Belarus in the Twenty-First Century: Between Dictatorship and Democracy 9781032318059, 9781032318066, 9781003311454

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Belarus in the Twenty-First Century

This book presents a comprehensive overview of current developments in Belarus. It explores how there has been an upswelling of popular support for the idea that Belarus must change. It highlights how the old regime, aiming to retain the Soviet legacy, reluctant to reform, presiding over worsening economic conditions and refusing to take measures to cope with the COVID19 pandemic, has been confronted by increasing bottom-up and horizontal social mobilisation which demands a transformation of state-society relations and a new sense of Belarusian peoplehood. The book outlines how the current situation has developed, considers how the present demands for change are deep-seated and long-brewing trends, and reveals much detail about many aspects of the growing societal mobilisation. Overall, the book demonstrates that, although the old regime remains in power, Belarusian society has changed fundamentally, thereby bringing great hope that change will eventually come about. Elena Korosteleva is Professor of Politics and Global Sustainable Development, and Director of the Institute for Global Sustainable Development (IGSD), University of Warwick, UK. Irina Petrova is Assistant Professor, School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), University College London (UCL), UK. Anastasiia Kudlenko is Research Fellow at the Institute for Global Sustainable Development (IGSD), University of Warwick, UK.

BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies Series editors: Sociology and anthropology: Judith Pallot (Chair), University of Oxford economics and business: Richard Connolly, University of Birmingham media and cultural studies: Birgit Beumers, University of Aberystwyth politics and international relations: Andrew Wilson, School of Slavonic and East European Studies, University College London history: Matt Rendle, University of Exeter This series is published on behalf of BASEES (the British Association for Slavonic and East European Studies). The series comprises original, highquality, research-level work by both new and established scholars on all aspects of Russian, Soviet, post-Soviet and East European Studies in humanities and social science subjects. Conservatism and Memory Politics in Russia and Eastern Europe Edited by Katalin Miklóssy and Markku Kangaspuro Projecting Russia in a Mediatized World Recursive Nationhood Stephen Hutchings Russia’s Regional Museums Representing and Misrepresenting Knowledge about Nature, History and Society Sofia Gavrilova Russian Nationalism Imaginaries, Doctrines, and Political Battlefields Marlene Laruelle Researching in the Former Soviet Union Stories from the Field Edited by Jasmin Dall’Agnola, Allyson Edwards and Marnie Howlett Belarus in the Twenty-First Century Between Dictatorship and Democracy Edited by Elena A. Korosteleva, Irina Petrova and Anastasya Kudlenko For a full list of available titles please visit: https://www.routledge.com/BASEESRoutledge-Series-on-Russian-and-East-European-Studies/book-series/ BASEES

Belarus in the Twenty-First Century Between Dictatorship and Democracy

Edited by Elena Korosteleva, Irina Petrova, and Anastasiia Kudlenko

First published 2023 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2023 selection and editorial matter, Elena Korosteleva, Irina Petrova and Anastasiia Kudlenko; individual chapters, the contributors The right of Elena Korosteleva, Irina Petrova and Anastasiia Kudlenko to be identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-31805-9 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-31806-6 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-31145-4 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454 Typeset in Times New Roman by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India

To the fallen, exiled, and imprisoned heroes of Belarus

Contents

List of Illustrations List of Contributors Foreword Introduction

ix xi xvii xviii

ELENA KOROSTELEVA, IRINA PETROVA, AND ANASTASIIA KUDLENKO

PART I

History, Identity, and Politics Revisited 1 The Political Symbols and Concepts of Statehood in the Modern History of Belarus

1 3

ANDREJ KOTLJARCHUK, ANDREJ RADAMAN, AND ELENA SINITSYNA

2 The ‘Genocide of Belarusians’ and the Survival of Lukashenka’s Regime

16

DAVID R. MARPLES AND VERANIKA LAPUTSKA

3 The Soviet Roots of the 2020 Protests: The Unlikely History of Belarusian Civic Nationalism

33

NATALYA CHERNYSHOVA

4 Foreign Policy Manifestations of Belarus’ 2020 Protest Movement: In-betweenness as Usual?

50

HUAWEI ZHENG

PART II

Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscapes 5 Stolen Decades: The Unfulfilled Expectations of the Belarusian Economic Miracle ALEŚ ALACHNOVIČ AND JULIA KOROSTELEVA

65 67 

viii  Contents

6 COVID-19 in Belarus: Politics, Protests, and Public Health

89

CHRISTOPHER J. GERRY AND CORA NEUMANN

7 The Belarusian Judicial System: What Can We Learn from Georgia and Ukraine’s Struggle for the Independent Judiciary?

102

LIUDMILA D’CRUZ, LIUDMILA KAZAK, AND PAVEL KURYAN

8 Belarusian Law as an Agent of Change

117

THOMAS KRUESSMANN AND ANNA S.

PART III

Reclaiming Public Space and Fostering Peoplehood 9 Social Movements and Political Change in Belarus in 2020 and After

131 133

TATSIANA CHULITSKAYA AND ELEANOR BINDMAN

10 Societal Self-Organization in Belarus Post-2020: The Rise of Peoplehood 146 ELENA KOROSTELEVA AND IRINA PETROVA

11 Activating and Negotiating Women’s Citizenship in the 2020 Belarusian Uprising

161

ELENA GAPOVA

12 Tracing the Emergence of Peoplehood in Belarus and Ukraine: A Comparative Study

179

ANASTASIIA KUDLENKO

13 Where Does Belarus Go from Here?

193

VICTOR SHADURSKI

Index

207

Illustrations

Figures 5.1 Real GDP growth decomposition 70 5.2 New business density (new registrations per 1,000 people ages 15–64) 73 5.3 Innovation performance of Belarus, 2020 74 5.4a Net external public sector and government debt 75 5.4b Gross external debt in relation to export and international reserves 75 5.5 Belarusian foreign trade in goods composition by key partners, 2019 76 5.6 GDP per capita growth rates in Belarus compared to neighbouring CEB countries, 2010–2020 77 5.7 Real GDP growth rate, per cent yoy 78 5.8 Inflation rate, per cent yoy 79 5.9a Public debt, per cent of GDP 80 5.9b Public debt, composition by currencies 80 6.1 Cumulative COVID-19 cases in selected countries, 2020 91 6.2 Cumulative COVID-19 cases in selected countries, 2020–2022 94 6.3 Vaccination rates against COVID-19 in various countries 95 6.4 Cumulative COVID-19 deaths in selected countries, 2020–2022 96 6.5 Mortality in Belarus since 2015 97 6.6 Excess mortality and COVID-19 mortality 98 6.7 Proportion of deaths attributed to COVID-19, by country, 2020 99 11.1 Tsapkala, Tsikhanouskaya, and Kalesnikava announce a joint campaign on July 16, 2020 163 11.2 A popular logo by Antanina Slabodchikava based on the image in Figure 11.1 163 11.3 “Women in White” in Minsk 164 11.4 A female protester in Minsk. August 2020 166



x  Illustrations

11.5 “You tortured my son at Akrestina [prison]. How are you now going to stop me, his mother?!” 167 11.6 The handmade poster reads: “I am rising up because of my granddaughters Tanechka and Sashen’ka.” Minsk, October 2020 168 11.7 A feminist anti-patriarchy poster at a rally 169

Table 5.1 Key macroeconomics indicators, 1995–2020

72

Contributors

Aleś Alachnovič is the Vice-President of the economic think tank CASE Belarus

and a PhD candidate at the Warsaw School of Economics, Warsaw, Poland (thesis: “Economic transition in Belarus – conclusions from the post-socialist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and former USSR”). Aleś also serves as Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Representative on Economic Reforms and a member of the Economic Group of the Coordination Council. Aleś graduated from the London School of Economics, London, UK, and the Warsaw School of Economics (under the supervision of Leszek Balcerowicz, the author of the radical economic transition programme in Poland in 1989–1991) and studied Chinese economic transition at the National Taiwan University, New Taipei, Taiwan. Previously, he worked at EY, McKinsey and the National Bank of Poland. Since 2021, Aleś has been a member of the Association of Polish Economists (TEP). Aleś has gathered over ten years of academic and professional experience researching and specialising in Central and Eastern European economies, including Economic transformation of post-socialist countries, institutional economics, and monetary policy.

Eleanor Bindman is Senior Lecturer at the Department of History, Politics

and Philosophy, Manchester Metropolitan University, Manchester, UK. Previously, Dr Bindman was Lecturer in Politics at the University of Liverpool, UK and Leverhulme Early Career Fellow at Queen Mary, University of London, UK. She completed her PhD in Russian and EU Politics at the University of Glasgow, UK, in 2013 and held visiting fellowships at the Aleksanteri Institute (University of Helsinki), Finland, and at New York University, US. Her research interests include policymaking processes in electoral authoritarian regimes, welfare reform, social policy, and social rights in Russia and other post-Soviet states.

Natalya Chernyshova is Senior Lecturer in Modern History at the University

of Winchester, UK. She has published on late Soviet social history, including Soviet Consumer Culture in the Brezhnev Era (2013, paperback 2015), on Belarusian history, and on the 2020 Belarusian protests. She is currently writing a biography of Petr Masherau, the popular communist leader of Soviet Belarus during 1965–1980, a research project funded by the British Academy Mid-Career Fellowship. 

xii Contributors Tatsiana Chulitskaya is Visiting Researcher at the Institute of the International

Relations and Political Science (IIRPS) of Vilnius University (VU), Lithuania, and a research associate at Manchester Metropolitan University, UK. She is originally from Belarus where she studied at the Political Science Department of the Belarusian State University (BSU). Since 2011, Tatsiana has been an academic director of think tank SYMPA/BIPART, Belarus. Her research interests are public policy analysis, public administration reforms, civil society and civic participation in non-democratic regimes, reforms in the post-Soviet countries and Belarusian studies. She is an author of many research and academic publications related to Belarus. In 2021 Tatsiana became an investigative researcher for Oxford Belarus Observatory (OBO), UK.

Liudmila D’Cruz is originally from Belarus where she studied law at the

Belarusian State University. She is a qualified solicitor in England and Wales with more than ten years’ experience working for a leading international law firm and commercial banks specialising in corporate and banking transactions, including multi-jurisdictional transactions. Previously Liudmila was a legal fellow of the Network of East-West Women, an international NGO. She has an LLM in International Public Law from the University of Westminster, UK.

Elena Gapova is Professor at the Department of Sociology, Western Michigan

University, US. She was previously the founding Director of the Centre for Gender Studies at European Humanities University in Minsk (currently Belarusian university-in-exile in Lithuania). She writes extensively on nation, class formation, gender, and intellectuals in the post-Soviet region and, Belarus in particular. Her latest publications include ‘Class, Agency, and Citizenship in Belarusian Protest’, Slavic Review 80(1) 2021; and ‘The Russian Revolution and Women’s Liberation’, in The Routledge International Handbook on Gender in Central-Eastern Europe and Eurasia (2021).

Christopher J. Gerry has recently joined the University of Central Asia (UCA)

as Dean of the Graduate School of Development, based in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Kazakhstan. Prior to this appointment, Professor Gerry was Head of Oxford University’s School of Global and Area Studies and Professor of Public Health and Health Economics in the UK. His research focuses mainly on public health, health economics, inequality, welfare and labour in Eastern Europe and Eurasia and he has published in many of the leading journals spanning public health, economics and the social sciences. While at Oxford, he founded and co-directed the Oxford Belarus Observatory, developed the Georgian studies Programme and launched a new flagship MPhil programme in Global and Area Studies. At UCA he will support the development of young scholarship, lead new research and educational initiatives and develop his own work on health and welfare in the Central Asian region.

Contributors 

xiii

Liudmila Kazak is an experienced Belarusian lawyer. She holds an LLB from

the Belarusian State University, Belarus. From 1997 to February 2021, she practised law at the Minsk City Bar Association as an advocate. She represented many political figures in the Belarusian courts including Maria Kalesnikava, the head of Viktar Babaryka’s electoral campaign during the presidential elections of 2020 in Belarus.

Elena Korosteleva is Professor of Politics and Director of the Institute for

Global Sustainable Development, at the University of Warwick, UK. She is also Co-Founder of the Oxford Belarus Observatory (University of Oxford, UK) and Principal Investigator for the GCRF-funded COMPASS (ES/P010849/1) and COMPASS+ projects. Her interests focus on resilience, complexity thinking, order formation and multi-order governance. Her recent publications include Resilient Communities of Central Eurasia (with I. Petrova, 2023); ‘Community Resilience in Belarus and the EU Response’, Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review, October 2021 (with I. Petrova); ‘The War in Ukraine: Putin and the Multi-Order World’, Contemporary Security Policy 43(3) 2022: 466–81 (with T. Flockhart); and Resilience in EU and International Institutions (with T. Flockhart, 2020).

Julia Korosteleva is Professor in Business Economics at the University College

London School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), UK. She holds a PhD in Economics from the Department of Economics, University of Bath, UK. Her research interests lie in the field of entrepreneurship, finance, and regional area studies. Dr Korosteleva’s recent publications include articles in peer-reviewed journals, including Entrepreneurship Theory and Practice, Journal of Business Venturing, Journal of Common Market Studies, Regional Studies, Small Business Economics, Entrepreneurship and Regional Development, Emerging Markets Finance and Trade, Journal of Economic Policy Reform Eastern European Economics, and Post-Communist Economics. She has also authored and co-authored a number of book chapters. Professor Korosteleva is engaged in a number of UK-based and European research projects, including Horizon 2020.

Andrej Kotljarchuk is Associate Professor and Director of Operations at the

Institute of Contemporary History, Södertörn University in Stockholm, Sweden. His research focuses on memory politics and ethnic minorities. Recent publications include the edited anthologies Sámi Educational History in a Comparative International Perspective (2019) and Ethnic and Religious Minorities in Stalin’s Soviet Union. New Dimensions of Research (2017) and the following articles: ‘Koldyczewo concentration camp’ (co-authored with Martin Dean) in The Encyclopedia of Camps and Ghettos 1933–1945 (2020), ‘Le génocide nazi des Roms en Bélarus et en Ukraine: de l’importance des données de recensement et des recenseurs’ (Etudes Tsiganes, 2016) and ‘World War II Memory Politics: Jewish, Polish, and Roma Minorities of Belarus’ (The Journal of Belarusian Studies, 2013:1).

xiv Contributors Thomas Kruessmann LLM (King’s College London) is Professor of Criminal

Law at New Vision University, Georgia, as well as co-ordinator of the Erasmus+ Capacity Building in Higher Education Project ‘Modernisation of master programmes for future judges, prosecutors, investigators with respect to European standard on human rights’ for Ukraine and Belarus with the University of Graz, Austria. As President of the Association of European Studies for the Caucasus, he devotes himself to European Studies in the wider Caucasus region, including by acting as series editor of the book series ‘European Studies in the Caucasus’. Professor Kruessmann is a German-qualified lawyer with extensive legal practice in one of Vienna’s leading law firms. He is founding director of the Russian, East European & Eurasian Studies Centre at the University of Graz (2010–2015) and Visiting Professor at Kazan Federal University, Russia (2015–2016). Beyond the Caucasus, his research interests extend to issues of comparative, European and international criminal law, gender and the law as well as corruption and compliance. He is chair of the Supervisory Board of Higher School of Jurisprudence/Higher School of Economics in Moscow and maintains close relations with a number of leading universities in Russia, Ukraine, and Central Asia.

Anastasiia Kudlenko is Research Fellow at the Institute for Global Sustainable

Development, School for Cross-Faculty Studies at the University of Warwick, UK. Previously, she worked as Post-Doctoral Research Associate for the Oxford Belarus Observatory, UK (2022), the GCRF COMPASS project (2021), and ERC Project Coordinator at SOAS University of London, UK. Dr Kudlenko’s research focuses on security sector reform, the EU as a security actor, societal resilience, complexity, security governance and security of Wider Europe, with a special emphasis on Central and Eastern Europe and the Western Balkans. She has international masters in Russian and Central Eastern European Studies from the University of Glasgow, UK, and Jagiellonian University in Krakow, Poland, and holds a PhD in Politics and International Relations from Canterbury Christ Church University, UK.

Pavel Kuryan is a Belarusian lawyer. He holds an LLB from the Belarusian

State University, Belarus and the University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK. He has more than ten years’ experience working in the dispute resolution departments of leading international law firms in London, serving clients from the region of Central and Eastern Europe and Central Asia.

Veranika Laputska is a PhD candidate at the Graduate School for Social

Research, Institute of Philosophy and Sociology, Polish Academy of Sciences and a Co-Founder of the EAST Center. Her thesis examines visual propaganda at the national commemorations in modern Belarus. She holds a Specialist Diploma in International Relations from the Belarusian State University, Belarus; an MA in European Studies from the European

Contributors 

xv

Humanities University, Vilnius, Lithuania; an MA in East European Studies from the University of Warsaw, Poland; and an MA in Economy and Society from Lancaster University, UK. She also holds a diploma in Gender Studies from Lund University, Sweden (2009) and completed an American Institute on Political and Economic Systems programme at Georgetown/ Charles Universities, US (2011). In 2022, she was a Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies Fellow at the Jack, Joseph and Morton Mandel Center for Advanced Holocaust Studies, United States Holocaust Memorial Museum working on the project ‘Maly Traścianiec and Other Forgotten Holocaust Sites in Belarus’. David R. Marples is a Distinguished University Professor of Russian and

East European History, University of Alberta, Canada. He is the author of 16 single-authored books, including Understanding Ukraine and Belarus: A Memoir (2020), Ukraine in Conflict: An Analytical Chronicle (2017), Our Glorious Past: Lukashenka’s Belarus and the Great Patriotic War (2014), and Heroes and Villains: Creating National History in Contemporary Ukraine (2008). He has published over 100 articles in peer-reviewed journals. He has also edited four books on nuclear power and security in the former Soviet Union, contemporary Belarus, and Ukraine.

Cora Neumann is a final year PhD candidate at the University of Warwick’s

Department of Economics, UK. She also has an MPhil in Russian and East European Studies from the University of Oxford, UK. Her research interests are gender economics and political economy; she is currently working on projects examining female entrepreneurship in the South Caucasus region and right-wing extremist voting in Germany.

Irina Petrova is a Lecturer (Assistant Professor) at the University College

London School of Slavonic and East European Studies (SSEES), UK. Prior to joining SSEES, she worked as a Post-Doctoral Research Associate at the GCRF COMPASS project at the School of Politics and International Relations, University of Kent, UK. She taught a range of courses on the History and Politics of the European Union, Europe and Eurasia, International Relations and research methods at the University of Kent, KU Leuven, Belgium, and Vesalius College (Vrije Universiteit Brussel), Belgium. Over the past decade, she contributed to several international research projects, including GCRF AGRE, Horizon-2020 UPTAKE project, Jean Monnet Networks C3EU, EUinDepth, ANTERO, NORTIA, and others.

Andrej Radaman was a Research Fellow of the Faculty of History of the

Belarusian State University, Belarus (2016–2018) and Research Fellow of the Department of Genealogy, Heraldry and Numismatics of the Institute of History of the Belarusian National Academy of Sciences, Belarus (2018– 2020). He was fired in 2020 for participating in a protest against Lukashenka’s regime. He is presently a visiting fellow at the Institute of History of Polish

xvi Contributors

Academy of Sciences, Poland, and from October 2021 has been a Doctoral Research Fellow at the University of Białystok, Poland. His research focuses on the political history of the Early Modern Age; the history of the state and law of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia and Samogitia and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth of both nations (the Kingdom of Poland and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania) and the Republic of Belarus; history of the national local self-government, parliamentary institutions and parliamentary law. Recent publications include Urzędnicy Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego. Spisy, t. V. Ziemia połocka i województwo połockie XIV-XVIII wiek, ed. H. Lulewicz (2018); t. IX. Województwo mścisławskie XVI-XVIII wiek, ed. A. Rachuba (2019); t. VIII, Ziemia brzeska i województwo brzeskie, XIVXVIII wiek, ed. A. Rachuba (2020). Anna S. is a master of law and a practising lawyer. Victor Shadurski is formerly Dean of the Faculty of International Relations of

the Belarusian State University (BSU), Belarus. Prior to this, he was Head of the BSU Department of International Relations for five years (1992– 1997). He participated in numerous educational and research cooperation projects. His research interests include current issues of foreign policy of the Republic of Belarus, its relations with European states, global development challenges and their impact on Belarus. Professor Shadurski authored numerous academic papers on these topics, including those published abroad, monographs, and manuals. Some of his most important recent publications include Lithuanian and Belarusian National Identity in the Context of European Integration (2013); Thomas M. Bohn, Victor Shadurski (Hg.), Ein weisser Fleck in Europa. Die imagination der Belarus als Kontaktzone zwischen Ost und West (with Thomas M. Bohn; editor and co-author, 2011).

Elena Sinitsyna is a Lecturer at Universidad Nacional Autonoma De México

(UNAM)’s Department of Political and Social Studies, Mexico, and at Universidad Iberoamericana (IBERO), Campus Mexico City, International Relations Department, Mexico. Her research interests include cultural and regional studies on Europe, Russia and Central Asia.

Huawei Zheng is an independent researcher who successfully defended his

thesis at the University of Kent, UK, in June 2022. His research interests include International Relations theory, Eurasian international relations, and Eurasian regionalism. His work ‘Fragile interdependence: the case of Russia-EU relations’ was published in the Cambridge Review of International Affairs in 2021. His PhD thesis looked at the Eurasian Economic Union as an order-making actor and explored its implications for the changing international order.

Foreword

I feel a bit ill-equipped to write a foreword for an academic book. By no means do I consider myself an academic. However, having the pleasure of knowing personally some of the authors and their stories, I am proud to have been invited to do so. Dear friends, I am thankful for your work and devotion to our cause. As I am writing in July 2022, our loved ones are still in jail. We are yet to achieve the democratic changes we are struggling for. And that’s where I see the unique value of this book – it captures the spirit of the moment defined by uncertainty and pain. The book is doing the crucial work of making sense of this pain. It helps us preserve it for future generations of politicians, researchers, educators, and Belarusians in general. I urge you to read this book not just as a piece of academic literature. Instead, I recommend you take a personal angle. Many authors and people interviewed for the book have been forced to leave the country. Many cannot return home. Some have been arrested. In addition to their academic work, they have personal stories to share. My big lesson of the last two years: ‘peoplehood’, as Professor E. Korosteleva defines it, comes together from thousands of such small human stories. And it is our duty to preserve them, reflect on them, and build our identity on them. The book helps us do exactly that. In democratic Belarus, when academics will try to figure out who we, Belarusians, are and where we come from, let this book be their guide. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya

Leader of the Belarusian democratic movement 

Introduction Elena Korosteleva, Irina Petrova, and Anastasiia Kudlenko

In 2003 we published a book on Belarus with Routledge titled Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy and Dictatorship. It was a result of the conference held at the University of Bath in 2001, ensuing in a collective volume delivered by an international team of scholars covering all key aspects of the country’s development at that time. Regrettably, many of the book’s critical observations including the forecast of the developments after the presidential election of 2001 in the Afterword, are still relevant today, despite that 20 years have passed since its publication. Most notably, the closing paragraph of the book noted: The conclusions which Lukashenka will draw from [the protests] and the choices the future holds for the Belarusian people are as yet unknown, but it is possible that the next free election or referendum in Belarus may lead to the installation of Lukashenka as “the president for life” of this small but strategically important east European country. (Korosteleva, Lawson and Marsh, 2003: 209) Indeed, what we seem to be witnessing today, especially since 2020, is the unfolding crisis of the repressive machinery of Lukashenka’s regime, who, having been in power for 27 years, has now resorted to violence and oppression to stay in control of his own people. And yet, the events that followed the presidential election of 9 August 2020, and its aftermath, demonstrate that the country has transformed dramatically over these two decades, not least in relation to its emerging acute sense of peoplehood and the desire for change. It is therefore essential to take stock of these recent changes and provide a holistic analysis of the ongoing political, socio-economic, legal and foreign policy developments, to understand what the future might hold for Belarus. As argued in the previous volume, over the past decades Belarus remained a unique case among the states of the former Soviet bloc, strongly desiring to preserve its Soviet legacy and being reluctant to reform. Today’s Belarus equally merits academic attention. From the perspective of democratisation and societal resilience, 2020–2021 protests and continued civil partisan resistance provide an important insight to study the grassroots transformation through self-organisation and emergence, not only enriching area studies, but 

Introduction  xix

also the scholarly work on democracy, transition studies, and nation-building. From the International Relations perspective, Belarus, located at the heart of Europe and in between the European Union and Russia, also presents an instructive complex case of a small state situated between two international orders eventually being forced to choose between them: in February 2022 by Lukashenka’s action of lending Belarus’ territory to Russia’s military aggression against Ukraine, Belarus became part of this war and an accomplice in Russia’s war crimes in Ukraine. What will become of the country, once on the path to democracy, and now torn apart by the aggressive geopolitics, and hollowed out by the regime’s atrocities vis-à-vis its own people, forcing thousands into exile and incarcerating thousands of others in overcrowded prisons and labour concentration camps in the 21st century, at the geographical heart of Europe? Despite the tragedy of the past two years, the year 2020 gives us a glimpse of hope, being seen by many scholars in this volume as a watershed year of change in the post-Soviet history of Belarus. It has exposed deep-laid and long-brewing trends, including the transformation of state-society relations and exhaustion of the previous social contract (Haiduk, Rakova & Silitski 2009; Douglas et al. 2020); evolution of societal identity and social mobilisation leading to a qualitatively new state of social and political developments in Belarus. The nonrecognition of the COVID-19 pandemic by the Belarusian authorities, who refused to introduce the lockdown and to provide related support measures to the population as was advised by the World Health Organisation (Astapenia & Marin 2020) served as a mobiliser of the societal bottom-up response, and a precursor of the forthcoming change. People developed multiple networks of self-organisation and self-help, launching neighbourhood support platforms and crowdfunding for the most vulnerable, and the affected. In this state of nascent mobilisation, the society approached the presidential election of 9 August 2020, marred by a widespread intimidation campaign by authorities, ensuing in disputed results. The unprecedented levels of peaceful mass protests across the whole country, lasting for nearly two years, followed. The authorities responded with escalating violence leading to a standoff and an ongoing political crisis. The deteriorating socio-economic conditions have worsened the living conditions for the majority of people even further, with many losing jobs or being forced to seek refuge abroad, and even more feeling intimidated and deeply frustrated, going quiet or underground to continue their resistance. Russia’s war against Ukraine which started on 24 February 2022, revitalised resistance in Belarus, this time also objecting to Belarus’ involvement in the war on Lukashenka’s orders, and his offering of Belarusian soil for Russian troops. At the time of writing this volume, Lukashenka’s regime persisted, sanctioned by the world, backed up by Russia (including financially), and supported by the highly centralised and securitised state apparatus, that had been formed for over three decades. Yet, everyone felt that the 2020 events transformed the societal dynamics irreversibly, not least through the formation of peoplehood in response to state violence, and with the unanimous support of the international community and Belarusian global diaspora. This widespread change

xx Introduction

undoubtedly paves the way to a new Belarus: while the title of the book looks at the country as presently being closer to dictatorship than to democracy, the contributions to the volume argue persuasively in favour of the democratic future for Belarus, premised on the transformative dynamics occurring in the very fabric of the society. This edited volume sets to provide an up-to-date analysis of the most recent developments in Belarus, focusing on the year 2020 as a watershed moment of change for the future of the country. It does so in three parts, preceded by this Introduction, and followed by the Conclusion written by an academicin-exile, a former Dean of the Faculty of International Relations, Professor Victor Shadurski. He, like many others, dared to openly criticise the state authorities for their mistreatment of students and staff at the Belarusian State University, and soon after he was forced to resign after dedicating all his life to the university.1 Part I, titled ‘History, Identity, and Politics Revisited’, focuses on revisiting the nation- and state-building in Belarus to highlight new trends in statesociety relations. In particular, Chapter 1 by Andrej Kotljarchuk, Andrej Radaman (a Belarusian scholar in exile), and Elena Sinitsyna re-assesses the role of political symbols, memory politics and statehood from a historical perspective to argue that despite the limited experience of sovereignty, Belarus has succeeded in emerging as a fledgeling yet feisty peoplehood, ready to defend itself even in the most brutal conditions of Lukashenka’s repression. Chapter 2 by David Marples and Veranika Laputska looks at the survival of Lukashenka’s regime through his manipulation of history and the declaration of a specific ‘Belarusian genocide’ to justify the state measures in combating any dissent and opposition to his regime. In Chapter 3 Natalya Chernyshova examines the Masherov era and its progressive influence on the formation of Belarus as a nation and peoplehood in 2020 to withstand Lukashenka’s oppression. Chapter 4 by Huawei Zheng traces the influence of the new grassroots movement under Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya as a newly elected leader of the democratic opposition, on Belarus’ foreign policy narratives in relation to the European Union and Russia/Eurasian Economic Union. He argues that the emergence of a strong bottom-up opposition and the unfolding protest culture during 2020–2022 pushed Belarus to the precipices of a geopolitical confrontation detrimental to the national stability and security of the entire continent. Part II of the book, titled ‘Socio-economic, and Legal Landscapes’, examines economic and legal developments in the country over the past three decades. Chapter 5 by Ales´ Alachnovicˇ and Julia Korosteleva assesses Lukashenka’s policy of ‘no-reform’, to argue that while for a time Belarus might have been seen as an ‘economic miracle’ experiencing continuing growth and productivity; the lack of reforms in reality, especially under the new regime of international sanctions, has left the country incapacitated for many years to come, to recover and stabilise its lost potency and economic capital. Chapter 6 by Christopher J. Gerry and Cora Neumann argues that the combination of long-standing economic stagnation and the

Introduction  xxi

mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic contributed both to the dismantling of the social contract sustained by Lukashenka’s regime for over 20 years, and to the rise of peoplehood in Belarus supported by nascent community infrastructures formed to replace the lack of response by the Belarusian authorities to the pandemic. The next two chapters – Chapters 7 and 8 – examine the state of the judiciary and the role of law as an agent of change in Belarus. Notably, Liudmila D’Cruz, Liudmila Kazak, and Pavel Kuryan, all practising lawyers, analyse the state of the judiciary system in Belarus, to highlight its particular flaws and the kind of reforms it may need, learning from similar experiences of transition by Ukraine and Georgia. The next chapter, by Thomas Kruesmann and Anna S. (whose name we have to anonymise to protect her from persecution by Belarusian authorities), focused on the role of law and legal culture in building a more responsible and transparent society. Using the case law on the legality of killings by East German border guards, the authors demonstrate that time is irrelevant when delivering justice, and all state perpetrators who committed crime in Belarus during 2020–2022 will be brought to justice. Part III, titled ‘Reclaiming Public Space and Fostering Peoplehood’, studies the emergence of a new social movement different from the ‘NGO-ised’ model of civil society, which dominated the Belarusian landscape prior to 2020, and the ensuing rise of peoplehood as a transformative and transformational political force, to contend that the ongoing societal change is irreversible. Chapter 9 by Tatsiana Chulitskaya (another academic-in-exile) and Eleanor Bindman explores a new complex fabric of civil society to better understand the factors that contributed to the widespread emergence of the protest culture in Belarus, and how and why it is sustained despite the ongoing repressions in the country. Chapter 10 by Elena Korosteleva and Irina Petrova examines the 2020 watershed moment of change for Belarus through the lens of complexity thinking to explain how the protests emerged through hitherto hidden and uncovered relational processes, and why they are believed to be irreversible in their nature to bring about democratic change for the country. They also introduce the notion of peoplehood, to which every chapter in this volume refers, to highlight a new qualitative difference in societal developments, by virtue of self-organisation and self-help, leading to new dynamics that cannot be suppressed spelling out the eventual demise of Lukashenka’s rule. The next chapter, Chapter 11 by Elena Gapova, looks at the actualisation of the women’s movement and their agentic emergence as a defining feature of the 2020 protests. Drawing on the first-hand evidence of conversations, collected artwork, and participatory engagement, she underscores that this was not just a feminist side of national reawakening. Rather, it symbolises a new kind of actual citizenship, activated, displayed, and negotiated by the women themselves feeling in part with men, in fighting for the new Belarus. Chapter 12 by Anastasiia Kudlenko, a Ukrainian with Belarusian roots, offers comparison between the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine and what she calls a Revolution of Indignation in Belarus in 2020.

xxii Introduction

While noting that the events of 2020 should be seen in their own right, as a standalone watershed moment, she also observes that a single unifying feature for both revolutions is that they were both driven by peoplehoods as a transformative force to create new, better life based on realisation self-worth, selforganisation and rekindling with the past. The concluding chapter, by Victor Shadurski, summarises all key developments in modern Belarus from a bird’s eye perspective highlighting three major transformations: first, Lukashenka’s personalistic rule no longer has any ground to stand on, due to the broken social contract, impoverishing state resources, and most importantly, degrading the state elite: according to Shadurski, these people can no longer control, let alone profiteer from the failing state. He argues that this is happening not simply because of Belarus’ bankrupt economy under the new sanctions regime, but also because of the moral bankruptcy of the state apparatus shaken up by the rising protest culture and growing resistance from the new generation of young Belarusians, supported internationally and uniting people of all walks of life today. *** This volume brings together a unique team of leading scholars and practitioners to look at the continuities and change in Belarus from the social philosophy, history, sociology, politico-economic, legal, and international relations perspectives. This team has been working collegially under the aegis of the COMPASS and COMPASS+ projects, in various capacities (as members of the Advisory Board, senior and junior scholars, from Belarus, the UK, the EU, and the wider region) supported by the Global Challenges Research (GCRF) fund (ES/P010849/1) and through the support of the Oxford Belarus Observatory set up two years ago to debate and examine change in the country, and finally, through the leadership of the Institute of Global Sustainable Development at the University of Warwick, aiming among other things, to make democracy more sustainable. This monograph is owed to all fighting Belarusians and Ukrainians in their quest for a better life. Long Live Belarus! Glory to Ukraine!

Note 1 For more information see the following commentary by EuroRadio on Shadurski’s departure, available here: https://euroradio​.fm​/ru​/posle​-razgovora​-napisal​-zayavlenie​ -uvolilsya​-dekan​-fmo​-bgu​-viktor​-shadurskiy (accessed on 29 July 2022).

References Astapenia, R. and A. Marin (2020) ‘Belarusians left facing COVID-19 alone.’ Chatham House. Available at: https://www​.chathamhouse​.org​/2020​/04​/belarusians​-left​-facing​ -covid​-19​-alone

Introduction  xxiii Douglas, N. et al. (2020) ‘Belarus: From the old social contract to a new social identity.’ ZOiS Report 6/2020. Available at: https://www​.zois​-berlin​.de​/publikationen​/belarus​ -from​-the​-old​-social​-contract​-to​-a​-new​-social​-identity Haiduk, K., Rakova, E. and V. Silitski (eds. 2009) Social Contracts in Contemporary Belarus. Belarusian Institute for Strategic Studies, SPb.: Nevskij Prostor. Korosteleva, E., Lawson, C. and R. Marsh (2003) Contemporary Belarus: Between Dictatorship and Democracy. Routledge Curzon. Petrova, I. and E. Korosteleva (2021) ‘Societal fragilities and resilience: The emergence of peoplehood in Belarus.’ Journal of Eurasian Studies 12(2): 122–32 https://doi​.org​/10​. 1177​/18793665211037835

Part I

History, Identity, and Politics Revisited



1

The Political Symbols and Concepts of Statehood in the Modern History of Belarus Andrej Kotljarchuk, Andrej Radaman, and Elena Sinitsyna

Introduction With the emergence of sovereignty as a key state objective, political symbols have been used as an ideological tool for nation-building and as devices for the inclusion/exclusion of different social groups within the nation-state. Belarus is an interesting case in this regard. According to the country’s Constitution of 1994, it has two official languages: Belarusian and Russian. But this is not the only “duality” Belarus is dealing with today. The country is represented de facto by two different sets of political symbols and somewhat conflicting historical concepts of statehood: one relating to the Belarusian People’s Republic of 1918, reflecting its historic European past and “Pahonia” as its white-redwhite flag; and the other to its Soviet past, and its green-red flag, now increasingly associated with Aliaksandr Lukashenka’s regime and nostalgia for the Soviet order. Why is it so? This chapter approaches the topic from three different perspectives to examine a bourgeoning sense of statehood and national identity in the changing Belarus of the 21st century. The first section will offer a historiographic overview of the different concepts of statehood in Belarus. The second section will focus on Belarus’ constitutional identity, while the final part will analyze the use of national and political symbols in the country to support the formation of peoplehood and nationhood as the pillars of independence and sovereignty of a modern-day state. The chapter aims to shed light on an understanding of the contemporary political crisis in the country and its ramifications beyond its borders.

States, Historians, and the Concepts of Statehood In international law, a state, to be considered as such by the international community, must possess “a permanent population, a defined territory, a government, and the capacity to conduct international relations” (Montevideo Convention on the Rights and Duties of States 1933). The concept of statehood manifests itself through the notions of identity, citizenship and political mobilization of a nation by means of various state institutions, including the education system, museums, press and state-affiliated academic scholarship, as well as political symbols. DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-2

4  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited

Unlike the neighbouring Baltic States, Belarus was not independent either after World War I or during the interwar period, and had no large diaspora in the West after World War II to advocate for its statehood. The Cold War contributed to this long period of political “unrequitedness”: very few academic monographs in English were published on the political history of Belarus and its centuries-long experience of statehood construction. This is even though there were some significant milestones in the history of the nation, for instance, when Belarus was part of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, a medieval principal military rival of the Duchy of Muscovy (Levko and Golubev 2018). The borders of the Grand Duchy with Poland and Russia almost perfectly coincide and reflect contemporary ethnic and linguistic borders between Belarusians and Russians in the east and Belarusians and Poles in the west (Kotljarchuk 2019: 73–74). Belarus became part of the Russian Empire at the end of the 18th century as a result of the partitions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Unlike Ukraine or Finland, Belarus had no autonomy within the Russian Empire, and was divided between several gubernias (municipalities) confronting and adopting multiple historical concepts of statehood. They were known at that time as Belarusian and Lithuanian fiefdoms or the North-Western Lands, which inhibited the development of the Belarusian national movement (Unuchek, Smiehovich and Filatova 2019: 309–311). Regarding religion as a key defining factor of identity and nationhood, there was a mixed picture as well. The Belarusian people were divided between various Christian denominations. In particular, until the mid-19th century, the majority of Belarusians were Catholics (Greek-Catholics and Roman Catholics) while the remainder belonged to the Orthodox and Protestant denominations. In 1839, the tsarist government abolished the Greek-Catholic church, the largest church in Belarus. Since then, most Belarusian believers belong to the Russian Orthodox Church. The religious diversity of the population also resulted in the coexistence of different written languages (Belarusian, Polish, Russian, etc.). The cultural diversity of Belarus is also reflected in the two different grammars of Belarusian literary language as well as the use of different scripts: for example, the Belarusian Eastern Slavic dialect belongs to the same linguistic group as Russian. The language issue, alongside religious and political binaries, contributed to the assimilation of Belarusians in first, imperial, and later, Soviet Russia. According to the nationalist narrative in the historiography of Belarus, the political birth of Belarus goes back to the anti-tsarist uprising of 1863–1864 led by Kastus’ Kalinouski (Unuchek, Smiehovich and Filatova, 2019: 213, 220– 223). He was born to a family of Belarusian nobility in Mostowlany, in the Hrodna region, and studied law at the University of St. Petersburg, but instead of pursuing a governmental career, he chose the underground resistance. Kalinouski was an editor of the first – illegal – newsletter in the Belarusian language, Muzhyckaja Prauda (Farmers’ Truth). Kalinouski advocated the ideas of national liberation, rule of law and social equality, and the restoration

The Political Symbols and Concepts  5

of the native Greek-Catholic Church for Belarus. He also favoured the old democratic traditions of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, as opposed to Russian autocracy. On 22 March 1864, he was publicly executed in Vilna, and his remains were clandestinely buried by the Russian authorities on the site of a military fortress on top of the Gediminas Hill in what is now modern-day Vilnius. The rediscovery of his remains in 2019 and his solemn reburial, which was attended by thousands of Belarusians, became a strong demonstration of the call for sovereignty by the Belarusian people (Burial of Kastus’ Kalinouski, Zygmunt Serakowski, and other insurgents (1863–1864)). At the beginning of the 20th century, the Belarusian national movement developed political institutions which were essential for an independent state, including political parties, native-language media and publishing houses as well as a nationwide network of native schools. The first modern concept of Belarusian statehood was formulated by Vaclau Lastouski in 1910. As a 27-yearold amateur historian, he published A Short History of Belarus in Vilna, written for the Belarusians in the Belarusian language (Lastouski 1910). According to Lastouski, Belarus’ old tradition of statehood originated in the medieval Principality of Polatsk and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania. The Grand Duchy was considered to be the first fully independent Belarusian state (Unuchek, Smiehovich and Filatova 2019: 216, 223, 336). After the union with Poland (1569), as Lastouski (1910: 8–16) argued, Belarus lost its independence, and under the tsarist Russian Empire the country also lost the relics of its old historical legislation, its cultural prominence and European administrative configuration to become a province of Russia. In 1918, on behalf of the social-democratic government of the Belarusian Democratic Republic Professor Mitrafan Dounar-Zapolski wrote a thesis titled “The basis of Belarusian state individuality”, published in Belarusian, English, German, and French (Dounar-Zapolski 1919). This was a political manifesto of a fledgeling Belarusian republic. Educated in Kyiv, Dounar-Zapolski was the first modern professor of the history of Belarusian descent. He argued that despite the fact that there was no such a country called “Belarus”, Belarus per se has had a long tradition of statehood: At times, doubt has naively been expressed about the fact that a Belarusian state existed. While it is true that no state existed under that name – just as there were no Italian, Belgian, Ukrainian and other states before they were formed. The Belarusian nationality represents itself in Lithuania-Ruthenia. (Kipel & Kipel 1988: 37) Dounar-Zapolski considered the Grand Duchy of Lithuania to be the first Belarusian state, due to the political predominance of Belarusian nobility and old Belarusian language and culture. This concept was developed by the Minsk Historical School during the interwar period at the Belarusian State University. Like their Lithuanian colleagues, Belarusian historians focused on the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a predecessor of the modern state. But unlike their

6  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited

Lithuanian counterparts, most Belarusian historians were murdered by the Soviet secret police NKVD, and the study of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Belarus’s history of statehood was postponed until the fall of the Soviet Union. As Rainer Lindner notes, “the history of Belarusian historiography during the Soviet time was the history of its liquidation” (Lindner 1998). The Soviet concept of Belarusian statehood was developed during the Stalin era. In 1934, the first communist history of Belarus was published. In 1948, the official concept of the history of Belarus was prepared by the Institute of History of the Academy of Sciences in Minsk, approved by the Communist Party and released in print. According to this concept, the Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) was the first state in Belarusian history; Belarus allegedly had no tradition of statehood before 1917, or immediately after, and was under Lithuanian, Polish, and Russian subjugation during most parts of its history. The Grand Duchy of Lithuania was presented as a state of Lithuanian feudal lords who exploited the Belarusian population. The Belarusian People’s Republic (created in fact by the left-wing politicians) in 1918 was described as a “bourgeois-nationalistic” project supported by the German Empire (Partnou 2000). This narrative was inscribed into the school and university curricula as a part of the teaching of history as a subject in Soviet Belarus. The editor-inchief of the school history textbooks published in both Belarusian and Russian during the 1960–1980s was Professor Laurentsii Abetsedarski. He denied the role of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania in the nation-building of the Belarusians and presented the Belarusian Democratic Republic as an extreme nationalistic project (Abetsedarski 1976). The concept promoted by Abetsedarski was heavily criticized by Belarusian historians in exile (Urban 1972) and later was denounced by the Belarusian Popular Front. With Lukashenka’s arrival to power, a new page in the history of Belarus began. The official state narrative had explicit anti-Polish and anti-western sentiments leading to a new revision of the concept of statehood. Official historians described the history of Western Belarus (then part of Poland) as the period of Polish occupation. In 2021, a new public holiday – National Unity Day, devoted to the unification of Western and Soviet parts of Belarus after the 1939 Molotov-Ribbentrop pact – was established. The antiPolish rhetoric affected even the image of the medieval and early modern history of Belarus. At the meeting with academic historians devoted to historical politics in January 2022, Lukashenka suggested calling the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth (1569–1793) “a period of brutal occupation and ethnocide of Belarusian people by Poland” (Lukashenka 2022). He subsequently ordered a revision of all school textbooks and the renovation of museum exhibitions in order to propagate his new vision of Belarusian history. Ironically, the year 2022 was declared by Lukashenka to be a Year of (New) History of Belarus, aiming at tailoring public historic narratives to Lukashenka’s needs, rooted in the stereotypes of Soviet historiography. On the contrary, the vision of Western Belarus by independent and international scholars is mostly ambivalent (Drweski 2002; Pashkevich 2006), but

The Political Symbols and Concepts  7

they agree on the political discrimination against the Belarusian minority. However, they argue, interwar Poland was not a dictatorship like the USSR, and Belarusian intelligentsia there was not exterminated physically like in Soviet Belarus. The Polish period was an era of massive political mobilization of the Belarusian nation and the Belarusian parliamentary club at the Polish parliament was set to act as a school for the bourgeoning peoplehood, the concept developed in this volume by Korosteleva and Petrova (2021), which later may even grow into a vision of nationhood equipped with its symbols of statehood and an inter-generational vision of the good life long-sought by the Belarusians through the history of their existence. The next section looks at the constitutional identity of the nation as a cornerstone of its development into a sovereign state.

The Statehood and Belarus’s Constitutional Identity The origins of the Belarusian political and legal thought, based on the idea of the national republic as a sovereign, independent, democratic state, could be traced back to 1903 when the members of the Belarusian Revolutionary (Socialist) Hramada were considering all these characteristics as their ultimate goal, while discussing other – more realistic and probable – alternatives for obtaining a real autonomy for Belarus within the hypothetical Russian federal democratic republic or within a common state with Lithuanians (Unuchek, Smiehovich and Filatova 2019: 309–311). By 1915–1917, there were three possible scenarios: (1) the revival of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania as a common state of all its nations (though the representatives of different ethnic groups and parties could not reach any consensus on this); (2) the establishment of a federal Lithuanian-Belarusian Republic; and (3) obtaining the status of autonomy for Belarus within the frontiers of the democratic or Soviet Russia (Sidarevich 2015; Unuchek, Smiehovich and Filatova 2019: 383–391). On 9 and 25 March 1918, the founders of the Belarusian Democratic Republic (BDR) exercised their right to self-determination of the nation. While declaring Belarus as an independent democratic sovereign state, they stated that Belarus finally became liberated after three and a half centuries of slavery, and that “Belarusian nation is alive, and will live” (Šupa 1998: 52–53, 62–63). It was the explicit refusal of any type of statehood within Soviet Russia; a denial of monarchic traditions of Russian autocrats that used to title themselves as the rulers of “White Russia”. It was also a refusal of the traditions of the unitary state with Poland; although, it was specially mentioned that it was necessary to accept the ancient traditions of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania of pre-Lublin period. During the Soviet period of Belarusian history, the Communists had denied any constitutional identity to the Belarusian statehood. The 1978 Constitution of the BSSR did not mention any pre-Soviet forms of historical Belarusian statehood. The narrative changed after the fall of the USSR. The project of the preamble of the first Constitution of the Republic of Belarus, claiming as its goal “to provide civil consensus”, acknowledged

8  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited

the efforts for the construction of a fair-minded social order in an ancient Belarus, reflected later in the Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia, and Samogitia, in the founding charters of the Belarusian Democratic Republic, in the Constitution of the BSSR, and in the Declaration on State Sovereignty. From 24 July 1991 to 6 July 1993, little changed in the constitutional text. But at the final stage of the work on the white paper of the Constitution, the majority of the Parliament voted for deleting the historical details of Belarusian statehood from the text. Instead, it states that Belarusian statehood has a centuries-long tradition and history (Vasilevich and Chudakov 2017: 115). Even today there are passionate debates on the origins, traditions, and essence of Belarusian statehood and its constitutional identity. Thus, the version of the alternative project of the Constitution of Belarus proposed for public discussion in autumn 2021 stipulated that Belarus’ history relies on the centuries-old history of the Belarusian statehood – from the Principality of Polatsk and the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, to the Belarusian People’s Republic, the BSSR, and up to the present day, paying tribute to the law written in Belarusian in the Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, in the Charters of the Belarusian People’s Republic and the Belarusian Constitutions. (Draft New Constitution from 26 October 2021) A complex conflation of history and politics emerges in this case: the supporters of the democratic republican tradition did not consciously distance themselves either from a monarchic statehood tradition of feudalism, or from the Soviet totalitarian form of statehood, or indeed from the latest decades of authoritarian statehood construction. It is important to consider and analyze all the contradictions of the long historical path of Belarusian statehood to ensure its future is certain. This is because only an impartial understanding of the complexity of stateand nation-building as a historical process could provide us with essential insights and an understanding of how democratic and monarchic traditions of Belarus are intertwined to express themselves in the recent wave of peoplehood. In his attempt to recover at least the formal loyalty of a passive majority of the population, and to neutralize his opponents, Lukashenka did all he could to isolate the active participants of the 2020 peaceful protests, keeping them imprisoned and persecuted. Influential representatives of the national political and cultural elite, capable of critical analysis of the situation and provoking a long-expected shift of collective conscience, are kept isolated from their audience. They are the first to be thrown out of academic and

The Political Symbols and Concepts  9

educational institutions, or forced to migrate out of the country, or simply kept silenced. The year 2022 was declared by Lukashenka as the Year of Historical Memory. Once again, there were orders to rewrite the textbooks in a situation of total intolerance to academic transparency and ideologizing history as a discipline. During the Meeting on Historical Politics, held in Minsk on 6 January 2022, Lukashenka, whose main narrative traditionally related to the history of Belarusian statehood of the Soviet past and the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945, this time called on the state-run agencies to pay more attention to the medieval Polatsk and Turau Principalities, as well as the early period of Grand Duchy of Lithuania. On this occasion he did not mention the statehood tradition of Belarus within the Russian Empire, but was extremely critical towards the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, defining it as a period of Polish occupation (Lukashenka 2022). Following the political leadership of the Russian Federation in the construction of the Union State, under the condition of de facto Russian domination (especially after the peaceful protests of 2020), Lukashenka embraced historical politics as a strategy of survival in the circumstances of a global fight for the revision and redistribution of political power. Being a monarchist in essence, Lukashenka constructed in Belarus a social structure based on privileges, where social mobility depends on servitude and blind obedience to the state system. The dictator and his close entourage disregard any signs of parliamentarism, local self-administration, freedom of speech and de facto constitutionalism, which were major characteristics of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia, and Samogitia within the formats of legal and political real union with the Kingdom of Poland (Radaman 2018). The same is true of the tradition of party-based democratic centralism, which was a main characteristic of the Soviet period of Belarusian statehood. Instead, Lukashenka joyfully accepted the comparison of his regime with the medieval reign of Useslau of Polatsk and of Vytautas the Great (Marzaluk 2019). This is probably an attempt to bring an additional long-term historical legitimacy to the tradition of the absolute ruler in Belarus. However, he did not officially recognize his form of government as a monarchy de jure, and the Belarusian nation found itself placed in a situation of dictatorship when there has been no choice, nor any alternative to a form of statehood as a system of social and political organization of the state institutions and political practices on a legal basis. Citizens of the country are unable to participate either in the state structure construction or exercise their right to change the state system through voting: it is an authoritarian regime camouflaged as a republic. However, the ideas of personal dignity, human rights, and freedom are still alive and were explicitly manifested in the street protests during 2020–2021. Only through understanding and participating in the debate on historic memories and future heritage collectively, a future democratic statehood of Belarus could emerge.

10  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited

National and Political Symbols The historical consciousness of the Belarusians is a critical part of national identity traditionally manifested through political symbols and cultural traditions of folklore. It embraces different narratives and rescues the nation from the collective amnesia caused by some periods of the Belarusian collective past. The analysis of the network of imagery through which political powers operate is a challenging experience for any political scientist. For this analysis, the focus is on the political symbols (i.e. flags, songs, emblems) as a reflection of tensions between the existing concepts of statehood and collective identities of those that compose a nation. They also shape the present struggle for democracy and the vision of the nation, as reflected in one of the chapters by Marples and Laputska, Kruessmann and Anna S., and Gapova in this volume. A hundred years ago, in 1916, one of the founders of modern Belarusian literature, Maksim Bahdanovich, inspired by the coat of arms and the history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Ruthenia, and Samogia, wrote a poem called Pahonia. In 2020, the year of popular protests, both the coat of arms Pahonia, and the poem of Bahdanovich, accompanied by the music of a Belarusian composer and immigrant activist Mikalaj Shchahlou-Kulikovich, became an emblem and a popular non-official anthem of the Belarusian protests against Lukashenka’s regime. A similar story had happened to Klaudzii Duzh-Dushevsky’s whitered-white flag, which was proposed in 1917 by the First Belarusian Congress of the Belarusian People’s Republic (BNR) as a symbol of national identity of the people of Belarus. Since 1995, Lukashenka has intentionally refused to use political symbols of the BNR. Instead, he sustained a different narrative based on the Soviet past. The focus of today’s anthem of Belarus is My Belarusy (“We are the Belarusians”) which was written in the 1940s and adopted in 1955 as a national anthem of the BSSR to glorify the friendship of Belarus and Russia. After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the music composed by Niescier Sakalouski was kept, and the lyrics of Michas’ Klimkovich were substituted by the lyrics written by Uladzimir Karyzna. One of the key ideas of the new national anthem entirely focused on Russia, and the loyalty to the Union State was underscored. Nowadays the Belarusians who use national symbols are being persecuted by the Lukashenka’s regime in the country.1 At the same time, Rada, a provisional parliament of the BNR, known to be the oldest existing government in exile, and the Belarusian political opposition, including the Coordination Council for the Transfer of Power created by a presidential candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya during the 2020 protests, identify themselves with the whitered-white political symbols. The “War of the Flags” in Belarus has its own history. In Minsk, the whitered-white flag re-emerged for the first time after World War II in 1988. In November, on the traditional Belarusian holiday Dzjady, students and political activists held an anti-Soviet meeting in Kurapaty (a suburb of Minsk), one of

The Political Symbols and Concepts  11

the first oppositional demonstrations in the Soviet Union. Kurapaty became an iconic image of Soviet crimes against humanity in Belarus. Here, in 1937–1938 during the Great Terror, the NKVD killed around 30,000 Belarusians. The “People’s Memorial”, including thousands of crosses and a memorial bank from the US government, was constructed in the early 1990s. However, the authorities recognized the memorial only in 2018. In 1991, with the dissolution of the USSR, the national white-red-white flag and Pahonia became for a while the official political symbols of independent Belarus. The political symbols of Soviet Belarus (flag, coats of arms, and anthem) created during the Stalinist era lost their legitimacy. As Gabriella Elgenius (2011: 59–60) pointed out, this is a normal praxis for many East European countries when the change of ideological regime leads to the modification of an old flag or adoption of a new one. When Lukashenka became president of Belarus in 1994, his inauguration was held under the historical white-red-white flag. However, a year after taking office, Lukashenka won a controversial referendum that gave him the power to dissolve parliament, and increased his authoritarian power. In 1995 the whitered-white flag lost its official status and was replaced by a modification of the BSSR flag. At the same time, Pahonia – Belarus’ historical coat of arms since 1918 – was replaced by the modification of the coat of arms of Soviet Belarus. The change of political symbols demonstrates a dramatic change in memory politics and led to the revision of the concept of statehood. The confrontation between national and Soviet political symbols, initiated by Lukashenka in 1995, led to the polarization of civil society and a gulf between the state and democratic opposition. The main headline of the independent media in the mid-1990s was the news about Miron. This was the nickname of a “Belarusian Zorro”, who placed national flags on top of many towers across the country. He placed the first flag on top of a 40-metre factory chimney in Liozno – the hometown of Marc Chagall. Since 1995 dozens of flags have been planted across Belarus. For almost a decade the police were hunting Miron. He was only detained in 2010, revealing his identity as Siarhei Kavalenka, an ordinary construction worker and a member of the Conservative party the Belarusian Popular Front (Kotljarchuk 2020). In the second half of the 1990s, the national white-red-white flag became a symbol of democratic opposition and was visible at all political demonstrations against Lukashenka’s regime. At the same time, the green-red flag became a symbol of the state apparatus and citizens who were loyal to the regime. Meanwhile, the state successfully popularized the green-red flag through the media and school, sport and military ceremonies. It led to a normalization of the red-green flag, which is alleged to be associated with welfare politics and stability of Lukashenka’s presidency (Kotljarchuk 2020). For the first time in its history, Belarus made headlines in the global media in August 2020. The disputed presidential elections after 25 years of authoritarian rule by Lukashenka led to mass protests across the country, lasting for months, for the right to vote at free and fair elections. The international readers

12  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited

were fascinated with the peaceful nature of the protests as well as the thousands of white-red-white flags waved by the protestors. Tragically, unprecedented repressions by the regime followed. One of the examples of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Coordination Council’s ethical, diplomatic, and legal success is The Nuremberg People’s Tribunal that started under the national white-redwhite flag in October 2021 in the German city, widely known for its international trials against the Nazi criminals. The Nuremberg People’s Tribunal has continued the investigation of persecution by the authorities of the Belarusian Free Press (Belarus in Focus, Press Club Belarus, Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ), a Legal Initiative, Viasna human rights centre, and other independent Belarusian media), reflected in the publication of the book Seeking Justice. Stories of Violence in Belarus. August 2020 Through the Eyes of Belarusian Media, under the motto “Each case must be investigated. Each victim must be remembered and protected”. The motive that pushes these projects is the desire to bring all and each of these cases of human rights violation to the Hague, the United Nations’ International Court of Justice. Both technological and moral capacities to keep on promoting the ideas of dignity and solidarity of the brutally suppressed inside the country’s democratic forces have been possible thanks to the multiple networks of self-organization, such as neighbourhood support platforms, independent bloggers, as well as opposition media channels like NEXTA, TUT​.​by (zerkalo​.​io), Naviny​.by​, Novy Cˇas, Nasha Niva, Onliner, Euroradio, regional media Hrodna​.life​, Mogilev.Online, Intex-press, Brestskaya Gazeta, Media-Polesie, Rehianalnaya gazeta, Silnye Novosti, as well as Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty/Radyjo Svaboda, Press Club Belarus, On-line Club “Svetlana Aleksievich Invites”, ePramova. Still, many of the oppositionists are kept in jail in Belarus. Journalists, lawyers and IT specialists are “major targets” of Lukashenka’s hybrid war against the opposition. At the same time, while they are targeted for the expression of their ideals, their faces – multiplied by social networks – have become the symbols and icons of the protest movement; while their persecutors stay in balaclavas, hiding their personal identity and erasing any evidence of their belonging to the regime. Finally, it can be stated that it is thanks to the recent shift in the Belarusian collective mentality, caused by their exposure to the global “network society”, Belarusians have now made a conscious choice for democracy and rule of law. More than “a historical predetermination”, it is a question of choice and a conscious response to the (other) “alternatives”, with change becoming irreversible.

Conclusion Lukashenka’s rule and manipulated memory politics commit Belarusians to the revisionist concept of statehood for Belarus. The contemporary concept is based on the Victory in the Great Patriotic War of 1941–1945 and the positives of the Soviet rule obliviating the cultural past that had contributed to the development of what Belarusians are today as a nation. Exploiting the

The Political Symbols and Concepts  13

mythology of the war and the crimes of the Nazi occupation has a practical political meaning for Lukashenka, as is shown in the next chapter by Marples and Laputska. This does not only relate to claiming a special place in history for Lukashenka himself as the last-standing defender of Europe against Nazism. It is also linked to the new politics of stigmatization of the democratic activists as the “heirs” of the pro-Nazi collaborators and servants of “the West” and NATO, also widely deployed in Russia’s war against Ukraine. At the same time, the anti-globalist, anti-EU and anti-liberal rhetoric of Lukashenka gives him an image of a “strong leader” within the European far right (Kotljarchuk 2022). The current regime provides a particular framing of the Belarusians’ native language, culture, political memories, and their own traditions of statehood, promotes the narratives based on the Soviet victory in the Great Patriotic War and the idealized unity with Russia. On the positive side, Lukashenka’s regime has also engendered the rise of civil society and the role of the new heroes as active opponents of authoritarianism: all those who had to go through physical and moral pain to remain loyal to their integrity and dignity; those who are currently serving as political prisoners of the regime; and all those who took on themselves the responsibility to articulate the challenges that the national culture and Belarusian statehood are facing today. It is important to understand that there is no such a thing as a single binary vision of history, and the people of Belarus are not just the fighters to preserve their past; they are also the creators of their own future, based on the cultural legacy and traditions of sovereignty, and the imageries, values, and symbols of their future “good life” vision.

Note 1 See chapters by Marples and Laputska; and Chernyshova for further discussion.

References Abetsedarski, L.S. (1976) Historyia BSSR: Padruchnik dlia vuchniu siaredniai shkoly. Minsk: Narodnaya asveta. Dounar-Zapolski, M. (1919) The Basis of White Russia’s State Individuality. Hrodna: The Ministry of Belarusian Affairs. Draft New Constitution [of the Republik of Belarus] from 26.10.2021. Available at: https://kanstytucyja​.online​/teksty​-konstitutsii​/draft​-new​-constitution​-from​-2021​-10​ -26 (Accessed: 30 May 2022). Drweski, B. (2002) Le petit parlement biélorussien: Les Biélorussiens au parlement polonais entre 1922 et 1930. Paris: Harmattan. Elgenius, G. (2011), Symbols of Nations and Nationalism: Celebrating Nationhood. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Kipel, V. and Z. Kipel (eds. 1988) Belarusian Statehood. Reader and Bibliography. New York: Belarusian Institute of Arts and Sciences, Inc. Available at: https://archive​.org​/details​/ bye​loru​ssia​nsta​t00kipe​/page​/n5​/mode​/2up (Accessed: 30 May 2022).

