Between Neutrality and Solidarity: Swiss Good Offices in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1992 (New Perspectives on the Cold War, 11) 9004690654, 9789004690653

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Liliane Stadler, Ph.D. (2021), University of Oxford, is a lecturer in History of International Relations at the University of Utrecht. Her research revolves around neutral states in multilateral diplomacy and conflict resolution. “At a time when Switzerland’s fundamental foreign policy values of neutrality and solidarity are coming under increasing international pressure, it is worth examining their historical evolution based on specific case studies. Liliane Stadler’s innovative study does exactly that.” – Professor Sacha Zala, Research Centre Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (Dodis) and University of Bern. “In a time when many observers hail the end of European neutrality, Liliane Stadler’s intriguing book about Switzerland’s good offices in Afghanistan is a welcome reminder of the important contributions to peace and stability provided by non-aligned and neutral states.” – Professor Aryo Makko, Hans Blix Centre, Stockholm University.

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE COLD WAR – 11

The present study investigates how and why this changed between 1979 and 1992. While the practical impact of Switzerland’s good offices was modest, the crisis revealed that Switzerland continued to struggle to balance the competing imperatives of permanent neutrality and international solidarity in an increasingly multilateral world.

Between Neutrality and Solidarity: Swiss Good Offices in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1992 Liliane Stadler

After 1979, Switzerland became increasingly involved in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan as a provider of humanitarian aid and good offices. It delivered aid to the region, hosted Soviet prisoners of war and eventually mediated between the Afghan regime and the mujahideen. What is puzzling about this development is that initially, following the Soviet invasion, both government and parliament refused to become diplomatically involved in Afghanistan on account of Swiss neutrality.

Between Neutrality and Solidarity: Swiss Good Offices in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1992 LILIANE STADLER

ISBN 978 9004 69065 3

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE COLD WAR – 11 ISSN 2452-2260 brill.com/npcw

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Between Neutrality and Solidarity: Swiss Good Offices in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1992

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New Perspectives on the Cold War Series Editor Jussi M. Hanhimäki (Graduate Institute Geneva) Marco Wyss (Lancaster University) Advisory Board Nigel Ashton (The London School of Economics and Political Science) Mark P. Bradley (The University of Chicago) Anne Deighton (University of Oxford) Mario del Pero (Centre d’histoire de Sciences Po, Paris) Bernd Greiner (Berlin Center for Cold War Studies) Tanya Harmer (The London School of Economics and Political Science) Hope M. Harrison (The George Washington University) Wolfgang Mueller (University of Vienna) Andrew Preston (University of Cambridge) Sergey Radchenko (Johns Hopkins University)

volume 11

The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/npcw

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Between Neutrality and Solidarity: Swiss Good Offices in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1992 By

Liliane Stadler

leiden | boston

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Cover illustration: Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil greets Swiss Secretary of State Klaus Jacobi in Kabul, 30 June 1991. Source: Bibliotheca Afghanica. The Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data is available online at https://catalog.loc.gov

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-typeface. issn 2452-2260 isbn 978-90-04-69065-3 (hardback) isbn 978-90-04-69066-0 (e-book) doi 10.1163/9789004690660 Copyright 2024 by Liliane Stadler. Published by Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill NV incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Brill Wageningen Academic, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau and V&R unipress. Koninklijke Brill NV reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill NV via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

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Contents

Acknowledgements ix List of Illustrations X Abbreviations xI



Introduction 1 1 A Non-linear Trajectory in Soviet Occupied Afghanistan 6 2 Conceptual Tensions between Neutrality, Solidarity, and Multilateralism 8 3 The Purpose of This Book 13

1 Swiss Neutrality and Solidarity from 1946 to 1979 21 1 Swiss Neutrality in Comparison to Other Neutrals 22 2 The Origins of Neutrality and Solidarity in Swiss Foreign Policy 29 3 Switzerland’s Humanitarian Tradition 31 4 Switzerland’s Record as a Neutral Mediator during the Cold War 35 5 Conclusion: Neutrality, Solidarity and Mixed Messages in Times of Crisis 47 2 Switzerland’s Guarded Response to the Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979–1980 48 1 The Soviet Invasion, December 1979 48 2 The Initial Reaction of the Swiss Government, January 1980 56 3 External Requests to Hold Diplomatic Talks in Switzerland 67 4 Conclusion: No Clear Foreign Policy toward Afghanistan 73 3 Swiss Humanitarian Aid to Pakistan and the Expulsion of the ICRC from Afghanistan, 1980–1982 75 1 The Exodus of Afghan Refugees to Pakistan 76 2 Swiss Technical Humanitarian Assistance to Pakistan 78 3 Obstacles to Humanitarian Aid for Afghanistan 84 4 The Humanitarian Crisis Becomes Increasingly Permanent 87 5 Conclusion: the Afghan Crisis as a Humanitarian Crisis 93 4 The Transfer of Soviet POWs from Afghanistan to Switzerland, 1982–1986 95 1 The ICRC Makes Contact with Soviet Prisoners of War 96

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2 The ICRC, the Soviet Union and the Swiss Authorities Arrange the Transfer of Soviet POWs to Switzerland 101 3 The Transfer Arrangement Stagnates 104 4 The ICRC Continues to Be Denied Access to the Afghan Interior 113 5 Conclusion: Switzerland Struggled as a Protective Power of Soviet POWs from Afghanistan 119 5 The Repatriation of Soviet POWs and the Return of the ICRC to Afghanistan, 1986–1987 121 1 The Public Debate on the Morality of the Prisoner Transfer Scheme 122 2 Negotiations Resume between the ICRC, the Soviet Union and the FDFA 128 3 The Escape of a Soviet POW to the Federal Republic of Germany 130 4 The Remaining POWs Return to the Soviet Union 134 5 Conclusion: Questions about Swiss Neutrality and Solidarity 136 6 The 1986 Referendum on Swiss UN Membership and the 1988 Geneva Accords on Afghanistan 139 1 Switzerland’s 1986 Referendum on UN Membership 141 2 Behind the Scenes of the UN Geneva Talks 145 3 The Design Flaws of the Geneva Accords of 1988 151 4 Conclusion: the Afghan Civil War Continues despite the Soviet Withdrawal 155 7 Swiss Mediation in Afghanistan, 1990–1992 160 1 Paul Bucherer, the Bibliotheca Afghanica and Track Two Diplomacy 161 2 Competing Initiatives for an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” 170 3 The August Coup against Mikhail Gorbachev and the Negative Symmetries Agreement 178 4 Conclusion: Swiss Good Offices Did Not Achieve a Peaceful Government Transition 186 8 Swiss Neutrality and Solidarity at the End of the Cold War 190 1 The Swiss Neutrality Debate of the Early 1990s 191 2 The Swiss Neutrality Debate of the Present 198

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Contents 

vii

3 The Ambiguous Relationship between Swiss and ICRC Neutrality 204

Conclusion 208



Bibliography 215 Index 233

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Acknowledgements I am grateful to all who have accompanied and supported this book project for the past seven years. First and foremost, I want to thank my doctoral supervisors, Anne Deighton and Paul Betts. This book is as much a product of their thoughtful and insightful supervision as it is of my own research. I would also like to thank all who have provided feedback on various revisions of this volume, including my doctoral examiners, Jussi Hanhimäki and Alessandra Iandolo, my colleagues at the International History Section of the University of Utrecht, Timothy Nunan, Pierce Ludlow, Marco Wyss, my anonymous peer reviewers, and Alessandra Giliberto. Special thanks go to my parents, Franz and Madeleine Stadler, for having read and commented on my work over the course of numerous iterations, as well as to Charles Helms. I also want to thank the many individuals who have given up their time to contribute their expertise and to answer my interview questions. Cornelio Sommaruga, Jacques de Watteville, Marianne von Grünigen, Paul Bucherer, Ulrich Lehner, Christoph Bubb, Hans Wegmüller, Armin Bachofen, and Andreas Koellreuter have all granted me extensive interviews, follow-up questions and have at times raised questions of their own that have been pivotal for this project. Over the years, I have received generous access to archival materials from the Swiss Federal Archives, the Bibliotheca Afghanica, the archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), the Yale Archives and Manuscripts Division, the UNHCR Archives, the British National Archives, the Ronald Reagan Archive, and the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars. I owe many thanks to the Fondation Jean Monnet, the Europainstitut at the University of Zurich and to St. Antony’s College at the University of Oxford, for partially funding this project. Finally, I would like to thank Bruno Lezzi, Jean de Courten, Albert Stahel, Hans-Ulrich Seidt, Maxwell Stroemer, Faisal Devji, Elizabeth Leake, Aryo Makko, Sacha Zala, Yves Steiner, and Thomas Bürgisser for having given me insights into their own research, for pointing me in the direction of relevant reading material or for inviting me to present my research at different occasions over recent years.

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Illustrations Illustrations 1

Excerpt from a signed petition for mediation addressed to the Swiss government by Pir Ishaq Gailani in January 1991 168 2 Klaus Jacobi meets Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in Peshawar on 4 July 1991 176 3 Paul Bucherer and Peter Sutter meet Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil, December 1991 184

Graphs 1

Swiss-Afghan economic exchange from 1970 to 1992 (in millions of Swiss Francs, CHF) 59 2 Contributions to the UNHCR program for Afghan refugees in Pakistan (US$), situation on 20 June 1980 79 3 Global number of refugees per host country, 1983 88

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Abbreviations AFP Agence France Presse CH-BAR Swiss Federal Archives, Berne, Switzerland CH-SBA Bibliotheca Afghanica, Bubendorf, Switzerland CIA Central Intelligence Agency COCOM Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls CPSU Communist Party of the Soviet Union CSCE Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe CWIHP Cold War International History Project, Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars EC European Community ETHZ Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich EU European Union FARC-EP Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo FCMA Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance FDFA Federal Department of Foreign Affairs FDJ Federal Department of Justice FMD Federal Military Department FOIA Freedom of Information Access FPD Federal Political Department FRG Federal Republic of Germany ICRC International Committee of the Red Cross IIGA Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan ISI Inter-Services Intelligence ISN International Relations and Security Network JCPA Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action KHAD Afghan Domestic Intelligence Service (Khadamat-e Aetela’at-e Dawlati) MINURSO UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara MSF Médecins Sans Frontières N+N Neutral and Non-Aligned Group NAM Non-Aligned Movement NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization NNRC Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission NNSC Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission NSA-GWU National Security Archive, George Washington University, USA NWFP North-West Frontier Province NZZ Neue Zürcher Zeitung OIC Organization of the Islamic Conference OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

xii OSGAP PDPA POW SALT SCA SPD UK-TNA UN UNA UNCTAD UNESCO UNFICYP UNGOMAP UNHCR UNICEF UNIDO UNIFIL UNIIMOG USAID WFP WHO YAM-USA

Abbreviations Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan Prisoners of War Strategic Arms Limitation Talks Swedish Committee for Afghanistan Social Democratic Party The National Archives, London, United Kingdom United Nations Unterabteilung Nachrichtendienst und Abwehr United Nations Conference on Trade and Development United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees United Nations International Children’s Emergency Fund United Nations Industrial Development Organization United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group United States Agency for International Development World Food Programme World Health Organization Yale Archives and Manuscripts Division, New Haven, USA

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Introduction On 25 December 1979, the Soviet Union invaded Afghanistan. Two days later, Spetznaz special forces attacked the presidential Tajbeg Palace on the outskirts of Kabul and captured Afghan President Hafizullah Amin. At 2:55 in the morning the next day, Radio Kabul announced his execution. In his stead, Babrak Karmal, the Afghan ambassador to Prague, assumed the presidency on 28 December. The intentions behind the Soviet regime change in Afghanistan were limited. Former British Ambassador to the Soviet Union and later Russia, Rodric Braithwaite, has argued that the aim of the invasion was to stabilize the Afghan government, the armed forces, the police and to withdraw within six to twelve months.1 Instead, the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan lasted nine years and fifty-two days and achieved none of its initial aims.2 Following the invasion, Cold War tensions between the Eastern and Western blocs experienced a sharp increase. According to Odd Arne Westad, it was the issue that “plunged Soviet-American relations to their lowest level since the Cuban Missile crisis” of 1962.3 It was a surprise, full-scale and overt invasion. Unlike Hungary and Czechoslovakia, where the Soviet Union had interfered militarily in 1956 and 1968 respectively, Afghanistan was a founding member of the NonAligned Movement (NAM) and therefore largely considered to be beyond the scope of the so-called Brezhnev Doctrine. Like most other governments, the Swiss government was caught by surprise at the time. The Federal Council – the executive body of the Swiss government – condemned the invasion on 9 January 1980. However, both government and parliament cautioned that Switzerland should not become diplomatically involved in the Afghan crisis. On 14 February, the Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Council of States – the upper house of parliament – met to discuss the invasion. Behind closed doors, Councillor Paul Bürgi argued that Switzerland should do no more than observe subsequent developments.4 His colleague René Meylan added that Switzerland should remain strictly neutral 1 Rodric Braithwaite, Afghantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–1989 (London: Profile, 2011), 8. 2 Ibid. 3 Odd Arne Westad, ‘The Fall of Détente and the Turning Tides of History,’ in The Fall of Détente: Soviet-American Relations during the Carter Years, edited by Odd Arne Westad (Stockholm: Scandinavian University Press, 1997), 23. 4 Kommission für auswärtige Angelegenheiten (Ständerat), ‘Hauptprotokoll der Sitzung vom 14. Februar 1980, 09:00–12:30 Uhr in Bern, Parlamentsgebäude, Zimmer 4,’ February 1980, E2004B#1984/38#2*, Swiss Federal Archives (CH-BAR), Berne, Switzerland. © Liliane Stadler, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004690660_002 Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

2

Introduction

so as to avoid contributing to a renewed Cold War climate.5 Ultimately, Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert concluded in open parliament a few days later that, “It is out of the question that Switzerland, whose neutrality demands great reticence, should play a leading role in this matter.”6 That said, the Swiss authorities did not remain entirely passive during the initial stages of the Soviet occupation. Along with other neutral and non-neutral states, Switzerland provided humanitarian aid to the conflict region. At US$ 180’577 in donations to the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), Switzerland ranked slightly ahead of neutral Finland by June of 1980. Finland had donated US$ 134’084 by this point. Yet both were far behind neutral Sweden in donations, which had contributed US$ 1’190’476 according to the UNHCR.7 By 1984, Switzerland’s humanitarian aid to the conflict region totaled CHF 7 million, a figure which rose to CHF 12.8 million in 1985.8 In comparison, the federal government donated approximately CHF 2.5 million in humanitarian aid to refugees affected by the Ogaden crisis by August of 1980 and CHF 3 million to victims of the Lebanese civil war by June of 1982.9 Most humanitarian aid for Afghan refugees flowed into neighboring ­Pakistan during the early 1980s. This was because most humanitarian aid organizations were expelled from Afghan territory, following the Soviet invasion. One of the organizations affected was the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), headquartered in Geneva. In January of 1980, the Soviet-installed ­Karmal regime granted the ICRC access to Afghan territory. Yet in June of 1980, the regime refused to renew the ICRC delegates’ visas.10 In order to regain access to Afghan territory, the ICRC negotiated a memorandum of understanding with the Soviet Union between 13 and 22 January of 1982. As part of this 5 6 7 8 9

10

Ibid. Pierre Aubert, ‘Rapport du Conseil Fédéral,’ n.d., E5001G#1993/174#17*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Il est exclu que la Suisse, qui sa neutralité oblige à une grande réserve, joue un rôle pilote en l’occurrence.” N.a., ‘Aide Mémoire: Assistance humanitaire aux réfugiés au Pakistan: Annexe II,’ 26 June 1980, 11_2_78–781.GEN[a] – 1980 – Governmental Contributions – Aid to Pakistan [­Volume 1], UNHCR Archives, Geneva, Switzerland. Longet (sic), ‘84.930 I Longet – Lage in Afghanistan (14. Dezember 1984),’ 14 December 1984, E2023A#1998/212#2473*, CH-BAR; N.a., ‘3. Öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe,’ Schweizerisches Jahrbuch für Entwicklungspolitik 6(1986), 339. Federal Council, ‘Aide d’urgenge aux refugiés en Somalie, crédit de Fr. 2.5 millions,’ 2 April 1980, Documents Diplomatiques de la Suisse (Dodis), https://dodis.ch/56384; Edouard Blaser, ‘Notiz an die Direktion für internationale Organizationen und Politische Abteilung II,’ 17 August 1982, Dodis, https://dodis.ch/53709. ICRC Department of Operations, ‘Afghan Conflict Victims Emergency Appeal No 3 (1 January – 32 December 1983),’ January 1983, E2023A#1993/129#1000*, CH-BAR.

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3

agreement, the ICRC agreed to arrange for the transfer of Soviet prisoners of war (POWs), captured by the Afghan resistance – the mujahideen – to a neutral country for an internment period of two years.11 On 10 May, the ICRC approached the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on 19 May, the Federal Council approved the operation.12 Nine days later, the first three prisoners landed at Zurich Kloten Airport.13 Two more arrived in November of 1982, one in January of 1983 and another in October of 1983. Yet in total, the prisoner transfer scheme never exceeded more than eleven prisoners. Paul Wipfli, the Swiss ambassador to Islamabad, estimated that there were possibly closer to 200 Soviet deserters in the Afghan-Pakistani border region near Peshawar.14 The transfer of only eleven POWs arguably paled in comparison. In Switzerland, this low number of Soviet prisoners quickly led to a public debate on the morality of the prisoner transfer scheme itself. Some, such as Peter Sager – member of the National Council, the lower house of parliament – argued that the low number of prisoners was attributable to the fact that the transfer scheme included repatriation at the end of two years. Deserters and prisoners of war were inherently difficult to distinguish from each other, he argued, and the Soviet Union had a historical record of treating both akin to treason.15 Consequently, repatriation may not only have deterred Soviet soldiers from taking part in the prisoner transfer scheme, but it threatened to endanger those who had taken part in it. In fact, in June of 1983, one of the prisoners escaped and fled to the Federal Republic of Germany.16 By May of 1984, the first three prisoners reached the end of their internment period. Two decided to remain in Switzerland, one returned to the Soviet Union, and without exception, all remaining prisoners chose to repatriate to

11 12

13 14 15 16

ICRC, ‘Protocole d’Entente donnant suite aux entretiens qui ont eu lieu à la mission permanente de l’URSS à Genève du 13 au 22 Janvier 1982,’ 22 January 1982, E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR. Jean De Courten, ‘Correspondence to Kirile L. Keline, Conseiller,’ 11 May 1982, E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR; Federal Council, ‘Confidentiel: Internement de membres des forces armées soviétiques capturés en Afghanistan,’ 19 May 1982, E5001G#1994/118#148*, CH-BAR. Edouard Brunner, ‘Correspondence to unknown,’ 2 June 1982, E2210.5#1996/373#21*, CH-BAR. Paul Wipfli, ‘Correspondence to EDA Direktion für Internationale Organizationen,’ 10 November 1983, E2200.162A#1994/329#45*, CH-BAR. ZeitBild, ‘Die Verlautbarung des EDA,’ 29 December 1982, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR. Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Note de Dossier: Internés soviétiques – Disparition de Iouri Vachtchenko,’ 11 July 1983, E2023A#1993/129#2765*, CH-BAR.

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Introduction

the Soviet Union between 1984 and 1986.17 That same year, the ICRC received permission from the Afghan authorities to return to Afghanistan. It is not entirely clear whether this was on account either of the ICRC’s prisoner transfer scheme or of the decision of the remaining prisoners to repatriate. In 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev became General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and gradually began preparations for the Soviet armed forces to withdraw from Afghanistan.18 In 1986, he replaced Babrak Karmal with Mohammad Najibullah as president. Najibullah, as he was commonly known, attempted to reconcile the Soviet-installed government with the local population and to reach out to the Afghan resistance through a policy program of “National Reconciliation.” Astonishingly, Switzerland’s diplomatic involvement in the Afghan crisis did not end in 1986. In February of 1989, the Soviet armed forces withdrew from Afghanistan and in August of 1990, Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil contacted the Swiss government through a private intermediary to ask for mediation between the Afghan regime and the mujahideen.19 During the fall of that year, Pir Ishaq Gailani, the personal representative of mujahideen leader Sebghatullah Mujaddedi relayed a similar request for mediation to the Swiss government through that same intermediary. Their common acquaintance was Paul Bucherer, a Swiss citizen and director of the Bibliotheca Afghanica Foundation in Bubendorf, Switzerland. Over the course of the 1960s and the 1970s, Bucherer had paid repeated visits to Afghanistan for the purpose of ethnographic research.20 Together with his wife, Veronica Bucherer-Dietschi, he had begun to collect a growing repository on Afghan culture, history, politics, ethnography and geography by 1975.21 As part of his work, he also cultivated close ties to members of the Afghan government, the mujahideen and the former Afghan royal family.22 17

Jacques de Watteville, ‘Sort des soldats soviétiques ayant terminé leur période d’internement en Suisse,’ 20 January 1986, E4280A#2017/355#1059*, CH-BAR. 18 Artemy Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye: The Soviet Withdrawal from Afghanistan (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 2011), 94. 19 Paul Bucherer, ‘Vorläufiger Bericht über die Reise nach und den Aufenthalt in Kabul vom 17. Bis 25. März 1991,’ 27 March 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), Bibliotheca Afghanica (CH-SBA), Bubendorf, Switzerland. 20 Lorenz Fischer, ‘Die Afghanen nicht vergessen!’ Vaterland, 22 February 1983, Press ­Collection, CH-SBA; N.a., ’31.1.1984. Stiftung Bibliotheca Afghanica,’ Amtsblatt des Kantons Basel-Landschaft, 23 February 1984, Press Collection, CH-SBA. 21 Ibid. 22 Paul Bucherer, interviewed by Liliane Stadler, 16 October 2018.

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During June and July of 1991, Bucherer accompanied Swiss Secretary of State Klaus Jacobi and Ulrich Lehner from the Swiss Foreign Ministry to Kabul, Islamabad and Peshawar. There, Jacobi met with representatives of the Afghan regime, the Pakistani government and the mujahideen. In early August, Bucherer also organized a gathering between regime and resistance representatives in Liestal, Switzerland.23 Yet on 19 August, parts of the Soviet armed forces and the intelligence services launched an unsuccessful coup against General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev with tangible repercussions for the Afghan crisis. On 22 August, the last day of the coup, Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil approached Swiss Secretary of State Klaus Jacobi to tell him that he thought Najibullah should resign.24 In September of 1991, the Soviet Union and the United States agreed to successively decrease their respective military and financial contributions to the Afghan regime and to the mujahideen respectively. Following another face-to-face meeting between the two conflict parties in Zurich in October, mujahideen representatives publicly met with Soviet officials for the first time in Moscow on 15 November 1991. Five days later, Najibullah himself reached out to Klaus Jacobi to invite him for a second visit to Kabul.25 Initially, Jacobi considered the invitation for early December, but ultimately decided against it. That same month, Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as General Secretary of the CPSU and Najibullah followed suit in March of 1992. A member of the Swiss ambassadorial staff in Islamabad surmised in 1993 that, “What happened was what almost everyone said would happen, namely that if Najibullah were to resign before a transition mechanism had been put in place, that would lead to chaos and civil war.”26

23 24 25 26

N.a., ‘Intra-Afghan Dialogue,’ 7 August 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA; N.a., ‘Bericht über die erste technische Vorbesprechung des “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” in Bad Schauenburg bei Liestal vom 8.-10- August 1991,’ 14 August 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Christian Hauswirth, ‘Besuch des afghanischen Aussenministers Abdul Wakil bei Staatssekretär Jacobi (JAC) vom 22. August 1991,’ 19 September 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Muhammad Najibullah, ‘Correspondence to Klaus Jacobi,’ 20 November 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. N.a., ‘Afghanistan: “Too Much Ambition and Ammunition,” Correspondence to FDFA,’ 10 March 1993, E2010–01A#2000/217#5*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Es ist eingetroffen, was fast alle sagten, nämlich dass ein Rücktritt Najibullahs, bevor ein Übergangs Mechanismus installiert ist, zum Chaos und Bürgerkrieg führen würde.”

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Introduction

A Non-linear Trajectory in Soviet Occupied Afghanistan

At first glance, the trajectory of Switzerland’s diplomatic involvement in Afghanistan was anything but linear during the time between the Soviet invasion in December of 1979 and the collapse of the Soviet-installed regime in March of 1992. The Swiss government became increasingly involved in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan as a provider of humanitarian aid and good offices between 1979 and 1992. The Swiss authorities delivered humanitarian aid, took in Soviet POWs and eventually mediated directly between the Afghan government and the mujahideen – as hostilities continued despite the Soviet withdrawal of 1989. What is puzzling about this gradual development is that initially, following the Soviet invasion of 1979, both government and parliament expressly refused to become involved in the Afghan crisis. They argued that as a small, permanently neutral state and as a non-member of the United Nations (UN), Switzerland was unable to make a difference. To be clear, what was puzzling was not that Switzerland reacted cautiously. In fact, many other governments were similarly at a loss about how to initially respond to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. What was puzzling about Switzerland’s involvement in the Afghan crisis was that the Swiss government completely reversed this initial stance over the course of the 1980s. Switzerland became deeply involved in Afghanistan as a provider of good offices by 1992, absent a coherent foreign policy toward Afghanistan and despite the fact that the Swiss government had historically been relatively unsuccessful as a neutral mediator in armed conflict up until this point. This begs the question of how Swiss foreign policy toward Afghanistan evolved between 1979 and 1992 and what this tells us about Switzerland’s role as a small neutral state at the end of the Cold War. The main argument of the present volume is that the Swiss government gradually began to view the Afghan crisis as an opportunity to play a meaningful role in a major conflict of the late Cold War as a permanently neutral state. This role evolved from the provision of humanitarian aid to a protective power mandate for Soviet POWs and ultimately to that of a neutral mediator. Overall, the practical impact of Switzerland’s good offices was relatively modest. At a conceptual level, however, the crisis revealed that Switzerland continued to struggle to balance the competing imperatives of permanent neutrality and international solidarity in an increasingly multilateral world. Switzerland’s diplomatic involvement in Afghanistan took place at a time of increased public debate on the nature and meaning of permanent neutrality at the end of the Cold War. According to a recently declassified internal

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7

policy memorandum by Thomas Borer dated 8 June 1990, the law of neutrality had “diminished both in profile and impact” such that “only very few states in Europe still cultivate it and take it seriously.”27 The Federal Council continued to defend Switzerland’s permanent neutrality in public. Yet in its first official report on permanent neutrality, released on 29 November 1993, the council offered an interpretation of permanent neutrality, which implied that the underlying assumptions of Swiss neutrality policy were beginning to shift. It argued that, “In the history of our country, neutrality has never been a rigid institution, but a flexible instrument for safeguarding interests.”28 Yet it also maintained that, “The maxim of solidarity has always been a defining element of Swiss foreign policy.”29 The conceptual tension between these two concepts is at the heart of this monograph and it continues to be relevant for understanding Swiss foreign policy to the present day. On 26 October 2022, the Federal Council released its second ever report on permanent neutrality – this time in response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine that year. It explicitly reaffirms the conclusions of the 1993 report, that Switzerland ought to retain its commitment to permanent neutrality as an instrument of Swiss foreign policy. At the same time, it recognizes that: Neutrality usually has a passive connotation. However, Switzerland has never seen itself as a passive member of the community of states… Our humanitarian tradition and good offices are therefore often mentioned in the same breath as neutrality and are to be seen as complementary to it. Both are an expression of Switzerland’s solidarity.30 27 28

29 30

Thomas Borer, ‘Thesenpapier zur Schweizerischen Neutralität,’ 8 June 1990, in Sacha Zala et al., eds., Diplomatische Dokumente der Schweiz: Band 1990, Document 24 (Bern: DODIS, 2021), https://www.dodis.ch/54523. Federal Council, ‘Bericht zur Neutralität: Anhang zum Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren vom 29. November 1993,’ 29. November 1993, https://www .eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/de/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/bericht-neutralitaet -1993_DE.pdf, 3. Ibid., author’s translation from, “Prägendes Element der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik war seit jeher auch die Maxime der Solidarität.” 27. Federal Council, ‘Klarheit und Orientierung in der Neutralitätspolitik: Bericht des Bundesrates in Erfüllung des Postulates 22.3385, Aussenpolitische Kommission SR, 11.04.2022,’ 26 October 2022, https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/de/documents/aussen politik/voelkerrecht/20221026-neutralitaetsbericht_DE.pdf, 3, author’s translation from, “Neutralität ist meist passiv konnotiert. Die Schweiz hat sich aber nie als ein passives Mitglied der Staatengemeinschaft verstanden... Die humanitäre Tradition und die Guten

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The conceptual tension between the competing concepts of neutrality and solidarity was not a post-Cold War phenomenon in Swiss foreign policy. Actually, there is evidence to suggest that it was a dominant theme in Swiss foreign policy since the early Cold War period. At present, the tacit consensus in the literature – to quote Andreas Wenger and Christian Nuenlist – is that on the surface, “Swiss foreign and security policy during the Cold War was characterized by a high degree of continuity.”31 During times of international crisis, however, the conceptual tension between the competing imperatives of neutrality and solidarity became difficult to navigate and the present investigation of Switzerland’s response to the Afghan crisis was precisely one of those instances. The rationale of this research is threefold. First, to explain how Swiss policymakers justified their involvement in Afghanistan over time. Second, to identify what experiences and lessons they carried over from one episode to the next, and third, to analyze how the conceptual tension between neutrality and solidarity affected Switzerland’s involvement in the Afghan crisis. 2 Conceptual Tensions between Neutrality, Solidarity, and Multilateralism Neither neutrality nor solidarity are straightforward concepts. According to Boleslaw Boczek, neutrality is primarily an “art and institution of traditional international law,” which “refers to the status of a state during an ongoing war between other states, whereby that state adopts an attitude of impartiality toward the belligerents.”32 According to Harto Hakovirta, on the other hand, “In an international conflict, a policy is the more neutral the less it interferes in the conflict, the more equally it benefits or harms the parties concerned and the less it affects the outcome of the conflict.”33 There are two fundamental differences between these two definitions of neutrality. First, where the former

31 32

33

Dienste werden deshalb oft in einem Atemzug mit der Neutralität genannt und sind somit als Ergänzung zu dieser zu sehen. Beide sind Ausdruck der Solidarität der Schweiz.” Andreas Wenger and Christian Nuenlist, ‘A “Special Case” between Independence and Interdependence: Cold War Studies and Cold War Politics in Post-Cold War Switzerland,’ Cold War History 8(2008), 218. Boleslaw Boczek, ‘Introduction: The Conceptual and Legal Framework of Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe,’ in Europe’s Neutral and Non-Aligned States: Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, edited by S. Victor Papacosma and Mark R. Rubin (Wilmington: ­Scholarly Resources, 1989), 3. Harto Hakovirta, East-West Conflict and European Neutrality (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1988), 8.

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interprets neutrality or the absence thereof as binary, the latter interprets it as a continuum ranging from complete to partial neutrality. Second, where ­Boczek interprets neutrality as a static concept, Hakovirta implies it is dynamic. Lastly, where Boczek primarily understands neutrality as a concept of international law, Hakovirta understands it as a matter of individual state policy. Neutrality was originally codified as a legal concept in the fifth and the thirteenth Conventions of The Hague, of 1907. The fifth convention specified the laws of neutrality pertaining to war on land. According to the convention, neutral territory was deemed inviolable and neutral states barred from assisting the belligerents.34 The thirteenth convention of The Hague pertained to naval conflicts and it also emphasized the right of neutral states to territorial integrity, their duty not to assist the belligerents, as well as the duty of neutral sates to treat all belligerents impartially.35 This meant that neutral states were barred from initiating armed conflict, taking part in it once it was underway and obliged to treat the parties to an armed conflict evenhandedly.36 Yet while international law on neutrality regulated the behavior of neutral states in wartime, it did not extend to peacetime, giving rise to highly idiosyncratic manifestations of so-called permanent neutrality. The main common denominator among permanently neutral states was that they were barred from joining alliances. Yet with the exception of ­Switzerland, most permanent neutrals, including Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland, joined the United Nations (UN) between 1946 and 1955. The Swedish government formally decided to apply for membership at a cabinet meeting on 9 August 1946 and on 9 November, Sweden was admitted to the General Assembly alongside Afghanistan and Iceland.37 Ireland joined that same year and Austria and Finland both joined in 1955.38 Initially, the Swiss government also 34 35 36

37 38

N.a., ‘Laws of War: Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers and Persons in Case of War on Land (Hague V),’ The Avalon Project, 1907a, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century /hague05.asp, Art. 1; 2; 4. N.a., ‘Laws of War: Rights and Duties of Neutral Powers in Naval War (Hague XIII),’ The Avalon Project, 1907b, accessed 26 January 2021, http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century /hague13.asp, Art. 1; 2; 6; 9. Radovan Vukadinović, ‘Various Conceptions of European Neutrality,’ in Between the Blocs: Problems and Prospects for Europe’s Neutral and Non-Aligned States, edited by Joseph ­Kruzel and Michael H. Haltzel (New York: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, 1989), 29; Boczek, ‘Introduction,’ 3. Norbert Götz, ‘From Neutrality to Membership: Sweden and the United Nations, 1941–1946,’ Contemporary European History 25(2016), 89; 91. Franz Cede, ‘Austria’s Neutrality – Myths versus Reality,’ in The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe, edited by Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko and Peter Ruggenthaler, 15–30 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 20.

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Introduction

intended to apply for UN membership in 1945. According to Daniel Möckli, the Swiss authorities primarily saw the UN as an opportunity to legitimize Switzerland’s permanent neutrality internationally, provided that it would be excused from the collective security mechanism of the Security Council.39 However, the founding members of the UN refused to make an exception for Switzerland and no Swiss delegation was invited to San Francisco for the founding conference of the UN in June of 1945.40 This left the Swiss government in a bind. Domestically, neutrality became a symbol of national sovereignty and independence in the aftermath of the Second World War.41 Internationally, on the other hand, it was highly unpopular.42 According Federal Councillor and Foreign Minister at the time, Max Petitpierre: [Neutrality] is considered incompatible with the collective security system that the United Nations aims to create. There is a tendency to oppose the two notions of neutrality and solidarity and to see in the former a refusal of the latter … ​But we are also convinced that by maintaining our neutrality, we are doing more service to the international community than if we gave it up.43 In accordance with this line of thought, Petitpierre presented the so-called Neutrality and Solidarity Doctrine to the Council of States – the upper chamber of the Swiss parliament – in October of 1947.44 The essence of the concept of solidarity was that the Swiss government was prepared to engage in any form of bilateral or multilateral cooperation that did not affect its ability 39 40 41 42 43

44

Daniel Möckli, ‘Neutralität, Solidarität, Sonderfall: Die Konzeptionierung der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik der Nachkriegszeit, 1943–1947,’ Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung 55(2000), 129. Daniel Frei, Neutralität – Ideal oder Kalkül? Zweihundert Jahre aussenpolitisches Denken in der Schweiz (Frauenfeld: Huber, 1967), 82. Möckli, ‘Neutralität, Solidarität, Sonderfall, 265. Urs Altermatt, ‘Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zur Gegenwart,’ in Neues Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, edited by Alois Riklin, Hans Haug and Raymond Probst, 61–78, (Bern, Haupt: 1992), 62. Max Petitpierre, ‘Propos Sur la Neutralité Tiré à part de “La Démocratie Suisse, 1848– 1948” des Editions Patriotiques S.A. Morat,’ 1948, E2800#1967/59#921*, CH-BAR, author’s ­translation from “On le considère comme incompatible avec le système de sécurité ­collective que les Nations Unies ont l’ambition de créer. On a tendance à opposer les deux notions de neutralité et de solidarité et de voir dans la première un refus de la seconde …​ Mais nous sommes aussi convaincus qu’en gardant notre neutralité, nous rendons plus de ­services à la communauté international que si nous y renoncions.” Möckli, ‘Neutralität, Solidarität, Sonderfall,’ 235.

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to remain neutral in times of conflict. In fact, it was intended to demonstrate that precisely in situations of conflict, Switzerland had the ability to make a meaningful contribution by virtue of being neutral through the provision of humanitarian aid and good offices. By referencing Switzerland’s long-standing humanitarian tradition, Petitpierre implied that the combination of neutrality and solidarity stood for continuity in Swiss foreign policy. In 1863, Swiss businessman Henry Dunant founded the Red Cross movement in Geneva as one of the world’s first non-governmental humanitarian aid organizations. The movement was also the driving force behind the Geneva Conventions on humanitarian law of 1864. Switzerland hosted both the movement and the signing of the convention and it not only became a signatory, but a depository state of the convention itself.45 Writing in 1945, Petitpierre argued that Swiss neutrality had not only helped to keep Switzerland out of the Second World War, but that it permitted the Red Cross movement to continue to operate from neutral territory.46 He even contended that the activities of the Red Cross “are linked to the neutrality of Switzerland.”47 Under Petitpierre, the Swiss government also increasingly began to link Swiss neutrality to the provision of good offices.48 According to Thomas ­Fischer, the term good offices encompasses all measures which third parties – be they states, international organizations or private individuals – can undertake in order to induce the parties to an armed conflict to negotiate a peaceful solution.49 In theory, these third parties do not need to be neutral. Providers of good offices can host international conferences and organizations. They can offer legal arbitration, conciliation and judicial settlements. They can 45 46

47 48 49

Freymond, ‘Der Humanitäre Bereich in der Aussenpolitik der Schweiz,’ 28. Max Petitpierre, ‘Le Chef du Département politique, M. Petitpierre, aux Légations de Suisse et aux Consulats généraux,’ in Documents Diplomatiques de la Suisse (DDS) 15 edited by Philippe Marguerat and Louis-Edouard Roulet, https://www.dodis.ch/res/doc/DDS-15 .PDF. Max Petitpierre, ‘Propos Sur la Neutralité Tiré à part de “La Démocratie Suisse, 1848–1948” des Editions Patriotiques S.A. Morat,’ 1948, E2800#1967/59#921*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Est liée à la neutralité de la Suisse.” Thomas Fischer and Daniel Möckli, ‘‘The Limits of Compensation: Swiss Neutrality Policy in the Cold War,’ Journal of Cold War Studies, 2016(18), 23. Thomas Fischer, Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise, 1979–1981: Eine Studie zur Politik der Guten Dienste im Kalten Krieg (Zürich: Forschungsstelle für Sicherheitspolitik der ETH Zürich, 2004), 17–18; Thomas Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace: Switzerland’s Contribution to International Conflict Resolution,’ in Jürg Martin Gabriel and Thomas Fischer, Swiss Foreign Policy, 1945–2002, 74–104 (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003), 75.

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also mediate, and they can engage in so-called protecting power mandates to conduct bilateral relations between governments who have cut diplomatic ties.50 During the First World War, Switzerland was amongst those countries which held the most protecting power mandates, reaching a maximum of 36 in total.51 Other states entrusted with similar mandates included the United States, the Netherlands and Spain. During the Second World War, the Swiss government took on over two hundred protective power mandates between 1943 and 1944. Exact estimates vary, but most historians converge at around 219 individual mandates for a total of 35 countries.52 Overall, Switzerland’s record as a neutral mediator was mixed. In 1917, Federal Councillor Hoffmann, the foreign minister at the time, attempted to mediate a separate peace between Germany and Russia. While this may arguably have been intended to resolve the conflict as a whole, the problem was that a peace on the Eastern Front would have disadvantaged Russia’s alliance partners in that it would have allowed the German high command to redirect all of its Eastern troops to the Western front.53 During the Second World War, the German government approached Federal Councillor Pilet-Golaz as a potential mediator, yet he declined.54 In fact, to quote Jon A. Fanzun and Patrick Lehmann, the current consensus in the literature is that, “Switzerland has never played a meaningful role as a mediator in interstate conflicts.”55 It is puzzling that it has nevertheless become an important component of the discourse surrounding neutrality and solidarity during the Cold War period and it might explain to some extent, why Switzerland’s approach to good offices in Afghanistan was largely without precedent.

50

51 52 53 54 55

Konrad Walter Stamm, Die Guten Dienste der Schweiz: Aktive Neutralitätspolitik zwischen Tradition, Diskussion und Integration (Bern: Lang, 1974), 4–5; Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 75; Reto Borsani, ‘Die Schweiz und die Guten Dienste: Ein weiterer Grund für den Alleingang?’ Swiss Political Science Review 1(1995), 5. Fischer, Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise, 1979–1981, 100. Daniel Trachsler, ‘Gute Dienste – Mythen, Fakten, Perspektiven,’ Bulletin 2004 zur schweizerischen Sicherheitspolitik, 2008, 38; Borsani, ‘Die Schweiz und die Guten Dienste,’ 7. Georg Kreis, ‘Die Schweizerische Neutralität im Ersten und im Zweiten Weltkrieg im Seminar über “Die Schweizerische Neutralität im Zeitalter der Weltweiten Interpendenz,”’ 4–6 November 1982, E9500.1#1993/131#39*, CH-BAR. Ibid. Jon A. Fanzun and Patrick Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt: Aussen- und sicherheitspolitische Beiträge der Schweiz zu Frieden, Sicherheit und Stabilität, 1945–2000,’ Zürcher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik und Konfliktforschung 57(2000), 106–107, author’s translation from, “Die Schweiz hat in zwischenstaatlichen Konflikten nie eine bedeutende Rolle als aktive Vermittlerin gespielt.”

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The Purpose of This Book

In terms of historiography, there exists only a small amount of literature on Switzerland’s role in Afghanistan during this period. Between 1985 and 1989, only three authors commented on the significance of the transfer of Soviet POWs to Switzerland. These included Edward Girardet, Mary Ellen O’Connel and Charlotte Carr-Gregg. Yet without exception, they have focused only on the role of the ICRC, rather than on the role of the Swiss government in this prisoner transfer scheme.56 Edouard Brunner, who served as Switzerland’s Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs shortly after the completion of the POW transfer scheme, later commented on it in his memoires.57 Yet he too gave only a brief overview of events without placing them into context or analysing their overall significance for the evolution of Swiss foreign policy at the time. Moreover, only two authors, Olga Pavlenko and Thomas Fischer, have commented on Switzerland’s role as a neutral mediator in Afghanistan after the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces in 1989. Pavlenko argues that, “Berne found particularly attractive the idea of becoming an intermediary in resolving regional conflicts.”58 Meanwhile, Fischer has concluded that the “Swiss Federal Department on Foreign Affairs tried – in vain – to mediate in the Afghan civil war by applying traditional ‘good offices’ to a domestic conflict situation.”59 This might be a tempting conclusion to draw from Switzerland’s involvement in Afghanistan, however, it does not address the broader questions on the overall significance of Switzerland’s engagement in the conflict for the changing conceptual dynamics between neutrality and solidarity at the end of the Cold War. That is the contribution I want to make and the reason why I have written this book. In doing so, I will also engage with new investigations into the significance of humanitarian and track two diplomacy, phenomena whereby non-state actors have become engaged in intergovernmental diplomacy. Overall, the historiography on the closing decade of the Cold War is moving further away from 56

57 58 59

Mary Ellen O’Connel, ‘Soviet Prisoners in the Afghan Conflict,’ Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 23(1985), 497–504; Charlotte Carr-Gregg, ‘An Extension of Humanitarian International Law: The Case of Soviet Soldiers Captured by Afghan Liberation Movements, 1982–1986,’ War & Society 7(1989), 95–105. Edouard Brunner, Lambris dorés et coulisses: Souvenirs d’un diplomate (Genève: Georg, 2001). Olga Pavlenko, ‘The Soviet Union and Neutral Switzerland: Concerns and Hopes in 1989,’ in Peter Ruggenthaler and Aryo Makko, The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe, 171–180 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 177–178. Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 74.

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state actors and intergovernmental organizations and more toward non-state actors and transnational networks. The war in Afghanistan was an inherently transnational conflict and the cross-border flow of refugees, resistance fighters and military aid between Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran predated the Soviet invasion of 1979. The invasion itself exponentially increased the already massive number of Afghan refugees, such that the UNHCR increased its budget to Pakistan from US$ 190’000 in August of 1979 to US$ 55 million for the period of January to December of 1980 alone.60 As discussed, Swiss humanitarian aid to Pakistan eventually rose to CHF 12.8 million by 1985.61 To date, most of the literature on humanitarian aid during Afghan crisis does not explicitly address the issue that most humanitarian aid was directed at neighboring Pakistan.62 In fact, there is only very scarce literature on humanitarian aid to the Afghan interior over the course of the Soviet occupation. In recent years, Timothy Nunan has become the first to render an account of the difficulties surrounding the provision of humanitarian aid to the Afghan interior during the 1980s. Using France’s Médecins sans Frontières (MSF) and the Swedish Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) as principal case studies, Nunan shows how the ideological divide of the Cold War and especially what he calls the “global spread of ‘real existing socialism’” actually became an important contributing factor toward the formation of transnational humanitarianism.63 Nunan does not directly address the involvement of the Swiss government in the Afghan crisis, yet his conceptual analysis contrasts strikingly with the work of the transnational Red Cross movement in Afghanistan. I contribute to the debate within this line of research by showing that in 1982 – in an effort to return to Afghanistan with the consent of the Afghan authorities – the ICRC approached the Swiss government with a request for a protective power mandate on behalf of a small number of Soviet prisoners of war, captured by the mujahideen in Afghanistan. In agreeing to this arrangement, the Swiss transitioned from the role of a provider of humanitarian aid to one of also providing good offices in the ongoing conflict. At the same time, however, they also unwittingly agreed to an arrangement that lacked a sound 60

N.a., ‘UNHCR Humanitarian Assistance Programme to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,’ n.d., E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR. 61 Longet (sic), ‘84.930 I Longet – Lage in Afghanistan,’ E2023A#1998/212#2473*, CH-BAR. 62 Rüdiger Schöch, ‘UNHCR and the Afghan Refugees in the Early 1980s, Between Humanitarian Action and Cold War Politics,’ Refugee Survey Quarterly 27(2008). 63 Timothy Nunan, ‘Graveyard of Development? Afghanistan’s Cold War Encounters with International Development and Humanitarianism,’ in The Development Century: A Global History, edited by Stephen Macekura and Erez Manela (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2018), 237.

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legal basis and at times even called into question the relationship between the Swiss authorities and the ICRC. This relationship has always been close and has given rise to sustained debate. As J.D. Armstrong argues, on account of its location, the ICRC’s role in world politics has become directly linked to Switzerland’s own unique status and to its own relationship with the Swiss government.64 During the period covered by my research, Switzerland provided approximately two thirds of the ICRC’s regular income and the ICRC’s governing body was made up entirely of Swiss citizens.65 Switzerland’s involvement in Afghanistan was an important test case for this complex relationship and the Swiss government and the ICRC ultimately played very distinct roles in the Afghan crisis. However, the ICRC as both a non-governmental organization and a transnational network of civil society, played the role of a catalyst in Switzerland’s transition from a provider of conventional humanitarian aid to a pioneer protective power for Soviet POWs. At the international level, this book finds a place in the new, nonsuperpower-centered histories of the Cold War. In 2007, Odd Arne Westad published The Global Cold War, which explores the impact of the ideological, material and territorial confrontation between the Cold War superpowers on the so-called Third World. This has dramatically opened up the global dimension of the field of Cold War history. Janick Marina Schaufenbuehl, Sandra Bott, Jussi Hanhimäki, and Marco Wyss have developed this argument, writing that, “For some time now, scholars have pointed to the importance of not limiting Cold War studies to the interactions between the superpowers.”66 Various avenues of research now explore to what extent independent agency was conceivable on the margins of the competing Cold War power blocs and whether leeway existed for smaller states, non-state actors or regional alliances to find freedom of manoeuvre in the Cold War international system.67 Many researchers have since begun to investigate the roles of neutral and non-aligned states, which operated outside of the traditional sphere of influence of the Cold War superpowers. The Series New Perspectives on the Cold War has been a leading source of this new scholarship. It includes Aviva Guttmann’s investigation into Swiss counter-terrorism diplomacy between 1969 and 1977, 64

J. D. Armstrong, ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross and Political Prisoners,’ International Organization 39(1985), 641. 65 Ibid., 617–618. 66 Janick Marina Schaufenbuehl et al., ‘Non-Alignment, the Third Force, or Fence-Sitting: Independent Pathways in the Cold War,’ The International History Review 37(2015), 901. 67 Ibid., 901–902.

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Sabina Widmer’s contribution to the relationship between Switzerland and Sub-Saharan Africa from 1967 to 1979 and Jürgen Dinkel’s research on the evolution of the NAM from 1927 to 1992. In fact, according to Peter Ruggenthaler’s and Aryo Makko’s recent contribution to their edited volume on Cold War neutrality, “There has been a wave of new studies” on the role of neutrality during the Cold War which are relevant for the present volume. Most are based on Western perspectives.68 A significant part of this literature has focused on the role of the neutrals as mediators at the Conference of Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) between 1972 and 1975.69 Nuenlist, for instance, has argued that Switzerland, Sweden, Finland, Austria and Ireland have actively shaped the substance of the Helsinki Final Act.70 Fischer has added to this that the neutrals, together with non-aligned Yugoslavia, Cyprus, Malta, Liechtenstein and San Marino acted as important bridge-builders for new ideas and as mediators in this context.71 According to Hanhimäki, it would not even be exaggerated to argue that the neutrals acted as a form of “midwives” to détente.72 Yet Hanhimäki has been careful to emphasize that overall, the European neutrals were not disproportionately influential in shaping the international history of the Cold War.73 In fact, he maintains that despite being active mediators in the context of the CSCE, the neutrals and their non-aligned partners ultimately never produced “a coherent alternative that would have challenged the perception of an essentially bipolar world order.”74 Outside of the context of the CSCE and of 68

Peter Ruggenthaler and Aryo Makko, ‘Introduction,’ in The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe, edited by Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko and Peter Ruggenthaler, 1–12 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 1. 69 Ibid., 6–7. 70 Christian Nuenlist, ‘Expanding the East-West Dialogue Beyond the Bloc Division: The Neutrals as Negotiators and Mediators, 1969–1975,’ in Origins of the European Security System: The Helsinki Process Revisited, 1965–1975, edited by Andreas Wenger, Vojtech Mastny and Christian Nuenlist (London: Routledge, 2008), 201–202. 71 Thomas Fischer, ‘Bridging the Gap Between East and West: The N + N as Catalysts of the CSCE Process, 1972–1983,’ in Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Trans-Atlantic Relations and the Cold War, 1965–1985, edited by Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad (Copenhagen: Tusculanum Press, 2010), 167. 72 Jussi Hanhimäki, ‘Non-Aligned to what? European Neutrality and the Cold War,’ in Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?, edited by Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Janick Schaufelbuehl, and Marco Wyss (New York: Roudledge, 2016), accessed 23 January 2024, ProQuest Ebook Central. 73 Ibid. 74 Jussi Hanhimäki, ‘Neutrality and Non-Alignment During and Beyond the Cold War,’ in Neutrality and Neutralism in the Global Cold War: Between or Within the Blocs?, edited by

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its follow-up meetings, the neutrals scarcely coordinated their foreign p ­ olicies, which partially resulted from the fact that their understandings of permanent neutrality varied widely. Compared to other neutrals, Finland for instance retained relatively close diplomatic ties to the Soviet Union because of their 1948 Treaty on Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA). ­Sweden, on the other hand, condoned NATO overflights across the south-western part of Sweden, entertained a secure line of communications between the Swedish Defence Staff and the US Air Force headquarters in Cronenberg, Germany, and prepared Swedish airbases to receive NATO aircraft.75 Thus far, research into the neutrals has tended to focus primarily on the European theatre.76 Bott, Hanhimäki, Schaufenbuehl and Wyss concluded in 2015 that the involvement of neutrals – especially of Switzerland – in the Cold War in the Third World, remains “largely misconceived.”77 The onset of the Cold War did not just challenge the Swiss to review the relationship between neutrality and solidarity in general. The processes of decolonization underway during the second half of the twentieth century also caused the Swiss government to rethink its foreign policies of neutrality, good offices and humanitarianism with emphasis on the Third World.78 This monograph is an attempt to engage this particular point in the literature of the Cold War, namely that a small, neutral state such as Switzerland began to reconsider the merits of its foreign policy not just in the European theatre, but beyond. Unlike Bott, Hanhimäki, Schaufenbuehl and Wyss, it will not focus primarily on the early and the mid-Cold War periods for this purpose, but on the final decade of the Cold War and then on the early post-Cold War period. Further, it will not focus on how Switzerland’s Cold War foreign policy in the Third World came into being. Using Afghanistan – a country which had never been colonized and which officially identified as non-aligned after 1961 – as a case study for Switzerland’s use of its various foreign policy tools, it will

75

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78

edited by Sandra Bott, Jussi M. Hanhimäki, Janick Schaufelbuehl, and Marco Wyss (New York: Roudledge, 2016), accessed 23 January 2024, ProQuest Ebook Central. Mikael Nilsson, ‘Amber Nine: NATO’s Secret Use of a Flight Path over Sweden and the Incorporation of Sweden in NATO’s Infrastructure,’ Journal of Contemporary History 44(2009), 287; Ola Tunander, ‘The Uneasy Imbrication of Nation-State and NATO: The Case of Sweden,’ Conflict and Cooperation 34(1999), 180. Schaufenbuehl et al., ‘Non-Alignment, the Third Force, or Fence-Sitting,’ 902. Sandra Bott et al., ‘Le rôle international de la Suisse dans la Guerre froide globale: un équilibre précaire,’ Relations internationales 163 (2015), 5, author’s translation from, “L’implication des pays neutres en général, et de la Suisse en particulier, dans la Guerre froide au tiers-monde est encore largement méconnue.” Ibid., 7.

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examine how the Swiss government’s understanding of the value of each of these tools evolved during the closing decade of the Cold War, and what this meant for the overall direction of Swiss foreign policy at this critical turning point in international history. In terms of source material, this book relies primarily on interviews with significant protagonists and on recently declassified archival materials alongside the secondary literature discussed so far. For the most part, interviews have been conducted face-to-face, semi-structured and on the record. Interviewees have included former policymakers from the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs and from the ICRC. Cornelio Sommaruga, Jacques de Watteville, Marianne von Grünigen, Christoph Bubb and Ulrich Lehner have all offered up their time to recount their personal insights on Switzerland’s involvement in Afghanistan, as have former Swiss army and intelligence officers Hans Wegmüller and Armin Bachofen. Representatives and associates of the Bibliotheca Afghanica (CH-SBA) in Bubendorf, including Paul Bucherer and Andreas Koellreuter have also recounted their personal experiences. It is thanks to Paul Bucherer, the director of the Bibliotheca Afghanica, that the Swiss Ministry of Foreign Affairs has granted Freedom of Information Access (FOIA) to archival materials from 1991 to 1993 both at the Bibliotheca Afghanica and at the Swiss Federal Archives in Berne (CH-BAR). Some of these still fall under the Thirty-Year Rule and will only become publicly available over the coming years. I was among the first to consult these records for research purposes and there exists as of yet no academic review of these documents. I have also relied on the Swiss Federal Archives for numerous other documents on the overall conduct of Swiss foreign policy over the course of the Cold War. The Swiss Federal Archives hold valuable documentation, for instance, on the Swiss reaction to the Soviet invasion of 1979. These include press clippings, minutes of parliamentary committee meetings, intelligence briefings and speeches of government ministers to parliament, international organizations or private assemblies. Similarly detailed coverage exists of the parallel conduct of the UN-mediated Geneva Talks on Afghanistan from 1980 to 1988, on the provision of Swiss humanitarian aid to the conflict region from 1980 to 1989, and on the Soviet prisoner transfer to Switzerland from 1982 to 1986. Further, the ICRC has given me special access to their classified archives on the internment in Switzerland of Soviets prisoners of war. Special access does not change the status of the consulted archives, which remain classified for as long as the series is not open to the public. However, in line with Article 7 of the Rules governing access to the Archives of the International Committee

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of the Red Cross, adopted on 2 March 2017, I was allowed to consult the ICRC archives for triangulation purposes. Per request of the ICRC, my research does not quote or reference the consulted classified archives, some of which remain protected by the ICRC’s privilege of non-disclosure. Instead, where information contained in these archives confirms information gathered from other archives, I have agreed to cite the latter. Where information contained in the ICRC archives contradicts information gathered from other archives, I have added a footnote instructing the reader to apply for specific access to the classified archives at the ICRC to verify the relevant details. The decision of granting a special access remains at the sole discretion of ICRC. The remaining archives consulted include UNHCR Archives in Geneva, the Fondation Jean Monnet in Lausanne, the Yale Archives and Manuscripts Division in New Haven, Connecticut, the British National Archives (UK-TNA) at Kew in London and the Ronald Reagan Archives in Simi Valley, California. The personal papers of former UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, held at Yale, have been valuable for triangulation purposes, as well as for the purpose of introducing an archivally based perspective of the United Nations on the Afghan crisis. The same is the case for a number of other archives consulted for triangulation purposes, including the UK-TNA at Kew in London and the ­Ronald Reagan Archives in Simi Valley, California. However, while both of these archives have provided valuable insights, they selectively continue to maintain strict confidentiality and inaccessibility both within and at times beyond the Twenty-Year Rule and the Thirty-Year Rule respectively.79 The same applies to most Soviet archives. Yet these fall outside of the scope of my investigation for reasons of language proficiency.80 Instead, I have relied on three archives that publish selected translated Soviet sources online and in the English language. These were the Wilson Center Digital Archive, the National Security Archive of George Washington University, as well as the Current Digest of the Soviet Press. Especially the Wilson Center and the National Security Archive have 79

80

The National Archives, ‘20-year rule,’ accessed 5 June 2020, https://www.nationalarchives .gov.uk/about/our-role/transparency/20-year-rule/; National Archives and Records Administration (NARA), ‘National Archives and Records Administration,’ accessed 5 June 2020, https://www.archives.gov/about/laws/nara.html. There are available documents on the Soviet-Afghan War held at the State Archive of the Russian Federation (GARF). These documents also include references to veterans, missions to retrieve Soviet prisoners of war and humanitarian operations. For further details, see https://statearchive.ru/.

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separately released a series of Politburo meeting minutes and reports that document the original Soviet decision to invade Afghanistan in 1979. These documents continue to be invaluable for my research and especially for the first few chapters of the present volume. However, as the main focus of the present volume is on the role played by Switzerland – as opposed to the Soviet Union – in the Soviet-Afghan conflict, I rely primarily on Swiss archival material.

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Chapter 1

Swiss Neutrality and Solidarity from 1946 to 1979 New archival materials and the current state of the literature suggest that since the early Cold War period, Switzerland struggled to balance the competing imperatives of permanent neutrality and displays of international solidarity against the backdrop of an increasingly multilateral world. The provision of good offices is a relatively new addition to this dynamic in scale and prominence. Permanent neutrality, meanwhile, has historically been both a relatively rare and a highly idiosyncratic phenomenon and even among permanent ­neutrals, Swiss neutrality is unique in at least three ways. First, Switzerland is the oldest among permanently neutral states. Second, Swiss neutrality was arguably an enabling factor in the foundation and evolution of the Red Cross movement. Third, Switzerland was the only permanent neutral not to join the UN during the Cold War. The first chapter of this volume compares Swiss ­neutrality to other expressions of permanent neutrality and it traces those elements of Swiss neutrality, which led to the formulation of Switzerland’s foreign policy doctrine of Neutrality and Solidarity in 1947. At its core, this policy was intended to compensate for Switzerland’s absence from the UN, by pursuing memberships in technically oriented multilateral organizations, providing humanitarian aid – often in cooperation with the Red Cross movement – and gradually, by providing neutral good offices in situations of armed conflict. Prior to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, ­Switzerland participated in the monitoring commissions of the Korean ceasefire agreement of 1953, the negotiation of the Evian Accords of 1962, as well as the repatriation of prisoners of war in the 1971 Bangladesh War of Independence. Switzerland was also briefly involved in the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 and the Falklands crisis of 1982. Most of these involvements ended without decisive successes, however, and neither neutrality nor solidarity took on the form of conclusively defined concepts in Swiss foreign policy throughout the Cold War. As a consequence, there remained a degree of latent conceptual tension in Swiss foreign policy between both neutrality and solidarity, as well as between neutrality and multilateralism throughout the Cold War.

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Swiss Neutrality in Comparison to Other Neutrals

Swiss neutrality is sometimes dated back to the Battle of Marignano of 1515, where Swiss mercenaries fought against each other on the opposing French and Italian sides.1 At the time, Switzerland was not a uniform political entity and its autonomous constituent regions sometimes entered into conflicting alliances with neighboring states.2 Neutrality was originally intended to ­prevent the complex religious, political and ethno-linguistic fabric of Swiss society from splitting up and aligning with competing European powers. In other words, it was intended primarily as a state-building tool, not a foreign policy tool. According to Edgar Bonjour, one of Switzerland’s most prominent historians of neutrality, the concept was much more “loose, relaxed and blurred” then, than it is now.3 It was not until the aftermath of the Napoleonic wars that Swiss neutrality became internationally recognized by the Treaty of Paris of 1815, making it a de jure neutral.4 What is more, it was not until the early Cold War period, that Swiss neutrality became as strict and unwavering as it still is today. In 1954, Rudolf Bindschedler, the director of the legal advisory service at the Federal Political Department (FPD), provided Swiss policymakers with a series of guiding principles on Swiss neutrality for the first time. The main document was circulated only internally at first. It gradually became omnipresent in the Swiss foreign service as a point of reference for what was deemed to be compatible with Swiss neutrality in practice. Except for the Conventions of The Hague, Swiss neutrality eschewed formal definition by both the Swiss constitution and the Federal Council throughout the Cold War. It was not until 1993, that the Federal Council released its first comprehensive stance on Swiss neutrality in an annex to its Report on Switzerland’s Foreign Policy in the 1990s.5 1 Hanspeter Neuhold, ‘The Neutral States of Europe: Similarities and Differences,’ in N ­ eutrality: Changing Concepts and Practices, edited by Alan T. Leonhard and Nicholas Mercuro (­Lanham: University Press of America, 1988), 103. 2 Edgar Bonjour, ‘Die Schweizerische Neutralität als Historisch Gewachsene Maxime im ­Seminar über Die Schweizerische Neutralität im Zeitalter der Weltweiten Interpendenz,’ 4–6 November 1982, E9500.1#1993/131#39*, CH-BAR. 3 Ibid. 4 Surya Subedi, ‘Neutrality in a Changing World: European Neutral States and the European Community,’ International and Comparative Law Quarterly 42(1993), 243. 5 Federal Council, ‘Bericht zur Neutralität,’ https://www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/de/documents /aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/bericht-neutralitaet-1993_DE.pdf.

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The Bindschedler Doctrine retrospectively legitimized the Swiss government’s decision to refrain from UN membership in 1946. At the time, the Federal Council had argued that Swiss neutrality was incompatible with the collective security mechanism of the UN Charter. The Bindschedler Doctrine justified this decision by differentiating invariably between so-called “technical” and “political” multilateral organizations.6 According to Bindschedler, Switzerland should attempt to join only those intergovernmental organizations which were exclusively economic, cultural, or technical in nature so as to fulfil its obligations under the Conventions of The Hague of 1907, and to prevent itself from becoming in any way partial in times of peace.7 The thinking behind this differentiation was that the institutionalization of cultural and technical cooperation in peacetime would never suffice to entice Switzerland to either start a conflict or to take sides in an ongoing conflict. At first glance, this was at odds with the fact that Switzerland’s economic relations were predominantly geared toward the West throughout the Cold War. According to the Bindschedler Doctrine, this was acceptable, because short of a customs union, economic ties would hardly entail a sufficient degree of political dependency.8 As long as a neutral state did not expressly use economic means for political purposes, such as to favour a party in a ­conflict through sanctions or trade in arms, a neutral could engage freely in world trade.9 In practice, however, this gave rise to heated debates, for instance as to whether the Council of Europe was an economic or a political organization. Switzerland had originally declined to join the council in 1949 and joined only in 1963. The Swiss government also initially refrained from joining the so-called Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM), which imposed export controls on NATO alliance partners and Western countries in their relations to the Soviet Bloc. Bowing to American pressure, the government relented in the so-called Hotz-Linder Agreement of 1951 and drastically curtailed its trade relations with the Soviet bloc.10 Switzerland therefore knowingly took a position in the economic aspects of the Cold War.

