Being in America : Sixty Years of the Metaphysical Society [1 ed.] 9789401210737, 9789042038288

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BEING IN AMERICA

VIBS Volume 272 Robert Ginsberg Founding Editor Leonidas Donskis Executive Editor Associate Editors Richard T. Hull G. John M. Abbarno Michael Krausz George Allan Olli Loukola Gerhold K. Becker Mark Letteri Raymond Angelo Belliotti Vincent L. Luizzi Kenneth A. Bryson Hugh P. McDonald C. Stephen Byrum Adrianne McEvoy Robert A. Delfino J.D. Mininger Rem B. Edwards Danielle Poe Malcolm D. Evans Peter A. Redpath Roland Faber Arleen L. F. Salles Andrew Fitz-Gibbon Francesc Forn i Argimon John R. Shook Eddy Souffrant Daniel B. Gallagher Tuija Takala William C. Gay Emil Višňovský Dane R. Gordon Anne Waters J. Everet Green James R. Watson Heta Aleksandra Gylling John R. Welch Matti Häyry Thomas Woods Brian G. Henning Steven V. Hicks a volume in Histories and Addresses of Philosophical Societies HAPS Edited by Richard T. Hull

BEING IN AMERICA Sixty Years of the Metaphysical Society

Edited by

Brian G. Henning and David Kovacs

Amsterdam - New York, NY 2014

Cover image: Silver tetradrachm from ancient Athens. (iStock) Cover design: Studio Pollmann The paper on which this book is printed meets the requirements of “ISO 9706:1994, Information and documentation - Paper for documents Requirements for permanence”. ISBN: 978-90-420-3828-8 E-Book ISBN: 978-94-012-1073-7 © Editions Rodopi B.V., Amsterdam - New York, NY 2014 Printed in the Netherlands

Histories and Address of Philosophical Societies (HAPS) Richard T. Hull Editor Other Titles in HAPS Adrianne Leigh McEvoy, ed. Sex, Love, and Friendship. Studies of the Society for the Philosophy of Sex and Love: 1993±2003. 2011. VIBS 232 Thomas O. Buford and Harold H. Oliver, eds. Personalism Revisited. 2002. VIBS 124 Bennie R. Crockett, Jr., ed. Addresses of the Mississippi Philosophical Association. 2000. VIBS 102 Alan Soble, ed. Sex, Love, and Friendship. 1997. VIBS 45 Richard T. Hull, ed. A Quarter Century of Value Inquiry. 1994. VIBS 13

CONTENTS LIST OF FIGURES

xi

EDITORIAL FOREWORD RICHARD T. HULL

xiii

GUEST FOREWORD: Being in America: On Metaphysics and the Metaphysical Society of America xvi WILLIAM DESMOND ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

xxix

INTRODUCTION

1 BRIAN G. HENNING AND DAVID KOVACS Part One: THE QUESTION OF METAPHYSICS

9

ONE

The Four-fold Art of Avoiding Questions PAUL WEISS

10

TWO

The Problem of the Analogy of Being GEORGE KLUBERTANZ

16

THREE

The Self as Source of Meaning in Metaphysics W. NORRIS CLARKE

40

FOUR

Reality and Metaphysics JOSEPH OWENS

58

FIVE

Merleau-Ponty and the Renewal of Ontology MARJORIE GRENE

78

SIX

Metaphysics, Critique, and Utopia RICHARD J. BERNSTEIN

100

SEVEN

The Question of Being ROBERT SOKOLOWSKI

120

EIGHT

Is Metaphysics Possible? STANLEY ROSEN

132

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BEING IN AMERICA

NINE

The Science We Are Seeking RALPH MCINERNY

154

TEN

The Practicality of Metaphysics FREDERICK FERRÉ

172

Part Two: THE QUESTION OF KNOWLEDGE ELEVEN

Two Faces of Science ERNAN MCMULLIN

TWELVE

Are Categories Invented or Discovered? A Response to Foucault JORGE J. E. GRACIA

THIRTEEN

Textuality, Reality, and the Limits of Knowledge NICHOLAS RESCHER Part Three: THE QUESTION OF LANGUAGE

183 184

204 222

245

FOURTEEN

Metaphysics and Language JOHN HERMAN RANDALL, JR.

246

FIFTEEN

Being, Immediacy and Articulation JOHN E. SMITH

258

SIXTEEN

Striving to Speak in a Human Voice: A Peircean Contribution to Metaphysical Discourse. VINCENT COLAPIETRO Part Four: THE QUESTION OF THE GOOD

278

309

SEVENTEEN

The Metaphysics of the Good IVOR LECLERC

310

EIGHTEEN

Perishable Goods GEORGE ALLAN

332

NINETEEN

The Generosity of the Good JOSEPH GRANGE

354

Contents

EPILOGUE

The Legacy and Future ROBERT C. NEVILLE

APPENDIX A

Bibliography of Presidential Addresses of the Metaphysical Society of America 1952±2010

INDEX

ix

366

375 381

LIST OF FIGURES Figure 1. Figure 2. Figure 3. Figure 4. Figure 5. Figure 6. Figure 7. Figure 8. Figure 9. Figure 10. Figure 11. Figure 12. Figure 13. Figure 14. Figure 15. Figure 16. Figure 17. Figure 18. Figure 19. Figure 20. Figure 21.

Portrait of William Desmond Portrait of Paul Weiss Portrait of George Klubertanz Portrait of W. Norris Clarke Portrait of Joseph Owens Portrait of Marjorie Grene Portrait of Richard J. Bernstein Portrait of Robert Sokolowski Portrait of Stanley Rosen Portrait of Ralph McInerny Portrait of Frederick Ferré Portrait of Ernan McMullin Portrait of Jorge J. E. Gracia Portrait of Nicholas Rescher Portrait of John Herman Randall, Jr. Portrait of John E. Smith Portrait of Vincent Colapietro Portrait of Ivor Leclerc Portrait of George Allan Portrait of Joseph Grange Portrait of Robert C. Neville

xvi 10 16 40 58 78 100 120 132 154 172 184 204 222 246 258 278 310 332 354 366

EDITORIAL FOREWORD The purposes of a philosophical society were discussed by James Edwin Creighton in his inaugural presidential address delivered 31 March 1902 before the First Annual Meeting of the American Philosophical Association at Columbia University. While Creighton died in 1924, well before the Metaphysical Society of America was formed, his analysis still holds. Moreover, as he was the chief American exponeQWRI³VSHFXODWLYHLGHDOLVP´ a view that held reality to be inter-subjective, the understanding of which results from the collective efforts of members of a social community, he is TXLWH ULJKWO\ WKRXJKW RI DV D PHWDSK\VLFLDQ ³>3@RVLWLYH LQGLYLGXDOLW\ GHUives its positive content from social relationships. . . . [T]he intellectual life is a form of experience which can be realized only in common with others WKURXJKPHPEHUVKLSLQDVRFLDOFRPPXQLW\´ Creighton emphasized that the programs presented before a SKLORVRSKLFDO DVVRFLDWLRQ VKRXOG VHUYH WR SURYLGH ³D VWLPXOXV WR WKH IRUFHV ZKLFKDUHHVVHQWLDOIRUSURJUHVVLQSKLORVRSKLFDOZRUN´7KXVWKHYHU\raison G¶rWUH for philosophical societies is to facilitate the work of their members in a progressive movement that searches for truth. Rather than merely to provide a pleasant occasion for enjoying social communication, an association is part RI WKH SKLORVRSKHU¶V ZRUN-place; its meetings are the crucibles in which the work of the past conduce to the insights oIWKHIXWXUH$QG³>L@WLVQHFHVVDU\WR recognize that there is a dead as well as a living past, that many of its problems, in the form in which they were stated, have been superseded, because the rest upon principles and assumptions which the drift of things has VKRZQWREHXQWHQDEOH´ Thanks to the work of Paul Weiss in founding both the Metaphysical Society of America and the journal, The Review of Metaphysics, this society has remained strong and its results accessible to scholars. Indeed, this society serves as a shining example of what a society should do in preserving its history and its results for succeeding generations. The desirability of preservation of the important work done on the floors of philosophical VRFLHWLHV¶ conferences has given rise to this special series in the Value Inquiry Book Series, the Histories and Addresses of Philosophical Societies. Too often the work done at the meetings of philosophical societies remains in the filing boxes of its members, perhaps passed along from secretary to secretary, perhaps misplaced, perhaps lost. HAPS seeks to provide a medium in which the work of philosophical societies, whether local, regional, confined to states, restricted to a common subject interest of its members, may be preserved. For a society to be able to present to its newer members a published guide to the best in its years of existence serves both to KHOSLQGXFWWKHQHZHUPHPEHULQWRWKHVRFLHW\¶VWUDGLWLRQVDQGWRSUHVHUYHWKH goodness of its materials otherwise endangered by the fragility of preservation

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BEING IN AMERICA

efforts. As well, inclusion of biographical sketches and photos of the SUHVHQWHUV ZKRVH ZRUN LV LQFOXGHG LQ WKH VHULHV¶ YROXPHV SURYLGHV reinforcement to the fading images and memory traces of our memories with biographical facts about and images of those presenters. Such provide us with the only kind of immortality of which we may be certain, our images and life stories that live on beyond the ken of immediate family, colleagues and friends. Philosophical societies are encouraged to consider contributing the selected elements of their histories, their meetings, their officers, to this HAPS series as a kind of collective memory, preserved in the volumes GHYRWHGWRWKDWVRFLHW\¶VSDVW Richard T. Hull Histories and Addresses of Philosophical Societies Special Series Editor Professor Emeritus University of Buffalo State University of New York and Visiting Professor Texas State University, San Marcos

William Desmond Katholieke Universiteit Leuven and Villanova University

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH I was born in Cork, Ireland in 1951. I grew up in one world, the Ireland of my youth, went to study in another world, the America of the 1970s. I have since WKHQSDVVHGEHWZHHQWKHVHZRUOGVDQGLQGHHG³EHLQJEHWZHHQ´LVSHUKDSVWKH central concern of my work as a philosopher. I did doctoral work at The Pennsylvania State University where I was inoculated against a facile historicism, while encouraged to take the tradition of metaphysics with due seriousness. I taught for 12 years at Loyola College in Maryland (Now Loyola University Maryland) and while there I was very much involved with the Metaphysical Society of America and the Hegel Society of America, being honored with the presidency of both societies. My concern with the between has many dimensions, some more local and intimately rooted in my being originally Irish, some less localized and crystallized out of wanderings in a more ecumenical space. My experience was that the different worlds in which I was and through which I passed could never be reduced to a unity, either simple or dialectical in the Hegelian sense. Some of my books reflect this, not least the trilogy: Being and the Between (winner of the Prix Cardinal Mercier, 1995 and the J.N. Findlay Award for best book in metaphysics, 1995±1997), Ethics and the Between (2001), and God and the Between (2008). At the moment I live primarily neither in Ireland nor America but in Louvain, Belgium: a place historically of exile from Ireland, a place somewhere in the historical memory of Ireland. While currently professor of philosophy at Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, serendipitously I spend time in America as the David Cook Visiting Chair in Philosophy at Villanova University. I continue to be between, and continue to think about the between, and remain still firmly convinced that metaphysics is not at all behind us. My recent book The Intimate Strangeness of Being: Metaphysics after Dialectic (2012) is testament to this. The William Desmond Reader which also just appeared (2012) gives a sampling of my work in metaphysics, aesthetics, ethics and the SKLORVRSK\ RI UHOLJLRQ DV ZHOO DV DQ HVVD\ RIIHULQJ DQ RYHUYLHZ ³:RUGLQJ WKH%HWZHHQ´ William Desmond 2012

Guest Foreword BEING IN AMERICA: ON METAPHYSICS AND THE METAPHYSICAL SOCIETY OF AMERICA William Desmond ³%HLQJ LQ $PHULFD´ +RZ DUH ZH WR WDNH VXFK D VXJJHVWLYH SKUDVH" $ philosopher might wonder if this phrase can be taken univocally. Perhaps there is something systematically equivocal about it. For one might be in America and have nothing to do with being in a philosophical sense; or one might be in America and be deeply perplexed by the persistent questions of metaphysics; and these ways of being in America might be as different as chalk and cheese, or day and night. Or one might wonder if the phrase is perhaps plurivocal, having many meanings which indeed do express something of the blooming pluralism of much of being in America. How then are we to take it? One would be too Aristotelian if one were to say that being in America epitomized being qua being; or that being in America is the first substance or being; or indeed that being in America reveals the highest being. Being in America is not a substance simply, though there may be much substantial to it; not indeed is it a process, though there may be much of dynamism to it. If there is something plurivocal to it, perhaps one might venture that it has something to do with being in a certain community, a community perhaps somewhere between (as William James might put it) a monism of the one and a pluralism more atomistic, somewhere between in a field of seeking and settling, where a community of inquirers grows up. Such thoughts would not be alien to the Metaphysical Society of America and what this Society has meant to not a few of its members over the last six decades. :KDW LV ³EHLQJ LQ $PHULFD´ IRU WKH 0HWDSK\VLFDO 6RFLHW\ RI $PHULFD" Once again many things, some of them distinctive to the cultural traditions that have historically shaped the Society. But, of course, being is not just American, and something of the more universal reference implied in it means that being for metaphysics in America will share in something of what being and metaphysics have come to mean in the Western tradition in a wider sense. I would like to say something first about the latter wider sense, and then some things about the former, with special reference to what being in America has meant to the Metaphysical Society of America and many of its members. Metaphysics, once another name for first philosophy, seems in recent centuries to be neither first nor last. Or perhaps we should say that it has

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WILLIAM DESMOND

fulfilled the biblical prophecy and first philosophy has become last philosophy. For some metaphysics has been thought to fall outside judgment entirely, neither first nor last philosophy, simply overcome or deconstructed, or subjected to the superior scorn of its post-metaphysical successors or replacements. The situation has not been easy, either in America or more JHQHUDOO\ VLQFH .DQW¶V FULWLTXH RI WUDGLWLRnal metaphysics. And while one interpretation of German idealism, not least Hegel, sees here a recrudescence of the now firmly put in its place metaphysics, the pathway seems to have been downhill most of the way since then. It is not only that scientifically oriented practices have had little time for the speculative divertissements of metaphysics, that more existentially and pragmatically tinged modes of thought cast stones on its merely theoretical and spectatorial stances, but within the many practices of philosophy, metaphysics became a whipping boy, even to the point of the euthanasia of it as pretending to the role of first philosophy. The speculative impulse loses confidence in itself and the critical side of the vocation of philosophy finds itself marked by self-laceration, at times even succumbing to self-hatred.1 What metaphysics means in all of this is not easy to pin down determinately, and a more sober detailing of the major tasks asked of first philosophy would be helpful, though it is beyond our present scope. One might say that it is the Nietzschean cartoon version of metaphysics as dividing the immanent world from the other world beyond that has lost its hold on the general mind, following the failure of confidence of the inner adepts of philosophy. One might venture that +HJHO¶V FRQILGHQFH LQ UHDVRQ ZDV WRR much of an overconfidence, and tended to produce a kind of a speculative bubble, and since the bubble burst we have been living with a long deflation in confidence in reason in philosophy ever since. At an extreme this idealistic overconfidence in speculative reason inverts with postmodern scepticism into the abjectness of a humiliated reason lacerating itself with accusations of its own impotency. This inevitably reinforces the loss of philosophical confidence in metaphysics. This devaluation of confidence in reason makes reasonable philosophers fret about being in bad faith if they make any attempt to think philosophically about being. +HJHO¶VVSHFXODWLYHKLJKQRRQZDVVHHQE\VRPH as the consummation of metaphysics but its aftermath was, paradoxically, less jubilation in mission accomplished as a malaise with rational philosophy itself, and the outbreak of a rash of anti-metaphysical tics. The critique of metaphysics, the ambition to attain the completion of metaphysics, leading to the end of metaphysics, follows an arc from Kant through Hegel and his anti+HJHOLDQ VXFFHVVRUV WR PRUH UHFHQW UHSUHVHQWDWLYHV RI WKH ³RYHUFRPLQJ RI PHWDSK\VLFV´ZLWK+HLGHJJHURUWKHH[FRULDWLRQRIPHDQLQJOHVV metaphysics with more positivistically inclined philosophy (Comte, Carnap, and others), or the deconstruction of metaphysics with Derridean thought.

Guest Foreword

xxi

This seems like a tale of woe, the dirge song of a dying art. Need we take it so? True, perhaps the over self-confidence of modern rationalism and idealism is over. What of the studied over-cautiousness of analytic ordinariness? But this seems not fully true to the robuster eros of philosophical mindfulness. What of the postulatory finitude of much recent Continental philosophy? One queries if it is too self-insistently immanent, not bringing us to limits where finitude is differently called into question and opened to what is more than itself. And there is not much hope in the abjection of postmodern anti-rationalism. It seems to be sawing the branch of denied being on which it is unhappily sitting. True, one might agree that certain practices of metaphysics are behind us, but that metaphysics simpliciter is behind us makes no sense, if we take metaphysics to EHFRQFHUQHGZLWKWKHIXQGDPHQWDOVHQVHVRIWKH³WREH´/HW us claim to overcome metaphysics, or deconstruct it, or to be postmetaphysical, nevertheless, our thinking and speaking and being as humans will continue to be informed by these fundamental senses, in one configuration or constellation or other. From this point of view, there is no overcoming of metaphysics as such. Indeed it is relevant to bear in mind that there are many practices of metaphysics, Platonic, Aristotelian, Thomistic, rationalistic, transcendental, realistic, and so on. To reduce this plurality to VRPH XQLYRFLW\ WKHQ VDLG WR EH ³RYHUFRPH´ LV IDU WRR FUXGH 2QH IHDUV WKDW some such secret univocalization is at work in much rhetoric about our being ³SRVWPHWDSK\VLFDO´ 6RPH GLVPLVVDOV of totalizing thought are often themselves hugely totalizing. Rather than a univocal totalization of ³PHWDSK\VLFV´ SHUKDSV ZH VKRXOG IRFXV ERWK RQ WKH SOXULYRFLW\ RI EHLQJ beyond all totalization, and the plurality of practices of metaphysics. 2 I would suggest that the point here is not just historical, but systematic in the following regard. One need not be a metaphysician in the explicit sense to live a life that is more or less meaningful. Other demands, however, are made on a philosopher. Here there is a struggle to bring a habit of more explicit mindfulness to bear on what is at play in being, especially with regard to the EDVLFSUHVXSSRVLWLRQVVRXUFHVDQGRULHQWDWLRQVWRZDUGWKH³WREH´WKDWPDUN our being in the midst of things. To be this thing or that, to be this process or that, this or that action or undergoing, to be this or that relation, and so on² all of these are concretions in being, even if the concretion is a becoming or is as a possibility, and each participates diversely in the sourcing powers of the ³WREH´7REHDVPLQGIXOWKDWLVWREHDVKXPDQLVWROLYHIURPWKHVHVRXUFHV but also to strain to be lucidly attentive to them. We do not have a choice about being mindful, though how intensive and extensive that mindfulness is may follow from choices or initiatives we ourselves undertake. In that regard, one does not have a choice about being an animale metaphysicum. The matter is not being a postmetaphysician but being a good metaphysician, under the call of truthful fidelity to the VRXUFLQJSRZHUVRIWKH³WREH´

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This is not to say that metaphysics is everything but that in all our WKLQNLQJ VRPH PHWDSK\VLFDO SUHVXSSRVLWLRQV DERXW WKH ³WR EH´ DUH DW SOD\ These may be mostly unacknowledged by common sense or art or science or religioQ EXW DOVR E\ ³SRVWPHWDSK\VLFDO´ SKLORVRSK\ 1HYHUWKHOHVV WKH\ DUH still at work. As a philosophical discipline metaphysics is a form of reflective thinking under fidelity to the truth of what is thus at play. And as I already suggested, it may well be true that what is being criticized or rejected in much RIWKLVWDONRIWKH³SRVWPHWDSK\VLFDO´LVDcertain picture of metaphysics, not OHDVW ERXQG XS 1LHW]VFKH¶V FDUWRRQ YHUVLRQ RI 3ODWR3 Dispensing with this picture does not dispense us from the metaphysical mindfulness asked by ³ILUVWSKLORVRSK\´FRQFHUQLQJWKH PRVWXOWLPDWH VRXUFHVRILQWHOOLJLELOLW\WKH most original sense(s) of being. Nor is there any necessity to separate these from reflection on the different and more particular domains of being wherein in life we find ourselves diversely. The perplexities here generated are to be expressed as still living questions. From Plato (Sophist, 244a) to Heidegger (opening Being and Time) and beyond, we have been called to renewed SHUSOH[LW\ DERXW WKH ³WR EH´ 6WLOO EHIRUH XV DUH WKH TXHVWLRQV RI ILUVW philosophy, posed by Aristotle when he said that being is said in many senses (WRRQOHJHWDLSROODFKǀV, Metaphysics 1003b5). Reflection on the plurivocity of being is even now not avoidable in an era said to be postmetaphysical. I have been talking about being in metaphysics but I turn now to being in America and being engaged with metaphysics in America. This situation, as I understand it, mirrors some of the factors mentioned already, though with some singularities relevant to understanding the sources of inspiration for the works gathered here in this volume. I would like to refer first to the singular importance of Paul Weiss as founder of the Metaphysical Society of America. As we know, he was a student of Alfred North Whitehead at Harvard in the 1930s. Further, he was the first editor with Charles Hartshorne of the writing of Charles Sanders Peirce, an act of homage to, and inheritance of arguably $PHULFD¶V JUHDWHVW SKLORVRSKHU 7KLV ZDV D WLPH ZKHQ WKH ROGer more humanistic ethos of philosophical studies came under threat of being superannuated, while more scientifically, logically, and mathematically influenced practices were making their influence felt in the self-image of the philosopher. One does not feHO DQ HQIRUFHG ³HLWKHURU´ LQ 3HLUFH EHWZHHQ scientific clarity and the quest of a more encompassing vision of things. One PLJKW VD\ VRPHWKLQJ VLPLODU IRU :KLWHKHDG¶V HIIRUW WR PDUU\ DQDO\WLF precision with speculative boldness, without the conceptual hand-wringing of merely critical thinking. The caricature of Whitehead in some quarters as a soft-centered systematizer is astonishingly at odds with his plural brilliances at mathematics, logic and metaphysics. This is a complicated and perplexing story: when O¶HVSULW GH ILQHVVH (Pascal) is absent among the geometricians, then they cannot generously recognize philosophers with superb finesse who yet are also masters of O¶HVSULWGHJpRPpWULH.

Guest Foreword

xxiii

Be that as it may, Weiss was a thinker imbued with a certain urgency to preserve the vocational impulse of first philosophy, or speculative metaphysics in the most ecumenical sense possible and to do so in times verging on spiritual emergency. Due to his charisma and persistence, the Metaphysical Society of America was formed, the still flourishing Review of Metaphysics established, and the regular annual meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America inaugurated. He served as editor of the Review of Metaphysics for a good number of years, and it was the custom that the Presidential address of the annual meeting be published there. In this book we find a selection of some excellent contributions spanning some 60 years or so. There is nothing postmetaphysical about them, nothing quite of the overcoming or deconstruction of metaphysics, even granting that metaphysicians here too can often be skeptical to the point of waspishness about what they are trying to do. We find the doing of metaphysic in a variety of styles and registers. This doing, while not devoid of meta-reflection on what it means to do metaphysics, in its own way somehow answers to the plurivocity of being, and the many ways in which first philosophy can turn to what is most original, most constant and most ultimate in being. The situation of metaphysics in the twentieth century and its nineteenth century antecedents, sketched above, is not confined just to the European situation or Great Britain, but also marks important aspects of the situation of philosophy in America. We forget too easily the huge presence of idealistic currents of thought in America in the nineteenth century, suitably modified of course, and how these influences marked the intellectual and cultural ethos of the great classical American philosophers like Peirce and William James. We forget how Hegelianism is trans-substantiated in thinkers like John Dewey² PRUH ³GRZQ WR HDUWK´ DQG ZLWKRXW WKH DEVROXWH :H IRUJHW KRZ SURFHVV philosophy inspired by Whitehead, and very American in its own way, though Whitehead belongs to no one land, was originally shaped by a background inseparable from a rich cultural ethos in which humanistic idealism was mixed with scientific curiosity and mathematical precision, and indeed an allround cultural openness to what poetry and religion might deliver to the human spirit. We forget how metaphysics had something to do with the search for a kind of synoptic vision or systematic thinking that would do justice to, or be true to, all of this. By contrast with such an orientation, we find around the time of the foundation of the Metaphysical Society, a certain turn away from the tolerant latitude of this broader wisdom toward the exacting precision of a more technical and scientistically pretentious form of WKLQNLQJDWXUQDZD\QRWLWVHOIDZDNHWR:KLWHKHDG¶VEUXWDOOXFLGLW\WKDW³WKH H[DFWQHVVLVDIDNH´4 Philosophy in America, then positivistically bewitched, brings in train its own end of metaphysics.5 One might see the Metaphysical Society as an outstanding example of the attempt to awaken from this bewitchment, accompanied by rituals of renewal of the intellectual spirit of more

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speculative reflection. One should recall that the American Philosophical Association, then more dominated by the practices of Anglo-American analysis, was in the ascendant, even though the style was more constrained by O¶HVSULW GH JpRPpWULH than was true earlier, or later. One might say that the Metaphysical Society, small though it was as a society, was of the more ecumenical and tolerant dispensation, and more open to philosophizing with due respect for O¶HVSULW GH ILQHVVH. We forget this too in the more pluralistically friendly atmosphere of recent decades of philosophy in America. I recall again the fact that many members of the Metaphysical Society stand somewhere outside the established scholasticisms. The Society was philosophically pluralistic before pluralism became professionally popular and made some mark in other philosophical societies. It is now sixty years later since the founding, and if we look at the contemporary scene one is worried about the danger of us all becoming academic scholastics now. I refer to the fact that when one looks at the two supposedly main camps of contemporary philosophy, the Continental and the analytic, one is struck sometimes by two complementary scholasticisms: on the one side, one might see more and more of the hermeneutical scholasticism of the text; on the other side, often we find something like the scholasticism of the technical or quasitechnical analysis.6 It is not that there were not the influence of scholasticisms in the Metaphysical Society. There can be a kind of scholasticism in process philosophy and in (neo-)Thomism obviously, but since these were outside the established church of analytical philosophy, the taint of their scholasticisms had something quaintly contrarian about it. It was partially protected from being the regnant ideology of the self-contented insider. And this is to say nothing of the more maverick thinkers in the Metaphysical Society who are difficult to place in any particular school. Of course, hermeneutical finesse and analytic technique exhibit excellences that any honest thinker must honor, and are at work in the present contributions. The plurality of practices of metaphysics was mirrored in the plurality of philosophical commitments in members of the Metaphysical Society. A student of Whitehead, Weiss published his first book entitled Reality. He told me that the point of its rather austere title was indirectly aimed at his mentor whose book Process and Reality had not quite enough of reality, so he thought. He also wondered if Whitehead had ever got his intent with the title. In any case, the story is one of respect and difference, difference offered with UHVSHFWWKDWDOORZVWKHVWDWXUHRIWKHRWKHU¶VWKLQNLQJ,QP\RZQ experience, and I think this is reflected in the contributions here, what we find is a robust sense of the individuality of the different practices of thinking. No one else FDQGRRQH¶VWKLQNLQJ IRURQHLQSKLORVRSK\DQGHYHQLIRQH LVD FRPPLWWHG member of a school, to be taken seriously as a thinker, it is not the school that GRHV RQH¶V WKLQNLQJ EXW WKH VLQJXODULW\ RI RQH¶V RZQ DFFHQW RU VWUHVV DV LW contributes to the school as a community of like-minded thinkers.

Guest Foreword

xxv

The Metaphysical Society, in its annual meetings, has exhibited something of that poise between a society and its singular individuals. These meetings obviously are a social thing, but in the social space the sessions were and are always plenary sessions, allowing the individual contributor his or her voice. As allowed space to speak singularly in the social field of the society, the individual adds to the richness of the gathering qua gathering. Philosophical friendship builds up in such a setting. Again to refer to my own experience, these meeting did and do have a special feel to them. On my first going to an annual meeting I felt this difference, very much outside the division of analytic and Continental. There was also on that score the generosity of older members to younger, and the boost of encouragement to younger contributors from more seasoned members. May the philosophical generosity continue. One might say that the society represented a community of inquiry engaged with a constellation of fundamental questions of the sort Weiss tried to set forth in the inaugural meeting. The practice of metaphysics can be diversely pursued without any loss of philosophical concentration. Even if boundaries are defined, they need not be entirely sealed to travelers or guests from outside the boundary. How can you seal boundaries if something like the whole is at issue, or in my own thought the between. I found a basic hospitality in the society to myself when a young philosopher and this hospitality continues to young scholars and new thinkers. There is nothing hieratic about this community of inquirers. There is the generosity of established scholars; there is the fresh energy of new voices. The meetings are gatherings of friends or those who become friends. Such a community of friends might be as wide in its embrace as the entire tradition of philosophy. No one committed to the life of mindfulness is exiled from this larger community of thinkers. Nor are such friends to be approached simply in an antiquarian spirit. They too are companions on the way of truth. This is true even of the friendship of the dead, just as we too will one day be dead, and with the hope that we will remains friends to the living who keep alive the spirit of inquiry. I recall how Aristotle spoke of the theoretical life as a bios xenikos: a strange life, the living of strangeness. Being in America is not theoretical in quite the Greek contemplative sense of pure beholding. There is too much work to be done. There is suspicion of the implied elitism that seems to go with such theory. There is an appreciation that we are participants rather than spectators in the intimate strangeness of being.7 Nevertheless, there is much hospitality for wondering before the intimate strangeness of being, and the beholding that wakes up to the amazing otherness of what is given to us to think. It is a strange life, the life of thought²the life of a strangeness. Looking askance at this strange life one might be labeled xenophobic. There is much in human life, in America as elsewhere, that is pervaded by noetic xenophobia. I would say that the Metaphysical Society has provided a

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sanctuary for the strange life of metaphysical thought. The results evident in this book are like the signatures recorded by guests who have found some hospitality and sanctuary in this guest house. They have come and abided for a while and alas some have left for good. Yet they have set forth their communication as a gift and reminder of what has been thought, and as an invitation and encouragement regarding what could still be thought. The names record individuals, and though there is the singularity of their contributions as thinkers, this is not incompatible with a community of thinkers. The elemental perplexities abide, even in this so called postmetaphysical age, as does the constancy of those trusted companions along the strange way of truth. NOTES 1. Post-Hegelian philosophy is strongly marked by an effort to revolt against or modify the Hegelian practice of dialectic. We find this in American philosophy as well as Continental and analytic philosophy. Merleau-Ponty claims that many strands of contemporary philosophy are marked by this relation to Hegel or Hegelianism (he mentions Marx, Nietzsche, phenomenology, existentialism, and psychoanalysis: Signs, H. and P. Dreyfus trans. (Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1964, 63). Likewise, analytic philosophy is inconceivable without Moore and Russell and their turn against idealism and Hegelianism generally [Peter Hylton, Russell, Idealism, and the Origins of Analytical Philosophy (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1990)]. This is also true of American pragmatism, and the quarrels of James and Dewey with earlier idealism. 2. In that plurality one might count not only Whitehead, but Karl Jaspers , and Gabriel Marcel, Paul Weiss, and others who do not fit into the divide between Continental and analytic philosophy. In addition, there are thinkers indebted to Aristotle and Aquinas, traditional Thomists, transcendental Thomists, or individuals like Jacques Maritain or Edith Stein. Recently in Continental philosophy Giles Deleuze and Alain Badiou remind us of metaphysics as a living option. Analytic philosophy, in post-positivistic form, exhibits its own engagement with metaphysical questions. See, for instance, Dean W. Zimmerman (ed.) Oxford Studies in Metaphysics, vol. 1, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004). In his introduction Zimmerman mentions some figures one would associate with the Metaphysical Society. 3. ,W LV ZRUWK QRWLQJ WKDW 1LHW]VFKH KLPVHOI FRQIHVVHG WKH IROORZLQJ ³3Oato, for H[DPSOHEHFRPHVDFDULFDWXUHLQP\KDQGV´F. Nietzsche, Der Wille zur Macht. Versuch einer Umwertung aller Werte (Leipzig: Kröner, 1930), 255 (§374); The Will to Power, trans. W. Kaufmann and R. J. Hollingdale (New York: Random House, 1967), 2026RPHSRVWPHWDSK\VLFLDQVZKRFODLP1LHW]VFKH¶VPDQWOHDUH asleep to the fact that they inherit a caricature. 4. Alfred North Whitehead, The Interpretation of Science: Selected Essays, ed. A. H. Johnson (New York: Bobbs-Merrill, 1961), 267. 5. It is interesting how the matter spans both the scientistic and the not so scientistic. I am thinking how Comte and Heidegger strike one as mirror images with respect

Guest Foreword

xxvii

to a scheme of unfolding like this: first religion/myth, then metaphysics, finally ending in science/cybernetics. 6. See my ³$UHZHDOO6FKRODVWLFV1RZ2Q$QDO\WLF'LDOHFWLFDODQG3RVW-dialectical 7KLQNLQJ´LQYearbook of the Irish Philosophical Society, 2010±2011, 1±24. 7. See my The Intimate Strangeness of Being: Metaphysics after Dialectic (Catholic University of America Press, 2012).

