obtain the concessions that Canada had secured.15 On this occasion it was the United States that provided the obstacle to the effective implementation of the agreement with Mexico. The U.S. Civil Aeronautics Board raised concerns about the requests of Canadian airlines to use the Canada-U.S. Air Transport Agreement, which gave Canadian airlines the right to land at Tampa/St. Petersburg en route to the Caribbean, to provide a stopover for the Mexico City flights. The Board was especially concerned about Trans-Canada Airways' intent to use the same aircraft to fly the U.S. and Mexican routes.16 The U.S. objections were ultimately overcome in the course of the year, and this enabled TCA to begin scheduled flights in January 1954 between Montreal and Mexico City, making non-traffic stops in Tampa en route. For reasons of economy, the agreement permitted TCA to use the same aircraft for the flights to Tampa as for the ongoing flights to Mexico City.17 While such developments may have seemed a tempest in a teapot, in the context of the gradual expansion of Canadian-Mexican and Caribbean tourism and trade, Canadian involvement in these routes was economically important as well as of symbolic value. The dispute was also yet one more illustration of the bilateral 22

SHARING A CONTINENT

difficulties which could arise between Mexico and Canada because of their separation by the United States. Sidney Smith, Secretary of State for External Affairs in the Diefenbaker government, thought bilateral aviation linkages sufficiently important to note, in the House of Commons in 1957, that "commercial aviation has been a significant factor in helping us to become better acquainted with the Latin American countries." He pointed out that Mexican airlines ran a regular service between Mexico City and Windsor, and that Canadian Pacific Airlines had become a major carrier in the Americas.18 The high-level, official Canadian interest in Latin America— and hence in Mexico—during World War II and the early 1950s tailed off late in the decade; it was not effectively revived until the election of Pierre Elliot Trudeau as Prime Minister in 1968. In the interim, leaders of the three North American countries met for the first time in March 1956 to discuss common interests. Canadian Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent and Mexican President Adolfo Ruiz Cortines paid a simultaneous official visit to White Sulphur Springs, West Virginia, to meet with President Eisenhower and administration officials. At the tripartite meeting, Secretary of State John Foster Dulles reported on his recent trip to Asia, and the three leaders reviewed developments in the Far East and Middle East. Predictably, for three nations that had yet to come to think in trilateral terms, the remainder of the conference involved bilateral talks— Canada-U.S., U.S.-Mexico.19 This precedent-setting meeting, informal as it was, did not, however, result in the institutionalization of trilateralism. Instead, relations for the next three decades remained largely bilateral. Sidney Smith, as Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, paid an official visit to Mexico in 1958. His successor, Howard Green, did not include Mexico in his 1960 Latin American tour, although Green was a strong supporter of Canadian membership in the OAS. Between the Smith and Green tours, Mexican President Adolfo Lopez Mateos paid a little publicized call on the Diefenbaker government in Ottawa, and Prime Minister Diefenbaker reciprocated the following year. In 1965 Lester Pearson's Liberal government sponsored a mining mission to Latin America that included Mexico.20 The previous year, Pearson's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Paul Martin, had contended that Latin America represented considerable economic potential for Canada, noting that Mexico and Chile 23

BEYOND MEXICO

in particular had been considerable beneficiaries of export financing through the Exports Credits Insurance Corporation. By this stage, Canada was also making a contribution to the Inter-American Development Bank.21 Such initiatives were reflective of a cautious but gradual enhancement of bilateral relations with Mexico as well as Canadian interest in the region. The establishment of a division for Latin America in the Department of External Affairs, along with Canadian membership in the UN Economic Commission for Latin America (based in Chile) in 1961, was a further indication of a modest expansion of the Canadian commitment. Cold War considerations, especially after the Cuban Revolution, the U.S.-backed Bay of Pigs invasion in early 1961 and the 1962 Missile Crisis, diverted Canadian policymakers in the Diefenbaker and Pearson years from any significant expansion of the Canadian presence in Latin America. Although one should not exaggerate the differences in Canadian and U.S. policy on Cuba in the 1960s, Canada—like Mexico—attempted to maintain some degree of distance from the U.S. on the Cuban situation. Both Canada and Mexico continued their diplomatic relations with Cuba under Castro and declined to be bound by the U.S. economic embargo. At the UN, Howard Green criticized the U.S. role in the Bay of Pigs.22 For Mexico and Canada, both small powers tied to the U.S. in the midst of an escalating Cold War, cautious independence from the direction of U.S. Cold War policies was the policy of discretion. The election of Pierre Trudeau as Prime Minister and the return of the Liberals to office in 1968 marked a quickening of official Canadian interest in Latin America, and especially in Mexico, as the Trudeau government conducted an extensive and controversial review of Canadian foreign policy.23 Although Latin America continued to be viewed in many quarters as Uncle Sam's other province, it offered Canada opportunities for expanded trade and investment. Further, countries such as Mexico seemed, from the perspective of Ottawa, to have a number of common interests with Canada, most of which derived from their relationship with the United States; these included the desire to control their economic development, fashion independent policies for natural resource exploitation, and maintain distance from the powerful centrifugal force of the East-West conflict. For a series of Trudeau governments from 1968 to 1984, interrupted by the brief 1979-80 interregnum of a 24

SHARING A CONTINENT

Conservative government under Joe Clark, Latin America held much promise, especially with the articulation of the Third Option notion of diversifying Canadian trade and investment and reducing dependency on the United States, in a quest to establish a multipolar rather than a bipolar world.24 The Canada-Mexico relationship from the late 1960s into the mid-1980s encompassed a wide range of bilateral and multilateral issues. For Mexico, these years witnessed substantial economic growth, development of massive new oil fields in the Gulf of Campeche, Chiapas and Tabasco, an oil boom in the late 1970s and early 1980s, and then economic crisis and restructuring, with a movement away from the older economic policies of statism and import substitution. For Canada, the Third Option meant increased economic nationalism, embodied in the establishment of PetroCanada, FIRA (the Foreign Investment Review Agency), and ultimately the National Energy Policy. In both countries, the late 1970s and 1980s also saw an effort to play a brokering and stabilizing role in the Central American crisis that followed the overthrow in 1979 of longstanding Nicaraguan dictator Anastasio Somoza. But, even before the Liberals were replaced in 1984 by a Conservative government under Brian Mulroney, that policy of economic nationalism had faded, giving way under the Conservatives to a policy of free enterprise capitalism, privatization, trade and investment liberalization, and a closer relationship with the United States—an orientation that was embodied in the 1989 U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement and the 1993 trilateral agreement with Mexico. The Trudeau years were marked by increased Canada-Mexico contacts. Indeed, it became clear that the Liberal government viewed Mexico as a critical component in the reorientation of Canada-Latin America relations. A major Canadian multi-ministerial mission, which included private sector and cultural agency representation, toured Latin America—including Mexico—in 1968. One of the products of the mission was the establishment of a ministerial level joint MexicoCanada committee, which was to meet periodically to provide a forum for discussion of matters of common interest to the two countries. At its first meeting in Ottawa, in October 1971, the committee discussed a wide range of issues, from tourism and youth exchanges to trade promotion and scientific and technological cooperation.25 25

BEYOND MEXICO

This is not, of course, to suggest that all was smooth sailing in the relationship. In 1969-70, for instance, there was a prolonged trade dispute between the two countries—initiated largely by Quebec manufacturers—over Mexican cotton exports to Canada. That dispute was settled amicably, however. Significantly, at the dinner which closed the negotiations, a Mexican official wryly proposed a toast to "our common border,"26 yet another indication of the extent to which the bilateral Canada-Mexico relationship was inevitably affected by the United States. In 1970, Secretary of State Gerard Pelletier attended the inauguration of Luis Echeverria as president of Mexico and extended an invitation for the president to pay an official visit to Canada. Echeverria responded with a trip to Ottawa, Montreal and Toronto in early 1973, meeting with Prime Minister Trudeau and other Canadian officials, in addition to making a well-received address to a joint session of the Houses of Parliament. The specific issues that drew the two nations together were the desire to expand trade, improve technology transfer (especially in complementary agricultural and industrial sectors such as transportation, steel, forestry, pulp and paper, and seaports), and stimulate investment. The two countries further agreed to consider measures to eliminate double taxation, to exchange views on their respective mineral policies, examine ways of using nuclear technology, co-operate in harmonizing industrial and environmental policies, and continue tripartite discussions with the United States on narcotics traffic.27 On the whole, this was the first generation of Canadian politicians that came to view Mexico and Canada as having a real community of interests in international affairs, with respect, for example, to law of the sea questions, the effort to defuse the Cold War and to encourage the peaceful use of nuclear technology, or their mutual support for the Mexican initiated Charter of Rights and Duties of States at UNCTAD.28 In 1976 Trudeau undertook a controversial tour of three Latin American countries—Cuba, Venezuela and Mexico, Canada's main trading partners in the region. The trip was controversial because of the inclusion of Cuba on the tour. Castro's Cuba had not previously been visited by a NATO head of state, and Castro at the time was expanding Cuba's international role by sending troops to Angola; Trudeau cautioned Castro not to undertake such a move, a significant warning because both the Trudeau and Mexican 26

SHARING A CONTINENT

governments of the period demonstrated sympathy and support for Cuba as part of their leanings toward Third Option or even nonaligned policies.29 That was the context in which Trudeau visited President Echeverria in Mexico City in 1976, late in the Mexican President's term. The main Canadian objective seems to have been the sale of a CANDU reactor to Mexico; but that effort, as well as more general commercial discussions, fizzled, in part because Echeverria was too close to the end of his term to take major policy decisions.30 By the 1970s, Canada-Mexico ties had taken on a more complex character. New and old Canadian firms, some of them in joint ventures with Mexican firms, were active in the country, including, among others, the Bank of Montreal, the Bank of Nova Scotia, the Toronto Dominion Bank, Alcan, Noranda, Massey Ferguson and Polymer. By 1973 a number of Canadian federal and provincial offices were operating in Mexico. These included the Canadian Government Travel Bureau, a Canadian Library Centre, an Ontario government office of trade and industrial development, and the Canadian Executive Service Overseas. In the private sector, the first meeting of the Canada-Mexico Businessmen's Committee took place in Mexico City in 1970, and since then business contacts, including federally supported trade seminars and trade shows (witness the very successful Monterrey Trade Show in 1991) have continued to flourish. Those events which have taken place in Canada since the late 1980s have normally involved the Canadian Council for the Americas, frequently with the co-operation of the Ottawa-based Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), both of which receive federal and private sector financial support. Tourism also continued to increase in the 1970s, with more than 100,000 Canadians travelling to Mexico in 1972. Bilateral trade too continued to assume higher importance, with Mexico-bound Canadian exports receiving more financing from the Export Development Corporation than exports from any other country in the world.31 Canada-Mexico trade did increase sharply in these years. Between 1968 and 1972, Canadian exports to Mexico rose from $54.6 million to over $99 million, making Mexico the second largest consumer of Canadian goods after Venezuela. By 1975 Canadian exports exceeded $222 million; by 1980, just before the 27

BEYOND MEXICO

radical downturn accompanying the Mexican debt crisis, they had risen to $494 million, although Mexico by that date ranked third in Latin America, behind Brazil and Venezuela. In 1992, with the relative decline of Brazil and Venezuela, Mexico was the major purchaser of Canadian goods in Latin America, with expenditures exceeding $771 million. A similar picture prevailed in Mexican exports to Canada, which rose from $47.3 in 1970 to $999 million by 1982, $1.7 billion by 1990 and $2.7 billion in 1992.32 Although Mexico represented a small proportion of total Canadian trade (Latin America as a whole purchased less than 2 percent of Canadian exports in 1990), it was the increased trade and the potential growth that attracted both government and business. By the time Trudeau returned to Mexico in 1982, with President Miguel de la Madrid in office, Mexico had assumed even greater significance in Canadian policy. However, because of the altered international financial context, the mission made little progress in attempting, for instance, to interest Mexico in purchasing CANDU reactors. Trudeau also had to mend fences with Mexico that had been weakened by Joe Clark's short-lived Conservative government in 1979-80; Clark had alienated Mexico by mishandling an oil deal because of the Tories' ideological opposition to working through the Crown corporation Petro-Canada. Nor were relations improved by the Clark government's opposition to the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. More serious for the new Trudeau government was the economic situation in the early 1980s. The international oil crisis of the 1970s in the Middle East had raised Mexico's importance to both Canada and the United States. In 1979 and 1980, Canada sought extensive oil purchases from Mexico. In 1980, bilateral trade boomed; yet overborrowing by Mexico (and the rest of Latin America) on world financial markets in anticipation of continued growth ultimately spelled disaster. In 1981, Mexico's capacity to purchase Canadian goods radically diminished, with the result that bilateral trade declined 50 percent over the following two years. In August 1982 Mexico had to announce that it could no longer meet its international debt payments. That announcement inaugurated the Latin American debt crisis and began Latin America's "lost decade." For Canada, the crisis meant endangered investment, bank insecurity, and lost employment as trade plummeted and Canadian banks struggled to cope with failed loans. If Canadians needed a 28

SHARING A CONTINENT

lesson in the interdependence of the nations of the western hemisphere, they received it as Mexico restructured its economy and renegotiated its international debts.33 The other crisis of the 1980s—that of Central America—was also indicative of both the common interests of the two nations and the extent to which they were inevitably caught up in the maelstrom of perceived Soviet-American tensions in the hemisphere. The Central American crisis—essentially in Nicaragua and El Salvador—also made Canadians more sensitive to security issues in the Western Hemisphere that could affect Canada. It caused some officials to broaden their understanding of security questions to include such issues as immigration and refugee pressures, as well as narcotics trafficking through Mexico. The political and international environment had also changed by the time the Liberals left office in Canada. Between 1980 and the "end" of the Cold War, with the destruction of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990, East-West tensions escalated and then moved toward accommodation; this was largely due to the initiative of Soviet President Mikhail Gorbachev and unrelenting pressure from the United States. The ideologically conservative Republican administration of Ronald Reagan was in full swing in Washington, with its emphasis on turning the tide against international Communism, radically reducing state intervention in the private sector, and encouraging trade and investment liberalization in the international sphere. Such a policy orientation echoed ideas attractive to the Conservative government of Brian Mulroney elected in 1984, to Margaret Thatcher's Tories in Great Britain, and—to a lesser degree, and perhaps more because of financial necessity—to the government of Miguel de la Madrid in its later stages, and afterwards to the Salinas administration, as they sought to dig out from under the debris produced by the storm of the debt crisis. From the outset of the Central American crisis in 1979, the Mexican governments of Luis Lopez Portillo and Miguel de la Madrid portrayed developments in the region as part of an internal political and social struggle, not the byproduct of Soviet-Cuban aggression. Mexican governments thus sought negotiated settlements and—consistent with the nation's foreign policy traditions— a multilateral approach to the region's difficulties, rather than the 29

BEYOND MEXICO

military and largely unilateral approach pursued by the Reagan administration prior to 1989.33 In keeping with that philosophy, Mexico over the next several years continued its economic relations with the Sandinista government in Managua. Like Canada it was critical of the human rights record of the El Salvador government and, in 1983, joined with Venezuela, Colombia and Panama to form the Contadora Group. Throughout the decade, the Contadora Group pressed for a negotiated settlement between the Sandinista government and its American-backed opponents, as well as between the U.S.-supported El Salvador government and the opposing guerrilla movement dominated by the FMLN (Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front). From the outset, the main concern of Canadian policymakers was that the Central American crisis be contained and that it not be allowed to destabilize such neighbouring countries as Venezuela, Colombia or Mexico, with whom Canada had close and important relations. It was also important from a Canadian perspective that the Central American conflict not undermine East-West relations more generally, given Canada's commitment to NATO and to the United States. Canadian views and policies with respect to Central America after 1979 were neither consistent—with a significant ideological shift from a Liberal to Conservative government in 1984— nor entirely effective; but there was consistency in the desire to prevent destabilization. Accordingly, in contrast to the situation that prevailed in the United States, there was consistent Canadian support for Mexico and the other members of the Contadora Group, along with the Central American presidents. The Contadora Group was seen as the most likely vehicle to bring about a peaceful solution in the region. From 1984 on, Canada worked closely with the Contadora on the establishment of a control and verification commission to supervise the gradual disarmament and demobilization of anti-government forces in Nicaragua and El Salvador. Hence, Canada became a member of the UN military groups established for that purpose in the two countries (ONUCA in Nicaragua and ONUSAL in El Salvador), and participated in the preparation and monitoring of the transitional 1990 election in Nicaragua and the Congressional election in El Salvador the following year.35 By the end of the 1980s, Canada was moving more decisively into the ranks of the American nations. It concluded a free trade agreement with the United States in 1988, joined the Organization of 30

SHARING A CONTINENT

American States the following year, and in 1993 concluded a trilateral trade agreement with Mexico and the United States (discussed later in this volume). Less than a decade earlier, few Canadians would have predicted such an evolution in the Canadian role in the Americas. The issues that continue to confront Canada and Mexicojoindy have changed with the end of the Cold War, the demise of the Soviet Union, the isolation of Cuba and its possible reintegration into the affairs of the hemisphere. National and regional security questions now revolve around such issues as refugees and migration, narcotics trafficking, and internal political and socio-economic conflicts in Mexico that might threaten its stability during a process of gradual democratization. The debate over a North American Free Trade Agreement also underlined, for many Canadians, the degree of interdependence that now exists in North America on a wide range of issues that will defy resolution by one nation alone. To the pressing issues of migration and narcotics mentioned above, one has to add environmental standards and the conditions under which people labour. These are issues that Canadians and Mexicans will have to face together. NOTES 1. For the most recent and well-researched account of that relationship, see James Rochlin, Discovering the Americas: The Evolution of Canadian Foreign Policy Towards Latin America (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 1993). A recent brief overview is provided by Stephen J. Randall, "Canada and Latin America: The Evolution of Institutional Ties," in A Dynamic Partnership: Canada's Changing Role in the Americas, eds. Jerry Haar and Edgar J. Dosman (New Brunswick, N. J. and London: Transaction Publishers, 1993), 27-44. 2. In the latter regard, note the Canadian Mexicanist Newsletter edited by University of Calgary Professor Herman Konrad, with the support of the Department of Foreign Affairs, and the recent establishment by the University of Calgary of a "study abroad" program at Universidad Nacional Autonoma de Mexico. Several Canadian universities (specifically Calgary and McGill) are involved in trilateral exchange and research programs with Mexican and U.S. universities under the auspices of the United States Information Agency.

31

BEYOND MEXICO

3. J. C. M. Ogelsby, Gringos from the Far North: Essays in the History of Canadian-Latin American Relations (Toronto: Macmillan, 1978); see also Herman Konrad's chapter in North America without Borders: Integrating Canada, the United States and Mexico, eds. S. J. Randall, H. Konrad, S. Silverman (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1992); C. Armstrong and H. V. Nelles, Southern Exposure (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1988). 4. Ogelsby, Gringos, 49-51. 5. Ogelsby, ibid., 50, 53. 6. On oil nationalization and the concern over Mexico's relations with the Axis powers, see S. J. Randall, United States Foreign Oil Policy 1919-1948: For Profit and Security (Montreal and Kingston: McGillQueen's University Press, 1985). 7. Ogelsby, Gringos, 58-59. 8. Canada simultaneously established diplomatic relations with Peru and raised the Brazilian legation to embassy rank. See Ogelsby, Gringos', Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 24; G.A. Calkin, "The Development of Relations between Canada and Mexico," International Perspectives (May/June 1973): 55; and F. A. Soward, Canada in World Affairs, from Normandy to Paris, 1944-1946 (Toronto, London: Oxford University Press, 1950), 153. 9. Source: Statistics Canada, Merchandise Trade, various years. 10. This differs from R. M. Will's assertion in 1960 that defence was the primary consideration and economics a distant second. See R. M. Will, "Economic Aspects of Canadian-Latin American Trade," International Journal, XV (Autumn 1960): 347. 11. External Affairs (July 1953): 213-17. 12. External Affairs (July 1953): 213-14. 13. Department of External Affairs and International Trade, Documents on Canadian External Relations, vol. 19 (1953): 1605-13 (hereafter referred to as DCER). 14. J. R. Baldwin's memorandum for Minister of Transport, March 2, 1953; the Cabinet authorized Baldwin to sign an agreement with Mexico May 13, 1953. See DCER, vol. 19 (1953): 847-74. 15. Wilgress memorandum, July 2, 1953, ibid. 16. J. H. Warren, Department of External Affairs, to Canadian Ambassador in Washington, September 2, 1953; Ambassador to Under-Secretary of State for External Affairs, October 6, 1953. See DCER, vol. 19 (1953): 847-74.

32

SHARING A CONTINENT

17. For an outline of the Canadian position, see Lionel Chevrier, Minister of Transport, memorandum, October 30, 1953, in DCER, vol. 19 (1953). 18. Excerpts from statement made in the House of Commons, November 26, 1957, cited in External Affairs (December 1957): 362. 19. External Affairs, April 1956, pp. 88-89. See also James Eayrs, Canada in World Affairs, October 1955 to June 1957 (Toronto: Oxford University Press, 1959), 102-103. 20. Ogelsby, Gringos, 30, 301. On the visits of Lopez Mateos and Diefenbaker, see Calkin, "Canada and Mexico," 55. 21. Paul Martin, "Latin America: Challenge and Response," Statements and Speeches (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs), no. 64/16, August 24, 1964, p. 16. See also Charlotte S. M. Girard, Canada in World Affairs, 1963-1965, 13 (Toronto: Canadian Institute of International Affairs, 1975). 22. Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 50-57, contains an excellent, fresh analysis of Canada-U.S.-Cuban relations. 23. Department of External Affairs, A Foreign Policy for Canadians (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1970). For overviews of Trudeau relations with Latin America, see J. Guy, "Trudeau's Foreign Policy and Latin America," Revista/Review Interamericana, 7 (Spring 1977); J. C. M. Ogelsby, "A Trudeau Decade: Canadian-Latin American Relations, 1968-1978,"Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs 21 (May 1979). 24. The best treatment of Trudeau-era foreign policy is J. L. Granatstein and Robert Bothwell, Pirouette: Pierre Trudeau and Canadian Foreign Policy (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990), although James Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, provides more detail on and insight into Latin American policies. 25. Calkin, "Canada and Mexico," 55. 26. Robert Butler, Jr., "Trade Conflict: The Mexican-Canadian Yarn War of 1969-70," Inter-American Economic Affairs, 25 (Summer 1971). 27. Calkin, "Canada and Mexico," 57-58. 28. Manning Bayless, et al., "Entente Cordiale? Divergence and Accommodation: Approaches to Multilateral Issues," Proceedings of the American Society of International Law 68 (1974), 204-25. 29. Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 97. 30. Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 98. 31. Calkin,"Mexico and Canada," 55.

33

BEYOND MEXICO

32. Statistics Canada, Merchandise Trade, various years. Canadian exports to Mexico included cattle, milk powder, motor vehicle parts and accessories, power boilers and production machinery, newsprint and wood pulp. 33. Canada, Standing Committee on Foreign Affairs, Canada, International Financial Institutions and the Debt Problem of Developing Countries (Ottawa: Supply and Services Canada, 1987); Riordan Roett, "Latin America's Debt: Problems and Prospects," International Journal, 43 (Summer 1988): 428-445. 34. Claude Heller, "U.S. and Mexican Policies Toward Central America," in Foreign Policy in U.S.-Mexican Relations, eds. Rosario Green and Peter Smith (San Diego: University of California at San Diego, Center for U.S.-Mexican Studies, 1989); Stephen J. Randall, "La politica exterior de los Estados Unidos de America y el future de la democracia en Centroamerica," in Monica Verea Campos and Jose Luis Barros Horcasitas, La politico exterior norteamericana hacia Centroamerica: rejlexiones y perspectivas (Mexico D.F.: Miguel Angel Purrua, 1991) 379-95. 35. The author was a member of the UN election monitoring in Nicaragua and the OAS monitoring group in El Salvador. There is a good overview of Canadian policy in Central America, including relations with the Contadora Group, in Rochlin, Discovering the Americas.

34

Ill REDISCOVERING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD: POST-NAFTA MEXICAN-CANADIAN RELATIONS Gustavo del Castillo V. A la redecouverte du voisinage: Les relations Canada-Mexique apres /ALENA

par un approfondissement et une consolidation des institutions mises en place par 1'ALENA.

Resume: Le Canada fut en quelque sorte redecauvertpar le Mexique en 1987, lorsque ce dernier prit conscience des implications possibles du traite de libre-echange canadoamericain pour sa securite economique. Le gouvernement mexicain manifesta subsequemment son interet pour un traite de libre-echange avec les Etats-Unis et des negotiations a cet effet furent engagees, auxquelles se joignit bientot le Canada. Elles deboucherent sur 1'Accord de libreechange nord-americain. Pendant cette courte periode, les relations canado-mexicaines se developperent et se diversifierent rapidemenL La base essentielle de ces relations, au dela de preoccupations economiques etroitement definies, est toutefois strategique: le Mexique et le Canada ont interet a joindre leurs efforts pour lutter centre les tendances provincialistes et protectionnistes de leur puissant voisin commun, les Etats-Unis. Dans cette perspective, une institutionnalisation des relations entre les trois pays est cruciale. Elle passe d'abord et avant tout

Cette entreprise rencontre toutefois des resistances importantes aux EtatsUnis. Tout d'abord, et paradoxalement, 1'accord de libre-echange lui-meme a entraine la-bas une accentuation de tendances protectionnistes deja puissantes. De plus, si les nouveaux liens entre le Mexique et le Canada ont pu etre rapidement institutionnalises, il n'en va pas de meme avec les Etats-Unis, dont les relations avec ses voisins sont plutot caracterisees par des initiatives ad hoc qui ne s'inscrivent pas dans un cadre pre-etabli. L'institutionnalisation, a travers 1'ALENA, des relations economiques entre les trois pays n'a pas que des consequences au niveau international. Elle a aussi d'importantes implications domestiques, puisqu'elle est susceptible de forcer le gouvernement mexicain a rendre plus transparent des aspects cruciaux de son fonctionnement, non seulement ses politiques d'achat et de commerce, mais aussi par exemple ses pratiques en matiere de protection de 1'environnement.

BEYOND MEXICO

IT is PRECISELY 300 YEARS since Mexican explorers set out for the Pacific Northwest, a region in what is now Canada. In one expedition aboard the Princesa Real, they explored and named Haro Strait (Port of San Juan), Sooke Inlet (Puerto de Revillagigedo), Esquimalt Harbour (Puerto de Cordova) and Port Discovery (Puerto de Bodega y Quadra). Many of these expeditions were in search of the mythical Strait of Anian, a hoped-for northwest passage.1 At the time, their rivals in this process of discovery were Russians, not Americans or British. The expedition by Lewis and Clark was still in the future, as was Mexican independence from Spain, which would occur some forty years later. But since those days when Catalonian soldiers left Mexican soil and encountered unfriendly natives in the Strait of Juan de Fuca and the Canal de Rosario, most Mexicans have viewed Canada as a snowy wasteland and an extension of the United States. From a Mexican perspective, Canadians are the "gringos from the far north."2 Mexico rediscovered Canada in 1987 when, for reasons of economic security, Mexico interpreted the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA) as a threat to the country's economic survival. Mexico therefore suggested in 1991 that it, too, would like a free trade agreement with the United States. This rediscovery of Canada has begun to take on new dimensions and encompass areas which will bring these two countries together. Nevertheless, one important question remains, and it goes to the centre of Canadian-Mexican relations: is there a shared basis, other than the economic interests as defined up to this point, on which to establish the foundations of a solid partnership in North America? It is suggested here that there is one such basis, and that is the presence of the United States. This paper will attempt to clarify this statement. It is posited that, independently of the scale of trade flows between Mexico and Canada resulting from the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the Canada-Mexico partnership will develop as these two nations recognize the common strategic interest both have in preserving and developing transnational institutions, with the explicit purpose of reducing the calls for protectionism and provincialism in the U.S. Congress. Such calls have come from actors at the national level such as Ross Perot, and from members of Congress whose districts or states have been negatively

36

REDISCOVERING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

affected by the structural changes in the global economy. Many of these protectionist calls are parallelled by claims that the U.S. government is suffering a "loss of national sovereignty" and that NAFTA is creating a huge "international bureaucracy." In this context, paradoxically, protectionism can be seen as one outcome of North American continentalist free trade. There are several distinct dimensions to be considered here. The first is that U.S. protectionism is the result of increasing intervention by the U.S. Congress in what had been the dominion of the Office of the President; that is, protectionism has emerged out of the loss of administrative discretion which trade legislation gave over the years to the U.S. executive. The second area of protectionism which is of concern is that arising out of NAFTA. Some of this protectionism is the old-fashioned practice of export restrictions, such as those negotiated on Mexico's horticultural and citrus products. Thirdly, there is the protectionism which may arise out of environmental or labour actions in the U.S. in response to Mexican or Canadian practices resulting from the NAFTA side agreements. Finally, and although the process of free trade area formation does not correspond to the usual notions of protectionism, one important question deals with the possibility of much greater access for the U.S. to countries seeking entry to NAFTA. This means it is in the interests of Canada and Mexico to prevent the development of the hub-and-spoke model of economic integration.3 The question, then, is whether the transnational institutions resulting from the actions of bilateral panels and NAFTA's environmental commission can reduce or have an impact on the types of protectionism outlined above. One final point: independently of North American trade policies and practices, we must be concerned with the types of actions which make continentalism a reality and notjust a word used in scholarly writing—a reality in which people in all three countries are respected for their differences and where cultural practices intermingle out of a sense that their diffusion and adoption will have a beneficial value throughout North America. Jerry Brown, while governor of California and in the running for the U.S. presidency, stated: I have a dream that all Americans can advance together, but that we do so in a form of regional interdependence. I see a type of common market or

37

BEYOND MEXICO

economic community that will bring along with us our brothers and sisters who share this land of North America. Mexicans, Canadians, Native Americans—North and South—all are a part of our destiny and it is time that we recognize that we are a part of theirs.4

It has taken almost one generation for this type of thinking to become politically acceptable and to be partially implemented in the form of the North American Free Trade Agreement. CONTEMPORARY CANADIAN-MEXICAN

RELATIONS

There is an important difference between Mexico-Canada relations and Mexico-U.S. relations. Once the intensity of the former reached a critical point, they were immediately institutionalized through bilateral agreements such as cultural exchanges, the use of Mexican agricultural labourers and now NAFTA. On the other hand, Mexico-U.S. relations, although historically intense, have been handled in an ad hoc fashion, even in areas such as trade where both countries have important interests. Part of the explanation for Mexico's acquiescence in this process has to do with its past mistakes in communicating with the U.S. government—going to the Department of State, for example, when the correct actor was the U.S. Trade Representative (USTR). Also, as friendships developed between Mexico's trade negotiators and U.S. trade decision makers, issues were "resolved" over the telephone, leaving Mexican actors believing that the matter had been dealt with (that the correct actor had been identified and that he was in the appropriate institutional position to resolve a problem) when, in fact, little had been accomplished. Simply put, Mexico was ignorant of how U.S. governmental processes functioned. Possibly more serious is the fact that these quick but unconventional practices left no institutional memory in either Mexico or the U.S. Over and over again, as actors changed, the entire learning curve had to be traversed.5 Some of these difficulties were unavoidable, given the differing cultural traditions. Yet most would agree that, when dealing with an intense bilateral relationship such as that between Mexico and the U.S., there is little room for mistakes—and undergoing trial by fire can be a costly experience. Just as the Mexicans are beginning to learn to deal with the United States, Canadians have 38

REDISCOVERING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

experienced some similar tribulations—brought on not by ignorance but by the asymmetry of power in their dealings with the United States.6 The important question is whether relations between Mexico and Canada will suffer the same difficulties that both countries experienced in dealing with the United States. Both countries would do well to remember their historical experiences with their all-powerful neighbour and, with this historical memory, take steps to treat each other differently.7 Yet it is one thing to hope for the best, and another to guarantee friendly, co-operative and constructive relations between Mexico and Canada. The NAFTA debate from 1991 to the present polarized Canadian opinion regarding Mexico. One was either for NAFTA or against it; there could be no middle ground. The sad outcome was that Canadians adopted some issues which had been raised in the United States.8 One cannot forget that the principal opposition to NAFTA arose out of the U.S. labour union organization, the AFL-CIO, which, following its customary opposition to all trade agreements (going back to the 1974 Trade Act) had gained an important and critical ally in U.S. conservationists. Independently of this, the AFLCIO picked up the banner of defending Mexican workers' rights and found resonance with Canadian labour and Canada's political left. As Stephen Randall has commented: An issue that troubled primarily the Canadian political left was the poor Mexican record on human rights, the one-party political dominance under PRI (Institutional Party of the Revolution) since the 1930s, the lack of a real independent voice for Mexican labour, the visible poverty of Mexican cities, including those border cities in which the maquiladora industries have concentrated, and Mexico's abysmal record on environmental protection.9 These criticisms, never the exclusive domain of the AFL-CIO or Canadian critics, very likely resonate with a majority of Mexicans as well. Perhaps more important is Randall's criticism of Michael Hart's book, which supported the trilateral process.10 He comments: Hart's contention that Canada and Mexico have a certain degree of common interest vis-a-vis the United States is correct only to the degree that Canada and Mexico have historically been peripheries dominated by 39

BEYOND MEXICO

the centre. That historical fact does not mean that Canada and Mexico have common economic and political issues; indeed, the political and cultural values and institutions of Canada and Mexico bear virtually no similarities.11

In his analysis of Canada's participation in the NAFTA negotiations, this same author concludes: "That decision was a defensive action by Canada. There seemed to be little significant interest in Canadian official or private circles in a trade agreement with Mexico."12 In other words, Canadian participation in the trilateral process did not originate out of the conviction that North America would best be served by such an arrangement, but out of the desire that nothing should affect Canada's interests as stipulated in the CanadaU.S. Free Trade Agreement (FTA). One Canadian author states the Canadian position as follows: Ottawa is terrified that the FTA has placed Canada in a totally untenable position. Having been promised an exclusive deal with the United States, having trumpeted to the nation the expected benefits of an exclusive deal, having a good understanding of the motivations of the BCNI [Business Council on National Issues] and the larger banks, a confused and panicked government is at the table because it believes that it has no other choice.13

It should also be remembered that the Mulroney government had a large number of issues on the table, all very troublesome and potentially threatening to the government. This initial Canadian reaction was tempered by the recognition that if free trade negotiations at the North American level were to take place—despite Canada's initially cold reception of the idea— perhaps the NAFTA negotiations could become a forum for Canada to bring up some of the issues which it felt had not been sufficiently addressed under the FTA. Michael Hart compares the possible outcome if Canada failed to enter the NAFTA negotiations with the outcomes experienced by Great Britain's failure to join the European Community early on. He states: Canada does not want to repeat the mistake the United Kingdom made in the 1950s and 1960s when it refused to join the integration movement

40

REDISCOVERING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

on the continent. By joining almost a generation later, it found that it had not only missed some of the trade, investment and other economic opportunities of European integration, but it also had to accept an institutional structure that it had not helped to shape.15

Having the FTA in place would prove to be beneficial to all parties, Hart stated, since it provided a framework understood both by Canadians and the U.S. and not opposed by Mexico. In the context outlined, Canada would be at the forefront in helping to shape the transnational institutional setting which would help regulate trade disputes in North America. Leonard Waverman went further than this by adding that the economic integration taking place in North America, and the institutions which Canada would help to build, would limit U.S. sovereignty: But the Canadian loss of sovereignty is more than offset by a much larger loss of sovereignty for the U.S. Sovereignty is a function of the ability to act unilaterally; common North American rules and institutions can greatly limit U.S. sovereignty (the sovereignty to hurt its neighbours).16

For the purposes of this work, it is accepted that in the long run NAFTA may represent an economic win-win-win situation for the participants, although the science of economics has some way to go before modelling predictions can be accepted outright. So in this respect, there are at least two dimensions of the interrelations between the countries of North America which have to be addressed: the first has to do with the economic growth which NAFTA may induce, the second with the political relations developing out of the process of integration. Few analysts would deny that trade flows will increase significantly in North America because of NAFTA. Leonard Waverman concludes: NAFTA reduces trade barriers against Mexican goods in U.S. and Canadian markets. For most manufactured products, these barriers were already low. Thus the new competition that Mexico will offer Canadian and U.S. producers will come largely from increased production in Mexico that results from NAFTA.17 41

BEYOND MEXICO

Tabk3 Summary Market Data fo r Mexico, 1991-94*

1991

1992

1993

1994*

GDP (% change)

3.6

2.6

2.7

3.6

Inflation (% change)

18.8

11.9

9.0

8.0

Exchange rate (% change)

4.5

1.4

1.2

5.0

Peso/U.S. Exchange rate

P3,075

P3,119

Cetes (91-Day Yield)

19.8%

15.9%

NP3,153 NP3.300 14.0%

2.0%

* Figures for 1994 are preliminary. Source: Salomon Brothers. Mexican Banks. Emerging Markets Research. July 29,1993.18

This scenario therefore assumes that large investment flows toward Mexico will occur and enhance its export potential, and that the political and macroeconomic environment is sufficiently stable to convince investors to risk capital in the Mexican market. Salomon Brothers, in promoting the purchase of Banacci stocks (the second largest publicly traded company in Mexico after TELMEX), offers the following scenario for the Mexican economy. Mexico has demonstrated not only the will to undergo economic liberalization leading to structural change, but has accompanied this adjustment process with economic policies which have controlled inflation, stabilized the exchange rate, and are beginning to lower interest rates—all of which have led to slow but predictable economic growth (See table 3). There is therefore no doubt that foreign investments will flow, giving the economy a new dynamism. The Canadian experience of free trade with the United States clearly demonstrates that trade liberalization helped those affected sectors. An author writing for the C. D. Howe Institute concludes: Foes of the FTA were clearly too pessimistic about export prospects and related employment growth in many key industries. In particular, many of Canada's manufacturing sectors seem to have performed remarkably

42

REDISCOVERING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

well in the U.S. market under the FTA.... The U.S. market continues, in fact, to be the most dynamic market for Canadian manufacturers of high value-added, finished goods and business services.19

Other authors see significant growth for Canadian service industries under NAFTA, particularly those associated with investment services where, they conclude: The most positive contributions [of NAFTA] are a tightening of the rules governing the foreign treatment of foreign investments in North America and the impetus the agreement supplies for the continuing liberalization of the Mexican investment regime.20

On the Mexican side, one very recent analysis of the effects of trade liberalization on the Mexican economy finds the results encouraging, especially the country's export performance to the U.S. The author concludes: On the export side, the function for total volume of export demand had a change in structure after liberalization. This can be viewed as a goal achieved by openness. Consolidation of trade liberalization policies would provide the economy with a more stable and dynamic export demand function. A situation that can become disfavorable for the economy is the fact that the income elasticity of demand for Mexican exports of Mexico's major trading partner (the United States) is rather low, but again the trade liberalization process has resulted in a two-fold increase in exports. This increase, however, is not yet sufficient to cope with the still-high income elasticity of demand for imports in Mexico.21

From this analysis it becomes clear that Mexican export performance is likely to increase in a two-step fashion: the first stage is the short-term one, dependent on trade liberalization, which at one time hindered Mexican exports. The second stage is longer term and is related to investment flows and plant restructuring which may occur during the years of NAFTA's implementation. The results of this stage are still to be seen, because Mexican imports (of capital goods) which may be dedicated to producing for export markets are still growing; therefore we can assume that there will be a time lag between Mexican imports of these 43

BEYOND MEXICO

goods and its exports to North America. What this time lag is, and what the growth curve of exports will look like, are still to be determined. Meanwhile, it should be noted that the longer this time lag, reflected empirically by a growing trade deficit and current account deficit in Mexico, the greater the questioning that will occur among the Mexican populace as to the appropriateness of the "liberalized economy." In other words, Mexicans are well aware that these lags reflect a sort of economic and political failure of the model or direction the country should take, as determined by decision-makers in Mexico City. As the confianza of Mexicans in their political leadership is weakened by these lags and failures, it will increase the demands for change in national institutions and leadership. The lack of trust can easily be measured by flight capital and the weakening of the Mexican peso, as was seen in 1982. During the months of January through March 1994, the currency has fallen by some 200 pesos against the U.S. dollar, and the rumours of a failing economy have led to an exit of capital from Mexico. Yet the question is whether Mexican exports into Canada will affect the latter's domestic production, or whether both countries' exports will compete in the U.S. market, leading to one country's trade diversion. It should be noted that one of the reasons Mexico decided to enter into free trade negotiations with the U.S. was a perception in Mexico City that certain Mexican sectors would be negatively affected by the U.S.-Canada Free Trade Agreement. In this respect, Gustavo Vega comments: The preferential access to the U.S. market may lead to the expansion of production capacity and higher employment for Canadian industries, without which they would not be able to compete globally.... In effect, when import-sensitive industries are threatened by imports, these are closely monitored and their aggregate effects are analyzed, leading to a regulatory system aimed at limiting their market share gains (as in the case of steel and textiles).... In summary, the FTA between Canada and the U.S. might result in trade diversion, negatively affecting strategic Mexican industries.23

This situation was equally valid for certain Canadian sectors, such as clothing, petrochemicals, steel, transportation and footwear. 44

REDISCOVERING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

In this context, both Canada and Mexico were concerned about some trade diversion from their traditional markets in the U.S. Yet the main preoccupation of both Mexico and Canada had to do with market access, since both were targeted by the United States during the Reagan and Bush presidencies for countervailing and anti-dumping actions.24 If one thing is clear, it is that because of its importance as the largest market in the world the U.S. has grown accustomed to acting unilaterally—be it in drafting trade legislation or in imposing punitive trade measures. The search for ways in which two peripheral nations like Canada and Mexico could attenuate the United States' exercise of power was the stimulus which drove negotiators of these two countries to sit and talk about free trade with the U.S. The most concrete example of the benefits obtained by Canada in the FTA with the U.S. is the article which states that Canada has to be explicitly mentioned as being a country affected by any modification of U.S. trade legislation, and that consultations with Canada have to take place before the legislation is implemented. This extraordinary consideration of Canada's interests is not replicated for Mexico's benefit in NAFTA. Although this article of the FTA does not exempt Canada from U.S. trade law (one of the main Canadian goals during negotiations), it does demonstrate that some relief may be obtained by mid-size countries like Canada from the unilateral exercise of power which the United States generally commands. One of the salient initial features of the NAFTA negotiations was that Canada's presence was motivated by a sense that the original FTA had to be protected. In this respect, NAFTA and the FTA were conceptualized, early on, as zero-sum games. This kind of thinking has rapidly evolved into a much more positive and constructive management of Mexico-Canada bilateral relations, encouraged perhaps by a sudden rush of trade between the two countries; in other words, business could be done in both directions.25 Although business expansion between these two countries is certainly an important force driving the bilateral relations of Canada and Mexico, North America now constitutes a region where homogeneous rules of the game exist for trade, services and investment. Yet these rules not only have to be interpreted by transnational and national institutions, they also have to be implemented. How they are interpreted and implemented will have to do with 45

BEYOND MEXICO

each country's understanding of the significance of the North American region within the broader context of a shrinking and globalizing planet. Given the asymmetry of power existing in North America, there is now the important question of how the area's major country will decide to interpret any agreement with peripheral nations. One U.S. author has stated: "Fundamental to success [of NAFTA] is finding the basis of equality among the three national parties that are so unequal in national product and in population size. Normally, the equalization of unequal nations is achieved through the formal process of diplomacy."26 In this context, NAFTA and its conflict resolution chapters represent the institutionalization of diplomacy. Yet the principal preoccupation that Mexican and Canadian actors may have is that, when dealing with the United States, diplomacy and negotiation can take place with the State Department or the USTR, but that it frequently stops at the door of a senator or a member of the House of Representatives, since neither Canadians nor Mexicans vote in that individual's state or congressional district. The principal issue becomes whether the adjudicatory powers of the bilateral panels and the Free Trade Commission set up under NAFTA can outweigh the power of electoral politics in the U.S. and their manifestation in the overall U.S. trade policy. THE INSTITUTIONALIZATION OF DIPLOMACY THROUGH NAFTA

NAFTA appears to have solidified some of the conflict-resolution infrastructure available to members. Under NAFTA and its Article 2002, the Secretariat will assist the Commission as well as provide logistical support to the twenty or so Working Groups and bilateral dispute settlement panels which may be set up by the three countries. These functions are new and not previously found under the Canada-U.S. FTA. When conflict does arise between members, countries are free to choose whether they will take their dispute to the GATT or to NAFTA. Yet if any of the three signatories decides to go the GATT route, it must notify the other two NAFTA partners, and if NAFTA mechanisms are chosen by a complainant, NAFTA must choose which forum will be used. Also, because NAFTA involves dimensions not treated under GATT, such as some health, environmental and 46

REDISCOVERING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

conservation issues, members will be forced to use NAFTA mechanisms. Besides the conflict-resolution mechanisms which appear in Chapters 19 and 20 of the NAFTA, the Agreement provides additional institutional mechanisms for conflicts over financial services.27 If there are or appear to be violations of the Investment chapter, NAFTA also provides for dispute settlement and arbitration, giving the parties the right to call for a tribunal in case of a violation by a central or provincial government. The Working Group on Customs Procedures is to oversee the functioning of customs operations and review appeals for the determination of origin before an exporter ships goods. In effect, NAFTA dispute settlement procedures are extensive but are yet to be tried. If the past operations of the FTA and its procedures are any indication of how existing asymmetry in North America can be equalized, then NAFTA faces a positive outlook. How does this institutionalization of diplomacy through NAFTA affect the bilateral relations between Canada and Mexico? If at one time the relationship between these two countries was sporadic, the pre-NAFTA atmosphere (which may be described as one of mutual recognition) was characterized by a multiplicity of contacts between businesspeople, labour leaders, environmentalists and public sector decision makers. In a post-NAFTA environment, the development of this new relationship will depend on the utilization of NAFTA's instruments to help curb trade protectionism in the United States. As can be seen from the discussion above, NAFTA dispute settlement procedures have to be interpreted not synchronically, that is, concurrently with a specific emerging conflict, but diachronically, providing continuous forums for continental discussions. Viewed in those terms, Mexico-Canada relations are sure to enter a new age. If, on the other hand, the institutions are not used to develop a continuous dialogue, there is a danger that they will be allowed to disappear, jeopardizing the continentalist perspective. In this context, the rate of utilization of these institutions will serve as an indicator of the direction North America is taking and, equally important, it will serve as a measure of the effectiveness of the social engineering involved in the design and creation of NAFTA's institutional framework.28 In other words, we have to be on the lookout to ensure that our institutions are utilized, and when they are not, that they are critically evaluated and changed to better serve North American interests.

47

BEYOND MEXICO

Although NAFTA is still so very new that its institutions and mechanisms for the resolution of trade disputes cannot yet be evaluated, one specific question, flowing from very plausible premises, needs to be asked. If NAFTA works out as expected—meaning that capital and technology flow into Mexico and the institutions which Canada used so well under the FTA begin to operate under NAFTA—what if, nevertheless, economic development still lags?29 In other words, what if there is economic growth but Mexico is still confronted by severe poverty, skewed income distribution, and the concentration of production?30 What if the quality of life for the majority of Mexicans does not change substantially, and the political institutions governing the country—although changing—are slow in reforming an authoritarian political system? Under these conditions—slow economic growth, meagre economic development, and the continuation of authoritarianism—does Canada have a role to play in helping to transform the Mexican socio-economic and political system? Few would argue that NAFTA was ever conceptualized as a mechanism to bring about the transformations being discussed here. Yet we cannot avoid the question of whether two close trading partners have anything to say to one another about institutionalized socio-economic injustice. How can these partners talk to one another about such topics, and are there any mechanisms which they may use co-operatively to help each other? There are three areas which Canada may focus on to aid in the Mexican transformation. The first has to do with governmental procedures introduced into NAFTA which require transparency of actions. The Mexican system has historically been characterized by a lack of transparency, not just involving international trade and government procurement. This concept and its applications could be extended to encompass areas such as environmental protection when the transfer of technology is a central element of environmental control. The transparency of testing methods and results might well aid in the betterment of the quality of life for average Mexicans. Perhaps more meaningfully, if this type of exercise is extended to areas not covered by formal trade agreements, the practice of transparency may become the customary way of behaving in the public and private sectors. The second area where Canada's influence could be felt is that of the financial institutions set up under NAFTA, such as the North American Development Bank (NADB). Since NAFTA integrates

48

REDISCOVERING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

two developed economies with a developing one, without the transfers to poorer members which characterize the European Community, Canada's influence could be exercised to make sure that Mexico is provided with the developmental resources necessary to implement some of the commitments made under NAFTA. There are issues of special importance to Mexicans living in areas (such as the border) where the NADB's actions will initially be centred, and these will involve quality of life; environmental protection and water quality are two such issues, and Canadians can establish ties of co-operation with local and regional Mexican actors. The Canadian experience of having to deal with northern U.S. actors and communities could help Mexicans interact more effectively with their counterparts in a transnational setting. Finally, since the end of World War II, Canada has been a major international player in worldwide institutions such as the G-7, the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and it has joined the Organization of American States so as to relate better to western hemispheric countries. Although Mexico is no stranger to these world institutions, Canada can now play a very specific role in them vis-a-vis Mexico, either as a guarantor or as a broker for Mexican interests. These economic interests and necessities will gradually become clear to Canada as the bilateral relationship intensifies, spurred by NAFTA. In other words, Mexico and its developmental needs will take on specificities to which Canada can respond with understanding and help. This developmental partnership is something those of us who believed in NAFTA saw as one of the principal outcomes of this trade agreement. It is a challenge to which we hope Canada can rise.

NOTES

1. Joseph P. Sanchez, Spanish Bluecoats: The Catalonian Volunteers in Northwestern New Spain, 1767-1810 (Albuquerque: University of New Mexico Press, 1990). 2. Ogelsby, Gringos. 3. One can easily visualize a scenario in which the U.S. enters into a free trade agreement with a non-NAFTA nation and where neither Canada nor Mexico have similar parallel interests. The question then becomes

49

BEYOND MEXICO

4. 5.

6.

7.

whether the NAFTA accession clause is invoked by the U.S. (implying to the non-NAFTA country that it would have to adhere to what has been negotiated in NAFTA), or whether a totally separate (bilateral) and distinct process is utilized in this other free trade agreement. The issue here is that NAFTA certainly implies one level of obligations as compared with a second free trade arrangement with disparate (lessened) obligations. In this scenario, goods and services entering the U.S. may undermine any benefits gained by Canadian or Mexican products under NAFTA. In such a context, protection must be sought so that all products entering the U.S. (with differing rules of origin) conform to a standard model of a free trade agreement. Office of the Governor, Sacramento, California, 1980. Personal interviews with U.S. trade policy actors: Department of State Economic Bureau, country desk officers, USTR personnel and Mexican SECOFI (Secretaria de Comercio y Fomento Industrial) personnel stationed in Washington. Some of these tribulations are clearly described in Brian Tomlin and Bruce Doern's marvellous book The Free Trade Story: Faith and Fear, in which they describe the free trade negotiations between Canada and the U.S. (in particular, see Chapter 8). A second book which describes some of these same problems is /'// be With you in a Minute, Mr. Ambassador: The Education of a Canadian Diplomat in Washington, (University of Toronto Press, 1991), by the then Canadian ambassador to the U.S., Allan Gotlieb. Few Mexicans have written about their experiences in Washington, with the notable exception of Matias Romero, who analyzes what went wrong with the passage of the 1883 Reciprocity Treaty between Mexico and the U.S.; the indignities suffered may be just too much. Canadian NAFTA negotiators seemed to be very respectful of their Mexican counterparts, emphasizing their knowledge and friendliness. Mexicans on the other hand seemed surprised by the conservative nature of Canadians. At other times during the long process of NAFTA negotiations, many Mexicans were taken aback on finding that Canadians would take the side of the U.S. In other words, from the outset, Mexicans thought that Canada would be a natural ally. It was not that Mexico had made a comprehensive analysis of the common interests shared with Canada, but it was assumed that because both were negotiating with the U.S., all important differences would vanish.