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Rudolf Bindschedler, ‘Der Begriff der Neutralität,’ 26 November 1954, Dodis, dodis. ch/9664. Bindschedler, ‘La notion de la neutralité,’ n.d., J1.223#2003/213#104*, CH-BAR. Bindschedler, ‘Der Begriff der Neutralität,’ dodis.ch/9664. Ibid. Sandra Bott, Janick Marina Schaufenbuehl and Sacha Zala, ‘Die internationale Schweiz in der Zeit des Kalten Krieges: Eine Zwischenbilanz,’ in Die internationale Schweiz in der Zeit

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Nevertheless, amongst the other European neutrals, Switzerland’s interpretation of permanent neutrality was by far the strictest. On account of the Bindschedler Doctrine, both the Swiss public and the authorities adopted an increasingly static and binary understanding of what constituted permanent neutrality and what did not, much along the lines of Boleslaw Boczek’s definition of the concept. This has since given rise to the latent consensus in the literature that over the course of the Cold War, Swiss neutrality policy actually remained relatively consistent. Andreas Wenger and Christian Nuenlist, for instance, have argued that, Swiss foreign and security policy during the Cold War was relatively continuous.11 Similarly, Thomas Fischer argues in a recent edited volume by Mark Kramer, Peter Ruggenthaler, and Aryo Makko that, “During the whole period of the Cold War we can discern a very homogenous national understanding of what role neutral Switzerland should play in international security affairs.”12 The present case study is a challenge to this conventional interpretation. Similar to other permanent neutrals, Switzerland’s interpretation of its role as a permanently neutral state evolved over the course of the Cold War and the Afghan crisis was a case in point. Unlike Swiss neutrality, Swedish neutrality was never regulated by an international treaty.13 In Sweden, parliamentary motions to include a declaration of neutrality in the constitution failed on multiple occasions, including in 1899, 1902, 1912 and 1975.14 As a custom, Swedish neutrality dated back to the early nineteenth century.15 It also gradually evolved by way of custom and thereby aligned more closely with Harto Hakovirta’s inherently flexible and dynamic understanding of the concept. In 1949, the Swedish cabinet then formulated a policy of “nonalignment in peace, aiming at neutrality in war” as opposed to strict permanent neutrality.16 This declaration came only shortly after a failed attempt to form a so-called Scandinavian Defence Union with

11 12 13 14 15 16

des Kalten Krieges, edited by Sandra Bott, Janick Marina Schaufenbuehl and Sacha Zala (Basel: Schwabe, 2011), 8. Wenger and Nuenlist, ‘A “Special Case” between Independence and Interdependence,’ 218. Thomas Fischer, ‘Swiss Cold War Neutrality: Undisputed Principle of Foreign Policy,’ in Peter Ruggenthaler and Aryo Makko, The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and ­Nonalignment in Europe, 64–74 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 67. Mikael Nilsson, ‘The United States and Neutral Countries in Europe, 1945–1991,’ Journal of Cold War Studies 21(2019), 209. Neuhold, ‘The Neutral States of Europe,’ 100. Ibid., 105. Olof Kronvall, ‘Swedish Neutrality, 1949–1991,’ in The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe, edited by Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko and Peter ­Ruggenthaler, 31–63 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 33.

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Norway and Denmark between 1948 and 1949.17 The reason why this proposal did not materialize was that both Norway and Denmark chose to join NATO after 1949. Meanwhile, according to Mikael Nilsson, Sweden began to clandestinely cooperate militarily with its Scandinavian neighbors in 1949, “a process that eventually led to Sweden’s defense capability becoming a de facto link in NATO infrastructure.”18 Ireland similarly pursued a mutual bilateral defence agreement with the United States after declining to join NATO in 1949.19 Like Sweden, Ireland was a so-called de facto neutral. Its neutrality did not have a basis in either constitutional law or in an international treaty. Like Swedish neutrality, it was the result of unilateral policy choices taken by successive Irish governments since Irish independence from the United Kingdom in 1921. Some, such as Stanley Sloan, have argued that as a consequence, Irish neutrality primarily became an expression of an aspiration not to become entangled in conflicts waged by the United Kingdom.20 Harto Hakovirta even maintains that Ireland’s decision not to join NATO was based more on an unwillingness to enter an alliance with Britain than on a commitment to permanent neutrality.21 Unlike Swiss, Swedish and Irish neutrality, Austrian and Finnish neutrality were products of the early Cold War period, as well as arguably the result of external interference.22 According to Hanspeter Neuhold, in the Austrian case it was the price the government paid to regain sovereignty from Allied occupation in the aftermath of the Second World War.23 In early 1955, the A ­ ustrian government came to an agreement with the Soviet Union to become permanently neutral.24 The four Allied powers, including the United States, the United Kingdom, France and the Soviet Union, subsequently agreed on A ­ ustrian independence in the so-called State Treaty on 15 May 1955.25 In honour 17 Nilsson, ‘The United States and Neutral Countries in Europe,’ 210. 18 Ibid., 211. 19 Hakovirta, East-West Conflict and European Neutrality, 105. 20 Stanley Sloan, NATO Enlargement and the Former European Neutrals (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1998), 6. 21 Hakovirta, East-West Conflict and European Neutrality, 105. 22 Mikael Nilsson and Marco Wyss, ‘The Armed Neutrality Paradox: Sweden and Switzerland in US Cold War Armaments Policy,’ Journal of Contemporary History 51(2016), 336. 23 Hanspeter Neuhold, ‘Permanent Neutrality on Contemporary International Relations: A Comparative Perspective,’ Irish Studies in International Affairs 1(1982), 18. 24 Jussi Hanhimäki, ‘The first line of defence or a springboard for disintegration? European neutrals in American foreign and security policy, 1945–61,’ Diplomacy and Statecraft 7(1996), 392. 25 Andrew Cottey, ‘The European Neutrals and NATO: Ambiguous Partnership,’ Contemporary Security Policy 34(2013), 454.

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of its earlier commitment, the Austrian National Assembly then adopted a constitutional law of permanent neutrality in October of 1955. That same month, all foreign troops withdrew from Austrian territory and the Austrian National Council passed legislation in the form of a Federal Constitutional Act, declaring Austria permanently neutral.26 Austrian neutrality was therefore primarily the result of a compromise in pursuit of sovereign independence, rather than the product of ingrained national identity. It was also the product of both diplomatic negotiations and domestic legislation. This was not the case for Finland, whose neutrality paradoxically tends to be even more strongly associated with external influence on the part of the Soviet Union.27 Finland had originally won its independence from the ­Russian Empire in 1917. During the interwar period, it remained de facto neutral. ­However, according to Hanspeter Neuhold, the Soviet Union effectively regarded Finland “as part of its security zone.”28 In 1939, Soviet armed forces invaded Finland without a declaration of war. Finland was defeated in 1940, resumed hostilities in 1941 and suffered another defeat during the so-called Continuation War of 1941 to 1944. In 1947, the two states signed a peace treaty and that same year, the Finnish government of Mauno Pekkala declined to join the ­Marshall Plan.29 Arguably the most important development with regards to Finnish neutrality was the FCMA that the Finnish government signed with the Soviet Union in 1948. This treaty gave rise to the term “Finlandization” coined by the contemporary Austrian Foreign Minister Karl Gruber.30 Article one of the agreement obliged Finland to defend itself in the event of an armed aggression against itself or the Soviet Union by either Germany or any of its allies.31 However, the arrangement differed from that of a military alliance in three ways. First, Finland alone was made responsible for the defence of its territory. Second, the FCMA contained no obligation to assist the Soviet Union in its defence

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Hanhimäki, ‘The first line of defence,’ 392. Jessica Beyer and Stephanie Hofmann, ‘Varieties of neutrality: Norm revision and decline,’ Conflict and Cooperation 46(2011), 299. 28 Neuhold, ‘The Neutral States of Europe,’ 107. 29 Hakovirta, East-West Conflict and European Neutrality, 101. 30 Johanna Rainio-Niemi, ‘Cold War Neutrality in Europe: Lessons to be Learned?,’ in Engaged Neutrality: An Evolved Approach to the Cold War, edited by Heinz Gärtner (­Lanham: ­Lexington Books, 2017), 22. 31 Juhana Aunesluoma and Johanna Rainio-Niemi, ‘Neutrality as Identity? Finland’s Quest for Security in the Cold War,’ Journal of Cold War Studies 18(2016), 53.

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elsewhere, and third, mutual military assistance was made conditional on mutual consultation and consent.32 The Soviet Union concluded several similar bilateral security agreements with Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Yugoslavia, Czechoslovakia, and Poland during this period.33 Yet the Finnish FCMA was qualitatively different from these. Its preamble stressed “Finland’s desire to remain outside the conflicting interests of the Great Powers.”34 That is why in substance, Finnish neutrality is often traced back to the preamble of its FCMA and why, in form, it is often associated with Soviet power politics in the region. According to Andrew Cottey, “Reassuring the Soviet Union in order to maintain the country’s territorial integrity and political independence remained the central pillar of Finnish foreign and security policy throughout the Cold War.”35 Unlike Austrian neutrality, however, Finnish neutrality did not take the form of a constitutional amendment. In essence, each permanent neutral cultivated a highly idiosyncratic form of permanent neutrality throughout the Cold War. There were only a few common denominators that they shared. First, their respective bilateral relationships with the Cold War superpowers remained ambiguous in the wake of the Second World War. Most permanent neutrals, with the exception of Finland, which remained bound by its FCMA until the 1990s, were implicitly Western-oriented.36 Jussi Hanhimäki has even argued that Sweden became a sort of “neutral extension” of the Western security system of the late 1940s and early 1950s.37 The Swiss government only established diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1946, having suspended them in 1918, following the Russian Revolution of 1917.38 Even in the case of Finland, Johanna Rainio-Niemi has argued that, neutrality was seen as the “key that unlocked the path westward, not eastward.”39 Yet a second common denominator that most permanent 32 33 34

Ibid., 54. Rainio-Niemi, ‘Cold War Neutrality in Europe,’ 21. N.a., ‘The Agreement of Friendship, Cooperation, and Mutual Assistance between The Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and The Republic of Finland,’ 1948, http://heninen .net/sopimus/1948_e.htm. 35 Cottey, ‘The European Neutrals and NATO,’ 454. 36 Bott et al., ‘Le rôle international de la Suisse dans la Guerre froide globale,’ 4. 37 Hanhimäki, ‘The first line of defence or a springboard for disintegration,’ 387. 38 Thomas Bürgisser, Sacha Zala and Thomas Fischer, ‘“Always Hit Back Right on the Kisser”? The Soviet Union in Swiss Foreign Policy during the Cold War,’ in The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe, edited by Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko and Peter Ruggenthaler, 260–290 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 261. 39 Johanna Rainio-Niemi, ‘Neutrality as Compromises: Finland’s Cold War Neutrality,’ in The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe, edited by Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko and Peter Ruggenthaler, 75–100 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 80.

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neutrals shared was that except for Switzerland, all of the permanent neutrals joined the newly established United Nations Organization between 1946 and 1955. This has definitively set Switzerland apart from the other permanent neutrals up until 2002. Like most neutrals, the Swiss government intended to apply for UN membership in 1945. As a founding member of the League of Nations, Switzerland had asked to be excused from the collective security obligations of the League’s Covenant and on 16 May 1920, Switzerland had joined the League on the basis of the assurance that it would be. The so-called Declaration of London of 1920 guaranteed Switzerland’s right to perpetual neutrality and recognized this as compatible with the principles of the League.40 At the end of the Second World War, the Federal Council hoped that the UN would extend the same courtesy.41 The Swiss government wanted to join the UN, but without the obligation of participating in economic and military sanctions mandated by Chapter Seven of the UN Charter.42 This was a policy recommendation issued by a special consultative committee to the Federal Council, chaired by Foreign Minister Max Petitpierre.43 However, the founding members of the UN refused to make an exception.44 The following year, Foreign Minister Petitpierre wrote to Paul-Henri Spaak, the chairman of the first session of the General Assembly and Belgian prime minister.45 Citing public opinion in support of permanent neutrality and its perceived incompatibility with the collective security mechanism of the UN, he informed Spaak that the Swiss government would not be submitting a membership application.46 In the long term, this presented the Swiss government with a serious dilemma. The second half of the twentieth century was not only remarkable for the uniquely bipolar structure of its international system, but also for the institutionalization of multilateral diplomacy in international 40 41 42 43 44 45 46

Georges-André Chevallaz, Neutralité suisse et Nations Unies (Lausanne: Editions de l’Aire, 1986), 57; Bonjour, ‘Die Schweizerische Neutralität als Historisch Gewachsene Maxime,’ E9500.1#1993/131#39*, CH-BAR. Stamm, Die Guten Dienste der Schweiz, 195. Ibid. N.a., ‘Schweizerisches Institut für Berufspädagogik, Kurs A 13: Schweizerische Innen- und Aussenpolitik aktuell – Die Mitarbeit der Schweiz im System der Vereinten Nationen,’ n.d., J1.301#2002/197#39*, CH-BAR. Max Petitpierre, ‘Le Chef du Département politique, M. Petitpierre, aux Légations de Suisse et aux Consulats généraux,’ https://www.dodis.ch/res/doc/DDS-15.PDF; Daniel Frei, Neutralität – Ideal oder Kalkül?, 82. Max Petitpierre, ‘Correspondence to Paul-Henri Spaak,’ 19 October 1946, E2800#1967 /59#918*, CH-BAR. Ibid.

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relations. By choosing not to join the UN, the Swiss government chose to forgo an opportunity to legitimize its permanent neutrality multilaterally. It also risked being perceived as both inherently passive and intrinsically isolationist in an international environment that was becoming increasingly critical of Swiss neutrality.47 Having remained neutral during the war, Switzerland had arguably done nothing to contain the violent expansion of Nazi Germany and there are those who suggest that it possibly even profited from the war itself by continuing to trade with both sides of the conflict.48 At the founding conference of the UN in June of 1945, the delegate of France even moved to explicitly condemn permanent neutrality in the conference record.49 According to Konrad Walter Stamm, the Swiss government therefore needed to demonstrate that its neutrality was “neither an expression of indifference and selfishness, nor [of] national egoism and that she had never played the part of a passive observer of world affairs, but [rather that] of a valuable member of the family of nations.”50 2

The Origins of Neutrality and Solidarity in Swiss Foreign Policy

During the fall of 1947, Foreign Minister Petitpierre formulated a new foreign policy doctrine in response to this dilemma.51 Again, this was not an official statement of policy, released by the Federal Council. Instead, addressing the annual gathering of Swiss ambassadors in Berne on 12 September 1947, Petitpierre reasoned that over the course of the Second World War, neutrality had become an axiomatic factor in Swiss public opinion on foreign policy.52 Internationally, however, pledging to stand aside from any and all conflict was met with suspicion and distrust. In response, his idea was to reposition Switzerland as an active neutral and as a useful member of the international community, 47 48 49 50

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Möckli, ‘Neutralität, Solidarität, Sonderfall,’ 284. Altermatt, ‘Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zur Gegenwart,’ 62. Max Petitpierre, Die schweizerische Neutralität in der Welt von heute (Vienna: Österreichische Gesellschaft für Aussenpolitik und Internationale Beziehungen, 1959), 7. Stamm, Die Guten Dienste der Schweiz, 198, author’s translation from, “Die Schweiz musste darlegen können, dass ihre Neutralität weder Ausdruck von Gleichgültigkeit und Selbstsucht noch nationaler Egoismus war und dass sie nie den teilnahmslosen Zuschauer am Weltgeschehen gespielt, sondern sich stets als wertvolles Mitglied der Familie der ­Nationen erwiesen habe.” Max Petitpierre, Exposé du Chef du Département politique, M. Petitpierre, lors de la ­Conférence annuelle des Ministres de Suisse à l’étranger,‘ in Diplomatische Dokumente der Schweiz 17 (1947–1949), edited by Michele Coduri et al. (Bern: Dodis, 1999), 86–92. Ibid., 90.

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willing to act in solidarity and to cooperate with other states, as long as it did not contradict its neutrality. On 7 October 1947, he presented this idea to the Council of States – the upper chamber of the Swiss parliament – arguing that in essence, Swiss foreign policy had historically been defined by two main principles: Neutrality and Solidarity.53 Since the 1860s, Switzerland had developed a reputation for being the neutral host state of the Red Cross movement. During the interwar period, Switzerland had also hosted the headquarters of the League of Nations on its territory. To further demonstrate the complementarity between Swiss neutrality and international solidarity, Petitpierre also began to pursue other forms of technical multilateral cooperation during the early Cold War period. Switzerland became a permanent observer at the UN in 1946.54 In 1948, it joined the Marshall Plan and the International Court of Justice.55 It also joined a number of specialized UN organizations as a non-UN member, including the UNHCR and the UN International Children’s Emergency Fund (UNICEF).56 A number of Swiss dignitaries became functionaries for the UN over subsequent years and eventually took part in numerous UN peacekeeping operations. Edouard ­Zellweger, for instance, served as special representative of the Secretary-General in Laos from 1960 to 1961 and Ambassador Ernesto Thalmann became a special ­representative of the Secretary-General in Jerusalem in 1967.57 Finally, in 1946, the government invited the UN to establish its European headquarters in the former League of Nations Palais des Nations in Geneva.58 Over subsequent years, other members of the Federal Council also began to make reference to the combination of Neutrality and Solidarity.59 Their aim was to demonstrate both a sense of continuity in Swiss foreign policy, while at the same time providing a rationale to the international community for ­Switzerland’s strict interpretation of neutrality.60 According to this reasoning, Switzerland was well positioned to provide humanitarian aid in times of war and in times of peace, the Swiss government would participate actively in 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

Max Petitpierre, ‘Réponse à l’interpellation Antognini du 2 octobre 1947 sur l’attitude de la Suisse vis-à-vis du Plan Marshall,’ in Max Petitpierre: Seize Ans de Neuralité Active, edited by Louis-Edouard Roulet (Neuchâtel: Editions de la Baconnière, 1980), 229. Michael Gunter, ‘Switzerland and the United Nations,’ International Organization 30(1976), 140. Altermatt, ‘Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zur Gegenwart,’ 63. Ibid., 64. Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 110. Stamm, Die Guten Dienste der Schweiz, 198. Möckli, ‘Neutralität, Solidarität, Sonderfall,’ 235. Ibid., 269.

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technical multilateral organizations.61 Meanwhile, throughout the period of 1945 to 1948, Federal Councillor Petitpierre went to great lengths to emphasize Switzerland’s unique position as the host country of the Red Cross movement. Addressing an assembly of Swiss legations and consular officers in April of 1945, he argued that Switzerland’s contributions to the Allied cause during the Second World War had been greater as a neutral host of the movement, than they would have been, had Switzerland entered the war and had its territory been invaded.62 In a pamphlet on Swiss neutrality published in 1948, he even maintained that the work of the ICRC “is linked to the neutrality of Switzerland.”63 The provision of good offices, on the other hand, was not explicitly part of Petitpierre’s rhetoric initially. What formed part of Petitpierre’s rhetoric was the idea of disponibilité – the idea that Switzerland should become known for its availability as a provider of good offices.64 Yet while Switzerland had gathered extensive experience as a protective power up until this point, the practice of mediating in armed conflict was not yet as commonly known at the beginning of the Cold War as it eventually became toward the early 1990s. 3 Switzerland’s Humanitarian Tradition Overall, Petitpierre’s argument that there was a conceptual link between Swiss neutrality and the humanitarian work of the ICRC remains contested. It is true that in 1863, the Red Cross movement was founded in Switzerland by Swiss businessman Henry Dunant. The movement was one of the first non-governmental humanitarian aid organizations in the world and it has also been the principal agent behind the initial codification of international humanitarian law – the body of law that governs conduct in war.65 Switzerland hosted the movement, the signing ceremony of the original Geneva Convention of 1864, and it not only became a signatory, but a depository state of the convention on account of its permanent neutrality.66 That said, the Red Cross movement has never been affiliated with the Swiss government. Rather, it is made up of multiple 61 62 63 64 65 66

Ibid., 267. Max Petitpierre, ‘Le Chef du Département politique, M. Petitpierre, aux Légations de Suisse et aux Consulats généraux,’ https://www.dodis.ch/res/doc/DDS-15.PDF. Petitpierre, ‘Propos Sur la Neutralité Tiré à part de “La Démocratie Suisse, 1848–1948” des Editions Patriotiques S.A. Morat,’ 1948, E2800#1967/59#921*, CH-BAR. Bürgisser, Zala, and Fischer, ‘“Always Hit Back Right on the Kisser”?,’ 263. Armstrong, ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross and Political Prisoners,’ 616. Freymond, ‘Der Humanitäre Bereich in der Aussenpolitik der Schweiz,’ 28.

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non-governmental organizations. This includes the ICRC, whose main task is to safeguard international humanitarian law, as well as national societies, which deliver humanitarian aid in their respective countries, and the International Federation of the Red Cross, which oversees their activities. According to the Geneva Conventions of 1949, the mission of the ICRC was – and continues to be – to protect any and all victims of war.67 This includes receiving demands for assistance from conflict victims and ­facilitating the establishment of safe zones, as well as the provision of medical aid.68 It includes securing safe passage out of occupied territories for civilians and tracing family members that have become separated in war zones.69 Finally, the statutes of the ICRC ­mandate for the ICRC to maintain correspondence and to conduct one-on-one visits to prisoners of war in their place of detention.70 The governing board of the ICRC has historically been composed exclusively of Swiss nationals, including former diplomats and politicians. There are also those who argue that the ICRC has been able to draw legitimacy from Switzerland’s staunch commitment to permanent neutrality by being headquartered in Geneva and by pledging political impartiality in its statutes. J.D. Armstrong, for instance, has argued that over time, its association with Switzerland has given the ICRC “something approaching to diplomatic status” and in this respect, the ICRC is unique among non-governmental international organizations.71 Former ICRC director, Cornelio Sommaruga, relativized this argument in a 1992 contribution to the International Review of the Red Cross. He wrote that, “The historical ties between the ICRC and the Confederation helped to create a situation whereby, for a long time, it is true, the ICRC’s neutrality was identified with Swiss neutrality.”72 The difference between the two, however, he argued, was that Swiss neutrality is based on its conduct toward states, while the neutrality of the ICRC rests on its conduct toward individuals – toward victims of conflict.73 When delivering humanitarian aid and monitoring compliance with international humanitarian law, the ICRC is obliged to treat all 67

ICRC, ‘The ICRC’s Mandate and Mission,’ 29 October 2010, https://www.icrc.org/en/doc /who-we-are/mandate/overview-icrc-mandate-mission.htm; Alexandre Hay, ‘Discours du Président du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge, M. Alexandre Hay, prononcé devant la Commission indépendante sur les questions humanitaires internationales à New York, le 12 novembre 1983,’ 12 November 1983, E2023A#1993/129#2766*, CH-BAR. 68 Ibid. 69 Ibid. 70 Ibid. 71 Armstrong, ‘The International Committee of the Red Cross and Political Prisoners,’ 641. 72 Cornelio Sommaruga, ‘Swiss neutrality, ICRC neutrality: Are they indissociable? An ­Independence worth protecting,’ International Review of the Red Cross 32(1992), 266. 73 Ibid., 267. Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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belligerents disinterestedly so as to be able to aid all victims of armed conflict, including civilian refugees, soldiers, sailors and prisoners of war.74 Over time, the Swiss government and the ICRC came to benefit from each other’s neutrality in this way. The ICRC gained diplomatic status and Switzerland gained a reputation for humanitarianism long before Max Petitpierre drew attention to this dynamic as part of his foreign policy doctrine of N ­ eutrality and Solidarity. Although most archival material from the ICRC is subject to a seventy-year closure period, there are also several well-documented instances, where the Swiss government and the ICRC worked closely together during the Cold War. Nicholas Rion, for instance, has illustrated this dynamic during the  Bangladesh War of Independence in 1971 and Sabina Widmer has explored the collaboration between the Swiss government and the ICRC during the Angolan War of 1975.75 According to Widmer, its close association with the ICRC allowed the Swiss government to gain “good standing” with all three liberation movements in Angola during the war.76 The Swiss government c­ overed approximately one third of the relief mission’s expenses “without, however, trying to influence the direction of its mission.”77 There were also exceptions to this trend, where the ICRC’s principles came into conflict and where the role of the Swiss government was morally questionable. Most notably, during the Second World War, the ICRC chose not to speak out publicly against the Holocaust. ICRC documents released to the U.S. Holocaust Memorial Museum in 1996 reveal that the organization was aware of Nazi concentration camps, but feared that speaking out against the Nazi leadership would endanger existing access to Allied prisoners of war.78 These records allegedly also document that the Federal Council urged the ICRC not to publicize information about the Holocaust for fear of endangering diplomatic relations between the Swiss government and Nazi Germany.79 This episode had serious repercussions for both the ICRC and the Swiss government, when it became public in 1996. It questioned the sincerity of their respective 74

Sabina Widmer, ‘Neutrality challenged in a cold war conflict: Switzerland, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and the Angolan War,’ Cold War History 18(2018), 209; Daniel Palmieri, ‘An institution standing the test of time? A review of 150 years of the history of the International Committee of the Red Cross,’ International Review of the Red Cross 94(2012), 1279. 75 Nicolas Rion, ‘Une occasion risqué pour la diplomatie Suisse: Protection des intérêts étrangers et bons offices en Inde et au Pakistan (1971–1976),’ Politorbis 40(2006), 44. 76 Widmer, ‘Neutrality challenged in a cold war conflict,’ 219. 77 Ibid. 78 Shai Dromi, Above the Fray: The Red Cross and the Making of the Humanitarian NGO ­S ector (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020), 122. 79 Ibid. Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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obligations to international humanitarian law, to political impartiality and to their commitments of mutual non-interference. There were also instances during the Cold War, where the ICRC’s principles came into conflict, most notably during the Biafra crisis of 1967 to 1969. The ICRC initially refrained from dispatching humanitarian aid workers to the conflict region without the consent of the Nigerian government.80 In August of 1968, it reversed its initial decision and proceeded without the government’s permission until 5 June 1969, when government forces shot down an ICRC aircraft carrying relief provisions. After this, the ICRC suspended all further flights without government consent.81 Both during the Holocaust and during the Biafra crisis, it became almost impossible for the ICRC to both remain neutral and to operate with the consent of the host government at the same time. The Swiss government’s role in the Biafran crisis remains to be explored in detail. Yet as a direct consequence of the Biafran crisis, the Red Cross movement split in 1972. A splinter group of French Red Cross workers led by Bernard Kouchner formed Médecins Sans Frontières (Doctors without Borders) with the aim of operating in conflict zones without necessarily securing the host government’s consent.82 Sabina Widmer argues that the ICRC was particularly careful to prove its impartiality in Angola on account of its problematic role in the Biafran crisis.83 Impartiality has remained priority for the ICRC to date. Overall, Max Petitpierre was not wrong to point out as early as 1948 that the humanitarian work of the ICRC has profited from its close conceptual association with Swiss neutrality and vice versa. As a non-governmental organization, which operated in zones of armed conflict only with the consent of host governments, the ICRC’s claim to impartiality has historically derived considerable legitimacy from Switzerland’s own commitments to impartiality and non-belligerence. Yet in practice, the work of the ICRC is highly context dependent. Its obligation to operate exclusively with the consent of the host government often involves political decision-making processes that do not hinge on its own neutrality or on its Swiss heritage. The ICRC’s provision of humanitarian aid to Afghanistan during the Soviet occupation was a case in point. Ultimately, the ICRC was able to operate on Afghan territory only with the consent of the Soviet-installed Afghan regime. Yet to this day, Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) retains the essence of Max Petitpierre’s 80 81 82 83

Michael Barnett, Empire of Humanity: A History of Humanitarianism (Cornell University Press, 2011), 137. Ibid., 138. Ibid., 144. Widmer, ‘Neutrality challenged in a cold war conflict,’ 219.

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1947 argument that permanent neutrality has enabled, not hindered Switzerland in demonstrating solidarity with the international community through the provision of good offices, humanitarian aid, and its legitimately close relationship with the ICRC. 4

Switzerland’s Record as a Neutral Mediator during the Cold War

Especially the first part of this argument is intriguing, because the concept of good offices was not explicitly part of Petitpierre’s core rhetoric on Neutrality and Solidarity. While the idea of disponibilité, the readiness and availability to provide such services formed part of Petitpierre’s discourse, the close conceptual association between neutrality and the provision of good offices only became part of Swiss public discourse toward the end of the Cold War. As discussed, according to Thomas Fischer, the term good offices encompasses all measures which third parties – be they states, international organizations or private individuals – can undertake in order to induce the parties to an armed conflict to negotiate a peaceful solution.84 Providers of good offices can host international conferences and organizations. They can offer legal arbitration, conciliation and judicial settlements. They can also mediate, and they can engage in so-called protecting power mandates.85 Each of these activities varies slightly with regards to the degree of influence that the provider of good offices has on the actual resolution of the conflict. In theory, these third parties do not need to be neutral. Strictly speaking, a provider of good offices should not express their own opinion or influence the conflict parties during this process. That is why there are those who assume that neutral states such as Switzerland are ideally suited to provide them.86 Former Swiss Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Raymond Probst, for instance argued in a 1989 book on the subject, that neutrals have a decisive advantage in providing good offices. Probst also offers his own slightly broader definition of the term good offices, which includes “any step within a line of successive procedures, all of them established for [the] peaceful settlement of disputes.”87

84 Fischer, Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise, 17–18 ; Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 75. 85 Stamm, Die Guten Dienste der Schweiz, 4–5; Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 75; Borsani, ‘Die Schweiz und die Guten Dienste,’ 5. 86 Stamm, Die Guten Dienste der Schweiz, 3. 87 Raymond Probst, “Good Offices” in the Light of Swiss International Practice and Experience (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1989), 1.

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Prior to the Cold War, Switzerland’s reputation for good offices rested primarily on its record as a protecting power.88 According to the definition by Daniel Trachsler, the task of a protecting power is to “maintain a minimum of diplomatic and or consular relations between two states, which, due to armed conflict or other reasons, do not maintain them.”89 The principal feature of this arrangement is that the protecting power does not act under its own name. It solely and voluntarily represents the interests of a conflict party.90 The protecting power has no mandate to mediate between the conflict parties. According to a definition by Jon A. Fanzun and Patrick Lehmann, mediation, on the other hand, “involves bringing conflict parties to an agreement for a peaceful settlement by actively participating in the process of negotiation.”91 This may also entail specific proposals about how to resolve any differences underlying a conflict.92 What a mediator can and cannot do is not specifically regulated under international law. What a protecting power can do, on the other hand, is regulated. The Treaties of Vienna on diplomatic and consular relations of 1961 and 1963 respectively spell out the rights and duties of protecting powers.93 In the absence of consular or diplomatic relations between third parties, the protecting power is responsible for the safety of the diplomatic personnel and the citizens of the state it is representing in another state. It is also responsible for their property.94 Other responsibilities may include the internment of prisoners, the exchange of war-wounded, and the transfer of mail and other communications.95 During the Franco-Prussian War from 1870 to 1871, the beaten fragments of the French forces commanded by General Bourbaki found refuge in Switzerland

88 89

90 91 92 93 94 95

Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 76. Trachsler, ‘Gute Dienste – Mythen, Fakten, Perspektiven,’ 37, author’s translation from “Aufgabe einer Schutzmacht ist es, zwischen zwei Staaten, welche wegen kriegerischen Auseinandersetzungen oder aus anderen Gründen keine diplomatischen und/oder ­konsularischen Beziehungen unterhalten, ein Minimum an gegenseitigem Kontakt aufrechtzuerhalten.” Borsani, ‘Die Schweiz und die Guten Dienste,’ 4. Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 83; Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 89. Stamm, Die Guten Dienste der Schweiz, 3; Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 89. Trachsler, ‘Gute Dienste – Mythen, Fakten, Perspektiven,’ 38. Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 88. Kreis, ‘Die Schweizerische Neutralität im Ersten und im Zweiten Weltkrieg,’ E9500.1# 1993/131#39*, CH-BAR.

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and received medical support from the Red Cross movement.96 Concurrently, the Swiss government accepted a protecting power mandate from the Kingdom of Bavaria and the Duchy of Baden to represent their diplomatic interests in France.97 During the First World War, Switzerland held 36 protective power mandates.98 Other states entrusted with similar mandates included the United States, the Netherlands and Spain. During the Second World War, the Swiss government took on over two hundred protective power mandates between 1943 and 1944. Exact estimates vary, but most historians converge at around 219 individual mandates for a total of 35 countries.99 That was the highest number of mandates that Switzerland ever held at any one time.100 Yet while the literature shows that Switzerland was relatively successful as a protecting power during the first half of the twentieth century, it also shows that it was less effective as a mediator. In 1917, Federal Councillor Hoffmann, the foreign minister, attempted to mediate a separate peace between Germany and Russia. However, while this may have been intended to resolve the conflict as a whole, the problem was that a peace on the Eastern Front would have disadvantaged Russia’s alliance partners in that it would have allowed the German high command to redirect all of its Eastern troops to the Western front.101 Here was a situation in which neutral Switzerland, in an attempt to offer its good offices, inadvertently not only would have taken sides in a conflict, but could have decidedly influenced its outcome. When it became known, Councillor Hoffmann was forced to resign.102 Yet this did not prevent a similar affair from taking place during the Second World War, when the German government approached Federal Councillor Pilet-Golaz as a potential mediator. In the absence of military advances in the Soviet Union, the idea was to verify the feasibility of a separate peace agreement between Germany and the Western allies.103 Pilet-Golaz, perhaps having learned from his predecessor’s mistake, did not directly approach the Western alliance partners, but encouraged ­representatives of the Vatican to do so.104 In the end, the arrangement came 96 97 98 99 100 101 102 103 104

Fischer, Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise, 1979–1981, 19; Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 120. Fischer, Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise, 1979–1981, 20. Ibid., 100. Borsani, ‘Die Schweiz und die Guten Dienste,’ 7. Trachsler, ‘Gute Dienste – Mythen, Fakten, Perspektiven,’ 38. Kreis, ‘Die Schweizerische Neutralität im Ersten und im Zweiten Weltkrieg,’ E9500.1# 1993/131#39*, CH-BAR. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid.

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to nothing, but had Pilet-Golaz been found out, he might very well have been forced to resign just like Hoffmann. In essence, their schemes were practically identical. By this point, the Swiss government had managed to host a substantial number of international conferences and diplomatic summits on its territory. Already during the early decades of the twentieth century, Switzerland had earned a reputation as a host country for international conferences. In 1923, for instance, the conference on the Greco-Turkish population exchange took place in Lausanne, while in 1925, France, Germany and Great Britain signed the Locarno Pact on Lago Maggiore.105 According to Fischer, “Switzerland’s political stability, its independent position between the blocs, its lack of a colonial past, as well as its favourable geographical location […] and infrastructure were the main factors that enabled Geneva to become a center of international relations.”106 In 1954, the same year as the formulation of the Bindschedler Doctrine, Geneva had successfully hosted the Indochina conference, which produced an armistice agreement on the ongoing wars in Korea and Indochina. Over the course of subsequent years, Switzerland also hosted the conference on the neutralization of Laos from 1961 to 1962; various meetings of the Second Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT II); and the second phase of the CSCE from 1972 to 1975. Interestingly, when asked, Switzerland agreed to host in most of these cases. However, it was hardly ever the case that Switzerland took the initiative and extended conference invitations on its own accord.107 What is more, in most of these cases, with the exception of the CSCE, in which Switzerland was an active participant, the Swiss government did not participate in these conferences in a mediating capacity.108 This was also the case during the Geneva Talks on the Soviet-Afghan crisis between 1982 and 1988, in which the Swiss were not involved, but on whose territory the conflict parties met repeatedly. There was one notable exception to this pattern, namely the Suez crisis of 1956. It was exceptional, because it was the first, and the only time that the Swiss government attempted to initiate a major international peace conference of its own accord during the Cold War.109 Instead of successfully demonstrating Switzerland’s ability to provide neutral good offices in an international 105 106 107 108 109

Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 101. Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 81. Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 103. Trachsler, ‘Gute Dienste – Mythen, Fakten, Perspektiven,’ 46–47. Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 105.

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conflict, however, the crisis became an unexpected turning point in Swiss foreign policy and ultimately led to the development of a set of criteria for the provision of good offices in 1958. During the summer of 1956, shortly after British forces had retreated from their occupation of the Suez Canal, Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser nationalized the Universal Maritime Suez Canal Company, which operated traffic through the canal.110 In response, Britain and France joined forces with Israel in a war against Egypt in October of 1956 and occupied the Canal Zone.111 On the morning of 6 November, the Swiss government issued a proposal for an international peace conference on the Suez crisis to the UN, as well as to the governments of the United States, France, Britain, the Soviet Union and India. India was invited on account of its leading position in the Non-Aligned Movement, of which Egypt was also member.112 Ironically, however, that same day, in response to pressure from the United States, Britain and France agreed to seek a diplomatic solution through the UN.113 The Swiss initiative was rejected by all parties, except for the Soviet Union, and this in turn led to heavy criticism in the Swiss press, given the concurrent Soviet invasion of Hungary.114 The Secretary-General of the UN, Dag Hammarskjöld, even considered the Swiss initiative to be a personal insult, because he had not been informed beforehand and because the initiative stood in competition with the UN as a platform for the resolution of the conflict. The Swiss did eventually end up playing a small role in the UN Emergency Force, the first official UN peacekeeping mission.115 When the Egyptian government denied several UN member states the right to land transport aircraft for UN peacekeeping troops, the Secretary-General turned to the Federal Council with a request for assistance.116 Arguably to rectify its relations with the UN, the Federal Council agreed immediately and between 1956 and 1957, Swissair, the Swiss national airline, transported approximately 3’800 troops from Naples

110 Fischer, Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise, 1979–1981, 31. 111 Ibid. 112 Peter Hug, Thomas Gees, and Katja Dannecker, Die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz im kurzen 20. Jahrhundert: Antibolschewismus, Deutschlandpolitik und organisierte Weltmarktintegration – Segmentierte Praxis und öffentliches Ritual (Bern: Universität Bern, Institut für Politikwissenschaft 2000), 34. 113 Fischer, Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise, 1979–1981, 33. 114 Frei, Neutralität – Ideal oder Kalkül?, 84. 115 Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 94. 116 N.a., ‘The Philosophy of Neutrality,’ n.d., E2010–01A#1996/396#731*, CH-BAR.

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to Egypt, paid for by the Swiss government.117 Interestingly, most well-known authors on the Suez crisis do not dwell on this contribution.118 For the Swiss, the consequences of the affair went beyond the UN peacekeeping mission in Egypt. From this point on, the government became cautious about offering its good services pro-actively during major international incidents.119 Switzerland abstained, for instance, from taking any initiatives to mediate between the parties in the Berlin crisis of 1961 or the Cuban missile crisis of 1962. Virginie Fracheboud has recently shown that similarly to the Suez crisis, the Swiss government helped to resolve a minor crisis involving the hijacking of two American planes by the Cuban regime during the summer of 1961. Together with the ICRC, the Swiss authorities also became involved in the repatriation of American citizens from Cuba between 1961 and 1963.120 However, where mediation was concerned, the Swiss authorities became much more cautious after the Suez crisis. In 1958, Raymond Probst, the future Secretary of State, circulated an internal memorandum within the FPD, detailing a set of strict criteria, which would henceforth need to be met for Switzerland to provide good offices in a conflict situation. Similarly to the Bindschedler Doctrine, these criteria were not formally adopted as an official policy by the Federal Council. Within the FDP, however, they quickly became accepted. According to these criteria, Switzerland would from then on only become active if all conflict parties formally invited the Swiss government to do so. All parties had to agree over the form and the scope of the good offices that were being asked for in advance and the mandate itself needed to be clearly defined, especially in its temporal scope. It would need to be compatible with Switzerland’s neutrality and it ought not itself to curtail the freedom of action of the Swiss government. Finally, there needed to be a reasonable chance of success.121 There are also some who argue that Switzerland’s role as a neutral observer in Korea after 1953 had contributed to the development of these criteria. Thomas Fischer maintains that it was largely in response to “negative experiences with 117 Max Petitiperre, ‘Correspondence to Swiss Mission in New York,’ 23 November 1956, Dodis, https://dodis.ch/12034. 118 Keith Kyle, Suez: Britain’s End of Empire in the Middle East (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011); Avi Shlaim, ‘Britain’s Quest for a World Role,’ International Relations 5(1975), 838–856. 119 Fischer and Möckli, ‘The Limits of Compensation,’ 25; Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 85. 120 Virginie Fracheboud, ‘La Suisse au service des intérêts américains à Cuba ou le succès de la politique de neutralité et solidarité (1961–1963),’ Relations internationales, 163(2015), 53; 55. 121 Fischer, Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise, 1979–1981, 35.

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a mandate in Korea …” that the FPD “elaborated a catalog of conditions to be fulfilled for future mandates.”122 The war between the communist North and the American- and UN-supported South had broken out in 1950 and the following year, the United States asked the governments of Switzerland and Norway to monitor a potential ceasefire agreement.123 This led to the formation of two distinct monitoring commissions, which eventually included Switzerland, Sweden (sic), Poland and Czechoslovakia. The Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission (NNSC) oversaw the eventual ceasefire agreement of 27 July 1953. The Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission (NNRC), which also included India, was responsible for the repatriation of prisoners of war.124 Initially, the Federal Council considered the NNSC and the NNRC to be ideal opportunities to demonstrate the compatibility of neutrality and solidarity in a UN setting. Yet the NNSC also gave rise to a number of problems for the Swiss.125 While the NNRC discharged all prisoners by February of 1954, the NNSC was forced to withdraw its inspection teams from both the North and the South of Korea in 1956.126 From then on, its mandate was effectively reduced to preventing a renewed outbreak of hostilities at the 38th parallel.127 Yet perhaps even more difficult for the Swiss government was the fact that the NNSC was not actually neutral at all. Poland and Czechoslovakia may have been militarily neutral with regards to the Korean conflict, but they often sided with the Korean People’s Army ideologically. As a result of this, both Sweden and Switzerland were increasingly identified as “Western” rather than simply as neutrals by outside observers.128 While the Federal Council did agree to see through its involvement in the commission, it concluded that henceforth, Switzerland would no longer agree to provide its good offices so easily. This feeling was doubtlessly reinforced after the Suez crisis of 1956 and arguably contributed to the formulation of Raymond Probst’s new set of criteria for the provision of good offices in 1958. 122 Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 90. 123 Eric Flury-Dasein, ‘Die Schweiz und Schweden vor den Herausforderungen des Kalten Krieges 1945–1970: Neutralitätspolitik, militärische Kooperation, Osthandel und KoreaMission,’ Schweizerische Zeitschrift für Geschichte = Revue suisse d’histoire = Rivista storica svizzera 54(2004), 138. 124 Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 90. 125 Trachsler, ‘Von Petitpierre bis Calmy-Rey,’ 113–114; Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 111. 126 Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 90. 127 Ibid. 128 Trachsler, ‘Von Petitpierre bis Calmy-Rey,’ 113–114; Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 111.

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Only the demand for Swiss good offices was not actually that high. Protecting power mandates, which entailed less direct involvement, remained popular. Between 1950 and 1995, Switzerland in fact took on 72 such mandates.129 The only successful Swiss mediatory mandate known to the Cold War literature, meanwhile, involved the French-Algerian negotiations of 1961. These ultimately led to the Evian Accords and the independence of Algeria in 1962.130 The previous year, Swiss diplomat Olivier Long, who had been on friendly terms with the French Minister for Algerian Affairs, Louis Joxe, received an official mandate from Federal Councillor Max Petitpierre. A French delegation headed by future French president Georges Pompidou met with representatives from the Algerian National Liberation Front for the first time in Lucerne in February of 1961.131 Negotiations continued in Les Rousses near the border to Switzerland.132 There were several times when negotiations threatened to break down and on one such occasion in February of 1962, Olivier Long played a crucial role as an intermediary in reuniting both parties around the negotiating table at Les Rousses near the French-Swiss border.133 That same year, the number of Swiss protecting power mandates had risen to sixteen following the Cuban Missile crisis. As a result of the crisis, the United States and several South American countries approached the Swiss to represent their diplomatic interests in Cuba. In fact, Switzerland continued to represent the United States in Cuba throughout the rest of the Cold War and also took on the protecting power mandate for Cuban interests in the United States from Czechoslovakia in 1995. Other prominent instances in which Switzerland exercised protecting power mandates during the Cold War include the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971, the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 and the Falkland Island crisis in 1982. Unlike Switzerland’s eventual involvement in the Afghan crisis after 1979, none of these mandates included the provision of conflict mediation. However, the case of the Indo-Pakistani war of 1971 arguably set an important precedent for Switzerland’s involvement in Afghanistan during the 1980s. In 1971, India and Pakistan mutually severed their diplomatic relations over the secession of Bangladesh and it was the first time that two developing countries asked Switzerland to reciprocally represent their diplomatic interests.134 129 130 131 132

Trachsler, ‘Von Petitpierre bis Calmy-Rey,’ 39. Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 103. Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 85. N.a., ‘Mitwirkung der schweizerischen Behörden beim Abschluss des Waffenstillstandes in Algerien (Beitrag für die Sitzungen der Kommissionen für Auswärtiges von Ende Mai 1962,’ 11 May 1962, Dodis, https://dodis.ch/10397. 133 Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 86. 134 N.a., ‘Relations Suisse-Pakistan,’ 5 September 1974, Dodis, https://www.dodis.ch/39478.

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Like Switzerland’s involvement in the wake of the Korean War, this particular protecting power mandate eventually came to include the protection of POWs.135 Approximately 92’000 Pakistani POWs were captured by the Indian army in Bengal and because of the recent declassification of relevant archival material, Nicolas Rion has become the first to write about this development.136 According to Rion, this, not the work of the NNRC in Korea, was the first time that the Third Geneva Conventions Relative to the Protection of Prisoners of War of 1949 were applied in an armed conflict.137 In some aspects, it was therefore an important precedent for Switzerland’s protecting power mandate involving the Soviet POWs from Afghanistan between 1982 and 1986. It also involved a close level of cooperation between the Swiss government and the ICRC.138 However, the Swiss were unsuccessful in attempting to mediate between India and Pakistan and played no part in the Accords of Delhi of 1973 and 1974. The same is true for the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 and of the Falklands crisis of 1982. In both instances, Switzerland took on protecting power mandates for the disputing parties, yet attempts to mediate were unsuccessful. On 4 November 1979, protesters stormed the American embassy in Teheran and captured over sixty embassy staff as hostages.139 The crisis itself did not immediately terminate diplomatic relations between the United States and Iran, but it made it impossible for the American embassy to continue to function as an embassy.140 Under these circumstances, the Carter Administration contacted future Swiss Secretary of State, Raymond Probst, who served as the Swiss ambassador to Washington at the time, to open an informal channel of communication with the Iranian authorities.141 This arrangement lasted until April 1980, when an attempt to rescue the hostages failed and US-Iranian diplomatic relations broke down.142 After this, the Swiss ambassador in Teheran, Erik Lang, became the most important source of information on the ground for both the Swiss and the American governments. Lang also ­eventually 135 N.a.,’ Correspondence to Ambassador Mallet: Concerns the Recognition of Bangla Desh (sic),’ 2 March 1972, https://dodis.ch/35582. 136 Rion, ‘Une occasion risqué pour la diplomatie Suisse,’ 44. 137 N.a., ‘Rapport sur la mission spéciale de l’Ambassadeur René Keller au Pakistan et en Inde, du 25 mars au 5 avril 1972,’ 10 April 1972, https://dodis.ch/35643. 138 Palmieri, ‘An institution standing the test of time?,’ 1291. 139 Fischer, Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise, 1979–1981, 9. 140 Odd Arne Westad, The Global Cold War (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 295–296. 141 Fischer, Die Rolle der Schweiz in der Iran-Geiselkrise, 1979–1981, 9. 142 Ibid.

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became an important source of information for the Swiss government on the Soviet-Afghan crisis during the 1980s. It was not through this channel that the hostage crisis was resolved, however. The regime of Ayatollah Khomeini eventually signaled its willingness to enter negotiations via the West German government and ultimately, it was the Algerian government which mediated between the Iranian and the American governments on the issue, leading to the release of the hostages in January of 1981.143 In the case of the Falkland crisis, the British government reached out to the Federal authorities on 2 April 1982 and asked them to represent British interests in Argentina.144 Over the course of the crisis, Switzerland took charge of the British embassy and two consulates-general, as well as of the protection of 30’000 British citizens.145 Following a request by British Ambassador Powell Jones, the FDFA, as the FPD had been renamed in 1979, also organized an informal meeting between British and Argentinian diplomats at one point during the crisis. Talks broke down almost immediately about whether the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands should form part of these talks.146 This might explain why experts on the Falkland crisis, most notably Lawrence Freedman, do not dwell on Switzerland’s short involvement as a mediator.147 Some might point out that Switzerland was also an active mediator during the CSCE from 1972 to 1975. The CSCE was a unique multilateral environment for the Swiss government both because of the substantial number of 35 states that attended and because of the diversity of issues that it addressed. It also became an unprecedented venue for neutral mediation in a multilateral context, as well as for the neutrals to work together as a group. The issues discussed at the CSCE between 1972 and 1975 were divided into three so-called “baskets.” The first concerned security issues. The second encapsulated economic, scientific, technological and environmental issues, while the third basket was devoted to humanitarian issues.148 These were all deemed to be sufficiently apolitical to allow Swiss participation in line with the Bindschedler Doctrine 143 Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 78. 144 Raymond Probst, ‘Correspondence to the Swiss Embassy in Buenos Aires,’ 2 April 1982, J1.301#2002/197#579*, CH-BAR. 145 Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 79. 146 Ibid., 86. 147 Lawrence Freedman, Signals of War: The Falklands Conflict of 1982 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1991). 148 Kostas Ifantis and Sotiris Serbos, ‘OSCE: A Natural Home for Europe’s Neutrals?’ International Journal of Humanities and Social Science 3(2013), 213; A. Bloed, ‘Institutional Aspects of the Helsinki Process After the Follow-Up Meeting of Vienna,’ Netherlands International Law Review 36 (1989), 343.

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of 1954 and in fact, Rudolf Bindschedler himself headed the Swiss delegation at multiple CSCE meetings.149 As the conference progressed, Switzerland became both a host country and a prominent mediator at the CSCE.150 In her doctoral thesis of 1999, Elizabeth Glas argued that at the CSCE, Switzerland was pro-active to such a degree that “she (sic) caused quite a stir.”151 There were multiple instances where Switzerland, together with neutral Finland, Austria, Sweden and non-aligned Yugoslavia, managed to extract a compromise solution to a difficult problem from the opposing Cold War factions at the conference. During the preparatory conference in Dipoli from 1972 to 1973, for instance, the N + N, as the neutral and non-aligned states became known, dominated the procedural debates and eventually devised an agenda for subsequent proceedings.152 In 1974, they resolved a deadlock over the preamble to the so-called third basket on human rights and the catalog of principles of the first basket on security issues.153 Eventually, the N+N even succeeded in including a reference to a state’s right to be neutral in the Helsinki Final Act, which concluded the CSCE in 1975.154 This was a significant achievement for the neutrals, as the UN Charter contained no such reference. However, the Swiss government did not act under an official mediatory mandate at the CSCE. On the whole, Switzerland’s record as a provider of good offices remained mixed throughout the Cold War. While its protecting powers continued to be in high demand, its ability to mediate was not. With the exception of the Evian Accords and the CSCE, Switzerland was largely unsuccessful as a mediating power.155 Switzerland was far from the only provider of good offices during this period. The close cooperation among the N + N at the CSCE was a relatively rare phenomenon. Between 1960 and 1991, Austria served as a protecting power six times.156 Sweden was active as a protecting power 21 times between 1952 and 1991. Unlike Switzerland, the Swedish government participated as a 149 Bürgisser, Zala and Fischer, ‘“Always Hit Back Right on the Kisser,” 275. 150 Elisabeth Glas, Aufbruch der Schweiz in die multilaterale Welt: Die schweizerische Aussenpolitik 1965–1977 (Ph.D. diss., University of Zurich, 1999), 103. 151 Ibid. 152 Fischer, Neutral Power in the CSCE, 363. 153 Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad, ‘Introduction: The Secrets of European Détente,’ in Perforating the Iron Curtain: European Détente, Transatlantic Relations and the Cold War, 1965–1985, edited by Poul Villaume and Odd Arne Westad, 7–17 (Copenhagen: Museum Tusculanum Press, 2010), 8. 154 Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 230; Glas, Aufbruch der Schweiz in die multilaterale Welt, 111. 155 Borsani, ‘Die Schweiz und die Guten Dienste,’ 6. 156 Trachsler, ‘Gute Dienste – Mythen, Fakten, Perspektiven,’ 40.

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mediator in the Suez crisis of 1956. It also mediated during the Vietnam War between 1965 and 1968, the Western Sahara conflict between 1976 and 1977 and the Iran-Iraq War between 1980 and 1986.157 The Finnish government was more reluctant to act as a mediator in armed conflict, preferring to support efforts by multilateral organizations such as the UN instead.158 Non-neutrals also took on protecting power roles during this period. Examples include Czechoslovakia, the United Kingdom, which represented the United States in China for some time, and the Netherlands, which ­represented Israel in the Soviet Union and Poland.159 Norway has been involved as a mediator in the aftermath of the Korean War, during the Vietnam War, as well as in Sudan, Sri Lanka, Cyprus, the Philippines and Colombia.160 To this day, the Norwegian government is perhaps best known for negotiating the Oslo Accords in the Arab-Israeli conflict in 1993 and 1995 respectively. What is more, over the course of the Cold War, an increasing number of mediating mandates were brought before the UN rather than before an individual state. According to Fanzun and Lehmann, a quarter of all such mandates went to the UN during the Cold War.161 Trygve Lie of Norway, the first UN Secretary-General, for instance, stepped forward as a mediator during the first Berlin crisis of 1948.162 At the time, his proposals were not accepted by the Cold War superpowers, yet his initiative nevertheless set a precedent. As discussed above, his successor, Dag Hammarskjöld of Sweden, became actively involved in the negotiations between the foreign ministers of Egypt, Britain and France during the Suez crisis of 1956 after Switzerland withdrew its initiative. The third Secretary-General, U Thant of Myanmar personally intervened in the Cuban missile crisis and in the Yemeni civil war.163

157 Ada Nissen, ‘A Historical View on the Nordic “Peace Brand”: Norway and Sweden: ­Partners and Competitors in Peace,’ in Do-Gooders at the End of Aid: Scandinavian Humanitarianism in the Twenty-First Century, edited by Antoine de Bengy Puyvallée and Kristian ­Bjørkdahl, 80–100 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2021), 84. 158 Ibid., 83. 159 Trachsler, ‘Gute Dienste – Mythen, Fakten, Perspektiven,’ 40. 160 Nissen, ‘A Historical View on the Nordic “Peace Brand,”’ 86. 161 Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 99. 162 Thomas M. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1998). 163 Rama Mani and Richard Ponzio, ‘Peaceful Settlement of Disputes and Conflict Prevention,’ in The Oxford Handbook on the United Nations, edited by Thomas Weiss and Sam Daws (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), accessed 23 January 2024, Oxford Academic Online. Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions.

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5 Conclusion: Neutrality, Solidarity and Mixed Messages in Times of Crisis Overall, several factors therefore complicated the Swiss government’s ability to demonstrate its commitments to both permanent neutrality and international solidarity since the early Cold War period. Having chosen not to apply for UN membership in 1946, the Swiss authorities pursued alternative avenues of multilateral cooperation by joining mainly technical intergovernmental organizations in line with the so-called Bindschedler Doctrine of 1954. These eventually included several specialized UN organizations, the Council of Europe and the CSCE, among others. They also continued to actively support the mission and mandate of the Geneva-based Red Cross movement, to provide protective power mandates, and signaled their availability to mediate in situations of armed conflict. However, following the overwhelmingly negative international response to its initiative of hosting an international peace conference to address the Suez crisis of 1956, the Swiss government began to act more cautiously in offering to provide its neutral good offices. According to Thomas Fischer and Daniel Möckli, the Swiss government concluded that “the best way to preserve its neutral status was by pursuing a passive foreign policy rather than exposing itself to risk by actively promoting peace initiatives.”164 This line of thinking also prevailed in Switzerland’s initial response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979. The issue with this is that at its core, the doctrine of Neutrality and Solidarity sent mixed messages to interlocutors abroad. In situations of armed conflict, the Swiss government is always forced to weigh off these two competing imperatives against each other and to make sure that the latter would not infringe the former. As a consequence, the relationship between neutrality and solidarity has always been an ambiguous one and it has sometimes led to more confusion than goodwill abroad. What is more, it has been a dynamic, evolving relationship, and one that has ultimately led to a wide range of foreign policy responses to instances of international tension and crisis. 164 Fischer and Möckli, ‘The Limits of Compensation,’ 25.

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Switzerland’s Guarded Response to the Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979–1980 In the Afghan context, both government and parliament initially refused to become diplomatically involved in early 1980. As has occurred in other cases both before and since the Soviet invasion, there developed a series of competing multilateral avenues in pursuit of a diplomatic resolution. The Soviet Union ultimately lent its support to diplomatic talks between the Karmal regime and neighboring Pakistan through the UN in 1981 and both parties chose the UN headquarters in Geneva as a location for their talks. These took place intermittently between 1982 and 1988. The Swiss authorities were not involved in any capacity and archival documents from the period do not suggest that they tried to claim credit for hosting the talks on Swiss territory as a demonstration of international solidarity. Rather, it appears as though both the FDFA heeded the lessons contained in both the Bindschedler Doctrine of 1954 and Raymond Probst’s 1958 criteria for offering to provide good offices. They did not pro-actively signal their so-called disponibilité – their availability to become diplomatically involved. Instead, especially during the initial stages of the Afghan crisis, the Swiss government signaled its commitment to permanent neutrality. Paradoxically, between 1980 and 1982, several third parties did approach the Swiss government to host diplomatic talks for precisely this reason. Yet none of these initiatives succeeded in gaining support from the Soviet Union, which not only denied being at war in Afghanistan but refused to consider diplomatic talks at all prior to 1981. When the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan finally did signal interest in diplomatic talks, the parties chose the UN as a mediator and venue for their discussions. In the beginning, it therefore did not actually appear as though the Afghan crisis would provide an opportunity for the Swiss government to demonstrate the compatibility of neutrality and solidarity in line with Max Petitpierre’s original understanding of the idea. 1

The Soviet Invasion, December 1979

It is a common misunderstanding that the war in Afghanistan began with the Soviet invasion of December 1979. By that time, a civil war was already underway. In 1973, Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan had deposed © Liliane Stadler, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004690660_004 Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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his own cousin, the ruling monarch, Mohammad Zaher Shah. Together with the communist People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA), Daoud toppled the monarchy and turned Afghanistan into a republic. In the spring of 1978, the PDPA overthrew President Daoud, killed him and changed the name of the republic to the Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) during what became known as the “Saur Revolution.”1 The PDPA’s Nur Mohammad Taraki became the new president and his deputy, Hafizullah Amin, became both prime and defence minister. Both were members of the so-called Khalq faction of the PDPA, which cultivated close ties to the ethnic Pushtun majority of the Afghan population. The rivalling Parcham faction within the party aligned itself more with Soviet-style communism, as opposed to the politics of a particular ethnolinguistic group. As it had done with Finland in 1948, the Soviet Union concluded a so-called FCMA with the new Khalqi regime on 5 December 1978. Unlike the FCMA concluded with Finland, the Afghan FCMA also included a clause to the effect that either party would lend assistance – including of the military kind – to the other in times of need. Hence, the Soviet-Afghan FCMA essentially had the character of a military alliance. It also played an increasingly important role in the bilateral relationship between both governments over the course of the following year. Since the coup against King Mohammad Zaher Shah in 1973, armed resistance groups had launched sporadic guerrilla attacks on Afghan territory from neighboring Pakistan. By the winter of 1978 to 1979, the resistance had already spread to 28 of 34 Afghan provinces and according to Odd Arne Westad it gradually became apparent that the resistance would become a serious military threat to the government.2 Collectively, the Afghan resistance movements became known as the mujahideen. This is somewhat misleading, because the mujahideen were anything but a unified resistance movement. Whilst they were unified in their opposition to the communist Afghan government, they were not unified in their political and military goals. Neither did they share a uniform interpretation of Islam – being both Sunni and Shi’a – a common ideology, or a clear vision as to the form of government they wished to see in Afghanistan. Olivier Roy contends that there were no leading Afghan political thinkers in Afghanistan, the likes of Sayyid Qutb in Egypt or Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini

1 Barnett Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan,’ Foreign Affairs 1989(68), 152; ­Panagiotis Dimitrakis, ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan: International Reactions, Military ­Intelligence and British Diplomacy,’ Middle Eastern Studies 48 (2012), 511. 2 Raymond Garthoff, Détente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1985), 990; Westad, The Global Cold War, 306.

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of Iran.3 According to American journalist Edward Girardet, the movement basically consisted of “a broad patchwork of guerrilla fronts, perhaps as many as 300 of varying effectiveness.”4 Many of them had a diverse array of foreign sponsors and their allegiances and internal alliances shifted constantly. William Maley adds to this that the resistance ranged from formal political parties with headquarters outside of Afghanistan to forces organized on a regional basis and to “scattered groups of fighters with local interests.”5 At the local level, smaller resistance groups usually consisted of an armed group of fighters led by a commander, who may have had ties to the exiled political resistance parties in Pakistan. Some commanders even emerged as regional political leaders themselves, ruling over small portions of the population and sometimes presiding over basic local administrations.6 The Pakistani military regime of Mohammad Zia ul-Haq, which had come to power in a military coup in 1977, supported various mujahideen groups based in Peshawar and Quetta on the Pakistani side of the border to Afghanistan.7 Six major Afghan resistance parties had established themselves on Pakistani soil by 1979. Many of these are worth introducing in detail, because they eventually came into direct contact with Swiss mediators during the late 1980s and the early 1990s.8 Jam’iyyat-e-Islami (the Islamic Society), led by Burhanuddin Rabbani, was an Islamist party made up mainly of Tajik and Uzbek fighters from northern Afghanistan. Rabbani himself had been a professor at Kabul University, where he had presided over an underground section of Sazman-e Javanan-e Musulman (the Organization of Muslim Youth). He had been one of the first to flee Kabul after the 1973 coup to settle in Pakistan. According to Peter Tomsen, American Special Envoy to Afghanistan from 1989 to 1992, Rabbani spoke fluent English and Arabic, was “mild-mannered and cagey” as well as neatly dressed at all times.9 3 Olivier Roy, Afghanistan: From Holy War to Civil War (Princeton: Darwin Press, 1995), 31. 4 Edward Girardet, Afghanistan: The Soviet War (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1985), 54. 5 William Maley, ‘Introduction: Interpreting the Taliban,’ in Fundamentalism Reborn? Afghanistan and the Taliban, edited by William Maley (London: Hurst, 1998), 9. 6 Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan,’ 153. 7 Kevin Baker, War in Afghanistan: A Short History of 80 Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier, 1839 to 2011 (Dural: Rosenberg Publishing, 2011), 197. 8 Abdul Rashid, ‘The Afghan Resistance: Its Background, Its Nature and the Problem of Unity,’ in Afghanistan: The Great Game Revisited, edited by Rosanne Klass (New York: Freedom House, 1987), 213. 9 Peter Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan: Messianic Terrorism, Tribal Conflicts, and the Failures of Great Powers (New York: Public Affairs, 2011), 307.

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Other resistance groups included Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (the Revolutionary Islamic Movement), which also operated in northern Afghanistan and was led by a man called Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, as well as Mahaz-iMilli Islami-yi Afghanistan (the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan).10 The latter was led by Pir Sayyid Ahmed Gailani. According to Peter Tomsen, he was the most westernized of the mujahideen leaders whom he met with during his time as American Special Envoy to the resistance.11 He also, according to Tomsen, exhibited “a lively sense of humour.”12 Like Harakat, Mahaz was a largely Pushtun-based resistance group. Unlike Harakat, however, Mahaz had ties to the former royal family and advocated for the return of the deposed king, Mohammad Zaher Shah, who lived in exile in Rome.13 Similarly to a fourth resistance group, Jebha-i-Nejat-i-Milli-Afghanistan (the Afghan National Liberation Front), led by Sebghatullah Mujadiddi, Mahaz promoted a Sufi interpretation of Islam. Hezb-i-Islami (Islamic Party), the final major resistance group, split into two separate parties with the same name shortly before the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, thus bringing the number of major resistance parties to six. Both were more radically Islamist in orientation than Jam’iyyat-e-Islami. Hezb-iIslami/Hekmatyar was led by a man called Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood movement in Kabul during the 1970s. A former student of Burhanuddin Rabbani, Hekmatyar broke with his mentor between 1976 and 1977 to found his own party, majority Pushtun in membership and sponsored heavily by the Pakistani government. Hezb-i-Islami/Khalis, on the other hand, was led by a man called Mawlawi Yunis Khalis. In March of 1979, a mujahideen insurgency in Herat in western Afghanistan led to a mutiny amongst the seventeenth division of the Afghan army.14 The entire seventeenth Division defected to the mujahideen at the same time, causing the Afghan government to lose control over the city entirely. What was more, over the course of the insurgency, dozens of Soviet military advisers, who had been routinely stationed in Herat as part of the ongoing 10 Baker, War in Afghanistan, 181. 11 Tomsen, The Wars of Afghanistan, 315. 12 Ibid. 13 Baker, War in Afghanistan, 181. 14 Rodric Braithwaite, ‘The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,’ in At the end of Military Intervention: Historical, Theoretical and Applied Approaches to Transition, Handover and Withdrawal, edited by Robert Johnson and Timothy Clack (Oxford: Oxford Scholarship Online, 2015), accessed 23 January 2024.

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Soviet military aid to Afghanistan, were killed alongside their families.15 The response of the communist Afghan government was to ask the Soviet Union for armed assistance in light of the 1978 FCMA, yet the Politburo refused.16 At the height of the crisis in Herat, from 17–19 March, the Politburo deliberated on the subject on a daily basis but ultimately decided against intervention. According to Alexei Kosygin, the chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Soviet Union, “If our troops were introduced, the situation … ​would not improve but would worsen.”17 According to Rodric Braithwaite, the former British Ambassador to the Soviet Union and subsequently to Russia, the Soviet Union feared becoming involved in a civil war and had “no desire to support a regime which could only survive with Russian bayonets.”18 On 1 April, KGB Chairman Yuriy Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defence Minister Dmitry Ustinov and Boris Ponomarev, Head of the International Department of the Central Committee, drafted a policy document, which argued that Afghanistan had not been ready for a socialist revolution to begin with and that if anything was to be accomplished, the PDPA would first need to widen its political base.19 The Afghan government gradually suppressed the Herat uprising on its own, yet this did not prevent other revolts, uprisings and mutinies from taking place in other parts of the country.20 In May, popular uprisings occurred in six provinces, including Kabul, and in July, rebels attempted to occupy Gardeyz, near the border to Pakistan.21 In response, the Taraki government filed a string of requests for military support with the Politburo. These included requests for helicopters in April, armoured troops in June and special forces in July.22 In August, Prime Minister Hafizullah Amin asked for Soviet troops to be introduced directly into Kabul.23 Yet political infighting also increasingly 15 Dimitrakis, ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,’ 511. 16 Braithwaite, ‘The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,’ accessed 23 January 2024. 17 Dimitrakis, ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,’ 512. 18 Braithwaite, ‘The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,’ accessed 23 January 2024. 19 Braithwaite, Afghantsy, 52. 20 Braithwaite, ‘The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,’ accessed 23 January 2024. 21 Braithwaite, Afghantsy, 53. 22 The Russian General Staff, editors, The Soviet-Afghan War: How a Superpower Fought and Lost, translated by Lester W. Grau and Michael A. Cress (Lawrence: University of Kansas Press, 2002), 10. 23 Ivan Pavlovskii, ‘Report from Soviet Deputy Defense Minister Army Gen. Ivan Pavlovskii, during visit to Afghanistan,’ 25 August, 1979, CWIHIP, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter .org/document/111559.