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS The bulk of this volume was compiled while both editors were associated with Gonzaga University. We thank Mitchell Palmquist and other Gonzaga graduate students for transcribing these presidential addresses and Maja Rodell for her indexing and proofreading. We are grateful to Richard T. De George (1983 president of the Society) IRUSURYLGLQJDFRS\RI3DXO.XQW]¶V³KLVWRU\´RIWKHILUVWWKLUW\\HDUVRIWKH Society, which materials were invaluable in writing the introduction to this volume. Jude Dougherty (1984 president of the Society) has been especially helpful in allowing us to reprint the articles that first appeared in The Review of Metaphysics. The addresses in this volume were reprinted with the kind permission of the publisher. The addresses are listed in the order in which they appear in this volume. 3DXO:HLVV³7KH)RXU-IROG$UWRI$YRLGLQJ4XHVWLRQV´The Review of Metaphysics, 4 (September 1950): 133±135. *HRUJH .OXEHUWDQ] ³7KH 3UREOHP RI WKH $QDORJ\ RI %HLQJ´ The Review of Metaphysics, 10 (June 1957): 553±579. :1RUULV&ODUNH³7KH6HOIDV6RXUFHRI0HDQLQJLQ0HWDSK\VLFV´The Review of Metaphysics, 21 (June 1968): 597±614. -RVHSK2ZHQV³5HDOLW\DQG0HWDSK\VLFV´The Review of Metaphysics, 25 (June 1972): 638±658. 0DUMRULH *UHQH ³0HUOHDX-3RQW\ DQG WKH 5HQHZDO RI 2QWRORJ\´ The Review of Metaphysics, 29 (June 1976): 605±625. 5LFKDUG %HUQVWHLQ ³0HWDSK\VLFV &ULWLTXH DQG 8WRSLD´ The Review of Metaphysics, 42 (December 1988): 255±273. 5REHUW6RNRORZVNL³7KH4XHVWLRQRI%HLQJ´ The Review of Metaphysics, 43 (June 1990): 707±716. 6WDQOH\5RVHQ³,V0HWDSK\VLFV3RVVLEOH"´ The Review of Metaphysics, 45 (December 1991): 235±257. 5DOSK0F,QHUQ\³7KH6FLHQFH:H$UH6HHNLQJ´ The Review of Metaphysics, 47 (September 1993): 3±18.

xxx

BEING IN AMERICA )UHGHULFN)HUUp³7KH3UDFWLFDOLW\RI0HWDSK\VLFV´ The Review of Metaphysics, 58 (March 2005): 519±528. (UQDQ0F0XOOLQ³7ZR)DFHVRI6FLHQFH´ The Review of Metaphysics, 27 (June 1974): 655±676. Jorge J. E. GUDFLD³$UH&DWHJRULHV,QYHQWHGRU'LVFRYHUHG"$5HVSRQVH WR)RXFDXOW´ The Review of Metaphysics, 55 (September 2001): 3±20. 1LFKRODV 5HVFKHU ³7H[WXDOLW\ 5HDOLW\ DQG WKH /LPLWV RI .QRZOHGJH´ The Review of Metaphysics, 59 (December 2005): 355±377. JohQ+HUPDQ5DQGDOO-U³0HWDSK\VLFVDQG/DQJXDJH´ The Review of Metaphysics, 20 (June 1967): 591±601. -RKQ ( 6PLWK ³%HLQJ ,PPHGLDF\ DQG $UWLFXODWLRQ´ The Review of Metaphysics, 24 (June 1971): 593±613. 9LQFHQW&RODSLHWUR³6WULYLQJWR6SHDNLQD+XPan Voice: A Peircean &RQWULEXWLRQ WR 0HWDSK\VLFDO 'LVFRXUVH´ The Review of Metaphysics, 58 (December 2004): 367±398. ,YRU/HFOHUF³7KH0HWDSK\VLFVRIWKH*RRG´ The Review of Metaphysics, 35 (September 1981): 3±26. *HRUJH$OODQ³3HULVKDEOH*RRGV´ The Review of Metaphysics, 54 (September 2000): 3±26. -RVHSK*UDQJH³7KH*HQHURVLW\RIWKH*RRG´ The Review of Metaphysics, 62 (December 2008): 111±121.

Lastly, we are indebted to Richard T. Hull for including this volume in his History and Addresses of Philosophical Societies series.

INTRODUCTION Brian G. Henning and David Kovacs The investigation of the truth is in one way hard, in another easy. An indication of this is found in the fact that no one is able to attain the truth adequately, while, on the other hand, no one fails entirely, but every one says something true about the nature of things, and while individually we contribute little or nothing to the truth, by the union of all a considerable amount is amassed. Aristotle, Metaphysics, Book II1 On 15 April 1950 at Yale University, Paul Weiss called to order the first meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America. Building on the work he had started three years earlier with the founding of the Review of Metaphysics, Weiss sought to create a space for metaphysics within the often-hostile terrain RI $PHULFDQ SKLORVRSK\ ³7KH SXUSRVH RI WKH 0HWDSK\VLFDO 6RFLHW\ RI $PHULFD´WKHRSHQLQJGHFODUDWLRQRIWKH6RFLHW\¶V&RQVWLWXWLRQXQDEDVKHGO\ VWDWHV³LVWKHVWXG\RIUHDOLW\´2 Six decades on, it is easy to forget just how dramatic, even controversial, this bald, unapologetic defense of metaphysics would have been in 1950. Recall first the historical context in which the Society was born. In the opening decades of the twentieth century, two competing philosophical projects each declared war on metaphysics. One line of attack FDPH IURP 0DUWLQ +HLGHJJHU DQG ODWHU ³SRVW-PRGHUQ´ SKLORVRSKHUV  ZKR WULXPSKDQWO\ GHFODUHG WKH ³HQG RI PHWDSK\VLFV´ 7KH VHFRQG ZDV ZDJHG E\ ORJLFDO SRVLWLYLVWV DQG ODWHU ³RUGLQDU\ ODQJXDJH DQDO\VWV´  ZKR derided metaphysics as linguistic nonsense.3 By midcentury, the influence of the latter particularly came to dominate Anglo-American philosophy. Thus, when Weiss delivered his inaugural invocation in 1950, barely a quarter of a century had passed since Ludwig Wittgenstein had concluded his Tractatus ZLWKWKHRPLQRXVSURFODPDWLRQWKDW³:KHUHRIRQHFDQQRWVSHDNWKHUHRIRQH PXVW EH VLOHQW´4 Similarly, two years later, in 1924, Bertrand Russell DQQRXQFHGLQ³/RJLFDO $WRPLVP´WKDt henceforth philosophers would not be distinguished based on their metaphysical beliefs, but on their systems of logic.5 ³In one fell swoop, the logical positivists sought to dismiss PHWDSK\VLFV E\ FODLPLQJ WKDW PHWDSK\VLFDO µSURSRVLWLRQV¶ DUH SVHXGRpropRVLWLRQV7KH\DUHQRQVHQVHWKH\ODFNFRJQLWLYHPHDQLQJ´6 7KHVH WZR FRPSHWLQJ WUHQGV ZLWKLQ SKLORVRSK\ ³SRVW-PRGHUQLVP´ DQG ³ORJLFDO SRVLWLYLVP´ FRPELQHG WR FUHDWH DQ RIWHQ-hostile environment for PHWDSK\VLFLDQV $V WKH 6RFLHW\¶V VHFRQG 3UHVLGHQW -RKQ Wild, noted at

2

BRIAN G. HENNING AND DAVID KOVACS

+DUYDUG 8QLYHUVLW\ LQ  WKH ³QHJDWLYLVWLF WUHQGV´ WKDW ZHUH ³DFWLYHO\ DWWDFNLQJ RQWRORJ\ DQG PHWDSK\VLFV´ KDG D ³SRZHUIXO GHVWUXFWLYH HIIHFW´ ³%XW WKLV LV IRUWXQDWHO\ QRW WKH ZKROH VWRU\ &HUWDLQ WKLQNHUV UHIXVHG WR EH swept along in the destructive currents and stood firm. . . . Metaphysics, while seriously weakened academically, did not completely die away. One XQDPELJXRXVLQGLFDWLRQZDVWKHIRUPDWLRQRIWKLVVRFLHW\ILYH\HDUVDJR´ 7 More than one hundred philosophers gathered to hear five papers at the 6RFLHW\¶V ILUVW PHHWLQJ8 A new spirit of inquiry was hailed by Weiss in his RSHQLQJDGGUHVV³7KH)RXU-)ROG$UWRI$YRLGLQJ4XHVWLRQV´LQFOXGHGLQLWV entirety as the first chapter of this volume. Weiss argued that within philosophy in America there were four blockades to genuine philosophical inquiry, each a manifestation of a kind of parochialism: geographic, historic, methodologic, and dogmatic. Each of these had developed into a tribalism that sought to establish one to the artificial exclusion of others. The new society, however, would have no such barriers. Now, metaphysicians from every philosophical tradition would submit their work to each other for scrutiny and criticism. Only by this kind of radical openness could metaphysics advance in an era otherwise hostile toward it. 7KLV VSLULW RI ZKDW 5LFKDUG %HUQVWHLQ FDOOV ³HQJDJHG SOXUDOLVP´ 9 is HQJUDLQHGLQWKHYHU\VWUXFWXUHRIWKH6RFLHW\¶VPHHWLQJV6LQFH:LOG¶V meeting at Harvard, all sessions have been held plenary. This allows for a single, continuous conversation that grows and builds with each paper presented. As Weiss noted in an address in Vienna, September 1968, ³%HFDXVHWKHUHZHUHQRFRQFXUUHQWVHVVLRQVWKRVHZKRDWWHQGHGWKHPHHWLQJV were able to hear all the prepared papers and the ensuing comments. This made for continuity in the discourse, and gave the members a sense of EHORQJLQJWRDVLQJOHRQJRLQJLQTXLU\´10 Similarly, the Presidential address, which since 1952 has been published in The Review of Metaphysics, is not PHUHO\DQKRQRULILFPRQRORJXH5DWKHUWKH3UHVLGHQW¶VDGGUHVVLVH[SHFWHGWR VHUYHDVWKHEDVLVIRUD³FUHDWLYHGLDORJXH´DQGLVWKHUHIRUHRIWHQIROORZHGE\ ³VHYHUHFURVV-examination from a commentator and by uninhibited discussion from the flRRU´11 Studied together, then, the addresses in this volume reveal a society that is exceptional not only in its purpose, but in its pluralistic attitude toward philosophical inquiry. From its inception, a primary aim of the Metaphysical Society of America was to create a space for what Charles Sanders Peirce FDOOHG D ³FRPPXQLW\ RI LQTXLUHUV´ :HLVV WRRN WKLV WR UHTXLUH FROODERUDWLRQ among not just one or two schools or methodologies, but among many schools. The controversial composition of the 1952 program is illustrative.12 Having served as chairman previously, 1952 was the year that Weiss was elected as the first President of the Metaphysical Society. Whereas previous meetings had brought together metaphysicians like Paul Tillich, Jacques Maritain and Charles Hartshorne asking questions about the nature of UHDOLW\ RU WKH RQWRORJ\ RI OLYLQJ WKLQJV IRU WKH 6RFLHW\¶V WKLUG PHHWLQJ WZR

Introduction

3

papers pressing issues in contemporary logic had been submitted. Haskell B. &XUU\ KDG VXEPLWWHG ³7KH 3KLORVRSK\ RI )RUPDO 6\VWHPV´ &XUU\ ZDV D mathematician at Pennsylvania State College (now Pennsylvania State University) whose work on the relations between reasoning and formal language brought him to study Russell and Alfred North Whitehead and to venture, albeit with trepidation, to certain philosophy conferences and journals. The second controversial paper was by Arthur Burks, entitled ³2QWRORJLFDO &DWHJRULHV )RU /DQJXDJH´ %XUNV KDG HDUQHG D 3K' LQ philosophy from The University of Michigan in 1941 before the United States HQWHUHG :RUOG :DU ,, 'XULQJ WKH ZDU KH ZHQW WR ZRUN IRU WKH $UP\¶V Ballistics Research Laboratory, where he drew upon his knowledge of mathematics, which was his first discipline, in helping to develop a high speed multiplier that could be used in one of the first digital computers. After the war he returned to work as a philosopher and became an authority on the works of Peirce, helping to edit the collected works of the American philosopher. 6HHQDVDWKUHDWWR³WUXHPHWDSK\VLFV´WKHVHWZRSDSHUVGLG not sit well with certain members of the Society. One member feared they would LQWURGXFH ³HSLVWHPRORJLFDO GLIILFXOWLHV DQG ZH KDYH WR JR LQWR HSLVWHPRORJ\ to meet them²6WDOHPDWH UHVXOWV´13 If epistemology were permitted, then semantics would be next. Were these not the very trends dominating philosophy in 1952 from which the Society sought to differentiate itself and in rejection of which it was founded? We can be thankful that this was not the majority view. For one, it was contrary to the spirit in which the Society came together. The provincialism that Weiss sought to combat had to be vigorous enough even to exclude the provincialism of provincialism: If metaphysicians were to submit their work for rigorous criticism, that must include criticism perceived even as a threat to metaphysics. Secondly, as reflected in particular in the second (The Question of Knowledge) and third (The Question of Language) sections of this volume, the Society has over the years produced some first tier work on topics of epistemology and language. Indeed, those topics have even come to be recognized as crucial to the metaphysical endeavor. Wild reflected this in his DGGUHVVWZR\HDUVODWHU³,WLVWUXHWKDWRUGLQDU\ODQJXDJHLVQRWWKHHQG of philosophy. But it is the beginning. Hence this new respect for common speech is a step in the right direction. Philosophy in America is alive once PRUH´14 7KLVSOXUDOLVWLFSXUVXLWRISHUHQQLDOTXHVWLRQVUHPDLQVWKH6RFLHW\¶V modus vivendi six decades later and is reflected in the diverse set of essays collected here.15 This spirit of shared inquiry has also made the Society unique in its diversity and plurality of thinkers who otherwise may not have engaged each other. As Ernan McMullin once commented,16 a unique feature of the Metaphysical Society was its blend of, on the one hand, religious thinkers, with their search for sublimity and fascination with a wisdom teetering near esotericism, and American philosophers, straight from the pragmatic tradition,

4

BRIAN G. HENNING AND DAVID KOVACS

always holding philosophy to the criterion of relevance and bringing metaphysical insights to bear on ordinary life. In this volume we see the spirit of the former exemplified in the papers by Klubertanz (Chapter 2), W. Norris Clarke (Chapter 3), Joseph Owens (Chapter 4), Marjorie Grene (Chapter 5), Ralph McInerny (Chapter 9), and McMullin (Chapter 11). 17 The latter is well represented by Bernstein (Chapter 6), Frederick Ferré (Chapter 10), Vincent Colapietro (Chapter 16), Ivor Leclerc (Chapter 17), George Allan (Chapter 18) and Joseph Grange (Chapter 19).18 If these two tendencies appear antithetical, then the Society would seem to have synthesized the opposites. It has never been enough for the members of the Society to seek a transcendent metaphysics divorced from practical concerns. When Weiss charged the 6RFLHW\ ZLWK WKH VWXG\ RI ³UHDOLW\´ KH ZDV QRW PHUHO\ UHIOHFWLQJ KLV RZQ Whiteheadian perspective; rather, he was deliberately keeping open the question whether metaphysics is the study of being qua being, or of something else. Because the nature and purpose of metaphysics has itself been a dominant theme within Presidential addresses, the first and largest VHFWLRQRIWKLVERRNLVGHGLFDWHGWRWKRVHSDSHUVZKLFKFRQIURQWWKH³TXHVWLRQ RI PHWDSK\VLFV´ ZKDW LV LW ZKDW DUH LWV RULJLQs, what is its future? The remaining three sections are organized topically and then chronologically DURXQGWKUHHRIWKH³ELJTXHVWLRQV´RIPHWDSK\VLFVNQRZOHGJHODQJXDJHDQG WKH JRRG :LOOLDP 'HVPRQG¶V )RUHZRUG DQG 5REHUW & 1HYLOOH¶V (SLORJXH written for this volume, help to situate the Society and the volume within its broader historical and philosophical context. Since both Desmond and Neville were presidents of the Society (as well as Secretary-Treasurer), a picture and autobiographical sketch has been included for each. Thus, although the philosophical heirs to post-modernism and positivism continue to occupy and closely guard much of the philosophical terrain, the fact that metaphysics is now a respected and even central part of philosophy in America today is itself a testament to the success of the Society and the vision and courage of its founders. William Earnest Hocking opened his 1958 address with an encomium praising their intrepid spirit: At the outset, let me congratulate the members of the Metaphysical Society on being metaphysicians with conscious intent. For it is the metaphysician who most completely fulfills the ideal of Living Dangerously. It is he who most fully renounces the security of current certitudes in the search for authentic certitude. It is he who chooses±let me say±to live out of doors in complete exposure to what we call Fact. And not alone to the facts than happen this way±he seeks the vicarious experience of all mankind, he invites their findings and their sufferings in this sense must be the absolute empiricist.19 As Bernstein reminds us in his 1988 Presidential address, we must not IRUJHWKRZPXFKKDVEHHQ³RSHQHGXS´E\WKHVHHDUO\³XWRSLDQGLJJHUV´³7KHLU

Introduction

5

enduring philosophical significance is in keeping the spirit of truth alive, in not allowing the inquisitive eneUJ\ RI WKH PLQG WR JR WR VOHHS´20 Indeed, by collecting and organizing in one place a selection of Presidential Addresses of the Metaphysical Society of America, a primary aim of this volume is thereby to evince the important role that the Society has played in the history of philosophy in America in keeping metaphysics alive.21 Although the divisions within the American academy have changed considerably since its founding, the need for a society dedicated to the rigorous and pluralistic pursuit of truth continues. It is our hope that the present volume establishes how the Metaphysical Society of America has fulfilled this need in the past. By looking at how some of the best presidential addresses have spoken to a host of philosophical problems, we can begin to understand how the Society will continue to thrive and do so in the future. Because this volume is a partial history of the Society, we have included biographies and (when possible) autobiographies of the presidents whose addresses are included. These biographies are frequently culled from a number of sources not widely available. The reader will hopefully be pleased by the variety of philosophers that have graced the Society. Unlike many philosophical societies, the presidents have come from both the continental and analytic traditions; they have come from both secular and religious backgrounds; there have been historians and contemporary philosophers; there have been Thomists, pragmatists, existentialists, and analysts; they have been born in the United States from rural Ohio to Manhattan, in Canada, in the United Kingdom, Germany, and South Africa. They have been men and they have been (though too infrequently) women. We hope the reader will appreciate reading these biographies to get a sense of just how diverse this society has been while also benefiting from the wide range of insights that the addresses themselves are sure to provide. Those who wish to study additional presidential addresses will profit from the Appendix, which lists all presidents and the titles of their addresses, which with few exceptions can be found in The Review of Metaphysics.22 To learn more about WKH6RFLHW\¶VRQJRLQJZRUNRUWREHFRPHDPHPEHUYLVLWLWVZHEVLWH.23 NOTES 1. Aristotle, Metaphysics. The Complete Works of Aristotle, trans. Jonathan Barnes (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1984): 993b1. *HRUJH3.OXEHUWDQ]DQHDUO\FKURQLFOHURIWKH6RFLHW\¶VKLVWRU\UHSRUWHGWKHFLrFXPVWDQFHV ³7KH &RQVWLWXWLRQDl Committee of the Metaphysical Society of America has submitted a draft of the constitution to the present members for their approval. Members of the committee were Ellen Haring, Chairman, George Burch, and George Schrader, Jr. The annual discussion meeting continues to be WKHELJIHDWXUHRIWKHSURJUDP´The Modern Schoolman, 28 (1951): 150. Joseph 2ZHQV¶  $GGUHVV ³0HWDSK\VLFV DQG 5HDOLW\´ FKDSWHU   HPERGLHV DQ Hxtended discussion of the significance and meaning of this definition of meta-

6

BRIAN G. HENNING AND DAVID KOVACS

physics. 35LFKDUG%HUQVWHLQFKDSWHU6HH%HUQVWHLQ¶V$GGUHVVIRUDQH[WHQGHGGLVFXssion of these challenges to metaphysics. 4. Ludwig Wittgenstein, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, trans. C. K. Ogden (London: Routledge, 1922): 189. %HUWUDQG5XVVHOO³/RJLFDO$WRPLVP´LQLogic and Knowledge, ed. Robert Marsh (London: Allen & Unwin, 1956): 323. 6. A distinct, but closely related, attack came from ordinary language analysts, whose VWUDWHJ\ZDV%HUQVWHLQJRHVRQWRQRWH³QRWWRGLVPLVVPHWDSK\VLFVDVQRQVense but to bypass it. But it soon became evident metaphysical issues could not be avoided. On the contrary, philosophers like Strawson and Sellars argued that analytic techniques could themselves be employed to tackle metaphysical issues. And today, one of the oldest and most persistent metaphysical disputes stands at the very center of those which have been shaped by analytic styles of philosophizing: disputes concerning realism and anti-UHDOLVP´107 of this volume). -RKQ:LOG³7KH1HZ(PSLULFLVPDQG +XPDQ7LPH´The Review of Metaphysics 7 (1954): 537±538. $IWHU:HLVV¶VLQDXJXUDODGGUHVV*HRUJH3KHODQSUHVHQWHG³%HLQJDQGWKH0HWDSKyVLFLDQV´ $UQROG 0HW]JHU UHDG ³3HUFHSWLRQ 5HFROOHFWLRQ DQG 'HDWK´ IROORZHG E\.DUO0HQJHU¶V³7KH9ROXQWDULVWLF(OHPHQWVLQ/RJLFDQG(WKLFV´DQG-RKQ 0LWK¶V³7KH6WUXFWXUHRI,QGLYLGXDOLW\´7KRXJKDEVHQW*:DWWV&XQQLQgKDP¶V ³0HWDSK\VLFVDQGWKH4XHVWIRU&ODULW\´ZDVDOVRUHDG 9. Richard Bernstein, chapter 6. 10. Paul Weiss, Review of Metaphysics, 22 (1969): 425. 11. Joseph Owens, chapter 3 7KLV ZDV SDUWLFXODUO\ PRGHOHG E\ WKH 6RFLHW\¶V ILUVW 3UHVLGHQW DQG )RXQGHU 3DXO :HLVV ZKR RIWHQ QRWHG WKDW ³1R RQH LV EH\RQG controversy, and presidents should not be exHPSWHG´ 3DXO.XQW]³7KH0HWDSK\VLFDO6RFLHW\Rf America: 1950±´'HSDUWPHQWRI Philosophy, Emory University, Atlanta GA, PhotoFRS\ .XQW]¶VXQSXEOLVKHG KLVWRU\RIWKH6RFLHW\¶VHDUO\\HDUVVHUYHVDVDEDVLVRISRUWLRQVRIWKHSUHVHQWLntroduction. 13. Ibid. -RKQ:LOG³7KH1HZ(PSLULFLVPDQG+XPDQ7LPH´±538. 15. Joseph Owens, chapter 3³5HDOLW\´-RVHSK2ZHQVUHIOHFWHGLQKLV3UHVLGHnWLDO$GGUHVV³LVDQREMHFWWKDWLQWULQVLFDOO\DOORZVDUDGLFDOSOXUDOLVPIRUPHWaphysical thinking, and yet offers in one way or another the same problems for all. Hence dialogue is possible, while strict uniformity is excluded. The pluralLVPPD\EHFDUULHGVRIDUDVWRJUDQWWKDWHYHU\RQH¶VDSSURDFKWRUHDOLW\LVDVLndividual as his fingerprints or his genetic structure. Yet just as these fit into narURZHU DQG ZLGHU IDPLO\ JURXSLQJV VR HDFK SHUVRQ¶V PHWDSK\VLFV ZLOO UHPDLQ open to closer or more remote association with others while retaining its individually disWLQFWLYHFDVW´ /HWWHUIURP0F0XOOLQWR3DXO.XQW]FLWHGLQ3DXO.XQW]³7KH0Htaphysical Society of America: 1950±´ 'HSDUWPHQW RI 3KLORVRSK\ (PRU\ 8QLYHUVLW\ Atlanta GA, Photocopy), 4. 7KLVRXWORRNLVUHSUHVHQWHGLQPDQ\RWKHU3UHVLGHQWLDO$GGUHVVHVDVZHOO&ROOLQV¶V ³7KH%RQGRI1DWXUDO%HLQJ´ %HUWRFFL¶V³7RZDUd a Metaphysics of CreDWLRQ´   'RXJKHUW\¶V ³6WUXFWXUH 6XEVWDQWLDO DQG 2WKHU´  

Introduction

7

%ODQFKHWWH¶V ³6XDUH] DQG WKH /DWHQW (VVHQWLDOLVP RI +HLGHJJHU¶V )XQGDPHQWDO 2QWRORJ\´   DQG :LSSHO¶V ³7KRPDV $TXLQDV RQ 7KH 8OWLPDWH 4XHVWLRQ Why Is There AnyWKLQJ$W$OO5DWKHU7KDQ1RWKLQJ:KDWVRHYHU"´ 5efer to Appendix A for a complete list of past MSA Presidents and their addresses. 18. This more pragmatic approach can also be seen in other Addresses, such as BrumEDXJK¶V ³$SSOLHG 0HWDSK\VLFV 7UXWK DQG 3DVVLQJ 7LPH´   1HYLOOH¶V ³9DOXH &RXUDJH DQG /HDGHUVKLS´   DQG /DFK¶V ³9DOXDWLRQDO 6SHFLHV´ (1997). Refer to Appendix A for a complete list of past MSA Presidents and their addresses.  :LOOLDP (UQHVW +RFNLQJ ³)DFW )LHOG DQG 'HVWLQ\ Inductive Elements of MetaSK\VLFV´ Review of Metaphysics 11 (1958): 525. It was at this ninth annual meeting that President Hocking announced to the membership that the society had been elected to the prestigious American Council of Learned Societies. 20. Bernstein, chapter 6.  &I ³:KHQ ZH WKLQN WKURXJK WKH YDULRXV DWWHPSWV WR NLOO PHWDSK\VLFV LQ RXU WLPH they do not lead us beyond metaphysics but back to what has always been central to the metaphysical tradition. The danger today does not come from the utopian impulse of metaphysics but rather from the various attempts to kill off metaphysics. Against those who are deeply suspicious of all forms of utopian thinking, I want to claim we need more utopian thinking. Metaphysicians have always been starga]HUVDQGGUHDPHUV:HQHHGWRNHHSRSHQWKHRSSRVLWLRQDOVSDFHRIFULWLTXH´ (Bernstein 115). 22. The only two presidential addresses that are not published in the Review are Wilfrid Sellars (1977) and Jude Dougherty (1984). 23. http://www.metaphysicalsociety.org

Part One THE QUESTION OF METAPHYSICS

Paul Weiss Yale University

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Paul Weiss, the founder of the Metaphysical Society of America, was born 19 May 1901 in Manhattan. He attributed his interest in philosophy to being hit twice by horse-drawn carts as a boy, spurring him to wonder why he survived when others died, and why he was struck twice when many are never struck once. At Harvard University, he studied under Alfred North Whitehead and developed great expertise in the philosophy of Charles Sanders Peirce. After earning his doctorate in 1929, he spent time teaching at Harvard, Radcliffe and Bryn Mawr.1 Weiss gained attention for editing and publishing, with Charles Hartshorne, the collected papers of Peirce between 1931 and 1935. In 1938 he published Reality. In 1946 he began teaching at Yale, where he remained until 1969 when he was forced to retire at the age of 68. 2 Weiss attempted to sue Fordham University for offering him a prestigious chair and then retracting the offer due to his age; the Supreme Court, however, refused to hear the case. He then taught at Catholic University of America, whom he also sued in 1992, alleging age discrimination when his contract was not renewed. He was successful and taught two more years before retiring.3 Unimpressed with logical positivism and uninterested in Continental philosophy, Weiss began forging a way that the project of metaphysics could continue in the era of linguistic analysis. In 1947 he founded The Review of Metaphysics, serving as its editor for 16 years. In 1950, he founded the Metaphysical Society of America. In 1958 his own systematic metaphysical theory was published as Modes of Being. :HLVV¶V RWKHU LPSRUWDQW ZRUNV LQFOXGH WKH HOHYHQ YROXPH Philosophy in Process (1966±1989), which detailed his daily philosophical reflections and ongoing arguments, and Emphatics (2000). Paul Weiss passed away on 5 July 2002.