50

REDISCOVERING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

8. While the author holds to this generalization, there are exceptions. One very critical perspective stands out—the one presented in the book The Political Economy of North American Free Trade, eds. Ricardo Grinspun and Maxwell A. Cameron (Montreal, Kingston, London: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1993). The underlying basis for criticism lies in the differences attributed by these editors to neoclassical economics and critical theory, which called in question (legitimately) most Mexican political, economic and cultural practices. Yet the major fault of many of the contributors to this volume is that they would use a trade instrument (NAFTA) to begin from ground zero and transform Mexico. Many of us would like to see Mexico transformed, but we take the world as it is (its initial conditions with all its flaws, not unquestioningly, and not rationalizing or justifying them) and go on from there. 9. Stephen S. Randall, "Canada, the United States and Mexico: the Development of Trilateralism," in Frontera Norte 3 (6), (JulyDecember, 1991): 132 (Published by El Colegio de la Frontera Norte, Tijuana, Baja California, Mexico). 10. Michael Hart, A North American Free Trade Agreement. The Strategic Implications for Canada (Ottawa: Centre for Trade Policy and Law and the Institute for Research on Public Policy, 1990). 11. Randall, "Canada, the United States," 134. 12. Randall, ibid., 135. 13. Mel Hurtig, The Betrayal of Canada (Toronto: Stoddart), 197-98. 14. The Mulroney government was taking a beating over unemployment, the failure of the Meech Lake accord, and the GST; it was naturally cautious about adding another issue concerning which there was no guarantee of success, and which was likely to compound the problems of unemployment and strengthen the charges that Canadian foreign economic policy was being dictated once more from Washington. As we know today, the government was right about all these problems, since they became the major topics of discussion in the 1993 elections, and the negotiations over NAFTA did not help them in any way. 15. Hart, A North American Free Trade Agreement, 133. 16. Leonard Waverman, "A Canadian Vision of North American Economic Integration," in Continental Accord: North American Economic Integration, ed. Steven Globerman (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute), 61.

51

BEYOND MEXICO

17. Leonard Waverman, 'The NAFTA Agreement: A Canadian Perspective," in Assessing NAFTA: A Trinational Analysis, eds. Steven Globerman and Michael Walker (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1993), 56. 18. Some of these forecasts have been shown to be too optimistic. Mexico's economy grew by only 0.4 percent in 1993. Manufacturing dropped by 1.5 percent with some specific sectors such as textiles dropping 7.4 percent (New York Times, February 22, 1994, Business Section, p.2. col.l). 19. Daniel Schwanen, "Were the Optimists Wrong on Free Trade? A Canadian Perspective," Commentary, No. 37 (October 1992), 11; Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. 20. Michael Gestrin and Alan M. Rugman, "The NAFTA's Impact on the North American Investment Regime," Commentary, No. 42 (March, 1993) 10; Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute. 21. Carlos Cabeza Resendez, "Trade Liberalization in Mexico and the North American Free Trade Agreement," U.S.-Mexican Occasional Paper No. 3 (The University of Texas at Austin. LBJ School of Public Affairs. U.S. Mexican Policy Studies Program, 1993), 23. 22. This exit of capital is serious enough for public sector personnel in San Diego who deal with Mexican affairs to have contacted the author, because of worries about the possibility of the repetition of the crisis of 1982. 23. Gustavo Vega Canovas, "El acuerdo bilateral de libre comercio entre Canada y Estados Unidos: implicaciones para Mexico y los paises en desarrollo," Foro Internacional, 28 (3) (January-March, 1988):396-97 (Published by El Colegio de Mexico). 24. See Stephen L. Lande and Craig VanGrasstek, The Trade and Tariff Act of 1984: Trade Policy in the Reagan Administration (Lexington: Lexington Books, D.C. Heath, 1986). 25. The latest example of rapidly increasing business opportunities has just been announced—ICA, Mexico's largest construction conglomerate, and the Toronto-based Reichmann International Mexico are forming a joint venture to build a new urban complex in Santa Fe, just south of Mexico City (New York Times, C2), February 21, 1994, p.2. col.l). 26. Alan K, Henrikson, "A North American Community: From the Yukon to the Yucatan," in The Diplomatic Record, 1991-1992, eds. Hans Binnendijk and Mary Lock (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1993), 72.

52

REDISCOVERING THE NEIGHBOURHOOD

27. For a discussion of how Chapter 19 of the FTA has functioned, see Gilbert R. Winham, "Dispute Settlement in NAFTA and the FTA," in Assessing NAFTA: A Trinational Analysis, eds. Steven Globerman and Michael Walker (Vancouver: The Fraser Institute, 1993). 28. Under the Framework Agreement signed between Mexico and the U.S. back in 1987, there were mechanisms for consultations which were never utilized because actors preferred the old way of doing things—calling on friends, trying to resolve conflicts in an ad hoc fashion, etc. The evaluation by trade representatives in Washington of how this agreement was operating at the time was negative. 29. Gustavo del Castillo, "The NAFTA: A Mexican Search for Development," in NAFTA as a Model of Development: The Benefits and Costs of Merging High and Low Wage Areas, eds. Richard S. Belous and Jonathan Lemco (Washington, D.C.: National Planning Association, Friedrich Ebert Stiftung and The Institute of the Americas, 1993). 30. Gustavo del Castillo, "Mexican Development Concerns and the Formation of a Free Trade Area in North America." Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Banking Subcommittee on International Development, Finance, Trade and Monetary Policy, April 16, 1991.

53

This page intentionally left blank

IV

POST-NAFTA: CAN THE UNITED STATES, CANADA AND MEXICO DEEPEN THEIR ECONOMIC RELATIONSHIP? Leonard Waverman1

L'apres-M£.NA: LesEtats-Unis, le Canada et le Mexique peuvent-ils encore approfondir leur partenariat economique? Resume: L'Accord de libre-echange nord-americain (ALENA) , loin d'offrir un cadre bien defini au commerce nordamericain, represente plutot un equilibre instable que les developpements des prochaines annees ne peuvent que faire evoluer dans 1'une ou 1'autre de deux directions: le demantelement—formel ou defacto—ou un modele communautaire plus formalise. L'instabilite de l'arrangement actuel resulte des pressions protectionnistes que 1'accord lui-meme, s'ajoutant a la liberalisation globale des echanges dans le cadre du GATT, genere chez les signataires. Le traite de libre-echange ne touchant pas les politiques domestiques, les gouvernements peuvent tout a loisir utiliser cellesci pour imposer des mesures de protection qui vont a 1'encontre de 1'esprit du

traite. C'est ainsi que les procedures antidumping, la definition des normes nationales et les controles frontaliers sont utilises pour imposer des barrieres non-tarifaires au commerce regional. Une harmonisation des politiques domestiques permettrait seule d'eliminer ces obstacles. Elle signifierait toutefois le passage a un niveau superieur d'integration, plus proche de la communaute economique que du simple libreechange. II n'est pas clair a ce stade-ci qu'un tel approfondissement des relations economiques entre les trois pays soit possible. Qui plus est, 1'extension de 1'accord a de nouveaux partenaires, auquel on attache actuellement beaucoup d'importance, rendrait une integration economique accrue encore plus difficile. Sans cette derniere, pourtant, I'utilisation croissante des barrieres nontarifaires risque fort de faire echouer 1'entreprise de liberalisation commerciale que represente TALENA.

BEYOND MEXICO

NOW THAT NAFTA AND THE URUGUAY ROUND agreements are finalized, many will assume that the mechanisms are in place to ensure a deepening of the economic relationships between the U.S., Canada and Mexico. In this paper I would like to extend a hypothesis that the present NAFTA agreement is an unstable equilibrium and that events will occur either to unravel NAFTA or to expand it to a more formal community type model. I do not prophesy which way the agreement will turn, but the potential to unravel in North America is real. The changes induced by NAFTA (and the GATT) on trade and investment flows will bring new pressures to bear and many of these pressures will be protectionist. NAFTA is in some crucial ways incomplete as it leaves domestic policies in place, policies which can be equivalent non-tariff barriers (NTBs) .2 The ability of NAFTA to survive will depend on the ultimate desires of the three national governments to respond to growing non-tariff barriers. It has become evident in the last two years that cross-border anti-dumping (AD) actions between the U.S. and Canada have increased substantially. It is also evident that the costs of the process have increased, with almost automatic appeals of domestic antidumping orders to binational panels and the growing use or threat in the U.S. of extraordinary challenges of binational panel decisions. Mexico has been most vigorous in its use of anti-dumping actions, even prior to NAFTA, perhaps to set a "good" example. Antidumping (and countervail) actions have no place in an FTA. Yet it is most difficult to see how the domestic sovereignty embedded in domestic AD (and countervail) laws can be changed. The next part of this paper deals with anti-dumping issues and examines steps to reduce their use. One cannot compare NAFTA and the European Union (EU) as they are totally different ventures. Yet, by examining the non-tariff barriers that became major issues within the community, one can predict the issues which could, besides AD, become the unsettling problems of NAFTA. The Cechinni Report, which provided the empirical base for the movement in Europe to the Single Market, identified technical barriers—border controls, standards, rules of origin and technical requirements—as the main costs of a "non-Europe." While NAFTA does attempt to come to grips with these issues, it cannot do so adequately for the same reason that anti-dumping actions are still so prevalent—the inability to relinquish domestic

56

POST-NAFTA

sovereignty in a number of critical areas.3 To minimize the protectionist side of technical issues requires one of three principles: a political vision of North America, an overarching court similar to the Court of Justice in the EU which could implement a North American vision, or a single North American act. None of these options seems feasible in North America. I examine how these issues could become important irritants to trade. The tensions which may become evident in NAFTA will then determine the Agreement's future. The new Liberal government in Canada was unable to proclaim NAFTA until an agreement was reached with the U.S. to appoint a working group substitute for anti-dumping as well as to develop a strengthened subsidies code by the end of 1995. I do not see this working group as a token to placate an uneasy Canadian electorate but as an essential continuing Canadian demand for "secure access." Anti-dumping, countervail, border disputes over content, differences in technical standards, all mean that the present NAFTA is an incomplete agreement. The committee structure set up in NAFTA is one means of reducing frictions and below I suggest means of improving those committee workings. In addition, Article 2006 of NAFTA may prove important. In this Article, any party may request consultation regarding "... any matter that it considers might affect the operation of the Agreement." This consultative process could become a constructive means of change to the Agreement, reducing trade frictions if countries utilize the process in an aggressive but positive manner. According to recent data, Canadian exports to the U.S. and American exports to Canada have grown substantially in those areas liberalized under the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement (CUSFTA). NAFTA can improve all economies; however, for it to do so in the long run requires the ceding of sovereignty in areas of domestic policy where most countries (especially the U.S.) may be unwilling to yield. Thus, while Europe wonders whether to widen before or after deepening, North America will likely widen (into Latin America) long before it deepens. Yet the process of widening now underway, first to Mexico, makes the process of deepening between Canada and the U.S. even more distant. If Canada and the U.S. could not jointly agree on convergence of some of their domestic policies, Canada, the U.S. and a host of Latin American countries have even less ability to come to a common policy on anti-dumping, standards and border issues.

57

BEYOND MEXICO

THE NAFTA AGREEMENT

It is important to remember what NAFTA does and does not do. 1. NAFTA and the Canada-U.S. FTA (CUSFTA) lower tariffs for most manufactured products flowing across the three borders over a fifteen-year period. Tariffs between the U.S. and Canada fall over the ten year period 1989 to 1999. All Mexican tariffs fall to zero by 2004, half became zero on January 1, 1994. U.S. and Canadian tariffs against Mexican products are scheduled to fall to zero over fifteen years—most over five years but with long adjustment periods for "sensitive" sectors (household glassware, footwear and ceramic tile; the definition of sensitive appears to be how important the sector was to congressional votes). "Snapback" provisions allow tariffs to revert to previous levels for a limited period if an import surge occurs. CUSFTA has been in place for five years. In 1988, the year before CUSFTA, the average trade-weighted Canadian tariff was 9.9 percent and the U.S. tariff 3.3 percent while in 1993 "most Mexican tariffs are currently between 10 and 20 percent."4 A significant number of the products subject to Canadian and U.S. tariffs have had producers requesting speedier reductions than were contained in the agreement. This suggests that tariffs between Mexico and its Northern neighbours will also come down faster than the negotiated minimum path. As tariffs fall, sectors facing new competition from producers in the other NAFTA countries could increasingly turn to other protectionist measures. 2. For a number of key manufactured goods elaborate rules of origin determine the ability to cross borders duty-free. Since U.S. tariffs are already low, quotas exist for some commodities (textiles and apparel), while customs interpretation can remain significant— regarding for instance the percentage of costs which are incurred in North America, as in the dispute between U.S. and Canadian customs over the degree of regional content in Hondas produced in Canada. Generally, a good crosses one of the two borders as a regional good if it is processed in North America in such a way that a change in tariff classification occurs.5 For chemicals, footwear, machinery, electronics and autos, a change in tariff classification is insufficient to justify regional status. 58

POST-NAFTA

These five categories must meet cost tests—50 percent to 62.5 percent (autos) of costs must be regional.6 In 1991, these five categories accounted for 46.6 percent of Canadian exports to the U.S., 50 percent of Mexican exports to the U.S. and 58.2 percent of U.S. exports to its two neighbours. Thus the cost tests are utilized for just over half of North American trade! For apparel and textiles, 50 percent of costs incurred in North America is insufficient to make the good regional. Most cotton and fabricated goods must meet a "triple transformation" test, i.e. fibre, textile and apparel must be North American in origin. 3. For agricultural products, there are three bilateral agreements: Canada/U.S.; Canada/Mexico and Mexico/U.S. Agriculture does not come close to free trade for Canada; U.S./Mexico agricultural trade is freer. 4. Mexico, because of constraints in its constitution, opted out of the clauses ensuring national treatment for its energy exports in U.S. markets and non-discrimination for energy exports in times of domestic Mexican energy shortages.7 5. Border disputes of the type which have arisen between the U.S. and Canada under CUSFTA are still prevalent in the European Union, and could become significant problems in NAFTA. Many disputes are implicit non-tariff barriers. For example, there will be differing interpretations of the elaborate language governing product eligibility for free trade. The three countries cannot agree on the data measuring the size of past exports and imports, so how will they agree on the measurement of the percentage of costs of a particular good which is incurred in North America? NAFTA is a clear improvement over CUSFTA. However, it leaves anti-dumping (AD) powers largely for each of the three countries to determine. AD decisions of a national agency are, as in CUSFTA, appealable to a binational appeal mechanism. While this mechanism is important and it does remove the most egregious kinds of protectionism, data show an expansion of AD cases between Canada and the U.S. since 1991. These trade disputes are important barriers and their escalation shows that new remedies to reduce their impact are required. 59

BEYOND MEXICO

A vast area which could emerge as a major source of disputes is that of differing technical requirements. Significant disputes will likely arise over technical standards and the lack of a "mutual recognition" clause in NAFTA is a matter of major concern. 6. NAFTA, in effect, is a pact on investment. Five basic principles are at play: i) national and/or Most Favoured Nation (MFN) treatment (whichever is better for the foreigner); ii) elimination of most performance requirements (except research and development, production, training and employment, construction and, for Canada, technology transfer); iii) free transfer of funds; iv) expropriation protection; v) dispute resolution. However, as Rugman and Gestrin8 point out, most existing impediments to Foreign Direct Investment (FDl) are grandfathered. The existing restrictions are substantial. In the U.S. they include broadcasting, telecommunications, airlines, shipping and banking.8 In addition, specific exemptions are allowed. Canada kept the Investment Canada review of transactions above $150 million and an exemption for "cultural industries."10 Mexico imposes a review mechanism starting at $25 million in 1994 but increasing to the Canadian threshold (expressed in U.S. dollars) by 2004 (as well as being indexed to inflation and economic growth) .n 7. NAFTA (over time) liberalizes trade and investment in a wide variety of services, including banking, finance, insurance, enhanced telecommunications services, and some land transportation. Mexico exempts oil and gas drilling, and gasoline retailing; Canada exempts culture, airlines, telecommunications, and broadcasting. ANTI-DUMPING AND COUNTERVAIL - WILL THEY BREAK NAFTA?12

The U.S. Agenda In discussing the "deepening" of new trading relationships in North America, it is important to begin with U.S. desires and the U.S. agenda. In the electoral politics of 1992, Clinton supported demands for more aggressive action against nations in Europe and Asia— many of them former Cold War allies—who had failed to play "fairly" in the global economy. In Putting People First, the Clinton campaign's platform document required that these nations abandon unfair trade 60

POST-NAFTA

subsidies in order to build a more "level playing field." To that end Clinton stated, among other things, that his administration would propose passage of a stronger and sharper "Super 301 "trade bill provision.13 As was stated in the campaign document, "if other nations refuse to play by our trade rules, we'll play by theirs."14 In focusing on the unfair practices of other nations, Clinton was adopting a well-developed position that the failure of American competitiveness could be attributed to others' actions as opposed to internal failures. The debate had grown increasingly loud and accusatory in the latter half of the 1980s as the U.S. trade imbalance exploded.15 Aggressive American trade policy makes use of a number of policy instruments. First, there has been encouragement or tacit support for the use of American trade remedy law (including AD and CVD) by the private sector. This reliance on national trade remedy laws has been most evident in the U.S.-Canada relationship and was of particular relevance to the actions taken by the new Liberal government over proclamation of NAFTA in Canada. Next, the immediate past administrations had employed an array of managed trade instruments including Voluntary Exports Restraints (VER) and Orderly Market Arrangements (OMA). When the steel VER ended in 1991, Canadian steel producers, despite the existence of "free trade," were swept up in a broad U.S. steel industry attack on steel imports. Finally, and most troubling, has been the willingness of American administrations to extract unilateral concessions from others and to threaten trade retaliation in the event of failure to achieve a satisfactory resolution. The abandonment of reciprocity or MFN and the turn to unilateral demands for concessions has been labelled "aggressive unilateralism."16 Such unilateralism has included use of Section 30117 actions against the practices of various states, as well as actions to open the markets of "offending" states described as Voluntary Import Expansion agreements (VIE). A revised "Super 301" could be used against Canada were the U.S. to determine that certain Canadian practices (for example the protection of culture) did not leave the playing field level. NAFTA limits the kinds of retaliation the U.S. might take against Canada (or Mexico) but does not leave unilateralism on the sidelines. The same is obviously true for Canada and Mexico. They can initiate trade sanctions against the U.S. 61

BEYOND MEXICO

The Clinton Administration's trade policy appears to be built on the belief that there is no contradiction between aggressive trade policy and free trade.18 This statement does not mean to suggest that the U.S. is the evil party in the agreement and that Canada and Mexico are saintly. Each party is maximizing its own self-interest. Canada has been an aggressive user of anti-dumping and in a number of sectors, such as marketing boards, beer and wine, particularly protectionist. Mexico is quickly moving to become the hub of NAFTA, signing FTAs with several Latin American countries.19 One would have expected parties to NAFTA to consider expanding the agreement before entering into new FTAs themselves. However, the U.S. has the power and an aggressive trade agenda. NAFTA does not fully protect Mexico and Canada against a number of present and potential U.S. protectionist policies. Neither does NAFTA fully protect the U.S. against such policies from its two neighbours. However, with 70 percent of Canadian and Mexican exports going to the U.S. and only 30 percent of U.S. exports flowing to Mexico and Canada, the power asymmetry parallels a trade asymmetry. That is why Canada in 1985 wanted secure access to the U.S. market. It is in this context of continued protectionism that the "widening and deepening" of economic relations in North America will take place. ANTI-DUMPING

Article VI of the GATT (pre-Uruguay Round) allows a country to use its national laws to levy an anti-dumping duty "on imports that cause or threaten to cause material injury."20 While nations exporting to the U.S. attempted to wrest significant concessions on the use of anti-dumping law from U.S. negotiators in the Uruguay Round, their attempts were largely unsuccessful and, some suggest, may allow a greater exercise of domestic AD: "this would permit U.S. Uruguay Round implementing legislation [which we have yet to see] to include anti-dumping rules that are even more trade restrictive than the current rules."21 Table 4 provides data on the extent of anti-dumping (AD) cases launched by Canada and the U.S. against each other between 1986 and 1993. A quick perusal of the table shows a number of interesting facts. First, the number of AD cases, both those initiated and those with affirmative findings, has fallen since Canada-U.S. Free 62

POST-NAFTA

Tabk4 Canada-U.S. Cross-border Anti-dumping Cases 1986-88

1989-91

1992

1993

1. Investigations Initiated:3 Canada against U.S.

15

10

7

13a

U.S. against Canada

9

5

4

8

2. Anti-dumping Affirmative Findings (dumping and injury): 7 5

6 1

18 1

6b 4

Canada against U.S.

—

18

8

11

U.S. against Canada

—

3

3

15

Canada against U.S. U.S. against Canada 3. Binational Panels:b

a b

Two investigations are in progress. There are more binational panels than cases with affirmative findings for two reasons. First, some appeals are launched after a temporary finding of injury on dumping is made. Second, appeals to both injury and dumping determinations are made.

Trade (CUSFTA) began, if one compares the three-year periods 19861988 and 1989-1991. However, the number of cases rises sharply in 1992 and again in 1993. Moreover, in any time period, Canada initiates and brings to successful conclusion more AD cases than does the U.S., although the ratio of Canadian to U.S. cases launched falls over the period. The timing of cases, however, shows important differences in Canadian and U.S. responses: while Canadian cases have been more or less evenly spread over the years, U.S. cases are increasing in the more recent periods. Thus it is the U.S. which is, relatively speaking, increasing its use of AD; Canada however remains an aggressive user.22 As noted, the number of AD cases brought rises sharply in 1992-93 (doubling in the U.S. over the previous two-year period); more cases have been initiated in 1992 and 1993 than in any previous two-year period in Canada-U.S. trade. Note a chilling new feature in 1993—the set of cross-border steel AD cases in 1993 signals a new tit-for-tat strategy of retaliation. Eighty percent of all AD cases have been put before binational panels since CUSFTA began and, in the last two years, all but two AD

63

BEYOND MEXICO

trade disputes have been appealed.23 There is, then, a recent increase in trade disputes and a now almost inevitable appeal of decisions in the world's latest and largest bilateral free trade area. These disputes exist despite free trade and despite a dispute resolution process which was introduced on the insistence of Canada, as a means of limiting the exercise of AD. It is fair to say that the basic Canadian purpose for negotiating free trade—unconstrained access to the U.S. market—still encounters unacceptable impediments. Anti-dumping actions within a free trade area are purely protectionist, are contrary to good sense, and are obvious barriers to free trade.24 AD is a trade barrier; it is the opposite of national treatment, and is discriminatory. AD cases, expected AD cases and threatened AD cases are equivalent to tariffs. Firms threatened by those actions face not only the possibility of tariffs, but the high fixed and sunk costs of defending themselves in lengthy court hearings in Washington, Ottawa or Mexico City. Even if the case is without merit, the exporter challenged has no recourse for recovering his costs of defence. AD fits into the classic economics strategy termed "raising rival costs," and designed to force rivals to raise prices through threats, through costs of defence, or through actual penalties. Recent work by Robert Staiger and Frank Wolak (1993) demonstrates that simply initiating an AD case provides half of the gains (restriction of imports) that result from a positive finding of dumping. The recent sets of steel actions launched in the U.S. as the "voluntary" export restraint program in steel ended, and the retaliatory responses in Canada to these actions, are obvious examples of the protectionist, trade-distorting nature of AD in a free trade area. The actions launched by Armco Steel et al. on June 30,1992, against imports of steel plates, hot-rolled, cold-rolled and galvanized steel from a number of countries, alleged dumping in the U.S. causing injury to U.S. producers. A number of articles and books25 examine and condemn the processes by which the Department of Commerce determines dumping and the U.S. International Trade Commission determines injury. Canadian anti-dumping processes are marginally superior. However, there is widespread if not unanimous agreement among economists that the process is stacked in favour of domestic producers and that the costing rules and determination of costs are biased towards the finding of dumping. 64

POST-NAFTA

The key is that AD cases are discriminatory against foreign producers, are inconsistent with national treatment and thus inconsistent with the basic premise of a Free Trade Agreement. Take as an example American Firm US which produces cold-rolled steel. Firm US competes with three other U.S. producers and two Canadian producers. Competition in the market reduces prices below the "costs" of Firm US which deems this competition unfair and considers launching actions against domestic competitor USB for predatory behaviour and against foreign competitor CAN for dumping.26 In order for Firm US to win a private anti-trust suit for predation against domestic competitor USB, it must prove two things— first, that prices were below variable costs and second, that Firm USB intended to drive Firm US out of the market in order to recoup the losses from pricing below cost.37 Predation cases are rare since the proof is difficult and the burden of proof is on the firm alleging predation to demonstrate that its rival priced below average variable cost. Contrast this difficult case with the much easier requirements Firm US must satisfy to show that foreign Firm CAN dumped its products in the U.S. The plaintiff can utilize costs constructed from accounting data including all overheads and a reasonable profit margin. Here the proof of dumping is not difficult and the burden of proof is on the firm alleged to have engaged in dumping to demonstrate that in fact it did not do so.28 In order for foreign Firm CAN to avoid a dumping charge in a free trade area, it has to price in the U.S. at production cost which is defined as fully allocated costs plus an 8 percent notional return on capital. U.S. domestic Firm USB however has to price below cost (defined as below incremental cost) with the "dangerous probability" of recouping its investment by driving Firm US out of the market before being liable for a charge of predation. Firm CAN in the U.S. market then faces a much more stringent pricing rule than does Firm USB. However, in a free trade area there should be no "U.S." or "Canadian" or "Mexican" market. The existence of AD creates artificial markets by raising entry barriers against foreign competitors. In the above example, if Firm CAN located in the U.S. instead of in Canada and had costs identical to those of its Canadian counterpart, it could not be accused of dumping. Since dumping laws discriminate against foreigners, they affect investment decisions.

65

BEYOND MEXICO

The only reason for accusing Firm CAN of dumping instead of applying the more difficult test of predation is its foreign identity. The continued existence of AD cases across borders in an FTA is contrary to national treatment. Foreign Firm CAN in the U.S. market is not treated in the same way as is domestic Firm USB; Firm CAN is treated differently and worse. These arguments are not news in Ottawa, Washington or Mexico City. The February 1994 Economic Report to Congress of the Council of Economic Advisors states: "Both in the United States and elsewhere, anti-dumping laws go beyond preventing anti-competitive practices—which should be their rationale—and often have the effect of protecting domestic industries from foreign competition."29 But the possibility that the current U.S., Mexican and Canadian administrations will come to a new understanding to reduce or replace AD (and CVD) actions by other schemes (such as the use of antitrust law) is low. The U.S. Administration did pull out all stops to have NAFTA passed; now new trade accords with Latin America are being floated.30 However, given the Clinton Administration's aggressive trade stance described above, there is likely little desire or ability in the U.S. to reduce or remove the International Trade Commission's and the Department of Commerce's oversight of AD; this would require revising or removing significant pieces of legislation. There is zero probability, post-NAFTA, of convincing a hostile Congress of the benefits of removing U.S. protectionist measures against Canada and Mexico. Adding Mexico to the FTA has clearly complicated the process. The fear of Mexican low wages will heighten attention to the prices of Mexican goods entering the U.S. Thus, "dumping" will be examined more closely.31 U.S. desire to implement the Enterprise of the Americas initiative also works to put AD revisions outside the realm of near-term possibility. How could Congress be convinced to open borders to Chile, Colombia and Peru and simultaneously to remove the safety valve of AD cases? North American markets will become more integrated as tariffs are reduced. Domestic firms, threatened by low tariffs, can increasingly rely on AD remedies. These will either be "visible" cases or the use of threats to launch actions unless the exporter understands the domestic pressures and agrees to raise its price. Thus one can predict an expansion of trade disputes within NAFTA. 66

POST-NAFTA

It is this expansion of disputes within a free trade area which creates political problems, as they have done in Canada and as they could do in Mexico. The exports involved may be a small share of North American trade, but the visibility of the disputes is a continuing source of political instability for the agreements. Under pressure from the new Canadian Liberal government, the U.S. and Mexico agreed to resurrect the Working Group in CUSFTA (Article 1907) which is "to conclude a report on the unfair trade codes by the end of 1995, but ... neither the U.S. nor Canada would be bound to comply with the report."32 Academics and many practioners agree that anti-dumping cases make no sense in a free trade area. In order to move towards their removal certain procedural steps can be taken, for example, instituting common information requests and agreeing to a sensible set of costing criteria as well as a common time frame. Canada and the U.S. already have similar agreements in other areas. In addition, an education process is needed to show to industry and labour that AD cases against the country lower output and employment. One has to build a constituency which is against domestic AD laws. Finally, the trade administrations and even committees of the legislatures in the three countries could meet in order to raise the awareness of the common problem that AD is creating. NEW BARRIERS TO TRADE: BORDER CONTROLS, PRODUCT AND TECHNICAL STANDARDS

NAFTA is a free trade agreement, but, as the European Union (EU) has found, free trade in goods involves many issues beyond the removal of tariffs. While NAFTA and the EU are not directly comparable, it is interesting to examine several of the issues that the Community and the Court of Justice have dealt with in order to ensure "a free flow of imports and exports." Article 3 of the Treaty on European Union of February 7,1992 calls for "the elimination, as between Member States, of customs duties and quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having equivalent effect; .... and an internal market characterized by the abolition, as between Member States, of obstacles to the free movement of goods, persons, services and capital" (emphasis added). 67

BEYOND MEXICO

The surveys of European business undertaken in 1987 and preceding the Cechinni Report listed technical barriers as the major impediment to the completion of the internal market. It is instructive to examine the technical barriers that the EC considered removing and to compare these to the methods of dealing with technical barriers in North America. I begin with border issues and then discuss technical standards. Border Issues Clearly, for imports to be equivalent to domestically produced goods, especially in a world of "just-in-time" production, timely and lowcost delivery is crucial. The EU has attempted to minimize delays and paperwork at border crossings, but real problems still exist today, 36 years after the Treaty of Rome. The European Commission attempted to reduce the impact of border controls (the physical inspection and administrative formalities involved when goods cross borders) by adopting directives that provided broad-based principles to be followed by member states. The directives did not have the expected effect, however; "it seemed that some member states purposely applied [them] on [their] narrowest definition."33 Since 1990, under the Single Market Act, the Commission has moved to eliminate border controls on intra-community flights, sea crossings, and train movements, but with little real effect due to the worries that illegal goods (drugs etc.) could slip across unguarded frontiers. Movement to a borderless community appears halted at this point.34 The Commission has proposed a Common Community Customs Code. Although the EU is a customs union (unlike North America) with common tariffs against third countries, there is, as yet, no common basis for handling third country imports. "The objective of the proposal [Community Customs Code] is to establish one coherent text replacing a multiplicity of different instruments and therefore ensuring greater legal transparency."35 The EU is grappling with setting up a common computerized information system at borders, systems to detect fraud, and even EU rather than national training of border officials. NAFTA is far behind the EU on these issues. NAFTA does set up a Working Committee on Trade in Goods which annually brings together officials concerned with border issues. This is likely an 68

POST-NAFTA

insufficient mechanism to deal with the complex issues that will arise on a day-to-day basis. The NAFTA negotiators have announced a trilingual one-page common certificate of origin.36 However, it is much more than the origin of a good which is checked at a border. Phytosanitary standards, fraud detection, immigration, and detection of counterfeit and grey market goods are among the many potential border roadblocks. "U.S. Customs also has the responsibility of enforcing the laws and regulations of about forty agencies at the border."37 Thus, the possibility of borders becoming costly impediments to increased cross-border trade is real. The issues are fourfold: the need for common agreement on the interpretation of the thousands of pages of detail in NAFTA; second, the need to train thousands of customs officials in this common interpretation; third, some mechanism is required for resolving disputes; and fourth, the problem of bottleneck infrastructure investments.38 NAFTA does contain a dispute resolution process: the binational panels. However, this process is costly and long—it can take up to a year.39 In 1992 the U.S. Customs Service interpreted the CUSFTA agreement to the detriment of Honda Canada (and to the detriment of Canada), and no process other than a binational panel could resolve differing interpretations. That interpretation was a trade barrier increasing the costs of Honda Canada cars in the U.S. NAFTA ended that dispute. However, one cannot rely on new agreements or costly binational panels to resolve border disputes, especially those involving minor issues. Nor can one depend on "good faith" to establish convergence of customs issues. One possible avenue for minimizing the number of disputes is to have the Working Group meet monthly, provide it with a staff, and have informal discussions of differing interpretations and potential conflicts before they become official disputes. Here the Free Trade Commission Secretariat (see below) can play crucial roles by utilizing its staffs and its power under the Agreement to set the agenda for Working Groups. Standards

Differing standards are potentially significant non-tariff barriers— their significance rising as high-tech goods increase their share of intra-NAFTA trade. Differing technical specifications, too, raise barriers against imports. Within the EC, until the 1970s, technical 69

BEYOND MEXICO

standards were classic means of maintaining national barriers to community trade. The Court of Justice, in two benchmark cases, (Casis deDijon being the most famous example) greatly reduced the ability of EC member countries to protect domestic producers on the basis of differing technical requirements. The EU has utilized several regimes in an attempt to reduce these barriers. Technical regulations cannot now be used to keep imports out if the other country's technical requirements are "equivalent."40 "Mutual recognition" and the "harmonization of national standards" are two other approaches (besides equivalence) that the EU has introduced over the years to reduce the trade-distorting elements of technical regulations. During the 1970s and 1980s, EC-wide standards replaced national standards for 185 products and services. The typical cases involved safety (cosmetics, foodstuffs) and some industrial products. Beginning in 1985, the Commission began to realize that uniform community-wide standards did not maximize product choice or diversity. Thus, where standards do not involve risks to health, safety or the environment, the rule of "mutual recognition" now holds. A country cannot prevent the importation of a good from another member country simply because that good meets a different but qualifying standard. Instead of harmonizing standards in these other areas, the community relies on labelling and consumer choice. Chapter 9 of NAFTA deals with "Standards-Related Measures." Article 904 affirms the rights of each party to set "any standardsrelated measures," although goods of another NAFTA country receive national and MEN treatment. Article 906.1 requires "to the greatest extent practicable" the compatibility of standards-related measures. Articles 906.4 and 906.6 are key to the effective withdrawal of standards as trade barriers. In these two subsections, parties agree that a standard of an "exporting party" is equivalent where the exporting party demonstrates "to the satisfaction of the importing party that its technical regulation adequately fulfils the importing party's legitimate objectives" (906.4, emphasis added) and that parties accept wherever possible "the results of a conformity assessment procedure" conducted in the other country. Article 908.2 requires mutual accreditation of conformity assessment bodies. Procedures are set out (908.33, 909, 910) to ensure non-discriminatory access to 70

POST-NAFTA

these bodies. Article 913 establishes the joint Committee on Standards-Related Measures, which monitors implementation and administration of the Chapter, provides a forum for consultation, and can establish sub-committees (four have already been detailed). It is not difficult to see the differences between the EU's mutual recognition process and NAFTA's Chapter 9. NAFTA is a host-country standard regime as compared to the home-country standard regime in the EU. Canada, for example, could require that Mexico prove that Mexican standards in some area, X, meet Canada's legitimate objectives. In the EU, France can require that Portuguese firms demonstrate that their standards in some area, X, meet Portugal's objectives. Thus NAFTA does not involve mutual recognition; that would require a home-country regime. NAFTA does remove the obvious uses of standards as trade barriers and does provide for processes that lower the costs of standards-setting. Each country will accept results of tests in the other two countries "whenever possible." However, there are three ways in which standards-setting in NAFTA is below the "standard" set in the EU. First, Article 904 of NAFTA allows individual country standards; for a number of goods, the EU has community-wide standards. Second, in the EU one cannot prevent the import of goods which meet different EU standards (except with respect to safety, health, and the environment); in NAFTA, it appears that imported goods meeting differing standards can be kept out. Finally, under NAFTA, it is open to an individual country's interpretation as to what the "legitimate objective" of a standard is, and what "practicable" means for comparability across countries.41 I predict early and numerous trinational problems, discussions and panels on these definitions. There are significant pressures from firms to harmonize standards across North America. Whereas the EU relies on a "top down" process mandating mutual recognition, within North America there is a "bottom up" process, whereby voluntary mutual recognition occurs for voluntary standards (i.e., those that do not involve health, safety and the environment). CUSFTA certainly speeded up this process. Voluntary standards-setting procedures differ, however, across the three countries, with a Crown Corporation established in Canada in 1970 (the Canadian Standards Council), which has the responsibility for managing (not regulating) the voluntary standard system in Canada.42 In the U.S. the process is much more 71

BEYOND MEXICO

fragmented since there are a number of standards institutes and associations. This raises the costs of harmonization because there are multiple and competing accreditation organizations in the U.S. As countries move to worldwide, principally ISO standards, mutual recognition of standards is a moot point and the issue becomes one of judging the viability of conformity assessment. This will likely be the significant future hurdle—the evidence that the standard is met in a given NAFTA country. INSTITUTIONS AND NAFTA

The NAFTA agreement establishes a number of committees, subcommittees and working groups. At the highest level there is a NAFTA Free Trade Commission, comprised of trade ministers from the member countries, which has a permanent home and a staff. Many of the committees are, however, ill-defined;43 none have staffs or permanent secretariats, and the linkages between committees are not spelled out (as noted, they are under the direction of the Free Trade Commission) . Thus the impact of these committees on the future of NAFTA is uncertain; several paths of development are possible. One possible path is for the committees to meet occasionally (most committees must meet once a year to discuss significant issues) . However, without staff, budgets, or the ability to generate and pass on information, their impact will likely be modest. As noted, the Free Trade Commission (FTC) supervises the implementation of the Agreement and can delegate work to the committees and working groups. The FTC has a secretariat, with each country establishing a permanent office for the FTC. Therefore, a second possible path is for the FTC to become a major instrument of change—a Commission which pursues its goal of implementing the Agreement in terms of the spirit of free trade and realizes that there is far more to free trade than tariff reductions. Thus, the FTC could become one of the engines that will reduce the ability of domestic protectionist forces to utilize anti-dumping, countervail, border controls, standards, etc. as trade barriers. This is more like an EU model than what is currently envisioned in North America. As structured, the FTC is not a policy body; having secretariats in each country it is not structured to be a Brussels-type oversight committee. However, the FTC, in supervising the Committee substructure, 72

POST-NAFTA

can set the agendas and embody the determination to make free trade happen. To deepen and widen economic relationships in North America may well require a Free Trade Commission with a mandate for real free trade. Another potential force for harmonization lies in Article 2006, under the rubric "consultations." Article 2006(1) allows any party to request a consultation "regarding any actual or proposed measure or any other matter that it considers might affect the operation of this Agreement." For example, Mexico could request a consultation with the U.S. over the U.S. technical standards for generic pharmaceuticals. Article 2006(2) permits Canada to join the consultation if Canada considers "it has a substantial interest in the matter." If there is no resolution of the dispute in 30-45 days or such other period as the parties agree to, a meeting of the Commission can be requested (2007(1)). The Commission must meet within ten days and if no resolution occurs, Mexico can request an arbitration panel (2008). A panel is selected from a roster of panelists; experts or Scientific Review Boards can be called upon (2014, 2015) and must provide an initial report within ninety days. Parties can comment (fourteen days limit), and a Final Report is issued within another thirty days. The Final Report is to be published (2017(4)). If the Report finds that a party (the U.S. in this example, with respect to its technical requirements on generic pharmaceuticals) is at fault and if the two parties cannot agree to a resolution of the dispute, Mexico can retaliate by "suspending benefits of equivalent effect" until such time as the parties have reached agreement on a resolution of the dispute (2019(1) ).44Thus, an aggressive use of "consultations" could prove to be a means of policy harmonization. In regard to this last section, I will be criticized for searching within the tea leaves of NAFTA for something that is not there. NAFTA is a Free Trade Agreement, it can be argued, thus "harmonization" issues are purposely left out. We are not designing a Community. The point of this paper is that the divide between issues that are within and without an FTA is no longer visible. Trade in goods is affected by a host of domestic policies. In NAFTA we have dealt with tariffs, but we have not effectively dealt with some of the most visible of the other impediments to trade, such as anti-dumping measures or standards which can be effective non-trade barriers. Thus my hypothesis: the Agreement is unstable and its future will require

73

BEYOND MEXICO

serious efforts to examine and deal with the remaining barriers to trade. I end with a recent quote attributed to the Canadian Minister of International Trade, Roy MacLaren: Canada, despite the existence of a free-trade agreement and now NAFTA, has continued to have its exports harassed by the United States, hindered 45 by the United States.

NOTES

1. Revised version of a paper of the same title appearing in Weintraub, Sidney, ed. Integrating the Americas: Shaping Future Trade Policy (Coral Gables, Fla., North-South Center, University of Miami, forthcoming 1994). Helpful comments were received from Alan Alexandroff, Sidney Weintraub, Sylvia Ostry and John Curtis. All errors and views are my own. 2. All Free Trade Agreements do leave domestic policies in place, unlike economic unions. 3. In the important book Governments and Corporations in a Shrinking World (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1990), Sylvia Ostry drew our attention to the need to harmonize a set of domestic policies. 4. U.S. General Accounting Office (GAO) 1993, Vol. 2. p. 14. 5. For many high-tech goods, no general, internationally recognized Harmonized Commodity Description and Coding System (HS) exists. Thus, where agreement was possible, the three countries made up their own HS class for those goods. For other high-tech goods on which agreement was not possible, specific rules were established. For example, a computer is of regional origin if 50 percent of its costs are regional and if the motherboard is regional. 6. Costs (for a rule-of-origin test) do not include sales promotion, marketing and after-sales services, packing and shipping, royalties and interest costs above a reasonable ceiling. 7. All three countries are members of the International Energy Association (IEA). The IEA rules require the sharing of exports in times of lEA-determined shortages. 8. M. Gestrin and A.M. Rugman, "The NAFTA's Impact on the NorthAmerican Investment Regime," Commentary 42 (March 1993) 10; Toronto: C.D. Howe Institute.

74

POST-NAFTA

9. Leonard Waverman, "The NAFTA Agreement: A Canadian Perspective," in Globerman and Walker, Assessing NAFTA. 10. Canada feels cultural industries are exempt under CUSFTA. The U.S. feels it can challenge Canadian actions which damage U.S. interests. The countries appear to have agreed to disagree. 11. Mexico's review only applies if there is more than 49 percent foreign ownership and if the enterprise was originally controlled by Mexican interests. 12. This section draws on joint work with Alan Alexandroff on this subject. 13. Super 301 actions refer to provisions that were added to the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988. These provisions made it mandatory for the USTR to identify trade policy priorities with respect to implementation of sections 301 through 310. The provisions required the USTR to prepare on schedule an inventory of foreign trade barriers, establish a priority list of countries and their unreasonable practices, and then set deadlines for their removal. The provision expired after 1990. 14. Governor Bill Clinton and Senator Al Gore, Putting People First: How Can We All Change America (New York: Times Books, 1992), 13. 15. Trade expert and former Economic Policy Advisor to the Secretary General of GATT, Jagdish Bhagwati, named this critique of the trading system, and the criticism of Japan and other rapidly developing economies, the "diminished giant" syndrome in the United States. This approach, suggested Bhagwati, arose in response to America's declining economic dominance in the global economy. The attack on the rising economic states, in his view, parallelled the British reaction to decline as compared with rapidly industrializing Germany and the United States in the late nineteenth century. 16. Again, this is a phrase that has been popularized by Jagdish Bhagwati. Bhagwati, The World Trading at Risk (New York: Harvester, 1991). 17. Section 301 of Trade and Tariff Act, 1974 directs the USTR to enforce U.S. rights under international trade agreements and to take other actions necessary to remove unfair foreign trade practices. 18. Sylvia Nasar, "The Risky Allure of Strategic Trade," The New York Times, February 28, 1993, p. El. 19. The exact nature of these "FTAs" i.e. how "deep" they are, is unclear.

75

BEYOND MEXICO

20. However, any individual or company affected by a ruling on AD or CVD can ask for a review of the decision by a bi- or trinational panel under Chapters 19 of CAFTA and NAFTA. This review mechanism supersedes appeals to the Court of International Trade in the U.S. or the Federal Court of Appeal in Canada. A decision of the panel can be appealed by one of the governments to an "Extraordinary Challenge Committee." 21. Richard H. Steinberg, "The Uruguay Round: A Preliminary Analysis of the Final Act." Berkeley Roundtable on the International Economy (Berkeley: University of California, 1994) 22. Countervailing duties have been based on a vaguely defined subsidies code agreed to in the Tokyo Round (the Interpretation and Application of Articles VI, XVI and XXIII of the GATT). In the Uruguay Round, it was generally the U.S. that was aggressively pursuing defining and limiting subsidies while foreign governments were attempting to constrain attacks on subsidies. The new GATT Agreement divides subsidies into four colours analogous to traffic lights (the level playing field is now a Grand Prix event): green (non-actionable); red (prohibited); amber (permissible yet actionable); dark amber (presumptively prohibited). Both the "green" and "dark amber" classes have five-year sunset clauses. It will take some time to determine the impact that the new GATT subsidies code will have on U.S. actions against Canada and Mexico. 22. The 13 AD cases launched in 1992-93 in Canada include four that constitute retaliation to the U.S. steel AD cases. 23. Thus one expert on AD has recently written: "the Chapter 19 binational review process under the FTA has little or no chilling effect on the invocation of anti-dumping laws on either side of the border." Michael Trebilcock, "The Case for Replacing Anti-dumping with Anti-trust," Canadian Competition Review, 14(4) (1993): 78. 24. AD cases may have some limited value even in a free trade area. The ability of private firms to initiate actions against foreign rivals in a known administrative process removes some protectionist pressures from the political arena. Not all political pressures are reduced— witness the Extraordinary Challenges launched by the U.S. government or the statements from the U.S. Administration during the NAFTA debate on the desirability of attacking Canadian exports of durum wheat. AD cases are now brought within a system of due process that permits those accused to react and to appeal. Removal

76

POST-NAFTA

25.

26.

27.

28.

of this process might cause these protectionist forces to move into less obvious, less public, venues. See especially Down in the Dumps: Administration of Unfair Trade Laws, eds. Richard Boltuck and Robert Litan (Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1991). This analysis assumes standing is a dumping case—that the firm is acting on behalf of the industry. Besides, dumping injury must also be proven. In the recent Brown & Williamson case (Brooke Group Ltd v. Brown and Williamson Tobacco Comp. 113 S. Ct. 2578 (1993): the U.S. Supreme Court stated that to demonstrate predation the plaintiff must prove: (1) "that the prices complained of are below an appropriate measure of its rival's costs," and (2) "that the competitor had a reasonable prospect, or ... a dangerous probability, of recouping its investment in below-cost prices." Significantly, the Court noted: "Because the parties in this case agree that the relevant measure of cost is average variable cost, ... we again decline to resolve the conflict... over the appropriate measure of cost." Elaborating on the second element of this test, the Court said that "[f]or recoupment to occur, below-cost pricing must be capable, as a threshold matter, of producing the intended effects on the firm's rivals," such as "driving them from the market." Contrary to the popular notion that dumping is "selling below cost," both in law and in economic theory the term is defined as international price discrimination, or the practice of charging a higher price for sales in a foreign producer's home-market than for export to the United States. Under current U.S. law, when comparisons to home-market or other third-market prices are not possible or when U.S. investigators find that a large part of the home-market sales are made "below cost," export prices to the United States are compared to a measure of production cost constructed from accounting data, through the use of statutory guidelines. In principle, all price comparisons are made at the "factory gate," or at the point when the goods leave their plants, and thus before any transportation or selling costs are incurred that would result in legitimate price differences among international markets. Once dumping has been found, U.S. law grants producers of a "like product" relief in the form of an antidumping duty if they then can prove to the ITC that they have been

77

BEYOND MEXICO

29. 30. 31.

32. 33.

34. 35.

36. 37. 38.

39. 40.

materially injured "by reason of the subject imports." (Boltuck and Litan in Down in the Dumps). Quoted in The New York Times, February 15, 1994, p. C2. The New York Times, February 3, 1994, p. C4. U.S. industries and politicians are convinced Canada and its provinces subsidize a wide variety of industries. The potential for subsidies must be large in Mexico with significant state controls still in existence and the exemption from NAFTA of crucial sectors such as energy. Thus changing countervail laws also becomes more difficult. The New York Times, December 3, 1993, p. C5. Dirk Vantyghem and Jacques Pelkmans. "Border Controls for Goods," in Centre for European Policy Studies, The Annual Review of European Community Affairs 1991, (London: Brassy's, 1992) 87. The Benelux countries have largely done away with borders amongst themselves. Vantyghem and Pelkmans point to one unfortunate fallout from real removal of internal border controls: the absence of statistics on imports and exports! The EC recognizes this and is moving to a "common system of integrated economic accounts" and data on shipments from companies rather than customs officials. (Vantyghem and Pelkmans, ibid., 87). Journal of Commerce, November 23, 1992, p.54. University of Texas at Austin, LBJ School, Texas Mexico Multimodal Transportation, 1993, p.9. See LBJ School, ibid., Chapters 3, 4 and 5 for a good discussion of the bottlenecks developing at the Mexico-Texas border because of inadequate roads, bridges, rail connections, border guard stations, etc. This is quick compared to pre-Uruguay Round GATT procedures. "During 1990, 39 rulings [of the Court of Justice] were delivered on questions relating to the free movement of goods and the operation of the Customs Union" and "the Commission undertook 1326 investigators of possible infringements of articles 30 and 36 in 1990. (Niall Bohan, "Technical Barriers to Trade," in The Annual Review of European Community Affairs 1991: 93-94). The number of cases in NAFTA as compared to the EC will not be a good measure of the importance of technical barriers, since in NAFTA there are only two borders and three trade flows. In the EC there are 11 borders and 132 internal trade flows.

78

POST-NAFTA

41. The EU has been quite careful to state that non-EU products are treated identically to EU products. Thus, once a product has been accepted in say, France, home-country equivalence means that product is exportable across the EU. I can find no similar language in NAFTA. 42. The Canadian Standards Council (CSC) runs four separate accreditation programs (for standards developers, certification organizations, testing laboratories and registration organizations— the latter three are conformity assessment groups), approves National Standards for Canada, and is the Canadian manager for international standards organizations (ISO and ITC). 43. For example, the "Committee on Trade in Goods" established under Article 316 "shall meet at the request of any Party to the Commission to consider any matters arising under this Chapter." Once a year (at least) a meeting of "officials responsible for customs, immigration, inspection of food and agricultural products, border expansion facilities and regulation of transportation" shall meet to consider movements of goods through ports! 44. However, Article 2021 states that no right of private action in domestic law can be introduced. 45. Globe and Mail, Thursday, April 14, 1993, p. B-l.

