Between Deontology and Justice: Chinese and Western Perspectives (Routledge Studies in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy) [1 ed.] 9780815383116, 9780367855352, 0815383118

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Between Deontology and Justice

In China, political philosophy is still a comparatively new academic discipline. While there is no such term as “political philosophy” in ancient Chinese texts, there are elements within them that could be considered part of that field. Central questions of Chinese ancient political philosophy include the legitimacy of the source of political power, the foundation of moral rationality for the use of political power, and the purpose of political activities. This book explores the idea of rights, the foundations of law, transference of power, democracy, and other topics as debated in ancient times. Focusing on important political thinkers in Chinese history, such as Kongzi, Laozi, Xu Fuguan, Liang Qichao, and Li Dazhao, the book explains characteristics that are particular to China, such as the system of abdication, the general will of the people, and the society of Great Harmony. While making comparisons between Chinese and Western political philosophy, the book also discusses how to establish a Chinese modern state and how to promote Chinese culture today so that it can influence more and more people around the world. The book will be a valuable reference for scholars of Chinese philosophy, political philosophy, and Chinese culture. Genyou Wu, Yangzi Chair Professor of Philosophy at Wuhan University, specializes in the history of Chinese philosophy, comparative philosophy, and political philosophy. Yong Li, Associate Professor of Philosophy, Wuhan University. Zemian Zheng, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Chinese University of Hong Kong. Jianjun Li, Assistant Professor of Philosophy, Wuhan University.

Routledge Studies in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy

It is widely recognized that in science, industry, and technology China is a modern superpower. However, there is still a common stereotype that Chinese philosophy consists of nothing but the earnest repetition of quaint sayings from long-dead sages. In actuality, philosophy in China today is vibrant and intellectually diverse. The aim of this series is to publish translations of the best and most representative works by contemporary Chinese philosophers. The books in this series include contemporary studies of the history of Chinese or Western philosophy, as well as original works of research in ethics, political philosophy, metaphysics, and other areas. Routledge Studies in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy seeks to fill the large gap that currently exists in the study of Chinese philosophy by providing high-quality translations to English-language scholars. Series Editor: Bryan W. Van Norden, Vassar College, USA Yong Li, Wuhan University, China Titles in this series currently include: Confucius and Modern World CHEN Lai Between Deontology and Justice Chinese and Western Perspectives WU Genyou Secret Subversion I: Mou Zongsan, Kant, and Original Confucianism TANG Wenming Secret Subversion II: Mou Zongsan, Kant, and Original Confucianism TANG Wenming A History of Classical Chinese Thought LI Zehou, translated by Andrew Lambert For more information, please visit www.routledge.com/Routledge-Studies-inContemporary-Chinese-Philosophy/book-series/RSCCP

Between Deontology and Justice Chinese and Western Perspectives Genyou Wu Translated by Yong Li, Zemian Zheng, and Jianjun Li

First published in English 2020 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, NY 10017 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2020 Genyou Wu Translated by Yong Li, Zemian Zheng, and Jianjun Li The right of Genyou Wu to be identified as author of this work has been asserted by him in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilized in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data A catalog record has been requested for this book ISBN: 978-0-8153-8311-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-0-367-85535-2 (ebk) Typeset in Times New Roman by Swales & Willis, Exeter, Devon, UK

Contents

Foreword: introducing Genyou Wu

vii

BRYAN WILLIAM VAN NORDEN

Preface: political philosophy and Chinese political philosophy PART I

1 The theory of daoyi: a concise treatise on Confucius’s political philosophy and his argumentation about the legitimacy of political power

viii 1

3

2 “Law comes from Dao”: the philosophy of law in the silk manuscript Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons

18

3 Transferring to the worthies rather than to the sons: the political philosophy in the Shanghai Museum bamboo slips manuscript Rong Cheng Shi (容成氏) and the question of which school it belongs to

34

4 Striving for democracy: Confucian political philosophy in the Ming and Qing dynasties

45

PART II

55

5 Laozi’s view of harmony and the ideal of social justice

57

6 A new interpretation of “preserve great harmony in union, and the result is advantageous, correct, and firm”: the relation between social fairness and utility in the “Commentaries on the Book of Changes”

65

7 The Confucian “kingly Way for all under Heaven” and contemporary international peace

77

vi Contents PART III

105

8 Freedom in the history of Chinese thought: vocabulary, concept, and idea

107

9 The “cultural liberalism” of Xu Fuguan

125

10 Xu Fuguan and Confucian political philosophy

134

11 On the possibility of dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism from a humanistic point of view

148

12 On Liang Qichao’s idea of liberty in his earlier works

164

13 A review of Li Dazhao’s social ideal

182

14 Individual freedom and the ideal society: the ideas of freedom of Yin Haiguang and Feng Qi in comparison

198

PART IV

215

15 The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” and cultural nationalism

217

16 Minben (民本) and democracy: a comparison of political ideas between China and the West

230

17 From political constitutionalism to international political constitutionalism: the reasoning of Rawls’s political liberalism

260

18 Political democracy and Chinese democracy: thoughts on Chinese political reforms and regional conflicts in the world

275

References Index

282 287

Foreword Introducing Genyou Wu

Professor Genyou Wu needs no introduction to scholars in China, where he is a distinguished professor in the School of Philosophy at Wuhan University, one of the top universities in the country, and also a Yangtze River Scholar, an honor given only to leading figures in their fields. Professor Wu is best known for his work on Chinese legal and political philosophy, especially in a comparative perspective. His work is historical, but he always has an eye on the contemporary relevance of history. Professor Wu is in the tradition of classical thinkers like Confucius in China and Cicero in the West, who believe that law and government have their ultimate foundation in morality, and morality has its ultimate foundation in the fabric of the universe. We can only hope that these humanistic ideals will have increasing significance in China. The present collection of essays gives a good sense of the overall trajectory of Professor Wu’s work. However, this is not an introductory book. Readers with no background in Chinese political philosophy would be well advised to first read some overviews of Chinese philosophy and intellectual history. But those who are equipped to follow Professor Wu’s learned and often subtle arguments will learn a great deal. Bryan William Van Norden, Series Co-Editor, Routledge Studies in Contemporary Chinese Philosophy

Preface Political philosophy and Chinese political philosophy

In China political philosophy is a new academic discipline. There is no agreement about the content, subject, or nature of this discipline. However, although there is no such term as “political philosophy” in early Chinese texts, there was in fact political philosophy, one of whose basic concepts is the idea of minben (民本, people as the foundation of government), which is very familiar to a modern audience. The ideal of the “kingly Way” (wang dao, 王道), the question of the distinction between China and its neighboring nations, and so on can all be discussed in the framework of political philosophy. Since philosophy as a modern discipline came from the West, it is impossible to talk about questions of philosophy without mentioning the relevant Western view. Such is the case in political philosophy. Let’s use the view of Leo Strauss as an example to see one modern Western philosopher’s view of the nature of political philosophy. Strauss inherits the view of philosophy from the ancient Greek tradition of Plato. He believes that philosophy is the pursuit of truth, and is therefore opposed to mere opinions. Since political philosophy belongs to philosophy, it is a discipline that pursues the truth of political activities, not just opinions about political activities. Therefore political philosophy is differentiated from mere “political thought” in a general sense.1 Political philosophy is also different from political science. Political science belongs to social science. In the realm of social science, since Comte’s positivism, there has been a tendency to transform social science into natural science; the neopositivism after Comte proceeded to claim that researchers should be neutral so that their own value tendencies will not bias their research in the humanities and in social science. Although this claim has a certain influence, it is in fact impossible. Leo Strauss has a different view about the so-called “neutrality” in modern academia. Strauss even came up with the radical statement that there has recently been no political philosophy at all, but only a history of political philosophy. This is not unfamiliar to us, since Hegel claimed that “philosophy is history of philosophy.” Just as there is no consensus in the definition of philosophy, it is also difficult to reach a consensus about the nature of political philosophy. This, to be sure, does not deny the necessity of political reflection about the nature of political activities.

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In fact, every historical period has its own philosophical reflections on the nature of political activities. Themes and highlights vary from period to period. There is no unified or fixed theme for political philosophy. From the perspective of comparative political philosophy, due to the differing environments of human life and cultures of different nations, their political philosophical concerns are different from one another. For example, in ancient Greece, Plato’s Republic reflects more on the question of justice of a city-state and of an individual person; at about the same time, Mencius reflects on the foundation of the morality and legality of the politics of the feudal states, and correspondingly on the distinction between righteousness and utility in politics. Generally speaking, ancient Chinese Confucian political philosophy is concerned more about the legitimacy of the source and employment of the ultimate political power of the king; it is concerned more about the question of daoyi (道义, Way and righteousness), and is different from the theories of justice developed in Western political philosophy. Roughly speaking, the central question for ancient Chinese political philosophy is reflection on the legitimacy of the source of political power, the foundation of moral rationality in the usage of political power, and the purpose of political activities; however, there is not much reflection on the methodological question as to how to use political power, and the question of checks and balances in political power. The pre-Qin philosophers’ story about abdication, the view of respecting the worthies, and the view that the political power of a king is conferred by Heaven, all belong to thoughts about the transition of political power, the subject in using political power, as well as the legitimacy of the source of political power. Huang Zongxi’s (黄宗羲) Ming Yi Dai Fang Lu (明夷待访录)2 marks a turning point. The opening chapters “Yuan Jun” (原君, “On the Prince”) and “Yuan Chen” (原臣, “On Ministership”) were still discussing, albeit in a new fashion, the legitimacy of the source of political power; however, “Yuan Fa” (原法, “On Law”) discusses the purpose of political activities and the foundation for the rationality of institutions. Compared with previous thinkers, Huang Zongxi’s discussion of the checks and balances of political power is more systematic. He and his contemporaries Gu Yanwu (顾炎武) and Wang Fuzhi (王夫之) all discuss the checks and balances of the highest political power, creating a new orientation for Chinese political philosophy. In the history of Chinese classical Confucian political philosophy, the three questions, namely, the legitimacy of the source of political power, the foundation of the moral rationality of the usage of political power, and the purpose of political activities, are unified in the framework of the political idea of minben (民本, people as the foundation of government). The idea that Heaven sees and listens through the people appeared in the Shang Shu (尚书, Book of Documents), a historical book of great significance for political philosophy, which for the first time in Chinese history transformed the religious view that government is based on the will of gods to the secularized and rationalized view that the foundation of government is the people. It is believed that the people are the foundation of the country; when the foundation is solid, the country is peaceful.

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The purpose of political activities is expressed by the idea that kings ascend to the throne for the sake of the people. There are other radical expressions of traditional minben, such as Mencius’s view that “people are the most valuable, and the ruler is of lesser importance,” Xunzi’s comparison that people may support or topple the governments of the rulers just like water may support or submerge boats, Huainanzi’s expression that the all-under-Heaven belongs to all people under Heaven. Is there any similarity between the thought of minben and modern Western democracy? There has been a great amount of discussion on this point.3 As far as I am concerned, the traditional Chinese concept of minben can lead to modern democracy. By “lead to” I do not mean that we can logically deduce the principle of democracy from minben. My observation is based on my reading of texts in Chinese intellectual history. To the purpose of articulating such a significant theoretical question, one essay in this book, “Striving for Democracy,” deals with the elements of democracy in Ming–Qing Confucian thought concerning political reform. To be sure, in order to explain the difference between traditional minben and modern democracy, we need to understand the modern notion of democracy. Modern democracy is based on the notion of individual natural rights, and such a notion is rooted in the religious culture in which all persons are equal before God. Does traditional minben contain the notion of equality and individual natural rights? Furthermore, can a notion of individuality similar to the modern West be developed from traditional Chinese society after the Northern Song Dynasty, in which Confucianism was dominant? All these questions are the crucial points concerning the issue of whether modern democracy can be developed from Confucian democracy. To answer this question, I have made a preliminary inquiry concerning the commensurability between them in two chapters in this book: Chapter 11 (“On the Possibility of Dialogue between the Confucian Doctrine of ‘Humaneness’ and Liberalism from a Humanistic Point of View”) and Chapter 16 (“Minben (民本) and Democracy: A Comparison of Political Ideas between China and the West”). This anthology is divided into four parts. Most of the chapters have been published in domestic or international professional academic journals. Only a few chapters appear for the first time. Part I of this book mainly discusses Chinese classical political philosophy concerning daoyi (the Way and righteousness), the metaphysical foundation of law, the process of transferring power, as well as the question of the grounds for political reform and its relation to a new theory of human nature. Part II focuses on the value of harmony in Chinese classical political thought and how ancient Chinese international political practice reflects such a value. It seeks to draw on the Confucian view of the “kingly Way for all under Heaven” to tackle the problems of the contemporary international context, providing Chinese political experience and wisdom in the quest for perpetual world peace. Part III starts from an analysis of the notion of freedom, the most essential concept for modern democracy, and investigates the evolution of the term zi you (自由, freedom) in Chinese texts, the commensurability between Confucianism and modern liberalism, and the notion of freedom

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for early Chinese reformists, Marxists, and Chinese philosophers after the May Fourth Movement in 1919, in order to establish a possible intellectual foundation for Chinese modern democracy. Part IV focuses on comparative political philosophy, and investigates how to introduce Chinese political philosophy to the world. Questions discussed include the distinction between China and neighboring nations, and the history of such a distinction, as well as its relation to nationalism in modern political philosophy. This discussion is meant to provide an understanding of cultural nationalism as the background for contemporary Chinese comparative politics. The question of the relation between minben and democracy is discussed in order to investigate the characteristics of the two different political intellectual traditions and their relationships. It provides a concrete answer to the question of whether and how Chinese culture can be modernized. This part contains a brief introduction to John Rawls’s political philosophy, using it as an outstanding and most representative example to reflect on the grounds and limits of political liberalism. The last chapter mainly reflects on the universality of democracy and its relation to different cultures of different nations; it reflects especially on the challenges of the contemporary development of Chinese politics towards democracy, and endeavors to come up with a vision of a mixed political form as a possible future type for Chinese democracy. Chinese political philosophy is still a new discipline. My preliminary research on Chinese political philosophy in this book is limited to three main questions: the legitimacy of the source of political power, the foundation of moral rationality for the use of political power, and the purpose of political activities. As to Western philosophy, the topic in my discussion is even narrower: I only touch on the topic of justice and a little thought of some thinkers such as Plato, Cicero, Kant, Marx, and Rawls. I do not mention many other important thinkers and their thoughts. Especially regrettable is that this book did not involve the relevant discussions by contemporary New Confucian thinkers such as Zhang Junmai (张君劢) and Mou Zongsan (牟宗三). I hope that in the future I will be able to learn more about contemporary New Confucian political philosophy. As the field advances and as I deepen my own political philosophical investigation and research, I will keep adjusting my description of the subject of political philosophy, and renew my understanding of the nature of political philosophy, discuss more questions of political philosophy, especially to reflect on the problem of the Chinese countryside and farmers from the perspective of political philosophy, in order to deepen the research of the forerunners in this field, such as Liang Shumin (梁漱溟), Fei Xiaotong (费孝通), and Wu Han (吴晗). This book is a collection of my research results in this field over a decade. It is explorative and preliminary. If there is anything worth mentioning, I would say that our times give me a new starting point different from previous thinkers: we reflect on the fundamental question of Chinese and Western political philosophy from a comparative perspective. Due to the growth of the economy in mainland China for more than ten years, Chinese people have become more confident in Chinese traditional culture. The attitude of academia has changed gradually.

xii Preface There is a tendency to re-evaluate the judgment made during the May Fourth Movement. Therefore, many scholars tend to be more sympathetic and understanding towards Chinese traditional culture. I was also influenced by this academic atmosphere. However, I still insist that Chinese culture can only prosper when it is modernized. Only through modernization can Chinese people seriously sort out our own great national legacy, especially the legacy of the Ming–Qing early enlightenment movement, combine it with the developments of modern society and personality, and establish a Chinese modern state, so that the great Chinese national culture can become a common world legacy for mankind in these times of globalization. I look forward to deepening and clarifying my understanding of Chinese and Western political philosophy in my future teaching and research, and writing a more systematic comparative political philosophy, to repay our times for their generosity, to repay my forerunners and contemporary scholars who helped me in all kinds of ways, and especially to repay my late father and mother, who were both illiterate farmers, as well as the whole community of farmers. They made their contribution silently to Chinese culture in traditional society, and made great sacrifices for the modernization of China. They deserve a reward, no matter how great, from modernized Chinese cities and other social groups.

Notes 1 Modern Chinese philosopher Jin Yuelin (金岳霖) has a unique view on the difference between political thought and political philosophy. See Jin Yuelin, “On Political Thought” (Lun Zheng Zhi Si Xiang, 论政治思想), Collected Works of Jin Yuelin (Jin Yuelin Ji, 金岳霖集), Beijing: China Social Sciences Press (Zhong Guo She Hui Ke Xue Chu Ban She, 中国社会科学出版社), 2000, 367–369. 2 The title of this book was translated by William Theodore de Bary as “waiting for the dawn: a plan for the Prince.” See William Theodore de Bary, Waiting for the Dawn: A Plan for the Prince. Huang Tsung-his’s Ming-i-tai-fang lu, New York: Columbia University Press, 1993. 3 See Jin Yaoji (金耀基), History of Minben Thought in China (Zhong Guo Min Ben Si Xiang Shi, 中国民本思想史), Taiwan: Commercial Press (Shang Wu Yin Shu Guan, 台湾商务印书馆), 1993. Li Cunshan (李存山), “Beginning from Minben to Democracy: Comments on the So-Called ‘Minben Limit’” (Cong Min Ben Zou Xiang Min Zhu De Kai Duan: Jian Ping Suo Wei “Min Ben De Ji Xian,” 从民本走向民主的开端: 兼评所谓“民本的极限”), Journal of East China Normal University (Hua Dong Shi Fan Da Xue Xue Bao, 华东师范大学学报), vol. 2006, no. 6 (2006), 1–8.

Part I

1

The theory of daoyi A concise treatise on Confucius’s political philosophy and his argumentation about the legitimacy of political power

1.1 Why I chose the term “daoyi” Throughout the history of China, rulers of every dynasty attached great importance to the question of the legitimacy of the foundation of their own political power. However, political practice is always different from the reflections in political philosophy. Political practice is concerned with how to obtain and reinforce political power, while political philosophy is more concerned with the source of political power and the question of legitimacy of the employment of power. A typical case is the debate on the legality of King Tang’s and King Wu’s revolutions against the tyranny of King Jie and King Zhou, which was debated between Yuan Gusheng (辕固生) and Huang Sheng (黄生) before King Jing of the Han dynasty (汉景帝). Huang Sheng held that King Tang and King Wu illegally killed their rulers, for they did not receive the mandate of Heaven, which was then believed to be the source of legality of political power. Yuan disagreed with Huang, and said, “those kings that King Tang and King Wu killed were tyrants; at that time the people all under Heaven all wished that Tang and Wu could replace Jie and Zhou. Tang and Wu answered to their appeal and killed Jie and Zhou. The people of Jie and Zhou were not willing to be ruled by Jie and Zhou and all turned to Tang and Wu. Tang and Wu could not decline but accepted it and ascended to the throne; is this not the mandate of Heaven?” Huang then said, “hats, though worn-out, should be worn on the head; shoes, though new, should be worn on the feet. Such is the distinction between the upper and the lower. Though Jie and Zhou lost the Dao [the right ‘Way’ to rule], they were still the lords; Tang and Wu were sages, but they were subjects. Officials may correct the wrong words and deeds of the lords, but should respect them. Now Tang and Wu did not, and killed them because of their mistakes, took their power and faced south [a kingly gesture]. If this is not a politically unjust killing, what else could it be?”

4

The theory of daoyi

Yuan Gusheng argued, “If you insist on this position, it also holds true for the case in which King Gao, the first king of the Han Dynasty, replaced the king of the Qin dynasty to take the position of a king, doesn’t it?” King Jing, who was in the royal line of King Gao, then put an end to the debate with the comment, “for those who eat meat, they can be considered to have good taste, even if they have not eaten unusual cuts. For those who discuss, they would not be considered unknowledgeable simply because they have not discussed the revolution of Tang and Wu.” Thereafter, there were no scholars who dared to discuss the question of the reception of the mandate of Heaven and the justice of exiling and killing [an unjust king] (学者莫敢明受命放杀者).1 Huang Sheng and Yuan Gusheng’s debate involves a significant question in political philosophy: the legality and the source of the power to rule. Huang Sheng mainly emphasizes the formal legality of a political order. A king, no matter how evil he is, as the son of Heaven, should be obeyed and respected by subjects, just like hats and shoes should belong in their own places. Therefore, the revolutions of Tang and Wu were illegal with regard to political procedure, even though they were morally justified. The source of the political power of Tang and Wu was violence, not the appointment of Heaven, thus it is illegal. On the other hand, Yuan Gusheng emphasizes the endorsement by the hearts of people as the foundation of legality for any existing political power. The mandate of Heaven is nothing but the hearts of the people. As the highest ruler, Jie and Zhou lost the hearts of the people, thus the revolutions of Tang and Wu had actual legality because they fulfilled the wish of both Heaven and the people and obtained the highest ruling power by an uncommon means, namely, revolution. Both sides seem to be rational. However, if we investigate more carefully, we find that their starting points in justifying political power are different. From the perspective of the idea of “minben” (民本, “people as the foundation” of government), the aim of politics is to protect the interests of the people, then the revolution theory is justified; from the perspective of the idea of “junben” (君本, “ruler as the foundation” of government), the power of the king is conferred by Heaven; in this view, revolution loses any political ground. The debate between Huang Sheng and Yuan Gusheng before King Jing of Han reflects the antinomy of these two paradigms of thought on the legality of political power. It is difficult to find any solution or commensurability between them. King Jing of Han was not a philosopher; he was aware that it is difficult to discuss this theoretical problem, so he put an end to the discussion on such an insoluble problem of political philosophy by his real political authority, so that thinkers thereafter would not dare to continue the discussion on such a fundamental question. But the question did not disappear simply because of the power of the king. The question of the legality of the king’s power to rule the people existed in real political practice. No matter how the existing ideology maintained the legality of the king’s power, it would be inevitable that his power would be eliminated if his government

The theory of daoyi

5

harmed the life of the people. The great pre-Qin Dynasty Confucian Xunzi compared the position of a king above the people to the boat above the water; as water can either support or submerge boats, so the people can support or topple the government of the king. Wei Zheng (魏征), a prime minister in the Tang Dynasty, repeated this comparison of Xunzi’s when he spoke to King Li Shimin (李世民). Both pointed out and acknowledged the close relationship between the people’s consent and the legality of the political power of the government. The issue discussed by Huang Sheng and Yuan Gusheng is daoyi (道义, “legitimate Way”), and it has gradually become the foremost question in Confucian political philosophy concerning the legality of the political power of the government. The term “daoyi” has no equivalent word in English, and does not appear in Confucius’s Analects as a compound word. “Daoyi” is a term that has been used by modern scholars to discuss the question of legality of political power in Confucian political philosophy in the Qin and Han dynasties, and it is different from the terms pre-Qin Confucians used when discussing the same question. However, even when they have not used the term, Chinese thinkers have long been interested in the issue of daoyi. According to the cultural tradition of the rituals of the Western Zhou Dynasty (c. 1045–771 BCE), all wise rulers should avoid “irritating both gods and people” (a phrase from the Guo Yu, 国语). In the middle and late Warring States period (403–221 BCE), the doctrine of “wu xing” (五行, five phases) developed by the School of Yin and Yang became significant because it provided abstract philosophical arguments for the legality of the transition of political power from one dynasty to another. The chenwei (谶纬, divination ideology) developed from the end of the Western Han Dynasty was to some extent meant for answering the question of the legality of transition of political power. In a new political atmosphere, the great Confucian Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒) in the Western Han Dynasty used strange phenomena in nature as signs to admonish the king that he had made mistakes in politics, thus starting a mystic tradition of Confucian political philosophy after the Western Han Dynasty. However, the mainstream of Confucian political philosophy (including Dong Zhongshu) is still rational in that it judged the legality of existing political power by the criterion of daoyi. The theory of daoyi is a mode of political philosophy that mainly takes as its starting point the value system of cultural tradition of rituals and music in the Western Zhou Dynasty, and discusses the legality of the policies and activities of an existing political power. For example, Confucius says, “When the Way [dao] prevails in the Empire, the rites and music and punitive expeditions are initiated by the Emperor. When the Way does not prevail in the Empire, they are initiated by the feudal lords.”2 Mencius says, “one who has the Way will have many to support him; one who has not the Way has few to support him.”3 Mencius admonished King Hui of Liang and said, “what is the point of mentioning the word ‘profit’? All that matters is that there should be benevolence and rightness [yi].”4 Dao (道, Way) and yi (义, rightness) appeared in parallel for the first time in the Great Treatise section of the Changes: “The nature [of man] having been

6

The theory of daoyi

completed, and being continually preserved, it is the gate of all good courses and righteousness [daoyi].”5 The words “daoyi” (道义) appeared together in the chapter “Law and Prohibition” (法禁) in the Guanzi: “virtuous actions are sure to be praised, daoyi is sure to be made clear”6 (德行必有所是, 道义必有所明). According to the dictionary Ci Hai (辞海), “daoyi” in modern Chinese mainly refers to the Way of humans and justice. Confucius used dao and yi separately; neither was used only as a concept to judge the legality of the highest political power, namely, the ruling power of the son of Heaven. Both were used as a concept to judge the rationality of the actions of individual scholar-officials or superiors (君子), and to judge the legality of the politics of the states ruled by the dukes. Confucius used “de” (德, virtue) to judge the legality of the power of the son of Heaven. For example, he says, “The Zhou continued to serve the Yin when it was in possession of two thirds of the Empire. Its virtue can be said to have been the highest.”7 The concept closest to “daoyi” is “daotong” (the transmission of the Way). Ever since Mencius, Confucians started to construct the idea of the transmission of the Way, even before the term “daotong” was in use. Mencius spoke of the ancient kings and sages, Yao (尧), Shun (舜), Yu (禹), Tang (汤), Wen (文), Wu (武), and Duke Zhou (周公), and lamented that the age he lived in was an age without a sage king. Mencius constructed a narrative of the “pedigree” of the transmission of the Way to articulate a paradigm of legitimate highest political power, but he did not abstract from it a political philosophy. Approximately since Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒), “dao” has been associated with the king’s highest power in the discussion of the question of the necessary way of political activities. He states, “dao is the way through which political order can be attained; it contains benevolence, rightness, rites, and music”8 (The Three Bonds of Heaven and Humans, Part A, 天人三策, 上). However, in the thought of Dong Zhongshu, dao is not a transcendent concept; Heaven is above dao. Dong Zhongshu states, the foundation of the dao is from Heaven. Heaven is unalterable, so is the dao. Therefore Yu succeeded Shun, and Shun succeeded Yao, three sages transmitted political power and maintained the same dao. In the reign of the past kings there was nothing left for the succeeding kings to remedy, therefore there is no mentioning of additions or abridgement.9 Han Yu (韩愈) in his “On the Way” (原道) reconstructed the theory of daotong (道统, transmission of the Way). He states, Yao passed it [the Way] to Shun, Shun to Yu, Yu to Tang, Tang to Wen, Wu, and Duke Zhou, Wen, Wu, and Duke Zhou to Confucius, and Confucius to Meng Ke [Mencius]; after the death of Ke, there was no one that continued the transmission of the Way.10 Han Yu made the Confucian theory of the transmission of dao much more abstract in philosophy, and the image of politicians in history became less

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important. He emphasizes the moral rationality manifested in political activities. Approximately since Zhu Xi (1130–1200) in the Southern Song, the term “daotong” has appeared. Zhu Xi states in his Preface to the Collected Commentaries on the “Mean”: Yao, Shun and Yu were the greatest sages of the Empire. The transition of the political power of the Empire from one to another was the greatest event of the Empire. … Thereafter, what the sages passed to sages, what made Tang, Wen, Wu to be king, what made Gao Yao, Yi Yin, Fu Yue, Duke Zhou and Duke Shao to be ministers, was the transmission of the Way.11 But Zhu Xi’s notion of “daotong” is no longer a concept concerning the legality of political power, but concerning the spirit of traditional Confucian morality. The reason I chose the modern term “daoyi” to discuss Confucian thought on the legality of political power has something to do with the introduction of the term “justice” from Western political philosophy. “Justice” in ancient Greek philosophy has the meaning of legitimate legality in political activities as well as the idea of natural law. For example, in Plato’s Republic, Socrates says that there is justice of one man, and there is justice of a whole city-state too (368e). If we try to seek justice in a city-state, we will find that “in founding the city we are not looking to the exceptional happiness of any one group among us but, as far as possible, that of the city as a whole.”12 Plato thinks that only when seeking happiness for the whole of the city can we find justice. But then, what counts as a just city-state? Plato believes that a state is just when each group of its people does the work most suitable to its nature and does not meddle with one another’s work. Though there is in the traditional Chinese language the term “zhengyi” (正义, which is used to translate “justice”), it originally means only the academic criticism and clarification of meanings, and does not have any connotation of legality of political power in philosophy. “Daoyi” has many meanings in modern Chinese, but it has connotations in political philosophy, and overlaps with such traditional philosophical terms as “dao” and “yi.” Using “daoyi,” one can revive the notion of “daoyi” implicit in traditional philosophy, and associate it with contemporary Chinese political philosophy. Most importantly, this modern Chinese term has a basic meaning of legality. When we say that a person’s action or an event, especially a significant political event, is not in accordance with daoyi, we mean that it lacks legality. However, the notion of “daoyi” I use here is not identical with the notion of “justice” in Western classical political philosophy, because daoyi is associated with conformity to the cultural traditions of the Western Zhou Dynasty. Daoyi both has a meaning relevant to the Western notion of justice, and maintains its uniqueness. Based on the consideration above, I chose “daoyi” to describe and uncover the question of the legality of political power discussed by traditional Chinese Confucian thinkers. In the following section of this chapter, I focus on Confucius, to analyze classical Confucian thought on this political philosophical question.

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1.2 Basic meanings of “dao” and “yi” in the Analects of Confucius 1.2.1 Dao and the legality of the ruling power of the dukes In the Analects, “dao” and “yi” are two distinct terms. “Dao” has a more metaphysical meaning, while “yi” refers to concrete systems of social norms under the institution of rites and music. We get a sense for the meaning of “dao” (Way) from Confucius’s comments: “He has not lived in vain who dies in the evening, having been told about the Way in the morning,”13 and “There is no point in seeking the views of a gentleman who, though he sets his heart on the Way, is ashamed of poor food and poor clothes.”14 He says, “It is Man who is capable of broadening the Way. It is not the Way that is capable of broadening Man.”15 He also says, “The gentleman devotes his mind to attaining the Way and not to securing food. … The gentleman worries about the Way, not about poverty.”16 Ancient Greek political philosophy was usually closely related to ethics. So is the case in pre-Qin China. In his Republic, Plato discusses the relation between the justice of a person and that of a state. When Confucius spoke of dao and yi, he was concerned both about the virtue of a member of the elites, such as scholar-officials and superiors, and about the legality of the political power of the dukes in the states. A difference between ancient Greece and China is that in ancient Greece there was no united empire ruled by the king as the son of Heaven, whereas in the age of the Zhou Dynasty, there was both a king that ruled the whole country, and states ruled by the dukes under the king. Thus the politico-philosophical questions discussed by pre-Qin Confucians were more large-scale than those in ancient Greece. Confucius’s “dao” sometimes refers directly to an ideal political principle. He mentions the possibility: “Should the Way fail to prevail then I would put to sea on a raft.”17 He told Ji Ziran, “The term ‘great minister’ refers to those who serve their lord according to the Way and who, when this is no longer possible, relinquish office.”18 From this, we may conclude that there was a political principle of the relationship between the duke and the minister of a state. If the duke did not act according to the principle, a true minister may disregard the demand of a duke. Confucius praises Zichan on the grounds that “he was respectful in the manner he conducted himself; he was reverent in the service of his lord; in caring for the common people, he was generous, and, in employing their services, he was just.”19 Elsewhere, Confucius says, “Who can go out without using the door? Why, then, does no one follow this Way?”20 I agree with the interpretation of the contemporary commentator Liu Baonan (刘宝楠), who explains that this means everyone should act according to the rites.21 Therefore “dao” sometimes refers to the system of rites. Confucius hoped that “At one stroke [the state of] Qi can be made into a Lu, and Lu, at one stroke, can be made to attain the Way”;22 in other words, if the state of Lu were to be ruled by a wise duke, it would attain the ideal of a society where the great Way prevails. Confucius distinguishes a country where dao prevails from a country without dao:

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When the Way prevails in the Empire, the rites and music and punitive expeditions are initiated by the Emperor. When the Way does not prevail in the Empire, they are initiated by the feudal lords. … When the Way prevails in the Empire, policy does not rest with the Counselors. When the Way prevails in the Empire, the Commoners do not express critical views.23 In other words, in the political activities of the dukes of the states, especially in sacrifice and war, when they all obey the king of Zhou as the son of Heaven, their activities have legitimacy. However, in Confucius’s time, the dukes of the states no longer obeyed the order of the king of Zhou. Thus the border official of Yi lamented, “The Empire has long been without the Way.”24 In the Analects, Confucius mentioned several times the distinction between “when a state has the Way” and “when a state is without the Way.” He talked about the legitimacy of a scholar-official’s behavior as well as the proper attitudes towards wealth and political office in different situations. He says: Have firm faith and be fond of learning, and abide to the death in the good way. Enter not a state that is in peril, stay not in a state that is in danger. Let yourself be seen when the Way prevails in the Empire, but keep out of sight when it does not. It is a shameful matter to be poor and humble when the Way prevails in the state. Equally, it is a shameful matter to be rich and noble when the Way does not prevail in the state.25 Confucius came up with the idea that scholar-officials have the right to choose among different political contexts: similar to a citizen’s right to “vote with his feet” (immigration and emigration) in modern democracy. Specifically, when a state is in political disorder, a scholar-official may live in retirement or flee to other countries. During the two world wars, many intellectuals fled from Europe to America; such is a typical case of how intellectuals choose political context in modern society, similar to the choice Confucius would endorse. Why do scholar-officials have the right to choose political context? This has something to do with the ethics of political responsibility; Confucius states, “Do not concern yourself with matters of government unless they are the responsibility of the office you are in.”26 Dao as a common principle that all members of a society should observe, affects both the gentlemen and the small men, albeit in different ways: “the gentleman instructed in the Way loves his fellow men and … the small man instructed in the Way is easy to command.”27 From this we can see that “dao” has a wide range of relevance in both ethics and politics. In Confucius’s time, his students sometimes use “dao” to express the essence of Confucius’s thought. For example, Zengzi says, “the way [dao] of the Master consists in doing one’s best and in using oneself as a measure to gauge the likes and dislikes of others. That is all.”28 Dao in this sense later became a central concept in expressing metaphysical thoughts in Chinese philosophy. To be sure, this trend also has something to do with Daoism and the philosophy of the Great Commentary on the Changes, a topic I will not discuss here.

10 The theory of daoyi 1.2.2 The meaning of “yi” (义) Confucius’s “yi” basically refers to the ethical rules of the ethical elite. He says, “The gentleman is versed in what is moral [义]. The small man is versed in what is profitable.”29 Yi was not yet used as a concept to judge the legality of political power of the highest rulers of the states. Only when yi serves as the rule of behavior for gentlemen does it become the way in which the ideal of a well-ordered society with dao can be realized. Thus the ethical question is transformed into a question of political philosophy. Confucius says: “In his dealings with the world the gentleman is not invariably for or against anything. He is on the side of what is moral [yi].”30 He also says, “‘I live in retirement in order to attain my purpose and practice what is right in order to realize my way.’ I have heard such a claim, but I have yet to meet such a man.”31 “The gentleman takes office in order to do his duty. As for putting the Way into practice, he knows all along that it is hopeless.”32 Compared with the political thought before Confucius, Confucius’s “yi” expresses more clearly a new spirit of humanism and rationality. For example, when Fan Chi asked what knowledge is, Confucius replies, “To work for the things the common people have a right to [yi] and to keep one’s distance from the gods and spirits of the dead while showing them reverence can be called wisdom.”33 What Confucius stresses here is the rationality of human social activities, although here the emphasis on yi does not lead to the negation of the existence of gods and spirits of the dead; it is merely that an attitude of respect and keeping distance is still required. From the texts quoted above we conclude that Confucius’s dao and yi do not deal with the legality of the highest political power, but serve as a norm of life for scholar-officials and gentlemen. Yi is a norm of value that is meant to realize dao. But there is one more central term we must understand to have a complete understanding of Confucius’s political philosophy. In what follows, we will discuss “de” in Confucius. 1.2.3 De and the source of the power of the government and the legality of its operation After the analysis of the basic meanings of “dao” and “yi,” let us concisely investigate how Confucius uses the criterion of de to evaluate the legality of the power of the king and the dukes. Confucius’s view of the legality of the power of the Zhou Dynasty is reflected in his praise of its government by means of culture and virtue. He says, “The Zhou is resplendent in culture, having before it the example of the two previous dynasties. I am for the Zhou.”34 He also praised Shun and Yu, from which his reflection on the legality of political power of the kings can be known. Confucius says, “How lofty Shun and Yu were in holding aloof from [bu yu yan, 不与焉] the Empire when they were in possession of it.”35 According to the traditional commentary, “bu yu yan” means that “[the sage king] did not

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concern himself with attaining the power to rule the world.” Namely, both Shun and Yu attain the power to rule the empire through their individual virtues. Therefore, Confucius praises Shun: “If there was a ruler who achieved order without taking any action, it was, perhaps, Shun. What was there to do but to hold himself in a respectful posture and to face due south?”36 In the Analects, Confucius praises Yu: With Yu I can find no fault. He ate and drank the meanest fare while making offerings to ancestral spirits and gods with the utmost devotion proper to a descendant. He wore coarse clothes while sparing no effort to enhance the splendor of his robes and caps on sacrificial occasions. He lived in lowly dwellings while devoting all his energy to the building of irrigation canals. With Yu I can find no fault.37 Not only does Confucius inherit the thought of “government by virtue” (德政) from the Zhou Dynasty, he also comes up with the ideal of “the rule of virtue” (为政以德). He says, “The rule of virtue can be compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of stars simply by remaining in its place.”38 It seems that he brings the criterion of “government by virtue” from the level of central government of Zhou to the level of the governments of the states, in order to judge the legality of the political activities of the dukes and ministers of the states. Therefore, he also says: Guide them by edicts, keep them in line with punishments, and the common people will stay out of trouble but will have no sense of shame. Guide them by virtue, keep them in line with the rites, and they will, besides having sense of shame, reform themselves.39 When Duke Ai in the Lu state asked Confucius what he should do in order to make the common people look up to him, he answered, “Raise the straight and set them over the crooked and the common people will look up to you. Raise the crooked and set them over the straight and the common people will not look up to you.”40 When Ji Kang Zi asked, “What would you think if, in order to move closer to those who possess the Way, I were to kill those who do not follow the Way?” Confucius answered: In administering your government, what need is there for you to kill? Just desire the good yourself and the common people will be good. By nature the gentleman is like wind and the small man like grass. Let the wind sweep over the grass and it is sure to bend.41 Therefore, according to Confucius, whether rulers personally have the moral quality suitable for government and whether they act morally are the criteria to judge whether they are entitled to rule.

12 The theory of daoyi The political form corresponding to the ideal of “government by virtue” is the government of wang-dao (王道, the kingly Way). What Confucius understands as the government of the kingly Way is the government of ren (仁政, benevolent/ humane government). Confucius says, “Even with a true king it is bound to take a generation for benevolence [ren] to become a reality.”42 The government of benevolence is the ideal political result that would be realized by the reign of a true king. To be sure, there is a distinction between the high standard of the ideal and the low standard of the acceptable. If we use the criterion that a king “cultivates himself and thereby brings peace and security to the people,”43 then even the reigns of the ideal sage king Yao and Shun had something to criticize. However, the “government of ren” is not an unrealizable utopia. Confucius believes that there are five ways to realize “government of ren”: Zi-zhang asked Confucius about benevolence. Confucius said, “There are five things and whoever is capable of putting them into practice in the Empire is certainly ‘benevolent’.” “May I ask what they are?” “They are respectfulness, tolerance, trustworthiness in word, quickness and generosity. If a man is respectful he will not be treated with insolence. If he is tolerant he will win the multitude. If he is trustworthy in word his fellow men will entrust him with responsibility. If he is quick he will achieve results. If he is generous his fellow men will be willing to do his bidding.”44 The Confucian ideal of “government of ren” is fundamentally different from the Christian ideal of “Heaven.” Heaven is an absolute and transcendent ideal kingdom, while “government of ren” is an ideal state realizable in this life, even though it may never be fully realized.

1.3 A preliminary investigation of the methodology of Confucius’s political philosophy As to the questions of how to improve the states in a correct way and how to realize a society in which the Way prevails, Confucius advocates roughly five methods. First, he believes in the transformative power of virtue in politics. As we saw above, when Ji Kang Zi asked Confucius, what if “I were to kill those who do not follow the Way?” Confucius answered that violence was not necessary, “By nature the gentleman is like wind and the small man like grass. Let the wind sweep over the grass and it is sure to bend.”45 Second, he emphasizes the need to clearly define social roles. When Duke Jing of Qi asked Confucius about government, Confucius answered, “Let the ruler be a ruler, the subject a subject, the father a father, the son a son.”46 Third, Confucius proposes the way of “rectifying names”: to make substantial judgment of actual political events according to the norms of the system of rituals and music, so that the political events of all the dukes in all states will be

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in accord with the requirement of the system of ritual and music. For example, Zilu asked Confucius, “If the Lord of Wei left the administration (zheng, 政) of his state to you, what would you put first?” Confucius answered, “If something has to be put first, it is, perhaps, the rectification (zheng, 正) of names.” Zilu complained that Confucius was pedantic to come up with such a roundabout way. In a time of political chaos, how is it possible to rectify the names? Confucius retorted that Zilu was boorish, saying, Where a gentleman is ignorant, one would expect him not to offer any opinion. When names are not correct, what is said will not sound reasonable; when what is said does not sound reasonable, affairs will not culminate in success; when affairs do not culminate in success, rites and music will not flourish; when rites and music do not flourish, punishments will not be exactly right; when punishments are not exactly right, the common people will not know where to put hand and foot. Thus when the gentleman names something, the name is sure to be usable in speech, and when he says something this is sure to be practicable. The thing about the gentleman is that he is anything but casual where speech is concerned.47 The reason why Confucius wanted to “rectify names” is that at that time the norms of the social system of rites and music were only empty names. Therefore he lamented that people in his era use “a gu [a drinking vessel with a regulation capacity] that is not truly a gu. A gu indeed! A gu indeed!”48 He also said, “Surely when one says ‘the rites, the rites,’ it is not enough merely to mean presents of jade and silk. Surely when one says ‘music, music,’ it is not enough merely to mean bells and drums.”49 When he watched the di (禘) ceremony of the sacrifice to ancestors, because contemporary performances were so debased, he said, “I do not wish to witness that part of the di sacrifice which follows the opening libation to the impersonator.”50 All these comments are the expressions of his disappointment with the collapse of the social system of rites and music. Fourth, he advocates the principle of even distribution. Confucius said: What I have heard is that the head of a state or a noble family worries not about underpopulation but about uneven distribution, not about poverty but about instability … when distant subjects are unsubmissive one cultivates one’s moral quality in order to attract them.51 Fifth, he advocates the principle of trustworthiness. When Zigong asked about governing the people, Confucius said, “Give them enough food, give them enough arms, and the common people will have trust in you.” If there is only one among these three to keep, Confucius said that he would give up arms and food and keep trust; his reason is that “death has always been with us since the beginning of time, but when there is no trust, the common people will not be able to stand on their feet.”52 It is crucial for the duke of a state to be trusted by his subjects.

14 The theory of daoyi In these five methods, the first one is about the norm of personal actions of rulers; the other four are mainly about the construction of institutions and cultural ideals. Not only did Confucius have profound reflections on the theory of political philosophy, he also has a variety of sayings about practical wisdom in the realm of political techniques. For different rulers or persons from different levels, he came up with concise principles about how to practice administration. For instance: Zizhang asked about government. The Master said, “In the daily round do not show weariness, and when there is action to be taken, do your best.”53 Zilu asked about government. The Master said, “Before working the people hard first set an example yourself.” Zilu asked for more. The Master said, “Do not allow our efforts to slacken.”54 While he was steward to the Ji family, Zhonggong asked about government. The Master said, “Set an example for your officials to follow; show leniency towards minor offenders; and promote men of talent.” “How does one recognize men of talent to promote?” “Promote those you do recognize. Do you suppose others will allow those you fail to recognize to be passed over?”55 When the Master went to Wei, Ran You drove for him. The Master said, “What a teeming population!” Ran You said, “When the population is teeming, what further benefit can one add?” “Improve their circumstances.” “When their circumstances have been improved, what further benefit can one add?” “Train them.”56 The Governor of She asked about government. The Master said, “Ensure that those who are near are pleased and those who are far away are attracted.”57 On becoming prefect of Ju Fu, Zixin asked about government. The Master said, “Do not be impatient. Do not see only petty gains. If you are impatient, you will not reach your goal. If you see only petty gains, the great tasks will not be accomplished.”58 Yan Yuan asked about the government of a state. The Master said, “Follow the calendar of the Xia, ride in the carriage of the Yin, and wear the ceremonial cap of the Zhou, but, for music, adopt the shao and the wu. Banish the tunes of Zheng and keep plausible men at a distance. The tunes of Zheng are wanton, and plausible men are dangerous.”59 All the methods of administration are offered to different interlocutors, but they all reflect from different perspectives the diversity and profundity of Confucius’s political thought.

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1.4 Conclusion At the end of this chapter, I would like to critically review the discussion of the contemporary scholar Jiang Qing (蒋庆) on the legality of political order and power from the perspective of Confucianism. In the fourth section of the second chapter of his book Political Confucianism: Turns, Characteristics and Development of Contemporary Confucianism, Jiang Qing makes an original claim that, in Confucian political philosophy, there is a threefold foundation of legality of political order and the ideal of Confucian politics of the kingly Way. He divides Confucian political legitimacy into three aspects: (1) the popular principle of “government for the people so that all people would support and be attracted to it”; (2) the “transcendent principle of the relation between Heaven and humanity, namely, that kingly Way follows Heaven”; (3) the cultural principle of “respect and acknowledgement of the central government of the king.”60 Jiang Qing claims: No matter in the past or present, in China or abroad, all political orders should have these threefold foundations of legality in order to be legal; namely, they should at the same time have the popular (secular), transcendent (sacred), and cultural (traditional) foundation of legality. The lack of any of them would make a political order illegal.61 Based on the view of threefold foundation, he criticized the approach of making judgment on the legality of political power only by “legality of rationality” (or “legality of the principle of law” [法理的合法性]).62 Jiang’s theory is unique and systematic. However, it remains a question whether it can be used as a universal criterion, especially whether the legality of modern political power needs a sacred transcendent foundation; moreover, is the sacred transcendent foundation sacred in a theological sense, or in the sense of the sublimity of secular philosophy? If the latter were the case, then daoyi is the so-called “sacred” transcendent foundation. In addition, it might be reasonable to say that culture is one of the foundations of legality, but which culture? Which school in this culture? Is it the totality of this school, or the core spirit of the school? It will be a bit narrow to specify the tradition of a certain school as the cultural foundation. On the other hand, if the foundation includes the totality of the culture of a school, the representation of such culture might not be strictly historical. Perhaps to be in accord with the tradition of culture means simply to be in accord with its spirit of humanitarianism. I do not think the Confucian tradition of san gang (三纲, three cardinal guides, namely, sovereign as guide for subject, father as guide for the son, husband as guide for the wife) could be a foundation for the legality of modern political power. Moreover, Jiang should clarify whether the three foundations of legality are equally important or whether there is a hierarchy in them. I personally believe that the humanitarianism and the spirit of rationality encapsulated in the theory of daoyi is perhaps the only plausible core of legality of modern political power.

16 The theory of daoyi This chapter chose “daoyi” as a concept to analyze the question of legality of political power. It focuses on Confucius’s political philosophy and makes a preliminary investigation of how Confucian thinkers deal with the question of legality of political power and other related questions. Is this perspective too modernized? Is it feasible? I look forward to hearing the feedback from experts from different areas in academia.

Notes 1 Si Ma Qian (司马迁), “Biographies of Confucians” (Ru Lin Lie Zhuan, 儒林列传), Records of the Grand Historian (Shi Ji, 史记), volume 61, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1959, 3122–3123. If not otherwise indicated, all translations in this chapter are our own. 2 Confucius, Analects 16.2, trans. D.C. Lau, New York: Penguin, 1979. 3 Mencius, Mencius 2B1, trans. D.C. Lau, London: Penguin Classics, 2004, 41. 4 Mencius, Mencius 1A1, 3. 5 Book of Changes (Yi Zhuan, 易传), ed. Qin Ying (秦颖) and Qin Sui (秦穗)., Changsha: Hunan Press (Hu Nan Chu Ban She, 湖南出版社), 1993, 299. The original Chinese is, (上) : “成性存存, 道义之门.” 6 Li Xiangfeng (黎翔凤), “Fa Jin” (法禁), Guan Zi Jiao Zhu (管子校注), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 2004, 282. 7 Confucius, Analects 8.20, 139. 8 Ban Gu (班固), History of Han (Han Shu, 汉书), Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Press (Shang Hai Gu Ji Chu Ban She, 上海古籍出版社), 2003, 1759. 9 Ban Gu, History of Han, 1775. 10 Wu Chucai, Commentary on Ancient Texts (古文观止译注), vol. 7, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Press (Shang Hai Gu Ji Chu Ban She, 上海古籍出版社), 2016, 16. 11 Zhu Xi (朱熹), Commentary on the Four Books (Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu, 四书章句 集注), Hangzhou: Zhejiang Ancient Books Publishing House (Zhe Jiang Gu Ji Chu Ban She, 浙江古籍出版社), 2011, 17. 12 Plato, Republic, trans. Allan Bloom, New York: Basic Books, 1968, Stephanus 420b, 98. 13 Confucius, Analects 4.8, 55. 14 Confucius, Analects 4.9, 55. 15 Confucius, Analects 15.29, 291. 16 Confucius, Analects 15.32, 293. 17 Confucius, Analects 5.7, 67. 18 Confucius, Analects 11.24, 193. 19 Confucius, Analects 5.16, 75. 20 Confucius, Analects 6.17, 95 21 Lun Yu Zheng Yi (论语正义), Beijing: Zhonghua Books Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1990, 233. 22 Confucius, Analects 6.24, 99. 23 Confucius, Analects 16.2, 303. 24 Confucius, Analects 3.24, 47. 25 Confucius, Analects 8.13, 135. 26 Confucius, Analects 8.14, 135. 27 Confucius, Analects, 4.16, 59. 28 Confucius, Analects 4.15, 58. 29 Confucius, Analects 4.16, 59. 30 Confucius, Analects 4.10, 57. 31 Confucius, Analects 16.11, 309.

The theory of daoyi 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60

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Confucius, Analects 18.7, 345. Confucius, Analects 6.22, 97. Confucius, Analects 3.14, 40–41. Confucius, Analects 8.18, 137. Confucius, Analects 15.5, 279. Confucius, Analects 8.21, 138. Confucius, Analects 2.1, 15. Confucius, Analects 2.3, 15. Confucius, Analects 2.19, 25. Confucius, Analects 12.19, 217. Confucius, Analects 13.12, 233. Confucius, Analects 14.42, 275. Confucius, Analects, 17.6, 300. Confucius, Analects 12.19, 217. Confucius, Analects 12.11, 213. Confucius, Analects 13.3, 226–227. Confucius, Analects 6.25, 99. Confucius, Analects 17.11, 325. Confucius, Analects 3.10, 37. Confucius, Analects 16.1, 301. Confucius, Analects 12.7, 209. Confucius, Analects 12.14, 215. Confucius, Analects 13.1, 225. Confucius, Analects 13.1, 225. Confucius, Analects 13.9, 231. Confucius, Analects 13.16, 237. Confucius, Analects 13.17, 237. Confucius, Analects 15.11, 283. Jiang Qing, Political Confucianism (Zheng Zhi Ru Xue, 政治儒学), Beijing: Joint Publishing (San Lian Shu Dian, 三联书店), 2003, 209. 61 Jiang Qing, Political Confucianism, 210. 62 Jiang Qing, Political Confucianism, 301.

2

“Law comes from Dao” The philosophy of law in the silk manuscript Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons

2.1 “Law comes from Dao”: an exposition of the metaphysical foundation of law in the Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons The silk manuscript Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons contains a concise exposition of “fa” (法, law). In the extant text of the Four Canons, there are two usages of the term “fa”: as a noun, it means laws, regulations, methods, and so on; for instance, “when one rests in a place, one has no law (法) to obey, when one acts one does not follow what the names prescribe”1 (居則無法, 動作爽名 from “Xing Zheng” (姓争)), and “[the Yellow Emperor] sent Li-hei to go in disguise to survey different states, and observe those who disregarded constancy and the law of goodness (以观无恒善之法)”2 (“Guan,” 观). In both cases, the noun “fa” mainly refers to the system of laws and decrees that govern a state. In other cases, the term “fa” (法) is used as a verb that means “to follow,” “to follow the example of,” or “to imitate.” For example, “In using the army, it is impossible to maneuver them without following Heaven (法天); it is difficult to put them in the battlefield without following the example of the Earth (法地)”3 (“Bing Rong,” 兵容). In this chapter I focus on the legal philosophy implicit in the concept of fa (法) in the Four Canons that means “the system of laws and decrees that govern a state.” This legal philosophy is encapsulated in a striking proposition that “law comes from Dao” in the Canon of Jing Fa (经法): Law comes from Dao. Law weighs gain and loss just like a tightened string that defines a straight line. Therefore those who hold on to Dao enact law but do not dare to disobey; when the law is established they do not dare to repeal. When they can straighten the string by themselves, they can know the world without confusion.4 From this passage we learn that the fa (法, law) in the Four Canons means the same as the Legalist School (法家) definition, namely, the law and decrees written down in silk manuscripts to define what is straight and what is crooked. But the Four Canons is different from the Legalist School in that the former

“Law comes from Dao” 19 emphasizes the relationship between law and Dao, and thereby lays bare the sanctity of law. The reasons why law is sacred are: first, it is necessary to let the legislators themselves be aware of the sanctity of the law, and therefore they will carry it out as long as it is enacted; second, it is necessary to let those who agree with the legislation accept the verdict of law, otherwise the law has no authority in society. Therefore, the proposition “law comes from Dao” is significant in philosophy because it bases secular laws on the sacred metaphysical foundation. The law in the secular world is not enacted by humans, but given by “Dao” which is objective and impartial. Therefore it is said that “only those who hold on to Dao can be open-minded, calm, impartial and just”5 (唯执道者 能虚静公正) (“Ming Li” (名理) in “Jing Fa” (经法)). Therefore, the law that governs us has objectivity and sanctity. This is the difference in the understanding of law between the “Dao-Law School” (道法家) in the middle Warring States period and the Legalist School. It shows that the Dao-Law School reflects on the metaphysics of law more profoundly than the Legalist School. Besides the fundamental statement of the sanctity of the law, the Four Canons explain the positive guiding role of law in social regulation. The author of the Four Canons believes that Heaven pertains to yang and earth to yin, therefore “all that is yang follows Heaven,” and “all that is yin follows earth”6 (“Cheng,” 称). The law that governs society pertains to public prohibition, thus, just like other prohibitions, it pertains to yang, while xing (刑, punishment) pertains to yin. Therefore, law is called “bright law” (明法), namely, open, clear, and just law. In the chapter of “Xing Zheng” (姓争), Emperor Gaoyang (高阳帝) and Li-hei (力黑) discuss the Way of government. Li-hei says, “the best way to suppress [war and fighting] is punishment and virtue (de, 德).”7 Xing (punishment) pertains to yin, hui (晦, darkness), and wei (微, minute), while virtue pertains to yang, hui (radiance), and zhang (彰, disclosure). Therefore, “let the bright be the law, and then what is minute will work well.”8 It means that only when the bright rule of regulation becomes the basic law in the administration of a state can the punitive measures that are yin, hui, and wei be taken. Here “bright law” does not refer to the regulation of law and decrees itself, but it lays bare the basic characteristics of the fundamental law for a state, namely, that the law is related to virtue, and differs from punishment. It reflects a fundamental difference between the “Daoist School of the Yellow Emperor and Laozi” (黄老道家) and the Legalist School: that the former does not consider punishment as the substance of law. After the explanation of the source of law and the metaphysical statement of its sanctity, the passage of “Jun Zheng” (君正) discusses the content of law and the reason why it can function in real political life. It says, law and measure are the highest form of correctness. Administration by law and measure should not be inconsistent, and the legislation of law should not be inconsistent. When the law is purely impartial without egocentricity, then the rule of reward and punishment will be trusted. Such is the way to attain good political order.9

20 “Law comes from Dao” The author of the Four Canons firmly believes in the efficiency of law, and holds that if one can hold on to the principle of law in the practice of administration, there would be no disorder in society. Why can government by law attain such socio-political order? It is because the law has the characteristic of being “purely impartial without ego-centricity.” Why does it have such a characteristic? The answer lies in the relationship between law and Dao. Because law comes from Dao, and Dao is the foundation by which all things come into being. “By attaining it [Dao], all things come into being and all events are accomplished”10 (“Dao Yuan,” 道原). Dao has the capacity of “using the straight to correct the crooked.”11 The law come from Dao, therefore it is also purely impartial and without egocentricity. From the extant text, we may conclude that the Four Canons was the first to provide a metaphysical justification of the law. It is an elevation of the thought of the Legalist School due to its combination with Daoism. The “fa” in the Four Canons is still the law by which the rulers govern the subjects, not the law universal for all citizens. In this sense, the “fa” in the Four Canons is similar to the “fa” in the Legalist School. Therefore the aim of the impartial law is merely to let the subjects accept the rule. From the perspective of rulers, the impartial law aims at securing the support of the people. It does not acknowledge the rights of the people in participating in politics. Such is the difference between the aim of legal philosophy in the Four Canons and the aim of the modern “law of the people” (公民法). The Four Canons several times uses the expression “cheng fa” (成法, complete law). In the passage “Cheng Fa,” the Yellow Emperor asks Li-hei, “Is there in the world a complete law (cheng fa) to guide or correct the subject?” Li-hei confirms and explains what cheng fa is: In the past when the Heaven and Earth were formed, they were just and fit well together as if they have names and forms. … [a Chinese character here is undecipherable] hold on to the name of oneness, using the Heaven from above as the measure [of law] to apply to the people within the four seas. I have heard the complete law, and therefore I say that it is not multifarious, and can be summarized in the word of oneness. Following the name and return to the oneness, and people will not transgress the regulation.12 According to the commentary compiled by the Wen-wu Chubanshe (文物出版 社, Cultural Artifact Press), here “oneness” means the “Dao,” therefore here the “complete law” is a synonym of Dao. Therefore, we can temporarily interpret “complete law” as “the law in accord with Dao.” The fa (法, law) in the “seven fa” in the passage of “Fa” (法) seems to be different from the passage of “Jing Fa” (经法) and “Jun Zheng” (君正). Because the silk on which the manuscript was written has been broken, there are only five fa in the extant passage: Heaven establishes eight standards of government and seven laws. That everything has a clear standard is the Way of Heaven. That everything has a proper

“Law comes from Dao” 21 measure is the measure of Heaven. That everything has a reliable rule is the regulation of Heaven. Suitability is the measure of Heaven. Trustworthiness is the regularity of Heaven. That everything would return when it reaches the ultimate extreme is the nature of Heaven. That everything has a necessity is the mandate of Heaven. … [nine characters here are missing] is the way Heaven gives mandates to Heaven. These are called seven laws.13 From the five laws in the extant text we read here, we can see that the seven laws are seven general principles and regulations that nature gives to the activity of mankind and to which humans should conform. We may conjecture that the “fa” in the Four Canons has some characteristics of “natural law,” because it is deduced from Dao and can become the law to regulate the order of the realm of humans. Similarly, the “nature” in the system of natural law in Roman philosophy represented by Cicero is not the modern notion of nature in itself that has no sanctity. At least we can say that the natural law in the system of thought of Cicero is the law of sanctity, therefore it shares the same nature with the “law of Dao” in the Dao-Law School (道法家) represented in the Four Canons.

2.2 The philosophy of law in the Four Canons and that in the Legalist School: a comparison There are three sources of the thought of the Legalist School: one is the Confucian tradition, concerning the institution of rituals; one is Daoism, and it forms the Dao-Law School, and the third is from the thoughts of politicians, and lays stress on the relationship between law and rulers. According to Guo Moruo (郭沫若), Zichan (子产) and some other early politicians belong to the Legalist School, but they did not come up with a theory of the principle of law. I agree partially with Guo, but I think that the politicians’ thought on the principle of law was represented in their partial negation of the traditional system of rituals. Namely, they broke the idea of rituals that “punishment does not apply to senior state officials, rituals do not apply to the common people,” and required that the senior state officials and the common people act under the same measure, which embodies the germs of the notion of equality in ancient times. In comparison with the system of rituals, this part of the Legalist School represents the thought of those who advocated socio-political reform since the Spring and Autumn period; for instance, Hanfeizi had the idea that “the law does not cater to the need of the noble class”; this idea represents to some extent the ideal of justice and equality of law for the Legalist School. Guan Zhong (管仲) was a representative thinker of the early Legalist School. The Book of Guanzi was traditionally believed to be his work. To be sure, the problem of authorship is a controversial issue. We consider this book as representative of the ideas of the early Legalist School, not necessarily of Guan Zhong himself. In this book, the term “fa” refers to many things. For instance, the essay “Fa Jin” (法禁) says,

22 “Law comes from Dao” if there is no controversy in the institution of law, people will not be divided. If the punishment including the death penalty is not pardoned, people will not be lazy in improving themselves. If there is no sham in the rank of nobility and government salary, the people from the lower class will not transgress against their superiors. When these three are kept in the government it is called law (法, fa), when they apply to the state it will become a convention.14 From this we can see that the law here is similar to what we nowadays call a political system of a state. This chapter does not discuss the complete meanings of fa (法) in this book, but focuses on a concise discussion of the more abstract idea of legal philosophy. First, the book argues for the sanctity of law, and considers benevolence, rightness, rituals, and music as derivative from law. The essay “Ren Fa” (任法) says: Therefore the government of the Yellow Emperor legislated law and held on to it, so that people would be content with the law. What we call benevolence, rightness, rituals, and music all come from the law. It is the way the ancient King unifies the people.15 This is obviously to incorporate Confucian thought into the the Legalist School, and to ground the sanctity of law through the technique of narrative of history. The essay “Ren Fa” (任法) also affirms the supremacy of law from the perspective of how the rulers use the law; it says, “the law is that by which the rulers unify the people and command the subject.” Moreover, “therefore the law is the ultimate Way under Heaven, the practical function which a sage-ruler would use.”16 Second, this book discusses in a very philosophical way the function of law and its characteristic of justice. The essay “Xin Shu Shang” (心术上) says, “the law is that from which all things necessarily come. Therefore there is a universal standard for the death penalty, imprisonment, and denouncement.”17 This saying summarizes the universality of law, the authority of law in penalties, and the equality of all people in law. However, it should be clarified that this “equality” is not the same as the equality of modern law of citizens in which all people are equal based on the idea of human rights; rather, it means merely equality in the measure of penalty for all people. In the essay “Fa Fa” (法法), the author emphasizes the “fa” as a universal institution that transcends all individual and accidental beings and affairs in social regulation. The author came up with the idea that “law is more significant than people,” that “the rulers should not transgress the law because of their love of people,” and that “the rulers should not harm the law because of their love of people.” To be sure, this essay also stresses the benefit of the law to the people; it says, “the law is the parent of the people.”18 The author of “Ren Fa” (任法) associates the justice of law with the justice of Heaven and earth, and says, using the institution of law to rule is just like the impartiality of Heaven and earth. In this way officials would not have private discussions, the scholars

“Law comes from Dao” 23 would not have private comments, and the people will not have private opinions. They would all listen to the superiors with an open mind. The superiors discuss with justice, judge with law, and then the burden of ruling all under Heaven would not be heavy.19 Finally, as to the significant philosophical question concerning the origin of law, the Book of Guanzi (管子) has two statements: one from the essay “Xin Shu Shang” (心术上), law comes from weighing, weighing from Dao. The movement of Dao and its virtue in practice are invisible. All things attain [their way of being] because of Dao, but no one knows its ultimate. There it is said that [Dao] can be rested upon but not discussed.20 This passage emphasizes the mystic and sacred nature of Dao in its application. Another statement is from the essay “Fa Fa” (法法): “Though the sages can legislate law, they cannot abolish the law in ruling a state.”21 This means that the law is created by the sages. The essay “Ren Fa” (任法) states clearly that there are those who legislate (sheng, 生, give birth to) the law, those who hold on to the law, and those who observe the law. Those who legislate the law are rulers, those who hold on to the law are officials, and those who observe the law are the people.22 Here sheng (生) means to legislate, different from the statement that “the law comes from weighing.” The latter is a statement concerning the nature of the law, that is, that the law changes with the times, and one should not obstinately follow ancient ways. In a word, the notion of law represented in the Book of Guanzi is close to Daoism, and different from the notion of law in the later Legalist School represented by Hanfeizi. It has no obvious criticism of the Confucian institution of rituals, but it is obviously different from the Confucian notion of social hierarchy. It affirms the supreme authority of the rulers and emphasizes the equality of all subjects under law. The authenticity of the extant Book of Shenzi (慎子) is controversial; it is treated here as a document of a part of the early Legalist School. On the one hand, the author of this book attaches importance to the regulation of Dao that a ruler should observe when ruling a state; on the other hand, he requires that a ruler should rule a state by law, and emphasizes the relationship between law and rituals. He came up with the idea that “when the Dao is followed it will be broadened, when transformed it becomes minute. To follow Dao means to depend on the common fact of human beings.”23 And the author points out that “all people do all things for themselves, if I were to transform them to do everything just for me, I cannot find anyone for this purpose.”24 On this basis of the theory of human nature, the author advocates a theory of impartiality that the institution of law and documents of

24 “Law comes from Dao” rituals are meant to establish “public rightness,”25 and comes up with the theory that rituals and laws should co-exist in government, that is, “the decision of reward and punishment should be based on law, and the virtue of action and proper measure of institution should be based on rituals.”26 The author seeks to lay bare the commensurability and openness of institutions to counterbalance the negative influence of the personal selfish desires and emotions of the rulers on administrative activities. As long as the rulers manage to distribute goods by law, practice virtue by rituals, they can ensure that “their desires do not interrupt the time, their love does not transgress the law, their conferring the rank of nobility does not go beyond their relatives, and their payment of government salary does not go beyond the recipients’ position”27 (“Wei De,” 威德). In the Missing Passages of the Book of Shenzi (Shen Zi Yi Wen, 慎子逸文), the author emphasizes the goal of justice and impartiality in “establishing the law to extinguish selfishness.” However, there is expression of autocracy in this book; for example, the author states, “In the state where the Dao prevails, the law is established and there are no private discussions,” and “that subjects be unified by a ruler, and things judged by the law, is the great Dao of a state.”28 The author even claims that the law is that by which the activities of all under Heaven are made uniform, and is the institution of great impartiality and stability. Therefore the wise should not use their plots to transgress the law, the disputers should not dispute to transgress the law, the scholars should not name things against law, and the officials should not accomplish anything against law. Though my joy and anger could be suppressed, my law should not be abandoned. Though the offspring could be punished, relatives could be annihilated, the great law should not be lacked.29 In this extreme statement of the strict principle of law, the benign principle of the fact of human emotions is abandoned. It could turn out to be good if the law itself is really ultimately impartial and so are the people who carry it out. However, if they are not so, then the very strong and strict principle of regulation by law might bring disastrous results. The idea of “righteousness above family loyalty” that existed in traditional Chinese society is to a great extent a product of the Legalist School. The thought on the role of law in government in the Book of Shenzi is close to Hanfeizi. It emphasizes how the rulers in the states should use law in administration and seek to institutionalize this method, thereby reducing the punished subjects’ hatred for the rulers. The author states: If a ruler abandons law and rules by his own will, and all denouncement, deprivation, conferment and reward are all decided by his own mind, then even if those who receive reward are properly selected, their expectations are limitless; even if those who are punished are properly selected, their wish to alleviate the punishment never stops. If a ruler abandons law to judge all things by his own mind, it might happen that different persons

“Law comes from Dao” 25 accomplish the same thing and receive different rewards, or that different persons commit the same crime and receive different penalty. Such is whence resentment comes. The author also says, a great ruler trusts law and does not interrupt things by his own opinions, and then all things are judged by law. People are allotted what is proper to them according to the law, receive reward and punishment and do not expect anything else from the ruler. Therefore there is no resentment, and the relation between the superiors and the subjects is harmonized.30 Finally, the author of the Book of Shenzi comes up with the theory of “ruling by means of law,” that is, “to base on law and number to observe gain and loss.” The author states: A ruler need not listen much. He observes gain and loss based on law and number. Those doctrines that are against the law should not be heeded; those accomplishments against law should not be expected; those relatives who have no merits should not be appointed to office. The office and law are fully impartial. The superiors and the subjects do nothing else but observing what the law determines.31 The author of the Book of Shenzi does not treat the law as sacred or inalterable. He states, “to rule a state without law would cause disorder, to observe the law without change would lead to decline.” “It is the rulers and the superiors who could alter the law according to Dao.”32 Namely, the law should be altered according to the times, and the reason for the change is “Dao.” From this we can conclude that the early thinkers of the Legalist School had a clear notion of the relationship between the law and Dao. As a thinker representative of the later Legalist School, Hanfeizi’s thoughts on law mainly come from the practice of government. He treats law as a publicly issued order: The law is the order of decree declared by the government which ensures that the degree of punishment is necessarily accepted or in accord with the heart of the people, so that reward will be given to those who are careful in obeying law, and punishment will be given to the evil.33 This law is completely public and statutory in contrast with the system of rituals, and it should be in accord with the heart of the people. Therefore, compared with the system of rituals, the law of the later Legalist School is more advanced to some extent. However, what the Legalist statutory law and the Confucian rituals protect and maintain is the autocratic government of the rulers in the states; as Hanfeizi says:

26 “Law comes from Dao” Therefore in recent times, those who can get rid of self-centered thoughts and get closer to the public law will have the people live in peace and the state in good order. Those who can get rid of partial actions and enforce the public law will have a strong army and his enemy will be become comparatively weak.34 In some respects, Confucianism and the Legalist School are the same. However, they differ in the method of government: the Legalist School advocates that the ruler treats all under his rule as equal, while the Confucian system of rituals stipulates different treatment for different persons according to the fact of human nature and the identity and status of different persons. However, it should be noted that there is a sense of transcendence in Hanfeizi’s ideal of law. It could, at least to a certain level, limit the influence of the rulers’ subjective likes and dislikes, and guarantee a certain level of objectivity. As Hanfeizi says, “therefore a wise sovereign appoints people by means of law but does not recommend anybody by himself; he measures the achievement of the officials but does not measure them by himself.”35 He also says, “a wise sovereign commands the officials all by means of law and does not think beyond that, or add additional favor to anyone. All actions should be in accord with law, law is the means to reduce partiality.”36 Hanfeizi’s ideal of law has a certain sense of impartiality. He says, law does not favor the noble, the string [for drawing straight lines in construction] does not allow bending. What the law imposes is something the wise cannot reject and the courageous do not dare to fight against. The punishment does not avoid great officials, the reward to the good does not disregard the ordinary people. Therefore, in order to correct the superiors’ wrong-doing, to interrogate the inferiors’ evil, to decide the truth and falsehood of government policy, to subdue greed and unify disagreeing opinions, to guide people in a uniform way, there is nothing better than using law.37 Such an impartiality, albeit limited, is a valuable element in the thought of the Legalist School. A bit different from the idea that a law should be “in accord with the fact of human nature” (因人之情 in the Book of Shenzi), Hanfeizi’s thought on law focuses on how to come up with a regulative system to control the weakness of selfishness in human nature in order to prevent anyone from harming the public welfare in pursuit of their own profit. Therefore, his thought on law is different from the system of law in modern capitalism that protects self-interest. Therefore, the idea of human nature as a foundation for law is not a factual statement of the quality of human nature, but a value judgment on the tendency of human nature. Compared with the modern system of law by means of which people can limit and check the power of the ruler, Hanfeizi’s thought on government still treats the law as a tool for the sovereign to rule the people and the officials efficiently. He says, “if the sovereign abandons law and uses partiality in

“Law comes from Dao” 27 government, then there would be no distinction between superior and inferior.”38 Therefore, if the reasonable elements of the thoughts of the School of Law were to fit the modern system of law, they should undergo a fundamental transformation in the spirit of legislation: from the former notion of law as a tool for the rulers to lead the officials and rule the people by means of punishment, to the modern system of law by means of which the people can check the power of the rulers. From the concise comparison above, we can conclude that the philosophy of law in the Four Canons is close to Daoism, and different from Shendao’s “using rituals and law as complementary” (礼法并用), and also different from Hanfeizi’s emphasis on law as the rulers’ administrative tool. However, the Dao-Law School represented by the Four Canons is not equivalent to the thought on natural law in the history of Western legal philosophy. It merely emphasizes the need to base law on the fact of human nature, and is therefore merely a law for administration of society, a law for the sovereigns themselves, not for the people. In such a tradition of legal philosophy, there is no liberty for the people. This is quite different from Cicero’s affirmation of the liberty of the people in his thought on law. Though Cicero is opposed to the fake liberty that is characterized by arbitrariness, he affirms sincerely the genuine liberty of the people. This is a valuable idea absent in the legal philosophy in pre-Qin China. This reminds us of Yan Fu’s (严复) heavy-hearted saying, “Liberty is what the ancient sages and worthies in China deeply feared, and would not establish in their teachings.”39

2.3 Comparison of the legal philosophy in the Four Canons and that in Cicero’s On the Laws40 In Cicero’s On the Laws, there are three important concepts: nature, lex (法律, law), and ius (法, law, justice). This book uses the literary form of dialogue, in which Marcus’s view always represents Cicero’s own thoughts. I compare this book with the Four Canons because both deal with the question of the metaphysical foundation of laws for human beings. To be sure, Cicero’s On the Laws involves the question concerning the rights and liberty of citizens, which is absent in the Four Canons. In what follows I discuss the similarities and differences of the two books on the question about the relation between human laws and their metaphysical foundations, in order to show the universal significance and profundity of the legal philosophy in the Four Canons. In discussing the etymology of the terms about law, Marcus gives a clear explanation of the relation between lex (法律, law), ius (法, law, justice), and nature as the ultimate origin of the former two. In the Roman age, lex was considered the highest reason, rooted in nature, which commands things that must be done and prohibits the opposite. When this same reason is secured and established in the human mind, it is law. And therefore they think that law is judgment, the effect of which is such as to order people to behave rightly and forbid them to do wrong.41

28 “Law comes from Dao” In Cicero’s time this view of law was widely accepted in Roman society, and its spirit came from the Greek view of law. The Greeks thought that the law is to give everyone what he or she deserves. Thus law entails fairness. However, Cicero disagrees with this view. He thinks that the Greek term nomos (law) comes from the verb nemo (to distribute), and the Latin term lex (law) comes from the verb lego (to choose). In fact, law means both to distribute and to choose. For Cicero, “the beginning of justice is to be sought in law: law is a power of nature, it is the mind and reason of the prudent man, it distinguishes justice and injustice.”42 In popular terms we call law only those regulations that have been written in order to permit or forbid something. Therefore there are two levels of meanings of law: one is the power of nature as the source of law; the other is the statute that is identified with law in popular terms. Cicero believes that it is impossible to establish a good custom or ethos simply by establishing the institution of a state on the basis of law in the popular sense of statute. One should seek the source of law from nature. For Cicero, it is the power and nature of gods that rule the whole cosmos. We may use different concepts such as reason, power, wisdom, will, and so on, to praise gods, and Cicero uses “reason.” He speaks very highly of reason, claiming that nothing is more divine and superior than reason; it resides in humans and in gods. What exists both in gods and in humans must be a common reason, and law is reason: We humans must be considered to be closely allied to gods by law. Furthermore, those who share law also share the procedures of justice; and those who have these things in common must be considered members of the same state, all the more so if they obey the same commands and authorities.43 The whole cosmos should be considered a common state for the gods and humans. Cicero believes that it is wrong to define a person’s legal condition simply according to their family relationships, for “it is all the more grand and glorious in nature at large that men should be a part of the family and race of gods.”44 Every human being has a soul, and “the soul was implanted in us by god. Hence there is in truth a family relationship between us and the gods, what can be called a common stock or origin.”45 Apart from humans, there is no other animal that has any notion of god. As for a human, though one might not recognize a god, as long as one recalls and knows where one came from, one will know the gods.46 “Furthermore, virtue is the same in human and god, and it is found in no other species besides; and virtue is nothing else than nature perfected and taken to its highest level.”47 From this we find that there is a similarity in the way of thinking or argumentative structure, between Cicero’s arguments about the source of law and the idea that “law comes from Dao” in the Four Canons. Both lead the discussion of law to a more fundamental being and authority, either to the gods in Cicero, or to the Dao in the Four Canons. Both believe that it is not sufficient to rule the people under Heaven solely by secular laws.