14  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited Korosteleva, E. and I. Petrova (2021) ‘Community resilience in Belarus and the EU response.’ Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review 59(4): 124–136. Kotljarchuk, A. (2019) ‘Understanding the geography of Belarus.’ Baltic Worlds 12(1): 73– 74. Available at: http://sh​.diva​-portal​.org​/smash​/get​/diva2​:1366725​/FULLTEXT02​. pdf (Accessed: 30 May 2022). Kotljarchuk, A. (2020) ‘The flag revolution: Understanding the political symbols of Belarus.’ In CBEES State of the Region Report 2020: Constructions and Instrumentalization of the Past. A Comparative Study on Memory Management in the Region. Ed. Mörner N. Stockholm: Elanders, 45–54. Available at: https://balticworlds​.com​/the​-flag​ -revolution​-understanding​-the​-political​-symbols​-of​-belarus/ (Accessed: 30 May 2022). Kotljarchuk, A. (2022) ‘The counter-narrative of WWII and the far right-identity.’ In The Many Faces of the Far Right in the Post-Communist Space: A Comparative Study of Far-Right Movements and Identity in the Region. Ed. Mörner N. Stockholm: Södertörn University Press, 61–75. Available at: https://www​.diva​-portal​.org​/smash​/get​/diva2​:1642568​/ FULLTEXT02​.pdf (Accessed: 30 May 2022). Lastouski, V. (1910) ‘Karotkaja historyja Belarusi, Vilna.’ Available at: https://files​.knihi​. com​/Knihi​/baravik​.org​/Lastouski​.Karotkaja​.Gistoryja​.Belarusi​.1910​.pdf (Accessed: 30 May 2022). Levko, O. and Golubev, V. (eds. 2018) Istorija beloruskoj gosudarstviennosti [History of Belarusian Statehood] (in Russian), vol. 1. Minsk: Belaruskaja navuka. Lindner, R. (1998) ‘Belaruskija historyki pad Stalinym, 1870–1945 (in Belarusian).’ Belarusian Historical Review 5:2(9): 365–395. Available at: http://www​.belhistory​.eu​/rajner​-lindner​ -belaruskiya​-gistoryki​-pad​-stalinym​-1870–1945/ (Accessed: 30 May 2022). Lukashenka A. (2022) ‘Lukashenka suggested to call the period of the Commonwealth the occupation of the Belarusian land by Poles and the ethnocide of Belarusian people.’ Nasha Niva, January 6, 2022. Marzaluk, I. (2019) ‘Ot monarha k Prezidentu: Institut glavy gosudarstva v Belarusi' ['From monarch to president: Institution of the head of state in Belarus] (in Russian).’ Belaruskaja dumka, 7: 64–71. Available at: https://beldumka​.belta​.by​/isfiles​/000167​_459175​.pdf (Accessed: 30 May 2022). Partnou, A. (2000) ‘Savietyzacyja histarychnaj navuki u Ukrainie i Belarusi (in Belarusian).’ Belarusian Historical Review 7:2(13): 476–488. Available at: http://www​.belhistory​.eu​ /andrej​-partnoў-savetyzacyya-gistarychnaj-navuki-ў-ukraine-i-belarusi/ (Accessed: 30 May 2022). Pashkevich, A. (2006) Parliamentary Forms of Struggle in Interwar Poland 1921–1930. Unpublished PhD dissertation [in Belarusian]. Minsk: Institute of History. 2006. Radaman, A. (2018) ‘Obrazovanije Rechi Pospolitoj. Gosudarstviennaja i politichieskaja sistema Vielikogo Kniazhestva Litovskogo’, ‘Razvitije pravovoj sistiemy. Statut 1588 goda (in Russian).’ In Istorija beloruskoj gosudarstviennosti. Eds. Levko, O. and Golubev, V., vol. 1. Minsk: Belaruskaja navuka, 364–384, 443–466. Available at: https://www​.academia​. edu​/41172889 (Accessed: 30 May 2022). Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty. Pahavan’nie Kastusia Kalinouskaga, Zygmunta Sierakouskaga i inshyh paustancau (1863–1864), 22.11.2019. Live broadcast. Available at: https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=HpzOSOLAdog (Accessed: 30 May 2022). Sidarevich, A. (2015) ‘Anton Luckievich i jago rola u bielaruskim ruhu (in Belarusian).’ In Da historyi belaruskaha ruhu. Ed. Luckievich, A. (3 ed.). Smalensk: Inbelkult, 7–21. Šupa, S. (ed. 1998) Archives of Belarusian Democratic Republic, vol. 1, book 1. Minsk, New York, Prague and Vilnius: Belarusian Institute of Arts and Sciences, Inc., Belarusian

The Political Symbols and Concepts  15 Literary Association. Available at: https://www​.svaboda​.org​/a​/29073019​.html (Accessed: 30 May 2022). Unuchek, A., Smiehovich, N. and Filatova, E. (eds. 2019) Istorija beloruskoj gosudarstviennosti (in Russian), Vol. 2. Minsk: Belaruskaja navuka. Urban, P. (1972) U sviatle histarychnykh faktau. New York: BINIM (Belarusian Institute of Arts and Sciences). Vasilevich, G. and Chudakov, M. (2017) ‘Konstitucionnyj process v Belarusi (istoria i sovriemiennost) (in Russian).’ Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of Belarus. Humanitarian Series 2: 106–121. Available at: https://vestihum​.belnauka​.by​/jour​/article​/ view​/389 (Accessed: 30 May 2022).

2

The ‘Genocide of Belarusians’ and the Survival of Lukashenka’s Regime David R. Marples and Veranika Laputska

Introduction In 2020, Belarusians came out into the streets of Minsk and other cities in tens of thousands to protest the official announcement that Aliaksandr Lukashenka had won a sixth term in office with more than 80 per cent of the vote, with the tally for his main opponent, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, reported as less than 10 per cent. For several months the protests continued peacefully, with women playing a prominent role (Shparaga 2021). The announcement of the election results was made following an earlier series of mass rallies in support of Tsikhanouskaya, the leader of the combined efforts of three main opposition electoral campaigns, and following the arrest of another popular candidate, Viktar Babaryka, and a third candidate, Valery Tsapkala, fleeing to Russia and then to Latvia. The 2020 campaign was unique in a number of ways, not least for the number of people flocking to the opposition candidate, the mocking of the president, initially as a ‘cockroach’ and as ‘Sasha 3 per cent’ following an online poll of potential supporters of each candidate (Tsapkala et al. 2021). The state responded with violence and repressions, with the beleaguered Lukashenka using his most reliable supporters from the Security Council, the KGB, and the militia to keep himself in power as he had done to a lesser extent during previous post-election protests in 2001, 2006, and 2010. The story is well known (Bekus 2021; Gabowitsch 2021; Paulovich 2021). What was unique was the loss of faith of the public in Lukashenka’s rule and the deep division of Belarus between supporters of the president and the disaffected populace (RFI 2020). This chapter examines the use of historical memory in the formation of national identity and the exploitation of the Second World War, which is still called the Great Patriotic War officially in Belarus (Marples 2014), as the cornerstone of Lukashenka’s presidency and foundation for the official Belarusian identity, but also as a means to alienate and isolate the opposition. Though Belarusian society to date can be described as highly divided and even polarized, the regime has managed to hold on to power through a combination of violence, the loyalty of certain sectors, and the support of the Russian

DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-3

Belarusian Genocide  17

Federation. Lukashenka has blamed Western interference and machinations for his uncomfortable position and for the protests.1 The goal here is to analyze the weakened regime’s latest efforts to shore up its position by changing the narratives of this historical memory from a focus on the traditional topics – partisans, the underground, victorious battles, and losses (memorial sites) – to the alleged and exclusive genocide of the Belarusian people. In addition, analogies have been made between the wartime collaborators carrying the white-red-white flag and the demonstrators who gathered in Minsk and other cities after the 2020 presidential elections to oppose the continuation of the Lukashenka regime. The latter has consistently used the ‘Great Patriotic War’ as a narrative not only to define modern Belarusian identity but also to support the legitimacy of the long-time dictatorship and equate the president with the state and its interests in the twenty-first century. There are numerous problems with the amended narrative and laws with which it has been heralded.

The Provocations There is a long history of opposition to Lukashenka’s rule, ranging from political parties formed in the late 1980s and early 1990s, such as the Belarusian Popular Front (divided into two branches in 1999), the Social Democratic Party (divided into two parties at the end of 1990s), the United Civil Party, and others; and the more recent opposition founded on tech-savvy youth and relying on social media. The change from traditional to contemporary was clearly manifested in the 2020 elections when banker Viktar Babaryka, founder of the Park of High Technologies and former diplomat Valery Tsapkala, and popular vlogger Siarhei Tsikhanouski emerged as the main opponents in the early part of the elections after the political parties failed to elect a unified candidate. The quick spread of COVID-19 played a major role in the consolidation of Belarusian society and disillusionment with their past political forces and the government. Belarusian society was changing, and the regime manifestly failed to deal with the effective communication among the demonstrators, enhanced in part by a number of Belarusian Telegram channels such as NEXTA, Belarus Golovnogo Mozga, Motolko Pomogi, and others. Three other events enhanced the political crisis further. Firstly, in May 2021, a Ryanair flight, operated by the Polish subsidiary Buzz, travelling from Athens to Vilnius was forcibly diverted to Minsk on suspicion of a bomb planted by the Hamas organization (Deutsche Welle (DW) 2021). Once the plane landed, the Belarusian authorities promptly arrested passenger Raman Pratasevich, former editor-in-chief of the NEXTA Telegram channel and then editor-in-chief of Belarus Golovnogo Mozga (after Ihar Losik, its founder, was arrested), along with his partner Sofia Sapega, a citizen of Russia. No bomb was found on board and the letter allegedly written by Hamas was an obvious fake. After a seven-hour delay at Minsk-2 International Airport, the plane was permitted to continue en route to Vilnius. The incident provoked

18  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited

widespread international outrage and led to the ban of Belavia flights from EU territories and the United Kingdom, and the United States issued further sanctions against Belarusian state companies. Lukashenka’s claim that Pratasevich constituted a terrorist threat was not taken seriously.2 The hijacking thus engendered the most serious sanctions imposed on Lukashenka’s regime to date. The second event was connected with the migration crises organized allegedly by the Belarusian regime targeting the Baltic States and Poland for several months at the end of 2021. In the summer of 2021, large groups of refugees from the Middle East, predominantly Iraq and Syria, had started to arrive in Minsk by plane and then were transported to Belarus’s borders with EU countries (Perez-Pena 2021). They were then forced to stay there by the Belarusian border officers and the army who would not allow the migrants to go back to Minsk to fly home after they were turned away from the EU border, which led to many deaths at the border in the light of cold temperatures and rainy weather (United Nations 2021). Belarusian (Vasilevich 2022) and Russian propaganda accused the West and the EU of ‘double standards’ and demonized the collective West via the state-owned media outlets (Lenta​ .​ru 2021). The third event relates to Russia’s war in Ukraine. Following a joint military exercise between the Russian and Belarusian troops between 10 and 20 February 2022,3 the Russian army used Belarus as a staging ground for the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Though no Belarusian troops had been deployed in the invasion at the time of writing, Minsk had joined in the anti-Ukrainian propaganda, and in November 2021, Lukashenka appeared to recognize for the first time Russia’s annexation of Crimea in March 2014 (Akhtyrko 2021). As a result, Western responses to the invasion included Belarus as a partner of Russia, adding it to the sanctions and trade embargos imposed, isolating Lukashenka even further. The EU, United States, and others have subsequently rejected the regime’s attempts to reopen a dialogue with the West. Belarus Foreign Minister Uladzimir Makei’s letter requesting new contacts (Lenkevich 2022)4 received the response that nothing could be done until Belarus released all political prisoners and held new and open presidential elections. Belarus thus has fallen increasingly into the Russian orbit, tying its future to that of Putin’s Russia, facing economic problems and a possible financial default in the near future.

The Official Belarus and the Great Patriotic War This chapter approaches the regime’s venture into the historical past as a justification for its current anti-Western stance and self-justification. Firstly, even from the beginning of this state-run campaign, there was little attempt to approach the topic of the Great Patriotic War from an academic and archival-based stance. Rather the war has been propagandized in state interests, with exaggerations of mortalities and distortions of events. Lukashenka’s own

Belarusian Genocide  19

contributions are ritualistic, increasingly so as his legitimacy as the president is not recognized by much of the Western world and even among his own citizens. Secondly, such campaigns are not new but rather an extension of what happened during the Soviet period. One can trace its origins in the later Khrushchev years in the Soviet Union (roughly 1960–1964) and particularly during the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev (1964–1982). From 1965, the twentieth anniversary of the Soviet victory, the war has been harnessed for propaganda purposes, initially to legitimize the Communist state and provide it with a raison d’etre that superseded the original focus on the October Revolution.5 Two of the highlights were the designation of the Brest Citadel as a Hero Fortress (1965) and Minsk as a Hero City in 1974 (Ganzer 2014). This renewed focus coincided with the elevation of former partisans to the leadership of the Belarusian Communist Party – Kiryl Mazurau and Piotr Masherau – occupying the periods of 1956–1965 and 1965–1980 respectively, almost a quarter of a century in total. At the same time, there was a de-emphasis of the crimes of Stalin, which Khrushchev had exposed at the 20th Party Congress in 1956. In the last years of the Soviet Union, Gorbachev again returned to the crimes of Stalin and posthumous rehabilitation of most of the leading Soviet officials executed or confined to camps in the period 1937– 1941. The campaign, however, was undermined in part by internal opposition and quietly shelved even before the end of the Soviet Union, as discussed in the next chapter by Chernyshova. Belarus meanwhile continued the commemoration through remembrance. Ultimately, the republic became home to about 8,000 memorials and monuments dedicated to the Great Patriotic War, divided between monuments to fallen soldiers (3,500), monuments to partisans and underground fighters (2,200), and monuments to ‘victims of Genocide’ (1,400),6 a phrase that is not related to the Jewish Holocaust but used to designate all ‘peaceful Soviet citizens’, which of course included Jews but also those of other ethnic origins. To put these figures into perspective, there are about 400 Lenin statues in Belarus today, half the original total, though the scale of removal of such monuments to the first Soviet leader does not compare with those of Ukraine, which one can call fully ‘de-Leninized’ since 2015.7 For many years, the chief focus of narratives about the war in Belarus has been on the partisan formations that operated from late 1941 to the summer of 1943. According to one source that exhaustively breaks down every partisan formation by district and region (including numerous names), 373,942 partisans operated on the territories of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) during the war, in addition to about 55,000 saboteurs, almost 80,000 people in organs of self-defence, and in the early part of the war there were also several ‘disorganized groups’ that are not included in the official lists of partisans (Manaenkov et al. 1983:19). There are collections of partisan memoirs and letters that are too numerous to list, and Belarus gained a reputation as the ‘partisan republic’, not least because the geography of the republic with

20  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited

its extensive forests and lakes proved ideal for partisan activities. The partisan leader, operating from a distant office in Moscow, was the leader of the Communist Party of Belarus and hardline Stalinist, Panteleimon Ponomarenko (1902–1984). Moreover, the official Belarusian narrative omits sporadic facts of anti-Semitism among the partisan regiments and ignores other underground fighting groups which were anti-Soviet, thus constructing a neo-Soviet myth of happily united Belarusian partisans fighting against the Nazis. In the context of this chapter, the critical aspect is the official narratives of the war, including partisans and underground operatives. Lukashenka, as the new leader of Belarus in 1994, inherited the Great Patriotic War rituals and chose to use them as the basis of state propaganda. In doing so, not only did he resurrect Soviet practices but also encouraged the investment of new narratives and directions that emphasize exclusively Belarusian roles in the war – partisans, the underground, regular soldiers, pilots, and others – and demonized the role of non-Soviet regiments and especially those fighting under a national white-red-white flag in Belarus, used also by the Nazi occupation forces during the war. In 1995, through a referendum, he changed the country’s date of independence and main national holiday from 26 July (when sovereignty was declared in 1990) to 3 July (marking the liberation of Minsk from the Nazi occupation in 1944) and the state symbols, including the white-red-white flag calling it ‘a fascist one’8 (a Nazi one) via the official media before the referendum and then again in 2020 during the mass protests (Reform​.​by 2020). Belarus thus had two occasions during the early summer for official military parades in a neoSoviet style: the regular Victory Day on 9 May, which it shared with Russia (and at that time, Ukraine), and 3 July. On those occasions, Lukashenka usually dressed in the military uniform of a General to salute the parading troops and made a speech of thanks to the war veterans in the parade. The year 2020 that saw the beginning of the COVID-19 pandemic, which swept across Minsk, provides a suitable example of the way in which current politics combined with historical memory in Belarus. The parade in Moscow on 9 May 2020 was cancelled for safety reasons, which meant that the only two being held in the year in the former Soviet republics were in Minsk and Ashkhabad (Turkmenistan). Lukashenka had already dismissed the pandemic as a ‘psychosis’ and chose to ignore the potential dangers of such a large open event which was to re-confirm the adherence to the official historical narrative about the importance of the Great Patriotic War for contemporary Belarus. At the ceremony, Lukashenka commented that: Belarus rose up as a live shield on the way of the aggressor. After marching through half of Europe the Nazis met fierce resistance in Belarusian lands for the first time … It is in the fierce battles of 1941, including in Belarusian lands, that the enemy’s confidence in its supremacy was shaken and the foundation of the future Great Victory was laid. (Sharkovshchina 2020)

Belarusian Genocide  21

He went on to claim that ‘every third Belarusian died to stop the advance of the Nazis to the east’ (Ibid:30), a statement which makes little sense even if one were to accept the one-in-three death toll. Gradually, however, the number of veterans able to participate in these annual commemorations dwindled to a point where their numbers hardly warranted such attention. By 1 January 2020, according to the presidential website of Belarus, only 5,217 veterans of the Great Patriotic War were still living, including two Heroes of the Soviet Union.9 Thus, it had become evident that if the regime were to retain the war as the main propaganda crux and identity marker, some changes of focus would be necessary. Before discussing the new policy, three other factors need to be explained briefly: war monuments and memorials; memorials to the victims of Stalin; and the Jewish Holocaust on Belarusian territory.10 All, to some extent, play a role in the current political spectrum in Belarus and its historical memory and demonstrate how the Lukashenka regime has clung to the war narratives from the times of Communist rule, similar in many respects to Russia, but in contrast to Ukraine, which outlawed memorials glorifying the Communist past, removed all Lenin monuments, and made heroes of the ‘fighters for Ukrainian independence in the 20th century’.

War Memorials In contemporary Belarus, every city, town, and settlement of any size has a war memorial and often more than one. In Minsk, there is a ‘Mound of Glory’ at the entrance to the city from the international airport, a Victory Square, and the Tomb of the Unknown Soldier. There are numerous monuments to partisans, including one erected in 2005 close to the Partyzanskaya metro station, and the better-known one of Marat Kazei, a 14-year-old boy killed during the last days of occupation, constructed in 1965 outside the Minsk Opera House. In addition, the Belarusian State Museum of the History of the Great Patriotic War dates back to 27 October 1944 and for the next two decades was located in the House of Trade Unions in Kastryčnickaja Square in the centre of Minsk, a building fortunate enough to have survived the war. In 2008, Lukashenka authorized the construction of a new museum near the obelisk in Minsk-Hero City, with a total area of around 15,000 square metres. It opened on the eve of the 70th anniversary of the liberation of Minsk on 2 July 2014.11 The Minsk war museum became a gathering point for anti-Lukashenka protesters in the late summer of 2020. The choice of venue was symbolic given the allegation that the regime had resorted to tactics as brutal as those of the Nazi occupants during the war years. It was a historical site closely linked to the Lukashenka leadership and part of its propaganda (the stella obelisk was opened in 1985 and designated Minsk as a “Hero City”). This might be one of the reasons why this place was seen as especially problematic for the regime. In previous protests of the 1990s–2010s this area had never been used for

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mass anti-regime protests in Minsk, also being quite close to Lukashenka’s new headquarters. For a period of more than 40 years, the Soviet and post-Soviet narratives of the war have been supplemented by museums and monuments conveying the message on the one hand of victory and courage, in textbooks, films, television, radio, newspapers, and social media; and on the other of losses and suffering (Goujon 2010). In the 1960s, losses of Belarusians, which are hard to calculate because of the division of the republic into various parts under the German occupation, were estimated at one in four. Today, as noted, that figure has been raised to one in three. There is no clarity, however, on the makeup of victims. The Jewish losses, which according to Belarusian-Israeli historian Leonid Smilovitsky may have been as many as 800,000 (cited in Rozovsky 2021), are simply included in the total number of victims. There is not the slightest indication in the official historical narrative of Belarus that Jews were targeted by the invasion force. And yet they compose roughly one-third of all the victims in the occupied republic. Belarus, according to this version of events, stands alongside Russia and Ukraine as the state most responsible for stopping the Nazi invaders and suffering proportionally the highest number of victims in the Great Patriotic War. The independent state of Belarus, based on this narrative, is derived directly from the sacrifices and heroism of the war period, as is democratic Europe. The war is transformed into the epochal event of the twentieth century and one that cannot be questioned or revised by historians or others – those who try are labelled ‘historical revisionists’. The Belarusian regime purposefully used the Great Patriotic War legacy with the neo-Soviet myth of Belarusian Nazi collaborators to manipulate a narrative of the post-2020 brutality used by the riot police against peaceful demonstrators. Belarusian official propaganda bluntly transferred the juxtaposition of partisans fighting against the Nazis to the police fighting against the demonstrators, as both the pro-Nazi collaborators and later the anti-Lukashenka demonstrators used the same symbol, namely the white-red-white flag. Later in 2020 and 2021 this would be further illustrated in a number of legislative acts that would equate the usage of the white-red-white flag to the ‘rehabilitation of Nazism’, as discussed in Part II of this volume.

Stalinist Killings But if the war is distant, the 1930s are even further so, despite their obvious importance in the defining of Belarusian identity. In an earlier study, we demonstrated how difficult it was to attain official recognition of the mass burial site at Kurapaty, north of Minsk (Marples and Laputska 2020). The establishment of an official monument in November 2018 was a notable step forward, but it was followed by the destruction of crosses surrounding the site and the installation of a small fence, sealing off the burial grounds. Protesters there have faced constant harassment and several attempts to dismantle the site. A restaurant

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adjacent to the entrance to Kurapaty, replete with services for male clients, has also served to belittle the sanctity of the site. It is still hard to estimate how many corpses were buried there, mostly executed between 1937 and 1938, with additional executions after the annexation of Western Belarus in September 1939. The majority appear to have been Belarusian peasants, but there is clear evidence that Poles, Jews, and other ethnic groups were also targeted. Kurapaty has remained a site of memory that is connected with the opposition to the regime. It was originally uncovered in 1988 by Zianon Pazniak, an archaeologist and founder of the Belarusian Popular Front. Its preservation has owed much to Pazniak’s party, the Conservative Christian Party of the Belarusian Front, as well as opposition figures from the Belarusian Christian Democracy, the Young Front, and also historians, archaeologists, and ethnographers. During the protests of 2020, one of the most spectacular events was the March against Terror which saw the formation of a chain of people throughout Minsk to Kurapaty and was led by Young Front leader and longstanding defender of Kurapaty Dzmitry Dashkevich (Belsat 2020). In March 2022, Dashkevich was arrested under accusations of organization of mass riots and remained in jail as of June 2022 (Belsat 2022). Over the past decade, several other mass killing sites have been located, but the authorities in each case have taken no action to investigate them more deeply. They include two large burial grounds in Vitsebsk region, one near Mahiliou, one near Homiel, and several in the city of Minsk and its outskirts. All the sites are in the territories that made up the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic before its westward expansion into eastern Poland. One of the chief investigators of this period, Belarusian State University Associate Professor Ihar Kuzniatsou, was fired in 2021 from his position (Belsat 2021). His removal follows a sustained campaign against him by the authorities that has resulted in court cases, vicious attacks in the media, and attacks on him in public debates with figures more acceptable to the authorities.

The Holocaust and the ‘Genocide’ Since 2015, more official attention has been paid to the Jewish Holocaust in Belarus than at any time in the independence period. In 2015 and 2018, two new memorials were constructed at Maly Traścianiec, the former Nazi killing camp located east of Minsk along the highway to Mahiliou. We have provided a more detailed account (Marples and Laputska 2022), supplementing earlier works by Belarusian historians such as Hanna Bahdanava and Leonid Smilovitsky (Smilovitsky 2000). The initiative for the venture came partly from outside Belarus, from Jewish communities in German, Austria, Poland, and Czechia whose relatives died in the Blahauščyna Forest and Šaškouka near Maly Traścianiec, but the Belarusian authorities cooperated, and Lukashenka took part in the official opening ceremonies. Still, even at the two Traścianiec memorials, there is no specific mention of Jews among the overall victims. The billboards and plaques stress the

24  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited

general Soviet losses, as in most of the memorials in towns and settlements on Belarusian territory, including Chatyń (Khatyn). The well-known memorial Yama (Pit), where some 5,000 Minsk Jews died in a mass execution carried out by the Nazi occupation forces, was created already in 1947, being one of the first memorials specifying Jews as the Nazi war victims on Soviet territory (Adamovich 2012). However, the main sculpture evident today – victims descending steps leading down into the pit – appeared only in 2000. The recent attention to Traścianiec appeared before the monumental events of the recent past: the COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 presidential elections, and Russia’s attack on Ukraine. These events have left Lukashenka with few options but to align more closely with Russia, to turn once again to past tropes about the Second World War and Belarusian achievements and losses, and to develop new directions in state narratives. Simultaneously, post-protest legislation of 2021 suppressed further media in their ability to speak freely, also about history. In line with that, after new amendments to the Law on Countering Extremism12 and the adoption of a new Law against Nazism Rehabilitation13 in May 2021, the opportunity for Belarusians to express their views became even more limited (Laputska 2022). Many Telegram users have already been charged for extremism, and more cases are currently being considered (Mediazona 2021). Moreover, individuals who have been previously recognized as members of the allegedly ‘extremist’ organizations cannot become founders of mass media within five years from the date of this recognition (BAJ 2022). Also, the authorities started to apply Art. 130 of the Belarusian Criminal Code against those people whose perception of Belarusian history (Spring96 2021), especially the period covering the Second World War and anti-Soviet resistance, differs from the official narratives, which largely coincide with the Soviet one. Leaders of the Polish minority in Belarus – Andżelika Borys; Andrzej Poczobut, a famous journalist writing for Gazeta Wyborcza; and the well-known Belarusian artist Ales Pushkin – have been imprisoned on such charges and have been awaiting their verdicts since 2020. Andżelika Borys was released on 25 March 2022 (Novy chas, 2022). German historian Felix Ackerman (2021) also made reference to the repressions against Poles in Belarus and accusations made by the Belarusian authorities for funding protests and ‘extremist’ channels such as NEXTA. The Law against Nazism Rehabilitation, writes Ackerman, is put into practice in such a way that any form of civil protest against the state can become illegal (ibid.). Demonstrations that feature the white-red-white flag can be interpreted as glorifying National Socialism. A new historical policy approach culminated in 2022. Thus, on 1 January 2022, a presidential decree announced that the year 2022 had been designated as the ‘Year of Historical Memory’ and that the Council of Ministers, together with the Office of the State Prosecutor, regional governments, and the Minsk City Council, were to elaborate and approve a republican plan of measures to bring this new concept into effect (Ukaz 1 January 2022).

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Just three days later, Lukashenka signed ‘The Law on the Genocide of the Belarusian People during the Great Patriotic War’. It declared that it provided for the legal recognition of the genocide of the Belarusian people committed by ‘Nazi criminals and their accomplices’ during the Great Patriotic War and the postwar period up to 1951. By ‘Belarusian people’, it added, it referred to all Soviet citizens who lived on ‘the territory of the Belarusian SSR’ during the specified period. It established ‘criminal liability’ for those who publicly denied the genocide of the Belorussian people ‘by posting relevant information in the media or on the Internet’. The introduction of the new law, it concluded, would ‘contribute to the inadmissibility of distorting the results of the Great Patriotic War and add to the cohesion of Belarusian society’ (Ukaz 5 January 2022). The appearance of these two laws in quick succession suggested a clear direction to the ‘Year of Historical Memory’. The goal was to introduce a new theme to the well-worn narratives of the war. More details became available on 4 February with an Order of the President of Belarus ‘About the Republican Council on Historical Policies with the Administration of the President of the Republic of Belarus’ (Prezident Republiki of Belarus 2022), which introduced the formation of the new Council, set up with the goals of preserving ‘historical truth and memory’ about the ‘heroic past of the Belarusian people’, the formation of ‘historical-state worldview’, and strengthening of ‘spiritual-ethical commonality’ of Belarusians. The Council’s makeup paid some lip service to academia in that it is permitting the National Academy of Sciences to introduce measures to put into place the said tasks but clearly Lukashenka intends to pay personal attention to the new narratives that are to be formed. The Council consists of representatives of state organs, political parties, public societies, well-known scholars, and established public figures. Its activities are being led by Ihar Serheyenka, the former KGB Brigadier-General who is currently the Chairman of the Presidential Administration. The Council has the right to assign priorities of historical research, to name and rename monuments and memorials, to coordinate the publications of mass information (media and social media), and to advise state organs on violations in the area of historical memory. After several meetings of the Council, more specifics became available. At the time of the issuance of the decree, Serheyenka stated: The whole complex of measures, first of all, will be aimed at preserving historical memory, at clarifying individual, controversial moments in our history. It is no secret that historical memory is subjected to various attacks, falsifications, attempts to rewrite the history of the Great Patriotic War, attempts to interpret certain periods of our history as existence in another state. Therefore, all these points will not only be considered at the meetings of the Council, but will also be implemented. (Sergeenko 2022)

26  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited

Some details were released in March 2022 by Belarusian Prosecutor-General, Andrei Shved. Speaking at the Minsk State College of Electronics, he claimed that studies had been carried out on perpetrators from various Nazi units. To that date, about 400 SS soldiers had been identified as still living, located in 15 different countries. While some countries, such as the three Baltic States, were refusing to extradite these people, others were cooperating (BELTA 2022). Shved also noted that over the coming six months there would be investigations of about 20 places of mass extermination with the help of the 52nd Battalion of the Ministry of Defence. He maintained that the facts about the “genocide” were previously unknown to the Belarusian public. By 16 March 2022, the investigative team had interrogated more than 13,500 witnesses ‘in connection with the genocide during the Great Patriotic War’. One of the areas of focus is the production of new textbooks on different historical issues, including the Second World War. At one such meeting in May 2022, Serheyenka informed journalists that ‘adjustments’ on the interpretations of the war were needed to existing textbooks for humanities and social sciences in higher educational institutions (Sergeenko 2022). Presumably, the adjustments provide an opportunity to insert the new concept of genocide of Belarusians into the texts. This, in turn, will help to further demonize the symbols used by the protesters of 2020 and to prevent any upcoming protests to be using white-red-white flag and coat of arms, as used by the Nazi sympathizers during the war on Belarusian territory. In future, a simple demonstration of such symbols very much associated with the anti-regime protests will have severe legal consequences. Thus the Great Patriotic War legacy has been unprecedentedly instrumentalized by the Lukashenka regime, especially after 2020. Underlying the change of direction is a move to reactivate the war by pursuing those responsible for the persecution. Shved is already the editor of a new book entitled Genocide of the Belarusian People, which reportedly contains formerly unknown places of mass extermination, as well as details on the destruction of settlements and villages. The campaign is using a new website, which is declared to be a joint operation of the Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BELTA), the Office of the Prosecutor-General, and the Ministry of Justice.14

Foreign Historians on the Genocide Laws Ackerman (2021) analyzed the speech made by Lukashenka on the 78th anniversary of the destruction of Chatyń (Khatyn) village on 22 March 2021. He noted the politicization of the atrocity and how it was applied by the speaker to current events involving the opposition. In particular, Lukashenka allotted specific attention to the part of Nazi ideology on the elimination of Slavs. He turned to Nazi symbols and citizens who use them, by which he referred to the white-red-white flag, which ironically was on display when Lukashenka was first inaugurated as president in 1994:

Belarusian Genocide  27

To those who claim the murderers as heroes, to those who bow to the white-red-white flags under which the genocide of the Belarusian people was carried out: We have dealt with this problem. We will prove to and show the whole world what a genocide is, and that those who are trying to teach us today how to live, at least they have no right to do so. (Ackerman 2021:26) Ackerman notes that the discussion resurfaced in May 2021, when the ProsecutorGeneral initiated an investigation of the ‘genocide of the Belarusian people’. His paper observes that on social media, rumours circulated that on the eve of the 80th anniversary of the German invasion (June 2021), the survivors of German camps and former slave labourers were put under pressure to recall their experiences during the Second World War, despite the passage of several decades. However, according to Ackerman, Jews appeared to be a major target, including both Jewish historians and Jews who protested against the announced results of the Belarusian presidential elections in 2020. Thus, in the official media, there were repeated attacks on Duesseldorf historian Alexander Friedman in the pages of the presidential newspaper Belarus Segodnya, and concerning the protests there are references to ‘people without a homeland’ who work for foreign powers in return for money, a phrase that is disarmingly similar to the attacks on ‘rootless cosmopolitans’ of the late Stalin era at the peak of Soviet anti-Semitism (Ackermann 2021). Later in the year, writer Liza Rozovsky (2021) analyzed the reaction of Israeli historians to the draft law on the ‘genocide of the Belarusian people’ with criminal sentences of five years to be imposed on those denying the law and ten years for repeat offenders. The historians feared that the new law would blur the distinction between crimes against Jews and crimes against Belarusians and criticized the fact that Jews were simply included as ‘Belarusian people’ rather than as a distinct ethnicity. She cites the response of Leonid Smilovitsky, a leading Belarusian-Israeli historian on the Holocaust in Belarus, who stated that: Belarus is one of the few countries in the world where [the government] claims an equivalence between genocide and terror. Genocide is where you are sentenced to death from the moment of birth. Terrorism is a reprisal operation for resistance. Smilovitsky went further, declaring that the law’s main purpose was to take retribution against civil society in Belarus. They are trying to claim: You (the opposition) are waving the white-red-white flag that the Belarusian murderers waved. You are fascists exactly like them, and if you deny it, here is a law for you. A Tel Aviv University historian, Yaakov Falkov, acknowledged that the Belarusians had suffered heavily during the war, but added that it was impossible

28  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited

to refer to the reprisals as genocide: ‘What separates genocide from a barbaric and brutal treatment of the local population is the intention to totally destroy part of the population based on a certain criterion … No one destroyed the Belarusians because they were Belarusians’ (Falkov 2017). Thus, Belarusians were treated brutally, even like animals, but there was no goal to eliminate them all. The occupants, Smilovitsky comments, opened elementary schools and churches for them and published newspapers in the Belarusian language.

Further Analysis The inferences are clear. The Belarusian regime has begun to rewrite the history of the Great Patriotic War in such a way that Belarusians become the main victims, ignoring the Jews as major targets of Nazi crimes even on Belarusian territory. The new trend of searching for Nazi collaborators and war criminals appears especially disturbing in light of the ‘de-Nazification of Ukraine’ proclaimed by Russia as a reason for the invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Even though the Belarusian army has yet to participate directly in Russia’s aggression – only Belarusian territory has been used to date by the Russian army – the expansion of the de-Nazification rhetoric might not only be used against the opponents of Lukashenka’s regime internally, but also one day by the Russian army against Belarusians. This is a major threat that is probably not fully realized by Aliaksandr Lukashenka and his supporters. Aside from the object of such a study, which seems to be to expand the memory of wartime suffering that has been exhaustively studied, there is an obvious politicization of history to promote a narrative of a regime woefully lacking legitimacy. Eyewitness testimony will likely lead to arrests and trials of alleged perpetrators of these crimes in an attempt to bring to life a past that was considered hitherto largely dead (TASS 2021). Wartime losses are being raised by at least 50 per cent, but materials in KGB archives are unlikely to be made available to researchers outside Russia and Belarus. In Minsk, these archives have been closed to the public since 1994. There is another advantage to the regime in altering the war narrative to make Belarusians victims of a genocide, namely to undermine efforts to elucidate Stalinist killings of the late 1930s. There is in fact a lengthy tradition among official narratives of blaming the Nazis for such deaths, starting with Kurapaty, that persists to the present (see, e.g., Smolianko 2011). Given a concerted state-driven campaign to prove that there was a genocide of Belarusians, it seems probable that any revived attempts to investigate the crimes of Stalin will face the problem of verification.15 The new laws adopted in 2021 and new decrees issued since the beginning of 2022 represent the latest attempt by a discredited regime to legitimize itself through the memories of the war, but now in a sharply modified form with Belarusians as the main victims, defying which will result in a criminal record and jail sentence. The methodology seems crude, but the regime is exploiting a

Belarusian Genocide  29

lengthy background of rhetoric pertaining to the war, which begins with what is taught in schools and higher educational institutions, supported by television, social media, parades, and commemorative sites and monuments. There is an anti-Semitic tone to the narratives in that they now seek to reduce the focus on the Jewish Holocaust – already badly neglected in Belarus – and ignore the former large presence of Jews in the urban life of the republic. The second aspect of the new direction is to vilify the opposition to Lukashenka as Nazis or neo-Nazis, using the flag formerly used by collaborators, denying or ignoring the fact that the flag predates the wartime occupation. In the future, one can anticipate the spectacle of very old men being subject to legal processes in Belarus that will inculpate them as perpetrators of genocide in Belarus – most likely in absentia for most of them. One could perhaps conclude that the campaign first and foremost is an illustration of the limited possibilities of an unpopular and embattled president who should have departed from office some years ago. But in the circumstances of a new European war in which Russia invaded Ukraine to remove ‘Nazis’ from power with the direct assistance of the authorities in Belarus, it takes on a much more sinister form.

Notes 1 See, for example, ‘Lukashenko obvinil Zapad v stremlenii smenit vlast v Belorussii,’ Izvestiya, 18 October, at https://iz​.ru​/1237063​/2021​-10​-18​/lukashenko​-obvinil​-zapad​ -v​-stremlenii​-smenit​-vlast​-v​-belorussii (Accessed 16 May 2022). 2 Pratasevich and his girlfriend Sofia Sapega were both detained, but the former promptly confessed – perhaps as a result of torture – and has since been cooperating with the authorities as he publicly announced on his new Twitter account @protas_by, which he later deleted. Sapega on the other hand received a six-year penal colony sentence after her trial in May 2022 for running a Telegram program called ‘The Black Book of Belarus’. She stated her intention to seek a pardon from Aliaksandr Lukashenka. See https://www​.polsatnews​.pl​/wiadomosc​/2022​-05​-06​/bialorus​-partnerka​-ramana​-pratasiewicza​-sofia​-sapiega​-skazana​-na​-szesc​-lat​-kolonii​-karnej/ (Accessed 7 May 2022) and https://www​.themoscowtimes​.com​/2022​/05​/06​/belarus​-jails​-activists​-russian​-girlfriend​-for​-6​-years​-a77607 (Accessed 8 May 2022). 3 The most perceptive analysis of Russia’s war plans to attack Ukraine, using Belarusian space as a take-off point, is Wasielewski and Jones (2022). 4 Uladzimir Makei, Foreign Minister of Belarus, had earned a reputation as the most outward-looking figure in the Lukashenka administration before he firmly backed the regime and its repressions after August 2020. The letter complained that European sanctions were isolating Belarus and pushing it further into the Russian orbit, as well as returning Belarus and the EU practically to an Ice Age. He asked the Europeans to renew contacts so that Belarus remained a part of Europe rather than part of Asia. The analysis by Lenkevich (2021) suggests that the initiative for the letter came from Lukashenka rather than Makei himself. 5 This was discussed in depth in Marples (2014). See also Rudling (2008) and Goujon (2010). 6 See https://specreport​.belta​.by​/memorialgomel (Accessed 15 May 2022). 7 See https://www​.rferl​.org​/a​/28101733​.html (Accessed 1 May 2022). 8 Belarusian official narratives still mostly use the term ‘fascist’ relating to Nazi Germany, as was the practice during the Soviet period.

30  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited 9 https://president​.gov​.by​/en​/belarus​/social​/social​-protection​/great​-patriotic​-war​-veterans​-support, 20 January 2022 (Accessed 13 May 2022). 10 For reasons of space, we are omitting here the question of collaboration. For an overview, see the insightful interviews in Maksymiuk (2015) with Valiantsin Taras and Jan Zaprudnik. On the Holocaust in Belarus, see especially Walke (2018). 11 http://www​.warmuseum​.by​/about​/istoricheskaya​-spravka/. 12 https://pravo​.by​/document/​?guid​=12551​&p0​=H12100104​&p1=1 (Accessed 9 June 2022). 13 https://pravo​.by​/document/​?guid​=12551​&p0​=H12100103​&p1​=1​&p5=0 (Accessed 9 June 2022). 14 It is available at https://specreport​.belta​.by​/memory (Accessed 19 June 2023). 15 During our visit to the mass execution site at Chajsy, Viciebsk Region, in September 2019, local researcher Yan Dziarzhautsau showed us the results of his research, in which he had identified the corpses of more than 20 victims, all of them ethnic Latvians whose families had moved to the area during the time of the Russian Empire. He has publicized his findings on the Facebook group Chajsy – Vitsebskiya Kurapaty, https://www​.facebook​.com​/groups​/1738507716405123 (Accessed 12 May 2022). It is likely they were killed as part of Stalin’s Latvian Operation of 1937–1938, which targeted Latvians across the Soviet Union, and followed a similar NKVD operation against the Poles.

References Ackermann, F. (2021) ‘Der Genozid am Belarusichen Volk: Als politischer Diskurs und Starfverfolgungpraxis.’ Belarus Analysen, 27 July. Adamovich, A. (2012) Khatyn. London: Glagoslav Publications. Akhtyrko, A. (2021) ‘Ot otritsaniya do priznaniya: Kak menyalos otnoshenie Lukashenko k Krymu.’ 4 November. Available at: https://www​.gazeta​.ru​/politics​/2021​/11​/04​_a​ _14170711​.shtml (Accessed 14 May 2022). BAJ (2022) ‘Mass media in Belarus. E-Newsletter 4 (66), 2021. Restriction on the print media activities.’ Available at: https://baj​.by​/en​/analytics​/mass​-media​-belarus​-e​ -newsletter​-no​-4​-66​-2021​-restriction​-print​-media​-activities (Accessed 8 June 2022). Bekus, N. (2021) ‘Echo of 1989? Protest Imaginaries and Identity Dilemmas in Belarus.’ Slavic Review 80(1): 4–14. Belarusian Telegraph Agency [BELTA] (2022) ‘Shved o genotside belorusskogo naroda v gody voyny: Utochnyayutsiya uchastniki karatelnykh operatsiy.’ 16 March. Available at: https://www​.belta​.by​/society​/view​/shved​-o​-genotside​-belorusskogo​-naroda​-v​-gody​ -vojny​-utochnjajutsja​-uchastniki​-karatelnyh​-operatsij​-490592​-2022/ (Accessed 16 May 2022). Belsat (2020) ‘Marsh suprats terroru. Shestse u Kurapaty. Chrinika dnya.’ Available at: https://belsat​.eu​/news​/marsh​-suprats​-teroru​-shestse​-u​-kurapaty/ (Accessed 8 June 2022). Belsat (2021) ‘Istorika Kuznetsova uvolili iz BGU posle 17 donosov ‘neravnodushnogo grazhdanina.’ 29 October. Available at: https://belsat​.eu​/ru​/news​/29​-10​-2021​-istorika​ -kuznetsova​ - uvolili ​ - iz ​ - bgu ​ - posle ​ - 17 ​ - donosov​ - neravnodushnogo​ - grazhdanina/ (Accessed 15 May 2022). Belsat (2022) ‘Zmitser Dashkevich stau padazravanym u kryminalnai sprave. En zasraetstsa za kratami.’ Available at: https://belsat​.eu​/news​/06​-04​-2022​-zmitser​-dashkevich​-stau​ -padazravanym​-pa​-kryminalnaj​-sprave/ (Accessed 8 June 2022). DW (Deutsche Welle) (2021) ‘Belarus diverts Ryanair plane to arrest activist journalist.’ Available at: https://www​.dw​.com​/en​/belarus​-diverts​-ryanair​-plane​-to​-arrest​-activist​ -journalist​/a​-57635240 (Accessed 8 June 2022).

Belarusian Genocide  31 Falkov, Y. (2017) Forest Spies. The Intelligence Activity of the Soviet Partisans. Jerusalem: Hebrew University Magnes Press and the Yad Vashem Press. Gabowitsch, M. (2021) ‘Belarusian protest: Regimes of engagement and coordination.’ Slavic Review 80(1): 27–37. Ganzer, Ch. (2014) ‘German and Soviet losses as an indicator of the length and intensity of the battle for the brest fortress (1941).’ The Journal of Slavic Military Studies 27 (3): 449–66. Goujon, A. (2010) ‘Memorial narratives of WWII partisans and genocide in Belarus.’ East European Politics and Society; and Cultures 24(1): 6–25. Laputska, V. (2022) ‘Media regulation during election and referendum campaigns in Belarus, MEMO98.’ Available at: https://memo98​.sk​/uploads​/content​_galleries​/source​/memo​/ belarus​-referendum​-2022​/policy​-paper​-final​.pdf (Accessed 8 June 2022). Lenkevich, I. (2022) ‘Pismo Makeya Evrope. Istoriya odnoy perepiski.’ 15 April. Available at: https://reform​.by​/308625​-pismo​-makeja​-evrope​-istorija​-odnoj​-perepiski (Accessed 15 May 2022). Lenta​.​ru (2021) ‘Zakharova ulichila Zapad v popytke nasnachit vinovatyykh v migratsionnom krizise.’ Available at: https://lenta​.ru​/news​/2021​/11​/22​/zaharova​_west/ (Accessed 8 June 2022). Maksymiuk, J. (2015) ‘World War II--60 Years After: Collaborators and Partisans in Belarus.’ Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty, 6 May. Available at: https://www​.rferl​.org​ /a​/1058755​.html (Accessed 15 May 2022). Manaenkov, A.L., et al. (1983) Partizanskie formirovaniya Belorussii v gody Velikoy Otechestvennoy Voyny (Iyun’ 1941-iyul’ 1944). Minsk: Belarus. Marples, D. (2014) ‘Our Glorious Past’: Lukashenka’s Belarus and the Great Patriotic War. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag. Marples, D. and V. Laputska (2020) ‘Kurapaty: The continuing debates.’ Slavic Review 79(3): 521–543. Marples, D. and V. Laputska (2022) ‘Maly Trascianiec in the context of current narratives on the holocaust in the Republic of Belarus.’ Europe-Asia Studies 74(1): 31–49. Mediazona (2021) ‘Operatsiya Waterlily. Kak rassleduyutsya dela ob extremizm v telegrame-Na primere Olgi Zolotar.’ Available at: https://mediazona​.by​/article​/2021​/12​/03​/ waterlily (Accessed 8 June 2022). Novy Chas (2022) ‘Anzhaliku Borys vypustsili z-za kratau.’ Available at: https://novychas​. online​/hramadstva​/anzaliku​-borys​-vypuscili​-z​-za​-kratau (Accessed 8 June 2022). Paulovich, N. (2021) ‘How feminist is the Belarusian revolution? Female agency and participation in the 2020 post-election protests.’ Slavic Review 80(1): 38–44. Perez-Pena, R. (2021) ‘A border crisis.’ The New York Times. Available at: https://www​. nytimes​.com​/2021​/11​/17​/briefing​/poland​-belarus​-border​-crisis​.html (Accessed 8 June 2022). Prezident Respubliki Belarus (2022) ‘O Republikanskom sovete po istoricheskoy politike pri Administratsii Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus.’ 4 February. Available at: https:// president ​ . gov ​ . by ​ / ru ​ / documents ​ / rasporyazhenie ​ - no​ - 22rp​ - ot​ - 4​ - fevralya​ - 2022-g (Accessed 12 May 2022). Reform​.​by (2020) ‘Lukashenko otkryto nazval belo-krasno-belyi flag fashistskim.’ Available at: https://reform​.by​/181490​-lukashenko​-otkryto​-nazval​-belo​-krasno​-belyj​-flag​ -fashistskim (Accessed 8 June 2022). RFI​.​ru (2020) ‘Sotsiologiya: COVID-19 + obednenie naroda = belorusskiy vzryv.’ Available at: https://tinyurl​.com​/4jknaapu (Accessed 8 June 2022). Rozovsky, L. (2021) ‘Belarus under fire for law equating holocaust with nazi crimes against nationals.’ Haarets, 19 December. Available at: https://www​.haaretz​.com​/jewish/​.

32  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited premium​-israeli​-historians​-belarus​-blurring​-holocaust​-with​-genocide​-legislation​-1​. 10477485​?lts​=1652724492416 (Accessed 12 May 2022). Rudling, P.A. (2008) ‘“For a heroic Belarus!”: The great patriotic war as identity marker in the Lukashenka and Soviet Belarusian discourses.’ Sprawy Narodowoœciowe/Nationalities Affairs 32: 43–62. Sergeenko, I. (2022) ‘Sergeenko: V istorii Belarusi est massa periodov, trebuyushchykh dopolnitelnogo izucheniya.’ 11 May. Available at: https://mgazeta​.by​/ofitsialno​ /item​ / 13735​ - sergeenko​ - v​ - istorii​ - belarusi​ - est​ - massa​ - periodov​ - trebuyushchikh​ -dopolnitelnogo​-izucheniya​.html (Accessed 16 May 2022). Sharkovshchina Regional Executive Committee (2020). ‘Lukashenko: The tragedy of the Belarusian nation in the Great Patriotic War is incomparable.’ 11 May. Available at: https://sharkovshchina​.vitebsk​-region​.gov​.by​/en​/republic​-en​/view​/lukashenko​-the​ -tragedy​-of​-the​-belarusian​-nation​-during​-the​-great​-patriotic​-war​-is​-incomparable​ -18064/ (Accessed 12 May 2022). Shparaga, O. (2021) Die revolution hat ein weibliches Gesicht: Der Fall Belarus. Berlin: Suhrkamp. Smilovitsky, L. (2000) Katastrofa Evreev v Belorussii 1941–1944. Tel Aviv: Biblioteka Matveia Chernogo. Smolyanko, A. (2011) Kuropaty: Gibel falshivki: Dokumenti i fakty. Minsk: Belaruskiy Soyuz Jurnalistov. Spring96 (2021) ‘Ugolovnoe presledovanie po politicheskim Belarus 2020–2021.’ Available at: https://spring96​.org​/files​/book​/ru​/2021​_politically​_motivated​_criminal​ _prosecutions​_ru​.pdf (Accessed 8 June 2022). TASS (2021) ‘Minsk knows names [sic!] 400 Nazi SS members still alive who killed Belarusians in WWII.’ 28 October. Available at: https://tass​.com​/world​/1355317​?utm​ _source​=google​.ca​&utm​_medium​=organic​&utm​_campaign​=google​.ca​&utm​_referrer​ =google​.ca (Accessed 9 June 2022). Tsapkala, V., Bekus, N., Maskaliova, M., and D. Marples (2021) ‘The campaign of the fighting women: The Belarusian election of 2020 and its aftermath: A conversation with Veranika Tsapkala.’ Canadian Slavonic Papers 63(3–4): 403–421. Ukaz Prezidenta Respubliki Belarus’ (Decree of President of Belarus) (1 January 2022) ‘Ob obyalenii 2022 goda Godom istoricheskoy pamyati.’ Available at: https://president​.gov​. by​/bucket​/assets​/uploads​/documents​/2022​/1uk​.pdf (Accessed 12 May 2022). Ukaz Prezidenta Republiki Belarus’ (5 January 2022). Available at: https://president​.gov​. by​/ru​/events​/aleksandr​-lukashenko​-podpisal​-zakon​-o​-genocide​-belorusskogo​-naroda (Accessed 12 May 2022). United Nations (2021) ‘End “appalling” Belarus-Poland border crisis, UN rights office urges.’ Available at: https://news​.un​.org​/en​/story​/2021​/12​/1108502 (Accessed 8 June 2022). Vasilevich, H. (2022) ‘The Belarusian migrant crisis and state propaganda,’ New Eastern Europe. Available at: https://neweasterneurope​.eu​/2022​/03​/14​/the​-belarusian​-migrant​ -crisis​-and​-state​-propaganda/ (Accessed 8 June 2022). Walke, A. (2018) Pioneers and Partisans: An Oral History of Nazi Genocide in Belorussia. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Wasielewski, P.G. and S.G. Jones (2022) ‘Russia’s possible invasion of Ukraine.’ Center for Strategic and International Studies, CSIS Briefs, 13 January. Available at: https://www​. csis​.org​/analysis​/russias​-possible​-invasion​-ukraine (Accessed 11 May 2022).

3

The Soviet Roots of the 2020 Protests The Unlikely History of Belarusian Civic Nationalism Natalya Chernyshova

Introduction In another contribution to this volume, Anastasiia Kudlenko has argued that the driving force of the revolutions of dignity is peoplehood, whose rise has been observed in the Belarusian protests by Korosteleva and Petrova (2021). While the emergence of peoplehood is predicated on the existence of a shared vision of the future, it also requires a collective identity that draws on a common past, traditions, and symbols (Petrova and Korosteleva 2021). This chapter points to the years under the leadership of Petr Masherau, First Secretary of the Communist Party of Belarus (CPB) during 1965–1980, as instrumental for the development of the contemporary Belarusian national identity that burst forth in the 2020 protests. It also explains why this identity combines ethnic elements with prominent civic ones. Going back to the Soviet times to help explain the existence of a Belarusian national identity, rather than its absence, might seem counterintuitive. Many scholars and commentators have seen the experience of the final Soviet decades to be at the root of Belarus’ post-Soviet problems. They point to mass urbanisation, accompanied by linguistic Russification during the long 1970s, and state-sponsored efforts to impose a supra-ethnic Soviet identity, as primary reasons for the republic’s seemingly weakened sense of national identity and its reluctance to embrace independence when the USSR collapsed in 1991. Belarus’ descent into authoritarianism under its first elected president, Aliaksandr Lukashenka, has been attributed, in part, to the Soviet legacy and the nostalgic pull it exerted over a large part of Belarusian society (Radzik and Słomczynska 2001; Silitski 2006; Manaev et al. 2011). Lukashenka himself has sought to present his regime as the heir and protector of this legacy. As discussed in the first chapter by Kotljarchuk et al. in this volume, a red-green flag and coat of arms closely resembling those of Soviet Belarus were returned as state symbols following a 1995 referendum, which also reinstated Russian as a state language. Lukashenka assumed the public mantle of a leader in the Belarus-Russia integration project. The social contract which his regime proffered to its citizens harked back to the Soviet times. It cast state ownership of the economy as the best way to ensure social DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-4

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equity, welfare, and job security. It made Soviet-style public commemoration of World War II (WWII) central to state propaganda. In official discourse, history textbooks, and scholarship, socialist achievements have been praised, while problematic aspects of Soviet Belarusian history, from war-time partisan violence to Stalinist terror, were avoided (Lewis 2018; Marples 2014; Marples and Laputska in this volume). Even after the state began to recognise other historical reference points for Belarusian national identity in response to the changed geopolitical situation post-2014, the Soviet past remained firmly at the core of the version of national identity that Lukashenka’s state sought to promote (Leshchenko 2008; Bekus 2019; Rudling 2017). In contrast, those in opposition to his regime have tended to draw on pre-Soviet Belarusian history as a source of national identity, while rejecting the Soviet experience as destructive (Goujon 2010; Rudling 2015). In such a political climate, attitudes to the Soviet past could act as markers of one’s political views on the present. But the 2020 protests, the largest in modern Belarusian history, threw such a direct relationship into question. The protests showed that the historic legacy which had long been successfully manipulated by Lukashenka as an instrument of legitimacy could be also used in opposition to the regime. Important features of the protest movement, such as its highly moral, civic nature, and commitment to non-violence, can be traced back to the social and cultural developments of the late Soviet decades. Furthermore, the grassroots quality of the protests has highlighted that the Belarusians are not a community without any sense of shared national identity, making it important to revisit the recent Soviet past in search of its roots. This chapter locks the spotlight on several aspects of this past, complicating the typical portrait of the long 1970s in Belarus and their legacy. It argues that far from being a barren space where all signs of national identity were eradicated, the Masherau years were a time when Belarusians were repeatedly reminded that they were a nation. These messages were underpinned by the economic and social successes Belarus enjoyed at the time, as it completed its transformation from a small peasant republic into an important industrial hub with an educated and largely urban population. It underwent rapid economic, demographic, and cultural changes, which left a profound legacy for its postSoviet society, not least because of their transformative impact on Belarusian identity. Since the 1960s, the national intelligentsia has lamented the loss of ethnic identity that accompanied modernisation, but what developed in late Soviet Belarus was a distinctive civic-national identity, the type of identity that hinges less on the usual markers of language and ethnicity and more on the shared sense of civic community, albeit with some ethnic attributes (Buhr et al. 2011). A more nuanced understanding of how the processes of late-Soviet national identity-building worked is important because their outcomes formed the foundations for the post-Soviet collective identity observable in the antiLukashenka protests of 2020. This contemporary identity centres on shared visions of a collective future, but it did not emerge overnight (Korosteleva and

The Soviet Roots of the 2020 Protests  35

Petrova 2021: 128). The developments of the Masherau years made an important contribution to its emergence. Anything approaching a comprehensive examination of Masherau’s Belarus and the full extent of its legacy for post-Soviet Belarusian identity is beyond the scope of this chapter. Instead, the analysis here focuses on three aspects. The first one is Soviet war memory in Belarus, especially the partisan myth, which became central to the specifically Belarusian Soviet identity. In particular, the chapter highlights how some of the republic’s commemorative practices of the war helped foster this specificity. The discussion then moves to some of the cultural measures that sought to promote, and sometimes to create from scratch, ethnic dimensions of Soviet Belarusian identity, which drew on pre1917 history. The measures in focus here concern the Masherau-era development of a national heritage sector and the creation of the first Belarusian national encyclopaedia. Finally, the chapter briefly sketches out some of the outcomes of post-war economic modernisation as another important contributor to Belarus’ collective identity that drew for inspiration and legitimacy on its prosperous present, such as it was in the long 1970s, rather than the “glorious past”, and infused the Belarusian identity with civic elements. The chapter concludes with remarks on the ways in which the legacy of the Masherau years has played out in the current political crisis.

Soviet Memory of War as Belarusian Memory Although the 2020 protests bore many hallmarks of a 21st-century protest movement (the role of digital technology being one example), history, and especially historical memory of WWII, was very much alive and part of the rhetoric on both sides. This might be less surprising coming from Lukashenka, who built his legitimacy partly on cultivating and maintaining the Soviet-style war memory (Goujon 2010; Marples 2014; Rudling 2011). But during the summer of 2020, this collective memory gave the protesters the rhetorical tools to verbalise their outrage about the regime’s violence and helped mobilise the popular response. The police beatings and torture in August 2020 were compared to the brutality of Gestapo and the Nazi camps. When the police locked a group of demonstrators in a Catholic church near the Parliament building in Minsk, an opposition news website reported the story under the headline: “It felt like Khatyn”, a reference to a Belarusian village that was burnt along with its inhabitants during the war and became a key Belarusian lieu de mémoire, unveiled in 1969 as a monument to all burnt villages of Belarus. Labelling the regime as “fascist”, the authorities as “occupiers” and the police as “punitive detachments” was, and remains, a constant in protesters’ rhetoric, on posters, and in Telegram channels. A grouping of IT hackers, who have taken to crashing government websites, have been calling themselves “cyber-partisans”, hinting at Belarus’s Soviet-era reputation as a “partisan republic”. In November 2020, when the country mourned 31-year-old Raman Bandarenka, beaten to death by pro-government thugs, candles were lit up in his honour at several

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WWII memorials. While these were not the only historical memories that informed the protests, even evoking the memories of Stalinist terror and the NKVD did not automatically exclude references to the war. One mass rally in October 2020 that centred on Kurapaty, the site of the mass burial of Great Terror victims near Minsk, saw some of the march participants shout “fascists” at the attacking police. The persistence of such historic references in protesters’ rhetoric points to the importance of war memory in Belarusian national culture that goes beyond its function as a political tool for the authorities. The war memory has a much longer pedigree than Lukashenka’s regime, and its effective use by protesters indicates how deeply ingrained it is in the Belarusian collective consciousness and suggests that the legitimacy of this memory and rhetoric still rests in the Soviet period, not Lukashenka’s post-Soviet regime. Among other things, it helps account for the resolutely peaceful nature of the 2020 protests and points to the resilience of certain aspects of late Soviet identity. It was especially during the Masherau period that war memory became intensively promoted in Belarus. While this process was facilitated by the emergence of a Union-wide cult of the Great Patriotic War under the leadership of Leonid Brezhnev (Tumarkin 1994), in Belarus public war memory gained a particular resonance because of the republic’s unprecedented suffering, which saw Belarus lose proportionally more of its residents than any other country in Europe during WWII (Snyder 2010: 249–51). To be sure, state-sponsored memory was severely curtailed, edited, and censored, serving to keep Belarus firmly in the Soviet fold (Lewis 2018: 53–80; Rudling 2008). But it was also underpinned by real events. For example, as Alexander Etkind et al. point out, for all the Soviet uses of Khatyn as a propaganda tool, it is “a genuine site of Belarusian mourning” (2021: 81; see also Rudling 2012). Similarly, while the memory of many controversial or unpalatable aspects of partisan warfare was silenced, Belarus did have the largest Soviet partisan movement and made a significant contribution to the Soviet war effort (Slepyan 2006: 51). While this made it easier for the Soviet authorities to instrumentalise war memory, it also meant that the state version of history had its challengers, making the shaping of public memory a bumpier process than the Soviet regime might have wished. Most famously, the official discourse was contested and disrupted by several national writers of war such as Vasil’ Bykau and Ales’ Adamovich, but even former partisans debated with the authorities their right to have their stories and memories of the war written into collective memory, even when those memories did not conform to the established official canon (Slepyan 2006: 282–86). The enormity of the war trauma seeped through the usual barriers of Soviet censorship. The Khatyn memorial near Minsk was so strikingly out of keeping with the Brezhnev-era monumentalism that it angered Soviet Minister for Culture Ekaterina Furtseva with its focus on personal loss and trauma instead of heroism. She demanded for it to be torn down (Levin 2005). Furthermore, however problematic and uneven, the war experience and, to some extent, trauma were turned into a central element of a specifically

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national identity in Belarus. The emphasis on the partisan contribution to the Soviet war effort was especially important in this: as Simon Lewis argues, “the semantics of a ‘partisan war’ endowed war memory with a sense of specificity that was conducive to the making of a national myth” (Lewis 2018: 54). It permeated post-war Soviet Belarusian culture (Wilson 2011: 114) and was central to the shaping of Belarusian national identity. This process reached its fullest extent in the Masherau years. In addition to literature, memoirs, cinema, music, and education, Belarusian war memory was shaped through commemorative practices and memorials. The number of war monuments increased exponentially during the long 1970s, and these years saw the completion of such central sites of Belarusian war commemoration as Khatyn, the Mount of Glory, and the Brest Fortress.1 These were actively promoted by the republic’s authorities: by the 1980s, the lion’s share of all public lectures about heritage sites [pamiatniki istorii i kul’tury] in Belarus, organised by the republic’s and local bureaus of heritage propaganda, was about military memorials: 11,154 out of 22,957 lectures, or 41 per cent.2 The centrality of war memory in national culture (and the authorities’ efforts to keep it there) was also illustrated by the museum attendance rates: in 1970, the Museum of the Great Patriotic War had a whopping 410,000 visitors, dwarfing the Museum of History which was visited by 150,000 people that year. Literary museums dedicated to the two founding fathers of Belarusian literature, whose works were on every schoolchild’s curriculum, attracted far fewer patrons: the Museum of Ianka Kupala in Minsk had 31,000 visitors in 1970, while the Iakub Kolas Museum was attended by a meagre 14,000 people.3 Impressive museum attendance rates alone do not tell the full story of how war-themed heritage made Belarusian war memory national. Its embrace stretched well beyond the capital and its museums, the pages of books and newspapers, or cinema and TV screens. There was geographical physicality inherent in commemorating the partisan activity that was at the same time a vehicle of national identity. Even Soviet war memorials could serve to nationalise, or at least localise history, as commemorative work in Belarus often took the form of war-memory tourism. The authorities and local museums organised walking tours and excursions that took their participants along warrelated historic routes. For instance, in 1970 the regional museum in Homel’ joined efforts with the local Komsomol and a local tourist station to design ten walking routes under the framework of a project entitled Po partisanskim tropam Poles’ia (Along the partisan paths of Poles’e). Young people walked from various regional cities to Mozyr, visiting villages and war memorials along the way and talking to local ex-partisans.4 The scope and reach of such events could be impressive: to mark the 25th anniversary of liberation from the Nazi occupation, the Homel’ regional authorities organised a tourism congress of 11,309 tourist groups, involving 91,400 people. Together they mapped out 237 walking routes to places of revolutionary and military glory, organised a remembrance week dedicated to fallen heroes, tidied up the local graves of soldiers and partisans; planted 14,000 decorative shrubs and trees, and landscaped

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18 lanes of orchard trees.5 The Homel’ region was by no means unusual in this: in 1972, the Mahileu region organised 3,000 excursions along historic routes, involving 400,000 youth as part of two campaigns for youth education about WWII.6 Such activities not only allowed their participants to immerse themselves in collective war memory but also enabled them to gain a very specific, physical sense of connection between that history and their own home territory. They could learn about Soviet war-time partisan feats and hardship, but also developed an intimate knowledge of, and a sense of belonging to, their native landscape. Another exercise connected to commemorating local war heroes that helped foster a sense of local community were the so-called “holidays of the street” [prazdniki ulits], which were held in the streets that were named after a war hero. The official flavour to these celebrations was imparted by a formal unveiling of a memorial plaque and official speeches, but they also included live music and a get-together of the street’s residents.7 Interestingly, one important manifestation of the Belarusian community spirit and grassroot political activism during the 2020 protests was the urban neighbourhood parties that brought together residents of neighbouring blocks of flats and often involved food sharing, music, and dancing. For all the promotion of internationalism in Soviet literature, some Belarusian writers were sometimes criticised for not giving the same geographical specificity to their works on the war and partisans that was part of the commemoration of partisan activities.8 Conversely, the works of one of the most respected and talented Belarusian writers of war prose, Vasil’ Bykau, have a national specificity that was difficult to censor, yet also difficult to miss (Astrouskaya 2019: 95). The success of all these efforts to foster a specifically national collective memory of war during the late Soviet era helps explain why Lukashenka was able to tap so successfully into it for more than two decades. But in 2020 the tables turned. It signalled the extreme degree of the regime’s loss of legitimacy when one of its key ideological tropes came to be directed against it, despite the authorities’ frantic attempts to reclaim war memory. The resilience of collective war memory also helped define one of the key features of the Belarusian protests: the commitment to peaceful forms of protesting that declared poignantly the chasm between the violent regime and its non-violent citizens.