79

This page intentionally left blank

V

MANAGING CANADIAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS IN THE POST-NAFTA ERA Edgar J. Dosman Gerer les relations canado-mexicaines apres /'ALENA Resume : Les relations entre le Canada et le Mexique ont pris, depuis 1990 et a un rythme croissant, une importance notable et surtout inattendue. L'ampleur des liens contractuels entre les deux pays, qui vont de la culture au commerce en passant par la science et la technologic, fait passer le Mexique devant les pays europeens et le Japon au sein des partenaires internationaux du Canada. Ces changements posent avec acuite le probleme de la gestion des relations entre les deux pays, etant donne surtout la rapidite de leur evolution. Paradoxalement, les nombreux et rapides succes de ce processus de rapprochement ont eu pour contrepartie une certaine incoherence, un manque de clarte dans la definition des interets en jeu, ainsi qu'un certain nombre de tensions tant bureaucratiques que politiques. La principale chance offerte, mais aussi le principal defi auquel le gouvernement canadien est confronte, touchent au delicat equilibre a etablir entre les relations bilaterales CanadaMexique et une dynamique trilaterale

nord-americaine dominee largement par les Etats-Unis. Dans le domaine du commerce, la signature de 1'ALENArepresente ainsi une etape cruciale dans le processus visant a instaurer un regime normatif capable d'encadrer la propension des Etats-Unis aux initiatives unilaterales. Les arrangements institutionnels prevus par 1'Accord doivent toutefois encore faire leurs preuves pour qu'on puissejuger de sa valeur effective. En ce qui a trait au gouvernement canadien, des rearrangements bureaucratiques du service exterieur ont suivi la signature de TALENA et clairement place les relations avec le Mexique au coeur des priorites de politique etrangere du Canada. Toutefois, la solution actuelle n'a pas que des avantages et, a certains egards, elle apparait meme bancale. D'un point de vue politique, par ailleurs, on assiste a la multiplication desordonnee des groupes interesses, dont les visions et priorites en regard du Mexique varient largement et s'entrechoquent souvent. Si, d'un cote, cela conforte 1'option mexicaine du gouvernement, ce dernier ne s'en trouve pas moins confronte au defi de canaliser et d'integrer ces interets et ces energies.

BEYOND MEXICO

TRANSITION: THE LEGACY OF THE 1980s THE CANADIAN FEDERAL GOVERNMENT'S Latin American Strategy, adopted in 1989, foresaw neither NAFTA nor a significant move forward in the bilateral relationship with Mexico (or with any other country in the Americas). Nor did scholars or other experts in either country. Instead, the authors of the Latin American Strategy in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade1 merely sought a modest revival in Canadian-Mexican relations after the dead 1980s— a period initiated in August 1982, when the Mexican Government announced in Toronto, at the annual meeting of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund, that it could not service its foreign debt. This shock abruptly terminated the promising four-year bilateral love-affair dating from 1978, in the course of which both Canada and Mexico rode the prevailing international oil and commodity boom to premature dreams of being "principal powers" with "global missions" and "special relationships." During the 1980s, Latin America's debt crisis had the effect of marginalizing Mexico, and relations with the region as a whole, in Canadian foreign policy; within External Affairs and International Trade Canada, Latin America ranked behind Africa in priority. But while this official neglect was understandable in the early 1980s, it continued far too long, and the Latin American Strategy was primarily an attempt to restore regional balance in Canadian foreign policy. By 1989 the region was recovering from the post-1982 economic crisis; Latin American economies were opening to global trading practices and competition with Mexico joining the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) in 1986; and a broad transition to democracy was well under way. In practice, NAFTA made the Latin American Strategy overwhelmingly successful in the Mexican context. Following the failure of his European visit in January 1990, President Salinas de Gortari accepted the need to move forward with a bilateral free-trade agreement with the United States. Talks produced a U.S.-Mexican announcement on June 11,1990 that negotiations towards this objective would proceed and Canadian Prime Minister Brian Mulroney was informed of this impending decision during his visit to Mexico in March 1990. Canada clearly faced a major choice—to stay with the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement which had just come into force (January 1, 1989) and 82

CANADIAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS

risk losing the hard-won (and contested) advantages of CUSFTA; or to move into new territory—a trilateral agreement including Mexico, that is NAFTA. After initial hesitation in Ottawa and Mexico City, both countries entered into the NAFTA process, with the formal launching of negotiations on June 12, 1991 in Toronto. The NAFTA process, therefore, provided the opening for a dramatic change in Canadian-Mexican relations which has affected all constituencies and regions of Canada. In 1990 only 400 businesses called on the Canadian Embassy in Mexico City; three years later the number had multiplied by 10 to 4,500. But other sectors— government, academe, NGOs and the media—also discovered Mexico in an explosion of contacts at every level. The same process of "discovering" affected Mexican relations with Canada; Canada is now among the four priority countries in Mexican external relations. The novelty in both Canada and Mexico, since 1990, is the change in elite opinion—governmental, business, higher educational and cultural—where interest and activity had previously centred almost exclusively on the United States rather than on each other's country. By January 1, 1994, when NAFTA was formally proclaimed in Canada, an unusual reordering of diplomatic priorities had occurred, with the largest Spanish-speaking country of Latin America suddenly transformed into a valued friend. The contractual link with Mexico through NAFTA was stronger than with Western Europe or Japan, and Mexican relations were now a permanent element in the operative mandate of Foreign Affairs and International Trade Canada. Canada and Mexico, each of them bound by a reciprocal preoccupation with the United States, had become important political as well as commercial partners for the long term. A unique middle-power linkage, with evident implications for other countries in the Americas, had materialized. How would this new relationship be managed? If NAFTA as a whole required an integrated policy framework, the Canadian-Mexican bilateral experience since 1990 reflects the predictable: a transition period, exploratory and stressful, not without success but lacking a clear definition of interest and coherence. The principal culprit has been the pace of change itself, which has overloaded the agendas of both countries and created domestic constituencies with competing visions of Mexico. 83

BEYOND MEXICO

BILATERAL RELATIONS AND TRILATERAL CHALLENGE

The Revival of the Joint Ministerial Committee The coming into force of NAFTA on January 1, 1994 coincided with the 50th anniversary of Canadian-Mexican relations. Prime Minister Jean Chretien's official visit of March 23-25,1994 to Mexico City, timed to coincide with Canada's Expo '94, the largest international Canadian trade show ever held, also underlined his government's commitment to the new bilateral relationship.2 Looking over the past five years, there was much to celebrate: it was now difficult to imagine the 1980s, when Nicaragua and Central America had preoccupied Canadian foreign policy makers to the virtual exclusion of Mexico. Clearly, a new threshold has been reached in bilateral relations—Mexico will not return to the margins of Canadian external relations. An indicator of the new spirit in the bilateral relationship has been the revival of the Canada-Mexico Joint Ministerial Committee (JMC). Created in November 1968 to deal with "matters of common interest to the two countries in the political as well as the commercial fields," the salience of the JMC depended on the ebb and flow of relations since the advent of the Trudeau years. Between 1976 and 1982, when relations prospered, JMC meetings were perceived as important events; in contrast, during the debt crisis between 1982 and 1989, the Joint Committee was relegated to the diplomatic sidelines. Indeed, the JMC fell so completely from public view that it seemed well on its way to extinction. Since 1990, with the NAFTA process under way, the JMC has quickly regained its position as the central bilateral institution and senior political forum for managing the bilateral relationship. In particular, after the formation of the Canada-Mexico-U.S. Working Groups on February 7, 1991, it has emerged as an instrument for deepening and broadening the relationship. As late as the JMC meeting in Mexico City on November 15-16, 1991, when only three Canadian ministers participated, Mexico worried about a lack of commitment on the part of the previous Mulroney government. But this fear proved groundless. Subsequent JMC meetings have become important occasions for respective foreign ministers to review in depth the overall state of the relationship. Moreover, the JMC is now established as an annual event (the 1968 agreement provided 84

CANADIAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS

for meetings every two years), another indication of its importance. So, far from becoming extinct, the JMC is now very much part of the Canadian diplomatic scene and shows no sign of leaving centre stage. The most recent JMC meeting, on March 1, 1994 in Mexico City, reflected the new priority and growing prestige of the event. For President Salinas de Gortari, approaching the end of his term, it represented a last hurrah; for the Chretien government it was an opportunity to demonstrate commitment and present new ideas. The dispatch of a very strong team of five Canadian ministers (including Environment, International Trade, Agriculture and Transport) , led by Foreign Affairs Minister Andre Ouellet, underscored the message from Ottawa that Canada's interest in Mexico transcended party politics. Substantively, the JMC meeting took up important new policy areas (such as transportation), and of course dealt at length with the possible extension and implementation of NAFTA and the environmental and labour side-agreements. Indeed, the acceleration of Canadian-Mexican relations is evident from an examination of the bilateral agreements now in force between the two countries. As can be seen from the attached summary, no fewer than eighteen federal departments or agencies, ranging from communications and culture to human resources, forestry and transport, have accords with their Mexican counterparts. Working relations between officials of both countries over a wide range of agencies and activities are now commonplace, including such once sensitive areas as security and human rights. Indeed, as bilateral transactions increase in every sector and area, the embassies in both capitals are struggling hard to maintain an overview—let alone control—of this exploding relationship. The decentralized nature of Canadian federalism contributes to the multiplicity of new initiatives; provincial governments are establishing separate linkages with Mexico.3 Non-governmental contacts between Canada and Mexico are also growing by leaps and bounds. As Mexico enters North America, its border with the U.S. and Canada has become porous in commercial, political, cultural and non-governmental areas. Post-secondary education has a particular long-term strategic importance in foreign relations, and Canadian-Mexican co-operation in this area offers an interesting snapshot of the change since 1990. The sector is under increasing pressure to respond to NAFTA with appropriate research and institutional linkages with Mexican counterparts. 85

BEYOND MEXICO

Table5 Canada-Mexico Agreements in Place Subject/Date

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Agreement

Agriculture June 1980 February 1981 March 1990

MOU on Agricultural Co-operation Agricultural Commodity Supply and Purchasing Arrangement Arrangement on Agricultural and Livestock Co-operation

Bank of Canada September 1992 Agreement between Central Banks Communications August 1962 Radio Co-operation April 1992 MOU on Telecommunications Co-operation February 1993 Agreement on Co-operation in the Field of Distance Education Culture January 1976 April 1991 November 1991 November 1991 February 1993

Agreement on Cultural Co-operation Film and Television Co-Production Agreement MOU on Cultural Relations Agreement on Museum and Archaeological Co-operation Report on Culture and Education

Economic Co-operation May 1980 Agreement on Economic Co-operation Environment March 1990 Bilateral Agreement on Environmental Co-operation September 1992 Trilateral MOU on Environmental Education (Canada, Mexico and United States) September 1993 Trilateral MOU on Environmental Co-operation Natural Resources May 1980 Industrial and Energy Co-operation Agreement October 1992 MOU on Co-operation in Surveying, Mapping, Remote Sensing and Geographic Information Systems February 1993 MOU on Co-operation in Mining Policy Export Promotion April 1991 Line of Credit Agreement with PEMEX April 1991 MOU covering Guarantees on EDC Loans to Commercial Banks in Mexico Public Administration January 1991 MOU on Co-operation between Comptrollers General for Technical Co-operation in Comprehensive Auditing

86

CANADIAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS

Table 5 (continued) Canada-Mexico Agreements in Place Subject/Date

Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) or Agreement

Forestry March 1990 March 1993

MOU on Forestry Co-operation Model Forest Arrangement

Housing February 1993

MOU on Co-operation in Housing and Human Settlements

Justice November 1977 March 1990 March 1990

Treaty on Transfer of Offenders Extradition Treaty Treaty on Mutual Legal Assistance in Criminal Matters

Human Resources June 1991 MOU on Seasonal Agricultural Worker Program May 1992 MOU on Co-operative Labour Activities September 1993 Trilateral Agreement on Labour Co-operation Revenue March 1990 March 1990 Finance January 1974 April 1991

Convention for Exchange of Information regarding Taxes Agreement on Mutual Assistance and Co-operation between Customs Administrations Agreement on Avoidance of Double Taxation Convention on Avoidance of Double Taxation and Prevention of Fiscal Evasion regarding Taxes on Income

Solicitor General March 1990 MOU on Co-operation in Combatting Narcotics Trafficking and Drug Dependency Trade and Investment February 1946 Trade Agreement March 1990 MOU for a Framework for Trade and Investment Consultations January 1994 North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) Tourism March 1990

Agreement on Tourism Co-operation

Transport December 1961 March 1994 March 1994 March 1994

Air Transport Agreement MOU on Technical Co-operation in the Transport Field MOU on Reciprocal Access by Tractor Trucks & Semi Trailers MOU on Recognition of Commercial Drivers' Licenses

Source: Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, Latin America and Carribbean Branch, 1994.

87

BEYOND MEXICO

According to one long-term observer, a great deal remains to be done, but there has to date been impressive success in articulating a distinctly bilateral agenda: For the first time, in both Canada and Mexico, we find a high level of interest by private and academic sectors, to build viable, lasting binational linkages.... Canadian academic interest in Mexico, which began in the 1960s, is entering a mature stage. Most important in this process—evident in the increased research activities, conferences, and the emergence of a Canadian Association for Mexican Studies—is a distinctly Canadian identity with the focus on relevant binational issues.4 Trilateralism

The strong momentum established in Canadian-Mexican relations since 1990 must also be seen in the North American context, in which the U.S. is the dominant factor for Ottawa and Mexico City. The dominating bilateral relationships centre on the U.S., and the extraordinary sets of linkages binding Mexico and Canada respectively to the one remaining superpower create a unique Canadian and Mexican dilemma. How can two small economies, with a combined GDP equalling 14 percent of that of the U.S., strengthen relations, given the inevitable drawing power lying between them? Both Canada and Mexico have tried "third options" in Europe and the Pacific; both have failed and find themselves in NAFTA, which introduces a trilateral institutional dimension of uncertain scope and dimension. Both Canada and Mexico supported NAFTA as an essential first step in creating a stable rules-based trade regime in North America from which both countries could work more effectively in maintaining a more open system at the global level. After their initial hesitation both Canada and Mexico quickly concluded that being in NAFTA together was preferable to individual bilateral trade deals with the U.S. But it is as yet unclear how the three commissions of NAFTA—environment, labour and the NAFTA secretariat to be established in Mexico City—will function, or whether they will begin an effective, long-term institution-building process. The many NAFTA working groups and dispute settlement mechanisms may or may not lead to a deepening of the agreement. Canada and Mexico are more committed to institutional strengthening at the trilateral level 88

CANADIAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS

than Washington is, for the very good reason that without it, continental harmonization will proceed on U.S. terms without stable rules of the game. The tradition of U.S. unilateralism in trade relations runs very deep; NAFTA is only the beginning of a long process of institution building. Nevertheless, the conclusion of NAFTA has set in motion major trilateral initiatives in other non-trade areas aimed at enhancing cooperation among the three countries. The Wingspread Initiative on North American Higher Education, for example, launched in September 1992, is specifically designed to broaden trilateral dialogue and communication. But while Canadians and Mexicans recognize the necessity and potential of educational and cultural collaboration with U.S. institutions as part of a North American vision, both countries are perceiving ever more clearly the vast asymmetry between their resources and those of the U.S. North America is not like Europe, with its relatively broad dispersal of power among members of the community. As Mario Ojeda Gomez, President of El Colegio de Mexico and a supporter of trilateral collaboration, has underlined, "there are great asymmetries between the U.S. universities on the one hand, and Canadian and Mexican institutions on the other" within Wingspread. "Unless a new formula or special mechanism of compensatory reciprocity is found, academic co-operation and cultural exchange among the three commercial partners cannot go very far. "5 The nightmare scenario of North American region-building is an unchecked expansion into Canada and Mexico respectively of "trilateral" programs launched by U.S.-based foundations, trade associations, universities and cultural institutions, in which Canadians access Mexico (and vice versa) via the U.S. The relevant phrase is "unchecked expansion"; many existing trilateral programs of U.S. foundations and agencies are creative and important long-term building blocks for Canadian-Mexican-U.S. understanding. At issue is the growth and vitality of Canadian and Mexican institutions which can mount programs to balance those of their U.S. counterparts. Canadians can either accept this challenge or face a takeover of their non-profit cultural and trade organizations supporting Canadian-Mexican and Latin American relations. Only a strong Canadian-Mexican bilateral relationship can balance the homogenizing pull of continental integration.

89

BEYOND MEXICO

Indeed, this is the core mutual interest of both governments, entering a new phase in the always complex challenge of managing relations with the U.S. The natural hope is that stronger private sector interaction, as trade and investment expands, will complement initiatives underway in other policy areas. But in a period of extreme resource scarcity in both Canada and Mexico, strengthening bilateral relations through major new programs will be difficult. On the positive side the expansion of economic, cultural and other linkages between the two countries has been impressive and points to a converging determination to counter-balance U.S.-led trilateralism. Canada, in short, will have to focus sharply its policy towards Mexico, with a strategic approach encompassing trade, technology, culture and higher education, and diplomacy. But there is also the bureaucratic challenge of dealing with a now important partner which is both part of Latin America and an expanded North America. BUREAUCRATIC POLITICS: MANAGING THE NEW RELATIONSHIP

The trilateral, as opposed to the bilateral, dimensions of CanadianMexican relations are reflected in a new and important bureaucratic division of labour within the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, which so far has not received sufficient scholarly attention. The Mexican agenda inevitably concerns many agencies within the Department—academic and cultural, trade, science and technology, and security (to name only a few)—and there is the familiar problem of intra-departmental coordination. The Latin America and Caribbean Branch (LGB) has long struggled with this challenge of acting as lead-player to maintain coherence. It has never been easy, not least because of the historically weak status of Latin America (and therefore of LGB) in Canadian foreign policy. The new element in the bureaucratic politics equation, however, concerns NAFTA: responsibility for managing this dominant aspect of Canada-Mexico relations has been given to the Trade and Economic Policy Branch rather than to LGB, which will continue to handle trade promotion and political relations. The rationale for this division of labour is as follows: NAFTA is seen as a multilateral trade issue, since it involves more than two countries. As a functional bureau with a global mandate within this policy area, the Trade and Economic Policy Branch should handle it along with GATT, the 90

CANADIAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS

new World Trade Organization (WTO), and so forth. Moreover it is argued that NAFTA is conceptually consistent with the new GATT agreement establishing the WTO. The difficulty with this arrangement is that the NAFTA is by far the most important dimension of Canada-Mexico relations, and is now even more significant because of the environment and labour side-agreements negotiated after the election of U.S. President Bill Clinton. This means that the trilateral agenda arising from NAFTA is being managed by a team with little substantive background, at least so far, in Mexican political or economic affairs. That expertise resides primarily in LGB. While NAFTA may be "multilateral" in the broadest sense of the word, it is very different from GATT, and its implementation can only be acomplished successfully within an overall policy which articulates the political dimensions of Canadian-Mexican relations. A question arises, therefore, regarding the implications of dividing responsibility for trade policy on the one hand and political relations on the other. In practice, Mexican relations have expanded so rapidly that both LGB and the Trade and Economic Branch have been too busy to worry about turf battles. Moreover, the Mexican dossier—both bilateral and multilateral—is still sufficiently novel and interesting to induce co-operation across agency barriers. Indeed, for LGB the last years have been exhilarating in the Mexican and Latin American context, as the relative attraction of the region in business and diplomatic circles continues to advance. Embassy positions and jobs in Ottawa dealing with Latin America are now prized, and Mexican affairs offer a rare opportunity for growth and new resources. Thus, in LGB, Mexico has emerged as first among equals in both the trade and the political areas. Both desks have been strengthened (particularly in trade promotion, with the new Access North America program) . The Canadian Embassy in Mexico has also increased its capacity: since 1991 its trade and economic staff has grown from 15 to 34. But despite additional resources, the burgeoning bilateral agenda continues to outgrow available staff time, and the Canadian Embassy in Mexico City remains the busiest in the world. For its part, the Trade and Economic Policy Branch is caught up fully in digesting both NAFTA and the new GATT agreement, and now has to confront the immediate question of Chile's accession to NAFTA. Indeed, international trade policy is so dynamic, and so vital 91

BEYOND MEXICO

for Canada, that it consumes a good part of the attention of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade as well as its Ministers and senior officials from related agencies. The Policy Planning Branch, for example, a think-tank group within the Department and a sister bureau to Trade and Economic Policy, maintains a continuing research activity on the possible extension of NAFTA to countries in Latin America (and possibly Asia-Pacific). Similarly, the U.S. Branch is fundamentally interested in Canada-Mexico relations, given the overwhelming importance of North America for Canada. In this latter case, a Solomonic solution may have been found: the Assistant Deputy Minister and Deputy heading the U.S. Branch have been named respectively the NAFTA Co-ordinator and Assistant Coordinator. Meanwhile, a parallel reorganization has transferred significant resources for trade policy from the U.S. to the Trade and Economic Policy Branch. In fact, this maintains continuity, since both individuals in question directed the NAFTA negotiating team from 1991 onwards; but it also underlines the importance of NAFTA and trilateral relations within Foreign Affairs. Indeed, the fact that the Trade and Economic Policy Branch is handling the NAFTA implementation is a significant departure in the political culture of Foreign Affairs where Latin America is concerned. This is a powerful bureau, with direct access to Ministers. In contrast, LGB has struggled for visibility, and has been saddled with time-consuming and depressing responsibilities (Haiti, for example) which drain energy. Thus the importance of the inclusion of Mexico (and indirectly Latin America) in the trade policy network of Foreign Affairs can hardly be exaggerated. It marks the beginning of a shift away from the Atlanticist focus of the Department and its more recent Asia-Pacific ventures. Trade policy has centred on the Washington, London, Paris, Tokyo and Geneva circle; now Mexico is also in the first division, and this is important for the role of Latin America as a whole in Canadian foreign policy. More fundamentally, there is no easy bureaucratic formula for managing Canada-Mexico relations. Mexico is unique in Canadian foreign policy—part of Latin America as traditionally defined, but now also an integral component of a new North American region. Three organizational options continue to be debated, each with a relatively strong supporting rationale on the one hand, and disadvantages on the other. 92

CANADIAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS

First, a Western Hemisphere Branch, folding in both the U.S. and the Latin America and Caribbean divisions, would have the advantage of accenting the Americas as a whole for policy and programming purposes. But the argument against this departure is also compelling: the U.S. relationship is so unique in character that Latin America and the Caribbean would receive secondary attention. The second option, a North American Branch, in which Mexico would in effect be handled from the U.S. Branch, poses the same dilemma as the first: Mexico would be swallowed by the U.S. relationship within Foreign Affairs, accentuating the trilateral drift. Moreover, this option would be contentious, for it would isolate Mexico from the rest of Latin America. Unlike Mexico, where the North American Commission, chaired by the senior Undersecretary for Foreign Relations and comprising his/her counterparts from other government departments, has been created to co-ordinate relations with both Canada and the United States, Ottawa has so far chosen to avoid the creation of a new interdepartmental mechanism. Instead, the Latin America and Caribbean Branch has established an informal working group to ensure exchange of information among the federal departments and agencies involved in Mexico. Neither institutionalized nor elaborate, the working group has provided a much needed clearing house for reviewing interdepartmental activities which keep expanding at a remarkable pace. The final option—and the one adopted by Foreign Affairs—is to cope with existing structures as described above, strengthening both the Trade and Economic Policy Branch and the geographic branch—LGB—in their respective responsibilities for Canadian-Mexican relations. The compromise identifies Mexico as a "Latin American plus" partner, with NAFTA being handled by the top leadership. In general, despite the division of responsibility within Foreign Affairs between the Trade and Economic Policy Branch (NAFTA) and the geographic branch (political relations), conflicts have so far been avoided through sound working relationships among senior officials. This could change with new personnel, and the tradition of rotation in the department makes it certain that the team will be constantly changing. While it is of fundamental importance that NAFTA be co-ordinated within a coherent bilateral policy towards Mexico and Latin America, there is an underlying concern that the Latin 93

BEYOND MEXICO

American and Caribbean Branch, without the NAFTA dossier, could become too marginalized to play the required lead role. Much depends on constituency building in Canada in support of greater priority towards the Americas. CONSTITUENCY BUILDING: THE CHALLENGE OF COHERENCE

The present period of transition in Canada-Mexico relations is also reflected in the evolution of domestic constituencies with sharply conflicting images of Mexico and policy demands. For Canadians there are many Mexicos, and each constituency guards and supports its particular vision. Each maintains a separate dialogue with its Mexican counterparts and is articulate in stating its position. The result is a set of fierce campaigns for contradictory policy initiatives—a fractured underpinning for a relationship of growing importance to both countries, which produces continuing surprises as linkages and experiences are deepened. There is a problem of communication and knowledge, and it is mutual. Both countries are very complex: on the Canadian side, the historic lack of attention to Mexico, as well as the artificial impressions received by 700,000 tourists each winter, complicate the task of understanding the other country. The intense media debate in Canada regarding the Chiapas outbreak on January 1, 1994 demonstrated the wide gulf between Canadian constituencies concerning Mexican relations and the challenge of overcoming the knowledge gap. Business The single most important development in Canada-Mexico relations since 1990, from the perspective of constituency building, has been the emergence of a permanent and region-wide business constituency. This is a significant change; it is not the reflection of the familiar large Canadian companies long active in Latin America, nor a narrow trade interest. For the first time, a broad cross-section of small and medium-sized companies, as well as transnationals, have recognized Mexico as an important future market. Whether this business interest is the result of the restructuring following the Canada-U.S. Free Trade Agreement, or whether the opening of the Mexican market is the "pull" factor, it is now clear that approximately 420 Canadian companies can be drawn to Mexico for a trade 94

CANADIAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS

show, and that increasingly Mexico is an integral element of Canadian corporate strategic planning. Business support for the agreement made Jean Chretien's conversion to NAFTA inevitable following his electoral victory. The Canadian business constituency deals with modern Mexico with its corporate leaders, sophisticated graduates from Mexico's top business schools, and competent government officials from the middle and upper classes. It sees Mexico's size and potential, and the existing opportunities hotly pursued by international competitors. Its members are excited by the discovery that this is for Canada an almost entirely new market which is interested in Canadian technology and investment. In addition, provincial governments strongly support business opportunities in Mexico; for most of them, too, the vision is one of opportunity and growth. Whether the December 20,1994 peso crisis and sharp devaluation in Mexico will affect business optimism remains to be seen. The key will be President Zedillo's recovery plan. Nevertheless, the peso shock has had the unfortunate effect of reviving memories of the 1980s debt crisis. Human Rights and NGOs

Chiapas confirmed the worst apprehensions of the human rights constituency, which has criticized NAFTA for locking in an unjust political and economic system within Mexico. Many in this constituency feel that not just NAFTA, but the entire neo-liberal order, of which NAFTA is a part, emasculates the Mexican (and Canadian) government's regulatory capacity, lowering social and environmental protection in favour of a transnational corporate agenda. They tend to focus on the costs of the economic transition, and also on the socially and politically excluded. A "borderless America" will benefit mainly big business in the three countries, strengthening an "authoritarian democracy," uninterested in the environment and workers' rights. How, therefore, will the displaced, the poor and the indigenous peoples find protection in this new North America? Not surprisingly, the human rights constituency in Canada has strong links with its Mexican counterparts—academic, NGOs, labour and so forth—which share its rejection of NAFTA. The optic regarding the future of Mexico is therefore as gloomy for the human rights constituency as it is positive for the business 95

BEYOND MEXICO

sector, which has little patience with this analysis. Each group has close linkages with Mexico—with the Mexican human rights constituency and with modern Mexico's business constituency respectively. There is, however, little dialogue between business and human rights groups in Canada regarding Mexico, and few challenges were more important for the 1994 Foreign Policy Review. NAFTA is now a reality and it will play a major role in shaping future relations with Mexico, but it is only a broad framework—the beginning rather than the end of a process where the two themes of governance and trade will require constant balancing. Quebec It is not surprising that the Liberal Government of Quebec would select Mexico as a priority country, but the rapid development of the Quebec-Mexico relationship would surprise many Anglophone Canadians. The Quebec mission in Mexico City is well established, with a staff of 20 people, and the Mexican Consulate General in Montreal, with 21 staff members, also has a presence distinct from that of the Embassy in Ottawa. Moreover, the Government of Quebec has bilateral accords scarcely less numerous than Ottawa's. It also has a bilateral mechanism, the Quebec-Mexico Working Group, which held its sixth meeting in March 1993 and constitutes a miniJMC. Indeed, Quebec ministers are active in Mexico in support of ambitious science and technology co-operation, trade and joint venture promotion, and cultural and higher education exchanges. These initiatives project a distinct image of "Latinos del Norte" and Quebec Inc.: an international, modern, technology-driven economy and partner, with or without the rest of Canada.6 The result is that, apart from France (and obviously the U.S.), no country is as important for Quebec's international relations as Mexico. Under Mulroney and Bourassa, Quebec's activism in Mexico (and other Latin American countries) was not conflictual; in fact, quite the reverse was true. Quebec is the natural base of the fourth language in the Americas, and for cultural reasons has stronger links with Latin America than do the other regions of the country. Both relationships—Canada-Mexico and Mexico-Quebec—have thrived since 1990. The Quebec mission in Mexico City underscores the bicultural reality of Canada; indeed, a satisfactory division of labour has been developed with the Canadian Embassy during the growth 96

CANADIAN-MEXICAN RELATIONS

years since 1990. Thus, Quebeckers not only have advanced their own relationship with Mexico, but have accessed relevant federal programs in every sector with astonishing success. The electoral victory of the Parti Quebecois in Fall 1994 has broken the entente cordiale regarding Mexico worked out under Bourassa and Mulroney, and introduced a conflictual element into Canada-Mexico relations. For the Parti Quebecois, the Quebec mission in Mexico City is an Embassy-in-waiting, with Mexico a strategic country in its drive to achieve international recognition for an independent Quebec. Indeed, after the U.S. and France, Mexico occupies top-ranking among possible foreign partners after a successful referendum; the government of Jacques Parizeau views it as a bridge into Latin America as a whole—a region of vital political and economic importance to Quebec. Thus the Parti Quebecois government has redoubled initiatives at every level—official, business and academic—to create and deepen its traditional linkages with Mexican counterparts. For Mexico, the prospect of involvement in any Ottawa-Quebec flare-up is most unwelcome. Mexicans are genuinely attracted by the warmth of Quebec hospitality and the overall charm of the province, but Mexico vitally needs a strong Canada in this vulnerable stage of continental integration. It therefore has a heavy stake in a satisfactory resolution of the long-standing constitutional debate in Canada. Aboriginal Peoples The interest among leaders of Canada's First Nations in the Chiapas uprising in Mexico, including a visit to the region by Grand Chief Ovide Mercredi of the Assembly of First Nations, illustrates a fourth potential aspect of the Canadian-Mexican relationship. While a bilateral relationship is still in the making, the potential significance in Canada of aboriginal nationalism in the Americas should not be underestimated. To a certain extent it parallels Quebec's yearning for a New World identity. And while the similarities between Canadian and Mexican First Nations are not striking, the deplorable state of many Canadian aboriginal communities, and the potential for confrontation, gives rise to cross-border comparisons. The Oka crisis caused a sensation throughout Latin America. The lesson for Mexico of the Chiapas uprising was that a member of NAFTA would be as pitilessly exposed to the Western media as a G-7 country. 97

BEYOND MEXICO

The equivalent message for Canada from Mexico is that social problems in Canada are now fair game in Mexico and Latin America. Canada-Mexico relations are in a period of transition. In four years, an astonishing growth has occurred, and all constituencies are engaged. While much has been accomplished, the learning process has only begun. The challenge is to build the basis for a mature, long-term relationship balancing the bilateral and trilateral dimensions. It will not be an easy task, given the diverging interests of Canadian constituencies, but few issues in Canadian foreign policy are as important for Canada in the 1990s and beyond.

NOTES 1. Until the arrival of the Liberal Government in 1993 headed by Prime Minister Jean Chretien, the Department maintained the title "External Affairs and International Trade Canada." 2. The visit also coincided with the assassination of Presidential candidate Donaldo Colosio. The experience had the effect of deepening Chretien's commitment to Mexico. 3. See below for a discussion of Quebec's policy toward Mexico. 4. Herman W. Konrad, "Building Academic Pathways of Awareness," Canadian Mexicanist Newsletter 4 (2), December, 1993. 5. Mario Ojeda Gomez, "National Identity and Mutual Understanding in the North American Region: The Promotion of Academic Exchange and Cooperation Among Unequal Partners," Conference on North American Higher Education, Racine, Wisconsin, September 12-15, 1992. 6. For a review of research and development co-operation , see "VI Reunion de Trabajo Mexico-Quebec Cooperacion Tecnica y Cientifica: Agenda de Trabajo," Tlateloco, D.F. 31 de Marzo de 1993.

98

BEYOND

This page intentionally left blank

VI

LA SPIRALE DU VIDE ET DU CHAOS: ESSAI SUR LA POLITIQUE HAITIENNE DE L'ETAT CANADIEN Jacques Zylberberg

The Spiral of Void and Chaos: An essay on Canadian Policy toward Haiti Abstract: Canada's recent attention to Haitian politics crowns more than 50 years of multifaceted relations involving aid, technical co-operation, tourism, religious missions, trade and, especially, Haitian immigration to Canada. In spite of this, Canadian policy toward this country has been informed less by knowledge than by prejudice. This tendency was revealed most clearly in the tremendous simplification of Haitian political dynamics which guided Canada's initiatives, with JeanBertrand Aristide on one side, and various expressions and residues of the Duvalier dynasty on the other. Conveniently ignored were the common national-populist and popular roots of both Aristide and Papa-Doc, the army's crucial role in toppling the latter, the abil-

ity of every single government since then to find support among some sections of the elite and intelligentsia, and the opposition of Aristide and his followers to an early OAS intervention. On such a tenuous basis, Canada developed a policy that has been hesitant and inconsistent, not only from a moral standpoint, with past support for other dictatorships (including that of the Duvaliers) conveniently left aside, but also from the perspective of Canadian interests in the region, with the surrender of all initiative to the United States. Significant progress took years, during which an economic embargo— whose dreadful effects were borne exclusively by the miserable masses—was the only "action" taken. The prevailing triumphalist view of Canada's significant contribution to the return of democracy in Haiti thus owes more to myth than to reality.

BEYOND MEXICO

Humpty Dumpty sat on a wall. Humpty Dumpty had a great fall. All the King's horses and all the King's men Couldn't put Humpty together again. PROLOGUE LA THEODICEE OFFiciELLE basee sur le mythe des origines et le mythe d'Hesiode est fort coherente. Grace a la cooperation de 1'Etat canadien et de ses experts, la decomposition du regime duvalieriste a etc couronnee par la consecration electorate massive, done legitime et legale, de Monsieur Jean-Bertrand Aristide. Ce denouement glorieux d'une situation intolerable d'oppression a etc perturbe cependant par les residus et les derives de 1'heritage de Papa-Doc et de Baby-Doc. Avec la collaboration des «pays-amis»—les Etats-Unis, la France, le Venezuela—les gouvernants canadiens, forts du consensus des gouvernes canadiens, avec une sage lenteur, multiplient les pressions economiques et les exhortations vertueuses qui ne manqueront pas de retablir Monsieur Aristide dans ses fonctions presidentielles effectives. Cette restauration du «ti-pere» du peuple hai'tien sanctionnera concretement les demandes des masses hai'tiennes et sera la preuve ultime de la correspondance harmonieuse d'une politique rationnelle et d'une normativite democratique impeccables dans le chef des elites canadiennes. DE LA SINGULARITE AU PREJUGE: PERCEPTIONS CANADIENNES D'HAITI

Depuis les annees 1940, il serait fastidieux d'etablir le releve exhaustif des facteurs humains qui informent les relations croissantes entre Haiti et le Canada. Rappelons pour memoire 1'action missionnaire, les demarches mercantiles, la cooperation technique, le tourisme et la prostitution, les organisations non-gouvernementales, la recherche universitaire, 1'immersion croissante des ONG, sans oublier 1'apparition et la reapparition fugace, sporadique et recurrente des medias canadiens. Le facteur le plus important du point de vue quantitatif a etc certainement constitue par les flux migratoires, surtout hai'tiens, 102

LA SPIRALE DU VIDE ET DU CHAOS

tant au depart qu'a 1'arrivee. Cette presence haitienne croissante dans la sphere du commandement canadien repose principalement sur deux axes qui ne se rejoignent que partiellement, a savoir une immigration pauvre survivant dans les zones urbaines a partir des secteurs de services ou dependant des programmes de bien-etre social, etant donnee la crise structurelle de l'emploi au Canada, tandis qu'un deuxieme axe permet de reperer une minorite de classe moyenne, une intelligentsia concentree et dispersee dans les secteurs ecclesiastiques, de 1'enseignement et des services de sante. Dans une gouverne politique canadienne multiculturelle, il est permis d'avancer que les elites lettrees sont tout autant ghettoi'sees que les collectivites urbaines immigrees. Le statut de 1'intelligentsia haitienne dans 1'espace canadien repond au paradigme suivant: 1) Dans les echelles de classes, l'immigration haitienne n'a aucune presence notoire au Canada. 2) Dans les echelles de prestige et de status social, les collectivites haitiennes sont prises dans le piege du schema de «minorite visible» et done d'inclusion subordonnee, au mieux minoritaire, ethniquement, culturellement et economiquement; au pire, cette immigration est illegale, percue comme perturbatrice plus ou moins volontaire des grands equilibres de la societe canadienne. 3) Dans les echelles d'ordre, la presence haitienne est tout aussi negligeable que dans les echelles de classe; sporadiquement, elle a cependant un apport limite mais reel grace a sa presence dans les appareils ideologiques, specialement ecclesiastiques et universitaires. Cette intelligentsia haitienne a a la fois alimente et diffuse un ensemble de representations dissipees, de realites singulieres devenues prejuges absolus, de categories evidentes. Les realites complexes, les processus variables hai'tiens s'ajustent progressivement aux cliches qui ont tenu lieu de culture politique a la fois aux detenteurs du pouvoir canadien depuis Lester Pearson et a 1'intelligentsia canadienne. En 1'absence d'une expertise haitienne proprement dite, au sein de la bureaucratic diplomatique canadienne, une pseudo-«realpolitik», c'est-a-dire 1'absence d'une politique coherente et continue, a permis au pouvoir de s'abriter derriere une topologie religieuse des relations internationales. L'improvisation desordonnee souvent, 1'opportunisme prudent quelquefois, s'occulte derriere I'evidence du bon sens canadien, le caractere absolu des valeurs canadiennes et 1'expertise «multiculturelle». 103

BEYOND MEXICO

4) Etant donnee ses origines, 1'intelligentsia hai'tienne devient experte des medias lors des crises ... mediatiques basees sur le desordre hai'tien. LA CONSTRUCTION CANADIENNE DU MONDE

Le paradigme de la cosmovision canadienne peut etre decline sur le mode suivant: 1) L'ordre est 1'origine, la fin et le principe de toutes choses. 2) La paix est la valeur supreme de 1'ordre national et de 1'ordre international. 3) Les etres humains, les acteurs sociaux, les protagonistes des relations internationales doivent toujours etre decodes a partir de leurs origines ethniques, de leurs caracteristiques culturelles et de leurs personnalites nationales. Ces facteurs de transmission quasigenetiques sont les antecedents des structures socio-economiques et sociopolitiques. 4) Les gouvernes politiques, les Etats, leurs structures et leurs actions correspondent a leurs determinants culturels, a leurs ressources economiques, filtres et parasites par la violence symbolique, neo-coloniale et imperialiste des autres Etats, specialement celle des grandes puissances. 5) Les Nations-Unies sont la matrice legitime des ideaux communs de 1'humanite et le cadre legal bureaucratique d'operations concretes qui garantissent d'abord la contention des politiques militaires expansionistes, la stabilisation et la routinisation des conflits armes, voire leur solution civile et pacifique. Plus recemment, les Nations Unies stimulent 1'adequation positive des desordres nationaux aux ideaux indefinissables du developpement durable et du respect de la biosphere. Ce galimatias normatif, ce bricolage generalise d'un ordre international, somme des particularismes nationaux et archeologie des sedimentations ideologiques et mondaines, legitime la politique canadienne de longue duree. Aussi bien McKenzie King que Lester Pearson, Trudeau et Joe Clark ont cherche a realiser une politique de type suisse ou suedois de neutralite. Get isolationnisme geopolitique a etc affecte par 1'insertion dans le Commonwealth et la proximite du geant americain. 104

LA SPIRALE DU VIDE ET DU CHAOS

Du Statut de Westminster au rapatriement constitutionnel, le Canada a reussi a lever 1'hypotheque britannique. Les Nations Unies et la sacralisation de la paix furent le lieu et 1'occasion de pratiquer une acrobatic de type gaullienne face aux Etats-Unis, aux politiques de bloc, a la guerre froide et a 1'OTAN. De Cuba a la Rhodesie, de Suez a 1'Afrique du Sud, du Vietnam a la Pologne, il est possible d'apprecier la solidarite atlantique minimale du Canada, sa radicalisation et sa distanciation de 1'Angleterre dans le Commonwealth, sa comprehension et sa tolerance face aux regimes totalitaires de 1'Est et aux gouvernes national-populistes du tiers-monde, son refus de participer a 1'Organisation des Etats Americains. Cette politique tous azimuts d'un petit pays se distingue de celle de la Suisse et de la Suede par sa fuite en avant internationaliste: elle precede le gaullisme et se demarque fortement de celui-ci par son engagement des 1956 pour les Nations Unies et pour les operations de paix, ancetre lointain et ignore du droit contemporain de 1'ingerence. Au-dela des critiques utopiques de 1'intelligentsia canadienne, celle-ci a pu se reconcilier avec une cosmovision qui valorisait 1'Etatprovidence canadien centre 1'Etat capitaliste americain, 1'Etat pacifiste canadien centre 1'imperialisme americain. Comme ses intellectuels, 1'Etat canadien a compris les necessites de 1'ordre cubain, sovietique et chinois, etant donne leur determinisme economique, culturel, la pesanteur de leur origine, sans oublier leur role de victime de 1'imperialisme anglo-saxon. Le culturalisme, 1'economicisme, la theorie de la dependance, omnipresents dans 1'intelligentsia hai'tienne immigree au Canada, greffee sur une formation religieuse manicheenne, integriste de gauche plus que fondamentaliste biblique, ont contribue a des lectures convergentes de la situation hai'tienne tout en facilitant paradoxalement 1'inaction des decideurs, puisque la paix n'etait pas menacee a Haiti. POLITIQUE DU VIDE ET DEBORDEMENTS DE LA SOCIETE HAITIENNE

L'expertise developpee au Canada en ce qui concerne le mini-Etat caribeen a toujours ete extremement normative et lapidaire. La constatation quasi-raciste du desordre permanent, les simplifications 105

BEYOND MEXICO

culturalistes sur le Vaudou et 1'alienation populaire, la generalisation et 1'extrapolation abusives des consequences de 1'occupation militaire americaine et de 1'influence exageree de la Republique dominicaine, satellite americain, confortaient, apres tout, les prejuges canadiens et les derives ideologiques du pouvoir hai'tien et de son opposition lettree en exil. Le simplisme et les rigidites d'un discours normatif a interdit depuis dix ans la remise en perspective du despotisme hai'tien d'apres guerre et la differenciation de son evolution. Au risque de nouvelles simplifications, il faut rappeler quelques caracteristiques de la gouverne politique hai'tienne qui facilitent a la fois une mise en perspective generale et une differenciation singuliere: 1) Le duvalierisme s'inscrit dans la longue marche glorieuse du national-populisme en Amerique latine et dans la Carai'be, independamment des caracteristiques ethniques, culturelles ou economiques nationales. II releve de la deuxieme generation nationale populiste, celle des Peron, des Batista, des Trujillo, des Perez Jimenez, bien que son origine civile le rapproche de la premiere generation, celle des Irigoyen, Alessandri, et Velasco Ibarra. 2) La difference principale avec les autres populismes reside dans la faiblesse des ressources economiques d'Hai'ti et la situation tres embryonnaire des appareils d'Etat au moment de 1'acces de Francois Duvalier au pouvoir. Tout comme dans le cas d'Aristide, Duvalier arrive au pouvoir legalement, profitant a la fois du parrainage du president Estime, fort populaire, et de I'aura charismatique conferee par son action sanitaire parmi les populations demunies. 3) Internationalement, Francois Duvalier s'inscrit dans le mouvement dit de la negritude dont il sera un des heros, avec Leopold Sedar-Senghor, Aime Cesaire et le Dr. Price-Mars. 4) L'exercice du pouvoir dans le national-populisme est cesariste et despotique, c'est-a-dire personnel et erratique. La liaison charismatique, au-dela des prebendes et du clientelisme, a etc reelle. L'adhesion au chef bien-aime s'est superposee aux differents clivages preexistants a Hai'ti. Cette relation personnelle au leader rend compte de 1'impossibilite dans 1'histoire politique contemporaine de faire coincider clivages sociaux et economiques avec 1'adhesion, 1'opposition ou 1'indifference au duvalierisme. Le despotisme se manifeste aussi dans la paranoia constante d'un pouvoir qui 106

LA SPIRALE DU VIDE ET DU CHAOS

soupconne en permanence meme les partisans les plus fideles de conspirer centre le regime. Le cesarisme est aussi un mode de predation, un systeme de predation, un systeme de prebendes et de clientelisme, facilite par la relation personnelle au chef et legitime par le noirisme. 5) Le national populisme est aussi une mobilisation populaire constante autour du chef charismatique, de ses enonces symboliques d'integration et de cohesion. Le noirisme, variete locale du mouvement intenational de la negritude, renforca demagogiquement 1'adhesion populaire. Mouvements symboliques et purement rhetoriques d'opposition a 1'Occident blanc sans consequences pratiques dans le domaine des relations internationales, les themes de la negritude ont consolide une legitimate apparente du regime, qui harcelait de maniere recurrente les couches de notables et de marchands categorisees et stigmatisees comme «mulatres». 6) Internationalement, le regime duvalieriste pratique un semiisolationnisme relatif et prudent, sans agressivite, specialement visa-vis du voisin insulaire dominicain. A la fin des annees 1950 et durant les annees 1960, le regime developpera un anti-castrisme interne et externe suffisanf pour calmer 1'agacement americain et contournera 1'offensive democratique au niveau regional du president venezuelien Betancourt. Duvalier pourra compter aussi sur le gouvernement de De Gaulle, qui n'est pas plus embarasse par les regimes dictatoriaux et despotiques que les differents gouvernements liberaux du Canada. 7) L'integration ideologique et charismatique s'accompagne d'une segmentation sociale permanente. La persecution des notables mulatres est completee par le harcelement de 1'Eglise, de 1'armee et des universitaires. A 1'Eglise, 1'on oppose la concurrence du Vaudou et des sectes, tandis que 1'armee se voit dedoublee par une espece de milice (de tontons macoutes). La segmentation ne signifie pas immobilisme et absence de changement. Une croissance urbaine lente et constante accueille, autour des noyaux etatiques et mercantiles, les surplus demographiques de la campagne et de son systeme inefficace de minifonds. Une croissance reelle des secteurs sanitaires et scolaires est cependant handicapee par la croissance demographique, la corruption et la gabegie administrative. La repression politique et 1'evolution sociale provoqueront une emigration croissante des elites metisses, des cerveaux et des sous-proletaires. 107

BEYOND MEXICO

8) Face a la politique du vide, instauree par Duvalier, 1'opposition interne et externe au regime sera le fait des militaires d'une part et des lettres d'autre part, sans oublier les ecclesiastiques. L'opposition lettree est national-populiste comme le regime, en partie noiriste aussi, mais de maniere plus radicalisee, souvent castriste. Cette immigration lettree se verra encourager dans son radicalisme par les differentes intelligentsia des pays d'accueil en Amerique latine, au Canada, aux Etats-Unis, en Europe occidentale et en Europe de 1'Est. OTTAWA : LE BIG BANG

En depit des micro-mobilisations de 1'emigration hai'tienne, le regime hai'tien avait beneficie dans sa reproduction moderne ou policiere a la fois de 1'aide internationale, y compris celle des ONG Internationales, et de I'inefficacite, voire de 1'hypocrisie des modeles vertueux a la Trudeau et a la Carter. L'administration Trudeau et les elites canadiennes en general n'ontjamais fait preuve d'un grand activisme face aux dictatures. Les medias canadiens n'avaient et n'ont pratiquement toujours pas d'antenne permanente dans la Carai'be et 1'Amerique latine. Dans les universites, les chercheurs latino-americains sont disperses et le regroupement professionnel semble domine par des representations utopiques et radicales. En depit de la croissance en terme de budget et de personnel des bureaucraties publiques et para-publiques—ACDI; CRDI; Institut canadien pour la paix et pour la securite internationales—il est difficile de soutenir que le Canada disposait d'un «staff» d'experts d'une part et d'une politique canadienne d'autre part. D'ailleurs, le style de recrutement d'Ottawa, le conformisme de 1'administration politique, la politisation de ses hauts fonctionnaires sous Trudeau, I'hegemonie au moins intellectuelle de ce dernier dans 1'exercice du pouvoir, n'ontjamais facilite I'emergence dans la fonction publique, a partir des «rank and file», de fonctionnaires dissidents et originaux. Dans la pratique, il est difficile de soutenir qu'il y cut vraiment une difference marquee entre le «benign neglect» de Kissinger et la rhetorique grandiloquente de 1'ere Trudeau. Aujourd'hui, au milieu des incantations democratiques, les propagandistes outaouais de 1'image canadienne preferent probablement ne pas se souvenir des ambiguites diplomatiques lors de la chute du gouvernement Allende, de 1'amitie chaleureuse avec Fidel Castro 108

LA SPIRALE DU VIDE ET DU CHAOS

et des mesaventures atomiques d'un Canada associe a la dictature militaire argentine. La construction d'un Etat-providence au Canada, la solution definitive du probleme canadien-francais, 1'independance du Canada, la distanciation face aux Etats-Unis, 1'ordre et la paix internationale, ne laisserent guere le temps au prince philosophe comme a ses successeurs et a ses predecesseurs de se rappeler que le Canada etait situe dans le continent americain et que celui-ci deborde arnplement 1'Amerique du Nord. L'arrivee au pouvoir des conservateurs et 1'acceptation minimale par Brian Mulroney des principes de realite a done constitue un Big Bang dans la representation du monde canadien. Ces modifications, moins importantes que ne le pensent ses detracteurs, peuvent etre resumees ainsi: 1) Les amis du Canada sont prioritairement les pays a « regime liberal». 2) Les Etats-Unis sont le premier de nos partenaires et allies dans cette nebuleuse liberale democratique. 3) II y a une liaison entre la liberalisation economique et le developpement politique. 4) Le Canada adhere done au modele idealo-volontariste-interventionniste developpe theoriquement sous Carter et actualise par 1'equipe Reagan. 5) L'interet national canadien depend autant sinon plus de ses relations economiques que des operations de paix; la paix d'ailleurs, dans cette cosmovision naive, depend surtout du developpement economique. Dans cette reorientation normative et pratique du Canada sur 1'echiquier mondial, specialement en ce qui concerne 1'hemisphere, certaines decisions a court terme sont tres significatives, entre autres: a) 1'adhesion du Canada a 1'Organisation des Etats americains; b) la constitution d'une zone de libre-echange en Amerique du Nord; c) la fondation d'un Centre international pour le developpement democratique et la suppression de 1'Institut pour la paix et la securite internationales. L'ouverture generalisee des conservateurs, la persistance de 1'heritage de Trudeau dans 1'intelligentsia et dans 1'administration publique sinon dans 1'opinion publique, la cacophonie incantatoire et brouillonne des Flora McDonald, Joe Clark et autres 109