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undermined the PDPA from within. During the fall of 1979, President Taraki went to Moscow on an official state visit after having attended a summit of the NAM in Havana.24 In his absence, several of his government ministers planned a coup against Prime Minister Amin. They included Colonel Mohammad Aslam Watanjar, the Minister of the Interior, and Major Sherjan Mazdoryar, the Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as Colonel Seid Muhammad Gulabzoi, the Minister of Communication, and Assadullah Sarwari, the director of the notorious Khadamat-e Aetela’at-e Dawlati (KHAD), the domestic intelligence service.25 Their plan was to assassinate Amin on his way to the airport, where he was meant to greet Taraki upon his return from Moscow.26 Yet Amin found out about the plot and confronted Taraki about it directly upon his arrival, at which point Taraki demanded that Amin resign.27 Later that day, Taraki himself participated in plotting a second assassination attempt. This time, the plan was to strike on 14 September, when Amin was scheduled to meet Taraki at the presidential residence. As Amin made his way into the building that day, the president’s guards opened fire and killed two of Amin’s personal assistants. Amin escaped unharmed and fled to the Ministry of Defence.28 From there, he successfully launched his own coup against Taraki.29 On 16 September, he replaced Taraki as General Secretary of the PDPA and on 9 October, he executed Taraki despite repeated Soviet appeals for his life.30 At least since the uprising in Herat that same year, the Politburo had been following the internal strife within the PDPA as much as it had been following developments related to the mujahideen insurgency. The Politburo was particularly concerned about Amin on account of speculations about his potential ties to the United States.31 Amin had studied in New York and the Soviet KGB, the

24 Braithwaite, Afghantsy, 62. 25 Hafizullah Emandi, State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan (New York: Praeger, 1990), 85. 26 Ibid. 27 Ibid., 86. 28 Westad, The Global Cold War, 313; Dimitrakis, ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,’ 513. 29 Dimitrakis, ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,’ 513; Agnes Bresselau von Bressensdorf, ‘Die Unterschätzte Herausforderung: Afghanistan 1979, das Krisenmanagement der NATO-Staaten und der Islam als Faktor der Internationalen Beziehungen’ VfZ 64 (2016), 86. 30 Westad, The Global Cold War, 313. 31 Emandi, State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan, 88.

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Committee for State Security, claimed that he had ties to the American Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).32 Unable to repair the rift within the PDPA that his coup had caused, Amin did in fact reach out both to the Kremlin and to the American government at the same time.33 He repeatedly held meetings with American officials in Kabul in late October.34 These in turn were monitored closely by the KGB, which, according to Odd Arne Westad, suspected the Carter Administration of looking for “a replacement for its lost positions in Iran.”35 In February of that year, the pro-American Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, had been toppled by Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, depriving the United States of its accustomed sphere of influence in the region. According to General Leonid Vladimirowitch Shebarshin, a KGB operative stationed in Iran at the time, the Soviet Union suspected Amin of “doing a Sadat on us,” referring to Egyptian president Anwar Sadat and meaning wholesale defection from the Soviet camp and turning to the United States for arms imports.36 In the background, tensions between both superpower camps had increased markedly during the fall and winter of that year. A case in point was the so-called NATO “double track decision” of 12 December. While proposing mutual limitations on both medium and intermediate-range nuclear missiles, it also threatened to deploy 572 American Pershing II and Cruise missiles across Europe, should the negotiations fail.37 Throughout this time, Amin issued repeated requests for Soviet military assistance to Moscow on 2, 3, 12, and 17 December and these may have tipped the balance in favour of the Soviet invasion.38 According to Braithwaite, the process by which the Politburo reached its final decision is not well documented, yet ultimately, the decision “was taken by the politicians against the advice of the military.”39 On 6 December, the first units of the Soviet armed forces began to deploy to Afghanistan and on 8 December, KGB Chairman Yuriy 32 Braithwaite, ‘The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,’ accessed 23 January 2024. 33 Westad, The Global Cold War, 315. 34 US Embassy Kabul, ‘Correspondence to Secretary of State: Meeting with President Amin,’ October 1979, National Security Archive, George Washington University (NSA-GWU), https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=5696254-Document-2-AmEmbassy-Kabul -cable-7726-to. 35 Westad, The Global Cold War, 316. 36 Ibid. 37 Raymond Probst, ‘Einführungsreferat: Die Europäische Sicherheit,’ 24 August 1983, E7001C#1994/105#269*, CH-BAR. 38 Dimitrakis, ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,’ 513. 39 Braithwaite, ‘The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,’ accessed 23 January 2024.

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Andropov, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko, Defence Minister Dmitry Ustinov and ­Second Secretary of the Communist Party, Mikhail Suslov met with General Secretary Leonid Brezhnev to discuss the merits of an invasion.40 On 12 December, despite previous intentions to the contrary, the Politburo decided to intervene in Afghanistan.41 Several key members of the Politburo, including Brezhnev, Andropov, Gromyko, Ustinov and Suslov, met again and decided unanimously to depose Amin, as well as to introduce limited armed  forces into Afghanistan.42 According to Elizabeth Leake, the reasoning behind the invasion was to reinforce the faltering socialist state.43 It was not intended to be a long-drawn out conflict and in fact, Leake argues that it was not even initially intended to be a war.44 Fred Halliday and Zahir Tanin have have similarly argued that at the time of the invasion, the Amin regime was not about to collapse. It still retained the loyalty of the armed forces, as well as of the civilian population in major cities.45 Rodric Braithwaite, meanwhile, estimates that the aim of the operation was only to secure the main roads and towns, to stabilize the government and withdraw within six to twelve months.46 By December of 1979, the KGB had already begun to infiltrate Kabul with Special Forces (Spetznaz) under “Operation Agat.”47 One Spetznaz unit was positioned at Bagram air base outside Kabul. Others were positioned near the 40

Alexander Lyakhovsky, ‘The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan (sic),’ translated by Anna Melyakova, 1995, NSA-GWU, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=5696257-Document-5 -Soviet-Decisions-in-December-1979. 41 Leonid Brezhnev, ‘Concerning the situation in “A,”’ 12 December 1979, NSA-GWU, https:// nsarchive2.gwu.edu//dc.html?doc=5696258-Document-6-On-the-Situation-in-A -December-12–1979. 42 Ibid.; Lyakhovsky, ‘The Tragedy and Valor of Afghan,’ https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu// dc.html?doc=5696257-Document-5-Soviet-Decisions-in-December-1979; According to Tom Blanton and Svetlana Savranskaya of the National Security Archive, Russian President Boris Yeltsin declassified the memo of the Politburo decision to intervene in 1992 as part of his own struggle against the legacy of the communist party (Tom Blanton and Svetlana Savranskaya, ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan, 1979: Not Trump’s Terrorists, Nor Zbig’s Warm Water Ports,’ 29 January 2019, https://nsarchive.gwu.edu/briefing-book /afghanistan-russia-programs/2019-01-29/soviet-invasion-afghanistan-1979-not-trumps -terrorists-nor-zbigs-warm-water-ports). 43 Elizabeth Leake, Afghan Crucible: The Soviet Invasion and the Making of Modern Afghanistan (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2022), 69. 44 Ibid. 45 Fred Halliday and Zahir Tanin, ‘The Communist Regime in Afghanistan 1978–1992: ­Institutions and Conflicts,’ Europe-Asian Studies 50(1998), 1362. 46 Braithwaite, Afghantsy, 8. 47 Westad, The Global Cold War, 321.

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presidential residence, the PDPA headquarters and the main radio station.48 On 25 December, the 40th Soviet Army invaded Afghanistan.49 In addition, units from the 40th Army’s 105th and 108th Motorized Rifle Divisions crossed the Afghan border at Termez and airborne troops from the 103rd and the 105th Air Divisions descended on Kabul and on Shindand near Herat.50 On 27 December, Spetznaz forces attacked the Tajbeg Palace on the outskirts of Kabul, where Amin had sought refuge.51 They executed the president along with several of his relatives and aides.52 Radio Kabul announced the execution at 2:55 am the following morning.53 In a spectacular twist of events, the broadcast claimed that the government had “requested the USSR to render urgent political, moral and economic assistance, including military aid, and that the Soviet government had agreed to do so.”54 An internal government dispatch to the Soviet ambassadorial network on 27 December further justified the invasion as a response to “the intervention from without and the terror unleashed by Amin within the country,” which had “created a threat to liquidate what the April Revolution [of 1978] brought Afghanistan (sic).”55 Babrak Karmal, the Afghan ambassador to Prague since the purge of 1978, was flown into Kabul together with a KGB unit and proclaimed himself the new president and General Secretary of the PDPA on 28 December.56 2

The Initial Reaction of the Swiss Government, January 1980

News of the invasion shook the world. This was a full-scale, overt Soviet ­invasion of a country outside of the Soviet bloc. Most observers were caught by surprize and initially struggled to assess the direct consequences of the invasion. Swiss commentators were no exception. The conservative newspaper Weltwoche and the liberal daily Neue Zürcher Zeitung appeared stunned and accused the Soviet Union of orchestrating an “imperialist” military takeover 48 Ibid. 49 Baker, War in Afghanistan, 172; Westad, The Global Cold War, 321. 50 Westad, The Global Cold War, 321. 51 Baker, War in Afghanistan, 172. 52 Westad, The Global Cold War, 321. 53 Dimitrakis, ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,’ 514. 54 Ibid. 55 N.a., ‘Message to Soviet Ambassadors on the Invasion of Afghanistan, Attachment to CPSU Politburo Decree #177,‘ CWIHP, translated by Gary Goldberg, 27 December 1979, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/113048. 56 Baker, War in Afghanistan, 172; Westad, The Global Cold War, 321.

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of a sovereign state.57 According to the Swiss daily Der Bund, the invasion represented much more than just the military invasion of a sovereign state. On 11 January, Der Bund reasoned that, “What is happening in Afghanistan at the moment is no less threatening for world peace than what happened in Europe in 1956 and 1968,” when Soviet forces advanced into Hungary and Czechoslovakia respectively.58 The Swiss government’s first public reaction was much more restrained. The so-called “Declaration of the Federal Council on Incidents in Afghanistan” of 9 January 1980 condemned the invasion as an act of aggression but did not identify the Soviet Union by name, much as it had done during the Soviet intervention in Czechoslovakia in 1968. It also committed the Swiss government to do nothing except to further observe ongoing developments in the region. However, according to Thomas Bürgisser, Sacha Zala and Thomas Fischer, the Soviet invasion “shifted the tone of conversation in Berne.”59 Switzerland subsequently voiced strong objections to the declaration of martial law in Poland in 1981 and the downing of a South Korean civilian airliner in the Soviet Union in 1983. According to Olga Pavlenko, it was not until the first Soviet-American presidential summit between Ronald Reagan and Mikhail Gorbachev that “a thaw in their relations could be detected.”60 Unlike neutrals such as Austria and Finland, Switzerland had always maintained relatively distant relations to the Soviet Union.61 Strong anti-communist sentiments amongst the Swiss population had been a consistent obstacle to closer diplomatic and economic ties throughout the Cold War. Switzerland had been one of the last European states to establish official diplomatic relations with the Soviet Union in 1946. The negotiations that preceded the resumption of diplomatic relations included the repatriation of nearly 6’000 Swiss citizens from territories occupied by the Soviet Union at the end of the war. They also included the repatriation of nearly 10’000 Soviet prisoners of war and forced laborers, who had fled to Switzerland from Germany during the Second World War, as well as the forced return of at least one political refugee and at least one deserter from the Soviet armed forces.62 Bürgisser, Zala, and Fischer emphasize that the forced repatriation of political refugees was against Swiss law, but

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Weltwoche, ‘Moskaus Imperialisten,’ 3 January 1980, E1110A#1988/121#12*, CH-BAR; Neue Zürcher Zeitung (NZZ), ‘Moskaus Griff in den Süden,’ 6/5 January 1980, E1110A#1988/121#12*, CH-BAR. 58 Der Bund,’ Ausgerechnet Afghanistan,’ 11 January 1980, E1110A#1988/121#12*, CH-BAR. 59 Bürgisser, Zala and Fischer, ‘“Always Hit Back Right on the Kisser,” 277. 60 Pavlenko, ‘The Soviet Union and Neutral Switzerland,’ 173. 61 Ibid. 62 Bürgisser, Zala and Fischer, ‘“Always Hit Back Right on the Kisser,” 263.

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that the Swiss government proceeded nevertheless, creating a disturbing precedent on the subject of forced repatriation to the Soviet Union.63 Historically, Switzerland’s diplomatic ties to Afghanistan had been even more distant than its relations to the Soviet Union. In fact, Switzerland and Afghanistan entertained scarcely any bilateral ties prior to the Soviet invasion. Modest diplomatic relations between the two countries began on 12 March 1929, when Switzerland recognized the Kingdom of Afghanistan, as it was called at the time.64 Until the mid-1970s, the only two bilateral treaties that existed between them related to citizen travel. The so-called Friendship Agreement of 1928 gave citizens of both countries the right to travel to the other and the Aviation Agreement of 1961 regulated air travel between both states. Switzerland never established an embassy in Afghanistan. Instead, in ­February 1954, the Swiss ambassador to Iran became accredited in Afghanistan and subsequently established a consular agency in Kabul. The agency was closed prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, after which the Austrian embassy took on a protective power mandate for Swiss interests in Afghanistan.65 In theory, the Swiss ambassador to Iran – who also became intimately involved in the Iranian hostage crisis on behalf of the Swiss government – remained accredited in Kabul and eventually became an important source of information on events in Afghanistan for the Swiss government.66 In terms of economic relations, these had been modest between both countries prior to the Soviet invasion and decreased even more thereafter. As depicted below, Swiss exports to Afghanistan, which consisted mainly of machinery and pharmaceuticals, dropped from approximately CHF 16.1 million in value in 1976 to CHF 1.2 million in 1980 and did not recover over the entire duration of the Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989. Imports from Afghanistan, on the other hand, reached a peak in 1980 at CHF 21.6 million in value and subsequently declined to CHF 16.1 million by 1984. These mainly included textiles and tapestries.67 Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979, internal correspondence from within the FDFA reveals that the Swiss authorities were not primarily concerned about being directly affected. They were, however, concerned about the security implications of the Soviet invasion for the wider 63 Ibid. 64 N.a., ‘Relations bilatérales Suisse-Afghanistan,’ 21 September 1992, E2200.141–03#2000 /235#2*, CH-BAR. 65 Ibid. 66 Ibid. 67 Ibid.

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25

20

15

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0

1970

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Swiss imports from Afghanistan

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Swiss exports to Afghanistan

Graph 1 Swiss-Afghan economic exchange from 1970 to 1992 (in millions of Swiss Francs, CHF) Source: Swiss Federal Archives (CH-BAR)68

geopolitical climate of the Cold War. Federal Councillor Pierre Aubert, who had become foreign minister in 1978, dispatched a circular note to all embassies, consulates and missions in the Swiss diplomatic network the day after the Federal Council’s public statement of 9 January 1980. Challenging a Soviet communiqué that the FDFA had received on 28 December 1979, Aubert argued that the invasion had violated the Charter of the UN and the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, both of which the Soviet Union had signed.69 He also advised all embassies that, “If the occasion presents itself – without, however, needing to take the initiative – make it known that we are concerned about the behaviour of the Soviet Union” and especially “about the danger that it might create a precedent in inter-European relations.”70 According to internal Swiss government documents, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan was a surprize, full-scale and 68

68 69 70

N.a., Relations bilatérales Suisse-Afghanistan, 21 September 1992, E2200.141–03#2000 /235#2* (sic), CH-BAR. Pierre Aubert, ‘Correspondence to Select Embassies,’ 10 January 1980, E2200.157–04#1992 /114#57*, CH-BAR. Ibid., author’s translation from, “Il faut donc lorsque l’occasion se présente, sans toutefois prendre l’initiative des démarches, faire état de notre inquiétude face au comportement de l’URSS et du danger qu’il pourrait constituer en tant que précédent dans les relations intereuropéennes.”

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overt invasion of a non-aligned state and there were a number of both neutral and non-aligned states in Europe within relatively close geographic proximity to the Soviet Union, including Yugoslavia, Finland, Austria and Albania.71 The reactions of most other permanently neutral states revealed similar levels of concern and uncertainty about how to act. The Swedish cabinet vehemently condemned the Soviet invasion. Sweden had also strongly criticized the Soviet interventions of Hungary in 1956 and Czechoslovakia in 1968.72 Finland, on the other hand, was among few delegations to abstain from condemning the Soviet Union in the UN General Assembly in January of 1980.73 The Austrian government voted to condemn the invasion at the UN General Assembly but objected to the imposition of sanctions against the Soviet Union and participated in the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow. According to Peter Ruggenthaler, the invasion “barely ruffled Soviet-Austrian relations.”74 In Switzerland, the reasoning was that being permanent neutral, the Swiss government ought not to participate in sanctions against the Soviet Union either. Beyond this, the government developed no cohesive foreign policy toward the Afghan conflict over the course of the early 1980s. Following the Federal Council’s public statement on Afghanistan on 9 Janaury 1980, the FDFA formed an ad-hoc working group on the crisis. Led by Edouard Brunner, the head of the Political Directorate on Europe and North America, the group prepared essential briefing points for Federal Councillor Aubert to present to parliament.75 The Swiss parliament is composed of the National Assembly (Nationalrat), which is the lower house of parliament, and the Council of States (Ständerat), which is the upper house. Prior to debating most issues in open session, each parliamentary chamber set the agenda and discussed it in detail behind closed doors with the relevant Federal Councillor. 71 72 73

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N.a., ‘Les événements d’Afghanistan et leurs conséquences,’ n.d., E2010–01A#1991/18#4*, CH-BAR. Jussi Hanhimäki, ‘United States and Neutrality in Scandinavia,’ in The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe, edited by Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko and Peter Ruggenthaler 405–424 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 416. Wolfgang Mueller, ‘The USSR and Permanent Neutrality in the Cold War,’ Journal of Cold War Studies 18(2016), 172; Kari Möttölä, ‘From Aspiration to Consummation and Transition: Finnish Neutrality as a Strategy in the Cold War,’ in The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe, edited by Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko and Peter Ruggenthaler 210–232 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 222. Peter Ruggenthaler, ‘A Hidden Danger for the Eastern Blog? Neutral Austria in Soviet Policy from 1955 to the End of the Cold War,’ in The Soviet Union and Cold War Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe, edited by Mark Kramer, Aryo Makko and Peter Ruggenthaler 148–170 (Lanham: Lexington Books, 2021), 153. N.a., ‘Les événements d’Afghanistan et leurs conséquences,’ E2010–01A#1991/18#4*, CH-BAR. Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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As part of their preparations, Brunner’s working group produced a series of working papers, which were circulated internally. Many confirmed Pierre Aubert’s initial suspicions about the strategic implications of the Soviet invasion for Switzerland’s immediate threat environment. As discussed, they primarily focused on the fact that this was the first time that the Soviet Union had invaded a non-aligned state and while most members of the NAM were newly independent states across Asia and Africa, there were several European exceptions. Founded in the Indonesian city of Bandung in 1955, the NAM stood for the pursuit of national independence based on peaceful coexistence, the support for national liberation movements across the world and crucially, the abstention from joining military alliances.76 Alongside Afghanistan, other prominent founding members included India, Pakistan, Ghana, Egypt and Yugoslavia. Unlike neutrality, which had its origins in international law, non-alignment was an explicitly political movement intended to form a buffer between the rivalling Cold War alliance systems. As Indian Prime Minister Jawaharlal Nehru explained at the Bandung Conference of 1955, Every step that takes place in reducing that area of the world which may be called the ‘unaligned area’ is a dangerous step and leads to war. It reduces that objectivity, that balance, that outlook, which other countries without military might can perhaps exercise.77 Brunner’s working group warned of this same effect and it even speculated that the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan might indicate a dangerous revision and expansion of the scope of the Brezhnev Doctrine in Soviet strategic ­thinking.78 Following the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia of 1968, Leonid Brezhnev, the General Secretary of the CPSU, had justified sending in Soviet troops to quell the protests of the so-called Prague Spring by arguing that, “The weakening of any of the links in the world system of socialism directly affects all the socialist countries. We cannot look indifferently upon this.”79 This logic subsequently became known as the Brezhnev Doctrine, which legitimized Soviet armed intervention within the Eastern bloc if a government threatened to deviate 76 77 78 79

Robert Mortimer, The Third World Coalition in International Politics (New York: Prager, 1984), 12. Ibid., 101. N.a., ‘Les événements d’Afghanistan et leurs conséquences,’ E2010–01A#1991/18#4*, CH-BAR. International Relations and Security Network (ISN), ‘Brezhnev Doctrine: Speech by First Secretary of the Soviet Union Leonid Brezhnev,’ Zurich: International Relations and Security Network (ISN), 1968, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/125400/1162_brezhnevdoctrine .pdf. Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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from its socialist orientation.80 Because Afghanistan had remained a member of the NAM despite its 1978 FCMA with the Soviet Union, Edouard Brunner’s working group now feared that the Soviet Union might expand the Brezhnev Doctrine to also include states outside of its traditional sphere of influence. Elizabeth Leake has recently argued that although the literature has not traditionally viewed Afghanistan as a “decolonized” state, the Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989 amounted to a form of “re-colonization” of both one of the first Asian states to be admitted to the UN in 1946 and one of the founding members of the NAM.81 Whether or not Afghanistan was de facto non-aligned at the time of the invasion remains subject to debate. By the time of the invasion, the Soviet Union had been exerting influence over Afghanistan for decades. During the late 1920s, the Politburo began to channel non-military aid to Afghanistan with the intention of creating an isolating buffer on the Soviet Union’s southern border.82 Over the course of the twentieth century, the Soviet Union not only invested consistently in Afghan road infrastructure, but also in the training of the Afghan armed forces. By 1972, approximately 100 Soviet technical specialists and consultants were in Afghanistan for this purpose.83 Similar conditions applied to the Afghan natural gas sector – particularly to extraction installations and pipeline networks.84 Most of the component parts for the latter were imported directly from the Soviet Union, leading to a high degree of Afghan dependency on Soviet technology and technical training in this sector of its struggling economy.85 What this amounted to in practice was that, although Afghanistan remained a non-aligned state throughout this period, economically, it was becoming heavily dependent on the Soviet Union. The Swiss Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs of the Council of States – the upper house of parliament – met to discuss these circumstances and their immediate implications for Switzerland on 14 February 1980. Relying on the briefing materials provided by Edouard Brunner’s ad hoc working group, Federal Councillor Aubert provided the parliamentary committee members from the Council of States with a so-called tour d’horizon, an analysis of 80

Jiri Valenta, ‘From Prague to Kabul: The Soviet Style of Invasion,’ International Security 5(1980), 119. 81 Elisabeth Leake, ‘States, Nations, and Self-Determination: Afghanistan and Decolonization at the United Nations,’ Journal of Global History 17(2022), 278. 82 Westad, The Global Cold War, 300. 83 The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War, 10. 84 Andrei Dörre and Tobias Kraudzun, ‘Persistence and Change in Soviet and Russian ­Relations with Afghanistan,’ Central Asian Survey 2012(31), 432. 85 Ibid.

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Switzerland’s geopolitical situation in the aftermath of the invasion of Afghanistan. “I do not think,” he began, “that we are directly and physically threatened at present.”86 “We need time for reflection, but we also need to be extremely vigilant with respect to our national security and to any possible reactions by the Soviet Union.” He recommended that at the upcoming CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid in November, Switzerland should point out that the Soviet Union had signed the Helsinki Final Act of 1975, pledging itself to respect the integrity of sovereign borders. As to bilateral relations with the Soviet Union, Aubert argued in favour of maintaining the status quo. Switzerland should not participate in any sanctions against the Soviet Union. Neither should Switzerland permit any attempts to circumnavigate sanctions through its own territory. The only direct measure that Aubert offered to take himself was to decline an existing invitation to visit the Soviet Union for the time being. Councillor of State Paul Bürgi maintained that, “In situations such as these, Switzerland tends to be an interested observer.”87 Only when the provision of raw materials or petrol were to become an issue would Switzerland be affected. His colleague René Meylan added that, “In the present circumstances, our country should remain true to its neutrality and should not contribute to the return of a Cold War climate.”88 In the end, the committee published a press release condemning the invasion but recommending no further measures. The Parliamentary Committee on Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly – the lower house of parliament – met a week later on 21 February. Aubert held the floor for most of the discussions, yet the committee of the National ­Assembly was more critical than that of the Council of States. Once it became apparent that beyond observing the ongoing developments in Afghanistan, the Federal Council lacked a clearly thought-out strategy on how to proceed from its initially passive stance, several members of the committee began to ask questions. Ultimately, their president, Josi Meier, motioned that the committee should submit a public interpellation to the Federal Council – a procedure similar to the Prime Minister’s Questions in the United Kingdom. Together with two colleagues from her committee, Meier submitted an interpellation that same day, asking: First, what measures will the Federal Council take in preparation for the upcoming follow-up conference in Madrid? Second, what would be done 86

87 88

Kommission für auswärtige Angelegenheiten (Ständerat), ‘Hauptprotokoll der Sitzung vom 14. Februar 1980, 09:00–12:30 Uhr in Bern, Parlamentsgebäude, Zimmer 4,’ February 1980, E2004B#1984/38#2*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Je ne pense pas que nous soyons directement... menacés nous mêmes.” Ibid. Ibid.

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about upcoming contacts between Switzerland and the Soviet Union on issues of political, economic, and cultural relations? And finally, what plans did the Federal Council have for the provision of Swiss national security and for the plight of Afghan refugees?89 One of the most telling moments in the early Swiss foreign policymaking process on the Afghan crisis was Federal Councillor Aubert’s public response to Meier in parliament. “It is out of the question,” he argued, “that Switzerland, whose neutrality demands great reticence, should play a leading role in this matter.”90 As much might have been expected in view of the Bindschedler Doctrine of 1954 and of Secretary of State Raymond Probst’s criteria for good offices of 1958. Yet it did not truly align with Pierre Aubert’s personal record as a policymaker. Ever since having taken office in 1978, Aubert had actually pursued what he himself referred to as the “Dynamization of Foreign Policy.”91 In line with Max Petitpierre’s doctrine of Neutrality and Solidarity, Aubert had consistently advocated that Switzerland should develop a more active neutrality in pursuit of international solidarity, especially in the defence of human rights, through development aid and through the provision of good offices.92 That being said, in addressing the parliamentary interpellations on Afghanistan, Aubert made it clear that, “It is not incumbent upon Switzerland” to “take initiatives to bring about a solution to the crisis and a dialogue between the superpowers.”93 He reasoned that, “Our availability to exercise good offices is well known, but it is governed by strict rules,” most likely referring to those devised by Raymond Probst in 1958.94 The only window of opportunity he could fathom was the upcoming CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid. In order to rally support in favour of attending, Aubert urged parliament to think of the CSCE as the one place where Switzerland had hitherto been able to participate in the “political life of the entire continent and in the company of the superpowers, all while enjoying

89

Josi Meier, ‘Kommission für auswärtige Angelegenheiten – Afghanistan: Besetzung durch die UDSSR,’ 21 February 1980, E5001G#1993/174#17*, CH-BAR. 90 Pierre Aubert, ‘Rapport du Conseil Fédéral,’ n.d., E5001G#1993/174#17*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Il est exclu que la Suisse, que a neutralité oblige à une grande réserve, joue un rôle pilote en l’occurrence.” 91 Thomas Fischer, Die Grenzen der Neutralität: Schweizerisches KSZE-Engagement und gescheiterte UNO-Beitrittspolitik im kalten Krieg, 1969–1986 (Zürich: Chronos, 2004), 269. 92 Ibid., 284. 93 Aubert, ‘Rapport du Conseil Fédéral,’ E5001G#1993/174#17*, CH-BAR. 94 Ibid.

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complete respect for its neutrality.”95 Where Switzerland’s bilateral relations with the Soviet Union were concerned, Aubert stressed that in keeping with its neutrality, Switzerland would show neither its approval nor disapproval of the invasion of Afghanistan by attending the conference in Madrid. Lastly, he announced that the Federal Council would leave it up to the Swiss Olympic Committee to decide, whether or not to attend the 1980 Summer Olympic Games in Moscow.96 The parliamentary debate that followed ultimately went in Aubert’s favour and most speakers supported his proposed course of action. The only exception to this line of argument came from Councillor of State Odilio Guntern, who urged that parliament ought to vehemently condemn the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and that Switzerland could offer its good offices, for the purpose of an international conference on Afghanistan.97 This suggestion fell on deaf ears. Both parliament and the Federal Council chose to remain diplomatically aloof of the Afghan crisis. During their respective speeches to parliament, Councillors of State Jost Dillier and Peter Hefti both agreed with Aubert that the best course of action would be to remain aloof of the crisis, but to attend the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid. Hefti argued that the very concept of détente – the gradual rapprochement between the Cold War blocs over the course of the previous decade – had come to an end with the surprize Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. “We ourselves cannot restore it,” he  added, “and it would be dangerous to formulate Swiss foreign policy on the basis of an illusion.”98 In light of these renewed Cold War tensions, Federal Councillor for Defence George-André Chevallaz announced an increase in Switzerland’s defence budget by 4.7 percent for the ongoing legislative period on 5 May 1980.99 On the same day, Major General Richard Ochsner, head of the military intelligence 95

96 97 98

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Aubert, ‘Rapport du Conseil Fédéral,’ E5001G#1993/174#17*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Je voudrais encore vous rappeler que ce forum représente le seul lieu ou la Suisse peut participer à la vie politique de notre continent tout entier, en présence des superpuissances et dans le plein respect de sa neutralité.” N.a., ‘Dringliche Einfache Anfrage Steiner vom 5 März 1980,’ 5 March 1980, E5001G# 1993/174#21*, CH-BAR. Ibid. N.a., ‘Dringliche Interpellation Guntern – Afghanistan: Besetzung durch die UdSSR,’ 18 March 1980, E4260D-01#1995/257#101*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Von uns aus können wir ihn in der heutigen Situation nicht wiederherstellen, und es wäre gefährlich, auf Illusionen eine schweizerische Aussenpolitik aufzubauen.” H.H. Frischknecht, ‘Nationalrat – Militärkommission: Protokoll der Sitzung vom 5. Mai 1980, 10:00–14:20, in Bern, Parlamentsgebäude, Zimmer 3,’ 20 Mai 1980, E1070#1995 /104#104*, CH-BAR .

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unit Unterabteilung Nachrichtendienst und Abwehr (UNA), delivered a report to the National Assembly’s Military Committee, speculating that the strategic aim of the Soviet Union in invading Afghanistan might have been to reach the Persian Gulf, to threaten Europe’s oil supply and to then to launch a military attack upon a weakened Europe. Yet the situation on the ground was becoming increasingly “diffuse, stagnant and marked by an entire series of separate conflicts, all of which look like they will be difficult to resolve.”100 During the initial stages of the Soviet occupation, the armed forces had been unable to consolidate their hold on the country to the extent that they could have used it as a base from which to possibly conduct further operations. “It can [therefore] not yet be determined for certain, whether the Soviet Union will advance to the Persian Gulf,” in order to “take the decisive step to control the oil fields” and then to deliver a “crucial blow against NATO-Europe.”101 The decisive factor for Switzerland in this regard, he stressed, was the question of Western military cohesion.102 Within the Western alliance, responses to the Soviet invasion of A ­ fghanistan varied widely. Most NATO members apart from France, the United Kingdom and the United States already struggled to comply with a previously agreedupon three percent increase in annual military budgets.103 On 4 January 1980, President Carter announced a series of unilateral sanctions against the Soviet Union, including the denial of 17 million metric tons of grain, the curtailment of Soviet fishing privileges in American waters, the potential withdrawal of the United States from the Moscow Summer Olympics of 1980, delays in opening new consular facilities, deferment of cultural and economic exchanges, as well as the provision of military assistance to Pakistan.104 British Prime ­Minister Margaret Thatcher almost immediately declared that the United Kingdom would sympathize with the American sanctions.105 Yet while most other West European governments criticized the Soviet Union along similar lines as

100 Ibid., author’s translation from, “Die Situation ist diffus, verfahren, gekennzeichnet durch eine ganze Reihe von Einzelkonflikten, die auf absehbare Zeit schwer lösbar erscheinen.” 101 Ibid. 102 Ibid. 103 Alexander Haig, ‘To all European Diplomatic Posts Immediate: Shaping European Attitudes,’ Kraemer, Sven – 1981–1987 – Files, Box 90/03, Ronald Reagan Archive (RRA-USA), Simi Valley, USA. 104 Henry Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union (Durham: Duke University Press, 1985), 198. 105 Bresselau von Bressensdorf, ‘Die Unterschätzte Herausforderung,’ 678.

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Switzerland had done on 9 January, most were reluctant to do anything else.106 A meeting at the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office between ­American, Canadian, French, German, Italian and British secretaries of state on 31 December 1979, for instance, concluded without an agreement on a common course of action.107 As a result, during a Soviet Politburo meeting on 17 January 1980, Foreign Minister Gromyko surmised that, “In NATO there is no unity regarding measures toward the Soviet Union” and not all Western countries are “in agreement with the sanctions which the USA is applying.”108 3

External Requests to Hold Diplomatic Talks in Switzerland

What the Politburo did not expect was the reaction of the Non-Aligned ­Movement. On 8 January 1980, the non-aligned members of the UN S­ ecurity Council submitted a resolution condemning the Soviet invasion of nonaligned Afghanistan. The vote was 13 in favour and two – the Soviet Union and the German Democratic Republic – against.109 As a permanent member of the council, the veto power of the Soviet Union meant that the resolution did not pass. Yet two days later, the delegations of the Philippines and Mexico initiated a resolution under the Uniting for Peace procedure, which allowed the General Assembly to convene an emergency session on matters that were blocked in the Security Council.110 Resolutions passed in the General Assembly were non-binding, but they were nevertheless strongly indicative of the general mood within the international community. Meeting in an emergency session on the Afghan crisis from 10 to 14 January, the General Assembly finally adopted Resolution ES-6/2, which condemned the Soviet invasion and demanded the immediate withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces.111 This was only the sixth emergency session of the General Assembly since the founding of the UN 106 Bradsher, Afghanistan and the Soviet Union, 199; Dimitrakis, ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,’ 529. 107 Dimitrakis, ‘The Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,’ 518. 108 N.a., ‘CC CPSU Politburo transcript (excerpt),’ 17 January 1980, CWIHP, translated by M. Doctoroff, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/111583. 109 K.P. Saskena, ‘Afghanistan Conflict and the United Nations,’ International Studies 1980(19), 666. 110 Ibid. 111 UN General Assembly, ES-6/2 – ‘The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security,’ 14 January 1980, https://www.securitycouncilreport.org /atf/cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20ARESES6%202 .pdf.

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in 1945. A total of 104 delegations voted for the resolution and only 18 voted against it. In the absence of a peaceful solution to the Soviet-Afghan crisis, this process repeated itself annually, with almost identical voting records, until the Soviet withdrawal in 1989. This initial resolution was particularly important in two respects. First, it provided the basis for the UNHCR to provide assistance to Afghan refugees. Second, it called for the appointment of a UN special representative on Afghanistan to find a diplomatic solution.112 Yet the UN was not alone in its search for such a solution. Several other intergovernmental organizations became diplomatically involved in the Afghan crisis during the early months of 1980 and a number of them approached the Swiss government to host diplomatic talks on its territory on account of its reputation for permanent neutrality. On 22 May 1980, the Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) met in Islamabad, Pakistan, to discuss the Afghan crisis.113 The OIC had originated as a Saudi Arabian project for the promotion of Islamic cooperation in an effort to counterbalance Egyptian President Gamal Abdel Nasser’s idea of secular pan-Arab nationalism.114 In September of 1969, 25 Islamic countries dispatched representatives to its first summit in Rabat and in March of 1970, the OIC held its first meeting at the Foreign Minister level to establish a permanent secretariat.115 By the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the organization had grown to 42 members and had committed itself to the promotion of Islamic solidarity, to cooperation in economic, social, cultural and scientific domains, as well as to arrange consultations among its members and other intergovernmental organizations.116 The OIC condemned the Soviet invasion even more harshly than the UNGA had done. First, it demanded the immediate and unconditional withdrawal of Soviet forces from Afghanistan. Second, it called for the restoration of Afghanistan’s independence, sovereignty and previously non-aligned character, as well as respect for its Islamic identity. In addition, the conference insisted that the Afghan people be able to freely choose their own form of government, their social and economic system of governance, as well as to safely return to their 112 Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary- General’s Memoir (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997), 182. 113 N.a., ‘Tour d’Horizon: Taiwan und die wichtigsten Ereignisse der letzten drei Monate,’ 18 August 1980, E2004B#1984/38#2*, CH-BAR; Ahmad M. Siddiqi, From Bilateralism to Cold War Conflict: Pakistan’s Engagement with State and Non-State Actors on its Afghan Frontier, 1947–1989 (Ph.D. diss., University of Oxford, 2013), 171. 114 N.a., ‘The Organization of the Islamic Conference,’ n.d., FCO 37/2414, The National Archives (UK-TNA), London, United Kingdom. 115 Ibid. 116 Ibid.

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homes in Afghanistan.117 Until then, the conference suspended Afghanistan’s membership on account of the invasion and called on all member states to cut their diplomatic ties to the Afghan regime.118 To find a diplomatic solution to the Afghan crisis, the conference leadership established a standing committee consisting of Agha Shahi, the Foreign Minister of Pakistan, Sadegh Ghotbzadeh, the Foreign Minister of Iran,119 as well as Habib Chatty, the General Secretary of the Islamic Conference.120 On 12 June 1980, the standing committee approached the FDFA to arrange for talks between the committee, the Karmal regime and the Afghan mujahideen in neutral Switzerland.121 Deliberations had initially revolved round Paris as a venue for the negotiations. However, Iranian Foreign Minister Sadegh Ghotbzadeh had raised objections to France, because the French government had recently imposed sanctions on Iran in response to the ongoing hostage crisis at the American embassy in Teheran.122 The Iranian government did not appear to mind that Switzerland was at this point actively involved in securing the release of these hostages as a neutral mediator. Rather, it was the FDFA, which was initially hesitant to provide a venue for these discussions, fearing that doing so might upset Switzerland’s bilateral relations to the Soviet Union.123 What was more, these discussions took place shortly after both government and parliament had agreed not to become diplomatically involved in the Afghan crisis. Upon reflection, according to Alfred Rüegg, the deputy director of the FDFA Secretariat for Africa, Asia, Oceania and Latin America, the FDFA decided that Switzerland stood to gain both trust and goodwill among most Islamic countries by supporting the diplomatic effort of the Islamic Conference.124 The meeting went ahead at Mont Pèlerin, overlooking Lake Geneva, from 20–21 June 1980.125 The Swiss government did not participate on account of its 117 Agha Shahi, ‘Prospects of a Political Settlement of the War in Afghanistan,’ Journal of South Asian and Middle Eastern Studies 7(1984), 4. 118 Siddiqi, From Bilateralism to Cold War Conflict, 171. 119 He was to be removed from his post in August of 1980 and executed in 1982 for allegedly having plotted an assassination attempt against Ayatollah Khomeini. 120 N.a., ‘Tour d’Horizon,’ E2004B#1984/38#2*, CH-BAR; N.a. ‘Afghanistan (Background Paper),’ 18 June 1980, E2010–01A#1991/18#5*, CH-BAR. 121 Shahi, ‘Prospects of a Political Settlement of the War in Afghanistan,’ 4. 122 A. Rüegg, ‘Dreierausschuss der islamischen Konferenz für Afghanistan,’ 16 June 1980, E2024A#1993/354#209*, CH-BAR. 123 Ibid. 124 Ibid. 125 David Gowan, ‘Paper on the Organization of the Islamic Conference,’ 21 July 1981, FCO 37/2414, UK-TNA.

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neutrality. Neither did the Karmal regime, which chose to boycott the OIC on account of its expulsion from the organization in the wake of the Soviet invasion.126 Babrak Karmal himself argued that by inviting the mujahideen to the conference, the standing committee was actually recognizing them on an equal footing to other parties to the talks, which he refused to accept.127 This issue of recognition eventually became a significant diplomatic stumbling block over the course of the 1980s and one which barred the conflict parties from direct talks for years. It was also the reason why the Iranian government withdrew from the standing committee shortly after the Mont Pèlerin meeting. According to Agha Shahi, under these circumstances, “no progress toward a political solution appeared possible under the aegis of the Islamic Conference.”128 Yet the OIC was not the only intergovernmental body, which tried to find a diplomatic solution to the Afghan crisis during the early 1980s. The NAM, the CSCE and the European Community (EC) all made similar attempts and failed for similar reasons. Some of them approached the Swiss government to host diplomatic talks during the early 1980s. The NAM were an exception to this trend. Its members were deeply divided amongst themselves over Afghanistan.129 Robert Rakove has shown that since the inception of the NAM during the early 1960s, many of its members have been active as mediators either individually or collectively.130 Mali, Algeria, Ghana and India, for instance, had all tried to mediate during the Vietnam War and Algeria was ultimately successful in mediating a resolution to the Iranian hostage crisis.131 In the case of the Afghan crisis, some of the NAM did not work with each other, but against each other. On one hand, the Socialist Federal Republic of Yugoslavia attempted to mobilize the NAM to condemn the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan. The Republic of Cuba, on the other hand, obstructed this attempt on account of its close ties to the Soviet Union. Acting with the consent of the Soviet Politburo, the Castro government delayed ministerial meetings of the NAM on the subject and instead offered its own good offices to Afghanistan and Pakistan instead.132 126 N.a., ‘Tour d’Horizon,’ E2004B#1984/38#2*, CH-BAR. 127 Shahi, ‘Prospects of a Political Settlement of the War in Afghanistan,’ 4. 128 Ibid. 129 N.a., ‘Tour d’Horizon,’ E2004B#1984/38#2*, CH-BAR. 130 Robert Rakove, ‘The Rise and Fall of Non-Aligned Mediation, 1961–6,’ The International History Review 37(2015), 993. 131 Ibid., 1004–1008. 132 N.a., ‘Tour d’Horizon,’ E2004B#1984/38#2*, CH-BAR; N.a., ‘Politburo Decision on Soviet Policy on Afghanistan, with report on Proposal by Fidel Castro to Mediate between Afghanistan and Pakistan, and approved letter from L.I. Brezhnev to Fidel Castro,’ March

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The Afghan crisis was also a hotly debated issue within the CSCE and the EC. According to Edouard Brunner, who led the Swiss delegation to the CSCE follow-up conference in Madrid from 1980 to 1983, “Hardly a day passed by on which Afghanistan was not discussed.”133 Yet other crises gradually pushed the Afghan crisis toward the back of the agenda. Martial law and the threat of a Soviet invasion of Poland in 1981, the Soviet downing of a civilian Korean Airlines flight and the American invasion of Grenada in 1983 not only preoccupied the CSCE but interrupted its proceedings for several months on multiple ­occasions. The effect of the EC on the Afghanistan deliberations was similar.134 At the initiative of the British Foreign Secretary, Lord Peter Carrington, the ten-nation EC originally proposed the neutralization of Afghanistan in ­February of 1980.135 The so-called Carrington Plan was different in form to some of the other proposals that circulated at the time, because it arguably perceived the Afghan crisis not just as a regional crisis, but as a systemic Cold War crisis. Accordingly, the plan included talks between the United States, the Soviet Union, Britain, France and China by virtue of their permanent membership of the UN Security Council. In addition, according to the plan, Pakistan, India and Iran would be invited in their capacity as neighbors to Afghanistan. Representatives of the mujahideen would only be invited during the later stages of the conference.136 On 12 July 1981, the British ambassador to Berne called upon the Swiss government to host such a gathering and in an act of uncharacteristic speed, the Federal Council offered two options to the British on the same day. The first was to stage a conference on the Carrington Plan on Swiss territory. The second was that Federal Councillor Aubert, who currently presided the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe, would encourage the members of the council to support the Carrington Plan.137 This was a remarkable transition from the government’s stance of 1980, which foresaw no role for Switzerland in the Afghan crisis. Yet neither of these initiatives came to fruition as a competing diplomatic channel began to gain traction through the UN with the backing of the Soviet Union.

10, 1980, Wilson Center Digital Archive, https://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document /111589. 133 Fischer, Die Grenzen der Neutralität, 296. 134 B. Schenk, ‘Afghanistan: Nie Vergessen,’ 3 April 1984, E2010–01A#1994/372#42*, CH-BAR. 135 Siddiqi, From Bilateralism to Cold War Conflict, 171. 136 Leonard Downie, Washington Post, ‘EEC to Propose Talks on Pullout by Soviets from Kabul,’ 25 June 1981, E2200.36#2000/290#330*, CH-BAR. 137 Edouard Brunner, ‘Afghanistan,’ 2 July 1981, E2200.36#2000/290#330*, CH-BAR.

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Up until this point, most diplomatic initiatives had failed to secure the support of the Soviet Union. This began to change toward 1982 and there are competing explanations for why this happened. According to Artemy Kalinovsky, one explanation might have been Leonid Brezhnev’s death in November of 1982. Another explanation might have been that the Politburo realized that the war against the Afghan resistance – the mujahideen – could not be decisively won. Not only were the mujahideen able to retreat across the porous border to Pakistan and to cultivate their supply lines from there, but they enjoyed popular support on both sides of the so-called Durand Line, which divided Afghan and Pakistani territory. In fact, CPSU Politburo meeting minutes from as early as February of 1980 reveal that some, including Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Defence Minister Dmitry Ustinov, began to think openly about the conditions that would have to be met for the Soviet Union to withdraw.138 At the NAM foreign ministers conference in New Delhi in January of 1981, the Soviet ambassador to Pakistan signaled to the Pakistani delegation at the conference that the Soviet Union was prepared to hold discussions on Afghanistan.139 Kurt Waldheim, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, who was also present, immediately decided to integrate this piece of news into his scheduled speech and offered the good offices of the UN on the spot.140 Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, his designated Personal Representative for Afghanistan, was with him and recalls in his memoirs that on the flight back to New York from New Delhi, they began their preparations for UN-mediated peace talks.141 They agreed on four main points of discussion, many of them similar to the preceding diplomatic initiatives of the OIC, the NAM and the EC. They included the withdrawal of troops, non-interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, appropriate guarantees and the voluntary return of Afghan refugees.142 Javier Pérez de Cuéllar eventually succeeded Kurt Waldheim as Secretary-General of the UN in 1981 and the Ecuadorian diplomat Diego Cordovez became the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Representative for Afghanistan.143 The following 138 N.a., ‘CC CPSU Politburo transcript (excerpt), On Andropov’s Conversations with Afghan leaders,’ 7 February 1980, CWIHP, translated by M. Doctoroff, http://digitalarchive .wilsoncenter.org/document/111587. 139 Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 182. 140 Ibid., 184. 141 Ibid. 142 Ibid. 143 Adam Baczko and Gilles Dorronsoro, ‘United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGMAP),’ in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, edited by Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tards, Norrie MacQueen and Paul D. ­Williams (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018), 270; Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 65–66.

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year, having received the consent of the Soviet Union and having visited the conflict region in person, Cordovez announced that tripartite talks between the Karmal regime, the Pakistani government and the UN were to begin in Geneva in June. 4 Conclusion: No Clear Foreign Policy toward Afghanistan This sequence of events was not strictly speaking out of the ordinary. As Fanzun and Lehmann have pointed out, approximately one quarter of all mediation mandates went to the UN during the Cold War.144 Meanwhile, both the Swiss government and parliament agreed early in 1980 that Switzerland ought not to become diplomatically involved in the Afghan crisis on account of its permanent neutrality. Neither identified the Soviet invasion as an opportunity to play a meaningful role in a major Cold War conflict as a permanently neutral state. This was not unusual either. As discussed during the previous chapter, Switzerland had accumulated a mixed record on the provision of good offices since the early post-war period and it is not entirely clear, what Switzerland could have done in this situation, even had the Swiss authorities wanted to intervene. Switzerland was equally cautious in its reaction to the Soviet invasion as many other small and particularly neutral countries. Other, more powerful and non-neutral states were similarly at a loss about how to respond. As for many other governments, there is evidence to suggest that the Swiss authorities did identify the invasion as a turning point in the late Cold War and as a return to confrontation as opposed to cooperation among the two opposing power blocs. Previous experiences such as the Korean War and the Suez crisis appear to have made them more cautious about pro-actively ­offering their good offices in situations of armed conflict. Consequently, the Federal Council initially stressed neutrality above disponibilité – its readiness to provide such offices. The council did agree to several requests by third party organizations, including both the OIC and the EC, to host diplomatic gatherings on the crisis on Swiss territory over the course of the early 1980s. Due internal disagreements and lacking support from the conflict parties, however, neither of these initiatives turned out to be successful and it was only in 1982 that diplomatic talks between Pakistan and the Soviet-installed Afghan regime proceeded through the UN instead. As a non-member of the UN, the Swiss 144 Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 99.

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government was not involved in hosting the so-called Geneva Talks. In fact, once the Geneva Talks were underway, it appeared increasingly less likely that the Swiss government would become involved diplomatically in the Afghan crisis at all. Apart from the provision of humanitarian aid, the Swiss government did not have a clear foreign policy toward the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan during the early stages of the occupation.

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Chapter 3

Swiss Humanitarian Aid to Pakistan and the Expulsion of the ICRC from Afghanistan, 1980–1982 Having ruled out both diplomatic involvement and a direct threat to Switzerland’s security during the immediate aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Swiss government de facto treated the Afghan crisis as a humanitarian crisis for the first two years of the Soviet occupation. The government primarily provided humanitarian aid to the conflict region through multilateral and non-governmental aid organizations with a focus on Pakistan. This was because the majority of Afghan refugees fled to Pakistan and because the Soviet-installed Afghan regime barred most foreign humanitarian aid providers from Afghan territory in the wake of the invasion. Despite close historical ties, the Swiss government also operated independently of the ICRC during this period and vice versa. The purpose of the present chapter is not to highlight how Swiss humanitarian aid to the conflict region was specific or different from that of other governments, although it will also compare the Swiss government’s contribution to the contributions of other states. Rather, the purpose of the present chapter is to highlight that during the early stages of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, Switzerland’s foreign policy was primarily humanitarian in nature, that the Swiss government operated independently from the ICRC, and that there was no attempt to play a distinguished or unique role in the conflict as a permanently neutral state. It will also become evident that between 1979 and 1982, the Soviet occupation and the humanitarian crisis both inside the country and in neighboring Pakistan and Iran became increasingly permanent. Denied access to the Afghan interior, this began to pose not only a technical, but an increasingly political issue for the ICRC – an issue which involved repeated negotiations with the Afghan and Soviet authorities, and which ultimately became difficult for the ICRC to resolve alone. Ultimately, therefore, this chapter is as much about the ICRC, its distinct understanding of the meaning of neutrality and its role in the Afghan crisis, as it is about the Swiss government’s nascent role in the crisis.

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The Exodus of Afghan Refugees to Pakistan

The first Afghan refugees had begun to trickle across the Pakistani border in 1973. That year, Prime Minister Sardar Mohammad Daoud Khan deposed his own cousin, the ruling monarch, Mohammad Zaher Shah.1 By the time that Daoud was himself overthrown by a communist coup in 1978, the gradual trickle of refugees had risen to a flood of half a million people.2 The Pakistani government accommodated these refugees even though it had signed neither the 1951 United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees nor its 1967 protocol. Helga Baitenmann argues that the reason for this benevolence was that the government of Mohammad Zia Ul-Haq feared losing its already minimal influence in the so-called tribal areas on the Afghan-Pakistani border.3 These regions had historically been difficult to govern on account of their separatist population. Now, with the influx of thousands of mostly Pushtun refugees, the government did not appear to want to risk upsetting the local Pushtunwali tradition of welcoming especially ethnic kin, for fear of destabilizing and alienating the region. By April of 1979, however, the Pakistani government was forced to appeal to the UNHCR for outside support on account of the ever-rising number of incoming refugees.4 The UNHCR had been founded in 1950 with a mandate to provide for refugees from the Second World War and for a period of only three years. Its first major operations concerned refugee crises in Western Berlin in 1953 and in Hungary in 1956.5 However, the 1967 protocol to the 1951 Refugee Convention recognized that in fact, refugee flows continued to be on the increase – not on the decrease – and that this was happening on a global scale.6 It therefore ­discarded the original geographical and temporal limits of the UNHCR’s mandate, allowing the UNHCR to be the first major humanitarian aid organization on location in Pakistan by May of 1979 – six months before the Soviet invasion.7 1 Helga Baitenmann, ‘NGOs and the Afghan War: The Politicization of Humanitarian Aid,’ Third World Quarterly 12(1990), 62–63. 2 Ibid., 63. 3 Ibid. 4 N.a., ‘UNHCR Humanitarian Assistance Programme to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan: Extracts of UNHCR report No. 9 – 1980 Calendar Year,’ July/ August 1981, E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR. 5 Jérome Elie, ‘The UNHCR and the Cold War: A Documented Reflection on the UN Refugee Agency’s Activities in the Bipolar Context,’ June 2007, https://graduateinstitute.ch//sites /default/files/2018-12/UNHCR_and_CW_Work-P.pdf. 6 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), ‘Convention and Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees,’ 16 December 1966, https://www.unhcr.org/3b66c2aa10. 7 Schöch, ‘UNHCR and the Afghan Refugees in the Early 1980s,’ 47.

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The invasion itself, exponentially increased the already substantial number of Afghan refugees. By January of 1980, Hasim Utkan, the UNHCR’s chargé de mission in Pakistan reported 402’000 registered refugees. Only eleven days later, Paul Stauffer, the Swiss ambassador in Islamabad reported over 430’000.8 The UNHCR, which had originally pledged only US$ 190’000 in August of 1979 now estimated its financial expenditures in Pakistan to amount to US$ 55 million for the period of January to December of 1980 alone.9 In addition to that, Stauffer relayed to the FDFA in Berne that Hasim Utkan had personally approached him to ask not for financial contributions, but for urgent material  aid for women and children.10 “Tents, woollen blankets and warm ­children’s attire,” were needed fast – if possible even via charter flight – due to the cold January temperatures.11 According to UNHCR statistics for the year 1980, 45.9 percent of all refugees registered in Pakistan were children, while 27.2 percent were women and only 26.8 percent were adult men.12 A British aid airlift had already taken place by that point and an Italian one was being planned.13 In addition to the UNHCR, organizations such as Terre des Hommes and the ICRC were also beginning to plan their missions to the country.14 According to the UK-based Business Recorder the ICRC was especially sought-after. On 23 January 1980, the paper quoted Dr. Nawal Khan, the principal administrator of the Peshawar-Khyber Hospital in Peshawar, saying that a network of field hospitals was urgently needed in the refugee camps.15 At his own hospital in Peshawar, he described how the patient load had increased by a full third since the invasion and that the medical care that was required was anything but routine work.16 “We have gunshot, shrapnel and bomb-blast wounds,” on a regular basis, he told reporters.17 8

Hasim Utkan, ‘Communication to Paul Stauffer,’ 5 January 1980, E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR; Paul Stauffer, ‘Communication to Abteilung Humanitäre Hilfe, Kopie auch an Politische Abteilung II und III,’ 16 January 1980, E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR. 9 N.a., ‘UNHCR Humanitarian Assistance Programme to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,’ E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR. 10 Stauffer, ‘Communication to Abteilung Humanitäre Hilfe,’ E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR. 11 Ibid. 12 N.a., ‘UNHCR Humanitarian Assistance Programme to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,’ E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR. 13 Stauffer, ‘Communication to Abteilung Humanitäre Hilfe,’ E2023A#1991/39#921*,’ CH-BAR. 14 Ibid. 15 Business Recorder, ‘ICRC approached for field hospitals: Afghan refugees,’ 23 January 1980, E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR. 16 Ibid. 17 Ibid.

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By February 1980, a number of foreign governments and international aid organizations had begun their operations in Pakistan. Yet the provision of medical and material aid remained patchy, while overwhelming numbers of refugees continued to pour into the country. The number of registered refugees had now risen to 600’000, with 500’000 in the loosely governed North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) and another 100’000 distributed across Baluchistan.18 There was also, at least initially, an element of confusion surrounding the logistics of the distribution of aid. According to Serge Chapatte, the development attaché at the Swiss embassy in Islamabad, apart from the UNHCR, the ICRC and the various national Red Cross and Red Crescent societies, there arrived a plethora of other organizations.19 These included the Austrian Relief Committee, the Church World Service, the Afghan Inter-Aid Committee, the International Rescue Committee, Save the Children and Union Aid for Afghan Refugees, among others.20 Initially, they largely operated without directives from the Pakistani authorities. The Pakistani Federal Coordination Committee for Afghan Refugees had recently been created under the supervision of the Secretary of the Frontier Regions Division in order to coordinate the influx of refugees to various camps. The Ministry of Health, on the other hand, was technically responsible for coordinating the influx of medical aid. However, the process of registering foreign aid organizations – and especially foreign aid workers – proved to be tedious.21 Other forms of humanitarian aid, including food, domestic utensils, clothing, shelter and drinking water, were distributed more quickly.22 2

Swiss Technical Humanitarian Assistance to Pakistan

On 9 February 1980, a chartered Transvaal aircraft arrived in Peshawar from Sion in Switzerland, carrying CHF 236’000 worth of tents, blankets and milk

18 19 20 21 22

Serge Chapatte, ‘Réfugies afghans au Pakistan: Etat de la situation à fin février 1980,’ 27 February 1980, E2023A#1991 39#921*, CH-BAR; N.a., ‘UNHCR Humanitarian Assistance Programme to Afghan Refugees in Pakistan,’ E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR. Chappatte, ‘Réfugiés afghans au Pakistan,’ E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR. S.D. Bazeley, ‘Minutes of the Third Voluntary Organizations Meeting,’ 9 December 1980, J2.233–01#1999/248#129*, CH-BAR. Chappatte, ‘Réfugiés afghans au Pakistan,’ E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR. Oikoumene, ‘The Afghan Refugee Situation in Pakistan,’ Refugees, Refugiés, Flüchtlinge, Refugiados, No. 51, April 1983, E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR.

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Li

ec Gre h ec Lu tens e xe te m in bo u I Ne ce rg w lan Ze d ala Fi nd Sw nla itz nd er lan Ch d in a I t De al Ne nm y th ar er k la Au nds str a Sw lia ed No en rw ay U Ca K na da FR G Ja pa n US A

8000000 7000000 6000000 5000000 4000000 3000000 2000000 1000000 0

Graph 2 Contributions toward UNHCR programmes for Afghan refugees in Pakistan (US$), situation on 20 June 1980 Source: UNHCR Archives23

powder.24 It also carried five tons of second-hand children’s clothing, donated by Terre des Hommes (Lausanne) and the Swiss Red Cross Society.25 By that time, one British, one West German, one Italian and two American aid flights had already arrived in Peshawar. Nevertheless, the Swiss donation received some coverage in the press.26 One of the main Pakistani newspapers, Dawn, reported on 9 February that Switzerland had delivered 26 tons of aid.27 The UK-based Business Recorder, on the other hand, reported 21 tons that same day, giving rise to confusion and media speculation.28 On 11 February, the Federal Council further dispatched two volunteers from the Swiss Disaster Relief Corps. Erwin Georg Heinzmann and Hans-Peter Bührer arrived in Islamabad on 17 February and assisted the World Food Programme (WFP) in its d­ istribution of 23

N.a., ‘Aide Mémoire: Assistance humanitaire aux réfugiés au Pakistan: Annexe II,’ 26 June 1980, 11_2_78–781.GEN[a] – 1980 – Governmental Contributions – Aid to Pakistan [­Volume 1], UNHCR Archives, Geneva, Switzerland. 24 Eugen Klöti, ‘Refugiés Afghans: Transport matériel de secours par vol charter,’ 29 January 1980, E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR. 25 Ibid. 26 Paul Stauffer, ‘Charterflug mit Hilfsgütern für die afghanischen Flüchtlinge in Pakistan,’ 10 February 1980, E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR. 27 Dawn, ‘Swiss Aid for Afghan Refugees,’ 9 February 1980, E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR. 28 Ibid.

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food among refugees until April 1981.29 Five further volunteers joined them over the course of this period on the account of their heavy work load.30 UNHCR records indicate that the Swiss government originally donated US$ 180’577 to Afghan refugees in Pakistan through the UNHCR by June 1980. Compared to other neutral and non-neutral states, this was not extraordinary. Switzerland’s contribution was only slightly higher than that of neutral Finland, which had contributed US$ 134’084 by this point. It was considerably less than that of neutral Sweden, which provided US$ 1’190’476 to Afghan refugees in Pakistan through the UNHCR by then.31 It was still less than Norway, which had given US$ 1.2 million to the UNHCR and the UK, which had given US$ 1.2 million as well. The United States contributed US$ 7.5 million and the EEC collectively gave US$ 18.8 million to the UNHCR six months after the Soviet invasion. The total of all Swiss humanitarian aid to Pakistan already rose to CHF 1.8 million by mid-March of 1980.32 This was more than Switzerland’s annual contribution to the UNHCR between 1973 and 1978, yet this increase was not widely reported in the Swiss press. Between 1973 and 1974, the Swiss government had donated CHF 1.4 million to the organization each year, a figure which rose to CHF 1.6 million in 1976 and 1977 and then to CHF 1.7 million in 1978.33 The Swiss government also donated CHF 1.25 million to the ICRC for assistance to refugees worldwide in 1980.34 To place these figures into context, the authorities donated a total of CHF 20 million in bilateral and multilateral aid to refugees worldwide in 1980.35 It contributed CHF 2.5 million to refugees of the Ogaden conflict that same year and CHF 3.1 million to victims of the

29

Arthur Bill, ‘Afghanische Flüchtlinge, IKRK-Aktion in Pakistan?,’ 11 February 1980, E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR; Chappatte, ‘Réfugiés afghans au Pakistan,’ E2023A#1991 /39#921*, CH-BAR. 30 N.a., ‘Einfache Anfrage Friedrich vom 16. März 1981: Flüchtlinge aus Afghanistan,’ 16 March 1981, E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR. 31 N.a., ‘Aide Mémoire: Assistance humanitaire aux réfugiés au Pakistan: Annexe II,’ 26 June 1980, 11_2_78–781.GEN[a] – 1980 – Governmental Contributions – Aid to Pakistan [­Volume 1], UNHCR Archives, Geneva, Switzerland. 32 N.a., ‘C.P.S, Aide aux réfugiés afghans,’ 20 May 1981, E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR. 33 Pierre Aubert, ‘Beiträge an international tätige Hilfswerke zu Lasten des Rahmenkredites für humanitäre Hilfe für die Jahre 1979 bis 1981 (BB vom 14.3.1979), 20 March 1979, Dodis, https://dodis.ch/53860. 34 Arthur Bill, ‘Aide Humanitaire aux Réfugiés et aux Personnes Déplacées en 1980,’ 18 ­February 1981, E2200.176#1995/67#80*, CH-BAR. 35 Ibid.

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Lebanese Civil War in 1982.36 In other words, the Swiss government’s provision of h ­ umanitarian aid to Afghan refugees was in line with its contributions toward other humanitarian crises at the time and it was not extraordinary in comparison to contributions made by other states. It was not until 1982 that the Swiss government raised its annual financial contribution to the ICRC to a total of 18 million.37 That year, the Federal Council also raised its contribution to ICRC programmes for political prisoners to an additional CHF 2 million per year.38 Like most donors, the Swiss government delivered the bulk of its humanitarian aid through Pakistan, where the majority of Afghan refugees had fled. Some aid organizations with whom the Swiss government worked were restricted to working with Afghan refugees in Pakistan on account of their mandates. The UNHCR, for instance, could only work with refugees, meaning those who were displaced outside of their home countries.39 The revolutionary regime in Iran refused support from the UNHCR until 1983, despite the steady accumulation of 1.5 million Afghan refugees on its territory.40 The UNHCR therefore primarily operated in Pakistan until 1983. The ICRC similarly operated out of Pakistan on account of its mandate. According to its statutes, the ICRC can only operate in a country with the consent of the host government.41 The ICRC leadership had made several offers of assistance to the authorities in Kabul, beginning in 1978. On 10 January 1980, the Soviet-installed Karmal regime briefly granted the organization access.42 From January to June of 1980, the ICRC dispatched a delegation to Kabul, which carried out repeated visits to the prison facilities of Pul-i-Charkhi.43 They took note of approximately 57 political prisoners 36

Federal Council, ‘Aide d’urgenge aus réfugiés en Somalie, crédit de Fr. 2.5 millions,’ 2 April 1980, Dodis, https://dodis.ch/56384; Edouard Blaser, ‘Notiz an die Direktion für ­internationale Organizationen und Politische Abteilung II,’ 17 August 1982, Dodis, https:// dodis.ch/53709. 37 Federal Council, ‘Contribution extraordinaire en faveur du Comité international de la Croix-Rouge,’ 20 June 1983, Dodis, https://dodis.ch/53020. 38 Ibid. 39 Girardet, Afghanistan, 210. 40 Leake, Afghan Crucible, 128. 41 ICRC, ‘Statutes of the ICRC,’ accessed 16 June 2020, https://www.icrc.org/en/document /statutes-international-committee-red-cross-0, Art. 6. 42 ICRC Department of Operations, ‘Afghan Conflict Victims Emergency Appeal No 3,’ E2023A#1993/129#1000*, CH-BAR.; ICRC, ‘Communiqué de Presse no. 1386,’ 25 January 1980, E2023A#1991/39#921*, CH-BAR. 43 ICRC, ‘Afghan Conflict Victims Emergency Appeal No. 7,’ January 1987, E2023A#1998 /212#976*, CH-BAR.