Writing Belarus into Pre-Soviet History Historians have focused almost exclusively on war memorials in the context of the Brezhnev-era glorification of WWII, but the war was not the only past whose memorialisation was promoted under Masherau. Heritage became another instrument of nation-building in Belarus during the late 1960s and 1970s, serving to emphasise the existence of a distinctive ethnic Belarusian history, culture, and identity. From the late 1960s onwards, the republic’s authorities stepped up their efforts to identify and take under state protection architectural and archaeological

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monuments of the Belarusian pre-revolutionary past. In December 1969, the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) Supreme Council adopted a law on “The Protection of Monuments of Culture of the Belarusian SSR”, which was jointly drafted by the Belarusian Ministry of Culture and the republic’s Society for Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments.9 The law included in its classification of cultural monuments objects that were far removed from Belarus’ partisan or even revolutionary past: it covered all monuments of cultural, historic, scientific, and artistic value and archaeological sites such as old towns, ancient mounts, remnants of ancient settlements, castles and ancient fortifications, moats, old mines, ancient cemeteries, burial sites, and tombstones, etc.10 The adoption of the law gave impetus to an active search for the previously neglected historical heritage by specialists and the local authorities. At the time the law was adopted, only a minority of registered monuments in Belarus were dedicated to its pre-revolutionary history: the 6,062 memorials in 1969 included 789 archaeological monuments, 78 architectural memorials, and 23 monuments dedicated to the Napoleonic invasion of 1812. The rest (nearly 4,000) commemorated the Great Patriotic War, the Revolution, and Lenin, or celebrated socialist labour.11 A mere three years later, the number of identified archaeological monuments had increased six-fold, skyrocketing from 789 to 6,142. There were now also 525 architectural monuments, as opposed to 78. Additionally, two new categories entered the nomenklatura of heritage: “monuments of art” [pamiatniki iskusstva] and ethnographic monuments. The total number of historical sites and monuments more than doubled since 1969, reaching 12,545 objects in 1972, and this increase came almost entirely from the addition of the newly identified or discovered archaeological and architectural monuments, as well as the new categories of ethnographic and art monuments.12 While the flagship commemorative project of 1968–1969 was the building of the Khatyn memorial complex, the authorities also funded a number of important restoration and conservation projects that included work on such valuable historical buildings as the 12th-century St Sophia Cathedral in Polatsk, 17th-century Great St Nicholas Church in Magileu, 16th-century Mir Castle, and 16th-century Spasso-Preobrazhenskaia Church in Zaslaul’ near Minsk. These and other projects continued throughout the 1970s, and the state budgets allocated to them kept growing. If in 1971, the republic spent 629,200 roubles on the restoration and conservation of 18 heritage sites,13 by 1975, the Ministry of Culture was spending over a million roubles on restoration work, and in 1980, it spent over 1,770,000 roubles.14 A lot more effort was put into advertising Belarusian national heritage to the public. In 1969, the party leadership decreed to launch a popular science newsletter, Pamiatniki istorii i kul’tury Belorussii (Historic and cultural monuments of Belorussia), and its first four issues came out in 1970.15 A range of guidebooks on memorials and historical sites was published in the early 1970s, including the second part of Arkheologicheskaia karta Belorussii (Archaeological map of

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Belorussia), which focused on the monuments dating back to the Iron Age and the Middle Ages in what was now Belarus. Often these publications had a local flavour: for instance, in 1971, the Hrodna region produced a series of booklets entitled Nashi sootechestvenniki (Our compatriots) and a Hrodna city guide, plus a map that showed historic monuments, war memorials, places associated with famous historic figures, and architectural and archaeological monuments in the region. The Hrodna Museum of History and Archaeology published 12 guides on various local monuments, including such titles as Tserkvi-kreposti (Churches – fortresses) and Pamiatniki arkhitektury (Architectural monuments).16 At the same time, the local and republican authorities sought to diversify the means of raising popular awareness of various monuments, which ranged from public lectures and talks by specialists to organised excursions, and television and radio broadcasts. For example, in 1971 the residents of the Homel’ region alone could attend 2,130 public lectures, watch and listen to 96 local television and radio presentations, and read over 120 popular articles published in the local press about various monuments. Students of the Hrodna Pedagogical Institute organised a game contest [viktorina] that tested its participants’ knowledge about monuments of history and culture in Belarus and the Hrodna region. In Minsk, a mobile exhibition entitled Pamiatniki Belorussii (Monuments of Belorussia) toured 18 enterprises and cultural institutions.17 Appreciating the value of heritage for patriotic education, monuments across the republic were used as backdrops for initiation ceremonies by the Komsomol and the Young Pioneers organisations. The Ministry of Culture developed ambitious plans for an open-air national museum-park of history and ethnography. Historians, ethnographers, and archaeologists were charged with the task of gathering exhibits for the museum. They spent two years collecting a variety of objects – dwellings, farm buildings, wood carvings, and ancient tools – that were claimed to represent the history of Belarusian folk art and customs. In 1971, the Ministry submitted to the Central Committee CPB its detailed plans for the museum, co-drafted with the State Building Committee, Belarusian Academy of Sciences, and the Belarusian Society for Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments.18 In one decade, the number of monuments, buildings, sites, and landscapes that the Belarusian authorities were promoting as national heritage nearly tripled, reaching 17,500 by 1 April 1980. Of these memorials and monuments, 7,470 were classed as historic monuments; 1,750 were architectural monuments; 5,980 were archaeological monuments, and the rest were monuments of art.19 While a good share of these memorials celebrated the Soviet past, many of them had an ethnic Belarusian dimension to them. The number of archaeological monuments that predated the Soviet regime and were presented as specifically Belarusian increased manyfold, as did the number of architectural monuments the republic took under protection.20 The heritage preservation campaign intensified especially in the second half of the decade: 9,167 out of the 10,750 monuments that enjoyed state protection in 1980 had been placed under it during 1976–1980.21

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Historical buildings came to be utilised more respectfully, with due consideration given to their historic value and fragility. They tended to be converted into museums, exhibition halls, and concert venues that were seen to serve a double function of promoting national heritage and national music.22 In 1980, the recently restored Spasso-Preobrazhenskaia Church in Zaslaul’ and a 19thcentury church in Raubichy housed museum displays; St. Sophia Cathedral in Polatsk was to be used as an exhibition and concert venue, while a 14thcentury castle in Lida was being restored to become a museum and a summer concert venue. To give these efforts a legal backing, in 1978 the republic’s Supreme Council adopted a law ‘On protection and usage of the monuments of history and culture’.23 Museums also played their part in educating Belarusians on their national past. By the end of the decade, the republic had 60 museums. In 1978, they were visited by 7,383,000 people, making Belarus, with its population of just over nine and a half million, the republic with the third highest museum attendance rates in the Soviet Union.24 The museums’ main holdings amounted to about one million items, and 40 per cent of these collections did not represent Soviet history.25 Unlike a few other republics, Belarusian museums could boast of covering the entire historical spectrum in their exhibitions.26 Certainly, plenty of problems plagued heritage work. Restoration projects often progressed slowly and were prone to delays; local authorities were far from always diligent in protecting monuments. The number of public talks and printed materials promoting awareness of cultural and historical monuments increased steadily, but their quantity was still deemed sorely insufficient.27 Disastrous decisions were taken with the approval of the party leadership that resulted in the loss of Minsk’s historic city centre in the Niamiha area. However, focusing exclusively on these failures can obscure how much was accomplished, especially considering that the Belarusian heritage building started from a very low point after the war. Just how low that starting point was is aptly illustrated by the story of the first Belarusian encyclopaedia. The possibility of producing a Belarusian Soviet Encyclopaedia (BSE) had been discussed during the interwar years, but the final go-ahead was given on Masherau’s watch. In 1965, proposals envisaged six volumes. By this point, Ukraine was already working on producing its national encyclopaedia with an estimated print run of 80,000 copies.28 In December 1966, the Central Committee CPB together with the BSSR Council of Ministers decreed to produce the Belarusian Soviet Encyclopaedia.29 Its size doubled to 12 volumes.30 The first volume came out in December 1969, before any other republic got theirs off the ground.31 This, however, was only the beginning of a very challenging process of creating a national encyclopaedia. Although entries on Belarus made up only a part of the Encyclopaedia, they were the hardest to produce. The appeal of the Encyclopaedia’s chief editor to the Central Committee in May 1970 testifies how much work remained to be done in inscribing fully the Belarusian nation.32 The BSE editors and contributors encountered serious difficulties when trying

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to write entries for a host of topics because entire sub-fields of Belarusian history, literature and art, language, geography, and economy had not been researched. These blank spots jeopardised a large number of planned articles on the Middle Ages, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, and the evolution of capitalism in Belarus. Little was known about the history of Belarusian towns and cities: the BSE team planned to have 203 entries on these; yet, published material was available on just nine Belarusian cities. Similarly, hundreds of proposed entries on Belarusian material culture could not be produced drawing on a lone monograph on the subject published in the post-war years. There were serious research gaps in the history of Belarusian literature, especially that from before 1917. The BSE editorial section for art and architecture also faced significant challenges. There were no statistical data on any aspect of art in Belarus. No published research existed on the history of Belarusian theatre and stage art before 1917 or on Soviet-era regional and amateur theatre. No one had done any research into the history of the Belarusian entertainment, choreography, or Belarusian folk dancing. The editors felt acutely the lack of research on Belarusian architecture and pre-Revolutionary fine arts, including surveys on Belarusian portraits, landscapes, still-life paintings, and so on. Except a few studies of ceramics, ornaments, and traditional decorative sashes, the evolution of Belarusian applied arts and traditional craftsmanship was yet to be researched. No books shed light on pre-Revolutionary musical life of Belarusian cities or documented how folk songs had been collected. There were no monographs on individual Belarusian composers and no major historical survey of Soviet Belarusian music. The very landscape of the republic presented a terra incognita. Entries on the geographical features of Belarus were often handicapped by the lack of available data. For instance, the BSE envisaged entries on 480 lakes in Belarus, but about 330 of them had not yet been surveyed. Even the language posed a major difficulty. The Encyclopaedia was in Belarusian, and the editors discovered that specialist scientific and technical terminology in the national language was neither sufficiently developed, nor standardised. More problematically, the vast majority of geographical names of places in the USSR and foreign countries had never been written in Belarusian. The Encyclopaedia required around 100,000 geographical names to be transcribed in Belarusian for the first time. A Belarusian-language dictionary of the republic’s population centres, lakes, rivers, and marshes did not exist. There were no large-scale maps available in Belarusian that would help determine the correct spelling of geographical objects.33 As the letter from the Encyclopaedia’s editors to the Central Committee CPB testifies, the writing of Belarus as a nation with its own geography, history, language, and heritage was still very much incomplete in the 1970s, but this process was gathering speed. Remarkably, by 1976 all 12 volumes of the Belarusian Soviet Encyclopaedia, including the one on Belarus, were published.

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Projects like the compiling of the national encyclopaedia and the expansion of Belarusian heritage were to instruct Soviet Belarusians that they were a people with their own national history, traditions, and material and performative culture. Furthermore, they emphasised that such traditions, history, and culture harked back to times long before the October Revolution, lending greater legitimacy to the concept of Belarus as a nation with a long pedigree. Soviet Belarusians might have been told that they owed much to Soviet power, but they were also regularly reminded that Belarus was not an artificial Soviet construct. Consequently, they were expected to possess a distinctive collective identity that was ethnically Belarusian, as well as Soviet.

Soviet Modernity in Belarus If the carefully selected past was important for infusing Soviet Belarusian collective identity with the required ethnic elements, the socialist present could be harnessed to present the image of Belarus as a modern, civic community. Thus, the republic’s rapid economic development and modernisation became a crucial contributing factor in the shaping of Soviet Belarusian identity during the long 1970s, leaving a lasting legacy for the post-Soviet era. During 1965–1980, the impressive post-war reconstruction was completed, and Belarus became a success story of Soviet modernisation. A largely peasant republic with little industry before WWII, during the late Soviet decades it came to boast a successful industrial sector that included, inter alia, major chemical works, several hydroelectric power stations, and a rapidly developing oil-refining industry. The eighth Five-Year Period was especially successful: the growth rate of national wealth was at a record high, exceeding 9 per cent. It was the time of industrial expansion, and the fastest growing industries during 1966–1970 were the cutting-edge science-intensive electronics, chemical industry, radio engineering, and machine-building.34 In 1970, Belarus was already producing nearly half of the total Soviet potassium fertiliser output as well as 19 per cent of all the polyethylene, 10 per cent of synthetic fibres, 18 per cent of all tractors, and 22 per cent of all motorcycles made in the Soviet Union. It was engaged in modernising its existing industry: production lines at 560 enterprises and workshops had become automated; 16 computing centres were set up, etc.35 As the decade progressed, industrial expansion continued. The republic manufactured relatively sophisticated and high-tech equipment and goods, including colour TV sets, refrigerators, high-precision metalworking lathes, haul trucks, and computers. Science received a major boost in investment from the republic’s authorities. Belarus under Masherau became an important scientific hub, including nuclear energy research. These developments underpinned the republic’s new status within the hierarchy of Soviet republics, and the permission to hold nuclear arsenal on its territory underscored its strategic importance and political loyalty. Belarusian agriculture was also being modernised, and its successes were reflected in Moscow’s increased economic demands on the republic during the

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1970s. In 1975 alone, Belarus was expected to deliver 1,015,000 tons of meat, 3,630,000 tons of milk, 790,000,000 eggs, 1,630,000 tons of potatoes, 140,000 flax, and 350,000 tons of vegetables to the Soviet state. Annual targets of grain were set at 500,000 tons plus an extra 35 per cent of the set target as a “bonus” delivery. Masherau instructed the republic to exceed these, already ambitious, targets.36 This was not unprecedented: in 1973, for instance, Belarus sold to the state 1,100,000 tons of grain, exceeding the planned target by 200 per cent.37 In the 1973 All-Union Socialist Competition, it was rewarded with generous bonuses and asked Moscow for permission to build a metro in Minsk, only the ninth city in the USSR to do so, reflecting the Belarusian capital’s size and importance. The economic transformations had a major impact on the fabric of Belarusian society. Reconstruction and industrial expansion fuelled rapid urbanisation. By 1975, the majority of Belarusians lived in cities. From 1960 onwards, Minsk was the fastest growing city among the 35 largest cities in the USSR.38 During the 1970s, up to 55,000 new residents arrived here annually (Navitski et al. 2011). The capital’s ability to absorb this influx of migrants is remarkable, considering that Minsk was almost entirely razed to the ground during the war, so much so that the post-war authorities briefly considered moving the capital elsewhere. But in the 1970s, it was an attractive place to live, with the continual expansion of industry supplying job opportunities and a highly educated population. Modernisation and modernity were the key tropes of the Soviet project and its raison d’être. Masherau-era Belarus came to exemplify all that Soviet modernity was to achieve. One visiting Moscow journalist reportedly exclaimed: “Soviet power exists only in Belarus!” (Shamiakin 1998). In this context, Belarus’ identity was not only wedded to the Soviet and pre-socialist past but also to the socialist present. Certainly, the Belarusians, like most other ethnic groups in the USSR, were continuously reminded to thank Soviet power for their political and economic emancipation. And yet, as the earlier discussion of heritage and war commemoration indicates, a distinctive national identity was being forged within the scope afforded by the Brezhnev leadership’s inconsistent approach to nationalities (on this, see Lovell 2010: 218–25; Smith 2013: 216–55). Many scholars, and observers at home, heard in the linguistic Russification of the long 1970s and 1980s the death toll for any kind of Belarusian national identity, a view further fuelled in the mid-1990s by the disappointments over the loss of preSoviet national symbols and the status of the Belarusian language. But concerns about the decline of Belarusian, especially in the cities, had been publicly voiced by members of the national intelligentsia back in the 1960s and 1970s, and while some of the most vocal dissenters were silenced, the republic’s authorities took notice and implemented measures to address these concerns. These measures help explain why the overwhelming majority of Belarusians proclaimed their loyalty to the language in the 1979 census (Kaiser 1994: 271). Belarusian national identity was fostered by other cultural means: via the Masherau-led

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support of Belarusian literature and national writers; by investing in Belarusian music and theatre; by popularising a jazzed-up, modern version of Belarusian folklore performed by such successful pop-music bands as Pesniary or Siabry; or by publicising Frantsishak Skaryna as “the first Belarusian printer”. The identity that all these different state mobilisation efforts produced combined symbolic ethnic attributes with modern and civic elements. It was framed by state-sponsored culture, history and symbols, but it also drew on the economic achievements of the late Soviet era: impressive post-war reconstruction, modernisation of the economy, and Soviet-style prosperity. The stable, prosperous, and respectable present rested on a heroic and traumatic recent past but could also lay claim to some pre-revolutionary roots that underpinned Soviet Belarusian identity. Masherau himself was an eloquent embodiment of the dramatic changes that Belarus experienced: he distinguished himself during the war as a partisan hero but had to live down personal loss and war-time trauma; he also had to thank the war for launching his party career. His transition from a rural setting to the capital mirrored the social and geographical mobility patterns of many of his compatriots. In the process, he, like them, dropped his Belarusian. Yet, he cultivated personal relations with the writers who worked in that language and did much to support and encourage Belarusian literature and culture, while at the same time prioritising the modernisation of the Belarusian economy and daily life. Belarusian society that Masherau’s economic and cultural policies helped build was modern, increasingly well-educated, and urban – a Soviet version of the middle class. It was Soviet; yet, it was not devoid of a sense of national identity even back in 1991. Since then, it came further along in that direction. An overwhelming majority (79 per cent) of Belarusians are now urbanites; many are well travelled, and most are connected to the internet.39 Lukashenka’s chief error was that, for all his attention to Soviet legacy, he failed to recognise this trajectory. He continued to address his electorate as if it was made up of villagers. In 21st-century Belarus, modernity primarily means a digital revolution, and it left the ageing dictator behind. Soviet modernity of the long 1970s enabled Belarusians to envisage a prosperous and dignified future, albeit within the considerable limits of the command economy and illiberal one-party state. Lukashenka’s social contract promised to secure a similarly prosperous and dignified future in the post-Soviet era, but it fell short on those counts. In the uncertain economic and political circumstances of 1994, the former propagandist and state farm manager Lukashenka just about cut the electoral mustard, but in the 2020 elections a far greater number of voters preferred the Englishspeaking wife of an imprisoned blogger and the vision of a dignified, modern collective future that she symbolised.

Concluding Remarks Elements of the Belarusian national identity constructed during the late Soviet era – civic-mindedness, modernity, technological savviness, aversion to

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violence conditioned by the collective war memory, and a shared vision of the future that acknowledges a national past – were recognisable in the crisis that burst into the open in August 2020. For all the undisputable changes Belarusian society has undergone over the last three decades, their direction was in many ways determined by the late Soviet experience. Lukashenka had long sought to exploit those continuities but ultimately failed. He even tried to become the national leader in the mould of Masherau. That did not go well either. For decades after his death in a car crash in 1980, Masherau remained one of the most highly regarded public figures in Belarus. In national polls, held regularly between 1996 and 2013 by the Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS), this former partisan hero was consistently voted first or second, leaving behind a plethora of well-known political names from different times and places. In every poll bar two, Masherau “beat” Lukashenka.40 Masherau’s enduring popularity shows just how resilient that historic period has been in Belarusian public memory. It inspired a lasting sense of collective pride that survived the 1991 divide. In 2013, over 78 per cent of respondents in another IISEPS poll agreed that victory in the Great Patriotic War was one of the 20th-century events that Belarusians could be most proud of. Notably, fewer (39 per cent) named the 1991 independence. The first-ever declaration of Belarusian statehood in 1918 received only 10 per cent of the votes. On the other hand, a third of the respondents named the post-war reconstruction and the subsequent industrialisation as Belarusians’ greatest achievements.41 The Masherau years were far from a Golden Age in Belarusian history. In addition to being ruled by a repressive political system (the experience it shared with all Soviet republics), Belarus during this time experienced the decline of its national language, sustained irreparable damage to its unique eco-systems, saw its war memory curtailed and manipulated, and lost some of its precious cultural heritage. But it was also taught that it existed as a national community and possessed its own culture, language, literature, history, and a successful economy. To disregard what many Belarusians have viewed as positive achievements of the major social-economic transformations of the Masherau years, as well as its contribution to the shaping of distinctively Belarusian identity, would leave a major gap in our understanding of “whence Belarus”. As Alexander Pershai notes, “every country has its symbolic capital in terms of economic welfare, culture and the politics of citizenship; all these factors have to be acknowledged and incorporated into the Belarusian nationalist project” (Pershai 2006: 632). The late Soviet legacy is a substantial part of that symbolic capital and ought to be acknowledged and properly understood as a basis for contemporary Belarusian identity that is modern, forward looking, and offers a sense of achievement and dignity without being nationally indifferent. As the 2020 protests have revealed, popular attachment to aspects of this historic legacy, so often dismissed as nostalgia that is counterproductive to democratic development, can play a surprisingly different role in the efforts of the Belarusians to write a new chapter in their collective history.

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Notes 1 Natsyianal’ny arkhiu Respubliki Belarus’ (NARB), f. 974, op. 2, d. 697, l. 1. 2 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1642, l. 11. 3 Belaruski Dziarzhauny Arkhiu-Muzei Litaratury i Mastatstva (BDAMLM), f. 78, vop. 1, spr. 200, ll. 159–160. 4 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 794, ll. 1–6. 5 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 794, ll. 1–6. 6 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1117, ll. 11–15. 7 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 794, l. 7. 8 BDAMLM, f. 78, vop. 1, spr. 144, ll. 32–33. 9 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 697, ll. 1–7. 10 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 873, l. 34. 11 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 697, l. 1. 12 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 873, l. 41. 13 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 873, l. 41. 14 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1641, l. 3. 15 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 697, ll. 1–7; NARB f. 974, op. 2, d. 794, ll. 1–9. 16 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 873, ll. 1–6. 17 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 873, ll.1–6. 18 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 873, ll. 41–44. 19 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1590, l. 1. 20 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1590, l. 1. 21 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1641, l. 1. 22 The Belarusian minister for culture advocated using Catholic churches and other historical and architectural monuments as venues for folk concerts, to make such concerts emotionally more powerful and appealing. NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1353, l. 265. 23 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1641, ll. 1–2. 24 These numbers must have included visitors to the republic. See NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1507, l. 187. 25 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1507, ll. 97, 187. 26 NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1507, l. 207. 27 See, for instance, NARB, f. 974, op. 2, d. 1642, ll. 1–12. 28 NARB, f. 1126, op. 3, d. 9, l. 239. 29 NARB, f. 4, op. 81, d. 2279, l. 67. 30 NARB, f. 1126, op. 3, d. 291, l. 257. 31 NARB, f. 4, op. 81, d. 2279, l. 69. 32 NARB, f. 4, op. 81, d. 2279, ll. 78–83. 33 NARB, f. 4, op. 81, d. 2279, ll. 78–83. 34 NARB, f. 528, op. 1, d. 41, l. 107, 109. 35 NARB, f. 528, op. 1, d. 41, ll. 110–111. 36 NARB, f. 528, op. 1, d. 41, ll. 136–137. 37 NARB, f. 4, op. 81, d. 2487, l. 3. 38 NARB, f. 4, op. 81, d. 2470, l. 184. 39 https://freedomhouse​.org​/country​/belarus​/freedom​-net​/2019. 40 http://www​.iiseps​.org/​?lang​=en. 41 http://www​.old​.iiseps​.org​/data13​-61​.html.

References Astrouskaya, T. (2019) Cultural Dissent in Soviet Belarus (1968–1988): Intelligentsia, Samizdat and Nonconformist Discourses. Wiesbaden: Harrassowitz Verlag. Bekus, N. (2019) ‘Belarus’s winding path to a post-soviet identity.’ Current History 118 (810): 258–64.

48  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited Buhr, R.L., Shadurski, V. and Hoffman, S. (2011) ‘Belarus: An emerging civic nation?’ Nationalities Papers 39(3): 425–40. Etkind, A. et al. (2012) Remembering Katyn’. Cambridge: Polity. Goujon, A. (2010) ‘Memorial Narratives of WWII Partisans and Genocide in Belarus.’ East European Politics and Societies 24(1): 6–25. Kaiser, R. (1994) The Geography of Nationalism in Russia and the USSR. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Korosteleva, E. and I. Petrova (2021) ‘Community resilience in Belarus and the EU response.’ Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review 59: 124–36. Leshchenko, N. (2008) ‘The national ideology and the basis of the Lukashenka regime in Belarus.’ Europe-Asia Studies 60(8): 1419–33. Levin, L. (2005) Khatyn’: avtobiograficheskaia povest’. Minsk: Asobny Dakh. Lewis, S. (2018) Belarus – Alternative Visions: Nation, Memory and Cosmopolitanism. London: BASEES/Routledge Series on Russian and East European Studies. Lovell, S. (2010) The Shadow of War: Russia and the USSR, 1941 to the Present. Chichester: Wiley-Blackwell. Manaev, O., Manayeva, N. and Yuran, D. (2011) ‘More state than nation: Lukashenko’s Belarus.’ Journal of International Affairs 65(1): 93–113. Marples, D. (2014) “Our Glorious Past”: Lukashenka’s Belarus and the Great Patriotic War. Stuttgart: Ibidem Verlag. Navitski, U. et al. (2011) Historyia Belarusi, Volume 6: ‘Belarus’ u 1946–2009 hh’. Minsk: Sovremennaia shkola. Pershai, A. (2006) ‘Questioning the hegemony of the nation state in Belarus: Production of intellectual discourses as production of resources.’ Nationalities Papers 34(5): 623–35. Petrova, I. and Korosteleva, E. (2021) ‘Societal fragility and resilience: The emergence of peoplehood in Belarus.’ Journal of Eurasian Studies 12(2): 122–32. Radzik, R. and Słomczynska J. (2001) ‘Belarus between the East and the West: The SovietRussian option versus the nationalist option in Belarusian society.’ International Journal of Sociology 31 (3): 11–45. Rudling, P. (2008) ‘“For a heroic Belarus!”: The Great Patriotic War as identity marker in the Lukashenka and Soviet Belarusian discourses.’ Nationalities Affairs (Sprawy Narodowościowe) 32: 43–62. Rudling, P. (2011) ‘Lukashenka and the “red-browns”: National ideology, commemoration of the past and political belonging.’ Forum für osteuropäische Ideen- und Zeitgeschichte 15(1): 95–125. Rudling, P. (2012) ‘The Khatyn massacre in Belorussia: A historical controversy revisited.’ Holocaust and Genocide Studies 26(1): 29–58. Rudling, P. (2015) The Rise and Fall of Belarusian Nationalism, 1906–1931. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press. Rudling, P. (2017) ‘“Unhappy is the person who has no motherland”: National ideology and history writing in Lukashenka’s Belarus.’ In War and Memory in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus. Eds. Fedor, J., Kangaspuro, M., Lassila, J. and Zhurzhenko, T. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan Memory Studies, 86–134. Shamiakin, I. (1998) Rozdum na aposhnim perahone. Dzenniki 1980-1995 hadou. Minsk: Mastatskaia litaratura. Silitski, V. (2006) ‘Still soviet? Why dictatorship persists in Belarus.’ Harvard International Review 28 (1): 46–47. Slepyan, K. (2006) Stalin’s Guerrillas: Soviet Partisans in World War II. Lawrence: University of Kansas.

The Soviet Roots of the 2020 Protests  49 Smith, J. (2013) Red Nations: The Nationalities Experience in and after the USSR. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Snyder, T. (2010) Bloodlands. Europe between Hitler and Stalin. London: The Bodley Head. Tumarkin, N. (1994) The Living and the Dead: The Rise and Fall of the Cult of World War II in Russia. New York: Basic Books. Wilson, A. (2011) Belarus: The Last European Dictatorship. London: Yale University Press.

4

Foreign Policy Manifestations of Belarus’ 2020 Protest Movement In-betweenness as Usual? Huawei Zheng

Introduction The year 2020 witnessed a series of crises at both global and national levels. It hit Belarus particularly hard, leading to mass demonstrations and political upheavals in the country. A number of factors contributed to this mass protest, including Lukashenka’s mismanagement of COVID-19 (Åslund 2020), mass anger at the authority’s mistreatment of demonstrators, and people’s disillusion with Belarus’ welfare state. Compared to the previous protests between 2011 and 2019 in the country, the 2020 demonstrations were widespread and persistent both in terms of their turnout and locality (de Vogel 2022; Mateo 2022). They severely undermined Lukashenka’s legitimacy and served as a catalyst for ongoing change in the country. Mass demonstrations following the disputed August 2020 presidential election, which lasted for over a year, were seen as exceptional for Belarus. It has significant political and social implications that have drawn the attention of social scientists. Scholars have examined the protest from the perspectives of civil society (Astapova et al., 2022; Douglas 2020), identity (Kazaharski 2021), peoplehood (Petrova and Korosteleva 2021, and in this volume), social class (Gapova 2021, and in this volume), and ordinary citizens (Pravdivets, Markovich, and Nazaranka et al. 2022). A special issue authored by Onuch and Sasse (2022) in Post-Soviet Affairs called “Understanding the 2020 Mass Mobilisation in Belarus” approached this movement from the sociological, geopolitical, and media aspects, presenting rich clusters of original data to explain the 2020 mass protest and the consequent change observable in the country. While political and social ramifications have been acknowledged, the foreign-policy manifestation of these domestic dynamics is yet to be fully explored in the existing literature. Given that Aliaksandr Lukashenka has remained in power for nearly three decades and that the protest movement was a recent event, studies of Belarusian foreign policy have focused almost exclusively on the authority’s stance, and even on Lukashenka’s personal attitudes or manoeuvring (Nesvetailova 2003; White and Feklyunina 2014; Polglase-Korostelev 2020). Previous studies of Belarus’ foreign policy mainly focused on the DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-5

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country’s pre-2020 dynamics (Allison, White, and Light 2005; Korosteleva 2011; White, Biletskaya, and McAllister 2016; Nizhnikau and Moshes 2020), while failing to capture the latest developments in light of the 2020 mass demonstration, and more importantly, against the 2022 Russia’s war in Ukraine. This chapter thus engages with the civil protest movement in Belarus to examine its foreign policy implications for the country. It focuses on a crucial aspect of Belarusian foreign policy, i.e., its position on the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU), Russia, and the European Union (EU). Notably, it asks to what extent the 2020 protest movement in Belarus brought about changes in terms of the country’s foreign policy choice and geopolitical orientation. Do the 2020 protest and the 2022 Russia’s war in Ukraine force us to reconsider Belarus’ pre-2020 position of in-betweenness? Belarus is one of the founders of the EEU and has been a firm supporter of Eurasian economic, security, and social integration. Along with Russia and Kazakhstan, Belarus formed a strong and solid pro-integration core, which was termed “the Eurasian Troika” by Leonov and Korneev (2019: 211). Lukashenka was perceived by some to be “the closest to Russia” (Sakwa 2014: 42). Nevertheless, Russia-Belarus bilateral relations have been far from easy, and after 2014 Lukashenka was wary of Moscow’s geopolitical ambitions due to the annexation of Crimea (Korosteleva 2016; Hansbury 2021). Located geographically between the EU and Russia, Belarus has been known for its “in-betweenness”, i.e., it is neither entirely committed to the EEU nor fully integrated with the Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP) (Allison, White, and Light 2005; Korosteleva 2015). The country’s in-betweenness was largely premised on Lukashenka’s pre-2020 diplomatic strategies that “stressed Belarus’ ‘multi-directionality’ in foreign policy” (O’Loughlin and Toal 2022: 44). Up until the 2020 electoral crisis, there were even efforts from the Belarusian side to seek rapprochement with the West, whereas by the end of 2019, BelarusRussia relations were deteriorating (Nizhnikau and Moshes 2020: 48–49). However, the dynamics of 2022 onwards may force us to revisit Belarus’s previous multi-vectored foreign policy and examine its changing identity and shifting in-betweenness. If a transformative political force has emerged in Belarus, we cannot afford to ignore its potential impact on the country’s foreign policy. Importantly, change at the “local” and “personal” levels may have broader implications for the regional or even global stage (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021). Moreover, Lukashenka’s responses to the protest may also decisively change his pre-2020 foreign policy that facilitated the country’s in-betweenness. Hence, new foreign policy thinking that originated from Belarusian civil protest movement may lead to more profound change in the Eurasian regional groupings such as the EEU, and more broadly, in regional geo-economic or geopolitical developments. Although the 2020 mass protest did not have a Maidan-like pro-European focus further discussed by Kudlenko in this volume, it was a domestically oriented process, it also manifested itself in the country’s foreign policy and the wider regional international politics. This chapter argues that after 2020 Belarus

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can no longer enjoy the position of in-betweenness as before. The room for remaining an in-between state has shrunk decisively after the 2022 Russia’s war against Ukraine. The oppositional force and the regime became more determined to align themselves with the EU and Russia respectively. To be more specific, the protest movement gave rise to an oppositional force, termed herein as the “grassroots opposition”, which is different from the traditional anti-regime movement and thus needs further analysis. At the initial stage of the protest, the grassroots opposition in Belarus distanced the movement from any geopolitical ambition, but then affirmed a stronger pro-European, antiRussian disposition after the 2022 Russia’s war in Ukraine. However, the Lukashenka regime chose to deepen its integration with Russia within the EEU/CSTO framework, as a regime-protecting strategy. As a result of choosing one geopolitical orientation as opposed to the previous strategy of ‘inbetweenness’, Belarus may slide into the danger of larger internal cleavage and global geopolitical confrontations. This chapter first will conceptualise Belarus’ grassroots opposition. Then it will trace the narratives articulated by its leading activists and opposition leaders on Belarus’ foreign policy and position on the EEU and the EU. Finally, it will look at the regime’s responses and situate the Belarusian case into broader regional and global international relations.

The Grassroots Opposition in Belarus: Its Characteristics and Agency The traditional opposition has failed to gain wider popularity in Belarus and suffered significant weaknesses. In this regard, Gapova (2021: 45, and in this volume) pointed out that the “old” opposition did not enjoy broad popularity. Rotman and Danilov (2003: 107) argued that “the level of trust in the opposition is low, and there has been no active, effective, and influential opposition in the country”. Worse, traditional opposition in Belarus has never been fully representative of civil society or well connected to the general public. As Ioffe (2004: 99) put it, “the opposition created the impression that it acted on behalf of a special caste of the initiated and was in no way connected with the majority of the people”. Meanwhile, de Vogel (2022: 19) argued that the (traditional) opposition in Belarus suffered from crackdowns and repression from the regime, which in later years deterred the opposition from engaging in collective actions. Nevertheless, the 2020 protest movement and the rise of peoplehood as argued by Korosteleva and Petrova (2021, and in this volume), seemed to bring fresh air into Belarus’ political landscape. The 2020 demonstrations were largely self-organised by the people, who were not connected formally to the opposition (Douglas 2020). The movement was neither prepared nor led by the traditional oppositional parties (Kazharski 2021). Instead, protesters were described as free and autonomous subjects (Gapova 2021: 50). Against this backdrop, it is necessary to introduce the concept of the “grassroots opposition” to capture

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these new dynamics and distinguish it from the hitherto traditional, formal, and unpopular oppositional force. The first characteristic of the emerged grassroots opposition is that major leaders and activists were not from the traditional oppositional parties. Instead, many of them fall into the category of specialists, professionals, or intellectuals, or are closely connected to these social groups. For example, even prior to the presidential election, leading activists began to campaign for their candidates of choice. These activists included Viktar Babaryka, a former banker; Valery Tsapkala, who was from the IT industry; and Siarhei Tikhanousky, a protest blogger. Female activists were also actively involved in the protest movement. For example, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the wife of the arrested presidential contender, decided to step forward and become a presidential candidate, in the name of her husband. She partnered with Veranika Tsapkala (another presidential contender’s wife) and Maryia Kalesnikava (Babaryka’s campaign chief) and, according to Douglas (2020: 20) “became a successful team that moved the masses prior to the election”. Before ascending to become the leading presidential candidate, Tsikhanouskaya was a housewife, while her husband was a popular businessman and a video blogger, famous for his initiative called “A Country for Living” (Strana dlya zhyzni), soon imprisoned on false grounds. Second, a lot of these emerging activists were professionals from middle/ upper social class or elite groups. The concept of the grassroot society captures the characteristic that they were well connected to and represented the mobilised masses from all walks of life, contrary to the incumbent. In this sense, they did not belong to the old and formal oppositional force, nor do they suffer the weaknesses of traditional Belarusian opposition. Data show that Tsikhanouskaya was rather popular in terms of how Belarusians said they voted. In a public opinion poll following weeks of protest, only 20.6 per cent of surveyed respondents said they voted for Lukashenka, while 52.2 per cent voted for Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya (Astapenia 2020). Third, and more relevant to our discussion of the foreign policy choices, Belarus’ grassroots opposition has gained wide international recognition, which the traditional oppositional force lacked. As the leader of Belarus’ grassroots opposition, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya was welcomed by the West. Belarus’ democratic cause drew sympathy from key political figures such as the US President Joe Biden, the French President Emmanuel Macron, and Josep Borrell, the High Representative of the EU Foreign Affairs and Security Policy.1 In addition, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya also had the opportunity to address international institutions such as the European Parliament and the United Nations Security Council, which served as an important recognition of the democratic struggle in Belarus, and legitimation of her authority by the international society. The new grassroots opposition has established itself as the key democratic force representing Belarus, at least in the Western world. Even though Lukashenka remained in power after the disputed 2020 presidential election, the grassroots opposition did not cease to act or demand their voice heard. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya declared herself the national

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leader of democratic Belarus. Meanwhile, her office managed to incorporate a number of professionals who comprised the Cabinet of Representatives and developed links with the Belarusian diaspora across the world. Notably, they included Valery Kavaleuski, a former diplomat from Belarus’ Ministry of Foreign Affairs, who serves as Head of the Cabinet and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s representative on foreign affairs, and Franak Viachorka, her Senior Adviser, and a former journalist. Other members included Tatiana Shchyttsova (representative on education and science), Aleś Alachnovič (representative on economic reforms), Kristina Rikhter (representative on legal affairs), Anatoli Liabedzka (representative for Constitutional Reform and Parliamentary Cooperation), and Alana Gebremariam (representative for youth and student affairs). Following Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s initiative, the Coordination Council, described as “the unified representative body of the Belarusian people”, was created to overcome the political crisis and facilitate social cohesion.2 Importantly, the Coordination Council did not aim to “seize power in an unconstitutional way”,3 or to undermine Tsikhanouskaya’s leadership, and served as a sign of unification of all political forces against the incumbent. In contrast to the mass protest and the rise of peoplehood, as Korosteleva and Petrova argue in their chapter of this volume, the grassroots opposition has established itself as a political force different from the old and formal opposition. They directly reached out to the people and successfully mobilised the masses before and after the election in 2020. A series of agencies have been organised around the main leader, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. These agencies functioned and campaigned in parallel with the authority, and this way may pave the way for a new foreign policy thinking to counter that of the Belarusian government. For example, the Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya (OST) set up the OST Research Centre to generate policy advice and connect with major international policy and decision-making bodies for strategic purposes. It subsequently developed partnership with the Oxford Belarus Observatory as a platform for policy engagement with Belarus in the spotlight and soon connected with the Policy Institute of GLOBSEC policy forum to run regular webinars on topical issues relating to Belarus’ current affairs and foreign policy thinking.4 The next section of this chapter takes a detailed look at the narratives of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office and explores their foreign policy orientations. The focus is placed on their attitudes towards the EU, the EEU, and Belarus’ position within it.

New Foreign Policy Thinking: Developing a New Identity? Dynamics before 2022

Contrary to the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity in 2013/2014, Belarusian protest movement of 2020/2021 showed little geopolitical orientation at the early stages. The main narrative was to distance the protest from any geopolitical claim, which was evidenced consistently in the statements of the opposition

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leader. As Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya put it, “our revolution is not geopolitical; it’s not a pro-Russian revolution nor pro-EU revolution”.5 She elucidated why the Belarusian revolution was different from the Ukrainian context: she believed it was “a fight inside the country”.6 The protest was depicted as merely a democratic movement that aimed to enhance the well-being of Belarusian people. According to Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, “we do not look to the East or West, we only look to better lives”.7 To some extent, this reflects the fact that during the protest movement there was no explicit call for geopolitical change among the Belarusian people. Therefore, the grassroots opposition did not take a revisionist approach to the Belarusian multi-vector foreign policy, a principle followed by Lukashenka for a long time. What has been constantly underlined by the grassroots opposition leader is the independence and sovereignty of the country, which should not be traded in any case. In the eyes of the grassroots opposition, the problem was Lukashenka himself, who had lost his legitimacy and credibility in serving as the president. From the grassroots opposition’s point of view, Lukashenka should be viewed only as “the former President of Belarus”, while his grip on power is seen as an illegitimate phenomenon subject to correction. Interestingly, one of the interviewees corrected the author when the latter referred to Lukashenka as “the President”, insisting that “since 2020, Lukashenka is not a President, but a person who illegally keeps power by force, brutality, and lawlessness … his lack of legitimacy and illegality of his office defines his weakness and exposes him to all kinds of pressure and manipulations”.8 In terms of foreign policy, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya said that “he (Lukashenka) buys the support from Russia; and all the deals (made by Lukashenka with Russia) are illegitimate”.9 The problem of foreign policy making being dictated by Lukashenka personally is also underlined and criticised by many respondents, one of whom in particular argued that “until August 2020, part of the decision-making process was hidden. A lot was decided on a personal level. The issues of cooperation with Russia were under the full control of Lukashenka”.10 Specific to the EEU, Belarusian grassroots opposition did not want to change the status quo of being an EEU member state. The strategy was to remain within the EEU, while seeking compatibility with gaining more benefits from the EU. For example, Aleś Alachnovič, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s representative on economic reform, was in favour of liberalising import of services from Belarus to the EU. Importantly, the private sector was distinguished from the state-owned enterprises (SOEs), which are seen as “the engine of Lukashenka’s regime and finance pool”.11 Experts from the grassroots opposition asked for more access for Belarusian service providers to the EU market. The main argument advanced by the opposition is that liberalising the trade of service would be a win-win situation for both Belarus and the EU, which “prevents Russia from absorbing Belarus as a country, while benefiting the EU in terms of labour migration”.12 Nevertheless, given that the central appeal of Belarusian grassroots opposition is to ask Lukashenka to step down, find a way out of the current political

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crisis, and hold a fair and honest election in the future, they find themselves aligned more with the West, and not Russia. Moscow chose not to engage with Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and continued to support the Lukashenka regime, particularly from logistical and financial aspects. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya herself is now in exile having settled in Vilnius, promoting the cause of Belarusian grassroots opposition mainly to the West. She called for more sanctions from the EU on businesses related to the regime and Lukashenka’s inner circles, which will put more pressure on Lukashenka and have trickle-down effects on the political landscape in Belarus. Therefore, although Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya claimed that the democratic movement was non-geopolitical, the foreign policy carried out by the grassroots opposition has de facto been heading towards the EU and the West, this way not deviating from its multi-vectorness. As one of the interviewees pointed out, “Tsikhanouskaya’s office initially considered future external relations as balanced”.13

Back to Europe: The Dramatic Narrative Shift after the 2022 Russia’s War with Ukraine The 2022 Russia’s war with Ukraine became a watershed for the implicit foreign policy orientations expressed by Tsikhanouskaya’s office. The war incurred harsh criticism from Belarusian opposition, which shifted their narrative root and branch. The main criticism is that by launching this war, Russia damaged Belarusian sovereignty and territorial integrity. Tatiana Shchyttsova, Representative of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya on Education and Science, viewed this as “an undeclared occupation of the Belarusian territory by Russian troops”.14 According to her accounts, the whole country of Belarus “is held hostage by the aggressor”.15 Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya pointed out explicitly that “Belarus is under de facto military occupation, and their movement has turned from a fight for democracy to a fight for sovereignty against Russian revisionism”.16 By allowing Russian troops to use Belarusian land, Lukashenka was perceived to have “committed an ultimate crime of high treason against the state of Belarus and Belarusian people”.17 Along with the condemnation of the Russian aggression and infringement of Belarusian sovereignty, there has been a more assertive self-affirmation of the European identity by Belarusian grassroots opposition. They have linked Ukraine’s and Europe’s fates more closely with Belarus’ own future. To give an example, Tatiana Shchyttsova claimed that “the Ukraine War makes us finally write off the former concept of ‘the post-Soviet states’ to the archive … the fate of Europe, including the fate of Belarus, is being decided today by Ukraine”.18 This is an outstanding remark that aligns Belarus with Europe and Ukraine, while distancing the country from Russia and more broadly, the whole post-Soviet region. The anti-war sentiment has also provoked a “back to Europe” narrative, which is evidenced in Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s statement that “when Ukraine wins, we will have a chance to return to the European family”.19 If the self-identification of Europeanness was rather modest at the

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early stage of the protest movement, it was articulated clearer and stronger in a few months in the aftermath of the war. As a result, a new foreign policy thinking of Belarusian opposition became more geopolitical almost overnight. As Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya put it, “should Ukraine fail, there will be no future but slavery in the Russian empire for Belarus … The war pushed Belarusians to come to this choice of geopolitics”.20 According to these views, this leads to a more profound change in Belarus’ foreign policy thinking, and more broadly, a reset of relations with Russia, the EEU, and the EU. A senior foreign affairs representative from Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s office elaborated on this: The EEU serves Russian interests, preventing Belarus from developing relations with the EU, which would definitely conform to our interests… The EEU, just like all other numerous integration initiatives with Russia, will all need to be reviewed on their conformity to the Constitution of Belarus. A democratic and sovereign Belarus will need to build relations with the EU almost from scratch.21 However, there remains a gap between the above new foreign policy thinking and the actual official policy of Belarus. Given that Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya made it clear that she was only representing a democratic Belarus in this transition period, and that she was more interested in serving her country in areas other than politics in the future, it remains to be seen to what extent will the new leadership, after a fair and transparent election, internalise these thoughts and level them up to Belarus’ foreign policy. The next section will examine how Lukashenka’s regime reacted to the protest in terms of its external relations and diplomatic strategy. It will also explore the ramifications of Belarus’ political crisis for the broader region.

Pushback of the Regime: Standing at the Forefront of Geopolitical Confrontations? There has been no easy and seamless path to democracy or regime change in Belarus. Although mass mobilisation in 2020 was unprecedented, Lukashenka’s regime engaged in pushbacks and repression against the protesters and oppositional activists, which led to torture, abuses, and tragic loss of lives. At the time of writing, Lukashenka has kept a firm grip on power, whereas the early 2021 protests seemed to have lost their momentum as a nationwide movement. Importantly, Onuch and Sasse (2022a: 4) observed that “there were few defections from within the inner circle of the regime, particularly the security forces and the military”. Lukashenka has thus benefited from his long-lasting investment into his inner circle and loyalists, who helped him cling to power, against his eroding legitimacy and trust among the Belarusian people. The regime also engaged in information campaigns to squeeze out independent media, bloggers

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and influencers, while infusing online channels (such as youtube) with proregime propaganda.22 Before 2020 Lukashenka pursued a pragmatic and multi-vectored foreign policy and, according to Onuch and Sasse (2022b: 65), even played off the two regional hegemons, i.e., the EU and Russia against each other. This foreign policy choice and a balanced geopolitical disposition were based on calculations of national interests for a small state located in-between two much greater powers. However, after 2020 Lukashenka effectively deviated from this multi-vectorness and aligned more closely with the Kremlin, which was reinforced by the 2022 Russia’s war in Ukraine. This shift in geopolitical orientation was largely driven by the logic of self-protection and a regime-securing strategy. Consequently, Lukashenka’s deepening integrations with Russia and within Russia-sponsored regional groupings increasingly correspond with what Allison (2018: 324) called “protective integration”, which is intended to bolster the regime’s security, stability, and legitimacy. These have been much tighter integrations, at both bilateral and multilateral levels. At a meeting with Putin in March 2022, Lukashenka suggested working out joint ways to counter the sanctions (imposed by the EU) within the EEU framework, and further opening the market (of Belarus) (Interfax 2022). Moreover, these integrations go beyond economic cooperation and extend to military, and even strategic fields. Following a referendum held on 27 February 2022, Belarus made a substantial change to its Constitution, in which provision for a nuclear-free zone in Belarus was omitted, effectively abolishing Belarus’ non-nuclear status and allowing the stationing of Russian nuclear forces (OST Research Centre, Oxford Belarus Observatory, and GCRF COMPASS Project 2022a). In the amendments to its Constitution, Belarus also abandoned its neutrality status, which allows Russian troops onto Belarusian territory and could threaten European security in general (OST Research Centre, Oxford Belarus Observatory, and GCRF COMPASS Project 2022b). Alarmingly, within an authoritarian context, we have seen a personalisation of Russia-Belarus integration by the top leaders of these two states. Against the backdrop of constitutional amendments in both countries, inter-state integration is at risk of being reduced to an interpersonal relationship that helps bolster Putin and Lukashenka’s regimes and maintain their grips on power. When commenting on Belarus’ future relations with Russia, one of the interviewees observed that “(after 2020) the integration of power structures looks the most dangerous (for Belarus)”.23 A personalisation of inter-state relations not only impedes Belarus’ democratic transition but also presents a danger to the country’s independence and sovereignty. It makes Lukashenka’s deal with Moscow less transparent, less driven by national interests, and explicitly subject to Russia’s manipulations or dictations. The first consequence of Lukashenka’s “turn to the East” is to further enlarge the cleavage among Belarusian population along the line of geopolitical disposition. Belarusians were divided in terms of their geopolitical attitudes and foreign policy preference. In a survey conducted by O’Loughlin and Toal

Foreign Policy and the Protest Movement  59

(2022: 51–53), they showed that “preference for joining the EU is only about one-half the ratio of the preference for staying in the EEU, while almost threequarters of respondents supported neutrality for Belarus”. Therefore, deviation from neutrality and abolishment of its non-nuclear status were against the will of the majority of the population. Worse, Onuch and Sasse (2022b: 74–76) found that “geopolitical preferences form part of the foundational basis of anti-authoritarian protest engagement in 2020, and that the anti-regime sentiment went hand in hand with anti-Russia attitudes and liberal democratic dispositions”. Instead of bridging the gap, the regime’s internal repression and foreign policy choice may further alienate a significant portion of the population, closing the window of opportunity for a peaceful and smooth democratic transition. Another profound ramification of Lukashenka’s departure from a multivector foreign policy is that Belarus is at risk of being dragged into a larger geopolitical confrontation, following the 2022 Russia’s War in Ukraine. We have seen a “collective West mobilised to the highest degree since 1945” (Sakwa 2022) supporting Ukraine ideationally, institutionally, and militarily. The War has been increasingly framed as “a fight for values”,24 and military equipment from the West is flooding the country; and institutionally, Ukraine has been offered an EU candidacy status. As a countermeasure, the Eurasian political-military alliance is integrating itself as well. This alliance is centred on Russia, driven by insecurity provoked by EU/NATO enlargement, supported by regional security organisations such as the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). Belarus may thus stand at the forefront of this geopolitical confrontation between the Euro-Atlantic and the Eurasian politicalsecurity blocs. Worse, Lukashenka explicitly pointed out at a recent CSTO summit that “we must be united on this [countering NATO enlargement]. It is not only Russia that must express concern and fight alone the attempts to expand NATO” (Belta 2022). As long as he remains in power, he seems committed to closer ties with Moscow, and this was reinforcing the Euro-Atlantic vs. Eurasian geopolitical rift.

Conclusion Belarus’ 2020 protest movement unfolds itself against a broader global transformation of international order. Babic (2020) used the term “interregnum” to describe a transitional period when the previously hegemonic liberal international order is in crisis, yet a new hegemonically stable world order is absent, and a new equilibrium has not been reached. Herein, one can make a useful analogy between the global order transition and the Belarusian case. Belarus finds itself in such an interregnum, where the seed for change has been sown, while the fruit is yet to be harvested. The old social contract has eroded, and the Belarusians no longer trust Lukashenka’s regime and its institutions. However, although the grassroots opposition led by Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has emerged to propel regime change, she wishes

60  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited

to be only a transitional political figure. It remains to be seen how the new oppositional force will take shape after a fairer election, and to what extent will they internalise the ideas of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s team. We have seen in the Belarusian case the interplay between attitudes towards liberal democracy, geopolitical disposition, and foreign policy choice. Given the pushback of Lukashenka’s regime, the window for a smooth, peaceful, and democratic regime change is closing quickly. In terms of foreign policy, at least in the short term, the most likely scenario is that Belarus will remain in the EEU, play a more active role in the CSTO, and be more closely integrated in a Moscow-centred political-military alliance. Belarus’ long-enjoyed in-betweenness has decisively changed. The most significant implication following the 2020 protest and the 2022 Russia’s war in Ukraine is that there has been a paradigm shift in Belarus’ foreign policy choice. To be more specific, the pre-2020 position of neither fully committed to the EEU and other Russia-led integrations nor completely devoted to the Eastern Partnership Initiative has increasingly turned into an either/or option, which means that it can either be further integrated into the Eurasian political-military alliance or drastically turn to the Euro-Atlantic bloc. The former paradigm is currently adopted by the regime, whereas in the future a liberal-oriented opposition may choose the latter one and trigger a reset of the country’s foreign relations. Belarus’ experience can thus inform the studies on post-Soviet states, on democratisation and on International Relations (IR) in a wider sense that as a small “in-between” state, its internal political change is always intertwined with normative orientations, geopolitical dispositions, and foreign policy preferences. Located geographically between what Onuch and Sasse (2022b: 78) called “normative symbolic powers and norm entrepreneurs”, domestic change of an in-between state may have “butterfly” effects, leading to broader regional or even global geopolitical upheavals, although this may not be the intended result of the change-initiator. Furthermore, the room for neutrality and multi-vector manoeuvring is shrinking for these smaller states. This chapter thus calls for further research that explores systemic factors in world politics that change the in-betweenness of smaller states and nudges them to align their multi-vector foreign policy to a commitment to one, and its consequences.

Notes 1 See ‘Global leaders on Belarus’, Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya website. Available at: https://tsikhanouskaya​.org​/en (Accessed: 19 January 2022). 2 See general information of the Coordination Council, Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya website. Available at: https://tsikhanouskaya​.org​/en​/coordination​_council/ (Accessed: 5 May 2022). 3 Ibid. 4 For more information see OST youtube recordings of these webinars available here: https://www​.youtube​.com​/channel​/UCyEEXOn​_QtIrmPfCHaajsdQ​/featured; and

Foreign Policy and the Protest Movement  61

5 6 7 8 9 10 11

12 13 14

15 16 17 18

19 20 21 22 23 24

Oxford Belarus Observatory website hosting policy briefs and popular policy blogs available here: https://obo​.web​.ox​.ac​.uk/ See video ‘I’m Trying to Topple Europe’s Last Dictator’, NYT Opinion, September 23, 2020. Available at: https://tsikhanouskaya​.org​/en​/events​/video​/a964b1b5d4a6570​.html (Accessed: 11 May 2022). See video ‘Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Interview for TRT World’, April 12, 2021. Available at: https://tsikhanouskaya​.org​/en​/events​/video​/b7896796be50c75​.html (Accessed: 15 May 2022). Ibid. Interview with Valery Kavaleuski on 17 May 2022, in a written form. See video ‘Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya at the Sedona Forum 2021’, May 2, 2021. Available at: https://tsikhanouskaya​.org​/en​/events​/video​/a99225aabfaef8a​.html (Accessed: 15 May 2022). Interview with Roza Turarbekova on 16 May 2022, in a written form. ‘Conclusions of the Expert Discussion “Liberalizing Import of Services from Belarus to the EU: A Revolutionary Win-Win Step”’, November 26, 2021. Available at: https:// tsikhanouskaya​.org​/en​/events​/news​/b1de8d6320627b7​.html (Accessed: 15 May 2022). Ibid. Interview with Roza Turarbekova on 16 May 2022, in a written form. See video ‘“More than 1500 Students and Academics Have Become Victims of Repression”. Appeal to the International Academic Community’, March 5, 2022. Available at: https://tsikhanouskaya​.org​/en​/events​/video​/f7ed8f4a13bf618​.html (Accessed: 16 May 2022). Ibid. See video ‘Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Speech at the Kalinouski Forum, 2022’, March 21, 2022. Available at: https://tsikhanouskaya​.org​/en​/events​/video​/ef8ae3eb3432eb0​.html (Accessed: 16 May 2022). Interview with Valery Kavaleuski on 17 May 2022, in a written form. See video ‘“More than 1500 Students and Academics Have Become Victims of Repression”. Appeal to the International Academic Community’, March 5, 2022. Available at: https://tsikhanouskaya​.org​/en​/events​/video​/f7ed8f4a13bf618​.html (Accessed: 16 May 2022). See video ‘Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Speech at the Kalinouski Forum, 2022’, March 21, 2022. Available at: https://tsikhanouskaya​.org​/en​/events​/video​/ef8ae3eb3432eb0​.html (Accessed: 16 May 2022). Ibid. Italics were added by the author. Interview with Valery Kavaleuski on 17 May 2022, in a written form. Observed from a presentation by Franak Viačorka at Oxford Belarus Observatory Webminar ‘Russia’s Cyber Warfare and Disinformation Campaigns in Belarus and Ukraine: What We Need to Know to Counter It?’, on 19 May 2022. Interview with Roza Turarbekova on 16 May 2022, in a written form. Observed from a presentation by Benjamin Heap at Oxford Belarus Observatory Webminar ‘Russia’s Cyber Warfare and Disinformation Campaigns in Belarus and Ukraine: What We Need to Know to Counter It?’, on 19 May 2022.

References Allison, R. (2018) ‘Protective integration and security policy coordination: Comparing the SCO and CSTO.’ The Chinese Journal of International Politics 11(3): 297–338. Allison, R., White, S. and Light, M. (2005) ‘Belarus between east and west.’ The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 21(4): 487–511.

62  History, Identity, and Politics Revisited Åslund, A. (2020) ‘Responses to the COVID-19 crisis in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.’ Eurasian Geography and Economics 61(4–5): 532–545. Astapenia, R. (2020) ‘What Belarusians think about their country’s crisis.’ Chatham House, 21 October. Available at: https://www​.chathamhouse​.org​/2020​/10​/what​-belarusians​ -think​-about​-their​-countrys​-crisis (Accessed: 10 May 2022). Astapova, A., Navumau, V., Nizhnikau, R. and Polishchuk, L. (2022) ‘Authoritarian cooptation of civil society: The case of Belarus.’ Europe-Asia Studies 74(1): 1–30. Babic, M. (2020) ‘Let’s talk about the interregnum: Gramsci and the crisis of the liberal world order.’ International Affairs 96(3): 767–786. Belta. (2022) ‘Lukashenko makes proposals to strengthen CSTO.’ May 16. Available at: https://eng​.belta​.by​/president​/view​/lukashenko​-makes​-proposals​-to​-strengthen​-csto​ -150260​-2022/ (Accessed: 26 May 2022). de Vogel, S. (2022) ‘Anti-opposition crackdowns and protest: The case of Belarus, 2000– 2019.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 38(1–2): 9–25. Douglas, N. (2020) Belarus: from the Old Social Contract to a New Social Identity. Berlin: ZOiS (Centre for East European and International Studies). Gapova, E. (2021) ‘Class, agency, and citizenship in Belarusian protest.’ Slavic Review 80(1): 45–51. Hansbury, P. (2021) ‘Domestic constraints on foreign policy change in Belarus.’ Journal of Belarusian Studies 11(1): 27–55. Interfax. (2022) ‘Lukashenko suggests discussing ways to overcome sanctions within CSTO, EAEU.’ March 11. Available at: https://interfax​.com​/newsroom​/top​-stories​/76427/ (Accessed: 23 May 2022). Ioffe, G. (2004) ‘Understanding Belarus: Economy and political landscape.’ Europe-Asia Studies 56(1): 85–118. Kazharski, A. (2021) ‘Belarus’ new political nation? 2020 anti-authoritarian protests as identity building.’ New Perspectives 29(1): 69–79. Korosteleva, E. (2011) ‘Belarusian foreign policy in a time of crisis.’ The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 27(3–4): 566–586. Korosteleva, E. (2015) ‘Belarus between the EU and Eurasian economic union.’ In Eurasian Integration: The View from Within. Eds. Dutkiewicz, P. and Sakwa, R. Abingdon: Routledge, 111–125. Korosteleva, E. (2016) ‘The European Union and Belarus: Democracy promotion by technocratic means?’ Democratization 23(4): 678–698. Korosteleva, E. and Petrova, I. (2021) ‘From “the global” to “the local”: The future of “cooperative orders” in Central Eurasia in times of complexity.’ International Politics 58: 421–443. Leonov, A. and Korneev, O. (2019) ‘Regional migration governance in the Eurasian migration system.’ In The Dynamics of Regional Migration Governance. Eds. Geddes, A., Espinoza, M.V., Abdou, L.H. and Brumat, L. Northampton: Edward Elgar Pub, 205–223. Mateo, E. (2022) ‘“All of Belarus has come out onto the streets”: exploring nationwide protest and the role of pre-existing social networks.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 38(1–2): 26–42. Nesvetailova, A. (2003) ‘Russia and Belarus: The quest for the union; or who will pay for Belarus’s path to recovery?’ In Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Eds. Korosteleva, E.A., Lawson C.W. and Marsh, R.J. London: RoutledgeCurzon: 152–164. Nizhnikau, R. and Moshes, A. (2020) ‘Belarus in search of a new foreign policy: Why is it so difficult?’ In Danish Foreign Policy Review 2020. Eds. Fischer, K. and Mouritzen, H. Copenhagen: Danish Institute for International Studies, 48–72.