BEYOND MEXICO

Kim Campbell, sans oublier les Vezina, les Landry et les McDougall, ont exacerbe les contradictions de la gouverne tory, prise dans un mouvement perpetuel d'implosion et d'explosion. A preuve, les quelques indicateurs suivants: 1) La redecouverte par Ottawa de 1'hemisphere sud et la conclusion de 1'ALENA sont contrebalancees par 1'obsession pacifique et la paranoia balkanique. 2) Alors que la reduction de 1'Etat-providence devient une priorite pour les conservateurs, ces derniers inserent dans le reseau de patronage et de clientele une multitude de groupes et de groupuscules canadiens opposes aux nouvelles orientations et branches sur les residus et les derives des administrations Trudeau-Clark. 3) Les valeurs de 1'administration Mulroney fmissent par etre filtrees et parasitees par les anciennes et nouvelles modes ideologiques nationales et internationales; c'est ainsi que le developpement democratique devient le developpement durable et la protection de la biosphere et la solidarite occidentale deviennent droit d'ingerence et aventurisme. 4) Dans un climat de crise economique et fiscale et de manque de ressources, la nomenklatura conservatrice se laisse entrainer megalomaniquement dans une plethore d'accords d'insertion organisationnelle et d'aventures internationales quelquefois contradictoires. Le Canada de Mulroney revient progressivement aux exercices megalomanes de Pierre-Eliot Trudeau et de Joe Clark, avec une dissonance cognitive extraordinaire entre 1'ampleur de la rhetorique vertueuse et la rarete des moyens. DESORDRE MILITAIRE, DESORDRE CIVIL: LA TRANSITION HAITIENNE

Le monde change et meme Ottawa et Haiti fmissent par changer. La mort de Francois Duvalier et 1'interregne de Jean-Claude Duvalier accelerent la modernisation et le changement social de la republique noire des Ameriques, meme si cette evolution ne satisfait guere aux canons de la morale et aux exigences du developpement durable. La nebuleuse clienteliste qui se dessine autour de 1'heritier dynastique est privee d'abord de la relation charismatique qu'entretenait Francois Duvalier avec les masses, pauvres, rurales, urbaines. Ce sont surtout des notables et des fonctionnaires lettres d'un 110

LA SPIRALE DU VIDE ET DU CHAOS

certain age qui representent, avec tres peu d'influence, la continuite noiriste aupres de Baby-Doc. Le regime s'ouvre aux couches metisses, longtemps categorisees negativement et stigmatisees par 1'ideologie dominante. Ne s'encombrant plus d'une politique de soutien a la negritude, au Vaudou, le gouvernement de Jean-Claude Duvalier transforme Haiti en une mauvaise caricature de Miami-Babylone. La nouvelle alliance favorise 1'armee reguliere au detriment des milices, alors que le regime anterieur tenait en suspicion ces militaires qui n'avaient pas toujours decele a temps certaines dissidences dans le corps des officiers. Cette armee est clivee selon plusieurs axes qui ne se recoupent point; les technocrates s'y opposent aux politises, les associes des mafias internationales meprisent les officiers «honnetes» qui se contentent de prebendes locales, les grades nationalistes ne sont pas satisfaits de la passivite, voire de la complicite, de Fetal-major face au retour de I'mfluence economique et militaire americaine dans 1'ile. L'ouverture ethnique, 1'ouverture commerciale, 1'ouverture demographique de la nouvelle coalition gouvernementale demontrent bien la modernisation suscitee nolens volens par le regime. Ce melange de gangsterisme, de narcotrafic, d'industrialisation legere, de semi-tolerance aux lettres de 1'opposition et au pluralisme religieux laisse peu de place a un projet de redistribution des revenus et de cooptation des masses penetrees partiellement par les sectes, le bas clerge catholique et les reseaux des ONG. La faiblesse de Baby Doc provient surtout de 1'absence d'un projet commun parmi les barons du regime, ensuite de la frustration symbolique de la vieille garde noiriste, et enfin, de 1'opposition des petites couches mercantiles et bureaucratiques, insatisfaites de leur mobilite dans le systeme. La chute et 1'exil de Jean-Claude Duvalier ont plusieurs consequences importantes pour 1'equilibre precaire hai'tien: 1) Pour la premiere fois depuis 1'election de Francois Duvalier, l'armee exerce le pouvoir sans partage a Haiti. 2) Les differentes formations civiles duvalieristes et antiduvalieristes s'averent incapables de construire une coalition minimalement efficace entre une plethore de groupuscules solidement reifies dans leurs systemes d'alliances et de haines ethniques, generationnelles et familiales. 3) Cette solidarite et ces inimities affectent les relations 111

BEYOND MEXICO

familiales, etant donne les differentes inclusions et exclusions individuelles durant le populisme duvalieriste et sa dissolution «paramodernisante». L'opposition ne se remettra jamais vraiment non plus de ses clivages et... de ses convergences ideologiques: 1) La rhetorique rationnaliste et la philosophic des Lumieres confortent des incantations interminables sur la nature et I'histoire d'Hai'ti, la revoke d'esclaves, la guerre avec Saint-Domingue, 1'occupation americaine, le Vaudou et sur les autres essences et evidences de la culture hai'tienne. De nombreux Canadiens, missionnaires, cooperants et diplomates semblent avoir etc tres impregnes par ces discours mondains. 2) Les deux gouvernes de Duvalier-pere et de Duvalier-fils sont connotees differentiellement dans les incantations ideologiques. L'ouverture «metisse» est annulee aux yeux d'une grande partie des intelligentsia par la capillarite du regime aux flux occidentaux. L'exil de Jean-Claude Duvalier marque le debut de la longue comedie des erreurs occidentales qui voit les petits machiavels de 1'armee hai'tienne manipuler non seulement une partie des intellectuels de gauche, mais aussi les diplomates occidentaux et les dirigeants de reorganisation des Etats americains et des Nations Unies. Les schemes d'action de 1'armee hai'tienne se repetent pourtant de maniere tragi-comique et simpliste sous les generaux Avril, Namphy, et Cedras: 1) Le dernier chef de 1'armee est toujours le modere qui va garantir un retour minimal a I'institutionalisation civile. 2) II y a toujours suffisamment de civils bardes de litres et de diplomes qui acceptent de cooperer avec les gerants de la transition ... militaire. 3) Lorsque 1'armee laisse enfin se derouler des elections, tot ou tard elle depose le president civil bien ou mal elu. Dans leur pudeur de defenseurs absolus de la democratic, des regimes occidentaux ont probablement eu le tort de ne pas appuyer le president, mal elu, Leslie Manigat. Ce dernier, manquant de legitimite electorate et populaire suffisante, a dirige cependant le pays sans sectarisme, sans corruption, et sans repression physique. Cette erreur d'appreciation de la communaute internationale ne semblait guere avoir d'importance, puisque les militaires ont paru accepter 1'investiture d'un gouvernement legal, populaire et bien elu, si 1'on en croit les observateurs internationaux. Malheureusement, 112

LA SPIRALE DU VIDE ET DU CHAOS

le president Aristide symbolisait le retour en force du national-populisme, offrant d'ailleurs des analogies troublantes avec la periode de Francois Duvalier. Les variations principales de Papa-Doc a Aristide resident dans le gauchisme et le tiers-mondisme presidentiel qui a remplace le noirisme, ainsi que dans la formation technocratique des experts du regime qui ont remplace les tabellions et autres lettres. Aristide, nouveau petit pere du peuple hai'tien, avait reussi une certaine liaison entre une partie de 1'intelligentsia et une partie importante des masses populaires, a 1'instar de Francois Duvalier. Les exhortations et les mobilisations populistes, toujours a la limite de la legalite, le sectarisme et le clientelisme de la fonction publique, la confrontation permanente avec le parlement et 1'ensemble des autres formations publiques, 1'antagonisme virulent visa-vis d'une hierarchic catholique romaine hostile au president et peut-etre a ses reformes, ont transforme ses concurrents civils en ennemis acharnes du pretre-president. Dans ce climat d'hostilite et de segmentation generalisee des forces politiques, sociales et civiles, le president Aristide ne dispose guere d'autorite, d'allies et de ressources pour s'opposer a 1'alliance de 1'etat-major et des elites civiles concurrentes, qui debordent largement le spectre ideologique de la droite ainsi que des reseaux duvalieristes. LE LIEVRE CANADIEN ET LA TORTUE HAITIENNE

Aucune cellule d'expertise hai'tienne minimalement competente n'existe dans 1'administration federale, dans le reseau universitaire ou au sein des groupes de pression ethniques, syndicaux, ecclesiastiques ou patronaux canadiens. La difficulte de consultations stables, continues avec des representants de «!'opinion publique canadienne» laisse la place surtout aux partisans du president Aristide, mais sans indiquer des moyens d'action precis au gouvernement canadien, dont 1'arsenal classique est limite a six instruments de seduction et de discussion: les rencontres personnelles, les conferences internationales, les communiques, les credits, les largesses economiques, les casques bleus. Ce dernier instrument est reserve en general aux conflits belliqueux internationaux. Ottawa repugne done a s'en servir dans une situation inedite du droit d'ingerence, a savoir 1'exercice illegitime du pouvoir d'un point de vue 113

BEYOND MEXICO

philosophique ou doctrinal plus que d'un point de vue juridique. Apres tout, ce n'est pas dans le passe mais dans le present que le gouvernement canadien ne semble pas trop preoccupe par les exigences, les imperatifs, les valeurs sacrees du developpement democratique a Bagdad, en Arabic Seoudite, au Rwanda, en Chine et a Cuba. Dans ce dernier cas, le Canada s'est d'ailleurs toujours oppose au boycott economique. Le blocus d'Hai'ti, apres le renversement d'Aristide, releve d'une solution de facilite qui ne resoud rien mais satisfait les vieux fantasmes canadiens de paix et d'ordre, rencontre les voeux de 1'opinion publique canadienne et s'ajuste aux differentes representations de nos multiples partenaires. Seule la population hai'tienne a souffert de cet embargo international, qui a permis au Canada, une fois de plus, de protester de sa virginite democratique tout en refusant concretement aux victimes de la dictature la possibilite de se refugier au Canada. Alors qu'une operation policiere de 1'OEA etait possible dans les jours qui ont suivi le coup d'Etat, il faut cependant noter que c'est le clan Aristide qui a 1'epoque s'y opposait absolument pour ne pas devoir son salut a l'homme blanc imperialiste d'Amerique du Nord. Aristide, ses conseillers et ses partisans immediats ont surestime les possibilites de resistance populaire et sous-estime les capacites de domination militaire. Les reticences canadiennes face a une intervention armee etaient done largement partagees par les autres intervenants potentiels; 1'administration Bush, reticente aux discours tout autant qu'aux politiques du President Aristide, s'etait laissee influencer tant par les accusations fondees que par les rumeurs calomnieuses et plus ou moins fantaisistes sur 1'incapacite a gouverner d'un homme brouillon, sectaire, erratique. Washington estimait de plus que les Etats-Unis auraient deja suffisamment d'engagements outre-mer pour ne pas augmenter les risques de confrontation avec les courants isolationnistes par une intervention armee a Haiti. L'embargo partiel, comme pour Cuba, la Lybie et 1'Irak, dans le cas d'un petit pays comme Haiti, etait meme un hommage surprenant du geant americain a la vertu democratique. Enfin, a Ottawa, un certain nombre de fonctionnaires, dont le bon sens se mariait habilement avec le conformisme habituel, ont accepte une politique minimale, ou plutot une absence de politique, parce qu'ils ne partageaient pas entierement les convictions dominantes sur Topposition absolue entre 1'enfer et le paradis, Cedras et Aristide. 114

LA SPIRALE DU VIDE ET DU CHAOS

Le Canada courait done d'ime conference Internationale a 1'autre, tandis que le reptile Hai'tien s'incrustait tenacement dans la pesanteur d'un pouvoir sterile mais effectif. La juxtaposition, plus que la hierarchisation ou la selection prioritaire, des conceptions Internationales de Trudeau, Clark et Mulroney avait cree une confusion invraisemblable dans une bureaucratic prise a la fois dans les clameurs du syncretisme ideologique et le tourbillon centrifuge et centripede d'un processus de decision-making qui supposait une discussion permanente avec une plethore d'amis et d'allies. Pour chaque situation, la spirale des alliances se modifie, ce qui explique le divorce entre le cynisme des politiques concretes et la megalomanie des sermons ministeriels canadiens. Dans le cas hai'tien, la constellation des partenaires, fort interessante, sinon pertinente ou efficace, peut etre decomposee en plusieurs niveaux de consultation, de marchandage et de dissipation de tout principe de realite: 1) Le premier partenaire pour Brian Mulroney—mais il n'est pas sur que ce soit le cas pour son predecesseur Clark, ses successeurs Campbell et Chretien et encore moins pour une partie de la bureaucratic de 1'edifice Lester Pearson—est indubitablement les Etats-Unis. La crise hai'tienne se developpe surtout sous le mandat de Bush et de Clinton. Au dela des heritages ideologiques et des suspicions mutuelles, la signature des accords successifs de libreechange bilateraux et trilateraux et 1'entree du Canada dans 1'OEA donnent au Canada plus de poids a Washington mais surtout plus de retenue dans ses chevauchees pacifistes solitaires ou ses aventures tiers-mondistes. Bush a continue sans entousiasme la politique de democratisation de Carter et Reagan. Ancien haut fonctionnaire de Washington dans une epoque de guerre froide, il est plus preoccupe d'ordre geopolitique que son predecesseur. Dans ses incursions prudentes et ses demonstrations de force sporadiques, il rejoint le Canada dans la fixation de ce dernier sur 1'utilisation des organisations internationales et dans les delais incroyables dans la resolution des conflits et les gachis inevitables dans les operations de terrain. Le comportement semi-hostile du gouvernement Aristide, de meme que les flirts libyens et castristes de ce dernier, n'ont certainement pas seduit le president americain, a la difference du gouvernement canadien! Les deux executifs se mettront d'accord cependant pour appliquer des sanctions peu efficaces et multiplier les declarations hostiles aux militaires. Le comportement de 115

BEYOND MEXICO

Washington ne laisse cependant pas de place aux equivoques: les bonnes dictatures n'existent plus dans 1'hemisphere, le mythe americain de la legitimite electorale s'y applique sans reserve et Washington a traite le gouvernement Aristide sans amitie excessive mais positivement, de 1'inauguration a 1'expulsion, en passant par la renegociation de la dette. En principe, Clinton est encore moins interventionniste que Bush, bien que le lobby pro-Cedras, les proprietaires americains de manufactures legeres a Haiti et dans les Carai'bes, et le lobby proAristide, le «Black caucus» du Congres, aient plus facilement acces a un president democrate, soutenu par 1'electorat noir, mais qui est foncierement decide a defendre les interets commerciaux americains. Cependant les mobilisations des groupements interesses, les rencontres du president exile et de son staff avec les decideurs d'opinion aux Etats-Unis vont compliquer le panorama. L'activisme prohai'tien va remobiliser une partie, assez faible sans doute, de 1'opinion publique a la tragedie constante de populations hai'tiennes opprimees par des gouvernes corrompues et repressives, mais elle attire 1'attention sur le caractere imprevisible du petit pere du peuple hai'tien et sur le dogmatisme de son equipe. La theologie de la liberation, le populisme tiers-mondiste, le jacobinisme regulateur, meme bricoles ideologiquement et revetus des oripeaux de la victime perpetuelle, ne constituent pas les meilleurs ingredients diplomatiques. Les controverses publiques sur Haiti, les rumeurs plus ou moins fondees sur le president depose, stimulent aussi malheureusement les prejuges culturalistes et parfois racistes sur Haiti. La conduite de la question politique hai'tienne se transforme finalement en une obsession de voir les Etats-Unis envahis par une maree noire caribeenne. La controverse sur les «boat-people» d'Haiti obscurcit tous les efforts diplomatiques du president americain. La transition Bush-Clinton, les connotations negatives de Cedras et d'Aristide, la peur de rimmigration hai'tienne donneront lieu a 1'accord de Governor's Island. Le compromis tardif et insuffisant sera filtre et parasite par les autres reseaux et noyaux de consultation. 2) II est difficile de savoir qui a invente le cercle des «pays amis», a savoir le Venezuela, les Etats-Unis, la France et le Canada. Ce reseau est plutot grotesque, voire pitoyable, si Ton songe a la situation gouvernementale de la France et du Venezuela. Le Venezuela n'est pas tres apprecie des Etats insulaires des Carai'bes, 116

LA SPIRALE DU VIDE ET DU CHAOS

qui soupconnent ses visees «imperiales»; de plus, le chef de 1'Etat de 1'epoque a connu une fin de regne mouvementee dans un climat de desordre generalise; enfin chacune des grandes formations politiques supporte des partis et des personnalite hai'tiennes opposees. La France connait la meme fin de regne penible sous le President Mitterrand, avec les episodes burlesques voire tragiques des gouvernements Cresson et Beregovoy, et les scandales relies a son role dans la tragedie du Rwanda; elle ne s'attendait certes pas a cette possibilite inesperee de venir introduire les bizarreries gaulliennes dans les affaires hemispheriques. L'activisme de 1'ambassade de France a Port-au-Prince est consacre ainsi continentalement. Le groupe des pays amis a facilite la tache rhetorique des diplomates du Canada puisqu'ils ont pu compter sur une majorite vociferante de partenaires pro-Aristide. 3) Les Nations Unies et 1'Organisation des Etats americains sont les deux autres cenacles ou s'exercent les efforts diplomatiques canadiens; dans ces arenes bureaucratiques, dispendieuses et inefficaces, les representants d'Ottawa s'imaginent de bonne foi qu'ils influent sur la marche du monde. Si le recours aux Nations Unies temoigne d'un vieux reflexe canadien, perpetuellement craintif d'un tete-a-tete avec les Etats-Unis, I'utilisation de 1'OEA etait logique et inevitable pour resoudre geopolitiquement la crise hai"tienne. Malheureusement, il faut bien constater que les reticences traditionnelles d'Ottawa n'ont pas entierement disparu en ce qui concerne les concertations hemispheriques et que la vieille dame panamericaine est encore pour le Canada un lieu de propagande sur la vertu et la difference canadienne. La diplomatic canadienne n'etait certes pas la seule responsable du gaspillage de temps et des ressources humaines et «lyriques». L'inflation des palabres, la reproduction elargie des discours vertueux convenait a nombre d'intervenants qui, a 1'instar des porteparole d'Ottawa, confondent avec plaisir 1'action et les enonces performatifs, parce qu'en realite ils ne veulent pas agir, ne savent pas comment agir et surtout connaissent mal les cibles de leurs actions. Celles-ci, les elites militaires hai'tiennes, ignorant superbement les condamnations morales dont elles etaient 1'objet, auraient demontre une propension a 1'elasticite et a la capillarite politique locale. La cooptation des civils, du parlement, de la Cour Supreme, 1'installation de premiers ministres humanitaires puis technocrates 117

BEYOND MEXICO

et 1'organisation de colloques «noiristes» anti-imperialistes ont ete trop facilement ignores par la nebuleuse legitimiste. Cette derniere n'a voulu percevoir que deux «mouvances», militaire et legale, a Haiti. A defaut de retablir policierement les forces dites legales, les diplomates canadiens et leurs allies ont perdu pres de vingt-quatre mois pour conclure le compromis de Governor's Island, base sur cette conception simplifiee et native d'un panier aux crabes constitue par une multiplicite d'elites intermediates haitiennes, tout aussi eduquees et carrieristes que les representants brouillons des Nations Unies, de 1'OEA et des gouvernements amis. Aucun des intervenants, aucun des negotiateurs n'etait satisfait du compromis boiteux qui intronisa un nouveau premier ministre designe par M. Aristide, Monsieur Malval, pour remplacer le premier ministre technocrate, 1'economiste Marc Bazin, entoure entre autres, comme Monsieur Aristide, par des technocrates canadiens. Malgre sa competence, son courage et sa bonne volonte indeniables, le premier ministre Malval se verra isole, harcele, voire agresse par la clique militaire sans reussir a etablir une vraie coalition civile. Meme son president, qui avait signe avec reticences le compromis, ne le soutiendra que tres partiellement. L'avenement et 1'echec de Malval, comme d'ailleurs 1'ensemble de la crise haitienne, correspondent malheureusement a une instabilite, sans oublier une incompetence stupefiante, des decideurs canadiens et internationaux. Au niveau du pouvoir executif, le jeu des chaises musicales de la nomenklatura affecte Bush, Clinton, Mulroney, Campbell, Chretien, Carlos Andres Perez, Cresson, Beregovoy, Balladur. L'ineffable Dante Caputo semble representer le seul element de continuite dans une chaine discontinue de divisions dissipatives et chaotiques ou la moindre peripetie paralyse 1'ensemble du systeme. Du point de vue de la competence il n'est pas evident que le ministere ait jamais organise une rencontre interne, disons de quatre heures avec quatre specialistes! EPILOGUE : UN CANADA IRRESPONSABLE ET RHETORIQUE

Des refugies expulses de 1'ambassade canadienne a Port-au-Prince aux «conseilles en securite» empeches de debarquer, les reactions nord-americaines sont devenues epidermiques, avec un seul axe de reference, la panique d'une immigration haitienne massive, et un 118

LA SPIRALE DU VIDE ET DU CHAOS

seul projet de type magique reposant sur la fatigue des militaires hai'tiens et la mobilisation des masses affamees. La politique canadienne ne repond actuellement pas a des criteres de rationnalite, soit strategiques, soit au service de valeurs. Le cas du Rwanda et la tolerance excessive pour la dictature cubaine interdisent de parler de droit humanitaire, de droit democratique ou de moralite tout court. L'Afghanistan, la Yougoslavie, la Georgie, 1'Azerbaidjan devraient rappeler nos diplomates et leurs collegues onusiens a plus de modestie. Du point de vue de la «real-politik» la diplomatic canadienne a abandonne, sans le vouloir, tout le pouvoir de decision finale a la diplomatic et a 1'araiee americaine ...

119

This page intentionally left blank

VII

CANADA AND CENTRAL AMERICA'S DEMOCRATIZATION PROCESS Elizabeth Spehar and Nancy Thede Le Canada et la democratization de I'Amerique centrale Resume: Au cours des annees 1980, I'Amerique centrale fut au coeur de 1'interet que porterent beaucoup de Canadiens a I'Amerique latine. Les representants officiels du Canada, et surtout ses organisations nongouvernementales, etaient activernent engages dans la region avant que le Canada ne s'implique formellement dans Fhemisphere, a la fin de cette decennie, en joignant 1'Organisation des Etats americains et en signant 1'Accord de libre echange nord-americain. A 1'exception de Costa Rica, les petits pays centro-americains partageaient une situation criante d'injustice sociale, un sous-developpement severe, ainsi que, pour la plupart, des regimes politiques repressifs et un niveau de violence politique eleve. L'implication des Etats-Unis dans les tensions politiques et les guerres civiles locales vint accentuer une instabilite politique qui projeta FAmerique centrale au centre de 1'echiquier politique international. Dans la seconde moitie de la decennie, les tensions politiques diminuerentprogressivement et des processus de democratisation s'engagerent tant bien que mal. La politique canadienne fut assez favorable a ces processus bien que mar-

quee par un manque de vigueur et de coherence. C'est par exemple surtout a 1'instance des organisations non-gouvernementales que le gouvernement canadien s'impliqua serieusement. Sa contribution fut neanmoins.reelle, le Canada insistant pour que prenne fin 1'intervention de tiers-partis, supportant activernent les initiatives regionales de paix et reconnaissant le role determinant des disparites economiques dans 1'emergence des tensions politiques elles-memes. Toutefois, si le secteur des ONGet des organisations volontaires a etc consequent dans son action en faveur de la democratisation, la politique du gouvernement canadien fut a plus d'un egard contradictoire. Cela fut particulierement flagrant lorsque le Canada sembla s'aligner sur la politique des Etats-Unis dans la region en reprenant par exemple 1'aide au Salvador et au Guatemala alors que la situation politique et sociale ne le justifiait pas. De meme, sa legitimation de processus electoraux douteux et son appui a des programmes d'ajustement structurel et a une liberalisation rapide du commerce—qui accentuent les inegalites socio-economiques—semblent peu compatibles avec une volonte d'encourager la consolidation de la democratic.

BEYOND MEXICO

WITH ITS DECISION TO JOIN the Organization of American States in 1989, Canada appeared finally to acknowledge its position as a member of the community of the Americas and to signal its willingness to take on a more active role within that community. Evidently, well before this "formalization" of Canadian participation in the hemisphere, Canada was already involved in the Latin American region, commercially, politically, diplomatically and through its aid programs. In the 1980s, Canada became particularly involved in Central America, both officially and, most strongly, through its active, non-government developmental and church sectors. Although Canada's involvement in Central America was frequently overshadowed by the powerful presence of the United States and the weight of that country's particular foreign policy agenda in the region, Central America nonetheless became a focal point of Canada's foreign policy in the 1980s. This paper seeks to explore the Canadian role with respect to democratization1 in Central America and to arrive at some conclusions and recommendations regarding an ongoing role for Canada in this area. The first section provides an overview of Central American democratization processes from 1979 to the present day, followed by a more detailed description of the main trends and issues and a discussion of the Canadian role in relation to these processes. Specific attention will be paid to the cases of Guatemala and El Salvador, particularly developments since 1990. The second section presents a synthesis of Canadian policy towards Central America and its relation to democratization, also with particular emphasis on the most recent period (1990-1994). The last section attempts to draw some conclusions about the present and future involvement of Canada in Central American democratization processes. Canadian governmental and non-governmental actors have responded positively, but only partially, to the very formidable challenges of supporting democratization in the region. Although Canadian involvement in the region has rapidly increased, official policy has not always been coherent or vigorous. Despite the current difficulties with the region's democratization processes, Canada can play a stronger support role at both the official and non-governmental levels. In doing so, it would be responding to the opening of opportunities for democracy and greater respect for rights in the region, however fragile, as well as to internal dynamics that have brought 722

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

issues of human rights and democracy into greater prominence in Canadian foreign policy. One determinant of the impact of Canadian governmental support for efforts toward democratization will be the manner in which this policy goal interacts with other, potentially competing, policy goals such as enhanced trade and investment through the promotion of economic liberalization and structural adjustment compliance by local governments. As Canada embarks on a major foreign policy review in 1994, it remains to be seen whether human rights and democracy will be reaffirmed by the Chretien government as central policy goals—a principle established by its predecessors—and what approach to human rights will be preferred. It also remains to be seen what degree of importance Central America will retain within a new Canadian foreign policy agenda. CENTRAL AMERICA: 1979-94

Central America over this period has been characterized by political and economic dynamics similar to those of South America: rightwing, repressive military regimes have gradually been replaced by conservative civilian regimes, within a framework of "controlled" or "restricted" democracy.2 On an economic level, the nationalism of the 1970s and early 1980s has been abandoned, and, under the duress of the external debt crisis, the "Chilean miracle" and IMF prescriptions have become the accepted wisdom of the political and economic elites. The order of the day is now the race to facilitate "integration" in accordance with the parameters set out largely by the United States; this concept includes conformity to a certain number of demands concerning democracy and good governance, and not only economic rules and performance. Central America has been characterized by greater overall regional coherence than South America during this period: it is certainly more homogeneous in its low level of industrialization and acute underdevelopment, as well as its extremely skewed economic structures and weak and inherently undemocratic political institutions (Costa Rica is the only major exception to this characterization) . This lack of economic and political democracy turned the region into the scene of several national liberation struggles, subjecting it as a whole to political instability. Faced with this situation, 723

BEYOND MEXICO

Latin American governments over the last decade pushed for the adoption of an overall regional framework for peaceful resolution of the conflicts. The turmoil in Central America made the region a focus of international attention during most of the 1980s, but it has since been progressively marginalized in relation to the major geopolitical concerns. In general, although there has been progress on democratization in the region in areas such as pacification, the development of formal political institutions and practices, the gradual broadening of political "space" for civil society and some demilitarization efforts, serious problems remain. For example, in countries such as Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala, the continuing influence of the military, the persistence of human rights violations and the continued marginalization, both economic and political, of large segments of the population compromise the movement toward democratic transition and consolidation. We shall now turn to a more detailed outline of Central American democratization efforts and their political context over the past 15 years, followed by specific considerations about the Canadian role. Armed Struggle and Democratization from Below: 1979-82 In response to highly repressive military governments and as a reaction to increasingly skewed economic distribution, armed revolutionary movements emerged in several countries during this period. The Sandinista victory in Nicaragua in 1979, the first successful revolution in Latin America since Cuba's twenty years before, gave an enormous boost to the other armed movements, leading to the creation of unified fronts (on the Nicaraguan model) in both El Salvador and Guatemala. International support for both the Sandinista government and the other movements grew rapidly, exemplified by the joint French-Mexican declaration in 1981 on El Salvador, recognizing the FMLN-FDR as a legitimate political force, and in the important grassroots solidarity movement with Nicaragua. From January 1981, however, opposition to the Sandinista regime was encouraged by the new Reagan administration in the U.S., which displayed an overt hostility towards Nicaragua. Other regional governments reacted to these events by, on the one hand, increasing repression of popular groups and revolutionary movements and, on the other hand, by undertaking 124

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

a number of limited "liberalization" measures. These reforms were generally sanctioned by the military and political elites, often in response to U.S. pressure. An example of this was the holding of elections in Honduras for a Constituent Assembly and for the presidency in 1980 and 1981 respectively, as mechanisms of a formal return to civilian rule. However, one month before the presidential elections, the military met with the two traditional political parties to impose conditions on the elections, including the prohibition of investigations into military corruption, a military veto over all cabinet appointments and absolute control of the military over "their own" affairs. In El Salvador, in October 1979, reformist elements among the army and the country's political and economic elite successfully overthrew the military government to install the country's first civilian-military junta. However, when more progressive members attempted to introduce reforms, they were swiftly blocked by the right. When they resigned in protest, the junta moved definitively to the conservative right, which presided over widespread military abuses while seeking to preserve intact the status quo. The early 1980s was one of the most brutal periods of Central America's recent history, particularly in Guatemala and El Salvador. Campaigns of terror and vicious massacres dealt a severe blow to organized civil society, eliminating thousands of leaders and members of social groups in both countries, as well as entire communities in the Guatemalan and Salvadorean countryside. This first period marks the beginning of increased Canadian involvement in the Central American region. An important factor contributing to the heightened profile of Central America during this time was the strong involvement of Canadian non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Nicaragua, as a response to the 1979 Sandinista victory and the ensuing implementation of a "new development model."3 During this period, Canadian development NGOs were vociferous in their criticism of U.S. policy in Central America, particularly with respect to Nicaragua. A growing number of them were becoming active in the policy debate within Canada, pressuring the Canadian government to do more, both by criticizing U.S. policy and by increasing aid to Nicaragua; and this, in spite of the fact that the Canadian government demonstrated considerable hostility towards this "politicization" of development NGOs.4 125

BEYOND MEXICO

On the governmental side, Canada sent its first high-level trade and investment mission to Central America in 1979, but diplomatically it maintained an ambivalent stance. Rejecting the U.S. analysis, according to which Central America was subject to a "communist threat," the government at the same time recognized the "legitimate security interests" of the United States in the region. With the arrival of the Reagan administration in early 1981, pressure from the United States intensified and Canadian criticism waned. On the level of its own policies, however, the Canadian government responded to the deteriorating human rights situation by suspending bilateral aid to El Salvador and Guatemala in 1981. The important place which Central America began to occupy in Canadian foreign policy was reflected by the creation of a "SubCommittee on Canada's Relations with Latin America and the Caribbean" within the Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence. In a 1982 report, it recommended that the government accord priority to Central America and make human rights concerns a more central issue in its dealings with the region, thus echoing the position of the Canadian human rights community and setting the tone for Canada's future relations.5 Interventionism vs. Multilateralism: 1982-86

During this period, polarization and instability were prevalent in Latin America through international confrontation such as the external debt crisis and the Argentine Falklands War. The major effect was to further undermine undemocratic regimes, but also to increase the military threat to those few governments attempting to alter the uneven distribution of political and economic power, Nicaragua being the prime example. In Central America, the result was a long drawn-out battle between two major approaches to "solving the problems" of the region, that is, to stabilize, pacify, and democratize the isthmus. On the one hand there was the U.S. "gunboat diplomacy" approach, which played a strong role in the Nicaraguan situation, in El Salvador, and remained dominant in Honduras. On the other hand, there was the emerging multilateral, regional approach, exemplified in the Contadora initiative. At the level of national governments, the trend towards some kind of regime "liberalization" continued, principally in the form 126

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

of shifts from military to formal civilian rule, and of limited development or reform of political institutional processes. In 1982, the United States threatened Nicaragua with invasion and began giving direct support to the Contra war. Latin American governments, however, were determined to construct a multilateral regional solution to the conflicts in Central America under the auspices of the Contadora Group (Mexico, Venezuela, Colombia and Panama). The Reagan administration, which insisted on the overthrow of the Sandinista regime as part of any solution, constantly attempted to undermine the initiative, and managed to mobilize the support of Costa Rica, El Salvador and Honduras to delay the signing of any agreement. Washington also refused to recognize the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice regarding Nicaragua's complaint against U.S. mining of its harbours. International repudiation of U.S. intervention grew, but there was little concrete action from other Western governments. In El Salvador, a determining factor in the course of the internal conflict was the preponderance of U.S. military and political involvement in the country. During this period, U.S. military and economic aid rose sharply.6 The period was characterized by strong U.S. backing for Jose Napoleon Duarte and his Christian Democratic Party (PDC) as an acceptable, moderate counterforce to the insurgents: they triumphed in the elections of the mid-1980s (1984, Presidential, and 1985, legislative). These elections brought in a centrist government and gave El Salvador its first civilian president in over 50 years; however, they were carried out in a highly undemocratic manner. The voting took place in a context of continuing civil war and human rights abuse, with the exclusion of important political forces from the proceedings, and with the heavy-handed involvement of a foreign government. The elections resulted in a government which was weak in the face of a powerful, entrenched military and political-economic elite. Duarte was incapable of realizing significant reforms or pursuing the pacification of the country although, during his period of office, there was some opening for civil society and the overall level of abuses declined from the previous period. In Guatemala, an internal coup within the military in 1982 set the stage for a slow but significant return to constitutional government. The new Guatemalan Constitution (1985) established a 127

BEYOND MEXICO

framework for institutionalization of the political competition. The 1985 elections returned at least nominal civilian rule to Guatemala. The popular movement quickly reacted to these modest openings by seizing the human rights banner and courageously reorganizing itself. Human rights abuses, while still very frequent, began to decrease after 1983. Canadian non-governmental actors and parliamentarians during this period maintained their focus on support to Nicaragua and denunciation of human rights abuses elsewhere. Official policy was oriented towards technical support for Contadora, accompanied by attempts to individualize policy country by country, but with an apparent absence of any overall guiding framework. By publicly announcing its support of Contadora, the Canadian government demonstrated its repudiation of "third party" intervention, multiplied its expressions of rejection of the policy of the U.S. and its allies, and openly increased official ties with Nicaragua. While support grew for Contadora and for Nicaragua, it also increased significantly for El Salvador, and somewhat for Guatemala, two countries where repressive conditions still reigned. For example, the government's assessment that progress in El Salvador under Duarte in the areas of democracy and human rights were significant enough to be "rewarded," led to the announcement of bilateral aid renewal to that country in 1985. The government explained such actions as efforts of "constructive engagement" with foreign governments. However, some analysts deemed them the result of a more complex combination of trade-offs among conflicting interests and forces, designed to strike a balance between the positions of domestic critics and those of the United States and also of other foreign governments. Other examples of such "engagement" were the sending of official observer delegations to the flawed elections in Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala. Canada did not however send a delegation to the Nicaraguan elections of 1984, and NGO critics were quick to point out these discrepancies in Canadian foreign policy. Human rights organizations responded to the general situation in the region with a demand for a ban on the sale of military equipment to Central America and requests for an annual human rights review. They also asked Canada to promote the application of human rights criteria in decisions of the international financial 128

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

institutions (iFIs), and urged more flexible refugee and immigration practices with regard to Guatemala and El Salvador. They argued in favour of stronger Canadian diplomatic representation in the region and a better human rights monitoring capacity. Many development NGOs, using human rights criteria, criticized the renewal of bilateral aid to El Salvador. This ultimately led to division within the NGO community and saw the Canadian Hunger Foundation—the NGO which was to administer the renewed funding to El Salvador—withdraw from the Canadian Council on International Cooperation (CCIC) when that umbrella organization took a stance against renewal. At the same time, NGOs were feeling increasingly marginalized by the decentralization of CIDA operations into the region. While calling for and applauding increased government attention to the region, they also began actively to oppose the idea of Canada entering the OAS, perceived as a forum dominated by the United States. A Regional Framework for Pacification and Democratization: 1986-89

During this period, the centre and centre-right governments elected in El Salvador (1984), Guatemala (1985) and Costa Rica (1986) increased their commitment to a regional solution. There were early efforts by Vinicio Cerezo in Guatemala to bring the presidents of the region to the negotiating table. The Arias peace plan increased the momentum by resurrecting the principles of Contadora, and the Central American governments finally signed the Esquipulas II agreement in a context where the positions of both Nicaragua and the United States were considerably weakened. The explosion of the Irangate-Contragate scandal in the U.S. signalled that the political tide was beginning to turn in the hemisphere's most powerful country; however, substantive modification of American foreign policy, to facilitate the pursuit of negotiated solutions to the region's conflicts, did not take place until the arrival of the Bush administration in early 1989. As the crisis in Eastern Europe began erupting in 1989, the "Cold War" logic of the U.S. approach to Central America progressively lost its relevance. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the fall of Communism in Eastern Europe overtook international attention, and regions such as Central America gradually began to fade from the international spotlight. 129

BEYOND MEXICO

The 1989 presidential elections in El Salvador spelled defeat for the largely corrupt and discredited Christian Democrats, as ARENA'S Alfredo Cristiani took over from an ailing Duarte. As in past elections, a climate of violence and intimidation prevailed and participation from the left was very limited, particularly in the Salvadorean countryside. As the staunchly right-wing ARENA party began to assert itself politically in El Salvador, many analysts feared that its rule could end any possibility of a negotiated settlement to the internal conflict in the coming years. However, a number of factors coincided at the end of this period to bring the possibilities of peace and democratization closer than ever before; these included the end of the Cold War and the realization by both the FMLN and the army that the war had reached a stalemate. In Guatemala, the January 1986 inauguration of Vinicio Cerezo as president marked the beginning of the country's transition to civilian rule. There was considerable hope, domestically and internationally, that this government would make a difference with respect to Guatemala's serious human rights situation. In fact, Cerezo quickly proved to be ineffectual in dealing with the army and powerful economic interests, unable to halt or prosecute continuing military abuses or to push through proposed socio-economic reforms. Tensions with the military resulted in two abortive coup attempts which succeeded in significantly dampening Cerezo's reforming ardour. During this period, and in accordance with Esquipulas II, attempts were made to explore the possibilities for direct peace negotiations between the government and the guerrilla URNG, beginning with a preliminary meeting in Madrid in October 1987. Opposition from some sectors of the military and political elites ran high, resulting in a stalemate on this issue and in a continuing climate of violence. The situation was illustrated by the assassination in August 1989 of diplomat Danilo Barillas, who, as ambassador to Spain, had played a key role in the 1987 conversations between the Government and the guerrilla forces. Internally, in Nicaragua, El Salvador and Guatemala, civil society groups were developing strength, despite the adverse conditions prevalent in each country. They were demanding further democratization and greater effective respect for human rights. In El Salvador, NGOs and popular organizations began to rebound after a devastating setback represented by the brutal army backlash of 130

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

November 1989, which followed the massive FMLN offensive in the capital city. Paradoxically, in Nicaragua, as the space for participation decreased due to the serious security situation generated by the Contra war, the strength of the popular organizations and their autonomy actually increased. In Canada, about 1986-87, new trends began to appear in official foreign policy thinking which affected the approach to Central America: one was the gradual affirmation of human rights as a fundamental foreign policy concern. Among the principles upheld was that human rights violations could be a criterion for suspending aid if they endangered the effectiveness of aid delivery.7 Another trend which made its appearance in Canadian policy, particularly towards the end of this period, was the importance given to developing country compliance with the economic structural adjustment programs of international financial institutions, and the role identified for Canada in encouraging this compliance through its aid programs. This policy became, and remains, a major point of contention between the government and a large section of the international development NGO community. Organizations such as Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives (CAPA) have argued that the consequences of structural adjustment policies promoted through CIDA's bilateral programming in Central America have cancelled out the desired effects of its social development projects, and led to (for example) a deterioration in the health and education sectors.8 Canadian governmental policy continued to put the accent on support to the regional framework for peace and democratization. For example, in 1987, Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark offered to provide a Canadian peacekeeping force within the framework of the Esquipulas II agreement. In 1988, a Parliamentary Committee was set up to study the implementation of Esquipulas II and to make recommendations on how Canada could best support this process.9 On the aid front, the tempo began to pick up: Canadian aid to the region peaked in 1987-88 at $55.4 million, up from $22.5 million in 1981. In 1987, it was announced that bilateral aid to Guatemala would be renewed, and in 1988 CIDA decided to extend major funds to Honduras, making it the most important recipient of Canadian bilateral monies in the region. The latter two decisions elicited further critical responses from the NGO community involved 131

BEYOND MEXICO

in Central America. Renewal of bilateral aid to Guatemala was judged premature: NGOs pushed for the money to be disbursed directly through non-governmental channels, and were dissatisfied with CIDA's decision to select one NGO to manage the Bilateral Branch funds as in the El Salvador arrangement, although in this case the government of the country concerned was less involved. The accent on Honduras, as opposed to Nicaragua, was also rejected by many NGOs. They considered that Nicaragua's attempts at structural transformation to attack the causes of underdevelopment should have been recognized by conferring on it a much higher level of bilateral aid, and that increased aid to Honduras amounted to rewarding a U.S. client state. Over 80 of these NGOs met in January 1989 to examine collectively new approaches to supporting the peace process in Central America through their partners in civil society. This heralded two important qualitative changes in NGO involvement in Central America: the introduction on a broad scale of the concept of "civil society" as an interpretive paradigm for policy development, and the active concertation amongst NGOs for program development and advocacy. Many Canadian NGOs, while maintaining their emphasis on work with grassroots organizations, had reached an impasse with respect to support for the process of democratization in a broader sense. This was particularly so in Nicaragua where, through their actions, most NGOs continued to support centralized Sandinista control (for example, by channelling their assistance through the Sandinista development co-ordinating body, FACS) and to ostracize those Canadian NGOs which, with their Nicaraguan partners, were arguing for greater effective autonomy of popular organizations. The period ended, significantly enough, with Canada's decision to join the OAS. At the same time, major official development assistance (ODA) cuts were announced, thus confirming the increasing importance of multilateralism—more specifically in this case, continentalism—in the Canadian official policy approach in an era of globalization. Democratization and the Neo-Liberal Paradigm: 1990-94

The political tide turned strongly in Central America at the beginning of this period, which was marked by the rather unexpected UNO victory in the February 1990 Nicaraguan elections. With this 132

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

victory, the limits of what was possible, in terms of social transformation, narrowed significantly compared to a decade before. The idea of negotiated solutions, both nationally and regionally, emerged unequivocally as the only apparently feasible option left, and it gained considerable momentum from U.S. support after the electoral defeat of the FSLN. The change of government in Nicaragua in 1990 resulted in a "homogenization" of the regional power structures, with all five governments now working within a conservative framework. This "homogenization" was also reflected in their general economic approaches, which followed the precepts of the neoliberal, export-led economic model increasingly prevalent in the Americas. The greater coherence of political and economic visions among Central American governments has given new life to regional economic integration efforts on the isthmus. Since January 1991, the Central American governments have also been involved in sporadic negotiations with Mexico on free trade, seeing this as the "back door" to inclusion in the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). During this period, then, the previously recalcitrant governments of Central America became more open to negotiations with internal armed opposition forces; they felt fairly certain of their ability, in the new, post-Cold War international context, to defeat these forces at the negotiating table and subsequently to confine the conflict to an electoral framework. Thus, in 1991 and 1992 there were rapid steps towards pacification, in particular the 1991 Queretaro framework agreement between the Guatemalan government and the URNG, and the opening of a UN human rights verification mission office (United Nations Mission on El Salvador— ONUSAL) in San Salvador in January 1991. This was followed by the 1992 Salvadorean peace agreement and ceasefire, and an unprecedented agreement between the Guatemalan government and the representatives of some 50,000 refugees in the south of Mexico on conditions for return. The pace slowed by 1993, however, with considerable backsliding in the democratization processes in both El Salvador and Guatemala: death squads made a disquieting reappearance in both countries and, despite pressure from the United Nations, little progress was made in peace negotiations in Guatemala or in the 133

BEYOND MEXICO

implementation of the thornier aspects of the peace agreements in El Salvador (for example, the recommendations of the Truth Commission) . This came after the initial buoyant period in El Salvador just after the landmark conclusion of the peace accord, and after the surprisingly non-violent resolution of Guatemala's "self-coup" which saw the President replaced by the reform-minded human rights ombudsman. In Nicaragua, the relatively smooth transition from the Sandinista government to Violeta Chamorro and UNO after the 1990 elections progressively turned to chaos. Continuing ideological and political divisions within the population and—of increasing importance—the widening gap between rich and poor, recreated a climate of instability and violence. Guatemala has seen three civilian presidents during this period, after decades of military rule: this includes the end of the Cerezo regime, the presidency of Jorge Serrano Elias, which was cut short mid-way through his mandate after an unsuccessful "self-coup" attempt, followed by the unprecedented civil society consensus that brought Ramiro de Leon Carpio to the presidency in June 1993. Gradual improvement in respect for human rights—in particular political and civil rights—has taken place over this period, although the problems are by no means resolved. Little further progress can be made without attacking the fundamental, structural causes of human rights violations in Guatemala: on the one hand, the extreme weakness of the state as a mechanism for redistribution and for imposing the rule of law and, on the other, the continuing predominance of military over civilian authority. The 1985 Constitution provides an adequate, in some aspects progressive, framework for the protection of individual and collective rights, but the inability of the judicial machinery to enforce it is compounded by far-reaching state corruption. One striking example is the issue of women's rights: while equality is enshrined in the Constitution, the 100-year-old civil code is an instrument of continuing discrimination against women. When its constitutionality was recently contested by the women's section of the Office of the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Code was upheld as it stands by the Constitutional Court. Freedom of expression has radically improved with the arrival of Ramiro de Leon to the Presidency, but early expectations that he would make important inroads into such problems as impunity have been disappointed. Although his arrival 134

CENTRAL AMERICA S DEMOCRATIZATION

signals another step forward in the growing hegemony of the modernist sector within the military, by no means has it resolved the issue of the place and role of the military in Guatemalan political affairs. On the economic level, the radical structural adjustment programs undertaken by Cerezo and, particularly, Serrano, have had a clearly negative impact on the living conditions of the majority of the population. The peace negotiations between the government and the armed URNG opposition, begun under Serrano, stalled from mid1992 until early 1994. The new government made an innovative framework proposal for their re-initiation, involving mediation by the United Nations, and, after an initial refusal by the URNG to go back to talks on that basis, in January 1994 the two sides finally reached a procedural consensus. In March 1994 talks resulted in a human rights accord and a commitment by both sides to reach an overall agreement by year-end. The armed opposition in Guatemala has to date evidenced no will to enter the national political arena, although representation of its views is seriously lacking since there are virtually no left-of-centre political formations in the country. The popular movement inside the country has grown exponentially since 1984, in which year it first began to re-emerge after the severe repression of the early 1980s, and it enjoys increasing credibility internally and internationally, as illustrated, for example, by the awarding of the 1992 Nobel Peace prize to popular indigenous leader Rigoberta Menchu. Despite a process of gradual strengthening of the various tendencies of the indigenous movement on the one hand, and independent progressive civilian sectors on the other, civil society as a whole remains weak and poorly articulated. Difficulties encountered in constructing a space for civil society dialogue by the "Instancia Nacional de Consenso" (bringing together Guatemalan business organizations, NGOs, political parties and popular sectors) in June and July 1993, led to the disintegration of that forum. Today the very notion of negotiation is still regarded with extreme suspicion by influential sectors of civil society. The immediate future, and the longer-term process of reconciliation, are certain to be marked by the increasingly polarized situation in the countryside, with the refugee return underway on one hand and an apparent process of remobilization of the notorious civil defence patrols or PACs, stimulated by the military, on the other. 135

BEYOND MEXICO

In El Salvador, 1990 was a key turning point in the country's turbulent history. After a decade of civil war and the deaths of tens of thousands of Salvadoreans, a breakthrough was finally achieved in April with the signing of the Geneva Accords by the government and the FMLN opposition forces, leading ultimately to the Chapultepec agreement, signed in Mexico City in January 1992. Although not exhaustive in their scope, the peace accords do provide a framework for the democratization of El Salvador. Any current analysis of the country's moves towards democracy must therefore look at the degree and the quality of implementation of these agreements. The accords touch upon key areas for the democratization of El Salvador, including the reform of political institutions, such as the electoral and judicial systems, social and economic rights, and the broadening of political space (for example, measures to establish the political participation of the FMLN). The agreements also refer to the strengthening of popular participation in the chapter on social and economic themes.10 As reflected by UN reports, important progress has been made, but grave problems remain with crucial aspects of the agreements which have not been fully implemented or have suffered serious delays, principally those for which the government is responsible. Such delays in the transfer of land and other benefits to the excombatants of the Armed Forces and the FMLN have sparked tensions since the demobilization which, if unaddressed, could threaten the peace and further democratization efforts. Serious problems have also been identified in the deployment of the new National Civil Police and the phasing out of the traditional security forces, notorious for their abuse of human rights, and in the degree of compliance with critically important reforms in the judicial system. El Salvador, since the ceasefire and peace agreement, has been in the midst of a complex period of transition. Advances in democratization have been tempered by periodic setbacks and by the persistence of some deeply entrenched anti-democratic practices and attitudes. The continuing high level of human rights abuse and the resurgence of death squad activity are particularly disturbing aspects of the current situation. On the economic front, the greater stability encouraged by the peace agreement translated into a five percent growth rate for the Salvadorean economy in 1993, in stark contrast to the economic 136

CENTRAL AMERICA S DEMOCRATIZATION

slowdown and recession of the 1980s. Growth has not, however, resulted in socio-economic gains for workers and the population at large, and most of the wealth generated remains with the owners of Salvadorean enterprises.11 Crucial for the consolidation of El Salvador's democratization process will be the degree to which deeprooted structural problems at the origin of the civil war, such as extreme socio-economic inequalities, will be addressed, particularly in the context of structural adjustment policies that have tended to further impoverish the poorer sectors. One of the most important elections in El Salvador's recent history is taking place in 1994: this is the first election to be held in peacetime since 1979, with ample participation of all sectors, including the left; it will determine Salvadoreans' choices for the presidency, the National Assembly, the municipal government and the Central American Parliament. The pre-electoral and electoral campaign periods, particularly in late 1993 and early 1994, were characterized by a sharp rise in political murders, particularly of leaders and grassroots members of the FMLN. The overall climate was tense and highly polarized, and predictions are that the run-off elections at the end of April between ruling party, right-wing ARENA candidate Armando Calderon Sol and Ruben Zamora, of the leftist coalition Democratic Convergence-FMLN-National Revolutionary Movement, will serve to further polarize the divided Salvadorean population. The elections thus far12 have been illustrative of the reality as well as the enormous difficulty of the country's transition to democracy. Amply observed by international delegations, the elections were sharply criticized for their poor organization and, in particular, for serious flaws in the voter registration process and in the final form of the electoral registry. Anomalies in the electoral lists and other irregularities effectively disenfranchised thousands of Salvadoreans who were legally eligible to vote. At the same time observers have acknowledged that the election, despite numerous imperfections, constitutes a definite step towards democracy in El Salvador: the general principle of freedom to express diverse opinions and ideas was upheld for participating political parties, voting was carried out in a climate of relative peace and security with significant participation, and few incidences of blatant fraud were detected.13 Furthermore, it was the 137