“Law comes from Dao” 29 Why are human beings connected with gods? The reason lies in “nature.” Cicero says, due to the tutelage of nature, human beings not only have law, but also imitate nature and create laws, and invent a variety of skills. “Reason imitates [nature] in order skillfully to achieve things necessary for life.”48 In Cicero’s system of legal philosophy, nature (or the immortal gods) is the ultimate root of law. Therefore, in his system of thought, “nature” as a concept is quite similar to the Dao in Daoism. Cicero highly praises the magnificence of nature and its grace to mankind. He says: Nature also not only adorned the human being with swiftness of mind, but also gave him the senses as servants and messengers; she supplied the latent and not completely formed conceptions of many things as the basis of knowledge, and she gave a bodily shape that is both adaptable and suited to the nature of man.49 For Cicero, nature is supreme, and she is not subject to any forces other than herself. Concerning human nature, Cicero says, “human nature itself has gone further: with no instruction, and taking as a starting point the knowledge of those things whose characteristics she knew from the first inchoate conceptions, she herself has strengthened reason and perfected it.”50 For this reason, the human laws should not be based on human opinions, but on nature, because nature itself represents justice. Nature is the mentor for human beings. The communication of mankind is possible due to the guidance of Nature. “There is no person of any nation who cannot reach virtue with the aid of a guide.”51 In comparison with Cicero’s detailed discussion of the characteristic of “nature” and his praise of it, we have to admit that the Four Canons says less on this topic of how Dao gives birth to law, and why law should be based on Dao. It only lays bare the characteristic of impartiality of Dao as the metaphysical foundation for the precisely impartial law. Cicero clearly defines the relationships among mankind, lex (law), ius (law, justice), and nature. He says, “we have been made by nature to receive the knowledge of justice one from another and share it among all people.” Moreover, he says: Those who have been given reason by nature have also been given right reason, and therefore law too, which is right reason in commands and prohibitions; and if they have been given law, then they have been given justice too. All people have reason, and therefore justice has been given to all.52 Cicero concludes that “justice exists by nature.”53 In terms of the spirit of inquiry into the metaphysical foundation of law, this conclusion is consistent with the statement that “law comes from Dao” in the Four Canons. Cicero discusses further the question of the foundation of legality of justice. He says:

30 “Law comes from Dao” The most stupid thing of all, moreover, is to consider all things just which have been ratified by a people’s institutions or laws. … There is only one justice, which constitutes the bond among humans, and which was established by the one law, which is right reason in commands and prohibitions. The person who does not know it is unjust, whether the law has been written anywhere or not.54 Cicero stresses that justice should not be measured by utility, otherwise the law would be disdained and destroyed by everyone. He says: The result is that there is no justice at all if it is not by nature, and the justice set up on the basis of utility is uprooted by that same utility: if nature will not confirm justice, all the virtues will be eliminated.55 Humans by nature respect and love others; such is the foundation of law. The deference to humans and religious observances towards the gods “need to be preserved not because of fear but because of the bond which exists between human and god.”56 Cicero elevates the position of nature over justice. This is a tendency distinct from Plato’s treating justice as a virtue necessary for both nations and individuals. Not only is law based on nature, the virtue of humans and things are all based on nature. Cicero says: What we call (and it is a misuse of the word) the virtue of a tree or of a horse is not a matter of opinion; it is natural. And if that is true, honorable and disgraceful can also be distinguished by nature. … Virtue is reason brought to completion, which certainly exists in nature; and therefore the same is true of all honorable behavior.57 Cicero’s final conclusion is that it is the highest good either to live in accordance with nature, that is, to enjoy a moderate life equipped with virtue, or to follow nature and to live in accordance with what can be called its law, that is insofar as possible to do everything to accomplish the demands of nature, who wishes us to live in accordance with virtue as if it were a law.58 This conclusion is consistent with the spirit of legal philosophy in the Four Canons, which emphasizes the significance of law and its foundation in Dao.

2.4 Conclusion Through the concise comparison above, we learn that the Four Canons clearly has the characteristics of Dao-Law School in the middle Warring States period, namely, it seeks to find the metaphysical foundation for human laws, thereby

“Law comes from Dao” 31 making human laws embody a sense of sanctity that transcends individuals. This is different from the tendency of the pre-Qin Legalist School, which emphasizes that the sovereign is above the law. This emphasis on the metaphysical foundation of human laws is comparable to Cicero’s legal philosophy in the Roman period. Here we can see a basis for dialogue between Chinese and Western thought. Especially noteworthy is that the Four Canons, in discussing the relation between law and penalty, holds that law pertains to yang (active forces/ aspects), while penalty pertains to yin (passive forces/aspects). Only when the law is clear, manifest, and prevailing in a state, can the penalty (which pertains to obscurity, yin, and the minute) function properly. In this sense, government by law would not be to rule people by means of fear, but by a positive means that is open and in accord with the requirement of virtue. This is totally different from the autocracy in Chinese history after the prefecture and county system was established, especially the extreme autocracy in the Ming dynasty and in the reign of the three early Qing emperors, who used draconian laws to rule the people. Traditional Chinese society after the Western Han Dynasty was largely a society governed by a Confucian system of rituals; the law as a complementary element was mainly the law of penal codes. In order for modern China to become a country governed by laws, the corresponding element in traditional culture is relatively undeveloped. This chapter seeks to extract a legal philosophy from the Dao-Law School, in order to provide a case of metaphysical inquiry into the foundation of law, so that it would be understood that for the fostering of government by law in contemporary China, such metaphysical thinking concerning the foundation of government by law is necessary. What the metaphysical foundation for contemporary China is is another question to which I have not yet provided a clear answer. What I could surmise is that if a metaphysical foundation that answers to the need of modern people were missing when contemporary China constructed a society governed by laws, then government by laws would lack a basis of faith in the heart of the Chinese people, and the dignity of law would not be secured. Legal philosophy is not a dispensable speculation of law. It is about a question of great significance to the reality of human life, about whether the sanctity of law would be established in the heart of the people.

Notes 1 Yu Ming Guang (余明光), New Annotations and Translation of Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons (Huang Di Nei Jing Xin Zhu Xin Yi, 黄帝四经新注新译), Changsha: Yue Lu Press (Yue Lu Chu Ban She, 岳麓书社), 2016, 187. 2 Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 145. 3 Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 195. 4 Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 44. 5 Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 135. 6 Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 264. 7 Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 183. 8 Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 185.

32 “Law comes from Dao” 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40

41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50

Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 269. Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 269. Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 274. Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 199. Yu Ming Guang, Four Canons, 105. Dai Wang (戴望), “Fa Jin” (法禁), Guan Zi Jiao Zheng (管子校正), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1954, 77. Dai Wang, “Ren Fa” (任法), Guan Zi Jiao Zheng, 256. Dai Wang, “Ren Fa” (任法), Guan Zi Jiao Zheng, 256. Dai Wang, “Xin Shu” (心术), Guan Zi Jiao Zheng, 221. Dai Wang, “Fa Fa” (法法), Guan Zi Jiao Zheng, 89. Dai Wang, “Ren Fa” (任法), Guan Zi Jiao Zheng, 258. Dai Wang, “Xin Shu” (心术), Guan Zi Jiao Zheng, 221. Dai Wang, “Fa Fa” (法法), Guan Zi Jiao Zheng, 92. Dai Wang, “Ren Fa” (法) Guan Zi Jiao Zheng, 256. “Yin Xun” (因循), Shen Zi (慎子), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1954, 3. “Yin Xun” (因循), Shen Zi, 3. “Wei De” (威德), Shen Zi, 3. “Wei De” (威德), Shen Zi, 3. “Wei De” (威德), Shen Zi, 3. “Shen Zi Yi Wen” (慎子逸文), Shen Zi, 7. “Shen Zi Yi Wen” (慎子逸文), Shen Zi, 13. “Jun Ren” (君人), Shen Zi, 6. “Jun Chen” (君臣), Shen Zi, 6. “Shen Zi Yi Wen” (慎子逸文), Shen Zi, 9. Wang Xian Shen (王先慎), “Ding Fa” (定法), Han Fei Zi Ji Jie (韩非子集解), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1954, 304. Wang Xian Shen, “You Du” (有度), Han Fei Zi Ji Jie, 22. Wang Xian Shen, “You Du” (有度), Han Fei Zi Ji Jie, 23. Wang Xian Shen, “You Du” (有度), Han Fei Zi Ji Jie, 25. Wang Xian Shen, “You Du” (有度), Han Fei Zi Ji Jie, 26. Wang Xian Shen, “You Du” (有度), Han Fei Zi Ji Jie, 26. Wang Shi (王栻) ed., Works of Yan Fu (Yan Fu Ji, 严复集), vol. 1, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1996, 3. The reason why I use Cicero’s On the Laws rather than Plato’s Laws to compare with the legal philosophy in the Four Canons is that Cicero’s legal philosophy is as synthetic as the Four Canons. Both of them pertained to transitional periods of philosophy, and are thus not as purely original as Plato’s Laws. Moreover, Plato in his Laws holds that laws are only expedient tools for administration necessary for a nonideal state, which are not needed in an ideal state. This tendency of thought runs counter to the Dao-Law School, thus I do not compare these two. Marcus Tullius Cicero, On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, trans. James E.G. Zetzel, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 111. Cicero, Commonwealth/Laws, 112. Cicero, Commonwealth/Laws, 113. Cicero, Commonwealth/Laws, 114. Cicero, Commonwealth/Laws, 114. Cicero, Commonwealth/Laws, 114. Cicero, Commonwealth/Laws, 114. Cicero, Commonwealth/Laws, 114. Cicero, Commonwealth/Laws, 114–115. Cicero, Commonwealth/Laws, 115.

“Law comes from Dao” 33 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58

Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Cicero, Cicero,

Commonwealth/Laws, Commonwealth/Laws, Commonwealth/Laws, Commonwealth/Laws, Commonwealth/Laws, Commonwealth/Laws, Commonwealth/Laws, Commonwealth/Laws,

116. 117. 118. 120. 121. 121. 121. 126.

3

Transferring to the worthies rather than to the sons The political philosophy in the Shanghai Museum bamboo slips manuscript Rong Cheng Shi (容成氏) and the question of which school it belongs to

The recently published second volume of Shanghai bamboo slips contains many essays that concern the question of pre-Qin political philosophy. Five essays, Min Zhi Fu Mu (民之父母), Zi Gao (子羔), Lu Bang Da Han (鲁邦大旱), and two sections of Cong Zheng (从政) all present Confucian political thought. There is only one essay, namely, Rong Cheng Shi (容成氏), whose tendency in political thought is very complicated; it is very difficult to tell at first glance whether it belongs to Confucianism, Mohism, or another school. From the facts that (1) it attaches high value to the worthies but not to blood relationship; (2) it does not advocate universal love (jian ai, 兼爱), and (3) it highly values the idealized description of government by the kings or emperors of remote antiquity, I think it might be a work of the pre-Qin Eclectic School (za jia, 杂家). In this chapter I discuss in five aspects the characteristics of political thought in Rong Cheng Shi and the problem of its attribution, namely, to which school it belongs.

3.1 The list of emperors and kings in Rong Cheng Shi and its comparison with that in “Qu Qie” (胠箧) in the Zhuangzi (庄子) The list of emperors and kings in remote antiquity in the chapter “Qu Qie” in the Zhuangzi was widely considered a fiction. However, the recently excavated bamboo slips manuscript Rong Cheng Shi has a list similar to that in “Qu Qie,” from which we learn that the legend is not a fiction by Zhuangzi alone, but was at least a reflection of a historical legend. “Qu Qie” describes the list of emperors and kings as follows: Long ago, in the time of Rong Cheng Shi, Da Ting Shi, Bo Huang Shi, Zhong Yang Shi, Li Lu Shi, Li Xu Shi, Xuan Yuan Shi, Xu Li Shi, Zun Lu Shi, Zhu Rong Shi, Fu Xi Shi, Shen Nong Shi, the people knotted cords and used them. They relished their food, admired their clothing, enjoyed their customs, and were content with their houses. Though neighboring states were within sight of each other, and could hear the cries of each

Transferring to worthies rather than sons 35 other’s dogs and chickens, the people grew old and died without ever traveling beyond their own borders.1 The list of emperors and kings in the Rong Cheng Shi is incomplete, because some bamboo slips are missing. It merely begins with Lu Shi and ends with Lu Bi Shi. According to Li Ling (李零), there might be one missing slip that reads “long ago, Rong Cheng Shi, … [two characters are missing] Shi.” The extant bamboo slips manuscript contains eight emperors or kings: “Lu Shi, He Xu Shi, Qiao Jie Shi, Cang Jie Shi, Xuan Yuan Shi, Shen Long Shi, Wei ~2 Shi, Lu Bi Shi when they ruled all under the Heaven.” In Rong Cheng Shi, Qiao Jie Shi, Lu Bi Shi and Wei ~ Shi do not appear in the Zhuangzi, nor in any traditional pre-Qin text, which shows that Rong Cheng Shi has its own unique resources for the knowledge of the list of the emperors and kings in remote antiquity. The “chronological list of names past and present” in Ban Gu’s(班固) History of Han (Han Shu, 汉书) has a list of emperors and kings of remote antiquity different from Zhuangzi’s, but does not contain the three emperors or kings. Ban Gu’s list of the 11 greatest sage kings or emperors is as follows: Tai Hao Fu Xi Shi, Yan Di Shen Long Shi, Huang Di (Yellow Emperor) Xuan Yuan Shi, Shao Hao Di Jin Tian Shi, Zhuan Xu Di Gao Yang Shi, Di Ku Gao Xin Shi, Di Yao Tao Tang Shi, Di Shun You Yu Shi, Di Yu Xi Hou Shi, Di Tang Yin Shang Shi, Wen Wang Zhou Shi. Ban Gu also identifies the second greatest persons of ren (benevolence) as: Nü Wa Shi, Gong Gong Shi, Rong Cheng Shi, Da Ting Shi, Bo Huang Shi, Zhong Yang Shi, Li Lu Shi, Li Xu Shi, Xuan Yuan Shi, He Xu Shi, Zun Lu Shi, Hun Dun Shi, Hao Ying Shi, You Cao Shi, and others. Since there are bamboo slips missing, we cannot tell how many characters are missing in the text of Rong Cheng Shi, and whether the names mentioned by Ban Gu would be in the missing slips. However, there is one thing we can tell for sure: there are names of three emperors or kings in the Rong Cheng Shi that do not appear in Ban Gu’s list; therefore, this text is important because it provides new information about the kings and emperors of remote antiquity. In comparison with Rong Cheng Shi, “Qu Qie” from the Zhuangzi provides the list of emperors and kings of remote antiquity to discuss the form of civilization, the model of ideal society, the way of life and human experiences, and does not deal with the operation of political power. Ban Gu’s list is all about the hierarchical ranking of the kings and emperors according to their ethical virtues. Rong Cheng Shi is different from both; it provides the list in order to discuss the question of the way of transferring of political power; it deals mainly with the question how a king or emperor attains the political power and than transfers it to another. The narrative of emperors and kings is not a vague expression of a social ideal, but a discussion of political philosophy about the procedure of transferring political power.

36 Transferring to worthies rather than sons

3.2 “Transferring political power to the worthies rather than to the sons”: the rule of transferring political power and the way of establishing political authority in Rong Cheng Shi “Transferring political power to the worthies rather than to the sons” is a political principle articulated in the Rong Cheng Shi. The author says: [When Rongchengshi, … Zun] lushi, Hexushi, Qiaojieshi, Cangjieshi, Xuanyuanshi, Shennongshi, Weiyishi, and Lubishi had [rule over] all-underheaven, they did not bestow it on their sons, but all of them bestowed it on men of worth. Their virtue being still pure, those above loved those below, unifying their wills, putting to rest their arms, and awarding office to the able.3 The author uses the narrative of the kings and emperors of remote antiquity to bestow a certain sense of sanctity to the political rule “transferring political power to the worthies rather than to the sons.” Furthermore, Rong Cheng Shi tells the details of the procedure of how a new political authority is established. People endorse only those rulers who can rule the country well. It took a long time for Yao to attain the power to rule all-under-Heaven. The author says, Formerly, Yao lived between Dan Fu and Diaoling. Yao followed [the precedents] in what he bestowed and offered tribute according to the season. He did not exhort the people, and yet they were hard-working. He did not mutilate or kill, and yet there were no robbers or thieves. He was lenient, and yet the people were submissive. Thereupon, from within [a territory with] the range of only one hundred li, he led all the people in the world. They came to make obeisance and set him [on the throne], regarding him as the son-of-heaven.4 Similar things happened to Shun and Yu. From this it is evident that the main reason for the political authority to be truly established is that the political forms represented by the new emperors and kings is in accord with the need of the people. Therefore, the transferring of political power and the establishment of new political authority are not determined only by the past rulers’ will to confer the throne to the worthies they selected. How to select a successor, how to pass the throne, and how the selected prove their virtue in political practice, these three elements form the whole story. Without the first two conditions, the selected would not be able to practice and prove their virtue; without the last condition, even though selected, the worthies might not be able to receive the power. For example, Yi (益) chosen by Yu (禹) is a typical case in which a selected successor was not accepted by the people, who chose Yu’s son, and therefore the transferring of power to Yi was not successful. Therefore, “transferring political power to the worthies rather than to the sons” is only a general rule in transferring political power. In order to implement the principle in political practice, there should be other supporting conditions. The imagination of an

Transferring to worthies rather than sons 37 ideal establishment of political authority in the Rong Cheng Shi reveals the complexity of the process of transferring political power. Mencius holds that the throne should not be passed from one person to another out of private will, the highest authority for the conferring of the highest political power is Heaven. This should not be considered as a regress in political thoughts, because both Rong Cheng Shi and Mencius, from different perspectives, maintain the view that the highest political power belongs to the public and thus does not allow its transferring to be simply decided by a private will. Furthermore, Rong Cheng Shi reveals the cultural background in which it was possible to implement the political principle of “transferring political power to the worthies rather than to the sons,” namely, that such a principle is endorsed by the whole society. When Yao felt weak and old, “Yao tried to abdicate the throne to rule all under heaven to the worthies, but there were no worthies under Heaven who could accept it. Rulers in different states all tried to abdicate the throne to the worthies.” Following a process of invitation and declination, Yao chose Shun. Though Yao had nine sons, he did not pass the throne to them. Yao followed the tradition. However, without the common political and cultural agreement on such a traditional procedure, especially the custom that rulers of different states all followed the tradition of abdication, the political principle of “transferring political power to the worthies rather than to the sons” would not be followed. According to Rong Cheng Shi, the transition from Yao to Shun and from Shun to Yu under such a principle went smoothly. However, when Yu wanted to pass the throne to Gao Yao, Gao Yao “declined the throne to rule all under heaven five times to other worthies.” At the end he even declined by the excuse that he was ill, and rejected the abdication till death. Thus this tradition was broken, and Yu had to make a temporary decision to pass the political power to Yi, but Yu’s son did not accept the decision and attacked Yi to seize power, and put an end to the way of abdication. To be sure, Rong Cheng Shi did not – and it was impossible for it to do so – tell us why such a traditional way would be destroyed. Here, we do not discuss the question about the intrinsic defect of such an ideal way of transferring political power. We may also see that, in order to introduce and realize the Western ideal of democracy into China, cultural tradition and ideology are important factors besides the economic and social conditions. The scandals of democratic governments in Latin America and some ridiculous things that have happened in democratic governments in Southeast Asia were all due to the lack of cultural tradition of democracy in local society. But we should not thereby claim that democracy is inapplicable to Southeast Asia. It reminds us only that it is a very complicated project to realize the ideal of democracy, much more than simply to borrow the procedure of election. For China to adopt democracy, it is important to revive the corresponding tradition in its own cultural background as the soil to transplant democracy. This is of great significance for the promotion of democracy in China.

38 Transferring to worthies rather than sons

3.3 Ideal of government by the worthies, and the procedure of abdication Rong Cheng Shi is no doubt an expression of the ideal of the government by the worthies. Yao, Shun, and Yu were all successors of their predecessors; all worthies selected were all devoted to the promotion of public welfare of the people, and were thus loved and supported by the people. Before he ascended to the throne, Yao had been a worthy who led a local government. After Yao ascended to the throne, “Within a range of one thousand li, [officials] holding [writing] boards took their proper positions. The [people in the] four directions became harmonious and, by cherishing them, he caused all the people under heaven to come to him.”5 Similar things happened to Yu and Shun. Before they ascended to the throne, they all led a local government but did not have the nobility of a son-ofHeaven, and were thus still considered a jian min (贱民, person of lower social status). In the text, “jian min” does not refer to only the most ordinary man from the mountains or fields, but simply to any person of a status lower than that of the son-of-Heaven. If it were not understood in this way, how could we explain the abdication of a king to an ordinary person who got recognized by the king simply because of his abilities in the age of antiquity when communicative technology was very poor? Very interestingly, Yao, Shun, and Yu did not search for a political successor until they became old and weak, and the successors they chose were all jian min before they became a king. How can such a person at once have the ability to rule a great country, and immediately earn the trust of others? The extant Rong Cheng Shi did not give such details. However, it is certain that here “jian min” does not refer to ordinary laborers. From this perspective, we find that the description of the transferring of political power in Rong Cheng Shi is partially fictional and imaginary. It was not so much a narrative of a historical fact as a reconstruction of a legend of history about the transferring of political power, through which the author expresses his great discontent about the political hereditary system in the traditional and his contemporary society. Such a tendency of thought was also detectable in the works of Mozi and Mencius. In the three chapters of “Shang Xian” (尚贤, “Respecting the Worthies”), Mozi repeatedly emphasizes the importance of using and respecting the worthies of great virtue. For example, in the first chapter of “Shang Xian”: Master Mozi says, “now all the kings, dukes and great officials who are in the post of administration desire that the country becomes rich, populous and in good political order. However, they are not able to make the country the way the desire but get the reverse result, … why?” Master Mozi says, “it is because they do not respect and rely on the worthy and able in administration. … the more worthies and able a country has, the better the country is in political order, and the less, the worse. Therefore a great official’s responsibility is to attract a great number of the worthies.”6

Transferring to worthies rather than sons 39 Mencius also attaches great importance to “close association with the worthies.” He thinks that in order to extend the great love of benevolence, the proper attitude is to consider urgent the close association with the worthies. Only when the worthies are in office can the welfare of the people be secured. He says: A wise man knows everything, but he considers urgent only that which demands attention. A benevolent man loves everyone, but he devotes himself to the close association with good and wise men. Even Yao and Shun did not use their wisdom on all things alike; this is because they put first things first. Nor did they use their benevolence to love everyone; this is because they considered urgent the close association with good and wise men.7 It should be added that although Mozi and Mencius hold the same attitude of “respecting and using the worthies” in politics, there is a minute difference. Mencius’s view contains only a vague idea of “transferring political power to the worthies,” but that is by far not the main idea. There could be two ways in which political powers are transferred to the worthies: one is exemplified by Yi Yin (伊尹) who exiled the king Tai Jia (太甲) and only later returned the power to him after he became virtuous. Such is an indirect way that the power was transferred to the worthies; the other way was exemplified by Yao who directly abdicated the throne to Shun. Even in such a case, Yao merely “recommended” Shun to Heaven. Thus Mencius says, “the son-of-Heaven should not give the ‘all under heaven’ to another person.” It is Heaven who conferred the power on Shun. “Heaven does not speak but reveals itself through its acts and deeds.”8 Therefore, the concept of transferring power to the worthies in Mencius is different from that in Rong Cheng Shi. Mencius emphasizes the virtue of benevolence as the ground for the peaceful transition of political power. He says, “the Three Dynasties won the Empire through benevolence and lost it through cruelty. This is true of the rise and fall, survival and collapse, of states as well.”9 By contrast, Mozi’s “respecting and using the worthies” stresses the practice of using the worthies and able in administration; though Mozi adduces the ancient tradition, yet that was not his emphasis. My preliminary conclusion is that the idea of “respecting and using the worthies” in Rong Cheng Shi is close to Confucianism for their common emphasis on showing benevolence to the people. The idea of “transferring power to the worthies” is not unique to ancient China. The ancient Greek thinker Plato has similar thoughts. He holds that a true king is a person who has the knowledge of how to govern. If one has the knowledge of how to rule a country, no matter whether he is in office or a commoner, he could be properly called a “ruler,” because he has the knowledge of such a technique and thus deserves the title, no matter in what situation he is. Politics is a technique. Just like the ill would seek a doctor, just like in sailing only those who know how to navigate in the sea deserve to become a captain, the person who has the power to rule the country should be the one who has the knowledge of administration. However, it is not the case that Plato

40 Transferring to worthies rather than sons emphasizes merely the technique of the politicians and not their virtues. Just like the Chinese classical notion of “the worthies” (xian ren, 贤人), the ideal king for Plato is similar to the ancient Chinese sage king who has not only knowledge of governing, but also the corresponding virtues. He should treat his subjects justly and impartially. Such a king not only protects the life of the subjects, but also transforms their characters and improves them to the utmost that human nature allows. Therefore, “respecting and using the worthies” or the pursuit of the government by the worthies is one of the common political ideals for both ancient Chinese and Greek society. It is not the same as modern democracy, but is still a meaningful resource for contemporary political philosophy. Specifically, given that the ideal of an open, fair procedure to transfer political power is secured, we must address the problem of how to ensure that the elected are virtuous and able politicians, not those who attain power because of their wealth or their skill of flattering. Such is an important question that modern democracy should not avoid.

3.4 The account of the legitimacy of seizing political power by force, and the Confucian theory of revolution (Geming, 革命, change of the mandate [of Heaven]) Rong Cheng Shi describes the transferring of political power with an attitude of “historicism.” It affirms both the principle of “transferring political power to the worthies rather than to the sons” as applicable to the age before King Tang of Shang, and affirms the legitimacy of the revolutions by King Tang of Shang and King Wu of Zhou. The affirmation of the legitimacy of their revolutions is a development of the thought on “transferring power to the worthies”, namely, if the rulers are not worthy and virtuous, those who are truly virtuous and worthy could topple the government of the tyrants by means of revolution. Therefore, King Tang of Shang stored up his political power, and earned trust from society and the endorsement of the people, and eventually overthrew the government of the tyrant Jie of Xia by military force. After all, the ground for revolution is the endorsement of the people, which is the essence of the theory of revolution in Rong Cheng Shi. Though Tang’s revolution was by force, the fundamental reason for his seizing the power is the endorsement of the people. Thirty-one generations after Tang, his descendants lost the throne also because of the lack of virtue. King Wu of Zhou waged war against Zhou (纣) for the same reason Tang did against Jie. Due to the fragmentariness of the bamboo-slips, we cannot read any description of the process by which King Wu seized political power, like the story we found in the Mencius. The remaining text of Rong Cheng Shi affirms the right to overthrow a government of a tyrant, on the condition that the new dynasty ought to be in accord with daoyi (道义, the Way and righteousness), benevolent to the people and devoted to the promotion of common welfare, and therefore gains the trust and love of the people, and eventually attains the power to rule all-under-Heaven. This mode of thinking is close to the Confucian thought represented by Mencius.

Transferring to worthies rather than sons 41 Although Confucius condemns rebellion and transgressing against one’s superiors, he affirms, “When faced with the opportunity to practice benevolence do not yield precedence even to your teacher.”10 If the practice is in accord with daoyi, then the means could be adjusted. Such is a reasonable development of Confucius’s view that one should act according to circumstances. Mencius develops Confucius’s thought of ren (benevolence), spells out its implication in political philosophy, and confirms the legitimacy of Tang’s and Wu’s revolutions against tyranny. Mencius says, “I have indeed heard of the punishment of the ‘outcast Zhou,’ but I have not heard of any regicide.”11 He considers as most important the rationality of the political end. In the ethics of political practice, Mencius develops a view of reciprocal relationship between the rulers and the officials. Thus, Mencius said to King Xuan of Qi: If a prince treats his subjects as his hands and feet, they will treat him as their belly and heart. If he treats them as his horses and hounds, they will treat him as a stranger. If he treats them as mud and weeds, they will treat him as an enemy.12 The preceding seems to suggest that Confucian political ethics is a form of aristocracy of the worthies. To be sure, this political ethics is also a product of the traditional system of rituals. The praise of Tang’s and Wu’s revolutions in Rong Cheng Shi belongs to the part of Confucianism represented by Mencius, and this tradition can be dated to the Book of Documents. Therefore, the theory of revolution in Rong Cheng Shi is closer to Confucianism.

3.5 To which school does Rong Cheng Shi belong? It is difficult to answer the question of which school Rong Cheng Shi belongs to. To analyze, concerning the transition of power, its position is close to the idea of “respecting and using the worthies” in Mohism; concerning administrative methods, it is inclined to Daoist naturalism; concerning the construction of social order, it has the Confucian value of cultivating the virtue of the people. As far as I can see, the author uses the narrative of the kings and emperors of remote antiquity to discuss the question of the legitimacy and source of political power, and the question who deserves to have such power. In this essay, though there are contents about the ideal social form of antiquity that we can also find in the chapter of “Qu Qie” in the Zhuangzi, such as the narrative of how Yao, Shun, and Yu became kings from lower social status, and how they built social orders, the major theme, as can be seen in the extant bamboo slips, is about the legitimacy and the source of political power, and about how it is lost and how a new political order could be built by new rulers. From this perspective, I think this is an eclectic essay that synthesizes the Confucian and Mohist ideas of respecting virtue and the worthies, and at the same time eliminates the Confucian emphasis on blood relationship and the Mohist belief in the will of Heaven and spirits and

42 Transferring to worthies rather than sons gods. It pertains to the Eclectic School. The following passage of Rong Cheng Shi could be adduced to support my view: [When Rongchengshi, …, Zun] lushi, Hexushi, Qiaojieshi, Cangjieshi, Xuanyuanshi, Shennongshi, Weiyishi, and Lubishi had [rule over] all-underheaven, they did not bestow it on their sons, but all of them bestowed it on men of worth. Their virtue being still pure, those above loved those below, unifying their wills, putting to rest their arms, and awarding office to the able. Hence, the deaf and mute carried candles; the blind played drums and stringed instruments; the lame guarded gates; the dwarfed made arrows; the gigantic thatched roofs; those who were stooped, leveled mounds; those with goiters boiled salt, and the anxious fished in the marshes. The disabled and rejected were not discarded. Whoever was left in obscurity, the [rulers] taught and instructed. They gave them drink and food. They employed the hundred officials [in appropriate tasks] and feasted them monthly. Thus, at that time there were no ….13 Thereupon, [Youyu Tong] did not reward and did not punish, did not mutilate and did not kill; the land had no starving people and on the roads no children dying prematurely. Those above and those below, the noble and the humble, all obtained what was appropriate to them. The [people of the lands beyond] the four seas paid tribute and those within the four seas came to his courts.14 According to the bibliography “Yi Wen Zhi” (艺文志) in the Book of Han (汉书) by Ban Gu (班固), there were 20 schools of thoughts in the Eclectic School, 13 of them existed in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. There are works attributed to these thinkers, but their authenticity is still in doubt. According to Ban Gu, the thinkers of the Eclectic School are from those officials whose responsibility is to discuss and comment on policies. They synthesize Confucianism and Mohism, and combine the thoughts of the School of Names and the School of Laws; they know the proper structure a government should have, and understand the penetrating principle of the government of the king, such is their advantage. Those who go to extremes might admire too many and do not concentrate their minds on one thing.15 The description of the principle of “transferring political power to the worthies rather than to the sons” for the kings and emperors of remote antiquity in Rong Cheng Shi shows the characteristic of an eclectic thinker, namely, they “know the proper structure a government should have, and understand the penetrating principle of the government of the king.” Judging from the extant text handed down, it is difficult to tell school Rong Cheng Shi belongs to, for there are no pre-Qin thinkers who clearly state the principle of transition of political power as “transferring political power to the worthies rather than to the sons.”

Transferring to worthies rather than sons 43 From its affirmation of the legitimacy of revolutions of Tang and Wu, we can tell that it is closer to Mencius’s school of Confucianism, though it does not attach importance to blood relationship as common Confucian thinkers do. Mencius’s narrative of “transferring political power to the worthies” is limited to the age of Yao and Shun, and does not mention the list of kings and emperors before that age. Therefore, it is still not clear whether the thought of “transferring political power to the worthies” in Rong Cheng Shi was influenced by Mencius’s school of Confucianism. Solely from the idea of “respecting the worthies,” we can tell that “Rong Cheng Shi” is close to Mohism whose three chapters of “Respecting the Worthies” argue repeatedly that respecting the worthies is the foundation of administration. However, Mohist “respecting the worthies” is different from the idea of “transferring political power to the worthies rather than to the sons” in Rong Cheng Shi. First of all, Mozi stresses that “a great official’s responsibility is to attract a great number of the worthies.” Although Mozi mentions the story how Yao, Shun, and Yu were chosen from among the humble to become sage kings in the traditional political background of “respecting the worthies,” Mozi does not use the story to argue for the principle concerning the transition of the highest power. Second, Mozi does not use the story of kings and emperors before Yao and Shun, while Rong Cheng Shi has a long list of them. The use of the legend from remote antiquity is close to Zhuangzi’s style of thought rather than Mohism. However, Daoism does not advocate “respecting the worthies”; therefore, Rong Cheng Shi could not be a Daoist text. Moreover, “respecting the worthies” belongs to a political tradition older than Mohism and Confucianism. Mozi says, treating “respecting the worthies” as the foundation of government is not merely a doctrine of Master Mozi, but is the Dao of the sage-kings, documented in the books of ancient kings, a doctrine handed down from a long time ago. Zhuan (传) says, “seek the sage and wise, so that they can help you [rule the all-under-heaven].” Tang Shi (汤誓) says, “then seek the great sage and exert yourself with him to rule the all-under-heaven.”16 Mozi says, in the past, the sage-kings knew that they should respect and use the worthies carefully so as to govern the country well; therefore, they wrote it down on bamboo-slips and silk, carved inscriptions in vessels, so as to pass it to their offspring.17 From the three points above, we can conjecture that Rong Cheng Shi should not be a Mohist essay. It might be related to Daoism, because its author shares with the Daoist thinkers a characteristic of “being knowledgeable of the Dao of survival and decay, fortune and misfortune in the past and present.”18 Rong Cheng Shi praises remote antiquity for “dismissing the army,” and for attaining social order without imposing rules of penalty and reward, which is related to the

44 Transferring to worthies rather than sons School of Names. The whole text, as can be read now, bears little influence from the School of Law. According to the definition of the Eclectic School in the Book of Han, my preliminary conclusion is that Rong Cheng Shi is a piece of work of the Eclectic School that bears influence from Confucianism, Daoim, Mohism, and the School of Names.

Notes 1 Chuang Chou, The Complete Works of Chuang Tzu, trans. B. Watson, New York: Columbia University Press, 1968, 111–112. Quoted here with adaptation to Pinyin. 2 This last symbol appears in the original Chinese monograph, and stands for a Chinese character in the bamboo slips too blurred to be recognized or too difficult to decipher. 3 Sarah Allan, Buried Ideas: Legends of Abdication and Ideal Government in Early Chinese Bamboo-Slip Manuscripts, New York, SUNY Press, 2015, 225. 4 Allan, Buried Ideas, 232. 5 Allan, Buried Ideas, 232. 6 Mo Zi (墨子), “Shang Xian” (尚贤), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 2007, 49. 7 Mencius 7A:46, in D.C. Lau trans., Book of Mencius, New York: Penguin Books, 1970, 192–193. 8 Mencius 5A:5, 143. 9 Mencius 4A:3, 119. 10 Analects 15.36, in D.C. Lau, trans., Analects of Confucius, New York: Penguin Books, 1979, 295. 11 Mencius 1B:8, 68. 12 Mencius, 4B:3, 128. 13 Allan, Buried Ideas, 225. 14 Allan, Buried Ideas, 230. 15 Ban Gu (班固), Yi Wen Zhi (藝文志) in Hanshu (漢書), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1962, 1742. 16 Mo Zi Jian Gu (墨子间诂), in Zhuzi Jicheng (诸子集成), vol. 4, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju,中华书局), 2006, 33–34. 17 Mo Zi Jian Gu, in Zhuzi Jicheng, vol. 4, 41. 18 Ban Gu, Yi Wen Zhi in Hanshu, 1732.

4

Striving for democracy Confucian political philosophy in the Ming and Qing dynasties

Confucian philosophers launched a political philosophy movement from the late Ming Dynasty to early Qing Dynasty (1600–1700). The core idea of this movement is against the royal tyranny that lasted for over two thousand years. This movement promotes the idea of division of political power and further allows more freedom for the people. Regarding this movement, Chinese Marxists in the early 20th century called it “early enlightenment,” while Mizoguchi Yuzo and John King Fairbank both agreed that late Ming and early Qing Chinese society had trends of modernization. I believe that this movement was in pursuit of political democracy. I understand that “democracy” in modern English is quite different from minzhu (民主) in modern Chinese. In modern Chinese, democracy is the opposite of autocracy. Any thoughts against autocracy are regarded as democratic or democratic ideals. They might not include any details of the democratic institutions. Furthermore, even with regard to the details of the democratic institutions, I do not think that the separation of powers practiced in the West is the only model. I believe that any idea that promotes the limitation of royal power is democratic. Therefore, I believe that there is a continuation between Ming scholars and Qing scholars regarding the criticism against the concentration of royal power. It may seem that the demise of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644) and the establishment of the Qing Dynasty (1644–1912) directly caused this movement. However, this movement is a result of a transition to modernization in China. My reason for this claim is as follows. When the Qing government became stable and the whole society became politically and economically more developed than the previous dynasty, a few Confucian philosophers, such as Yuan Mei (袁枚, 1716–1797), continued to argue for the same political reforms. What Yuan Mei and other thinkers of the Qing Dynasty did was a part of what Gu Yanwu (顾炎武, 1613–1682), Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲, 1610–1695), and Wang Fuzhi (王夫之, 1619–1692) of the late Ming Dynasty had been doing. The central idea of this movement is that the monopoly of royal power is the source of social chaos and political turmoil. Apparently this idea was revolutionary at that time in China. Philosopher Dai Zhen (戴震, 1724–1777) argued that “those who hold political positions lack virtues and are good at deceiving people. They are disasters for the public.” Furthermore, he claimed, “Social

46 Striving for democracy chaos originates from the top, which hurts the people.”1 This claim is revolutionary. Historian Qian Daxin (钱大昕 1728–1804) argued against the same kind of despotism. He argued that it is wrong to infer from loyalty in a family to loyalty in a government. He made a clear distinction between the private family life and the impartial public life. He argued that the filial piety valued in family life is not applicable to the relation between a subordinate and a superior in the state.2 Public officials should be loyal to the people, rather than to an emperor. And emperors cannot take away people’s rights, such as rights to free speech. Qian’s distinction between the public and private domain or the loyalty to an emperor and to people was part of the anti-despotism movement of the late Ming dynasty. In this chapter I will discuss the political thought of four philosophers of the early Qing Dynasty: Gu Yanwu, Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzhi, and Yuan Mei. I will argue that these four Confucian thinkers are consistent in arguing against despotism and calling for political reforms for democracy.

4.1 Gu Yanwu’s idea of political reform and democracy Gu Yanwu proposes, “We should combine the feudalistic system of dukes with the system of counties.”3 He argues that the division of power among the feudal dukes implemented in the Western Zhou Dynasty (1046–771 BCE) can be absorbed into the system of counties, which would overcome the monopoly of royal power. Gu believes that the feudal system of dukes represents the idea of a division of powers. The system of counties is based on the idea of the centralization of powers. Combining these two would create a better system. There are problems with each of the two systems. For the feudal system of dukes, Gu points out that the dukes have more powers than county mayors and easily become dictators in a region. For the system of counties, a county mayor does not have enough power to reign over his districts. Since at Gu’s time the system of counties was in place, he emphasized more of the problems of this system that were critical then. Gu claims that under this system, emperors always think that their territories are not large enough. An emperor does not trust his local officials. The emperor would like to regulate every detail of the local officials. Thus there would be more paperwork and regulations. Then the government agency becomes too large to be effective. The mayors of local counties constantly worry whether they will break or have broken any rules, instead of how to serve the people well. Gu believes that under this system, people have become poorer and the state has become weaker. There is no way out of this dreaded situation without changing the system.4 According to Gu, the solution for this situation is to increase the power of the county mayors. They should have financial and administrative power. For example, an emperor should give county mayors the power of collecting taxes and appointing local lower-ranking government officials, which was allowed in the feudal system of dukes. Gu argues that the central government should abolish the governmental agencies that spy on local mayors.

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The central government should also allow mayors with great achievement to pass their positions to their competent descendants. Furthermore, there should be alternatives in electing mayors, rather than just through exams.5 All these measures are supported by the argument that the division of powers in the feudal system of dukes should be introduced to the system of counties. Gu is confident that the emperors would endorse his view as long as they want a powerful country. Gu’s idea of the division of power is quite different from the kind in a liberal democracy. The system of checks and balances in modern democracy is on the horizontal level, but Gu’s division of power is more vertical. In Gu’s ideal, the regional governments share power with the central government. But on the horizontal level, there are no checks and balances inside the local governmental agencies. However, his proposal is innovative and significant compared to the dominant system of counties implemented at that time. The following discussion explains why. First of all, Gu’s idea of the division of power is motivated by his view of human nature. Gu believes that humans are selfish. Everyone works for themself. In contrast, the system of counties is based on the idea that everyone should work for an emperor, the representative of the public good. In the system of counties, the whole nation actually works for the royal families. For example, during the Tang Dynasty people worked for the Li royal family; during the Song Dynasty people worked for the Zhao royal family; and during the Ming Dynasty people worked for the Zhu royal family. Although those royal families established political orders in the name of national interests, in reality they only worked for their own familial interests. They endorsed Confucianism, especially Mengzi’s idea of a good human nature. They condemned the view that human beings by nature are selfish and that it is good to be selfish. But Gu argues that everyone should love their family partially. We should recognize that it is natural and even normative to love one’s family partially. Gu believes that ancient sage kings did not forbid or condemn but encouraged this partial love. The sage kings divided the land, awarded it to the dukes, and finally established the “sage king government.” This sage king government motivates the dukes to serve the good of the nation by letting them pursue their own legitimate interests.6 According to Gu, what sage kings did was not to teach people to be selfless. What motivates Gu’s political reforms is a different theory of human nature from the one that underlies the system of counties. Second, Gu’s proposal for the division of power includes the distinction between management of the local governments and ownership of the central government. He proposes that a mayor (zhixian, 知县) not only should be given more power of management and be promoted from the political rank of the seventh level to the fifth level, but also be given a new name: the commander of the county (xianlin, 县令). Furthermore, every three years there would be an assessment of the achievement of any commanders. Gradually, the commander would have autonomy of management. Finally, the commander’s position can be passed on to his capable descendants. It was believed that this tenure system

48 Striving for democracy could motivate the commander to be more responsible for the welfare of the public. The commander could lease the mining rights, which would increase local revenue.7 For Gu, the commander is in a political contract with an emperor. Gu’s design definitely would cause new problems, such as creating space allowing separatist regimes. However, his design was meant to weaken the centralization of the system of counties. Finally, these political reforms come with his proposal to reform the imperial exam. He suggests that the imperial exam should not be the only way to select governmental officials. It should be accompanied by other alternatives, such as what was practiced during the Han Dynasty (202 BCE – 220 CE), that is, candidates for political positions could be recommended by the public. Another alternative is to select officials based on certain talents, such as public speaking, calligraphy, and legal knowledge. This method was practiced in the Tang Dynasty (618–907 CE).8 Both alternatives would avoid the limitation of one single exam to determine the candidacy for political positions. Furthermore, it might motivate some scholars who do not have these talents to pursue other career tracks, such as teaching. If being a politician were the only recognized career track for scholars, then it would be a waste for those scholars who do not have politically relevant talents to pursue this career track. Overall, I believe that Gu’s proposal of political reforms is to alleviate the monopoly of powers in the system of counties. His proposal also implies a new political ideal. This ideal shares some similarity with modern liberal democracy, which is to recognize the importance of the division of powers. To some extent, Gu’s proposal can be seen as a 17th century Chinese appeal to liberal democracy.

4.2 Huang Zongxi’s political ideal and the prototype of Chinese liberal democracy Compared to Gu’s proposal of political reforms, Huang Zongxi elaborates a more comprehensive and intensive criticism against monarchy. Huang is the first Chinese philosopher to propose a clear democratic ideal. He argues that promoting people’s well-being is the only aim of political activities. He further argues that the rise and fall of different dynasties has nothing to do with the aim or essence of politics.9 How is this political ideal different from the traditional idea that the people are the root of a country (minben, 民本)? I believe that there are five differences. First of all, Huang proposes a new political arrangement that would establish a new type of relationship between the emperor and his ministers. From the viewpoint of the division of power, the emperor and his ministers are equal. They all serve the people. However, the traditional idea that the people are the root of a country takes the people as the only means to keep the country at peace. The end is the stability of the country. The emperor and his ministers are not equal. The emperor has an absolute power that cannot be challenged by the ministers. However, Huang believes that since the country is so big and the population so

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large, one man cannot rule it all. The division of power is necessary. Furthermore, Huang uses a metaphor to describe the relationship between the emperor and the ministers that all of them are pulling a log forward. The emperor and the ministers are all working to move the log forward. There is only a difference in division of labor.11 Thus Huang believes that the traditional metaphor of a father and sons is not the right way to capture the relationship. Huang perceives the relationship from the aim of serving the people. If a minister resigns from his position, then he is like a stranger to the emperor without any further duty to serve. If a scholar who holds a political position does not serve the public, then he is merely a servant for the emperor. However, if he is to serve the public, then he is either a teacher or a friend to the emperor.12 What Huang proposes about the relationship between the emperor and the ministers is quite different from the traditional idea that people are the root of the country. Second, Huang argues that there is a difference between public law and private law. Public law refers to the law made by the people. Private law refers to law made by an emperor. Furthermore, Huang argues that public law should replace private law. Huang believes that public law should regulate the following aspects of life: farming, herding, schooling, marriage, and taxation. The spirit of law cannot be shown by private law. Huang criticizes that, since the Qing and Han Dynasty’s establishment of the system of counties, there has been no real law. All the laws practiced were made by and for royal families.13 Third, Huang proposes that a prime minister (zaixiang, 宰相) should be reinstated to assist the emperor or even to substitute for the emperor. The reasoning is that since the existence of the emperor is to manage the public affairs of the whole country, which cannot be handled by just one man, extra positions should be established. Thus, various political positions are set up as deputies of the emperor. An emperor is only one public official among others. There is no barrier between him and other public officials. He can even be replaced. An emperor is more of a symbol of the highest power. Thus, in Huang’s political design, a prime minister is different from the traditional one who has to obey the emperor unconditionally. A prime minister should be equal to the emperor and can replace the emperor and carry out the executive power if the emperor is incompetent.14 Huang’s political design is not compatible with the traditional idea that the emperor as the son of Heaven has absolute power over everything. In the historical context, since the founding emperor of the Ming Dynasty abolished the position of the prime minister, all the political officials reported to the emperor, which resulted in a monopoly of power. Furthermore, in political practice the emperor cannot handle the management by himself, and a few corrupted ministers or persons close to the emperor would dominate the power, as in the eunuch period of the Ming Dynasty. Huang proposes that the prime minister should be given more power so that the power does not fall into the hands of royal relatives or royal servants. Since royal relatives and servants lack political knowledge or training, they would not act in the interests of the country. Rather, they would act according to the interest of the emperor or even their own interests. Thus the government becomes a tool for a group of people to

50 Striving for democracy gain benefits for themselves. Huang points out that, if the prime minister can work with the emperor, the emperor does not need to deal with public affairs alone. To some extent, the power of the emperor is weakened or divided.15 This political design is very similar to what happens in constitutional monarchies of some early modern European countries. Fourth, Huang argues that the function of schools should be expanded and that schools should also be made into training places for politicians. The emperors and various political officials should be intellectually educated and culturally informed. What the emperor affirms is not necessarily right. Thus the emperor should leave judgments to places like schools, where scholars can discuss and debate. Obviously, this design is very different from the reality that the emperor determines right or wrong. Huang even suggests that the emperor should go to listen to the critics from the royal academy. Political officials should do the same thing.16 Huang’s proposal can be traced back to the traditional idea that local schools should participate in local politics. But according to Huang, the political involvement of schools should be more extensive. This political design might strengthen the political function of schools, but could jeopardize the academic independence of schools from politics. After all, schools are supposed to be neutral with regard to political standings. Fifth, Huang suggests that there should be different methods to select political officials. Royal exams cannot be the only way. Recommendations and other methods should be included. Furthermore, the government should also employ those with special talents and strong commitments to serve the country.17 Overall, Huang’s political design is quite different from the traditional idea that the emperor holds absolute power. Huang believes that the purpose of a government is for the good of the people.

4.3 Wang Fuzhi’s political ideal of “Gong Tian Xia” (the good of the country, 公天下) With regard to criticism of the monopoly of power in the system of counties, Wang Fuzhi shares a similar view with Gu Yanwu and Huang Zongxi. Wang criticizes King Wen of the Zhou Dynasty (1152–1106 BCE) who was well respected by Confucians. Wang points out that the Xia Dynasty and Shang Dynasty both had the position of the prime minister. But, starting with King Wen of Zhou Dynasty, the position of the prime minister was abolished and absolute monarchy in China began.18 Wang argues that we have to split the power of the emperor. Wang proposes the political ideal of “gong tian xia” (the good of the country). His principle is that the well-being of the people is more important than the power of a royal family. This principle is similar to Huang Zongxi’s idea that the well-being of a country depends on the life of the people rather than the power of a royal family. Wang also compares the system of counties with the feudal system of dukes. He argues that the system of counties is much better than the feudal system of dukes with regard to the good of the country. However, Wang

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also points out that since the system of counties assumes the monopoly of the emperor, it is not good for the well-being of the people. Furthermore, the length of reign of a royal family has nothing to do with whether the people are cared for. Wang believes that the first emperor of the Qin Dynasty (259–210 BCE) was overthrown because the royal family merely wanted to pass its power to descendants. However, many royal families afterwards did not see the reason that the Qin royal family failed.19 Wang argues that the good of the people should be the only criterion of political legitimacy. However, with regard to how to restrain the power of the emperor, Wang’s view is different from Gu’s and Huang’s. Huang argues that the emperor and the ministers should share power and suggests that a senior minister can even carry out the executive power when the emperor is incompetent. Wang disagrees. He proposes that the position of the emperor should be more like a symbol of power and that a set of laws and regulations are the basis for governmental policies to be made and carried out. Wang even argues that the early sage kings were humble and did not use power to dominate. They acted according to the spirit of Daoism, wuwei (无为), and letting the ministers do their jobs according to various regulations and laws.20 So the political institution and the set of laws and regulations are the key to a good government. Wang also proposes that there are three ways to transfer the power of the emperor: inheritance, recommendation, and revolution. He points out that when the security of the nation is at stake, those who can defend it should be leaders so the nation does not fall into the hands of foreigners.21 With regard to how to balance powers, based on his research of Chinese political history, Wang proposes that the emperor, the prime minister, and the counselors should form the core of the government. According to Wang, they have different duties. The duty of the emperor is to appoint the prime minister. If the prime minister is incompetent, then the emperor can determine whether to discharge him. And the counselors are supposed to point out the mistakes made by the emperor, rather than by the prime minister. And the prime minister should weigh in on significant issues, such as national security and important appointments of positions. Counselors can participate in the deliberation of less significant issues.22 Thus, with regard to the balance of power, Wang makes a different proposal from Huang’s and Gu’s. Overall, the emperor appoints the prime minister; the prime minister appoints counselors; and the counselors evaluate the political performance of the emperor. Wang believes this arrangement of the balance of power can keep the government stable. Compared to Huang’s proposal, Wang’s idea of the balance of power is less radical. It is much closer to the traditional political setup of the Tang Dynasty. Compared to Gu’s proposal that to increase the power of the mayors of counties is a way to balance power vertically, Wang’s idea is to balance power horizontally on the highest level. However, all of their ideas are to balance power and concur with the spirit of modern liberal democracy. Their proposals present different alternatives for early Chinese democratic ideals. In fact, Gu and Huang in their time communicated with each other about their political ideals, but Wang

52 Striving for democracy did not participate. However, they all targeted the problems of the system of counties. Besides thoughts on the balance of power, Wang also discusses the issue of land property rights. Wang argues that property rights to land should be protected. The replacement of one royal family by another one cannot affect people’s property rights to the land since the land was not given by the new emperor.23 Thus people’s property rights are immune from political change. This is a huge challenge to the idea that the land is owned by the royal government under the system of counties. This idea is similar to what modern philosophers hold about the legitimacy of private property.

4.4 Political thought of the middle Qing period and the modern transformation of Confucian political thought Even under the tight literary inquisition during Emperor Qianlong’s rule of the Qing Dynasty (1711–1799), the philosopher Yuan Mei compared the system of counties and the feudal system of dukes and pointed out a direction to modern democracy. With regard to political reforms, Yuan Mei’s proposal is close to Gu’s idea. Yuan argues that the system of counties does not carry out the ancient sages’ idea of “the good of the country,” but the feudal system of dukes does a better job. Here is Yuan’s argument: since the emperor cannot govern the country by himself, as ancient sages pointed out, in the system of dukes, the dukes would share the power with the emperor and serve the country better. As there are many dukes, they would challenge and even overthrow any emperor who is incompetent and corrupted.24 Furthermore, Yuan argues for the feudal system of dukes from the perspective of personal liberty. First of all, Yuan argues that the feudal system of dukes would prevent a corrupted emperor from abusing power since the dukes share some of the power. A local riot against a duke would not jeopardize the stability of the whole country. But it would in the system of counties, as in the peasant riot against the Qin Dynasty that rapidly overthrew that dynasty.25 Second, under the feudal system of dukes, scholars have more freedom. What Kongzi, Mengzi, and other early Chinese philosophers achieved was during the time of feudal dukes. If a scholar is not welcomed or valued by one duke, he could move and make proposals to another duke. This is what Kongzi and Mengzi did in their times. However, under the system of counties, the standard examination is implemented nationwide. If a scholar fails this exam a couple times, he would not be given credentials to move to another county and find a job there. Therefore, under the feudal system of dukes, scholars would have more space to exercise their capacities.26 Yuan shares many arguments with Gu. But Yuan has some distinct views. For example, Yuan perceives the space for scholars to exercise their capacities as intrinsically valuable. He believes that the diversity of professionals is also

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good in itself. Yuan’s view is compatible with the value of diversity in modern society.

4.5 Conclusion I believe that what Gu, Huang, Wang, and Yuan argue about their political ideals and designs are far from liberal democracy. They sometimes do not agree with each other. However, what I have explained so far is ignored by many philosophers. They miss the significance of these four thinkers’ expectation of political modernization in China. These four thinkers should not be perceived as classical Confucians, such as the New Confucians during the Song Dynasty and Ming Dynasty. However, they are still Confucians and inspired by Confucianism. Therefore, I believe that Confucian political thought has the potential to contribute to modernization in China. During the 17th, 18th, and 19th centuries there was no Western political democracy in theory or practice developed from Confucian tradition. However, this does not imply that during these three centuries, no Chinese political democracy, at least in ideas, emerged from the Confucian tradition. Probably due to this newly emerged thought, many Confucian scholars during the transition from the Qing Dynasty to the Republic of China endorsed Western political democracy. The political reform launched by Kang Youwei and Liang Qichao was a trial as a result of this endorsement. Even if it did not last long and finally failed, it marked the official beginning of the pursuit of real political democracy. It is still going on today.

Notes 1 Dai Zhen (戴震), “The Original Good” (原善), The Complete Works of Dai Zhen (Dai Zhen Quan Ji, 戴震全集), vol. 2, Beijing: Tsinghua University Press (Qing Hua Da Xue Chu Ban She, 清华大学出版社), 1999, 27. 2 Qian Daxin (钱大昕), “The Original Filial Piety” (原孝), in Qian Yan Tang Ji (潜研 堂集), vol. 2, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Press (Shang Hai Gu Ji Chu Ban She, 上海古籍出版社), 1989, 281. 3 Gu Yanwu (顾炎武), “On Counties” (郡县论一), in Gu Ting Lin Shi Wen Ji (顾亭林 诗文集), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1983, 12. 4 Gu Yanwu, “On Counties,” 12. 5 Gu Yanwu, “On Counties,” 12. 6 Gu Yanwu (顾炎武), “Yan Si Qi Cong” (言私其豵), in Ri Zhi Lu (日知录), Changsha: Yue Lu Press (Yue Lu Chu Ban She, 岳麓书社), 1994, 92. 7 Gu Yanwu, “On Counties,” 17. 8 Gu Yanwu, “On Counties,” 17. 9 Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲), “Yuan Chen” (原臣), The Complete Works of Huang Zongxi (Huang Zong Xi Quan Ji, 黄宗羲全集), vol. 1, Hangzhou: Zhejiang Ancient Books Press (Zhe Jiang Gu Ji Chu Ban She, 浙江古籍出版社), 1985, 5. 10 Huang Zongxi, “Yuan Chen,” 5. 11 Huang Zongxi, “Yuan Chen,” 5. 12 Huang Zongxi, “Yuan Chen,” 5.

54 Striving for democracy 13 Huang Zongxi, “Yuan Fa” (原法), The Complete Works of Huang Zongxi, vol. 1, 6–8. 14 Huang Zongxi, “Yuan Fa,” 8. 15 Huang Zongxi, “Yuan Fa,” 9. 16 Huang Zongxi, “Xue Xiao” (学校), The Complete Works of Huang Zongxi, 10. 17 Huang Zongxi, “Xue Xiao,” 10. 18 Wang Fuzhi (王夫之), “Shang Shu Yin Yi” (尚书引义), The Complete Works of Wang Fuzhi (Wang Fu Zhi Quan Ji, 王夫之全集), vol. 5, book 2, Changsha: Yue Lu Press (Yue Lu Chu Ban She, 岳麓书社), 1996, 397. 19 Wang Fuzhi, “Du Tong Jian Lun” (读通鉴论), The Complete Works of Wang Fuzhi, vol. 1, book 10, 68. 20 Wang Fuzhi, “Du Tong Jian Lun,” 474. 21 Wang Fuzhi, “Huangshu Yuanji Di Yi” (黄书原极第一), The Complete Works of Wang Fuzhi, vol. 1, book 12, 503. 22 Wang Fuzhi, “Song Lun” (宋论), The Complete Works of Wang Fuzhi, vol. 4, book 11, 121–122. 23 Wang Fuzhi, “E Meng” (恶梦), The Complete Works of Wang Fuzhi, book 12, 551. 24 Yuan Mei (袁枚), “Shu Liu Zi Feng Jian Lun Hou” (书柳子封建论后), in Xiao Cang Shan Fang Shi Wen Ji (小仓山房诗文集), book 3, Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Press (Shang Hai Gu Ji Chu Ban She, 上海古籍出版社), 1988, 1634–1636. 25 Yuan Mei, “Shu Liu Zi Feng Jian Lun Hou,” 1636. 26 Yuan Mei, “Zai Shu Feng Jian Lun Hou” (再书封建论后), in Xiao Cang Shan Fang Shi Wen Ji, book 3, 1638.

Part II

5

Laozi’s view of harmony and the ideal of social justice

In the history of Chinese political thought, Daoism came up with its own unique philosophy on the question of social harmony. Early Daoist thinkers condemned war, tyranny, technology, and the usage of advanced weapons. They required that rulers should obey social laws, value highly people’s life and property, and provide a peaceful environment for the people to settle down and enjoy their work. Laozi’s political philosophy of “esteeming Dao and honoring virtue” and concrete political strategy of “honoring softness,” “respecting frugality,” and “valu[ing] deep love” are valuable intellectual resources to maintain peace in contemporary world. Laozi states that the fundamental mark of whether human beings have wisdom is whether they realize the value of “he” (和, harmony). He says, “To know harmony means to be in accord with the eternal. To be in accord with the eternal means to be enlightened.”1 Laozi in chapter 55 of the Dao De Jing uses examples from daily life to describe what harmony is like. He says, when you look at an innocent child, he may cry all day but his body does not show any sign of discomfort. This is because his heart-mind is in a state of natural peace. If one realizes the value of such an extreme state of harmony, one can understand the eternal principle, and thereupon one has wisdom. If people care too much about the nourishment of life and longevity, that might on the contrary lead to disaster. Therefore Laozi says, “For the mind to employ the vital force without restraint means violence.” Namely, this way violates the basic rule of harmony, and only accelerates one’s decline and death. Just like Confucius’s “valuing harmony” requires that the rules of rituals be observed, Laozi’s “valuing harmony” has its own fundamental principle, which is “esteeming Dao and honoring virtue.” Only when Dao is esteemed and virtue honored, can social harmony and justice be realized.

5.1 “Ten thousand things esteem Dao and honor virtue”: Laozi’s theory of Dao and natural justice In Laozi’s thought, although Dao is not a metaphysical concept that could be sufficiently articulated by language, as Laozi says in chapter 1, “The Dao that can be told of is not the eternal Dao”; the notion of Dao contains ideas of

58 Laozi’s view of harmony and social justice harmony, rightness, justice, fairness, order, tolerance, and modesty. The Dao that cannot be fully told of, as the abstract, original Dao, represents the origin of ten thousand things, and the totality of Heaven, earth and ten thousand things. Therefore, language could not clearly define Dao in this sense. However, as an ideal political principle for the society of human beings, “Dao” (or the “Dao of Heaven”) represents harmony, peace, and fairness. As Laozi says, “The Way of Heaven reduces whatever is excessive and supplements whatever is insufficient.”2 It is an early expression of the ideal of social fairness. Such an ideal could be considered natural justice. Laozi holds that Dao has positive value to everyone. “It is the good man’s treasure, and the bad man’s refuge.”3 Laozi believes that although Dao is formless and abstract, and seems to be humble and insignificant, yet there is nothing in the world that could master it (chapter 32). Those dukes that have potentiality to become a king and rule all-under-heaven should follow the rules of Dao. Although it seems that Dao takes no action, there is nothing left undone (chapter 37). If a duke could follow the rule of Dao, ten thousand things under the Heaven would automatically find their proper place, and follow his leadership. Laozi even says that if the dukes hold on to Dao, the spiritual beings would not reveal their supernatural power (chapter 60). In the late Zhou Dynasty, the common ideology was the belief in God in Heaven and spiritual beings, Laozi’s theory of “esteeming Dao and honoring virtue” was indeed a “philosophical breakthrough” as Karl Jaspers described. In Laozi’s philosophy, there is the element of trusting rationality and relegating the importance of spiritual beings. Moreover, it contains a profound spirit of tolerance. Laozi was aware of the conflicts that would take place when human beings all sought their own profits. Laozi was aware of the phenomenon of “growing desire after transformation” (chapter 37), and he came up with the solution that “I would restrain them with simplicity, which has no name.”4 The “simplicity that has no name” is another expression or descriptive phrase of the concept of Dao. In our experience, water embodies the characteristics of Dao the best. Laozi praises water for its wisdom that it is good at benefitting ten thousand things but does not compete with them, and dwells in the lowly places that all dislike and disdain, therefore the virtue of water is close to Dao (chapter 8). Laozi praises water in order to tell the rulers that they should be good at benefitting the people without competing with them or exacting profits from them, treating the people humbly, just like the great oceans and rivers embrace the water from all brooks. Laozi’s doctrine of non-action is not a simple negation of any actions of the rulers. It only admonishes the rulers to learn from the great sages in the history, making great political contributions without antagonizing the people. Therefore, Laozi admonishes the great ministers: He who assists the ruler with Tao does not dominate the world with force. The use of force usually brings requital. Wherever armies are stationed, briers and thorns grow. Great wars are always followed by famines.5

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Laozi thinks that a wise politician should not be misguided by the wrong opinion that a good government relies on advanced weapons. Those politicians who like good weapons might potentially have relish for killing people. Therefore, Laozi remarks negatively on war, Fine weapons are instruments of evil. They are hated by men. Therefore those who possess Tao turn away from them. The good ruler when at home honors the left [symbolic of good omens]. When at war he honors the right [symbolic of evil omens]. Weapons are instruments of evil, not the instruments of a good ruler. When he uses them unavoidably, he regards calm restraint as the best principle. Even when he is victorious, he does not regard it as praiseworthy, For to praise victory is to delight in the slaughter of men. He who delights in the slaughter of men will not succeed in the empire.6 Laozi strongly condemns wars, and requires that rulers should learn the way to kindly benefit the people and rule society in a peaceful way. He especially warns the politicians that it is definitely infeasible to use force in order to realize one’s own political ideal. Laozi’s profound political wisdom of valuing harmony and peace deserves to be remembered and reflected upon over and over again by contemporary politicians in different countries.

5.2 “Heaven’s way is indeed like the bending of a bow, when [the string] is high, bring it down”7: the question of fairness and justice in society Laozi sometimes uses “Heaven’s Dao” instead of “Dao,” through his extolment of “Heaven’s Dao,” he praises the fairness in the society, and the political virtue of the politicians who do not compete with the people for profits. In chapter 77, in order to express the ideal of social fairness, Laozi compares Heaven’s Dao with the Dao of humans, namely, the policies of the rulers in Laozi’s time. He says: Heaven’s Way is indeed like the bending of a bow. When [the string] is high, bring it down. When it is low, raise it up. When it is excessive, reduce it. When it is insufficient, supplement it. The Way of Heaven reduces whatever is excessive and supplements whatever is insufficient. The way of man is different. It reduces the insufficient to offer to the excessive.8

60 Laozi’s view of harmony and social justice By the last sentence, Laozi means the phenomenon that in human society the rulers exact tax from the people while the people starve to death. The reason why the people do not fear death and revolt violently against the rulers is that the rulers care about the nourishment of their own life too much, and the ornament of their imperial courts, till the national granaries are all empty, and the fields are exceedingly weedy. He warns the rulers: When the people do not fear of what is dreadful, Then what is greatly dreadful will descend on them. Do not reduce the living space of their dwellings. Do not oppress their lives. It is because you do not oppress them that they are not oppressed. Therefore the sage knows himself but does not show himself. He loves himself but does not exalt himself. Therefore he rejects the one but accepts the other.9 In chapter 73 and chapter 81, he praises “Heaven’s Dao” in order to express his yearning for the virtue that a ruler should have, namely, a virtue of not competing with people for profits. He says: The Way of Heaven does not compete, and yet it skillfully achieves victory. It does not speak, and yet it skillfully responds to things. It comes to you without your invitation. It is not anxious about things and yet it plans well. Heaven’s net is indeed vast. Though its meshes are wide, it misses nothing.10 Laozi also urges people to pursue good virtue by the extolment of “Heaven’s Dao” that “The Way of Heaven has no favorites, It is always with the good man”.11 With the very concise five thousand words, Laozi shows his strong philosophical concern for political reality in his discussions on social fairness and the policies that can benefit the people, based on the notion of “Heaven’s Dao.”

5.3 Politics of virtue and the ideal society of “small country and few people” Laozi projects his ideal of society to a golden age in remote antiquity when the great Dao prevails in the world. He says, “When the great Dao declined, the doctrines of humanity [ren] and righteousness [yi] arose.”12 “Only when Dao is lost does the doctrine of virtue arise.”13 Namely, when the Dao was not lost or declining, human society was in a state of ideal order. What was it like in this golden age? Laozi says, “The best (rulers) are those whose existence is (merely) known by the people.” In this age, people only knew that there was someone responsible for the government, but they did not feel any burden from

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them. This is what Zhuangzi later called “the age of great virtue.” This ideal of political philosophy in pre-Qin Daoism has some affinity with modern liberalist ideal of democracy in which the power of government is reduced to only the necessary in order to revive the creativity of society. In Laozi’s ideal of the government of the highest virtue, rulers do not claim themselves to be a benefactor for the people. Laozi says, “The man of superior virtue is not [conscious of] his virtue, and in this way he really possesses virtue.”14 A ruler that possesses virtue should be like an ideal sage who does not reconcile conflicts without principle. Laozi says, “To patch up great hatred is surely to leave some hatred behind. How can this be regarded as good? Therefore the sage keeps the left-hand portion [obligation] of the contract, and does not blame the other party.”15 The left-hand portion of a contract symbolizes the power of the rulers, but the ideal rulers does not levy tax at will. The blueprint of an ideal society of “small country and few people” drawn by Laozi is best articulated in chapter 80 of Dao De Jing, Let there be a small country with few people. Let there be ten times and a hundred times as many utensils But let them not be used. Let the people value their lives highly and not migrate far. Even if there are ships and carriages, none will ride in them. Even if there are armor and weapons, none will display them. Let the people again knot cords and use them [in place of writing]. Let them relish their food, beautify their clothing, be content with their homes, and delight in their customs. Though neighboring communities overlook one another and the crowing of cocks and barking of dogs can be heard, Yet the people there may grow old and die without ever visiting one another.16 This blueprint of an ideal society might seem to be against development of civilization. However, what it expresses is a yearning for an ideal harmonious society in which people live in a peaceful life and enjoy their work, without war or any weapons. In this ideal society, apart from the suggestion that “Let the people again knot cords and use them [in place of writing]” and that “the people there may grow old and die without ever visiting one another,” as well as not using ships and carriages, which are not compatible with modern life, other suggestions contain the political ideals and the vision of peaceful and harmonious life that are still meaningful for contemporary world, for at least the four following reasons. First, Laozi advises that the organization of a country as a human society should be small and not populous. Nowadays, those countries that own nuclear weapons are mostly great countries. The population explosion in many countries nowadays is a serious problem, energy resources will soon be in short supply.

62 Laozi’s view of harmony and social justice On the contrary, those small countries in the European Union such as Luxembourg would never wage war against other countries. Second, Laozi warns against the danger of owning machines of a large scale, including weapons that can cause enormous numbers of deaths, against the use of advanced means of transportation, and against making a show of advanced arms. Nowadays the number of nuclear weapons is sufficient to destroy human life on earth several times over. Car drivers consume oil, cause global warming, and destroy the ozone layer that protects life on earth. Third, Laozi emphasizes that the way of life and social custom should not harm our senses such as taste, and that it is important that people like such a way of life and customs. Nowadays, the excessive desire for eating and dressing up causes some people to eat rare animals and plants and to try strange clothes, but they are perplexed as to the view of what is truly beautiful. Though they live a wealthy and undisturbed life, they are restless in mind, and are not content with the environment of their life. Fourth, Laozi expresses the yearning for a self-sufficient life so that people need not leave their family and hometown for livelihood. There is a lament in the Huo Zhi Lie Zhuan (货殖列传, “Biography of Merchants”) in Shi Ji (史记, “Record of a Historian”) by Sima Qian (司马迁) that all people under Heaven come and go in all directions, but they all pursue the same goal of profit. Laozi’s wish that “the people there may grow old and die without ever visiting one another” actually expresses sympathy for those people who have to be always on the go for petty profits.

5.4 “A big country may be compared to the lower part of a river. It is the converging point of the world; it is the female of the world”: Laozi on the principle of diplomacy between states and its contemporary significance Born at the end of the Spring and Autumn period, Laozi came up with the general guiding principle for diplomacy between different states under the reign of the king of Zhou. He says, “A big country may be compared to the lower part of a river. It is the converging point of the world; It is the female of the world.” Namely, a great state should learn from the virtue of the great rivers and seas. They are content with the lowly place they dwell in and receive the water from small brooks and rivers. The converging point of rivers is just like the genitals of a female animal, which attracts the male to court for sexual favor. Why should rulers of the great states be like the female or the great rivers and seas? If the rulers of the great states could treat the small states humbly, they would gain their support. If the rulers of the small states could treat the great states humbly, they would be supported and accepted by the great states. The diplomatic end for the great states is nothing but to annex and herd the small states, and the diplomatic end for the small states is nothing but to gain support and protection from the great states. Both of them should make a humble gesture if they want to attain their goals. Especially the great states should be humble to

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win goodwill from other states. This principle, though originally meant to regulate diplomacy between the states under the reign of the king of Zhou, is nonetheless significant for contemporary diplomacy between different nation-states. Every great country nowadays should sincerely help the weak and small countries to win their trust. On the contrary, manipulation by force would not gain their support. To admonish those rulers of the great states who desired to obtain the power to rule all-under-Heaven, Laozi used the virtue of great rivers and seas (tolerance, broad-mindedness, modesty, and non-aggressiveness) and claimed that they should learn from them in order to win over the hearts of the people all under Heaven. He says, “The great rivers and seas are kings of all mountain streams, because they skillfully stay below them. That is why they can be their kings.”17 The society of human beings runs its own course that should not be interrupted or manipulated by individual wills. Laozi says: When one desires to take over the empire and act on it [interfere with it], I see that he will not succeed. The empire is a spiritual thing, and should not be acted on. He who acts on it harms it. He who holds on to it loses it. Laozi admonished the rulers that if they wanted to win the support of the people all under Heaven, they should esteem Dao and honor virtue. In the realm of senses, the Dao constantly has no name, though it seems humble and insignificant, there is no one in the world that can truly master it. “If kings and barons would hold on to it, all things would submit to them spontaneously.”18 Laozi also says, “Tao invariably takes no action, and yet there is nothing left undone. If kings and barons can keep it, all things will transform spontaneously.”19

5.5 Conclusion In traditional Chinese thought, Daoism represented by Laozi has rich resources for the theory of harmony, as well as for the pursuit of social fairness and natural justice. These could be a source of inspiration for the contemporary construction of a harmonious society. A harmonious society could not be without Dao or justice, otherwise, there could be the danger that “to patch up great hatred is surely to leave some hatred behind” which Laozi warns against. No matter within a country or internationally, only when Dao is observed can social harmony be truly realized. Laozi does not provide us with any concrete and definite method to realize harmony. His proposal to return to the original status of society, thought-provoking as it might be, is infeasible. Due to the defectiveness of human knowledge and virtue, on the way to ultimate peace and harmony, human society has to undergo a series of inharmonious processes. Human beings can get close to the ultimate ideal of “being in accord with Dao” only through certain periods of oscillation between that “being in accord with

64 Laozi’s view of harmony and social justice Dao” and departure from Dao. Laozi seems to be unaware of this dialectic. However, Laozi requires that we return to the origin and reflect: was all that we have already had necessary? Can we lead a simpler, healthier, and more dynamic life? Such is perhaps the everlasting charm of the Daoist political philosophy represented by Laozi.

Notes 1 Laozi (老子), Dao De Jing (道德经), ch. 55, in Wing-Tsit Chan, trans. & ed., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, 166. 2 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 77, 174. 3 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 77, 174. 4 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 37, 158. 5 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 30, 154. 6 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 31, 155. 7 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 77, 174. 8 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 77, 174. 9 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 72, 173. 10 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 73, 173. 11 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 79, 175. 12 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 18, 148. 13 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 38, 158. 14 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 38, 158. 15 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 79, 175. 16 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 80, 175. 17 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 66, 170. 18 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 32, 156. 19 Laozi, Dao De Jing, ch. 37, 158.

6

A new interpretation of “preserve great harmony in union, and the result is advantageous, correct, and firm” The relation between social fairness and utility in the “Commentaries on the Book of Changes”

For centuries, scholars of the Book of Changes have been focused on the metaphysics or the wisdom of how to comprehend the unchanging principle from changing phenomena. There is nothing wrong with such discussions, but this customary mode of thinking distracts us from appreciating the political wisdom of harmony. In fact, there is an abundant resource of thought in this topic to explore. In this chapter I focus on the proposition “preserve great harmony in union, and the result is advantageous, correct, and firm” (保合太和, 乃利贞), which I believe captures the quintessence of the political philosophy in the Book of Changes. Its basic meaning is that only when a social and political environment of harmony and peace is created, can all benefits that human beings have attained be fair, valid and sustainable. This is the most brilliant thought in the theory of great harmony in the Book of Changes. In fact, the silk manuscript Yi Zhi Yi (易之义, The Meaning of the Book of Changes) reads the Book of Changes as a book that highly appreciates harmony. It says: Heaven and earth operate together, vapor and smell affect each other, the confluence of yin and yang forms things. Firmness and softness together form … [a character is missing here]. All things strive for longer life and are disinclined to death. The author of the Book of Changes realized it and therefore wrote this book, such is the ultimate of harmony.1 Namely, the Book of Changes is here read as an expression of the highest wisdom of harmony. Therefore I am not alone in working in this orientation of interpretation. The contemporary world is characterized by economic and cultural globalization, but the shadow of the danger of nuclear war has never cleared up. How to establish a mode of economic development under the condition of social harmony is a challenge to philosophy, a challenge posed by contemporary human existence and the demands of development. I believe that the philosophy of the Book of Changes is a source of inspiration for us to develop a new philosophical idea,

66 Fairness, utility, and the Book of Changes namely, to regulate the economic development by the condition of legitimacy required by the “great harmony” (太和) of the social environment, to replace the model that prioritizes economic development (an economic model that has existed for a long time in modern capitalism) with a model that prioritizes social harmony.

6.1 “Preserve great harmony in union, and the result is advantageous, correct, and firm”: Yi Zhuan (“Commentaries on the Book of Changes”) on the relation between a harmonious political environment and social utility Zhou Yi (周易, the Book of Changes) contains two parts: Yi Jing (易经, “Classics of the Book of Changes”) and Yi Zhuan (易传, “Commentaries on the Book of Changes”). The Yi Jing was originally an ancient book of divination used to foretell the future, determine uncertain things, and make decisions. Due to the limits of knowledge of nature, this book contains a lot of mystic elements. Yi Zhuan (易传) or “Commentaries on the Book of Changes” is a philosophical interpretation of the Book of Changes written by outstanding thinkers in the middle Warring States period. There must have been lots of works of interpretation of the Book of Changes, but the extant Yi Zhuan contains only 10 pieces of work. The sentence of “preserve great harmony in union, and the result is advantageous, correct, and firm” (保合太和, 乃利贞) comes from the Tuan Zhuan (彖传) of Qian (乾); it requires that people maintain a dynamic and peaceful social atmosphere, only then can the activity of seeking benefits be legitimate according to daoyi (道义, Dao and righteousness). This “great harmony” (太和) is not a gift from nature, but created by people who pursue peace. “Preserve in union” (保合) suggests that the people have the awareness to pursue peace and harmony. Therefore, the philosophy of the Book of Changes advocates an ideal of “great harmony” in the sense of “creating harmony.” Such is my contemporary interpretation of this sentence. In history there have been different interpretations of this sentence. Zhu Xi, the great philosophy in the Southern Song period, interprets it from the perspective both of natural philosophy and of social philosophy. He explains “great harmony” as “the harmonious and dynamic mixture of the qi of yin and yang,” and “preserve in union” as “protect the whole after [things are] born, which is the meaning of ‘advantageous, correct, and firm’.” Zhu Xi means that the dynamic, peaceful and harmonious qi created in an atmosphere after the mixture of yin and yang in the natural world. Before the sentence about great harmony in the Yi Zhuan, there is an expression “ge zheng xing ming” (各正性命, each has their correct nature and destiny). Zhu Xi believes that this means that all beings attain their own natural endowment at the moment they are born. “Preserve in union” describes the effort to attain the perfect state of all things after they were born, a state that is “advantageous, correct, and firm.”