Foreign Policy and the Protest Movement  63 O’Loughlin, J. and Toal, G. (2022) ‘The geopolitical orientations of ordinary Belarusians: Survey evidence from early 2020.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 38(1–2): 43–61. Onuch, O. and Sasse, G. (2022a) ‘The Belarus crisis: People, protest, and political dispositions.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 38(1–2): 1–8. Onuch, O. and Sasse, G. (2022b) ‘Anti-regime action and geopolitical polarization: Understanding protester dispositions in Belarus.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 38(1–2): 62–87. OST Research Center, Oxford Belarus Observatory and GCRF COMPASS Project. (2022a) ‘Nuclear-free Belarus: Is it in danger?’ GCRF COMPASS Policy Brief, available at https://obo​.web​.ox​.ac​.uk​/files​/nuclear​-freebelaruspdf (Accessed: 20 January 2023). OST Research Center, Oxford Belarus Observatory and GCRF COMPASS Project (2022b) ‘Russia’s war against Ukraine, and the referendum in Belarus: What happens next?’ GCRF COMPASS Policy Brief, available at https://obo​.web​.ox​.ac​.uk​/files​/ policypdf (Accessed: 20 January 2023). Petrova, I. and Korosteleva, E. (2021) ‘Societal fragilities and resilience: The emergence of peoplehood in Belarus.’ Journal of Eurasian Studies 12(2): 122–132. Polglase-Korostelev, G. (2020) ‘The union state: A changing relationship between Belarus and Russia.’ Journal of the Belarusian State University. International Relations 2: 38–46. Pravdivets, V., Markovich, A. and Nazaranka, A. (2022) ‘Belarus between West and East: Experience of social integration via inclusive resilience.’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs, advanced online publication. Available at: https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/09557571​. 2022​.2027870 (Accessed: 25 May 2022). Rotman, D.G. and Danilov, A.N. (2003) ‘President and opposition: Specific features of the Belarusian political scene.’ In Contemporary Belarus: Between Democracy and Dictatorship. Eds. Korosteleva, E.A., Lawson C.W. and Marsh, R.J. London: RoutledgeCurzon, 100–111. Sakwa, R. (2014) Frontline Ukraine: Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I. B. Tauris. Sakwa, R. (2022) ‘The march of folly resumed; Russia, Ukraine, and the West.’ Publicreading Rooms. Available at: https://prruk​.org​/the​-march​-of​-folly​-resumed​-russia​-ukraine​-and​ -the​-west/ (Accessed: 24 May 2022). White, S. and Feklyunina, V. (2014) Identities and Foreign Policies in Russia, Ukraine and Belarus: The Other Europes. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. White, S., Biletskaya, T. and McAllister, I. (2016) ‘Belarusians between east and west.’ PostSoviet Affairs 32(1): 1–27.

Part II

Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscapes



5

Stolen Decades The Unfulfilled Expectations of the Belarusian Economic Miracle Aleś Alachnovič and Julia Korosteleva

Introduction Among all the post-socialist economies that embarked on economic transition in the late 1980s–early 1990s, Belarus can typically be regarded as an outlier. Compared to its counterparts in Central Europe and the Baltic States (CEB), which on average went through a deeper and more prolonged output contraction in the 1990s after initiating the economic reforms (EBRD 2005), the Belarusian economy showed impressive economic growth in the late 1990s– early 2000s, having undergone hardly any economic transformation. As of 2000, a decade after the transition began in the region, the private sector in Belarus accounted for a mere 20 per cent of GDP compared to 67 per cent on average across its neighbouring counterparts (EBRD 2005). Following some patchy economic liberalisation in 1994–1995, whatever meagre reforms had taken place, were reversed with the state assuming an increasing role in controlling the economy. A pervasive state intervention in Belarus manifested itself in the increased state ownership, price controls, state redistribution of financial resources to “priority” sectors of the economy, production targets and so forth (Korosteleva and Lawson 2010). While some of these Soviet anachronisms were eliminated throughout the later decades, the practice of subsidising state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and other forms of state intervention in the economy have been preserved. Nevertheless, the economy grew on average by 8.1 per cent per capita over the period of 1996–2008 (World Bank WDI 2021a). Has the Belarusian economic miracle continued to live up to its expectations beyond the Global Financial Crisis (GFC)? The rate of economic growth noticeably slowed down in Belarus post-GFC, but more so over the past decade compared to its CEB counterparts, which seemed to have weathered better the turbulent times of transition and global financial crisis, steadily paving the way towards prosperity. The structural rigidities of the economy, accumulated over the past few decades, including a dominant role of the state, a surge in the levels of external and public debt (denominated in foreign currency) and continuing dependence on the Russian economy, have placed serious constraints on the DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-7

68  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape

future economic growth in Belarus. The mismanagement of the COVID-19 pandemic, adverse consequences of the 2020 political crisis, and Russia’s war against Ukraine have further aggravated the economic situation in Belarus, contributing to the decline in economic growth, an increase in vulnerability of its banking sector and public debt position and a surge of inflation with the expectations of the Belarusian economy sliding into recession in 2022 and stagnation afterwards. Consequently, this chapter reviews the case of Belarus’ economic development path after the breakup of the USSR, asking the following questions: (1) why did Belarus follow a different path of transition compared to its CEB counterparts? (2) what implications this has had for its economic development three decades after the transition began? and (3) how have the recent events of the 2020 political crisis in Belarus and the Russia-Ukraine war in 2022 acted as a wake-up call for the society to initiate a long-awaited change to a liberal economic path of development? Belarus’ economic fallout of the early 2020s appeals for urgent economic reforms, the speed and success of which depend highly on the resolution of the current geopolitical crisis in the region and the political crisis inside Belarus. The next section provides an overview of the Belarusian transition over the past three decades to better understand some structural rigidities of the economy and their adverse effects on its growth. It proceeds with the discussion of contemporary developments, focusing on the aftermath of the 2020 political crisis and further implications for its economic development. Section four provides a discussion of the reforms Belarus would need to undertake in the foreseeable future, followed by the conclusions.

Belarus’ Path of Transition: An Overview Early Stage of Transition: 1990–1995

The initial shock for all transition economies was the collapse of the administrative planned system which predetermined the transformational recession in socialist countries marked by an initial fall in output (Campos & Coricelli 2002). The CEB countries, committed to market reforms and integration with the European Union, followed the conventional transition approach of pursuing the policies of liberalisation, deregulation and privatisation. After the dissolution of the USSR, the Belarusian authorities were not ready for a radical reformation of the country. At the start of the transition, the Belarusian economy remained heavily dominated by energy-intensive manufacturing and mining industries that determined its strategy to preserve economic links with Russia, its core supplier of energy, buyer of Belarusian goods and investor. Compared to its counterparts in the CEB region, such a policy allowed for a less profound recession in Belarus at the start of the transition. However, an expansionary macroeconomic policy of the early 1990s triggered hyperinflation and declining living standards, largely determining the choice

Stolen Decades  69

of the Belarusians to elect the populist Lukashenka in 1994. The beginning of Lukashenka’s presidency, 1994–1995, was marked by some fragmented market reforms, reducing inflation, but at the cost of declining output and employment (Korosteleva 2004). Afraid of losing his political popularity, Lukashenka reversed the reforms in 1996, setting the path for the establishment of an authoritarian regime and turning economic policy into the tool for assuring political viability of the dominant political elite (Korosteleva 2004; Korosteleva 2007b). An Illusion of the Economic Miracle: 1996–2004

Admitting a decrease in aggregate demand as one of the factors of output decline, the authorities stressed the importance of state stimulation of demand through policies of an unprecedented credit expansion, negative real interest rates and administrative price control as central ones to achieving economic growth and minimising negative social costs of transition. The mechanism of administrative resource allocation was not only realised through the directed preferential credits supplied to SOEs to keep them afloat but also through such indirect instruments as relief from paying some taxes and customs duties by the “strategic” sectors of the economy; licensing of certain economic activities that aimed to crowd out the potential competitors from the market; rationing access to cheap natural resources; multiple exchange rates; and price distortions. Overall, pervasive state intervention in economic regulation in Belarus created a type of state capitalism, combining state ownership and state control of the economy with the elements, attributed to crony capitalism, promoting rent-seeking practices to the benefit of political elites (Korosteleva 2007b). Public and quasi-public investment-led economic growth was further supported by direct and indirect subsidies from Russia and a favourable external environment that boosted Belarusian exports in the late 1990s–early 2000s. Being a small open economy, Belarus highly depends on foreign trade. Since the establishment of the Customs Union between Russia and Belarus in 1995, Belarus received unlimited access to the Russian market and sizeable loan subsidies and energy discounts, estimated to reach between 11 and 19 per cent of the Belarusian GDP in the late 1990s–early 2000s (Silitski 2002; Aslund 2021).1 The policy of money-led stimulation of aggregate demand triggered the surge in households’ consumption and investment. Subsidising SOEs allowed them to preserve their production capabilities in the medium run, gradually increasing the share of productivity as a driver of economic growth in the late 1990s and early 2000s (Figure 5.1). Altogether, credit-stimulated economic growth jointly with the Russian in-kind subsidies ensured a fast recovery of the Belarusian economy with an economic growth rate averaging at 7 per cent over the period of 1997–2004 – the phenomenon coined in the literature as the Belarusian economic miracle (Korosteleva and Lawson 2010). ​

70  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape 14 12 10 8 6 4 2 0 -2 -4 -6

11.0

3.1 4.8 5.0 5.4

4.1

6.3

9.5 6.0 5.1 3.7

3.7

-0.1

2.6

0.5 1.3 1.4

0.4 -0.6 -1.3

-4.1

-0.5

-4.3

-0.1

Labor Quanty Contribuon

Labor Quality Contribuon

Total Capital Contribuon

Total Factor Producvity

-0.8

Growth of GDP, change in the natural log

Figure 5.1 Real GDP growth decomposition

However, a loose monetary-credit policy accelerated inflation and led to inefficient allocation of resources, lowering the productivity of accumulated capital and overall deterioration of Belarus’ competitive position (Korosteleva and Lawson 2010; Kruk 2013).

A Dual Path of Economic Development: 2005–2019 Tensions with Russia, industrial modernisation, and recession

The economic developments in the late 2000s were driven by the reduction in Russia’s subsidies that urged the authorities to initiate some fragmentary structural reforms, including taking some steps towards modernisation of the industrial sector and private sector initiatives (including targeted privatisation), while continuing to subsidise SOEs. Exports to Russia started to decline in 2005 reflecting declining competitiveness of the Belarusian machinery and equipment products with Belarus losing its share in the Russian market to Chinese manufacturers. The export position was worsened further since 2007 because of political tensions with the Russian authorities who initiated a policy of gradual adjustment of the price of gas, supplied to Belarus, to market prices, starting with a doubling of the gas supply price in 2007. This move had adverse consequences for the Belarusian economy, given the relatively high energy intensity of Belarusian industries. Higher energy prices also harmed the competitiveness of export-oriented enterprises specialising in the production of transport, equipment and electric goods, widening the trade deficit. Finally, as a last straw in trade wars between Russia and Belarus, was the introduction of a special duty on crude oil exports to Belarus in 2007–2009 to settle the long-lasting disputes between the two countries regarding sharing

Stolen Decades  71

revenues from oil export duties in relation to the rest of the world that reduced energy subsidies to Belarus further (IMF 2019a). The global economic crisis additionally reduced Belarusian export growth in 2008–2009, widening a current account deficit (Table 5.1) and triggering the fall in GDP per capita growth from 10 per cent in 2008 to stagnation in 2009 (Figure 5.1), along with the expansionary fiscal and monetary policy of the election 2010 year resulting in a severe currency crisis in the first half of 2011. To address a decline in output growth after the global financial crisis, the authorities initiated some industrial modernisation during 2012–2015 via the increase in investment directed towards SOEs, targeting an upgrading of their worn-out fixed assets, and enterprise restructuring. The attempts at industrial modernisation largely failed which was also evidenced via a declining and negative contribution of total factor productivity to economic growth in the early 2010s (Figure 5.1). Large-scale privatisation and reforms directed towards increasing enterprise competitiveness remained stagnant (EBRD 2013). Foreign direct investments post-2011 remained low to ignite any foreign capital-led modernisation of the real sector (Table 5.1). Overall, as of 2013, Belarus presented itself as one of the least reformed economies with the progress of transition being stalled since the reversal of political and economic course in 1996 (EBRD 2013). A continuing credit expansionary support of inefficient SOEs threw the economy into the recession during 2015–2016, triggering also an increase in external debt relative to GDP as a result of the Belarusian rouble devaluation and a disproportionately large share of external debt denominated in foreign currency. Private Sector Developments

Private sector development initiatives have largely begun with the creation of High-Technology Park (HTP) in Minsk in September 2005, entitling its residents to tax incentives and other benefits introduced gradually over the past decade. The HTP creation effectively marked the establishment of the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industry in Belarus, taking root in the mid-late 1990s with the birth of such new technology firms like EPAM Systems, known these days as a world-leading software engineering and ICT services company. The HTP has continued to grow, hosting new unicorn start-ups in the later years, including VIBER, a messaging app; MSQRD, social network service and video sharing mobile app, acquired by Facebook in 2016; AIMatter, a neural network technology-based app for changing the background images, acquired in 2017 by Google and so forth. The ICT sector’s contribution to GDP has steadily increased over the past decade, reaching 5.5 per cent of GDP in 2018 and projected (prior to the start of the political crisis in late 2020) to reach 10 per cent of GDP by 2023 (Foy 2020). The private sector developments have continued with some business environment deregulation reforms over the period of 2008–2010, leading to the introduction of a one-day registration policy for individual entrepreneurs and

Note: * shows the 2019 year figures.

Source: World Bank World Development Indicators (2021) accessed 17/11/2021.

Indicators GDP per capita growth (annual per cent) GDP per capita, PPP (constant 2017 international $) Final consumption expenditure (per cent of GDP) Exports of goods and services (per cent of GDP) General government final consumption expenditure (per cent of GDP) Gross domestic savings (per cent of GDP) Gross fixed capital formation (per cent of GDP) Gross capital formation (per cent of GDP) Industry (including construction), value added (per cent of GDP) Research and development expenditure (per cent of GDP) Income share held by lowest 20 per cent Income share held by highest 20 per cent Current account balance (per cent of GDP) Foreign direct investment, net inflows (per cent of GDP) Poverty headcount ratio at national poverty lines (per cent of population) Total debt service (per cent of exports of goods, services and primary income) External debt stocks (per cent of GNI) Inflation, GDP deflator (annual per cent)

Table 5.1 Key macroeconomics indicators, 1995–2020 1995 –10.1 5,805.3 79.6 49.7 20.5 20.4 24.7 24.7 33.4 ... ... ... –3.4 0.11 ... 3.4 12.6 661.5

2000 6.3 8,053.2 76.4 69.2 19.5 23.6 25.2 25.4 33.5 0.7 7.9 39.1 –3.6 0.9 41.9 5.5 20.7 185.3

2005 10.1 11,940.2 72.8 59.8 20.8 27.2 26.5 28.5 37.8 0.7 8.9 36.5 1.5 1.0 12.7 3.96 17.6 18.97

2010 7.98 17,288.4 71.7 51.4 16.0 28.3 38.8 40.7 35.4 0.7 8.8 37.5 –14.5 2.4 5.2 5.9 50.6 11.3

2015 –3.98 18,307.5 67.8 58.0 14.9 32.2 28.6 29.0 32.7 0.5 9.7 35.5 –3.2 2.9 5.1 14.9 70.9 16.0

2020 –0.7 19,148.2 68.4 61.9 16.9 31.6 24.8 26.3 31.3 ... 10* 35.4* –0.4 1.98* 4.8 11.3 73.7 10.1

72  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape

Stolen Decades  73

simplification of liquidation procedures. A new entry of firms was expected to be facilitated further with the development of “Great Stone China-Belarus” industrial and logistics park initiative launched in 2012, the enactment of the decree on the development of entrepreneurship in 2017 and the steps taken to facilitate digital transformation of the economy in 2018. While all these developments laid good foundations for the diversification of the Belarusian economy to be led by new technology firms, they were compromised by the political crisis following the Belarusian presidential elections in August 2020, and various structural rigidities inherited from the Soviet times and deepened under the Lukashenka’s rule. Under the current regime with a preserved heavy state intervention in the economy, there has overall been little progress observed in the new business entry in Belarus compared to its CEB counterparts (Figure 5.2). Belarus’ relative innovation capacity, assessed via Global Innovation Index, also remains the lowest among its neighbours overall and in the majority of its dimensions (Figure 5.3). Belarus underperforms particularly in terms of institutional quality where the most concerns raise government effectiveness, the quality of regulatory environment and the rule of law; and within the business environment dimension of the institutional pillar – the cost of redundancy dismissal, and ease of resolving insolvency. Some other areas of concern include low Research and Development (R&D) capacity, not compatible with an economy pledged to become knowledge based and technology oriented; credit constraints underlying the underperformance of the market sophistication pillar; underdeveloped innovation linkages to enable an efficient technology transfer that remains the weakest link within the business sophistication pillar and lack of intangible assets, such as trademarks, global brand names and so forth, constituting part of the creative pillar assessment. In sum, it is worth emphasising that regardless of inheriting favourable initial economic conditions at the start of the transition, which jointly with the preservation of some links with Russia allowed the Belarusian economy to bounce 25.0 20.0 15.0 10.0 5.0 0.0

0.3 2006

0.6 2007

0.8 2008 Belarus

0.9

0.8 2009

2010

Lithuania

1.1

0.9 2011 Latvia

2012 Estonia

1.4 2013

1.1 2014

0.9 2015

Russian Federaon

1.0 2016

1.2 2017

Ukraine

Figure 5.2 New business density (new registrations per 1,000 people ages 15–64)

1.3 2018

74  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape 90 80 70 60 50 40 30 20 10 0

Belarus

Latvia

Lithuania

Poland

Ukraine

Russia

Figure 5.3 Innovation performance of Belarus, 2020

back in the mid-1990s and to grow spectacularly in the late 1990s–early 2000s, structural rigidities of the economy, accumulated over the past few decades and summarised below, have placed serious constraints on future economic growth. These include the following: 1. Dominant state control over the economy via asset ownership; cumbersome regulation; and allocation of resources has become a fatigue, throwing the economy into stagnation over the last decade. Although the share of the state in the economy has decreased over the past decades,2 the state preserves its dominant control over the banking sector with state banks owning more than half of all banking assets in the country, and their share in lending to the real sector of the economy accounts for 70 per cent (EBRD 2021). In their majority, SOEs remain inefficient in terms of their operation and dependent on state subsidies, constituting a burden for the economy as a whole (IMF 2019b). With a few exceptions, they are locked on the regional CIS market, and their innovation in-house activity as judged by their R&D expenditure remains fairly marginal to have any substantial impact on raising their competitiveness globally. 2. External debt has increased over the past decade (Figure 5.4a), and it is primarily denominated in foreign currency (Figure 5.9b), making the economy vulnerable to any external shocks. International reserves in proportion to gross external debt have declined (Figure 5.4b). They are also predominantly comprised of illiquid assets.

Stolen Decades  75 50

46.5

45

45.7

40 31.9

35 30 25

28.7

29.5

29.4

31.6

29.1

39.4 30.9 26.6

22.8

20.3

17.7

20

29.9

45.1 41.9

39.6

19.2

17.3

16.7

2013

2014

15 10 2

5 0

0

0

2005

2010

2011

2012

external government debt, % of GDP**

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

external public sector debt (using extended defion)*, % of GDP

Figure 5.4a Net external public sector and government debt

140 120 100 80 60 40 20 0

2005

2010

2011

2012

2013

2014

gross external debt, % of exports

2015

2016

2017

2018

2019

2020

internaonal reserves, % of gross external debt

Figure 5.4b Gross external debt in relation to export and international reserves

3. Belarusian economy remains highly dependent on the Russian economy in the part of energy and financial subsidies (IMF 2019a). Russia also remains the largest trading and investment partner (Figure 5.5). Overall, the past decade of stolen reforms in Belarus has led to stagnation of the Belarusian economy (Figure 5.1) and slipping behind its neighbours to the West (Figure 5.6).

76  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape 4

3.9

7

23.1 4.7

41.5

12.6 3.2

0.7

UK Poland Lithuania Other CIS

Germany Russia Ukraine Other non-CIS

UK Poland China Other CIS

Germany Russia Ukraine Other non-CIS

4.5 3.4

21

0.9 4.3 9.6

55.8

Figure 5.5 Belarusian foreign trade in goods composition by key partners, 2019

Contemporary Developments The Early 2020s and the Oil Price Saga

Belarus entered the year 2020 without an agreement on supplies of Russian crude oil and gas prices. The gas dispute was resolved, keeping the price at the level of 2019, but from January to March 2020 Russia stopped the supply of oil to Belarus. The key reason for such a clash between Belarus and Russia at that time was the tax manoeuvre in the oil industry that Russia had been conducting since 2015 which resulted in phasing out oil subsidies to Belarus. The idea was to gradually increase tax on oil extraction while decreasing duties on exports of crude oil and petroleum products to stimulate Russia-based refineries to refine crude oil in Russia instead of exporting it. The second phase of tax manoeuvre was to take place between 2019 and 2023, meaning the steadily rising prices for Russian crude oil imported to Belarus, while the duties on exports of petroleum products retained in the Belarusian budget were to drop by 5 per cent points annually from 30 per cent to 0 per cent. It implied that Belarus would pay the market price for Russian crude oil starting in 2024. According to the Research Centre of the Institute for Privatisation and Management (IPM 2019), the cumulative total losses for 2019–2024 were estimated at around 15 per cent of Belarus’ GDP in 2019. Following the oil dispute, real GDP growth contracted in the first quarter

Stolen Decades  77

GDP per capital growth, annually 2010-2020 10.0 8.0

8.0

6.0

5.6

4.0 2.0 0.0 -2.0

1.8 2010

2011

2012

1.0

2013

2.6

1.6

2014

2015

2016

2017

3.3

2018

2.1

2019

-0.7 2020

-2.6

-4.0

-4.0

-6.0 Belarus

Poland

Latvia

Lithuania

GDP per capita growth, 2010-2020 average 6.0 4.9

5.0 4.0

3.7

3.7

Poland

Latvia

3.0 2.0

1.9

1.0 0.0

Belarus

Lithuania

Figure 5.6 GDP per capita growth rates in Belarus compared to neighbouring CEB countries, 2010–2020

of 2020 (Figure 5.7), marking the start of the third economic crisis of the last decade, after the ones in 2011 and 2015–2016. The Mismanagement of the COVID-19 Outbreak as a First Trigger of an Uproar in Belarus

Just before the Russia-Belarus oil disputes were resolved, the COVID-19 pandemic erupted. Minsk chose a very controversial strategy for dealing with the pandemic. The authorities ignored the problem and decided against

78  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape

8.0 6.0 4.0 2.0 0.0 -2.0 -4.0

Figure 5.7 Real GDP growth rate, per cent yoy

shutting down production or encouraging social distancing, which cause significant implications for the health of the economy and society overall, as discussed in the next chapter of this volume by Gerry and Neumann. Despite all the attempts of the Belarusian authorities to misrepresent the true statistics of deaths attributed to the COVID-19 pandemic, the real numbers were much higher, putting Belarus among the countries with the highest death rate resulting from the COVID-19 pandemic.3 The state also decided not to support private businesses during the pandemic. Only the designated SOEs were able to receive any significant financial support. Despite the chosen strategy, the economy was hit by the pandemic, leading to a drop in real GDP by 3.3 per cent year-over-year (yoy) growth in the second quarter of 2020 (Figure 5.7). The Dark before the Dawn: The 2020 Political Crisis, Sanctions and Gradual Economic Fallout

The next blow to the economy was the 2020 presidential election. The brutal suppression of peaceful protests and massive violation of human rights triggered a sanctions response from the international community, which was toughened further in May–June 2021 after the regime hijacked a plane carrying an opposition activist and oversaw a migration crisis on the border of Belarus with the EU. Among those which were expected to have

Stolen Decades  79

an economic impact were a set of trade, financial and aviation sanctions; blocking sanctions against selected entities; sanctions against wealthy business owners (so-called Lukashenka’s ‘wallets’); sectoral sanctions, targeting among others the largest Belarusian exporters of chemical and petrochemical products. Regardless of the deepening political crisis, in 2021, the Belarusian economy surprised again with a fast recovery from the post-COVID recession and a surge in economic growth in the first two quarters of 2021 (Figure 5.7). They were largely attributed to net exports increase driven by the world prices upswing in raw materials and commodities markets (socalled ‘exports miracle’). Nevertheless, in light of the declining economic growth (Figure 5.7), growing inflation (Figure 5.8) and vulnerable public debt position (Figure 5.9 and 5.9b), the Belarusian economy was to fall into recession in 2022 (World Bank 2021b). This will deepen further because of the above-mentioned structural rigidities of the economy and acceleration of the adverse impact of sectoral economic sanctions, broadened by the international community in response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine on 24 February 2022. Belarus is recognised by the world as the co-aggressor in this war, urging the international community to broaden the scope of sanctions for the country. As of April 2022, 40 Western countries, including members of the EU as well as the US, UK, Canada, Switzerland and Norway, have severely restricted imports from Belarus of, among others, crude oil and petroleum products, potash and nitrogen fertilisers, iron and metal products, wood and wood products, cement and rubber products. In particular, the EU and US banned the supply of two-thirds of the Belarusian exports to these countries (based on the value of exports for 2021). The US, Canada, and the UK deprived Belarus of the most-favoured-nation (MFN) status, which will increase tariffs on Belarusian exports to these 12.0 10.0

9.9

4.0

10.0

8.5

8.0 6.0

10.2

7.3 5.8

5.7

6.1 5.3

4.7

4.8

5.2

2.0 0.0

2019Q1 2019Q2 2019Q3 2019Q4 2020Q1 2020Q2 2020Q3 2020Q4 2021Q1 2021Q2 2021Q3 2021Q4

Figure 5.8 Inflation rate, per cent yoy

80  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape 60.0 50.0 40.0 30.0 20.0

2021Q2

2021Q1

2020Q4

2020Q3

2020Q2

2020Q1

2019Q4

2019Q3

2019Q2

2019Q1

2018Q4

2018Q3

2018Q2

2018Q1

2017Q4

2017Q3

2017Q2

0.0

2017Q1

10.0

External debt

Domesc debt in foreign currency

Domesc debt in naonal currency

Local Authories' debt

Central government's guarantees

Local authories' guarantees

Figure 5.9a Public debt, per cent of GDP

2.4 6.3

5.2

6.9

79.2

RUB

CNY

EUR

USD

BYN

Figure 5.9b Public debt, composition by currencies

countries (e.g., in the case of Canada, this means 35 per cent duty on Belarusian goods). Due to the war, Belarus lost supplies to Ukraine, to which it directed almost 13.6 per cent of its exports in 2021. Exports to Russia will also fall significantly due to the deep recession. Thus, owing to the war and sanctions, Belarusian exports could be reduced by about 4 per cent, which is concerning given that Belarus is highly dependent on trade. In addition, the EU banned Belarusian automotive transportation providers

Stolen Decades  81

from working in the EU. This war places serious constraints on the future economic performance of Belarus as a whole.

What Needs to Be Done to Ensure Belarus’ Economic Stabilisation and Growth?4 Under the current geopolitical crisis, Belarus finds itself at a crossroads in history with its future development being highly dependent on the outcome of the Russia’s war against Ukraine in the first place. If the war persists for long, this will further precipitate the downfall of the Belarusian economy. The longer it lasts, the costlier a post-war recovery is going to be for any parties involved in this conflict. Nevertheless, it is expected that an economic fallout, aggravated by the Western sanctions, will bring the inevitable collapse of dictatorial regimes in both Belarus and Russia. Under this scenario, the country should be ready to consider further steps to mitigate its economic collapse and consider future reforms for economic stabilisation and development. Future economic reforms in Belarus should be the outcome of an inclusive national dialogue, which would be impossible without free and democratic elections, and should reflect the values and aspirations of its people. While it has been debated for some time to what extent the Belarusians would like to see the state playing a reduced role in the economy, more recent survey data suggests that Belarusians view the private sector and entrepreneurship as sources of economic growth and see the role of the state primarily as a provider of public goods such as healthcare and education (Rudkouski 2020; Thinktanks.by​ 2022. On average, Belarus’ population is well-educated and creative, and it has high potential to unleash its entrepreneurial spirit to place Belarus on a new entrepreneurial path of economic development in which a significant role is played by new technology firms. It is essential for a new government to communicate clearly to the society the vision of reforms, their timing and sequence, benefits and costs, chances and challenges prior to launching the reforms, as failing to do this was one of the main mistakes of many reformers in post-socialist countries (Guriev 2019). Meaningful economic reforms are more likely to succeed if the judicial system, as discussed in the subsequent chapters of this volume, is also reformed at the same time. The latter will be key to defending the foundations for economic growth – human rights, property rights protection and contract enforceability. In general, Belarus’ experience of economic transformation should be smoother compared to its counterparts in the early 1990s. As a laggard in reforms, it can learn from the mistakes of other transition counterparts and adopt best practices. One of the largest concerns anticipated in reforming the economy is a reform of the public sector. Belarus has a much smaller

82  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape

share in the economy than three decades back, making the public sector less challenging. Finally, the private sector, which accounts for nearly 50 per cent of the country’s employment, is dominated by relatively healthy and competitive firms that could help facilitate SOE restructuring, absorbing some job reallocations. However, the smoothness of reforms depends on the state of the economy after the end of the Russian-Ukrainian war and the attitude of Russia towards Belarusian democratisation and economic liberalisation (Hartwell et al. 2022). In the next sub-sections, the key aspects of future economic reforms are fully considered. Macroeconomic Stabilisation

In the first place, for a successful economic transformation, it is essential for Belarus to undergo macroeconomic stabilisation and institutional reforms that jointly will help to address the structural rigidities identified earlier. Declining economic growth, rising inflation, and mounting public debt have all adversely affected macroeconomic stability in Belarus. The drying up of international funding in the light of the imposed economic sanctions, an outflow of households’ deposits in foreign currencies and growing nonperforming loans (NPLs) of SOEs may trigger a severe banking crisis. The following actions must be considered to re-build macroeconomic stability: (1) establishing a legal foundation of the National Bank (NBRB)’s institutional, functional, personal and financial independence to allow it to achieve its objectives of maintaining low inflation and financial stability; (2) reforming the banking sector and tackling the problem of bad loans of SOEs; (3) fiscal policy support for structural reforms, targeted social protection and fiscal consolidation and (4) managing and sustaining public debt. More specifically, maintaining the financial stability of the Belarusian economy depends on resolving the problem of debt problem of SOEs and preventing their consequences if the unresolved political crisis leads to a worsening of the economic situation in the country. Belarus might adopt the successful case of the Slovak banking sector “cleaning” in 1999–2000 when, with the support of international financial institutions, NPLs were transferred in instalments to a newly established specialised bank in exchange for the government bonds (Naūrodski & Šramko 2021). This would need to be propped by endowing the NBRB with the power of a mega-regulator, i.e. making it both a regulation and supervision institution for the financial market; and introducing transparent and effective (both in terms of time and costs) legal bankruptcy procedure. In the long run, Belarus should open the banking sector to foreign investors to facilitate the privatisation of stateowned banks. To support structural reforms, the authorities will need to reduce the cost of maintaining the state apparatus, to transit to medium-term fiscal management and introduce fiscal rules with a view to ensuring due support for structural

Stolen Decades  83

reforms while sustaining public debt. At the same time, authorities must phase in mechanisms for fiscal transparency and the accountability of the budgetary process, reduce tax evasions and close fiscal loopholes, such as numerous VAT and other tax reliefs as well as unreasonable benefits and preferences for individual entities established by the regime. Belarus will need to refinance its public debt at a lower interest rate and for longer periods to reduce the debt burden on the budget and free up significant funds. Extending the loan terms with deferred repayment for the first few years of reforms will provide additional savings for the budget. Economic Liberalisation and Private Sector Development

The private sector has developed rapidly in Belarus in recent years despite the high regulatory burden, unfair competition, and the risks of facing politically motivated criminal prosecutions. Ensuring competitive neutrality through the restructuring of state governance and SOEs and providing equal treatment for private and public sectors in regulation, public procurement, access to loans and other aspects is essential in facilitating private sector development further. Among other things, the focus should be placed on revising and liberalising existing regulations. Other measures should include further decriminalising minor economic offences; reforming oversight bodies to minimise inspections and associated sanctions; introducing a moratorium on SMEs inspection for up to three years; reducing the fiscal burden on business and labour, including social security contributions via a shift towards consumption and wealth taxes; and removing price controls and administrative market barriers. Creating entrepreneurial and start-up infrastructure to support nascent high-tech businesses and entry of individual entrepreneurs could be tackled efficiently via promoting the development of incubator parks; provision of consultancy and training grants; loan guarantee schemes for start-ups; R&D tax reliefs to encourage innovation; and facilitating a practice-based entrepreneurial and business education at higher education institutions. To ensure the provision of start-up funds, tapping into FinTech opportunities and developing venture capital infrastructure should be foreseen along with the reforms of the banking sector and revitalisation of the stock market. It is essential to ensure the integration of Belarus into the global value chains to enable its trade diversification and reduce its dependence on the Russian market. The following steps should be taken in this direction: finalisation of the accession to WTO; adopting the partnership priorities between the EU and Belarus; reviewing numerous EU trade restrictions for Belarusian goods and services; developing and signing a Comprehensive and Enhanced Partnership Agreement between the EU and Belarus that would also comply with Belarus’ membership in the Eurasian Economic Union. With respect to the latter, it is worth considering the examples of the agreements signed between the EU and Armenia, when Armenia was already a member of the Eurasian Economic

84  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape

Union, or Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Area, signed between the EU and Georgia, Moldova and Ukraine. Finally, a programme to encourage the return of businesses operated by Belarusian migrants overseas should be developed to prioritise, among other things, the facilitation of access to unexploited real estate under state control, and a business relocation support programme. Restructuring and Privatisation of State-Owned Enterprises

The path to SOEs’ restructuring should start with creating a single government body in charge of SOEs management and restructuring. Currently, the de facto management of SOEs is scattered across sectoral ministries and the State Committee on Property, making an overall assessment of the sector impossible and related problems less visible. The next step should be to evaluate and classify all SOEs through financial audit procedures to understand their viability and divide them into three groups: (1) viable and financially stable SOEs; (2) SOEs in need of financial support but able to become solvent and (3) insolvent SOEs. To restructure the largest and most significant SOEs (around 100 companies currently on the list of strategically important enterprises), individually tailored measures should be designed. Their privatisation should be postponed until they become more attractive for investors once proper incentives and corporate governance policies are implemented following their restructuring, and the administrative and tax burdens as well as the extent of cross-subsidisation are reduced. As for small and medium-sized SOEs located in large cities, they could be either privatised or liquidated without further delay. In particular, this concerns SOEs in the services sector like retail trade, transportation and warehousing, accommodation, food services, entertainment and recreation. Belarus already has a large enough private sector that could absorb and effectively use released assets and labour as a result of this restructuring.

Redefinition of the State’s Mission

Looking ahead, the role of the state in the economy should also be redefined. Instead of picking winners and combining regulation and ownership roles, it should focus on building inclusive institutions and providing public goods. The government can provide a supporting role for building up an entrepreneurial state via strategic and mission-oriented investment in tackling grand societal challenges and co-creating new markets which would otherwise be considered too-risky undertakings for private firms (Mazzucato 2013). Establishing the rule of law, efficient judiciary, and functional political institutions is a prerequisite, and decentralisation of major government functions would help build transparency, accountability and trust in these institutions.

Stolen Decades  85

Further reforms should focus on (1) reforming education with focus on nurturing creativity and entrepreneurial skills, and healthcare system with a focus on patient-centric approaches, while preserving the inclusivity of these public services; (2) decentralising decision-making, including by giving local authorities more powers and more flexibility on spending decisions. This is a reform that has delivered great results in other countries in the region (e.g., Poland, Slovakia and Ukraine); (3) promoting innovation through support for science and R&D tax relief schemes, as well as technology transfer development and innovation infrastructure; and (4) conducting productive development policies, including digitalisation and investment in renewable energy. The latter will provide an additional source of economic growth and contribute to the diversification of energy sources and energy security. Facilitating a green transition through participation in the EU policy initiatives like European Green Deal will promote a sustainable and circular economy, reduce carbon emissions and support for Belarusian exporters in becoming better prepared for trade and investment opportunities offered by the European markets. An Efficient Social Support Policy

Reform of the social support system would be especially important to absorb the impacts of SOE restructuring, which should include introducing unemployment insurance and benefit schemes. The expansion of unemployment support must be accompanied by the expansion of active labour market services and retraining programmes. Targeted social assistance to the most vulnerable groups should be addressed via extending the longevity and increasing the minimum size of benefits. The pension system reform should foresee the introduction of a fully funded component, for which the initial funding could come from the proceeds of privatisation. However, further parametric reforms, including the gradual raising of the effective retirement age, may become necessary. Among other things, it is also important to address demographic challenges via redirecting childcare support away from the benefits that support long parental leave to instead supporting public (and private) childcare and offering Belarusian parents an option of combining childbearing with active labour market participation. Other actions to consider include supporting and promoting gender equality in the labour market, including through anti-discrimination legislation; introducing smart migration policies, focused on attracting the diaspora; reducing male mortality through a comprehensive set of policies that promote a healthy lifestyle.

Conclusion Three decades on, Belarus remains the least transformed economy in the region with the state preserving the dominant control of the economy via bank asset ownership and allocation of resources, employment provision and burdensome

86  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape

regulation. The chosen “status-quo” strategy at the start of the transition aimed at preserving economic links with Russia, public and quasi-public credit-led economic growth policy, jointly with Russia’s subsidies, helped avoid a sharp output contraction at the early transition, minimise social losses, making the economy boom over the decade prior the global financial crisis. However, the model of state capitalism with prevalent rent-seeking practices to benefit the political elite and delayed economic reforms have led to the accumulation of a number of structural rigidities, driving the economy into stagnation post-2008. The COVID-19 pandemic, the 2020 post-presidential political crisis and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine put further strains on the economy, calling for a change. Back in the middle 1990s, Belarusians were not ready for market reforms. Coming to the early 2020s they seem to have embraced them more willingly when seeing clear benefits of private ownership and a healthy competitive environment. The role of the state going forwards should be re-focused on building inclusive institutions and providing public goods and effective social care support; promoting innovation via creating incentives for private R&D investments, technology transfer development and innovation infrastructure; tackling grand societal challenges and facilitating the emergence of new markets. The speed and success of the reforms to a large extent depend on the resolution of the Russian-Ukraine war and the ongoing political crisis in Belarus.

Acknowledgements The authors would like to acknowledge support with some data and fruitful discussion with Kateryna Bornukova and Dzmitry Kruk from BEROC Economic Research Center.

Notes 1 According to Aslund (2021), Russia’s subsidies amounted to USD $ 6 billion per year in the early 2000s, which is based on the average estimate of the Belarusian GDP of USD $ 32 billion. over the period of 2000–2004 (WB WDI 2021), were reaching 19 per cent of GDP. The energy discounts were reduced post-2008 but according to the IMF (2019a), they still remained substantial. 2 According to EBRD (2021) based on their Life in Transition Survey in 2016, employment in SOEs and public services (public administration, healthcare, education, etc.) remained the highest in the region, accounting for over 60 per cent of total employment. According to the data from IPM Research Center and Belstat (2021), employment in SOEs has declined to 30 per cent but jointly with public services, it accounts for 54.5 per cent of total employment. 3 According to Karlinsky and Kobak (2021) by 30 June 2020 the excess mortality in Belarus during COVID-19 pandemic was 14.5 higher than the officially reported COVID-19 death count. 4 This section is based on the Chatham House policy paper (Bornukova & Alachnovič 2021).

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Bibliography Aslund, A. (2021) How to Break Lukashenka. Available at: https://frivarld​.se​/rapporter​/how​ -to​-break​-lukashenka/ (Accessed: 29 September 2021). Belstat (2021) Osnovnyje pokazateli dejatelnosti organizatsii gosudarstvennogo sektora za janvar-dekabr 2020 goda. Available: https://www​.belstat​.gov​.by​/ofitsialnaya​-statistika​ /makroekonomika ​ - i ​ - okruzhayushchaya ​ - sreda ​ / statistika ​ - predprinimatelstva ​ / statisticheskie​-izdaniya_​/index​_22254/ (Accessed: 29 September 2021). Bornukova, K. and Alachnovič, A. (2021) ‘What economic reforms does Belarus need and how can the West help? Available at: https://www​.chathamhouse​.org​/events​/all​ /research​-event​/what​-economic​-reforms​-does​-belarus​-need​-and​-how​-can​-west​-help (Accessed: 23 June 2021). Campos, N.F. and Coricelli, A. (2002) ‘Growth in transition: What we know, what we don’t, and what we should.’ Journal of Economic Literature 40(3): 793–836. EBRD (2005) Transition Report 2005: Business in Transition. London: EBRD. EBRD (2013) Transition Report 2013: Stuck in Transition?. London: EBRD. EBRD (2021) Transition Report 2020–21: The State Strikes Back. London: EBRD. Foy, H. (2020) ‘Belarus skilled population will be a boon if its economy opens.’ The Financial Times, 19 August. Available at: https://www​.ft​.com​/content​/271acc0d​-e821​ -4394​-93d6​-69f6ebe09872 (Accessed 2 January 2022). Guriev, S. (2019) ‘Gorbachev versus Deng: A review of Chris Miller’s the struggle to save the soviet economy.’ Journal of Economic Literature 57(1): 120–146. Hartwell, C.A., Bornukova, K., Kruk, D. and Zoller-Rydzek, B. (2022) The Economic Reconstruction of Belarus: Next Steps after a Democratic Transition. Available at: https://www​. europarl​.europa​.eu​/thinktank​/en​/document​/EXPO​_STU(2022)653663 (Accessed: 19 May 2022). IMF (2019a) ‘Republic of Belarus: 2018 Article IV consultation-press release.’ In IMF Staff Report, 17 January. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. IMF (2019b) ‘Reassessing the role of state-owned enterprises in Central, Eastern, and Southeastern Europe.’ In European Departmental Paper Series, No 19. Washington, DC: International Monetary Fund. IPM (2019) ‘The macroeconomic forecast for Belarus. Global context and regional risks [Macroekonomicheski prognoz dlia Belarusi. Global’nyi context i regional’nye riski].’ Available at: http://www​.research​.by​/webroot​/delivery​/files​/bro2019r1​.pdf (Accessed: 5 December 2022). IPM (2020) Grafik mesiatsa, tablitsa nedeli: Nanimatel poslednej instantsii. Available at: http://www​.research​.by​/webroot​/delivery​/files​/ft2020r06​-7​.pdf (Accessed: 3 January 2022). Karlinsky, A. and Kobak, D. (2021) ‘Tracking excess mortality across countries during the COVID-19 pandemic with the World Mortality Dataset’, ELife 10. Available at: https://elifesciences​.org​/articles​/69336#:~​:text​=Karlinsky​%20and​%20Kobak​%20used​ %20the​,than​%20expected​%20during​%20the​%20pandemic (Accessed: 19 January 2023). Korosteleva, J. (2004) ‘Continuity over change: Belarus, financial repression and reintegration with Russia.’ In Reforging the Weakest Link. Ed. Robinson, N. Hants, Burlington: Ashgate, 61–80. Korosteleva, J. (2007a) ‘Maximizing Seigniorage and inflation tax: The case of Belarus.’ Eastern European Economics 45(3): May–June, 33–50.

88  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape Korosteleva, J. (2007b) ‘Belarus: Heading towards state capitalism?’ In Varieties of Capitalism in Post-Communist Countries. Eds. Lane, D., Myant, M. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 221–238. Korosteleva, J. and Lawson, C. (2010) ‘The Belarusian case of transition: Whither financial repression?’ Post-Communist Economies 22(1): 33–53. Kruk, D. (2013) ‘Belarus’ anti-crisis management: Success story of delayed recession?’ Europe-Asia Studies 65(3): 473–488. Mazzucato, M. (2013) The Entrepreneurial State: Debunking Public vs. Private Sector Myths. London: Anthem Press. Naūrodski, S. and Šramko, I. (2021) Transformation of the Financial System in Slovakia: Dos and Don’ts, mimeo. Rudkouski, P. (2020) ‘Belarusy zmianilisya za aposhnija dzesiats god. Ab getym svedchyts 7-aja kvylia apytuvannaiu na kashtounasciakh.’ Available at: https://belinstitute​.com​ /index​.php​/be​ / article​ / belarusy​ - zmyanilisya​ - za​-aposhniya​-dzesyac​-god​-ab​-getym​ -svedchyc​-7​-aya​-khvalya​-apytannyau​-pa (Accessed: 3 January 2022). Silitski, V. (2002) ‘Palitychnaya ekanomiya Belaruska-Rasiiskai integratsyi.’ In BelarusianRussian Integration: Analytical Papers [Belaruska-Rasiiskaya integratsyya: analitychnyya artykuly]. Ed. Bulgakau, V. Minsk: Entsyklapedyks, 222–269. Thinktanks​.​by (2022) ‘Pavel Daneiko: Reformy – Eto transformatsia tsennostnoj sistemy.’ Available at: https://thinktanks​.by​/publication​/2021​/10​/03​/pavel​-daneyko​-reformy​ -eto​-transformatsiya​-tsennostnoy​-sistemy​.html (Accessed: 3 January 2022). World Bank (2021a) World Development Indicators (WDI). Available at: https://databank​. worldbank​.org​/source​/world​-development​-indicators (Accessed: 28 September 2021). World Bank (2021b) ‘Europe and Central Asia economic update, fall 2021: Competition and firm recovery post-COVID-19.’ Available at: https://openknowledge​.worldbank​. org​/handle​/10986​/36296 (Accessed: 6 December 2021).

6

COVID-19 in Belarus Politics, Protests, and Public Health Christopher J. Gerry and Cora Neumann

Introduction On 9 August 2020, in the midst of the global COVID-19 pandemic, the adult population of Belarus was invited to participate in the country’s latest presidential election which, in the manner of those that preceded it, was neither free nor fair. In an egregious act of electoral fraud, the authorities announced that Aliaksandr Lukashenka had claimed the right to a sixth term in office with a wholly implausible 80 per cent of the vote. The declaration of this result stirred a cascading wave of protests, further galvanised by a brutal police suppression subjecting peaceful protesters to arrest, violence and abuse, with more than 7,000 jailed in the first five days. Hundreds of thousands of protesters defied police intimidation to participate in organised marches in the capital, and elsewhere, every weekend during the months ahead. Unlike the demonstrations that followed the rigged elections of 2006 and 2010, the 2020 protest movement became a cross-class, cross-cleavage, nationwide protest, engaging workers, white-collar professionals, students, rural and urban, the young and the old. Traditional opposition groups marched alongside social groups that had previously been loyal to Lukashenka and, for a few short weeks, it seemed plausible that the president would fall in the face of this unprecedented coalition. That he survived, is largely due to the enduring loyalty of Belarus’s elite, along with the support received from Russia, which acted to breathe life into the regime’s campaign of repression. However, while the momentum and power of the protests have been contained, the forces that prompted the unprecedented coalition to turn against Lukashenka have not disappeared and are continuing to shape the political trajectory of Belarus. In this chapter, we revisit the 2020 protest movement through the lens of the economic decline that preceded it and, more particularly, the COVID-19 pandemic which helped to facilitate it. We argue that the combination of longstanding economic stagnation, the brutal suppression of the mass protests, and the mishandling of the COVID-19 pandemic has combined to dismantle the social contract which had hitherto sustained Lukashenka’s rule. In so doing, an unprecedented social movement has emerged in Belarus and, as of summer

DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-8

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2022, while the outcome of this uprising remains unresolved, the social contract between Lukashenka and the population seems forever shattered.

The Economic Context The apparent stability of Belarus during the post-Soviet era marked it out as a relative success story. An economic model based on recycling cheap Russian oil for resale to Europe, alongside a manufacturing sector dominated by state-owned enterprises and continued financial support from Russia, enabled Lukashenka’s regime to fulfil a stable, sustainable social agreement with the population. The Belarusian people received jobs, housing, social services, and some material comforts; and in return, Lukashenka could preside over a non-reforming, “paternalistic”, autocracy, while demanding the population’s loyalty. Russia’s 2014 invasion and annexation of Crimea, and the consequent sanctions, undermined this model. The collapse of oil prices and the Russian rouble prompted the scaling back of the Russian subsidies that underpinned the economic model of Belarus. In combination with the continuing effects on Eastern Europe of the 2008–2009 Global Financial Crisis, this added up to a decade of stagnation for Belarus, with GDP no higher in 2020 than it had been in 2010 and with real wages less than 70 per cent of those prevailing in 2010 (Light 2020). Of course, with most of Europe also suffering a period of austerity-driven economic decline in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis, Belarus was not alone in enduring a bleak decade of stagnating living standards. Crucially for what was to follow, however, Belarusians had nowhere to turn to seek redress. Lukashenka’s reluctance to develop institutions of accountability rendered Belarus a state without political parties, with government by favoured appointment and with a near-total marginalisation of the opposition (Way 2020). While this meant Lukashenka could navigate the 2010s relatively comfortably, the bargain between the people and the president, which underscored the regime, had been considerably weakened by the financial crisis and subsequent economic stagnation.

COVID-19: Politics and Protest Against this background of a stagnating economy and declining real living standards, for many Belarusians, it was Lukashenka’s (mis)handling of the COVID-19 crisis that represented a significant tipping point, and which created the space for an opposition movement to emerge. At the start of the pandemic, in March 2020, governments across Europe were beginning to formulate serious, often emergency, responses to the COVID-19 pandemic. By late March, in response to the spread of COVID-19 in Russia, Putin had announced both a “non-working week” and the cancellation of the Russian constitutional referendum. Lukashenka meanwhile was dismissive of the threat posed by COVID-19, instead recommending tractor driving, vodka drinking,

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and visits to the sauna as potential remedies (Åslund 2020). “You just have to work, especially now, in a village […] there, the tractor will heal everyone. The fields heal everyone” (AFP 2020). There was to be no self-isolation; sports and other public events were not suspended and – in contrast, even to Russia, – the May 9 Victory Day parade would proceed as planned (Khurshudyan 2020). Notwithstanding Lukashenka’s dismissal of the threat, Belarus’s Ministry of Healthcare did (at that point) register COVID-19 infections, casualties, and tests, and reported them to the World Health Organisation. While, as for many other countries, these official data do not provide an accurate picture of the real COVID-19 pandemic, they do provide a useful point of comparison with neighbouring European countries as well as vital information on the internal dynamics of the pandemic. As shown in Figure 6.1, these data demonstrate that by April 2020 (May 2020), the reported per capita cumulative cases of COVID-19 in Belarus were already higher than in Russia and Ukraine (and the UK) and remained so until well beyond the August election. Figure 6.1 further demonstrates that, compared to other countries, Belarus had a relatively large per capita spike in infections between April and June 2020, before experiencing a mid- to late-summer decline in cases, mirroring the trends observed elsewhere in Europe. In combination, this meant that, by August 2020, there had been approximately four times as many COVID-19 cases per capita in Belarus than in neighbouring Ukraine (Way 2020).

Figure 6.1 Cumulative COVID-19 cases in selected countries, 2020

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These observations are crucial for understanding the public mood in the months leading up to the August election. Not only did Lukashenka’s dismissive responses to the coronavirus attract global ridicule but they were at odds with the reality of the population’s experience of the pandemic. Lukashenka’s failure to either recognise the seriousness of the pandemic or to intervene to shield the population appeared to many as a fundamental failure by their leader to protect the physical well-being of the population. As Sierakowski (2020: 10) explains, “When he denied the threat and failed to intervene beyond advising people to drink vodka, it seemed like a moral abdication. That was especially disappointing to the middle-aged, who feared for their parents”. There was a further unintended consequence of this disjoint between the deprecating statements of their leader and the reality of Belarusians’ COVID19 experience. Effectively, the population had to learn about and manage the threat of the pandemic on its own. Accordingly, and in ways that few anticipated, Belarusian civil society stepped to the fore to buy, manufacture, and distribute essential medical supplies and equipment; to assist hospital and other medical personnel; and to directly support those suffering from COVID-19 (Strategic Comment 2021; Karath 2020). In late March the crowdfunding campaign “ByCovid19” was launched with the intention of buying medical supplies for hospitals. It is reported that this crowdfunding alone raised almost £300,000 within three months, facilitating the distribution – by volunteers – of personal protective equipment (PPE), oxygen tanks and other medical provisions (Karath 2020). Similarly, during the spring peak of 2020, many Belarusians took it upon themselves to quarantine, wear masks, and maintain social distancing. Meanwhile, attendance at sports events and socialising in cafes and restaurants declined dramatically (Khurshudyan 2020). In short, where the president failed to provide leadership and guidance or even to acknowledge the reality of the pandemic, the Belarusian population stepped in to support each other and to voluntarily adapt their behaviours to the evolving demands of COVID-19. The people themselves supplanted the role of government. Lukashenka’s mishandling of the pandemic therefore had two distinct effects. First, it cost him support across all sections of the population, including those who had previously been loyal supporters. Second, it helped to galvanise civil society, propagating social solidarity and trust, and mobilising communities in coordinated acts of self-help and support, facilitated by new means of networking and communication (Mateo 2022). It is in this context that the reaction to the announcement of Lukashenka’s comprehensive election victory is to be understood. That it was greeted with pervasive disbelief and a rapidly shared certainty that the results were simply implausible, should have come as no surprise. The collective movement, which had its roots in the deteriorating economic climate and flourished during the first months of the pandemic, was primed to take on an entirely new dynamic in the post-election period, with mass demonstrations and strikes that would be met by regime violence and repression.

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COVID-19: Politics, Protests, and Public Health As elsewhere, COVID-19 remained relevant well beyond August 2020, but in the case of Belarus, the narrative and the policies changed. The manner in which the population had adjusted its behaviour to the evolving pandemic as well as the rapid accumulation of data and anecdotes detailing the presence of COVID-19 in Belarus surely impacted on the government’s public health policies. But so too did the evolving politics of the time. As the protest movement accelerated, in the wake of the election, Belarus grabbed the attention of the world as hundreds of thousands took to the streets, industry went on strike, and international opprobrium rained down on the regime. Lukashenka, initially powerless in the face of these protests, gradually fell back on the totalitarian playbook: capturing or driving out opposition leaders, imprisoning journalists, barricading squares and streets, and doing all he could to quell protest and shore up his position. COVID-19 represented a surprisingly effective tool to quell these protests. Closing the land borders in the name of the pandemic, helped to isolate Belarus from the West; limiting social gatherings and requiring self-isolation to stop the spread of the virus proved a convenient, if unsuccessful, obstacle to protest; and insisting trials should be conducted online while denying prisoners access to lawyers (Stepus 2021), violated principles of justice while simultaneously contradicting public health policy. Unsurprisingly then, according to Brookings (2021), Belarus was among the countries with the largest 2020 decline in civic participation, freedom of expression, and freedom of association. The regime also used COVID-19 as a weapon against protesters by allowing it to spread, unchecked, among the imprisoned population. Overcrowding in cells, restricted access to medical care, and frequent relocating of prisoners were all cited as explanations for the rapid spread of the virus among the prison community. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the opposition leader, claimed that infected people were moved from cell to cell simply to infect as many people as possible. Artsiom Liava, a journalist, reported awaiting his court hearing in a cell constructed for 10, but which actually housed around 100 inmates. Kastus Lisetsky, a musician imprisoned for two weeks following his participation in a protest, explained that prison guards were following orders when they let the virus run its course in the prisons. These experiences (Associated Press 2020) suggest that the Belarusian regime explicitly utilised the virus as an instrument of punishment against prisoners. Notwithstanding these observations, the combination of a self-reliant population forging its own COVID-19 response, alongside a government belatedly acknowledging the pandemic in its public health policies, while also exploiting its presence to limit freedoms and target protesters, paradoxically represented a potentially strong overall response to the pandemic. Indeed, during autumn 2020, a clearer set of public health measures and guidelines were introduced. Masks became mandatory in November, border restrictions were introduced in December, remote learning for schools was announced, a 14-day isolation

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requirement for close contacts was introduced, and various other measures were adopted. However, Belarus never experienced a full lockdown and those measures that were introduced were never closely monitored by officials, perhaps reflecting the spirit of self-monitoring that had emerged voluntarily (Kirpich et al. 2022). Consistent with this, Figure 6.1 demonstrates that Belarus’s relative spike in COVID-19 cases had passed by the time of the post-election protests and that, by the end of 2020, the UK, Russia, and Ukraine had all overtaken Belarus in terms of infections. Extrapolating these data through to May 2022 (latest data available at the time of writing), Figure 6.2 shows that this trend continued. From late 2020, reported cases per population were well behind countries like the UK, US, and France, and were similar to those reported for Russia and Ukraine and some of the better-performing North European countries, including Germany and Denmark. This appeared to continue throughout 2021 and beyond. After a slow start, Belarus also progressed relatively swiftly with its vaccination programme and, at the time of writing, a comparatively high level of the population has been vaccinated (Figure 6.3). By February 2022 it had overtaken Ukraine and Russia and, by May 2022, had surpassed the European average rate for the fully vaccinated share of the population. Residents of Belarus had access to two vaccines, the Russian Sputnik vaccine and the Chinese Sinopharm vaccine, with the latter becoming particularly well supplied during 2022 (Stoma et al. 2022).

Figure 6.2 Cumulative COVID-19 cases in selected countries, 2020–2022

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Figure 6.3 Vaccination rates against COVID-19 in various countries

This narrative of a relatively well-controlled pandemic from mid to late 2020, driven first by the responses of civil society and social networks and later also by government intervention and vaccine rollout, is not entirely implausible. After the initial spike in infections, Belarus has reported low levels of COVID-19 throughout the pandemic compared to other countries, both absolutely and per capita. It has also reported a comparatively low positive rate and a low mortality rate and there was no reported spike in mortality linked to the initial rise in COVID cases in early 2020. Figure 6.4 presents the cumulative COVID-19 mortality rates for Belarus in comparison to the UK, Ukraine, and Russia for the period from March 2020 to May 2022 inclusive. On the face of it, after the initial period of official denial and derision, Belarus would seem to have handled the coronavirus pandemic rather adeptly. A closer inspection is called for though. In comparison to Figure 6.2, which presented the equivalent data for infections, Figure 6.4 reveals an intriguing divergence between Belarus on the one hand and Russia and Ukraine on the other. While the cumulative caseloads per capita (Figure 6.2) map each other closely through the entire period, from autumn 2020, the cumulative death rates (Figure 6.4) in Russia, Ukraine, and the UK experience a step-change. COVID-19 mortality rises rapidly from autumn 2020, while Russia and Ukraine take a somewhat less steep rise to a similarly high destination, around 2,500 deaths per million population. Meanwhile, the equivalent figure for Belarus is only a little over 500 per million.

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Figure 6.4 Cumulative COVID-19 deaths in selected countries, 2020–2022

There have been various reasons put forward to explain this lower death rate: the relatively high number of hospital beds per capita; the absence of care homes and the associated relative dispersion of vulnerable groups within the population; and the compliance of the Belarusian population with mandatory and advised measures (Karáth 2020). To give further perspective, the rate of COVID-19 cases that proved fatal is also much lower than in other countries. That is, even if we assume that the incidence reporting is accurate, if the mortality rate was the same as in neighbouring Poland, Belarus would have had ten times as many deaths as those reported. While these various explanations are not without some merit, it became commonplace internationally during the pandemic to examine excess or “above-trend” mortality to uncover the true impact of the pandemic on public health. Not only does this mitigate against inconsistent or irregular reporting and recording mechanisms but it also incorporates other fatal aspects of the pandemic that are not directly related to contracting the virus but that are linked to the likelihood of mortality – for example, mental health-related illnesses or those linked to a lack of access to health care facilities. It is therefore well-suited to understanding how robust the claims to a well-controlled pandemic really are. Figure 6.5, depicting monthly mortality levels in Belarus in the five years prior to the pandemic, 2020, and the first months of 2021 (Belarus ceased reporting these data in March 2021), demonstrates very clearly that Belarus

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Figure 6.5 Mortality in Belarus since 2015

experienced exceptionally stable mortality rates in the five years preceding the pandemic and in January – March of 2020. However, by April 2020 it is equally clear that a sharp upward trend in mortality had set in. Initially peaking in June, at mortality levels equivalent to 150 per cent of the seasonal norm, mortality declined through the summer months before rising again sharply during winter 2020–2021, reaching levels equivalent to 180 per cent of the seasonal norm. These data also show that by March 2021, levels had reverted closer to the norm, though still on the high side of the trend. In itself, Figure 6.5 is not inconsistent with Figures 6.1–6.3 which, respectively, show that, first, the virus spread rapidly during spring 2020, slowed down during the summer of 2020, before taking off sharply again in winter 2020–2022; and second, that vaccination rates increased quite dramatically during 2021, in ways that should have lowered mortality, regardless of the spread of the virus. The really striking feature of these data is the contrast between the sharp rises in mortality during 2020 and the relatively benign-looking pandemic that took place according to the reported deaths due to COVID-19. Figure 6.6 allows us to examine this more closely and makes clear just how stark the divergence is between the reported mortality due to COVID-19 and the actual mortality experienced in Belarus during 2020, as well as in other countries in the region. We include Ireland as a useful comparator here, representing a non-post-Soviet country, with excellent reporting mechanisms and for

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Figure 6.6 Excess mortality and COVID-19 mortality

whom we see more congruent excess mortality and COVID-19 mortality trends for 2020. In contrast, the divergence in mortality and COVID-19-attributed mortality is common across the post-Soviet region, as shown for Russia (closer to Belarus in its mortality “gap”) and Ukraine but is nowhere as extreme as in the case of Belarus. Indeed, few countries globally, attribute a lower percentage of 2020 deaths to the coronavirus than Belarus – as shown in Figure 6.7. This is consistent with the findings of Kirpich et al. (2022), who conclude that overall mortality in Belarus for this period was “higher than for all neighbouring countries”. In sum, considering Belarus’s very low fluctuation in monthly mortality until March 2020 and its stark increase in mortality after the beginning of the pandemic, as well as the lack of other events that might account for such increases in mortality (e.g. a war or natural catastrophe), it is reasonable to assume that the majority of the excess deaths of 2020 and early 2021 can be attributed to the pandemic (including deaths directly from COVID-19). This leaves us in little doubt that, while a combination of circumstances gradually – and perhaps paradoxically – produced a pandemic response that protected public health, the reality of 2020 in Belarus was one of public health failure represented by one of the largest relative excess death rates in the world.