BEYOND MEXICO

first time in many years that all the major political players in El Salvador had agreed to deal with their differences within the same set of democratic "rules of the game." During this entire period, a key element of democratization in El Salvador has been the continuing development of an important civil society sector which, despite years of repression, is now thriving. Organized civil society groups are still, to a significant degree, "attached" or strongly identified with either the governmental or FMLN camps, but more autonomous organization has also begun to flourish and should be strengthened. Hundreds of NGO and grass-roots groups now exist, responding to a vast number of constituencies in the country. A significant number were involved in the crucial task of providing information and civic education to the population in preparation for the elections, including women's groups which attempted to promote greater participation of women in this process. Another positive element of this period as a whole has been the continuing interest and involvement of the international community in El Salvador's democratization process, in particular the critically important role of the United Nations, and more specifically, that of ONUSAL. Originally intended to terminate its operations after the elections, the El Salvador-based mission will continue to operate in the country for an additional period of time. Whether, once the mission has departed, Salvadorean local institutions will be sufficiently prepared to take up the vital monitoring and assistance functions of ONUSAL in the areas of human rights and democratization remains to be seen. With the end of the electoral cycle, international attention on El Salvador in general will likely fall substantially. It will be important for those truly committed to human rights and democratic development to be prepared to stay with El Salvador "for the long haul," and to make careful, long-term support plans to sustain and deepen what democratic advances have already been achieved. In terms of Canadian policy on Central America as a whole, it is apparent that the region no longer enjoys a prominent place on the foreign policy agenda. Promised substantial increases in aid to Central America, announced by Joe Clark in 1988, have so far failed to materialize, due to the cutbacks in official development assistance of recent years; given the continuing pressures for fiscal restraint in Canada, it is unlikely that a significant reversal of this trend will take place in the near future. 138

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

On the other hand, Canadian interest in the region has gravitated even more to the issues of rights and democracy: since 1990, CIDA programs for Central America have been increasingly linked to concerns about human rights and democratization, as has much of Canada's diplomatic effort. This latter approach is consistent with Canadian foreign policy evolution over the past years, which has increasingly emphasized the importance of rights and democracy and which, during this period, was given high international profile by Prime Minister Mulroney in multilateral forums. Canada has also been interested in exploring trade opportunities with Central America, and has addressed these two concerns through its participation in the multilateral "Partnership for Democracy and Development" or FDD; this was initiated between Central American governments and their main country donors in April 1991 as a vehicle for dialogue on two principal goals: strengthening democracy in Central America, and promoting economic development, mainly through economic liberalization and increased trade. In the non-governmental development sector, issues and concepts of democratization and human rights have increasingly been incorporated into organizations' work and priorities relating to Central America. This has meant continuing to support grass-roots organizations and a number of traditional NGO partnerships, but now within the broader context, as an act of strengthening civil society and popular democratic participation. It has also meant stretching the frontiers of past work in some areas; for example, the concern for and focus on the participation of women is increasingly a "front and centre" issue for a number of Canadian NGOs in their work in the region. In response to the concern of their partner organizations in Central America, many Canadian NGOs are supporting efforts to address the global challenges of neo-liberal economic policy and its effects on the most disadvantaged sectors, as well as the effects of increasing economic integration. This new area of concentration has opened up interesting opportunities for the NGOs to work on coherent transnational strategies and to link communities and groups affected by many of the same phenomena in the North and South. In its approach to Guatemala, despite a committed attitude in the United Nations Commission on Human Rights towards this country, the Canadian government had by this period somewhat 139

BEYOND MEXICO

exhausted its credibility by appearing to repeat an identical position with respect to each of the successive civilian governments since 1986, that is: "This government is really trying to do something, we have to encourage them." Canada maintained this official position despite growing evidence that the political agenda was ultimately being determined by the military. On the other hand, with the appointment of a new ambassador in 1990, the Canadian Embassy in Guatemala began playing a very positive role in supporting and defending the human rights movement inside the country, a role which has been acknowledged and appreciated by Guatemalan NGOs and the international community within Guatemala, as well as by numerous Canadian NGOs. As for CIDA, a new program "in the pipeline" for Guatemala is a modestly funded "Democratic Development Fund," which will be developed and coordinated under the management of a Canadian NGO. Clearly interested in improving upon its past relations with NGOs on the issue of Guatemala, CIDA has adopted a much more collaborative approach to the wider NGO community in the development of this initiative. The major unresolved issues between Canadian NGOs and government concerning Guatemala centre on the question of whom to support inside the country and how to deliver that support. NGOs grouped within the Central America Monitoring Group (CAMG), for example, are arguing that support for democratization must go almost exclusively to those who have been most marginalized and most definitely not to the reform of the state sector.14 Meanwhile the government would appear to prefer spreading its support around more broadly within civil society and the state. Although the NGOs have more open and longer-standing relationships with elements of Guatemalan civil society than do the government agencies, these relationships are frequently based on alliances with a specific sector and set of groups within that society. While perfectly coherent in terms of their institutional objectives and mandate, this approach has tended to reduce the capacity of many NGOs to analyze the overall situation and to identify important emerging trends. Some are now making efforts to broaden their informational and analytical base, whereas others maintain a more fragmented and partial view of the situation. In the case of El Salvador, the attention of both Canadian governmental and non-governmental entities during this period has largely been directed to responding to the "new moment," specifically 140

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

in the areas of peace-making and peace-building. Through both bilateral and multilateral means the Canadian government has attempted to support various aspects of the implementation of the peace accords. For example, Canadians are presently fulfilling an important verification and support function through their participation in the multinational ONUSAL. In the area of bilateral aid, CIDA responded to the signature of the peace accords by establishing a $5 million program intended to address human rights and democratic development issues. One aspect of this initiative was the continuation of the "Program of Support for Community Development" or PADECO, managed by the Canadian Hunger Foundation (CHF), which had been criticized by others of the Canadian NGO community during its original phase. A further aspect was a $2.6 million "Interim Fund for Human Rights and Democratic Development," which targeted the reintegration of Salvadorean ex-combatants and the support of institutions emanating from the peace accords. In a recent report on Canadian official development assistance, prepared by Canada-CaribbeanCentral America Policy Alternatives (CAPA), an organization traditionally very critical of Canadian government positions and frequently critical of CIDA's activities in the region, both programs were given positive evaluations.15 The report did, however, urge the government to be more rigorous in its attitude towards compliance with the peace accords by state institutions. It specifically recommended that Canada consider conditioning future assistance to two institutions created by the accords, the Supreme Electoral Tribunal (TSE) and the Human Rights Ombudsman's Office, on improvement in their performance. The report aimed its most severe criticism at Canada's bilateral and multilateral support of IMFinspired structural adjustment policies in El Salvador and elsewhere. Intended to "take over" from the program described above is a five-year, $25 million CIDA "Social Reconstruction Program," to provide continuing support for the implementation of the peace accords. The program will contain several components, including a specific sub-program on human rights and democratic development. At the time of writing, implementation of the program appears to be indefinitely stalled.16 NGO interest and involvement in El Salvador continues to be high, although there is a need for reformulation of approaches, given 141

BEYOND MEXICO

the new context of working in a time of peace. This will entail, among other things, building and broadening new alliances and exploration of innovative approaches to co-operation in the post-war context—for example, the promotion of dialogue and co-operation across the spectrum in Salvadorean society with identified common interests, such as citizens' initiatives at the municipal level. Recent interesting ventures include a project undertaken by the Canadian Lawyers Association for International Human Rights (CLAIHR), in collaboration with the Legal Studies Institute of El Salvador (IEJES), focusing on electoral and human rights reforms. The project illustrates a promising trend towards fuller appreciation of the importance of developing credible, effective formal institutions in a democratizing country, and acknowledgment of the potential NGO support role in such processes. Such well-targeted activities could be important complements to the vital role played by NGOs at the grass-roots, civil society level. In another area of potential contribution, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development (ICHRDD) has sponsored a "democratic development" study in El Salvador; this includes analysis of the full range of rights as well as the democratizing roles of state institutions and civil society sectors. The study and the follow-up workshop intended to "socialize the results" widely in El Salvador will hopefully contribute to the development of strategic approaches for support in the new conjuncture. In summary, Canada's support for democratization in Central America on both a governmental and a non-governmental level has been important during this most recent period. Each sector is following its own particular logic with respect to the fostering of democratization, albeit with greater convergence on issues and approaches than in the past. One major exception is in the economic realm, where the government's tendency has been to see growth—through an emphasis on economic liberalization and trade—as an important democratizing factor, while NGOs have been focusing on the potential of such strategies, if unchecked, to actually compromise the social and economic rights of the poor majorities in the region. On the official level, although recent policy developments outlined here have responded to some of Canada's internal dynamics as well as to the interests and drive of key governmental policymakers, they are also clearly echoing the thinking and policy directions established in multilateral arenas such as the Organization for Economic 142

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

Co-operation and Development (OECD). A new neo-liberal paradigm for foreign policy, resulting from strong intergovernmental consensus, particularly among the G-7 countries, is being tested around the world. It includes the concepts of good governance, marketbased economies, human rights and democratization, in an overall framework of political and economic liberalization. Among the local Central American governments, the new consensual economic and political framework of the early 1990s appears to be solidly in step with this new global approach. CANADIAN POLICY AND DEMOCRATIZATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA: SYNTHESIS AND ANALYSIS

As we have seen, although Canadian interest and involvement in Central America had traditionally been minor, the 1980s would radically alter Canada's attitude towards Central America. The serious political and human rights situation in the region in the early 1980s, particularly in El Salvador and Guatemala, resulted in a strong focusing of attention by Canadian NGOs and volunteer groups on building solidarity with the peoples of the region and on political lobbying at home aimed at securing a strong Canadian response to the numerous rights violations. In great measure, because of the strong pressure from solidarity groups, churches and NGOs, which in turn generated public opinion and parliamentary pressure, the Canadian government also began to respond more consistently to the human rights situation in the region, although not to the degree, nor necessarily in the manner, which the pressure groups desired. Canada's policy in Central America during this period has effectively promoted democratization, particularly when it has been firm in supporting basic principles that it traced for itself in the region—non-intervention of third parties in the regional conflict, support for regional peace efforts as opposed to militarized solutions, and the recognition of deep socio-economic disparities as being the root causes of the region's conflicts rather than an EastWest confrontation of ideologies. In addition to its political and diplomatic support, and its provision of technical advice for the Contadora and Esquipulas II processes, Canada played an important role in sending Canadians to be part of the ONUSAL and ONUCA peace-keeping and peace-building efforts. 143

BEYOND MEXICO

Through its aid program, Canada has also made a modest but important mark for itself. Canadian aid to the region began to increase somewhat in the 1970s and then markedly during the 1980s, although the increases per country have been quite varied over this period. The overall "democratizing" effect of Canada's aid is difficult to measure, and serious questions have been raised about ClDA's emphasis on compliance with IMF-inspired structural adjustment programs for beneficiary countries and the counter-productive effects that such policies are having on the social and economic rights of local populations. Of interesting potential are recent CIDA projects initiated in the region, a number of which place explicit emphasis on support to democratization and human rights. Canadian non-governmental organizations working in the isthmus have developed programs with important sectors of the population that had remained largely untouched by official development support. Over the past decades, Canadian NGO and church work has concentrated mostly in the areas of humanitarian assistance and social and economic development, although, as the repression and violations increased in the region during the 1980s, organizations quickly responded to the necessity of supporting their local partners against serious threats to their security and physical integrity. Official Canadian policy has been less conducive to democratization in Central America when it has aligned itself too closely with the interests of the United States. External Affairs officials play down the influence that the U.S. has had on our policies towards Central America, as well as the amount of influence that Canada can exert on the United States in matters of foreign policy. Canada was frequently silent during the 1980s about the Americans' heavyhanded role in the region, and some NGOs regarded this as tantamount to complicity. A second area in which Canadian official policy appeared counter-productive to democratization was its practice of sending observer delegations to elections in Central America held at several stages of the turbulent 1980s period, in countries where the military authority continued to prevail over civilian leaders and where internal conflict and massive rights violations dominated the national landscape. The implications of such involvement were the legitimization of electoral processes which, although they may technically have been relatively "free and fair," were played out in a 144

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

political context that was anything but democratic. As Einar Berntzen points out: "In a situation characterized by civil war and a population gripped by fear, genuinely free elections are impossible even if the ballots are counted accurately."17 A third area in which Canada's actions have frequently been termed inconsistent with its support for democratization in Central America, was the renewal of bilateral aid to El Salvador and Guatemala in 1984 and 1987 respectively; it had been suspended because of systematic rights violations, at a time when the human rights situation in both countries remained critical. It is likely that the rationale behind the last two examples (support to "non-democratic" elections and renewal of bilateral aid to human rights violators) has much to do with Ottawa's oft-stated belief in "constructive engagement." The idea, which has often set the government at odds with the NGO community, is that for Canada to have any kind of serious influence or "leverage" in a region such as Central America, it must maintain some kind of links with local governments—links which should be varied (diplomatic, trade, aid, and others) and which ideally must include some "carrots" as well as "sticks." The 1988 Parliamentary Committee report entitled "Supporting the Five: Canada and the Central American Peace Process" referred to the bilateral aid question as being illustrative of the problem of trying to strike "the right balance" between two potentially competing policy objectives: in this case, between sending a strong message to the two governments in question about their poor human rights record and supporting Esquipulas II as well as the key actors involved in this peace initiative (such as President Cerezo of Guatemala). The Committee's conclusion was that "there is no easy way of eliminating this policy dilemma."18 Judging from recent developments both in Canada and abroad, one of the greatest challenges yet to the coherence of foreign policy on the subject of democracy and rights may make its appearance in the arena of "trade vs. rights." Recent statements by Prime Minister Chretien and ministers of his government have clearly placed economic imperatives above action on human rights, and have even suggested a double standard in dealing with countries according to their relative economic potential.19 Canada's own economic interests and support for human rights abroad are not necessarily mutually exclusive; however, the pursuit 145

BEYOND MEXICO

of economic goals outside a coherent policy framework towards a region or a country, which would create the linkages between these goals and other objectives, could become problematic and even counter-productive. A recent example of such a situation was the Canadian government's refusal to tie human rights or democracy concerns to negotiations with Mexico on the North American Free Trade Agreement, insisting that NAFTA was strictly and exclusively about trade. The instigators of the recent uprising in Chiapas used the symbolic moment of NAFTA's introduction to showcase their concerns to Mexicans nationally and to the world; this had everything to do with Mexico's long-standing socio-economic inequalities and the injustices, particularly towards indigenous peoples, which are liable to be aggravated by a multilateral trading arrangement that refuses to explicitly contemplate such issues. The handling of the situation in Mexico, including the position of the international community, may prove to be an interesting "litmus test" of the commitment to democratization within the neo-liberal paradigm. How the seemingly "coherent" concepts of this new paradigm will be actualized in real policy terms is a key question for the future, as major contradictions will likely arise (and in fact, are already becoming apparent) in the simultaneous drive for more open, liberal political systems and an open, liberalized economy. In the specific case of Central America, the relatively modest amounts of trade since the beginning of the 1980s and the 1990s suggest that the region will not soon become an important commercial partner for Canada. In this context, the potential antagonism between Canadian economic imperatives and the pursuit of a coherent approach to the human rights and democratic development challenge is clearly not of the same order as it is in other regions. It would appear that for this reason Canada can "afford" to put human rights and democracy at the top of its concerns in Central America, at least for the moment. Within the Central America section of the Bilateral Branch of CIDA, interesting and significant developments have occurred with respect to "democratization," particularly in the way in which the section relates to the non-governmental sector. It has been showing a greater transparency than in the past with respect to its programming and decision-making and has incorporated a much solicited consultation process with NGOs into its operations. For example, 146

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

a consultation on general programming in Central America was held in the summer of 1993 with a wide array of Canadian NGOs working in the region; later on, consultations were also held with NGOs, via the CCIC, on the proposed Guatemala Democratic Development Fund. The section seems to be taking seriously its own role in shaping the human rights and democratic development agenda, as can be seen from its establishment of a "human rights and democratic development cluster group" of Agency civil servants based in Hull and in the region. This cluster group has been set up not only as a management tool for the emerging "cluster" of CIDA projects being funded in this domain, but also as a mechanism enabling CIDA's own staff to develop a base of knowledge of the issues sufficient to improve future programming. A similar "glasnost" attitude is manifest in the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, where both human rights and regional officials have demonstrated a growing interest and, in many cases, proactivity, in creating more regular mechanisms of dialogue with NGOs. It is clear that some "cultural" problems are creating friction in this process, the goals and forms of consultation being much more open-ended and participatory in the NGO community, and more controlled and closely oriented in the government sector. "Hybrid" organizations such as ICHRDD and the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL) have been playing a useful role in bridging the gap, but might be expected to do so more systematically in the future. These developments bode well for less antagonistic and more constructive relationships between Canadian government and NGOs in the context of activity in support of democratization in Central America. However, as mentioned above, potential clashes of a considerable order may yet be on the cards in the specific area of social and economic rights and structural adjustment policies. How strongly Canada pushes regional economic integration efforts, what shape such action will take, and how it may be linked to form an "Enterprise for the Americas "-type of strategy will also be determinant. SOME CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

Since the late 1980s and early 1990s Canada has officially expressed its commitment to furthering human rights and democratic 147

BEYOND MEXICO

governance in its foreign policy. Canadian foreign policy institutions such as CIDA and Foreign Affairs have also become more responsive to the desires of the Canadian public and particular interest groups for greater transparency and consultation on international issues. The atmosphere is more favourable to a conciliatory relationship between government and NGOs on Central American policy, and more real collaboration between the government and a broad array of NGOs interested in supporting democratization in the region. Canada's future role in the region regarding democratization will depend therefore on a number of factors, principally the following: • How compatible the pursuit of Canada's trade, investment and other priorities in the region will be with human rights and democratization support efforts; • What kind of working and consultative relationships will develop between the government, NGOs and other Canadian "stakeholders" in the region; • How clear a set of guidelines will be established for the operationalization of democratic development support for this and other regions by both NGOs and government. Central to the realization of programs and actions favouring democratic development is the further definition and refinement of the concepts and subsequent strategies in this area. In recent history, one of the major challenges to further democratization is embodied in the continuing polarization, violence and acute social and political conflicts existing in a number of Central American societies (El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, principally; Honduras to some extent). In these societies, repression, traditional inequalities and in some cases, civil war, have bred a climate of mutual distrust, deep resentment and scant to non-existent tolerance for differences in opinion or opposing political, ideological, social or economic visions. The development of a democratic culture and practice within society and the state will therefore be an essential foundation for further democratization advances. Major social transformations through revolution or other means have not occurred in the region and the Sandinista experiment was effectively short-circuited; there does not appear in the short term 148

CENTRAL AMERICAS DEMOCRATIZATION

to be a serious possibility of creating a dynamic reformist political centre. The danger may be that we will witness a period of absence of all-out civil war but no continuous strides towards effective democratization. The second major challenge in the region is that of continuing socio-economic inequalities and their structural underpinnings, critically affecting large sectors of the population. For the region to ignore this tragic imbalance, or for international actors not to respond with appropriate support, would seriously impede future democratization in the region. In Canada both the government and non-government sectors are in a position to play a pivotal role, with other actors, in addressing the political, economic, social and cultural challenges posed by democratization in Central America. Both sectors now possess a considerable body of experience. The key will be to resolve as much as possible the policy contradictions of the past, to preserve the preeminence of human rights considerations in policy, and to establish more open collaboration among sectors in Canada on these issues, all in a spirit of constructiveness and tolerance which, it is hoped, will eventually also characterize the Central American region. NOTES 1. This article adopts the basic premise that "Democracy is best understood in terms of achieving the complete range of human rights." Cited from Clarence J. Bias and David Gillies, "Human Rights, Democracy and Development." (ICHRDD, Montreal, 1993), 8. 2. That is, with the military playing an important role and often intervening overtly. 3. "Tools for Peace" mobilized unheard-of amounts of public donations in its innovative fund- and materials-raising campaign for Nicaragua: the equivalent of $2 million per year in the early 1980s. 4. The decision to cut off CIDA funding to SUCO in 1983 was largely a result of that NGO's active and vociferous involvement in Nicaragua, southern Africa—and Quebec. 5. Frances Arbour,"'America's Backyard': Central America," in Robert O. Matthews and Cranford Pratt, Human Rights in Canadian Foreign Policy (Montreal and Kingston: McGill-Queen's University Press,

149

BEYOND MEXICO

6.

7. 8. 9. 10.

11. 12. 13. 14.

15.

16. 17.

18. 19.

1988): 221, 232. House of Commons Standing Committee on External Affairs and National Defence, "Canada's Relations with the Caribbean and Central America: Report to the House of Commons" (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1982). From $5.9 million in 1980, U.S. military aid to El Salvador rose to $533 million by 1985. See John A. Booth and Thomas W. Walker, Understanding Central America (Boulder CO/Oxford: Westview Press, 1993), 101. See for example, the 1987 CIDA aid strategy document Sharing our Future. CAPA, "Canada's Aid Policy in Central America," CAPA Occasional Paper, Toronto, September 1992, 13-18. See House of Commons, "Supporting the Five: Canada and the Central American Peace Process" (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1988). See United Nations, Acuerdos de El Salvador: en el camino de la paz. (New York: U.N. Department of Public Information, June 1993) 85, 86. Interpress Service, November 30, 1993. The first round of elections was held in March, with run-off elections to take place in April. Press release of the "Committee for Peace and Democracy in El Salvador" observer team, Ottawa, March 1994. Central America Monitoring Group, "CAMG Response Document to CIDA Concerning the Democratic Development Fund for Guatemala," October 1993, unpublished. See CAPA, "Canadian Development Assistance in El Salvador: A Contribution to Peace-Building?," CAPA Occasional Paper, Toronto, January 1994. The new Liberal government might be rethinking this ambitious, long-term initiative, devised under the last Conservative government. Einar Berntzen, "Democratic Consolidation in Central America: A Qualitative Comparative Approach," Third World Quarterly, 14 (3) (1993): 601. House of Commons, "Supporting the Five," p. 31. See Thomas L. Friedman, "Trade vs. Human Rights," New York Times, Feb. 6, 1994, pp. 1 and 10; LaPresse, March 17, 1994.

150

VIII CANADA-OAS RELATIONS: MORE OF THE SAME? Peter McKenna Le Canada a VOEA: Plus fa change... Resume: Depuis son entree a 1'Organisation des Etats americains (OEA) en Janvier 1990, le Canada conserve un ordre dujour remarquablement stable. Au coeur de ses preoccupations on trouve le developpement democratique, les droits de la personne, la reforme de TOEA, ainsi que la securite hemispherique. La meme stabilite caracterise le second degre de 1'echelle des priori tes canadiennes: cooperation economique, droits des femmes, trafic de stupefiants et problemes environnementaux. L'origine de cette continuite doit etre cherchee au niveau des caracteristiques fondamentales de la politique etrangere canadienne. D'une part, celles-ci refletent une conscience tres claire du statut de puissance moyenne du Canada et des preoccupations et possibilites qui en decoulent, en terme d'option multilaterale en particulier. D'autre part, la politique canadienne a TOEA manifeste son souci traditionnel pour ce que Cranford Pratt a appelee «l'internationalisme a visage humain». II en va ainsi, par exemple, de la preoccupation canadienne pour les questions de paix

et de developpement democratique dans les Ameriques: 1'interet du Canada pour ces problemes et son activisme en ce qui les concerne decoulent d'une longue tradition et s'appuient sur une credibilite internationale acquise de longue date. Dans la mesure ou 1'accession meme du Canada a I'Organisation s'inscrivait dans cette perspective fondamentale et que 1'alternance des Conservateurs et des Liberaux a Ottawa ne semble pas 1'affecter, on voit mal pourquoi elle cesserait de determiner 1'attitude du pays sur la scene interamericaine. Un rearrangement important des priorites canadiennes a TOEA est en somme tres peu probable. L'election d'un nouveau secretaire-general pour 1'organisation, Cesar Gaviria, n'est pas susceptible non plus d'affecter les objectifs du Canada. Bien au contraire, 1'interet qu'il a manifeste pour la reforme de I'Organisation et le style volontaire dont il a fait preuve en tant que president de la Colombie pourraient fort bien en faire un allie privilegie de la diplomatic canadienne en Amerique latine dans la poursuite de ses objectifs traditionnels.

BEYOND MEXICO

NOTWITHSTANDING A NEW LIBERAL GOVERNMENT in Ottawa and

a

new

Canadian Ambassador to the hemispheric body, Canada's role within the Organization of American States (OAS) has not been fundamentally altered. In many ways, Canada's "OAS record" for 1993 was very reminiscent of the government's performance during its first three years of membership.1 This country has maintained a continuing interest in a core grouping of issues, including democratic development, OAS reform, human rights, and hemispheric security. Canadian officials have also, with perhaps less urgency and priority, focused their energies on a second set of issues, namely, economic co-operation, women's rights, drug trafficking, and the environment. Given this seemingly overflowing agenda, and the attendant demands placed upon Canada's OAS mission in Washington and officials engaged in OAS affairs in Ottawa, one might be tempted to argue that Canada's Ambassador to the OAS now spends a good deal of his time occupying a chair that for almost 70 years was noteworthy for being "empty." In light of Canada's expanding role within the OAS, and the growing significance of this political relationship, scholarly attention should be focused on the emerging Canada-OAS dynamic. As an important development in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy over the last few years, it can be approached from both a descriptive and an analytical standpoint. For the sake of clarity, the following discussion will be framed around a number of key questions: Why is Canada a full-fledged member of the OAS? What has Canada been doing in the OAS? And how does one explain or account for Canada's behaviour within the OAS? It is hoped that cogent and comprehensive answers to these questions will provide a better understanding of Canada-OAS relations. The conclusion presents a number of observations on the likely direction of Canada-OAS relations under the Chretien government. MEMBERSHIP IN THE OAS

Canada became an official member of the OAS in January 1990, when it deposited the requisite instruments of ratification in Washington.2 A good deal of speculation has actually revolved around Canada's decision to seek full membership in the body, especially in view of the fact that successive Canadian governments were determined, for a 152

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

variety of reasons, to remain aloof from the hemispheric forum. James Rochlin, for instance, points to the fact that, inter alia, senior mandarins within the Department of External Affairs (DEA)—including Richard Gorham and Louise Frechette—recommended to then Secretary of State for External Affairs Joe Clark that Canada should join the body.3 Others, such as Edgar Bosnian, argue that the membership decision should be understood in the context of global restructuring, regional developments (i.e., democratization), and OAS institutional revitalization.4 According to Brian Stevenson, "it appeared as though the decision to join came from the clear blue sky and was perhaps simply an arbitrary decision made by the Prime Minister himself."5 It was even hinted at the time that former Prime Minister Brian Mulroney, while driving in the back seat of a limousine with Canada's then Ambassador to the United States, Derek Burney, in Washington, was so impressed with the ornate architecture of the OAS building that he indicated to Ambassador Burney that Canada should perhaps give serious consideration to joining this organization.6 Upon closer scrutiny, one can begin to unravel the "OAS puzzle" with some semblance of cogency and precision. Clearly, Canada's membership in the OAS came about for various reasons, including the fact that it served to advance and promote Canadian interests, that it enabled Canada to make a constructive contribution to inter-American affairs, and that it provided Canadian officials with an opportunity to reform and strengthen the Organization from within.7 These factors also provide valuable insights into the reasons for Canada actually being inside the OAS today, instead of being on the outside looking in. Former Prime Minister Mulroney recognized the value to Canada, particularly in an age of growing interdependence, of joining the hemispheric forum. In his speech before the San Jose hemispheric summit in October 1989, where he announced Canada's intention to join the OAS, Mulroney stated: We realize that Canadians' rights will not be secure while the rights of others are denied; that Canadian prosperity will not be assured while the prosperity of others is diminished. That Canada's environment will not be safeguarded until the environment of everyone is protected; and that Canadian society will not free itself from the evil of drugs while others remain in its grip.

153

BEYOND MEXICO

"On all these issues," he went on to say, "hemispheric co-operation is integral to Canada's interests and the OAS holds the key to that co-operation. Canada's presence here today signals a new departure in our relations with Latin America. We recognize that our interests are directly engaged here. We will no longer stand apart."8 In other words, there was a realization on the part of the Prime Minister that Canada, particularly because of the transnational nature of many of these pressing hemispheric issues, could not simply avoid the direct or the indirect consequences flowing from them. Membership in the OAS, however, would enable Canada to confront these thorny problems in a concerted or multilateralist fashion and also to protect its own distinct political, economic, security, social, and humanitarian interests. The Secretary of State for External Affairs, Joe Clark was, like the Prime Minister, cognizant of growing Canadian interests in the region. He was also in agreement with those in the Department of External Affairs who put forward the argument that forces of regionalism would heighten the importance of those same interests in the coming years.9 Joining the OAS, then, would allow Canada to solidify and to consolidate its relations with the regional zone of the Americas, and to advance its interests within that region. In addition, Clark appeared to be of the mind that OAS membership was a symbolic as well as a substantive means of demonstrating Canada's commitment to expanding linkages with the Americas, including those of an economic nature. In his testimony before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade (SCEAIT), Clark impressed upon the committee members an important point: "The long-term potential for trade with Latin America is tremendous." Obviously, he felt that membership would place Canada in a better position to take advantage of future trade, commercial and investment opportunities in the region. This feeling was reinforced later when he went on to indicate: "We think the fact of joining the OAS creates a sense of being part of the family in Latin America. We think it can lead to more constructive, durable trade links." Clark also believed, like Mulroney, that the time had come for Canada to recognize the fact that it was a country of the Americas and therefore should assume its rightful hemispheric obligations and responsibilities. Put another way, it was time for Canada, in 154

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

partnership with the other states of the Americas, to confront the myriad problems plaguing the region. Of course, many of these same problems—such as development, democracy, debt, drugs and the environment—had direct consequences for Canada. For Clark, full membership in the hemisphere's principal political institution would give this country not only a seat at the table, but also the ability to engage with both voice and vote those issues which impacted upon Canadian interests. As Clark himself explained: "We have a responsibility to be at the table when issues of importance to us are discussed, and we have an obligation to speak out when our interests are threatened or our values are under attack. "10Simply put, admission to the OAS would permit Canada to protect its interests as well as to have a say in shaping the formulation and execution of any measures designed to deal with the hemisphere's debilitating problems.11 This point is consistent with the argument that Canada, by participating fully in OAS deliberations, could make a constructive contribution to inter-American affairs. Canada's storied history and experience with multilateral forums, its non-imperialist image, its membership in the group of Western industrialized countries (G-7), and its penchant for mediation, bridge-building, and pragmatism, would enable it to play an important role within the region.12 Indeed, Canada would be well-suited to fashion a truly hemispheric consensus or coalition for dealing with the region's difficult problems without alienating either the United States or Latin American countries. In addition, it could act as an important catalyst and intellectual contributor to resolving, or at least attempting to resolve, some of these pressing problems. In short, Canada's membership in the OAS would provide it with an excellent opportunity to bring an innovative, fresh, and balanced approach to inter-American political life.13 An important component of this innovative approach was Canada's determination to reform and revitalize the OAS by "boring away" from within. While acknowledging some of the weaknesses of the body (including the sharp polarization between the U.S. and the Latin American countries), Joe Clark indicated that he thought that Canada could play a significant role in overcoming some of these difficulties. According to Clark, Canada possesses and exercises "precisely the talents which can overcome confrontation." He also referred to the fact that Canada was welcomed by the OAS, "because of our 155

BEYOND MEXICO

tradition as an honest broker, a country of reason, a country whose skills and independence have helped breathe life into multilateral organizations ranging from the United Nations to the GATT, to the Commonwealth and La Francophonie." Through an adroit and judicious use of Canada's formidable diplomatic skills, Clark believed that Canadian officials could work to reform and reinvigorate the body. He was undoubtedly of the mind that these officials would be better situated to influence the process of OAS reform from within rather than from some semidetached position. Although Clark admitted in his Calgary speech that the OAS could not by itself solve all the problems confronting the Americas, he maintained that it was possible to transform the body into an effective institution where meaningful political dialogue could take place.14 And, as he explained in his testimony before the Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade: "We are there because we can probably help the organization work more effectively and contribute to the general achievement of goals in the region."15 Senior officials at External Affairs also viewed Canada's membership decision as a much-needed "shot in the arm" for the oft-criticized hemispheric forum.16 The mere addition of Canada's name to the list of member states would, they believed, almost immediately raise the prestige and profile of the body. With regard to institutional reform, they urged the Minister to seek immediate membership in the OAS if the government was serious about revitalizing the organization.17 Canada could then seek to utilize its fairminded approach and cordial relations with all the members of the body in its quest for meaningful reform. For instance, it could work to reduce the level of polarization between the English- and Spanish-speaking members of the OAS—a key point, given Canada's close relations with the U.S. and the countries of the Commonwealth Caribbean. CANADA-OAS RELATIONS IN 1993

Having completed this admittedly brief discussion of why Canada is a full-fledged member of the OAS, we can now move on to a more detailed account of Canada's "record of performance" within the body in 1993. Perhaps the most visible aspect of Canada's presence 156

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

within the hemispheric forum has been its contribution to resolving the continuing crisis in Haiti.18 Canada, along with other member states, such as the United States and Venezuela, have played (and continue to play as of this writing) an important role in trying to secure an end to the Haitian crisis. From the very beginning, the OAS has remained firmly committed to re-establishing the democratically elected government of Jean-Bertrand Aristide.19 Indeed, just days after President Aristide was ousted by the Haitian military, on September 30,1991, foreign ministers from OAS member states met in Washington to condemn the coup and to call for the restoration of the President. At this meeting, Canada actively encouraged other member states to impose economic and financial sanctions against the military-led junta of Lieutenant-General Raoul Cedras—which they collectively did on October 2. Two days later, Canada's Barbara McDougall was part of a nine-member OAS mission sent to Haiti to meet with Haitian military leaders. But after two days of hastily arranged meetings, the OAS mission emerged from the airport conference room without any assurances from the military that they would permit the reinstatement of President Aristide. In point of fact, disgruntled Haitian soldiers actually disrupted the October 6 meeting, and in a noticeably threatening manner. In a frantic and highly charged situation on the international airport tarmac, members of the mission hurriedly boarded the Canadian Armed Forces Boeing 707 and headed back to Washington.20 Although the OAS has attempted a number of further diplomatic initiatives to resolve the crisis, it has met with only minor success. At times, the military leadership has expressed its willingness to remove itself from power and to allow the return of President Aristide, but it has repeatedly reverted to its initial position, namely, its steadfast refusal to step aside. For instance, the so-called Governor's Island agreement, which was reached in New York City in June of last year, called for Aristide's return to Haiti by the end of October 1993. However, the de facto military regime, while initially agreeing to the terms of the pact, voided the deal and rejected any possibility of returning power to Aristide. While U.S. support for Aristide has wavered recently, Canada still remains committed to restoring his constitutional government.21 In any event, Aristide remains in exile in Washington while an army-backed transitional government in Haiti tries to consolidate itself. 157

BEYOND MEXICO

Like Haiti, the other dominant issues of concern to Canadian officials have remained largely the same since the country joined the hemispheric forum in 1990. Still, 1993 was a hectic year for Canada's mission at the OAS and for officials at the Pearson Building, headquarters of the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, in Ottawa—and it was not without its controversial moments.22 Canada's agenda within the OAS can be divided into two different sets of issues.23 The primary set includes democratic development, OAS reform, human rights, and hemispheric security. A second set focuses on drug trafficking, economic co-operation, women's issues, and the environment. Canadian officials in both Ottawa and Washington have been active in all of these areas but, arguably, more vigourous on the first set of issues—thus reflecting, perhaps, the priorities of the Canadian government.24 This is not to suggest that Canada has made only token efforts on the second set, since it has sought to have its voice heard while offering constructive ideas on these matters. On the issue of democratic development, Canada continues to make contributions to election preparation and election monitoring in Latin America. In the May elections in Paraguay, Canada contributed some C$60,000 and five members to the OAS observer mission.25 In late November, Canada also contributed both personnel and financial resources (C$35,000) to the OAS-observed elections in Honduras.26 Just one week later, Canada participated in the presidential elections in Venezuela, which saw the return to power of former President Rafael Caldera and his party, the Committee for Independent Political Organization (COPEI). In addition to providing C$40,000, Canada sent a number of observers, including John Graham, executive co-ordinator of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD) ,27 Further indication of Canada's strong support for democracy in the Americas was evidenced by Ottawa's response to the May autogolpe (self-coup) in Guatemala.28 Canada supported a toughly worded resolution, passed during an emergency meeting of the OAS Permanent Council, condemning the unconstitutional actions of Guatemalan President Jorge Serrano. Canada also participated in a June 4 Special OAS Foreign Ministers' Meeting in Washington to deal with the crisis in Guatemala. At that meeting, External Affairs Minister Barbara McDougall indicated "that Canada would accept 158

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

nothing less than the full restoration of constitutional government in Guatemala."29 Canada's commitment to safeguarding democracy has seemingly been firm from the time the country took its seat in the OAS council chambers. Indeed, as the initial driving force behind the creation of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy (UPD), Canada has sought to make its presence felt in this area. The Unit finally began to find its feet, so to speak, largely under the able stewardship of John Graham, a respected Canadian foreign service officer. It has adopted a typically Canadian approach, based on pragmatism and practicality, and characterized by fine-tuning of its mandate, securing greater resources, developing contacts with regional parliaments, establishing linkages with the Inter-American Development Bank (IDE) and aid agencies in Canada and the United States, and fostering a positive relationship with a host of democratic institutions in Latin America. Moreover, it has been working in the area of election preparation and confidence-building in hopes of instilling some semblance, however small, of a civic or democratic culture in the region. Given the region's history of authoritarian and military regimes this will, of course, not be a particularly easy task. But perhaps one can take some encouragement from Paraguay's recent election which, though it was marked by some irregularities, resulted in the first democratic election of a president in 182 years.30 Like democratic development in Latin America, the UPD has also experienced some difficult and trying times. Its wide-ranging mandate of promoting representative democracy in the Americas was far too large for the resources made available to it. In fact, it was initially staffed by a small group of officials from the Secretary General's office and therefore limited essentially to electoral observation. In other words, it was not financially or institutionally prepared to deal effectively with matters of democratic development and good governance. As one Canadian official caustically remarked: "The Unit was like a glob of green jelly." It was an organizational entity entrusted with a remarkably large mandate, but with no sense of direction or purpose. Canada, as part of its overall OAS reform efforts, has sought to place the Unit on a firmer footing. Besides working on a more definite mandate and strategy, Canadian officials have made some 159

BEYOND MEXICO

progress toward fashioning a clear set of priorities that make sense, as well as a series of precise tasks that it can perform adequately.31 Accordingly, three basic target areas have been delineated: civic education, electoral observation activities, and training for legislators and legislative staff. In terms of civic education, the Unit is interested in transmitting or disseminating information about democratic processes and values.32 The focus here will be on "curriculum enhancement for schools" (beginning in the Trinidad and Tobago Department of Education) and "facilitating public service communication."33 Secondly, electoral observation activities will be intended to make "the electoral process more effective and transparent and to support the development of up-to-date civil registers." Third, training for legislators and legislative staff will be directed "not only at the level of the national congress, but at state (provincial) and at municipal levels where alienation between society and the political/executive organs of the state is felt most acutely." These training programs will focus on a variety of different, though related, areas, including the relationship between legislatures and the political executive, the drafting of legislation and regulations, and the "nuts and bolts" of the budgetary process. In addition, attention will be given to the following: "understanding and coping with the needs of the media; how to help institutions become more effective and transparent (not corrupt); and how to improve the effectiveness of a parliamentarian through computer technology."34 Canada's interest in OAS reform was also manifested in other institutional areas. For instance, it was active in pushing for the amalgamation or merging of the body's Inter-American Economic and Social Council with the Inter-American Council for Education, Science, and Culture. Seeking to ensure improvements in technical co-operation, Canadian officials believed that it was possible to coordinate information more effectively, to reduce inefficiency, and to avoid duplication within a single Council. At the 1993 OAS General Assembly, the Canadian delegation was successful in getting a resolution approved which called for the creation of the Inter-American Council for Integral Development.35 According to the resolution, this newly-established Council is intended "to promote co-operation among the American States for the purpose of achieving integral development and, in particular, helping to eliminate extreme poverty."36 In the area of human rights, Canada still remains 160

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

interested and committed—at least in the sphere of rhetoric.37 Canadian officials in Washington are cognizant of domestic support in Canada for, and concerns about, the protection of basic human rights in the Americas. Through the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, these same officials are supportive of "good governance"—that is, ensuring that the military remains under civilian control, fostering professional and competent civil services in the region, urging adequate funding for social programs, and advocating respect for, and protection of, fundamental human rights. This commitment was demonstrated most recently at the 1993 OAS General Assembly in Managua, where the Canadian delegation played a role in forging the Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and Development. In addition to a number of statements on strengthening democracy in the region, the Declaration called for a hemisphere-wide commitment to "address the problem of safeguarding human rights with renewed emphasis on the promotion of civil, political, economic, social, and cultural rights. Where violations of human rights are pointed out, educational and promotional activities should also be carried out to prevent situations in which human rights are threatened."38 While Canada apparently remains vigilant about human rights, it has also shown itself to be active in the area of hemispheric security. For example, the Canadian government continued its quest to either reform or dismantle the Inter-American Defence Board (IADB), despite opposition from Mexico and a number of South American countries.39 Moreover, Canadian officials are working on creating the proper conditions for peace and security in the Americas, with particular emphasis on confidence-building measures modelled on those utilized in Central America (i.e., security agreements, greater transparency, and arms reductions). They have also expressed an interest in instituting mechanisms for conflict prevention and management, strengthening the global non-proliferation regime and offering support for the UN Conventional Arms Register. These same officials draw a clear connection between confidence-building in the region and political stability, economic progress, democratic development, and respect for human rights in the Americas.40 During the course of the Managua General Assembly, Canada demonstrated its commitment to this increasingly important area of security. It supported, for example, a resolution advocating the 161

BEYOND MEXICO

need to define the precise legal-institutional relationship between the Inter-American Defence Board and the Organization of American States.41 And in Mrs. McDougall's prepared address to the Assembly, Canada's position on the IADB was made perfectly clear: As a body that receives approximately $2 million each year from the OAS and yet remains largely outside the system, the Board is long overdue for such a review. Canada will be guided in these discussions by the following principles: clear political and civilian control, strict guidelines for accountability, a revised and well-defined mandate flowing from this political process, and the allocation of a modest budget appropriate to these newly defined tasks. If this new role is not deemed acceptable, we would advocate that the Board be abolished. The status quo is not acceptable to Canada.42

Canada also supported another resolution establishing an Experts' Meeting on Confidence- and Security-Building Measures, under the auspices of the Special Committee on Hemispheric Security. This Meeting of Experts, which met for the first time in November 1993, is mandated to examine whether, and ensure that, "security mechanisms and measures to promote confidence work toward preventing potential sources of conflict and thus assist efforts to safeguard peace and security."43 Clearly, Canada has placed a fair amount of emphasis on enhancing hemispheric security through building confidence and urging regional co-operation. Hemispheric and regional co-operation has also played a crucial role in Canada's second set of issue areas. With respect to drugtrafficking, for instance, Canada continued to host the RCMP seminar on drug enforcement and to participate actively in the InterAmerican Drug Abuse Control Commission (CICAD). In fact, Canada was, together with Mexico, part of a drafting group that devised and sent out a questionnaire on the nature of the drug problem to all member states. It was intended to collect information on the drug trade in Latin America and to recommend possible solutions for dealing with the problem. Canadian officials have also been involved in trying to streamline CICAD in order to make it more efficient. They were especially concerned about the fact that countless proposals, some of a questionable nature, were being submitted for possible funding. As a result, Canada, along with Jamaica, put forth 162

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

a resolution seeking to establish project guidelines for CICAD so as to reduce the endless flow of project proposals. Under the heading of economic co-operation, Canada has shown a burgeoning interest in trade-related matters. Consequently, it has moved to revitalize the Special Committee for Consultation and Negotiation (CECON), long considered ineffectual and little more than a forum for criticizing the United States. While not exactly pushing the issue, Canada is an enthusiastic supporter of greater dialogue on economic liberalization issues and reduction of trade barriers. Accordingly, it has become active in the Special Committee on Trade, which seeks to exchange information and to promote a better understanding of trade-related matters.44 Canada has been less active on women's issues and on the environment, which perhaps reflects their low priority. Still, Canadian officials continue to work co-operatively with other member countries within the Inter-American Commission of Women (CIM). They have also been involved in framing a draft convention on violence against women. It is hoped that this convention will be ready for signature by the 1995 OAS General Assembly and thus create a useful precedent for the 1995 Conference on Women's Issues in Beijing. On the environmental front, Canada has maintained a fairly low profile within the OAS. This is due, in part, to the fact that Canadian officials are not particularly impressed with the body's less than dynamic Committee on the Environment. Canadian officials believe that the Committee is not reaching its full potential and is desperately in need of a new breath of life. As part of a plan to resurrect the Committee, these officials are considering dusting off the 1940 Environmental and Wildlife Convention to evaluate its applicability to the OAS. EXPLAINING CANADA'S BEHAVIOUR WITHIN THE OAS

When reviewing Canada's recent performance within the OAS one is struck by the continuity in those issue areas which have attracted significant Canadian attention. Indeed, a very clear core of issues— including OAS reform, democracy, good governance, hemispheric security and human rights—has absorbed most of the energy of Canadian officials in both Washington and Ottawa. This continuity 163

BEYOND MEXICO

raises an important analytical question: Why has Canada opted for these issues in preference to others? Stated differently, what are the factors which drive, or underpin, Canada's issue agenda at the OAS? In trying to account for this agenda, one runs the risk of overlooking certain pertinent reasons. The present examination, while comprehensive in nature, is not intended to provide an exhaustive list of explanatory factors or variables. Instead, it will highlight a number of key sources or determinants of Canada's behaviour within the hemispheric body, with evaluations of a variety of historical, external and domestic factors. From a historical standpoint, the core set of issues is consistent with Canada's long-standing status in the international system. It is a contemporary reflection of Canada's past concerns and capabilities as a middle power. It is a fact that much of Canada's positive international image has been due to its focus on, and commitment to, improving the quality of life for the world's peoples, or as its critics might refer to it, global "do-goodism."45 Issues involving good governance, human rights and the environment clearly fall within the purview of this so-called "do-goodism" or what Cranford Pratt, for one, has positively labelled "humane internationalism."46 In short, then, these issues are clearly in the spirit of Canada's storied middle-power tradition.47 At the heart of this tradition has been a concentration or preoccupation with international peace and security, along with the central goal of building order. This concern with establishing and maintaining a stable world order has been applied to various regions in the world capable of engendering regional conflict or "brushfire wars,"48 because Canadian officials believed that such regional "brushfires" held out the possibility of imperilling the world community in a wider global conflict. Canada's past concerns about regional instability—and its potentially wider implications—help to place in context Ottawa's current focus on issues such as good governance, democratic development, and hemispheric security. Indeed, foreign policy officials, as evidenced by Canada's work on confidence-building measures within the OAS, are committed to fostering a stable and predictable order in Latin America. Underscoring this quest for order building, both regionally and globally, has been a keen awareness on the part of officialdom in Ottawa of Canada's middle-power status and capabilities.49 164

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

As representatives of a country of medium resources and capabilities, though possessing a formidable and highly skilled diplomatic corps, Canadian officials fully realize that Canada is not in a position to reshape or mould the existing world order, or even the regional order, to its liking. It simply does not possess the raw power or capabilities to impose a firm and predictable order in the Americas.50 Thus, it must work in concert with a number of other like-minded countries in the OAS—including Mexico, Brazil, Chile and Venezuela—on such issues as good governance, human rights, OAS reform, and hemispheric security, which are the building blocks or foundation stones for just such a regional order.51 While this middle power penchant for order building, combined with medium capabilities, offers some important insights into Canada's OAS issue agenda, it does not provide a total explanation. For the purposes of a fuller examination, it is useful to outline and to analyze the external as well as the domestic sources of Canada's OAS policy. From an external perspective, one needs to take into account the changing global architecture—due to such powerful forces and developments as globalization, growing interdependence, and the end of the Cold War. These changing circumstances have opened up new opportunities for countries such as Canada to take on greater responsibilities in world politics. Given a new window of opportunity provided by the OAS, and the advent of greater freedom of diplomatic manoeuvre, Canadian officials have responded by advancing a full and ambitious agenda of issues. Canada's core set of issues, then, is partly a function of confrontation with, and the desire to take advantage of, the new political and diplomatic space created by these changing international realities.52 Advancing these types of issues within the OAS is also consistent with the policy preferences of the new Clinton Administration in the United States.53 This is not to suggest that officials in Washington have determined, or have sought to determine, Canada's agenda within the OAS. It is rather the case that Canada's issue agenda (including OAS reform) coincides with, and thus does not conflict with or run counter to, the general foreign policy thrust of the Clinton White House. Although there exists no hard evidence, it does seem unlikely that officialdom in Ottawa would deliberately fashion a core set of issues which would be likely to elicit a negative reaction from U.S. officials. There is, then, no clear or causal 165

BEYOND MEXICO

relationship between Canada's OAS agenda and the policy priorities of the White House. Stated differently, the role of the U.S. helps to shed some light on the probable reasons why a different series of issues was not selected by Canada; but it does not offer any insights into, or explanation for, the nature and longevity of the current set. More to the point, Canada's issue agenda within the OAS is consistent not only with the Clinton Administration's policy thrust, but also with the issues emerging on the new global agenda. Indeed, the issues of "high politics," which dominated world politics in the 1950s and 1960s, have declined in importance, as compared with questions about "low politics"—international trade, economic security, environmental degradation and human rights.54 Put another way, the global appeal and saliency of such issues as democratic development, sustainable development and protection of human rights have served to shape Canada's issue focus within the OAS. With a seemingly worldwide consensus emerging around these fundamental issues, it was logical for Canada to seek their application on a regional basis. Issues and problems within the region itself have undoubtedly influenced Canada's selection of its core issues. Canadian officials were cognizant of the fact that continued abuses of human rights and basic freedoms, environmental destruction and tenuous civil-military relations held out the possibility of political instability in the region. And with the fragile flower of democracy still not firmly rooted in Latin America, at a time when painful neo-liberal economic reforms were in progress, they saw the necessity of confronting these potentially explosive issues before they reached unmanageable proportions. Canada's OAS agenda, then, was partly a response to pressing developments within the region, as well as a determination to address them in a meaningful and multilateralist fashion. In addition to external determinants of Canada's issue agenda, there are a number of domestic sources. For example, the core set of issues had the support and endorsement of the former Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall.55 She was very enthusiastic about Canada playing a leading role in promoting regional order and stability, hemispheric co-operation and consensus building, and in mitigating conflict—all, incidently, classic middle-power missions. 166

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

In her prepared address before the June 1993 OAS General Assembly in Managua, which was actually delivered by Stan Gooch, then Assistant Deputy Minister for Latin America and the Caribbean, Canada's position was stated quite clearly. The Canadian government would continue to express a firm and unwavering interest in issues related to democratic development, human rights, hemispheric security, and OAS reform. As the written text succinctly noted: What were our priorities in joining? Why did we think the OAS and the region were important to Canada? What do we see as the primary areas of accomplishment over the last three and half years? All these questions can be answered in terms of three broad themes: democratic development and human rights, economic development, and co-operative security.