One THE FOUR-FOLD ART OF AVOIDING QUESTIONS Paul Weiss 7KHIROORZLQJLVWKHFKDLUPDQ¶VDGGUHVVRIZHOcome to the Metaphysical Society of America at its first meeting at Yale University, 15 April 1950. It has been said and will undoubtedly often be said again that this is an historic occasion. Not only are we about to hear a most distinguished group of speculative thinkers, not only does our panel cut across school, creed, doctrine and nation for the purpose of promoting truth regardless of where it may lead, but today we open a forum devoted exclusively to the pursuit of questions lying at the root of all knowledge and action. Isaiah Berlin has recently remarked that men in the twentieth century, instead of continuing the struggle to answer the basic questions all men ask, tend rather to avoid or to cancel them. Our century has been characterized by a series of somewhat violent efforts to reject the problems that bye plagued mankind in the past²problems which continue and will continue to haunt every one of us throughout our lives. His observation has particular pertinence to twentieth century philosophy, especially as it has been practiced in this country. With few notable exceptions, our philosophers have spent most of their energies denying to themselves and trying to deny to others the right and opportunity to think creatively on matters of basic importance to us all. Instead of affirming that hard questions, the unsolved, the perennial problems of mankind are precisely those with which men must continue to deal freshly and freely, they have instead attempted to run away from them by one of four routes²the geographic, the historic, the methodologic, and the dogmatic. It is possible to avoid thinking through an issue by attaching oneself to some other nation of thinkers and patiently following the curve of its thought, repeating what had been said before. There is humility in the attitude, there is freedom from provincialism, there is catholicism of spirit, some courage too. But they overlay a more serious error. Speculation demands all the poser, all the freedom a man can master; it does not allow one merely to repeat what had been said elsewhere, though it surely does permit one to agree with, build on and make use of the insight and wisdom of others. When we realize how shamefully we in this country neglected such men as Peirce and Veblen, Gibbs and Sullivan while we subscribed to minor variations on the thought

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and art dominant in Berlin or Vienna, Oxford or Paris, we come to see that we in this country have been slack in our pursuit of cosmic truth. Happily we are almost entirely out of this period, and a growing number now reflect on issues and pursue lines of inquiry with complete indifference as to where they may have originated. It is the nature of things as found anywhere, not the views as promulgated somewhere which should drive us on and which will enable us to transcend the borders that keep men politically opposed. Philosophy is a living, incredibly difficult enterprise in which one must take advantage of the genius of men of every time, and use what we can to reach, if possible, a higher level of understanding and perceptiveness than was characteristic even of them. He who tries to force inquiry inside the pattern forged by men of some previous age belies what they themselves set out to do and defrauds future generations of the fruits which might have been won today. We owe it to ourselves and to those who come after neither to keep within, nor to stay resolutely outside anytime. The Greeks and the medieval, the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries are all part of our heritage. To ignore whatever was not handled in the past is almost as bad an act of treachery to the rights of reason as is a deliberate refusal to try to learn from some particular period of time. The characteristic American way of avoiding hard questions²one is tempted to say, our contribution to this art²is to insist on using some one method, say that of pragmatism, instrumentalism, idealism, analysis, linguistics or logistics, and to deny the importance or meaningfulness of anything which lies beyond its scope or power. But we have been given no assurance by fact or dialectic that the mysteries which beset us are to be solved in only one way. We need not one, but many methods, not one but hundreds of schools²or better, we must avoid prescribed methods, limitative schools and programs, and instead invite a host of independent inquirers to VXEPLW WR RQH DQRWKHU¶V FULWLFLVPV WKH SURGXFWV RI WKHLU KRQHVW WKRXJKW 1R man or school has mastered all the ways by which we can learn all that we should He who approaches issues from only one direction denies himself and us the truths that require another approach. At the present time the dominant denial of the existence and validity of many basic problems comes from the positivists and existentialists, the Marxists and the semanticists who, in the name of science, God, economics or logic deny the meaning of any questions which cannot fit inside the limits they have set up as defining the nature of meaning and the possibility of being. Disturbed by the fact that men disagree and have long disagreed, that there are very old questions that have not yet been answered, that no known method seems adequate to the task of wrestling the last secret from man and nature, they suggest that we give up the unending task and settle only for what is compatible with some arbitrarily assumed criterion or framework. It is certainly true that scientists and Kierkegaardians, communists and Carnapians use language with considerable precision, that they communicate with the

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members of their schools with considerable success, that they seem to make some kind of progress, and that they are fairly clear as to just how to distinguish what they will accept to be truth from what they will reject as falsehood. But this is far from justifying their belief that questions which their systems cannot accommodate are, by that fact, shown not to be questions at all. The one great intellectual crime, C. S. Peirce observed, is the crime of blocking the road of inquiry. This we do when we use the deceives of geography, history, methodology or outright rejection to deny to men the need and the right to deal with such root questions as the nature and relation of being and non-being, God and the world, time and eternity, good and bad, logic and existence, the individual and the totality. I deem it a great privilege to be able to share with you in the pleasure of pursuing these questions once again in the company of these eminent thinkers. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 1. Ari L. Goldman, ³Paul Weiss, 101, Philosopher And Challenger of Age Bias´ New York Times July 24, 2002 http://www.nytimes.com/2002/07/24/us/paul-weiss101-philosopher-and-challenger-of-age-bias.html.  -XGH 3 'RXJKHUW\ ³3DXO :HLVV ±´ Proceedings and Addresses of the American Philosophical Association 77 (2004): 174± 175. $UL/*ROGPDQ³Paul Weiss, 101, Philosopher And Challenger of Age Bias.

George Klubertanz, S.J. St. Louis University

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH George P. Klubertanz was born 29 June 1912 in Columbus, Wisconsin. President of the Metaphysical Society in 1957, Klubertanz was Professor of PhilosoSK\DW6DLQW /RXLV8QLYHUVLW\+HHDUQHGKLVEDFKHORU¶VDQG PDVWHU¶VLQ /DWLQ and Greek from St. Louis University and his doctorate in philosophy from the University of Toronto. His works include The Philosophy of Human Nature (1953), Introduction to the Philosophy of Being (1955), St. Thomas Aquinas on Analogy (1960), and Being and God: Introduction to the Philosophy of Being and to Natural Theology (1963). George P. Klubertanz died ³ZLWKDERRNLQKLV KDQG´ July 1972.1

Two THE PROBLEM OF THE ANALOGY OF BEING George Klubertanz Delivered at the eighth annual meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, Indiana University, 22 March 1957. Introduction Is the problem of being of central importance in any metaphysics? I think it is, and by way of preliminary argument two reasons can be advanced. The first reason is that metaphysics, regardless of the view one takes of it, aims at reaching knowledge and making statements about reality as a whole, that is, about being. Now, if such knowledge can be attained, a scientific metaphysics is possible; if not, impossible. The second reason is that only if metaphysics is possible can there be any demonstrative knowledge about God. I say ³GHPRQVWUDWLYH NQRZOHGJH´ GHliberately, for I do not intend to claim any immediate experience of God,1 nor deny the existence of a pre-philosophic knowledge of God.2 These two connected considerations show the importance and the direction of the inquiry about being. But there is a danger of moving too fast²of wishing to talk about the relation of the world to God without first getting a sound metaphysics of the being of experience. Those who wish to begin metaphysics with the existence of God,3 or to consider the whole of metaphysics as theology,4 are, it seems to me, involved in a circular process: being is known through knowing God, and God is known only as the cause of being.5 Is There Really a Problem of Being? Has modern analysis done away with the problem of being? The claim is RIWHQPDGHLWLVVDLGWKDW³H[LVWHQWLDOTXDOLILHUV´OLNH³VRPH´³D´³WKLV´ GR all that is necessary.6 %XWWKHVWDWHPHQW³6RPHPHQDUHSKLORVRSKHUV´LVDQ H[LVWHQWLDOSURSRVLWLRQRQO\LILWKDVWKH IRUFHRI³7KHUH are some men who are philosophers´7 2U LQ RWKHU ZRUGV WR VWLSXODWH WKDW WKH SKUDVH ³some PHPEHUV RI D FODVV´ PHDQV ³VRPH existing PHPEHUV´ DV RSSRVHG WR DQ ³HPSW\FODVV´ WKDW KDV QR>UHDO@ PHPEHUV GRHV QRWHOLPLQDWH WKHSRVVLELOLW\ of conceiving and speaking of individuals of a class who are not real, and consequently does not remove the difference between particularity and UHDOLW\ $Q ³H[LVWHQWLDO TXDOLILHU´ RU D V\PERO XVHG EHIRUH D SURSRVLWLRQ RU

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WKHXVHRIWKHSKUDVH³7KHUHLV´LVPHUHO\DGLIIHUHQWDQGFRPSOLFDWHGZD\RI ³SRVLWLQJ WKH ZKROH UHDOLW\ RI WKH ZKROH VXEMHFW´ DV .DQW SXW LW  8 But any H[SUHVVLRQZKLFKVLPSO\SRVLWVDVXEMHFWDVH[LVWLQJLVWKHYHUE³WREH´LQLWV existential signification. 7KH IXQFWLRQ RI WKH YHUE ³WR EH´ LV FDSDEOH RI YDULRXV H[WHUQDO expressions, particularly at the second remove, as in writing. This can be seen, not only in the highly artificial languages constructed by contemporary logicians and analytic philosophers, but also in the agglutinative languages found here and there as natural forms.9 Even in the languages with which we are most familiar, context often determines whether we are speaking H[LVWHQWLDOO\³6RPHPHQDUHLQFXUDEO\VLFN´ RUQRW³6RPHRI6KDNHVSHDUH¶V PLQRUFKDUDFWHUVDUHPRVWDGPLUDEOH´  Again, some philosophers would like to eliminate the problem of being E\ UXOLQJ WKDW LQ WKH ³LGHDO ODQJXDJH´ RQO\ UHDO WKLQJV ZRXOG EH PHQWLRQHG 7KXVWKHRFFXUUHQFHRIDVXEMHFWRUDQ³XQGHILQHGSUHGLFDWH´LQWKHODQJXDJH would be all that is necessary. This again shows that the function of asserting FDQEHDFFRPSOLVKHGLQRWKHUZD\VWKDQE\WKHZRUGV³LV´DQG³H[LVWV´ *UDPPDWLFDO DQG OLQJXLVWLF UXOHV DQG ³XQLYHUVHV RI GLVFRXUVH´ DUH useful things, but they serve only to distinguish sentences; they do not settle between meanings nor explain them, much less explain the nature of things referred to by the sentences in question. Hence, the problem of being is not a problem of the use of words, and so is not solved by rules for this use. The problem of being is not a question of psychological intention. We GRQRWLQTXLUHLQWRDVWDWHRIPLQGWKDWPLJKWEHFDOOHG³DIILUPDWLYH´,WLVQRW the primary metaphysical question to ask how people can talk about griffins and pink elephants.10 Looked at from the introspective-psychological point of view (which seems to be the point of view of pure phenomenology), an act of affirmation is always and univocally an act of affirmation. That is why a pure phenomenology, in its historical sense, does not even touch the basic problem of metaphysics, much less solve it. The problem of being is not a question of logical intention. The logical LQWHQWLRQ RI ³LV´ LV XQLWLYH DQG IURP WKH SRLQW RI YLHZ RI SXUH ORJLF WKLV function seems to be purely univocal.11 But the functions of composition, division, relation, and the like, considered in their purely logical working, do not determine the structure of reality, and do not even directly reveal it, 12 that is, if we start out from them as the primary referent. The problem of being is not primarily a question of the psychological processes by means of which an affirmation of real existence can be made, though this is an interesting and important question. 13 But the psychological structure of the act of knowing does not explain the being of things we know, and so an epistemology can never substitute for a metaphysics, as many empiricists since Hume have tried to make it do.14 The question about the meaning of being is not a question of the genesis of knowledge, nor to be decided by a study of the genesis of knowledge.

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There are some who seem to hold that all knowledge takes place by a differentiation within preceding knowledge.15 In this view, the first act of knowledge contains all future knowledge implicitly, and the only progress that can be made is to make this content explicit. Now, this view could SRVVLEO\EHGHIHQGHGLIWKH³LPSOLFLWQHVV´LVSURSHUO\XQGHUVWRRG%XWLIWKH only explication allowed is a formal one, that is, according to the rules of logical implication, I take this to be equivalent to a denial of metaphysics in favor of logic, or at best an idealistic procedure à la Hegel and other immanentist philosophers. One can grant that such procedure is necessarily univocal, but one can question whether it will ever reveal more than is present²namely, the logical conditions of pure experience. This, as found in the human knowers we are, to my mind does not reveal any real conditions of NQRZOHGJHVLQFH,WKLQNWKDWVXFKDQDOOHJHG³SXUHH[SHULHQFH´LVDFRQVWUXFW not an existential fact. The problem of being is not a purely physical fact, in (the really LPSRVVLEOH  DEVWUDFWLRQ IURP DOO UHIHUHQFH WR LQWHOOHFW ,Q WKH UHDO ³QRQXQGHUVWRRG´ RUGHUWKHUH LVQRFRPPXQLW\H[FHSWWKDWRID UHDOJHQHUDOFDXVH or, alternatively, real identity. Nominalism would be true metaphysics if it were not physically impossible²if we could have a science about things without in any sense understanding them.16 Nominalism seems to be an attempt to construct science which is not in and of an intellect. The problem of being is not primarily a question of how a certain noun RUDGMHFWLYH³EHLQJ´LVXVHG17 ,WLVQRWHYHQDTXHVWLRQRIWKHPHDQLQJRI³LV´ LQDEVWUDFWLRQ:KHQZHDVNDERXWEHLQJZHDUHSULPDULO\LQWHUHVWHGLQ³WKDW ZKLFKLV´RULQRWKHUZRUGVLQWKHPHDQLQJRI³LV´DVXsed in a proposition about some real thing or things.18 Finally, the problem of being is not necessarily a single problem. I mean this denial in many ways. First, and most significantly, we have no right to assume that there is only a single problem of being. If being were evidently univocal, it would seem to be to become an almost nugatory question. It would be important still, but it could be disposed of in a paragraph; it FHUWDLQO\ FRXOG QRW DEVRUE WKH PDMRU SDUW RI D SKLORVRSKHU¶V DWWHQWLRQ (YHQ the very possibility that the problem of being is a multiple problem makes it philosophically intriguing. Secondly, we have no right to assume that the problem of being can be multiple in only one way. Thirdly, we have no right to assume that a philosopher has one and only one problem and type of relation in mind when he talks about being, analogy, and so on. Such an assumption betrays an historical naivete, comparable in its own way to an XQGHUJUDGXDWH¶VGHVLUHWRKDYHRQHZRUGIRURQHWKLQJ)RXUWKO\ZHKDYHQo right to assume that every time a philosopher speaks of being he is going to speak his entire mind,19 or even that, given the context, he can do so relevantly. The conclusion of this preliminary view of the problem can be stated thus: the problem of being is the problem of the meaning, in general and in

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SDUWLFXODU RI WKH SUHGLFDWLRQ RI ³LV´²the assertion of the existence²of all the sorts of reality that there are. It is possible to study meaning without explicit reference to the things with which the meanings are concerned,20 but the more properly metaphysical approach is to study meaning in reference to those things. Perhaps it would be even better to make the statement stronger, and say: to study all the kinds of things insofar as they are related to being. The Being of Experience and Its Analogy (a) The Being Of Individual Subsistents Experience presents us with many individuals which have both common qualities and specific and individual differences. The fact of common qualities gives rise to the problem of universals. Now, most common SUHGLFDWHVDUHWRVRPHH[WHQW³IRUPDO´WKDWLVWKH\DUHLQWHOOLJLEOHHVVHQFHV ZKLFK FDQ EH FRQFHLYHG DV DQVZHUV WR ³ZKDW-TXHVWLRQV´ $V IDU DV WKH community of predication is concerned, like the common predicates, ³LV´ LV said of many truthfully and properly²it is true and correct to say of each thing in this room that it is. But there is a difference. All universal predicates are partial, they state an aspect of the subject of which they are predicated. They name or describe the subject under some formal determination which is at the same time a SDUWLDOFRQVLGHUDWLRQ%XW³LV´LQLWVVWURQJHVWVHQVHSUHFLVHO\SRVLWVWKHwhole subject. It adds nothing to the subject. It is precisely the assertion of the actuality of the subject. Now, this subject, taken in its existential actuality, is an individual. Whether an individual has common qualities or not, whether it has relations to other things or not it is, as individual, distinguished from other individuals, and so, in some sense, unique all the way through. When we assert the actuality of an individual, we assert it according to the entire nature RIWKDW LQGLYLGXDO ³-RH 6PLWKLV´ GRHVQ¶W PHDQLQSUHSKLORVRSKLFDO XVDJH 21 ³DVLIKHZHUHXQFKDQJHDEOH´DQG³7KLVWDEOHLV´LQWKHVDPHRUGLQDU\XVDJH GRHVQ¶W LPSO\ WKH WDEOH¶V XWWHU VXSHUIOXRXVQHVV22 These latter meanings are legitimate philosophical manipulations of terms, but it seems to me (a) that all the important philosophical problems and relations uncovered by the distinction between being and existence can be handled in another way, that is, in terms of natures, and (b) such a distinction fails to observe properly a part of the original datum, namely, that there is a community as well as diversity of being. In otKHUZRUGVWKHDVVHUWLRQWKDW³6RPH-WKLQJLV´FDQPRVW VLPSO\EHGLUHFWHGWRWKHWKLQJ¶VDFWXDOLW\OHDYLQJWKHGHVLJQDWLRQRIWKHkind of actuality open to be determined by the nature of the subject whose actuality is affirmed. In this way, the affirmation of existence does not prejudge the issue of the sort of being a thing has. ,Q RWKHU ZRUGV ZKHQ ³LV´ LV FRQVLGHUHG LQ LWV ILUVW DQG FRQFUHWH SURSRVLWLRQDO IXQFWLRQ LW DOZD\V LPSOLHV ³DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH SURSHU QDWXUH RI

The Problem of the Analogy of Being

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WKDWZKLFKLV´6LQFHWKHVXEMHFWRI such an affirmation is in the first instance the concrete individual with its proper nature and all its individual SHFXOLDULWLHV HYHU\ VXEMHFW RI ³LV´ LV GLIIHUHQW IURP HYHU\ RWKHU RQH $QG VLQFH ³LV´ LV SUHGLFDWHG DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH SURSHU QDWXUH RI WKDW which is, it is predicated differently in each instance of its use. Yet there remains a perfectly FOHDULQWHOOLJLELOLW\RI³LV´²QRWLQDFWXDOLW\ZKLFKLVDIILUPHGRI³WKLVWKLQJ´ DQG³WKDWWKLQJ´EXWLQWKHVLPLODULW\RIIXQFWLRQLQHDFKDQGHYHU\LQVWDQFe.23 ³;LV´PHDQV³;LVDFFRUGLQJWR;¶VSURSHUZD\RIH[LVWLQJ´,WLVWKHUHIRUH QHLWKHU ; QRU ;¶V DFWXDOLW\ WKDW LV FRPPRQ WR DQ\WKLQJ HOVH EXW WKH proportion of X to its own actuality which is similar to the proportion of DQ\WKLQJHOVHWRWKHODWWHU¶V own actuality. Let me now summarize and give a descriptive name to the results of the DERYH DQDO\VLV ,Q LWV ILUVW XVH ³EHLQJ´ LV VKRUW-KDQG IRU ³6RPHWKLQJ ZKLFK LV´LWPHDQVWKDW³6RPHWKLQJKDVWKHNLQGRIDFWXDOLW\ZKLFKLVSURSRUWLRQHG to the concretH LQGLYLGXDO QDWXUH RIWKDWWKLQJ´ +HQFH³LV´LVQRWXQLYHUVDO but a proportional predicate. Since it does have an intrinsic intelligibility, but RQHZKLFKYDULHVLQHYHU\XVHZHFDQVD\WKDWLWLV³DQDORJRXVE\DQDQDORJ\ RISURSHUSURSRUWLRQDOLW\´7KH³DQDORJ\RIEHLQJ´DVWKXVGLVFRYHUHGLVQRW the analogy of a noun or adjective; the expression is simply short-hand for ³WKHDQDORJ\RIWKHXVHVRIµLV¶LQDSURSRVLWLRQ´EDVHGRQHDFKLQGLYLGXDO¶V possession of its own unique act of existing). The analysis just conducted has revealed that being affirms the actuality of an individual thing, inasmuch as that thing has its own proper actuality ZKLFK LV SURSRUWLRQHG WR DQG OLPLWHG E\ WKDW WKLQJ¶V SURSHU QDWXUH ,I RQH were to think that the entire analogy of being is the analogy of proper proportionality, several metaphysical positions ought to follow. The first is that we could have a categorical, general analysis of beings according to their principles; this analogy is the analogy of distinct individuals which possess their proper act. The second position implied is that there can be only finite UHDOLW\ IRU WKH ³SURSRUWLRQ´ WKDW ZH KDYH IRXQG LV D real proportion in the things themselves.24 7KLUGO\ WKH SUHFLVH PHDQLQJ RI ³LV´ LQ WKLV NLQG RI analogy seems to depend upon a knowledge of the nature of the thing which we assert to exist; hence, it would seem to be restricted to the beings of experience, and so, if there were no other analogy, we could have a metaphysics only of finite being, in which the knowledge of immaterial being would necessarily be imprecise and largely metaphorical. (b) Metaphor and Improper Proportionality In conjunction with the analogy of proper proportionality, it is customary for Thomists to take up the so-called analogy of improper SURSRUWLRQDOLW\ IRU H[DPSOH WKH ³IRRW´ RI D PRXQWDLQ  ZKLFK WKH\ LGHQWLI\ with metaphor. I am not at all sure that this part of the theory is correct. I believe that there is a place to treat of improper proportionality in

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metaphysics, but not in the analysis of the sensible being of experience. I believe, moreover, that metaphor is a very important kind of knowledge, and that it is based upon analogy; but I also believe that metaphor is not directly analogy at all,25 and consequently, I believe that we can discuss the analogy of being without stopping to investigate metaphor. (c) Being and the Categorical Analysis of Individuals When I said above that the analogy of proper proportionality is not capable of handling some kinds of analysis of experience, I implied that there DUH RWKHU ³WKLQJV´ LQ H[SHULHQFH EHVLGHV GLVWLQFW FRPSOHWH LQGLYLGXDOV :KDW these other things might be is most easily shown by considering a number of H[DPSOHV³7KHUHLVDORWRIVXIIHULQJLQWKHZRUOG´³0DQLVUDWLRQDO´³0DQ is a tool-using, symbol-XVLQJDQLPDO´:KDWGRHV³LV´PHDQLQWKHVHYDULRXV cases? Can we simply transfer what we have already found concerning the PHDQLQJRI³LV´ZKHQDSSOLHGWRFRQFUHWHLQGLYLGXDOVLQH[SHULHQFH"6XSSRVH ZHWU\³6XIIHULQJLVLQ the way suited to its nature, something like the way WKDW -RH 6PLWK H[LVWV DFFRUGLQJ WR KLV QDWXUH´ 7KLV H[SRVLWLRQ SUHVXSSRVHV that suffering is a thing, a real concrete subject. But his is not true² PHWDSK\VLFDOO\VXIIHULQJGRHVQ¶Wexist; suffering is not an independent reality ZKLFK KDV LWV RZQ SURSHU H[LVWHQFH ³6XIIHULQJ LV´ PHDQV ³WKHUH DUH VRPH SHUVRQV ZKR DUH DFWXDOO\ DIIHFWHG E\ VXIIHULQJ´ RU ³6XIIHULQJ LV DFWXDOO\ IRXQGLQVRPHSHUVRQV´7KLVFKDQJHRIH[SUHVVLRQLVQRWLQWHQGHGWROHVVHQ or disguise the reality of suffering, but to specify the kind of reality it has. 7KLV LV WKH GRFWULQH WKDW WKHUH DUH ³DFFLGHQWV´ WKDW LV PRGLILFDWLRQV RI VXEVWDQFH³6XIIHULQJLV´LPSOLHVWKDW³WKHUHLV some one who is affected by VXIIHULQJ´ +HQFH ZKHQ ZH VD\ ³6XIIHULQJ LV´ ZH DUH FKDQJLQJ (grammatically and cognitively) an adverbial phrase into a noun that can be XVHGDVDVXEMHFWLQPRUHWHFKQLFDOWHUPVZHDUHFKDQJLQJD³IRUPby ZKLFK´ into a substance.26 7KHUHIRUH WKH ³LV´ SUHGLFDWHG RI DQ DFFLGHQt is not the VDPH DV WKH ³LV´ SUHGLFDWHG RI D VXEVWDQFH EXW LV VLPLODU WR WKH ODWWHU inasmuch as an accident inheres in and modifies a substance which is. We PD\ FDOO WKLV ³DQ DQDORJ\ RI SURSRUWLRQ E\ LQKHULWDQFH´ 7KLV LV WKH NLQG RI analogy that AristoWOHZDVSULPDULO\WDONLQJDERXWZKHQKHLQVLVWHGWKDW³LV´ GRHVQRWKDYHDVLQJOHPHDQLQJLQUHODWLRQWRYDULRXV³FDWHJRULHV´ 27 To interpret the categories as being by analogy of proper proportionality would imply that each of the categories is a subject of existing and of other attributes. The analogy of proper proportionality is intelligible only of various subjects exist, possess an act of existing, in the way proper to them. True, we tend to think of accidents as if they were substances, but this is not reason to let ourselves be deceived into thinking that they are a diminished kind of substance. Accidents are analogously being, by they are not analogously substance.28 A different sort of analogy shows up when we speak of absolute natures, as when, for H[DPSOH ZH VD\ ³0DQ LV PRUWDO´29 This is not a direct

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statement about an existing subject, nor one about the objective order of knowledge, nor again about a modification of an existing subject. What sort RI DFWXDOLW\ GRHV ³PDQ´ KDYH" 7KHUH DUH LQGLYLGXal men, who are, by the QDWXUH³PDQ´ZKLFKWKH\SRVVHVV30 But this nature constitutes their essence; it LV WKDW LQ ZKLFK DOO DFFLGHQWDO PRGLILFDWLRQV LQKHUH 7KXV ³0DQ H[LVWV´ PHDQV³7KHUHDUHPHQZKRDUHby QDWXUHZKLFKLVKXPDQLW\´7KLVWKHQLV also the change of an adverbial phrase into a noun, but this time what has been changed is the subject of the inherence of accidents and of actuality. 7KLV LV WKH GRFWULQH RI ³VHFRQG VXEVWDQFH´ DV WKDW E\ ZKLFK LQGLYLGXDO subsistences are what they essentially are. Second substances not only are said to be, but they also receive various essential predicates, for example, ³0DQ LV PRUWDO´ 7KLV DFFRUGLQJ WR WKH LQWHUSUHWDWLRQ MXVW JLYHQ PHDQV ³7KHUH DUH PHQ ZKR DUH E\ WKH QDWXUH µPDQ¶ ZKLFK WKH\ KDYH DQG this nature has certain intelligible relations (cODVVHG DV µpredicables¶), among ZKLFKLVWKHSURSHUW\RIEHLQJVXEMHFWWRGHDWK´7KLVRIFRXUVHLVVLPLODUWR the Averroistic interpretation of absolute natures, which is not accepted by everyone, but which seems to have the most sharply realistic (empirical, even sensist) basis.31 The analogy involved in predications about second substance is still an analogy of proportion, inasmuch as the essential nature of a sensible thing, by which it is, is related to the subject itself which actually is. We could call this DQ ³DQDORJ\ RI SURSRUWLRQ E\ HVVHQWLDO FRQVWLWXWLRQ´ LQDVPXFK DV WKH (absolute) nature is the first subject of the inherence of accidents and of actuality (especially the act of existing).32 If a philosopher were to consider (explicitly or implicitly) the analogy of proportion as the unique kind of analogy, and were to use the substanceaccident experience as his point of departure for the analysis of reality, it seems to me he would end with Spinoza¶VVLQJOH-substance doctrine of being. If, on the other hand, the analogy of proportion is combined with a pure causal analogy,33 two alternatives seem to be possible. If efficient and formal causes are kept distinct, the doctrine of being should be something like $ULVWRWOH¶V³SURVKHQ´ equivocity²there is a single subject of being, but it is not identified with the other things which are merely denominated being by reference.34 If efficient and formal causes are somehow blended (as $ULVWRWOH¶V ³KHDOWK DQDOogy seems to suggest in not distinguishing between causes, effects, and signs), then Plotinian or Hindu positions are the natural outcomes; these positions are kept from being pantheism or single-substance doctrines by making being an extrinsic denominatioQDV ³KHDOWK´ LVD IRRG  of either God or creatures. G ³%HLQJVRI5HDVRQ´DQG$QDORJ\ 8QGRXEWHGO\ ZH PDNH DVVHUWLRQV DERXW ZKDW DUH FDOOHG ³EHLQJV RI UHDVRQ´ )RUH[DPSOHZHVD\³0DQLVDVSHFLHV´³7KLVUHDVRQLQJLVYDOLG´³5HDVRn-

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LQJ LV´ LV QRW PHant to posit reasoning among the real things of experience, except in the psychological sense that it is the activity of some person, and so, like any accident, inheres in a substance. But ordinarily this is not what we are WU\LQJWRVD\1RUGRHV³5HDVRQLQJLV´PHDQWRVD\³5HDVRQLQJLVLQLWVRZQ SURSHUZD\VRPHZKDWDV-RH 6PLWKLVLQKLV´,QWKLVSURSHUVHQVHRIEHLQJ ³UHDVRQLQJ´LVQ¶WDOOLWLVQRQ-being. Some Thomists and some mathematical UHDOLVWV VD\ WKDW WKLV PHDQV ³LV-LQWHQWLRQDOO\´ 8QOHVV VXFh a phrase is explained, it is mere mystery-mongering, or an illegitimate substantialization of WKHREMHFWVRIWKHPLQG:KDWLVWKHNLQGRI³H[LVWHQFH´UHIHUUHGWRZKHQZH VD\³7KLVUHDVRQLQJLVYDOLG´",WVHHPVWRPHWKDWWKH³LV´LQTXHVWLRQLVDQ ³LV-NQRZQ´DQGRQO\DQ³LV-NQRZQ´35 I think that is what St. Thomas meant E\WKHSKUDVH³WKHWUXWKRIDSURSRVLWLRQ´ 36 to paraphrase Bishop Berkeley, WKH ³esse of such beings of reason is FRJQRVFL´ It is not the activity of reasoning that is valid or invaOLGEXW³ZKDW-is-UHDVRQHG´6LPLODUO\LWLVQRWWKH act of grasping what man is that is a species; but rather, what-is-known in a FRQFHSW ³ZKDW-is-FRQFHLYHG´ 6LPiODUO\ ZKHQ ZH VD\ ³7KLV MXGJPHQW LV WUXH´ ZH PHDQ QRWWKHDFWLYLW\RIMXGJLQJEXW ³ZKat-is-MXGJHG´ 7KHVHDUH not real beings with an act of existing, but they are conceived as if they were real beings, after the manner of real beings. A valid reasoning is to invalid as normal beings are to monsters. This seems to me to be an analogy of improper SURSRUWLRQDOLW\ZKHUHWKHVFKHPHZRXOGEHGHVFULEHGVRPHWKLQJOLNHWKLV³$ reasoning is-known and so is considered as if it were a subject with the attribXWHµYDOLG¶VRPHZKDWDVDUHDOVXEMHFWVXEVLVWVZLWKVRPHGHILQLWHPRGHRIEeLQJ´37 There iVDQRWKHUVRUWRIEHLQJRIUHDVRQOLNHWKHIDPRXV³QRWKLQJ´DQG WKH ³YDFXXP´ 7KHVH DUH HYLGHQWO\ PHQWDO FRQVWUXFWV DQG WKH RQO\ ³EHLQJ´ WKH\ KDYH LV WKHLU ³EHLQJ-thought-RI´ %XW XQOLNH WKH ORJLFDO HQWLWLHV PHQWLRQHG DERYH WKH\ DUH ³ILUVW LQWHQWLRQ´ FRnstructs, and they function in relation to the knowledge of real being. From one point of view, we can FRQVLGHU WKHP D PHQWDO ³VKRUW-KDQG´ What is said when we speak of a vacuum is entirely related to the real order, and it is in terms of the real order that such statements are true or false. Thus this order of mental being is related to the real order and is not a mental world parallel to the real. But in spite of the fact that this second class of mental beings is formed quite differently from the first, and belongs to a different order of intention (first, instead of second), they are also beings by an analogy of improper proportionality ± they are said to be, as if they really were, but they are not. (e) Causal Analogy within Experience Many of the causes we find within experience are of exactly the same nature as their effects; for example, the causing of local motion in one object when it is struck by a moving object, the hot thing heating other things around it, and so on. But we also find other instances where this is not so; for H[DPSOH PRWLRQ LV FKDQJHG LQWR ³SRWHQWLDO HQHUJ\´ LQ WKH FKDUJLQJ RI D

The Problem of the Analogy of Being

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VWRUDJHEDWWHU\7KHZRUG³HQHUJ\´XVHGRIWKHPRWLRQRIWKHIO\ZKHHODQGWKH electrical charge of the battery is obviously not used univocally, but analogously. The pattern here is one of denomination by cause or effect, as ³KHDOWK\´LVSUHGLFDWHGRIPHGLFLQHRUIRRG³FDXVDOO\´ or ³YLUWXDOO\´; and is predicated of color, step, and feeling effectively or manifestatively. As long as we know only the bare fact of the causal relation, it is impossible to tell whether the perfection (attribute) so predicated is actually, instrinsically an attribute of both cause and effect. It is of course also not necessarily extrinsic; cause and effect could be really similar without being the same. The important points about causal analogy are these: first, from the mere fact of causal relation it is impossible to tell whether the attribute is intrinsic or extrinsic; secondly, if it is extrinsic, it truly denominates, without revealing, some perfection in the cause which is at least the equivalent of the perfection in the effect from which the denomination is made. (f) Analogy Beyond Experience The most difficult problem of being is this: can we truthfully affirm as real (WKDWLVLQSV\FKRORJLFDOO\DQGORJLFDOO\WKHVDPH´VHQVHDVWKHWKLQJVRI experience) God who by definition is not within ordinary experience? What precisely is the question here? It is not a matter of psychology or logic, as the TXDOLILFDWLRQ ³WUXWKIXOO\´ VKRZV :H DUH DVNLQJ DERXW WKH UHIHUHQW RI WKH proposition, not merely about its form. Hence, in describing the kind of analogy that might be in question, it is necessary to determine the sort of reference that is operative. In discussing this question today, I am making two assumptions: (1) the causal relation can ground an affirmation and a knowledge of a cause not experienced;38 (2) in the case in question, concretely for us there is no other way to do this. We assume that the causal proof has been carried out, and that it has FRQFOXGHG WR WKH DVVHUWLRQ ³*RG H[LVWV´ ZLWK WKH WZR-fold implication that God exists as cause and as Himself uncaused. In the course of this proof analogy is operative, and the analogy itself develops in a reasoned way as the proof moves along. Let me assume that the causal proof for the existence of God is known. The first step consists in the evidence that some being is found to be caused, and then that the entire order of experienced being is caused. Therefore, there is a cauVHRIWKLVRUGHURIEHLQJDQGWKLVFDXVHLVSUHFLVHO\D³FDXVHRIEHLQJ´ that is, a cause that brings it about that these things are. Now, a cause is either univocal with (that is, of the same nature as) its effect, or not. If univocal, the alleged cause would itself be caused, and so would not be the ultimate or first cause. Hence, the cause we are speaking of cannot be univocal with its effects.