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Figure 6.7 Proportion of deaths attributed to COVID-19, by country, 2020

Conclusion In this chapter, we have argued that Belarus’s experience of the COVID19 pandemic during 2020 and beyond represents an intriguing case in which interdependent narratives of public health, politics, and protest combine to shed light on the incubation and growth of the mass protest movement during 2020 and the discredited government’s response, both to that movement and to the evolution of the COVID-19 pandemic. We do not claim that the onset of the coronavirus pandemic caused the protest movement that erupted in the summer and autumn of 2020. We do however argue that the government’s dismissive response to COVID-19 provided a tipping point around which Belarusian society, including those previously loyal to the Lukashenka regime, publicly expressed their discontent with the government; uniting and strengthening civil society and undercutting the legitimacy of the Lukashenka presidency through the wave of unprecedented protests that spread across Belarus. In turn, the regime learned to use the pandemic strategically, both as a tool against protesters, limiting rights to civic participation in the name of the pandemic and, in letting the virus spread uncontrolled through the prisons as a form of subjugation and punishment for the captive protesters. The government’s initial lacklustre approach to COVID-19 prompted the population to take matters into their own hands. In turn, this provoked the

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regime to introduce some limited measures to contain the virus alongside the more extreme measures linked to their specific targeting of the protest movement. This combination meant that, perhaps paradoxically, the pandemic appeared to have been brought under control rather promptly – at least in terms of reported cases. However, the disproportionately low reporting of COVID-19 mortality and the gaping chasm between excess deaths and those deaths officially attributed to the virus indicates that the authorities underreported coronavirus deaths by many thousands. These were deaths which would have been largely avoidable had there been an earlier response to the pandemic. While the discrepancy between reported deaths and actual deaths is not unique to Belarus, the data we present in this chapter suggest that the scale of the incongruity in Belarus is among the largest observed and that therefore, during 2020, Belarus experienced one of the highest death rates from COVID19 in all of Europe. The 2020 pandemic therefore bequeaths two enduring and related legacies in Belarus. First, the arrival of the pandemic brought into sharp focus the inability and/or unwillingness of the government to fulfil its side of the social bargain made with the people of Belarus. This resulted in a major public health catastrophe during 2020, felt by the people, but denied by the regime. Second, and provoked by this breach of trust, the pandemic stirred and united Belarusian society in a common cause. What followed was an unprecedented wave of social protest and civil activism that swept across the country with a momentum that has found ways to outlive the brutal repressions of the regime in the two years since that fateful summer. It remains to be seen whether and when the will of Belarus’s democratic forces, sparked so dramatically during the COVID-19 summer of 2020, will prevail.

References AFP (2020) ‘Belarusian leader proposes “tractor” therapy for virus.’ Available at: https:// news​.yahoo​.com​/belarusian​-leader​-proposes​-tractor​-therapy​-virus​-142413377​.html​ ?guccounter​=1​&guce_​​refer​​rer​=a​​HR0cH​​M6Ly9​​3d3cu​​Z29vZ​​2xlLm​​NvbS8​​&guce_​​ refer​​rer​_s​​ig​=AQ​​AAAFD​​0jExp​​5xzWO​​In3dO​​YjYNY​​rT1Np​​eR51m​​OPcxz​​FyeEo​​ TSGuA​​f3O29​​qLAfE​​XOnc7​​BMaPd​​UsJPv​​twNSv​​1UyT3​​4a3IH​​byaDk​​Yny9m​​VUBCy​​ eXgjh​​qNDVL​​fTiDj​​MuqVI​​l9QtX​​LWmOF​​J0oAn​​yCP​-S​​J30vY​​NmA3E​​fkDSc​​hOOxY​​ lLI7U​​H​-3H (Accessed: 19 June 2022). Åslund, A. (2020) ‘Responses to the COVID-19 crisis in Russia, Ukraine, and Belarus.’ Eurasian Geography and Economics 61(4–5): 532–545. Available at: https://doi​.org​/10​. 1080​/15387216​.2020​.1778499 Associated Press (2020) ‘Virus besets Belarus prisons filled with president’s critics.’ Associated Press, 26 December. Available at: https://www​.voanews​.com​/a​/covid​-19​-pandemic​ _virus​-besets​-belarus​-prisons​-filled​-presidents​-critics​/6200023​.html (Accessed: 20 June 2022). France-Presse, A. (2020) ‘Belarusian leader proposes “tractor” therapy for coronavirus.’ The Moscow Times, 16 March. Available at: https://www​.themoscowtimes​.com​/2020​/03​

COVID-19 in Belarus  101 /16​/belarussian​-leader​-proposes​-tractor​-therapy​-for​-coronavirus​-a69644 (Accessed: 31 May 2022). Karáth, K. (2020) ‘Covid-19: How does Belarus have one of the lowest death rates in Europe?’ BMJ (Clinical Research Ed.) 370: 3543–3543. Available at: https://doi​.org​/10​. 1136​/bmj​.m3543 Karlinsky, A. and Kobak, D. (2022) ‘Tracking excess mortality across countries during the COVID-19 pandemic with the world mortality.’ [online], eLife. Available at: https:// doi​.org​/10​.7554​/eLife​.69336 Khurshudyan, I. (2020) ‘As Belarus faces a rising number of cases, its leader clings to denials.’ The Washington Post, May 3. Available at: https://www​.pressreader​.com​/usa​ /the​-washington​-post​-sunday​/20200503​/281930250143966 (Accessed: 5 May 2020). Kirpich, A., Shishkin, A., Weppelmann, T.A., Tchernov, A.P., Skums, P. and Gankin, Y. (2022)‚ ‘Excess mortality in Belarus during the COVID-19 pandemic as the case study of a country with limited non-pharmaceutical interventions and limited reporting.’ Scientific Reports 12(1): 1–13. Available at: https://doi​.org​/10​.1038​/s41598​-022​-09345-z Light, F. (2020) ‘How poor handling of Covid-19 has caused uproar in Belarus.’ The New Statesman, 24 June. Available at: https://www​.newstatesman​.com​/world​/2020​/06​/how​ -poor​-handling​-covid​-19​-has​-caused​-uproar​-belarus (Accessed: 25 May 2022). Mateo, E. (2022) ‘“All of Belarus has come out onto the streets”: exploring nationwide protest and the role of pre-existing social networks.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 38(1–2): 26–42. Available at: https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/1060586X​.2022​.2026127 Piccone, T. (2021) ‘Rule of law takes a big hit during COVID-19.’ Brookings, 18 October. Available at: https://www​.brookings​.edu​/blog​/order​-from​-chaos​/2021​/10​/18​/rule​-of​ -law​-takes​-a​-big​-hit​-during​-covid​-19/ (Accessed: 20 June 2022). Richtie, H., Mathieu, E., Rodés-Guirao, L., Appel, C., Giattino, C., Ortiz-Ospina, E., Hasell, J., Macdonald, B., Beltekian, D. and Roser, M. (2022), ‘Coronavirus pandemic (COVID-19).’ [online], Our World in Data. Available at: https://ourworldindata​.org​/ coronavirus​-source​-data (Accessed: 27 June 2022). Sierakowski, S. (2020) ‘Belarus uprising: The making of a revolution.’ Journal of Democracy 31(4): 5–16. Available at: https://doi​.org​/10​.1353​/jod​.2020​.0051 Stepus, Y. (2021) ‘Belarus: Authorities accused of weaponising covid-19 against protesters.’ Institute for War and Peace Reporting, 15 March. Available at https://www​.iwpr​.net​ /global​-voices​/belarus​-authorities​-accused​-weaponising​-covid​-19​-against​-protesters (Accessed: 20 June 2022). Stoma, I., Korsak, K., Voropaev, E., Osipkina, O. and Kovalev, A. (2022) ‘Comparative study of immunogenicity and safety of Gam-COVID-Vac and Sinopharm BBIBPCorV vaccines in Belarus.’ medRxiv. Available at: https://doi​.org​/10​.1101​/2022​.02​.05​. 22270499 Strategic Comment (2021) ‘The protest movement in Belarus: Resistance and repression.’ Strategic Comments 27(2): i–iii. Available at: https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/13567888​.2021​. 1911136 Way, L.A. (2020) ‘Belarus uprising: How a dictator became vulnerable.’ Journal of Democracy 31(4): 17–27. Available at: https://doi​.org​/10​.1353​/jod​.2020​.0052

7

The Belarusian Judicial System What Can We Learn from Georgia and Ukraine’s Struggle for the Independent Judiciary? Liudmila D’Cruz, Liudmila Kazak, and Pavel Kuryan

Introduction An independent judiciary is a critical institution in the successful functioning of a democratic state which should adhere to the rule of law principle to guarantee fundamental human rights, including the right to a fair trial. According to “Basic Principles on the Independence of The Judiciary” (United Nations 1985), the independence of the judiciary must be guaranteed by a functioning democratic state and be enshrined in its constitution or the law of the country. Furthermore, it stipulates that all governmental and other institutions must respect and observe the independence of the judiciary to warrant a functioning democratic system of governance. This chapter examines the functioning of the Belarusian judicial system to highlight the key challenges to be addressed, through reforms, in the future. It also includes an overview of the experience of Georgia and Ukraine – the countries which in the early 1990s faced the same challenges as those faced by Belarus in reforming their judicial systems after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Finally, it provides examples of measures necessary to implement in Belarus to reshape the current judicial system to make it robustly democratic and independent.

An Overview of the Belarusian Judiciary System On 27 July 1990, the Supreme Council of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) adopted the declaration “On the State Sovereignty of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic”, which proclaimed the full state sovereignty of the Republic of Belarus and declared its determination to create a state governed by the rule of law. The declaration enshrined the rule of law and the separation of powers as the essential principles of the state. Those provisions were to be implemented by adopting a new constitution and laws of the Republic of Belarus. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, Belarus inherited the Soviet system of law and courts, which were an integral part of the administrative apparatus of DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-9

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government. Consequently, independent Belarus1 had to face a multi-pronged task of building a democratic state and reforming the existing system of courts and law enforcement agencies. To achieve that, Belarus adopted the Concept of the Judicial and Legal Reform of the Republic of Belarus2 (the “Concept”) in 1992, the main objectives and principles of which were: • • • • • •

the creation of a legal system capable of ensuring the functioning of the state governed by the rule of law; the establishment of an independent judiciary as the main guarantor of the rights and freedoms of citizens; the priority of the rights and freedoms of an individual; the supremacy of law; mutual responsibility of the state and an individual and separation of powers among the legislative, executive and judicial branches.

The Concept provided for the creation of a four-tier judicial system by returning to the magistrates’ courts and inter-regional judicial districts, which aimed to eliminate the dependence of courts on local authorities and the nomination of a jury. However, many of those provisions of the Concept have never been implemented. Another attempt to move to an independent judiciary system in Belarus was made in the first Constitution of sovereign Belarus, which was adopted on 15 March 1994. It proclaimed the separation of powers into three branches: executive, legislative and judicial, in line with a general provision by “Basic Principles” (United Nations 1985) for the independence of branches required for a democratic state. For example, for the independence of the judiciary, the Consultative Council of European Judges in its Opinion 1 (Council of Judges, 2001, Art. 14) provides that “states should include the concept of the independence of the judiciary either in their constitutions or among the fundamental principles acknowledged by countries”. The Council of Europe fully supports this provision and acknowledges that “the basic principles ensuring the independence of the judiciary should be set out in the Constitution or equivalent texts” (Council of Europe 2010). Provisions of UN basic principles (United Nations 1985) and the European Charter (European Charter 1998) echoed this approach. The first Belarusian Constitution also declared the independence of judges. It did not envisage the creation of an independent body tasked with the selection and appointment of judges. Instead, the Constitution provided that those powers were shared between the Supreme Council and the President: the Supreme Council elected the members of the Constitutional Court, the Supreme Court and the Supreme Economic Court of the Republic of Belarus (Art. 83) and the President appointed the judges of other courts (Art. 100). The process of building an independent judiciary system continued by way of adopting the Law N 3514-XII “On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges in the Republic of Belarus” adopted on 13 January 1995.3 Some of the provisions of the Concept

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were reflected in this law, for example, the provisions relating to jury trials. However, it did not establish the four-tier court system or the inter-regional judicial districts specified in the Concept. Any attempt to create an independent judiciary system in Belarus came to an end in 1996 when Lukashenka, the first (and to date the only) elected President of Belarus, announced the constitutional referendum, which was held on 24 November 1996. The result of that plebiscite radically changed the system of powers in Belarus by strengthening the role of the President and making all the other branches of power subordinate to the presidency. For example, the Constitution of Belarus, as amended in 1996,4 fundamentally changed the approach to the appointment and promotion of judges. The President received the power to appoint and dismiss all judges from office, which explicitly undermined the independence of the judiciary principle. Since then, there have been some changes to the judicial system due to the development of legislation and the adoption of new codes. However, most of the changes failed to improve the independence of the judiciary and instead, provoked a flurry of criticism from international organisations. Most of the criticism however related to the failure to ensure the independence of judges, including the role of the President in their appointments and dismissal (United Nations 2001, 2005, 2013a, b, 2014a, 24b, 2017 and 2019). Furthermore, some UN reports also referred to the instances of the “telephone justice” (whereby judges acted upon instructions from governmental officials (United Nations 2005: 10), material dependence of judges from the Ministry of Justice (for example, concerning monthly bonuses) and, in some cases, from local authorities (for subsidised state housing) (United Nations 2005: 10), and to the fact that the candidates were “nominated and appointed during closed sessions” and that the criteria of such nominations remained “undisclosed to candidates and the public” (United Nations 2020: 5). The latest “Universal Periodic Review Report on Belarus” still referred to the issues with the independence of the judiciary (de facto and de jure) and recommended, among others, (a) reconsidering the President’s role in selection, appointment, promotion and dismissal of judges; (b) considering the creation of an independent body to regulate the selection process for judges; c) ensuring other guarantees of the irremovability of judges (United Nations 2020b: 4). At the same time, there were some positive changes. For example, Anaïs Marin, the Special Rapporteur on human rights in Belarus, noted in her report (United Nations 2020: 5) that the transfer of organisational, logistical and staffing support of local courts to the Supreme Court, as envisaged by the Code of the Judicial System and the Status of Judges5 No. 139-3 of 29 June 2006, was a positive step. However, overall, it had a minimal impact on the independence of judges. The events in Belarus after the presidential elections of 9 August 2020 escalated the shortcomings of the judicial system and demonstrated that the judiciary in Belarus became an integral part of Lukashenka’s repressive regime. In the aftermath of the protests, the main task of the Belarusian judiciary was not to administer justice but to persecute citizens who dared to speak

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against the regime. Guided by instructions from police officers, prosecutors, and other government officials rather than law, the judges have been convicting large groups of peaceful protesters against rigged elections based on criminal and administrative charges and imposing sentences that are disproportionate in their severity. For example, the report by Viasna, a non-governmental human rights organisation, “Human Rights Situation in Belarus: March 2022”, states that at the time of writing there were 1,110 political prisoners held in places of detention (2022). Amnesty International, in its report, concluded that the “justice system was systematically abused by the authorities” and that “judges were manifestly biased towards the prosecution and law enforcement agencies” (Amnesty International 2021/2022: 91). To create the appearance of reforms, the regime introduced the amendments to the Constitution, which were adopted in another constitutional referendum held in Belarus on 27 February 2022. This referendum was nontransparent because of the lack of genuine public consultation and discussion on critical elements of the revisions given that Lukashenka announced it only on 21 January 2022. In the amended Constitution, the President retains most of his powers; for example, he appoints and dismisses judges of courts of general jurisdiction (Art. 84). The amended Constitution also introduced a new body, the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly, as the highest representative body of democracy of the Republic of Belarus (Arts. 89-1). The Assembly has the right to elect judges of the Constitutional and Supreme Courts (Art. 89). The judges of these courts are to be elected on the proposal from the President, previously agreed with the Presidium of the All-Belarusian People’s Assembly. Although the Assembly is referred to as the highest representative body, the procedure of its formation demonstrates that it will be under the complete control of the executive branch, headed by the President. Therefore, it could be concluded that the President keeps a tight grip over the judiciary. The section below will examine Georgia and Ukraine’s journeys while reforming their judicial systems to understand what lessons could be learned from their experience to enable Belarus to reform in the future. Their pathways are relevant to Belarus as these countries had similar legal systems in the early 1990s as a legacy of the USSR. However, despite certain misgivings, both Georgia and Ukraine have still been more successful than Belarus, in building a democratic state.

Judicial Reforms in Georgia The World Justice Project (WPJ) Rule of Law Index 2021, which measures the effectiveness of the rule of law, ranks Georgia 49th out of 139 countries and jurisdictions, while Belarus’ ranking is 97, just below El Salvador and Paraguay (World Justice Project 2021: 10). Following the Rose Revolution,6 Georgia undertook a range of judicial reforms, most of which were successful. The high ranking of Georgia in the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index

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2021 demonstrates that thanks to those reforms, the country has managed to create an effective judicial system (World Justice Project 2021: 24). Transforming the Judiciary in Georgia: Positive Lessons to Learn

A key player in the initiation and implementation of judicial reforms has been the High Council of Justice of Georgia (the HCJ). Initially, the HCJ was established in 1997 as a consultative body of the office of the President of Georgia, who used to appoint most of its members.7 However, following the reform in 2018, the Venice Commission8 commented that the new composition and activity of the HCJ are primarily in line with international standards which, “if interpreted and implemented in good faith, can ensure the independence and efficiency of the judiciary” (Venice Commission 2018, Paragraph 44). The majority of the HCJ members are judged and elected directly by their peers; the Parliament of Georgia elects five members; one member is appointed by the President of Georgia and the chairperson of the Supreme Court, by his/her position, is also a member of the HCJ.9 The HCJ has been tasked with ensuring the independence of courts, effectiveness of justice, appointment, promotion and dismissal of judges and is accountable to the conference of judges of Georgia. A significant focus of the initial judicial reforms in Georgia related to its court system and instances of case review. The new system included general courts (district (city) courts, courts of appeals, the Supreme Court) and the Constitutional Court.10 In the first instance, cases are reviewed by district (city) courts, the composition of which may include magistrate judges. Tbilisi Court of Appeals and Kutaisi Court of Appeals review petitions for appeal on decisions of district (city) courts. The Supreme Court of Georgia became the court of cassation of Georgia’s highest and final instance of justice administration. This structure ensures that each case may go through an appeal process, if necessary, which is an essential safeguard of the right to a fair trial. Such safeguard, for example, was abused in Belarus in February 2021 when the Supreme Court judges heard Viktar Babaryka’s case and whose guilty verdict denied Mr Babaryka (an imprisoned presidential election candidate) any chance of appeal. Financial support and material recourses of courts in Georgia increased dramatically over the years. For example, the government allocated GEL 246.5 million to the Ministry of Justice in its budget for 2021, which was an increase of GEL 22.5 million compared to 2020 (Civil Archives 2020). To compare, the Ministry of Justice’s budget in 2005 was GEL 40.5 million only (Civil Archives 2004). The allocated budget covers significantly increased judges’ salaries and pensions and funding for the modernisation of court premises and courtroom equipment such as computers, electronic monitors and internet access. To ensure a fair workload for judges, limit corruption and improve the effectiveness of justice administration, in 2017 the HCJ introduced the procedure for automatic electronic allocation of cases in general courts according to

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which cases among judges are allocated randomly based on an algorithm for generating numbers (Human Rights Education and Monitoring Centre 2018). Another area of significant reforms to establish credibility in the Georgian judicial system included developing a merit-based system of appointment of judges with a very high level of transparency. The process provides that if there is a vacancy for a judge at a district (city) court and a court of appeals, the HCJ announces a competition through the official gazette of Georgia. A registered candidate goes through a rigorous selection process which includes an interview with the HCJ members, filing the property status declaration for officials with the Civil Service Bureau and a points-based assessment by the HCJ. Evaluation sheets prepared by the HCJ members independently following the interview are available to the public if the HCJ decides to appoint the relevant candidate as a judge. In certain circumstances provided by law, an unsuccessful candidate may appeal the decision of the HCJ to the Chamber of Qualification of the Supreme Court, for example, if he/she believes that a member of the HCJ was biased or discriminatory.11 Judges of the Supreme Court are elected, upon recommendation of the HCJ, by the Parliament of Georgia. The HCJ nominates candidates to the Parliament through the publicly announced selection procedure during which the HCJ members interview and assess documents submitted by prospective candidates.12 Several judiciary independence guarantees were introduced in Georgian legislation during the reforms, for example: •

•

•

no communication with a judge which is related to a specific case or issue and which fails to comply with the principles of independence and impartiality of court/judge and the adversarial nature of legal proceedings is permitted from the moment a case is submitted to a court until the court judgment made on the case takes effect, and at the stage of criminal investigation;13 any interference in the activity or any pressure on a judge to influence the decision by a government or local self-government body, public or political association, legal entity or an individual is prohibited and punishable by law;14 and inviolability and immunity of a judge so that it is impermissible to bring criminal proceedings, arrest, search a judge, his/her place of residence, office or car, without consent of the HCJ. 15

It is important to note that Georgia received significant financial and expert support to implement judicial reforms from several international organisations such as the United States Agency for International Development, the World Bank, the Council of Europe, the European Union, and the Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. Thus, the Venice Commission has been regularly providing its recommendations and opinions on reforms undertaken in Georgia. Another recent example of support of the judiciary in Georgia is a

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EUR1,220-million project implemented by the Council of Europe to enhance the effectiveness and transparency of the court system in Georgia by supporting improved legislative safeguards, case management practices and training capacities within the court system and at the Georgian Bar Association (Council of Europe 2019–2023). Shortcomings of Judicial Reforms in Georgia

Some critics of the judicial reforms in Georgia believe that despite decades of reforms, the judicial system in Georgia is still not “free from internal corporate, financial, or party interests” (Imnadze 2021: 10). Following the amendments to the Constitution in 2018, the number of judges of the Supreme Court of Georgia was increased to 28 judges.16 As a result, a very unusual situation occurred in 2019 as the Supreme Court of Georgia was expecting to have 18 to 20 new judges to be appointed for life (until retirement). Although the HCJ nominates candidates for the Supreme Court judges, the final decision of the appointment of a practically new Supreme Court was made by the ruling parliamentary majority in December 2019, which, as Transparency International reported (2020), was accompanied by some violations (for example, the journalists were forcibly made to leave the hall, some MPs were not allowed to evaluate candidates. It is possible to argue that the control by the Parliament of the new composition of the Supreme Court, which, as the Venice Commission commented, will possibly remain the same for the next 20–30 years (Venice Commission 2019, Paragraph 12), undermines the principle of judicial independence. Despite certain shortcomings during the reform process, Georgia’s high ranking in the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 2021 demonstrates that the country has made significant progress in fighting corruption, limiting government interference in justice administration, and building trust in the judiciary. Judicial Reforms in Ukraine17

Ukraine has been reforming its judicial system for some time and the country’s experience could be valuable in reforming this system in Belarus. This section focuses on the reforms of the judiciary, which took place after the Euromaidan Revolution (“Euromaidan” or “Revolution”).18 After the Euromaidan, the Ukrainian authorities faced many challenges and reforming the judiciary was arguably the most important one. Primarily due to high corruption, the judiciary of Ukraine was one of the least popular institutions in the country. Gallup survey conducted in 2014 showed that only 16 per cent of Ukrainians were confident in the judicial system and courts (Rochelle & Loschiky 2014), one of the world’s lowest ratings. After the Revolution, one of the first legal acts adopted by the parliament was Law 1188-VII “On the restoration of trust in the judiciary in

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Ukraine” dated 8 April 2014. This law established that the Temporary Special Commission must inspect the decisions of judges adopted during the Euromaidan Revolution. The High Council of Judges (HCJ)20 and High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ)21 had to play specific roles in this process. However, the authority of their members was terminated by this law, and new bodies were formed with a substantial delay which postponed the whole process of its implementation.22 Additionally, this law provided that, among other things, chairpersons of courts should be elected by the judges of those courts. This provision did not positively impact the judicial system, and in about 80 per cent of the courts, the judges elected the same persons who held those positions earlier (Kuibida et al. 2018). Overall, the work of this Temporary Commission has proven to be ineffective.23 Judicial reforms were part of the electoral programme of Mr Poroshenko, one of the presidential candidates and the winner of the 2014 presidential elections.24 Elected as the President, Mr Poroshenko launched the judicial reform by signing on 16 October 2014 the Decree 812/2014 “On establishing the Council for Judicial Reform.”25 The Council was established as an advisory body to the President of Ukraine. It was tasked to develop the strategy for judicial reforms within the three months after the approval of its personnel. On 27 October 2014, he signed the Decree 826/2014, which approved the Regulation of the Council and its composition.26 In reforming the system, the authorities extensively cooperated and relied on advice from the Venice Commission. On 13 November 2014, the Minister of Justice of Ukraine requested the Venice Commission to provide its opinion on the draft law amending the law “On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges of Ukraine” (the “Preliminary Opinion”) (Venice Commission 2015). The explanatory note that accompanied the request stated that those amendments aimed to remedy some deficiencies in the judicial system as recommended by the Commission in their 2010 Joint Opinion (Venice Commission 2010). Among other things, those amendments intended to simplify the judicial system, introduce new mechanisms for selecting judges and the competitive basis of their appointment. The Venice Commission, in the Preliminary Opinion, concluded that “the current draft law appears to be well put together and in line with European standards” (Venice Commission 2015: 5). However, it repeated previous criticism that the main issue lay within the country’s constitutional framework, in particular the roles of the political institutions and their influence on the judiciary. The Venice Commission, inter alia, recommended excluding the Verkhovna Rada (the Parliament) from judges’ appointment and dismissal and excluding the Parliament’s competence in lifting judges’ immunities (Venice Commission 2015:16). Law 192-VIII “On Ensuring the Right to a Fair Trial” dated 12 February 201527 introduced amendments to some laws and redrafted the law “On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges of Ukraine.” Nevertheless, the revised law still failed to increase trust in the judiciary because of the country’s 19

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constitutional framework. There was also a lack of political will of the authorities to loosen control over the judiciary. The aim of this law was also to revive the work of the HQCJ and the HCJ. However, these judicial bodies comprised the judges who opposed any reforms, so this attempt did not bear much fruit. To remedy the constitutional limitations, the constitutional reform commission was established by Decree of the President of Ukraine 119/2015 dated 3 March 2015.28 On 20 May 2015, Mr Poroshenko signed the Decree 276/2015 “On the Strategy for Reforming the Judiciary, Judicial System and Related Legal Institutions for 2015-2020”,29 which aimed, inter alia, to amend the constitution to remedy the limitations described above. On 30 September 2016, the following acts came into force: (i) Law 1401-VIII “On Amendments to the Constitution of Ukraine (provisions on justice)”30 and (ii) the Law 1402-VIII “On Judiciary and Status of Judges.”31 The amended constitution adopted the principle “the majority of judges elected by judges” and provided for the leading role of judges in the formation of the HCJ. This provision was included in the constitution even though this principle does not always work in transitional democracies (Zhernakov 2016: 1). The constitution aimed to enhance the independence of the judges and established that the President appoints judges upon nomination by the HCJ. Law 1402-VIII simplified the court structure system by introducing a threetier system with the new Supreme Court at the top.32 It also introduced anticorruption rules for judges, such as submission of the declaration forms and provision of information about their assets and disciplinary responsibility for the breach of the provisions including their dismissal. The last piece of the legislation adopted in 2016 was Law 1798-VIII “On the High Council of Justice”,33 adopted on 21 December 2016. This law significantly broadened the authority of the HCJ, including the power to make recommendations on the appointment, transfer and dismissal of judges. The reforms brought by the 2016 legislation introduced some positive changes. However, they could not be named victorious, and one of the reasons was that both the HQCJ and the HCJ retained most of their corrupt colleagues in their positions. The next attempt to reform the judiciary was made on 16 October 2019 with the adoption of Law 193-IX “On amendments to certain laws of Ukraine on judicial governance bodies”34 was adopted. These amendments provided for the role of international experts in the formation of the new HQCJ. The old HQCJ was dissolved immediately effect, but the new one was not formed, and around 2000 vacancies were not filled. Notably, law “On the High Council of Justice” was amended and a new organ – The Integrity and Ethics Commission (IEC) was introduced with the task to “ensure transparency and accountability of members of the HCJ and members of the HQCJ of Ukraine”. This law envisaged the participation of the international expert in the IEC. The law also reduced the number of the Supreme Court judges (from 200 to 100).35 However, this Law 193-IX had several significant disadvantages, and the most serious one was giving too much power to the HCJ, which sabotaged the

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implementation of this law (Zhernakov 2020). The HCJ was tasked to form the Selection Commission to select candidates for the positions in HQCJ of Ukraine. However, contrary to the provisions of Law 193-IX, it included additional requirements for the members of the Selection Commission, for example, five years of experience. A Constitutional Court decision related to Law 193-IX dated 11 March 202036 worsened this situation. The Constitutional Court declared the IEC as an unconstitutional body and, by doing so, removed any scrutiny checks on the members of HCJ. The Court also declared the new composition of the HQCJ and the reduction of the number of the members of Supreme Court to be unconstitutional. That was not a surprising decision as nine judges of this court out of 15 were members of the judiciary, who protected the status quo in the system. The next attempt to reform the judiciary was made in July 2021 with the adoption of Law 1629-IX dated 13 July 2021 “On Amendments to the Law of Ukraine on the Judicial System and the Status of Judges and some laws of Ukraine regarding the resumption of the work of the High Qualification Commission of Judges of Ukraine”.37 This was an important development in legislation that paved the way to re-establishing the HQCJ to select candidates to fulfil the judicial vacancies in the courts. Law 1635-IX dated 14 July 2021 “On Amendments to Certain Legislative Acts of Ukraine Concerning the Procedure for Election (Appointment) to the Positions of Members of the HCJ and Activities of Disciplinary Inspectors of the HCJ” was adopted.38 That law provided for the creation of the Ethics Council that would oversee the integrity of the HCJ which was formed on 8 November 2021. It consisted of three international experts and three Ukrainian judges. Venice Commission welcomed the rationale behind the adoption of this law. It stated that “a judicial reform which does not tackle the functioning of the HCJ and the integrity of its members is doomed to fail” (Venice Commission 2021: 13). Since its formation, the Ethics Council has successfully begun performing its duties and allowed several candidates to proceed for interviews for the positions at the HCJ (see, for example, Pravo 2022a–d). At the time of writing, the reforms have not been completed. The illegal Russian invasion of Ukraine had a negative impact and slowed down the implementation of the reforms but has not haltered them (Alekankina 2022). However, overall, it is possible to conclude that Ukraine’s problem in building an independent judiciary is less institutional, but more mindset related. In particular, it was a mistake to place HCJ, an unreformed judicial body, in charge of the reforms.

Conclusion At this stage, it is not easy to propose a complete set of reforms for Belarus that will help to turn its judiciary into an independent system. This depends on many factors, including, for example, what system of state governance

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democratic Belarus will choose in the future once the current regime is defeated. Nevertheless, based on Georgia and Ukraine’s experience and experts’ views from major international organisations, the first step in reforming the judiciary should begin with creating an independent body, such as a judicial council. That body will be responsible for initiating and implementing judicial reforms to create a system free from political and corporate interests and government interference with proper guarantees of judiciary independence. Later, the judicial council may be tasked with selecting candidates for a judge position by the open and merit-based procedure. Members of the judicial council must be appointed using a competitive and transparent procedure and must include members of the judiciary, members of the bar, academics and international experts. The positive development of the judicial system reforms in Ukraine was the creation of the Ethics Council, in which international experts were invited to participate. It launched the procedure of formation of the HCJ, a body which plays a pivotal role in the administration of justice in Ukraine. Using a similar procedure in Belarus regarding the judicial council may be helpful. Given the active role of specific judges in the persecution of members of the opposition and peaceful protectors during the events of 2020–2022, the lustration process may be useful in removing people with anti-democratic attitude from public office and restoring people’s trust in the Belarusian justice system. Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her office share that view and acknowledge it in their plan,39 according to which: •

• • •

all judges who made unreasonable and unlawful decisions concerning protesters must be removed from office and would no longer be able to work in the justice system or practise law, with the exceptions of those who, at any stage of the crisis, acquitted protesters or terminated proceedings against Belarusians in politically motivated cases, and also publicly refused to consider such cases or impeded their consideration in the format of the Italian strike; any court chairperson whose judges made politically motivated decisions must be removed from office; all judges who are guilty of passing deliberately unjust and unlawful sentences or decisions must be prosecuted and officials who refused to carry out criminal orders and were punished for it or forced to resign must be reinstated in their previous positions.

Finally, the planning of judiciary reforms in Belarus must be done with a systematic strategy aiming at long-term improvements, and continuous revisions. This will only become possible, once the political stalemate of power transfer through a free and fair presidential election, inclusive of freeing all political prisoners in Belarus, takes place, allowing the country to choose a strategy most suited to its needs and future aspirations.

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Notes 1 Belarus had become a sovereign independent state when the Agreement “On the Creation of the Commonwealth of Independent States” dated 8 December 1991 came into force for the Republic of Belarus on 10 December 1991. 2 Resolution of the Supreme Council of the Republic of Belarus dated 23 April 1992 N 1611-XII “On the Concept of Judicial and Legal Reform”. 3 Law N 3514-XII “On the Judicial System and the Status of Judges in the Republic of Belarus” dated 13 January 1995, available in Russian at: https://belzakon​.net/​%D0​ %97​%D0​%B0​%D0​%BA​%D0​%BE​%D0​%BD​%D0​%BE​%D0​%B4​%D0​%B0​%D1​%82​%D0​ %B5​%D0​%BB​%D1​%8C​%D1​%81​%D1​%82​%D0​%B2​%D0​%BE/​%D0​%97​%D0​%B0​%D0​ %BA​%D0​%BE​%D0​%BD_​%D0​%A0​%D0​%91​/1995​/1858 (accessed 19 May 2022). 4 “Constitution of the Republic of Belarus 1994” (as amended and supplemented at the referendum on 24 November 1996), available in Russian at: https://wipolex​-res​.wipo​. int​/edocs​/lexdocs​/laws​/ru​/by​/by016ru​.pdf. 5 Code of the Judicial System and the Status of Judges, No. 139-3 dated 29 June 2006, available in Russian at: http://pravo​.by​/document/​?guid​=3871​&p0​=hk0600139. 6 The Rose Revolution is the change of power in Georgia in November 2003 following mass protests against the flawed results of a parliamentary election that resulted in the resignation of Eduard Shevardnadze.The Rose Revolution triggered new elections with a large majority won by United National Movement, a democratic party founded by Mikheil Saakashvili. 7 Art. 60 of the Organic Law on Common Courts, No. 767-IIs, dated 13 June 1997, available at: www​.refworld​.org​/cgi​-bin​/texis​/vtx​/rwmain​/opendocpdf​.pdf​?reldoc​=y​ &docid​=548f0a9c4 (accessed 19 May 2022). 8 The European Commission for Democracy through Law, also known as the Venice Commission, is the Council of Europe’s advisory body on constitutional matters. 9 Art.47 of the Organic Law on General Courts, No.2257, dated 04 December 2009, available at: matsn​​e​.gov​​.ge​/e​​n​/doc​​ument​​/view​​/9067​​6​?pub​​​licat​​ion​=3​4 (accessed 19 May 2022). 10 The Organic Law on General Courts, No.2257, dated 04 December 2009, available at: matsn​​e​.gov​​.ge​/e​​n​/doc​​ument​​/view​​/9067​​6​?pub​​​licat​​ion​=3​4 (accessed 19 May 2022). 11 Arts.35–36 of the Organic Law on General Courts No.2257, dated 04 December 2009, available at: matsn​​e​.gov​​.ge​/e​​n​/doc​​ument​​/view​​/9067​​6​?pub​​​licat​​ion​=3​4 (accessed 19 May 2022). 12 Arts.35–36 of the Organic Law on General Courts No.2257, dated 04 December 2009, available at: matsn​​e​.gov​​.ge​/e​​n​/doc​​ument​​/view​​/9067​​6​?pub​​​licat​​ion​=3​4 (accessed 19 May 2022). 13 Art.72 of the Organic Law on General Courts No.2257, dated 04 December 2009, available at: matsn​​e​.gov​​.ge​/e​​n​/doc​​ument​​/view​​/9067​​6​?pub​​​licat​​ion​=3​4 (accessed 19 May 2022). 14 Art. 8 of the Organic Law on General Courts No.2257, dated 04 December 2009, available at: matsn​​e​.gov​​.ge​/e​​n​/doc​​ument​​/view​​/9067​​6​?pub​​​licat​​ion​=3​4 (accessed 19 May 2022). 15 Art.40 of the Organic Law on General Courts No.2257, dated 04 December 2009, available at: matsn​​e​.gov​​.ge​/e​​n​/doc​​ument​​/view​​/9067​​6​?pub​​​licat​​ion​=3​4 (accessed 19 May 2022). 16 Art. 61(2) of the Constitution of the Republic of Georgia, available at: matsn​​e​.gov​​.ge​/ e​​n​/doc​​ument​​/view​​/3034​​6​?pub​​​licat​​ion​=3​6 (accessed 19 May 2022). 17 Please note the analysis of Ukraine’s judiciary took place prior to Russia’s intervention into the country. 18 The Euromaidan Revolution occurred between November 2013 and February 2014. 19 Available in Ukrainian at https://zakon​.rada​.gov​.ua​/laws​/show​/1188​-18​/ed20140408​ #Text.

114  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape 20 Body of public authority and judicial governance. 21 Judicial governance body primarily tasked with selecting the judicial candidates and conducting judicial assessments.Yanukovich gave enormous power to this body and, by doing so, exercised political control over the judiciary. 22 For example, the HCJ started working only in June 2015. 23 Reports of this commission are available at http://www​.vru​.gov​.ua​/add​_text​/30 (accessed 5 January 2022). 24 Petr Poroshenko – the electoral programme of the candidate for the president of Ukraine. Election 2014. Dated 1 April 2014. Available in Russian at https://vibori​.in​. ua​/kandidaty​/predvibornie​-programy​/1723​-poroshenko​-2014​.html​#comment​-4334 (accessed 19 May 2022). 25 Available in Ukrainian at https://zakon​.rada​.gov​.ua​/laws​/show​/812​/2014​/ed20141016​ #Text (accessed 19 May 2022). 26 Available in Ukrainian at https://www​.president​.gov​.ua​/documents​/8262014​-17896 (accessed 19 May 2022). 27 Available in Ukrainian at https://zakon​.rada​.gov​.ua​/laws​/show​/192​-19​/ed20150212​ #Text (accessed 19 May 2022). 28 Available in Ukrainian at https://www​.president​.gov​.ua​/documents​/1192015​-18571 (accessed 19 May 2022). 29 Available in Ukrainian at https://zakon​.rada​.gov​.ua​/laws​/show​/276​/2015​#Text (accessed 19 May 2022). 30 Available in Ukrainian at https://zakon​.rada​.gov​.ua​/laws​/show​/1401​-19​#Text (accessed 19 May 2022). 31 Available in Ukrainian at https://zakon​.rada​.gov​.ua​/laws​/show​/1402​-19​#Text (accessed 19 May 2022). 32 However, as it was pointed out in the Short Overview of the Judicial reforms in Ukraine prepared by the Democracy Justice reform (available at http://en​.dejure​.foundation​/ library​/judicial​-reform​-in​-ukraine​-what​-has​-changed​-for​-the​-last​-three​-years), the newly created Supreme Court was mostly composed of old judges with 44 judges (23%) clearly lacking integrity. 33 Available in Ukrainian at: https://zakon​.rada​.gov​.ua​/laws​/show​/1798​-19​#Text (accessed 19 May 2022). 34 Available in Ukrainian at: https://zakon​.rada​.gov​.ua​/laws​/show​/193​-20​/ed20191016​ #Text (accessed 19 May 2022). 35 This provision was criticised by the legal community, including the Venice Commission in its opinion, dated 9 December 2019. 36 Available in Ukrainian at: https://ccu​.gov​.ua​/sites​/default​/files​/docs​/4​_p​_2020​.pdf (accessed 19 May 2022). 37 Available in Ukrainian at https://zakon​.rada​.gov​.ua​/laws​/show​/1629​-IX​#Text (accessed 19 May 2022). 38 Available in Ukrainian at https://zakon​.rada​.gov​.ua​/laws​/show​/1635​-IX​#Text (accessed 19 May 2022). 39 Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya’s Plan is available at: https://tsikhanouskaya​.org​/en​/plans (accessed 19 May 2022).

References Alekankina, K. (2022) ‘The war has not halted reforms: An overview of the first quarter of 2022.’ Vox Ukraine, 10 May. Available at: https://voxukraine​.org​/en​/the​-war​-has​-not​ -halted​-reforms​-an​-overview​-of​-the​-first​-quarter​-of​-2022/ (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Amnesty International (2022) Amnesty International Report 2021/2: The State of the World’s Human Rights. Available at: https://www​.amnesty​.org​/en​/documents​/pol10​/4870​ /2022​/en/ (Accessed: 19 May 2022).

The Belarusian Judicial System  115 Civil Archives (2004) Parliament Approved the 2005 Budget, 29 December. Available at: https://civil​.ge​/archives​/106911 (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Civil Archives (2020) Georgian Parliament Confirms 2021 State Budget, 30 December. Available at: https://civil​.ge​/archives​/389765 (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Council of Europe (2010) CDL-AD(2010)004 Report on the Independence of Judicial System. Part 1: Independence of Judges. Venice, 12–13 March. Council of Europe (2019–2023) Enhancing the Accountability and the Efficiency of the Judicial System and the Professionalism of Lawyers in Georgia. Available at: https://www​.coe​.int​/ en​/web​/tbilisi​/enhancing​-the​-accountability​-and​-the​-efficiency​-of​-the​-judicial​-system ​ -and​-the​-professionalism​-of​-lawyers​-in​-georgia (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Council of Judges (2001) Consultative Council of European Judges, Opinion 1, 23 November. Available at: https://rm​.coe​.int​/1680747830 (Accessed: 19 May 2022). European Charter (1998) European Charter on the statute for judges. Strasbourg, 8–10 July. Human Rights Education and Monitoring Centre (2018) The new system of case distribution in common courts. Available at: https://socialjustice​.org​.ge​/uploads​/products​/pdf​/The​ _New​_System​_of​_Case​_Distribution​_1521041412​.pdf (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Imnadze, G. (2021) Waves of Judicial Reform That Cannot Reach the Shore. Available at: https:// ge​.boell​.org​/en​/2021​/09​/06​/waves​-judicial​-reform​-cannot​-reach​-shore (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Kuibida, R., Malyshev, B., Shepel, T., Marusenko, R. (2018) ‘Establishment of the new supreme court: Key lessons.’ Centre of Policy and Legal Reform and DEJURE Foundation January Pravo (2022a). Members of the HCJ Tendered Resignation Massively – Ethics Council Breached the Law, 9 February. Available at: https://pravo​.ua​/chleny​-vrp​-masovo​-podaly​-u​-vidstavku​ -etychna​-rada​-porushyla​-zakon/ (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Pravo (2022b) 10  Members of HCJ Resigned. 22 February 2022. Available at: https://pravo​.ua​/ 10​-chleniv​-vrp​-pishly​-u​-vidstavku/ (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Pravo (2022c) 3  Out of 4 Members of the HCJ Confirmed the Possibility to Retain a Post. 7 May. Available at: https://pravo​.ua​/try​-z​-chotyrokh​-chleny​-vrp​-pidtverdyly​-mozhlyvist​ -obiimaty​-svoi​-posady/ (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Pravo (2022d) Ethics Council did not Allow a Candidate to Proceed for Interview for the Position at HCJ. 21 December. Available at: https://pravo​.ua​/etychna​-rada​-ne​-dopustyla​-do​ -spivbesidy​-odnoho​-kandydata​-na​-posadu​-chlena​-vrp/ (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Rochelle, S. and Loschiky, J. (2014) Confidence in Judicial Systems Varies Worldwide. Available at: https://news​.gallup​.com​/poll​/178757​/confidence​-judicial​-systems​-varies​ -worldwide​.aspx (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Transparency International (2020) The State of the Judicial System 2016–2020, Transparency International Report. 30 October. Available at: trans​​paren​​cy​.ge​​/en​/p​​ost​/s​​tate-​​judic​​ial​-s​​ ystem​​​-2016​​-2020​ (Accessed: 19 May 2022). United Nations (1985) Basic Principles on the Independence of The Judiciary adopted on 06 September 1985 by the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders held at Milan from 26 August to 6 September 1985 and endorsed by General Assembly resolutions 40/32 of 29 November 1985 and 40/146 of 13 December 1985. Available at: www​.ohchr​.org​/en​/instruments​-mechanisms​/ instruments​/basic​-principles​-independence​-judiciary United Nations (2001) UN Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Independence of Judges and Lawyers, Dato Param Cumaraswamy, submitted in accordance with Commission resolution 2000/42, dated 8 February.

116  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape United Nations (2005) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, Adrian Severin, 18 March. United Nations (2013a) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 18 April. United Nations (2013b) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 6 August. United Nations (2014a) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 22 April. United Nations (2014b) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 12 August 2014. United Nations (2017) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 21 April. United Nations (2019) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 8 May. United Nations (2020a) Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights in Belarus, 17 July. United Nations (2020b) Report of the Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights on Belarus, 27 February. Venice Commission (2010) CDL-AD(2010)026 Joint Opinion on the Law on the Judicial System and the Status of Judges of Ukraine, Directorate of Co-operation within the Directorate General of Human Rights and Legal Affairs of the Council of Europe. Venice, 15–16 October. Venice Commission (2015) CDL(2015)004 Preliminary Opinion on the Draft Law “On Amending the Law on the Judicial System and the Status of Judges”. Strasbourg, 11 February. Venice Commission (2018) CDL-AD(2018)029 Opinion on the Provisions on the Prosecutorial Council in the Draft Organic Law on the Prosecutor’s Office and on the Provisions on the High Council of Justice in the Existing Organic Law on General Courts, adopted by the Venice Commission at its 117th Plenary Session. Venice, 14–15 December. Venice Commission (2019) CDL-PI(2019)002 Urgent Opinion on the Selection and Appointment of Supreme Court Judges, issued pursuant to Article 14a of the Venice Commission’s Rules of Procedure. Strasbourg, 16 April. Venice Commission (2021) CDL-PI(2021)004 Urgent Joint Opinion of the Venice Commission and the Directorate General of Human Rights and Rule of Law. Strasbourg, 5 May. Viasna (2022) Human Rights Situation in Belarus, March 2022. Available at: https://spring96​. org​/en​/news​/107299 (Accessed: 19 May 2022). The World Justice Project Rule of Law Index (2021) Available at: https://worldjusticeproject​. org​/sites​/default​/files​/documents​/WJP​-INDEX​-21​.pdf (Accessed: 19 May 2022). Zhernakov, M. (2016) “Judicial Reform in Ukraine: Mission Possible?” Policy report. December 2016. Zhernakov, M. (2020) ‘Judicial reform in Ukraine: Stalled, damaged and abandoned.’ 3 DCFTAs Op-ed, No 11/2020, April.

8

Belarusian Law as an Agent of Change Thomas Kruessmann and Anna S.

Introduction In the rise of Belarusian peoplehood in the aftermath of the 2020 mass protests (Petrova and Korosteleva 2021), the issue of identity is of central importance. Whereas state ideology has placed an emphasis on the legacy of the World War II victory, Slavic brotherhood and Soviet economic advancements, the brutal repressions that took place after the August 2020 presidential election made it clear to even the most complacent audience that there was only one stark choice left – that is, between accepting the usurpation of presidential powers by Aliaksandr Lukashenka or facing adversity under his repressive system. The social contract which hitherto guaranteed a stable life with modest economic well-being has effectively been abrogated. Everyday life is now precarious if not unbearable, as any sign of resistance can lead to job loss, eviction, reprisals and ultimately arrest, coupled with search and seizure of whatever private space is left (de Vogel 2022; and Gapova’s chapter in this volume). Repressions are also systematic, and they go beyond reacting to individual acts of defiance to identify potential dissenters. It is in this nightmare that the people of Belarus have discovered their identity, an unspoken collective bond that would find its expression in Telegram channels, in red-white-red colours displayed on the most casual everyday items, and in a strong connection with the diaspora, especially those activists and artists who chose to work from abroad for the benefit of their “country for living” (strana dlya zhizni). Societal resilience is working “in different ways, via bottom-up and horizontal relations. These relations are premised on the intergenerational knowledge system imbued in public memory and traditions” (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021: 4). This chapter argues that the rule of law is among those traditions that help reinforce peoplehood and support the struggle for a brighter future. The attraction of the rule of law stands in stark contrast to the use of law as an instrument of state power, for engineering the past and modelling the present of societal relations. But compared to the Soviet Union, where law was permeated by socialist legality, Belarusian law is in principle free of such interferences: there is no dynamic application in the light of the demands of the materialist progression of history, as interpreted by the Communist Party. DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-10

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From the doctrine of socialist legality, only the belief in lex dura sed lex (“the law is harsh, but it is the law”) remained, and ironically it is this very dimension of fierce legal positivism which is ever so often emphasised in the messages of Lukashenka to the people. For the rule of law to reinforce bottom-up and horizontal relations, there is the challenge of overcoming the existing legal system which is premised on maintaining a strong vertical line of command. In a situation in which the Constitutional Court has lost its independence (Vashkevich 2019 and 2020), in which professional judges cannot be expected to follow the law and their conscience, the emasculation of law can only be overcome by a principled and fresh reading. This chapter therefore argues that underneath the surface of the legislation in force, there is a legal tradition grounded in the rule of law which is capable of overcoming the repressions and bringing those responsible for them to justice. This connection is most clearly expressed in the term “constitutional identity”, itself proclaimed in the preamble of the current Constitution as a bridge to earlier rule of law monuments of Lithuania. Arguably, the strongest impact of a legal strategy grounded in the rule of law would be to have those responsible for the repressions answer a future national court under the criminal laws in force at the time of committing their offences. Responsibility under international criminal law constitutes a valid alternative, as the current investigations by e.g. Lithuanian prosecutors of crimes against humanity under universal jurisdiction show.1 However, for Belarusian peoplehood to come to peace with the repressions, a criminal prosecution based on national law would be far more helpful. This is because domestic standards of criminal law form the essence of peoplehood, i.e. the type of law that people agreed to be governed by. Being held accountable to those very standards will ensure the basis for a national process of assigning responsibility and eventually also healing the wounds of the past. In the first part of this chapter, some conceptual issues of the interplay between criminal law, security laws and the retrospective reassessment of legality will be discussed. The so-called border guard shooting cases, decided by the German Supreme Court in the early 1990s, offer rich comparative material on which to build. The second part will present a technical analysis of some of the changes introduced into Belarusian legislation to make repression more effective. It will argue that these amendments will not stand scrutiny from a rule of law perspective. The third part will present an argument why such a reading is actually grounded in Belarusian law and part of the cultural and legal identity which creates Belarusian peoplehood.

Criminal Law and Regime Change Addressing the crimes of a previous political regime by means of criminal law is sometimes labelled as “victor’s justice” when imposing legal standards unknown at the time. By comparison, international criminal law now offers important leverage, but offences such as crimes against humanity or genocide

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require a large-scale or systematic perpetration. Interestingly, in Germany after reunification, courts started to examine individual cases of killings by East German border guards first before applying the legal framework to wider instances of “government criminality” (Regierungskriminalität). In those early cases, however, the choice of applying the West German (FRG) Criminal Code was not a political one but dictated by a legal requirement to apply the Criminal Code with the milder sanctions. The most topical question in such cases is whether criminal law may be applied retrospectively to situations in which this particular legislation was not in force. In this respect, Article 15 (1) of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ratified by Belarus in 1973) maintains that “No one shall be held guilty of any criminal offence on account of any act or omission which did not constitute a criminal offence, under national or international law, at the time when it was committed.” Observance of this temporal rule is the strongest argument in favour of analysing criminal liability for the repressions committed in Belarus after August 2020 based on the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus of 9 July 1999.2 At the same time, applying the laws in force at the time of the event does not preclude a change in the legal interpretation of the provisions in question. As for the comparable Article 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR), the Grand Chamber of the European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) in Kononov v. Latvia (2010, at para 241) asserted that: It is legitimate and foreseeable for a successor State to bring criminal proceedings against persons who have committed crimes under a former regime and that successor courts cannot be criticized for applying and interpreting the legal provisions in force at the material time during the former regime, but in the light of the principles governing a State subject to the rule of law and having regard to the core principles on which the Convention system is built. Even if the ECHR, due to lack of ratification by Belarus, is to be left out when discussing situations in Belarus, the rule of law remains a viable standard. In the German border guard shooting cases the Supreme Court grappled exactly with this issue: whether a justification of the shootings by the GDR Border Code was permissible considering the rule of law criteria, and whether a retrospective re-interpretation conformed with the constitutional prohibition on the retrospective application of criminal law in the German Constitution. In the leading case of 3 November 1992 (BGHSt 39,1), the Court started with a prima facie application of the GDR Border Code and whether it could serve as ground for justification regarding the crime of homicide. Interestingly, the relevant clause in the Border Code required a degree of proportionality when judging the legality of the use of force, but while the life of the perpetrator should be saved “if possible”, the overwhelming rationale was to stop the border crossing at any cost. How these grey areas would be filled was an

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important question. On the one hand, the Court extensively discussed the Border Code as part of socialist law, hence as an instrument for the realisation of Party politics. As it turned out, its binding force heavily depended on the dictates of the political leadership which considered the illegal border crossing not in a technical way, but as a morally charged betrayal of the socialist way of life and an utterly disreputable act. On the other hand, the actual binding force of the Border Code depended on the daily orders given out to the border guards when taking up duty (Vergatterung). It turned out that border guards at times were ordered to avoid casualties at any cost, e.g. during holidays or international sports events, while on other days they were ordered to simply follow the Border Code (Herrmann 1993). Border guards also received promotions even when a lethal outcome could have been avoided. Establishing this multi-level framework is exceedingly important for cases emanating from Belarus. Absent socialist legality, there is obviously no legal doctrine to hold that laws should be systematically applied according to the autocratic leader’s will or whether, on the contrary, the overriding maxim is lex dura sed lex. On the other hand, little is known about the orders which Belarusian riot police follow when they disperse meetings, take people into arrest, etc.3 The Court concluded that in nearly all cases state practice in the GDR (based on the Border Code in light of the political guidelines and actual orders) would provide a justification for the killing. The second argumentative step by the Supreme Court is the most famous one, as it is related to the so-called Radbruch formula. Taking up earlier judgements on the illegality of Nazi laws, the Court maintained that a recognised ground for justification must, however, be struck down in the case of an “obvious and gross violation of fundamental principles of justice and humanity” where the contradiction between the written law and justice becomes so unbearable that “the written law must give way to justice” (BGHSt 39:1). Having thus struck down justification under GDR law, the Court returned to the applicability of FRG criminal law which allowed for mitigating circumstances, but was confronted with the constitutional requirement in Article 103 (2) of the Basic Law (Grundgesetz), according to which “[A]n act may be punished only if it was defined by a law as a criminal offence before the act was committed.” The Court – 17 years before Kononov v. Latvia! – reasoned that there cannot be protection of an offender’s reliance on a given state practice when this state practice is in breach of fundamental requirements of the rule of law. Needless to say, this argument has been extensively discussed in the scholarly literature, but it has become the standard line in dealing with cases of retrospective re-interpretation of offences.

Examples of the Applicability of Belarusian Criminal Law in Light of the Rule of Law Considerations Looking at Belarusian law through the lens of the German Supreme Court’s case law, there is no prima facia doctrine of “autocratic legality” except an

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extreme emphasis on legal positivism. Still, it is not clear whether police are acting on the basis of the relevant legislation alone or whether there is an additional dimension of normative requirements, expressed in the orders they receive. It is quite likely that beyond the rules of professional ethics (confirmed by Order of the Ministry of the Interior on 4 March 2013 No. 67, see Demidova 2020) there are instructions issued on a daily basis on when violence should be meted out, whether or not bystanders should be arrested or how forcefully female or elderly protesters should be targeted. Any discretion offered under legislation may thus be critically influenced by instructions given most likely orally. A good example of the “spirit” of Belarusian law is the widely published speech of Lukashenka when appointing Siarhei Khamenka Minister of Justice on 18 October 2021.4 Previously, Khamenka served as Deputy Minister of the Interior. With no background in law, he may not have been the most obvious candidate for the appointment under normal circumstances. Lukashenka, however, pointed out that there were plenty of experienced lawyers in the Ministry of Justice while there was “in the nearest future a need for strong organisers, administrators because a very large amount of organizational questions must be decided.” And adding to this, he noted: “I will not hide that we need very devoted people, disciplined ones, focused on the decision of questions. (…) There decisions must be taken and taken decisions must be realized. People will see this in the nearest future.” 5 While ominously referring to the so-called “questions”, this quote is rather revealing in the way it juxtaposes law/lawyers and administrators. Obviously, being directly in the President’s line of command is more important for a Minister of Justice than serving the law. Khamenka in turn meekly commented on his appointment that he was ready to execute all tasks given to him, “having devoted my entire life to the word ‘legality’”.6 The repressions which took place after August 2020 were not immediately based on changes in the security laws. The Laws “On Internal Affairs Bodies” of 17 July 20077 “On the Border Guard Service” of 11 November 20088 and “On Counteracting Extremism” of 4 January 20079 all showed various amendments, but none of them were specifically adapted to the situations to come. Only in May 2021, coordinated amendments were introduced which expanded the justification for the use of force without, however, admitting that the purpose of these changes was to increase impunity. An interview with a drafter of bill No. 106-Z of 17 May 2021, Ivan Mamayka, created the impression that the amendments were “business as usual”.10 But as it is clear also from the German border guard shooting cases, any expansion of the grounds of justification has a direct effect on the application of the offences contained in the Criminal Code. As the German Supreme Court pointed out, for defining a criminal offence by law it is without difference whether the actual offence is cast widely with generous grounds for justification or whether it is defined narrowly (BGHSt 39:1).

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Proportionality and the Legitimate Use of Discretion According to the version of Article 26 of the Law “On internal affairs bodies” which preceded the August 2020 events, force11 may be used in a given situation at the discretion of the officer, but only if there are no other means for achieving the given task. At the same time, the officer is called upon to minimise risks to life, health, honour, dignity and property of citizens while promptly offering medical and other help to those affected. Hence, the preceding version of the Law sees the use of force as an ultima ratio to be governed by proportionality. There is “bounded discretion”, i.e. the use of force must be the least invasive to achieve the given goal of averting a threat. This is in line with classical rule of law thinking and means that any triggering of the Criminal Code would be justified. In addition, Article 26 clarifies that the individual officer is not liable for damage caused to the legal interests of the person affected. The amendments of 17 May 2021 bring about a change to this rule which materialises both in the Law “On internal affairs bodies” and in the Law “On the border guard service”. First of all, there is a significant change in the language. Whereas the preceding version focused on the limits of discretion, the new version focuses on the power: the officer “has the right” to use force and furthermore that this right must be exercised taking into consideration the given situation, the character of the offence (whether crime or misdemeanour) and the personality of the offender. And only added to this is the statement that the use of force must follow the requirements of the given Law. The new version of the Law thus drops the fundamental nexus between the use of force and the tasks to be achieved and allows the police officer to take into account in particular the “personality” of the offender. While this term is highly vague, it will invariably lead to some kind of stereotyping. Do certain “personalities” deserve a different treatment, i.e. may certain types of protesters be beaten? In other words, bounded discretion is turned into free discretion; but free discretion may be filled with instructions from superiors. While these two versions of the law are clearly different, Article 26 in the new version still calls upon the officer to minimise risks to life, health, honour, dignity and property of citizens while promptly offering medical and other help to those affected. It is hard to make sense of this. The most likely explanation is that this particular requirement has simply been “forgotten”, as it is incompatible with the notion of “free discretion”. A more sophisticated explanation might be that the unchanged requirement now becomes a prohibition of excessive force. So, while it is in principle permissible to beat up demonstrators based on their “personality”, the beating must not be excessive. In any case, the changes to the Law appear to be ill considered and create a significant grey area for the actual function of the security law, i.e. to provide grounds for justification under criminal law and also defences against damages under civil law. It goes without saying that from a rule of law perspective, this confused wording needs to be cleaned up and the original meaning of a consistently applied proportionality test must be reinstated.

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Separation of Powers in Defining Participation in Extremist Groups Article 361-1 Criminal Code criminalises the founding of or participation in extremist organisations. The Russian term “formirovanie” implies a certain structure, as the law also envisages the existence of “structural subunits”. Whether the organisation needs to be membership-based is not clear from the wording. In addition to “founding”, the offence may also be committed by “participation” which may either be “leading” or “joining”. On the whole, it is clear that the lawmaker’s idea of an “extremist organisation” is patterned on the notion of the “organised criminal group”. And so it shares the rationale that committing an offence by an organisation is more dangerous than by an individual because the organisation is more durable due to its internal structure and membership basis, and it is capable of forming its own institutional will.12 While this type of offence is rather common in many post-Soviet countries, it is important to understand that its actus reus is formulated in a closed way. Compared to other areas of economic crime where the elements of the offence are often defined by using a dynamic reference to some administrative authority’s determination, the lawmaker in the given case decided to construct the offence in a way that its elements do not depend on any outside determination and must be interpreted exclusively by the criminal courts. In effect, this principle of construction is also an expression of the constitutional idea of separation of powers. On 14 May 2021, however, an amendment to the Law “On Counteracting Extremism” came into force. Its new Article 15 gives the Ministry of the Interior as well as the Committee on State Security (KGB) the power to declare a group of citizens an extremist organisation. In a strict reading, Article 15 could still be understood as a matter of administrative law, concerning the issue of prohibition of organisations under the laws of association. However, in practice the determinations by the Ministry of the Interior and the KGB are now forming the basis for law enforcement to prosecute and courts to sentence under the Criminal Code. This new practice is all the more doubtful because the Ministry of the Interior and the KGB have started to declare Telegram channels to be “extremist organizations”, although a simple chat forum could never satisfy the requirements set out in Article 361-1 Criminal Code for extremist organisations. As a result, the Ministry of the Interior and the KGB are actually deciding on the scope of criminalisation, with the criminal courts only rubber-stamping this determination. Needless to say, this practice is clearly in breach of the rule of law.

Applicability of the Criminal Provisions on Human Trafficking One final point of illustration is the fact that despite the migrant crisis on the borders with Poland and Lithuania of 2020/2021 (as far as is known) no domestic prosecution based on Article 181 Criminal Code (“human trafficking”)

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has been launched. The law defines human trafficking as the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receiving of persons for the purpose of exploitation, committed by deceit or misuse of trust or the use of force where the latter is not dangerous for the life or health of the victim, or by threatening such violence. While it is clear that Lukashenka is ultimately orchestrating the large-scale influx of migrants to put pressure on Lithuania and Poland as well as the EU on the whole (Berzins 2022), it is for a legal assessment to be asked whether this type of action is done “in the interest of exploitation”. The wording of Article 181 Criminal Code follows the United Nations’ Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children, supplementing the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime which Belarus ratified in 2003. The UN Protocol states that exploitation “shall include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs”.13 While the UN Protocol clearly intends to give a minimum definition, it is worthwhile asking whether trafficking for the purpose of pushing people across a border in violation of the territorial sovereignty of a neighbouring country is not an equal instance of exploitation. Under the rule of law, this question should first be raised by prosecutors when considering bringing charges. However, it is clear that in the current political system, especially with the justice sector “administered” by Minister of Justice Khamenka, no prosecutions of this kind can be expected.

Rule of Law as a Legal Value in Belarus While the list of cases could easily be expanded, it is clear from the rule of law perspective that courts will have to take a very close look at the various acts of repression and those ultimately responsible for them. The crucial question is whether the rule of law observations made here can be sustained by a technical reading of the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus.14 Article 1 (1) declares Belarus to be a unitary, democratic, social state based on the rule of law. Article 7 promulgates that the Republic of Belarus shall be bound by the principle of “supremacy of law” which is not, as one might expect, the supremacy of legislation, i.e. governing by law, but expressly the rule of law in the meaning of “verkhovenstvo prava”. Articles 22 and 23 establish that everyone is equal before the law; limitation of rights and freedoms of an individual is allowed only in cases prescribed by law, for the benefit of national security, public order, protection of public morals and health, rights and freedoms of other persons. The rule of law principle of the modern Constitution of Belarus is not a novelty. Rather, as will be demonstrated further, it has been there since the beginning of formation of the Belarusian constitutional identity. But does it fit into current legislative reality? Does it have any sufficient background to maintain in effect despite all the anti-constitutional acts adopted during the rule of Lukashenka?