With regard to OAS reform, the address referred to the fact that the Organization "was becoming more open to reform, determined to become a more relevant organization, more responsive to the needs of its democratic members. We have tried to contribute to this process during our brief tenure in this organization, and we have already seen some very tangible and encouraging results."56 In addition to ministerial support, this list of issue areas had the backing of an internationalist-oriented foreign policy bureaucracy. Officials within the Latin America and Caribbean Branch in particular view these issues as important and fundamental to getting the region situated on a more stable, orderly, and peaceful footing. This stability in the region, according to officials, is the key that can unlock the door to a "new hemisphere;"57 to be sure, a hemisphere in which resources can be directed towards strengthening economies rather than for security purposes and where a culture of democracy can take root without the fear of one country going to war against another. The issues articulated by Canadian officials in the OAS are intended, then, to create and maintain stability in the region so as to preclude a return to the Cold War days when civilian governments were losing out to military regimes.58 Canadian officials in Washington also recognized the fact that the OAS itself appears to view these issue areas as important. Not only did these same officials detect a perceived need to deal with them seriously, but they were also in tune with a general consensus within the Organization on the significance of these issues. A large 167

BEYOND MEXICO

majority of the member countries were in agreement on the fundamental importance of consolidating a stable and predictable regional order in the Americas. Being cognizant of this emerging agreement, Canadian officials have sought to take advantage of this new window of opportunity within the OAS. This, in turn, helps to explain Canada's willingness to champion this core set of issues. As one senior Canadian official remarked pointedly: "The simple answer is that it needs to be done."59 Both ministerial and bureaucratic factors, when viewed together, suggest that official government interest in these issues is part of an overarching foreign policy.60 Stated differently, these issue areas are consistent with a foreign policy which is underscored by these same priorities and objectives. While one should be careful about describing Canadian foreign policy as becoming increasingly infused with morality, there does appear to be greater attention given to human rights and democratic development. More emphasis, for instance, is being accorded to human rights abuses in foreign countries, on the reporting of these abuses and the actors involved, and on Canadian missions abroad gathering information and preparing written reports on the state of human rights.61 This increased government attention to human rights, and Canada's OAS policy in general, may also be the result of pressures from "civil society." More specifically, prevailing public attitudes in Canada have crystalized around the importance of promoting human rights, democratic development, and good governance in the conduct of Canadian foreign policy.62 There is little disagreement, if any, among the Canadian public on the saliency of these issues. There have also been pressures on Ottawa from the non-governmental community, church groups, the attentive public, and the media in favour of greater attention to human rights concerns.63 In short, Canada's issue agenda at the OAS reflects the government's intention to deal with issues and concerns that civil society views as important. One should not, however, lose sight of the fact that Canadian foreign policy is based on some calculation of Canada's national interest. Both ministers at the political level and officials at the bureaucratic level are interested in promoting and advancing Canadian interests, be they economic, security-related, political, or symbolic.64 The point here is that there exists a proximate affinity between Canada's OAS policy and Canadian interests, however nar168

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

rowly defined. Clearly, Canada has a genuine stake in encouraging stability and conflict avoidance in the region, along with an open economic and trade environment in the Americas. Success will have positive and long-term implications for Canada's economic prosperity, job creation, and standard of living. Simply put, Canada's championing of these core issues is linked to the pursuit of Canadian interests, as determined by official Ottawa. CONCLUSION On the basis of the preceding discussion, a number of observations, admittedly of a general character, can be made. First, it seems clear that the issue agenda guiding Canadian action within the OAS for 1993 has remained consistent with the agenda of the past three years. Issues such as OAS reform, hemispheric security, democratic development, and human rights continue to occupy the energies of Canadian officials in both Ottawa and Washington. This agenda, however, could easily become overcrowded as a second tier of issue areas—including drug-trafficking, the environment, women's issues, and economic co-operation—grows in importance. The consistency of this agenda was the result of a variety of historical, external and domestic factors. Canada's traditional middle-power status, and the attendant style of diplomatic behaviour, places Canada's OAS policy in its proper framework or context. Indeed, Canada's long-standing middle-power concerns about order building, conflict reduction, mediation, and multilateralism go a long way towards explaining Canada's behaviour within the hemispheric body. From an external standpoint, developments in the international system and within the OAS itself, coupled with a change of leadership in the United States and an emerging consensus in Latin America, have all helped to shape Canada's issue agenda. One could also obtain insights into Canada's OAS agenda from an examination of the domestic environment. By way of illustration, ministerial endorsement should not be downplayed as a factor in forging Canada's issue-agenda. In addition, bureaucratic support for this agenda sheds some light on its longevity or staying power. It is probably fair to say that overarching Canadian foreign policy objectives and a desire to promote Canadian interests in general 169

BEYOND MEXICO

were factored into the calculations as well. Lastly, pressures from civil society—and its morally charged concerns—undoubtedly played a role in fashioning Canada's issue focus. An argument could be made that some of these same factors will no doubt impact upon the new Liberal government's approach toward the OAS. For this reason, one should not expect any fundamental shift in Canada's OAS policy, and the issues underpinning that policy. While it is possible that the proposed review of Canadian foreign policy espoused by the Chretien government will recommend changes in this area, it is difficult to conceive of any major reorientation. There might, however, be changes around the margins—such as an intensified effort to ratify the American Convention on Human Rights and thereby set the stage for Canada to seek a seat on the Inter-American Commission of Human Rights. Still, the overall issue focus is unlikely to be altered in any substantial manner. The Liberal party's ubiquitous "Red Book," and the government's apparent willingness to remain committed to it, does seem to reinforce this impression. Prior to coming to power, there were no indications by the Chretien team that the importance of this agenda had dissipated. In fact, the section covering foreign policy indicates that a Liberal government would support "such goals as sustainable development, global economic prosperity, a capable defence, and the eradication of poverty and social inequality."65 And it goes on to note the following: "We will continue to support democracy and respect for human rights worldwide and will provide for a more open foreign policy-making process at home."66 It is interesting to note that the Liberal government chose to designate a "junior minister" responsible for Latin America and Africa. While it is perhaps too early to say with any confidence what the significance of this move will be, it does seem to indicate a continuation, at least, of official government interest in, and attention toward, the region as a whole. With regard to the OAS in particular, it could mean that Secretary of State Christine Stewart will bring forward issues involving the hemispheric body, or the Department's concerns and recommendations regarding the Organization, more promptly for the consideration of the Minister of Foreign Affairs. Still, one can safely assume that Canada's approach toward the OAS will be "more of the same" rather than a radical break with the past. 170

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

POSTSCRIPT

Recently, Canada's membership in the OAS generated some unintended media attention with the election of a new Secretary General for the body, Colombian President Cesar Gaviria on March 27, 1994. Gaviria, with the firm support of the United States, Canada, and a host of Caribbean countries, defeated Costa Rican foreign minister Bernd Niehaus. Some commentators have suggested that both the United States and Canada actively lobbied for Gaviria's candidacy, much to the chagrin of the Costa Rican.67 There has even been some speculation, but little in the way of hard evidence, to the effect that Washington and Ottawa used pressure tactics to secure the votes of a number of smaller member states.68 What is certain, though, is that U.S. and Canadian officials viewed Gaviria as a stronger and more suitable Secretary General than Mr. Niehaus.69 The Canadians saw Gaviria in a more positive and flattering light, as a candidate with experience and stature, and thus someone who could bring a certain degree of prestige to the body. He was also considered to have other skills which made him a more acceptable choice, including management capabilities, a purported determination to tackle difficult problems, and solid links to the influential Rio Group. And given his future ambitions to seek the presidency of Colombia again in the future, he would likely be emboldened to make his presence felt in a meaningful and constructive fashion. He was therefore thought to be in a better position to strengthen the Organization to confront the challenges of the 21st century. While the "politics" surrounding the election of Gaviria created a stir among journalists and political pundits, it unnecessarily diverted attention away from more substantive matters. More important is the question of where the new Secretary General plans to take the Organization in the coming years. At first glance, his vision is not likely to stray from the oft-heard objective of trying to reform the organization and make it a more active player in hemispheric affairs. Nor is his focus likely to shift markedly away from such issues as democratic development, OAS reform, and human rights. From Canada's standpoint, Gaviria at least holds out the prospect of invigorating the hemispheric forum. If his past record as Colombia's president is any indication, he could bring to the body 171

BEYOND MEXICO

an active, as opposed to a reactive, leadership style. While "preventive diplomacy" is obviously more attractive than simply reacting to events as they unfold, it remains to be seen whether Gaviria can actually put it into practice. Still, he is more likely to avail himself of Article 115 of the OAS Charter, which authorizes the Secretary General to "bring to the attention of the General Assembly or the Permanent Council any matter which in his opinion might threaten the peace and security of the Hemisphere or the development of the Member States." His first real test, though, will undoubtedly come at the "Summit of the Americas" gathering in Miami, early in December 1994, where it will be his task to follow up on any agreement or consensus emanating from that meeting of hemispheric leaders. NOTES 1. See Peter McKenna, "How is Canada Doing in the OAS?," Canadian Foreign Policy 1 (2) (Spring 1993) :81-98. 2. Prior to becoming a full-fledged member of the OAS, Canada was a permanent observer to the Organization. For the most part, observer status, which Canada obtained in 1972, enabled our representative to monitor OAS deliberations, to establish contacts with other observers and permanent representatives, and to assess the workings of the hemispheric body. Canada's observer could not, however, participate with vote or voice on matters before the Permanent Council. 3. Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 192. See also, Peter McKenna, "Canada Joins the OAS: Anatomy of a Decision," in Jacques Zylberberg and Francois Demers, eds., America and the Americas, (Sainte-Foy, Quebec: Les Presses de 1'Universite Laval, 1992), 253-69. 4. Edgar J. Dosman, "Canada and Latin America: The New Look," International Journal, 47 (3) (Summer 1992) :543. 5. Brian J.R. Stevenson, "Canada and the OAS: A New Era Emerges?," (CAPA Working Paper, 1991), 3. 6. Confidential interview with a former senior DEA official, August 4, 1990. Still others point to the fact that OAS membership was consistent with Canada's historical predilection for joining international organizations. See also Jeffrey Simpson, "The Folly of Joining the OAS," The Globe and Mail, October 4, 1989, p.A6, and

172

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

7.

8.

9. 10.

11.

12.

13.

14. 15.

David MacKenzie, "The World's Greatest Joiner: Canada and the Organization of American States," British Journal of Canadian Studies 6(1) (1991):203-20. There is no evidence to suggest that Canada was pressured by the United States into joining the hemispheric body. In fact, senior officials in the Department of External Affairs were miffed at the fact that Prime Minister Mulroney, while visiting President Bush at his Maine vacation retreat in August 1989, informed the media of his discussions with Bush on the possibility of Canada seeking full membership in the OAS. To all intents and purposes, the decision to join the body was made before Mulroney visited President Bush in Kennebunkport. (Confidential interview with a former senior DEA official, 12 August, 1991). Office of the Prime Minister, "Notes for an Address by The Right Honourable Brian Mulroney," October 27, 1989, San Jose, Costa Rica, p.5. Hugh Winsor, "Joe where?" The Globe and Mail, November 17, 1990, p.Dl. Testimony of The Right Honourable Joe Clark, Secretary of State for External Affairs, Canada, House of Commons, Standing Committee on External Affairs and International Trade, Minutes of Proceedings and Evidence, 34th Parliament, 2nd Session, No. 25 (Ottawa, Queen's Printer: November 8, 1989) 8, 28, 7, 10. This line of argument is very reminiscent of Canada's functional principle, which provided guidance and structure for Canada's foreign policy in the immediate post-1945 period. For more on this principle, see Denis Stairs, "The Political Culture of Canadian Foreign Policy," Canadian Journal of'Political Science 15 (December 1982):667-90. For a sampling of this argument, see Department of External Affairs and International Trade, "Notes for a Speech by the Secretary of State for External Affairs, The Right Honourable Joe Clark, to the University of Calgary on Canadian Policy towards Latin America," February 1, 1990, Calgary, Alberta, pp.1-9. For some discussion of this innovative approach, see Peter McKenna, "Canada and the OAS: Opportunities and Constraints," The Round Table 327 (1993):323-39. "Notes," 3, 6-7. "Testimony of The Right Honourable Joe Clark," 18.

173

BEYOND MEXICO

16. In the past, the OAS had been frequently criticized for a variety of reasons, including its failure to play a significant role in hemispheric affairs, its reputation for being dominated by the U.S. (its largest contributor), and its penchant for acting as a mere talk shop or debating society. Additionally, it has been singled out for having some organizational difficulties and a bloated bureaucracy. For these reasons, a number of member states refused to send their top diplomats to the organization or to pay their membership dues on time. More recently, however, the forum has seemingly been energized by the end of the Cold War, a firmer U.S. commitment to multilateralism, the "internationalization" of issues (i.e. democracy, the environment, population movements, and drug trafficking), and the entry of Canada. As a result, member states are starting to take the OAS more seriously and hence have begun to pay their dues on schedule. 17. Confidential interview with a former senior DEA official, August 20, 1991. 18. For additional assessment of Canada's high-profile role in the ongoing crisis in Haiti, see McKenna, "How Is Canada Doing In The OAS?," 87-89 and McKenna, "Canada and the Haitian Crisis," The American Review of Canadian Studies (forthcoming). 19. When assessing the effectiveness of the OAS in the Haitian crisis, it is worth noting that no previous military coup in Latin America has been successfully reversed. 20. Colin MacKenzie, "OAS mission to Haiti ends without success," The Globe and Mail, October 7, 1991, p.Al. 21. Since October 1993, naval vessels from Canada, the U.S. and France have been enforcing the sanctions against the military junta. They have focused their energies mainly on preventing desperately needed petroleum supplies from reaching the tiny country. 22. In early January, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights called upon the Canadian government to respond to a claim by a Kenyan dissident who was reportedly denied refugee status in the country and subsequently deported. See Estanislao Oziewics, "OAS Agency Asks Canada to Explain Deportation," The Globe and Mail, January 8, 1993, p.A5. 23. It is worth noting that there was an appointment of a new Ambassador to the OAS, a changeover of staff at the mission in Washington and the addition of another officer, bringing the total 174

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

24.

25. 26. 27.

28.

29.

30. 31. 32.

33.

34. 35.

to four. Moreover, a second foreign service officer has been added to cover OAS affairs at the renamed Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade in Ottawa. For a "mixed," though critical, assessment of Canada's activities within the OAS, see Canada-Caribbean-Central America Policy Alternatives (CAPA), Report on Canada's Third Year in the OAS, (CAPA Occasional Paper, June 1993) 1-33. Isabel Vincent, "Paraguay's Election Isn't All Beer and Skittles— There's Voting, Too," The Globe and Mail, May 17, 1993, p.A16. Confidential interview with Canadian official in Washington, January 8, 1994. In the main, electoral observation consists of a variety of activities, including talking to the respective political parties, speaking with electoral officials, checking voter lists, organizing polling stations, and visiting as many stations as possible on election day. For discussion of the coup, see Tim Golden, "Guatemala's CounterCoup: A Military About-Face," The New York Times, June 3, 1993, p.A3, and Edmond Mulct, "The Palace Coup That Failed," The Globe andMail,]une 29, 1993, p.A!7. External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "Canada Applauds Guatemala's Return to Democracy," This Week in Trade and Foreign Policy, 129 (June 3-9, 1993). Isabel Vincent, "Paraguay Election Receives Plaudits," The Globe and Mail, May 11, 1993, p.A6. Confidential interview with a Canadian official in Washington, November 19, 1993. This discussion relies heavily upon a recent piece by John W. Graham, Executive Co-ordinator of the UPD, entitled: "In Pursuit Of Democracy: The Case Of the UPD," Changing Americas Series: Report (Ottawa: Canadian Foundation for the Americas, December 1993) 1-4. Funds were made available by the Unit for an impartial nongovernmental organization in Paraguay "to prepare and to transmit by radio information about the modalities of a forthcoming national election and about the responsibilities of those concerned, including the electorate." Ibid., 4. Ibid., 3-4. The creation of this new technical assistance council necessitated modifications to the OAS Charter. Canada deposited its instruments of ratification with the General Secretariat of the OAS in

775

BEYOND MEXICO

36.

37.

38.

39.

40. 41.

42. 43.

44.

45.

Washington on October 4, 1993. Secretary of State for External Affairs, "Canada Ratifies Protocols Strengthening the Organization of American States," News Release, No.191, October 5, 1993. Organization of American States, "Amendment of the Charter of the Organization of American States as Regards Technical Cooperation," General Assembly, 19th Special Session, June 7, 1993, Managua, Nicaragua, p.3. This interest, however, has to be weighed against the Canadian government's seeming unwillingness to secure a seat on the InterAmerican Commission on Human Rights. While it is true that Canada has still not signed the American Convention on Human Rights, this should not prevent it from running a candidate when a position becomes vacant. As for the American Convention, some of the provinces continue to have difficulty with its wording, although meetings of the Continuing Committee of Human Rights Officials are still ongoing. Organization of American States, "Declaration of Managua for the Promotion of Democracy and Development," General Assembly, 23rd Regular Session, June 7, 1993, Managua, Nicaragua, pp.4-5. Opposition from Mexico and from South American members stems in large part from the fact that the military authorities in these countries continue to view the IADB in a favourable light. Confidential interview with a Canadian official in Washington, November 19, 1993. Organization of American States, "Inter-American Defense Board," General Assembly, 33rd Regular Session, June 9, 1993, Managua, Nicaragua, p.2. "An Address by The Honourable Barbara McDougall," Managua General Assembly, p.5. Organization of American States, "Meeting of Experts on Security Mechanisms and Measures to Promote Confidence in the Region," General Assembly, 23rd Regular Session, June 8, 1993, Managua, Nicaragua, p.3. See Organization of American States, "Establishment of the Special Committee on Trade (CEC)," General Assembly, 9th Plenary Session, June 11, 1993, Managua, Nicaragua. Maureen Appel Molot, "Where Do We, Should We, or Can We Sit?: A Review of Canadian Foreign Policy Literature," International Journal of Canadian Studies 1 (2) (Spring/Fall 1990) :81.

176

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

46. See Middle Power Internationalism: The North South Dimension, ed. Cranford Pratt (Montreal: McGill-Queen's University Press, 1990). 47. For a sampling of this tradition, see John W. Holmes, Canada: A Middle-Aged Power (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1976) and Carsten Holbraad, Middle Powers in International Politics (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1984). 48. On this point, see Kim Richard Nossal, The Politics Of Canadian Foreign Policy (Scarborough, Ontario: Prentice-Hall Canada, 1989) 51. 49. For discussion of this point, see John W. Holmes, "Most Safely in the Middle," International Journal 39 (Spring 1984):366-88. 50. For an interesting discussion of this argument, see Tom Keating, Canada And World Order (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1993) 9-23. 51. While there is no formal agreement between these countries to work on these issues, this should not discourage Canada from engaging in coalition-building activities within the hemispheric body. 52. For more on this additional space, see Andrew F. Cooper, Richard A. Higgott, and Kim Richard Nossal, Relocating Middle Powers: Australia and Canada in a Changing World Order (Vancouver: UBC Press, 1993) 21. 53. President Clinton's foreign policy has emerged rather slowly since his inauguration, being driven and shaped largely by events in the external environment. Nevertheless, Anthony Lake, Clinton's security advisor, has articulated the organizing principle known as "enlargement" as an alternative to the long-standing policy of "containment." This new, post-Cold War principle is based largely on strengthening and consolidating democratic governments and market economies, while countering those states which are hostile to democracy and free markets. Graham Fraser, "Bill Clinton's Tightrope Act," The Globe and Mail, October 5, 1993, p.All. 54. For more on this point, see Cooper, Higgott, and Nossal, "Relocating Middle Powers, "21. 55. See, for instance, Barbara McDougall, "Introduction," in Making A Difference: Canada's Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, eds. John English and Norman Hillmer (Toronto: Lester Publishing, 1992), ix-xvi and McDougall, "Canada and the New Internationalism," Canadian Foreign Policy 1(1) (Winter 1992/93) :l-6. 56. External Affairs and International Trade Canada, "An Address by The Honourable Barbara McDougall, Secretary of State for External Affairs, to the 23rd OAS General Assembly," Managua, Nicaragua, June 7, 1993, pp.2, 6.

177

BEYOND MEXICO

57. Confidential interview with Canadian officials in both Ottawa and Washington. 58. Confidential interview with a Canadian official in Washington, November 24, 1993. 59. Confidential interview with a Canadian official in the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy, November 19, 1993. 60. See Barbara McDougall, "Canada's Commitment to the Organization of American States," North-South (June-July 1992) :34. 61. Confidential interview with a Canadian official in Washington, November 25, 1993. For an alternative view, see Inter-Church Committee on Human Rights in Latin America, Critiques of the Department of External Affairs' Country Profiles (January 1992) 1-16. 62. This raises the question, of course, of whether Canada's agenda at the OAS is, at least in part, driven by political considerations. 63. Confidential interviews with Canadian officials in both Washington and Ottawa. There is no evidence, however, to support the view that the Canadian business community, led in this case by the Business Council on National Issues (BCNI), has helped fashion Canada's OAS agenda. Written correspondence from a representative of the Business Council, July 30, 1992. 64. Officialdom in Ottawa might wish to be careful, especially if it wants Canada to remain a member in good standing, about promoting Canadian interests rather than the interests of the OAS itself. 65. Liberal Party of Canada, Creating Opportunity: The Liberal Plan for Canada, (Ottawa: The Liberal Party of Canada, 1993) 106. Also see, Giles Gherson, "Lots of Sound Bites but No Substance about Where Canada's Heading Abroad," The Globe and Mail, January 12, 1994, p.A16. 66. Liberal Party of Canada, Creating Opportunity, p.106. Also, Giles Gherson, "Lots of Sound Bites." 67. Dave Todd, "Canada Denies It Lobbied to Keep Costa Rican from Top OAS Post," The Montreal Gazette, April 8, 1994. 68. Larry Birns and Jeremy Latimer, "Canada's Reputation Jeopardized by Support for U.S. Bullying of OAS," The Ottawa Citizen, March 23, 1994. It is worth noting that both Chile and Venezuela, along with the countries of Central America, supported the candidacy of Mr. Niehaus.

178

CANADA-OAS RELATIONS

69. The ungracious manner in which Mr. Niehaus accepted the vote of the membership—with his subsequent tirade against the heavyhandedness of the United States and the colonial mentality of the smaller member states—was proof for some that they had made the appropriate choice.

179

This page intentionally left blank

IX

A PATHWAY TO URBAN DEVELOPMENT? THE TORONTO-SAO PAULO MUNICIPAL PROFESSIONAL EXCHANGE PROGRAM W. E. (Ted) Hewitt Echange professionnel intermunidpal: Une nouvette voie vers le developpement urbain en Amerique latine? Resume : L'Amerique latine est la plus urbanisee de toute les regions en voie de developpement et son taux d'urbanisation, qui atteint deja 70 p. 100, s'accroit encore rapidement. Cette situation est problematique a plus d'un titre: compte tenu de leur taille, les villes d'Amerique latine souffrent d'un manque criant d'infrastructures et de logements convenables, elles etouffent sous la congestion automobile et, plus generalement, sont confrontees a une demande rapidement croissante de services sociaux de base. A tous ces egards, la planification urbaine semble offrir des voies de solution. C'est pour repondre a de tels besoins que, dans le cadre d'une initiative de la Federation canadienne des municipalites (FCM) , les villes de Toronto et de Sao Paulo se sont engagees en 1987 dans un programme d'echange professionnel. Plus de cinquante echanges ont etc realises depuis lors et ce programme est devenu 1'un des fleurons du bureau

international de la FCM. De simple modalite particuliere d'aide au developpement, il est devenu un projet pilote majeur etant donne le nombre important de ses realisations: amelioration du service d'ambulances, construction d'habitations pour les populations defavorisees, programmes de recreation et de sante publique et meme construction d'un pare de calibre international. En retour, et nonobstant des effets positifs sur le moral de ses employes et sur son image de marque, la ville de Toronto a aussi tire du programme des idees interessantes, par exemple dans la gestion des marches publics et la distribution de repas dans les ecoles de Sao Paulo. Le programme n'est toutefois pas depourvu de faiblesses, ses realisations apparaissant moins spectaculaires lorsque 1'ampleur des efforts engages est prise en compte. De plus, il pourrait servir de canal a 1'exportation de modes de planification urbaine qui sont remis en cause dans les villes des pays developpes ellesmemes. Malgre tout, 1'accord entre Toronto et Sao Paulo apparaft comme un modele de cooperation Nord-Sud que 1'on gagnerait a imiter.

BEYOND MEXICO

PROBLEMS ASSOCIATED WITH RAPID URBAN GROWTH represent some of the most pressing challenges in the developing world today. The situation is especially acute in Latin America, now home to several of the world's largest cities. Here, unbridled urban expansion has put tremendous pressure on cash-strapped local governments for provision of an ever-expanding array of new services and infrastructural improvements in a number of critical areas, ranging from water supply, sewage treatment and housing to communications and transportation. To confront these growth-related dilemmas, many Latin American cities have attempted to develop comprehensive urban management strategies, in effect replacing a more laissez-faire, private sector driven approach to development which was characteristic of the past. Urban planning has figured prominently as part of this solution. Despite the existence of a variety of political, funding, and technical obstables to their establishment, municipal planning bodies are today increasingly commonplace throughout the region, as are a number of state- and national-level support organizations offering technical assistance to the urban development process. For some time now, urban development initiatives of many types have also been facilitated from outside the region through well-established international aid programs and agencies. One of the more innovative types of international development assistance has come in the form of formal co-operation agreements linking cities in Latin America and other parts of the developing world to their developed counterparts in countries such as the United States, Canada, and Germany. In contrast to "direct aid" strategies, mostly oriented towards simple monetary transfer through both grants and loans, these types of arrangements are increasingly seen as offering unique benefits to municipal participants. They allow for the direct transfer of development-related information, technical know-how and financial aid to those who most need and are best able to use such resources. Moreover, such programs are seen to be less paternalistic than "cash-based" assistance initiatives, given that their benefits are two-way, with cities at both ends of the development spectrum gaining from the ongoing exchange process. This study examines one such city-to-city arrangement, the Municipal Professional Exchange Program (MPEP) struck between Sao Paulo (Brazil) and Toronto (Canada) in 1987. Operating 182

THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO PROGRAM

under the sponsorship of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), its constituent members, and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), the program is formalized in terms set forth in a multiphase intermunicipal "Agreement of Economic, Technical, and Management Cooperation." This arrangement represents a long-term effort allowing Sao Paulo—a city currently struggling with problems of rapid and, so far, largely unregulated growth—to benefit from Toronto's urban development experience. Using data obtained from municipal, FCM and CIDA documents, as well as from interviews with administrative personnel, the study examines the history of the Toronto-Sao Paulo MPEP, its operational mechanisms, principal benefits and drawbacks. Overall, it finds this particular exchange strategy to be a good start in the direction of enhancing local-level planning and service delivery in the case of one Latin American metropolis. At the same time, the review points to the existence of a range of challenges potentially affecting the project's long-term viability and therefore its utility as a model for emulation throughout the region or in the developing world generally. URBAN DEVELOPMENT IN LATIN AMERICA: PROBLEMS AND PROPOSED SOLUTIONS

Developing countries are urbanizing rapidly. Worldwide, the rate of urban growth in these nations has averaged more than 4 percent per year since the end of the Second World War, an increase fuelled largely by incipient industrialization and associated large-scale rural-urban migration. By the year 2000, the developing world as a whole will likely account for nearly 66 percent of the planet's urban population. Growth in the number and size of cities in the developing world has been equally impressive. The number of cities with over one million population is expected to double during the last two decades of this century, from 118 to 284, while the population of these cities is expected to triple, from 339 million to 931 million. By the year 2000, 21 of the world's 30 largest metropolitan areas will be in developing countries. With such rapid urban growth has come a variety of challenges. As Rondinelli suggests, "one of the most crucial [challenges] facing developing countries over the next decade will be meeting the growing demand for basic social services, infrastructure and public 183

BEYOND MEXICO

facilities."1 There are also problems associated with increased traffic congestion, unemployment, and substandard housing.2 Such growth-related challenges are readily apparent in Latin America, traditionally the most highly urbanized of the world's developing regions. Among the approximately 70 percent of Latin Americans now living in cities, urban unemployment and underemployment levels are striking. Municipal environmental control is lax, contributing to poor quality of life. Many cities also face tremendous service provision difficulties, especially in the areas of water supply, energy, communications, waste removal and housing.3 Rapid growth, poverty, and ineffective policing have also contributed to soaring crime rates in many centres. Increasingly, however, remedial action designed to confront these difficulties is in evidence, and a number of urban management programs have been proposed or implemented in many parts of Latin America since the end of the Second World War. Some plans have called for an all-out attack on the root cause of the problem—growth itself—through the development of strategies designed to attract people away from larger centres. Yet, despite some successes—and the apparent growth in recent years of smaller and medium-sized urban centres—critics have suggested that such plans are largely unworkable and ineffective. In their view, there are decided advantages to larger centres and these will continue to attract migrants to cities in large numbers. Compared with rural regions, cities afford newcomers greater opportunities for education, employment, and social interaction. Insofar as they provide large markets, labour pools, and reduced transportation costs, they also attract industries and services which create employment and fuel still further growth.4 More effective urban planning is another solution to the problems of urban growth, both in the narrower traditional sense, through improved zoning and land-use policy, and in the broader social sense, through the effective redistribution of municipal goods and services among the citizenry at large. Yet, in Latin America at least, this solution has not been easy to apply. In most developed countries, as Violich5 points out, the planning process has emerged slowly, accompanying the relatively slow growth in city size itself. In Latin America, however, recent growth and change have largely outpaced both the political will and the technical ability to plan. This lack of a strong planning tradition in the region is attributed 184

THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO PROGRAM

to a number of factors. To begin with, municipal action on the planning front has been limited by the power of special interest groups, especially within the private sector, which have lobbied for less restrictive controls over uban development. Politicization of government bureaucracies has also been an inhibiting factor, given that administrations usually follow political leaders into "exile" following electoral defeats. Long-term planning has thus been rendered less feasible and, even when implemented, subject to frequent change. At the national level too, there has been a general lack of recognition of the need for urban development planning and thus few technical or financial support mechanisms have emerged to encourage the local planning process.6 Since the 1960s, however, such difficulties have begun to abate, and there has been a trend toward centralized planning of Latin American cities. This is perhaps most dramatically evident in the emergence of planned cities, such as Brasilia in Brazil. On a less spectacular level, it has also meant the establishment of municipal planning commissions and secretariats securely lodged within municipal administrative structures. Such bodies have received considerable support through the formation of a range of national and regional urban development agencies, which have offered both technical and financial planning assistance to municipal governments.7 A good example of this was the creation of the Institute Brasileiro de Administracao Municipal (IBAM), a non-profit organization which, since the 1950s, has supported urban planning initiatives throughout Brazil.8 Furthermore, local urban development strategies have received a measure of support from outside Latin America through direct aid channels such as the World Bank or various national development assistance programs in Europe and North America. Also active on this front have been a limited number of international municipal exchange organizations. The best known of these is perhaps the Inter-American Municipal League, which worked for more than 30 years (1930s to 1960s) to encourage co-operation between municipalities in the United States and Latin America in the planning field.9 In the wake of a general call from development assistance organizations for the establishment of co-operative, local-level development strategies,10 the popularity of this and other types of intermunicipal assistance programs has grown steadily in recent 185

BEYOND MEXICO

years. Such initiatives do have certain problems and limitations. As Turner suggests, the exchange process "which includes definition of projects, the allocation of funds, and the selection of technical advisors is both time consuming and subject to a number of inefficiencies." Among these, he claims, are the obstacles created by national and international bureaucracies, travel, documentation, lack of data, and lack of back-up services. However, such programs are seen as having major benefits for developing world partners through the direct transfer of technical know-how to local administrators and planners. It is axiomatic, Turner states, "that the best kind of technical assistance is that which seeks to transfer skills, thereby reducing or eliminating the need."11 A Canadian response to the call for international urban development assistance emerged after 1986 with the establishment of the International Office of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities. Citing the Canadian government's focus on local empowerment as a development priority, and provided with funding from its member municipalities and from CIDA, the FCM set out to establish a network of international linkages involving Canadian cities and those in the developing world. The program has been seen by developing world cities as a mechanism for offering much needed technical and administrative expertise; for their Canadian partners, it has been seen as a way to broaden the professional horizons of municipal officials and offer new insights into municipal problems and, not unimportantly, to stimulate export of Canadian goods and services. Approximately 50 FCM members (10 percent) currently participate in the programs developed by the FCM's International Office. These are divided into three categories: • International partnerships: long-term relationships built on a network of knowledge-expertise exchanges. These agreements seek concrete solutions to municipal problems and promote the empowerment of local governments in the developing world; • Special initiatives: shorter-term, finite activities based on specific requests by developing world cities for support; • Training and research: projects consisting primarily of courses and seminars on municipal issues (e.g. planning, environment, sustainable development) designed to inform local level professionals and policy makers. 186

THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO PROGRAM

In terms of program funding in each of these areas, the FCM typically covers the up-front transportation costs of the municipal officials and technicians involved at both ends of the exchange. Personnel or material costs are absorbed by the participating municipalities themselves. In 1993-94, approximately 36 percent of the International Office's $4.1 million budget was allocated to international partnerships, 27 percent to training and research and 12 percent to special initiatives.12 Sponsored within the special initiatives category, the TorontoSao Paulo Municipal Professional Exchange Program has been seen as one of the FCM International Office's most visible success stories. Yet the implementation of the program has presented its architects and engineers with a variety of challenges. The benefits and problems of the MPEP are presented in the sections below, following a brief historical review of the project. BACKGROUND TO THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO MPEP

The birth of the Toronto-Sao Paulo Exchange Program can be traced to the 49th Annual Conference of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities in June, 1986. Representatives from seven developing world cities, including Sao Paulo, had been invited to this meeting to discuss the viability of international collaboration on municipal development issues. Each of the cities was paired with a Canadian partner, in Sao Paulo's case, the city of Toronto. This initial contact led to further communications and, a year later, representatives from the two cities met face to face in Sao Paulo to formalize a Phase 1 "Agreement of Economic, Technical and Management Cooperation" and to define potential co-operative projects.13 Since that time, some eight additional phase agreements have been signed, all with the same or similar titles. In many ways, the two cities are ideal partners for this type of exchange. To begin with, they share a number of structural features. While Sao Paulo is much larger than Toronto in both area and population (As table 6 shows), both cities lie at the heart of metropolitan regions representing the largest urban concentrations within their respective countries. Moreover, they are key financial and industrial powers within their national jurisdictions. To borrow a Brazilian phrase, in many ways both Toronto and 187

BEYOND MEXICO

Table 6 Selected Indicators Comparison, Toronto-Sao Paulo Indicator

Sao Paulo Metro SP Toronto Metro TO

Area, km2 Population, 1991 (thousands) Persons per household (SP-1989.TO-1991)

1509.99

8051.00

97.155

630.09

9,480

15,202

635

2,275 2.63

3.5

3.82

2.3

Urban transit ridership (millions) (SP-1990, TO-1992)

2,632

3,218

424

—

Median male income (SP-1989, TO-1991) (% of total)

3,600

—

29,000*

—

Infant mortality, 1990

31.26

33.24

6.3**

* Figures are for Toronto Census Metropolitan Area ** Figures are for Ontario Sources: EMPLASA, Metropole Eletronia: Dados e Informaces sobre a Grande Sao Paulo. Verso 1.0. Sao Paulo: Emplasa, 1993, Tables 1.4, II.2.49, V.9, PV.3, II.4.17, III.2.19; Statistics Canada, Health Reports, Supplement #15 1992 Vol 4 No. 1 Deaths, 1990, p. 20; Statistics Canada, Profile of Census Tracts in Toronto, Part A. Ottawa: Industry, Science and Technology Canada, 1992. 1991 Census of Canada, pp. 432-434; Statistics Canada, Profile of Census Metropolitan Areas and Census Agglomerations, Part B. Ottawa: Industry, Science and Technology Canada 1993. 1991 Census of Canada, p. 126; Toronto Transit Commission, 1992 Operating Statistics.

Sao Paulo are "the engines which pull the other cars" of their respective national economies. In addition, as a developed world city, Toronto has much to offer Sao Paulo. Despite its own growth pains and administrative changes since the Second World War, Toronto and its sister municipalities, which form the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, were seen early on as a model for large-scale urban government.14 Popularly dubbed the "city that works," the Metro Toronto region has became the envy of municipal planners and administrators in North America, largely for its ability to provide a safe, clean, livable environment for its nearly 2.3 million inhabitants. And while the recent recession has severely affected the metropolitan region's continued ability to provide the quality of life which earned it this reputation15

188

THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO PROGRAM

(some now openly ask, "Is Toronto broken?"), the city and region still stand as a rare model for urban planners in less developed areas to emulate. Sao Paulo, for its part, continues to face some daunting challenges. While developed world cities fret over issues such as sustainable development, contracting-out of services or core revitalization, Sao Paulo, like other cities in Latin America, is concerned with much more basic dilemmas, mostly related to the city's phenomenal growth. Between 1961 and 1991, the municipality of Sao Paulo's population tripled in size from 3.7 million to 9.5 million, while the greater Sao Paulo region increased from 4.7 million to 15 million. And while the municipality's growth has stabilized somewhat at about 1 percent per year, newer and generally less affluent areas on the city's southern and eastern peripheries continue to expand at an annual rate of between 2 and 3 percent.16 The social problems exacerbated by such rapid growth are many in number (See table 6). One of the most serious of these is poverty. While Sao Paulo may be the wealthiest city in Brazil (if not all of Latin America), many of its residents survive on very meagre incomes. The median income of male wage earners, for example, is less than $3600, as compared to $29,000 in Toronto.17 Approximately 35 percent of all families subsist on less than $4500, and some 10 percent on less than $1800 per year. Another problem is housing. Not only is household occupant density higher in Sao Paulo than it is in Toronto but substandard housing is a serious problem in many areas. In the city core, some 3 million people reside cheek byjowl in decrepit factories and old mansions that have been converted to cortifos [tiny flats]. Another 800,000 inhabit precarious shacks in sprawling favelas [shantytowns] spread throughout the city. Basic services for the majority of the municipal population are also seriously lacking (See table 6). In many areas of the city, especially on the periphery, streets are unpaved and neighbourhoods frequently lack schools or even parks. Commuting from outer areas to the city centre and industrial nuclei is also a challenge. The public transportation system, while both inexpensive and extensive—well over 3 billion passengers ride the bus or subway in the municipality of Sao Paulo each year, as compared to just over 400 million for the entire Metropolitan Toronto region—offers service which is often sporadic, uncomfortable, time-consuming, and sometimes unsafe. 189

BEYOND MEXICO

The quality of policing represents still another concern. Municipal and especially state military police maintain a high visibility, but the crime rate remains staggering. In 1988, police registered 3,800 homicides or attempted homicides, nearly 30,000 assaults, and over 180,000 thefts, including 42,000 car thefts.18 Furthermore, the quality of health care is seriously inadequate, as indicated by Sao Paulo's infant mortality rate of 31 per thousand— 5 times that of Toronto. Not only is there a general lack of free public facilities, but hospitals and health centres tend to be concentrated in the central core region. With only 14 percent of the total population, the downtown region is home to nearly half of Sao Paulo's 167 health facilities. By contrast, the eastern periphery, with 28 percent of the population, has less than 1 percent of all facilities. A lack of sanitary sewers in many regions compounds health problems. While in central Sao Paulo, the ratio of sewer to water hookups is 0.97, this falls to 0.67 on the eastern periphery, with similar figures in evidence for outlying areas in the north and south.19 In the absence of septic tanks or other waste treatment strategies, sewage on many streets simply flows down open drainage ditches and eventually into nearby streams and rivers. Historically, claims one observer, such conditions represent "the effect of unrestrained market forces in determining metropolitan spatial relationships" in the absence of a strong public commitment to urban planning. Yet, since at least 1970, Sao Paulo has made a serious attempt to take up the challenge of urban growth management. Its efforts are most clearly evidenced in the establishment of planning management bodies such as the Coordenadoria Geral de Planejamento (COGEP), and the Municipal Planning Secretariat (SEMPLA). Moreover, while initially formed to deal with more traditional concerns in the areas of transportation and zoning, planning agencies in Sao Paulo have gradually widened their focus to include social concerns such as housing, welfare, and recreation. All in all, the city has produced a very high level of professional competence in comprehensive municipal planning which is increasingly recognized by political authority.20 Sao Paulo's urban development exchange program with the City of Toronto stands as concrete evidence of this enhanced role for planning and the new planning competence. The MPEP, which is coordinated through Sao Paulo's Planning Secretariat and Toronto's 190

THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO PROGRAM

Management Services Department, is seen by the city as a highly effective tool for enhancing local planning capabilities and service delivery in a number of areas. The first project stage (Phase 2 Agreement), covering the period from June 1987 to May 1988, called for technical co-operation between the two cities in a total of nine areas. The seven subsequent Phase Agreements each included anywhere from eight to eleven project priorities. Specific priority areas for each of these phases are listed in table 7. Project priorities in each of these phases are largely in keeping with Sao Paulo's urban development needs, but are set through a joint consultation process involving high-ranking municipal officials from both cities. Once they have received approval from the Toronto and Sao Paulo city councils, and the FCM, technical personnel working in the specific municipal departments involved meet to put them into action.21 Since the inception of the MPEP in 1987, there have been at least ten high-level exchanges between the project co-ordinators in Toronto and Sao Paulo, and well over fifty direct exchanges involving more than eighty technical personnel working in specific priority areas.22 A large volume of information has also been traded through less direct means, such as telephone, telefax, or written correspondence. At least nine of the seventeen or so projects explored through these exchanges have represented major initiatives, requiring longterm and intense intermunicipal co-operation. They include projects designed to facilitate improved urban planning (through upgrading of local infrastructure and services); information and mapping systems (to allow Sao Paulo to develop a more effective property registry for planning and taxation purposes); public health programs (to combat communicable disease); emergency services (to develop a more effective emergency response strategy); parks (through the development of Canadian-style recreation and leisure areas); commercial relations (by stimulating greater interchange between businesses in Toronto and Sao Paulo); recreation services (to improve Sao Paulo's capacity for offering facilities and programs); administrative reform (to effect a decentralization of power and enhance public participation in government); and access to international financing for infrastructure projects (through organizations such as the World Bank). Smaller scale projects have explored technical co-operation in areas including transportation, public services, 191

fghfggfhfghfghfhfhhhh

Table 7

Toronto-Sao Paulo Phase Agreement Projects, in Order of Priority, 1987-95* Phase 2 (1987-88)

PhaseS (1988-90)

Phase 3a (1989-90)

Phase 4 (1990-92)

Commercial relations

Toronto Place

Toronto Park

City of Toronto Park

Health

Public/private sector

Sempla-Urban operations

Recreational programs

Emergency assistance systems

Commercial relations

SEMAB-Central market

Public/private sector

Data processing

Property information systems

Property information systems

Commercial relations

Transport and parking

Public health programs

Public health and environment

Property information systems

Emergency health services

Public health programs

Urban planning Emergency assistance systems Human resources

Parking

Traffic & Transport

Emergency Assistance systems

—

Transports

Parking and popular participation

Decentralization

—

—

Garbage disposal

Service & works maintenance programs

—

—

Commercial projects

—

--

---

---

ttt

* Dashes indicate that there were no further priorities within a given phase

192

THE TORONTO-SAO PAULO PROGRAM

Table 7 (continued) Toronto-Sao Paulo Phase Agreement Projects, in Order of Priority, 1987-95* Phase 5 (1992-94)

Phase 6 (1993-95)

Phase 4a (1991)

Phase 4b (1991-92)

City of Toronto

City of Toronto Toronto Park Park in Sao Paulo

Recreational activities

Recreational programs

Recreation programming

Urban planning

Urban operations

Urban operations

Urban planning

Geographic and property info, systems

Unified registry

Central property Chambers of Commerce registration / geographic info.