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2

Liu Yuan (刘沅) of the Qing Dynasty distinguishes the Dao of Heaven and the Dao of humans in his interpretation of this sentence. He believes that: Qian Yuan [乾元, the origin of Qian] is the principle of Heaven, while ‘bao he tai he’ [保合太和, preserve in union the great harmony, and the result is advantageous, correct, and firm] is the Dao of how human beings should follow Heaven. This means that humans and animals all attain the Dao of Qian as their own nature and destiny. Only when they each rectify their own nature and destiny can [the great harmony] be preserved in union.3 Li Daoping李道平 gives a new account of this sentence. He says, “he (和, harmony) is li (利, profit/advantage), but the part of Qian (乾) in the Book of Changes does not speak of profit/advantage, therefore it uses the expression ‘great harmony’.”4 Namely, the great harmony itself is a profit; however, the Dao of Heaven is impartial, therefore in dealing with this topic people should not focus on profit, therefore here the author only mentions the great harmony. Wang Fuzhi, a great philosopher in the Ming–Qing transitional period, emphasizes the importance of the effort of human beings in preserving great harmony in union in his Zhou Yi Wai Zhuan (周易外传, “External Commentary on the Book of Changes”). He says, “preserving in union” is meant to attain “the great harmony.” Without such effort, some occasional qi would slip in and cause surplus or deficiency. Wen (文, ornament) means to make up for the deficiency, jie (节, moderation) means to reduce the surplus. When both are done, then rituals and music will prevail, and the ultimate of centeredness and harmony will be established.5 Wang Fuzhi considers utility, fame, and position as results that will necessarily follow the virtue of great harmony, as he says, “utility and accomplishment pertain to the result that will necessarily be attained through the virtue of the great harmony; attaining a social position pertains to the result that will necessarily follow the transformation of the great harmony.”6 In the Zhou Yi Nei Zhuan (周易内传, “Internal Commentary on the Book of Changes”), Wang Fuzhi develops his thoughts. He writes: By its virtue of persevering positive strong power, Qian (乾) rules the transformation of qi and prevails in all things in four seasons. All things follow their own paths. Although there are various ways of change and transformation, all things regard the Dao of Qian as the great rectitude. The nature and destiny of all kinds of things form the respective rules for things, so that things do not harm or run counter to each other, and the strong and the weak protect each other to fit with each other, so as to coexist in the great harmony, such is why zhen (贞, correctness and firmness) could lead to li (利, advantage/profit), and all li are zhen.7

68 Fairness, utility, and the Book of Changes According to Wang Fuzhi, fair social circumstances will benefit the people, and on the other hand, an action of securing one’s own profit through a fair way is an expression of social justice. Wang Fuzhi believes that a wise ruler should learn from the sage, because the sage can learn from the law of the Dao of Heaven that ensures all things grow and attain their proper places harmoniously and in a reciprocal way. Just as Wang Fuzhi says: From sincerity to enlightenment is a process of learning, in which one observes the proper way of each thing every minute from the beginning to the end, and makes sure that such observation does not err, and realizes that from youth to old age, every time in every change there is a proper correctness which benefits all things but is unknown to them. All things coexist and grow together between Heaven and earth, such is the great function of the heavenly wheel of the great harmony, and all is li (利, advantage/profit) and zhen (贞, correct/firm).8 From the text quoted above, it is evident that most traditional Chinese philosophers’ interpretation of the sentence “preserve great harmony in union, and the result is advantageous, correct, and firm” use the Dao of Heaven as a model to discuss the norms of the activities of human beings in their pursuit of profit. Few of them realize that the purpose of political activities is to create a harmonious social atmosphere, so as to ensure fairness and sustainability in the pursuit of profit. Wang Fuzhi realized this, due to his experience of the political disorder in the Ming–Qing transitional period and the trauma it caused human beings. Therefore, he stresses the awareness to actively preserve great harmony in union in his interpretation of Yi Zhuan. Wang Fuzhi’s thought is an important resource for us to reflect on the positive meaning of world peace to the economic and social development of human beings in the age of globalization. Based on Wang Fuzhi’s view, I propose to interpret the sentence in the sense that only when every member of a human society finds a proper place in the society, making a truly harmonious coexistence, can all profits of human society be fair and sustainable. The praise of Heaven by the author of Yi Zhuan is meant to create a norm for an ideal king. Heaven as the head of all beings operates impartially and harmoniously, so that ten thousand states are all at peace, such is the ideal of the Dao of a king, expressed in the Yi Zhuan as “shou chu shu wu, wan guo xian ning” (首出庶物, 万国咸宁, the head rises above all things, and ten thousand states are at peace). In the “Wen Yan” (文言) of Yi Zhuan, the author extols Heaven for its characteristic of impartially facilitating the growth of all things. He says: (24) The “greatness” and “originating” represented by Qian refer to it as [the symbol of] what gives their beginning [to all things], and (also) secures their growth and development. (25) “The advantageousness and the correctness and firmness” refer to its nature and feelings [as seen in all the resulting things].

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(26) Qian, [thus] originating, is able with its admirable benefits to benefit all under the sky. We are not told how its benefits are conferred; but how great is [its operation]! (27) How great is [what emblematized by] Qian! – strong, vigorous, undeflected, correct, and (in all these qualities) pure, unmixed, exquisite! (28) The six lines, as explained [by the duke of Zhou], bring forth and display [its meaning], and everything about it is [thus] indirectly exhibited. (29) [Heaven] at the proper time drives with these six dragons through the sky. The clouds move, and the rain is distributed; all under Heaven enjoys repose.9

6.2 “How to gather people? By wealth”: elements of humanism in the economic philosophy of Yi Zhuan In the second half of the Xi Ci (系辞), the author comes up with two crucial questions: how to maintain a post and how to gather people. To these two questions, the author answers, to gather people through wealth, to maintain a post through the virtue of ren (仁, benevolence). Here, the political philosophy of the Book of Changes obviously has the characteristic of classical humanism. It implies that the aim of economic development is the gathering of the people, not a mere seeking of profit. This is quite different from the Western capitalist view that the aim of economic development is merely profit. The system of modern capitalist society, due to the fundamental transformation of the nature of production, has been unambiguously oriented to the seeking of high profits and production targets through competition, which leads to the devaluation of human beings. By contrast, the philosophy of the Book of Changes born out of ancient Chinese agricultural civilization has the element of classical humanism. Therefore, Cui Jin (崔觐),10 a scholar of the Book of Changes in the period of Northern and Southern Dynasties, explains the sentence of “how to gather people? By Wealth” that it means the following: Wealth and goods are what people desire, but it should be ensured that the desire for them should not harm yi (义, righteousness). Without the regulation of yi, wealth would be lost.11 This means that morality should be the prerequisite for sustainable economic activities. The major reason for the two World Wars in the 20th century was competition for resources for economic development. The invention of nuclear weapons changed the nature of war for human beings. Since the Cold War, nuclear deterrence has greatly reduced the possibility of future world war, but the plundering of resources all over the world guided by new technology, as well as the phenomenon of competition in the recruitment of skilled labor, has developed by leaps and bounds. Therefore, different solutions to the problems of how to

70 Fairness, utility, and the Book of Changes balance economic development and care for human nature, as well as how to set priorities, determine different modes of economic development. In the sentence “how to gather people? By wealth,” gather (ju, 聚) has the connotation of “to unite.” At first glance it seems to be stressing the importance of wealth, without which the unification of people might become impossible. Indeed, if we pay closer attention to this sentence, we find that the reverse is the case: wealth is meant to gather, connect, and unite people. Therefore, the end of using wealth is uniting people, and wealth is just a means for this end. When wealth is deficient, in order to unite people, more wealth should be created. However, it should be remembered that wealth is just a means to gather people, not an end in itself. The ultimate end of using wealth is the unification of the people. Therefore, to a great extent, the traditional Confucian distinction between yi (义righteousness) and li (利benefit/profit) is a requirement to the rulers that they should prioritize the justice of social rules over the accumulation of wealth in society. Just as The Great Learning says: Therefore the ruler will first be watchful over his own virtue. If he has virtue, he will have the people with him. If he has the people with him, he will have the territory. If he has the territory, he will have wealth. And if he has wealth, he will have its use. Virtue is the root, while wealth is the branch. If he regards the root as external [or secondary] and the branch as internal [or essential], he will compete with the people in robbing each other. Therefore, when wealth is gathered in the ruler’s hand, the people will scatter away from him; and when wealth is scattered [among the people], they will gather round him. Therefore if the ruler’s words are uttered in an evil way, the same words will be uttered back to him in an evil way; and if he acquires wealth in an evil way, it will be taken away from him in an evil way.12 We could say that there might be problems in Confucians’ maintaining of the principle of social justice, because the content of such justice assumes a certain hierarchy in society. However, it is nonetheless absolutely correct for the Confucians to maintain such a mode of thinking which requires that the rulers should prioritize social justice over profit, and that the government and officials should not compete with common people in accumulating wealth. Only on the foundation of social justice can a genuine harmony in society be secured. In fact, the lack of humanitarian care in early modern capitalism has been criticized by socialist thinkers born out of capitalist society. The 18th century utopian socialists and the classical Marxist thinkers all criticized with great moral enthusiasm the anti-humanitarian nature of modern capitalism, and projected social ideals of socialism and communism. Although these social ideals are to some extent utopian, they are consistent with the spirit of modern humanitarianism. The difference between the utopian and the Marxist thought is that the latter is supported by social science and emphasizes the importance of practice. However, due to the limitation of the times, classical Marxist thinkers did not consider

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social harmony as the prerequisite for a fair and sustainable economic development. On the contrary, they lived in an age when conflicts between classes had just become clear and severe in early capitalist society, and they came up with a theory of social revolution, calling on the exploited proletariat to unite together and fight against the unfair social system by force, and thereby forming the trend of socialist revolution all over the world. In the early and middle period of the 20th century, the socialist camp represented by the Soviet Union and China was formed. Under the guidance of the classical Marxist theory of revolution, workers’ struggle in capitalist society has forced it to readjust its economic policy, and caused the capitalist countries to transform from the “economic beasts” hunting greedily for profit to welfare states. However, the greed of capitalism has not been fundamentally transformed, but re-directed to the developing countries and areas, causing a great number of conflicts between nations all over the world. Therefore, modern capitalist economic development, despite adjustment, has not fundamentally changed its anti-humanitarian nature, which is most poignantly shown in the deterioration of the relationship between human beings and nature, of the relationship between human individuals and society, and in the mounting tension between mind and body. The earth is less and less suitable to inhabit, people feel more and more isolated, and the tension between mind and body is getting more and more discomforting. All these are the problems of the antihumanitarian nature of the mode of economic development of modern capitalism. Therefore, it is an intrinsic requirement of the development of human beings and human society to re-evaluate and propose a humanist ideal of modern economic development. This step is a rational continuation of the classical idealist and Marxist theory of social criticism. The tradition of the philosophy of the Book of Changes has repeatedly emphasized the priority of humanist values in economic development, and against economic activity that seeks nothing other than profit. Therefore, this tradition attaches importance to the rationality of the end of economic activities, and regards the nature of economic activities as the endeavor to unite society, an endeavor to “gather people,” rather than simply achieving any production target. There is a rich and profound resource of classical humanism to be explored. This idea found a similar expression in Laozi, the founder of Daoism. Laozi observes with wisdom the danger of negligence of the value of one’s own life due to seeking external profit and fame, Which does one love more, fame or one’s own life? Which is more valuable, one’s own life or wealth? Which is worse, gain or loss? Therefore he who has lavish desires will spend extravagantly. He who hoards most will lose heavily. He who is contented suffers no disgrace. He who knows when to stop is free from danger. Therefore he can long endure.13

72 Fairness, utility, and the Book of Changes Laozi condemned the rulers of his time for their relentless accumulation of wealth that causes great misery to the people. He commented: The people starve because the ruler eats too much tax-grain. Therefore, they starve. They are difficult to rule because their ruler does too many things. Therefore, they are difficult to rule. The people take death lightly because their ruler strives for life too vigorously. Therefore they take death lightly.14 Therefore, he called “Dao Kua” (道夸, robbery and extravagance) those phenomena in which the rulers gather wealth from the people for the ornament of the court and clothes of the rulers and disregard the suffering of the people, he wrote: The courts are exceedingly splendid, While the fields are exceedingly weedy, And the granaries are exceedingly empty. Elegant clothes are worn, Sharp weapons are carried, Foods and drinks are enjoyed beyond limit, And wealth and treasures are accumulated in excess. This is robbery and extravagance. This is indeed not Tao [the Way].15 Not only does the philosophy of the Book of Changes contain a humanistic economic theory that regards the unity of the people as the end of economic development; it also contains a philosophy of individual life that treats the complete development of human nature as the end. From this individual’s perspective, Yi Zhuan is also opposed to the way of life in which one pursues wealth regardless of one’s own life, and says, “when that application [of the knowledge of things] becomes the quickest and readiest, and all personal restfulness is secured, our virtue is thereby exalted.”16 This means that the pursuit of profit is meant to secure the restfulness of personal life, and thereby to perfect one’s virtue. The author of Yi Zhuan considers as xiao ren (小人, petty persons/small men) those who pursue profit to the negligence of ren (仁, benevolence), yi (义, righteousness), honesty, and shame, and quotes Confucius saying to condemn such disorder of priority in values. The master said: The small man is not ashamed of what is not benevolent, nor does he fear to do what is not righteous. Without the prospect of gain he does not stimulate himself to what is good, nor does he correct himself without being moved.17

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Other Confucians condemn the phenomenon of “using one’s self/body for money” (以身发财, an expression in The Great Learning), namely, the deed of securing money by consuming one’s own energy and risking one’s own life; and they advocate that one should “use money to prosper one’s self/body” (以 财发身), namely, to use wealth to fulfill a variety of needs for the complete development of human individuals.18 The sentence “how to gather people? By wealth” contains a profound humanistic element that not only was born out of its own historical background but also transcends it. From a historical point of view, “how to gather people” means how to attract more people and unite them so that a country could become more populous, and thereby more prosperous in economy. This is the requirement of historical conditions, because in ancient times the land was vast but sparsely populated. For our contemporary society, a profound humanistic economic philosophy could be extracted from the proposition of “how to gather people? By wealth” from the tradition of the philosophy of the Book of Changes. This proposition involves not only the question of how to attract talents but also, more importantly, how to motivate the heart of the people in the whole society so that they would endorse an ideal system of social institution. From this perspective, we can say that the classical Marxist thinkers’ utopia of communism still has a fascination of moral idealism, because in this ideal society “the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”19 The value of individuals and that of society are both esteemed, and the value of individuals is prior to social value and regarded as the starting point of theorization. In this sense, the ideal of communist society and that of liberalist society have something in common. The former has a requirement of human beings richer than the latter. The demand of liberalism is a minimum requirement, namely, the bottom line required for an ideal society to ensure basic liberty. By contrast, classical Marxists have a higher requirement on the basis of liberalism: it affirms not only individual liberty, but also the full development of a person after liberty has been ensured.

6.3 The dialectical relationship between social harmony and the fairness and sustainability of economic development: the contemporary significance of the proposition “preserve great harmony in union, and the result is advantageous, correct, and firm” Nowadays, on the basis of economic power and military force, international peace has become some sort of slogan of daoyi (Dao and righteousness). After the 1960s, with the formation of post-industrial society, the problem of global devastation of the eco-environment and the aggravation of regional conflicts force us to reflect on the problem of the mode of economic development. Especially the acceleration of the devastation of the eco-environment in developing countries precipitates reflection on the question of fairness and

74 Fairness, utility, and the Book of Changes sustainability of economic development. In order to solve the problems in reality, we always need to extract theoretical strength from ancient wisdom. I personally believe that the proposition “preserve great harmony in union, and the result is advantageous, correct, and firm” in the Yi Zhuan has given us a hint: the creation of a harmonious and peaceful social environment is the prerequisite for a fair and sustainable economic development. Without the former, the fairness of economic activity and the potential of sustainable development are all in doubt. Chinese traditional agricultural society attached importance to the harmony between human beings and nature, emphasizing mainly the adjustment of human activities to nature, for example, conducting economic activities according to the climate and other natural seasonal phenomena. Besides this, modern economic development has more complicated aspects, namely, on the one hand, it should observe the regulation of natural rules; on the other hand, it should fulfill the intrinsic requirement of human nature, so as to ensure the harmony between economic development and social harmony. This question was later developed and articulated in the history of Chinese philosophy as the debates over the distinction between yi (义, righteousness) and li (利, benefit/profit) in ethics, and that between wang (王, king) and ba (霸, despot) in politics.20 The yi/li distinction is about the question of economic ethics, namely, whether economic activities are in accord with moral requirements. Traditional Chinese people, especially Confucian thinkers, emphasized that one should pursue profit for the practitioners of business in a way in accord with moral requirements. This is the essence of the yi/li distinction. The distinction between king and despot is a question of the legitimacy of the use of political power. We call it the way of a despot, if a ruler who has great political power uses force to rule the people and to deal with other nations; the opposite is true if a ruler treats the people with benevolence and gains their trust and support, and other nations are attracted to him and are willing to live in peace with his nation. An element of the way of a king is to ensure that people gain profit. As the second half of Xi Ci (系辞) says, after Shen Nong Shi (神农氏) took over power from Bao Xi Shi (包栖氏) to rule all under Heaven, he cut down trees to teach people how to make agricultural tools. He stipulated midday as the time for markets, and brought together all the people to exchange their wares, and then return after they got what they wanted.21 Therefore, the ancient Chinese political ideal of the “way of a king” is a politics of harmony, benevolence, and liberty to which all people under the Heaven would be attracted. Mencius from the Warring States period admonished King Xuan of Qi: Now if you should practice benevolence in the government of your state, then all those in the Empire who seek office would wish to find a place at your court, all tillers of land to till the land in outlying parts of your realm, all merchants to enjoy the refuge of your market-place, all travellers to go by

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way of your roads, and all those who hate their rulers to lay their complaints before you. This being so, who can stop you from becoming a true King?22 Indeed, in the Yi Jing and Yi Zhuan, there are other words that attach importance to harmony, especially the hexagram of Tai(泰, peace). The Tai hexagram is comprised of the upper trigram Kun (坤) and the lower trigram (乾). It symbolizes the peace which is formed when the hard and strong is humble and stays in a lowly place under the soft and weak. The commentary entitled Tuan Zhuan (彖传) explains the Tai hexagram with the words: “Heaven and earth in communication with each other, and all things in consequence having free course, and [also] the high and the low, [superiors and inferiors,] in communication with one another, and possessed by the same aim.”23 And in such an ideal status, “the way of the superior man appears increasing, and that of the small man decreasing.”24 Thus a harmonious social situation will come. In such an ideal, between countries under Heaven there will be normal trade cooperation under fair principles, and all people will find the places they belong. This ultimate harmonious society involves the harmonious relationship between nature and human beings, ensuring a long and sustainable economic development.

6.4 Conclusion The Yi Zhuan contains thought on the relationship between peace in society and economic development. It inspires us to reflect on the following levels of thought: (1) How to develop the global economy and ensure that each nation benefits from it in the mode of peaceful trade cooperation? (2) How to construct a mode of economic development in which human beings and the eco-environment coexist harmoniously? (3) How to ensure a harmonious relationship between individuals and society, so that the end of economic development is the happiness of each person, not merely the increase of profit? (4) How to cultivate the harmony between mind and body in each person when material life has been improved, lest the latter has negative impact on human life? In a word, only when great harmony is preserved in union can all human activities of acquiring utility have legitamacy and positive value.

Notes 1 Chen Songzhang (陈松长) and Liao Mingchun (廖名春), “Decipherment and Interpretation of the Silk Manuscript ‘Er San Zi,’ ‘Yi Zhi Yi,’ ‘Yao’" (Bo Shu Er San Zi Wen, Yi Zhi Yi, Yao Shi Yi,《帛书、、释文》), in Chen Guying (陈鼓应), ed., Research on Daoist Culture (Dao Jia Wen Hua Yan Jiu, 《道家文化研究》第三辑), Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Press (Shang Hai Gu Ji Chu Ban She, 上海古籍出版社), 1993, 429. 2 A scholar in the period of Qianlong (乾隆), who wrote a book, Zhou Yi Heng Jie (周易恒解). 3 Ma Zhenbiao (马振彪), Doctrines of Zhou Xi (Zhou Yi Xue Shuo, 周易学说), ed. Zhang Shanwen, Guangzhou: Huacheng Press (Hua Cheng Chu Ban She, 花城出版 社), 2002, 11.

76 Fairness, utility, and the Book of Changes 4 Li Daoping (李道平) and Pan Yuting (潘雨迁), Zhou Yi Ji Jie Zuan Shu (周易集解 纂疏), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1994, 37. 5 Wang Fuzhi (王夫之), “External Commentary on the Book of Changes” (Zhou Yi Wan Zhuan, 周易外传), vol. 1, section 8 of the commentary on Qian (乾), Complete Works of Chuanshan (Chuan Shan Quan Shu, 船山全书), vol. 1, Changsha: Yue Lu Press (Yue Lu Chu Ban She, 岳麓书社, 1996, 831. 6 Wang Fuzhi, “External Commentary”, 831. 7 Wang Fuzhi, Complete Works of Chuanshan, vol. 1, 52. 8 Wang Fuzhi, Complete Works of Chuanshan, vol. 1, 52–53. 9 Book of Changes (Yi Zhuan, 易传), ed. Qin Ying (秦颖) and Qin Sui (秦穗), Changsha: Hunan Press (Hu Nan Chu Ban She, 湖南出版社), 1993, 13. 10 Cui Jin in the period of Northern and Southern Dynasties wrote a commentary on the Book of Changes, which has been lost. 11 Li Daoping (李道平), Zhou Yi Ji Jie Zuan Shu (周易集解纂疏, 潘雨廷), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1994, 602. 12 Wing-Tsit Chan, ed., A Source Book in Chinese Philosophy, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1963, 92–93. 13 Source Book, ch. 44, 161. 14 Source Book, ch. 75, 174. 15 Source Book, ch. 53, 64–65. 16 Book of Changes, 325. 17 Book of Changes, 325–327. 18 The original text from The Great Learning is as follows: “A man of humanity develops (fa, 发) his personality by means of his wealth, while the inhumane person develops wealth at the sacrifice of his personality.” Source Book, 94. Zhu Xi comments that “fa (发) means to raise up. The person of humanity distributes wealth in order to win over the people; the inhumane person forgets and sacrifices his personality to increase wealth and goods.” See Zhu Xi (朱熹) ed., Commentary on the Four Books (Si Shu Zhang Ju Ji Zhu, 四书章句集注), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1983, 12. 19 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, New York: International Publishers, 1970, 31. Compare Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party (共产党宣言), Anthology of Marx and Engels (马克思恩格斯选集), vol. 1, Beijing: People’s Publishing House (Ren Min Chu Ban She, 人民出版社), 1995, 294. 20 The distinction between wang (king) and ba (despot) is from Mencius, Mencius said, “A ruler who uses force to make a pretense at humanity is a despot. Such a despot requires a large kingdom. A ruler who practices humanity with virtue is a true king. To become a true king does not depend on a large kingdom. Tang became, so with only seventy li, and King Wen with only a hundred. When force is used to overcome people, they do not submit willingly but only because they have not sufficient strength to resist. But when virtue is used to overcome people, they are pleased in their hearts and sincerely submit, as the seventy disciples submitted to Confucius.” Cf. Sourcebook, 2A:3, 64. 21 Book of Changes, 319. 22 Mencius 1A:7, D.C. Lau trans., Penguin Books, 1970, 58. 23 Book of Changes, 57. 24 Book of Changes, 57.

7

The Confucian “kingly Way for all under Heaven” and contemporary international peace

In the pre-Qin period, Confucius proposed, as against despotism, that a ruler should cultivate his virtue to attract foreigners and bring peace to relations with neighboring states; thereafter Confucians developed a view of the “kingly Way for all under Heaven.” This political ideal implies a humanitarian and benevolent manner of conductiong cultural exchanges which would eventually lead to political unity. This ideal is significant and needs a creative contemporary interpretation. Nowadays, unilateralism in international politics is represented by the United States of America, especially American politics since George W. Bush took power, most conspicuously shown in the refusal to sign the “Kyoto Protocol,” the “Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court,” the blatant violation of the “Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-Ballistic Missile Systems,” and the unilateral waging of war by invading Iraq. American unilateralism shows a tendency of very narrow nationalism that prioritizes the interests of America only, and it threatens the peace of the world. The ideal of peace in the American ideal of liberalism has been trampled upon in an unprecedented manner. How can mankind draw on each nation’s cultural traditions to develop ideas conducive to world peace? Such is a project for future scholars in the humanities and public intellectuals. This chaptyer deals with this topic from the perspective of comparative philosophy, starting from the resources in Chinese philosophy to investigate the significance of the tradition of the Confucian political philosophy of the “kingly Way for all under Heaven” to contemporary world peace.

7.1 History of Confucian thought on the “kingly Way for all under Heaven” “The kingly Way (Dao) for all under Heaven” is not so much a historical description of a socio-political form that existed in the past, as a Confucian ideal of a society of great union and harmony. Such a view of “all under Heaven” has a core spirit, namely, to attain world peace through establishing an ideal social form, and letting other nations, countries, and regions whose cultures are less developed automatically learn from it and assimilate it into their own cultures. Although the notion of “all under Heaven” envisioned by Confucians is very different from the term “world” we now use to refer to the globe

78 The “kingly Way” and international peace that contains all nations, it contains a core ideal of how communities on a large scale could coexist harmoniously, and is thought-provoking in regard to contemporary endeavors to achieve world peace. In Chinese philosophy, the “kingly Way” appeared very early. But it appeared in the Confucian tradition very late. The Confucian political ideal has the spirit of and longing for the ideal of the kingly Way, but he did not use the concept “Wang Dao” (王道, kingly Way). Confucius criticized Ran You and Zilu for their assisting the Ji family (季氏) of the Lu (鲁) state to prepare the launch of an attack on Zhuan Yu (颛臾), which was already a dependent state of Lu, and he came up with an expression of the kingly Way that “when distant subjects are unsubmissive one cultivates one’s moral virtue in order to attract them, and once they have come one makes them content.”1 This could be considered an archetype of the kingly Way. It might seem somewhat simple to directly borrow Confucius’s idea to serve as a model for modern international politics, but it contains useful contents distinct from modern and contemporary Western notions of modern international relations on the basis of the notion of independent countries. This thought emphasizes that great countries and developed countries should not extend their mode of civilization through war, but should alternatively use the attraction of their own culture to make other countries learn from them. This valuable idea deserves a modern interpretation. Confucius praises Guan Zhong, “It was due to Guan Zhong that Duke Huan was able, without a show of force, to assemble the feudal lords nine times. Such was his benevolence. Such was his benevolence.”2 He also says: Guan Zhong helped Duke Huan to become the leader of the feudal lords and to save the Empire from collapse. To this day, the common people still enjoy the benefit of his acts. Had it not been for Guan Zhong, we might well be wearing our hair down and folding our robes to the left. Surely his was not the petty faithfulness of the common man or woman who commits suicide in a ditch without anyone taking any notice.3 Confucius spoke highly of Guan Zhong’s diplomatic skills that united the feudal states to assist the royal family of Zhou. Such an ideal of the kingly Way could be developed into a principle to deal with contemporary international relations. To be sure, Confucius says, “When the Way prevails in the Empire, the rites and music and punitive expeditions are initiated by the Emperor. When the Way does not prevail in the Empire, they are initiated by the feudal lords.”4 He affirms the positive value of some wars in the world of the kingly Way, namely, those wars that are waged not in order to win territory, people, or wealth, but in order to punish those local revolts against the social order of the united Zhou kingdom. In other words, only under the requirement of daoyi (道义, Dao and righteousness) can wars be allowed. It is only an expedient measure. In common situations the use of force is not allowed.

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In a word, Confucianism founded by Confucius generally condemns war, and longs for an ideal world where the kingly Way prevails and people are attracted to culture by its moral virtue rather than driven by force. Confucius says, “Even with a true king it is bound to take a generation for benevolence to become a reality.”5 He also says, “The rule of virtue can be compared to the Pole Star which commands the homage of the multitude of stars simply by remaining in its place.”6 Therefore, the spirit of the ideal of the kingly Way is Confucius’s notion of ren (仁, benevolence). This spirit became clearer in Mencius. From the extant texts, we can see that the concept of “Wang Dao” (王道, kingly Way) already appeared in the Book of Mencius, a concept that expresses the ideal of the kingly Way implicit in Confucius’s view about the positive role of moral virtue in bringing peace and unity to the world. Mencius came up with the concept of the kingly Way for the first time in 1A:3, he says, If you do not interfere with the busy seasons in the fields, then there will be more grain than the people can eat; if you do not allow nets with too fine a mesh to be used in large ponds, then there will be more fish and turtles than they can eat; if hatchets and axes are permitted in the forests on the hills only in the proper seasons, then there will be more timber than they can use. When the people have more grain, more fish and turtles than they can eat, and more timber than they can use, then in the support of their parents when alive and in the mourning of them when dead, they will be able to have no regrets over anything left undone. This is the first step along the Kingly way.7 The essence of Mencius’s ideal of the kingly Way is the government of benevolence, and the concrete historical contents of the kingly Way is “the Way (Dao) of ancient kings,” namely, the Way of Yao, Shun, Yu, Tang, Wen, Wu, and Duke Zhou. Mencius regards the spirit of the Book of Odes as the kingly Way. He says, “When the wooden clappers of the true King fell into disuse, songs were no longer collected. When songs were no longer collected, the Spring and Autumn Annals were written.”8 The reason why the Book of Odes is a symbol of the spirit of the kingly Way is that the kings sent officials to collect songs from different states, those songs that reflect the customs of different states. This way of collecting songs shows that the king is willing to hear the voice of the people. In the text of Mencius, another expression of the idea of the kingly Way is the phrase “wang tian xia” (王天下, to become a true king of all under Heaven), whose fundamental philosophical spirit is the “ren zheng” (仁政, government of benevolence). Mencius admonished King Xuan of Qi: Now if you should practice benevolence in the government of your state, then all those in the Empire who seek office would wish to find a place at your court, all tillers of land to till the land in outlying parts of your realm, all merchants to enjoy the refuge of your market-place, all travellers to go by way of your roads, and all those who hate their rulers to lay their complaints before you. This being so, who can stop you from becoming a true King?9

80 The “kingly Way” and international peace In this text Mencius articulated in detail Confucius’s view that the ideal of kingly Way would attract people all under Heaven. In Mencius 2A:5, Mencius sums up the methods of the kingly Way for all under Heaven: Mencius said, “If you honour the good and wise and employ the able so that outstanding men are in high position, then Gentlemen throughout the Empire will be only too pleased to serve at your court. In the marketplace, if goods are exempted when premises are taxed, and premises exempted when the ground is taxed, then the traders throughout the Empire will be only too pleased to store their goods in your marketplace. If there is inspection but no duty at the border stations, then the travellers throughout the Empire will be only too pleased to go by way of your roads. If tillers help in the public fields but pay no tax on the land, then farmers throughout the Empire will be only too pleased to till the land in your realm. If you abolish the levy in lieu of corvée and the levy in lieu of the planting of the mulberry, then all the people of the Empire will be only too pleased to come and settle in your state. If you can truly execute these five measures, the people of your neighbouring states will look up to you as to their father and mother; and since man came into this world no one has succeeded in inciting children against their parents, In this way, you will have no match in the Empire. He who has no match in the Empire is a Heaven-appointed officer, and it has never happened that such a man failed to become a true King.10 To summarize, in the Book of Mencius there are four policies as the concrete measures of the “kingly Way for all under Heaven”: (1) to ensure a solid economic foundation of the society. For example, Mencius says, “When those who are seventy wear silk and eat meat and the masses are neither cold nor hungry, it is impossible for their prince to be a true King.”11 (2) To respect the life and property of the people. For example, Mencius says, “He becomes a true King by bringing peace to the people. This is something no one can stop.”12 (3) To take care of the people just like taking care of one’s own family members. Mencius says: Treat the aged of your own family in a manner befitting their venerable age and extend this treatment to the aged of other families; treat your own young in a manner befitting their tender age and extend this to the young of other families, and you can roll the Empire on your palm.13 (4) To delight and worry for the people and with the people. Mencius says: The people will delight in the joy of him who delights in their joy, and will worry over the troubles of him who worries over their troubles. He who delights and worries on account of the Empire is certain to become a true King.14

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Mencius firmly believes that “a benevolent man has no match in the Empire”;15 he says: “There are cases of a ruthless man [or a man of no benevolence] gaining possession of a state, but it has never happened that such a man gained possession of the Empire.”16 Therefore, the way of benevolence becomes a political principle of the kingly Way for all under Heaven, as well as the foundation of legitimacy of the source of political power to rule all under Heaven. Mencius condemned waging war in order to possess more territory or make one’s own state more populous. In modern words, he was opposed to the use of war as a means to further one’s interests. He criticized King Hui of Liang that he “sent his people to war, making pulp of them, for the sake of gaining further territory,” which is an action that “extends his ruthlessness from those he does not love to those he loves,” and violates the principle of benevolence.17 Mencius says: In the Spring and Autumn Annals there were no just wars. There were only cases of one war not being quite as bad as another. A punitive expedition [zheng, 征] is a war waged by one in authority against his subordinates. It is not for peers to punish one another by war.18 The reason is that Mencius defines “punitive expedition” (zheng, 征) as to rectify (zheng,正). He says, “To wage a punitive war is to rectify. There is no one who does not wish himself rectified. What need is there for war?”19 Here he clearly states his view about the foundation of legitimacy of war. Mencius believes that for the ideal sages, “had it been necessary to perpetrate one wrongful deed or to kill one innocent man in order to gain the Empire, none of them would have consented to it. In this they were alike.”20 From the principle of daoyi (Dao and righteousness), he distinguishes the kingly Way from the way of a despot, or “leader of the feudal lords” (as D.C. Lau translates ba, 霸); he says: One who uses force while borrowing from benevolence will become leader of the feudal lords, but to do so he must first be the ruler of a state of considerable size. One who puts benevolence into effect through the transforming influence of morality will become a true King, and his success will not depend on the size of his state.21 Mencius does not negate the positive meaning of any wars. If a war is in accord with daoyi (Dao and righteousness), it is permissible to wage an “expedition.” He quotes the Book of Documents and says: The Book of History says, In his punitive expeditions T’ang began with Ke! With this he gained the trust of the Empire, and when he marched on the east, the western barbarians complained, and when he marched on the south, the northern barbarians complained. They all said, “Why does he not come to

82 The “kingly Way” and international peace us first?” The people longed for his coming as they longed for a rainbow in time of severe drought. Those who were going to market did not stop; those who were ploughing went on ploughing. He punished the rulers and comforted the people, like a fall of timely rain, and the people greatly rejoiced. The Book of History says, We await our Lord. When he comes we will be revived. Mencius says: One who has the Way will have many to support him; one who has not the Way will have few to support him. In extreme cases, the latter will find even his own flesh and blood turning against him while the former will have the whole Empire at his behest. Hence either a gentleman does not go to war or else he is sure of victory, for he will have the whole Empire at his behest, while his opponent will have even his own flesh and blood turning against him.22 Similar words can be found in Mencius 3B, where he talks about King Tang of Shang, King Wen, and Wu of Zhou. It is evident that Mencius’s kingly Way for all under Heaven is not simply to negate the significance of war, but to maintain that a war should fulfill the requirement of political justification on the basis of the Way of benevolence. Another great Confucian Xunzi discussed more systematically the politics of the kingly Way. In the extant book of Xunzi, the question of how to deal with disputes under the guidance of the kingly Way, he describes “the government of a true king” as follows: Promote the worthy and capable without regard to seniority; dismiss the unfit and incapable without hesitation; execute the principal evildoers without trying first to instruct them; and transform the common lot of men without trying first to rectify them. Although the distinctions between social classes have not yet been fixed, there will still be [such basic distinctions as] primary and secondary. Although they be the descendants of kings and dukes or knights and grand officers, if they are incapable of devotedly observing the requirements of ritual and moral principles, they should be relegated to the position of commoners. Although they be the descendants of commoners, if they accumulate culture and study, rectify their character and conduct, and are capable of devotedly observing the requirements of ritual principles and justice, they should be brought to the ranks of a prime minister, knight, or grand officer. Hence even persons of dissolute doctrines, dissolute theories, dissolute undertakings, and dissolute abilities who turn away in evasion of their duties and twist around to shirk their responsibilities should be entrusted with office, instructed in its duties, and their improvement awaited for a short time. Encourage them with commendations and rewards; chastise them with rebukes and punishments. If they

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perform their responsibilities with ease, they should be supported; if they do not, they should be discarded. Those who have one of the Five Defects should be raised up and gathered in so that they can be cared for. They should be given official duties commensurate with their abilities and employment adequate to feed and clothe themselves so that all are included and not even one of them is overlooked. Those who employ their talents in conduct opposed to what is proper to the occasion should be condemned to death without mercy. This may be described as “Heaven’s Power” – such is the government of the True King.23 From the passage quoted above, it is evident that in Xunzi’s thought the government of the kingly Way is a civilized political form whose core spirit is rituals and righteousness. The promotion of the worthy and capable, punishing the evil, and rewarding the good are all according to the criteria of rituals and righteousness; the policy of relief to the poor (similar to charity in the modern world) is carried out under the principle of the Way of benevolence. Unfortunately, the world in which Xunzi’s kingly Way prevails is without the spirit of liberty, because Xunzi says, in such an ideal world, those whose abilities and actions are against the rituals will be killed, which implies a tendency of despotism in government and ideology. Xunzi basically inherits Confucius’s thought, and regards ritual and righteousness as the basic criteria for the kingly Way, and regards the welfare of the people as the end of the kingly Way. From this perspective, we can say that there is at least a quintessence of democracy implicit in this tradition. He says, one who cultivates ritual principles becomes a king; one who effectively exercises government becomes strong; one who wins over the people will be secure; and one who merely collects tax levies will perish. Accordingly, the True King enriches the people; the lord-protector enriches his scholarknights; a state that barely manages to survive enriches its grand officers; and a state that is doomed enriches only the ruler’s coffers and fills up his storehouses.24 Apart from the criterion of rituals and righteousness, the basic spirit of the kingly Way contains the way of benevolence. Xunzi says: His humanity is the loftiest in the world, his justice the most admirable, and his majesty the most marvelous. His humanity being the loftiest is the cause of no one in the world being estranged from him. His justice being the most admirable is the cause of none failing to esteem him. His majesty being the most marvelous is the cause of no one in the world presuming to oppose him. His majesty permitting no opposition coupled with a way that wins the allegiance of others is the cause of his triumphing without having to wage war, of his gaining his objectives without resort to force, and of the world submitting to him without his armies exerting themselves. Such is the one who knows

84 The “kingly Way” and international peace the Way of a True King. One who knows all three of these ways, if he desires to become a king, will be king; if he desires to be a lord-protector, will be lord-protector; and if he desires to be strong, will be strong.25 Similar to Mencius, Xunzi also investigated the concrete methods for realizing the kingly Way. There are four main methods: (1) The political model to be imitated is the age of the three kings of the three dynasties (Xia, Shang, and Zhou). Xunzi wrote about the regulations of a true king: His Way does not antedate that of the three Dynasties; his model is not divided in its allegiance to the Later Kings. A way that antedates that of the Three Dynasties is characterized as “unsettled.” A model that is divided in its allegiance to the Later Kings is called “inelegant.”26 (2) In the world of “the kingly Way,” there is a strict and clear institution of reward and punishment. Xunzi says, Those lacking inner power shall be without honored status, those without ability shall be without office, those who lack accomplishment shall go unrewarded, and those who do not transgress shall not be rebuked. In the royal court none shall occupy positions out of mere good fortune. Among the people none shall gain a living by mere good fortune. The worthy shall be honored and the able employed, each assigned a position of appropriate rank, with none overlooked. The cunningly shrewd are restrained and violent behavior is forbidden, but there is no excess in the application of rebukes and punishments. The Hundred Clans will then clearly perceive that good, though performed in the privacy of the home, will be selected for commendation in the royal court and that acts contrary to the good, though performed in darkest secrecy, will be exposed to punishment in public view. This may be described as “having fixed principles.” Such are the principles of a king.27 (3) The world of the kingly Way has rational politics, economics, and foreign trade policy, and is an open social form. He says: He graduates the taxes, rectifies the affairs of government, and develops the myriad things, thereby nourishing the myriads of people. From the production of the fields, the tax rate is one part in ten. At border stations and in the markets, goods are inspected, but imposts are not levied. The use of the mountains, forests, marshes, and weirs is permitted or forbidden according to the season, but excises are not assessed. Land is inspected as to quality, and the rate of taxation set accordingly. The distance over which goods must travel is taken into account in setting tribute payments. The circulation and transport of valuable commodities and foodstuffs is not impaired by obstructions or hindrances, causing them to be freely presented and interchanged so

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that “all within the four seas will become as of one family.” Accordingly, those who are nearby will not hide their abilities and those who are distant will not hate their toilsome tasks. There will be no part of the country, however secluded or out of the way, where men will not hasten to serve and find peace and contentment in his rule. This may indeed be described as being “a leader of men.” Such is the model of the king.28 (4) Finally, the realization of the world of the kingly Way hinges on the endorsement of the hearts of the people. Therefore the position and dignity of every person is the major concern and the political end for the world of the kingly Way. Xunzi says, “The True King tries to win men; the lord-protector [ba, 霸] to acquire allies; the powerful to capture land.”29 He borrows the dialogue between Yao (尧) and Shun (舜) to tell the political secret of success to win over the all under Heaven. Yao asked Shun, saying: “I desire to cause the empire to come to me. How might this be accomplished?” Shun responded: “Hold fast to unity and do not lose it. Act with subtlety and do not fall idle. Be loyal and honest and do not become tired. Then the empire will come to you of its own accord. In holding fast to unity, one behaves like Heaven and Earth. In acting with subtlety, one acts like the sun and moon. When loyalty and sincerity become complete within, they become apparent without. When this is visibly manifest to all within the four seas, the empire will be but a single comer; then indeed what more would be needed to cause them to come?”30 From the fourth point, it is evident that Xunzi maintains Confucius’s view that morality is the foundation for the way to attain the political power to rule all under Heaven. Similar to Confucius and Mencius, Xunzi was not opposed to war under the principle of the kingly Way. He even says: those who in antiquity began with a single country and gained the empire did not go back and forth across it, but rather cultivated their government so that none failed to long for their rule. It is for this reason that they were able to execute the violent and proscribe the cruel. Hence, when the Duke of Zhou marched to the south, the countries to the north were resentful and said, ‘Why does he not come to us alone?’ When he marched to the east, the countries to the west were resentful and said, ‘Why does he leave us to last?’ Who could contest with such a ruler! One who could make his country like this would become king!31 After the Han dynasty, the notion of the kingly Way became prominent in all kinds of works, and became the Chinese common ideal of world peace, especially in Gongyang’s Commentary on the Spring-Autumn Annals (春秋公羊传), Dong Zhongshu’s (董仲舒) Luxuriant Dew from the Spring and Autumn Annals

86 The “kingly Way” and international peace (春秋繁露), and the Exegetical Interpretation of Gongyang’s Commentary on the Spring and Autumn Annals (春秋公羊传解诂) by He Xiu (何休). In the Eastern Han Dynasty, the idea of great unification (大一统) under the kingly Way was predominant. This idea was later combined with the idea of great harmony (大同) from the Book of Rites (礼记), and developed by Kang Youwei (康有为) and became the Chinese early bourgeois ideal of great harmony (大同). Nowadays, facing the complicated situation of the international community, it might turn out to be a fruitful project for contemporary world peace to re-interpret the pre-Qin Confucian political traditional ideal of “kingly Way for all under Heaven.”

7.2 A reflection on the ideal of peace in Kant, Marx, and Rawls Modern Western thought on international peace could be traced to Grotius. However, as to the contemporary system of international laws, I believe it would be more proper to start with Kant. In 1795, the aged Kant at the age of 71 wrote a long treatise “On Perpetual Peace,”32 in which he discussed the approach to realize perpetual peace from the perspective of independent sovereign countries. The historical background of his work is that France and Prussia signed a treaty for peace in Basel on May 5, 1795. As to the source of Kant’s thought, he is obviously influenced by Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s On the Social Contract and Thomas Hobbes’s Leviathan. Rousseau’s theory of the social contract provides Kant with the principle of individualism, and Hobbes’s theory of the origin of a state provides Kant with a lower estimation of human nature – because of the evil of human nature, it is necessary to realize liberty by means of the restraints of law. Kant considers a country to be similar to an individual person, namely, it is a substance that has an independent personality. It should not be by any means annexed to another country. Kant says that no independent country, no matter what size it is, can be obtained by another country by inheriting, exchanging, buying, or presenting. A country is not a property, it is different from the land it occupies. A country is a human society which cannot be commanded by anything else other than itself. To annex a country is similar to annihilating the moral personality of an individual and treating him or her as a thing. How to ensure that a country is safe and not invaded by other countries? Kant believes that there should be a constitution to protect every nation just like the constitution of all citizens. Kant believes that this league is capable of protecting every nation, because all nations in a natural state of coexistence without law tend to encroach on each other, just like human individuals in a natural state. Therefore, in seeking self-protection, they would require other nations to enter with them into a constitution of citizens, so as to ensure the protection of the rights of every nation. The full respect for the “rights of countries,” and the low estimation of human nature are two cornerstones for Kant’s theory of international peace. Kant’s theory of perpetual peace provides the principle that serves as the foundation for the international laws of the contemporary international community.

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In order to achieve international peace, Kant advocates that all reasons that might cause future war should be annihilated, and that standing troops should be gradually dismissed, and that a nation’s constitution and government should not be interfered with by other countries by force, and that basic mutual trust among human beings should not be harmed (here there is the germ of international ethics), so that the end of the theory of sovereign country is limited to the protection of independence, and the situation of the “law of the jungle” in the international community can be avoided. However, the theory of Western modern international peace represented by Kant lies on the foundation of a psychology of self-protection among nation states, in which all nation-states are on guard against each other. Such a theory of international relation could lead to an opposite result: that every sovereign state develops military force to protect itself. The two world wars in the 20th century are evidence. After the 1950s, the international arms race was upgraded to a nuclear arms race. Therefore, the theory of international peace based on the assumption of sovereign countries, though aiming at the annihilation of any causes of future wars in theory, provides nonetheless the foundation of legitimacy in developing the sovereign countries’ military forces. Under certain circumstances, it aggravates confrontation between modern countries. It is noteworthy that Kant unambiguously excludes the consideration of benevolence or ethical concern from the theme of perpetual peace, and elaborates this theme solely from the perspective of rights. In the third provision of perpetual peace he states that rights of citizens all over the world are limited to the condition of universal kindness; however, this is not a problem of benevolence, but a problem of rights. The requirement of kindness or hospitality is only a right that a person should not be treated hostilely because he or she comes from a foreign country. This extreme theory of rights, though profound, is a nonhistorical formalism. Kant provides an empirical explanation for the rights of kindness. He points out that this right belongs to everyone, because everyone has the right to occupy a surface of the earth and enter into a society; the surface of the globe is not able to disperse them infinitely, therefore it is necessary that they should tolerate one another. From the viewpoint of the theory of rights, Kant treats the right of kindness only as a possible condition for a peaceful contact and communication between foreigners and the native-born. Although Kant fundamentally negates the role of morality in international peace, his theory of rights contains in itself a certain ethical content. First, the term “right” Kant uses has three connotations: rights, law, and justice, and justice is not without ethical content; second, he affirms “mutual trust” as one of the premises for his theory of perpetual peace; however, “mutual trust” is not a matter of rights, he says; any countries at war with other countries should not allow any hostile action that would later make impossible mutual trust in future peace, such as sending persons to enemy countries for assassination, poisoning, violating a treaty of capitulation, or inciting betrayal in enemy countries. This view, pedantic as it seems, contains a certain ethical thought which is negative and regulative, rather than a positive and open ethics of mutual trust. In modern

88 The “kingly Way” and international peace society and in new situations in the future, the limitations of Kant’s thoughts on peace have become more and more evident, namely, it is impossible to maintain international peace under the international law on the basis of the notion of rights and the low estimation of human nature. Bourgeois selfishness and the low estimation of human nature, though profound in the construction of sociopolitical rules, have determined the preventive character of modern Western ethics and politics. This selfishness in the theory of human nature exposes modern Western culture to the negative influence of the psychology of selfprotection. The international law in the modern international community is a product of such a theory of human nature. Although it has brought forth a great number of valuable rules and defined a relatively reasonable space for the activities of sovereign countries, making great progress in the history of mankind, such a system of international laws cannot ensure a genuine “perpetual peace” in the international community. The reasons, as aforesaid, are that it prescribes rights but not duties, and that it relies on a psychology of mutual prevention rather than mutual trust; its result can only be a temporary stable but unfair status under strong power maintained by an economically strong country, not genuine international peace. Bertrand Russell saw clearly the difficulty of dealing with international relations with the aim of sovereign countries. He pointed out that all the great countries claimed that they have supreme sovereignty over not only internal affairs but also foreign affairs. Such a claim of supreme sovereignty led to conflicts between great countries. Solutions are of only two kinds: one is war; the other is diplomacy, and the latter is based on the threat of war. The claim of absolute sovereignty of a country amounts to solving foreign affairs by force.33 In order to improve the international relationship on the basis of the theory of sovereign countries, Russell proposed to establish an international institute to which all nations submit their sovereignty, so that international conflicts can be solved through international law, and world peace can be maintained. The theory of “world government” shares the same logical structure with Rousseau’s theory of a democratic state. Rousseau envisioned a government that represents the common will, a government to which all individual persons submit their rights, so that the government protects the rights of every citizen that supports the common will. Russell substituted Rousseau’s “individual person” with “sovereign country,” Rousseau’s “country” representing common will with international institute. Rousseau’s ideal of democracy has been proved by history to be only imaginary; therefore, Russell’s ideal of a “world government” obviously has the same imaginary nature. Moreover, Russell’s theory of “world government” has the modern Western notion of rights as its starting point, therefore it does not provide any substantially new content beyond Kant’s theory of international peace. The recent system of international laws only provides a basic commitment of the independence of sovereign countries for international affairs, while a genuine international ethics needs to be introduced in order to guide the international community to perpetual peace. Given the foundation of the theory of

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sovereign countries, only when a new international ethics is introduced, can a new situation of perpetual world peace be achieved. Kant says that the status of peace should be created. This is a consistent with the logic that human reason gives law to nature, namely, the principle of peaceful coexistence of human beings should be established by human reason. However, it is impossible to establish a truly perpetual international peace solely through the contemporary system of international laws on the foundation of the Western Enlightenment notion of rationality. Since the beginning of the 20th century, human beings should transcend the limits of the recent system of international laws based on the notion of sovereign countries, and base the legitimacy of sovereign countries on a comprehensive understanding of human nature, pursue an international ethics required by contemporary and future international exchange, and at the same time attend to the international duties of each, only then can all nation-states in the world be guided in the correct way to perpetual peace. After Kant, Marx and Engels proposed a theory of class conflict, and envisioned international peace in the future, namely, to create world peace on the basis of the union of the proletariat all over the world and to annihilate all systems of exploitation. In the Manifesto of the Communist Party, they claim: The bourgeoisie has through its exploitation of the world market given a cosmopolitan character to production and consumption in every country. To the great chagrin of Reactionists, it has drawn from under the feet of industry the national ground on which it stood. All old-established national industries have been destroyed or are daily being destroyed. They are dislodged by new industries, whose introduction becomes a life and death question for all civilized nations, by industries that no longer work up indigenous raw material, but raw material drawn from the remotest zones; industries whose products are consumed, not only at home, but in every quarter of the globe. In place of the old wants, satisfied by the productions of the country, we find new wants, requiring for their satisfaction the products of distant lands and climes. In place of the old local and national seclusion and self-sufficiency, we have intercourse in every direction, universal inter-dependence of nations. And as in material, so also in intellectual production. The intellectual creations of individual nations become common property.34 Marx and Engels then analyzed the nature and limits of the bourgeois government, namely, modern bourgeois private property is built on the basis of class conflict and exploitation of some people by others. Therefore, the sacred mission of the Communist Party is the abolition of private property, and moreover, to seize power by means of class struggle in order to change the nature of “public power,” so that the past way of using public power to enslave people would become impossible. Eventually class conflict will be annihilated in a country and then in the world, and a world of freedom and equality will be created. “In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class

90 The “kingly Way” and international peace antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”35 Therefore, the working class from all over the world should unite together to revolt against class oppression and exploitation in order to realize world peace. Marx states, now that the emancipation of the working class requires the brotherly cooperation of workers, if there are foreign policies that pursue evil ends and make use of prejudice among nations, and sacrifice people’s blood and wealth, how could they accomplish such a great mission? Therefore, the workers should know the secret of international politics, supervise the diplomacy of their own governments, and sometimes should fight against them when necessary. If they cannot be stopped, then all workers should unite and uncover these policies, endeavor to make the simple rules of morality and justice among individuals become the supreme principle in dealing with relations among nations. Such a struggle is part of the struggle for the emancipation of the working class. Marx then calls for the proletariat all over the world to unite. Obviously, classical Marxist thinkers required that modern international peace should be built on the foundation of the genuine emancipation of human beings. Although they emphasized that the rules of morality and justice of individuals can serve as a model for international rules, they did not simply borrow the theory of the rights of individuals to deal with the problem of sovereign countries; rather, their solution to world peace is based on the idea of emancipation of human beings. For Marx and Engels, there will be no international peace until mankind is fully emancipated and class antagonism and oppression are annihilated. This view is obviously more profound than Kant’s theory of sovereign countries. In the last year of the 20th century, John Rawls, the most distinguished political philosopher in contemporary America, from the perspective of liberalism, proposed a new theory of the world peace of mankind in the present and in the future. He came up with a grand vision of the “law of peoples.” Based on his political ideal of a liberal democratic constitution, he endeavors to extend it from the internal politics of a country to the international, and wishes to use the liberal democratic constitution as a guidance to rationally guide other political systems to form a common peaceful and stable international community. To borrow Rawls’s own words, “it is important to see that the Law of Peoples is developed within political liberalism and is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples. I emphasize that, in developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, we work out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people.”36 For Rawls, the free Society of Peoples is possible; he says: Our hope for the future of our society rests on the belief that the nature of the social world allows reasonably just constitutional democratic societies existing as members of the Society of Peoples. In such a social world peace and justice would be achieved between liberal and decent peoples both at home and abroad. The idea of this society is realistically Utopian in that it depicts an achievable social world that combines political right and justice for all liberal and decent peoples in a Society of Peoples. Both

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A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism try to say how a liberal society might be possible. The Law of Peoples hopes to say how a world Society of liberal and decent Peoples might be possible.37 From the quotation it is evident that Rawls endeavors to extend liberal society from the level of domestic society to the international level of a world Society of liberal Peoples, thereby constructing an ideal of international peace from the perspective of liberalism. In the monograph The Law of Peoples, Rawls distinguishes five types of domestic societies: “the first of these is liberal peoples, and the second, decent peoples. The basic structure of one kind of decent people has what I call a ‘decent consultation hierarchy,’” There may be other types of decent peoples that do not have such a hierarchy, but are worthy of membership in a Society of Peoples. The three other domestic societies are “outlaw states,” “societies burdened by unfavorable conditions,” and “benevolent absolutisms”: “They honor most human rights, but because they deny their members a meaningful role in making political decisions, they are not wellordered.”38 Only the liberal and the decent peoples are called “well-ordered peoples.” Although these five types of societies cannot describe a real nationstate, as ideal models these types are conducive to contemporary discussion of international peace. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls discusses mainly three types of relations between peoples. First, he thinks that ideally there is no war between free peoples. This is determined by the character of the peoples and the domestic regime. He says: When that happens, as I believe, following Kant, it will, the society of these peoples will form a group of satisfied peoples. As I shall maintain, in view of their fundamental interests being satisfied, they will have no reason to go to war with one another. The familiar motives for war would be absent: such peoples do not seek to convert others to their religions, nor to conquer greater territory, nor to wield political power over another people. Through negotiation and trade they can fulfill their needs and economic interests.39 Even from the perspective of history, there has been no war between liberal democratic peoples. Rawls says, “Though liberal democratic societies have often engaged in war against nondemocratic states, since 1800 firmly established liberal societies have not fought one another.”40 The reason for this, Rawls explains, is that “a society of democratic peoples, all of whose basic institutions are well-ordered by liberal conceptions of right and justice (though not necessarily by the same conception), is stable for the right reasons.”41 Rawls believes that with the full realization of the ideal element of constitutional democracy, “armed conflict between democratic peoples will tend to disappear as they approach that ideal, and they will engage in war only as allies in self-defense against outlaw states.”42

92 The “kingly Way” and international peace Second, Rawls does not negate the possibility of war between free democratic peoples and outlaw states. Rawls does not define clearly what is an outlaw state. According to his description of a democratic free society, we can conjecture that an outlaw state is a state that violates basic human rights of a democratic liberal society, and has the potential to invade other societies and states. However, Rawls believes that the peoples of the free democratic society and well-ordered society should treat the soldiers and civilian population in a outlaw state differently from its leaders and officials. Therefore in the conduct of war for the purpose of self-defense, the wellordered people should not attack the civilian members of the population. Those soldiers and civilian population are not responsible for the war. “For soldiers are often conscripted and in other ways forced into war; they are coercively indoctrinated in martial virtues; and their patriotism is often cruelly exploited.”43 Rawls distinguishes the “outlaw states” from the peoples of the outlaw states, which is the reason why he uses the phrase “law of peoples” rather than “law of states” in discussing international peace. Third, from the perspective of liberalism, Rawls discusses the assistance the liberal democratic peoples provide for the burdened societies. He says: The burdened societies, while they are not expansive or aggressive, lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered. The longterm goal of (relatively) well-ordered societies should be to bring burdened societies, like outlaw states, into the Society of well-ordered Peoples.44 However, as to the concrete strategies of assistance, Rawls does not mean that the well-ordered people should provide excessive material resources for the burdened societies, because a well-ordered society is not necessarily wealthy, and a burdened society does not lack resources so much that it could not organize itself in good order. The crucial point is how to correct the fundamental injustice in politics and society. Based on the aforesaid, Rawls proposes three basic guidelines of assistance: The first guideline is the principle of “just savings.” (1) Concerning the purpose: The purpose of a just (real) savings principle is to establish (reasonably) just basic institutions for a free constitutional democratic society (or any well-ordered society) and to secure a social world that makes possible a worthwhile life for all its citizens.45 (2) Concerning the limit of the savings: “savings may stop once just (or decent) basic institutions have been established.”46 (3) The distinction between just savings and wealth: “Great wealth is not necessary to establish just (or

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decent) institutions. How much is needed will depend on a society’s particular history as well as on its conception of justice.”47 Second: A second guideline for thinking about how to carry out the duty of assistance is to realize that the political culture of a burdened society is allimportant; and that, at the same time, there is no recipe, certainly no easy recipe, for well-ordered peoples to help a burdened society to change its political and social culture.48 From this view, it is evident that a well-ordered society provides assistance for the burdened society usually under certain circumstances of some agreement such as human rights, equal rights for women, and so on. Third, the aim of assistance is to help burdened societies to be able to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members of the Society of well-ordered Peoples. … Thus the well-ordered societies giving assistance must not act paternalistically, but in measured ways that do not conflict with the final aim of assistance: freedom and equality for the formerly burdened societies.49 Rawls borrows the model of dealing with justice in domestic society for the international level; he says: In a liberal domestic society that gap cannot be wider than the criterion of reciprocity allows, so that the least advantaged (as the third liberal principle requires) have sufficient all-purpose means to make intelligent and effective use of their freedoms and to lead reasonable and worthwhile lives. When that situation exists, there is no further need to narrow the gap. Similarly, in the basic structure of the Society of Peoples, once the duty of assistance is satisfied and all peoples have a working liberal or decent government, there is again no reason to narrow the gap between the average wealth of different peoples.50 Perhaps, as to the problem of the gap between the wealth of different peoples, Rawls’s thoughts on social justice and equality are different from the ancient Chinese farmers’ utopia of absolute egalitarianism, and from the Confucian ideal of great harmony. But Rawls has not yet reflected on the question regarding what proportion or what extent of difference is acceptable and reasonable. Liberalism has a long tradition in America and in European countries. Within the tradition of liberalism there is a difference between radical and conservative camps. Compared with the conservative, the radical liberalists are more inclined or closer to socialism in politics. The 18th century philosophers Rousseau from France and Kant from Germany have great influence on later political liberalism.

94 The “kingly Way” and international peace Rawls proclaims himself an heir to the theory of the social contract since Rousseau and Kant, and in his later work Law of Peoples he basically follows Kant’s view of perpetual peace, and reflects on the possibility of the extension of the ideal of a well-ordered society of constitutional democracy to the society of peoples. The difference between him and Kant is that he does not emphasize the notion of the sovereign country, but the sovereignty of the peoples. Moreover, Rawls starts from the analysis of different regimes in contemporary countries, gives full consideration of the complexities of the interactions among different sovereign countries of different regimes, and as regards the starting point of thinking, he treats “peoples,” rather than nation-states, as the unit of international politics, which to some extent transcends Western mainstream thought on international relations represented by Kant, which bases its theories on the notion of sovereignty of countries, and inherits the humanitarian tradition from the Enlightenment. In this sense, it is close to Marx’s thought that treats individuals as the starting point of thought on international relations. However, just like most liberalists, Rawls has no clear consciousness of the hypocrisy of the values of liberty and democracy in contemporary capitalist society, therefore he is unable to elaborate more profoundly and meticulously the relationship between world peace and the full emancipation of human beings. His analysis of international peace is as formally meticulous as his analysis of social justice, and shows the linguistic and theoretical advantage of the influence of analytical philosophy in contemporary American political philosophy. However, as to deep investigation of the substantial problems we are facing nowadays in attaining world peace, in The Law of Peoples Rawls has not dealt with such things as the significance of the emancipation of human beings and the balanced development of society towards world peace, thus leaving room for further theorization.

7.3 Huntington’s theory of the “clash of civilizations” and Tu Wei-ming’s “cultural dialogue” and its theoretical foundations In contemporary theories of international politics, Samuel Huntington’s theory of the clash of civilizations and Tu Wei-ming’s theory of cultural dialogues are a pair of antitheses. Behind Huntington’s discussion on the problem of clash of civilizations is his concern for the interests of America. Therefore, his theory is not meant to provide a solution to the clash of civilizations in the process of globalization, rather, it is only concerned with how to make use of this circumstance to reconstruct America’s diplomatic circle to secure its own interests. This basic orientation runs counter to the general wish for peace of the peoples all over the world. As a theory of international relationship, Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” stresses the aspect of conflict rather than cooperation between civilizations. According to this theory, after the Cold War, the new fundamental source of conflict in the world

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will not be primarily ideological or primarily economic. The great divisions among humankind and the dominating source of conflict will be cultural. Nation states will remain the most powerful actors in world affairs, but the principal conflicts of global politics will occur between nations and groups of different civilizations, The clash of civilizations will dominate global politics, The fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future.51 That is, direct conflicts of politics will give way to conflicts between civilizations. Then as a theory of cultural conflict, what is the theoretical content of Huntington’s concept of civilization? Huntington holds that a civilization is a cultural entity: A civilization is thus the highest cultural grouping of people and the broadest level of cultural identity people have short of that which distinguishes humans from other species. It is defined both by common objective elements, such as language, history, religion, customs, institutions, and by the subjective self-identification of people.52 As regards the scope of a civilization, “A civilization may include several nation states, as is the case with Western, Latin American and Arab civilizations, or only one, as is the case with Japanese civilization. Civilizations obviously blend and overlap, and may include subcivilizations.”53 Despite the difference and complexity, “civilizations are nonetheless meaningful entities” and “they are real.”54 From Huntington’s definition of the intension and extension of the notion of civilization, we can see that it is a view of static civilization that neglects the fact that a civilization should be studied according to its historical background, its dynamic development, its changeability and mutual adaptability. Thus this theory lacks accuracy in scholarship. For example, it is doubtful whether his “Japanese civilization” is a proper expression. Moreover, in the theory of civilization, he confounds the concept of difference with that of contradiction, and it is not rigorous to equate difference to conflict. Huntington states that “the fault lines between civilizations will be the battle lines of the future,” for the following reasons. First, differences among civilizations are not only real; they are basic. Civilizations are differentiated from each other by history, language, culture, tradition and, most important, religion. The people of different civilizations have different views on the relations between God and man, the individual and the group, the citizen and the state, parents and children, husband and wife, as well as differing views of the relative importance of rights and responsibility, liberty and authority, equality and hierarchy. … Over the centuries, however, differences among civilizations have generated the most prolonged and the most violent conflicts.55

96 The “kingly Way” and international peace Second, the world is becoming a smaller place. The interactions between peoples of different civilizations are increasing; these increasing interactions intensify civilization consciousness and awareness of differences between civilizations and commonalities within civilizations. … The interactions among peoples of different civilizations enhance the civilization-consciousness of people that, in turn, invigorates differences and animosities stretching and thought to stretch back deep into history.56 Third, “the processes of economic modernization and social change throughout the world are separating people from longstanding local identities. They also weaken the nation state as a source of identity.” Huntington means that economic globalization and cultural fundamentalism are the causes of the conflicts. Fourth, the growth of civilization-consciousness is enhanced by the dual role of the West. On the one hand, the West is at a peak of power. At the same time, however, perhaps as a result, a return to the roots phenomenon is occurring among non-Western civilizations. … A West at the peak of its power confronts non-Wests that increasingly have the desire, the will and resources to shape the world in non-Western ways.57 Fifth, cultural characteristics and differences are less mutable and hence less easily compromised and resolved than political and economic ones. “Even more than ethnicity, religion discriminates sharply and exclusively among people. A person can be half-French and half-Arab and simultaneously even a citizen of two countries. It is more difficult to be half-Catholic and half-Muslim.”58 Sixth, “economic regionalism is increasing.” And “on the one hand, successful economic regionalism will reinforce civilization-consciousness. On the other hand, economic regionalism may succeed only when it is rooted in a common civilization.”59 Huntington is especially worried about the rise of China. He holds: Common culture, in contrast, is clearly facilitating the rapid expansion of the economic relations between the People’s Republic of China and Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore and the overseas Chinese communities in other Asian countries. … If cultural commonality is a prerequisite for economic integration, the principal East Asian economic bloc of the future is likely to be centered on China.60 Huntington analyzes the clash of civilizations both on micro- and macro-levels. The clash of civilizations thus occurs at two levels. At the micro-level, adjacent groups along the fault lines between civilizations struggle, often violently,

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over the control of territory and each other. At the macro-level, states from different civilizations compete for relative military and economic power, struggle over the control of international institutions and third parties, and competitively promote their particular political religious values.61 Throughout his theory, Huntington stresses the confrontation between West and non-West, especially the possible connection between Confucianism and Islam that might become the greatest threat to the West. Therefore, Huntington ends with a demarcation of political conflicts and economic powers. His realistic concern is much greater than his theoretical concern. Especially his view that the “clash of civilizations” always happens along the fault lines of civilizations does not hold either in the empirical test of history or in theoretical analysis. From the viewpoint of history, the past two world wars both happened in Europe, not along the “fault line of civilizations.” Theoretically, the difference between civilizations does not entail contradiction or conflict between civilizations. In the current and future international community, the possible wars would be basically caused by white-hot competition and conflicts between economic interests of different countries, not by a clash of civilizations. Moreover, he ignores the role of modern nation-states, especially the possibility that a modern nation-state can change its own mode of culture to pursue national interests in the course of economic globalization, especially China, though considered a Confucian country by Huntington, has been endeavoring to learn from the model of Western civilization rather than to confront it. The current situation is that China and the West have different ideologies, but the future conflict between the West and China will be by no means a conflict between Western civilization and Confucian Chinese civilization; rather, future conflict would be caused by competition between the interests of China as a developing country and those of American and European nation-states. And even this conflict of interests will not necessarily lead to wars between countries, for they could be alleviated or annihilated by rational negotiation and reasonable trade. Some Japanese and Western scholars are worried that a rich and powerful Chinese nation which has a long history is rising and competing with them in the world market. They usually use their economic and cultural advantages to raise the issue of the “Chinese threat,” against which we should be clear-headed and cautious. Contrary to Huntington, Tu Wei-ming (杜维明), a Chinese professor at Harvard University maintains the principle of “cultural dialogue.” He holds that Huntington’s “clash of civilizations” is a narrative of West-centricity and is based on a mode of polarizing thinking and shows clearly the mindset of maintaining the supremacy of the West. The greatest mistake in his theory is that he treats culture as a static structure, and from a geopolitical viewpoint he divides the globe into several systems: West, Japan, Confucianism, Islam, Hinduism, and Latin America. In fact, “civilization is basically a dynamic development, just like a river. All great civilizations have influenced one another.”62 Tu holds,

98 The “kingly Way” and international peace Huntington’s understanding of Confucianism is outdated, and is very dubious. He was greatly influenced by Lucian Pye. He heard Lee Kuan Yew’s criticism of Western human rights, liberty and democracy, which aggravated his prejudice that the Confucian tradition is incompatible with modern democracy. In fact, there is a spirit of inclusive humanism in the tradition of Confucianism. It is possible that Confucianism could interact healthily with Western democracy.63 Tu criticizes Western humanism since the Enlightenment for being “exclusive, aggressive to nature, and anthropocentric.” Confucian civilization is a form of inclusive humanism, and therefore it is possible that Confucianism and Christianity can interact healthily. He believes that it is against the common sense of history to exclude Japan from the circle of Confucian culture. “Although Japan may not be fully influenced by Confucian culture, it should not be excluded, and this exclusion is inconsistent with Japan’s current consideration (at both governmental and non-governmental levels) to return to Asia.”64 Tu admits that conflicts between civilizations might be inevitable in some areas, but he believes that the general direction for the future of world civilization is “dialogue.” He says, “I think, there must be a variety of conflicts and contradictions in the process of readjustment all over the world. However, it is an inexorable trend that peaceful coexistence will be attained through coordination, regional and global cooperation.”65 Tu’s theory of cultural dialogue is based on his view that the world community has emerged. He says, due to the development of science and technology, areas in all corners of the world have been connected in the network of relations by information, transportation, trade, and finance. Under the condition that the eco-environment and energy resources are problems that transcend the boundaries of countries, it has become an evident truth for intellectuals that nowadays human communities of different races, areas, languages, cultures, classes, and religions should seek the way of harmonious coexistence. If we take into consideration the problem of nuclear war, the deterioration of the ecosystem, pollution of the environment, the crisis of energy, and the social disorder caused by population explosion, it will become obvious that human beings should cooperate to create a mode of harmonious coexistence.66 As to the problem of “cultural dialogue,” Tu proposes an ethics of the responsibility of development, and reflects on and criticizes Western exclusive humanism since the Enlightenment. He elaborates and promotes the inclusive humanism in Confucian culture, and believes that “the shu dao (恕道, the reciprocal way) that lies in the Confucian spirit of benevolence and righteousness” is “the cardinal value necessary for the mode of harmonious coexistence. This value is on the one hand respect for others (Confucius’s “do not do unto others what you do not want them to do to you”), on the other hand a commitment to

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oneself (Confucius’s “A man of humanity, wishing to establish his own character, also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be prominent himself, also helps others to be prominent”). From mutual respect the golden rule is deduced, from the commitment to oneself a sense of responsibility for society can be cultivated. This approach is better at fostering mutual understanding between human beings than those “truths” imposed on specific individuals, communities, religions, countries, and cultures, and more capable of developing an ethics of responsibility than altruism.”67 As a Chinese scholar, Tu extracts from traditional Chinese culture the idea of cultural dialogue, providing Chinese intellectual resources for international peace. It is thought-provoking that he borrows the Confucian inter-personal ethics and develops it into an international ethics. He seeks to criticize the Western Enlightenment’s “exclusive humanism” from the perspective of Confucian “inclusive humanism,” which might not be fair in methodology, for he stresses only the advantages of one side and only the disadvantages of the other. Thus it could be greatly challenged both in theoretical and in real-world dimensions. In a word, both Huntington’s theory of “the clash of civilizations” and Tu’s “cultural dialogue” are cultural theories of relations among nation-states in the contemporary world. The former focuses on the interests of countries, and is continuous with the mode of thinking in the Cold War and ideological conflicts. The latter focuses on the fact of globalization caused by the modern international integration of trade and manufacturing, as well as its accompanying problems. Tu proposes an ethics of responsibility with the aim of supporting a global harmonious coexistence. From this starting point of theorization it corrects the prejudice of the theory of “the clash of civilizations.” Huntington stresses interests and power, while Tu emphasizes responsibility and duties. If the strong countries do not listen to the needs of the weak at all, then the supposed dialogue would become a monologue, and no mutual understanding or communication are achieved. Therefore, as regards the current issue of international peace, I wonder whether we could propose a more comprehensive approach, and ponder the question of international politics from the basis of human nature. On the one hand, this approach emphasizes the domestic overall national strength; on the other hand, it adopts the way of attracting and integrating other communities by moral virtues, which is deduced from Confucius’s belief in the strength of moral virtue in bringing peace to the world.

7.4 A possible dimension for a theory of international peace: the Confucian “kingly Way for all under Heaven” based on humanitarianism Contrary to the tendency of Christianity to preach the “truth” it believes in, in Confucius’s view of politics based on moral virtue, as well as in other views of the “kingly Way for all under Heaven” developed by the great Confucians such as Mencius and Xunzi, a form of politics of the kingly Way has been proposed

100 The “kingly Way” and international peace in which world peace could be achieved through attracting foreign peoples by cultivating the virtue of the politicians and the people. As Confucius says, “when distant subjects are unsubmissive one cultivates one’s moral virtue in order to attract them.”68 This political principle in dealing with the relations among different feudal states in the late Spring and Autumn period, if transformed and articulated in modern language, could be developed into a new thought in dealing with contemporary international relations. That is, any civilized countries, though they might hold that they maintain a system of good political ideals, should not impose this system of ideals on other nations. Rather, on the basis of peaceful economic and cultural exchanges, they should only do their best so that other nations could automatically be attracted to them and follow the guidance of their own political ideals. From Confucius to Mencius and Xunzi, the basic spirit is consistent: that the foundation of government is the way of benevolence. Mencius says that “had it been necessary to perpetrate one wrongful deed or to kill one innocent man in order to gain the Empire, none of them would have consented to it.”69 Such is the bottom line for the politics of “kingly Way for all under Heaven.” To combine it with the humanitarianism developed from modern Western society, the “kingly Way for all under Heaven” contains the following political proposals. First, the fundamental principle of political legitimacy is respect for the life of individual human beings. This principle is consistent with the theory of human rights developed from Western modern society, but more fundamental than the latter. Were the life of an individual human being not respected, other human rights (such as property, thought, and freedom of speech) would be groundless. Therefore, if human rights are to be respected, the existence of human life is the most basic right. In dealing with conflicts of interests or values and ideals, the most simple and obvious truth is the priority of existence of human life. Therefore, the basic principle for international politics and domestic politics is the same; in international politics, priority should be given to human life over the sovereignty of countries. Second, all humanitarian concerns in international affairs should be limited to humanitarian assistance, and should not be used as an excuse for the use of force. Especially when there is difference between cultures and faiths among different countries or nations, no party is allowed to proclaim itself to be the sole holder or defender of truth and wage a “holy war” against other parties. Nor may anyone use ideology as an excuse to impose economic sanctions on another country that might jeopardize or harm the normal life of the people in another country, because the direct victims of economic blockade are in most cases the people rather than the rulers of the country in economic blockade. Third, wars in international society are reasonable only under the following condition: when a country or a nation threatens the existence of another country or the life of another nation. If so, the current international organization may authorize and organize joint forces from various countries to wage war out of humanitarian concern. Such is a reasonable extension of the meaning of the Confucian political ideal of the kingly Way expressed in Confucius’s saying that

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ideally “the rites and music and punitive expeditions are initiated by the Emperor.” Although the United Nations in the contemporary world is not an equivalent of the Emperor of the Zhou Dynasty, the United Nations could serve as an embodiment of international social daoyi (Way and righteousness) or justice and carry out humanitarian assistance and limited military punitive expeditions. Finally, in dealing with an autocratic country or other non-democratic countries, as long as they do not wage wars, their governments should not be overthrown by means of wars; rather, economic and cultural means should be used to call upon the peoples in these countries to fight for liberty domestically. The economic and cultural attraction or pressure could cause a country or an entity of civilization to adopt a humanitarian political form. In humanitarian punitive expeditions against autocratic or non-democratic countries, the target should be strictly limited to the countries’ rulers and soldiers actively engaged in war, and should by no means be extended to the civilian population. Those soldiers wounded and captured should be taken care of out of humanitarian concern and not be maltreated.70 To sum up, the construction of a new ethics for international politics is the most urgent cultural task in the current process of globalization. Although each country’s strategy is made according to their own interests, the humanitarian principle should be given the first priority over human rights and the sovereignty of a country. Otherwise, using the excuse of human rights and the sovereignty of a country to interfere with the domestic affairs in another country would be hypocrisy and political trickery.71 The contemporary system of international laws affirms the foundational position of the notion of nation-states. Thus a new ethical principle of international politics needs to specify the basic responsibility of nation-states. An international society that focuses on rights but ignores humanitarianism and responsibility will end up in a state of jungle law, and is obviously incapable of maintaining perpetually peaceful interaction between nation-states, because if each nation-state safeguards only its own rights, they would compete with each other in developing arms, and might eventually use force to settle economic disputes. Therefore, the new international ethics should at least establish the value of responsibility and the Confucian view of basing political influence on moral virtue. In international affairs, the strong countries should not force other nation states to adopt their own cultures and values, nor should they, in securing their own interests, use democracy and liberty or other values as an excuse to wage wars against other countries. The proper way for a country should be first of all to administrate itself well, open itself up to the world, and engage itself in peaceful and fair economic and cultural exchange, so that other nation-states will feel an affinity to a more reasonable form of civilization and choose it automatically. To be sure, any theorization is powerless when facing the reality of power politics. However, the task of a theorist is to provide principles for a better human existence. As to whether the principles are adopted by politicians in reality, it is beyond the competence of a theorist. Mencius says, “A great craftsman does not put aside the plumb-line for the benefit of the clumsy carpenter. Yi did

102 The “kingly Way” and international peace not compromise on his standards of drawing the bow for the sake of the clumsy archer.”72 The ideal of international politics based on the Confucian “kingly Way for all under Heaven” (or the view that political influence should be based on moral virtue) might seem too unrealistic in the international society of power politics, but it is nonetheless a possible direction that could guide mankind to world peace.

Notes 1 Confucius, The Analects of Confucius (Lun Yu, 论语), trans. D.C. Lau, 16.1, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 301. 2 Confucius, Analects, 255–257. 3 Confucius, Analects, 257. 4 Confucius, Analects, 303. 5 Confucius, Analects, 233. 6 Confucius, Analects, 15. 7 Mencius, 1A:3, in Book of Mencius, trans. D.C. Lau, New York: Penguin Books, 1970, 51. 8 Mencius, 4B:21, 131. 9 Mencius 1A:7, 58. 10 Mencius, 2A:5, 82. In D.C. Lau’s translation. “tian xia” (天下) is translated as “the Empire.” In this chapter, however, “tian xia” is translated literally as “all under Heaven.” 11 Mencius, 1A:3, 52. 12 Mencius, 1A:7, 54. 13 Mencius, 1A:7, 56. 14 Mencius, 1B:4, 63. 15 Mencius, 7B:3, 194. 16 Mencius, 7B:13, 196. 17 Mencius, 7B:1, 194. 18 Mencius, 7B:2, 194. 19 Mencius, 7B:4, 195. 20 Mencius 2A:2, 79. 21 Mencius 2A:3, 80. 22 Mencius 2B:1, 85. 23 Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 2, trans. John Knoblock, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1990, 94–95. 24 Xunzi, vol. 2, 98. 25 Xunzi, vol. 2, 100. 26 Xunzi, vol. 2, 101. 27 Xunzi, vol. 2, 101. 28 Xunzi, vol. 2, 101–102. 29 Xunzi, vol. 2, 98. 30 Xunzi: A Translation and Study of the Complete Works, vol. 3, trans. John Knoblock, Stanford: Stanford University Press, 1994, 265. 31 Xunzi, vol. 2, 110. 32 See Immanuel Kant (康德), On Perpetual Peace (Yong Jiu He Ping Lun, 永久和平论), Li Shi Li Xing Pi Pan Wen Ji (历史理性批判文集), Beijing: Commercial Press (Shang Wu Yin Shu Guan, 商务印书馆), 1990. 33 Bertrand Russell (伯特兰罗素), The Proposed Roads to Freedom (Zi You Zhi Lu, 自由之路 (下), vol. 2, Beijing: Culture and Art Publishing House (Wen Hua Yi Shu Chu Ban She, 文化艺术出版社), 1998, 435.