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It is self-evident that developed legal systems do not emerge from nothing: such systems have legal history, where the most fundamental legal principles are rooted. Belarus is not an exception. In fact, as will be demonstrated below, Belarus has a rich and quite unique legal history. The Statutes of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania (GDL) represent legal values that form the core of Belarusian history, as discussed in the first chapter of this volume. The most well-known memorials of law of early modern Belarus are valuable, in the first place, for determining the underlying principles of a ruleof-law state, which was very uncommon for the rest of Europe back in the 16th century. While other European states went through the era of absolutism, when the personality of a monarch was paramount, the GDL and the PolishLithuanian Commonwealth declared the supremacy of law and separation of powers.15 The very first Statute of 1529 was different from other early modern legal acts not only because of its structure and significant amount of legal material but also due to its high level of legal thought and constitutional orientation (Dounar 2009). Article 9 Section 1 of Statute 1529 stated, in particular: “we hereby establish … that all our citizens, both poor and rich … must be judged by the same written law”.16 As noted by Mikola Ermalovich, taking into account that there was no similar document in Europe at that time, we can speak about the ground-breaking role of Belarus in the process of development of political and legal culture (Ermalovich 2003). The Statute of 1566 detailed and developed the provisions of the Statute of 1529. Namely, in Article 1 Section 3 the Grand Duke promises, under the oath he gave to all residents of the state, to take care of the observance of their rights, to strive to increase the rights of all states, as well as to protect the sovereignty of the state and take care of its rise.17 However, the most progressive legal act was the Statute of 1588, the norms of which appeared to have some kind of constitutional nature. The preamble to the Statute already contained the idea of the necessity to limit the powers of the monarch, that the supremacy of law, and not of a person, must be established in the country. This provision was implemented further in the articles of the document. The rule of law was stated directly, the law was the same for everyone “from the highest to the lowest status”. Chancellor of the GDL, Leu Sapega, in addressing a wide circle of citizens of the GDL, warned about the danger of a monarch’s tyranny in the country. He even quoted Aristotle, saying “Whoever demands that the law shall rule, clearly demands the rule of divinity and intelligence; and whoever demands that the person shall rule, brings an animal origin … Law – is a mind free from unconscious ideas”.18 And just like that, the Statute of 1588 declared the rule of law principle for all people of the GDL without exception. The first European Constitution “Ustawa Rzadowa” appeared on 3 May 1791 in a climate of a complicated political crisis of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and directly stated the principle of separation of powers in the state, rights and obligations of existing social classes. Under Article 5 of

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the Constitution of 1791, the government must guarantee that “civil freedom and public order will always remain in balance”. The same Article postulates that “any power in civil society must arise from the will of people”. The text of the Constitution was addressed to “citizens” of the Commonwealth. Unfortunately, adoption of the Constitution did not save the state from several separations of its lands in future. Yet, as history shows, Belarusian legal identity will emerge later, at the beginning of the 20th century. In 1918, the first Belarusian national state was declared – the Belarusian People’s Republic (BNR). Although in fact the life of the BNR was quite short (less than a year), it was able to adopt several constituent documents, thus laying down the foundation of the national state. The most remarkable ones are of course the Statute of BNR Rada and the Second and the Third Constituent Statutes. These very documents established the main principles of the Belarusian state, the rights of the citizens and the main powers of the governing bodies of the state. The BNR was created sovereign and independent on all lands where the Belarusian people had quantitative superiority. All residents of the BNR were guaranteed basic civil liberties: freedom of speech, press, assembly, unions, freedom of conscience, as well as the inviolability of the person and premises. National minorities were guaranteed the right to self-realisation up to autonomy within the BNR. The question of whether the BNR managed to adopt its own Constitution still remains unresolved. It may be the case that the so-called “Provisional Constitution” of BNR was never in fact adopted and the Statute of BNR Rada is mistakenly taken as a constitution.19 However, it goes without saying that the attempts of the BNR to create a sovereign national state went hand in hand with the continuation of the Belarusian legal tradition reflected in the major legal document adopted previously on the territory of Belarus. The main ideas were the same: guarantee of human rights; separation of powers; equal treatment of people from different religions, nationalities and cultures; respect of the rule of law. Despite the presence of academic discussion with regards to the question of whether a formal constitution of BNR in fact existed, the constitutional identity of Belarus continued its formation through foundational legal acts of BNR, which can be treated as having constitutional nature. Afterwards Belarus became a part of the USSR, which critically changed its constitutional vector. During the period of the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR), a total of five constitutions were adopted – and all of them were basically copied from USSR constitutions adopted earlier. Following Belarus’ independence after the dissolution of the USSR, the first and the only Constitution of independent Belarus was adopted in 1994. Its preamble declares that the people of Belarus adopt the Constitution “based on centuries-old history of Belarusian statehood”. This formulation begs the questions of how many centuries of statehood were meant here? Does the history of Belarusian statehood include the very first legal acts adopted in the GDL and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth and the statehood that was shaped back the 14th–16th centuries, or does it merely include the Soviet era of the Belarusian state as represented by the BSSR?

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Ivan Pliakhimovich, in his well-known Commentary on the 1994 Constitution, holds that emphasis on the centuries-long history of Belarusian statehood in the preamble has more of a formalistic than a real meaning. Influence of history is not seen in the provisions of the Constitution and political life of the state … Historical perception of our people, state officials does not go deep into the centuries, but is limited mainly by XX century – the Soviet period … Among currently existing legal acts in Belarus there are none adopted before the Soviet era. (Pliakhimovich 2015: 9) This view, however, is rather limited. It may be granted that state officials’ ideas of history do not go beyond the Soviet past because selection to public office mostly depends on loyalty to the regime. Likewise, the emphasis on the centuries-long history of Belarusian statehood goes deeper than the question of whether legal acts in Belarus adopted before the Soviet era are still in force. Conversely, even where a constitution may explicitly incorporate provisions of an earlier constitution (e.g. the German Grundgesetz in Article 140 makes an explicit reference to the Weimar Reich Constitution’s provisions on the relationship between state and church) this is not per se indicative of constitutional identity. We argue that the modern Belarusian Constitution, by its nature, is a successor to the Statute of 1588, the Constitution of 1791 and the Constituent Statutes of the BNR. We hold that this legacy has not even been disrupted by the so-called constitutional referendum of February 2022. Its sole purpose was to cement the powers of the central authorities. It did not reflect the state of mind of Belarusian society and could be called nothing else but a sham.20 However, the question is whether this historic legacy can be brought to the discussions under the term “constitutional identity” and if so, what it exactly means. The term “constitutional identity” has been rarely used in earlier academic literature or official legal sources, but it has become increasingly central to scholarly discussions, as witnessed, in particular, by the recent conference at MRU School of Law.21 As noted by Sergey Chigrinov, judge of the Constitutional Court of Belarus: Constitutional identity is mediated by the presence in the constitution of a so-called constitutional core, i.e. norms and principles of absolute character in the meaning that they cannot be changed or neutralized by any means of supra-national legal system … moreover, constitutional identity is one of the main factors determining valuable dominants of individual constitutional legal consciousness and constitutional culture as a social phenomenon. (Chigrinov 2016: 35)

Conclusion Having assessed the legal traditions of Belarus and its constitutional acts throughout history, even in a simplistic way, it has become clear that the rule of law

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represents the constitutional core of the Belarusian legal system. It is the driving force of this state and nation. Whenever Belarusian people were given freedom to embrace their culture, history and legal traditions (Grand Duchy of Lithuania, Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, BNR), they implemented the principle of the rule of law in their main legal documents. This is also true for the current Constitution which professes to uphold the centuries-old traditions of the rule of law. It is this constitutional core that cannot be done away with, as it permeates the entire legal system. And it is for this reason that Belarusian law is capable of acting as a powerful agent of change, even despite its current use as an instrument of repression. As an example, it was demonstrated that the concerted legislative changes in the field of public security from summer 2021 do not withstand scrutiny from a rule-of-law perspective. Any future Belarusian independent court will have no difficulty in applying the law in force at the time when the acts of repression were committed, and bringing those responsible to justice.

Notes 1 The EU continues to stand with the people of Belarus – European External Action Service (europa​.​eu), (accessed 19 May 2022). 2 Национальный правовой Интернет-портал Республики Беларусь (pravo​.​by), (accessed 19 May 2022) 3 Silitski (2006) claims that after the Orange Revolution “amended legislation provided the legal basis for continued repression by permitting the president to decide when firearms could be used during peacetime, effectively allowing him to approve armed crackdowns on protests”. 4 Лукашенко назначил экс-замминистра внутренних дел министром юстиции (belta​.​ by), (accessed 19 May 2022). 5 “Хорошие, крепкие юристы в Минюсте есть. Там в ближайшее время нужны будут очень сильные организаторы, управленцы, потому что придется решать очень много организационных вопросов, - сказал Президент. - У нас пройдет ряд мероприятий, прежде всего организационного характера, по линии Минюста. Не стану скрывать: там нужны очень преданные люди, дисциплинированные, нацеленные на решение вопросов. Там нельзя сегодня считать до 20, 10 или даже до трех. Там надо принимать решения или реализовывать принятые решения. Люди это увидят в ближайшее время”. Quoted from the transcription by Belta of 18 October 2021 (ibd.). 6 “посвятивший свою жизнь слову ‚законность‘, готов выполнить все поставленные перед ним задачи” (ibd.). 7 Национальный правовой Интернет-портал Республики Беларусь (pravo​.​by), (accessed 19 May 2022). 8 Национальный правовой Интернет-портал Республики Беларусь (pravo​.​by), (accessed 19 May 2022). 9 Национальный правовой Интернет-портал Республики Беларусь (pravo​.​by), (accessed 19 May 2022). 10 Какие изменения предлагается внести в Закон «Об органах внутренних дел»? (pravo​.​by), (accessed 19 May 2022). 11 Use of force is listed alongside the use of “special means, weapons, military and special technology”. Suffice it to focus here on the use of force. 12 Decree of the Plenary of the Supreme Court of the Republic of Belarus of 25.09.2003 No. 9 “On the court practice regarding offences, connected to the founding and the

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13 14 15 16 17

18 19 20

21

activities of organised groups, gangs and criminal organisations”, https://www.court. gov.by /ru /jurisprudence /post _plen /criminal /vspup /680576836235421c .html (accessed 19 May 2022). TIP.pdf (unodc.org), (accessed 19 May 2022). Конституция Республики Беларусь (pravo.by), (accessed 19 May 2022). https://1863x.com/constitution-of-belarus/ ​ ​ ​ ​ (accessed 19 May 2022). https://pravo.by /pravovaya -informatsiya /pomniki -gistoryi -prava -belarusi /kanstytutsyynae -prava -belarusi /statuty -vyalikaga -knyastva -lito -skaga /statut -1529 -goda/ (accessed 19 May 2022). https://pravo.by /pravovaya -informatsiya /pomniki -gistoryi -prava -belarusi /kanstytutsyynae -prava -belarusi /statuty -vyalikaga -knyastva -lito -skaga /statut -1566 -goda / kamentaryi-t-i-do-nar-da-statuta/ (accessed 19 May 2022) (Commentary of T.I. Dounar to the Statutes of GDL). https://pravo.by /pravovaya -informatsiya /pomniki -gistoryi -prava -belarusi /kanstytutsyynae -prava -belarusi /statuty -vyalikaga -knyastva -lito -skaga /statut -1588 -goda / kamentaryi-t-i-do-nar-da-statuta/ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ (accessed 19 May 2022). Міхась Пліска. Часовая Канстытуцыя БНР: легенда ці рэальнасць. https://gazeta.​ ​ ​ ​ ​ arche.by/article/473.html (accessed 19 May 2022). Joint statement by the Chair of the Delegation for Relations with Belarus, MEP Robert Biedroń, and the European Parliament’s Standing Rapporteur on Belarus, MEP Petras Auštrevičius, from 1 February 2022 https://www.europarl.europa.eu/cmsdata/244649/ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ Joint%20statement%20on%20the%20rising%20number%20of%20political%20prisoners %20in%20Belarus_01.02.2022.pdf ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ (accessed 19 May 2022). https://www.mruni.eu/en/news/conference-initiated-by-law-school-will-contribute -to-drafting-of-democratic-constitution-for-belarus/ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ ​ (accessed 19 May 2022).

References Berzins, V. (2022) ‘Hybrid warfare: Weaponized migration on the Eastern border of the EU?’ The Interdisciplinary Journal of International Studies 12(1): 38–49. Chigrinov, S.P. (2016) ‘Constitutional identity and constitutional development in XXI century (in Russian).’ Journal of Foreign Legislation and Comparative Law 58(3): 32–38. Demidova, I.A. (2020) ‘Legal culture of the state law enforcement service in the Republic of Belarus: Activity and value-normative aspects (in Russian).’ Sibirskoe yuridicheskoe obozrenie 17(2): 160–167. Dounar, T. (2009) ‘Constitutional orientation of the first digest of laws of Belarus (in Belarusian).’ In Statute of Great Duchy of Lithuania 1529 – Foundation of Development of Belarusian Statehood and Constitutionalism (dedicated to the 480th year of adoption): Collection of Scholarly Articles. Minsk: RIVSH, 3–14. Ermalovich, M. (2003) Belarusian State Grand Duchy of Lithuania (in Belarusian). Minsk: Bellitfond, 295–297. Herrmann, J. (1993) ‘Human rights-hostile and human rights-friendly interpretation of para 27 of the GDR Border Guard Act. On the German supreme court’s decision on border shootings of 3 November 1992 (in German).’ Neue Zeitschrift für Strafrecht: 118–121. Korosteleva, E. and I. Petrova (2021) ‘Community resilience in Belarus and the EU response.’ Journal of Common Market Studies 59(S.1): 1–13. Petrova, I. and E. Korosteleva (2021) ‘Societal fragility and resilience: The emergence of peoplehood in Belarus.’ Journal of Eurasian Studies 12(2): 122–132. Pliakhimovich, I.I. (2015) Commentary on the Constitution of the Republic of Belarus (in Russian). Minsk: Amalfeya, 2015.

130  Socio-Economic and Institutional Landscape Silitski, V. (2006) ‘Still Soviet? Why dictatorship persists in Belarus.’ Harvard International Review Spring.28, no. 1: 46–53. Vashkevich, A.I. (2019) ‘Constitutional justice in the republic of Belarus.’ In Constitutional Courts in Post-Soviet States: Between the Model of a State of Law and its Local Application. Ed. J. Zaleśny. Frankfurt am Main: Peter Lang, 141–194. Vashkevich, A. (2020) ‘Judicial “independence” in Belarus: Theory and practice.’ Gdańskie studia prawnicze. Wydawnictwo Uniwersytetu Gdańskiego XXIV(4): 41–55. De Vogel, S. (2022) ‘Anti-opposition crackdowns and protest: The case of Belarus 2000– 2019.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 38(1–2): 9–25.

Part III

Reclaiming Public Space and Fostering Peoplehood



9

Social Movements and Political Change in Belarus in 2020 and After Tatsiana Chulitskaya and Eleanor Bindman

Introduction The aim of this chapter is to explore how civil society organisations (CSOs) and social movements in Belarus mobilised in 2020, and what role they play in the mass protests and other dramatic political events which unfolded there and continue to shape their activities. In some respects, this was an unexpected development as civil society and social movements in Belarus and many other post-Soviet and post-Communist societies had for many years been seen within the dominant research narrative as relatively weak and marginalised (Morje-Howard 2003; Narozhna 2004). Yet as Jacobsson and Koloczuk (2020) argue, a reassessment of post-socialist civil society is long overdue and there is a need to investigate the newer hybrid forms of formal and informal activism and organisation seen in many countries and contexts across Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). These differ from a more ‘NGO-ised’ model of civil society which dominated the field until the 2010s and was often criticised for being elitist and out of touch with the needs of the people it claimed to represent. As a result, the ways in which traditional Belarusian civil society organisations (CSOs) and newly formed social movement organisations mobilised existing activists and new members, and participated in both large- and small-scale protests against the incumbent regime from 2020 onwards, merit further analysis. The chapter starts with the definition of the concepts of civil society and social movements and an explanation of the research framework. It then goes on to discuss the Belarusian political context and the events of 2020 which provided the grounds for changes in mobilisation practices in the country. Next, the situation within Belarusian civil society which existed prior to the presidential election in August 2020 and how it developed after the protest events which followed this election are explored. This discussion is focused in particular, on the newly emerged social movements and grassroots organisations which mushroomed just after the election and the extensive repression the authorities used against both previously existing organised civil society organisations (CSOs) and newly established initiatives. Finally, a reflection on the current situation in Belarusian civil society with reference to the new and tragic context of Russia’s war against Ukraine is provided. DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-12

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Defining ‘Civil Society’ Civil society, an area of activity long targeted by Lukashenka in his attempt to sideline alternative and critical voices, has traditionally been seen as encompassing a wide range of formal and informal organisations including community and grassroots groups, trade unions, professional bodies, NGOs and social enterprises (Edwards 2004). It involves citizens acting collectively to achieve certain goals, make demands on the state and hold the state accountable. It functions as a sector of organised social and public life which is autonomous from the state and the market, but also crucially from the political system and is more focused on seeking concessions or redress from the state than trying to win formal power (Diamond 1994). A robust and independent civil society is presented as a key element in mobilising citizens at all stages of the process of successful democratisation (Diamond 1994; Linz and Stepan 1996), although this is just one of the many factors involved in the democratisation process (Doowon 2006). Social movements are seen as forming part of civil society (Edwards 2004) and the two types of organisation are often used interchangeably in the wider political and media discourse, yet they perform somewhat different functions and have different aims and tactics. While civil society is based around cooperative ties which foster mutual trust, shared values and social cohesion (Putnam 1993) and seeks to be autonomous from the state and the political system, social movements are disruptive, transgressive and seek to put pressure on decision-makers and play an active role in the political process by using unconventional forms of political participation (Tarrow 1989; Della Porta 2020). Where civil society organisations tend to operate in the ‘third sector’ as structured NGOs, social movements are seen as informal networks, which transcend the boundaries of any specific organisation and share a strong common identity. They use protest politics (mobilising for protest events in the public sphere) and information politics (collecting and deploying credible information) to draw public attention to their cause (Keck and Sikkink 1998) and are seen as a variant of what Tilly and Tarrow (2015) call ‘contentious politics’. While studies of social movements have long focused on developments within established democracies, more recently scholars have begun to highlight the fact that social movements are a normal feature of life in contemporary authoritarian regimes too and that they have the potential under certain circumstances to challenge illiberal systems of governance, extract policy concessions and contribute to democratisation (Chen and Moss 2019; Lorentzen 2013). In terms of the analysis of civil society and social movements, many studies address them as separate phenomena, although some scholars have explored the links between them in the context of green politics and antiracist protests in Western European and North American countries (e.g. Barry and Doherty 2001; Ruzza 2008). As Della Porta (2020) points out, the distinction between the two phenomena has become increasingly blurred and there are plenty of

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interactions between them: civil society organisations participate in protest campaigns and membership of the two types of organisations often overlaps. Civil society organisations can become politicised and sometimes morph into social movement organisations. Furthermore, social movements have triggered the development of civil society organisations as a means of survival in the lull after intense moments of protest have died down – something which relates directly to the case of Belarus as the waves of protest have ebbed and flowed since August 2020 in the face of intense repression. As a result, rather than analysing the two phenomena as separate entities, exploring the existing and potential interactions between social movement studies and civil society studies could lead to a better understanding of recent empirical developments (Della Porta 2020). This is something which Korosteleva and Petrova also explore in the context of the concept of peoplehood in Chapter 10 of this volume. This relates to Belarus as a country which has experienced mass mobilisation of the population against the incumbent regime and, since Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, is faced with the challenge of organising an antiwar movement in different forms (from individual protest actions to activities on the railroads interrupting the movement of Russia’s military equipment).

The Belarusian Context Prior to the events of 2020, civil society organisations and social movements in Belarus were largely seen as weak and marginal in terms of their social base (Terzyan 2020). This was partly due to certain structural and historical factors which scholars also observed in other post-communist and post-Soviet societies such as low levels of social cohesion, trust in institutions and low engagement in political processes as a legacy of state socialism (Morje-Howard 2003; Narozhna 2004). It was also, however, due to Lukashenka’s relentless efforts since coming to power in 1994 to eliminate sources of opposition to his regime and use the instruments of state repression against his political opponents, the independent press and civil society organisations (Silitski 2010) while offering a ‘social contract’ to the population which for many years provided broad social support and extensive state subsidies to the majority of Belarusians without the kind of mass privatisation and economic ‘shock therapy’ experienced by neighbouring countries (Marples 2006). Yet, it should be noted that in spite of the hostile political environment in the country and the lack of mass civic participation, civil society organisations (or organised civil society) not only existed in Belarus but also frequently performed important social functions including advocacy, the provision of social services to vulnerable groups within the population, and organisational development of their own (CSOs Sustainability Index, 2020). This type of socially oriented CSO was often treated differently from those that engaged in any activity which could be construed as ‘political’ and even developed relationships with state institutions in order to achieve their goals of supporting vulnerable groups (Bindman and Chulitskaya: forthcoming).

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As in other post-Soviet countries with electoral authoritarian regimes such as Georgia in 2003 and Ukraine in 2004, presidential elections in Belarus have had the potential to become flashpoints and a window of opportunity for opposition activity and protests (Bunce 2017). Yet when this occurred in Belarus in 2006 and 2010 Lukashenka was able to see off this threat using a combination of pre-emptive authoritarianism such as changing legislation to make it harder to register or operate a political party or NGO before the election; and police brutality against protesters and the jailing of the leading opposition candidates after the election (Frear 2018). From around 2015, the regime’s approach to civil society underwent significant change in the context of the so-called political liberalisation, on the one hand, and ongoing socio-economic turbulence in Belarus (including a deterioration of the demographic situation), on the other. It began to see civil society as a resource which could be used to deliver certain cultural programmes and social services which the state could not (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021; Bindman and Chulitskaya forthcoming). This included fundraising support for different socially vulnerable groups (the Imena organisation) and organising diverse cultural events (e.g. Ў Gellery and others). The Belarusian authorities also began to view civil society as an instrument which could be used to demonstrate to the West that the political environment in Belarus allowed CSOs to exist. This led to a proliferation of civic initiatives in the areas of culture, urban development, gender issues and other spheres as a kind of ‘controlled openness’ which made some activism and civic participation possible as long as it was not overtly political (Bedford 2021). However, human rights defenders and other organisations whose activities were seen by the authorities as potentially dangerous for the status quo and politically dangerous still faced substantial restrictions even in terms of legal registration. Many of them (including the well-known human rights organisation Viasna) could not get official legal status in Belarus and either acted as unregistered organisations or were legally registered abroad (Chulitskaya et al. 2020). In early 2020, the Belarusian authorities had no reason to expect problems would arise as a result of the upcoming presidential election in August of that year. Moshes and Nizhnikau (2021) argue that by this point political opposition had been marginalised, civil society had been largely co-opted and had its energy directed into non-political activities, and Belarusian society seemed politically apathetic and accepting of the fact that Lukashenka would remain in power for life. Before the 2020 spring and summer changes, civil society in Belarus existed predominantly in the form of constrained non-governmental organisations, while mass social movements, which had been heavily suppressed in the middle-end of the 1990s, have not re-emerged since.

Civil Society and the Events of 2020 In March 2020, Lukashenka made the kind of an unforced error that Treisman (2020) argues can lead to democratisation by mistake – where an authoritarian

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leader has no intention of ceding power but fails to choose the course most likely to avoid this scenario. His refusal to recognise the rapidly emerging COVID-19 crisis as a threat to public health or to implement even the most basic infection control measures appalled Belarusians, damaged trust in the state and created an opportunity for critics of the regime to mobilise supporters against it (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021; Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021). This led new grassroots civil society initiatives such as #ByCovid19 to form, crowdfund resources and involve large numbers of previously non-political volunteers and activists in helping to support hospital staff who then went on to become involved in the political campaign leading up to the election in August and the subsequent protests. They were helped in this effort by members of Belarus’ extensive IT sector who played a central role in creating online platforms for crowdfunding, election monitoring and new civil society organisations (Kryvoi 2020). It should be mentioned that organised CSOs also played a certain role in this process. For example, existing social organisations such as Imena and Ulej (headed by the son of the most popular oppositional candidate Viktar Babaryka) were also key to organising and promoting these endeavours through fundraising. When the protests began in Belarus, civil society structures and organisations that had emerged prior to 2020 (including long-standing Belarusian political parties) did not play a proactive role in these processes; that is, they were not their initiators. The drivers of political mobilisation were completely different forces and actors, while more established civil society organisations played more of a supporting role in ongoing processes and were involved in them, as a rule, at the level of activists’ individual participation rather than at the institutional level (BIPART 2021b). Some human rights organisations (including Viasna and other initiatives) were more involved from the very beginning in performing their primary function of human rights defence such as monitoring state violations of protesters’ and detainees’ rights. Another example of more active, although not institutional, involvement was the case of the young female activists from the organisation Ee Prava (Her Rights) who were among the initiators and active participants of the Women’s Marches which took place every Saturday from August until November 2020. Meanwhile other diverse social movements which brought together large numbers of women, pensioners, students, factory workers and professionals and have nationwide reach have sprung up since the first wave of protests in August 2020 to maintain the momentum of the protest movement in the face of extensive repression of its participants by the authorities. A relatively new phenomenon for Belarus was that of local ‘backyard’ communities which brought together people living in neighbouring buildings and streets and performed two functions: mass mobilisation (including the coordination and implementation of different protest activities); and community building (organising cultural and educational events, performances and other). Despite the widespread use of violence against protesters both during and after the initial mass protests, those who continue to engage in protest activity have at all

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times remained entirely peaceful, something which Bekus (2021) sees as a strategic choice which has enabled mobilisation across a range of societal groups. While the authorities’ campaign of repression has at least temporarily been successful in putting a stop to the kinds of mass protests of hundreds of thousands of people which took place in Minsk and other towns and cities in the summer and autumn of 2020, the protests have transformed themselves into less visible yet still powerful and subversive forms of local resistance and self-help which continue to undermine the legitimacy of the regime (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021, and in this volume). The upsurge in mass mobilisation in the summer and autumn of 2020 triggered many positive changes in the level of trust, solidarity and activism amongst Belarusian citizens. It inspired a rejection of the stereotypical perception of ‘politics’ and ‘social activity’ as ‘unworthy’, ‘dangerous’ or as marginal spheres and activated an explosive process of forming a positive image of ‘self’ as a civic nation with the forming of many new civic initiatives and local communities. However, the swift and widespread use of repression by the authorities in response puts into question the endurance and long-term nature of these effects (BIPART 2021a). From the point of view of institutionalisation, the events of 2020 in Belarus resulted in the appearance of new social movements, civic initiatives and groups in parallel to the previously existing CSOs. The former acted in a more horizontal and less structured way in comparison with the latter that functioned more professionally.

Belarusian Civil Society in a Situation of Political Crisis After the suppression of the initial mass protests in mid-to-late 2020, the Belarusian authorities proceeded with the use of systematic and harsh repression against civil society. The rhetoric and actions of the Belarusian authorities were and remain aimed at destroying any independent activity in principle. Therefore, at the time of writing, repression and restrictions are applied more and more not only to those who disagree with the status quo but also with respect to any initiative that does not originate from and/or is not completely controlled by the state. The year 2021 became a tragic year for civil society in the country when all types of organisations and movements faced unprecedented repression on the institutional and individual level. If at the beginning of the crisis in late 2020 and early 2021 repressions were mostly against individual members of CSOs and activists, from mid-2021 the authorities started a witch-hunt aimed at organisations and initiatives. The newly emerged local ‘backyard’ communities which were often united and to some extent coordinated via Telegram, one of the most popular social messengers, became the target of particular attention from law enforcement agencies. The most active members of these communities were followed, put into prison etc. From July 2021 onwards there was a series of arrests of activists working for organised civil society sector (CSOs) and searches of the offices of organisations and at the homes of activists. More than

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200 CSOs (around 10 per cent of all registered CSOs in the country) of different forms were liquidated or are in the process of liquidation (BIPART 2021a). As of 28 February 2022, 366 non-profit organisations in Belarus were in the process of forced dissolution (including lawsuits and forced removal from the Unified State Register of Legal Entities and Individual Entrepreneurs). There were 223 non-profit organisations (public associations, foundations and institutions) in relation to which statutory authorities or founders made the decision to liquidate them (Lawtrend 2022). Many civic initiatives, especially those that were to any degree connected to the protest activities or opposition political leadership in exile (particularly the presidential candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya) were officially proclaimed as extremist organisations by the Belarusian authorities. It should be mentioned that at the beginning the most serious attention and repression were directed against newly established initiatives like BySol – a crowdfunding initiative and later a formal organisation which raises funds for those who have suffered from repression; Rabochyi Ruh (Workers’ Movement) which brought together Belarusian workers ready to participate in strike action; and more specialised initiatives such as the Foundation of Medical Solidarity which assist medical professionals who supported the protests. Thus, all types of Belarusian civil society organisations, initiatives and social movements faced repression. If at the beginning there had been some belief or hope that those organisations which existed before 2020, had initially separated themselves from politics and had relatively good relations with Belarusian civil servants and officials would avoid repressions, this rational presumption was not borne out and the majority of these organisations were repressed. The pressure exerted on Belarusian civic movements, initiatives and CSOs by the Lukashenka regime since 2020 has had three main directions and several important consequences. The first is physical threats against activists. Thus, between 9 August 2020 and March 2021, some 30,000 people have reportedly been arrested. At least four people lost their lives in the context of protests; according to official sources, more than 2,600 people were injured between 9 August and 23 November 2020 (UN 2021). Arrests, fines, administrative and criminal jail sentences and the forced departure from the country of leaders and/or members of organisations are greatly weakening the third sector. The greatest pressure has been exerted on human rights organisations (for instance, the entire leadership of Viasna has been imprisoned), but essentially any activity in any sphere – from social services to research and analysis – is under threat. In addition, on the legal level, on 22 January 2022 the Belarusian authorities reintroduced article 193.1, ‘Activities on Behalf of Unregistered Organizations,’ of the Criminal Code of the Republic of Belarus which brings back criminal responsibility for acting on behalf of an unregistered organisation. Belarusian CSOs, especially those which operate inside Belarus, are losing human resources as people choose safer activities such as moving to the IT sphere. Because of the unpredictability, the unpredictable nature of the repression, and the uncertainty of the rules of the game (the understanding of what

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can and cannot be done), people turn towards self-censorship and not only leave CSOs but are also afraid of any form of civic activity. Some organisations have consciously decided to become non-public and ‘non-media’ and consider the public activities of other CSOs that have members or staff in Belarus to be irresponsible (BIPART 2022). The second dimension of the repression being used is the removal of technical and institutional opportunities which would enable the activities of organisations and civic initiatives to continue. Belarusian authorities conducted seizures of equipment, documents and bank accounts belonging to CSOs, initiated numerous inspections of their premises, and used their ability to liquidate legal entities and other types of institutional pressure on these organisations (Lawtrend 2022). Illustrating this situation, Amnesty International reported ‘sweeping crackdown’ on Belarusian CSOs which happened on the early morning of 14 July 2021 when law enforcement officers broke into and searched the offices of at least a dozen major Belarusian civil society and human rights organisations and opposition groups, as well the homes of civil society leaders, including the human rights group Vyasna, Belarusian Association of Journalists (BAJ), Belarusian Helsinki Committee (BHC), the human rights group Human Constanta, the independent research centre BEROC, organisation Gender Perspectives, World Union of Belarusians Batskaushchyna etc. (Amnesty 2021). However, in late 2021, some representatives of Belarusian CSOs expressed hope that after the constitutional referendum in late February 2022, which was initiated by the authorities, the institutional environment for their organisations might improve while the authorities themselves seemed to be promoting the idea that this might in fact happen (BIPART 2022). However, as subsequent events demonstrated, that referendum coincided with the beginning of Russia’s invasion of Ukraine which led to further deterioration of the situation for any civic activity in Belarus. The third dimension of the repression is the significant reduction in, or limitation of, funding opportunities for Belarusian CSOs, civic initiatives and social movements. Given the current government rhetoric of a new Cold War with the West and the campaign against so-called ‘foreign agents’, any transparent funding from outside the country can become a pretext for persecution. The possibilities for legal financing of CSOs within the country have always been limited (CSO Sustainability Index 2020) but since late 2020 they have been practically non-existent. The risk of harassment of citizens and businesses providing financial support to CSOs (including donations and crowdfunding) increased because such support was linked to allegedly ‘financing the protests’. Receiving money in Belarus from any foreign counterpart under any type of legal contract has become virtually impossible as it is highly likely to cause repressive actions by law enforcement agencies against the Belarusian CSOs receiving the funds and their individual employees – numerous inspections are taking place and criminal prosecutions are being initiated for receiving funds from abroad (BIPART 2022). As a result of the direct threats and challenges of the post-2020 developments, many Belarusian activists and even organisations had no other choice

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but to leave the country. Some of the CSOs forced to leave the country already had legal entities/status abroad which was caused by funding and/or legal reasons (Chulitskaya et al. 2020) and they are currently able to continue their activities for Belarus from abroad. However, if previously such organisations existed in foreign countries purely legally and financially, they are now based and acting from abroad. Another group of organisations and activists started the process of legal registration, formal and informal resettlement abroad. A third group of organisations still have activists and, in rare cases, legal entities in Belarus, and function in a mixed mode with some members (usually the leadership) of the organisation abroad and other members remaining inside the country. The most popular destinations for the institutional migration of Belarusian CSOs and initiatives have been Lithuania and Poland – neighbouring countries which have long been traditional hubs for Belarusian civil society. However, the post-2020 developments in Belarus caused Belarusian organisations and activists to move to new locations – Ukraine and Georgia. Those relocated to Ukraine suffered additional trauma of fleeing twice, this time from Russia’s war against Ukraine in February 2022: they have been forced to become refugees for the second time in a short period. Based on these different modes of existence, Belarusian CSOs, initiatives and social movements face different challenges and have different needs. Although all Belarusian CSOs and initiatives intend to work with an explicitly Belarusian agenda, there is a growing gap between the organisations and movements inside and outside Belarus due to the fact that relocated entities tend to become estranged from the actual Belarusian context and they exist and act in different jurisdictions and contexts. Organisations and initiatives are at different stages of implementing their activities: from continuing to work in Belarus in some forms or having been recently dissolved to full institutionalisation and operation from abroad. Consequently, there are different agendas for their activities. In addition, the field of activity also affects the way a particular organisation functions. For example, many of the CSOs that provide services to vulnerable groups have chosen to stay in Belarus even with all the restrictions and risks that entails because it is impossible to support their target groups otherwise. Other organisations, such as those engaged in research, are less restricted by the factor of presence in the country and can work from abroad more easily. It is important to note that there is a risk that organisations in Belarus may drop out of sight of their target audiences who simply will not know or receive information about their existence and activities, especially given the accompanying crackdown on independent media and/or the replacement of civil society organisations by so-called ‘government-organized NGOs’ (GONGOs).

Conclusion From the institutional perspective, it might be observed that Belarusian civil society has existed in an extremely hostile authoritarian political environment since 2020 but has nevertheless experienced several important developments

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which influence its shape and activities. Firstly, because of COVID-19 and other developments inside and outside the country, new civil society initiatives have appeared. These initiatives differ from the previously existing CSOs in their forms, and on the one hand they are less professionalised as civil society organisations; on the other hand, they actively use business-like practices of fundraising and management and perform as a new type of organisation. It is, however, worth noting that often these new initiatives were created by, or involved the participation of, civic activists who had some previous experience working for CSOs. Secondly, new social movements (including protest movements and local initiatives), which were less organised and institutionalised than CSOs but were much larger in scale, appeared in 2020 as part of the wave of protest activities. Now, in response to the severe repression, they have either frozen their activities or become smaller and are passing through a process of institutionalisation. It is possible that they may become platforms for a new wave of mass mobilisation in the country if a window of opportunity opens. However, it is difficult to evaluate the extent to which this idea might be realised. Thirdly, Belarusian CSOs as professionally organised entities are surviving through repression, although with major losses in terms of resources, staff and legal status, and must act in a different mode now. From the broad political repression of activists in July 2021 the Belarusian government shifted to more targeted institutional repression of CSOs of various kinds that operate in various spheres. The process of the mass dissolution of CSOs continues today. Many organisations and activists have been forced to leave the country and now conduct their activities from abroad because of the greatly increased threats to their personal safety. Despite the intensification of repression and worsening conditions, combined with the fact that many CSOs are truly on the edge of survival retain the potential to act as an agent of socio-political transformation, at least by preserving a space for free activity both inside and outside the country. Nevertheless, the current state of CSOs can be described as both ‘survival’ and ‘crisis’. CSOs are losing not only their registration status in Belarus but also people (especially in Belarus) and their connections with their target groups. There is a growing gap between ‘those who left’ and ‘those who stayed’ in terms of both people and organisations, and their respective needs and problems. Russia’s war against Ukraine has impacted Belarusian civil society as it has all societies and people in the region. From a short-term and narrow perspective, we observe that many Belarusian activists and organisations which escaped from repression at home to Ukraine then had to flee the country. Alternatively, some Belarusian activists have stayed in Ukraine to organise and assist with volunteers’ activities or even participate in military action. Inside Belarus, new anti-war initiatives of different types have appeared. While some of them are typical for the country in terms of being non-violent protests and/or volunteer initiatives similar to civic movements, others have a totally different character of violent disobedience where they try to stop Russia’s military equipment being sent through Belarus. This other type of initiatives is an important

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topic for further research. Finally, it is obvious that the war in Ukraine will at least lead to some change in the approach of Western donors towards funding Belarusian CSOs and civic movements both inside and outside the country. Although civil society will most likely remain the focus for support, the priorities and size of the resources provided might differ and will have to be tailored to more specific needs on the ground.

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Social Movements in Belarus 2020 and After  145 Silitski, V. (2010) ‘“Survival of the fittest”: Domestic and international dimensions of the authoritarian reaction in the former Soviet Union following the colored revolutions.’ Communist and Post-Communist Studies 43: 339–350. Stepan, A. and Linz, J. (2013) ‘Democratization theory and the ‘arab spring’.’ Journal of Democracy 24(2): 15–30. Tarrow, S. (1989). Democracy and Disorder: Protest and Politics in Italy, 1965–1975. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Terzyan, A. (2020) ‘The state of civil society in Belarus and Armenia: Challenges and opportunities.’ Modern Diplomacy. Available at: https://moderndiplomacy​.eu​/2020​/12​ /03​/the​-state​-of​-civil​-society​-in​-belarus​-and​-armenia​-challenges​-and​-opportunities/ (Accessed 01.06.2022). Tilly, C. and Tarrow, S. (2015) Contentious Politics, Oxford: Oxford University Press Treisman, D. (2020) ‘Democracy by mistake: How the errors of autocrats trigger transitions to freer government.’ American Political Science Review 114(3): 792–810. UN (2021) ‘Situation of human rights in Belarus in the context of the 2020 presidential election.’ Available at: https://documents​-dds​-ny​.un​.org​/doc​/UNDOC​/GEN​/G21​ /032​/81​/PDF​/G2103281​.pdf​?OpenElement (Accessed 01.06.2022). Way, L. and Levitsky, S. (2006) ‘The dynamics of autocratic coercion after the Cold War.’ Communist and Post-Communist Studies 39: 387–410.

10 Societal Self-Organization in Belarus Post-2020 The Rise of Peoplehood Elena Korosteleva and Irina Petrova

Introduction The 2020 presidential electoral cycle and its aftermath in Belarus saw the burgeoning protest movement of a massive scale, gathering wide swaths of Belarusian society in an often spontaneous and informal manner, which normally escapes the linear logic of political sciences in relation to mass mobilization. Until 2020, the conventional wisdom about Belarusian society posited that its general political apathy and passivity, engendered by the nature of the political regime, impeded the active formation of societal contestation movements. Yet, the political protests that emerged around and after the 2020 presidential election arguably manifested qualitative change in Belarusian society – seemingly apolitical and atomised, it rapidly self-organized into myriads of activist and self-help communities to oversee protests and address specific social issues (Petrova and Korosteleva 2021; Korosteleva and Petrova 2022). These processes have been largely informal and hence difficult to capture and understand using traditional political sciences’ methods of conceptualization. Two years after the election, the protest movements continue but factually have failed to bring about obvious change to the regime and political institutions in Belarus. Nevertheless, the emergence and self-organization of these protest communities did result in a profound and tangible change to public mindset, leading to a qualitative transformation of the society itself. This chapter aims to address this apparent discrepancy between the lack of political change on the one hand, and the perceived societal transformation on the other. Zooming in to these elusive and informal processes of self-organization, hitherto untouched by traditional approaches, may offer an innovative analytical framework to understand the complexities of emergence, endurance, and transformation, and to account for the informal and hidden societal dynamics, which in the long term are responsible for not just profound but irreversible change. The conventional political science literature has so far missed an opportunity to address and capture this informal relational realm of political change brewing under the surface of the societal fabric, with a tendency to erupt when the right moment comes. The wide-scale protests which started in August 2020 have been often framed in the literature as either a delayed post-Communist DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-13

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transition similar to those of the Central and Eastern European states in the early 1990s or as a coloured revolution similar to those in Georgia (2003) and Ukraine (2004). This framing builds on the comparative politics regime dichotomy between democracy and autocracy (Moshes and Nizhnikau 2021; Kulakevich and Augsburger 2021) fundamentally discarding all other developmental nuances in between. This is not to undervalue the contributions made by the democratization studies: no doubt, they help to understand political aspirations and grievances behind the protests and to explain the formation of the main political institutions important for sustaining the democratization movement, or vice versa, to examine the factors behind regime’s survival. Yet, the democratization studies have several limitations. First, they normally render a linear (and as a rule, teleological) view of change – that is, an expectation of progression from authoritarianism to democratization, and subsequently to democratic consolidation and endurance; or in some cases democratic backsliding along the full-spectrum scale of democracy-building (Levitsky and Way 2012). In reality, however, the informal processes of change often escape this simplified logic of progression and reveal a much more nuanced picture of attainment (Cianetti and Hanley 2021) resulting in a complex entanglement of both democratic and autocratic elements which are by and large hidden in the relational fabric of society (Chandler 2022). Second, democratic mobilization tends to account for more fixed institutionalized processes, such as formal political contestation and organized civil society, whereas most of the bottomup and horizontal self-organization processes are unorganized and unstable, hence, difficult to register and even more challenging to analyze as a coherent process, and a contributing factor to change. In a similar vein, many academic studies of the protests in Belarus also adopted an analytical frame of identity or nation-building. These studies emphasize the unfinished nature of national identity-building in Belarus as compared to other post-Soviet states and analyse the 2020 protests from the perspective of symbolism utilized in the studies of nation-building (Bekus 2021; 2022; Kazharski 2021). Similarly to the democratization framework, this analytical lens offers important insights into competing identities and identity-making by zooming in on the reshaping of identity through symbolic tools, revising public narratives, and political identity practices. Yet, while extending our understanding of identity and nation-building practices, this framework does not explain the role of self-organization which was prevalent in the 2020 protests, and which, if anything, helped to unlock the hidden potential of informal community relations in fostering identity into a formidable political force. The process of selforganization has therefore remained on the margins of the academic reflection of the recent political protest in Belarus despite its significant contribution to bringing about societal change. This chapter aims to bridge this literature gap by contributing to the study of societal self-organization building and the emergence of peoplehood in the example of Belarus. It will first discuss the intellectual background of complexity-thinking and its emergence as one of its central processes. In the second

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part, the chapter will analyse how self-organization in Belarus reveals hidden and unorganized processes of collective action which lead to a qualitative change of the societal system, inclusive of the emergence of peoplehood as a political force.

Emergence: The Act of Self-Organization without Central Control The chapter adopts complexity-thinking as the main analytical lens. Developed in the first half of the 20th century in natural sciences, in the past three decades complexity-thinking has been proliferating into social sciences offering a promising research agenda in terms of its explanatory power. This is because complexity-thinking builds on new ontological and epistemological premises that provide a better account of complexity of social processes as compared to the dominating positivist thinking. In particular, the ontological assumptions put forward the idea of a social world as made of a complex mesh of relations in permanent flux. This view is radically different from the positivist scheme of the world as made of fixed objects that develop against fixed backgrounds (Kurki 2020). By recognizing that no agency is fixed and every agency is constituted from the sum of its relations to other objects in the relational mesh, complexity-thinking presents social reality as an open system made up of a large number of different heterogeneous actors and networks. Interactions in an open system are essentially unpredictable due to the principle of non-linearity. The epistemological implication of it means that as opposed to a closed system where knowing the initial input allows us to predict the outcome building on a number of principles functioning within the system, in an open system we are essentially incapable of prediction due to the large number of actors and potential paths of societal processes. While this limited ability to predict might be frustrating, complexity-thinking brings us closer to the understanding of society as an open system that can be studied retrospectively. One of the main ordering processes pertinent to open systems is the process of emergence, which is sometimes referred to as self-organization (this chapter uses these two terms interchangeably). Emergence is a process of self-organization of individual actors into a qualitatively new system without central control. This concept was initially studied in biology in the 1970s to explain the behaviour of flocks of birds or schools of fish that self-organize into a system to address a common objective or challenge. Reynolds (1987) suggested analyzing these processes not as fixed against a certain background but build around a few principles that guide the behaviour of individuals in a network, hence the model draws only on the interaction of members of the network. The product – Biods, an artificial life programme simulating a flock of birds – made important insights into understanding the birds’ collective movement, which is increasingly adopted by social and economic sciences. In particular, according to this model of emergence, individuals in a system behave in accordance with several main principles. First, separation implies keeping a certain distance

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from other individuals/biods, to perform basic life functions and attainment. Second, alignment means following an average direction of the system. Applied to social systems, each individual is expected to move in the general direction a social system takes them, thus aligning themselves based on shared imaginaries and/or visions of the “good life”. Third, cohesion implies a move towards the flock centre or a certain adaptation to the behaviour of the other individuals in the system. In structural terms, it also suggests the emergence of order based on a certain authority at the core and the norm acceptance by the flock. While in biology these principles are analyzed literally, various applications by social sciences allow for their adaptation to understanding specific societal conditions that cause the emergence and subsequent structuring. These principles of an open complex system may help us capture and explain fluid and hidden processes of societal emergence in the case of Belarus.

Self-Organization in Belarus and the Rise of Peoplehood A grassroots horizontal political mobilization that took place in Belarus in the aftermath of the 2020 election was pointed out by many scholars as one of the key characteristics of the protest seen as a watershed moment leading to change. While it is to an extent addressed elsewhere in this volume (see especially Chapters 3, 6, 8, 9, 11, and 12), this chapter aims to bring these dynamics to the front of the discussion to shed light on these elusive processes of forming hidden societal ties, with their entrenchment (and, potentially, their subsequent dissolution), to understand how their relational nature may lead to a rupture point in the system, as was evidenced by the 2020 post-August protests and societal mobilization. These processes are difficult to capture given their temporary, spontaneous, informal, and often opaque nature, which is why they often escape academic attention. However, these processes are essential for us to understand that while they may be unseen and/or unexpected, they are not at all accidental, having emerged and been brewing as hidden relations for years; and also to insist that the societal change we see unfolding in Belarus today, is irreversible and tangible, despite its lacking manifestations in terms of regime change and its political institutions. The phenomenon of “new communities”1 with particular references to dvory (courtyards) and microraiony (micro-districts) is discussed below to highlight the logic of emergence and its impact on fostering change, as part of complexity-thinking in an open societal system of relations. Dvory and Microraiony: Their Role as the Epicentres for Self-organization in the Aftermath of the 2020 Presidential Election

Dvor is a public space adjacent to several apartment blocks which would normally form a square following a standard design of a residential dwelling from the Soviet times; and microraion is an area made up of several dvory, which would normally include a number of amenities, e.g. a school, pharmacy, shops, thus

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designing a shared living space, reflected through propiska (registration of living) for administrative purposes. They would normally be the centres of communal life for decades, but never in such an active and spontaneous form as it happened during the protest events of 2020. Prior to that, dvory and microraiony served as a place for tackling problems related to the shared household and its management, i.e. heating, water supply, cleaning, or repair. They may become self-organized into tovarischestva with an election of a manager and their team from a shared household, often on a salaried basis paid from collected residential fees, to manage the communal space and advocate on its behalf. The state has been keen to institutionalize these “self-organisations” to have control over their activities, by way of offering government financial support and resourcing. In addition, dvory also traditionally associate with communal gatherings – spending time with neighbours/friends, retirees’ bench-chatting and kids on the playground, and occasional street parties. Dvory and microraiony played an important role in the Soviet times. Associating with urban developments, and often being a witness to forced relocations (including after the Chernobyl tragedy, when the entire villages were moved to new city dwellings in the suburbs of Minsk, the capital), they played a crucial role in socializing and organizing public life and free time. They would normally boast sports-related spaces, children’s playgrounds, chess alleys, and parks; and in the after-war time, they would also provide foodbanks and clothing for redistribution. More broadly, in the post-Soviet space, e.g. in Central Asia and the Caucasus, they also serve as communal infrastructures to offer support for young families; financial advice for the needy, and moral judgement for anti-social behaviour; as well as organize various festivities for communal celebrations (Babayev and Abushov 2022). With time, these infrastructures, especially in urban areas, became eroded, due to various factors including increasing social mobility, limited free time, and financial support; and the state took over most of them, in terms of managing spaces and their maintenance. While the degree of local engagement in dvory and microraiony varies from one place to another, an increasing atomization in Belarusian society on par with some general trends across post-Soviet space over the past decades resulted in typically limited and falling levels of local socialization. This unexpectedly altered in 2020, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 pandemic when neighbours began to support each other in the absence of the state response to the pandemic (see Chapter 6 for further information). These invisible and hitherto dormant support infrastructures stimulated by COVID-19 paved the way for the revival of local connectedness which became particularly visible in August 2020, when the post-election protests started on a massive scale. It is then that dvory and microraiony (re)emerged as the epicentre of local societal self-organization and resistance, maintaining connections among neighbours to offer protection or a hiding place when necessary; to inform each other of planned activities or possible danger, or simply to get together, to feel part of the community. Burgeoning activities of people in dvory and microraiony

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included diverse actions: not only did they reflect growing public resistance to the violence of the state by reportedly leaving doors unlocked to save people from the police’s harassment, but they also included civic activities such as tea-drinking, public lectures, movie screenings, meetings with local musicians and artists, creation of a symbolic space by displaying white-red-white flags, and painting graffiti and murals. The scope of dvory and microraiony activities was particularly striking in Minsk, the capital city, but was also visible as a new phenomenon in other towns across Belarus. By unpacking the three principles of self-organization – separation, alignment, and cohesion – we demonstrate below how hitherto atomized and disconnected city dwellers eventually turned into emergent protest communities, forming a peoplehood as a political des forces de résistance. Separation

Separation is defined as keeping a certain distance from other individuals in a system. It allows individuals, on the one hand, to differentiate themselves from the other members of a collective, and on the other allows them to maintain distance, to avoid collision with the other actors. In the case of Belarus in 2020, separation reflected individual self-identification in terms of their choice and attitude towards the authorities. In many cases, it changed personal self-realization from non-participation and avoidance of local civic/political activism into an active identity and certain actorness. From this perspective, it is essential to trace what triggered this self-realization and self-identification as a moment of becoming part of a self-organized collective. Existing surveys (Douglas 2021; BIPART 2021) conducted in the aftermath of protests demonstrate that realization of an individual’s own actorness was stimulated by a combination of factors. The widespread perception of a state-committed electoral fraud combined with the shocking levels of state repression and violence against peaceful protesters were further enhanced by the fact that many people were either personally affected or knew someone who suffered or was inflicted trauma or physical injury as a result of state persecution (Douglas 2021:8). Other contributory factors included the feeling of indignation (as discussed in Chapter 12) and the desire to make people’s own voices heard and express civic unity with the other protestors (Douglas 2021:8–9). These events and corresponding social dynamics led to “a departure from paternalist values, implying an erosion of the value base for the previous social contract” (Krawatzek and Langbein 2022:107), which contributed to self-realization of people as citizens. On a higher level, separation is also about communities realizing themselves as distinct groups with their own collective actorness. This implies selfidentification and potential interaction with other collectives. The data on the grassroots communities available from the Belarusian Institute for Public Administration Reform and Transformation (BIPART 2021) shows that while drovy-based communities recognized their own actorness, they had little or no interaction with other communities. Most of the cooperation took place

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among similar types of dvory/microraiony communities (e.g. Borovoe), while as a rule they would report an absence of any significant cooperation with either established civil society organizations, political parties, and even the Tsikhanouskaya office or the Coordination Council. Protestors did organize themselves similarly to the flocks of birds in their bifurcation. This limited cooperation with the established structures can be explained by multiple factors, including the high scale of repressive measures by the state and hence the lack of trust or suspicion in relation to those whom people did not know personally; lack of connections among people; as well as the absence of previous track record of self-organization and grassroots activities. An analysis of the dynamics under the separation category points to the visible process of self-identification and self-awareness first, before moving towards the stages of alignment and cohesion resulting in an eventual rise of peoplehood as a political force. Triggered by the COVID-19 self-help networks and August 2020 protests, we could observe the emergence of small grassroots communities especially in the form of dvory, and realization of their own role as active community members rather than as atomized entities in the pursuit of self-interest. This was an essential shift in Belarusian society which ensued post-August election of 2020. One could observe emerging connections among the individuals at the early stages of grassroots selforganization, which as is shown in the next sections becomes transformed into a more integrated network of local communities through alignment and cohesion. Alignment

The second principle of emergence – alignment – means following the average direction of others in a system. By aligning their behaviour to the closest members in a group, individual members move in the same direction to form a network. This principle explains how the behaviour of everyone in the group might lead to a collective action and the emergence of order. In relation to a human collective, the principle can be seen as a contribution to similar types of activities by aligning one’s actions to the actions of others, which creates a critical mass and transforms small individual actions into a powerful collective force. This is a stage when dvory align themselves into microraiony, to support each other in the clandestine movement of resistance in Belarus. In a situation of crisis, as reported by the Belarusian Institute for Public Administration and Reform and Transformation (2021), “new communities” began to form rapidly, by holding joint actions and events. According to this survey (2021:36), the most common types of activity included material support for those under pressure or repression in connection with their civic position (64.9 per cent), solidarity actions, and support for political prisoners or those under pressure (62.9 per cent), events and activities aimed at strengthening ties among neighbours, community building (52.5 per cent), distribution of leaflets, newspapers (49.8 per cent), appeals to government agencies through

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letters, petitions, and statements regarding the general political situation (33.9 per cent). BIPART surveys also indicated that civic initiatives launched before the elections continued to play an important role as support infrastructures, initiating various campaigns, including outreach and awareness-raising work. Based on semi-structured interviews, online surveys, and participatory observation, they concluded these “new communities” underwent several stages of transformation, or “waves of alignment” (2021:35–36): • •

• •

August–September 2020: “Explosive growth”, associated with an individual awakening and many new people joining the protests and flash-mob actions; October–December 2020: “Inertial development”, with participation in the street protests becoming routine, and almost an institutionalized activity: e.g. general Sunday protests; pensioners’ protests on Mondays; women’s protests; workers’ protests etc. January–March 2021: “Crystallization”, associated with decreasing levels of mass protests, and their transformation into flashmobs and organized actions (e.g. Women in White) April–July 2021 (and onwards): “Survival and partisan activities”, associated with moving newly formed relations of communities, online (cyber-partisans), or underground, in the form of clandestine activities (repainting murals, or displaying white-red-white flags), joining campaigns like “Plan Peramoha” or sabotaging work deliverables (aka “Italian strike action”) etc.

It is important to note that these forms of bonding through protest activities have been evolving in nature, always seeking the most effective means to showcase resistance and undermine the government response. Furthermore, these new emergent communities and groupings were always associated with higher levels of trust and support, including crowdfunding, neighbourhood watch, offering shelter to those fleeing the police, letter-writing, as well as keeping in touch with those in prisons or those who migrated abroad. The emergent grassroots communities tended to contribute to non-state platforms – e.g. “Golos” and the “Honest People”, which enjoyed the broadest popular support and initiated actions, and later span off into other groupings and initiatives (e.g. BY_HELP; BYSOL_Solidarity Fund etc). Most active self-organization related to the support of political prisoners. Atomized first, with the increasing levels of repression, people began to selforganize into support groups for the affected families for the attendance of court hearings, to support the persecuted, and for being on “duty” by prison walls for the released. Numerous online sites were set up (e.g. https://prisoners​. spring96​.org​/en) to coordinate support and contact, and for political lobbying, inter alia, on the international level. The next section discusses how these various forms of alignment eventually led to the rise of peoplehood in Belarus, as a moment of becoming a political force.

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The third principle of emergence – cohesion – implies a move towards the flock centre or a certain adaptation to the behaviour of the other individuals in a system, thus forming an order. In the context of a human collective, cohesion implies development of coherent internal rules within the collective, and institutionalization through various symbols, and actions, of a type of authority that would formally be recognized as a leading force for change. In the case of Belarus, the most manifested signs of the development of internal rules within grassroots communities were solidarity, reciprocity, support to the members of the community, and the feeling of unity held together by pursuing a common goal of free and fair elections. Expressing solidarity, for example, was reported as one of the main activities of the local communities (BIPART 2021:36). The practice of expressing solidarity was manifested in multiple forms, symbolically – the use of the white-red-white flags, singing songs, human chains of people holding hands in the protests etc. – were essential for creating a feeling of common identity different from the one promoted by the state. The material form of solidarity was no less important and included financial support to those persecuted by the state, collecting information about political prisoners and those detained in protests, communication with their families, serving as an intermediary of information among people and prisons, coordination of crowdfunding etc. Less formally, weekend dvory and microraiony festivals involving voluntary donations of food, clothing, and other goods to the affected members of the community, as well as joint activities to celebrate and enhance a sense of togetherness – through art workshops, singing, and church-going –contributed to the rise of peoplehood in Belarus, based not on national or geopolitical preferences, but rather on the emotional feeling of community driven by a sense of indignation towards authorities, and the imaginary of the “good life” associated with peaceful and dignified living conditions, and being respected as “humans” – “lyudzmi zvattsa” (to be called people) (Petrova and Korosteleva 2021). As a result, through these invisible processes of alignment and self-organization, the post-2020 Belarusian society has become more cohesive due to the establishment or activation of internal rules and principles binding these communities together. Solidarity, reciprocity, a higher level of trust, and a common idea of a better life served as a glue to hold communities together through the darkest times of suffering, torture, persecution, and imprisonment. This was evidenced in the post-2020 months by the unprecedented levels of community engagement driven by the idea of togetherness. Essentially, this contributed to the emergence of better coordinated collective action (Mateo 2022) and the rise of peoplehood. The Belarusian peoplehood, as shown, has not emerged overnight: it went through different stages of separation, alignment, and cohesion, to crystallize into a formidable and irreversible force for change. While it was clearly triggered by the lack of state measures to protect the people from the COVID-19

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pandemic and mobilized further due to the brutal actions by the incumbent authorities against peaceful mass demonstrations disputing the results of the 9 August 2020 presidential election, the awakening of the Belarusians has been brewing for years. Peculiarities of Belarusian community formation, including a relatively late start of nation-building in the second half of the 19th century, geopolitical and geocultural in-betweenness (stark Orthodox Russian influence on the one hand and Catholic Western on the other), the devastating effect of the two world wars and intensive socio-economic development in the framework of the USSR (Bekus 2010; 2014; Buhr et al. 2011; Ioffe 2003) have fostered, if anything, some very modest aspirations among the Belarusians – those of quietness and peace, non-interference and fortitude shaped by a phrase “as long as there is no more war”, which was painstakingly rehearsed by the post-war generations as a daily mantra. As the 2019 focus groups revealed,3 stability, above all, remained “the most important value” for the Belarusian respondents, through which they appraise the notions of “family, work, no debt, stable income” (female, 51 years old, Vitebsk), and “the desire to live your own little quiet life” and “the wish to avoid any changes even on a daily basis” (male, 65 years old, Gomel). This was further reinforced by a sense of “moral satisfaction” (of self-realization) and ontological security (feeling safe, stable, and financially protected from the adversity of life) – as part of “good life” aspirations that many respondents mentioned as shaping their lives. It is important to note that for many it is the moral aspects of their vision of the “good life” that topped up their priority “list”: “A good life is an opportunity for selfrealization, dignity and preservation of our culture and a certain subjective well-being” (male, 55 years old, Grodno); while another noted the salience of “health, and a decent life” (male, 63 years old, Gomel). These aspirations come in stark contrast with the waves of mass protests which were occurring daily in Belarus after the August election of 2020. This suggests that these people must have found themselves on a real precipice that led them to break with the very foundations of their cherished stability for the sake of dignity and a better future for their children. These disputed elections and especially the subsequent state violence (ODIHR OSCE 2020) mobilized every strata of the population: from the young to the old, and people of all walks of life, views, or faiths (Douglas 2021; Gapova 2021). It seems that what mattered the most to them, after all, was not stability, but a sense of dignity of life to be called and treated as “people” – “lyudzmi zvatstsa” – and a sense of justice, which was so starkly denied to the Belarusians in the recent election, and which, when raised, incurred such a brutal response from the regime (Human Rights Watch 2021). Wanting to be justly treated as “hramada” (coherent community) and “human”, rather than “narodets” (demeaning of the notion of people), “bydlo” (animals), “ovtsy” (sheep), “narkomany i prostitutki” (drug-addicts and whores), which is a repetitive narrative of the Lukashenka’s administration (see e.g., Kryzhanovskaya 2020; Postimees 2020), has pushed the Belarusians to swap their illusion of stability and rise up to the regime. This single moment 2

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meant moving beyond separation, and alignment, to a new form of cohesion, and a new vision of life becoming “peoplehood”, post-August 2020, with no turning back. As mentioned above, peoplehood means more than a civil society, and much more than a movement of national defining. It precisely symbolizes the moment of being that seems to have erupted so suddenly, through relational sharing of pain and grief, and through the fostering of future ideas, dreams, and desires, especially in the face of a crisis and/or gross injustice and suffering. It brought out a palpable sense of community of relations, which hitherto was hidden, obscure, and even dormant. It was facilitated by societal support infrastructures, which seemingly emerged from out of nowhere, in a society one thought was so urbanized and devoid of any vivid connections that it was difficult to imagine that these communal relations would ever exist (see endnote 2 for further reference). This highly-(self)organized sense of community, emerging in response to COVID-19 in early 2020, came on time for the moment of protests, literally erupting into a network of self-organization and self-help across the neighbourhoods – dvory and microraiony. What came forth is the incredible tenacity, resolve, determination, and most of all the creativity of the Belarusians, who peacefully stood up to the pain, abuse, injustice, and violation of dignity, unleashed by the Belarusian authorities in an effort to thwart the revolt and restore previous order. What has emerged, through the simmering desire for a “good life”, and a myriad of hitherto hidden and newly formed community relations, “the bonds and networks”, is “this new sense of meaningfulness – as well as a shared experience of living through grief and pain” that “cannot be undone in Belarus” (Minchenia and Husakouskaya 2020), or what is referred to in this chapter as the moment of becoming “peoplehood”. In a short space of time – several months – this moment of “becoming peoplehood” not just simply brought people together in their resistance to violence; it has changed them into a qualitatively new community, including their understanding of their own fragilities and ways to address them through shared perceptions of life, and banishing fear bringing out a new “we-feeling” of “togetherness”, solidarity and collectivity, and constructing a new political identity that “encompasses diverse political ideals, visions of a new Belarus … and, importantly, community identity” (Ibid). This was clearly not in terms of the civil unrest, democracy-building effort, or “the awakening of the nation”, “but in terms of people coming together in times of great uncertainty, horrendous state violence, and the sense of urgency, solidarity and mutual aid” (Ibid; see also Kazharski 2021). Two years on from the 9 August 2020 election, at the time of writing this chapter, the moment of peoplehood as a qualitatively different community of relations is still experiencing the ongoing transformation – that is, as a moment of self-organization without any central authority to drive it. The sense of togetherness, accelerated through digital communication and breaking the boundary of silence; the pain and grief that have been growing into an

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enormous burden that only a peoplehood could carry; or “Mury” (walls), the song that became so motivational – all these things together suddenly came out into the open, turning these resilient people into a truly transformational and transformative force. In sum, what has occurred in Belarus through the processes of emergence, is essential for our understanding of the nature of transformation of the Belarusian society. While it may still not be feasible in terms of regime change or new political structures, people in Belarus, even under the pressure of state repression, feel different and more self-aware, and those processes of separation, alignment, and cohesion, manifesting themselves through peoplehood, may have gone underground, but they did not vanish or being wasted. The new generation of Belarusians feel this change, and for now these hidden relations of community might contribute to reinforcing the self-organization dynamics in building a new Belarus.