Public health programs

Public health programs

Property information system

Public health system

Emergency service and ambulances

Emergency ambulance services

Public health programs

World Bank/ Inter-American development bank

Public participation and decentralization

Decentralization Emergency ambulance and public services participation

Homeless

Homeless

Public services

Public services Libraries

Information exchange

—

Libraries

Police

—

—

—

Police

World Bank Financing

Administrative reform

193

Toronto Park in Sao Paulo

Emergency ambulance services

Culture

Private sector

BEYOND MEXICO

public shelters, libraries, garbage collection, policing, human resources, and culture. Benefits of the MPEP to Sao Paulo Since the deal was first struck in 1987, Sao Paulo has consistently given a high priority—in principle—to the MPEP. In official documents, it is cited as the "most successful, active, and beneficial" of Sao Paulo's seven existing international linkages.23 Another indication of the importance given to the program is the secure position it has been assigned within Sao Paulo's administrative structure. Unlike Toronto, where the MPEP is administered part-time through the city's Management Services Department, Sao Paulo has created a special office within the Planning Secretariat for executive co-ordination of the program. The priority given the MPEP, and the very positive attitudes of successive municipal administrations towards it, is explained in large part by the many apparent successes of the program. As table 8 shows, most of those more enduring projects (as indicated by the higher number in column 1), which have received a higher priority in successive Phase Agreements (as indicated the lower number in column 2) have to date moved forward towards the implementation stage.24 Typically, this progression has involved a highly selective funnelling process. To begin with, a large number of sub-projects within a given priority area may initially be put forth for discussion. From these, a smaller number of specific initiatives are selected out for further investigation and technical co-operation. Depending upon their ultimate viability, a still smaller number of initiatives then reaches the stage of actual implementation. Those initiatives which have successfully made it through the selection process have been widely publicized in a variety of official documents released by the Cities of Toronto and Sao Paulo, the FCM and CIDA.25 These fall into a number of priority areas, and are summarized below: • Urban planning and operations: Much of the focus here has been on the development of more effective strategies for co-operation between the public and private sectors to improve infrastructure and services. A large number of projects have been discussed, including the establishment of food distribution systems, the creation 194

THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO PROGRAM

TableS Toronto-Sao Paulo MPEP Project Outcomes, 1987-93

Project

Total Priority Stage Realized Information Technical Phases

Urban planning/operations Information systems Public health Emergency services City of Toronto Park Commercial relations /private sector Recreation Administrative reform Transportation Public services Homeless International bank financing Libraries Police Human resources Culture Garbage

Exchange

8 8 8 8 7 6 4 4 3 3

2

3.0 4.1 4.8 5.6 1.0 5.0 2.0 7.5 6.6 9.0 8.0

2

8.5

2

9.5 10.5

2 1 1 1

Implementation

7.0 7.0 9.0

of a Sao Paulo real estate board, co-operation between municipal junior achievement programs, as well as specific redevelopment and reurbanization projects in the city. To date, technical exchanges with Toronto have resulted in project implementation in two areas: food distribution and housing. In the first, discussions with Toronto have facilitated the creation of a Sao Paulo mini-market system. So far, nearly thirteen suburban markets have been constructed. There are plans for another seven, as well as for a fish market terminal and a floral market. In the housing area, Toronto has helped Sao Paulo improve its zoning regulations and development strategy—known as the operapes ligadas—for enhancing the quality of housing stock. Under this program, developers are permitted to build projects to a higher than allowed density in return for set tax increases. 195

BEYOND MEXICO

The revenues collected are then applied to the construction of public housing. To date, the City of Sao Paulo has used nearly US$110 million from this source to build approximately 9,000 dwellings, and approximately 5,000 of Sao Paulo's poorest citizens have been relocated to these units. • Public health: Sao Paulo and Toronto have exchanged information and know-how in a number of health-related areas and projects have been realized in at least two. To begin with, Toronto has assisted Sao Paulo with training programs for environmental health inspectors. The major success here, however, has been Toronto's help with Sao Paulo's adoption of the "Healthy City" program. As part of the global "Healthy Cities" movement, in which urban centres on several continents participate, the program calls for effective public participation in health care planning, and for integration of health maintenance strategies across a range of municipal departments. • Emergency services: Discussion has taken place in a number of areas, including disaster response, pollution warnings and control, and fire prevention. This has resulted in a number of projects. With technical know-how supplied by the City of Toronto (and Metro), the City of Sao Paulo has worked in co-operation with the state government to upgrade the regional ambulance fleet. Over 100 new ambulances have been ordered, along with approximately 200 radios to improve communication. Although not all the new vehicles are yet in service, internal reports claim that the local ambulance response rate has already improved by 50 percent. Toronto has also advised Sao Paulo on the installation of a new 911-style emergency report service, and has actively participated in ambulance attendant training, as well as technical training in emergency medical services for physicians and nurses. • City of Toronto Park: Probably the most visible achievement of the MPEP, the development of a Canadian park in Sao Paulo has appeared as a priority since Phase 3. Demonstrating a high degree of intermunicipal and private sector co-operation, Toronto and Sao Paulo were jointly involved in all phases of park planning, from site selection to long-term maintenance. Toronto parks and recreation expertise was used in the selection of recreational equipment, wading pool technology, and wetlands preservation in the immediate area. To date, Toronto has also contributed approximately US$200,000 to the total project cost of US$1.5 million, half in cash, 196

THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO PROGRAM

and half in the form of donated playground equipment. • Recreation: Recreation did not appear as a project priority until the Phase 4 Agreement. Nevertheless, some projects have already shown results. Discussions with Toronto parks and recreation personnel have resulted in greater co-ordination between municipal departments responsible for parks, recreation, and sports, respectively. Sao Paulo has also recently developed a municipal leisure policy. More concretely, since the fall of 1990, Toronto has sent teams to help train recreation leaders in Sao Paulo. So far, some 80 people have directly benefitted from this training, and they in turn have offered instruction to over 1000 others. Their newly acquired knowhow has been applied to the development of two-week summer camp programs for Sao Paulo children. In 1991, these programs served nearly 200,000 youngsters, and in 1992, nearly 300,000. It is expected that eventually 1 million children will participate in these camps. Finally, Toronto has helped the Service Social do Comercio (SESC), a non-government organization which runs a number of recreation centres across the city, to improve its programming and select new recreational equipment. • Administrative reform: This first emerged as a priority in Phase 4. At that time, the municipal government was interested in decentralizing authority, while at the same time enhancing popular participation in government. Sao Paulo has looked to the City of Toronto's municipal structure and relationship with Metropolitan region to guide the reform, and has consulted with the Canadian Urban Institute on issues such as boundary determination, jurisdiction, and service delivery. The reform is currently in its final stages. • International bank financing: Sao Paulo has received some assistance from Toronto in formulating its applications to major world funding bodies for infrastructure improvement loans. Recently, Sao Paulo received a World Bank loan for environmental infrastructure projects, in the amount of US$500 million, although final approval from Brasilia for the loan transfer is still pending. • Information systems: While the upgrading of mapping and information systems has been a priority since the Phase 2 Agreement, work in this area largely remains at the technical exchange stage. To date, however, Sao Paulo has purchased at least one portion of the software required for the new system, and further upgrades are planned as funding becomes available. 197

BEYOND MEXICO

• Commercial relations/private sector: Since the MPEP wasfirststruck, bilateral private sector contact has reportedly increased, and a number of co-operative programs have been explored. Evidence of this enhanced interchange is the growing number of direct flights (many of them non-stop) between Toronto and Sao Paulo. Direct benefits of these exchanges are difficult to gauge. Nevertheless, die Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce in Toronto does report an increase in the volume of trade between the two cities, and the necessary infrastructure for expanded trading relations is being put in in place. Benefits of the MPEP to Toronto

While the MPEP is designed first and foremost to assist Sao Paulo's urban development, Toronto has in its turn benefited from its participation in the program.26 These benefits are fewer in the case of Sao Paulo and frequently less tangible, although some projects do have the potential to reach the implementation stage. To begin with, as a result of its participation in the MPEP, Toronto has appreciably enhanced its international reputation. For example, Toronto is reported to have won an international award for the development of the Healthy City concept and its application to Sao Paulo. Moreover, as a result of its more visible international presence, Toronto has been invited to such important international conferences as the 1991 International Five Cities Environmental Project, sponsored by the Canadian government and the World Bank, and the 1992 Technical Parallel Conference to the United Nations Conference on the Environment and Development. Toronto was also selected as the site for a new UN agency, the International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives. At the level of city management, Toronto administrators report that the MPEP has raised consciousness among participating city employees of developing world problems, and encouraged them to consider new ways of dealing with their own problems at home. City employees have also gained a greater understanding of the culture of Toronto's growing Latin American community and their needs. Participation in the MPEP is reported as well to be a morale booster for personnel selected to represent the City of Toronto at the international level. Toronto's information exchanges with Sao Paulo have also had a limited impact in a number of service delivery areas. One project of interest to Toronto is Sao Paulo's 198

THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO PROGRAM

field-to-table food distribution system, used to bring low-cost food directly from the farm to market outlets located in low-income neighbourhoods. In addition, Toronto has looked at Sao Paulo's school lunch program, which serves nearly 1.2 million children each day. The program is reported to have provided the incentive for a Toronto Board of Education project to furnish breakfast and lunch to students in sixteen city schools. In still another area, the city has examined the possibility of applying Sao Paulo's innovative public-private sector cost-sharing programs for illness prevention. One report states that the city is currently negotiating with a dental products company to develop a dental research and education project. Toronto would be responsible for programming and data collection, while the company would provide educational materials and data analysis. Toronto officials have also investigated ways of decentralizing health care delivery along lines adopted in Sao Paulo, and have looked at that city's organizational model and community involvement techniques in the area of maternal and child health care. Finally, Toronto Transit Commission officials have looked carefully at Sao Paulo's urban transportation system, in an effort to discover ways to increase capacity with existing resources. Perhaps the most visible benefit of the MPEP to Toronto thus far has been economic. Canadian companies have sold about a half million dollars in products and services to Sao Paulo as a result of the program. In one case, an Ontario-based software company earned $50,000 for helping to set up Sao Paulo's property registry system. In another, a Canadian supplier sold $220,000 worth of recreational equipment to the Service Social do Comercio (SESC) and, as mentioned previously, $100,000 worth of playground equipment was shipped from Canada for use in the City of Toronto Park. CHALLENGES AND PROBLEMS OF THE MPEP

Despite its advertised successes and potential, the implementation of the MPEP has presented at least some challenges. Some are purely technical. Others are more fundamental and, over the long term, may affect the viability of the program. On the technical side, first of all, there has been a good deal of criticism expressed, especially from the Sao Paulo end, about the 199

BEYOND MEXICO

suitability of representatives chosen for information and technical exchanges.27 In some cases, participants did not hold positions which would allow them to fully disseminate acquired knowledge and expertise. In others, fluency in English (the lingua franca of the program) has been cited as a problem. In response to these difficulties, Sao Paulo has called for much closer screening of participants. Second, there is the problem of funding. A Phase 4 report lauds the success of the program, but at the same time suggests that the demands from Sao Paulo for new projects exceed Toronto's ability to provide effective assistance, given the ongoing and real costs of freeing up staff and resources. Maintaining progress in approved project areas also entails escalating costs, as hands-on technical interchange—and especially troubleshooting—may prove timeconsuming. In time, these fiscal pressures may force a limitation of both the number and the scope of projects entertained during any one phase of the program.28 These more fundamental difficulties are of two types. The first has to do with administrative continuity—or at least the lack of it. It has been well noted in the literature that Latin American city governments tend to possess more politicized bureaucracies than their North American, and especially Canadian counterparts. "Perhaps the most unfortunate result of this politicization of governmental bureaucracies," one observer suggests, "is the lack of continuity in both policies and high-ranking personnel. When a particular administration goes out of power, experienced planning personnel will be dismissed."29 This is painfully evident in the Sao Paulo case, where regular administrative turnover is a reality dictated by the Brazilian federal constitution.30 Having survived three successive administrations, the MPEP has seen three changes in general policy direction, and at least three changes in personnel in a number of key areas, especially health care. In Toronto, where changes in municipal government have resulted in far fewer bureaucratic disruptions, considerable concern has been expressed about the effects of these changes in a number of project areas.31 The impact of administration changes on project continuity may be seen in the shifting character of priorities witnessed over the life of the MPEP (See table 7). Phases 2 through 4 were developed during the pro-development, pro-business administration of Janio Quadros, a former president of Brazil. Project priorities set 200

THE TORONTO-SAO PAULO PROGRAM

during these early years reflected the administration's predominant tone, with commercial relations, public-private sector co-operation, technical planning and service issues predominating. However, with the assumption of power in 1991 by the socialist Workers' Party (Partido dos Trabalhadores, or PT), under mayor Luiza Erundina, project priorities changed, reflecting the new administration's preoccupation with social issues. From Phase 4a on, the MPEP focused on such areas as the homeless, public services, libraries, police, public participation and decentralization. Private sector issues were largely abandoned as, in the view of the municipal government, work in this area in the past had not directly benefitted the municipality. Only in Phase 5 did private sector co-operation creep back through a new fourth priority "Chambers of Commerce." After the election of the conservative Paulo Maluf as mayor in 1992, private sector projects again appeared as a major priority, while many of the social service related priorities established by the former PT regime were dropped. In all, as can be seen from table 8, only a very few project priorities survived these various shifts in policy orientation. The second major problem is also political and relates to the general expectations of the parties involved. For its part, Sao Paulo entered into the MPEP and, despite frequent changes in project priorities, has in principle strongly supported it as a means to improve local planning and service delivery. The high priority given to the program is reflected in its durability through successive administration changes, and also in the establishment of a separate office within the SEMPLA to administer it. At the Toronto end—aside from the enhanced international reputation and good feeling which comes from helping out its sister city to the south—expectations are less well defined. One which has explicity emerged, however, especially during the life of the more recent Phase Agreements, is economic. While Toronto has not limited its involvement in the program to areas where it could reap direct economic benefit, accord documents clearly suggest that economic spinoffs from its participation are anticipated. For example, in both City of Toronto and FCM literature, economic spinoffs are pitched as major benefits of the Toronto-Sao Paulo agreement.32 The need to create positive economic opportunities for Toronto and Canada, moreover, has long been the driving force behind the support given the MPEP by the Department of Foreign Affairs and 201

BEYOND MEXICO

International Trade, through the Canadian Consulate General in Sao Paulo.33 To date, however, economic benefits accruing to the city and region have been relatively small. As mentioned previously, sales posted by Canadian companies have so far reached less than $500,000. And while the Toronto-based Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce has reported an increase in economic activity among local companies since the inception of the program, it is not clear that these have been the direct result of city-to-city interchange. One of the limitations upon the program's direct ability to pay such dividends to Toronto is related to Sao Paulo's financial situation. Sao Paulo has been sensitive to Toronto's concerns in this area, and has agreed that Canadian-made products and services should be acquired whenever feasible.34 Yet, while Toronto may show Sao Paulo exactly what it needs to buy in order to bring equipment and services up to standard, it cannot tell municipal officials where to buy them. Acquisition of equipment and services tends quite logically to follow the principle of least cost, given both budget constraints and local politics. While Canadian companies may be considered as potential suppliers, they will not be chosen if they are not cost-competitive.35 Should the present pattern of limited economic benefits continue, it may cause concern among at least some present supporters of the MPEP at the Toronto end. Given the cost to the City of Toronto in personnel and resources, now estimated at over C$1.5 million,36 some greater return from goods and services supplied to Sao Paulo may then be necessary to maintain the political will to keep the program alive. A MODEL FOR EMULATION?

What began largely as an experimental development assistance undertaking (to borrow a term used by development policy analyst Dennis Rondinelli37) the Toronto-Sao Paulo MPEP has established itself as a major pilot project, and thus makes itself available for international emulation. Given the money and effort expended to date, and the number of projects implemented, it is fair to ask whether the program is a viable model. There is no simple answer to this query. Certainly there are unique advantages to the program, and to both parties. Supporters 202

THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO PROGRAM

of the MPEP, including the former secretary of planning under the Erundina government, Paul Singer, argue that through consensual face to face discussion and direct technology transfer, urban planning and the delivery of urban services in Sao Paulo has been measurably improved. In addition, Singer argues that the program has facilitated enhanced contact between different levels of government and NGOs in both Toronto and Sao Paulo. In the latter city, discussions about improving police, fire, and ambulance services have increased co-ordination between municipal, regional, and state authorities responsible for emergency assistance strategies. In Toronto, NGOs working with the homeless have conferred with their counterparts in Sao Paulo, and CESO (Canadian Executive Services Organization) has agreed to assist in the formulation and development of project priorities wherever its expertise may be needed.38 In terms of successes, supporters of the MPEP have pointed to its impressive contribution to improved ambulance service, new housing for the poor, important new recreation and public health programs, and a world-class park. For its part, Toronto claims to have learned much from Sao Paulo about dealing with megacity headaches in areas such as transportation and food distribution. The potential for enhanced trade in goods and services is also cited as a major outcome of the program. At the same time, some critics do point to certain limitations of the MPEP.39 From the fifty or more exchanges which have taken place so far, they suggest, only a few projects have emerged. Moreover, these have affected a relatively small portion of the local population. In the area of housing, for example, the municipality has constructed 9,000 units, an impressive number by any count, but one representing only a tiny fraction of what would be needed to properly house the nearly 4 million Paulistanos [the inhabitants of the city of Sao Paulo] now living in substandard conditions. The problem, some suggest, is that the quantity of technical advice often exceeds Sao Paulo's ability to implement actual changes. Those connected with the private sector also argue that the program has been overly exclusive; that private sector involvement, which could greatly facilitate the urban development process, has been devalued, even ignored. Others point to limitations placed on the role of NGOs, especially in the area of housing and the homeless, despite the fact that such organizations have much experience and expertise to offer to municipal programs. 203

BEYOND MEXICO

There is also the broader issue of the appropriateness of aiding and abetting Latin American planners' rush to adopt North American style urban development strategies. In the North, planning—the cornerstone of development—has meant strict zoning and the rigid compartmentalization of cities, limiting public interchange. It has also led to the development of invasive transportation corridors, the elimination of established neighbourhoods, the emptying out of city centres, and the rise of the ubiquitous shopping mall. There is evidence already of these trends emerging in Latin American cities, especially Sao Paulo. Yet, some have argued, the most vibrant cities are those where rigid planning concepts have historically played a lesser role, as in Europe. Potentially then, Sao Paulo, by adopting Toronto planning techniques, may not only be in danger of losing its unique urban character, but might be buying a range of North Americanstyle urban management headaches down the road. At face value, however, it is clear that the MPEP has done more good than harm. The program's annual up-front cost is in the neighbourhood of $200,000 to $300,000. If one were to include material costs and personnel secondment in both cities, that figure might be closer to $600,000. This contributes to an annual exchange of information and technical advice whose long-term value is incalculable. In the form of direct aid, the same amount of money would likely contribute little to urban development. Even a limited roadway improvement, such as an intersection upgrade and installation of traffic lights, can cost as much as $500,000. However, the question remains: Is this particular program a model for other intermunicipal urban development plans to emulate? The present study suggests that the best answer is probably "yes," but only pending further research. To begin with, the Toronto-Sao Paulo MPEP and its benefits must be examined more thoroughly in each of its component facets, from project start to finish. Second, and more important, it needs to be reviewed in light of other existing intermunicipal arrangements. For example, it has been suggested that a similar program now operating between the City of Toronto and Lima, Peru, though far more limited in scope than the Sao Paulo arrangement, has had more concrete results.40 Only through careful comparative analysis can the Toronto-Sao Paulo MPEP's benefits and shortcomings be fully explored, and the applicability of the program, as a whole or in part, properly assessed. 204

THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO PROGRAM

NOTES

1. Dennis Rondinelli, "Increasing the Access of the Poor to Urban Services: Problems, Policy Alternatives, and Organizational Choices," in Urban Services in Developing Countries, eds. Dennis Rondinelli and G. Shabbir Cheema (London: Macmillan, 1988), 22. 2. John D. Herbert, Urban Development in the Third World: Policy Guidelines (New York: Praeger, 1979) 10. See also Robert B. Potter, Urbanization and Planning in the Third World (London: Groom Helm, 1985). 3. G. Edward Ebanks, "Las sociedades urbanizadas de America Latina y El Caribe: Algunas dimensiones y observaciones," Notas de Poblacion2l(57) (1993): 125-60. 4. United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, "Developing a Strategy for Urbanization," in Urban Development in the Third World, ed. P. K. Ghosh (Westport, CN: Greenwood, 1984) 109-121. See also Herbert, Urban Development. 5. Francis Violich, Urban Planningfor Latin America: The Challenge of Metropolitan Growth (Boston: Oelgeschlager, Gun & Hain, 1987) 107. 6. Ibid. See also Fernando Padrao "Problems of Urban Development and Regional Planning in Latin America," in Ghosh ed. Urban Development. 7. See Pirie M. Gall, Municipal Development Programs in Latin America (New York: Praeger, 1976) 4-6. See also Violich, Urban Planning. 8. See Institute Brasileiro de Administrate Municipal, Relatorio de Atividades 1992 (Rio de Janeiro: IBAM, 1993), 5. 9. See Violich, Urban Planning, 115. 10. Independent Commission on International Development Issues, North-South: A Programme for Survival (London: Pan, 1980). See also James I. Lin ton, Canadian International Development Assistance: Policy and Performance, 1975-1980 (Master's thesis, University of Western Ontario, 1982) and Alan Turner, "Project Planning," in The Cities of the Poor, ed. A. Turner (London: Groom Helm, 1980). 11. Turner, "Project Planning," 66. 12. See Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), International Office, Annual Review, 1992-1993 (Ottawa: FCM, 1993), 6-13, 17. 13. See Prefeitura do Municipio de Sao Paulo (PMSP), Secretaria Municipal do Planejamento, Programa Municipal de Intercdmbio Professional Sao Paulo-Toronto: Historico. 1986-1993 (Sao Paulo: PMSPSempla, 1993) 9-13.

205

BEYOND MEXICO

14. See Webb S. Fiser, Master of the Metropolis (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall, 1962) 117-21. 15. John Sewell, The Shape of the City (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1993). 16. Empresa Metropolitana de Planejamento da Grande Sao Paulo (EMPLASA), Metropok Ekctronica: Dados e Informacoes sobre a Grande Sao Paulo (Versao 1. 0. Sao Paulo: Emplasa, 1993), p. II. 2. 49, 50. 17. While some costs, such as for luxury hotel accommodation, car rental, or fine dining, are roughly the same in the two cities, most day-to-day items in Sao Paulo are probably less than half what they are in Toronto. Given the size of the wage gap between the two centres, however, there is little question that the purchasing power of the average Sao Paulo wage earner is far less than that of his or her Toronto counterpart. 18. Prefeitura do Municipio de Sao Paulo (PMSP), Secretaria Municipal do Planejamento, Dossie Sao Paulo (Sao Paulo: PMSP-Sempla, 1992) 34-36,41. 19. EMPLASA, MetropokEkctronica, pp. II. 2. 50, III. 2. 23, IV. 1. 4. 20. SeeViolich, Urban Planning, 321, 371. 21. Interview with Heloisa Leitao D'Affonseca, Coordinator of the Toronto-Sao Paulo Municipal Professional Exchange Program, Municipality of Sao Paulo, 4 May 1993. 22. PMSP, Programa Municipal de Intercdmbio, 1993. 23. Ibid., 50. 24. Some anomalies are evident, but they are relatively few in number. For example: on the one hand, technical difficulties and lack of funding have stalled full implementation of the second project (information systems); on the other hand, international bank financing has reached the implementation stage after appearing in only two agreements. 25. See City of Toronto, Management Services Department (MSB), Status Report: Agreement of Cooperation Toronto-Sao Paulo (Toronto: MSD, 1993). See also PMSP, Programa Municipal de Intercambio (1993) and Federation of Canadian Municipalities (FCM), International Office, Benefits of International Partnerships for Canadian Municipalities (Ottawa: FCM, 1993) and Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA), Institutional and Impact Evaluation of the Federation of Canadian Municipalities' International Program: Final Report (Hull: C. A. C. International, 1993).

206

THE TORONTO-SAG PAULO PROGRAM

26. City of Toronto, MSD, Status Report and FCM, Benefits of International Partnerships. 27. PMSP, Programa Municipal de Intercdmbio, 93. 28. Ibid, 90-95. 29. Violich, Urban Planning, 108-09. 30. The Brazilian constitution prohibits administrations at all levels from succeeding themselves. They are limited to one term only. 31. PMSP, Programa Municipal de Intercdmbio, 46-47. 32. Ibid., 132, 139 and FCM, Benefits of International Partnerships, 28, 51-53. 33. Interview with Walter Domingos, Commercial Officer, Canadian Consulate General, Sao Paulo, May 18, 1993. 34. PMSP, Programa Municipal de Intercdmbio, 152. 35. Interview with W. Domingos. 36. City of Toronto, MSD, Status Report, 1. 37. Dennis Rondinelli, Development Projects as Policy Experiments (London: Methuen, 1983), chapter 4. 38. Interview with Dr. Paul Singer, former Secretary of Planning, Municipality of Sao Paulo, May 20, 1993. 39. Interview with Wendy Barker, Superintendent, Brazil-Canada Chamber of Commerce, Sao Paulo, May 17, 1993.

40. Ibid.

207

This page intentionally left blank

X

CANADA AND SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA H.P. Klepak

Le Canada et les questions de securite en Amerique latine Resume: Aussi recemment qu'en 1990, lors de son accession a 1'Organisation des Etats americains, le Canada enoncait tres clairement sa volonte de ne pas prendre part au systeme de securite inter-americain. En cela, la politique canadienne s'inscrivait dans une continuite ininterrompue depuis la Confederation. Au cours des annees qui ont suivi, pourtant, les initiatives canadiennes en matiere de securite hernispherique se sont multipliees. Des changements profonds dans la region, de meme qu'une prise de conscience de la nouvelle situation geo-politique, economique et culturelle du pays ont en fait mene a une complete remise en cause de la politique traditionnelle du Canada dans ce domaine: pour la premiere fois en ce qui a trait aux questions de securite, le Canada s'est concu comme partie pleine et entiere des Ameriques. Apres une periode de crise dans les annees 1980, marquee par plus d'un conflit—Perou-Equateur, Falkland-Malvinas,

invasion de Panama—, plusieurs facteurs se sont combines pour modifier la problematique de securite dans 1'hemisphere. La fin de la guerre froide, la democratisation de la grande majorite des gouvernements de la region et le retour des militaires dans leurs casernes ont ouvert la voie a une cooperation de type nouveau et a 1'etablissement de relations militaires directes. C'est toutefois d'abord par le biais de sa participation aux operations de maintien de la paix des Nations Unies en Amerique centrale que 1'engagement militaire du Canada dans la region a pris un tournant decisif, cette operation marquant le premier deploiement de forces canadiennes en Amerique latine. A cette dimension traditionnelle de la politique du Canada en matiere de securite s'est toutefois bientot ajoutee la lutte centre le trafic de la drogue. Cette question s'impose tres clairement comme un aspect central de la securite regionale et elle a donne lieu a une extension rapide de la cooperation militaire canadienne avec les pays de 1'hemisphere.

BEYOND MEXICO

ANALYSES OF CANADIAN SECURITY involvement in Latin America are few and far between. Indeed, it would have been pointless until 1990 to say that there was any such connection worthy of note. Even when Canada did decide, in late 1989, to join the Organization of American States (OAS) and to expand its relations with the Latin American nations in other ways as well, security affairs were explicitly excluded from the areas where Ottawa intended to expand contacts. Ottawa signalled early on that it intended to continue with its long-standing policy of staying aloof from hemispheric defence cooperation, except of course for its extensive links with the United States and its rather limited connections with the Commonwealth Caribbean. When joining the Organization of American States on January 1, 1990, Canada made it clear that it had no intention of signing the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (the Rio Pact)—the key building block of the inter-American security system—or of taking part in any of the other elements of that system. In addition, Ottawa specifically excluded itself from the defence and collective security aspects of the OAS embodied in Chapter V of that organization's Charter. Nonetheless, the ensuing three years saw Canada develop its security links with the rest of the hemisphere enormously and this change was particularly visible in relations with the OAS and its Latin American members. Indeed, the writing was already on the wall in the autumn and winter of 1989-90, when Canada first helped to set up the framework for an eventual peacekeeping mission in Central America in the context of the Esquipulas and subsequent peace accords. Then, in November 1989, Canada was instrumental in the organization and despatch of a reconnaissance operation for the United Nations to see how such a mission could best be put in place; in the end it became the country with the largest single contingent in the mission, dubbed ONUCA—UN Observation Mission in Central America—after its Spanish acronym. Canada not only sent a large number of officers and other ranks to verify the application of key aspects of the accords, but also provided the helicopter squadron without which the mission could not have fulfilled its responsibilities.1 This was to be only the beginning. Indeed, it is difficult to assess the 1993 involvement of Canada in Latin American security affairs without setting it in the context of the extraordinary growth 210

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

of that connection from 1989 to 1992. This period set the stage for the continued expansion of this connection over the last year. A NEW SECURITY SCENE AND CANADA'S PLACE IN IT, 1989-92

The inter-American security system was transformed by the events of the late 1970s and the 1980s. Slowly established, and largely through U.S. initiatives, over the better part of a century, the system was based on total U.S. domination, exercised through various elements; these included a collective defence treaty (the Rio Pact of 1947), permanent organs (the Inter-American Defence Board, the Inter-American Defence College and, indeed, the OAS itself), and a vast array of bilateral U.S.-Latin American accords embodying all kinds of basing rights, special access to territory, minerals and other supplies, military missions, and arms sales.2 The most famous of these bilateral agreements were the MAPs (Mutual Assistance Pacts), set up in the early to mid-1950s at the height of the Cold War.3 This system had been established initially to co-ordinate a hemispheric response—without Canadian participation—to the threat of war in Europe, then to fight the Nazi, fascist and Japanese threat in World War II and, from 1947 on, to halt any possible communist attack on the Americas. It was variously amended so to allow such a role to include the smashing of communist ideological penetration of the Americas, an undertaking which was to call for quite extraordinary levels of U.S. involvement in the internal affairs of Latin American countries, and which led to the expulsion of Cuba from the OAS, armed and covert intervention by Washington in several states, and the acceptance of the infamous National Security Doctrine, at one stage or another, by most of the armed forces of Latin America.4 Needless to say, such a system could hold little appeal for Canada, a country whose defence relations with the United States had for decades been on a mutually profitable basis and had been both close and friendly. If asymmetries existed, as they of course did, they were handled fairly comfortably through the usual Canadian preference for multilateralism, expressed largely through the British Commonwealth and then NATO, and also generally, if not always, through a sensitivity of the United States to Canadian concerns.5 In addition, Canadians found the military governments 211

BEYOND MEXICO

of Latin America, which so often resulted from what Ottawa tended to consider a highly excessive level of "red scare," unappealing and often worse than the evil they were meant to avoid. There was virtually no Canadian interest, in any circles of power, in a greater role in such a system. Many Canadians had long seen the OAS as little more than a forum in which this country could hardly avoid being forced to choose sides between the United States, our major ally and close neighbour, and the Latin Americans, our new partners and friends. Given the divergences between the views of Washington and those of Latin American capitals, our discomfort seemed assured. This was a major reason for avoiding the Organization altogether. But if this was true for overall relationships, it was even more so for security issues. Here the stakes were very high, with Washington looking for Ottawa's support on issues which the U.S. considered vital and which, for Canada, were generally peripheral; meanwhile, Latin Americans expected Canada to take their side on concerns regarding which this country had traditionally differed with the U.S., such as intervention in the domestic affairs of states, the extent of the communist menace, the source of instability in the Third.World, and the like.6 The 1980s were, in any case, a period of crisis for the system. The simmering Peru-Ecuador boundary dispute erupted into open conflict in 1981 and the inter-American security system proved unable to act effectively. The next year, the Falklands War found the system not only without life but even saw the dominant and leading member take the side of an extra-hemispheric power (the United Kingdom) against Argentina, a member of the system in good standing. In 1983, the Grenada invasion occurred without anything positive being done by the system. As if all this were not enough, during the rest of the decade the efforts of the system were continually frustrated by the civil wars in Central America and, as the decade closed, its members were humiliated by the U.S. invasion of Panama.7 Little wonder, then, that the Americas' security system was in deep trouble by the time Canada was considering joining the OAS. Little wonder, moreover, that Ottawa was less than interested in extending the relationship to include issues of security which might link this country more closely with the inter-American security system or its organs. 212

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

It has already been mentioned, however, that events were soon to change the degree to which Canada could keep its distance. The first Central American peacekeeping operation, begun in the autumn of 1989, was an introduction to what was to come. Just as it was picking up steam, and even before Canada formally joined the OAS, the dilemma so many had feared did in fact present itself. In December 1989, the United States launched Operation 'Just Cause," the invasion of Panama and the overthrow of its government headed by General Manuel Noriega. Condemnation of Washington's action, while really rather lukewarm, was nonetheless virtually unanimous in Latin America, with only El Salvador, totally dependent on U.S. support, agreeing that the invasion was justified. Canada, only days away from formal membership of the OAS, and involved in complicated free trade and other discussions with the U.S., stumbled in attempting to come up with an official reaction and, to the amazement of many at home and in Latin America, backed the U.S. attack. Washington based its own explanation on why it had moved unilaterally in Panama on the need to deal with a security problem, in this case the drug "war." Nonetheless, to many, even those who felt Noriega had to go, the invasion was merely a repetition of what Latin America had for so long known—the U.S. moving when it wanted to and for reasons of its own but cloaked in the security shroud.8 Ottawa was immensely embarrassed but learned quickly that the danger of being caught between Latin American and U.S. fire on major issues in the Americas was far from being an academic question. Canada was becoming a member of a "community," whatever its faults, and that community expected its members to have views on issues of importance. Panama proved, as other issues have done since, that one cannot be a member on some issues but not on others. Panama was thus to be only the tip of the iceberg where Canadian decision-makers and Latin American security issues were concerned. The country joined the OAS as the Organization, and especially the whole inter-American security system, was coming into question. Because of Canadian experience in NATO, the Commonwealth, La Francophonie, the Group of Seven, NORAD and the like, many countries in the OAS looked to Ottawa to give its insights on the needed reforms of the system. The fact that Canada understood well the problems of asymmetries in alliances merely heightened interest in the role it might play in the reform process, especially in 213

BEYOND MEXICO

the security field. At the same time, the end of the Cold War meant there would be more interest in regional conflicts and great scope for the use of Canadian Forces and diplomacy in support of peacekeeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes in the hemisphere. Canada's reputation as a "helpful fixer" would ensure that the call for Canadian resources and skills would be frequent and powerful.9 Equally important was Canada's determination to reinforce, through its presence at the OAS table, the trend to democratic government in the hemisphere. Its diplomats knew well that the success of the country's membership in the OAS would depend on the ability of the countries of Latin America to retain in power their often fledgling democracies. Canadians had enough doubts about closer relations with Latin America without seeing their new partners slip back into dictatorship and military rule. In addition, there was a sincere wish to help in the reinforcement process. This, however, meant a link with wider security issues, from which civil-military relations in Latin America cannot be divorced. Canada therefore found itself drawn into this area of concern as well. Drugs were also an item of growing importance on the OAS agenda and gradually, if unfortunately (when seen from Ottawa's perspective), the drugs issue was being increasingly seen as a security issue by the majority of Latin American and Caribbean states, just as it had been for some time by Washington. Indeed, it was no doubt in large part as a result of emphasis in the U.S. on the military aspects of fighting the international drugs trade that countries farther south in the hemisphere, and indeed elsewhere in the world, began to take up the U.S. government's expression "war on drugs" and apply it to their own efforts in this field.10 Canada was to become more closely involved in this hemispheric effort, although never to the point of establishing a direct military connection. The Canadian Armed Forces were to come into infinitely closer contact with their counterparts in Latin America over these years. And while this contact was to be effected, for the most part, through the United Nations peacekeeping operations in Central America, less visible connections were established through visits, briefings, training, a military attache presence, and conferences between Canada and several of the countries of the region. It should be kept in mind that all this activity between late 1989 and the end of 1992 took place in a context in which, officially 214

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

speaking, Canada continued its policy of not accepting either the Rio Treaty (the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance) or the security arrangements of the Charter of the Organization of American States. ELEMENTS OF A GROWING CONNECTION, PEACEKEEPING 1989-92

By far the largest security connection between Canada and Latin America has been the initiative involving the despatch to Central America of two peacekeeping and verification missions, one large and one smaller. Not only was this the first time Canadian Forces had in any real sense been deployed to an area of Latin America,11 but it was also the first significant United Nations operation in the region.12 Canada had been willing to assist in verification and peacekeeping in Central America since the beginnings of the crisis and civil wars of the 1980s. With growing NGO calls for a more active policy in the region, and having itself a clear distaste for Washington's interpretation of the crisis as essentially the result of Soviet and Cuban meddling, as well as a fear of the effects of U.S. policy on NATO alliance solidarity, Ottawa agreed as early as 1983 to help with the peace process. It offered to put at the disposal of the United Nations, and of the Central American republics themselves, Canadian experience in peacekeeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes.13 Canada acted as a formal witness for negotiations between the Nicaraguan government and the MISURASATA, an armed insurgent grouping of that country's native peoples. In addition, technical advice was provided to the Contadora countries at various stages of that joint effort by neighbouring countries to help bring peace to Central America. When proposals were made in 1986 for a joint border commission as a measure for building confidence between Costa Rica and Nicaragua, Canada offered help in its design. It therefore surprised no one when Canada agreed to provide the largest contingent of observers after the Esquipulas II accords were signed in 1987; subsequent agreements allowed for the despatch to the region of a reconnaissance mission, followed by an advance party and, finally, a full-blown verification mission in late 1989. In addition, Canada provided the absolutely essential helicopter squadron, without which the mission would have been unimaginable, as well as the mission second-in-command. The expansion of the 215

BEYOND MEXICO

mission's mandate, from the original limited one of verifying certain security aspects of Esquipulas II to the demobilizing of the Contra army in Nicaragua in Operation "Home Run," resulted in Canadian support being extended even further. While the helicopter squadron was withdrawn before the end of the mandate, Canadians continued to provide a large number of the actual observers right up to the completion of the mission in 1991-92. This did not end Canadian involvement in Central American peacekeeping. El Salvador, in many ways the thorniest of the three Central American civil conflicts, had not been safe enough for an effective verification mission to be deployed under the terms of any of the peace accords following Esquipulas II. The few observers sent there before 1992 were actively involved only to the extent of familiarizing themselves with the country and engaging in liaison with the local population, road reconnaissance, and the gathering of information. It was not until after the Chapultepec accords of January 1992 that it was decided to set up a separate mission, ONUSAL, to verify aspects of those agreements between the government in San Salvador and the FMLN guerrillas. Backed by the tremendous prestige of the UN, this force, including Canadian civilians as well as military personnel, was part of the most ambitious verification missions ever undertaken, and one which would soon involve many of the factors which are now considered under the rubric of "nation-building."16 These operations are still in progress and Canadian officers are currently on the ground in the country and will be so indefinitely. This emphasis on actual peacekeeping and verification operations should not obscure the fact that Canada's peacekeeping connection with Latin America is far from being one of mere deployments, however much these dominate the public's view of this field of foreign policy. Ottawa sees Latin America as a potential major source of peacekeeping forces for the United Nations and, under some circumstances, for the OAS itself. As is well known, the UN is increasingly hard-pressed to find appropriate and sufficiently numerous peacekeeping forces for its activities in this field, which have vastly increased in recent years, and any such assistance should be of help to Canada, a traditional and over-extended contributor. While some Latin American countries have a long record of providing this support for the UN, most have not; indeed, because of the OAS historical experience 216

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

of domination by the U.S. and the common use of the term "peacekeeping" as a cover for unilateral U.S. decisions and deployments, most have not wished to become involved in such operations.16 Under such circumstances, and given the new context for international peacekeeping as well as the desire on the part of many Latin American countries to give meaningful roles to their armed forces outside national borders, Canada has been active in informing the region of trends in peacekeeping and in sharing its thinking and experience in this field. Joint conferences have been held to which representatives of the armed forces of some Latin American states (among others) were invited to learn more about this type of operation. In addition, the Department of National Defence (DND) has sent briefing teams to a number of Latin American countries to speak on the subject of peacekeeping to officers and military colleges. To date, several countries have received such teams, including Argentina, Chile, Cuba, El Salvador, Guatemala, and Nicaragua, with others to come. In addition to making these direct contacts, it is felt very worthwhile to discuss issues of conflict prevention and management with officers of these states as part of the general drive for peaceful relations in the hemisphere. The reception has been extremely favourable and results to date very gratifying.17 REFORM OF THE INTER-AMERICAN SECURITY SYSTEM

As has been previously mentioned, Canada had no intention of joining the inter-American security system when it opted for full OAS membership. Nonetheless, it realized the difficulties of being in some parts of the inter-American system and not in others. It was, of course, pleased that a fundamental aim of the inter-American system was to strengthen the peace and security of the hemisphere and to prevent conflict. Its concern was domination by the United States of the specifically security-oriented elements of the system. With Canada's entry into the OAS, more and more of those involved began to feel that the Organization was still potentially useful as a forum for discussion of such issues; in their view Canada would have to take a role in the reform of the system then in place so that it would meet the concerns of this country where hemispheric, or at least Latin American, security was concerned. 217

BEYOND MEXICO

From early on, Canada's Secretary of State for External Affairs, Barbara McDougall, showed increasing interest in this issue and was coming to the view that Canada's special experience in NATO, NORAD and elsewhere, as well as the exceptional confidence it received from Latin American countries with regard to security matters, gave it a natural role in the organization and in the design of a new interAmerican system. Canada soon defined interest in both the traditional security areas, related to national defence, and in new ones related to democracy and development and what are increasingly termed "nontraditional security issues."18 Ottawa wanted to see collective and cooperative action on regional security, including the adoption of the new ideas of "co-operative security" by which Canada set such store. In addition, because of its experience and credentials in these areas, and the lack of extensive experience on the part of a number of Latin American states, Canada wanted to work bilaterally on specific security issues such as arms control and disarmament. Canada's two key political objectives were to be the linked ones of encouraging and strengthening democratic advances in the hemisphere, and acting directly to foster security in the region. Security was to be defined broadly, to take in concerns for human rights, the environment, and democracy. The list of issues of interest was a long one, including the closely related matter of Latin American civilmilitary relations (and specifically demobilization in key countries and reductions in military strength virtually across the board), the illegal international narcotics trade, long-term border disputes, and weapons proliferation, nuclear and conventional.19 To the surprise of many, Canada did not wait, as one might have expected from the "new boy," for others to make the main move.20 It pressed early on for a wide-ranging debate on hemispheric security to be conducted within the OAS. At the Santiago General Assembly of the OAS, the movement for a resolution on non-proliferation was begun by Canada which, once again because of its vast experience in this area outside the Americas and the fact that it had little negative "baggage" on this issue in the hemisphere, was well received. The following year, at the same event, this time in Nassau, Canada was the main mover in pushing forward a proposal for the establishment within the OAS of a Special Commission on Hemispheric Security, something which would have been 218

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

inconceivable a few years earlier and which, perhaps, Canada alone was in a position to propose and have generally accepted. This special commission was to be headed by the Argentine ambassador to the OAS, Hernan Patino Mayer, who had had a longterm interest in the subject of inter-American security. It was set up with the dual mandate to look at hemispheric security through the prism of the co-operative security concept and to address specifically non-proliferation issues. Canada was, of course, anxious to advance on regional security matters but was also keen to build up the capacity for co-operation of key players in anticipation of the 1995 Review Conference of the Non-Proliferation Treaty.21 Finally, Ottawa was keen to do something helpful in reply to UN SecretaryGeneral Boutros Boutros-Ghali's request, framed in 1992 in An Agenda for Peace, that the regional organizations accept a larger role in the peaceful settlement of disputes, thereby bringing some relief to the increasingly hard-pressed world body. Thus it is not too much to say that in the first three years of Canadian membership of the OAS, despite the absence of formal linkages to either the Rio Pact or Chapter V (the security chapter) of the OAS Charter, this country became a major instigator of reform, or at least the potential beginnings of reform, of the interAmerican security system. Far from these efforts being resented by the Latin American members of the OAS, they were generally welcomed, although there was hesitation on the part of some members who were concerned about excessive foreign intervention in their security affairs. This can hardly be surprising, given the history of the Organization, and it must remain a long-term goal to bring them over to the idea of reform. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS

For a long time, Canada has seen good governance and democracy as essential building blocks for peace in Latin America. If civil wars are to be avoided, there must be hope for change within the political system without recourse to violent means. Only democracy can provide this, and only through the exercise of human rights as a normal part of such democratic rule can people be led to believe they live in a state of law where dissent is permitted and those at the top can be replaced through a peaceful process. 219

BEYOND MEXICO

Despite the return of civilian governments to almost all the hemisphere, the cruel reality is that democracy and human rights are not yet anchored in most Latin American societies and that, indeed, there has been a distressing return to coups and talk of coups over the last two years. And if the most dramatic forms of this resurgence have been seen in Guatemala, Haiti, Peru, Venezuela, and even Trinidad and Tobago, the potential for a return of authoritarian and/or military rule is much more widespread. In addition, hopelessness and frustration in the face of economic and social crisis, added to the extraordinary impact of readjustment policies now in place or being implemented virtually throughout the region, has triggered spontaneous outbreaks of violence in Argentina, Venezuela and parts of the West Indies and, most recently, in Mexico itself, Canada's primary and closest partner in Latin America. It can be of little surprise that Canada views this issue seriously, as one closely intertwined with other security issues such as civil-military relations, drugs, border conflicts—in which the most adventurous and nationalist regimes tend to be military or authoritarian—proliferation, peacekeeping and even the reform of the inter-American system. They are all connected because the role of the military in so many Latin American societies is so great.22 In order to produce a community of which Canadians will wish to be part, to reduce the chances of nuclear proliferation between Argentina and Brazil, to reinforce tendencies away from military solutions to border and other differences between regional states, and to have the kind of governance which may hope to provide stability, it is essential that democracy be solidified in Latin America. It is this reasoning that pushes Canada to link the issues in its policy toward the region. Early in its OAS membership, Canada became known for being less than quiet on human rights and democracy issues. Extremely active in electoral monitoring initiatives, it once again brought experience gained largely in other parts of the world to the Latin American scene. In furtherance of its peacekeeping and verification interests, it assisted especially in the early efforts to push Haiti toward elections and eventual democracy. It argued consistently that the road to democracy would have to pass through social and economic development, although it had not necessarily been at the 220

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

forefront in agreeing to Latin American insistence that development required more open markets in the developed countries and a more forgiving attitude toward the Third World's horrendous debt difficulties. In regard to the 1992 coup (or autogolpe) in Peru, Canada was a leader in making the terms for that country's reinstatement as a functioning member of the OAS as harsh and demanding as possible, and as insistent on democratic process as was practicable. Haiti's tortuous path has been watched carefully in Ottawa, with even Prime Minister Mulroney calling for tough measures, including the use of military force, to hasten the pace of change. In defence terms, Canada's involvement has perhaps been small, but it is nonetheless striking for a country which has always steered well clear of such issues in Latin America. The Department of National Defence used a variety of occasions to start a lecture series in Latin America on democratic societies. Uniformed officers from Canada described Canada's national and Commonwealth experience in areas such as the military justice system, civilian command and control of the armed forces, and the integrated command system, all with a view to suggesting that it was perfectly possible, and indeed praiseworthy, for armed forces to be subordinated to civil society and that the transformation of Latin American societies with this in mind was both possible and good for the armed forces themselves. The Inter-American Institute for Human Rights also began a lecture program on human rights subjects in conjunction with the Canadian Department of National Defence. This too was aimed at demonstrating the importance of human rights and the ways in which abuses could be handled within national armed forces. It dovetailed nicely with Royal Canadian Mounted Police efforts in the same vein, and connected with police training for Caribbean and Latin American police forces, especially in the anti-drugs role. Thus, here again, Canada had taken a much more active role in issues of democracy and human rights than most observers thought it would or could when it joined the OAS in 1990. Of course, it did not just win friends; it was seen as a troublemaker by those opposed to what they viewed as excessive or too rapid democratization, and by those anxious for the armed forces to retain the most influential role possible in their national societies. 221

BEYOND MEXICO

DRUGS

From the beginning of its membership in the OAS, Canada showed its preference for this multinational body as the forum in which it wished to make its principal contribution to anti-narcotics co-operation in the hemisphere. It quicklyjoined the Inter-American Drug Abuse Commission (CICAD, after its Spanish acronym) and donated $800,000 to the Commission for 1991-92.23 Since then, it has worked reasonably closely with the Organization. On the security side of this issue, Canada has wished, as was mentioned above, to avoid getting involved in the trend to define the effort as a "war on drugs," and prefers to put the emphasis on reducing the demand through health, social and educational measures.24 Nonetheless, the RCMP has become involved in police force training in the anti-drugs field, both in the West Indies and in Latin America. In addition, intelligence and surveillance equipment has been sold to Colombia, and RCMP liaison officers operate in several Latin American capitals.25 DND has no such obvious linkages. Nonetheless, there has been an indirect Canadian security connection with Latin American antidrugs operations through the U.S. and NORAD. With the end of the Cold War, and the reduced requirement for the extremely sophisticated and extensive North American air defence system, there has been a tendency, perhaps natural, to start using the resources of NORAD for tracking potential drug-carrying aircraft in North American air space.26 The difficulty is that this ties Canada into a U.S. structure in which it has relatively little say and where militarization of the effort to combat the drug trade has been considered the priority, unlike the Canadian approach of seeing this problem primarily as a social, economic and health issue. The NORAD system enmeshes Canada in a North American antidrugs approach not entirely of its choosing. Meanwhile, the U.S. has established an enormous series of bilateral and multilateral arrangements with many states of the Caribbean and Latin America which are aimed at anti-drugs security co-operation. Thus Canada is now involved in an anti-drugs "hub and spoke" type of system with Latin America through the U.S. NORAD accords. Most criticism of this state of affairs has not been aimed so much at the accords as at the absence of any public or other debate in this country in advance of such 222

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

co-operation. It will be seen later on that this has had further consequences in 1993. Here, then, one sees a much more circumspect Canadian interest in what, without doubt, is considered an enormously serious security problem in much of Latin America.27 Ottawa has not given a very high priority to this field of endeavour, particularly where the Canadian Armed Forces are concerned, although it has loaded one more task on both naval and air operations off our coasts and in our skies. It remains to be seen whether this activity will result in useful co-operation with Latin America, or even with the Commonwealth Caribbean. DIRECT MILITARY LINKAGES

Leaving aside the large-scale connection between the armed forces of Canada and those of Latin America occasioned both by this country's contributions to Central American peacekeeping and by the Latin American countries' growing participation in United Nations operations worldwide, there have been several other areas of direct contact between these military establishments between 1989 and the end of 1992. Some of these have been referred to in other sections of this paper but here it is worth mentioning the training, briefing, visits, and attache dimensions of this relationship. Before 1989, a Canadian officer who had some experience with Latin American counterparts was a rarity. Canada had, of course, trained some Venezuelan officers in the 1970s, when CF-5s were sold to their country. In the 1940s, there had been some degree of instruction given to sailors from those Latin American countries which had picked up World War II Royal Canadian Navy ships at rock-bottom prices when peace came. And occasionally a Canadian officer had been called in for consultations regarding a particular weapon or piece of equipment which was being considered for sale to a Latin American country. Otherwise, an occasional visit of a Latin American warship to a Canadian harbour or naval base was as much connection as one was likely to find. As was discovered in 1989, when ONUCA was being formed, the Canadian Armed Forces could count their Spanish-speaking officers on the fingers of only a very few hands. To all intents and purposes, Latin America was the forgotten continent at DND. 223

BEYOND MEXICO

Over the next three years, this was to change, if not as dramatically as in the UN context. As has been mentioned, the Canadian Armed Forces began to give briefings to Latin American officers and military training institutes on a wide range of subjects of mutual interest, but especially on civilian control of armed forces and similar governance issues. In these lectures, the place of human rights was significant, as they were in the previously mentioned co-operation with the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights. In addition, the annual courses at the National Defence College put more emphasis on Latin America in their international visits program—with respect to the visits by sister (Latin American) colleges and to the sending of groups to selected Latin American countries. In the specific case of Cuba, such visits led the authorities of that country to choose the Canadian National Defence College as the model for the creation of their own near-equivalent institution. And in 1992 permission was granted for the first time for a Latin American officer, a Salvadorean major, to attend the Canadian Armed Forces Staff College's one-year course in Toronto. At the end of that year, the College militaire royal de Saint-Jean hosted the first-ever workshop on "Canada and Latin American Security," sponsored by the Canadian Foundation for the Americas (FOCAL), the Department of Foreign Affairs and International Trade, the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development, and the Arias Foundation for Peace and Human Progress. FOCAL, an extremely active organization with a mandate to stimulate links between Canada and Latin America, and the Department of Foreign Affairs were both developing a keen interest in security issues in the hemisphere and were consistently helpful to, and supportive of, research efforts dealing with that field. Academics, diplomats and officers from Canada, Latin America, Europe and the United States attended, and the formal papers were subsequently published in book form.28 Finally, and in some ways most dramatically, the early 1990s saw the opening of the first Canadian military attache's office in Latin America. Despite many requests over the years from the Department of External Affairs for a military officer to be attached to embassies in the region (the reasoning being the importance of the military in these countries), approval had never been given to such an idea. But now the time seemed right. Relations with Mexico were 224

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

expanding tremendously. Central America had Canadian Forces personnel in situ. And NAFTA was a real possibility. Thus the Mexico City embassy received a colonel from the Canadian Armed Forces as military attache, and this officer also had responsibility for Cuba, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua. Thus the first permanent Canadian military window on Latin America was established. THE YEAR 1993

The year 1993 marked the fourth full year of Canada's membership in the Organization of American States. It also saw fruition of some of the policy desires Ottawa had defined over the previous three or four years regarding Latin American security matters. A few initiatives were undertaken during this year. As was noted in the previous section, the year's Canadian activities with a Latin American security element will be assessed under the rubrics of peacekeeping and the peaceful settlement of disputes, reform of the interAmerican system, the narcotics issue, reinforcement for democracy, and direct military activities. One year is, of course, not much time in the international relations of a significant actor on the world scene, Canadians' traditional scepticism notwithstanding. Nonetheless, an attempt will be made to underscore those initiatives which appear to have some future as elements of Canadian policy in this area. PEACEKEEPING, 1993

In Latin America, as in so many other places in the world, there continued to be an explosion of peacekeeping activity in 1993. It has been pointed out that, from a Canadian point of view, there is the hope that, while peacekeeping will continue to be a successful tool in Central America, the Latin American nations will see their way to putting more financial and military resources into peacekeeping worldwide. This, it is felt, will not only alleviate UN (and Canadian) difficulties in finding troops (and money) for such operations. It will also reinforce democracy by giving national armed forces a stake in the international system, a real role for good in the international community, and linkages with democratic nations' armed forces, unencumbered by the Cold War baggage such connections included in the past. 225

BEYOND MEXICO

In Central America, the ONUSAL mission, now the only remaining verification operation in Central America, continued to move ahead with its mandate of overseeing many security and other aspects of the 1992 Chapultepec accords.29 And while there were constant delays in implementing the agreements, especially those concerned with the troublesome issues of army demobilization, human rights-related reforms, security forces restructuring and the like, the main portions of the program were advancing and the mission was acknowledged to be making a "progressive improvement" possible in most trying circumstances.30 Canadian military personnel, now working with reduced numbers alongside their civilian colleagues, are serving well in the mission but much remains to be done. Insofar as Latin American contingents provided to the UN are concerned, progress continues to be exceptional. More and more countries are now participating, and while Canadian efforts can hardly be considered the cause of this improvement, there is no doubt that the atmosphere allowing this expansion to take place has been created in part by Canadian co-operation with the militaries of key Latin American contributors. Latin American (and indeed Caribbean) military personnel are now serving all over the world; they include officers and other ranks from Argentina, Barbados, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Guyana, Honduras, Jamaica, Peru, Uruguay and Venezuela.31 These contributions ease enormously the burden of the UN and of Canada in finding contingents. However, this does not mean that all Latin American forces are ideal for this sort of work or that there is not room for major improvement in the preparation of these troops for duties with the United Nations. It does mean that the Latin Americans have frequently aided greatly in the tasks faced by the UN and that, without them, these tasks would be much more difficult to undertake.32 Argentina has been most co-operative in helping the United Nations, and Canada has been particularly pleased with the Argentine effort.33 In this context, Canada assisted in organizing a NATOArgentine conference on multinational and UN operations hosted by the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires in October 1993. The Argentines have been encouraged by NATO to build up their joint operations capabilities, termed "interoperability" 226

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

in military jargon, by exercising on a bilateral basis with NATO members. The Argentines look forward to doing this with Canada, and so far Ottawa seems to be looking favourably at the idea. Reciprocal naval visits are also planned. In 1993, Canada continued military and diplomatic briefings of Latin American armed forces and diplomats on peacekeeping. In addition, a major joint conference on peacekeeping was held in Ottawa by York University's Centre for International and Strategic Studies and the Department of National Defence. Officers from a number of Latin American countries were invited to this event, which proved to be an important opportunity for exchanges of views on the changing nature of peacekeeping and the best national and international responses to these changes. SYSTEMIC REFORM

The Canadian initiatives at the general assemblies of the OAS in Santiago and Nassau are bearing fruit. The year 1993 saw the appearance of the first major reports of the special security commission of the OAS, along with important meetings of senior representatives of the member countries to discuss the next move. A meeting of this kind was held by the OAS in November, with a significant airing of views, and much progress was felt to have been made. Canada presented a paper on confidence-building measures (CBMs) as a further initiative related to its desire to have more transparency on the Latin American military scene. And while there is still no absolute agreement on what is needed or possible in Latin American security, or indeed in the inter-American security system as a whole, questions were raised, and debated, about the best sub-regional approaches, a range of possible CBMs, and conflict resolution generally. The special commission is to proceed with the preparation of a report for the General Assembly meeting in 1994 and will be asking experts on key issues to contribute. Canada is playing an instrumental role in pushing this process along and has reason to be pleased with results so far, considering that there was literally no movement on these issues in past decades. Ottawa is also developing its policy on the Inter-American Defence Board and its College, institutions for which this country 227

BEYOND MEXICO

has felt little love in the past although it contributes indirectly but substantially to them each year. It is participating in deliberations whether there can be a role for the IADB and LADC in peacekeeping, democratic and human rights support, or other currently relevant tasks, thereby changing their old Cold War image.34 Many countries would oppose the complete abolition of the Board and College, so a compromise may have to be found. Questions of democratic and social and economic development are now very much on the security agenda of the OAS, although it must be said that practical measures to alleviate these truly massive problems may be long in coming. Issues directly concerned with security are no longer considered to be untouchable and embarrassing. In addition, a broad definition of security, to include new issues such as the environment, is increasingly accepted as legitimate. Canada can take some major degree of credit for this extremely important change. In this context, preventive diplomacy, peacekeeping, peacemaking, and peacebuilding have entered the OAS lexicon in ways that would have simply been unthinkable a halfdecade before. The Department of External Affairs joined FOCAL again in May 1993, to help host at the College militaire royal de Saint-Jean a workshop on hemispheric security matters, putting the emphasis this time on the title of the workshop: "The Future of the Inter-American Security System." The North-South Center of the University of Miami was instrumental in funding this event, which was the first attempt to garner the views of Canadians, Central Americans and people from the Caribbean states as to the future of the inter-American system. Was it capable of addressing their security concerns and, if it was not, what could be done to change it? A further workshop in the next year was to sound out United States and South American views on the same theme. DEMOCRACY AND HUMAN RIGHTS, 1993

The year 1993 was something of a shocker for those optimists who felt the trend towards democratization in Latin America was somehow irreversible. The series of auto- and other golpes in Guatemala in late May caused great consternation in Latin America and the OAS. Repeatedly, events in Haiti returned to provide a douche froide 228

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

for the UN and the OAS. At one time or another, ten current or past Latin American presidents were under arrest, under investigation, or otherwise involved in corruption allegations of a major kind. Political parties and, to some extent, the democratic system as a whole, came under considerable fire and there were rumours of coups in several countries. The Canadian stands at the OAS were generally very firm on these issues. Canada was keen to use all the pressures the OAS could bring to bear in order to force all sides in the Guatemalan political landscape to use democratic procedures and constitutional channels to resolve the crisis. The Department of External Affairs worked to ensure the Fujimori government in Peru did not get off the hook with respect to its promises to return to constitutional government sooner rather than later. Ottawa used rough language over Haiti and backed it up, when the blockade was re-established in the summer, with the despatch of three warships, the second largest force off that country's coasts.35 Canadian diplomats were anxious to impress upon the members of the OAS that our membership in the community depended on this community being something to which Canadians wanted to belong because it seemed to be one where key values were shared. If that were not the case, Canadians would rapidly lose interest in being a part of an inter-American organization of any kind. Specifically with respect to the security link, Canada continued to send lecturers and briefing teams to Latin America to speak on topics which allowed for an insistence on the essential advantages of democratic values to states and to their armed forces. Although the impact of those briefings was reduced by the continuing lack of qualified Spanish-speakers within the officer ranks of the Canadian Armed Forces, it was generally felt to be positive. Peacekeeping, human rights, and democracy continued to be subjects for which Canadian officers could expect a ready audience in Latin America as long as a "holier than thou" attitude could be avoided. Despite the shortage of Spanish-speaking officers, the Department of National Defence increased its co-operation with the Inter-American Institute for Human Rights. However, 1993 was the first year without a major insurgency in Central America; in consequence, the activities described above were inevitably treated as less urgent than they had been previously. 229

BEYOND MEXICO

DRUGS AND SECURITY IN 1993

Canadian public involvement in security aspects of anti-drugs activities in Latin America did not increase in any appreciable way in 1993. The Canadian connection with the U.S. on this matter no doubt became more concrete as time passed, and co-operation became a matter of routine. One issue alone seemed to suggest a much closer connection and it is not possible as yet to confirm the degree of importance which should be given to it. In the summer, the Commander of the Canadian Air Force attended the 33rd Conference of American Air Force Commanders. At that conference, in Santiago de Chile, the subject of mutual support and co-operation in anti-drugs operations came to the fore and, it is reported by normally highly reliable sources, the 23 commanders "agreed to promote cooperation in terms of (among other things) ... the struggle against drug trafficking."36 If Canada did agree to do more than share information indirectly through the United States, then this would be the first direct case of Latin American-Canadian defence cooperation in the fight against the drug trade. This could open up a large area of potential co-operation but also a plethora of problems for the Canadian Armed Forces and the government. The links between anti-drug operations and anti-guerrilla operations are close in many countries in Latin America, and there will doubtless be accusations that this country is joining the U.S. in intervening in other countries because such action is easier than addressing root causes of the drug trade at home. DIRECT DEFENCE CO-OPERATION

In the realm of direct Canada-Latin America defence co-operation, there was considerable expansion in 1993. Not only did Canada's Commander of the Air Force meet his hemispheric counterparts for the first time in Santiago, but so did the Commander of the Army. Canada had been invited before to such conferences but had, at best, only gone as an observer (like Mexico) and even then very sporadically. This year, it is clear, will mark the beginning of full membership in these conferences, the only meetings of their kind in the Americas, which had previously had a reputation for a 230

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

fervent Cold War mentality and domination by the United States. It remains to be seen if these aspects have both completely disappeared. As has been mentioned, in 1992 permission was given for a Salvadorean to take the Canadian Forces Staff College course; he attended during 1993. This is almost certainly the beginning of some, if limited, officer training for Latin Americans here in Canada on a regular basis. In addition, planning continues for exchanges with the armed forces of some Latin American countries, and Canada has become a favourite nation for this sort of co-operation. It represents a major departure from Canadian practice where Latin American armed forces are concerned, and no doubt reflects the new feeling in Ottawa that it is beneficial to expose these countries' soldiers, sailors and airmen to democratic armed forces bathed in traditions of human rights, subservience to civil authority, the rule of law, professionalism, and respect for roles such as peacekeeping, as well as to the concept of such status for the army as De Vigny's famous grande muette. CONCLUSION

The year 1993 has seen the continuation and acceleration of a growing Canadian interest in the security of this hemisphere, that interest extending beyond our traditional concerns with the United States and, to a very limited extent, the Commonwealth Caribbean. Ottawa has continued seeking to do what it can to anchor the democratic transition more solidly while also addressing regional security in a wide sense. Canada has acted both bilaterally and multilaterally to further these policy objectives and has found rather like-minded states such as Argentina a great help. On a regular basis, there is now policy analysis of issues which Canada could never have imagined addressing in the past. Its new status as an "American" country is being underscored by an active and forward security policy for the Americas; this policy is more than a change, it is virtually a complete reversal of what this country has known since Confederation. Canada is realizing that its contractual links with Mexico (and the United States, of course) are actually greater than those with the United Kingdom or France, and that this represents an enormous shift in its geopolitical and cultural situation. As its connections 231

BEYOND MEXICO

with Europe are reduced, and the difficulties of establishing close relations (including meaningful security arrangements) with Asia become obvious, the Americas are beginning to look like "home," whether Canadians like it or not, especially in this era of increasing tendency toward blocism. If these trends continue, Canada will be linked with the Americas in ways undreamed of a few short years ago. And for the first time, in security terms, the great asymmetries of North American political life will have no powerful counterpoise. The French Empire, the British Empire and Commonwealth, even NATO, where Canada was allied to the strong in facing those asymmetries, will be but memories. This country may, soon and for the first time, be allied to the weak. The consequences need not be negative but the shift is important. Beyond 1993, Canada must come to grips even more clearly with what it wants from the Americas, including security arrangements, and define ways in which this new partnership can be made to reinforce its own traditions of multilateralism and counterpoise politics which have served it so well and so long.