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But the cause of being cannot be simply equivocal, that is, totally other than its effects, as the doctrine of metaphorical or symbolic knowledge of God would have it,39 and this for two reasons. The first reason is that it makes no sense to say that A is the case of B inasmuch as A has no relation of any kind to B. %XW³WRWDORWKHUQHVV´WRWDOHTXLYRFLW\LVWKH denial of all relations. The second reason can best be shown negatively. Suppose one were to wish WR XVH ³LV´ LQ DQ HTXLYRFDO VHQVH WKDW LV DV KDYLQJ no meaning in common ZLWK WKH ³LV´ ZH DWWDFK WR WKH WKLQJV RI H[SHULHQFH :KDWHYHU WKLV PHDQLQJ would be, it would have to be describable as non-being; but non-being is precisely nothing at all (if we make the negation to bear precisely on the is). 7RWDOO\ QHJDWLYH ³NQRZOHGJH´ LV QRW ³GRFWD LJQRUDQWLD´ EXW VKHHU EODQNQHVV RIPLQG,I³LV´ZHUHHTXLYRFDOZHZRXOGEHVD\LQJWKDW³*RGLV´DQGZRXOG EH PHDQLQJ ³*RG LV-QRW´ ,Q WKLV FDVH WKH QRQ-being would even lack the reference to actual being; it would lead to incapacity to make (except YHUEDOO\ WKHMXGJPHQW³*RGLV´ ZKLFKZHEHJDQE\VXSSRVLQJ7KHGHnial of being to god by one who believes in Him makes sense only if what we are GHQ\LQJLVQRW³LV´EXWVRPHLPSOLHGPRGHRIEHLQJDVIRUH[DPSOHILQLWXGH changeability, sensibility, and so on. )RUWKHVHWZRUHDVRQVWKHUHIRUH³LV´LQWKHVWDWHPHQW³JRGLV´FDQQRWEH equivocal. Now comes the second step of the proof for the existence of God. We have said that God is, and that He is uncaused. Hence, God is, not by another. Hence, it is His own proper nature to be. In still other words, God is by His essence, and so, God is His own being; hence we can convert the proposition WRUHDGµ7KHHVVHQFHRI*RGLVEHLQJ¶ To illustrate this special relationship, we can turn for a moment to St. 7KRPDV¶VYLHZRI3ODWRQLFSDUWLFLSDWLRQ40 Let us assume that every sensible thing is not wholly what it is, but that it rather is by participation in the DEVROXWH)RUP)RUH[DPSOH³3HWHULVDPDQ´PHDQVWKDW3HWHULVQRWVLPSO\ PDQ EXW LV D PDQ E\ SDUWLFLSDWLRQ LQ ³PDQ LQ KLPVHOI´ )XUWKHUPRUH WKH Form of man is purely and simply man²this is its whole nature. In other words, men are by participation in the Form of man, but the Forms are essentially what they are. Now, this relationship is an analogy: individual men are similar to the Form of man, and yet different, and the relationship is expressed quite precisely in the two contrasting terms: participation and HVVHQFH 7KLV LV D XQLTXH UHODWLRQ $ULVWRWOH¶V ³WKLUG PDQ´ REMHFWLRQ LV DV LUUHOHYDQW DV ZRXOG EH WKH TXHVWLRQ ³E\ ZKDW LV WKH UHODWLRQ UHODWHG WR LWV VXEMHFW"´ $ULVWRWOH¶V RWKHU REMHFWLRQV VHHP WR PH WR EH ZHOO WDNHQ  %XW whether the Forms thus conceived are validly posted entities or not, they serve to illustrate a relation between a perfection and things which do not fully possess that perfection. Let us apply this relationship of participation to the relationship between *RGDQGFUHDWXUHV³*RGLV´± this means that God is identical with His act of existing, that God and His existing are indistinguishable. For God, to be God

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is to be simply, and to be is to EH*RG,QRWKHUZRUGV³LV´LVXVHGRI*RGLQ WKHZD\RILGHQWLW\2QWKHRWKHUKDQGZKHQZHVD\³7KLVILQLWHWKLQJLV´ZH do not mean that its being is identical with itself. This thing can truly be said WR EH LW KDV D ³WR EH´ $QG WKLV LV WKH ZD\ Ln which formal predicates are SUHGLFDWHG WKDW LV DV ³WKDW E\ ZKLFK´ D WKLQJ LV ZKDW LW LV WKDW LV WKH\ DUH SUHGLFDWHGDVD³SDUW´LQZKLFKWKHWKLQJVKDUHVZLWKRXWEHLQJLGHQWLFDOZLWKLW. John is a PDQ QRW PDQ KH VKDUHV LQ KXPDQLW\ KH LV PDQ E\ ³IRrmal SDUWLFLSDWLRQ´IRUPDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQRIFRXUVHLVQRWUHDODQGGRHVQRWLPSO\ the existence of the Form of man, but only its intelligibility. 7RDSRLQWWKHSUHGLFDWLRQRI³LV´LVVLPLODU-RKQLVEXWQRWE\LGHQWLW\ KH VKDUHV LQ ³EHLQJ´ LQ WKH VHQVH RI ³WR EH´  KLV DFWXDO H[LVWLQJ LV WKXV something like a part in which he shares. But the participation expressed by ³LV´LVH[LVWHQWLDOSDUWLFLSDWLRQDQGVXFKSDUWLFLSDWLRQLVQHFHVVDULO\UHDODQG LPSOLHVQRWRQO\WKH LQWHOOLJLELOLW\RI³EHLQJE\ HVVHQFH´EXWDOVRWKHODWWHU¶V reality. The analogy between being-by-participation and being-by-essence can EULHIO\EHFDOOHGWKH³DQDORJ\RISDUWLFLSDWLRQ´7KLVDQDORJ\QHFHVVDULO\KDV two terms between which the special relation of participation holds. It is a ³RQH-to-RQH´DQDORJ\7KDWWKHSDUWLFLSDWLQJWHUPVDUHPDQ\GRHVQRWFKDQJH the relationship of the participant to the participated; it rather founds the relationship (analogy of proper proportionality) of the many to each other. Of course, this analogy can be fully understood only after the proof that God exists and that He exists by essence. As the proof proceeds, the analogy is indeterminate and expressible only negatively, that is, as neither equivocation nor univocation; the sort of analogy is not further determinable until the nature of the terms to be related is clearly known. ³&DXVDODQDORJ\´ LVRILWVHOI QRWD IXOO\GHWHUPLQDWH ZD\RIH[SUHVVLQJ analogy, and is not coextensive with participation, for there is strictly equivocal causality where there is no intelligible likeness to be found. On the other hand, not all participation, not even all real participation, is necessarily causal (in the strict sense of efficient causality); there can be non-causal participation, but this is a secondary relationship, based on the simpler relationships already discussed, and of no special significance at this point. 41 To recapitulate: God can be known to exist, first by an indeterminate analogy of causality, and finally by the analogy of participation. In this DQDORJ\*RGLVNQRZQWREHE\HVVHQFHDQGWKLV³WREH´LVWKH³VDPH´DFWRI being in which the beings of experience participate. In knowing God as a VXEVLVWHQWDFWRIEHLQJZHNQRZVRPHWKLQJDERXW³ZKDW*RGLV´WKRXJKZH simultaneously know that ³ZKDW*RGLV´LVQRWDIRUPRUIRUPDOSHUIHFWLRQ ,QWKHVWULFWVHQVHRIWKHZRUG³HVVHQFH´ZHGRQRWNQRZWKHHVVHQFHPHWDSK\VLFV@ ZKLFK KLVWRU\ KDV XQIROGHG´ ZKLOH DOVR DFNQRZOHGJLQJ ³RQH has to select a definite type of metaphysics which will inevitably exclude RWKHUW\SHVRIWKRXJKWZKLFKKDYHERUQHWKHQDPH´ 3 For Owens, this type of metaphysics is one which does not ignore, but rather builds upon and perhaps even pre-supposes the proofs for the existence of God. These insights are pursued in An Elementary Christian Metaphysics (re-issued by Center for Thomistic Studies, University of St. Thomas, 1985), An Interpretation of Existence (Glencoe/McGraw-Hill, 1968), and Cognition: An Epistemological Inquiry (University of Notre Dame Press, 1992). Although Owens wrote nine books and over 150 articles, an important manuscript was just short of completion at the time of his death in 2002. $ULVWRWOH¶V*UDGDWLRQVRI%HLQJLQ0HWDSK\VLFV(-Z was edited and prepared for publication by Lloyd Gerson in 2007. In this work Owens continues his lifelong effort to demonstrate that knowledge and cognition bring us into immediate contact with the world, thus overcoming the Cartesian problem and providing a firm foundation for a robust metaphysics.

Four REALITY AND METAPHYSICS Joseph Owens Delivered at the twenty-third annual meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, The Catholic University of America, 17 March 1972. I The annual Presidential Address in the Metaphysical Society of America has QHYHU KDG WKH UROH RI D ³VWDWH RI WKH XQLRQ´ PHVVDJH ,W LV HQYLVDJHG DV D scholarly discourse on a relevant philosophical topic. It subjects the topic to direct examination, followed by severe cross-examination from a commentator and by uninhibited discussion from the floor. In a word, it is expected to take the lead in creative dialogue. It is in no way a report in monologue fashion. Nevertheless an inquiry into the current notions of metaphysics and into the attitude of the Metaphysics Society towards its own professed object qualifies eminently enough as a scholarly examination of a relevant philosophical theme. The professed object of the Society, as stated in the first DUWLFOH RI LWV FRQVWLWXWLRQ LV ³WKH VWXG\ RI UHDOLW\´ ³5HDOLW\´ PD\ VHHP a despairingly vague notion. Yet under its aegis the widely scattered metaphysical endeavors in America, with their seemingly hopeless centrifugal tendencies, have been gathered into organized activity and have stayed together and expanded during past twenty-two years. That in itself is an altogether remarkable achievement. In fact, it was unbelievable twenty-two years ago, outside the foresight and the courage of the founders of the 0HWDSK\VLFDO 6RFLHW\ +RZ ³UHDOLW\´ FRXOG EH WKH RSHUDWLYH QRWLRQ XQGHU which all this was accomplished is accordingly a theme worthy of the closest scrutiny. The theme is all the more timely at the present moment when the corporate organization of the metaphysical enterprise, commenced twentytwo years ago in America, is about to attain its required fulfillment in expansion on the global front. That is the goal envisaged for the first meeting of the international Metaphysical Society, at Varna in 1973. The inspiration for this intercontinental organization has in point of fact come from the members of our own Society, and the task of drawing up the constitutions for it has been initiated by them. A searching examination of ZKDW ZH KDYH XQGHUVWRRG E\ PHWDSK\VLFV DQG KRZ WKH QRWLRQ ³UHDOLW\´ KDV functioned as the bond that has kept so many diverse tendencies together in

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one metaphysical enterprise over the past twenty-two years, is therefore of prime interest for the guidance of this more extended effort. The concept of reality is moreover a highly controversial topic. Every one may be expected to have his own notion of what reality means, and consequently his own explanation of the way it has functioned as the aspect that makes possible a unity in the apparently unlimited diversity of metaphysical directions. The fact that it has so functioned is there, in the work of the last twenty-two years, whatever explanation one may care to give it. The fact shows that metaphysicians, no matter how far apart in their language and in their views, can join in concerted effort under the succinct IRUPXOD³WKHVWXG\RIUHDOLW\´ An open discussion of the meaning of reality, and of the ways in which the one notion is related to the many different ways of thinking that go under the KHDGLQJRI³PHWDSK\VLFV´LVDFFRUGLQJO\RIYLWDOFRQFHUQDWWKHSUHVent stage of the metaphysical undertaking. The first problem, obviously, is how reality can be understood to serve as the unifying factor for all the widely divergent tendencies that are called metaphysics. The second problem, consequent upon this unifying capability, is how the aspect of reality distinguishes these ways of thinking from all other types of knowledge and marks them off as a different and thoroughly pluralistic discipline constituted in its own right. Difficulties, of course, surface immediately in both these perspectives. To function as a truly operative unifying and distinguishing factor, the notion of reality will have to possess a content of its own over and above the special content of particular realities. How may it in fact have a content of this kind? Then, even though that content be granted, there is still difficulty in seeing how the notion of reality could in any way set metaphysics apart from the other sciences. In discussions within our Society fun has been poked at the formula ³D VWXG\ RI UHDOLW\´ SUHFLVHO\ IURP WKLV DQJOH 7KH FODLP KDV EHHQ made that to look to it for a distinguishing mark is ridiculous, since all other sciences would likewise maintain that they too are concerned with reality and not with illusions. But is this the point at issue? Is not the point rather the question of the operational role played by the notion? Though every science deals with what is real and not with what is illusive, do any except metaphysics make reality the aspect under which things are approached? Do not the other sciences merely presuppose the reality of their objects and then treat of them under aspects such as the qualitative or the quantitative or the normative? If this is so, the approach from the viewpoint of reality will account for the distinction of metaphysics from any other science. The distinction is a verifiable fact. Attend a meeting of the Metaphysical Society and then one of physics or psychology or economics or political science. You will be only too well aware that the discussions pertain to markedly different disciplines. The problem does not lie in establishing the fact. The problem is ZKHWKHUWKHQRWLRQ³UHDOLW\³FRUUHFWO\H[SUHVVHVW\SHRILQWHOOHFWXDOLQTXLU\

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There are two phases, then, to be probed about the notion of reality as the object of metaphysical pursuit. The first is how it can unite in pluralistic fashion so many radically diverse ways of thinking into a common metaphysical enterprise. The second is how it serves to distinguish this pluralistic complex of thought from all other intellectual disciplines. II In regard to the first phase of the question, a rather paradoxical situation has to be faced. If asked for a personal understanding of what metaphysics means, few of us, possibly none of us, would straightway reply that it is the study of UHDOLW\7KDWZRXOGKDUGO\EHRQH¶VRZQZD\RIVD\LQJZKDWPHWDSK\VLFVLV Yet the experience of the past twenty-two years has shown sufficiently that HDFK RQH¶V YLHZ RI WKH QDWXUH RI PHWDSK\VLFV QR PDWWHU KRZ GLYHUVHOy formulated, can sooner or later, and in one way or another, be brought successfully under that succinct and common formula. How? To answer, one might take a quick look at some of the more prominent types of metaphysical thinking, and see how each in spite of its own different formulations is able to fit under the common notion of the study of reality. Accompanying that detailed investigation will be the inquiry why the reality so know is able to furnish the radically diverse starting points that set up the variety of metaphysical tendencies developed in the course of western philosophy. The earliest western thinker for whom there are enough fragments to give a rounded picture of his thought is Heraclitus of Ephesus. His concern was to make manifest and to promote the unity of the common cosmos based on wisdom, in contrast to the dream worlds in which individuals live when they foolishly pursue their own idiosyncrasies. His inspired message is presented as a logos WKDWLVFKDUDFWHUL]HGDV³UHDO´1 In this setting there can KDUGO\ EH DQ\ REMHFWLRQ WR UHJDUGLQJ KLV SKLORVRSK\ DV ³D VWXG\ RI UHDOLW\´ with reality as the operative notion that is meant to distinguish his thought from the polymathy of other Greek teachers. Correspondingly in Parmenides the world is approached not from the doxastic principles inherent in particular viewpoints, but from the doxastic principles inherent in particular viewpoints, but from the all-HPEUDFLQJ VFRSH RI EHLQJ ,Q FRQWUDVW WR WKH GR[DVWLF ³WKH UHDO´ LV TXLWH REYLRXVO\ DQ DSW ZD\ RI GHVFULELQJ WKH REMHFW RI 3DUPHQLGHV¶ study, with reality as its operative notion. Plato in his turn uses a phrase that is UHDGLO\WUDQVODWHG³WKHUHDOO\UHDO´2 to express Ideal being, the means by which things are intellectually explained. No objection arises accordingly, to regard KLV KLJKHVW WKRXJKW DV H[SODQDWLRQ LQ WKH OLJKW RI DQ REMHFW¶V EDVLF UHDOLW\ $ULVWRWOH¶V UHDVRQLQJ SURFHHGV LQ WHUPV RI ZKDW D WKLQJ LV D QRWLRQ HDVLO\ expressed today as its reality.3 It is precisely the task of the primary philosophy, the Aristotelian theology, to account for this reality, as all the other sciences merely presuppose it.4 Quite neatly, then, the operative notion

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in the Aristotelian metaphysics may be characterized as reality. Against this combined Platonic and Aristotelian background the ascent of Plotinus through intelligence to the One may for the same reasons be named the pursuit of the real, in contrast to the utter unreality of pure matter or pure evil. 5 Not one of these thinkers, it is true, does in fact describe his PHWDSK\VLFDO WKLQNLQJ DV ³WKH VWXG\ RI UHDOLW\´ ZLWK RQH SRVVLEOH WKRXJK partial exception.6 Probably none of them would accept it as the most apt way of expressing the nature of his pursuit. Aristotle gives a number definitions of the primary philosophy. Of these the one that has had by far the greatest vogue describes it as the science of being qua being.7 But there are alternates that convey the same notion in phrases that lend themselves to the translation LQ (QJOLVK ³WKH VFLHQFH RI UHDOLW\´8 Is it therefore too much to expect that each of the other thinkers also would allow the use of the phrase to describe his metaphysical thinking, even though none would give it his first preference? In the middle ages Aquinas accepted the traditional Aristotelian definition of metaphysics as the science of being qua being. Yet he XQGHUVWRRG³EHLQJ´LQWKHVWURQJH[LVWHQWLDOVHQVHRIWKHDFWXDOLW\RIQDWXUHRU essence, and accordingly in a sense in which it was contrasted with the res, that is, with the thing or the reality.9 On first thought one might be inclined to say that metaphysics so conceived could not by any stretch of words be appropriately designated as the science of reality. But in Aquinas a thing is potentiality for existence. By studying it under that aspect one is thereby investigating it from the viewpoint of existence. Grudgingly, perhaps, one can with this understanding allow that Thomistic metaphysics comes under the FDSWLRQ³DVWXG\RIUHDOLW\´:LWK'XQV6FRWXVRQWKHRWKHUKDQGWKHQRWLRQ of a reality in contrast to a thing takes on a very special meaning. 10 For him a reality, namely the nature expressed by the definition, is the aspect under which metaphysical consideration takes place.11 From this viewpoint it might not be too much to say that for Scotus the distinguishing and operative characteristic of metaphysics is its concern with realities. Yet the formal description of metaphysics given by him remains within the Aristotelian tradition of being qua being, whether this is understood in an Avicennian or Averroistic sense.12 The same phenomenon, then, appears in medieval philosophy as in the ancient field. The metaphysical thinking of the epoch would not care to describe itself first and foremost as a study of reality. Nevertheless it can offer no insuperable objection to the title for purposes of dialogue with other trends of thought. In modern philosophy, the cogito of Descartes is meant to overcome the illusions caused by sense cognition and by ways of thinking that have become ingrained since childhood. Cartesian first philosophy may in this perspective be regarded as a study of the real, in contrast to acquiescence in illusions. The titles of Bradle\¶V Appearance and Reality DQG RI :KLWHKHDG¶V Process and Reality indicate well enough that the notion of reality can be regarded as the

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focus upon which both Idealism and Process philosophy concentrate. Where metaphysics is restricted to answering the question what one can know, and accordingly equated with a critique of knowledge, the conception of it as a study of reality may become somewhat more tenuous. Nevertheless insofar as its overall thrust may be characterized as the endeavor to ascertain what one really knows in contradistinction from illusion, one can see how it may without too much strain be brought under that caption. Similar is the case with the pragmatic currents that make success in real life the all-pervading test of truth. The positivist conceptions of metaphysics as the cataloguing of the ultimate presuppositions that have in reality been grounds for human thinking, or as the investigation of the widest logical framework in which that thinking has taken place, may with perhaps somewhat greater strain be ranged under the study of reality. Phenomenology and existentialism, with their professed involvement in the Lebenswelt for starting-points and directives, should not find the designation too difficult to accept. Finally, Linguistic analysis may explicitly claim to be dealing not with reality but with the language and disciplines that bear upon the real.13 Nevertheless the ³GHVFULSWLYH PHWDSK\VLFV´ XSRQ ZKLFK LW RSHQV JRHV DGPLWWHGO\ EH\RQG WKH use of words,14 and begins to focus on the common territory of the traditional metaphysicians. If this domain be named reality, no reason emerges why linguistic analysis in its full development may not be regarded as culminating in a study of reality. These considerations round out the picture sufficiently to account for the successful cooperation of so many radically diverse tendencies in the Metaphysical Society during the past twenty-two years. Ancient, medieval, and modern ways of thinking have been brought together and kept together under the common formula of the study of reality. But the very success of the formula gives rise to an even more puzzling question. How can reality as a single object allow, with any sincerity and penetrating understanding, for the profoundly different starting points of the various western metaphysicians? These starting points may be divided very broadly under three headings. They can be located in the things, or in thought, or in language. In Aristotle and in general in western philosophy up till the time of Descartes the starting points were found in things directly known, the thought about them and the knower being attained only concomitantly.15 But things presented many different aspects, allowing many different types of metaphysics, for instance Platonism, Avicennianism, Averroism, Thomism, Scotism and so on, to arise. From Descartes on the starting points have been located largely in thought. Here again, the cogito seems to have offered an indefinite number of possibilities for inaugurating different metaphysics. Likewise language offers LQQXPHUDEOH VWDUWLQJ SRLQWV IRU FRPPHQFLQJ RQH¶V PHWDSK\VLFDO WKLQNLQJ +RZ FDQ WKH RQH FRPPRQ REMHFW ³UHDOLW\´ SUHVHQW PHDQLQJIXO IDFHWV WKDW LQ practice seem innumerable, and still remain a common rallying point for all the radically diverse types of metaphysics?

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The answer to this query has been sharply and concisely etched in last \HDU¶V SUHVLGHQWLDO DGGUHVV $V IDU DV WKH VWDUWLQJ SRLQWV RI PHWDSK\VLFDO WKRXJKWDUHDWLVVXH³LPPHGLDWHSUHVXSSRVHVDUWLFXODWLRQ´ 16 This may seem a paradox, even a contradiction, for anyone who is conditioned to a buildingblock understanding of thought about the universe. Whether from a hasty reading of the Aristotelian Analytics17 in which all reasoning is a complex process that issues from basic indemonstrable principles or from an ingrained tendency towards logical atomism18 the expectation is that the starting points should be relatively simple and the final product most complex. Yet upon closer scrutiny the situation shows itself to be quite different. If the immediate IURPZKLFKRQHFRPPHQFHVRQH¶VUHDVRQLQJLVDWKLQJWKHWKLQJWXUQVRXWWR have its nature and its existence, its necessary and its accidental features, its complicated relations to other things, its activities and its place and its time. It cannot at the moment be separated from any of these. It involves them all. As playing its role of a starting point for metaphysics it is inevitably being known, and thereby involves thought and a knowing agent, no matter in what way one cares to explain these two. Likewise the metaphysician, already in adult life as he commences his work, is dependent upon language. He will not avoid expressing even his inmost thought in words. The combined complexities of things, thought, and language are accordingly present in the immediate object from which metaphysics takes its start. This condition holds whether that immediate starting point be located in the external world, or within human thought, or in the expression given it by human speech. All these cRPSOH[LWLHV DUH LQWLPDWHO\ LQYROYHG LQ RQH¶V PHWDSK\VLFDO VWDUWLQJ point. They condition reality no matter how one cares to explain it, and they condition reality in an undetermined variety of ways. Immediacy does not eliminate wide variety of articulation in the metaphysical object that is common to all. Reality in consequence is an object that intrinsically allows a radical pluralism for metaphysical thinking, and yet offers in one way or another the same problems for all. Hence dialogue is possible, while strict uniformity is H[FOXGHG 7KH SOXUDOLVP PD\ EH FDUULHG VR IDU DV WR JUDQW WKDW HYHU\RQH¶V approach to reality is as individual as his fingerprints or his genetic structure. Yet just as these fit into narrower and wider family groupings, so each perVRQ¶V PHWDSK\VLFV ZLOOUHPDLQRSHQWRFORVHURU PRUH UHPRWHDVVRFLDWLRQ with others while retaining its individually distinctive cast. This allows amply for communication among all, and for the possibility of learning metaphysics from another, while excluding the transmission of metaphysics in textbook fashion or in the way mathematical or chemical formulas are understood in exactly the same manner by all. The method of communication and dialogue and teaching in metaphysics will accordingly be quite different from that of any mathematical or experimental science. Success in a moon voyage depends upon every person of the thousands concerned understanding the formulas and the signals in exactly the same way. Success in metaphysical

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dialogue, on the other hand, UHTXLUHV WKDW RQH PDLQWDLQ RQH¶V RZQ understanding of the notions at issue while at the same time allowing them the flexibility to function in the way intended by the other party . 19 Nor does this radically pluralistic conception of metaphysics involve any baneful relativism. It sees a common reality in thing, thought and language, available to all. It acknowledges different starting points for each metaphysician in that common reality, but does not maintain that each starting point or set of starting points has equal virtuality for pursuing the metaphysical enterprise. A set of starting points limited to the qualitative and quantitative, for instance, cannot hope to reach the spiritual order, nor can a starting point that conceives anything outside thought as unthinkable proceed with metaphysical cogency to a genuinely external world. 20 The search for the metaphysical starting points that will give the greatest possible scope and penetration to the pursuit is left fully open by this radically pluralistic conception of the discipline. The quest for excellence need not be dimmed by acknowledging and understanding the merits of a metaphysics that deals with WKH VDPH UHDOLW\ LQ D ZD\ UDGLFDOO\ GLIIHUHQW IURP RQH¶V RZQ DSSURDFK DQG from which one may learn much without in any way infringing upon the LQWHJULW\RIRQH¶VRZQPHWDSK\VLFDOSULQFLSOHV III Granting that reality does serve in the above way as the common object for dialogue and organized effort among metaphysicians, one may now face the question of the content that enables reality to be the unifying and distinguishing mark of the discipline. How does the notion of reality legitimize metaphysics as a discipline in its own right, set apart from the mathematical and experimental sciences, having its own distinctive methods and pursuing its own inalienable goals? What is there in the notion of reality that gives it a content of its own, a content sufficient to serve as the object of a meaningful intellectual pursuit? As contradistinguished from its opposite, the notion of reality is sufficiently manifest. It can be thought about and talked about, and accordingly made the object of intellectual inquiry. Its opposite, nothing, as Parmenides (Fr. 2 DK) insisted, can be neither thought of nor spoken about. But how does that initially obvious content mean anything over and above the particular content of things? How can it provide a further object for a distinct science? Some thinkers have denied that it does while with those who see in it a content of its own the answer differs as widely as their innumerably different starting points.21 Reality, this would indicate, is not an object that can be DEVWUDFWHGIURPLWVLQVWDQFHVDVQHDWO\DVWKHQRWLRQ³PDQ´IURP:DOODFHDQG 0F*RYHUQRUWKHQRWLRQ³ELUG´IURPKDZNDQd dove. It is not at all a notion that is common in virtue of one concept and differentiated in virtue of