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and delivered about two tonnes of emergency medical supplies to surrounding hospitals via the local Afghan Red Crescent Society.44 Yet in June of 1980, the Afghan authorities refused to renew the ICRC delegates’ visas, forcing them to interrupt their mission and to leave the country unexpectedly.45 The ICRC complied with the Karmal regime’s request that it leave Afghan territory.46 A few organizations, including the World Health Organization (WHO) and the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) continued to operate in Afghanistan after June 1980, but were restricted to government-controlled areas.47 According to Edward Girardet, this meant that they came under considerable pressure from the Soviet and Afghan authorities to serve the interests of the communist regime. There were also non-governmental organizations (NGOs) that evaded the government-controlled zones altogether. MSF, for instance, conducted cross-border medical operations into Afghanistan from Pakistan.48 Writing in 1985, Girardet reported that since the early summer of 1980, Aide Médicale Internationale, MSF, and Médecins du Monde had collectively sent over 400 French, Belgian, and Swiss doctors and nurses to the country.49 Other, smaller organizations that operated sporadically on Afghan territory to provide medical assistance included the French International Bureau for Afghanistan, the SCA, and the Afghanistan Relief Committee of New York.50 NGOs such as the Dignity of Man Foundation and the Americans for Afghanistan Committee also organized funds for educational, social projects and delivered clothing where possible.51 Finally, as part of the US government’s growing support for the Afghan mujahideen over the course of the 1980s, the United States Agency 44 Ibid. 45 ICRC Department of Operations, ‘Afghan Conflict Victims Emergency Appeal No 3,’ E2023A#1993/129#1000*, CH-BAR. 46 Girardet, Afghanistan, 224. 47 Ibid., 146. 48 Wesley Attewell, ‘“From Factory to Field”: USAID and the Logistics of Foreign Aid in Soviet-Occupied Afghanistan,’ Environment and Planning D: Society and Space 26(2018), 725; Daniel von Muralt, ‘Reisebericht über Feldbesuch in Pakistan: UNHCR Afghan Flüchtlingslager un NWFP und Belutschistan, Bedürfnisse und Kanäle humanitärer Hilfeleistung in Afghanistan, IKRK-Tätigkeit in Peshawar und Quetta, SRK ophthalmologisches Programm in Mardan (NWFP),’ 10 June 1985, E2025A#1997/200#1584*, CH-BAR. 49 Girardet, Afghanistan, 215. 50 Daniel von Muralt, ‘Reisebericht über Feldbesuch in Pakistan: UNHCR Afghan Flüchtlingslager in NWFP und Belutschistan, Bedürfnisse und Kanäle humanitärer Hilfeleistung in Afghanistan, IKRK-Tätigkeit in Peshawar und Quetta, SRK ophthalmologisches Programm in Mardan (NWFP),’ 10 June 1985, E2025A#1997/200#1584*, CH-BAR. 51 Girardet, Afghanistan, 211.

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for International Development (USAID), launched a government-sponsored Cross-Border Humanitarian Aid Programme in 1985.52 The issue of cross-border humanitarian aid has hitherto received comparatively little attention in the literature on the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. Timothy Nunan has made several valuable contributions on this subject, showing that in fact, the Afghan crisis was a critical turning point for the history of global NGO activity.53 Focusing primarily on MSF and on the SCA, Nunan argues that the Afghan crisis “had become a battleground between two very different visions of Third World sovereignty – Soviet-style territorial authoritarianism on the one hand, and post-state humanitarianism on the other.”54 According to Nunan, NGOs such as MSF and SCA, which ignored sovereign borders for the provision of humanitarian aid, emerged “not as challengers pressing up against the state from below, but as horizontal contemporaries of organs of the state.”55 In the context of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, these originally left-leaning organizations became confronted with a violent manifestation of the spread of what Nunan calls “real existing socialism,” which became an important contributing factor for the formation of transnational humanitarianism.56 There were important differences between cross-border organizations such as MSF and SCA and the humanitarian approach of the ICRC, which ultimately had direct repercussions for the relationship between the ICRC and the Swiss government in the context of the Afghan crisis. MSF was founded after several volunteer doctors chose to leave the French Red Cross in 1971, following the Biafra crisis in Nigeria of 1967 to 1970.57 Similarly to the chain of events that took place, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the ICRC had withdrawn from Biafra in 1969, following a request from the Nigerian government.58 As a result, a small group of former members from the French Red Cross including Bernard Kouchner, Max Récamier, and Jacques Bérès founded MSF in 1971.59 Unlike the ICRC, which operated in conflict regions only with the consent of host governments, MSF took the view that doctors should be

52 53 54

Attewell, ‘“From Factory to Field,”’ 725. Nunan, ‘Graveyard of Development?,’ 223. Timothy Nunan, Humanitarian Invasion: Global Development in Cold War Afghanistan (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2015), 5. 55 Ibid. 56 Nunan, ‘Graveyard of Development?,’ 237. 57 Dromi, Above the Fray, 117. 58 Nunan, Humanitarian Invasion, 133. 59 Ibid.

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able to operate anywhere.60 In Afghanistan, MSF did exactly that beginning in 1981, after the Pakistani authorities refused permission for the organization to operate from camps on the Pakistani side of the border.61 According to Nunan, MSF soon “embraced an antitotalitarian stance that viewed authoritarian borders as meaningless,” a concept also known as sans-frontièrisme.62 3

Obstacles to Humanitarian Aid for Afghanistan

The literature has since referred to this divergence as a split between traditional humanitarianism and new humanitarianism. According to Mie Vestergaard, following the Biafran War, “a new reality of operating in active conflict under widespread media coverage with an explosion of actors involved to ‘do good’ materialized in new relief groups, committees and NGOs emphasizing the right to intervene.”63 The main difference between these new humanitarian organizations and the more traditional approach of the ICRC was their relative disregard for “state cooperation, neutrality and confidentiality.”64 Unlike the ICRC, which operated on the basis of discrete diplomacy and neutrality toward all conflict parties, these new organizations were much more vocal in their public criticism of the belligerents.65 Throughout its history, the neutrality of the ICRC and its commitment to operating only with the consent of state actors allowed it to vastly expand its mandate. According to ICRC historian Daniel Parlmieri, throughout the twentieth century, “From Germany to Palestine; through Korea, Hungary, Algeria, the Congo and Yemen – to name just a few places of conflict – it [the ICRC] was present, often to a significant degree, in all major crises and on all continents.”66 There were also setbacks to this territorial expansion. However, despite having to withdraw its operations from the theatre of war in several instances, including from Biafra in 1969, from Congo in 1965, and eventually from ­Afghanistan in 1980, the ICRC did not adopt the principles of new humanitarianism. If anything, these experiences arguably made the ICRC more careful to demonstrate its impartiality. As discussed, Suzanne Widmer has specifically 60 Ibid., 134. 61 Ibid. 139. 62 Dromi, Above the Fray, 117. 63 Mie Vestergaard, ‘An Imperative to Act: Boarding the Relief Flights of the International Committee of the Red Cross in Biafra, 1967–1970,’ New Political Science 40(2018), 676. 64 Ibid. 65 Dromi, Above the Fray, 117. 66 Palmieri, ‘An institution standing the test of time?,’ 1288.

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commented on this phenomenon in relation to the Angolan Civil War from 1975 to 1976.67 By 1980, the ICRC had 30 delegations stationed in 60 countries, with approximately 400 delegates directly involved.68 That year, ICRC delegates visited 630 prisons, compared to 250 in 1971.69 Shai Dromi has shown that operations in Vietnam in 1975 and in Lebanon in 1976 also established MSF as a major humanitarian organization, yet its lack of resources sometimes prevented it from being among the first organizations on the scene.70 In the context of the Afghan crisis, the work of the ICRC primarily differed from that of new humanitarian organizations such as MSF and the SCA in two respects. First, despite being based in neutral Switzerland, the ICRC did not have the governmental affiliation that the SCA has with Sweden.71 At no point did the Swiss parliament equate the work of the ICRC with a “Swiss model,” the way the Swedish Riksdag equated the SCA’s success in the Afghan Ghazni province as a “Swedish model” in January of 1983.72 By this point, cooperation between the Swiss government and the ICRC in Afghanistan did not extend beyond ordinary financial contributions. During the fall of 1982, the SCA had equipped a group of Afghan doctors in the Pakistani border regions to deliver medical supplies to a clinic in the Ghazni province and on 11 January 1983, they received a dispatch claiming that “Sweden is the first country in the world to have used public funds to assist the war-affected Afghan people.”73 There was no equivalent to this development in relation to Switzerland. Interestingly, however, it appears as though while the SCA openly identified with its Swedish heritage and its close ties to the Swedish International Development Authority, it did not premise its operations on Swedish neutrality and there appears to have been no expectation on the part of the Swedish authorities that it do so. Second, unlike the SCA and MSF, the ICRC had a unique mandate to protect and promote compliance with international humanitarian law among conflict parties. Nunan’s analysis indicates that the humanitarianism that both MSF and the SCA represented was no longer a form of “’politics among nations,’ but politics in spite of nations.”74 This conceptualization did not apply to the ICRC. Rather, the ICRC operated based on the nuanced assumption that states were the principal actors responsible for the implementation of international 67 Widmer, ‘Neutrality challenged in a cold war conflict,’ 219. 68 N.a., ‘Extension des tâches du CICR depuis 1972,’ n.d., E4110B#1986/81#415*, CH-BAR. 69 Ibid. 70 Dromi, Above the Fray, 129. 71 Nunan, ‘Graveyard of Development?, 222. 72 Nunan, Humanitarian Invasion, 146. 73 Ibid., 146. 74 Ibid., 120.

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humanitarian law and because the implementation of international law was the main purpose of the ICRC, it ultimately also required government cooperation for the provision of humanitarian aid. Cross-border operations of the type conducted by MSF and the SCA were both cumbersome and risky. They operated illegally in both Afghanistan and Pakistan and had not only to defy but often to bribe police and government officials in both countries to be able to work.75 These operations were also dangerous due to ongoing hostilities. In October and November of 1981, Soviet armed forces began to crack down on NGO hospitals and after 1981, hospitals were regularly bombed in the mujahideen-controlled areas.76 On 5 November, for instance, three Soviet helicopters descended onto the main health center of the Panshjir Valley and whilst the medical staff managed to evacuate all of the patients, two Soviet fighter jets obliterated the buildings thirty minutes after the evacuation.77 Unlike MSF and the SCA, the ICRC therefore turned its attention exclusively toward the Afghan refugees in Pakistan, having been expelled from the scene of the conflict in 1980. It assumed responsibility for the provision of health care to ten refugee camps in Pakistan and deployed four mobile medical units, which rotated among these camps.78 In March 1981, the Pakistani government transferred these responsibilities over to a series of government medical teams under the supervision of the UNHCR.79 Alleviated of these responsibilities, the ICRC subsequently began to install a war surgery hospital in Peshawar, near the Afghan-Pakistani border.80 By June 1981 alone, the ICRC had received more than 1’500 war-wounded in Pakistan and performed over 3’500 surgical ­operations under anaesthesia, most of which were amputations.81 The vast majority of these war-wounded were victims of mines.82

75 Attewell, ‘“From Factory to Field,” 725. 76 Sir Frederic Bennett, ‘Exposé de Motifs,’ n.d., E2023A#1998/212#439*, CH-BAR. 77 Girardet, Afghanistan, 220. 78 ICRC Department of Operations, ‘Afghan Conflict Victims Emergency Appeal No 3,’ E2023A#1993/129#1000*, CH-BAR. 79 ICRC, ‘Afghan Conflict Victims Emergency Appeal No. 7,’ E2023A#1998/212#976*, CH-BAR. 80 ICRC Department of Operations, ‘Afghan Conflict Victims Emergency Appeal No 3,’ E2023A#1993/129#1000*, CH-BAR. 81 Refugees Magazine, ‘The ICRC Hospital at Peshawar,’ January 1983, E2023A#1993/129#802*, CH-BAR. 82 ICRC, ‘Afghan Sitrep No. 1: Action en faveur des réfugiés Afghans au Pakistan,’ 9 November 1981, E2010A#1995/313#2833*, CH-BAR.

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The Humanitarian Crisis Becomes Increasingly Permanent

Throughout this time, the Soviet occupation and the corresponding humanitarian crisis was becoming increasingly permanent. According to Richard Ochsner of the Swiss intelligence service, by August of 1980, the Red Army had neither managed to consolidate its political influence in Afghanistan, nor to extend its influence toward the Persian Gulf via Iran or Pakistan.83 This assessment of the situation persisted into the mid-1980s with a 1983 report from the Political Secretariat of the FDFA claiming that the “heroic Afghan combatants, who had managed to resist the invading troops despite mediocre arms, had managed to create a military stalemate.”84 Meanwhile, the refugee situation in Pakistan continued to deteriorate. By December of 1981, the total population of registered refugees in Pakistan had increased to 2.3 million. In December of 1982, it stood at 2.7 million.85 While over-reporting and multiple registration may have played a role in determining these figures, Pakistan had undeniably become host to the largest single refugee population in the world.86 Iran, which hosted 1.6 million Afghan refugees at the time, ranked in second place. The following graph is adapted from a 1983 report by Susan Goodwillie, a consultant to the UNHCR. The report was prepared for a meeting of experts on global refugee aid and development on Mont Pèlerin, Switzerland, from 29–31 August 1983. It shows that combined, the Afghan refugee populations in Pakistan and Iran made up roughly 4.3 million. That was over half of the global refugee population of 7.7 million at the time and six times the size of the next-largest refugee population in Somalia.87 According to Susan Goodwillie, there was a trend among governments that moved away from integrating refugees economically into their own societies, as many lacked the economic means to generate income opportunities for refugees in the first place.88 Pakistan, whose 88 million inhabitants earned a

83 84

Hans Wegmüller, interviewed by Liliane Stadler, 26 March 2019. Secrétariat politique, ‘Département fédéral des affaires étrangères, Exposé – Conférences des Ambassadeurs (1980): Problèmes de sécurité,’ August 1980, E7113A#1991/174#9*, CH-BAR. 85 Oikoumene, ‘The Afghan Refugee Situation in Pakistan,’ E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR. 86 Susan Goodwillie, ‘Refugees in the Developing World: A Challenge to the International Community,’ 5 August 1983, E2025A#1993/130#1536*, CH-BAR. 87 Ibid. 88 Ibid.

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3000000 2500000 2000000 1500000 1000000 500000 0

Co st Ni a Ri c c Zi arag a m ua ba Vi bw et e Dj nam Ho ibou nd ti Rw uras Gu an at da em Za ala m An bia M gol ala a Ug ysia Ta and nz a a M nia ex Al ico Th geri ail a Bu and ru n Ch id in a Za ire Su So dan m ali a Pa Iran ki sta n

Approximate number of refugees

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Host country Graph 3 Global number of refugees per host country, 1983 Source: Swiss Federal Archives (CH-BAR) 89

per capita income of only US$ 320 in 1982, was a case in point.90 The Pakistani government therefore openly opposed the permanent integration of Afghan refugees into Pakistani society.91 The concluding report of the Mont Pèlerin conference, written by Mohamed Sahnoun and J. Burke Knapp therefore suggested that, “What is needed … are development-oriented programmes which provide such opportunities for the refugees and some [sic] local population, including activities which create assets of continuing economic value to areas where refugees live.”92 Instead of encouraging the Pakistani authorities to integrate the Afghan refugees directly into the Pakistani economy, it launched a large-scale income-generation project for the Afghan refugee population in 1983, which used external funds to provide refugees with an occupation outside of the regular Pakistani economy.93

89 Ibid. 90 Fritz Rudolf Staehelin, ‘Pakistan: Contribution au financement de travaux préparatoires pour un projet de création d’emplois et de protection de l’environnement dans les régions occupées par les réfugiés afghans (Proposition No 200/83),’ 5 October 1983, E2025A#1993/130#1536*, CH-BAR. 91 N.a., ‘Projet-Pilote au Pakistan, mis au pied par la Banque Mondiale: Autosuffisance des Réfugiés,’ 3 January 1983, E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR. 92 Mohamed Sahnoun and J. Burke Knapp, ‘Report: Meeting of Experts on Refugee Aid and Development, Mont Pèlerin, Switzerland,’ 29–31 August 1983, E2025A#1993/130#1536*, CH-BAR. 93 N.a., ‘Projet-Pilote au Pakistan, mis au pied par la Banque Mondiale: Autosuffisance des Réfugiés,’ 3 January 1983, E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR.

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This project became the Swiss government’s main humanitarian focus in Pakistan after 1982. The plan was to employ approximately 12’000 persons for a period of two to three years.94 The tasks that they worked on included reforestation, road reparation works and irrigation system repairs. This was because especially during the early years of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, many refugees had brought their livestock with them to Pakistan. Together with the large quantities of humanitarian aid, which were transported into the refugee regions of Baluchistan and the NWFP on a daily basis, this gave rise to considerable infrastructural and environmental degradation.95 Together with the UNHCR and the World Bank, the Pakistani government sought to rectify this damage, while, at the same time distributing an annual US$ 141 per person in exchange.96 Considering that the annual income per capita in Pakistan was US$ 320 at the time, that was a considerable sum.97 The Swiss government initially pledged CHF 2’596’672 for the preparatory stage of the project in 1982.98 This was significant in comparison to other neutrals at the time. Finland, for instance, contributed CHF 108’128 and Sweden contributed CHF 215’866 in 1982.99 In fact, it exceeded the contributions of both the EC, which pledged CHF 2’045’000 and the United States, which pledged CHF 1’717’485 at the time.100 According to the Federal Council, by 1984, the Swiss government had now contributed over CHF 7 million to humanitarian aid for Afghan refugees.101 In 1984, the Federal Council allocated CHF 8.8 million to humanitarian aid overall, a figure which rose to CHF 12.8 million in 1985.102 This included both financial and material donations such as blankets, tents and milk powder, as well as the dispatch of multiple volunteers from the Swiss Disaster Relief Corps, as displayed in Table 1 below.103 According to Table  1, Switzerland’s contribution to the UNHCR/World Bank 94 Ibid. 95 Staehelin, ‘Pakistan: Contribution au financement,’ E2025A#1993/130#1536*, CH-BAR; UNHCR, ‘Pakistan: Income Generating Project for Refugee Areas – Project Completion Report,’ August 1989, E2025A#2002/145#2460*, CH-BAR. 96 N.a., ‘Projet-Pilote au Pakistan,’ E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR.; Staehelin, ‘Pakistan: Contribution au financement,’ E2025A#1993/130#1536*, CH-BAR. 97 Staehelin, ‘Pakistan: Contribution au financement,’ E2025A#1993/130#1536*, CH-BAR; UNHCR, ‘Pakistan: Income Generating Project,’ E2025A#2002/145#2460*, CH-BAR. 98 UNHCR, ‘Pakistan: Income Generating Project,’ E2025A#2002/145#2460*, CH-BAR. 99 Ibid. 100 Ibid. 101 Longet (sic), ‘84.930 I Longet – Lage in Afghanistan,’ E2023A#1998/212#2473*, CH-BAR. 102 N.a., ‘3. Öffentliche Entwicklungshilfe,’ 339. 103 N.a., ‘Aide Suisse en Faveur des Refugiés Afghans au Pakistan,’ E2023A#1993/129#802*, CHBAR.

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income-generating project was the Swiss government’s most sizeable, as well as gradually increasing contribution toward the Afghan humanitarian crisis. There were also substantial contributions to NGOs such as Enfants du Monde and Entraide Protestante, as well as to the ICRC and to the Swiss Red Cross Society. Swiss and international humanitarian aid to Iran never reached comparable levels to those of Pakistan. The humanitarian crisis in Iran also received much less coverage in the global press, because the new revolutionary regime of Ayatollah Khomeini distrusted foreign journalists.104 The Swiss medical periodical Schweizerische Ärtztezeitung published an editorial on the subject in January Table 1  Swiss humanitarian aid (in CHF) to refugees in Pakistan, 1981 to December 1984

Annual total

Recipient organization

1981: 2’223’000

UNHCR World Food Programme

Size of donation

400’000 (cash) 787’000 (flour) 150’000 (cash) 785’000 (milk powder) Swiss Disaster Relief Corps 72’000 (World Food Programme logistics) 1982: 2’126’000 ICRC 200’000 (cash) Swiss Embassy Islamabad 65’000 (to purchase tents) Enfants du Monde 91’000 (cash) Entraide Protestante 100’000 (tents, medicines, blankets, clothes) UNHCR 800’000 (cash) World Food Programme 770’000 (milk powder) 1983: 1’511’000 Swiss Red Cross Society 300’000 (cash) Swiss Embassy Islamabad 11’000 (to purchase medicine) UNHCR 500’000 (cash) UNHCR/ World Bank 700’000 (income-generating project) 1984: 4’300’000 UNHCR/ World Bank 4’300’000 (income-generating project) World Food Programme Food aid planned but not recorded

104 N.a., ‘Islamic Republic of Iran: Unnoticed Asylum Country,’ Refugees, November 1985, E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR.

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of 1985, lamenting that, “Information in Europe appears to be inversely proportional to the scale of the catastrophe.”105 Prior to the Soviet invasion, there were already up to 600’000 Afghan workers in Iran, yet after 1979, hundreds of thousands of Afghan refugees fled to Iran as well.106 According to Elizabeth Leake, by 1983, an estimated 1.5 million Afghans had settled in Iran.107 Unlike in Pakistan, the Afghan refugee population in Iran spread out across the entire country.108 The cities of Birjand in the East and Zabol, across the border from Afghanistan, had perhaps the largest concentrations of Afghan refugees next to Mashhad in the North-East. In Mashhad, there was an entire Afghan neighborhood called Golshahr, which housed approximately 250’000 of the 1.2 m ­ illion inhabitants of the town.109 Only by 1983 was the UNHCR able to conduct a visit to Mashhad for the first time, followed by a second visit six months later.110 It opened its first office in Iran in 1984, toward whose mission Switzerland initially contributed CHF 300’000.111 Unlike in Iran, tensions gradually grew between refugees, mujahideen fighters and the local population in Pakistan. Originally, most observers had been impressed by the hospitality with which local Pakistanis had welcomed the Afghan refugees into their midst. Many shared not only a common religion, but a common ethnic Pushtun background.112 Unlike in Iran, where most refugees lived in cities and mingled with the local population, refugee tents in Pakistan had given way to permanent segregated compounds and houses by the mid-1980s. Many male refugees had taken up work as shopkeepers, restaurateurs and construction workers, having initially benefitted from the UNHCR’s income generation project.113 However, as refugees they continued to receive aid rations from the UNHCR.114 This allowed them to work for less

105 Schweizerishe Ärtztezeitung, ‘Medizinische Hilfe im Inneren Afghanistans,’ 9 January 1985, Press Collection CH-SBA, author’s translation from, “Information in Europa scheint umgekehrt proportional zum Ausmass dieser Katastrophe zu sein.” 106 Sarah Kenyon Lischer, Dangerous Sanctuaries: Refugee Camps, Civil War and the Dilemmas of Humanitarian Aid (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2006), 64. 107 Leake, Afghan Crucible, 128. 108 N.a., ‘Islamic Republic of Iran,’ E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR. 109 Ibid. 110 Girardet, Afghanistan, 209. 111 Longet, ‘84.930 I Longet – Lage in Afghanistan,’ E2023A#1998/212#2473*, CH-BAR. 112 Refugees, ‘The largest of all refugee populations,’ February 1986, E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR. 113 Luciano Lavizzari, ‘Note on a visit to Baluchistan,’ 23 March 1986, E2025A#1997/200#1584*, CH-BAR. 114 Ibid.

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and to undercut the local Pakistani workforce.115 At the beginning of the 1980s, this problem had been mitigated by the fact many Pakistani workers had been employed in the Persian Gulf region. Toward the mid-1980s, however, many returned in the wake of a gradual depression that plagued the Gulf economies.116 The combination of these factors strained the relationship between the Afghan refugees and their Pakistani hosts and there were a growing number of instances of armed violence throughout 1986. Observers reported bomb explosions, kidnappings and feuds amongst mujahideen groups in the border regions during the spring of 1986.117 After a shooting at a bus station in Quetta, the authorities eventually imposed a curfew on the town in October.118 That same month, a series of bomb blasts shook the NWFP in various locations.119 According to one observer, locals did not dare to protest openly, because unlike in Iran most Afghans were “heavily armed” and unchecked by the Pakistani authorities.120 Most refugees were either illiterate or at times unfamiliar with the dialects spoken in their Pakistani host provinces.121 In exchange for offering assistance during the registration process with the Pakistani authorities, many mujahideen demanded that new arrivals join their ranks. In this way, successful recruiters also increased their relative strength vis-à-vis other groups of mujahideen.122 Rudiger Schöch has argued that the government of Pakistan actively encouraged this process and made aid available only to those refugees whose families had become affiliated with one of seven officially recognized mujahideen parties in Pakistan.123 In the long term, this may have strengthened those parties that the Pakistani government preferred, but it also blurred the lines between refugees and mujahideen fighters even more and it meant that humanitarian aid intended for refugees sometimes wound up in the hands of the mujahideen. This subject finds little coverage in Swiss diplomatic cables from the period. Neatly documented figures on aid spending are much more common, but they were scarcely accompanied by an in-depth analysis of the impact of Swiss 115 Noa Vera Zanoli, ‘Report on Social Aspects,’ 27 December 1986, E2025A#1997/200#1584*, CH-BAR. 116 Ibid. 117 Lavizzari, ‘Note on a visit to Baluchistan,’ E2025A#1997/200#1584*, CH-BAR. 118 Zanoli, ‘Report on Social Aspects,’ E2025A#1997/200#1584*, CH-BAR. 119 Ibid. 120 Lavizzari, ‘Note on a visit to Baluchistan,’ E2025A#1997/200#1584*, CH-BAR. 121 N.a., ‘Afghanische Asylanten,’ 21 January 1987, E4280A#1998/296#1306*, CH-BAR. 122 Ibid. 123 Rüdiger Schöch, ‘Afghan refugees in Pakistan during the 1980s: Cold War politics and ­registration practice,’ New Issues in Refugee Research 157(2008), 9.

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humanitarian aid in the region. The Federal Council continued to increase the level of humanitarian aid to the Afghan refugees in Pakistan over the course of the 1980s. In October of 1987, Switzerland transferred CHF 10 million to the UNHCR for the second phase of its income-generating project in Pakistan.124 In the meantime, the FDFA repeatedly declined direct requests for humanitarian aid from the mujahideen in an attempt to avoid political entanglement in the Afghan conflict.125 In April of 1983 for instance, Burhannudin Rabbani, the leader of the Jam’iyyat-e-Islami resistance group, had paid a visit to Switzerland as part of a fundraising tour through Europe and the United States. He received no funding from the Swiss at the time despite repeated visits.126 However, he ultimately played an important role as a facilitator of Switzerland’s protective power mandate for Soviet POWs from 1982 to 1986, as well as during the initial stages of the Swiss mediation attempt in Afghanistan in 1990. 5

Conclusion: the Afghan Crisis as a Humanitarian Crisis

These later developments were not strictly in line with Switzerland’s initial trajectory in the Afghan crisis after the Soviet invasion of 1979. Prior to 1982, it did not appear as though the Swiss government would become diplomatically involved at all. Already during the early stages of the Soviet occupation, it became clear that Switzerland was not directly affected by the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. Neither did the Swiss government become directly involved in various competing multilateral attempts to resolve the Afghan crisis peacefully. As a consequence, the Swiss government primarily treated the Soviet occupation as a humanitarian crisis – one which became increasingly permanent as the invasion itself turned into a prolonged counter-insurgency campaign against the Afghan mujahideen. As a provider of humanitarian aid, Switzerland did not visibly distinguish itself from other states on the basis of permanent neutrality. Switzerland was one among many humanitarian aid providers in the conflict. The Swiss authorities did not coordinate 124 N.a., ‘Beitrag vom Fr. 10 Mio für die zweite Phase des Weltbank/ UNHCR Projekts “Arbeitsbeschaffung für afghanische Flüchtlinge und Lokalbevölkerung in Pakistan,”’ 21 October 1987, E4010A#1994/344#885*, CH-BAR. 125 R. Vieux (Chef du protocole et d’information, République et canton de Genève), ‘­Correspondence to A. Hugentobler (Division politique II, Département fédéral des affaires étrangères),’ 16 March 1983, E2010A#1995/313#2833*, CH-BAR. 126 Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Note d’entretien: Entrevue avec le Professeur Rabbani,’ 19 April 1983, E2010A#1995/313#2833*, CH-BAR.

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their provision of humanitarian aid particularly closely with the ICRC either. Yet while the provision of humanitarian aid to Afghan refugees in neighboring Pakistan – and Iran after 1983 – allowed the Swiss authorities to remain politically aloof of the Afghan crisis, the same was not the case for the ICRC. Having been expelled from Afghan territory in in 1980, the ICRC struggled to regain access to internally displaced persons, as well as to political and military prisoners within Afghanistan. Between 1980 and 1982, the ICRC primarily conducted its operations out of Peshawar in Pakistan. Its presence there ultimately became important for Switzerland’s involvement in Afghanistan for two reasons. First, because it created a substantial amount of goodwill amongst the Afghan refugee population. Second, because through its presence in Peshawar, the ICRC encountered a large number of mujahideen resistance groups who were based there.

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Chapter 4

The Transfer of Soviet POWs from Afghanistan to Switzerland, 1982–1986 The mujahideen were rumoured not to take prisoners, but as a result of its presence in Peshawar, the ICRC found out that they occasionally did. The ICRC delegates in Peshawar were swift to recognize this as an opportunity. According to the 1949 Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, POWs could be interned in a neutral third country during armed conflict.1 If the ICRC were able to offer such an arrangement to the Soviet and the Afghan authorities, it might be able to negotiate its own return to the Afghan interior. This was a highly unorthodox idea, but in the spring of 1982, the ICRC was able to convince the representatives of the Permanent Mission of the Soviet Union to the UN in Geneva of its merits. On the basis of this agreement, the ICRC approached the Swiss government to host these prisoners as a gesture of Switzerland’s good offices. The resulting transfer of eleven POWs from Afghanistan to ­Switzerland was  an  unusual form of cooperation between a government and a nongovernmental humanitarian organization in the context of an armed conflict. It was an instance in which the ICRC assisted the belligerents of an armed conflict in transferring POWs to a neutral third country for internment. As such, it raised significant questions about the nature and meaning of permanent neutrality, about the dividing line between state and non-state actors in war and about the significance of humanitarian ideals in the overall context of the global Cold War. In recent years, new investigations into POWs have revealed how understudied the phenomenon continues to be and how easily prisoners of war shift across the theoretical dividing line between state and non-state actors. In 2017, for instance, Sarah Kovner has investigated the vast number of Japanese and American POWs taken prisoner during the opening stages of the Second World War in the Pacific.2 Incidentally, her research also reveals that the Swiss government and the ICRC worked closely together to protect these prisoners’ basic rights. According to Kovner, both were “overwhelmed by the 1 N.a., ‘Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,’ 12 August 1949, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c8.html, Art. 10. 2 Sarah Kovner, ‘A War of Words: Allied Captivity and Swiss Neutrality in the Pacific, 1941–1945,’ Diplomatic History 41(2017), 719. © Liliane Stadler, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004690660_006 Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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challenges they faced in the Pacific” and “found it increasingly difficult to work together” on account of their diverging mandates. Switzerland also acted as a protecting power for the United States and the United Kingdom at the time.3 The transfer of Soviet prisoners of war from Afghanistan to Switzerland between 1982 and 1986 faced similar obstacles. In practical terms, its impact on the humanitarian situation inside Afghanistan was modest during this period. However, it did mark a change in Switzerland’s role in the Afghan crisis from the provision of humanitarian aid to the provision of good offices in close cooperation with the ICRC. 1 The ICRC Makes Contact with Soviet Prisoners of War Prisoners of war are not criminals, imprisoned for breaking the law. Strictly speaking, they are not political prisoners either, although these two categories at times overlap.4 They are armed combatants, imprisoned by enemy belligerents in order to prevent them from engaging in further hostilities during armed conflict.5 Unlike civilian prisoners, they are members of the military and unlike political prisoners, they are not citizens of the interning state or political authority.6 Strictly speaking, they constitute a specific social construct within international humanitarian law, which is defined in article four of the Third Geneva Convention of 1949.7 According to the convention, the parties to a conflict may detain POWs without formal procedures or reasons.8 Yet if this is to occur within the remit of the law, it must safeguard the prisoners’ basic human rights.9 POWs may be detained, but they may not be harmed. 3 Ibid., 721. 4 Iris Rachamimov and Rotem Kowner, ‘Introduction: Military, Civilian, and Political Internments: Examining Great War Internments Together,’ in Out of Place : A Global and Local History of World War I Internments, edited by Doina Anca Cretu, Nancy Fitch, André Keil, Bohdan S. Kordan, Rotem Kowner, Sarina Landefeld, Assaf Mond, Mahon Murphy, Iris Rachamimov, Lena Radauer, Naoko Shimazu, Matthew Stibbe, Hazuki Tate, and Neville Wylie, 1–22 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2022), 8. 5 Ibid., 6–7. 6 Ibid., 8. 7 N.a., ‘Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,’ 12 August 1949, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c8.html, Art. 4. 8 Silvia Sanna, ‘Part II Specific Issues and Regimes, B Geneva Convention III, Ch.48 Treatment of Prisoners of War,’ in The 1949 Geneva Conventions: A Commentary, edited by Andrew Clapham, Paola Gaeta and Marco Sassòli (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 10.1093/ law/9780199675449.001.0001. 9 Ibid.

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They must be humanely treated throughout their internment and freed at the end of hostilities.10 In practice, however, these principles are often difficult to enforce. This is because political prisoners, prisoners of war, and deserters are often difficult to distinguish in the absence of verifiable records. The transfer of a small number of Soviet prisoners from Afghanistan to Switzerland between 1982 and 1986 was no exception. By the time of this transfer, the Swiss government had already accumulated extensive experience as a neutral host of foreign POWs as part of its humanitarian tradition. In 1871, the Swiss government interned large parts of the French Eastern Army, commanded by General Charles-Denis Bourbaki, which had sought refuge from the Prussian Army during the Franco-Prussian War.11 Thomas Bürgisser has estimated that the Swiss authorities also hosted over 12’000 Italian, 7’000 German, 2’000 French and 2’000 Austria-Hungarian POWs on Swiss territory during the First World War.12 During the Second World War, nearly 10’000 Soviet prisoners of war fled Germany for Switzerland. At the end of the war, the repatriation of these prisoners formed part of the bilateral negotiations, which led to the establishment of diplomatic relations between Switzerland and the Soviet Union in 1946.13 This also led to sustained criticism among the Swiss public, as it became known that some of these prisoners were treated as deserters and sentenced to forced labor upon their repatriation.14 A number of authors have since commented on this malpractice. C ­ harlotte Carr-Gregg, for instance, has argued in one of very few publications on the transfer of Soviet prisoners of war from Afghanistan to Switzerland that the Soviet authorities historically regarded members of their armed forces who were captured by the enemy “as traitors.”15 This subject also received considerable media attention at the time. According to Nikolas Tolstoy of the Wall Street Journal, “traditionally, [Soviet] prisoners of war have been considered as 10 Ibid. 11 Thomas Bürgisser, ‘Internees (Switzerland),’ in International Encyclopedia of the First World War, edited by Ute Daniel, Peter Gatrell, Oliver Janz, Heather Jones, Jennifer Keene, Alan Kramer and Bill Nasson (Berlin: Freie Universität Berlin, 2015), http://dx.doi .org/10.15463/ie1418.10735. 12 Ibid. 13 Bürgisser, Zala and Fischer, ‘“Always Hit Back Right on the Kisser,”’263; Unité d’enseignement et de recherche de Verte-Rive (Pully, Suisse), ‘L’internement et le rapatriement des militaires soviétiques réfugiés en Suisse pendant la seconde guerre mondiale,’ 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2763*, CH-BAR. 14 Unité d’enseignement et de recherche de Verte-Rive, ‘L’internement et le rapatriement des militaires soviétiques,’ E2023A#1993/129#2763*, CH-BAR. 15 Carr-Gregg, ‘An Extension of Humanitarian International Law,’ 96.

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traitors, a state of affairs made quasi-official by numerous government orders issued during World War Two.”16 In general, Western media outlets reported much more frequently on Soviet deserters than they did on Soviet POWs over the course of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan. The latter were much more difficult to report on due to lack of access. As part of the wider Cold War narrative of systemic competition, it was common for Western media outlets to argue that deserters tried to escape not only the hostilities in Afghanistan but the political system of the Soviet Union itself. They also tended to argue that Soviet soldiers from the Central Asian republics were most inclined to desert to the mujahideen on account of their faith.17 This narrative has become more nuanced in recent years. Most notably, Christian Bleuer has shown that Soviet deserters and prisoners of war continue to be poorly understood in the literature. Bleuer has shown that among Soviet Muslims, desertion was actually not an issue of particular concern for the Soviet leadership during the occupation of Afghanistan.18 The main reasons for desertion amongst Soviet soldiers were bullying and hazing within the armed forces, but while there were attempts to desert to the mujahideen or to flee to the West, many deserters also attempted to return to their homes in the Soviet Union.19 Future research might investigate the testimonies of Soviet prisoners or deserters, some of which were also published in mujahideen journals, in order to further explore the more nuanced distinctions between POWs and deserters in the context of the Afghan crisis. What is known to the literature is that relatively few Soviet combatants surrendered to the mujahideen voluntarily.20 According to Rodric Braithwaite, they were informed by their commanding officers that this would be viewed as treason by the Soviet authorities and that they would likely be tortured by their captors.21 In other words, it was made clear to Soviet soldiers that the authorities would make no distinction between deserters and prisoners of war. Most Soviet soldiers who fought in Afghanistan were conscripts, who received no more than one month of basic training. Colloquially, they were referred to as the Afgantsy and this term has since also become the title of 16

Nikolas Tolstoy, The Wall Street Journal, ‘The Clock is Ticking on Seven Russian Soldiers,’ 14 November 1983, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR. 17 Baker, War in Afghanistan, 188. 18 Christian Bleuer, ‘Muslim Soldiers in Non-Muslim Militaries at War in Muslim Lands: The Soviet, American and Indian Experience,’ Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs 32(2012), 494. 19 Ibid., 495. 20 Braithwaite, Afgantsy, 259. 21 Ibid.

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Rodric Braithwaite’s influential monograph on the experiences of Soviet soldiers in Afghanistan. The Afgantsy originated from all parts of the Soviet Union, including Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, Central Asia, the Caucasus and the Baltic states.22 The majority of them had no party, bureaucratic or military elite background. They lived and fought in appalling conditions, suffering freezing winters, extreme summers, poor nutrition, rampant disease and often severe bullying. Health care was so poor in the conflict zone that according to Braithwaite, the “Soviets filled more hospitals than they constructed.”23 Yet they were forbidden from disclosing where they were fighting even to their families, as the Soviet Union had never officially declared war on Afghanistan, citing its responsibilities under the 1978 FCMA. For this reason, Soviet officials also denied the applicability of the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and their 1977 Protocols to the Afghan conflict. This was a major obstacle to the humanitarian work of the ICRC, which was not only based on the Geneva Conventions, but dependent on the consent of the host government. Monitoring compliance with international humanitarian law and reminding conflict parties of its existence is one of the principal tasks of the ICRC.24 The ICRC launched numerous attempts to regain access to Afghan territory over the course of the early 1980s. It also made attempts to establish contacts with various mujahideen resistance groups in order to verify their treatment of POWs. Most mujahideen resistance groups did not actually take prisoners. In fact, most resistance groups were known for ruthlessly shooting their prisoners on the spot. According to Charlotte Carr-Gregg, the ICRC initially dispatched Bernard Grunenfeld, a former ICRC delegate to Cambodia and Iran, to Pakistan to reach out to various mujahideen commanders in order to address the human rights situation amongst their prisoners.25 Carr-Gregg writes that his aim was to “negotiate the release of Soviet prisoners” from amongst the mujahideen and in return, to “gain the cooperation of the mujahideen to facilitate access for their wounded and sick to the ICRC-run hospitals near the Pakistani border.”26 New archival materials from the ICRC Archives in Geneva and the Swiss Federal Archives in Berne give reason to revise this existing narrative in more 22 23 24

Ibid., 8. Ibid., 175. ICRC, ‘Statutes of the ICRC,’ 21 December 2017, https://www.icrc.org/en/document /statutes-international-committee-red-cross-0, Art. 4, paragraph 1.c. 25 Carr-Gregg, ‘An Extension of Humanitarian International Law,’ 99. 26 Ibid.

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detail. On 11 March 1980, less than three months after the Soviet invasion, Michel Zufferey of the ICRC received word from Agence France Presse (AFP) that Burhanuddin Rabbani’s resistance group, Jam’iyyat-e-Islami, had captured six Soviet soldiers the previous day.27 Two days later, however, Zufferey received word that the prisoners had been killed in a bombardment.28 Then, almost a year later, on 16 February 1981, the Pakistani government similarly approached the ICRC with news of a Soviet soldier, who had been captured by the mujahideen on 2 January near Ghazni, south-west of Kabul. His name was Konstantin Anatoliwich Zaiken and he was handed over directly to the Soviet Consulate General in Karachi.29 Internal memoranda from the FDFA conclude that these developments inspired the ICRC to suggest the transfer of Soviet prisoners of war to a neutral country.30 The idea was that it would give the mujahideen an incentive to keep their prisoners of war alive and to trade them against mujahideen captives held in Afghanistan.31 Yet the idea received no response at first. This changed in October of 1981, when the fundamentalist resistance group Hezb-i-Islami/Khalis captured Mikhail Akhrimov, a Soviet industrial consultant to the Afghan regime whose expertise was in land mines.32 As an industrial consultant, Akhrimov was not strictly speaking a POW but a civilian prisoner, yet his specialization in land mines blurred this distinction somewhat. Nevertheless, his civilian status may have been the reason, why the Soviet authorities did not treat his capture as an act of treason. In fact, his is not the only reported case of a Soviet advisor, captured by the mujahideen. Resistance combatants frequently targeted Soviet advisers to trade them for political prisoners.33 Elizabeth Leake has recently analysed the case of Soviet geologist Evgeni Okhrimiuk, who was kidnapped by the mujahideen in Kabul during the early stages of the occupation. He was subsequently executed when the Soviet authorities 27

Michel Zufferey, ‘Pour comité de Zuffrey Islamabad,’ 12 March 1980, E2200.162A# 1994/329#45*, CH-BAR. 28 Ibid. 29 Jean Courvoisier, ‘Rapport de visite à un soldat soviétique “interné” au Pakistan,’ 16 ­February 1981, E2200.162A#1994/329#45*, CH-BAR. 30 Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Note de Dossier: Internement de membres des forces armées soviétiques capturés en Afghanistan – Entretien avec une délégation du CICR,’ 11 May 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. 31 Paul Stauffer, ‘Correspondence to Politische Abteilung II,’ 23 February 1981, E2200.162A#1994/329#45*, CH-BAR. 32 Bringolf (sic), ‘Correspondence to De Courten,’ 5 October 1981, E2200.162A#1994/329#45*, CH-BAR; ICRC archival documents diverge on this point. To verify the records of the ICRC, it is necessary to submit a FOIA request citing Article 7 of the Rules governing access to the Archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, adopted on 2 March 2017. 33 Leake, Afghan Crucible, 96.

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refused to exchange him for a political prisoner.34 According to Leake, the Soviet authorities did attempt to negotiate his release, which they also did in Akhrimov’s case. In a subsequent internal government memorandum, Edouard Brunner of the Swiss Federal Department of Foreign Affairs, speculated that Akhrimov’s case may have been among the first instances, where the Soviet leadership prioritized humanitarian considerations over questions of principle. Brunner also speculated that the propaganda effect the Soviet authorities could achieve by negotiating the release of a civilian would outweigh the propaganda effect the mujahideen would manage to attain by bringing the Soviet Union to the negotiating table.35 This may also have been why the leader of Hezb-i-Islami/Khalis, Mawlawi Yunis Khalis, initially rebuffed Soviet advances for direct negotiations and declared that he would only treat with the ICRC.36 2 The ICRC, the Soviet Union and the Swiss Authorities Arrange the Transfer of Soviet POWs to Switzerland In Akhrimov’s case, the Soviet Union agreed to open a channel of communication with the ICRC through its Permanent Mission to the United Nations in Geneva and its embassy in Islamabad.37 The relevant ICRC documents on his case remain classified, which is why it is difficult to judge what about Akhrimov’s case was unique for the Soviet authorities. Yet the outcome of these discussions had implications for prisoners beyond Akhrimov himself. Between 13 and 22 January 1982, the ICRC and the Soviet Union negotiated an overarching memorandum of understanding on prisoners of war in the Afghan context. This memorandum repeated the ICRC’s initial proposal to transfer Soviet prisoners from Afghanistan to a neutral country.38 Initially, it suggested India for this purpose. In exchange, the ICRC demanded permission to return to Afghanistan to provide humanitarian aid both to the civilian population and to the mujahideen prisoners captured by the Soviet forces and the Afghan regime. The mujahideen were neither represented in these discussions nor signatories 34 Ibid. 35 Edouard Brunner, ‘Correspondence to unknown,’ 2 June 1982, E2200.162A#1994/329#45* (sic), CH-BAR, Berne, Switzerland. 36 Ibid. 37 Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Note de Dossier: Internement de membres des forces armées soviétiques capturés en Afghanistan,’ E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. 38 ICRC, ‘Protocole d’Entente donnant suite aux entretiens qui ont eu lieu à la mission permanente de l’URSS à Genève du 13 au 22 Janvier 1982,’ 22 January 1982, E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR.

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to the memorandum, but their consent was important because they were the ones who held the Soviet prisoners captive. A substantial number of them agreed with the terms of the memorandum, but not all of them did. The most important group to disagree was Hezb-iIslami/Khalis, the group that detained Akhrimov.39 Their main grievance was that the neutral state to which prisoners would be transferred was India. India had refrained from criticizing the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in the UN, although Indian President Indira Gandhi called it “inadmissible.”40 According to Avinash Palival, condemning the invasion at the UN would have risked jeopardizing the Soviet Union’s support over Kashmir, as well as the continued supply of Soviet oil and defence equipment.41 At the time of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, India received over 70 percent of its arms imports from the Soviet Union.42 The Soviet Union had also notably supported India during the India-Pakistan War of 1971.43 In view of these circumstances, Artemy Kalinovsky has argued that the Indian government of Indira Gandhi actually preferred a Soviet-supported communist regime in Afghanistan, especially on account of its own ongoing standoff with Pakistan since 1947. A communist regime in Afghanistan was presumably less susceptible to Pakistani influence and therefore in India’s interest.44 Yet for these reasons, India was politically unacceptable to the mujahideen and Hezb-i-Islami/Khalis insisted on transferring their prisoners to Pakistan instead, where a number of mujahideen resistance groups had found both refuge and political support themselves.45 The Soviet Union rejected this option for exactly that reason.46 According to the records of the FDFA, it was Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Jam’iyyat-e-Islami, who finally suggested Switzerland on account of its reputation for permanent

39 Ibid. 40 Avinash Palival, My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet Invasion to the US Withdrawal (London: Hurst & Company, 2017), 50. 41 Ibid., 48. 42 W. Howard Wriggins, ‘Pakistan’s Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of ­Afghanistan,’ Pacific Affairs 57(1984), 289. 43 Palival, My Enemy’s Enemy, 48. 44 Artemy Kalinovsky, “‘The Soviet Union and the Global Cold War,’ in The Cambridge History of Communism, edited by Juliane Fürst, Silvio Pons, and Mark Selden (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 88. 45 Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Note de Dossier: Internement de membres des forces armées ­soviétiques capturés en Afghanistan,’ E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. 46 Edouard Brunner, ‘Correspondence to unknown,’ 2 June 1982, E2210.5#1996/373#21*, CH-BAR.

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neutrality.47 On 10 May 1982, the ICRC contacted the FDFA about the SovietICRC memorandum of understanding and about the mujahideen proposal to involve Switzerland.48 Two days later, the FDFA informed the Federal Council and from 12–14 May, the ICRC and Edouard Brunner – who had in the meantime advanced to head the Directorate for International O ­ rganizations at the FDFA – exchanged a series of letters with the ICRC to finalize the terms of Switzerland’s role.49 Brunner was particularly adamant to stress in these letters that Switzerland had not actually been party to the memorandum of 22 January, but that if the Soviet Union were to cover the costs of the internment, the Swiss government would carry it out as a demonstration of its good offices. It was agreed that the Swiss government would be responsible for the terms and the location of the internment and that the internment itself ought to be capped at a maximum of two years – a condition that arose from ICRC negotiations with various mujahideen groups.50 This condition in particular eventually gave rise to considerable debate in the press once the arrangement was made public.51 Overall, the Swiss authorities were relatively swift to reverse their initial stance of 1980, not to become diplomatically involved in the Afghan crisis. On 17 May, the FDFA, the Soviet Union and the ICRC informally agreed on the conditions above at a tripartite meeting in Geneva and on 19 May, the Federal Council approved the operation in line with Switzerland’s long-standing foreign policy tradition of disponibilité.52 Nine days passed from the ICRC’s initial request to the Federal Council’s approval. Moreover, the relevant documents at the Swiss Federal Archives do not appear to document any substantial discussion on either the merits and applicability of Raymond Probst’s 1958 criteria on the provision of good offices or on the parliamentary committee meetings 47

Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Note de dossier: Afghanistan – Professeur Rabbani,’ 19 April 1983, E2023A#1993/129#2764*, CH-BAR. 48 Jean De Courten, ‘Correspondence to Kirile L. Keline, Conseiller,’ 11 May 1982, E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR. 49 Pierre Aubert, ‘Internement de membres des forces armées soviétiques capturés en Afghanistan,’ 18 May 1982, J1.301#2002/197#547*, CH-BAR. 50 N.a., ‘No Title,’ 17 September 1982, E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR; Evéquoz, ‘Note de Dossier: Internement de membres des forces armées soviétiques capturés en Afghanistan,’ E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR; ICRC archival documents arguably diverge somewhat on this point. To verify the records of the ICRC, it is necessary to submit a FOIA request citing Article 7 of the Rules governing access to the Archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, adopted on 2 March 2017. 51 Ibid. 52 Conseil Fédéral, ‘Confidentiel: Internement de membres des forces armées soviétiques capturés en Afghanistan,’ 19 May 1982, E5001G#1994/118#148*, CH-BAR.

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of early 1980, which had expressly ruled out diplomatic involvement in the Afghan crisis. This is even more puzzling, seeing as Probst himself had since advanced to the position of Secretary of State of Foreign Affairs. As such, he became the highest-ranking civil servant in the department under Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert. What was also puzzling is that unlike during Switzerland’s initial response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in January 1980, neither parliament nor any of the parliamentary committees on national security or foreign affairs were informed of Switzerland’s new role in the Afghan crisis as a host-state of Soviet POWs. During the early stages of the transfer operation, policy was determined at the executive and departmental level and parliament was only consulted in the aftermath. There were also those who expressed doubt about the feasibility of the operation. Edouard Brunner, for instance, foresaw that both parliament and the public would eventually take issue with the informality of the plan and especially with the condition of repatriation after two years. After all, while the Swiss government may have been neutral toward the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, the Swiss press and the Swiss public were not. “We are aware of the difficulties that can arise for Switzerland from this operation,” Brunner wrote at the time, “especially if the Soviet transferees no longer agree to be repatriated at the end of their internment.”53 Should this be the case, it could lead to a heated public debate about the Swiss government’s commitment to human rights and about the moral dimensions of permanent neutrality more broadly. 3

The Transfer Arrangement Stagnates

At the heart of the problem was the fact that the arrangement itself was a political, rather than a legal one, which was why its implications were also primarily political as opposed to legal. First of all, the memorandum of understanding between the Soviet Union and the ICRC was not legally binding. Second, it did not include either the Swiss government or the mujahideen as parties. Third, according to the ICRC, the operation complied with Article 111 of the 1949 Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, which stipulated that it was permissible to move prisoners of war to a neutral country for their internment.54 However, the convention only applies to conflicts between 53 54

Brunner, ‘Correspondence to unknown,’ E2210.5#1996/373#21*, CH-BAR. N.a., ‘Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,’ 12 August 1949, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c8.html, Art. 10.

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states, but the Soviet Union blatantly denied its invasion of Afghanistan, as well as the applicability of the convention. Instead, the Politburo insisted that its involvement in Afghanistan was in accordance with their 1978 FCMA, at the behest of the Afghan government, as well as in response to unspecified foreign interference. In order to circumnavigate this obstacle, the parties to the transfer operation agreed to apply the Geneva Convention only de facto rather than de jure – “by analogy” as the Swiss authorities called it.55 This way, the transfer of prisoners could go ahead during the spring of 1982, but it left both the issue of enforcement and the issue of repatriation unresolved. This was compounded by the fact that the Geneva Convention did not mandate for a limited internment period of two years. Rather, according to Article 118 of the convention, prisoners should be “released and repatriated without delay after the cessation of active hostilities.”56 Whilst a proposal to make an exception to this article had been discussed at the Geneva Conference of 1949, it had not been adopted.57 It became an issue again after the Korean War, when in 1953, many North Korean prisoners refused to be repatriated. Yet at the time the Soviet Union vetoed any exceptions to the existing legal framework, possibly because the choice not to be repatriated had the potential to reflect not only an individual decision, but the attractiveness of the two competing social and political systems of the Cold War.58 This conundrum was also at the heart of the prisoner transfer scheme that the FDFA and the ICRC were in the process of setting up together with the Soviet Union in the spring of 1982. One reason why these problems were not addressed in the beginning and why the operation itself was initiated so swiftly was that the ICRC was keen to return to Afghanistan in order to provide humanitarian aid and to monitor violations of humanitarian law as soon as possible. Its eagerness to return paradoxically is something for which it also received criticism at the time.59 There were those who argue that the ICRC compromised its principles in the

55

Evéquoz, ‘Note de Dossier: Internement de membres des forces armées soviétiques capturés en Afghanistan,’ E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. 56 N.a., ‘Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,’ 12 August 1949, https://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c8.html, Art. 118; ICRC, ‘Memorandum sur l’internement en pays neutre,’ 7 May 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. 57 D.H. Anderson, ‘Correspondence to Miss Bevan SAD,’ 10 February 1984, FCO 37/3447, UK-TNA. 58 Ibid. 59 N.a., ‘Internement de membres des forces armées soviétiques capturés en Afghanistan par les mouvements de la résistance afghane,’ 18 May 1982, E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR.

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process.60 By May of 1982, the ICRC knew of six Soviet soldiers detained by the mujahideen.61 Out of these, one soldier chose to stay in Afghanistan and the mujahideen made the transfer of two dependent on the successful resumption of the ICRC’s activities in Kabul.62 This meant that only three prisoners could be transferred, but the ICRC chose to go ahead nevertheless. All three prisoners were held by a faction of Hezb-i-Islami and on 27 May, they were handed over to the ICRC.63 Their names were Valeriy Didienko, Yuriy Povarnitsin and Viktor Sinchuk. As per the ICRC’s standard procedure, each of them was able to speak to an ICRC delegate in confidence and each was asked whether they agreed to be transferred to Switzerland for a two-year internment period after which they would be repatriated to the Soviet Union. According to ICRC records held at the Swiss Federal Archives in Berne, all three agreed and were thus swiftly taken to Karachi and onto a direct Swissair flight bound for Zurich-Kloten airport, where they arrived at 7:01 on the morning on 28 May.64 The Swiss press was caught off-guard by the ICRC’s half-page matter-of-fact press statement, which announced their arrival and the purpose of their highly regulated stay. The conservative weekly Weltwoche declared itself “baffled” and reckoned that “what may appear very simple to a layperson is in reality a brave diplomatic act of the finest quality.”65 What made it such was that the ICRC managed to persuade both the Soviet Union and the mujahideen to participate despite the fact that the former continued to deny its occupation of Afghanistan and the latter scarcely took prisoners.66 Ueli Schmid of the daily Berner Zeitung similarly commended the operation as “a world premiere and a diplomatic masterpiece by the ICRC” and the Tribune de Genève enthusiastically compared the operation to a “theatre stunt or a poker strike.”67 According to 60 Ibid. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 ICRC archival documents diverge on this point. To verify the records of the ICRC, it is necessary to submit a FOIA request citing Article 7 of the Rules governing access to the Archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, adopted on 2 March 2017. 64 Brunner, ‘Correspondence to unknown,’ E2210.5#1996/373#21*, CH-BAR. 65 Weltwoche,’ Irgendwo in der Schweiz: Sowjetarmisten aus Afghanistan in helvetischem Gewahrsam,’ 2 June 1982, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Was Laien höchst simpel erscheint, ist in Wirklichkeit ein diplomatischer Bravourakt erster Qualität.” 66 NZZ, ‘Die sowjetischen Gefangenen in Schweizerischer Obhut,’ 19/20 June 1982, E4300C-01#1998/299#602*, CH-BAR. 67 Ueli Schmid, Berner Zeitung, ‘Unklarer Status der drei Russen in St. Johannsen: Weder Kriegsgefangene noch Internierte,’ 5 June 1982, E4300C-01#1998/299#602*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from “dürften als Weltpremiere sowie als diplomatisches ­Meisterstück

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Charlotte Carr-Gregg, the ICRC had previously played the role of an intermediary during the transfer of Portuguese prisoners from Angola, Mozambique and Guinea-Bissau to Tanzania, Senegal, Zaire and Guinea.68 Edouard Girardet also describes the role of the ICRC in managing a limited exchange of prisoners during the Vietnam war.69 Yet in the same vein, Girardet recognizes that in the Soviet-Afghan case, “for the first time in its history, and in the history of any humanitarian institution, the organization has been faced with a totally new concept of prisoner responsibility, namely the proxy internment of conventional (Soviet) POWs captured by (Afghan) guerrillas” (sic).70 There were also negative reactions to the arrival of the Soviet prisoners, both in the press and from private citizens. The day following the arrival of Valeriy Didienko, Yuriy Povarnitsin and Viktor Sinchuk in Zurich, the FDFA received an angry letter from a private citizen signed J. Hauenstein. “I think it is an impertinence toward the entire Swiss people,” Hauenstein wrote, “that Switzerland will take in and care for soldiers of a foreign country, who suppress an entire nation and who have been taken prisoner there.”71 The daily newspaper Der Bund published a similar editorial on 10 June, which argued that the Swiss government appeared to be unable to distinguish between those who genuinely needed help and those who persecuted them.72 The conservative weekly Weltwoche stressed in its mostly positive coverage of recent events, the ICRC had not yet been allowed back into Afghanistan despite the arrival of the Soviet prisoners in Switzerland.73 Overall, the amount of press coverage on the prisoner transfer scheme gradually became a source of concern for the ICRC. According to Othmar Uhl of the FDFA’s public relations office, Richard Pestalozzi, the ICRC’s vice president, feared that too much press coverage could dissuade the Soviet Union from fulfilling its side of the bargain of allowing the

68 69 70 71

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des IKRK gelten;” Tribune de Genève, ‘Coup de théâtre ou de poker du CICR! Des prisonniers soviétiques relâchés par les Afghans sont en Suisse,’ 29 May 1982, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR. Carr-Gregg, ‘An Extension of Humanitarian International Law,’ 97. Girardet, Afghanistan, 225. Ibid. J. Hauenstein, ‘Correspondence to FDFA,’ 29 May 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Ich finde es eine Zumutung für das ganze Schweizer-Volk, dass Soldaten einer fremden Nation, welche ein ganzes Volk unterdrücken und dort in Gefangenschaft geraten in der Schweiz aufgenommen und betreut werden.” H. Haldemann, Der Bund, ‘Verfolger schützen?,’ 10 June 1982, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CHBAR. Weltwoche, ‘Irgendwo in der Schweiz,’ J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR.

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ICRC back into Afghanistan.74 Mid-June 1982, the ICRC was already planning the transfer of the next – much larger – group of Soviet prisoners despite the fact that it had not received authorization from the Afghan regime to return to Afghanistan.75 Meanwhile, the National Assembly – the lower house of parliament – scheduled a debate on exactly this issue on 14 June 1982. This was the first time that a degree of parliamentary oversight became apparent in relation to the  prisoner transfer operation. As one of the first to speak, Laurent Butty of the Christian Democratic Party asked Federal Councillor Pierre Aubert to justify why there had been no progress in the return of the ICRC to Afghanistan so far. Aubert’s response to Butty was particularly revealing with respect to a number of difficulties that eventually began to plague the operation at a deeper level. “We have only been dealing with the ICRC on this matter, as we have been dealing with the ICRC concerning the mujahideen,” he replied.76 In other words, the Swiss government communicated only with the ICRC and did not have a direct channel of communication, either with the Soviet Union or with the mujahideen at this stage. This appears to be true insofar as the relevant FDFA documents at the Federal Archives in Berne contain no direct correspondence between the Swiss authorities and the mujahideen during this period. All communications went through the ICRC, due to the sensitivity of the operation. However, it also led to confusion on a number of occasions and minor problems quickly became major ones in the absence of a formal agreement and a corresponding enforcement mechanism. Especially the quick temper of some Soviet prisoners meant there was no shortage of problems. On the whole, their minders described Valeriy Didienko, Yuriy Povarnitsin, and Viktor Sinchuk as lazy and immature.77 In the words of their minder Colonel Jean Rossier, their behaviour was not exactly “befitting of the military” and they had a certain disregard for the rules.78 They were all aged between 19 and 20 at the time and had no experienced officer amongst them. Prior to enlisting in the armed forces as a soldier, nineteen-year-old Valeriy Didienko had worked as a crane operator in the Ukrainian Soviet Socialist

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Hans Uhl, ‘Aktennotiz: Anruf von Richard Pestalozzi, Vizepräsident IKRK – Sowjetische Militärpersonen,’ 11 June 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. Ibid. N.a., ‘Butty: Sowjetische Kriegsgefangene in der Schweiz (Conseil National),’ 14 June 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. Colonel Rossier, ‘Kurzbericht über die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen in der Schweiz (Zeitabschnitt vom 24.12.82 bis 31.3.93),’ 5 April 1983, E2023A#1993/129#2764*, CH-BAR. Ibid.

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Republic (SSR).79 Viktor Sintschuk was also nineteen years old and a native of the Ukrainian SSR, where he had worked as a driver prior to joining the army.80 Juri Povarnitsin was twenty years old at the time of his arrival in Switzerland. He held the rank of a sergeant and had worked as a truck driver in his native Russia before the invasion of Afghanistan.81 It is unclear from the available documents, whether they were volunteers or conscripts, although few Afgantsy had originally volunteered. Together, the three of them were assigned to the correctional facility of St. Jean in Gals in the Canton of Berne. The facility was not actually a prison and that was the main reason why the Swiss authorities had selected it. Even though the Soviet Union refused to recognize the applicability of the Third Geneva Convention, the Swiss decided to apply it by analogy and according to the convention, prisoners of war should not be treated as criminals. St. Jean did not even have a fence, which turned out to be a problem. At midday on 8 June, Yuriy Povarnitsin made the first of several unsuccessful escape attempts by tying together a series of woollen blankets and using them as a rope to climb out of a back window.82 At 17:20 in the evening, he was sighted and shortly thereafter arrested along the nearby Canal de Thiel, the river linking the lakes of Bienne and Neuchâtel in Western Switzerland.83 Speaking to Heidi Tagliavini, a Russian-speaking representative of the FDFA, the following day, Povarnitsin claimed that he had tried to escape, because he could only see two options for himself at this point: Flight or death.84 Upon learning of this, the cantonal police immediately transferred him to a nearby hospital on 10 June for fear that he might provoke a diplomatic incident.85 He returned to St. Jean on 14 June, but made a second escape attempt within less than a month. Unlike the first one, this second one was also widely reported in the Swiss press.86 On 7 August, three days prior to the arrival of prisoners Hasan Malikovich Agadzhanov, and Viktor Vladimirovich Sapozhnikov in Switzerland, there

79 80 81 82

N.a., ‘Personalien der sowjetischen Internierten,’ n.d., E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR. Ibid. Ibid. B. Bigler, ‘Povarnitsin, Jurij, geb. 14.4.1962, sowjetischer Staatsangehöriger Entweichungsbericht,’ 9 June 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. 83 Ibid. 84 Ibid. 85 Adrien Evéquoz,’ Internés militaires soviétiques – Rapport du CICR, Visite de M. Hocké, Berne, 17 juin 1982,’ 18 June 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. 86 Berner Zeitung, ‘Andere Mentalität schafft Probleme,’ 11 August 1982, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR.