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34 Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, Beijing: Foreign Languages Press, 1970, 35. 35 Marx and Engels, Manifesto, 31. 36 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999b, 9–10. 37 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 6. 38 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 63. 39 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 19. 40 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 51. 41 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 53. 42 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 54. 43 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 95. 44 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 106. 45 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 107. 46 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 107. 47 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 107. 48 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 108. 49 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 111. 50 Rawls, Law of Peoples, 114. 51 Samuel P. Huntington, “The Clash of Civilizations?” Foreign Affairs, vol. 72, no. 3 (1993), 22. 52 Huntington, “Clash,” 24. 53 Huntington, “Clash,” 24. 54 Huntington, “Clash,” 24. 55 Huntington, “Clash,” 25. 56 Huntington, “Clash,” 25–26. 57 Huntington, “Clash,” 26. 58 Huntington, “Clash,” 27. 59 Huntington, “Clash,” 27. 60 Huntington, “Clash,” 28. 61 Huntington, “Clash,” 29. 62 Tu Wei-ming (杜维明), Collected Works of Tu Wei-ming (Du Wei Ming Wen Ji, 杜维明文集), Wuhan: Wuhan Publishing House (Wu Han Chu Ban She, 武汉出 版社), 2002, 474. Translation mine. 63 Tu Wei-ming, Collected Works, 474. 64 Tu Wei-ming, Collected Works, 475. 65 Tu Wei-ming, Collected Works, 479. 66 Tu Wei-ming, Collected Works, 484. 67 Tu Wei-ming, Collected Works, 485. 68 Confucius, Analects, 301. 69 Mencius, 2A:2, 79. 70 For a meticulous discussion of this topic, see Rawls’s Law of Peoples. 71 Recently revealed documents show that the war waged by joint forces led by the American government represented by George W. Bush was not for the sake of liberty or democracy, but merely served the interests of his family, the arms dealers, and the global strategy of the USA. 72 Mencius, 7A:41, 191.

Part III

8

Freedom in the history of Chinese thought Vocabulary, concept, and idea

Traditional Chinese thought is replete with divergent concepts of freedom, whether these are ideas or merely notions. However, the ideal of freedom has not been credited as a positive value in the tradition of humane civilization. Especially in old monarchical societies, freedom is treated as opposed to order. Since humane civilization has always regarded order well, freedom often fails to get its deserved recognition. Freedom was not regarded as an affirmative intellectual value by Chinese society until Yan Fu, Liang Qichao, and others spread the political ideals of modern Western systems. Actually, the ideal of freedom has only been advocated by a few intellectuals who believed in Western democracy during part of the 20th century. Examples are the Chinese Communists who made use of the idea of democracy as a positive value while fighting against the tyranny of the Beiyang warlords and the Nationalist Party. Often the idea of freedom is an obscure one, while its positive value and significance are expressed by examples (such as the design of the modern constitutional system). Until now, Chinese people have been afraid of discussing the problem of freedom publicly and deeply in the official media and press, and also still reject the ideal of freedom in the construction of many political systems. Hence a serious investigation is in order as to why China has rejected the ideal of freedom in the design of political structures in modern times. In this chapter, depending on the ideas or concepts of freedom appearing in the traditional and Chinese attitudes to the idea of freedom throughout its long history, the author will analyze the causes both historically in the Chinese intellectual tradition and also analytically in the relation between freedom and arbitrariness as discussed in the psychology of culture, without, however, making any practical recommendations for action. We can see subconscious misunderstandings of freedom as arbitrariness, such as Mao Zedong regarding freedom as anarchic, the Kuomintang in Taiwan suppressing the idea of freedom, and Yin Haiguang’s defence of freedom. These cases show this misunderstanding’s influence in political life, and also provide one reason why both the Kuomintang and the Chinese Communist Party have rejected the idea of freedom over a long period.

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8.1 Analysis of the meaning of freedom as a concept in traditional Chinese thought In Chinese classics, the word ziyou (freedom) as a disyllabic word first appears probably in Hou Han Shu (History of the Later Han). In Shi Ji (Records of the Historian), it says that “poverty or wealth is ziyou [dependent on oneself], regardless of what one is given or deprived of.”1 However, this ziyou (freedom) is not the term to be used as the disyllable, and it only means that poverty or wealth is caused by one’s own conduct. As a disyllabic phrase, ziyou (freedom) first appears in Hou Han Shu (History of the Later Han), for example, in the chapter “An Si Yan Huang Hou Ji” (Basic Annals of Queen An Si Yan): Hence, with Jin as the Wei Wei [captain] and Yao as the Cheng Men Jiao Wei [lieutenant of the city gate], Yan also controls the power; those three brothers, as the authority in power, could ziyou [freely] get the fortune and realize the might.2 In Lei Hui Zhuan (The Treatises of Lei Hui), it says: At that time, with Wang Diao as the He Nan Yin [Chief Executive of Henan Province] and Li Fu as the Luo Yang Lin [Mayor of Luoyang], they both had an intimate relationship with Dou Shan, so they let him act ziyou [freely as according to his will].3 But in both cases, ziyou (freedom) works as a verb and also works as the inverted term youzi (by one’s self) – which means doing things according to one’s will. Although it implies “freedom” in the modern sense, yet the essential meaning is arbitrariness. From the above two examples, we know that ziyou (freedom) in traditional culture is used with those behaviors violating the normal system, and means “arbitrariness” in a negative sense to criticize the roisterous way of the three brothers Yanjin, Yanyao, Yanyan, and Leihui. After Hou Han Shu (History of the Later Han), ziyou (freedom) always appears as a disyllabic phrase. Now from the appearances of ziyou (freedom) as the disyllabic phrase in Er Shi Wu Shi (Twenty Five Histories of Dynasties), we can disclose the meaning and value of ziyou (freedom) from the following three aspects: (1) Ziyou (freedom) in the negative sense, as individual arbitrariness, conflicts with the system: one can say in this way that, from the beginning, in the Chinese historical classics, ziyou (freedom) appears in the derogatory sense of individual arbitrariness, which is incompatible with the normal system. The above examples have shown this point clearly. The following cases also will show that even the emperor himself cannot do things by his will alone. In Hou Han Shu (History of the Later Han), it says:

Freedom in the history of Chinese thought 109 In the July of the third year of Yongshou, the ground of Hedong splits,; at that time, Ji, the brother of the Empress Liang, holds the political power, and the Emperor Huan wants ziyou [freedom], which the government is worried about.4 Also, Hou Han Shu (History of the Later Han) quotes Yinshao’s Feng Xu Tong (Works of Customs): The ancestors of Dong are together with Liang. Until the first year of Guangxi, Dongzhuo comes to court, and seizes the opportunity, then dethrones the emperor and kills the empress, reigns over the whole government, issues orders ziyou [freely], slaughters more than ever, and his power is greater than the emperor’s.5 In the “Wu Qiu Jian Zhuan” (The Treatise of Wu Qiu Jian) of San Guo Zhi (Record of the Three Kingdoms), it says: “But [Si Ma] Shi desires to act ziyou [freely], disobeys the appanage, and holds the power by himself without any obligation, and that is his fourth crime.”6 And the treatise lists among the crimes of Si Ma Shi that he encroaches upon the power of the emperor as a minister. In the “Xin Fa Zhi” (The Treatises of Criminal Law) of Jin Shu (History of the Jin), it says: During the period of Xiankang, Yu Bing likes to legislate severe law that is very complicated, to castigate people; later the law becomes more tolerant, and severe or tolerant is ziyou [free], as a result the law does not work efficiently.7 And in the “Wang Jun Zhuan” (The Biography of Wangjun) of Jin Shu (History of the Jin), it says, “The imperial government issues the official document that says I suddenly abandon the wise institution, and do things ziyou (freely).”8 In the “Xiu Kun Zhuan” (The Monograph of Liu Kun), volume 62 of Jin Shu (History of the Jin), it says: If you the wise emperor are still so tolerant, and do not see the situation clearly, then the dissatisfied people would imitate the way of Duan Pidi, and kill ziyou [freely], and justify their behavior arbitrarily according to their wills; according to what reason could you as the emperor kill him?9 In the “Bian Hu Zhuan” (The Monograph of Bian Hu) of the Jin Shu (History of the Jin), it says: Just like what the father of Shi promises on his death, it is necessary to justify the name and title, otherwise it would be baseless only according to the rite. If the husband wants to divorce, he must have reasons; also there is no reason to keep the divorced wife in the house to serve the husband.

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Freedom in the history of Chinese thought Supposing the father of Shi, when he is in confusion as he is dying, permits his wife the ziyou [freedom] to leave, which must be against the rite. Then his wife does not know whether she should leave or stay. At this time Shi should help her shift from the position of his father’s concubine to be his father’s wife … and treat her, the stepmother, as his birth mother, that is what the saints teach us. Shi, as the famous intellectual, disobeys the rite inside the family, which never happens in history, and his behavior is neither good for memorializing his dead father nor filial towards his mother. After the death of her husband, if the wife is alive and you let her have the ziyou [freedom] to leave, if she dies, you let her be buried together with the strangers. What Shi does could be called serving the living without rite or burying the dead without rite.10

In the “Dai Fa Xing Zhuan Fu Chao Shang Zhi Zhuan” (The Monograph of Dai Faxing and Chao Shangzhi) in the Song Shu (History of the Song), it says: After the death of Dai Faxing, the emperor sends the document to Chao Shangzhi, which says: “I inherit this empire, rule the whole country, and confide with all former ministers, all of which is known by the whole of society. I did not expect Dai Faxing to rely on the boon from me, to lord over others, to violate the law out of greed for money, to issue orders ziyou [freely], and to commit so many crimes that he comes to such an end. I know that you all are faithful to your duties, but there are so many different remarks which are difficult to verify or falsify in society, that not only would these remarks scare the people, but also would cause the crimes, then I might order an investigation, all of which is contrary to my original hope. So now I am concerned with various affairs, pay attention to the small matters, and I hope that you all do your best.”11 The word freedom appears in these passages as a derivative of the verb, and it is used in the derogatory sense, referring to personal arbitrainess and the breach of institutional rules. (2) Freedom as a positive value adapting to the demands of the system: certainly, adapting to the demands of the system, there would be a positive sense in the term ziyou (freedom). In San Guo Zhi, “Wei Zhi” (Record of the Three Kingdoms, The Book of Wei), it says, “Today there are groups of powerful ministers and eunuchs together, vicious as the merchants in the market, so there is no ziyou (freedom) for the emperor, whose commands come from others.”12 The powerful ministers and eunuchs take charge of the government and the public, and that disturbs the absolute monarchist political system with the focus on imperial power, so the emperor cannot freely issue orders to every part of the country, and that would be a political problem. Therefore, there must be a positive sense in the freedom of will for the emperor himself.

Freedom in the history of Chinese thought 111 Sometimes the San Guo Zhi (Record of the Three Kingdoms) commends the free commanding of famous generals, such as Sun Ce’s trust in Tai Shici, consenting to his own decisions in leading troops freely. In the “Jiang Biao Zhuan” (The Treatise of Jiangbiao), it says: Sun Ce says to Tai Shici, “Li Mu has blamed my help for the Yuans attacking the city of Lu Jiang, and his tone is very trivial and his reason is also not sufficient, why? Because at that time, several thousand soldiers under the charge of my father are all in the territory of Gong Lu. I have the will to create a new cause, so I cannot be unyielding from Gong Lu and try to get my former troops. And I get only a thousand soldiers for going twice. But Gong Lu still wants me to attack Lu Jiang. And I have no other choice in this situation. But later he does not obey the duty of a minister, surrendering himself, and he tries to fight against the emperor. And he does not accept my suggestion. Although friendship is important in relations between gentlemen, yet facing this important event we have to break up; that is the whole story from my knowing Gong Lu to our breaking up. Now Liu Yao is dead and I really regret that I should have clarified this matter before his death. And his son now is in the Yu Zhang, and I wonder how Hua Zi Yu treats him and whether his former troops still follow him? You are a native and also worked for him before. Would you like to go and visit his son and inform his troops of my idea? And the troops who would like to come with him could come; also you should take care of the others who would not. By the way, check what is the state of Hua Zi Yu’s administration and see whether the people in Lu Lin and Po Yang would like to adhere to him. The need for soldiers for your troops, you can ziyou [freely] decide.”13 Here, ziyou (by yourself) is not the disyllabic phrase, but it shows Sun Ce’s affirmative attitude to his favorite general regarding his freedom to make decisions. It seems to be recognized as an approval of the notion of freedom. Again, in the Zhu Huan Zhuan (The Biography of Zhuhuan), it says: “Zhuhuan likes to fight in the front, and feels shameful about being commanded by others, so every time in the battlefield, if he cannot issue orders ziyou [freely], he would feel very angry.”14 In the “Zheng Xian Zhi Zhuan” (The Biography of Zheng Xianzhi) of Song Shu (History of the Song), it says, in the sixth year of Yixi, Zheng Xianzhi lets the law-officer Qiu Quan present the memorandum to the emperor to impeach Yi; it says, “Luo Daosheng usually opens letters from the officials to the emperor and documents from the emperor to the officials secretly, then he would reveal the classified information. And according to the law, he should be beheaded in the street. But when it is reported to execute the criminal, Yi considers that Luo Daosheng is the marquis, so he suspends the report and plans to excuse him. Although Yi has a good reputation and he is lower only than the prime minister, yet he may not decide the punishment of the criminal,

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Freedom in the history of Chinese thought and he should not give Luo Daosheng ziyou [freedom]. Furthermore, it has been already reported that the criminal would be executed, but his release does not ask for instruction from his superior, which should be called acting beyond his authority. Although the minister Zheng Xianzhi is the nephew of Yi, yet he should not be entangled in this according to the law. I pray the emperor to dismiss Yi from his office.”15

Also in the “Di Hu Zhuan-Lue Yang Qing Shui Di Yang Shi Zhuan”(The Biography of Di Hu – The Biography of Lue Yang Qing Shui Di Yang Shi) of Song Shu (History of the Song), it says, “Being alive by betrayal, rather than dying with innocence. All officers are very angry, because they are controlled without ziyou [freedom].”16 In the Nan Qi Shu (History of the Southern Qi), volume 50, “Ming Qi Wang Zhuan-Po Yang Wang Bao Yin Zhuan” (The Biographies of Seven Ming Princes – The Biography Of Po Yang Wang Bao Yin), Bao Yin cries out saying, “That day I don’t know the one who forces me to get on the carriage, and I want to escape but cannot. I have no ziyou [freedom].”17 The above examples in the historical texts show that, in traditional Chinese political or martial lives, especially under particular circumstances, such as when supporting royalty, individual free will is approved of. And the word ziyou in the sentence “he should not give Luo Daosheng ziyou [freedom]” in the Song Shu (History of the Song) is used as a noun for the first time, which is similar to its meaning of the right to liberty in contemporary political philosophy. (3) As a new concept, freedom carries a meaning of “the personal right to choose and act independently” in the later Qing Dynasty. In the “Xuan Tong Huang Di Ben Ji” (Basic Annals of the Emperor Xuantong), volume 25 of Qing Shi Gao (Draft History of the Qing), there first appears the word ziyou (freedom): “The State Department wants consent that we should use the Gregorian calendar, and that people are granted the ziyou [freedom] to have their hair cut, and the emperor has approved it.”18 It is the earliest text in Chinese standard history that affirms the right to liberty of the common people, which is very valuable. In Record 128, “Bang Jiao Zhi” (Records of International Relations), volume 153 of Qing Shi Gao (Draft History of the Qing), it says: Russia still has ziyou [freedom] of trade along the whole Yangtze River, does not recognize the distinction between the commercial port and the hinterland, and regards river transportation the same as road-carriage, but different from sea transportation, and does not change this until a long time later.19 In Record 4, “Bang Jiao Zhi” (Records of International Relations) of Qing Shi Gao (Draft History of the Qing), it says: In the Sino-American “Continuation Treaty” of the fourth year of Tongzhi, its fifth item says, “people in both countries have the ziyou [freedom] to go

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to the other country.” Recently local residents of San Francisco evinced hatred towards the Chinese for taking away their job opportunities, and there was tension. Last year the Congress considered a bill to limit immigration from China, but it was rejected by the President. Also last year there was another argument in America. This was that with the idea of harsh treatment of Chinese people (through the note of vice-ambassador Rong Hong to the American Department of Foreign Affairs), the new policy on the Chinese is not true to the treaty. This is because the American government conducts inequitable policies concerning Chinese people. It is the “Continuation Treaty” that contributes most to protecting the Chinese in America. Today America sends messengers to our China, and we are worried about the bowdlerizing of the treaty; please send officers and discuss it.20 The word ziyou (freedom) in the last two historical texts, from the context, shows that the ministers in the late Qing Dynasty obviously reject the idea of freedom. However, in these two texts, one involves national sovereignty, the other relates to the difference between two nations’ attitudes to citizens, so it discloses more about the complexity of Chinese thought about the value of freedom. The compilation of Qing Shi Gao (Draft History of the Qing) dates to the 11th year of Chinese Republic (1922), but we can discern that the authors of the compilation still resist the value of freedom, meanwhile Yan Fu and Liang Qichao have already introduced the notion of freedom into the broader Chinese community of intellectuals. Certainly, in the literary tradition, the value of the word “freedom” has long been affirmed by some poets. In the poems of Du Fu and Liu Zongyuan, there is constant admiration of the value of freedom. Such as one occasion in a poem by Du Fu, “Go out without dependence, hike feeling ziyou [free].” Another one is in a poem by Liu Zongyuan, “not ziyou [free] to pick the duckweed.” It is because the standard history represents the dominant ideology of a society that the quoted materials are mainly from the standard history. This dominant ideology can reflect the essential features of the national ideal. Viewing the historical text in “Er Shi Wu Shi” (Twenty Five Histories of Dynasties), one sees that the understanding of the idea and value of freedom in official Chinese ideology since the dynasties of Qin and Han is complicated. In addition, there are changes in the understanding because of communication between Chinese and Western cultures. Detailed, concrete research should be developed into the idiographic historical events and the history of institutions. Here we merely provide the opportunity to consider a few historical cases. And compared to contemporary usage of the word, “freedom” is just a common term and not a precise philosophical concept. But it is difficult to research the notion of freedom in traditional Chinese culture, since in ancient China the idea of freedom was not usually expressed by the word ziyou (freedom).

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8.2 Thought on freedom as an ideal in Chinese philosophy As an ideal, freedom in the modern sense does not take the form that “freedom” has in Chinese thought. But to some extent, there is an idea of freedom in preQing Confucianism and Taoism.21 Ren zhen (let one’s true self be) and ren ziran (let nature be) in Taoism and wei ji zhi xue (study for oneself) and the ideal of da zhang fu ren ge (the personality of a gentleman) in Confucianism, both imply the meaning of pursuing virtual freedom, from which follow other issues, such as individual free will in modern Western philosophy, and which also relates to political freedom in some sense. First, the notion of “nature” regarded by Taoists implies germinating the idea of freedom. In political philosophy, Laozi always insists that the ruler should honor the Dao (Way) and respect the De (Virtue): “the sage manages affairs without action, and spreads doctrines without words,” and “all things arise, and he does not turn away from them,” also “he produces them, but does not take possession of them. He acts, but does not rely on his own ability. He accomplishes his task, but does not claim credit for it.”22 This is the connotative tendency of the thought of freedom in the political philosophy of Laozi. The most substantial contribution to Chinese classical thought on freedom comes from Zhuangzi. On the one hand, he highlights individual free will, and puts forward the ideal of you xin (flying away); on the other hand, he talks about freedom in the epistemological sense. In xiao yao you (free and easy wandering), he shows the ideal of “there is one who chariots upon the normality of the universe, rides upon the transformation of the six elements, and thus makes excursion in the infinite,”23 which embodies the living stage that you would grasp the law of change in nature, then attain the level of freedom as to “set one’s mind in flight by going along with things as they are.” And that socalled cheng wu (going along with things as they are), that is as the host to rein things, also that is “using things rather than being alienated by things,” that is, not as the slave of the objects, which has always been emphasized by Zhuangzi. Generally speaking, there are two meanings in the concept of “things” in Zhuangzi’s thought: one is naturally existing reality, and the other is social reality (including various systems and customs). For naturally existing reality, Zhuangzi mainly accentuates “following the laws of objects,” understanding the changing nature of objects, and fitting in with objects. As for social reality Zhuangzi’s attitude is more complicated, but one aspect of it is being content with destiny: “intimacy of filiations, and righteousness in the liege relationship, cannot escape from the world between the heaven and earth,” and you could only be at peace with fate when you are confronted with these necessary laws. The other is avoiding or dissociating in the interspaces between opposites, such as in the “Yang Sheng Zhu” (essentials for maintaining good health), the story of a butcher carving a bullock, which discloses a way of avoiding the contradictions, working so as to “insert the thin edge of my knife into the crevices.”24 Or in the “Shan Mu” (a mountain tree), it is by “I would be in between useful and useless” to avoid encountering contradictions. But even the story of the

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butcher carving a bullock is based on knowing the contradictions of the things, to “cleave along the main seams and thrust the knife into the big cavities.”25 Therefore, somehow it refers to understanding the laws of contradictions in things; otherwise it can neither avoid the contradictions, nor win “passive freedom.” Furthermore about the problem of freedom, Zhuangzi gives a rich discussion on political freedom too. The chapter of “Zai You” (let be and let alone) typically reflects his idea of political freedom, and also other chapters, such as “Ma Ti” (the hooves of horses), too. Second, Confucianism in the pre-Qin era also discusses the idea of freedom in many different ways. Especially, from the view of moral philosophy, Confucius argues about the power and possibilities of free will which is expressed in the process of seeking after the good thus: “Being ren [humane] could only come by one’s self, how could it come by others?” – a quotation which well represents Confucius’s brilliant thought on virtuous freedom. Mencius also gives a high evaluation of the moral ideal of a person becoming a gentleman. He points out that the learning activity in the process towards this ideal goal is neither learning of cosmetology for the beauty of one’s body, nor learning as a sideshow for the pleasure of others, nor trading oneself into the family of the emperor. Instead, it is the study of accomplishment of one’s personality, as “deeply learning for the acquirement of self,” so it is a kind of learning for pursing individual spiritual freedom. Xunzi inherits Kongzi’s idea of learning the gentleman’s art of cultivating personality. Beyond that, however, Xunzi makes deep and refined arguments for the free mind of human beings. For him, there is the evidential character of freedom in the human mind: The mind is the lord of the body and master of the spiritual intelligence. It issues commands but does not receive commands. On its own authority it forbids or orders, renounces or selects, initiates or stops. Thus, the mouth can be forced to be silent or to speak. The body can be forced to crouch down or stretch out. But the mind cannot be forced to change its ideas. If the mind thinks something right, it will accept it; but if it thinks something wrong, then it will reject it. Therefore, it is said that the state of mind is such that of necessity it perceives on its own. No prohibition can be placed on what it selects. Its objects are diverse and extensive when it has perfect concentration; it is not divided in purpose.26 From this passage we can get the idea that because of the mind, we are essentially free. The mind cannot be forced to change its ideas. One can know where the mind initiates or stops. Although one can be forced to be silent, yet one cannot be imposed upon to change one’s ideas or to collapse a firm will. Its objects are diverse and extensive, but also the objects cannot submerge the mind. The mind can reach the state of the spirit that there is unity among

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contradictions, through filtration. From this point, Hsun Tzu establishes the inner basis for human freedom. Xunzi makes more inquiries: as humans have this kind of mind, which guarantees the root of freedom, why are the “minds” of common people in reality always in confused states? For Xunzi, only by making the “mind” peaceful could we let the “mind” show the character of independence and freedom. For example, if mind is deluded by external objects, or by doubts, or by intoxicants, in these circumstances the “mind” loses its independence and freedom. Therefore, the “free mind” could actualize its real freedom only by being in the rational state. Indulgence of desires only forfeits one’s freedom of mind. Actually, Xunzi reminds one that only by being rational can one be equipped with the capability of freedom. Only by being rational will one have real freedom. So Xunzi undertakes the art of commanding the mind from Zhuangzi, which is by “its emptiness, unity, and stillness,” ultimately being capable of knowing Dao, accordingly, in the presence of numerous allurements, then we could act rightly, and enter into the world of independence and freedom. Consequently, freedom of mind comes into being through the grasping of the Dao. The free mind reveals the spirituality in the rational state. Basically, Xunzi affirms the value of free will in the Confucian tradition of moral rationality. There is some spirit of freedom even in the thought of the Rationalistic School in Song and Ming. William Theodore de Bary makes a deep inquiry of the free spirit implied in the philosophy of education of the Rationalistic School in Song and Ming. He thinks that Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen in pedagogical activities in Northern Song and Southern Song Dynasties contribute effectively to the cultivation of free individual human personality. For example, there is reflection as valuable in learning in the thought of Chu Hsi, his “self-satisfaction as valuable in learning,” and “Confucius not as the criterion of right or wrong” but as the spirit of independent thinking in Wang Shou-jen. Both imply the formation of an independent human being. And there are many social causes for the movements of spiritual liberation after the later Ming. Yet it is indisputable that the spirit of curiosity, speculation, and reflection in the thought of Chu Hsi and Wang Shou-jen play an important role. There are here, however, no concepts of freedom in those reflections on freedom. Third, after the late Ming Dynasty radical thinkers represented by Li Zhi launched a revolution in the intellectual community. They brought forward the radical ideal of liberalism as “one following its favorites, one using its advantages.” At the same time, the traditional way of calling for the spirit of freedom is changed into the manner of liberating one’s natural disposition. As Fei Mi says: The different fortune of dynasties is just like the change of four seasons. And the distinctions in temperament are like the separation between water and fire … there are differences between talented people in different eras, high intelligence with poor knowledge or rich knowledge with poor

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understanding. … The world does not necessarily stay in the same way. Difference is good for harmoniousness.27 Huang Zongxi, Gu Yanwu, Wang Fu-chih, and other thinkers in the transition between Qing and Ming Dynasties give voice to the ideal of political freedom through criticism of outdated, despotic political institutions. From the point of selfish human nature, Huang Zongxi justifies individual righteousness in the pursuit of personal interests. He also warrants the relationships of scholars with monarchs even when the scholars are not officials in the government, thereby recognizing the individual freedom of intellectuals. As for the notions of freedom in the form of annotation from Tai Chen: “the tiny different sensual desires are making sense of distinction,” and “following its nature will lead back to necessity,” all these are the cultural resources that value the spirit of freedom in traditional Chinese thought. However, as these ideas of freedom did not gain their proper conceptual form, they would not become basic ideas of value. Under the tradition of courtesy and humane culture, the social order controlled by the idea of a superior ideology crushes the whole society. That is the difference in the essential tendency of valuation between traditional Chinese society and modern industrial society.

8.3 The theoretical reasons for the Chinese rejection of the idea of freedom from the perspective of the relationship between freedom and arbitrariness 8.3.1 Understanding the relation between freedom and arbitrariness in the Western intellectual tradition, with the example of Cicero’s Republic There are many discussions of the differences between freedom and arbitrariness in the Western tradition. Here we only take Cicero as an example. In The Republic, Cicero relates the political thoughts of Plato to show a deep suspicion of the liberty of people through the statements of Scipio. In such a state that “liberty prevails everywhere,” it necessarily follows: to such an extent that not only are homes one and all without a master, but the voice of anarchy extends even to the domestic animals, until finally the father fears his son, the son flouts his father, all sense of shame disappears, and all is so absolutely free that there is no distinction between citizen and alien; the schoolmaster fears and flatters his pupils, and pupils despise their masters; youths take on the gravity of age, and old men stoop to the games of youths, for fear they may be disliked by their juniors and seem to them too serious. Under such conditions even the slaves come to behave with unseemly freedom, wives have the same rights as their husbands, and in the abundance of liberty even the dogs, the horses, and the asses are so free in their running about that men must make way for them in the streets. Therefore, he [Plato] concludes, “the final result of this boundless license is

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The conclusion of Cicero seems similar: “But if the people hold the supreme power and everything is administered according to their desires, that is called liberty, but is really license.”29 Then, “For just as an excess of power in the hands of the aristocrats results in the overthrow of an aristocracy, so liberty itself reduces a people who possess it in too great degree to servitude.”30 8.3.2 Chinese Communists’ misunderstanding of the idea of freedom, in the case of Mao Zedong’s Combat Liberalism Written in 1937, Combat Liberalism, by Mao Zedong, is a criticism of the permanent traditions of the consciousness of boorish laxity, the vulgar philosophy of mediocre people, and the style of absolutism and bureaucratism in the government of Chinese society. This is not a comment on orthodox “Liberalism” since modern times in Western countries. Mao generalizes the idea of “liberalism” like this: viewed as a whole, liberalism rejects ideological struggle and stands for unprincipled peace, thus giving rise to a decadent, philistine attitude and bringing about political degeneration in certain units and individuals in the Party and the revolutionary organizations.31 Concretely speaking, liberalism manifests itself in these eleven ways: 1) To let things slide for the sake of peace and friendship when a person has clearly gone wrong, and to refrain from principled argument because he is an old acquaintance, a fellow townsman, or a schoolmate. 2) To indulge in irresponsible criticism in private instead of actively putting forward one’s suggestions to the organization. To show no regard at all for the principles of collective life but to follow one’s own inclination. 3) To let things drift if they do not affect one personally; to say as little as possible while knowing perfectly well what is wrong, to be worldly wise and play safe and seek only to avoid blame. 4) Not to obey orders but to give pride of place to one’s own opinions. To demand special consideration from the organization but to reject its discipline. 5) To indulge in personal attacks, pick quarrels, vent personal spite, or seek revenge instead of entering into an argument and struggling against incorrect views for the sake of unity or progress or getting the work done properly. 6) To hear incorrect views without rebutting them and even to hear counterrevolutionary remarks without reporting them, but instead to take them calmly as if nothing had happened.

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7) To be among the masses and fail to conduct propaganda and agitation or speak at meetings or conduct investigations and inquiries among them, and instead to be indifferent to them and show no concern for their well-being, forgetting that one is a Communist and behaving as if one were an ordinary non-Communist. 8) To see someone harming the interests of the masses and yet not feel indignant, or dissuade or stop him or reason with him, but to allow him to continue. 9) To work half-heartedly without a definite plan or direction; to work perfunctorily and muddle along – “So long as one remains a monk, one goes on tolling the bell.” 10) To regard oneself as having rendered great service to the revolution, to pride oneself on being a veteran, to disdain minor assignments while being quite unequal to major tasks, to be slipshod in work and slack in study. 11) To be aware of one’s own mistakes and yet make no attempt to correct them, taking a liberal attitude towards oneself. From the quoted original text and its main ideas, it seems that the liberalism criticized by Mao Zedong is totally different from the liberalism which Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu talk about. And later, Communists’ understanding of liberalism has mainly been influenced by Mao Zedong. The conception of “liberalism” in this sense will not only be combated by Communists, but also opposed by any organization and government with a spirit of responsibility. Nevertheless, what has been argued against by Mao Zedong as “liberalism” happens not to be the genuine matter of liberalism. And real liberalism undoubtedly would fight against this “fake liberalism.” The hero does not expect the fake one to ruin his fame. At the end, Mao Zedong analyzes the origin and the nature of liberalism and its jeopardizing of revolutionary enterprise, as well as its relation with Marxism. And he thinks, “liberalism stems from petty-bourgeois selfishness,” and “it places personal interests first and the interests of the revolution second, and this gives rise to ideological political and organizational liberalism.” And, “liberalism is a manifestation of opportunism and conflicts fundamentally with Marxism.” Therefore, it is negative and objectively has the effect of helping the enemy. And furthermore, “people who are liberals look upon the principles of Marxism as abstract dogma. They approve of Marxism, but are not prepared to practice it or to practice it in full.” Part of the analysis of Mao Zedong is reasonable, but most of it is misunderstanding due to his incomprehension. Liberalists care about personal interests, but that does not mean selfishness. Because liberalism specially emphasizes the dividing line of rights between the group and individual, and insists on reasonable self-regard. It is true that theoretically, liberalism is totally different from Marxism, and also against Marxism, but not in an abstract or dogmatic way. From the view of humanism, there are some common bases between liberalism and Marxism, and Marxism does not blindly exclude the idea of individual esteem in liberalism. Therefore, liberalism is not the deadly enemy of Marxism, and also has nothing to do with opportunism.

120 Freedom in the history of Chinese thought To sum up, the so-called “liberalism” criticized by Mao Zedong is not the one in modern Western intellectual history, but rather the unprofessional habits of laxity and discretion formed in Chinese feudalist society. These go against modern community and its embodiment in the proletarian revolutionary organization. The ideas and habits of this “fake liberalism” would be severely spurned by genuine liberalists. 8.3.3 Beholding the difficulties for modern Chinese to comprehend the notion of freedom through the discussion of Yin Haiguang on the distinction between freedom and arbitrariness Yin Haiguang, self-regarded as the son of the May Fourth Movement (Spirit of Science and Democracy), in the ruling period of the Kuomintang in Taiwan, writes many articles to argue for the rationality of liberalism, and one of the most important points is to distinguish liberalism from indulgence, and to make the point clear that freedom has nothing to do with chaotic social order. What he says in the “Implication of Liberalism” directly clarifies the misapprehension of freedom at that time. He says, “Now, as soon as one mentions liberalism, many people would associate it with laissez-faire doctrine immediately. It seems that liberalism inevitably implies laissez-faire doctrine. Furthermore, liberalism would become synonymous with a laissez-faire economy.”32 In the article “Understanding Freedom of Speech and Its Basic Conditions,” Yin Haiguang offers a critical view on the reasons for the restriction of free speech. He thinks: Freedom of speech itself does not need to have specific content or goals. It is one kind of tool. It can be used to rebel, or to put down the rebellion. It is unjust for the rebellious group to make use of free speech for the rebellion. But it would be right to put down the rebellion in free speech. Why can we not realize the just goal from the liberty of free speech, if it could be used by the rebellious group for an unjust purpose? And if we don’t affiliate with freedom of speech to achieve the right goal, but are scared of free speech, then what is the sticking point?33 The reason lies in their confusion of “freedom” with “indulgence.” “One who used to be indulgent but has not enjoyed genuine freedom would regard freedom as indulgence.” But in fact, “the intrinsic spirit and its starting point are absolutely different.” Hitler’s behavior is indulgent, while the political leaders of democratic nations are restricted by public opinion and the laws, and reflect morally on conscience; and also almost every detail in their lives should be fair and reasonable, otherwise there would be the anxiety of the probability of losing their powers.34

Freedom in the history of Chinese thought 121 He also says: The essential difference between freedom and indulgence could be reflected in speech. The rebellious group’s so-called “free speech” does equate to speech indulgence. That simply is action without responsibility. While with genuine free speech, just as with genuine freedom, its starting point is reason and duty. Since reason and duty are the starting point, it would be based on the scientific spirit and a just attitude. Since it is based on the scientific spirit and a just attitude, it would not make groundless accusations, or evade responsibility, tell a lie, or shoot at random; instead it would be earnestly based on conclusive evidence; also only those who say they will be responsible for the nation, for the country, and for the current dangerous situation would speak before the crisis, frankly and rationally, and give a straightforward account according to the matter. Isn’t such freedom of speech valuable? Should not the beginner in the study of democracy cultivate this kind?35 Finally he says: liberalism does not equate to laissez-faire doctrine, not even to the principle of indulgence. It includes the higher value of life and the real value of virtue. The fundamental distinction about the relation to human nature between liberalism and totalitarianism is that totalitarianism tends to chain human nature, while liberalism tends to set human nature free. Hence, liberalism cherishes individual difference, and advances individual development out of one’s potentiality to the utmost. By reason of this basic merit, therefore, democracy always defeats the totalitarian finally in the struggles between them.36 Yin Haiguang also analyses the historical and cultural reasons for the rejection of the idea of freedom for the Chinese or even East Asians. He says, To be honest, very few East Asians have the true self-conscious experience of free living. “In a state of disunity,” this type of life cannot be called freedom. Therefore, we are not certain of the real denotation of the concept “freedom,” and at best we only faintly hope and like it. In such cases, those who hate freedom but do not dare to attack freedom frontally, they interpret freedom as a very bad thing through fabricating some confused concepts, which results in some people’s misunderstandings in recent years, such as considering freedom to be laxity, or not obeying order, and so on.37 Moreover, Yin Haiguang refutes the specious idea that “excessive freedom would ruin freedom,” and regards it as illogical. “In fact, what ruins freedom is not freedom itself, but rather tyranny, indulgence, and violence.”38 Especially,

122 Freedom in the history of Chinese thought in despotic areas, people who attempt to overthrow the government always mobilize the masses through the propaganda of “freedom.” But once the stern reigning machine loosens or even disjoints, then there follows semi-anarchy or full anarchy. Usually after anarchy, wicked tyranny comes. With the emergence of wicked tyranny, the seed of freedom has been devastated.39 Therefore it becomes a vicious circle. For those who lack self-consciousness of free-living experience, they cannot make a distinction between freedom and indulgence. The indulgence of their conduct and speech can only show their inability to be responsible for their conduct and speech, and also their being incapable of self-discipline.40

8.4 Conclusion From the above broad outline one of the most important cognitive reasons that the mainstream of Chinese society and Chinese people since Qin and Han dynasties are so afraid of the notion of freedom becomes clear. It is because of their mistakenly relating freedom with indulgence. The essential feature of the culture of courtesy and humanization is to attach importance to the function and value of social order. And also in traditional agricultural society in the undeveloped conditions of transportation and communication, it is difficult to reign over such a big empire, and the ability to correct and deal with social disturbances is limited. The need for order crushes the appeal to open-minded and diverse lives. This dead-end habit of ideology still deeply constrains Chinese ideation until today, for politicians in particular. If we could theoretically distinguish freedom from indulgence, clarify the relation between freedom and responsibility, freedom and reason, then the Chinese would not be so afraid of the idea of freedom. Certainly, the point is not so simple. It still has something to do with the fact that international society does not stick to some valuable universal ideals. That is one of the reasons why we Chinese do not accept many of the ideas of liberalism in the 20th century. On this point, the article “Why Youths of May Fourth Abnegate ‘Liberalism’: Research on the Interactions between the Development of Significant Events and Ideas,”41 written by Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, provides new insight and useful references.

Notes 1 Si Ma Qian (司马迁), “Records of the Grand Historian” (Shi Ji, 史记), vol. 129, “Grouped Biographies of Merchants” (Huo Zhi Lie Zhuan, 货殖列传), 69, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局). 1959. 03255. 2 Fan Ye (范晔), “History of the Later Han” (Hou Han Shu, 后汉书), vol. 1, “Basic Annals of Queens 10” (Huang Hou Ji Di Shi, 皇后纪第十), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1965, 00437. 3 Fan Ye, “History of Later Han,” vol. 43, “Grouped Biographies of Zhu Le He 33” (Zhu Le He Lie Zhuan Di San Shi San, 朱乐何列传第三十三), 01478.

Freedom in the history of Chinese thought 123 4 Fan Ye, “History of Later Han,” vol. 106, “Treatises of Five Elements: 4 Sinking of the Ground” (Wu Xing Zhi Si-Di Xian Tiao, 五行志四•地陷条), 03334. 5 Fan Ye, “History of Later Han,” vol. 107, “Treatises of Five Elements: 5 The Illness of Humans” (Wu Xing Zhi Wu-Ren E Tiao, 五行志五•人疴条), 03346. 6 Chen Shou (陈寿), “Record of the Three Kindoms” (San Guo Zhi, 三国志), “The Book of Wei” (Wei Shu, 魏书), vol. 28, “The Treatise of Wu Qiu Jian” (Wu Qiu Jian Zhuan, 毋丘俭传), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局). 1959, 00765. 7 Fang Xuanling (房玄龄), “History of the Jin” (Jin Shu, 晋书), vol. 30, “The Treatise of Criminal Law” (Xin Fa Zhi, 刑法志), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju 中华书局), 1974, 00942. 8 Fang Xuanling, “History of the Jin,” vol. 42, “The Treatise of Wang Jun” (Wang Jun Zhuan, 王濬传), 01211. 9 Fang Xuanling, “History of the Jin”, vol. 62, “The Treatise of Liu Kun” (Liu Kun Zhuan, 刘琨传), 01689. 10 Fang Xuanling, “History of the Jin,” vol. 70, “The Treatise of Bian Hu” (Bian Hu Zhuan, 卞壶传), 01868. 11 Shen Yue (沈约), “History of the Song” (Song Shu, 宋书), vol. 94, “The Treatise of Dai Fa Xin and Chao Shang Zhi” (Dai Fa Xing Zhuan Fu Chao Shang Zhi Zhuan, 恩幸传•戴法兴传附巢尚之传), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1974. 02304. 12 Chen Shou, “Book of Wei”, vol. 10, “The Treatise of Jia Xu Zhuan” (Jia Xu Zhuan, 贾诩传), 00326. 13 Chen Shou, “Book of Wu” (Wu Shu, 吴书), vol. 49, “The Treatise of Tai Shi Ci” (Tai Shi Ci Zhuan, 太史慈传), 01189. 14 Chen Shou, “Book of Wu, vol. 56, “The Treatise of Zhu Huan” (Zhu Huan Zhuan, 朱桓传), 01315. 15 Shen Yue 沈约, “History of the Song” (Song Shu 宋书), volume 64, “The Treatise of Zheng Xianzhi” (Zheng Xianzhi Zhuan 郑鲜之传), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju 中华书局). 1974. 01695. 16 Shen Yue, “History of the Song,” vol. 98, “The Treatise of Di Hu – The Treatise of Lue Yang Qing Shui Di Yang Shi” (Di Hu Zhuan-Lue Yang Qing Shui Di Yang Shi Zhuan, 氐胡传•略阳清水氐杨氏传), 02407. 17 Xiao Zixian (萧子显), “History of Southern Qi” (Nan Qi Shu, 南齐书), vol. 50, “The Treatises of Seven Ming Seven Princes – The Biography of Po Yang Wang Bao Yin” (Ming Qi Wang Zhuan-Po Yang Wang Bao Yin Zhuan, 明七王•鄱阳王宝 夤传), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1972, 00865. 18 Zhao Erxun (赵尔巽), “Draft History of the Qing” (Qing Shi Gao, 清史稿), vol. 25, “Basic Annals of the Emperor Xuantong” (Xuan Tong Huang Di Ben Ji, 宣统皇帝 本纪), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1977, 01002. 19 Zhao Erxun, “Draft History of the Qing,” vol. 153, “Records of International Relations 1 – Russia” (Bang Jiao Zhi Yi-Russia, 邦交志一•俄罗斯条), 04513. 20 Zhao Erxun, “Draft History of the Qing,” vol. 156, “Records of International Relations 4 – USA” (Bang Jiao Zhi Si-USA邦交志四•美利坚条), 04585. 21 Kongzi, Mengzi, and Zhuangzi all admit Heaven or fate as playing a decisive role for humans. And this is mainly because there are necessary and accidental limitations to fulfilling one’s desires in the material dimension, therefore the limitation of fate or Heaven to humans is essentially on the level of human desire. But on the level of accomplishment of personality, Kongzi, Mengzi, and Zhuangzi all think there are infinite possiblities. Therefore, Kongzi said, “It is Man who is capable of broadening the Way. It is not the Way that is capable of broadening Man” (The

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22 23 24 25 26 27

28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41

Analects, 15.29); “Being humane could only come by one’s self, how could it come by others?” (12.1); “Is benevolence really far away? No sooner do I desire it than it is here” (7.30). And Mengzi said, “move the heart, forbear the nature, and develop to its infinity” (Mengzi, 12.15); “Save the whole” (11.15); “make peace your mind” (11.11); “develop your moving force” to “most great and most strong” (3.2); and grow your personality as “rich and glorious” (14.25); and “develop as a saint” (14.25). And also Zhuangzi said, “set one’s mind at flight by going along with things as they are” (Zhuangzi, ch. 4), “using things rather than being alienated by things” (ch. 20). Zhuangzi inherited the thought of “Dao follows nature” from Laozi, therefore, they both faintly had this idea of following the necessary law of nature, and also Zhuangzi thought that through grasping external necessity and contingency (so-called Dao and Qi in the philosophy of nature, and Ming in political philosophy) and by “following” one could be free. But Laozi had nothing to say about freedom on the level of philosophy. If we call successfully following the Dao freedom, then there is a similar sense in Laozi as in Hegelian philosophy, that freedom is to follow necessity. But in the thought of Laozi, Ming (fate) is not meant in the sense of determinism. However, in his political philosophy, he required that the king should follow the Dao and allow the people. And that is some sense of indulgence. Laozi (老子), ed. Wang Bi (王弼), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1954, ch. 2. Zhuangzi (庄子), ed. Guo Qingpan (郭庆藩), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1961, ch.1. Zhuangzi, ch. 3. Zhuangzi, ch. 20. Xunzi (荀子), ed. Wang Xianqian (王先谦), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1988, ch. 12. “Treatise on the Great Tao” (Hong Dao Lun, 宏道论), chs. 11–12, quoted from Hu Shi, The Academic Works of Hu Shi (Hu Shi Xue Shu Wen Ji, 胡适学术文集, ed. Jiang Yihua (姜义华). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华 书局), 1991, 1137. Cicero, The Republic, book 1, XLIL.67–XLIV.68, trans. C.W. Keyes, Loeb Classical Library, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1928. Cicero, Republic, book 3, XIIL.23–XV.24. Cicero, Republic, book 1, XLIV.68. Mao Zedong (毛泽东), “Combat Liberalism” (Da Ji Zi You Zhu Yi, 自由主义), Selected Works of Mao Zedong (Mao Ze Dong Xuan Ji, 毛泽东选集), Beijing: People’s Publishing House (Ren Min Chu Ban She, 人民出版社), vol. 2, 1952. Yin Haiguang (殷海光), Collected Works Of Ying Haiguang (Ying Hai Guang Wen Ji, 殷海光文集), vol. 1, ed. Zhang Binfeng (张斌峰), Wuhan: Hubei People’s Press (Hu Bei Ren Min Chu Ban She, 湖北人民出版社), 2001, 11. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, 56. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, 57. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, 57. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, 29. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, 128. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, 132. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, 124. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, 132. Jin Guantao and Liu Qingfeng, “Why Youths of May Fourth Abnegate ‘Liberalism’,” The Twenty First Century, 2004, vol. 82, no. 4.

9

The “cultural liberalism” of Xu Fuguan

To search for the spiritual tradition of freedom in a country “where the sages and the wise in past dynasties had a fear of freedom,” does it not mean, to borrow a phrase from Mengzi, to climb trees to catch fish? For people who have not yet begun to think philosophically this is the first doubt that must arise. It must become even more difficult to understand, if we bear in mind that now is a time when the cry “Down with Confucianism” that came from the May Fourth Movement can be still continually heard. So to speak of the idea of freedom in Confucianism must be unexpected for many people. In recent years, liberalism and communalism in the West have been reproachfully questioning each other. Against this background some people even claim that liberalism in the modern West is coming to an end. In the face of such a complicated situation, is it too late to speak of the dialogue between Confucianism and liberalism or of “Confucian liberalism”? However, sometimes academic investigation goes in a direction contrary to intuition or popular feeling. That this chapter has chosen “Confucian liberalism” as an academic concern of Xu Fuguan is the outcome of my careful reading of his works concerning Confucian thought on freedom. Although the liberalism talked about by him is somewhat different from the liberal tradition born out of Western empiricism, in light of Xu’s exploration and interpretation there seem really to be some common ideas on freedom. With reference to Confucian moral freedom I provisionally call what we find in Xu’s thinking “cultural liberalism.” This “cultural liberalism” presupposes the inborn motivation of human beings for cultural creation and sees “moral freedom” and “intellectual freedom” as the root and starting point of political freedom. Maybe “cultural liberalism” has not touched the institutional question of how to effectively protect human freedom in socio-political life; in other words, it has not given enough attention to the problem of “negative freedom.” Nonetheless, it has opened the heavy door to dialogue between Confucianism and liberalism, so it has created a vast academic field for communication between Confucianism and the main ideology in the modern West. The people who are involved in cultural construction in China nowadays, and striving for the creative transformation of Chinese culture, perhaps should not ignore the spiritual tradition of freedom in their own national culture, so they also may gain inspiration from Xu’s thinking on the

126 The “cultural liberalism” of Xu Fuguan relationship between Confucianism and liberalism. This chapter will give an overview and a review of Xu’s Confucian thought on liberalism concerning its four aspects: its connotations and distinguishing features, its theoretical advantages, its theoretical disadvantages, and its inspiration for our present situation.

9.1 The connotations and distinctive features of the theory of “cultural liberalism” The reason why I call the Confucian liberalism interpreted by Xu “cultural liberalism” can be found in the article “Why Oppose Liberalism?” (Weishenme yao fandui ziyouzhuyi, 为什么要反对自由主义), in which Xu has explained the spirit of liberalism and the idea of free society in Chinese culture initiated by Confucius. He claims that the spirit of liberalism is inherent in the cultures of human beings. If it is called a kind of culture, even though no corresponding words about liberalism or freedom in this culture can be found, there must be some form of the spirit of freedom in some degree which is living and functioning. Otherwise, it must have been impossible to create any form of culture.1 Because Xu has so specifically understood “freedom,” I name the Confucian liberalism represented by him “cultural liberalism,” which differs from the traditional liberalism in Western culture, especially the “political liberalism” of modern times. According to my primary understanding, “cultural liberalism” is possessed of three features: first, Xu discusses freedom as the widest background of cultural creativity, so that freedom becomes a universal value. He sees freedom as the ultimate motivation of the cultural progress of human beings and makes it generally observable among human cultural phenomena. In this way a commensurable basis for the comparison of the spirit of freedom between China and the West has been found, so that he refrains from the attitude that sees Western liberalism as standard and then only by reference to it judges and evaluates the Chinese spirit of freedom. Second, “cultural liberalism” is focused on the emphasis of “self-awareness” or “self-mastery,” highlighting the awakening of self-consciousness. He says, the spiritual state of liberalism is “self-awareness,” if we make use of the concept from European culture, or it can be understood as “self-mastery,” if we utilize the word in Chinese culture. From birth a person is thrown into a present tradition and society, and he follows the current of the mainstream of this tradition and society. While blindly drifting with the current as time unnoticeably passes, a few people would occasionally be awakened and strive to spiritually stand up, questioning the truth or falsehood of the present ideas and matters in this tradition and society in order to independently make his own judgments. They do this totally in light of their own conscience and

The “cultural liberalism” of Xu Fuguan 127 reason, which transcend the present ideas and matters in this tradition and society, so that they can make decisions about whether to follow or refuse on their own. In this way, it is not tradition and society that manipulate a person’s life, but his personal conscience and reason, which just means his “self-awareness” or “self-mastery.” This is called liberalism.2 Third, cultural liberalism does not exclude concern of political freedom, but sees it as a special embodiment of the former and sets it on the basis of moral and intellectual freedom, on which political freedom is firmly founded. He says, “free spirit must be extended to politics. Only after it has gained concrete achievements in politics, can it become a definite system and provide moral and intellectual freedom with an indubitable assurance.” And, “the most terrible disasters for human beings and the heaviest oppressions of human nature usually come from politics.” In politics, moral and intellectual freedom are involved; therefore, from the viewpoint of practice political freedom is the guarantee of other forms of freedom. Whether spiritual freedom can become a social common sense or an imposing idea depends on political freedom. “Although the liberal spirit is as old as human culture, the concept ‘liberalism’ was a product of the 19th century as democracy matured. This is not accidental.” Xu goes on to say, “it is necessary to subordinate political needs to the judgment and manipulation of each individual’s conscience and reason, and to make politics the instrument of everyone, not everyone the instrument of politics.” Such a “humanistic” appeal leads necessarily to “humanistic” politics, “the politics that takes human rights as its soul and parliament as its architecture.”3 But political freedom does not cover all dimensions of freedom completely. “Political freedom needs intellectual and especially moral freedom as its root; it needs the moral freedom that draws nourishment from itself.” Xu claims that this is “the practical common sense in history.” In his work Between Academy and Politics, he says, “the greatest difference between the academy and politics can be seen as the difference between quality and quantity.”4 Regarding philosophy and science, the average man has less knowledge than a philosopher and a scientist. This difference is determined by quality. But in politics a vote cast by the average man is the same as that of an expert: they each have only one vote. Democracy functions in the way that quantity has an effect on quality. But can we say that democracy is undoubtedly in contradiction with the promotion of human quality? No, because democracy guarantees first of all the right of the people, including the experts, to freely express their opinions. Just via democracy the experts can express their valuable ideas that appeal to the reason of the public, so that they can exercise influence upon the public and win sympathetic understanding from them, and make it possible that their opinions have an effect on society. Therefore, if seen from this perspective, democracy has paved a broad way on which human beings can enhance their quality. And

128 The “cultural liberalism” of Xu Fuguan freedom in democratic politics is embodied as the majority’s victory over the minority. But at the same time, there are also apparently opportunities to make changes regarding the relationship between the majority and the minority. That means opportunities for quality to win out over quantity. In the end the result is that “behind political quantity it is still academic quality that exercises the influence.”5 In this essay he has furthermore talked about the relationship of democracy with humanism and personal morality. He says, “the politics that focuses on quantity has, if understood more deeply, its foothold in the great principle of humanism. Humanism acknowledges first of all that ‘life’ is the foremost value.” The spirit of traditional Confucianism takes the esteem of life as its first principle. Because of this, the Confucian spirit as humanism is “the factual ground for democratic freedom”; at least it is not in opposition to the democratic politics of freedom.6 Furthermore, the personality of a person consists in his motivation, spiritual embodiment, bearing, and mien; these four aspects together constitute the value of a human life, which support and guide not only politics but also all activities in life including academic activity and give vigor to all activities and lead them all in the right direction. Democracy is a kind of attitude, and Confucianism or humanism is mainly such a noble attitude that flows from nature and feeling and helps accomplish life. This attitude is responsible for all aspects of life and thus also is the source of democracy and freedom; and democracy and freedom also are the objectification of the Confucian or humanist spirit in politics. Only in this way can the integral essence of Confucianism or humanism be seen as realistic.7

9.2 The theoretical advantages of the theory of “cultural liberalism” No matter how Xu’s cultural liberalism is reviewed, I personally think that his theory has a threefold advantage. Firstly, Xu has brought all creative activities of the spirit into what he means by spiritual freedom, so that with the theory he can explain as much as possible (he was thus running the risk of overinterpretation). Being based on his view of “cultural liberalism”, he thinks Confucius’s achievements in the collation of the classics and historical writing (revising and editing the Odes and History, correcting the traditional rites and music, and composing the Spring and Autumn Annals to “humble the Sons of Heaven, admonish the feudal princes and reprove the senior officials”) are all embodiments of the free spirit, and he sees Mencius’s ideal of “the great manhood” as the ideal of freedom. He claims that although in Chinese thought there was no definite idea of “human rights,” it does not mean that there was no free spirit in it. What makes it more difficult for others to accept is his saying that Confucius initiated the “Chinese free society”. He says, “Confucius has laid the foundations of Confucianism, and thus meanwhile created the Chinese free

The “cultural liberalism” of Xu Fuguan 129 society. In my view, this is the main condition for the survival and development of the Chinese people despite thousands of kinds of sufferings and miseries.”8 He thinks, “simply from the following two aspects we can see Confucius’s endeavors to transform the non-free society into a free society”: First, Confucius has established the status of the Chinese by freeing them from “nature” through the highlighting of learning and teaching; through the activities of learning and teaching that encourage personal subjective initiatives in practice, Confucius “has broken the class distinction that has naturally arisen in history, so that an individual can change his social status by means of his endeavors,” so that he has highly affirmed creative educational activities and the reform of educational system that help to promote the social freedom of human beings. Second, “cultural liberalism” has chosen a special advantageous perspective to integrate human activities of striving for freedom into a present specific cultural tradition. This encourages cultural creativity in light of one’s own tradition. He says, a liberal frees himself from tradition and society; this does not mean a negation of tradition and society, but an effort to re-assess tradition and society in order to clarify present ideas and phenomena and give them new significance, so that he hopes to create a more just and meaningful tradition and society. A liberal is still living in the stream of tradition and society, but he is no longer passive with some kind of negative attitude, but actively and positively exercises his influence in order to transform tradition and society. In this way tradition and society are no more a disoriented power, but subordinated to the light of human conscience and reason, and they will gradually become the achievements born out of human conscience and reason.9 Among liberals in the modern West, some radicals (like Thomas Paine) tend to be highly critical of tradition. However, among classic liberals some conservatives attach much importance to the relationship of modern culture to tradition. For instance, the modern conservative liberal Edmund Burke criticized the French Revolution. He cherished tradition from the standpoint of a conservative liberal. Third, with regard to Chinese cultural tradition Xu emphasizes the significance of moral freedom in politics. This has made clear the cultural capacity of China to transcend the utilitarian needs of practical politics on the one hand and also enable China to admit and accept the Western liberal consciousness of religious pluralism on the other (even though with regard to its spiritual disposition China as a nation lacks the same religious transcendent feelings as in the Christian West). In comparatively researching the Chinese–Western spirit of freedom Xu once said, “in the West the spirit of freedom is vibrantly embodied in reason, in China only in morality.” (Let us leave aside whether his claim concerning the embodiment of the free spirit in the West can be assumed or not.) And he thinks that Confucianism and Daoism both have developed the Chinese spirit of freedom with focuses on different dimensions:

130 The “cultural liberalism” of Xu Fuguan with regard to morality Confucianism has positively affirmed life, so the spirit of freedom in this respect is positively embodied; on account of feelings and emotions Daoism has striven to be freed from the fetters in life, so the spirit of freedom in this respect is negatively embodied. Confucianism and Daoism are two main streams of the Chinese culture. If we cannot approach the abundant contents regarding the spirit of freedom as the basis of the philosophy of the two, we cannot comprehend the cultural heritages represented by and transmitted in them.10 Mainly with respect to morality, Confucianism has developed the spirit of freedom of man, and Daoism has developed the feeling of freedom with regard to the arts or aesthetic activities. The modern Chinese must explore the free spirit in traditional Chinese culture to develop political freedom, so that modern political freedom can be rooted in the earth of the national culture. Xu has even said, “the Confucian spirit of ‘the root and ground in man himself’ [ziben zigen, 自本自根] does not need an external God; thus regarding politics they naturally do not accept oppression from some external authority.” On account of this, Confucian politics must be regarded as democratic, and the thinkers of democracy should also admit that Confucianism can be its spiritual foundation. The people who are devoted to learning and thinking with an objective attitude will certainly not think that I’ve drawn wrong conclusions by false analogy.11 What’s more, he says, “Confucius has laid the foundations of Confucianism, and thus meanwhile created Chinese free society. In my view, this is the main condition for the survival and development of the Chinese people despite thousands of kinds of sufferings and miseries.”12

9.3 The theoretical limits of “cultural liberalism” Although Xu’s “cultural liberalism” has affirmed that the value of freedom is universal, to a great degree he has ignored the economic basis and the systematic effects of the corresponding political institutions that are necessary for the realization of a man’s freedom in a society. He sees freedom as the reassurance of conscience and the awareness of reason, and thus has reduced the difficulty in humans’ fighting for freedom to creative spiritual activities and simplified the process of building up a political system. He has especially ignored the significance of “negative freedom.” Therefore, regarding theoretical comprehensiveness and precision, these are apparent shortcomings. First, concerning the interaction between individuals and society Xu’s “cultural liberalism” pays too much attention to the directness of the connection

The “cultural liberalism” of Xu Fuguan 131 between an individual and the masses; it is short on rational thinking about the complexity of the detailed relationship between individuals, system, and country. Thus, he has just extended the traditional Confucian ideas that are focused on the cultivation of virtue to the field of political philosophy. He says, by liberalism is meant not only the accomplishment of an individual through spiritual liberation by himself; it implies more that when he is personally accomplished, he has meanwhile made contributions to the masses. There were of course the liberals who were only conscious of individuals but not of the general public; but according to the facts of history, dynamic individuals constitute a dynamic community or group; on account of this, a liberal country is the most progressive, most prosperous, and strongest one in history.13 This simplification fails to show awareness of the complexity of the political operation in modern society, and it is then unfavorable for the construction of a modern democratic system in its authentic sense. Second, being seen as a whole, Xu’s understanding of liberalism in the modern West is one-sided, for he regards the spirit of liberalism as “an attitude to remove restrictions in all forms.” He adds, “but the reason of an individual compels him to jump out of this attitude, so that he can positively affirm something and be responsible for his affirmation.” He even thinks, a free society “refers to a possibility that a man can just by his own endeavors change his social status.”14 From this we see that what Xu has in mind is “positive freedom” in the terms of Isaiah Berlin; but to “negative freedom” – the freedom to avoid something – he has not given enough attention. “Negative freedom,” as the freedom to be freed from all kinds of persecution in practical politics, is the basic guarantee of freedom itself. Without it, it would be superfluous to talk about freedom in other forms. Finally, contrary to the assumption of human nature in modern political liberalism in the West, Xu has excessively relied on the Confucian philosophical doctrine of the goodness of human nature. He holds that Chinese culture is set up on the view of the goodness of human nature. It has thus affirmed human dignity and equality, and it is also the ground for the possibility for the peaceful co-existence of human beings; naturally it also is the ground for political democracy.15 This is undoubtedly one-sided with regard to modern liberalism which pays attention not only to negative but also to positive freedom, because without the integration of the evilness of human nature into liberal theory there would have been no way to set up the modern principle of contract.

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9.4 Its significant inspirations for the present political reality As a thinker of significant originality, Xu has – not confined to the manifold and complex theories on liberalism in the West but keeping in accordance with his own view of culture – given a special interpretation of freedom or the spirit of freedom that is overwhelmingly rational, and makes possible Chinese–Western cultural dialogue regarding the valuable elements in both of them. Theoretically it has provided the dialogue between Confucianism and liberalism with a common cultural presupposition. Academically this is very valuable. To say it simply, two points in Xu’s theory on “cultural liberalism” are theoretically inspiring: first, he strongly confirms that the free spirit is the mother of all cultural creations, emphasizing the universal character of the free spirit in its positive sense. In the field of political philosophy, this can provide a theoretical balance to the discursive hegemony of modern Western society. Second, he has confirmed the relationship between tradition and the spirit of free creation, which thus provides China in her pursuit of modernization and clarification of her traditional heritage with a new theoretical explanation. In particular, his idea that moral freedom is the cultural foundation of political freedom is of profound and lasting theoretical significance for the Chinese nation – which attaches great importance to moral cultivation but comparatively lacks religious feelings as in the West – to think over how to develop a consciousness of personal freedom in politics, for modern political freedom in the modern West is tied in with its religious tolerance. If Chinese political freedom is not to be deformed into a kind of anarchy, and if modern democracy based on the idea of liberalism is not to denegenrate to a stage-show in which politicians mutually invade one another’s privacy, or even attack each other, it must depend on the cultivation of the moral freedom of the politicians. Needless to say, there are also theoretical blind spots in Xu’s cultural liberalism. The first one is its over-emphasis on positive freedom as “self-mastery,” ignoring the value and significance of negative freedom. Because of this, with regard to the question concerning political freedom he has not seen the importance for an individual to be freed from compulsorily doing or not doing something. Consequently he has not thought over the problems regarding how with careful consideration to concretely design systems to regulate interference into and oppression of individuals by the government or state power. Without these concerns the cultural ideal that highlights spiritual freedom cannot really be carried out. The second one lies in the fact that he has only taken notice of the importance of Western liberalism to encourage people to cultivate their morality and has tried in light of the Confucian doctrine of the goodness of human nature to complement liberal theory with moral philosophy, but he has not taken the evil side of human nature into his consideration on liberalism. Therefore, the theory of social contract in the modern sense cannot be advanced, which has the consequence that he cannot lay a solid foundation for modern democratic politics.

The “cultural liberalism” of Xu Fuguan 133 Nevertheless, Xu as a thinker who is possessed of a strong consciousness of modernity and of rich practices in politics is keenly aware of the importance of political freedom. He holds that even though political freedom is not the entire matter, all possibilities of freedom must touch upon it; thus when talking about freedom we have to integrate political freedom into it. Political freedom should get its nourishment from intelligence and morality, but what’s more important is to see that “it is necessary to subordinate political needs to the judgment and manipulation of each individual’s conscience and reason, and to make politics the instrument of everyone, not everyone the instrument of politics.” Being based on this perspective, Xu has described modern political freedom as the one “that takes human rights as its soul and parliament as its architecture.” He has placed the problem of human rights at the center of political freedom, which proves that his “cultural liberalism” is based on a clear enough knowledge of modern democracy. But the lack of the necessary recognition of liberal ideas in the Western empiricist tradition in Xu’s thinking is the blind spot on his academic horizon that should be overcome by the intellectuals after him who are ambitious to make contributions to the construction of Chinese democracy.

Notes 1 Xu Fuguan (徐复观), Between Academy and Politics (Zai Xue Shu Yu Zheng Zhi Zhi Jian, 在学术与政治之间), Taiwan: Student Press (Xue Sheng Shu Ju, 学生书局), 1985, 160. 2 Xu Fuguan, Between Academy and Politics, 290. 3 Xu Fuguan, Between Academy and Politics, 160. 4 Xu Fuguan, Between Academy and Politics, 169. 5 Xu Fuguan, Between Academy and Politics, 170. 6 Xu Fuguan, Between Academy and Politics, 171–172. 7 Xu Fuguan, Between Academy and Politics, 175. 8 Xu Fuguan, Between Academy and Politics, 289. 9 Xu Fuguan, Between Academy and Politics, 293. 10 Xu Fuguan, “The Basic Character of the Confucian Spirit and Its Restriction and Rebirth” (Ru Jia Jing Shen Zhi Ji Ben Xing Ge Ji Qi Xian Ding Yu Xin Sheng, 儒家精神之基本性格及其限定与新生), in Xiao Xinyi (萧欣义), ed., Confucian Political Thought and Free Democratic Human Rights (Ru Jia Zheng Zhi Si Xiang Yu Zi You Min Zhu Ren Quan, 儒家政治思想与自由民主人权), Taiwan: Student Press (Xue Sheng Shu Ju, 学生书局), 1988, 60. 11 Xu Fuguan, “Basic Character,” 73. 12 Xu Fuguan, Between Academy and Politics, 289. 13 Xu Fuguan, Between Academy and Politics, 280. 14 Xu Fuguan, Between Academy and Politics, 289. 15 Xu Fuguan, “On Confucius’s Thought on Ruling by Virtue” (Kong Zi De Zhi Si Xiang Fa Wei, 孔子德治思想发微), in Xiao Xinyi, ed., Confucian Political Thought, 99.

10 Xu Fuguan and Confucian political philosophy

Xu Fuguan (徐复观), as a representative of the New Confucianism, has made great efforts to expound the significance of Confucian political philosophy in modern times. He strives to find the inner connection between the quintessence of Confucian political philosophy and the spirit of modern democracy, and, by deeply exploring the positive values of Confucian political philosophy, tries to remedy and rectify the spiritual foundation of modern democracy. By thoroughly criticizing the Legalists (fajia, 法家) he has cleaned up the pollution of Confucian political philosophy in history. In contrast to the analysis of the theoretical construction of Xu’s Confucian ideal of democracy by He Xinquan (何信全) in his book Ruxue yu xiandai minzhu (儒学与现代民主, Confucianism and Modern Democracy), this chapter will, in light of Xu’s elaboration of the political thought of several great Confucians in history, bring to light his work on exploring the spiritual depth of Confucian political philosophy, so that, finally, we can through his analysis of Confucian political philosophy take a glance at his own ideal of political philosophy and its theoretical blind spots.

10.1 Xu’s reconstruction of the political philosophy of Confucius Xu has highly appraised the contributions of Confucius in political philosophy. He said, “Confucius laid the foundations of Confucianism, and meanwhile created the Chinese free society. In my view, this is the main condition for the survival and development of the Chinese people despite thousands of kinds of sufferings and miseries.”1 What deserves to be noticed is that here Xu’s expression “free society” means “such a society in which an individual can improve his status through his own endeavors”; therefore, it is not equivalent to a free society in the present sense. How should we understand Xu’s claim that Confucius “created the Chinese free society”? There are two aspects to this saying. First, Confucius established the distinct status of human being by freeing the human being from “nature” through the highlighting of learning and teaching, so that the human being,

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who originally belongs to nature and is one kind of animal, has stood up to rely on his own strength and power to change his value; he may escape from being not virtuous and become virtuous, and he may escape from being incompetent and become competent; except for the extremely intelligent and the extremely foolish people are usually variable; and regarding virtue and ability they may either ascend or fall; the situation is different from other animals, which are born so and stay so, naturally determined and unchangeable.2 Second, Confucius “has broken the class distinction that has arisen in history, so that an individual can change his social status by means of his endeavors.” In this respect Confucius has emphasized two points: he thinks, on the one hand, any person who is possessed of some position should have the “virtue” and “ability” corresponding to his position, which is most significant in his proposal of zhengming (正名, rectification of name); on the other hand, Confucius proposes that “a virtuous person is entitled to get a corresponding position.” Hence, besides the idea “to treat relatives as relatives” (qinqin, 亲亲), he proposes rather more, “to treat the excellent as the excellent” (xianxian, 贤贤), and maintains “‘the election of the excellent and the competent” and, at the same time, rejects the traditional way “to select officials in terms of family backgrounds or origins.”3 However, although Xu praises Confucius’s historical contribution to the initiation of a Chinese free society, he soberly recognizes that the free society initiated by Confucius was not completely set up in history, because there was an unresolved problem in politics, namely, the use of political power. … Thus, the teaching of Confucius has sustained national survival, but was unable to resolve this political problem, so that the history of China has always fallen into a vicious circle of order and disorder.4 But, Xu believes that a subsequent development based on the political thought of Confucius necessarily points to the way of democratization. And this kind of democracy is superior to, not in opposition to, the utilitarianism which is born out of European democracy, because it is based on the highest idea of human beings – ren (仁, humaneness) – thus it can purify modern democracy and thoroughly resolve the problems that are irresolvable if only by relying on administration.5 Xu has even attempted a reinterpretation of Confucius’s idea that the sovereignty of a ruler, if it corresponds to the identity of the ruler, should be

136 Xu Fuguan and Confucian political philosophy respected. He thinks that Confucius’s respect for the sovereignty of a ruler does not mean respect for rigid dogmas as criticized by people in later times, but means to respect the fact that in politics “there must be an orderly form, which does not mean to respect some specific ruler.”6 Therefore, Confucius did dare to criticize the rulers as a teacher criticizes students, and he actively responded to the call of Gongshan Furao (公山弗扰), which shows that he was for Gongshan’s rebellion. Thus, in Confucius’s political thought “the right to rebel” is affirmed. This is the origin of the Confucian advocacy of the “revolutions of Tang (汤) and Wu (武)” and the idea of “enforcing justice on behalf of Heaven” in following times. We could discuss further how reasonable Xu’s interpretation is with reference to historical facts; it is, however, undoubtedly a creative interpretation.

10.2 Xu’s reinterpretation of the dispute on governance by man and governance by law in the political philosophy of Mencius Xu gives a very high appraisal of the revolutionary significance of the political philosophy of Mencius. He says, regarding politics Mencius talks about humaneness and righteousness, and about the way of the Three Emperors, in order to change the politics that starts from and goes back to the ruler, to the one that whole-heartedly strives for the people. The idea is not yet accomplished in reality even for us today who have had a history of more than 2000 years after him; and so politics has not yet really been changed with regard to this idea. But it was really a historical event that shook heaven and earth. He not only subordinates the interests of the ruler to those of the people, whose interests are seen as the criterion to judge political measures; but also he subordinates the rites and morality stressed by Confucians to the life of the people, so that only with regard to the life of the people do the rites and morality get their significance, rather than the people living for the sake of the rites and morality.7 Standing on such theoretical heights, Xu’s acclaim of the ultimate political ideal of Mencius leads us to see not only the democratic features of Confucian political philosophy during the pre-Qin period, but also a specific form of democracy that transcends the capitalist form and is similar to the socialism familiar to us. In the view of Xu, Mencius apprehended that the transmission of political power must be decided by the people, for Mencius insists that “politics should start from and end by the people.” Mencius proposes the idea of “what is given by Heaven” (tianyu, 天与, Wanzhang shang, 万章上) in order to negate the ruler’s right to take the government as private property; and the so-called “what is given by Heaven” actually means “‘what is given by the people’ … because he is sure that political power should be given by the people, he has affirmed the right of political revolution 2000 years ago.”8 Xu reflected that he had not well recognized the value of Mencius’s thought on democracy before, and said,

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like many other people, he merely saw Mencius’s saying “the people are more important than the ruler” as an idea of minben (民本, “people as root”). Later on he found that such a view was problematical. “The idea of ‘rule by the people’ can, of course, not clearly be seen in Mencius’s sayings; but the principle of ‘rule by the people’ originates with and is hinted at by him.”9 In his evaluating of Mencius’s political philosophy it is plain that Xu not only was against the view that Confucian political thought is opposed to modern democracy, but also took it that the idea of modern democracy was already germinated by Mencius, although it was not institutionalized. Modern democracy is necessarily involved with the issue of governance by law. Accordingly, Xu has carefully analyzed Mencius’s thought on governance by law and Mencius’s attitude towards it. Xu thinks that the truth of the saying “Confucianism attaches importance to governance by man, but not by law” depends upon the definition of law. If law is understood as constitution, there was no such idea 2000 years ago; if law is understood as “an everlasting, unchangeable law,” then it is what Mencius means in his reference to “old institutions” and “the law of the emperors in ancient times.” If by law it means “penal code,” “then it must be admitted that the Confucians do not pay much attention to it, though do not deny it.” If law is interpreted as the objective principles that must be obeyed generally and the systems and administrative organizations that are based on these principles, then how could we say that Mencius and Confucianism in general do not attach importance to governance by law?10 According to Xu’s clarification of the concept “governance by law” it is shown that he has confirmed Confucian governance by law. He thinks that what Mencius means by “governance by law” more or less contains the following contents: first of all, the concept zheng (政, governance) used by Mencius refers to “governance by law,” as he points out, in the citation “the emperors in the ancient times had the heart-and-mind that could not endure [the sufferings of] others, therefore there was accordingly governance that could not endure [the sufferings of] others” (Gongsun Chou shang, 公孙丑上) the word “governance” means “governance by law” in a common sense. Second, the “governance by law” of Mencius also includes economic systems. Mencius has repeatedly stressed that “a wise monarch should bring to order the economic life of the people,” which implies that the ruler should regulate people’s agricultural production by law. Furthermore, he has mentioned concrete law-based rules such as “to check but not collect tax at the customs pass and markets,” “for a market if there are cargo backlogs there, then there should be no tax collection, and if the market is regulated by law, then cargo backlogs will disappear,” and so on. Third, Mencius has proposed governance by law based on the policies of the ancient sage kings; for instance, he speaks of “the well-field system” ( jingtian, 井田) and the construction of a school system. Xu thinks the schools in more

138 Xu Fuguan and Confucian political philosophy ancient times were only “archery fields and sites for the people to live out their life in retirement,” but through the constant endeavors of the Confucians they “were elevated to function as a standard educational mechanism,” and up to the time of Mencius they took a definite form. With regard to the proposal of governance by law, this was a great event. That meant, besides the other institutions of governance in the history of China there has been then an educational system as well.11 In terms of Mencius’s thinking highly of governance by law, Xu expounds further, what Confucianism regards as rites in politics actually refers to governance by law, and Confucius has absolutely not ignored governance by law. Because of this, the Confucians in the Han Dynasty often said, “Confucius has composed the Spring and Autumn Annals (Chunqiu, 春秋) which functions as the law of an emperor.”12 In addition, “the nine classical rules,” as in the saying “in general, in respect of the governance of a country there are nine classical rules,” from the Doctrine of the Mean (Zhongyong, 中庸), “refer to the nine articles of law.” Finally, Xu summarizes that regarding the relationship between governance by man and governance by law the view of Mencius is: “If we solely rely on the good [nature of human beings], there is no need for political governance; and if we solely rely on the law, there is no ground for the people to be law-abiding.”13 This statement means it is not enough for good governance to have only the men who are well able to govern; what is also needed for governance is the law. But governance by law cannot be realized on its own; it needs well governing men to carry it out. Therefore, “with regard to the man who can govern well and the law by which he governs we could not just pay attention to one side and neglect the other.”14 In this way, Confucianism has not only the idea of governance by law as interpreted by Xu, but has also dialectically thought through the relationship between governance by man and governance by law.

10.3 Xu’s analysis of the political ideas of Xunzi By his analysis of the spirit of the political philosophy of Xunzi, Xu reveals the change in Confucian thought during the period of later Warring States and its similarity with and difference from the Legalists. Not only has he affirmed Xunzi’s development of contributions to Confucian political philosophy, he has also pointed out the dictatorial and autocratic elements contained in Xunzi’s thinking. Xu thinks that both Xunzi and Confucius pay much attention to the rite, but their focuses are very different.

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What Confucius means by rites in politics refers to the internalized selfeffacing rite. … Contrary to the tendency of internalization by Confucius and Mencius, Xunzi makes the rites externalized and transforms them into something outward, into a kind of principle and instrument for political organization, which is to be found in the thought neither of Mencius nor of Confucius.15 Concretely speaking, Xunzi’s discussion of the rites has four features: first, by rites Confucius and Mencius mean ways of expressing esteem and modesty, whereas Xunzi pays much attention to “discrimination” (fen, 分), as he says, “to set up rites and moral rules in order to discriminate” (Wangzhi, 王制; Lilun, 礼论). Second, Xunzi speaks of the “all-round function” of governance by rites. On the one hand, it helps “the king behave properly”; and on the other hand it also helps him “govern according to the principle of non-interference.” Third, with reference to the origins of human society Xunzi proves the necessity of rites, which is not seen in the thought of Confucius and Mencius. Fourth, Xunzi also attaches importance to the “maintenance of people’s desire.” It implies that it is, not according to desire, but in terms of the divergence in ability and the division of labor among the people that remuneration is determined. This is very different from what Confucius means in his saying “not the want, but the equality should be noticed.” Besides, prior to Xunzi there was no thought of “imposing restrictions on the branches [the branches as a metaphor refer to the people who live as manufacturers and merchants].” Since Xunzi there has been a view that “increasing the number of manufacturers and merchants leads to the poverty of the state” (Fuguo, 富国), and it was advised “to decrease the number of manufacturers and merchants and to increase the number of farmers” (Jundao, 君道). Thus, the restrictions on manufacturers and merchants evidenced the influence of the Legalists, which is distinct from the Confucianism represented by Confucius and Mencius. In comparing the thought of Xunzi with that of the Legalists, Xu has shown not only the characteristics of Xunzi’s political philosophy, but also his deviation from the Confucian tradition. With regard to three aspects, Xunzi differentiates himself from the Legalists. First of all, whereas the Legalists deny the importance of history and culture, Xunzi’s rites are rooted in history and culture. In this sense Xunzi “can absolutely not be identified as a Legalist.” Second, Confucianism is humanism; it subordinates schemes and stratagems to the nature of human beings and thus upholds the capable and virtuous person. Legalism sees the rule as the foundation, pays less attention to the nature of human beings, and subordinates human beings to the rule which makes the rule the “host” and the human the “guest.” Furthermore, Legalism requires that an emperor attach importance to rules, tactics, and power, but not virtue, so that an emperor should behave secretly and unpredictably. On the contrary, Xunzi requires that an emperor should be open to avoid rumors and tricks.