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DQRWKHULQWKH ZD\WKH QRWLRQ ³PDQ´ VKDUHVLQWKH JHQHULFQDWXUH H[SUHVVHG E\ WKH FRQFHSW ³DQLPDO´ EXW LV GLIIHUHQWLDWHG IURP WKH EUXWH ZRUOG E\ WKH IXUWKHUFRQFHSW³UDWLRQDO´1RWKHVLWXDWLRQKHUHLVPXFKPRUHSURIRXQG7KH same notion that is common is the very notion that differentiates. No differentia other than the common notion itself is required or permitted. The RQH QRWLRQ ³UHDOLW\´ LV UHSOHWe with all its differentiae²generic, specific and individual. Parmenides had made this clear when he showed that being absorbed all its differentiae. Aristotle probed and articulated still more sharply the polyvalent character of the single notion. Only by being real can the differentiae function. Under any non-real aspect they could not differentiate reality. Under scrutiny, then, reality turns out to be like a parameter that applies in a different way in every instance. It applies moreover in graded variety as it differentiates individually, specifically, and generically. Yet it unites its instances without exception in its all-inclusive embrace. The one notion does all this, uniting and differentiating, and is both all-extensive and allcomprehensive in the same sweep. Because of this innate pluralistic character, reality presents itself as an object with problems of its own, problems that attract the human intellect and call for the investigation that goes under the name metaphysics. It is unitary enough to require the consistency of treatment that belongs to a science. Yet it does not limit the treatment to the inhibiting consistency that the proverb regards as the virtue of small minds. Rather, it sets the stage for a deeply pluralistic approach. It has need of a consistent treatment that remains open to the innumerable differences. It never allows the indwelling differences to annihilate its unity, nor the unity to dispense with the differences. Both remain essential to the one notion. Just as a literary genius like Chesterton could stay a passionate devotee of orthodoxy while reveling with delight in its paradoxes, so metaphysics thrives on the intellectual consistency of its procedure while rejoicing in the indefinitely varied and prima facie conflicting ways in which it deals with reality. Reality is a unitary yet multifaceted object of this kind, and accordingly in virtue of its own self invites thoroughly pluralistic interpretation. But how does this pluralistic object, while uniting so many different kinds of metaphysics into one discipline, distinguish the pursuit from other intellectual activities? In the objects of the other sciences, reality is of course present. But none of these sciences would call into question the reality of itself or of its subject matter, as metaphysics may do. None of them on its own level has to ask the question about its own reality. Nor would they add the notion of reality to the description of their objects, along with the color, size and shape. They do not enter it as a factor in their scientific formulas. They take it for granted, without having to use it operatively. 22 With metaphysics, on the other hand, reality is the very warp and woof RI WKH LQWHOOHFWXDO SURJUHVV :LWKHU ZLWK ODVW \HDU¶V SUHVLGHQWLDO DGGUHVV RQH cDUHVWRGHVFULEHWKHEDVLFDUWLFXODWLRQRIWKLVLPPHGLDWHREMHFWDV³insistence,

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persistence, and expression´23 RU ZLWK $YLFHQQD DV ³EHLQJ DQG WKLQJ DQG QHFHVVLW\´24 or however else, it provides a set of working notions different from those of any other inquiry. By the effective use of these notions a metaphysical discussion is at once distinguished from a discussion in mathematics or in physics. Neither the mathematician nor the physicist would have the least hesitation in saying that the discussion was of a different type from his²if he would allow it any sense at all! The same would hold for the other sciences. The intellectual articulation and the vocabulary generated by the notion of reality mark a distinctive science that refuses to be identified either in character or in method or in scope with any other. It refuses to be identified in scope. For types of metaphysics in which the starting points found in reality lead to the super-sensible domain, the difference in scope is obvious. With Aristotle and Aquinas and Descartes and many others metaphysics culminates in the study of the spiritual soul and the divine nature.25 This field lies outside the scope of any mathematical or experimental science. Metaphysics alone among the recognized theoretical sciences on the merely human level has entry to it. The importance of metaphysics in this respect has been acknowledged in Jewish, Christian and Moslem theological tradition. But even in types of metaphysics whose starting points do not show the way to the spiritual order the difference in scope from other sciences is clear cut. Reality as the operative notion enables metaphysics to view things and sciences and languages in their totality. Metaphysics alone among the purely human disciplines undertakes a global scrutiny of everything, assigning to each general type of thing and to each science the place and function each is meant to have in the universe as a whole. Today the need of such overall assessment is felt keenly. Each particular science today is poignantly aware of its inability to see things outside its own strictures, and keeps asking other sciences to provide the means of holding things in balance. The need of a discipline with universal scope is thereby insinuated, and this is the distinctive scope that metaphysics offers. Further, reality as an object of philosophy inquiry necessitates the use of a method different from that of any other discipline. It is an object that is too wide to be controlled by quantity or sensible qualities, as is done in the experimental sciences. The convenient double-check of verification is sensible experience is accordingly not applicable. Metaphysics has to find its unassailably true and certain principles in its general object reality, and to reason cogently from these general principles to its conclusions. Its only means of verification is to check each step of the reasoning with the utmost care. Metaphysics has consequently its own method. For it, imitation of methods that have proved successful in other sciences, or the proposal of their norms as the ideal, would be a crippling error. The operative influence of reality as its object stands out sharply in this distinctive requirement of a method that would not be appropriate in any other intellectual discipline. The

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methods of mathematics and of the experimental sciences are to be neither envied nor aped by the metaphysician. Finally, by means of reality as an object metaphysics acquires the distinctive character of a fully constituted science, namely the role of a science in its own right. It is able to rule its own household, and accomplish its tasks apart from outside dictation. In its characteristic scope, namely the consideration of things from the viewpoint of their totality, and the rational investigation of the supersensible realm, it does not get intrinsic help from the principles of other sciences. It is grateful to the other sciences for whatever new aspects of reality they may discover in their own fields, and it subjects these results to scrutiny in its own overall perspective. But they do not affect or change its character as a science. It proceeds in the same way as before, in assessing the new data from its own viewpoint. It is not at all invalidated when the theories of particular sciences are superseded by the discovery of new data or by their reinterpretation of the old. The metaphysics of Aristotle, of Aquinas, of Kant and of Hegel retain their pristine worth throughout all the changes in the conceptions of the physical universe, greatly as these have metamorphosed from Ptolemy through Newton to Einstein and Heisenberg. Metaphysics functions accordingly as a full-fledged science self-sufficient in its own sphere.26 The positivistic view of metaphysics as an immature stage in human thought or as an interim and amateuristic speculation in an area while waiting for the appropriate experimental science to catch up, 27 cannot in consequences be tolerated by anyone who takes reality seriously as the object of intellectual investigation. Likewise the assessment of metaphysics as a handmaid of different origins in Christian theological tradition28 does not do justice to the essential status of the discipline. Today scientists and diplomats have asked philosophy to clarify concepts in their respective fields, and some philosophers place its whole function in the help it can offer to experimental science and to political and social organization. Metaphysics as a branch of philosophy is only too willing to be of any help it can to anyone. But its essential nisus is not located in any of these ancillary functions. Any diminution of its freedom, any spirit of servitude to another science, would tend to harden the delicate and sensitive touch required for its own explorations. It can help others best by pursuing its own course as a science complete and sovereign in its own domain. IV The conclusion emerging from the above considerations is that reality presents in itself a distinct yet flexible object for a fully constituted science. It is sufficiently distinct to render metaphysics a discipline different from all other disciplines. Metaphysics thereby acquires its own characteristic scope,

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its own characteristic method, and its own definitely recognizable identity. On the other hand, reality is an object flexible enough to preserve identity in the LQQXPHUDEOH W\SHV RI WKLQNLQJ WKDW FRPH XQGHU WKH QDPH ³PHWDSK\VLFV´ Hence arises the seeming paradox that no individual metaphysician may be inclined to describe his own thinking as the study of reality, and yet all are quite willing for purposes of dialogue and cooperation and organization to combine under that one caption. These considerations should help one to understand how American philosophers over the last twenty-two years, against a seemingly hopeless background, have been successful in making metaphysics flourish as a recognized science, with the Metaphysical Society giving it its merited voice in the American Council of Learned Societies. Metaphysics as an investigation of the totality makes no infringement on the territory of other sciences. It merely requires status as an acknowledged discipline in its own right. It can hardly be expected to rest content with anything less, if it is to have the opportunities to do its work satisfactorily. Its organized effort, consolidated in America during the last twenty-two years, is now going out on the intercontinental scene. One may watch with interest how the focus on the study of reality, already successful in western philosophy, will appeal to trends of Hindu, Chinese, and other non-western thought. A requirement for success is that we ourselves have a clear understanding of what we mean by reality and by metaphysics. For the purpose envisaged, the reality encountered by all in the world of everyday experience has to be understood as an object both firm enough and flexible enough to maintain its identity while extending on the one hand to the spiritual and divine orders, and on the other to the cognitional and the fictitious, as in the various senses of a real doubt, a real poem, a real novel, a real dream.29 Things cry to be understood in the all-embracing perspective of the totality, human aspirations crave for that unifying type of knowledge, and metaphysics is the discipline that offers fulfilment to this deepest natural desire of man to know. BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES 1. Obituary, The Globe and Mail, November 2, 2005, http://v1.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/story/Deaths.20051102.93008739/BDASt ory/BDA/deaths  0LFKDHO (ZEDQN ³,Q 0HPRULDP -RVHSK 2ZHQV &665´ The Review of Metaphysics 59 (2006): 715±716. 3. 'HVPRQG&RQQHOO³5HYLHZSt Thomas and the Future of Metaphysics by Joseph 2ZHQV´Studies: An Irish Quarterly Review 46 (1957): 361±363.

NOTES ³2IWKLV7UXWKUHDODVLWLVPHQDOZD\VSURYHWREHXQFRPSUHKHQGLQJ ´+HUDFOi-

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tus, Fr. 1, tr. M. Marcovich, Heraclitus (Merida, Venezuela: Los Andes University Press, 1967), p. 6. Cf. ibid., p. 9, and Werner Jaeger, The Theology of the Early Greek Philosophers (Oxford, Clarendon Press: 1947), pp. 228±229, n. 11. Though the opening line of the fragment may be translated in different ways, the overall notion of a common world that is real for all is obvious throughout the SDVVDJH2QWKHQRWLRQRI³SRO\PDWK\´VHH+HUDFOLWXVFr. 40 (DK; Marcovich, Fr. 16). 2. Plato, Phdr., &(&I³3ODWRIRUZKRPWKHUHDOPRIWKHLGHDVDORQHZDVWKH µUHDOO\UHDO¶´:1RUULV&ODUNH³:KDWLV5HDOO\5HDO"´LQProgress in Philosophy, ed. James A. McWilliams (Milwaukee: Bruce Publishing Co., 1955), p. 81. In Parmenides, too, the objects of seeming may be approached through the notion of UHDOLW\LQVRIDUDVWKH\DUH³QDPHG´E\RU³QDPH´EHLQJFr. 8.36±41 DK). 3. Aristotle, Apo., II 17,99a21±23. Cf. 11,94a20±b37. 4. Metaph., E 1,1025a3±18. A discussion of this topic may be found in my study The Doctrine of Being in the Aristotelian Metaphysics, 2nd ed. (Toronto: Pontifical Institute of Mediaeval Studies, 1963), pp. 259±275. 5. See Plotinus, En., I, 8, 3.6±34; 7.17±20. Cf. I, 3, 4±5. 6. At times Aristotle describes the primary philosophy as the science of ousia. See Metaph., B 2,996b31; 997a1±2 and 11; Z 1,1028b4± ȁ D ,I RQH FRXOGVHHRQH¶VZD\FOHDUWRWUDQVODWHousia E\³UHDOLW\´DVLQ:&KDUOWRQArisWRWOH¶V3K\VLFV,,, (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1970), pp. 3 (185a23±b4)ff., one would actually have an instance of a leading metaphysician who characterized KLVZRUNDV³WKHVWXG\RIUHDOLW\´ 7. Metaph ī ±3,1003a21±1005b11; E 1,1025b3±1026b32; K 3,1060b31±1061b32; 7,1064a1±b8. 8. E.g., the science of ousia, supra, n. 6; of alêtheia, Metaph. A 3, 983b2±3. 9. This difficulty arises from the basic metaphysical distinction in Aquinas between a WKLQJDQGLWVEHLQJ6LQFH³UHDOLW\´FRPLQJDVLWGRHVIURP res ³WKLQJ´VKRXOG mean what is other than being, it can hardly be an apt designation for the object of metaphysics where the dominant actuality is existence. This has been only too apparent in the confusion introduced into the Thomistic tradition through the WDNLQJRYHURI *LOHVRI5RPH¶VWHUPLQRORJ\RI H[LVWHQFHDVDUHDOLW\res) that was distinguished from another reality (res), the essence. It occasions difficulty WRGD\LQDFTXLHVFLQJLQ3HLUFH¶VIRUPXODWLRQ³WKHUHDOLW\RI*RG´LQVWHDGRIWKH WUDGLWLRQDO ³H[LVWHQFH RI *RG´ -RKQ ( 6PLWK LQ KLV ³&RPPHQWDU\´ RQ WKLV point in God, Man and Philosophy, ed. CarO:*ULQGHO1HZ³H[FOXGLQJ limits´ Schranken], but not of boundaries >³WHUPLQDWLQJ OLPLWV´ Grenzen], namely, it admits that something indeed lies without it, at which it can never arrive, but not that it will at any point find completion in its internal progress. . . . [T]he possibility of new discoveries is infinite: and the same is the case with the discovery of new properties of nature, of new powers and laws by continued experience and its rational combination.19 Here Kant was right²even on the Leibnizian principles considered at the outset of this discussion. The cognitive range of finite beings is indeed limited. But it is also boundless because it is not limited in a way that blocks

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the prospect of cognitive access to ever new and continually different facts, thereby affording an ever ampler and ever more adequate account of reality.20 Some writers analogize the cognitive exploration of the realm of fact to the geographic exploration of the earth. But this analogy is profoundly misleading. For the earth has a finite and measurable surface, and so even when some part of it is unexplored terra incognita its magnitude and limits can be assessed in advance. Nothing of the kind obtains in the cognitive domain. The ratio and relationship of known truth to knowable fact is subject to no fixed and determinable proportion. Geographic exploration can expect eventual completeness, cognitive exploration cannot. There are no boundaries²no determinate limits²to the manifold of discoverable fact. Appendix Further Implications. It is worthwhile to note that the numerical discrepancy between truths and facts that textuality imposes recurs time and again in other contexts, and in particular as between x x x x x x

names and entities statements and possibilities descriptions and objects novels and plots instructions and actions explanations and phenomena

The same quantitative discrepancy between the verbal and the ontological occurs throughout. In each the former is a verbalized indicator for the later. There are just not enough of the former to go around, so that there is a recurrence of the musical chairs situation touched upon above: any one of WKHVH³SOD\HUV´FDQILQGDVHDWLQJDFFRPPRGDWLRQLQODQJXDJHEXWQRWHYHU\ one. The problem is that of deficient accommodation for an oversize group of candidates. We have (‫ ׊‬x) ¸ (‫ ׌‬y)Sxy but emphatically not ¸(‫ ׊‬x)(‫ ׌‬y)Sxy. In particular, consider names. Of course everything is capable of being named. Nothing is name-resistant. We could (as someone has quipped) simply name everything Charlie. The real question is if everything could have a unique name characteristic of itself alone, an identifying name. Now everything that is in fact identified could be named via the VSHFLILFDWLRQ ³WKH LWHP LGHQWLILHG LQ VXFK DQG VXFK D ZD\´ 2U DW OHDVW WKLV would work if the identification process answered to some verbalized formula or other. Now supposing this to be the case, the real question becomes: Are there enough verbal/textual identifiers to go around? Can everything that has an identity be individuated by verbalized formulas?

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ThHDQVZHULV³QR´6HOHFWDQ\ODQJXDJH\RXSOHDVH²take your pick. As long as it is produced recursively²like any other human language²it will only have countably many expressions (words, sentences, texts). But we know full well that the number of objects is transdenumerable: uncountably infinite. (Think of the real numbers for example.) So there just are not enough names for everything. In musical chairs not everybody gets to be seated. In reality not everything gets to be named. Of course, things will stand differently if we radically revise the concept of language. Thus, if we are prepared to countenance a thing-language (rather than a word language), then we could adopt the rule that everything names itself. Then, of course, everything is namable. But this sort of thing is clearly cheating. 7KH TXHVWLRQ ³,V HYHU\WKLQJ QDPHDEOH"´ EHDUV WKH IRUPDW ³&DQ HYHU\WKLQJRIW\SHEHXQLTXHO\DVVRFLDWHGZLWKVRPHWKLQJRIW\SH"´2QO\ if we are definite about what type 1 and type 2 are will a question of this format be well defined and meaningful. As long as that type at issue is FRQVWUXHG VR EURDGO\DVWR LQFOXGH WKH UHDOQXPEHUVDQG ³QDPLQJ´FDOOV IRU specification within a recursively articulated language, a negative answer to our question becomes unavoidable. And so, while nothing is name-resistant and everything is namable in the sense of being able, in principle, to bear a name, the possibility of realizing this prospect across the board²with everything whatsoever bearing a name² is precluded by the general principles of the situation. Things and names also engage in a game of musical chairs in a way that renders it unavoidable that some of the former must lose out.21 NOTES 1. To be sure, there lurks in the background have the question of whether having mere information is to count a having knowledge. With regard to this quantitative issue it has been argued that authentic knowledge does not increase propositionally with the amount of information as such, but only proportionally with its logarithm. See chapter RIWKHDXWKRU¶VEpistemology (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2003). This would suggest that the actual knowledge within WKH /LEUDU\ RI &RQJUHVV¶V PDQ\ YROXPHV PLJKW EH HQFRPSDVVHG LQ VRPH IDU more modest collection. But this sort of complication can be put aside as irrelevant to the course of reflection that will be unfolded. 2Q$UFKLPHGHV¶HVWLPDWHVHH 7&+HDWK The Works of Archimedes (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1897). 3. See G. W. Leibniz, 'HO¶KRUL]RQGHODGRFWULQHKXmaine, ed. Michael Fichant (Paris: Vrin, 1991). The quotation is from a partial transODWLRQRI/HLEQL]¶VWH[WLQ3KLOLS %HHOH\³/HLEQL]RQWKH/LPLWVRI+XPDQ.QRZOHGJH´ The Leibniz Review 13 (December 2003): 93±7 (see p. 95). 4. It is well known that Leibniz invented entire branches of science, among the differential and integral calculates, the calculus of variations, topology (analysis situs), symbolic logic, and computers. But there is also one branch in which sub-

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sequent developments have not arrived even now, namely epistemetrics, the measurement of knowledge. For while intelligence measurement (IQ assessment) is a well developed field, knowledge measurement is not² QRWZLWKVWDQGLQJ WKH SUROLIHUDWLRQ RI TXL] VKRZV FRPSDULQJ GLIIHUHQW SHRSOH¶V knowledge of various fields. The actual measurement of how much people do know²and no less importantly, or how much they can know²is still a substantially unrealized domain of investigation. 5. The longest word I have seen in actual use is the 34-OHWWHUDEVXUGLW\³VupercalifragilLVWLFH[SLDOLGRFLRXV´IURPWKHPXVLFDO³0DU\3Rppins. 6. G. W. Leibniz, 'HO¶KRUL]RQ, 11. This of course long antedates the (possibly apocryphal) story about the Huxley-Wilberforce debate which has Huxley arguing that sensible meaning could result from chance process because a team of monkeys typing at random would eventually produce the works of Shakespeare²or (on some accounts) all the books in the British Library, including not only 6KDNHVSHDUH¶VZRUNVEXWWKH%LEOHDVZHOO7KHstory which goes back, at least, WR6LU$UWKXU(GGLQJWRQ¶V The Nature of the Physical World [London: McMillan, 1929], 72±3) is doubtless fictitious since the Huxley-Wilberforce debate of 1860 antedated the emergence of the typewriter.) However, the basic idea goes baFNDWOHDVWWR&LFHUR³,ID FRXQWOHVVQXPEHURIWKHWZHQW\-one letters of the alphabet . . . were mixed together it is possible that when cast on the ground they VKRXOGPDNHXSWKH$QQDOVRI(QQLXVDEOHWREHUHDGLQJRRGRUGHU´De natura deorum, bk. 2, chap. 27). The story launched an immense discussion on the conWHPSRUDU\VFHQHDVLVUHDGLO\DWWHVWHGE\D*RRJOHRU7@KHUHLVQRHVFDSLQJDQDFFRXQWRIWKHZRUOGWKDW can include the utterances, the affirmations, and denials that permit any world to EHLQWHOOLJLEOH´ ³7KHSHUVRQXWWHUDQFHDQGWKHZRUOGEHFRPH´IRUKLP ³LQVHSDUDEOH´ :KDWKHLV³XQZLOOLQJWRVD\LVµ7KHUHLVWKHZRUOGDQGKHUH DUHWKHVLJQV¶³DQGVymbols by which we articulate the world (191). No wedge is to be driven between articulation and being. But, as Miller notes in The Paradox of Cause 1HZ1@RWKLQJLVWUuer than true poetry. And let me tell the scientific men that the artists are much finer and more accurate observers than they are, except of the special minutiae WKDWWKHVFLHQWLILFPDQLVORRNLQJIRU´CP, 1.315). Artists no less than scientists GUDZ GLVWLQFWLRQV DQG FRQVWUXFW V\QWKHVHV ³LQ WKH LQWHUHVW RI LQWHOOLJLELOLW\´ Herein lies a deep affinity between art (including poetry) and science (including SKLORVRSK\ DQDIILQLW\H[SOLFLWO\XQGHUVFRUHGE\3HLUFH³7KHZRUNRIWKHSRHW or novelist is not so utterly different from that of the scientific man. The artist introduces a fiction; but it is not [at least in the best art] an arbitrary one; it exhibits affinities to which the mind accords a certain approval in pronouncing them beautiful, which if it is not exactly the same as saying that the synthesis is WUXHLVVRPHWKLQJRIWKHVDPHJHQHUDONLQG´CP, 1.383). The affinity between art and science is that both are engaged in modes of articulation ordained to exhibiting affinities and discerning differences. In the work of scientists, Peirce also appreciates the ineliminable role of metaphor in an irreducible sense (metaphor as a mode of utterance that cannot, without loss, be translated into a literal SDUDSKUDVH ³7KH8QLYHUVHDVan DUJXPHQWLV´DFFRUGLQJWRKLP³QHFHVVDULO\D great work of art, a great poem²for every fine argument is a poem and a symphony²just DVHYHU\WUXHSRHPLVDVRXQGDUJXPHQW´CP, 5.119). On this topic, VHH 0LFKDHO 5DSRVD 3HLUFH¶V Philosophy of Religion (Bloomington: Indiana 8QLYHUVLW\ 3UHVV   DOVR &KULVWRSKHU +RRNZD\ FKDS  ³2Q 5HDGLQJ *RG¶V *UHDW 3RHP´  RI Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism: Themes from, Peirce (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000). Finally, for a deep sensitivity to WKH DHVWKHWLF GLPHQVLRQV RI3HLUFH¶V SKLORVRSKLFDO SURMHFW VHH 'RXJODV 5 $nderson, Creativity and the Philosophy of C. S. Peirce (Dordrecht: Martinus Nijhoff, 1987). $FFRUGLQJWR3HLUFHPHWDSK\VLFVDVSDUWRISKLORVRSK\³OLPLWVLWVHOIWRVRPXFKRI WUXWKDVFDQEHLQIHUUHGIURPFRPPRQH[SHULHQFH´CP, 1.184). 7KHUHLVLQKHUHQWLQKXPDQH[SHULHQFH ZKDW&DVVLUHUFDOOV³V\PEROLFSUHJQDQFH´ (Prägnanz), that which according to him gives, as John Michael Krois notes, in Cassirer; Symbolic Forms and History (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987), form and fecundity to human expression in its irreducibly different PRGHV )RU.URLV¶VLOluminating exposition of this central notion in CassiUHU¶VSKLORVRSK\RIV\PEROLFIRUPVVHHSS±62 of this study. But, above all, VHHFKDS³6\PEROLF3UHJQDQFH´ RISDUWRI(UQVW&DVVLUHUThe Philosophy of Symbolic Forms, vol. 3, trans. Ralph Manheim (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1957). 7KHRULJLQDOWLWOHRIWKLVDGGUHVVZDV³0XWDEOH)RUPVDQG*HQHUDWLYH3URFHVVHV´ But this is, in truth, the title of a paper yet to be written, one toward which this essay only gestures in its concluding section. A more accurate title is thus required. For this and other important suggestions, I am indebted to Kory Spencer Sorrell, who took pains to help me put this address into a form worthy of the

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VINCENT COLAPIETRO journal founded by Paul Weiss, also the person most responsible for there being a Metaphysical Society of America! I am also indebted to comments on earlier draft offered by Douglas Anderson, Wes DeMarco, Brian Martine, Jorge Nobo, David Weissman, and above all John E. Smith.

Part Four THE QUESTION OF THE GOOD

Ivor Leclerc Emory University

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH Ivor Leclerc was born 9 February 1915 in South Africa. After receiving his BA from the University of South Africa in 1941, he served in the South African Armed Forces during the Second World War, attaining the rank of Captain. After the war, he received his MA from the University of Cape 7RZQDQGLQHDUQHGD3K'IURP.LQJ¶V&ROOHJH/RQGRQ+HOHFWXUHG at the University of Glasgow from 1950 to 1964, the last two years of which he was senior lecturer in logic and metaphysics. After that, he worked as a professor at Emory University until his retirement in 1982, becoming Fuller E. Callaway Professor of Metaphysics and Moral Philosophy in 1980. He was twice Visiting Professor of Philosophy at Bonn University, first in 1961 and again in 1973. For a time he was married to the philosopher Eva Schafer, with ZKRPKHKDGWZRFKLOGUHQ:LWK6FKDIHUKHWUDQVODWHG*RWWIULHG0DUWLQ¶VAn Introduction to General Metaphysics (1961). Leclerc was an established authority on Alfred North Whitehead and SXEOLVKHG WZR LPSRUWDQW ZRUNV RQ :KLWHKHDG¶V SKLORVRSK\ :KLWHKHDG¶V Metaphysics (1958) and :KLWHKHDG¶V 3KLORVRSK\ %HWZHHQ 5DWLRQDOLVP DQG Empiricism  ,QWKH IRUPHUWH[W /HFOHUF IRFXVHVRQ :KLWHKHDG¶V ODWHU thought, as exemplified in Process and Reality. Philosophy of nature, for Leclerc, is central to understanding Whitehead, and can be understood within an historic narrative that connects Aristotle and Whitehead by virtue of their mutual approach. This approach entails studying the processes observed in nature. This approach extends even to the question of metaphysics itself: To understand divergent metaphysical positions, one must understand the different conceptions of metaphysics, different metaphysical traditions, and the different problems and solutions proposed. Thus, Leclerc argues, there is a crucial interdependence of philosophy and the history of philosophy upon one another. /HFOHUF¶V RWKHU LPSRUWDQW ZRUNV LQFOXGH The Nature of Physical Existence (1972), where he argues against materialism, positivism and idealism, and The Philosophy of Nature (1986). In addition to being the President of the Metaphysical Society of America, which awarded him the )RXQGHU¶V0HGDOLQKHZDVDOVR3UHVLGHQWRIWKH International Society for Metaphysics from 1980 to 1985. Ivor Leclerc passed away on 16 May 1999.1

Seventeen THE METAPHYSICS OF THE GOOD Ivor Leclerc Delivered at the thirty-second annual meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, University of South Carolina, 13±14 March 1981. I In the inquiry into this topic it is desirable at the outset to enter into some linguistic examination, for this will facilitate, not only the avoidance of possible confusions because of the diversity of senses in which the word ³JRRG´LVXVHGEXWDOVRWKHUHFRJQLWLRQRIZKHUHH[DFWO\OLHWKHSKLORVRSKLFDO LVVXHVZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKH³JRRG´ ,QLWVSUHGRPLQDQWXVDJHWKH ZRUG³JRRG´DVDOVR ਕȖĮࢡȩȢbonus, and their cognates in modern European languages) is an adjective, but the English word, on which we will here concentrate, sometimes also occurs in an adverbial and in a substantival usage. The Oxford English Dictionary defines ³JRRG´DV³7KH PRVWJHQHUDODGM RIFRPPHQGDWLRQLPSO\LQJWKH H[LVWHQFH of a high, or at least satisfactory, degree of characteristic qualities which are DGPLUDEOH LQ WKHPVHOYHV RU XVHIXO IRU VRPH SXUSRVH´1 Of particular significance in this are: (1) the generality of the adjective; (2) that it is one of ³FRPPHQGDWLRQ´   WKDW WKH REMHFW RI WKH FRPPHQGDWLRQ LV FHUWDLQ ³FKDUDFWHULVWLF TXDOLWLHV´   WKDW WKH DGMHFWLYH GRHV QRW FRQQRWH WKH attribution of the qualities absolutely, but rather relatively, comparatively, in degree; and (5) that the qualities are distinguishable in respect of their being admirable either (a) in themselves, or (b) as useful for some purpose. In this characterization of the adjective its philosophical relevance is signified by its generality. But wherein exactly that generality lies becomes a TXHVWLRQ 'RHV LW SHUWDLQ WR WKH IDFWRU RI ³FRPPHQGDWLRQ´ RU WR WKH ³TXDOLWLHV´",WPLJKWEHWRWKHIRUPHUVLQFHWKHZRUG³JRRG´DOZD\VLPSOLHV ³FRPPHQGDWLRQ´%XWRQWKHRWKHUKDQG³JRRG´DOVRFDUULHVWKHFRQQRWDWLRQ RI WKH TXDOLWLHV LQ TXHVWLRQ EHLQJ RQHV RI ³ZRUWK´ LH WKH\ DUH ³ZRUWK\ RI FRPPHQGDWLRQ´ 7KDW LV WR VD\ LW LV WKH TXDOLWLHV ZKLFK E\ WKHLU ³ZRUWK´ elicit the commendation. However, to pursue this we have to take account of VRPHFRPSOLFDWLRQVLQUHJDUGWRWKHPHDQLQJRIWKHZRUG³JRRG´ 6RPHRIWKLVFRPHVWRWKHIRUHLQDQH[DPLQDWLRQRIWKHZRUG³ZRUWK´ 7KLVPHDQV³KDYLQJDVSHFLILHGYDOXH´RULJLQDOO\DSHFXQLDU\YDOXHWKHZRUd ODWHUFRPLQJDOVRWREHXVHGLQDJHQHUDOL]HGVHQVHRI³WKHUHODWLYHYDOXHRID