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occurred a further incident at St. Jean.87 On the evening of 6 August, Didienko, Povarnitsin and Sintschuck threatened their translator, Linda Howard.88 During the night, they forced open the doors of their ward and at 11:00 the next morning, Povarnitsin made his way into the office of the ward’s director, demanding to be paid CHF 700 in cash.89 Sintchuck appeared in the office shortly thereafter, accompanied by Linda Howard, whom he held hostage. They sealed themselves into the office along with the director and Howard, repeatedly demanding to be paid the sum of CHF 700. Fortunately for both hostages, a member of staff alerted the police. Five police officers were dispatched from the nearby towns of Erlach and Ins. They arrived at St. Jean by 12:30, one and a half hours after the hostage situation had begun. Sintchuck eventually gave himself up to the police, but Povarnitsin made another attempt to escape. It took a guard dog, tear gas, and the combined strength of several policemen to finally bring him in. After that, the directorate of St. Jean moved both him and Sintchuck to the disciplinary ward. Didienko was made to join them as well, despite the fact that there had been no proof of his involvement.90 Once they were locked up, the director of St. Jean wrote a flustered letter to the police directorate of the canton of Berne. He explained in detail what had come to pass and argued that it would be impossible to keep the Soviet prisoners at his facilities.91 He requested their immediate relocation elsewhere and demanded that the Federal Department of Justice (FDJ) “not consider any further internment of Russians (sic) in our facilities.”92 After a short spell in the disciplinary ward, Povarnitsin, Sintchuck, and Didienko were therefore temporarily moved to the high-security prison of Thorberg, a fifty minutes’ drive from Gals in the direction of Berne.93 In the meantime, two days after Povarnitsin’s second escape attempt, two further Soviet prisoners arrived at the airport of Zurich-Kloten.94 They too had been captives of one of the Hezb-i-Islami factions.95 Viktor Sapozhnikov was 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

N.a., ‘No Title,’ 17 September 1982, E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR. B. Eichenberger, ‘Sowjetische Internierte: Polizeieinsatz,’ 7 August 1982, E2850.1#1991 /234#173*, CH-BAR. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., author’s translation from “Bitten Internierung weiterer Russen in unserer Anstalt abzusetzen.” N.a., ‘No Title,’ E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR. Berner Zeitung, ‘Andere Mentalität schafft Probleme,’ J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR. Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Compte rendu de séance: Internés militaires soviétiques,’ 18 August 1982, E5001G#1994/118#148*, CH-BAR.

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a twenty-year-old infantry soldier from the Ural region of Russia and Hasan Agadzhanov was a twenty-one-year-old tank operator from Azerbaijan.96 Their arrival against the backdrop of Povarnitsin’s escape attempts caused the ICRC to worry about the security measures in place at St. Jean. According to JeanPierre Hocké, who was an ICRC delegate at the time and became the director of the UNHCR in 1985, the semi-open character of the institution, as well as the fact that the Soviet prisoners mixed with ordinary residents during working hours could cause problems.97 The Soviet embassy in Berne was even more explicit in its criticisms. On 25 June, Vladimir Lavrov, the Soviet ambassador to Switzerland, called on Edouard Brunner, chastizing him that the arrangements at St. Jean did not correspond to the assurances that the Soviet Union had received in May.98 Paradoxically, the Soviet ambassador complained about the fact that after Povarnitsin’s escape attempt, three Soviet prisoners had been moved to the high security prison at Thorberg, which was not in keeping with the nature of their internment as per the Third Geneva Convention.99 During another visit on 4 August, Lavrov handed Brunner an entire list of complaints entitled “Remarks, Wishes and Propositions from the Soviet Side.”100 Among other aspects, the Soviet Union demanded changes in the accommodation of the prisoners as well as in their daily work schedules. They asked that disciplinary measures be less strict and that visits, correspondence and telephone calls from embassy staff be more frequent. Most importantly, however, Lavrov wanted a permanent Russian translator from the Soviet embassy to be stationed with the prisoners.101 This was out of the question for the Swiss authorities. Internal memoranda suggest that the FDFA suspected the Soviet embassy of intending to spy on its own citizens. The FDFA did concede that St. Jean was not ideally suited for the internment of the Soviet prisoners under conditions laid out in the Third Geneva Convention.

96

Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Second transfert en Suisse de membres des forces armées soviétiques capturées par la résistance afghane – Communication du CICR (29–30 Juillet 1982),’ 2 August 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2762*, CH-BAR. 97 Evéquoz, ‘Internés militaires soviétiques,’ E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. 98 Edouard Brunner, ‘Internés militaires soviétiques – Intervention de l’Ambasadeur d’URSS, Berne, 25 juin 1982,’ E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. 99 Ibid. 100 Edouard Brunner, ‘Note d’entretien: Internés militaires soviétiques – Entretien avec l’Ambassadeur d’URSS, Berne, le 3 août 1982,’ 4 August 1982, J1.301#2002/197#548*, CH-BAR,  author’s translation from “Remarques, souhaits et propositions de la partie soviétique.” 101 Brunner, ‘Note d’entretien: Internés militaires,’ J1.301#2002/197#548*, CH-BAR.

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In mid-August, therefore, the FDFA, the FDJ and the Federal Military Department relocated the current five Soviet prisoners to the military detention center in Früebüel on the Zugerberg in the canton of Zug. Früebüel was located on the south-western fringe of the Zugerberg, 1000 metres above sea level and with spectacular views of both the nearby Rigi and Pilatus mountains.102 The facility itself consisted of a number of military barracks which served as lodgings, as well as an administrative center and a central farm on which the internees worked during the day.103 During the summer of 1982, seven Swiss military personnel were already interned there for disciplinary reasons. Some had tried to avoid mandatory military service, others had tried to steal military equipment, and some had violated orders whilst on duty.104 According to a 1983 report in the German daily newspaper Die Welt, “The place is teeming with uniforms, camouflage, Jeeps, military trucks, barbed wire and [other] cars.”105 The same article also described a number of ominous warning signs across the Zugerberg plateau, which read, “You are entering territory guarded by the military. If you are ordered to stop moving, STOP immediately and follow the instructions of the troops. If you fail to do so, they will use their firearms.”106 It is unlikely that the barbed wire and the heavy military guard were already in place on the Zugerberg at the time that the first five Soviet prisoners arrived there in the summer of 1982. Judging by the report of the ICRC’s first official visit, “The facilities at the Zugerberg are not enclosed by barriers or walls and public access is possible across the area.”107 This lack of security originally worried the ICRC considerably, both considering Povarnitsin’s various escape 102 Rolf Wespe, Tages-Anzeiger, ‘Rotarmisten auf dem Zugerberg,’ 26 August 1982, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR; Die Welt, ‘Die Russen auf dem Zugerberg und die hohe Politik,’ 9 August 1983, E5001G#1994/118#148*, CH-BAR. 103 ICRC, ‘Rapport de la visite du CICR au center militaire de Zugerberg (Canton de Zoug, Suisse),’ 17 August 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2762*, CH-BAR. 104 Wespe, Tages-Anzeiger, ‘Rotarmisten auf dem Zugerberg,’ J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR; N.a., ‘Internierung sowjetischer Kriegsgefangener in der Schweiz: Beitrag Geschäftsbericht EMD (Entwurf),’ 25 November 1982, E5001G#1994/118#148*, CH-BAR. 105 Die Welt, ‘Die Russen auf dem Zugerberg,’ E5001G#1994/118#148*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from “Es wimmelt dort von Uniformen und Tarnanzügen, von Jeeps und Militärlastwagen, von Stacheldraht und Wagen.” 106 Ibid., author’s translation from, “Sie betreten militärisch bewachtes Gebiet. Auf den ­Aufruf HALT sofort stillstehen und den Weisungen der Truppe nachkommen. Bei ­Missachtung der Warnung macht die Truppe von der Schusswaffe Gebrauch.” 107 ICRC, ‘Rapport de la visite du CICR au center militaire de Zugerberg,’ E2023A#1993 /129#2762*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Le complexe du Zugerberg n’est pas fermé par des barrières ou autres murs d’enceinte et la circulation publique est possible à travers le domaine.”

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attempts, as well as the fact that according to the Third Geneva Convention, prisoners of war were supposed to be shielded from outside scrutiny and intimidation. However, at approximately the same time as the Soviet prisoners arrived on the Zugerberg, the ICRC also received its first opportunity to return to Afghanistan and the security measures on the Zugerberg were not immediately altered. 4 The ICRC Continues to Be Denied Access to the Afghan Interior In August of 1982, the Afghan authorities agreed to allow ICRC delegates to return to the country. Internal memoranda at the FDFA indicate that the first delegation to return arrived in Kabul on 13 August.108 In June of 1982, the ICRC had been preparing the transfer of no less than twenty Soviet soldiers to Switzerland.109 Frustrated by the absence of progress the Afghan side, an ICRC delegation asked to meet with Shah Mohammad Dost, the Afghan foreign minister, who was in Switzerland at the time for the purpose of the UN-mediated talks with Pakistan in Geneva.110 During their meeting on 14 June, Dost appeared to understand the problem of the hold-up, as well as the significance of the prisoner transfer operation more generally and promised to personally take care of the matter upon his return to Kabul.111 One month later, four ICRC delegates, including one physician, received permission to visit Kabul. Their mission was to establish a permanent ICRC presence in the country and to develop their protection and medical assistance programmes for civilians and war victims within Afghanistan. According to ICRC documents held at the Swiss Federal Archives in Berne, the organization’s delegates were received by Foreign Minister Dost himself and received assurances that they could visit all prisoners captured in combat.112 The delegation visited block number one of the Pul-i-Charkhi prison complex and saw a total of 338 prisoners during the initial days of its stay in Kabul.113 On 16 and 108 Evéquoz, ‘Compte rendu de séance,’ E5001G#1994/118#148*, CH-BAR; ICRC Department of Operations, ‘Afghan Conflict Victims Emergency Appeal No 3,’ E2023A#1993/129#1000*, CH-BAR. 109 Evéquoz, ‘Internés militaires soviétiques – Rapport du CICR,’ E2023A#1993/129#2761*, CH-BAR. 110 Ibid. 111 ICRC Department of Operations, ‘Afghan Conflict Victims Emergency Appeal No 3,’ E2023A#1993/129#1000*, CH-BAR. 112 Ibid. 113 N.a., ‘Afghanistan,’ 11 January 1983, E2010–01A#1994/372#42*, CH-BAR.

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17 August, the delegation also inspected three local hospitals in Kabul and further inspections were planned.114 Yet in total, the ICRC mission of 1982 lasted only three months and in early October of 1982, the delegation was again asked to leave.115 Over the course of subsequent discussions with the ICRC and with the Soviet embassy in Berne, the FDFA sought out the reasons for the sudden interruption. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs Raymond Probst maintained that despite being allowed back into Afghanistan, the ICRC had made no progress in transferring the twenty Soviet soldiers that it had known of since June of 1982.116 According to Bernard de Riedmatten of the FDFA’s Directorate for International Organizations, another possible reason might have been that the Soviet Union was simply becoming disinterested in the entire affair. After all, the Soviet government had initially shown interest only when Hezb-i-Islami/ Khalis had captured Mikhail Akhrimov, an industrial consultant back in 1981.117 Not only had the mujahideen not delivered any Soviet civilians since then, they had hardly delivered any soldiers at all. According to David Delapraz of the ICRC, a third possible reason might have been that the Karmal regime had become uneasy about what the ICRC could witness in Afghanistan, both in its prisons and on the battlefield.118 A fourth and final reason for the ICRC’s renewed expulsion from Afghanistan might have been that the Soviet Union was upset about the internment conditions of its prisoners. This particular issue actually formed the major part of a discussion that Secretary of State Raymond Probst had with Anatoliy Adamichin, the head of the Eastern Europe Section at the Soviet Foreign Ministry on 18 October of 1982. The visit itself had been scheduled far in advance on account of a Swiss industry exhibition near Moscow that month. On 8 October, Alexandre Hay, the president of the ICRC, personally asked Probst

114 ICRC, ‘Communiqué de presse no 1449,’ 27 August 1982, E2023A#1993/129#802*, CH-BAR. 115 Edouard Brunner, ‘Correspondence to Ambassadors,’ 19 November 1982, E2210.5#1996 /373#21*, CH-BAR; ICRC Department of Operations, ‘Afghan Conflict Victims Emergency Appeal No 3,’ E2023A#1993/129#1000*, CH-BAR. 116 Raymond Probst, ‘Correspondence to Brunner, Muheim, Riedmatten,’ 20 October 1982, J1.301#2002/197#547*, CH-BAR; Bernard de Riedmatten, ‘Note de dossier: Internés soviétiques: téléphone de M. Jean de Courten du CICR, le 27.10.1982,’ 28 ­October 1982, J1.301#2002/197#548*, CH-BAR; NZZ, ‘Probst zieht Bilanz,’ 23 October 1982, J1.301#2002/197#547*, CH-BAR. 117 Bringolf (sic), ‘Correspondence to De Courten,’ E2200.162A#1994/329#45*, CH-BAR. 118 Paul Wipfli, ‘Correspondence to Jean-Pierre Ritter,’ 19 October 1982, E2200.162A#1994 /329#45*, CH-BAR.

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to intervene with the Soviet authorities on behalf of the ICRC during his visit.119 This became the first time that Switzerland established a direct channel of communication on the subject with the Soviet authorities. It also meant that Switzerland was taking on a mediating role between the ICRC and the Soviet Union for the first time, further deepening its involvement in the Afghan crisis as a provider of good offices. At the outset of their conversation, which was also attended by the Soviet Ambassador to Switzerland, Vladimir Lavrov, Adamichin complained about the internment conditions on the Zugerberg.120 “We are not at all satisfied with the way in which the accords between the ICRC and the USSR have been applied,” he began.121 What was more, “We are not satisfied by the living conditions offered to the Soviet citizens.”122 Referring to Soviet Ambassador Lavrov’s multiple complaints, Adamichin expressed hope that in the future, Switzerland would “show more understanding where our embassy’s suggestions are concerned.”123 Probst agreed with Adamichin that the situation was not ideal, but he ventured that it would be better for the Soviet embassy to communicate its concerns to the FDFA before submitting formal notes of protest, as it had done on numerous occasions in the past.124 “It would be even better if we didn’t have any protests to make in the first place,” Lavrov countered.125 Yet Probst reminded Lavrov and Adamichin that the original accord of 22 January had been concluded without Swiss involvement and that the Swiss were merely enacting its stipulations in “analogy to the Third Geneva Conventions.”126 He then changed the subject and asked directly, why the ICRC had been expelled from Afghanistan for a second time earlier this month.127 The Swiss government, he maintained, had received information from the Soviet embassy in Berne that a certain group of mujahideen had promised to ­liberate 119 Edouard Brunner, ‘Président CICR et Hocke ont informé 8 octobre CFA et Soussigné de ce qui suit,’ 11 October 1982, E2210.5#1996/373#21*, CH-BAR. 120 N.a., ‘Entretiens du 18 octobre 1982 entre M. le Secrétaire d’Etat Probst et M. l’Ambassadeur Adamichine,’ 18 October 1982, J1.301#2002/197#547*, CH-BAR. 121 Ibid., author’s translation from, “Nous ne sommes pas satisfaits non plus de la manière dont les accords entre le CICR et l’URSS sont mis en application.” 122 Ibid., author’s translation from, “Nous ne sommes pas satisfaits des conditions de séjour offertes aux citoyens soviétiques.” 123 Ibid., author’s translation from, “Nous espérons qu’à l’avenir la partie suisse manifestera une plus grande compréhension à l’égard des propositions de notre ambassade.” 124 Ibid. 125 Ibid., author’s translation from, “Il serait plus agréable de ne pas avoir de protestations à formuler.” 126 Ibid., author’s translation from, “par analogie à la 3ème Convention de Genève.” 127 Ibid.

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several Soviet prisoners but had not done so. He also argued that the ICRC could hardly be blamed for this and that it would be a shame for the ICRC’s mission in Afghanistan to come to an end under these conditions. He therefore urged the Soviet Union to exert its influence over the Karmal regime to allow the ICRC to return as a gesture of goodwill.128 “For our part,” Adamichin replied, “we can only attest that the ICRC has not kept its promises and has misrepresented the position of the Afghan government in its communiqué.”129 “There must obviously have been a misunderstanding,” Probst interjected, adding that the ICRC would like to rectify this by meeting with representatives of the Red Cross Society of the Soviet Union.130 To this, one of Adamichin’s aides responded that, “Before we agree to go to Geneva, the ICRC has to make an effort to liberate the […​] Soviet prisoners in question.”131 They should have been transferred in July, while the Soviet side had not only tolerated but extended the ICRC’s mission in Afghanistan. Only once these prisoners had been transferred, he said, would it be conceivable for the ICRC to return to Kabul.132 Adamichin asked Probst to wait for a definitive response to the question of direct talks between the ICRC and the Soviet Red Cross Society. The following morning, he sent word to Probst at an ambassador’s luncheon, that talks could proceed in Geneva, although not necessarily with the Soviet Red Cross alone and “taking into consideration the realization” (sic) of the ICRC’s promises to transfer the remaining prisoners.133 Up until this point, the FDFA had not given much consideration to the fact that the number of prisoners who had been transferred to Switzerland had only been very small and that this might have become a problem for the Soviet authorities. As Probst’s discussions in Moscow showed, however, this did appear to matter. In a documentary aired on ABC News in February of 1983, journalist Ludmilla Thorpe estimated that the resistance held almost 150 prisoners and that the ICRC had received official notification of thirty.134 128 Ibid. 129 Ibid., author’s translation from, “Pour notre part, nous constatons que non seulement le CICR n’a pas tenu ses promesses, mais qu’il a de plus présenté dans un communiqué la position du gouvernement afghan de manière faussé, en rejetant sur ce dernier ses ­propres manquements.” 130 Ibid. 131 Ibid., author’s translation from “Pour que nous nous rendions à Genève, il faut auparavant que le CICR s’engage à libérer les […​] prisonniers soviétiques en question.” 132 Ibid. 133 Ibid.; 24 heures, ‘Raymond Probst rentre de Moscou: On a parlé des soldats russes,’ 23–24 October 1982, J1.301#2002/197#547*, CH-BAR. 134 Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Note de dossier: Prisonniers soviétiques capturés par la résistance afghane – Émission de la chaîne américaine ABC, vendredi 18 février 1983,’ 22 February 1983, E2023A#1993/129#2764*, CH-BAR. Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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What was more, Paul Wipfli, the Swiss ambassador to Islamabad, informed the FDFA in November of 1983 that a substantial number of Soviet deserters were rumoured to have crossed the Afghan border into Pakistan – many of them into Peshawar – without being checked by the Pakistani authorities.135 As many as 200 of them were said to have filtered into a refugee camp at Darrah, near Peshawar, making it appear rather strange in comparison that only five prisoners had so far been transferred to Switzerland.136 The exact numbers of Soviet deserters during the period of occupation remains unknown. While there has been a substantial amount of research into desertion from the Afghan armed forces during this period, Soviet records have yet to be investigated for this purpose.137 According to Anton Minkov and Gregory Smolynec, the desertion rate in the Afghan armed forces reached over twenty percent during the mid-1980s and then eventually stabilized at around ten percent.138 Katya Drozdova and Joseph H. Felter have estimated that by 1989, desertions outweighed combat losses amongst the Afghan armed forces.139 Some have argued that because the Soviet armed forces were largely composed of conscripts, the rate of desertion among Soviet soldiers also increased over time.140 However, this argument has yet to be verified. On account of the relatively small numbers of verifiably reported cases, it is difficult to argue that the Soviet authorities intended to use the prisoner transfer scheme to Switzerland as a method to counteract desertion.141 However, there were concerns among the Swiss authorities that offering asylum to prisoners at the end of their internment would encourage desertion among Soviet soldiers.142 As discussed, those who did desert to the West often received considerable media attention, 135 Paul Wipfli, ‘Correspondence to EDA Direktion für Internationale Organizationen,’ 10 November 1983, E2200.162A#1994/329#45*, CH-BAR; Wipfli’s contacts with the ICRC had also revealed that the Pakistani authorities had interfered in a number of the transfer operations to Switzerland, capturing soldiers of military rank or political significance from the mujahideen and delivering them to the Soviet embassy in Islamabad, from where they were taken directly to the Soviet Union. The reasons for this interference remain unclear and could serve as the subject for further research. 136 Ibid. 137 Katya Drozdova and Joseph H. Felter, ‘Leaving Afghanistan: Enduring Lessons from the Soviet Politburo,’ Journal of Cold War Studies, 21(2019), 49. 138 Anton Minkov and Gregory Smolynec, ‘4-D Soviet Style: Defence, Development, Diplomacy and Disengagement in Afghanistan During the Soviet Period Part I: State Building,’ Journal of Slavic Military Studies 23(2010), 323. 139 Drodzova and Felter, ‘Leaving Afghanistan,’ 49. 140 Baker, War in Afghanistan, 179. 141 Bürgisser, Zala and Fischer, ‘“Always Hit Back Right on the Kisser,”’ 278. 142 Pierre Simonitsch, ‘Das IKRK schweigt wegen der heiklen Lage: Jede Rotkreuz -Stellungnahme könnte das Vertragswerk gefährden,’ Tagesanzeiger, 5 July 1983, Press Collection, CH-SBA. Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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which focused not solely on their negative experiences in the Afghan conflict, but on their negative experiences of the Soviet social and political system as a whole. The relatively small number of Soviet transfers to Switzerland also became an issue for the mujahideen, who became increasingly reluctant to hand over their prisoners to the ICRC. Thus far, they had achieved neither the release of mujahideen prisoners from regime prisons nor ICRC access to Afghanistan as a result of the Soviet prisoner transfer scheme to Switzerland.143 As time progressed, they began to criticize the continued absence of the ICRC from Afghanistan. In February of 1983, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, for instance, announced that he would refrain from transferring any more prisoners to the ICRC until it resumed its activities in the county.144 Likewise, a Reuters Dispatch from 24 January 1984, journalist Tom Heneghan reported that Jam’iyyate-Islami blamed the ICRC itself, arguing that “The Red Cross didn’t keep its part of the deal, so we’re not giving them prisoners anymore.”145 The ICRC managed to negotiate the release of two further prisoners in November of 1982, one more in January of 1983 and another prisoner in ­October of 1983. Rimas Viktorovich Burba and Guernam Vasilievich Anisimov both arrived in Switzerland on 23 November 1982.146 Rimas was the first ranking officer to be transferred to Switzerland and he was also the first to have been released directly by Jam’iyyat-e-Islami commander Ahmad Shah Massoud, who operated from inside of Afghanistan as opposed to from Pakistan.147 Yuriy Ivanovich Vashchenko landed in at Zurich-Kloten airport on 14 January 1983. He was a native of Kansk in Siberia and had been captured by Mahaz-iMilli Islami-yi Afghanistan on 20 November 1982.148 At the time of his release, the ICRC sent word to the FDFA that thirty more Soviet prisoners were ready 143 Tom Heneghan, ‘Reuters Dispatch,’ 24 January 1984, E2023A#1993/129#2766*, CH-BAR. 144 Evéquoz, ‘Note de dossier: Prisonniers soviétiques capturés par la résistance afghane,’ E2023A#1993/129#2764*, CH-BAR. 145 Heneghan, ‘Reuters Dispatch,’ E2023A#1993/129#2766*, CH-BAR; Evéquoz, ‘Note de dossier: Afghanistan – Professeur Rabbani,’ E2023A#1993/129#2764*, CH-BAR. 146 N.a., ‘Personalien der sowjetischen Internierten,’ 14 January 1983, E2023A#1993/129#2764*, CH-BAR. 147 Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Note de dossier: Prochain transfert en Suisse d’un prisonnier soviétique,’ 24 September 1983, J1.301#2002/197#548*, CH-BAR. 148 Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Note de dossier: Internés miliaire soviétiques – Prochain transfert en Suisse, Entretiens avec M. Fournier du CICR, 28 décembre 1982; 3,4 et 5 janvier 1983,’ 5 January 1983, J1.301#2002/197#548*, CH-BAR.

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to be transferred.149 Yet only one more arrived by 1983. His name was Mikhail Nikolayevich Govtva and he too came from Siberia.150 Unlike previous prisoners, he had not been handed over to the ICRC by the mujahideen, but by the Pakistani authorities.151 5 Conclusion: Switzerland Struggled as a Protective Power of Soviet POWs from Afghanistan In total, the number of Soviet prisoners transferred to Switzerland did not exceed eleven. Yet the scheme itself was only terminated in 1986, meaning two years after the impasse of January 1984. This raises a number of questions about the motivations of the different parties to the scheme at that stage. Why did select groups of mujahideen continue to supply prisoners to the transfer scheme despite the inability of the ICRC to access Afghan territory on a permanent basis? Why did the ICRC and the Swiss government persist in their efforts to maintain the scheme despite the lack of cooperation from the Soviet and Afghan authorities and why were the latter not allowing the ICRC back into Afghanistan despite its best efforts to uphold its obligations to the memorandum of understanding with the ICRC from 22 January 1982? Lastly, what role did the Pakistani authorities play in encouraging or discouraging the mujahideen from partaking in the transfer scheme? At first glance, it may appear as though the ICRC was naïve to believe that the transfer mechanism would allow its delegates to return to Afghanistan despite the absence of formal guarantees from the Soviet and Afghan authorities. What was more, the mujahideen were anything but a united front and negotiating the release of mujahideen prisoners required the cultivation of steady contacts to multiple resistance groups, whose strategic aims were not always aligned. Why, therefore, should they coalesce around the ICRC’s attempt to return to Afghanistan? It may also appear as though the motivations of the Swiss authorities to partake in the scheme did not extend beyond trying to show relevance internationally without pro-actively becoming involved in the 149 Ibid. 150 Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Note de dossier: Internés miliaire soviétiques – Nouveau transfert en Suisse d’un soldat soviétique capturé en Afghanistan,’ 25 October 1983, J1.301#2002 /197#548*, CH-BAR. 151 Ibid.

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conflict or taking sides among the conflict parties. This could explain why the Swiss authorities only sought direct contact to the Soviet authorities when asked to do so by the ICRC. In practical terms, the scheme’s odds of success were slim from the start and began to decline shortly thereafter. However, at a deeper level, it allowed both the ICRC and the Swiss government not only to work in close cooperation with each other, but to demonstrate their commitments to both neutrality and solidarity against the odds in the context of armed combat. The parties to the scheme selected Switzerland primarily on account of its neutrality and they selected the ICRC on account of its ability to negotiate at the inter-state level despite being a non-governmental organization itself. This attribute in turn rested on the ICRC’s ingrained commitment to operating in areas of armed conflict only with the consent of the host government and on its demonstrated commitment to international humanitarian law. Over the course of the first two years of the prisoner transfer scheme, the ICRC did receive criticism for its slow progress and the Swiss authorities did receive criticism for harbouring Soviet prisoners of war on Swiss territory. As the following chapter will show, the level of criticism increased exponentially as the time approached for the first Soviet prisoners to return to the Soviet Union. The challenge for both the Swiss government and the ICRC then became to demonstrate neutrality not only under international law, which regulated the rights of the Soviet POWs, but in the moral contest between the two social and political systems across the Cold War divide between East and West.

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Chapter 5

The Repatriation of Soviet POWs and the Return of the ICRC to Afghanistan, 1986–1987 Already during the fall and winter of 1982, the mainstream Swiss press began to pick up on the practical and the ethical dilemmas underlying the prisoner transfer scheme. Would the Soviet prisoners agree to be repatriated at the end of their two-year internment period as they had indicated they would in the beginning? How could the ICRC and the Swiss authorities verify, whether or not their consent to repatriate was freely given? What would happen to those who repatriated? What would happen to those who did not? How would the press and the public interpret their choices in light not of the hard, but the soft power contest for appeal between the social, political and economic systems of East and West? When would the ICRC be allowed to return to Afghanistan to provide humanitarian aid? And how far would the Swiss authorities be able to go in order to demonstrate their solidarity with the ICRC while remaining permanently neutral? The increasingly public debate on these questions led to a parliamentary hearing of FDFA Secretary of State Raymond Probst on 22 November 1982. Yet the issues underlying the hearing itself remained unresolved until the prisoner transfer scheme was discontinued in 1986. Three main themes dominated the discussion as early as 1982. The first concerned the internment conditions on the Zugerberg. The second related to the secrecy of the transfer operation, and the third was about the conditions of the prisoners’ repatriation. A common denominator to all three themes was that there was no enforcement mechanism to ensure either the return of the ICRC to Afghanistan, the participation of the mujahideen and their Soviet prisoners in the scheme, or the safety of the Soviet prisoners upon repatriation to the Soviet Union. Moreover, according to Maya Jurt of the conservative weekly Weltwoche, “All parties to the agreement turned a blind eye to some aspects and showed no interest in being informed about all of the details.”1 The Soviets seemingly did not want to know the role that Pakistan was playing in the handover of the prisoners of war, while the Afghans profited from the propaganda opportunity and 1 Maya Jurt, Weltwoche, ‘Sorgenkinder,’ 29 Dezember 1982, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Dass alle Vertragsparteien ihre Augen zudrücken und kein ­Interesse zeigen, über alle Details genau informiert zu werden.” © Liliane Stadler, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004690660_007 Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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did not want to know how the prisoners were being interned in Switzerland.2 Finally, the ICRC did not appear to be interested in the pranks played by the internees on their Swiss wards.3 These, as the journal ZeitBild (sic) reported, had become increasingly serious on the Zugerberg and included the theft of a motorbike, unwarranted and unsupervised disappearances and excessive consumption of alcohol, in addition to at least two more escape attempts on the part of Yuriy Povarnitsin.4 Individually, these flaws in the arrangement may have appeared minor. However, collectively, they began to call into question the feasibility of the arrangement, the degree of control that the Swiss government and the ICRC had over the scheme, their respective abilities to remain neutral toward the conflict parties, as well as the compatibility of the scheme with their respective humanitarian principles. Rather than demonstrating the compatibility of neutrality and solidarity in Swiss foreign policy and instead of serving as an example of successful cooperation between the Swiss government and the ICRC in the domain of humanitarian diplomacy, the scheme ultimately re-kindled elements of a larger, persistent debate in Swiss foreign policy about Switzerland’s role as a small, neutral state at the end of the Cold War. 1

The Public Debate on the Morality of the Prisoner Transfer Scheme

According to National Councillor Peter Sager, one of the editors of the journal ZeitBild, there were several issues, which appeared to suggest that the architecture of the scheme was tilted in favour of the Soviet Union. First of all, the prisoners were not simply interned in Switzerland but were virtually kept in conditions of solitary confinement.5 Apart from the Swiss authorities and the ICRC, only the Soviet embassy had been able to visit the prisoners and journalists were strictly barred from doing so. Sager did concede that Article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention required prisoners of war to be sheltered from public scrutiny, but in this particular case, he claimed that the effect was one of intimidation, rather than protection.6 Second, he was aware that these 2 Ibid. 3 Ibid., author’s translation from, “Das IKRK zeigt überhaupt kein Interesse über die Kapricen und Streiche der unbändigen Sieben informiert zu werden.” 4 ZeitBild, ‘Die Verlautbarung des EDA,’ 29 December 1982, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR. 5 Peter Sager, ‘Correspondence to Raymond Probst,’ 22 December 1982, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR. 6 Ibid., N.a., ‘Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War,’ https://www .refworld.org/docid/3ae6b36c8.html, Art. 13.

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conditions had been arranged such as to increase the likelihood of the ICRC’s return to Afghanistan. Seeing as the ICRC had been expelled from that country again on 7 October, however, he thought the entire arrangement was nothing short of “Soviet extortion.”7 After all, “even if the Soviet Union pretends not to be at war in Afghanistan, it is without any doubt still obligated to grant the ICRC access to its prisoners,” no conditions attached.8 Lastly, prisoners who did not agree to be repatriated to the Soviet Union after two years were not permitted to partake in the transfer scheme in the first place.9 As discussed, the issue with this was that many POWs feared repatriation for one of two reasons. First, deserters were known to be historically mistreated in the Soviet Union and second, prisoners of war were inherently difficult to distinguish from deserters. Repatriation, some feared, could mean yet more imprisonment or worse for Soviet POWs, because they were virtually indistinguishable from deserters.10 Yuriy Povarnitsin, one of the earliest transferees to Switzerland, confirmed this himself in a consequential interview that he gave to Radio Free Kabul before his transfer in early 1982. Radio Free Kabul was a radio station run by the so-called Committee for Human Rights that included writers such as Vladimir Boukovsky, Marek Halter and the controversial French public intellectual Bernard-Henri Lévy.11 “On my return,” Povarnitsin said, “the government in Moscow will convene a tribunal and they will decide whether to put me in prison or in front of a firing squad.”12 In the same interview, he also made serious allegations against the Soviet government on account of its interference in Afghanistan. “They told us we were being sent to Afghanistan to fight the Chinese and the Americans, but since coming here, I have not seen a single Chinese or American soldier.”13 These allegations were widely publicized in the

7 8

Peter Sager, ‘Correspondence to Raymond Probst,’ J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR. Ibid., author’s translation from, “Die Sowjetunion ist auch dann, wenn sie keinen Krieg zu führen vorgibt, zweifellos verpflichtet, dem IKRK Zugang zu Lagern von Gefangenen, die im Rahmen militärischer Feindseligkeiten gemacht worden sind, zu gewähren.” 9 ZeitBild, ‘Die Verlautbarung des EDA,’ J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR. 10 Ibid. 11 Vincent Philippe, 24 heures, ‘Détenu soviétique en Suisse dénonce la guerre en Afghanistan: “Entre la mort et la prison,”’ 21/22 August 1982, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR. 12 Ibid., author’s translation from, “A mon retour, le gouvernement de Moscou convoquera un tribunal et ils décideront s’il faut me mettre en prison ou me fusiller.” 13 Ibid., author’s translation from “Ils nous ont dit que nous étions envoyés pour défendre l’Afghanistan contre les Chinois et les Américains, mais depuis que j’y suis, je n’ai pas vu un seul, ni un soldat chinois ni un soldat américain.”

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Swiss press during the summer of 1982, causing many to worry for Povarnitsin’s safety upon his repatriation to the Soviet Union.14 Ambassador Lavrov lodged another angry protest with the FDFA when the interview was published in the daily 24 heures in August of 1982.15 Yet the ICRC and the FDFA were arguably concerned about the effect that media such as ZeitBild and Radio Free Kabul had on the POWs themselves. According to ­Jean-Pierre Hocké of the ICRC, the real purpose of Radio Free Kabul was to encourage desertion amongst Soviet soldiers in the first place.16 Should their narrative take hold, it would raise the question of whether the prisoners on the Zugerberg themselves were deserters, as opposed to genuine POWs and this would pose yet one more substantial risk to the ICRC’s transfer mission. By this point, the Swiss media also began to turn on the moral integrity of the ICRC. On 10 November, Bernard-Henri Lévy launched a furious critique of the ICRC’s handling of the operation in his column for the French daily Le Matin. According to Lévy’s account, he had been solicited to work for the organization in 1981, while working on a project to set up a Russian-language radio broadcasting station in Pakistan together with his two collaborators, Marek Halter and Renzo Rossellini.17 Lévy claimed that as they were working on their project, they were approached by an employee of the ICRC, who asked them to negotiate the release of Soviet prisoners of war held in captivity among Afghan resistance fighters.18 He had allegedly agreed to do so under the condition that if transferred to Switzerland, the Soviet soldiers would be accorded the rights of POWs as contained in the Third Geneva Convention. In his column, Lévy not only broke the silence he had committed himself to in allegedly negotiating on behalf of the ICRC, but he accused both the ICRC and the Swiss government of directly violating the Third Geneva Convention through their treatment of the Soviet POWs on the Zugerberg.

14 15 16 17 18

NZZ, ‘Die Komplexität eines Guten Dienstes (Canton de Zoug, Suisse),’ 8 September 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2762*, CH-BAR. Paul Widmer, ‘Stichwortartige Aufzeichnung: Gefangenenaustausch und Probleme mit Internierten; Unterredung mit dem sowjetischen Botschafter Lavrov, Bern den 24. August 1982,’ 25 August 1982, J1.301#2002/197#548*, CH-BAR. N.a., ‘Note de dossier: Intenés militaires soviétiques – Offensive des “Comités RadioKaboul libre,”’ 2 September 1982, E2023A#1993/129#2762*, CH-BAR. Bernard-Henri Lévy, Le Matin, ‘Scandale à la Croix-Rouge?,’ 10 November 1982, E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR. NZZ, ‘Die internierten Rotarmisten in der Schweiz,’ 11 November 1982, E2850.1#1991/234 #173*, CH-BAR; Vincent Philippe, 24 heures, ‘Prisonniers Soviétiques: Les Français s’en mêlent – Bernard-Henri Lévy veut voir Youri,’ 11 November 1982, E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR.

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Why, Lévy asked, had the presence of the Soviet prisoners in Switzerland originally been kept so secret from the public? Was it normal that no foreign journalists were allowed to meet them? Like Sager, Lévy criticized that the only visitors who had been permitted to see them had been diplomats from the Soviet embassy in Berne. In fact, British archival documents suggest that a member of the Soviet Embassy in Berne visited them every single day.19 This, he argued, constituted a “flagrant violation” of article 13 of the Third Geneva Convention, which prohibited any form of intimidation.20 Referring to the 22 January agreement between the ICRC and the Soviet Union, Lévy accused the ICRC of having signed “an occult accord with the Kremlin,” whose alleged condition that the prisoners would be repatriated after a span of two years amounted to a “visa for immediate deportation.”21 In the case of Povarnitsin, he even warned that it would be “quite simply a death sentence.”22 In a letter to the editors of Le Matin, the ICRC took a stance on Lévy’s accusations on 16 November. The Swiss and the Soviet governments did not comment. To begin with, Michel Mercier, the head of the ICRC’s public relations division, dismissed the notion that Lévy had been in any way involved in negotiating the release of Soviet prisoners of war from captivity.23 According to Mercier, it had been Lévy who had contacted the ICRC in Peshawar during the previous summer, not the other way around. At a meeting with ICRC delegates, there had been a general exchange of information but nothing had been either offered to Lévy or asked of him.24 As to the Soviet prisoners who had been transferred to Switzerland since then, Mercier argued that they had been informed of their right to freely choose whether or not to subject themselves to this transfer as soon as they had been released from custody by the mujahideen. Mercier stressed that, on principle, the ICRC did not act against the stated intent of those it sought to assist. Each step of the procedure concerning their internment in Switzerland had therefore been clearly explained to each of the prisoners who had taken up the offer. As part of their interment on the Zugerberg, they also received regular visits from delegates of the ICRC, which were not in contradiction of, but modelled on the Third Geneva Convention. Lastly, while Mercier conceded that Article 13 of the convention prohibited any form of intimidation toward POWs, the same article also entitled them to 19 B.D. Adams, ‘ICRC/ Afghanistan,’ 9 August 1983, FCO 37/3070, UK-TNA. 20 Lévy, ‘Scandale à la Croix-Rouge?,’ E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR. 21 Ibid. 22 Ibid. 23 Michele Mercier, ‘Message to Le Matin de Paris from the International Committee of the Red Cross,’ 16 November 1982, E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR. 24 Ibid.

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­ rotection against public curiosity. Should the editors of Le Matin therefore p wish to contribute in any way to the safety and well-being of the current and future Soviet POWs in Switzerland, he argued, it was essential that they avoid further “allegations and pseudo-scandals.”25 Unfortunately for Mercier and for the ICRC, however, the Swiss parliament did not think of what had transpired as a “pseudo-scandal” and on 22 ­November, Secretary of State Raymond Probst was called to testify before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly. This was an important moment for the prisoner transfer operation. Not only did parliament initiate a degree of oversight, but for the first time, the Federal Department of Foreign Affairs was forced to confront those issues that had been neglected since the beginning of the operation. National Councillor Rudolf Friedrich, the Future Federal Councillor and Head of the (FDJ), was one of the first to engage with Probst on the subject. He began the proceedings by clarifying that he had not asked Probst to testify, because he was against the operation, but because it had been heavily criticized in the press.26 He had gathered that the ICRC had wanted to gain access to prisons in Afghanistan by offering the extraction of Soviet POWs and their transfer to Switzerland. Yet what one continued to hear was that the former part of the operation had failed. “Is that so?” he asked.27 National Councillor Georg Stucky seconded that he had heard from the warden of the detention facility on the Zugerberg that he himself was still unclear about the legal status of the Soviet inmates. He had never actually received any detailed instructions from the Swiss authorities.28 Turning first to Friedrich and then to Stucky, Probst acknowledged the principal shortcomings of the arrangement. First of all, there was no guarantee that the ICRC would be allowed back into Afghanistan.29 Second, there were  no assurances as to the treatment of the prisoners upon repatriation. “We are fully aware of the risk that [they] are taking,” he conceded.30 Yet at the same time, Probst acknowledged, “We cannot declare now that we will grant political asylum to the prisoners who are here, because if we do, that would prevent

25 26 27 28 29 30

Ibid. N.a., ‘Nationalrat: Kommission für auswärtige Angelegenheiten, Protokoll der Sitzung vom 22 November 1982, 9:30–13:45 Uhr in Bern, Parlamentsgebäude, Zimmer 3,’ ­December 1982, E2850.1#1991/234#173*, CH-BAR. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid. Ibid., author’s translation from “Wir sind uns des Risikos der Internierten voll bewusst.”

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the ICRC from ever returning to Kabul.”31 The daily Tages-Anzeiger speculated that allowing the prisoners to stay in Switzerland might be interpreted as a quasi-invitation to desert the Soviet armed forces.32 By November of 1982, therefore, an arrangement that had originally begun with genuine concern for the humanitarian situation within Afghanistan, had evolved into a public discussion on whether or not the ICRC and the Swiss government were upholding their commitments to remain neutral and whether they were in the process of violating their own humanitarian principles. Paradoxically, the arrangement had originally proceeded in loose “analogy” to the Third Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War. Yet it now turned out that the repatriation of the prisoners potentially threatened the well-being especially of those prisoners, who had voiced themselves critically of the Soviet Union in public. Public scrutiny of both the ICRC and the FDFA in this regard, as well as the fact that the ICRC continued to be denied access to Afghan territory for humanitarian purposes ultimately compounded in a public debate that threatened to derail the entire scheme. The public debate was by no means exhaustive and there were also a number of issues that remained conspicuously absent. For instance, it may appear ironic that the press and the informed public accused the Swiss government of mistreatment compared to the internment conditions for Soviet POWs amongst the mujahideen. Most captured Soviet soldiers captured by the mujahideen were executed. Yet the point that the transfer to Switzerland likely saved lives also found less resonance in public discourse as time progressed. Another issue that remained absent from public discussion was the issue of war crimes. At no point did the public discourse on the Soviet POWs raise the question of whether or not any of the transferees had been involved in the perpetuation of war crimes in Afghanistan. Lastly, the discourse revolved exclusively around the Soviet soldiers, who were transferred to Switzerland. The fate of the Soviet land mine specialist Mikhail Akhrimov, for instance, remained unknown, as he was never transferred to Switzerland. Likewise, the fates of those Soviet soldiers who declined to take part in the transfer scheme remained an unknown.

31 32

Ibid., author’s translation from “Wir können jetzt nicht offiziell erklären, wir würden den Kriegsgefangengen Asyl gewähren, weil sonst das IKRK keine Möglickheit mehr hätte, nach Kabul zurückzukehren.” Pierre Simonitsch, ‘Das IKRK schweigt wegen der heiklen Lage: Jede RotkreuzStellungnahme könnte das Vertragswerk gefährden,’ Tages-Anzeiger, 5 July 1983, Press ­Collection, CH-SBA.

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2 Negotiations Resume between the ICRC, the Soviet Union and the FDFA In the meantime, the ICRC and the Swiss government resolved to hold a series of discussions with the Soviet Union, as agreed in Moscow in October 1982. Originally, talks between a Soviet consular delegation and the ICRC resumed without the Swiss authorities, taking place in Geneva from 6–19 February 1983.33 Yet these discussions achieved little. According to ICRC records held at the Swiss Federal Archives in Berne, the communication between the FDFA and the Soviet Union constituted a major stumbling block, as had the conditions of the prisoners’ internment, of which the Soviet Union had not approved. These two points formed the basis of the discussions that were held during this time.34 The issues debated in the Swiss press and in parliamentary committees were almost completely left out. What was more, while the ICRC rejected Soviet demands to station their own personnel on the Zugerberg, it did not challenge the arrangement that the prisoners were to be repatriated to the Soviet Union after two years.35 This eventually became a problem, as several prisoners refused to return home once their two years elapsed. Following a first round of discussions in Geneva in February, an ICRC delegation headed to Moscow for a second round on 14 March.36 Amongst this delegation were Jean de Courten, the ICRC’s lead delegate for Asia and the Far East, as well as François Zen Ruffinen, the head of the ICRC’s delegation that had visited Kabul in 1982.37 There was scarce progress in Moscow, as Soviet diplomats insisted that only the Afghan authorities could decide on whether or not to permit the return of the ICRC. Changing gear, they then claimed to know that the ICRC had received reports of thirteen more Soviet prisoners in January and demanded that they be transferred to Switzerland immediately.38 De Courten and Zen Ruffinen, on the other hand, maintained that they stood

33

Rossier, ‘Kurzbericht über die sowjetischen Kriegsgefangenen in der Schweiz,’ E2023A# 1993/129#2764*, CH-BAR. 34 N.a., ‘Projet aide-mémoire à remettre aux autorités soviétiques,’ n.d., E2023A#1993 /129#2764*, CH-BAR. 35 Ibid. 36 Edouard Brunner, ‘Note d’entretien: Internés militaires soviétiques – Entretien avec MM. De Courten et Zen Ruffinen, du CICR, Berne, jeudi 3 mars 1983,’ 14 March 1983, E2023A# 1993/129#2764*, CH-BAR. 37 Ibid. 38 Ibid.

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little chance of receiving any further prisoners from the mujahideen unless the ICRC be readmitted to Afghanistan first.39 Both sides eventually agreed to postpone their negotiations and to include the Swiss authorities in their further deliberations. On 3 May 1983, a Soviet delegation led by Ambassador Lavrov and composed of representatives from the Soviet Foreign Ministry, the armed forces and of the Soviet Red Cross, arrived in Geneva, where tripartite talks resumed at the ICRC headquarters.40 The Soviet delegation began by presenting another catalogue of 28 demands concerning the conditions of internment on the Zugerberg.41 These demands – not the issues discussed in Moscow in March – then formed the basis of the discussions with the Swiss authorities. The Swiss declared themselves willing to make certain adjustments to these conditions, but not to adopt all of the 28 Soviet demands, some of which contradicted the initial agreement between the ICRC and the Soviet Union.42 For instance, they agreed to arrange daily telephone calls and to allow Soviet embassy staff to show the internees Soviet film material as per one of their 28 requests.43 However, they refused to allow the embassy to station staff permanently on the Zugerberg and – more importantly – they refused Soviet demands that all prisoners be repatriated at the end of their internment, as it would violate the principle of free choice to deny the prisoners the opportunity to change their minds on whether or not to return to the Soviet Union. This was another important moment for the prisoner transfer scheme, which revealed how the scheme itself, though conducted by two neutral entities – the Swiss government and the ICRC – was connected to the larger Cold War competition between systems. Despite the fact that the ongoing negotiations mostly concerned logistical technicalities, it became clear that the parties to the scheme had very different views on the principle of free choice. For the Soviet Union, repatriation remained a necessary and inviolable condition for each prisoner transfer. For the ICRC and the Swiss authorities, it was more important to know that each prisoner consented to this condition voluntarily. As such, they also recognized that some of the prisoners might change their minds and that this might have direct implications for all parties. For the ICRC, it had the potential to jeopardize the return to Afghanistan. For 39 40

Ibid. Pierre Aubert, ‘Gespräche mit einer sowjetischen Delegation über die internierten ­sowjetischen Soldaten,’ 30 May 1983, E5001G#1994/118#148*, CH-BAR. 41 Ibid. 42 Ibid. 43 N.a., ‘Note d’information,’ 13 October 1983, E2023A#1993/129#2766*, CH-BAR.

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the Swiss authorities, it could mean that the prisoners would become asylum seekers, and this might have political implications for Switzerland’s bilateral relations to the Soviet Union. Lastly, for the Soviet Union, it would reflect negatively on the ongoing military campaign in Afghanistan, on life in the Soviet Union, as well as on the Soviet political system. Given these circumstances, the ICRC and the FDFA feared that the Soviet Union primarily wanted its own personnel on site at the Zugerberg to inform on the prisoners and to pressure them to return home. In fact, British archival sources reveal that one of the prisoners themselves already acted as an informant for the Soviet embassy in Berne.44 Talks broke down anew on 26 May, leaving the future of the arrangement uncertain.45 3

The Escape of a Soviet POW to the Federal Republic of Germany

To compound matters still further, on 8 July, two weeks after talks broke down, one of the Soviet prisoners escaped from the Zugerberg, plunging the already problematic transfer scheme into its most acute crisis to date. Each Friday, the prisoners had been allowed an informal outing to the nearby town of Zug, where they could spend their earnings from work at the camp on a bit of shopping. On 8 July, four of the Soviet prisoners were taken into Zug by six guards in plain clothes. At the local COOP, a standard-sized supermarket, Yuriy Vashchenko asked permission to use the facilities as a pretext to escape into the crowd.46 His guards immediately alerted the cantonal police and the Federal Military Department (FMD), which notified the Swiss border patrol. The only problem was that out of all the internees currently on the Zugerberg, Vashchenko was the only one of whom the authorities did not have a photograph.47 Roger Bär, from the Swiss embassy in Bonn, subsequently reconstructed Vashchenko’s escape in a diplomatic cable dated 18 July. According to Bär, Vashchenko crossed the border to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 44 45 46

47

C. W. Long, ‘Correspondence to H.E. Mr Adams: ICRC and Afghan Problems,’ 26 October 1983, FCO 37/3070, UK-TNA. Edouard Brunner, ‘Internés militaires soviétiques,’ 27 May 1983, J1.301#2002/197#548*, CH-BAR. Adrien Evéquoz, ‘Note de Dossier: Internés soviétiques – Disparition de Iouri Vachtchenko,’ 11 July 1983, E2023A#1993/129#2765*, CH-BAR; Edouard Brunner, ‘Note de dossier: Internés militaires soviétiques/ Vachtchenko/ Entrevue avec l’Ambassadeur d’URSS, Mercredi 27 juillet 1983,’ 28 July 1983, E2023A#1993/129#2765*, CH-BAR. Evéquoz, ‘Note de Dossier: Internés soviétiques – Disparition de Iouri Vachtchenko,’ E2023A#1993/129#2765*, CH-BAR.

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sometime between 8 and 9 July. From there, he hitchhiked to Freiburg im Breisgau, where he arrived on 9 July. The following day, a Taxi driver dropped him off at a local police station, from where he was transferred to the Department for Immigration in Karlsruhe. On 11 or 12 July, Vashchenko formally applied for asylum in the FRG. In an interview with the German magazine Die Bunte in S­ eptember of 1983, he gave two reasons for his escape and for applying for asylum. First, because the FRG was geographically close and second, because unlike the Swiss “they don’t collude with the Soviets.”48 He also made it known that “I am not ashamed to be Russian. I am ashamed for my political leadership.”49 Apparently, throughout his internment in Switzerland, he had received visits from high-ranking officials at the Soviet embassy, who had ­lectured to him about Soviet politics and pressured him to return home. “Everything they said and wrote was a lie,” he told Die Bunte, much like Povarnitsin had told Radio Free Kabul before leaving Pakistan.50 The cases of both Povarnitsin and Vashchenko showed that desertion was a genuine issue for the prisoner transfer scheme. They also prominently displayed these prisoners’ distrust of their own government. Markus Zemp, one of the FDFA’s Russian translators on the Zugerberg, wrote in one of his reports on the situation that the only internee who had ever spoken positively about the prospect of repatriation to the Soviet Union was Viktor Sintschuk. Hasan Agadzhanov had occasionally mentioned it in connection with work and said that he hoped to resume his post as an overseer on frozen goods transports after going back.51 Rimas Burba was apparently conflicted about wanting to see his parents again but feared what might happen if he did.52 Zemp reported to the FDFA in mid-August of 1983 that Victor Sintchuck had made up his mind not to return to the Soviet Union. If forced to return, he threatened to escape to the FRG or Canada like Vashchenko.53 Curiously, Yuriy Povarnitsin was one of the few who indicated that he might eventually return to the Soviet Union.

48 49 50 51 52 53

Die Bunte, ‘Ein Russe packt aus,’ 15 September 1983, J1.301#2002/197#549*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from “Deutschland steckt nicht mit den Sowjets unter einer Decke.” Ibid., author’s translation from, “Ich schäme mich nicht, ein Russe zu sein. Ich schäme mich für meine politische Führung.” Ibid., author’s translation from, “Alles, was sie sagten und schrieben, war eine Lüge.” Markus Zemp, ‘Bericht von Markus Zemp, Dolmetscher “Campo,”’ 5 August 1983, E2023A#1993/129#2765*, CH-BAR. Markus Zemp, ‘2. Bericht von Markus Zemp, Dolmetscher Campo2 (sic),’ 16 August 1983, E2023A#1993/129#2765*, CH-BAR. Ibid.

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It would be stupid, he argued, to want to stay in “free” Switzerland, seeing as he had only ever seen its “fences and barbed wire.”54 Linda Howard, the FDFA’s original translator, who had stayed with the Soviet prisoners since their days at St. Jean, wrote to the FDFA in February of 1984 that none of the remaining prisoners wanted to guarantee to the Soviet embassy that they were willing to return home after two years.55 According to Markus Zemp, they generally appeared to be afraid of the embassy officials who paid them regular visits.56 They had repeatedly asked him about whether he reported their misdeeds to the embassy and apparently they were well aware of the fact that the Soviet government had committed itself to pay the expenses related to their internment.57 On more than one occasion, they told Zemp that they were glad that the Soviet embassy was not allowed to station any embassy officials on the Zugerberg, because it would have meant that they would lose the last of their privacy.58 On 12 March 1984, with the two-year internment of the first three prisoners coming to an end in May, the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament, once more took up the subject of repatriation. In his response to a series of questions from National Councillor Jean Clivaz of the Social Democratic Party, Federal Councillor Pierre Aubert announced that in theory, the plan was still for the original three prisoners to return to the Soviet Union on 27 May.59 Aubert also reminded Clivaz that Didienko, Povarnitsin and Sinchuk had each told the ICRC of their consent to repatriation prior to coming to Switzerland.60 Yet instead of following up with a guarantee to this effect to the Soviet Union, Aubert definitively departed from the original arrangement between the ICRC and the Soviet Union of 22 January 1982. He announced that: If, at the end of their internment, any of the internees express their desire not to go back, to stay in Switzerland or to go to a different country, that

54

Ibid., author’s translation from, “Es sei dumm zu glauben, er wolle in der freien Schweiz bleiben, da er bis jetzt nur Gitterstäbe und Stacheldraht gesehen habe.” 55 Linda Howard, ‘Correspondence to Adrien Evéquoz,’ 1 February 1984, E2023A#1993 /129#2766*, CH-BAR. 56 Zemp, ‘2. Bericht von Markus Zemp,’ E2023A#1993/129#2765*, CH-BAR. 57 Ibid. 58 Ibid. 59 N.a., ‘Antwort von Bundesrat P. Aubert vom 12. März auf die parlamentarische Anfrage Clivaz,’ 27 April 1984, E2023A#1993/129#2766*, CH-BAR. 60 Ibid.

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will, freely expressed, will be respected. We will force none of them to return to their home country against their will.61 The public debate on repatriation dwindled down after that. Yet, over time, the substantial majority of prisoners actually chose to return to the Soviet Union. Three weeks prior to 27 May, the FDFA formally invited the three original Soviet POWs, Didienko, Povarnitsin and Sinchuk, to re-state their intentions with regards to repatriation. Didienko decided to return home, while Povarnitsin and Sinchuk chose to stay and these decisions were relayed to the ICRC.62 Both Povarnitsin and Sinchuk also had to re-state their intentions to a representative of the Soviet embassy, after which the FDFA transferred them to a secret location outside of the reach of the Soviet authorities.63 Didienko was driven to Zurich-Kloten airport on 27 May, where he boarded an Aeroflot flight to Moscow in the presence of the FDFA, the ICRC and officials from the Soviet embassy.64 Being the first to repatriate to the Soviet Union, Didienko initially maintained regular correspondence with his former translators from the Zugerberg. He returned to his native Ukraine, where he first stayed with his parents in Zaporoshie and then settled in Kiev where he resumed work as a crane operator on various construction sites.65 Sintchouk and Povarnitsin both tried to settle in Switzerland, but they both encountered difficulties initially. Sintchouk briefly settled in Aesch, a German-speaking village close to the border-town of Basel, where he took up employment as an agricultural laborer on the farm of Andreas Koellreuter.66 According to Koellreuter, the authorities swore him to secrecy about Sintchouk’s true identity and he therefore told his staff that Sintchouk was a seasonal laborer from Poland. Surprisingly, however, shortly after Sintchouk’s arrival, the wife of one of his employees asked to see him in confidence and told him she knew who Sintchouk really was. Two years ago, 61

Ibid., author’s translation from, “Je voudrais redire ici très clairement ce qui suit: si l’un ou l’autre des internés devait à l’échéance exprimer le désir de ne pas rentrer, de rester en Suisse ou de gagner un autre pays, sa volonté librement exprimée serait respectée.” 62 Jacques de Watteville, ‘Sort des soldats soviétiques ayant terminé leur période d’internement en Suisse,’ 20 January 1986, E4280A#2017/355#1059*, CH-BAR. 63 Ibid. 64 Ibid. 65 N.a., ‘Afghanistan ist nicht vergessen: Wie Walerij versucht , so zu leben wie alle,’ 2 November 1990, E2200.157–04#2000/409#53*, CH-BAR; ICRC archival documents diverge on this point. To verify the records of the ICRC, it is necessary to submit a FOIA request citing Article 7 of the Rules governing access to the Archives of the International Committee of the Red Cross, adopted on 2 March 2017. 66 Andreas Koellreuter, interviewed by Liliane Stadler, 17 December 2018.

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she had been on a camping holiday in Erlach near Gals with her family and had seen Sintchouk’s and Povarnitsin’s break-out of the correctional facility at St. Jean. Fortunately for both Koellreuter and Sintchouk, she agreed to keep their secret for the sake of Sintchouk’s safety.67 Then, to Koellreuter’s surprize, one day, Sintchouk simply disappeared. Records at the Swiss Federal Archives located him in Australia several years later.68 Povarnitsin, on the other hand, applied for political asylum in Switzerland. His application was originally rejected but was eventually successful upon appeal and he settled in the region of Lake Geneva. In December of 1985, he moved to Bovy near Chexbres, where he began to work as an agricultural technician.69 4

The Remaining POWs Return to the Soviet Union

Without exception, all the remaining Soviet prisoners eventually returned to the Soviet Union, undergoing the same procedure as Povarnitsin, Sintchouk and Didienko prior to their departure. Hasan Agadzhanov was released in August of 1984, as was Viktor Sapozhnikov. According to information that the FDFA continued to receive from the Soviet embassy in Berne, Agadzhanov returned to his native Azerbaijan, while Sapozhnikov went home to his native Ural region in Russia. Rimas Burba settled with his parents in Lithuania in November of 1984 and remained in touch with Markus Zemp via regular telephone calls thereafter. Guernam Anisimov returned to Kujbychev that same month. Mikhail Govtva went home to his parents in Leningrad in December of 1985, having first undergone a debriefing in Moscow and another at Tashkent.70 Even Yuriy Vashchenko returned to the Soviet Union, after having originally applied for political asylum in Germany. He eventually settled in Sverdlovsk.71 The last Soviet prisoner of war left Switzerland on 26 March 1986. The FDFA speculated in its concluding report on the prisoner transfer scheme that their voluntary repatriation ultimately worked in favour of the

67 68 69 70 71

Ibid. N.a., ‘Afghanistan ist nicht vergessen,’ E2200.157–04#2000/409#53*, CH-BAR. De Watteville, ‘Sort des soldats soviétiques ayant terminé leur période d’internement en Suisse,’ E4280A#2017/355#1059*, CH-BAR; N.a., ‘Pressemitteilung: Asylentscheid im Fall Povarnitsin,’ 25 May 1986, E4280A#2017/355#1059*, CH-BAR. De Watteville, ‘Sort des soldats soviétiques ayant terminé leur période d’internement en Suisse,’ E4280A#2017/355#1059*, CH-BAR. N.a., ‘Afghanistan ist nicht vergessen,’ E2200.157–04#2000/409#53*, CH-BAR.

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ICRC’s recurrent attempts to return to Afghanistan.72 Yet this is difficult to prove in light of other significant concurrent developments. On 11 March 1985, Mikhail Gorbachev had replaced Konstantin Chernenko as General Secretary of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and on 4 May of 1986, the Soviet Politburo replaced Babrak Karmal with Mohammad Najibullah, the director of the KHAD, in an attempt to prepare the regime for the withdrawal of Soviet troops. According to Jacques de Watteville of the FDFA, it seemed “as though under these circumstances, she [the Soviet Union] encouraged the Afghan government to resume negotiations with the ICRC to arrange for its activities in Afghanistan to continue.”73 Talks concerning the return of the ICRC to Afghanistan resumed in November of 1985 and on 6 April 1986, after six years of negotiation, intermittent mediation, repeated visits and recurring expulsions, the ICRC finally received permission to return to Kabul.74 The Neue Zürcher Zeitung published an enthusiastic commentary on the occasion, emphasizing that “for the first time in four years, an ICRC delegation visited Afghanistan this week.”75 Others, such as the daily Tages-Anzeiger, were slightly more cautious, arguing that the terms of the Karmal regime’s invitation were actually quite “vague” and that the invitation coincided with rumours that the Soviet Union might withdraw some of its troops from Afghanistan.76 On 13 April, Jean de Courten, the ICRC’s Delegate General for Asia, personally led the ICRC’s renewed mission to Kabul and this turned out to be the ICRC’s most successful mission to date. It precipitated a further round of negotiations with the Afghan regime, the results of which allowed the ICRC to establish a permanent presence in the country starting March 1987.77 What was more, not only was the ICRC now authorized to operate in the government-controlled 72 73 74 75 76 77

Jacques de Watteville, ‘Note de dossier: Bilan de l’opération Zugerberg: Internement de prisonniers soviétiques en Suisse (1982–1986),’ 5 May 1986, E4280A#2017/355#1059*, CH-BAR. Ibid., author’s translation from “Il semble même que dans ce contexte elle ait encouragé le gouvernement afghan à reprendre des négociations avec le CICR en vue d’une reprise de ses activités en Afghanistan.” ICRC, ‘Afghan Sitrep No. 49,’ 23 April 1986, E2023A#1998/212#976*, CH-BAR. NZZ, ‘Sondierungsgespräche des IKRK in Afghanistan,’ 9 April 1986, Press Collection, CH-SBA, author’s translation from, “Erstmals nach vier Jahren besuchte in dieser Woche wieder eine Delegation des IKRK Afghanistan.” Pierre Simonitsch, Tages-Anzeiger, ‘Das IKRK hat wieder einen Fuss in Afghanistan,’ 15 April 1986, Press Collection, CH-SBA. ICRC, ‘Afghan Sitrep No. 64 (January-June 1987),’ June 1987, E2023#1998/212#861*, CH-BAR; ICRC, ‘Pressecommuniqué Nr. 1531: Wiederaufnahme der IKRK-Aktivitäten in Afghanistan,’ 3 Febrary 1987, E2023#1998/212#861*, CH-BAR; N.a., ‘Afghanistan,’ International Review of the Red Cross 30(1990), 52.

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areas, but in all areas controlled by the mujahideen as well. The first ICRC medical team left Geneva for Kabul on 27 February of 1987 and was allowed to conduct a renewed inspection of Pul-i-Charkhi prison, beginning in early March.78 This time, the team inspected not just block one of the prison, but blocks three and four as well. In addition, the ICRC was also able to visit prisons in Mazar-i-Sharif and in Herat, as well as the Dar-u-Tadib detention center in Kabul.79 Unlike most prisons, which operated under the jurisdiction of the Ministry of the Interior, this prison was administered directly by the KHAD.80 As might have been expected, complications surrounding the ICRC’s presence in Afghanistan led to a renewed interruption of inspections between July and December of 1987.81 According to the Neue Zürcher Zeitung, the new government of former KHAD director Mohammad Najibullah refused to comply with the ICRC’s confidentiality criteria during its prison visits.82 Yet this time, in contrast to previous occasions, the ICRC itself chose to interrupt its visits.83 This interruption was shorter than previous ones and in line with Mikhail Gorbachev’s concurrent attempts to reform the Afghan government, the ICRC was not only allowed to return the following year but to open its first ever hospital in Kabul.84 Originally, the clinic operated with 50 patient beds and by the end of 1990, this number had increased to 280. Between January and December of 1990, it admitted 4’088 patients, carried out 8’724 surgical interventions and consulted 7’189 out-patients.85 5

Conclusion: Questions about Swiss Neutrality and Solidarity

This was a significant development in the Afghan crisis, as well as for the relationship between the Swiss government and the ICRC. Although it is not unequivocally clear whether the Soviet prisoner transfer scheme and the decision of the majority of prisoners to repatriate have influenced the ICRC’s ability to 78

ICRC, ‘Afghan Sitrep No. 64 (January-June 1987),’ E2023#1998/212#861*, CH-BAR; ICRC, ‘Communication à la presse no 7/87,’ 25 February 1987, E2023#1998/212#861*, CH-BAR. 79 N.a., ‘Afghanistan,’ International Review of the Red Cross 30(1990), 52. 80 Ibid. 81 Ibid. 82 NZZ, ‘Wieder IKRK-Gefagenenbesuche in Kabul: Entsendung einer achtköpfigen Delegation,’ 9 February 1988, Press Collection, CH-SBA. 83 Ibid. 84 N.a., ‘Afghanistan,’ International Review of the Red Cross 30(1990), 53. 85 Ibid.