140 Xu Fuguan and Confucian political philosophy In spite of the threefold difference between Xunzi and the Legalists as mentioned above, the elements leading to an autocratic regime are implied in the basis of his political philosophy – the theory on the original evil of human nature [xing e, 性恶]. Xunzi thinks that human nature is evil. On this account morality is not rooted in humanity itself, and the rites are not the outcome of the innermost needs of the human heart, and are merely the product of the sages or the emperors in ancient times, whose need consisted in guarding against the evil of human nature on the basis of a utilitarian computation. Thus, in human beings themselves there is no reliable guarantee for the accomplishment of the rites and morality. The workable guarantee is then to be ascribed to the emperors in ancient times. How could the sages and emperors in ancient times safeguard such a thing? Necessarily they must resort to political compulsion. After the rites were completely politicized, for the people the rites have nothing to do with spontaneity, nor with autonomy; they are institutionalized, given from the external, and compulsory. … Consequently, the rites become the self-serving excuse of an emperor. Therefore, Xunzi’s ideal society in which “there is no chance of a position in the imperial court and no chance in life for the people” degenerates into a society where politics invades everything, and under this political compulsory force life is uniform, lacks freedom, and is devoid of human warmth.16 Xu has extensively analyzed the dictatorial tendency implied in Xunzi’s thought, and tried hard to eliminate the contents which are involved with the dictatorial politics in Confucian thought; it shows Xu’s concern for democracy and political freedom; the affinity between Confucianism as understood by him and modern democracy is also reflected in his thinking. Regarding the different consequences in governance he has analyzed Mencius’s theory of the goodness and Xunzi’s theory of the evilness of human nature: Mencius believes that human nature is good and relies on the “likes and dislikes” of the people. On the basis of this an emperor should take measures in accordance with the likes and dislikes of the people, which results in the implementation of people-oriented thought. … Xunzi thinks that human nature is evil, so the likes and dislikes of the people are not reliable. Thus, with the help of the [law-like] rites an emperor should interfere and transform them, because “an emperor is such a key person who is responsible for political differentiation [fen, 分].” As a result, the people are not autonomous; they have to look up to the emperor, and their existence depends on the emperor.17

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What’s more, he said: Xunzi has externalized and politicized the rites and regards them as “the perfection of the human way,” the result of which is that for the people there is only political, but no private life, and one who is not compatible with the present politics commits the most heinous crimes. Thus, he said, “the one whose intelligence and ability are opposite to the [spirit] of the time is, without remission, to be sentenced to death” (Wangzhi, 王制).18 Xunzi even says that intellectuals living in troubled times could only “praise the beautiful, spread the good, keep a distance from the evil, hide the debased, speak of the advantageous, and do not propagate the weak points of a despot, which is to be seen as convention” (Chendao, 臣道). Criticizing this attitude, Xu says, an intellectual’s life of such abasement and disgrace is really his tragedy. Naturally Xunzi has smelled out the cruel and heartless atmosphere of the Qin state and was inevitably influenced by it; in addition, he has attached too much importance to politics, thinking that a person cannot escape from the political. This should be the cause of such an extreme attitude.19

10.4 Xu’s modern interpretation of the political philosophy of Lu Xiangshan “The esteem of individual personality” is the “basis of modern democracy.” According to this basic principle, Xu firmly believes that Lu Xiangshan’s (陆象 山) doctrine on “truth in heart” implies the possibility of the “great accomplishment of personality,” and also of the “great embodiment of the esteem of individual personality.” Accordingly, Lu “guides the people to be aware of the esteem of their personality” as the way to cultivate personality. In relation to the political problem, the realization of this idea necessarily requires the esteem of “every individual life,” and it cannot be allowed that one or two tyrants arbitrarily commit any kind of outrage; accordingly all matters are dealt with in the light of rationality or truthful principles and all spiritual shackles born out of despotism cannot be accepted.20 Therefore, Xu thinks that the core of Lu’s political thought lies in the development of Mencius’s view that “the people are more important than the ruler” in order to make clear the distinctive “duties” of a ruler and his subjects. Lu has upheld the rational spirit, intending to sweep away “name-oriented discrimination” which has become the spiritual shackle in past millennia. It was a great

142 Xu Fuguan and Confucian political philosophy revolution not only at that time, but even in today’s world, where tyrantlike rulers are pleased with their status and different officials like “eunuchs and concubines” are in competition to serve their rulers. Political people whose conscience is not completely beclouded would feel deeply ashamed and even sweat.21 In a very modern style, Xu has given an account of Lu’s proposal in political philosophy, thinking that Lu firmly believed the ultimate aim of all political organizations is “for the people.” Heaven has given birth to the people and set up rulers to look after and raise them. The administrative organization and the arrangement of officials are also because of the people. The people are most important, the state is less important than the former, and the ruler is comparatively nonessential. The people are the foundation of a state; only because of a gathering of people can a ruler be called a ruler. This must be regarded as of great significance.22 On the basis of the idea of free speech in modern political philosophy, Xu gives a modern interpretation of Lu’s thinking on the public discussion of political issues: “Lu thinks that to discuss political issues is not like discussing the family affairs of others; men in political discussion are not the family slaves of others; they should talk about them openly and above board.”23 By discussing political issues in this manner – “to talk boldly before the ruler at court but to behave compliantly outside” (that means, to speak bluntly before the ruler but to be humble elsewhere) – the ruler would consequently only make grand gestures and act as a figurehead. This would “increasingly reduce the influence of the ruler.” Lu’s theory of the way of a ruler is summarized by Xu as threefold: the first is the elimination of wrongness in the heart of a ruler; the second requires that the ruler must know his subordinates well enough to assign them appropriate tasks. That presupposes that the ruler should be knowledgeable. The third touches on the motive of the ruler. It must be good, and the ruler does not have to interfere in government too much. Furthermore, according to his understanding of the spirit of modern democracy Xu has highly affirmed Lu’s political proposal concerning moral management. He said, democracy is a system in which the people manage the governors. The building up of such a system is for the sake of the management of the governors. Thus, selfish governors are always afraid of and want to keep a distance from democracy; they are not really devoted to setting up this system. Therefore, democracy is the root, not the branch. Regarding the fact that in the times when democracy was not yet built up the efficiency of all political systems depended on the moral state of the ruler, whether it was white or black, the theory proposed by Lu was persuasive.24

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With regard to Lu’s administrative style during the period when Lu worked as the magistrate of Jinmen (荆门) county, Xu explained, he worked there as a magistrate with the same attitude as he gave academic lectures. He meets with subordinates, treating them as friends. His staff and other officials talk about matters, disputing advantages and disadvantages before him; he listens to them silently, then praises them, so that he can cultivate his mind to be impartial. It was just like the style and grace of democracy nowadays.25 To sum up, with reference to the modern idea of democracy Xu has spoken highly of the political thought of Lu. Besides the several Confucians mentioned above Xu has also noticeably recognized the value of the political thought of the great Han Dynasty Confucian Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒) and argued for him with sympathetic understanding. He says, first of all, in face of the Legalist conception of “governance for the sake of governance” Dong strives to re-clarify the essential Confucian idea that “politics is for the people, not for the ruler.” In this idea the fundamental Confucian esteem of life is implied.26 To be freed from the “inhuman life” caused by Legalist politics and to lead “a human social life” is the lofty task of Dong. … The human social life longed for by Dong is: “When coming back home, there is the intimacy between father and son and among brothers, when going to court there is the moral principle between ruler and subject. When the old and the young meet together, respect for seniority is seen. People treat each other beautifully and they are happily grateful and mutually love on another.” This is the real humanistic social life according to Confucianism, which is opposite to the social life under Legalist politics.27 To put it briefly, the political thought of Dong “refers, in contrast to the totalitarian fascist politics in ancient China, to a politics based on human nature”; his Tianren sance (天人三策, Three Replies to the Emperor’s Questions on Heaven and Man) “are political calls for the [reinstatement] of human nature.”28 Xu argues that we should see Dong’s call for the exclusive reverence of Confucianism as a movement that “has arisen as a struggle to transform the historic fate of our nation – from a politics that ‘treats human as non-human’ to a politics that ‘treats human as human’.”29 This appraisal was very unlike the views of the scholars in mainland China at the same time.

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10.5 The ideal of Xu’s political philosophy in light of his analysis of the spirit of Confucian political philosophy Xu summarized the significance of Confucian political philosophy as follows: Confucianism subordinates political power (the governance of the land under Heaven) to the individual personality, the result of which is that political power is comparatively not so important, and it is not permitted merely for the sake of the pursuit of political power to injure the personal dignity or to ignore the original end of politics itself. Only in this way is the accomplishment of personal cultivation possible, and politics cannot be the field of a few men to manipulate power. Also in this way both personality and politics can be purified. This is the most essential significance of Confucian political thought, and also the highest peak of the Confucian esteem of personal dignity.30 Apparently, Xu has explored the very positive aspects of Confucian political philosophy, which is extended and characterized as the following seven points. First, Confucianism has inherited the “people-oriented” idea to see “political power under Heaven” as a subjectivity-like being; for this kind of subjectivity, the Son of Heaven or an emperor is just like a subordinate object. Thus, Confucians think political power under Heaven cannot “be given to or by” the Son of Heaven or an emperor; as Mencius says, Zikuai (子哙) cannot give the state Yan (燕) to another, and Zizhi (子之) has not taken the state of Yan from Zikuai, and, the Son of Heaven cannot give political power under Heaven to another. Second, the Son of Heaven or an emperor is not the subject of political power under Heaven, and his existence depends on the agreement of the people, so it is a kind of contract. For those who have broken the contract his right should be rescinded. In this sense 2000 years earlier than the West Confucians rationalized the “right to rebel,” namely the right for revolution. Third, the reason for setting up the Son of Heaven or an emperor must be traced back to the need of the people, and what the people most basically need is existence; the biggest task of an emperor is to safeguard the existence of the people. Therefore, to love and care for the people belongs to the biggest task issued by Confucians to an emperor. Fourth, for the sake of protecting the life of the people Confucianism has heavily stressed the “clarification of the subtle relationship between the righteous and the utilitarian” (yi li zhi bian, 义利之辨). What Confucianism means by the utilitarian is the interests of the ruler; the righteous in politics refers to the rights of the people. Fifth, now that an emperor is set up because of the need of the people, all political activities are for the people, not for the emperor. Accordingly, court officials as servants of the emperor should not aim to worship the latter, but to cooperatively accomplish a common task.

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Sixth, Confucianism advocates governance by virtue. The basic sense of governance by virtue is “embodied teaching” (shenjiao, 身教), that means an emperor himself should set an example through his own behavior: as Confucius says, if the ruler as an embodied being behaves righteously, his governance goes well without enforcement; if not, he will not be followed even despite enforcement. Seventh, Confucianism does not accept that political power under Heaven is the private property of an emperor and also makes it clear that the task of the Son under Heaven is to love and care for the people. Thus, to love and care for the people is the end and “to gain political power under Heaven” is only a means. Confucianism emphasizes that the cultivation of the feeling body (embodied being) is the basis for all human beings, from the Son of Heaven to the common people, in order to strengthen a person’s moral sense that makes him a human being. The moral sense itself does not decrease because of personal wealth nor increase because of his wretched poverty. To have political power under Heaven or not has nothing to do with a decrease or increase in the moral sense. To sum up, the seven features can also be approached from the following twofold perspective. The first touches on the end of politics. The spirit of Confucian political philosophy stresses the value of pursuits that are for the people; it does not accept political activities which seek to further the private interests of the ruler. The second refers to the ideal foundation of politics that is accomplished through the cultivation of personality. Those who are not virtuous are not qualified to take part in politics. Because of this, with regard to their actual content, Confucian political philosophy and modern democracy are not opposite to each other in spirit, but complementary. We could even say that the Confucian ideal of personality is the basis of democracy; as Xu said, the spiritual basis of democracy is personal dignity. Personal dignity comes from the self-awareness rooted in human nature; the self-awareness rooted in human nature is the core of Confucianism; Mencius specifically deepened this point. Thus, Mencius makes the assertion that the people are important, the state is less important and the emperor is comparatively unimportant. He is the forerunner of democratic thought of our country.31 In any case, how should we face the fact that modern democracy has not developed out of Confucian political philosophy? Xu argues, “the reasons why Confucianism has not created the form of democracy are manifold; in any case, the assumption that the Confucian spirit may hinder democracy surely comes from the heartless national enemy or from the ignorant and senseless cultural compradors.”32 Affirming the significance of the exclusive reverence of Confucianism in the Han Dynasty he comments, “the reason to decide on the exclusive reverence of Confucianism actually is the same as expressed in our faith in democracy nowadays, while neither praising nor relying on fascism.”33 Thus, Xu very firmly believes,

146 Xu Fuguan and Confucian political philosophy from the standpoint of the Chinese those who honestly revere Confucius should strive for democracy so that the spirit of Confucius can be realized and practiced in politics. Those people who really long for democracy should explore the basic spirit of Confucius in order that democracy may be rooted in their own great tradition and all aspects in social life may be harmonized.34 As seen from the discussion above, not only does Xu long for the form of modern democracy, he also thinks that modern democracy has in itself unconquerable shortcomings that must be complemented with the thought and spirit of Confucianism. But to what extent is his view reasonable? This can be further discussed, but will not be touched upon here. I simply raise the question here to encourage more thinking. According to the brief introduction above we see that Xu thinks Confucian political and ethical thought contains the spirit of modern democracy; at least it is not in contradiction with the latter. Such an interpretation results in reconciling the tension between traditional Confucianism and the modern democratic system, so that the tense relationship between the traditional and the modern is lessened, but at the same time the content of modern democracy may also be enriched. This is his contribution to the re-interpretation of Confucian political philosophy. The question is: the spiritual and social foundation on which modern democracy depends is in any case modern individualism and industrial and commercial society. The traditional reverence for personal cultivation and traditional social cooperation based on small-scale agricultural economics could not give birth to modern democracy. Therefore, in my opinion, Xu’s modern interpretation of Confucian political philosophy gives too much attention to its significant agreements with modernity and ignores their incompatible aspects. It cannot be denied that Confucian political ideas, also including the ideas in Daoism and Buddhism, through a modern interpretation could all become spiritual sources for Chinese democracy. But systematic construction of Chinese democracy must be erected upon new spiritual foundations, which are a definite affirmation of basic, inviolable individual rights, including the rights of life, property, free speech, and so on, not only traditional personal dignity; an efficient way to limit the power of governors, but not the traditional trust based on the “sage complex”; and a system of constitutional government based on respect for individual equal rights, not teaching and transformation in light of the rites and music. All of these points concerning the thinking of modern democracy are ignored in Xu’s expounding of his political ideal of democracy. Pointing out the blind spots in Xu’s thinking encourages more exploration of the relationship between Confucianism and modern democracy. This not only respects Xu but also offers a way to absorb and develop his thinking. In respect of this point I ask for inspirations from my colleagues in academic circles.

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Notes 1 Li Weiwu (李维武), ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan (Xu Fu Guan Wen Ji, 徐复观文集), vol. 2, Wuhan: Hubei People’s Press (Hu Bei Ren Min Chu Ban She, 湖北人民出版社), 2002, 128. 2 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 129. 3 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 132. 4 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 132–133. 5 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 132. 6 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 131. 7 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 136–137. 8 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 137. 9 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 138. 10 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 141. 11 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 142. 12 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 143. 13 Mencius (Mengzi, 孟子), trans. D.C. Lau, 4A; Lilou shang (离娄上), London: Penguin Classics, 2004. 14 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 143. 15 Li Weiwu, ed., “An Analysis of Xunzi’s Political Thought” (Xun Zi Zheng Zhi Si Xiang Jie Xi, 荀子政治思想解析), Collected Works of Xu Fuguan (Xu Fu Guan Wen Ji 徐复观文集), vol. 2, 153. 16 Li Weiwu, ed., “Xunzi’s Political Thought,” Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 163. 17 Li Weiwu, ed., “Xunzi’s Political Thought,” Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 163–164. 18 Li Weiwu, ed., “Xunzi’s Political Thought,” Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 165. 19 Li Weiwu, ed., “Xunzi’s Political Thought,” Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 165. 20 Xu Fuguan (徐复观), On the History of Chinese Thought (Zhong Guo Si Xiang Shi Lun Ji, 中国思想史论集), Taiwan: Student Press (Xue Sheng Shu Ju, 学生书局), 1983, 60. 21 Xu Fuguan, History of Chinese Thought, 60. 22 Xu Fuguan, History of Chinese Thought, 60. 23 Xu Fuguan, History of Chinese Thought, 63. 24 Xu Fuguan, History of Chinese Thought, 66. 25 Xu Fuguan, History of Chinese Thought, 70. 26 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 199. 27 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 204–205. 28 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 205. 29 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 205. 30 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 151. 31 Xu Fuguan, History of Chinese Thought, 60. 32 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 133. 33 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 213. 34 Li Weiwu, ed., Collected Works of Xu Fuguan, 133.

11 On the possibility of dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism from a humanistic point of view1

11.1 Introduction: Raising the question of how “humanism” can be the foundation of dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism The search for the possibility of dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism is as an academic endeavor intrinsically relevant to the critical situation of traditional Chinese culture, which has been looking for a way-out for itself in modern times. As one of the main issues of the Chinese in modern times, it touches on the value of traditional culture. Xu Fuguan (徐复观), as one of its very important representatives, has tried to demonstrate the spiritual connection between Confucianism and democracy in modern free society, while Yin Haiguang (殷海光), who is lifelong a disciple of Friedrich August von Hayek in spirit, also returned to Confucianism in the latter part of his life, holding that the spiritual source of “inner freedom” (or moral freedom) can be found in the Confucian tradition. Professor William Theodore de Bary of Columbia University has with arduous and detailed discussions spent a lifetime investigating the thought on freedom implied in Confucianism, having been especially focused on the period from the Song and Ming dynasties to the time of Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲). All of these discourses are the most valuable literary proofs of and spiritual inspirations for the dialogue between Confucianism and liberalism. But behind these discourses lies a presupposition that basically Western liberalism is unconsciously assumed to be the standard for judging, on the basis of which similar ideas in the Confucian cultural tradition have been sought in order to rationally demonstrate the value of Confucianism to modern society. In the scientific field concerning cultural comparison, this Westerncentrism is to some degree historically understandable, but academically it is unacceptable. What I want to do with this chapter is to work out the foundations for dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism. In comparison with the work of other scholars, my approach might be different. This will be especially evident with regard to my different way of thinking. I start my discussion as follows: with reference to the basic idea of progress concerning human civilization and the motivation behind it for rapid development. (Naturally many

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people will raise questions such as: is there a basic idea behind the progress of the human civilization? Can an idea be the original motivation for the progress of society? And can we apply the concept “progress” in talking about the change of civilization?) I will explore the possibility of dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism. Therefore, the value standard that is cherished in liberalism will not be taken as the only one to judge whether the Confucian doctrine on “humaneness” is of modern value. Regarding the value in modern society of both liberalism and Confucianism, this is to be subordinated to a more fundamental value standard – humanism. I admit that such a standpoint of thinking is characteristic of historical essentialism, which is inopportune and inappropriate in our times, which are popularly anti-essentialist and deconstructionist. But in my opinion, in pluralistic times, the coexistence of essentialism and antiessentialism, and of construction and deconstruction should be accepted. Any prejudice that lays emphasis only on one specific methodology must fly in the face of the need for cultural pluralism. Let’s come back to the question itself. I want to ask: how can humanism become the foundation of the dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism? I will answer it with regard to the following three aspects. First, in my view, by “humanism” is implied the most essential and most important idea for the evolution of human civilization, that is, “to treat human beings as human beings.” Because of this dynamic idea, human beings were progressively freed from primitive religions in archaic times and from theological ideology in the Middle Ages. Although from the point of view of formal logic, the denotation of this proposition is vague, and its connotations are also not so definite, some ideas such as “human beings are the end,” “respect for the plurality of human culture,” “human beings are animals with feelings and desires that are similar to other animals, but they cannot be treated with the attitude applied to other animals,” and so on are all included in this basic proposition. The distinction between the “contemplative observation of what is made by man” and the “contemplative observation of what is brought forth by nature” in the Yijing (Zhouyi, 周易) can be regarded as an early expression of classical humanism in China. “Through contemplatively observing what is brought forth by nature the change that accords with the time is to be known”; this is about the importance of following natural law. And “through contemplatively observing what is made by man the transformation of the cultural world under Heaven is to be discerned”; hereby is implied the topic of transforming human customs in terms of an ideal. Transformation (hua, 化) means gradual change, which is to be carried out on the basis of an awareness of the different customs or conventions and according to the general tendency, only not in a compulsory way. Thus, in the face of problems in the human cultural world we have to, first of all, observe human cultures – namely, the customs and rules of the people in different areas. Culture (wen, 文) implies a kind of texture (wen, 纹), which means orderly arrangement. Human culture contains the arrangement of human relations in the broad sense. In the terminology of

150 Dialogue between humaneness and liberalism sociology it then means customs and rules. Like the natural sciences what we do with this step is to exactly know the object. As to the second aspect it is the “transformation of the world under Heaven.” This means the practice – slowly, harmoniously, and in accordance with the human – of changing society on the basis of knowledge. The ideal state is what is described by Mencius: “it should not be done in order to gain political power under Heaven if the requisite for it is just to commit only one unjust thing or to kill only one innocent man,” which gives expression to the most humanist ideal in classical political philosophy in China. As an attitude, humanism cares for the priority of the existence of human beings. In the Analects (Lunyu, 论语), on hearing of a stable fire from one of his disciples Confucius immediately asked, “Was anybody hurt?”, but did not mention horses. From this story we can see his humanistic concern. Regarding the third aspect of humanism, it is as the embodiment of the character and accomplishment of a person, the virtue of a superior or humane man (junzi, 君子) in classical Chinese philosophy. Jade symbolizes the virtue of a humane man, because it is qualified as exquisite, even harmonious, and not coarse. Confucius’s ideal of the accomplishment of a man consists in “being inspired through poems, being matured in manners, and being accomplished in musical harmony,” in which his pursuit of the richness and harmoniousness of human nature is clear. This is also a classical Chinese expression of humanism. In the time of Cicero in ancient Rome, humanism or the humanistic education was “an educational system that helps an individual develop himself to the utmost degree.”2 In some sense this is similar to the ideal of the humanities in later times. This kind of humanist spirit or the educational system of humanities spiritually has very much in common with what Confucius pursues through the “six classical arts” (liuyi, 六艺) or the ideal personality of a humane man. Second, before the dawn of modern society humanism slowly developed into a central idea in society, by which the people were inspired to fight against alienated religions or ethics, and with the help of which they developed a new view of themselves. But to begin with, the term humanism covered a very wide range of meaning. In the time of Cicero, humanism referred to the study of the classics and the all-round development of personality. But after the Renaissance humanism was, according to the view of Irving Babbitt, mainly used to denote a tendency to return to the spirit of ancient Greece and Rome, and at the same time, to mean education in rules and laws in order to enhance humane accomplishment; as he said, we have seen thus far that the word humanist has two main meanings – an historical meaning in its application to the scholars who turned away from the Middle Ages to the Greek and Romans, and a psychological meaning, as one may say, that derives directly from the historical one: humanists in this latter sense are those who, in an age, aim at proportionateness through a cultivation of the law of measure.3 In China there was no the Renaissance as in the West, but during the period of the Ming–Qing transition new thoughtful movements included similar humanistic

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spirits. Besides the fruitful studies of the philosophy of the pre-Qin period in scholarship, the humanistic concern of balancing feeling/desire and rational calculation was talked about very much in order to argue against the control of feeling/desire through rational calculation and to argue for personal temperaments and dispositions. The continuous development of humanism into the 18th century as the Enlightenment in the West especially highlighted the significance of a person’s character and his rational ability. Accordingly, liberalism and individualism became the main theoretical resources; and personal competence, rights, feeling, will, and so on in almost all humanistic fields such as in philosophy, ethics, politics, the arts, and so on were highly cherished. Thus, even the rise of modern natural science had also to give credit to the humanistic trend. Naturally, from today’s point of view the humanistic trend has also shown a shortcoming regarding its anthropocentrism by emphasizing too much the separation between nature and man, which has led to a series of ecological problems. But this does not mean the end of humanism. Because the two basic concerns of humanism – what does it mean to be a human being and what a kind of life is the life of a human being? – have not yet been well answered even today. Humanism does not necessarily result in anthropocentrism; and the harmony between man and nature belongs to the basic implication of the proposition that “a human being should lead the life of a human being.” Nature is the basic prerequisite for human existence. Human beings cannot sustain their existence by disobeying the laws of nature, but at the same time they surely need such a nature that is proper for the human existence; this is the main new focus of humanism in the 21st century. At present it is difficult to imagine that the harmony of nature and man can be realized without following the principle of humanism. Accordingly, our need to go further on the way that was initiated since the time of the Renaissance and also well paved through Enlightenment reason will not necessarily lead to tension in the relationship between man and nature. What is required from us is that we should not understand “humanism” as “anthropocentrism”, as the absolute human control and unreasonable misuse of nature. Third, the basic idea – “to treat a human being as a human being” or “human beings are the end” – is contained both in Confucian doctrine on “humaneness” and in liberalism, but it is differently concretized by them. Generally speaking, the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” is an ethically characterized theory of politics; with apparent ethical concern Confucianism mainly focuses on the nourishment of mercy and compassion, whereas liberalism – as a socially oriented theory of the ethics – is relatively more complex, striving to change moral compassion into a theory of rights. Ethically liberalism emphasizes moral self-discipline or autonomy, affirms the free will, free choice of an individual, and his responsibility for his autonomy. From a historical perspective the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” had not fully developed in the 20th century. In it ethics, politics, and the philosophy of rights are not clearly distinguished from one other. As an ethically characterized theory of politics and philosophy of rights it pays too much attention to ethics and focuses on the principle concerning the question – “How ought we properly treat others?” – in social interactions in the broad sense; but regarding the philosophy of politics liberalism

152 Dialogue between humaneness and liberalism has proposed a theory of rights – it concerns “What rights should we have to do or not to do something?”, on account of which the realization of the essential idea of humanism – “the human being is the end” – can be concretely carried out in social politics. We call the moral principle contained in the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” “the moral principle of compassionate interaction,” but the humanistic spirit embodied in the liberalist theory concerning social politics the “principle of the social justice.” If the latter is applied in the field of ethics, it can be also the “principle of autonomy or self-discipline.” For this reason, with reference to different spiritual traditions the humanism in Confucianism and that in Western liberalism respectively have developed and been enriched in their own ways, with different emphases upon specific aspects as implied in the idea of humanism. “Humanism” as a theory concerns the question of how to live a social life for human beings. It has become the study of the humanities as contrasted to the natural sciences, after the natural sciences have become independent disciplines. It has, however, something in common with the natural sciences in regard to scientific methodology; for example, it also asks how to determine the subject matter in a discussion. However, regarding value problems such as what kind of life is meaningful, what kind of life is the life of human beings, and so on, it differs from the natural sciences. From the point of view of formal logic humanism can be seen as a concept of species, and the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism both belong to it as concepts of genus. The Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” as humanism from the ancient East and liberalism as the modern form of humanism in the West are both the embodiments of humanism in different areas and of different times. As liberalism drove in the car of Western civilization, it went from something local to something global; liberalism as implied in the Confucian doctrine on “humaneness” was still limited in the form of local and regional culture. Thus, dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and “liberalism” actually can be seen as dialogue between humanism that is local and regional and humanism that takes the form of world culture. The reason for humanism to be the foundation for dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism is that they both concentrate on an essential theme, that is, they both discuss how to live a social life for human beings on different levels, in different ways, and with different emphasis. It is plain that neither quantum mechanics nor the theory of relativity nor structuralism can be the foundation of the dialogue between the two. The problem is that they have different concerns. Of course, discussion about the dialogue of the two from the standpoint of humanism cannot exhaust all the implications of comparing Confucianism with Western philosophy, namely, it does not exclude possibilities to compare Confucianism with other philosophical schools. The basic methodology of this chapter lies in the working-out of a proper topic that is suitable for dialogue between traditional Chinese philosophy and modern Western philosophy. To put it in popular terminology, it aims to find out the commensurability that is necessary for comparative philosophy. My taking humanism as the foundation of the dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism can be seen as an exceptional attempt in

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methodology. Whether there is commensurability or not is still open to examination and criticism from my peers, but the direction to pursue such a methodology is in my view not a problem. To extend my discussion initiated above, I will try, in support of my argumentation, to briefly elucidate the concepts of humanism, the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness,” and “liberalism” in the modern West. What I want to stress is that the content implied by these three concepts would require a thick book for its detailed elucidation. Therefore, the discussion that follows will be only an introductory summary and touch on just part of the theme; much more must be left out.

11.2 Some general knowledge concerning humanism Rendao zhuyi (人道主义) in Chinese is the translation of humanism, which etymologically comes from the Latin humanistas, the Chinese translation of which is sometimes renwen zhuyi (人文主义), sometimes rendao zhuyi, while in English the two identically refer to “humanism.” According to the Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, “humanism” refers to “a cultural impulse characterized by classical letters, individualistic and critical spirit, and a shift of emphasis from religious to secular concerns” in Renaissance Europe (Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, p. 908). In the Zhongguo da baike quanshu (中国大百科全书) there are two articles on rendao zhuyi and renwen zhuyi, which means almost the same only with different details. It proves that they are different translations of the same concept. In the Zhonghua baike quanshu (中华百科全书) there are articles on rendao and rendao zhuyi, but not renwen zhuyi. Etymologically and originally, renwen zhuyi (appreciation for the humanities) and rendao zhuyi (humanism) mean the same. But because of the independent development of the natural sciences they have built up their own system of methodology which is distinguished from that of traditional religious and moral studies. Against this background, humanism as the study of the humanities that are in contrast to the natural sciences takes on a new meaning. Methodologically, it has something in common with the natural sciences, but ultimately it is different from the positivism of the latter. The humanities such as literature, the arts, philosophy, and so on are characterized by non-positivist judgment that highlights, for example, the value of imagination. While the features of the modern natural sciences lie in their quest for exactness and universality, the traits of the humanities are embodied in their focus on the particularity and uncertainty of the sensual world of human beings. (Of course, in quantum mechanics problems of uncertainty such as randomness and probability are also included.) Such a humanistic trend can be seen as a special embodiment of humanism itself in modern times; it is posited against the purely physically oriented investigation of man or human beings, and requires respect for the human right to exist in the first place and respect for the integrity and individual character of a man, which should be treated as an end in itself. It opposes, for instance, human beings being subjected to any scientific experiments, even if they are designed for the sake of saving human beings themselves in the medical experiments. Therefore,

154 Dialogue between humaneness and liberalism the humanities in the modern sense, as contrasted to the natural sciences, are still included in humanism or can be regarded as an enrichment of the latter. Parallel to the progress of the modern natural sciences, especially to that of the theory of biological evolution, humanism has also spiritually borrowed very much from them. From the natural sciences humanism has not only learned to examine the problems of human beings and their society with a historical, metamorphic, and organic point of view, but also received more persuasive, positive support from them. In respect to this point the development of the natural sciences has not run in an opposite direction to humanism. If the natural sciences develop in a way that is compatible with human nature, then they are possessed of the humanistic trait and can bring wellness to human beings; otherwise, the natural sciences would be terrible monsters. For this reason, humanism as a doctrine of the mode of human social existence has not lost its basic implication that “human beings are the end” in modern society. From the perspective of academic history the outcomes of the discussions on “humanism” in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe can deepen our research. They differentiated “humanism” into two levels: humanism in the broad sense and humanism in the narrow sense. The former means “the progressive ideas and trends of thought in a society”; its main connotations are: (1) advocating human dignity and affirming human beings as the highest value and the end of social development; (2) the importance of human happiness in this life and recognition of the worldly needs and the ability for human beings to satisfy and develop themselves; (3) the belief in the possibility to educate human beings and to develop their ability, and the need for personal freedom and the all-round development of the individual; (4) the pursuit of human accomplishment and the requirement of developing interpersonal relationships that are based on mutual respect. Humanism in the narrow sense refers to topics since the Renaissance. It is characterized as follows: (1) originally, it came out from Italy, represented by Francesco Petrarch. Its earliest form was the teaching of classical literature and respect for the ancient tradition; (2) it attached importance to the personal relationship with God, human free will, and the priority of human beings against nature; (3) in philosophy it regarded the man as the scale to evaluate everything else, encouraging the human pursuit of truth and goodness; it required that the people ought to give up prejudiced philosophical systems, religious dogmas, and abstract deductions, and instead to pay attention to the value of real life; (4) it was a doctrine that emphasized an individual’s value in his religious faith in God, striving to free people from religious alienation. Chronologically, scholars in the former Soviet Union and Eastern Europe have understood humanism in terms of three different periods, namely, humanism in ancient times, capitalist humanism, and socialist humanism. For the sake of the uniformity of terminology I am inclined to divide humanism into two types, the classical and the modern one. In the Western cultural tradition humanism before the Renaissance was classical humanism, while humanism afterwards was conventionally called modern humanism. In China, we think that the Confucian doctrine

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of “humaneness” since Li Zhi (李贽) in the 17th century was the beginning of modern Chinese humanism, whereas humanism before was its classical form. Whether in China or in the West, the watershed between classical and the modern humanism lies in differentiation: the former stresses social identity and hierarchy in spite of its respect for personal dignity, while the latter attaches importance to the free development of human personality under the condition of the equality of human beings. According to the standard classification, the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” before the 17th century belonged to the category of classical humanism, afterwards it has developed in the direction of modern humanism, though its development has been not as full as in the West, also with different emphasis from the latter. Human civilization before the modern era was basically expressed in the form of national and regional histories, and the Chinese Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” as a kind of classical humanism is thus also characterized by its nationality, and in comparison with the Roman humanistic tradition it was also regionally limited. Therefore, in the process of the modernization the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” as one of the spiritual sources of “humanism” in world history must, in the face of the fact that it has fallen behind as compared with the West, change itself from something local to something global, before it really has a universal impact on world history.

11.3 In what sense is the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” humanism? The doctrine of “humaneness” is one of the most dynamic in Confucian ethics and politics. From the earliest discourse on “humaneness” to the thought in Tan Sitong’s (谭嗣同) Renxue (仁学), the idea of “humaneness” was continually transformed in the direction of modern humanism. The doctrine of “humaneness” as a classical idea of humanism implies the following basic principles: 1) Filial piety and fraternal duty are the basis of humaneness. A humane person loves human beings, but the principle to treat persons near to oneself with special intimacy is of specific importance. 2) Regarding interpersonal relationships, the principles of loyalty and forbearance are cherished – which can be traced back to the proverb in the Analects (Lunyu, 论语): if one wants to succeed oneself, one should at the same time think of the success of others; if one wants oneself to be prosperous, one should at the same time think of the prosperity of others; if something is not desired by oneself, one should not put it to others. 3) As a social concern it advocates universal love: to love universally and be kind to others. A humane person loves people. 4) As guiding principles in politics, “governance by virtue” and the importance of “humaneness and righteousness” are respectively stressed by Confucius and Mencius. The former talks about “keeping order in terms of virtue,”

156 Dialogue between humaneness and liberalism and the latter attaches importance to “humane politics” and the “extension of kindness to the whole world.” 5) Economically, Confucius emphasizes “making the people rich,” and Mencius speaks of the “the perseverance of the people with the prerequisite that the people should have secure agricultural property.” 6) With regard to personal moral cultivation, Confucius stresses the “virtue of perseverance,” the “virtue of a superior man” that brings to expression the consistency that is required in his moral ideal, steadfastness in one’s selfcultivation and the abundant development of human beings that is relevant to education as embodied poetry, rite, and music. The development of the doctrine of “humaneness” by the Confucians after the Han Dynasty was characteristic of their attention to the universality of humaneness. Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒) of the Han Dynasty made a distinction between “humaneness” and “righteousness,” thinking that “humaneness is embodied in the treatment of others, and righteousness is the virtue to regulate oneself.” He exalted “humaneness” to the height of Heaven, extremely stressing the universality and all-embracing inclusiveness of “humaneness.” Zhang Zai (张载) in the Song Dynasty said, “the people are my brothers and all the other things are my friends,” which extended “humaneness” to a concept of universal love. Zhang’s idea became a spiritual source for an early form of the Chinese Enlightenment movement during the period of the Ming–Qing transition. At the end of the Ming and the beginning of the Qing Dynasty the practical application of the doctrine of “humaneness” in politics is comprehensively discussed as exemplified in the work Mingyi daifang lu (明夷待访录) by Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲). Though Huang did not directly express his thoughts in terms of the concept of humaneness like Tan Sitong (谭嗣同) in his Renxue (仁学), the connection of this work with the doctrine of humaneness is apparent. His overwhelming criticism of the tyranny of the monarchy and his strong defense of private property are the deepening and systematization of the thought of the “humane politics” of Mencius. In the Mengzi ziyi shuzheng (孟子字义疏证) Dai Zhen’s (戴震) sympathy with the people of lower classes, his accusation of “killing in the name of truth” as seen in the politicized ethics and especially implied in the Song–Ming official philosophy, and his request for the separation of ethics from the law are all humanistic embodiments of his concern for vulnerable groups. Concern for vulnerable groups motivated the union of humanism with socialism later on. As to the work Renxue by Tan Sitong, Tan combined the Confucian doctrine of humaneness with Buddhist compassion, Christian universal love, and capitalist theories on freedom and equality in modern times all together. Through a great fusion Tan has comprehended “humaneness as being unobstructed,” and thus carried forward the thinking of humaneness in the direction of modern humanism. It must be admitted that, except for the principle concerning loyalty and forbearance that became universal rules of behavior in the ancient society of China, all the other principles given above have remained on the level of idea and have never been realized as universal regulations in any actual form. Thus,

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to what extent humanism in the form of the doctrine of “humaneness” in the history of China has been implemented is a question that deserves being carefully considered. Cognitively, the doctrine of humaneness has a defect in that it lacks a factual description of “what a human being is.” It has rather explained very much “what ought a human being to do,” which seems an aggressive ethical concern. On the political level it especially lacks the clarification of inalienable rights that a man should possess. Mencius proposes the political practice of the idea of “humane love” and the “extension of kindness”; he speaks also of classical Chinese democracy concerning the way of a ruler and subjects in treating each other properly, and accepts the reasonableness of revolution against a tyrant; and with respect to economics Mencius thinks of “providing the people with secure agricultural property.” Nevertheless, regarding the whole system of the doctrine of humaneness, themes of personal inalienable social rights, limitations on the power of monarchy, and so on were seldom referred to. On account of this, although the doctrine of “humaneness” holds free will in high esteem as expressed in propositions like “the commander of the three armed forces may be removed, but the will of even a commoner cannot be easily defeated,” “a Confucian intellectual can be killed, but he should not be insulted,” and so on, free will lacks protection in terms of the “principle of justice,” thus it is merely morally encouraged but lacking universal validity based on the laws in a society. According to humanism as embodied in modern political liberalism, the free will of a man should be proposed as follows – “a Confucian intellectual should neither be killed nor be insulted,” except that the man has broken the law and should be sentenced to death by law. Otherwise, not only a Confucian intellectual, but more precisely, all people should neither be arbitrarily killed nor insulted. Accordingly, the “principle of morally compassionate interaction” in the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” throughout ignores the limitation of political power, and does not pay enough attention to personal rights. But at the same time, it heavily stresses the moral commitments that must be assumed by individuals; and because of this it could not effectively put its idea of humanism into practice. Although in Huang Zongxi’s (黄宗羲) Mingyi daifang lu (明夷待访录) and Tan Sitong’s (谭嗣同) Renxue (仁学) we can see radical criticism of the unlimited political power of a tyrant, hoping for an effective balancing of it; in actual political practices there seemed to be no chance for all these ideas to be implemented before circumstances really changed with the passage of time. And in the process of Chinese modernization there has never developed a strong social public consciousness that the political power should be supervised and balanced, and the rights of citizens in social life should be protected. On the basis of this we can say the Chinese tradition of humanism represented by the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness,” whether in its classical or in its modern form, bears the innate defect that it has ignored the balance of political power and the convincing protection of personal rights, and it has overemphasized personal moral commitments in society. Therefore, political life in modern China is still characterized

158 Dialogue between humaneness and liberalism as an overabundance of moral enthusiasm but too few rational regulations in society. Because of this, in our search for a foundation of the dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and modern Western liberalism, we have to soberly see into the structural defect in our own thoughts.

11.4 In what sense is liberalism humanism? What is liberalism? Or of what features is liberalism possessed? This cannot be answered in a few words. Professor Charles Frankel of Columbia University gives a personal interpretation that contains six aspects:4 1) Cultural liberalism: liberalism in this sense is contrasted with regional ideology or religious fanaticism. It attaches importance to variety in cultural education in order to enhance the intelligence of people and to develop their cultural competence, so that the people could, with sympathy and critical acuity appreciate the pluralistic possibilities of human life. 2) Political liberalism: this stresses peaceful transformation and tries to legitimate various forms of transformation. 3) Economic liberalism: this formulates policies to regulate strong power that is out of balance. 4) Philosophical liberalism: this believes in the priority of rational methodology. 5) Moral liberalism: the character or style of freedom is embodied as moderation, self-mastery, and compromise. 6) Free education: this has strong convictions to carry out the long-term ideals of morality, culture, and civilization, makes compromises, but does not court people’s favor by making impressive statements. The division of humanism into several varieties given above by Frankel can help us understand the different aspects of it. But his knowledge of liberalism is not exhaustive and has apparently ignored the different traditions of liberalism, especially the metaphysical foundation of liberalism – individualism does not receive adequate consideration. Such an interpretation of liberalism may very probably run the risk of losing the quintessence of liberalism. His summary of moral and political liberalism only highlights one aspect of the spirit of liberalism. The other aspect of political liberalism is the emphasis of the priority of personal rights, which remains unchanged whether in classical or in modern liberalism. As for moral liberalism, not only moderation, self-mastery, and compromise but also particularity concerning the full development of the individual personality should be stressed. Nevertheless, the elucidation of the several aspects of liberalism by Frankel is very significant. It provides us with a more detailed understanding of liberalism. The six aspects mentioned above bring liberalism in the modern West and traditional values together. The “humanism” embodied here in the theory of liberalism takes into account the sense of history, because the liberalist ideal of “cultural liberalism” and free education is still connected to classical education in humanities. For instance, political

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liberalism attaches importance to legalization of the process of the transmission of political power that necessarily results in its protest against violent revolutions and its cherishing of continuity in spite of social transformations. Philosophically, liberalism believes in the power of reason as the cultural basis of continuity in spite of social transformations. All these are issues appreciated in liberalism and individualism since the Renaissance. In reality, the greatest contribution of liberalism as a branch of modern Western humanism to modern society lies in its political philosophy that emphasizes the basic inalienable rights of individuals and strongly shows its distrust in political power. With regard to the fields of philosophy and culture in the broad sense it expresses doubt regarding ultimate truth and advocates a skeptical philosophy. Accordingly, dogmatism in philosophy and culture, academic authoritarianism based on dogmatism, and political collectivism and totalitarianism are all dealt a devastating blow. Even though the form of liberalism is various and complex, and almost all important thinkers have talked about the problem of freedom, with regard to human rights there is something common for liberalism on the political level. They wish, through the form of the social contract, to protect human rights, which every person has even in the natural state, though they are not safely established. This idea is shared by liberalism both of English empiricism and Continental rationalism. Only regarding the question of how to realize these rights do the thinkers not agree with one other. For example, Hobbes thinks that an individual must absolutely obey the state’s will that is established on the basis of agreement; for Locke, if the government is not in accordance with the will of people, the people can overthrow it; in the opinion of Spinoza a state should not impinge on personal rights; and Rousseau also considers that it is impossible for the public will to be subject to that of individual citizens; if it be so, it undermines itself. Generally speaking, classical liberalism politically stresses very much the priority of personal rights, opposing shackles on human nature through organizations and cultural dogmas. Economically it affirms spontaneous regulations through the free market, because what the thinkers of classical liberalism faced was oppression of the rising civil class from the mighty Christian tradition and all kinds of feudal powers. Since the 1880s and especially after the First World War, parallel to the development of capitalism and the rise of socialist thought, the new socialist trend in liberalism has, besides its further affirmation of individual rights and value, highlighted the importance of social cooperation. Representatives are the British pioneer of the Labour Party Leonard Trelawny Hobhouse and the German philosopher Grimm. In the 1970s John Rawls as a synthesis of classical and modern liberalism emphasized, naturally alongside his concern with the priority of personal rights, the decisive role played by social organizations regarding the distribution of interests in a society. His A Theory of Justice definitely shows concern for people who are in unfavorable positions, thus it is possessed of a humanistic character, while in Political Liberalism the importance of cultural agreement by members of society is confirmed.

160 Dialogue between humaneness and liberalism Liberalism in the modern West was mainly influenced by humanism, which is regarded as the ultimate value, the result of which is the awakening of human beings. But philosophically its metaphysical foundation is the tradition of atomistic individualism. Its main argumentation is the priority of individuals in contrast to organizations and society. In spite of the complexity with regard to the schools of liberalism, in my view they share some basic ideas which can be summarized as follows: 1) A man is not a god; he has desires of his own, and has to live the life of a human being by satisfying his desires. 2) Precisely because a man is not a god, intellectually a man cannot be omniscient, and everyone may make mistakes. 3) Everyone is a child of God, therefore, all people are equal regarding their existence in a society. 4) Human beings are rational and therefore endowed with the same rights. 5) A man should enjoy the property of his own that is sacred and inviolable. 6) In social life, a man can do everything that he wants to do when allowed by law, and at the same he enjoys freedom from the persecution of political powers. Classical liberalism especially stresses an individual’s rationality and his basic rights, usually by regarding society as a stage of an individual to develop his competence and character in order to satisfy his desires. In such a society all people are possessed of basic reason, and they utilize reason to establish social rules so that everyone can regulate their own behavior in terms of these rules. On the basis of free activities, individual and social benefits can be naturally maximized, and society may automatically stay in a harmonious state. The supervision of political interference in personal behaviors is the most fundamental ideal of classical liberalism. Modern liberalism is not so optimistic. It has seen the weakness in human nature and the function of government in free social competition, thus it has paid more attention to the relation between freedom and equality. For instance, the two basic principles given by Rawls in A Theory of Justice typically give expression to the wisdom of modern liberalism in dealing with relations between individuals and society. In Political Liberalism the two principles are formulated as follows: the first is the principle of fair equality of opportunity: “each person has equal claim to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic rights and liberties, which scheme is compatible with the same scheme for all”; the second is called by Rawls the difference principle: social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, they are to be attached to positions and offices open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.5

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Thus, starting from the inherent Western tradition and being based on the claim that human beings are possessed of reason and have basic rights, liberalism has enriched the idea of humanism. It holds that each person in a society ought to have basic rights which should not be ignored or deprived, and must be protected. Accordingly, liberalism has, in debate with other schools, developed a series of political and ethical doctrines. In so far as it aims to protect the rights of individuals (citizens), to limit political power and the power of various social organizations, and to encourage self-choice and self-responsibility in morality, it deepens and enriches humanism.

11.5 Tentative conclusions and some explanations According to the discussions about the Confucian humanistic doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism as given above we tentatively conclude: 1) There is an ideological basis for comparison between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism, namely, they both attach importance to a man’s value in society. A person in Confucianism is a social sign in general, while a person in liberalism refers to an “atom-like” individual. 2) Both doctrines start from the basic idea that “human beings are the end,” but they have developed it from different points of view. The Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” emphasizes with forceful language a man’s moral dignity in society without yet fully making the distinction between what is political and what is ethical, and its thought on rights is not definite. Liberalism in the field of politics mainly highlights, in terms of rigid normalization, the sacredness of a person’s rights in society; in the field of morality it pays much attention to autonomy in self-choice and the consciousness of self-responsibility. 3) Being guided by the basic idea of “treating a human being as a human being,” the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” has, with the focus on human nature for the sake of personal cultivation, mainly contributed to the highlighting of compassion – the principle of compassionate interaction, while liberalism in the modern West has mainly contributed to working out the “principle of justice” that cherishes personal rights with regard to the sociality of human beings. 4) Though the “principle of compassionate interaction” of the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” does not ignore the rights of disadvantaged people, the idea has not been carried out and fully matured in actual politics. The “principle of justice” of liberalism has transformed personal compassion to the duty of government, and weakened the effect of interpersonal compassion in politics, and thus tried to exclude feelings and emotions from politics. Liberalist political theory leaves much space for charities like religious organizations in society to assume specific moral responsibilities with compassion. Personal compassion belongs to the field of personal free will and is not much connected with political behaviors. There is a distinctive line

162 Dialogue between humaneness and liberalism between political life that belongs to the public space and the personal field that needs moral choice and responsibility (although the two are in some ways connected with each other, this is different from the bond between politics and personal morality or disposition). 5) Through dialogue with liberalism, the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” needs at least to develop a theory of rights of its own in order to enrich the connotations of the “way of human beings.” Liberalism may also learn from the principle of compassionate interaction in the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” that should also be seen as a spiritual source. Liberalism may try to fully realize the cultivation of personality in the Confucian sense in political and social life, but at the same time not lose its own dynamic principles. Finally, I want to complement that the humanistic perspective is not the only choice to search for the foundation of the dialogue between the Confucian doctrine of “humaneness” and liberalism, and I cannot claim either that this perspective is absolutely proper. In reality, the perspective regarding the continuity and jump-like discontinuity in cultural transformation can also be chosen to check the relationship between Confucianism, liberalism, and conservatism. The three all attach importance to the continuity of cultural transformations, the details of which merit being investigated. In my view, the differences between Chinese and Western cultures are various, great, and even fundamental, but in any case human life faces many common issues such as birth, death, food, sexuality, community, self, corporeity, mind, matter, and so on. Culturally and philosophically comparative research may be based on these common issues in order to find out “the commonness among the difference” and inversely to analyze “the differences among seeming commonness.” Probably in this way the embarrassing and ridiculous cases of cultural comparison as exemplified by Qian Zhongshu (钱钟书) – “the dogs in the West are bigger than cats in China” – may be avoided. In this sense this chapter is a tentative investigation, and its methodological significance can perhaps be just embodied at this point.

Notes 1 This chapter was written with reference to the following literature: (1) William Theodore de Bary, The Liberal Tradition in China, Columbia: Columbia University Press, 1983 (Chinese translation by Li Hongqi, 李弘祺); (2) Tu Wei-ming (杜维明), Renxing yu ziwo xiuyang (人性与自我修养), Taiwan: Lianjing chubanshe, 1992; (3) David Conway: Classical Liberalism: The Unvanquished Ideal, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 1995; (4) Anthony Arblaster: The Rise and Decline of Western Liberalism, Oxford: Blackwell, 1986; (5) The article “humanities” in Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: “Branches of knowledge that investigate human beings, their culture, and their self-expressions. The modern conception of humanities … draws on CICERO’S humanitas, a program of training for orators. … The Renaissance humanities contrasted studia humanitatis (studies of humanities) with studies of the divine; by the 19th century the distinction was instead drawn between the humanities and the sciences.” Britannica Concise Encyclopedia, revised and expanded edition, 2006, p. 908.

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At that time included under the humanities were mathematics, linguistics, history, philosophy, and other disciplines, which is similar to general studies or all-round education nowadays and therefore not confined to the field of humanities in the modern sense. Gu Mingyuan, Dictionary of Education (教育大辞典, Jiaoyu Dacidian), Shanghai: Shanghai Education Press, 1998, 112. Norman Foerster, ed. Humanism and America: Essays on the Outlook of Modern Civilization, New York: Farrar Rinehart, 1930, 30. Charles Frankel, The Democratic Prospect, Ann Arbor, MI: Harper & Row, 1962. John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, 5.

12 On Liang Qichao’s idea of liberty in his earlier works

More than 100 years ago, the unstable Chinese society of the late Qing Dynasty was in danger of becoming extinct, especially with regard to political sovereignty and racial survival. What ideas did Liang Qichao (梁启超), one of the intellectuals with social concerns during this era, contribute in order to save China? For him the idea of liberty is like gold among sand. He said, “concerning the great world events in the past hundreds of years, is it not that they all were motivated through the idea of ‘liberty’?”1 And, “liberty is the universal principle under Heaven and is requisite for human life, thus it is nowhere to be unfitting.” He even predicted, in the 20th century there would be three countries that would exercise decisive influence on the world, they are Russia, the United States, and China. These three countries have to realize great changes in their old situations, in order to accomplish their respective great causes. What are the ways to change? For the United States the republican system is to be changed into the imperial, while for Russia and China the monarchy is to be changed into liberalism.2 What is the present significance of Liang’s idea of liberty, which he enunciated more than 100 years ago? Does the idea of liberty mean the same as in the context of modern Western philosophy? And what is the difference? As we know, later on in the Chinese social context many Western concepts like democracy, liberty, human rights, science, equality, and so on were more or less falsely interpreted. This was especially so with regard to the concept of liberty. On the one hand, in the process of Chinese modernization it aimed to free individuals from the old monarchical system, highlighting the conflict between individuals and the old social system; on the other hand, because the process of Chinese modernization was full of various difficulties and foreign military oppression, so much so that the existence of the Chinese nation as a whole was even in doubt, individual liberty had to be subordinated to the independence and liberty of the nation. Therefore, there has often been a conflict between “individual liberty” and “national liberty,” which was apparently brought to

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expression in Liang’s idea of liberty. On the basis of this, this chapter will, by analyzing Liang’s understanding of liberty, try to uncover the fortunes of the Western philosophical idea of liberty as interpreted in Chinese society, in order to contribute something inspiring to Sino-Western philosophical communication and interplay. First of all I will give a short examination concerning the etymology of the word “liberty” which functions as a clarification of cultural background for the Chinese understanding of liberty.

12.1 An etymological examination of the word “liberty” (ziyou, 自由) In classical Chinese “ziyou” as a two-syllable word first appeared in the works of the Tang Dynasty.3 According to traditional classical studies, the combination of the two-syllable “ziyou” has not only positive but also negative connotations. When an individual’s free action disobeys the rites-based orders and disciplines, the free will and action of an individual is negative and means disobedience, arbitrary decisions and behaviors, as recorded in Kong Yingda’s (孔颖达) interpretation of the behavior of Gongzi Wei (公子围) in the Chunqiu zuozhuan zhengzhi – Yingong banian (春秋左传正义·隐公八年); Gongzi Wei’s temple ritual was the arbitrary liberty (ziyou) based on his manipulation of political power. It was not righteous. But the same Kong also used the word ziyou positively in the Mengzi zhushu – Gongsun Chou xia (孟子注疏·公孙丑下), where it means independence and self-mastery in one’s relationship with the ruler. Mencius said, if a subject cannot behave in accordance with his duty in his position, and if he tries to admonish the ruler but fails, he should give up his political position and leave. Now that I am in the position of a teacher-like subject to the ruler, my liberty (ziyou) to go on or to give up regarding my political duty is great. As seen from this, the implication of the word “liberty,” whether it’s positive or negative, totally depends on the context and thus is not possessed of the absolute positive value. In the traditional thought of the Chinese Middle Ages the two-syllable word “liberty” in the positive sense appeared specifically in the Tanjing (坛经) of Hui Neng (慧能) and the poems of Liu Zongyuan (柳宗元). Hui Neng said, for example, that enlightenment is not conditioned by external practices. It focuses on one’s own mind so that one’s self-nature can always be stabilized in the right-seeing, and the numerous ideological pollutions can be seen through and thus purified in time just at the moment of their appearing. Metaphorically the situation seems to be that a vast ocean embraces all branch-like streams, but small ones and great ones all are united into the one. This is the moment of seeing one’s nature. No abiding somewhere outside and inside and being free (ziyou) while the spirit is going out and coming back, it helps the mind get rid of attachments and stay in the state of no-obstruction. Hui Neng mainly emphasizes that a Chan/Zen practitioner must be awakened to his self-nature and be freed from the fettering of the Buddhist sutras. Only after he has awakened to his self-nature, can the Chan practitioner free himself, transcend the worldly

166 On Liang Qichao’s early idea of liberty dispute about right and wrong, become enlightened to the all-round Buddhist wisdom, and come to realize the spiritual state of “being free regardless of the mind’s going out and coming back” or “self-mastery liberty.” Liu Zongyuan wrote in his poem “Chou Cao shiyu guo xiangxian jianji” (酬曹侍御过象县见寄) that the jade-like green water flows in front of the mountain whose peak is broken; in the distance a poet stops his boat made of Mulan (木兰) tree; the spring wind brings with it the endless emotions of the rivers Xiao (潇) and Xiang (湘); but I’m not at liberty to pick up the Pi (蘋) flowers in the river before me. Liu here metaphorically expresses his political depression after his failure in political reforms. Of course, “liberty” as an idea also possesses a positive sense in traditional Confucianism; for instance, Confucius stresses that “the practice of humaneness must be decided on one’s own.” Accordingly, the later interpreters of the classics have positively explained the autonomy of a man’s moral liberty, as exemplified in the Zhouyi zhengyi – shangjing xuzhuan vol. 2 (周易正义·上经需传卷二), that the practice of humaneness must be decided on one’s own, only in this way does good fortune come along. The first part of this saying comes from the Analects (Lunyu, 论语) of Confucius. The liberty (ziyou) belongs to oneself, that’s why it’s said that the practice of humaneness must be decided on one’s own. In the Mengzi (孟子) the Confucian intellectual’s moral freedom to protest against the ruler’s political power was also positively interpreted by later commentators, as cited above. The critics of rite-based teachings like Zhuangzi (庄子) and his followers definitely appreciate the idea of liberty. Zhuangzi’s thought on the “wandering of the mind” (youxin, 游心) and his criticism of all kinds of measures taken by the rulers to fetter the mind of the people express his longing for liberty. Zhuangzi’s sayings – such as “wandering into the boundlessness in accordance with the vitality of the Heaven and the Earth and being based on the comprehension of six sorts of qi-energy” (“Xiaoyao you,” 逍遥游) and that communicating alone with the spirit of the Heaven and the Earth, but meanwhile not looking down upon the ten thousand worldly affairs (“Tianxia,” 天下), and so on – express his aspiration to liberty. In Chinese intellectual history after Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒), the school of Daoism has been the opposition to orthodox thought. Especially with regard to its criticism of rite-based teachings, the Daoists are usually seen as heretics. Because of this, the Daoist idea of liberty is basically accepted by intellectuals as a form of protest. Due to the influences exercised by these traditional ideas upon their mentality, the Chinese are apt to misunderstand the idea of liberalism originating in the West. First, official ideology habitually sees “liberty” as a disturbing and destructive element of the present order; second, intellectuals in general merely regard “liberty” as a protest against the present order in terms of personal free will, while not striving to create a new systematic order protecting individual liberty. Usually, the spontaneous, idyllic life is understood by them as a symbol of liberty, which continuously makes up a cultural illusion and leads to the third Chinese understanding of liberty: the misleading understanding of liberty as arbitrariness by the common people who are unable to

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study deeply. Furthermore, the undisciplined and unorganized character of the people, the idyllic life style in traditional agricultural, small-scale society and the lack of innermost respect for organized, disciplined public life all together give an illusionary impression. This resulted in the Chinese identification of liberty with arbitrariness. Because of this, it remains a very important task of enlightenment and education even for modern China to understand the idea of liberty correctly. With this background in mind, we can understand why Liang Qichao very often makes a distinction between liberty and arbitrariness in his discussions on liberty. In the eyes of Liang, the 20th century was the age of free competition in economics, which was the result of the industrial development of the past 400 years. He classifies the movements of struggle for liberty since the 16th century in the West, trying to get some inspiration for a specific Chinese striving for liberty from the liberal movements in the previous eras in the West. He thinks that, due to the different situations, the content in the pursuit of liberty is various. For China in the past, there was no problem concerning the four-tier hierarchy of people (scholars, farmers, craftsmen, and merchants), nor any problem concerning the relation between the master lands and their overseas colonies, nor of religious beliefs, nor problems in relation to the groups of workers (namely the social problem of laborers) either. For China at that time the most controversial issue was related to political participation and national authority. Furthermore, the two problems “have the same root. If A is resolved, the answer for B will automatically be got; and if the answer for B is gained, there would be no A problem even though A seems not resolved.”4 For this reason he thought that discussions about the content of liberty and the way to become free for China at that time must depend on its urgent problems in reality, which consists in balancing individual liberty on the one hand and the liberty of the country and national independence on the other. With regard to the social, political reality, it must be said that Liang’s recognition of the value of liberty comparatively accords very well to the actual national state at that time. From this we see that he is not the sort of academic scholar who could not digest advanced ideas from the West, or could only blindly follow them. On the contrary, he is a thinker cognizant of the necessity to make Western ideas compatible with Chinese tradition.

12.2 “For the evolution of human beings, nothing is more important than the liberty of mind, the liberty of speech, and the liberty of press” – Liang’s highlighting the value of liberty In 1899, the 25th year of the Guangxu period of the Qing Dynasty, Liang collected what he had written in his spare time and from it edited a book Ziyou shu (自由书). In the preface he explained the origin the title of the book. He said,

168 On Liang Qichao’s early idea of liberty the Western scholar J.S. Mill declares that for the evolution of human beings nothing is more important than freedom of mind, freedom of speech, and freedom of the press. I am possessed of the three forms of liberty. The book has then accordingly gained its present title.5 Later on, in the ninth chapter “Lun Ziyou” of the book Xinmin shuo (the work was completed in 1902, the 28th year of the Guangxu period) he further explained the meaning of liberty: “liberty is in opposition to slavery.” He thought what the liberals in Europe and the United States argue for is no more than the following four aspects: “first, political liberty; second, liberty of religion; third, national liberty; fourth, economic liberty.”6 According to the literature of his era, his understanding of the four aspects of liberty is basically correct. He said, political liberty means people’s liberty in relation to the government; religious liberty means believers’ and followers’ liberty in relation to the churches; national liberty means a country’s liberty in relation to other countries; and economic liberty means liberty in the interplay between capitalists and laborers.7 Liang’s early idea of liberty is strongly colored by the theory of evolution. In the article “Diqiu diyi shoujiudang” (地球第一守旧党) he said, people’s rights and liberty are universal principles under Heaven. The natural progress of the world results from its continuous accumulation of energy till today. As the collected energy becomes more and more great, it must come out. It is like the situation after a very cold winter: with the help of the spring wind all plants give birth to leaves and branches and become more and more green. How can it be oppressed? How can it be oppressed?8 In “Ziyou yanjiu” (自由研究) he added, all things concerning human beings and all things in nature share, for the sake of evolution, the same principle that through natural competition and selection the advantageous will win and the disadvantageous will lose. Even the sciences and religions are subject to this heavenly principle, and there is no way to escape from it. Therefore, whether in talking about learning or teaching, one must respect the liberty of researchers; do not limit them from the outside. Only in this way both can learning and teaching develop.9 Since Liang’s idea of liberty is based on the theory of evolution, his recognition of the value of liberty is consequently strongly determined by utilitarianism. According to the Ziyou shu he appreciates the instrumental value of liberty. For instance, in the article “Jingshen jiaoyu zhe ziyou jiaoyu ye” (精神教育者自由教育也), Liang said, like ten thousand horses wildly running and ten thousand rivers violently flowing, the nations of the world are intensively competing with one

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another, in power and in intelligence. In such a world, [China] is now in an extremely precarious situation, like a heavy object hanging by a hair, or like someone who bets all on a single throw. She has to save herself from the deadly illness by making the whole country intelligent and vitalized. But by what can the whole country be made intelligent and vitalized? It is liberty. Liberty is the original motivation of spirit.10 For Liang “liberty” was still an instrument of destruction. He thought that the two phenomena, namely obedience to the sayings of one master in the Chinese academic tradition and conformity to the political system of one emperor in the Chinese political tradition, are the ultimate sources for disease-like stupidity and weakness; worse yet, the monarchical emperors “treat the people as slaves and thieves,” but the people themselves are also accustomed to it and “see themselves as slaves and thieves.” In this way they unconsciously change mental slavery into a kind of morality. “Therefore, if we know that [the development of] people’s intelligence is the most urgent [task], for the moment nothing is more needed than liberty.”11 Liang took the standpoint of utilitarianism and the theory of evolution to talk about the value of liberty. He found problematic the relation between liberty and tolerance, and thought the significance of the negative liberty of people in keeping silent was also ignored. Thus, in discussing the relation between power and liberty Liang stressed the significance of positive liberty in self-mastery. He said, power and liberty in essence are not diverse. Despite the divergence of the names the point is for both of them to get rid of limitation from outside, in order to satisfy what one desires. In this respect there is no minute difference.12 With regard to international relations the situation is the same. Only when the power of two countries that are in confrontation is balanced can the actions of both of them be kind and polite: “this is what is called liberty.”13 After the analysis of Kant and others talking about the relation between liberty and power he came to the conclusion: “it is then plain that power and liberty are absolutely two different matters.” In society nowadays men in lower positions and the ones of higher ranks both are powerful, so their powers are balanced. Today the people can enjoy liberty, “therefore we say that power and liberty are the same thing.”14 On the basis of this, Liang declared, the people are not, as claimed by the idealists, naturally endowed with rights of liberty, equality, and so on, only because they are born as human beings. … If we wish to enjoy the right of liberty, there is no other way than being a man with power. If one wishes to be free alone, he has to make himself powerful; if a country wants to be free, it has to make itself powerful too. Oh power! Oh power! Everyone should have his brain printed with the word.15 The pursuit of positive liberty from such a perspective very probably leads to an outcome like the French Revolution.

170 On Liang Qichao’s early idea of liberty In the paper “Fangqi ziyou zhi zui” (放弃自由之罪) Liang surprisingly discusses the relation between “the invasion of the liberty of others” and “the relinquishing of liberty” without recognition of the evil of the former: Western scholars think that the greatest evil in the world is intervening in the liberty of other people. And giving up liberty is also wrong. But in my view, by comparison relinquishing liberty is primary, while the invasion of the liberty of others is secondary. Why? If there are no people in the world who give up their liberty, then there won’t be any people who violate the liberty of others. What is violated by these people is just what is given up by those. It’s about the same thing.16 He firmly believes in the social Darwinist principle of the “survival of the fittest in natural selection,” and affirms the right of the advantageous to strengthen their power for the sake of impnging on the liberty of the weak. This is like the survival of species in nature. Therefore, it must be admitted that if there is no one who gives up his liberty, then there would be no one who violates the liberty of the former. The ultimate source of the evil lies in the one who gives up his liberty, then the invader has somehow compulsorily to take it.17 In the “Guoquan yu minquan” (国权与民权) he says the same again: if our people do not give up the right of liberty, which thief-like ruler of the people can violate it? If our country does not give up its right of liberty, which tiger-wolf-like country can invade it? From the fact that others can invade our people and our country I know that the guilt of our people and our country in giving up liberty cannot be forgiven.18 Such sayings were encouraging for China at that time. But from the perspective of liberalism it was unavoidably one-sided, for such a view of liberty in terms of social Darwinism consequently leads to the loss of the spirit of liberty; it will also be misused by men and countries in power to excuse their guilt. How is liberty realizable? Liang thinks there are two ways: one is through destruction in politics, and the other is to criticize ideology. It is necessary to dismantle and destroy the violent and polluted political systems that have a history of several thousands of years, so that the evil officials who are like wild animals such as tigers, wolfs, and so on will lose their support from and dependence on the people, who are like mice or foxes in the social community. Only in this way can the organs of the diseased body-politic go on the way of progress. It is also necessary to criticize and clarify the weak and misleading theories and doctrines of the past millennia, so that millions of stupid scholars and intellectuals who are like silverfish,

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parrots, jellyfish, dogs, and so on will be short of the help from the people who can only play with the words. Only in this way can the eyes and ears of the people be refreshed and real progress can be made.19 The suggested ways pay more attention to destruction than construction. It had its historic reasonableness in the social and political context of the late Qing Dynasty, but is seriously one-sided from the present perspective. If liberty is employed as merely an instrument, it leads to the hunting dog getting cooked with the rabbit, as the expression goes. If liberty itself has not yet become a kind of basic value in modern society and thus valued by the people, we will never realize true liberty.

12.3 “If nobody misuses his liberty, then everybody can accomplish his liberty. this is called civilized liberty” – Liang’s theory of the limits of the power of government and people Liang has his own special understanding of political liberty. He divides political liberty into three aspects: “the first is the common people’s liberty in relation to the noble; the second is individuals’ liberty in relation to the government; the third is the colonial lands’ liberty in relation to their master lands.”20 In the following discussion I will focus on individuals’ liberty in relation to government. In the eyes of Liang, above government and people there is still a substantial, individually characterized country. Accordingly, government and people are merely constitutive elements of a country. He said, in the world there is no one country without people, nor one county without government either. Government and people are constitutive elements of a country. So it’s all right if we say that the government belongs to the people, and it’s all right too if we say that the people belong to the government, for above the government and the people there is still an individual country to unite and bind them together. The country alone is possessed of sovereignty, on which the existence of the government and the people depend.21 He thinks thus that in discussions about individual rights the concept of sovereignty is apt to be connected with some extreme individualism, which then leads to anarchy. However, if the power of government is not limited, the political system easily falls into monarchy and the people will not make progress. Therefore, clarification of the limits of the power of government and people is of importance in political philosophy. How then is the power of government and people limited? He thinks, the limits of the power of government and people mean that government and people should play an equal role; they are in agreement that they set the limits of power. So it doesn’t mean that the government bestows power on the people.22

172 On Liang Qichao’s early idea of liberty If the government could bestow power on the people, it could take it back too. Therefore, the equality of government and people is required and that is what limits the the power of government and people. He has also taken the traditional Chinese political system that was based on the idea of humaneness as an example to illustrate the harmfulness of the inflation of the power of government. Although according to the idea of humane politics the people should be protected and kindly treated, because of the unlimited power of the ruler the result is that only theoretically were politics supposed to be humane, but practically there were no effective methods and measures to realize it. … Consequently, the situation has become a vicious circle that there were always brutal rulers and thief-like subjects in the past two thousand years who have treated the people violently.23 Thus, by thinking over the issues on the limits of government and people’s liberty Liang definitely settles on the essential aim of government as service of “the public interest.” The way of a government with regard to public service is various, but it must be aimed to develop the wellness of the people inside and to strengthen the national ability to compete outside. … Although for a government there are tens of thousands of kinds of responsibility, it can be summarized in two sentences: one is to help the people to accomplish the things that they cannot do only by themselves, the other is to protect the people’s liberty from being violated.24 Accordingly, the limits of the power of government are that “whatever the people do, if it invades the right to liberty of others, the government is legislated to intervene. If not, the liberty of the people must be respected and the government should not intervene.” If the government cannot prevent the people from violating the liberty of others in everyday life and, on the contrary, invades the liberty of the people, “it then commits the worst crime in the world.”25 Liang is always very careful about the power of the government, insisting that political principles must be based on “liberty and equality.” He said, “everyone enjoys his liberty by laws, and all people are equal under the laws. Isn’t this what the existence of the people depends on?”26 Against the turbulent social and political situation in the late Qing Dynasty he strongly argued for the rights of liberty and equality of the people. He said, in recent years, the government has tried in a hundred and one ways to collect money from the people by inventing different names, which has resulted in the loss of liberty or property for the people; the government has supervised what the people say and do, which has resulted in the loss of the liberty of speech and assembly for the people; the

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government has opened all letters and checked everywhere in the city, which has resulted in the loss of the liberty of communication and travelling for the people; the government has arbitrarily examined family houses and living rooms, which has resulted in the loss of the liberty of living for the people; the government has arbitrarily sentenced people to death without due process, which has resulted in the loss of liberty of life for the people; the government has manipulated public views to mislead the mind of the people, which has resulted in the loss of liberty of conscience for the people. All other inequalities in laws are under the similar situation. Under such political oppression, how is it possible for the people to live the life of a living human being? Those ones who are for the people struggle for the rights of equality and liberty without caring for their lives; is their revolution not doubtless righteous? The reason why I love liberty and equality so much lies precisely in this!27 From the materials given above we see that in his discussion of political liberty Liang basically grasps the spirit of the modern liberal philosophy of politics. Furthermore, for Liang there are two forms of invasion of the liberty of others: the one is invasion of the liberty of an individual; the other is invasion of the liberty of the public. The punishment of the former is subject to private law; and the punishment of the latter is by the public law. Both public and the private law are legislated according to the sovereignty of a country. He thinks that most civilized people can legislate and obey laws for themselves. On the basis of his analysis of J.S. Mill’s view on liberty he proposed the concept of “civilized liberty.” He said, in a civilized country nobody acts arbitrarily. The people are so, the ruler is so, the minority is so and the majority is also so. Why? Everyone has power that is limited. The limiting of power is so as not to abuse people’s liberty. The abuse of liberty has necessarily the consequence of the invasion of other people’s liberty. This is barbarian liberty. If nobody abuses his liberty, the liberty of everyone can be achieved. This is civilized liberty. Without civilized liberty no country can be ultimately stabilized.28 By writing the Xinmin shuo (新民说) in 1902 Liang further expounded the concept of “civilized liberty”: civilized liberty is liberty by law. All actions and movements of the people are like the rhythm of a machine and the disciplined parading of an army … thus the real free people know to obey. What is to be obeyed is

174 On Liang Qichao’s early idea of liberty the law. The law is legislated by myself not only to protect my liberty, but also to limit my liberty.29 In light of the idea of civilized liberty he criticized the misunderstanding of some young people in China at that time: How much and how enthusiastic is the talk about liberty among the young people nowadays! What they’ve said was regarded as civilized. They lack knowledge of the liberty discussed by Western scholars. All major issues concerning liberty are without one exception related to the public interest, and absolutely do not include a defense of arbitrariness.30 And what is the relation between public liberty and personal liberty? Liang said, public liberty is the sum of personal liberty. A person cannot separate himself from the public to exist. If no public community protects his liberty, his liberty would be suppressed, invaded, and taken away by another community, and then how can there be individual liberty?31 In order to elucidate the truth that an individual’s liberty cannot be separated from the public, he offered a metaphor regarding the relationship between the human body and its parts. The mouth cannot arbitrarily eat food without choice, the hands cannot arbitrarily take a sword to kill people. If the parts of a body were really so, the body would lose its liberty. The relation between individual liberty and public liberty is the same. Liang repeatedly opposed such a kind of pseudo-liberty: some shallow young people think of wantonness and impoliteness as liberty, and think of arrogance and disrespect for the old as equality. Such a kind of liberty and equality has never existed in any country of the world in history. There is no such an interpretation of liberty, so we must not permit that they abuse the beautiful name of liberty.32 At the same time, he did not agree with some old people who encouraged the arbitrariness of the monarchical rulers by distorting liberty. Liang’s view of liberty keeps the balance in the tension between the young and the old. He sees political liberty as the “great wall for the people” and the people’s “talisman.” For this reason, he firmly argues for the legitimacy of political liberty. Personally I think that the main theoretical goal of Liang lies in the distinction between liberty and arbitrariness. He claimed that liberty is public liberty not individual liberty. This means that liberty is liberty under some conditions, not limitless. If we think that liberty is individual, then such phenomena in China at that time as the local officials’ arbitrariness, debtors’ refusal to give back money, men and women’s illegal assignations, old and young people

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taking opium, and so on are all the freest behaviors. But these four examples do not belong to the concept of liberty; Liang insists that liberty does not mean individual arbitrariness. If arbitrariness is also a kind of liberty, that must be barbarian liberty, in opposition to civilized liberty. Liang is very strongly opposed to thinking of liberty as the way “to satisfy private desires.” With this misunderstanding “the word liberty would not only be misused by the monarchical parties, but also be the public enemy in regard to the future of China.”33 Therefore, in the eyes of Liang liberty implies first of all public liberty and evolution, not arbitrary choice regarding private “small things and matters.” A humane person with an ideal in mind is usually situated in such a state that “his body is tired and his mind is worried, and he places himself in an unfree situation lifelong. Only then can he help and uphold the people and the country he loves achieve liberty.”34 People like this sacrifice themselves for the sake of the realization of the liberty of the people and their country. Starting from the analysis of public and individual liberty, Liang has penetrated into the ultimate connotation of liberty in the hope that China would enjoy the advantage of liberty, but not be subject to its disadvantages. He said, with regard to the two meanings of liberty, namely the public and the individual, I have explained them with examples near to our life. As a contribution to the academic circle I hope the lover of liberty in the world won’t make liberty poisonous and further, because of this, bring the poison to the world.35 From this we see what Liang has earnestly and carefully done while introducing the modern liberal theory of liberty. Furthermore, Liang noticed the relation between liberty and law, and primarily connected his thinking on liberty with the issues concerning social culture, politics, the legal system, and so on. He said, so I have found out the universal principle among all countries in the world: the nations which give most importance to liberty are usually most good at supervision and punishment. Why? Because the essential spirit of liberty lies in the respect of everyone’s liberty, and in the prevention of the invasion into others’ liberty. The supervisor sets the limits of liberty, and the supervised pays attention to the limits. For free citizens there are three important things in general to obey: first, obedience to universal principles; second, obedience to the laws legislated by the society in which he is living; third, obedience to the decisions made by the majority. In this sense we say that civilized people are most free, and the barbarian too. They both are free, but what distinguishes the civilized and the barbarian is the fact whether there is the power to supervise and punish or not. Liberty without supervision and punishment harms like a thief of the public; and liberty with supervision and punishment is like treasure benefiting the public.36

176 On Liang Qichao’s early idea of liberty “Accordingly,” Liang said, liberty on the one hand and supervision and punishment on the other are not only not in opposition, they are dependent on each other and cannot be separated even for one moment. Those people who speak of liberalism should again and again come back to this point.37 In the first two decades of the 20th century when few Western liberal works had been translated into Chinese, Liang already sharply saw the spiritual difference between the Chinese “undisciplined liberty” that characterizes the smallscale agricultural society in ancient China and liberty in the modern sense. He also noticed the dialectical relation between liberty and supervision. This is a key point. He claimed that in ancient China there was liberty in terms of customs, but not liberty in terms of virtue. The virtue of liberty cannot be alienated; it is internalized in me and I alone enjoy it. But the liberty in terms of customs … is only because of the fact the government does not forbid it; if it is forbidden, very suddenly the liberty in this sense disappears without any notice. Officials do not forbid the people doing something, “not because they respect human rights and do not dare to forbid it, but just because they are not good at governing, have ignored their duties, and thus had no time to take care.” However, “at any time officials can forbid, and at any time liberty can disappear. Such a kind liberty is the liberty of slaves.”38 Undoubtedly, Liang was very profound to see the essential difference between “slaves’ liberty” and “the virtue of liberty” in the modern sense.