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WKLQJ LQ UHVSHFW RI LWV TXDOLWLHV RU RI WKH HVWLPDWLRQ LQ ZKLFK LW LV KHOG´ 2 +LJKO\ UHOHYDQW KHUH LV WKH ZRUG ³YDOXH´ D V\QRQ\P RI ³ZRUWK´²more especially relevant because of the prominence of this word in philosophical GLVFXVVLRQVRIWKH³JRRG´7KHQRXQ³YDOXH´±±deriving from the Old French valu, past participle of valoir (from Latin valere ³WREHVWURQJ´ PHDQLQJ³WR EHVWURQJWREHRIZRUWK´±±in its earliest usage in English meant the amount of some commodity, medium of exchange, etc. which renders it of worth. 3 7KXV WKH ZRUG ³YDOXH´ OLNH ³ZRUWK´ DQG ³JRRG´ DOVR HQWDLOV LQ LWV connotation the relative or comparative. This is signified too in the word which has in the ODVWKXQGUHG\HDUVFRPHLQWRXVHDVWKHQDPHIRUWKH³JHQHUDO WKHRU\ RI YDOXH´ YL] ³D[LRORJ\´±±from ਙȟȚȠȢ ³ZHLJKLQJ DV PXFK RI OLNH YDOXHZRUWKDVPXFKDVKHQFHJHQHUDOO\ZRUWKZRUWK\´ 4 It is important to note some differences, as well as similarities, between WKH ZRUGV ³JRRG´ ³ZRUWK´ DQG ³YDOXH´ IRU WKHVH ZLOO WXUQ RXW WR EH RI phiORVRSKLFDOVLJQLILFDQFH)LUVWWKHZRUG³YDOXH´LVXVHGERWKDVDQRXQDQG DVDYHUE³ZRUWK´DVDQRXQDQGDVDQDGMHFWLYHDQG³JRRG´DVSULPDULO\DQ adjective, but also sometimes substantivally. Secondly, there is a peculiarity RIWKHZRUG³JRRG´GLVWLnguishing it from the other two±±as a consequence of ZKLFK³ZRUWK´DQG³YDOXH´FDQQRWEHDFFHSWHGDVH[DFWV\QRQ\PVRI³JRRG´ 7KHFRQQRWDWLRQVRIERWKZRUGV³ZRUWK´DQG³YDOXH´DVZHKDYHVHHQHQWDLO their being relative, comparative±±which is to say that they are not used in an DEVROXWHVHQVH7KHVDPHKROGVLQUHVSHFWRIWKHZRUG³JRRG´DVDQDGMHFWLYH as has been brought out above in the consideration of the O.E.D. definition of ³JRRG´ %XW WKLV ZRUG KDV WKH SHFXOLDULW\ WKDW ZKHQ WKH DGMHFWLYH LV XVHd substantivally, it becomes absolute. One instance of this is when the adjective ³JRRG´ LV XVHG DV SOXUDO ZLWK WKH PHDQLQJ RI ³JRRG SHRSOH´ KHUH ³JRRG´ XVHG ZLWK WKH DUWLFOH  LV DEVROXWH HJ LQ WKH VWDWHPHQW ³ZKHUH WKH JRRG FHDVH WR WUHPEOH´ $QRWKer instance of the absolute sense is the plural DGMHFWLYH ³JRRGV´ PHDQLQJ LQLWLDOO\ ³SURSHUW\ PHUFKDQGLVH HWF´ EXW extended also to non-material properties, etc. A third, and main, instance of the absolute use is that in which the singular adjective is used with the PHDQLQJRI³WKDWZKLFKLVJRRGLQYDULRXVVHQVHV ´HJ³KHEHFDPHDSRZHU IRUJRRG´³IRUWKHJRRGRIPDQNLQG´ This absolute sense is of special significance philosophically. We get an intimation of this by considering a statement of WKH IRUP ³; LV JRRG´ $Q LQVWDQFH RI WKLV ZRXOG EH ³-DFN LV JRRG´ 7KLV VWDWHPHQW LV DPELJXRXV 7KH ZRUG ³JRRG´ KHUH FRXOG EH DQ DGMHFWLYH XVHG SUHGLFDWLYHO\ WKH VWDWHPHQW PHDQLQJ ³-DFN LV D JRRG SHUVRQ´±±the adjective carrying the implication of the perVRQEHLQJUHODWLYHO\RUFRPSDUDWLYHO\JRRG%XWWKHZRUG³JRRG´LQWKH sentence could be meant as a predicative noun, in which it has an absolute VHQVH $QRWKHU LQVWDQFH RI WKLV IRUP RI VWDWHPHQW ZRXOG EH ³SOHDVXUH LV JRRG´ 7KLV FRXOG PHDQ WKDW SOHDVXUH LV ³D JRRG WKLQJ DWWULEXWH FRQGLWLRQ HWF ´ %XW ³JRRG´ FRXOG EH LQWHQGHG KHUH DV D QRXQ 1RZ WKLV FRXOG PHDQ WKDWSOHDVXUHLV³DJRRG´RQHDPRQJRWKHUV2ULWFRXOGPHDQWKDWSOHDVXUHLV

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³WKHJRRG´XQFRQGLWLRQDOO\,WLVWREHQRWHGWKDWLQWKHODWWHU VHQVHRI³JRRG´ ZLWK WKH GHILQLWH DUWLFOH WKH ZRUG ³JRRG´ KDV D GLVWLQFWLYHO\ SKLORVRSKLFDO PHDQLQJ ,W LV WR EH QRWHG WRR WKDW WKLV VHQVH RI WKH QRXQ ³JRRG¶ LV QRW FDSWXUHG E\ WKH QRXQV ³YDOXH´ DQG ³ZRUWK´ 2QH FRXOG PHDQLQJIXOO\ VD\ SOHDVXUHLV³DYDOXH´EXWQRWWKDWSOHDVXUHLV³WKHYDOXH´RU³WKHZRUWK´IRU WKHZRUGV³YDOXH´DQG³ZRUWK´DUHUHODWLYHDQGFRPSDUDWLYHE\FRQWUDVWZLWK ³JRRG´LQWKHVHQVHXQGHUFRQVLGHUDWLRQZKLFKLVDEVROXWH These considerations become especially pertinent when we take account RI SRLQW   DERYH WKDW WKH TXDOLWLHV FRPPHQGHG DV ³JRRG´ DUH WR EH distinguished as commendable±±either in themselves or as useful for some purpose±±this distinction being alternatively referred to in philosophical discourse as respectiveO\ ³LQWULQVLF´ DQG ³LQVWUXPHQWDO´ ,W LV WKLV consideration which more particularly brings us to the philosophical issue in UHVSHFWRI³JRRG´ II 7KH FHQWUDOSKLORVRSKLFDO LVVXH LVWKDWFRQFHUQLQJWKH QDWXUH RI ³JRRG´ 7KH ZRUG³JRRG´DVWKHPRVWJHQHUDODGMHFWLYHH[SUHVVLQJTXDOLWLHVRI³ZRUWK´RU ³YDOXH´ FRYHUV D ZLGH UDQJH RI VSHFLILF TXDOLWLHV VXFK DV ³H[FHOOHQFH´ ³VXSHULRULW\ RI NLQG´ WKH FRQQRWDWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ TXDOLWLHV VXFK DV ³FRPPHQGDEOH´ ³DGPLUDEOH´ ³DSSHDOLQJ´ ³DJUHHDEOH´ ³HQMR\DEOH´ ³JUDWLI\LQJ´ ,W DOVR LQFOXGHV VXFK DV ³XVHIXO´ ³DGYDQWDJHRXV´ ³EHQHILFLDO´ ³DGHTXDWH´ ³HIIHFWXDO´ ³VXLWDEOH´ ³FRPSHWHQW´ HWF 7KLV ODVW JURXS FOHDUO\ SHUWDLQVSDUWLFXODUO\WRWKH³LQVWUXPHQWDO´VHQVHRI³JRRG´WKDWRI³JRRGIRU´ something. The otheUV HVSHFLDOO\ ³H[FHOOHQFH´ ³VXSHULRULW\´ FRXOG EH ³LQWULQVLF´EXWWKH\FRXOGDOVREHPHDQWLQDQ³LQVWUXPHQWDO´VHQVH Philosophically the issue is what it is in all this variety of qualities ZKHUHE\ WKH\ FRQQRWH ³JRRGQHVV´ LH WKH TXDOLW\ RU FRQGLtion of being ³JRRG´":KDWIXQGDPHQWDOO\LVPHDQWE\³JRRG´³JRRGQHVV´" We can narrow down the search for an answer to that question by QRWLQJ WKDW WKH LQVWUXPHQWDO VHQVH RI ³JRRG´ WKDW RI ³JRRG IRU´ SRLQWV beyond itself to ends or purposes sought to be attained because of their ³JRRGQHVV´ 7KHVH KRZHYHU PLJKW WKHPVHOYHV DOVR EH ³JRRG´ LQ DQ instrumental sense, but since a regressus ad infinitum must be rejected, we PXVWFRPHWRVRPHRURWKHU³JRRGLQLWVHOI´,WLVWKHUHIRUHWRWKHPHDQLQJRI ³JRRG´LQWKHLQWULQVLFVHQVHWKDWZHQHHGWRGLUHFWRXUDWWHQWLRQ Now in our earlier analysis of the O.E.D. GHILQLWLRQRI³JRRG´ZHQRWHGD certain polarity: on the one VLGH LV WKH IHDWXUH RI ³FRPPHQGDWLRQ´ DQG RQ WKH other the objects of this commendation, WKH ³WKLQJV´ ZKLFK DUH UHJDUGHG DV ³JRRG´ :H WKHQ UDLVHG WKH TXHVWLRQ ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH JHQHUDOLW\ RI ³JRRG´ whether it pertained to one or other of the two sides. We can now more sharply focus the issue by asking whether the things are commended because they are

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³JRRG´ RU LV LW WKH FDVH WKDW ³JRRGQHVV´ UHVLGHV RQ WKH VLGH RI WKH ³FRPPHQGDWLRQ´" The latter is the position taken by thinkers, such as Ralph Barton Perry in his A General Theory of Value, who hold that the commendation is a IXQFWLRQ RI ³LQWHUHVW´ ³GHVLUH´ ³IHHOLQJ´ HWF RI WKH VXEMHFW 7KDW LV WKLV WKHRU\ LV WKDW D WKLQJ LV ³JRRG´ E\ YLUWXH RI LWV EHLQJ WKH REMHFW RI LQWHUHVW desire, etc. Now it is significant that in the argumentation for this theory, it is WKH ZRUG ³YDOXH´ ZKLFK LV SUHGRPLQDQWO\ XVHG UDWKHU WKDQ ³JRRG´ 7KH DUJXPHQWLVWKDWWKHREMHFWLV³YDOXHG´E\DVXEMHFWDQGWKDWDFFRUGLQJO\WKH REMHFWKDVD³YDOXH´E\UHDVRQRIWKHDFWRI³YDOXLQJ´WKDWLVD³YDOXH´SODFHG on the object by the subject. The inference then is that the object cannot be ³LQWULQVLFDOO\JRRG´ ,QWKLVDUJXPHQWLWLV³YDOXH´DVDYHUEWKDWLVSUHGRPLQDQW±±´YDOXH´DV D QRXQ GHULYHV IURP WKH YHUE ZKLFK H[SUHVVHV WKH DFW RI ³YDOXLQJ´ 7KH VXEMHFW³YDOXHV´ZKLFKPHDQVWKDWWKHVXEMHFW³HVWLPDWHVRUDSSUDLVHV´LH ³DWWDFKHV D ZRUWK RU YDOXH´ WR WKH REMHFW 7KLV HQWDLOV WKH LQIHUHQFH WKDW WKH ³YDOXH´RIWKHREMHFWFDQQRWEHLQWULQVLFWRLW7KLVLQIHUHQFHLVHQWLUHO\YDOLG± ±ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHWHUP³YDOXH´%XWWKLVLVQRWHTXLYDOHQWWRVD\LQJWKDWWhe REMHFWFDQQRWEH³JRRG´LQLWVHOILH³JRRG´LQDQLQWULQVLFVHQVH,QWKHILUVW SODFHLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGWKDWWKHVXEMHFWDWWDFKHV³a YDOXH´WRWKHREMHFW2QH FRXOG YDOLGO\ KROG WKDW WKLV HQWDLOV WKDW WKHUHE\ LW DWWDFKHV ³YDOXH´ WR WKH object. But ³YDOXH´KHUHGRHVQRWKDYHDQDEVROXWHVHQVHLWPHDQV³VRPHRU RWKHU YDOXH´±±LH ³YDOXH´ LQ D UHODWLYH VHQVH 6HFRQGO\ WKH ZRUG ³YDOXH´ KHUHFDQQRWEHUHSODFHGE\³JRRG´VD\LQJWKDWWKHVXEMHFWDWWDFKHV³a JRRG´ to the object, this being taken to impl\WKDWLWDWWDFKHV³JRRG´LH³VRPHRU RWKHUJRRG´WRWKHREMHFW)RU³JRRG´DVDQRXQHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHVWDWHPHQW ³LW D SHUVRQ D WKLQJ  LV JRRG´ GRHV QRW PHDQ ³VRPH RU RWKHU JRRG´ +HUH ³JRRG´ KDV DQ DEVROXWH VHQVH ZKLFK LV DEVHQW IURP ³YDOXH´ DQG ³ZRUWK´±± when these words are used strictly, which is to say, not as surreptitious V\QRQ\PV IRU ³JRRG´ LQ WKH DEVROXWH VHQVH5 Therefore the conclusion of the DUJXPHQWZKLFKZHKDYHEHHQFRQVLGHULQJWKDWWKHREMHFWFDQQRWEH³JRRG´LQ an intrinsic sense, LVLQYDOLGDQG PXVWEHUHMHFWHG7KHVWDWHPHQW ³LWLV JRRG´ KDVDPHDQLQJTXLWHEH\RQGZKDWFDQEHH[SUHVVHGE\WKHZRUG³YDOXH´ The kind of theory with which we are concerned here is that which can EH JHQHUDOL]HG DV WKH ³VXEMHFWLYH´ WKHRU\ RI JRRG 7Kat is, it is the theory ZKLFKJURXQGV³JRRG´LQWKHVXEMHFW,QWKHIRUPRIWKHWKHRU\ZKLFKZHKDYH FRQVLGHUHGDERYHLWJURXQGV ³JRRG´ LQWKH VXEMHFWE\FRQFHLYLQJ ³JRRG´DV PHDQLQJWKDWWKHVXEMHFWKDVDFHUWDLQ³LQWHUHVW´³GHVLUH´³IHHOLQJ´HWFZLWh UHVSHFWWRWKHREMHFW,QDQRWKHUIRUPRIWKLVWKHRU\LWJURXQGV³JRRG´LQWKH VXEMHFWE\FRQFHLYLQJ³JRRG´DVGHSHQGHQWXSRQWKH³WKRXJKW´³MXGJPHQW´ RU³YDOXLQJ´RIVRPHVXEMHFW,QHLWKHUIRUPWKHWKHRU\HQWDLOVWKDWWKHREMHFW FDQQRWEH³JRRG´LQLndependence of a subject, and thus that the object cannot EH ³JRRG LQ LWVHOI´ LH ³LQWULQVLFDOO\ JRRG´ 7KLV VXEMHFWLYH WKHRU\ PXVW finally be rejected as untenable because, by denying the possibility of an

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REMHFW EHLQJ ³JRRG LQ LWVHOI´ LW LV DGPLWWLQJ ³JRRG´ RQO\ LQ DQ LQVWUXPHQWDO sense, and is thereby involved in a regressus ad infinitum. This could be taken as pointing to the acceptance of the alternative WKHRU\WKDWWKHPHDQLQJRI³JRRG´LVWREHJURXQGHGLQWKHREMHFW:KHQZH DVVHUW³LWLVJRRG´±±in the intrinsic, as opposed to the instrumental sense±±the ³LW´ LV DQ REMHFW HJ D SHUVRQ RU WKLQJ 7KLV FRXOG EH FKDUDFWHUL]HG DV WKH ³REMHFWLYH´ WKHRU\ RI JRRG ,Q WKLV WKHRU\ JRRG LV UHIHUUHG WR DV EHLQJ ³REMHFWLYH´LQWKHVHQVHRILWVEHLQJGHSHndent upon an object±±in contrast to the subjective theory, in which good is dependent upon the subject. The philosophical issue which arises with respect to this theory is: what H[DFWO\LVWKH VWDWXVRI³JRRG´LQWKLVWKHRU\",IJRRGEHGHSHQGHQWXSRQDn object, this entails that good is not itself an object in the sense of being an LQGHSHQGHQWO\H[LVWLQJWKLQJ:HKDYHVHHQHDUOLHUWKDWLQWKHVWDWHPHQW³LWLV JRRG´ RU ³; LV JRRG´ ³JRRG´ LV D SUHGLFDWLYH QRXQ LH ³JRRG´ LV EHLQJ ascribed to X. This DVFULSWLRQRI³JRRG´WR;HQWDLOVWKDW³JRRG´KDVWKHVWDWXV RI D ³TXDOLW\´ LH LW WHOOV ³ZKDW´ ; LV±±D ³TXDOLW\´ DQVZHUV WR WKH interrogative, of what NLQG RU VRUW 7KLV LQ FRQWUDVW WR ³JRRG´ EHLQJ D ³TXDQWLW\´ZKLFKGRHVQRWHQWDLO³ZKDW´EXW³KRZPXFK´ RUD³UHODWLRQ´±±a UHODWLRQKDVWREHH[FOXGHGIURPWKH³ZKDW´VLQFHLILWEHLQFOXGHGWKLVZRXOG HQWDLOWKDW³JRRG´ZRXOGEHLQSDUWGHSHQGHQWXSRQWKDWWRZKLFK;VWDQGVLQ DUHODWLRQZKLFKZRXOGLPSO\WKDW;FRXOGQRWEH³JRRGLQLWVHOI´ The issue has now to be raised whether good as a quality is to be conceived as on par with all the other qualities ascribed to X as constituting ³ZKDW´LWLVLHLWV³HVVHQFH´ ZLWK³JRRG´WKXVEHLQJDVFULEHGDVDTXDOLW\ DGGLWLRQDO WR WKH RWKHUV" 2U LV ³JRRG´ D GLVWLQFW TXDOLW\ GLIIHUHQW IURP WKH others in some fundamental respect±±as is maintained for example in the GRFWULQHRIJRRGDVD³WUDQVFHQGHQWDOTXDOLW\´"$QGDOVRLVJRRGDVDTXDOLW\ WREHFRQFHLYHGDV³LQKHULQJLQ´WKHWKLQJDVGRWKHRWKHUTXDlities? This conception of qualities as simply inhering in a thing is one of long heritage in the Neoplatonic tradition and which has come to be widely accepted as an implicit presupposition. It needs critical scrutiny, in general, and in particular in reVSHFWRI³JRRG´DVDTXDOLW\,QWKHWUDGLWLRQDOGRFWULQH it needs to be observed, it is accepted that that in which a quality inheres must EH D ³VXEVWDQFH´ LH D VHOI-VXEVLVWHQW H[LVWHQW :LWK UHJDUG WR ³JRRG´ DV D quality, it needs to be considered, first, whether good necessarily inheres in a substance. And secondly, it needs to be examined whether good as a quality is LQGHHGDGHTXDWHO\FRQFHLYHGDV³VLPSO\LQKHULQJ´ 5HVSHFWLQJWKH ILUVW ³JRRG´ LVFHUWDLQO\DVFULEHGLQ VRPH LQVWDQFHVWR substances, e.g., to persons, and things. But is it only ascribed to substances? &RQVLGHU WKH FHOHEUDWHG GRFWULQH RI .DQW WKDW ³QRWKLQJ LQ DOO WKH ZRUOG±± indeed nothing even beyond the world±±can possibly be called good without qualification except a good will´6 Will is clearly not a substance. Or consider WKH FRQFOXVLRQ RI 6LU 'DYLG 5RVV DUULYHG DW IURP KLV H[DPLQDWLRQ RI ³ZKDW WKLQJV DUH JRRG´ ³)RXU WKLQJV WKHQ VHHP WR EH LQWULQVLFDOO\ JRRG±±virtue,

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pleasure, the allocation of pleasure to the virtuous, and knRZOHGJH´7 Again QRQHRIWKHVH³WKLQJV´LVDVXEVWDQFH Are we to conclude from this that the conception of good as necessarily inhering in a substance is unacceptable? Will is not a substance, but is it not the case that it is the will or a person, i.e., of a substance? Does not the same KROG ZLWK UHJDUG WR ³YLUWXH´ ³SOHDVXUH´ DQG ³NQRZOHGJH´" %XW LI ZH DJUHH that this is indeed the case, does this entail that when, e.g., Kant maintains WKDWRQO\D ³JRRG ZLOO´FDQEH DFFHSWHGDVLQWULQVLFDOO\JRRGKH LV meaning strictly that it is the person who is intrinsically good? And for Ross, that it is the person who is virtuous, or enjoying pleasure, or possessed of knowledge, that is intrinsically good? It is clear, I think, that this is not what Kant and Ross aUH PDLQWDLQLQJ 2I FRXUVH WKH ³SHUVRQ´ LV LQYROYHG EXW QRW SULPDULO\ VR LQ respect of good; primarily for Kant it is will which is intrinsically good, and the person is good in a derivative sense. Accordingly it must be concluded that the doctrine, that good necessarily inheres in a substance, is indeed unacceptable. III But there is a further problem involved in this, the problem of how precisely WRXQGHUVWDQGWKH³LQKHUHQFH´RIJRRGLQDWKLQJ7KLVLVDQDVSHFWRIWKHVWLOO more general problem of how to conceive the inherence of qualities in a thing. 7KHUHLVDORQJWUDGLWLRQWKDWWKLVLQKHUHQFHLV³VLPSOH´ZKLFKLVWRVD\ not complex or analyzable into any further elements; that is, the inherence of a quality is ultimate, beyond further analysis. The inherence of a color is an LQVWDQFH RI WKLV WKH FRORU LV VLPSO\ ³LQ´ D WKLQJ 'HVFDUWHV H[HPSOLILHG WKLV traditional conception in his doctrine of extension as the essence of physical VXEVWDQFH H[WHQVLRQ ZDV FRQFHLYHG E\ KLP DV ³VLPSO\ LQKHUHQW´ LQ PDtter. And it was this presupposition that Leibniz called into question in his criticism of the Cartesian doctrine, Leibniz maintaining that the concept of H[WHQVLRQ LV QRW ³VLPSOH DQG SULPLWLYH´ WKDW LW LV RQ WKH FRQWUDU\ ³DQDO\]DEOH´±±according to him inWR³SOXUDOLW\FRQWLQXLW\DQGFRH[LVWHQFH´8 But this metaphysical presupposition involves, and indeed rests upon, DQRWKHUQDPHO\WKDWRID³VXEVWDQFH´RUILQDOVHOI-subsistent existent, as itself ³VLPSOH´,WLV³RQH´DQGLWV³XQLW\´LV³VLPSOH´LH not further analyzable. Leibniz shared this presupposition with Descartes. It is this metaphysical presupposition which, it seems to me, has to be brought into question and FULWLFDOO\H[DPLQHG7KLVLVWKHFRQFHSWLRQRID³WKLQJ´RU³VXEVWDQFH´DVZLWK itVLQKHUHQWTXDOLWLHVWKHVHFRQVWLWXWLQJ³ZKDW´WKHWKLQJLVLWV³HVVHQFH´7KH ³VXEVWDQFH´LVWKH³VXEMHFW´RIWKHTXDOLWLHVDQGGRHVQRWH[LVWDSDUWIURPLWV TXDOLWLHV (YHQ ZKHQ WKH VXEVWDQFH LV KHOG WR EH ³DFWLYH´±±as it is in the Neoplatonic traditiRQWKLV³DFWLYLW\´EHLQJWKDWRI³WKLQNLQJ´±±WKH³DFWLYLW\´ LVFRQFHLYHGDVDTXDOLW\LQKHULQJLQWKHVXEVWDQFH'HVFDUWHV¶res cogitans is DQ H[HPSOLILFDWLRQ RI WKLV EDVLF PHWDSK\VLFDO FRQFHSWLRQ ³WKLQNLQJ´ LV IRU

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KLPDTXDOLW\FRQVWLWXWLQJWKH³HVVHQFH´RIWKHVXEVWDQFH³ZKDW´LWLV%XWWKH FRQFHSWLRQRI³WKLQNLQJ´SHUVHLVDQDEVWUDFWLRQWKHUHLVQR³WKLQNLQJ´DSDUW IURP³WKRXJKWV´WKH³LGHDV´6RLWLVWKH³WKLQNLQJ-LGHDV´WKDWLVWKHTXDOLW\RI this substance. A main point in respect of this philosophical position is that the substance with its qualities is self-contained, both in regard to its ³FRQFHSWLRQ´±±it is completely understandable and conceived as a subject with its simply inhering qualities±±DQGLQUHJDUGWRLWV³EHLQJ´±±as Descartes saLGLW³VRH[LVWVWKDWLWQHHGVQRRWKHUWKLQJLQRUGHUWRH[LVW´ 9 I would argue that crucial in this metaphysical position is that of the FRQFHSWLRQ RI ³DFWLQJ´ DV D TXDOLW\ RI D VXEVWDQFH DQG WKDW WKLV FRQFHSWLRQ has especially to be critically examined. 7KH MXVWLILFDWLRQ IRU P\ VLQJOLQJ RXW ³DFWLQJ´ LV WKDW VLQFH 3ODWR DQG certainly since Aristotle DQG 3ORWLQXV LW KDV EHHQ VHHQ WKDW ³DFWLQJ´ (ਥȞȑȡȖİȚĮ KDVWREHDGPLWWHGDVD IXQGDPHQWDOIDFWRULQZKDWLVDFFHSWHGDV IJઁ ʌĮȞIJİȜ૵Ȣ ੕Ȟ D FRPSOHWH RU UHDO EHLQJ ,W ZDV WKH VHYHQWHHQWK FHQWXU\ from Basso and Descartes, through Newton, which diverged from that insight LQ FRQFHLYLQJ SK\VLFDO EHLQJ DV PDWWHU ZKLFK LV LQHUW LH ³LQDFWLYH´ LQ LWV essential nature. The physical science of the last hundred years has, however, had to abandon that doctrine, coming instead to conceive the physical as essentLDOO\ DFWLYH ,W LV WKH FRQFHSW RI ³DFW´ ³DFWLQJ´ ZKLFK WRGD\ KDV WR receive primarily metaphysical attention. This is not the occasion for an attempt at an extensive investigation of WKH FRQFHSW , FDQ QRZ RQO\ DGXPEUDWH WKH DQDO\VLV RI ³DFWLQJ´ DV fundamentally relational, as Leibniz in the modern period was the first to see and seek to develop, with his conception of the act being of a monad as perceptio, that is, as essentially relating it to another as object. Leibniz, however, remained entangled in the Neoplatonic conception of the act as EHLQJDVD³WKLQNLQJ´DQGFRQVHTXHQWO\WKHREMHFWIRUKLPDVIRU'HVFDUWHV ZDV SULPDULO\ ³LGHD´ UDWKHU WKDQ DQRWKHU EHLQJ±±LH LW ZDV WKH ³LGHD RI¶ another being. This subjectivism has to be rejected; the object of acting must be another being per se. If the object of acting is another being per se, this entails that acting is relational, i.e., an act of relating a being to another. ,QWKLVFRQFHSWLRQLWPXVWEHDSSUHFLDWHG³DEHLQJ´DVVXEMHFWRIDFWLQJ is nRWFRPSOHWHLQLWVHOIZLWKWKH³UHODWLRQ´DGGLWLRQDOWRLW,QDILQDODQDO\VLV RID EHLQJ ZH ILQGRQO\ ³DFWLQJV´±±the subject is not an entity distinct from WKH ³DFWLQJ´±±DQG ³DFWLQJV´ DUH HVVHQWLDOO\ UHODWLRQDO 1RZ WKLV PHDQV WKDW what are to be considHUHGDV³TXDOLWLHV´LH³ZKDW´WKHEHLQJLVLQKHUHQRWLQ a subject per se, apart from its acting±±for there is no subject±±but the TXDOLWLHVLQKHUHLQWKH³VXEMHFW-DFWLQJ´$QGVLQFHWKHDFWLQJLVUHODWLRQDOWKLV PHDQV WKDW WKH TXDOLWLHV ³TXDOLI\ WKDt relational acting±±´TXDOLI\´ LQ WKH etymological sense of the medieval Latin qualificare ³WR PDNH RI D FHUWDLQ TXDOLW\WRJLYHDFHUWDLQTXDOLW\WR´7KDWLVWRVD\LWLVWKH³DFWLQJ´ZKLFKLV TXDOLILHGDVRIVXFKDQGVXFKDNLQGEXWVLQFHWKH³DFWLQJ´SHUVHLVQRWDSDUW IURPWKH³UHODWLRQ´LQDFHUWDLQPRVWVLJQLILFDQWVHQVHWKHTXDOLW\LQKHUHVLQ

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WKH ³UHODWLRQ´±±EXW QRW ³UHODWLRQ´ WKRXJKW RI DV GLVWLQFW RU DSDUW IURP LWV terms, the acting subject and its object. Further, this inherence is not to bH FRQFHLYHG DV D ³VLPSOH LQKHUHQFH´ IRU³UHODWLRQDODFWLQJ´LVQRW³VLPSOH´,QWKHILUVWSODFHDEHLQJDVVXEMHFWLV QRW WR EH FRQFHLYHG DV ³VLPSOH´ DV KDYLQJ RQO\ D VLQJOH VLPSOH DFWLQJ LH RQHZKLFKLV³XOWLPDWH´QRWIXUWKHUDQDO\]DEOH5DWKHUWhe acting of a being is highly complex, analyzable into an indefinite multiplicity of sub-acts. In the second place, these actings are relational, which means that they relate to objects. That is, the actings being relational, they have a multiplicity of objects, which have to be distinguished into two kinds. The sub-acts are necessarily related to each other, which means that they have each other as objects, but with only one subject entailed in these relations. These objects, and thus relations, are internal to the acting being. The other kind of object is that constituted by other beings. This multiplicity of relations, of both kinds, LV LQ HDFK FDVH GHILQHG E\ D ³TXDOLW\´ LWVHOI QRW VLPSOH EXW RI GHJUHHV RI complexity and thus analyzability. IV On the basis of this analysis we can now turn to a consideration of the nature DQGVWDWXVRI³JRRG´ We must conclude as the outcome of the foregoing analysis that, first, ³JRRG´DVDTXDOLW\LVQRWGLIIHUHQWIURPRWKHUTXDOLWLHVLQWKDWLWDOVRPXVWEH conceLYHG DV LQYROYHG LQ DQG SHUWDLQLQJ WR D EHLQJ µLQ UHODWLRQ´ WKDW LW inheres in the being in respect of its relations. Secondly, good is not any simple, i.e., not further analyzable, quality. Rather, good is a complex quality pertaining to and inherent in a complex of relations constituting some ³ZKROH´ 2QHNLQGRI³ZKROH´ LVWKDWZKLFKLVWKH EHLQJLWVHOIWKDW ZKLFKLVWKH acting subject. In this, the complex of acting integrate into a unity, into a whole. Thus we have a kind of whole which is constituted by the internal interrelatedness of the actings of the being, in respect of their being an integral acting. Now this interrelatedness, as constituting a unity or whole, has, as such, a definiteness or character. That is, there is a particular complex character or quality which is that of the whole, and that character or definiteness qualifies the interrelatedness, the interactings. Now included in this complex character or definiteness of the whole is WKDWTXDOLW\RUIHDWXUHZKLFKZHNQRZDVLWV³JRRGQHVV´7KLVIHDWXUHZKLFK ZH GHVLJQDWH E\ WKH ZRUG ³JRRG´ LV RQH SHUWDLQLQJ WR WKH ZKROH DV FRQVWLWXWHG E\ DQ LQWHUUHODWHGQHVV RI DFWLQJV 7KDW LV ³JRRG´ LQKHUHV LQ WKH interrelatedness constituting the whole. Further to be noted is that it is such a wholH RI LQWHUUHODWLRQ ZKLFK LV ³JRRG LQ LWVHOI´±±without regard to anything