NOTES 1.

See Colonel John Joly, "ONUCA- A Story of Success in the Quest for Peace," Canadian Defence Quarterly 20 (6): 12-19. 2. Pierre Queuille, L'Amerique latine, la doctrine Monroe et le panamericanisme (Paris: Payot, 1969) 194-236. 3. For a full treatment of this topic, see Horacio L. Veneroni, Estados Unidos y lasfuerzas armadas de America latina (Buenos Aires, Editora Doce, 1989); and Lars Schoultz, National Security and United States Policy toward Latin America (Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1987) 143-90. 4. For the various elements of this story, see Queuille, L'Amerique latine, 228-36; Abraham Lowenthal, Partners in Conflict: The United States and Latin America in the 1990s (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1990) 30-34; Schoultz, National Security, pp.106-39; Ernesto Lopez, Doctrina de seguridad nacional (Caracas: Minidefensa, 1966); and E.V. Garcia-Amador, La Cuestion cubana en la OEA y la crisis del sistema interamericano (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1987) 13-99.

232

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

5. J.L. Granatstein, Ties that Bind: Canadian-American Relations in Wartime from the Great War to the Cold War (Toronto: Hakkert, 1977). 6. Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, pp.45-46; and H.P. Klepak, Canada and Latin America: Strategic Issues for the 1990s (Ottawa: Operational Research and Analysis Establishment, 1990) 223-24. 7. Augusto Varas, "Democratizacion, paz y seguridad en America latina," in Paz, seguridad y desarrollo en America latina, ed. Jose Silva Michelena (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1987) 165-88; and Edgardo Mercado Jarrin, Un Sistema de seguridad y defensa sudamericano (Lima: CONCYTEC, 1989) 158-62. 8. H.P. Klepak, "Security Issues in the Western Hemisphere of the 1990s: A Canadian Perspective," in A Dynamic Partnership: Canada's Changing Role in the Americas, eds. Jerry Haar and Edgar Dosman (Miami: University of Miami Press, 1993) 164-65. 9. Jack Child, The Central American Peace Process, 1983-1991 (Boulder CO: Lynne Rienner, 1992) 23-25, 50-51, 57; H.P. Klepak, Verification of a Central American Peace Accord, Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, Occasional Paper No.2, 1989. 10. See Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 209-19 and "Canada and the Andean Drug Wars," in Haar and Dosman eds., A Dynamic Partnership, 93-106; Klepak, Canada and Latin America, 203-21, and by the same author, "The Use of the Military against the Illicit Drug Trade," Jane's Intelligence Review (November 1992):525-28. 11. There had been, in 1930, a very small Royal Canadian Navy landing party put ashore to protect the lives of British Commonwealth citizens during the Salvadorean civil war, but they re-embarked only a few hours later. In addition, there had been Canadian soldiers in quite large numbers deployed to British dependencies in the Caribbean and South Atlantic areas during World War II in order to free British regulars for transfer to crucial fighting fronts. See Peter McFarlane, Northern Shadows: Canadians and Central America (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1989), for a short and highly critical look at the Salvadorean "intervention." 12. The United States had of course always opposed UN activity in the hemisphere, preferring the OAS as a regional organization it could easily dominate to an international body in which extra-hemispheric states having a droit de regard on what Washington considered its sphere of influence.

233

BEYOND MEXICO

13. See Child, The Central American Peace Process, pp.23-25; and Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 152-56; H. P. Klepak, Security Considerations and Verification of a Central American Arms Control Regime (Ottawa: Department of External Affairs, 1990) 50-53; and Liisa North, ed., Between War and Peace in Central America: Choices for Canada (Toronto: Between the Lines, 1990) 47-49, 189-91. 14. ONUCA, "ONUCA Observer" (Tegucigalpa: UN/Lithograph Press, 1990) 40-66. 15. ONUCA, "ONUCA Observer," pp.18-19; Ricardo Cordova Macias, "El Salvador: las negociaciones de paz bajo la mediacion de las Naciones Unidas," in Gabriel Aguilera, ed., Centroamerica ante las nuevas relaciones internacionales (Guatemala: FLACSO, 1992) 66; and ONUSAL, "ONUSAL como mecanismo de verificacion activa en materia de derechos humanos," 1993. 16. Klepak, Canada and Latin America, 181-84; Child, The Central American Peace Process, 8-9; Hector Faundez-Ledesma, "El Marco juridico institucional para la solution de conflictos en el sistema interamericano," in Silva Michelena, Paz, seguridady desarrollo, 252-56. 17. See Graeme Clark, "Some Thoughts on Canada and Latin American Security," in Canada and Latin American Security, ed. H. P. Klepak (Montreal: Meridian, 1993) 89-95. 18. See Robert E. Bedeski, "Unconventional Security Threats: An Overview," NPCSD Working Paper No.11 (Toronto, York University, May 1992). 19. See Clark, "Some thoughts," and chapters by Klepak in Canada and Latin American Security. 20. The present author, in a book chapter written as late as January 1992, was also still reluctant to believe Canada would take a truly leading role in this area from which it had almost formally excluded itself when joining the OAS. See in Haar and Dosman, A Dynamic Partnership, 167-68. 21. See, for example, Ambassador H. Patino Mayer's recent article entitled "Aportes a un nuevo concepto de seguridad hemisferica," in Seguridad Estrategica Regional, No. 4 (September 1993):84-89. It is worth noting that Argentina has been a prime mover in the area of regional security in recent years and has been a most helpful collaborator with Canada in this regard. 22. There are many excellent works on this subject. For its background, see John J.Johnson, The Military and Society in Latin America

234

SECURITY ISSUES IN LATIN AMERICA

23. 24.

25.

26.

27.

28. 29.

(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1964), pp.153-73; Alain Rouquie, L'Etat militaire enAmerique latine (Paris: Payot, 1982). For more current trends, see Frederick M. Nunn, The Time of the Generals: Latin American Professional Militarism in World Perspective (Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1992). For case studies of South and Central America, see respectively Carlos Juan Moneta, ed., Civiles y militares: fuerzas armadas y transicion democrdtica (Caracas: Nueva Sociedad, 1990), and Rodolfo Cerdas, ElDesencanto democrdtico: crisis de partidos y transicion democrdtica en Centroamerica y Panama (San Jose: Iberoamericana, 1993). Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 223. For significant works on the problem of drugs in Canada, and the measures to deal with it, see Bruce K. Alexander, Peaceful Measures: Canada's Way Out of the War on Drugs (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1990); Victor Malarek, Merchants of Misery: Inside Canada's Illegal Drug Scene (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1990). That part of Canada's anti-drugs assistance and training which is concerned with the Commonwealth Caribbean is much less open to criticism than that directed to countries in Latin America, where human rights and democracy problems remain. This has already occasioned some heavy criticism. See John Dent's paper, tabled but not presented at the January 1993 York University Conference "Counter-narcotics Policy in the Western Hemisphere," with the title "Militarization of Drug Policy: Canada and the U.S. War on Drugs," and Marci McDonald's two articles in The Toronto Star, published on October 12 and 13, 1993, respectively, and entitled "NORAD as Drug Cop" and "Canada's Role in the Rebirth of Star Wars." Latin American security perspectives on this issue are found in Jarrin, Un Sistema de seguridad, 110; Alejandro Deustua, El Narcotrd/ico y el interes nacional: un andlisis en la perspectiva internacional (Lima: CEPEI, 1987) 137; Guy Delbrel, Geopolitique de la drogue (Paris: La Decouverte, 1991) 97-158; and Diego GarciaSayan, ed., Coca, cocainay narcotrdfico: laberinto en los Andes (Lima, Comision andina de juristas, 1989) 131-222. This work is cited in footnote 17: Klepak, ed., Canada and Latin American Security. It should be remembered, however, that the UN (and Canada) have expressed the hope that negotiations between the Guatemalan

235

BEYOND MEXICO

30.

31.

32.

33. 34.

35.

36.

government and the URNG guerrillas will soon lead to a peace settlement in that country, and to their willingness to help with the implementation of such accords. A continuing commitment in Central America, after the peace agreements in El Salvador have been implemented, is therefore a distinct possibility, both for the UN and for Canada. See Child, The Central American Peace Process, 137-40. ONUSAL, "VI Informe del Director de la Division de derechos humanos al Secretario General," UN Publication A/47/912, April, 1993. Even tiny Costa Rica, proud of its tradition of being unarmed, has had personnel from its Civil Guard serving in Cambodia. Mexico, reticent about peacekeeping in general, has nonetheless provided police trainers and observers for ONUSAL. There have been complaints about corruption in some Latin American units, and also some adverse comments about the human rights records and attitudes of some individuals from these countries. These concerns must be taken seriously in view of the wide mandates given to the UN missions at this time. Julio Horacio Rube et al, "El Ejercito argentine: fuerza de paz de la UN," in Revista Militar, No.725 (1992):6-13. Hugo Luis Cargnelutti, Seguridad interamericana: & Un subsistema del sistema interamericano? (Buenos Aires: Circulo Militar, 1993) 70-72; and Rodolfo Garrie Faget, Organismos militares interamericanos (Buenos Aires: Depalma, 1968) 11-41. France also sent a warship to beef up the blockade conducted mainly by the U.S., and Venezuela and Argentina both offered military assistance. "Military leaders, space cooperation and drug trafficking," in Drug Trafficking Updated (July 12, 1993) 6.

236

XI

CHANGING DIRECTIONS? CHALLENGES FACING CANADIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN LATIN AMERICA Laura Macdonald Changer de voie ? Le defi latino-americain des organisations non-gouvernementales canadiennes Resume : II n'y a pas que 1'ordre etatique mondial qui soil nouveau; 1'univers des organisations non-gouvernementales (ONG) canadiennes est lui aussi bouleverse. La fin de la guerre froide a favorise ici aussi un declin de 1'aide au developpement destine au tiersmonde, niais elle ouvre la possibilite d'un role accru pour les ONG dans la definition des politiques de developpement. L'ACDI a aussi reoriente sa politique d'aide, reduisant son appui aux agences gouvernementales des pays du tiers-monde et misant de facon croissante sur le secteur des ONG, tant canadiennes que locales. Ces dernieres, d'ailleurs, parties integrantes de societes civiles de plus en plus fortes, sont plus sophistiquees et sures d'elles que jamais auparavant : les ONG du tiersmonde, et tout particulierement d'Amerique latine, reclament main tenant une autonomie accrue et la fin des rapports paternalistes qui les unissaient a leurs partenaires du Nord. Enfin, la liberali-

sation du commerce et 1'emergence d'enormes blocs economiques remettent en question la pertinence des activites traditionnellement locales des ONG en replacant les enjeux fondamentaux du developpement au niveau global. La legitimite meme des organisations non-gouvernementales etde leurs activites est remise en cause par ces changements. Pour repondre au defi qu'ils posent, les ONG canadiennes doivent reorienter leurs activites, laisser un peu de cote 1'economie pour concentrer leurs efforts sur le politique et cibler de facon privilegiee le global aux depens du local. Une partie croissante de leur travail doit maintenant etre faite au Canada, prenant la forme de pressions politiques dirigees tant aux politiques d'aide qu'a la politique etrangere et commerciale du gouvernement canadien. Enfin, la necessite de s'attaquer aux tendances globales de 1'economie politique internationale implique une alliance plus etroite non seulement avec les ONGdu tiers-monde, mais aussi avec les mouvements sociaux du Nord et du Sud qui travaillent a batir un futur plus juste.

BEYOND MEXICO

AS CANADIAN NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS (NGOS) providing development assistance to Latin America approach the 21st century, they are facing profound challenges to the way they think about themselves and their work. In some ways, these challenges arise from the previous successes of development NGOs, but they nevertheless call into question the raison d'etre of these organizations. Like other elements of the international aid regime, NGOs were strongly marked by the geopolitical and economic forces of the postWorld War II period. During these years, official and non-official aid agencies shifted from providing short-term charity and relief toward longer-term "development" goals, with both Northern and Southern NGOs playing an important role in expanding local subsistence economies and levels of community organization. NGOs also developed strong reputations among the public for delivering aid efficiently, honestly and effectively. Although NGOs' contributions were quite significant, the fundamental assumptions of this aid regime have been increasingly undermined in recent years. Cutbacks in government funding for development assistance to the South are placing financial pressure on Canadian NGOs. The failure of NGOs and other development actors to counteract the growing gap between living conditions in North and South, as well as increased demands from NGOs in the South for greater autonomy, have created substantial pressures for change from both within and outside the NGO community. In order to maintain the legitimacy which is their main strength, Canadian NGOs working in Latin America will have to shift their focus away from economic to more political goals, away from local to more global issues. Their ability to do so, however, is severely constrained by the institutional structures, funding mechanisms, and attitudes inherited from the previous period. Only a few NGOs have really begun to face this challenge. Somewhat surprisingly, it is the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA) which is in some ways promoting this shift by identifying two key roles for NGOs: supporting civil society in the South, and creating linkages between civil societies in North and South. However, NGOs do not necessarily agree with CIDA, or among themselves, as to what this reorientation of their traditional roles would mean in practice. This chapter outlines some of the current constraints on the activities of Canadian NGOs working in Latin America and some of 238

CHANGING DIRECTIONS

the opportunities available to them. These factors have particular significance because of the importance of Latin America for many Canadian NGOs, because of the strength of civil society and NGOs in Latin America, and because of the tendency toward regionalization which is bringing civil societies in Canada and Latin America closer together. CANADIAN NGOS AND THE AID REGIME

NGOs often present themselves as autonomous organizations, sprung from Canadian civil society and motivated by concerns ranging from charity to solidarity. While this picture conveys much truth, it ignores the active part played by the Canadian state in promoting the emergence of Canadian NGOs, as well as the broader international context. According to Keith Griffin, the international aid regime which emerged after World War II was a product of the Cold War: Were it not for the Cold War there would have been no foreign aid programs worthy of the name, for without the Cold War it would have been impossible to generate the domestic political support in the donor countries necessary to sustain foreign assistance for more than four decades.1 One reason that aid flows took primarily the form of bilateral assistance was geopolitical: donors wanted to support friendly regimes and win political influence. Canada's aid program was also marked by its anti-Communist origins. While the language of the Cold War was generally more muted in Canada than in the United States, the same objectives were reflected in the justification of Canada's first exercise in official development assistance (ODA), the Colombo Plan. Lester B. Pearson described the deliberations of the Colombo Conference to the House of Commons in February 1950 in the following terms: Communist expansionism may now spill over into southeast Asia as well as into the Middle East.... It seemed to all of us at the conference that if the tide of totalitarian expansionism should flow over this general area, not only will the new nations lose the national independence which they have secured so recently, but the forces of the free world will have been driven off all but a relatively small bit of the great Eurasian land mass.... 239

BEYOND MEXICO

If southeast Asia and south Asia are not to be conquered by communism, we of the free democratic world ... must demonstrate that it is we and not the Russians who stand for national liberation and economic and social progress.2

Canada's official aid program initially concentrated on support to newly decolonized countries of the British Commonwealth, reflecting Canada's historical ties to the Empire. The program subsequently expanded into former French colonies in response to Quebec nationalism. Latin America was viewed, however, as part of the U.S. sphere of influence, and Canada only began delivering bilateral aid to that region in 1971.3 When CIDA was established in 1968, a Non-Governmental Division was created which disbursed $5 million to 20 agencies in its first year.4 Public support for these programs, as well as the agency's development education work, helped mobilize Canadian support for the broader aid program. NGO assistance was also seen as a useful way of attending to the needs of Third World populations marginalized by processes of "modernization," thus forestalling dangerous instability. During the 1980s, the percentage of total Canadian ODA channelled through the voluntary sector (including NGO food aid and International Humanitarian Assistance) increased from 9 percent of the total budget in 1980-81 to 18 percent in 1990-91.5 With private contributions included, the international development work of Canadian NGOs in 1989-90 could be valued at over half a billion dollars.6 NGO assistance thus represents some 20 percent of Canada's total aid effort. Canada's 220 NGOs range in size from organizations like World Vision Canada, with an annual operating budget of over $25 million, to small bodies such as Comite de solidarite Tiers Monde, with an annual budget of under $100,000.7 A breakdown of the Canadian governmental and non-governmental aid by region shows that Canadian NGOs have displayed considerably more interest in, and contacts with, Latin America than the state agency. While as a region the countries of the Americas receive the lowest percentage of total Canadian ODA, they receive the highest percentage of ODA channelled through NGOs (See table 9). The interest of Canadian NGOs in Latin America has been related to the strength of NGOs and social movements in that region. 240

CHANGING DIRECTIONS

Table 9 Percentage of Total Canadian ODA by Region Anglophone Africa

25

Francophone Africa

22

The Americas

15

Asia

38

Percentage of ODA through Voluntary Channels Anglophone Africa

11

Francophone Africa

7

The Americas

24

Asia

7

Source: SECOR Group, Strategic Management Review Working Document.

Even if it was not their conscious objective, Canadian NGOs have contributed to the strength and diversity of civil societies in Latin America by supporting these groups. As the size of the NGO sector has expanded, the nature of the work NGOs do and the way they think about their role in development has also evolved. When they first emerged, they primarily provided relief and welfare assistance. In the 1960s and 1970s, they began to shift their efforts toward the implementation of development projects, aiming thereby to increase local communities' capacity for self-reliant development. In more recent years, frustration with what can be achieved at the local level has led to increased efforts by some NGOs to change development policies at the national and international levels, and so remove the macro-economic constraints on local initiatives.8 While NGOs have their origins in the humanitarian impulses of civil society, they also form part of the broader aid regime. Some Canadian NGOs working in Latin America have gradually become more politicized; they have publicly opposed some Canadian state policies, particularly government response to the 1973 Chilean coup d'etat and the Central American crisis of the 1980s. However, the 241

BEYOND MEXICO

large majority of NGOs continue to view their roles as apolitical and humanitarian. Many, especially the large agencies, are little different from state contractors, without distinct values or goals. The apparent autonomy of NGOs has thus concealed the extent to which NGO assistance complemented official Canadian foreign policy in the context of the Cold War. The nature of specific NGOs' ties to the Canadian public also varies widely. In some cases, public participation is limited to donations. Other NGOs have extensive volunteer programs and development education activities, and work with specific sectors of the Canadian public such as trade unions or women's organizations in order to ground themselves more deeply in Canadian civil society. The sector also includes institutions such as universities, colleges, trade unions, professional associations and cooperatives, which fund activities of counterpart organizations in the Third World (these are referred to by CIDA as Non-Governmental Institutions or NGIs). Over the years, the steadily expanding funding for NGOs led to a sense of complacency among many of the larger agencies, especially those heavily dependent on state funding. Moreover, increased professionalism diluted some of the original ethical concerns which had initially led to the formation of NGOs. However, this complacency has been shaken by several converging forces in the late 1980s. THE "NEW WORLD ORDER": IMPLICATIONS FOR NGOS

Several recent changes in the world have called into question the traditional orientation of Canadian NGOs. The first change, the end of the Cold War, has brought both constraints and opportunities. The end of the competition between the superpowers and their allies for influence in the Third World, together with a global recession, has led to a decline in ODA levels. ODA is also increasingly oriented toward commercial objectives and toward the countries of the former Eastern bloc. These trends have been apparent in recent ODA cuts in Canada which have led to decreased NGO funding. Assistance to NGOs decreased by approximately 8 percent in 19929 (in contrast to earlier years when the budget for NGOs was increasing annually by 10 to 12 percent). Meanwhile, widespread "donor fatigue" in the Canadian public has made it difficult for NGOs to appeal to the public for alternative sources of funding. 242

CHANGING DIRECTIONS

On the other hand, the decline in international ideological tensions has created some potential opportunities for NGOs to take a more active role in defining international development policy. Tim Draimin, policy director for the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (CCIC), the umbrella group of Canadian development NGOs, points out: A democratization of policy-making is occurring, because the political system is less paranoid ideologically and because of the recession. There is a crisis of the legitimacy of existing institutions which has led to the search for new, more consultative institutions. The government is looking for new ideas and new legitimacy, based on social consensus.10

According to Draimin, this "policy gap" means NGOs in Canada now have much more access to decision-makers, although this does not necessarily translate into more influence. CCIC's role is to develop tools for promoting dialogue between government and NGOs, and to equip the latter to make the transition toward a more policyconscious role. The organization is currently negotiating a $1.5 million grant from CIDA to support policy advocacy and policy development. CIDA is also rethinking the way in which it gives aid, and this has major implications for the role of NGOs. During the Cold War, foreign aid tended to enlarge the role of Third World states and increase their power relative to civil society.11 The end of the Cold War has been followed by greater emphasis among Western donors on human rights and democratic development. At the same time, a shift away from traditional "humane internationalism" toward more neo-liberal philosophies has led Canada to support structural adjustment programs promoted by the International Monetary Fund and other international financial institutions.12 These programs include decreased support for state agencies while according an important role to NGOs, who are called upon to provide services to marginalized populations which have suffered the effects of state cutbacks. A senior CIDA official says that the Canadian partnership branch, which funds both NGOs and private companies, is now "coming into its own" because of the increased recognition of the importance of funding "civil society" in the Third World.13 For several 243

BEYOND MEXICO

years, some Canadian NGOs have been urging the Canadian government to recognize the critical role civil society plays in processes of development and democratization. For example, a 1990 CCIC report, which proposed a co-operative program of Canadian NGO funding in Central America, argued that "the broad popular movement, including the organizations, associations, and federations of various sectors of society—the so-called civil society—has become the primary agent for peace in the various countries in the region."14 In the last year, however, CIDA has taken the lead in reconceptualizing the roles of both government and NGOs in development. This move is in line with the increased recourse to neoliberal prescriptions which recommend limiting the role of the state in development, and placing increased emphasis on the role of the market. Thus a 1993 policy document states: For decades, international development assistance has been primarily directed to and through governments in the belief they knew best. However, this belief in a providential, all powerful state, providing its citizens with all their needs, has few adherents today even among governments. In its place, as a new and complementary partner in development, is an emerging, dynamic, enlightened, and contentious, civil society, defined as all those voluntary associations of people outside the realm of government but including private enterprise.... While the state provides the various forms and organizations of government to carry out public functions, it is civil society which creates the values and normative framework for governance and private enterprise.15

Based on these assumptions, the document argues that "enhancing the strategic linkages and fostering the most effective and efficient partnerships between like-minded organizations and people in Northern and Southern civil societies"16 would be the most effective way to support civil society in the South. One of the most important elements in this renewal in aid policy is increased consultation between government and NGOs, providing greater opportunity for NGO participation in policy development discussed above. This reorientation of CIDA policy represents a substantial shift in official thinking on development assistance. In its response, CCIC welcomes the document as a "very welcome and major step in the evolution of greater transparency and dialogue in the CIDA-NGO 244

CHANGING DIRECTIONS

relationship,"17 but calls for an understanding of the unique contribution of the voluntary sector (as opposed to the private sector) within civil society, and for CIDA's recognition of NGO autonomy. A final important factor in the reshaping of the work of NGOs is the increased sophistication and assertiveness of NGOs and social movements in the South. Southern NGOs have become increasingly critical of the paternalism and excessive intervention of northern NGOs. For example, the Manila Declaration on People's Participation and Sustainable Development, issued by 31 NGO leaders from around the world, states that foreign assistance "too often has contributed more to the problem than to its solution. It places the initative and responsibility in the hands of foreigners rather than in the hands of the people."18 NGOs in the South are encouraging their "partners" to focus their efforts on lobbying, advocacy and education work in the North in order to address the power structures which constrain local efforts at development. Many Canadian NGOs will ignore or make only marginal accommodations to these demands, preferring to maintain their control and power over the process of aid delivery. A significant number of NGOs are, however, sufficiently value-driven to respond to these demands from the South. As well, CIDA is currently revising the nature of funding to NGOs (shifting toward institutional support and away from project funding), and the new criteria for evaluation of Canadian NGOs include consideration of their relationships with their counterparts in the South. The experience of NGOs working in Central America provides a concrete example of the changing relationship between CIDA and Canadian NGOs. During the 1980s, many NGOs were strongly critical of the impact of U.S. foreign policy in Central America, and they called on the Canadian government to adopt a more independent foreign policy toward the region. Many, for example, strongly opposed the Canadian government's 1984 decision to renew bilateral assistance to El Salvador. Canadian aid was believed to legitimize the government of Jose Napoleon Duarte, and to support its counter-insurgency policy. The government's decision to provide aid to El Salvador through a Canadian NGO, the Canadian Hunger Foundation (CHF), fomented considerable dissension within the Canadian NGO community. In fact, CHF withdrew from CCIC after the Council's public denunciation of the resumption of aid to El Salvador. 245

BEYOND MEXICO

In general, then, NGO attitudes toward Canadian foreign policy in Central America in the late 1980s were critical and confrontational. On the government side, Canadian officials were aloof and suspicious toward NGOs19 and resisted NGO attempts to link issues of aid delivery with broader political and human rights issues. This distant relationship was largely conditioned, however, by Canada's unwillingness to criticize the Reagan administration's belligerent policy in the region. The end of the Cold War and the peace accords reached in Central America have created a climate in which increased dialogue between the Canadian state and Canadian NGOs on policy issues is possible. This changing relationship can be seen in the work of the Central America Monitoring Group (CAMG) .20 The group was formed in 1988, at the height of the civil war in El Salvador, by eleven Canadian NGOs supporting partner organizations in that country.21 In this period, progressive Salvadorean NGOs (particularly the churches) were facing attempts by the Salvadorean government to block the delivery of material assistance to the popular sectors, which were being subjected to a campaign of assassination and intimidation by death squads. These organizations called on their partners abroad to denounce the government's actions and support their right to do political work in a civilian manner. The Monitoring Group was formed to take on this type of advocacy and lobbying work, based on shared analysis and information, in order to protect what was called the "humanitarian space" of their partners. In effect, this meant protecting the sphere of civil society against state and para-statal repression. The group organized fact-finding missions to El Salvador and produced several briefs to Parliament. CAMG has experienced a significant shift in the character of its relations with CIDA and External Affairs. In its early briefs, CAMG was very critical of Canadian policy in the region and insisted on the need to incorporate advocacy of the broad range of human rights (civil, political, social, economic and cultural) into the pursuit of peace and democracy in Central America. In the early 1990s, CAMG's activity has focused increasingly on Guatemala, and particularly on support of the return of refugees from Mexico. The member agencies have undertaken joint programming work to assist displaced people, and the Canadian embassy in Guatemala is giving active and positive support. Former ambassador 246

CHANGING DIRECTIONS

Brian Dickson has played a leading role in assisting returning refugees, and the embassy's willingness to facilitate asylum for those who have to leave the country rapidly is perceived as particularly helpful, as is its support for human rights organizations like the Grupo de Apoyo Mutual (GAM). The embassy has also been an active participant in the International Group for Consultation and Support to the Return (GRICAR), comprised of four representatives of embassies in Guatemala. The GRICAR was formed to promote respect for the 1992 accords signed between the Guatemalan government and the refugees planning to return. While the CAMG continues to exercise pressure on the Canadian government, strategies now focus on specific policy issues rather than on philosophical critique. According to Jean Symes of Inter Pares, former co-ordinator of CAMG: "Once the Cold War was over the government was more comfortable taking on the rhetoric of human rights." This allowed NGOs to "take on more of a protagonistic role because the government was willing to listen to us."22 It will, however, be apparent from what follows that basic philosophical differences remain over the nature of civil society and the process of democratization in Central America. The degree to which the discourse of the Canadian government has come to resemble that of the NGOs, as well as the continuing differences, can be observed in the process leading up to CIDA's 1993 decision to create a new $1.5 million Democratic Development Fund for Guatemala by 1995. The parameters of the fund in many ways reflect the demands and values of NGOs in both Canada and Guatemala, as well as CIDA's increased emphasis on the role of civil society. While the program includes activities which strengthen "governance systems" and promote reform of state institutions, it also extends to the promotion of "confidence-building and dialogue between groups, especially between elements of civil society and its formal institutions." CIDA also specifies that an important criterion for funding will be the use of the Fund "as a vehicle for strengthening relationships and synergy between Canadian NGOs in Guatemala and between Canadian and local NGOs."23 In addition to inviting Canadian NGOs to bid on the administration of the program, CIDA also sent a memo to CCIC outlining the proposal and asking for comments. In its response, CAMG welcomes the opportunity to provide input on the Fund's design as an 247

BEYOND MEXICO

"important step towards evolution of greater transparency and dialogue in the CIDA-NGO relationship."24 CAMG insists that moves toward democratization in Guatemala have been propelled from below, not from the state level. In this context, CAMG provides an important statement about the nature of civil society and the role of development assistance in democratization which is worth quoting at some length: The terrain of civil society is the nexus of groups and organizations outside of the market and formal political society. By civil society we mean the dynamic of these groups engaging amongst themselves, to a greater or lesser extent, in a process of alliance-building, confrontation, conflict and negotiation, as well as promoting and defending their selfdefined interests vis-a-vis the state. When civil society is vibrant it encompasses a wide set of actors and their inter-relationships: from bankers' associations to women's soup kitchens. In the Guatemalan context, then, it becomes clear that there is nothing intrinsically pro-democratic in "strengthening civil society" as a whole. Most Guatemalans are either outside civil society, or tenaciously on its margins, their more active participation deterred by structural economic, social, political and cultural barriers. Moreover, many elements of civil society are opposed to the democratic participation of all sectors, and some continue to actively impede such participation through physical, economic, or political means ... To strengthen the process of democratization in Guatemala, therefore, we must strengthen the capacity of those who stand most to gain from a democratic social and political order to participate more fully in civil society—those who have been historically marginalized from Guatemala's formal and informal decision-making processes: women, indigenous peoples, victims of the violence, rural communities, the displaced, workers and campesinos?5

This statement contests the neo-liberal assumptions embedded in CIDA's view of civil society and points to opportunities for further dialogue between NGOs and CIDA. In general, then, CAMG has been quite successful in taking advantage of new space for dialogue between NGOs and the state on issues of human rights and democratic development.

248

CHANGING DIRECTIONS

GLOBALIZATION AND REGIONAL INTEGRATION: A MACROECONOMIC ROLE FOR NCOS?

In addition to the end of the Cold War there is a challenge facing the Canadian NGOs which is potentially much more profound; it is the ongoing process of globalization of capital and the accompanying shift toward the formation of regional economic blocs. According to Tim Draimin, Canadian NGOs are having to reconcile their success with micro-projects with the fact that overall conditions are worsening, at least for the Third World. For some time, Latin American NGOs have been pushing their Northern partners to take a reduced role in project implementation and instead increase their activism against the major obstacles presented by the North to their achieving alternative development models.26 However, Canadian NGOs have insufficient skills, money, political will, alliances, and political influence to produce much of an impact on these global economic processes. To date, their main concerns at this level have focused on the structural adjustment programs (SAPs), imposed on Third World states as conditions for funding by international funding institutions (iFIs) such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund. The Canadian churches have been particularly vocal on this issue. In 1991 they issued a strong critique of Canadian ODA policies, recommending that CIDA no longer link Canadian bilateral assistance to the acceptance of IMF conditions.27 This report resulted in a spirited and somewhat bitter exchange between the churches and CIDA. Recently, as part of its preparation for the Foreign Policy Review process initiated by the new Liberal government, CCIC—one of the organizations which had pressed for the review— also called for the "democratization" of orthodox structural adjustment programs. The NGOs argue that structural adjustment is necessary in many Third World countries, but that current neo-liberal forms of adjustment have a harsh impact on the poor, especially on women, and also undermine environmental sustainability. While preoccupied by the effects of globalization and structural adjustment, some Canadian NGOs working in Latin America have also expressed concern about the impact of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and its possible extension to other countries of the hemisphere. Some of the most politically active NGOs, as 249

BEYOND MEXICO

well as the mainline churches, are members of Common Frontiers, a popular sector working group formed in response to the NAFTA talks. Common Frontiers promotes trinational linkages among popular sector groups in Canada, the United States and Mexico which focus on the developmental, labour, environmental, and human rights implications of NAFTA. However, not all NGO members have been very active in Common Frontiers, and many NGOs resist expressing political opinions on such sensitive political issues. Sandra Sorenson, chairperson of the Action Canada Network, a coalition of popular sector groups in Canada which has led the fight against the Canada-U.S. free trade agreement and against NAFTA, says the obstacle is not a lack of commitment to the issue but principally the very different organizational culture of the development NGOs: The motivation for development NGOs in Canada has primarily been to be in the world. Whatever work was done in Canada was done out of a view of solidarity linkage which still had a face to the South rather than here. Linkage was the key issue. Whereas now, what we learned with the Free Trade Agreement and now NAFTA was, in fact, that it was through this free trade deal that we actually began to move into the world in a strategic way. It wasn't just that we needed to have solidarity and linkage programs but that it was a strategic necessity that progressive organizations establish long-term relationships of trust, movement-to-movement and sector-by-sector.28

Sorenson recognizes that it is an enormous challenge to build an organizational culture trinationally. She thinks it has been more difficult for international NGOs to establish these kinds of relationships because of how they are perceived in the South: 'They have been cash cows. It's not a relationship of equals." Also, the organizational structure of the NGOs has created a split between international and domestic divisions, "with a lack of legitimacy given to the domestic, and the real power base controlled outside of the country. Their interest in Canada was never as great as their interest in the South." Canadian NGOs may become more active in response to regional integration as some of their traditional partners in countries further south are affected by it. In an attempt to broaden the discussion of regional integration beyond North America, some NGO members of Common Frontiers, in late 1993, organized a four-member 250

CHANGING DIRECTIONS

delegation to Peru, Bolivia, Colombia and Chile; the delegation visited popular sector groups formed around opposition and alternatives to economic integration. Representatives of similar networks in Mexico and Central America joined the group for their final meetings in Santiago. The delegation's purpose was to communicate the Canadian free trade experience to groups in the South and to learn from their experience of structural adjustment and the neoliberal economic model. It is hoped that these initial contacts will lead to strategies for long-term co-operation.29 Other NGO initiatives in response to NAFTA include a paper entitled the "Principles of Fair Trade," produced by the CCIC InterAgency Working Group on Latin America and adopted by the CCIC board in 1993. Rather than specifically denouncing the NAFTA, the document argues that trade agreements must be based on "an appropriate vision of social justice and environmental sustainability."30 CCIC views the Foreign Policy Review process initiated by the new Liberal government as an opportunity for broader consultation and policy advocacy on a wide range of issues. Through consultation with its member groups, CCIC has developed four policy papers for use in various forums to present NGO views on current Canadian policies and possible alternatives. In addition to presenting such alternatives to the incoming government, CCIC is pressing its member organizations to devote more of their time and resources to advocacy work. The CCIC policy paper on economic justice casts doubt on neo-liberal orthodoxy on trade: The social, political, cultural and ethical implications of trade arrangements should not be divorced from or regarded as secondary to purely economic criteria. Trade agreements must be based on an appropriate vision of social justice and environmental sustainability. To ensure fairness, Canada should pursue trade policies that have as their basic goals: 1) the satisfaction of basic human needs; 2) increasing social equity; and 3) ecological sustainability.31 After the documents were written, CCIC held a Foreign Policy Review conference in February 1994. Participants supported a call for the establishment for a trinational non-governmental forum to monitor the impact of NAFTA on human rights in Canada, the U.S., and Mexico. 257

BEYOND MEXICO

At present, only a few development NGOs, apart from the churches, view advocacy as a major component of their work. The churches have taken the lead in lobbying and advocacy, partly because of moral and ethical commitments. The pursuit of ecumenism has also led to the formation of interchurch coalitions around specific areas or issues, which make policy work more feasible. Secular NGOs will need to undertake fundamental reforms in their internal structures and guiding principles, as well as their relationships with other NGOs, if they are to respond to the macro-economic forces and international institutions which largely determine the development future of most Third World peoples. CONCLUSIONS

This is a moment of considerable risk but also considerable opportunity for Canadian NGOs working in Latin America. Changes in the international system have fundamentally altered the context within which NGOs operate, requiring them to think creatively about their future directions. The poor and working peoples of the South have not responded passively to changes in the international system, and the socially disruptive consequences of globalization have already given rise to social movements among women, environmentalists, peace activists, trade unions, indigenous peoples, and others; these create the opportunity for global connections and alternatives.32 During the Cold War era, NGOs in the South increased dramatically in size, number and institutional capacity. While some are parasitical in nature, seeking funding at whatever cost, most are connected to domestic social movements and are unwilling to accept the subordinate role in which they have traditionally been cast by northern NGOs. They are increasingly demanding autonomy, and calling upon northern NGOs to take a more active role in development education and advocacy. CIDA has also moved with this shift in orientation. While external obstacles remain, the primary limitations on adoptions by NGOs of this more pro-active and policy-oriented direction are internal. As Brian Murphy, of Inter Pares, explains: We in the international NGOs have a dilemma: by and large, we were not created to do what we now want to do, and what we are being called upon to do.... Our structures and capacities have not developed in a way 252

CHANGING DIRECTIONS

that facilitates flexible or "automatic" response to new realities, or even our own learning. In some ways our structures and capacities impede response to more radical, or even merely independent, interpretations of reality, let alone a more dynamic way of framing a new and vibrant vision of what is possible. There is evidence that we are not even capable of responding to the minimal challenge coming from CIDA in its own review process. We are experiencing the limitations of our institutions and the contradictions that they represent in the real world.33

A CIDA official also notes that NGOs have been as critical of CIDA policies as might have been expected. According to that official, however, the policy input of NGOs, with few exceptions, has not been strong. It is often focused on the funding mechanisms for NGOs rather than substantive policy issues; even on the issue of cuts in CIDA assistance, NGO voices have been relatively muted.34 To become more effective in responding to the global and local changes which shape their work in Latin America, NGOs will need to develop new skills in policy analysis and advocacy. More fundamentally, however, they will need to discover shared values which differentiate NGOs from the private and public sectors. These values need to go beyond the humanitarian impulses which motivated NGOs in their early years; more egalitarian relationships must be developed with NGOs and social movements in the South. And in order to handle the broader structural forces in the international political economy, NGOs need to develop closer alliances with social movements both in Canada and abroad which are working for a more just future.

NOTES 1. Keith Griffin, "Foreign Aid After the Cold War," Development and Changed (1991): 647. 2. Quoted in Keith Spicer, "Clubmanship Upstaged: Canada's Twenty Years in the Colombo Plan," International Journal 25 (1) (Winter 1969-70): 25. 3. Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 77. 4. See Laura Macdonald, "Current and Future Directions for Canadian NGOs in Latin America," in Haar and Dosman, eds., A Dynamic Partnership, 113-31.

253

BEYOND MEXICO

5. SECOR Group, Strategic Management Review Working Document, a study completed for the Canadian International Development Agency, October 9, 1991, p.49/1. 6. Ian Smillie, "A Time to Build Up: New Forms of Co-operation Between NGOs and CIDA," a study commissioned by the Canadian Council for International Cooperation (Ottawa December 1991), p.8. 7. Tim Brodhead and Brent Herbert-Copley, Bridges of Hope? Canadian Voluntary Agencies and the Third World (Ottawa: North-South Institute, 1988) 9. 8. David C. Korten, Getting to the 21st Century: Voluntary Action and the Global Agenda (West Hartford CT: Kumarian Press, 1990). 9. Tim Draimin, Interview, Ottawa, October 1993. 10. Interview, Ottawa, October 28, 1994. 11. Griffin, "Foreign Aid," 670. 12. Cranford Pratt, Some Lessons from the Last Time Around: Canadian International Development Assistance and the 1994 Foreign Policy Review (Ottawa: North-South Institute, November 1993). 13. Interview, Hull, January 1994. 14. CCIC, Canadian NGO Options in the Context of the Central American Peace Process—Towards a Canadian NGO Cooperative Program in Central America, Ottawa, April 1990, pp.8-9. 15. CIDA, Canadian Partnership Branch. Canadian Partnership Branch: Integrating Change, Hull: unpublished document, 1993, p.2. 16. Ibid., p. 2, emphases in original. 17. CCIC, Development Policy Unit, "Notes on 'Canadian Partnership Branch: Integrating Change.'" Ottawa: unpublished document, May, 1993, p.l. 18. Manila Declaration on People's Participation and Sustainable Development, Appendix A in Korten, Getting to the 21st Century, 21721. 19. Rochlin, Discovering the Americas, 129. 20. Information in this section is largely based on an interview with Gauri Sreenivasan, co-ordinator of the Central America Monitoring Group, Ottawa, January 26, 1994. 21. The CAMG currently has 16 members including NGOs, churches and human rights groups; as well, Amnesty International, which was formerly a member, now has consultative status. The group's original name was the El Salvador Monitoring Group; the name was changed in 1990 in order to place its activity in a regional context.

254

CHANGING DIRECTIONS

22. Interview, Ottawa, March 1994. 23. CIDA, Americas Branch. "Aide-Memoire: Democratic Development Fund for Guatemala," Hull: unpublished document, 1993. 24. AMG, "CAMG Response Document to CIDA Concerning the Democratic Development Fund for Guatemala," Ottawa: unpublished document, October 27, 1993. 25. CAMG, "CAMG Response Document to CIDA," October 27, 1993, p.3, emphasis in original. 26. Brian Tomlinson, "Critical (and Personal) Reflections on CIDA's 'Sharing Our Future' and its Implications for CUSO Programming," Ottawa: unpublished document, 1989. 27. Interchurch Fund for International Development, Churches' Committee on International Affairs, Canadian Council of Churches. Diminishing Our Future. CIDA: Four Years After Winegard. Toronto: 1991, p.10. 28. Interview, Ottawa, February 1994. 29. Interview, Paul Mably, OXFAM Canada, Ottawa, January 1994. 30. CCIC. "Working Paper on Principles of Fair Trade," Ottawa: unpublished document, April 20, 1993. 31. CCIC. "'Economic Justice—Toward a Just and Sustainable Canadian Foreign Policy,' a discussion paper based on NGO submissions to the CCIC's Foreign Policy Review," January 1994, pp.23-24. 32. Robert W. Cox, "The Global Political Economy and Social Choice," in The New Era of Global Competition: State Policy and Market Power, eds. Daniel Drache and Meric S. Gertler (Montreal & Kingston: McGillQueen's University Press, 1991) 335. 33. Brian K. Murphy, "Towards the 21st Century: Reflections on the Future of Canadian NGOs," Ottawa: unpublished document, October 1993, p.5. 34. Interview, Hull, January 1994.

255

This page intentionally left blank

CONTRIBUTORS Jean Daudelin est docteur en science politique et charge de projet a la Fondation canadienne pour les Ameriques. Ses recherches et publications portent entre autre sur les problemes de democratisation et de violence politique en Amerique centrale et au Bresil. Dr. Gustavo del Castillo Vera obtained his Ph.D. from the University of Texas at Austin. He is a research faculty member at the Colegio de la Frontera Norte, in Tijuana, and has published extensively on the political economy of North America. Edgar J. Dosman is Executive Director of the Canadian Foundation for the Americas and a Senior Fellow at the Centre for Research on Latin America and the Caribbean at York University. He has published widely on Canadian defence and foreign policy. W. E. (Ted) Hewitt is Associate Professor of Sociology at the University of Western Ontario in London. He is author of Base Christian Communities and Social Change in Brazil (1991) and currently researching municipal exchange programs between Canada and the developing world. Hal P. Klepak teaches at the Royal Military College of Canada, in Kingston, and is Director of Security Programs at the Canadian Foundation for the Americas. He has published widely on international security affairs. Laura Macdonald is Assistant Professor at the Department of Political Science at Carleton University in Ottawa. Her forthcoming book, Supporting Civil Society: The Political Impact of Non-Governmental Assistance to Central America, is being published by Macmillan Press. Peter McKenna is Assistant Professor in the Department of Political Science at Saint Mary's University. He is completing a book on Canada and the OAS which will be published by Carleton University Press. Stephen Randall is Dean, Faculty of Social Sciences and Imperial OilLincoln McKay Chair in American Studies, University of Calgary. He is the author of, among other books, The United States and Colombia, and, with J. H. Thompson, Canada and the United States.

257

BEYOND MEXICO

Elizabeth Spehar is Executive Coordinator of the Unit for the Promotion of Democracy of the Organization of American States and former Head of the Americas Program at the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Nancy Thede is the former Human Rights Advisor on Guatemala of the International Centre for Human Rights and Democratic Development. Ms. Thede is currently doing doctoral research in anthropology in Southern Spain. Leonard Waverman is Professor in the Department of Economics, University of Toronto, and Director of the University's Centre for International Studies. He has published widely on international trade and anti-trust, energy and telecommunications economics. Jacques Zylberberg est professeur a 1'Universite Laval et a 1'Ecole doctorale de science politique, Paris I. II a public, recemment, L'Amerique et les Ameriques, ainsi que La democratic dans tons ses Etats. Argentine, Canada, France.

258