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return to Afghanistan in 1987, the renewed provision of humanitarian aid to the Afghan interior was important for those affected. According to Paul Bucherer of the Bibliotheca Afghanica, “Almost every family had someone in their family who had been treated by the ICRC either in the form of medical treatment or prosthetics” either inside Afghanistan or in its vicinity.86 The return of the ICRC to the Afghan interior was also important for its relationship to the Swiss government. Pierre Aubert’s decision to allow each Soviet prisoner to reconsider his original pledge to repatriate could have threatened the ICRC’s chances to return to Afghanistan. Yet it did not. Aubert consciously overrode the memorandum of understanding between the ICRC and the Soviet Union. In doing so, he demonstrated that the Swiss government and the ICRC, though close collaborators in the humanitarian domain, were institutionally distinct from each other and ultimately played different roles in the Afghan conflict. By this point it had become abundantly clear that the memorandum of understanding itself had become impossible to enforce. Moreover, the transfer scheme had inadvertently created a situation for the Swiss government, whereby the authorities were forced to take a side in the broader Cold War contest the for the moral superiority of social systems over the issue of individual liberty. The present case has shown that Switzerland and especially Swiss popular opinion was firmly in line Western values of individual freedom and respect for basic human rights. Some might contend that both the ICRC and the Swiss government came dangerously close to either intentionally or naively violating their own humanitarian principles, as they navigated the successive pitfalls of the transfer scheme. Yet this would over-simplify the constantly shifting demands of the operation, as well as the complexity of humanitarian aid provision itself. Over the course of its history, the ICRC has repeatedly found itself in situations where it was forced to balance its own principles to both protect victims of war and to promote international humanitarian law. Mia Vestergaard calls this phenomenon “messier terrain” and similarly to the present investigation into the Afghan crisis, her investigation into the Biafran War concludes that, “The ICRC was not merely operating blindly and naively, but rather … ​its humanitarian politics were caught up between international humanitarian law and the politics of relief on the ground.”87 In the absence of high numbers of Soviet prisoners, the tangible impact of the prisoner transfer scheme may have been relatively benign. It allowed the Swiss government to become involved as a provider of good offices in addition 86 87

Paul Bucherer, interviewed by Liliane Stadler, 16 October 2018. Vestergaard, ‘An Imperative to Act,’ 678.

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to providing regular humanitarian aid to the wider conflict region. Some may initially even have seen the scheme as an opportunity to play a meaningful role in the conflict as a permanent neutral. Yet by the time that the last Soviet soldier departed Switzerland for the Soviet Union and the ICRC managed to return to Afghanistan to provide humanitarian aid, it appeared as though Switzerland’s protective power mandate and with it its involvement as a provider of good offices in Afghanistan had come to an end. Up until the early 1990s, there continued to be reports of Soviet prisoners in Afghanistan, both military and civilian.88 The relevant records in the Swiss Federal Archives remain to be declassified, yet in April of 1991, Lieutenant General Leonid Ivashov of the Soviet Ministry of Defence approached Pierre-Yves Simonin at the FDFA with reports of over 300 missing individuals.89 There were no further transfers of Soviet prisoners to Switzerland during this period, yet it appeared – at least in this context – that the Soviet Union no longer equated prisoners of war with deserters per se. 88

89

David Vogelsanger, ‘ Besuch von Generalleutnant Leonid G. Ivashov, Leiter des ­Verwaltungsdepartementes des Verteidigungsministeriums der UdSSR am 12. April 1991: ­Sowjetsoldaten in den Händen afghanischer Rebellengruppen,’ 16 April 1991, Dodis, https://dodis.ch/60119. Ibid.

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The 1986 Referendum on Swiss UN Membership and the 1988 Geneva Accords on Afghanistan Nothing suggested that Switzerland would provide any additional good offices in the Afghan crisis after 1986. In fact, aside from its existing protective power mandates and from its unsuccessful attempt to mediate in the Falkland ­Crisis of 1982, research has documented no comparable opportunities for the Swiss government to provide its neutral good offices during the mid-1980s. The Swiss government continued to provide technical humanitarian aid to numerous conflict regions over the course of this decade, including in Afghanistan, Somalia, Sudan, Lebanon, Iraq, and Ethiopia among others.1 Yet its last successful and documented demonstrations of neutral mediation dated back to the Evian Accords of 1962 and to its joint effort with other neutral and nonaligned states to mediate between the Cold War blocs during the Helsinki process from 1972 to 1975. Overall, Switzerland’s ability to demonstrate solidarity internationally through the provision of good offices had received mixed responses during the Cold War thus far. There was no discernable pattern in the provision of Swiss good offices, other than the Swiss government’s continued disponibilité – its readiness – to provide such services when asked to do so. The prisoner transfer scheme involving Soviet prisoners from Afghanistan was a case in point. It came about in response to a request from the ICRC. In practical terms, its demonstratable humanitarian impact was modest. At the same time, it carried considerable risk of implicating both the Swiss government and the ICRC in the broader soft power competition among the Cold War blocs. High-level diplomatic talks on Afghanistan, meanwhile, took place behind closed doors at the United Nations European headquarters in Geneva. Technically speaking, Geneva may have been selected for its neutral location. Yet as discussed, the Swiss authorities were not involved in the discussions between the Karmal regime and the Pakistani government.

1 Arthur Bill, ‘Aide Humanitaire aux Réfugiés et aux Personnes Déplacées en 1980,’ E2200.176#1995/67#80*, CH-BAR; Federal Council, ‘Humanitäre Hilfe: Sonderbeiträge an UNHCR, IKRK, OIM, UNBRO und UNRWA für deren Programme zugunsten von Flüchtlingen, Vertriebenen und anderen Konfliktopfern,’ 20 December 1989, Dodis, https://dodis.ch/55914.

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The purpose of the present chapter is to demonstrate two points. First, that following the Soviet prisoner transfer scheme from 1982 to 1986, the Swiss government continued to struggle to demonstrate solidarity internationally as a permanent neutral in an increasingly multilateral world. In the absence of additional requests to become diplomatically involved, it no longer looked as though the Afghan crisis would offer a genuine opportunity for the Swiss government to play a meaningful role in the conflict after 1986. This predicament also notably coincided with a critical juncture in Swiss foreign policy that same year. For the first time since the founding of the UN in 1945 and in defiance of the Bindschedler Doctrine of 1954, the Federal Council held a nation-wide referendum on membership of the UN. The referendum proved unsuccessful. Yet it was important for two reasons. First, it showed that the FDFA and the Federal Council had begun to re-assess the nature of the relationship between permanent neutrality and multilateralism since 1954. Second, the fact that the voting public did not share their assessment essentially forced the Swiss government to continue its post-war trajectory of demonstrating neutrality and solidarity outside of the world’s most prominent multilateral diplomatic forum. The present chapter also argues that there were important aspects to both the Geneva Talks from 1982 to 1988, as well as to the so-called Geneva Accords of 1988, which ultimately led multiple conflict parties to look for mediation outside the institutions of the UN. The so-called Geneva Talks have been rendered in detail in the existing scholarship on Afghanistan and on the Soviet occupation from 1979 to 1989. In his well-known study on Soviet decision-making in the Afghan context, Artemy Kalinovsky has argued that Soviet leaders recognized soon after the invasion that it would lead them into a “quagmire, with serious costs for their relationship with the rest of the world.”2 By 1982, they came to accept the need for UN diplomacy to resolve their predicament.3 Kalinovsky has also demonstrated that the reason why Soviet leaders nevertheless delayed the decision to withdraw was that some continued to believe they would ultimately be able to stabilize Afghanistan, re-build the Afghan armed forces, and make the Soviet-installed regime acceptable to its people.4 The Geneva Talks were part of this effort. As Elizabeth Leake has recently shown, UN negotiators attempted to bring about the circumstances for Soviet withdrawal, yet they “avoided conversations about what an Afghan state should specifically look like.”5 That was the main issue, which ­perpetuated the Afghan 2 3 4 5

Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 2. Ibid., 55. Ibid., 2. Leake, Afghan Crucible, 238.

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crisis even after the Soviet withdrawal of 1989. It ultimately persuaded both representatives from the mujahideen and from the Afghan regime to request outside mediation from the Swiss government in 1991 and this presented a welcome opportunity for Swiss diplomacy demonstrate the compatibility of neutrality and solidarity outside of the UN system in view of the unsuccessful 1986 referendum. 1

Switzerland’s 1986 Referendum on UN Membership

In complete reversal of its 1946 decision not to join the UN, the Federal Council announced this referendum in March of 1986. There is evidence to suggest that the Federal Council already considered applying for UN membership as early as 1967. That year, National Councillor Willy Bretscher submitted a postulate to the Federal Council on the status of Switzerland’s relationship to the UN since its initial decision not to apply for membership in 1946. The Federal Council carefully considered the merits and drawbacks this question for two years before submitting two government-internal reports on the subject, one in 1969 and one in 1971.6 Both reports essentially confirmed the foreign policy course that the Swiss government had been pursuing since the post-war period, namely, to remain outside of the UN and to compensate for its absence by joining technical intergovernmental organizations and by performing good offices and providing humanitarian aid abroad in times of crisis. Curiously, neither of these reports explicitly excluded the possibility of Switzerland joining the UN in the future.7 In addition to this, the Federal Council set up an independent task force to inquire into the political feasibility of a Swiss bid to join the UN. In 1973 this task force surprisingly reached a favourable verdict.8 At the same time, however, there was no serious discussion about abandoning the Bindschedler Doctrine either within the FDFA or within the broader public sphere. A third internal UN report appeared in 1977 – two years after the Helsinki Final Act – and this time, the Federal Council explicitly came out in favour of UN membership.9 It argued that joining would be “a necessary extension of Switzerland’s foreign policy and would give our country access to a

6 7 8 9

Altermatt, ‘Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zur Gegenwart,’ 69. Ibid., 71. Ibid. Glas, Aufbruch der Schweiz in die multilaterale Welt, 121.

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forum that it needs, if it is to unfold its entire potential.”10 In 1981, roughly one year after the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, the Federal Council then published this stance in a public announcement to parliament and in 1984, both the National Assembly and the Council of States sided with the government.11 Elizabeth Glas has suggested that the obvious explanation for this drastic change of course was Switzerland’s prominent role at the CSCE from 1972 to 1975. Together with other neutral and non-aligned states, including Finland, Sweden, Austria, and Yugoslavia, the Swiss delegation contributed to the resolution of a number of procedural and content-related issues relating to the conference’s three so-called baskets. Having played a meaningful role as a permanently neutral state in an important multilateral organization may have encouraged Swiss policymakers to re-assess the compatibility of the Bindschedler Doctrine of 1954 with UN membership. Swiss historian Thomas Fischer, however, has cautioned that Switzerland’s performance within the CSCE only encouraged the political elite to reconsider UN membership. It did not sufficiently influence public opinion on the subject, which remained strongly attached to Switzerland’s strict post-war interpretation of permanent neutrality.12 According to Edouard Brunner, there was an additional reason for the Swiss government’s reconsideration of UN membership. Writing in November of 1982, Brunner argued that, “One hears neutrality enjoys great prestige and respect among other states, who appreciate the quality of our good offices and who entrust many such missions to us.”13 However, he also recognized that, “One should not overestimate the character of these missions and imagine that our country is the mediator par excellence.”14 Rather, as discussed in chapter one, Brunner conceded that most of Switzerland’s good offices had actually taken the form of protecting power mandates. It had become rare for the Swiss government or for Swiss citizens to take on mandates of mediation or arbitrage

10 11 12 13

14

Ibid., 113, author’s translation from, “Der Beitritt wäre eine notwendige Ergänzung unserer Aussenpolitik und würde unserem Land ein Forum erschliessen, das es braucht, wenn es alle seine Wirkungsmöglichkeiten voll entfalten will.” Altermatt, ‘Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zur Gegenwart,’ 75. Fischer, Die Grenzen der Neutralität, 158. Edouard Brunner, ‘La Suisse aux Nations Unies, pourquoi? in Seminar über “Die Schweizerische Neutralität im Zeitalter der Weltweiten Interpendenz,”’ 4–6 November 1982, E9500.1#1993/131#39*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “L’on entend dire que notre neutralité jouit d’un grand prestige, qu’elle nous attire le respect des autres États, qui, appréciant la qualité de nos bons offices, nous confient beaucoup de missions.” Ibid., author’s translation from, “Il ne faut pas surestimer le caractère de ces missions et s’imaginer que notre pays est le médiateur par excellence.”

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and this diminution of Switzerland’s mediating role was indicative of an atrophy of her importance and of her image on the international stage. The policy doctrine of Neutrality and Solidarity, according to Brunner, had not persuasively achieved its desired effect of compensating for Switzerland’s absence from the UN. Rather, because Switzerland was absent from the UN, the Swiss government was also absent from the place where mediation increasingly tended to take place.15 The Geneva Talks on Afghanistan were a case in point and according to Brunner’s reasoning, it would have made more sense for Switzerland to demonstrate the effectiveness of its good offices through multilateral institutions, as opposed to outside of them. Yet this idea coexisted uneasily with both the Bindschedler Doctrine of 1954 and, more importantly, with public opinion. As a result of the revised Staatsvertragsreferendum of 1977, membership applications for major international organizations had become subject to a nation-wide referendum, if a petition by at least 50,000 voters or 8 cantons demanded it. Yet throughout the years leading up the UN referendum of 1986, it remained difficult to persuade the public to vote in favour. In 1946, UN membership had been deemed incompatible with Swiss neutrality on account of public opinion. By voting on UN membership in 1986, the Swiss public essentially had to cast a vote on whether or not the nature of the relationship between Swiss neutrality and collective security had changed and it became a significant challenge for the FDFA to argue that it had. One internal FDFA memorandum argued that UN member states had a certain degree of leeway in the way in which they implemented UN Security Council decisions.16 It also added that the Security Council hardly ever agreed on the imposition of military and non-military sanctions, which were at the core of the compatibility issue between Swiss neutrality and UN membership.17 Another argument that the FDFA invoked was the fact that Switzerland had joined a substantial number of specialized UN organizations during the post-war period. However, as a non-member of the UN, it had little say in setting the agenda, allocating funds or planning specific operations. Such was the case, for instance at the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), UNESCO, and at the United Nations Industrial Development Organization (UNIDO). However, none of these arguments sufficed to sway public opinion. As early as November of 1983, British diplomat Sir Antony Acland reported to the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office that, “The discussion is somewhat academic since all agreed such a proposal would not pass the two stages of 15 Ibid. 16 N.a., ‘Schweizerisches Institut für Berufspädagogik,’ J1.301#2002/197#39*, CH-BAR. 17 Ibid.

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a referendum.”18 On 16 March 1986, only 24.3 percent voted in favour with a turnout of 50.7 percent of the population.19 Thomas Fischer has pointed out that the return of Cold War tensions between the superpower camps, following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan and the collapse of détente, were also partly to blame for the negative outcome of the UN referendum. In the prevalent climate of tension, fluctuation and uncertainty, Fischer argued, “The Swiss government no longer managed to stay its course of opening up toward the outside world.”20 Rather, as had been the case during the post-war period, the Swiss public appeared have more faith in Swiss neutrality than in multilateral institutions. In terms of Switzerland’s diplomatic involvement in the Afghan crisis, the referendum may appear to have made no difference at first. Yet it arguably set back Switzerland’s already difficult relationship to the UN even further. According to Francesca Pometta, Switzerland’s Permanent Observer to the UN in New York, “Our situation vis-à-vis the organization and its members is fundamentally weak … ​if we do not rapidly formulate a strategy for our relationship to the organization, ultimate decline will be inevitable with all the negative consequences that this could have for Swiss foreign policy in the medium to long term.”21 As a result, there was a discernible attempt within the FDFA to promote Switzerland’s good offices more pro-actively over the course of the late 1980s and the early 1990s. In a diplomatic cable to all Swiss embassies and consulates, Franz Muheim, the head of the Directorate for International Organizations at the FDFA, encouraged all diplomatic representatives to demonstrate that, even as a non-member, Switzerland pursued a constructive policy toward the UN.22 “This,” he argued, “is based on Switzerland’s will to cooperate closely with the UN Secretary-General in particular and with the world organization in general, and to support them – wherever possible – with the means at our disposal.”23 In the Afghan context, however, these good 18 19 20

21 22 23

Antony Acland, ‘Correspondence to Mr. Young, WED (sic),’ 7 November 1983, FCO 28/5907, UK-TNA. Altermatt, ‘Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zur Gegenwart,’ 75. Fischer, Die Grenzen der Neutralität, 18, author’s translation from, “Im Klima der zunehmenden internationalen Spannungen, die spätestens 1980 mit Afghanistan deutlich wurden, gelang es auch der Schweizer Regierung nicht mehr, den von ihr angestrebten Kurs der aussenpolitischen Öffnung zu halten.” Francesca Pometta, ‘Corresponence to Direktion Internationale Organizationen,’ 13 March 1987, E2200.36#2000/291#704*, CH-BAR. Franz Muheim, ‘Ausbau der schweizerischen Beteiligung an friedenserhaltenden Aktionen und Guten Diensten,’ 27 Juni 1988, E2200.64#1999/164#83*, CH-BAR. Ibid, author’s translation from, “Diese beruht auf dem Willen der Schweiz, mit dem UNOGeneralsekretär im besonderen sowie mit der Weltorganization im allgemeinen eng

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intentions turned out to be i­ll-matched with the UN Secretary-General’s own agenda. In 1988, two years after Switzerland’s unsuccessful referendum on UN membership, the UN-mediated Geneva Accords on Afghanistan were opened for signature. Yet they did not address several of the core elements of the Afghan crisis, leading a number of conflict parties to seek mediation elsewhere. Through informal channels, both the Afghan regime and the mujahideen ultimately reached out to the Swiss government for mediation during the early 1990s. The FDFA initially reacted cautiously and over successive stages of mediation, its representatives continuously sought to align their attempts to mediate with the continued efforts of the UN to restore stability to the region. However, non-membership of the UN, competing interests among the mujahideen and within the Afghan regime, as well as parallel channels of communication between the Swiss and UN mediators made it difficult for Swiss and UN representatives to work together effectively. 2

Behind the Scenes of the UN Geneva Talks

The UN-mediated Geneva Accords of 1988 were a remarkable turning point in the lead-up of Switzerland’s involvement in Afghanistan as a neutral mediator. They were not conducted face-to-face. The most important developments took place behind the scenes. They concerned actors, who were not themselves represented at the negotiations and the aim of the accords was not to resolve the war in Afghanistan. The institutional design of the talks made this impossible and arguably paved the way for the conflict parties to approach other, external mediators for tactical reasons. This is how the Swiss government ultimately became directly involved as a mediator in Afghanistan in 1991 and it is why the Swiss authorities came to interpret the Afghan crisis as an opportunity to play a meaningful role in a major conflict of the late Cold War as a permanently neutral state despite their initial refusals to do so in early 1980. Diplomatic talks between the Karmal regime, the Pakistani government and the UN began in Geneva in June of 1982 and lasted until April of 1988. Neither the mujahideen, Soviet Union, nor the United States were represented. Moreover, the Pakistani delegation refused to meet directly with a delegation from the Karmal regime for fear of implicitly recognizing the regime as the legitimate government of Afghanistan. Between 14 and 16 June 1982, Diego Cordovez, the UN Secretary-General’s Personal Representative for Afghanistan, zusammenzuarbeiten und sie – wo immer möglich – mit den uns zur Verfügung stehenden Mitteln zu unterstützen.”

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shuttled between the two delegations, walking back and forth between the Geneva Inter-Continental Hotel on one side of the Place des Nations and the UN main building on the other, so as to speak to Pakistani Foreign Minister Sahibzada Yaqub Khan and his Afghan counterpart, Shah Mohammad Dost.24 Yet the talks quickly began to stall over the issue of who should be involved. During the initial stage of the discussions, Sahibzada Yaqub Khan made it clear that he expected the eventual agreement to involve a mechanism for consulting Afghan refugees on the issue of their return home.25 However, this was not yet an established practice.26 According to article II, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state.”27 Javier Pérez de Cuéllar and Diego Cordovez outwardly took this to mean that they were bound to work at the government level only. In his memoirs, de Cuéllar recalls that part of the reason for the UN’s refusal to include refugee representatives in the Geneva process was also that, as he put it, the word “refugee had two meanings.”28 On one hand, it referred to Afghans living in Pakistan and Iran. As discussed, however, it was also “a euphemism for the leadership of the resistance,” which mixed freely with the civilian refugees across the border.29 Shifting alliance constellations among the mujahideen, their collective inability to agree on most issues and their failure to establish a functioning government in exile arguably also penalized them in their relations with the UN. This being said, the UN did maintain clandestine contacts to the resistance, beginning at the thirteenth Islamic Conference meeting of foreign ministers in Niamey, Niger, in August of 1982.30 In Niamey, Isofou Fjermakoye, then Under-Secretary-General of the UN, held confidential meetings with Sebghatullah Mujaddedi of the Afghan National Liberation Front, Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani,31 the leader of Mahaz-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan and ­Maulawi 24

N.a., ‘First Indirect Trilateral Talks on Afghanistan Under UN Auspices In Geneva,’ Defence Journal 1–2(1982), 52. 25 Imitiaz Bokhari, ‘Evolution of a Dual Negotiation Process: Afghanistan,’ The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Sciences 518(1991), 64. 26 Philip Corwin, Doomed in Afghanistan: A UN Officer’s Memoirs of the Fall of Kabul and Najibullah’s Failed Escape (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 58. 27 United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations,’ 26 June 1945, https://www.un.org/en /about-us/un-charter/full-text. 28 Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 188. 29 Ibid. 30 Ibid., 189. 31 Not to be confused with Pir Ishaq Gailani, personal representative of Sebghatullah ­Mujaddedi.

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Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, the leader of Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami Afghanistan.32Also present was Giandomenico Picco, Diego Cordovez’ deputy, who continued to hold regular meetings with resistance leaders after 1983.33 Yet the mujahideen were never officially included in the Geneva Talks and in public, they condemned the talks harshly for not being included. In the meantime, the government of the United States had begun to channel substantial military and financial aid to the mujahideen. Covert American aid to the mujahideen had begun informally under the Carter administration after it had suspended aid to the Pakistani government in April of 1979 on account of its covert uranium enrichment program. In February of 1980, President Carter offered Zia ul-Haq $400 million in security and economic assistance in the context of the Afghan crisis. This ultimately developed into approximately US$ 30–40 million annually.34 The Reagan Administration, which came into office in January of 1981, envisioned not merely the containment but the so-called “roll-back” of Soviet influence in the region.35 According to Barnett Rubin, American aid grew from $30 million in 1980 to $600 million annually between 1986 and 1989, an amount that was matched and at times exceeded by aid from Saudi Arabia and other Arab states.36 Between 1982 and 1986, most of the weapons that the Reagan administration channelled to the mujahideen passed through the Pakistani Inter-Service Intelligence Agency (ISI) and consisted either of Egyptian purchases of Soviet ­military stock from the 1960s or of Chinese imports.37 In delivering these weapons, the Pakistani authorities both supported the mujahideen and also ­controlled them to a certain extent. According to Edward Girardet, for instance, the ISI was careful to prevent the transfer of highly sophisticated weaponry to the mujahideen in large numbers, so as to prevent an uncontrolled escalation of the conflict.38 At the same time, the ISI refrained from encouraging the mujahideen to pursue a unified strategy and in fact cultivated the ongoing fragmentation of the resistance by channelling military aid to some groups more than others. In other words, while participating in the Geneva Talks, the 32 Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 189. 33 Ibid. 34 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 71. 35 Elisabeth Leake, ‘Spooks, Tribes and Holy Men: The Central Intelligence Agency and the Soviet Invasion of Afghanistan,’ Journal of Contemporary History 2018(53), 245–246. 36 Barnett Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan: State Formation and Collapse in the International System (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 196. 37 Wriggins, ‘Pakistan’s Search for a Foreign Policy After the Invasion of Afghanistan,’ 295; Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan, 197; Girardet, Afghanistan, 67. 38 Girardet, Afghanistan, 67.

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Pakistani government also played an active part in keeping the Afghan conflict going – arguably not for the sake of a military solution, but to gain a measure of control over the conflict itself. Under these conditions, the Geneva Talks made little progress throughout the mid-1980s, until the US State Department unexpectedly dispatched a letter to Diego Cordovez on 10 December 1985. Despite the fact that the United States was not represented at the Geneva Talks, the letter gave the consent of the American government to act as a guarantor for the legal framework concluded at Geneva.39 That same month, the Karmal regime reportedly handed Cordovez a schedule for Soviet troop withdrawals to be discussed at Geneva if the Pakistani delegation agreed to direct talks.40 Most contemporary and retrospective observers agree on what had been the main reason for this change in attitude on both sides. In March of 1985, the General Secretary of the Politburo of the Soviet Union, Konstatin Chernenko, had died of heart failure.41 His successor, Mikhail Gorbachev, spent the first few months in office consolidating his position and grappling with the worsening economic situation of the Soviet Union.42 Yet as the year progressed, it became increasingly clear that as part of his reform agenda, the new General Secretary intended to retreat from Afghanistan. Gorbachev even briefly discussed this topic with American President Ronald Reagan during their summit meeting in Geneva in November of 1985.43 On 28 July 1986, Gorbachev publicly announced the unilateral withdrawal of 7’000 Soviet troops from Afghanistan at a speech in Vladivostok. Already in February of that year, he had disclosed his determination to find a political solution to the Afghan crisis in an address to the 27th Party Congress of the CPSU. In this respect, 1986 was a critical year for the Geneva Talks. Even though neither the Soviet Union nor the United States were formal parties to the talks, they were both directly involved in the Afghan crisis and the Geneva Talks had hitherto made no significant progress without their consent. During the summer of 1986, the Soviet Union replaced President Babrak Karmal, whom it had initially installed at the head of the Afghan government, 39 40 41 42 43

Klaus Jacobi, ‘Verhandlungslösung für Afghanistan,’ 17 December 1985, E2010–01A#1994 /372#43*, CH-BAR; Bokhari, ‘Evolution of a Dual Negotiation Process,’ 65. Bokhari, ‘Evolution of a Dual Negotiation Process,’ 65. Archie Brown, ‘The Gorbachev revolution and the end of the Cold War,’ in The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Volume III), edited by Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 247. Braithwaite, ‘The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.’ Jack Matlock, ‘Memorandum of Conversation: Reagan-Gorbachev Meetings in Geneva November, 1985,’ 19 November 1985, NSA-GWU, https://nsarchive2.gwu.edu/dc .html?doc=5752885-National-Security-Archive-Doc-01-Memorandum-of.

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during the invasion of 1979. In March of that year, as the Swiss were heading to the polls over UN membership, Karmal had visited Moscow for medical treatment, where the Soviet Politburo demanded he step down as president of Afghanistan. The Afghan media later reported that he had chosen to resign for health reasons and according to Artemy Kalinovsky, he eventually settled in Moscow, where he received a state-owned apartment and a nearby dacha.44 On 4 May, he was replaced as the head of the PDPA by Mohammad Najibullah, the former chief of the Afghan secret police, KHAD.45 Najibullah, as he preferred to be known, was a trained doctor and like Karmal, he had joined the PDPA at its creation in 1965.46 In 1977, he joined the party’s central committee and after the Soviet invasion of 1979, he became the director of the KHAD.47 Two years later, he entered the Politburo of the PDPA, in charge of tribal relations. Of Pashtun tribal origin himself, he was an exception among the dominant Parcham faction of the party and the Soviet Politburo now hoped to use this to its advantage. Ever since its inception in 1965, the PDPA had been prone to factionalism to such a degree that the party split into two factions in 1967. Khalq, meaning “the masses”, became the faction of the communist party and was associated closely with the Pushtun tribes. Parcham, the second faction, called itself “the banner” and unlike Khalq, Parcham closely aligned itself with the idea of Soviet-style communism. That was why the Soviet Union had tended to back the Parcham faction of the PDPA throughout its occupation of Afghanistan. Artemy Kalinovsky has argued that replacing Karmal with Najibullah became the first of several steps that the Soviet Union took from 1985 to 1987 with the aims of reforming the government and of withdrawing from the country altogether.48 Beginning in 1987, the Najibullah regime then launched a so-called initiative of “National Reconciliation” with these aims in mind. In short summary, the intention was to reach out to the opposing Khalq faction of the PDPA, to members of the clergy and to ordinary citizens to broaden the popular appeal of the government. In January 1987, the government announced a ceasefire and an amnesty for selected mujahideen fighters.49 The word “Democratic” was removed from the country’s name to turn it into the Republic of 44 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 98. 45 Bokhari, ‘Evolution of a Dual Negotiation Process,’ 66; Braithwaite, ‘The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,’ accessed 23 January 2024. 46 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 95. 47 Baker, War in Afghanistan, 191; Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 95. 48 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 94. 49 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 94; Baker, War in Afghanistan, 192.

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Afghanistan. The Najibullah regime recognized the necessity of demonstrating respect to the religion of Islam and that Muslim public figures needed to be given a political role.50 In November of 1987, a Loya Jirga, a council of tribal elders, was convened to approve a new constitution.51 The constitution introduced multi-party democracy and the right to private property for the first time since the PDPA take-over in 1978 – before many Soviet satellites in Eastern Europe did so.52 The government abandoned its plans for extensive land reform and returned expropriated land to former landowners.53 Yet perhaps unsurprisingly, none of these measures were sufficient to endear Najibullah and his regime to the mujahideen, who boycotted the parliamentary elections that followed in April of 1988.54 As a result, the PDPA continued to dominate parliament and Najibullah retained his position in the new government. The fact that the policy of “National Reconciliation” did not broaden the popular appeal of the regime and did not stabilize Afghanistan politically was not lost on the Soviet Politburo. Neither was the ever-increasing imperative to withdraw. The military and economic reasons, which ultimately led the Soviet Union to withdraw from Afghanistan have been extensively investigated elsewhere. According to the minutes of a Politburo meeting from 21–22 January 1987, Mikhail Gorbachev’s new Foreign Minister Edouard Shevardnadze estimated that the campaign in Afghanistan cost “a billion roubles a year.”55 More importantly, he also emphasized that within Afghanistan itself, “The attitude toward us is more negative than it seemed to us.”56 At a further Politburo meeting on 26 February, Gorbachev ultimately maintained that, “The withdrawal of troops is the only correct decision.”57 That same month, he had announced that the Soviet withdrawal could begin on 15 May, if an agreement were concluded in Geneva by 15 March.58 He also agreed to complete the withdrawal 50

Vassily Klimentov, ‘”Communist Muslims”: The USSR and the People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan’s Conversion to Islam, 1978–1988,’ Journal of Cold War Studies 24(2022), 17. 51 Benedict Gubler, ‘Besuch des afghanischen Botschafters in Moskau, Muhammedulla Safi bei Botschafter Pianca und dem Unterzeichneten am 1. Dezember 1987,’ 3 December 1987, E2010–01A#1994/372#44*, CH-BAR. 52 Mike Bowker, Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War (Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997), 136. 53 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 142. 54 Bowker, Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, 136. 55 N.a., ‘Notes from Politburo Meeting, 21–22 January 1987 (Excerpt),’ 22 January 1987, CWIHP, translated by Gary Goldberg, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117230. 56 Ibid. 57 N.a., ‘Notes from Politburo Meeting, 26 February 1987 (Excerpt),’ 26 February 1987, CWIHP, translated by Gary Goldberg, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document/117233. 58 Rosanne Klass, ‘Afghanistan: The Accords,’ Foreign Affairs 66(1988), 932.

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within nine months of its starting date.59 This came as a shock to the Najibullah regime, whose new foreign minister, Abdul Wakil, refused to sign any potential agreement on these terms. It took roughly six weeks for Gorbachev to convince Najibullah and for Soviet ambassador-at-large Nikloai Kozyrev to convince Wakil to consent to the terms that the Soviet Union and the United States had agreed on bilaterally. On 8 April, Cordovez announced that the terms of the Soviet withdrawal had been concluded and that the Geneva Accords were open for signature. 3

The Design Flaws of the Geneva Accords of 1988

What is revealing about this episode of the Geneva Talks is the extent to which the relevant developments took place not during the talks themselves, but behind the scenes. They primarily came to depend on decisions taken by Soviet and American officials. As part of the Geneva Accords, which were signed on 14 April, both superpowers signed a “Declaration of International Guarantees,” in which they pledged to “invariably refrain from interference and intervention in internal affairs of the Republic of Afghanistan and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” as well as to “respect the commitments contained in the bilateral agreement between the two on the principles of their mutual relations.”60 Pakistan and the Najibullah regime in turn signed two separate agreements as part of the Geneva Accords. The first governed the so-called “Principles of Mutual Relations,” which mainly revolved around non-interference and non-intervention.61 The second regulated the voluntary return of Afghan refugees from Pakistan to Afghanistan.62 Finally, the “Interrelationships Agreement,” which was signed by all four, provided for the phased withdrawal of “foreign” – not “Soviet” – troops from Afghanistan until 15 February 1989.63 Collectively, the accords came into force on 15 May 1988, yet as quickly became apparent, they did not end the war. They contained several substantial weaknesses, which ultimately gave the Afghan conflict parties ample reason to seek additional mediation elsewhere. First, they included no explicit provisions to end the struggle between 59 Ibid. 60 UN Peacemaker, ‘Agreements on the Settlement of the Situation Relating to Afghanistan (Geneva Accords),’ https://peacemaker.un.org/node/641. 61 Ibid. 62 Ibid. 63 Ibid.

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the Afghan regime and the mujahideen. This remained a major issue up until the collapse of the regime in 1992.64 Second, while they did regulate the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces, they left the issue of the future form of Afghan government unresolved and the mujahideen manifestly refused to work with the Najibullah government.65 Third, as American Secretary of State George Shultz reiterated in the press conference following the signatory ceremony, the accords contained no explicit provisions concerning the flow of American weapons to Pakistan, although technically it prohibited the flow of these weapons from Pakistan to Afghanistan.66 Most importantly, the accords lacked a feasible enforcement mechanism. In his memoirs, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar “considered the fact that an arms cut-off was not included in the Geneva Accords to be a major weakness.”67 However, he also contended that “the subject was never within the control of influence of the United Nations.”68 Over the course of the talks, the UN made a number of decisions that had serious political repercussions and justified them as matters of procedure. On genuine matters of procedure, on the other hand, the UN seriously underperformed, particularly when it came to monitoring the implementation of the Geneva Accords. Following the signature of the Accords, Pérez de Cuéllar dispatched no more than fifty UN military observers to the region. Their mandate was simply to relay their observations back to the UN.69 Peacekeeping operations normally tended to be authorized by the UN Security Council, yet in the case of Afghanistan, the United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) came about in an exchange of letters between the president of the Security Council and the Secretary-General.70 According to Pérez de Cuéllar, it stood little chance in the Security Council. The Soviet Union would have wanted the mission to focus on monitoring compliance with non-interference, while the United States would have expected it to exclusively monitor the Soviet withdrawal. During the spring and summer of 1988, UNGOMAP established its headquarters in Islamabad and Kabul. 64

Richard Cronin and Francis Miko, Afghanistan: Status, U.S. Role and Implications of a Soviet Withdrawal (Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1988), 3. 65 H. Hubel, ‘Dokumente zu den Genfer Afghanistan-Abkommen vom April 1988,’ EuropaArchiv 43(1988), D291. 66 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 149. 67 Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 197. 68 Ibid. 69 Klass, ‘Afghanistan,’ 924. 70 Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 198.

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Meanwhile, Soviet Defence Minister Dmitry Ustinov issued a formal directive for the withdrawal even before the Geneva Accords were signed in April of 1988.71 According to Rodric Braithwaite, there remained about 110’000 Soviet troops, over 600 tanks, 1’594 armoured fighting vehicles, 2’862 armoured personnel carriers, 326 helicopters and 160 aircraft in the country.72 They were spread over 25 garrisons and 45 barracks. In May of 1988, their retreat began at Jalalabad and Kandahar. In July, it continued in Shindand near Herat and according to Richard Cronin and Francis Miko, by that time approximately 10’000 troops had been withdrawn.73 Retrospectively, the Russian General Staff estimates that by February 1989, the Red Army had suffered 13’833 casualties, 49’985 wounded and approximately 311 soldiers missing in action.74 During the summer of 1988, Pakistani President Mohammad Zia ul-Haq then approached Yuli Vorontsov, the Soviet ambassador to Kabul, and signaled to him that he would support a future Afghan government that would be composed of one third PDPA, one third “moderate” opposition and one third from the so-called “Peshawar Seven,” the officially recognized mujahideen parties that had operated from Pakistan.75 Vorontsov passed this message on to the Soviet Politburo and received a approving response. Unfortunately, Zia ul-Haq was killed in a plane crash on 17 August 1988 – the details of which remain unclear – and the initiative faltered. In December of 1988, UN Secretary-General Javier Pérez de Cuéllar then made a second attempt to encourage the formation of a transitional government and arranged a meeting between Vorontsov and mujahideen leaders, including Burhanuddin Rabbani from the Jam’iyyat-eIslami, in Saudi Arabia.76 Over the course of the following months, Vorontsov also met with representatives of the Shi’a mujahideen in Iran and Turkey, yet he achieved little by way of actual progress.77 Perhaps because of this, Mikhail Gorbachev proposed a so-called “Intra-Afghan Dialogue,” an exclusively Afghan gathering between the regime 71 Braithwaite, ‘The Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan,’ accessed 23 January 2024. 72 Ibid. 73 Cronin and Miko, ‘Afghanistan,’ 3. 74 The Russian General Staff, The Soviet-Afghan War, 309. 75 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 155. 76 Ibid. 77 Y.M. Vorontsov, ‘Report concerning the current political situation inside Afghanistan and the possibilities of solving the Afghan question,’ 3 February 1989, CWIHP, translated by Todd Hammond and Derek Paton, http://digitalarchive.wilsoncenter.org/document /113128.

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and its various opponents, in December of 1988. The idea was to resolve the ongoing differences between the Afghan regime and the mujahideen without the involvement of the Soviet Union, which was in the midst of its withdrawal operations, yet also without any outside interference from the likes of the UN, Pakistan or the United States.78 This notion is important to bear in mind, because although the mujahideen initially rejected this idea, the UN revived it in 1991 and the Swiss government eventually deferred to it in its own attempts to mediate between the conflict parties. There were two main reasons why the mujahideen rejected it at the time. The first was Najibullah’s ruthlessness both as president, as well as formerly as head of the notorious KHAD. KHAD had imprisoned and tortured countless regime opponents over the course of the 1980s. As a result, the mujahideen categorically refused to work with its former director. The second was that the Soviet Union continued to supply Najibullah with both military and non-military aid throughout this period.79 The imperative for Najibullah to compromise was therefore not acute. However, as it turned out, the further the Soviet withdrawal progressed, the more it became apparent that opposition to Najibullah not only came from the mujahideen, but also from within his own ranks. On 15 February 1989, a little over nine years since their initial invasion, the last Soviet troops left Afghanistan without having achieved their initial objectives.80 Already during the fall of 1988, Minister of Defence, General Shahnawaz Tanai, and Colonel Seid Muhammad Gulabzoi staged the first of two regime-internal military coups against Najibullah.81 Gulabzoi had already been amongst a group of plotters who had staged an unsuccessful coup against Hafizullah Amin in 1979. As the first of two coups against Amin in 1979 had been, this first of two coups against Najibullah was unsuccessful. Following the coup, Najibullah imposed martial law across the country on 20 February 1989. At the same time, he launched a far-reaching purge of his own party.82 The purge included Mohammad Zeary, the head of the PDPA’s recruitment branch and Ismail Danesh, the Minister of Education. Prime Minister Mohammad Hasan Sharq, not a member of the PDPA himself, retained his post. Most new 78

Barnett Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan: From Buffer State to Failed State (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1995), 102. 79 N.a., ‘Correspondence to Secretary of State Klaus Jacobi,’ 28 March 1991, E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR. 80 Bowker, Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War, 136. 81 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 157. 82 N.a., ‘Afghanistan: Offizieller Besuch des Österreichischen Vizekanzlers und Aussenministers Aloïs Mock vom 8./9. März 1989,’ 28 February 1989, E2010–01A#1996/396#1*, CH-BAR.

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members of his new cabinet pertained to the Khalq faction of the PDPA. The idea behind this was to prevent another coup from the within the faction itself. Yet a second coup by General Tanai in March of 1990 demonstrated that despite the purge and the imposition of martial law in early 1989, Najibullah remained vulnerable to attacks from within his own ranks. This time, Tanai even joined forces with the mujahideen. More specifically, he joined forces with Gulbuddin Hekmatyar. In response, Najibullah had arrested up to 137 army officers loyal to Tanai.83 By March of 1990, the atmosphere had become so tense that Tanai and Najibullah no longer attended the same meetings and Tanai refused to enter the presidential residence for fear of arrest.84 He launched his second armed bid for power on 7 March 1990, ordering the air force to bomb the presidential residence.85 This coup also failed within several hours and Tanai defected to Pakistan. The Pakistani government, meanwhile, continued to support the mujahideen in violation of the Geneva Accords and the Soviet Union lodged numerous complaints to that effect with the UNGOMAP between 1989 and 1990. President Zia ul-Haq’s successor, Ghulam Ishaq Khan, on the other hand, accused Afghanistan of similarly violating the Geneva Accords, while both the Soviet Union and the United States categorically refused to sign a formal agreement to end military support to their respective clients.86 After the completion of the Soviet withdrawal in February that year, the United States urged the UN to reduce its monitoring mission and on 15 March 1990, UNGOMAP was discontinued for lack of agreement within the Security Council.87 4 Conclusion: the Afghan Civil War Continues despite the Soviet Withdrawal Overall, the Soviet withdrawal had been relatively well planned and well executed. Its aftermath was anything but. It had a substantially destabilizing effect on both the Afghan regime and on the role of the United Nations in the region, as well as a disorienting impact on the Afghan resistance. At no point over the course of the Soviet occupation had the mujahideen been a united force. Yet 83 84 85 86 87

Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 184. Ibid. Ibid., 185. N.a., ‘Correspondence to Secretary of State Klaus Jacobi,’ E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR. Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, ‘Report of the Secretary-General,’ 17 October 1990, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Papers (MS 1768), Box 11, YAM-USA.

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no resistance group interpreted the Soviet withdrawal as a complete victory. Although many were pleased that the Geneva Accords had ended the Soviet occupation, the Soviet Union had left behind a Soviet-style government and continued to fund it. The question of how Afghanistan should be governed remained unanswered. On this issue, most mujahideen groups had differed since the initial stages of the Afghan civil war during the early 1970s and by 1990, they were fighting amongst themselves almost as much as against the Najibullah regime. The seven Sunni mujahideen parties that were recognized by the Pakistani government – the so-called Peshawar-7 – held a shura in Rawalpindi, Pakistan, in February of 1989.88 A shura, an Islamic institution much like a Loya Jirga, consists of a consultative and an advisory body. Its purpose was to form a provisional government in light of the Soviet withdrawal. However, the composition of the shura itself already gave rise to considerable disagreement amongst the mujahideen.89 According to Petar Troendle, the Swiss ambassador in Islamabad, the Pakistani military and intelligence services had initially pressured the Pakistani-based mujahideen parties into forming a provisional government in opposition to the Najibullah regime. At the same time, Brian Glyn Williams argues that the Pakistani authorities actively side-lined certain mujahideen factions, most notably Tajik-dominated Jam’iyyat-e-Islami, led by Burhanuddin Rabbani.90 The government of Iran campaigned heavily for the presence of Shi’a representatives at the shura, while Saudi Arabia, according to Barnett Rubin, “weighed in with huge payoffs to assure that the clients of Iran, its main rival for influence in the region, received no representation.”91 In the end, the entire shura was composed of delegates from the so-called “Peshawar Seven.” Not even the former King, Zaher Shah, who had been deposed in 1973 and now lived in exile in Rome, was invited to attend.92 On 10 February, five days before the completion of the Soviet withdrawal, the shura finally met in a vast government-sponsored transit center for religious pilgrims and on 23 February, after two weeks of heated debate, it announced the composition of the so-called Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan (IIGA).93 Most major ministerial posts went to representatives from the Pesha88 Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 103. 89 N.a., ‘Afghanistan nach dem 15. Februar,’ 24 April 1989, E2010–01A#1996/396#1*, CH-BAR. 90 Brian Glyn Williams, ‘Afghanistan after the Soviets: From Jihad to Tribalism,’ Small Wars & Insurgencies 25(2014), 938. 91 Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan,’ 155. 92 Ibid., 156. 93 N.a., ‘Afghanistan: Offizieller Besuch des Österreichischen Vizekanzlers und Aussenministers Aloïs Mock,’ E2010–01A#1996/396#1*, CH-BAR; Cordovez and Harrison, Out of Afghanistan 383; Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan,’ 154. Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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war Seven. Sebghatullah Mujaddedi of the Afghan National Liberation Front became interim president and Abdul Rasul Sayyaf of Ittehad-al-Islami (Islamic Union), became prime minister.94 Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of Hezb-iIslami/Hekmatyar, was made chief commander of the IIGA’s unified armed forces. Yet as quickly became apparent, neither the IIGA nor its armed forces were as unified as they made themselves out to be.95 Neither were they universally accepted as an interim government, an issue that Ahmad Shah Massoud already pointed out in correspondence to American President Ronald Reagan in September of 1988.96 The IIGA was not only unrepresentative of the ethnic composition of Afghan society. It did not even exercise the functions of a government in exile. It was much more like another mujahideen alliance in its composition and function. Some, such as Barnett Rubin, argue that it did not even succeed in this and that it “exacerbated rather than resolved conflicts among the mujahideen.”97 Finally, the IIGA had to first regain Afghan territory.98 Beginning in the spring of 1989, the IIGA launched a series of military operations across the border into Afghanistan, the most important one being an attack against the city of Jalalabad.99 Jalalabad was strategically located near the Pakistani border and convenient for the Peshawar-based mujahideen to reach, seeing as they already controlled the main highway from Peshawar up until the outskirts of the city.100 Under the command of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the armed forces of the IIGA launched an assault on the city on 7 March. Afghan President Najibullah immediately requested outside support from the Soviet Union, much like during the time of the Soviet occupation and not so different from Hafizullah Amin, who had repeatedly asked for Soviet support against the mujahideen in line with the 1978 Afghan-Soviet FCMA during 1979. As during the spring of 1979, the Politburo denied these requests on 10 March 1989.101

94

N.a., ‘Afghanistan: Offizieller Besuch des Österreichischen Vizekanzlers und Aussenministers Aloïs Mock,’ E2010–01A#1996/396#1*, CH-BAR. 95 Williams, ‘Afghanistan after the Soviets,’ 938. 96 Ahmad Shah Massoud, ‘Correspondence to Ronald Reagan: Recognition of the Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan,’ 22 September 1988, CO 002 Afghanistan, Democratic Republic of, Box 36–38, RRA-USA. 97 Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan,’ 154. 98 Ibid., 156. 99 Braithwaite, Afgantsy, 296; Baczko and Dorronsoro, ‘United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGMAP),’ 272. 100 Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan,’ 156. 101 Braithwaite, Afghantsy, 296. Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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To the genuine surprize of most observers, however, the Jalalabad campaign failed.102 The government troops stationed in and around the city did not defect to the IIGA as anticipated and neither did the local population. Rather, the Swiss embassy in Islamabad reported to Berne that the population actively participated in the defence of the city.103 As part of the armed assault on Jalalabad, Gulbuddin Hekmatyar had anticipated armed support from Tajik commander Ahmad Shah Massoud. His advance from the northern Panjshir region would have intercepted government supply lines from the Soviet Union.104 Yet Massoud did not comply with Hekmatyar’s request for assistance, because his own party, Jam’iyyat-e-Islami, had not been represented at the IIGA and in fact, Hekmatyar had repeatedly interrupted Massoud’s own supply lines from Pakistan in the past. To add to Massoud’s refusal, pro-communist Uzbek militias led by Abdul Rashid Dostum, who had collaborated with the Afghan regime for years, opted to protect the government’s supply lines from the Soviet Union.105 Come August of that year, Massoud even launched his own armed assault on Hekmatyar’s forces, but by mid-October – at which point heavy snowfall began to interfere with the ongoing hostilities – neither side had won a decisive victory and the Najibullah regime was still in power.106 The purge of the PDPA and the imposition of martial law had briefly allowed Najibullah to unify his own ranks, as the IIGA failed both to mount credible political opposition and a unified military campaign against the regime.107 Throughout this time, Najibullah also continued to receive arms, ammunition, fuel and basic foodstuffs from the Soviet Union to sustain his regime.108 Under these circumstances, it became clear that the Geneva Accords of 1988 could not restore peace to Afghanistan. By leaving the fate of the Afghan regime uncertain on purpose, the accords essentially left the root cause of the crisis untouched. Throughout the 1980s, the UN refused to include the Afghan refugees and the Afghan mujahideen in the Geneva Talks for fear of setting a precedent in the UN’s relations to non-state actors. At the same time, the UN implicitly recognized the Soviet-sponsored Afghan regime by including it in the negotiations. What was more, between 1986 and 1988, the Cold War superpowers became increasingly important behind the scenes in negotiating the Soviet withdrawal, despite the fact that neither of them were official parties to 102 Williams, ‘Afghanistan after the Soviets,’ 938. 103 N.a., ‘Afghanistan nach dem 15. Februar,’ E2010–01A#1996/396#1*, CH-BAR. 104 Williams, ‘Afghanistan after the Soviets,’ 938. 105 Ibid. 106 Rubin, ‘The Fragmentation of Afghanistan,’ 160. 107 N.a., ‘Patt-Situation in Afghanistan,’ 27 September 1989, E2010–01A#1996/396#1*, CH-BAR. 108 Ibid.

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the talks. Eventually, they both agreed to act as guarantors to the agreement, but both continued to support the opposing sides of the ensuing civil war. As discussed, the Swiss government was not involved in the Geneva Talks during this time. Besides its continued humanitarian assistance to Afghan refugees, described in chapter three, there is no evidence of Swiss involvement as mediators or negotiators in Afghanistan between 1986 and 1990. During a parliamentary debate in March of 1987, Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert announced that since 1986, Switzerland had donated over 5.5 million Swiss francs in direct humanitarian aid to the country.109 At the same time, he passed judgment on the Geneva Talks and argued that in the long term, there could be no solution without the participation of the mujahideen. Having lost the 1986 referendum on UN membership, there was little that Switzerland could do and the CSCE, of which Switzerland remained an active member, had no instruments to do so either, Afghanistan being a non-member state. There also appeared to be no intention on the part of the Swiss authorities to become further involved. Yet this changed unexpectedly in 1990. 109 Henri Stranner, Basler Zeitung, ‘Afghanistan-Konflikt: Konsens zwischen Bundesrat und Parlament,’ 12 March 1987, Press Collection, CH-SBA.

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Chapter 7

Swiss Mediation in Afghanistan, 1990–1992 During the fall of 1989 – half a year after the departure of the Soviet armed forces – Paul Bucherer, the director of the Swiss-based foundation Bibliotheca Afghanica, returned to Afghanistan for the first time in ten years. Prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979, Bucherer had visited the country repeatedly for the purpose of historic and ethnographic research, whilst cultivating close personal ties to high-level political figures on both sides of the conflict, as well as to the royal family.1 Bucherer was a private citizen teaching architecture at a professional school in Liestal, in the canton of Basel-Landschaft. His interest in Afghanistan dated back to his student days. Beginning in 1968, he started to collect and to archive books and literature on the country.2 In 1971, he traveled to Afghanistan for the first time, and thereafter returned frequently after the coup of 1973.3 In 1975, the archive became publicly accessible under the name of Bibliotheca Afghanica with the aim of promoting research and teaching on Afghan geography, culture, history, politics, and society.4 It offered regular lectures, seminars and exhibitions for the interested public and in 1983, four years after the Soviet invasion, Bucherer transformed the archive into a foundation, funded by private donors under the supervision of the Eidgenössisches Departement des Inneren (EDI) – Swiss Federal Ministry of the Interior.5 Following his visits to Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal in 1989, Bucherer reported to the board of his foundation that he had been approached by various personal acquaintances with the unexpected request that the ­Bibliotheca Afghanica mediate in finding a political solution to the ongoing hostilities outside of the UN. Unable to fund such an enterprise by itself, however, the board of the Bibliotheca Afghanica advised Bucherer to redirect them to the Swiss Foreign Ministry, the FDFA. The FDFA had recently created 1 Paul Bucherer, interviewed by Liliane Stadler, 16 October 2018. 2 Lorenz Fischer, ‘Die Afghanen nicht vergessen!’ Vaterland, 22 February 1983, Press Collection, CH-SBA. 3 Esther Jundt, ‘Ein Archiv als Friedensvermittler,’ Basellandschaftliche Zeitung, 16 March 1992, Press Collection, CH-SBA. 4 N.a., ’31.1.1984. Stiftung Bibliotheca Afghanica,’ Amtsblatt des Kantons Basel-Landschaft, 23 February 1984, Press Collection, CH-SBA. 5 N.a., ‘Gesammeltes Wissen über Afghanistan,’ Aargauer Tagblatt, 28 March 1984, Press Collection, CH-SBA; in February of 2023, the archives of the Bibliotheca Afghanica were integrated into the collections of the Basel University Library, where they remain open to the public. © Liliane Stadler, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004690660_009 Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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a Service for Questions of Peace (Dienst für Friedensfragen). Its first director was Ulrich Lehner, to whom Bucherer and several of his contacts now turned.6 First to act upon the board’s advice was Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil, who personally visited Switzerland in August of 1990. As part of his visit, he deposited a formal petition at the FDFA in Berne, inviting the Swiss government to mediate between the communist regime of President Najibullah and the various groups of mujahideen.7 Second was Jalil Shams, the counsellor of the former Afghan King, Zaher Shah, who had been toppled in a military coup in 1973. Later that year, Shams similarly channelled a request for mediation to the FDFA through the Bibliotheca Afghanica.8 Third, Pir Ishaq Gailani, a personal representative of Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, the president of IIGA in Peshawar, communicated his interest to Paul Bucherer during the fall of 1990 and Bucherer referred him to the Swiss government.9 1

Paul Bucherer, the Bibliotheca Afghanica and Track Two Diplomacy

Instances such as this, where non-state or civil society actors take on diplomatic roles between state and non-state conflict parties, are gradually coming to the attention of both historians and international relations scholars.10 According to Richard Langhorne, such actors can play significant roles when “crises seem to lie beyond the control of governments or the relevant intergovernmental organizations.”11 This phenomenon is sometimes referred to as track two diplomacy, meaning diplomacy conducted via private channels. Lior Lehrs has recently also introduced the term “private peace entrepreneurs” to capture this trend. According to Lehrs, whereas track two diplomacy is a fairly broad-based term, a private peace entrepreneur is “a private citizen with no official authority, who initiates diplomatic correspondence with official representatives from 6

7 8 9 10 11

Ulrich Lehner, interviewed by Liliane Stadler, 18 September 2019; author’s translation from “Dienst für Friedensfragen”; Paul Bucherer, ‘Vorläufiger Bericht über die Reise nach und den Aufenthalt in Kabul vom 17. Bis 25. März 1991,’ 27 March 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Bucherer, ‘Vorläufiger Bericht über die Reise nach und den Aufenthalt in Kabul vom 17. Bis 25. März 1991,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Ibid. Ibid. Sara Hellmüller, ‘The Role of Civil Society Actors in Peacemaking and Peacebuilding,’ in Routledge Handbook of Peace, Security and Development, edited by Fen Osler Hampson, Alpaslan Özerdem, Jonathan Kent (London: Routledge, 2020), 415. Richard Langhorne, ‘The Diplomacy of Non-State Actors,’ Diplomacy & Statecraft 16(2005), 332.

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the opposing sides during a conflict, in order to promote a conflict resolution process” without an official mandate to negotiate.12 Initiatives of private peace entrepreneurs have thus far been documented during the so-called “Troubles” in Northern Ireland, the 1970 peace agreement between Egypt and Israel, as well as in Apartheid South Africa, among others.13 Paul Bucherer’s role in the Afghan crisis of the early 1990s fits well with Lehrs’ definition of private peace entrepreneurs, as he repeatedly established contacts between state and non-state actors during this period with a view to negotiating a peaceful resolution to the ongoing civil war. In doing so, he came into contact with government representatives from Switzerland, Pakistan and the United States, with representatives from intergovernmental organizations such as the UN, yet also with government representatives whose legitimacy was widely contested. The legitimacy of the Soviet-installed Afghan regime was called into question both by the mujahideen and by governments across the world, who refused to grant their recognition. The mujahideen themselves were non-state actors, neither nominated, elected or internationally recognized. What was more, none of these actors operated in a vacuum and there were multiple competing avenues of mediation, which various conflict parties explored at different times. The previous chapter has discussed the continued involvement of the UN in Afghanistan into the early 1990s. After 1988, there is also evidence of negotiations between the Afghan regime and select groups of mujahideen, of talks with other Muslim countries, with the PLO and most recently, with the German Social Democratic Party (SPD), which involved the former Chancellor of the Federal Republic of Germany, Willy Brandt.14 The changing constellation not only of conflict parties but of mediators and the resulting tension between mediators is a phenomenon that future research should continue to explore. The focus of the present volume is on Swiss foreign policy in the context of the late Cold War, on the uneasy relationship between neutrality, solidarity and multilateralism, as well as on Switzerland’s relationship with the United Nations. The present chapter therefore focuses primarily on the interactions between the conflict parties with

12 13 14

Lior Lehrs, ‘Private Peace Entrepreneurs in Conflict Resolution Processes,’ International Negotiation 21(2016), 382; 386. Ibid., 399. Guntram von Schenck, ’18. Kapitel aus den Lebenserinnerungen von Dr. Guntram von Schenck,’ n.d., Ordner von Botschafter Dr. G. von Schenck: Dokumente zu den Vermittlungs-Bemühungen der SPD (Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands) unter Willi Brandt, H.-J. Wischnewski, unterstützt von Genscher und Kohl, zur Friedensfindung in Afghanistan 1991–1992, CH-SBA.

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the Swiss government, the United Nations and on the unexpected role of Paul Bucherer as a private peace entrepreneur. As early as 1990, it became evident that while both representatives from the Afghan regime and from the mujahideen sought mediation outside of the UN, they also continued to engage with the UN as a mediator. On 21 November 1990, President Najibullah paid a personal visit to Switzerland. The New York Times reported that he met with Afghan guerrilla leaders at the UN European headquarters in Geneva.15 The Neue Zürcher Zeitung speculated – correctly as it later turned out – that Sayyid Ahmad Pir Gailani, founder of Mahaz-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan was among the mujahideen delegation.16 However, as the venue of their meeting already suggested, this was a UN, rather than a Swiss initiative and the absence of coordination between the two was indicative of a trend in Swiss-UN relations over Afghanistan. On 7 November 1989, the UN General Assembly had passed a resolution requesting “the Secretary-General to encourage and facilitate the early realization of a comprehensive political settlement in Afghanistan in accordance with the provisions of the Geneva Agreements.”17 This was remarkable for two reasons. First, throughout the Geneva Talks, the Secretary-General had emphasized article II, paragraph 7 of the UN Charter, according to which “Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the jurisdiction of any state.”18 Second, most observers, including the Secretary-General himself, actually expected the Afghan regime to collapse soon after the withdrawal of the Soviet armed forces.19 Nevertheless, on 7 November, he initiated discussions with Afghan Prime Minister Mohammad Hasan Sharq and three days later, he met Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Jam’iyyat-e-Islami.20 On 15 March 1990, a little over a week after the abortive Tanai-Hekmatyar coup against the Najibullah regime, he established the Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP). The office was headed by Benon Sevan, who had previously 15 16 17 18 19 20

New York Times, ‘Afghans’ President Meets Rebels,’ 22 November 1990, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. NZZ, ‘Treffen des afghanischen Präsidenten mit Opponenten: Zufriedenheit Najibullahs mit Gesprächsergebnis in Genf, 21 November 1990,’ Press Collection, CH-SBA. UN General Assembly, ‘44/15 – The Situation in Afghanistan and its Implications for International Peace and Security,’ 1 November 1989, http://www.securitycouncilreport.org/atf /cf/%7B65BFCF9B-6D27-4E9C-8CD3-CF6E4FF96FF9%7D/Afgh%20ARES44%2015.pdf. United Nations, ‘Charter of the United Nations,’ 26 June 1945, https://www.un.org/en /about-us/un-charter/full-text. Pérez de Cuéllar, Pilgrimage for Peace, 200. Ibid., 201.

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served with the UNGOMAP peacekeeping mission.21 Hence, it became apparent that at the time that Paul Bucherer was beginning to receive requests for mediation, the UN was setting in motion its own extensive mediation machinery. The present chapter argues that the while the Swiss authorities ultimately began to view the Afghan crisis as a decisive opportunity to showcase Switzerland’s foreign policy doctrine of Neutrality and Solidarity, their attempts to mediate in Afghanistan after 1990 collided with the UN’s competing attempts to mediate. The fact that the two initiatives coincided but did not overlap also became evident during Najibullah’s visit to Switzerland in November of 1990, where he visited both the UN and a delegation of Swiss parliamentarians on the same day. He did not meet with the Federal Council, as Abdul Wakil’s request for mediation was still being processed. Neither did he appear in any way to link the two initiatives. Rather, when meeting with the Committee on Foreign Affairs of the National Assembly, the lower house of parliament, he lectured the councillors on his own peace plans, which involved organizing a Loya Jirga and a transitional government to prepare elections for a new government.22 Felix Auer, one of the councillors present, later suggested that it had been a “monologue,” rather than a dialogue and the Journal de Genève commented that curiously, he did not repeat his government’s request for Swiss mediation.23 It is therefore not entirely clear from the existing records, whether the regime’s request for Swiss mediation had originated with the president or the foreign minister. Since the previous year, there had also been rumours of a new and possibly large-scale UN-mediated conference on Afghanistan – to be held in Switzerland but hosted by the UN. In January 1989, the FDFA had received hints to that effect from a Swiss academic, Professor Nicolas Jéquier. According to internal FDFA memoranda, Jéquier entertained regular correspondence with members 21 22

23

Pérez de Cuéllar, ‘Report of the Secretary-General,’ 17 October 1990, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar Papers (MS 1768), Box 11, YAM-USA. Paul Bucherer, ‘Teilnehmer des Gesprächs vom Mittwoch 21 November 1990, 16:30 Uhr im Bundesrats-Zimmer, Bundeshaus Wandelhalle 1. Stock mit seiner Exzellenz, dem Staatspräsidenten der Republik Afghanistan Dr. Mohammad Najibullah,’ 20 November 1990, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA; Felix Auer, ‘Afghanistan: Parlamentariertreffen mit Präsident Najibullah vom 21.11.90,’ 24 January 1991, Box 6-1/3 Friedensfindung, CH-SBA; N.a., ‘Notiz: Empfang des Staatspräsidenten der Republik Afghanistan, Dr. Mohammed Najibullah, durch Mitglieder der Kommission für auswärtige Angelegenheiten des Nationalrates am 21. November 1990, 16:30h im Parlamentsgebäude,’ 29 November 1990, E2023A#1999/138#2966*, CH-BAR. NZZ, ‘Friedensgesten im Konflikt um Afghanistan: Die Sondierungen Präsident Najibullahs in der Schweiz,’ 30 November 1990, Press Collection, CH-SBA.

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of the Afghan elite who had chosen to live in exile in Europe after the 1973 coup against King Zaher Shah. Some of them also maintained ties to Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, from whom they had gathered that the Secretary-General was about to announce a Loya Jirga of 100 to 800 people.24 According to Jéquier, there was a possibility that the Secretary-General might approach the Swiss government to host this gathering in view of Switzerland’s long-standing reputation for hosting international conferences. However, on 26 November of that year, five days after Najibullah’s visit to Switzerland, the former Afghan king, Zaher Shah published his own peace plan for Afghanistan. Similar to the proposal that Najibullah had described to the committee on foreign affairs of the Swiss National Assembly and similar to what the FDFA had gathered from Professor Jéquier, this plan too involved the meeting of a Loya Jirga. More specifically, the plan proposed several places, where such a gathering might be held, including Afghanistan itself, but also Egypt, Turkey, Switzerland or Austria. The former king’s role in Afghan politics was contested by this point. Among the general public, he was generally well liked. Some traditionalist mujahideen resistance groups even favoured his return to resume his role as king. Some argue that the Najibullah regime and certain Soviet advisors may also have entertained the notion of Zaher Shah serving as a figurehead after the Soviet withdrawal. However, a number of prominent resistance groups, including Jam’iyyat-e-Islami, Hezb-i-Islami/Hekmatyar and Ittehad-al-Islami, who had gained both power and influence over the course of the Soviet occupation, resisted his return. It was unclear, whether or not mediation of any kind could lead to agreement among the mujahideen on this point. In a cable to the relevant Swiss embassies dated 5 December, Klaus Jacobi, who had succeeded Edouard Brunner as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs in 1989, therefore suggested that it should be made known that Switzerland was prepared to host such a gathering if two conditions were met. In line with the criteria for good offices that former Secretary of State Raymond Probst had formulated in 1958, Jacobi wrote that Switzerland would be prepared to act as a host, if all Afghan conflict parties agreed and if the UN Secretary-General had no objections.25 This was important because it suggested that the FDFA was aware that multiple peace initiatives were beginning to develop at the same time, as had originally been the case following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. Particularly becoming involved in an initiative that was in competition, as opposed to alignment, with the UN was not in Switzerland’s interest. After all, 24 25

N.a., ‘Note au Chef du Département (pour information préalable éventuelle du Conseil fédéral): Afghanistan/ Bons Offices,’ 23 January 1989, E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR. Klaus Jacobi, ‘Afghanistan,’ 5 December 1990, E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR.