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H[WHUQDO 7KLV LV WKH SULPDU\ LQVWDQFH RI ³JRRG LQ LWVHOI´ QDPHO\ WKDW pertaining to a being in respect of its own whole of interrelated actings. However, a single being is not to be considered only in the respect in which the internal interrelatedness of its actings constitutes it an integral whole, for its actings also necessarily involve other beings as objects. This means that there are also other wholes, constituted by the being in question and one or more other beings with which it is in interaction. Let us consider the case of two beings in such interaction. We have here a whole constituted by the interrelatedness of the two, and this has a certain complex character or definiteness. This character or definiteness is partly determined by the particular characters of the two beings themselves; but the character of the interrelatedness itself also in part determines the individual characters of the two beings. This kind of whole of interrelatedness and its complex determinateness is instanced in, e.g., a marriage, or a friendship. 7KLV ZKROH RI LQWHUUHODWHGQHVV LV WKDW FRQVWLWXWLQJ D ³VRFLHW\´ 10 What is pertinent to us here is that the complex character of such a societal whole of LQWHUUHODWHGQHVV LQFOXGHV DOVR WKDW IHDWXUH ZKLFK ZH GHVLJQDWH E\ ³JRRG´ Now when we consider that whole per se in respect of its goodness, it is ³JRRG LQ LWVHOI´ %XW VLQFH WKH DFWLQJV RI HDFK RI WKH WZR EHLQJV DOVR KDYH other beings as objects, the societal whole can be considered also in respect of its interrelatedness with one or more other beings. In respect of this LQWHUUHODWHGQHVV WKH VRFLHWDO ZKROH FRXOG EH FRQVLGHUHG DV ³XVHIXO´ WR WKH other beings, as e.g., furthering their purposes, etc. That is to say, this FRQVLGHUDWLRQRIWKHVRFLHWDOZKROHZRXOGEHRILWDV³JRRGLQVWUXPHQWDOO\´ It will not be necessary to go into an investigation of more complex wholes of interrelatedness; in principle the situation respecting the analysis of ³JRRG´ ZLOO QRt be different: any whole of interrelatedness will in one FRQVLGHUDWLRQEH³JRRGLQLWVHOI´DQGLQDQRWKHUEH³LQVWUXPHQWDOO\JRRG´ We can now, on the basis of the foregoing analysis, return to the issue H[DPLQHG LQ VHFWLRQ  DERYH WKDW EHWZHHQ WKH ³VXEMHFWLYLVW´ DQG WKH ³REMHFWLYLVW´ WKHRULHV RI JRRG DQG DFKLHYH D VLJQLILFDQW FODULILFDWLRQ RI WKH issue. With the analysis of good as pertaining to the interrelatedness FRQVWLWXWLQJDZKROHZHFDQFRQFOXGHLQUHVSHFWRIWKDWZKROHEHLQJ³JRRGLQ LWVHOI´ that good is clearly to be accorded an objective status. $ SUREOHP DULVHV KRZHYHU ZLWK UHJDUG WR ³LQVWUXPHQWDO JRRG´ VLQFH WKH ³LQVWUXPHQWDO JRRG´ ZRXOG VHHP WR LPSO\ VRPHRQH IRU ZKRP DQG LQ UHVSHFWRIVRPHSXUSRVHWKHZKROHLQTXHVWLRQLV³JRRG´7Kis would entail a relationship between that someone and the whole in question, a relationship in ZKLFK WKDW VRPHRQH ³MXGJHV´ RU ³YDOXHV´ WKDW ZKROH DV EHLQJ ³JRRG IRU´ some end. The crucial issue is whether that someone uniquely determines that whole in reVSHFWRILWVEHLQJ³JRRGIRU´VRWKDWZLWKRXWWKDWVRPHRQHMXGJLQJ RU YDOXLQJ WKHUH VLPSO\ ZRXOG EH QR ³JRRG IRU´ DW DOO LQ UHVSHFW RI WKDW whole. The affirmative answer to this question is what constitutes the ³VXEMHFWLYLVW´WKHRU\RIJRRG

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But, I would DUJXH WKLV DQDO\VLV RI ³LQVWUXPHQWDO JRRG´ LV QRW WR EH accepted as valid. For the whole in question is not dependent upon a judgment RUYDOXDWLRQE\DQRWKHUEH\RQGLWIRULWWREH³LQVWUXPHQWDOO\JRRG´VLQFHWKH beings constituting the whole of interaction are, as we have seen, necessarily also in interactive relations with other beings. It is by virtue of, and in respect to, these relationships beyond itself that that whole with which we are FRQFHUQHGLV³LQVWUXPHQWDOO\JRRG´7KHVHUHODWLRQVKLSVDQG the whole as in WKRVHUHODWLRQVKLSVDUHD³)DFW´DQGPRUHRYHUWKH\DUHDIDFWDQWHFHGHQWWR the judging or valuing. It is not the judging or valuing which bring that fact into being; rather it is the case that the judging, etc., presupposes that fact, and therefore is a judgment respecting that fact. This means that the instrumental JRRGQHVVRIWKHZKROHLQTXHVWLRQLV³REMHFWLYH´ V We have now to deal with another, and more difficult problem, with respect WRWKHVWDWXVRI³JRRG´.DQWKDGPDLQWDLQHG as we noted earlier, that nothing LV WR EH UHJDUGHG DV JRRG ZLWKRXW TXDOLILFDWLRQ H[FHSW D ³JRRG ZLOO´ 7KLV HQWDLOVWKDW ³JRRGLQLWVHOI´ SHUWDLQVRQO\WRWKH PRUDO7KLVFRQFHSWLRQWKDW JRRGLQWKHVHQVHRI³LQWULQVLFJRRG´LVWREHUHVWULFWHGWRWKH³PRUDOJRRG´LV a widely held doctrine. Another position, appreciably wider than this, in UHJDUGWRZKDWLVWREHFRQFHLYHGDV³LQWULQVLFDOO\JRRG´LVWKDWPDLQWDLQHGE\ 6LU'DYLG5RVV³JRRGLVDFKDUDFWHULVWLFEHORQJLQJSULPDULO\RQO\WRVWDWHVRI mind, and belonging to them only in virtue of three characteristics±±the moral virtue included in them, the intelligence included in them, and the pleasure LQFOXGHGLQWKHP´11 The issue is whether this kind of restriction in respect of ZKDWLV³LQWULQVLFDOO\JRRG´LVDFFHSWDEOH The issue here is ultimately a metaphysical one. What needs to be considered is the metaphysical foundation for that restriction in respect of ZKDW LV YDOLGO\ WR EH UHJDUGHG DV ³LQWULQVLFDOO\ JRRG´ 7KH WKHRULHV RI WKLV kind are, it seems to me, tenable on the basis only of either of two metaphysical positions. One is the metaphysical dualism so widely accepted VLQFHWKHVHYHQWHHQWKFHQWXU\ZKLFKZRXOGH[FOXGH³LQWULQVLFJRRG´IURPWKH entire realm of nature, confining it only to man. The other position, which has GHULYHGDVDUHDFWLRQWRWKHGXDOLVWLFRQHKROGVWKDWZKDWLVXOWLPDWHO\³UHDO´ LVRQO\WKH³PHQWDO´RU³VSLULWXDO´7KHFUHGLELOLW\RIWKHVHWZRSRVLWLRQVUHVWV upon the acceptance of the seventeenth-century conception of physical or QDWXUHEHLQJDVHVVHQWLDOO\³LQHUW´ZLWKLWVFRUROODU\WKH1HRSODWRQLFGRFWULQH WKDW ³DFW´ SHUWDLQV VROHO\ WR PLQG +RZHYHU WKH VLWXDWLRQ KDV EHHQ fundamentally altered by the abandonment by twentieth-century physical science of the conception of the physical as inert, and by its de facto DFFHSWDQFHRIWKHXOWLPDWHSK\VLFDOHQWLWLHVDVHVVHQWLDO³DFWLYH´

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0\DQDO\VLVRI³DFW´DQG³DFWLQJ´DERYHKDVEHHQSDUWLFXODUO\FRQFHUQHG ZLWKKXPDQDFWLYLW\EXWWKHFRQFHSWRI³DFW´FDQEHJHQHUDOL]HGWRDOl beings, LHWRDOOZKLFKDUHDFFHSWDEOHDVIJ੹ ʌĮȞIJİȜ૵Ȣ੕ȞIJĮFRPSOHWHRUUHDOEHLQJV )XUWKHU LQ UHVSHFW RI WKHVH P\ IRUHJRLQJ DQDO\VLV RI ³DFW´ UHPDLQV YDOLG , can here do no more than adumbrate this position. 12 In it a being, by its acting, affects another or others, thereby effecting some change in them. This was the YLHZRI³DFWLQJ´ZKLFK.DQWLQKLVMonadologia Physica and other precritical ZULWLQJV KDG DGYDQFHG LQ SODFH RI /HLEQL]¶V VXEMHFWLYLVWLF perceptio, this entailing that only phenomenal relations were possible, Kant correctly insisting RQ SK\VLFDO UHODWLRQV QHFHVVDU\ KDYLQJ WR EH ³UHDO´13 In the position being maintained here, the acting of a being necessarily has to be relational. This general metaphysical position now allows us to hold that any whole RIUHODWLRQDODFWLYLW\FDQEHFRQFHLYHGDV³JRRGLQLWVHOI´7KDWLVWRVD\WKHUH FDQ EH QR PHWDSK\VLFDO QHFHVVLW\ WR UHVWULFW ³JRRG LQ LWVHOI´ RU ³LQWULQVLF JRRG´WRKXPDQEHLQJVLWLVWREHH[WHQGHGWRall beings. This means that any whole of relational activity constituting an integral being must be regarded as ³JRRG LQ LWVHOI´ )XUWKHU DV ZH KDYH VHHQ UHODWLRQDO ZKROHV FRQVWLWXWHG E\ WZRRUPRUHEHLQJVFDQDOVREH³JRRGLQWKHPVHOYHV´7KHLQWULQVLFJRRGQHVV here is grounded in the relational acting of the constituent beings and pertains primarily to them as in that interrelation. Further, in terms of this metaphysical position, not only can there be no UHDVRQIRUUHVWULFWLQJ³JRRG´WRWKHKXPDQEXWWKHUHFDQDOVREHQRUHDVRQIRU OLPLWLQJ³JRRG´WRWKH PRUDO7KH PRUDOJRRGPXVWEHUHJDUGHGDVDVSHFLHV of good in a generic sense. VI This brings us to the central and crucial issue involved in our topic. So far we have taken it for granted that there is a factor or quality which we term ³JRRG´DQGZHKDYHLQYHVWLJDWHGLWVVWDWXVHJZKHWKHULWLV³VXEMHFWLYH´RU ³REMHFWLYH´ %XW FHQWUDO WR WKH SKLORVRSKLFDO FRQFHUQ PXVW EH WR VHHN WR XQGHUVWDQG WKH QDWXUH RI ³JRRG´ 7KLV UDLVHV WKH LVVXH RI KRZ WKDW understanding is to be achieved. What does it consist in? For the attainment of this understanding, I would maintain, it is necessary to go to first principles; this understanding is to be achieved only in terms of metaphysical categories and concepts. One approach to this understanding is to seek the cause of people, WKLQJV HWF EHLQJ ³JRRG´ 7KH FODVVLF LQVWDQFH RI WKLV DSSURDFK DQG RQH which has historically been of great influence, is the Platonic doctrine that the ³FDXVH´ RI WKLQJV EHLQJ JRRG LV WR EH IRXQG LQ WKH )RUP RU ,GHD of Good. Another approach was that of Aristotle, who found the conception of a selfsubsistent Form of Good quite untenable. His approach was to seek the XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI ³JRRG´ LQ WHUPV RI ³HQG´ IJȑȜȠȢ  +H KHOG WKDW ³JRRG´ LQ

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the most general sense, is ³WKDWDW ZKLFKDOOWKLQJVDLP´14 It is true that for Aristotle telos³HQG´LVDcauseEXWLWLVDFDXVHLQWKHVHQVHRI³WKDWIRUWKH VDNH RI ZKLFK´ IJઁ Ƞ੤ ਩ȞİțĮ  E\ FRQWUDVW ZLWK WKH 3ODWRQLF FDXVH DV WKH ³IRUPDO FDXVH´ 7KHVH WZR DSSURDFKHV ZHUH FRmbined in the medieval doctrine of God as the ultimate cause±±WKH FDXVH RI ³EHLQJ´ DQG DOVR RI ³HQG´WKHtelos of all creation. But there are serious philosophical difficulties in these three positions. Let us start with the Aristotelian. In holding that ³JRRG´LV³WKDWDWZKLFKDOO WKLQJV DLP´ LV $ULVWRWOH defining ³JRRG´ LQ WHUPV RI ³DLP´ RU ³HQG´" ,V KH PDLQWDLQLQJ WKDW LW LV ³DLP´ RU ³HQG´ ZKLFK constitutes ³JRRG´" ,V LW QRW UDWKHU WKDW VRPHWKLQJ LV ³DLPHG DW´ because LW LV ³JRRG´" 6HFRQGO\ consisWHQW ZLWK KLV FULWLFLVP RI 3ODWR $ULVWRWOH GRHV QRW VHW RXW WR ILQG ³WKH JRRG´ UDWKHU KH VHHNV WR DVFHUWDLQ ZKDW LV WKH KLJKHVW EHVW VXSUHPH (ਙȡȚıIJȠȞ JRRGRUWKHFRPSOHWHSHUIHFWIJȑȜİȚȠȞ JRRG7KXVKHDVNVZKHWKHU this good is to be identified witK ³SOHDVXUH´ ਦįȠȞȒ  RU ZLWK ³KDSSLQHVV RU well-EHLQJ´ İ੝įĮȚȝȠȞȓĮ  RU ZLWK ³YLUWXH´ ਕȡİIJȒ  RU ZLWK ³IXQFWLRQ´ (਩ȡȖȠȞ RU³DFWLYLW\´਩ȞȑȡȖİȚĮ RU³DFWLRQ´ʌȡȐȟȚȢ :HDUHKRZHYHUVWLOO OHIW ZLWK WKH LVVXH ZKDW LV ³JRRG´" $ULVWRWOH UHMHFWV WKDW ³WKH JRRG LWVHOI´ Į੝IJઁ IJઁ ȐȖĮࢡȩȞ FRXOGEHWKH 3ODWRQLF,GHDRU)RUPRI*RRG 15 that is, the ³JRRG´ ZH DUH VHHNLQJ FDQQRW EH D VHOI-subsistent being. Nor, he argues, FRXOGLWEHDXQLYHUVDOIJ੒ țȠȚȞȩȞ 16 IRUD³XQLYHUVDOJRRGQHVV´FRXOGQRWEH WKH³VXSUHPHJRRG´17 In contrast with these positions he puts forward that the ³JRRG´ZHDUHVHHNLQJLVWREHIRXQGLQ³WKDWIRUWKHVDNHRIZKLFKDVDQHQG´ IJઁ Ƞ੤ ਩ȞİțĮ੪ȢIJȑȜȠȢ 18 But it is still obscure how this gives us the meaning RI³JRRG´ The issue we have KHUH WKDW DV WR WKH PHDQLQJ RI ³JRRG´ LV DQ extremely difficult one. It is difficult to see precisely what kind of answer is requisite, and the formulation of the problem is difficult. The issue has, however, been recognized, and thinkers down the ages have sought to deal with it in a variety of ways and in terms of various theories. One of these views, which has had a wide currency, even in recent times, has been to hold WKDWLQUHVSHFWRI³JRRG´ZHKDYHDQXOWLPDWHDQGLQHIIDEOHTXDOLW\ZKLFKFDQ only EH ³LQWXLWHG´ 0RVW UHFHQW WKLQNHUV KROGLQJ WKLV YLHZ KDYH QRW JRQH further and entered into the question of the metaphysical status of this quality. Some, however, have done so, and have given the answer in terms of REMHFWLYHO\ H[LVWLQJ ³HVVHQFHV´±±e.g., by Nicolai Hartmann.19 These ³LQWXLWLRQLVW´WKHRULHVLWVKRXOGEHQRWHGLQYROYHVRPHIRUPRI3ODWRQLVP±± whether or not this be recognized by their proponents. At this point it is appropriate to turn to an examination of the Platonic position, one of the three approaches mentioned above to the understanding of ³JRRG´7KH3ODWRQLFGRFWULQHLVWKDWWKHPHDQLQJRI³JRRG´LQUHVSHFWRIWKH ³WKLQJV´ZKLFKDUHUHJDUGHGDV³JRRG´LVWREHIRXQGLQWKH)RUPRU,GHDRI Good. Now in this doctrine the Form of GoRGLVLWVHOI³DEHLQJ´)XUWKHULQ many interpretations of the doctrine, this Form is taken to be the perfect

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H[HPSODURI ³JRRG´±±ZKLFKLVHQWLUHO\FRQVLVWHQW ZLWKWKH )RUPDV ³D JRRG EHLQJ´7KHTXHVWLRQFDQKRZHYHUEHUDLVHGDVWRWKHPHDQLQJRI³JRRG´LQ WKLV³JRRGEHLQJ´WKH)RUPRI*RRG'RLQJVREULQJVWROLJKWWKHGLIILFXOW\ RUIDOODF\ZKLFKLQWKH$FDGHP\FDPHWREHUHIHUUHGWRDVWKDWRIWKH³WKLUG PDQ´7KHGLIILFXOW\LVWKDWLQWHUPVRIWKLVWKHRU\WKHPHDQLQJRI³JRRG´RID ³JRRG SHUVRQ´ LV JURXQGHG LQ WKH )RUP RI *RRG %XW VLQFH WKLV IRUP LV ³D JRRG EHLQJ´ WKH TXHVWLRQ PXVW EH UDLVHG DV WR WKH JURXQG RI that ³JRRG´ Answer: another Form of Good±±and so on ad infinitum. Aristotle urged this difficulty as fatal to the Platonic conception of )RUPV DV ³EHLQJV´ DQG LQ particular to the Form of Good as a being. Plato himself was well aware of this difficulty respecting the meaning of ³JRRG´ LQKHUHQW LQ KLV WKHRU\ RI )RUPV DQG PDGH RQH KLJKO\ VLJQLILFDQW attempt to deal with it. He did so in the Republic in his celebrated simile of the sun. In this Plato presented an argument by analogy. To have vision of an object capable of being seen, there is required not only an eye capable of sight, but a third factor is also necessary: the sun with its light; so analogously, to have knowledge and truth about things capable of being known, there is required not only a knowing mind (nous) with a capacity of knowing, but a third factor also is necessary: the Form of Good. But then Plato extends the analogy moVW VLJQLILFDQWO\ ³WKH VXQ QRW RQO\ JLYHV WKH objects of sight their capacity of visibility, but also provides for their JHQHUDWLRQJURZWKDQGQXUWXUH´20 so analogously, the objects of knowledge not only receive from the presence of the Good their being known, but also WKHLUEHLQJRUH[LVWHQFHIJઁ İȚ੤ĮȚ DQGWKHLUHVVHQFHȠ੝ıȓĮ DUHSURYLGHGE\ the Good.21 How is this argument to be understood, especially the latter part of it? How are we to conceive the Good as providing things with their ousia, i.e., WKDW ZKHUHE\ WKH\ DUH ³ZKDW´ WKH\ DUH" $QG QRW RQO\ WKDW EXW DV SURYLGLQJ DOVR WKHLU YHU\ ³EHLQJ´ to einai), their existing? We get an answer to this question by considering this last passage together with that which Plato had earlier introduced the topiF RIWKH *RRG ³)RU \RXKDYH RIWHQ KHDUGWKDWWKH greatest thing to learn is the Form of the Good, that it is by this that just things DQG RWKHU VXFK EHFRPH XVHIXO DQG EHQHILFLDO´22 What Plato is getting at is missed if this passage is interpreted, as it so frequently is, as dealing with the merely utilitarian.23 He is saying that, without the Form of Good, just actions, and pious and brave actions, etc., would be simply pointless, without meaning or relevance, lacking entirely in any worthwhileness. That is, unless just DFWLRQV HWF ZHUH ³JRRG´ WKH\ ZRXOG EH FRPSOHWHO\ PHDQLQJOHVV DQG irrelevant. In that culminating passage of his argument (509B) given above, Plato extends his insight respecting justice, etc., also to knowledge, and to being and essence8QOHVVNQRZOHGJHEH³JRRG´NQRZOHGJHZRXOGEHXWWHUO\ pointless and irrelevant±±it would be simply not worthwhile at all. And, ousia ³ZKDW´ D WKLQJ LV HTXDOO\ ZRXOG EH HQWLUHO\ GHYRLG RI VHQVH DQG PHDQLQJ XQOHVV LW ZHUH ³JRRG´ )XUWKHU DQG PRVW LPSRUtantly, being or

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H[LVWLQJ LWVHOI XQOHVV LW ZHUH ³JRRG´ ZRXOG VLPSO\ EH PHDQLQJOHVV ZLWKRXW any point or purpose, devoid of anything whereby it would be worthwhile, and thus would be sheerly impossible. In accord with the ontology which Plato maintained in his middle SHULRG³WKH*RRG´LVKHUHVWDWHGWREHWKH)RUPRU,GHDRI*RRG%XWLQWKDW culminating passage Plato proceeds to a most important statement, namely WKDW ³WKH JRRG LV QRW ousia (being, essence), but transcends ousia in dignity DQG SRZHU´24 It is not surprising that he has been seen as, in this passage, going beyond the Form of Good±±as one among the other Forms±±and that many, such as Plotinus, have interpreted him as referring here to the Divine. This receives further credence from the scheme of the Timaeus, in which the demiourgos LVVSRNHQRIDV³JRRG´25 0\FRQFHUQLQWKH IRUHJRLQJDQDO\VLVRI3ODWR¶VDUJXPHQWLQWKHVLPLOH of the sun has been to bring out the following points. First, that Plato himself had seen a most significant difficulty in his doctrine of Forms with respect to WKHPHDQLQJRI³JRRG´QDPHO\WKDWWKHSUREOHPRIWKHPHDQLQJRI³JRRG´LV not to be resolved in terms of a theory of Forms, for, contrary to the ontological position he then had been accepting, the Forms are not the final RQWRORJLFDO XOWLPDWHV KH KDG VXSSRVHG VLQFH LQ UHVSHFW RI ³JRRG´ WKH\ DUH dependent, i.e., dependent on something as the principle, the source, of ³JRRG´±±in other words, the Forms are dependent upon this principle as that without which they themselves would be pointless and meaningless, and thus FRXOG QRW ³EH´ LQ WKDW ILQDO VHQVH ZKLFK KH KDG HDUOLHU DVFULEHG WR WKHP Secondly, I have been concerned to bring out the implication that this difficulty consequently equally pertains to the modern WKHRULHVRI³HVVHQFHV´ ZLWKUHVSHFWWRWKHPHDQLQJRI³JRRG´$QGWKLUGO\,ZLVKWRSUHVVWKHSRLQW WKDW 3ODWR¶V DUJXPHQW LV HQWLUHO\ YDOLG DQG WKDW ZH KDYH FRQVHTXHQWO\ WR recognize the metaphysical necessity of a principle RI³JRRG´ It was in Neoplatonism that the conception of a transcendent principle or VRXUFHRI³JRRG´±±LHRIWKH³JRRGQHVV´RIWKLQJVDQGRIthe very meaning RI ³JRRG´±±was not only fully embraced, but was also identified with the Divine. This is the third of the approaches to thH PHDQLQJ RI ³JRRG´ mentioned above (p. 18). This approach, like the other two, involves significant difficulties. In discussing these a distinction has to be made in this Neoplatonic doctrine between the position of Plotinus and that accepted by most of Christian Neoplatonism following Augustine. Both ground the PHDQLQJ RI ³JRRG´ LQ *RG DQG LQ ERWK SRVLWLRQV *RG LV WKH VROH SULQFLSOH source, or origin of all things. This means that for both God is the cause of the ³EHLQJ´ RIWKLQJVDQGRIWKHLU³JRRG´ The crucial difference between these WZR SRVLWLRQV LW WKDW $XJXVWLQH FRQFHLYHG *RG WKH FDXVH RI ³EHLQJ´ DV ³D EHLQJ¶ LQ FRQWUDVW WR 3ORWLQXV ZKR PLQGIXO RI 3ODWR¶V DUJXPHQW LQ WKH Republic ZKLFK ZH WUHDWHG DERYH  KHOG WKDW *RG LV ³EH\RQG EHLQJ´ (ਥʌȑțİȚȞĮIJોȢȠ੝ıȓĮȢ LQRWKHUZRUGVWKDW*RGWUDQVFHQGV³EHLQJ´

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Let us first examine the Christian Neoplatonist position respecting the JURXQGLQJ RI WKH ³JRRG´ RI FUHDWHG WKLQJV LQ *RG :KDW H[DFWO\ GRHV WKLV position entail? The issue turns on the conception of the relation of God to ³JRRG´7KHSRVLWLRQFRXOGEHWDNHQWREHH[SUHVVHGE\WKHVWDWHPHQW³*RGLV JRRG´ ZKLFK FRXOG EH LQWHUSUHWHG DQG XVXDOO\ KDV EHHQ DV PHDQLQJ WKDW *RGDVDEHLQJKDVWKHDWWULEXWHRI³JRRG´RU³JRRGQHVV´±±of course in the superlative degree. God, then, is the cause of good in creatures by creating WKHPZLWKWKHDWWULEXWH³JRRG´7KLVKRZHYHUOHDYHVXQUHVROYHGWKHSUREOHP RI WKH PHDQLQJ RI ³JRRG´ IRU WKLV SRVLWLRQ UXQV LQWR D YLFLRXV UHJUHVV 7KH PHDQLQJ RI ³JRRG´ LQ FUHatures has to be sought in God, but this raises the SUREOHPRIWKHPHDQLQJRI³JRRG´LQ*RG(YLGHQWO\WKHDUJXPHQWLVLQYROYHG LQWKH³WKLUGPDQ´GLIILFXOW\ This difficulty is avoided by Plotinus, who clearly saw the validity of 3ODWR¶VDUJXPHQWLQWKHRepublic as demonstrating the metaphysical necessity of a principle RI ³JRRG´ )RU 3ORWLQXV WKH 2QH RU *RG DV WKH SULPDU\ RU XOWLPDWH SULQFLSOH RI DOO DQG HYHU\WKLQJ LQFOXGLQJ WKH ³JRRG´ RI DOO WKLQJV ³FDQQRWWKHUHIRUHLWVHOIEHJRRG´੮ıIJİIJ૵ ਦȞ੿ Ƞ੝į੻ȞਕȖĮࢡȠȞਥıIJȚȞ 26 Rather, ³LWLVEH\RQGJRRG´ਕȜȜµ਩ıIJȚȞਫ਼ʌİȡȐȖĮࢡȠȞ), which entails, as Plotinus says, WKDW³LWLVWKHJRRGQRWIRULWVHOIEXWIRURWKHUWKLQJVLQVRIDUDVWKH\DUHDEOH WRSDUWLFLSDWH LQLW´țĮ੿ Į੝IJઁ Ƞ੝ȤਦĮȞIJ૵ IJȠ૙Ȣ į ૃਙȜȜȠȚȢ ਕȖĮࢡȩȞİ੅ IJȚ Į੝IJȠ૨ įȪȞĮIJĮȚ ȝİIJĮȜĮȝȕȐȞİȚȞ 27 This means that the principle of good transcends good±±LWLVQRWLWVHOID³JRRGEHLQJ´$FFRUGLQJO\WKHPHDQLQJRI³JRRG´LQ good things has to be sought in that principle of good, but since that principle LVQRWLWVHOIJRRGWKLVSRVLWLRQGRHVQRWUXQLQWRWKH³WKLUGPDQ´GLIILFXOW\ Thomas Aquinas was the medieval Christian thinker who was most fully aware of this difficulty with respect to the conception of a one transcendent principle, or source and origin of all things, a difficulty which he sought to overcome with his doctrine of analogy and of transcendental categories. He PDLQWDLQHG WKDW ³EHLQJ´ DQG ³JRRG´ LQ UHVSHFW RI *RG DUH QRW WR EH understood univocally, i.e., in the sense in which they pertain to creatures; rather they are to be understood analogically. This means that, as in regard to FUHDWXUHVZHVSHDNRIWKHLU³EHLQJ´LHWKHLU³KDYLQJEHLQJ´VRZLWKUHJDUG WR*RGZH FDQVSHDNRI*RG³EHLQJ´ QRZ KRZHYHULQWKHVHQVHRI ³having EHLQJ´EXWDV³EHLQJper se´ipsum esse. And, as in respect of creatures we predicate thH DWWULEXWH ³JRRG´ VR LQ UHVSHFW RI *RG ZH FDQ SUHGLFDWH D ³WUDQVFHQGHQWDOJRRG´7KHSUREOHPZLWKWKLVGRFWULQHLVWKDWWKHYHU\QRWLRQ RI ³WUDQVFHQGHQWDO SUHGLFDWHV RU SULQFLSOHV´ KDV LWVHOI WR EH XQGHUVWRRG DQDORJLFDOO\WKDWLVWKH³WUDQVFHQGHQWDOV´are not predicates or categories in a univocal sense, i.e., in the sense in which creatures have predicates; rather, WKH\ DUH ³DQDORJRXV WR´ SUHGLFDWHV +RZHYHU FRQVLVWHQWO\ WR WUHDW WKHP DV thus analogous is exceedingly difficult, and all too readily the transcendentals are implicitly thought of as predicates which pertain to God, which means that *RGLVWKRXJKWRIDVKDYLQJWKHDWWULEXWH³JRRG´DOEHLWLQDVXSHUODWLYHVHQVH