Conclusion This chapter asked how we could capture the processes of bottom-up societal self-organisation that became a characteristic feature of political protests after the August 2020 election. Many observers noticed this social trend, which was unprecedented in the history of Belarus, and yet the question of how a previously atomized, disconnected, and politically apathetic society managed to self-organise in such a short space of time, into a powerful force capable of collective action, remained unaddressed. Building on the insights from the natural sciences literature on emergent processes, we analytically differentiated their three organizing principles – of separation, alignment, and cohesion. Rather than focusing on official institutions or other fixtures, we argue that understanding societal dynamics based on these principles allows us to capture and expose these hidden processes of selforganization. In particular, the principle of separation implies self-realization/ distinction of oneself from the other, being capable of actorness. The principle of alignment explains how people adjust their actions to those of others in the community to facilitate join dynamics. The principle of cohesion means the development of common rules within a community that brings its members together and creates a sense of common purpose and identity. Taken together, these processes result in the multiple streams of collective action observed in Belarus in the post-2020 months, and even more so in the emergence of peoplehood as an organized yet peaceful transformative force which has its presence and effect on the society two years on, clearly positing the year of 2020 as a watershed moment of becoming a collective force. Building on the analysis of principles of self-organization, the emergence perspective helps us to fill the knowledge gap in relation to the hidden grassroots social dynamics that often remains unaccounted for, while playing a crucial role in the transformation of the societal fabric. This chapter thus contributes to the literature on popular protest, democracy- and identity-building

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by explaining the principles that underpin the processes of societal emergence as a transformative political force.

Notes 1 For more information see www​.sympa​-by​.eu​/bipart​/research (accessed 28 July 2022). See research conducted by the Centre of European Transformation in Belarus, in particular, “New groups and the social structure of Belarusian society” (May 2021); monitoring of “Local telegram-chats” (summer–autumn 2020 and November–December 2020) and “Voices of the streets” (August–September 2020 weekly monitoring). For more information visit https://cet​.eurobelarus​.info​/ru​/library​/publication/​?themaLibraryID​=1. The evidence of societal transformation and the emergence of new groups is further corroborated by online survey of the adult population in Belarus aged between 16 and 64 conducted by ZOIS in December 2020: https://en​.zois​-berlin​.de​/publications​/belarus​-at​-a​-crossroads​-attitudes​-on​-social​-and​-political​-change. 2 For more information see Egorov and Shelest’s 2020 research report ‘Belarus in the situation of the pandemic’, available at https://cet​.eurobelarus​.info​/ru​/library​/publication​ /2020​/12​/20​/belarus​-v​-situatsii​-epidemii​-covid​-19​-harakter​-reaktsii​-na​.html (accessed in January 2022), and Gerry and Neumann’s chapter in this volume. 3 Focus groups were conducted under the GCRF COMPASS project (ES/P010849/1), during May–June 2019 and in November 2020. The initial six focus groups were conducted in all regional centres of Belarus, including Brest, Gomel, Grodno, Minsk, Mogilev and Vitebsk. Each focus group involved up to 11 participants, totalling 54 respondents who took part in the focus groups representing all the socio-demographic groups (by gender, age and level of education) in equal proportions. The obtained data provided an opportunity to consider the state of the Belarusian society on the eve of the turbulent events examined below, to study the elements of fragilities and resilience experienced in the country to date.

References Babayev A. and Abushov, K. (2022) ‘The Azerbaijani resilient society: Explaining the multifaceted aspects of people’s social solidarity.’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 35(2): 210–234. doi:10.1080/09557571.2021.2020214. Bekus, N. (2010) Struggle over Identity: The Official and the Alternative “Belarusianness”. Budapest: Central European University Press. Bekus, N. (2014) ‘Ethnic identity in post-Soviet Belarus: Ethnolinguistic survival as an argument in the political struggle.’ Journal of Multilingual and Multicultural Development 35(1): 43–58. doi:10.1080/01434 632.2013.845197. Bekus, N. (2021) ‘Echo of 1989? Protest Imaginaries and Identity Dilemmas in Belarus.’ Slavic Review 80(1): 1–14. Bekus, N. (2022) ‘Reassembling society in a nation-state: History, language, and identity discourses of Belarus.’ Nationalities Papers. Advanced online publication: 1–16. doi:10.1017/nps.2022.60. Belarusian Institute for Public Administration Reform and Transformation, BIPART (2021) Civil Society in Belarus in the Context of a Political Crisis: Current State and Challenges. Available at: https://sympa​-by​.eu​/sites​/default​/files​/library​/needs​ _assessment ​ _ full ​ _ survey ​ _ full ​ _ version ​ _ eng ​ . pdf ​ ? fbclid ​ = IwA ​ R 1Fs ​ Y ElW ​ y OUu​ W7WKFdD​-ogHL9h11F8Hn2pAM​_oR9​yTPr​564l​dBnt​N8nShE (Accessed on 28 July 2022).

Self-Organization in Belarus Post-2020  159 Buhr, R., Shadurski, V. and Hoffman, S. (2011) ‘Belarus: An emerging civic nation?’ Nationalities Papers 39(3): 425–440. doi:10.1080/00905992.2011.565319. Chandler, D. (2022) ‘Decolonising resilience: Reading Glissant’s poetics of relation in central Eurasia.’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 35(2): 158–175. doi:10.1080/0 9557571.2021.1944984. Cianetti, L. and Hanley S. (2021) ‘The end of the backsliding paradigm.’ Journal of Democracy 32(1): 66–80. doi:10.1353/jod.2021.0001. Douglas, N. (2020) ‘Belarus: from the old social contract to new social identity.’ (Issue 6). Available at: https://en​.zois​-berlin​.de​/fileadmin​/media​/Dateien​/3​-Publikationen​/ ZOiS​_Reports​/2020/ ZOiS​_Report​_6​_2020​​.pdf (Accessed on 28 July 2022). Gapova, E. (2021) ‘Class, agency, and citizenship in Belarusian protest.’ Slavic Review, 80(1): 45–51. Ioffe, G. (2003) ‘Understanding Belarus: Belarussian identity.’ Europe-Asia Studies 55(8): 1241–1272. doi:10.1080/0966813032000141105. Kazharski, A. (2021) ‘Belarus’ new political nation? 2020 anti-authoritarian protests as identity-building.’ New Perspectives 29(1): 69–79. doi:10.1177/2336 825X20984340. Korosteleva, E. and Petrova, I. (2022) ‘What makes communities resilient in times of complexity and change?’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 35(2): 137–157. doi:10. 1080/09557571.2021.2024145. Krawatzek, F. and Langbein, J. (2022) ‘Attitudes towards democracy and the market in Belarus: What has changed and why it matters.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 38(1–2): 107–124. doi: 10.1080/1060586X.2022.2029034. Kryzhanovskaya, E. (2020) ‘Commentary: Europe should talk about Belarus with Putin, not Lukashenko.’ Deutsche Welle. Available at: https://www​.dw​.com​/ru​/o​-belarusi​-evropa​ -dolzhna​-govoritne​-s​-lukashenko​-a​-s​-putinym​/a​-54612819 (Accessed on 28 July 2022). Kurki, M. (2020) International Relations in a Relational Universe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Kulakevich, T. and Augsburger, A. (2021) ‘Contested elections, protest, and regime stability: Comparing Belarus and Bolivia.’ Canadian Slavonic Papers, 63(3–4): 316–337. doi:10.10 80/00085006.2021.1991744. Levitsky, S. and Way, L. (2012) Competitive Authoritarianism: Hybrid Regimes after the Cold War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Mateo, E. (2022) ‘“All of Belarus has come out onto the streets”: Exploring nationwide protest and the role of pre-existing social networks.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 38(1–2): 26–42. doi:10.1080/1060586X.2022.2026127. Minchenia, A. and Husakouskaya, N. (2020, November 19). ‘For many people in Belarus, change has already happened.’ Opendemocracy. Available at: https://www​. opendemocracy​.net​/en​/odr/many-​peopl​e-bel​arus-​chang​e-has​-alre​ady-h​appen​ed/ (Accessed on 28 July 2022) Moshes, A. and Nizhnikau, R. (2021) ‘The Belarusian revolution: Sources, interim outcomes, and lessons to be learned.’ Demokratizatsiya: The Journal of Post-Soviet Democratization 29 (2): 159–182. Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights, Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe. (2020) ‘ODIHR gravely concerned at situation in Belarus following presidential election.’ Available at: https://www​.osce​.org​/odihr​/belarus​ /459664 (Accessed on 28 July 2022). Petrova, I. and Korosteleva, E. (2021) ‘Societal fragilities and resilience: The emergence of peoplehood in Belarus.’ Journal of Eurasian Studies 12(2): 122–132, doi:10.1177/18793665211037835.

160  Fostering Peoplehood Postimees. (2020). ‘We are not ovtsi, bydlo and narodets: How factory workers protest in Belarus.’ Available at: https://rus.postimees.ee/70​40005​/my-n​e-ovc​y-ne-​bydlo​-ne-n​ arode​c-kak​-v-be​larus​i-pro​testu​yut-r​abotn​iki-z​avodo​v (Accessed on 28 July 2022). Reynolds, C. (1987) ‘Flocks, herds and schools: A distributed behavioral model.’ In SIGGRAPH ’87: Proceedings of the 14th Annual Conference on Computer Graphics and Interactive Techniques. Association for Computing Machinery, 25–34. doi:10.1145/37401.37406.

11 Activating and Negotiating Women’s Citizenship in the 2020 Belarusian Uprising Elena Gapova

Introduction From the very beginning, women’s agentic participation has been one ­defining feature of the 2020 Belarusian nationwide mobilization, sometimes metaphorized as “a revolution with a female face” in a clear reference to The Unwomanly Face of War by the Nobel Laureate Sviatlana Alexievich. Women were at the forefront of the uprising as its (real and symbolic) leaders and in the trenches as its foot soldiers, and some commentators celebrated the phenomenon as lived feminism based on sisterhood and solidarity (Shparaga 2021), while others pointed at the use of gendered/feminized imagery that invoked heteropatriarchal values (Fein 2020). The intention of this chapter is to put women’s agency into the context of the general Belarusian mobilization for social change while exploring the following questions: from what kind of social anxiety did women’s mobilization result? What were women seeking to achieve? Why does it matter that most women were not rising up under feminist slogans? If women’s activism and broader mobilization for social change were intertwined, how can one account for the use of gendered symbolism? On contemplating political solidarity across the line of gender, it can be argued that the Belarusian protesters were seeking “actual citizenship,” a different kind of relationship with the state which would ensure actually partaking in power and decision-making. Women took to the streets within the nationwide struggle against the oppressive regime as “equal citizens”; at the same time, they were rising in their capacity as women. This claim draws from the insights made by Judith Butler (1990) who argues that gender is performative: it is realized through its own making in mundane daily exchanges. Thus, while most Belarusian women went out with general anti-authoritarian goals in view, they still protested “as women.” In other words, they enacted, mostly, established protocols with which gender is performed and tended to rely on culturally established patterns of gender. The Belarusian uprising, an outstanding case of mobilization in the summer of 2020, was telegrammed and televised, tweeted, facebooked, and mediated in all other possible ways. Thus, this analysis draws on the first-hand material and accounts of protest activism presented in social media (Telegram, DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-14

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Facebook, and YouTube), protest reportage by popular media (tut​.b​y, Nasha niva, news platforms and FB groups), and citizen journalism. This chapter also benefits from multiple conversations (on Zoom and other messaging platforms) with protesters and experts and from previous research by the author on the Belarusian uprising (Gapova 2021). The chapter begins with a factual account of women’s involvement in the events of 2020 and then moves to offer a glimpse into the social base of antiauthoritarian protests and considerations of gendered citizenship. Eventually, the focus shifts to the case of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, an “ordinary housewife” turned political actor, as a proxy for emerging women’s political subjectivity.

Women’s Mobilization in Three Acts Women’s involvement in the Belarussian uprising can be structured chronologically into three “acts”; each of them showcasing a specific role that women performed as collective agents pushing for social change. Act 1: Female Leaders Take Over

The 2020 Belarusian presidential elections became international news on July 16, three weeks before election day, when Maryia Kalesnikava, the presidential campaign manager for Viktar Babaryka, a former bank CEO and cultural entrepreneur; Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, the wife of Siarhei Tsikhanousky, a subversive “social” blogger and another contender; and Veranika Tsapkala, the wife and campaign manager of Valery Tsapkala, a former IT Park general manager, announced they were joining forces after two male presidential candidates had been arrested and one had to leave the country. A photo of three young women raising their hands in gestures of resistance – a fist, a heart, and a V-sign (Figure 11.1) – looked as if it was purposefully created for the global media market and soon became a meme (Figure 11.2). The whole situation, however, echoes an episode in the history of the Polish Solidarity movement when, during martial law in December 1981, several thousand male activists had been arrested and women became instrumental in the functioning of the trade union (Penn 2005). In a similar way, repressions against male candidates in Belarus created an opportunity structure for women, as scholars of social movements call the removal of exogenous factors which limit social actors (Tarrow 1998). Women are rarely viewed as significant political contenders, and Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, “an ordinary housewife” in the eyes of the regime strategists, who had collected hundreds of thousands of signatures in her favour, was allowed to get on the ballot running “instead” of her jailed husband. Maryia and Veranika contributed their courage, willpower, minuscule budgets, and organizational resources to stand with the united democratic candidate. For once, women were carrying out leading rather than traditional roles, and the nation accepted the transformation enthusiastically.

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Figure 11.1 Tsapkala, Tsikhanouskaya, and Kalesnikava announce a joint campaign on July 16, 2020. Photo by Vasily Fedasenka

Figure 11.2 A popular logo by Antanina Slabodchikava based on the image in Figure 11.1

Act 2: A Turning Point

Fast forward to the immediate post-election days of “blinking” internet, police brutality, misinformation on government-controlled TV, radio and print media, and scattered attempts of resistance, as voters were beginning to contest

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the numbers that the (female-headed) Central Election Committee was feeding them.1 This violent period of detentions, riot police in the streets and residential areas, and rumours of the horrendous torture of protesters in Minsk prisons came to an end on the third day of the unrest, as two hundred “women in white” with flowers in their hands went out to form the first solidarity chain (a human line) in downtown Minsk (Figure 11.3). The idea of this symbolic act of non-violent resistance emerged in a women’s internet chat, and a female activist and an art curator advised on how to “stage” the performance and invited journalists to broadcast it. The act was made radical by its political timing – the moment of national tension and urgency – and can be seen as an “intervention” (Bishop 2012): it was unexpected and had an element of secrecy and surprise; it was unauthorized and risky (no one could know the cost of participation), and it created an impact through the use of common objects (white apparel and flowers). Relying on the established gendered symbolism of women as the guardians of peace and mercy, it created a strong visual message by the “opposition” of the women in white to “men in black,” such as the riot police (Ousmanova 2020). The mode of distribution involved new media, and very soon the event was on most screens in the country and internationally. The intervention proved so powerful as to shift the dynamic of mobilization, as hundreds of thousands of people of all ages and social backgrounds poured into the streets all over the country to form solidarity chains, wave white-red-white flags, chant, and march demanding an end to police brutality, the release of political prisoners, and fair elections. At one emotional moment, the riot police who were

Figure 11.3 “Women in White” in Minsk. Photo by Pavel Martinchyk

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guarding government buildings in the capital city lowered their shields to signal that they were abstaining from the of use force, and several young women rushed, in an impulsive act of “fraternization” (or sisterhood?), to hug and even kiss them. It seemed that the revolution had won, but this was just the beginning of actual mass mobilization. Act 3: Mass Mobilization and Gendered Performance

At a time of great civic contentions, as was demonstrated powerfully in 2020 by both the Belarusian uprising and the Black Lives Matter rallies in the US, people resort to the power of “bodily gathering.” According to Judith Butler, assemblies epitomize the very essence of the political, for “bodies in their plurality lay claim to the public” (Butler 2015: 71). It is essential for a bodily enactment to be plural. Throughout the period of mass mobilization, as protesters were contesting electoral fraud, their collective action repertoire included populous marches, street performances, concerts, flash mobs, petition drives, teach-ins, community festivals, subversive graffiti, hanging out flags and posters, internet campaigning and whatever peaceful forms of civic disagreement one can possibly think of. Women and men participated in the mobilization side by side; at the same time, their protest performance could be overtly gendered. First, men were active in painting graffiti and hanging out handmade posters and flags from bridges and tall structures, and female activists were very creative in using their bodies to articulate resistance. Relying on the established political semantics of red and white (that derives from the red-and-white national flag), they used these colours in their outfits, hair, and personal objects, to send a message (Figure 11.4; faces of protestors in this chapter are blurred to protect participants' identities, as manyprotesters have been arrested and persecuted on the basis of images used in themedia and other publications). With time, authorities began persecuting the use of red and white not only in dress but also as window curtains or in any other form as political practice and illegal picketing. Second, still in August, female activists came up with the idea of all-women marches, and younger women self-organized (via chats) to come into the streets of the capital city every Saturday (while Sundays were reserved for non-gendered mass rallies). At the first march on August 29, younger protesters obviously enjoyed shaming and trolling riot police chanting Vam nikto ne dast! (no one is going to put out for you), thus invoking the “sex threat” that the ancient Greek Lysistrata used to make men stop all wars and humiliate the riot police as males. Some women carried posters that worded the demands of Lukashenka’s resignation along the lines of a woman rejecting a man: “Go away! This is the end of an affair between you and me, and I don’t want you anymore!” Third, throughout the period of mass mobilization women used gendered messages that re-enacted their moral agency and power based on traditional roles. Resorting to motherhood, one of the most powerful images

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Figure 11.4 A female protester in Minsk. August 2020. Author unknown

in all cultures, was especially common; the celebration of the beauty and moral worth of Belarusian women was another recurring theme. For example, one poster read “I am rising up because of my granddaughters Tanechka and Sashen’ka.” Another one addressed those in law enforcement: “You tortured my son at Akrestina (prison). How are you now going to stop me, his mother?!” (Figures 11.5, 11.6). Those appeals were found to be “patriarchal” by some feminist ideologists. Several times, at climatic moments individual women resorted to highly gendered gestures and bodily postures, such as going to their knees in front of armed police to plead non-violence. This is not to say that women

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Figure 11.5 “You tortured my son at Akrestina [prison]. How are you now going to stop me, his mother?!”

overwhelmingly resorted to gendered messages: in one video, a female protester carried a poster with the May-68’s slogan “Structures don’t take to the streets!” Initially, security forces on the ground were hesitant about targeting women as severely as men, for gendered taboos persist in all cultures, and assaulting women physically would be very bad publicity anywhere. Having become aware of their somewhat milder treatment by siloviki (security forces), women sometimes formed chains to shield men from the police, but that trick only worked for a while. Female protesters were attacked, beaten, and, probably,

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Figure 11.6 The handmade poster reads: “I am rising up because of my granddaughters Tanechka and Sashen’ka.” Minsk, October 2020. Author unknown

assaulted, but generally women suffered less direct physical violence, but had threats of physical and sexual violence when arrested. Fourth, scattered feminist slogans and groups were a part of the protest scene. Feistier ones celebrated girl power, while most targeted, in their posters and chants, the patriarchy which, they believed, was at the basis of an undemocratic political order in the country. Proceeding from the assumption that Lukashenka was a paradigmatic male abuser assaulting the womannation, feminists viewed the uprising as a step in bringing an end to patriarchy in general (Figure 11.7). However, the feminist vocabulary seemed confined to the capital city where most feminist NGOs were situated. Of the three female leaders, only Kalesnikava identified herself as a feminist. When arrested in September of 2020, she ripped up her passport to prevent herself from being deported from the country; she was accused of the intention to usurp state power and of being a threat to national security and was sentenced to 11 years in prison. According to her lawyer, she refused to plead for clemency.

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Figure 11.7 A feminist anti-patriarchy poster at a rally. Author unknown. A photo posted on NEXTA Telegram channel that was instrumental in protest organizing

Mass street protests lasted for about four months and were eventually crushed with extreme violence, repressions against activists and their families, arrests, loss of employment, threats of putting one’s children in foster care, long prison sentences, and even several deaths, as the regime made a strategic decision to make resistance costly. According to human rights organizations, more than 40,000 people were detained for their participation in protests; at the time of writing, arrests and persecution continue. Of more than 1,200 political prisoners, women make up around 10 per cent.

Deconstructing the Protest An unprecedented mobilization of which women were an integral part resulted from a “social anxiety” that had been developing in Belarusian society for some time. While some immediate triggers that pushed forward situational forms of civic activism and solidarity contributed to the dynamic,2 it was foundational structural framing that made those triggers ignite. Making sense of it comes down to understanding who the protesters were, sociologically speaking, and what their grievances against the regime might have been. With over one million people of various social backgrounds participating in the mass mobilization, it was geographically dispersed: 19 localities went into the streets on the first day of mass unrest, and at least 100 towns with a population of over 5,000 in the first week, with a little more intensity in the West of the country (Mateo 2022). It is remarkable that the share of those who were between the ages of 18 and 29 – 20 per cent – was equal to those who were

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older than 55; at some point, the latter group initiated their own rallies of senior citizens (with women prevailing in them). Most participants were Russian speakers, their educational levels being higher than in the population in general (Vardomatsky 2021). The driving force of the protest mobilization was urban “Russian-speaking intelligentsia and new groups: teachers, university professors, creative types, cultural and media professionals, and a lot of people from the information technology (IT) sector” (Shelest 2020). This group could identify best with the potential candidates, who, for the first time in many years, were successful professionals and public figures, educated and witty, rather than the all-too-familiar oppositional activists who had been preaching national culture and human rights for years. The question is, however, how to theorize a group that embraces a bank CEO and a precarious artist. An obvious temptation would be to cautiously invoke “new class” theory and consider whether it can be adapted to the peculiar reality of Belarusian state capitalism. The concept of the “new class” that was introduced by sociologists in response to the rise of managerial and expert elites in the early twentieth century has been adapted, in post-industrial society, to embrace social divisions, privilege, and exclusion based on non-economic distinctions. These can be produced through cultural outlooks and implicated in the modes of exclusion and/or domination created by the various forms of capital and even the power of discourse (Botero 2004). With the transition of post-socialist societies to global capitalist economies, “new class” formations, alongside regular economic inequality, have been crystallizing there (King and Szelenyi 2004). Applying this reasoning to the Belarusian case can, with certain reservations, make sense. Most protesters, urban skilled professionals immersed in post-industrial service and information economies, use their intellectual, cultural, and educational capitals to sustain livelihood and privilege. Two groups stood out among the agents of mobilization. On the one hand, those were itishniks (employed in the Belarusian IT sector), as for some time Belarus has praised itself as an “IT-nation.” The beginnings of this success story go back to the Cold War, when the Soviet government had invested heavily in defence research and development (R&D) and STEM education. After socialism, a critical mass of highly trained engineers as well as an East-West pay differential made Belarus, among some other places, an attractive outsourcing destination for Western high-tech companies. In the early 2000s, the Belarusian IT sector was boosted with tax breaks and special preferences; currently, it makes 5.6 per cent of the Belarusian GDP and almost fifteen per cent of all new jobs (National Statistics 2020), with, for example, EPAM Systems, which trades on the NY Stock Exchange. IT professionals, a prominent group due to their grasp of expert and economic capitals, are united by their unique relationship to the technological base of the contemporary global economy of which they have been clear beneficiaries. The second important faction of mobilization activists is an educated precariat who gets their sustenance from the global media market or ad hoc projects

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coming their way through international ecological, human rights, or feminist informational networks. Their employment depends on their inclusion in project-based networking, independent content production based on one’s own resourcefulness, and making oneself “interesting.” It is certainly tempting to suggest that the Belarusian political divide follows the line between those making a living from post-industrial service and creative economy and those who are employed in manufacturing or the state sector. The reality, however, is more nuanced. Belarus has retained its “industrial giants,” which date back to the Soviet period and currently produce for the Russian market, and industrial workers made about 21 per cent of street protesters during the first week. While they might have been triggered by police brutality, various forms of protest organizing were registered at 89 enterprises, which is the biggest industrial workers’ mobilization in the post-Soviet region since 1991 (Artiukh 2021). Belarusian big enterprises are state-owned and “burdened” with important social support functions, and workers’ activism subsided due to the risks of job loss and persecution which are much higher than in the post-industrial information economy, but the very fact of their participation is important for making sense of the social cleavages from which the unrest emerged. Clearly, the dividing line in the Belarusian revolution is not between occupational groups (although they matter) but rather they separate two “megaclasses” produced by a peculiar post-Soviet state capitalism. On the one side are those who are included in “the system,” and on the other those “outside the system” (Pastukhov 2020). For example, a driver for a high-rank state bureaucrat would be “included,” while an entrepreneur with no government connections is excluded (constantly under threat of persecution on arbitrary charges should the person seem “nonconforming” in any way). Those inside the “system” collectively control the state, have access to wrangling public money, and are the beneficiaries of state capitalism. The “system” also controls how the law is to be applied (or not applied) in its interests, and formulates and imposes “state ideology,” a loose doctrine of patriotism and loyalty to the government (or, rather, the president)3 that is taught in schools and universities and promoted by state-run media and art. This explains why doctors (employed in the state sector but having no access to assets control and aware of the scale of police violence) supported the protests on par with petty entrepreneurs and loosely employed creative types. At the same time, state bureaucrats, university administrators, local government officials, and performers in government-sponsored “show business,” who get their sustenance from propagandistic programming on state TV were on the opposite side. If one considers professional competencies only, all artistic types should be in the same class; in reality, they belong to different resource groups, follow different aesthetic principles and appeal to very different audiences. The ultimate “owner” of this nation-state corporation is the president, who relies on masculinist institutions: the military and security forces. In Gramscian terms, he dominates without hegemony or legitimizing recognition.

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Anti-Authoritarian Uprising and Political Subjectivity On many days, theBelarusian uprising looked like a colourful festival, as Catholics (signing psalms), feminists and LGBT activists, indie musicians, ordinary citizens, groups of professionals, and activists of all “shapes” and orientations could be seen marching side by side. Making sense of what could unite this diverse spectrum in their revolutionary fervour can also help with understanding the constitution of women’s political subjectivity. Importantly, a discussion of “political platforms” would hardly shed enough light on the issue: intuitively clear to both sides, these were not really debated, for the real focus was on candidates’ personalities and backgrounds. Rather, it makes sense to rely on cultural evidence: slogans, posters, performances, videos of workers confronting their managers, discussion logs on social media, and so on. To generalize, the protesters wanted “change” (peremen). The appeal that comes from a famous song by the late legendary Soviet rock singer Victor Tsoy and which became a symbol of social change during perestroika, was featured on posters and walls; it was chanted by protesters and sung by musicians. The essence of that change that everyone desired was “to be called human” (ludzmi zvattsya). This phrase derives from another work of art, this time a poem by the canonical Belarusian writer Yanka Kupala that is familiar to everyone from their middle school days. The line was used regularly by workers confronting their top managers at the “Grodna-Azot” chemical plant, at potassium mines in Salihorsk or when speaking with the Head of the (token) Parliamentary Commission on Human Rights. It is astounding how often protesters resorted to the vocabulary of dignity and worth. At one climatic moment, women-philosophers performed a public reading of John Locke’s tract on liberty, and the words “Men being … by nature, all free, equal and independent, no one can be … subjected to the political power of another…” were ringing over a downtown plaza. The workers of the Minsk Tractor Works who were marching in an impressive formation towards the House of Government on 16 August 2020 carried a street-wide poster that read “We are no cattle” (meaning “we are human beings”). In Grodna, a foreman speaking on behalf of his team explained to the city mayor: at this moment, we are not putting forward any demands of raising wages or providing us with adequate work gear, but rather we want to be treated with respect.4 Dignity has been a charged and historically changing concept, so what kind of change in the social contract would it take for the protesters to feel that they have their dignity? Belarusian sociologist Oksana Shelest who was able to interview multiple protesters, from preschool teachers to highly skilled professionals, argues that most of them listed the impossibility of personal and professional development, the curtailing of their life project as their main grievance against the regime (Shelest 2021). For them, “dignity” stood for agency, being able to realize one’s will as a way of reaching autonomy and being recognized as an “agent” by others. For months, protesters marched in rallies, campaigned for political prisoners and collected money for the persecuted; they volunteered at prison gates, organized community events with poets, musicians, and intellectuals in their residential quarters; painted subversive graffiti; hung up

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protest flags, wore protest symbols on their clothing and made statements with women’s underwear in “political colours” on the clothes lines of their balconies; were engaged in public advocacy and awareness-raising and so on. Itishniks organized several hackathons and created internet platforms which became instrumental in proving election fraud with actual numbers. Those who were in Silicon Valley in the US organized the Belarusian Solidarity Fund (BySol) to which anyone could contribute, and which intended to provide financial assistance to “anyone who was repressed, persecuted, or lost their jobs”.5 Such everyday activities foster identity formation: performing them makes you who you are, and protesters insisted that they were doing all this of their own free will. A friend expressed the connection between being and doing best in her Facebook post in October 2020, as she wrote: “The old opposition [i.e. before 2020] was trying to give us back our rights, but the new one has given us back to ourselves. They said: ‘You know what you need to do. Go and do it.’”6 When acting of their own volition, and performing peaceful, but public acts of resistance protesters were achieving self-awareness and becoming “themselves,” that is, who they believe they are. This signification has a political dimension, as it is related to political subjectivity and the category of citizenship, which implies one’s status vis-à-vis a political and legal relationship to the state. Sociologists Uladzimir Ishchanka and Aleg Zhurauleu, a Russian and Ukrainian, argue in their paper that “postSoviet revolutions have been responses to a severe crisis of political representation,” that is, to the diminishing capacity of ruling elites to successfully claim representation of the interests of broader social groups and even less so of the whole nation (Ishchenko 2021). Citizenship implies autonomy and recognition of a person as a member of a polity and an equal partner. This quest for a recognition of one’s voice and rights can be exemplified by the case of Vadzim Prakopieu, a famous Belarusian restauranteur and public figure. Having left the country before the elections, he has been contributing to the protests through regular “consciousness raising” videos on YouTube. In particular, he virtually confronted Aliaksandr Lukashenka with political demands, shamed him for the use of violence against peaceful protesters, including women, called him an unmanly loser (“you lost!”), and challenged him to a dual, speaking against the backdrop of a punching bag.7 Every video had more than a million and a half views, thus allowing the speaker to regain his full voice while striving to be heard by the nation and, most of all, by the addressee and, thus, to be recognized as an equal partner, “a citizen.” It is important that he belongs to a new business class whose members get their sustenance from the market and are interested in clear and transparent rules that would be the same for all economic actors. A fair election means that rules are transparent and observed, while class is formed as it comes together in its own making: group signification was taking place in the process of struggle for signification (Tsoneva 2019) and recognition. The focus of the Belarusian anti-authoritarian revolution has been on a new social contract between the state and the citizens. In that new liberal contract, citizens – ideally, at least – would partake of power and thus realize their autonomy.

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Women as Political Agents: The Entanglements of Public and Private Belarusian women’s quest for citizenship and recognition has been complex because of their gendered status. Throughout human history, citizenship has been classed and gendered, and Prakopieu’s standoff against Lukashenka is very telling in this respect: his is a gendered performance with one “alpha male” challenging another. Still, he is perceived as standing for a cause, for, starting with Aristotle, citizenship was considered a male privilege par excellence. Citizenship derived from supposedly male traits like “virtue friendship,” a special bonding based on human nature, which, the philosopher believed, women and slaves lacked. Performing his “strong male” drama, Prakopieu was still perceived as a political actor participating in the struggle. Not so with women, as their “female traits” or “women’s priorities”, if revealed, would instead distance them from claiming public causes. The case of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya who became involved in politics after her husband was arrested on false charges and she decided to run “in his place” (pushed, as some argued, by private concerns rather than public and abstract interest), encompasses this complexity and the underpinnings of women’s coming into agency. In fact, in her early interviews as a candidate, she explained, quite simply and sincerely, that her real wish was “to have my husband and kids and make dinner for them,”8 i.e. to live an ordinary life.9 These statements caused a stir both in political circles and among feminists who might have expected a “manifesto” from a female candidate, and some accused Tsikhanouskaya of strengthening the confines of patriarchal domination. Lukashenka, who has had a “good-natured” sexist record and who positions himself as a father to the nation,10 suggested, only half-jokingly, to change the Constitution by adding a requirement that anyone running for presidency should have some experience of military service, which, of course, makes only men eligible. He also noted that Belarusian society was not “ripe” enough to elect a woman, and that a female, being “weak” by nature, would struggle to cope with presidential duties. Social media, however, reacted immediately, as the internet, which allows connectivity and mobilization to an unprecedented degree, has contributed to a certain “feminization of the public sphere” through online and offline discussions, debates, and commentaries on women’s rights or state policies (Gheytanchi and Moghadan 2014). Thus, a joint online “women’s voice” came up with another amendment: why not have a requirement that only those who have given birth (te, kto rozhali) have the right to run for the presidency? This exchange may look comic, but, in fact, it invokes a classical (and still not completely resolved) opposition between the private (reproductive work) and public (e.g. market participation or government service). In early modernity, women’s reproductive “duties” and accompanying alleged “character traits” were declared the reason for their exclusion from citizenship by Enlightenment thinkers. Denis Diderot and other thinkers argued that women

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did not possess the qualities of autonomous subjects necessary for being citizens: they were irrational, unable to grasp the concept of objectivity or to place the general will above their private interests, and incapable of impartial judgment, responsibility, and self-representation (Young 1987). The work of social reproduction is traditionally done by women in the private sphere and, importantly, out of love (and for free), while public service is a prerogative of men who perform it (ideally) for general or abstract reasons of public good and are usually paid for it. Although in most nations women have been granted citizenship with their political rights, this gendered opposition of public vs. private as male vs. female has persisted symbolically and in a particular vision of social policy and justice. It remains at the core of an ongoing global debate about gender equality. Tsikhanouskaya public statements can be analyzed within the framework of this relationship between public and private, as she argued her cause from a particular position that shaped her argument. Hers is a case of someone who proceeds from one’s personal and private situation and concerns and transforms them into a “precondition” for public action. Having been registered as a candidate, she virtually addressed her jailed husband saying: “Serezha, I love you very much. I am doing this for you and for all those people who followed you and believed in you.”11 When asked about her programme, Tsikhanouskaya replied: “I am not a politician, and I don’t know how to run a country. I am a ‘technical’ candidate. I want to win so we can have fair elections with other candidates participating.”12 Put differently, she stated her goal as giving a voice to those who were devoid of it in the current system, thus asserting the priority of an objective principle. Her speech on state TV as a candidate expanded this line, as she stated: My name is Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya. I am thirty-seven years old. I was educated as a teacher and a philologist. I worked as a secretary and a translator, and I can speak Belarusian, Russian, and English. I am not a politician, it is my husband, Siarhei Tsikhanousky, who was going to run for the presidency, and that is why he is currently in jail… I, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya, am running for the President of Belarus to bring change and to hold new, open, fair elections after August 9th. (Tsikhanouskaya 2020) Declaring her status as that of a wife and an ordinary person who “does not know how to run a country”, Tsikhanouskaya does not become “particularistic”. Quite the opposite: she asserts her citizenship which – in principle – includes all members of the polity, whatever their personal circumstances are, through a performative utterance which brings what it states into being (Austin 1962). Her TV speech as a candidate begins with a strong statement by a (female) citizen, who introduces herself and thus asserts her responsibility for the claims she is going to make as she rises against a system devoid of abstract

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and impersonal rules. What she stands for, however, is a universalist principle (“new and fair elections”) which, ideally, would give a voice to the citizens. Most importantly, Tsikhanouskaya comes into the agency as she rises up on behalf of other citizens in her capacity as a woman and thus transforms the mundane turning personal into political. In this context, the debatable issue of women re-enacting “heteropatriarchal” imagery and appealing to traditional roles can be understood differently. Women rise as citizens and assert their agency by being in the streets on par with men. At the same time, to assert themselves, they make use of those instruments that are available to them in their culture, for agency is not simply a synonym for resistance to relations based on domination. It is the capacity for action enabled by specific relations based on subordination, which may require playfully engaging with entrenched stereotypical gender roles within an existing social and cultural context (Paulovich 2021: 43). All societies are gendered, although somewhat differently, which is why every culture has its own hetero(patriarchal) tropes. Being agentic, women often make use of prêt-à-porter cultural elements which serve as power metaphors. To give an example: in the American movie G.I. Jane (1997) the main character played by Demi Moore snaps at a man doubting her resilience as a Navy seal in training: “Suck my ***!” An anatomical woman, she still picks a gendered trope that stands for power within the male culture of the military of which she happens to be a part. As individuals rise against what they see as injustice from their particular positions they “activate” “their civic identities, initiatives, and the awareness of freedom and dignity” (Phillips 2014: 241). When participating in the struggle for fair elections and citizenship, Belarusian women acted as autonomous individuals while resorting, at times, to those tropes through which they could reach their goals of making themselves heard and thus subvert the traditional power structure.

Conclusion Women’s participation in the 2020 protests in Belarus has been deeply intertwined with a larger social movement for socio-political change and a different social contract. This is not to say that liberal citizenship which is at the centre of this contract is not a problematic category, for autonomy is very much a partner concept to class. It is sometimes argued that women’s specific interests are not articulated in the general opposition platform in Belarus, so, at the end, women might not get their “gendered rewards” (Naumau, Matveieva 2021). However, it must be taken into account that in the post-socialist world, women are often subordinated to a special “dependent” category: they are constrained through controlling benefits (“bestowed” on them by the “father-state”) instead of being recognized as full and autonomous human beings. Which is why the pursuit of citizenship, and the rise of women’s political subjectivity have been the most important “unforeseen” results of the Belarusian mobilization. At least the question of whether a woman can be elected as the president in Belarus has now been answered. Yes, she can!

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Notes 1 Aliaksandr Lukashenka supposedly got 81% of the vote, and Tsikhanouskaya got 10%. According to the final Report from Golos (Voice), an online platform created to monitor Belarusian elections, Svetlana Tsikhanouskaya got at least three million votes and won in the first round. Available at: https://bit​.ly​/golos​-count. According to the study by Chatham House, Tsikhanouskaya got more than fifty per cent of the votes. Available at: Chatham House - Belarus - III​.p​df - Google Drive. 2 The triggers were the power of ‘connective action’ that digital media provide; the empowering experience of volunteer activism during the first wave of the pandemic, and a relative deterioration of the economic situation due to lockdowns. 3 Currently, those employed in the state sector, especially educators, are expected to demonstrate “loyalty” to retain their contracts. 4 ‘Rech’ rabochego na zabastovke v Belarusi’, 2020. TVRain, 17 August. Available at: https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=OEcbOimyT60​&t​=71s. 5 See https://bysol​.org​/en/. 6 This post has been anonymized to protect the author. 7 See, for example: https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=Z141LwybcLU​&t​=19s. 8 “Glavnaya sopernitsa Lukashenka zayavila o zhelanii zharot’ kotlety vmesto vlasti”. 2020. Lenta​.r​u. 27 July. Available at: https://lenta​.ru​/news​/2020​/07​/27​/kotletki/ 9 Tsikhaouskaya stayed at home for several years to take care of a child with disability. 10 Lukashenka’s popular nickname is Bat’ka, or dad, in Belarusian. 11 ‘Kak Gomel’ vstrechal Tikhanovskuyu’. 2020. Tut.by, 27 July. Available at: https://news​. tut​.by​/economics​/694210​.html 12 Ibid.

References Artiukh, V. (2021) ‘The Anatomy of Impatience: Exploring Factors behind 2020 Labor Unrest in Belarus.’ Slavic Review 80(1): 52–60. Austin, J.L. (1962) How to Do Things with Words: The William James Lectures Delivered at Harvard University. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bishop, C. (2012) Artificial Hells: Participatory Art and the Politics of Spectatorship. London: Verso. Botero, W. (2004) ‘Class Identities and the Identity of Class.’ Sociology 38(5): 985–1003. Butler, J. (1990) Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity. London: Routledge. Butler, J. (2015) Notes Towards a Performative Theory of the Assembly. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Fein, L. (2020) ‘Women and feminism in Belarus: The truth behind the “flower power.” An Interview with Irina Solomatina by Luba Fein.’ FiLia. Available at: https://www​.filia​. org​.uk​/latest​-news​/2020​/9​/21​/women​-and​-feminism​-in​-belarus​-the​-truth​-behind​-the​ -flower​-power (Accessed May 2022). Gapova, E. (2021) ‘Class, agency, and citizenship in Belarusian protest.’ Slavic Review, 80(1): 45–51. Gheytanchi, E. and Moghadam, V. (2014) ‘Women, social protests, and the new media activism in the Middle East and North Africa.’ International Review of Modern Sociology 40(1): 1–26. Ishchenko, V. and Zhuravlev, O. (2021) ‘How maidan revolutions reproduce and intensify the post-Soviet crisis of political representation.’ PONARS Eurasia Newsletter. Available at: https://www​.ponarseurasia​.org​/how​-maidan​-revolutions​-reproduce​-and​-intensify​

178  Fostering Peoplehood -the​-post​-soviet​-crisis​-of​-political​-representation/​?fbclid​=IwA​R3wr​EZ7b​8kPa​0MtR​ ialG​IGk9​lQHS​RJjY​amLD​4DNJ​78OD​Vqa9​49noi9TW-s (Accessed May 2022). Kascian, K. and Denisenko, V. (2021) ‘Society in the authoritarian discourse: The case of the 2020 presidential election in Belarus.’ Intersections. East European Journal of Society and Politics 7(4): 124–138. King, L. and Szelenyi, I. (2004) Theories of the New Class: Intellectuals and Power. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Mateo, E. (2022) ‘“All of Belarus has come out onto the streets”: Exploring nationwide protest and the role of pre-existing social networks.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 38 (1–2): 26–42. National Statistics Committee of Belarus. Available at: https://www​.belstat​.gov​.by​/en/ (Accessed July 2022). Navumau, V. and Matveieva, O. (2021) ‘The gender dimension of the 2020 Belarusian protest: Does female engagement contribute to the establishment of gender equality?’ New Perspectives 29(3): 230–248. Ousmanova, A. (2020) ‘Authoritarianism and patriarchy, or why Belarusian women take issue.’ In Partizanka: Almanac of Belarusian Culture. Berlin: Publication by Goethe Institute. Pastukhov, V. (2020) ‘Revolutsia othodit s Belarusskogo vokzala.’ Novaya Gazeta, 14 September. Available at: https://novayagazeta​.ru​/articles​/2020​/09​/14​/87084​ -revolyutsiya​-othodit​-s​-belorusskogo​-vokzala (Accessed July 2022). Paulovich, N. (2021) ‘How feminist is the Belarusian revolution? Female agency and participation in the 2020 post-election protests.’ Slavic Review, 80(1): 38–44. Penn, S. (2005) Solidarity’s Secret: The Women who Defeated Communism in Poland. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press. Phillips, S. (2014) ‘The women’s squad in Ukraine protests: Feminism, nationalism and militarism on the maidan.’ American Ethnologist 41(3): 414–426. Shelest, O. (2020) ‘Belorusy gotovy k dolgoi bor΄be. Sociolog o nastroeniiakh Protestuiushchikh.’ Deutche Welle, 26 August. Available at: https://www​.dw​.com​/ru​/ belorusy​-gotovy​-k​-dolgoj​-borbe​-sociolog​-o​-nastroenijah​-protestujushhih​/a​-54704307​ ?fbclid​=IwAR0SRaB​_ZG0​rMLw​cI6N​Fdgc​aG91​vGSt​MDix​tZv2​qUj86xlYS​_vomk​ _gTRfk (Accessed June 2022). Shelest, O. (2021) ‘Novaya sociologia dlya novoi Belarusi’, Nashe mnenie. Available at: http://nmnbt​.eu (Accessed July 2022). Shparaga, O. (2021) Die Revolution hat eine weibliches Gesiht. Der Fall Belarus. Suhrkramp: Verlag AG. Tarrow, S. (1998) Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Tsikhanouskaya, S. (2020) Vystuplenie kandidata v presidenty Belaruusi na TV, 28 July. Available at: https://www​.youtube​.com​/watch​?v​=y7GGyAWZHLU (Accessed June 2022). Tsoneva, J. (2019) The Making of the Bulgarian Middle Class: Citizens against the People in the 2013 Protests. PhD diss., Central European University. Vardomatsky, A., Mozheiko, V. and A. Rublev (2021) ‘Novaya sotsiologiya dlya novoi Belarusi.’ Nashe Mnenie, 15 March. Available at: https://nmnby​.eu​/news​/discussions​ /7360​.html​?fbclid​=IwAR3Y2fZbKATJzFn_​_g5Z​owrf​cyhT​Ql9I​f7oY​XlnX​xHEK​jSEP​ hWrk​x0ohpw (Accessed June 2022). Young, I. (1987) ‘Impartiality and the civic public: Some implications of feminist critique of moral and political theory.’ In Feminism as Critique. Eds. S. Benhabib and D. Cornell. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

12 Tracing the Emergence of Peoplehood in Belarus and Ukraine A Comparative Study Anastasiia Kudlenko [In the 21st century] there would be one revolution that would spasmodically defy the dehumanizing terror of the new tyrannical orders: the revolution of dignity … This revolution would be less motivated by economic predicament and more by oppressed people’s growing access to information and the possibility to compare their daily humiliations with better and more dignified lives elsewhere. (Kapuściński 1989, quoted in Witoszek 2021)

Peoplehood as a Driving Force of Revolutions of Dignity From the moment Belarusians took to the streets to protest the results of the fraudulent presidential elections in August 2020, the events in the country were compared to Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity that took place six years prior. Comparisons were drawn by politicians (Lukashenka’s own quick dismissal of the possibility of Maidan’s1 repetition (Matveev 2020) led to speculations on the topic), journalists (Mackinnon 2020), and academics (Umland 2020, HURI 2020). Nonetheless, as Belarusians chose different forms of protest and strategies of mobilization and refused to resort to violence even in the face of violent repressions from the regime, the interest in comparing the two countries and, most importantly, using Ukraine’s experience as a lens for predicting the future of Belarus dwindled. While the predictive value of the Ukrainian case for understanding Belarusian prospects might be limited, there is still merit in analyzing the protest movements that shook these neighbouring states to their core. The comparison with Ukraine, which experienced similar levels of largely leaderless self-organization motivated by ideational rather than materialistic goals, can shed some light on the mobilization of Belarusian society that for a long time remained apolitical. When Russia attempted a full-scale invasion of Ukraine in February 2022, Ukrainians demonstrated resilience in the face of the largest military aggression seen on the European continent since the end of World War II. This resilience takes its root in part in the Revolution of Dignity, and by analysing the latter alongside the Belarusian protests of 2020–2021, it is attempted here to get a better understanding of Belarusian resilience and its potential to change the country’s trajectory. DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-15

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In what follows, popular mobilization in Ukraine in 2013–2014 and in Belarus in 2020–2021 are compared to take a closer look at societal resilience as the process of self-organization. This reading of resilience, developed by Korosteleva and Petrova (2021) on the basis of complexity-thinking (Kavalski 2016), offers an innovative way of dealing with the uncertainty and unpredictability of modern life. Understood as a quality of a complex system and the process of self-governance, used to manage life fragilities “bottom-up and in a self-help manner, with external support only as necessary” (Petrova and Korosteleva 2021: 125), resilience is constituted of an assemblage of many elements. Following KorostelevaPetrova framework and building on the studies by Berenskoetter (2010, 2011), Flockhart (2020), and Sadiki (2015), the focus here is on four elements only: identity, aspirations for the ‘good life’, local support infrastructures, and peoplehood. While the list is not exhaustive,2 the alignment of the chosen elements was already shown to be significant in the Belarusian context (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021; Petrova and Korosteleva 2021). By applying the same framework to Ukraine and comparing the latter to Belarus, the aim is to contribute to the study of revolutions of dignity (Witoszek 2019; 2021).3 Driven by the human search for dignity, which is predominantly seen as an ethical and cultural project tied to empathy, desire for respect, and reason rather than being simply motivated by economic hardship, the revolution of dignity was predicted by Ryszard Kapuściński, an eminent Polish war correspondent and author, to dominate the political landscape of the 21st century (Witoszek 2021). At the time of writing, having the evidence of the protests in Egypt, Tunisia, Libya, and Syria that came to be known as the Arab Spring; Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity that started as Euromaidan but quicky grew into a much bigger political and social movement; the Hong Kong Umbrella Revolution; and the Belarusian protests in response to the rigged presidential elections of 2020 which are called here the Revolution of Indignation, Kapuściński’s prediction does not seem unsubstantiated. The main argument made in this chapter is that the driving force of revolutions of dignity is peoplehood, which represents one of the key elements of societal resilience and can be defined as a “transformative force, that intensely rejects previous order arrangements, and enables new ideas for bottom-up governance to take hold and shape a community’s direction for future development” (Petrova and Korosteleva 2021: 126). The emergence of peoplehood is “both spontaneous and long-coming” (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021: 5). It is a deeply political process that is predicated on the alignment of other elements of resilience, i.e. identity, interpreted not as a stand-alone component, but “as a process of making sense of, becoming with, and seeking a good life”, which, understood mainly in ideational rather than material terms, defines the human need for adaptation and change (Korosteleva and Petrova 2022: 144) and local support infrastructures, composed of formal and informal ties, practices and resources that enable communities to act on their aspirations for the good life, while simultaneously tapping into their past (Petrova and Korosteleva 2021: 126).

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While identity here is understood through its close interrelation with the dimension of the future, manifested through the idea of the good life, it is important to note that it is also linked to the past, validated through history, traditions, and symbols, and the present in the form of shared experiences, values and norms (ibid.). It is, however, the future vision that deserves special attention in the context of a VUCA-world (Burrows and Gnad 2017), i.e. a world of increasing vulnerability, uncertainty, complexity, and ambiguity – the world of transformative change. This is mainly because the future, or in Berenskoetter’s (2011: 663) terminology “the vision” is seen as “a source of energy which stimulates action” and as a “pull factor” providing the Self with an opportunity to move on, or ahead” (ibid.: 653). In the analysis provided below, therefore, while acknowledging the past and present dimensions of the sense of Self, i.e. identity, the emphasis is on the visions for the good life that motivated the protesters. Ukrainians and Belarusian, while relying on and repurposing the symbols of the past, are shown to be united in their wish to break free from the past practices of corrupt and backward politics and build new lives based on truth, freedom, and dignity. To understand how the entanglement of identity which is, first and foremost, manifested through the desire for the good life, and local support structures aligned to allow the emergence of peoplehood in Belarus and Ukraine, key mobilizing factors, related to politics, violence, media, and economy, are investigated. The data for the analysis is obtained from surveys of protesters,4 poster slogans, and social and independent media.5 Before proceeding with the comparative analysis, it is necessary to define the temporal framework of the compared protests. In Ukraine, this is November 2013–February 2014, and in Belarus, August 2020–December 2021. The next section studies the manifestations of identity and aspirations for the good life through the analysis of the mobilizing factors, linked to politics and violence.

The Evolution of Identity in Ukraine and Belarus in the Times of Revolutions While being motivated by political events, the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and the Belarusian Revolution of Indignation seem to have little in common, at least on the surface. Their differences, however, start moving to the background if a closer look is taken at how the protests unfolded and what kept them going. In Ukraine, the protests started in response to the decision of the then president Victor Yanukovych not to sign the Free Trade and Association Agreement with the European Union (EU) but grew in scale and scope when the Berkut riot police used force to disperse the peaceful student gathering on 30 November 2013 (May 2020). It ended with Yanukovych fleeing Ukraine in the middle of the night in February 2014 and with over a hundred deaths, mostly on the side of protesters.6 In Belarus, the motivation was provided by the fraud of the presidential elections held on 9 August 2020, but it was again the violence of the regime used against unarmed peaceful protesters and, in

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some cases, simply passers-by that gave the protests the new strength and purpose (Chernyshova 2020). The use of violence by Lukashenka did not stop the protests. In fact, it made them more versatile and creative, prompting the emergence of a completely new repertoire of dissent (Krawatzek and Sasse 2021). This section argues that in both Ukraine and Belarus the revolutionary events are linked to the evolution of societal identity, the transformation of the collective Self. While there are many interpretations of identity,7 here it is understood as a mechanism for managing uncertainty-induced anxiety or a process of coping with the complexity of the social environment by breaking it down into meaningful components (Gaertner et al. 2002). To put it differently, it is “a sense of Self in time” (Berenskoetter 2011), and this sense is by no means static. Given different historical development and divergent dynamics of post-Soviet orientation, identity in Ukraine and Belarus is usually studied from different perspectives. In Ukraine, ethnicity, language, and geopolitical orientation (towards the West or Russia) are usually presented as key markers of identity, highlighting divisions in society (Shevel 2018; Onuch and Hale 2018). Identity in Belarus, on the other hand, while traditionally also understood through the prism of ethnicity or language, is now more often described as civic, and linked to universal values such as tolerance or humanity (Zaprudnik 2002: 114–115; Bekus 2021). The lack of emphasis on traditional ethnic or national identifiers in Belarus has led some scholars to question its ability to create a functional modern state (Marples 2002). Nonetheless, the divergent approaches to reading identity in Ukraine and Belarus are not necessarily meaningful when it comes to the comparative study of the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and the Belarusian Revolution of Indignation, especially based on complexity-thinking. In both cases, the ethnonational and linguistic dimensions were secondary to the fight for a better future and the good life, defined by ideas of dignity and truth (more pronounced in Ukraine, though although present in Belarus), freedom and transparency (emphasized more vividly in Belarus), and respect for human rights (demanded in both countries equally). This requires some further explanation, especially in reference to Ukraine given the speculation, in particular, projected by the Russian propaganda machine, and picked up by news outlets around the world, about the role of the nationalist and right-wing forces in the revolution (Johnson 2014). Recent research on the Revolution of Dignity and its participants demonstrated not only that the radically oriented protesters constituted an insignificant portion of the protesters (despite the increased media attention they received), but also that the language preferences, often used to illustrate the division in the Ukrainian society did not carry much weight either (HURI 2020). For instance, Olga Onuch (2014: 49) found that 22 per cent of the protesters were Russian speakers, yet their linguistic distinctiveness was the only thing differentiating them from the rest of the protesters as they were as likely to be motivated as the others by “their support for democratic rights and opposition to unjust uses of

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state repression” and a wish for closer Ukraine-EU relations. Of course, in the 2013–2014 Ukrainian revolution, the Ukrainian language was still predominant. Moreover, the protesters also adopted nationalist slogans, which were used to distinguish themselves from the Yanukovych regime which at the time positioned itself as Russian oriented.8 This opposition can demonstrate how identities are relational and intersubjective and how they emerge in opposition to “significant others” (Wendt 1999; Berenskoetter 2010). In this context, the nationalist slogan, “Slava Ukraini! Heroyam Slava!” – “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to Heroes!” is an interesting example. Originally used by the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA), which fought against the German and Soviet occupation from 1942 to 1952 predominantly in Western Ukraine, the slogan lost its original meaning, and during the revolution (as well as after) offered a way of honouring those who died fighting for Ukraine and its future as well as demonstrating pride in being part of the heroic nation (Shveda and Ho Park 2016: 90). In Belarus, similar repurposing of the old symbols could also be observed, and the use of the white-red-white flag is the most prominent example (as highlighted in the preceding chapter of this volume). Long used as a symbol of the opposition, it was the official flag of the 1918 Belarusian National Republic that preceded the Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic. During the protests that started in 2020, however, the flag was embraced by the country en masse as one of the ways to distance themselves from the Lukashenko regime and to symbolize the new Belarus that was no longer willing to put up with the corruption and authoritarianism but demanded dignity and freedom (Bekus 2021). In a similar way, Belarusians repurposed the slogan “Zhyve Belarus” – “Belarus is Alive” and the “Pahonia” – “Chase” coat of arms (LRT 2020; Martysevich 2020). Still, the Belarusian language was not dominating the protests, which reflects the long-term Russification of society. The linguistic Russification did not translate into the political sphere (Zaprudnik 2002), however, as Belarusians speaking Russian largely identify as being Belarusian9 (Fabrykant 2019). According to some observers, the fact that Sviatlana Tsikhanovskaya, who became the main challenger of Lukashenko, yet not the single leader of the protest movement, spoke Russian and did not promote the nationalistic view of Belarus, associated with the traditional opposition, was one of the reasons for the movement attracting broad societal support (Bedford 2021). It is important to note here that although ethno-linguistic markers were not that important for mobilizing the protesters in Belarus and less important than initially anticipated in Ukraine, the protesters were still vocalizing their support for independent, democratic, and free Belarus and Ukraine respectively, thus contributing through their activism to the political reinvention of their respective homelands. This awakening of communities from a broad sample of populations was remarkable in both cases, though more striking in Belarus. Ukraine had already gone through one successful electoral revolution and boasted a vibrant civil society, while Belarus on the eve of the protests was seen as largely apolitical (Bedford 2021: 809). The political injustice, which demonstrated

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the authorities’ disrespect for the people’s will, and the violence that followed seemed to produce a powerful mix of societal anger and determination to act. In times of crisis and uncertainty, the people of Belarus and Ukraine refused to be bystanders in the decision of their future. Through the adaptation of the old symbols (in Ukraine, going as far as the Cossack epoch, and in Belarus, to the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, but mostly involving the reimagining of the times of World War II), protesters saw their pain and suffering through the eyes of their ancestors and vowed to have a better future for the next generations. This future or the vision of the good life is primarily seen in the ideals of democracy, human rights, and freedom, which is reflected in the surveys of protesters. In Ukraine, for example, 22 per cent of protesters explained their choice to participate in the protests as support for the democratic future of Ukraine, while around 20 per cent were protesting against the violation of their rights (HURI 2020, using the UPP-EPPS data). Nearly 14 per cent explained their participation as support for closer ties with the EU (ibid.). The Ukrainian protesters, therefore, to an extent, were connecting their future with the EU, but it was not their main motivation. In Belarus, just over 35 per cent saw their main goal as the removal of Lukashenka, who symbolized the old way of life, while just under 29 per cent wanted to see a bigger change than simply a new president, expressing hope for the democratic future for Belarus (Onuch 2020). What is also interesting is that around 20 per cent demanded new presidential elections that had to be run in a free and fair way. In a nutshell, Belarusian demands were more specific than in Ukraine, yet were still connected to larger ideas such as democracy, fairness, and freedom. Having mentioned violence against the protesters in the two countries, it is necessary to acknowledge the violence or the lack thereof among the protesters. This aspect is probably the most visible difference between the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and the protests in Belarus. If the former is often presented as a bloody revolution, ignoring the fact that protesters took up arms only towards the end, the latter is characterized by the persistent refusal of protesters not only to resort to violence but even to violate rules and norms of socially accepted behaviour (Chernyshova 2020). It is important to understand that violence was never the first choice in Ukraine, and the people who resorted to it saw no other choice (Shveda and Ho Park 2016). As little change was achieved after the 2004 Orange Revolution, some protesters were not ready to give up their dream of being a free independent European nation in charge of choosing its own future. And the brutal force of the Yanukovych regime met the fire of the protesters, with the reimagined history of Cossacks and UPA providing inspiration.10 In Belarus, the non-violence of the protesters could be interpreted as another way of differentiating themselves from the regime, which they were refusing to tolerate. It could also be seen as influenced by the trauma of World War II, which left deep scars on the Belarusian nation, many of which remain to be healed.11 This difference between the use of violence in the revolutionary movements in Ukraine and Belarus confirms Sadiki’s postulate that bottom-up movements

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of transformation, defined here as peoplehood, can take peaceful or violent forms in their attempt to exert pressure bottom-up (2015: 703). To sum up, the reimagined symbols of the past, brought to the fore through a plethora of creative protest tactics, representing the present dimension of identity, and the aspirations for the future good life of democracy, transparency, freedom, and dignity, offer a vision of the evolving identities in Ukraine and Belarus. This evolution, however, would not have been possible without the support of local infrastructures, which are analyzed in the following section through the prism of media and economic factors.