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the aim of Switzerland’s long-standing policy of Neutrality and Solidarity had consistently been to highlight the complementarity between Switzerland and the UN in the domain of good offices. The following day, the Swiss embassy in Washington D.C. also informed Under Secretary of State for Political Affairs Robert Kimmit about Switzerland’s readiness to host a Loya Jirga in accordance with UN plans. The day after that, the Swiss ambassador to Moscow, met with Soviet representatives to that end.26 The State Department had no objections and the Soviet Union welcomed Switzerland’s offer in principle. According to Olga Pavlenko, the Soviet Ministry of Foreign Affairs thought highly of Switzerland’s efforts to “liberate Soviet prisoners of war and bring them back home” and suggested that the Swiss authorities “continue their peace mission in this region and contribute to the reinforcement of the ‘National Reconciliation Policy.’”27 However, according to FDFA reports, the Soviet Union felt that Zaher Shah’s plans for a Loya Jirga might be premature at this stage. The IIGA not only rejected the participation of the former king at such a gathering but demanded the resignation of Najibullah and his entire cabinet before entertaining the possibility of such talks.28 What is interesting is that those representatives of the mujahideen who approached the Swiss government for mediation, none placed their requests in the context of the already ongoing efforts of the UN. In fact, it appeared as though they had deliberately approached the Swiss authorities, because Switzerland was not a UN member. However, with the exception of the IIGA, the mujahideen scarcely coordinated their interactions with outside mediators, which is why their motivations for approaching different mediators at different times is not always clear. One possible explanation for why they sought Swiss mediation specifically, was simply because they trusted Paul Bucherer’s recommendations on account of close personal ties. A second explanation is that prior to 1988, the Geneva Talks and the Geneva Accords had failed to include them, and they now sought an alternative to UN mediation. A final explanation, however, is that by involving the Swiss government, they stood to gain leverage vis-à-vis the UN in the aftermath of the Soviet withdrawal of 1989. Unlike other mediators, the Swiss government had spent decades building a reputation for neutrality and solidarity outside of the UN. What was more, on 26 27 28

N.a., ‘Correspondence to EDA – Politische Direktion,’ 6 December 1990, E2200.157–04#2000 /409#53*, CH-BAR. Pavlenko, ‘The Soviet Union and Neutral Switzerland,’ 177. N.a., ‘Afghanistan – Ihr 6483,’ 7 December 1990, E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR.

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the basis of this, the Swiss government had developed a history of humanitarian and diplomatic involvement in the Afghan crisis over the course of the 1980s. In January of 1991, therefore, Pir Ishaq Gailani, the personal representative of IIGA President Sebghatullah Mujaddedi relayed a formal request for Swiss mediation to Paul Bucherer and on 16 February 1991, Bucherer delivered it to Ulrich Lehner at the FDFA that same day. It read as follows: Bearing in mind the considerable support for human rights and humanitarian aid that the Swiss people and their government have consistently demonstrated and in accordance with the solicitousness they have shown towards the Afghan people throughout the past decade, we hope that the Swiss government will deploy all available means to help the Afghan people restore peace and security and to find a just and honourable solution to the Afghan problem, which will guarantee the self-determination of the Afghan people.29 The document was written by Gailani himself and signed by no less than 706 moderate members of the mujahideen, as well as by other prominent members of Afghan society.30 From Berne, it was immediately transmitted to Klaus Jacobi who was on an official visit to Washington D.C. at the time. Originally, the document presented Jacobi with a conundrum. If the Swiss were to accept, they might have the opportunity to demonstrate both neutrality and solidarity and to play a meaningful role in a major conflict of the late Cold War as a permanently neutral state. However, this might steer them onto a collision course with the UN. Jacobi therefore immediately sought the opinions of both the Bush Administration – which had come into office in January of 1989 – and 29

30

Pir Sayed Ishaq Gailani et al., ‘Hilfeersuchen an Volk und Regierung der Schweiz zum Zweck der Wiedergewinnung von Frieden in Afghanistan nach elf Jahren Krieg,’ 24 ­January 1991, Box 6-1/3 Friedensfindung, CH-SBA author’s translation from, “In Anbetracht des grossen Einsatzes für Menschenrechte und humanitäre Hilfe, den Volk und Regierung der Schweiz seit langem erbracht haben, und der menschlichen Anteilnahme die die Schweiz im vergangenen Jahrzehnt dem Afghanischen Volk gezeigt hat, erhoffen wir von der Schweizer Regierung, das sie alle ihr zur Verfügung stehenden Mittel einsetzt, um den kriegsgeplagten Afghanischen Volk bei der Wiedergewinnung von Friede und Sicherheit behilflich zu sein und eine gerechte und ehrenhafte Lösung des Afghanischen Problems durchzusetzen, die das Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Afghanischen Nation gewährleistet.” The original letter was written in Dari, a Farsi dialect spoken in Afghanistan, and accompanied by a French translation. Bucherer, ‘Vorläufiger Bericht,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA.

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of the United Nations, concerning this unanticipated alternative to the UN’s plans for a Loya Jirga. Back in Switzerland, Paul Bucherer proceeded to arrange a meeting between Gailani and the Afghan Mission to the UN in Geneva. This eventually paved the way for an invitation for Bucherer to meet directly with Afghan President

Illustration 1 Excerpt from a signed petition for mediation addressed to the Swiss government by Pir Ishaq Gailani in January 1991 Source: Bibliotheca Afghanica

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Illustration 1 (cont.)

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Najibullah in Kabul in March.31 The proposal that grew both out of Bucherer’s correspondence with Gailani and of his personal meeting with Najibullah was similar to the one that had already been proposed by Mikhail Gorbachev back in December of 1988, namely that of a so-called “Intra-Afghan Dialogue.” Unlike the UN-mediated Geneva Talks of 1982 to 1988, it was to take place strictly between the Afghan parties to the conflict. Further, the discussions were to be held face-to-face, rather than through an official intermediary. Finally, unlike a Loya Jirga, it was much less strict concerning the number of attendees and the political nature of the gathering. As such, there was also much less at risk of outright failure over disagreements on representation. The shura that led to the establishment of the IIGA in 1989 almost broke down over this issue on a number of occasions. However, it is important to note that both initiatives for an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” emerged independently of each other. 2

Competing Initiatives for an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue”

To resolve the issue of potential parallels between the Afghan initiatives, transmitted by Bucherer and the UN’s plans, the FDFA finally dispatched Bucherer to meet with Zaher Shah in person at his residence in Rome on 20 April. It was a remarkable meeting in two respects. First, because it was an example of the use of personal contacts and track two diplomacy. Second, this brought about an implicit agreement between the two existing initiatives on mediation in Afghanistan. Zaher Shah agreed to support the plan of an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” and welcomed Switzerland’s involvement, given its reputation for extensive experience in the domain of good offices.32 According to the former king, it should have been used as a means to secure the consent of the various mujahideen groups gradually and to then conduct peace talks on the basis of consent.33 Toward this end, he recommended a series of sequential dialogues with the diverse parties that made up the mujahideen, as well as with government representatives from Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iran.34 These talks, he stressed, should be conducted in strict confidentiality and without commentary to the press.35 Paul Bucherer, for his part, also emphasized that the plan 31 32 33 34 35

Ibid. Paul Bucherer, ‘Aktennotiz über das Treffen mit Ex-König Zaher Shah und General Wali,’ 23 April 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Bucherer, ‘Vorläufiger Bericht,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Ibid. Ibid.

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should not be interpreted as a Swiss initiative, probably so as to avoid any further competition with the UN. Apart from that, he relayed to Zaher Shah that essentially, the idea had the approval of the United States, the UN and the ­government of Iran.36 On 21 May 1991, almost exactly one month after Bucherer’s meeting with Zaher Shah, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar, the Secretary General of the United Nations, published a UN plan for Afghanistan containing the idea of an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue.” Yet what may have appeared like the result of a coordinated effort between the UN and the Swiss was not coordinated at all. The so-called FivePoint Plan stressed the importance of restoring Afghanistan’s territorial integrity, of the self-determination of its political and social systems, as well as the need for the transition to a new government. This, it emphasized, should take place based on an exclusively “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” among Afghans themselves. Outside stakeholders, on the other hand, should stop the flow of arms into the country and support the flow of financial and material aid instead.37 However, the UN plan made no mention of the role that Paul Bucherer and the FDFA had played in securing consent for the idea of an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue.” In his memoirs, Pérez de Cuéllar leaves out Switzerland’s involvement. On the same day of the publication of the UN Five Point Plan, Ulrich Lehner, Paul Bucherer, and M.D. Shabaz of the Afghan Mission to the UN in Geneva, met to discuss the next steps in this direction. According to Shabaz, Sebghatullah Mujaddedi, the president of the IIGA, Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani,38 the leader of Mahaz-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan and Maulawi Mohammad Nabi Mohammadi, the leader of Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami Afghanistan, had all informed him of their readiness to meet with representatives of the Najibullah regime to discuss forming a transitional government.39 According to Shabaz, the Najibullah regime was also prepared to participate in these discussions – in no less than two weeks’ time.40 Remarkably, however, none of these parties mentioned involving the UN, which presented a problem for the Swiss. Whereas the Swiss authorities appeared to try to involve the UN in its effort to mediate amongst

36 37 38 39 40

Bucherer, ‘Aktennotiz über das Treffen mit Ex-König Zaher Shah und General Wali,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Javier Perez de Cuéllar, ‘Statement by the Secretary-General on Afghanistan, SG/SM/4568,’ 21 May 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Not to be confused with Pir Ishaq Gailani, personal representative of Sebghatullah ­Mujaddedi. Paul Bucherer, ‘Offizielle Information aus Kabul über einen Friedensplan,’ 25 May 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Ibid.

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the conflict parties, both the regime and the mujahideen appeared to avoid coordination between UN and Swiss mediators. In mid-June 1991, Bucherer and Lehner traveled to the United States with the purpose of updating the UN and the State Department on their meeting with Shabaz and to propose that Switzerland send a delegation to the conflict region. The records of their meetings suggest that the UN did not object, yet it did not propose a joint mission either. Instead, during their meeting in New York on 17 June, Benon Sevan, the head of the OSGAP, gave Bucherer and Lehner two pieces of advice. First, he cautioned them against appearing too closely aligned with any particular party, be it the Afghan government or any particular resistance group.41 Perhaps this was in response to the fact that the IIGA appeared to favour contacts with the Swiss over contacts with the UN. He also advised that the Swiss delegation “play for time” if any of the conflict parties were to approach them with specific requests or peace plans of their own. This suggests that the UN did not actually want the Swiss to make substantial progress during their visit to the region.42 In his account of the meeting, Lehner added to this that Sevan said he would be “pleasantly surprized,” if the Swiss managed to convince Najibullah to resign. This was something that Sevan himself had been trying to achieve for two years.43 The reception that Bucherer and Lehner received in Washington D.C. was even more discouraging. On 18 and 19 June, Bucherer and Lehner met with Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia Teresita Currie Schaffner, Director for Pakistan, Afghanistan and Bangladesh Affairs Edward Abington, as well as Afghan Country Officers David Katz and Leonard Scensny.44 Some of their interlocutors cautioned Bucherer and Lehner against their upcoming visit to the region.45 Not to be discouraged and accompanied by both Bucherer and Lehner, Secretary of State Klaus Jacobi boarded the inaugural Swissair flight to New Delhi on Friday 28 June 1991, from where he proceeded to Kabul. An internal FDFA memorandum dated 28 June gave three reasons for his visit to the region. The first was to encourage the conflict parties to reconcile their differences and to find a coordinated solution. Second, to testify to the willingness of the Swiss government to contribute toward this end and third, for them to gather firsthand information about the different viewpoints and the different actors on 41 42 43 44 45

Ulrich Lehner, ‘Note à Monsieur le Secrétaire d’Etat Klaus Jacobi,’ 18 June 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Ibid. Ibid. Ulrich Lehner, ‘Note à Monsieur le Secrétaire d’Etat Klaus Jacobi,’ 19 June 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. N.a., ‘Afghanistan – Reise von Staatssekretär Klaus Jacobi – Briefing des State ­Departments,’ 17 July 1991, E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR. Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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the ground.46 Some of these actors were initially confused as to whether the Swiss were visiting on behalf or independently of the UN. There was more than one occasion during the visit, on which Jacobi, Bucherer, and Lehner had to explain that there was no Swiss peace plan as such, and they repeatedly attributed the idea of an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” to the UN. Strictly speaking, the idea had been separately discussed by Paul Bucherer and King Zaher Shah prior to the announcement of the UN’s Five Point Plan of May 199147. However, they argued that, having been approached by various conflict parties, the FDFA had subsequently decided to provide its good offices in support of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s Five Point Plan.48 What made this arrangement confusing to outsiders was that the UN at no point publicly confirmed this arrangement. Moreover, while it may have made sense in the context of Switzerland’s long-lasting effort to demonstrate the value of its neutral good offices to make up for its absence from the UN, this was not something that most observers outside of Switzerland would have known. From New Delhi, the Swiss delegation flew on to Kabul, where Jacobi met with Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil and with Benon Sevan on 30 June. Wakil appeared incredibly pleased to welcome a high-level foreign diplomat such as Jacobi to Kabul, as it doubtlessly accorded the Najibullah regime a certain degree of legitimacy.49 After meeting with Wakil, Jacobi met with Fazlulhaq Khaliqyar, who had recently become Prime Minister, and with Najibullah himself. Both supported the idea of an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” and Khaliqyar even told Jacobi that he was prepared to speak to the mujahideen without any prior conditions.50 Jacobi’s meeting with Benon Sevan was slightly less straight-forward. Contradicting what Bucherer and Lehner had gathered from M.D. Shabaz in May, Sevan began by telling Jacobi that Najibullah remained completely unacceptable to the mujahideen and that even if he was ready to speak to them, they were unwilling to speak to him.51 He also cautioned that most of the mujahideen leaders who had indicated their willingness to enter 46

N.a., ‘Note de discussion: Voyage de Monsieur le Secrétaire d’Etat Klaus Jacobi en Inde, en Afghanistan et au Pakistan, du 28.6. au 6.7.1991,’ 27 June 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 47 Ibid. 48 Ibid. 49 N.a., ‘Entretien avec M. Abdul Wakil (W), Ministre des affaires étrangères de l’Afghanistan, le 30 juin 1991 à Kaboul,’ 10 July 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 50 N.a., ‘Entretien avec M. Fazlulhaq Khaliqyar (K), Premier ministre, le 1er juillet 191 à Kaboul,’ 11 July 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA; N.a., ‘Entretien avec le Président ­Najibullah (N), le 2 juillet 1991 à Kaboul,’ 11 July 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 51 N.a., ‘Entretien avec M. Benon Sevan, Représentant personnel du Secrétaire général de l’ONU en Afghanistan et au Pakistan, le 30 juin 1991 à Kaboul,’ 11 July 1991, EDA 1 (1990– 1992), CH-SBA Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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into discussions with M.D. Shabaz in May of that year had been relatively moderate and as such they were unrepresentative especially of the more radical mujahideen parties within the IIGA. Najibullah, on the other hand, Sevan reported, was anything but prepared to step down as a precondition for an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue.”52 After all, who would take his place? The mujahideen were not a unified movement and did not have a decisive figurehead, the IIGA having failed to establish itself as a legitimate alternative to the Najibullah regime. The only person, to whom Sevan could imagine Najibullah ceding power was the former king, Zaher Shah. Yet it was highly unlikely that the latter would accept it, coming from Najibullah, who had originally been installed by the Soviet Union.53 The following day, having traveled from Kabul to Islamabad, Jacobi met Akram Zaki, the Pakistani Secretary General for Foreign Affairs.54 Zaki effectively compounded the issue by telling Jacobi that Pakistan was happy to accept any leader in Afghanistan as long as they were not installed by the Soviet Union.55 He also argued that he believed this to be the will of the Afghan people, yet he did not address Pakistan’s support for the mujahideen.56 This made it appear as though Pakistan was no more than an interested bystander, when in fact, as the West German ambassador to Pakistan confirmed to Jacobi later that day, Pakistan played a key role in the conflict and exerted substantial influence over the mujahideen.57 He added to this that Pakistani policy toward Afghanistan was determined primarily by General Asad Durani, the director of the Pakistani secret service, Inter-Services Intelligence, whom Jacobi was also scheduled to meet.58 According to the minutes of that meeting, Durani was openly irritated at Jacobi’s visit and at Switzerland’s involvement in Afghanistan.59 Like Sevan, he argued that it was impossible even to seat all of the Afghan armed groups around a single table given the climate of mutual 52 Ibid. 53 Ibid.; Paul Bucherer argues that in fact, Najibullah had signaled his readiness to cede power to former king, Zaher Shah, as early as March of 1991. He allegedly asked Bucherer to take photographs of the private rooms of the Royal Palace to demonstrate to Zaher Shah that everything was ready for his return to Kabul. Yet that no written record of his intentions were kept, because these might have threatened the stability of the regime. 54 Pakistan did not have a foreign minister at the time. 55 N.a., ‘Entretien avec M. Akram Zaki (Z), Secrétaire générale aux affaires étrangères,’ le 3 juillet 1991 à Islamabad, 15 July 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 56 Ibid. 57 N.a., ‘Entretien avec l’Ambassadeur RFA (D), le 3 juillet 1991 à Islamabad,’ 15 July 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 58 Ibid. 59 Ibid.

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distrust.60 He therefore appeared not to understand what the Swiss hoped to achieve. That evening, arguably to clarify the reasons for his visit – and despite earlier warnings from Zaher Shah to avoid publicity – Jacobi gave a widely reported press conference at the Swiss embassy in Islamabad.61 He began by reiterating that Switzerland was interested only in promoting an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” in line with the UN’s Five Point Plan.62 Yet as the press conference progressed, Jacobi’s statements became increasingly more political. The aim of the dialogue for instance, he began to argue, was ultimately to reach an agreement on a process of transition in Kabul.63 According to the Pakistani newspaper The Nation, Jacobi also said that a solution to the Afghan war could not completely disregard President Najibullah.64 In fact, “If the Afghans are as yet not ready to speak to Najibullah, we will have someone as go-between from the UN, but those who do not want such a meeting should stay out until they like.”65 In saying this, Jacobi may have alienated a number of mujahideen groups, who continued to insist on Najibullah’s resignation. He also implicitly equated the Swiss involvement in Afghanistan with the involvement of the UN, which had repeatedly disregarded the demands of the mujahideen throughout the Soviet occupation. What was more, Jacobi also confirmed all of the above without first having discussed it with representatives of the mujahideen. By the time that he reached Peshawar the following day, news of his press conference had already arrived and he received a cold reception. One of Jacobi’s first encounters was with none other than Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, the leader of the radical Hezb-i-Islami/Hekmatyar. Addressing most of the points that Jacobi had made at his press conference in Islamabad, Hekmatyar immediately made it clear that there was no way that he would work with Najibullah and that he rejected the UN Five Point Plan all-together. Instead, he expected the

60 61

Ibid. N.a., ‘Afghanistan: Schweiz will sich einschalten,’ Baseler Zeitung, 9 July 1991, Press Collection, CH-SBA; n.a., ‘Die Schweiz unterstützt Afghanistan auf dem schwierigen Weg zum Frieden,’ Basellandschaftliche Zeitung, 9 Juli 1991, Press Collection, CH-SBA. 62 N.a., ‘Jacobis Informationsreise durch Afghanistan und Pakistan: Friedensdialog noch in diesem Jahr in Gang?,’ NZZ, 9 July 1991, Press Collection, CH-SBA. 63 Frontier Post, ‘Swiss govt. Supports peace initiative on Afghanistan,’ 4 July 1991, Box 6-1/3 Friedensfindung, CH-SBA. 64 The Nation, ‘Afghan issue: Najib can’t be disregarded says Jacobi,’ 4 July 1991, Box 6-1/3 Friedensfindung,, CH-SBA. 65 Ibid.

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Kabul government to resign unconditionally.66 Burhanuddin Rabbani of the Jam’iyyat-e-Islami and Sebghatullah Mujaddedi of the IIGA, with whom Jacobi also had separate meetings that day, echoed some of these sentiments. Rabbani was adamant that Najibullah could not be included in the “Intra-Afghan Dialogue,” because he continued to receive support from the Soviet Union.

Illustration 2 Klaus Jacobi meets Gulbuddin Hekmatyar in Peshawar on 4 July 1991. Source: Bibliotheca Afghanica

In fact, as Artemy Kalinovsky has shown, the Soviet Union only agreed to cut off its military aid to the Najibullah regime when one of his primary backers in Moscow, KGB Chief Vladimir Kriuchkov, was arrested following a failed August coup attempt against Mikhail Gorbachev in 1991.67 Mujaddedi added to this that, like General Asad Durani in Islamabad, he did not consider it feasible to try to unite all of the mujahideen parties in an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” in the first place.68 The resulting picture was therefore one that differed remarkably 66 67 68

N.a., ‘Entretien avec Gulbuddin Hekmatyar (H), le 4 juillet 1991 à Peshawar,’ 15 July 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Artemy Kalinovsky, ‘The Failure to Resolve the Afghan Conflict, 1989–1992,’ in The End of the Cold War and the Third World: New Perspectives on Regional Conflict, edited by Aglaya Snetkov and Stephen Aris, 136–154 (London: Routledge, 2011), 138. N.a., ‘Entretien avec le Prof. S. Mujaddedi (M), chef du Jabhe-e-Nejat Milli, le 4 juillet 1991 à Islamabad,’ 15 July 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA.

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from the one painted by M.D. Shabaz back in May of 1991. Out of all his hosts, Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil and President Najibullah appeared to have been the only ones to welcome Jacobi and to encourage him in his effort to mediate in the Afghan conflict. Soon after returning to Switzerland and arguably in an attempt to salvage the “Intra-Afghan Dialogue,” Paul Bucherer took the initiative to prepare a new, more modest round of consultations. These were intended to begin with an even smaller circle of participants, to be gradually widened to include representatives from all sides of the conflict. By 11 July, discussions with Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil and Jalil Shams, counsellor to Zaher Shah, produced the so-called “2 + 3 Plan” to bring together three representatives of hand-picked, moderate mujahideen parties and two representatives from the Najibullah regime at a secret location in Switzerland. Given the circumstances and the opposition that the “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” continued to experience among the mujahideen, this was considerable. However, it was also slightly problematic, because it is not entirely clear whether President Najibullah was personally aware of this plan. In fact, former Swiss diplomat Marianne von Grünigen has suggested that even prior to Klaus Jacobi’s visit to the conflict region, it was not always entirely clear to what extent Najibullah was informed of ongoing consultations by his own government.69 The UN, on the other hand, was made aware when Klaus Jacobi and Benon Sevan met in Geneva on Friday 19 July. Once again, however, while the Swiss informed the UN, the UN did not offer its support. Ultimately, two high-ranking representatives from the Kabul government and three high-ranking moderate representatives of the mujahideen – all of whose names remain classified – met in Switzerland on 8 August 1991. They gathered first at the Afghanistan Archive of the Bibliotheca Afghanica in Liestal, Switzerland, and subsequently proceeded to the nearby Hotel Bad Schauenburg for their discussions.70 Paul Bucherer, Ulrich Lehner and Peter Maurer, who has since served as president of the ICRC and who served as the personal assistant to Klaus Jacobi at the time, were also present but did not take part in the deliberations.71 The operation was codenamed “OSMAN Carpet Trading Inc.” and according to Andreas Koellreuter – Viktor Sintchuck’s employer after his release from the Zugerberg and member of the Cantonal Council of 69 70 71

Marianne von Grünigen, interviewed by Liliane Stadler, 26 October 2018. N.a., ‘Intra-Afghan Dialogue,’ 7 August 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA; N.a., ‘Bericht über die erste technische Vorbesprechung des “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” in Bad Schauenburg bei Liestal vom 8.-10- August 1991,’ 14 August 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. N.a., ‘Bericht über die erste technische Vorbesprechung,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA.

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Basel-Landschaft at the time – both the hotel staff and the local police were told that they were hosting a carpet dealer conference.72 3 The August Coup against Mikhail Gorbachev and the Negative Symmetries Agreement Unfortunately, the conference quickly began to stall. The first working session began at 9:00 on 9 August, at which point the moderate delegates of the mujahideen announced that they could only speak in private capacity. The delegates from Kabul, on the other hand, claimed that they had been authorized to discuss technical matters only.73 During a second meeting that afternoon, they repeatedly refused the proposal of the mujahideen to organize a Loya Jirga and the demand that the Najibullah regime step down within a year after it was held.74 That evening, they agreed that the Kabul government would review its standpoint within one month, at which point Jalil Shams would travel to Kabul to resume the discussions. Within two weeks of his visit to Kabul, both sides would then determine a date for the formation of a common working group, which was to meet in Switzerland.75 However, after the closure of the afternoon session the representatives from Kabul changed their minds again and refused to sign the meeting’s protocol.76 It would have been difficult to imagine either Bucherer or the FDFA trying to salvage the outcome of the discussions under those circumstances. Then, within the span of ten days, not only the circumstances surrounding Switzerland’s involvement in Afghanistan, but the systemic parameters of the Afghan crisis changed irreversibly. On 19 August, KGB Chief Vladimir Kriuchkov and Soviet Army General Valentin Varennikov, who had played an important role in planning and executing the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, launched a coup against CPSU General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev.77 The degree to which economic and political reforms had begun to lag behind 72

Andres Koellreuter, interviewed by Liliane Stadler, 17 December 2018; N.a., ‘Intra-Afghan Dialogue,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 73 N.a., ‘Intra-Afghan Dialogue,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA.; N.a., ‘Bericht über die erste technische Vorbesprechung,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 74 Rashid, ‘The Afghan Resistance,’ 208; N.a., ‘Intra-Afghan Dialogue,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 75 N.a., ‘Intra-Afghan Dialogue,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA; N.a., ‘Bericht über die erste technische Vorbesprechung,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 76 Ibid. 77 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 200.

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economic and political destabilization in the Soviet Union has been extensively documented.78 Archie Brown has argued that by 1988, Mikhail Gorbachev “had consciously set about dismantling the Soviet system.”79 However, “At no time did he wish to see the disappearance of the Soviet state.”80 Alex Pravda has since maintained that the collapse of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 involved two intertwined processes, “the transformation of the communist regime and the disintegration of the highly centralized Union.”81 The liberalization and restructuring of the Soviet economy came from the top, while the Union, according to Pravda, was undermined from below.82 Between 1989 and 1991, the governments of various Soviet republics began to declare their own laws and to develop their own institutions. Tax revenue, for instance, no longer reached the Soviet treasury.83 From 1989 to 1990, the republics in the Baltics and in the Caucasus began to press for independence between late 1990 and 1991, as did the Ukraine and even Russia itself.84 The fact that the Soviet Politburo had refrained from interfering during the uprisings in Hungary and Poland in 1989, as well as the fall of the Berlin Wall in November of that year arguably sent a crucial signal to many Soviet republics themselves. The so-called Union Treaty, which was due to be signed on 20 August, was intended to reform the Soviet Union along the lines of a confederation, yet in light of the attempted coup, it was never signed. The coup itself failed and Mikhail Gorbachev remained in power until his resignation in December of 1991. Yet already beginning in August of 1991, the Soviet Union began to disintegrate. This had significant consequences for the ongoing conflict in Afghanistan, as well as for the involvement of the Swiss and the UN. First of all, following the attempted coup and a re-shuffle amongst the leadership of the Soviet armed forces, the Soviet Union and the United States announced on 13 ­September that they would both discontinue their support to the Afghan conflict parties.85 By the end of November, the governments of Pakistan, Saudi Arabia 78 Brown, ‘The Gorbachev revolution and the end of the Cold War,’ 248. 79 Ibid. 80 Ibid. 81 Alex Pravda, ‘The collapse of the Soviet Union, 1990–1991,’ in The Cambridge History of the Cold War (Volume III), edited by Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 356. 82 Ibid. 83 Kalinovsky, A Long Goodbye, 200. 84 Pravda, ‘The collapse of the Soviet Union,’ 1990–1991, 357. 85 N.a., ‘Joint Soviet-American Statement on Afghanistan,’ Current Digest of the Soviet Press, 37 (1991), accessed 23 January 2024. N.a., ‘Statement by the Spokesman of the Secretary-General,’ 13 September 1991, E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR.

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and Iran also indicated their support for this so-called arrangement on “Negative Symmetry” – meaning simultaneous reductions in arms supplies that had been vital both for the Najibullah regime and for the mujahideen.86 The final cut-off date for military aid, it was agreed, was to be 1 January 1992. This was devastating for both the Afghan regime and for the Afghan resistance, as it ultimately threatened their material existence, as well as their internal cohesion. What it also meant was that as the United States and the Soviet Union began to coordinate their retreat from the Afghan war, mediators such as the Swiss and the UN became more important outside contacts for the conflict parties. On 22 August, the final day of the Soviet coup, Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil paid another visit to Klaus Jacobi and confided in him that he was now of the opinion that Najibullah would have to be replaced.87 Najibullah Mujaddedi – the son of the president of the IIGA, Sebghatullah Mujaddedi – also reached out to the FDFA at around the same time. It is unclear whether they concurrently reached out to the UN. However, what gradually became apparent was that the information exchange between the UN and the Swiss authorities suffered after the “Negative Symmetries” agreement. Without American and Soviet military aid, pressure mounted on both the regime and the resistance to secure other forms of outside support to secure their survival. It also increased the pressure on both the Swiss and on the UN to find a diplomatic solution. What complicated matters for the Swiss was that at the same time as it was withdrawing its military support from the mujahideen, the United States began to side openly with the UN over the issue of mediation. On 11 September, Deputy Assistant Secretary for South Asia Teresita Currie Schaffner told Stephan Nellen of the Swiss embassy in Washington that, “Frankly, we think that an active role by Switzerland or anyone else will not help matters. We are not going to deal with Najibullah or his representatives and are not interested in efforts to arrange such a meeting.”88 In other words, whilst the United States curtailed the flow of weapons to the mujahideen, it continued to propagate the stance of a selective part of fundamentalist groups that an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” could only take place without the Afghan regime. The Swiss, on the other hand, had relied exclusively on the support of moderate members of the 86 87 88

Barnett Rubin, ‘Post-Cold War State Disintegration: The Failure of International Conflict Resolution in Afghanistan,’ Journal of International Affairs 46(1993), 485. Christian Hauswirth, ‘Besuch des afghanischen Aussenministers Abdul Wakil bei Staatssekretär Jacobi (JAC) vom 22. August 1991,’ 19 September 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. Edouard Brunner, ‘Afghanistan: (1) Die schweizerischen Bemühungen um Gesprächsvermittlung (Eure 97 und 100) und (2) der Beschluss des “arms cut-off” in Moskau vom letzten Wochenende,’ 23 September 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA.

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mujahideen in their attempt to revive the “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” in August. The Afghan regime expressly thanked the Swiss government for its good offices at a meeting of the General Assembly on 25 September and even the Soviet Union relayed its gratitude through the Swiss embassy in Moscow on 24 October.89 These diverging opinions mattered both for the prospects of the diplomatic process in Afghanistan overall, as well as for Switzerland’s involvement specifically. Above all, they complicated the relationship between the Swiss authorities and the UN. In late September, the Swiss Permanent Observer to the UN in New York met with a member of Benon Sevan’s staff at OSGAP. Sevan himself was traveling in Afghanistan and Pakistan at the time. In his absence, they discussed that the UN had begun to plan a larger meeting of thirty to fifty Afghan representatives in Switzerland, presumably in Geneva, yet without involving the Swiss government.90 FDFA documents show that Sevan had informed the Swiss authorities of this on a previous occasion and Switzerland had actually already made it known that it was prepared to host such a gathering on its territory.91 However, at the time, Sevan had also advised the Swiss authorities to conduct themselves as discretely as possible. In a tone similar to that of Teresita Currie Schaffner, he had complained to FDFA staff that in recent talks with UN humanitarian aid personnel in Kabul, Paul Bucherer had apparently reiterated that Switzerland was operating “within the framework of the UN-Plan.”92 This was nothing new, as the Swiss had been repeating this frame of reference ever since Jacobi’s visit to the region in June of that year. Yet internal FDFA documents concluded that, “Perhaps by giving this remark a certain emphasis, S. [Sevan] wanted to imply that whatever the solution in Afghanistan, it was to be primarily the ‘Chasse gardée,’ the preserve, of the UN.”93 On 18 October, Pérez de Cuéllar publicly announced the UN’s plans for an intra-Afghan conference to prepare a Loya Jirga. In an internal FDFA document, Jacobi commented that the FDFA had not been included in this process,

89 90 91 92 93

N.a., ‘Correspondence to Klaus Jacobi,’ 25 September 1991, E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR; N.a., ‘Correspondence to Politische Abteilung III, Dienst für Friedensfragen,’ 24 October 1991, E2200.157–04#2000/409#53*, CH-BAR. N.a., ‘Correspondence to Klaus Jacobi,’ E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR. N.a., ‘Correspondence to Secretary of State Jacobi,’ 4 October 1991, E2010–01A#2000/217#5*, CH-BAR. Ibid. Ibid.

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having heard about this additional step from third parties instead.94 This trend of parallel Swiss and UN initiatives continued as the Afghan National Liberation Front, the moderate party of IIGA President Sebghatullah Mujaddedi asked for discussions with the Afghan regime in Switzerland shortly thereafter.95 On 27 October, Sebghatullah Mujaddedi’s son Najibullah Mujaddedi and his associate General Hamidullah met with representatives of the FDFA at a restaurant in Zurich. Also present, but in separate rooms were Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil and Defence Minister General Ghulam Faruq Yaqubi.96 Mujaddedi had asked for this meeting for two reasons. First, because he faulted the UN for lack of concrete progress and second, because the Afghan National Liberation Front had gathered from the Afghan media that Najibullah might be prepared to step down in favour of Sebghatullah Mujaddedi.97 Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil did not explicitly deny these reports, yet again, it is unclear whether he acted independently or on behalf of Najibullah at this stage. Prior to confirming anything, he demanded that the regime be given protective guarantees from the UN and the Soviet Union, the United States, as well as from a representative part of the mujahideen.98 Having obtained no concrete results in Zurich, a moderate group of mujahideen led by Burhanuddin Rabbani then traveled to Moscow for the first time and met with Foreign Minister Boris Pankin on 15 November – Edouard Shevardnadze having stepped down in December of 1990.99 In a joint Afghan-Soviet statement that day, the Soviet Union publicly declared itself in favour of a democratically elected government in Afghanistan for the first time, as well as in favour of elections to be monitored by the UN and the OIC.100 In other words, having decided to withdraw its troops and its military support from the Afghan regime in 1989 and having agreed to stop supplying it in September of 1991, the Soviet Union now withdrew its political support as well. The more fundamentalist members of the IIGA, including Abdul Rasul Sayyaf of Ittehad-al-Islami, Mawlawi Yunis Khalis and Gulbuddin Hekmatyar refused to travel to Moscow 94

Klaus Jacobi, ‘Afghanistankonferenz der UNO,’ 18 October 1991, E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR. 95 Ibid. 96 Peter Sutter, ‘Aktennotiz: Geheimtreffen zwischen einer Vertretung der afghanischen Regierung und der Opposition in Zürich (16./27.10.1991),’ 29 October 1991, EDA 1 (1990– 1992), CH-SBA. 97 Ibid. 98 Ibid. 99 Rubin, The Search for Peace in Afghanistan, 126. 100 N.a., ‘Text of Soviet-Afghan Statement Coordinated,’ 15 November 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA.

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and were not represented in the mujahideen delegation. It appears as though the Afghan regime was not consulted either. It was most likely for this reason that president Najibullah reached out to Secretary of State Klaus Jacobi in a personal letter five days later, writing that, “I would like to invite you as a friend of the people of my country to pay a visit to Kabul.”101 Its meaning was not entirely clear to Jacobi and he decided to consult M.D. Shabaz from the Afghan Mission to the UN in Geneva before issuing a reply. They met on 23 November, and Shabaz explained that in light of the immediate cessation of arms deliveries from the Soviet Union on 1 January, of the recent secret meeting in Zurich, and of the public visit of the mujahideen to Moscow, the regime was now prepared to negotiate a transition.102 Ideally, he added, Najibullah would like to cede power to Zaher Shah and if that was not possible, he would settle for Seghatullah Mujaddedi, the president of the IIGA.103 Prior to Jacobi’s visit to the conflict region that summer, Benon Sevan had told Jacobi he would be “pleasantly surprized” if the Swiss could manage to convince Najibullah to resign.104 Now, five months later, Najibullah’s resignation appeared to have become a genuine possibility. Jacobi accordingly drew up the following plan: on 26 November, he would meet with Mujaddedi to discuss his views on the matter. At the same time, he would send Paul Bucherer and Peter Sutter of the FDFA to Kabul to begin negotiations with the regime. If Najibullah was prepared to resign, Sutter was instructed to call Jacobi immediately. If everything went according to plan, ­Jacobi would then cancel all of his appointments at short notice and fly to Kabul on 3 December to formally witness Najibullah’s resignation on 5 D ­ ecember.105 Nobody was to know about this, not even the UN, and on 6  December, he would return to Switzerland while Bucherer and Sutter would try to establish contact with local mujahideen commanders, most notably with Ahmad Shah Massoud, whose forces were by this point garrisoned around Kabul.106 On 15 December, Jacobi would then invite Mujaddedi and Najibullah to Switzerland 101 Najibullah, ‘Correspondence to Klaus Jacobi,’ 20 November 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 102 Paul Bucherer, ‘Aktennotiz: Übergabe eines Schreibens des Afghanischen Präsidenten Najibullah an Staatssekretär Jacobi durch M.D. Shabaz in Egerkingen, 23.11.91,’ 24 ­November 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 103 Ibid. 104 N.a., ‘Note à Monsieur le Secrétaire d’Etat Klaus Jacobi,’ E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR. 105 Bucherer, ‘Aktennotiz: Übergabe eines Schreibens des Afghanischen Präsidenten Najibullah,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 106 Paul Bucherer, ‘Vorgehen beim Besuch in Kabul, Anfang Dez. 1991,’ 27 November 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA.

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for a first face-to-face meeting in order to agree on further steps in the direction of a transitional government.107

Illustration 3 Paul Bucherer and Peter Sutter meet Afghan Foreign Minister Abdul Wakil, December 1991. Source: Bibliotheca Afghanica

Once again, it is difficult to imagine what the consequences for Afghanistan could have been, had this plan succeeded. The fact that the conflict in Afghanistan continues to this day already suggests that it did not. On 1 December, Peter Sutter and Paul Bucherer met Abdul Wakil in Kabul and he repeated to them that Najibullah had chosen to resign. According to Wakil, ever since the diplomatic success of the mujahideen in Moscow, Najibullah had felt himself betrayed by the Soviet Union, rejected by the United States, and neglected by the United Nations. According to Sutter’s reports, he thought that the Swiss were the only ones who could “get him back in the game.”108 He relayed this back to Jacobi over the telephone on 2 December, but Jacobi was not convinced that he had sufficient information to grant Najibullah’s request for an immediate

107 Ibid. 108 Peter Sutter, ‘Mission von Paul Bucherer und Peter Sutter in Kabul vom 1. bis 5. Dezember 1991,’ 6 December 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA.

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visit.109 He therefore instructed Sutter and Bucherer to investigate further, most probably, to verify, whether Najibullah genuinely intended to resign, whether it had been a tactical manoeuvre or whether others within his government were trying to remove him. After all, Abdul Wakil had privately confessed to Jacobi as early as August, that he thought Najibullah would have to be replaced.110 As it was, under the present circumstances, Jacobi saw no need to cancel his scheduled appointments and traveled to the United States from 9–13 ­December. There, he met with Undersecretary of State Arnold Kanter, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar – whose term was about to expire at the end of the year – Benon Sevan, and Yuli Vorontsov, who now served as the Soviet representative to the United Nations. Pérez de Cuéllar and Sevan reacted positively to Jacobi’s news that Najibullah might be prepared to resign, and they cautiously encouraged Jacobi to go to Kabul. Yet they also appeared wary that different parties within the regime might attempt to use Jacobi’s visit for their own purposes. In the meantime, they continued to pursue their own plans for a preparatory Loya Jirga under UN supervision. The only person who opposed Jacobi’s involvement was US Undersecretary of State Arnold Kanter, who repeated the American position that the UN was best suited to find a diplomatic solution to the war in Afghanistan. Any “parallel channels” he considered “dangerous.”111 It appears that as a result, Jacobi did not take up Najibullah’s invitation but continued to gather more information instead. On 24 December 1991, the same day that Mikhail Gorbachev resigned as the General Secretary of the CPSU, representatives of the regime and from the moderate Peshawar parties once more traveled to Zurich. As in October, this delegation included Sebghatullah Mujaddedi’s son Najibullah Mujaddedi, as well as two political advisers to Pir Sayed Ahmad Gailani of the Mahaz-i-Milli Islami Afghanistan. Foreign Minister Wakil, as well as Security Minister Yaqubi, his adviser Dr. Zamir and Chief of Staff Walledullah (sic) arrived on 28 December.112 Abdul Wakil, who had convened the meeting, explained that he sided with the Swiss approach of steadily broadening the circle of participants at gatherings such as this one. In a next phase, for instance, he advocated the inclusion of former king Zaher Shah.113 109 N.a., ‘Factfinding Mission nach Kabul/ Afghanistan im Dezember 1991 durchgeführt von P. Sutter, Bern und P. Bucherer, Liestal zur Vorbereitung einer allfälligen Friedensmission von Herrn Staatssekretär Klaus Jacobi,’ 5 December 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 110 Hauswirth, ‘Besuch des afghanischen Aussenministers Abdul Wakil bei Staatssekretär Jacobi,’ EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 111 Sekretariat Staatssekretär, ‘Besuch Staatssekretär Jacobi in den USA, 9.-13.12.1991,’ 17 December 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 112 Peter Sutter, ‘Aktennotiz – Streng Vertraulich,’ 8 January 1991, EDA 1 (1990–1992), CH-SBA. 113 Ibid.

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Meanwhile, however, Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s successor Boutros Boutros-Ghali formally announced a so-called “Gathering of Afghans” in early February of 1992. This new version of an Afghan gathering was planned to go ahead either in Geneva or in Vienna toward the end of April and the Tages-Anzeiger reported that the UN expected approximately 150 participants from various political parties and ethnic backgrounds, including high-ranking field commanders and representatives from the royal family.114 The plan was for there to be approximately 35 working groups for an even bigger gathering to identify candidates for an interim government.115 4

 onclusion: Swiss Good Offices Did Not Achieve a Peaceful C Government Transition

As it turned out, neither the Swiss nor the UN approach to the idea of an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue” succeeded, because on 18 March, President Najibullah made true his intention to resign. There is no subsequent record of any Swiss involvement in his decision to resign that day. Former UN speechwriter Phillip Corwin has suggested that his speech had been written for him by UN staff.116 In it, he announced that he would no longer “insist on [his] personal participation in the proposed Afghan gathering, hosted by the Secretary-General as part of the UN process.”117 Further, he added that, “Once an understanding is reached, through the United Nations process for the establishment of an interim government in Kabul, all powers and all executive authority will be transferred to the interim government as of the first day of the transition period and as stated by the Secretary-General.”118 He made no mention of the diplomatic involvement of the Swiss and there is no evidence that he attempted to find an alternative solution through the parallel channels of the FDFA at this stage. Neither is there evidence of UN-FDFA coordination on this point. At first, Najibullah’s resignation may have appeared to be a success for the UN. However, the UN proved unable to predict and control its consequences. Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali initially welcomed Najibullah’s

114 Ibid. 115 Ibid. 116 Philip Corwin, Doomed in Afghanistan: A UN Officer’s Memoirs of the Fall of Kabul and Najibullah’s Failed Escape (New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992), 171. 117 Muhammad Najibullah, ‘Statement of President Najibullah,’ March 1992, EDA 2 (1992– 1997), CH-SBA. 118 Ibid.

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resignation as “a major contribution to the peace process.”119 According to Boutros-Ghali, “An agreement in principle has been reached to establish, as soon as possible, a pre-transition council composed of impartial personalities to which all powers and all executive authority would be transferred.”120 On the surface, at least, he therefore made it appear as though there was a feasible, pre-planned transition mechanism in place and that the UN was in control of it. In reality, however, the UN was anything but in control. To begin with, as the Neue Zürcher Zeitung commented in early April, “The UN peace plan includes early elections, an exceedingly optimistic projection for a country that is completely destroyed …”121 More critically still, with the announcement of Najibullah’s imminent departure, those mujahideen who had advanced to the outskirts of Kabul in 1991 now began to move on the city itself. A member of the Swiss ambassadorial staff in Islamabad surmised in 1993 that, “What happened was what almost everyone said would happen, namely that if Najibullah were to resign before a transition mechanism had been put in place, that would lead to chaos and civil war.”122 Uzbek General Dostum, who had been allied with Najibullah during the Soviet occupation, swiftly took Mazar-i-Sharif in the North and entered into an alliance with Ahmad Shah Massoud against Gulbuddin Hekmatyar’s troops, which were stationed around Kabul.123 On Saturday 18 April 1992, the Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported that, “The Najibullah regime is defeated.”124 Earlier that week, government troops had mutinied in Northern Kabul, inciting Najibullah to attempt to escape. On Thursday, he attempted to board a UN plane to India, but Uzbek militia prevented him from reaching the airport. From there, he retreated to the UN compound, where he was to remain in self-imprisonment until the Taliban captured Kabul in 1996. According to Phillip Corwin, he launched into a tirade against Abdul Wakil as soon as he was there, calling him a “coward” and accusing him of having turned “180 degrees” – possibly an indication that Wakil had 119 Boutros Boutros-Ghali, ‘Statement by the Secretary-General on Afghanistan,’ 10 April 1992, E2210.5#1998/8#23*, CH-BAR. 120 Ibid. 121 NZZ, ‘Vordergründige Erfolge der Uno in Afghanistan,’ 7 April 1992, Press Collection, CH-SBA. 122 N.a., ‘Afghanistan: “Too Much Abmition and Ammunition,” Correspondence to FDFA,’ 10 March 1993, E2010–01A#2000/217#5*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Es ist eingetroffen, was fast alle sagten, nämlich dass ein Rücktritt Najibullahs bevor ein Übergangs Mechanismus installiert ist, zum Chaos und Bürgerkrieg führen würde.” 123 Ibid. 124 NZZ, ‘Erbitterter Machtkampf in Afghanistan: Sturz und Fluchtversuch Präsident Najibullahs,’ 18 April 1992, Press Collection, CH-SBA, author’s translation from, “Das Regime Najibullah ist am Ende.”

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been undermining Najibullah’s position from within the regime.125 In one of the defining moments of the Afghan crisis, he asked aloud: Why, if he had personally been such an obstacle to peace, why was there no peace now that he was gone?126 The director of the Political Secretariat at the FDFA wrote in 1994 that under these circumstances, “There [was] little that Switzerland could have done in the domain of national reconciliation that would have had a reasonable chance of success.”127 Instead of becoming the first step toward the resolution of the war in Afghanistan, Najibullah’s resignation in 1992 had been the last in a poorly coordinated peace effort. Already after the “Negative Symmetries” agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in September of 1991, events had begun not only to accelerate, but to spiral out of control, leaving both the UN and the FDFA little room to manoeuvre or to coordinate their activities. From then on, both consciously began to pursue their own interpretations of an “Intra-Afghan Dialogue,” the Swiss being more gradualist and the UN’s being more comprehensive. At the same time, the divisions that had existed within the Afghan regime and amongst the mujahideen respectively throughout each of their histories began to resurface irreversibly in early 1992. Najibullah’s decision to resign in the absence of a transition mechanism proved fatal not only for his regime, but for the mediation efforts both of the UN and of the Swiss government. That is not to say that his resignation was the principal reason behind the failure of either of their efforts to mediate. Between 1988 and 1992, it had become obvious that in the Geneva Accords, the United Nations had brokered an agreement which ignored the fundamental issues at stake in Afghanistan. Despite repeated protests from the General Assembly throughout the period of the Soviet occupation, the UN Secretariat implicitly condoned the Soviet presence in Afghanistan by choosing to treat with the Soviet-installed Afghan regime. It consistently refused to include the mujahideen prior to 1988 and it consciously left the future of the Afghan government unresolved in Geneva. Against this backdrop, both the moderate factions amongst the mujahideen and the Najibullah regime sought diplomatic alternatives and in Paul Bucherer they found a private individual who spared

125 Corwin, ‘Doomed in Afghanistan,’ 123. 126 Ibid. 127 N.a., ‘Note au secrétaire d’Etat Jakob Kellenberger,’ 20 January 1994, E2010–01A#2000 /217#6*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Il y a peu de chose que la Suisse pourrait entreprendre dans le domaine d’une réconciliation nationale, avec une chance raisonnable de réussite.”

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no effort to establish contact to the Swiss authorities and to bring the conflict parties face to face in dialogue. Looking back, the Swiss authorities had only gradually embraced the Afghan crisis as an opportunity to demonstrate the merits of its foreign policy doctrine of Neutrality and Solidarity internationally. Following the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, both government and parliament decided decisively to remain diplomatically aloof of the Afghan crisis and to remain strictly neutral instead. In the case of the Soviet prisoner transfer scheme from 1982 to 1986, the Swiss authorities became active only in response to an explicit request from the ICRC. When it came to mediating between the Afghan conflict parties that remained at war after the Soviet withdrawal of 1989, the Swiss government only became active on account of Paul Bucherer’s effort to engage the FDFA. What the Afghan crisis fundamentally revealed about the nature of Swiss Cold War foreign policy, was that demonstrating both neutrality and solidarity is a challenge, for which there is no guidebook. It has historically led to mixed results, because it inherently sends mixed messages. Swiss policymakers imperatively have to weigh the risks against the benefits of becoming diplomatically involved in a conflict, of being instrumentalized by conflict parties, of managing competing initiatives, as well as of navigating both systemic parameters and the rapidly changing dynamics of conflict. These vary widely across different conflicts and each of these aspects has the potential to affect Switzerland’s ability to remain neutral in an ongoing conflict. Hence, the present study has shown that Switzerland still struggled to demonstrate both neutrality and solidarity internationally in times of conflict and crisis. Yet it has also shown that the Swiss government’s fundamental understanding of the nature, meaning, and relationship between the concepts of neutrality and solidarity evolved over time. After the Suez crisis of 1956, Swiss policymakers became cautious in offering their good offices abroad pro-actively and the early stages of the Afghan crisis reflected this hesitation. Over the course of the 1980s, the Swiss government became increasingly involved in Afghanistan as a provider of good offices without, however, developing a clear and coherent foreign policy toward the crisis and without achieving decisive results. What was more, the UN referendum of 1986 suggests that both the Federal Council and the FDFA were aware of the underlying imperative for change in the ambiguous relationship between neutrality and solidarity. It is therefore worth asking, what are the lessons of the Afghan crisis for Swiss foreign policy and what do they tell us about Switzerland’s role as a small, permanently neutral state at the end of the Cold War?

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Swiss Neutrality and Solidarity at the End of the Cold War Perhaps it is worth highlighting that there were several avenues for engagement that the Swiss consciously chose not to pursue. They did not pro-actively offer to host diplomatic talks in the manner that had been decisively rejected during the Suez crisis of 1956. They did not provide exceptionally high amounts of humanitarian aid to the region between 1979 and 1992. They did not unilaterally expand the prisoner transfer scheme arranged by the ICRC despite the relatively small number of prisoners between 1982 and 1986. They did not attempt to mediate between the Afghan regime and the mujahideen without the consent of the Cold War superpowers and of the UN. They did not devise a comprehensive peace plan. They did not seek to compete with the UN over mediation but sought to cooperate with UN officials over the course of their diplomatic involvement between 1990 and 1992. In the absence of compelling information to suggest Najibullah’s resignation in December of 1991, Klaus ­Jacobi did not travel to Kabul at Najibullah’s invitation. Critics might argue that Switzerland’s involvement did not achieve a lasting, peaceful government transition in Afghanistan after the Soviet withdrawal of 1989. It is also likely that the Swiss government’s leading role in the transfer of eleven Soviet prisoners of war from Afghanistan to Switzerland between 1982 and 1986 was not the only factor, which ultimately secured the return of the ICRC to Afghanistan in 1987. As discussed, structural changes, including the transfer of power from Konstantin Chernenko to Mikhail Gorbachev in 1985 and from Babrak Karmal to Mohammed Najibullah in 1986 doubtlessly factored into this decision as well. At the same time, however, there is no tangible evidence to suggest that the objectives of Swiss diplomacy during this period were to achieve decisive breakthroughs. Throughout the period of their increasing involvement in Afghanistan, the Swiss authorities appeared to be conscious of the limitations of their initiatives. Each attempt at involvement was a distinct and calibrated exploration of what was possible for a permanent neutral in light of systemic constraints. In a sense, that is also the core of the meaningful provision of good offices by a small state. It is about mapping fragile but common ground among those prepared to explore it further. If there is a role for small states to provide good offices in situations of armed conflict, this is it. At the same time, this approach also constitutes a necessary precaution © Liliane Stadler, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004690660_010 Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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to prevent especially permanently neutral small states from becoming instrumentalized by any parties to the conflict, as this has the potential to violate their neutrality. It explains the Swiss government’s relatively cautious attitude toward Soviet representatives during the negotiations that led to the repatriation of the Soviet prisoners of war between 1984 and 1986, as well as their ­careful and gradualist approach toward the mujahideen, the Afghan regime, the UN, and American government representatives after 1990. Initially, both parliament and the Federal Council refused any form of diplomatic involvement at all, citing Swiss neutrality and Switzerland’s inability to play a leading role in the diplomatic resolution of a major Cold War conflict as a small state. This form of reasoning has since changed remarkably and in fact, since the late 1980s and the early 1990s, policymakers, politicians, and members of the public have repeatedly reasoned that Swiss neutrality and solidarity go hand in hand in Swiss foreign policy. The Swiss government’s involvement in Afghanistan has never featured prominently in the public discourse and it would therefore be mistaken to argue that it played a decisive role in bringing about this change. However, what is remarkable about this particular episode in Swiss Cold War foreign policy is that in all of the instances, in which external actors, including both state and non-state actors, approached the Swiss government for good offices, they did so not solely on account of Switzerland’s reputation for neutrality, but on account of its reputation for neutrality and solidarity. Consequently, where the Swiss government’s original rationale was to exclusively demonstrate neutrality in the Afghan crisis in early 1980, it gradually became an attempt to demonstrate the compatibility of neutrality and solidarity. What is more, this gradual change occurred at a time of systemic change, during which the discourse surrounding Max Petitpierre’s original terminology experienced a decisive revival. While the FDFA navigated the complexities of the ongoing Afghan civil war, the end of the Cold War also sparked a wide-sweeping policy debate about the overarching narrative of neutrality in Swiss foreign policy. 1

The Swiss Neutrality Debate of the Early 1990s

What is striking about the early 1990s is that the Swiss government essentially continued to mull over the same uneasy balance between neutrality, solidarity, and multilateralism just as it had done in the beginning of the Cold War. In fact, the competing imperatives at the heart of this complex dynamic still persist. That is why the present case study matters for academics and practitioners alike. It also matters for the broader public, which is likely to vote on

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a popular initiative to define neutrality in the Swiss constitution for the very first time over the course of the coming months. Unlike Sweden and Finland, which have both applied for NATO membership in 2022, Switzerland may vote on whether or not to enshrine and define the concept of neutrality in the constitution. The rhetoric of neutrality and solidarity is being deployed by both proponents and opponents alike. What emerges against the backdrop of this debate and what has also emerged from the wider context of Switzerland’s provision of good offices in Afghanistan between 1979 and 1992, is that maintaining strict neutrality while demonstrating solidarity with other international actors is essentially a discussion about change versus continuity in Swiss foreign policy. For the Swiss government to steer a near-steady course through the tensions between neutrality and solidarity, it has to constantly re-assess, which elements of its foreign policy it needs to adapt in order for the others to remain balanced. This became evident over the course of Switzerland’s growing involvement in Afghanistan as a provider of good offices during and after the Soviet occupation, where the Swiss government essentially reversed its initial stance on diplomatic involvement to demonstrate solidarity. What it also suggests is that Swiss Cold War foreign policy, though characterized by some as largely static on account of its strong commitment to permanent neutrality, was dynamic and that it evolved with Switzerland’s changing international environment. This became particularly evident during the late Cold War and early post-Cold War periods, which have formed the backdrop of the present case study. By 1990, it became clear that the bipolar Cold War order was undergoing an unprecedented series of unpredictable changes. As Switzerland’s mediatory mandate in the Afghan conflict began to take shape, Cold War divisions on the European continent began to fade. The disintegration of the Soviet Union and the political integration of the European Community began to materialize as genuine possibilities across the Cold War divide. After decades of what Raymond Aron had described as a condition of “paix impossible, guerre improbable,” parameters began to shift. As discussed in the previous chapter, the implosion of the Soviet Union between 1989 and 1991 had a substantially destabilizing effect on the ongoing hostilities in Afghanistan. Yet they also had practical implications for the Swiss Confederation as a permanently neutral state. Federal Councillor René Felber – who succeeded Pierre Aubert at the helm of the FDFA in 1988 – was among the first to raise the decisive question of the time, which was “whether it still makes sense for Switzerland to retain its status as a permanent neutral under these changed circumstances.”1 What did 1 René Felber, ‘Aussprachepapier: Fragen zur schweizerischen Neutralität,’ 28 January 1991, E2010–01A#2000/217#486*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Ob die Beibehaltung des Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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Swiss neutrality mean at this critical juncture between impossible and possible peace? Did neutrality continue to serve the national interest and what did it mean in relation to the Swiss government’s continued efforts to demonstrate solidarity with the international community at times of change and tension? These questions dominate Swiss public discourse today, but they are not new. They are the legacy of a Cold War foreign policy, whose aim has consistently been to strike a balance between the competing imperatives of neutrality and solidarity in an increasingly multilateral world. The year 1990 was a significant turning point in this respect. According to a divisive recently declassified Swiss foreign policy memorandum dated 8 June 1990, “The law of neutrality has diminished both in profile and impact [such that] only very few states in Europe still cultivate it and take it seriously.”2 Ireland had joined the EC as early as 1973 and Austria, Finland, and Sweden eventually joined the European Union (EU) in 1995. Over the course of the 1990s, all of the permanent European neutrals joined the new NATO Partnership for Peace. What was more, all European neutrals, including Switzerland, participated in economic sanctions regimes mandated by the UN Security Council during the 1990s, beginning with the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 2 August of 1990. On 6 August, the Security Council unanimously drafted a list of economic sanctions against Iraq and on 7 August, despite being the only permanently neutral state not to have joined the UN since its inception, the Swiss government unilaterally adopted these sanctions.3 It was the first time since 1938 – when Switzerland was still a member of the League of Nations – that the Swiss government participated in a multilateral sanctions regime.4 Since Security Council Resolution 661 against Iraq, the Swiss government has also participated in non-military sanctions against Yugoslavia in 1992, Libya in 1992, Haiti in 1993, Sierra Leone in 1997, and Afghanistan under the Taliban regime in 2000.5 Most recently, Switzerland has adopted the EU sanctions regime against Russia in response to its invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022. With the benefit of hindsight, it has become possible to recognize that many permanent neutrals – Switzerland among them – essentially began to

2 3 4 5

S­ tatus eines dauernd Neutralen für die Schweiz unter diesen veränderten Verhältnissen überhaupt noch sinnvoll sei.” Borer, ‘Thesenpapier zur Schweizerischen Neutralität,’ dodis.ch/54523. Federal Council, ‘Nr. 1467. Verordnung über Wirtschaftsmassnahmen gegenüber der Republik Irak und dem Staat Kuwait,’ 7 Aug. 1990, Dodis, www.dodis.ch/55525. Emmanuel Bichet, ‘La neutralité Suisse à l’épreuve des deux guerres in Irak (1991 et 2003),’ Politorbis 35(2004), 41. Federal Interdepartmental Working Group, Swiss Neutrality in Practice – Current Aspects (Bern: EDA, 2000), https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/109736/Swiss%20neutrality%20in%20practice% 20.pdf, 4. Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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exhibit certain forms of behavior during the 1990s that called into question their respective long-term commitments to permanent neutrality. Both the Security Council’s and the Swiss government’s decisions to adopt economic sanctions would have been impossible in 1979, when the Soviet Union invaded non-aligned Afghanistan. At the time, both government and parliament explicitly rejected Switzerland’s participation in the American-led sanctions regime against the Soviet Union. Clearly, the significance of multilateral diplomacy and the meaning of permanent neutrality in Swiss foreign policy had evolved since the late 1970s. Yet the precise nature of these shifts remained ambiguous throughout the 1980s, especially considering that the referendum on Swiss UN membership had failed in 1986 and Switzerland continued to be a non-member of the organization. Were political multilateral organizations off-limits indefinitely as a result of the referendum? Did the collective security mechanism of the UN begin to play a different role in the international system once the superpowers began to cooperate on the imposition of sanctions during the early 1990s? Were economic sanctions genuinely compatible with permanent neutrality now and if so, how come? Which demonstrations of Swiss solidarity continued to come at the expense of Swiss neutrality in the changing international climate of the early 1990s and which ones did not? And most importantly, what did this mean for Switzerland’s role as a permanently neutral state at the end of the Cold War? To answer some of these lingering questions, the FDFA set up an internal task force between 1991 and 1992, which included both academics and ­practitioners in the field of Swiss foreign policy. Some, including Ambassador Marianne von Grünigen and Secretary of State Klaus Jacobi also played meaningful roles in respectively overseeing the FDFA’s mediatory mandate in Afghanistan after 1990. Their final report, which carried the fitting title “Swiss Neutrality Put to the Test – Swiss Foreign Policy between Continuity and Change,” appeared in March 1992 and concluded that: The military threat in Europe has decreased considerably. Other forms of external threats on the other hand, are coming to the fore. Neutrality provides none or almost no protection against these. Instead, they demand collective action in show of solidarity at a European and often even at a global level.6 6 Studiengruppe zu Fragen der schweizerischen Neutralität, ‘Schweizerische Neutralität auf dem Prüfstand – Schweizerische Aussenpolitik zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel,’ March 1992, PDB 2/12/188, Fondation Jean Monnet (FJM-CH), Lausanne, Switzerland, author’s ­translation from, “Die militärische Bedrohung in Europa hat deutlich abgenommen. Andere

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Similar to the way in which the Bindschedler Doctrine of 1954 had retrospectively justified the Federal Council’s decision to refrain from UN membership in 1946, the task force retrospectively justified the Swiss government’s participation in UN sanctions against Iraq in 1990. On one hand, what had changed between 1954 and 1992 was Switzerland’s immediate security environment, which was no longer exclusively dominated by Cold War antagonisms. On the other hand, the task force also advocated for a novel understanding of what the concept of solidarity meant under these changing circumstances. Switzerland’s demonstrations of solidarity had hitherto taken the form of technical multilateral cooperation, alongside either unilateral or bilaterally arranged provisions of humanitarian aid and good offices. Afghanistan had been a case in point. In future, however, the task force speculated that demonstrations of solidarity would increasingly require participation in collective action, as had been the original intention behind the UN Charter. The economic sanctions regime against the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait was a turning point in this regard. In a consequential foreign policy report released on 29 November 1993, the Federal Council agreed with this novel interpretation and with its implications for Switzerland’s long-standing foreign policy doctrine of Neutrality and Solidarity. Its widely circulated “Report on Switzerland’s foreign policy in the 1990s” held that: For some time now, the Federal Council has increasingly placed this maxim of solidarity and participation at the centre of foreign and security policy thinking, because Swiss interests can only be safeguarded by an attitude of sharing international responsibility and participating in international problem-solving and decision-making.7

Formen der äusseren Gefährdung treten dagegen stärker in den Vordergrund. Gegen sie bietet Neutralität kaum oder keinen Schutz. Sie verlangen vielmehr gemeinsames, solidarisches Handeln auf europäischer und oft sogar weltweiter Ebene.” 7 Federal Council, ‹Bericht zur Neutralität: Anhang zum Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren vom 29. November 1993,› 19 November 1993, https://www.eda .admin.ch/dam/eda/de/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/bericht-neutralitaet-1993 _DE.pdf, 12, author’s translation from, “Der Bundesrat hat diese Maxime der Solidarität und der Partizipation seit einiger Zeit vermehrt ins Zentrum des aussen- und sicherheitspolitischen Denkens gerückt, weil schweizerische Interessen nur durch eine Haltung des Mittragens von internationaler Verantwortung, der Mitwirkung bei internationalen Problemlösungen und Entscheidungen gewahrt werden können.”

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Whereas the Federal Council under Max Petitpierre had argued in 1946 that neutrality and collective security were incompatible, the Federal Council now explicitly argued that Swiss neutrality and the UN’s collective security mechanism were two separate means in pursuit of the same goals. These goals included the “maintenance of national integrity, the prevention of conflicts and wars, the safeguarding of peaceful coexistence.”8 Moreover, as a small state, the Council reasoned that Switzerland had an overriding interest in ensuring that the collective security order of the UN continued to function effectively.9 According to the report, demonstrating solidarity therefore meant that regardless of whether or not Switzerland would ultimately become a UN member in the future, it needed to support those measures contained in the UN Charter intended to punish violations of international law.10 The paradox behind this new interpretation was twofold. First, there was no intention on the part of the Swiss government to challenge permanent neutrality as a core concept of Swiss foreign policy. Second, in the aftermath of the negative UN referendum of 1986, there developed a conscious attempt within the FDFA to demonstrate Swiss solidarity in the traditional sense and to revive the provision of good offices in situations of armed conflict. Diplomatic representations were encouraged to stress Switzerland’s “solidarity with the UN especially in the domain of peace.”11 In 1988, the Federal Council had argued in a short report on the topic that, “There is undoubtedly a close connection between the good offices that Switzerland currently performs and its position as a permanently neutral state.”12 As discussed, Olga Pavlenko has since observed in her research on the Cold War relationship between Switzerland and the Soviet Union that there was a “surge” in the foreign policy activities of Switzerland during this period.13 Following the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in 1989, Switzerland not only took on a mediatory mandate 8 9 10 11

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Ibid., 18, author’s translation from, “Aufrechterhaltung der einzelstaatlichen Integrität, die Verhütung von Konflikten und Kriegen, die Sicherung eines friedlichen Zusammenlebens.” Ibid. Ibid., 19. Muheim, ‘Ausbau der schweizerischen Beteiligung an friedenserhaltenden Aktionen und Guten Diensten,’ E2200.64#1999/164#83*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “Unsere Solidarität mit der UNO namentlich auf dem Gebiet ihrer Bestrebungen zur Friedenssicherung.” Direktion für Völkerrecht, ‘Ausgesuchte Neutralitätsfragen,’ 26 March 1991, Dodis, dodis. ch/60578, author’s translation from, “Zwischen den Guten Diensten, welche die Schweiz gegenwärtig leistet, und ihrer Stellung als dauernd neutraler Staat besteht zweifellos ein enger Zusammenhang.” Pavlenko, ‘The Soviet Union and Neutral Switzerland,’ 179.