12.4 “Whoever earnestly desires true liberty must begin by getting rid of the slavery in his heart” – Liang’s “concern for spiritual liberty” How could the liberty of Chinese country, nation, and individuals be realized with regard to the social and political context of the late Qing Dynasty? Liang focused on the transformation of the mind of the people. This approach can be seen as the continuance of the mind-oriented scholarship of the late Ming Dynasty in modern China. It was basically the same idea as the one – “to save the disastrous situation by virtue of the power of the mind” – called for by the contemporary Tan Sitong (谭嗣同) in his Renxue (仁学) and what Yan Fu (严复) in his Yuanqiang (原强) proposed – encouragement of the people’s energy, development of the people’s intelligence, and the renewal of the people’s virtue. What made Liang different was his introduction to the modern Western intellectual weapons to transform the mind of the people. He regards liberty of mind as the mother of all other forms of liberty. In introducing the thoughts of Bacon and Descartes, he said, “from

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the liberty of mind is truth born.” Such an idea is compatible with the basic spirit of Western liberalism since the start of modern times. In the article “Shi Dexing Xiangfanxiangcheng yi” (十德性相反相成义) Liang spoke more about this: “so in order to save the spirit of China at present, there is no other idea than the virtue of liberty.”40 From the ethical perspective, Liang thinks that liberty is the motivation of the spirit that knows its own nature. He said, “to make the people free means to make them know their self-nature and not be controlled by others.”41 And further, liberty is the symbol of right. For a human being to be a human being two elements are necessary: the one is life and the other is rights. Without one of them a man cannot be called a human being. So liberty means the life of spirit.42 The foundation of liberty is “my liberty,” “spiritual liberty.” Because of this, Liang especially emphasized the importance of personal liberty while talking about liberty in his book Xinmin shuo (新民说).43 He divided the “I” into two parts: the one part is the I that is in relation to all other persons whose form is the body with a manifest standing in the world; the other part is what is subtly in my spiritual heart that is in relation to my body.44 The latter I is “the spiritual I.” He insisted that it is not bad if the others treat me as a slave; what is really bad is my own attitude that I am willing to be enslaved. Put another way, even the fact that I am a slave of others is not terrible; what is truly terrible is that “I become a slave to myself.” Thus, “no shame is bigger than the slavery of mind, and so the body-based external form of slavery is the slightest.” What actually matters is the awakening of the subject, to protest against the situation in which I was enslaved. In this way all forms of external slavery will be extinct in the end. Only slavery of mind is not formed because of the pressure from outside, and so liberation from it does not depend on some power from outside either. It seems like a cocoon caught in its own trap or like something in a pot under which the fire is always burning. Whoever earnestly desires true liberty must begin with getting rid of the slavery in his heart.45

12.4.1 The four types of slavery of mind The first refers to blind respect for people in ancient times, to be slaves of them. So he admonished the people in his country: Do not be slaves of the people in ancient times. The sages and outstanding persons in ancient times made great contributions to society. We respect them; this is proper. Nevertheless, the personality of those people

178 On Liang Qichao’s early idea of liberty and mine should not be mixed. Isn’t the reason why they have become sages and outstanding persons is that they are able to develop their selfconsciousness?46 If this were not so, how was it possible that Confucius is Confucius, rather than Yao (尧) and Shun (舜)? Total blind obedience to persons in ancient times would not be different from those in the the Boxer Movement who were superstitious in relation to their religious leaders. Therefore, Liang said, “I have ears and eyes to discern matters; I have the mind to think and it is possessed of limitless truth.” In relation to the people in ancient times “sometimes I learn from them, sometimes I befriend them, and sometimes I am in opposition to them. It doesn’t matter. My mind relies on the universal truthful principle. How free it is!”47 The second kind of mental slavery refers to being enslaved to worldly customs. Because of the weakness in human nature, human beings are subject to the influence of worldly conventions. The situation is like that of one dog barking when it sees some shadow, then hundreds of other dogs barking because of the barking of the first dog. Thus, Liang warns the people not to fall into the conventional trends of their age. “Despite the overwhelming waters the pillar stands; despite living in the dreamy and drunken world the spirit is aware. This is the cause of a great man. How free it is!”48 The third refers to being enslaved by experiences. According to Liang, an individual or a nation could be ensalved by its former experiences and environment. The fourth refers to slaves of emotions and desires. He admonishes the people: “Do not be slaves of emotions and desires. A person’s loss of his mind is not caused by others.”49 In respect to ethics, Liang thinks that liberty is important because “liberty means the absolute liberty of the conscience, not being controlled by bodily caused desires.”50 And equality is ethically important because “all people have their inborn potential capacity. By extending and realizing it all of them can become Yao and Shun.” But if the people are arbitrarily “subject to arrogant and violent emotions, they tend to become more and more base, and gradually they will forget the values needed to be a human being and fall into the class of animals. How is equality possible then?”51 Due to the fact that Chinese capitalists themselves were short of power, their ideas regarding social reform tended usually to be merely focused on the power of the will. Liang’s discourses on individual liberty are also in this direction. Finally, they set aside the social conditions that are requisite for the realization of liberty and overemphasized the effects of ideas and mind. Comparatively, Liang’s talking about “individual liberty” is ultimately different from Gong Zizhen’s (龚自珍) will-focused theory of “the esteem of the I.” Liang highlighted the significance of the “universal truthful principle” in his thinking on liberty so that he qualified the will-focused idealistic tradition with intense rationality. For example, in the article “Lun Ziyou” from Xinmin shuo he explained,

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I have the heart-mind. By hearing words and receiving information, I believe in some of them, and doubt others of them. … [My mind is so free that] it can stand at the top of a high mountain and walk at the bottom of the ocean. In the process “of freely selecting and choosing in spite of the present accumulation of knowledge and wisdom after thousands of years” (the saying is by Fang Yizhi [方以智]) a man can think independently and, in the court of reason and in light of the universally accepted truth, evaluate and judge scholarship and science whether in China or in the West, whether in the present or in the past. I have eyes and ears, and the heart-mind. Being born in such a culturally developed world, I exhibit the scholarship and sciences of China and the West, of the past and the present, to judge if they are right or wrong in the court of reason. That which is confirmed will be accepted, and that which is denied will be dismissed. Isn’t it the most wonderful thing for a great man?52 We have to affirm the sharpness of Liang’s theoretical investigation. He perfectly recognized the manifold oppression of liberty in the traditional authority-oriented society, calling for building up a new morality on the basis of spiritual liberty to cultivate and nourish “the spiritual life of the Chinese nation.” He said, spiritual liberty is the mother of all other forms of liberty, which is either forbidden by government or obstructed in society. In our country there are four hundred million people, but none of them can be seen as an accomplished person, because they have only material and bodily life, but not the spiritual life. Today, in order to save the spiritual life of China, nothing is more urgent than the virtue of liberty.53 What’s more, just because of his appraisal of “spiritual liberty,” later on he departed from his teacher Kang Youwei in scholarship. In the book Qingdai xueshu gailun (清代学术概论) he commented that the remaining diseases in the tradition of Chinese scholarship definitely lie in the tendency to depend on famous people in ancient times and the confusion of name and reality. Kang Youwei must declare that the doctrine of the Great Community comes from Confucius. But as for Confucius’s political reform, why is it necessary to say that it relies on something older? Why must all famous intellectuals need support from ancient times? This is also related to the two diseases mentioned above. The independence and liberty of spirit remain hopeless until these diseases are cured. About this point, Liang Qichao has repeatedly talked. However, his themes were often not compatible with his teacher; therefore, the school of Kang is separated from that of Liang. What Liang says here is still inspiring even today.

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Notes 1 Liang Qichao (梁启超), “Xin Min Shuo – Lun Zi You” (新民说·论自由), Yinbingshi heji (饮冰室合集), vol. 6, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1989, 44. 2 Liang Qichao, “Russian Freedom Thought” (E’ren Zhi Zi You Si Xiang, 俄人之 自由思想), Book of Freedom (Zi You Shu, 自由书), Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 60. Note: the Ziyou shu was finished in 1900, the 15th year of the Guangxu (光绪) period, some articles of which were written after the year 1895. 3 Xu Fuguan (徐复观) has claimed that the combination of ziyou can already be found in Hanshu – Wuxingzhizhu (汉书·五行志注). See Xu Fuguan (徐复观), Confucian Political Thought and Free Democratic Human Rights (Ru Jia Zheng Zhi Si Xiang Yu Zi You Min Zhu Ren Quan, 儒家政治思想与自由民主人权), Taiwan: Student Press (Xue Sheng Shu Ju, 学生书局), 1985, 292. But I have not found the combination of ziyou in this work. Xu has probably mistaken the mentioned work for the Houhanshu – Wuxingzhi (后汉书·五行志). Regarding the exact dating of the appearance of the word ziyou see Chapter 8. 4 Liang Qichao, “On Freedom” (Xin Min Shuo – Lun Zi You 新民说·论自由), Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 44. 5 Liang Qichao, Book of Freedom (Zi You Shu, 自由书), Yinbingshi heji (饮冰室合集), vol. 6, 6. 6 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 40. 7 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 40. 8 Liang Qichao, Book of Freedom, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 7. 9 Liang Qichao, Book of Freedom, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 93. 10 Liang Qichao, Book of Freedom, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 36. 11 Liang Qichao (梁启超), Zhi Nan Hai Fu Zi Da Ren Shu (致南海夫子大人书), Liang Qi Chao Nian Pu Chang Bian (梁启超年谱长编), Shanghai: Shanghai People Press (Shang Hai Ren Min Chu Ban She, 上海人民出版社), 1983, 236. 12 Liang Qichao, Book of Freedom, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 30. 13 Liang Qichao, Book of Freedom, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 30. 14 Liang Qichao, Book of Freedom, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 30. 15 Liang Qichao, Book of Freedom, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 31. 16 Liang Qichao, Book of Freedom, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 32. 17 Liang Qichao, Book of Freedom, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 23–24. 18 Liang Qichao, Book of Freedom, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 24. 19 Liang Qichao, Zhi Nan Hai Fu Zi Da Ren Shu, 236. 20 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 40. 21 Liang Qichao (梁启超), Lun Zheng Fu Yu Ren Min Zhi Quan Xian (论政府与人民 之权限), Yinbingshi heji (饮冰室合集), vol. 2, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1989, 1. 22 Liang Qichao, Lun Zheng Fu Yu Ren Min Zhi Quan Xian, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 2, 5. 23 Liang Qichao, Lun Zheng Fu Yu Ren Min Zhi Quan Xian, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 2, 6. 24 Liang Qichao, Lun Zheng Fu Yu Ren Min Zhi Quan Xian, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 2, 7. 25 Liang Qichao, Lun Zheng Fu Yu Ren Min Zhi Quan Xian, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 2, 3. 26 Liang Qichao (梁启超), Guo Min Qian Xun (国民浅训), Yinbingshi heji (饮冰室合集), vol. 8, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju 中华书局), 1989, 17. 27 Liang Qichao, Guo Min Qian Xun, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 8, 17. 28 Liang Qichao, Guo Min Qian Xun, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 8, 4. 29 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 45. 30 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 45. 31 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 45. 32 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 17. 33 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 45.

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34 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 46. 35 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 50. 36 Liang Qichao (梁启超), “Shi De Xing Xiang Fan Xiang Cheng Yi” (十德性相反相 成义), Liang Qi Chao Zhe Xue Si Xiang Lun Wen Xuan (梁启超哲学思想论文选), Beijing: Peking University Press (Bei Jing Da Xue Chu Ban She, 北京大学出版社), 1984, 51. 37 Liang Qichao, “Shi De Xing Xiang Fan Xiang Cheng Yi,” 52. 38 Liang Qichao, “Shi De Xing Xiang Fan Xiang Cheng Yi,” 52. 39 Liang Qichao, “Jin Shi Wen Ming Chu Zu Er Da Jia Zhi Xue Shuo” (近世文明初祖 二大家之学说), Liang Qi Chao Zhe Xue Si Xiang Lun Wen Xuan, 91. 40 Liang Qichao, “Shi De Xing Xiang Fan Xiang Cheng Yi,” 52. 41 Liang Qichao, Zhi Nan Hai Fu Zi Da Ren Shu, 236. 42 Liang Qichao, “Shi De Xing Xiang Fan Xiang Cheng Yi,” 50. 43 What’s more, Liang analyzed the causation of the free spirit, which consisted of six aspects: (1) the equality of the four kinds of people, namely, intellectuals, farmers, manufacturers, and merchants; (2) the right to participate in politics; (3) clarification of the right to possess land; (4) issues of religious faith; (5) the founding of the national country; (6) the emergence of public laborers. 44 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 46. 45 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 47. 46 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 48. 47 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, 48. 48 Liang Qichao, “Xin Min Shuo”, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 6, p. 48. 49 Liang Qichao, Guo Min Qian Xun, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 8, 16. 50 Liang Qichao, Guo Min Qian Xun, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 8, 16. 51 Liang Qichao, Guo Min Qian Xun, Yinbingshi heji, vol. 8, 16. 52 Liang Qichao, “Bao Jiao Fei Suo Yi Zun Kong Lun” (保教非所以尊孔论), Liang Qi Chao Zhe Xue Si Xiang Lun Wen Xuan, 100. 53 Liang Qichao, “Shi De Xing Xiang Fan Xiang Cheng Yi,” 51.

13 A review of Li Dazhao’s social ideal

From Hong Xiuquan (洪秀全) to Kang Youwei (康有为) and Liang Qichao (梁启超), and further to Sun Yat-sen (孙中山), and finally to Li Dazhao (李大 钊), social ideals in early modern China experienced a long-lasting change process from the utopian to the scientific. Li Dazhao is one of those who decisively strove for a significant epochal change in social ideals in early modern China. In the fifth and sixth issues of the sixth volume of the magazine Xin qingnin (新青年) in October of the year 1919, Li published the article “My Marxist Perspective” (Wode Makesi zhuyi guan, 我的马克思主义观). With this article Li initiated his thinking on society from the perspective of Marxist historical materialism. With this article Li developed what was useful and discarded what was not from his early humanism, and critically examined the comparatively shallow capitalist ideal of freedom and democracy which apparently showed a kind of “socialistic humanistic concern” in spirit and was intensively colored by the proletariat’s international pacifism. In short, Li’s social ideal was focused on the liberation of mankind. On the basis of the mutual transformation of mind and material, social change and development should be united with the development of mankind, and a politics based on the supervision of the people would be changed into a politics based on the management of materials. The outline of his social ideal was the principle that unites humanism and socialism. Concretely, it included a fourfold aspect: “democratic politics,” “the unity of individual freedom and public solidarity,” “cosmopolitanism,” and “the system concerning women.” The basic spirit and principle of this social ideal were still a great inspiration for the Chinese socialistic modernization of the present and for the dialogue between civilizations and cultural globalization in the 21st century.

13.1 The political ideal of democracy Regarding Li’s political ideal, what he calls pingmin zhuyi (平民主义) actually means democracy in the general sense. Regarding the different interpretations of the concept of democracy in Western culture, to which Li gave very careful consideration, he said, “pingmin zhuyi is the translation of democracy, which is translated by some as minben zhuyi (民本主义), or as minzhu zhuyi (民主主义),

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or as minzhi zhuyi (民治主义), or as weimin zhuyi (唯民主义), or just translitereated.”1 Why was democracy not directly translated as minzhu zhengzhi (民主政治) by Li? In this phrase is contained the very rich significance concerning culture. He explained thus, minzhu zhuyi is still applicable in politics, for it differentiates itself from monarchy and aristocracy and means a kind of politics for the public. But if it is applied to describe the social tendency in economics, arts, literature, and other areas, its political implication is too great, and thus it will make the originally very wide denotation become narrow.2 Because of this, Li’s translation of democracy as pingmin zhuyi is the result of his repeated considerations. In this translation is implied Li’s thoughtfulness, for democracy does not only refer to a kind of political system, but also a kind of social, cultural spirit. Democracy can grow only in the proper cultural atmosphere. With regard to the development of Li’s political thoughts the process is roughly as follows: from traditional Chinese people-oriented thought to the modern capitalist political ideal of democracy, and further to proletarian democratic politics – the political thought of the working class. As to the chronology of this development, at the time of the publication of the article “Da’ai pian – Ai wumin zhi shisuo ye” (大哀篇 – 哀吾民之失所也) on April 1st, 1913, his political thought was, roughly speaking, basically traditional people-oriented humanism. In this treatise Li with fierce words criticized the fact that contemporary politicians and warlords had in the name of republic assembled many unconscious people “to flaunt some ideology and to disturb the world,” but in fact they wanted to benefit themselves at the cost of the interests of the people. Therefore, he lamented: Terrible! Nowadays it is really so with regard to those people who think of themselves as the ones who declared a struggle for the people’s well-being and rights. With whom can our people share peace and happiness? It is tiring and sad! After suffering from the corrupted politics of the late Qing Dynasty, our people have further suffered from great wars and turbulences. Everywhere is the disaster caused by wars, our eyes are full of ruins, and the economic life of the people is totally broken. It is extremely too much!3 As Li himself became more and more acquainted with Western democracy and as he was more or less subject to the influence of capitalistic thought in his early years, his political thought afterwards soon turned to a longing for the modern democratic model of politics, proposing limitation of the power of the tyrant and the upholding the people’s power through setting up a constitution. According to the articles collected in the Li Dazhao wenji (李大钊文集), the treatise Zhengzhi duikang zhi yangcheng (政治对抗之养成) which was written by Li on November 1st, 1914 shows the primary change of his political thought into the modern Western capitalist democracy based on a constitution.

184 A review of Li Dazhao’s social ideal According to him, if the people want to enjoy “the happiness resulting from well-governed peace,” “surely a constitution that can really guarantee such a kind of happiness is needed.” Whether the constitution can surely so function or not, depends on whether it’s sufficiently tolerant or not. And this is further dependent on whether the constitution is equally considered or not. … The goodness of the constitution lies in taking the whole into consideration, not being limited to a specific time and area, and not being manipulated by some specific group or community.4 For this reason, he proposed four principles to politically protest: 1) “It is hoped that the powerful can limit his limitless power to tolerate the appearance of other political powers within the correct regulations. Hopefully, the new ones will not be so over-harmed that possible new political fortunes become extinguished on the way. 2) Hopefully, those people who left party A – because it suddenly became very strong and even arbitrary – in order to follow party B in the hope of struggling against party A, can awaken and respond to the needs of our age. At least it is hoped that they will not prevent righteous heterodox parties from being founded. In this way I hope they will give up the false and embrace the right way. 3) It is hoped that those people who so abused their power that they were defeated, but still seek revenge with their remaining power, can truly regret now in sorrow and even be awakened by relinquishing their murderous plans, so that they can direct their power in the right direction by avoiding the possible consequence that, without clear direction and selfknowledge, they would harm the fortune of the country and finally selfdestruct. 4) Hopefully, all righteous people in society can focus on justice, being not fettered by high social positions, interests, and power to blindly follow the strong worldly tendency and thus be misused by powerful men.” Whether the four principles can be carried out, depends on whether the mind of the people can change. He said: I have examined numerous events and happenings both in history and in the present, and have come to the knowledge that the ultimate cause for the suddenness of rises and falls, for changes in cultural fortunes, and for the perishing of political power without exception comes down to changes of mind. Spiritual preparation in the mind becomes the powerful tendency of the age.5

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Apparently, at this time Li’s thought on constitutional politics was ideally connected with the hope of people’s awakening in mind and the self-awareness of powerful politicians. It shows that he had not yet come to realize that the actual foundation of democracy results from economic development at a specific phase on the one hand, and from the balancing of diverse political parties in reality on the other. It cannot be reached merely through changing people’s minds. Prior to his reception of Marxism Li energetically propagated the capitalist ideal of freedom and democracy and made excellent contributions in opposing the Chinese monarchical system. According to the paper “Xianfa yu sixiang ziyou” (宪法与思想自由) published on December 10th, 1916, Li sees individual freedom as the meaning of human life and as the source of the spirit as expressed in the constitution. And on the basis of the freedom that is abstractly understood by him he criticized the monarchy and its ideology. He said, for a human life in the world, it is acceptable to die without freedom, but it cannot be endured to live without freedom. By observing all human struggles in the history, we know that they all were done for the sake of freedom. And he thinks, “since the Qin Dynasty, in our country the enemy of the freedom of the people is emperors and ages.” In the paper he takes the historical facts regarding the failure of the Qing Dynasty to create a constitution and Yuan Shikai’s (袁世凯) abuse of the outcome of the republican revolution as examples to prove the opposition between constitutional politics and the emperor by claiming “the emperor and the constitution cannot co-exist.” He also opposed the Beiyang (北洋) government’s measures to idolize Confucius by misusing Confucius’s authority, and pointed out “the constitution is set up for the sake of the people’s freedom, not for the authority of an emperor or sage; it is set up for the living people’s happiness, not for any idols.” He also criticized the political pressures on spiritual freedom and on freedom of speech that were based on the monarchy in Chinese history. The most unfree countries with regard to the freedom of the press in the world are first of all China, Russia, Spain, and Turkey. The disaster concerning words and books in China was more terrible than the fire of the Qin Dynasty. Since the times of the later Chinese Middle Ages people such as Li Zhuowu (李卓吾), Jian Shengtan (金圣叹), and so on have all been killed because of words and books. Many people who became prisoners thanks to their words and books in the early Qing Dynasty had no way to argue for themselves. It was so disastrous that it remains a striking catastrophe even after the fire of the Qin Dynasty.6 Because of this, Li proposed three forms of freedom regarding spiritual life: the first is freedom of the press, the second religious freedom, and the third freedom of professors. By reference to examples in China and the West and

186 A review of Li Dazhao’s social ideal from ancient and modern times he extensively argued for the freedom of professors – namely, the significance of academic freedom for the cultural construction of a country. Later on, in parallel with the international proletariat’s struggle against capitalism, Li gained more understanding of capitalist politics, realized the hypocrisy in it, and then turned to the ideal of socialism. At that time what he desired was no longer capitalist democracy, but a new model of democracy that is named by him pingmin zhuyi. The administration in such a kind of democracy is intended to manage things and matters, but not to control the people; it is focused on the management of things and matters, but not the gain of power. In the article “You pingmin zhengzhi dao gongren zhengzhi” (由平民政治到工人政治), he said, by democracy in modern sense it does not mean the manipulation of the people but the management or disposing of the things and matters. In order to study the democracy, we should focus on the techniques and skills in managing the things and matters, but on the question how to gain the power. Afterwards, he complemented this with details in another paper “Pingmin zhuyi” (平民主义), and stressed repeatedly that the essence of democracy lies not in the manipulation of the people but in the management of things and matters; it is the union of humanism and socialism, as he himself put it: Democracy in the modern sense no longer means government of the people, for the people, by the people, but means the administration of the people, for the people, by the people. It does not mean the manipulation of the people but the management or disposing of things and matters. In order to realize democracy, we should focus on the techniques and skills in managing things and matters, not on the question of how to gain the power.7 With reference to the idea of communism as discussed in the Manifesto of the Communist Party and the German Ideology by Marx we see that democracy as described above is actually the free democracy after being freed from the alienation. In Li’s thinking, democracy is not only a form of politics, but also represents a specific spiritual predisposition: democracy at present is a kind of predisposition, a spiritual convention, and a worldview of life; it not merely refers to a concrete political system, but in reality an abstract philosophy of life; it is not only the outcome of pure reason, but also deeply colored by feelings, explosive emotions, wishes, and desires.8 Many times Li has said the translation of democracy as pingmin zhuyi is the best, for to translate it with any Chinese combination other than this may lose its rich cultural meanings. Just because in his political ideal of pingmin zhuyi

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the issue of individual liberation is especially concerned, his thinking on the relation between individual freedom and social solidarity is very dialectical, which makes his understanding of democracy superior to the Western capitalistic thinkers in early modern times.

13.2 The desired individual–collective relationship as the unity of individual freedom and public solidarity Humanism is the core of Li’s social ideal. According to his ideal of society, politics means the management of things and matters, not the manipulation of the people; it is just one of the means of realizing the liberation of themselves. The ultimate concern of Li’s social ideal is the liberation of human beings, in which are included the freedom of the individual and the liberation of women as sub-subjects. With regard to the long history of the monarchy in China Li specially stressed the significance of spiritual liberation (the liberation of the personality). He claimed, the foundation of freedom in all forms lies in the liberation of the mind, … for all forms of unrest and unhappiness in human life are caused by the manifold systems and habits that have disturbed mutual kindness among people, consequently the spirit of the people in society is isolated. In such a society an individual’s life is full of sadness and pain; things and matters such as country, family, polite consideration, systems, and so on, have all become fettering and invasive in relation to an individual’s freedom of spirit; negatively they have functioned to separate people from one another and disturbed their mutual kindness, sympathy, and love.9 The diverse organizations and communities made up of people were originally places for people to communicate feelings and to develop their capacity, now they have changed into an alienated power to oppress them. “The freedom of mind” is aimed at breaking the alienation, freeing people’s personality and inner capacity. Regarding the problem of young people’s suicide because of the hopeless future of China at that time, Li had on the one hand great sympathy for young people, on the other he encouraged them to live with the same decisiveness of mind that it takes to die: I hope that the vital and youthful people can protest against the depressive culture of our age with just the same decisive mind and spirit as they had to die and sacrifice themselves, so that they can transform the problematic social system and create an interesting and idealistic life. We can transform the Japanese spirit to commit suicide to live a new life. We have to go on to embrace our new life, even if we are subjected to the carriage wheels, the cutting edge of a broadsword, the water of a very deep pool, or the fire of an active volcano. We have no fear of death, but this should absolutely

188 A review of Li Dazhao’s social ideal not be because life is full of suffering and we are tired of it, but just because we want to create a new world and we desire happiness.10 So Li encouraged young people to invert the decisive mind that dares to die to break the fettering of the old social systems, to create a new social life, and ultimately to liberate themselves. In the eyes of Li, the quintessence of democracy is to provide an opportunity for the development of the individual personality. Actually, democracy aims to provide an opportunity for the free development of the individual personality. Under the monarchy in earlier ages one person oppressed the public; he didn’t allow the people to develop their own personality or give them freedom. Only the system of democracy helps develop the individual’s personality.11 In light of the common abstract aim of the liberation of the people he noticed the same spirit underlying different political forms. He thinks democracy, socialism, and free government share something common in spirit: “Whether in politics, economics, or society, democracy respects the personality of a person. The spirit of socialism is also so.”12 And with regard to the spirit, free government is identical with the democracy. The quintessence of a free government does not lie in the fact that the majority compels the minority, but in the fact that if some problem arises, all people can freely and equally think over and discuss it to arrive at a shared solution. After enough consideration and discussion then the result will be tested still according to the principle that the minority follow the majority. During the detailed discussion the majority should be openminded and listen to the minority; after the decision is made by law, the minority should be ready to accept the opinion of the majority. The truth of free government does not lie in dependence on the power of majority, but in public agreement and acceptance. The superiority of the majority shows just a methodology to demonstrate public agreement.13 Being different from the views of the extreme individualism and the anarchism that were popular at that time in China, Li absorbed the dialectical spirit of Marxist philosophy and therefore dialectically approached the relationship between individual freedom and social regulation. He protested not only against the individual’s isolation from society but also against the social oppression of the individual personality, striving for a balance between the two sides. He said, let’s imagine that a person is born isolated from society, completely living alone on his own. Undoubtedly, he has no freedom to choose except to continue along the way of isolation. For such a life how can we see any

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meaning of being an individual? Let’s imagine again that a society has totally oppressed the development of the individual personality. That society must be deadly uninteresting. The individuals who are contained in the society have no way to freely act and become day after day withered and corrupted, how is so-called social regulation still possible?14 On the one hand, liberated individuals are not external to a society, but together constitute a society that is an organic unity. Only in this way can an individual lead the real life of a human being. On the other, society must permit that everyone can freely and sufficiently develop his capacity so that public life can be full of possibilities and energy. According to him individual freedom can be harmoniously united with public solidarity in theory. Individuals and society are not two matters that are exclusive against each other, but two aspects of one matter; they do not refer to matters that are opposite to each other, but imply the two different perspectives with which people observe. … Truly rational individualism must take into account social regulation; and truly rational socialism must take into account individual freedom. Individuals are elements of the constituted community; a society is the organization that unites diverse elements. Real freedom does not mean the elimination of all relationships, but the opportunity to freely choose in spite of arrangements and organizations; it does not mean a state of ultimate accomplishment, but a process to progress forwards and upwards. Real social regulation does not mean the oppression of individualistic activities in all forms, but the provision of various chances for the individuals in it to freely choose and arrange; it does not mean a state of death, but of a living organic body.15 Here Li already understood “individual freedom” as an open “process to progress forwards and upwards,” but not something that is a priori presupposed in thinking, so he avoided abstraction in talking about freedom and liberation and proved, regarding the problem of freedom, to be a profound thinker of Marxism in its early stage in China. Concerning the relation between individual freedom and social reform, his thinking is already superior to early capitalist thinkers like Yan Fu (严复), Liang Qichao (梁启超), and so on. Li stressed, the freedom that we require is the freedom in discipline; and the discipline that we care for is the discipline for freedom. There is only the freedom that is based on discipline, and vice versa. Individuals and society, freedom and social regulation, are originally inseparable.16 Precisely because of the dialectical entanglement of freedom and social regulation, “the liberation of the individual personality” that the Chinese have been pursuing in modern times

190 A review of Li Dazhao’s social ideal absolutely does not mean mere separation, but the creation of a new great universal community that points to the accomplishment of the individual personality by freeing individuals from the old fettering. On the one hand it is the movement of individual liberation, on the other it is that of public solidarity. The two kinds of movements seem in opposition, but actually they are constitutive of each other.17 In the Manifesto of the Communist Party Marx said communist society is an association of free men “in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.” Furthermore in the German Ideology, concerning the relation between individuals and society Marx says, “Only in community [with others has each] individual the means of cultivating his gifts in all directions; only in the community, therefore, is personal freedom possible.” The community meant by Marx truly belongs to everyone, but not some organization that is oppressively above individuals. With such a community it is as individuals that the individuals participate in it. It is just this combination of individuals (assuming the advanced stage of modern productive forces, of course) which puts the conditions of the free development and movement of individuals under their control – conditions which were previously abandoned to chance and had won an independent existence over against the separate individuals.18 Within such a true community individuals can realize their freedom through the association set up by themselves. According to what is cited above, Li’s discourses on the dialectical relation between “individual freedom and public solidarity” are basically compatible with Marx’s thought, which means that he has exactly understood the Marxist theory on society and has revealed that theoretically the Chinese Marxists in the 1920s had already worked out the ideas of social reform that correspond to Chinese social reality. These ideas proved to be very valuable principles for thinking of the solution to the two great historical puzzles in modern China, which are the puzzles of enlightenment and selfsalvation.

13.3 The relationship between the liberation of women and the liberation of human beings A common humanistic concern among progressive thinkers in modern China is their sympathy for the weak, and especially for oppressed women. From Li Zhi (李贽) to Kang Youwei (康有为) and Tan Sitong (谭嗣同), the concern remained. With reference to the view of the yin阴–yang阳 balance in traditional Chinese philosophy Li Zhi primarily argued for the modern humanistic idea of the equality of the two genders, man and woman as natural existence. In their thinking on the capitalistic republic Kang Youwei and Tan Sitong expressed unlimited deep sympathy to women and children, proposing the liberation of

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women. Being influenced by historical materialism, the Marxist Li Dazhao also included the issue of the liberation of women into his considerations about an ideal society. He said, “there is no real democracy in a country where women are not liberated.”19 He even thinks that the equality of the two genders is more important than anything else, for all other differences in a society with regard to for example property, class, and so on can be overcome through proper reforms, whereas “the two genders of man and woman are a limit forever, and cannot be changed. Therefore, democracy concerning the two genders is more urgent than anything else.”20 Different from thinkers who argued for women in earlier times, Li intensively combined the liberation of women with criticism of male power and the monarchy, opinionatedly assuming that the male gender is by nature connected with monarchism. He holds that parallel to the fall of matriarchy and the rise of patriarchy “monarchism was born and thus it is patriarchal.” Being based on the abstract premise of “the difference in gender” he further deduced that, if a society merely allows men the opportunity to be active, such a kind of society must be full of monarchy, arbitrariness, violence, and coldness, absolutely lacking the spirit of democracy, for men are predisposed to tend to monarchy. It is just because of women’s predispositions to peace, beauty, kindness that the average predisposition of human beings keeps balanced, and the true spirit of democracy is made possible in the end. Thus, he asserted further, if we hope that democracy will be realized in China we first have to liberate women, so the spirit of peace, beauty, and love of women can get the chance to exercise possible influencs on monarchical and brutal men in all areas of society. Gradually, men will become accustomed to it and experience the unnoticed transformation. And surely monarchical society will be changed to a democratic one.21 Of course, Li’s discourses on the relationship between monarchy and peace in terms of the gender difference tend to be opposite to historical materialism. It shows that his Marxist thought is mixed with a residuum of the abstract theory of human nature, for the foundation of monarchy does not lie in the gender problem but in the development of productive forces. In history, there are monarchical women like the empresses Lu (吕后) of the Han Dynasty who grabbed all the power, Wu Zetian (武则天) who usurped the throne, and Cixi (慈禧) who wrecked the county, though they are exceptions. However, in traditional families the men are not always monarchical. In any case, Li touched on the truth concerning human liberation in Marxist philosophy – “the liberation of women is the yardstick in observation of the degree of liberation of human beings” – and this reveals the profundity of his social ideal.

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13.4 The ideal of international peace that is based on the working class The philosophical basis for the thoughts and ideals concerning international relations and peace since modern times is derived from the principle of individualism that is extended in the theories of country or nation. In the Perpetual Peace Kant said: “Nations, as states, may be judged like individuals who, living in the natural state of society – that is to say, uncontrolled by external law – injure one another through their very proximity.”22 In order to avoid such international disorder, an international system of peace must be set up with reference to the way of disposing inter-subjective relations, the result of which is the protection of the rights and freedom of every national state within the international system, as individual rights and freedom are protected in the democratic system. Kant said as follows: For states, in their relation to one another, there can be, according to reason, no other way of advancing from that lawless condition which unceasing war implies, than by giving up their savage lawless freedom, just as individual men have done, and yielding to the coercion of public laws. Thus they can form a State of nations (civitas gentium), one, too, which will be ever increasing and would finally embrace all the peoples of the earth.23 Li’s ideal of international peace is no exception either. He extended his thought on the relationship between individual freedom and public solidarity into the areas of country or nation, his political idea of pacifism into international relations, and proposed a program of world peace on the basis of the peace of the working class. He held, a unit, whether as a local community, a state, a nation, or other social forms, is like an individual and has its own character; unionism can protect their freedom from being invaded by others. And different units, whether as a local community, a state, a nation, or other social forms, are like individuals and share something in common, too. Unionism can help them accomplish matters in common in the way that the equally characterized organizations can be founded and the specific duties be clarified so that they can mutually help.24 Just because of this, Li said, we can assert that the present world is a unionist world, a democratic world too; the organizations in the world in the future will be surely unionist ones, democratic ones too. Unionism is just one of the forms of democracy.25 Different from the early capitalistic ideal of internationalism represented by Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong, and so on, Li’s internationalism is based on the

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theory of the struggle of the classes. Thus, he was aware of the point: true cosmopolitan unionism can only be “the international association of the working class” after the extinguishing of class differences. He divided the internationalist movements at that time into two sorts: one is “the internationalist movement of the middle class,” the other is “the internationalist movement of the working class.” But only the latter can bring real international peace. Li claimed the international conflicts and wars at that time were due to class oppression and the inequality of the classes that have indirectly led ultimately to international inequality, therefore, in the face of the chaos and conflicts between the imperial countries all plans and wishes to be anti-war have become illusory and dream-like, and all international conferences are only institutions of distribution that are busy with the punishment of the weak and small lands by the powerful lands.26 He applied the method used to analyze the classes in the area of the international relations, which is superior in comparison to the imagined international peace of Kang Youwei, Tan Sitong, and others. This demonstrates the enduring cognitive soberness of the early Chinese Marxists in the face of complex modern international relations. Very incisively Li generalized the spirit of monarchism and imperialism, which is often embodied as “some kind of pan-ism. Those with pan-ism in mind try to satisfy their own desires, oppress others through their power so that others are subject to them.”27 In order to realize true world peace, different nations must be united in the spirit of “democracy,” so logically the end will surely be a democratic free association, for every individual has his owe free area. If one is very arrogant without consideration for the freedom of others, and even does something harmful, then the extension of his freedom will mean the shrinking of the freedom of others; and his increase the decrease of others. The fortune of the one side is the misfortune of the other; and the happiness of the one side is the sadness of the other. Accordingly, one side that is extended, enlarged, stronger, increasing, of good fortune, and in well-being surely succeeds, but the other side that is becoming smaller, weakened, insulted, extinguished, and sunject to disasters suffers from unlimited spiritual disturbance and pain; gradually, the latter will no more endure it and strive to revenge and protest. Furthermore, anyone has great desire that is undoubtedly not smaller than mine; if he also believes in pan-ism and comes into conflict with the arrogant one, necessarily one of them must lose according to the principle that two things cannot be of the same power. Therefore, the one who has pan-ism in their mind will be either defeated by the avenging public that consists of the weak or die of the contention between the two powerful sides. Consequently, democracy will undoubtedly win against other possibilities.28

194 A review of Li Dazhao’s social ideal Li’s analysis of the direction of international peace 70 years ago is still positively inspiring for us today. At the time of the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the Japanese-American scholar Francis Fukuyama made the prediction of “the end of the history,” declaring that capitalism has won against socialism. However, the failure of the former Soviet Union does not mean the victory of the capitalistic countries represented by the United States; there is no causation of logical necessity between the two. The competition between socialism and capitalism as the two main models in modern times is just beginning; the way of international peace is still very long. At present, the capitalistic societies are changing in a subtle and profound way. The competition of ideology in the 1980s is now replaced by competition in economics, resources, energy, and cultivation of talented persons. Meanwhile, through legal procedures and institutionalized peaceful transformations, for instance, the set-up of the shareholding system among capitalistic private enterprise, high inheritance taxes, social welfare, and so on, capitalistic distribution is slowly characterized by socialism; the socialistic countries which were mainly agricultural and economically not developed have undergone industrialization in the form of state capitalism and experimented with new forms of socialism that were not imagined by the classical Marxists. Both the light of the humanism in socialistic theories, on the one hand, and the great benefits and interests brought about in history and reality by capitalistic society, on the other, are what human beings need. To possess both of them is not practical at present, but it should at least be an ideal of human beings. On the basis of this, regarding the tendency of world peace in the future, any conclusion is too early to be given at present. What we can do is, in light of the power of reason, to further research the way to peace for mankind.

13.5 The historical status of Li’s ideal of society According to the fourfold analysis we think that Li’s longing for a society of “democracy” (pingmin zhuyi) is something we still have to strive for. In such an ideal society the privileged class in politics, economics, and society will be removed, all people can contribute something constitutive to the country. The function of the political administration is the manipulation of the people; the political administration is for the people and of the people, and is carried out and utilized by all the people for the sake of the management of things and matters. Everything that is particular in his own being, whether it is a community, a region, a nation, or an individual, should have its own free space, being free from invasion and intervention from the outside. In this society there is no relationship between ruling and obeying, it is simply an association of free people. Such a society is democratic; only in such a democratic society can there be the individuals of freedom and equality.29

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Similar to the process of social development in the modern West, the social ideal in modern China also experienced a change from the utopian to scientific socialism. Hong Xiuquan (洪秀全), who represented the social ideal of the farmer class, imagined “a worldly heaven” on the basis of the transformation and re-use of traditional Chinese egalitarianism, after he roughly absorbed something from Western Christianity. Such an ideal of “a worldly heaven” was formally Western, but concretely included many elements of traditional Chinese patriarchal society, and was thus full of ideas of emperor-centered monarchy, hierarchy, and oppression based on gender difference. Later on, Hong Rengan (洪仁玕) added many capitalistic elements in regard to social development, and thus made the spirit of the social ideal of the Taiping tianguo (太平天国) very modern and at the same time showed the intention of the farmer class in history to get rid of patriarchal tradition as well as its longing for equality, although they had no opportunity or time to implement their theories in the social system. The capitalistic social ideal in modern China can be divided into two phases. The first is the early phase represented by the capitalistic reformers in the movement of the Wuxu weixin (戊戌维新). Kang Youwei as one of its representatives chose the way to reform with reference to ancient times and by taking into account modern Western capitalistic ideas, constituting an ideal of a society of great solidarity. The second phase evidenced the fusion of the later capitalistic republic with the socialistic idea represented by Sun Yat-sen. Such an event in social development in modern China already revealed the possibility of a union between Chinese national capitalists and socialism. It also proved to be the inner historical and logical evidence that transformed many old democratic thinkers like Li Dazhao and so on into Marxists. Prior to his reception of Marxist historical materialism Li proposed the “people as the foundation” (minben, 民本) and capitalistic social ideals. All these ideals can be seen as experiments in the thinking of modern Chinese who with great national concern were determined to constitute a new ideal society. After the introduction of Marxism into China a number of Chinese intellectuals reaccepted Marxist historical materialism, which consequently transformed a utopian social ideal into a scientific one in China. Li’s social ideal perfectly represents it in its early form. The essential spirit of the scientific social ideal is “the union of humanism and socialism,” as Li in the Wode Makesi [Marx] zhuyi guan (我的马克思主义观) expressed, we propose to transform the mind of human beings in light of humanism, and to transform the economic system in light of socialism. Without the transformation of the economic system the mere transformation of the human mind would be not effective; and without the transformation of the human mind the mere transformation of the economic system would not succeed either. We propose the twofold transformation of material and mind, and the unified transformation of body and soul.30 The writing of this chapter so far has provoked the association of certain ideas in me: from the 1950s to the 1970s, Chinese academic circles extended the

196 A review of Li Dazhao’s social ideal theory of the class struggle to all areas in the humanities and social sciences. This really went too far. However, over the long course of history and up to the present, differences between classes and strata in human life are an objective fact. If it is a fact that the socialistic movement by a process of socializing the means of production since the 20th century has not proved successful in protecting individuals’ rights, it is also the truth that capitalistic privatization of the means of production has not really laid a sound basis for human freedom and development. How to organize the possession of the means of production, and how, in light of the just forms of socialized production and distribution, to reduce as much as possible the degree of limitation that necessarily occurs in the material life of human beings, these are the unavoidable social problems at present that are shared both by socialism and capitalism, which insists on the idea of freedom. If capitalism can, in terms of its inherent history and cultural traditions, resolve the problem, countries which insist on a socialistic ideology can also resolve the problem of the relation between individual freedom and social development in terms of their own inherent history and cultural traditions. Although in Li’s social ideal there is no present solution for resolving this problem, he has, in my view, at least provided us with some basic principles for overcoming it, which are the principle of the unity of humanism and socialism, the principle of individual liberation and public solidarity, and his ideal of international peace based on the democratic politics. These three principles are the fruit of academic research in modern society that we should firmly bear in mind.

Notes 1 Li Dazhao (李大钊), “Populism” (Ping Min Zhu Yi, 平民主义), Collected Works of Li Dazhao (Li Da Zhao Wen Ji, 李大钊文集), vol. 4, Beijing: People’s Publishing House (Ren Min Chu Ban She, 人民出版社), 1999, 246. 2 Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 246. 3 Li Dazhao, “Da’ai pian – Ai wumin zhi shisuo ye” (大哀篇 – 哀吾民之失所也), Collected Works of Li Dazhao, vol. 1, 12. 4 Li Dazhao, “Da’ai pian,” 12. 5 Li Dazhao, “Formation of Political Confrontation” (Zheng Zhi Dui Kang Zhi Yang Cheng, 政治对抗之养成), Collected Works of Li Dazhao, vol. 1, 100–101. 6 Li Dazhao, “Constitution and Freedom of Thought” (Xian Fa Yu Yan Lun Zi You, 宪法与思想自由), Collected Works of Li Dazhao, vol. 1, 230. 7 Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 252. 8 Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 252. 9 Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 245. 10 Li Dazhao, “The Problem of Youth Suicide” (Qin Nian Yan Shi Zi Sha Wen Ti, 青年厌世自杀问题), Collected Works of Li Dazhao, vol. 3, 123. 11 Li Dazhao, “From Civilian Politics to Worker Politics” (You Ping Min Zheng Zhi Dao Gong Ren Zheng Zhi, 由平民政治到工人政治), Collected Works of Li Dazhao, vol. 4, 140. 12 Li Dazhao, “From Civilian Politics to Worker Politics,” 140. 13 Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 250–251. 14 Li Dazhao, “Liberty and Order” (Zi Zou Yu Zhi Xu, 自由与秩序), Collected Works of Li Dazhao, vol. 4, 62.

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Li Dazhao, “Liberty and Order,” 62–63. Li Dazhao, “Liberty and Order,” 63. Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 253. Karl Marx: The German Ideology, online version: Marx/Engels Internet Archive (marxists.org), 2000. Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 259. Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 260. Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 261. Immanuel Kant: Perpetual Peace, trans. M. Campbell Smith, London: George Allen & Unwin, 1903, 128. Immanuel Kant: Perpetual Peace, 136. Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 254. Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 256. Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 257. Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 258. Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 259. Li Dazhao, “Populism,” 264. Li Dazhao, “My Marxist View” (Wo De Ma Ke Si Zhu Yi Guan, 我的马克思主义观), Collected Works of Li Dazhao, vol. 3, 35.

14 Individual freedom and the ideal society The ideas of freedom of Yin Haiguang and Feng Qi in comparison

Yin Haiguang (殷海光) and Feng Qi (冯契), as two modern philosophers in “the period after the May Fourth Movement,” were both students of the philosopher Jin Yuelin (金岳霖), but they are very different with regard to their political ideas and their academic approaches. In politics, one of them chose the Kuomintang (KMT), and the other the Communist Party; in academic orientation, one chose modern Western empiricist liberalism in the West, the other Marxism. However, in the end both came to focus on the theory of freedom, and became two typical thinkers on each side of the Taiwan Straits who were concerned with the problem of freedom. Seemingly, Yin Haiguang’s choice of liberalism based on individualism and his fierce criticism of the socialist ideal of the Communist Party are totally in opposition, like water to fire, to the social ideal of Feng Qi who chose Marxist theory. But regarding social ideals and their intellectul approaches to them in the late years of their lives, there is something commensurable between them to be found, that is: an ideal society must be founded on respect for individual freedom so that individuals can fully develop their capacity and personality in society. By comparing the two thinkers who are so different in personality and academic approach and with regard to the commensurability of their ideals of freedom, this chapter will try to contribute to the construction of a theory of freedom in modern China in the hope that some valuable inspiration will be gained from thinking about it.

14.1 “Integral freedom” – Yin Haiguang’s ideal of freedom For Yin Haiguang who was a figure in “the period after the May Fourth Movement” freedom remained a lifelong tenet. But different from the “external freedom” highlighted during the period of the “May Fourth Movement,” the freedom pursued by him is on the one hand colored by empiricist rationality to some extent, and on the other is also possessed of the transcendent spiritual character of traditional intellectuals. Especially in the late years of his life, after he had affirmed the excellent qualities of traditional culture and evidenced the various shortcomings in modern Western civilizations, Yin’s recognition of freedom became more sound and comprehensive; he still insisted on “external freedom” and continued his uncompromising criticism of oppressive institutions in

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various forms, but at the same time he laid particular stress on “internal freedom,” which was discussed in comparatively more detail. All these together characterized his thought on freedom. From a negative perspective we can judge his personal traits in approaching freedom as follows: not only is it not the Chinese version of the view on freedom of the school of Western empiricism, but nor is it the traditional Chinese, especially Daoism-inflected, inner freedom that was highlighted by intellectuals in history either. It is rather a kind of “integral freedom” that is based on modern culture on the one hand and critically takes the reverse in modern culture into consideration on the other. From the positive perspective we see that it opposes all forms of “oppression” and strives for a societal state in which the people suffer no violent threats, economic pressure, or monarchical ideology, and can fully develop a creativity that points to positive values and can be well guided. This is what Yin called “actualized freedom.” Many papers researching Yin’s thinking on freedom particularly stressed his connection with the master of modern Western liberalism, Friedrich August von Hayek, but ignored his creative aspects. This was one-sided. In reality, his criticism of the “mythos of modernity,” his deep exploration of the connotations of individual freedom, and his research on the ethical foundations of freedom already went beyond the spiritual horizon of the empiricist knowledge of freedom. For he had more awareness of the shortcomings of modern Western civilization, and in addition, he was influenced by his friends and students around him; his intellectual attention was focused on tradition, trying to unite Western liberalism with the spirit of freedom implied in Chinese tradition. He continually criticized the various forms of “oppression and control” of freedom, and meanwhile the focus of his concern was on “inner freedom” with much emphasis of the value of “inner freedom,” which is different from his particular stress on external freedom in his middle age. In the article “Ziyou de lunli jichu” (自由的 伦理基础) in 1965, he spoke highly of the inner force of a man, and combined this inner force with “Confucius’s humaneness and Mencius’s righteousness”. He said, “the inner force can be the humanness of Confucius, the righteousness of Mencius, or the benevolence of Buddha.”1 And he even said, if we consider the problem to the extreme, when a man has achieved insight into the question of life and death and thus is free from the fear of death, any oppressive means will be redundant. In this way, totalitarianism will melt like ice and break like tiles.2 Such an extreme stress on “the inner force” or the idea of free will is definitely not the same as the orthodox empiricist emphasis on the protection of life and its highlighting of the freedom of speech and faith. Nevertheless, the ideal characteristic of inner freedom is extended from traditional Chinese intellectuals to the circle of modern thinkers on freedom. Why did Yin in his last years pay so much attention to “inner freedom”? The answer must be found in the milieu of his age. He holds,

200 Individual freedom and the ideal society since modern times, many new elements have corrupted this kind of “inner force” of people; many people who seize chances to seek private gain and utilize “human weakness” to solidify their power have destroyed this kind of “inner force” of people, … so that tens of thousands of people who have disappeared without development of their personality into a vast collective are completely subject to manipulation.3 Parallel to the change of the living milieu of liberalists and the change in the monarchical form, the central concern of liberalist discourses has correspondingly changed. Yin said, “effects from the change in the world atmosphere are as great as the overwhelming flood, and the streets are full of depressive persons.” Behind the “positive image” of modern society is the connotation of human nature becoming empty, the “personality” pursued since “the Age of Enlightenment” is changed to an empty shell. Because of this, Yin especially paid great attention to the problem of the inner force in spite of his inheritance of the traditional empiricist concern with “external freedom,” opposed various forms of political totalitarianism, and at the same time, protested against various powers of “oppression and manipulation” in modern society and culture. This is what orthodox empiricist liberalists like Hayek have not paid sufficient attention to (of course, J.S. Mill repeatedly mentioned the problem concerning the manipulation of the minority by the majority, which implies a criticism of the modern populism existing in public culture), but it is an actual problem that has become a necessary concern of modern liberalists. Yin’s concern with this point brings to light not only the personal features in his thinking on freedom, but also reflects an advantage in his liberalistic thoughts that he keeps up with the times, does not blindly follow the outstanding people prior to him, and does not stubbornly defend dogma. With great pain he observed that those who carefully protect their free personality were regarded as stubborn people who know nothing of the affairs of the day, and therefore bring trouble on themselves. In the name of developing the personality secular culture in modern times has betrayed “the spirit of the Enlightenment”; after it was primarily freed from alienation through power, it is now tending to be alienated through money and material desires and has caused a kind of “disease of being short of morality.” For the healing of “the disease of being short of morality” Yin especially highlighted “the inner force,” hoping that it can save modern people from degeneration. On the basis of this, Yin see “inner freedom” as “the starting point of all forms of freedom.” He thinks, in the sense of morality the alleged “inner freedom” means that our moral subject has overcome personal desires. … To extend this, if a man wants to be free, he has to overcome himself, to be the master of himself, so that “his thinking will not be subject to his shell-like body.” The alleged practice and cultivation by the sages and the excellent must be so.4

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Such a saying, if extracted from its context, seems to be in the tendency of asceticism, but in reality it should be seen as an extended emphasis on the importance of “inner freedom” by Yin, for the authentic meaning of freedom absolutely does not imply that human beings should live as animals. On the contrary, it just points to the possibility that human beings can enhance human nature in the incessant process of the diligent cultivation of their behavior to a god-like state. Inner freedom is sometimes called by Yin the “freedom of open-mindedness” or the “freedom that his mind be not enslaved.” According to him, realizing inner freedom is especially difficult with regard to the cognitive aspect. He said, for a man it is easy to be free that his body be not imprisoned, but for the freedom of his mind he has to be possessed of the capacity for intelligence that transcends his age and environment and requires corresponding practice. If a man wants to see the iron net set on the seashore, all he needs is a glance; but if he wants to see the iron net set in his mind, he has to make many intelligent reflections.5 With reference to the traditional theory of “the union of knowledge and practice,” even if a man can really be aware of the iron net in his brain, it is still necessary for him to practice very much in order to be able to escape from the fettering of such a net, because many are already accustomed to this kind of prison-like. Chinese intellectuals who have grown up in the monarchic tradition are especially easily characterized by a kind of “rickets of the body and soul,” so even if they can sometimes become conscious of the “iron net,” they are able to overcome it. Some of them have even tried to beautify this kind of life. Thus, I strongly agree with the following statement of Yin’s: It is really arduous for us to be aware of the prison in the mind. Even if after arduous endeavors we have come to realize the prison in the mind, only few people are brave enough “to escape from the prison” and create a new building. In turbulent times, Chinese intellectuals in general are attached to their accustomed prison in the mind.6 In order to free the mind from this kind of prison, to break the prison in the mind, Yin very carefully analyzed its features. He divided the prison into two types: “the first is the uncritical worship of antiquity, … regarding persons in antiquity as god-like”; the other type refers to the “tyranny of the time.” Fierce criticism was directed towards the two types of prison by Yin, which remains very significant even today. But with regard to actuality the critique of the second type is of more significance, for in recent years the anti-ancient tendency in academic circles in China has been very strong; the prison of the first type is no longer threatening for Chinese intellectuals at present. The greatest possible threat is the “tyranny of time,” as Yin pointed out that in modern society the people especially “worship power,” preferring it to all else,

202 Individual freedom and the ideal society therefore, any unreasonable argumentation can find a market, if the marketing is well done. Those clichés that are born out of manipulation have narrowed and imprisoned the mind of the people, stopped all reasonable pursuits and objective discussions. For China, for almost half a century, “the storm of opinions” has arrived time after time, again and again, pulling up the young shoots of truth by their roots.7 Protesting against the “tyranny of time” depends on the inner freedom of a man. Spiritual independence and inner freedom of the mind ultimately make human beings different from the animals. In the face of people’s loss of inner freedom in modern society Yin lamented, the sight of human beings is inferior to eagles, their physical strength inferior to buffalos, their speed inferior to rabbits. But the brain of human beings can think with which all known animals cannot compare. … However, this most wonderful feature is imprisoned by human beings, reducing its efficiency; it has even lost its function. Such a loss is too great. The totalitarian system even built up a dam in the river of human beings’ thinking, compelled tens of thousands of people to live with the same one idea in a direction that is determined by some power and points to a forecasted end. The loss resulting from this harms not merely one generation.8 From this we see that Yin’s idea of freedom is personally characterized and is thus not a simple Chinese copy of empiricist liberalism. As shown above, I have provided a detailed analysis of the personal character of Yin’s idea of freedom, highlighting its emphasis on the aspect of “inner freedom.” This does not mean that Yin did not attach importance to “outer freedom.” In fact, despite his extreme attention to the importance of inner freedom, Yin never ignores outer freedom. In discussing the relation between inner and outer freedom, Yin said, “‘freedom of mind’ or ‘inner freedom’ is the starting point of freedom, and without ‘freedom of mind’ there will be no ‘outer freedom.’ But from this can it not be deduced that if we have ‘inner freedom,’ then we will naturally gain ‘outer freedom’.”9 They belong to different layers of a problem. “‘Freedom of mind’ is not a substitute for ‘outer freedom,’ and it is impossible for it to be that. … We cannot cultivate a man’s ‘freedom of mind’ in a ‘movement’.” But if “inner freedom” is not guaranteed through “outer freedom,” then “such inner freedom is in fact a kind of atrophy of mind.”10 Freedom of this kind is at most “a behavior of self-preservation”; it is the negative freedom of the “preservation of life and the safeguarding of the body” that the Daoists long for. When the people of a time struggle for ‘outer freedom,’ but are frustrated because of the disadvantage of the current situation, idealistic philosophers put on a solemn face with a reproach that the people are in unrest, and persuade them to strive for ‘inner freedom.’ This is a kind of cold-blooded escapism.11

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According to this, Yin never ignores the significance of outer freedom. His criticism of monarchy in all forms in China and the West, in history and at present, is the embodiment of his thought and pursuit of “outer freedom” (later in the discussion I will come back to this point). This chapter is focused on the individual character of Yin’s idea of freedom; therefore, it attaches more importance to the expounding of his concern with inner freedom. For Yin himself spoke about individual freedom, so we may conclude that the pursuit of integral freedom is the full formulation of his thinking on freedom, or to put it in his own words: Freedom must begin in one’s heart, and be, from different perspectives and to different extents, directed towards the actual contents of life. This is the realization of freedom. Only realized freedom is integral freedom. The freedom that we pursue must be of this kind.12

14.2 “The free personality of the common people” – Feng Qi’s ideal of personality Feng Qi is is one of the philosophers who comparatively early talked about the problem of human freedom in the academic circles of the mainland after the 1980s. Feng’s idea of freedom is different from Yin’s, for their academic background is different on the one hand and Feng has rather philosophically approached the problem of freedom on the other. Anyway, Feng’s theory is focused on individual freedom, more exactly, ultimately on the freedom of the most common people. This brings him and Yin together in regard to their common direction in thinking about freedom, though they went different ways. Feng’s view of freedom is intensively connected with his doctrine of “the transformation of knowledge into wisdom” (zhuan shi chneg zhi, 转识成智), which is longed for throughout his entire philosophical system. With this “theory on wisdom” he hopes to make people wiser in the face of natural and social problems, and only on the basis of wisdom can they be freer. The idea of freedom is mainly brought to expression in his valuing the pursuit of “the free personality of the common people.” Feng explained thus, the free personality that I now talk about is civilian, most people can realize it. Such a personality also embodies the essence of the species and its connection with history, but first of all it requires the accomplishment of free personality. A man being of free personality means that he is not only one member of the species, not only one cell in the social association, but is possessed of his own characteristic continuity and insistency which differentiates him from other members of the species and maintains his uniqueness in complicated social connections.13 “The free personality of the common people” differs from the personalities of the sages and heroes in ancient times. A man of free personality is not an omniscient and omnipotent sage, but a common person, and he has

204 Individual freedom and the ideal society shortcomings, may make mistakes. Accordingly, it is not accepted that mankind can become ultimately enlightened and can gain absolute freedom. On the contrary, it concedes that a man can win his freedom only in the interaction between his personal existence and cosmic nature, by which he constantly appropriates what is alien to him. Therefore, mainly on the basis of philosophical epistemology or from the perspective of historical materialism Feng approached the problem of freedom, which is different from Yin who discussed it ethically, politically, and sociologically. Feng thinks, “human beings are not born free, but in the process of appropriating things that are alien to them they become more and more conscious from the state of unconsciousness, and then more and more free.”14 Thus, in the eyes of Feng, for mankind freedom is given a priori, or in other words, human freedom is not anything that can be ontologically determined. If human freedom must be upheld as the thing in itself, it exists only in the areas of value embraced by human beings or in “enjoyable spiritual states,” in and only in such areas and states am “I” a master. “I” am the master in these areas; all these creatures, values are created by my spirit and become the embodiments of it. Only in this way can “I,” who is of free personality, be possessed of ontological significance.15 But this does not mean that “‘I’ is materialized to some being in the ontological sense,”16 for only “on the basis of spiritual development is human freedom possible.” Feng therefore limited the problem of human freedom to the specific historical process and, by the way, highlighted the significance of spiritual freedom. Just with reference to the latter point, the “inner freedom” stressed by Yin is spiritually commensurable with Feng, because essentially Feng’s ideal of “the free personality of the common people” merely focuses more attention on the inner spiritual freedom of human beings. The tradition in which Feng continued his thinking and the actual problems faced by him are very different from those in which Yin was situated; the ideal of “the free personality of the common people” is focused on criticizing the various forms of totalitarianism, dogmatism, and money worship in China and the West, in ancient times and the present. In respect of his spiritual predisposition Feng inherited the rationalistic “philosophy of the Enlightenment” and humanism, full of sympathy with the life the people in lower classes. He sensed that the civil class, after being freed from the manipulation of authority, was about to fall into the danger of being enslaved by money in the face of money worship; and on the Chinese mainland because of the heavy influences of “the Cultural Revolution” that still continue, the historical shadow of the worship of authority and dogmatism has not fully faded, there remains a very real question of how to cultivate the independent personality of the vast common people. How to properly balance one’s life in the face of authority and money is an important subject matter in the life of every common person. The free personality of the common people is not the one of the sages and heroes that is unreachable, it is an ideal

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for the common public that is associated with the ideal of human equality and its thorough liberation. In this kind of personality are included the moral spirit of independence and seriousness and the intellectual capacity to critically judge popular ideas in the secular world, so it is open-minded. In this sense “the free personality of the common people” and “the open and free mind” are different approaches but have equally satisfactory results.

14.3 The critique of reality on the basis of the ideal of freedom The academic background and the theoretical approach of Feng and Yin are different. One of them focuses on the critique of monarchy and the various forms of totalitarian politics, the other concentrates on a philosophical investigation into the theory of freedom. In spite of the differences, one point is shared by them, that basically they criticized all possible fettering and disturbances of freedom in reality in light of an ideal of realizing human freedom. 14.3.1 Yin’s critique of the totalitarian system of manipulation and oppression Yin attaches special importance to the integral freedom of an individual. He sees the individual characterized by such a kind of freedom as “the ultimate atom” of a society. In the long article “Ziyou de lunli jichu” (自由的伦理基础), Yin says, individuals are the ultimate atoms of a society. … An individual cannot be separated, divided into several ones. An individual is not an abstractum, but a real concretum. The subject in a society who suffers from pain or enjoys happiness is an individual. Only an individual has the feeling of glory or shame in his relation to his country, and individuals together constitute the phenomenon of a civilization, and they respect values; especially, this reminds us of those individuals who have produced ideas.17 And, “the freer the individuals are, the more civilized the world is.”18 The degree of “individual freedom” has become the standard to evaluate the progress of society. In terms of his incomparable stress on individual freedom, and as a result of his endeavors towards the realization of individual freedom, Yin systematically and powerfully criticized manipulative and oppressive behaviors and systems in all forms whether they were in China or in the West, in ancient times or in the present. He always said, “the most terrible enemy of freedom is manipulation and oppression, without which there will be no problem for the realization of freedom.”19 But by “manipulation and oppression” what does he mean? Yin explains that “they are created by the manipulator and oppressor so that a manipulating and oppressing force that is cobweb-like in politics is formed, and the manipulated and the oppressed have no other choice than following the intention of the former.”20 Out of his personal cherishing of

206 Individual freedom and the ideal society freedom, Yin has carefully researched various forms of freedom. He classifies it as threefold: the first form is naked violence, the second control in terms of mythos, the third is economic. Naked violence refers to “pure physical force,” for instance, the blow from a stick that inflicts pain, the cut of a knife that may cause death, the shot of a gun that makes a person fall, and the press of a button that destroys a whole city, and so on all pure physical forces, … which have from ancient times constituted the foundations of manipulation and oppression. [And] economically, the manipulated and oppressed are subject to threats against their biological existence, or of completely losing their means of subsistence, so this may lead to death without blood.21 Among the three types of “manipulation and oppression” Yin’s analysis of the one of mythos is the most inspiring. He uses the concept of “mythos” in the broad sense, and accordingly regards all forms of governance that manipulate people’s minds and fetter their actions in terms of some ideology or idea as mythological control. In very early ancient times “the mythos of nature” was utilized, in the Middle Ages “the mythos of monarchical power,” and in modern times it is the mythos of the current ideology. Against the last one his criticism was especially fierce: the modern mythos “manipulates and oppresses the mind, which has the consequence that the offender will feel himself inferior, lonely; his spirit will be so shocked that he cannot sustain himself any longer.”22 Even though the effects and embodiments of the three forms of manipulation and oppression are different, they are not separate from one another, “violence, mythos, and economics can be utilized in turn” so that they together form a web of “manipulation and oppression.” It can be asserted that Yin’s critique of manipulation and oppression is profound and striking. Besides his absorption of ideas from Hayek and others he made some developments and extensions that can be seen in his detailed analysis of the systems of manipulation and oppression in his thinking on freedom. His critique is not merely limited to some kind of “-ism” or ideology. But he somewhat misunderstood Marxism, taking the dogmatized, simplified pseudoMarxism as authentic. Nevertheless, we can well reflect in light of his misunderstanding and criticism the failures of the Marxist movements of the 20th century, to get ready to put into practice and improve the Marxist idea of society. Incidentally, we can also find out the compatible points and connections between modern liberalism and Marxism to make the latter an increasingly allembracing theoretical system that can really digest the quintessence of all human cultures. 14.3.2 Feng’s critique of the worship of power and money Different from the life background and actual social concern of Yin, Feng mainly criticized the worship of power and money that still exists in society

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in terms of his theory of “the free personality of the common people.” From the perspective of social development he points out the reason for “alienation”: from the historical perspective of social development, the force of alienation is twofold: one is the superstition in authority that is based on the dependence of others; the other is the worship of money that derives from dependence on the material.23 The forces of “alienation” are stronger for people in present society who are still under the influence of “the Cultural Revolution” and, furthermore, the market economy since reform and opening-up. Feng was a victim of “the Cultural Revolution” and also evidenced the various forms of alienation of many Chinese at the start of the market economy; therefore, he was able to profoundly criticize these phenomena in the early stages. Because of this, he became a Marxist philosopher on the Chinese mainland who comparatively very early and systematically discussed the problem of human freedom. And he didn’t stop at analyzing the phenomenon of Chinese alienation, but also took history into account and observed that many rulers in Chinese history were good at intrigues, complying in appearance but opposing in heart. This resulted in a loss of personality for many people. During “the Cultural Revolution” many people continually fell into traditional habits and harmed morality; under the new historical conditions the worship of power and money has advanced further. Since reform and opening-up, because of the temptations of the market economy many become slaves to money. Against this situation Feng proposed the ideal of cultivation of “the free personality of the common people,” to oppose the distortion of the human personality. Feng’s criticism of the forces that fetter human freedom lacked the perspectives of politics and sociology. In spite of this, his critique of alienation in reality was already directed at Marxist dogmas that were upheld by some dogmatic Marxists, and was of great actuality. He noticed that some of the dogmatic Marxists had already forgotten “the aim of Marxism that is for the people”: something essential is forgotten. The communist cause must be “from the people” and “for the people,” as Marx said. The cause must be accomplished by a new mankind; the accomplishment itself is in turn for the people to be renewed.24 These people ignored the value of mankind, and thus ignored their education “to enhance the quality of the mankind.” Such behaviors are in fact “crimes committed against the nation.”25 In this critique is revealed the outstanding courage of Feng as a philosopher, which also reflected the atmosphere of academic freedom in modern socialistic China. The publication of these critical words could not be imagined during the period of “the Cultural Revolution.” The existence of such a fact also shows that Chinese society since reform and

208 Individual freedom and the ideal society opening-up has tried to correct the failings that were in opposition to Marxist principles but perpetrated by dogmatic Marxists, and is striving to transform that socialistic society so that it can be livelier than capitalistic society. It also makes it clear that socialism is not necessarily in opposition to freedom; not merely that, but it also urges the comprehensive and free development of human beings. Feng’s critique of society on the Chinese mainland is not only targeted, but also forward-looking. It merits our respectful attention.

14.4 The search for commensurability: linking individualism with communism – thought concerning the construction of a theory of freedom in present-day China With regard to the present trend that liberalistic masters like Hayek strongly oppose dialogue between socialism and liberalism, my risky endeavor to work out compatibility between Yin who follows the liberalistic view of freedom and Feng who believes in the Marxist view, between the individualistic and the communist view of freedom, seems to be ignorant of the present state of affairs. In any case, I think that the two great outcomes of humanism – liberalism and Marxism – are in agreement in respect of their common championing of individual freedom and the ideal society, despite their diversity in other aspects. Because of the identity of this pursuit liberalism and communism are complementary to each other with regard to methodological approaches; it also makes clear the big gulf between communism and fascism, between liberalism and anarchism. This fact encourages us to synthesize Yin and Feng, liberalism and communism, on the basis of this assumed commensurability. However, regarding their discourses on freedom there are also definite differences between Yin and Feng, which result from their different individual value orientations and belief systems; but in reality these differences also reflect the diversity among Marxist scholars and liberalists. Today, we should further our theoretic research on freedom. It is to ask, why do countries which accept liberalism not insist on liberalistic principles in regard to national issues? Why have all Marxist countries wrongly chosen totalitarian politics? Why is the economy of public ownership not efficient? And why can the vast numbers of workers and farmers who are already freed from economic exploitation not really enjoy freedom, as Marx had always predicted? All these questions are raised here, and they remain to be answered. As we know, the liberalists after Marx, despite their different academic standpoints, generally agree with one another in their protest against the communist ideal of society. And in spite of the diversity of their argumentations they all think that according to the communist ideal personal property will be abolished, and then ultimately freedom will be abolished also. Because of Stalin’s simplification and distortion of Marxism, and also because of the ravages of human nature in “the Cultural Revolution” initiated by Mao Zedong (毛泽东), the reputation and image of socialism is distorted and ruined in people’s hearts. Consequently, the positive role played by the socialistic ideal in the transformation and

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revolution of society is forgotten by the people, too. The problems that can be traced back to the period of primitive capitalistic accumulation have been partly resolved in the present capitalistic society, the reason for which not only lies in the inner logic of capitalistic development, but is also due to socialists’ critique and correction of capitalism to a great extent. Without the global socialistic movements there would hardly be the present trend of international equality and peace (this view comes from Gu zhun (顾准)). With regard to this aspect the liberalists have made few contributions (even though some liberalists have also recognized this point; for instance in the book Liberalism by Hobhouse there are detailed discourses about it). The liberalist criticism of the various failures of communist movements is also very profound, which does not suffice in any way to negate the communist ideal nor the value of its existence. The assumption that communism and socialism necessarily lead to totalitarianism and autocracy is theoretically not sound. Furthermore, we cannot equate Stalin’s faults with Marxism or socialism, cannot naively think of it as supra-fascism, and absolutely cannot reduce the faults and failures in the process of socialistic constructions to the Marxist theory of socialism either, because the social and historical causes for them are extremely complicated and subtle. Yin’s critique of communism and socialism was basically inherited from the ideas of Hayek and others. He said, the blind communist demand for equality in modern times without consideration of the differences regarding the quality, achievement, and capacity of people was essentially aimed at quelling their envy, which was advocated as “equality.” It was totally based on the unsatisfactory blind emotion of the people of lower classes who were agitated to “overturn their fate.”26 And the communist construction of “economic equality” may “make freedom foundationless and rootless.”27 In his criticism we see that he has not yet completely comprehended the essential spirit of communism; he has been especially unable to understand the communist pursuit of “equality” from a historical perspective. However, his critique of the faults in the process of communist movements and the Marxist Feng’s exposure of “the forgetting of the people” in dogmatized Marxism both point to the same problem but by different means. This amazing phenomenon cannot simply be seen as a chance intellectual occurrence, but rather as a revelation that the ultimate values of the liberalists are compatible with those of the Marxists. The commensurability that combines the thinking of the liberalist Yin and that of the Marxist Feng lies in the fact that both have connected individual freedom with an ideal of society, and thereby seen the realization of individual freedom as the symbol of an ideal society. Yin said, in modern society that is civilized, free, and open everyone enjoys freedom of speech, everyone can express their opinions without being worried and being threatened … the make-up and progress of a civilized, free, and open society must be realized under sunlight.28

210 Individual freedom and the ideal society And Feng said, the personality must be developed all-round. And at the same time, it is required that socialism be united with humanism. Such a system is required that under it dependence on powerful persons and on the material must be overcome. The striving for corresponding social conditions and the striving for individual all-round development must be united.29 According to Yin, “to regard human beings as human beings” is “the ethical foundation of freedom.” In discussing his doctrine on wisdom, Feng said, a man must be disposed as the end, as an individual, only in this way can he respect himself and be free from fear, and at the same time respect other people. Without this basic starting point in mind it is impossible for him to understand others.30 He even talked about the value of every individual from the height of philosophical ontology: “the entity in the ontological sense is an individual, not a collection of particulars. Such an individual is an organic whole, a life that is living and developing; it is the spirit that sustains its identity.”31 In reality, Yin himself to some extent confirmed the Marxist theory of society: since modern times the theories on the history of economy and the trend of socialism proposed by Marx and so on have at least indirectly contributed to the improvement of “the capitalistic working class” and the enhancement of their social status.32 Therefore, we cannot place liberalism and Marxism in a relationship of thorough opposition. With regard to the humanistic attitude that is shared by liberalism, this idea is compatible with the Marxist theory of society. And as to the idea of freedom of Yin himself, “the inner freedom” repeatedly highlighted by him and his emphasis on independent thinking and the spirit of constantly criticizing are in agreement with the dialectical spirit of Marxism, for the essence of the latter just points to the incessant critique of reality. But it is not surprising that regarding the problem of freedom the views of the liberalist Yin and the Marxist Feng in modern China are to some extent overlapping, for in fact communism and liberalism can be connected in many aspects. First of all, a fundamental principle of modern liberalism is: “There is nothing in the basic principles of liberalism to make it a stationary creed, there are no hardand-fast rules fixed once and for all.”33 The principle is identical with dialectical materialism which is the foundation of the communist ideal. Second, both of them are idealists whose tenet is individual freedom as the highest aim of a society. Third, a true liberalist is also an international pacifist, which is also similar to the ideal of communist society. Finally, with reference to their theoretical sources, both

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communism and liberalism are born out of the trend of the humanism that has sprung up rigorously in modern times. A historical misunderstanding of communism by liberalists lies in the point that they have seen the communist elimination of private ownership as the deprivation of the properties possessed by the individuals. On the contrary, the communist ideal is devoted to getting rid of “private ownership” that is dependent on the exploitation of the labor of other people, that is based on possession of the means of production, not opposing the reasonable possession of personal property. In terms of the distribution principle of socialism in its primary stage, recompense is made according to the amount of labor expended, so it admits the possession of private properties and the right to budget them. Its aim is that everyone can gain social wealth through his legal labor. The wealth of this kind is precisely what the liberalists call “private property”. According to the communist ideal, the intention is to eliminate the physical or biological influences exercised by private property upon mankind. In other words, it intends to deprive the properties of the big private owners through social revolutions so that the possession of social wealth can be more reasonable and then everyone can enjoy the opportunity to completely develop himself in actual social activities. Of course, the question of how it is possible for the means of production in the name of the public ownership not to be manipulated by some people to control other citizens during the early socialistic phase of communism remains a great theoretic subject matter that deserves being carefully researched in socialistic countries at present. How can the people really play the role of the householder? With what system can the people’s effective supervision of the power of the administrative party be guaranteed, so that the wealth that belongs to the people will not be stolen away? These great theoretical and practical questions are addressed in the socialistic reform of the present. Without solution of these questions it will not come to pass that people under the socialistic system can enjoy true democracy and freedom, and its developement cannot be compared with the degree of capitalistic development nor even catch up with it either. And for the people it won’t be persuasive to speak of the superiority of socialism unless this is based on trustworthy facts. It must be admitted that at present the socialistic countries are still searching for the way and investigating how to develop the creative capacity of the people. In any case, the principal enemy of communism (or socialism) is monarchism and the various stupid systems. The basis of monarchy is stupidity and it brings forth new stupidity. In order to realize the communist ideal, an open and rational society is needed, and its people must be possessed of high moral quality and rich scientific knowledge. Liberalism is also directed against monarchy and stupidity, so in this sense it is a theoretic ally of communism (or socialism), and it can be the object of learning on the one hand and of criticism on the other from the standpoint of communist theory. We have to get a clear recognition of this fact in constructing the Marxist theory of freedom in modern China. Nevertheless, between liberalism and communism there is systematical divergence. In my view, it does not lie in their values or aims, it refers rather to the

212 Individual freedom and the ideal society systematic divergence in methodology concerning ways to realize individual freedom. Communism will completely get rid of private ownership to realize the public ownership of the wealth, so that the people can avoid the status in which they are economically exploited and then, on that basis, become free. Liberalism immovably strives to protect the private property of every individual, so that everyone can have his private property, which cannot be removed by others and then, on that basis, his freedom in social activities can be guaranteed. When judged from the perspective of today, the two seemingly conflicting theories, which seem in opposition like water to fire, are just different approaches, but achieve equally satisfactory results in regard to the values they pursue. The pursuit of human liberation and the realization of social harmony are the necessary contents of all progressive theories. Only from this perspective can we see that the discussed commonality between Yin and Feng in their thought on freedom does not seem farfetched as if it were just a play of thinking. If it is right that freedom in the old societies was born only in the purple, which could only be enjoyed by the minority, today it has become the basic value of modern civilization and remains the highest value that will be forever longed for by human beings. From the perspective of the highest value we can say that freedom refers to the “Dao” in Daoism, the humaneness in Confucianism, the ideal of Tathāgata in Buddhism, and the God that fairly cares for all nations in all Western religions. With regard to this fact, how should we refuse the dialogue and the intrinsically implied commensurability between the various progressive theories?

Notes 1 Yin Haiguang (殷海光), Collected Works of Ying Haiguang (Ying Hai Guang Wen Ji, 殷海光文集), vol. 1, ed. Zhang Binfeng (张斌峰), Wuhan: Hubei People’s Press (Hu Bei Ren Min Chu Ban She, 湖北人民出版社), 2001, 360. 2 Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 361. 3 Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 361. I have referred to the Taiwan version of Yin Haiguang quanji (殷海光全集), vol. 15, 1191, because of the examination of the word zhuosang (斫丧), which is here translated as “destroy.” 4 Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 349. The citation is slightly corrected by the author, for he thinks that “moral subject” (daode zhuyi, 道德主体) has been mistaken for “moral-ism” (daode zhuyi, 道德主义). 5 Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 349. 6 Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 350. 7 Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 351. 8 Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 351. 9 Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 351. 10 Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 352. 11 Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 351. 12 Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 352. 13 Feng Qi (冯契), Human Freedom, Truth, Good and Beauty (Ren De Zi You He Zhen Shan Mei, 人的自由和真善美), Shanghai: East China Normal University Press (Hua Dong Shi Fan Da Xue Chu Ban She, 华东师范大学出版社), 1996, 320. 14 Feng Qi, Human Freedom, 12. 15 Feng Qi, Human Freedom, 319.