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QRW SHUWDLQLQJ WR FUHDWXUHV  7KXV *RG LV LPSOLFLWO\ WKRXJKW RI DV ³D JRRG being´ZLWKWKHFRQVHTXHQFHWKDWWKH³WKLUGPDQ´GLIILFXOW\LVQRWHYDGHG What is requisite, I would submit, is explicitly to recognize, what Plato and Aristotle had effectually begun to appreciate,28 and what Plotinus very clearly saw, that the primary or ultimate principle cannot validly be thought of in terms of categories at all, because categories cannot pertain to it, since such a principle is the principle or source also of the categories. That is, we need to recognize that what Aristotle had explicitly stated with respect to hyle as an ultimate principle, can validly be generalized to all ultimate principles, and thus that an ultimate principle ³LQ LWVHOI LV QHLWKHU D SDUWLFXODU WKLQJ QRU D quantity nor designated by any of the categories by which being is GHWHUPLQHG´29 In other words, an ultimate principle transcends all categories. Plotinus had concluded from this that accordingly the One must transcend knowledge, since knowledge is necessarily in terms of categories. Aristotle had however correctly argued that this conclusion does not necessarily hold in respect of primary principles, and that we can validly have knowledge (ਥʌȚıIJȒȝȘ  RI D SULPDU\ SULQFLSOH RQH ZD\ EHLQJ WKDW RI DQDORJ\ 30 as Thomas Aquinas also recognized. VII With this clarification of the concept of ultimate principles we can now turn VSHFLILFDOO\ WR WKH SUREOHP RI WKH SULQFLSOH RI ³JRRG´ DQG DWWHPSW DQ approach different from those which we have reviewed and seen to have some or other serious defect. We can achieve such an approach, I would propose, IURPWKHVWDQGSRLQWRIDPHWDSK\VLFVRI³DFW´ ,Q D PHWDSK\VLFDO FRQFHSWLRQ RI DOO EHLQJV DV ³DFWLQJ´ HYHU\ EHLQJ VWDQGV LQ QHHG RI DQ ³HQG´ D telos VLQFH ³DFWLQJ´ HQWDLOV DQ ³HQG´ WRZDUG which the acting is aimed or directed. Now the end of an agent is, logically, QRW JHQHUDEOH E\ WKH DJHQW LQ TXHVWLRQ VLQFH WR EH DQ ³DJHQW DFWLQJ´ SUHVXSSRVHVDQ³HQG´31 7KXVWKHHQGPXVWEH³JLYHQ´LHLWPXVWEHDGDWXP for that agent. Can this end in question be derived as a datum from other agents? This cannot be because, (a) since there can be no reason why any one agent among others should be uniquely privileged as a donor; and (b) with a plurality of prospective donors, the agent in question is faced with the necessity of a choice, which SUHVXSSRVHVDQ³HQG´ DVDFULWHULRQLQWHUPVRI which to choose between them. This leaves as the only alternative that the UHTXLVLWHHQGIRUWKHDJHQWLQTXHVWLRQPXVWEH³JLYHQ´E\RUGHULYDEOHIURP a transcendent principle or source of ends. That is to say, there is a metaphysical necessity for a transcendent teleological principle. This was clear to Aristotle. It was equally clear to Aristotle that there is a necessary connection betweHQ³HQG´DQG³JRRG´7KLVLVVREHFDXVH³HQGHQWDLOVIJઁ o੤ ਩ȞİțĮ³WKDW

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IRUWKHVDNHRIZKLFK´7KDWLVWKH³HQG´HQWDLOV³WKDWRQDFFRXQWRIZKLFK´ RU ³ZKHUHIRUH´ RU ³WKH UHDVRQ IRU ZKLFK´ WKH DFWLQJ LV GRQH DQG WKLV ³UHDVRQ´ PXVW EH WKDW WKH HQG EH LQ VRPH UHVSHFW ³JRRG´ 7KLV ³JRRG´ KRZHYHU FDQQRW EH D SXUHO\ ³LQVWUXPHQWDO´ RQH DQG WR HVFDSH DQ LQILQLWH UHJUHVVZH QHFHVVDULO\PXVWFRPHWRD ³JRRGLQLWVHOI´RU³LQWULQVLFJRRG´ 32 7KXVZHKDYH$ULVWRWOH¶VJHQHUDOSRVLWLRQWKDW³WKHJRRGLVWKDWDW which all WKLQJVDLP´33 VLQFH³WKHJRRG´LV³WKDWIRUWKHVDNHRIZKLFKDVDQHQG´34 Now Aristotle, having rejected, as we have seen,35 the conception of ³WKHJRRGLWVHOI´ DVVHOI-subsistent or as a universal, held that it must be the supreme, complete, RU SHUIHFW ³JRRG´36 and which, he argued, is to be identified with the divine unmoved mover as the teleological cause, i.e., as the teleological principle. This is a doctrine which has had a powerful influence on subsequent theological thought. Aristotle maintained the position that God LVDWKLQNHUZKRVH³WKLQNLQJLVDWKLQNLQJRQWKLQNLQJ´ 37 DQGDUJXHGWKDW³WKH DFWXDOLW\RIWKRXJKWLVOLIH´38 WKXVWKDW*RG¶V³VHOI-dependent actuality is life PRVWJRRGDQGHWHUQDO´39 The point in this argument which is of special relevance to us here is that it is because God is the highest or supreme good that God is the teleological principle, the principle of ends. In other words, God provides the end for all things by being that at which all things aim, and that he is this by his being the highest good. This Aristotelian position has been accepted by much subsequent theological thought. It is important, however, to appreciate that there is a crucial difficulty in this argument. The argument is that God is the transcendent principle source, of ends by virtue of being the highest or principal good. The difficulty LQYROYHG LQ WKLV LV WKDW RI WKH ³WKLUG PDQ´ )RU ZH FDQ YDOLGO\ UDLVH WKH TXHVWLRQ ZK\ RU ZKHUHE\ LV *RG ³JRRG´" 7R DQVZHU WKDW *RG LV JRRG E\ YLUWXHRI³WKLQNLQJ´WKHIXUWKHUTXHVWLRQFDQEHUDLVHGDVWRZK\³WKLQNLQJ´LV WKHKLJKHVWJRRGRULQGHHG³JRRG´DWDOO"7KHRQO\ZD\RXWRIWKLVGLIILFXOW\ as Plato and Plotinus had seen, is to maintain not that God is the principal good, but that God transcends good by being the principle of good. 7KHSUREOHPQRZLVKRZWKH³SULQFLSOHRIJRRG´LVWREHFRPSUHKHQGHG We can, I would now suggest, most readily approach this problem from a FRQVLGHUDWLRQRI³HQG´7KH³HQG´IRUDEHLQJPHDQVWKDWDWZKLFKLWVDFWLQJ DLPV DQG WKLV HQWDLOV VRPH ³RUGHU´ :KDW LV LPSOLHG LV QRW PHUHO\ VRPH RU RWKHULHDQ\RUGHUEXWDQRUGHUZKLFKLV³ILWWLQJ´³VXLWDEOH´³DSSURSULDWH´ for that being. Further, that end, the order, which is aimed at, is some form of definiteness as a possibility for its actualization. But every form of definiteness, considered as simply as such, i.e., in complete abstraction from actuality or actualization, is a completely general possibility. Now a form of definiteness as a general possibility entails that, as ³JHQHUDO´LWLVZLWKRXWDQ\WKLQJZKHUHE\LWZRXOGEH³EHWWHU´RU³ZRUVH´ZLWK respect to any given actual or acting being. That is to say, the realm of pure possibility, by virtue of its complete generality, is necessarily neutral with

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regard WRLWVTXDOLILFDWLRQRIDFWXDOLW\7KLVPHDQVWKDWWKHIDFWRURI³EHWWHU´RU ³ZRUVH´ LV QRW LQKHUHQW LQ RU GHULYDEOH IURP WKH UHDOP RI IRUPV RI definiteness per se. This factor must be derived from some other source. That source, I would content, cannot be other than the transcendent principle of HQGV)RUWKH³HQG´DVZHKDYHVHHQHQWDLOV³ILWWLQJQHVV´³VXLWDELOLW\´LH WKDWLWEH³EHVW´7KDWLVWRVD\WKH³SULQFLSOHRIHQG´HQWDLOVWKDWLWEHDOVRWKH ³SULQFLSOHRIJRRG´ %XW WKH ³SULQFLSOH RI JRRG´ FDQQRW EH DV $ULVWRWOH DQG PXFK RI WKH WKHRORJLFDO WUDGLWLRQ KDYH PDLQWDLQHG WKH ³KLJKHVW JRRG´ 5DWKHU WKH ³SULQFLSOH RI JRRG´ PXVW EH WKDW ZKHUHE\ DQG IURP ZKLFK WKHUH LV D distinction at all EHWZHHQ³JRRG´DQG³EDG´³EHWWHU´RU³ZRUVH´³ILWWLQJ´RU ³XQILWWLQJ´ ³VXLWDEOH´ RU ³XQVXLWDEOH´ HWF whereby, indeed, these words have any meaning at all. This distinction is not inherent in actuality as such, nor in pure possibility as such. But it is a fundamental presupposition for any actuality, and a fundamental presupposition for possibility to have any UHOHYDQFH WR DFWXDOLW\ 7KXV D WUDQVFHQGHQW ³SULQFLSOH´ RI ³JRRG´ ZKLFK LV DOVRWKH³WHOHRORJLFDOSULQFLSOH´LVDQXOWLPDWHPHWDSK\VLFDOQHFHVVLW\ 40 BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES (XJHQH/RQJ³,YRU Leclerc´ LQThe Dictionary of Twentieth-Century British Philosophers, ed. Stuart Brown (England: Thoemmes Continuum, 2005): 549±553.

NOTES 1. Oxford English Dictionary³*RRG´$DGM 2. Cf. O.E.D.³:RUWK´DUWV±2. 3. My italics; cf. O.E.D.³9DOXH´DUW 4. Liddell, Scott, Jones, A Greek-English Lexicon. 5. There has been a failure, in much recent philosophical literature to recognize this KLJKO\VLJQLILFDQWGLIIHUHQFHLQFRQQRWDWLRQEHWZHHQ³JRRG´RQWKHRQHVLGHDQG ³YDOXH´DQG³ZRUWK´RQWhe other, and the absolute sense, strictly pertaining only WR³JRRG´KDVEHHQLPSOLFLWO\LPSRUWHGLQWR³YDOXH´DQG³ZRUWK´ZLWKWKHFRnsequence that spurious reasoning has passed undetected. 6. I. Kant, Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten, Erster Abschnitt, BA 1; tr. Lewis White Beck, Foundations of the Metaphysics of Morals, (New York: The Bobbs-Merrill Company, Inc., 1959), p. 9. 7. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good (Oxford: At the Clarendon Press, 1930), p. 140. 8. Cf. Letters to De Volder, 24 March 1699, 23 June 1699, April 1702, resp. pp. 516, 519, 527 in L.E. Loemker, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz: Philosophical Papers and Letters (Dordrecht-Holland: D. Reidel Publishing Company, 1969), and in G.W. Leibniz: Philosophische Schriften, ed. C.I. Gerhardt, 7 vols. (Berlin and Halle, 1849±55), 2: 169, 193, 241. 9. Descartes, Principles of Philosophy, Pt. 1, Princ. 51; E. Haldane and G.R.T. Ross, 2 Vols. (Cambridge: University Press, 1911), I: 239; Adam and Tannery, 8: 24. 10. I have dealt with this interrelatHGQHVVFRQVWLWXWLQJD³VRFLHW\´LQP\SDSHUV³7KH

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0HWDSK\VLFVRI6RFLDO5HODWLRQV´DQG³&RPPXQLW\WKH6WDWHDQGWKH1DWLRQDO 6RFLHW\´ FRQWULEXWHG WR PHHWLQJV RI WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO 6RFLHW\ IRU 0HWDSK\VLFV (1980 and 1981), publication forthcoming in the Proceedings of the Society. 11. W.D. Ross, The Right and the Good, p. 122. )RUDIXOOHUWUHDWPHQWVHHP\³0DWWHU$FWLRQDQG3K\VLFDO%HLQJ´LQInternational Philosophical Quarterly (March 1981). 13. See my The Nature of Physical Existence (London: Allen and Unwin; New York: Humanities Press, 1972), pp. 276±83. 14. Aristotle, Nichomachean EthicsDIJਕȖĮࢡȠȞȠ੤ʌȐȞIJૃਕijȚİIJĮȚ 15. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1217b8±1218a38. 16. Ibid., 1218a39±b2. 17. Ibid., 1218a39±b7. 18. Ibid., 1218b8±27. 19. Nicolai Hartmann, Ethics, tr. Stanton Coit, 3 vols. (London: Allen & Unwin; New York: Humanities Press, 1932). 20. Plato Republic, 509B (my tr.). 21. Ibid., 509B. 22. Ibid., 505A (my tr.). 23. Cf. e.g., W.C.K. Guthrie, A History of Greek Philosophy (Cambridge: University Press, 1975) 5: 503±504. 24. Plato Republic, 509B: Ƞ੝țȠ੝ıȓĮȢ੕ȞIJȠȢIJȠ૨ਕȖĮࢡȠ૨ਕȜȜµ਩IJȚਥʌȑțİȚȞĮIJોȢȠ੝ıȓĮȢ ʌȡİıȕİȓĮțĮ੿įȣȞਕȝİȚਫ਼ʌİȡȑȤȠȞIJȠȢ 25. Plato Timaeus, 29E. 26. Plotinus Enneads 6. 9. 6. 27. Ibid. 28. This is why Plato, in the TimaeusLQKLVDFFRXQWRI³WKH*RGVDQGWKHJHQHUDWLRQ RIWKHDOO´& KDGUHFRXUVHWRP\WK$ULVWRWOHVDZWKDWWKHਙȡȤĮȚWKHSULQFiples, of things in becoming, viz., matter and the Forms, cannot be understood in terms of the categories. 29. Aristotle Metaphysics, 1029a 20±22. 30. Aristotle Physics, 191a 9±11. 31. The supposition that it is, is the basic fallacy of the subjectivist theory of good. 32. Cf. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1094a 19±23. 33. Aristotle, Nichomachean Ethics, 1094a 3. 34. Aristotle, Eudemian Ethics, 1218b 10. 35. See section VI. 36. Cf. Nichomachean Ethics, 1094a 22. 37. Aristotle MetaphysicsE਩ıIJ૕ȞਲȞȩȘıȚȢȞȠȒıİȦȢȞȩȘıȚȢ7U5RVV 38. Met., 1072b 28±ਥȞȑȡȖȚĮį੻ਲțĮࢡૃĮਫ਼IJ੽ȞਥțİȓȦȠȣȗȦȘਕȡȓıIJȘțĮȧĮȚįȚȠȢ 39. Met., 1072b 29±IJ੒ȞࢡİઁȞİȚȞĮȚȗ૵ȠȞਕȚįȚȠȞਙȡȚıIJȠȞ 40. Whitehead, I think, had a grasp of this in his doctrine of GoGDVWKH³SULQFLSOHRI FRQFUHWLRQ´ KDYLQJ D ³SULPRUGLDO YDOXDWLRQ RI SXUH SRWHQWLDOV >ZKHUHE\@ HDFK HWHUQDO REMHFW KDV D GHILQLWH HIIHFWLYH UHOHYDQFH WR HDFK FRQFUHVFHQW SURFHVV´ (Process and Reality, part 2, chapter 1, section 1).

George Allan Dickinson College

AUTOBIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH I was born on the first morning of 1935, a bleak wintry day on the windswept plains of North Dakota in the midst of the Great Depression. I learned as I grew up there that good things are born or made only with difficulty and that even the best of them perish all too soon. My family found no fault with this way of the world, celebrating the good things when they came and when they were gone rejoicing that once, uniquely and fortunately, they had been. At Grinnell College, my teacher Henry Nelson Wieman introduced me to :KLWHKHDG¶V WKRXJKW 7KH NH\ WR WKH SURFHVV SKLORVRSK\ , GLVFRYHUHG UHVRQDWLQJ with my childhood intuitions and thereafter guiding my rational imagination, was its insistence on the radical temporality of all things. My graduate study with Daniel Day Williams at Union Theological Seminary and with Bob Brumbaugh and John Smith at Yale University allowed me to develop this insight. Then teaching for over thirty years at Dickinson College, serving twenty of them as academic dean, has rubbed my nose constantly in the practicalities of life and learning, the difficulty and ephemeral nature of thinking insightfully and accomplishing something worthwhile. I am convinced that too many process thinkers and Whiteheadian interpreters, and often Whitehead himself, undermine the intuition that all things come to be and perish by claims about the importance of eternal or everlasting realities or about the necessity of timeless metaphysical principles needed to ground time-bound actualities and even time itself. My presidential address defends the opposing hypothesis: all things are finite achievements, created as a result of creative acts effected in contingent situations, and are therefore precious because fragile, always at risk, always in need of reformulation, and always eventually lost. I have published three books on the ontological foundation of social values that exemplify my kind of process thinking. They explore the idea that social values lie in the massive stability of previously successful accomplishments (The Importances of the Past), that they are found in the identification of possibilities by which a given situation can be transformed into a better one (The Realizations of the Future), and that they are functions of hierarchically organized structures that foster adaptive change while preserving what is fundamental (The Patterns of the Present). In each case, my argument eventually pushes beyond the constraints of temporal contingencies in an appeal to claims about timeless realities, and there it flounders. A fourth book, still in the making, reconciles these different approaches by rescuing them from the siren song of the timeless, rooting them instead in North Dakota realities. George Allan 2012

Eighteen PERISHABLE GOODS George Allan Delivered at the fifty-first annual meeting of the Metaphysical Society of America, Dickinson College, 17±19 March 2000. An obvious feature of our experience is the constant perishing of what we value. Persons we love, objects we treasure, ideals we revere, desires that enthrall us, groups to which we pledge allegiance, projects in which we are engaged, systems that command our respect, accomplishments before which we stand in awe, memories we cherish, hopes to which we cling²they all are eventually lost to us. They abate, explode, crumble, die, erode, fade; they are deformed, eviscerated, torn apart, vanquished, made to disappear. They gang always, not merely aft, a-gley. The perishing may be cataclysmic or gradual, the devastation wreaked by hurricane-force winds and pandemic plagues or the unnoticed pressures by which tectonic plates shift and species adapt. So pervasive are these perishings that folk wisdom assigns as deepest truth the observation that of anything it caQEHVDLG³WKLVWRRVKDOOSDVVDZD\´ The mood of our response to the perishing of these goods is usually somber, of course: sorrow at the loss, anger that it should have happened, despair over our ensuing loneliness, eventual acceptance of the inevitability. But our mood can also be one of relief, expectation, excitement, for often it is good that goods perish since their perishing is instrumental to the arising of new and better goods. We harvest the corn and slaughter the hogs that we might eat; our boss accepts another job and we hope her successor will be quick to improve our working conditions; we vote to replace competent but tiring incumbents with bright-eyed reformist neophytes. My argument in this essay is that the perishing of what is good is not merely sometimes instrumentally good, sometimes instrumentally bad. It is DOVRDOZD\VDQLQWULQVLFJRRG7KHQHFHVVDU\FRQGLWLRQVRIDEHLQJ¶VLQKHUHQW worth are necessary conditions of its vulnerability. To be good is to be fragile and to be fragile is to endure but for a time. I Let me begin by reflecting on we human beings, that glory among the perishable goods, and on warfare, that foremost of the cultural calamities that hasten our perishing. The use of physical force by persons against other

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persons takes many forms but is stridently manifest in times of war. Members of one group slaughter those from another in order to eliminate that group and DOO IRU ZKLFK LW VWDQGV 7KH UHG KRUVHPDQ OHDGV RXU HQHP\¶V DWWDFN FORVHO\ followed by the white horse of pestilence and the black of famine, the three preparing the way for the pale rider who brings our death. Or we ride the red horse ourselves, intent on preserving or furthering our good by destroying not RQO\ RWKHUV¶ JRRGV EXW WKHPVHOYHV DV ZHOO IRUFLQJ Rut of existence the precious good they are intrinsically. My aim is not simply to deplore these calamities, although of course I do, but to explain them. I will use the intentional destruction of persons for nonpersonal reasons, for reasons of state or ideology or ethnicity, as a window on the ontological structure of the good. I will take the killing fields of war as a synecdoche for the perishing of goods of all sorts. My hope is thereby to accomplish two things. First, to make it clear why goods are good because they perish and, second, why we are therefore too often led to hasten their perishing. I will be helped in my explorations by arguments Simone Weil makes in a slim monograph on violence that she published during the darkest days of the Second World War.1 For Western civilization, the exemplary account of war and its destruction of persons is found in the Iliad.2 Sometimes the Trojans ride the red horse, sometimes the Greeks: As when a lion, murderous, springs among the cattle Which by thousands are grazing over some vast marshy field . . . And their flanks heave with terror, even so the Achaians Scattered in panic before Hector and Zeus, the great father. As for them²they fled across the plain like cattle Whom a lion hunts before him in the dark midnight . . . Thus the mighty Agamemnon, son of Atreus, pursued them, Steadily killing the hindmost; and still they fled. In each case, the heroes fall upon their enemies like ravenous beasts, slaughtering them at will. They the lion, their enemy the defenseless cattle, lambs to the slaughter. +RPHU¶V WURSH FDSWXUHV YLYLGO\ WKH JORULILFDWLRQ RI YLROHQFH DJDLQVW things and persons. We victors, brave warriors all, both find delight and fulfill our duty by unmaking what is not of our making. Someone else¶VFUHDWLRQVRU QDWXUH¶VRUHYHQ*RG¶V ZHWUDPPHOXQGHUIRRWSLOODJLQJWKHFLW\NLOOLQJWKH men, raping the women, enslaving the children, sowing the fields with salt. Or more benignly, we merely dominate, manipulate, utilize: we subjugate without enslaving, abuse without raping, emasculate without killing. In every case, we devalue the value of objects, organisms, or persons to a level sufficient to justify our control over them. First we debase their perceived worth

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in order then to debase their actual worth. Taking these other beings as less valuable than ourselves, we treat them accordingly. Inverting the Kantian logic, we argue that can implies ought. We have destroyed them because we could. 6LPRQH:HLOGHILQHVIRUFHDJDLQVWSHUVRQVDV³WKDW[WKDWWurns anybody who is subjected to it into a thing´3 The extreme expression of force is when a person is turned into a corpse, a thing no longer of any value, to be dragged EHKLQGRQH¶VFKDULRWDVDWURSK\DQGWKHQGLVFDUGHG . . .the horses Rattled the empty chariots through the files of battle, Longing for their noble drivers. But the on the ground Lay, dearer to the vultures than to their wives. The force need not be so extreme, however. Persons who are subjugated to DQRWKHU¶V SRZHU DUH DOVR PDGH Whereby into things. Slaves may be of more worth than corpses, but they are not therefore deserving respect or consideration. The master, the one who has and exercises the devaluing force, is for those who are mastered by it an external necessity²cold, hard, pitiless, not in any way to be expiated but only to be endured: But whenever he came upon a commoner shouting out, He struck him with his scepter and spoke sharply: ³*RRGIRUQRWKLQJ%HVWLOODQGOLVWHQWR\RXUEHWWHUV You are weak and cowardly and unwarlike, LV@EXWD brief joy to Achilles, and the death of Achilles but a brief joy to the Trojans, DQGWKHGHVWUXFWLRQRI7UR\EXWDEULHIMR\WRWKH$FKDHDQV´ 14 The aim of the Iliad is not to glorify war nor to vindicate the Greeks, but to show us²as all great literature should²our common human condition. Weil argues that we acknowledge the limits of power and knowledge by using them moderately. We should seek to secure our knowledge by means of rigorous arguments from sound premises and established fact, but it is a virtue to know that we do not know for sure how rigorous or sound they actually are. Recognizing that what we know is tentative and incomplete, we have reason to respect what our opponents say even when it seems obvious to everyone that we have the better case, as also we have reason to recognize the worth of our inquiry even when we have lost our way in it or others have

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exposed its incoherence or its false presumptions. Similarly, it is a virtue to show mercy when our strength is at its apogee and to find dignity even in our moments of abject weakness. It is good to recognize that goods perish. We have justification neither to boast of the goods we possess nor to despair their passing as though we had a right to them, as though we came by these goods because we were ourselves good or lost hold of them because we were unworthy. WeiO FDOOV WKLV WKH ³JHRPHWU\´ RI YLUWXH WKH QXUWXULQJ RI WKH ³VSLULWXDO IRUFH´ UHTXLUHG WR ³DYRLG VHOI-GHFHSWLRQ´ WR H[SUHVV LQ DOO RXU DFWV ³WKH JUHDWHVWOXFLGLW\SXULW\DQGVLPSOLFLW\´15 We are virtuous insofar as we seek to be lucid, to recognize that suffering and failure are inescapable, that DQRWKHU¶V IRUFH RU VRPH QDWXUDO IRUFH ZLOO GHVWUR\ HYHQ our most cherished WKLQJV WKDW QR RQH LV ³H[HPSW IURP WKH PLVHU\ WKDW LV WKH FRPPRQ KXPDQ ORW´16 We are virtuous insofar as the motives for our actions are pure, insofar as we have learned not to admire force, not to side with it against the weak and the unfortunate. These virtues of lucidity and purity, Well says, rest upon a third, simplicity: finding joy in the perishable goods of this world, caring for them because they are the highest goods. We act in simplicity insofar as we do not expect to be more than merely human, insofar as we count ourselves among the goods, these highest goods, that are so precious because so perishable. Weil argues that the Iliad LVXQLTXHDPRQJDFFRXQWVRIZDU³IRUWKHQRWH of incurable bitterness that continually makes itseOIKHDUG´LQWKHSRHP¶VHSLF YHUVHVD³ELWWHUQHVVWKDWSURFHHGVIURPWHQGHUQHVVDQGWKHQVSUHDGVRYHUWKH ZKROHKXPDQUDFHLPSDUWLDODVVXQOLJKW´17 The bitterness, however, is not a lament over the deaths of heroes or the failure of their war aims. It is an evocation of the contrast between the destruction violence wreaks and the intrinsic good of what it destroys. In the Iliad³QRWKLQJSUHFLRXVLVVFRUQHG ZKHWKHU RU QRW GHDWK LV LWV GHVWLQ\ HYHU\RQH¶V XQKDSSLQHVV LV ODLG EDUH without dissimulation or disdain; no man is set above or below the condition FRPPRQWRDOOPHQZKDWHYHULVGHVWUR\HGLVUHJUHWWHG´18 This celebration of the good in what perishes, a good found not simply in objects and individuals and communities but in the way of life that contextualizes them, is wonderfully evoked, for example, by this glimpse of the fountains nearby the gates of Troy, as Hector flees past them unarmed, wrathful Achilles approaching fast behind: Close by there stood the great stone tanks, Handsomely built, where silk-gleaming garments :HUHZDVKHGFOHDQE\7UR\¶VORYHO\GDXJKWHUVDQGKRXVHZLYHV In the old days of peace, long ago, when the Greeks had not come. Past them did they run their race, pursued and pursuer. The moral ground for human being lies in its vulnerable, perishable character. Our fragility is inherent in the complexity of our biological nature, our cultural heritage, and our self-identity, all of them features of contingent

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accomplishments. We are the beings we are because of the evolution of organisms interacting in natural environments, because of the history of bipedal primates interacting in natural and cultural environments, and because of the development of personality and character through the interactions of the natural, cultural, and individual environments we experience, remember, and expect. Thus the intrinsic goodness of human being is a function of things made, lost, and made again, achievements unique, unnecessary, and at risk. Our proper response to this recognition of the moral ground of our common humanity, according to Weil, should be acts of love and justice. We should nurture these precious human goods and affirm our solidarity with them. Love and justice are thus the actions entailed by lucidity, purity, and simplicity. Lucidity is the recognition of our shared vulnerability to loss, SXULW\ WKH LQVLVWHQFH WKDW WKHUHIRUH QR SHUVRQ¶V QHHGV DUH SUHHPSWLYH RU irrelevant, simplicity the willing embrace of the actions thereby made appropriate. In keeping with the moral geometry of these thoughts, the issue is not whether we can succeed in attaining lucidity, purity, and simplicity, whether we can succeed in loving other persons and treating them justly, but that we aspire to do so. Our aim should be to shelter and comfort the weak by our power rather than to use that power indifferent to its consequences for others. Our aim should be to use what we know to explore cautiously what we find baffling rather than to dismiss it as irrational or irrelevant. In having such a moral aim, we must recognize that our efforts will inevitably fail, that our strength will not be enough to protect the weak nor our knowledge sufficient to plumb the mysteries of reality. But we should be encouraged in our efforts by the sense of the rightness of these endeavors, their metaphysical grounding in a good that can be found only in what such failed efforts²in their very failing²have managed to make and are still making. VI Before closing, I must confess that I may have gone too far in what I have argued. I have associated knowledge and power in order to defame the claims of the former by attacking those of the later. Deploring the consequences of imagining that we possess absolute power or at least that we are favored by whatever is or has absolute power, I have also deplored the belief that we can have absolute knowledge or know that our limited truths are linked to such an absolute. I have claimed not only that an orientation toward transcendent goods, toward absolute powers and absolute truths, undercuts the importance of perishable goods, of transient actions and limited understandings. I have claimed as well that there are no such things as absolute powers and truths, that rather all things are products of processes, particular works worked up out of contingent materials in some specific manner. These claims are based

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RLO P\ UHDGLQJ RI :KLWHKHDG¶V RQWRORJLFDO SULQFLSOH WKDW WR EH LV WR EH DQ actuality or a feature of an actuality.19 \RXILOOLQWKHEODQN@WREH"´&KDVLQJDIWHU ideal essences has not detected any lasting findings. Linguistic analysis in either the Anglo-American or the Continental traditions appears to have run out of steam. So far pragmatism has been unable to distinguish consequences that hold steady as the winds of change shift. Nevertheless, we do retain certain powers. The first is the continuing generosity of the good which even today does not withhold its power to gather into a unity the real and the intelligible. And in the end we also have the power of the art of composition. I conFOXGHE\TXRWLQJ:KLWHKHDG³DSDUW IURP FRPSRVLWLRQ WKHUH LV QR PHDQLQJ WKDW LV WR VD\ WKHUH LV QRWKLQJ´ 22 Composition requires integration. Recent years have witnessed a remarkable JURZWKLQWKHXVHRIZKDWLVFDOOHG³PLQGIXOQHVV´LQSV\FKRWKHUDS\7Ke term, of course, is taken from the Buddha (and often rather shamelessly without attribution). This is no great concern. I am sure the Buddha does not mind that we are becoming more mindful about mindfulness. This mindfulness is not at all like the dichotomy introduced by the Cartesian separation of the human mind from the human body. What is involved is the integration of mind and body. Mindfulness is an action that is utterly different from representational thinking. When practiced well, body is saturated with mind, and mind is DEVRUEHGWKURXJKRXWERG\0LQGIXOQHVVLVWKHOLYLQJRXWRI3ODWR¶VHURVLQLWV drive toward the good. It is immediately evident that there are countless connections here between Western and Asian disciplines such as yoga, tai chi, and any human activity that requires agile skills. A concrete way is opened for real somatic

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JOSEPH GRANGE

ZRUN LQ FRPSDUDWLYH SKLORVRSK\ , WKLQN RI 3ODWR¶V J\PQDVWLF FXUULFXOXP , WKLQNRI$ULVWRWOH¶VGHWDLOHGLQVWUXFWLRQRQKRZWRKLWWKHPHDQLQRUGHUWROLYH a gooGOLIH,WKLQNRI:DQJ