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there. In 1989, the Federal Council also dispatched over 400 Swiss citizens to provide medical aid and observe the elections in Namibia.14 Starting in 1989, the council budgeted CHF 15 million annually for new and existing peacekeeping operations. This included both financial and material contributions, as well as personnel for the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the United Nations Interim Force In Lebanon (UNIFIL), and the United Nations Iran-Iraq Military Observer Group (UNIIMOG).15 In 1990, the Swiss armed forces stationed a medical unit in the Western Sahara as part of the UN Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO) and in January of 1991, Geneva hosted a summit meeting between American Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz.16 That same year, the FDFA attempted to arrange a face-to-face meeting between Serbian leader Slobodan Milošević and Croatian president Franjo Tuđman, Klaus Jacobi explored the possibility of holding a Middle East conference in Geneva and Edouard Brunner accepted the position of Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s Special Envoy to the Middle East.17 Meanwhile, over the course of the mid-1990s, the Swiss government continued to join a number of multilateral initiatives, including the Geneva Disarmament Conference, the Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council and it ultimately presided the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) – the successor to the CSCE – in 1996.18 The revised constitution of 1999 even included an implicit reference to the concept of solidarity by charging the Confederation with the task of promoting a “peaceful and just international order” in article 2.19 However, as the present case study has shown, demonstrating solidarity especially through the provision of good offices is not without risk. Writing as early as 1968, then-Federal Councillor Willy Spühler already recognized that essentially, mediation required the potential to command influence,

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Arthur Bill, ‘Zur Erfahrungsbilanz des Schweizerischen Einsatzes im Dienste der UNO in Namibia, Frühling 1989 bis Frühling 1990,’ 20 April 1990, www.https://dodis.ch/56263. Muheim, ‘Ausbau der schweizerischen Beteiligung an friedenserhaltenden Aktionen und Guten Diensten,’, E2200.64#1999/164#83*, CH-BAR. Klaus Jacobi, ‘Informations sur les télex hebdomadaires,’ 7 January 1991, Dodis, https:// www.dodis.ch/60126. Bürgisser and Zala, ‘Einleitung,’ XXX. EDA, Swiss Neutrality in Practice – Current Aspects, https://www.files.ethz.ch/isn/109736 /Swiss%20neutrality%20in%20practice%20.pdf, 3. N.a., Bundesverfassung der Schweizerischen Eidgenossenschaft, 18 April 1999, https:// fedlex.data.admin.ch/filestore/fedlex.data.admin.ch/eli/cc/1999/404/20000101/de/pdf-a /fedlex-data-admin-ch-eli-cc-1999-404-20000101-de-pdf-a.pdf, Art. 2.

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something which small, neutral states tended to lack.20 Spühler also cautioned that mediation in particular was, “generally not crowned with success.”21 In 1988, the Federal Council recognized this same issue and conceded that, “One should not overestimate the extent of the services that Switzerland can offer to conflict parties.”22 The present case study on Afghanistan has illustrated that there are a multitude of both internal and external factors that affect not only whether or not Switzerland is asked to provide its neutral good offices in a conflict. There are also many competing alternatives for protective power mandates and mediation from other neutrals, non-neutrals and intergovernmental organizations. Once a mandate is underway, the Swiss authorities have to incessantly ensure that their involvement in a third-party conflict does not infringe on Swiss neutrality and that they are not at risk of becoming instrumentalized by the conflict parties themselves. Even then, there is no guarantee of a peaceful resolution to the conflict or of the resumption of diplomatic relations between states that have previously severed them. In most cases, the dynamics of armed conflict are highly idiosyncratic, impossible to reliably predict, and there is unlikely ever to be a guarantee of success for the provision of neutral good offices. If anything, the Afghan conflict revealed that there were factors at play during the Swiss government’s involvement that were ultimately beyond its control. It is misleading to argue that Switzerland is ideally suited for the provision of good offices on account of its neutrality. Doing so also overlooks the inherent complexities of armed conflict, as well as the historical tendencies of neutrality and solidarity to encroach on each other during instances of third-party conflict. In the past, this has generated mixed signals where the Swiss government has remained diplomatically aloof, as well as mixed results when it has become diplomatically involved. 2

The Swiss Neutrality Debate of the Present

These issues persist to the present and they have found renewed expression in Switzerland’s response to the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Present-day commentators have rightfully cautioned against direct comparisons between the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979 and the Russian invasion 20 21 22

N.a., ‘Aktuelle Neutralitätsfragen: Referat von Herrn Bundespräsident W. Spühler vor den Kommissionen für auswertige Angelegenheiten der Eidgenössischen Räte am 23. Bzq. 25. Januar 1968 in Genf,’ n.d., Dodis, https://dodis.ch/34088. Ibid. Direktion für Völkerrecht, ‘Ausgesuchte Neutralitätsfragen,’ dodis.ch/60578.

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of Ukraine in February of 2022.23 There are clear limits to the utility of direct historical comparisons for the purpose of drawing generalizable conclusions. While the perceived threat of shifting spheres of influence appears to have played a role in both instances of armed aggression and while both the Soviet Union and the Russian Federation have consistently denied being at war, in those two cases, there are important differences between the two acts of war. Ukraine is not a non-aligned state. The objectives of the present-day Russian invasion are not limited, and the war in Ukraine is an inter-state conflict, whereas the Afghan crisis was a variable conflagration among state and non-state conflict parties, inter-mixed with elements of an ongoing civil war, which included transnational movements of resistance fighters, refugees, and various forms of aid. At first glance, the Swiss government’s relatively decisive response to the Ukraine crisis also appears to be fundamentally different from its cautious response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan. On 24 February 2022, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine and on 28 February, the Federal Council announced that it would adopt EU sanctions against Russia. These included goods and financial sanctions, freezing select personal and company assets, as well as a ban on the establishment of new business relationships. Visa facilitations for Russian nationals were suspended and select individuals received an entry ban. Swiss airspace was sealed for all flights to and from Russia and to all Russian aircraft.24 In April 2022, the Swiss delegation voted to expel Russia from the UN Human Rights Council. None of these steps were ever seriously considered in response to the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan of 1979. They are technically in line with Switzerland’s new interpretation of the concept of solidarity since the First Gulf War in 1990. Yet they have since given rise to an unprecedented public debate in both breadth and depth about the nature and substance of Swiss neutrality in the twenty-first century, demonstrating that the relationship between neutrality and solidarity – despite having evolved significantly over the course of the late 1980s and the early 1990s – remains contested. According to Tim Guldimann, Switzerland’s ambassador to Berlin from 2010 to 2015, “The Ukraine war has brought two maxims of our foreign policy, neutrality and solidarity, into a new opposition.”

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Ulrich Schmid, ‘Russlands Erinnerung an Afghanistan,’ NZZ, 25 July 2023, 1. Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten (EDA), ‘Switzerland adopts EU sanctions against Russia,’ 28 February 2022, https://www.admin.ch/gov/en /start/documentation/media-releases.msg-id-87386.html.

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Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov has accused Switzerland of no longer being neutral and some Swiss citizens share this view.25 According to former Federal Councillor Christoph Blocher of the Swiss People’s Party (­Schweizerische Volkspartei), the adoption of EU sanctions in response to the Russian aggression against Ukraine has made Switzerland a party to the conflict itself. This argument has formed the basis for a popular initiative to add a formal commitment to permanent neutrality to the Swiss constitution. Neither the concept of neutrality nor the concept of permanent neutrality have ever been defined in successive revisions of the constitution since the foundation of the Swiss Confederation in 1848. In part, this has allowed Swiss neutrality to evolve over time. Yet it has also given rise to heated public debate. The text of the popular initiative has been formulated by the conservative association Pro Switzerland (Pro Schweiz), led by National Councillor Walter Wobmann. It forbids memberships in military alliances and allows military cooperation with third parties only in defense against armed aggression. It also forbids participation in sanctions regimes against conflict parties, and it compels the Swiss government to make use of its neutrality to prevent and resolve armed conflicts through the provision of good offices. In contrast, following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, Federal Councillor Ignazio Cassis, who currently heads the FDFA as foreign minister, has argued that Swiss neutrality ought to be revised to become more cooperative and to provide more flexibility in “working with partners to protect the international order.”26 At the World Economic Forum in Davos in May of 2022, he introduced the concept of “cooperative neutrality.”27 On 11 April 2022, the foreign policy committee of the Council of States had demanded clarity and orientation on Swiss neutrality policy from the Federal Council. The concept of “cooperative neutrality” was Cassis’ initial response to this demand. Yet on 26 October, the Federal Council as a whole (Gesamtbundesrat) openly rejected Cassis’ proposal for revising Swiss neutrality. In a widely publicized report, the council argued that the principles of neutrality contained in its 1993 report required no alterations.28 This meant that first, Switzerland was to remain permanently neutral, 25 26 27 28

Tobias Gafafer, ‘Für Russland ist die Schweiz nicht mehr neutral – der Bundesrat sucht in der Krise seine Rolle,’ NZZ, 8 April 2022. Ignazio Cassis, ’Die Wirklichkeit ist multilateral,’ 23 May 2022, https://www.admin.ch /gov/de/start/dokumentation/medienmitteilungen.msg-id-88955.html. Ibid. Federal Council, ‘Klarheit und Orientierung in der Neutralitätspolitik: Bericht des Bundesrates in Erfüllung des Postulates 22.3385, Aussenpolitische Kommission SR, ­ 11.04.2022,’ 26 October 2022, https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/de/docu ments/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/20221026-neutralitaetsbericht_DE.pdf, 25.

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especially toward the parties of an armed conflict. Second, this was a matter of choice, rather than obligation under international law. Third, it would be defended by the Swiss armed forces if necessary. Fourth, it meant that Switzerland would under no circumstances initiate an act of aggression with the aim of territorial expansion. Yet fifth, and this is arguably a legacy from the Cold War, Swiss neutrality would not prevent either the Swiss government or its citizens from voicing their opinions and to take position on international developments.29 However, the report also specified that if the UN Security Council collectively identified an act of armed aggression, this would free Switzerland from its commitment to neutrality under international law. In other words, Switzerland would not be neutral with regards to military sanctions ordered by the UN Security Council.30 Without a UN Security Council decision, the law of neutrality, as enshrined in The Hague Conventions of 1907 remained in force. Such, according to the Federal Council, is the case in the present-day Ukraine crisis. As a result, the competing imperatives to both remain permanently neutral and to demonstrate solidarity with the international community have become particularly clear in the context of the Russian invasion of Ukraine. Unlike in the aftermath of the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Switzerland is now a member of the United Nations, having joined in 2002. In 2023 and 2024, Switzerland even holds a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council. The scope of those acts of solidarity that have become permissible in Swiss foreign policy has expanded in ways that would have been unimaginable in 1979. Yet at heart, both the Swiss government and the Swiss public remain strongly committed to permanent neutrality. In March of 2023, the Federal Institute of Technology in Zurich (ETHZ) published a study, according to which 91 percent of Swiss voters support permanent neutrality.31 This figure is down only slightly from 97 percent in 2022, which would suggest that a popular initiative to enshrine neutrality in the Swiss constitution has considerable chances of success. What is striking about the initiative from the perspective of the present case study on Afghanistan, is that among other arguments, it reasons that the combination of permanent neutrality, and the provision of good offices is more reliable than to trust in multilateral organizations. These, it reasons, 29 30 31

Ibid., 3. Ibid., 6. Tibor Szvircsev Tresch, Andreas Wenger, Stefano De Rosa, Thomas Ferst, Emanuela Rizzo, Jacques Robert, and Till Roost, ‘Studie “Sicherheit 2023”: Aussen-, Sicherheitsund Verteidigungspolitische Meinungsbildung im Trend,’ 22 March 2023, https://ethz.ch /content/dam/ethz/special-interest/gess/cis/center-for-securities-studies/pdfs/Si2023 _Medienbericht.pdf.

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can become paralyzed in situations such as the present-day war in Ukraine, which is strongly reminiscent of those reasons, which prevented the Federal Council from originally joining the UN at the time of its foundation and gave rise to the doctrine of Neutrality and Solidarity in the first place. Meanwhile, both the present-day Federal Council and the initiative committee under Walter Wobmann recognize that there is no proven causal relationship between permanent neutrality and the successful provision of good offices.32 Since the end of the Cold War, the Swiss government’s record on the provision of good offices has remained almost equally mixed as it had been during the Cold War. Between 2008 and 2015, the Swiss government hosted diplomatic talks on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action (JCPA) on Iran’s nuclear energy programme in Lausanne and Geneva. In 2009, the FDFA also mediated a normalization agreement on the diplomatic relations between Turkey and Armenia in Zurich. In both instances, however, the implementation of these agreements has been only partially successful. Switzerland’s most recent mediatory mandates have included negotiations for a ceasefire agreement in Myanmar between 2012 and 2015, as well as between the Columbian government and the Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia – Ejército del Pueblo (FARC-EP) between 2012 and 2016. In 2014, Switzerland chaired the OSCE again and in this role, Ambassador Heidi Tagliavini led the trilateral talks, which led to the establishment of the so-called Minsk Group. In 2019, the FDFA mediated between the Frelimo and the Renamo armed groups in Mozambique. On 19 August 2020, the daily Neue Zürcher Zeitung reported that the Swiss Foreign Ministry was offering to mediate between Turkey and Greece over the issue of natural gas deposits off the coasts of Cyprus. An accompanying editorial argued that Switzerland was predestined as a mediator on account of its neutrality and experience.33 This initiative has not materialized and neither have requests for the Swiss government to provide good offices in the Ukraine crisis, despite a summit meeting between presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin in Geneva in June of 2021. Most recently, Saudi Arabia and Iran have agreed to restore diplomatic relations through Chinese – as opposed to Swiss – mediation in March of 2023. Against this backdrop, the Federal Council’s “Neutrality Report” of 2022 has raised an important point. Not only has Switzerland’s record on the provision

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Federal Council, ‘Klarheit und Orientierung in der Neutralitätspolitik,’ 3; Pro Schweiz, ‘Argumentarium,’ accessed 21 August 2023, https://neutralitaet-ja.ch/argumentarium/. Tobias Gafafer, ‘Die Schweiz ist als ehrliche Vermittlerin prädestiniert,’ NZZ, 19 August 2020, 9.

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of good offices been mixed in the past. It has also been variable over time. According to the Federal Council’s report: Neutrality usually has a passive connotation. However, Switzerland has never seen itself as a passive member of the international community. At all times, it has been actively involved in international politics, sometimes more, sometimes less, depending on the domestic and foreign policy scope for action and the prevailing circumstances. The humanitarian tradition and good offices are therefore often mentioned in the same breath as neutrality and are thus to be seen as complementary to it. Both are an expression of Switzerland’s solidarity.34 This figuratively brings the neutrality and solidarity discourse of the present-day full circle to its originally intended meaning, which includes not only the provision of good offices, but also the provision of humanitarian aid and a strong commitment to the promotion of international humanitarian law. In 1948, Federal Councillor Max Petitpierre wrote that, “Neutrality, as a humanitarian action, which in wartime can be exercised outside any political contingencies, also satisfied, at least to some extent, the requirements of solidarity in times of total war.”35 Unlike in relation to good offices, Petitpierre clearly interpreted Swiss neutrality as an enabling factor for its humanitarian tradition. At the time, the Swiss Confederation had already developed an international reputation for humanitarianism on account of its close relationship to the ICRC.36 Since then, this relationship has repeatedly come under scrutiny by academics and practitioners alike. To what extent were the neutrality of the Confederation and the neutrality of the ICRC related? To what extent did the Swiss government’s repeated attempts to demonstrate solidarity in situations 34

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Federal Council, ‘Klarheit und Orientierung in der Neutralitätspolitik,’ 3, author’s translation from, “Neutralität ist meist passiv konnotiert. Die Schweiz hat sich aber nie als ein passives Mitglied der Staatengemeinschaft verstanden. Zu jedem Zeitpunkt hat sie sich in der internationalen Politik aktiv eingebracht, je nach innen- und aussenpolitischen Handlungsspielräumen und herrschenden Umständen mal mehr, mal weniger. Die humanitäre Tradition und die Guten Dienste werden deshalb oft in einem Atemzug mit der Neutralität genannt und sind somit als Ergänzung zu dieser zu sehen. Beide sind ­Ausdruck der Solidarität der Schweiz.” Petitpierre, ‘Propos Sur la Neutralité (Tiré à part de “La Démocratie Suisse, 1848–1948” des Editions Patriotiques S.A. Morat,’ 1948, E2800#1967/59#921*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from, “On peut affirmer que la neutralité, par action humanitaire qu’en temps de guerre, permet d’exercer hors de toute contigence politique, satisfait aussi à l’époque des guerres totals, au moins dans une certaine mesure, aux exigences de la solidarité.” Möckli, ‘Neutralität, Solidarität, Sonderfall,’ 208.

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of armed conflict, despite its permanent neutrality, rely on the presence of the ICRC on its territory? Does Swiss neutrality in turn serve as a necessary condition without which the ICRC could not operate? Or, in short, do the Swiss Confederation and the ICRC share a humanitarian tradition on the basis of Swiss neutrality? Unlike the present-day public debate on neutrality, the relationship between the Swiss government and the ICRC has historically been much less openly contested. In fact, the present case study on Afghanistan may have been one of few exceptions to this trend, as the mainstream press began to question the morality of the ICRC’s prisoner transfer scheme from Afghanistan between 1982 and 1986, as well as its associated difficulties in returning to the conflict region during this time. 3

The Ambiguous Relationship between Swiss and ICRC Neutrality

The present case study has explored the manifold practical and political obstacles to the provision of humanitarian aid to the Afghan interior, as well as the evolution of an informal arrangement between the Swiss government and the ICRC to achieve the return of the ICRC to Afghanistan, following its expulsion in 1980. Both before and since the transfer scheme that brought eleven Soviet prisoners of war from Afghanistan to Switzerland between 1982 and 1986, observers have speculated about the precise nature of the relationship between the Swiss government, its humanitarian tradition, and the ICRC. However, while it remains doubtful as to whether there exists a causal relationship between Swiss neutrality and the provision of good offices, there is a more stable consensus on the mutually beneficial relationship between Swiss neutrality and the neutrality of the ICRC. In his 1968 address to the foreign affairs committee of both parliamentary chambers, Federal Councillor Willy Spühler maintained that, “There is no doubt that Switzerland’s permanent neutrality was and still is the prerequisite for any successful activity of the committee.”37 Having its headquarters in a neutral state and having a committee composed of exclusively Swiss nationals, he contended, allowed the ICRC to fulfil its mandate. In return, the ICRC reinforced Switzerland’s standing in the international community as a humanitarian actor.38 Representatives of the ICRC have repeatedly stressed that while the relationship between the organization and 37

N.a., ‘Aktuelle Neutralitätsfragen,’ https://dodis.ch/34088, author’s translation from, “Es besteht kein Zweifel, dass die ständige Neutralität der Schweiz die Voraussetzung für jede erfolgreiche Tätigkeit des Komitees war und noch heute ist.” 38 Ibid.

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the Swiss government was mutually beneficial, it has not historically been one of mutual dependence.39 In practice, the ICRC has historically been both a non-governmental organization, registered in Switzerland, and what Denise Plattner of the organization’s legal division has referred to a “legal person under international law.”40 As such, the ICRC has consistently been in a unique position among non-governmental organizations both within and beyond the humanitarian sector. Plattner also contends that the neutrality of the ICRC is unique in the sense that it is not of the sort that applies to neutral states like Switzerland. According to Plattner, the form of neutrality “applicable to relief operations for victims of armed conflict does not seem to exist as a legal concept.”41 It is a practicality, which in addition to the organization’s institutional independence and its reputation for discretion, allows ICRC delegates to gain access to war zones and detention centers that may be off-limits to other humanitarian organizations. Again, the present case study on Afghanistan is a case in point. Alexandre Hay, president of the ICRC from 1976 to 1987 has put it this way: “State neutrality... essentially means standing apart from the dealings of this world.”42 The neutrality of the ICRC, on the other hand, was intended to enable it to engage in these sorts of “dealings.” It was intended to be empowering. In practice, the statutes of the ICRC require the organization not only to demonstrate neutrality toward the parties of an armed conflict, but to obtain permission from host government to operate in conflict regions. In situations where government consent is withheld, as was the case in Afghanistan between 1980 and 1987, the ICRC can neither provide humanitarian aid nor monitor the application of international humanitarian law. The choice of turning to the Swiss government under those circumstances did not primarily result from the close collaborative relationship between the Swiss authorities and the ICRC. It came about at the suggestion of the Afghan mujahideen. Yet it was a case in which ultimately, the Swiss government’s reputation for neutrality and good offices played an enabling role in the ICRC’s ability to extract Soviet prisoners of war from the conflict region.

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Massimo Lorenzi, Entretiens avec Cornelio Sommaruga, president du CICR (Lausanne: ­ ditions Favre, 1998), 103. E Denise Plattner, ‘ICRC neutrality and neutrality in humanitarian assistance,’ International Review of the Red Cross 36(1996), 165. Ibid., 173. Alexandre Hay, ‘Schweizerische Neutralität und Humanitäre Aktion,’ Der Staatsbürger 7(1989), 40, author’s translation from, “Staatliche Neutralität... bedeutet im wesentlichen Sinne ein Abseitsstehen von den Händeln dieser Welt.”

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To clarify the relationship between the Swiss government and the ICRC, Federal Councillor René Felber and Cornelio Sommaruga, the president of the ICRC from 1987 to 1999, signed a mutual agreement to define the legal status of the ICRC in 1993. That was the same year, in which the Federal Council released its first official report defining the meaning and function of neutrality in Swiss foreign policy. The agreement between the Swiss government and the ICRC guaranteed the “independence and freedom of action” of the organization from the Swiss government.43 It recognized the ICRC’s “international juridical personality and the legal capacity in Switzerland.”44 It granted the same immunities to the ICRC as to other international organizations whose headquarters were located in Switzerland and it recognized the functions and purpose of the ICRC as laid down in the Geneva Conventions of 1949 and its 1977 Protocols. This agreement has formed the legal basis of the relationship between the Swiss government and the ICRC ever since. This does not mean, that all questions regarding the relationship between Swiss neutrality, the ICRC, Switzerland’s humanitarian tradition and its commitment to solidarity have been conclusively answered. Quite the opposite is true. If anything, the present case study is an invitation for further research into questions that have defined Swiss foreign policy, humanitarianism and neutrality since the Cold War period. Above all, this study has challenged the assumption that neutrality and solidarity are static concepts. It has also challenged existing assumptions that there exists a causal link between Swiss neutrality and the successful provision of good offices. The Swiss government’s record on the provision of good offices has historically been mixed. This is partially because situations of armed conflict and international crisis such as the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan have historically tended to create competing imperatives for Swiss foreign policy. On one hand, Switzerland is compelled to demonstrate neutrality vis-à-vis both conflict parties. On the other hand, it has had to legitimize its permanent neutrality by demonstrating solidarity with those affected by armed conflict. As a non-member of the UN between 1946 and 2002, the Swiss government frequently contributed humanitarian aid and at times also provided good offices in the form of protective power mandates, mediation and as a neutral host of international conferences and summit meetings. In the Afghan case, Switzerland engaged in all of the above between 1979 and 1992. Switzerland’s involvement in Afghanistan after 1992 43 44

ICRC, ‘Agreement between the International Committee of the Red Cross and the Swiss Federal Council to determine the legal status of the Committee in Switzerland,’ International Review of the Red Cross 293(1993), Art. 2. Ibid., Art. 1.

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remains subject to further research, as do several other instances, in which the Swiss authorities provided good offices during the 1990s. Additional research would be of value in exploring the institutional and organizational impact of the revival of the provision of good offices within the FDFA during this decade. Some might also explore the continuation of Switzerland’s uneasy relationship with the UN after the end of the Cold War. In short, the late Cold War and the early post-Cold War periods continue to provide an abundance of research opportunities for the exploration of Switzerland’s role as a small, permanently neutral state in an increasingly multilateral world.

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Conclusion The current study has added two insights to the current state of research. First, mixed signals generate mixed results. The doctrine of Neutrality and Solidarity inherently contains competing imperatives and it has historically generated mixed messages in times of conflict and crisis. This has been the case over the course of the Afghan crisis and it is currently the case in the context of the Ukraine crisis. What is puzzling is that among the public and even in the Swiss media, it is nevertheless common to assume that Switzerland is well suited to the provision of good offices on account of its neutrality. In the literature on Swiss good offices, this line of argument dates back to 1989. That year, former Swiss Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Raymond Probst, published a monograph entitled “Good Offices” In Light of Swiss International ­Practice and Experience. According to Probst, experience showed that neutral and especially permanently neutral states are often in a better position to assist other nations in settling their conflicts.1 Moreover, Swiss neutrality provided an “element of continuity, security and stability,” which made it well-suited as a mediator, a protective power or as the host of international conferences.2 This in turn presumably made good offices a promising tool to demonstrate Switzerland’s solidarity with the international community. A number of authors, Daniel Trachsler and Thomas Fischer among them, have since confirmed that Switzerland deservedly enjoys a reputation as a reliable protective power, acting as a communication channel between states that have severed diplomatic relations. Yet there exists a consensus in the academic literature that the same is not necessarily true for mediation, which involves a third party in finding a solution to a conflict.3 At first glance, Switzerland’s role in the Afghan conflict appears to fit this general pattern. It has also raised a set of broader questions about the overall significance of Switzerland’s diplomatic involvement in armed conflicts as a permanent neutral and on the changing nature of its neutrality toward the end of the twentieth century. Andreas Wenger and Christian Nuenlist have argued in a seminal essay in 2008 that, “Swiss foreign and security policy during the Cold War was characterized by a high degree of continuity.”4 Similarly, 1 Probst, “Good Offices” in the Light of Swiss International Practice and Experience, 13. 2 Ibid., 14. 3 Trachsler, ‘Gute Dienste – Mythen, Fakten, Perspektiven,’ 43; Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 79; 96; Fanzun and Lehmann, ‘Die Schweiz und die Welt,’ 106–107. 4 Wenger and Nuenlist, ‘A “Special Case” between Independence and Interdependence,’ 218. © Liliane Stadler, 2024 | DOI:10.1163/9789004690660_011 Liliane Stadler - 978-90-04-69066-0 Downloaded from Brill.com 04/08/2024 08:23:09PM via University of Wisconsin-Madison

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Thomas Fischer argues in a recent edited volume by Mark Kramer, Peter Ruggenthaler and Aryo Makko that, “During the whole period of the Cold War we can discern a very homogenous national understanding of what role neutral Switzerland should play in international security affairs.”5 This cannot necessarily be said of Switzerland’s involvement in the Afghan crisis. Hence, the second insight that the present study provides is that both neutrality and solidarity are dynamic concepts and they are more context-dependent than commonly assumed. Despite strong initial reservations, the Swiss government ultimately became deeply involved in Afghanistan as a provider of good offices by 1992, absent a coherent foreign policy toward Afghanistan and despite the fact that the Swiss government had historically been relatively unsuccessful as a neutral mediator in armed conflict up until this point. In 1986, the Swiss government also launched its first serious bid to join the UN since the Federal Council decided against it in 1946. As it had done during the early post-war period, this episode led to deep introspection on the relationship between neutrality and solidarity in Swiss foreign policy. In the absence of decisive breakthroughs in Afghanistan, Switzerland’s concurrent involvement there did not persuasively demonstrate their mutual compatibility either. Rather, Switzerland’s non-linear trajectory in the Afghan crisis suggests that Swiss foreign and security policy, especially during the late Cold War period, was not necessarily characterized by a high degree of continuity. Nor was it based on an entirely homogenous national understanding of what role neutral Switzerland should play internationally. In fact, the relationship between neutrality and solidarity in Swiss foreign policy has been in constant flux and continues to be to this day. Much as in Giuseppe Tomasi di Lampedusa’s The Leopard, Swiss foreign policymakers are aware of the consistent imperative that for everything to stay as it is, everything has to be able to change. To summarize the present study, the Swiss authorities delivered humanitarian aid, took in Soviet POWs and eventually mediated directly between the Afghan government and the mujahideen – after hostilities continued despite the Soviet withdrawal of 1989. Originally, the Swiss government had no discernable foreign policy toward Afghanistan, apart from the dual imperatives of maintaining neutrality and demonstrating solidarity with those affected by the crisis. In response to various requests to provide neutral good offices, however, the Swiss government increasingly began to view the Afghan crisis as an opportunity to play a meaningful role in a major conflict of the late Cold War as a permanently neutral state. 5 Fischer, ‘Swiss Cold War Neutrality,’ 67.

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The practical impact of Switzerland’s good offices in Afghanistan was relatively modest between 1979 and 1992. In comparison to other, both neutral and non-neutral governments, its provision of humanitarian aid was not extraordinary. The number of Soviet prisoners, transferred to Switzerland for internment between 1982 and 1986 never exceeded eleven. What is more, judging by the available archival material at the Swiss Federal Archives and the ICRC, the Swiss authorities did not play a decisive role in the return of the ICRC to Afghanistan in 1986. A number of systemic factors surrounding the leadership changes in both the Soviet Union in 1985 and in Afghanistan in 1986 may have equally contributed to the ICRC’s return. The Swiss authorities ultimately mediated between the Afghan regime and the mujahideen between 1991 and 1992. However, systemic factors including the continued involvement of the Cold War superpowers, the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, the collapse of the Soviet-installed Afghan regime in 1992, and the renewed descent into civil war prevented the peaceful resolution of the Afghan crisis for the foreseeable future. In a recent edited volume on Cold War neutrality and non-alignment, Thomas Fischer has concluded that the “Swiss Federal Department on Foreign Affairs tried – in vain – to mediate in the Afghan civil war by applying traditional ‘good offices’ to a domestic conflict situation.”6 Yet while this might be a tempting conclusion to draw from Switzerland’s involvement in Afghanistan, it does not address the broader questions on the overall significance of Switzerland’s engagement in the conflict for the changing nature of its neutrality at the end of the Cold War. In the present volume, I have examined the Swiss government’s involvement in Afghanistan to demonstrate that Switzerland continued to struggle with essentially the same defining foreign policy issue at end of Cold War that it had struggled with at the beginning: How to balance the competing imperatives of permanent neutrality and international solidarity in an increasingly multilateral world. My rationale has been threefold: To identify what experiences and lessons Swiss policymakers carried over from one episode of the Afghan crisis to the next, to explain how they justified their involvement in Afghanistan over time, and to analyze how the conceptual tension between neutrality and solidarity affected Switzerland’s involvement in the Afghan crisis as a whole. At the time of the Soviet invasion in late 1979 and early 1980, both the Swiss government and parliament refused to become diplomatically involved, citing Swiss neutrality as a limiting factor for diplomatic involvement. Remaining 6 Fischer, ‘From Good Offices to an Active Policy of Peace,’ 74.

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diplomatically aloof of the Afghan crisis at first was arguably indicative of a lesson learned from Switzerland’s mixed record on the provision of good offices up until this point. Since the formulation of Max Petitpierre’s doctrine of Neutrality and Solidarity in 1947, Switzerland struggled to strike a balance between these competing imperatives. The Swiss government participated in the Neutral Nations Supervisory Commission and the Neutral Nations Repatriation Commission in Korea after the ceasefire agreement of 27 July 1953. It also contributed to the formulation of the Evian Accords on Algerian independence from France in 1962. Yet Switzerland’s offer to host diplomatic talks on the Suez crisis of 1956 was rejected by the participants and its diplomatic involvement in the resolution of the Iranian hostage crisis of 1979 and the Falklands War of 1982 remained unsuccessful. The Swiss government’s provision of humanitarian aid to the Afghan conflict region, on the other hand, was part of a long-standing, apolitical and domestically popular tradition of humanitarianism that Federal Councillor Max Petitpierre had made repeated reference to as part of the doctrine of Neutrality and Solidarity in 1947. In 1973, the Federal Council released an official policy on humanitarian aid and in 1976, parliament sanctioned a federal law on international development and humanitarian aid.7 Unlike the provision of good offices, the provision of humanitarian aid had the advantage of conforming with the Bindschedler Doctrine of 1954, according to which the Swiss government could participate only in strictly technical – as opposed to political – intergovernmental organizations. By the time of the Afghan crisis, the provision of humanitarian aid to the conflict region was part of a routinized procedure. More challenging for Switzerland to navigate during the Afghan crisis was its complex relationship with the ICRC. In her well-known analysis of Switzerland’s relationship with the ICRC in the context of the Angolan War in 1975, Sabina Widmer has shown that the Swiss government’s association with the ICRC became an important asset to Swiss diplomacy, allowing it to “play a larger, more visible role than its small size would suggest.”8 The relationship between the ICRC and the Swiss government has received considerable attention in the literature both before and since. Interestingly, in the context of the Afghan crisis, the dynamic Widmer describes was reversed. The ICRC relied heavily on the Swiss government for the logistical aspects of the relocation, internment and repatriation of those Soviet POWs who chose to participate in the transfer scheme. At one point, the Swiss government also mediated 7 Freymond, ‘Der Humanitäre Bereich in der Aussenpolitik der Schweiz,’ 27. 8 Widmer, ‘Neutrality challenged in a Cold War Conflict,’ 219.

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between the ICRC and the Soviet Union. Yet overall, what was most striking about the Swiss government’s decision to participate in the prisoner transfer scheme was its willingness to proceed without a binding legal framework in 1982. It appeared as though, over time, the FDFA became both more eager to become involved in Afghanistan not just at the technical, humanitarian level, but at the diplomatic level as well. Initially, Switzerland’s provision of humanitarian aid revolved around technical collaboration with non-governmental and intergovernmental organizations at an administrative level. The prisoner transfer scheme gradually came to involve regular exchanges with the ICRC, as well as bilateral exchanges with the Soviet Union. Switzerland’s mediatory mandate ultimately included exchanges with multiple stakeholders, both at the governmental, non-governmental and intergovernmental level. These included the mujahideen, the Afghan regime, the United Nations, the United States as well as the Soviet Union. In complete reversal of Foreign Minister Pierre Aubert’s assessment that Switzerland should not play a leading role in the Afghan crisis, the FDFA ultimately became involved with most major stakeholders of the Afghan crisis. This increasing involvement was arguably part of a larger trend. Olga Pavlenko has recently argued that, there was a “clear surge in the foreign policy activities of Switzerland against the background of the system-wide collapse that covered not only the USSR, but also the entire Yalta-Potsdam system of international relations.”9 In January of 1991, the Swiss government hosted diplomatic talks between American Secretary of State James Baker and Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz in Geneva and in March of that year Edouard Brunner, the former Swiss Secretary of State, became Javier Pérez de Cuéllar’s Special Representative for the Arab-Israeli conflict.10 That same year, the FDFA attempted to assist the UN in hostage negotiations in Lebanon, dispatched a medical unit from the Swiss Armed Forces to the Western Sahara as part of MINRUSO and explored the possibility of peace talks between Serbian President Slobodan Milošević and Croatian President Franjo Tuđman.11 In parallel, the FDFA formed a new so-called Division for Peace, Security and Disarmament (Frieden, Sicherheit, Abrüstung), led by Marianne von Grünigen.12 9 10 11 12

Pavlenko, ‘The Soviet Union and Neutral Switzerland,’ 179. Bürgisser and Zala, ‘Einleitung,’ xxxi. Ibid., xxxii. Markus Heiniger, ‘Rückblick für die Zukunft: 30 Jahre Friedensengagement im EDA 1990–2020,’ 2021, Eidgenössisches Departement für auswärtige Angelegenheiten EDA,

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213

Yet, this larger trend was not exclusively due to the collapse of the Soviet Union and the Cold War international system. The resurgence in post-war rhetoric surrounding the compatibility of neutrality and solidarity began before the end of the Cold War. In 1986, the federal government had lost a popular referendum on UN membership, having reversed its original stance under Max Petitpierre that this was incompatible with permanent neutrality. In 1988, Franz Muheim, the head of the Directorate for International Organizations at the FDFA followed up with an internal memorandum to Switzerland’s major embassies, stressing that Switzerland continued to “pursue a constructive policy” toward the UN to “testify our solidarity also as a non-member.”13 Klaus Jacobi’s repeated attempts to coordinate Switzerland’s mediatory mandate in Afghanistan with the UN was a welcome – although ultimately unsuccessful – opportunity to demonstrate this sense of solidarity with the UN in practice. As part of the larger revision of the relationship between the roles of neutrality and solidarity in Swiss foreign policy at the end of the Cold War, the FDFA also set up an internal task force in 1991 to review the merits of neutrality in Swiss foreign policy altogether. Both Klaus Jacobi and Marianne von Grünigen participated in this task force and according to their report dated March of 1992, Swiss neutrality was unable to provide any form of protection against the security challenges of the post-Cold War period. Instead of neutrality, what was needed was solidarity in the form of collective action.14 Building on their conclusions, the Federal Council then released its first ever official report on Swiss neutrality in 1993. According to the report, “Swiss neutrality and the United Nations collective security system seek to achieve similar objectives, namely the maintenance of national integrity, the prevention of conflict, and the safeguarding of peaceful coexistence.”15 At first glance, this was a complete reversal from Max Petitpierre’s 1948 assessment that neutrality “is considered

13 14 15

Direktion für Entwicklung und Zusammenarbeit DEZA, https://www.swissinfo.ch /resource/blob/47380682/32c523f889fb66424803e51b2109a712/studie--30-jahre-friedens engagement-im-eda-1990-2020-data.pdf, 8. Franz Muheim, ‘Ausbau der schweizerischen Beteiligung an friedenserhaltenden Aktionen und Guten Diensten,’ 27 Juni 1988, E2200.64#1999/164#83*, CH-BAR. Studiengruppe zu Fragen der schweizerischen Neutralität, ‘Schweizerische Neutralität auf dem Prüfstand – Schweizerische Aussenpolitik zwischen Kontinuität und Wandel,’ March 1992, PDB 2/12/188, Fondation Jean Monnet (FJM-CH), Lausanne, Switzerland. Federal Council, ‘Bericht zur Neutralität: Anhang zum Bericht über die Aussenpolitik der Schweiz in den 90er Jahren vom 29. November 1993,’ 29. November 1993, https:// www.eda.admin.ch/dam/eda/de/documents/aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/bericht -neutralitaet-1993_DE.pdf, 18, author’s translation from, “Die schweizerische Neutralität und das kollektive Sicherheitssystem der Vereinten Nationen versuchen, ähnliche Ziele zu v­erwirklichen, nämlich die Aufrechterhaltung der einzelstaatlichen Integrität, die

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Conclusion

incompatible with the collective security system that the United Nations aims to create.”16 Switzerland ultimately joined the UN in 2002 and in 2022, the Swiss government successfully campaigned for a non-permanent seat on the UN Security Council for the first time in its history. That same year, the Russian Federation invaded Ukraine. Like the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December of 1979, the Russian invasion of Ukraine in February of 2022 was a surprise, full-scale and overt invasion in complete contradiction of international law. The Swiss government condemned the invasion and, after initial deliberation, adopted the sanctions regime of the European Union, which led to a heated public debate about whether or not, Switzerland continued to be permanently neutral. In November of 2022, the Swiss People’s Party (Schweizerische Volkspartei) began collecting signatures for a popular initiative to protect Swiss neutrality under the constitution. One month earlier, the Federal Council had released its second-ever report on neutrality, in which it reiterated the core principles of impartiality and non-belligerence and argued that the conclusions of 1993 continued to apply.17 Yet crucially, the report recognized two fundamental aspects of the dynamic between neutrality and solidarity in Swiss foreign policy. First, neutrality is not an indispensable prerequisite for the provision of good offices and humanitarian activities.18 Second, neutrality requires flexibility to adapt to changing international circumstances.19

16

17

18 19

Verhütung von Konflikten und Kriegen, die Sicherung eines friedlichen Zusammenlebens.” Petitpierre, ‘Propos Sur la Neutralité Tiré à part de “La Démocratie Suisse, 1848–1948” des Editions Patriotiques S.A. Morat,’ 1948, E2800#1967/59#921*, CH-BAR, author’s translation from “On le considère comme incompatible avec le système de sécurité collective que les Nations Unies ont l’ambition de créer.” Federal Council, ‘Klarheit und Orientierung in der Neutralitätspolitik: Bericht des Bundesrates in Erfüllung des Postulates 22.3385, Aussenpolitische Kommission SR, ­ 11.04.2022,’ 26 October 2022, https://www.eda.admin.ch/content/dam/eda/de/documents /aussenpolitik/voelkerrecht/20221026-neutralitaetsbericht_DE.pdf, 25. Ibid., 3. Ibid., 8.

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Von Grünigen, Marianne.

Wegmüller, Hans.

16 October 2018. 17 December 2018. 18 September 2019; 22 May 2020. 26 October 2018. 26 March 2019.

Newspapers and Periodicals Due to varying authorship practices amongst newspapers, footnote citations have included the names of individual journalists where available. Where unavailable, the newspaper in which an article has appeared was cited instead of the author’s name. France Le Matin



Die Welt

Federal Republic of Germany

Pakistan Dawn Frontier Post The Nation

Switzerland

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Brunner, Edouard. Lambris dorés et coulisses: Souvenirs d’un diplomate. Genève: Georg, 2001. Cordovez, Diego and Harrison, Selig S., editors. Out of Afghanistan: The Inside Story of the Soviet Withdrawal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995. Corwin, Philip. Doomed in Afghanistan: A UN Officer’s Memoirs of the Fall of Kabul and Najibullah’s Failed Escape. New Brunswick: Rutgers University Press, 1992. Pérez de Cuéllar, Javier. Pilgrimage for Peace: A Secretary- General’s Memoir. New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1997.

Books

Baker, Kevin. War in Afghanistan: A Short History of 80 Wars and Conflicts in Afghanistan and the Northwest Frontier, 1839 to 2011. Dural: Rosenberg Publishing, 2011. Barnett, Michael. Empire of Humanity : A History of Humanitarianism. Cornell University Press, 2011. Bowker, Mike. Russian Foreign Policy and the End of the Cold War. Aldershot: Dartmouth, 1997. Bradsher, Henry. Afghanistan and the Soviet Union. Durham: Duke University Press, 1985. Braithwaite, Rodric. Afghantsy: The Russians in Afghanistan 1979–1989. London: Profile, 2011. Chevallaz, Georges-André. Neutralité suisse et Nations Unies. Lausanne: Editions de l’Aire, 1986. Cronin, Richard, and Miko, Francis. Afghanistan: Status, U.S. Role and Implications of a Soviet Withdrawal. Washington D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 1988. Dromi, Shai. Above the Fray: The Red Cross and the Making of the Humanitarian NGO Sector. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2020. Emandi, Hafizullah. State, Revolution, and Superpowers in Afghanistan. New York: ­Praeger, 1990.

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Chapters in Edited Books

Altermatt, Urs. ‘Vom Ende des Zweiten Weltkrieges bis zur Gegenwart.’ In Neues Handbuch der schweizerischen Aussenpolitik, edited by Alois Riklin, Hans Haug, Raymond Probst. Bern: Haupt, 1992, 61–78. Baczko, Adam, and Dorronsoro, Gilles. ‘United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGMAP).’ In The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, edited by Joachim A. Koops, Thierry Tards, Norrie MacQueen and Paul D. Williams. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, 269–273. Boczek, Boleslaw. ‘Introduction: The Conceptual and Legal Framework of Neutrality and Nonalignment in Europe.’ In Europe’s Neutral and Non-Aligned States: Between NATO and the Warsaw Pact, edited by S. Victor Papacosma and Mark R. Rubin. Wilmington: Scholarly Resources, 1989, 1–42. Borer, Thomas. ‘Thesenpapier zur Schweizerischen Neutralität.’ In Diplomatische Dokumente der Schweiz: Band 1990, Sacha Zala et al., eds. Bern: Dodis, 2021, http:// www.dodis.ch/54523. Borer, Thomas. ‘Thesenpapier zur Schweizerischen Neutralität.’ In Diplomatische Dokumente der Schweiz: Band 1990, edited by Sacha Zala et al. Bern: DODIS, 2021, Document 24. Bott, Sandra, Schaufenbuehl, Janick Marina, and Zala, Sacha. ‘Die internationale Schweiz in der Zeit des Kalten Krieges: Eine Zwischenbilanz.’ In Die internationale Schweiz in der Zeit des Kalten Krieges, edited by Sandra Bott, Janick Marina Schaufenbuehl and Sacha Zala. Basel: Schwabe, 2011, 5–16.

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Unpublished Theses

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Index 2+3 Plan 177 Acland, Antony 143, 144n Adamichin, Anatoliy 114–116 Aesch 133 Afgantsy 98, 99, 109 Afghan Inter-Aid Committee 78 Afghan Treaty of Friendship, ­Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA) of 1978 49, 52, 62, 99, 105, 157 Agadzhanov, Hasan 109, 111, 131, 134 Akhrimov, Mikhail 100–102, 114, 127 Amin, Hafizullah 1, 49, 52–56, 154, 157 Andropov, Yuri 52, 55, 72 Anisimov, Guernam 118, 134 April Revolution of 1978 49, 52, 56 Aubert, Pierre 2, 59–65, 71, 104, 108, 132, 137, 159, 192, 212 Auer, Felix 164 Austrian neutrality 25–27 Austrian Relief Committee 78 Austrian State Treaty of 1955 25 Bachofen, Armin 18 Bagram 55 Baluchistan 78, 89 Bär, Roger 130 Battle of Marignano, 1515 22 Berner Zeitung 106 Bibliotheca Afghanica 4, 18, 137, 160, 161, 168, 176, 177, 184 Bindschedler Doctrine, 1954 23–24, 38, 40, 44–45, 47–48, 64, 140, 141–143, 195, 211 Bindschedler, Rudolf 22, 23, 45 Boukovsky, Vladimir 123 Bourbaki, Charles-Denis 36, 37, 97 Boutros-Ghali, Boutros 186, 187 Braithwaite, Rodric 1, 51n, 52, 53n, 54, 55, 98, 99, 148n, 149n, 153, 157n Bretscher, Willy 141 Brezhnev Doctrine 1, 61, 62 Brezhnev, Leonid 1, 55, 61, 62, 72 Brunner, Edouard 13, 60–62, 71, 101, 103, 104, 111, 142, 143, 165, 197, 212 Bubb, Christoph 18

Bucherer, Paul 4, 5, 18, 137, 160–164, 166–168, 170–174, 177, 178, 181–185, 188, 189 Burba, Rimas 118, 131, 134 Bürgi, Paul 1, 63 Butty, Laurent 108 Carter, Jimmy 43, 54, 66, 147 Chatty, Habib 69 Chernenko, Konstatin 135, 148, 190 Chevallaz, George-André 65 Church World Service 78 Clivaz, Jean 132 Collective Security 10, 23, 28, 143, 194, 196, 213, 214 Committee for Human Rights 123 Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) 4, 5, 61, 72, 148, 178, 185 Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) 16, 38, 44, 45, 47, 63–65, 70, 71, 142, 159, 197 COOP 130 Coordinating Committee for Multilateral Export Controls 23 Cordovez, Diego 71–73, 146–148, 151 Council of Europe 23, 47, 71 Council of States (Ständerat) 1, 10, 11, 30, 60–63, 142, 200 Cuban Missile Crisis 1, 40, 42, 46 Danesh, Ismail 154 De Courten, Jean 128, 135 De Cuéllar, Javier Pérez 19, 72, 146, 152, 153, 165, 171, 173, 181, 185–186, 197, 212 De Riedmatten, Bernard 114 De Watteville, Jacques 18, 135 Declaration of International Guarantees 151 Declaration of London, 1920 28 Declaration of the Federal Council on Incidents in Afghanistan, 1980 57 Delapraz, David 114 Delhi, Accords of 1973 and 1974 43 Democratic Republic of Afghanistan (DRA) 49, 151 Der Bund 57, 107 Desertion 3, 57, 97–98, 117, 123–124, 127, 131, 138

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234 Détente 16, 65, 144 Didienko, Valeriy 106–110, 132–134 Dienst für Friedensfragen 161 Dillier, Jost 65 Dost, Shah Mohammad 113, 146 Durani, Asad 174, 176 Eidgenössisches Departement des Inneren (EDI) 160 Evian Accords, 1962 21, 42, 45, 139, 211 Falkland Crisis, 1982 21, 42–44, 139 Federal Council 1, 3, 7, 10, 12, 22, 23, 28–31, 33, 37, 39–42, 57, 60–65, 71, 73, 79, 89, 93, 103, 108, 126, 132, 140–142, 164, 189, 191–192, 195–204, 206, 209, 211, 213–214 Federal Council Neutrality Report of 2022 202, 203, 214 Federal Department of Foreign Affairs (FDFA) 34, 44, 48, 58–60, 69, 77, 87, 93, 100, 102, 103, 105, 107–109, 111–118, 121, 124, 127, 128, 130–135, 138, 140, 141, 143–145, 160, 161, 164–167, 170–173, 178, 180–183, 186–189, 191, 192, 194, 196, 197, 200, 202, 207, 212, 213 Federal Department of Justice (FDJ) 110, 112, 126 Federal Military Department (FMD) 130 Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) 79, 130, 131 Finnish neutrality 25–27, 46 Finnish Treaty of Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance (FCMA), 1948 17, 26, 27, 49 Five Point Plan 171, 173, 175 Fjermakoye, Isofou 146 Foreign Affairs Committee of the Council of States 1, 62–63, 200, 204 Foreign Affairs Committee of the National Assembly 63, 126, 164–165, 204 Franco-Prussian War, 1870–1871 36, 97 Früebüel 112 Gailani, Pir Ishaq 4, 161, 167, 168, 171n Gailani, Pir Sayyid Ahmed 51, 163 Gals 109, 110, 134 Geneva Accords, 1988 140, 145, 151–153, 155–156, 158, 166, 188 Geneva Conventions, 1949

Index Geneva Conventions 11, 31, 32, 43, 95, 96, 99, 104, 105, 109, 111, 113, 115, 122, 124, 125, 127, 206 Geneva Talks, 1982–1988 18, 38, 74, 140, 143, 145, 147–148, 151, 158–159, 163, 166, 170 Ghotbzadeh, Sadegh 69 Good Offices 6–7, 11–15, 17, 21, 31, 35–42, 45, 47–48, 64–65, 70, 72–73, 95–96, 103, 115, 137–139, 141–144, 152, 165–166, 170, 173, 181, 186, 189–192, 195–198, 200–204, 206–207, 208–211, 214 Gorbachev, Mikhail 4, 5, 57, 135, 148, 150, 151, 153, 170, 176, 178, 179, 185, 190 Govtva, Mikhail 119, 134 Gromyko, Andrei 52, 55, 67, 72 Gulabzoi, Seid Muhammad 53, 154 Guntern, Odilio 65 Halter, Marek 123, 124 Hammarskjöld, Dag 39, 46 Harakat-i-Inqilab-i-Islami (the Revolutionary Islamic Movement) 51, 147, 171 Hay, Alexandre 114, 205 Herat 51–53, 56, 136, 153 Hefti, Peter 65 Hekmatyar, Gulbuddin 51, 118, 155, 157, 158, 163, 165, 175, 182, 187 Helsinki Final Act, 1975 16, 45, 59, 63, 141 Hezb-i-Islami/Hekmatyar 51, 157, 165, 175 Hezb-i-Islami/Khalis 51, 100–102, 114 Hocké, Jean-Pierre 111, 124 Hotz-Linder Agreement, 1951 23 Howard, Linda 110, 132 Humanitarian aid 2, 6, 11, 14–15, 18, 21, 30–35, 74, 76, 78–90, 92–94, 96, 101, 105, 121, 137–139, 141, 159, 167, 181, 190, 195, 203–206, 209–212 Humanitarianism 14, 17, 33, 83–85, 203, 206, 211 India-Pakistan War, 1971 102 India 39, 41–43, 61, 70, 71, 101, 102, 187 Inter-Continental Hotel 146 Interim Islamic Government of Afghanistan (IIGA) 156–158, 161, 166, 167, 170–172, 174, 176, 180, 182, 183 International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) 2–4, 13–15, 18, 19, 31–35, 40, 43, 75, 78, 80–86, 90–96, 99, 100, 103–108, 111–139, 177, 189, 190, 203–206, 210–212

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Index International Rescue Committee 78 Interrelationships Agreement, 1988 151 Intra-Afghan Dialogue 170–177, 180, 181, 188 Iranian hostage crisis, 1979 21, 42–44, 58, 69, 70, 211 Irish neutrality 9, 16, 25, 162, 193 Jacobi, Klaus 5, 165, 167, 172–177, 180–185, 194, 197, 213 Jam’iyyat-e-Islami (the Islamic Society)  50, 51, 93, 100, 102, 118, 153, 156, 158, 163, 165, 176 Jebha-i-Nejat-i-Milli-Afghanistan (the Afghan National Liberation Front) 51 Jéquier, Nicolas 164, 165 Joint Afghan-Soviet Statement of 1991  182, 183 Kabul 1, 5, 50–58, 81, 100, 106, 113, 116, 123, 124, 127, 128, 131, 135, 136, 152, 153, 170, 172-178, 181, 183–187, 190 Kanter, Arnold 185 Karmal, Babrak 1, 4, 48, 56, 69, 70, 73, 81, 82, 114, 116, 135, 139, 145, 148, 149, 150 Katz, David 172 Khadamat-e Aetela‘at-e Dawlati (KHAD) 53, 135, 136, 149, 154 Khalis, Mawlawi Yunis 51, 100–102, 114, 182 Khalq 49, 149, 155 Khan, Ghulam Ishaq 155 Khan, Sahibzada Yaqub 146 Khan, Sardar Mohammad Daoud 48, 49, 76 Khomeini, Ayatollah Ruhollah 44, 49, 54, 69, 90 Kimmit, Robert 166 Koellreuter, Andreas 18, 133, 134, 177 Korean War, 1950–1953 21, 41, 43, 46, 73, 105 Kosygin, Alexei 52 Kozyrev, Nikloai 151 Kriuchkov, Vladimir 176, 178 Lang, Erik 43 Lavrov, Vladimir 111, 115, 124, 129, 200 Le Matin 124–126 League of Nations 28, 30, 193 Lehner, Ulrich 5, 18, 161, 167, 171, 173, 177 Lévy, Bernard-Henri 123, 125 Lie, Trygve 46 Liestal 5, 160, 177

235 Long, Olivier 42 Loya Jirga 150, 156, 164–166, 168, 170, 178, 181, 185 Mahaz-i-Milli Islami-yi Afghanistan (the National Islamic Front of Afghanistan) 51, 118, 146, 163, 171, 185 Marshall Plan 26, 30 Massoud, Ahmad Shah 118, 157, 158, 183, 187 Maurer, Peter 177 Mazdoryar, Sherjan 53 Médecins Sans Frontières (MSF) 14, 34, 82–86 Mediation 4, 36, 40, 42, 44, 73, 93, 135, 139–145, 151, 154, 157, 159–175, 177, 180, 183, 188, 191, 194, 196–198, 202, 206, 208–213 Meier, Josi 63, 64 Mercier, Michel 125, 126 Meylan, René 1, 63 Mohammadi, Mohammad Nabi 51, 147, 171 Mont Pèlerin 69, 70, 87 Muheim, Franz 144, 213 Mujaddedi, Najibullah 180, 185 Mujaddedi, Sebghatullah 4, 146, 157, 161, 167, 171, 178, 180, 182, 183, 185 Mujahideen 3–6, 14, 49–51, 53, 69, 70–72, 82, 86, 91–94, 98–104, 106, 108, 114, 115, 117–119, 121, 125, 127, 129, 136, 141, 145–148, 150, 153–159, 161–167, 170, 172–188, 191, 205, 210, 212 Najibullah, Mohammad 4, 5, 135, 136, 149–152, 154–158, 161–166, 170–178, 180, 182–188, 190 National Assembly (Nationalrat) 26, 60, 63, 66, 108, 126, 132, 142, 164–165 National Reconciliation 4, 149, 150, 166, 188 NATO double track decision, 12 December 1979 54 Negative Symmetry Agreement of 1991 180 Nellen, Stephan 180 Neutrality 6–13, 16–17, 21–35, 47–48, 64–65, 73–74, 84, 120, 140–143, 189, 191–196, 198–206 New humanitarianism 84, 85 Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) 1, 15–17, 39, 45, 53, 60–62, 67–68, 70, 72, 142, 194 North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) 17, 23, 25, 54, 66–67, 192–193

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236 North-West Frontier Province (NWFP) 78, 89, 92 Ochsner, Richard 65, 87 Office of the Secretary-General in Afghanistan and Pakistan (OSGAP) 163, 172, 181 Okhrimiuk, Evgeni 100 Olympic Games in Moscow, 1980 60, 65, 66 Operation Agat 55, 56 Organization of the Islamic Conference (OIC) 68, 70, 72, 73, 182 OSMAN Carpet Trading Inc. 172, 177 Pahlavi, Mohammad Reza 54 Pakistani Federal Coordination Committee for Afghan Refugees 78 Pankin, Boris 182 Panshjir Valley 86 Parcham 49, 149 Pekkala, Mauno 26 People’s Democratic Party of Afghanistan (PDPA) 49, 52–54, 56, 149, 150, 153–155, 158 Peshawar 3, 5, 50, 77–79, 86, 94–95, 117, 125, 153, 156–157, 161, 175, 185 Peshawar-7 / Peshawar Seven 153, 156, 157 Peshawar-Khyber Hospital 77 Pestalozzi, Richard 107 Petitpierre, Max 10, 11, 28–31, 33–35, 42, 48, 64, 191, 196, 203, 211, 213, 214 Picco, Giandomenico 147 Place des Nations 146 Pometta, Francesca 144 Ponomarev, Boris 52 Povarnitsin, Yuriy 106–112, 122–125, 131–134 Prague Spring 61 Principles of Mutual Relations, 1988 151 Prisoners of War (POW s) 3–4, 96-98 Probst Criteria, 1958 40, 41, 48, 64, 103, 165 Probst, Raymond 35, 40, 41, 43, 48, 64, 103, 104, 114–116, 121, 126, 165, 208 Protective power 6, 12, 14, 15, 31, 37, 58, 93, 119, 138, 139, 198, 206, 208 Pul-i-Charkhi 81, 113, 136 Quetta 50, 92 Rabbani, Burhanuddin 50, 51, 93, 100, 102, 153, 156, 163, 176, 182

Index Radio Free Kabul 123, 124, 131 Reagan, Ronald 57, 147, 148, 157 Refugees 2, 14, 33, 57, 64, 68, 72, 76–81, 87–93, 117, 146, 151, 158–159, 199 Repatriation 3, 4, 21, 40, 41, 57, 58, 97, 104–106, 121, 123–137, 191, 211 Report on Switzerland’s foreign policy in the 1990s 22, 195, 197, 199 Rossier, Jean 108 Sager, Peter 3, 122 Sanctions 23, 28, 60, 63, 66–69, 143, 193–195, 199–201, 211, 214 Sans-frontièrisme 84 Sapozhnikov, Viktor 109, 110, 134 Sarwari, Assadullah 53 Save the Children 78 Sayyaf, Abdul Rasul 157, 182 Sazman-e Javanan-e Musulman (the Organization of Muslim Youth) 50 Scandinavian Defence Union 24 Scensny, Leonard 172 Schaffner, Teresita Currie 172, 180, 181 Sevan, Benon 163, 172–174, 177, 181, 183, 185 Shahi, Agha 69-70 Shams, Jalil 161, 177, 178 Sharq, Mohammad Hasan 154, 163 Shebarshin, Leonid Vladimirowitch 54 Shevardnadze, Edouard 150, 182 Shultz, George 152 Shura 156, 170 Sinchuk, Viktor 106–108, 132–133 Solidarity 6–8, 10–13, 17, 21, 29, 30, 33, 35, 41, 47–48, 64, 68, 120–122, 136, 139–141, 162, 164, 166–167, 189, 191–203, 206–211, 213–214 Sommaruga, Cornelio 18, 32, 206 Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, 1979 1, 2, 6, 7, 14, 18, 22, 39, 47–48, 51, 52–73, 76, 77, 80, 83, 91, 93, 100, 102, 104, 105, 109, 140, 142, 144, 149, 154, 165, 189, 198, 199, 201, 206, 210, 214 Soviet-ICRC Memorandum of Understanding, 1982 2, 102–105, 119, 137, 143 Spaak, Paul-Henri 28 Spetznaz 1, 55, 56 St. Jean 109–111, 132, 134 Staatsvertragsreferendum 143 Suez Crisis, 1956 38–41, 46, 47, 73, 189, 190, 211

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237

Index Suslov, Mikhail 55 Sutter, Peter 183–185 Swedisch Committee for Afghanistan (SCA) 14, 82, 83, 85, 86 Swedish neutrality 9, 16–17, 24–25, 27, 45–46 Swiss Disaster Relief Corps 79, 89, 90 Swiss Neutrality Put to the Test – Swiss Foreign Policy between Continuity and Change 194, 195 Swiss protecting power mandate for Cuba in USA 42 Swiss protecting power mandate for USA in Cuba 42 Swiss UN Membership Referendum, 1986 140–159, 189, 194, 196, 213 Swiss-Afghan Aviation Agreement of 1961 56 Swiss-Afghan Friendship Agreement of 1928 58 Swiss-Afghan Relations before 1979 58, 59 Swiss-Soviet relations 27, 57–58 Tages-Anzeiger 127, 135, 186 Tagliavini, Heidi 109, 202 Tanai, Shahnawaz 154, 155, 163 Taraki, Nur Mohammad 49, 52, 53 Thalmann, Ernesto 30 Thatcher, Margaret 66 The Hague Conventions, 1907 9, 22, 23, 201 Thorberg 110, 111 Track Two Diplomacy 13, 161, 162, 170 Treaty of Paris, 1815 22 Troendle, Petar 156 U Thant 46 Uhl, Othmar 107 Ul-Haq, Mohammad Zia 50, 76, 147, 153, 155 UNHCR Income-generation project for Afghan refugees 88–90 Union Aid for Afghan Refugees 78 Union Treaty 179 United Nations Charter 23, 28, 45, 59, 146, 163, 195, 196

United Nations Convention on the Status of Refugees, 1951 76 United Nations Good Offices Mission in Afghanistan and Pakistan (UNGOMAP) 152, 155, 164 United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) 2, 14, 19, 30, 68, 76–81, 86–93, 111 United Nations Security Council Resolution ES-6/2 67 United Nations Special Representative on Afghanistan 30, 68 Ustinov, Dmitry 52, 55, 72, 153 Utkan, Hasim 77 Varennikov, Valentin 178 Vashchenko, Yuriy 118, 130, 131, 134 Von Grünigen, Marianne 18, 177, 194, 212 Vorontsov, Yuli 153, 185 Wakil, Abdul 4, 5, 151, 161, 164, 173, 177, 180, 182, 184, 185, 187 Waldheim, Kurt 72 Watanjar, Mohammad Aslam 53 Wegmüller, Hans 18 Weltwoche 56, 106, 107, 121 Wenger, Andreas 8, 24, 208 Wipfli, Paul 3, 117 Yaqubi, Ghulam 182, 185 Zaher Shah, Mohammad 49, 51, 76, 156, 161, 165, 166, 170, 171, 173, 175, 177, 183, 185 Zaiken, Konstantin Anatoliwich 100 Zaki, Akram 174 Zeary, Mohammad 154 ZeitBild 122, 124 Zufferey, Michel 100 Zugerberg 112, 113, 115, 121, 122, 124, 126, 128, 133, 177 Zurich Kloten Airport 3, 106, 110, 118, 133

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21mm

NPCW 11

Liliane Stadler, Ph.D. (2021), University of Oxford, is a lecturer in History of International Relations at the University of Utrecht. Her research revolves around neutral states in multilateral diplomacy and conflict resolution. “At a time when Switzerland’s fundamental foreign policy values of neutrality and solidarity are coming under increasing international pressure, it is worth examining their historical evolution based on specific case studies. Liliane Stadler’s innovative study does exactly that.” – Professor Sacha Zala, Research Centre Diplomatic Documents of Switzerland (Dodis) and University of Bern. “In a time when many observers hail the end of European neutrality, Liliane Stadler’s intriguing book about Switzerland’s good offices in Afghanistan is a welcome reminder of the important contributions to peace and stability provided by non-aligned and neutral states.” – Professor Aryo Makko, Hans Blix Centre, Stockholm University.

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE COLD WAR – 11

The present study investigates how and why this changed between 1979 and 1992. While the practical impact of Switzerland’s good offices was modest, the crisis revealed that Switzerland continued to struggle to balance the competing imperatives of permanent neutrality and international solidarity in an increasingly multilateral world.

Between Neutrality and Solidarity: Swiss Good Offices in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1992 Liliane Stadler

After 1979, Switzerland became increasingly involved in Soviet-occupied Afghanistan as a provider of humanitarian aid and good offices. It delivered aid to the region, hosted Soviet prisoners of war and eventually mediated between the Afghan regime and the mujahideen. What is puzzling about this development is that initially, following the Soviet invasion, both government and parliament refused to become diplomatically involved in Afghanistan on account of Swiss neutrality.

Between Neutrality and Solidarity: Swiss Good Offices in Afghanistan from 1979 to 1992 LILIANE STADLER

ISBN 978 9004 69065 3

NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE COLD WAR – 11 ISSN 2452-2260 brill.com/npcw

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