Individual freedom and the ideal society 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33

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Feng Qi, Human Freedom, 320–321. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 334. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 335. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 352. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 354. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 357. Yin Haiguang, Collected Works, vol. 1, 357. Feng Qi, Human Freedom, 241. Feng Qi, Human Freedom, 309. Feng Qi, Human Freedom, 309. Yin Haiguang (殷海光), The Complete Works of Yin Haiguang (Yin Hai Guang Quan Ji, 殷海光全集), ed. Zhang Bingfeng (张斌峰), Taiwan: Laureate Book Co. (Gui Guan Tu Shu Chu Ban Gong Si, 桂冠图书出版公司), 1162. Yin Haiguan, Complete Works, 1164. Yin Haiguang, Complete Works, 1167–1168. Feng Qi, Human Freedom, 326. Feng Qi, Human Freedom, 202. Feng Qi, Human Freedom, 203. Yin Haiguang, Complete Works, 1185. Friedrich A. Hayek: The Road to Serfdom, New York: Routledge, 2006, 17.

Part IV

15 The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” and cultural nationalism1

The Chinese/barbarian distinction is a topic in Chinese political philosophy. Across different eras its content does not remain unchanged. At the time of Confucius the main content of the debate of the Chinese/barbarian distinction was the set-up and sustainability of the dominant role of the Central Plains culture. After the arrival of Buddhism the debate was changed to one on “the Chinese/Indian distinction,” which was embodied as the dispute between Confucianism and Daoism in the process of their competition with Buddhism to become the national religion regarding their controversial essentiality and inherent superiority. The debate of this time was ended with the birth of the sinicized Chan/Zen Buddhism. The appearance of Song–Ming philosophy (song-ming lixue, 宋明理学) symbolized the fact that, after its absorption of foreign cultures Chinese culture gave birth to its national spirit anew. After the Southern Song Dynasty the Mongol and the Manchu nations defeated the ruling classes of the Han nation. Although in everyday life there were always problems concerning national feeling, a debate on the Chinese/barbarian distinction did not emerge, for the conquerors had gradually applied Confucian doctrines as the governing programs. However, after the founding of the Qing Dynasty, Han intellectuals strongly protested against the barbarian political and cultural polices implemented by the Manchu ruling classes in the early stages, which started again the fierce debate on the Chinese/barbarian distinction. Wang Fuzhi’s (王夫之) idea of nation and “the Chinese/barbarian distinction” during the Yongzheng (雍正) period are two representative cases. The relevant discussions about them can be found in Xiao Gongquan’s (萧公 权) Zhongguo zhengzhi sixiang shi (中国政治思想史), mention of which will be omitted here. What especially deserves our attention is a new round of the debate on the Chinese/barbarian distinction, changed to one about the China/West distinction, after the middle Ming Dynasty when a number of Western missionaries came to China and brought with them Christianity and Western culture, which are spiritually very different from Chinese religion and culture. Up to now, this round of the debate on the Chinese/barbarian distinction is still intensively ongoing and will continue.

218 The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” The contents of the debate on the Chinese/barbarian distinction vary, but they share a common concern, that is, how to establish the dominant role of Chinese culture in order to cultivate national self-confidence. To be sure, in the “debate on the Chinese/barbarian distinction” there have always been extreme thoughts, typical embodiments of which were narrow-minded Han-centrism and the extreme view of “the transformation of the Chinese through barbarian cultures.” Both of them were extreme views and were disadvantageous for the fusion and development of a national culture. History has evidenced that a rational “view on the relationship between the Chinese and the barbarian” should be based on the national confidence to boldly absorb the quintessence of the cultures of other nations. Only in this way can Chinese culture sustain its vigorous vitality.

15.1 Views on the Chinese–barbarian relationship during the pre-Qin period The debate on the Chinese/barbarian distinction originated very early on. In the chapter “Yaodian” (尧典) of the Shangshu (尚书) there is a “distinction between the barbarian and the people of Xia [夏, the Chinese]”, while in the Zuozhuan (左转) we can find the words that malign minorities. For instance, in the item “Mingong yuannian” (闵公元年) of the Zuozhuan there are sayings such as “the barbarians are jackals and wolves, and the Xia communities are intimate relatives,” and so on; in the item “Dinggong shinian” (定公十年) there are again such sayings as “the barbarians do not scheme to invade China.” So we see the Chinese/barbarian distinction has a long history. The Confucian view of the Chinese–barbarian relationship represented by Confucius lays stress on the achievements of the Central Plains culture. The foundation of this theory can be traced to the rite-based ordering and righteousness of Chinese Xia culture, which is superior to the primitive phase of barbarian culture. Confucius confidently says: “The rude tribes of the east and north have their princes, and are not like the States of our great land which are without them.”2 And in the chapter “Xianwan” (宪问), when his student Zigong (子贡) asked Confucius whether Guan Zhong (管仲) can be counted as a humane person, Confucius praised Guan Zhong as a true man of humaneness and told his students that they should not judge Guang Zhong along the lines of conventional views: Zigong said, “Guan Zhong, I apprehend, was wanting in virtue. When the Duke Huan caused his brother Jiu to be killed, Guan Zhong was not able to die with him. Moreover, he became prime minister to Huan.” The Master said, “Guan Zhong acted as prime minister to the duke Huan, made him leader of all the princes, and united and rectified the whole kingdom. Down to the present day, the people enjoy the gifts which he conferred. But [without] Guan Zhong, we should now be wearing our hair unbound, and the lappets of our coats buttoned on the left side. Will you require from him the petty loyalty of common men and common women, who would commit suicide in a stream or ditch, no one knowing anything about them?”3

The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” 219 Here we see that Confucius confirmed Guan Zhong’s contributions to protecting and sustaining the advanced Chinese culture of rites and righteousness. Although in respect to the ruler–subject relation Guan Zhong was not riteoriented in details, he deserved praise regarding his great righteousness in protecting the Chinese nation. In the chaper “Zihan” (子罕) Confucius emphasized the transformative forces exercised by the advanced culture on the backward culture: The Master was wishing to go and live among the nine wild tribes of the east. Someone said, “They are rude. How can you do such a thing?” The Master said, “If a superior man dwelt among them, what rudeness would there be?”4 This means that even in a remote, desolate, and uncivilized region its savageness and wildness will disappear if a superior man dwells there. The implication is, a superior man can civilize a region and change its savageness to civilization. What Confucius claimed at that time was proved in the subsequent historical process of development. For instance, after Liu Zongyuan (柳宗元) was relegated to Liuzhou (柳州) and Su Shi (苏轼) to Hainan (海南), they both made great contributions to local cultural development, and improved the cultural status of the local regions. Basically, Mencius inherits Confucius’s view on the Chinese/barbarian distinction, accepting that the transformation of barbarians by the Chinese is valid, but not vice versa. In the “Tengwengong shang” (滕文公上) of the Mengzi (孟子) Mencius says, “I have heard of men using the doctrines of our great land to change barbarians, but I have never yet heard of any being changed by barbarians.”5 In his dispute with the follower Chen Xiang (陈相) of the School of Agriculture (nongjia, 农家), Mencius even scolded Chen Xiang with disdainful words, “now here is this strike-tongued barbarian of the south, whose doctrines are not those of the ancient kings,” and so on, which brought to expression the chauvinistic tendency implied in Chinese culture. In the book Lilou xia (离娄下), Mencius even asserts that Shun (舜) was born in Zhufeng (诸冯), moved to Fuxia (负夏), and died in Mingtiao (鸣条), a man near the wild tribes to the east. King Wen (文) was born in Zhou (周) by Mount Qi (岐), and died in Biying (毕郢), a man near the wild tribes to the west. Those regions were distant from one another by more than a thousand li (里), and the era of one sage predated that of the other by more than a thousand years. But when they got their wish, and carried their principles into practice throughout the Middle Kingdom, it was like uniting the two halves of a seal.6 Mencius’ view of the Chinese/barbarian distinction was colored by the theory of cultural evolution as it would be called in latter times, which sees the development of human culture as a linear process in which cultures are situated in a relationship of replacing and being replaced. This view ignores the interplay

220 The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” between different cultures and is disadvantageous for the mutual learning of various nations. However, in the era when the Liji (礼, Book of Rites) appeared, the Confucian view of the Chinese/barbarian distinction had changed. In the chapter “Wangzhi” (王制) of the Liji it is said: The people of those five regions – the Middle states and the Rong Yi (戎夷) [and other wild tribes around them] – had all their several natures, which they could not be made to alter. The tribes to the east were called Yi (夷). They had their hair unbound, and tattooed their bodies. Some of them ate their food without its being cooked. Those to the south were called Man (蛮). They tattooed their foreheads, and had their feet turned in towards each other. Some of them [also] ate their food without its being cooked. Those to the west were called Rong [戎]. They had their hair unbound, and wore skins. Some of them did not eat grain-food. Those to the north were called Di (狄). They wore skins of animals and birds, and dwelt in caves. Some of them also did not eat grain-food. The people of the Middle states, and of those Yi (夷), Man (蛮), Rong (戎), and Di (狄), all had their dwellings where they lived at ease; their flavors which they preferred; the clothes suitable for them; their proper implements for use; and their vessels which they prepared in abundance. In those five regions, the languages of the people were not mutually intelligible, and their likings and desires were different. To make what was in their minds intelligible, and to communicate their likings and desires, [there were officers] – in the east, called transmitters; in the south, representationists; in the west, Di; and in the north, interpreters.7 The passage in the Liji objectively first describes the habits and customs of various nations, and then theoretically gives an analysis, and comes to the view that despite the diversity of habits and customs, they share something basically human in common: all had their dwellings where they lived at ease; their flavours which they preferred; the clothes suitable for them; their proper implements for use; and their vessels which they prepared in abundance. Furthermore, the author of the Liji thinks, despite the different languages of the nations, they can with the help of translation “communicate their likings and desires” to each other, making mutual understanding between cultures possible. The view of the Chinese/barbarian relationship in the Liji was the result of a theoretical investigation that was based on historical experiences of the fusion of the Chinese nation with other nations around it after the periods of Spring and Autumn and of the Warring States.

15.2 The view of the Chinese–barbarian relationship during the Wei–Jin and Sui–Tang period From about the reign of Emperor Ming (明帝) of the Han dynasty Buddhism was introduced to China, and accordingly, the debate on “the Chinese/

The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” 221 barbarian distinction” in general was centered upon “the Chinese/Indian distinction.” In this process some criticized that Buddhism does not accord with Chinese traditional rite-based doctrines, others argued for bringing Confucianism, Daoism, and Buddhism together to digest them all thoroughly. Therefore, the debate on the Chinese/Indian distinction seemed complex from the beginning. Huan Xuan (桓玄), who lived before Fan Ye (范晔), criticized Buddhism, claiming that barbarian nations cannot be cultivated through normal teachings, thus Buddhism utilized supernatural powers to surprise and persuade them. This criticism was directed at the usage of supernatural powers during early Buddhist missionary work. In the chapter “Xiyu zhuan” (西域传) of the Houhan shu (后汉书) Fan Ye admitted that Buddhism is the custom of a specific region on the one hand, but on the other, from the standpoint of defending the traditional rite-oriented teaching of China, he criticized that the followers of Buddhism do not obey Chinese rite-oriented orders, and are not possessed of laws and regulations. He Chengtian (何承天), who was contemporary with Fan Ye, talked about the differences between the Chinese and the Indians in his response to Zong Shaowen’s (宗少文) questions, claiming that the Chinese are quiet and harmonious, characterized by humaneness and righteousness, thus the Duke Zhou and Confucius taught them to distinguish nature from habits. Foreign people are characterized by cruelty, they are greedy and angry. For this reason Buddhists preach the five precepts. These early anti-Buddhist speeches were full of national prejudices, arising mainly because of ignorance of Indian and Buddhist culture. These prejudices are amply collected in the Lihuo lun (理惑论) of Mouzi (牟子) (it was alleged that he lived in the Eastern Han Dynasty). In the form of question and response the Lihuo lun exhibits the various prejudices people harboured towards Buddhism at that time. In short, they are threefold and can be summarized as follows. First, Buddhist devotees leaving home and becoming monks without care for their parents evoked uncomfortable feelings in some Confucians at that time. They said that śramaṇa followers shaved their heads, how bad is it that this behavior disobeys what the sages said and does not accord with the way of a filial child? Second, Confucians talk about threefold impiety, of which the fact that a man fathers no children is the most serious. But Buddhists leave their family and their wives or they get never married, which is in opposition to Chinese ritebased teachings. It was claimed that the blessing is not greater than to have descendants, and the impiety is not more terrible than to have no children, and that śramaṇa followers leave their wives and children, give up property, or stay unmarried; how terrible are their behaviors that are contrary to the way of being blessed and filial? Third, the Buddhist doctrine of the reincarnation of human beings is in opposition to Confucius’s view that “While you are not able to serve men, how can you serve their spirits?” and “While you do not know life, how can you know about death?”8

222 The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” Anyway, the author of the Lihuo lun does not oppose Buddhism, but argues for it in detail. It can be seen as the first treatise that advocates the unity of the Three Teachings. Mouzi thinks that the tattoos of Buddhists are no different from those of the people in the Yue (越) region, and among them there many brave men who are ready to die for a great cause. Thus it should be criticized only according to the standards of piety. A superior man must appraise them as brave and righteous men, and it is never heard from a superior man that Buddhists ridiculously destroyed themselves, adding new connotations to the Chinese concepts of braveness and righteousness that are beyond the Confucian definitions. Furthermore, Boyi (伯夷) and Shuqi (叔齐) did not accept the founding of the Zhou Dynasty and died of hunger on Mount Shouyang (首阳), and they are affirmed by Confucius as excellent men and “ones who strove to be humane and accomplished humaneness.” Confucius also affirmed the national feelings embraced by them. The fact that Buddhists do not accept the rites and behavior disciplines of the Han Dynasty and have their own value system is also no problem. In addition, although Confucius does not talk about the spirits and gods, the latter Confucians without exception make sacrifices to ancestors; and the Daoists also pay much attention to issues concerning life and death, so accordingly, the Buddhist belief in reincarnation of soul should not be subject to criticism either. The author of the Lihuo lun lists what is common between Buddhist and Chinese Confucian cultures, arguing for the reasonable elements of Buddhism. This positively contributed to the spread of Buddhism in China and belongs to the positive aspects of the “debate on the Chinese/Indian distinction.” During this period there were some incorrect views regarding the Chinese– Indian relationship. For instance, the Daoist Wang Fu (王浮) of the Western Jin (晋) dynasty wrote the Huahu jing (化胡经), defaming the Buddhist nations. He thinks that they are people of “cruelty and impoliteness,” and, therefore, Laozi (老子) pretended to be barbarian in order to teach them. It is said in the Huahu jing: “the barbarians are cruel and wild, so [Laozi] pretended to be the Buddha to teach them that they should shave their heads and no longer father children.” And more, Gu Huan (顾欢) of the Song Dynasty from the Liu (刘) family wrote the Yixia lun (夷夏论) to analyze the Chinese/Indian distinction from the perspective of customs and lifestyles. First, he analyzes the differences in appearance. The Chinese nation’s appearance and clothes seem “dignified and beautiful like flowers,” but the Buddhists “have shaved their heads, their clothes seem barbarian and do not cover the whole body.” Second, from the perspective of the funeral rite, in Chinese burials inner and outer coffins are utilized, but the Western barbarians burn the corpse with fire or sink it into water. Through comparison we can see which one is better: To protect the whole corpse and follow the rites is the teaching of enhancing the good; to destroy the appearance of the body and change its nature is the teaching of absolute evil. … Now we who are possessed

The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” 223 of the Chinese nature learn the teaching of the Western barbarians. We are neither the same nor totally different from each other. In their way we have left our wives and children below and abandoned sacrifices to ancestors above. Everything that is desirable is offered to the gods, piety is put into practice only for the sake of the [Buddhist] teachings, but not because of parents. We are therefore unaware of our disobedient rebellion in rite. … Abandoning the Chinese way and learning the barbarian one, wherein does rightness lie?9 Finally, Gu Huan criticizes the living ways of the Buddhists. He says, barbarians are used to kneeling down in a specific way that the left leg bends and only the right knee touches the floor. This is different from the Chinese way and, therefore, was first forbidden by Duke Zhou and later given up by Confucius too. And Buddhism comes from barbarians, isn’t it the accustomed evil of the barbarians? But the Dao is originally Chinese, doesn’t it mean that the ethos of the Chinese is by nature good?10 All of these critical words against the Indian lifestyle that came from disputes about cultural difference brought to light sino-centrism. Theoretically they are not correct and should be rectified. Seen as a whole, the debate on the Chinese/barbarian distinction during the early period of the Wei–Jin and of the Southern and Northern dynasties remained on a lower theoretical level and cannot withstand theoretical examination. The truly valuable views on the Chinese–Indian relationship are those from the profound philosophers (xuanxue jia, 玄学家) who have researched the commonalities and differences between Buddhism and Daoism. For instance, Fan Tai (范泰) and Xie Lingyun (谢灵 运) both asserted, “the texts of six classics point to the establishment of a political system rectifying worldly life; in order to investigate the subtle and profound truth, aren’t we dependent on the Buddhist sutras which function like a compass?” And Seng Shao (僧绍) claimed in the Zheng erjiao lun (正二教论), “Confucius and Laozi have reached the depths in their understanding of worldly affairs; … but to the wonderful experience of Samadhi in meditation the Buddhist teachings have made great contributions.” Duke Zhou, Confucius, and Laozi are all “teachers of emperors,” but what the Shakyamuni Buddha expounded is “the truth that gets to the ultimate.”11 What’s more, Liu Xie (刘勰), the great theoretician in literature, said, “the ultimate of the Dao points to oneness; and the wonderfulness of the truly spiritual state is of no duality.” The proposal of the inter-penetration of Confucianism, Buddhism, and Daoism by these intellectuals during the Wei–Jin period exercised great influence on the sinicization of Buddhism. Later on, it also very positively inspired the progressive intellectuals of the late Ming Dynasty to actively integrate Western culture.

224 The “Chinese/barbarian distinction”

15.3 The view of the Chinese–barbarian relationship during the Ming and Qing dynasties During the Ming and Qing dynasties, the debate on the Chinese/barbarian distinction was changed to one of the Chinese/Western distinction. From the arrival of European missionaries represented by Matteo Ricci in China in the late Ming Dynasty a new round of the debate on the Chinese/barbarian distinction started. Roughly speaking, two main views dominated this new round of debate from the end of the 16th century to the Opium War of the 1840s: the one view was for learning from the West and a Chinese–Western synthesis; the other view firmly opposed the Westernization of China from the standpoint of protecting the rite-based teachings and Chinese culture with regard to customs and politics. In the conflict between the two diverse civilizations the debate on the China/ West distinction did not lead to national wars, for at that time the national power of China was able to protect its sovereignty. But because of negative influences from conservative forces, Chinese–Western communication at that time was hindered. On the one hand, it was conservative forces from the Vatican; they attempted to culturally and economically invade China in the name of doing missionary work. Therefore, missionary work was transformed into the definite action of intervening in Chinese politics, which was offensive to the Chinese government so that cultural and scientific communication was stopped. On the other, it was the impediment from the side of conservative Chinese officials. They illegally persecuted the Western missionaries, thus changing an ideational dispute into a political conflict. Very regretfully, the Chinese did not seize the opportunity to develop for two hundred years, which led to the catastrophe of the century in China. The historical causes were very complicated. Anyway, the lessons from it are worth learning. 15.3.1 “The School of Comprehensive Study” represented by Xu Guangqi At the beginning the Chinese–Western confrontation the great scientist Xu Guangqi (徐光启) of the late Ming Dynasty saw the advantages of Western science. He was determined to learn from it and, thus, accepted Christian baptism. His attitude to Western science is that “marvelous calculation [reasoning and deduction] should be integrated into the [Chinese] horizon of great momentum.” In his cooperation with Matteo Ricci in translating Euclid’s Elements of Geometry Xu saw the disadvantages of Chinese academia, therefore he proposed comprehensive study of the cultures of both sides, saying “it is necessary to comprehensively study before we can win and transcend.” In order to protect the missionaries Xu defended with great patience their religious doctrines. Huang Bolu (黄伯禄) once said in the Zhengjiao fengbao (正教奉褒) that Xu Guangqi explained to the emperor that the teachings in their country focus on self-cultivation to serve the God, and they have heard that the teachings of the Chinese sages also focus on self-cultivation but to serve Heaven. Principally they are identical. Therefore, they have, in spite of hardships and difficulties,

The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” 225 come here to verify the fact so that everyone can strive to be good, which corresponds to Heaven’s kindness to the people. Many other great scientists who were contemporary with and a little later than Xu like Wang Zheng (王徵), Mei Wending (梅文鼎), Fang Yizhi (方以智), and so on basically all shared Xu’s view about the comprehensive study of both cultures. Wang Zheng said that, whether the scholarship is fine or rough, it aims to benefit mankind; whether the person is from China or from the West, it is in any case expected that he does not disobey Heaven. Mei Wending claimed that we should penetrate Western scholarship and find out what it is still lacking. And Fang Yizhi said that Western scholarship can be borrowed as an instrument to measure the teachings of Yu (禹) and Duke Zhou. Even the emperors Shunzhi (顺治) and Kangxi (康 熙) of the Qing Dynasty praised Western scholarship and made use of it. In the third year of the Shunzhi period an imperial decree was sent out to employ Johann Adam Schall von Bell as the Shaoqing (少卿) of the Taichangsi (太常寺). The Emperor thought that his technique of astronomy and calendar study was superior to Luo Xiahong (洛下宏) and others in ancient China. The emperor Kangxi put a number of missionaries in important positions, and let them draw a map of the great Qing Empire. He set up a royal institute for sciences that was like an academy in the modern sense and joined it to learn the calendar, mathematics, and so on. 15.3.2 The opposing faction represented by Shen Que and Yang Guangxian Even though people with breadth of vision at that time stressed learning from the Western sciences and culture, there were also some people who opposed it. From the 44th year (1610) of the Wanli (万历) period, Shen Que (沈㴶) who was the assistant minister of the Ministry of Rites of the coexistent capital Nanjing (南京) presented three times a proposal to the emperor criticizing Christianity. It was written: Its abnormality and strangeness … lie in the ambition to change and confuse the essential rules and orders constantly transmitted to us from Yao and Shun. … It says that we don’t have to offer sacrifices to the ancestors, but just worship God, then we would ascend to Heaven and avoid Hell. The teachings of Heaven and Hell can be found both in Buddhism and Daoism, but they still persuade people to be filial and fraternal and warn them that the opposite will be punished. So they nevertheless support Confucianism. But Christianity advises that people do not have to offer sacrifices to the ancestors, it is not filial, and will lead to the consequence that the people in the world won’t respect their parents or care for their children. What kind of ugly species is it that such a distorted teaching was created by it? In any case, it is the main enemy of Confucianism, and the whole world should scold it. How can it be possible that it would very actively persuade the whole world to accept its teaching?12

226 The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” In terms of the proposals of Shen Que some of the missionaries in China were arrested, their property was also confiscated. Shen Que sent out further a bulletin that the Jesus of Christianity was sentenced to death because he broke official laws, how can he be regarded as a sage? And the teachings of the celestial movements introduced by them are in opposition to the great calendar of the Ming, and furthermore, they have privately kept seismometers, this is illegal. Therefore, they should be arrested. Yang Guangxian (杨光宪) of the early Qing Dynasty opposed the Western calendar. The cause for this case was very complicated, not only were personal affairs entangled in it, but also political deliberations were implied therein. Generally speaking, his view was conservative; especially with regard to his saying “it is fine if there is no good calendar in China, but it cannot be endured for China to have Westerners,” we see that he was intended to enclose China for ever. It was consequently not advantageous for the development of China. Mainly in respect to culture and politics, he criticized Christian missionary activities in China. First, he thought that some of the Christians regarded the Chinese as barbarians who were short of cultivation. This was an insult to the Chinese. Second, for him the missionaries were politically not benign, because they were surveying Chinese geography. According to him, since the time of Matteo Ricci the missionaries had preached Christianity in the name of spreading knowledge of the calendar, they set up settlements in all thirteen provinces of the whole country; the situation is like what the Japanese once did to the state of Lusong (吕宋): at first the Japanese collected information before they attacked Lusong state. Therefore, of the political intentions of the missionaries we should be careful. Though to some extent the view was reasonable, yet it would absolutely result in the cessation of Chinese–Western communications in sciences and culture. It is normal that there is mutual misunderstanding between different nations at the beginning of their confrontation. But the best way to eliminate misunderstanding is to increase communication; and the best method to avoid invasion from others is to learn from other people’s advantages to strengthen oneself. In this way one would be free from worries. But Yang Guangxian said, it is fine if there is no good calendar in China, but it cannot be endured for China to have Westerners; without a good calendar, the consequence would be like in the Han Dynasty when people had no knowledge in adjusting the beginning of each month, so the solar eclipse happened most on the last day of a month. Despite this, it enjoyed a governance of 400 years; as to the Westerners, I’m afraid that they use money to convert our people; the situation would be like someone who wants to collect fuel wood on the fire, disaster will come very quickly.13 With this view against the West in mind China unfortunately fell into a passive, disadvantageous status. Regarding the Chinese–Western cultural relationship Yang Guangxian’s suggestion did not really consider the interests of the

The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” 227 nation. Seemingly he was on the side of the ruling class, but in reality he made the Qing Dynasty collapse. The calendar is involved in agricultural production, and so on. If the sciences and technologies of a dynasty are not developed and it then does not have a solid material foundation, how can it sustain its governance? Among the traditional intellectuals there were some who were short-sighted, and seemingly cared for the interests of the dynasty by opposing Western sciences and culture. These people were disadvantageous for Chinese–Western cultural communication. In a sense, due to the short-sightedness of some of them in the 19th century China gradually became weak and backward. For modern Chinese this merits careful reflection.

15.4 The debate on the Chinese–barbarian relationship at the end of Qing Dynasty and the beginning of the Republic of China After defeat in the Opium War, China, regarded as a heavenly, superior country, had totally lost face. Despite this, only a small number of intellectuals with breadth of vision were awakened; an outstanding representative of them was Wei Yuan (魏源). From the Sizhou zhi (四洲志) that was given to him by Lin Zexu (林则徐), Wei Yuan edited a new book Haiguo tuzhi (海国图志) in the hope of awakening the Chinese people. He claims that this book aims to fight against the barbarians in light of the barbarians and to overcome the barbarians through learning from the advanced techniques of the barbarians. This view appeared in the early first phase of modern China and symbolized a new beginning for knowledge in the Chinese–Western cultural relationship. The second phase was represented by Feng Guifen (冯桂芬), Wang Tao (王涛), and Zheng Guanying (郑观应) who proposed a view of “China as substance, the West as function; China as the root, the West as the branch.” For instance, Feng Guifen claims that Chinese moral and ethical teachings are the root, being complemented by Western technologies that are used to make the country rich and strong. Wang Tao held that what is above the forms is Chinese, which is advantageous in Dao; what is below the forms is Western, which is advantageous in the construction of instruments. If we only praise the Westerners, and derogate and stay confined to ourselves, I cannot see that this would achieve the essential in bringing China to order. And Zheng Guanying claimed that Chinese learning is the substance, Western learning the branch-like secondary; we have to take Chinese learning as the main matter and Western learning as the auxiliary, knowing what is urgent and what is not, examining the way to synthesize both of them, mastering the complementary relationship between the unyielding and the soft, and seeing the essence of governance. These views were expressed as “China as the substance and the West the function” by Zhang Zhidong (张之洞) who represents the early capitalistic reformers. The view of “China as the substance and the West the function” was in reality closely connected with the ossified view of the relationship between the past and the present, which aimed to protect despotic monarchism. It was seriously criticized after China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War of the year Jiawu (甲午). In the Waijiao ba yu zhuren shu (外交报与主人书), Ya Fu (严复) clarified that the phrase of

228 The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” substance and function is used to refer to one matter. There is the substance of a buffalo, then there exists the function of carrying; there is the substance of a horse, then there exists the function of traveling far away; accordingly, for Chinese learning there are its substance and function; for Western learning there are its substance and function too. If China and the West are separated, both of them exist integrally; if they are united, both die out. Yan Fu’s view, that for both Chinese and Western cultures there are their own substance and function respectively, in theory strongly attacked the school of conservatism that actually defended the old social system and opposed reform using the excuse of the substance/function distinction. In the 20th century, as Western culture flooded into China, the dispute between “the school proposing the total Westernization of China” and “the school arguing for the protection of the quintessence of Chinese culture.” After Marxism was introduced into China, the Marxists also gave thought to this issue. Mao Zedong (毛泽东) who was a representative of the communists claimed in his Xin minzhu zhuyi lun (新民主主义论) that “that which comes from foreign countries should be utilized by the Chinese.” Being influenced by the international communist milieu at that time, China betrayed its own proposal in fact. Since reform and opening-up, the theory of the establishment of socialism with Chinese characteristics has been offered. But the question of how this proposal can be put into practice and realized requires ongoing theoretical investigation. To recall the various views on the China/West distinction in philosophy and culture in the past, and to reflect on and re-examine the experiences – even the painful ones – from China’s contacts with foreign cultures to benefit from the lessons that China learned, must be very significant and beneficial for the cultural construction of today.

Notes 1 The issue of nationalism is very complicated. See Xu Xun (徐迅), Min Zu Zhu Yi (民族主义), Beijing: China Social Sciences Press (Zhong Guo She Hui Ke Xue Chu Ban She, 中国社会科学出版社), 2005. In this chapter I will only give a discussion in outline. 2 Analects, 3.5. There is another explanation of the sentence as given by Yang Shuda (杨树达): The barbarians have even excellent rulers; this is different from China where there are none. See Yang Shuda, Lunyu shuzheng (论语疏证), Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Press (Shang Hai Gu Ji Chu Ban She, 上海古籍出版社), 2007. 3 Analects, 14.17. 4 Analects, 9.14. 5 Mengzi, 3.1.4. 6 Mengzi, 4.2.1. 7 Liji (礼记), ed. Pingsheng Hu and Meilan Cheng, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 2007, 89–90. 8 Mouzi Lihuo Lun, accessed online: http://yuedu.163.com/book_reader/ 3d3910fba5e3492bae76dba8110a17e7_4, accessed on July 19, 2019. 9 Quoted from Yangzheng Li, “Gu Huan’s Yixialun and Yixia Debate,” Daojiao Yanjiu (道教研究), vol. 1988, no. 4 (1988), 3.

The “Chinese/barbarian distinction” 229 10 Yangzheng Li, “Gu Huan’s Yixialun and Yixia Debate,” 4. 11 Citations according to Tang Yongtong (汤用彤), Han Wei Liang Jin Nan Bei Chao Fo Jiao Shi (汉魏两晋南北朝佛教史), vol. 1, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1955, 335. 12 Shengchao poxie ji (圣朝破邪集), ed. Guiqi Xia (夏瑰琦), Hong Kong: China Alliance Press (Xuan Dao Chu Ban She, 宣道出版社), 1996, 187. 13 Peking University Institute of Religious Studies, ed., Mingmo Qingchu Yesuhui Sixiang Wenxian Huibian (Jesuit Documents in China from Late Ming to Early Qing Dynasty, 明末清初耶稣会思想文献汇编), Beijing: Peking Univeristy Press (Bei Jing Da Xue Chu Ban She, 北京大学出版社), 2003, “Qing zhu xiejiao Zhuang” (请诛邪教状), Book of Budeyi (不得已), vol. 5, 386.

16 Minben (民本) and democracy A comparison of political ideas between China and the West

16.1 Introduction: the characteristics of political culture in China and the West respectively Because human beings face some common problems – such as the problem of the relationship between man and nature, the problem of satisfying physiological needs like eating, drinking, clothing, and housing, the problem of life and death, and so on – there exists the possibility for human beings to communicate with and understand one another, in spite of their differences in culture and thinking. Because human beings have to conquer difficulties in a natural environment, and from primordial times onwards their lives are full of war, the virtue of courage is generally praised among nations; and because care for others and help from others are without exception needed for human coexistence and growth, virtues like “moderation,” “humaneness,” and so on are universally extolled by great traditions. In addition, they are all connected with the moral and political ideals of fairness and justice. However, due to differences in natural environment and also in social structure among different nations, different systems of thought and cultural patterns are developed in dealing with the relationship between humans and nature, between humans and society, and with interpersonal relationships,1 cultures emphasize different things. For example, the Chinese comparatively respect the old more, whereas Westerners love children more; the Chinese comparatively give more attention to the cultivation and nourishment of mind and human nature, whereas Westerners put more emphasis on rationality and the pursuit of knowledge; the Chinese have a longstanding tradition of emphasizing minben, whereas Westerners emphasize democracy. In respect to moral and political philosophy, Chinese culture has highlighted individual self-awareness and individual responsibility, whereas Western culture emphasizes individual free will and individual rights. With regard to thought, from their beginnings in ancient Greece, Westerners have emphasized the method of definition, whereas from the pre-Qin period onwards the Chinese, except for the Mohists and the dialecticians during that period and the middle and late Warring States, are not interested in defining. In Plato’s Meno, Socrates discusses with Meno the question, “What is called ‘virtue’?” At first, Meno

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gives many examples concerning “virtue,” but Socrates is not satisfied with this. He explains that it is as if I have asked you to explain to me what a circle is, but you’ve only given me examples of circular things. In contrast, in the Analects Confucius explains to his disciples what ren (仁, humaneness) is, but never defines it. To different disciples he explains ren differently. On the level of more abstract philosophical thought, the Chinese pay more attention to the natural phenomena of emergence and change and to the virtue of maintaining vitality and spirit in the face of change. This is the framework in which the specific Chinese philosophy of yi (易, change) or dao (道, Way) is embedded. Westerners, however, tend to pursue something eternal and unmovable, whence so-called ontology, or the “theory of being,” is developed. There are many more contrasts, but here we leave them aside. At the beginning of the 20th century, Chen Duxiu (陈独秀, 1879–1942), Li Dazhao (李大钊, 1888–1927) and other scholars talked about the cultural differences between China and the West. Chen Duxiu thought the basic position for occidental nations was war, whereas for Asian nations it’s peace; the former nations are based on the individual, whereas the latter nations are based on the family and clan; the former emphasize rule by law and utilitarianism, whereas the latter emphasize feeling-oriented cohabitation and empty formality.2 After the publication of Chen Duxiu’s article, Li Dazhao wrote in response “Dongxi wenming genben zhi yidian” (东西文明根本之异点, “Fundamental Divergences between Eastern und Western Cultures”). Li Dazhao’s view is summarized as follows: “Eastern culture is characterized by passivity [quietness], whereas Western culture through activity,” for which the essential ground lies in the divergence in natural conditions. In accordance with the geographical differences between the North and the South, he divided human culture into “Northern culture” and “Southern culture”: Southern culture is Asian culture and Northern culture is occidental culture. The South receives more grace from the sun, being more vouchsafed by nature, and so its culture is characterized by harmony with nature and with other cultures of the same human species; the North receives less grace from the sun, being therefore less vouchsafed by nature, and so its culture is characterized by the struggle with nature and with other cultures of the same human kind.3 Before Chen Duxiu’s and Li Dazhao’s treatises, a Chinese scholar Gu Hongming (辜鸿铭, 1857–1928) wrote an English book, The Spirit of the Chinese People, which criticizes the disadvantages of Western culture, and approves and extols the religious and cultural spirit in the Chinese tradition. This book has exercised much influence in the West. In short, comparison between Eastern and Western cultures is one of the hot topics in world culture in the 20th century, about which there are many works and treatises both in the East and the West, which cannot be treated in detail here. This chapter will take traditional Chinese thought about minben and

232 Minben and democracy traditional Western thought about democracy as examples to work out the valuable traditions of political culture in China and the West respectively. This could serve as an intellectual reference point for the current political movement calling for democratization.

16.2 The idea of Minben in the Chinese tradition The two characters “minben” (民本) can be traced back to the Classic of History (Shangshu 尚书). In the chapter “Songs of the Five Sons” (wuzi zhi ge, 五子之歌) of this work it states: “It was the lesson of our great ancestor: the people should be cherished, and not looked down upon. The people are the root of a country; if the root is firm, the country is tranquil” (皇祖有训, 民可近, 不可下; 民惟邦本,本固邦宁). The two characters minben later become the condensed summary of the two sentences “The people are the root of a country; if the root is firm, the country is tranquil.” The word ben here means root and foundation. The idea of minben in the Classic of History also finds expression in its lesson for rulers of how to get the correct information to govern. The political thought to this time could of course not free itself from the theological thought of the “Mandate of Heaven” (tianming, 天命). But the authors of the Classic of History ingeniously transformed the ideology of the “Mandate of Heaven” to the abstract will of people, the result of which is enrichment of the content of the idea of minben. The influence the people exercised in political activities was strengthened, as is stated in the chapter “Counsels of Gao-yao” (Gaoyao mo, 皋陶谟): “Heaven hears and sees as our people hear and see; Heaven brightly approves and displays its terrors as our people brightly approve and would awe” (天聪明, 自我民聪明, 天明畏自我民明威) and in the chapter “Great Declaration Ⅱ” (taishi, 泰誓): “Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my people hear” (天视自我民视, 天听自我民听). Though the political thought was expressed in terms of the “Mandate of Heaven,” it was admitted that the seeing, hearing, and power of Heaven are the seeing, hearing, and power of the people. To put it another way: “the way of the Heaven is far away, but the way of man is at hand” (天道远, 人道迩). This is the early form of the idea of minben. The valuable ideas in the Classic of History are succeeded and embodied later on both by Confucians and Daoists in different ways. For example, the Confucian emphasis on and love of the people, and the Daoist grace and kindness to people all are the expressions of the idea of minben. Confucius said, “To rule a country of a thousand chariots, there must be reverent attention to business, and sincerity; economy in expenditure, and love for men; and employment of the people in the proper seasons” (导千乘之国: 敬事而信, 节用而爱人, 使民以时; The Analects, “Xue Er”). The talk here of “economy in expenditure, and love for men” and “employment of the people in the proper seasons” express respect for the role of people in political life. And the political principle stated by Laozi, “Dignity finds its [firm] root in its [previous] meanness, and what is lofty

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finds its stability in the lowness [from which it rises]” (贵以贱为本, 高以下为基), is also the abstract expression of the idea of minben. After the middle period of the Warring States, the idea of minben is richly developed by the school of Confucians, among which Mencius (Mengzi) and Xunzi can be seen as two Confucian representative figures who advocate of the idea of minben during the pre-Qin period. Mencius talks very much about the idea of minben. In the following only two classical passages will be introduced to demonstrate the idea of minben espoused by Mencius. In the Chapter “Wan Zhang Ⅰ” of Mengzi (孟子·万章上) there is such a dialogue: Wan Zhang said, “Was it the case that Yao gave the throne to Shun?” Mencius said, “No. The sovereign cannot give the throne to another.” “Yes – but Shun had the throne. Who gave it to him?” “Heaven gave it to him,” was the answer. “‘Heaven gave it to him’ – did Heaven confer its appointment on him with specific injunctions?” Mencius replied, “No. Heaven does not speak. It simply showed its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs.” “‘It showed its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs’ – how was this?” Mencius’s answer was, “The sovereign can present a man to Heaven, but he cannot make Heaven give that man the throne. A prince can present a man to the sovereign, but he cannot cause the sovereign to make that man a prince. A great official can present a man to his prince, but he cannot cause the prince to make that man a great official. Yao presented Shun to Heaven, and Heaven accepted him. He presented him to the people, and the people accepted him. Therefore I say, ‘Heaven does not speak. It simply indicated its will by his personal conduct and his conduct of affairs.’” Zhang said, “I presume to ask how it was that Yao presented Shun to Heaven, and Heaven accepted him; and that he exhibited him to the people, and the people accepted him.” Mencius replied, “He caused him to preside over the sacrifices, and all the spirits were well pleased with them; thus Heaven accepted him. He caused him to preside over the conduct of affairs, and affairs were well administered, so that the people reposed under him; thus the people accepted him. Heaven gave the throne to him. The people gave it to him. Therefore I said, ‘The sovereign cannot give the throne to another.’ Shun assisted Yao in the government for twenty and eight years – this was more than man could have done, and was from Heaven. After the death of Yao, when the three years’ mourning was completed, Shun withdrew from the son of Yao to south of the South river. The princes of the kingdom, however, repairing to court, went not to the son of Yao, but they went to Shun. Litigants went not to the son of Yao, but they went to Shun. Singers sang not of the son of Yao, but they sang of Shun. Therefore I said, ‘Heaven gave him the throne.’ It was after these things that he went to the Middle Kingdom, and occupied the seat of the Son of Heaven. If he had, before

234 Minben and democracy these things, taken up his residence in the palace of Yao, and had applied pressure to the son of Yao, it would have been an act of usurpation, and not the gift of Heaven. This sentiment is expressed in the words of the Great Declaration: ‘Heaven sees accordingly as my people see; Heaven hears accordingly as my people hear.’”4 This conversation touches on the problem concerning the transmission of power of the Son of Heaven (sovereign). What Mencius means is the importance of the agreement of the people in the transmission of state power. Though it was an idealistic saying, the germ-like early form of the modern theory of contract is implied in it. Another more classical citation from Mencius embodies also the idea of minben. Mencius said: The people are the most important element in a nation; the spirits of the land and grain are the next; the sovereign is the lightest. Therefore, to gain the peasantry is the way to become sovereign; to gain the sovereign is the way to become a prince of a State; to gain the prince of a State is the way to become a great official. When a prince endangers the altars of the spirits of the land and grain, he is changed, and another appointed in his place. When the sacrificial victims have been perfect, the millet in its vessels all pure, and the sacrifices offered in their proper seasons, if yet there ensue drought, or the waters overflow, the spirits of the land and grain are changed, and others appointed in their place.5 During the period of the Warring States another representative of Confucianism Xunzi (荀子) specifically talked also about the idea of minben. He said, “not for the sake of ruler has Heaven given birth to the people, and just for the sake of the people is a ruler supported by Heaven.”6 Moreover, from the perspective of the rectification of names, he expounded the duty of a state-ruler by saying, for what is a state-ruler? [Its meaning] lies in organizing the people. What is the significance that a state-ruler is able to gather together the people? It is because in this way he can nourish the people better. … If it is so, all people under Heaven assemble around him, which is called the ability to gather together.7 Although having criticized Mencius regarding the issue of human nature, he, in agreement with Mencius, in a similar way admitted the right of people to overthrow a tyrant ruler. He thought, if a ruler could not take care of people and caused inequality in the distribution of social wealth, then revolution would take place: an official may kill his ruler, a man in a lower position may murder one in an upper position, or someone betray his state-city and behave without

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loyalty and not be ready to die out of duty, and so on; this is the necessary consequence induced by the ruler himself and nothing else.8 The famous view “water can not only float a ship but also overturn it” (水能载舟, 亦能覆舟) comes from him too, which later on exercised great influence on rulercentered monarchial society. After the Han Dynasty the idea of minben was more intensively expounded by some progressive thinkers; for example, the great thinker Jia Yi (贾谊) says: As regards political government the people are without exception the root. A country sees them as the root, a ruler sees them as the root, and officials see them as the root. Hence, the safety and risk of a country depend on the people, the dignity and disrespect of a ruler depend on the people, and the nobleness and meanness of an official depend on the people. Because of this, the people are without exception the root. [And] people are the root of feudal vassals, education is the root of governance, and Dao is the root of education.”9 Jia Yi’s idea of minben was not an empty slogan. On the one hand, it was embodied in its connection with the examination of the achievement and loyalty of an official; for example, Jia Yi said, the people are possessed by a state-ruler, whose officials must help govern them. So for an official of a ruler, his achievement lies in making people rich and happy and his guilt lies in making people poor and suffering. Hence, if a ruler knows which officials are capable and excellent, he is intelligent; if an official loves the people, he is loyal. On the other hand, it was embodied in the evaluation of historical events; for example, he said, Zhou [of the Shang Dynasty] called himself the King of the Heaven, and Jie [of the Xia Dynasty] called himself the Son of the Heaven. After they had perished, people scolded them. As seen from this, position is not enough to make one noble, and title is not enough to make one glorious. So the dignity of a gentleman can be called dignity only if the common people dignify him; the wealth of a gentleman can be called wealth only if the common people are happy about it.10 Very earnestly, Jia Yi admonished the rulers: “the people are the majority”; “they are powerful and cannot be conquered”; “from the earliest times to today, the people, sooner or later, inevitably defeat the one who is the enemy of the people”; “so disaster and grace do not depend on Heaven, but on the people. The people are of such importance; their will must be respected.”11

236 Minben and democracy Jia Yi’s idea of minben also relates to questions on how rulers should pay attention to the will of the people and how they should choose officials, which can be seen as a concrete extension of the thought “Heaven sees as my people see; Heaven hears as my people hear” in the Classic of History, Jia Yi said, Although the people are foolish, a wise ruler must let them participate in the selection of officials. Therefore, if people praise someone, a wise ruler will examine it and choose this person by seeing the people come to him; if people grumble about him, a wise ruler will examine it and discard this person by seeing the people complain about it. Hence, a king makes no mistake by choosing an official, because he will necessarily let people participate and be accorded with them. So the people are an official’s measure. An official is measured by the people and the result can be followed.12 Dong Zhongshu (董仲舒), another great politician and thinker of the Han Dynasty, said also, not for a king has Heaven given birth to the people; but for the people has Heaven set up a king. If he has enough virtue to bring the people safety and happiness, Heaven supports him; if he is so evil to cause disaster and hurt to the people, Heaven will take his throne back; … hence, as the Xia Dynasty lost its way, [the king of] the Yin Dynasty carried out a punitive expedition; as the Yin Dynasty lost its way, [the king of] the Zhou Dynasty carried out a punitive expedition; as the Zhou Dynasty lost its way, [the king of] the Qin Dynasty carried out a punitive expedition; as the Qin Dynasty lost its way, [the king of] the Han Dynasty carried out a punitive expedition; that the one who is in line with the Dao carries out a punitive expedition against the one who has lost his way is the heavenly principle.13 In addition, he thinks that a king receives the mandate from Heaven and his heavenly duty is to lead the people to develop according to the good; if his heavenly duty could not be fulfilled, Heaven would show some omen and even send out punishments in serious cases, which is an important component of his theory on the correspondence between Heaven and man. He said, Heaven has given birth to the people, who are endowed with a good nature but cannot become good, and for this reason set up a king to bring them the good. This is the will of Heaven. The people who are endowed with a nature that is not yet good will alternatively receive teachings from the king to accomplish nature. A king is the one whose task is, in accordance with the will of Heaven, to help the people accomplish their nature.14

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Liu Zhou (刘昼) of the Northern Qi Dynasty, which is a part of the period of the Southern and Northern Dynasties, also produced discourses on the idea of minben. He said, food and clothes are the root of the people, the people are the root of a country. The people are as dependent on food and clothes as fish on water, a country is as dependent on the people as a person on feet. A fish cannot live without water; a person cannot walk without feet, a country cannot be regulated without support from the people. The kings in ancient times comprehended this point and strived therefore to afford the people with food and clothes.15 Metaphorically Liu Zhou regards the people as “the feet of a country.” If the people of a country are damaged, this country surely falls into disaster: Heaven has given birth to myriad people and set up a ruler for them. So a ruler functions like the Heaven of the people. Heaven’s nourishment of things is based on Yin and Yang; a ruler’s transformation of the people is based on politics and education. Therefore, if summer and winter do not come in time, there will be disease and plague, and if the wind and the rain do not appear in time, there will be a poor harvest and hunger. Sentence and punishment are like the summer and the winter of the people, and education and command are like the wind and the rain of the people. If sentence and punishment are not carried out in time, the people will be hurt; if education and command are not moderated, the social community will be spoiled. Hence, in the water that is muddy there are no fish flexing their tails, on earth that is barren grow no lush plants, under governance that is too chaotic there are no happy people. To the people, political governance is like a string instrument, whose strings of different pitches, when played, must be harmoniously coordinated. Generally speaking, cold feet hurt the heart, and exhausted people hurt the country; but warm feet calm down the heart, and comfortable people bring the country peace. Therefore, those who are good at governing see benevolence, not harsh cruelty, as the root and the priority. They lessen sentences and punishments in order to safeguard the life of the people, reduce compulsory work in order to let the people have a rest, decrease land tax in order not to harm the wealth of the people, and do not ignore the right time for agriculture so that the people can harvest well. In this way people’s families have enough to live, the country becomes wealthy, and peace under Heaven will be accomplished. The relationship of the people to their ruler is like that of a person to his parents. It is unheard of that parents are rich and their children are poor, or the parents are poor and their children are rich. So the wealth and satisfaction of the people matter not only for the people themselves, but also for the country; and poverty and dissatisfaction matter not only for the people

238 Minben and democracy themselves, but also for the country. Because of this, You Ruo (有若) says, “if the people have enough, how is it possible that the ruler doesn’t have enough? If the people don’t have enough, how is it possible that the ruler has enough?” This is just what I mean.16 In the Lun lianghe ji huaixi lihai zhuang (论两河及淮西利害状) the great politician Lu Zhi (陆贽) of the Tang Dynasty said, people are the root of a country; wealth is the heart of the people; war is the worm of wealth. Heart injury results in the injury of root, and root injury results in the withering of boughs and branches, which must lead to uprooting.17 In addition, he said, I, as an official, have heard that the establishment of the root of a country lies in getting [the support of] the people; to get [the support of] the people lies in feeling the emotion [of the people]. So, Confucius says, “the feeling mind of the people is the field of sage-kings”; this means that from it the way of governance is originated … the feeling mind is either free-flowing or blocked, accordingly there appears either peace or stagnation; the feeling mind is either warm-hearted or cold and ruthless, accordingly there appears either decrease or increase [concerning governance] … therefore in ancient times, the sages and kings, whose position is above the common people, in their heart-mind had to follow the heart-mind of [the people] under Heaven, and did not dare to compel the people under Heaven to satisfy his personal desires. He said, moreover, the one, as the ruler of the people under Heaven, must regard the heartmind of the people under Heaven as his own, and not be confined to his own personal one, and regard the ears and eyes of the people under Heaven as his own, and not be confined to his own personal ones. In this way he can penetrate the will of the people under Heaven and completely empathize with the feeling of the people under Heaven. The love and hate of the one who regards the heart-mind of the people under Heaven as his own are the love and hate of the people under Heaven; in this way, his hate cannot be wrong, and his love cannot go astray; then how is it still possible for him to be confined to his own private mind and be subject to his own personal disposition? The hearing and seeing of the one who regards the ears and eyes of the people under Heaven as his own, are the hearing and seeing of the people under Heaven; in this way he can clearly see everything and clearly hear everything, how is it still possible for him to be confined to his own private ears and eyes and to incur deceit and confusion? The appeal to the heart-mind and the use of the ears and eyes [of others]

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are common to Shun (舜) and Zhou (纣). But Shun aimed to uncover his faults so that he could desire the same as the people under Heaven together and not be confined to his own private preference … whereas Zhou aimed to expose the faults of others so that he did fall in line with the people under Heaven but was trapped in his own private preference.18 Lu Zhi thinks, therefore, that for a ruler the main task in politics is to face the needs of the people, to worry about what the people worry about. He said, I as an official must say that the urgent task nowadays lies in understanding the feeling-based mind of the people through sympathetic examination. … From the old times to today there has been no such a situation that one whose love and hate are identical with the people, the people don’t want to come to be with him. … For an emperor like you, how can you not bring the family-like country to peace in this way that you sympathetically examine the feeling-based mind of the people in order to love and hate with them together? This is what is urgent at present.19 From the late Tang to the period of the Five Dynasties Chinese society fell into disunity and chaos, and the idea of minben was also in an oppressed state. From the Song Dynasty through the Yuan Dynasty to the Ming Dynasty, the idea of minben was not well developed either. During the period of the Northern and Southern Song war the country was militarily weak, but philosophy and arts underwent very great development. Against this background Wang Anshi’s (王安石) political reform, being based on the traditional idea of minben, was an experimenal political practice. The well-known saying “Being worried before the people under Heaven’s being worried, being happy after the people under Heaven’s being happy” (先天下之忧而忧, 后天下之乐而乐) of Fan Zhongyan (范仲淹) is in reality also an embodiment of the idea of minben by traditional scholar officials. When discussing questions on the relationship between the public and the private, and between the righteous and the profitable among the scholars from the School of Cheng-Zhu (Study of Principle, 程朱理学) and from the School of Lu-Wang (Study of Mind, 陆王心学), the idea of minben was touched on on different levels, which will not be listed here. During the period from the late Ming to the early Qing Dynasty the idea of minben underwent impressive development. Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲), Gu Yanwu (顾炎武), Wang Fuzhi (王夫之), Tang Zhen (唐甄), and so on all excellently expounded the idea of minben. Some of their thoughts very closely approached the spirit of modern democracy. Huang Zongxi, for example, said, “the political peace und unrest of the world under Heaven has little to do with the rise and fall of one emperor family, but means the happiness and misery of the people.”20 He talks about the political idea that “the people under Heaven are the host, and the emperor is the guest,” which is an intensification and concretization of the idea of the pre-Qin period. He advocated learning from the Three Dynasties in ancient times so that “the wealth under Heaven could be stored under Heaven”:

240 Minben and democracy valuable materials in mountains and rivers should not be used up, and the power [of an emperor] to reward and punish should undoubtedly be distributed [among other administrative officials]; the noble should not be limited to the imperial household, and the lowly should not mean the common people in the wilderness.21 He argued, moreover, for the substitution of “the law for the people under Heaven” (tianxia zhi fa, 天下之法) for “the law of one sole family” (yijia zhi fa, 一家之法), firmly stressing the equality of the emperor and officials and their governance together, according to the division of labor and cooperation, of the people under Heaven, which belongs to the conception of modern administration. In addition, he advocated the transformation of the traditional school into an organization functioning like a parliament, so that not only the emperor high above but county magistrates down below could all regularly listen to political discussions by advanced scholars in order to improve the administration. These ideas of minben don’t seem to be limited to traditional content, and are very similar to the modern concept of democracy. Therefore, some scholars call the idea of minben during the period from the late Ming to the early Qing Dynasty the “new minben.”22 Similar to Huang Zongxi, Wang Fuzu also praised the political ideal “to see the political state [the world under Heaven] as public wealth [gong tianxia, 公天下]”. He advocated the humanistic political principle that the “life and death of the people” must be prior to the “rise and fall of one imperial family.” With this humanistic principle he critically investigated concrete history. In his commentary on the historic event, for instance, of the imperial power transfer during the Wei–Jin period Wang Fuzhi, being not confined to the traditional pedantic Confucian view of the relationship between a ruler and his ministers and seeing this event as a revolt, affirmed the peaceful power transfer from the perspective of respecting the life of the people. He said, the world under Heaven is not a private matter of one family. The time, whether long or short, of the existence of a political state is somewhat determinate. If, in the face of the necessary change of the imperial family, there is no disaster as in the situation where blood flows in the fields, then power should just be transferred to others and the people can be freed from the disease-like unrest. As in the case of the power transfer from the Wei to the Jin Dynasty, which, despite the rebellion in the upper classes, maintained the people in peace, was it not allowable? As seen from this point, how could we say that the kings of the Three Dynasties, who set up assisting ministers and vassals in order to ensure the longevity of the state lest it be overthrown, had private desires?23 In his concrete criticism of the monarchical politics in the Qin and Song Dynasties he actually criticized traditional monarchism in general, and gave intensive expression to his democratic ideal. He said,

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the sages have saved the world under Heaven [which is held fast through heavenly forces in terms of the cosmological imagination in ancient China] from disasters by strongly seizing the reins and stabilizing its feet, and they necessarily negated [the political measures taken by] the lonely Qin and the simple Song Dynasties in order to keep the reign alive. The world under Heaven is regarded as a holy thing by them, but they could not be attached to some ideology and privatize it. … That which Heaven and Earth have given birth to includes human beings’ differently talented and rich resources, which are enough to nourish and vitalize the body and its defense system of the organic world. The sages have brought order to the world by subordinating it to administrative management; therefore, though they have the world under Heaven as public wealth, their private interest was also naturally integrated, and though they behaved passively by following the needs of the people under Heaven, they also made use of the world under Heaven. Hence, it’s said, “Heaven doesn’t tendentiously cover, the Earth doesn’t tendentiously carry, and a king is not so selfish as to control the world by himself alone.” So it is. Now if a king desires to manage [the world under Heaven], he had better do it through the division of administrative and political labor and through the system of enfeoffment to develop and utilize it.24 Tang Zhen (唐甄), the thinker of the early Qing Dynasty, also heavily criticized the monarchy by saying that “all emperors since the Qin Dynasty have been thieves.” In Tang Zhen’s eyes, the essential end of politics lies in the sustenance of the people. He said, those outstanding emperors of ancient times promoted excellent persons in order to bring order to governance, assessed their achievements to promote excellent persons, sustained the people to assess their achievements, and afforded enough food to sustain the people. There are a hundred kinds of positions which imply a hundred kinds of duties, but they all are centered on the sustenance of the people.25 Tang Zhen definitely opposed the view that “it is difficult to govern the people,” and advocated the well-known theory of “the management of officials.” He said, the difficulty in governing the world under Heaven is thought to be the difficulty of governing the people. They don’t know that the difficulty in governing has nothing to do with the people, but has much to do with the officials. Generally speaking, what the common people desire, if they are not insane, is to get that which pleases them and to avoid that which brings suffering. When have they ever broken the laws legislated by the government above and troubled it? The political theoreticians could not see the grounds, thinking that laws and orders cannot be carried out because of the

242 Minben and democracy harmful nature of the people. They freed the officials from responsibility and blamed the people. That’s why it is difficult to talk with them about administration.26 Besides these thinkers, many artists and thinkers such as Zheng Banqiao (郑板桥), Dai Zhen (戴震), Yuan Mei (袁枚), and so on in the Qing Dynasty have rich thoughts on minben, which will not be listed here. For details please see Chapter 4 in Part I of this book, “Striving for Democracy: Confucian Political Philosophy in the Ming and Qing Dynasties.”

16.3 The idea of democracy in the Western tradition The idea of democracy and its form of government has undergone a long history in the West. As early as in ancient Greece there were discourses on the democratic political system, for example, in the famous “Pericles’ Funeral Oration,” Pericles says: “Its [Athens’] administration favours the many instead of the few; this is why it is called a democracy.”27 The English word “democracy” has its origin in ancient Greek demokratia and was introduced into English through its French variant démocratie. It consists of two parts: demos and cratos. Demos means the people living on the land, which corresponds to the traditional Chinese phrase qiumin (丘民), and cratos denotes governance or reign. According to the general definition in dictionaries, the idea of democracy in the Western political tradition refers to a form of governance in which the majority participates in ruling, so it is contrasted with such forms of governance as aristocracy, oligarchy, and monarchy. The ideal form of democratic governance requires that all citizens should take part in the decisions of governmental policy. Such a pure form of democracy was carried out only for a short time in ancient Greece. However, women and slaves were excluded according to this form of democratic governance. The modern form of democratic governance now in question is representative democracy, which is carried out through representatives who are selected by the people, directly or indirectly, for a certain time. The way to govern in the form of representative democracy is debate and persuasion, not violence. Decisions are made on the basis of the majority of affirmative votes, the policy resulting from which reflects, to some degree, the will or interests of the people. In order to avoid excessive concentration of power, the governmental functions such as legislation, administration, and jurisdiction are divided. The values and governing principles that sustain the modern form of democratic governance are freedom and equality, which are also called the ideals of modern democracy. According to the principle of freedom, an individual must choose for himself, and it should not be allowed that others choose for him or compel him to accept the choice made by others. The principle of equality requires that all citizens equally have the right to choose officials who are in charge of governance and to take part in an election to be an official.

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In ideal democratic governance the rights of citizens are legislated, which include the following freedoms: freedom of speech, freedom of press, freedom of association, freedom of peaceful assembly, and freedom from unreasonable search and seizure. Nowadays most people including political theorists in the West believe that representative democracy can safeguard the freedom and rights of citizens to the greatest degree and reduce the abuse of political power as much as possible. Others think that, in view of irresistible pressure from the power of wealth, the indifference of more and more people towards politics, conservatism in the mind of many people, and the mutual enmity and corruption among the people, the subsistence of the authentic form of democratic system is under threat.28 Therefore, in the present era the theoretical form of deliberative democracy appeared in the West. The idea and its form of governance in the West have experienced a process of development in political practice. In ancient Greece there was a form of democratic governance for a short time, which was very different from its modern form. For in ancient Greece politics was mainly limited to city-states where only freemen were counted as citizens; but ‘metics’ (people not born in Athens) and slaves were not seen as equal “persons,” so they had no political rights. Therefore, democratic politics in ancient Greece was actually a form of governance by the majority of freemen, but not the politics based on the citizen in the modern sense. What’s more, at the time of Plato (ca. 4th century BCE), because of political corruption, Socrates, the teacher of Plato, was executed in the democratic system. For this reason Plato himself didn’t like democracy. In his Republic he opined that for the sake of the best politics a state should be governed by a philosopher-king who has grasped the truth. For governing a state is like a man steering a great ship. Who is the ablest captain? Of course the one who not only knows how to steer but also is possessed of the virtue to serve the people. Hence, a king must be someone who knows well how to govern a country and has the virtue of righteousness, absolutely not an ordinary person from among the masses. A country could not be governed by the majority either. This is the typical conception of governance by expertise, which is very similar to the idea of governance by the sages and the excellent in ancient China. In fact, democracy was only one of the four forms of governance in ancient Greece. The characteristics of democracy were much discussed by Aristotle, the disciple of Plato; for example, he said: Now the foundation of a democratic state is liberty, and people have been accustomed to say this as if here only liberty was to be found; for they affirm that this is the end proposed by every democracy. But one part of liberty is to govern and be governed alternately; for, according to democratic justice, equality is measured by numbers, and not by worth: and this being just, it is necessary that the supreme power should be vested in the people at large; and that what the majority determine should be final: so

244 Minben and democracy that in a democracy the poor ought to have more power than the rich, as being the greater number; for this is one mark of liberty which all framers of a democracy lay down as a criterion of that state; another is, to live as everyone likes; for this, they say, is a right which liberty gives, since he is a slave who must live as he likes not. This, then, is another criterion of a democracy. Hence arises the claim to be under no command whatsoever to any one, upon any account, any otherwise than by rotation, and that just as far only as that person is, in his turn, under his also. This also is conducive to that equality which liberty demands.29 Aristotle summarized the properties of democracy with regard to the following five aspects. First, in respect of administration the characteristic of a democratic state is itself also fivefold: (1) all the magistrates should be chosen out of all the people, and (2) all to command each, and each in his turn all; (3) all the magistrates should be chosen by lot, except to those offices only which required some particular knowledge and skill; (4) no census, or a very small one, should be required to qualify a man for any office; (5) none should be in the same employment twice, or very few, and very seldom, except in the army, and all their appointments should be limited to a very short time, or at least as far as possible. Second, in respect of jurisdiction the whole community should be qualified to judge in all causes whatsoever, let the object be ever so extensive, ever so interesting, or of ever so high a nature, such as, for example, public affairs as well as private contracts. Third, in respect of the rules in discussing official business the supreme power should be in the public assembly, by which all political affairs, or at least military actions, are decided. In contrast to this, no magistrate should be allowed any discretionary power but in a few instances. Fourth, according to the ideal of democratic politics, there should, if possible, be a fund to pay all the citizens who have any share in the management of public affairs, either as members of the assembly, judges, or magistrates; but if this cannot be done, at least the magistrates, the judges, the senators, and members of the supreme assembly, and also those officers who are obliged to eat at a common table ought to be paid.30 Fifth, regarding the term of office “no office should be for life; and, if any such should remain after the government has been long changed into a democracy, they should endeavour by degrees to diminish the power; and also elect by lot instead of vote.”31 In accordance with his philosophical view which is a doctrine of the mean and his preference for governance by the middle class in politics, democracy was not so appreciated by Aristotle. Because of this his description of the classical democratic state in ancient Greece was not objective and trustworthy.

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Through his criticism we could only get a rough sketch of the views on democracy by thinkers in ancient Greece. In the ancient Roman Empire and in the long Middle Ages there was no democracy, nor much discussion about it. Generally, democracy and democratic thoughts were regarded as something negative at that time. Cicero (1st century CE) openly opposed democracy and inclined towards a political form that synthesized the advantages of monarchy, aristocracy, and democracy. He expressed his distrust in democracy, by saying, when everything is done by the people itself, no matter how just and moderate it may be, that every equality is itself inequitable, in that it recognizes no degree of status. … the … people’s control of all things, to look on further, when it turned into the madness and license of a mob, was disastrous to the people itself.32 Aquinas (13th century) was also against democracy, thinking that in democracy the majority of the common people utilize the “power of the mass” to govern or oppress the rich. The mass as a whole is like a tyrant. Even at the time of the French Revolution, the conservative Edmund Burke said in the book Reflections on the Revolution in France, “A perfect democracy is, therefore, the most shameless thing in the world,” which is of course a critical claim directed at the bloody tyranny of Robespierre. These thinkers who are critical of democracy as mentioned above all had a definite aristocratic standpoint to scold the governance of the mass. However, reflection on the “tyranny of the mass” greatly inspired democracy to further think over the interests and rights of the minority. The political thinker John Stuart Mill in his On Liberty especially stressed the rights of the minority, which can be seen a response to the aforementioned political thoughts. Briefly, democratic ideas since the 17th century were the outcome of the political and spiritual movement by the new capitalists in opposition to the old aristocratic class. Politically they set out from the abstract capitalist values of individual rights, freedom, and equality, and so on, and built up a political, legislative form and social ideology that was suitable to the development of capitalist economics. That ideas of democracy from the 17th century were capitalistic should not be forgotten. Opinions regarding the form of democracy were also diverse. Rousseau (1712–1778), the French thinker of the Enlightenment, thought of a form of democracy with the characteristics of monarchy. He said, the sovereign may … commit the charge of government to the whole people, or to the greater part of the people, in such a way that there may be citizens who are magistrates rather than simple citizens. We call this form of government a democracy.33 But he definitely said, too, that “in general, democratic government is suitable to small states, aristocracy to those of moderate size, and monarchy to large

246 Minben and democracy ones.”34 He did not see the democratic government that he anticipated as the universally valid form of government. This point is usually ignored the scholars who speak of Rousseau’s thought on democracy. The democracy conceived by the English thinker Locke represented the typical form of democracy in later times. His ideal of democracy is based on such a hypothesis: Men being … all free, equal, and independent, no one can be put out of this estate, and subjected to the political power of another, without his own consent. The only way whereby any one divests himself of his natural liberty, and puts on the bonds of civil society, is by agreeing with other men to join and unite into a community, for their comfortable, safe, and peaceable living one amongst another, in a secure enjoyment of their properties, and a greater security against any, that are not of it. This any number of men may do, because it injures not the freedom of the rest; they are left as they were in the liberty of the state of nature. When a number of men are so consented to make one community of government they are thereby presently incorporated, and make one body politic, wherein the majority have a right to act and conclude the rest.35 After a country is constituted on the basis of free people, the free people entrust some of them as their representatives to take over political power. In this way, representative democracy is born, as Locke said: The majority having, … upon men’s first uniting into society, the whole power of the community naturally in them, may employ all that power in making laws for the community from time to time, and executing those laws by officers of their own appointing; and then the form of the government is a perfect democracy.36 According to the discussion above, the democratic ideal of Rousseau is a form of direct democracy that is only fitting for small lands; the representative democracy of Locke is not dependent on population size and thus can be carried out in both small and large countries. The capitalist form of democracy after the 17th century is basically in accordance with Locke. After him many other capitalist theoreticians and politicians have continually enriched and complemented the discourse of Locke. Therefore, representative democracy became the main form of capitalist democracy. The discourse on democracy by Alexis de Tocqueville, the famous French politician and thinker of the 19th century who comparatively very early conducted research into American democracy, can be regarded as the third paradigm of democracy. He thinks that “the principle of the people’s sovereignty” that was worked out by European thinkers in the 18th century was completely carried out in practice in the United States in the 1770s. This principle was thus “the common basis of all laws” and made it possible that the population, land, and property of this country

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have constantly increased. It led then to the result that during that period America “is found to have been … not only the most prosperous, but the most stable, of all nations of the earth.” In America “the republic there has not been the assailant, but the guardian, of all vested rights; the property of individuals has had better guarantees there than in any other country of the world; anarchy has there been as unknown as despotism.” He thinks that France can have its own specific system of democracy, which must not be the same as in America. But the basic principles on which the American constitution rests are shared by all forms of republic: those principles of order, of the balance of powers, of true liberty, of deep and sincere respect for right, are indispensable to all republics; they ought to be common to all; and it may be said beforehand that wherever they are not found, the republic will soon have ceased to exist.37 Undeniably, Tocqueville to some extent beautified American politics at that time, because in the second half of the 18th century in the United States the problem of slavery was not well resolved, the treatment of black people was terrible, the living conditions of Native Americans were more miserable. The American democracy described by Tocqueville was merely for white people, the capitalists of the middle classes who were in rapid development. Nevertheless, his summary of the spirit and principles implied in the American democratic society deserves our attention. Besides the five basic principles given above, Tocqueville still recognized that democracy and the democratic spirit as a faith in culture needs to be cultivated and guided by the elites in the society, so that its disadvantages can be avoided and its advantages can be encouraged and nourished. For the France of his generation, according to him, the first of the duties that are at this time imposed upon those who direct our affairs is to educate democracy, to reawaken, if possible, its religious beliefs; to purify its morals; to mold its actions; to substitute a knowledge of statecraft for its inexperience, and an awareness of its true interest for its blind instincts, to adapt its government to time and place, and to modify it according to men and to conditions.38 By recalling the French Revolution and summarizing what should be learned from the revolutionary experience, he said, the heads of state have made no preparation for it, and it has advanced without their consent or without their knowledge. The most powerful, the most intelligent, and the most moral classes of the nation have never attempted to control it in order to guide it. Democracy has consequently been abandoned to its wild instincts, and it has grown up like those children who have no parental guidance, who receive their education in the public streets, and who are acquainted only with the vices and wretchedness of society. Its existence was seemingly unknown when suddenly it acquired supreme power. All then servilely

248 Minben and democracy submitted to its caprices; it was worshipped as the idol of strength. … The result has been that the democratic revolution has taken place in the body of society without that concomitant change in the laws, ideas, customs, and morals which was necessary to render such a revolution beneficial. Thus we have a democracy without anything to lessen its vices and bring out its natural advantages; and although we already perceive the evils it brings, we are ignorant of the benefits it may confer.39 Tocqueville very profoundly pointed out that “illegitimate violence and oppressive power” are the ultimate causes that have brought forth evils among the people. He said, men are not corrupted by the exercise of power or debased by the habit of obedience, but by the exercise of a power which they believe to be illegitimate, and by obedience to a rule which they consider to be usurped and oppressive.40 In terms of the differences between society in the United Sates and that of the European continent observed by him he gave the following description: But the scene is now changed. Gradually the distinctions of rank are done away with; the barriers that once severed mankind are falling; property is divided, power is shared by many, the light of intelligence spreads, and the capacities of all classes tend towards equality. Society becomes democratic, and the empire of democracy is slowly and peaceably introduced into institutions and customs.41 And the ideal democratic society was by Tocqueville so conceived: I can conceive of a society in which all men would feel an equal love and respect for the laws of which they consider themselves the authors; in which the authority of the government would be respected as necessary, and not divine; and in which the loyalty of the subject to the chief magistrate would not be a passion, but a quiet and rational persuasion. With every individual in the possession of rights which he is sure to retain, a kind of manly confidence and reciprocal courtesy would arise between all classes, removed alike from pride and servility. In such a society, the people, well acquainted with their own true interests, would understand that, in order to profit from the advantages of the state, it is necessary to satisfy its requirements. The voluntary association of the citizens might then take the place of the individual authority of the nobles, and the community would be protected from tyranny and license.42

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In a democratic state thus constituted, Tocqueville firmly believes society would not be stationary. But the impulses of the social body might there be regulated and made progressive. If there were less splendor than in an aristocracy, misery would also be less prevalent; the pleasures of enjoyment might be less excessive, but those of comfort would be more general; the sciences might be less perfectly cultivated, but ignorance would be less common; the ardor of the feelings would be constrained, and the habits of the nation softened; there would be more vices and fewer crimes.43 In short, a democratic nation as understood by Tocqueville is in such a state that the people enjoy well-being and society is regulated in an orderly fashion. And the nation, taken as a whole, will be less brilliant, less glorious, and perhaps less strong; but the majority of the citizens will enjoy a greater degree of prosperity, and the people will remain peaceable, not because they despair of a change for the better, but because they are conscious that they are well off already.44 The democratic society as described by Tocqueville is in some respects similar to the Chinese ideal of “a society of a comparatively well-off level” (xiaokang, 小康), in which the psychological satisfaction is again somehow similar to the Daoist longing for a small territory and population. After the two World Wars, especially from the middle of the 20th century, many totalitarian countries also boasted that their countries were democratic, which has aroused many doubts with regard to democratic society. In spite of the diversity of views on democracy, it absolutely cannot be just an empty slogan. In the 20th century, parallel to the unfolding of democratic practice, generally acknowledged democracy must be possessed of at least three main characteristics:45 first, election of the head of state must regularly take place, the result of which can substantially affect the policies and the status of the makers of the old policies; second, elections must be all-embracing, namely, everyone has the vote directly to elect; third, the right of citizens freely to vote must be seriously protected in the process of elections. The lack of any one of these three should not be accepted. As for the first point, in a true election there must be competitors; it is a competition between people with different views. Consequently, the result of an election will change the policies and the status of the makers of the old policies. The second point stresses that the state cannot stop citizens who are of lawful age from voting for any reason regarding gender or nationality. The third point aims to stop infraction of the rights of minorities. In respect of citizens’ religious faith, their freedom of speech, and their choice of way of life, democracy should intervene, so the tragedy of Socrates’ death won’t happen again.

250 Minben and democracy A rich variety of democratic ideas have emerged in the contemporary West. The healthy development of democracy can be seen in phenomena such as the emergence of procedural democracy, and so on, which is based on representative democracy. And regarding the relation between democracy and freedom, between democracy and nomocracy there are many new proposals. However, the checks and balances on the diverse forces must ultimately go back to the interests and rights of the majority which are still the quintessential concern of modern democracy, just as Gu Su says, democracy is eternally appealing; originally it meant rule by the majority, but it absolutely does not refer to the arbitrariness of the majority. Rule by law and the balance of political forces are the elements of its function in regulating. It cannot merely depend on a small number of judges and legislators. Rule by a few elites without democratic supervision is no different from despotism, thus the supervisor and judge of the small number of elites are still the majority of the people. That means between the majority of the people and the minority of the elites there must also be a balanced relationship which is embodied as the unity of the democracy and nomocracy in politics.46 In the book Models of Democracy, the famous contemporary political philosopher David Held carefully analyzed the various forms of democracy in Western society from ancient times to the present. According to him classical democracy is of four sorts: classical democracy, republicanism, liberal democracy, and Marxist direct democracy. The variants of democracy from the 20th century are fourfold: competitive elitism, pluralism, the democracy of legitimatization, and the democracy of participation.47 The details concerning the various models of democracy in this book will be omitted here. Reference to the book gives us at least an impression of the complexity of the issue of “democracy,” which cannot be naively understood as it is in our everyday talk about administration: matters being arranged simply in light of majority votes.

16.4 Differences and similarities between minben and democracy and their interconnection Concerning the differences and similarities between minben and democracy and the interconnection between the two, Jin Yaoji (金耀基) gives a concise explanation. He thinks, in Chinese history there were ideas of minben, but not of democracy. If Lincoln’s claim ‘of the people, by the people, for the people’ can be translated as the minyou [民有], minzhi [民制], and minxiang [民享] that were advocated by Sun Yat-sen [孙中山] in his the doctrine of the ‘Three People’ [sanmin zhuyi, 三民主义], minzhi [by the people] was not an idea from our country, it was a product of the West.

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But the ideas of “of the people” and “for the people” are basically implied in the spirit of minben of our nation. Minben and democracy are similar, but cannot be identified; there are connections between them, but not the same matter. In the idea of minben the spirit of ‘by the people’ is not necessarily contained, but it is basis of democracy. It seems that the difference is not so big, but the consequence is certainly differentiated.48 Jin also thinks that between minben and democracy there is an inner consequential relation. He sees Sun Yat-sen’s doctrine of the “Three People” as an embodiment of the traditional Chinese idea of minben, claiming that from the idea of minben democracy may be developed, and in this idea “the democratic” is implied. He said, generally, the three spiritual points of democracy are already implied and confirmed in the idea of minben. First, the people are the most important subject of a country; this is brought to light in such expressions as ‘the people are more important the ruler,’ ‘the ruler is the guest while the people are the host’; second, state affairs are subjected to the will of the people, which is affirmed in sayings like ‘the seeing of Heaven is the seeing of the people,’ ‘the hearing of Heaven is the hearing of the people,’ and ‘what the people wish Heaven will surely follow’; third, it has also confirmed that everyone is possessed of personal dignity and the right to existence, which is certainly seen in such formulations as ‘concerning the dignity of a human being there is no difference among Yao, Shun [尧舜], and all other persons, all others who want do something in politics must also recognize it’ and ‘revering life and nourishing the people.’49 In terms of the discussions of Jin and many other scholars concerning the differences and similarities between minben and democracy I will give a sketch of the topic. The differences between the Chinese idea of minben (up to the time of the Opium War in 1840) and the classical and modern idea of democracy (up to the year 1835 when the book De la Démocratie en Amérique by the French political thinker Tocqueville was published) are fourfould and can be summarized as follows. First, the traditional idea of minben is a kind of political philosophy, but has hardly dealt with the form of governance. The idea of democracy since ancient Greece is not only a political idea, but also a form of governance. Second, because in the idea of minben the form of governance was not touched upon, it naturally does not address the concrete question – who governs? Therefore, the idea of minben and monarchy have run in parallel. But democracy includes ideas about the form of governance; it comes thus into conflict with monarchy, aristocracy, and oligarchy and refers to state governance by the most common people. Because of this, it is impossible for democracy and monarchy to be carried on at the same time.