The Importance of Local Support Infrastructure and the Power of Self-Organisation The Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and Belarusian Revolution of Indignation were notable for the unprecedented levels of self-organization, civic activism, creativity, and spontaneous cooperation (Wynnyckyi 2020; Umland 2020). In both countries, communities, large and small, came together, without a single unifying leader, to support the victims of regime violence, protect the vulnerable and deliver a clear message to the world that they were a united force, not afraid to speak their truth and demand to be treated with dignity. Local support infrastructures were intricately developed in Ukraine and Belarus and were crucial for sustaining the weeks of protests that grew into months. As the protests evolved, the support infrastructures evolved with them. In Belarus, for example, when the protest movement took a more covert form in the face of the mounting crackdown (Kruope 2020), people demonstrated solidarity and readiness to provide mutual aid through multiple fundraising campaigns, whose goals varied from emergency relocations and supporting courtyard initiatives to helping families of political prisoners and those who lost jobs for political reasons (Bysol 2022). Many have also provided legal support, medical advice, transportation, and even therapy pro bono (Probono 2022). In the early stages of the protests, communities came together to help neighbours, people gathered outside prisons to provide help to recent detainees, and memorials and concerts were organized to keep the spirits up (Petrova and Korosteleva 2021; Peleshuk 2020). In Ukraine, self-organization was similarly high, yet people chose different forms of cooperation, more suitable to the format of the protests, defined by the physical space of Kyiv’s Square of Independence, the main square of the country, hereinafter the Maidan. The latter provided not only a site for a gathering of thousands of protesters that grew into millions on weekends, but turned into the encampment with field kitchens, hospitals, places of worship, and a range of other facilities, necessary for supporting the daily lives of those revolutionaries who stayed there full time (Diuk 2014: 15). The Maidan resembled a beehive with everyone working tirelessly on their individual tasks for the common goal of defending democratic and free Ukraine. Self-organization was at the core of the Revolution of Dignity: whether self-publishing newspapers, organizing

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lectures for the Free University of Maidan, or setting up self-defence units to resist attacks of the Berkut riot police, Ukrainians cooperated seamlessly and organically (ibid.). In both cases, in Belarus in 2020–2021 and in Ukraine in 2013–2014, independent and social media were initially seen as the mobilizing factors that played an indispensable role in self-organization of the masses. Recent research, however, shows that the media were not mobilizing by themselves, rather they have offered platforms (especially, in the case of social media) for coordination of efforts and created the opportunity for protesters to cooperate and self-organize (Onuch 2015; HURI 2020). Through channels of social media,12 Ukrainians and Belarusians established well-connected networks that enabled the coordination of mobilization processes and sped up the flow of trusted information. It is important that in most cases, people chose particular social media as sources of trustworthy information and as platforms for self-organization, based on the networks that existed in the real world, e.g. among friends or in neighbourhoods (HURI 2020). Another commonality that deserves mentioning concerns the use of social media as a means for reviving forms of traditional cooperation that existed in these communities not just for decades but for centuries. For instance, in Belarus, people came together as hramady (communities), supol’nasts, talaka (togetherness) and tuteishyya (those who live here) (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021: 6). In Ukraine, the community structures were largely similar, e.g. hrmady (communities), viche (popular assembly), and toloka (communal help). Self-organization during Ukraine’s Revolution of Dignity and Belarusian Revolution of Indignation demonstrated that horizontal cooperation was trusted and valued much more than hierarchical relations. In both cases, the protest movements lacked charismatic leadership but were united by the common ideal of dignity and fairness (Wynnyckyi 2020: 136). While assessing the role of social media in the protests, it is impossible not to mention their demobilizing effects. The accessibility of digital media, instant nature of communication, and speed of information dissemination allowed the amplification of radical voices in Ukraine (Shveda and Ho Park 2016) or the spread of misinformation that caused confusion among protesters and international observers in Belarus (Astapenia 2021). Apart from the media, self-organization has also been influenced by economic factors.13 While economic reasons were neither among the leading drivers of the protest movements in Belarus nor in Ukraine, the economy still played an important role in mobilizing the masses and influencing the levels of self-organization. In Belarus, Lukashenka’s regime was able to survive for so long, to a great extent, due to the co-optation of the public (Bedford 2021: 809). Most of the population was loyal to the regime in exchange for the basic level of financial and social stability. This social contract, however, was broken when the regime refused to recognize the COVID-19 pandemic14 as a real threat (see Gerry’s chapter in this volume) and left Belarusians to their own devices in the fight against the virus. This was a huge miscalculation that created an opportunity for vast community mobilization (ibid.: 812). Even before the protest started, the #ByCOVID19 crowdfunding campaign raised

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more than $300,000 for medical supplies (Peleshuk 2020). Numerous initiatives were set up by volunteers and volunteer groups across Belarus to support the vulnerable, provide medical help and deliver food and medication supplies to those affected by the virus. These initiatives, which emerged in early 2020, provided a strong foundation for even more substantial self-organization during the protests that followed in the summer of 2020 (Petrova and Korosteleva 2021: 128). In Ukraine, the protesters were dissatisfied with the corrupt practices of Yanukovych and his closest circle that came to be known as Simja (the Family). While the government promoted practices of nepotism, bribery, and top-level corruption, most of the Ukrainian population, which could not boast oligarchic ties, was faced with declining standards of living (Aslund 2013). In such circumstances, many relied on their own networks for survival, which, similar to those in pandemic-stricken Belarus, provided a platform for self-organization in times of the revolution. Thus, it is possible to state that both in Ukraine and Belarus self-organization and civic activism were a response to adversity and the governments’ inability or rather refusal to perform their basic functions. At the same time, the past practices of the government were not the only motivating factor for people to self-organize. They were also led by the desire to avoid unfairness in the future, and to live in countries where the economy and politics work not just for the selected elites but the whole society (Sheva and Ho Park 2016: 86; HURI 2020). Here, therefore, the entanglement of the past and future can also be seen, where the former creates the foundation for civic activism and the latter acts as a powerful pull factor.

In the Shadow of the War: What Is Next for Peoplehood in Belarus? The discussion above shows that, despite many differences, popular mobilization in Ukraine in 2013–2014 and in Belarus in 2020–2021 had a lot in common, especially if analyzed through the prism of societal resilience as the process of self-organization. The analysis of key factors of mobilization, relating to politics, violence, media, and economy, revealed that Ukrainians and Belarusians, motivated by the ideas of dignity, truth, freedom, and respect for human rights, came together as peoplehoods. In Ukraine and Belarus, one could observe: • • •

the emergence of peoplehood as alignment of identity, aspirations for the good life and support infrastructure, which developed bottom-up against the background of the ruling regimes’ neglect of their populations’ needs; the formation of identity, oriented towards the future, but rooted in history and expressed through a range of creative means; and crystallization of the idea of the good life, through commitment to the ideas of democracy, freedom, truth and dignity.

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It is also clear that in both countries, the revolutions of dignity have not yet finished, though the Ukrainian revolution was more successful in achieving its goals. Ukrainians continue their fight for dignity and freedom, this time in the war, started by Russia in 2014, that escalated into the large-scale invasion on 24 February 2022. The Belarusian revolution, after a short period of “hibernation” in the wake of the regime’s repressions, also found a new breath of life in light of Russia’s war against Ukraine (Tharoor 2022). But are there any lessons that Belarus can learn from the Ukrainian experiences of the last eight years? In the context of the emergence of peoplehood as a transformative force that rejects the old and sets out to create something new, at least three lessons can be emphasized. First, the peoplehood emerges and is sustained when the vision of the future and the good life, is not only defined by high ideas (such as democracy and freedom) but also when there is a shared understanding of what stands behind these ideas and how they can be translated into practice. For instance, one of the results of the Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity that strengthened the democracy in the country and, as it turned out later, contributed to the resilient response of local communities to the war was the reform of decentralization. This means that in Belarus the democratic forces need to continue working closely with local communities to identify and design key reforms to be implemented in the near future, thus looking beyond the immediate goal of dismantling the Lukashenka regime. The second lesson concerns the impact of exogenous factors on revolutions of dignity and readiness to face them. It does not matter whether protesters largely ignore geopolitics (like in Belarus) or use it as a starting point for their dissent (like in Ukraine): the interconnectedness of international, national, regional, and local elements in the complex world means that sooner or later difficult questions must be answered, for example how the future, envisioned by protesters, fits into the broader international politics. The results of the Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine were immediately met with aggression from Russia, which moved on to annex Crimea and sponsored separatists in the eastern regions of Donetsk and Luhansk. However, these actions did not stop the determination of Ukrainians to live in a democratic and independent state, which prompted Russia to invade Ukraine in 2022. The Ukrainian society once again turned into a peoplehood and proved that it is ready to fight a bloody war to achieve a future defined by dignity and freedom. This is by no means to glorify violence, but to suggest that Belarus and Belarusians at some point will have to decide whether they want to remain under Russia’s influence or commit to the “fight” for their sovereignty. As Ukraine’s example shows, the onus for this fight (whatever form it takes) is likely to be with the local communities, even if the international community is supportive of it. The third and final lesson here is about the importance of the relational logic of revolutions of dignity. Dignity, which translates into Ukrainian as hidnist and Belarusian as hodnast’, is best understood through the network of relations as it is not simply an attribute of an individual or collective unit (e.g. nation), but also a demand upon others (Wynnyckyi 2020:128). The relational character is

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also the basis for self-organization, which is so important for resilience of communities in the face of adversity, and is integral to the development of a common identity, that combines elements of the past, present, and future. As long as Belarusians continue nurturing this relationality, the networks of relations that emerged during the Revolution of Indignation, there will be no going back to the old ways of life, defined by authoritarianism and fear of repressions. The indignation will give way to dignity.

Notes 1 The Square of Independence in Kyiv that became synonymous with protests in Ukraine. 2 See Plough (2021) for a broader view on the fundamentals of resilience. 3 The Belarusian case in this context could be viewed as a Revolution of Indignation, developed further in this chapter. 4 In Ukraine, the EuroMaidan Protest Participant Survey (Onuch and Sasse 2016; HURI 2020) and in Belarus surveys by Centre for East European and International Studies (Sasse 402020) and by MOBILISE “Determinants of ‘Mobilisation’ at Home and Abroad” project (MOBILISE 2022). 5 In Ukraine, mainly Facebook, YouTube, Hromadske​.​ua and Ukrainska Pravda​.com​.​ua; in Belarus,YouTube, Instagram, Telegram channels (Golos, Nexta, Chestnye Lyudi, etc.), spring96​.o​rg and chater97​.or​g. 6 The annexation of Crimea and the armed conflict that broke out in the East of the country in the spring of 2014 are not included as part of the analysis (Onuch and Sasse 2016; Wynnyckyi 2020). 7 For debates on identity in social sciences, see Brubaker and Cooper 2010. 8 This was not always the case, for the discussion on the role of European integration in the Ukrainian foreign policy, pursued by different presidents, including Yanukovych, see Haran and Zolkina (2014). 9 A similar situation is observed in Ukraine, where many Russophones see themselves as Ukrainian. Nonetheless, this is often ignored by researchers. 10 See Onuch and Sasse (2016), Shveda and Ho Park (2016) for further discussion of the role of violence in the Revolution of Dignity as dispelling myths about it. 11 For further discussion of the legacy of World War II, see Chapter 3 in this volume. 12 In Ukraine, Facebook and YouTube were most prominent, while in Belarus, the list also includes Telegram and Instagram. 13 For more on the role of the economy in the protests, see Chapter 8. 14 See Chapter 7.

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190  Fostering Peoplehood Berenskoetter, F. (2010) ‘Identity in international relations.’ In The International Studies Encyclopaedia. Eds. Denmark, R.A. and Marlin-Bennett, R. Hoboken: Wiley-Blackwell, 3595–3611. Berenskoetter, F. (2011) ‘Reclaiming the vision thing: Constructivists as students of the future.’ International Studies Quarterly 55(3): 647–668. doi: 10.1111/J.1468-2478.2011.00669.X Brubaker, R. and Cooper, F. (2000) ‘Beyond “Identity”.’ Theory and Society 29(1): 1–47. Burrows, M. and Gnad, O. (2018) ‘Between “Muddling Through” and “Grand Design”: Regaining political initiative: The role of strategic foresight.’ Futures 97: 6–17. Bysol (2022) The Belarusian Solidarity Fund. Available at: https://bysol​.org​/en/ (Accessed 01.05.2022). Chernyshova, N. (2020) ‘A very Belarusian affair: What sets the current anti-Lukashenka protests apart.’ PONARS Eurasia Policy Mem 671. Available at: https://winchester​. elsevierpure​.com​/en​/publications​/a​-very​-belarusian​-affair​-what​-sets​-the​-current-​ anti​ -lukashenka​-pr (Accessed 05.05.2022). Diuk, N. (2014) ‘Euromaidan: Ukraine’s self-organising revolution.’ World Affairs 176(6): 9–16. Fabrykant, M. (2019) ‘Russian-speaking Belarusian Nationalism: An ethnolinguistic identity without a language?’ Europe-Asia Studies 71(1): 117–136. Flockhart, T. (2020) ‘Is this the end? Resilience, ontological security, and the crisis of the liberal international order.’ Contemporary Security Policy 41(2): 215–240. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1080​/13523260​.2020​.1723966 Gaertner, L., Sedikides, C., Vevea, J.L. andIuzzini, J. (2002) ‘The “I,” the “we,” and the “when”: A meta-analysis of motivational primacy in self-definition.’ Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 83(3): 574–591. https://doi​.org​/10​.1037​/0022​-3514​.83​.3​.574 Haran, O. and Zolkina, M. (2014) ‘Ukraine’s long road to European integration.’ PONARS Eurasia Policy Perspectives. Available at: https://www​.academia​.edu​ /6592388​/Belarusization​_Hybridization​_or​_Democratization​_THE​_CHANGING​ _PROSPECTS​_FOR​_UKRAINE​?email​_work​_card​=title (Accessed 12.05.2022). HURI (Ukrainian Research Institute Harvard University) (2020) From ‘Glory to Ukraine’ to ‘Long Live Belarus’: A Comparison of Mass Mobilization in Ukraine (2013–2014) and Belarus (2020). Available at: https://huri​.harvard​.edu​/event​/onuch​-mateo (Accessed 10.04.2022). Johnson, E. (2014) ‘The innocence and violence of EuroMaidan: Notes from Kyiv.’ Slovo. Available at: https://blogs​.ucl​.ac​.uk​/slovo​/2014​/01​/31​/the​-innocence​-and​-violence​-of​ -euromaidan​-notes​-from​-kyiv/ (Accessed 10.04.2022). Kavalski, E. (ed.) (2016) World Politics at the Edge of Chaos: Reflections on Complexity and Global Life. Albany: SUNY Press. Korosteleva, E. and Petrova, I. (2021) ‘Community resilience in Belarus and the EU response.’ Journal of Common Market Studies Annual Review 59(4): 1–13. https://doi​.org​ /10​.1111​/jcms​.13248 Korosteleva, E. and Petrova, I. (2022) ‘What makes communities resilient in times of complexity and change?’ Cambridge Review of International Affairs 35(2): 137–157. Krawatzek, F. and Sasse, G. (2021) Belarus protests: Why people have been taking to the streets: New data. The Conversation. Available from: https://theconversation​.com​/belarus​ -protests​-why​-people​-have​-been​-taking​-to​-the​-streets​-new​-data​-154494 (Accessed 17.05.2022). Kruope, A. (2020) ‘Crackdown on peaceful protesters escalates in Belarus: Further international action needed to end impunity for torture, police violence.’ Human Rights

Emerging Peoplehood in Belarus and Ukraine  191 Watch. Available at: https://www​.hrw​.org​/news​/2020​/11​/09​/crackdown​-peaceful​ -protesters​-escalates​-belarus (Accessed 03.05.2022). LRT (2020) ‘Zhyve Belarus from Minsk to Vilnius: Where does the slogan come from?’ Available at: https://www​.lrt​.lt​/en​/news​-in​-english​/19​/1283994​/zhyve​-belarus​-from​ -minsk​-to​-vilnius​-where​-does​-the​-slogan​-come​-from (Accessed 01.05.2022). Mackinnon, A. (2020) ‘Why Belarus is not Ukraine.’ Foreign Policy. Available at: https:// foreignpolicy​.com​/2020​/08​/12​/belarus​-protests​-lukashenko​-not​-ukraine/ (Accessed 09.02.2022). Marples, D. (2002) ‘History and politics in post-Soviet Belarus: The foundations.’ In Contemporary Belarus: Between Dictatorship and Democracy. Eds. Korosteleva, E.A., Lawson, C.W. and Marsh, R.J. London: Routledge, 21–35. Martysevich, M. (2020) ‘Belarus: The alphabet of protest.’ Culture​.pl​. Available at: https:// culture​.pl​/en​/article​/belarus​-the​-alphabet​-of​-protest (Accessed 09.02.2022). Matveev, V. (2020) ‘Lukashenko ob ulichnych aktsiyah: Otvet budet adekvatnyj, stranu razorvat’ ne pozvolim /Lukashenko about street protests: We will provide an adequate answer, the country will not be torn apart/ Belta, 10 August.’ Available at: https://www​. belta​.by​/president​/view​/lukashenko​-ob​-ulichnyh​-aktsijah​-otvet​-budet​-adekvatnyj ​ -stranu​-razorvat​-my​-ne​-pozvolim​-402291​-2020/​?fbclid​=IwA​R1Mc​itJT​un2f​frMH​ 3Vr3​EoYdKW​-5Dh​AdkE​brkc​cHoe​KsqZ​1r4s​PoSHWRuk (Accessed 09.03.2022). May, L. (2020) ‘Belarus 2020 and Ukraine 2013–2014 protests: Similarities and differences.’ Fletcher Russia and Eurasia Program. Available at: https://sites​.tufts​.edu​/fletcherrussia​ /lisa​-may​-belarus​-2020​-and​-ukraine​-2013​-2014​-protests​-similarities​-and​-differences/ (Accessed 16.03.2022). MOBILISE (2022) Mobilise Project. Available at: https://mobiliseproject​.com/ (Accessed 01.04.2022). Onuch, O. (2014) ‘Who were the protesters?’ Journal of Democracy 25(3): 44–51. https://doi​. org​/10​.1353​/jod​.2014​.0045 Onuch, O. (2015) ‘Facebook helped me do it: Understanding the EuroMaidan protester “tool-kit”.’ Studies in Ethnicities and Nationalism 15(1). https://onlinelibrary​.wiley​.com​/ doi​/10​.1111​/sena​.12129 Onuch, O. (2020) ‘Belarus rises: Four months and counting.’ ZOiS Spotlight 46. Available at: https://en​.zois​-berlin​.de​/publications​/belarus​-rises​-four​-months​-and​-counting (Accessed 05.04.2022). Onuch, O. and Hale, H.E. (2018) ‘Capturing ethnicity: The case of Ukraine.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 34(2–3): 84–106. https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/1060586X​.2018​.1452247 Onuch, O. and Sasse, G. (2016) ‘Maidan in movement: Protest cycles, diversity of actors, and violence.’ Europe-Asia Studies 68(4): 556–587. Peleschuk, D. (2020) ‘Belarusians have finally emerged as a Nation: A young country has found an identity in the movement to overthrow a dictator.’ Slate. Available at: https:// slate​.com​/news​-and​-politics​/2020​/08​/belarus​-lukashenko​-minsk​-national​-identity​. html (Accessed 12.04.2022). Petrova, I. and Korosteleva, E. (2021) ‘Societal fragilities and resilience: The emergence of peoplehood in Belarus’, Journal of Eurasian Studies 12(22): 122–132. https://doi​.org​/10​. 1177​/18793665211037835 Plough, A.L. (2021) Community Resilience: Equitable Practices for an Uncertain Future. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Probono (2022) Probono​.by​. Available at: http://probono​.by/ (Accessed 17.05.2022). Sadiki, L. (2015) ‘Knowledge production in North Africa.’ Journal of North African Studies 20(5): 688–690.

192  Fostering Peoplehood Sasse, G. (2020) ‘Belarus’s optimistic protesters and Putin’s intentions.’ Carnegie Europe. Available at: https://carnegieeurope​.eu​/strategiceurope​/83381 (Accessed 17.05.2022). Shevel, O. (2018) ‘Towards new horizons in the study of identities in Ukraine.’ Post-Soviet Affairs 34(2–3): 183–185. doi: https://doi​.org​/10​.1080​/1060586X​.2018​.1451243 Shveda, Y. and Park, J.H. (2016) ‘Ukraine’s revolution of dignity: The dynamics of Euromaidan.’ Journal of Eurasian Studies 7: 85–91. Tharoor, I. (2022) ‘The war in Ukraine boosts Belarusian opposition.’ The Washington Post, 3 May. Available at: https://www​.washingtonpost​.com​/world​/2022​/05​/03​/alexander​ -lukashenko​-belarus​-opposition​-tikhanovskaya/ (Accessed 12.04.2022). Umland, A. (2020) ‘What happens to Belarus after Lukashenka falls?’ New Eastern Europe 6(44): 81–87. Wendt, Alexander. (1999) Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press. Witoszek, N. (2019) The Origins of Anti-Authoritarianism. London: Routledge. Witoszek, N. (2021) ‘The revolution of dignity and its drivers.’ Concilium Civitas. Available at: http://conciliumcivitas​.pl​/the​-revolution​-of​-dignity​-and​-its​-drivers/ (Accessed 02.05.2022). Wynnyckyj, M. (2020) ‘Unravelling the Ukrainian revolution: “dignity,” “fairness,” “heterarchy,” and the challenge to modernity’. Kyiv-Mohyla Humanities Journal 7: 123–140. Zaprudnik, J. (2002) ‘Belarus: In search of national identity between 1986 and 2000.’ In Eds. Korosteleva, E.A., Lawson, C.W. and Marsh, R.J. Contemporary Belarus: Between Dictatorship and Democracy. London: Routledge, 110–124.

13 Where Does Belarus Go from Here? Victor Shadurski

From an academic-in-exile…

Introduction In August 2020, after the disputed presidential election, the mass peaceful ­protests that swept across the country demonstrated that the Belarusian nation had reached a new higher level of discontent, rising as a political community – termed here as peoplehood (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021) – in their indignation. This meant turning a hitherto atomized and largely apolitical society into a powerful force for change, with no point of return to the previous status quo. Hundreds of thousands of citizens, representing the most politically and economically active, educated, and highly qualified groups of the population showed a moment of self-organization, openly declaring their desire for a “better life”, inclusive of building an independent, and democratic state in Belarus. As the analysis in this volume demonstrated, the ruling regime of Aliaksandr Lukashenka is no longer sustainable or resilient to internal and external challenges. The unbalanced state tries to prolong its existence by resorting to mass terror against civil society, comparable to the Stalinist repressions. Having experienced the unjustified cruelty of the security forces, Belarusians temporarily ceased their mass street protests, and instead moved underground. Hence, while on the surface everything seems calm, the tensions deep down remain at the same intense level. The confrontation between society and power has transformed into a new form of resistance traditional to Belarus – a partisan movement (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021a; Korshunov 2022; Karbalevich 2022; Fisher 2022). Subjected to political and economic international sanctions and lacking the necessary support in the country, the Belarusian authoritarian government could only rely on the assistance of the Kremlin. With the start of Russia’s large-scale invasion of Ukraine, when the territory and resources of Belarus were used by the aggressor to attack a neighbouring state, the tension in the country noticeably increased. The official Minsk support for Russian aggression

DOI: 10.4324/9781003311454-16

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gave the protest movement new momentum in the fight for freedom and justice (Russkaya Ruletka Lukashenka 2022). In what follows, three of the most important issues for understanding Belarus are discussed. First, the latest rise and development of Belarus as a nation, which acquired sovereign identity three decades ago and, despite all internal and external obstacles, finally asserted the right to exist. Second, the degradation of the ruling political group (including crippling economy and lawlessness) under the parochial leadership of Lukashenka since he came to power in 1994 is now irreversible, constantly requiring Russia’s propping. Third, the emergence of the Belarusian peoplehood is analyzed, to reflect the highest level of self-organization of society and this way to warrant a way forward for the fledgling nation.

Belarus: From Europe’s “Ugly Duckling” to a Sovereign Entity The history of Belarus is filled with many tragic and dramatic events. For centuries, its territory was part of larger state entities (as shown in Chapter 1 of this volume), and the Belarusian people often acted as a donor to the cultures of other nations. Belarus had only short periods of peaceful respite. At the turn of the 1980–1990s, favourable external and internal conditions aligned to propel Belarus to create an independent state and to acquire the right to formulate its domestic and foreign policies. Thirty years on, the country’s sovereignty is threatened again, this time by Russia, which at the time of writing is occupying its territory for military purposes in Ukraine and ensuring Lukashenka’s full dependency on Russia’s support for his regime. It can be assumed that the main internal prerequisite for such uncertainty is the incompleteness of the process of formation of the Belarusian nation. According to Viktar Babaryka, who challenged Aliaksandr Lukashenka in the presidential race and was sentenced to 14 years in prison on false grounds, the Belarusian people have not yet managed to get out of the period of “childhood” for centuries. He believed that today’s Belarusians must break this vicious circle of “childhood” to mature as a nation (Babaryko 2022). The democratic, political, and socio-economic transformations carried out by the young Belarusian state in the first half of the 1990s did not receive the necessary external support. It was especially noticeable in comparison with the Baltic countries and other post-Soviet states. One can find enough evidence that, at least at the beginning of its sovereign history, Belarus was externally perceived as the “ugly duckling of Europe”, being too nostalgic for the USSR and too loyal to Russia (Naumchik 2013: 426). The main problem of the Belarusian society during the 30 years of independence was the lack of experience of democratic conditions. Since the summer of 1994, Belarusians had not seen the change of power in openly contested elections; they also learned the dangers of opposing the government, especially since the 2020 election. After the referendum in May 1995, a policy of gradual

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eradication of the national-ethnic characteristics of Belarusian heritage began, and the use of the Belarusian language soon came to a sharp decline. According to an independent sociological study conducted in 2021, only 32 per cent of the country’s citizens considered the Belarusian language their mother tongue, and only 3 per cent spoke it at home (Bolsh Ne Pamyarkoўnyya 2022). The authorities, not without success, cultivated a false dilemma among the inhabitants of the country: “Lukashenka or chaos”. It was alleged that the departure of the authoritarian regime would inevitably lead to unrest and social upheaval. The Belarusian authorities argued that in order to strengthen state resilience, absolute political loyalty of the population to the president, patriotism, and hard work for modest pay were necessary (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021). The official propaganda succeeded in forming negative attitudes towards the west and a positive outlook to reunification with Russia (Bolsh Ne Pamyarkoўnyya 2022). In the context of authoritarianism, the Belarusian nation did not become more consolidated, instead, it remained fragmented. The lack of unity within the Belarusian society in relation to the choice of language also correlated with the situation in other areas, including geopolitical preferences, choice of economic and domestic political priorities, assessment of historical events, etc. The deep split of the Belarusian society, when many residents of the country on both sides of the political divide did not just disagree but also hated each other, was evidenced by the survey data conducted by Chatham House (November 2021). According to the classification used in the study, the “core of protesters” (staunch opponents of Lukashenka) made up 30 per cent of respondents, the “bastion of Lukashenka” (the dictator’s electorate) had 27 per cent, and people with intermediate or vague political views (“neutrals”) made up 43 per cent (Drakokhrust 2022). The presence of several large opposing groups in Belarus has become the reason for the weak expression of the collective will of the Belarusian nation, and its slow mobilization to solve the most complex national and state challenges. Belarusian society was dominated by an (individual) adaptation strategy for overcoming crises, lacking collectivism and community support owing to numerous bloody wars and conflicts, which convinced Belarusians that they would be unable to change their unfavourable circumstances and could only “hide” to survive alone: as the Belarusian saying goes, “Maya hata zkrayu” (My house is separate), meaning non-interference and neutrality (Shadurski 2014: 22). At the same time, it would be wrong to argue that the Belarusian society did not develop under the conditions of authoritarian rule. In the economy, culture, and education of Belarus since the mid-1990s some autonomous spheres were preserved, which gave some, although limited, chances for progress. Rapidly developing areas include the IT sector, joint ventures with foreign capital, small and medium-sized business structures, foreign tourism institutions, etc. These spheres, developing either without state support at all or with minimal interference from the power vertical, made the country outwardly more attractive and stable.

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However, the main reason for the formation of the potential for change was that during the years of independence, a new generation of Belarusians grew up who for the most part were no longer nostalgic for the USSR, travelled more around the world compared to the older generations, did not demonize the West and, above all, neighbouring countries, and shared with them democratic values. Concerning other parts of the society, it became evident that the majority of the population of Belarus has become disillusioned with the policy of the ruling regime and no longer expects positive changes from it. There is abundant evidence that in the 2020 election, Belarusians in their majority voted against Lukashenka. However, as the subsequent developments showed, the majority of the population was not ready to resist the official authorities, and consequently people have been trying to adapt and to survive the repressive system, even now, when change, albeit slow, is now irreversible. Opponents of the regime, whose number has increased significantly as a result of the events of 2020, now live under conditions of insecurity and a strong sense of danger and injustice, which provokes a conflict between them and the pro-government group. The fact that groups remain in separate information spaces further strengthens the established attitudes towards themselves and representatives of another group. The role of national symbols has changed too: as discussed in Chapters 1 and 2 of this volume, they have become a marker indicating belonging to a particular community. The internal split of Belarusian society is also promoted by Russia. At the initial stage of the aggravation of the Belarusian political crisis, a significant part of the population associated hopes for reconciliation with Russia and President Vladimir Putin. However, it soon became clear that it was Russia who acted as the guarantor of Lukashenka’s regime in Belarus and throughout the post-Soviet space. Among the vocal opponents of the regime, there is a large share of the population still resisting the actions of the authorities. Despite the pressure, and moral and physical torture, they did not give up their views and adherence to democratic principles. Their courageous behaviour in the “court trials”, their letters from prison, and their optimism are all testimony to their resistance. Currently, more than a thousand Belarusian prisoners have been given the status of “political prisoners”. In reality, many more Belarusians who are imprisoned today deserve this status (Boguslavskaya 2022). This shows that the Belarusians are moving away from their “childhood” days to become a nation one day, and the peoplehood that emerged during 2020–2021 is the sure foundation of its future success.

A Slow Degradation of the Belarusian State-Political Model To understand the transformational processes in Belarus today, it is also important to analyze the transformation of a hitherto parliamentary republic into an authoritarian personalistic state under Lukashenka, its pillars and values.

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The bureaucratization of the country, the growth of corruption, and economic stratification, which intensified after the collapse of the USSR, caused justified discontent among people. However, it should be pointed out that a significant proportion of Belarusians had a simplified understanding of the prerequisites and ways out of the crisis. Under the conditions of low political culture, democratic reforms and market transition were erroneously named as the main reason for the negative phenomena. The economic transformations were painful for many in Belarus, who sought solace in a “strong hand” of the president capable, according to their expectations, of quickly putting an end to corruption and stopping growing economic inequality. Despite public expectations that Lukashenka would be able to combat corruption and reduce bureaucracy, he, on the contrary, strengthened and expanded the state power, to satisfy his own ambitions in the first place. The influence of civil society, the Belarusian parliament, and the judiciary on the activities of the executive branch began to noticeably decrease. Thus, in August 1995, a group of deputies of the Supreme Council of the 12th convocation appealed to the prosecutor’s office to protect their colleague, the leader of the labour movement, Siarhei Antonchik, who was arrested by the security services. In response to the deputy’s appeal, First Deputy Prosecutor General Uladimir Kandratyev cynically stated that for him Lukashenka's word was above the Constitution and laws (Naumchik 2013: 500). The described example, which took place just a year after Lukashenka came to power, became the dominant trend in the functioning of the authorities under the conditions of the so-called vertical of power (“presidential register”), within which a careful selection of leaders and employees was carried out from the highest to the lowest echelons of power. When selecting for a particular position, preference was given not to the business and professional qualities of candidates, but to their devotion to the dictator. Speaking with students of the Academy of Management (October 2019), Lukashenka said that the above-mentioned register included 850 people appointed by him, with “protection and immunity” (Lukashenka pro svoy kadrovyy rezerv 2019). Data showed that agricultural specialists and former employees of law enforcement agencies, who did not have any relevant educational foundation to perform executive functions, were recruited for high positions (Lukashenka zasekretil chislennost gosapparata 2019). Particular attention was paid to the selection of candidates for senior positions in the law enforcement agencies: the recruitment and material incentives for employees of repressive structures. Their numbers grew rapidly and much attention was paid not only to the training of personnel but also to their indoctrination. In terms of the number of employees of paramilitary structures per capita, Belarus is ahead of any European country (MKRU 2020). From the beginning of its existence, the regime was afraid of popular protests; therefore, it paid constant attention to the repressive apparatus and used the “experience” of other regimes in suppressing dissent.

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The Belarusian regime intensively exploited the economic legacy of the Soviet times, which fell into decay. Elements of a market economy, the foundations of which were laid in the first half of the 1990s, were forced to function under constant administrative pressure, to expand not because of, but in spite of the authorities. The decaying political regime has introduced a dead-end economic model in Belarus, as demonstrated in Chapter 5 by J. Korosteleva and A. Alakhnovich. The crippled economy has become a rare example of the functioning of a non-market, centralized economy in a predominantly market environment. To a large extent, the sharp drop in unreformed Belarusian industrial and agricultural production and the decline in the standard of living of the population was held back due to the export of cheap Russian hydrocarbon raw materials (Anikeev 2016). After the 9 August presidential election, the decay of the Belarusian state apparatus and law enforcement agencies became especially noticeable and, arguably, irreversible. The mass protests in Belarus in the summer and autumn of 2020 failed to overthrow the dictatorial regime, but arguably inflicted a mortal wound to it. The conflict between the ruling regime and society has escalated so much that the authorities have practically no political or economic mechanisms for resolving it. As history shows, the state’s reliance solely on violence is a dead end and cannot continue indefinitely. There is a growing anticipation of the inevitable defeat of the Belarusian regime: while its fall will not happen automatically, there is an ongoing effort encompassing the opposition inside and outside the country and external economic and political pressure to dislodge the regime. The decay of the state apparatus continues to accelerate, including due to the gradual departure from it of many skilled managers and employees who disagree with the policies of the regime. Some leave voluntarily; others are fired due to suspicions of disloyalty to the state (signing for alternative presidential candidates, frank comments on social networks, participation in peaceful actions, etc.). The decrease in the quality of the work of the state bureaucracy is facilitated by the fear of Lukashenka that has intensified in recent months, which has been cultivated in the power vertical for decades. It seriously inhibits the initiative of the state apparatus and prevents the lower and middle levels of power from making even the simplest decisions. Numerous officials of various levels are afraid to take responsibility for specific decisions, which gives some analysts a reason to figuratively compare the work of Belarusian state structures with the “Italian” strike. One can agree with the opinion of Alexander Opeykin (2022), executive director of the Sports Solidarity Fund, that the main principle of many of Lukashenka’s supporters is the rejection of their own opinion and moral convictions, ignoring the law and justice for the sake of receiving any small benefits in the form of a position, allowance, plot for building a house, minimum social weight, etc. In Lukashism, according to Opeykin, the main criterion is silence and bestial cruelty, sitting in the depths of the soul, fierce hatred for everything bright and different.

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The so-called legislative and judicial branches of power have finally discredited themselves in the last two years. The judicial and legal system is almost completely functioning according to the “sometimes not up to the law” directive, which Aliaksandr Lukashenka officially gave at a meeting of prosecutors in September 2020 (Lukashenka — prokuroram 2020). Directions from the very top led to the fact that even the basic norms of the law, approved by the authoritarian government itself, were not observed when passing unreasonable court sentences to the protesters. Examples of legal degradation (legal default) include sentencing without evidence, repression and the destruction of the legal profession independent of the state, sophisticated torture of prisoners for “political” reasons, etc. (Aleksandrovskaya 2021). Legal default that presently prevails in Belarus will have long-term negative consequences, since the disrespect of the legal norms established in the world cultivated by the authorities, the activities of the so-called law enforcement and judicial structures based on a “telephone law” from “above” have seriously eroded the foundations of the legal culture of the Belarusian population. Belarusians were accustomed to unfair sentences by the authorities, justification of corruption, the “normality” of using personal connections for their own ends. Restoration of lost legal values will require great effort and considerable time, as discussed in Chapters 7 and 8. To reinforce the atmosphere of fear and insecurity in Belarusian society, the puppet members of the House of Representatives and the Council of the Republic of the National Assembly adopted almost unanimously repressive legislative acts dictated by the top of the executive branch, which did not meet any international legal standards. In 2021, for example, Belarus adopted a whole package of laws aimed primarily at combating the protest movement in the country. On 14 May 2021, Lukashenka signed a law “On countering extremism”, allowing the death penalty for an attempt to commit a terrorist attack.1 The document enshrined a number of concepts – “extremist group”, “extremist symbols and paraphernalia” – which received a tendentious interpretation by the courts. Thus, for example, the authorities classified as “extremist group” not only the authors of some telegram channels that criticize the political regime, but also their subscribers. The “highlight” of the decaying regime is the frantic state propaganda, in which hate speech is flourishing. A group of authors came to the surface in the official media, violating all the rules and norms of decency in journalism. In a state that respects the law, aggressive propagandists would undoubtedly be held responsible for inciting social hatred, for damaging the personal dignity of hundreds of Belarusian and foreign citizens. However, under the conditions of the ruling regime, “state propagandists”, on the contrary, were awarded government regalia and received material and moral encouragement for their “duty” to the state. The logical consequence of slipping into authoritarianism was, on the one hand, the increased dependence of the ruling group in Belarus on the Kremlin, and a sharp deterioration in relations (up to a breaking point) with democratic

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countries, primarily with the European Union and the United States. From a state that not without reason claimed the honorary status of a “donor of European security”, in the words of the Belarusian analyst Valery Karbalevich (2022), Belarus has now become a destabilizing factor and a threat to regional security on the European continent. The tragedy for the Belarusian people and their neighbours, which has yet to be assessed, was to allow the use of its territory for Russia’s military invasion of Ukraine, and the shelling of Ukrainian settlements with Russian missiles. Along with Russia, Belarus began to be associated with the role of aggressor state, with all the ensuing negative moral and legal consequences. Belarus has become an outsider in many international ratings that characterize the situation with respect for human rights, freedom of the media, the number of prisoners, etc. Serious political and economic sanctions were imposed against the Belarusian government. The field of manoeuvre in the foreign policy sphere was shrinking rapidly (Karbalevich 2022). According to many analysts, the Belarusian political model, despite its seeming stability, turned out to be very fragile: the balance within the ruling elite was destroyed, the ideological consensus was destroyed – a symbiosis of the national, Soviet, and pro-Russian. The government, which has neither mass public support nor the necessary moral and material resources to reduce the degree of tension in society, is short lived (Kazakevich 2022). The only question that remains is the longevity of the Kremlin ruler Putin supporting Lukashenka and his regime.

Peoplehood as the Main Pillar of Belarusian State Independence The year 2020 can be called a turning point, in the activities of civil society in Belarus. It began with the initiatives of Belarusian citizens to organize assistance to the doctors fighting against the rapidly spreading COVID-19 pandemic. Belarusians quickly realized that in counteracting the disease, one cannot fully rely on state structures, which, to please the ruler, began to manipulate statistics, in many cases replacing real measures to prevent the disease with propaganda about the world level of medicine in Belarus. Why did 2020 become a turning point for the Belarusian nation and civil society? Based on the discussion in this volume and some of our own observations, there are several reasons for understanding the changes that have taken place. Firstly, the protests of 2020 contributed to the rapid and voluntary “rallying around the flag” of hundreds of thousands of citizens who were confident in the need for change and demanded that Belarus should return to democratic norms and standards. For many Belarusians, peaceful demonstrations, which began in Belarus on such a massive scale almost for the first time, have become a real holiday. People did not feel alone in their striving for a better life, they realized that they belonged to a new political community (peoplehood), as discussed by Korosteleva and Petrova in this volume. It is no coincidence that the first mass protest processes resembled a kind of carnival: the participants put

Where Does Belarus Go from Here?  201

on appropriate clothes, made posters, chanted ironic slogans, played musical instruments, acted out theatrical performances, etc. Mass rallies and demonstrations of Belarusians began with a government-sanctioned meeting of voters with the presidential candidate Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya and her closest team members, Maryia Kalesnikava and Veranika Tsapkala, which took place on 30 July 2020. Tens of thousands of participants gathered in the Peoples’ Friendship Park in Minsk, demonstrating a peaceful and organized nature of the Belarusian demonstrations (Vybory v Belarusi 2020). There was a general feeling that in the confrontation between the ruling regime and civil society, a turning point had come in favour of the latter. This inspired civil society activists and at the same time frightened the ruling elite. The authorities violated the rules of the pre-election campaign that they previously declared. All the venues allocated for holding meetings with presidential candidates appeared to be “booked” out. At the same time, regular visits by Lukashenka to the military and police units expedited, planning to use the forces for suppressing the protests. Many popular slogans emerged expressing the Belarusian peoplehood, such as “A Belarusian to a Belarusian is Belarusian”, “We did not know each other until this summer”, “Belarusian protests are when, standing on a bench, they take off their shoes” and others. Many new songs, poems, video clips, and design works dedicated to the Belarusian revolution have appeared on social networks and have gained wide popularity. Well-known music critics began to write about the phenomenon of Belarusian protest art (Korosteleva and Petrova 2021; Troitskiy 2020). In contrast to self-organized mass street protests, the authorities succeeded in maintaining control over the state-owned enterprises and state media. At the same time, in August 2020, at some enterprises and institutions, attempts were recorded by labour collectives to express their position in relation to the ongoing events, to condemn violence, etc. The most striking event took place at the Minsk Wheel Tractor Plant on 17 August 2020, when Lukashenka personally came to meet with the workers. The participants staged an obstruction to the dictator (Popytka Lukashenka 2020). As another example, an extraordinary meeting of the Council of the Belarusian State Univeristy (BSU) can be cited (18 August 2020), where the Council’s appeal to teachers, staff, and students was adopted. Representatives of student organizations present at the meeting played an important role in the adoption of this document. Although the final document was of a compromising nature, it largely reflected public opinion. Thus, in particular, the appeal stressed that the members of the Council did not only demand the condemnation of violence and aggression; they also called for the prosecution of those responsible. The document expressed sympathy for the victims during the protests, and demanded material assistance for them (Zasedanie Soveta BGU 2020). Such actions in state structures in August 2020 were a rather isolated phenomenon, and soon, under the crackdown by the regime, they stopped altogether, unleashing full-blown violence on those who dared to speak up (Belarus: “Zachistka grajdanskogo obschestva” 2022).

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Second, even in the absence of a coordinating centre, participants of mass demonstrations showed high self-organization and creativity. Popular telegram channels and local chats on social networks (popular protest infrastructure) played a big role in uniting and informing the supporters of the urgent changes. They acted as platforms for discussions, information and any relevant feedback. In chats, Belarusians discussed not only participation in mass demonstrations, but also holding courtyard events, various social projects, etc. Social networks have become even more important as the main source of alternative news. They acted not only in the direction of disseminating information and analytics, but also increasingly began to act as initiators and coordinators of public actions. This trend was outlined long before the events of 2020. Thus, back in 2011, in a number of Belarusian cities, protests were held under the general name “Revolution through social networks”, the essence of which was that, at the call of social networks, Belarusians went out to short and spontaneous demonstrations in the most unexpected places. Despite the fact that the protesters did not speak with slogans, but silently clapped their hands, hundreds of people were arrested and sentenced to administrative imprisonment and fines (Guscha 2011). One of the symbols of the new media is Anton Motolko, a blogger from Minsk, who gained an effective media influence in 2015–2017 by initiating public discussions about local social problems in social networks. He went beyond usual online communication and openly criticized authorities for their inaction, demanding they solve problems. The influence of civil society activists such as Motolko is comparable to the influence of a major newspaper because his messages became viral mobilizing more protesters to join (Shadurski and Malishevskaya 2019: 42). During and after the mass protests of 2020, the authorities resorted to unprecedented repressions against independent journalists, declaring dozens of telegram channels extremist. Many journalists were arrested and subjected to criminal prosecution. However, the authoritarian regime failed to change the situation and seriously impede the dissemination of alternative information. Third, during the active political confrontation in Belarus, the active role of women was revealed, leading to the description of Belarusian protests as those with the female face. Even under conditions of total repression, a small group of women dressed in the colours of Belarusian or Ukrainian symbols made daring marches in the capital of Belarus, which created an optimistic informational occasion on social networks (V Minske zhenshchiny 2021). Fourth, in the events of 2020–2022 representatives of the Belarusian diaspora in dozens of countries of the world took an active part. In the democratic conditions of the country of residence, foreign Belarusians held numerous actions of solidarity, raised funds in support of the repressed and needy protesters, and assisted forced migrants from Belarus in settling. The Belarusian diaspora, which has increased significantly due to economic migration and political refugees in recent years, has shown in practice that it is an integral part of Belarusian society, primarily in the struggle for positive changes. Their role in the democratic struggle for Belarus cannot be underestimated.

Where Does Belarus Go from Here?  203

Fifth, according to many politicians and experts, Belarusians, through their actions and solidarity, have created a very attractive, positive, strong, and beautiful image of our country in the world (Sannikov 2022). The events in Belarus for the first time on such a large scale became the feature of the world community. News from Belarus occupied the front pages of the world media, including on the pan-European news channel Euronews. The Office of Tsikhanouskaya working conjointly with the Belarusian diaspora and world institutions continues the effort of keeping Belarus on the news front pages, even in the situation of Russia’s war in Ukraine.2 Sixth, despite the suppression of open protests, civil society continued peaceful protest in other ways. The history of Belarusian resistance can become a new encyclopedia of forms of protest, primarily peaceful. There are many forms of manifestation of collective and individual rejection of the authoritarian regime: social ostracism against punishers, refusal of honours, participation in ideological shows, consumer boycott, refusal of the official press, all kinds of strikes, and absenteeism from work “due to illness”, the boycott of church ministers-collaborators, exposing agents of the regime, making visual signs of protest, supporting political prisoners, and others. The refusal to purchase goods produced by enterprises whose owners and managers were suspected of being close to Lukashenka’s circles (consumer boycott) was widely adopted. Belarusian enthusiasts even created a special application that helped identify goods from “undesirable” manufacturers. A lot of work was done by specialists in the field of information technology. They actively participated in identifying persons who grossly violated human rights by persecuting the opposition. A manifestation of open resistance that required great courage was the continued display of national flags and other symbols of protest, the fight against which was declared one of the main tasks of the regime. Flags on tall trees have become a symbol of the unbroken protest spirit of Belarusians. Instead of some flags taken down by order of the authorities, others appeared in the busy neighbourhoods. The events of 2020 stimulated not only the emergence of a new political community in Belarus, peoplehood, but also the emergence of new authoritative figures and structures among the Belarusian opposition. As a result of the election campaign, the national leader Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya managed to unite and bring hope to the Belarusian citizens. Her office at the time of writing included 12 employees responsible for specific areas of activity. This small team actively works on the preparation of short-term and long-term projects to restore democracy in Belarus, and also as a voice in the media space on a global scale (Slyunkin 2021). Thus, in recent months, Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya has held meetings with dozens of heads of state and government. She was hosted by hundreds of ministers, large cities, and major businesses (Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya 2022). The events that began in Belarus in the spring of 2020 remain of great importance not only for the Belarusians, but also for Europe and the whole

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world. The peaceful struggle of the Belarusians against dictatorship has raised many new questions for politicians and researchers including about the specifics of the authoritarian regimes in the 21st century and their potential to resist democratic transformations. While the answers are yet to be investigated further, the reality shows that such regimes as those of Belarus and Russia are proving harder to maintain by every day. Their extended agony makes a democratic future much more desirable, and in truth, inevitable. Long Live Belarus!

Notes 1 For more information see https://abcnews​.go​.com​/International​/wireStory​/belarus​ -expands​-death​-penalty​-law​-ups​-threat​-opposition​-84814806 (accessed 20 July 2022). 2 For more information see Oxford Belarus Observatory which has been running joint events with the research centre of Tsikhanouskaya’s office to raise awareness about Belarus worldwide: https://obo​.web​.ox​.ac​.uk​/home; the OST website and YouTube channels https://www​.youtube​.com​/results​?search​_query​=tsikhanouskaya and its research centre https://www​.youtube​.com​/channel​/UCyEEXOn​_QtIrmPfCHaajsdQ.

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Index

1918 Belarusian National Republic 183 Abetsedarski, L.S. 6 Academy of Management 197 Ackerman, F. 24, 26, 27 Adamovich, A. 36 Alachnovič, A. xx, 54, 198 All-Belarusian People’s Assembly 105 Amnesty International 105, 140 Anna, S. xxi, 10 anti-EU 13 anti-globalist 13 anti-regime protests 26 anti-Soviet resistance 24 anti-Ukrainian propaganda 18 anti-Western stance 18 Arab Spring 180 archaeological monuments 38–40 architectural memorials 39 Aslund, A. 86n1 August election 91, 155 Babaryka, V. 16, 17, 53, 106, 162 Babic, M. 59 Bahdanava, H. 23 Bahdanovich, M. 10 Bekus, N. 138 Belarus: Belarus Golovnogo Mozga 17; Belarus-Russia integration project 33; capitalism in 42; civil protest movement in 51; constitutional identity 7–9; COVID-19 Outbreak 77–78; domestic and foreign policies 194; early 2020s and oil price saga 76–77; early stage of transition 68–69; economic liberalisation 82–84; economic reforms in 81; economic stabilisation and growth 81–82; encyclopaedia 42; foreign historians on genocide laws 26–28;

foreign trade in goods composition 76; GDP per capita growth rates 77; geographical features of 42; Great Patriotic War 18–21; gross external debt 75; holocaust and ‘genocide’ 23–26; inflation rate 79; innovation performance of 74; international community and xix; macroeconomic stabilisation 82–83; mortality in 97; national and political symbols 10–12; national identity-building in 147; net external public sector and government debt 75; new business density 73; nonprofit organisations in 139; nuclearfree zone in 58; political and social implications 50; political crisis, sanctions and gradual economic fallout 78–81; political symbols xx; post-Soviet history of xix; presidential elections in 136; private sector developments 71–76, 83–84; public debt 80; real GDP growth decomposition 70, 70; real GDP growth rate 78; social support policy 85–86; Soviet Modernity in 43–45; Soviet war memory 35–38; Stalinist killings 22–23; state-owned enterprises 84; states, historians, and concepts of statehood 3–7; State’s Mission 84–85; tensions with Russia, industrial modernisation, and recession 70–71; War Memorials 21–22 Belarusian Academy of Sciences 40 Belarusian anti-authoritarian revolution 173 Belarusian Christian Democracy 23 Belarusian Constitution 127 Belarusian Criminal Code, Art 130 of 24 Belarusian Democratic Republic (BDR) 7 Belarusian Institute for Public Administration Reform and Transformation 151, 152



208 Index Belarusian-language dictionary 42 Belarusian law: criminal law and regime change 118–120; criminal provisions on human trafficking 123–124; participation in extremist organisations 123; proportionality 122; rule of law considerations 120–121, 128 Belarusian Ministry of Culture 39 Belarusian national identity 37 Belarusian national movement 4 Belarusian People’s Republic (BNR) 126 Belarusian Popular Front 17 Belarusian Society for Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments 40 Belarusian Solidarity Fund 173 Belarusian Soviet Encyclopaedia 41, 42 Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) 19, 39, 183 Belarusian Telegram channels 17 Belarusian Telegraph Agency (BELTA) 26 Berenskoetter, F. 180 Biden, J. 53 Bindman, E. xxi BIPART surveys 153 Borrell, J. 53 Borys, A. 24 Brezhnev, L. 19, 36 Brookings 93 BSSR Council of Ministers 41 budgetary process 83 Butler, J. 151 #ByCovid19 137, 186 Byelorussian Soviet Socialist Republic (BSSR) 6 Bykau, V. 38 BySol 139 capitalism 42, 69, 170–171 Catholic churches 35, 47n22 Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) 133 Central Election Committee 164 Chagall, M. 11 change, in Belarus: civil society 134–135; in country’s foreign policy choice and geopolitical orientation 51, 57; COVID-19 pandemic 86; criminal law and regime change 118–120; criminal provisions on human trafficking 123– 124; geopolitical change 55; geopolitical situation 34; judicial system 104; “local” and “personal” levels 51; political crisis 138–141; political structures 157; of political symbols 11; rule of

law 124–127; separation of powers in, extremist groups 123; social change 172 Chernyshova, N. xx Chigrinov, S. 127 Chinese Sinopharm vaccine 94 Christian denominations 4 Chulitskaya, T. xxi civic activism 185, 187 civic community 34, 43 civil partisan resistance xviii Civil Service Bureau 107 civil society 50, 52, 92, 95; 2020 events 136–138; defined 134–135; political crisis 138–141 civil society organisations (CSOs) 133, 138 Code of the Judicial System 104, 113n5 cohesion 54, 149, 154–157 Cold War 4, 140 Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) 59 Communist Party 20, 117 Communist Party of Belarus (CPB) 20, 33 Communist rule 21 community of relations 156, 157 COMPASS project xxii complexity thinking xxi, 148, 180, 182 Constitutional Court of Belarus 118, 127 constitutional identity 3, 8 Constitution of Belarus 8, 104 Coordination Council 152 Council for Judicial Reform 109 Council of Europe 103, 107, 108 COVID-19 xix, xxi, 15, 17, 20, 24, 50, 137, 142, 150, 186, 200; cumulative COVID-19 cases 91, 94; cumulative COVID-19 deaths 96; economic context 90; economic stagnation 89; excess mortality and mortality 98; mismanagement of 77–78; politics, protests, and public health 93–99; politics and protest 90–92; proportion of deaths 99; vaccination rates against 95 crimes against humanity 11, 118 criminal liability 25, 119 crowdfunding xix, 139, 153, 154 cultural heritage 46 Danilov, A.N. 52 D’Cruz, L. xxi de facto Russian domination 9 democracy xix, 10, 12, 23, 56, 57, 60, 105, 147, 156, 184, 185, 187, 188, 203 democratic mobilization 147

Index  209 democratisation xviii, 60, 134, 136, 147 Denmark 94 de Vogel, S. 52 dictatorship 7, 9, 17, 204 Diderot, D. 174 digital communication 156 digital revolution 45 disorganized groups 19 Dounar-Zapolski, M. 5 Duchy of Muscovy 4 dvory and microraiony 149–151 Dziarzhautsau, Y. 30n15 Eastern Partnership Initiative (EaP) 51, 60 economic: crime 123; liberalisation 82–84; migration 202; problems 18; transformations 44, 197 Elgenius, G. 11 Encyclopaedia 41 Ermalovich, M. 125 Ethics Council 112 Etkind, A. 36 Eurasian Economic Union (EEU) 51, 83 Euro-Atlantic bloc 60 EuroMaidan Protest Participant Survey 189n4 European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) 119 European Court of Human Rights (EctHR) 119 European Union (EU) xix, 51, 55, 107, 181, 200 European war 29 external debt 71, 74, 75 extremist organisation 24, 123, 139 Facebook 162, 189n5 Falkov, Y. 27 female activists 137, 165 feminist anti-patriarchy poster 169 feudalism 8 financial market 82 Flockhart, T. 180 foreign agents 140 foreign direct investments post-2011 71 foreign policy: 2022 Russia’s War with Ukraine 56–57; geopolitical disposition 57–59; and geopolitical orientation 51; grassroots opposition in 52–54; ‘multidirectionality’ in 51; Russia-Belarus bilateral relations 51 fraternization 165 free discretion 122

freedom of speech 9 Free Trade and Association Agreement 181 Friedman, A. 27 Gapova, E. xxi, 10 GCRF COMPASS project (ES/ P010849/1) 158n3 Gebremariam, A. 54 Gediminas Hill 5 Genocide of the Belarusian People 26 geopolitical disposition 60 Georgia 106–108, 112, 136, 141, 147 Georgian Bar Association 108 German Supreme Court 118 Germany 94, 119 Gerry, C. J. xx G.I. Jane (1997) 176 global financial crisis 71, 90 Global Innovation Index 73 Google 71 government debt 74 ‘government-organized NGOs’ (GONGOs) 141 Grand Duchy of Lithuania 4, 5, 7–9 Great Patriotic War 16, 18–22, 25, 36, 39 Great St Nicholas Church 39 Great Terror victims 36 Greek-Catholic church 4 Greek Lysistrata 165 green-red flag 11 gross external debt 74 High Council of Judges (HCJ) 109 High Council of Justice of Georgia 106 High Qualification Commission of Judges (HQCJ) 109 High-Technology Park (HTP) 71 Hong Kong Umbrella Revolution 180 Hrodna Museum of History and Archaeology 40 Hromadske​.​ua 189n5 human rights 9, 81, 104, 136, 140, 171, 184, 200 human rights organisations 136, 139, 140 Iakub Kolas Museum 37 Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Studies (IISEPS) 46 Information and Communication Technology (ICT) industry 71 information politics 134 information technology (IT) sector 170 Instagram 189n5

210 Index Integrity and Ethics Commission (IEC) 110 International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 119 international recognition 53 International Relations (IR) xix, 60 international reserves 74 Iraq 18 Iron Age 40 Ishchanka, U. 173 Jacobsson, K. 133 Jewish Holocaust 19, 23, 29 Jews 23, 27 judicial system: in Georgia 105–108; overview of 102–105; in Ukraine 108–111 Kalesnikava, M. 53, 162, 163, 201 Kandratyev, U. 197 Kapuściński, R. 180 Karbalevich, V. 200 Karyzna, U. 10 Kavalenka, S. 11 Kavaleuski, V. 54 Kazak, L. xxi Kazei, M. 21 key macroeconomics indicators 72, 72 Khamenka, S. 121 Khatyn memorial complex 39 Kirpich, A. 98 Korolczuk, E. 133 Korosteleva, E. xxi, 7, 33, 52, 54, 135, 180, 200 Korosteleva, J. xx, 198 Kotljarchuk, A. xx, 33 Kremlin 199 Kruesmann, T. xxi, 10 Kudlenko, A. xxi, 33 Kupala, Y. 172 Kurapaty 10–11, 23, 28 Kuryan, P. xxi Kuzniatsou, I. 23 labour market 85 Laputska, V. xx Lastouski, V. 5 Law 193-IX 110, 111 Law 1401-VIII 110 Law 1402-VIII 110 Law 1629-IX 111 Law 1635-IX 111 Law against Nazism Rehabilitation 24 law enforcement agencies 138 legal default 199 Lewis, S. 37

Liabedzka, A. 54 Liava, A. 93 liberal democracy 60 Lindner, R. 6 Lisetsky, K 93 Lithuania 141 local self-administration 9 Locke, John 172 Lukashenka, A. xviii, xxi, 9, 11, 16, 28, 33, 50, 89, 90, 117, 173, 177n1 macroeconomic stabilisation 82–83 Macron, E. 53 Makei, U. 18, 29n4 Mamayka, I. 121 Marin, A. 104 market economy 198 Marples, D. xx, 10, 13 Masherau, P. 19, 33 Masherau-era development 35 mass mobilisation 137, 138, 142, 165 mass privatisation 135 Mazurau, K. 19 Middle Ages 40 migration crises 18 Minister of Justice 121 Minister of Justice of Ukraine 109 Ministry of Culture 39, 40 Ministry of Justice 104 Ministry of the Interior 123 Minsk 44; female protester in 166; “Women in White” in 164 Minsk war museum 21 Moshes, A. 136 most-favoured-nation (MFN) status 79 Motolko, A. 202 Motolko Pomogi 17 national flags 203 national identifiers 182 national identity 34 national liberation 4 national white-red-white flag 11, 12 Nazis/Nazism 13, 20; camps 35; ideology 26; occupation forces 20; symbols 26 Neumann, C. xx NEXTA 17, 24 NEXTA Telegram channel 169 Nizhnikau, R. 136 non-governmental organisations 136 non-profit organisations 139 non-Soviet regiments 20 North American countries 134 nuclear energy research 43

Index  211 October Revolution 19, 43 Office of Sviatlana Tsikhanouskaya (OST) 54 O’Loughlin, J. 58 Onuch, O. 57–58, 60 Opeykin, A. 198 opposition media channels 12 organisations and initiatives 141 organisations still 141 organised criminal group 123 organised excursions 40 Organization for Security and Co-operation in Europe 107 Oxford Belarus Observatory 54 oxygen tanks 92

post-Soviet collective identity 34 post-Soviet state capitalism 170 post-war economic modernisation 35 Prakopieu, V. 173 Pratasevich, R. 17 presidential elections 11 Principality of Polatsk 8 private sector developments 71–76 protective integration 58 protest: activism 151; mobilization 170; movement 34, 52 provocations 17–18 public debt 79, 80, 82–83 Pushkin, A. 24 Putin, V. 58, 196, 200

Pahonia 10 parliamentarism 9 Partyzanskaya metro station 21 Pazniak, Z. 23 pension system reform 85 peoplehood 33; 2020 protest movement 52, 54; anti-authoritarian uprising and political subjectivity 172–173; Belarusian context 135–136; Belarusian state-political model 196–204; civil society 134–138; evolution of identity in Ukraine 181–185; local support infrastructure and power of selforganisation 185–187; political crisis 138–141; Revolutions of Dignity 179–181; self-organization in Belarus 149–157; self-organization without central control 148–149; women’s mobilization in 162–169; women's political agents 174–176 Pershai, A. 46 personal dignity 9 personal protective equipment (PPE) 92 Petrova, I. xxi, 7, 33, 52, 135, 180, 200 Pliakhimovich, I. 127 Poczobut, A. 24 Poland 96, 141 Poles 23 police’s harassment 151 Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 4–6, 9, 125 Polish minority, in Belarus 24 political: climate 34; crisis 17; discrimination 7; institutions 5, 149; liberalisation 136; parties 17; prisoners 13, 18, 152, 172, 185; refugees 202; rights 175; symbols 3; system 134 post-Communist transition 146–147 post-Soviet Belarusian identity 35

Rabochyi Ruh (Workers’ Movement) 139 Radaman, A. xx Radbruch formula 120 red-green flag 11 repression 117, 118, 138–140, 142, 151, 157, 169, 183, 188, 189, 202; criminal liability for 119; foreign policy choice 59; political opponents 135; violence and 16 Research and Development (R&D) 73, 170 resilience 36, 38, 117, 176, 179, 180, 187, 195 Revolution of Dignity in Ukraine xxi, 182, 185, 188 revolution of indignation 180, 185, 186, 189 Reynolds, C. 148 right to vote 11 Rikhter, K. 54 Rose Revolution 105 Rotman, D.G. 52 Rozovsky, L. 27 rule of law 4 Russia: Belarus-Russia integration project 33; Russian nuclear forces 58; Russian Orthodox Church 4; Russian Sputnik vaccine 94; Russian-Ukrainian war 82, 140, 142; war crimes in Ukraine xix Sadiki, L. 180 Sakalouski, N. 10 Sasse, G. 57–58, 60 Second World War 16, 24 self-justification 18 self-organization 147, 148; alignment 152–153; cohesion 154–157; dvory and microraiony 149–151; political change 146; political institutions 149; separation 151–152 Serheyenka, I. 25 Shadurski, V. xx, xxii

212 Index Shelest, Oksana 172 Shved, A. 26 Sierakowski, S. 92 Silitski, V. 128n3 Skaryna, F. 45 Slabodchikava, A. 163 smart migration policies 85 Smilovitsky, L. 22, 23, 27, 28 social/societal: anxiety 151; class 50; cohesion 134, 135; contestation movements 146; contract 33, 45; distancing 92; equality 4; groups 3; identity xix; media 186; mobilisation xix; mobility 9; movements 133–135, 137; networks 202; resilience xviii, 117, 187; self-organization 147; Social Democratic Party 17; solidarity 92 Society for Preservation of Historical and Cultural Monuments 39 socio-demographic groups 158n3 socio-political transformation 142 sovereignty xx Soviet Belarusian identity 35 Soviet historiography 6 Soviet national symbols 44 Soviet Union 19, 21, 41, 102, 117 Spasso-Preobrazhenskaia Church 41 Stalin 19, 21 State Building Committee 40 state capitalism 69 state-owned enterprises (SOEs) 55, 84, 90 state repression 135 state-society relations xix state violence xix Supreme Council of the 12th convocation 197 Syria 18 Tarrow, S. 134 tax evasions 83 Telegram 24, 35, 117, 138, 189n5 Temporary Commission 109 terrorism 27 Tikhanousky, S. 53 Tilly, C. 134 Toal, G. 58 Tomb of the Unknown Soldier 21 Transnational Organized Crime 124 Treisman, D. 136 Tsapkala, V. 16, 17, 53, 162 Tsepkala, V. 162, 163 Tsikhanouskaya, S. 16, 53–57, 59, 60, 93, 112, 162, 163, 174, 175, 183, 201, 203 Tsikhanouski, S. 17 Tsoy, V. 172

Ukraine 108, 147; community structures 186; democracy, fairness, and freedom 184; evolution of identity in 181–185; peoplehood in 187–189; power of self-organisation 185–187; Revolution of Dignity 188; self-organization 185; Ukraine-EU relations 182 Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UPA) 183 Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity 182, 188 Ukrainska Pravda​.com​​.ua 189n5 United Civil Party 17 United Nations Convention 124 United Nations’ International Court of Justice 12 United Nations Security Council 53 United States 200 United States Agency for International Development 107 UN Protocol 124 urban skilled professionals 170 USSR: constitutions 126; ethnic groups 44 vaccination 95 Venice Commission 106, 107, 109, 111 Viachorka, F. 54 Viasna 12, 105, 136, 139 War Memorials 21–22 wartime losses 28 Western Belarus 23 Western European countries 134 white-red-white flags 12, 17, 22, 26, 27 women: anti-authoritarian uprising and political subjectivity 172–173; deconstructing protest 169–171; feminist anti-patriarchy poster 169; feminist slogans and groups 168; human rights organizations 169; mass mobilization and gendered performance 165–169; movement xxi; physical and sexual violence 168; political agents 173–176; political subjectivity 176; Women’s Marches 137 World Bank 107 World Health Organisation xix, 91 World Justice Project Rule of Law Index 105, 108 World War I 4 World War II 34, 184 Young Front 23 YouTube 162, 173, 189n5 Zheng, H. xx Zhurauleu, A. 173