252 Minben and democracy Third, without touching upon the issue of the form of governance, the practical limitation of the power of the ruler according to the idea of minben is in reality very weak. The ideal implied in minben can be carried out only with the support of outstanding emperors and subjects, for the people themselves there was no way to practice the political idea. In contrast to this, in democracy the people can strive for their own interests by actually participating in political activities and realizing their own political ideal (although in the classical politics in the history of the West, democracy was also seldom put into practice). Fourth, the knowledge of human nature as implied in the idea of minben is not so definite; it rather roughly presupposes that human nature is good. The ideas of minben after Qin and Han (秦汉) dynasties mainly continued Mencius’s view on the goodness of human nature. In contrast, the presupposition of Western democracy is admitting that all people are “free,” and for the sake of realizing freedom they employed the form of democratic governance. This point was basically accepted by most political thinkers from the time of Aristotle who already provided a picture of democracy, but this is the principal deficiency of the traditional Chinese ideal of minben. To the times of the late Ming dynasty, the presupposition concerning human nature changed as reflected in the thoughts of Li Zhi (李贽) and Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲). They both recognized the reasonableness and legitimacy of the notion that “human nature is selfish.” To put it in other words, they admitted “reasonable selfish behaviors,” and provided the change from the traditional idea of minben to modern democracy with a theoretical basis regarding human nature. The difference between minben and democracy is already summarized as above. Now it remains to ask whether there is some commonality between the two. In my opinion, there are at least four points that are shared by them. First, they both confirm the importance of the people in politics and represent a secular political ideal that points to the realization of worldly happiness of the majority of people. They both can thus be counted as belonging to the rational, realistic political idea. Second, they both oppose extreme monarchy and tyranny. But the former accepts monarchy with a liberal and progressive ideal; the latter proposes governance by the people. At this point they are different. Third, they both agree to the ideas of “of the people” and “for the people,” although the thought of minben lacks the idea of “by the people” which is also part of democracy. Fourth, they both are developing and dynamic ideas in history, whose connotations have been constantly enriched and developed. Thus, it is not correct to observe the two political traditions from a static point of view. The question that follows is: are there possible connections between the traditional Chinese idea of minben and Western democracy, especially democracy in the modern West? Answering the question is the most essential requirement on the way to Chinese modernization. Since the Opium War and especially since

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the May Fourth New Culture Movement, the modernization of China is the most essential requirement of the whole Chinese people. On the level of reality, this essential requirement is embodied as the need to realize the dream of wealth and prosperity and go beyond the historical situation in which the Chinese were victims of political oppressors. On the level of political system, the Chinese pursuit of Western democracy also serves to realize the political and social ideal. The question of whether the idea of minben can be integrated with modern Western democracy is actually the question whether traditional Chinese culture can be modernized, or whether traditional Chinese culture can sustain its value in the process of modernization with regard to political philosophy. To this question my answer is: first, although it is a fact that the idea of minben and the politics of monarchy coexisted in Chinese history, the idea of minben is not theoretically in opposition to modern democracy, they are rather intrinsically coherent. That means accepting the idea of minben not only does not mean negating democracy, but also means willingly accepting the latter. In this sense, the development of the idea of minben into democracy can be seen as consequential. Second, in its historical development the idea of minben is gradually endowed with some characteristics that characterize modern Western democracy, and gradually it has changed from a pure idea to a concrete design of the form of governance. This development can been observed through Huang Zongxi’s (黄宗羲) Mingyi daifang lu (明夷待访录), Gu Yanwu’s (顾炎武) Junxian lun (郡县论), Wang Fuzhi’s (王夫之) discourses on politics, Tan Sitong’s (谭嗣同) Renxue (仁学), and so on. Third, according to the three principles of modern democracy – of the people, by the people, for the people – in the idea of minben two of them are contained, only not the part “by the people.” On account of this, if the “by the people” in Western democracy can be integrated into the idea of minben, it is possible for Chinese tradition to develop an idea of democracy. My personal view: the idea of minben has not been completely carried out with regard to the political practices in traditional Chinese society, but during the dynasties when politics was well-ordered the idea of minben was really more or less put into practice. Generally in the dynasties after the Qin (秦) and Han (汉) the emperors, except for the muddle-headed and tyrannical ones, have cared very much for the people. The Western idea of democracy and its form of governance in the long history of the West were merely very briefly realized in some city-states like Athens in ancient Greece. In the Roman Empire and the long Middle Ages it was not really put to practice. Only in modern times, parallel to the rise of the capitalism, has the idea of democracy slowly become mainstream. And slowly the democratic form of governance was implemented in some countries, the most typical of which is Anglo-American constitutional democracy. However, West Germany in Europe set up a democratic system just after the Second World War, when it was defeated. In general there have been two main types of democracy since the turn of the 20th century: the capitalist one and the socialist one. The way of the New Democracy that was established by the Chinese communists in 1940 can be seen as one mode of socialist

254 Minben and democracy democracy. This kind of socialist democracy is still a work in progress at present, the most urgent problem still being the one of “by the people.” This is not only the old problem that Chinese tradition left to us, but also a very realistic problem that needs urgently to be resolved for the sake of the further democratization of China. In the present time when Western and Chinese cultures are confronting each other and intermingling, how might we benefit from the democratic tradition and its political practices in order to bring Chinese socialist democracy to fruition? This is a task not only of politicians, but also of thinkers.

16.5 Conclusion: the prospect for modern Chinese democracy According to the historical experiences in Chinese society the transformation of the system must be observed with a long lens. After the roughly five hundred years of wars from the Spring and Autumn (Chunqiu, 春秋) period to the era of the Warring States (Zhanguo, 战国) the first emperor of the Qin conquered and merged six other states, and the feudal system of the Zhou Dynasty (周) was changed to the system of prefectures and countries of the Qin (秦) Dynasty. However, from the Western Han (西汉) to the end of the Sui (隋) the ghost of the feudal system remained. By the reign of Li Shimin (李世民) of the Tang (唐) Dynasty the system of prefectures and countries was in reality completely carried out. But during the period of the Ming and Qing dynasties there were still feudal phenomena, although the princes of the vassal states were no longer in possession of political power in fact. From this we see that the establishment of a new political system historically needs much time. The Chinese longing for democracy for more than a century necessarily demands a long-term struggle; before democracy began to be slowly carried out in China, it had more than two thousand years’ history of monarchy. Thus we have to be patient enough to investigate the conditions and concrete implementations for Chinese democratization. 16.5.1 Discourses regarding the change of political system and the demand for democracy since the Ming and Qing dynasties The ideological sparks of democracy were not lacking in traditional Chinese society. The great politician Zichan (子产) of the state Zheng (郑) did not destroy the township school; in the Tang Dynasty there was a system that allowed specific officials to correct the orders of the emperor; and there was always the system of admonition from officials to the emperor in traditional Chinese society. In all of these examples the consciousness of democracy was more or less implied. After the first emperor of the Qin carried out the system of prefectures and countries in place of the feudal system of the Western Zhou, it functioned for more than two thousand years in political practice. At the time of the transition from Ming to Qing Dynasty, the disadvantages of the system of prefectures and countries under the monarchy emerged, regarding which discussions about comparisons between it and the feudal system also appeared. The philosophical

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thinking of the “change of the system” was generally shared among the great philosophers of the new age. Gu Yanwu’s Junxian lun (nine chapters), Huang Zongxi’s Mingyi daifang lu, the Songlun (宋论), Du tongjian lun (读通鉴论) and other works of Wang Fuzhi that systematically criticized the crudeness of the Qin and the naivety of the Song, and even a series of works by Yuan Mei (袁枚) of the Qianlong (乾隆) period such as his reflection on Liu Zongyuan’s (柳宗元) Fengjian lun (封建论), all of these works expressed, by comparing the feudal system with the system of prefectures and countries, the ideal of democracy in the modern sense and thus embodied the pursuit of democracy among advanced Chinese intellectuals. At the time of the late Qing dynasty, Chinese institutional change, inspired by Western modern democracy and with enthusiasm, was theoretically and practically implemented. Kang Youwei (康有为) and Liang Qichao (梁启超) started it, and Sun Yat-sen (孙文), Huang Xing (黄兴), Zhang Taiyan (章太炎) and others continued. By the end of the War of Liberation in 1949, the form of a republic was institutionally established. At present, the Chinese political system is confirmed as a democratic, republican system. Moreover, parallel to the continual unfolding of Chinese modernization, the demand for democracy will become more and more urgent. By recalling the history of the replacement of the feudal system through the system of prefectures and countries, for instance, the history of the coexistence of the two systems at the beginning of the Han Dynasty or the struggle between the two during the Wei Jin (魏晋) period and the Southern and Northern dynasties (南北朝), we can conclude that the conflict between ghost-like monarchy and democracy that has become the spirit of the present time must last for a long time. Therefore, the path to actual Chinese democracy and republicanism is “long and hard,” its success depending on the great patience of the nation to continually explore and hope. 16.5.2 The history of Western democracy since modern times and its present dilemma Through observation of world history, the actual process establishing the republican system in Western Europe and the United States lasted for a long time. The difficulties in the process and the disasters that resulted from it were countless. In short, the development of democracy in modern Western Europe was involved with colonial history. It is at the same time a bloody history of national expansion. The British colonization of India, the invasion of China by the Eight Nation Alliance, and the colonization of Africa by Great Britain and other countries were too terrible to calmly recall with peaceful emotion. The American holocaust against the Native Americans is an unforgivable atrocity committed by them. In fact it was anti-human. Furthermore, there were two bloody World Wars, in which almost all people of the world were involved. As for the sufferings in Europe and among European people there is too much to be fully documented. Naturally, we should not totally reduce the colonial crimes to capitalist democracy, but in any case the modern capitalist revolution against

256 Minben and democracy the feudal system inwardly was intensively connected with its colonial expansion outwards. Because of this, capitalist democracy absolutely cannot be accepted as an ideal form which a people’s democracy should aspire to. From the Renaissance to the French Revolution in 1789, the decisive victory against the old monarchical system took about five hundred years. Afterwards, the repeated competition between monarchy and democracy/republicanism lasted more than a century. The situation in Britain was different from Germany, but from a macro-perspective, the replacement of the monarchy through democracy/republicanism took a tortuous route. Still today the worldwide establishment of democracy remians a historic task that needs to be finished. The task is comparatively tougher and the path is longer in Africa and Asia than elsewhere. Partly according to the history of Europe and the United States, the democratic/republican system also falls into a morass of its own. Thus, laments about the decline of Western civilization can also be heard in academic circles in Europe and the United States. However, viewing the entire trend of world civilization, the ultimate establishment of the political system of democracy/ republicanism is underway. Democracy/republicanism in Europe and the United States belongs only to the rich, therefore its decline is only the decline of the democracy/republicanism of the rich, and does not mean the decline of the democracy/republicanism of the people. The People’s Republic originated in the Russian Soviet Union and spread to China. But in the face of the dissolution of the former Soviet Union it is plain that, objectively speaking, the journey globally to establish the political system of democracy/republicanism has just begun.

16.6 The future of and prospects for the political idea of democracy On the basis of the above discussion, investigating the transition of the political system in the present world points to the ultimate end of a true realization of the people’s democracy. Borrowing the saying “freedom as substance, democracy as function” from Yan Fu (严复), we think that the political trend not only for the world today but also for the world in the next one hundred years can be formulated thus: people’s freedom as substance, people’s democracy/republic as function. In the present world the wave of economical globalization is more turbulent than any age in the past, and underneath the plurality of cultures are some basic values generally acknowledged; the phenomena of conflict, psychological strain, and contradiction corresponding with the increasingly frequent and penetrating communications between civilizations, which previously were isolated from one another, cannot prevent the acknowledgment of some basic values. The ideal of democracy is one of these that has won much acknowledgment to a comparatively great extent. There are a variety of theories about the “end” nowadays in European– American academic circles. Though some insights are contained in them, the so-called “end” actually refers to the “end” of some theory of an ideal that was previously advocated by someone, but not the “end” of the spirit that is

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implicit in the theory advocated. For example, Immanuel Wallerstein, the author of The End of Liberalism, declared the end of liberalism after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1989, which is an antithesis to Francis Fukuyama’s theory of the “end of history” that predicted “the end of socialism.” By scrutinizing the argumentation in the book we find that the author has used lame arguments and perverted logic. The alleged end of liberalism can at most mean the end of capitalistic liberalism, but not the end of the spirit of individual freedom that is cherished and pursued by people all over the world since modern times. Therefore, in an age of the “global village” when the economy is globalized and culture is pluralized, Chinese scholars in the humanities and social sciences should be more open-minded about absorbing the achievements in the humanities and social sciences of other countries. Rather than being confined to various theories at present just in order to follow what Western scholars propose, we should on the basis of the rich historical experiences of the cultural vicissitudes of China see into the great trend and tendency of global changes in order to work out theories that elucidate “the people’s freedom as substance and the people’s democracy/republic as function.” In this way, we can make contributions to the true and complete establishment first of Chinese democracy and then further to the development of world culture.

Notes 1 In his book Li Shi De Bei Ju Yi Shi (历史的悲剧意识), Shanghai People Press (Shang Hai Ren Min Chu Ban She, 上海人民出版社), 1992, 34, Xu Sumin (许苏民) mentioned “relationship in five dimensions,” namely the relationship between human and nature, between self and other, between individual and collective, between human and tradition, and between human and history. 2 Chen Duxiu (陈独秀), Du Xiu Wen Cun (独秀文存), Hefei: Anhui People’s Publishing House (An Hui Renmin Chu Ban She, 安徽人民出版社), 1987, 27–29. 3 Li Dazhao (李大钊), Collected Works of Li Dazhao (Li Da Zhao Wen Ji, 李大钊文集), vol. 2, Beijing: People’s Publishing House (Ren Min Chu Ban She, 人民出版社), 1999, 202. 4 Mengzi, 9.5. 5 Mengzi, 14.14. 6 Xunzi (荀子), Da Lue (大略), 27, www.shicimingju.com/book/xunzi/27.html, accessed on July 24, 2019. 7 Xunzi (荀子), Jun Dao (君道), 12. 8 Xunzi (荀子), Fu Guo (富国), 10. 9 Jia Yi (贾谊), Jia Yi Ji Jiao Zhu (贾谊集校注), ann. Wang Zhouming and Xu Chao, Beijing: People’s Literature Publishing House (Ren Min Wen Xue Chu Ban She, 人 民文学出版社), 1996, 125. 10 Jia Yi, Jia Yi Ji Jiao Zhu, 126. 11 Jia Yi, Jia Yi Ji Jiao Zhu, 127. 12 Jia Yi, Jia Yi Ji Jiao Zhu, 128. 13 Dong Zhngshu (董仲舒), Chun Qiu Fan Lu (春秋繁露), vol. 7, chap. 25, “Yao Shun bu shanyi, Tang Wu bu zhuanshan” (尧舜不擅移,汤武不专杀), in Er shi er zi (二十二子), Shanghai: Shanghai Ancient Books Press (Shang Hai Gu Ji Chu Ban She, 上海古籍出版社), 1986.

258 Minben and democracy 14 Dong Zhngshu, Chun Qiu Fan Lu, vol. 10, chap. 3, Shen chan ming hao (深查 名号). 15 Liu Zhou (刘昼), Liu Zi Jiao Shi (刘子校释), chap. 11, “Guinong” (贵农), annotated by Fu Yashu, Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1998, 112. “Is Liuzi Liu Zhou or Liu Xie (刘勰)?” This is a question in controversy among scholars. According to the investigation of Fu Yashu Liuzi refers to Liu Zhou. 16 Liu Zhou, Liu Zi Jiao Shi, chap. 12, “Aimin” (爱民), 122–123. 17 Lu Zhi (陆贽), Lu Zhi Ji (陆贽集), Beijing: Zhonghua Book 18 Lu Zhi, Lu Zhi Ji, 325. 19 Lu Zhi, Lu Zhi Ji, 326. 20 Huang Zongxi (黄宗羲), “Yuan Chen” (原臣), The Complete Works of Huang Zongxi (Huang Zong Xi Quan Ji, 黄宗羲全集), vol. 1, Hangzhou: Zhejiang Ancient Books Press (Zhe Jiang Gu Ji Chu Ban She, 浙江古籍出版社), 1985, 5. 21 Huang Zongxi, “Yuan Fa” (原法), Complete Works, vol. 1. 22 See the Introduction and other related chapters in Feng Tianyu (冯天瑜) and Xie Guian (谢贵安), Jiegou zhuanzhi – mingmo qingchu “xin minben” sixiang yanjiu (解构专制 – 明末清初“新民本”思想研究), Hubei: Hubei People’s Press, 2003. 23 Wang Fuzhi (王夫之), “Du Tong Jian Lun” (读通鉴论), Complete Works of Chuanshan (Chuan Shan Quan Shu, 船山全书), vol. 11, Changsha: Yue Lu Press (Yue Lu Chu Ban She, 岳麓书社), 1996, 416. 24 Wang Fuzhi, Huang Shu, Zai Zhi (黄书·宰制), Complete Works, vol. 12, 508. 25 Tang Zhen (唐甄), Qian Shu, Kao Gong (潜书·考功), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Zhong Hua Shu Ju, 中华书局), 1955, 110. 26 Tang Zhen, Qian Shu, Ni Zheng (潜书·柅政), 154. 27 Thucydides, History of the Peloponnesian War, trans. R. Crawley, New York: Blackwell, 2013, 34 28 Yu Jiyuan (余纪元), Dictionary of Western Philosophy English–Chinese (西方哲学 英汉对照词典), Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company (Ren Min Chu Ban She, 人民出 版社), 2001, 242. 29 Aristotle, A Treatise on Government [Politics], book Ⅵ, chap. Ⅱ, trans. W. Ellis, London: J. Dent & Sons, 1912. 30 Aristotle, Politics, book Ⅵ, chap. Ⅱ. 31 Aristotle, Politics, book Ⅵ, chap. Ⅱ. 32 Cicero, On the Commonwealth and On the Laws, ed. J.E.G. Zetzel, Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 19–20. 33 Jean-Jacques Rousseau, The Social Contract and Discourse on the Origin of Inequality, ed. L.G. Crocker, New York: Washington Square Press, 1967, 68. 34 Rousseau, Social Contract, 69. 35 Locke, The Second Treatise of Government, chap. 8, §. 95. The Online Library of Liberty, 2005. 36 Locke, Second Treatise, chap. 10, §. 132. 37 Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, ed. P. Bradley. New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1945. 38 Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 7. 39 Tocqueville, Democracy in America. 8. 40 Tocqueville, Democracy in America. 9. 41 Tocqueville, Democracy in America. 9. 42 Tocqueville, Democracy in America. 9–10. 43 Tocqueville, Democracy in America. 10. 44 Tocqueville, Democracy in America. 10. 45 The following discussion is based on the theories of Gu Su (顾肃). See Gu Su, The Basic Ideas of Liberalism (Zi You Zhu Yi De Ji Ben Li Nian, 自由主义的基本理念),

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Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press (Zhong Yang Bian Yi Chu Ban She, 中央编译出版社), 2003, 159. Gu Su, Basic Ideas, 177–178. See David Held, Models of Democracy, Cambridge, UK: Polity Press, 2008. Jin Yaoji (金耀基), History of Minben Thought in China (Zhong Guo Min Ben Si Xiang Shi, 中国民本思想史), Taiwan: Commercial Press (Shang Wu Yin Shu Guan, 台湾商务印书馆), 1993, 13. Jin Yaoji, History of Minben Thought, 193–194.

17 From political constitutionalism to international political constitutionalism The reasoning of Rawls’s political liberalism

John Rawls, born in 1921 in Baltimore, Maryland, a political philosopher and a leading figure of new liberalism, was a philosophy professor at Harvard University. His book, A Theory of Justice, published in 1971, has had an enormous influence on the Western intellectual community. After the publication of A Theory of Justice, he published Political Liberalism, The Law of Peoples, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy, and Collected Papers, which constitute a comprehensive system of political liberalism. Starting with justice as fairness, which provides the foundation for his political liberalism, Rawls moves from domestic democracy to the foundation of peace and order in the international community. It seems that Rawls wants to build a peaceful international community on the foundations of political liberalism. His political liberalism theory is famous for its rigor, clarity, insights and comprehensiveness. In the mid-1980s, Rawls’s impact reached China. The Chinese version of A Theory of Justice, translated by Huaihong He, was published by the Commerce Press in China. It had been 17 years since its first publication in 1971 in English. After this, Political Liberalism, The Law of Peoples, and Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy have been translated in Chinese. At this point, only the Collected Essays have not been translated yet. Since the 1990s, there have been more and more Chinese works on Rawls’s moral philosophy and political philosophy. As far as I know, there are few articles in Chinese that give a comprehensive introduction to Rawls’s political philosophy. This chapter is not that ambitious. I will introduce the basic arguments of his political liberalism. Then I will give a short evaluation of his theory, which is based on contemporary international political reality and traditional Chinese political ideals.

17.1 Justice as fairness: the moral foundation of Rawls’s political liberalism With the publication of A Theory of Justice, Rawls’s political liberalism is the result of his distinction between justice in the moral sense and justice in the political sense. He claims that, “In Theory a moral doctrine of justice general in scope is not distinguished from a strictly political conception of justice.”1 Thus,

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“The account of the stability of a well-ordered society in Part III is therefore also unrealistic and must be recast.”2 The realistic challenge to modern democratic society is, “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?”,3 or: How is it possible that deeply opposed though reasonable comprehensive doctrines many live together and all affirm the political conception of a constitutional regime? What is the structure and content of a political conception that can gain the support of such an overlapping consensus?4 These questions are what Rawls is most concerned with. Rawls has formulated his challenge clearly, that is, how to construct a reasonable political doctrine, which enables various reasonable but conflicted comprehensive doctrines to coexist in peace. Thus, the moral foundation of this political principle has to transcend these various doctrines. Rawls claims, “The problem of political liberalism is to work out a conception of political justice for a constitutional democratic regime that the plurality of reasonable doctrines – always a feature of the culture of a free democratic regime – might endorse.”5 Furthermore, “political liberalism, rather than referring to its political conception of justice as true, refers to it as reasonable instead.”6 The concept of political justice is limited to political values, and the principles and ideals of the political conception are based on principles of practical reason in union with conceptions of society and the person. The concept of political justice cannot aim for truth. This concept can be discussed, criticized, and revised. “The principles of political justice are the result of a procedure of construction in which rational persons (or their representatives), subject to reasonable conditions, adopt the principles to regulate the basic structure of society.”7 Rawls believes that political justice is not about the “highest good.” As a political liberal, his main concern is “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?” In other words: Part of this problems is: What are the fair terms of social cooperation between citizens characterized as free and equal yet divided by profound doctrinal conflict? What is the structure and content of the requisite political conception, if, indeed, such a conception is even possible?8 Rawls claims that the clash between salvationist, creedal, and expansionist religions motivates the “the concept of political justice.” After “it introduces into people’s conceptions of their good a transcendent element not admitting of compromise,” there could be two solutions to the conflicts: “moderated only by circumstance and exhaustion, or equal liberty of conscience and freedom of thought.”9 Rawls believes that political liberalism commits from the outset to

262 Rawls’s political liberalism “the absolute depth of that irreconcilable latent conflict” and thus holds that “Except on the basis of these last, firmly founded and publicly recognized, no reasonable political conception of justice is possible.”10 Rawls separates political justice from various concepts of comprehensive moral justice. He believes that political liberalism is different from comprehensive liberalism. Rawls claims, “the general problems of moral philosophy are not the concern of political liberalism, except insofar as they affect how the background culture and its comprehensive doctrines tend to support a constitutional regime.”11 The major challenge for political liberalism is, “how is a just and free society possible under conditions of deep doctrinal conflict with no prospect of resolution?”12 Different from the Theory, Political Liberalism tries to provide ground for the basic religious and political liberties, the basic rights of citizens in civil society, such as freedom of movement and fair equality of opportunity, the right to personal property, and the protections of the rule of law. Thus Rawls focuses more on the basic political rights of citizens in civil society, which is to find a political concept of justice, rather than to provide a moral concept of justice. This is why Rawls has an assumption that it is a society with good political order. This is an ideal society, rather than any particular liberal society. Rawls sets up his aim as to figure out “how the well-ordered society of justice as fairness is to be understood once it is adjusted to the fact of reasonable pluralism and regulated by a political conception of justice.”13 Our intuitive question is why Rawls’s political liberalism would treat justice as fairness as the political basis for liberalism. In other words, how could justice as fairness, and not any other idea, serve as the moral foundation for political liberalism? Rawls seems to have the following explanations: the idea of justice as fairness is a normative and moral concept. Rawls claims that, the ideas of the domain of the political and a political conception of justice are normative and moral ideas in their own right, that is, their “content is given by certain ideals, principles, and standards, and these norms articulate certain values, in this case political values.”14 I believe that for Rawls political ideas cannot be separated from moral ideas. In fact, in the Theory, Rawls wants to “present the structural features of such a theory of justice so as to make it the best approximation to our considered judgments of justice and hence to give the most appropriate moral basis for a democratic society.”15 I believe that Rawls did not focus on the political basis when he wrote the Theory. In the Western tradition, justice as the moral basis for a democratic society has been recognized as a philosophical issue. Rawls points out the connection between justice and fairness. I believe that the idea of justice as fairness can be the moral basis of a democratic society, because this idea provides a protection rooted in human nature for the coexistence of various reasonable theories. Rawls claims,

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the problem of political liberalism is to work out a political conception of political justice for a constitutional democratic regime that a plurality of reasonable doctrines, both religious and nonreligious, liberal and nonliberal, may freely endorse, and so freely live by and come to understand its virtues.16 Ideas about politics are separate from ideas about morality, but have to be based on ideas about morality. Our moral ideas are different from those of ancient times. “For the ancients the central problem was the doctrine of the good and for the moderns the central problem was the conception of justice.”17 The problem of the good is a transcendental problem. Conflict among people with different ideas of the good can only be resolved by constant struggles. However, conflict among people with different ideas of political justice can be resolved through conscience and reflection. People would come to a consensus bounded by constitution and further establish a long-term rather than temporary agreement. Thus, justice as fairness as the basis of political liberalism renders it different from ancient political doctrines, even different from classical liberalism. It inherits the traditional idea of justice but adds the idea of fairness. Justice as fairness being the moral basis for political liberalism is a kind of political idea. Then, how is it different from justice as fairness as a kind of purely moral idea? Rawls makes two points: first, for an example of the difference between the moral values of a comprehensive doctrine and the [moral] political values of a political conception, consider the value of autonomy. This value may take at least two forms. One is political autonomy, the legal independence and assured political integrity of citizens and their sharing with other citizens equally in the exercise of political power. The other form is moral autonomy expressed in a certain mode of life and reflection.18 Second, as the agent who owns this idea, it changes from a moral agent to a political citizen. Rawls claims, in the transformation from the comprehensive doctrine of justice as fairness to the political conception of justice as fairness, the idea of the person as having moral personality with the full capacity of moral agency is transformed into that of the citizen.19 However, “the person is seen rather as a free and equal citizen, the political person of a modern democracy with the political rights and duties of citizenship, and standing in a political relation with other citizens.”20 Thus, the moral personality of an individual is replaced with a political citizenship. Personal cultivation is replaced with the rights in political life. And these rights are protected by laws.

264 Rawls’s political liberalism Rawls keeps emphasizing the following question, “the fact of reasonable pluralism raises this question all the more sharply, since it means that the differences between citizens arising from their comprehensive doctrines, religious and nonreligious, are irreconcilable and contain transcendent elements.”21 In this situation, “by what ideals and principles, then, are citizens as sharing equally in ultimate political power to exercise that power so that each of them can reasonably justify their political decisions to each other?”22 The political reality forces Rawls to figure out a political idea that has a reasonable moral basis and transcends all moral and religious comprehensive doctrines. Certainly, Rawls’s moral thoughts on political actions are the result of his reflection on two World Wars, especially, World War II. He raised a very sharp question, the wars of this century with their extreme violence and increasing destructiveness, culminating in the manic evil of the Holocaust, raise in an acute way the question whether political relations must be governed by power and coercion alone. If a reasonably just society that subordinates power to its aims is not possible and people are largely amoral, if not incurably cynical and self-centered, one might ask with Kant whether it is worthwhile for human beings to live on the earth?23 In order to answer this hard question, Rawls makes an ideal assumption: a reasonably just political society is possible, and for it to be possible, human beings must have a moral nature, not of course a perfect such nature, yet one that can understand, act on, and be sufficiently moved by a reasonable political conception of right and justice to support a society guided by its ideals and principles.24 This moral nature is what justice as fairness suggests. Justice as fairness would cultivate moral ideals in citizens, which would support a reasonably just political society in the long run. I believe that this is what makes Rawls’s political philosophy reputable. In order to understand Rawls’s political liberalism, we have to look into two other basic ideas in this theory: the original position and the veil of ignorance.

17.2 The original position and the veil of ignorance The idea of the original position is the logical starting point of Rawls’s new political liberalism. This logical starting point is a further development of the state of nature in the social contract theory of Rousseau and Kant. From a historical point of view, we cannot find a real state of nature in which everyone is free and equal. Thus the classical social contract theory indeed loses some of its credence. Rawls changes the assumption in his social contract theory. He starts with an ideal society in which citizens have morality and rights. He treats justice as fairness as the original position, the logical

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assumption of this political philosophy. Specifically, in Rawls’s political liberalism, a well-ordered society is a fair cooperation system organized by equal and free citizens. The question that Rawls tries to answer is, within this system, which traditional concept of justice can define the appropriate principle of freedom and equality. Rawls believes that justice as fairness is the basis for cooperation. He claims, justice as fairness recasts the doctrine of the social contract and adopts a form of the last answer: the fair terms of social cooperation are conceived as agreed to by those engaged in it, that is, by free and equal citizens who are born into the society in which they lead their lives.25 Under the conditions of justice as fairness, it would “situate free and equal persons fairly and must not allow some persons greater bargaining advantages than others. Further, such things as threats of force and coercion, deception and fraud must be excluded.”26 This non-historical assumption is in conflict with actual historical reality, since in reality people are unequal. Some people are better off than others. Many people live in miserable conditions. In this unequal reality, how could we achieve idealistic cooperation? How could a political philosophy find its starting point? The original position that Rawls proposes intends to exclude the contingent conditions in reality, and sets up a fair starting point. As Rawls points out, the original position, with the features I have called “the veil of ignorance,” is this point of view. The reason the original position must abstract from and not be affected by the contingencies of the social word is that the conditions for a fair agreement on the principles of political justice between free and equal persons must eliminate the bargaining advantages that inevitably arise within the background institutions of any society from cumulative social, historical, and natural tendencies.27 Rawls believes that in the ideal society “these contingent advantages and accidental influences from the past should not affect an agreement on the principles that are to regulate the institutions of the basic structure itself from the present into the future.”28 It is obvious that the original position provides the logical starting point for those basic principles that regulate the basic social structures. There have to be logical starting points for basic social principles. The original position is indeed the logical starting point. Here is the structure of the reasoning: the original position → principles → the institution of the basic structure itself. Why is the original position related to the veil of ignorance? In the original position, each participant has to be equal. However, in reality we are different with regard to social status. This different social status cannot be sufficient reason for others to accept certain social arrangements. As Rawls points out,

266 Rawls’s political liberalism the fact that we affirm a particular religious, philosophical, or moral comprehensive doctrine with its associated conception of the good is not a reason for us to propose, or to expect others to accept, a conception of justice that favors those of that persuasion.29 Thus, the starting point of an ideal political philosophy, the original position, asks people to give up their previous positions and takes responsibility for serving free and equal citizens. Under the veil of ignorance, each person would reflect upon the basic political principles. As Rawls puts it, the original position “describes the parties, each of whom is responsible for the essential interests of a free and equal citizen, as fairly situated and as reaching an agreement subject to conditions that appropriately limit what they can put forward as good reasons.”30 The original position does not allow people to use their own religious and philosophical comprehensive theories to regulate others. Is, then, the idea of the original position itself a metaphysical view of the self? Rawls does not think so. When “we simulate being in the original position, our reasoning no more commits us to a particular metaphysical doctrine about the nature of the self than our acting a part in a play.”31 When we are in the original position, citizens may have their own personalities or preferences, but they can only play the role of citizens in the political theater. They are free and equal and they have to regard others as free and equal too. I will sketch the political conception of persons for Rawls. “First, citizens are free in that they conceive of themselves and of one another as having the moral power to have a conception of the good.”32 Under this condition, citizens as free individuals would see their own personality as independent of any religious and philosophical comprehensive doctrines. “Given their moral power to form, revise, and rationally pursue a conception of the good, their public identity as free persons is not affected by changes over time in their determinate conception of it.”33 Second: A second respect in which citizens view themselves as free is that they regard themselves as self-authenticating sources of valid claims. That is, they regard themselves as being entitled to make claims on their institutions so as to advance their conceptions of the good (provided these conceptions fall within the range permitted by the public conception of justice).34 Rawls uses the case of slaves to make the above points. In a society with slaves, “laws that prohibit the maltreatment of slaves are not based on claims made by slaves, but on claims originating from slaveholders, or from the general interests of society (which do not include the interests of slaves).”35 In the original position, every citizen is free and equal and they can make demands of their institutions. In other words, those basic principles based on the original position are legitimate because equal and free citizens make them. “The third respect in which citizens are viewed as free is that they are viewed as capable of taking responsibility for their ends and this affects how their various claims

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36

are assessed.” In the original position, every citizen is assumed as rational individuals, whose right to be free and equal is an assumption, which is not a historical description of the actual rights that citizens hold. Thus, the evil of ignorance is also an ideal assumption. Rawls believes that this way when we design political principles, we would not be guided by our own personal, political, or philosophical views. We would act as free and equal citizens. When this principle is situated in specific historical contexts, we can desire compensation principles in order to make up the inequality.

17.3 Rawls’s two political principles Rawls’s new political liberalism has two features: on the one hand, it maintains the basic doctrine of liberalism and affirms the priority of liberty and equality; on the other hand, it maintains fairness and makes sure that those who are marginalized can be given the capacity to be free and equal. In the book Political Liberalism, Rawls directly endorses the two principles from the Theory of Justice, but states them more concisely. Here are the two principles: a) Each person has an equal right to a fully adequate scheme of equal basic liberties which is compatible with a similar scheme of liberties for all. b) Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions. First, they must be attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they must be to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged members of society.37 With regard to the order of these two principles, we can learn from what Rawls says in the Theory of Justice; here is the first priority rule: The principle of justice is to be ranked in lexical order and therefore the basic liberties can be restricted only for the sake of liberty. There are two cases: (a) a less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all, and (b) a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to those citizens with the lesser liberty.38 Here is the second priority rule: The second principle of justice is lexically prior to the principle of efficiency and to that of maximizing the sum of advantages; and fair opportunity is prior to the difference principle. There are two cases: (a) an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those with the lesser opportunity; (b) an excessive rate of saving must on balance mitigate the burden of those bearing this hardship.39 Based on the above explanation, Rawls holds the basic doctrine of liberalism. However, he values particularly fairness and equality, which makes him

268 Rawls’s political liberalism different from classical liberalism, which orients towards individualism. Viewed from the history of Western liberalism, Rawls’s theory is more in line with the liberalism that is sympathetic to socialism, which makes him different from conservative liberals and libertarians. In Political Liberalism, Rawls further explains the idea of the priority of liberty. He does not generalize the priority of all liberties, but only the basic liberties. The basic liberties include freedom of thought and the liberty of conscience, liberty with regard to property, and freedom of speech. These liberties cannot be taken away for any utility. As Rawls puts it, the priority of liberty implies in practice that a basic liberty can be limited or denied solely for the sake of one or more other basic liberties, and never, as I have said, for reasons of public good or of perfectionist values. This restriction holds even when those who benefit from the greater efficiency, or together share the sum of the advantage, are the same persons whose liberties are limited or denied.40 This makes Rawls different from utilitarianism and perfectionism and keeps his liberalism intact. The reason for Rawls to have the compensation principle is his humanist stance and the logical assumption of his political liberalism. In the original position, each person is assumed to be free and equal, which might not be true in political reality. In reality, due to historical and social factors, we are not equal. Some of us are not free either (not just those people kept in prison). Thus, those principles designed for free and equal citizens would not be fit for people in real life. Some of us are free and well off; and others are not free and worse off. In order to make everyone free and equal, political institutions and policy making have to start from political reality and protect the principle of fairness without harming basic liberties, which is to benefit the least advantaged members of society.41 Thus, political liberalism as a political ideal favors social welfare. However, this is required by its own logic: everyone should be free and equal. What the above discusses is Rawls’s political liberalism within the bounds of domestic political institutions. However, political liberalism does not have to be limited to domestic politics. What Rawls says in The Law of Peoples is about international justice. Rawls discusses how political liberalism can help achieve global peace.

17.4 The Law of Peoples: Rawls’s theory of global peace This book is Rawls’s attempt to reflect upon global peace in his late years. He starts from the basic ideas of liberal democracy and connects one country’s liberal democratic institution to various other political institutions in the international community. He hopes that the leading power of liberal democracy would bring other counties with different political institutions together and form a peaceful and stable society. As Rawls puts it,

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it is important to understand that the Law of Peoples is developed within political liberalism. This beginning point means that the Law of Peoples is an extension of a liberal conception of justice for a domestic regime to a Society of Peoples. Developing the Law of Peoples within a liberal conception of justice, we work out the ideals and principles of the foreign policy of a reasonably just liberal people.42 Rawls believes that a liberal international society is possible. He claims, our hope for the future of our society rests on the belief that the nature of the social world allows reasonably just constitutional democratic societies existing as members of the Society of Peoples. In such a social world peace and justice would be achieved between liberal and decent peoples both at home and abroad. The idea of this society is realistically Utopian in that it depicts an achievable social world that combines political right and justice for all liberal and decent peoples in a Society of Peoples. Both A Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism try to say how a liberal society might be possible. The Law of Peoples hopes to say how a world Society of liberal and decent Peoples might be possible.43 Based on the above quote we can see that Rawls attempts to extend the liberal society within one country to world society and build a peaceful international community. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls divides domestic societies into five types, reasonable liberal peoples, decent peoples, outlaw states, societies burdened by unfavorable conditions, and benevolent absolutisms. For the decent peoples, there is a kind called decent consultation hierarchy. There are other kinds of decent people institutions that are different from decent consultation hierarchy but are valuable members of world society. For the benevolent absolutisms, those societies “honor human rights; but, because their members are denied a meaningful role in making political decisions, they are not wellordered.”44 Rawls believes that the first and the second kind of domestic societies are well-ordered peoples. Even though the fifth type does not capture any real nation-state, as an abstract model, it is good for discussing international peace. In The Law of Peoples, Rawls discusses the connections of the three types of domestic society. First, Rawls believes that reasonable liberal people ideally would not have wars. This is decided by the nature of reasonable liberal peoples and their domestic political institutions. As Rawls puts it, the idea of a reasonably just society of well-ordered peoples will not have an important place in a theory of international politics until such peoples exist and have learned to coordinate the actions of their governments in wider forms of political, economic, and social cooperation. When that happens, as I believe, following Kant, it will, the society of these peoples will

270 Rawls’s political liberalism form a group of satisfied peoples. As I shall maintain, in view of their fundamental interests being satisfied, they will have no reason to go to war with one another. The familiar motives for war would be absent: such peoples do not seek to convert others to their religions, nor to conquer greater territory, nor to wield political power over another people. Through negotiation and trade they can fulfill their needs and economic interests.45 Even viewed from history, people of reasonably just societies did not have wars. Rawls believes that “though liberal democratic societies have often engaged in war against nondemocratic states, since 1800 firmly established liberal societies have not fought one another.”46 Here is the reason. “A society of democratic peoples, all of whose basic institutions are well-ordered by liberal conceptions of right and justice (though not necessarily by the same conception), is stable for the right reasons.”47 Rawls believes that “armed conflict between democratic peoples will tend to disappear as they approach that ideal, and they will engage in war only as allies in self-defense against outlaw states.”48 Second, Rawls does not denounce the self-defense war of democratic people against outlaw states. He would encourage sanctions against outlaw states. What is an outlaw state? Rawls does not give a clear definition. According to his descriptions of democratic people, we can infer that an outlaw state refers to those states that violate basic human rights and invade other states. However, Rawls believes that democratic people should separate soldiers and civilians from their leaders and officials. Thus, when democratic people carry out defensive wars against outlaw states, they cannot attack civilians. As for soldiers of the outlaw state, leaving aside the upper ranks of an officer class, they, like civilians, are not responsible for their state’s war. For soldiers are often conscripted and in other ways forced into war; they are coercively indoctrinated in martial virtues; and their patriotism is often cruelly exploited.49 We can see here that Rawls makes a strict distinction between outlaw states and people from outlaw states. This is probably why he uses the term the law of peoples rather than the law of states. Third, Rawls discusses the obligations of democratic societies to other societies with needs. His discussion derives from his liberal stance. He believes that, “burdened societies, while they are not expansive or aggressive, lack the political and cultural traditions, the human capital and know-how, and, often, the material and technological resources needed to be well-ordered.”50 In the long term, “well-ordered societies should … bring burdened societies, like outlaw states, into the Society of well-ordered Peoples. Well-ordered peoples have a duty to assist burdened societies.”51 However, it does not follow that this assistance is indefinite. According to Rawls, well-ordered societies are not necessarily rich. And burdened societies are not so poor that they cannot

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organize their order. The key is to correct political and social injustice. Based on the above ideas, Rawls proposes three basic principles of assistance. The first is the guideline for duty of assistance. There are three elements of this principle. (1) The purpose: “to establish (reasonably) just basic institutions for a free constitutional democratic society (or any well-ordered society) and to secure a social world that makes possible a worthwhile life for all its citizens.”52 (2) The limit of saving: when just or decent basic institutions are established, savings may stop. (3) The separation between wealth and justice: great wealth is not a necessary condition to build just or decent institutions. A society’s particular history and particular conception of justice are relevant to how much wealth is needed. The second is to realize that “the political culture of a burdened society is all-important.” Thus, well-ordered societies should help change the social and political culture of a burdened society. Based on this idea, when a well-ordered society extends assistance to a burdened society, they would add extra conditions with regard to human rights, gender equality, and so on. The third is that the aim of assistance is “to help burdened societies to be able to manage their own affairs reasonably and rationally and eventually to become members of the Society of well-ordered Peoples.”53 Thus, well-ordered societies cannot act paternalistically when offering assistance. They have to realize that the final purpose of assistance is to achieve freedom and equality for those burdened societies. When dealing with justice in a civil society, as the least advantaged are given enough means to exercise their liberties and achieve their worthwhile aims in the life, the wealth gap does not have to be narrowed. According to Rawls, it is a similar case with international justice. In the arrangement of the Society of Peoples, when all peoples have functioning liberal or decent political institutions, we would not need to narrow the wealth gap between well-off and burdened societies.54 I believe that based on this point there could be a reasonable wealth gap between well-off and burdened societies, Rawls’s social ideal with regard to justice and equality is different from the absolute egalitarianism endorsed by Chinese peasants in ancient times and Confucian ideal society.

17.5 Some reflections Liberalism has a long history in Europe and North America. There are different schools of liberalism. Some are conservative, and others are radical. The radicals are much closer to socialism. Rousseau and Kant were great influences on political liberalism. Rawls inherits the social contract theory from Rousseau and Kant. I believe that the Law of Peoples is basically in line with Kant’s eternal peace idea. It is very challenging to evaluate Rawls’s political liberalism in the history of political liberalism of 20th century, which would involve comparing his thoughts with Isaiah Berlin, Friedrich Hayek, Jürgen Habermas and others. Here I would only comment on his idea of the original position and compare this starting point with the logical starting point of Confucian political

272 Rawls’s political liberalism philosophy. Hopefully there might be inspirations relevant for the research methodology of doing comparative political philosophy. In the Theory of Justice, Rawls gives explicit explanations of the aims of using the concept of the original position and the related concept of the veil of ignorance. He claims, the idea of the original position is to set up a fair procedure so that any principles agreed to will be just. The aim is to use the notion of pure procedural justice as a basis of theory. Somehow we must nullify the effects of specific contingencies which put men at odds and tempt them to exploit social and natural circumstances to their own advantage. Now in order to do this I assume that the parties are situated behind a veil of ignorance. They do not know how the various alternatives will affect their own particular case and they are obliged to evaluate principles solely on the basis of general considerations.55 I believe that there is a huge implication of Rawls’s reasoning here. During the procedure of designing the basic principles, if there is any partiality towards a certain group of people, then there would be injustice in the basic social structure. This basic injustice would not just have impact on the generation that designs the structure but also have great influence on generations to come. I agree with Rawls that only if we start from the idea of pure individuals, free and equal citizens, excluding any contingent historical or social factors, can we have a long-term, just social structure. It is true that justice is a historical concept. Different times and nations have their own conceptions of justice. Rawls’s idea of justice is based on the modern Western ideas of individual liberty and equality. Furthermore, his political philosophy starts from the reasonable pluralism in liberal democratic societies. However, the above historical facts do not imply that his idea is not universally applicable. One inspiration from his political philosophy is that we could start from his assumption in political philosophy and compare our own assumptions in our own political culture, thus evaluating our own political culture. I believe that this is a productive and innovative way to reflect upon our own political culture. In fact, individual equality and liberty were the starting point of Chinese socialism in the early 20th century. The early Chinese Communist Party theorists, such as Dazhao Li and Duxiu Chen, shared this idea. However, in the long national independence war and civil war, individual equality and liberty were set aside for the priority of national independence and state building. Then, guided by the idea of class struggle, the starting point of the basic social structure was changed to the majority against class enemies, which was to take away their liberty and equality. Thus, the ideas of universal human nature and human rights that emerged in modern Western societies and in ancient China were ignored in modern China. Human natural rights were replaced by various privileges and prerogatives. This wrong starting point of political infrastructure has not been corrected yet. Since class struggles have to a great degree disappeared,

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the starting point of our political philosophy, legal structure and social policy making should have been restored back to universal human nature. Recognizing individual equality and liberty should have been our original position of basic social and political infrastructure design. Socialism, which originated in modern Western societies and criticized the problems of Western capitalism, indeed is different from capitalism, but they share some basic similarities. I believe that to respect individual liberty and equality is their commonality. This is what Marx said in the Communist Manifesto, “In place of the old bourgeois society, with its classes and class antagonisms, we shall have an association, in which the free development of each is the condition for the free development of all.”56 We may evaluate Confucian political philosophy based on the above discussion. Traditional Confucian political philosophy indeed treats its theory of human nature as its original position. However, Kongzi’s idea of human nature is different from Mengzi’s and Xunzi’s. The view of human nature in the preQin period is different from later times’ hierarchical view of human nature. It is not until the late Qing period that Sitong Tan (谭嗣同) in his Theory of Ren (仁学) corrects this view and returns to the moral equality view of human nature. Then Confucian political philosophy is very similar to modern political philosophy. Based on the idea of human nature as the starting point to account for the transitions of Confucian political philosophy might be an interesting and innovative perspective. It is beyond the scope of this chapter to develop a further analysis of this approach.

Notes 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23

John Rawls, Political Liberalism, New York: Columbia University Press, 1996, xvi. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xvii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xviii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xviii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xviii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xx. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xx. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxv. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxvi. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxvi. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxviii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxviii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxxv–vi. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxxvi. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxxvii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxxviii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xxxviii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xliii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xliii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xliii. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xliv. Rawls, Political Liberalism, xliv. Rawls, Political Liberalism, lx.

274 Rawls’s political liberalism 24 25 26 27 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56

Rawls, Political Liberalism, lx. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 23. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 23 Rawls, Political Liberalism, 23. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 23. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 24. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 25. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 27. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 30. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 30. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 32. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 33. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 33. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 291. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, rev. edn, Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, 220. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 266–267. Rawls, Political Liberalism, 295. Rawls’s colleague, Robert Nozick, is the primary critic of this compensation principle. Nozick is the foremost conservative liberal. John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, 55. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 6. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 4. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 19. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 51. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 53. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 54. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 95. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 106. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 106. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 107. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 111. Rawls, Law of Peoples, 114. Rawls, Theory of Justice, 118. Karl Marx and Frederick Engels, Manifesto of the Communist Party, chap. 2, www.marx ists.org/archive/marx/works/1848/communist-manifesto/, accessed on January 3, 2017.

18 Political democracy and Chinese democracy Thoughts on Chinese political reforms and regional conflicts in the world

18.1 The urgency of Chinese political reform: perspectives from anti-corruption Our current world is more dynamic but with more dangers than ever. It is the same case with China. China nowadays is more flourishing than ever, but also full of uncertainties. Depleted resources and environmental problems appear in every place in the world. It is the same case with China, probably more seriously so. These are undisputable facts. We have numerous problems in education, agriculture, and other areas. In international relations, we have conflicts with the USA and Japan on political and economic issues, which endanger Chinese national security and development. One key issue is about Taiwan. I believe that problems with corruption, as a result of our current underdeveloped political institutions, are the most urgent issue in the present-day Chinese political domain. Corruption is a shocking but common phenomenon. Various forms of bribery are the most common form of corruption. The corruption of governmental officials in high positions accepting bribes causes indignation in the majority of citizens. The central government has been taking harsh measures to crack down on corruption, especially at the level of provincial officials. However, these have not pacified people’s anger. Clear-sighted people with a clear mind know that the corruption in contemporary China is not incidental. The key reason is a lack of checks and balances on political power. How to force party officials to follow laws religiously and carry out the party doctrines of serving the people? I do not think that we have found an efficient solution yet. Citizens cannot efficiently supervise how officials exercise their political power. Since these rights cannot be implemented openly, this impotence is the cause of corruption. Different scholars have offered various solutions to these challenges in Chinese society. As an intellectual in the humanities with an interest in political philosophy, I believe that the solution lies in building Chinese democracy, which would provide channels to supervise government officials. With fast-growing economic development, socialist political reforms should follow. The direction of Chinese political reform is to ensure those basic political rights that are stated in the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China. We should allow

276 Political democracy and Chinese democracy true democracy led by the people and allow citizens to be involved in political governance and supervision. If various political rights cannot be guaranteed in the legal system, then socialist democracy cannot be realized. Then there is no way that corruption will end in China. Without socialist democratic political institutions, there will be no true civil society. History from the West and the East has shown that a lack of checks and balances inevitably leads to corruption. Socialist society, especially the current early stage of socialist society in China, is bound by this political rule too. I believe that there are several reasons for the truth of this political rule. First, there are two natural tendencies in human nature: good and bad. The selfish natural tendency easily leads to selfish acts. When a political system is not able to stop people from abusing their powers, this political system cannot stop corruption. Second, lack of knowledge can lead to corruption. Even if every political leader were a moral saint, they would have limited knowledge about many things. This is much truer in modern society with the exploding amount of information. Thus, it is unavoidable that, due to lack of knowledge and information, those people with power would make mistakes. Thus, if their power is not under the supervision of citizens, and they do not take suggestions from citizens, they will act upon false information, leading to bad outcomes. This kind of corruption has nothing to do with morality, but it is also corruption due to abuse of power. If there were selfish motivation, this kind of abuse would be easily connected with bribery. Lastly, due to the fact that our current political institutions are under development, we do not have good supervision over those in political power. The government punishes those who have already abused their powers. However, for those in political power, they would take greater risks to protect their secrets, which might cause further damage to society. I believe that underdeveloped political institutions are also bad for those people in power. Many political officials are the elites of society. Due to the problems of the political system and less-than-perfect morality, their crimes are not just damaging to themselves but also to society and the people. Their waste of wealth is bad, but the waste of their talents is also bad. We do have many talented people in society. But it took enormous public resources to educate and nourish those talented people. From a utilitarian perspective, in order to save resources, anti-corruption and building socialist democracy are very urgent.

18.2 The necessity of Chinese democracy building: from the perspective of national integrity How to build socialist democracy? How to build Chinese democracy without dividing China? This is a very real and urgent question. From the perspective of international relations, ideological conflicts after the Cold War are more clearly about national interests. I believe that, whether it is liberalism represented by the USA or socialism represented by China, these ideologies primarily serve nation-states. Chinese democracy building would not completely copy the model from Western societies. This is not just because of its different

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history or culture, but also because of different political institutions. Chinese socialism defines the nature of Chinese political democracy building. Nowadays, even if China were completely changed into a democratic and market-oriented society like the USA, the EU, Japan, and other countries would also challenge China on many issues. I believe that the large population of China threatens to use up a huge proportion of global natural resources, which would endanger the extravagant lifestyle of the USA. I think that China as a nation state cannot really be endorsed by those rich counties in the Global North. But I do not think that this implies that we should give up democracy. I suggest that we should look into Chinese cultural tradition and combine democracy building with research into traditional Chinese political philosophy. This will help to build a new type of democracy which would share the essence of modern democracy but suitable to Chinese people’s cultural heritage. I believe that it will not only be beneficial to the unifity of China as a nation-state but also contribute to world peace and human flourishing. In this era of powerful nationalism, I believe that in order to keep it in check, we have to establish a modern socialist democracy. Nationalism without socialist democratic institutions would easily lead to disastrous consequences. Political opportunists would easily take advantage of nationalism and foster the idea that national interests take precedence. This would suppress individual development and engender political authoritarianism. Ultimately, this kind of nationalism would become a tool of totalitarianism. At the beginning of the 20th century, Hitler took advantage of the nationalism in Germany after World War I, and brought disaster to Germany but also to the world. Therefore, even from the perspective of maintaining national interests, we should hold on to socialist democracy. We cannot claim any kind of superiority of Chinese culture. This kind of view has been popular throughout Chinese history. We used to perceive our own nation as civilized but our neighboring states as barbarians. I believe that within the Chinese nation, we have to recognize that we are a nation with many races. Our socialist democracy should learn how to deal with the unity of different races inside our nation. Democracy does not mean that different races should be autonomous ruling themselves, it rather means that in both content and format our political institutions should maintain modern humanism and respect the political rights of each citizen. Modern China developed from ancient China. A nation with many races is the result of historical development. This nation has its own cultural tradition. Over its long history, China gradually underwent the cultural unification of different races. With a strong county system, different races were ruled by one centralized empire. While Western countries were still divided, China was a unified empire for a long time. Even with short periods of divisions, in the end it was always unified as a strong empire. Thus, the coexistence of many races in China is very different from the many states of the Soviet Union. In ancient China, the country was unified by its unique culture of rituals and institutions and had its own cultural identity. Since 1949, China has endorsed republican political

278 Political democracy and Chinese democracy institutions and unified different races. We built a modern socialist nation-state and kept different races unified within regional autonomous governance. I believe that with regard to the modern national state, first of all, we have to respect history. Then we can discuss legitimacy. With regard to legitimacy, we can discuss whether it is legitimate for different nations to build their own nation-states. However, the fact that different races have lived together for a long time renders nation-state building difficult. The cost of building and governing an individual nation-state for each race is so high that it prevents the building of various nation-states. I believe that it is important to respect how history has produced the unification of different races in China. China has allowed autonomous governance in many regions with a large number of minorities. It is important that different ethnic groups learn from each other and cultivate their own cultural traditions. I recognize that it is very challenging to preserve each ethnic group’s own cultural tradition but also to modernize each group. At this point, there are huge gulfs in economic and cultural development across regions and races. It is important to have economic development and to improve socialist democracy in order to allow different races to cultivate their cultures but also to embrace modern development. I believe that it is wrong to separate different races from the People’s Republic of China as a way to develop democracy in China. The USA is a young federal state with many races. There are different political systems among the UK, Germany, and France. China is one of few ancient civilizations. I do not think that we can just easily copy what the West does for Chinese democratic reform. We can definitely learn from the West. But we have to start from our own context and look for political systems that are fit for us, ones that are Chinese, modern, and socialist.

18.3 Regional conflicts and the possibility of realizing democracy across the globe Rawls claims in the Law of Peoples that democratic countries would not have wars against each other. However, democratic countries could start wars against outlaw states. In the last decade of the 20th century, the USA, as a self-claimed paradigm of democracy started wars against Iraq and Yugoslavia. Especially with the 2002 war against Iraq, the USA bypassed the United Nations. Many people believed that this reveals the real nature of a new imperialistic state. If a country that values liberty and democracy can easily break the principles of international justice, should we still learn from such a political institution? In other words, what is the nature of democracy? Should it use two different political standards when it deals with civil and international political issues? Could we ask whether the political leader of Yugoslavia committed ethnic genocides? Why should the people of Yugoslavia endure more than 70 days’ terror of NATO air strikes? Should Saddam’s regime be overthrown in this way? Should the Iraqi people endure more than a decade of economic sanctions from the USA? As a non-democratic state, should we

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endorse the surgical manner of violence used by the USA to overthrow this regime? I believe that what Aristotle said about the distinction between doing the right thing and doing the thing in the right way is relevant here. Relevantly, the distinction between right ends and right means in dealing with international political issues, such as regional conflicts, might be meaningful. In international politics, we could admit that USA is right to overthrow a totalitarian regime and transplant a democratic regime. However, we could still ask whether the USA is doing it in the right way. I believe not. There are many totalitarian states in Africa, Asia, and South America. Some of them are still living as tribes. Has the USA overthrown those states with its own political and economic resources? Then why does the USA not endeavour to implement democracy in those countries? I believe that it is certainly because those countries have not threatened American political and economic interests. Thus, I think that American democracy is indeed much better than many totalitarian regimes in history or modern times, but it is not an ideal political regime. At least in the area of dealing with international relations, the USA does not represent the true spirit of democracy. It represents the interests not of the majoritry, but rather of a few giant capitalists. I believe that democracy in the USA is the balance of interest groups of big capitalists. This form of democracy has to tend to the rights of a majority of citizens merely because they are consumers, who are essential for market development. However, in essence, this is not real democracy, rule by the people. Thus, what Marx and Engels proposed in socialism has a high moral standing, especially in international politics. I believe that it is beneficial for us to look for better democracy, at least in relation to the conduct of international politics. I think that true democracy should be about people. The majority of people should rule. Modern democracy in North America and Europe is led by capitalists. This political institution cannot maintain the peaceful coexistence of different states. Thus, what I recommend for democracy is that the majority of people exercise their liberty in this regime, which would serve their interests. This political institution is based on modern democracy but is different from all actual democratic regimes. I believe that this political institution would hold the same standard with regard to civil politics and international politics. Even with regard to conflicts among different states, the solution is democratic deliberation rather than iron fists. I believe that it is impossible to realize democracy globally with America’s current mode of operating. Using the excuses of democracy and liberty but merely serving the national interests of the USA would only wrongly induce people to become sick and tired of democracy. They might even adopt a more hostile view towards democracy, if they are misled by radical thinkers. Thus, from the perspective of international politics, the current democratic regimes in North America and Europe cannot bring good news to the international community.

280 Political democracy and Chinese democracy

18.4 The mixed type of constitution and the possible contribution of Chinese democracy According to Plato, political acts are a practical craft. Thus we need special skills in politics. Democracy can easily delude people with the idea that everyone should govern the state. This is far from truth. I believe that the essence of modern democracy is that every citizen has some indispensable natural rights, such as the right to life and property. Government cannot impose upon citizens without their consent even if it is to promote the good. All political powers are divided into parallel powers that can be checked and balanced. Its moral basis recognizes the selfishness of human nature. Its epistemic basis is to admit our cognitive limitations. And its historical starting point is the modern market economy. Modern democracy recognizes that each citizen has rights to participate in politics. Through open competition, each citizen has the opportunity to gain power. Thus, each citizen could rationally express her political claims and draw support through persuasion. When they gain power, they can be monitored by supporters and critics. I believe that in a democracy, only a few who have political skills can gain political power; not every citizen is capable of governing. Thus, the democratic institution has to be authoritative in order to implement its various policies. But the difference between totalitarianism and meritocracy is that people in power in a democratic institution have to be checked and balanced by other political powers. And the public can monitor the use of power to a great extent. I think that the ideal of democracy in modern society is very close in spirit to Cicero’s mixed type of constitution. In the book On the Commonwealth, Cicero discusses the theory of the mixed type of constitution. He believes that the best government should include the excellent elements of monarchy, and assign important jobs to aristocrats, and leave other things for the common people to deliberate and decide. This kind of arrangement would maintain fairness, thus common people would accept it. It can also maintain social stability since it prevents the monarchy from becoming despotic, the aristocrats from forming interest groups, and the common people from being misguided.1 On the issues of international politics, modern democracy is very close to Rawls’s Politics of Peoples. In the Law of Peoples, Rawls proposes that we form a sytem of international law based on liberal peoples, rather than nation-states,. Rawls believes that equal and free peoples are the actors in international society. They have the following three characteristics: first, there are just and reasonable constitutional governments that serve them; second, they have what John Stuart Mill called common empathy; third, they are moral. The first is related to institutions; the second is more culturally related; and the last one is based on ideas of rights and justice. Rawls believes that those groups of liberal peoples are different from autonomous states in the traditional sense. Traditional autonomous states would launch wars just to serve their own national interests. However, groups of liberal peoples would not do that. As Rawls puts it,

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a difference between liberal peoples and states is that just liberal peoples limit their basic interests as required by the reasonable. In contrast, the content of the interests of states does not allow them to be stable for the right reasons: that is, from firmly accepting and acting upon a just Law of Peoples.2 Since liberal people do have their own fundamental interests that are allowed by their rights and justice, they would ensure other people’s reasonable justice, and they would peacefully coexist with others. Those who are familiar with Marx’s theory of states and the union of international workers would recognize the similarity between Marx’s theory and Rawls’s idea of international justice. Marx makes claims about uniting all international workers and annihilating states. Rawls sees that current nation-states, whether democratic or not, are not able to realize world peace. Even though he claims that his theory of international peace is a utopian theory, he insists that it is a realistic utopian ideal. After surveying some classical political thinkers’ views, I believe that we should combine the modern Enlightenment ideas from the East and the West since the 17th century, extend the ideal of international workers to the new ideal of liberal peoples, and build a mixed type of international politics of peoples. We may thereby realize global peace. Ideas in international justice, international law, environmental ethics, and cyber-ethics could contribute to this new political institution. With regard to civil politics, Chinese democracy should inherit the good traditions of the county system, such as traditional consultation and the lessons of the balance of power. It should also welcome criticism from citizens and the modern media. With regard to international politics, China should adopt the revised ideas of rule by benevolence, insist on China’s own manner of political reform, and get along with other nations via the idea of peace even with disagreements. Thus, how China builds a democratic country and how democracy building learns from China are the questions of our times.

Notes 1 Cicero, On the Commonwealth and On the Law, ed. J.E.G. Zetzel, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1999, 19. 2 John Rawls, The Law of Peoples, Boston, MA: Harvard University Press, 1999, 29.

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Index

abdication 38–40 administration 14, 19–20, 186, 244 alienation 186–187, 200, 207 ancient Greece 7, 8, 28, 230, 242, 243–245 ancient Rome 150, 245 anthropocentrism 151 Aquinas, Thomas 245 arbitrariness 117–122, 166–167, 174–175 Aristotle 243–244, 279 assistance 92–93, 270–271 autocracy 24, 25–26, 31, 45, 101 Babbitt, Irving 150 balance of power 51, 247, 281 Ban Gu 35, 42 barbarian see Chinese/barbarian distinction de Bary, William Theodore 116, 148 benevolence: Chinese political reform 281; humanism 98; traditional philosophies 12, 39, 41, 69, 72, 74, 79, 81, 83–84, 100; and war 82 Berlin, Isaiah 131 Book of Changes 65–75 Book of Guanzi 21–23 Book of Han 42 Book of Odes 79 Book of Shenzi 23–25 bourgeois society 86, 88, 89 bright law 19 Buddhism 146, 156, 165–166, 199, 212, 217, 220–223, 225 Burke, Edmund 129, 245 Bush, George W. 77 calendar 226–227 capitalism: and democracy 245, 246, 279; Li Dazhao’s philosophy 185, 186; modern China 195–196; and socialism 70–71, 194, 209, 273

central government 47 Chen Duxiu 119, 231 Chen Xiang 219 cheng fa (complete law) 20 chenwei (divination ideology) 5 Chinese/barbarian distinction 217–228 Chinese Communist Party 107, 118–120, 272 Christianity 12, 98, 156, 159, 195, 217, 225–226 Chu Hsi 116 Cicero 21, 27–30, 31, 117–118, 150, 245, 280 citizens/citizenship 86, 242–243, 249, 261–264, 266–267, 275–276, 280; see also democracy; rights civilizations 94–99 civilized liberty (Liang) 173–174 Cixi, Empress 191 clash of civilizations (Huntington) 94–99 class conflict 89–90, 196 classical humanism 154–155 classical liberalism 159–160 colonialism 255–256 commanders 47–48 common people (Feng Qi) 203–205 communism 70, 73, 89–90, 208–212; see also Chinese Communist Party compassion 151, 161 conflict see clash of civilizations; war Confucius/Confucianism 3–16, 45–53, 134–146; Chinese/barbarian distinction 217, 218–219; force 40–41, 78–79; freedom 115–116, 125–133, 166; “humaneness” 148–162, 166, 199, 231; international peace 77–102; justice 70; methodology 12–14; minben 232–233; cf. other political philosophies 23, 25–26, 41–43, 72–73, 145–146, 273

288 Index constitutional politics 183–185, 260–273, 280–281 constructionism 149 corruption 275–276 counselors 51 creativity 61, 126, 129 Cui Jin 69 cultural dialogue (Tu Wei-ming) 94–99 cultural evolution 219–220 cultural liberalism 125–133, 158 cultural nationalism 217–228 Cultural Revolution 207, 208 cultural tradition 5, 37, 129, 196, 277–278 culture 149–150 Dai Zhen 45–46, 156, 242 dao (the Way) 5–6, 8–12, 18–31, 57–59, 67, 212; see also Daoism; Heaven’s Dao; kingly Way for all under Heaven Dao-Law School 19, 30–31 Daoism 51, 57, 63–64, 129, 166, 217, 232, 249 daotong (transmission of the Way) 6, 7 daoyi 3–16, 40, 81, 101 Dazhao Li 272 de 10–12 deliberative democracy 243 democracy: and minben 230–257; modern philosophies 37, 88, 127–128, 182–187, 188, 275–281; traditional philosophies 45–53, 61, 83, 136–137, 145–146; in the West 242–250 despotism 46, 74 diplomacy 62–63 division of power 47–49 Dong Zhongshu 6, 156, 236 Du Fu 113 Duke Ai 11 Duke Huan 78 Duke Jing of Qi 12 dukes 8–9, 46, 50–51, 52, 58 Duxiu Chen 272 Eclectic School 42, 44 eco-environment 73–74 economic development 69–73 economic liberalism 158 education 129, 134–135, 150, 158 elections 249 emancipation 90 emotions 24 emperors 34–35, 48–50, 51, 185; see also kings

Engels, Friedrich 89–90, 279 Enlightenment, the 151, 200 equality 172–173, 178, 264–267 essentialism 149 ethics 8, 9, 10, 41, 87–89, 98–99, 101, 151–152 even distribution 13 evolution 168 fa (law) 18–22; see also law Fairbank, John King 45 family relationships 24, 28, 46, 155; see also transferring political power Fan Zhongyan 239 Fang Yizhi 179, 225 Fei Mi 116–117 Feng Guifen 227 Feng Qi 198–212 Feng Xu Tong (Works of Custom) 109 feudal system 46, 47, 50–51, 52, 254 force 40–41, 59, 206, 248; see also war Frankel, Charles 158 free society 128–129 free will 157 freedom 107–122, 185–186, 187–190, 198–212, 264–267; see also liberalism; liberty French Revolution 129, 169, 245, 247–248 Fukuyama, Francis 194, 257 Gao, King 4 Gao Yao 37 Gaoyang, Emperor 19 gender equality 190–191 Germany 277 globalization 65, 68, 96, 97, 99, 101, 257 gods 28–29, 212 gong tian xia (the good of the country) 50–52 Gong Zizhen 178 Gongshan Furao 136 Gongzi Wei 165 governance by law 137–138 governance by virtue 11, 155 great harmony (Book of Changes) 65–75 von Grimm, Baron 159 Gu Hongming 231 Gu Su 250 Gu Yanwu 46–48, 51, 117, 239, 253, 255 Gu Zhun 209 Guan Zhong 21, 78, 218–219 Guo Moruo 21

Index Han Dynasty 4–5, 48, 255 Han Yu 6–7 Hanfeizi 21, 23, 24–27 harmony 57–64, 65–75 Heaven 12, 20–21, 22–23, 68–69, 224–225; see also Mandate of Heaven Heaven’s Dao (Laozi) 59–60 Held, David 250 History of Han 35 Hitler, Adolf 277 Hobbes, Thomas 86, 159 Hobhouse, Leonard Trelawny 159, 209 Hong Rengan 195 Hong Xiuquan 182, 195 Hou Han Shu (History of the Later Han) 108–109 Hsun Tzu 116 Huang Sheng 3–4 Huang Xing 255 Huang Zongxi 48–50, 51, 117, 156, 157, 239, 252, 253, 255 Hui, King 5, 81 Hui Neng 165 human nature 26–27, 29, 47, 89, 131, 140, 252, 273 humaneness (Confucius) 148–162, 212 humanism 69–73, 98–99, 127, 128, 139, 148–162, 187–190, 195 humanitarianism 99–102 humanities 153–154 Huntington, Samuel 94–99 imperial exam 48 individual–collective relationship 187–190 individualism 160, 208–212 indulgence 120–121 inner freedom (Yin Haiguang) 198–203, 210 international peace 77–102, 192–194, 268–271 ius (law, justice) 27–28, 29; see also justice; law Ji family 78 Ji Kang Zi 11, 12 Ji Ziran 8 Jia Yi 235–236 jian min (person of lower social status) 38 Jiang Qing 15 Jie, King 3, 40 Jin Shu (History of the Jin) 109–110 Jin Yaoji 250–251 Jin Yuelin 198

289

Jing, King 4 junben (ruler as the foundation) 4 jurisdiction 244 justice 7, 29–30, 59–60, 260–265, 272 Kang Youwei 179, 182, 190, 192, 195, 255 Kangxi, Emperor 225 Kant, Emmanuel 86–88, 89, 94, 192, 271 kingly Way for all under Heaven (Confucius) 77–102 kings 34–35, 74; see also emperors Kuomintang 107 Laozi 57–64, 71–72, 232–233 law: content 19–20; government, administration and social regulation 19, 22, 24–25, 27, 137–138; justice, equality and impartiality 21, 22, 24, 25, 26; liberty 171–176; objectivity and sanctity 19, 22, 31; origin 23; public and private 173; rituals 23–24, 25–26, 31 Law of Peoples 90–91, 268–271 Legalist School 18–19, 21–27, 134, 139 lex (law) 27–28, 29; see also law li (benefit/profit) 67, 68, 70, 74 Li Daoping 67 Li Dazhao 119, 182–196, 231 Li-hei 19 Li Shimin, King 5 Li Zhi 116, 190, 252 Liang Qichao 107, 113, 164–179, 182, 189, 255 liberal democracy 90–94 liberalism 73, 90, 93–94, 116–117, 148–162, 208–212, 257, 260–273; see also cultural liberalism; freedom liberty 27, 164–179, 268 Liji (Book of Rites) 220 Liu Baonan 8 Liu Yuan 67 Liu Zhou 237 Liu Zongyuan 113, 165–166, 219 local governments 47 Locke, John 246 Lu, Empress 191 Lu Xiangshan 141–143 Lu Zhi 238–239 Manchu 217 Mandate of Heaven 232, 236 manipulation 205–206

290 Index Mao Zedong 107, 118–120, 208, 228 Marx, Karl 89–90, 190, 273, 279, 281 Marxism 70–71, 188, 190, 195, 206, 207–212, 228 May Fourth Movement 120, 125, 198, 252 mayors 46–47 Mei Wending 225 Mencius: benevolence 74–75, 79–82, 199; Chinese/barbarian distinction 219; daoyi 5, 6; freedom 115; humaneness 136, 155–156, 157; minben 233–234, 252; transferring political power 37, 38, 39, 41, 136–137; transformation 150 meritocracy 280 metaphysical foundation of law 19, 20, 27–31 Mill, John Stuart 200, 245, 280 minben (people as the foundation) 4, 48, 137, 195, 230–257 mind, the 115–116, 177–179 Ming Dynasty 45–53, 176, 224–227 Ming–Qing transition 67, 68, 150–151, 156 ministers of states 8 minzhu 45 missionary work 224–227 Mizoguchi Yuzo 45 modern humanism 154–155 modern liberalism 160 modernization 45, 132, 157, 164, 182, 252–253, 255 Mohism 41–42, 43 monarchy/monarchism 191, 211, 251, 252, 256; see also emperors; kings monopoly of royal power 45 moral liberalism 158 morality 129–130, 132, 136, 140, 161, 179, 200, 262–264 Mozi 38, 39, 43 mythos (Yin Haiguang) 206 Nan Qi Shu (History of the Southern Qi) 112 nation-states 101, 278 nationalism 277 natural justice 57–59 natural law 21 natural sciences 152, 153–154 nature 27–30, 74, 114, 134–135, 151, 168; see also human nature negative freedom/liberty 131, 169 Northern and Southern Song war 239

On the Laws (Cicero) 27–30 Opium War 224, 227, 252–253 oppression 205–206 original position (Rawls) 264–267, 272 outer freedom (Yin Haiguang) 202–203 outlaw states 92, 270 Paine, Thomas 129 pan-ism 193 peace 77–102, 192–194, 268–271 penalty/punishment 19, 21, 22, 31, 84, 173, 175–176 personality 188–189, 200 Petrarch, Francesco 154 philosophical liberalism 158, 159 pingmin zhuyi 186–187 Plato 7, 8, 39–40, 117–118, 230, 243, 280 political justice 260–264 political liberalism 158–159 political liberty 171–176 political reform 275–281 positive freedom/liberty 169 power 34–44, 47–49, 171–176, 206–208, 276 pre-Qin period 8, 27, 34, 136, 218–220, 233, 239, 273; see also Eclectic School; Legalist School prime minister 49–50, 51 private law 49 procedural democracy 250 progress 148–149 property rights 52, 211 public law 49 qi 66, 67 Qian 67, 68–69 Qian Daxin 46 Qian Zhongshu 162 Qianlong, Emperor 52 Qin Dynasty 5, 51, 254 Qing Dynasty 45–53, 185, 217, 224–227, 255, 273 Qing Shi Gao (Draft History of the Qing) 112–113 race relations 277–278 Ran You 78 Rationalistic School in Song and Ming 116 rationality 151, 160 Rawls, John 90–94, 159, 160, 260–273, 278, 280–281 reason 28, 89 rectifying names (Confucius) 12–13

Index ren (benevolence) 12, 35, 41; see also benevolence Renaissance, the 150, 153 representative democracy 242–243, 246 respecting the worthies (Mozi) 38–39, 40, 41, 43 revolution 40–41, 136 reward 84 Ricci, Matteo 224 rights 87–88, 100, 146, 159–160, 177, 243, 280 rites 138–139, 140 rituals 21, 23–24, 83 Rong Cheng Shi 34–44 Rousseau, Jean-Jacques 86, 88, 159, 245–246, 271 royal families 47, 50–51 royal power 45 rule of virtue (Confucius) 11 Russell, Bertrand 88 sage kings 40, 47, 51 sages 23 san gang 15 San Guo Zhi (Record of the Three Kingdoms) 109, 111 scholars/scholar-officials 9, 52, 117 schools 50 scientific socialism 195 self-awareness 126–127 self-protection 87 selfishness 24, 26, 47, 88, 252, 276 Shang Dynasty 50 Shangshu 218, 232 Shen Que 225–227 Shendao 27 Shun 10–11, 36, 37, 38, 39, 233–234 Shunzhi, Emperor 225 Sitong Tan 273 slavery 266 slavery of mind 177–179 small country and few people (Laozi) 60–62 social chaos 45–46 social Darwinism 170 social justice 57–64, 93; see also harmony social utility 65–75 social welfare 92–93 socialism 70–71, 136, 186, 194, 195–196, 208–209, 272–273, 275–281 Society of Peoples 90–91 Socrates 7, 230–231, 243

291

Son of Heaven 38, 39, 49, 144, 234 Song Dynasty 47 Song Shu (History of the Song) 110, 111–112 Song–Ming philosophy 217 sovereign countries 88–89 sovereignty 135–136 Soviet Union 194, 277 Spinoza, Baruch 159 spiritual freedom 176–179, 187, 204 Stalin, Joseph 208, 209 Su Shi 219 suicide 187–188 Sui–Tang period 220–223 Sun Yat-sen 182, 195, 251, 255 survival of the fittest 170 Tai Chen 117 Tai hexagram 75 Tai Jia 39 Taiping tianguo 195 Tan Sitong 156, 157, 176, 190, 192, 253 Tang, King 3–4, 40, 41, 82 Tang Dynasty 5, 47, 48, 51, 254 Tang Zhen 239, 241 Taoism 114 de Tocqueville, Alexis 246–249 totalitarianism 205–206, 277, 279, 280 transferring political power 34–44 transformation 149–150 trustworthiness 13 Tu Wei-ming 94–99 tyranny 40, 41, 245 unionism 192–193 United Nations 101 United States of America 77, 246–247, 278–279 utilitarianism 168–169 veil of ignorance (Rawls) 264–267, 272 virtue 12, 28, 30, 60–62, 70, 135, 145, 156 von Bell, Johann Adam Schall 225 von Hayek, Friedrich Augustus 199, 200, 206, 208, 209 Wallerstein, Immanuel 257 Wang Anshi 239 wang-dao (the kingly Way) 12, 78, 79; see also kingly Way for all under Heaven Wang Fu-chih 117

292 Index Wang Fuzhi 50–52, 67–68, 217, 239, 253, 255 Wang Fuzu 240 Wang Shou-jen 116 Wang Tao 227 Wang Zheng 225 war 59, 78–79, 81–82, 85, 91–92, 100–101, 270, 278; see also World Wars Warring States period 5, 19, 30 water 58 wealth 69–73, 92–93 Wei Yuan 227 Wei Zheng 5 Wei–Jin period 220–223, 240, 255 Wen, King 50, 82 Western culture 217, 224–228, 230–257, 276–278 Western Han Dynasty 5 Western Zhou Dynasty 5, 46 wisdom 203, 210 women 190–191 working class 90, 192–194 world government (Russell) 88 World Wars 69, 97, 249 worldly heaven (Hong Xiuquan) 195 the worthies 36–40 Wu, King 3–4, 40, 41, 82 wu xing (five phases) 5 Wu Zetian, Empress 191 wuwei 51 Wuxu weixin 195 Xia Dynasty 50 Xiao Gongquan 217 xiao-kang (comparatively well-off society) 249 xing (punishment) 19 Xu Fuguan 125–146, 148 Xu Guangqi 224–225 Xuan, King 41, 74–75, 79 Xunzi 5, 82–86, 115, 138–141, 234

Yan Fu 27, 107, 113, 176, 189, 227–228, 256 Yang Guangxian 225–227 Yao 37, 38, 39, 233–234 Yellow Emperor’s Four Canons 18–31 Yi 36, 37 yi (rightness/righteousness) 5–6, 8–12, 70, 74 Yi Yin 39 yin and yang 19, 31, 190, 237 Yin Haiguang 107, 120–122, 148, 198–212 Yu 10–11, 36, 37, 38 Yuan Gusheng 3–4 Yuan Mei 52–53, 242, 255 Yuan Shikai 185 Zengzi 9 Zhang Taiyan 255 Zhang Zai 156 Zhang Zhidong 227 zhen (correctness/firmness) 67, 68 Zheng Banqiao 242 Zheng Guanying 227 zhengyi 7 Zhou, King 3, 40 Zhou Dynasty 8–9, 10–11, 50, 254 Zhu Huan Zhuan (The Biography of Zhuhuan) 111 Zhu Xi 7, 66 Zhuan Ju 78 Zhuangzi 34–35, 41, 61, 114–115, 166 Zichan 21, 254 Zilu 13, 78 ziyou (freedom) 108–113, 165–167 Zuozhuan 218